JAIS

論文

The Interpretive Theory of Translation
and Its Current Applications
Choi Jungwha, Ph.D
(Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)Interpreting and translation are two of the oldest activities in the annals of humanhistory. Records of translation activities date back over 2000 years, and since ancient
times, translation has been studied by numerous scholars. Interpreting, on the other
hand, had no theory of its own, so to speak, until modern times. Although the activityof interpreting dates back to ancient times, it did not begin to take shape in its modern
form until 1917 at the negotiation table of the Versailles Treaty. Consecutive
interpreting, in which the interpreter begins only after the speaker has finished, cameabout after the Versailles Treaty. In contrast, simultaneous interpreting, which has
become the preferred mode, had its debut at the Nuremberg Trials after World War II.
The Interpretive Theory of Translation (aka, the Theory of Sense) was developed by
Danica Seleskovitch and Marianne Lederer (researchers at the Ecole Superieured’Interprètes et de Traducteurs (ESIT) at the University of Paris III ― the so-called
Paris School). The following is a brief outline of this theory.
Interpretation DefinedInterpretation can be universally defined as understanding speech and rewordingthat understanding in a different language. Theoretically, interpreting requires afaultless command of both the source and target languages, a deep insight of the subject
matter and mastery of the correct methodology needed to carry out the interpreting
process.
In practice, of course, the situation is different. Many so-called theoretical problems
of interpretation are merely practical issues borne of individual interpreters, e.g.,
inadequacies such as insufficient language or subject knowledge, poor interpreting

Choi Jungw ha , “T he I nter pr eti ve T heory o f Tra nsla tio n and I ts Curr e nt Appli ca tio ns.”
Interpretation Studies, No . 3 , December 20 03, pa ges 1 -15 .
(c) 2003 b y the Japa n Asso ciati o n for Interpreta tio n Studies

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skills, working into a foreign language or the inability of theoreticians to sort out thelexical items instead of text segments, language learning exercises, etc. The correct
parameters such as confusion between a language and a text, translation ofInterpretive Theory of Translation, in fact, does not deal with the many practicalaspects of translating.
The Interpretive Theory is built upon four pillars: 1) command of the native
language, 2) command of the source language, 3) command of relevant world andbackground knowledge, and 4) command of interpreting methodology.
The first pillar is the command of one’s native language. Everyone would agree
that translators and interpreters must be able to use their mother tongue in all its
nuances and subtleties. The second pillar, the command of the second language, ismore difficult to assess precisely. The closed systems: phonological and grammatical,
have to be mastered, while the limitless range of lexical items is subject to a lifelong
and open-ended learning process. The same is true of both world and backgroundknowledge, which are not static. Rather, they are the result of a continuous, dynamic
process of acquisition.
The fourth pillar is methodology. In this regard, the Interpretive Theory differsfrom most other theories as it posits that methodologically the process of translating
requires an understanding of sense (language meaning + cognitive complements) anda formulation of the translation on the basis of the synecdoche principle.
The Interpretive Process
The text to be translated may seem to be a French, English, Korean text. This
common impression is hard to dispel, yet the claim that a paper is “French” or“English” is inaccurate. In fact, the graphic signs the paper carries are not meanings,
but rather symbols. The meanings of those symbols are in the reader’s or listener’s
mind. It could be said that this is a paper covered with signs that belong to thegraphological system of the French or the Korean language, but not that this is a
French or Korean paper. To claim that reading a text is reading a French text or a
Korean text is a misconception because the reading activity is twofold:it requires 1)

a text composed of signs by an author, and 2) a reader who assigns meanings to thosesigns. At this stage there is already an interpretive activity ― assigning language
meanings to language signs. On the other hand, believing that a text carries thesentence meanings of a given language is too wide a concept as it credits the text witha quality that is actually an interpretive activity on the part of the reader or listener.
This concept threatens to distort the object to be translated, and it results in abortive2

attempts to translate one language into another.
At the same time this belief is too narrow a concept as the reader’s or the listener’sinterpretive activity extends far beyond assigning language meanings to language
signs. A reader or a listener not only calls upon his command of a language tointerpret the signs but also on his world and background knowledge. In theInternational Herald Tribune, the headline of one of its articles reads: “Singapore SARSa ‘low risk.’” These signs can be recognized as English but at the same time must be
associated to relevant world knowledge to understand what is meant by the author.
Grammatical propositions, to be understood, require an attribution of language
meanings, texts require in addition relevant world knowledge (such as: Singaporean
researcher’s illness (first case of SARS since the WHO said in July that highly
contagious disease had been contained worldwide) is not likely to spread).
The full interpretive process comes into play as soon as the translator or theinterpreter adds not only his knowledge of language concepts to signs, but also his
knowledge of the world. In that case, translating/interpreting conveys an intended
meaning; in other words, the sense.
Knowledge of the world is language independent. Translating/interpreting an
English text into Japanese calls quite naturally on cognitive complements stored
nonverbally in our memory and actualized in the target or source languages.
Cognitive Complements
Native listeners and readers are usually not aware of cognitive complements.
Verbal, situational, cognitive contexts and knowledge of the world come into playquite naturally, while language alone seems to be present. In everyday conversation,
when listening to each other, the part played by knowledge of the language isdifficult to distinguish from background information. Sometimes, however, whenoverhearing strangers speaking to each other, we realize we do not understand them,even though we understand all the words they say. Imagine hearing “I told him so
again and again.” We would not know who him is or what so represents. We
understand the language, not the speaker’s utterance. The deictics, him and so,consequently point to information that does not belong to language knowledge, but
to background knowledge. Thus, background knowledge, just as language, plays arole in the comprehension of speech.
Whatever the command of languages interpreters may have, language problems
would remain unresolved if it were not for cognitive complements. Let us try now todiscriminate between the various types of cognitive complements that enable good3

interpreters to convey the speaker’s meaning.
Verbal Context
Speech is uttered in a continuous stream of words, each word contributing to themeaning of the words around it and being made more specific by these surroundingwords. The meaningful interaction of words present in the working memory (onaverage, 6 to 8 words) is the first instance of cognitive complements; it dispels word
polysemy.
In other words, verbal context specifies the appropriate meaning. For example,
the Korean word 배 (bae/(ベ)) can mean stomach (腹), pear (梨), boat (船).

But

when you hear ‘bae’ with a verb, for instance 배가 아프다 (お腹(ベ)が痛い),배를먹다 (梨(ベ)を食べる), 배를 타다 (船(ベ)に乗る), all ambiguity disappears.
Situational Context
Interpreters are part of the event at which they interpret. They not only see theparticipants, but they also know who the participants are and in what capacity theytake the floor. Thus, seeing who is being addressed will enable the interpreter, uponhearing “Mr. President”, to say either “大統領님”, (daetongryongnim―President of
Republic)” or “社長님 (Sajangnim―President of a company)” or “会長님 (Hoejangnim―President of the Board of Directors)” depending on what is appropriate in thecircumstance. Awareness of situational context represents a further cognitive
complement that brings forth relevant meanings, and consequently dispelling
polysemy. Being present at the discussions and witnessing the proceedings enables
the interpreter to gather sufficient knowledge to translate appropriately. For instance,
having heard A make a statement and B saying “Mr. A’s comments…”, B might say,
“A 가 지금 말한 것은 (A ga malhankoseun―what Mr.A just said).
Thus, he is translating what happened, not what was said, and setting up an
equivalence that could not be forecast at the language level. The term ‘comments’corresponds to a number of Korean words such as 코멘트 (koment―comment), 말씀(malseum―words). Interpreting is not, however, supposed to align correspondingwords, since in no two languages do words ever coincide entirely. Rather, it should
convey sense on the basis of both verbal information and cognitive complements.
These increase the number of possible translations, as Delisle (1988) observes.
Cognitive Context
As we listen to someone speaking, we remember roughly what was said4

previously. Since it would hardly be possible even for the best of mnemonists torepeat several minutes of speech verbatim, and since observation shows that trainedinterpreters make use of their memory of things said previously to understandsentences now being uttered, it must be inferred that to a large extent words said
previously have lost their verbal shape, and context, since it stems from things said.
It is the cumulative knowledge brought by the speech chain up to the point where theinterpreter is translating.
In consecutive, as in simultaneous interpretation, interpreters make use of thiscognitive context. It is best illustrated in consecutive where it accumulates so that theinterpreter gets the full sense of all parts of the speech. When delivering his
interpretation, he makes use of it to find the appropriate wording.
Professional interpreters never interpret sentence by sentence; they prefer to wait
for the speech to proceed, so that it imparts maximum information. They know thatthe accurate meanings of words arise not only out of their language tenor but also outof cognitive context.
Whether engaged in court interpretation or conference interpretation, inconsecutive or simultaneous, interpreters all over the world claim that understanding
is of paramount importance. The question then arises: Does understanding relate
only to language or does understanding speech also require knowledge of the world?
Linguists often consider that understanding a verbal utterance and understanding
its language is one and the same thing. In conversation, when we are listening to eachother, the part played by knowledge of language can hardly be discerned from that
played by background information. It is only when we overhear strangers speaking
to each other that we realize we do not understand them, although we do understandthe language, not the utterance. As in the aforementioned example, the deictics, him
and so, point to things that do not belong to language but to background knowledge.
Thus background knowledge is as important as command of language inunderstanding speech.
When confronted with themes with which we are not familiar, the domestic
politics of a foreign country for instance, we also realize that we lack certain
knowledge other than that of language: knowledge that is necessary to fully
understand what we are hearing or reading. Such will surely be the readers’ reaction
to the International Herald Tribune headline: “Singapore SARS case a ‘low risk’”.
Background knowledge is a blanket expression covering a number of “cognitive
complements” that help us understand speech. These include knowledge of theworld, of time and place, of the circumstances out of which a speech arises, memory5

of things said previously, knowing who the speaker is and who the listeners are.
The broader the cognitive complements, the less ambiguity and polysemy there isin language, and the more thoroughly speech is understood. This can easily be shownin the following sentence, which illustrates that knowledge, or a lack of knowledge
about a single name, Dominique de Villepin, when mentioned without any
background information, makes a huge difference in understanding. “At a conference
last week, Dominique de Villepin said that the government was vulnerable for two
reasons; first, ministerial reform; second, Middle East issues.”
Listeners will understand this sentence at different levels, depending on whether
they know who Dominique de Villepin is. Those who know, understand the politicalnature of the information. Those who do not, understand that it refers to the Frenchgovernment, but miss implications that are otherwise obvious. The proper name
Dominique de Villepin designates a given person, but also an individual with a
specific function (Minister of Foreign Affairs). In this utterance the name clarifies theword vulnerable, which loses the shades of meaning of unprotected or defenseless,listed in the dictionary, keeping only that of open to attack.
No one will challenge the need for cognitive complements in intralingual
communication. There is, however, far less unanimity when it comes to interpreting.
Here, the need to add cognitive complements to source language utterances in order
to convey them accurately in another language is not always clearly understood.

Allinterpreters have had the experience of delegates who want them “just to translate”
without asking questions.
Why can’t the interpreter “just translate” even when he knows all the words ofthe source language and all corresponding words in the target language? The firstanswer is empirical: years of practice and observation of practice show that
languages, however closely related, do not match in actual speech. This means thattranslating languages as heard, faultless though the translating might be, does notmake sense.
The broader the cognitive complements, the less ambiguity and polysemy there isin language, and the more thoroughly speech is understood.
When no cognitive complements are present, we are faced with more words andsentences, in sum, more language. Investigations into machine translation haveshown the polysemy of lexical items, that is, the number of signifiés that can be
attached to individual signifiants (see Winograd’s example; ‘stay away from the bank’might be advice to an investor or to a child too close to a river). It has also shown
how readily an alignment of words can carry multiple meanings (The sentence6‘chickens are ready to eat’ implies that something is about to eat something, butwhich are the chickens?).
Ambiguity is a feature of language, and it is due to the absence of cognitive
complements. Language turned into acts of speech always carries cognitive
complements. When going to my bank to have a discussion with the manager, I nevereven think of river banks, just as when smelling the fowls roasting in the oven I know
we will soon be eating and never think of live chickens strutting about pecking on
food. Isolated words or sentences are language; they elicit meaning, not sense. The
only possible level of interpretation is that of graphic signs into multiple linguistic
concepts and ambiguous sentences.
Words in a text are actualized by the verbal context. Of all the various possible
meanings of a given word looked up in a dictionary, only one appears when used in a
text. At the same time relevant knowledge in a text is activated as a cognitive
complement that combines with the actualized meaning lending it in an ad hoc sense;that rules out any ambiguity. For those who do not know, Bloody Sunday refers to
the shooting 20 years ago in Northern Ireland of civil rights marchers by British
troops.
In stating that translation needs information additional to language meaning andclaiming that translators understand texts because of the cognitive complements theybring to bear on them, the Interpretive Theory of Translation introduces the processof translation into the vast area of cognitive research.
Sense and Thing
While graphic signs taken in isolation are interpreted into concepts, signs in a text
are interpreted into sense. Instead of concepts, translators are faced with things.
Concepts collect under one name features common to all individuals, leaving asidesuch features that are not shared by all. In the concept ‘man’, we find a body, a head
and limbs; in an actual man, we find many more elements, in addition to the common
ones; age, height, race, etc. In a text, the concept ‘man’ is turned into a real man―mybrother or a well-known personality.
Things are much richer than concepts and the richer they are the easier it will be
for the translator to find an appropriate designation in any language. A thing iseasier to put across in another language than a concept.
Because sense is based on the cognitive complements of individual readers/
listeners or translators, it is to some degree an individual matter; its depth will vary
according to the knowledge and the world experience of each individual. Whatever7the specifics of sense, however, there is a vast area of overlap of the sense understoodby each of the communication partners, so that communication is usually easily
established.
The translator, acting as a mediator between an author who wants tocommunicate and readers who want to understand him/her, operates in this area ofoverlap. The readers of the translation will bring their own cognitive complements tothe translated text. The translator’s rendering enables them to discover the text
superficially or deeply, just in the same way as readers of the original. Understanding
a text is universal. The translator’s understanding is only a specific case of the universal
process.
Observation of a successful interpretation has proven beyond doubt that innormal communication, contrary to popular belief, sounds are not understood first as
language meanings and then connected to actual events; they are always instantly
understood as the thing meant by a speaker, which Seleskovitch calls sense. Language
meaning as such appears only in isolation and it is a misnomer to speak of“understanding” in connection with words or sentences in isolation. When we havethe necessary language competence, we “recognize” sentences as being English or
French; we “recognize” grammaticality as well as differences between word
arrangements; “understanding” applies only to “sense” which appears when we listen
to a speech such as defined above.
Sense is the awareness of the things meant by a speaker. As such, it is much more
durable than the language sounds of a speech. Good interpreters, skilled inconsecutive interpretation, remember the slightest nuances of a speech when they
start rendering it, though the mass of fleeting sounds that carried it has long
vanished.
Seleskovitch explained the concept of correspondence and equivalence using themetaphor of ‘raisin bread’. If the original text is of various ingredients for making
raisin bread, the interpreter or the translator will make the dough into the bread. The
raisin is the part that can find a correspondence: the form remains unchanged.
However, the rest of the dough, made of flour, sugar, salt and yeast, are allincorporated into the dough, and one can no longer separate the original ingredients.
Yet, they are all in the dough. The mixed dough can be understood as the equivalent
part. The relationship between an equivalent and a correspondence is explainedusing the following diagram.

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When correspondence is possible, the interpreter/translator can move directlyfrom understanding to re-expression. If not, the interpreter/translator retrieves what
the original text is saying, that is the sense, and looks for its equivalence in the target
language.
The Theory of Sense is based on the fact that different languages use different
ways of expressing similar content. The theory explains that interpreting andtranslation is not merely laying down what is said in the source text using
corresponding words in the target text; that will result in a text that the target readerscannot understand. The theory emphasizes that the work of interpreting andtranslation is an extremely creative undertaking.
Looking at the process
Many attempts have been made to try and determine the process of translation.
The various trials and errors of the translator ― the hesitations, changes of mind andthe corrections, assuming they are available for proper scrutiny, however, do not giveaccess to the actual process that goes on in translating, i.e. interpreting graphic signs
into sense.
Oral translation lends itself better to a detailed examination of the cognitive
process of translation. Oral speech is evanescent; its sounds disappear instantly, butsense remains. Formulation in another language shows clearly that sense is made up
of two elements: actualized language meanings and cognitive complements.
By recording oral translation/interpreting of speeches, it is possible to trace thedevelopment of the comprehension of sense, with the false starts, lagging behind,corrections, and anticipation of the rendering in the other language. The interpreter’s
rendering is a direct reflection of his understanding. His formulation is not thetransfer of one language into another.

9Units of meaning
The second-by-second examination of a good simultaneous interpretation shows
how the sounds of small segments of utterances deliver their part of the message andfall into oblivion immediately after. The sense of a speech is built upon fragmented
utterance after another, the length of which varies. The Paris School calls them “unitsof meaning”.
Units of meaning are not units in the sense that they can be measured once andfor all. Rather, they are born when a sufficient number of words merge with therelevant knowledge, taking on an ephemeral life. One after the other, these units ofmeaning blend with what has already been stored cognitively and form a moregeneral sense ― the sense that remains in the minds of the listeners when the speech
has come to an end.
Compared with listening and understanding a speech in general, the specificity of
the interpreter’s task is to grasp and render each and every unit of meaning. This
enables the researcher to visualize the nature of the understanding process, from thefleeting passage of sounds to the full comprehension of speech.
Interpreting proves that there are three stages in the process of any oral or writtentranslation:1)

the understanding of sense,2)

a de-verbalization stage, meaning that the words and sentences that gavebirth to sense are forgotten, while sense remains present without any linguistic
support, and3)

the reformulation of this sense in the other language.

Deverbalization
Understanding the concept of sense requires that it be broken down schematicallyinto a double interpretive activity; the interpreting of graphic signs into concepts,
then the addition of cognitive complements to such concepts. Actually these twointerpretations merge into a single one. Immersed in context, the translator interprets
graphic signs directly into sense. This sense remains present as awareness even while
the signs fall into oblivion. That stage is the stage of deverbalization.
De-verbalization is a natural phenomenon in oral translation, at least inconsecutive interpretation. As the sound chain disappears, the good interpreterconveys non- verbal sense into his native tongue. While it is clearly noticeable ininterpreting, deverbalization is more difficult to observe in written translation. It is
not as obvious because the original text is there. In other words, unlike the sounds of10

oral speech, it does not disappear. The graphic signs remain, and they call for theproper linguistic concepts and direct correspondences in the other language,
short-circuiting the search for appropriate equivalences. Deverbalization is a naturalfeature of the interpretative process, requiring an effort on the part of the translator.
It is nevertheless present in the form of the translator’ awareness of what an author
means in a given passage.
Limiting research to grammar and contrastive linguistics in order to overcome thedifferences in language structures has taken the science of translating no further thanwhat machine translation can achieve. Languages differ in all respects, not only insound structures, semantics or syntax, but also in the way speakers refer to ideas,
facts and events. If interpreters and translators could proceed directly from one
language to the other, there would be no point in their existence: the machine would
take over. The machine’s inability and the translator’s ability are based on the factthat the machine operates solely on the basis of formal signs, while translators andinterpreters work mainly on the basis of an awareness of ideas.
Understanding a segment of text means de-verbalizing, which enables thetranslator to discover modes of expression that are not interfered with by the original
language. This is the way successful translation works.
Formulation or the synecdoche principle
The third stage of the process is the search for idiomatic means of expression that
render the sense of the original, the actual wording being divorced from the source
language, and complying with the usage and customs of the target language.
Words in texts are made up of two parts: the graphic sign or explicit part and theimplicit part, itself formed of the relevant knowledge readers apply to the explicit
part. The Interpretive Theory of Translation claims that languages are not codes sothat words as such are not translatable. The object of translation is the sense born outof the merging of language actualized in a text and the receptor’s relevant
knowledge.
The explicit parts of a text are known as synecdoches, and languages not only
differ in their lexicon and grammar but also in the way the natives express theirthoughts. Speech and text are both synecdoches, but in two different languages thesame sense is hardly ever expressed with the same synecdoches. Translators whowant to be understood have to avoid the structures of the original language and inmany instances, its choice of words. In order to achieve a meaningful result, i.e. totransmit sense in a form acceptable to readers of the translation, the translation has to11

be formulated in a way that agrees with the target language. The whole thing, orsense, is never formulated exhaustively. Only a part of it designates the whole and theparts used are not the same in two languages even though they designate the same
whole.
To wrap up this explanation of the Interpretive Theory of Translation, it would beinteresting to take note of the way Sigmund Freud translated. In his Life and Work of
Sigmund Freud, Ernest Jones describes Freud’s method:“In the first part of the year (1880), Freud was able to cope with the boredom(of military service) by devoting himself to translating a book by John StuartMill, the first of five large books he translated. It was a congenial work, since
he was specially gifted as a translator. Instead of laboriously transcribingfrom the foreign language, idioms and all, he would read a passage, close thebook and consider how a German writer would have clothed the same
thoughts ― a method not very common among translators. His translating
work was both brilliant and rapid.”
What took place when Freud closed his book after having read a passage from it?
What occurred is the phenomenon which provides the key to the mechanism of
human language. According to Seleskovitch, the linguistic forms of the original
vanished and left behind only the awareness of the sense.
What took place when Freud reclothed the foreign thoughts in German linguistic
garb? He treated someone else’s thoughts as if they had been his own and expressed
them as he would have his own ideas. His expressions, being spontaneous andseeking only to convey the sense adequately, conformed to the genius of the German
language and thus provided the German reader with a formulation that was crystal
clear.
Why did Freud work passage by passage, whereas he could have “retold” thebook if his object was to avoid a “painstaking transposition”? Because discourse ismade up of units of sense, and because a translator faithful to the structuring of theoriginal thought is duty bound to reproduce them all. If he had taken portions larger
than “passages”, Freud would have run the risk of missing out part of the content.
On the other hand, if he had taken smaller portions ― for example, if he had worked
sentence by sentence ― he would have relapsed into the span of formal memory (alsocalled immediate or very short term memory), which contains about seven or eightitems. He would then have risked falling under the sway of the items of the source

12language and transposing their meanings; such a transposition, which would haveresulted in a text stamped with foreign turns of phrase and betraying the norms ofthe target language, could only have obscured the original thought. The distance
Freud kept from the text enabled him to free the cognitive mechanisms that arenecessary to a non-linguistic translation.
In consecutive interpretation, the interpreter reproduces the speech in one
language after he has heard the entire text in another language. Rather than retain theoriginal formulation, he/she notes only the ideas; accordingly, the reproduction ismore in the nature of a “narration” than a “repetition”.

Comparison of thisnarration with the original shows the difference which there may be between
transposition of meanings from one language system into another and discourse(including both speech and writing), in discourse ideas are formulated spontaneously,
thoughts are in direct control.
General applicability of the interpretive theory of translation•

The Interpretive Theory of Translation is based on principles which apply to any
language combination; research done on a number of language pairs including
French and Chinese, English, German or Japanese validate the assumption thatthe interpretive process is applicable to all language pairs since it is languageindependent.

•

The methods advocated by the Interpretive Theory of Translation are not only
valid for functional translation, but also for economic, political, technical,
scientific or commercial texts. There is no a priori obstacle to applying theInterpretive Theory to literature or poetry, as long as the transfer of linguistic
elements from one text to another is considered as being not translation but
transcoding, the result of which is to show readers of the translations thepeculiarities of the original language. The other condition is to define translation
as a text that should produce the same cognitive, affective and esthetic effects onreaders as the original text does.

•

The Interpretive Theory of Translation also gives guidelines for the treatment of
cultural features.
The recognition of the fact that sense is not contained in any given language ortext but arises from cues given by the text/language and cognitive complementsfrom the target reader is great help for translators in solving problems related totranslating a text’s cultural aspects. The part played by these cultural aspects in thetext, their importance in understanding the author’s meaning, and the reasons13

readers would read the text are weighed by translators who find ad hoc solutions foreach cultural point.
To conclude, I would like to stress that “translation” is a very broad notion. It
can be used to point to the act of translating or to the result of this act. It covers:
1)

translating exercises done in language classes and aiming at improving
knowledge of a second language, and2)comparisons of language pairs which may lead to the establishment ofbilingual dictionaries of comparative grammars.

These two activities bear on the linguistic aspects of translation and look forcorrespondences between the source and the target languages.
Yet the word ‘translation’ also covers the cognitive process we are concernedwith as translators and translatologists: what is “understanding” may be quite
different from understanding or knowing a language, and why is the designation of awhole concept through a synecdoche the basis for formulating sense in one’s own
language?
*
Editor’s Notes: This paper is based on the keynote speech given by the author at the 4th Annual
Conference of the Japan Association for Interpretation Studies held in Kobe, Japan, on September
23, 2003. We thank Dr. Choi for agreeing to rewrite the speech for inclusion in this issue ofInterpretation Studies.

Sohee Jungwha CHOI is a founding member and the current president of the Korean
Society of Conference Interpretation. She holds a Ph.D. from the l'Ecole Superieured'Interpretation et de Traduction in Paris. In 2001, she received the prestigious ”Prix
Danica Seleskovitch” in recognition of her eminent contributions to the profession ofconference interpretation. She currently resides in Seoul, where she is a professor at theGraduate Program of Translation and Interpretation of Hankuk University of Foreign
Studies. Personal Website: http://www.choijungwha.com/

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Delisle, J. (1998). Translation: an Interpretive Approach. (Translation Studies, No. 8)
University of Ottawa Press.
Lederer, M. (1981). La Traduction Simultanee. Paris: Lettres Modernes.

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Lederer, M. (1994). La Traduction Aujourd'hui. Paris: Hachette.
Lederer, M. (1998). The Interpretive Theory of Translation: a brief survey. Publicos de laCiudad de Buenos Aires.
Seleskovitch, D. (1975). Langues et Memoire. Paris: Lettres Modernes.
Seleskovitch, D. (1978). Interpreting for International Conferences. Washington, D.C.: Pen
and Booth.
Seleskovitch, D & Lederer, M. (1993). Interpreter pour Traduire (3e edition). Paris: Didier
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Seleskovitch, D & Lederer, M. (1989). A Systematic Approach to Teaching Interpretation. Silver
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