Tentative translation

Revised 2nd Edition

Security Trade
Control Guidelines
for researchers in universities and otherinstitutions of higher education

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  Japan Society for Intellectual Production

Tentative translation

Security Trade Control Guidelines for Researchers: Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION

1

Layout of these guidelines

2

1. Academic research activities and security trade controls

3(1) Researchers’ questions about security trade controls

3(2) Hypothetical case studies and practical advice for researchers6

2. Examples of implicated research fields, including those linked to WMDs

11(1) Scope of security trade controls for research-related exports(list controls and catch-all controls)(2) Examples of research fields linked to WMDs (list controls)1114(3) Examples of research subjects linked to weapons other than WMDs
(conventional weapons) and applicability judgments (list controls)
3. Cases where the end-user and end-use of goods or technology are subject to advance screening

23
26(1) Investigating the end-user and the end-use (catch-all controls; procedures for general-purpose items that are notsubject to list controls)

26(2) Examples of goods and research subjects that are very closely linked to thedevelopment of weapons (specific examples of items subject to catch-all controls)

26(3) End-users suspected to be involved in WMD programs(institutions on the Foreign End User List)
4. Steps exporters should take when they think an item may be subject to export control legislation

2931(1) When the exporter’s university or institution has implemented an effective security trade control support system 31(2) When the exporter’s university or institution does NOT have an effective security trade control support system 32(3) Contact offices for enquiries regarding export control legislation (determining whether or not an export is subject tocontrols)

36(4) The issue of the extraterritorial application of U.S. Export Administration Regulations (supplement)

36

5. Basic statistical data

38(1) Personnel-related statistical data

38(2) Research-related statistical data

39

[Statistics]

39[Questionnaire survey]

41(3) Export license-related data

45

Annex 1 Example of a research field classification system in the field of nuclear power46

Annex 2 Example of a research field classification system in the field of aerospace49

Annex 3 Toxic chemical substances that are subject to security trade controls

52

Annex 4 Viruses, bacteria, etc., subject to security trade controls

54

Annex 5 Hypothetical problems involving export controls at universities

56

REFERENCES
AFTERWORD
Index

Tentative translation

INTRODUCTION
These guidelines have been created for all university personnel who may have to deal withsecurity trade controls in the course of their work, including researchers and administrators
involved in international exchange programs. Their purpose is to help everyone to understandhow security trade controls apply to research-related exports.
While the majority of university personnel may not be familiar with the Foreign Exchange andForeign Trade Act (hereinafter, “Foreign Exchange Act” [these guidelines cover the provisions
regarding controls on foreign trade]), controls enforced under this Act do in fact cover a wide
range of university activities. For this reason, before participating in programs or activities thatinvolve foreign people or transactions, faculty members need to check whether any aspect of theplanned activity may be controlled under this Act. Also, further to a partial revision of the Act inApril 2009, each exporter is now legally required to identify the party responsible for determining
whether an export license is required. Everyone working for universities must therefore
familiarize themselves with the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Act, even as they apply tocommonplace activities like international exchange programs, paying particular attention to
the provisions related to security trade controls.
However, the reality is that many major universities that run active international exchange
programs have yet to establish institution-based systems to deal with security trade controls. In
addition, many of their personnel are not fully aware that, in order to be run successfully andsafely, international programs are required to comply with security trade control regulations. Thissituation is compounded by the fact that, as the population decreases and their are fewer young
Japanese to fill university places, more universities are expanding their international exchange
programs in a bid to maintain student numbers.
In order to help Japanese universities promote their international exchange programs, including
industry-academia collaborations involving foreign companies, the Japan Society for Intellectual
Production has developed these guidelines, along with our “Guidelines for Establishing and
Implementing a Voluntary Control System for Security Trade”. These guidelines are intended to
be of reference to faculty members and others who actually deal with security trade controls in
the course of their research work or in connection with international exchange programs, and theother set of guidelines is primarily intended to help organizations establish their own internal
systems for dealing with security trade controls. With the aim of supporting universities in fulfilling
their social responsibilities as members of the community, and in order to allow faculty
members and staff the freedom to focus on performing their day-to-day work, in thesepages we will explain in a simple manner how security trade control regulations may apply
to international academic exchange programs, and shall clearly outline steps that
researchers and other staff need to follow as they proceed in their research activities.
It should be noted that certain academic activities are exempt from security trade controls under
the Foreign Exchange Act, and as such will not be covered in these guidelines, including basic
scientific research that is not focused on technical application (i.e., research that employs atheoretical or experimental methodology, and whose primary purpose is not to design or produce
specific products but to explore principles of natural science), and general “educational” activities
using materials like textbooks.
Japan Society for Intellectual Production1Tentative translation[Layout of these guidelines]
These guidelines have been broken down into the following chapters:
1. Academic research activities and security trade controls;
2. Examples of implicated research fields, including those linked to WMDs;
3. Cases where the end-user and end-use of goods or technology are subject to advancescreening;
4. Steps exporters should take when they think an item may be subject to export control legislation;
and
5. Basic statistical data.
In Chapter One, we explain that when it comes to international academic exchange programs, there
is no research field that is totally exempt from security trade controls, and offer some precautions forresearchers who are involved in these programs. We then describe some realistic, fictional scenariosthat will help researchers and university personnel understand how export controls are applied, andthat will highlight some of the less obvious areas where there is a risk of security trade control
violations in the context of international academic exchange. If you don’t understand how security
trade controls apply to academic research activities, we recommend you to read Chapter One
first.
In Chapter Two, we start by explaining the framework of security trade controls (in particular, “listcontrols”). We then provide examples of subjects within each of the major research fields that are
most likely to be implicated in the “export” of items, or international transfer of technology, that could
potentially be used in the development, production, and use of WMDs or conventional weapons (inthese guidelines, the term “export” is not limited to the conventional sense of buying and selling, butalso indicates bringing or sending items out of Japan). If you already understand the importance of
security trade controls in universities and would like to know more specific information regarding
the status of your research subject under the Foreign Exchange Act , please start readingfrom Chapter Two.
In Chapter Three, we explain that, even if the item to be exported or the technology to be transferred
is not explicitly listed on the control lists explained in Chapter Two, there are certain cases (subject to“catch-all controls”) where the exporter will still be required to apply to the Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry (METI) for an export license. If you are already involved in international
research-related exchange activities, and have understood how list controls are applied, buthave questions or concerns regarding license requirements in particular cases, please startreading from Chapter Three.
In Chapter Four, we explain specific steps to be taken when an export or international transfer oftechnology is found to be subject to legal controls. If you have found out that your researchrequires you to export an item or provide a technology to another country, but you do notknow what to do next, you will find the answer in Chapter Four.
In Chapter Five, we share some basic statistical data related to security trade controls as they apply
to academic research activities.

2

Tentative translation

1. Academic Research Activities and Security Trade Controls(1) Researchers’ questions about security trade controls:[Question 1] Why do we have to deal with security trade controls in our university?
As we mentioned in the Introduction, legal controls under the Foreign Exchange Act cover a wide
range of transactions, including the transfer of funds and the export of materials and equipment(referred to in the Act, and hereinafter, as the export of “goods”). International academic
exchange often involves exports of goods (dealt with in Article 48 of the Act) and provisionsof technology (referred to in the Act as “provision of services”, and dealt with in Article 25) thatare subject to security trade controls. There are a wide range of university-based activities
that could fall subject to the provisions of this Act, including the export of researchequipment, chemical substances or microorganisms; sponsored research or collaborative
research involving foreign governments or companies; the provision of technical guidance toforeign companies; and the acceptance of foreign researchers and international students.
Universities are therefore required to implement appropriate measures for dealing with security
trade controls.
The purpose of the Foreign Exchange Act is “to enable the proper development of foreigntransactions and the maintenance of peace and security in Japan and in the international
community, and thereby to ensure equilibrium in the international balance of trade and currency
stability as well as to contribute to the sound development of the Japanese economy” (Foreign
Exchange Act, Article 1). That is, the Foreign Exchange Act was not enacted to simply control
economic transactions between Japan and other countries, but rather to support “themaintenance of peace and security in Japan and in the international community”.
Many readers might find it hard to believe that international academic exchange programs could
pose any kind of threat to security in Japan and the international community. However, let’s notforget that academic research conducted at universities involves highly sophisticated technicalknowledge in research fields such as nuclear, aerospace and microorganisms engineering. It
also entails the use of physical and chemical equipment, as well as the accumulation of theworld’s most advanced scientific technologies, chemical substances and microorganisms. All ofthese resources have the potential to be used in the development of nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons or missiles, or as their means of delivery (hereinafter, “Weapons of Mass
Destruction” or “WMDs”; the specific ways in which these resources can be diverted to WMD
programs are explained in detail below). We need to remember that leading researchers in thesefields are certainly well positioned to share and distribute their knowledge and resources.
Many readers might still object that their own research field has got nothing to do with WMDs,
and that only a few particular academic fields are subject to security trade controls. This is anunderstandable objection. However, the opposite is in fact true: nowadays, any scientificresearch field, including agriculture, medicine, dentistry and pharmacy, could potentially belinked to weapons programs. Given the recent trend toward a more interdisciplinary style ofacademic research, when viewed in their wider context, all scientific research fields can be
implicated. Researchers in certain “special research fields” that are relatively closely related to
WMDs tend to understand how their work could be used to contribute to weapons programs.
They are therefore usually fully aware of the importance of security trade controls, and3

Tentative translation

experienced in dealing with these controls in their day-to-day work. As a result, they are rarely
involved in serious violations. What is of most concern is the risk that researchers who are
unfamiliar with the regulations could unwittingly send sensitive research-related goods
out of Japan that could end up contributing to WMD programs. For instance, a researcher
in electronic engineering who lacks expertise in chemistry could unknowingly be involved in theexport of certain commercially-available, controlled chemical substances that he or she is using.
Also, universities that accept large numbers of researchers from abroad (hereinafter, “foreign
researchers”) and international students may neglect to find out enough information about eachindividual, such as the name of their home university and their personal background. But METI
has identified certain end-users and end-uses that are subject to strict security trade control
regulations (see Chapter 3, “(3) End-users suspected to be involved in WMD programs[Institutions on the Foreign End User List]”). The list names specific categories, institutions andcountries that are of particular concern. As they take in large numbers of international
researchers and students, a university may unknowingly accept someone connected with one ofthese controlled categories, institutions or countries. If that person thereby gains access to adual-use technology, it could pose a threat to Japan’s national security and also undermine thetrust that the international community places in our country.
However, simply rejecting all researchers and international students from specificcountries would be considered a form of discrimination based on nationality, somethingthat the international community has been working hard to overcome, and would thus beunacceptable from a human rights point of view. The Foreign Exchange Act was notformulated to promote such a discriminatory attitude.
As should now be clear, a wide range of university-based international exchange activities arelikely to fall subject to security controls under the Foreign Exchange Act, and it is for this reason
that universities are required to implement appropriate measures for dealing with security tradecontrols. In particular, in order to maintain and develop a free research environment that allows
faculty members to focus on their day-to-day work, universities that are actively involved ininternational exchange programs must work to increase awareness of security controls
among their staff and researchers. By increasing awareness, we can eliminate common
misconceptions researchers have about trade controls, including the idea that their own
research poses no threat and so does not fall subject, and we can also help everyone
recognize the importance of establishing effective voluntary systems for dealing withtrade controls.

[Question 2] What kind of research and activities are subject to security trade export controls?
As explained in the answer to Question 1, almost all research fields in the sciences, including
research in science, engineering, agriculture, dentistry, medicine and pharmacy, are likely to fallsubject to regulations. The primary purpose of security trade export controls (in these guidelines,
the term “export controls” also covers international transfers of technology) is to control
transnational movement of WMDs and conventional weapons (i.e., weapons other than WMDs,
such as guns, tanks and fighter jets). Therefore, the Act’s “goods” category mainly targets theseweapons, their constituent parts, and civil goods that could be used in their development (forexample, production machinery), and the “technology” category mainly targets technologies that4

Tentative translation

could be used in the design, production or use of these “goods”. The export legislation lists the
specific goods and technology for which an export license is required: when the item to beexported matches the technical specifications prescribed under the legislation, the exporter must
apply for a license (“list controls”; for details, see Chapter 2).
However, even where the goods or technology in question are not found to match the technicalspecifications stated on the control lists, depending on the country of the end-user, exporters
may still be required to confirm the scope of the end-user’s business activities as well as theexport’s proposed end use, in order to prevent the export from being used in weapons programs.
If, on the basis of these checks, it is determined that the goods or technology to be exported may
be diverted for WMD purposes, the exporter must apply for an export license (“catch-all
controls”; for details, see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3).
To sum up, in order to comply with export controls, exporters must first check whether the item or
technology they wish to export is named on the control lists. If it is, their universities must takeappropriate steps to control the export. If it is not, the exporter must go on to check theend-user’s country. If that country is subject to controls, the exporter must investigate theproposed end-user and end-use, and, depending on the result of that investigation, the university
must take appropriate steps to control the export to prevent it from being diverted to weapons
programs.
The following are examples of research fields in science and engineering that are particularly
likely to fall subject to export controls:(i) Nuclear power(ii) Aerospace(iii) Chemistry(iv) Biology(v) Precision engineering (including control engineering, electronic engineering andmechanical engineering)(vi) Information engineering (including communications engineering, software engineering)
In Chapter 2, we will provide detailed explanation about these fields, for (i) to (iv), in the context
of WMDs, and for (v) and (vi), in the context of conventional weapons.

[Question 3] How are security trade export controls useful in promoting research?
Some researchers in the fields of science and engineering may understand why universities
need to enforce export controls, but may still resent them as yet another restriction on theirresearch activities. But, in reality, quite the opposite is true: as we shall now explain, export
controls are in fact fundamental to facilitating international collaborative research, and allow
everyone to get their work done more efficiently and with less hassle.
Take, for example, a researcher who needs to exchange research materials with her researchcollaborators abroad. If her university does not have an adequate system in place to deal with
export controls, she could unknowingly end up sending controlled goods overseas. The illegaltransaction may only be picked up at a later stage, by which point her research will already haveprogressed to an important stage. This could put an abrupt end to the collaborative project. If
researchers send goods overseas without paying enough attention to export controls, it is also5Tentative translation

possible that the goods could get held up in customs and end up being delivered late, andadditional freight costs may have to be paid. If, on the other hand, universities take enoughcare to administer export controls in the proper way, they can avoid problems related to theexport of research-related goods, as well as problems associated with accepting researchers orinternational students from countries that are implicated in the development of WMDs.
Despite these benefits, some researchers may still feel that having to deal personally withcomplex export control procedures will get in the way of their work involving international
exchange programs. It is true that export controls do give researchers a few extra tasks to deal
with. If, however, their university has implemented its own effective system for administeringexport controls (as described in the “Guidelines for Establishing and Practicing Voluntary
Control System for Security Trade”), researchers who are involved in the hands-on work will
only need to take a minimum of care to comply with their institution’s rules, and won’t
find themselves overwhelmed by extra procedures. In the case of institutions that have yet tofinish establishing their own system to manage export controls, if researchers working on
international collaborative projects pay close attention to what’s written in these guidelines andtake just a few simple steps, they will be able to proceed with their projects unimpeded. These
guidelines provide a simple summary of what you, as researchers, need to know, leaving
you free to focus on running your international projects. This advice is designed to help
you minimize the formalities you have to go through in order to ensure the ongoing andsecure running of international exchange activities.
When a collaboration with a foreign company or university reaches the stage where it is ready to
be applied practically, researchers at universities that have implemented effective procedures forexport control will be at an advantage when it comes to publicizing and developing their resultscommercially. Export controls are enforced under international agreements, which means that
other countries share similar export control procedures to Japan. In other words, companies anduniversities abroad also have to comply with their own country’s export control rules. If aJapanese university has a comprehensive system in place to ensure absolute compliance with
export controls under our own Foreign Exchange Act, foreign collaborators are more likely to seethat university as being a reliable partner, making them more comfortable to enter into
collaborative research or business contracts. This will also save the university a lot of effort whenit comes to contract negotiations.
(2) Hypothetical case studies and practical advice for researchers
To help you to understand how important security trade controls are to university research
activities, we will now present a few simple fictional scenarios that illustrate problems associatedwith international exchange activities, and provide some practical advice as to how they can besolved. At the end of this booklet, you can also find a section entitled, “Hypothetical Problems
Involving Export Controls at Universities”, where expanded versions of the case studies given
here have been compiled as an accessible reference resource to help faculty members in their
day-to-day work.
[Scenario 1]
A researcher failed to check in advance whether an item he wanted to export was subject tocontrols, and as a result his experiment was delayed and extra costs had to be paid.

6

Tentative translation(Summary)
Professor A of National University Y was conducting collaborative research with Professor L of
University S, Country X, and they were working on developing a new kind of floor inspection
technology. One day, they decided that Professor A would send University S a particular piece ofinspection equipment that he had developed, so that a floor inspection experiment could be donein Country X. University Y didn’t have a department in charge of export controls, or any staff who
were familiar with the regulations, so Professor A consulted with a freight forwarding company,
and on the basis of their advice decided to apply for a tax exemption (an “ATA Carnet”1) and goahead and export the equipment. However, when the freight forwarder made its customs
declaration, customs officials were concerned that a particular part of the inspection equipment
might require an export license under the Foreign Exchange Act. After Professor A was informedof this by the freight forwarder, he checked METI’s website and realized that the part in question
did indeed require an export license. This meant that he had to fly the rest of the equipment out
ahead, and delay the delivery of the controlled part. He immediately applied for a license, and assoon as one was issued he exported the part, but the field experiment had been delayed and he
had to pay extra money to cover the second delivery.
Note 1) ATA Carnet:
This is a customs document issued under the ATA Convention (Customs Convention on the
ATA Carnet for the Temporary Admission of Goods). The ATA Carnet simplifies the process ofmaking temporary, duty-free imports when bringing goods such as professional equipment (atypical example is equipment for TV news coverage), commercial samples, and goods for
exhibitions into a foreign country. The ATA Carnet is convenient as it is accepted by customs inseveral countries, even if each country normally has different import procedures. When you
first obtain a carnet you are required to apply for qualification, which you should obtain throughyour university. For details, contact an international freight forwarding company or the Japan
Commercial Arbitration Association (visit their website here: www.jcaa.or.jp/index.html)(Practical Advice)
An export license must be obtained before attempting to send goods overseas (before making acustoms declaration). For this reason, it is essential to check well in advance whether or not yourexport requires an export license.
[Scenario 2]
A researcher who wished to provide a certain technology to an international student realized that
he was required to apply for an export license under the Foreign Exchange Act, and avoided
breaking the law.
(Summary)
Although he rarely makes media appearances, Professor U of Research Center S, National
University T, is one of the internationally acclaimed researchers who have been producing
remarkable results in the development of solid rocket engines. Professor J is a professor at the
Department of Mechanical Engineering in the Faculty of Engineering of the same University. He
is engaged in research into a system for injecting fuel into the interior of piston engine cylinders,
and was Professor U’s senior in graduate school, One day, Professor J asked Professor U if
Student M, an international student from Country I who had been accepted into the University’s
doctoral program about three months beforehand, and who was studying in Professor J’s lab,7

Tentative translation

could participate in the journal-reading sessions and study groups carried out in Professor U’slaboratory. Professor J explained that, as part of his research into thermo-fluid analysis in the
combustion process, Student M was also interested in jet engines and rocket engines, which,like piston engines, are types of internal-combustion engine. At first, Professor U said that hewould welcome Student M. However, the following day, when Professor U was reading Student
M’s resume that he had received from Professor J, he found out that Student M was a researcher
at University Z, Country I. He asked Professor J for details, and found out that Student M was,while studying as a graduate student at University T, still employed as a researcher at University
Z’s Aerospace Engineering Department, and was still receiving salary from that institution.
University Z, Country I, is listed on METI’s Foreign End User List as a research institution
suspected of being implicated in the development of missiles (see Chapter 3, Section 3,“End-users suspected to be involved in WMD programs [Institutions listed on the Foreign End
User List]”).2 A license was therefore required from METI before providing someone affiliatedwith that institution with knowledge on the latest rocket technology that could be used in thedevelopment of WMDs. If they provided this technology without a license, they would probably
be breaking the law. Considering the nature of Professor U’s research, and Student M’s
affiliation, Professor U judged that METI would not grant a license in this case, and decided torefuse Professor J’s request.
Note 2) Foreign End User List:
This is a list provided by METI that identifies foreign institutions and fields of research that aresuspected of being involved in WMD programs. Unless it is obvious that the export will not
contribute to WMD programs, a license needs to be obtained from METI when carrying out
research or university-based activities where goods or technology need to be provided toparties listed on the Foreign End User List, and careful consideration is therefore required.

(Practical Advice)
A license under the Foreign Exchange Act must be obtained before providing technicalinformation that could potentially be used in WMD programs to the foreign institutions or
individuals (including international students and researchers) that have been identified on theForeign End User List. Prospective exporters should therefore proceed with caution and verify
whether or not the provision of information in question may be subject to controls.
[Scenario 3]
It did not occur to a researcher that an item she had made for her research project would be
subject to controls, but it was. As a result, the item could not be exported and the researcher had
to find an alternative way of conducting her experiment.
(Summary)
Professor U at the Faculty of Engineering, Private University T, is working on research into waysof removing anti-personnel landmines in post-conflict areas. Professor U had proposed the useof sound waves to detect anti-personnel landmines made of plastic, and was planning to test her
idea in a field test in Country C, a country in Southeast Asia that has been struggling to finds
ways of clearing anti-personnel landmines. Professor U developed an acoustic landmine
detector that consisted of several different devices, to which she applied a strong oscillating
source (sound source) that she had made herself, which incorporated an ultra-magnetostrictor
capable of easily generating wideband, large-amplitude mechanical vibrations. The other
instruments were all large and heavy, so Professor U decided to send them to Country C using a8

Tentative translation

reliable international carrier. However, since the oscillating source was a fragile handmade
device that needed to be handled with care, and given its small size, Professor U planned tocarry it with her in her carry-on baggage. It never occurred to her that her handmade research
prototype would fall subject to export controls. However, right before she was going to depart forCountry C, she was informed by the carrier that the ultra-magnetostrictor was controlled as“metallic magnetic materials” under the Export Trade Control Ordinance (hereinafter, “Export
Order”), Appendix 1, Section 5, vi, and that it matched the specifications in the METI Goods
Ordinance, Article 4, Item (viii)(b). 3 As she had no time to obtain an export license before her
departure, and as it was very difficult to re-schedule her visit to Country C, Professor U had nochoice but to go ahead with the tests using an alternative oscillating source.
3) METI Goods Ordinance:
This refers to the “Ordinance of the Ministry Specifying Goods and Technology Pursuant toProvisions of Appendix 1 of the Export Control Order and the Appendix of the Foreign
Exchange Order”.

(Practical Advice)
The necessity of an export license under the Foreign Exchange Act does not depend on how big
the item is, or on who made it. Exporters are required to apply for an export license when the
item’s materials, structure, etc., match the technical specifications stipulated by law (Appendix 1of the Export Trade Control Ordinance and the METI Goods Ordinance).
[Hypothetical Case 4]
An illegal export was almost committed because researchers were under the false impressionthat an export license was not necessary for items that were to be brought back home.
(Summary)Dr. M at the Faculty of Science, Public University O, decided to conduct research into
fluctuations in continental interior palaeomagnetism from different geological eras by studying
the intensity and direction of faint magnetism remaining in each layer of stratum. He planned tomeasure slight magnetic anomalies in each layer by bringing a very low noise level,high-performance triaxial flux-gate magnetometer (gradiometer) into Country E, a country thatexperiences few major crustal movements. However, University O was not equipped with atriaxial flux-gate magnetometer, so Dr. M had to ask Dr. K, a research collaborator at a national
university, to let him use the magnetometer in Dr. K’s laboratory. The date of their departure to
Country E was approaching, but one day, an administrator in charge of export controls at Dr. K’s
university found that the flux-gate magnetometer was controlled under the Export Trade Control
Ordinance, Appendix 1, Section 10, “(ix) Magnetometers”, as well as under the specifications of
the METI Goods Ordinance, Article 9, Item (xi)(d). The administrator informed Dr. K that heneeded to obtain an export license from METI. Dr. M and Dr. K were both surprised that an“export” license was required, because they were planning to bring the magnetometer to Country
E in their carry-on baggage, and then bring it back to Japan once they’d completed the survey.
They’d been under the impression that they didn’t have to complete export procedures for items
that would be brought back to Japan. Dr. K immediately asked his University’s section in chargeof handling export licenses to make the application, and he received a license permitting him tobring the triaxial flux-gate magnetometer from Japan to Country E, on condition that he would
promptly send the device back to Japan once the survey was complete. If the administrator in
charge of export controls had not discovered that an export license was required, Dr. M and Dr.

9Tentative translation

K would have unwittingly committed a violation of the Foreign Exchange Act.

(Practical Advice)
In very limited circumstances, exports of items that are to be brought back home may be exempt
from export license requirements. A typical example is a computer or mobile phone for personaluse. In general, even if an item is to be brought back home, if its technical specifications are
subject to export controls (i.e., if they are listed in Appendix 1 of the Export Trade Control
Ordinance and the METI Goods Ordinance), an export license must be obtained in advance.

10

Tentative translation

2. Examples of implicated research fields, including those linked to WMDs
(1) Scope of security trade controls for research-related exports (list controls and catch-all
controls)
The primary purpose of security trade controls is to control the transnational movements of
WMDs and conventional weapons. Security trade controls are enforced under national
legislation in all countries that are bound by certain international political agreements. 4
Note 4) At present, international security trade controls are implemented under multinational
agreements between countries participating in one of the following four international export
control forums, each of which is run by an international body through which participating
countries decide by consensus what security trade control regulations they will enforce. All
agreements entered into under these international export control forums are enforced under
the national legislation of participating countries:(i) Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)A multinational effort that regulates security trade controls applying to conventional
weapons, including so-called “dual-use goods” (general-purpose items that could bediverted to conventional weapons), equipment used to produce conventional weapons, andthe transfer of related technology.
(ii) Australia Group (AG)A multinational effort that regulates security trade controls applying to biological andchemical weapons (including their raw materials, production equipment, and transfers ofrelated technology).
(iii) Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
A multinational effort that regulates security trade controls applying to items that could bediverted to the development of nuclear weapons (including dual-use goods that could
contribute to nuclear weapons programs, production equipment thereof, and transfers ofrelated technology).
(iv) Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
A multinational effort that regulates security trade controls applying to rockets andunmanned aerial vehicles (including dual-use goods that could contribute to their
manufacture, production equipment thereof, and transfers of related technology).

For security trade controls to be effective, countries need to control the transnational movements
not only of the WMDs and conventional weapons themselves, but also of their components andequipment used in their manufacture. And the transfer of goods is not the only concern: transfersof technology can also contribute to weapons production. This is why countries also need tocontrol the transnational transfer of technology that can be used in the design, production, or use
of weapons.
In addition, goods subject to international controls include some that are commonly used bycivilians, such as golf clubs, or carbon fiber that can be used for buildings missiles (these goods
are generally referred to as “goods for military and civilian uses”, “general-purpose items” or“dual-use goods”). Special attention is therefore required when transferring these kinds of goods
overseas. If you mistakenly assume that a commonly used civilian item is not subject to export
controls, you may end up committing a serious violation of security trade control laws. In orderthat your work can continue uninterrupted, all researchers who handle high quality or

11Tentative translation

high-performance civilian goods are therefore advised to make completely sure that the export ofthese goods is not restricted under the Foreign Exchange Act.
In “Reference 1”, you can find a table summarizing the scope of these security trade controls.
You will generally need to apply to METI for a license under the Foreign Exchange Act whentransferring research-related items belonging to any of the categories in the table, or whentransferring technology that could be used in the design, production or use of these items (i.e.,
technical information transferred in the course of international collaborative research, whenoffering technical assistance, or when accepting interns). As can be understood from the table,
the term “list controls” refers to controls on specific goods that have been listed in the legislation.5
Note 5) Items that are subject to list controls are listed in Sections 1 to 15, Appendix 1, of the Export
Trade Control Ordinance issued under the Foreign Exchange Act. Transfers of technology thatare subject to controls are listed in 15 sections in the “Appendix” of the “Foreign Exchange
Order” issued under the Foreign Exchange Act. Here are the links from METI’s security tradecontrol website:
Exports of goods, Appendix 1 of the Export Trade Control Ordinance:
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/kanri/sinsa-unyo/gaihihanntei-tejyun/yusyutsu-betsu1/y1-3.ht
mProvisions of technology, Appendix of the Foreign Exchange Order
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/kanri/kankei-horei/ekimu/gaitamerei/main.html#betsuhyou

However, even when a general-purpose item is not found to match the technical specifications
stated on the control lists, depending on the country of the end-user, other controls may apply,and exporters may be required to investigate the export’s proposed end-user and end-use (theseinclude WMD catch-all controls and Complementary Export Control for Conventional Weapons,
and shall hereinafter be referred to collectively as “catch-all controls”). If that investigation
uncovers any possibility that the export could be diverted to weapons programs, the exporter will
be required to apply for an export license.6
Note 6) Goods subject to WMD catch-all controls include goods that, although not identified on control
lists, are likely to be used in the development, production, use or storage of WMDs (thesegoods are identified in Appendix 1, Section 16 of the Export Trade Control Ordinance, which
includes all goods apart from animals and plants, foodstuffs, wood, etc.). Destinations subject
to catch-all controls are all destinations excluding countries that implement strict export
controls (so-called “white countries”, which are listed in Appendix 3 of the Export Trade
Control Ordinance). Goods controlled under Complementary Export Control for Conventional
Weapons are goods that are not identified on control lists but that are likely to be used in thedevelopment, production, or use of conventional weapons. Generally, countries that are
subject to UN arms embargos are also subject to controls (11 countries and regions, including
Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan, to which the export of weapons is prohibited under UN
Security Council resolutions). Catch-all controls also apply where a prospective exporter isnotified that he of she has to apply for an export license from the Minister of Economy, Tradeand Industry. Here are the links from METI’s security trade control website.
Overview of catch-all controls:
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/anpo03.html

12Tentative translation
List of controlled goods under catch-all controls:

http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/law_document/tutatu/t07sonota/t07sonora_kanzei
teiritu.pdf
Complementary Export Control for Conventional Weapons, Q&A, and Glossary:
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/kanri/qayougo/hokantekiyushutukisei_q_a/main2.htm

These links provide an overview of the scope of Japan’s security trade control system. In order tobe able to adapt to the latest controls, it is recommended that universities keep up to speed on
the occasional updates that are made to trade control legislation in response to developments inthe domestic and international situation. In April 2009, for instance, the Foreign Exchange Act
was partially amended to take account of changes in the international security situation. Here is asummary of the revised provisions (see Reference 2):(i) Revision of technology transfer controls:
All international transfers of technology that is of concern from a security point of view are
now subject to the export licensing system. In order to ensure that the new controls can beproperly enforced, individuals planning to carry USB memory or similar devices out ofJapan in order to provide technical information overseas will require an export license.
→ When international students and researchers who are returning to their home countries
intend to carry with them, either as reference materials or as USB memory, information
on specific technology that is subject to export controls, they may need to obtain an
export license under the Foreign Exchange Act.7(ii) Penalties and compliance:
Heavier penalties shall now be imposed for exporting controlled goods without a license,and new penalties have been introduced for obtaining a license by dishonest means.
The revised provisions also outline standards that exporters must follow, such as the duty
to designate one individual to take responsibility for determining whether or not thetechnology to be provided to a foreign institution is subject to export controls. A new
mechanism was also established for advising exporters on how they can comply with thesestandards.
Note 7) The Foreign Exchange Act defines individuals who have their residence in Japan as“residents”, and individuals who have their residence abroad as “non-residents”. Foreigners
who have remained in Japan for at least six months are deemed to be “residents” (seeReference 3): in other words, once they have been in Japan for more than six months,
international students and researchers come to be regarded as residents. It is important tonote that if these students and researchers wish to provide a foreign institution with a
specific technology, the current provisions may require them to obtain a license. In addition,
under the revised Foreign Exchange Act, they may also need to obtain a license before
bringing USBs or similar memory devices containing information on specific technology outof Japan.

In this chapter, we will focus on how list controls affect research activities. In Chapter 3, we will
discuss the ways in which catch-all controls apply to research activities: that is, where it is theend-user and the end-use of the goods or technology in question that comes under examination.
Before we go any further, you should familiarize yourself with the idea of making “applicability

13

Tentative translation

judgments”: that is, determining whether or not the item to be exported or the technology to betransferred overseas is subject to controls under the Foreign Exchange Act (primarily, whether or
not the export is subject to list controls). It is also important to note that, even if you determinethat a particular export is subject to export controls, this does not mean that the export isprohibited. It simply means that the export or transfer can only be carried out under a license
granted by METI. Therefore, once you have applied for and obtained this license, you will befree to proceed with your research. It is generally unlikely that exports of goods and transfersof technology that are required for the purpose of academic research will be prohibited on
security grounds.
(2) Examples of research fields linked to WMDs (list controls)
Mainstream academic fields where research is done that can be linked to WMDs include nuclear
power, chemistry, biology and aerospace. However, in Japanese universities, researchers inthese fields clearly do not conduct research that bears any direct relation to WMDs. Having said
that, some research activities may require them to handle goods that could form part of, or beused in the production of, either WMDs themselves or the technology used in the design,
production or operation of WMDs.
We will now give some examples of specific research subjects, from each research field linked to
WMDs, where export controls can apply, and we shall also state the relevant legal provisions
and legislation in each case.
(i) Nuclear Power:(a) Legislation related to this research field:
Major legal provisions related to the field of nuclear power include, applying to use andmanagement within Japan, the “Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear
Fuel Material and Reactors”, and the “Act for Prevention of Damage from Radioactive
Isotopes”, and applying to transnational exchanges, the “Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons”, and several other international agreements. Due attention must be given
to the Foreign Exchange Act when exporting goods or technology related to nuclear power
for research purposes (see Reference 4).
(b) Examples of research subjects linked to WMDs and applicability judgments
In Annex, 1 you can see an example of a research classification system in the field of
nuclear power. Out of this wide range of research subjects, subjects that are generally
considered to have the most potential to be diverted to nuclear weapons programs include
research that involves equipment that induces or generates nuclear reactions (nuclear
reactors), as well as devices and materials used in the production of that equipment, or inuranium enrichment and plutonium separation and extraction. For your reference, we haveoutlined below some specific examples of research subjects in the field of nuclear power thathave the potential to be diverted to nuclear weapons programs along with example
judgments.
[Research Subject Example 1] Research on excitation schemes of 235U using dye laser
beams
Research field:
Category: Nuclear fuel cycles and materials
Specialized area: Isotope separation, isotope application, uranium

14

Tentative translationenrichment
Research subject: Irradiating a plurality of dye laser beams, 235U is selectively excitedamong U (uranium) isotopes for photoionization. Ions generated in thisway are recovered using an electrode plate, causing 235U to be enriched.
Potential diversion: This research could be used in the design and development of uranium
enrichment equipment to generate highly enriched uranium as a raw
material for nuclear weapons.
Judgment Example: Dye laser oscillators are listed as “goods” in Appendix 1 of the Export
Trade Control Ordinance, Section 2, Item xxxi: “Gas laser oscillators,
solid-state laser oscillators, or dye laser oscillators that can be used forthe separation of uranium isotopes”. Accordingly, this item will be subject
to list controls if its technical specifications correspond to any of thefollowing “specifications” listed in Appendix 1 of the Ordinance of the
Ministry Specifying Goods and Technology Pursuant to Provisions ofAppendix 1 of the Export Control Order and the Appendix of the Foreign
Exchange Order (MEXT Ministerial Ordinance No. 49; hereinafter, “METI
Goods Ordinance”), Article 1, Item xxxvi:“(xxxvi) Gas laser oscillators, solid-state laser oscillators or dye laser
oscillators that fall under any of the following:(a) to (c) (omitted)(d) Among exciter laser oscillators designed for use within a wavelength
range exceeding 240 nanometers and less than 360 nanometers,
and designed to generate a pulse, those falling under the following 1
and 2:
1. Oscillators with a pulse repetition frequency exceeding 250 hertz;
and
2. Oscillators with an average output exceeding 500 watts.
(e) to (g) (omitted)(h) Dye laser oscillators designed for use within a wavelength range
exceeding 300 nanometers and less than 800 nanometers that fallunder any of the following:
1. Variable wavelength laser oscillators emitting a single-mode pulse(excluding equipment that only performs laser beam
amplification) that fall under all of the following i through iii:
i. Oscillators with a pulse repetition frequency exceeding 1
kilohertz;
ii. Oscillators with an average output exceeding 1 watt; andiii. Oscillators with a pulse width less than 100 nanoseconds.
2. Variable wavelength oscillators emitting a pulse that fall under allof the following i through iii (excluding those falling under 1):
i. Oscillators with a pulse repetition frequency exceeding 1
kilohertz;
ii. Oscillators with an average output exceeding 30 watts; andiii. Oscillators with a pulse width less than 100 nanoseconds.”
Other devices apart from those mentioned above are specified as “goods”
in Appendix 1 of the Export Trade Control Ordinance, Section 2, Item (vii),

15

Tentative translation“Equipment for the separation of uranium or plutonium isotopes or theirauxiliaries, or components (excluding those listed in (xxxi) below)”. If its
specifications match any of the following specifications detailed in the
METI Goods Ordinance, Article 1, Item (vii), the equipment will be subject
to list controls:“(vii) Equipment for the separation of uranium or plutonium isotopes fallingunder any of the following, or auxiliaries thereof or components thereof:(a) to (e) (omitted)(f) Equipment utilizing laser separation methods;(g) and (h) (omitted)”.
Export controls under the Foreign Exchange Act also apply to thetransnational provision of any technology that can be used in the design,
production or use of the goods specified on the control lists.
[Research Subject Example 2] Research on dry reprocessing using metal electrolysis
processing of spent metal fuelResearch field:
Category: Nuclear fuel cycles and materials
Specialized area: Fuel reprocessing
Research subject: Spent metal fuel is used as an anode to cause the precipitation of
uranium. The uranium is recovered and plutonium, etc., are thenseparated and recovered.
Potential diversion: This technology can be used in the development of equipment toseparate and recover uranium and plutonium to be used as raw materials
in nuclear weapons.
Judgment Example: Equipment to separate and recover nuclear fuel materials such asuranium and plutonium from spent fuel is listed as “goods” in Appendix 1of the Export Trade Control Ordinance, Section 2, Item (v), “Equipment
specially designed for the separation or reprocessing of irradiatednuclear fuel materials or nuclear source materials, or components orcontrollers thereof”. The specifications detailed in the METI Goods
Ordinance, Article 1, Item (v) include “Equipment specially designed forthe separation or reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel materials or
nuclear source materials, or components or controllers thereof”. Thisequipment matches these specifications and is therefore subject to list
controls.
Export controls under the Foreign Exchange Act also apply to thetransnational provision of any technology that can be used in the design,
production or use of goods specified on the control lists.

[Research Subject Example 3] Research on the nuclear properties of hafnium
Research field:
Category: Nuclear fission engineering
Specialized area: Reactor physics, nuclear data, criticality safety
Research subject: Studying the neutron absorption properties of hafnium, and how neutron
absorption affects its composition.
Potential diversion: This material can be used in the control rods of nuclear reactors to16

Tentative translation

produce nuclear fuel materials to be used in nuclear weapons.
Judgment Example: Hafnium is listed as “goods” in Appendix 1 of the Export Trade Control
Ordinance, Section 2, Item (xxiii), “Metals, waste or scraps of hafnium or
hafnium alloys, or hafnium compounds, or their primary or semi-finishedproducts”. If its specifications match any of the following specifications
detailed in the METI Goods Ordinance, Article 1, Item (xxviii), the export
will be subject to list controls:“(xxviii) Metals, waste, or scraps of hafnium and hafnium alloys (limited
to those with a hafnium content exceeding 60% of the total weight) or
hafnium compounds (limited to those with hafnium content levelexceeding 60% of the total weight), or primary or semi-finished products
thereof”.
Export controls under the Foreign Exchange Act also apply to thetransnational provision of any technology that can be used in the design,
production or use of the goods specified on the control lists.

(c) Interactions with individuals or institutions overseas that may arise in this field
When university researchers conduct research in the subject areas mentioned above, theymay, as illustrated by the examples below, be required to interact with individuals or
institutions overseas. Therefore, before starting to promote your research, it is essential todetermine whether you need to apply for a license under the Foreign Exchange Act.
･Research on excitation schemes of 235U using dye laser beams:
If the research forms part of an international collaborative project, or if the researcher plans
to have a laser beam manufactured overseas, the research collaborators or the foreign
manufacturer may need to be provided with the design specifications of controlled items orreference materials describing enrichment technology (technology used in separationequipment).
･Research on the nuclear properties of hafnium:
Researchers developing hafnium control rods to improve the operation of nuclear reactors
may need to provide design information or materials to collaborators abroad, or to an
institution abroad that operates a nuclear reactor facility, in order to have prototype
materials irradiated.
･Research into the development of next-generation fuel:When conducting research into new fuel materials that can be used to develop thenext-generation of nuclear reactors, in order to investigate fuel properties, researchers mayneed to have experiments done at nuclear reactor facilities located overseas. This may
require them to provide overseas collaborators, manufacturers and nuclear reactor
operators with controlled materials, or information detailing their design.
(ii) Aerospace:(a) Legislation related to this research field:

17

Tentative translation

Major legal provisions related to the aerospace field include, applying to use andmanagement within Japan, the “Civil Aeronautics Act” and the “Aircraft Manufacturing
Industry Act”, and applying to transnational interactions, treaties such as the “Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies” (Outer Space Treaty) and several otherinternational agreements. The Foreign Exchange Act may apply when exporting goods ortechnology related to aerospace for research purposes (see Reference 5).
(b) Examples of research subjects linked to WMDs and applicability judgments
In Annex 1, you can see an example of a research classification system in the field of
aerospace. Out of this wide range of research subjects, subjects that are generally
considered to have the most potential to be diverted to nuclear weapons programs include
research in the fields of aerodynamics, structural dynamics, materials, control engineeringand propulsion engineering. For your reference, we have outlined below some specificexamples of research subjects in the field of aerospace that have the potential to be diverted
to missile programs along with example judgments.
[Research Subject Example 1] Research on a method for producing carbon fiber reinforcedcarbon (C/C composite)
Research field:
Category: Structural dynamics / materials
Specialized area: high-temperature resistant materials
Research subject: Carbon fiber can be used to reinforce inorganic or organic materials, inorder to produce a higher performance composite with improved dynamic
and functional properties.
Potential diversion: Carbon fiber-reinforced carbon (C/C composite) is an ultra
high-temperature resistant material. So when incorporated in the nozzle
component of rocket motors for missile propulsion, the propulsion
system’s performance can be dramatically enhanced.
Judgment Example: Composite that can be used in rockets is listed as “goods” in Appendix 1of the Export Trade Control Ordinance, Section 4, (xv), “Structural
materials listed below that can be used in rockets or unmanned aerial
vehicles: (1) Composites or their molded products; 2 to 5 (omitted)”. If its
specifications match the following specifications detailed in the METI
Goods Ordinance, Article 3, Item (xvi), the materials will be subject to list
controls:“(xvi) Structural materials falling under any of the following:(a) (Omitted)(b) Composites using carbon and carbon fibers designed for rocket use
or molded products thereof (limited to those usable in rockets
capable of transporting payloads for 300 kilometers or more, or
unmanned aerial vehicles capable of transporting payloads
weighing 500 kilograms or more for 300 kilometers or more);(c) to (h) (omitted)”
Even if the materials in question do not match these specifications,
exporters still need to determine whether they fall subject to any of theother provisions in the METI Goods Ordinance. For example, whether the18

Tentative translation

export includes prepreg or molded products as structural materials
capable of use for gas centrifuge rotors, controlled under Article 1, Item(xxii); molded products that use fibers, controlled under Article 4, Item (ii);or fibers, prepregs or preforms that use the fibers, controlled under
Article 4, Item (xv).
Export controls under the Foreign Exchange Act also apply to thetransnational provision of any technology that can be used in the design,
production or use of the goods specified on the control lists.

[Research Subject Example 2] Research for designing and making prototypes of flying
objects using carbon-fiber-reinforced resin composite.
Research field:
Category: Structural dynamics/ materials
Specialized area: Composite dynamics
Research subject: Carbon-fiber-reinforced resin composite (CFRP) is used to design andmake prototypes of the flying object’s body in order to minimize its
weight.
Potential diversion: High-performance composite base materials can be used to make flying
objects such as missiles as light as possible, enabling them to carrybigger mounted objects (e.g., warheads) and to fly over a greater range
with more fuel on board.
Judgment Example: As in Example 1, composites that can be used in rockets are listed as“goods” in Appendix 1 of the Export Trade Control Ordinance, Section 4,(xv), “Structural materials listed below that can be used in rockets or
unmanned aerial vehicles: (1) Composites or their molded products; 2 to
5 (omitted)”. If their specifications match the following specifications
detailed in the METI Goods Ordinance, Article 3, Item (xvi), the materials
will be subject to list controls:“(xvi) Structural materials falling under any of the following:(a) Composites (excluding prepregs with glass transition points of 145
degrees centigrade or less) made from organic substances
reinforced with fibers with specific strength exceeding 76,200
meters and specific elastic modulus exceeding 3,180,000 meters or
those with metal in the matrix phase, or molded products thereof(limited to those designed for use in rockets capable of transporting
payloads weighing 500 kilograms or more for 300 kilometers or
more, goods falling under item (ii)(a) (limited to those usable inrockets capable of transporting payloads weighing 500 kilograms ormore) or goods falling under item (ii)(b));(b) (c) to (h) (omitted)”.
Even if the materials in question do not match these specifications,
exporters still need to determine whether they fall subject to any of theother provisions in the METI Goods Ordinance. For instance, whether theexport involve prepreg or molded products as structural materials
capable of use for gas centrifuge rotors, controlled under Article 1, Item

19

Tentative translation(xxii); molded products that use fibers, controlled under Article 4, Item (ii);or fibers or prepregs or preforms that use the fibers, controlled under
Article 4, Item (xv).
Similarly, exporters wishing to export flying objects that function as
rockets or unmanned aerial vehicles (Appendix 1 of the Export Trade
Control Ordinance, Section 4, Items (i) and (i)-2) must determine whether
the technology matches the specifications detailed in the METI Goods
Ordinance, Article 3, Item (i) and (i)-2.
Export controls under the Foreign Exchange Act also apply to thetransnational provision of any technology that can be used in the design,
production or use of the goods specified on the control lists.

(c) Interactions with individuals or institutions overseas that may arise in this field
University researchers conducting research in the subject areas mentioned above may, as
illustrated by the example below, be required to interact with individuals or institutions
overseas. Therefore, before starting to promote your research, it is essential to determine
whether you need to apply for a license under the Foreign Exchange Act.
･When carrying out research on composite or heat-resistant materials as part of aninternational collaborative research project, researchers may to need to provide
collaborators with test pieces (samples), including test pieces of carbon-fiber-reinforcedcarbon composite. They may also need to export materials in order to have tests performed
overseas (such as performance tests on carbon-based heat-resistant materials using
high-efficiency arc wind tunnels).
(iii) Chemistry(a) Legislation related to this research field:
There are more than fifty acts and regulations that apply to the field of chemistry. Major
legal provisions include, applying to use and management within Japan, the “Poisonousand Deleterious Substances Control Act” and the “Pharmaceutical Affairs Act” which deal
with hazard prevention and safety; the “Explosives Control Act” and the “Fire Service Act”
which deal with hazard prevention; and the “Chemical Substances Release andManagement Act (PRTR Act)” which deals with environmental protection. In addition, thereis the “Chemical Substances Evaluation Act” and the “Hazardous Wastes Export Import
Control Act”, which also regulate interactions with individuals and institution overseas. The
Foreign Exchange Act may apply when exporting goods or technology related to chemistry
for research purposes (see Reference 6).
Many universities have recently started introducing chemical management systems thatincorporate substance databases. These databases allow universities to ensure thatchemical materials are managed and handled effectively and efficiently and in compliancewith all applicable laws. Universities have a duty to strictly implement the Foreign Exchange

20Tentative translation

Act, while making sure that chemical substances are handled in the prescribed manner andincreasing awareness of compliance issues among faculty members.
(b) Examples of research subjects linked to WMDs and applicability judgments
The field of chemistry incorporates a very wide range of subjects, including physicalchemistry, inorganic chemistry, organic chemistry, biological function related chemistry andbiotechnology, polymer chemistry and materials chemistry. Chemistry also involves a wide
variety of applied research. This makes it difficult to provide examples of typical researchclassification systems in this field.
In addition, it is generally unlikely that researchers in this field will choose to conduct
research into a specific chemical substance which we already know how to produce(including substances that constitute the raw materials of chemical agents for chemical
weapons). Researchers are also unlikely to need to exchange goods related to thesechemical substances with individual or institutions overseas. Considering thesecircumstances, it is not easy to come up with examples of academic research subjects inthis field that can be considered to have a relatively high potential to be diverted to research
related to chemical weapons. Having said that, special attention should be given to the fieldof applied chemistry where certain chemical substances are used that can also be used in
the production of chemical weapons, or where these substances are produced as aby-product (i.e., where their production is not the primary purpose of the research).
Accordingly, an export license may be required under the Foreign Exchange Act when
researchers wish to bring substances they have produced which contain controlled
substances out of Japan, when they wish to present to research collaborators overseas anovel method for synthesizing chemicals which produces a controlled chemical as aby-product, or when a foreign researcher who has visited Japan wishes to bring a superior
piece of research equipment (production equipment, etc.) with him or her upon returning
home.
Under the Foreign Exchange Act, an export license must be obtained before exporting
substances that can be used as raw materials for military chemical warfare agents (listed in
Annex 3), or when providing technology that can be used in the design, production or use of
these substances. In addition, equipment that can be used in the production of militarychemical warfare agents and their components (reactors, storage vessels, heat exchangers,
pumps, etc.), and which matches the prescribed specifications, is also subject to export
controls. Therefore, when handling these chemical substances and equipment, allresearchers who interact with individuals and institutions overseas in the course ofinternational collaborative research projects, etc., need to give careful consideration towhether export controls apply.
(iv) Biology(a) Legislation related to this research field:
Major legal provisions related to the field of biology and which apply to use andmanagement within Japan include the “Act Concerning Prevention of Infection of Infectious
Diseases and Patients with Infectious Diseases”, the “Act on Domestic Animal Infectious
Diseases Control”, and the “Act on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological21

Tentative translation

Diversity through Regulations on the Use of Living Modified Organisms” (Cartagena Act).
Transnational exchanges are regulated under the “Quarantine Act”. The Foreign Exchange
Act may apply when exporting goods or technology related to biology for research purposes(see Reference 6).
(b) Examples of research subjects linked to WMDs and applicability judgments
Research subjects in the field of biology that are likely to fall subject to export controls are
identified by subject area, such as bacteria, viruses and toxins. Out of this wide range of
research subjects, the area that is considered to have the most potential to be diverted tobiological weapons programs is that involving the use of living organisms, toxins, or theirgenes as raw materials for bacterial agents. For your reference, we have outlined below
some specific examples of research subjects in the fields of biology, pharmacy, medicine
and biochemistry that have the potential to be diverted to biological weapons programs
along with example judgments.

[Research Subject Example 1] Research on Bacillus anthracis
Research field:
Category: Bacteriology
Specialized area: Bacillus anthracis
Research subject: Research on spores of Bacillus anthracis includes research on thepathogenicity of Bacillus anthracis; research on vaccines for Bacillus
anthracis; and research on diagnostic methods for anthrax.
Potential diversion: This research can be diverted to the production of biological weapons
where spores of Bacillus anthracis are processed into a form that caneasily be aerosolized, enabling them to be sprayed and trigger
pulmonary anthrax. In 2001, in the U.S., several postal packages werelaced with Bacillus anthracis spores. This caused 22 cases of anthrax, 11of which were pulmonary anthrax (5 fatalities), and 11 of which were skinanthrax.
Judgment Example: Bacillus anthracis is listed as “goods” in Appendix 1 of the Export Trade
Control Ordinance, Section 3-2, Item (i), “Organisms or toxins, or theirsubunits or genes used as raw materials for military bacterial agents anddefined by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Economy, Trade andIndustry”, and in the the METI Goods Ordinance, Article 2-2, Paragraph 1,
Item (ii), “Bacteria (excluding vaccines): Brucella abortus, …, Bacillus
anthracis, …”.
Export controls under the Foreign Exchange Act also apply to thetransnational provision of any technology that can be used in the design,
production or use of goods specified on control lists.
[Research Subject Example 2] Research on the botulin toxin
Research field:
Category: Research on toxins
Specialized area: Botulin toxin
Research subject: Research on the botulin toxin includes research on the structure andfunction of the botulin toxin, research on defensive methods against the
botulin toxin, research on the development of a rapid detection system

22

Tentative translation

for the botulin toxin, and research on treating the botulin toxin.
Potential diversion: This research can be diverted to the production of biological weapons
where Bacillus botulinus is cultured to purify the toxins, which are thenmixed with drinking water and foodstuffs, killing those who consume
them. The botulin toxin is extremely toxic. In 1995, in Iraq, in excess of
20,000 liters of the botulin toxin was found and discarded. The Aum
Shinrikyo Cult that used to operate in Japan is also reported to havebeen studying this toxin.
Judgment Example: The botulin toxin is listed as “goods” in Appendix 1 of the Export Trade
Control Ordinance, Section 3-2, Item (i), “Organisms or toxins, or theirsubunits or genes used as raw materials for military bacterial agents anddefined by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Economy, Trade andIndustry”, and in the METI Goods Ordinance, Article 2-2, Paragraph 1,
Item (iii), “Toxins (excluding immunotoxins): aflatoxin, …, botulin toxin,…”.
Export controls under the Foreign Exchange Act also apply to thetransnational provision of any technology that can be used in the design,
production or use of goods specified on control lists.
(c) Interactions with individuals or institutions overseas that may arise in this fieldResearchers involved in, for example, international collaborative research may need toexport virus samples as part of their research results. In order to create an identical research
environment, they may also need to provide collaborators overseas with goods including
bioreactors (for culturing pathogens; fermenters), centrifuges (for enriching pathogens), andfreeze dryers (for drying pathogens into powder).
Under the Foreign Exchange Act, an export license must be obtained before exporting livingorganisms, etc., that can be used as raw materials for military bacterial warfare agents (aslisted in Annex 4), or when providing a technology that can be used to design or produce
these organisms. Export controls also apply to equipment that matches particularspecifications and that can be used to produce or spray military bacterial warfare agents ortheir components (including fermenters, centrifuges, freeze dryers, and spray/ fog
generators).
It is therefore essential that all researchers who will handle these chemical substances orthis equipment as part of international activities such as collaborative research projects
determine whether or not they need to apply for an export license under the Foreign
Exchange Act.
(3) Examples of research subjects linked to weapons other than WMDs (conventional weapons)
and applicability judgments (list controls)
As we explained under “(1) Scope of security trade controls for research-related exports (listcontrols and catch-all controls)”, in addition to WMDs, conventional weapons are also subject tolist controls. We will now present some examples of research subjects that may be linked toconventional weapons and may therefore fall subject to export controls.

23

Tentative translation(a) Legislation related to this research field:
There are several acts and regulations that apply to specific research fields that may belinked to the production of conventional weapons. We will not enter into detailed
explanations here, but, to mention a few examples of acts which control day-to-day research
activities, the “Radio Act” and the “Telecommunications Business Act” regulate
telecommunications, the “Industrial Safety and Health Act” regulates the working
environment, and the “Copyright Act” (concerning computer program copyrights) regulates
software. The Foreign Exchange Act may apply when exporting goods or technology related
to the following fields of research.
[Research Subject Example 1] Research on high-resolution infrared imaging systems
Research field:
Category: Precision engineering, information engineering
Specialized area: Photoelectric properties, image processing, image
recognition
Research subject: Includes research on imaging reinforcing tubes for high-resolution
near-infrared light using gallium arsenide or indium gallium arsenide; andresearch on imaging devices or image recognition devices that use these
imaging reinforcing tubes for near-infrared light.
Potential diversion: This research can be diverted to producing conventional weapons suchas night vision devices for nocturnal combat.
Judgment Example: Imaging reinforcing tubes for high-resolution near-infrared light are listed
as “goods” in Appendix 1 of the Export Trade Control Ordinance, Section
10, Item (ii), “Optical detectors or their coolers, or components for suchdetectors or coolers, or equipment using optical detectors”, and in the
METI Goods Ordinance, Article 9, Paragraph 1, Item (iii), “Opticaldetectors or components thereof” that fall under “(b) Image reinforcing
tubes”.
Export controls under the Foreign Exchange Act also apply to thetransnational provision of any technology that can be used in the design,
production or use of these goods specified on control lists.

[Research Subject Example 2] Research on high-performance piezo-ceramic oscillators for
sonar
Research field:
Category: Precision engineering
Specialized area: Sensor engineering, functional materials
Research subject: Includes research on how to improve the threshold ofpolarization-inverted electric fields in piezo-ceramics and prevent
piezoelectric constant reduction under hydrostatic pressure exceeding
10 MPa (approx. 100 atmospheres), and research on, and building
prototypes of, composite piezo-ceramic oscillators for sonar that can be
operated under these conditions.
Potential diversion: This research can be diverted to the development of conventional
weapons such as sonar, sea mines and torpedoes.
Judgment Example: The piezo-ceramic oscillator is listed as “goods” in Appendix 1 of theExport Trade Control Ordinance, Section 10, Item (i), “Underwater
detection equipment utilizing sound waves, equipment for determining

24

Tentative translation

the position of vessels, measuring equipment for the speed over groundof vessels, or their components”, and in the METI Goods Ordinance,
Article 9, Paragraph 1, Item (i), “(a) Those having a transmission function
or components thereof”, “2. Underwater acoustic equipment” which falls
under “v. Underwater acoustic equipment which is designed for use at
depths exceeding 1,000 meters”.
Export controls under the Foreign Exchange Act also apply to thetransnational provision of any technology that can be used in the design,
production or use of these goods specified on control lists.
(b) Interactions with individuals or institutions overseas that may arise in this field
University researchers conducting research in the subject areas mentioned above may berequired to interact with individuals or institutions overseas as part of collaborative research
projects or other international activities. In this field, it is particularly common to find goods
that are primarily for civilian use fall subject to export controls. It is therefore essential that
researchers make an accurate determination as to whether they need to apply for a licenseunder the Foreign Exchange Act.

25

Tentative translation

3. Cases where the end-user and end-use of goods or technology are subject to advancescreening(1) Investigating the end-user and end-use (catch-all controls: procedures for general-purpose
items that are not subject to list controls)
As we explained in Chapter 2, researchers who wish to export goods or technology identified oncontrol lists are required to apply for a license under the Foreign Exchange Act. However,depending on the destination country, there are some cases where catch-all controls apply, andexporters may also be required to obtain a license before exporting or providing goods ortechnology even if they do not fall subject to list controls. In such cases, even when exporting a
non-controlled general-purpose item, the exporter will be required to verify the item’s proposed
end-user and end-use. If it is deemed likely that the export will be used in the development,
manufacture, and use of weapons,8 the exporter will be required to obtain a license before
proceeding with the export. METI runs a useful website on security trade controls. All
researchers thinking of making an export should visit this site and carefully read through the
explanations it provides regarding catch-all controls. Catch-all controls only apply to exports tocountries other than those that implement strict export controls (the so-called “white countries”
which are listed in Appendix 3 of the Export Trade Control Ordinance) 9, so the easiest way tofind out whether controls apply is to check whether the end-user’s country is one of thewhite countries.
Note 8) The judgment as to whether or not the goods or technology in question are likely to be used in
the development, manufacture, or use of weapons is reached by determining whether theend-user and end-use meet any of the conditions specified by the relevant Ministerial
Ordinances.
Regarding the end-user:
If there is evidence that the end-user of the goods to be exported “carries out thedevelopment, etc. of nuclear weapons, etc.” or “has carried out the development, etc. of
nuclear weapons, etc.”, it will be deemed likely that the goods in question will contribute tonuclear weapons and other weapons programs, and it will therefore be necessary to apply
for a license. Possible sources of such evidence include,(i) Documents that the exporter has received, such as agreements, pamphlets, and catalogs,
or documents that the exporter has been witness to;(ii) Information received from the importer or end-user; and(iii) Documents prepared by METI (the Foreign End User List).
Regarding the end-use:
If there is evidence that the goods to be exported are to be used in “the development,
etc. of nuclear weapons, etc.”, it will be necessary to apply for a license. Possible sources ofsuch evidence include,(i) Descriptions in agreements, or other documents that the exporter has received; and(ii) Information received from the importer or end-user.
Note 9) Check this URL to see a list of the “white countries”:
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/kanri/catch-all/bepyoudai3nokuni.htm(2) Examples of goods and research subjects that are very closely linked to the development of
weapons (specific examples of items subject to catch-all controls)

26

Tentative translation

There are some general-purpose items with specifications that are not subject to list controls but
which are identified on METI’s list of 40 items that are of particular concern due to their potential
use in WMD programs (see Reference 7).10 Particular attention is therefore required whenexporting any of the items on this list as they may fall subject to catch-all controls.
Note 10) Visit the following URL to see this list, entitled “Examples of goods that are highly likely to be
used in the development, etc. of WMDs” (40 items):
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/law_document/tutatu/t04shinsei/t04shinsei_heikikamoturei.pdf

With regard to exports that may be diverted to the development of conventional weapons, as arule, destinations subject to control are those countries that are under UN arms embargos (11states and regions to which UN Security Council resolutions forbid the export of weapons,
including Iraq, North Korea and Afghanistan) (see Chapter 2 (1), Note 6)).
[Research Subject Example 1]
Research field:
Category: Precision engineering, control engineering, electric powerengineering
Specialized area: Electric equipment engineering
Research subject: Includes research on precise velocity control of synchronous induction
electric motors and research on measures against deviated interphaseload variation in three-phase AC transmissions.
Related items:
Frequency changers
Names and technical specifications of frequency changers are listed inAppendix 1 of the Export Trade Control Ordinance, Section 2, Item (viii),
and in the METI Goods Ordinance, Article 1, Item (viii). If the goods ortechnology in question correspond to these specifications, list controls
will apply. If not, the exporter must refer to Appendix 1 of the Export
Trade Control Ordinance, Items in Section 16 (Catch-All Controls) inorder to determine whether catch-all controls apply.
Typical examples of related technology: High-frequency distortion reduction technology,
frequency control stabilizing technology.
Relation to weapons: This technology can be incorporated into equipment that supplies AC
power of the right frequency to run high-speed electric motors that drivea centrifuge for uranium enrichment to produce enriched uranium to be
used in nuclear weapons.
[Research Subject Example 2]
Research field:
Category: Precision engineering, mechanical engineering, electronicengineering
Specialized area: Not otherwise specified.
Research subject: This field involves, for example, research on vehicle suspension systems,
research on the mechanical properties of anti-vibration rubber (orelastomer), and research on packaging technology for electronic
components.
Related items:
Vibration test equipment
Names and technical specifications of vibration test equipment are listed
in Appendix 1 of the Export Trade Control Ordinance, Section 2, Item(xvi), and in the METI Goods Ordinance: Article 1, Item (xxi); Appendix 1,
Section 4, Item (xxiv); and Article 3, Item (xxv). If the goods or technology
in question correspond to these specifications, list controls will apply. If

27

Tentative translation

not, the exporter must refer to Appendix 1 of the Export Trade Control
Ordinance, Items in Section 16 (Catch-All Controls) in order to determine
whether catch-all controls apply.
Typical examples of related technology: Digital control technology, excitation force
improvement technology, etc.
Relation to weapons: This technology can be incorporated into equipment such as vibration
generators, which are used to test components of nuclear explosive
devices by replicating the vibrational environment at the moment oflaunch. It can also be used in the development and testing of rockets andunmanned aerial vehicles.
[Research Subject Example 3]
Research field:
Category: Precision engineering, materials science, polymer engineering
Specialized area: Not otherwise specified.
Research subject: This field involves research on the reduction of residual stress in molding
carbon-fiber-reinforced resin composite (CFRP) thin plates, research ontechnology for fabricating CFRP plates (in particular, bonding
techniques), research on technology for producing carbon fibers, and thedevelopment of technology for spinning and weaving carbon fibers.
Related items:
Composite materials using carbon fibers
Names and technical specifications of composite materials using carbon
fibers are listed in Appendix 1 of the Export Trade Control Ordinance,
Section 4, Item (xv), and in the METI Goods Ordinance: Article 3, Item(xvi)(b); Appendix 1, Section 5, Item (xviii); and Article 4, Item (xv)(b). If
the goods or technology in question correspond to these specifications,
list controls will apply. If not, the exporter must refer to Appendix 1 of theExport Trade Control Ordinance, Items in Section 16 (Catch-All Controls)in order to determine whether catch-all controls apply. (However, it isimportant to note that molded products, or prepreg and other materials
incorporating this technology, may be listed elsewhere.)
Typical examples of related technology: Lightening technology, technology to improveheat-resistance and thermal shock properties, etc.
Relation to weapons: These materials can be used in aircraft skin and, as structural materials
for rockets, in the nozzles of rocket motors, in the nose of re-entry
vehicles, and in other heat protection components.
[Research Subject Example 4]
Research field:
Category: Precision engineering, Control engineering
Specialized area: Not otherwise specified.
Research subject: Research on attitude control (artificial semicircular canal) in humanoid
robots, research on anti-skid mechanisms for vehicles, research on
standalone car navigation systems.
Related item:
Gyroscopes
Names and technical specifications of gyroscopes are listed in Appendix
1 of the Export Trade Control Ordinance, Section 4, Item (xvi); and in the
METI Goods Ordinance: Article 3, Item (xvii); Appendix 1, Section 11,
Item (ii), and Article 10, Paragraph 1, Item (ii). If the goods or technology
in question correspond to these specifications, list controls will apply. If
not, the exporter must refer to Appendix 1 of the Export Trade Control

28

Tentative translation

Ordinance, Items in Section 16 (Catch-All Controls) in order to determine
whether catch-all controls apply.
Typical examples of related technology: Output stabilizer technology, etc.
Relation to weapons: This technology can be mounted in missile guidance systems or flightcontrol systems with an accelerometer to measure the direction ofvelocity. It may also be used in automatic pilot systems, navigationequipment, and so on.
(3) End-users suspected to be involved in WMD programs (institutions on the Foreign End User
List)
Even general-purpose items that are not subject to list controls cannot be assumed to berisk-free, since if they should fall into the hands of someone involved in WMD programs, they
could end up being used for weapons development. Exporters therefore need to exercise a lot of
caution. To help them make a judgment, METI has provided exporters with the “Foreign End
User List” (see Reference 8), which identifies institutions abroad and fields of research that aresuspected to be involved in the development, manufacture and use of WMDs. As of September
3rd, 2010, the list names a total of 331 institutions in nine countries including North Korea, Iran,Pakistan and India.11 Unless it is obvious that there is no risk of involvement with WMD programs,
researchers are required to obtain a license from METI before conducting research with any ofthese institutions, and before providing them with goods or technology. As we can see, exporters
need to pay particular attention when working with any of these institutions.
Note 11) To see the names of specific institutions, etc., consult the “Foreign End User List”, which isaccessible via the “Search by Keyword” section of METI’s security trade control website. Checkthe following URL :http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/law05.html#gaikokuuserlist

Even if the end-user is a “university” or “research institution”, exporters should still bevery careful, as a license may be required before providing goods or technology to any of
the institutions listed on the Foreign End User List. As illustrated below, the list actually
includes universities, research institutions, hospitals, and more. In addition, universities need toexercise just as much caution when accepting researchers or international students from any ofthese institutions and when providing them with certain technology. The Foreign End User List is
occasionally revised to reflect the evolving situation in Japan and around the world, so
universities in Japan are expected to keep track of these revisions so that they can makejudgments based on the latest requirements.
Table 3-1 Some universities, research institutions, and other institutions listed on the Foreign
End User List (excerpt)(As of September 3rd, 2010)
Country

Name of Institution

Iran

Amirkabir University of Technology [M,N], Educational and Research Institute (ERI) [M],Jaber Ibn Hayan Research Laboratories [N], Sharif Technical University [M,N], Tarbiat
Modares University [B,C], Tehran University [B,C,N], etc.

North
Korea

Kanggye Defense College, Physics Department [N], Kim Cheaek University ofTechnology [B,C,M,N], Kim Il Sung University [N], Korea Red Cross Hospital [B,C,M,N],
etc.

29

Tentative translation
China

Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (BUAA) [M], Northwestern Polytechnic
University [M], etc.

Pakistan

Quaid-I-Azam University (QAU) [N], Pakistan Institute of Engineering & Applied Sciences[N], etc.

The letters in square parentheses ([ ]) represent the category of concern. “B” is biological weapons, “C” ischemical weapons, “M” is missiles, and “N” is nuclear weapons.

30

Tentative translation

4. Steps exporters should take when they think an item may be subject to export controls
Before attempting either to export goods or to provide a service transnationally, the faculty
member who is directly involved in the research (hereinafter, “you”) is advised to check whether
or not the transfer in question is subject to export control legislation. If your university does nothave its own export control manuals or reference materials, you are recommended to check
METI’s security trade control website (http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/index.html), where you
can access the “Goods and Technology Matrix”. This matrix has a useful Excel version
that has search function. If you can access it, the “Reference Classification forApplicability Judgment (Compass)” (divided into “Compass for Goods”12 and “Compass
for Technology”13), available on the old version of the website, is another resource that canhelp you determine whether controls may apply, although you should be aware that thislist does not incorporate recent revisions to the Order and Ministerial Ordinances. If,
having consulted these resources, you determine that your export is likely to be subject to export
control legislation, you should proceed to follow the steps outlined in 1 (if your university has asystem for security trade control) or 2 (if it does not) below.
Note 12) Check the following URL:
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/kanri/gaihi/tsuri/gaihi_1.htm
Note 13) Check the following URL:
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/kanri/gaihi/ekimu_tsuri/gaihi_1.htm

In addition, it is the person who is providing the research-related goods or technology toan institution overseas who is legally responsible for determining whether or not it isnecessary to apply for a license. If the export forms part of university-based research
activities, then it is the university to which the researcher belongs that is responsible formaking this determination. If a researcher or his or her university inadvertently violates theForeign Exchange Act, they cannot defend themselves on the grounds of ignorance.
Exporters should therefore be very careful when deciding whether export controls apply.
(1) When the exporter’s university or institution has implemented an effective security tradecontrol support system
First, you should seek advice from the university office that is in charge of export control. If your
your university has its own procedures for approving provisions of goods or technology touniversities or companies overseas, follow these procedures and consult with the office as andwhen necessary. When consulting with the office, be prepared to provide detailed information
including the proposed end-user’s name, country and primary field of work, and to account for
how the end-user will use the goods or technology in question. The office in charge of export
controls will carefully review the information you have provided to determine whether or not the
proposed export or transfer is subject to export-control legislation. If they find that it is, you will be
required to apply to METI for a license.
Again, it is important to note that security trade controls under the Foreign Exchange Act do
not prohibit the export of controlled items: they simply require the exporter to obtain alicense before exporting these items. The fact that a license is required in order to export
certain goods or technology should not deter exporters from trying to send the item in question toan overseas university or company. Whether or not a license can be granted will be determined31

Tentative translationaccording to the following criteria:(i) Whether it is probable that the goods or technology will actually reach the proposed enduser;(ii) Whether it is probable that the end-user identified in the application will be the one toactually use the goods or technology provided;(iii) Whether it is probable that the goods or technology provided, as well as any goods to be
produced using the technology provided, will be used in a way that could pose a threat tointernational peace and security; and(iv) Whether it is probable that the goods or technology provided will be managed properly by
the end-user.
The specific details of each application — for instance, whether or not the end-user is listed on
the Foreign End User List, or the particular specifications of the goods or technology to beprovided — will of course give rise to different determinations. This is why it is important toprovide your university’s export control office with the most accurate information
possible. One detail can make all the difference in determining whether or not you will need toapply for a license from METI. Also, once the license has been granted, you can go to this sameoffice to get help completing your customs declaration. Making a little extra effort to gather all the
relevant information in the early stages will help you establish a good relationship with the export
controls office, a relationship that will be useful to help you through subsequent export
procedures.
(2) When the exporter’s university or institution does NOT have an effective security trade control
support system
If this is the case, you will almost certainly have much more to do, as you will have to take care of
all export control procedures yourself, including submitting the application to METI. Having said
that, if you follow the right steps you shouldn’t encounter too many difficulties. You may also beable to find a freight forwarding company that can take care of certain parts of the process for acommission. However, it is important to note that, even when it is the individual exporter who
takes charge of export procedures, the university is still legally responsible for ensuring thatexport control legislation is complied with and that all necessary applications to METI are
submitted.
The first step is to consult with the university office in charge of research support (social
collaboration), and explain that you need to send goods to a foreign country for research
purposes. In general, even aside from any controls under the Foreign Exchange Act, any
proposed transfer of university equipment needs to be authorized by the university office incharge of supplies and property management (or financial affairs). You should therefore discuss
details of your plans with this office, and find out what authorization procedures your university
has in place regarding security trade control exports under the Foreign Exchange Act.
Once you’ve consulted with and received authorization from that office, you can start taking
steps in preparation for export. It is vital that you start by thoroughly reviewing thespecifications of the goods or technology to be exported to find out what legislation
applies. To do so, it can be useful to refer to the above-mentioned “Goods and Technology
Matrix” and “Compass” resources. These tools are a little complicated to use, but it shouldn’t
take too long to find out whether there are any restrictions in place on sending the goods or32

Tentative translation

technology in question to a foreign country.
To make a quick and accurate determination, go through these steps in the following order:(i)

Check if the goods or technology in question are listed on the control lists (seeChapter 2).
If yes, unless your export is subject to an exemption, you will need to apply for a license.
List controls generally apply to the kind of high specification (high spec) goods andtechnology that are relatively easily diverted to military use, and which are not widelyused in university research. Having said that, you still need to take care to make anaccurate determination.
(ii) If not, check if the end-user’s address (domicile) is in one of the “white countries”.
If it is, you don’t need to apply for a license.
(iii) If your export is not listed on the control lists, but the end-user’s address(domicile) is not in one of the “white countries”, check if the end-user is listed in
the “Foreign End User List” explained in Chapter 3, Part 3. If you find the end-user’sname in the Foreign End User List, your export is highly likely to be subject to WMD
catch-all controls (see Chapter 3). In particular, it is essential to apply for a license whenthe “category of concern” that the Foreign End User List assigns to the end-user inquestion covers the proposed use of the goods or technology you are providing. In
addition, please check carefully to see whether your export includes goods or technology
listed as “examples of goods that are highly likely to be used in the development of
WMDs (40 items)”, as explained in Chapter 3, Part 2.
(iv) Even if, on the basis of Step 3, a license application does not seem necessary to export
to the end-user in question, it is still necessary to understand the nature of theend-user’s activities, and to determine whether they may have any connections tomilitary-related institutions or military programs. If you have any suspicions that theend-user may be involved in any way in the development of WMDs, you will need to apply
for a license.
(v) Even if, on the basis of Step 4, you determine that the end-user poses no threat, in order
to be sure whether or not the export is subject to WMD catch-all controls, you now needto verify how the items you are providing are going to be used. In addition, if the end-user
is in a state or region that is subject to a UN arms embargo, you will need to carryout an additional review to determine whether the goods or technology you areproviding are likely to be used in the development, production or operation of
conventional weapons. If yes, you will need to apply for a license.
(vi) Finally, even if, on the basis of Step 5 above, you have determined that you do not need
to apply for a license, check whether METI has sent you a special notice concerning
the export of the goods or technology in question. If yes, you will need to apply for alicense.
Figure 4-1 illustrates these steps in a flowchart. If, after going through these steps, you realizethat the goods or technology you plan to provide to an overseas institution or non-resident
individual (i.e., an international student or visiting foreign researcher) for research purposes issubject to export controls, you will need to obtain a license from METI before proceeding.
However, you will not need to apply for a license if your export is a technology (service) that isalready in the public domain (that is accessible to more than a small group of people). Export
control legislation also contains several special provisions that exempt encryption technology

33

Tentative translationfrom the license requirement (see the Ministerial Ordinance on Trade Relation Invisible Trade,etc., commonly known as the “Invisible Trade Ordinance”). As for the provision of goods, thelegislation also allows for some exemptions for small-sum transactions (see the Export Trade
Control Ordinance). These exemptions are explained in the “Security Trade Control Guidebook”(published by Associate Professor Yukiko Shinya, University of Tsukuba), which is included at
the end of the “Guidelines for Establishing and Practicing a Voluntary Control System for
Security Trade”. We recommend that you look through these resources carefully. In addition,
Table 4-1 summarizes how to approach the tricky area of controls that apply to international
students and visiting foreign researchers.
It is important to note that, when applying for a license, the documents you need to submit andthe office to which you need to submit them may differ depending on which parts of thelegislation your export is covered by. For details, visit the Security Trade Control Policy Divisionwebsite and select “Application Flow” under “Application Procedures”. You can then select“Specific License Application”, and open “Documentation and Receiving Offices (Goods)” and“Documentation and Receiving Offices (Technology)”.14
Note 14) The specific URLs are as follows:
For goods:
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/sinseimadoguti.html
For technology:
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/sinseimadoguti_ekimu.html

Table 4-1 Controls applying to international students and visiting foreign researchers
Recipient

Residency

Technology

Materials/ Equipment

Status(Service)(Goods)Nonresident

Faculty member (Resident)⇒ Student, Researcher, Other.
(Non-resident)

Beforeentry
Less than
6 months
6 monthsor moreAfter entry

Controlled*

Resident

Faculty member (Resident)⇒ Student, Researcher, Other.
(Resident)
Controlled

Japan ⇒ Foreign country
Regardless of the residencyof the exporter, all exports(movements) of goods fromJapan to a foreign country
are Controlled*.

All provisions of technology to a foreigncountry are Controlled*, regardless of
the residency status of the end-user.
(e.g., Student or Researcher⇒ Foreign country)
The arrow, “⇒”, represents the direction of movement.
* The university must observe export trade control procedures before providing technology or exporting goods(determine whether controls apply, go through transaction procedures, etc.).
Note: U.S. Export Controls are applied on the basis of nationality (not residency), and therefore cover all exports
involving international students.

34

Tentative translation

Start

(i)

Are the goods ortechnology listed on thecontrol lists?

Yes

No
(ii)

Is
the end-userYesin one of the “whitecountries”?

No
(iii)

Is the end-user
identified on the “Foreign
No
End-User List”?

(iii)
Yes

Yes

Is
the proposed use of thegoods or technology identified
as a “category of concern” inthe “Foreign End User List”?

No
(iv)

(iv)

Do you havethe proposed use Yes information that could raise
No Is obviouslyof noconcerns about theactivities of the end-user(links to the military, etc.)?

concern?

Yes

No
(v)

Are the goods ortechnology provided
likelyto be used in WMD
programs?

Yes

No
(v)

Is theend-user in astate or region that is
subject to a UN arms
embargo”?

No

Yes
(v)

Yes

Are they likely
to be used in thedevelopment or use of
conventional
weapons?

Yes

No
(vi)

Did
METI instruct you toapply?

No
Apply for license

Note: (i) to (vi) correspond to the steps in Chapter
4, Part 2

Application
NOT necessary

Fig. 4-1 Flowchart to determine whether you need to apply for an export license.

35

Tentative translation(2) Contact offices for inquiries regarding export control legislation (determining whether or not
an export is subject to controls)
If your university doesn’t have office in charge of export controls and it is difficult for you to get
advice elsewhere, you can contact your region’s Bureau of Economy, Trade and Industry, or the
METI Security Export Licensing Division (Phone: 03-3501-2801), with any questions you haveregarding list controls or catch-all controls, and any concerns you have regarding your license
application. Before making an enquiry, please prepare all the information you’ll need, including,for list controls, the specific name of the item in the order along with its technical specifications,and for catch-all controls, the country of the end-user, the item’s classification in the Customs
Tariff Table, the use to which the item will be put, and verified information on the end-user.
Having all this information to hand will help the office handle your enquiry efficiently, and yourconcerns may be cleared up more quickly than you would expect. For details, including officehours, visit METI’s security trade control website (URL:
http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/kanri/tetsuzuki/madoguchi/main.html). For details of contact
offices, and any other enquiries regarding security trade control, see “Reference 9”.
Whatever you do, don’t bypass these procedures on the optimistic assumption that you
don’t need a license. If you are in any doubt, be sure to ask.
(3) The issue of the extraterritorial application of U.S. Export Administration Regulations(supplement)
We have explained what exporters need to know about security trade controls under the Foreign
Exchange Act in Japan. However, exporters who will be involved in long-term interactions withcompanies or universities in the United States should remember that in some situations U.S.
trade control laws can be applied extraterritorially, and that exporters may therefore have to deal
with “re-export controls”. The United States attempts to justify extraterritorial application on thebasis that their Export Administration Regulations (EAR) cover the re-export fromcountries other than the U.S of goods that originated in the U.S., as well as products
manufactured abroad which contain U.S. produced goods. Many have criticized thesecontrols, saying that they infringe on national sovereignty, but they are nonetheless de facto
controls and exporters trading with U.S. organizations have to comply with them.
According to EAR, re-export controls may apply in the following cases:(i) When re-exporting (i.e., exporting to a foreign country) goods or technology imported fromthe United States;(ii) When re-exporting (i.e., exporting to a foreign country) goods incorporating parts ormaterials imported from the United States; and(iii) When re-exporting (i.e., exporting to a foreign country) goods or technology produced
through the direct application of technology imported from the United States.
Exporters who do not comply with U.S. export control requirements may be forced to cease theirtransactions with U.S.-based companies or universities, and, if convicted, may even face36

Tentative translation

criminal penalties such as imprisonment or fines.
These requirements have greatly complicated export control procedures for exporters involved in
U.S. related trade. More details are available on the website of the U.S. Department ofCommerce, and the Commercial Service of the U.S. Embassy in Japan has published its
guide to “U.S. Export Administration Regulations”, a Japanese-language explanation ofre-export controls that can be accessed at www.buyusa.gov/japan/ja/ear.html. Exporters who
still have doubts about these regulations can get in touch with the Commercial Service of the U.S.
Embassy in Japan:
The Commercial Service, U.S. Embassy Japan
1-10-5 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-8420, JAPANTEL: (03) 3224-5060, FAX: (03) 3589-4235

37

Tentative translation

5. Basic statistical data
(1) Personnel-related statistical data(i) Changes in the number of international students(As of May 1 each year)

FY

Total Number ofInternational Students

Number of
Self-supporting
International Students

Number of
Government-supported
International Students

Number of International
Students Dispatched byForeign Governments

2003

109,508

98,135

9,746

1,627

2004

117,302105,592

9,804

1,906

2005

121,812110,018

9,891

1,903

2006

117,927

106,102

9,869

1,956

2007

118,498

106,297

10,0202,181

2008
123,829
111,225
9,923
2,681
Source: Japan Student Services Organization (FY2008 Results of International Student
Enrollment Survey)(ii) Number of International Students by Area of Origin
Of Which Are Short-Stay International
Students
Number of International
Percentage
Students

Area

Number of International
Students

Asia

114,189

92.2

5,915

60.6

Europe

3,819

3.1

1,770

18.1

North America

2,343

1.9

1,584

16.2

Africa

1,084

0.9

44

0.5

Latin America

1,008

0.8

118

1.2

Middle East

842

0.7

55

0.6

Oceania

544

0.4

270

2.8

Percentage

TOTAL
123,829100
9,756
Source: Japan Student Services Organization (FY2008 Results of International Student
Enrollment Survey)

100(iii) Number of International Students by Educational Stage and Type of Institution
National

PublicPrivate

TOTAL
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f

Number ofInternational
Students%%

38

Number ofInternational
Students

I
n
%
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l

Number ofInternational
Students%

Tentative translation

Educational Stage

S
t
u
d
e
n
t
s

Graduate school

20,247

62.0

1,316

4.0

11,10334.0

32,666

100.0

Undergraduate

9,674

16.0

1,302

2.2

49,54481.9

60,520100.0

Two-year college

2

0.1

5

0.2

2,110

99.7

2,117

100.0

Technical college
Special institute(Special course)
Preparatory
education
curriculum

462

85.9

0

0.0

76

14.1

538

100.0

0

0.0

9

0.03

25,74499.97

25,753

100.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

2,235

100.0

2,235

100.0

30,385

24.5

2,632

2.1

90,812

73.3

123,829

100.0

TOTAL

Source: Japan Student Services Organization (FY2008 Results of International Student
Enrollment Survey)

39

Tentative translation(iv) Number of International Students by Field of Specialization
Field of Specialization

Number of International
Students

Percentage

Art and science

29,18923.6

Social science

48,25939.0

Science

1,526

1.2

Engineering

19,511

15.8

Agriculture

2,887

2.3

Health2,768

2.2

Domestic arts

2,772

2.2

Education

2,981

2.4

Art

4,006

3.2

Other

9,930

8.0

TOTAL
123,829
100.0
Source: Japan Student Services Organization (FY2008 Results of International Students
Enrollment Survey)(2) Research-related statistical data
[Statistics](i) Number of sponsored research projects
FY

Total Number

Foreigncompanies(Unit: 1,000 JPY)

Percentage

Total value

Foreigncompanies value

Percentage

FY2003

13,78645

0.33

85,904,359

748,395

0.87

FY2004

15,23639

0.26

101,227,322

117,4120.12

FY2005

16,96041

0.24

126,479,747

181,234

0.14

FY2006
18,04573
0.40
142,035,360
306,127
0.22
Source: Report of August 31, 2007, Meeting of the Committee for the Promotion of Industrial, Academic
and Public Cooperation, Council for Science and Technology(ii) Number of collaborative research projects
FY

Total number

Foreigncompanies

Percentage

Total value

Foreigncompanies value

Percentage

FY2003

9,255

15

0.16

21,620,823

64,3830.30

FY2004

10,72832

0.30

26,375,829

100,678

0.38

FY200513,02051

0.39

32,343,275

272,693

0.84

FY2006
14,75783
0.56
36,843,149
361,456
0.98
Source: Report of August 31, 2007, Meeting of the Committee for the Promotion of Industrial, Academic
and Public Cooperation, Council for Science and Technology

40Tentative translation(3) FY2008 Collaborative research projects with foreign companies, top 30 institutions(Unit: 1,000 JPY)
Name of Institution

Amount of money received

1

Tokyo Institute of Technology

179,446

2

University of Tokyo

127,478

3

Tohoku University

73,213

4

Keio University

58,197

5

Osaka University

51,071

6

University of Tsukuba

38,968

7

Kyushu University

36,6438

Nagoya City University

21,2609

Kyoto University

18,700

10

University of Yamanashi

18,32911

Kanagawa Institute of Technology

10,000

12

University of Hyogo

9,746

13

Nagoya Institute of Technology

9,606

14

Kumamoto University

8,943

15

Chiba University

7,292

16

Tokai University

7,150

17

Kanazawa University

7,000

18

Hitotsubashi University

6,268

19

Shinshu University

5,000

20

Kobe University

4,888

21

University of Fukui

3,839

22

Hokkaido University

3,438

23

Yamagata University

3,433

24

Electro-Communication University

3,000

24
26
27
28
28
30

Nagasaki Institute of Applied

3,000

ScienceTokyo University of Agriculture andTechnology
University of the Ryukyus

2,884
2,726

Suzuka National College of

2,000

Technology
Tokyo University of Science

2,000

University of Occupational and

1,876

Environmental Health, Japan

As of July 29, 2009; Survey on Industry-Academia Collaboration in Universities, etc. (MEXT)

41

Tentative translation[Questionnaire survey]
The following are the results of a survey conducted in July 2009 in cooperation with the
University Network for Innovation and Technology Transfer (UNITT), and reflect responses fromdepartments involved in industry-academia collaborations across 29 UNITT-affiliateduniversities.
(i) Descriptions of research (by controlled field):(a) Nuclear power:◆ Number of search results for controlled subjects, by keyword:
Nuclear reactor: 64 results; Nuclear fuel: 16 results, Reprocessing: 12 results;
Enrichment: 9 results.
◆ Examples of specific research subjects:○ Study of the design of supercritical-pressure light water cooled nuclear reactors(engineering research)○ Reactor core thermal hydraulics etc., of supercritical-pressure light water cooled
nuclear reactors (engineering research)○ Supercritical fluid (natural science research)○ Application of information technology in researching nuclear reactors (engineeringresearch)○ Core design for fast-breeder reactors (energy engineering research)○ Localized creep damage analysis of pipes in cooling systems after serious accidents(mechanical system engineering research)○ Study report on reliability demonstration testing of nuclear reactor containment vessels(energy engineering research)○ Turbine-based power generation systems in sodium-cooled fast reactors (nuclear
reactor engineering research)○ Determining age-related degradation in nuclear power plants (mechanical systemengineering research)○ Cross flow between sub-channels in nuclear reactors (natural science research)○ Nuclear physics (nuclear reactor experiments)○ Transmutation of waste in long-established nuclear reactors (engineering research)○ Nuclear fuel behavior in irradiation fields (engineering research)○ Methods for dry fuel reprocessing (material science research)○ Spent fuel solvent extraction (energy engineering research)○ Research and development of separation technology for difficult to separate long-lived
nuclides using natural products (functional materials chemistry research)○ Advanced reprocessing systems using highly selective and controllable precipitants(nuclear reactor engineering research)○ Effects of irradiation on the chemical properties of metallic glass (metal materials
research)○ Development of oxygen monitoring technology for use in the submerged treatment ofhigh-level radioactive materials (engineering research)○ Flow properties in two-phase agitation systems (engineering research)42

Tentative translation○ Steam oxidization of high temperature aluminized materials (engineering research)○ Transmutation of transuranium elements in nuclear reactors (engineering research)○ System dynamics analysis of fuel cycles (engineering research)○ Uranium cascade theory (energy engineering research)○ Production and use of plutonium that is highly resistant to nuclear proliferation (nuclear
reactor engineering research)○ Atomic-scale control using supergravity fields (extreme environment research)○ Evaluating the safety of radioactive waste disposal (engineering research)○ Development of SiC/SiC composites (energy engineering research)(b) Aerospace:◆ Number of search results for controlled subjects, by keyword:
Composite: 34 results; High-temperature resistant materials: 13 results; Propulsion
systems: 12 results; Rockets: 9 results; Autonomous control: 6 results; Guidance control: 4
results; Remote control: 2 results◆ Examples of specific research subjects:○ Dynamics of laminated composite plates (engineering research)○ Probabilistic design methodology for composite structures (engineering research)○ Preparation of carbon nanotube metal composites (materials science research)○ Evaluation of composites (science and engineering research)○ Development of SiC/SiC composites (energy engineering research)○ Destruction dynamics, damage dynamics, and long-term durability evaluation ofaerospace composites (science and engineering research)○ Study of hot corrosion behavior of materials (engineering research)○ Evaluation of high-temperature resistant ceramics (engineering research)○ SiC epitaxial growth technology (physics research)○ Tantalum carbide (TaC) production technology (physics research)○ Strengthening of heat-resistant materials for space planes using electron beamirradiation (materials science research)○ Development of next-generation plasma thrusters (aerospace engineering research)○ Basic research on ramjet engines (aerospace engineering research)○ Unsteady combustion of solid propellants (aerospace engineering research)○ Research and development of microplasma thrusters (engineering research)○ Plasma torch igniters for supersonic combustion (engineering research)○ Flame stabilization mechanisms in supersonic combustion (fluid chemistry research)○ Two-staged combustion hybrid rockets (engineering research)○ Nuclear rockets (science and engineering research)○ Improving the reliability of rocket design technology (engineering research)○ Brazing of nozzle skirts using metallic porous bodies (materials science research)○ Research and development of experimental winged rockets (engineering research)○ Small solid rocket thrusters using laser-assisted combustion (engineering research)○ Autonomous flight control of powered parafoils (engineering research)○ Discontinuous control and backstepping method for the underactuated control of
VTOL aerial robots (science and engineering research)

43

Tentative translation○ Advanced control of spacecraft using disturbance estimation (engineering research)○ Motion analysis and control of spacecraft (mechanical system engineering research)○ Switching control of underactuated manipulators by introducing a definition ofmonotonically decreasing energy (science and engineering research)○ Motion control and communication for satellites (science and engineering research)○ Satellite-controlled electric rockets using chemical propellants (engineering research)○ Development of technology to detect liquid hydrogen fuel leaks (engineering research)○ Vibration suppression properties of ground materials (engineering research)○ Research and development of satellite communication systems (electronicengineering research)○ DNS of combustion fields (science and engineering research)(c) Chemical substances:◆ Number of research subjects related to the production of toxic chemical substancessuch as potassium cyanide and carbonyl dichloride (Phosgene): 19 results◆ Examples of specific research subjects:○ Synthesis of phosphine ligands using phosphorus trichloride (engineering research)○ Development of a novel method for generating carbon-carbon bonds using controlled
substances (chemical research)○ Development of imaging probes for disease-related receptors using controlled
substances (pharmaceutical research)○ Functional materials design and synthetic organic chemistry using controlled
substances (engineering research)○ Development of a novel method for polymer-controlled synthesis using controlled
substances (chemical research)(d) Biology (bacteria/ microorganisms):◆ Number of research subjects related to the production of viruses, bacteria, etc., such as
Bacillus anthracis and the avian influenza virus: 18 cases◆ Examples of specific research subjects:○ Botulinum neurotoxins (life and environmental science research)○ Analysis of mechanisms for regulating toxin production in Clostridium perfringens(medicine and health research)○ Development of prophylactic vaccines against viral diseases (medicine and healthresearch)○ Development of early detection and rapid diagnostic methods for possible terrorist
pathogens, etc., and establishment of evaluation methods thereof: Bacillus anthracis,
Yersinia pestis, Burkholderia pseudomallei and Mycobacterium tuberculosis (medical
research)○ Detection of food borne pathogens and plant pathogens using visualization tools(medical research)○ Pathogenicity and diagnosis methods of Chlamydia psittaci (medical research)○ Diagnosis methods of Coxiella burnetii (medical research)○ Development of a disease model of the flavivirus infection in monkeys (virus research)○ Pathogens in monkeys (primatology research)

44

Tentative translation○ Spread of infectious diseases across international borders in Southeast Asia (virus
research)(ii) Institutional systems to deal with export controls on goods and technology being provided to
end-users overseas:
Twelve of the twenty-nine universities that responded to the questionnaire had institutional
systems in place to deal with export controls on goods and technology being provided to
end-users overseas. Their responses, including details of the responsible departments oroffices, and methods by which exports are managed, are summarized below:(a) Number of exports to end-users overseas:
Goods: 47 cases; Technology: 19 cases(b) Circumstances of these exports:○ As part of collaborative research: 63 cases○ Provisions of samples to universities or research institutions abroad: 29 cases○ As reference materials or data for publication or presentation: 1 case
○ Other: 6 cases(c) Department or office usually in charge of managing export controls (multiple answers
allowed)○ Research support: 6 universities○ Industry-academia-government collaboration: 5 universities○ Intellectual property: 2 universities○ Respective departments: 2 universities(d) How controls are usually managed:○ Through applications from respective departments○ Using checklists and other paperwork to confirm procedures○ Through campus-wide communications (e.g., drafting and distributing handbooks,
holding seminars), as well as through providing individual consultation services(iii) Management of research results, other than those protected as intellectual property:
Fifteen of the twenty-nine universities that responded to the questionnaire had institutional
systems in place to manage the provision of all tangible materials (e.g., strains), expertise, etc.,that had been obtained as research results to recipients oversea. Details of departments oroffices in charge, and methods by which these provisions are managed, are outlined below:(a) Department or office usually in charge of management (multiple answers allowed)○ Research support: 9 universities○ Industry-academia-government collaboration: 7 universities○ Intellectual property: 5 universities(b) Management methods:○ There is a department responsible for executing MTAs (Material Transfer Agreements)

45

Tentative translation

for transfers of certain tangible materials to and from external institutions.
○ Researchers can make notifications and requests through a database.
○ The institution has rules in place regarding research results management.
(3) Export license-related data:
In recent years, several dozen licenses have been granted annually under the Foreign
Exchange Act in connection with exports of goods and technology by universities (licenses
granted by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry for exports subject to list controls).
Specific examples of licenses granted to universities include a license for exporting the avian
influenza virus to Vietnam, and a license to provide an Australian institution with technology forthe design, production and use of preforms and other carbon fiber materials (see Table 5-1).
Table 5-1 Examples of export licenses granted to universities
ApplicantDestination

Goods/ Technology

University A

BrazilCarbon fiber molded products

University B

VietnamAvian influenza virus

University C

China

Aerosol mass spectrometer

University D

ThailandInfrared thermography

University E

Cambodia

Radar

University F

United States

Spent atomic fuelUniversity G

Australia

Technology for developing, producing and using
preforms and molded products using carbon fiber46

Tentative translation(Annex 1)
Example of a research field classification system in the field of nuclear power
1. A typical example of research project classification:(1) We have outlined below, as an example, a research field classification system in the field of
nuclear power that is employed by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan, and have given
examples of specialized fields that are representative of each category.
(2) Specialized fields that involve the use of equipment for inducing or generating nuclear
reactions (nuclear reactors), devices or materials that form part of this equipment, or uranium
enrichment and plutonium separation and extraction, are generally considered to have thepotential to be diverted to research related to nuclear weapons.
Category

Specialized field

Nuclear fission
engineering

302 Advanced Reactors, Nuclear Design, Nuclear Transmutation
Technology
303 Research Reactors, Application of Neutrons
311 Reactor Design, Construction and Examination of Nuclear
Power Stations, Aseismatic Design, Nuclear Ships

Nuclear fuel cycles andmaterials

402 Nuclear Fuel403 Reactor Materials
406 Isotope Separation, Application of Isotopes, Uranium
Enrichment
408 Fuel Reprocessing

2. Research classification system
Below, you can find a research classification system that is employed by the Atomic Energy
Society of Japan, which is given as an example of a research field classification system in thefield of nuclear power:
Category
Category I
General Issues

Category II
Radiation, Accelerator

Specialized field

101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Philosophy and Ethics of Nuclear Energy
Regulatory Engineering and Politics of Nuclear Energy andInternational Relations
Economic and Social Aspects of Nuclear Energy
Energy and the Environment
Nuclear Education
Nuclear information
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

201

Nuclear Physics, Nuclear data, nuclear reaction technology

47

Tentative translation

and Beam Technology

Category III
Fission Energy
Engineering

202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209

Radiation behaviors, Radiation Shielding
Radiation Physics, Radiation Detection and Measurement
Accelerator and Beam Acceleration Technology
Application of Beams
Beam Design, Target
Orbital radiation, Laser
Medical reactors and Accelerators
Neutron Sources, Neutron Technology

301
302

Reactor Physics, Nuclear Data, Criticality Safety
Advanced Reactors, Nuclear Design, Nuclear Transmutation
Technology
Research Reactors, Application of Neutrons
Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Reactor Strategy
Reactor Instrumentation, Instrumentation Systems, Reactor
Control
Remote Control, Robotics, Image Processing
Thermal Hydraulics (including Energy Conversion, Transfer,and Storage)
Nuclear System Design, Human-Machine Systems,
Advanced Information Processing
Design and Manufacturing of Reactor Components andTransportation Vessel/ Storage Facilities
Operational Management, Inspection and Maintenance ofReactors
Reactor Design, Construction and Examination of Nuclear
Power Stations, Aseismatic Design, Nuclear Ships
Nuclear Safety Engineering (including Nuclear Facilities/
Installation Safety, PSA)
Computational Science and Engineering

303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
Category IV
Nuclear Fuel Cycle andNuclear Materials

401
402
403
404
405

408
409
410
411
412

Basic Properties
Nuclear Fuel
Reactor Materials
Irradiation Behavior, Irradiation Technology
Reactor Chemistry, Radiation Chemistry, Corrosion
Chemistry, Decontamination
Isotope Separation, Application of Isotopes, Uranium
Enrichment
Nuclear Chemistry, Radiochemistry, Analytical Chemistry,
Chemistry of Actinide
Fuel Reprocessing
Radioactive Waste Management
Radioactive Waste Disposal and the Environment
Decommissioning Technology of Nuclear Facilities
Accountancy, Safeguards Technology

501

Plasma Technology (including Inertial Confinement Fusion)

406
407

Category V
Fusion Energy

48Tentative translation

Engineering

502
503
504
505
506

Category VI
Health Physics andEnvironmental Science

601
602
603
604
605
606

Fusion Reactor Material Technology (Reactor and Blanket
Materials, Irradiation Behavior)
Tritium Technology (Fuel Recovery and Refining,
Measurement, Isotope Effect, Safe Handling)
Reactor Component Technology (First Wall, Diverters,
Magnets, etc.)
Fusion Neutronics
Fusion Reactor Systems, Design, Application
Medical and Biological Applications of Radiation (including
Nuclear Medicine, Biological Effects)
Radiation (Radioactivity) Measurement, Dosimetory
Radiation Control
Environmental Radioactivity
Radiation Dose and Environmental Safety Assessments(including Meteorological Aspects, Global Environment)
Philosophy and Standards for Radiation Protection(Note) Specialized fields that involve the use of equipment for inducing or generating nuclear
reactions (nuclear reactors), devices or materials that form part of this equipment, or
uranium enrichment and plutonium separation and extraction, which are generally
considered to have the potential to be diverted to research related to nuclear weapons
are underlined.

49

Tentative translation(3) (Annex 2)

Example of a research field classification system in the field of aerospace
1. A typical example of research project classification:(1) Below, we have provided a typical example of a research field classification system in thefield of aerospace.
(2) Specialized fields that involve research into aerodynamics, structural dynamics, materials,
control engineering and propulsion engineering are generally considered to have thepotential to be diverted to research related to missiles.
A. Field of aerodynamics:
Basic fluid dynamics
Compressible hydrodynamics → Flight performance enhancement technology for
missilesRarefied gas dynamics → Missile re-entry technology (suborbital flight in upper air)
Aerodynamic heating → Missile re-entry technology (development of warheads)
Numerical analytical approach → Flight performance enhancement technology for missiles
B. Field of structural dynamics and materials:
Thin-walled structural dynamics
Structural dynamics in extreme environments → Design of missile warheads
Composite materials dynamics → Development of higher-performance flying objects
Materials
High-temperature resistant materials → Protection of warheads against aerodynamic
heating, Development of higher-performancerocket nozzles
C. Field of control engineering and system engineering:
Navigation, guidance and control engineering → Precision guidance for missiles
Unmanned aerial vehicle systems → Remote control and autonomous control technology
for aerospace vehicles
D. Field of propulsion engineering:
Rocket engines → Development of missile thrusters
Solid rocket engines
Liquid rocket engines

2. Research classification system
An example of a research field classification system in the field of aerospace is given below.
A. Field of aerodynamics
Basic fluid dynamics
Ideal fluid dynamics

50

Tentative translation

Viscid fluid dynamics
Compressible hydrodynamics → Flight performance enhancement technology for missiles
High-temperature gas dynamics
Rarefied gas dynamics → Missile re-entry technology (suborbital flight in upper air)Airfoil theory
Aerodynamic heating → Missile re-entry technology (development of warheads)
Aerodynamic noiseInternal fluid dynamics
Rotor aerodynamics
Numerical analytical approach → Flight performance enhancement technology for missiles
B. Field of structural dynamics and materials
Thin-walled structural dynamics
Dynamics of reinforced structures
Shell theory
Buckling theory
Structural dynamics in extreme environments → Design of missile warheads
Composite material dynamics → Development of higher-performance flying objects
Structural vibration
Numerical analytical approach
Materials
Aluminum alloy, magnesium alloy
Titanium alloy
Composite material dynamics
High-temperature resistant materials → Protection of warheads against aerodynamic
heating, Development of higher-performance rocket
nozzles
C. Field of control engineering and system engineering
Flight control engineering
Navigation, guidance and control engineering → Precision guidance for missiles
Flight dynamics
Orbit dynamics
Attitude control theory
Unmanned aerial vehicles systems → Remote control and autonomous control technology foraerospace vehicles
Special airplanes
Airships
Vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft
Rocket systems
Satellite systems
Manned space systems
Space exploration engineering
Space utilization engineering
Remote sensing technology
D. Field of propulsion engineering
Jet engines

51

Tentative translation

Turboprop engines
Ramjet engines
Rocket engines → Development of missile thrusters
Solid rocket engines
Liquid rocket engines
Electric propulsion
Laser propulsion
Fuel science and firing science
Structural materials
Numerical analytical approach
E. Field of flying object engineering
Flying object guidance theory
Flying object control theory
Propulsion theory52

Tentative translation(Annex 3)
Toxic chemical substances that are subject to security trade controls
1. Substances used as raw materials for specific chemical agents◎	  The following substances, or mixtures containing them in quantities exceeding 30%
of total weight:
3-hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine, Potassium fluoride, Ethylene chlorohydrin, Dimethylamine,
Dimethylamine hydrochloride, Hydrogen fluoride, Methyl benzilate, 3-Quinuclidinone, Pinacolone,
Potassium cyanide, Potassium bifluoride, Ammonium bifluoride, Sodium bifluoride, Sodium
fluoride, Sodium cyanide, Phosphorus pentasulfide, Diisopropylamine, 2-Diethylamino ethanol,
Sodium sulfide, Triethanolamine hydrochloride, Phosphorous acid triisopropyl, Diethyl
thiophosphoric acid, Diethyl dithio phosphoric acid and Sodium hexafluorosilicic acid.
2. Substances with toxicity equivalent to specific chemical agents◎	  The following substances, or mixtures containing them in quantities exceeding 1% of
total weight for substances listed in “ii”, or exceeding 30% of total weight for
substances listed in “iii”:(i) Saxitoxin and Ricin(ii) O,O-diethyl=S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] = phosphorothiolate and alkylate salts and protonate
salts thereof, 1,1,3,3,3-pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)-1-propane and 3-quinuclidinyl =benzilate(iii) Carbonyl dichloride, Cyanogen chloride, Hydrogen cyanide and Trichloronitromethane
3. Substances used as raw materials for the substances with toxicity equivalent to specificchemical agents listed above◎ The following substances, or mixtures containing them in quantities exceeding 10% of total
weight for substances listed in “ii”, or exceeding 30% or total weight for substances listed in“iii”.
(i) Alkyl phosphonyl difluoride (with alkyl groups having 3 carbons or less only), O-alkyl =O-2-dialkylaminoethyl = alkyl phosphonite (including cycloalkyl groups in O-alkyl alkyl groups,
though limited to O-alkyl alkyl groups having 10 carbons or less, and O-2-dialkylaminoethyl or
alkyl phosphonite alkyl groups having 3 carbons or less); alkylate salts and protonate salts
thereof, O-2-dialkylaminoethyl = hydrogen = alkyl phosphonite (O-2-dialkylaminoethyl or alkyl
phosphonite alkyl groups having 3 carbons or less only); alkylate salts and protonate salts
thereof, O-isopropyl = methyl phosphonochloridate and O-pinacolyl = methyl
phosphonochloridate(ii) Compounds containing phosphorus atoms having no bond with a carbon atom other than abond with one alkyl group having 3 carbons or less; N,N-dialkyl phosphoramidic = dihalide53

Tentative translation(with alkyl groups having 3 carbons or less only); Dialkyl = N,N-dialkyl phosphoramidate (withdialkyl or N,N-dialkyl phosphoramidate alkyl groups having 3 carbons or less only); Arsenictrichloride, 2,2-diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid, Quinuclidine-3-ol,
N,N-dialkylaminoethyl-2-chloride (with alkyl groups having 3 carbons or less only) andprotonate salts thereof; N,N-dialkyl aminoethane-2-ol (limited to those alkyl group carbon
number of which is 3 or less) and protonate salts thereof; N,N-dialkyl aminoethane-2-thiol(with alkyl groups having 3 carbons or less only) and protonate salts thereof;
Bis(2-hydroxyethyl) sulfide and 3,3-dimethylbutane-2-ol(iii) Phosphoryl chloride, Phosphorus trichloride, Phosphorus pentachloride, Trimethyl phosphite,
Triethyl phosphite, Dimethyl phosphite, Diethyl phosphite, Sulfur monochloride, Sulfur
bichloride, Thionyl chloride, Ethyl diethanol amine, Methyl diethanol amine andTriethanolamine

54

Tentative translation(Annex 4)
Viruses, bacteria, etc., subject tosecurity trade controls
1. Viruses, bacteria, etc., used as raw materials for specific bacterial agents◎ The following living organisms, toxins and their subunits or genes:(i) Viruses (excluding vaccines): the African horse sickness virus, the African swine fever virus,
the Andes virus, the Ebola virus, the yellow fever virus, the Aujeszky's disease virus, theOmsk hemorrhagic fever virus, the Oropouche virus, the Guanarito virus, the Kyasanur Forest
disease virus, the cattle plague virus, the rabies virus, the Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever
virus, the foot-and-mouth disease virus, the monkeypox virus, the peste des petits ruminants
virus, the Sin Nombre virus, the vesicular stomatitis virus, the western equine encephalitis
virus, the Saint Louis encephalitis virus, the Seoul virus, the tick-borne encephalitis virus, the
Chikungunya virus, the Chapare virus, the louping ill virus, the Teschen disease virus, theChoclo virus, the dengue fever virus, the smallpox virus, the eastern equine encephalitis virus,
the Dobrava-Belgrade virus, the avian influenza virus (limited to strains having the H5 or H7 H
antigen), the swine fever virus, the Nipah virus, the Japanese encephalitis virus, theNewcastle disease virus, the Hantaan virus, porcine enterovirus type 9, the Junin virus, theblue tongue virus, the Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, the Hendra virus, the potato
Andean latent tymovirus, the potato spindle tuber viroid, the Powassan virus, the Machupo
virus, the Marburg virus, the Murray Valley encephalitis virus, the goat pox virus, the sheep
pox virus, the Laguna Negra virus, the Lassa fever virus, the lumpy skin disease virus, the Rift
Valley fever virus, the lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus, the Lujo virus, and the Rocio virus.
(ii) Bacteria (excluding vaccines): Brucella abortus, Chlamydia psittaci, the gas bacillus, Coxiellaburnetii, Mycoplasma mycoides (small colony), the cholera bacillus, trench fever rickettsia,
Shigella dysenteriae, Bacillus anthracis, the typhoid bacillus, enterohemorrhagic Escherichia
coli serotype O157, Rickettsia prowazekii, Actinobacillus mallei, Brucella suis, Bacillus pestis,
Bacillus botulinus, Brucella melitensis, Mycoplasma capricolum subspecies capripneumoniae(strain F38), Bacillus tularensis, Pseudomonas pseudomallei, and Rickettsia rickettsii.
(iii) Toxins (excluding immunotoxins): aflatoxin, abrin, clostridium welchii toxin, HT-2 toxin,
staphylococcal enterotoxin, conotoxin, cholera toxin, Shigella dysenteriae toxin,
diacetoxyscirpenol toxin, T-2 toxin, tetrodotoxin, Viscum album lectin, verotoxin or Shiga
toxin-like ribosome inactive protein, botulin toxin, Volkensin, microcystin, or modeccin.
(iv) Subunits of toxins falling under (iii) above, or Annex 3, 2, (i).
(v) Bacteria and fungi: Clavibacter michiganensis ssp. sepedonicus, Coccidioides immitis,
Coccidioides posadasii, Cochliobolus miyabeanus, Colletotrichum coffeanum var. virulans,
Xanthomonas albilineans, Xanthomonas oryzae pv. oryzae, Xanthomonas campestris pv. citri,
Pyricularia oryzae, Pyricularia grisea, Puccinia graminis, Puccinia striiformis, Microcyclus ulei,
or Ralstonia solanacearum race 2 or 3.
(vi) Genes (including chromosomes, genomes, plasmids, transposons, and vectors) having a55

Tentative translationbase sequence of nucleic acids falling under (i), (ii) or (v) above, wherein that base sequenceof nucleic acids causes the expression of pathogenicity or the production of toxins fallingunder (iii) above; Annex 3, 2, (i); and (iv) above.
(vii) Organisms (including microorganisms) the genes of which are altered so as to render a basesequence of nucleic acids falling under (i), (ii), or (v) above, wherein that base sequence of
nucleic acids causes the expression of pathogenicity or the production of toxins falling under(iii) above; Annex 3, 2, (i); and (iv) above.

56

Tentative translation(Annex 5)

Hypothetical problems involving export controls at universities
To help you understand how important security trade controls are in the context of university
research activities, we have compiled these reading materials, in which we have presented a few
hypothetical problems researchers may face when they become involved in international
exchange. All of these stories describe realistic situations, and they contain some valuablelessons for faculty members who are engaged in research. Having said that, readers should notethat all of these stories are fictional, and do not depict any actual people or events.

[Scenario 1] How much can we be expected to know about the scope of export controls?
Professor A of National University Y was conducting collaborative research with Professor L of
University S, Country X, and they were working on developing a new kind of floor inspection
technology. One day, they decided that Professor A would send University S a particular piece ofinspection equipment that he had developed, so that a floor inspection experiment could be donein Country X. Although the inspection equipment was just a prototype built for the experiment, it
was still considered to be property of University Y, so once the experiment was done it was to besent back to Japan so that Professor A could keep using it in his experiments. University Y didn’t
have a department in charge of export controls, and as Professor A couldn’t find any university
personnel who were familiar with the regulations, he decided to ask someone from the freight
forwarding company that was handling the export about what procedures had to be done before
exporting the inspection equipment. On the basis of the company’s advice, he decided to obtainan ATA Carnet which would exempt him from having to pay import taxes when bringing
inspection equipment exceeding 10 million Japanese yen in value into country X, and again
when returning the equipment to Japan.1
However, when the freight forwarding company submitted the customs declaration to send theequipment by airfreight, customs officials pointed out that a certain part of the inspection
equipment might require an export license under the Foreign Exchange Act. The agent made anurgent call to Professor A’s lab, and said, “Customs has pointed out that a particular part of yourequipment might need an export license under the Foreign Exchange Act. Unless we canconvince them otherwise by the end of today, they won’t approve clearance, and we won’t beable to fly out the equipment as scheduled.” It had never even occurred to Professor A that hemight need an export license, so he couldn’t even tell on the spot which part of the equipment
customs had taken issue with — all he could think of was how disappointed Professor L would bewhen he found out the equipment wasn’t coming on time. He had to try and keep to theexperiment schedule, so, to prevent the floor experiment from being too delayed, he knew that
he had no choice but to send out the non-controlled parts on the scheduled flight. He decided
that he would fly these parts ahead, and that he would send on the parts that were stuck in thecustoms as soon as the license issue was cleared up.
Professor A had no idea what kinds of goods were controlled under the Foreign Exchange Act,so, under the advice of the freight company, he checked METI’s security trade control website(www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/index.html; see Chapter 4 of this booklet for details). The wholeprocess was new to him, so it took him a while, but he was eventually able to find out that the57

Tentative translation

part in question was listed under “Goods”, and that he therefore needed a license to export it. He
immediately submitted an application to the Kanto Regional Bureau of Economy, Trade andIndustry, and once he received his license he was finally able to send on the rest of theinspection equipment, one week later than had been scheduled. As a result of this delay theexperiment had to be carried out later than had been planned, and Professor A felt bad for all thetrouble he had caused Professor L. He was also forced to stretch his limited budget to cover the
extra cost of flying the equipment in two installments.
Professor A later found out that he’d been lucky that the destination of his export had beenCountry X, (one of the “White Countries” explained in Chapter 3, (1)) a fact which made thelicense application procedure much simpler. He discovered that for certain destinations he would
have needed a declaration from the recipient saying that the equipment was not going to beresold, and it would have taken him much longer to get a license. As it turned out, his export had
only been delayed by one week, so while the holdup had affected their experiment schedule,
except for the additional cost, it hadn’t had too much of an impact on the project overall.
Professor A feels embarrassed for having made the mistake: because University S was one of
the first-class national universities of Country X, it hadn’t occurred to him that export controls
might apply. He can’t even imagine how difficult things would have been if his collaborator had
been in a university in somewhere like Southeast Asia. He regrets not having at least consulted
with one of METI’s offices in advance (such as his region’s Bureau of Economy, Trade andIndustry, or the METI Security Export Licensing Division).
Note 1) ATA Carnet:
This is a customs document under the ATA Convention (Customs Convention on the ATA Carnet for
the Temporary Admission of Goods). The ATA Carnet simplifies the process of making temporary,
duty-free imports when bringing goods such as professional equipment (a typical example is equipment
for TV news coverage), commercial samples, or goods for exhibitions into a foreign country. The ATA
Carnet is convenient as it is accepted by customs in several countries, even if each country normallyhas different import procedures. When you first obtain a carnet you are required to apply for
qualification, which you should obtain through your university. For details, contact an international
freight forwarding company or the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association (visit their website here:
http://www.jcaa.or.jp/index.html).

[Scenario 2] We have the right to provide international students with technicalinformation, don’t we?
Although he rarely makes media appearances, Professor U of Research Center S, National
University T, is one of the internationally acclaimed researchers who have been producing
remarkable results in the development of solid rocket engines. It can be very difficult to control
the thrust of flying objects with solid rocket engines after ignition, and in order to cope with therapid changes that occur in the ascent trajectory, such as changes in external pressure, a lot ofcreativity has gone into devising the cross-sectional shape of the combustion chambers andpropellants. Professor U has the reputation of being the best researcher in this field. In recent
years, he has mainly been working on improving propulsion efficiency during rapid ascent
trajectory by changing the cross-sectional shape of the propellants, and this original technology
has been drawing a lot attention from other researchers in the field.

58

Tentative translation

Professor J, who is a professor at the Department of Mechanical Engineering in the Faculty ofEngineering of the same University, has spent years researching systems for injecting fuel into
the interior of piston engine cylinders. He is also highly respected for his research on turbo
chargers involving characteristic curve analysis. In April 20XX, Student M, an international
student from Country I, entered the doctoral program of the Graduate School of Engineering
Research and started studying in Professor J’s laboratory. Student M did not speak Japanesewell, which meant that Professor J sometimes had difficulty communicating with him, but hespoke excellent English: before joining University Z in Country I as a researcher, he had received
his master’s degree in mechanical engineering from a university in the United Kingdom. Thanks
to this educational background, he was very good at performing numerical simulation techniques
using supercomputers for fluid analysis. At thirty, he was a little older than other students, but hewas a hard-working and highly dedicated researcher. Professor J was very happy with Student
M, and felt that having such a brilliant doctoral student was a great boost to his own research.
One day, three months after he had arrived in Japan, Student M came to Professor J, and said, “Icame to study at your laboratory because I’m interested in studying thermo-fluid analysis in the
combustion process in piston engines, a type of internal-combustion engine. But I’m alsointerested in researching other types of internal-combustion engines, like jet engines and rocket
engines. A famous researcher on solid fuel rockets, Professor U, has his laboratory in this
University’s Research Center S, and I was wondering if I’d be able to join in on somejournal-reading sessions in his laboratory, and attend some study groups with industry
technicians. Would that be possible?” Professor J could see that Student M was eager to learn
about the latest breakthroughs, and was impressed by his enthusiasm. As he listened, hethought about how he could help this diligent student progress in his research career. He
happened to know Professor U very well, having been three years ahead of him at the same
graduate school in University T. He told Student M that he would check with Professor U and getback to him with the answer. Student M gave him a big smile, thanked him warmly, and bowed
several times as a sign of his appreciation.
The next day, Professor J bumped into Professor U, who had left his Research Center to go anddeliver his weekly lecture in the Engineering Department. He called out to him,
“U, long time no see!”“Yes, Professor J. It has been ages. We’re in the same university, but we hardly get a chance to
see each other.”“I have something to talk to you about. Is now a good time?”“Well, I actually have to be getting to a continuum dynamics lecture for students in themechanical program.”“When is convenient for you?”“Well, after the lecture I have something to do in my lab, but how about after that?”“We could have dinner?”“That sounds great!”
That evening the two professors went to a restaurant near the University and spent a while
catching up. After some time, Professor J brought up Student M: “In my lab, we have aninternational student from Country I — his name is M. He is such a brilliant guy, and he’s alsointerested in other kinds of internal-combustion engines and is eager to learn about yourresearch. He doesn’t speak Japanese very well yet, but he is a seriously devoted researcher and59

Tentative translationa very sharp guy. Do you think he’d be able to join in on some journal-reading sessions in yourlab, or attend the study groups you have with industry technicians? Everyone will be inspired byhis input, for sure.” Professor U was pretty open to the request, saying, “Well, I don’t want to say
no — after all, he did go straight to you. There’s just one thing. Aside from my journal-reading
sessions, trade secrets can sometimes come up in the study groups with industry technicians,
and so I’ve had everyone in my lab sign confidentiality pledges. I’ll want him to do the same. And
could you also fax me his resume before he comes? It’ll help when I’m introducing him to thetechnicians.” “For sure”, responded Professor J, “I’ll send it to you tomorrow morning.”
As he’d had a late night, the next day Professor U came to his lab about one hour later thanusual, to discover that Student M’s resume was already on his desk. “So fast”, he exclaimed,wondering how Professor J had had the energy to get in and send it so early. He picked up theresume straight away and skimmed through it, along with the Japanese translation that
Professor J had evidently prepared for him. He saw that Student M had done his bachelor’s
degree in mechanical engineering at the Department of Engineering, University Z, Country I. He
had then gotten his masters degree in mechanical engineering from the Graduate School ofEngineering Research, University N in the United Kingdom, and had gone on to become aresearcher at University Z in Country I, before finally joining the doctoral program in mechanicalengineering at the Graduate School of Engineering Research, University T. Professor U had theimpression that he’d heard of “University Z” somewhere before, but couldn’t remember in what
context. Just in case, he phoned Professor J to find out a little more about Student M’s academic
background.
Although Professor U found Professor J’s voice on the other end of the phone much too piercingthat morning, he managed to find out that Student M had been working as a researcher in
University Z’s Aerospace Engineering Department, and that he was actually still registered as a
researcher there, and was even still receiving salary from University Z. When he heard that,
Professor U realized where he had heard of University Z — it was on METI’s Foreign End User
List as a research institution in Country I which was suspected of being involved in missiles
programs (see Chapter 3, “(3) End-users suspected to be involved in WMD programs”).
Professor U took a deep breath, and braced himself to break the news to Professor J, afraid that
his loud voice was going to get louder still.
“Professor J, I’m afraid that, as things stand, I might not be able to let Student M join ourjournal-reading sessions and study groups.” Professor J was stunned, “What? Why?…” He wasabout to go on, but Professor U stopped him: “Please listen to me, would you? Let me explain
the situation.” He continued, “We have an Act here in Japan called the “Foreign Exchange andForeign Trade Act”, and according to its rules we need to apply for a license from METI when wewant to provide certain institutions — ones named on a list called the “Foreign-End User List” —with certain types of technology that could be used in the development of weapons of mass
destruction. Student M is a graduate student here in Japan, but he still has his status as a
researcher at University Z in Country I, and I’m afraid that’s one of the universities on the Foreign
End User List. Of course, if we can get a license, I’ll be happy to let him join us, but considering
the nature of my research and Student M’s status, I don’t think that METI will grant us one...”Professor J was now agitated: “But it’s not like you’re developing weapons, right? You’re justdoing academic research. How can you possibly need a license from METI just to let him join inon your lab’s journal-reading sessions and study groups?” Professor U tried asking Professor J

60

Tentative translation

to speak a little more quietly, explaining that he had a headache, but he wished he hadn’t when
Professor J shouted back, “I was born with this loud voice! I’m just trying to get to the bottom of
this!” Professor U realized that he was just adding fuel to the fire, and, having no idea how toassuage Professor J, decided to proceed as politely as possible: “I understand how you feel,
Professor J, but please just hear me out for a moment. As you said, it’s true that I’m not directly
involved in the development of weapons. But it’s also true that what I’ve learned through trying tofind the optimum cross-sectional propellant shape for solid fuel rockets could potentially be usedin the development of military missiles if it fell into the wrong hands. This is why we are requiredby law to get a license before handing over this kind of sensitive technical knowledge. And
Student M is a researcher in this field who still belongs to an organization that can’t be allowed tohave access to my findings. I don’t mean to scare you, but if we don’t comply with the Foreign
Exchange Act we could be charged with a crime, and could end up going to prison (up to 10
years, under the revised Foreign Exchange Act) or having to pay a fine (up to 10 million yen, or
within 5 times the value of the illegal export, under the Foreign Exchange Act). On top of that,
University T could also be liable as our employer and could have to pay a fine. Please
understand that this isn’t discrimination against Student M because of his nationality. This issimply one of the many administrative policies we need to protect Japan’s national security. I
mean, hasn’t University T accepted Student M as a doctoral student regardless of his
nationality? As long as he sticks to studying piston engines, which have nothing to do withmissile development, there will be no problem at all.”Professor J was silent at the other end of the phone for what seemed a little too long, before
quietly responding, “So you’re saying that if you reveal your findings to M without a license from
METI, you could face criminal charges for violating the Foreign Exchange Act.” When Professor
U confirmed this, Professor J was very disappointed, but said, “I have a lot of respect for thegreat work you’ve done in a very difficult field — I know that your work has been acclaimed
worldwide — and I want to apologize for getting so agitated. I didn’t understand what you were
trying to say, and my response was totally unprofessional. I will explain everything you’ve told me
to M.” But Professor U cautioned him not to share too much with M, saying, “Professor J, for thesake of Student M, we should keep this between us. I don’t want to distract him from finishing his
studies at your lab and receiving his doctoral degree.” Professor J had no choice but to agree.

[Scenario 3] This prototype is handmade — what difference does it make what it’s madeof?
Professor U at the Faculty of Engineering, Private University T, is working on research into waysof removing anti-personnel landmines in post-conflict areas. Professor U had proposed the useof sound waves to detect anti-personnel landmines made of plastic which cannot be detected byconventional landmine detection techniques that use magnetism and electro-magnetic waves.
Anti-personnel landmines are generally buried just under the surface of the ground, and so
Professor U reasoned that sound waves could prove to be an effective way of detecting them.
After performing several trial runs in fields set up for that purpose at her University and at anational research institution, Professor U was convinced that her idea was ready to be applied,and decided to demonstrate her new technology at sites in Country C in Southeast Asia, a region
that had been struggling to find ways to clear landmines. She had made arrangements with local
NGOs, and had set to work preparing for the on-site demonstration.

61

Tentative translation

The detection device that Professor U had designed was made up of a strong oscillating source
capable of generating a wide-bandwidth, large-amplitude mechanical vibration; a commerciallyavailable laser Doppler vibrational distribution measurement device that had been manufactured
overseas; an arbitrary waveform generator that had been made in Japan; a power amplifier; anda digital storage oscilloscope. The device belonged to the University, and the commerciallyavailable parts alone had a value in excess of thirty million yen. University T didn’t have an office
to deal with security trade controls, so Professor U decided to check with Professor A of
University Y, who had been her senior back in university. As it happened, Professor A had once
messed up in a similar situation, and so he was well qualified to advise Professor U. On the basisof his advice, she decided to apply at a particular office to get approval from University T before
bringing the equipment out of the country, to get a carnet in her own name for all of its
components, and then to ship the equipment to Country C in advance, and send it all back toJapan once the demonstration had finished. As she was very busy, she decided to get a reliableinternational carrier to take care of the license procedures for her. She had to pay a security
deposit, but it still worked out less expensive than if she had done everything herself.
However, Professor U decided that, instead of sending the strong oscillating source out inadvance along with the rest of the equipment, she’d be better off carrying it with her in her handluggage. She had built it herself in her lab as a prototype for her experiments, and had made it
using an ultra-magnetostrictor, which is a special kind of magnetic material. It wasn’t as sturdy as
the commercially available ones — it was mechanically stiff but also fragile — so Professor U
was afraid that it might get damaged on the way. It also happened to be just the right size andweight to fit into carry-on baggage. She was confidant that, even if she got stopped going
through security, she’d be able deal with the situation by giving an appropriate explanation.
Meanwhile, the carrier had checked the rest of the equipment, using an operation manual
Professor U had given them, and had confirmed that none of it was subject to list controls (seeChapter 2, “(1) Scope of security trade controls for research-related exports”). Just in case, theyalso contacted the METI Security Export Licensing Division with all the required information (seeChapter 4, “(3) Contact offices for enquiries regarding export control legislation”), including
equipment specifications, the country of destination, the name of the end-user, and the proposed
end-use of the equipment, and were able to confirm that catch-all controls would not apply.
All the export procedures went ahead smoothly, and on Friday, three days before Professor U
was due to leave for Country C, she got an e-mail from the local NGO letting her know that the
package had arrived safely. She also got a call from the person who had been handling her
shipment telling her that the delivery had gone to plan. Feeling relieved, Professor U thanked theman from the company, saying, “It was much easier than I’d thought. All that’s left to do now iscarry over the ultra-magnetostrictor oscillating source. Thank you for everything”. Picking up on
what she had said, he asked her, “Professor U, did you say ultra-magnetostrictor? What kind of
device is that?” He sounded worried. After Professor U had given a brief explanation, he asked
her to hold on for a moment and the phone went silent. Professor U could make out the sound oftyping on the other end.
After ten seconds or so, he came back and said, “Professor U, I’m afraid it looks like you’ll
probably need a license to bring that device with you to Country C, but you don’t have one, doyou?” Professor U couldn’t believe what she was hearing: “But, it’s just a simple device that I
made myself. I can’t believe that I have to get a license to bring it abroad. And it’s already Friday— I don’t think I have time to get a license...”. She was lost for words. The man from the62Tentative translationcompany explained that the problem was not with the oscillating source itself, but rather that theultra-magnetostrictor inside it was a kind of “Metallic magnetic material”, a category listed in the
Export Trade Control Ordinance (the Export Order) Appendix 1, Section 5, Item (vi), and its
specifications matched those outlined in the METI Goods Ordinance, Article 4, Item (viii)(b).
Professor U momentarily considered pushing back her departure to give herself time to get alicense, but rejected the idea as soon as she recalled how long it had taken to set up theschedule with the local organizations — it would be impossible to rearrange everything at thispoint. The man from the company waited for Professor U to respond, but she stayed silent, andso he eventually ventured, “I know nothing about your field so I could be way off, but isn’t there
any way you could do the experiment without using this particular oscillating source?” Professor
U thought for a moment, and then replied, “Yes, I suppose it could be possible to do theexperiment without it. Hitting something like an iron picket with a hammer can act as an
oscillating source...” And with that, Professor U decided that this time she’d have to go without
the sturdy oscillating source that she’d been so proud of.
The man from the company tried to apologize, saying that he wished he’d picked up on the issueearlier, but Professor U stopped him: “It’s my fault. In fact I should be thanking you — if you
hadn’t pointed this out to me today, I would have ended up breaking the law. I really appreciate
all your help”. Professor U was calm, but from her voice it was clear that she was dejected. She
promised herself that she would never tell Professor A that she’d made this mistake even after all
the advice he’d given her, and decided to have a drink alone at a local pub that night.

[Scenario 4] How lucky that our University has an office to deal with export controls!
Dr. M at the Faculty of Science, Public University O, decided to conduct research into
fluctuations in continental interior palaeomagnetism from different geological eras by studying
the intensity and direction of faint magnetism remaining in each layer of stratum. In order to do so,he needed to do a geological survey over strata that lie in thick layers and which are therefore
not affected by frequent crustal movements in the continental interior. These kinds of strata areto be found in Country E, so Dr. M planned to go there and measure slight magnetic anomalies ineach stratum with a very low noise level precise triaxial flux-gate magnetometer (gradiometer).
Dr. M exchanged emails with an acquaintance at a university in Country E to discuss his plans,
and a local research institution agreed to help out with the survey.
Triaxial flux-gate magnetometers can be used to quantitatively measure the magnetic field in aparticular place. They work by generating a sine wave alternating current magnetic field that isjust below the saturation magnetic flux density of a ferromagnet such as ferrite. Using a detection
coil, they extract high frequency components of magnetic flux density fluctuations by measuring
non-allignment with a very small background magnetic field. Since they are capable ofmeasuring the environmental magnetic field along the direction of a magnetic circuit, if they areprovided with mutually orthogonal three directions, they can measure all of the vector
components of the magnetic field at once, and can also produce a gradient of the magnetic fieldin each direction. How accurate these measurements are depends on the level of backgroundnoise: the lower the background noise, the more accurate the measurement.
Dr. M’s laboratory wasn’t equipped with this kind of high-performance triaxial flux-gatemagnetometer, so he asked Dr. K, a professor at one of Japan’s national universities, to let him

63

Tentative translation

use their triaxial flux-gate magnetometer to conduct the survey. As the magnetometer belonged
to Dr. K’s University, they had to get permission from that University’s property management
office before bringing the device out of Japan. The application process seemed straightforward.
However, one day, Dr. M got a call from Dr. K telling him that an administrator at his University
had asked whether they’d remembered to apply for an export license from METI. At that point
they hadn’t even decided how they were going to send the equipment, and Dr. M didn’t know athing about export procedures.
As well as having procedures in place for bringing university property out of Japan, Dr. K’s
University had also already established its own system to deal with export controls. The
administrator at the University’s Export Control Office had noticed the term “triaxial gradiometer”
in a document attached to Dr. K’s property transfer application which she had received from the
Supplies Division, and had a hunch that this device might in fact be a “triaxial flux-gatemagnetometer”, a device that requires an export license. She visited Dr. K’s laboratory to checkthe device, and once she’d confirmed that it was in fact a triaxial flux-gate magnetometer, she
told Dr. K that he would have to get a license from METI to export it, as it fell into the category“(ix) Magnetometers”, listed in Appendix 1, Section 10 of the Export Order, and matched thespecifications detailed in Article 9, Item (xi)(d) of the METI Goods Ordinance.
It had never even occurred to Dr. K and Dr. M that the Foreign Exchange Act would apply to any
kind of academic surveys or research activities, and they were astounded to hear that they’dneed an “export license”. If they’d had a freight forwarding company handle the shipment,
someone from the company would have pointed this requirement out to them. But as the device
was not so big and not particularly fragile, they’d been planning to bring it to and from Country E
in their carry-on baggage, and had assumed that they wouldn’t need to do any extra paperwork.
The device didn’t look like the kind of thing that would be subject to list controls, but fortunately
the administrator had noticed its name and realized that it might fall subject to export legislation,and had managed to prevent Dr. M and Dr. K from unwittingly exporting it without a license.
In addition, some of the researchers that Dr. M was planning to work with in Country E wereaffiliated with one of the country’s governmental research institutions, and, although the details
hadn’t been made clear, these researchers had sent Dr. M a request asking permission to use
the device for something unrelated to the survey. It can’t be ruled out that, if Dr. M had brought
the triaxial flux-gate magnetometer into Country E without realizing that it was subject to controls,
the device might have ended up being used for some questionable purposes.
Dr. K wasted no time in applying for an export license via his University’s office, and METI
granted the license on condition that the equipment would be sent back to Japan as soon as thesurvey was done. As per their original plan, Dr. K and Dr. M decided that they would bring theequipment to Country E in their hand luggage, and would bring it back to Japan the same way
once the work was done. Needless to say, they also explained to their research collaborators in
Country E that they couldn’t allow them to use the device for anything other than the scheduled
survey.
If the administrator had only processed the property transfer application without taking thetrouble to look into the question of export controls, Dr. M and Dr. K would have ended up
committing a violation of the Foreign Exchange Act. The very thought of it gave them chills. The
whole incident made Dr. M realize how important it was that his own University also establish an

64Tentative translation

office to deal specifically with export controls.

65Tentative translation

AFTERWORD
The Japan Society for Intellectual Production aims to promote greater interconnectedness
between industry, academia, and government by looking into what happens when these threesectors, which have no common background, goals or organizational culture, attempt tocollaborate, identifying problems that may arise, devising solutions, and formulating our findings
into schematized knowledge bases. We take various approaches to achieving these aims.
In recent years, Japanese universities have been starting to interact more and more with foreigncompanies and research institutions. This presents universities with a new challenge, andmeans that, on both an individual and university-wide level, there is a need to increaseawareness of security trade controls under the Foreign Exchange Act. Understanding thesecontrols, and making arrangements for their implementation, is an essential part of forging andmanaging relationships with foreign institutions. The ongoing vitality ofindustry-academia-government collaborations also depends on the extent to which universities
are equipped to process and comply with these rules.
In order to meet the needs of Japan’s research communities in the face of these evolving
circumstances, in 2009 we created our “Guidelines for Establishing and Practicing Voluntary
Control Systems for Security Trade” and “Security Trade Control Guidelines for Researchers”. In
formulating these two sets of guidelines, we received considerable assistance from the relevant
divisions and offices at METI and MEXT, including the METI Trade and Economic Cooperation
Bureau’s Security Export Inspection Office of Trade Control. Scientific knowledge was sharedwith us by specialists from a wide range of fields, recommended to us by the Atomic Energy
Society of Japan, the Japan Society for Aeronautical and Space Sciences, the Chemical Societyof Japan, and the Japanese Society for Virology. Our work was also supported by university
management organizations such as the University Network for Innovation and Technology
Transfer. We set up a working group to formulate these two sets of guidelines in collaboration
with the Security Export Inspection Office, and the draft was then meticulously reviewed inmeetings with interested parties from related government agencies, societies and management
organizations. The working group was originally made up of five people, including myself,
Masami Ito, as well as Kazunari Adachi (Professor at Yamagata University), Ryosho Kuwae(Toshiba Corporation and others), Hiroshi Satake (Professor at University of Tokushima) andTaikan Yamada (Professor at Waseda University). I would like to give special thanks to Kazunari
Adachi for the contribution he made to the drafting of these two sets of guidelines.
In the past two years, the situation faced by universities in Japan and overseas has undergone
dramatic changes, and a few new cases arose that had not been covered in the first edition ofthese guidelines. Further, since the guidelines were first published, they have been the subject ofmany comments, criticisms and requests from researchers and personnel at various universities
and research institutions. In response to these voices, and to the changing context in which
universities are working, we are now releasing revised versions of both sets of guidelines.
I would like to acknowledge the hard work and generosity of Yoshiro Sawada (Professor at Otaru
University of Commerce), Yukiko Shintani (Associate Professor at the University of Tsukuba)
and Makoto Otsuka (Associate Professor at J. F. Oberlin University) in helping us revise theseguidelines. Finally, on behalf of the Society, I would like to offer my sincerest thanks to everyone
at the Security Export Inspection Office for their tireless work in developing the first and revisedTentative translation

editions.
I sincerely hope that researchers will make use of these guidelines to deepen their familiarity with
export controls, and that universities across Japan will press ahead in establishing their own
systems for dealing with exports controls on an institutional level.
March 22, 2011
Masami Ito,
Professor at Gunma University
Japan Society for Intellectual Production

Note
The following individuals cooperated in the formulation of these guidelines:
Ryuhei Aoki, Professor, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, the University of Tokyo
Kazunari Adachi, Professor, Faculty of Engineering, Yamagata University
Masami Ito, Professor, The Innovation Center for Cooperative Research, Gunma University
Makoto Otsuka, Associate Professor, Social Science Programs, Department of Management
Policy, Collage of Business Management, J. F. Oberlin University
Yoshito Oshima, Professor, Department of Environment Systems, Graduate School of Frontier
Sciences, The University of Tokyo
Masafumi Katsuta, Professor, Graduate School of Environment and Energy Engineering,
Waseda Universitiy
Ryosho Kuwae, Visiting Professor, Utsunomiya University; Project Professor, the University ofElectro-Communications; Toshiba Corporation
Hiromu Satake, Professor, Deputy Director-General, Department of Industry-Academia
Collaboration Research Planning, The University of Tokushima
Yoshiro Sawada, Professor, Center for Business Creation, Otaru University of Commerce
Yukiko Shinya, Associate Professor, Tsukuba Industrial Liaison and Cooperative ResearchCenter, University of Tsukuba
Ikuo Takashima, Professor, Graduate School of Veterinary Medicine, Hokkaido University
Tomio Tanzawa, Project Professor, Atomic Energy Research Laboratory, Tokyo City University
Sadashi Higuchi, former Chief, Security Export Administration Group, Research Security Control

Tentative translation

Division, International Affairs Department, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science andTechnology
Yukio Matsubara, Professor, Public Collaboration Research Center, Niigata University
Morio Matsunaga, President, Kyushu Institute of Technology
Taikan Yamada, Director, International Institute for Japan Studies; Professor, Faculty of Scienceand Engineering, Waseda University(Arranged according to the Japanese syllabary, excluding titles. Affiliations and titles are as ofNovember 2010.)

Cooperating bodies:
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

Tentative translation

Index
Legend:Page numbers in the “Security Trade Control Guidelines for Researchers”: R-#
Page numbers in the “Guidelines for Establishing and Practicing Voluntary Control System for

Security Trade”: S-#Aapplicability judgment

R-13,14,S-34

Australia Group (AG)

R-11

C
catch-all controls (WMD -)R-12,26

Compass (- for goods, - for technology)

R-31,S-34

complementary export control for conventional weapons

R-12

compliance

S-2,4,5,7,12

control over transfers of technology

R-13,S-3

D
departure for home/temporary -/reentry (- of international students and foreign researchers)

S-37

dual-use

R-11

E
export (- of handmade item, - of equipment to be brought back home)

R-8,9,60,S-9,10Export Order (Export Trade Control Ordinance)

R-9,S-9

Export Trade Control Ordinance (Ministerial Ordinance on Trade Relation Invisible Trade, etc.)

R-34

export controls

R-4,11,S-11

export of goods

R-3,S-6F
Foreign End User List
Foreign Exchange Act (Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act)
Foreign Exchange OrderR- 29,S-9
R-1,3,S-1,2
R-12

G
general-purpose items, goods for military and civilian uses
goods that are highly likely to be used in the development, etc. of WMDs (40 items)

R-11,12,26,29
R-26,27

I
international export control regimes
international students, visiting foreign researchers

R-11
R-34,S-3,35

Lcontrol lists

R-12

M
METI Goods Ordinance
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

R-9,S-10
R-11

N
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)P

R-11

Tentative translation
provision of technology

R-3,S-6

R
Resident and Non-resident

R-13,34,S-35

S
security trade control (- and university board members, - and freedom of research)
serviceR-3,4,S-13
R-3,33,S-5,6U
UN arms embargo
U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (extraterritorial application of -)R-12,27
R-36

W
Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)White Countries

R-11
R-12,26

Tentative translation

Cover Design by Masayuki Kawasaki (Associate Professor at Wakayama University)

Japan Society for Intellectual Production (hereinafter, “J-SIP”) reserves all rights as
the author of these Guidelines. However, provided that the use is for non-commercial
purposes, anyone may create a reproduction of these Guidelines with a clear
indication of J-SIP’s copyright, and distribute or rent the reproduction or transmit thecontents thereof to the public, provided that the contents of these Guidelines are notaltered in any way. J-SIP will impose no restriction on non-commercial use meetingthese criteria. Any translation or rearrangement of these Guidelines, or use to createa secondary work, shall require authorization from J-SIP.
These Guidelines are an English translation of a copyrighted work of Japan Society for Intellectual Production.
This English translation of the Guidelines was prepared by the Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate
University (OIST). Japan Society for Intellectual Production is not responsible for the translated English text.