Vol.22 No.1 October 2019

What the Graduate School of Peace Studies
Aims to Achieve
In April this year, the Hiroshima Peace Institute inaugurated the
Graduate School of Peace Studies at Hiroshima City University,
launching a Master’s Degree Program in peace studies. This is
the ﬁrst graduate school dedicated to peace studies among public
university graduate schools in Japan.
This graduate school offers peace studies originating from
Hiroshima, and holds several lectures on Hiroshima’s atomic bomb
experience, in a group of courses titled “Hiroshima and Nuclear
Issues.” These are courses that only the Graduate School of Peace
Studies can oﬀer.
While featuring these unique courses, its curriculum isdesigned to enable students to pursue studies in various academic
disciplines, including law, politics, sociology, and history, as wellas learn about research methodologies. One of the characteristics ofHiroshima-originated peace studies is its intention to disseminate
Hiroshima’s experiences and eﬀorts to people at home and abroadusing theories and perspectives of each academic discipline, and topass these on to the next generation.
The graduate school aims to help students not only acquire theprofessional expertise in their ﬁelds of interest, but also cultivate
their capabilities to understand thought patterns and research
results in other ﬁelds.
It is certainly meaningful to analyze and explain incidents
and events that occur on a daily basis in the real world. However,
it is also important to examine what underlies these incidents andevents—for instance: the structure of modern society, the tideof history that forms the structure, and characteristics of humanbehavior. If you pursue peace studies as an academic discipline,
you need to learn about methodologies for deeply understanding
various social incidents and events, and develop expert analyticalskills in a speciﬁc ﬁeld.
In addition to the above expertise, students also need to obtain
an understanding of ﬁelds other than their specialized ones. Peace
is a phenomenon that is ambiguous and multidimensional. The
issues of peace have a lot to do with various fields such as law,politics, sociology, history, education, philosophy, and naturalscience. For this reason, peace studies is said to be interdisciplinary.
Those who engage in peace studies are therefore required to gain
both high expertise in a specialized ﬁeld and deep understanding inother disciplines.
The Master’s Degree Program of the Graduate Schoolof Peace Studies strives to ensure that students can acquire
outstanding problem-ﬁnding and solving skills.

Ryo Oshiba

As in other social sciences, in peace studies it is extremely
important to notice the problem. Researchers should always check
whether there are any problems that are overlooked or unnoticed,
or problems they have noticed but don’t know how to call to publicattention.
By reading many books and investigating previous studies,
you will begin to clarify the point at issue. In my specialized ﬁeld,
for example, if the concept of human dignity is presented, you
might ﬁnd a problem that you had not previously noticed.
Additionally, you might discover a problem while listening tovarious people’s stories. It is safe to say that conducting dialogue
with other people is one type of ﬁeldwork in peace studies. Here in
Hiroshima, opportunities abound for engaging in such dialogues.
It is true that, “Throw away your books, Let’s go into thestreets (Sho wo suteyo, machi e deyo)” proposed by Shuji Terayama
is a good idea. However, I would like to recommend the idea of,“Let’s go to the town with your books (Sho wo motte machi edeyo)” as suggested by Ikuya Sato. [Notes: Sho wo suteyo, machi
e deyo (Throw away your books, Let’s go into the streets), by Shuji
Terayama, published in 1967 by Haga Shoten; Fieldwork—Sho
wo motte machi ni deyo (Let’s go to the town with your books), by
Ikuya Sato, published in 2006 by Shinyosha.]
Finally, I would like to mention that the Graduate School
is committed to improving students’ communication abilities by
providing diverse occasions and employing various methods. If
graduate students complete an excellent thesis, it would of course
be largely due of their own endeavors. However, please rememberthat the support of many people is what enables these students
to devote themselves to study and research in graduate school. I
therefore hope that they will use what they have learned in graduate
school to give back to society, not using it strictly for their own
sake. The power to “communicate” things to others is a quality thatis indispensable for building and maintaining peace.
Next year, Japan will mark the 75th anniversary of the atomic
bombings. It is an important task for us to discuss how we shouldpass on the atomic bomb experiences and memories to future
generations. The Hiroshima Peace Institute is determined to tackle
this task, by nurturing next-generation individuals who will convey
the atomic bomb experiences and memories and communicate
these invaluable assets to people all around Japan and overseas,through the education provided by the Graduate School of Peace
Studies.
(Director at HPI)

Contents

What the Graduate School of Peace Studies Aims to Achieve
Ryo Oshiba …………………………… 1
The Current Trends in Nuclear Disarmament
after the Conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
Kazumi Mizumoto ……………… 2-3
The Significance of Counter-proliferation Financing
Yasuhito Fukui ……………………… 3
Nuclear Power in the Manhattan Project
Robert Jacobs ………………………… 4
Philippines Perspectives Regarding Japanese Army Stragglers
Hitoshi Nagai ………………………… 5
Public Relations in Postwar Britain and Japan
Kyungjin Ha ………………………… 6
Hello from HPI
Tadashi Okimura …………………… 7
Hello from HPI
Ryo Oshiba …………………………… 7
Development of HPI Research Projects
Xianfen Xu …………………………… 7
Diary ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 8
Visit HPI s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace̲e/1The Current Trends in Nuclear Disarmament
after the Conclusion of the Treaty on theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons
Kazumi Mizumoto
Introduction: Current Trends in Nuclear Disarmament
As of July 7, 2019, it has been two years since the adoptionof the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), whichhas promoted the treaty, won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize, giving hopeto citizens who seek to abolish nuclear weapons. However, shortly
after that, in January 2018, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a U.S.
academic journal specifically addressing nuclear issues, announced
that the Doomsday Clock—which symbolizes how close humanity is
to annihilation due to nuclear war, with the apocalyptic event depicted
as midnight on the clock—moved forward to two minutes before
midnight. This is the Clock’s closest approach to midnight since
its inception, matching that in 1953 when the Clock ticked to two
minutes before midnight after the United States and the Soviet Union
began testing hydrogen bombs, setting oﬀ the nuclear arms race.
According to estimates by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), the worldwide total inventory of nuclear
weapons as of January 2019 stood at 13,865 (600 less than 2018
figures), with more than 91% of them owned by the U.S. andRussia. While the nuclear development programs of North Korea
and Iran have been a matter of concern, the U.S. and Russia must be
well aware that the two nuclear superpowers shoulder the greatest
responsibility for humanity’s survival.

Dark Shadow Cast by Worsening U.S.-Russia Relations
The worsening relations between the United States and Russia
have cast a dark shadow on international aﬀairs. The Ukraine crisis
broke out after the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsulain the aftermath of political changes in Ukraine in 2014. Since
then, the conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) and Russia has intensiﬁed, with U.S.-Russian relations everworsening—the U.S. has pursued its plan to build missile defense
systems in Europe, evoking strong opposition from the RussianFederation.
In February 2019, the U.S. Trump administration notified
its Russian counterpart that the U.S. would withdraw from theIntermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), which wasconcluded between the two countries in 1987. It was the ﬁrst nuclear
weapons elimination treaty to have been signed between Washington
and Moscow, and an epoch-making deal that is thought to have helped
bring an end to the Cold War. In response, Russia declared that it
would also suspend its participation in the pact. The INF Treaty wasformally terminated on August 2 this year, enabling both countries
to resume the arms race to develop ground-launched medium-range
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kms.
The end of the INF Treaty makes the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (New START) the sole remaining nuclear arms
reduction treaty between Russia and the U.S. New START cameinto effect in February 2011, and limits the number of deployedstrategic nuclear warheads (mounted on a missile with a range of
5,500 km or longer) to 1,550. However, if no improvement is madein bilateral relations, this treaty is likely to expire in February 2021,
thus removing the warhead limitations. The international community
2

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.22 No.1, October 2019should urge again that the U.S. and Russia take responsible action.

Possibility of TPNW’s Entry into ForceThe TPNW considers nuclear weapons themselves to be evil,
and includes a comprehensive set of prohibitions on participating in
any nuclear weapon activities, such as their development, testing andproduction, as well as the use of such weapons for military purposes.
The TPNW therefore gives great hope to those who wish to eliminate
nuclear weapons. However, it is meaningless if the Treaty does not
actually work. First of all, we should ensure the Treaty enters into
force. One article of the TPNW stipulates that “This Treaty shallenter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.” As of July
1, 2019, a total of 23 countries have ratiﬁed it, requiring ratiﬁcationfrom 27 additional countries. Moreover, if nuclear weapon states do
not join the Treaty, the number of nuclear weapons cannot be reduced.
The greatest challenge is how to realize their accession to the TPNW.
However, adoption of the TPNW is not without meaning. Twoyears ago, it was adopted at the U.N. negotiating conference by avote of 122 states in favor (with one vote against and one abstention),
which accounted for nearly two-thirds of all the countries aroundthe world. This indicates that the prohibition of nuclear weapons,
which the Treaty aims to achieve, is becoming a certain norm in
the international community. Among the 70 states that have alreadysigned the Treaty, if 27 signatories that have not yet ratified give
ratification, the Treaty can enter into force. For this reason, somepeople think that its ratiﬁcation is a matter of time. Even if nuclear
weapon states have not acceded, once the TPNW enters into force,its provisions prescribe that the first meeting of States Parties shallbe convened within one year, and further meetings of States Parties
shall be convened on a biennial basis, and that a conference to review
the status of the Treaty shall be convened after a period of ﬁve years
following its entry into force. Through these meetings, a “TPNW
Process” will be formed, which will have considerable signiﬁcance.

Future Challenges: U.S.’s Sophisticated Approach toWinning over Other TPNW Opponents
Meanwhile, there are many challenges to be addressed toenhance the Treaty’s eﬀectiveness. First, we should consider how todeal with nations possessing nuclear weapons that have opposed the
TPNW from the beginning, and nations under a nuclear umbrella. The
most crucial task will be how to conclude the discussions at the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference slated for 2020.
Of the past NPT Review Conferences held every five years,
only the three conferences in 1995, 2000, and 2015 succeeded inconcluding meaningful agreements toward nuclear disarmament. A
concern has risen as to whether or not next year’s conference will beable to achieve a positive result as at the above conferences. However,from what we saw at the Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2020
NPT Review Conference held at the United Nations Headquartersfrom April to May 2019, the nuclear weapon states were strongly
opposed to the TPNW, making the prospects bleak.
In particular, the U.S. has taken a sophisticated approach. In theThe Signiﬁcance of Counter-proliferation
Financing
Yasuhito Fukui
Counter-proliferation ﬁnancing refers to measures designed to freeze
the assets of a natural person or an entity who intends to acquire
WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction) including nuclear weapons. It
diﬀers from traditional disarmament and non-proliferation measuresin that it specifically aims to freeze funds and the financing forcompanies producing WMDs. This approach bears similarity to the“naming and shaming” method used by some NGOs that openly
publish the name of companies that produce cluster munitions,or of the ICAN campaign which discloses the names of financial
institutions that invest in companies involved in the manufacture of
nuclear weapons. However, counter-proliferation ﬁnancing measures
go beyond such techniques because states themselves can order theassets of suspected perpetrators to be frozen without delay, basedon United Nations Security Council resolutions that are legallybinding. However, their legally coercive powers may constitute aserious violation of human rights if a natural person or an entity were
designated by mistake.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmentalorganization working with the Organisation of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), and is tasked with regulating not only
counter-proliferation financing, but also, anti-money laundering
measures and counter-terrorist ﬁnancing. Pursuant to these goals, theFATF has officially adopted 40 recommendations and participating
OECD States are obligated to implement these measures. In theframework of the FATF the working definition of proliferation
ﬁnancing is: “the act of providing funds or ﬁnancial services which areused, in whole or in part, for the manufacture, acquisition, possession,development, export, trans-shipment, brokering, transport, transfer,
stockpiling or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and theirmeans of delivery and related materials (including both technologies
and dual use goods used for non-legitimate purposes), in contraventionof national laws or, where applicable, international obligations.”
A process of mutual evaluation is to be conducted by aninternational team in Japan in 2019 to assess the status of thecountry’s implementation of the FATF recommendations. Based on
subsequent discussions at a plenary meeting to be held next summer,

the results of the mutual evaluation will be disclosed in a ﬁnal report
to be issued in the fall of 2020. The mutual evaluation of Japan
includes questionnaire surveys conducted in May and June of thisyear, and on-site inspections of supervising organizations, including
the Financial Services Agency, and financial institutions such as
banks, by the international evaluation team. Authorities, such as
the Financial Service Agency (part of the Ministry of Finance) the
Crime Revenue Prevention Office of the Japanese Police Agency,
and ﬁnancial institutions in the private sector, have been struggling
since the result of the third mutual evaluation, conducted ten years
ago, severely criticized the poor performance of Japanese financial
institutions.
The emergence of new state-of-the-art financial technologies,
such as Bitcoin and other crypto-assets, has required authorities andfinancial institutions to quickly develop and implement additional
measures. Furthermore, local banks, credit banks (so called Shinkin)and overseas branches of Mega-bank have been targeted forclandestine money-laundering operations by DPRK related banks.
To prevent this, measures implemented by the FATF require banks toverify the source of funds for money transfers, especially those over
100,000 yen, including verifying whether the recipient of the moneyis the head of a foreign state, a top executive of a foreign government
or central bank or organizations belonging to them, or one of theirfamily members. Such individuals are considered to be PEP (politically
exposed persons).
It is clear that funds used for nuclear weapon development
programs in the DPRK were partially procured with assets that weremoved through the Japanese Banking System. Therefore, if the resultsof the mutual evaluations are not suﬃcient, the ﬁnancing of Japanesecompanies through overseas banks will become more difficult andthere will be an unnecessary and substantially negative impact on
the Japanese economy. To assure the utility of counter-proliferation
ﬁnancing and non-proliferation measures, the international community
awaits the eﬀective implementation of the FATF recommendations.
(Associate Professor at HPI)

Continued from Page 2
negotiation phase, the country opposed the TPNW on the groundsof the “unstable international security environment.” However, inthe 2018 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting, the U.S. governmentchanged its attitude, and proposed the Creating an Environment for
Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) initiative. And in the 2019 Preparatory
Committee meeting, the government announced that it would launch
the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament Working
Group (CEWG) this summer in Washington D.C.
As problems regarding the global security environment, theU.S. has cited, for example, the tensions in South Asia and the
Middle East, the increasing nuclear arsenal in Asia, and the nuclear
weapons modernization promoted by some counties. The U.S. denies
the TPNW, saying that while ignoring these problems regarding thesecurity environment, you should not take an approach based on theidea that reducing and prohibiting nuclear weapons will be a solution,and that the approach will inevitably fail.
However, Washington has taken very few speciﬁc actions—justoffering support in starting the negotiations for the Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Its true purpose appears to win over othercountries opposing the Treaty to its side. In next year’s NPT Review
Conference, a confrontation may occur between the CEND groupled by the U.S. and the group of non-nuclear-weapon states that arein support of the Treaty. Japan, which aims to be a bridge-builder
between confronting countries, says that it wants to participate in the
CEND group, if invited. However, it is a matter of great concern thatJapan might end up just being forced to work like a “butler” who isloyal to his master.
(Professor at HPI)
Visit HPI s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace̲e/3

Nuclear Power in the Manhattan Project
Robert Jacobs
In 1953 American President Dwight Eisenhower spoke before
the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York Cityand talked of his desire for the world to know and share “atoms
for peace.” In those early days of the Cold War with two bitterrivals, the United States and Soviet Union, both engaged in a
nuclear arms race and actively developing thermonuclear weapons(h-bombs), there were grave international concerns about the riskof nuclear war. Eisenhower spoke of how the world could instead
be envisioned as a place of peace and wealth. “The United Statesknows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can bereversed,” he intoned, “this greatest of destructive forces can be
developed into a great boon, for the beneﬁt of all mankind.” Thisidea was expressed more directly by that most American ofcommunicators, the Walt Disney Company. Published in 1956,
a few years after Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech, and justa year before the United States began to operate a commercial
nuclear power plant that produced electricity for civilian use at
Shippingport, Pennsylvania, The Walt Disney story of our friend theatom was a paean to nuclear power. “We all know the story of themilitary atom, and we all wish it weren’t true,” writes Heinz Haber
in the prologue of the book, “so far, the atom is a superb villain. Its
power of destruction is foremost in our minds. But the same power
can be put to use for creation, for the welfare of mankind…It is
up to us to give the story a happy ending. If we use atomic energy
wisely, we can make a hero out of a villain.”
Such discourse suggested that the immense power of nuclear
weapons witnessed in the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki could
somehow be transformed and the atom—this amazing storehouseof energy—could be engineered to provide that power for peacefuluses. Seemingly, since the atom had been “split” and the energy
inside of it released, we could now work to release that energy forgood rather than for evil; rather than being threatened by the atom,
all of the people of the world could beneﬁt from atomic energy.
Shrouded behind such discourse was the fact that nuclear
power plants had actually been invented before nuclear weapons,in fact, the invention of nuclear power plants was a fundamental
step in the later manufacture of nuclear weapons. Nuclear power
plants were invented as a part of the Manhattan Project. They
were designed, develop, built and operated ﬁrst by the Manhattan
Project, and became an essential part of the manufacturing of thenuclear weapons that the United States used in the two nuclear
attacks on Japan in August 1945.
The first controlled and sustained nuclear chain reaction—
the basis of a nuclear power plant—was achieved in Chicago on 2
December 1942. This was CP-1, short for Chicago Pile 1. During
the month of November in 1942 a team had constructed the pilein a rackets court under the stands of the football stadium at the
University of Chicago. The pile consisted of over 6 tons of “natural”
uranium (uranium in its raw form, as it comes out of the Earthwhen it is mined), 50 tons of uranium oxide, and over 400 tonsof graphite. The graphite formed the structure of the pile and theuranium was used as the nuclear fuel.
On 2 December 1942 Enrico Fermi’s team would achieve
4

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.22 No.1, October 2019a controlled chain reaction, splitting the nuclei of uranium-235
atoms and releasing energy, in a manner that could be controlled:
it could be turned up, turned down, and ultimately turned off.
This proved that it was possible to operate a nuclear power
plant. The Met Lab was primarily tasked in late 1942 and 1943
with developing an efficient method for plutonium production.
Plutonium had been “invented” in a laboratory at the University ofCalifornia in late 1940 (“invented” since traces amounts do exist
in nature, but it was unknown to humans until it was manufactured
in the lab). Plutonium-239 also has a ﬁssionable nucleus, just likeuranium-235.
The Manhattan Project designated a site in Eastern Washington
state to be the location where the United States would manufacture
plutonium for its nuclear weapons: the Hanford Engineer Works.
While the Manhattan Project had built several research reactors to
reﬁne the design of nuclear power plants, the ﬁrst reactors built forindustrial operation were built at Hanford. Construction began on
the B Reactor, the ﬁrst non-research nuclear power plant ever built,
in March of 1943 at Hanford. The B Reactor went critical—began
to burn nuclear fuel—in the spring of 1944.
Eventually nine nuclear power plants were to be built
at Hanford, and they would manufacture over 55 metric tonsof plutonium. As the Cold War evolved, a second plutonium
production facility would be set up by the United States militaryat the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, where an additional
ﬁve nuclear power plants would be built to manufacture plutonium
for the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile.
The United States would construct 14 nuclear power plants
solely to manufacture plutonium, from which it would build morethan 60,000 nuclear weapons during the Cold War. In fact, the ﬁrst
13 nuclear reactors built in the United States were built to producethplutonium, it was the 14 nuclear reactor built in the U.S. that was
the ﬁrst built speciﬁcally to produce electricity for civilian use, at
Shippingport in 1957. First things ﬁrst.
With its 13 plutonium production nuclear power plants inoperation, steadily churning out tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons, American leaders began to think about building
more nuclear power plants, with the new purpose of generating
electricity. The actual transition being suggested in Eisenhower’s
Atoms for Peace speech was not a transition from nuclear weapons
to nuclear power plants, but rather, a transition from nuclear power
plants being used to kill people to their being used to provide
people with electricity. It was not a wish for a “new” technology,
but rather a policy to use a technology developed for mass murder
for additional, constructive uses.
Nuclear power plants were invented as part of the Manhattan
Project two and a half years before the project succeeded inbuilding a nuclear weapon. The ﬁrst 13 nuclear power plants built
in the United States did not generate electricity, but only plutonium
for weapons of mass destruction. This is the origin of nuclear
power.
(Professor at HPI)

Philippines Perspectives Regarding Japanese Army Stragglers:
The Search Operations on Lubang Island
On March 12, 1974, Hiroo Onoda, a former Second Lieutenant in theJapanese Imperial Army, returned to Japan for the ﬁrst time in about 30
years from Lubang Island in the Philippines. His return was jubilantly
welcomed by people in Japan, who praised him as a “hero.” Even after
the end of World War II, Onoda had refused to surrender and survived
nearly three decades hiding in the jungle. Perhaps the Japanese people
were surprised at the news that the former solider in a tattered militaryuniform had emerged from the jungle, and pleased at his safe returnhome.
On the other hand, around that time, the local people living on
Lubang Island felt relieved to hear that he had left the island. Why? The
story of this Japanese army straggler has generally been told from theangle of Onoda. In this paper, however, I would like to review this topic
from the perspective of the Philippines.
Even after the war ended in August 1945, 55 Japanese soldiersrefused to surrender and hid in the jungle on Lubang Island. By the endof March 1946, 48 of them had surrendered, with another three soldierskilled during a clash with U.S. troops. Second Lieutenant Onoda andthree other soldiers remained hidden in the jungle. Around July, 1950,
one of the four, Private Yūichi Akatsu walked away from the others tosurrender. This clariﬁed that three soldiers were still alive.
People living on the peaceful island of Lubang deeply feared theJapanese soldiers who remained after the end of the war. These Japanesearmy stragglers posed a threat to local people’s lives and property. Since
their lives were at risk even while farming in the mountains, local people
requested several times that the Philippine government ﬁnd the Japanesesoldiers hiding in the jungle. On May 7, 1954, Philippine Army Scout
Rangers encountered the three remaining Japanese soldiers in Gonting,located on the south of the island, where one of them, Corporal Shōichi
Shimada, was shot dead. Second Lieutenant Onoda and Private Kinshichi
Kozuka ran away from the site. Shortly after that, the families of thesetwo Japanese soldiers and an oﬃcial of the Japanese Ministry of Healthand Welfare were sent to Lubang Island as a “Settoku tai (persuasionteam).” Although a search was conducted for about three weeks fromthe end of May to the middle of June, they could not ﬁnd the soldiers.
Subsequently, the residents suﬀered a series of incidents, in which people
and animals were killed, apparently by the remaining Japanese soldiers.
In January 1959 a local resident was shot and his carabao(water buﬀalo) also shot to death. In February of the same year a local
construction worker was also killed. The local people demanded that
the Philippine government take appropriate action, and as a result,the Philippine Constabulary (PC) began an operation to subdue theremaining soldiers. Hearing this news, the Japanese government
dispatched a search team, including members of the Onoda and Kozuka
families. From May to December the Japanese team conducted massive
search operations with the Filipino team. Nevertheless, no tracesindicating they were still alive was found, and on December 9, 1959
an official statement was released to announce the death of the tworemaining soldiers. Subsequently, the oﬃcial view was that no Japanesesoldiers remained on Lubang Island. Needless to say, however, this did
not convince the local people.
This situation changed dramatically after an incident that occurred
on October 19, 1972, in which Kozuka was shot to death. Local residents
found Onoda and Kozuka burning piles of rice that the farmers had
harvested, and reported it to the PC, which rushed to the site. In the
resulting gunﬁght between the PC and the two men, Kozuka was shotand killed, but Onoda escaped. After this incident, which revealed
that Onoda was still alive, Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos
assigned the task of searching for him to the Philippine Air Force (PAF),
in place of the PC. President Marcos then gave the PAF strict orders
not to kill Onoda. Additionally the Philippine government promised theJapanese oﬃcials that as soon as Onoda was taken into custody, it would
transfer him to the Japanese government. What lay behind this promise
was diplomatic considerations given by the Macros administration, that
adopted a friendly policy towards Japan.
In October 1972 the Philippines President’s oﬃce organized “Task
Force Onoda,” to search for Onoda. PAF Lieutenant Colonel Pedro
D. Juachon, security officer for the Executive Secretary, was put in

Hitoshi Nagai

charge. Juachon was given the mission of taking Onoda into custody
alive by Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor, Jr. Since he wasaware of the anger of the local people who had been besieged by theJapanese soldiers, Juachon felt the need to forbear their revenge. For
this reason, soon after his arrival on Lubang Island, Juachon assembled
the local people to explain the purpose of the search and ask for theirunderstanding and cooperation. At the same time, Juachon said that if
someone tried to kill Onoda, he would kill that person, displaying hisstrong commitment to accomplish the mission.
“Task Force Onoda” involved collaboration among the PAF,
the local people and the delegation (search team) from the Japanese
government. Juachon emphasized to the Philippine parties concernedthat the task force’s mission was to rescue Onoda without injury, andthat even if they came across Onoda and he shot at them, they must
not respond to his attack but retreat. Although the search operations
continued for about half a year from October 1972, the task force was
not able to find Onoda, and the search was called off on April 15 thefollowing year.
The situation was ﬁnally resolved by Norio Suzuki, a 24-year-old
Japanese adventurer. This young man had traveled to Lubang Island tolook for Onoda independently. Suzuki camped there with cooperationfrom the town mayor and others, and finally encountered Onoda on
February 20, 1974. Onoda promised Suzuki he would surrender, on thecondition of an order from his superior. The two men then separated,
and immediately former Major Yoshimi Taniguchi, Onoda’s former
commanding officer, was dispatched to the island. On the evening ofMarch 9, 1974, Onoda showed up before Taniguchi and Suzuki at acamp on the island, and at last surrendered upon receiving a verbal orderfrom Taniguchi that released him from his military duties.
There were several factors that urged Onoda to surrender himself.
It is certain that the order from his superior was an important factor,
but what should not be overlooked was the search efforts by both thePhilippine and Japanese governments. The former soldier had heard his
family members’ voices, thoroughly read newspapers left by the searchteam, and lastly encountered a young Japanese man who was camping
by himself. Onoda later said that, judging from these facts, he came tobelieve that “it was a hundred-to-one odds” that the war was indeed over,which convinced him to surrender. If that was true, we could say that the
search eﬀorts by the Japanese and Philippine authorities were also key
factors that moved his heart and paved the way for his surrender.
On March 10, Onoda descended the mountain, under the escort of
PAF oﬃcers. This was probably done in anticipation of any unforeseen
problems, such as an attack against Onoda by local people. During thenight on the same day, the former soldier arrived at the air force stationon the island, and surrendered to PAF Commanding General Jose L.
Rancudo. In the morning of March 11, Onoda was transferred from
Lubang Island to Manila by PAF helicopter. He then paid a courtesy visit
to President Marcos at Malacañang Palace, where the president extended
a “full and complete pardon to Lt. Onoda for any violations he may havecommitted during and after the war.” The following day, Onoda returned
to Japan.
Many efforts by Philippine and Japanese parties concerned werebehind the rescue of former Second Lieutenant Onoda. Certainly, thenewspapers left by the Japanese search team, his family’s requests forhis appearance, and the order from his commanding oﬃcer played key
roles in accomplishing Onoda’s surrender. However, we should not makelight of the responses from the Philippine government that created these
conditions. What should be noted is that these measures were taken
by restraining the anger and frustration of the victims of the residents
on Lubang Island—some of whom were killed or injured, and others
deprived of their property by Japanese soldiers (after all, no individualcompensations were made for the victims). On March 12, 1974, Onoda
safely returned home, without facing worst-case scenarios, including
the occurrence of any gunﬁght or any causalities. However, behind thescenes, the local people who had been victimized by the Japanese army
stragglers were forced to be silent due to diplomatic considerations.
(Professor at HPI)

Visit HPI s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace̲e/5Public Relations in Postwar Britain and Japan:
Fieldwork at the National Archives of the United Kingdom

Kyungjin Ha
Between March 19 and 23, 2019, I visited the National Archives of theUnited Kingdom (TNA) located in Richmond upon Thames in southwest
London. The main purpose was to investigate records on the activitiesof the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) in and around
Hiroshima. However, I was able to find reference materials that weremore informative than expected, which made the fieldwork fruitful.
Based on the research findings, this paper attempts to broaden theperspective in understanding the history of public relations in postwar
Japan.
To begin with, I would like to mention that “Public Relations in
Postwar Britain and Japan” is a very rare theme. Conventional studies on
public relations in Japan—in particular, historical research to investigate
its origin and starting point—have attached primary importance to theUnited States. The reason behind this is related to the trend in studies
on the occupation of Japan, which form the foundation for research into
the history of public relations. While studies on the occupation of Japanare supposed to focus on the General Headquarters of the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), these studies haveclariﬁed the actual conditions of the occupation, almost wholly centeringon the U.S. military. Also, public relations studies have put a spotlighton how the GHQ’s occupational policy awakened political and economic
entities in postwar Japan to work as practitioners of public relations,based on the assumption that the occupation forces were equal to the U.S.
military.
I have no intention of raising any objections to these arguments.
However, some issues remain to be discussed to provide deeper insight
into this history. Even if the occupation of Japan was conducted undera power structure with the U.S. military as the de facto head, the GHQ
was an organ of the Allied Powers, and various countries dispatched
their military organizations to reside in Japan during the occupation
period. Hiroshima and its surrounding areas came under the control of
the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF), which consistedof British, Australian, New Zealand, and British-ruled Indian militaryforces. As pointed out in the book Eirenpogun no nihon shinchu to tenkai(British Commonwealth Occupation Force’s presence and deployment
in Japan) by Takeshi Chida (published in 1997 by Ochanomizu Shobo)
and other related works, the BCOF units in charge of the Chugoku andShikoku regions often had diﬀerent views from those of the GHQ andthe military government that executed GHQ directives, while working incooperation with them in performing their duties.
Going back to the history of public relations, the GHQ and themilitary government made suggestions to the prefectural governments
nationwide to install units responsible for public relations activities(called the Public Relations Oﬃce, or PRO). The aim was to encourage
the country to reﬂect its public’s opinions in information disclosure andpolicymaking, thereby advancing Japan’s administrative democratizationand establishing interactive relationships between the government
and the private sector. On the one hand, the GHQ and the military
government formulated a code and practiced censorship to eliminate
obstacles to the occupation; on the other hand, they sought to havedemocratic communication take root in Japan. That attempt was itself
ironic.
In light of the above history, we can consider that after WorldWar II public relations was transplanted by the GHQ, in the course ofreforming Japan’s militaristic and autocratic politics and government
into advanced, democratic ones. However, this research has highlighted
an issue regarding public relations in occupied Japan that cannot be fully
explained by this simple theory. Specifically, there was a model other

6

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.22 No.1, October 2019

than the American military for advancing democracy.
The major duties of the BCOF were to maintain security in the
Chugoku and Shikoku regions, including the disarmament of Japan’sarmy and naval forces, disposal of discarded weapons, and crackdown
on black markets and unlawful immigration. Civic administration wasunder the charge of the U.S. military. However, the BCOF carriedout extensive sanitary, education and cultural programs, to meet theneed for establishing friendly relationships with multilateral militaryorganizations and soldiers, as well as with local residents whom the
BCOF contacted while fulfilling their duties. Furthermore, the BCOF
placed emphasis on activities to communicate information not only to theGHQ, but also to governments and people of countries comprising the
British Commonwealth. For example, the BCOF published an original
newspaper to explain the signiﬁcance and achievements of its activities
and cultivate their support. In postwar Japan, the BCOF played a keyrole not only in enforcing the occupation, but also in practicing public
relations at the same time.
Also, a relationship of tension regarding public relations can beobserved between the GHQ and the BCOF. The reference materials that
I obtained during this research include many documents that clearlyshow an aspect of the BCOF as an observer that attentively watched
the information dissemination and communication activities conductedby the GHQ (primarily the U.S. military). In some reports, the BCOF
analyzed that the U.S. activities that extensively covered diverse ﬁelds,such as public relations, advertising, secret intelligence, censorship andculture, would ultimately lead to the “Americanization” of Japan. These
reports were carefully studied and discussed by relevant divisions of the
British government. The author considers that the BCOF provided the
U.K. and other Commonwealth countries with important perspectives tobe integrated when these nations conceived their strategies against Japan,
while referencing the U.S. approaches.
The BCOF and its public relations activities in the regions under
its jurisdiction made up only a small part of the larger picture of theoccupation. Nevertheless, records left by the BCOF prompt us tolook into the occupation of Japan in a multifaceted manner. In otherwords, the BCOF records highlight the fact that the occupation, whose
objectives were to reconstruct Japanese society and transform theJapanese people’s mindset, was carried out by various forces that had
different motives within the Allied Powers. Among other things, theBCOF records indicate that America/the U.S. military, which played acentral role, had implications not only for Japanese society and people,
but also for each county involved in the occupation and reform of Japan,
inﬂuencing their identity as enforcers of the occupation.
The above perspective will open the possibility for a newinterpretation of public relations, which is regarded to have been
introduced to Japan to advance postwar democracy. Notably, byrevisiting whether there were any other elements than “America” during
the process in which public relations became widespread in various
parts of occupied Japan, we can examine the history of postwar public
relations and how it should be conducted. As the cases of the BCOF
and the British government suggest, the pluralistic enforcers of Japan’s
occupation directed close attention to the U.S. military and its public
relations approach. Their attention focused ﬁrst only on public relations
that the U.S. conducted in occupied Japan, then grew to cover public
relations in American society as a whole. Tracing this process mightenable us to obtain clues to better understand the global expansion of
public relations after World War II.
(Associate Professor at HPI)

Hello from HPIOSHIBA Ryo

OKIMURA Tadashi

Dr. Ryo Oshiba was born in Hyogo
Prefecture in 1954. He graduated from the
Department of Law, Hitotsubashi University.
He holds an M.A. from the Graduate Schoolof Law at Hitotsubashi University and a Ph.D.
in Political Science from the doctoral course at
Yale University. Before taking his present post at HPI in April
2019, Dr. Oshiba served as Associate Professor in the Facultyof Law, Sophia University; Professor in the Department of Law,
Hitotsubashi University and Vice President of the same university;and Professor at the School of International Politics, Economics andCommunication, Aoyama Gakuin University. He also was Presidentof the Japan Association of International Relations (2004–2006).
He specializes in international relations. His publications include:[Single-authored] Kokusai soshiki no seiji keizaigaku (Political
economy of international organizations) published by Yuhikaku
Publishing in 1994, and Kokusai seiji riron (Theories of international
politics) from Minerva Shobo in 2016; [Authored/edited] Nihon no
gaiko (dai 5 kan) Taigai seisaku––Kadai hen (Japan’s diplomacy,
vol. 5, challenges in diplomatic policy), published by Iwanami
Shoten in 2013; and [Coauthored/edited] Power kara yomitoku,
global governance ron (Power shifts and global governance),
published by Yuhikaku Publishing in 2018.

Having grown up in Tokyo, Dr. Tadashi
Okimura graduated from undergraduate
studies at the College of Arts and Sciences,
University of Tokyo. He then obtained his
M.A. in government and politics from the
University of Maryland in the United States, andcompleted the doctoral program without a Ph.D. degree in the
Graduate School of Law, Hitotsubashi University. Later, in 2007
he received his Ph.D. in law from the Graduate School of Law,
Hitotsubashi University. After serving as Professor in the Facultyof Policy Studies, University of Shimane, he was appointed
Professor at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City
University in April 2019. His books (coauthored) include: Gigaton
Gap–Kiko hendo to kokusai kosho (Gigaton Gap–Climate change
and international negotiations), published by Alterna in 2015; Asia
no kankyoho seisaku to Nippon (Asian environmental policies andJapan), published by Shojihomu in 2015; and Kokusai-seijigaku
nyumon (Introduction to international politics), published byMinerva Shobo in 2008.

Director / Specially Appointed Professor

Hello, I am Ryo Oshiba, and am happy to assume my new role here
at the Hiroshima Peace Institute. My specialty field is international
relations. I use a theoretical framework to study internationalorganizations that work to alleviate poverty. To achieve peace andpeacekeeping, it is vital to address the issues of reconstruction
and poverty. In the Graduate School of Peace Studies (Master’s
Degree Program) inaugurated this academic year, I will strive tonurture graduates who can understand peace studies originating in
Hiroshima, thereby cultivating individuals who can communicate
Hiroshima’s historical experiences to others in Japan and around theworld. Through our research and education activities, we want tocontribute to building and maintaining world peace as HPI aims toachieve, and to further developing local communities.

Professor

I am Tadashi Okimura. I am pleased to have joined the facultyof the Hiroshima Peace Institute from this spring. I specialize
in international relations. I have mainly studied the formationof international regimes regarding global environmental issues.
In recent years, international regimes have been formed in
an increasingly interdisciplinary manner. The Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), adopted by the UN, comprise a setof 17 goals to be achieved by 2030 that were defined based on
the premise that interrelations exist between the three aspects ofthe environment, the economy, and society. Among the goals, Goal
16, which is dedicated to the promotion of peaceful and inclusive
societies for sustainable development, is closely related to one of
the HPI’s founding objectives—contributing to realizing sustainableglobal peace and to developing local communities. In the future, I
would like to put my energies into social contribution activities, inaddition to fostering practitioners and researchers, in the Graduate
School of Peace Studies, who can work toward achieving peace.

Development of HPI Research Projects
Xianfen Xu
Since FY2000, the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) has implemented
various research projects as part of its efforts to further encourage
research activities. This ﬁscal year (FY2019), six projects were selectedfrom among many entries, bringing the total number of adopted research
projects to 33 since FY2000.
The six research projects adopted this ﬁscal year will address a wide
variety of themes. These projects are intended to pursue peace studies
from historical, local, regional, and/or global perspectives. Specificresearch themes are as follows: “Comparative Study on the Japanese War
Crime Trials: 70 Years after Their Conclusion,” “Preliminary Researchon the Cultural Construction of Hiroshima as a City of Peace: Viewing
the Hiroshima Toyo Carp as a Clue,” “Charting the Myanmar Ethnic
Peace Process,” “Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Measures throughFunding Regulations including Proliferation Financing,” “Peace, Nuclear
Weapons, and Governance Issues in Asia,” and “Experience of theEuropean Security Community: Lessons for Establishing an East Asian
Community.” Among these, “Peace, Nuclear Weapons, and Governance
Issues in Asia” is the theme of a continuing research project, underwhich a handbook of the same title was published by Kyodo News in theprevious ﬁscal year. This project aims to produce the next volume of thehandbook.
Each research project is designed as an interdisciplinary study thattranscends the boundaries of various specific academic fields, and is
carried out to achieve a concrete objective following a detailed researchplan. The respective project teams are comprised of HPI researchers andexternal research collaborators. These members work together holding
regular research meetings or conducting surveys overseas, thereby
exchanging views among researchers both in and outside Japan. Throughthese vigorous research activities, the HPI aims to deepen collaborative
research and expand the network of researchers.
The HPI will disseminate the results of its research projects widely
to outside organizations and individuals, through report presentationsat academic conferences and the publication of academic papers andresearch works. At the same time, the HPI will actively share theseresearch findings with the general public by organizing HPI public
lecture series and other events.
(Associate Professor at HPI)

Visit HPI s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace̲e/7

DIARY◆ Dec. 3‒5 Hitoshi Nagai conducts field research work andgathers oral history interviews regarding the Japanese army
stragglers on Lubang Island in the Philippines.
◆ Dec. 8 Akiko Naono gives a presentation on the atomic
bomb survivors’ movement from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s at
the Japanese Association for Contemporary Historical Studies
held at Kwansei Gakuin University.
◆ Dec. 10‒11 Gen Kikkawa, Narayanan Ganesan, Robert
Jacobs and Makiko Takemoto attend and present papers at a
joint workshop “Processes of Peace & Democratization,” heldby HPI, Catholic University Portugal and Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung at Catholic University Portugal, Lisbon, Portugal.
2019◆ Jan. 10 Xianfen Xu gives a lecture, “China in Northeast
Asia,” at a seminar for students from Kyungpook National
University at Hiroshima City University.
◆ Jan. 16 Hyun Jin Son gives a lecture, “Uniﬁcation of Korean
Peninsula,” and Kyungjin Ha gives a lecture, “Peace and Media:
Focusing on Power Industry and Public Relations in Postwar
Japan,” to the students of Kyungpook National University at
Hiroshima City University.
◆ Jan. 17 Takemoto gives a lecture, “German and Japanese
Peace Movement,” at a seminar for students from Kyungpook
National University, held at Hiroshima City University.
◆ Jan. 31 Kazumi Mizumoto attends as a committee memberof the Hiroshima Prefecture’s “Hiroshima Report Drafting
Project” meeting organized by and held at the Center for the
Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan
Institute of International Aﬀairs in Tokyo.
◆ Feb. 4 Ganesan gives a lecture, “Threats to Peace inSoutheast Asia,” to postgraduate students from Tsukuba
University at the Satellite Campus of Hiroshima City University.
◆ Feb. 8 Ha delivers a lecture, “Global Media: Politics andCommunication,” in the 4th HPI Public Lecture Series inEnglish at the Satellite Campus of Hiroshima City University.
◆ Feb. 21 Ha presents a lecture, “Historical Sociology of
Public Relations,” to media oﬃcials in a seminar organized by
the Asahi Shimbun Hiroshima Bureau.
◆ Feb. 22 Son attends an opinion exchange meeting with
the Nagasaki Youth Delegation as a commentator at Nagasaki
University.
◆ Feb. 24‒Mar. 11 Jacobs conducts ﬁeld work and gathers oral
history interviews at Chernobyl in the Ukraine and Sellaﬁeld in
the United Kingdom.
◆ Feb. 25 Tetsuo Sato’s Book Review, “Whaling in the
Antarctic: Significance and Implications of the ICJ Judgment,edited by Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Dai Tamada. Leiden/
Boston, Brill/Nijhoff, 2016. Pp. ix, 423.” is published in theJapanese Yearbook of International Law, Volume 61, 2018, pp.
333–339.
◆ Mar. 8 Kikkawa gives a lecture, “The Memory of History
and the Multilateral Security Archtecture,” at Aoyamagakuin
University. ▽Mizumoto serves as vice-chair at the 25th meetingof the Exhibition Review Committee of the Hiroshima Peace
Memorial Museum at the International Conference Center
Hiroshima.
◆ Mar. 12 Mizumoto attends the annual meeting of theAdvisory Research Group of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS● Published by● Printed by

8

December 1, 2018 ― May 31, 2019

Museum at the Museum.
◆ Mar. 25‒29 Yasuhito Fukui participates in the group of
governmental experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons System(LAWS) as an academic representative and makes a statement in
French, Geneva, Switzerland.
◆ Mar. 27 Kikkawa gives a special lecture, “The Dilemma of
Globalization and Nationalism,” at Hiroshima Shudo University.
◆ Mar. 30 Tetsuo Sato’s Book Review, “How We Could Read
ONUMA Yasuaki, International Law in a Transcivilizational
World (Cambridge University Press, 2017)” is published inTokyo Review of International Law, No. 6, 2018, pp. 159–179.
◆ Apr. 20 Akihiro Kawakami gives a public lecture, “What is
the Constitution?” at the Niho Public Hall, Hiroshima.
◆ Apr. 26 Jacobs gives a lecture, “The Problems of Longterm Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel Worldwide,” to the FourthInternational Conference on Nuclear Decommissioning andEnvironmental Recovery, INUDECO 2019, in Slavutych,
Ukraine (by Skype).
◆ Apr. 27 Fukui attends the annual conference of the Japan
Branch of the Association of International Law at the Universityof Tokyo.
◆ Apr. 30‒May 2 Fukui participates in the 3rd Preparatorycommittee for 2020 NPT Review Conference at UN
Headquarters in New York.
◆ May 3 Kawakami gives a lecture, “Abe Administration andConstitutional Revision in Japan,” hosted by the Saga Peace
Movement Center at the Mate Plaza SAGA.
◆ May 19 Sato and Fukui attend the 2019 annual meetingof the Japanese Association of World Law, held in Tokyo. ▽Kawakami participates as a panelist in the symposium, “The
Article 9 is a Treasure of Japan, Asia and the World,” at Meiji
University.
◆ May 21‒25 Ganesan gives public lectures on Southeast
Asian international relations and threats to peace at Mandalay
and Yadanabon Universities, Myanmar.
◆ May 23 Son gives a presentation, “Japan’s Policy towards
ASEAN,” at the workshop “Change in International Strategic
Environment and South Korea’s New South Policy,” at the
Korea Institute for National Uniﬁcation, Gangwon-do, Korea.
◆ May 26 Mizumoto attends the 1st meeting on the Peace
Declaration organized by the City of Hiroshima at theInternational Conference Center Hiroshima. ▽Takemoto gives
a paper, “German Pacifism and Peace Movements in the 20th
Century: Its Continuity and Break,” at the annual meeting of theHistorical Science Society of Japan at Rikkyo University.
◆ May 28 Xu gives a lecture, “Sino-US-Japan Triangular
Relations,” at the School of History, Capital Normal University,
Beijing.
◆ May 30 Ryo Oshiba gives a presentation, “Resilient Peace,”at the Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity, Jeju, Korea.

Vol.22 No.1（October 1, 2019）

Editorial Committee (Yasuhito Fukui, Robert Jacobs, Hitoshi Nagai, Xianfen Xu), Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University
3-4-1, Ozuka-higashi, Asaminami-ku, Hiroshima, 731-3194 Japan
Phone: +81（0）82 830 1811
Fax: +81（0）82 830 1812
E-mail: office-peace@m.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp
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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.22 No.1, October 2019

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