JAIS

論文

Conceptualization Processes in Simultaneous Interpretation
FUNAYAMA Chuta(Kobe City University of Foreign Languages)This paper proposes a theoretical framework to trace conceptualization processes inutterance comprehension and it is applied to the analysis of authentic records ofsimultaneous interpreting. A lexical entry in utterance is supposed to trigger first a
cognitive object with a lexical tag, which may then shift to one with a conceptual tag. The
latter is purported to represent conceptualization going on in utterance understanding.
Several pieces of evidence are shown to verify the effectiveness of the theoretical devices
discussed here. The proposed model is considered helpful in analyzing simultaneousinterpretation and at the same time expected to contribute to the study of utterance
understanding.

1.

Introduction
It is empirically recognized that some type of conceptualization takes place at somepoint of verbal comprehension. When asked to repeat what you have just heard, you
could reproduce its content fairly easily, while it is usually not so easy to reproduce
the exact wording the speaker has used and this tendency becomes more conspicuouswith longer utterances. You understand what is meant even if the speakerinadvertently makes an error in enunciation, but you are not justified if youerroneously understand what is said with perfect linguistic expressions. Thus wenotice asymmetry between expression and content. Such experiences show that
linguistic expressions result in some concepts in our mind and the first possible
dichotomy researchers come up with may be the distinction between lexical forms
and concepts. While the input in verbal communication is in the lexical form, theunderstanding of utterances seems accomplished in conceptual terms.
Simultaneous interpreting (henceforth SI) has been observed to prove that it is nota mere process of replacing phrases in the source language (henceforth SL) with theirlexical counterparts in the target language (henceforth TL). It is quite natural that SI

FUNAYAMA Chuta, “Conceptualization Processes in Simultaneous Interpretation.”Interpretation Studies, No. 4, December 2004, Pages 1-13(c) 2004 by the Japan Association for Interpretation Studies

Interpretation Studies, No. 4: 2004

involves conceptual operations because it is indeed a holistic linguistic activity
encompassing verbal comprehension. But those conceptual operations are yet to be
explored more, though we’ve seen a progress in SI studies and many functions
required for SI are identified (See Setton 1999, for instance).
In this paper we are going to examine the real-time flow of conceptualization inauthentic SI records with the help of certain theoretical device, which will be
introduced and discussed in the next section. Specific SI examples will be observed tosee if our theoretical framework fits the reality or not in section 3.
2.

Lexical and Conceptual Tagging
The unit of input in verbal communication is lexical and linguistic decoding

provides the hearers with basic clues to the meanings the speaker intends to convey.
In processing the incoming lexical forms on-line, the hearer must retain some of themfor a while because the interpretation of utterance requires a certain combination ofwords. Furthermore, some information derived or inferred from linguistic decoding
must be held for a longer span. Funayama (2002) proposed the notion of cognitive tag,or c-tag for short, to describe the real-time process of verbal comprehension. A c-tag
is to be attached to a cognitive object, which is posited as the target of manipulationin the comprehension process, yet its substance is underdetermined at its birth and tobe adjusted in the developing context. Since a c-tag is assigned to such an abstract
object, it is also supposed to be abstract in nature. However, we want to trace theinteractions and development of cognitive objects in discourse by following tractable
tags. We therefore propose in this paper to give each c-tag a specific name and allow
a shift or exchange among tags, by which we could describe the ‘fluid’ nature of a
cognitive object. We posit here two types of c-tags, or just ‘tags’ for short: they arelexical and conceptual tags.
A lexical tag carries a lexical item as its label and the concept to be represented insuch type of cognitive object is mainly lexical, though its content is yet to be shaped
out in the oncoming context. This process has been studied as the identification of
explicature through disambiguation, reference assignment, enrichment and ad hoc
concept construction in Relevance Theory (See Sperber & Wilson 1986/95 andCarston 2000).
Conceptual tags are attached to concepts the hearer/interpreter comes to entertain
either based on the conceptual development of lexical entries used in discourse orfrom outside the ongoing context. In the former case a part of the concept represented
by a lexical tag is given prominence and it changes the main characteristic of theconcept so that a different name becomes more appropriate to represent the concept.
In the latter case some information obtained outside the present context is made2

Conceptualization Processes in Simultaneous Interpretationnecessary as a concept and given a tag. Such emergence of a conceptual tag and what
is called ‘procedural information’ in Relevance Theory will be discussed later.
The notional relationship among cognitive object, lexical tag and conceptual tag isschematically depicted below 1) .
(1)

Schematic description of lexical and conceptual tags
lexical tag

cognitive object

conceptual tag

cognitive object

They are used to trace the way conceptualization proceeds in utterance understanding in general and to hypothesize what is constructed in the interpreter’s mind
in SI studies in particular. The real-time flow of tagging for linguistic input is
schematized in (2).
(2)

Schematic flow diagram of tagging
lexical input ―→ lexical tagging - - - →―→ conceptual tagging - - - →When we are engaged in processing linguistic input, we start with the handling oflexical items. A sequence of words should be put into the hearer’s working memory
for further processing, where a tag is attached to each lexical item according to the
proposed model. The notion of tagging is useful because it can distinguish what is
retained and how it is retained. Although words such as ‘desk,’ for example, might bekept in memory with potentially all the information the word ‘desk’ could contain,
what is actually retained in the current memory is practically limited to the part ofmeaning that is relevant to the context. You need not retrieve the meaning of thecheck-out desk in a library when the utterance is about the layout of someone’s study.
A lexical tag is just an ornamental label after all and it does not delimit its content, or
cognitive object, allowing changes in content. In the present example the cognitive
object with the lexical tag ‘desk’ is supposed to consist only of the relevant part of thelexical meaning supplemented with contextual information. In other words, thecontext-sensitive meaning of a particular token of ‘desk’ is represented by the lexical3

Interpretation Studies, No. 4: 2004

tag named ‘desk’ throughout the comprehension process. Thus the device of tagging
enables us to show the way in which what is triggered by a lexical item remains
under one and the same name throughout, yet changes in its content.
A conceptual tag symbolically represents a chunk of concept just as a lexical tag
symbolically represents a certain lexical content. It may sound contradictory to saythat a concept functions as a symbol, but we assume that some representative concept
may serve as a sort of cover-sheet. The verb ‘confer’ in an utterance, for instance, may
give rise to the lexical tag ‘confer,’ which symbolically represents relevant part of its
dictionary meaning and such syntactic information that a subject, an object, and the
preposition ‘on’ are grammatically required. On the other hand, this input in theutterance may lead to the conceptual tag ‘GIVING

2) ,’which abstracts away

particular semantic elements of ‘confer’ such as ‘official act’ and generalizes thecommon meanings shared by ‘bestow,’ ‘lend,’ ‘render,’ and other similar verbs, andcontains such generalized information that an agent, a theme, and a patient aresemantically required. In other words, this conceptual tag represents a cognitive object ofhigher order.
Now that we have two kinds of tagging, some discussion on their relationship is inorder. In usual cases, lexical input is considered to trigger lexical tagging first andthen conceptual tagging. Since apparent exceptions such as onomatopoeia are limited,
we assume here that lexical tagging leads to conceptual one. This does not necessarilymean that conceptual tagging replaces lexical one. In fact, as will be discussed later,
we should consider that lexical and conceptual tagging may overlap, though lexical
tagging fades away earlier than conceptual tagging in ordinary cases as isschematized in (2). A shift in prominence from lexical to conceptual tagging would
come earlier for those lexical items which are more familiar to the hearer. The hearer
would stop short of shifting to conceptual tagging and retain only the lexical tag if hehasn’t heard the expression before. Thus the timing of shift is connected with thesemantic certainty.
In the following example, a conceptual tag emerges without lexical input.
(3)

I think what the United States may see as a liberating influence that should be

welcomed by everybody, is considered to be a malign influence by others.
A contrast is depicted in this passage: what the U.S. sees as a liberating influence
and what others see as a malign influence. One and the same thing is viewed in acontrastive way. Now this contrast is not described lexically. There is no word suchas ‘contrast.’ The meaning of contrast is derived from the whole construction helpedby the two noun phrases, ‘a liberating influence’ and ‘a malign influence,’ and the use

4Conceptualization Processes in Simultaneous Interpretationof ‘others’ in contrast to ‘the United States.’ The last two helping features contributeto the contrast conveyed by this message, but they cannot define any contrast alone.
The two adjectives filling the same syntactic position awaits contextual consideration:‘liberating’ and ‘malign’ are not lexically contrastive. In a similar way, ‘the U.S.’ and‘others’ constitute mere juxtaposition, which might be interpreted as addition, forinstance. The conceptual tag ‘CONTRAST’ is proposed to represent such an emerging
notion.
When there is no single lexical trigger, it would be more adequate to attach aconceptual tag to the emerging concept of contrast. Since it is not connected with a
specific lexical item in the utterance, what triggers this tag should be considered notpredetermined. Some hearer/interpreter may hit upon the idea when the
combination of the phrases: ‘the U.S. may see’ and ‘liberating,’ while others may wait
until ‘by others’ completes the picture. Thus the timing of setting up a newconceptual tag is considered to depend on who is processing the utterance.
The notion that conceptual tags emerge in input processing finds its cognate in
Relevance Theory, though there is a certain difference as we will note it toward theend of this section.
According to Relevance Theory, an utterance may encode two basic types of
information: conceptual and procedural (Wilson & Sperber 1993). The term‘procedural information’ tries to define, for example, the non-lexical meaning of ‘and’in the following utterance:(4)

Mary injured her leg and sued Peter.
The first and the second propositions in (8) are understood as being connected bysuch a concept as ‘A is the reason for B.’ This meaning is not derived from the lexical
meaning of ‘and’ but from the result of inference made by the hearer as Wilson andSperber claim. The conjunction ‘and’ is argued to provide just computational
information to help the hearer to manipulate representational information. Now,
what they regard as computational in the inferential phase of comprehension is basedon a cognitive object with its conceptual tag in our terminology. The linguistic
decoding of ‘Mary injured her leg’ and ‘Mary sued Peter’ may lead to the emergenceof a cognitive object with the conceptual tag ‘IS THE REASON FOR,’ which must be
supported by the hearer’s knowledge of social conventions, logical necessity, andother factors.
The concept ‘IS THE REASON FOR’ is available to the hearer independent of thelinguistic decoding of a particular utterance but ‘and’ may have triggered thisconcept in this example. Such possible combination of dependence and independence5Interpretation Studies, No. 4: 2004

in relation to lexical information is described in our model as a possible shift fromlexical to conceptual tagging of ‘and.’ When the hearer encounters ‘and,’ its lexical
content is entertained in the hearer’s mind with the lexical tag ‘and.’ Then it may turninto a modified cognitive object with the conceptual tag ‘IS THE REASON FOR,’
reflecting additional information obtained in the developing context.
We may note that cognitive tags may emerge without any triggering lexical input,
as exemplified above with (3). Therefore, our theoretical perspective, in which a
lexical item may trigger both lexical and conceptual tagging, and conceptual tagging
may be derived from both lexical and non-lexical sources, is wider in its application
scope than the relevance-theoretic distinction of conceptual and procedural
information, which is limited to linguistic decoding.
3.

Conceptualization Observed in SI Data
Although the distinction of lexical and conceptual tagging is theoretically expected

to play an essential role in exploring what constitutes utterance understanding in
general, ordinary settings of verbal communication do not give observable evidence
showing the nature of what is kept in a hearer’s mind and it is generally difficult fora hearer to determine introspectively whether a piece of memory he has build up in
his mind is lexical or conceptual. Records of genuine simultaneous interpreting
contain a lot of evidence not available elsewhere and are precious in this regard. We
can obtain observable clues to the degree to which a hearer/interpreter hasconceptualized the input by checking the lexical correspondences between SL and TL.
For example, when an interpreter takes in an unfamiliar word, he may defer finding a
possible equivalent and retains its form as it sounds. This is confirmed in SI datawhen we find, for instance, an SL expression is just transliterated in TL. This is a clear
case where the incoming information is being kept as lexical information. When aword in language A is rendered into a word in language B which is generally
described in dictionaries to be equivalent, the input might be still lexical in nature.
However, if the interpreter produces a phrase corresponding to the SL meaning, yet
the way he expresses the content does not follow any ordinarily possiblecombinations of words taken from standard lexicon, then it constitutes a case whereconceptualization has progressed to a greater extent.
A hearer/interpreter first identifies an incoming sequence of lexical items to build
up a meaningful story in his mind while both bottom-up and top-down processes
seem to proceed in parallel. In our model the contribution made by each lexical item
to the story building can be traced by following tags. The appearance of a TL
expression, which is considered to correspond to a certain SL lexical item, is taken toreflect that it has been retained by that moment in some manner. We may judge

6Conceptualization Processes in Simultaneous Interpretation

whether a lexical tag has been maintained or a conceptual one has replaced it bychecking the nature of intended equivalence between the SL and TL expressions. Ifthey are in accordance with the usual pairing found in a majority of dictionaries, weconclude that the item in question has a lexical tag, while if they are free from such
constraints we may assume that it has a conceptual tag. For example, if English ‘tell’is translated into Japanese ‘hanasu’ (to speak), we may say that the lexical concept‘tell’, which bears the label ‘tell’ by definition,

has been kept at least until ‘hanasu’is uttered in the output, whereas if ‘tell’ is translated into ‘kaku’ (to write) in a
separate case, a conceptual tag has been attached at some point between the onset of‘tell’ in the SL and the use of ‘kaku’ in the TL. Although it is theoretically absurd to
give a linguistic label to a conceptual tag, we may call the conceptual tag in question
as ‘ACT OF PRODUCING A STORY’ for convenience. This leads to the possible
explanation about how the interpreter comes up with ‘kaku’: it is quite natural for theconcept of ‘ACT OF PRODUCING A STORY’ to be represented by ‘kaku’ as well as‘hanasu,’ and if the speaker is a writer, only ‘kaku’ fits the context (See an actual
example cited in Funayama 2000).
While it is difficult to identify when a lexical tag ceases to exist or is replaced by aconceptual tag, we notice that a lexical tag remains for some duration to help theinterpreter in charge to struggle for better translation. In the example below we canconfirm that the lexical tag for ‘manage’ survives two trials of translation.
(5)

SI Example for lexical tagging

E

104

because, to a greater extent, they were, if not manipulating, at leastJ

104

これも興味深いことだと思います．というのも彼らは，

E

105

managing the materials that the journalists had to offer. So I thinkJ

105

しなかったまでも，ま，管理はしていたわけですね．

E

106

there were quite a lot of difficulties there. But on the whole, it was

J

106

ストに提供するか，そのへんを，マネージしてたと思います． そこにいろいろ難しさはあり

ま，操作はどういうものを，ジャーナリ[BS23, NHK-BS, 2003/4/24]

In this example, English ‘manage’ is once translated as ‘kanri-suru’ (line J 105) but
later it is also put into ‘maneeji-suru’ (line J106). This case shows that a lexical tag
does not necessarily completes its life when the interpreter finds a counterpart in TL,
though in many other cases lexical tags are considered to disappear because of thelimited capacity of working memory. One of the important reasons why the life of alexical tag is prolonged seems to be related to the dissatisfaction on the part of theinterpreter with the first translation. In the above example, the interpreter could have7Interpretation Studies, No. 4: 2004

wondered if ‘kanri-suru’ is an appropriate translation. Such a case suggests that alexical tag remains effective as far as the search for the fittest TL phrase continues. If
translation is accomplished only by finding equivalent phrases in TL, we need only
lexical tagging and not conceptual tagging. The reality, however, goes beyond lexical
exchanges.
Now we are going to show how conceptual tagging is employed in actualinterpretation scenes. Lexical tags are essentially what interpreters target themselves
at in their work and they are not conscious about conceptual tags, not because they
are unfamiliar with this terminology, but because what we are exploring rests in thedomain of interpreters’ intuition or automatic processing. We are here trying to dig
up sources for conceptual tags.
In the next example, the relevant sources are scattered throughout the preceding
context and a cognitive object with a new conceptual tag appears to have emerged byconflating several concepts.
(6)

SI Example for emergence of a conceptual tag

E 079
J 079

to convey to the American people, and for that matter, the international

E 080
J 080

population what this war was actually about after so many ah持つためです．

そして， 実際に，また，国際社会にも，

アメリカの人たちにも，そして実際にこの戦争は，何のためなのかということを伝えました．

E

081

stories and allegations, and insinuations that what we were doing wasJ

081

たくさんのいろいろな話や， 主張や，申し立てや，あるいは暗に秘めてE

082

go i n g f o r e mp i r e a n d w e w e r e go i n g t o ki l l i mme n s e n u mb e r s o f c i vi l i a n s

J082

たりいろんなことがありました．たとえばアメリカは帝国をつくろうとしている，あるいはE

083

a n d w e w o ul d b e us i n g w e a p o n s o f mas s d e s t r uc t i o n o u r s e l v e s a n d s o o nJ083

本当にたくさんの市民を殺そうとしている，

E

084

and

J

084

あろうと，

E

085

administration understood properly that there was no better, no moreJ085

示す必要があったのです．

lots of things like this

批判されそして大量破壊兵器を使うでneeded to be rebutted and I think the

いろんなことが言われましたけども，そうじゃないということをそしてブッシュ政権はそれをちゃんと理解しました．
[BS23, NHK-BS, 2003/4/24]

We want to focus our attention on the interpreter’s expression ‘ironnakotoga
iwaremasita’ (a variety of things were said) in line J084 in this example. The
corresponding English phrase in the SL is just ‘lots of things like this’ (line E084),8

Conceptualization Processes in Simultaneous Interpretation

which doesn’t mention the ‘say’ part of the interpreter’s output. The lexicalinformation we find in the preceding context is only ‘stories,’ ‘allegations,’ and‘insinuations’ (line E081) and their content (lines E081-083). One of the common
features shared by these SL phrases is that they are verbally stated and theinterpreter had that characteristic come out, or formed a newly combined concept in
our terminology. The conceptual tag that may be called ‘VERBAL STATEMENT’ led
to the addition of the ‘say’ part. It is not at issue here in this discussion whether that
addition is intentional or not. The question to be asked here is where the source lies
for the occurrence of the ‘say’ part. And we claim that a shift from the lexical tag‘stories’ and others to the conceptual tag ‘VERBAL STATEMENT’ is the source for the‘say’ part. On the premise that there’s a limit on the capacity of working memory andthus on the number of lexical tags retained at a time, it is reasonable to assume that
lexical information goes through conceptualization.
In the following example, the source of a conceptual tag is found in theinterviewer’s question, fairly remote in time from the TL occurrence.
(7)

SI Example for retention of a conceptual tag

Q:

Is it the case that the U.S. does not think the legitimacy of this war important?

(omission)
E 111
J 111

moment that we liberated his country?” and i, like secretary powell,

E 112
J 112

am confident that we would find evidence that he did indeed. We’ve

E 113
J 113

seen evidence that some of incredibly high levels of toxic chemicals

E 114
J 114

seemed to have been dumped into rivers shortly before or in the midst
本当に， 極めて 高度に毒性のある，
化学物質が

E 115
J 115

of

現在はどうかといいますと，

ま，彼，

どうでしょうか，っていうんですが，国を今解放したんですけども

私はパウエル長官と同じように，

彼は大量破壊兵器を持っていたという証拠は見つかると思います．

our liberation campaign.

That suggests that there were weapons at the

河川に流されたということもあります．

このわれわれの解放作戦の途中にです．

(omission)
E 121
J

121

E 122
J

122

as the secretary… the bottom line is absolutely right. The people
いる人たちがそれを見つけるのを手伝ってくれるとof Iraq themselves are the best indication of how correct, how justified,
思います．

でも，パウエル長官がおっしゃったとおり，イラクの人々を見れば，

9

Interpretation Studies, No. 4: 2004

[end]
E 123

how moral was the effort to bring about the end of this regime. My

J

われわれの作戦が，

123

E 124
124

J

われわれの努力が，どれだけ本当に

guess is t ha t there a re gre at ma ny other peo ple aro und t he wo rld who a re
正しいものであったかということを証明してくれると思います．

彼らの反応を見てもそれが[BS23, NHK-BS, 2003/4/24]

The interpreter’s output ‘wareware no sakusen’ (our operations) in line J123 is not
an immediate response to any SL expression and is considered to derive from a
concept obtained early in the discourse. This is confirmed by the TL expression‘wareware no doryoku’ (line J123), which directly follows ‘wareware no sakusen’ as
its replacement after listening to the SL phrase ‘the effort.’ The expression ‘doryoku’seems to be the direct response to English ‘the effort.’ 3)
The cited passage as a whole responds to a question by the moderator regarding
the legitimacy of the war in Iraq and the interpreter’s recognition that the topic of
this interaction was going to be the war in Iraq can be judged to have already been
established even before the present response started. The conceptual tag given to thisknowledge, however, need not be named ‘the war in Iraq’ because this topic is being
repeated meantime by the SL speaker as ‘liberated his country’ (line E111) and ‘ourliberation campaign’ (line E115). This range of mentions tell us that the concept of
war is modified or, you might say, biased. Therefore, a name such as ‘war in Iraq’
would be too general to reveal the interpreter’s understanding of the speaker’s
intention and a concept like ‘LIBERATION CAMPAIGN’ seems to better serve as thename of the concept.
One of the basic differences between lexical and conceptual tags is that the former
is in principle taken out of the lexical items used in SL, whereas the latter is worked
out conceptually on the part of the hearer/interpreter so that what is entered on aconceptual tag as an identification tag is not verbal in nature but conceptual. The
description of a concept such as ‘LIBERATION CAMPAIGN’ in the above example ismerely for convenience and should not be understood as something as stable as
lexical items.
Conceptual tagging also reveals how abstracting ability is used in utterance
understanding. In our last example, a literal translation is superseded by someaudience-friendly translation through conceptualization on the part of theinterpreter.
(8)

SI Example for coordination by a conceptual tag

10Conceptualization Processes in Simultaneous Interpretation

E 103

[A]:

I think the U.S. can live with a democratic administration in Iaq

J 103[A]: 私は，

アメリカはwhich is not

民主的に選ばれた政権，

E 104

deeply pro-U.S.

I mean, there is not a pro-U.S. administration in Pris. but from the

J 104

これを受け入れることができると思います．親米でなくてもです．

E 105

point of view of many people in this administration, we don’t have Fench people

J 105

親米政権ではありませんよね．

E 106

flying airplanes into buildings .

J 106

この政権からいいますと，

E 107

in the administration, they have a simplistic view of what’s going on in the

J 107

わけです，

パリは，あれはでも，

and quite frankly,

いまのI think for many people

このフランスのひとたちは，やはりテロはやらないから，受け入れられる

私たちは．

しかし，

いまの政権，

しかしながら，どういうこ[BS23, NHK-BS, 2003/4/25]

The SL phrase ‘flying airplanes into buildings’ (line E106) has its own literalmeaning and an interpreter may leave its contextual interpretation to the audience byrecoding word for word in TL. The interpreter in the above example, however,rendered the phrase into Japanese ‘tero’ (terrorism) in line J106 instead. This was
realized through a certain conceptualization, which is represented by conceptual
tagging in our model. The SL words ‘flying airplanes into buildings’ should begrouped together first in this process and then given the status of a conceptual entity,
which may bear a label such as ‘TERRORISM.’ This grouping of words into a concept
is considered to be what hearers generally do in verbal understanding. In the case oftranslation, this process of understanding may be left to the hearers of theinterpretation but the literal understanding by the final audience is incorrect in eithercase. The SL speaker is not talking about a general scene of flying airplanes into
building, which might include a scene of flying a paper airplane into a building, but
the intended meaning in this context is ‘the opposite of democracy.’ A conceptual tag
is here expected to function to coordinate the grouping of lexical items, theprocurement of contextual and encyclopedic information, and the cross-examinationof harmony among these factors. A cognitive object, once formed, may function tocoordinate pieces of information gathered from several sources.
4.

Conclusion

11

Interpretation Studies, No. 4: 2004

This paper proposes a way to delineate how conceptualization goes on in verbal
comprehension. The conceptualization part of utterance understanding discussed
here has been partly recognized in other approaches including Relevance Theory andcognitive linguistics but requires more research and the present model is expected toplay a seminal role in such research.
Since conceptualization in utterance comprehension is beyond perception andtherefore denies simple description, we need to construct a theoretical frameworkthat enables us to trace and represent our mental activity as closely as possible. We inthis paper traced the flow of conceptualization in SI and showed that the two types oftagging proved effective in explaining the way interpreters work on-line. Successful
explanation of this sort in turn supports the validity of our model, contributing to theresearch of utterance understanding in general.
One of the implications of our model to the study of translation is found in its
possible application to the definition of literal translation. It has been based oncommon sense to talk about the merits and demerits of literal translation. There’s aproductive possibility to define literal translation by limiting the translator’s
conceptualization to lexical tagging only. This topic should be worthy of a separate
thesis.

筆者紹介：船山 仲他 （ふなやま ちゅうた） 神 戸市外国語大学英米学科教授。日本通 訳学会副会長。日本時事英語学会会長。1970 年代初めからさまざまな分野の会議通訳に従事。
近年は、同時通訳の実践的経験と言語学研究の融合を図り、科学研究費補助金を受けた「同時通訳における情報フローの認知言語学的検証」(2000)、「同時通訳における対訳遅延の認知言語学的研究」(2002)などの研究がある。

Notes
1)

As is shown in (1), tags are attached to cognitive objects, but we often discuss tags
without mentioning that they are representing cognitive objects when no misunderstanding is feared.

2)

We use uppercase letters for conceptual tags, and lowercase ones for lexical tags.

3)

Although we cannot determine the reason why the to-infinitive clause following ‘theeffort’(E123), i.e. ‘to bring about the end of this regime’(E123), misses its counterpart
in the TL, its meaning is well in line with the way the interpreter considers what the
topic is and therefore the missing part does not pose any problem at all.

12

Conceptualization Processes in Simultaneous Interpretation

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