T20 Policy Brief

INDIA 2023

Task Force 4
Refuelling Growth: Clean Energy
and Green Transitions

Securing Critical
Minerals Supply Chainsfor the Clean Energy
Transition
May 2023
Tom Moerenhout, Professor, Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy
Pranati Chestha Kohli, Research Assistant, Columbia University Center on Global
Energy Policy
Siddharth Goel, Senior Policy Advisor, International Institute for Sustainable
Development
Saon Ray, Visiting Professor, Indian Council for Research on International Economic
RelationsNandakumar Janardhanan, Research Manager Climate and Energy, Institute for Global
Environmental Strategies
Simon Hoiberg Olsen, Senior Policy Researcher, Institute for Global Environmental
Strategies

AbstractT

heInternational

AgencyEnergyestimates

associated with upstream mining, sothat

additional types of capital provision are

to hit net-zero globallyneeded. It will assess several modes ofby 2050, six times more

blended finance, in which development

critical minerals will be required infinance is used to unlock commercial

2040 than today.1 The rapid increasefinance, with the fundamental objective

in demand for critical minerals is likely

of derisking mining investment andto increase price volatility. This could

improving access to critical minerals for

aggravate energy security concerns,

emerging economies.

and thereby delay the necessary clean
energytransition.

The brief builds on the Global Blended
Finance

Alliance

launched

attheThese vulnerabilities are amplified inprevious G20 summit in Indonesia

emerging

they

to assess different types of capitallack access to capital to secure criticalprovision, with a focus on environmental,

minerals. It is essential for G20 countries

social, and governance frameworks. It

to collaborate to lower the cost of capital

examines how G20 cooperation, withacross the critical minerals value chain—

the support of international financial

production, processing, and recycling—

institutions, might be able to maximise

as well as to develop and adopt

capital availability for critical mineralsustainability criteria to ensure that clean

supply. The authors urge the G20 toenergy supply chains are both resilientconsider creating a critical minerals

and sustainable.

supply chains working group, consider

economies

becauseG20 enabled financing, coordinate theThis policy brief provides an overview

formation of standards and investmentof frameworks for investment in criticalfacilitation, and coordinate emerging

minerals production and explores ways

economyto deepen access to supply chainsmineral alliances.

participationincriticalby lowering the cost of capital. Banksand investors are deterred by the risks

ABSTRACT

3

The Challenge1Critical mineral supply gaps

minerals’ ownership and processing in

The International Energy Agency (IEA)2

certain areas, long project development

estimates that to hit net-zero globally bytimes,

2050, six times more critical minerals

trade, and exposure to climate risks. For

will be required in 2040 than today. The

example, more than half of the world’s

rapid increase in demand for criticallithium production is located in areas

minerals, coupled with inadequate

with high water stress.7 Upstream,

investment is likely to cause a supply-

the development of new mines takes

demand deficit that will contribute to

16 years on average, from discovery

greater price volatility. The International

to

Monetary Fund argues that the supply

exploration, and feasibility phase (whichof critical minerals is inelastic in the

includes permitting) taking more thanshort term and that lithium, cobalt,

12 years.8 Currently, energy transition

nickel, and copper prices could reachmodels do not factor in critical mineralhigh peaks over a prolonged period

supplyof time under a net-zero scenario.3

assessment of how a lack of supply

According to Bloomberg New Energy

could slow down technology adoption.9

underdeveloped

production,

withconstraints

international

the

in

a

discovery,bottom-up

Finance, the supply of metals used incountry risk towards mining, and theInvestment challenges tosecuring sustainable criticalmineral supply chainsdecreasing quantity of reserves.4 Even

Critical mineral supply chains require

without net-zero scenarios, demandsignificant up-front capital for the

could outstrip supply, especially for

upstreamcopper5 and lithium.6

andthe energy transition is constrained
due to a lack of investment, increasing

production,

eventual

recyclingprocessing,of

criticalminerals. This up-front capital is alsoThis could aggravate energy security

needed to ensure that critical minerals

concerns and make the clean energy

are processed according to soundtransition unaffordable for developing

environmental and social standards,

and emerging economies, as well as

which virtually all policymakers, supply

unattainable globally. Diversified supply

chain

chains for critical minerals are needed

recognise as a necessity.

participants,

andinvestors

to overcome bottlenecks, such as thehighgeographicalconcentrationof

THE CHALLENGE

5

Thesevulnerabilities

amplifiedinarecriticalespeciallymineral-richstate to capture more economic rents.
Banks

and

these

investors
various

are

risks

deterreddeveloping and emerging economies,byand other countries that seek to capitalise

with upstream mining, making otheron the need for midstream or recycling

energy transition projects with higher

processes. This is because accessrisk-adjusted returns more attractive.

to capital and technology is tougher

Additionally, mining companies do nothere compared to many higher-income

yet see reliable market structures (foreconomies. Globally, it is estimatedinstance,that the required investment in four key

and price, about the market size ofminerals (copper, lithium, nickel, andcertaincobalt) to achieve net-zero by 2050 is

pricing instruments that are in the early

between US$360 billion and US$450

stagesbillion.10 Currently, however, 55 percent

facilitateof that needed investment remains

social, and governance (ESG) criteria

absent, with only 45 percent announced.11

also

uncertainty

smallerofabout

metals,development)

investment.

remainassociatedofftake

and

about

that

can

Environmental,

inconsistent,

furtherdiscouraging investment.
A

combinationoffactors

lowersinvestment attractiveness in criticalAt the same time, developing andminerals. The higher cost of capital due

emerging economies are additionallyto rising interest rates to combat inflation

vulnerable

is presently posing a formidable hurdle

developmental

for project developers. Many countries,

energy transition. When they are unableespecially developing and emerging

to source critical minerals, they are at

economies, are dealing with high debt

risk of losing market share in emerging

levels and have low fiscal space toelectric vehicle supply chains.

support new sectors. In addition, certain
countries might seek to nationaliseindustries or increase the role of the

6

THE CHALLENGE

becauseof

implications

the
of

the

The G20’s Role2

G20’s role in reducing risk in
critical minerals investment

The G20 countries are also the main

The G20 countries are major producers

first stage of processing or further(see

criticalstages such as cathode and anodeminerals, which warrants coordination

manufacturing. China processes 40

across the G20 to improve the security

percent of the world’s copper, 35

Tables

1

and

2)

of

consumers of critical minerals, at theof supply and accelerate the global
energy transition.

Table 1: G20 countries’ share of global production of criticalminerals (2023, in %)Lithium

CobaltNickel Copper Manganese

Rare
Graphite
Earth

3.11

4.85

16.50

6.00

2.00

0.03

Argentina

4.77

Australia

46.92

Brazil

1.69

Canada

0.38

2.05

3.94

1.19

China

14.62

1.16

3.33

42.31

1.46

2.52

6.69
1.15

4.95

70.00

65.38

FranceGermany

2.38

India

0.02
2.40

Indonesia

5.26

48.48

0.97

0.64

1.15

Italy
Japan

6.15

South Korea

2.54

1.31

Mexico0.00

Russia

4.68

6.67

4.23

0.87

1.15

Saudi Arabia
South Africa
Turkey

1.42

0.22

UK
US

0.42

0.55

3.85

6.32

14.64

44.96

14.33

EuropeanUnion
G20 Total

68.38

23.45

Source: Compiled by authors based on USGS 2023 Mineral Commodity Surveys12

8

THE G20’S ROLE

76.03 73.23

percent of nickel, 65 percent of cobalt,

15 percent of cobalt; and Argentina

58 percent of lithium, and 87 percent ofprocesses 10 percent of lithium.13

rare earths; Japan processes 6 percentof copper and 8 percent of nickel;

Some risk factors in certain mineral-

Indonesia processes 15 percent ofrichnickel; EU countries process more thansuch as expropriation risk and politicalemerging

economies

remain,Table 2: G20 countries’ share of global reserves of critical minerals(2023, in %)Lithium

CobaltNickelCopperManganese

Rare
Earth

18.07

21.00

10.90

15.88

3.23

15.88

16.15

Argentina

10.38

Australia

23.85

Brazil0.96

Canada

3.58

2.65

2.20

0.85

China

7.69

1.69

2.10

3.03

16.00

Graphite

22.42

0.64
16.47

33.85

15.76

2.00

5.31

2.42

FranceGermany
India
Indonesia

7.23

21.00

2.70

Italy
Japan
South Korea

0.55

MexicoRussia

3.01

7.50

6.97

16.15

4.24

Saudi Arabia
South Africa
Turkey

0.43

27.27

UK
US

3.85

0.83

0.37

4.94

50.31

33.92

70.17

29.39

1.77

EuropeanUnion
G20 Total

50.24

77.10

72.67

Source: Compiled by authors based on USGS 2023 Mineral Commodity Surveys14

THE G20’S ROLE

9

instability. However, the G20 can playgaps and derisk projects. Specifically,

a positive role with respect to the highthe G20 should cooperate to develop

cost of capital and high perceived

and experiment with blended financeinvestment and credit risk in critical

instruments that can lower the costmineral supply chains. As with manyof capital across the critical minerals

other energy transition investments invalue

chain.

emerging economies, developers andprojects within critical mineral supply

Energy transition financeinstruments less suited formining and processing

chains, in part because many critical

The need for the G20 to explore

minerals are ‘by-products’ of minerals

new financial instruments and riskthat are consumed in larger quantities,

mitigationsuch as copper or nickel. Essentially,guarantees and first-loss tranches,

the G20 can leverage its resources tois especially needed given that othercontribute to two main pillars that caninnovative financing tools appear lessimprove critical mineral supply chains,

suitable for critical mineral supply

namely investment and sustainability.

chains. Instruments like green bonds

financiers believe there is insufficient
risk capital and a lack of bankable

tools,

such

ascreditare less applicable since they are moreOn the one hand, there is a need foroften used to finance the installation of

bettercreditinfrastructure that directly contributes

risk

to the reduction of carbon emissions.

thinkingenhancements

political

insurance

products.

Inaddition,

It would be much more difficult to use

technical

assistancewith

respect

such bonds for upstream mining or

to mining project preparation andprocessing because of several factors:

regulatory

10

and

about

frameworks

is

also

necessary. On the other hand, the G20

1. The issuance of green or othercountries and their capital markets canthematic bonds for mining projects

also contribute to mechanisms that

may face scepticism from investors

improve the availability of catalytic

who might question the credibility

capital. Catalytic capital refers toand impact of these instruments in a

investments that can take on more

sector known for its potential negative

significant risks and can fill financing

externalities.

THE G20’S ROLE

Investors

interested

in green bonds are often focusedand the private sector. In the context

on supporting projects with a directof

positive environmental impact.

projects in emerging and developing

big,

capital-intensiveminingeconomies, catalytic capital is crucial
2. Green bonds usually adhere tofor several reasons besides helping

specific standards or guidelines,

counter the political, environmental,

such as the Green Bond Principles

and social risks:or the Climate Bonds Standard.
Thesestandards

requirethe

1. High upfront costs: Mining projects

financed projects to demonstraterequire significant investments inpositive environmental or social

infrastructure,

impacts. It might be difficult for

exploration

mining projects to prove that therevenues.

equipment,
beforeandgenerating

mined minerals are actually used
for low-carbon environmental andsocially sound purposes.

2. Long-term nature of investments:
Mining projects incur long lead times
between an investment decision

3. Some jurisdictions may have legal

andproduction.

Thisextendedor regulatory constraints that limit

timeline can deter investors looking

the issuance of green bonds forfor shorter-term gains.

specific industries, including mining.
These constraints may arise from

3. Limited access to capital markets:concerns related to environmental

Companies operating in emerging

protection,and developing economies oftensocialsustainability

impacts,orobjectives.

face challenges in accessing capital
due to the lack of developed financial

Blended finance as catalytic
capital in critical mineral
supply chains

4. Higher risk profile: Given the highBlended finance combines financial

upfront costs and long tenure,capitalinvestors,

mining projects present uncertainty

institutions,in the form of completion risk,

philanthropic organisations, governments,

market risk, and supply risk, amongfromdevelopment

impactfinancemarkets and institutional support.

THE G20’S ROLE

11

others. Catalytic capital can help

high upfront capital costs of mining

with derisking such projects.

projects. Follow-on funding canalso be available depending on theOver the last decade, blended financeperformance of the project.

has provided over US$181 billion for thefinancing of projects, a majority of which

2. Concessional capital: To derisk highwere climate-oriented transactions.15 In

capex projects and ensure a greater

recent years, there has also been a shift

return for equity investors, providing

away from large, utility-scale renewable

upfront capital at a concessionalenergy assets since they are now able

rate is a potential solution. A

to garner financing from institutional

study conducted by IFC noted

lenders and mainstream lenders. Given

that blended finance instruments

the changing nature of climate-oriented

had leveraged US$ 1 to US$4 ofprojects with more energy technologies

commercial capital for every dollar

yielding higher returns and becomingof concessional capital.17

investment friendly, there is a need toevaluate new emerging sectors wheremore risk-bearing capital is relevant.

3. Project

financing:

Blendedcapital that aims to utilise thecreditworthiness of certain entities

Because of drawbacks in instruments

tosuch as thematic bonds, there is a needprojects has been used with great

for more blended finance instruments.

success in the past.

While there are five broad vehicles
for blended finance,16 some are more
relevant for mining than others:

1. Blended funds: These could be
limited liability debt facilities orprovide private equity funding. Sucha structure will allow investors to
mitigate risks associated with the

12

THE G20’S ROLE

financehigh-risk,

low-returnRecommendations
to the G20

3
THE G20’S ROLE

13

T

he

G20

Indonesianlaunched

under

the

finance instruments and setups havepresidency

worked in the past and how they canthe

Globalbe adapted to critical mineral value

Blended Finance Alliancechains, where projects are often(GBFA) in 2022. The initiative is new, withof a multi-decade duration. This

the G20 Development Working Groupshould then feed into the G20 Global

also agreeing on the G20 Principles toInfrastructure Hub (GI Hub), specifically

Scale up Blended Finance in 2022. This

its action area 3.1 on how to best

has put blended finance on the map,leverage private sector participationand it was discussed again at the firstto scale up sustainable infrastructure

meeting of the Sustainable Financeinvestment.19

Working Group held in Guwahati in

To deploy blended finance, there is a

February 2023.18 The G20 can align theneed to establish forecasts of expected

need for critical minerals financing with

infrastructure investments in mineral-

the GBFA.

rich countries as well as forecasts ofanticipated demand for low-volume

14

A G20 critical minerals
supply chains working group

critical minerals, which remain important

Similar to the G20 Energy Transitions

The G20 should immediately mobilise

Working Group, the Critical Minerals

resources for this. The G20 group should

Supply Chains Working Group should

also set up an institutional body likefocus on promoting sustainable supply

the GI Hub or the Green Finance Study

chains, facilitating investment, andGroup to evaluate existing models of

improving ESG performance in theseblended finance and see what type of

supply chains. This group shouldmodels can be useful for investment

then be aligned with, and feed into

in critical minerals. Similar to the G20

the work of existing groups such as

Compendium on Promoting Investment

the Trade and Investment Group, theforInfrastructure Working Group in the

G20 group should request members

finance track, and the Energy Transition

countries to share their policy practices

Working Group. The G20 should help

on promoting investment in criticalinvestigate what policies and blended

mineral supply chains.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE G20

sources of uncertainty for investors.

Sustainable

Development,theG20-enabled financing

China’s development finance projects21

The G20 should work with agencies

shows that between 2000 and 2017, it

such as the Multilateral Investment

financed 690 mining-related projects,

Guarantee Agency to provide additionalof which 69 went directly in the mining

downside risk coverage in the form ofsector. Asia (253) and Africa (186) werepolitical risk insurance for borrowers

the top beneficiaries, having received

or developers. There is also scopefinance for project development andfor providing support to emerging

construction,

economies

trade

mineral exploration, and joint mineralagreements for raw critical minerals as

research and testing labs. China’s Eximm​​ining and refining supply chains are

Bank issued the most loans, a total ofbeing set up. For example, the EU is203, followed by China Development

planning on using the Global GatewayaBank.

to assist partner countries in setting up

countries have also used development

their own extraction and processing

finance for mining-related activities. For

industries20.

also

example, in 2020, the US Development

approach the New Development Bank

Finance Corporation approved a US$25

in addition to the World Bank to raise

million investment in TechMet Limited

finance for critical minerals projects.

to boost the production of nickel andthroughThebilateral

G20

shouldgeologicalBesides

China,

surveys,

other

G20

cobalt in Piaui, Brazil.22
One core strength of the G20 is incoordinatingthedevelopment

work

banks

of

national

Finally, the G20 group of countries

forequityhas a history of extending technicalinvestments in projects that will enableassistancecriticalprocessing,

economies. Technical assistance isor recycling. China by far has theparticularly relevant for critical mineralmost experience in financing mining-mining. The Global Green FinancerelatedLeadershipamineralmining,activities.

An

analysisoffunding

Programbtoemerging

recommended

The Global Gateway is a European strategy to, among others, boost secure links in energy and transport
sectors by also facilitating major investments in infrastructure development across the world.

b

These suggestions were made at the G20 Workshop for scaling-up sustainable finance. For more, see:
G20 Sustainable Finance Working Group, 2022 Sustainable Finance Report (G20, 2022),https://g20sfwg.
org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/2022-G20-Sustainable-Finance-Report-2.pdf.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE G20

15

that

the

G20

Sustainable

Financeaccelerate production. The sanctity

Working Groupc facilitate the creationof contracts is easier to uphold whenof a network to coordinate various

local

capacity-building programs in emerging

peoples are involved since they will

markets and developing economies,

be able to hold both incumbents andwith the help of multilateral development

new policymakers to account. It also

banks

non-governmental

reduces risk since social involvement

organisations, research bodies, andhelps accelerate permitting processes

thinkshouldbecausepolitical

address the issues relevant to the G20

Similarly,

improvingsustainable finance roadmap, including

standards will facilitate permitting.

(MDB),

tanks.

The

network

communities

and

risk

indigenous

isreduced.

environmental

approaches for identifying sustainable
investments and activities, taxonomies

The G20 should also consider adoptingor

guidinglabels,sustainability

disclosuresprinciples
foron

investment

and reporting, risk/impact assessment

facilitation

sustainable

criticaland management, and managing themineral supply chains. The G20 oughttransition to clean energy.

to consider a supply chain development
standard where investment in upstream

Coordination of efforts withrespect to standards andinvestment facilitation

mining is followed by assistance toTheplaying

captured by resource-rich countries.

an active role in the coordination of

A similar process was adopted for

efforts to develop ESG standards forsustainable infrastructure in emerging

criticalandeconomies through the Finance toassist mineral-rich countries in meeting

Accelerate the Sustainable Transition-

those

Infrastructure.23

can

c

G20

shouldmineralsupplystandards.
help

considerattractThis

chainscombination

investment

anddevelop local processing capacity,which

increases

the

This

value

initiative

share

was

conceived in 2020 by the Climate Policy

The Sustainable Finance Study Group launched in 2018 is co-chaired by China and the UK, and has theobjective of examining more initiatives of green finance. For more, see: Ray, S., Jain, S., Thakur, V., and S.
Miglani, Global Cooperation and G20: Role of Finance Track (Springer, 2023), https://link.springer.com/
book/10.1007/978-981-19-7134-1.

16

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE G20

close the financing gap for sustainable

Coordination of efforts
with respect to emerging
economy participation in
critical mineral alliances

infrastructurelabelling

The G20 should also seek to coordinate

process for sustainable infrastructure

the several alliances that are currently

assets. This kind of assistance can help

being

developed,

includingthecreate a new sustainable infrastructure

Minerals

Security

Partnership,theasset class that can further facilitate

Sustainable Critical Minerals Alliance,

the expansion of bankable projects inand the Critical Minerals Club. Someemerging economies.

of these alliances overlap while others

Initiative, the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation, the International
Finance Corporation, and others tothroughacompete.

Even

if

these

alliances

Finally, the G20 should consider thefollowdevelopment of a minimum standard

develop organically from other types offor Ease of Doing Business thatcooperation among member countries,

developing economies should meetthe exclusion of emerging economies

to receive blended capital from MDBs

affects the feasibility of a just energy

or developed economies. Preferencetransition that many of the founding

should be given to countries with amembers of these alliances publicly

minimum sovereign credit rating of

support. Within a G20 context, there

Ba3, which is the minimum requirement

can be sound deliberation on how tofor many mainstream private sector

integrate emerging economies in criticalinvestors. This will help target blended

mineral partnerships set up by several

finance instruments to regions whereother members. This can also prevent

shorter-term

the creation of critical mineral cartels

is feasible.

project

realisation

geopoliticalpreferencesandlike the Organisation of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries, which could delay
the clean energy transition.

Attribution: Tom Moerenhout et al., “Securing Critical Minerals Supply Chains for the Clean Energy
Transition,” T20 Policy Brief, May 2023.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE G20

17

Endnotes

1

International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions –Analysis (IEA, 2023), https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-cleanenergy-transitions.

2International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions –Analysis.

3

Lukas Boer and Andrea Pescatori, Energy Transition Metals (IMF, 2021), https://www.imf.
org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/10/12/Energy-Transition-Metals-465899.

4

Bloomberg, “Transition Metals Become $10 Trillion Opportunity as Demand Rises andSupply Continues to Lag” BloombergNEF, last modified February 16, 2023, https://about.
bnef.com/blog/transition-metals-become-10-trillion-opportunity-as-demand-rises-andsupply-continues-to-lag/.

5

S&P Global, The Future of Copper: Will the Looming Supply Gap Short-Circuit the Energy
Transition?

(S&P

Global,2023),

https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/mi/

info/0722/futureofcopper.html.
6International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions –Analysis.

7

International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions –Analysis.

8

International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions –Analysis.

9

Tom Moerenhout, James Glynn, and Lilly Lee, Critical mineral constraints and energy systemmodels (Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy, 2023).

10International Energy Agency, Energy Technology Perspectives 2023 – Analysis (IEA, 2023),
https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2023.

11

International Energy Agency, Energy Technology Perspectives 2023.

12

USGS, “Mineral Commodity Summaries,” USGS, accessed 01 May 2023, https://www.
usgs.gov/centers/national-minerals-information-center/mineral-commodity-summaries.

13

International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions –Analysis.

14

USGS, “Mineral Commodity Summaries”

15

Convergence, “Blended Finance,” Convergence, accessed May 22, 2023, https://www.
convergence.finance/blended-finance#market-size.

16	​​“Convergence. “Blended Finance.”
17

IFC, The why and how of blended finance (IFC, 2020), https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/
connect/768bcbe9-f8e9-4d61-a179-54e5cc315424/202011-New-IFC-Discussion-Paper.
pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=no0db6M

18

18

“Green bonds, SLBs, MDBs in focus at Guwahati G20 meet on sustainable finance”, Outlook
India, accessed May 8, 2023, https://www.outlookindia.com/business/green-bonds-slbsmdbs-in-focus-at-guwahati-g20-meet-on-sustainable-finance-news-258947.

19

G20, G20/GI Hub Framework on How to Best Leverage Private Sector Participation to Scale
Up Sustainable Infrastructure Investment (G20 2023),

https://cdn.gihub.org/umbraco/

media/4832/g20-gi-hub-framework-to-scale-up-investment-in-sustainable-infrastructure.
pdf.
20

European Commission, ​​“Critical Raw Materials: Ensuring Secure and Sustainable Supply
Chains for EU’s Green and Digital Future,” European Critical Raw Materials Act, March 16,2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_1661.

21

AidData, “Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 2.0.,” AidData, 2021,
https://www.aiddata.org/data/aiddatas-global-chinese-development-finance-datasetversion-2-0.

22“Public information summary - TechMet Limited,” US International Development FinanceCorporation, accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.dfc.gov/sites/default/files/media/
documents/9000115916.pdf.

23

Barbara Buchner, Christian Deseglise, Lori Kerr, Michael Ridly, Vikram Widge andRob Youngman“FAST-Infrastructure,” CPI, accessed April 3, 2023, https://www.
climatepolicyinitiative.org/fast-infra/.

19

INDIA 2023

20

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE G20