Tentative translation

Security Trade Control Guidelines for Researchers(Concise Version)
Japan Society for Intellectual Production
This is a concise version of the “Security Trade Control Guidelines for Researchers”. These
guidelines were created for university personnel who may have to deal with the security-relatedtrade controls in the course of their work, including faculty members engaged in research andclerical staff, in order to facilitate understanding of how export controls can apply toresearch-related exports. The Japan Society for Intellectual Production revised these guidelines
in March 2011 in cooperation with relevant government agencies to reflect revisions that weremade to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (hereinafter, “Foreign Exchange Act”) in
April 2009.
1. Academic Research and Security Trade Controls
The Foreign Exchange Act was created not only to control economic transactions between
Japan and other countries, but also to ensure “the maintenance of peace and security in Japanand in the international community”. The security-related trade controls implemented under thisAct cover a wide range of transactions, including the export of materials and equipment (referred
to in the Act, and hereinafter, as “goods” ) that could potentially be used in the production ordevelopment of weapons, as well as the international transfer of technology that could be used
for that same purpose (referred to in the Act as “provision of services”). Under the provisions of
the Foreign Exchange Act, activities related to international student exchange programs
that could fall subject to security-related trade controls include the export of researchequipment, chemical substances, and microorganisms; sponsored research orcollaborative research involving foreign governments or overseas companies; technicalguidance to companies based overseas; and the acceptance of foreign researchers andinternational students.
Nowadays, there is no research field in the sciences that is completely devoid of any connection
to military technology. Given the recent trend toward interdisciplinary research, what is of mostconcern is the possibility that research-related goods that have left Japan’s borders
without being picked up as a security threat could end up contributing to thedevelopment, production or operation of weapons of mass destruction (hereinafter,“WMDs”) or conventional weapons. It may happen that, having failed to find out enoughinformation about the person’s home university and background, a university could unknowingly
accept an international researcher or student who is connected to one of the foreign institutions
that are subject to heightened trade controls. If the international researcher or student thereby
gains access to a dual-use technology, it could pose a threat to Japan’s national security andalso undermine the trust that the international community places in our country. This is why
universities that are actively engaged in international exchange programs are required to
implement measures to ensure that security-related trade controls are correctly applied.
Research fields in science and engineering that are particularly likely to fall subject toexport controls include nuclear science, aerospace, chemistry, biology, precisionengineering (including control engineering, electronic engineering and mechanicalengineering), and information engineering (including communication engineering andsoftware engineering). However, there are, needless to say, other research fields that may also1Tentative translation

be subject to controls.
2. Research fields, such as those that can be linked to WMDs, where controls are likely
to apply
The primary purpose of security-related export controls is to control the transnational
movement of conventional weapons and WMDs. All countries that participate in international
trade-control agreements have in place their own legislation to implement these controls. Goods
that are subject to international control include general-purpose items for civilian use (forexample, golf clubs), as well as materials that could be used to build weapons, such as the
carbon fibers used in the construction of missiles. The export of these goods should therefore beundertaken with great caution.
Specific items that are subject to controls under Japan’s trade control laws are listed in a
Ministerial Ordinance of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). The Foreign
Exchange Act requires that a license be granted by METI before any research-related goods thatfall under any of the categories on this list are exported, or before any technology that could be
used in the design, production or operation of these goods is transferred internationally (for the
purpose of conducting international collaborative research, providing technical assistance,
granting internships, etc.). These controls that are imposed on particular categories of goods andtechnology are referred to as “list controls”. But even where the general-purpose item or
technology in question are not found to match the technical specifications stated on the control
lists, depending on the country of the end-user, other controls may apply, and exporters may berequired to investigate the proposed end-user and end-use. If that investigation uncovers any
possibility that the export could be diverted to weapons programs, the exporter will be
required to apply for an export license. These additional controls include WMD catch-all
controls and complementary export controls for conventional weapons, and shall hereinafter bereferred to collectively as “catch-all controls”. 1
1)

For details of list controls and catch-all controls, please visit METI’s Security Trade Control
Policy Division website, at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/index.html.

It is important to note that security-related trade controls under the Foreign Exchange Act
do not prohibit the export of controlled items: they simply require the exporter to obtain alicense before exporting these items. The fact that a license is required in order to export
certain goods or technology should not deter exporters from trying to send the item in question toan overseas university or company. In fact, exports of goods and technology for research-related
purposes are actually unlikely to be forbidden on the grounds of security.
Universities in Japan do not conduct research directly related to WMDs. Having said that, someresearch conducted in Japan may involve the handling of goods on the control lists that
could potentially form part of, or be used to manufacture, WMDs, or the technology used
to design, produce and operate WMDs. Here are some examples of such fields of research:(i) Nuclear Power:
Research on the excitation scheme of 235U using dye laser beams; Research on dry
reprocessing using metal electrolysis process of spent metal fuel; Research on the nuclear
properties of hafnium, etc.

2Tentative translation(ii) Aerospace:
Research on methods of producing carbon fiber-reinforced carbon (C/C composite);
Research into the design of flying objects built with carbon-fiber-reinforced resin (CFRP)
composite and the production of their prototypes, etc.
(iii) Chemistry
It is not easy to isolate specific examples of research subjects in the field of chemistry thathave the potential to be diverted into chemical weapons research. Having said that, we canmention research involving the use, or generation as a by-product, of certain chemical
substances that can also be used in the production of chemical weapons.
(iv) Biology
Research on Bacillus anthracis, Research on botulin toxin, etc.
Control lists also cover conventional weapons. Examples of research subjects linked toconventional weapons that are subject to export control include research on high-resolution
infra-red imaging systems, and research on high-performance piezo-ceramic oscillators used forsonar.
3. Cases where the proposed end-user and end-use of goods or technology is subject toadvance screening
Depending on the country of destination, there are some cases where, even if the goods
to be exported, or the technology to be transferred, are not included on the control lists,
catch-all controls apply and the exporter is required to obtain a license before going
through with the export or transfer. Catch-all controls apply when the proposed end-user
or end-use of the export may be implicated in the development, production or operation of
weapons. Catch-all controls only apply to exports to countries that are not so-called “whitecountries”: that is, that do not enforce strict export controls.2 You can therefore easily find out
whether catch-all controls will apply by checking whether the proposed end-user is in
one of the “white countries”.
Note 2) Check this webpage to see the list of “white countries”:
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/kanri/catch-all/bepyoudai3nokuni.htm

METI has also provided a list of 40 general-purpose items that are not on the control lists but thatare of particular concern due to their potential use in the development, manufacture andoperation of WMDs. In addition, Item (i), Section 16, Appendix 1 of the Export Trade Control
Ordinance lists 32 items that could be used in the production of conventional weapons (see the
METI Security Trade Control Policy Division site). Under catch-all controls, even if the goodsin question are not identified on the control lists, if they are being transferred to a
country other than one of the “white countries”, the proposed end-user and end-use of
the exported items will be subject to thorough screening. Here are some examples ofresearch areas, and related items, that may be subject to controls:
(i)

(ii)

Research on precise velocity control of synchronous induction electric motors; Researchon measures against deviated interphase load variation in three-phase AC transmission.
Related items: Frequency changers.
Research on vehicle suspension systems; Research on the mechanical properties ofanti-vibration rubber (or elastomer); Research on packaging technology for electronic3Tentative translation

components. Related items: Vibration test equipment.
(iii) Research on reduction of residual stress in molding carbon-fiber-reinforced resin
composite (CFRP) thin plates; Research on technology for fabricating CFRP plates (inparticular, bonding techniques); Research on technology for carbon fiber production anddevelopment of carbon-fiber spinning and weaving technology. Related item: Composite
material incorporating carbon fibers.
(iv) Research on attitude control (artificial semicircular canals) in humanoid robots; Research
on anti-skid mechanisms for vehicles; Research on stand-alone car navigation systems.
Related item: Gyroscopes.
METI has also provided a “Foreign End-User List” , 3 which lists foreign institutions thatare suspected of being involved in the development, production and operation of WMDs(see the METI Security Trade Control Policy Division website). Unless it is clear that the goods ortechnology in question will not be used in the development of WMDs, anyone wishing to conduct
research with any of these institutions, or wishing to provide them with goods or technology, is
first required to obtain a license from METI. This list names particular universities andresearch institutions, and caution is required when providing goods or technology toresearchers or international students who are affiliated with one of these institutions. The Foreign
End-User List is occasionally revised to reflect the evolving situation in Japan and overseas, anduniversities in Japan are expected to keep up-to-date with the latest information.
3) You can consult the Foreign End-User List here:
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/law05.html#gaikokuuserlist
4. Steps exporters should take when they think an item may be subject to export control
When a researcher is preparing to export research-related goods or technology to a foreign
institution, it is the university to which that researcher belongs that has the primary legal
responsibility to determinate whether or not it is necessary to apply for a license. First, afaculty member who is actually involved in the research (hereinafter, “you”) needs to check
whether or not the goods or service to be provided fall subject to export control legislation, which
can be done by consulting the “Goods and Technology Matrix” (the Excel version has asearch function) that can be accessed via METI’s Security Trade Control Policy Divisionwebsite (see Note 1). If you can access it, the “Reference Classification for Applicability
Judgment (Compass)”, available on the old version of the website, is another resource that canhelp you determine whether controls may apply, although you should be aware that this list does
not incorporate recent revisions to the Order and Ministerial Ordinances. If, having consulted
these resources, you determine that your export is likely to be subject to export control legislation,
you will need to take the following steps.
If the institution to which you belong has implemented an effective security trade control support
system, the first step is to seek advice from the university office that is in charge of export control.
When seeking advice, you should be prepared to provide detailed information including the
proposed end-user’s name, country and primary field of work, and to account for how theend-user will use the goods or technology in question. You should also follow any institutional
export-control approval procedures that your institution has in place. The office in charge ofexport control will carefully review the information you have provided to determine whether or not
the proposed export or transfer is subject to export-control legislation. If they find that it is, you

4Tentative translation

will be required to apply to METI for a license. Whether or not a license can be granted will be
determined according to the following criteria:(i) Whether it is probable that the goods or technology will actually reach the proposed enduser(ii) Whether it is probable that the end-user identified in the application will be the one toactually use the goods or technology provided(iii) Whether it is probable that the goods or technology provided, as well as any goods to be
produced using the technology provided, will be used in a way that could pose a threat tointernational peace and security(iv) Whether it is probable that the goods or technology provided will be managed properly by
the end-user
If, on the other hand, your university or institution does NOT have an effective security
trade control support system in place, you should first consult with the university office incharge of research support or social collaboration. In general, any proposed transfer of university
equipment needs to be authorized by the university office in charge of supplies and property
management (or financial affairs). You should therefore discuss details of your plans with thisoffice, and find out what authorization procedures your university has in place regarding security
trade control exports under the Foreign Exchange Act. Above all, it is vital that you
thoroughly review the specifications of the goods or technology to be exported to findout which legislation applies. To do so, you can, as mentioned above, consult the “Goods andTechnology Matrix”, as well as the “Compass” resource that is available on METI’s Security
Trade Control Policy Division website (the old version).

5

Tentative translation

Start

(i)

Are the goods ortechnology listed on thecontrol lists?

Yes

No
(ii)

Is
the end-userYesin one of the “whitecountries”?

No
(iii)

Is the end-user
identified on the “Foreign
No
End-User List”?

(iii)

Yes

Yes

Is
the proposed use of thegoods or technology identified
as a “category of concern” inthe “Foreign End-User List”?

No
(iv)

(iv)

Do you havethe proposed use Yes information that could raise
No Is obviouslyof noconcerns about theconcern?

activities of the end-user(links to the military, etc.)?

Yes

No
(v)

Are the goods or technology
provided likely
to be used in WMD
programs?

Yes

No
(v)

Is theend-user in astate or region that is
subject to a UN arms
embargo”?

No

Yes
(v)

Are they likely
to be used in thedevelopment or use of
conventional
weapons?

Yes

Yes

No
(vi)

Did
METI instruct you toapply?

No
Apply for license

Note: “(i)” to “(vi)” correspond to the steps on thenext page.

Application
NOT necessary

Fig. 1 Flowchart to determine whether you need to apply for an export license.

6

Tentative translation

The flowchart in Figure 1 shows the steps you should take to determine whether or not you arerequired to apply for an export license. Simply follow the steps in the order written below to makea quick and accurate judgment:(i) Check if the goods or technology in question are listed on the control lists. If yes,
unless your export is subject to an exemption, you will need to apply for a license.
(ii) If not, check if the end-user’s address (domicile) is in one of the “white countries”.
If it is, you don’t need to apply for a license.
(iii) If your export is not listed on the control lists, but the end-user’s address(domicile) is not in one of the “white countries”, check if the end-user is listed in
the “Foreign End-User List”. If you find the end-user’s name in the Foreign End-User
List, your export is highly likely to be subject to WMD catch-all controls (see Part 3). In
particular, it is essential to apply for a license when the “category of concern” that theForeign End-User List assigns to the end-user in question covers the proposed use of thegoods or technology you are providing. In addition, please check carefully to see whether
your export includes goods or technology listed as “examples of goods that are highly
likely to be used in the development of WMDs (40 items)”, as explained in Part 3 above.
(iv) Even if, on the basis of Step 3, a license application does not seem necessary to export
to the end-user in question, it is still necessary to understand the nature of theend-user’s activities, and to determine whether they may have any connections tomilitary-related institutions, etc. If you have any suspicions that the end-user may be
involved in any way in the development of WMDs, you will need to apply for a license.
(v) Even if, on the basis of Step 4, the end-user is determined to pose no threat, in order tobe sure whether or not the export is subject to WMD catch-all controls, you now need toverify how the items you are providing are going to be used. In addition, if the end-user isin a state or region that is subject to a UN arms embargo, you will need to carry out
an additional review to determine whether the goods or technology you areproviding are likely to be used in the development, production or operation of
conventional weapons. If yes, you will need to apply for a license.
(vi) Finally, even if, on the basis of Step 5 above, you have determined that you do not need
to apply for a license, check whether METI has sent you a special notice concerning
the export of the goods or technology in question. If yes, you will need to apply for alicense. However, catch-all controls will not apply where the export is a technology that isin the public domain (that is accessible to more than a small group of people).
Documents required for the application, and the office to which your application must be
submitted, are detailed on the Security Trade Control Policy Division’s website under“Application Procedures”, for “Goods” and “Technology”. If you have any questions orconcerns regarding license applications, you can contact the Regional Bureau of
Economy, Trade and Industry, or the METI Security Export Licensing Division (Phone:
03-3501-2801). Before making an enquiry, please prepare all the information you’ll need,including, for control lists, the specific name of the item in the order along with its technicalspecifications, and for catch-all control, the country of the end-user, the item’s classification in
the Customs Tariff Table, the use to which the item will be put, and verified information on theend-user. Having all this information to hand will help the office to respond to your enquiry in full.
For details, such as office hours, please check the following URL:
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/kanri/tetsuzuki/madoguchi/main.html.
Copyright March 2011, Japan Society for Intellectual Production
These Guidelines are an English translation of a copyrighted work of Japan Society for Intellectual Production.
This English translation of the Guidelines was prepared by the7Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate
University (OIST). Japan Society for Intellectual Production is not responsible for the translated English text.