A n n u a l Re p o r t

2004

> IRSN missions
Research and public service missions
Defining and implementing national andinternational research programmes

Contributing to training in radiation protection

Permanent monitoring in mattersof radiation protection

Public information

Technical support and assistancefor public authorities
Technical support with regard to nuclear andradiological risk

Operational support in the event of a crisis
or radiological emergency

Contractual services of expert appraisal,
research and measurement
Carrying out expert appraisals, research andworks for public or private organisations

2004

News, strategy and organisation

A n n u a l Re p o r t

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2

I R S N

News, strategy
and organisation

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News, strategy and organisation

Monitoringfor protection

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3

> Expertise, independenceof judgement andopen-mindedness
IRSN’s three priorities
E

mployees were granted a three-year right ofreturn and now at the end of this period morethan 80% of those who worked at IRSN under
CEA status have opted for an IRSN contract. This
success shows great support for our Institute’s
missions and definitively validates our neworganisation and project.Together, the 1,500 IRSN
employees now share the same priorities and thesame choices: the Institute must show a high levelof scientific and technical expertise; it must ensure
independence of judgement in all circumstances;
its open-mindedness towards all those concernedby its missions, the strengthening of relations thus
formed and the quality of information circulated
will make society place its trust in IRSN.
Good management and team confidence in theInstitute’s global project are the main keys tosuccess. Having fulfilled the commitments madeby IRSN, the financial year 2004 shows that theInstitute is in good working order. More comprehensive than previous reports, the 2004 annual report
also covers the numerous projects carried out.

The objectives were achieved. Three significant
examples can be cited:■ the success of the last test carried out in the
PHEBUS-FP research programme on the fission
products that would result from a core meltdown
accident in a nuclear reactor;■ the acceleration of ENVIRHOM, the research

4

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programme dedicated to understanding how
humans and ecosystems react to chronic, longterm exposure to low-level radioactive contamination;■ the record number of dossiers presented to thestanding advisory groups of experts who deal withsafety and radiation protection issues for safety
authorities.
Transparency is a further challenge.The excellenceof IRSN’s research and the quality of its expert
assessments are well known. Yet, all scientificassertions deserve to be explained, analysed andcompared. In the same way, an expert assessment
should not put an end to discussions. It opens thedebate and guides the decision. It should also
help to enlighten the public opinion.
IRSN’s 2004 annual enquiry into how French people
perceive nuclear risks met with a great response
from the ministries, the media and the public.This
study particularly underlined the trust placed in
the work of scientists and experts. However, theFrench would like to be better informed and more
involved when there are decisions to be taken.
This demand is particularly directed at IRSN, thepublic expert in nuclear and radiological risks.
It must be addressed.
IRSN boasts many assets but it must fully accept
its essential choice of opening up to the European
and international scientific community. In the
future, it will be the norm for researchers toexchange ideas and work together on shared projects
regardless of national borders, for knowledge to bepooled and for investments to be shared in themost expensive test facilities and calculation codes.
Risk assessment criteria, expert appraisal methods
and safety standards are to be gradually harmonised
within the European Union and worldwide. Sarnet,
the European network of excellence, dedicated tomodelling serious accidents in nuclear installations,demonstrates this desire to integrate. One could
consider transposing this example to the field ofradiation protection and radioecology. IRSN has aleading role to play in encouraging the developmentof networks devoted to research and expertise inEurope and beyond, and in exerting a growing
influence within international scientific bodies.

News, strategy and organisation

Jacques Repussard,
Director General

Jean-François Lacronique,President of the Boardof Directors“

Institute for RadiologicalProtection and Nuclear
Safety has a leading role toplay in encouraging
the development of
networks devoted toresearch and expertise inEurope and beyond, and inexerting a growing
influence withininternational scientificbodies.

”Jean-François Lacronique,President of the Boardof Directors

Jacques Repussard,
Director General

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5

> Part of IRSN’s expertiseis devoted to national defence
and security issues

In fact the Institute’s “nuclear defence expertise”
covers two distinct areas in which the State isliable to be held directly responsible and forwhich defence secrecy often has to be implemented:• nuclear safety and radiological protection in
nuclear installations and activities related to national defence, whether of a military or civil nature;• the security, and above all the physical protectionof nuclear materials, installations and transportation nationwide.
The corresponding activities, including basic studies
and research, are carried out in a specific operational
division, with the support of the entire Institute.
In 2004, the framework agreements between theInstitute and State authorities were carefully drawn
up.They concern the provision of direct assistance(inspections, operational command of transportations, etc.) or technical support (processing
dossiers, preparing exercises, etc.).

Michel Brière,
Assistant Director General,in charge of missions related to defence

In the present context when the demand for expertise is increasing but budgetary resources cannot
be increased, good relations and mutual trust
between the Institute and State authorities are amajor advantage.

As far as activities are concerned, there was a significant increase in the work due to:• the ongoing modernisation of France’s deterrent
force which is adopting a very strict approach tosafety;• the strengthening of the international fight against
the proliferation of nuclear weapons (additional
protocol to IAEA’s safeguard agreement and new
EURATOM regulations).
Nuclear defence expertise is a specific application
and,for obvious reasons,does not lend itself to development on the national and international markets.

6

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2 0 0 4Michel Brière,
Assistant Director General,in charge of missions related to defenceNews, strategy and organisation> IRSN missions
IRSN’s articles of association (Decree No. 2002-254 of 22 February 2002) laid down seven missions for
the Institute, relating to radiation protection and nuclear safety. They are organised into three fields:

Research and public service missions
Defining and implementing national and international research programmes
IRSN defines and conducts research programmes aimed at maintaining and developing the skills
necessary for expert appraisal in its fields of activity. It either carries them out itself or entrusts
them to other French or foreign research institutes.

Contributing to training in radiation protection
As a research and expert assessment establishment, IRSN has a duty to contribute to teachingin the areas in which it has competence: nuclear safety and radiation protection. The radiation
protection training courses it organises are directed at professionals working in the health sector
and people exposed to risk in their jobs.

Permanent monitoring in matters of radiation protection
IRSN carries out permanent monitoring in matters of radiation protection by assisting in
the radiological monitoring of the environment and by managing and processing
dosimetric data on workers exposed to ionising radiation and managing the inventoryof ionising radiation sources.

Public information
IRSN informs the public of nuclear and radiological risks via publications, the Internet,
a travelling exhibition jointly organised with DGSNR, conferences, etc.

Technical support and assistance for public authorities
Technical support with regard to nuclear and radiological risk
IRSN provides technical support in the field of nuclear and radiological risk to public authorities
that so request it. Its scope of intervention includes civil nuclear facilities, secret classified
installations, the transport of radioactive substances, the application of treaties on the control,
physical protection and security of industrial and medical applications. In the fields of safety andradiation protection, the Institute carries out tests, research, development experimentations, anddevelops models, codes and safety tools.

Operational support in the event of a crisis or radiological emergency
In the event of an incident or accident involving ionising radiation, IRSN carries out measures ofa technical, health and medical nature for public authorities, in order to ensure the protection of
the population, workers and the environment, and restore the security of the facilities.

Contractual services of expert appraisal, research and measurement
Carrying out expert appraisals, research and works for public or private organisations
IRSN carries out contractual services of expert appraisals, research and works – analysis,
measurement and dosing – for French, European and universal organisations in the public andprivate sector. In addition, the Institute carries out third-party expertise for ICPE outside the nuclear
sector.

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7

> IRSN in 2004
Report and perspectives

In 2004, IRSN, a public establishment created in 2002, strived to implement all the strategic actions set
out by the Director General in 2003. They are based on a system of management through quality aimed
at contributing to the efficient running of the Institute. Within this framework and in order to carry out
its missions properly, IRSN has started to draw up a contract of objectives between IRSN and the State(2006-2009).
As leading public expert, the Institute should make proposals on matters concerning radiation protection
and nuclear safety. A strategy of action, in both research and expertise, is developed through internal andexternal discussions, approved by the establishment’s supervising authorities. IRSN has identified about
10 strategic and multidisciplinary programmes corresponding to fields in which the stakes are high andin which the Institute shall have to evolve in the coming years.

IRSN’s main lines ofdevelopment in 2004
1. OPTIMISING SUPPORT MISSIONSFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIES■ Formalising relationships withpublic authorities

In 2004, IRSN signed nine framework agreementswith the administrations to which it provides
technical support (DSND, DGSNR, DRT, DPPR, etc.).
Two agreements remain to be drawn up with theauthority in charge of defence-related safety.
■ Clarifying operating methods withadministrations

This involves adapting the “code of practice” drawn
up with DGSNR to improve the efficiency of relations
and practices when evaluating the safety of basic
nuclear installations.
An inventory of current practices was carried out
in 2004 with the administrations concerned. It
led to the implementation of working groups incharge of identifying lines of progress while
taking the constraints of all parties into account.
This work will be completed in 2005.
■

Implementing public service missions

Within the limits of the resources allocated to it,
IRSN continued setting up a national network for8

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Strategic investment scheme
At the end of 2004, IRSN developed
an investment plan of 40 M€ intended
to finance the renewal of equipment.
One of its aims is to bring the networkof environmental measurements up to
standard requirements and to make it
denser.
It also aims to renew the emergency
vehicles used in crisis situations, the SIPA
simulator, etc.

environmental measurements, the SISERI (a database on doses received by workers), the sourcesmanagement system, etc.
2. REWORKING ITS RESEARCH PROCESSIN CONSULTATION WITH ITS MAIN PARTNERS■ Promoting scientific and technicalexcellence

The Scientific Board was put together and held its
first meeting in 2004. It is in charge of ensuring
the quality of the Institute’s scientific production
in research and expertise: the quality of projects(upstream and downstream) and the quality ofteams and researchers. As well as the Institute’s

News, strategy and organisation
Drawing up the contract of objectives
with the State
Discussions on the contract of objectives between IRSN
and the State started in January 2004, and involved
numerous internal projects and meetings with thesupervising authorities. Organised around the four mainlines of development set out in 2003, the contract ofobjectives should eventually lead to the strengtheningof the Institute’s position in the field of nuclear andradiological risk control, nationally and internationally,taking into account the expectations of the different
parties involved.

internal evaluation tools (audits, commissions,project reviews, etc.), the Scientific Board judges
the scientific and technical interest of the programmes and their results.
Moreover, the Institute wanted to assess the research
programmes it conducts with the manufacturers that
use them and who sometimes contribute financiallyto them. It was with this approach to quality andpertinence that IRSN and EDF decided to organisea discussion seminar on research in 2004.
3. OPENING UP ITS EXPERTISE TO TAKE
THE EXPECTATIONS OF SOCIETY INTO ACCOUNT■

Giving an impulse to pluralist expertise

The Institute has started to set up groups bringing
together manufacturers, associations and outside
experts with which it can discuss the technicalchallenges of complex and controversial subjects.
In 2004, the first discussions were held at theBois-Noirs mining site in the Loire department.These
discussions could be extended to all mining sites via
a group of pluralist experts.
■

Developing the Institute’s activities

Actions have been conducted within the Instituteboth to inform teams (seminars to promoteindustrial awareness) and to formalise the rangeof services provided by the Institute (40 data sheets
were drawn up).

Preparing the corporate project
In September, IRSN organised a forum thatbrought together 200 employees to discuss:“What strategy and actions should beundertaken in the future?” The aim was to getworking groups to build IRSN’s corporate
project for the years ahead – a project thatwould enable it to carry out its public expert
missions for the benefit of society.

4. DEVELOPING THE EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

Continuing international research
programmes■

In 2004, IRSN took the position that the 7th FPRD
should support research on existing reactors anddistinguish between support projects for public
policies and projects for manufacturers.

Adopting common policy in relation toexpert appraisal■

IRSN, AVN and GRS have started to write common
guidelines on how to evaluate the safety of nuclear
facilities. In 2004, they completed the first chapter
devoted to harmonising the principles applied by thethree organisations.

Getting involved in internationalorganisations■

The ICRP, whose radiation protection recommendations form the basis of international
regulations, renewed its composition in 2004. IRSN
is represented within the main commission andwithin four of the five theme-based committees,
the most recently created being dedicated toenvironmental protection. This subject is related
to the strategic programme “Chronic risks”. IRSN
also tries to be present and active in the otherinternational bodies involved in nuclear safety andradiation protection.

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> Main events

a possible storage facility
at the Bure site (Meuse).

JANUARY■■■

8
Launching of the TACIS project
whereby technical support was given
to the Ukrainian safety authority inthe analysis of the dossier authorising
start-up of the Rovno 4 andKhmelnitski 2 VVER 1000 reactors.
22
The standing advisory group for
nuclear reactors examined an IRSN
report on the safety of CABRI, theexperimental reactor, and thepressurised water loop that CEA
intends to install in this reactor.

■

16-19
Participation in the Medec trade fair
for the medical world.

3
The standing advisory groupof experts on installations intended
for long-term storage of radioactive
waste examined an ANDRA dossierconcerning the mechanical behaviour of10

I R S NA N N U A L■

26
The HFD from the Ministry ofIndustry signed two agreements
concerning IRSN’s technical assistancein the implementation of theconvention prohibiting chemical
weapons and the regulations on
the protection and control of materials.
29
Jacques Repussard presented thesupervisory authorities with thestakeholders’ committed approach,particularly through the pilot
initiatives in pluralist expertise.
■ The framework agreement whereby
IRSN provides technical assistanceand support to DSND was signed.
■■

18
Creation of Sarnet, a European
network of excellence devoted
to research on severe accidents,organised by IRSN.

■

23
IRSN organised a seminar devoted to“concerted approaches”. This seminarassembled about a hundred players
from society (industrialists, operators,
experts, administrations, unions,associations, CLI and ANCLI) witha view to improving concerted action
around high-risk industrial sites.

■

4-5
Awareness course on the treatmentof risks related to earthquakes formembers of the standing advisorygroup for nuclear reactors and thestanding advisory group for plants.

MARCH
■

16
In-house seminar on scientificand technical excellence held at
the Le Vésinet site (Yvelines).

31
Meeting to summarise the
2nd international inter-comparison
campaign for laboratories thatcalibrate radon measuring instruments(EUROMET, No. 657).

FEBRUARY
■

■

■

24
ANCLI and IRSN organised a seminar
to describe the main lines of theircooperation following an enquiry
previously carried out with CLI.
■ The standing advisory group of
experts on installations intended forlong-term storage of radioactive waste
and the standing advisory groupin charge of the basic nuclear
installations other than nuclear
reactors examined an EDF dossierconcerning the dismantling of firstgeneration reactors (Saint-Laurentdes-Eaux – Loir-et-Cher andBugey – Ain).
■R E P O R T

2 0 0 4

APRIL
■

20
The CD-Rom “Information on nuclear
risk and how it is managed” was sent
to prefectures and EDF nuclear power
plant CLIs.

■

28
The Reactor Safety Commission
examined an IRSN report on
the security systems of Barracuda,
the future nuclear attack submarine.
■ Renewal of Cofrac accreditations
for IRSN metrology laboratories.
■ The TACIS RF/TS/39 contract for
SEC/NRS (Russian safety authority)
started up with the participationof IRSN, GRS and APAT. It covers:
evaluation of the procedure toauthorise storage of radon-type
waste, writing of a safety reportplanning guide for the safety of waste■

News, strategy and organisation
storage and evaluation of the safety
report on the creation of a new
storage facility that could in the longterm (fifty years) become a surface
waste disposal site at the Serguiev
Posad site located in the north of
the Moscow region.

governing the release andtransportation of radionuclides
in a deep geological disposal
at the Bure site (Meuse).
■

24-28
An IRSN expert chaired the meetingon social aspects and public involvementin radiation protection at the IRPA
congress in Madrid.
■ A contract was signed with SNCF,
involving a study of workstations withregard to nine types of transported
radioactive materials.
■ The “Kursk 1 safety report review”
project was completed and the results
were presented to the Safety Review
Group (EBRD).
■

■

10-11
Organisation of the final seminar of
the OECD MASCA international projecton the behaviour of corium at tankbottom.

■14
A Eurosafe seminar was held in
Cologne (Germany) on knowledge
management in institutes that conduct
research and expertise in nuclear
safety.

JUNE
■

■

4
The agreement with DGSNR was
signed – it describes the conditions
under which IRSN provides technicalsupport to DGSNR and the methods
used to launch and conduct thetechnical support actions.
8
The standing advisory groupof experts on installations
intended for long-term storage ofradioactive waste examined
an ANDRA dossier concerning
the geo-chemical phenomena

9
The standing advisory group for
nuclear reactors examined EDF’s
method of taking aspects related tohuman factors into account whenmodifying installations.
■ Seminar summarising the REP-Na
programme: assessment of the first
10 tests of the CABRI REP-Na
programme and unansweredquestions that will be addressed in
the next CABRI-water loop programme.

■

1
The standing advisory group on
nuclear reactors examined certain
aspects related to the safety of the
EPR (command-control, radiation
protection, containment building, etc.).

■

6
Members of IRSN’s Scientific Board
were appointed.

■

8
Presentation of IRSN’s radiation
protection action plan (Maison del’Amérique latine, Paris).
■ The national inventory of uranium
mining sites put together by IRSN was
published (from the end of theSecond World War to May 2001).
■ A seminar on waste was organised in
Havana (Cuba) by CPRH, IRSN, CSN,
SSI – six Central American countries
took part.

■

MAY
■

JULY

■

18
The agreement with DPPR was signed:
it describes the conditions underwhich IRSN provides technicalsupport to DPPR and the methods
used to launch and conduct thetechnical support actions.

■

23-25
IRSN gave its first training course on“radon metrology” as part of its
radiation protection training mission.

I R S N■

AUGUST
Signing of a cooperation agreementwith CEREGE (European Centre
for Research and Education in
Environmental Geosciences) on the
paleoseismic programme in Provence.
■ The cooperation agreement with
the Ukraine on the Chernobyl
experimental platform project
was renewed for four years.
■

SEPTEMBER■A N N U A L

6-10
IRSN organised the second Ecorad
Conference aimed at taking stock of theR E P O R T

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> Main events

knowledge that enables us to assess how
radioactivity impacts the environment.
■

■

■

■

20-21
IRSN in-house forum – “What strategy
and actions should be undertaken in
the future?”
22
Signing of a BfS/NRPB/IRSN tripartite
agreement concerning dosimetricassistance (biological analyses) inthe event of a crisis.
22-23
Organisation of an SFRP day on
exposure to natural radioactivity due
to human activities.
■ A report on the radiologicalconsequences of flooding in
the Petite Camargue in December
2003 was given to the PACA and
Languedoc-Roussillon DRASS,
the Bouches-du-Rhône, Vaucluse andGard DDASS, the DSND, the DGSNR,
the Gard CLI, the DPPR and the PACA
DRIRE.

■

14
The agreement with DDSC was
signed – it describes the conditions
under which IRSN provides technicalsupport to DDSC and the methods
used to launch and conduct thetechnical support actions.
■ The standing advisory group forreactors and its German counterpart(RSK) met to discuss the recommendations
on the safety of nuclear powerreactors issued in 2003 and 2004.
■ The Safety Assessment Guide,a document common to IRSN,
GRS and AVN, was circulated.
■■

OCTOBER

6
The PHARE contract with the
Lithuanian safety authority came toan end and another contract was
signed with this same authority andwith the European Commission,concerning the dismantling of
the Ignalina power plant.
■ The Reactor Safety Commission
examined an IRSN report on the
security baseline of Barracuda,
the future nuclear attack submarine.

■

1-2
IRSN participation in the Journéesfrançaises de radiologie(French Radiology Congress).

19
A crisis situation exercise involving a
nuclear material inventory was
conducted at the CERCA and Orphée
facilities.

■

4-6
IRSN Thesis Presentation 2004 in Aussois.

NOVEMBER■■

5-6
IRSN, GRS and ICC organiseda seminar in Kiev at which FGI(Franco-German Chernobyl Initiative)
results were presented.

12

I R S NA N N U A L

■

■

■

8-9
IRSN and GRS organised the 6th Eurosafe
Forum in Berlin (Germany) basedon nuclear safety experience
feedback.

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4

15
IRSN’s Scientific Board held its firstmeeting.

18
The Phebus FPT3 test was
conducted. It was the fifth and last
test in the PHEBUS FP programme.
■ The standing advisory group for
nuclear reactors examined certain
aspects related to the safety of
the EPR (corium recuperator, safety
injection system, boron dilution
accidents, etc.).
■ 19
A round table was organised to
discuss the role expert assessment
organisations had to play regarding
nuclear transparency. About
10 players from various fields took part(journalists, CLIs, associations, experts).
■

■

■

■

25
The standing advisory group for
nuclear reactors examined theexperience feedback on the use of fuelduring the period 1996-2002.
30
The standing advisory group in chargeof facilities intended for long-term
storage of radioactive waste examined
ANDRA’s “Granite 2002” dossier.
■ Riskaudit signed a contract toprovide Bulgaria with technicalassistance to reinforce the controlof radioactive sources.
■■

30/11-3/12
Participation in the Pollutec trade fairin Lyon.

News, strategy and organisation■

2
The standing advisory groupon nuclear reactors examined experience
feedback on the use of French andforeign pressurised water reactors
during the 2000-2002 period (1st session).
■ Contracts were signed with CEA
to operate the CABRI and PHEBUS
reactors, to conduct tests in these
installations and to bring the CABRI
installation up to standard.
■

3
The cooperation frameworkagreement with INRS was signed:
it specifically concerns the transfer
of knowledge from one organisation
to the other, the pooling of scientifictools, joint research and expertise,
professional training and expert
assessment of workstation risks.
■

6
A cooperation agreement was signedwith ANVAR to promote technologicaltransfer and make the most of IRSN’s
potential for innovation anddevelopment.

■

12
Tripartite agreement between IRSN,EDF and CEA relating to the SOURCE TERMEVALUATIONS research programme,
whose purpose is to reduce uncertainties
on the evaluation of releases fromradioactive products in the event ofan accident involving core meltdown
of a pressurised-water reactor.

■

14
The Reactor Safety Commission
examined an IRSN report on

DRIRE, DDASS and DSNR.
The DPPRA was sent a report onfood chain contamination by fission
products released during nuclear
weapon testing.

interactions between the weapon
system of Barracuda, the future nuclear
attack submarine, and the safety of
the nuclear boiler room.

DECEMBER■

14-22
Meetings between the federal atomic
energy agency (Rosatom), NIKIMT,IBRAE and ERC of Saint Petersburg(Russia) and IRSN as part of the crisis
management cooperation.

■

15
The standing advisory group for basic
nuclear installations other than
nuclear reactors examined theconditions for dismantling Super-Phenix.

■

16
The standing advisory group for
nuclear reactors was presented
with different subjects concerning
measures taken or envisaged by EDF
with regard to core meltdown
accidents that could affect PWR
power plants.

■

21
As new website was launchedwhere the analysis results ofradioactivity in aquatic environments
can be consulted.
■ The report specifying radonmeasurement protocols in spa
facilities was sent to DGSNR
and put on the Internet.
■ A study on the origin and future ofradioactivity resulting from medical
activities and found in Toulouse’s
waste-water system was presented to
the Compagnie Générale des Eaux deToulouse (water company), theToulouse hospital, the local DRASS,

■

■

22
The standing advisory groupfor nuclear reactors examined
the specifications on modifications
envisaged by EDF on the clogging
of sumps in safety injection andcontainment spray systems,in the event of an accidental
break in the primary system of a PWR.

■I R S N.

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13

> Organisation
A short description of IRSN■

Creation■

IRSN was created by article 5 of the law of
9 May 2001 instituting the French healthand environmental safety agency and by
the implementing decree of 22 February 2002.
■

StatusIRSN is a public establishment of an industrial
and commercial nature placed under the joint
authority of the Ministries of Defence,the Environment and Sustainable Development,
Industry, Research, Health and Social Affairs.
■

Jacques REPUSSARD, Director General.
Michel BRIÈRE, Assistant Director Generalin charge of IRSN missions related to defence.
Philippe JAMET, Assistant General Director
in charge of general matters.

Expertise and research

IRSN is the public expert in research andexpertise related to nuclear and radiologicalrisks.
■

Fields of activity• Environment and response.
• Radiation protection of persons.
• Prevention of major accidents.
• Reactor safety.
• Safety of plants, laboratories, transport
and waste.
• Defence nuclear expertise.

14

I R S N■

2004 budget

Receipts of 254 M€, expenditure of 276 M€,
of which 16 M€ went into investments.

Directors

Jean-François LACRONIQUE, Presidentof the Board of Directors.

■

4 main lines of development• Optimising support missions for publicauthorities.
• Reworking its research process in consultation
with its main partners.
• Opening up its expertise to takethe expectations of society into account.
• Developing the European and international
dimension.

A N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4■

Staff

IRSN employs about 1,500 specialists –engineers, researchers, physicians, agronomists,
veterinarians and technicians, experts
competent in nuclear safety and radiation
protection and in the control of sensitive
nuclear materials.
■

IRSN sites

Head office: Clamart
Agen, Cadarache, Fontenay-aux-Roses,
La Seyne-sur-Mer, Le Vésinet,
Les Angles/Avignon, Mahina (Tahiti),
Octeville/Cherbourg, Orsay, Pierrelatte, Saclay.

News, strategy and organisation> Activity 2004
Key figures

RESEARCH

50%
of the IRSN budget
devoted to research
activities

172
publicationsin scientific journals,
with review committees

INTERNATIONAL
ACTIVITIES

2004 budget

State

100
bilateral agreementswith research andexpertise bodies
from 30 countries

80
international projects
in progress

MEDD 99%
Others 1%

Expenditure:
Operating 94%
Investment 6%

FranceTECHNICAL SUPPORTFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESHUMAN RESOURCES

608

1,515

technical reports
to the public authorities(excluding defencerelated activities)

peopleemployed by IRSN
or seconded to theInstitute from CEA
Origin of funding:272
noticestransmitted to safety
authorities for defencerelated activities

EDF 30%
COGEMA 7%
DGSNR 7%
CEA 5%
Others 51%

State 81%
France 16%
Foreign 3%

IRSN’S INTELLECTUALASSETS

Foreign16
French patents
in force (one of whichis co-owned by CEA)
and 20 patents in force
abroad158
Software applications
and databases listed,
24 of which are co-owned
by CEA

CCE 25%
RISKAUDIT 24%
GRS 12%EPRI 8%
NRC 7%
Others 24%

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> The Board of Directors
on 31 December 2004
hrough its deliberations, the Board of Directors decides upon the organisation and running of IRSN. It monitors the programmesof activities and when results of the work carried out are known, it decides upon the follow-up. From a financial point of view,
it approves the annual statement of estimated revenue and expenditure, the amendments and the allocation of results.

T

It examines the general terms and conditions for formalising agreements and contracts. It approves acquisitions and sales ofindustrial property rights, acquisitions or sales of shareholding and large-scale real-estate projects. It checks on the generalconditions of human resource management (recruitment, employment, remuneration).
The Board of Directors is made up of 24 members: 10 appointed representatives of the State, 6 qualified figures chosen
for their competence, including either a member of parliament or a senator from the Parliamentary Office for evaluationof scientific and technological options, 8 elected representatives from the establishment’s staff. The term of office formembers of the Board of Directors is five years.
■

COMPOSITION■

President: Jean-François LACRONIQUEQUALIFIED FIGURESClaude BIRRAUX
Vice-President of the Parliamentary Office for scientific and technological choices.

STATE REPRESENTATIVES

Dominique GOUTTE

Patrick AUDEBERT

Director of the major heavy ion accelerator, at the instigation of
the Minister for Research.

■

Manager of the national mission supporting the nuclear risk management,
representing the Minister for Civil Security.

Jean-François LACRONIQUE

Director of Labour Relations, representing the Minister for Employment.

Professor of Medicine, at the instigation of the Minister of Health andSocial Affairs.

Marie-Claude DUPUIS

Maurice LAURENT

Director of the Industrial Environment Department, Department for
the Prevention of Pollution and Hazards, representing the Minister for
the Environment and Sustainable Development.

Former department head at the National Assembly, at the instigation of
the Minister of Industry.

Jean RANNOU

Florence FOUQUETAir Force General, at the instigation of the Minister of Defence.

Branch manager of the nuclear industry, General Directorate for Energy
and Raw Materials, representing the Minister for Industry.

Jacques VERNIER

Jean-Denis COMBREXELLE

Bernard FROIS
Director of the Power, Transport, Environment, Natural Resources
Department from the Technologies Department, representing
the Minister for Research.

Mayor of Douai, at the instigation of the Minister for the Environment
and Sustainable Development until April 2004 when he is resigning –a successor has not yet been appointed.
■

FIGURES PRESENT BY RIGHT

Marcel JURIEN de la GRAVIÈRE

Thierry TROUVÉ

Delegate for nuclear safety and radiation protection for activities andinstallations related to defence.

Government Commissioner and Director for the prevention of pollution
and risks.

André-Claude LACOSTE

Daniel RACINET

General Director of nuclear safety and radiation protection.

State Controller.

Thierry MICHELON

Jacques REPUSSARD

Deputy Director of environmental risk management, General Directorate
for Health, representing the Minister for Health and Social Affairs.

Director General.

Marc PREVÔT

Accountant.

Engineer General, shipbuilding armaments Inspector, representing
the Minister of Defence.

Marie-Catherine POIRIER

Jean-Claude DALE

Secretary of the Works Committee.

Nicolas VANNIEUWENHUYZE
Office Manager, Budget Department, representing the Minister for
the Budget until 30 June when he is resigning – successor has not yet
been appointed.

■

SALARIED BOARD DIRECTORSCFDT representatives
François ROLLINGER, Dominique MARTINEAU, Thierry FLEURY

CFE-CGC representatives
Hervé BOLL, Jean-Marc DORMANTCGT representatives
Mireille ARNAUD, Xavier MOYA, Betty CATANIA16

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on 31 December 2004
he Scientific Board examines the Institute’s programmes of activities and gives its opinion. It checks upon the pertinence and follow-up of research programmes defined by IRSN. It assesses their results. It can make recommendations
on the directions of the establishment’s programmes.

T

The Scientific Board can be consulted by the President of the IRSN Board of Directors or by the supervising Ministers.
The IRSN Scientific Board was formed on 6 July 2004, by a joint order from the Minister of the Environment andSustainable Development, the Minister of Health and Social Safety, the Minister of Defence, the Minister in chargeof Industry and the Minister in charge of Research.

■

COMPOSITION

President: Michel QUINTARD

George YADIGAROGLU

Director of Research at the Toulouse Institute of Fluid Mechanics,
at the instigation of the Minister in charge of Research.

Professor of nuclear engineering at the Swiss Federal Instituteof Technology, at the instigation of the Minister in charge of Industry.

Bernard SEVESTRE

André PINEAUEngineer General, Assistant Director of the French Atomic Energy
Commission, at the instigation of the Minister in charge of Defence.

Professor at the École des Mines in Paris, at the instigation of the Ministerin charge of Industry.

Martin SCHLUMBERGER

Philippe LECONTE

Professor of Medicine and Clinical Director at the Gustave-Roussy Institut,at the instigation of the Minister in charge of Defence.

Physicist and former Director of the research programme on managementof radioactive waste at the CEA, at the instigation of the Minister incharge of Research.

Ethel-Esther MOUSTACCHI
Scientific Director for the Atomic Energy High Commissioner,at the instigation of the Minister in charge of the Environment.

Victor TESCHENDORFF
Head of Department at the Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit(GRS / Germany), at the instigation of the Minister in chargeof the Environment.

André AURENGO

René AMALBERTI
Professor of Medicine and Clinical Director at the Institute of Aerospace
Medicine, at the instigation of the Minister in charge of Employment.

Lars-Erik HOLM
Professor of Medicine and Director General of the Swedish Radiation
Protection Authority, at the instigation of the Minister in chargeof Employment.

Professor of Medicine and Clinical Director at the Pitié-Salpêtrière
Hospital, at the instigation of the Minister in charge of Health.

Jean-Marc COSSET
Professor of Medicine and Clinical Director at the Curie Institut,at the instigation of the Minister in charge of Health.

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17

News, strategy and organisation> The Scientific Board

> Organisation chart
April 2005
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Jean-François LACRONIQUE, President

GENERAL DIRECTORATE
Jacques REPUSSARD, Director General
Michel BRIÈRE, Assistant Director General in charge of IRSN missions related to defence
Philippe JAMET, Assistant General Director in charge of general matters

OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENTS■

Department for Nuclear Defence ExpertiseJérôme JOLY, Director

FUNCTIONAL DEPARTMENTS■• Application of international controls• Technical support and studies• Defence safety assessment• Nuclear facility security■■• Strategic programmes• Relations with institutional partners• Management tools and follow-up of strategic objectives• Study and research programmes• International relations• Policies and syntheses• Promoting and supporting operations• Relations with stakeholders• Secretariat for standing advisory groups• Risk management

Department for the Environment and Response
Didier CHAMPION, Director• Study of radionuclide behaviour in ecosystems• Studying and monitoring radioactivity in the environment• Analysis of geosphere-related risks• Sample processing and metrology for the environment• Radiation Protection response and assistance• Emergency situations and crisis organisation■

Department for the Prevention of Major Accidents
Michel SCHWARZ, Director

Department for the Radiation Protection of Persons
Patrick GOURMELON, Director■• Radiation protection studies and expertise• Radiobiology and epidemiology• External dosimetry• Internal dosimetry■■

Department for Reactor Safety
Martial JOREL, Director

Department for the Safety of Plants, Laboratories,
Transport and Waste
Thierry CHARLES, Director

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General secretariat
Jean-Baptiste PINTON, General secretary• Financial matters• Human resources• Commercial relations and legal support• Managing real-estate holdings and corporate services• Managing information systems• Fuel cycle transportation and installation• Laboratories, irradiators, accelerators and decommissioned reactors• Radioactive waste• Confinement, fire and industrial risks• Criticality• Aerodispersion of pollutants

18

Communication Department
Marie-Pierre BIGOT, Director• Internal communications• Information and relations with the media• Programmes and relations with the public• Pressurised-water reactors• Gas-cooled, fast-neutron and experimental reactors• Equipment and structures• Systems and risks• Thermohydraulics, cores and control of facilities• Severe accidents and radiological consequences• Human factors■

Department for Scientific and Technical
Evaluation and Quality
Joseph LEWI, Director• Radiation Protection training• Scientific evaluation and activities• Quality Management• Health, Safety and Environmental protection• Scientific and technical knowledge engineering• Scientific information resources• Studies and experimental research on accidents• Experimental engineering and instrumentation• Fuel studies and modelling in accidents• Fire, corium and confinement studies and modelling■

Department for Strategy, Development
and External Relations
Jean-Christophe NIEL*, Director

2 0 0 4■

Accounting Office
Jean-Claude DALE, Accountant* No longer working for IRSN at the time of publication of the report.

News, strategy and organisation> IRSN sites:
Activities and staff

OCTEVILLE – CHERBOURG
Staff: 16 employees■ Environment

CLAMART(Head office)Staff: 220 employees
Functional departments

LE VÉSINET
Staff: 161 employees■ Environment and response■ Radiation protection of persons

FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES
Staff: 749 employees
Operational activities■ Defence nuclear expertise ■ Environment and response■ Radiation protection of persons ■ Reactor safety■ Safety of plants, laboratories, transport and waste

SACLAY
Staff: 51 employees■ Safety of plants, laboratories,
transport and waste

ORSAY
Staff: 17 employees■ Environment

PIERRELATTE
Staff: 21 employees■ Response■ Radiation protection of persons

CADARACHE
Staff: 328 employees■ Environment■ Prevention of major accidents■ Radiation protection of persons■ Defence nuclear expertise

AGEN
Staff: 3 employees■ Environment and response

LES ANGLES – AVIGNON
Staff: 25 employees■ Response■ Safety of plants, laboratories,
transport and waste

LA SEYNE-SUR-MER
Staff: 5 employees■ Environment

MAHINA - TAHITI
Staff: 3 employees■ Environment> Details of IRSN sites can be found on the flap at the back of the report.

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Activities in 2004

Knowledge
for prediction

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Description of programmes
o optimise the manner in which it carries out its assigned missions, IRSN organises its activities into a rangeof subject-related programmes. Some of these are termed strategic, as they are either cross-disciplinary, a
response to the priority challenges of the Institute or mobilise resources and teams around a common objective.
IRSN programmes are structured around six targets.

T

Civilian nuclear expertise
Human and organisational reliability
This programme covers all IRSN activities on thesubjects of human reliability and organisational
analysis in nuclear installations or other situations
involving exposure to ionising radiation.
It also meets the growing demand from the safety
and radiation protection authorities and takes
account of the changes associated with the ageingof operating teams, changes in skill levels, etc.

Analysis of the safety of PWR
and other operational reactors
IRSN carries out in-service monitoring in supportof the authorities of EDF nuclear power plants
and other reactors being operated for experimental
purposes. It examines the information arising fromthe use of these reactors, identifies and prioritises
safety problems and prepares reports based on the
feedback. IRSN also analyses the safety dossiers
submitted by users in accordance with the regulations.

Support for the safety assessmentof operational reactors
IRSN carries out studies and research actions to
optimise support for the public authorities in respectof safety for current and future installations. IRSN
activities divide into three fields: the development

22

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2 0 0 4of probabilistic safety studies, the carrying out ofstudies in support of analysis and the acquisition
and/or development of software and calculation
codes with the associated research.

PWR ageing
The ageing of nuclear power plants results indeterioration of components which needs to beprevented, monitored and counteracted to ensurethat the installation can continue to operate undersatisfactory safety conditions.
The research carried out by IRSN covers various
aspects of the problem: ageing of components, studyof the containment behaviour and non-destructive
testing.

The fuel and its management
during normal and accident
operating conditions
For economic reasons, EDF is seeking to extend
the useful life of fuel and is turning towards new
materials. For these new operating conditions, IRSN
activity involves:■ for expertise, the relevance of current safety
criteria or the definition of new criteria and anassessment of the associated safety margins;■ for research, improvements in knowledge.

Future reactors and innovative projects
By around 2010, this programme should provide
IRSN with an appropriate and considered positionon the most credible projects being considered
for the replacement of current generations of
nuclear power plants. The programme is targeting
Generation IV reactors, with a view to achieving
improvements in safety, reductions in waste andresistance to proliferation and malicious acts.

Severe reactor accidents
IRSN studies and research carried out on coremeltdown accidents in a water reactor (severe
accidents) aim to gain a sufficient understandingof the phenomena to be able to understand therisks associated with these accidents and theprocedures adopted by the operator in responseto them. The aim is to improve prevention of such

accidents, to identify the resources needed to limit
their consequences and to prepare IRSN for the
management of the crisis should an accident occur.

Safety of plants, transportand dismantlingThis programme is intended to contribute to safetyof plants, transport and dismantling by identifying
areas for safety improvements, where appropriate.
It includes:■ assessment of safety in plants, other installations
and transport;■ management of the national inventory of “civil”
radiation sources;■ research and studies into the risk of criticality,
especially during transport;■ expert assessment activity at an international
level and for at-risk non-nuclear installations.

Defence nuclear expertise
Safety of installations, systems
and transport
IRSN provides technical support to government
authorities for the safety assessment of military
nuclear systems, secret basic nuclear installations
and defence-related transport systems. Activities
concentrate on the expert assessment of safety
documents, analysis of operating experience,
assessment of internal emergency plans as well as
preparations for the crisis organisation.

for France’s international commitments on the useof material that could serve in the manufacture of
nuclear and chemical weapons.
In this context, the Institute provides directtechnical support to the public authorities (national inspections, accompanying international
inspections, missions of an operational nature) andalso technical support to the administrative
authorities (expert assessment of dossiers,
contribution to the development of doctrines andregulations).

Material protection and monitoring
IRSN activities on this subject concern, on the
one hand, the level of protection for nuclear material
against the threat of theft or hijacking with malicious intent and, on the other hand, the respect

Protection of installations
and transport against malicious acts
This programme aims to take account of malicious
acts during the design and operation of nuclear

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installations. It also addresses the assessment ofpotential consequences resulting from malicious

acts against transport containers for nuclear orradioactive materials.

Protection of persons and the environment
against ionising radiation
Environmental monitoring
The aim of this programme is to be able to determine, at any time, the radioactivity levels to which
populations are being subjected, to determine its
origin and to provide early warning of any abnormalrise in ambient radiation fields in the various environments.

minants.Although risks are low for a given individual,
they apply to vast human populations and immense
ecosystems, which may give rise to significant consequences, especially at a collective level. Refining theirassessment may therefore offer advantages when
considering health or environmental management.

Radioecology
Waste management safety
Activities under this field aim to understand therisks associated with radioactive waste and to
identify, where necessary, the options available toimprove its management from the point of view ofsafety and radiation protection. Activities under
this programme relate to:■ an understanding of unused matter and material,
waste and packages;■ the storage and disposal of radioactive waste
regardless of its origin, activity levels or the radionuclides involved;■ the management of used sources;■ polluted sites.
These activities involve an assessment of operators’
dossiers, the development of technical doctrines
as well as studies and research to help understandthose events that might affect the storage safety.

Chronic risksThis programme contributes to the assessment of
the effects of chronic exposure to radioactive conta-

24

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The research and studies carried out within IRSN
are contributing to knowledge and understandingof the origin and future of radionuclides discharged
or pre-existing in the environment.The aim is to assess
their radiological impact under normal operating,incident or accident conditions. Operationally, thisinvolves making contingency plans using aids-todecision tools, the prediction of releases and their
movement, reinstatement of the immediate andremote environment of an incident site, etc.

Radon
For more than twenty years, IRSN has been studying
radon in all its aspects: formation and migrationin the ground, exhalation then dispersion in theatmosphere, metrology, cartography, accumulationin buildings,health risks,reductions in concentrations,
etc.The knowledge and experience acquired, which
has no equivalent in France, enables IRSN to offer
support to the public authorities engaged in a riskmanagement policy associated with radon and to
those tasked with implementing it.

Radiation protection of workers
The ultimate aim of the programme is to identify
the most critical situations and to analyse themeans to reduce exposure. This programme
combines IRSN activity relating to exposure(internal and external) of workers in nuclear
installations, other installations and workstations
that result in exposure to ionising radiation.

Radiation protectionin the medical field
Medical exposures represent the main sourceof exposure of the population to ionisingradiation of artificial origin. These exposures
may present risks for practitioners exposed in a
repeated manner and for patients also exposed
repeatedly. This IRSN programme is divided into
three areas:■ medical expert assessment;■ epidemiology of medical exposures;■ research into delayed complications in patientstreated with radiotherapy.

Exposure assessment
and protection equipment
This programme aims to improve understandingof people’s exposure in normal situations and tocarry out dosimetric expert assessments undercomplex situations, in several areas:■ radiation protection and epidemiological expert
assessments of populations;■ dosimetry, routine measurement devices;■ dosimetry, measurement devices under development.

Radiation protection doctrine
Radiation protection doctrine is developed at aninternational level by a range of authorities that
may be scientific, technical or regulatory in nature(ICRP, AEN, IAEA, Euratom, etc.).
This programme, based on the involvement of IRSN
experts within these authorities, aims to develop
the doctrine, introduce new subjects to study withinthese authorities and build a dialogue with all the
French players concerned with radiation protection.

Hazards and crisis situations
Fire, explosion and dispersion
This programme covers IRSN activities in the fieldof control of risks associated with fire, explosion andaerodispersion of radioactive or toxic contaminants
within the facilities or into the environment. The
studies, research and expert assessments under
this programme aim to improve installation safetylevels and hence provide better protection for the
public, workers and the environment.

Naturally-occurring hazards
Activities carried out by IRSN aim to assess thesafety of installations against naturally-occurring
hazards (earthquakes and floods), and to identify,
where applicable, prospects for improvement.
This programme addresses:■ expert assessments of the risks of flooding andsevere drops in water level that could affect nuclear
installations;■ an understanding of the phenomena that govern
the morphological and geological changes at sites;■ the development, optimisation and validationof methods and tools enabling an assessment of
the seismic hazard.

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Management of emergency
situations, risk management
IRSN ensures that its resources (Emergency
Response Centre, mobile means) remain operational
and are improved to be able to provide assistanceto the public authorities following an accident or
post-accident situation in France. IRSN preparescontingency plans and takes part in crisis exercises.
This activity offers training to its teams in interaction
with other players in the crisis, the coordinationof exercises at national level and the preparationof both national and international contingency
plans. Feedback, in this field, is a vital factor in achieving progress.
This programme has two parts:■ studies and development, crisis exercises;■ ensuring that the Emergency Response Centre andmobile means remain operational.

Managementof post-accident situations
Post-accident management of a nuclear or radiological crisis may involve a large number of players
required to undertake the long-term managementof many interdependent facets: radiological protection and health monitoring of populations,reinstatement of territory, redeployment of industrial
and agricultural activities, compensation for victims,
etc.This programme aims to put in place an organisation, methods, and a range of technical tools, aswell as a network of external contacts, to enable
all the partners to carry out their missions effectively.

26

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Radiation accidents
Following an accidental exposure to ionisingradiation, medical teams must be able, in as shorta time as possible, to assess the injuries sufferedby the irradiated individual in order to be able toestablish an appropriate treatment protocol. The
aim of IRSN, as provider of technical support tothe hospital structures, is to improve the diagnosis
by taking full advantage of the interface between
dosimetry, biological research and medical
applications.

Radiation protection response
and assistanceThis programme covers:■ activities involving checks, tests and expert
assessments of the effectiveness of ventilation andfiltration systems in nuclear installations;■ assistance and response in operational radiation
protection, to characterise the radiological stateof the premises or sites, and contribute to the
management of abnormal situations;■ monitoring activities in accordance with thedecree relating to the protection of workers against
hazards rising from ionising radiation.
These activities are carried out under conventions
with the public authorities.

Education, distribution
Communication
As part of its missions, the Institute contributes
to informing the public and public authorities about
nuclear safety and protection of persons and theenvironment. It publishes the scientific results of
its study and research programmes.

Training and education
through research
Education activities enable the Institute’s knowledge
base to be formalised, enhanced and taught. This
involves the setting up of external or internal courses,
participation in external training and providing support for theses and courses. In addition, the IRSN’s
policy of scientific and technical excellence aims
to achieve the highest possible level of scientificand technical merit across all its research and expert
assessment activities and recognition of thisexcellence.

International assistance, support
for programmes and agreements

Investments: updatingof the CABRI reactor
The updating of the CABRI reactor involves
improving the earthquake protection of the buildings and equipment, modernising the ventilation
system and installing a pressurised water loop
replacing the sodium loop. Once completed, thisinstallation will be used to reproduce, under the
CIP international programme, the thermohydraulicconditions of a PWR during a reactivity accident.

AMANDE
This new installation will generate metrologystandard monoenergetic neutron beams, needed
for the study and characterisation of neutron
detectors for radiation protection purposes. The
AMANDE project will now provide support for thereference installations already operated by IRSN
and will enable it to have primary referencescomparable to those in the major international
metrology laboratories.

The Institute’s international activities involve:■ bilateral relations with foreign opposite numbers;■ relations with international organisations;■ special involvement in relations with European
institutions;■ support activities for foreign safety authorities;■ contributions to the international activities of
the French safety authorities.

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14%

share of external joint
funding receipts
for research programmes

6,200

283

source movements
recordedin 2004

personnel attended IRSN
radiation protection
training

38,000environmental samples
taken annually28

I R S N689,038“hits” on the IRSN website

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Research and public
service missions
In order to be able to offer relevant expert appraisal, IRSN develops its own
research programmes. For the Institute, this involves anticipating future questions
on changes to and control over the risks of nuclear activities and developing new
research topics on the accidents and crisis management where IRSN provides
support to the public authorities. The Institute’s public service missions also coverradiation protection monitoring, contributing to training on radiation protection
matters as well as public information.

> 30 Defining and implementing national and international
research programmes> 78 Contributing to training in radiation protection> 81 Permanent monitoring in matters of radiation
protection> 84 Public information

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RESEARCH AND PUBLIC SERVICE MISSIONSD E F I N I N G A N D I M P L E M E N T I N G N AT I O N A L A N D
I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S E A R C H P RO G R A M M E S

Assessment of programmed systems.

Defining and implementing
national and international research
programmes
he research activities carried out by IRSN have several objectives: applied research, not excluding basic
research, research in support of expert assessment, a complementarity between experimentation, modellingand interpretation. Research programmes developed by the Institute give priority to national and international
collaboration by welcoming PhD students, developing programmes in partnership and the creation of mixed
research units.

T

Support for the safety assessmentof operational reactors
63
current theses
16

post-doctorates
per year37

holders of seniordoctorates or authorised
to supervise research349

communications
in congresses

26
ICPE
under theEnvironmental Code30

IRSN carries out research and development activities into non-destructive
testing methods and the assessmentof research into programmed systems.
These activities are in support of its
expert assessment work.
Non-destructive testing
The equipment testing using ultrasound and eddy
current techniques is mainly aimed at:■ developing new methods for demonstration
purposes, such as the use of multi-element ultrasound sensors that can be adapted in real time tothe complex forms of components. This work is
aimed at showing the feasibility and advantagesof these methods prior to their industrialisation;■ developing simulation software for these methods
that will enable their performance to be predicted
and hence achieve improvements in their industrial
usability.
The year 2004 was dedicated to demonstrating

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2 0 0 4the correct operation of flexible sensors on largegrain or cracked materials.

Assessment of programmed systems
The power of computers enables designers to
produce increasingly complex software. It istherefore becoming increasingly difficult to validate
its design. IRSN is constantly striving to improve
its methods and tools for assessing programmed
systems. On the subject of the analysis of coverageof validation tests, IRSN commissioned thedevelopment of the GATEL tool by CEA.The resultsof this activity have been used in particular toanalyse the EPR-reactor protection system in 2004.
The systems that EDF plans to use for this reactor
are also multi-task and therefore introduce anadditional complexity factor: in 2004, IRSN began
the study of a tool to check the design rules andsynchronisation properties for multi-task softwarethat will facilitate the detection of unsafe behaviours
during the analyses of such systems.

Power plant at Nogent-sur-Seine (Aube).

Reactor vessel head at the Civaux power plant(Vienne).

Research into the ageing of PWR
IRSN launched an experimental
programme in 2003 to gain further
knowledge on the subject of stresscorrosion of alloys used for the weldingof reactor vessel heads.
The stress cracking of nickel-based alloys in reactors
led EDF to replace, in particular, some reactor
vessel heads on French nuclear power plants. The
recent discovery of cracks in Sweden (on reactor
vessel nozzles), in Japan (dissimilar metal junctions
on the pressuriser) and in the United States (reactor

vessel penetrations) shows that inspections forcracking should be carried out on filler metals
as well as on parent metals. It was in this context
that IRSN began an experimental programme
to assess cracking speeds on Inconel 82 in CEA’s
Venus loop in 2003. This programme, which is due
to end in 2007, produced its first results in 2004.
These results will be compared with those fromother international experimental programmes.
They will enable the Institute to use data acquiredcompletely independently from operators andmanufacturers when conducting its investigations.

14

nuclear activities
authorised under the
Public Health Code8
current European
projects on radiation
protection and safety
Hosting of

38
foreign scientists

The fuel and its management during
normal and accident operating conditions
The fuel behaviour has been the subjectof major research work at IRSN, mainly
concerned with the control rod ejection
accident as well as the loss of primarycoolant accidents and dewatering ofspent fuel pits.
Control rod ejection accident
The study of the behaviour of fuel following thecontrol rod ejection accident is primarily basedon experimental programmes (CABRI programmes,
analytical tests) and simulations (SCANAIR software
for rod thermo-mechanical calculations).
Experimental programmes
In 2004, IRSN led the way in seeking to interpret
the REP-Na tests carried out between 1992 and2002 in the sodium loop of the CABRI installationand to define the tests of the CIP (CABRI Interna-

tional Project) which will be carried out using a newpressurised water loop currently under construction(see text on p. 32).
For the REP-Na tests, the detailed interpretation of
the REP Na-12 test (MOX rod irradiated at 65 GWj/t,
Zircaloy-cladded) enabled confirmation of its
representativity with respect to the case of a powerreactor up to a maximum fuel enthalpy value of
80 cal/g.
This test, which did not cause a failure in the rod, alsoenabled the qualification of the SCANAIR software
to be extended.
For the CABRI-CIP programme, the studies carriedout enabled the conclusion to be drawn that thetest loop was representative of power reactors.
The first qualification test (CIP Q) of the test series,
which should be completed by 2010, will aim to
confirm the absence of artefacts associated with
the new test facility and to study the physicalI R S NA N N U A L

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RESEARCH AND PUBLIC SERVICE MISSIONSD E F I N I N G A N D I M P L E M E N T I N G N AT I O N A L A N D
I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E S E A R C H P RO G R A M M E S

Environment of the CABRI experimental reactor.

phenomena arising after significant heating of
the clad (that could not be simulated in the sodiumloop). Development of the test matrix of the CIP
programme was pursued and was the subject ofdetailed design studies. As a complement to thisprogramme, IRSN is examining the possibility ofusing the Japanese NSRR-reactor for the study ofthe behaviour of fission gases present in the irradiated fuel during temperature transients.
Simulation
IRSN has continued to develop the SCANAIR calcu-

lation code, for use in preparing and interpreting
the CABRI tests and their transposition to the scaleof nuclear reactors. This software models the
behaviour of a fuel rod subject to a power transient.
The main development introduced into the
SCANAIR software in 2004 was a model to assess
the probability of fuel rod sheath failure during
such a transient, calling on tools from elastoplastic
failure mechanics.This model exploits a statisticalanalysis of mechanical test results on irradiatedfuel clads in order to derive a (probabilistic) relationship between the size of defects and the rod burnup.

FOCUS

MODELLING OF IRRADIATED FUEL BEHAVIOUR IN A REACTIVITY
INSERTION ACCIDENT (RIA)
The study into the behaviour of irradiated fuel rods following an RIA needs to cover:■ changes in the fuel microstructure (morphology, local heterogeneities in the fuel pellets and the cladding), resulting fromthe radiation effects;■ local effects (pellet-clad interaction, etc.).
One of the major difficulties of accident simulation lies here in the coexistence of very different scales: the micron for
microstructures (hydrides in the clads, inter-granular bubbles of fission gases in the pellets) and the metre for rod height.
To resolve these difficulties, it was clear that very advanced models had to be developed. By using scale change methods,
these models determine the behaviour of a given microstructure, then introduce the result into a more general digital
representation of the structures, such as that used in
the SCANAIR calculation code.
It was mainly in the context of two theses, jointly funded with
EDF, that these methods were the subject of major developments
during 2004 with, for example, the development of anelastoplastic behaviour law for hydrided Zircaloy.

Thanks to their general character, the models developed can easily
be applied to different situations (changes to fuel design, changes
to operating conditions, other fuel types), demonstrating
the advantages of this development for industrial applications.
SCANAIR software specialists.

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Storage tank for CABRI installation test devices.

A model that is representative of heat exchanges
between the clads and the coolant was also
developed, validated and incorporated in thesoftware. Its originality lies in the fact that it covers
all heat exchange regimes for very rapid heating(of the order of 3,000 °C/s to 10,000 °C/s), including
following a DNB.
Version 4 of the SCANAIR software, incorporatingthese latest developments, was transferred to EDF,
which is partly funding these developments aspart of the CEA-EDF-IRSN tripartite research agreement.
In addition, the detailed modelling work on
irradiated fuel (see Focus p. 32) was continued.
Models will be prepared on this basis to enhance
future versions of SCANAIR.
In terms of applications, IRSN has used the SCANAIR
software to define test conditions for the future
CABRI water loop and has carried out studies
supporting expert assessments into dossiers forfuel development programmes or for fuel management within the reactor, submitted by EDF. For
example, this software is used by IRSN to assess
the soundness of one of the criteria (clad temperature) proposed by EDF to ensure fuel containment
during a reactivity insertion accident (RIA).

quenching, etc.). IRSN has, in particular, carriedout a study into whether it would be useful todevelop an advanced accident calculation tool withthe associated R&D, in order to model these
phenomena in detail.This feasibility study enabled
the prioritisation of needs and will serve as a basis
for the development of a specification for this tool.
IRSN has also undertaken the definition of a multiyear study programme concerning accidents
involving dewatering of irradiated fuel assemblies
during handling or in the storage pits (power reactors
and spent fuel processing plants). Design of thisprogramme has been mainly based on exploratory
calculations, carried out using the ICARE-CATHARE
calculation code, using the example of a dewateringin a spent fuel storage pit of a 900 MWe reactor.

Loss of primary coolant accident
and dewatering of spent fuel pits
The criteria associated with the loss of primarycoolant accident, mainly aimed at ensuring thatthe reactor core would remain “coolable” during
this transient, may be called into question bychanges in fuel management (increases in burnup
fraction) or new designs of fuel rods. Much work
has been done on the phenomena that come intoplay (expansion/failure, oxidation, resistance to

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Storage tank for CABRI installation test devices.

Modifications to the CABRI installation
In order to enable testing underthermohydraulic conditions that are
representative of a water reactor,
IRSN is jointly funding the fittingof a pressurised water loop in the
installation to replace the sodium loop,
previously used for the study of fuelin fast neutron reactors.
The research programmes carried out in the
CABRI research reactor of CEA (Cadarache, Bouchesdu-Rhône) on the behaviour of highly irradiatedfuels enables experimental data to be gatheredon the effects of an increase in burnup fraction forthese fuels.
The work of installing the water loop is accompanied by an upgrade to the safety standard of theinstallation.There are also plans to refurbish certain
equipment. In parallel, IRSN is developing an
instrumented test device intended to be fitted withthe sections of irradiatedrod that are being tested.
The international CABRICIP programme currently
being prepared in the
future installation should
include 12 tests starting
between the end of 2008
and the beginning of
2009, at an average rate
Team S2IE for CABRI and PHEBUS, from theof three or four tests per
experimental programmes support engineering
department at Cadarache (Bouches-du-Rhône).
year. The modifications

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2 0 0 4to the installation have been submitted to public
enquiry and have been the subject of a preliminary
safety report that has been forwarded to DGNSR(see Focus p. 96).

Progress madeThe year 2004 has been set aside for the cleaningup of the installation, the dismantlement of theold systems, and the packaging and removal of
the equipment associated with the use of thesodium loop. The reactivity injection system has
been dismantled with a view to optimising it, andthe pit equipment of the CABRI reactor has been
removed with the intention of reinforcing thepile block in 2005, to ensure its resistance toearthquakes. At the end of 2004, the installation
was ready to receive the first components of theloop.

Progress in the studies
The geometry of the test device has been decided,
and the corresponding instrumentation has been
qualified.
In parallel, technical specifications for key
components of the future installation have been
written (reactivity injection system, equipment formonitoring fuel ejected during a test, device forcoating the rod for post-test examination, etc.).
The national and international partners on theplanned experimental programme met twice during
2004 to define in detail the test matrix.

ASTEC software team.

The SARNET co-ordinator flanked by two collaborators.

Research work into severe accidents
with core meltdown
The study and research programme
carried out by the Institute in the fieldof core meltdown accidents is centredon the primary physical fields identified from accident scenarios and theoptions for limiting consequences.
The approach adopted in this programme is basedon the establishment of accident scenarios, theidentification of physico-chemical phenomena,
the carrying out of experiments on discrete effects
to determine the basic data and to develop elementary mathematical models, and writing calculation
codes bringing together these models and data,
as well as qualifying them using more generalexperiments.

2004, birth of the European
SARNET network
The scale of the human, technical and financial
resources to be used to examine in depth thequestions relating to severe accidents and theadvantages of sharing acquired knowledge
encouraged the Institute to seek national andinternational partners. The European network of
excellence SARNET, set up as part of the European
Commission’s 6th FPRD is an example of this.
This network began its work on 2 April 2004.
Coordinated by IRSN, it unites 49 organisations
from 18 European nations involved in nuclear reactor

safety research (safety institutes, universities,
industry, etc.).
This network aims to:■ better coordinate European research capabilities
on core meltdown accidents;■ contribute to reducing the lack of knowledge inthis field by carrying out appropriate joint research
programmes;■ incorporate the latest knowledge in advanced
computer systems for the assessment of electronuclear reactor safety in Europe, especially in thefield of probabilistic safety studies;■ disseminate information and train new experts
in this field.
The following were achieved in 2004:■ the development and deployment of the communications platform via Internet ACT. This gives accessto all information relating to the life of the network(documents, announcements of events, seminars or
meetings, etc.); it enables the collection of opinions(discussion forums, questionnaires, etc.) and thecreation of joint documents. It gives access to the
ASTEC software and to the network’s experimental
database;■ the distribution in June 2004 of version V1.1 of
the ASTEC software to 25 partner organisations on
the occasion of the session organised by IRSN toprovide training in its use. A qualification matrix
and an assessment matrix for the software has been
defined and the corresponding work has been initiated;

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■ the start of information exchanges between■ the structuring of the DATANET experimental

partners. Several circles of experts have been set
up and more than a dozen working meetings havebeen organised with the aim of developing common
positions on the phenomenology of severe accidents:
their modelling, methods of assessing their consequences and priority requirements in research terms;

database configured according to the technicalsolution developed by the Joint research centre in
ISPRA. This consists of a network of databases
developed by certain European organisations at
different sites to which access is available overthe Internet.

FOCUS

SOURCE TERM PROGRAMME
In 2004, IRSN initiated a new programme, called SOURCE TERM, whose aim is to reduce uncertainties
concerning the assessment of the release of radioactive products into the environment following
a core meltdown accident in a water reactor.
Amongst these effluent releases called “Source Term”, iodine and ruthenium are the radioactive products that present
the greatest risk to exposed populations. The studies, carried out under “Source Term” over more than twenty years, along withan analysis of tests of the PHEBUS-FP programme, have shown that significant uncertainties remained (for example a factorof 10 on organic iodine concentrations in the containment, as this chemical form of iodine is virtually not retained, for example
by the sand filter following a controlled depressurisation of the containment).
In 2004, in conjunction with its primary partners CEA and EDF, IRSN prepared a document describing the planned programme
for the period 2005-2010 with estimates of its multi-year cost. The various IRSN experimental areas of the programme havemade progress at a technical level: thus the EPICUR programme on the formation of organic iodine under gamma radiation
continued with the completion of the experimental device, and the scientific and technical strategy of the CHIP programmeon the chemistry of non-equilibrium iodine was determined.
The first item under the SOURCE TERM programme will concern the chemistry of iodine in the primary cooling system (CHIP)
and in the containment (EPICUR). In the primary system, special attention will be paid to non-equilibrium chemistry (CHIP).
The second item will concern the sequence of a severe accident involving degradation of boron carbide (B 4C) control rods that
equip the most recent French reactors as well as the boiling-water reactors in service in Europe (BECARRE tests).
The third item will address the consequences of a degradation of fuel elements in contact with air following penetration of
the vessel after the meltdown of part of the reactor core or the dewatering of a spent fuel storage pit, especially the releaseand chemical behaviour of ruthenium (tests of release of fission products in the CEA’s VERDON facility and tests under EPICUR).
In addition, correct prediction of the sequence of a dewatering in a spent fuel storage pit requires a better knowledge of theoxidation of clads by air (MOZART tests).
The fourth item will address the release of fission products from the fuel. A microanalysis programme on irradiated fuel andon fuel that has been subjected to release tests (VERCORS) will enable a validation of the current interpretation of releases
measured during tests already carried out. As a complement to this, it is planned to carry out three supplementary release
tests in the CEA’s VERDON facility using MOX and UO2 fuel at high-burnup fractions.

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What is a severe accident?
Fitting the test section in the Intermezzo furnace.

A severe accident originates from a core water cooling
failure that prevents the power generated by the reactor
from being evacuated, even after the shutdown of thechain reaction (so-called “residual power”).
Over a period of between one and several hours, a seriesof human or equipment failings can lead to deterioration of

IRSN is continuing the joint development of the
ASTEC software with its German counterpart GRS,
with the aim of making it the European reference
software for severe accidents.
Public information relating to the network isavailable on website www.sar-net.org that openedat the beginning of 2005.

the fuel and its melting. Complex phenomena then occur,
whose impact depends on the initial conditions of the accident
and the actions of the operators. The accident may be describedin four major phases:■ under the effect of residual power, the fuels present in thereactor core lose their integrity, releasing hydrogen following
oxidation by water vapour of the clads surrounding the fuel andStudies and research into severe
accidents carried out in 2004
Core degradation and behaviour of the corium
in tank
This phase of the accident is studied using the
ICARE/CATHARE software developed by IRSN.
Version V1 was used as part of the PSA to examine
breaches of the primary cooling system inducedby core meltdown and was used to interpret theresults of the German QUENCH tests carried out
using boron carbide control rods.
Version V2 that enables the bi-dimensional calculation of core material thermohydraulics andmotions was delivered in 2004.

emitting fission products into the containment;■ if water is no longer injected into the vessel, the core melts andthe mass of molten material thus formed (called corium) starts
attacking the base of the vessel and then penetrating it. During
this advanced stage of degradation, a vapour explosion may
occur; the containment may also be affected by the effects of
the hydrogen present (deflagration and/or detonation).
The reactor structures may also be subject to the effects ofa vapour explosion resulting from a water/corium interaction
before and after the penetration of the tank.
In the particular case of a penetration, ejection of corium maylead to direct heating of the atmosphere in the containment;■ under the effect of the heat released by the corium, the concrete

basemat of the reactor pit under the vessel may suffer thermal
degradation that could lead to the release of a range of gases

The behaviour of fission products
Investigations on fission products have been
dominated in recent years by the international
PHEBUS-FP programme.The final test of the series,
FPT-3, was carried out in 2004 (see Focus p. 38).
Discussions were held on the way forward forresearch into the behaviour of fission products inan accident situation with core meltdown. These
resulted in IRSN creating a new programme, entitled
SOURCE TERM, whose aim is to reduce uncertainties
concerning the assessment of radioactive products
released into the environment. The year 2004 wasdedicated to identifying requirements, establishing
the programme’s priorities, defining its technicalcontent and assessing the associated timescales
and costs (see Focus p. 36).

that, when added to the water vapour already generated, would
lead to a progressive rise in pressure within the containment;■ some of the fission products emitted during the first phase(mainly noble gases, iodine and caesium) may escapethe containment either because of its leakage rate or as the resultof deliberate actions of the operators.
Such an accident may thus lead to a major release of radioactive
releases (1) into the environment.

(1) Such releases are still called “SOURCE TERMS”.

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PHEBUS reactor: dry storage area for test devices.

FOCUS

FPT-3: FINAL TEST UNDER THE PHEBUS-FP PROGRAMMEThe PHEBUS-FP programme involved a total of five reduced scale (1/5000) overall experiments,
which have studied the release of fission products and of structural materials during the meltdown of an irradiated rod
assembly, followed by the transport of these products into the primary cooling system, as well as their behaviour inthe containment, under thermohydraulic and physico-chemical conditions that are representative of a severe accident.
The results obtained are serving to qualify the ASTEC and ICARE-CATHARE software programs.
The fifth test in the programme was completed successfully on 18 November 2004. Its aim was to verify, within an overall test,
that the calculation codes used for safety studies correctly simulated the degradation mechanisms of a water reactor coreequipped with boron carbide control rods and the associated “source term”.
The core was simulated by an assembly of 20 UO2 rods (18 irradiated and 2 non-irradiated and instrumented) surroundinga boron carbide (B4C) rod cooled by a weak flow of water vapour representative of that following a core meltdown accident.
The increase in power in the assembly provokes a thermal runaway in the clad oxidation reaction, the failure of the B4C rod
and its oxidation.
This generates hydrogen, boric acid, as well as carbonated gases that could have a significant impact on the chemistry of fission
products, especially on the chemical forms of iodine present in the containment. These gas emissions were detected on line.
The power was then increased until movement of the fuel was observed following its liquefaction leading to the shutdownof the test in accordance with predetermined criteria.
The fission products and structural material released into the system simulating the PWR primary cooling system and into
the tank simulating the containment were measured. On line spectrometry measurements and sampling of the vapours
and aerosols were carried out. In the containment, the experiment continued for four days, to examine the behaviour of fission
products, and especially that of gaseous iodine.
A brief and rapid analysis of the measurements made during theFPT-3 test, as well as the initial non-destructive tests of the fuelassembly, suggested that the presence of a boron carbide control
rod significantly affected the fuel degradation.

PHEBUS reactor control room during the test at Cadarache(Bouches-du-Rhône) on 18 November 2004.

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It also suggested that the liquid mixtures resulting from the control
rod degradation accelerated the dissolution of the fuel. High levelsof oxidation of the boron carbide under severe accident conditions
were also observed.
Of course, all this remains to be confirmed.
Several partners in the PHEBUS programme (IRSN, GRS, PSI) have also
already carried out calculations to derive results from the test.

2 0 0 4

A PHEBUS
test in figures■ About 60 people participatedin the test.

Analysis of containment strength.

■ Duration of the test: five

hours for the fuel degradation
then four days monitoring
the behaviour of the fission
products.
■ Between five and six years toanalyse the data and interpretthe test.

The proposed programme will be jointly fundedand executed under the IRSN-EDF-CEA tripartite
framework. It already has support, internationally,
from the European Commission and the USNRC.
Containment resistanceConcerning hydrogen explosions, IRSN hascontinued the development and qualification of
its calculation tools, including the TONUS software.
This has led to its participation in ISP 47 and thecarrying-out of a highly instrumented combustion
test programme, in collaboration with CNRS in
Orléans.
TONUS was also qualified using the results of the
TOSQAN programme for the distribution ofhydrogen in the pressure vessel (see Focus p. 39).
IRSN has also carried out RECI analytical experiments with a view to assessing the effect of catalytichydrogen recombiners on the forms of iodine
present in the containment. In 2004, these experiments enabled conversion rates for caesium andcadmium iodides into gaseous iodine to be
determined.
The Institute also carried out a series of studies insupport of the sizing analysis for recombiners in
P’4 reactors (1,300 MWe).
Concerning the risks of vapour explosions, and as
part of the SERENA operation of the OECD-NEA,
IRSN carried out studies into corium/waterinteractions in the vessel and the vessel sump aswell as a major programme of work comparing
the models of the various software routines usedby partners in this activity. Assessments were also

FOCUS

TOSQAN PROGRAMMEThe year 2004 has seen the completion of the “water
vapour condensation” test phase of the TOSQAN
programme and its interpretation.
A detailed analysis of all the results of these tests was also carriedout. This examined in particular the influence of numerous
parameters included in the condensation models in the thermohydrauliccodes for the containment, with a view to identifying limits andsensitivity to the physical parameters measured. These models,
generally developed from laboratory experiments, were thus validated
at a more industrial scale. Additional investigations remain to be
carried out in the case of stratified atmospheres.
Spray tests started during 2004 after initial calculations had been
completed. A reference test was carried out whose results contributed
to the development of an international comparative exercise. Specificspray tests were carried out in parallel to qualify an innovative
non-intrusive optical measurement technique for the temperatureof droplets entitled “overall rainbow refractometry”, developed aspart of a thesis. This technique was coupled to other opticalmethods such as spontaneous Raman diffusion spectrometry,
PIV and an imaging technique enabling the measurement of vapour
fractions and the speed and size of droplets. The results obtained
enabled the carrying out of general and local analyses of
the interactions between spray droplets and the air/vapour mix,
illustrating the phenomena of condensation on droplets andof evaporation.

Apparatus for laser measurements using a newtechnique: rainbow refractometry.

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Visual inspection of a fuel assembly at the Romans plant (Drôme).

carried out on the risk of loss of containment integrity
for a 900 MWe reactor by the floor movements that
could result in an explosion of vapour outside the tank.
The experimental programme on direct heatingof the atmosphere of the vessel of a P’4 reactor,

carried out in collaboration with FZK in the DISCO
installation, continued with the carrying out of aseries of low temperature tests and the first hightemperature tests.

Safety of plants, transport and dismantling
Research and studies carried out by
IRSN relating to the safety of plants,
transport and dismantling mainly
concern the risks of criticality andthe dispersion of radioactive material
outside the containment buildings.
Studies and research into criticality
The risk of criticality, i.e., the unintentional initiationof a chain neutron reaction, exists at all stages ofthe fuel cycle, from uranium enrichment into
uranium 235, fuel storage and transport, enhancement of material derived from spent fuelreprocessing through, to the storage of waste
generated. The prevention of this risk involves
determining the conditions that make it possible
to ensure sub-criticality during these operations.
It is also essential to know the consequences that
may arise from a criticality accident. In these fields,
the Institute carries out studies and research todevelop advanced calculation tools with the highest
possible level of qualification.
The studies that enable an assessment of the riskof criticality call on calculation codes that use
nuclear data libraries (cross sections). These
codes must be able to resolve neutron problems
that differ widely one from another because of
the diversity of fissile environments encounteredand the geometry of the devices that contain them.

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Under the CRISTAL project (see Focus p. 41), theInstitute developed a multi-group simulation
program for three-dimensional neutron transport,
entitled MORET 4. In 2004, this program was the
subject of new developments to its algorithms forthe physical, mathematical and statistical models.
International publications and numerous organisations stressed the power of this software, particularly well adapted to the requirements of criticality
studies.
The use of simulation software based on the MonteCarlo method remains suspect for the calculationof specific situations within which non-groupedfissile materials interact. IRSN has contributed to
improvements in these calculation methods byparticipating in the working group coordinated by
the OECD-NEA; thesis studies were undertaken to
reduce the uncertainties and bias of simulation
calculations used to assess the risks of criticality
by improving the statistical methods used. IRSN
also continued, in 2004, to improve all its criticality
calculation tools in terms of modelling capability
for complex systems and the detailed analysis of
calculation results, to gain a better understandingof safety margins.
The qualification of calculation codes is obtainedby comparing data calculated using these codeswith experimental data. Experimental criticality
studies are therefore carried out under nationalIllustration of modelling techniques forcriticality studies.

or international partnerships. These involve thecreation of full-scale configurations with known
chemical, geometrical and neutron characteristics,
very close to the critical state. These experiments
are then reproduced by calculation. Comparisons
between calculations and experiments enable
any deviations or bias to be detected and quantified,
and the security margins to be incorporated in
criticality studies can then be determined. Thus in
2004, the Institute completed the development of
the “Fission products” experimental programme
under a PIC with COGEMA. This experimental
programme was set up in 1995 and included morethan 170 critical experiments, the last of which,carried out in April 2004, aimed at representing arealistic situation of the dissolution of irradiateduranium oxide PWR rods.At the end of 2004, IRSN
carried out an experimental programme enabling
the very accurate measurement of changes in thecriticality properties of plutonium as a functionof its ageing in the criticality laboratory of the CEAat Valduc (Côte-d’Or).
IRSN also considered the setting up of the following
programmes:■ Pu TEMPERATURE EFFECT programme, intended
to measure experimentally the effects oftemperature on low concentration plutonium
solutions where the overall effect of temperature
could become positive;■ STRUCTURAL MATERIALS programme, designed
for the qualification of neutron characteristics ofthe component elements of structural materials(steel, concrete, PVC, etc.);■ programme for the experimental qualification ofconfigurations using low moderated MOX fissile
environments.
The Institute has also continued its active
participation in the ICSBEP international project.

Under the aegis of OECD/NEA, this project enables
the sharing of criticality experiments carried out
throughout the world and the acquisition of highquality experimental data, for use in qualifying
calculation tools.
A criticality accident results in the release of energy,

FOCUS

CRISTAL V1.0: NEW VERSION OF
THE CRISTAL PACKAGE
The new version V1.0 of the CRISTAL package has been
operational since November 2004.
This package, which is made up of a set of calculation codes, nuclear
data libraries and calculation procedures, enables the executionof all types of calculations needed to analyse criticality risks innuclear installations – excluding reactors – and the transport
containers for radioactive materials. It was developed and validated
under collaboration between IRSN, which manages the project,
CEA and COGEMA.
This new version is a response to the need to calculate, without
excessive conservatism, the criticality of transport containers, spent
fuel storage and processing installations, while retaining an envelope
approach to safety studies. To achieve this, the CRISTAL user has
software, nuclear data and interfaces that enable the calculationof the abundance of the main radionuclides present in spent fuel.
These calculations are carried out by the CESAR software developedby CEA and COGEMA, for different types of fuel taking accountof the manner in which they were irradiated in the reactor andcooled in the spent fuel pit.
The CRISTAL package was validated by comparison between
calculations and experiments. At the end of 2004, 1,300 criticalexperiments had been modelled and calculated using CRISTAL;
these included 230 that were representative of spent fuel, somewith fission products, which represents a unique step forwardin the world.

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STARMANIA test bench at Saclay (Essonne).

In transport configuration

TRANSPORTIn storage configurationY

Spent fuel pit: storage error

60.4

STORAGE

30.2
0.0

ZOOM

-30.2
-60.4

-364.0-291.2-218.4-145.6

-72.8

0.0

72.8

145.6

218.4

291.2

364.0 X

Scale 3:26.96 - Cross section 2 = 0.0

Illustration of modelling techniques for criticality studies.

essentially in the form of heat, accompanied byintense emissions of neutron and gamma radiation.
In 2004, the Institute carried out studies into
criticality accidents for transport containers toassess the consequences and options for response.
Collaboration was initiated on these subjects
with Imperial College, which provides technicalsupport to the UK safety agency.

Radionuclide dispersion
In support of expert assessments of the risks ofdispersion of radioactive or toxic material outside
the containment buildings, IRSN carries out studies
and experiments corresponding to a range ofpossible accident situations.
In order to be able to carry out more realistic

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2 0 0 4assessments of radionuclide releases, work wasundertaken to improve understanding of thetransfers of gases and fine particles. The results
obtained in the context of aeraulic tests in air on
cracked concrete slabs (for example following anearthquake) enabled the development of a flow
law through the cracks that is more appropriate
than existing models. The work is continuing toaddress air/vapour mixtures and the retention ofaerosols.
Full scale experiments in the STARMANIA installation enabled the gathering of data on the aeraulicand mechanical behaviour of equipment used toisolate for fire protection purposes (doors andfirewall valves) when subject to pressure andtemperature conditions that are representativeof a fire in a confined area.
Modelling was carried out, aimed at determining
the effectiveness of high-efficiency filters installed
in series. The corresponding calculation models
will be the subject of experimental validation.
Work was also carried out on the effectiveness ofzeolith trapping for certain gases.
In 2004, a programme was launched to enhanceknowledge of the influence of wind effects on
accidental releases, in the case of a partial or total
failure of an installation’s ventilation.This programme includes the carrying out of wind tunnel tests
on models that are representative of nuclear
installations.

Dry boring in a gallery of an experimental
tunnel at Tournemire (Aveyron).

Waste-related research activity
In the field of waste, IRSN concentrated
its efforts in 2004 on the managementof high-level long-lived waste (HLLLW),
in the light of the upcoming parliamentary meeting under the law ofDecember 1991.
Storage in clay strata
The work was primarily concerned with the storage
of HLLLW in a deep geological clay stratum. They
included the development of digital models andtheir validation by laboratory or field tests.
To carry out these experiments on geologicalstorage, IRSN has access to an old railway tunnel
cut through a thick clay (shale) strata in Tournemire(Aveyron). The similarities between the shale atTournemire and the rocks at the ANDRA laboratory
in Bure (Meuse) enable IRSN to carry out bothmethodological and phenomenological studies.
The study of the containment properties of shale
was started by identifying and characterising fissuresand an analysis of the interstitial solutions containedin the pores of the material. The chemical andisotopic analysis of fluids collected from thesefissures enables their origin and their residence
time within the massif to be identified. The very
low water content of the shales made it necessary
to develop a methodology intended to minimise
any effect on the interstitial solutions during
sampling.There was in fact evidence that extraction
conditions did affect the isotopic composition ofthese fluids.

Characterisation of zones disrupted
by excavation
Excavation usually disrupts the rocky massif leading
to an increase in permeability in the area of theworkings.This disrupted or damaged zone (termed
EDZ: Excavation Disturbed Zone) may vary overtime as the galleries are ventilated and the shales
flow.
In 2004, under the DECOVALEX international
project, IRSN began an exercise in modelling of the
EDZ around the Tournemire tunnels. This projectwill continue to 2006 and will incorporate acomparison between modelling results and in situ
characteristics. Changes over the longer term could
be studied under this exercise as the Tournemiresite has tunnels of very different ages (one year,
eight years and a hundred and ten years).
A campaign of characterization of the EDZ bymaking radial drillings around the tunnels at
Tournemire was set up to obtain the most complete
set of data possible to form a basis for the modelling
exercises. The data collected will enable better
understanding of propagation in space and timein the disturbed zone. Drillings will enablemeasurement of the zone’s permeability andchanges in the propagation speed of ultrasonicwaves. Measurements, especially of water content
and porosity, carried out on the core samples taken
during drillings, will complete the characterisationof the zone.
A test termed “mine-by-test” (tunnelling into
instrumented rock to monitor the hydro-mechanicalI R S NA N N U A L

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Instrumentation used to monitor changes in the rock after drilling.

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INNOVATIONS IN THE MELODIE SOFTWAREThe MELODIE software for modelling the transferof radionuclides in geological formations benefited
from two major advances in 2004:■ the first enables the simulation of radionuclide transportphenomena by convection and diffusion in heterogeneous geologicalenvironments, thanks to a calculation scheme using finite volumes;■ the second, taking advantage of a new, advanced, multi-processor
architecture, concerns the parallelisation of the resolution oftransport equations.
These changes offer major advantages for the overall modelling ofa repository site and the assessment of dose impact in case a package
is released.

IRSN is responsible for the development
and updating of the MELODIE software.

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reaction), undertaken as part of the European projectNF-PRO (6th FPRD), enabled, in 2004, the obtainingof measurements of displacement, deformationand interstitial pressure. Programs for theinterpretation and digital simulation of the reactionof rock to tunnelling have been developed.

Modelling of the behaviourof a storage site
Studies have been carried out with a view todescribing the thermal, mechanical and chemical
behaviour of a radioactive waste storage site, taking
into account the disturbances caused by the
implementation and the progressive deteriorationof the various constituent materials.
These studies have mainly involved:■ modelling the geochemical interactions associatedwith the introduction of oxidising water into the
Callovo-Oxfordian shales, as well as the presenceof large quantities of concrete, to assess the degree
and extent of the corresponding perturbations;■ developing hydro-mechanical models of the
behaviour of shale/bentonite and shale/cement
interfaces to be able to quantify the possible roleof these interfaces in the performance of a seal;■ modelling the behaviour of an anchor keystone
for a tunnel seal to assess the advantages anddisadvantages of such a device in preventing flow
across the fractured zone around the excavations;■ completing the development of a delayed failure
model of the fracture zone around the excavationsin the shales, to estimate the possible long-term
behaviour of this zone;

Packaging and reference marking of clay coresample taken at Tournemire (Aveyron).

■ modelling the thermal changes in a chamber

containing exothermic waste to identify the key
parameters affecting the intensity and extent ofheat flow in and around the packages.
The results of IRSN studies into the alkalisation of
shales by cement and the long-term mechanicalbehaviour of damaged shales have been publishedin peer-reviewed publications.
IRSN also carried out studies in 2004 on:■ the hydro-geological modelling of the Paris basin,
and especially the Bure site, by incorporating into
its model a new set of data and especially thoserelating to salt concentrations in deep aquifers;■ the development of a modelling approach forstorage structures in a geological environment, toidentify the complementarity of storage barriers
in order to confine released activity as close as
possible to the packages. This study has been thesubject of a European research project (BENIPA
project) and is continuing under the Franco-German
project REGIME (IRSN/GRS);■ the development of a water transport program,including the possibility of change of phase(liquid/gas).
As for the development of the MELODIE software,
which offers risk estimation for waste storage,
2004 marked a major development in the digital
methods used, as well as in the strategy implemented to estimate the dose impact of a repository(see Focus p. 44).

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Ventilation system at the DIVA experimental
installation at Cadarache (Bouches-du-Rhône).

Incorporation of human factors
in the design processes
In 2004, the Institute continued the research started
in 2003 on the incorporation of human factors in
the design processes.This involved identifying theimpact of the various decisions taken during thedesign on the future operators’ work, and thenstudying the way in which this impact is taken into
account in the development of the project team’s
decisions.Three modification processes for SEVESO
classified installations were thus analysed.

The Institute also reviewed expert assessments
carried out in the human factors and organisational
fields over the last fifteen years. This involved
primarily surveying the subjects analysed(supervisory interfaces, operating instructions,maintenance organisation, incident analysis), as
well as the approaches adopted (ergonomics,sociology, management, etc.).

Research activity in the fire
and aerodispersion fields
IRSN research into fire encompasses
the sequence and consequences of fire,its propagation and the circulation ofsmoke to other premises via openings
or the ventilation system.
The purpose of the research into the aerodispersionof pollutants is to develop the ability to containradioactive or toxic materials and to reduce
uncertainties in the assessment of the normal or
accidental releases of pollutants and of theirdispersion, especially with a view to understanding
the consequences for man and the environment.

Research programmes
The experimental approach offers, among otherthings, the opportunity to extend knowledge about

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2 0 0 4the specific physico-chemical phenomena of fires
and to supplement the database needed to develop
and then validate models related to the various
phenomena resulting from fires in a confinedventilated area.These models are then introduced
into the calculation codes used for studies in supportof the assessments of the effectiveness of fire
precautions. Some programmes are carried out incollaboration with industrial partners (EDF,
COGEMA, etc.) and are the subject of exchanges
with other national and international organisations(INERIS, universities, US-NRC, etc.).
Two research programmes were completed in
2004: the first addressed fires in electricalcabinets (CARMELA/CARMELO programme), andthe other was about changes in gas pressure
when a fire occurs in an installation consistingFull-scale blowing device to test the strength of VHE filters and fire dampers
under pressure (STARMANIA).

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of several spaces (DIVA 0 programme).
Two other experimental programmes, started in
2003, firmed up in 2004 with the preparation andcompletion of the first test campaigns.The PRISME
programme is concerned with heat and smoke
propagation from a fire source to adjacent spaces(see Focus p. 48). The PICSEL programme aims tobetter assess the consequences of fires with slow
kinetics of the “electrical cabinet type” in a nuclear
installation (see Focus p. 49).
In parallel with these programmes, in 2004 IRSN
continued with the acquisition of data andinformation on the behaviour of compartmentationequipment (doors and firewall valves) in the
STARMANIA installation. These tests are intended
to ascertain changes in aeraulic and mechanicalstrengths of these compartmentation devices asa function of the temperatures and pressures towhich they might be subjected during a fire in aconfined space.

BEHAVIOUR OF URANIUMHEXAFLUORIDE (UF6)
Under the PIC set up by IRSN with operators of the
upstream cycle of nuclear fuel (COGEMA, EURODIF, FBFC)
addressing the behaviour of uranium hexafluoride(UF6), the work undertaken by IRSN in 2004 covered:■ tests and simulations to assess the UF 6 behaviour in a room under
different configurations (building ventilation configuration, leakrate, etc.). Because of the difficulties of operating with UF6 , thetests undertaken in IRSN facility in Saclay (Essonne) were carriedout using SF6 , a good simulator of UF6 for the phenomena studied;■ the development of a modelling tool for the sublimation of solid UF6 .

The aim of this work was to enable a more realistic assessment of
the chemical and radiological consequences of an accidental uranium
hexafluoride release.
All the tests and models will be used in support of the design for a new
method to quantify releases.
The programme is planned for completion in 2006.

Simulation of a fireTwo approaches have been developed to simulatea fire in a nuclear installation: a simplified approach,currently using the FLAMME_S/SIMEVENT software,and, from 2006, the SYLVIA software, and a detailed
approach being run under the ISIS code. For thesimplified approach, the coupled FLAMME_S/SIMEVENT software has been operational since1999. It was used in 2004 to carry out studies
prior to the PRISME programme tests (accurate
definition of test conditions and integrity checkfor the DIVA installation during these tests).
Development of the SYLVIA software continued
in 2004 (see Focus p. 50).
For the ISIS code, which will enable the development

Experimental device simulating the behaviour of heavy gases at
Saclay (Essonne).

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Device for PICSEL tests under the SATURNE hood.

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PRISME EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMME
In 2004, IRSN continued its work under the PRISME
experimental programme.
The aim of this is to study propagation mechanisms for smoke andheat from a fire in a given room towards adjacent premises.
It will provide unique large-scale information on these phenomena thatare important for the understanding of the risks associated with fire.
It will enable the validation or modification of the corresponding IRSN
calculation codes, and hence offer better estimates of the time periods
after which there might be failure in essential safety equipment
following a fire.
Three smoke propagation modes were taken into account: propagation
via an open door, propagation via a ventilation duct transiting
the room where the fire started and ventilating an adjacent room,and propagation via a ventilation duct involving reversal of flow inthe latter.
The programme includes both an analytical and a global approach.
The analytical approach involves separate studies of the source,
the three propagation modes described above and the flows into
the adjacent room.
The global approach studies the interactions between the three
propagation modes for actual fire scenarios, with and without
the effect of ventilation.
The study of the fire source, carried out in 2004, enabled thedescription of the behaviour of a sheet of hydrogenated tetrapropylene
in an open area and in a closed room ventilated mechanically. Thisreference fire will be used for the study of the three propagation
modes and of flows into the adjacent room.

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2 0 0 4of a fire to be studied in detail by calculating inparticular the temperatures and concentrations of
the various gases in the different elemental volumesof a room, 2004 saw the development of version 2that enables the simulation of fires in confined
spaces with mechanical ventilation. A series ofcalculation cases (test cases), of increasing
complexity, enabled the validation of the models
used to be consolidated, in particular for thesimplified ventilation model that was coupled tothe basic version in 2003.The calculation of a fullscale fire test in the FLIP test series, carried out in
the PLUTON installation, began at the end of 2004
and marked the start of the qualification phase.
In conjunction with the PRISME and PICSEL
experimental programmes, a preliminary study,
conducted with specialist universities in the field,
led to a proposal and initiation of work on a thesison the generic development of the power of a firewith a view to creating improved models for
combustion rate in solid materials.

Research into aerodispersion
In order to assess the measures needed tounderstand the containment of radioactive material
and to reduce uncertainties in the estimation of
releases into the environment, the work undertaken
by IRSN aims to determine the physico-chemical
phenomena relating to the suspension ofcontaminants and their transfer under normal
and accident situations in an installation. In 2004,
under this topic, IRSN undertook the enhancementof the BADIMIS database, used in the Institute’s
expert assessments and studies, exploiting newly
obtained test results about the suspension ofradioactive materials when powders andcontaminated objects are dropped. New programmes on the suspension of contaminants wereControl room of the DIVA experimental
installation.

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launched. They concern contaminated liquids andcontaminated solid materials affected by a fire.
The work about changes in physical characteristics
of aerosols generated during a fire and the clogging
of high-efficiency filters by these aerosols has
enabled new basic data to be acquired that has
been incorporated into the calculation tools.
As far as atmospheric dispersion is concerned, IRSN
has continued to upgrade its calculation tools fordispersion and the estimation of the consequencesof an accidental release of radioactive products to
replace certain models now considered obsolete.
The aim is to have available a set of tools incorporating the latest knowledge acquired on the topic
of dispersion in the near field of the installations,but also at a regional or continental level, that could
be used in a crisis situation and for study and expert
assessment purposes.
In 2004, the architecture of the various tools wascompleted and the development of calculation
models was continued with collaboration fromuniversity partners. A first version of the pX software intended for crisis situations was developed.

PICSEL EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMMEThe PICSEL programme is being undertaken by IRSN
under a PIC with COGEMA.
It concerns the study of fires in electrical cabinets that could affectan installation including several ventilated premises (clogging
of high-efficiency filters by smoke, disturbance of pressure levels in
premises, etc.), as well as equipment containing radioactive material(glove boxes, bins, etc.).
The aim of this programme is to enhance knowledge about thephenomena relating to the propagation of fires in solid materials
in confined and ventilated spaces, and to qualify the calculation
codes for these phenomena. The PICSEL programme started in 2003
and will continue to 2008.
2004 was set aside for the carrying out of PICSEL_A tests: thesewere intended to characterise an electrical cabinet fire in a freeatmosphere under the extraction hood of the SATURNE device,
by measuring the concentration of soot produced, the heat flux fromthe source to nearby equipment and the source power. In parallel,
the PICSEL_C tests, relating to the characterisation of componentsof the glove box (glove ports) and waste bins, were preparedfor execution at the beginning of 2005. The PICSEL_A and PICSEL_C
tests represented the two stages prior to the tests that will be
carried out in the DIVA installation (in multi-premises configuration)in the second half of 2005. For these tests, the configuration of thepremises and the ventilation network will be decided based on initial
calculations carried out using the FLAMME_S software.

1

2

3

Test aimed at ascertaining electrical cabinet combustion modes.
1- Ignition phase. 2- Fully developed fire. 3- Post-experimental phase.

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SYLVIA SOFTWARE PLATFORM
If the risks associated with fire are to be better understood, it is vital to be able to predict thedevelopment of a fire within an industrial complex consisting of premises that may or may notcontain radioactive material, linked one to another by a ventilation system or other openings.
To this end, IRSN is developing SYLVIA, that simulates the propagation of a fire in such an installation and calculates
in particular the transport of smoke, hot gases and, where applicable, any suspended contaminants. Delivery of the firstversion is planned for 2006. A preliminary version was produced in 2004. This simulates the flows of a gaseous mixture
and is coupled to a graphical tool that enables the construction of a ventilation network and the entering of software input
data. The physical models correspond, for the fire, to a simplified approach, as in the FLAMME_S/SIMEVENT software, butwith significantly improved digital processing of the equations, especially for the description of the interaction between
the fire and the ventilation. Subsequently, changes in the compartmentation and containment elements resulting fromthe fire will be modelled (filter clogging, changes to the aeraulic behaviour of doors and firewall valves, etc.).
Over the longer term, SYLVIA will incorporate a detailed calculation module of the fire (ISIS software) and will be coupled
to SUNSET to carry out uncertainty analyses.

Research on earthquakes
IRSN’s seismological work aims at abetter understanding of earthquakes
as an external source of potential hazard
to at-risk installations.

Location of stations of the IRSN seismic network for the Middle
Durance fault, against a topological background. The red lines show
the fault segments.

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Seismological and geodesic instrument arrays enablesource activity to be measured, and speeds anddeformations to be estimated.
In 2004, data from the array installed around the
Middle Durance fault and determination of thesource mechanism for around thirty earthquakes
enabled confirmation of the primarily strike-slip
faulting nature of the fault, which must be known
in order to be able to carry out digital simulationsof motion prediction.
The study of site effects (effects of superficial soil
layers on motions resulting from earthquakes) also
focussed on the two instrumented sites: the Grenoble
intermount basin and the Aigion region in Greece.
In 2004, the response of superficial layers to seismic
stresses,termed the “transfer function”,was calculated
from recordings of weak motions at both sites.
Finally, a major effort addressed the probabilistic
estimation of the seismic hazard for which a
study was carried out at the Tricastin site (Drôme).

Electronic slate for the referencing of samples
taken from the environment.

The SYMBIOSE platform is used to model transfers of radionuclides in theenvironment.

Radioecology research
In 2004, the Institute carried out
research into two aspects of radioecology:on the one hand,the behaviourof radionuclides on ecosystems in
relation to controlled or accidental
releases resulting from nuclear activities and on the other hand, work
intended to achieve a better understanding of the spatial and temporaldevelopment of radioactivity in theenvironment.
Development of models, tools andexpert assessment techniques
In order to be able to assess the impact of nuclear
activities on the environment, IRSN has been overmany years developing and maintaining the models
and tools needed to predict the behaviour ofradionuclides. In 2004, a new version of the ASTRAL
software, jointly funded by EDF, was installed at
the Institute’s Emergency Response Centre (CTC).
This software enables an assessment of theconcentrations of radionuclides in various sectorsof the food chain, following an accidental
atmospheric release. The main innovation is theability to carry out calculations for uranium. In
addition, a version of the CASTEAUR software,
dedicated to the estimation of the radiologicalimpact of radionuclide releases into watercourses,
has been developed to enable longer-term
calculations. For the marine environment, the
DISPRO software, whose aim is to predict theatmospheric dispersion of radionuclides in the nearfield of the La Hague plant (Manche) has beenvalidated by campaigns involving sea plotting.
In the field of new tools, a prototype of the
SYMBIOSE integrated modelling platform has been

completed. Unlike software that only works in asingle environment (agricultural, aquatic or
airborne), SYMBIOSE addresses all the media using
the same software, enabling the modelling oftransfers both within and between the different
media. As part of the work undertaken incollaboration with EDF, specific models have been

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LAUNCH OF THE ERICA EUROPEAN
PROGRAMME
Adopted under the 6th FPRD EURATOM, the ERICA
European programme was launched in March 2004.
Its aim is to develop a method to measure (from scientific, decision-making
and societal points of view) the effects of radioactive contaminants on
the environment, with an emphasis on the protection of fauna, floraand ecosystems. ERICA is based on lessons learned from the European
FASSET programme (5th FPRD), in which IRSN participated, that formaliseda conceptual framework for assessing the impact of radionuclides on theenvironment. Coordinated by the Swedish radioprotection authority (SSI),ERICA brings together 15 partners from seven European nations.
Five working groups have been set up:■ development of assessment tools;■ development of methods to characterise and estimate the risk to theenvironment;■ preparation of recommendations concerning the demonstration of
the protection of the environment against radioactive contaminants,
including managerial aspects and communication with interested parties;■ applications for the assessment methods developed to a range ofin situ study cases;■ general project management.
IRSN participates in all these groups and is coordinator for the second.
The ERICA programme, which will end in February 2007, will provide anapproach that offers logical links between methods and software tools enablingassessment and management of the environmental risk associated withradionuclides.

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Sampling of sediment in the Rhône river at Arles following a flood occurrence.

developed and incorporated into SYMBIOSE thatenable the prediction of carbon 14 and tritium transfer in the environment.

Development of applied knowledge
Experimental activity, aimed at understanding themechanisms that control the behaviour of radionuclides in the environment, are being undertaken
in support of model development. 2004 thus saw
the completion of the European BORIS programme,

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LAUNCH OF THE EXTREME PROJECTIn 2004, IRSN launched a project concerned with theimpact of extreme events on the transfers of materials
in coastal regions.
This project, entitles EXTREME, was in part born out of the results of
the CAROL project, that enabled, on the scale of the lower Rhône valley,
the determination of what had become of the various artificial
radioactive element contributions that this region has been subjected
to over the past forty years. The aim of EXTREME is to assess the impactof “extraordinary” natural processes on the flow and distributionof radioactivity stocks, whether they are artificial or natural in nature.
The main aim will be to understand the scale of the transfers of materials
and contaminants associated with these exceptional climatic episodes.
Studies will also be carried out into the transfers between
the atmosphere and the ground during high precipitation rates, fog ordeposits of particles of Saharan origin. Similarly, the river flow towards
the sea or the land, in the case of flooding, will be monitored. Finally,
the resuspension of sediments in coastal regions, in stormy conditions,will also be studied. Preliminary results show that such exceptional
events lead to significant flows of radioactivity and to activities thatare temporarily superior to those corresponding to the mean transfer
processes. Some extreme events may thus lead to transfers equivalent
to several months, even several years, of accumulated mean transfers,
as well as the creation of new storage areas.

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coordinated by IRSN, that, using experiments andmodelling, enabled the role of biological elements
to be better explained, firstly in the properties ofsorption/absorption of radionuclides in soils andsecondly in the soil/plant transfers.
In the study area concerned with the resuspensionof marine sediment, work under a thesis presented
in 2004 enabled the demonstration of possible
remobilisation of plutonium in sediments depositedin the Channel and the Irish Sea.
In the atmospheric dispersion field, IRSN participated in several experimental measurement
campaigns that aimed either at a better understanding of atmospheric dispersion phenomena
in an urban environment (collaboration with MétéoFrance), or at characterising aerosols released by
the La Hague plant (collaboration with COGEMA).
The activities planned under the IRSN/CEA/EDF
tripartite collaboration continued in 2004. In thiscontext, IRSN worked mainly on the developmentof a method for the assessment of the risk to theenvironment resulting from radionuclides andcarried out several studies into the behaviour ofradionuclides in the non-saturated zone of the soil.
At an international level, IRSN teams were heavily
involved in the IAEA’s EMRAS programme. In
particular, the Institute was tasked with coordinating
the activities of the group assigned to revising the
IAEA guide TRS-364 that is a compilation of basic
radioecological data.
Finally, in the context of the many calls for tenderemanating from public organisations (ANDRA,
Seine-Normandie Water Agency, Basse-Normandie
Region , PACA Region , Ministry for Research, Ministry
for Environment), around 10 projects proposed by
the Institute were adopted concerning the evolution
and effects of radioactive pollutants in theenvironment.

Sediment press used to extract interstitial water
for analysis.

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Understanding spatial and temporalchanges to radioactivity
in the environment
The Rhône is the primary source of artificial
radioactivity in the western Mediterranean. The
flow of pollutants, whether radioactive or not,travel down the Rhône to the sea, and hence theaccumulations of radionuclides that have formed,
especially at its delta, are of interest to the national
and international scientific community. They are
the subject of a range of projects (ORME, RESYST,MEDICIS and EUROSTRATAFORM): IRSN participates in some of these.
For the ORME project, the collaboration takes theform of the supply of data from the IRSN’s OPERA
station in Arles (Bouches-du-Rhône) that possesses
a device unique in France for the automatic
measurement of pollutants flow. The Institute’s
know-how is also of interest to the Rhône andMediterranean Water Agency that participated in
the funding of this station, as well as the
Oceanographic Centre of Marseilles, that will soon
be using this infrastructure to analyse chemical
pollutants. Studies based on the results from thisstation have also shown the significance of peaksin the flow arriving at the sea. The first results ofa thesis started in 2002 show that more than
80% of the 115 GBq of caesium 137 carried by
the Rhône during 2002 were carried during only
about twenty days of flood flow.The primary sourceof the flow of caesium and plutonium into theMediterranean is no longer discharges from nuclear
installations but the drainage of the radioactivity
present in the soils of the drainage basin and theremobilisation of radionuclides present in ancient
sediments stored in the riverbed. At sea, various
phenomena result in the rapid deposit of radioactive pollutants in a fairly limited 30km2 zone

THE ECORAD CONGRESSIn September 2004, IRSN organised the second ECORAD,
an international congress on radioecology; this was heldin Aix-en-Provence (Bouches-du-Rhône).
Under the patronage of the International Union of Radioecology (IUR)
and the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP),
ECORAD brought together more than 320 scientists from 36 different
countries.
The aim of the congress, entitled “The scientific basis for environment
protection against radioactivity” was to carry out a surveyof the knowledge available to the international scientific communityand hence to assess the impact of radioactivity on the environment.
The congress was particularly interested in newly acquired data on
the effects of chronic exposure on organisms and ecosystems, witha view to enabling the development of relevant international
recommendations.
Five technical meetings were held in the margins of the congress,
including the general assembly of the IUR.
150 papers were submitted to the congress secretariat, for publicationin the report of the congress. The year 2005 will see the issue of these
papers in the SFRP’s review Radioprotection. The guest lectures willthemselves be featured in an IRSN publication.
The Institute intends to make ECORAD a regular international meeting
place for radiological scientists. The third is planned for September 2007.

Programme of the ECORAD international congress(September 2004).

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Since April 2004, the CEA’s carbon 14 measurement laboratory at Gif-sur-Yvette has
been equipped with an accelerator mass spectrometer (AMS). IRSN is entitled touse it to study 400 samples a year as it made an 8.5% contribution to its financing.

corresponding to the river’s prodelta. However,
the results obtained in 2004 in respect of oneof the sampling series under the REMOTRANS(5th FPRD) programme, carried out in 2001 andinvolving many institutes under the supervisionof IRSN, showed that this zone did not represent
an ultimate resting place for radionuclides.
Levels had in fact dropped significantly since theinventory carried out in 1998 using samples taken
in 1991. The future for the deposits and thedispersion of radionuclides on the continental
shelf concerns the international community under
the European programme EUROSTRATAFORM in
which CNRS, IFREMER and IRSN are participating
for France along with around 10 European institutes.

Research into the metrology ofradionuclides in the environment
Radioecological studies on land involvethe search for radionuclides under arange of conditions, sometimes in verysmall quantities, in order to be able
to understand and quantify the spatial
and temporal movements of radionuclides discharged during nuclear
activities. There is therefore an ongoing requirement for improvements
and changes to metrology techniquesin support of such studies.
In 2004, IRSN therefore pursued several developments in radionuclide metrology:■ development of an analysis method for gamma
radiation spectra by digital simulation of different
measurement configurations; this method is currently being adapted to the in situ characterisationof radionuclides present in the soil;

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2 0 0 4■ improvements in understanding of backgroundnoise in germanium diode spectrometers usedby IRSN in the Modane (Savoie) undergroundlaboratory, enabling the measurement of very
low activities (of the order of a few mBq) ofradionuclides in very small quantities of material(less than a gram). As an illustration, developmentof this instrumentation has allowed us to offer
instrumentation support to a radiotoxicologicalstudy carried out in 2004 within IRSN on theingestion of sand particles with high levels ofnatural radiation;■ development, in collaboration with the École desMines in Nantes (Loire-Atlantique), of the couplingof a mass spectrometer and a capillary electrophoresis system intended to characterise thechemical form (speciation) in which radionuclides
are found in the environment, information essential
to an understanding of their behaviour.

Sorting female zebra fish (Dario Rerio) to study their fecundity after chronic
exposure to uranium.

Influence of exposure chronicity
on the behaviour and toxicity of radionuclides:
the ENVIRHOM programme
Amongst the environmental disruptions that are often evoked as a possible
cause of the development of certain
pathologies, the case of radioactivity
merits detailed study. It is for thisreason that IRSN launched, in 2001,
the ENVIRHOM research programme.
Its aim is to enable a better assessmentof the risks associated with chronic
exposure to ionising radiation.
Within the ranges of exposures that lead to deferredrisks (cancers, genetic mutations, etc.) rather
than immediate effects, the current system toprotect the human from ionising radiation is basedon the assumption of a linear relation without athreshold between a “dose” indicator and the risk
run. This indicator has been adjusted primarily
thanks to the monitoring of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
survivors,who were exposed to high levels of exposure
consisting of gamma and neutron radiation.
In practice, this exposure mode rarely affects major
populations or the environment, which are more
often exposed to chronic moderate radiation
resulting from internal contamination and for which
there is very little relevant experimental data.
This is one of the main conclusions of the European
programme ERICA, in which IRSN participates.The
aim of the ENVIRHOM programme is therefore tocontribute to correcting these shortcomings sothat the extrapolations used to assess risk can bemade more reliable. The initial results, while still
not suitable for transfer to an operational impact

assessment tool, already confirm that moderateinternal contamination are indeed a specific situation.

Human exposure
The first task undertaken involved verifying, using
several specific examples, whether the accumulation
rates, excretion rates and toxicity of radionuclides
after chronic contamination could be predicted basedon what can be observed in the case of acute exposures.
The first element studied was uranium, as this canbe present in high concentrations in the subterraneanwaters of certain regions (Finland, New Mexico,
Canada). The corresponding studies were carriedout using rodents that had been contaminatedexperimentally by uranium added to their drinking
water. The first results were obtained in 2004.

Accumulation of uranium in tissues
and comparison with ICRP models
The experiments show that uranium accumulates
in most organs of the rat, and that the process iscomplex. The uranium concentrations in the colon
seem to increase gradually over time. This agrees
with the ICRP models predicting that, in chronic
exposure cases, the uranium concentration in agiven organ rises to reach a plateau, and the ratevaries according to the organ studied. In contrast,
the results obtained for other tissues show thaturanium accumulation does not follow this pattern.
The kidneys, the skeleton, small intestine, the brain,
muscles, liver and the body overall, show very
specific contamination profiles that result inphysiological changes linked to the contamination

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Laboratory specialised in the study of daphnia at Cadarache (Bouches-du-Rhône).

duration. In addition, one can see a significant
deposit of uranium in certain structures, such as
the brain or the teeth, which were not covered
specifically in conventional models. The dataobtained is not yet such as to support an opinion
that these phenomena, observed on rodents withuranium, can be generalised to other radioelements
and the human race. However, they show that theconsequences of chronic exposure cannot besystematically extrapolated from those arisingfrom acute exposures. These results have been
submitted for publication.
Effects on the central nervous system
The studies on the central nervous system were carriedout by measuring any
disruptions to sleep or
URANIUMbehaviour. Enriched+=+uranium and depleted
Medicine
Medicineuranium were used to
distinguish the effect
PHASE I
PHASE I
due to chemical toxiPHASE II
PHASE II
city from the overall
PHASE III
PHASE III
toxicity of the element.
The results show thatan exposure of fortyDisposal
Disposal
five days to enricheduranium is sufficient
Schematic representation of the effects of uranium.
to disrupt the sleep/
waking cycle in animals, affect their short-term
memory and increase anxiety levels. These effects
are not seen with depleted uranium and can be
explained, at least in part, by the uranium
accumulation in certain brain structures. Whenthe contamination is continued for nine months,
the depleted uranium seems to affect the cellular56

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2 0 0 4organisation in certain brain structures. An article
has been accepted for publication.
All these effects are observed when the uranium
concentration measured in the kidneys, usuallyconsidered to be reference target organ, is less thatthe known toxicity threshold.This seems to indicatethat the brain is more sensitive to uranium thanare the kidneys and that it could be used insteadof the kidneys as reference organ. However, itremains to be explained why depleted uranium
does not accumulate on the same way in thebrain and why, apparently, it does not induce thesame neurobiological effects.
The detoxification function of xenobiotics
The experiments carried out after chronic
contamination by depleted uranium over ninemonths show that the latter can modify thedetoxification function of xenobiotics, such as
medicines.The three medication metabolism phasesthat exploit the enzymes and transporters thatenable the elimination of foreign substances wereanalysed especially in the liver and kidneys. This
study shows that chronic contamination by depleted
uranium induces over-expression of first-phaseenzymes (P450 cytochromes) in these organs while
the phase-II enzymes and the phase-III transporters
are not affected.
The increase in the expression of P450 cytochromes
and the absence of changes to phase-II enzymes
and phase-III transporters could result in changes
to a major defence mechanism of the organism,
detoxification by xenobiotics. Effectively, in thecase of a medicinal treatment, the medication
metabolism may produce a metabolite that could
become toxic if it accumulates following a riseChironomid larvae in uranium contaminatedenvironment.

in its synthesis rate (phase I) without an increase
in its elimination (phases II and III). Conversely,
if the medication retains its initial active form,
its rapid degradation in phase I could lead totherapeutic ineffectiveness.
If these hypotheses are confirmed, medicinal
dosages will have to be changed when treating
individuals with chronic exposure to uranium.
The results obtained in 2004 are presented in articles
that will be submitted for publication in 2005.

Exposure of the environment

are obtained using depleted uranium orwith uranium enriched with uranium 233(which is highly radioactive); this would
appear to prove that the effect of theradioactivity is, in this case, negligible
when compared with the chemical
toxicity. At this level of concentration,
the dose estimations are however of theorder of 10 mGy per day, which seems
to confirm that, for the low dose rates
that are characteristic of environmental
contamination, quite large doses ofradioactivity are needed to produce
discernable effects.

Theoretical
data

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0,2

1

0,1
0

32 95 186 312 368 570

Experimental
values

The case of uranium
Indisputable effects are seen even for quantities
that are lower than those used in the experimentson the rats. For example, concentrations as low as
150 nanomoles per litre are sufficient to prevent
growth in seaweed populations. The same results

The first results confirm the validity of the initialassumptions: chronic exposure is a specific problem,the different test organisms and the range oftechniques applied demonstrated that they were
well suited to the task of demonstrating definite
effects or microscopic effects that could be
precursors.

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0TheoreticalvaluesY-mazeProspects

Other radionuclides
This example naturally poses thequestion of improvements to conventional dose indicators to make themmore representative of real effects. The
dose rate is clearly an important parameter, as is the type of radiation.To clarify
this point, tests are under way on a rangeof test organisms (daphnia, fish, worms)
using depleted uranium, uranium 233,
americium 241, polonium 210 andselenium 79.

Length of
exposure (days)

Assessmentof memorisation
capacities bymeasuring
spontaneousalternations

The limited amount of data available prior to thelaunch of ENVIRHOM would appear to substantiate
the hypothesis that relatively high dose rates areneeded before definitive effects emerge. The
order of magnitude is around 10 mGy per day (orabout 1,000 times the natural exposure rate).
Nevertheless, the data is too fragmentary to draw
reliable conclusions.
It is in fact entirely possible that this order ofmagnitude will vary depending on the nature of
the radiation source.
Furthermore, interpreting observations in the naturalenvironment is particularly difficult because of its
lack of homogeneity. A large-scale environment
showing little contamination could in fact be amosaic of accumulations and of zones with virtuallyno contamination.

I R S N

2

Experimental
results

0,3

Spontaneousalternations (%)
74
72
70
68
66
64
62
60
58

*#

Specimens

DU

EU

Uranium concentration in the rat
after chronic ingestion of depleted
uranium (DU) via its drinking water.

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Granite house in Kersaint (Bretagne) where the Institute conducts experiments tofurther understanding of the circulation of radon in the home.

Research activity on radon
IRSN undertakes research to improveknowledge of the effects on healthresulting from radon in housing .
Research also addresses the measurement of radon under particularconditions, its behaviour in buildings
and the deposit of its daughter
products.
Risks of lung cancer associatedwith domestic radon.
The risks of lung cancer associated with domestic
exposure to radon and to tobacco smoking havebeen the subject of numerous epidemiologicalstudies. Most of these have failed to show asignificant risk but lacked statistical power. The
joint analysis of 13 case studies undertaken in
Europe, that included the French study carriedout by IRSN, enabled some conclusions to be drawn.
The French study, published in 2004 in the review
Epidemiology covered 486 cases of lung cancer and984 subjects. Radon concentrations were measured
or recreated for each of the houses over the thirty
years preceding the diagnosis of lung cancer andthe tobacco smoking history of each subject
established by questionnaire.The study showed an

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UNDERSTANDING THE RADON CONCENTRATIONMECHANISMS IN BUILDINGSAs part of a research programme concerned with understanding the mechanisms affecting theradon concentration in buildings, IRSN is using an uninhabited detached house, located in
Kersaint (Finistère), on a well-characterised uranium-bearing geological formation.
Instrumentation of the various rooms and of the garden has enabled monitoring since 2002 of radon penetration throughthe basement slab, its accumulation in the building and its distribution via air circulation between the floors and exchanges
with the outside. In 2004, changes to the instrumentation enabled the detection of the disturbance caused by the buildingon the surrounding ground and the characterisation of two additional radon sources in the building: the semi-buried wallsin the basement and the building materials.
In parallel, the multiplicity of parameters involved led IRSN to develop the calculation code RADON2 that enables thestudy of radon concentrations in the internal atmosphere of the building. The aim is to develop a tool for the predictionof radon activity per unit volume in houses located in regions with a high potential for exhalation or on polluted sites.
As a preliminary, the validity of the phenomenological model on which RADON2 is based must be confirmed using dataacquired by instrumentation during the experimental phase that continues into 2005.
Scientific collaborations have been developed with the University of Bretagne-Occidentale and the laboratory for the studyof transfer phenomena as applied to buildings in La Rochelle (Charente-Maritime) for the characterisation of thepermeability of the overall envelope of the building.

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Probe measuring radon concentration in the
ground.

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increased risk of lung cancer as radon concentrationrose,with results at the limit of statistical significance.
The joint European analysis, published in 2004 in
the British Medical Journal, covered 7,148 cases oflung cancer and 14,208 subjects. It shows asignificant relation, of the linear type with no
threshold, between exposure and effect once
allowance has been made for age, sex, the region
lived in and smoking habits. For an increase of
100 Bq/m3 of radon, the risk of lung cancer over a
lifetime increased by 8.4%.Thanks to its significant
statistical power, the study confirmed the existenceof an increased lung cancer risk following domestic
exposure to radon. This result is coherent withvalues published in the literature and with those
extrapolated from results of studies on uranium
miners.

Radon metrology
IRSN has undertaken work on the presence andbehaviour of radon in thermal spa establishments
to improve understanding of the exposure of thosetaking the waters and the staff to natural radiation.
This work has shown that exposure routes andlevels differ according to the category of personnel
considered (doctors, kinesitherapists, maintenanceand laundry personnel, etc.) and as a function ofduration of stay and of contact with the thermal
water, which is responsible for the presence ofradon in the buildings. In 2004, IRSN developed aprotocol that defined two methods for measuring
natural radiation in thermal establishments.
Following work on the metrology of the activity
per unit volume of radon in a particularly humid
atmosphere, IRSN carried out radon measurements
in prehistoric decorated caverns that come under

USE OF RADON AS A GEOLOGICAL PROBE
Ever since the launch of the Viking spacecraft in 1976,
the search for life on Mars has been a major concernof scientists studying the planets.
A vital aspect of this research is the unambiguous determinationof the presence or absence of water in the first few metres of soil
at equatorial latitudes. A “simple” measurement of radon
concentration in the lower Martian atmosphere could provide proofof the presence of water, which up to now the Spirit andOpportunity robots and the satellites Mars Odyssey and Mars
Express could not provide.
The planned use of radon as a geological probe on the planet Mars
results from the well-established fact on Earth that the exhalationof radon from a porous soil is highly dependent on the watercontent of that soil: a quantity of water, even very small, increases
spectacularly the ability of radon to collect in the pores of the soil
and migrate into the atmosphere.
A thesis jointly funded as part of the partnership with the CNES
is under way to transpose this observation to the environmental
conditions on the Martian surface and to define the characteristics
of a radon detector that could be embarked on a future Mars
exploration platform. A PhD student arrived in December 2004
in IRSN’s laboratory for the physics and metrology of aerosols.

Baccara, the radon calibration bench at Saclay.

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Map of the gamma dose rate in real time with respect to geographic location.

the Ministry of Culture. Because of the very specificnature of the atmosphere of these caverns(confined and humid), an experimental protocol
to characterise radon concentrations is being

validated in five prehistoric decorated caves selectedby the Ministry: Chauvet in Vallon-Pont-d’Arc(Ardèche), Niaux (Ariège), Lascaux, Font-de-Gaume
and Combarelles (Dordogne).

Epidemiology of nuclear workers
IRSN is developing epidemiologicalactivity with a view to estimating
the risks of cancer associated withc hronic exposure to low doses ofionising radiation.
Current radiation protection standards are primarily
based on the results of the followup of survivors from the Hiroshima
and Nagasaki bombs, who were
exposed to high dose rates over very
short time scales. Current concerns
in radiation protection are more
directed towards individuals exposed
to low doses over a prolonged period
in the course of their work. Models
are used to extrapolate the knowledge
from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
survivors to groups of individuals
chronically exposed. In order to verify
the validity of these extrapolations,
epidemiological studies on popuRadon dosimeter at Kodalpha.

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lations exposed to low doses over time have been
set up since the 1970s. Workers in the nuclear industry represent an appropriate group for thesestudies as they form an abundant population whose
employment is stable and where there are highquality records of doses received.
In this context, IRSN has set up monitoring for acohort of employees from the CEA-COGEMA group,with a view to estimating the risks of cancer
associated with occupational exposure to ionisingradiation, exposures that are low but chronic. This
monitoring requires the retrieval of the individual
doses received by the workers throughout theircareer, search for vital statistics (whether deceased
or not) and, where relevant, the cause of death. In
total, more than 50,000 workers employed by the
CEA-COGEMA group since the 1950s are involved.
An initial descriptive analysis of the mortality of
CEA workers was published in 2004 in the American
Journal of Industrial Medicine.This showed evidenceof under-mortality of this population in comparison
with the general French population for both allArchive room of the source expertise unit atFontenay-aux-Roses (Hauts-de-Seine).

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causes of death and for all cancers, but a significant
excess of deaths from malignant melanoma. An
analysis of the dose-effect relationship for part ofthe cohort (29,000 individuals) was carried out.
Analysis of the whole cohort will be possible once
all dosimetry has been validated.
Part of this data was forwarded to the ICRC, thatis coordinating the international study relating toabout 50,000 nuclear workers in 15 countries andthat in particular addresses the effects on healthof external X- and gamma radiation. An analysis
of mortality was carried out and an article wassubmitted in 2004 for publication in a review.
The cohort of CEA-COGEMA workers will also be
incorporated into the European research project,
coordinated by IRSN, into the risks of internal
exposure to ionising radiation.
Finally, under a PIC between IRSN and COGEMA,a study was launched in 2004 into the morbidityof current workers, in collaboration with COGEMA’s
work medicine department.

COORDINATION OF EUROPEAN PROJECTSON THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF IONISINGRADIATIONIRSN’s epidemiology laboratory has alreadycoordinated several European research projects,
especially under the 4th (1996-1999) and5th (2000-2003) FPRD.
This work concerned the quantification of the risk of cancer
associated with cumulative exposure to radon, and in particular
based on studies of uranium miners.
In 2004, a new research project was developed in response to thecall for tenders from the 6th FPRD.
This research, more ambitious than earlier programmes, will involve
18 partners from nine countries, under the coordination of IRSN.
Its aim is to improve understanding of the health implications –cancers and other pathologies – of chronic exposures to ionisingradiation.
In particular, it aims to introduce new factors into the quantificationof the risks associated with internal exposures, by incorporating
the majority of European studies on the subject: cohorts of uranium
miners (more than 20,000 miners), study into domestic radon (joint
study by 13 European countries), and studies into the risks for nuclear
workers who have received internal exposures, etc. This research
implies collaboration between research teams across three disciplines:
epidemiology, dosimetry and bio-mathematical modelling.
The project is due to start in 2005 and will last three years.

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End of accelerator
beam line and
TID target60
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Polyethylene
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50

0.5

40

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20
0.2
Depleted
naturaluranium

10

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Iron
Water lens010-8 10-7 10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3 10-2 10-1 10-0

Neutron Energy (MeV)

Development of reference neutron fields with the CANEL T400 device producing
realistic mixed fields.

Improvements in radiation protection
To improve radiation protection forworkers, patients and the public, IRSN
makes regular improvements to themethods and tools it uses to assess
the exposure of persons to ionisingradiation.In nuclear installations whereradioactive material is handled, theworkers are exposed to a risk of internal
contamination. Their protection isprovided by equipment, whose
performance following an accident has
been studied by IRSN. Effectivenesshas also been improved.
In 2004, IRSN mainly worked on the developmentof tools for the simulation of internal contamination,
by developing reference neutron fields, the loweringof detection limits, for example for the measurementof wounds contaminated by actinides or for thepassive dosimetry of neutrons, and finally theassessment of exposure on board aircraft duringsolar maximum.

a device on the reduction of aerosol transfers towards
the outside of a containment are greater for thelarger particles (5 µm).

Dispersion of pollutants
In the field of pollutant dispersion, thesis work
completed at the end of 2004 enabled thedevelopment of correlations describing the
spatiotemporal evolution of the concentration ofa gaseous pollutant in the immediate vicinity ofan accidental leak as a function of the various
parameters concerning the leak (speed and durationof the emission, dimensions of the aperture), thepollutant (initial density and concentration) andventilation of the room (transverse flow rate).These
correlations were incorporated into a simplified
calculation tool that can be used to estimate theconcentrations of pollutants in a room after an
accidental rupture in the containment provided bya containment. Complementary work is being
undertaken to study the case of a specificcontaminant, as well as the influence of partitions
and obstacles in a room.

Effectiveness of protection equipment
In the area of protection equipment effectiveness,
IRSN studied in 2004 the situation created by theaccidental failure of static containment provided
by the gloves and sacks fitted to glove boxes used
for the handling of radioactive material.The results
enabled a quantification of the amplitude of aerosol
transfer phenomena following the tearing of such
equipment under a range of configurations. The
effectiveness of a safety device offering dynamic
containment by means of an additional extraction
flow was demonstrated, regardless of the nature of
the contaminant (gas, aerosol).The benefits of such

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Sampling
In the field of aerosol sampling, the work undertaken
by IRSN aims to provide the means to evaluate
the sampling strategies to be introduced to estimate
the exposure of workers, and especially the choice
between individual and fixed-station sampling. In
2004, comparative tests of various types of sampler
were carried out in situ in a workshop. Two main
points were identified: responses differed between
fixed-station samplers and individual samplers anddepended primarily on their individual performance
as a function of the granulometry of the sampledPhysical phantom used for the calibration ofwhole-body radiation measurement
installations.

aerosols. In addition, the comparison between
individual sampling and ambient sampling showedthat the activities measured by individual samplingmight be significantly higher, in certain contexts,
than those determined from ambient sampling.

Improvements to in vivo
measurement of actinides
Mathematical phantoms for the realistic invivo measurement of actinides in the lungs andcontaminated wounds
One of the methods used to estimate the internal
contamination of an individual relies on the
direct measurement of X- and gamma radiation
emitted by his/her organism. This in vivo method,termed “anthroporadiametry”, offers the advantage
of being quick and easy to implement for X- andgamma radiation emitters at energies exceeding
100 keV.Where actinides have been incorporated,
its use is more problematical as the emitted
radiation is low and highly absorbed in tissues.
Although major efforts have been made to improvephysical phantoms (mannequins) used to calibrate
anthroporadiametry installations, such models canonly offer an approximate representation of thehuman body. Consequently, corrections have to be
applied to the calibrations obtained using these
physical phantoms in order to extrapolate them
to a given individual.These corrections are critical,
but particularly significant for the in vivo measurement of low energy radiation, as absorption intissue is high.
So, to improve the calibration, three-dimensional
mathematical phantoms built up from scanned
images or IRM (voxelised phantoms) were linked to
MCNP Monte-Carlo calculation codes. An interface, called ŒDIPE, enabled, firstly, the generationof voxelised phantoms and, secondly, the simulationof whole-body measurement under conditions
similar to reality.
In 2004, an initial validation of this approach
involved introducing into ŒDIPE the geometriccharacteristics of the multi-detector counting
system belonging to the biological and medical
analysis laboratory at COGEMA Marcoule (Gard)

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ANTHRO-Si projectIn 2004, IRSN completed development of a prototypeof ANTHRO-Si, the whole-body counting measurement
system.
This was the result of a project started in 1995, to lower the detection
limits of current measurement systems, that use germanium detectors
cooled using liquid nitrogen.
This project involves the design of a system based on the use of “pixelated”
PIPS silicon detectors operating at ambient temperature.
Whole-body measurements can rapidly determine the radiation ofradionuclides incorporated by a person. It is used for medical monitoringof workers at risk of internal contamination. However, for transuranicelements, the sensitivity of the measurement is limited by the factthat low energy X- and gamma lines (< 100 keV) associated with alphadisintegrations are absorbed. This absorption and the heterogeneous
distribution of activity in the tissues contribute to the difficulty ininterpreting the results of the measurement.
The metrological performance of ANTHRO-Si will be studied in 2005
for wounds contaminated by actinides, before considering whether it canbe industrialised.
The major advantage of ANTHRO-Si is its ability to locate contaminations
more accurately thanks to the “pixilated” detectors with minimal mechanicalsize, while offering, at first sight, a better compromise between resolutionof the measurements and the surface of the detector than the germanium
detectors. This system, if industrialised, would be a simple in vivo
measurement system for internal contamination resulting from accident
situations.

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Development of 3D digital phantoms.

based on drawings provided by the manufacturer.
Activity measurements were then made using point
sources; these enabled the validation of thegeometric description of the system by comparison
with measurements “simulated” by the MCNP code.
Other measurements, made using the Livermore
physical phantom (at the Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory – USA), enabled the validation of theŒDIPE tool for the installation, demonstrating thepossibility of deriving graphs of virtual effectiveness,as they were obtained by simulation, with a viewto calibrating the installation.

Application of voxelised mathematical phantoms associated with
the MCNP Monte-Carlo code for the realistic in vivo measurementof actinides in the lungs and in contaminated wounds.
6
7
8

14

16

16

9

10 15
17

14

15
10

10
17

11
10
13

Sectional view of the modelling of a germanium detector.

Based on these results, research has been targeted on determining the uncertainties in themeasurement. The first stage involved studying
the variation of incorporated activity within an
individual (represented by a voxelised phantom),when the measurement system was calibratedusing a range of thoracic thicknesses for theLivermore physical phantom. The results obtained
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voxelised phantoms with morphology close to thatof the persons being measured; the need todetermine bio-parametric equations specific toEuropean morphology, as current equations are in
general determined by the morphology of North
Americans.
The second stage involved the simulation of nonhomogenous contaminations, to improve understanding of the influence of heterogeneity in thecontamination on the calibration. Two simplified
cases of lung contamination were used; their results
were compared with those obtained for a uniform
contamination of the lungs. The results seem toshow no significant difference between a nonhomogenous contamination and a uniform
contamination for energies in excess of 26 keV;but, a slight difference is reported at 17 keV. Consequently, heterogeneity in contamination does notcall into question existing calibrations.

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Dosimetry of neutrons by track detection
In 2003, the IRSN’s dosimetric monitoring laboratory undertook a study with the aim of improving
the passive neutron dosimetry system based on
the track detection technique. The objectives area reduction of the detection threshold, better
treatment of background noise as well as anextension of the response of the dosimeter to low
energy levels.
The physical principle of the detector used (apolycarbonate commercialised under referencePN3) depends on the interaction of neutrons in
the volume of the material. The resultant breaks
in the polymer chains create damaged areas thatreact in contact with a strong alkaline medium
before the rest of the polymer. The result is theappearance of microscopic tracks on the detector

Positioning of the neutron dosimetricapparatus in front of CANEL.

Dosimetric assessment during a solar flare.

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surface after several hours of immersion in an alkaline
solution.
The determination of optimum parameters for chemicaltreatment concluded in 2004 with the development of anew protocol for the measurement of doses resulting
from neutrons.Thanks to a chemical treatment, the detector
becomes sensitive to external charged particles, which
improves its performance, with a response multiplied by
two; there is an indicator that shows if the dosimeter has
been irradiated; the addition of converters in contact withthe dosimeter enables the entire energy spectrum to becovered.
Development of reference resources
The IRSN’s neutron metrology and dosimetry laboratory
holds the status of laboratory associated with the National
metrology and test laboratory (LNE). It therefore operates
within its facilities all the tools required to better define
the major standard quantities such as fluence and ambient
dose equivalent. These quantities are obtained after
experimental confirmation of energy distributions forradiation fields calculated using the MCNP code. In 2004,
the final results of the international spectrometry campaign
on the CANEL T400 installation were published. These
resulted in improvements to the characteristics of one of
the CANEL screens; they also gave access to the energy
distribution of the neutron field of the SIGMA stack. In
addition, liquid scintillation spectrometry of the neutronreference sources called into question the universalityof the spectrum of the AmBe source indicated in standard
ISO 8529-1.

COSMIC RADIATION:
THE DOSMAX PROJECT
Because of cosmic radiation, aircrew receive individual
annual doses that, in certain cases, can attain several
millisieverts.
In this context, the DOSMAX project, funded by the European
Commission, linked more than 10 European laboratories between 2000
and 2004, with the aim of assessing exposure on board aircraft duringsolar maximum periods. Numerous measurements were carried out
in flight by the various laboratories, in collaboration with the airlines.
The Institute organised an airborne intercomparison of dosimetricsystems from the various laboratories on an Air France cargo aircraft
during a Paris-Fairbanks-Tokyo flight. This intercomparison was aunique opportunity to compare the responses of several dosimetrictechniques in an actual situation and to show if there was good
coherence between the various experimental systems and themodels used to carry out the routine monitoring of the doses received
by aircrew. The effective dose measured for a return flight was
120 µSv ± 10 µSv (for comparison, the individual annual effective
dose due to cosmic radiation in France is of the order of 300 µSv).

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0,14

WASHINGTON

0,09

PARIS

NEW-YORK 0,08

SAN FRANCISCO
TOKYO

0,10

BUENOS AIRES

Doses in millisieverts (mSv) for one trip

Measurements taken by IRSN with the NAUSICAA apparatus on board Air
France long-haul aircraft between 1996 and 1998 show the reality of exposureof flight personnel.

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AMANDE accelerator.

The AMANDE installation
In 2000, IRSN decided to build a new
installation, called AMANDE, which
could generate mono-energetic
neutron radiation fields, whose energy
could be varied between 2 keV and
20 MeV. The primary aim of thisinstallation is to determine the response of measurement equipment as
a function of neutron energy, as recommended by the international standard
ISO 8529-1.
The AMANDE installation will be at the heart of
the French neutron reference system, ensuring that
the IRSN’s neutron metrology and dosimetrylaboratory (LMDN) becomes a reference laboratory
for this field at national, European and international
levels.This laboratory is associated with the national
metrology and test laboratory (LNE) for both
dosimetry and neutron metrology matters. The
AMANDE installation could also generate a reference

Test hall for the AMANDE installation.

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7 MeV photonic field (recommended by theinternational standard ISO 4037-1) that currently
does not exist in France. It will enable an extension
to the IRSN’s calibration capabilities in the highenergy photon field.
2004 saw the completion of build and installation
as well as the setting up of the accelerator itself
with its associated equipment. The performanceof this accelerator will enable an accurate
determination of the energy and fluence of theneutron field with a resolution of less than a few
percent. Neutron emission could reach 5.10 8 s -1
and will generate continuous or pulsed radiation
fields with a pulse width of less than two
nanoseconds. As the experiment hall has metal
walls, background noise resulting from diffusedneutrons is significantly reduced compared withequivalent installations with concrete walls. Finally,an automated system with moving arms enables
accurate location of the detectors to be irradiatedat a given angle and distance (up to 6 m) from thetarget, the neutron source.
The AMANDE installation completes the installations already in use at IRSN:■ two neutron generators, associated with the
CANEL device, that generate neutron fields similar
to those observed at certain work stations inreactors;■ an irradiator that employs two radioactive sources(one of americium-beryllium and the other ofcalifornium);■ SIGMA that generates a field with a high proportion of “thermal” neutrons.

“Rando” whole-body phantom for dosimetryof patients.

The radioprotection of patients:
consequences of radiotherapy on
healthy tissue present in the radiation field
The IGR and IRSN have formed a mixed
unit,under the framework of the Higher
Education’s Own Research Unit (UPRES)
27-10 for the study of the physiopathological mechanisms that control
the development of radiation-induced
fibrosis and the definition of new
therapeutic strategies for theirtreatment.
The doses of radiation required to control cancerous
tumours in the abdominal-pelvic region cause acuteand delayed intestinal toxicity phenomena.
The delayed complications of the radiationinduced fibrosis type may have very significant
consequences both from their chronic andprogressive nature and from the associatedmorbidity and mortality. Currently no treatment
is available.
Recent studies have shown that the fibroses were
evolutionary pathologies comparable to a chronic
scar-formation process. Two models have been
proposed to explain the delayed effects developedby healthy tissue following radiotherapy. The firstdescribes the delayed effects as the consequenceof severe and persistent acute effects. The second
describes the delayed effects and the radiationinduced fibrosis as the result of the irradiationof connective tissue and the reduction ofparenchymatous and stromal cells. These two
hypotheses are being examined within the mixed
team. Preclinical tests have been carried out witha specific intestinal growth factor: the Glucagonlike Peptide 2 (GLP-2). This therapeutic approachaims to produce epithelial cells and the recolonisation of the intestinal mucus after irradiation.
The study is being undertaken under a researchcontract with the Novo Nordisk laboratories

FOCUS

EUROPEAN MOVES IN MEDICALRADIATION PROTECTION
The research carried out by the mixed IGR/IRSN
team on radiation-induced enteritis forms part of
the European-wide effort to encourage the transfer
of research results to radiotherapy.
The Translational Research Group (TRG), formed in 2001 within theRadiotherapy group of EORTC, had as its aim the development andcoordination of relations between clinicians with the aim of ensuring
the early clinical application of advances in research into radiobiology
and radiopathology. The activities of the group are directed along
three lines: predictive agents, diagnostic agents and therapeutic agents,
into which the work of IRSN fits perfectly. Two clinical studies, plus
a predictive test resulting from IRSN work, will be set up incollaboration with the IGR.
The involvement of IRSN in the TRG/EORTC and ESTRO group puts theInstitute at a European level in the medical radiation protection field.

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Preparation of the colouring of histological cross section slides.

(Denmark), suppliers of the growth factor. One
beneficial effect has been shown in the acute anddelayed damage to the irradiated small intestineof the rat. This work was the subject of two
publications in 2004. Complementary studies are
now needed to confirm the therapeutic effect andto understand the modes of action of GLP-2.
A second therapeutic line of enquiry has beendeveloped in parallel. This is based on the results
obtained by IRSN on physiopathological mechanisms leading to radiation-induced enteritis in man.
These results mean that it may be possible toconsider using the inhibition provided by Connective

Tissue Growth Factor (CTGF/CCN2) as a meansof effective and specific action against fibroses.
This discovery opens up genuine therapeutic
possibilities as pharmacological inhibitors of the
Rho/ROCK channel exist that control the productionof CTGF: the statins and fasudil. Therapeutic
experiments using statins have been started
using the rat: the first results show a resorption ofradiation-induced enteritis in the rat.
These promising preliminary results, published in
2004, and the close collaboration with the IGR,
lead one to hope that an early clinical applicationof the new anti-fibrosis strategies will be possible.

Irradiation and contamination accidents
The research programme carried out
by IRSN on the effects of medium andhigh doses of radiation is divided along
two lines: research for bio-indicatorsfor diagnostics, or even prognostics,
enabling an understanding of theextent of the radiation-induced
damage; research into new targets
for therapeutic action.
In parallel, the development of operational
measurement systems at different points of theorganism completes the diagnostic resources. The
risk of terrorist actions has increased interest in
this research programme that associates
physiopathologists with physicians.

Cutaneous radiation syndrome
Two hospital organisations, the Burns Treatment
Centre (CTB) at the Defence teaching hospital in

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2 0 0 4Percy (Hauts-de-Seine) and the oncologyradiotherapy department at the Curie Institute(Paris), to whom IRSN often provides technicalsupport, have acquired an internationallyrenowned ability in the field of medical treatmentof cutaneous radiation-induced syndrome, resulting
from their experience in the treatment of victimsof accidents in Georgia, Peru and Poland. Theirexperience shows that, while the pathogenics ofthe cutaneous effects of ionising radiation are welldescribed, the medical treatment remains extremelycomplex and problematic; the only therapeutic
issue is the removal of irradiated tissue and skingrafting where tissues are tending towards necrosis.
This finding has led IRSN, in cooperation with the
CTB clinicians, to develop a research programme
supported by the DGA, aimed at improving
diagnosis and treatment of localised irradiation(see Focus p. 69).

Observation with a fluorescence microscope (FISH technique: fluorescencein situ hybridisation).

FOCUS
Improving diagnostics
An accurate and early dosimetric assessment of
the degree to which the exposed tissue is affected
is useful but does not suffice to confirm a diagnosis.
It must be supplemented by an assessment of tissue
damage and the volume of tissue likely to suffer
necrosis. An overall approach to the improvement
in diagnostics of localised irradiation, including theintercomparison of various biophysical (Doppler
laser, thermography, RMN), clinical and biological
techniques, was initiated in 2004 under a contract
with the DGA (see Focus p. 69). Here, IRSN isdeveloping a new approach to biological dosimetryof localised irradiation, based on the applicationof cytogenetic techniques on the cells present in
the skin tissue. This approach, tested during thelast localised irradiation accident (Georgia) treatedin France, is being validated on an experimental
animal model. Its results will then be comparedwith those obtained by the biophysical techniques
regularly used in clinic.
Identification of new therapeutic targets
From a physiopathology point of view, the responseof skin tissue to acute high-dosage radiation canbe compared to a pathological tissue repair process,with the epidermal, vascular and mesenchymatouscomponents all contributing to the failure toheal.
Histological studies, carried out during different
cases of localised irradiation accidents, provided
accurate information about the various stages ofthe process. Molecular studies using biochip haveenabled the identification of the principle genes
involved in the cutaneous vascular response in man,during the latent phase of the cutaneous radiation
syndrome. The expression of some of these genes

IMPROVEMENTS IN THE DIAGNOSIS OF
CUTANEOUS RADIATION SYNDROME
In 2004, IRSN responded to a call for tenders from the
DGA for improvements in the diagnosis of cutaneousradiation syndrome.
The bid by the Institute was accepted. This research programme
combines clinicians from the Percy Hospital, radiobiologists fromIRSN and the Defence medical service research centre (CRSSA) andphysicians from the instrumentation, signals and systems researchand study laboratory (LERISS) in the Paris 12 University.
The programme is organised around two major themes:■ the development of dosimetry tools for localised radiation,a thesis jointly funded by the DGA and IRSN started in September 2004;■ the study of the physico-pathological consequences of localised
radiation of cutaneous tissue. The transformation of the irradiatedtissue towards necrosis is one of the possible consequences of
localised high-dose radiation that remains without a satisfactory
medical response. This transformation occurs through successive
eruptions that are difficult to predict. The aim of the study is
to examine the pathological tissue repair process after radiation
with a view to defining new therapeutic strategies. This research
consolidates the links that IRSN has forged with hospital organisations
that can take responsibility for radiation victims, and in particular
the Percy Hospital, with the Institute providing technical support tothe medical treatment of victims of accidental radiation.

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Preparing samples after a histological analysis.

has been confirmed using molecular biology
techniques, and their functional involvement has
been verified in the animal.
The significance of the initiation and maintenanceof vascular endothelium activation after irradiationof the cutaneous tissue has thus been demonstrated
experimentally. Strategies aimed at controlling thisstructural and functional degradation of the vascularcompartment could therefore be explored in the
short term.
An article summarising this was submitted for
publication in 2004.

A therapeutic approach toaccidental irradiation
A study of radiological accidents that have occurred
over recent years shows that, in most cases, theoutcome was fatal primarily through lack of atherapeutic strategy adapted to the whole range

Irradiation and contamination accidents - Placing a sample for measurement
by EPR spectrometry.

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2 0 0 4of radiation-induced damage. It is difficult totreat an acute radiation syndrome because of thesimultaneous attack against several physiological
functions, and in particular the haematopoietic,
gastro-intestinal and cerebrovascular systems. A
generalised inflammatory syndrome may also
appear, sometimes accompanied by secondary
pathologies affecting the liver, the kidneys or thelungs. This array of pathologies can be grouped
under the term “radiation-induced Multiple Organ
Failure Syndrome” (MOFS).
Cellular therapy
The reduction or disappearance of normal stem
cells, capable of regenerating tissue after a trauma,
would appear to be the possible cause of radiationinduced MOFS. In the future, cellular therapy, which
consists of bringing in cells capable of repairingdamaged tissue, could be a promising approach.
The work undertaken by IRSN within the mixed
team installed at the Saint-Antoine Hospital(UPRES 16-38, Paris) is investigating the possibilityof adapting the principles of cellular therapy to thecase of victims of accidental irradiation in order
to correct cellular deficits in each of the damaged
tissues.
This approach was first developed for bone marrow.
The results obtained show that the technique of
ex vivo expansion of haematopoietic cells isparticularly effective in treating medullar aplasia.
Adaptation of this technique to the case of
accidental irradiation has been tested on an
experimental model of heterogeneous high-dosage
irradiation of a non-human primate. Medullarycells were sampled after irradiation, expanded
and reinjected into the animal, seven days after
irradiation; the results obtained showed a real but

Filling of tubes with fixing mixture in order to fix chromosomes.

Molecular therapy
A European contract called NAIMORI brought
together between 2001 and 2004 a number ofEuropean teams (CIEMAT, Madrid (Spain); Erasmus
University of Rotterdam (The Netherlands);
ILM/University, Ulm (Germany); CEA/Évry; IRSN)
to evaluate the response of haematopoietic tissues
and human epidermis to radiation and to seek new
therapeutic approaches to medullar aplasia,
inflammation of the tissues and the cutaneousradiation syndrome. IRSN was responsible for thework to characterise the generalised inflammatory

response and its limitation by cytokines. The
experimental model adopted was whole-body or
abdominal irradiation of mice, some treated bytherapeutic agents.
The animal survival rate and the recording of
numerous biological parameters were supplemented
by a histological analysis of sampled tissues. The
association of thrombopoietin (TPO) withinterleukins (IL) 4 or 11 was shown to be more
effective for animal survival than TPO alone. This
improved animal survival rate cannot be explained
solely by the restart of blood-cell production; theresults suggest that the combined TPO andinterleukin treatment reduces radiation-induced
inflammation and acts on vascular permeability.
In addition, in the case of abdominal radiation
alone, a remote effect on the lungs that were notincluded in the radiation field was observed. Thiseffect on the lungs could result from the action of

1.2x106
Signal amplitude (DU)

minimal effect on medullary aplasia. However,
the irradiated animals developed a MOFS,
suggesting the need to use other types of cell tocorrect the functional deficits observed. In the lightof this, studies were undertaken in 2004 aimed atdemonstrating the possibility of transplanting
human mesenchymatous stem cells (MSC) into
irradiated immunodeficient mice (NOD-SCID), in
which it is possible to assess the implantation,
proliferation and differentiation of the grafted
human MSC. These studies show that the MSC arecapable of implantation in numerous organs
following a whole-body irradiation and that theymigrate in preference towards the damaged zones
following an abdominal irradiation. The results
obtained also show that once implanted, the MSC
proliferate and differentiate by acquiring thecharacteristics corresponding to the receiver tissue,
in particular for the vascular system, the kidneys
and brain. These results have led to the current
study of molecular addressing mechanisms for the
MSC towards damaged tissue and their involvementin the functional regeneration of the damaged
tissue.

1.0x106
8.0x105
6.0x105
4.0x105
2.0x105
0.0-2.0x105-4.0x105-6.0x105
3460

3480

3500

3520

3540

3560

Magnetic field (G)Irradiation and contamination accidents – EPR signal of hydroxyapatite
in tooth enamel showing a high dose (60 Gy).

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Change of culture medium for human adult stem cells.

circulating inflammatory mediators arising fromthe gastro-intestinal response to radiation.
All the results obtained in this European programme
were incorporated in nine IRSN scientificpublications. They tend to show that the threemajor types of tissue that determine the outcome
for victims of radiation are the haematopoietic,
epithelial and vascular tissues. The regenerative
capability of the stem cells responsible for the
repopulation of haematopoietic and epidermal
tissues determines the response of these two typesof tissue. Simultaneously, the inflammatory
response developed by the irradiated endothelial
cells interferes with tissue repair.

Dose measurement by electronicparamagnetic resonance
IRSN is studying spectrometry using electronicparamagnetic resonance (EPR) with a view todeveloping a technique for the determination ofdoses received in different parts of the organism
to establish the best possible diagnosis and propose

FOCUS

EUROPEAN FIRST PROJECT
During therapeutic radiation for the treatment ofcancer, the healthy tissue surrounding the tumour may
be damaged.
These lesions may have serious consequences, such as tissular aplasia
or fibrosis. Their existence limits the effectiveness of treatment
by radiation, forcing a reduction in doses received by the patients.
In 2004, the FIRST project was accepted under the 6th FPRD.
IRSN is responsible for studying the gastro-intestinal system.
The Institute is also involved in the study of the effects on the skin,
as well as in a study into the preparation of mesenchymatous stem
cells for grafting purposes.

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2 0 0 4the most appropriate therapeutic strategy. This
technique involves an assessment of doses received
by biological specimens that retain the free radicals
created by the ionising radiation; the quantity offree radicals is directly proportional to the doseabsorbed; the number of free radicals is determinedby placing specimens in a magnetic field andquantifying the absorption of microwave radiation
under resonance conditions.
This technique has been in use at IRSN for several
years for small ex vivo specimens requiring invasive
sampling (bone, tooth enamel, dentine) for material
arising from the victims’ environment (sugars, etc.),
or for exposures to photons or electrons. It was
successfully applied to the victims of accidental
exposures in Georgia and Poland. In 2004, thistechnique was extended to the case of an exposure
to a mixed field (photons + neutrons) typical of a
criticality accident. In particular, a study showedand quantified the difference in sensitivity of dentine
and tooth enamel to photons and neutrons. These
dosimetric properties enabled the experimental
determination of the photonic and neutroncomponents of a mixed field using EPR spectrometry
measurements on enamel and dentine. The
measurement protocols introduced at IRSN werevalidated during the third international dosimetry
intercomparison using EPR spectrometry on tooth
enamel.

Management of post-accident situations
In 2004, the major part of IRSN’s
research into the management of postaccident situations came under theinternational projects EURANOS and
CORE.
EURANOS is a project coordinated by the Germanorganisation FzK, which brings together nearly
50 teams and 20 countries. Adopted by the European Commission under the 6th FPRD, its main
aim is to define possible actions for the rehabilitationof agricultural and built-up areas following an
accident resulting in long-term radiologicalcontamination. The work began in 2004 with thesetting-up in France of groups of relevant parties(agricultural technical institutes, local government
services, elected representatives, experts), who will
be tasked with proposing appropriate rehabilitation
strategies for the various post-accident situations:transition between the emergency phase and thestart of post-accident phase, the first weeks following
the accident and the later years.
The CORE programme aims to achieve long-term
rehabilitation of living conditions for the populationsof the four districts of Byelorussia contaminatedby the Chernobyl (Ukraine) accident, by means ofa range of actions in the fields of agriculturaldevelopment, health, radiological protection andeducation. IRSN is contributing to this in the healthand education fields.

International cooperation to improve
control over radiological and nuclear risks
Collaboration between nations enables
resources to be shared, knowledge to
be enriched and skills reinforced. In thefields of research into radiation
protection and nuclear safety andreliability, the international aspectof the IRSN’s work develops year on
year.Its major aim is to deepen scientificand technical understanding and todevelop tools for the modelling ofphenomena.
By enabling an increase in knowledge and providing
additional tools, especially calculation codes, andoptimising methods, the international cooperation developed by IRSN contributes to a better
understanding of radiological and nuclear risks andto improvements in their control. The exchanges
and activity are carried out within the frameworkof bilateral or multilateral agreements, programmes
launched by community or international authorities:
European framework programmes for research anddevelopment (FPRD), and projects carried out under
the auspices of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency(NEA). They also come under the working groups
and committees of the IAEA, NEA, UNSCEAR andthe European Commission, etc. These exchanges
and activities lead to conclusions that may haveI R S NA N N U A L

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French-German Initiative for Chernobyl (FGI): steering committee meetingon 6 October 2004 in Kiev (Ukraine).

FOCUS

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE
FGI RESULTS
On 5 and 6 October 2004, IRSN, GRS and the Chernobyl
centre organised an international conference in Kiev on
the results of the French-German Initiative (FGI) for
Chernobyl, launched in 1996 by the French and German
Ministers of the Environment to mark the 10th anniversaryof the accident.
This conference was attended by about 200 people from Ukraine,
Byelorussia, Russia, the European Union and international organisations(EBRD, EC and IAEA).
In fact, while many studies have been carried out in the past, mainly in
Ukraine, Russia and Byelorussia, on the consequences of the Chernobyl
accident from safety, environmental and health viewpoints, the results
were scattered, sometimes ignored and often heterogeneous.
The FGI mobilised numerous teams of scientists around 35 projects.
It facilitated the gathering of data, their validation and organisation
into coherent databases that were accessible to public authorities,
scientists and the public. The aim was to make available tothe international community a unique tool for the collation and diffusionof scientific information that could be used to model phenomena
and the management of crisis situations and in the developmentof systems to monitor the consequences of an accident on the healthof populations. The data set thus created on the consequencesof the accident is accessible on the website www.fgi.icc.gov.ua.

the advantage of an international consensus.
In 2004, the activities of IRSN in this field wereconcerned with the continuation of the projects
in the 5th FPRD, preparation and initiation of new
6th FPRD projects, completion of the programme
under the Franco-German initiative for Chernobyl
and increasing bilateral collaboration, especiallywith the United States and Russia.

Cooperation between IRSN and the
CPHR on the study of the Chernobyl
accident consequences on thehealth of children
In 2004, IRSN and the Cuban CPHR took a first step
towards cooperation on the protection of man andthe environment against nuclear radiation. This
project is based on the experience of the CPHR withthe treatment of Ukrainian children irradiated following the Chernobyl accident.About 8,000 children
have been received in Cuba since 1986 for treatment
under an inter-government agreement between thetwo countries.
In association with the relevant Ukrainianorganisations, the activity was concerned with thestudy and extension of the dosimetric and medical
databases for the period 1990-2004. To complete
the activity, the medical teams in the Cuban centreof Tarara, where the children were treated, were
contacted. Finally, the current cooperation between
IRSN and the CPHR in the radiobiology fieldcontinues, with in particular the hosting of two
Cuban students in IRSN’s laboratories.

Participation by IRSN at the IAEA
conference in Beijing
Rostrum at the international conference on 5 and6 October 2004 in Kiev (Ukraine).

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2 0 0 4IRSN was involved in the international conference
organised by the IAEA between 18 and 22 OctoberIRSN has signed
cooperation agreementswith radiation protection
and nuclear safety
organisationsin 27 countries:
Germany, Argentina, Belgium,

1st meeting of the SARNET steeringcommittee on 2 April 2004, during
the 6th FPRD.

Byelorussia, Bulgaria, Canada,
China, South Korea, Cuba, Egypt,
Spain, United States, Finland,
Hungary, India, Italy, Japan,
Morocco, Czech Republic, Slovak
Republic, United Kingdom, Russia,
Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland,
Tunisia, Ukraine.

2004 in Beijing on the theme “Continuous
Improvement of Nuclear Safety in a Changing
World”. The main aim of this conference was tocontribute to the definition of the Agency’s 20072011 programme on the subject of nuclear safety
by promoting exchanges of view in this field.
In addition to the presence of nuclear safety experts,
this conference brought together numerous
managers of organisations who came to debate
the major questions associated with nuclear safety.
Thus, the IRSN’s Director General spoke on thefollowing subject: “The challenge of sustainable
development in the nuclear field: Research ismore than ever a vital component of nuclear safety
and radiation protection policies.” He stressed inparticular the importance of developing andharmonising risk assessment methods to meetsociety’s expectations in the field of radiologicaland nuclear risk management.
More generally, this conference aimed at providing
answers to the questions raised by the deregulationof the electricity markets, the diversification oftechnologies and the globalisation of economies,
especially in the fields of quality assurance,
knowledge management, the harmonisation ofstandards and safety practices.

Participation by IRSN in the 6th FPRD
The 6th FPRD (2002-2006) is directed towards
greater integration of teams by sharing resources,
skills and knowledge, mainly through the creationof long-term networks of laboratories.

In 2004, IRSN continued its work under projects
adopted following the first call for proposals:■ the SARNET network of excellence, relating tosevere accidents, headed by IRSN, that coordinates
the efforts of around 250 scientists in 49 different
organisations;■ the ERICA project, dedicated to the protectionof the environment against radiation, in which IRSN
is participating in the assessment of the radionuclidetransfers into the environment and the resultant
risks;■ the EURANOS project, concerning the conductof the post-accident phase, under which IRSN isworking on the definition of appropriate
countermeasures;■ the NF-PRO project for the behavioural modellingof fission products in the geosphere, with a view

FOCUS

DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATIONBETWEEN IRSN AND THE NRC
In 2004, IRSN and the NRC (United States) increased
their bilateral cooperation through numerous
exchanges on the subject of the experimentationand modelling of severe accidents.
Amongst other things, the NRC decided to participate in the fireprogramme (PRISME) undertaken in the DIVA installation in Cadarache(Bouches-du-Rhône). Similarly, IRSN and the NRC are cooperating
actively in the field of physical protection for nuclear material andinstallations, especially the transport of nuclear materials. In addition,
discussions were initiated in October 2004 with the NRC on newexperimental programmes, and especially the SOURCE TERM programme
that, amongst other things, will address subjects associated withthe releases of iodine or fission products. Finally, IRSN and the NRC
are continuing their cooperation under the CABRI-water loop programmeon reactivity accidents that can affect pressurised water reactors.

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to determining the performance of theircontainment during storage;■ the COWAM 2 project on the governance of risks
associated with waste storage.
During 2004, IRSN also participated in the
preparations for two projects in the radiation
protection field, which were adopted under the callfor proposals in 2004. These are CHRONIC RAD

FOCUS

END OF THE EUROPEAN ASTRID PROJECTThe ASTRID project, set up by the European Commission
under the 5th FPRD and coordinated by IRSN, wascompleted at the end of 2004.
Eight partners participated in this, including the safety authorities
from Finland (STUK), Hungary (HAEA) and Sweden (SKI), and technicalinstitutes such as FzK, GRS (Germany) and VUJE (Slovakia).
The first objective of the project was to define an assessment method forthe state of the installation in case of an accident affecting a European
light water reactor (PWR, WER, BWR), in order to structure and harmonise
the technical expert assessment at a European level: this objective wasachieved through the definition of an expert assessment method.
The second objective was to develop a computerised crisis tool tosupport the expert assessment method, to diagnose the status of theaffected installation and rapidly assess the releases (real or potential)
based on pre-calculated discharges. It should also be able to assess inmore detail the possible developments of an accident, by simulating
the thermohydraulic behaviour of the reactor, and the emission andtransfers of fission products in the installation. The tool is currently ina pre-operational state: collaboration with GRS will contribute torendering it operational.

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2 0 0 4

EPID, a project led by IRSN which addresses the
epidemiology of cancers associated with ionisingradiation, and CONRAD, a project dedicated to
dosimetry.

Development of cooperation
between IRSN and Russian institutes
In 2004, IRSN increased its cooperation with theRussian institutes, that began in the 1990s, under
the agreement between CEA and the Russian
Minister for Atomic energy (Minatom now
Rosatom).
This cooperation now covers a wide field: humanprotection, criticality, design and safety of liquid
metal reactors, fuel and severe accidents in water
reactors.
As far as human protection is concerned, the subjects
cover the study of the tissue banks of irradiatedvictims as well as an assessment of the pathologies
that could result from chronic contamination bycaesium.
2004 was also notable for an increase in cooperationin the crisis management field between IRSN and
Rosatom. Activities will include the comparison ofcrisis management procedures, including tools, theorganisation of international crisis exercises
concerning the transport of nuclear material,
participation in exercises in France and Russia andthe response strategy in an emergency situationor during the post-accident phase.

Full meeting of the International Commission for RadiologicalProtection (ICRP) in Beijing (China) in October 2004.

New recommendations concerning
radiation protection
2004 was marked by the consultation
process initiated by the ICRP with professionals in the radiation protection field,
national authorities, international organisations
and more broadly the general public, to listen to
their opinions on the draft for new generalrecommendations concerning radiation protection.
The radiation protection doctrine is developed atinternational level within a range of scientific,
technical and regulatory bodies. According to theterms of reference of the relevant international
agencies, IRSN specialists participate in this work
either as experts or as part of their public service
role or in support of the authorities. It must be
remembered in this context that ICRP publications
serve as a basis for the drafting of international
regulations, especially the European directives andthe core standards of the IAEA. The international
bodies involved are: UNSCEAR, ICRP, IAEA (RASSC),
Euratom (groups of experts under articles 31 and37), NEA (CRPPH), IUR and organisation for radiation
protection standardisation (ISO, IEC). In this context,
IRSN has increased and structured its internal andexternal consultation process.Within the Institute,a network was installed in 2004, linking the IRSN
specialists involved with international authorities,
as well as the representatives of the directorates
concerned. Amongst the seminars organised,
the first, for which preparations were made in
2004, was held on 27 January 2005 and involved a presentation of the draft for future
recommendations by the IRSN’s representatives
participating in the work of the ICRP. Externally,
the Institute has set up a pluralist working groupwhose aim is discussion with the players involved(authorities, industry, associates, institutions).This
group met twice in 2004 and was able to distributeinformation on the work of the ICRP and othermajor international agencies concerned withradiation protection. Finally, to parallel the changes
in radiation protection doctrine, IRSN wanted to
examine in more depth certain much-discussed
subjects, such as the effects of low doses (especiallyfollowing the publication by non-institutional
experts of a report calling into question the method
used by the ICRP to estimate the risks associatedwith internal contamination) and the concept ofenvironmental protection, with the aim of updating
the Institute’s position. Concerning environmental
protection, it must be emphasised that, up to now,
the approach has been characterised by the ICRP’s
hypothesis that man was the creature that was themost radiation-sensitive, and that the measurestaken to protect humanity should guarantee
protection for the environment. Over the decade,the lack of scientific demonstration of thisstatement and the rise in influence of environmental
preoccupations, as demonstrated by numerous
international conferences, has led to a reexamination of this hypothesis. It thus became
important for the Institute, which is one of the few
organisations in the world to undertake research
into radioecology, to prepare a doctrinal statementin this field. Furthermore, IRSN has undertaken thetranslation into French of the first publication of
the ICRP dedicated to this subject (publication 91
issued in 2003 and entitled “A framework forassessing the impact of ionising radiation on nonhuman species”).

I R S NA N N U A L

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RESEARCH AND PUBLIC SERVICE MISSIONSCONTRIB UTING TO TRAININGI N R A D I AT I O N P ROT E C T I O N

A radon metrology training session in Le Vésinet (Yvelines).

Contributing to training
in radiation protection
ne of the missions assigned to IRSN when it was formed was to contribute to the radiation protection trainingof health professionals and those who are exposed in the course of their work. This activity is based on a
recent regulation aimed at ensuring that greater account is taken of the risks to which professionals are exposed.

O

An activity to help prevent risks
and their possible consequences
As a research and expert assessment
establishment, IRSN has a duty toprovide training and to contribute toteaching in the areas in which it hascompetence: nuclear safety andradiation protection.

20

training sessionsorganised and completed

78

The ultimate aim of this training and education is
not only to provide theoretical knowledge, but also
to promote tools and methods aimed at minimising
nuclear and radiological risks in all the activity areas
under consideration. Training and education must
contribute to promoting prevention and they
therefore demonstrate the social worth of theInstitute to those economic , industrial or
institutional players involved in these risk-bearing
activities.
It is for this reason that, apart from the participationof IRSN agents in teaching during the university
year – long recognised as effective –, the decree
relating to the missions of the Institute focuses

I R S NA N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4on the professional radiation protection training.
It targets specifically medical or paramedical staff
involved with medical imaging or therapy using
ionising radiation. This explicit mention of the
medical sector echoes the preoccupations of the
public authorities and the recent development oflegislation and regulations aimed at providing
greater protection for personnel and patients.
In this context, IRSN must:■ continue, or increase, its presence on university
or school courses by giving priority to a specifictraining project concerning nuclear safety andradiation protection;■ create the conditions for the development of
a sector for professional training aimed at thevarious professional categories concerned anddemonstrating the Institute’s involvement in “handson” prevention.
Following the creation within IRSN of a pole forprofessional training, 2004 was set aside forconsideration of a strategy to be implemented

FOCUSon this subject and for the setting-up of a rangeof training activities for specific categories ofprofessionals.
In strategic terms, the aim was to set development
targets taking into account the IRSN’s referencerole in nuclear safety and radiation protection,
identify partners, classify the categories of priority
professionals and finally reconcile the training
quality with the economic balance of an activity
that relates to a competitive sector.
The first training modules completed in 2004 wereselected on the basis of expressed requirements
and their feasibility. The priority categories were
workers exposed to ionising radiation: IRSN
employees, approved organisations tasked withmeasuring radon in establishments open to the
public, company doctors and persons tasked with
monitoring workers’ dosimeters, as well as thefactory inspectorate.
At the request of the local information commissionin Saclay (Essonne), a course on “radiation
protection, citizenship and governance” wasarranged for its members, local elected representatives, representatives of associations andteachers. Finally, several specific activities to raiseawareness were arranged in the hospital sector,
forerunners of more sustained activity during 2005.
In 2004, all the sessions were organised by IRSN
management. Several other offers were made oftraining in radiation protection in the medical field.
These offers may be supplemented by sessions
arranged at a client’s request. Several dossiersof this type investigated in 2004 should cometo fruition in 2005.

TRAINING ON RADON
Since 2004, IRSN has been organising training courses
on the radon metrology for any organisation wanting
to participate in an approval scheme for radonmeasurement in locations open to the public. This
training has been made necessary by recent changes
in legislation in this area.
The new French regulations relating to the management of risks
associated with radon, following on from the directive 96/29/Euratom,
introduce an obligation for owners of locations open to the public
to “implement measures to monitor exposure to natural radiation
where these are likely to affect health”. These measures must be
implemented by IRSN or by an approved organisation (decree dated
15 July 2003). Obtaining approval issued by the Minister for Healthin the light of a recommendation from the national approvalcommission is subordinate, amongst other things, to the provisionof proof that the organisation has achieved competence either
through practical experience or by attending specialist training
in the radon metrology.
The aim of the training is to familiarise students with the various
techniques for detecting radon as well as the investigations
required when the presence of this gas has been demonstrated.
In 2004, more than fifty requests for approval were submitted
to the commission and IRSN trained around 20 students.
Four training sessions are planned for 2005.

Trainees receive a combination of theoreticaland practical training.

I R S NA N N U A L

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RESEARCH AND PUBLIC SERVICE MISSIONSCONTRIB UTING TO TRAININGI N R A D I AT I O N P ROT E C T I O N

Each training session is attended by about 15 external participants.

Training sessions carried out in 2004
Subject of sessions
or professional
training activity
Radon metrology
Dosimetry management
at work
Training in the radiation
protection of exposed workers
Radiation protection inspection
in a work environment
Raising awarenessin a medical environment
Radiation protection,
citizenship and governance
TOTAL

80

I R S N

Sessionduration

Number

3 days2 days

2
2

1 day

7

3 days

2

1 day

6

1 day

1
20

A N N U A L

R E P O R T

Target audienceof sessions
in 2004
Approved organisations, housing experts
Industrial medical officers,
radiation protection officers
Exposed personnel

Numberof students
trained21
12

Factory inspectors,
medical inspectors
Hospital doctors and personnel,
industrial medical officers
Elected representatives, CLI members,
teachers

40

110

80
25
288

2 0 0 4

Real-time radiological monitoring of French
territory in the warning systems remotemonitoring room in Le Vésinet (Yvelines).

Permanent monitoring in mattersof radiation protectionT

he public service missions assigned to IRSN relating to radiation protection concern the radiological monitoringof the environment in France, assessment of human exposure and management of radiation sources.

Radiological monitoringof the environment

500

sampling points
across the country

Radiological monitoring of theenvironment is provided by IRSN, using
telemetry devices and laboratory
analysis of environmental samples. It
operates throughout the territory using
stations that may or may not be locatedclose to facilities that could discharge
radionuclides into the environment.

origin or resulted from the near proximity of the
beacons to a transport of radioactive containers.
In addition, the year 2004 saw the setting up of a“supervisor” enabling all the data from the remotesensing network to be centralised on a server
independent from the establishment server.In parallel,most of the equipment was modernised with aview to improving data acquisition and processing.

The remote monitoring networks

The sampling networks

These provide real-time radiological monitoring of
the environment by means of self-contained
beacons that continuously measure the radioactivityof the area where they are located. In more detail,two networks provide air monitoring (Téléray forthe ambient gamma dose rate and DARA for
atmospheric dust). Two other networks monitor
the water (Hydrotéléray for rivers and Téléhydrofor wastewater in towns).
Once an increase in radioactivity is detected, awarning is sent to IRSN and an initial investigation
is mounted. There were a dozen trips of Téléray
beacons in 2004: most were of meteorological

These supplement the environmental monitoringby taking measurements on samples from various
environmental locations. In 2004, 32,727 samples
were analysed. The samples are taken by IRSN or
technical associates (DDASS, French Navy, MétéoFrance, EDF, COGEMA, etc.). They enable changes
in activity level to be monitored in the various
environments to which the public is exposed.
Sometimes, these networks may reveal abnormal
situations and they enable the consequences tobe estimated.This was the case in 2004 for a special
study relating to the consequences of the flood
conditions on the Rhône in 2003.

1,000

dosimetricmeasurement points

213

beacons making up
the territorial remotemonitoring network
NearlyI R S NA N N U A L

100,000

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4radiological analyses
carried out

81

RESEARCH AND PUBLIC SERVICE MISSIONSP E R M A N E N T M O N I TO R I N G I N M AT T E R S
O F R A D I AT I O N P R OT E C T I O N

Environmental monitoring by radiation monitors is completed by a network of manual
sampling operations.

Towards an optimisation ofmonitoring and greater visibility
In order to improve the management of the massof data acquired by these networks, IRSN has
initiated work aimed at developing a uniquecomputer management tool. Discussions began in
2004 to identify the exact role of this monitoring.
This will lead to a redeployment of resources in theyears to come.
Finally, a new website (http://eau.irsn.org/) wenton line at the end of 2004.There, the general public
can find the data relating to the radiologicalmonitoring of the various aquatic mediums(seawater, rain, rivers, subterranean waters, etc.).
The permanent monitoring
mission requires from thelaboratories a rigour in sample
analysis that the Institutewants to inculcate by meansof accreditation to its instrumentation laboratories (seeQuality chapter, part 3).

Environmental
monitoring in French
Polynesia

Inside a SARA monitor (automatedaerosol radioactivity monitoring device).

82

I R S NA N N U A L

In 1962, France set up a radiological monitoring network in
Polynesia. Since 1976, theInstitute has itself been

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4

managing a network spread over seven islands(Tahiti, Maupiti, Hao, Rangiroa, Hiva Oa, Mangareva
and Tubuai). The total area covered by thismonitoring is equivalent to that of Europe. The
sampling strategy adopted makes it possible todetermine the exposure of individuals either
externally, by inhalation or ingestion. The primaryeffort addresses the latter component, for whicha sampling plan was established based on anutritional study updated in 1991.The radioactivity
analyses cover gamma, strontium and plutonium
emitters. Caesium 137, detected at very low activity
levels in virtually all the 400 samples taken, is the
predominant radionuclide. The last dosimetricanalysis carried out by IRSN concerned 2003. The
total “added” dose attributable to fallout fromatmospheric testing is less than 5 µSv per year.
IRSN prepares an annual report that is available
on the Institute’s website.

Team from the source expertise unit.

Monitoring ionising radiation sources
Concerning the monitoring of ionisingradiation sources, IRSN carried out thefollowing principle operations in 2004:

In addition, the following statistics for 2004 illustrate
the magnitude of the task that has been assigned
to IRSN of managing the national inventory ofionising radiation sources:■ technical examination of 18 initial or renewal

requests for authority to hold or distribute sources,
in response to tasking from the competentauthorities (DGSNR,AFSSAPS, DSND, prefectures);■ technical examination of three requests fordispensation from CAMARI (certificate attesting
the ability to handle radioscopy and industrial
radiography equipment) at the request of thedepartmental labour directorates;■ provision of advice on four technical or regulatory
subjects associated with the use of ionising radiation
sources:- exemption criteria for industrial electricalgenerators;- draft decree on the monitoring of the movementof sources;- European equivalences of the radiation protection
officer;- categorisation of sealed sources in accordancewith the IAEA and in accordance with European
Directive 2003/122; application to the case ofFrance.

2,400 authorisations issued, renewed ortransferred between authorities;■ 4,700 requests for the supply of sealed sources;■ 1,500 requests for the supply of unsealed sources;■ 3,300 recovery certificates;■ 460 requests for the export of sources;■ 300 requests for the import of sources.
The large number of authorisation requests thatwere subject to modifications in 2004 can be
explained by transfers of skills between authorities.
Such changes have to be transferred by IRSN to
the national inventory.
■I R S NA N N U A L

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RESEARCH AND PUBLIC SERVICE MISSIONSP U B L I C I N F O R M AT I O N

Travelling exhibition at La Rochelle in June and July 2004.

Public information
ne of the IRSN’s missions is to provide information to the public about radiation protection and nuclear
safety. To achieve this, the Institute has developed a range of activities to enable it to provide answers tosociety’s concerns about the technical and health risks associated with nuclear matters. There is also a needto respond to the public’s desire for involvement in the subject. This policy shows that the Institute is ready tolisten to the concerns of society.

O

Information and communication
activities

Road show“Nuclear under close
surveillance”

6,500

visitors including
1,120 students;
4 towns visited15

conferences
organised778

requests for
information
processed
via the contact
box on the website

12,000copies of
the annual
report issued

Information activities undertaken by
IRSN in the field of radiation protection
and nuclear safety have to contributeto the education of the public on risks
and their prevention.They also enable
the Institute’s scientific output andactivity to be promoted.
Information for the general public
Intended primarily for the general public and forstudents, the road show entitled “Nuclear underclose surveillance” was conceived in partnershipwith DGSNR. This interactive and educational
exhibition addresses by means of panels, models,computer games and videos, the numerous subjects
associated with nuclear matters: radioactivity
and health, nuclear reactors, the Chernobyl accident,
the fuel cycle. Each year, it visits any locality that
submits a request. In 2004, the exhibition visited
Saint-Dié (Vosges), Metz (Moselle), La Rochelle(Charente-Maritime), Martigues (Bouchesdu-Rhône): a total of 6,500 visitors including
1,120 students, during 25 weeks of operation. In

parallel to the exhibition, series of scientific lectures
were organised on subjects of general interest:
the Chernobyl accident, radioactive waste, nuclear
installations and earthquakes, nuclear power
stations under extreme climatic conditions, ionisingradiation and health.
IRSN participated in a range of events aimed atraising public awareness of the challenges facedby science. Thus, on 25 May, on the occasion of
the open day at Croissy-sur-Seine (Yvelines), theInstitute welcomed a large number of visitors to
its laboratories in Le Vésinet. Workshops wereavailable on the measurement and monitoring ofOpen day on the Le Vésinet site in May 2004.

84

I R S NA N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4

Travelling exhibition for junior high school pupils.

radioactivity in the environment, intervention andassistance in radiation protection.
Similarly, IRSN participated in the “Science Fair”(15-17 October). This event aimed to familiarise
visitors with science and technology and to help
improve their understanding of the challenges ofresearch. The Institute had a stand in the Science
Village installed by the Ministry in the Luxembourg
garden. 16,000 people visited the Village. IRSN also
took part in the events organised by the local council
in Clamart (Hauts-de-Seine) during a conference
on 15 October on nuclear matters and the healthapplications of ionising radiation.

Information for professionals
IRSN participates in exhibitions and conferences
to provide information for professionals in theenvironmental, health and nuclear safety fields. In
2004, the Institute exhibited its radiation protection
expert assessment activities at specific conferencesand exhibitions: doctors (MEDEC, 16-19 March),radiologists (open days of the French radiologicalsociety, 1-2 October), radiation protection officers(congress of the SFRP, December). At the MEDEC,
the Institute jointly organised on 17 March a
conference on “health effects resulting fromradiation of the foetus and the infant”. IRSN also
participated in the 11th Congress of the IRPA (2328 May), held in Madrid (Spain). At this congress,
that every two years brings together the experts
in the field, IRSN scientists presented their recent
work and the Institute had a stand.
In addition, the Institute participated in Pollutec(30 November-3 December), a trade fair for environmental professionals, where its stand provided
details about the services, nuclear-related and otherwise, that it can offer to industry and local authorities.

Finally, the 6th EUROSAFE forum that was held in
Berlin on 8 and 9 November 2004: this was organised
by IRSN and GRS and brought together experts innuclear installation safety, waste management,
radiation protection and nuclear material safety(see Focus p. 86).

5professional exhibitions

Internet

and 4,500 training
pamphlets distributed

The Internet is a major vehicle for informationand cannot fail to develop further. The Institute’s
website was created in 2002 and saw its usage risesignificantly in 2004, with more than 690,000 hits,
or an average of 25,000 single visitors per month,mainly professionals.The main activity on the site
in 2004 involved a programme of information
publication and update and improvements in thegraphical identity of the Institute’s thematic
sites. In addition to the information provided on
the institutional site, IRSN administers specificsites, mainly linked to databases or projects being
monitored by the Institute: scientific site, SISERI,
CRISTAL, portal on environmental monitoring, etc.
Work has also begun on the contact box, to improve
it and to ensure that visitors’ requests are answered
as well as possible. Finally, consideration is now
being given to a rebuild of the site to make it aportal site, structured by the public.

Participation inand public events

30,000information booklets
55,548

visits in 2004,
to the IRSN’s
scientific site,or about 2,000 single
visitors per month

IRSN’s stand at the Pollutec exhibition in Lyon
in December 2004.

I R S NA N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 485

RESEARCH AND PUBLIC SERVICE MISSIONSP U B L I C I N F O R M AT I O N

Nucléon guides members to help them discover IRSN.

FOCUSEUROSAFE 2004 FORUM
On 8 and 9 November 2004, IRSN and GRS jointly
organised in Berlin the 6th EUROSAFE forum on
the subject: “Learning from experience – a cornerstoneof nuclear safety.”
EUROSAFE is the fruit of a European initiative in 1999 by IRSN and
its German opposite number GRS; its aim is to promote convergencein the technical practice of nuclear safety across Europe. It is basedon an annual forum, a half-yearly scientific and technical magazine
and a website.
The forum was attended by about 450 experts from technical safety
organisations, research institutes, regulatory authorities, electricity
companies, industry, public authorities and non-governmental organisations from the European Union, Switzerland and Eastern Europe.
Intended to foster closer collaboration between technical safety
organisations, these scientific and technical days offer the chance eachyear to debate matters relating to experience gained in nuclear safety.
The latest work by IRSN, GRS and their partners in the European Union
and Eastern Europe was described.
All information on the forum, the texts of the presentations and issuesof the EUROSAFE tribune are available at www.eurosafe-forum.org.
The next forum, organised jointly by AVN, IRSN and GRS, will be held
in Brussels on 7 and 8 November 2005.

The Eurosafe forum in November 2004 in Berlin.
P2_M1_P86Z86

I R S NA N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4For scientific communication, the rebuildingof IRSN’s scientific website (http://net-science.irsn.fr/)
has been initiated to improve its ergonomics andreadability.
The aim of this site is to ensure that the Institute’s
teams and work are known. The new version is
expected to be on line at the end of the first halfof 2005. Action has also been taken to ensurethat the site is listed by Internet search engines.

Publications
In 2004, IRSN continued to publish information
documents intended for the general public ,professionals and scientists. In this way, IRSN
provides the public with a collection of pamphlets
on radioecology, the transport of radioactive
materials, radon, radioactive waste, etc. In 2004,
this collection was supplemented by a new
document on caesium.
A collection entitled “The professionals collection”
has also been created and six pamphlets updated
and distributed at the exhibitions and conferences
attended by the Institute. These address thefollowing subjects:■ aiding medical teams following radiologicalaccidents;■ medical exposure to ionising radiation;■ ionising radiation and health;■ services provided in non-nuclear fields;■ operational radiation protection, services andexpert assessments;■ response to a nuclear accident.
Similarly, the collection of IRSN scientific booklets
has been updated and developed, and three subcollections created. Lignes directrices consists ofguides or booklets of recommendations, such as
the completely new publication Vos patients et les

Information is provided for the general public by
the IRSN travelling exhibition.

rayons, un guide pour les médecins praticiens, atranslation of the ICRP publication Radiation andyour patient: a guide for medical practitioners; IRSN
is here fulfilling its public service role by the free
distribution of this guide to the medical world.
Colloques contains contributions to the symposia
or conferences organised or jointly organised by
IRSN (in 2004 for example ECORAD). Sciences etTechniques brings together the sum total ofknowledge of radiation protection or nuclear safety.
These publications are coordinated and for themost part written by IRSN scientists, withparticipation from one or several external authors.
The quality of these works is guaranteed by aneditorial committee.
Finally, each year IRSN publishes its annual report
distributed to higher authorities, opinion formers
and to points of contact in the press andassociations, both in France and internationally.
In 2004, 9,000 copies of the French version of the2003 annual report were produced, and 3,000 of
the English version.

I R S NA N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 487

9

national nuclear
crisis exercises(civilian sector)

2

actual mobilisationsof IRSN’s Emergency
Response Centre

24

meetings heldby standing
advisory groups

88

I R S NA N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4IRSN ACTIVITIES IN 2004

Technical support andassistance for publicauthorities
IRSN carries out its work in a spirit of partnership with the public authorities,
whether acting on behalf of the authorities (technical assistance) or
providing technical support.
For IRSN, the key to progress in the fields of expert assessment and technical support
lies in the pursuit of technical dialogue with manufacturers and the formalisationof the Institute’s technical approach by publishing policy documents.

> 90

Technical support with regard to nuclear
and radiological risk

> 128 Operational support in the event of a crisis
or radiological emergency

I R S NA N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 489

TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCEFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESTECHNIC AL SUPPORT WITH REGARDTO NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGIC AL RISKIRSN analyses technical dossiers supplied by EDF.

Technical support with regard
to nuclear and radiological riskt the request of the authorities, IRSN assesses technical dossiers submitted by operators. These dossiersconcern the safety of reactors, plants, transport and dismantling as well as waste management and preventive
measures with regard to earthquakes. They also concern radiation protection of persons and the environment.
The Institute analyses all the risks and draws up reports on the provisions proposed to control them. Those reports
are then transmitted to the authorities or standing expert groups.

A

608

technical reports
to the public authorities(excluding defencerelated activities)
Participations in nearly600

BNI inspections

107

test reports issued oncross-comparison studies
of environmental
radioactivity
measurements

150,000

workers monitored byexternal dosimetry

21,089radiotoxicologicalanalyses125

anthropogammametricanalyses

90

Reactor safety analysis
IRSN provided support for DGSNR inassessing the operating safety andradiation protection of the 58 reactors
on French nuclear power plants. In
particular, the Institute examined therisks of clogging of sump filters and theprotection of those reactors from external hazards. It also assessed the safetyof the EPR nuclear reactor project
and followed up experimental reactors.

Examination of work and inspection programmes
conducted during refuelling and reactor maintenance shutdowns
In the course of 2004, IRSN conducted examinations
during some 40 shutdowns lasting between threeand eight weeks. In each case, the Institute studied
the work and inspection programmes planned by
the operator, followed-up the performance of those
operations and examined the results of start-up
tests.

Assessment of pressurised water
reactors (PWR)

Examination of general operating rules
The operator modifies the technical operating
specifications (STE) and periodic test regulations
according to the modifications implemented onreactors and feedback received. IRSN gives its
opinion on the acceptability of these documentsfrom the safety point of view. Moreover, in 2004,
IRSN issued about 100 reports on acceptabilityof EDF requests for concessions with regard totechnical operating specifications (STE) for various
reasons (operating contingencies, equipment
unavailability, etc.). In this context, after the heat

IRSN provides support, in particular, for theexamination of work and inspection programmes
conducted during refuelling shutdowns, theexamination of general operating rules, participationin monitoring inspections and the analysis offeedback. IRSN also contributes to the areas coveredby reactor safety reviews. It examines datasubmitted by EDF on those topics, jointly with EDF,
and reactor safety reviews requested by DGSNR
in the context of 10-yearly outage programmes.

I R S NA N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4

The Fessenheim nuclear power plant (Haut-Rhin).

wave in summer 2003, IRSN analysed an STE
amendment dossier aimed at relaxing some
operating requirements concerning the maximum
tempera-ture inside the reactor building and theannual scheduled outage time authorised for thecleaning of some heat exchangers. In the case of
the latter, IRSN was unable to approve the DGSNR
proposal in view of the supporting evidence provided.
Reactor safety reviews and corresponding safety
reports
During 2004, IRSN continued safety reviews on
900-MWe and 1,300-MWe reactors with a viewto conducting third and second 10-yearly outage
programmes, respectively. Every reactor undergoes
a safety review every 10 years. This review entails
verifying that power plants are maintained incompliance with baseline requirements on designand operation, and the study of possible changes
in those baselines and corresponding modifications.
The purpose of these modifications is to improvereactor safety.They are based on feedback received,
new knowledge obtained and new safety provisions
adopted for the most recent reactors wheneverthat is technically feasible and there is a significant
gain in terms of safety.
Analysis of reactor operation feedback
IRSN examines feedback on reactor operation fromvarious points of view including, in particular, eventsand anomalies.
■ The 681 significant events reported by EDF in
2004 were examined and are described in acomputer database. The incidents that were mostcharacteristic of safety failings were, or will be,
submitted to thorough analysis and, in somecases considered to be precursors, probabilistic
studies will be conducted in order to assess theirseverity in terms of risks of damage to the reactor
core (see Focus p. 99). Furthermore, IRSN sends
reports on the most significant incidents to the
IAEA in accordance with the terms of theinternational “Incident Reporting System”.
■ A quarterly meeting is held between EDF, DGSNR
and IRSN to identify events of a generic nature
concerning power plants and to give advice on how

15dose assessments
by biological dosimetry

134
assessments of humanradiation protection

FOCUS

INCIDENT AT FESSENHEIM
An error in the configuration of a pipe system on
4 January 2004, due to inadequate preparationof a servicing operation led to the entry of resins
into the primary cooling system of reactor 1
at the Fessenheim power plant (Haut-Rhin).
Although the system was quickly returned to compliance, the resinscaused clogging of the sampling lines resulting in the loss of automatic
monitoring of the concentration of boron in the water in the primarycooling system and several filters on the injection line at primary coolant
pump joints which led to loss of the injection function. The numerous
filter replacement operations required to recover the injection function
led to the contamination of seven persons. IRSN examined
the methods proposed by EDF to shut down the reactor and,more particularly, the risks posed by the presence of the resins inthe systems with regard to cooling (blocking up pipes) and availabilityof the reactor’s shutdown rod cluster control assembly (jamming duringdrop). IRSN then examined the results of inspections on the equipment
concerned (pumps, measuring sensors, reactor control rods) andthe monitoring programme proposed by EDF to follow up the changes
in various parameters during the next operating cycle. IRSN
recommended that EDF should pay special attention to the rod drop
time and the fouling of some filters which could be due to the presenceof resin residues. A thorough analysis of this event was started by IRSN
and will form the subject of a report in 2005.

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TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCEFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESTECHNIC AL SUPPORT WITH REGARDTO NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGIC AL RISKManagement of significant events.

A cable fire breaks out in a trough supporting electric
power cables for reactor 2 at the Cattenom power plant(Moselle) during start-up.
The fire is brought under control by the fire brigade and
the PUI and the radiological PUI are triggered.

The IRSN emergency response centre is mobilised.

The reactor is shut down in accordance with the applicable
procedures.

to deal with them. In this context, EDF and IRSN
draw on lessons learned from events that haveoccurred in foreign power plants.
■ Every three years, an assessment of reactor operation feedback for power plants in service is presented
to the standing advisory group for nuclear reactors(see Focus p. 94).
■ In 2004, IRSN developed statistical event analysis
tools which can be used to generate indicators inorder to obtain an overview of changes in safetyat power plants in operation.
Monitoring inspections
In 2004, IRSN supported basic nuclear installation
inspectors in the preparation of nearly 300 moni-

FOCUS

INCIDENT AT CATTENOM
A cable fire broke out in a trough supporting electric power cables for reactor 2 at the Cattenom power
plant (Moselle) during start-up on 16 May 2004. The fire was brought into control by the fire brigade
and the internal emergency plan (PUI) was triggered. The IRSN Emergency Response Centre wasmobilised (see Focus p. 129) and the reactor was shut down in accordance with the applicable procedures.
Owing to the potential safety consequences of such an incident, IRSN conducted in 2004, a detailed analysis focusing on thefollowing aspects:■ design: the incident was caused by the heating of 6.6 kV cables from the coolant pumps to the condenser. The pump motors
for the Cattenom plant units required a power of 9 MW, instead of 5 MW as in the case of other 1,300-MWe reactors.
The cables were not correctly dimensioned, however, and the trough concerned had recently been closed following
modification work: as a result, the heat generated could no longer escape satisfactorily. The damaged cables were replaced
before restarting the reactor and the troughs were re-opened on a temporary basis. It is planned to install cables with a larger
cross section on the site’s other plant units in order to prevent them overheating;■ management of the fire alert: the rapidity and effectiveness of external emergency actions were evaluated;■ human factors: the control of the reactor in these circumstances was examined;
This analysis will form the subject of an IRSN report scheduled for release in 2005. This event was reported to the IAEA.
In addition, IRSN assessed the steps taken by EDF for the restarting of the reactor and recommended that a cable and troughtemperature monitoring programme should be implemented by EDF.

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Power plant at Belleville-sur-Loire (Cher).

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toring inspections on EDF reactors. IRSN accompanied the inspectors for some of those inspections.

INSULATION DEFECT ON VALVEACTUATORS

Risk of clogging of containment
sump filters

An insulation defect was revealed, in September 2003,
by accidental spraying of two valve electrical splice boxes
on reactor 2 at the Penly power plant (Seine-Maritime).

Clogging of sumps by debris originating, in particular, from heat-insulating materials following a breakon the primary cooling system can jeopardise
core cooling in the long term. For this reason, EDF
conducted a study on design modifications toprevent this risk. Early in 2004, EDF put forward a
dossier of assumptions it had adopted in order todefine modifications to be made to all French power
plants: the implementation of those modifications
is scheduled to start in 2005. After examining thisdossier, IRSN presented its conclusions to thestanding advisory group for nuclear reactors on
22 December 2004. In drawing up this report, IRSN
took into account the first results of an experimental
pro-gramme it launched to evaluate the risk ofchemical compounds being formed during therecirculation phase in the long term. The advisorygroup decided that some assumptions required
further confirmation by EDF but that the solutions
it had adopted should be implemented as quickly
as possible on power plants.

Protection of reactors against
external hazards

The valves concerned, located inside the reactor building, must be able
to operate in degraded ambient conditions including, in particular, when
they are exposed to spraying. In the course of inspections conductedduring the subsequent shutdown of the reactor, in early 2004,
the operator detected cuts in the insulating material on the electric wires
supplying power for the valves. The inspection of other actuators subject
to the same qualification requirements revealed a large number of similar
defects.
These defects were liable to jeopardise the operation of the actuators inan accident situation, i.e., emergency shutdown in safe condition.
Furthermore, these defects may have concerned reactors at other power
plants. For this reason, IRSN sent DGSNR a report, in 2004,
recommending the inspection of all existing reactors during shutdowns.
EDF subsequently confirmed the generic aspect of the defects, this being
due to incorrect utilisation of the insulation removal tool before making
connections.
Owing to the extent of the corrective work to be performed on reactors,
IRSN recommended focusing on the minimum number of actuators at
a first stage. The Institute took into account the respective weights
in the probability of core meltdown and of the risk of a defect on a single
actuator leading to failure of an entire electric switchboard and, thus,
all the actuators depending upon it.

In this field, the year 2004 was mainly dedicatedto pursuing safety assessments regarding theprotection of reactors against floods of external
origin. In this context, the maximum design floodlevels and the dossiers of the plants at Belleville(Cher) and Le Bugey (Ain) were examined. These
were considered to be priority sites owing to theconsiderable reinforcement of existing protection
systems planned by EDF. This provided IRSN withthe opportunity to express its opinion on the

An insulation problem occurred on reactor 2
at the Penly nuclear power plant(Seine-Maritime) in September 2003.

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Experts in flooding hazards.

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EXAMINATION OF FEEDBACKFROM 2000 -2002
On 2 December 2004, IRSN presented the standing
advisory group for nuclear reactors with its conclusions
on the examination of feedback from the operationof PWRs over the period 2000 to 2002.
This examination, conducted every three years,
provides the opportunity to conduct a transverse
investigation on safety-related matters highlighted
during the relevant period.
The following topics were dealt with in 2004: processingof significant safety-related events, analysis of the applicationof technical operating specifications, analysis of start-up tests
and periodic tests, analysis of electrical switchboard failures,
measurement deviations from flow and temperature sensors,
reliability of diesel generators and feedback from instrumentationand control equipment for 900 MWe and 1,300 MWe plant units.
The conclusions of the report submitted to the standing advisorygroup for nuclear reactors (GPR) indicate that EDF must carry out
a number of actions in order to improve safety with regard to
the topics examined, especially measurement deviations on flow
and temperature sensors.

IRSN examines feedback on PWR operation.

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2 0 0 4planned reinforcement measures and on thetemporary measures proposed by EDF to cover theperiod pending the completion of modifications
on the plants. The improvement of operating
documents was also examined in 2004.

Internal emergency plans (PUI)
A new standard was defined in 2003 for internal
emergency plans at EDF power plants. Work on
examining the corresponding dossiers wasvigorously pursued in 2004: Cruas (Ardèche), Chinon,
Le Bugey, Nogent (Aube), Penly (Seine-Maritime),
Gravelines (Nord) and Saint-Alban (Isère). During
the year, work was completed on the examinationof the EDF dossier recommending the setting up
of a specific internal emergency plan organisation
to deal with floods liable to affect all the reactors
on a single site.

Assessment of the safety of the EPR
nuclear reactor project
Following the drawing up of “Technical Guidelines
for the Design and Construction” (in October 2000)
and pending a request for authorisation to proceed,
IRSN is continuing to examine the safety of the
EPR project on the basis of technical dossiers:■ connected with the compliance with generalsafety objectives;■ concerning innovative technical solutions (corium recovery, computerised instrumentation andcontrol, etc.);■ which have changed since the technical directives (containment with metal liner, etc.);■ describing changes concerning power plants inoperation (with regard to floods, heat waves, etc.),
for the EPR project.
During 2004, a set of EDF technical dossiers concerning the EPR project were examined by IRSN andAerial view of the future EPR site at Flamanville (Manche).

were presented and discussed during meetings ofthe standing advisory group for nuclear reactors.
These dossiers concern:■ the Teleperm XS computer platform which will
be used to develop the reactor protection system;■ the new containment design comprising aprestressed concrete internal containment with ametal liner and a concrete external containment;■ improvement of worker radiation protection;■ computerised control principles;■ design of the corium recovery system (see
Focus p.105), to maintain the reactor’s containment
integrity in accident situations involving core

meltdown;■ accident situations involving heterogeneous

dilution of the boron in the primary cooling system;■ the design of the safety injection system;■ the processing of non-qualified multiple equipment failures in case of earthquake;■ foreseeable combinations of internal and external
hazards and internal events to be taken into accountfor reactor design.
EDF’s technical dossiers concerning allowance forthe risk of impact by a commercial aircraft were
examined and discussed at a meeting of therestricted group responsible for nuclear reactors.

FOCUS

EPR REACTOR: COLLABORATION WITH FINLANDIn December 2003, following the decision by the Finnish council of state to build a fifth nuclear
reactor in Finland, the operator, TVO, decided to construct an EPR-type reactor and applied to
the Finnish Government for permission to build.
The dossier was submitted to technical examination by the Finnish safety authority (STUK) in 2004.
STUK held technical discussions with DGSNR and IRSN during 2004 to consider modifications to the EPR project
which could be requested by STUK on the basis of Finland’s current regulations regarding the safety of nuclear reactors.
These discussions focused, in particular, on theprevention of failures for main pipes of the primaryand secondary systems, the limiting of the consequencesof accidents involving failure of steam generator tubes,
the design of the corium recovery system, and digital
instrumentation and control. Efforts were made toharmonise the positions on these various topics.
The Finnish Government granted permission to build
in February 2005. In-depth discussions will be continued
with STUK during subsequent EPR project development
and implementation phases in Finland and in France.

The EPR project in progress on the Olkiluoto site in
Finland.

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TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCEFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESTECHNIC AL SUPPORT WITH REGARDTO NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGIC AL RISKDiscussions and explanations on the CABRI installation with an IRSN reactor
safety team.

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SAFETY OF THE CABRIEXPERIMENTAL REACTOR

A report was drawn up by IRSN on the procedureand the qualification of equipment that EDF intends
to use for the EPR reactor.

In 2004, IRSN examined the preliminary safety reportsubmitted by CEA to support its request for modificationof the CABRI installation.
This examination covered the following points in particular:■ the design and dimensioning of the pressurised water loop which
will be placed at the centre of the reactor core;■ the utilisation of zircaloy for the manufacturing of the in-pile
section of that loop;■ the seismic reassessment of the installation;■ the list of operating conditions adopted for the safety
demonstration;■ the radiological consequences of envelope accidents retained.
IRSN’s analysis took the specific features of the CABRI reactor into
account:■ it is not constantly in operation (a few days a year only);■ the first barrier of the loop is the vessel containing the pressurised
fluid (the experimental rod clad may burst during the test);■ fuel-water interaction could cause a pressure peak in the loop’s
primary system and this must be allowed for when dimensioning it;■ the zircaloy used to manufacture the in-pile section of the loop
is a fragile material;■ very high level effluents may be produced by the experiments.
This analysis was presented to three meetings of the standing
advisory group for nuclear reactors.

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In October 2004, EDF selected the site at Flamanville(Manche) to build a first reactor and submitted adossier with the national commission for publicdebate. Following this stage, EDF is expected toapply for authorisation to build the reactor. It will
supply the preliminary safety report which willthen be examined by IRSN.

Follow-up of experimental reactors
In 2004, IRSN’s appraisal work on research reactors
and fast-neutron reactors mainly concerned CABRI,PHEBUS, the high-flux reactor of the Laüe-LangevinInstitute (RHF) and PHENIX.
The analysis of the preliminary safety report on
the CABRI reactor, modified by the installation ofa pressurised water loop, was presented during two
meetings of the standing advisory group for nuclear
reactors. In general, the work done involved thedetailed examination of every aspect of thatreactor’s safety by means of an approach similar
to that adopted for power reactors while allowing
for specific features of the installation’s operation(see Focus p. 96).

Assessing the safety of the PHENIX reactor.

Furthermore, IRSN examined supplementary items
requested from the operator of the PHEBUS reactor,
regarding shutdown criteria in particular, prior tothe conducting of the PHEBUS-FPT3 test in
November 2004.
In 2004, the Institute also studied the proposal
from the high-flux reactor operator concerning theseismic classification of equipment and associatedfunctional requirements.This proposal is intended
to respond to a recommendation made by thestanding advisory group in May 2002 during the
HFR safety review.

modules. In addition, IRSN studied dossiersconcerning, in particular, the failure of a steam
generator chest in the event of simultaneous failureof a sodium module and a water tube. Furthermore,
IRSN evaluated CEA studies conducted to showthat the melting of a fuel assembly could not be
propagated beyond the six nearest assemblies.

In January 2003, the restarting of the PHENIX
reactor was authorised for a period limited to theequivalent of 720 days operation at full power. Its
decommissioning is scheduled for 2008. In 2004,
IRSN assessed the safety of irradiation experiments
conducted in this reactor, some of which fall into
the category of research operations conducted in
the context of the 1991 law on the managementof high-level long-lived waste. IRSN also examined
the operator’s demonstrations illustrating theconsequences for the safety of steam generatorsof some “malfunctions” noted on two modules ofa steam generator (especially the deformation ofwater tube spacer grids) and the proposal for
more thorough inspections on steam generator
PHEBUS reactor: test device storage pit.

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TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCEFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESTECHNIC AL SUPPORT WITH REGARDTO NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGIC AL RISKIRSN conducts civil engineering survey.

Support for the safety assessmentof operational reactors
In 2004, IRSN’s activities in supportof the safety analysis of reactors inoperation were mainly focused on workin the fields of civil engineering ,thermal-hydraulics and PSA.
Civil engineering
In preparation for the third 10-yearly outage
programmes for 900-MWe power plants, IRSN
conducted a review of the design and dimensioningof civil engineering works. It assessed the behaviourof some works, such as electrical buildings, in caseof earthquake or explosion of external original.
IRSN continued its action on the analysis of the
behaviour of containments allowing for the effects
of ageing of structures and accident situations
which could affect their tightness. To optimise its
capabilities in digital simulation, IRSN took partin an international exercise for the cross-comparisonof designs and tests, organised by the OECD-NEA
which considered containment mockups tested
in the USA.
In the context of feedback on the floods of 1999,
lRSN examined the stability of the protective dykes
on the sites at Belleville (Cher), Fessenheim (HautRhin) and Le Bugey (Ain) in 2004.
In general, IRSN checks on the in-service followup of civil engineering works and EDF’s manner of
dealing with cases of non-compliance identified:equipment or tank anchoring defects, etc.
For the follow-up of containments, IRSN examined
the tests carried out in 2004 on the sites at Golfech(Tarn-et-Garonne) and Cattenom (Moselle). In the98

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2 0 0 4context of the EPR project, IRSN continued its
examination of the design of civil engineering works.
The installation’s containment and its ability towithstand an intentional impact by a commercial
aircraft were covered in reports presented to groupsof experts.
Furthermore, regarding the modification ofregulations in line with new scientific knowledge,
IRSN continued its work with a view to revising
basic safety rules concerning the aseismic designof BNIs.

Level-1 probabilistic safety studies
Probabilistic safety studies (PSA) assist in assessing
the measures adopted by operators by thesystematic investigation of accident scenarios. In
particular, they make it easier to weight the importance for safety of problems identified during design
or operation so that high-priority improvements
can be put forward, where applicable. A level-1 PSA
covers scenarios leading to core meltdown anddetermines their frequencies.
The year 2004 saw the completion of the level-1
PSA for 900-MWe power plants using “event-related”
control. The corresponding summary report wascirculated in September 2004.This study is regularly
used for safety assessments including, in particular,
to appraise precursor incidents and requests forconcessions with regard to technical operating
specifications.
A revision of the level-1 PSA was begun in 2004
to allow for control of the “state-oriented approach”
type, using the PANAME method developed by

Thermal-hydraulic studies with the CATHARE
code.

IRSN to quantify the reliability of control actions.
The information obtained in this study was usedin the safety revision for the third 10-yearly outage
programmes for 900-MWe power plants. The IRSN
study thus identified topics for which the advantagesof design or operating modifications should be examined by EDF.

Thermal-hydraulics
IRSN uses the CATHARE code to conduct thermalhydraulic studies in support of safety analyses inorder to understand physical phenomena that are
not fully mastered or to obtain new tools.

In 2004, calculations regarding accidents involving
complete loss of steam generator feedwater wereconducted for the future EPR reactor. In the context
of the examination of the in-service strength oftanks for the 900 MWe reactors – a topic that will
be presented to the standing nuclear section in2005 – supplementary calculations were performed
in order to assess the envelope characteristic ofthermal-hydraulic studies conducted by EDF.
IRSN performed calculations for about 30 level-2
PSA front-end phases using SIPA/SCAR simulators
in 2004. The Institute also pursued its study of the“inherent” dilution phenomenon.This type of barium

FOCUS

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PSAs APPLIED TO SAFETY-RELATED EVENTSIRSN conducted probabilistic assessments on safety-related events with the most severe
potential consequences.
About 10 events, occurring in French or foreign power plants, are selected every year. The aim of these studies is to assess
the increase in probability of core meltdown resulting from those events.
They help to define measures which could reduce the consequences for safety. These preventive measures may entailorganisation or equipment. As a result of these studies, it can be determined which scenarios out of all those resulting
in core meltdown are significantly affected by the event
studied and, thus, those requiring priority action in orderto reduce possible consequences.
In 2004, IRSN completed a comparison of probabilistic
analysis methods applied to events, in cooperation with
the German and Japanese safety operations (GRS and NUPEC,
respectively). This exercise, based on three actual significant
events, showed that the three authorities had similar
approaches but that the probabilistic models should preferably
be harmonised.
Event quantification meeting at the pressurised water reactor
assessment department.

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TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCEFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESTECHNIC AL SUPPORT WITH REGARDTO NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGIC AL RISKSIPA simulator development room.

dilution may occur in the event of a primary system
break due to the stopping of the feed – to thecore – of “clear” water (without barium) which
has accumulated in the water boxes and steam
generator tubes when natural circulation is resumed(without primary coolant pumps). The study
included detailed thermal-hydraulic calculations
and CATHARE calculations simulating the PKL
installation used to study “inherent” dilution phenomena in the context of OECD projects. Furthermore,
to obtain a tool to assess future EDF studies, IRSN
began studies on steam pipe failure accidents.

SIPA 2 simulator
The SIPA 2 simulator is used at IRSN to prepare
scenarios for crisis exercises, provide training inreactor physics and control and conduct studies
on the thermal-hydraulic behaviour of power plants
and their operation in accident conditions.
Two simulator configurations are currently being
used. In one, the boiler (primary and secondary
systems) is simulated by the CATHARE-SIMU codefor 900-MWe and 1,300-MWe reactors and, since100

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2 0 0 4early 2004, the other features the simulation of
the boiler and cooling system in shutdown stateby the CATHARE 2 V2.5 (SCAR) code.
The first version is used for training purposes(nine one-week sessions a year on normal operation,
design basis accidents and non-design basis
accidents) in the preparation of crisis exercises
under IRSN responsibility: power plants at Gravelines(Nord), Nogent (Aube) and Le Blayais (Gironde) in
2004 and for studies concerning 1,300-MWe power
plants.
The second version is used for studies regarding
900-MWe power plants with, in 2004, the calculationof accident front-end phases in power operationand shutdown conditions for the 900-MWe level-2
PSA, and the study of operation in case of failureof a steam generator tube, in the context of theexamination of the MOX Parity dossier transmitted
by EDF (see Focus p. 102).
In parallel to these activities, the renovation of
the SIPA 2 simulator, to begin in 2005, was thoroughly examined in 2004.

The Tricastin power plant at Pierrelatte (Drôme).

Ageing of pressurised water reactors
In the context of its work on PWR
ageing, IRSN conducted studies on theageing of electrical equipment in 2004.
These studies covered the following
three areas:■ assessment of the impact of ageing on the “steady-state” lead batteries, currently used in PWRs, on
their operability during and after seismic stresses.
Indeed, the conservative sizing of some batteries
could lead EDF to seek to use them in conditions
adversely affecting their availability in case of
seismic stresses. Despite a visible deterioration in
their condition following an accelerated ageing
sequence, the batteries tested demonstrated goodelectrical and mechanical behaviour both during
and after seismic tests;■ an analysis of changes over time in the reliabilityof certain safety-critical electrical components,
based on a statistical analysis of data relating to
defects that have occurred during use of thesecomponents;■ an enquiry into the obsolescence and ageing ofelectrical equipment at 15 companies with a rangeof activities. This provided feedback on theirpractices and strategies for managing electricalequipment during utilisation and long-term storage.
The difficulties and problems encountered and theassociated ageing phenomena were surveyed.
This information will contribute to the assessments
conducted by IRSN in this field.

IRSN conducts studies on the ageing of lead batteries.

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TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCEFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESTECHNIC AL SUPPORT WITH REGARDTO NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGIC AL RISKIRSN experts who took part in the study of the “MOX parity” dossier.

Fuel in normal and accident operating
conditions
IRSN is providing DGSNR with technicalsupport for the study of fuel management provisions proposed by EDF
and,in particular,management changes
planned by the operator by 2007.

Definition:
the burnup fraction(expressed as GWj/t)characterises
the quantity of energy
produced per tonneof fuel.

EDF plans to implement new fuel management
methods:■ MOX parity for 900-MWe CPY power plants(increase in the burnup fraction of MOX fuel to
52 GWj/t, fuel assembly mean maximum value);■ GALICE for 1,300-MWe power plants (increasein burnup fraction of UO2 fuel to 60 GWj/t);■ ALCADE for 1,450-MWe power plants (increase
in UO2 fuel burnup rate to 52 GWj/t).

Each new fuel management method is subject toan approval process conducted by DGSNR which
entails three examination phases by IRSN:■ feasibility of the proposed management;■ updating of the safety dossier (revision of safety
report studies, general refuelling safety assessment
dossier);■ updating of the operation dossier (revision ofgeneral operating rules).
In 2004, the safety dossier on MOX Parity management (see Focus p. 102) and the feasibility dossierfor GALICE management were prepared.
The boosting of fuel performances entails a
reduction in safety margins. Therefore, demonstrating the acceptability of a new fuel management

FOCUS

IRSN’S OPINION ON THE “MOX PARITY” DOSSIER
EDF plans to modify the management of MOX fuels used in combination with UO2 fuels in 20 reactors
in France by implementing a new management dubbed “MOX Parity”.
The reactors concerned are currently operated on the basis of a “hybrid” fuel management: UO2 fuel assemblies are used
for four cycles in the reactor compared with three cycles for MOX assemblies.
The objective of MOX Parity management is to increase the number of irradiation cycles for MOX fuel assemblies to 4.
This new management will require an increase in the enrichment of the MOX fuels and will therefore lead to an increasein the maximum burnup fraction of MOX assemblies.
The acceptability of EDF’s proposals were examined between mid-2001 and mid-2004. Following this examination,
IRSN’s decision in 2004 went against the implementation of the new management as proposed by EDF. The Institute’s
reservations mainly concerned inadequacies in the substantiations provided by EDF as regards the fuel’s satisfactory behaviour
in normal operation (maximum thickness of zirconium oxide on claddings, maximum internal pressure of rod during irradiation).
Supplementary substantiating data is thus awaited from EDF.

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UO2 pellet constituting the fuel for a PWR.

system generally means using new methods forsafety studies relying, in particular, on the use of
3D computing tools and so reducing the conservatism introduced by the uncoupled methods used
for power plant design.
In this context, it is worth mentioning:■ the utilisation of the CATHARE code for the
analysis of loss of coolant accident studies, andthe implementation of the realistic deterministic
method coupled with a hot rod statistical method;■ the utilisation of a kinetic 3D method for the
study of control rod ejection accidents.
In addition, the implementation of a new management may require changes in fuel. In this way, for
the GALICE management, a modification in thefuel product is required in order to comply withdesign criteria: this entails the utilisation of M5
alloy as the cladding and structure material for thefuel assembly (AFA 3GLr AA). In 2004, IRSN exami-

ned the dossiers concerning this fuel assembly
which must be inserted in the reactor a few years
before a new fuel management can be implemented.
IRSN also examined the dossiers regarding foreign
fuels acquired by EDF in the context of its fuelprocu-rement diversification policy.This concernedthe ENUSA fuel assemblies loaded in 900-MWeand 1,300-MWe reactors.

Typesof fuel assembly:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

New
2nd cycle
3rd cycle

R P N M L

K J

H G F

E

D C B A

Refuelling plan for a pressurised water reactor.

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Some members of the IRSN severe accident risks analysis andstudy teams.

Examination of risks associated with severe
core meltdown accidents
The examination of the risks associatedwith core meltdown accidents for
power reactors is supported by researchand development programmes andpunctuated by meetings of thestanding advisory group for nuclear
reactors dealing with specific topics
selected according to advances inknowledge.

Water reactors in service
In the context of the safety review for the third
10-yearly outage programmes for 900-MWe reactors(VD3 900), IRSN presented the standing advisorygroup meeting on 16 December 2004, with various
topics concerning core meltdown accidents which
could lead to modifications in equipment orprocedures during 10-yearly outage programmes.
The following points were discussed: management

FOCUS

BASEMAT AT THE FESSENHEIM POWER PLANT
In the context of the modifications to be made during the third 10-yearly outage programmes,
IRSN examined the basemat of the reactors at the Fessenheim power plant (Haut-Rhin) in 2004.
This basemat, directly above the reactor pit, is less thick than those in other EDF reactors in service. It therefore follows that,in the case of interaction between the corium and the concrete, the time taken to break through the Fessenheim basemat
would be shorter and, as a result, radioactive products (gases and aerosols) would be released to the atmosphere more quickly.
IRSN therefore analysed whether it would be useful
to install supplementary devices which would delay
penetration of the basemat in Fessenheim reactors.
Using the MEDICIS corium-concrete interaction moduleof the ASTEC V1 software package, IRSN was able toassess the time required to break through the existing
basemat and to show that adding water on the corium
would not significantly delay the basemat penetration
time. On the other hand, increasing the basemat
thickness with a layer of refractory concrete would delay
the penetration of the basemat enough to reach a timecomparable with that for other 900-MWe reactors.
IRSN also examined the dosimetric consequences forworkers who would make this modification.
Aerial view of the Fessenheim nuclear power plant(Haut-Rhin).

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1 Robustness of reactor pit

a Collection of corium
before door is breached

2 Breaching of door for complete removalof corium before reflooding
3 Kinetics of corium spreading before reflooding
4 Heat resistance of steel structureof spreading chamber floor

1

5 Thermal-hydraulics
of cooling system

Lost
material
Protective latera
Spreading chamber

53Floor cooling

IRSN specialists for the design of the EPR corium
recovery system.

of the molten core (corium) in the reactor pit, risk
associated with direct heating of the containment,
and instrumentation to be installed for the
management and follow-up of a severe accident.
In examining these topics, IRSN relied to a great
extent on the current state of research and, inparticular, studies conducted on the interaction
between corium and concrete, and the risks of steam
explosion. Some generic studies were conducted in
the context of level-2 PSA development that IRSN
undertook for 900-MWe reactors. In addition, IRSN’s
expertise in the field of instrumentation is basedon experience acquired in the context of the PHEBUS
programme.
IRSN recommended that EDF should increase thethickness of the basemat for reactors at the
Fessenheim power plant (see Focus p.104) and installa corium detection device in the reactor pit, after
the reactor vessel penetration.
Furthermore, as a result of the analysis, EDF was
led to plan a modification of the bolts on theequipment access hatch for CPY type reactors so
as to ensure tight sealing for pressure peaks of up
to 8 bars. EDF is also to modify the device used todepressurise the primary system via SEBIM valves,
including in the case of a severe accident with total
failure of electric power supplies (mains anddiesel generators).

EPR reactor project
IRSN examined the following two topics in 2004:■ the new containment design and its capabilityof maintaining its integrity and tightness after
global deflagration of the quantity of hydrogen

42

Melt plugs

Melt discharge system

Block diagram illustrating corium recovery in the PWR reactor.

which could be present in the containment in theevent of a low-pressure core meltdown accident
or after a representative fast local deflagration;■ the robustness of the corium recovery concept
proposed by EDF (see Focus).

FOCUS

EPR CORIUM RECOVERY SYSTEM
The system for the recovery of molten material fromthe core (corium) planned for the EPR reactor represents
a significant improvement for safety in case of a core
meltdown accident.
Indeed, it would avoid the failure of the basemat and, thus,
failure of the containment leaktightness. The corium flowing fromthe reactor vessel after its failure would be collected and received ina dedicated spreading chamber where it would be cooled by a passive
water injection system.
Examination in 2004 of the system proposed by EDF led IRSN to identify
several points requiring more thorough investigation. The Instituteconducted studies on these points with its own calculation tools which
confirmed that the system planned by EDF was appropriate to meetthe objectives defined:■ complete collection of the corium in the reactor pit before failureof the door below the reactor pit;
■ obtaining of a great enough breach size on failure of the door to allow
rapid flow and spread of the corium;■ limited ablation of the sacrificial concrete layer;■ heat resistance of the steel structure of the spreading chamber;■ satisfactory operation of the cooling system under that chamber.
Some points should, however, be investigated further, especiallythe failure of the door separating the reactor pit from the spreading
chamber and the analysis of a new device proposed by the designer,
the thickness and the nature of the sacrificial concrete in the spreading
chamber and the reliability of the passive basemat cooling device
in that chamber.

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Eurodif’s enrichment plant on the Tricastin site (Drôme).

Safety expertise for future reactors
to follow EPR
Looking beyond the EPR to future
reactors, IRSN directed efforts in 2004
to the study of steps to be taken to
prepare expertise on their safety.
Among the various projects for reactors andassociated fuel cycle installations currently being
developed in the context of the Generation IV
International Forum (GIF), it is worth noting projects
featuring:■ high or very high temperature reactors (HTR/VHTR)
which are helium cooled;■ fast neutron reactors which are gas cooled (GFR)
or sodium cooled (SFR).
In the case of these reactors, designers are seeking

Control rod drive/refueling
penetrations
Generator

Steel reactor
vessel
TurbineRecuperator
Compressor

Annularreactor core

Intercooler
Shutdownheat exchanger
Shutdown circulator
Precooler

GT-MHR module.

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improvements, especially with regard to safety,
reduction in waste and resistance to malicious acts.
As for the schedule, reactors of this type could not
replace the PWRs of generations II (existing) and III(EPR) and others until the middle of the 21st century.
Nevertheless, for some types of reactor, designers
envisage the building of “demonstrators” by 20102015.
As regards safety expertise, IRSN will initially focus
on high or very high temperature reactors, proceeding with technical exchanges, in particular, with
Framatome, which is developing a VHTR project.
Furthermore, the Institute will monitor progress
made in the study of gas-cooled fast neutron reactors and on the development of sodium-cooled fastneutron reactors.
In 2004, IRSN established international contacts
in the field of future reactors, including with GRS
and NRC in particular. IRSN will also take part in
the integrated project for the 6th FPRD on “V/HTRIP” concerning accident design codes in particular.

Working meeting to express opinions on the safety of installations.

Safety of plants, transportand dismantling
IRSN provides technical expertise fordossiers transmitted by nuclear installation operators and by applicantsfor radioactive material transport
packages.The Institute also studies therisks of dispersal of radioactive
materials and of criticality which are
to be found in most installations. IRSN
draws up reports on internal emergency plans (PUI) for sites containing
nuclear installations.
Installations “upstream” of cycle
In 2004, IRSN assessed the dossier on the safety
review of the installation operated by COMURHEX
on the Pierrelatte site (Ardèche). In particular, IRSN
pointed out inadequacies in the provision madefor the risks of dispersal of radioactive and chemicalmaterials, fire and external hazards.
The definition of safety options for the new uranium
enrichment plant (Georges-Besse II) which AREVA
plans to build on the Pierrelatte site were examinedby IRSN in 2004. This plant, which is intended toreplace the EURODIF plant, will use the enrichment
process based on centrifugation of uranium ingaseous UF 6 form developed by URENCO. The
centrifugation process considerably decreases
the quantity of gaseous UF6 present in the installation, which also reduces the risks of dispersal ofradioactive and chemical materials. As a result of
the survey conducted, it was concluded that thesafety options proposed by AREVA appear to be
acceptable at this stage of the project.
The United States is envisaging using MOX fuelassemblies made from weapon grade plutonium
in American nuclear power plants. Four first-off
assemblies intended for a PWR in the USA havebeen manufactured in France.This operation, known
as EUROFAB, involves two French installations:the plutonium technology facility (ATPu) for the
manufacture of fuel rods and the MELOX plant at
Marcoule (Gard) for the manufacture of fuelassemblies. IRSN examined the specific provisions
planned by the operators of these installations withregard to criticality risks. Indeed, the product usedentails specific criticality risks owing to the highcontent of plutonium 239 and the low content of
plutonium 240.
IRSN collaborated with DGSNR in the inspectionof the plant’s manufacturing fuels intended for
PWRs in Europe.The information drawn from these
inspections, in terms of comparison of provisions
implemented to control risks and, in particular, toreduce the doses received by workers, were
presented at an international conference organisedby the IAEA in Beijing (China) in October 2004.
This information will be used when the dossier is
examined for the safety review of the French fuelmanufacturing plant in Romans-sur-Isère (Isère).

Installations “downstream” of cycle
For installations “downstream” of the fuel cycle, amajor portion of IRSN’s work was dedicated to
examining changes in the operating range ofirradiated fuel reprocessing installations UP2-800
and UP3-A and of the COGEMA STE3 waste treatment installation at La Hague (Manche), and theprovisions proposed by COGEMA in that respect.

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Aerial view of the Cogema-La-Hague site (Manche).

The decrees published in the OJ on 11 January 2003
define the operating range of these installations,and any extension of the operating range in force
is subject to specific authorisation, described as“operational” authorisation, granted by interministerial order. In the course of 2004, three specificdossiers for the extension of the operating range
were examined by IRSN and laid to the publicationof three interministerial orders. These concern:■ fuel assemblies, known as UOX3, with a mean
specific burnup fraction for the assembly of lessthan 60 GWj/t and a mean content of uranium 235
isotopes before irradiation of less than 4.5%;■ MOX fuel assemblies with a burnup fraction notexceeding 55 GWj/t and a content by weight ofplutonium and americium not exceeding 8.65%
for irradiation;■ non-irradiated MOX fuel elements initiallyintended for the SNR 300 fast neutron reactor of
Kalkar (Germany), with a plutonium content by
weight not exceeding 40%.
The technical investigation by IRSN focused, inparticular, on the changes in risks related to heatreleases and radiolysis, risks of external exposure(especially to neutrons in the case of MOX), criticality risks and the modification of waste characteristics as a result of the treatment operations for
those fuels.The Institute reached a favourable opinion
on the provisions adopted for the protection ofworkers and the environment.

Assessment of internal emergency
plans (PUI)
For laboratories and plants, the internal emergency
plans for the CEA Valrhô and Superphenix centres,
the COGEMA plant at Pierrelatte and the CEA centre
at Fontenay-aux-Roses were analysed.The analysis

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2 0 0 4of the internal emergency plan for the COGEMA
plant at Pierrelatte included, in particular, a detailed
examination of the accident situations considered.

Safety of radioactive materialtransport
TranSAS mission
In 2004, the IAEA arranged a 10-day meeting ofabout 15 foreign experts to assess the organisationof the inspection of radioactive material transport
safety in France, in the context of a TranSAS mission.
DGSNR and IRSN, along with the firms with thelargest international transport flows (COGEMA
and CIS bio international), were audited.
The mission concluded that the French inspection
system was suitable for the volume and complexityof transport operations performed.
PATRAM conference
The 14th PATRAM international conference, held
in Berlin (Germany), was the occasion for muchdiscussion on the five topics presented by IRSN:■ a model for the calculation of the effects of surface
contamination of packages: the study of thedosimetric impact of contaminations showed thatthe limits in force remain appropriate although
the margins for some isotopes were found to belarge;■ radioactive material transport flows andcorresponding doses for workers and the generalpublic: using the data collected, it was possible tospecify the number of transportations of inspection
equipment containing radioactive materials;■ the fire behaviour of two parcel models containing
irradiated fuel or vitrified waste, respectively: theduration of fire resistance of these parcels is significantly greater than the statutory requirements.The

Rail transportation of vitrified waste.

results obtained will be used as a transport accident
management tool;■ safety distances to be prescribed in case of atransport accident. These will be integrated indepartmental emergency plans to deal withradioactive material transport accidents;■ a methodology to determine the exemption limits
for fissile actinides.
Study on harmonisation of European practices
regarding certification of package models
In 2004, the European Commission financed a study
conducted by IRSN and BAM (Germany) on theharmonisation of European practices with regard
to certification of package models for transportof radioactive materials.
This study included three phases:■ study of practices in force in France and Germany;■ distribution of a questionnaire covering the main
points of those practices to all European Union
member and candidate countries;■ analysis of answers received in order to draw up
recommendations aimed at achieving greater
harmonisation.
In this context, it was proposed that guidelines
should be drawn up for operators to prepare safety
dossiers and for the relevant authorities to assess
those documents, and that standard formats should
be defined for safety dossiers, survey reports andcertificates of approval.
EUROFAB project
IRSN conducted a technical survey of safety dossiersfor the various types of transport operations, byroad and by sea, for the two package models
concerned, FS 47 for plutonium oxide supplied by
the USA and FS 65-900 for the four fabricatedassemblies and supplementary rods.
IRSN also went on line with explanations of its
assessment of the risks associated with possible
transport accidents in response to two associations,
WISE-Paris and Greenpeace International, andthe results of the study carried out by the Large &Associates consulting firm.

Safety of dismantling decommissioned
nuclear installations
In the last few years, the main nuclear operators(CEA, EDF, COGEMA) undertook major programmes
for the dismantling of nuclear installations which
will lead to the decommissioning of some 40 basic
nuclear installations by 2025.
In the course of 2004, IRSN examined the following,in particular:■ decommissioning and dismantling operations for
the SILOE and SILOETTE experimental reactors
on the CEA site at Grenoble (Isère);■ decommissioning and dismantling operations forthe enriched uranium processing workshops (ATUe) on the CEA Cadarache site
(Bouches-du-Rhône);■ decommissioning and dismantlingoperations for the SICN plant at VeureyVoroize (Isère).
On 24 and 31 March 2004, IRSN gave
its opinion on EDF’s strategy for thedismantling of “first generation”reactors,
to the standing advisory group for basic
nuclear installations other than nuclear
reactors and excluding installations
designed for long-term storage ofradioactive waste (standing advisory
Technical examination ofgroup for plants).
a safety dossier on an installationin the process of being dismantled.

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Melox MOX fuel manufacturing plant at
Bagnols-sur-Cèze (Gard).

Assessment of risks of dispersal ofradioactive materials
The risks of the dispersal of radioactive or toxic
materials in normal, incident or accident conditions
are the subject of a close study by IRSN.
In 2004, specific safety assessments on these risks
were conducted for a variety of installations suchas plants and laboratories (CIS bio international in
Saclay, CEA Valduc – Côte-d’Or, FBFC in Romans –Isère, MELOX in Marcoule, COGEMA in La Hague),installations in the process of being dismantled (UP1plant in Marcoule, Superphenix reactor), research
reactors (OSIRIS in Saclay, RHF in Grenoble), the
RES reactor at Cadarache and certain other auxiliarybuildings for EDF reactors.
Generic topics concerning all nuclear installations
were also studied, such as the quantification ofdischarges which could be caused by an earthquake,taking into account the conditions for cracking ofbuildings and pressure differences caused by wind,gas system leaks and heating of the air insidebuildings.
Another noteworthy event in 2004 was IRSN’sparticipation in the drawing up of ISO standards inthe field of containment and, in particular, of astandard concerning the design and operation ofventilation systems in nuclear installations otherthan reactors. IRSN also began collaborating with110

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its Ukrainian counterpart (SSTC) in the field of safety
instructions to be applied to filtration equipmentfor nuclear installations.

Assessments of criticality risks
Specific technical analyses are conducted on criticality
risks.
In 2004, IRSN conducted 104 assessments which led
it to perform comparative calculations and specificstudies to verify the substantiations put forward by
nuclear operators in their authorisation requests andto evaluate the safety margins associated withcalculations, according to the level of validation of
the calculation tools used by the applicants.A study
aimed at specifying the criticality risk in undergroundrepositories for radioactive waste was conducted forchanging scenarios in the very long term.
Furthermore, IRSN analysed incidents related tothe criticality risk and provided support for surveillance
inspections and crisis exercises for which questionsof criticality could arise.
IRSN also took part in the IAEA’s work on themodification of international regulations on thesafety of radioactive material transport and theOECD’s work on improving criticality calculation
methods.

As part of its appraisal of the storage of highactivity waste, IRSN is conducting research on
the properties of clay as a potential host rockat Tournemire (Aveyron).

Examination of safety dossiers concerning
mining waste and participationin the writing of regulations
IRSN’s role includes the safety ofvarious stages of radioactive waste
management: processing, packaging,transport,interim storage and disposal
for various categories of waste withall activity levels, mining waste, contaminated soil, etc.
In 2004, in view of the time limit set by the lawof 1991 for research in the management of highlevel long-lived waste (HLLLW), the Instituteconcentrated its efforts mainly on examining
dossiers concerning this waste.

Disposal in deep geologicalformations
Three dossiers on the feasibility of disposal in deep
geological formations, drawn up by ANDRA, were
examined by IRSN and the conclusions of theseinvestigations were presented to the standing
advisory group for radioactive waste long-term
disposal facilities. These dossiers concerned:■ mechanical disturbances liable to occur in a
repository in the clay formation studied by the
Bure underground laboratory (Meuse/HauteMarne);■ chemical disturbances in that repository;■ the current position of studies of the benefits ofFrench granite formations as a location for a HLLLW
repository (“2002 granite dossier”).
The analysis of the first two dossiers completed afirst cycle for the examination of key points on thesafety of a possible repository, with regard to:■ the qualities of the geological site studied;■ the design features of a repository;■ the questions on safety raised by the operation
and reversibility of a repository.
The investigations conducted on mechanical andchemical disturbances and their coupled effects
and also on thermal and hydraulic disturbances
resulted in an initial assessment of changes in theperformance of the containment barriers of arepository and of the suitability of the design
provisions envisaged by ANDRA to prevent those
disturbances and reduce their effects.
In conducting its investigation,
IRSN relies on its own researchfacilities such as the Tournemire
experimental platform (Aveyron)and takes part in international
experimental projects (MontTerri) and modelling projects(Decovalex, European projects
such as SPA, BENIPA, NFPRO).
It is in this context that IRSN
was able, in particular, toformulate its opinion regardingtransfers in semipermeable
mediums, the potential role ofcolloids in potential radionuclidetransfers in the repository andMeasuring the direction of cracks in a
the geological environment,
tunnel gallery at Tournemire (Aveyron).

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Vacuum packing of clay samples taken at Tournemire for chemical analysis
in the laboratory.

and the influence of hydraulic binders on thecontainment properties of clays.
The assessment of the “2002 granite dossier” provided the opportunity to analyse the possible options
for a repository in a granite medium and to examine
the capacity of French granites to accommodate
such a repository. The analysis conducted on thebasis of the bibliographical data contained in the
ANDRA dossier, originating from French and foreign
granitic sites, led IRSN to consider that thesedeep granitic formations did not have geologicalcharacteristics that were incompatible, in a genericmanner, with a possible repository.
IRSN also examined the work and research pro-

FOCUS

MIMAUSA PROGRAMMEUranium mining activities may have led to modifications in the natural environment
and to radiological marking in the air, water and soil.
This marking may be significant without necessarily having notable dosimetric consequences.
On the basis of its current and past work, IRSN has precise knowledge about several of these mining sites but only partial
data is available for other sites. For this reason, DPPR, a department of the French Ministry for Ecology and Sustainable
Development (MEDD), asked IRSN in 2003 to set up
a programme aimed at preparing a radiological reporton the environment around uranium mining sites.
This programme, called MIMAUSA, is being conductedin close collaboration with COGEMA. Its steering committee
includes members from MEDD, IRSN, COGEMA and DARPMI
Bretagnefrom the French Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry.
AlsaceGuérande
VendéeSaint-Symphorien
Château-Chinon
AllierSaône-et-Loire
Benaize
CreuseForez
Gartempe
Crouzille
AmbertMaurienne
Corrèze
CantalAquitaine
LorèzeAveyronLodève

PACA

Mining areas in France.
The concept of “mining areas” was defined in the context
of the MIMAUSA inventory as a means of grouping sets of sites
in geographic areas.
The name allocated to each “mining area” can reflect either
its inclusion within specific administrative boundaries or the nameof a large city, or it can be drawn from a mining title.

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For the “knowledge assessment” section of this programme,
IRSN published a national inventory of uranium mines inJune 2004 and this can be consulted on the following website:www.irsn.org. It lists the sites where uranium ore exploration,
extraction or processing activities have been conducted inmainland France. There is a descriptive summary data sheet
for each site.
In parallel, IRSN has started collecting detailed information
focusing on two pilot sites: Gartempe (Haute-Vienne) andAmbert (Puy-de-Dôme).
A database containing mapping data is being created
for the organisation and subsequent consultationof the information provided.

Redevelopment of the mining site at L’Écarpière (Loire-Atlantique).

grammes planned by ANDRA in the Bure undergroundlaboratory in support of the application for authorisation to proceed with excavation of the experimental“niche” and galleries for the laboratory.

Waste packages
As regards waste packages, IRSN examined thefollowing three dossiers:■ a first version of the specifications for packages
obtained by bituminisation in the STE3 workshop
at the COGEMA plant in La Hague (Manche), of
sludge from the previous STE2 workshop;■ the application for authorisation to continue
using package interim storage cell 124 (E-I-P) at
the COGEMA plant in Marcoule (Gard) beyond thefourth interim storage level;■ an ANDRA dossier giving the inventory of HLLL
and MLLL packages for the dimensioning of a
possible repository in the clay layer studied at Bure.

Disposal facilities
In the field of surface disposal facilities for low
and intermediate activity waste, IRSN examined
specific dossiers concerning the Aube and Manche
centres (statutory monitoring plan, internal
emergency plan, resin storage, reception of sealed
sources in a surface disposal facility).
On the COGEMA uranium ore processing waste
disposal sites, the Institute conducted third-party
surveys of the following in response to a requestfrom DRIRE:■ the radiobiological impact for 2002 of the former
L’Écarpière mining site (Gétigné, Loire-Atlantique);■ the environment monitoring conducted by
COGEMA around the sites at Gueugnon (disposalof ore processing waste) and Bauzot near Issyl’Évêque (disposal of waste slightly contaminatedby natural radionuclides);■ the application for authorisation to store mining

deads and demolition products from the SIMO
plant at the open-cast mine on the Bois-NoirsLimouzat site.
Furthermore, on the request of DDASS in Creuse,a study was conducted on a project to set up aswimming facility at a pond on the location of theformer Grands-Champs open-cast mine (village of
Gouzon, Creuse). The overall results showed thatusing this site as a swimming facility would not
result in a significant increase in doses received
compared with the average level of exposure forinhabitants of Limousin.

Regulations on waste safety
IRSN took part in work to revise and draw up policies
concerning waste safety. In this way, it contributed
to work in 2004 aimed at modifying basic safety
regulations III.2.f and III.2.e dealing, respectively,
with the safety of disposal of radioactive waste indeep geological formations (III.2.f) and favourable
characteristics of waste packages with regard totheir acceptance in a surface disposal facility (III.2.e).
The Institute is also contributing to the preparationof a reference guide concerning HLLL and MLLL
packages (referred to as “L542”) for which elimination systems are currently being studied.
In 2004, IRSN drew up a guide concerning a final
disposal facility for naturally radioactive waste
whose activity level has been increased by theindustrial process that produced it.The aim of thisguide is to provide producers of this type of waste
and, in particular, personnel responsible for thedesign of disposal centres with a method describing
the various steps to be implemented for theassessment of radiological impacts. This work,
conducted at the request of MEDD in the context
of a working group comprising representatives of

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the administration along with producers and waste
disposal agents, was presented to the SFRP congressin Marcy-l’Étoile (Rhône) in September 2004.
In addition, in 2004, IRSN performed work in support
of authorities involved in radioactive waste
management (French and foreign safety authorities,
IAEA, etc.) including in particular:■ participation in monitoring inspections of basic
nuclear installations as technical support for DGSNR
and DSND;■ participation in the work of the IAEA committee
responsible for examining safety guides concerning

radioactive waste management (WASSC);■ participation as consultant in the drawing-up ofsome of those guides (concerning geologicaldisposal in particular);■ the drawing-up, in a Franco-Belgian context andin liaison with ANDRA, of a common position on
the safety approach for geological disposal facilities;■ the training, in response to the IAEA request, ofsafety authorities from East European countries
in the field of surface disposal facilities for radioactive waste.

Human and organisational reliability
Special assessments conducted by IRSN
in the field of human and organisational
factors were centred on three topics
in 2004.
Control and supervision
IRSN examined the design principles ofcomputerised control planned for the EPR reactor.
These principles are, to a great extent, based on
experience acquired on N4 power plants. They
had passed an initial validation by EDF throughtests conducted on mockups with operators. Owing
to EDF’s desire to increase the level of responsibilityof the control team, IRSN examined, in particular,
the assistance provided to operators by supervisioninterfaces. In the context of the standing advisory

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2 0 0 4group for EPR, IRSN stressed that it was essentialthat the control team should retain its power overcontrol and have an overall view of the evolutionof the process, but that it should be provided with
sufficient guidance in order to avoid inappropriate
actions.

Organisation and management
Nuclear power plants undergo regular technicalmodifications that have a significant impact on
operating procedures, work organisation and thecompetencies required from agents. IRSN examined
the method and organisation implemented by EDF
to allow for that impact during the design of
those modifications (see Focus).
Furthermore, during the updating of safety reports

Reports presented to the standing advisorygroup on nuclear reactors.

FOCUS
for various nuclear installations, IRSN examined
the manner in which operators dealt with risks
associated with human actions: starting up of theextension of the CEA irradiated fuel study laboratory(Saclay) and the “pit” section of the test reactor
at Cadarache, commissioning of the Civaux power
plant (Vienne), safety review of the CABRI reactor,
and dismantling of Superphenix.These investigations
focused on the operational provisions adopted by
the operators to prevent and repair human errors
liable to adversely affect proper control of thesafety of installations.

Feedback
Two safety-related events which occurred in nuclear
power plants were submitted to thorough analysis
by IRSN with regard to human and organisational
factors. This highlighted the fact that a team may
experience difficulty in rigorously applying a control
procedure when its view of the trend in operation
parameters leads it to believe that the actions
required by that procedure are ineffective.

INTEGRATION OF HUMAN FACTORSIN THE DESIGN OF MODIFICATIONSTO EDF POWER PLANTS
The analysis of actions carried out in the early 2000s
indicated that modifications made in power plants
resulted in difficulties for some agents (operating
and local servicing personnel), or even, incidents.
During the year 2003, IRSN conducted a retrospective studyof the implementation of nine modification projects. Parties involvedin the projects and the operating staff concerned by thosemodifications were interviewed. The main documents written
during the projects were analysed. The study revealed inadequacies
as regards the integration of human factors in the designof modifications.
At the end of 2003, EDF began to introduce a procedure
for the analysis of social-organisational and human impactsof modifications (SOH procedure). In 2004, IRSN assessed
this procedure by comparing it, firstly, with the results of its studyof the projects and, secondly, with “good practices” forthe integration of human factors in project control.
This assessment showed that the procedure, which was designed
to be carried out upstream of modification projects, should be extended
to include a study of the human factors at each stage of projects:
analysis of needs, analysis of impacts, specification andimplementation of solution, validation tests, implementation on site
and follow-up during operation. In this context, IRSN emphasised
the need to provide designers with more training in the fieldof human factors and to improve the assistance provided by the guides
for this procedure.

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Ventilation
system

VHE filters
Extraction
Blowing

Cableway
Electric equipment
cabinetSmoke(soot and gas)

Smoke

Fire propagation studies.

Fire protection of installations
Assessing the fire protection of an
installation means studying steps
proposed by the operator for prevention,
detection and action in order to avoid
the outbreak of fire, to detect andcontrol any fire outbreak that occurs,
to limit the fire to within a predefinedvolume and to extinguish it.
Fires and explosions, whether they originate frominside the installation or are of external origin (forest
fire,lightning,industrial environment or communicationroutes) are possible sources of accidents. Nuclear

operators take steps to prevent or limit fires andexplosions so they cannot result in serious direct
or indirect consequences for personnel, membersof the public and the environment.

Assessment work
IRSN assesses the validity of the means adopted
and justified by the operator in installation safety
dossiers. For this purpose, the Institute can rely on
the results of research – especially research it has
conducted itself –, the results of studies conductedusing design codes in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomena involved, specific

FOCUS

FIRE PSA
In order to appraise the provisions adopted by EDF, against fire risks and to determine possible waysof improving safety, a specific probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) was made by IRSN for 900-MWe
reactors.
This assessment included a systematic investigation of accident scenarios that could be caused by fire and their frequencies
were determined.
The year 2004 saw the completion of the fire PSA version based on the event-related control of accident situations.
IRSN also conducted a sensitivity assessment in order to gauge the effect of implementing the fire action plan adopted
by EDF to improve fire protection for 900-MWe and 1,300-MWe reactors.
In this way, the critical premises and sequences representing a major part of the risk of core meltdown were identified.
For the purposes of this study, fire scenario calculations were performed using the coupled FLAMME_S/SIMEVENT software.
The information drawn from the experimental programmes on fire (DIVA 0 and CARMELA) carried out in IRSN installations
are to be integrated during a future update of the PSA. This work focused, in particular, on electrical cabinet fires and fire
propagation from one room to adjacent premises.
The lessons drawn from the fire PSA were also used for the safety review associated with the third 10-yearly outage
programmes for 900-MWe power plants.

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2 0 0 4IRSN personnel in ventilated protective suits take part in fire studies.

probabilistic safety studies, international practices,
as well as feedback and data drawn from incidents
that have occurred in nuclear and non-nuclear
installations.
Owing to the specific features of nuclear installations,special care is taken to maintain the availability ofsafety functions in case of fire and to preserve thecontainment of radioactive materials. All the effectsof fire (transfers of hot gases, soot, pressure, etc.)
and their consequences on safety-related equipment
are considered. The influence of ventilation on
the development of a fire and on its consequencesis also taken into account in order to examine,in particular, ventilation control strategies in case of fire.
The main topics studied by IRSN in 2004 include,
above all, the assessment of fire protection provisions
conducted in the context of the definition of setsof modifications to be made during the third 10yearly outage programmes for 900-MWe reactors,
taking into account the results of the probabilistic
safety assessments (PSA) on fire conducted by
IRSN (see Focus p. 116). In this context, IRSN also
examined the operator’s principles of prevention
and protection to control risks concerning thepresence of hydrogen in the buildings of the nuclear
island. Other assessments of explosion risks wereconducted for the industrial implementation of amethod for the chemical dehydrogenation ofreactors in N4 power plants, operations for thedestruction of sodium described in the preliminary
safety report on dismantling of the Superphenix
reactor, and risks related to the external environment
for several nuclear installations. In addition, an
assessment of fire risks was conducted in supportof the safety assessment of the Khmelnitski 2 reactor
by the Ukrainian safety authority.
With the processing of the first results ofexperiments on heat and smoke propagation andstudies on the fire behaviour of sectorisation andcontainment equipment conducted by IRSN in the
DIVA and STARMANIA installations, it has beenpossible to obtain a better appraisal of the pressure
effects associated with fire and to reduce theuncertainties in the evaluation of releases of radioactive materials to the environment during a fire.
The suspension coefficients to be considered andthe redeposition and retention coefficients foraerosols in an installation were determined for anumber of materials which could play a part in afire.

TPH pit fire in confined and ventilated premises.

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TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCEFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESTECHNIC AL SUPPORT WITH REGARDTO NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGIC AL RISKRadioecological impact studies
In 2004, IRSN conducted two impact
studies in the field of radioecology forthe public authorities: one concerned
the effects of floods of the Rhône riverin late 2003 and the other examinedthe consequences in France of the aboveground testing of nuclear weapons.

100

10

1

0,1
137

Cs

0,01
1962

1966

1970

1974

1978

10
90

Sr

In December 2003, the highest water level everrecorded on the Rhône caused flooding as the dykes
in the river’s low valley overflowed or gave way.
When it is in spate, the Rhône carries large amountsof suspended matter (sediment and swell particles
washed down from the catchment area), which cancontain the major part of the annual flows of someradionuclides. Reflecting the concern of the
inhabitants in the areas concerned, CLI in Gard and
DRIRE for the PACA region asked the Institute tocarry out a scientific survey and, in addition, DGSNR
requested an assessment of the radiologicalconsequences of the floods. The results of thissurvey were presented to CLI in June 2004 and areport was published in October 2004. They showthat the levels of radioactivity measured in the soilin the flooded areas and in local produce were notsignificantly different from those measured inneighbouring areas. The same applied to the mainchemical pollutants measured in a few samples.

Impact in France on atmospherictesting of nuclear weapons

10,1
Le Vésinet
Clermont-Ferrand
Model of Paris region
Model of Clermont-Ferrand

0,01
1962

1966

1970

1974

1978

Radioactivity of the daily food intake of children aged 8 to 12,
between 1961 and 1978: SCPRI measurements in schools in
two French cities and values calculated from the radioactivity
reconstituted in various foodstuffs included in their food intake.

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Study of impact of Rhone river floodsof December 2003

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Following controversy over significant caesium-137
activity levels measured in the mountainous
Montagne Noire area (Aude) in 2002, the DPPR
department of the French environment ministryasked IRSN in 2003 to carry out a survey of the
fallout in France from all atmospheric weapons
tests. This entailed reconstituting the variation
with respect to time of the activity of the 14 mainradionuclides present in the air, in deposits and inDuring flood periods, the Institute takes greaternumbers of samples of river sediments which
may contain the main part of annual
radionuclide flows.

the food chain, and then to assess the doses received
by inhabitants. This survey was based on nearly
40,000 results for measurements performed inmainland France between 1961 and 1978. In spiteof the large amount of data available, modelling
was necessary to fill gaps in the sequences ofmeasurements. Data for fruit and vegetables, wheat,milk and meat were used to adjust the transfer
models. The highest activity levels in the air anddeposits were due to those short-lived radionuclides.
However, contamination of the food chain by thoseradionuclides remained limited owing to their shorthalf life and their low mobility. Caesium 137 andstrontium 90 were measured in practically all thecompartments of the food chain during this period.

Iodine-131 contamination of foodstuffs was conducted in bursts after each test.
Overall, for all radionuclides, the activities measured
hardly exceeded 1 to 10 Bq/kg-1 fresh except in leaf
vegetables and grass where the values rose to as
much as 1,000 Bq/kg -1 fresh in the early 1960s.
At each stage of the calculation, IRSN studied theregional variability in order to modulate the very
generic assessment of the dosimetric impact of
the tests proposed by UNSCEAR.
In 2004, these results were set out in two reports by
the Institute, presented to a congress and publishedin a magazine.A report concerning dosimetric aspects
will be published in summer 2005.

Earthquake and flood risks
Seismic hazard
In 2004, the Institute conducted investigations
on various dossiers:■ safety option dossier for the Ionisos installation
at Sablé (Maine-et-Loire);■ long-term storage of medium- and high-level
waste from CEA;
■ examination of the preliminary safety report for
the Georges-Besse II installation;■ earthquake detectors for the high-flux reactor
in Grenoble (Isère);■ safety reviews for 10-yearly outage programmes
VD3 900 and VD2 1300.
Assessments were also conducted on foreign
installations: a survey concerning the Chernobylsite was carried out by teams from the Institutethrough RiskAudit, subsidiary of IRSN and GRS,

and a study was also carried out on the probabilistic assessment of the seismic risk for the Krskosite (Slovenia) in the context of a European
PHARE project.

Flood hazard
Following the flooding of the Le Blayais site
(Gironde) at the end of 1999, EDF conducted areview of the protection arrangements for all its
installations and of the methods used to characterise
the flood hazard. Historically, the flood hazard
was defined in the basic safety rule RFS I.2.e bymeans of the maximum design flood level
representing an extreme high water level for sites
near rivers or the sea. After the flood at Le Blayais,
it appeared to be necessary to allow for additional
associated hazards, such as rain, sea swell andI R S NA N N U A L

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TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCEFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESTECHNIC AL SUPPORT WITH REGARDTO NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGIC AL RISK

Recording of samples taken from nuclear installations for the analysis ofradioactive releases.

ground-water. EDF drew up a dossier for each of its
sites with the aim of justifying the protection
provisions it had taken against external flooding
risks. In addition to the work related to the protectionof reactors, IRSN examined, in 2004, the points
considered for the dimensioning of protective dykes

for the sites at Belleville (Cher) and Le Bugey (Ain).
For the Belleville site, this activity more especiallyconcerned the effect of rising groundwater and the“lapping” phenomenon in the case of extreme highwater levels. The Le Bugey site chose the solutionof percolation under the protective structures.

Environmental monitoring
Technical support for authorities withregard to environmental monitoringcovers a number of actions: radiologicalanalyses,metrology,cross-comparisonsand assistance with inspections.
Monitoring of effluent releases from
nuclear installations
IRSN carried out monitoring of radioactive releases
from nuclear installations.This undertaking involved

a continuous assessment on the basis of radiologicalanalyses of gaseous and liquid effluent samples
taken from main drains. The objective is both toverify the release values declared by the operatorsand to improve knowledge of the nature and activityof the radionuclides released, along with theirvariations in the course of time, in order to define
suitable environmental monitoring plans.
In case of incident or accident, this data is completed
by that obtained from samples at stations set up

FOCUS

SETTING UP THE NATIONAL NETWORK FOR ENVIRONMENT RADIOACTIVITY
MEASUREMENTS
An order issued on 17 October 2003 placed the technical management of the National networkfor environmental radioactivity measurements under IRSN’s responsibility.
This network will collect the results of measurements conducted over the years by public establishments, government
departments, nuclear operators, local authorities and associations. In particular, IRSN is to provide the secretarial services forthe steering committee prescribed by the order and take charge of the centralisation, processing and archiving of analysis
results. It is also required to make data available to the general public on a website. This network will help to estimate
the doses inhabitants are currently exposed to by the whole range of nuclear activities. In order to join the network, laboratories
must be able to guarantee the quality of its measurements by obtaining approval from the French Ministries for Environmentand Health after nomination by an approval commission. In this context, IRSN organised four cross-comparison exercises in
2004. The Institute also supervised several working groups for the steering committee and the approval commission in order toregister all the measurements made and draw up the specifications of the future database. A temporary web portal was developed at
the end of the year and will be accessible to the general public in 2005.

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Analysis of alkaline elements by atomic
absorption spectrometry.

in the environment near the relevant site in orderto quantify the extent of releases and their impact
on the environment. In 2004, with the monitoring
facilities used, it was possible to complete theinformation given by the operator regarding theevents during which accidental gaseous releasesof limited size were noted.
Study was pursued in 2004 with DGSNR in orderto optimise monitoring by seeking greater relevanceof the radionuclides searched for and a decreasein the number of samples analysed (5,300 in 2004),
which will reduce the waste produced by thelaboratory concerned.

Metrology to support IRSN missions
As the radioactivity contained in samples decreases
as time passes owing to the reduction in releases,
IRSN is developing increasingly efficient techniques
for the processing and measurement of radionuclides found in samples taken from the environment.
Thanks to the competencies developed and themeans used, the Institute is able to process andanalyse radioactivity at low levels (a few tens or
hundreds of Bq/kg) and very low levels (a few Bq/kg)

in samples taken during radioactivity monitoring
operations, by applying protocols and techniqueswith a COFRAC-approved reference level. In thisway, some 30,000 samples entailing nearly
90,000 measurements are processed every year in
the IRSN laboratories on its Le Vésinet site (Yvelines).
The measuring facilities used can be mobilised for
accident or post-accident situations if necessary.

Conducting of cross-comparisons
The Institute organises and prepares samples forannual cross-comparison campaigns in the context
of public health code at the request of DGSNR for
the approval of measurement laboratories. Fourcross-comparisons were made in 2004, on theanalysis of low-activity radionuclides of natural
or artificial origin in various environmental matrices(water, algae, plants).

Support for inspections
In its capacity as technical expert, IRSN provides support for basic nuclear installation inspectors conducting unexpected plant inspections, such as at Nogentsur-Seine power plant (Aube) in January 2004.

Technical support in the field of radon
IRSN provided support in the following ways in2004:■ some 30 predictive mapping surveys wereconducted by various organisations using a variety
of methods to identity areas concerned by radonin certain French departments, in response torequests from DDASS and DRASS. DGSNR asked
IRSN to prepare a report on these surveys and to
propose criteria for the classification of geographic
areas according to the level of their “radon potential”;■ as the reference organisation on the subject ofradon, IRSN contributed to the work of the Frenchnational commission for the approval of organisations authorised to conduct radon activity concentration measurements in locations accessible tothe public;■ IRSN prepared technical data sheets giving
examples of the reduction of radon concentrations
in public, private and industrial buildings. These
data sheets were circulated to DDASS and DRASS.

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Operation to recover a high-level irradiator in a clinic in Toulouse.

Radiation protection response
and assistance
In 2004, public authorities at bothnational and local levels called on IRSN
on a dozen occasions for various operations which led to the discovery of ionising radiation in inappropriate locations.
One example was the case where radioactive material was found in a private home in Huningue (Alsace).
At a first stage, these operations consist in establishing the qualitative and quantitative characteristicsof the radionuclides found and the extent of theareas which may be contaminated. IRSN then under-

takes to make the locations safe by placing the contaminated equipment or sources in appropriate
packaging and storing it pending its subsequentelimination by a suitable process.
Other types of operations are also carried out by
IRSN, such as: assistance with radiation protection
on tritium-contaminated work sites at Ganagobie(Alpes-de-Haute-Provence), technical support for
inspections carried out by public authorities (train
carrying irradiated fuel at Bordeaux railway station)
and action taken on radon-contaminated sites.

Radiation protection of workers
IRSN contributed to the drawing-up
of decrees and orders required bymodifications to French regulations onradiation protection of workers.
The Institute also participated in the monitoringof the worker exposure and was involved in thescreening of applications for the approval of external
dosimetry laboratories and in the organisation ofcross-comparisons.

Impact of changes in regulations on
IRSN activities
Changes in French regulations on worker radiation
protection were stipulated in decree No. 2003-296,
issued in 2003 and supplemented in 2004 by decree
No. 2004-1489 authorising IRSN to use the national
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2 0 0 4drawing up of these decrees and the relevant
implementation orders which entrust IRSN withkeeping the national inventory of ionising radiation
sources (SIGIS) and managing worker monitoring
system (SISERI). Decree No. 2003-296 also mentions
the Institute’s role in the measurement of individual
external and internal doses for exposed workers,
in the provision of expertise such as surveys ofwork stations and consulting services to assist
industrial doctors and radiation protection officers.
It also opens up prospects for studies and research
for IRSN, such as the processing of dosimetric data
for epidemiological purposes.

Follow-up of worker exposure
IRSN uses the following two tools to follow up
worker exposure:Passive dosimetry.

■ SIEVERT is used to assess doses in flying crew.

This system, developed in collaboration with DGAC
is now operational. The model allowing for solar
eruptions for the calculation of doses has been
improved since 2004.
■ SISERI centralises all the dosimetric data on
exposed workers on a nation-wide basis. 2004
was a key year for the setting up of SISERI.The tasks
started were successfully completed:- fitting out of renovated, secure premises for theteam responsible for running SISERI and computer
servers;- installation and acceptance of computer systemwith, in particular, the recovery of data from theearlier database;- testing of the system’s various components (legal,
IT, etc.) during the pilot phase (second half of 2004),
with a limited number of establishments consulting
or transmitting dosimetric data;- communication of information on the system’stime limits, features and statutory provisions to
the various partners and users (industrial medical
officers and radiation protection officers);- publication in the OJ of: the decree of 30 December
2004 authorising IRSN to use the national registerof persons (RNIPP); the order concerning the medical
supervision form and individual dosimetric dataon workers exposed to ionising radiation; thefavourable opinion issued by CNIL on 24 June 2004
regarding the management of confidential data in
SISERI. These three statutory instruments werenecessary to officially start up SISERI.
The system will come into operation in 2005, when
all contributors and users must be able to accessthe database in accordance with stipulated protocols.
Work on the integration of the oldest dosimetricdata in the database will be continued. In this manner,
SISERI should soon become an essential tool forthe follow-up of workers exposed in corporate
environments and a powerful survey tool for theprocessing of the centralised data for the purposesof prevention and protection.

Approval and cross-comparison
In pursuance of the order of 6 December 2003,
about four out of 10 external dosimetric laboratories
submitted applications to IRSN for approval by theWork Relationship Directorate in 2004. IRSN
gives its opinion on the suitability of the equipment and methods used by those laboratories.
The order also requires IRSN to organise a crosscomparison of the dosimeters proposed by thelaboratories.This cross-comparison was carried out
in October 2004.

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TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCEFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESTECHNIC AL SUPPORT WITH REGARDTO NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGIC AL RISKScanner acquisition console at Cochin Hospital.

Radiation protection in the medical field
The justification of medical acts andthe optimisation of exposures are thetwo principles underlying the protectionof personnel exposed for medical
reasons.These principles are mentioned
in the Euratom directive 97/43.
In France, they are reflected in decree
No. 2003-270 of 24 March 2003 andthe corresponding provisions areincluded in the public health code
(articles R.1333-55 to 74).

Reflection on the actions to be taken for theradiation protection of patients began in 1998 witha study mission entrusted to Professors Bonninand Lacronique concerning measures for the
improvement of patients’ radiation protection,i.e., reducing doses administered to the lowest
possible level, while maintaining the quality of
the radiological treatment. Thereafter, a working
group of experts from institutional bodies andhealth professionals gave recommendations
published by InVS in 2002. Then, in 2003, DGSNR

FOCUS

RADIOGRAPHIC EXAMINATIONS IN SPORTS MEDICINE
An order issued on 11 February 2004 defines the nature and frequency of medical examinations,which may be common to all sport disciplines or conducted for a specific sport discipline.
Radiographic examinations may be prescribed, such as x-rays of the lumbar spine (front, side, 3/4 views) performed annually
before the age of 15 and then every two years, or of the cervical spine (front, side with measurement of the Torg ratio) every
two years. The Sports Department of the French Ministry for Youth, Sport and Associations asked IRSN in 2004 to conduct
a study to assess the risks associated with prescribed radiographic examinations.
IRSN examined several cases characterised by the morphology and age of the sport practitioner (in order to adapt
the parameters of radiographic examinations) and duration of the sporting career:■ slim or heavily-built sport practitioner;■ adolescent aged under 15 or over 15;■ sporting career of six years or ten years.
For each of these cases, the doses received (in mGy) by the most exposed organ, by the thyroid gland and by the reproductive
organs, and the effective dose (in mSv) were calculated. As regards the individual effective dose received over a whole sporting
career, they are between 0.4 and 5.6 mSv, i.e., no more than approximately the dose received in a single scanning examination.

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Scanner interpretation room.

FOCUS– in close cooperation with the relevant departments of IRSN and InVS – drew up an action planfor the monitoring of the exposure of patients toionising radiation of medical origin (PASEPRI).
The courses of action adopted meet two objectives:■ improve knowledge of patients’ ionising radiation
exposure doses so they can be further optimised;■ gather the knowledge required for the subsequentdevelopment of action for the epidemiologicalmonitoring of the effects of ionising radiation on
patients.
The relevant actions are classified into six categories:
regulations,exposure information system,monitoringof effects of ionising radiation, surveys, the scientifictriality of information/training/technology
monitoring, and research. All these topics concern
IRSN to varying degrees and some are actually
included in its missions. Two topics concern IRSN
in particular: diagnostic reference levels and medical
exposure observatory.

JOINT IRSN/AVN/GRS GUIDE TO SAFETYASSESSMENTIRSN and its German and Belgian counterparts (GRSand AVN, respectively) have been developing close
collaboration in many fields for several years,
including research, safety studies and exchanges of information
on problems encountered in nuclear installations in order to improvetheir competencies in nuclear safety. After in-depth comparisonof the safety assessment practices implemented by the three organisations,they decided to draw up a joint guide to safety assessment.
The purpose of this guide is to give recommendations on theperformance of safety analyses with reference to safety dossiers
submitted by nuclear operators. It specifies the rules to be compliedwith in order to ensure the quality of those analyses and stresses,
in particular, the objectivity and technical quality of assessments
as these are essential factors for the credibility of the resulting
appraisals. The guide is applicable to assessments for all typesof nuclear installations or activities, including transport and storageof radioactive materials.

Diagnostic reference levels
The order of 12 February 2004 specifies in article 5:“IRSN is responsible for collecting the data requiredfor periodic updating of diagnostic reference levels.
For this purpose, it receives, from the operator or
the authorised party, the results of the assessments
conducted in pursuance of articles 2 and 3.” Theexaminations concerned by these provisions include
conventional x-ray examinations (six for adults,four for children), four scanning examinations in

The work completed in 2004 concerned, in particular, the generalprinciples of conducting safety assessments. This will be followedby more technical aspects concerning safety principles and the key
points of assessments for the various types of nuclear installations
and activities.

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TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCEFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESTECHNIC AL SUPPORT WITH REGARDTO NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGIC AL RISK

Positioning a patient for a scanning examination.

adults and 10 nuclear medicine examinations.
IRSN’s action in 2004 mainly consisted in presenting
the modes of application of these provisions tohealthcare professionals and updating data sheets
along with experts from learned scientific societies.
Data collection has been started. By late 2004,
about 10 nuclear medicine departments (out ofapproximately 300) and one radiology department(out of about 5,000) had sent IRSN the data requiredby the order. In addition, several radiology departments asked IRSN for help in validating the dosimetric data supplied by their installations or measuring
the doses delivered to patients’ skin.

FOCUS

STRENGTHENING COOPERATION WITH CHINESE SAFETY AND RADIATIONPROTECTION ORGANISATIONSHaving started some twenty years ago when French companies built the Daya Bay nuclear power
plant (China), cooperation between IRSN and its Chinese partners in the field of nuclear safety andradiation protection mainly concerned the training of personnel and the sharing of analysis
methods and tools.
In 2004, the Chinese authorities and IRSN agreed to give this cooperation a new boost which resulted in the performanceor start-up of several actions in the course of the year. In this context, the Director General of IRSN met the managersof the Chinese safety and radiation protection authority and of nuclear safety assessment and research organisations.
In addition, a new programme was arranged to receive Chinese trainees at IRSN and a study was started to promote joint
projects on radiation protection and nuclear safety including the setting up of associated laboratories. Preliminary
discussions were also held on the association of Chinese organisations with IRSN research programmes such as
the international CABRI programme and the SOURCE TERM programme.

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Cardiological radiology installation at Cochin
Hospital.

FOCUS

Observatory of medical exposures
to ionising radiation
The frequency of the various radiological examinations and the corresponding doses must be known
in order to assess what contribution medical exposure
makes to the population’s total exposure.This datais also required in order to meet the increasing
public demand for information on medical practices,
the number of treatment sessions and the corresponding doses. For this reason, IRSN and InVS are
working together to create an observatory of
medical exposure to ionising radiation for the purposes of public assessment.
In 2004, preliminary work was carried out to draw
up an analysis of the data available in France frominstitutional databases (CNAM-TS and SAE). This
resulted in a count of approximately 44.3 million
treatment sessions per year including 3.5 million
scanning examinations but the data did not provide
any information on the exact nature of the treatment sessions or their corresponding doses. However,this initial summary forms the basis on which theobservatory will rely for future tasks in two maincategories to be performed in 2005:■ creation of a network of establishments representative of French practices;■ more specific investigations to obtain moredetailed analyses of practices.

HOSTING TRAINEES FROM CHINESE
SAFETY ORGANISATIONSHaving accepted a request for support fromthe IAEA regarding fire protection, IRSN welcomeda representative from China Atomic Energy Authority
and three engineers from Beijing Institute of Nuclear
Engineering in early May 2004.
For two weeks, IRSN agents gave explanations of their methodsof assessment and the standards applied, illustrated by actual analysis
cases. This new contact marks the beginning of a collaboration with
Chinese nuclear organisations in the field of fire and explosion
protection.
Furthermore, in the context of collaboration between IRSN and
NNSA-NSC, two engineers from the Beijing Nuclear Safety Centre(China) arrived at IRSN in October 2004 for a one-year stay: oneof them working on nuclear power plant safety reviews and the othertaking part in probabilistic safety assessments.

IRSN’s fire and explosion protection specialists received a Chinese delegation
on 14 May 2004 at the Fontenay-aux-Roses site.

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TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCEFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESO P E R AT I O N A L S U P P O RT I N T H E E V E N T
OF A CRISIS OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY

Discussion between parties in the crisis is facilitated by using maps showing
measurement points around the accident-affected installation.

Operational support in the eventof a crisis or radiological emergency
n the event of a crisis or radiological emergency, IRSN provides operational support during the emergency phaseitself but also during the post-accident phase. The Institute has the means to deal with all these situations.
It implements and sizes them according to the magnitude of the event.

I

In 2004, IRSN took part in the revision of official
texts related to radiological emergencies and how
to deal with them and in the transposition ofEuropean directives in these fields conducted by
SGDN. This work particularly involved drawing up
an interministerial directive on the action of publicauthorities in the event of a radiological emergency
and on the development of a directive related tothe performance and processing of environmental
radioactive measurements in the event of aradiological emergency. The first directive dates
from 7 April 2005 and gives IRSN a central role in
the technical coordination and interpretation ofenvironmental radioactivity measurements. To
prepare for this role, the organisation of crisis
management within IRSN evolved in 2004.

Emergencies
In the event of an emergency, IRSN provides public authorities with operational
support based on fixed and mobilemeans that can be mobilised rapidly:
emergency response centre, resources
for assessing individual exposure,
etc.
Developing crisis resources
Renovating the emergency response centre (CTC)
Renovation on the Institute’s CTC started in 2003
and was completed in 2004. As well as renovating
the infrastructures, the premises used for thetechnical units were enlarged and their ergonomics
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2 0 0 4equipment was resized and access to documentation was facilitated.
Improving the duty system
In 2004, the Institute carried out an overallreorganisation of its on-call system. Former practices, inherited from IPSN and OPRI were harmonised so as to produce a coordinated, homogenous
and coherent system. Moreover, the role of “dutyengineers” was clarified: they are now IRSN’s only
point of entry for emergency calls.
The system also includes agents who can bemobilised for IRSN’s mobile unit. They will be rushed
to the site of the accident in addition to the CTC
agents.

Radiological Consequences
Unit (CCR) x2• Design CCR• General CCR

PWR Installation
Assessment Unit (CEI REP) x 7• Supervisor• Control• Systems• Thermal-hydraulics• Containment• TIP/KPS• Audioconference
Mobilisationof CTCManagement Unit
(CD) x1• Technical Secretarial Centre (IA)Secretarial Unit
(CST) x1
• Secretary

Duty
engineer

IRSN Mobile Unit x2• Measurement Coordination• Measurement Facilities

Remote monitoring expert (TELERAY, etc.)

Monitoring of nuclear
material transport
x1

Operations expert
x2

Incident
management

The duty engineer is IRSN’s sole input point for all types of emergency calls
24 hours a day.

FOCUS
Organisation, methods and materials
The crisis organisation, the methods and the expert
assessment materials are constantly being improved.
Discussions on the expert assessment methods tobe adopted for an accident affecting EDF reactors
were pursued. Material to assist in the expert
assessment of the state of installations and theestimation of consequences for laboratories andplants was completed. In addition, in 2004, work
was carried out on emergencies that could affectan installation or ship of the French Navy.This work
resulted in the definition and implementation ofa specific organisation for the Unit in charge ofassessing the installation (“CEI-Marine”) in the
CTC. The Institute and naval staff entered into
discussions with a view to drawing up a common
expert assessment method and developing tools
to estimate the consequences of accidents.

REAL ACTION TAKEN BY THE CTC
IRSN’s Emergency response centre (CTC) went into
action in 2004 when two real incidents affected
EDF’s nuclear power plants:■ on Sunday 16 May, a fire broke out in reactor 2 of the Cattenom
power plant (Moselle), causing the destruction of electric cables.
As a preventive measure, the operator activated the “safety andradiological” internal emergency plan (PUI). Alerted by DGSNR’s
warning device, IRSN’s duty personnel arrived at the CTC at about
03.00 p.m. and monitored how the situation was developing.
At about 06.00 p.m., in the absence of anything worrying, the CTC
was deactivated and personnel were put on standby in their homes
until the next day (see Focus p. 92: Incident at Cattenom);■ on Wednesday 23 June at about 07.00 p.m.,a second incident occured at
the Paluel site (Seine-Maritime).
1

Exercises and feedback
IRSN took part in 12 exercises organised by publicauthorities to test the national crisis organisation,
via the activation of its CTC and the dispatch ofits mobile unit to the prefecture’s operational
control centre (PCO). It should be emphasized thatthe type of accidents envisaged (military installations, transport) and the subjects dealt with during
the exercises are more and more diversified,
especially during the post-accident phase.
Among the lessons learnt from these exercises isthat it is essential to continue developing expert
assessment methods. For EDF reactors, this concerns
specific situations (shutdown). For laboratories,
plants and transport, we should continue developing
pre-calculated data sheets on the three types ofdischarge, the consequences and specific tools.
Finally, these exercises emphasized that a great
effort should be devoted to improving coordination,

4
3

5

3

6

2
3

1

At about 07.00 p.m., a vast
amount of seaweed comes in

2

Clogging of the two rotating drum
screens for the cooling water for reactor 3

3

Shortly afterwards, emergency shutdown of reactor 2
was unavoidable and then reactors 1 and 4 were shut down as a precaution

4

At the requests of EDF and DGSNR, IRSN mobilised its Emergency Response Centre (CTC)at about 11.00 p.m. to monitor the development of the situation

5

The CTC remained mobilised all night long6

The decision to demobilise was made at about 03.00 p.m. the next day after various reviews

Although these two incidents presented little risk as far as reactor
safety was concerned, they showed the CTC’s capacity for reaction
and the high level of professional motivation on the part ofthe duty teams.

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TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCEFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESO P E R AT I O N A L S U P P O RT I N T H E E V E N T
OF A CRISIS OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY

Discussion between the doctor and contamination measurement experts in IRSN’s
Master Gemini mobile laboratory.

interpreting environmental measurements andmanaging the post-accident phase. Furthermore,
the CTC should renew its mapping tools to be able
to meet the requirements of outside contacts more
effectively.

Fixed operational resources forassessing individual exposure
In the event of a crisis, in addition to its mobile
resources, IRSN may have to use the fixed resources
located on the sites of Fontenay-aux-Roses (Hautsde-Seine) and Le Vésinet (Yvelines). These resources
are dedicated to the dosimetric monitoring of

exposed workers and in the event of an accident,
suspected external irradiation or internal contamination, they are used to assess the doses received
by a small number of victims.For each of these resources, the operational capacities have been estimatedby associating the number of examinations it ispossible to carry out with the acceptable detection
limits for emergency assessments.
The biological assessment of the dose received byexternal irradiation is based on the number of unstable chromosomic anomalies in the circulating
blood lymphocytes. IRSN has implemented a technique that can process 200 blood samples in two

FOCUS

EXERCISE IN DEALING WITH VICTIMS OF A RADIOLOGICAL ATTACKIRSN took part in exercise R 53 concerning operations to deal with victims of a radiologicalterrorist attack. It was carried out at the Necker Hospital (Paris) on Sunday 10 October 2004
and organised by the Paris Public Hospitals, SAMU 75 (mobile accident unit), Police Headquartersof Paris and DGSNR.
The Paris Fire Brigade, SPRA and IRSN were invited to take part. The Minister of Health and the representative of
the Minister of the Interior were present during the exercise.
The scenario involved a “dirty” bomb exploding in a public place, leading to the spontaneous arrival at a hospital of
50 people, plus three seriously injured people brought by ambulance. The aim of the exercise was to test whether
the required equipment was in place in the event of radioactive contamination. Personnel from the Necker Hospital Nursing
College played the role of contaminated victims. The tents for receiving victims and for decontamination had been put
in place beforehand so that they could be put up quickly.
IRSN sent the following personnel to the Necker Hospital:■ two operators to carry out internal contamination tests with the mobile laboratory (Master Gémini);■ three operators to carry out radioactivity tests upstream and downstream of the decontamination chain;■ a doctor to observe operations;■ a specialist at the local emergency control centre called the “Control Tower”;■ a doctor in charge of communication.
IRSN was involved in sorting the people who arrived at the hospital and carrying out individual contamination tests.

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2 0 0 4IRSN experts are called upon to create suitablescenarios for all crisis exercises.

FOCUS
weeks with a dose uncertainty of ± 1 Gy. In 2004,
a convention of mutual assistance was signed with
NRPB (United Kingdom) and BfS (Germany)
whereby each signatory can request assistancefrom the two other parties if more than 300 samples
have to be processed. If those involved need to beprovided with passive dosimeters, IRSN has
4,000 dosimeters that it can process in two batchesof 2,000 dosimeters in one and a half days foreach batch.
Internal contamination is judged by measuring
bodily retention via whole-body radiometry andby measuring radionuclides in excreta (urine, stools).
The operational capacity of IRSN’s fixed whole-bodyradiometry resources for measuring pulmonary
retention of actinides, retention of radioactive isotopes of iodine in the thyroid and retention of fission
and activation products in the whole body is presented in table 1. The operational capacities of IRSN
in radiotoxicological analysis are presented in table 2.
Depending on the complexity of the exposure
situation and the information available (the physicochemical characteristics of the contaminant for
example), it takes between thirty minutes andfour hours to assess the dose received by a contaminated person.

EXERCISE IN DEALING WITH AN ACCIDENTINVOLVING TRANSPORTED RADIOACTIVE
MATERIAL
On 30 September 2004, a national crisis exercise wascarried out to simulate a transport accident involving
radioactive material.
For the first time, the scenario concerned rail transport. There was
supposed to be a collision between a tanker and a railway wagon loadedwith a package of irradiated fuel from an EDF power plant, at a levelcrossing near Saint-Pierre-des-Corps railway yard (Indre-et-Loire).
The expert assessment involved making a diagnostic of the condition of
the package and forecasting its evolution so as to evaluate theenvironmental consequences of the accident and assess the solution
proposed by the sender for recuperating the package.
As well as preparing and coordinating the exercise, IRSN deployed
its crisis organisation to provide support to public authorities (itactivated the emergency response centre and sent a mobile unit to thesite of the accident).
The exercise highlighted the progress made since the previous exercise,especially in the organisation of the mobile unit, and the main points
the Institute needs to improve, i.e., feedback from the site of theaccident, autonomy in means of communication, etc.

Setting up an accident scenario.

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TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCEFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESO P E R AT I O N A L S U P P O RT I N T H E E V E N T
OF A CRISIS OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY

At the operational control station, IRSN experts explain the action plan
to be implemented around the accident-affected installation to representativesof the fire brigade.

Operational capacity of IRSN’s fixed whole-body radiometry resources
Pulmonary retentionof actinides

Retention of iodinein the thyroid

Retention in the whole bodyof fission and activation productsRadionuclide

239Pu

241Am

U natural

125I

129I

131I

57Co

60Co

134Cs

137Cs

Detection
limit (*)
(Bq)

13,800

60

750

3

5.2

6.4

100

72

64

100

Countingtime

10 minutes

10 minutes

5 minutes

Operational
capacity

210 people per week

210 people per week

560 people per week(*) Detection limits were estimated for a standard man of 70 kg and increased to take into account a possible increase in the ambient background in the case of an
accident.

Operational capacity of IRSN’s radiotoxicological medical analysis laboratory
Direct measurementof gamma
emitters
in urine

Direct measurement Beta measurementof betaof strontium 90
emitters
in urine
in urine(3H, 14C, 90Sr)

Measurementof alpha
emitters
in urine orstools(238-239Pu,
234-235-238U)

Weighted measurementof uranium(natural or
depleted)in urine

Detection limit

16 Bq/l

3,840 Bq/l

1 Bq/l

2 Bq/l

5 µg/lCounting time

15 minutes

7.5 minutes

60 minutes

36 hours (*)

Immediate measurement

Operational capacity

270 samples
per day

480 samples
per day

60 samples
per day

32 samples
per day

50 samples
per day(*) A fixed period of at least three days must be added to the counting time for the pre-processing of the samples.

Support in managing post-accident
situations
Two working groups were set up within
IRSN to develop proposals for guidelines
on the management of post-accident
situations and a strategy for measuring
individual and environmental radioactivity.

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2 0 0 4

The group working on “Guidelines” discussed thelifting of the sheltering directive after a nuclear
accident. Sheltering protects the population fromthe immediate consequences of an accident but
cannot be prolonged for very long. A decision has
to be taken on whether to keep the population inDuring the exercise, the fire brigade has the taskof taking field samples specified by IRSN.

FOCUS
the area concerned or whether to move them away
temporarily (or even definitively). This difficult
subject has received little attention from theinternational community and cannot be settledwith technical criteria alone. The parties involved(public authorities, elected representatives, thepopulation) would, no doubt, have to confer witheach other in depth during the post-accident phase.
During this phase, the radiological risk comesfrom long-term, low-dose rate exposure.
The group working on “measuring radioactivity”
started by stating the main objectives of the radioactivity measurements at the different stages of a
nuclear or radiological crisis:■ during the emergency phase, the area affectedby the passage of the radioactive plume has to be
determined, the radioactive release has to be assessed and the various consequences of the accident
evaluated;■ at the beginning of the post-accident phase,measurements enable an initial radiologicalcharacterisation to be made and help publicauthorities take decisions regarding the protectionof the population concerned;■ then, during the post-accident phase, measurements will make it possible to define contaminatedareas where the maximum levels acceptable forthe marketing and consumption of foodstuffs havebeen exceeded and to define rehabilitation strategies for agricultural and built-up areas.
Moreover,in 2004,the Institute continued developing
computer tools for accident situations to measureenvironmental radiation (DATARAD) and produce
graphic representations of these results (CARTORAD).
This work should allow IRSN to effectively carryout its mission of centralising and interpreting, at
national level, all the results of the contamination
measurements taken during the accident situation

PIERRELATTE EXERCISE
The main crisis exercise of 2004 was carried out at
the Tricastin site (Drôme) on 18 and 19 November under
the coordination of SGDN.
This greatly mobilised the Institute in various ways. In addition toorganising the technical scenario, activating the CTC and sendinga mobile unit to the operational control centre, a new element was
introduced, i.e., a person was sent the CICNR, placed under the authorityof the Prime Minister, and to a crisis unit set up by the Ministry of theInterior’s COGIC. These inter-governmental units do not systematicallytake part in all exercises.
IRSN’s role here is to provide technical advice.
Moreover, the Pierrelatte exercise presented a certain numberof characteristics: it was aimed at testing the ability of the national
crisis organisation to manage the emergency phase of the accident andalso the start of the post-accident phase. Among the issues addressed
was the lifting of the sheltering directive for populations living near
the site. During the exercise, IRSN made various recommendations tothe safety authorities (DSND then DGSNR), related to consumption
restrictions, rehabilitation of contaminated areas, taking a census andchecking the population. This exercise highlighted that IRSN needed toincrease its presence at local level in the event of crises.

At the operational control station, IRSN reviews aspects
regarding the measurements taken in the environment.

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TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCEFOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIESO P E R AT I O N A L S U P P O RT I N T H E E V E N T
OF A CRISIS OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCYIn IRSN’s truck, equipped with a radioactivity measurement laboratory, 12 people
at a time can be given thyroid and chest check-ups.

FOCUS

CD-ROM – “INFORMATION ON NUCLEARRISK AND HOW IT IS MANAGED”
In April 2004, IRSN distributed a CD-ROM on nuclear
risk and how it is managed.
The purpose was to provide clear information, accessible tonon-specialists, on nuclear accidents, their possible short - andlong-term consequences and the way an accident situation
can be managed.
Indeed, it became clear that all parties concerned should possess
the same knowledge on nuclear risk and how to manage it.
This CD-ROM is mainly intended for decentralised bodies in chargeof managing crises – prefectorial bodies, departments in charge ofcivil defence, fire protection, emergency services, departments incharge of health, agriculture and facilities, the police force, etc.
It is also intended for CLIs, given the diversity of the missions
they carry out.
In 2004, the Institute supported the distribution of this tool byorganising detailed presentations of the CD-ROM, at the requestof DSND, ANCLI’s Scientific Board, SGDN’s protection andsafety of the State division and the CLI of Nogent-sur-Seine (Aube).

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2 0 0 4and the post-accident situation by the various
teams, especially the fire brigade and the operators.
To evaluate how the contamination of the foodchain and the different parts of the biosphere evolve
over a period of time, the Institute’s CTC relies ona specialised team located at Cadarache (Bouchesdu-Rhône) that uses impact calculation tools like
ASTRAL and cartographic representation software
programs.The team can thus integrate the environmental data from the field and from modelling.
This organisation was tested during the SECNUC,
post-accident phase, crisis exercise. It concernedan accidental release from the COGEMA installationsin Pierrelatte (Drôme) on 18 and 19 November 2004.
Indeed, IRSN was very involved in the preparationof this exercise, coordinated by the SGDN and the
MARN (DDSC). It was also involved in the exercise
carried out in Belleville-sur-Loire (Cher) in March
2005.The Institute’s support in this field included:■ preparation of the strategy to measure radioactivity in the environment and in foodstuffs;■ identification of the actions that could be implemented during the hours following the lifting of
the sheltering directive;■ development of a draft version of a tool thatwould help IRSN’s CTC decide upon the first actions
needed for the rehabilitation of agricultural andbuilt-up areas.

The renovation of mobile facilities entails the
updating of a whole range of equipment (vehicles,
measuring equipment, data processing equipment).

Operational support in case of crisis
IRSN provides the State’s decentralised
departments with in-the-field operational support for the coordinationand validation of radioactivity measurements performed by different operators in the environment and on the
population.
This support concerns the emergency phase andthe post-accident phase. In 2004, for each exercise,the Institute’s mobile unit, composed of a team
to coordinate measurements and a team with amobile measurement system, was mobilised forreal or fictive situations and put at the disposal of
the site’s operational control centre. During the“transport” exercise at Saint-Pierre-des-Corps(Indre-et-Loire), the unit was reinforced by a unit
head who also gave operational radiation protection
advice to those involved in the exercise.

FOCUS

PLAN TO RENEW MOBILE RESOURCES
In 2004, IRSN started drawing up a plan to renew its mobile resources. This mainly concerns
the resources needed for the different situations that the Institute may have to deal with.
The Institute has a stock of mobile resources, the oldest of which was developed in the 1970s but most of which date backto the 1980s. They are intended for carrying out large-scale anthropogammametric measurements on people likely to have been
exposed to radioactive releases. The purpose of these measurements is to sort the population according to their levelof internal contamination in order to direct them to the suitable medical departments.
These resources can also be used to measure radioactivity present in food chain samples or environmental samples
via γ spectrometry.
These resources have been used in France during emergency exercises in which IRSN participated and for various otheroperations: at polluted sites (the Bayard site in Saint-Nicolas-d’Aliermont, Seine-Maritime), to monitor transportation(SNCF wagons), to measure exposure to radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl accident (Saint-Jean-d’Ormont, Vosges,
and in the Mercantour) or for incidents involving contamination during the shutdown of nuclear power plants.
The stock of mobile operation resources has, on the whole, been maintained in operational condition but due to its age,
it is becoming more and more difficult to maintain.

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2 0 0 4135

1,714,000
personal dosimeterssupplied and used

1,019

analysesof drinking water
carried out

150

analysesof foodstuffs
carried out
Almost150

radiation protection
operations

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2 0 0 4IRSN ACTIVITIES IN 2004

Contractual servicesof expert appraisal,
research and measurement
Selling services enables IRSN to turn to account the know-how and specificskills it has acquired in the nuclear field that are applicable to other fieldsof activity. Selling services is also a way of optimising the use of technical platforms
developed for research programmes. It also enables the Institute to diversify
its sources of income.
Excluding the co-financing of research, the services provided by IRSN correspondto about 5% of its present budget. Once developed, they should not exceed 15%of this budget. Moreover, the Institute is careful to ensure that these services remaincompatible with its mission of support and technical assistance to public authorities.

> 138 Services related to statutory requirements> 142 Services not related to statutory requirements

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CONTRACTUAL SERVICES OF EXPERT APPRAISAL,RESEARCH AND MEASUREMENTS E RV I C E S R E L AT E D TO S TAT U TO RY
REQUIREMENTS

Evaporator room of the water analysis laboratory at Le Vésinet (Yvelines).

Services related to statutory
requirements
Radiological testing of water intended
for human consumption
The evolution of regulations aimed atproviding better consumer protection
has led to a high demand in radioactivity
measurements of water intended forhuman consumption. IRSN provides
radiological water analysis services tomanufacturers and regulatory bodies(DDASS).
The radiological quality of water is assessed via
two parameters: the total indicative dose (TID) andthe tritium activity. The measuring strategy consists
in measuring the tritium activity and the overall
activity of alpha and beta emitting radionuclides.
If these activities are less than 100 Bq/l, 0.1 Bq/land 1 Bq/l respectively, the TID is considered asless than 0.1 mSv per year.If this is not the case,further
analyses are carried out to identify the natural or
artificial radionuclides responsible for theseexcessive values and a dose calculation is conducted
for a consumption of 730 litres of water per year.
This dose is then compared with the 0.1 mSv/year
defined by the Euratom directive, based on the
WHO recommendations.
The time required to conduct the analyses varies
from 4 to 12 weeks, depending on the tests. In 2004,
about 20% of the cases processed required further
analyses.As a result of new regulations, IRSN tested
three times more samples in 2004 than in 2003.

Radon detection
Within the framework of risk management related
to radon in buildings, IRSN provided detection
services and conducted further investigations as
defined in the regulations. In 2004, radon measurements were taken in several establishments open

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2 0 0 4to the public. The IRSN department concerned(Radiation protection Response and Assistance
Service) received ISO 9001 certification from AFAQ
for studies and expert assessments conducted inradon control.

Cobalt 60 irradiator, “ICO 4000”.

Radiation protection of workers
Decree 2003-296 of 31 March 2003
and the associated application orders,
aimed at protecting workers fromionising radiation, have led IRSN to provide
services involving the measurement of individual,
external and internal doses in exposed workers,
expert assessments involving workstation studies
and consultancy services for industrial physicians
and people skilled in radiation protection.

Monitoring external exposureof exposed workers
Over 250,000 workers are at risk of external exposure to ionising radiation in France. According toregulations, the monitoring of occupational exposure is conducted via passive dosimetry whatever
the field (medicine, the nuclear industry or not).
There are various techniques for measuring doses:
photographs,thermoluminescence or trace detection.
They result in a wide range of dosimeters adapted
to various radiation fields and variable doses.
In 2004, IRSN monitored about 150,000 workers
in 18,000 establishments. The breakdown of
dosimeters used for this is as follows:■ 1,600,000 photographic dosimeters;■ 61,000 thermoluminescent dosimeters;■ 53,000 trace-detection dosimeters.

Monitoring the internal
contamination of exposed workers
Assessing the exposure of workers at risk of internal
contamination is conducted by determining theincorporated activity in the body. Two types ofanalyses are used, i.e., measurement of incorporated
activity via whole-body radiometry and measurementof excretion activity via the radiotoxicologicalanalyses of urine and stools. In 2004, IRSN:■ conducted 131 whole-body radiometry examinations;■ and regarding radiotoxicological analyses:- 3,889 people were monitored;- 7,790 biological samples were tested (urine, stools,
hair, nails, blood);- 21,089 tests were conducted;- 64 different radionuclides were measured during
analyses.

Qualification of measuring installations
In 2004, IRSN was requested on several occasions
to examine whole-body radiometry installations:Civaux nuclear power plant (Vienne), CEA centres
in Valduc (Côte-d’Or) and Grenoble (Isère) in orderto check the calibration quality of these installations.

Studying workstations on SNCF
trains transporting radioactive
material
Regulations regarding the rail transport of dangerous
goods require operators to have a radiologicalprotection programme for the transport ofradioactive material.Within this framework, SNCF
entered into a contract with IRSN whereby thelatter will carry out dosage measurement campaigns
at workstations for the nine types of radioactive
materials transported. In 2004, IRSN characterised
four types of transported material. The five othertypes will be studied in 2005.

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CONTRACTUAL SERVICES OF EXPERT APPRAISAL,RESEARCH AND MEASUREMENTS E RV I C E S R E L AT E D TO S TAT U TO RY
REQUIREMENTS

Approval of protection equipment by technical centres.

Conformity of materials and equipment
IRSN has two technical centres incharge of checking that equipment andmaterials comply with standards (orany other pre-defined baseline).These
centres can intervene at the requestof operators, manufacturers or authorities, within the framework of programmes involving the developmentof materials or processes or to meetstatutory requirements.
In their fields of expertise, they take part in drawing
up statutory and normative texts for France andfor other countries.
The activities of IRSN’s Technical Centre for Radiological Protection Instrumentation Approval (CTHIR)
involve individual dosimetry, atmospheric or
environmental dosimetry,measurements of contamination (water, air, surfaces) and detection ofcriticality accidents.
In 2004, CTHIR participated in standardisation
working groups within the framework of the SC45B
subcommittee in charge of radiation protection
instrumentation within IEC. 2004 saw the publicationof standard IEC 62022 for which the CTHIR was
project manager. It concerns systems to detectsources of γ radiation transported in vehicles. CTHIR140

I R S NA N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4is also part of the French delegation to CENELEC(European standards) and is in charge of transcribing
IEC standards into European standards.
After analysing test results and technical dossiers,
CTHIR gave its opinion on the compliance to relevant
standards of an operational dosimeter and a detection set for criticality accidents. It calibrated
17 probes associated with this type of system – thisis done before they are first put into service or when
they are returned for maintenance.
Examinations on the compliance of radiation protection equipment are carried out in accordancewith CTHIR’s quality management system which
received ISO 9001 certification, version 2000, at
the end of 2002.
CTHIR operates the IRMA irradiator (Saclay, Essonne).
This installation can irradiate equipment andmaterial within the framework of studies on theirresistance to radiation (dose rate of up to 20 kGy/h).
Campaigns conducted in 2004 represent a total oftwenty-eight weeks and were mainly directed at research units and manufacturers of radiation detectors.
The expertise of IRSN’s Technical Centre for Nuclear
Equipment Approval (CTHEN) involves the approvalof safety equipment used in the nuclear industry(mainly high-efficiency filters and fire dampers)
and the certification of individual protection
equipment.

Operational dosimetry.

CTHEN receives notice from the Ministry of Labour
to carry out EC type examinations on clothing andgloves intended to protect workers from ionisingradiation or radioactive contamination. Its missions
are governed by an agreement signed on 23 August

2004 between IRSN and the Ministry. Two typesof ventilated clothing received “EC” certificationin 2004 and 118 “extended” certificates were issued(following modifications to previously certified
equipment or associated technical dossier).

FOCUS

NON-NUCLEAR THIRD-PARTY EXPERTISE
Expertise gathered in the field of nuclear safety enables IRSN to conduct critical analyses of studies
on the environmental dangers of classified industrial facilities belonging to different sectorsof activities (agri-food industries, fine chemistry, petrochemistry, etc.).
Among the 50 or so critical analyses conducted by IRSN in 2004, we can cite those linked to ARKEMA’s sites in Balan (Ain),
Carling (Moselle), Saint-Fons (Rhône) and La Chambre (Savoie), Cristal Union’s alcohol distillation plants in Bazancourt(Marne) and Bray-sur-Seine (Seine-et-Marne), Grande Paroisse’s plant in Grandpuits (Seine-et-Marne) that manufacturesammonium nitrate-based fertilisers, SOGIF-Air Liquide’s sites in Fos-sur-Mer (Bouches-du-Rhône), Tavaux (Jura), Richemont(Moselle) and Grand-Synthe (Nord).
To conduct these analyses, IRSN relies on its expertise in thefollowing fields: fire, explosion, atmospheric dispersion, commandcontrol, reliability of components, human factors, seismology,
flooding, etc.
The Institute also takes part in different working groups set upby the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development:
technological risk prevention plans, toxicological reference values,a group of third-party expert bodies as well as several sector-based
working groups (chlorine, LPG, ammonia, flammable liquids, etc.).
Finally, IRSN provides the administration with technical support
when discussions are held at European level on the best
technologies available in terms of risk prevention.
Staff of the non-nuclear installations safety analysis centre.

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CONTRACTUAL SERVICES OF EXPERT APPRAISAL,RESEARCH AND MEASUREMENTS E RV I C E S N OT R E L AT E D TO S TAT U TO RY
REQUIREMENTS

Checking a filter with a radiation measuringassembly.

Services not related to statutory
requirements
Study regarding the presenceof radionuclides in the Toulouse urban area
sewer system
In 2004, IRSN conducted a study at therequest of the Toulouse water company,
Compagnie Générale des Eaux deToulouse (Haute-Garonne), on theorigin of low-level radioactivity foundin the Toulouse urban area sewage
system.

A portable Telehydro probe has been developed
to take measurements at precise points along water
courses.

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2 0 0 4This study, in fact, was focused on the presence ofradionuclides in discharges from hospitals using
unsealed sources for diagnostic or radiotherapy
purposes. Having a half-life of about eight days, theiodine 131 used was found in waste water, sludge
and incineration residues at water treatment plants.
Technical landfill centres could refuse to accept
these residues owing to the presence of thisradionuclide.
The study comprised four successive phases:
verification of the origin of the radionuclides witha Telehydro portable detector, identification of thesource (urine or faeces) of the radioactivity, studyof its dilution in the sewer network, and measurement of the dose rate at various points of thepurification plant. The results were presented in
December 2004 and the study report was delivered
to the customer in February 2005.

The radiological monitoring of nuclear power
plants entails taking samples from allenvironmental milieus.

Operational radiation protection services
IRSN’s services in operational radiation
protection cover all entities possessing
or using ionising radiation sources,
mainly in France but also in other countries.
These services consist in consulting and study activities (sealed or unsealed sources, contaminatedsites), monitoring of equipment and installations(statutory radiation protection inspections, inspec-

tions on the efficiency of VHE filters and iodine traps)
and action (such as safetying of sources, radon detection and measurements) especially in abnormal
conditions. In 2004, the Institute provided about
150 service missions of all types. Its customers
included industrial firms in the nuclear field (EDF,
COGEMA, DCN) and also public and privateorganisations.

IRSN provides measurement and study
services in the radioecological field forindustrial firms and public authorities.
Radioecological follow-up of nuclear
power plants
Every year since 1991, IRSN has conducted radioecological monitoring of French nuclear power
plants for EDF. This entails identifying and characterising the marking due to effluent releases fromthose power plants as opposed to radioactivity ofother exogenous origins: atmospheric nuclear tests
in the 1960s to 1980s, the Chernobyl accident andreleases from hospitals.
This annual study involves the sampling andprocessing of between 600 and 700 samples inland, aquatic, continental and marine environments.
IRSN has developed the necessary tools and knowhow in the fields of sampling, sample processing
and analysis and in the interpretation of results inorder to take into account the very low activity

Activity report (137Cs/134Cs)

Radioecology services
1000

Chernobyl fallout
Measurements in effluentsDownstream detection

100

10

1

0,1
1986

1990

1995

2000

2003

137Cs/134Cs activity reports measured in continental aquatic samples taken
downstream of power plants, from power plant effluents and fallout fromthe Chernobyl accident.

levels to be measured. These chronological series
complete those supplied by IRSN’s OPERA networkand can be used to annually update the environmental baselines for areas near nuclear power plants
whether or not they are affected by releases.

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Tricastin nuclear power plant (Drôme).

The services agreement with EDF also encompasses
applied studies, particularly regarding the behaviourof carbon 14, tritium and iodine 129 in the environment. This agreement was renewed for the years
2005-2007.

Studies around the COGEMA sitein La Hague
The radioecology services contract of several years’
standing between IRSN and COGEMA has been
extended to cover two topics concerning theirradiated fuel processing plant in La Hague(Manche). As a result, a first study in 2004 was
conducted to validate the DISPRO calculation codeused to predict the dispersal of radionuclide releases
in the Manche area of France from the La Hague
plant. This required offshore measurement
campaigns off the coast of Nord-Cotentin. A second
study concerned granulometric distributions ofaerosols discharged by the stack of plant UP2-800.
It showed that the aerosols released were scatteredin the environment in liquid form and probably
contained organic components.

Operating method for radon measurement
In the context of its “quality” policy, Gaz de France
regularly analyses the composition of the gas it
distributes. An operating method to measure radonin natural gas was defined by IRSN. This process
involves special technical skills which required
the training of Gaz de France personnel by IRSN.

Services concerning dispersalof contaminants
IRSN provides contractually specified
services regarding the ventilation of
installations and the dispersal ofradioactive and non-radioactive contaminants (such as malodorous contaminants) in nuclear and non-nuclear
fields.
These services include studies on the behaviourof installations’ ventilation systems in normal or
accident conditions. They are based on the use of
calculation codes developed by IRSN (SIMEVENT144

I R S NA N N U A L

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2 0 0 4or FLAMME_S/SIMEVENT when the accident
situation studied consists in a fire outbreak in ventilated premises).

Modelling and study work
The modelling used in the SIMEVENT code is basedon an electrical analogy in which the ventilation
system is divided into nodes (pressure, temperatureand uniform concentrations) connected by branches
representing the behaviour of various items ofequipment (fans, pipes, filters, valves, regulators,etc.). The code simulates air flows in the system

LPG storage spheres.

cations to the installation, for example, or thesequences of degraded or accident situations on

Schéma de ventilation
+

V3

-

A
V3
B
C

V1
V1

D

+

V2
E

LaveurF
G+

in steady-state or transient operating conditions(calculation of pressure values at nodes and flowrate values in branches). It also processes thetransport and retention of gaseous and particulate
species and the clogging of filters by aerosols. The
main input data is the air resistance values of thevarious resistant equipment (calculated on thebasis of pressure and flow rate values measured
with the installation in a given state) and theoperating curves for the various fans.
Conducting a study with the SIMEVENT code begins
with the modelling of a reference state for theventilation system on the basis of the study of
drawings, an on-site study and measured results
generally provided by the firm. It is then possible
to calculate the ventilation systems after modifi-+

Cooling coil

Balancing damper

Check valve

Heating coil

Isolation damper

Fan

VHE filter

Pressure controller-

Ventilation drawing.

FOCUS

PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTS APPLIED TO INDUSTRIAL SITES
Owing to the experience IRSN has acquired on pressurised water reactors, the Ministry of Ecology
and Sustainable Development has entrusted it with a pilot project for the developmentof a probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) for an industrial installation of the Seveso type.
The objective of this project is to clarify the contribution that a probabilistic assessment could make to the studyof the safety of industrial installations.
The site chosen is the filling centre at Herrlisheim (Alsace), operated by Rhône Gaz, which volunteered for the project.
The selected plant receives, stores, packages and ships liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).
The study entails identifying the various accident sequences which could lead to a BLEVE and identifying the probabilitiesof those sequences. The scenarios examined feature the occurrence and then the ignition of a gas leak resulting in a fire
affecting, in the short or medium term, one of the storage containers: either a road tanker or a tank wagon.
After defining a suitable study procedure for the installation, IRSN performed modelling in 2004 for a case representing
the initiating event leading to BLEVE (leak on an LPG pipe). The method adopted, drawn from the method used for PSAs
performed by IRSN for nuclear power plants, was validated and then generalised to cover all triggering events.
The final report will be delivered in 2005.

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Control panel of the irradiation room for radiobiological studies or high-level
dosimetry.

Schéma SIMEVENT

R
Q

N0

P

0

P105A

600

O

-20

6000

5800

300

N
M

12500

130

3000

P105B

N12

-50

-170
14500

3300

N14
-300

N16
14500

-170

N18
14500

N20

* 200

-950

500

L

P105C

K

3500

150

-70

14500

3600

50

100

J
-500

J2

J4

*

I

J6

500

450

3500 100

0

300
2000

-70

1800
150

I20

4100

300

Node

P105E

H2

2000

-400

1500

-100

1950
200

100

F

F2

F6
200

-300

1400

E

P105F

F8
-200

100

F12

1500

50

600

18000
0

HO

-600

D6
100

E16

-900

-950

E18
4300

-1500

* Fan
Filter strength

E204300 -1800

Duct strength

D12

-300

-100

E14
4100

P105G

D8
600

C

1500

Chute strength

G20

*

18000

D

N0

K22
18600

P105D

J8

18000

H
G

L20

-700

Downstream pressure
controller
Check valve

B

Atmosphere

A
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

SIMEVENT drawing.

containment in the installation.These calculations
are performed using scenarios and hypotheses
which are precisely described by the firm in its

specifications. Some studies have the aim ofbalancing the ventilation of an installation by
calculating the position of balancing dampers so
as to obtain the desired pressure values in thepremises concerned.
As a result of an increase in the number of requests
for services, five major CEA installations werestudied in 2004. This type of service is of greatinterest to IRSN as it is a means of obtaining usefulfeedback on actual applications of the calculation
codes it has developed. It is important to emphasisethat these services do not constitute a safety
demonstration and that the results obtained in thiscontext do not give any indication of the conclusions
that may be drawn by IRSN when, in response toa request from a safety authority, it assesses asafety dossier incorporating those results.

Dosimetry services
IRSN’s installations, certified by
COFRAC, specify reference radiationlevels for photons and neutrons. They
are ideally suited for the provision ofservices in the field of metrology:
qualification and calibration of dosimeters andmeasuring instruments for radiation protection.
IRSN also performs studies to characterise various
installations: determining the dose rates and energy
spectra for ionising radiation present in the
installations examined. IRSN is also called upon in
the field of biological dosimetry to assess doses
received in cases where irradiation is suspected.
In all fields, it receives requests for its services fromwithin France and other countries.

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2 0 0 4Characterisation of radiation fields
in installations
CALIBAN installation
In 2004, on request from the CEA centre at Valduc(Côte-d’Or), IRSN carried out a measurement
campaign on the CALIBAN reactor (CEA-Valduc)
which is able to generate intense pulses of neutrons
and fission gamma rays. The study consisted incharacterising the beam of mixed neutron-gamma
radiation produced by the reactor.
Proton therapy centre
Ophthalmic and intercranial tumours are treatedusing proton beams at the Orsay proton therapy
centre (Essonne). Secondary radiation, mainly

Measurement with a tissue equivalent
proportional counter for the CPO proton
beam line.

consisting of high-energy neutrons, is produced
simultaneously and causes additional exposure
outside the beam, during treatment.To assess these
exposures for patients and the doses delivered to
the various electronic systems, IRSN conducted
the mapping of dose rates in the treatment roomin 2004.
Krsko reactor
In October 2004, IRSN carried out neutronic measurements at the Krsko nuclear power plant (Slovenia)
on request from the operator. For highly irradiating
locations, the measurements were performed witha set of Bonner spheres.
Reactor of Le Vigilant nuclear submarine
Technicatome is a company with a multi-spheresystem that is almost identical to that at IRSN for
neutron spectrometry. This system was used to
conduct measurements in 2004 on ISO reference
sources from IRSN and then in the environmentof the Le Vigilant nuclear submarine’s boiler roomin order to verify whether the fluence response
functions of the spheres in the IRSN system weretransferable to the Technicatome system.

Metrology activity
In 2004, the IRSN ionising radiation dosimetrylaboratory, certified by COFRAC for reference
photon beams, issued 53 calibration certificates:nine for IRSN and 44 for external customers. In
addition, it supplied two test reports in the context
of the approval of dosimetric instruments. Furthermore, in response to demand from some manufacturers, seven weeks were spent perfecting
dosimeters with calibrated beams.
The IRSN neutron metrology and dosimetrylaboratory, certified by COFRAC for reference
neutron radiation, issued 11 calibration certificates.
In addition, IRSN contributed to the European
EVIDOS project which aims to compare theresponses of individual active or passive dosimeters
exposed in mixed neutron-photon fields
representing those encountered in the nuclear
industry. IRSN is responsible for providing neutronenergy spectra and reference magnitudes (doseequivalent Hp(0.07) and Hp(10)).
In accordance with regulations, IRSN organised,at the end of 2004, a cross-comparison of dosimeters supplied by organisations that had applied
for approval for the assessment of external exposure
by means of individual passive dosimeters (516 dosimeters concerned). As the reference laboratory,
IRSN also participated in the cross-comparison ofpassive dosimeters organised by the IAEA.

Assessment of activity in biologicaldosimetry
The estimation by biological dosimetry of doses
received in cases of suspected or proven radiation
is based on the observation of unstable dicentricchromosomal aberrations formed in the lymphocytes of the individuals concerned. Since 1992, the
IRSN biological dosimetry laboratory, the only
recognised laboratory in France for this type of assessment, has performed more than 200 estimates ofindividual doses, including five in 2004.
For cases among the assessments performed in
2004, the individuals had been exposed several
tens of years previously for various reasons andwere, in particular, present in locations with highradioactivity. Owing to specific pathologies,
these persons consulted a doctor who looked fora link between their pathologies and possible

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REQUIREMENTS

Development of passive dosimeters.

exposure to ionising radiation. In three of the fourcases, the number of chromosomal aberrations
observed was greater than that for the non-exposed
population taken for reference. On the basis ofthese results, it may be considered that these
individuals were indeed exposed to substances,
radioactive or not, which could cause chromosomic
aberrations.
In four other cases, IRSN was called in for individuals
whose dosimeters indicated exposure although thecircumstances of that exposure were not clear. To
confirm the doses received, the only way of clearing

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2 0 0 4up any doubt is to perform dosimetry on theindividuals themselves: two of them had a positive
biological dose of borderline statistical significanceand two had a biological dose that was not different
from zero.
IRSN was also asked to carry out a biologicaldosimetry assessment for three persons working
on the demolition site of a former clinic and who
may have been in contact with radium needles. In
fact, none of them had been exposed to any
significant extent.

Reading and interpreting films.

Conventional radiology at Cochin Hospital,
Paris.

Assessment of dose received
by the foetus during a diagnostic examination
on a pregnant woman
IRSN is regularly called upon to conduct
dosimetric assessments for pregnant
women who have undergone radiological examinations.
When exposure to ionising radiation is envisaged
for a woman of child-bearing age, the consulting
doctor and the doctor who performs the examination must check whether she is pregnant. If

pregnancy is confirmed or cannot be ruled out,
special attention must be paid to the justification
for the examination. Allowance must be made forthe urgency of exposing the woman and the unborn
child. Nevertheless, every year there is a numberof accidental exposures of pregnant women. It istherefore not unusual for medical physicists to be
asked to assess the dose received by the foetus.
Nearly all these requests concern conventional

FOCUS

CONSULTING AND ASSISTANCE FOR HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALSThe IRSN medical radiation protection assessment unit circulated a leaflet in 2004 to inform
healthcare professionals of its missions regarding the radiation protection of patients and workers
in the medical field:■ collection and periodic updating of diagnostic reference levels;■ assistance and consulting of healthcare professionals;■ information to healthcare professionals and radiation protection training for personnel
in the medical field;■ performance of studies and assessments for healthcare professionals, patients
and, more generally, persons exposed to ionising radiation in the medical field;■ technical support for national authorities and organisations concerned by the radiation
protection of medical personnel and patients;■ contribution to knowledge of medical practices which may result in exposure to ionisingradiation, through an observatory set up in collaboration with InVS.
These missions concern about 18,000 professional staff, 130,000 workers and a great
many patients for an equipment population of approximately 50,000 installations ranging
from the dentist’s x-ray equipment to the 30-MV linear accelerator. The leaflet was circulated during the French national
radiology conference days (between 5,000 and 6,000 participants) and conference days for radiation protection officers(nearly 500 participants). These events provided the opportunity to meet professionals requiring advice and assistancein order to implement decree 2003-270 of 24 March 2003 and its implementation orders.

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Control desk of the interventional radiology department at Cochin Hospital, Paris.

radiology and scanning, with the foetus located in
the region examined or not.
In 2004, dosimetric assessments were conductedby IRSN on 51 pregnant patients who had undergone
one or more radiological examinations.These cases
were divided between conventional radiology (38)and scanning (23).
Reconstitution of the dose received by the foetus
is based, as far as possible, on the actual characteristics of the examination. For this purpose, forms
to be filled in by radiologists have been createdfor scanning, conventional radiology, vascularradiology and interventional
radiology. These forms specify all
the parameters required in orderto reconstitute precise doses (typeof installation, detector used, highvoltage, exposure time, charge, doseindex for conventional radiology
and scanning, etc.). Allowing fortechnological developments and,in particular, the complexity of the

Scanner interpretation console.

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2 0 0 4

medical equipment, the data is transmitted withmore or less detail and accuracy by the requesting
parties. As a result, the dose values for the foetus
are assessed either on the basis of data specific totypical radiological procedures (in cases where little
information is known) or by simulation software
after entering the exact parameters of the examination.
For the assessments conducted in 2004, the estimated doses range from less than a few micrograys,
when the foetus is within the diffused radiation(13 cases) to 55 milligrays (µGy), when the foetus
is in the region examined by scanning. For 14
cases (27.5%), the dose was less than 1 mGy; for
20 cases (39.2%),the dose was between 1 and 10 mGy;for 12 cases (23.5%),it was between 10 et 30 mGy;for five cases (10%), it was between 30 and 55 mGy.
Compared with international recommendations andespecially the recommendations in ICRP publication
84, these doses are lower than the value of 100 mGy
below which no effect has been demonstrated
regardless of the number of weeks into pregnancy.

The Rovno plant in Ukraine.

Collaboration with Eastern European
countries
Since the beginning of the 1990s, theinternational community has developed a high level of collaboration with
Eastern European countries in order toimprove the safety level of their nuclear
installations and reinforce the regulations they have introduced.
Nuclear safety in Eastern European countries is amajor target for IRSN’s international action. Cooperation in this field, in partnership with GRS
and in close collaboration with other European
technical safety organisations and those of thecountries concerned, involves in particular thedevelopment of statutory frameworks, the transfer
of design codes and training in their utilisation,and the conducting of safety assessments.

FOCUS

ASSISTANCE TO EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIESIRSN took part in about 30 projects providing assistance to Eastern European countries in 2004 inorder to improve the safety of their nuclear installations. In particular, the Institute participated insafety reviews for the RBMK reactors in Lithuania and Russia and the WER reactors in Ukraine.
In Lithuania: In 2004, IRSN continued its participation in the safety review for the new emergency shutdown system for reactor 2
at the Ignalina power plant whose installation was completed in summer 2004. This review was conducted in the context
of a European project providing support for the Lithuanian safety authority (VATESI) managed by Riskaudit.
In Russia, the in-depth review of the safety report on reactor 1 of the Kursk power plant, which began in December 2001,
was completed in May 2004. Financed by the nuclear safety fund (NSA) managed by EBRD, the project worth about 1.5 million euros
brought together some 50 Western experts representing about 10 nuclear safety organisations from seven countries: IRSN (France),
GRS (Germany), SERCO Assurance and NNC (United Kingdom), ES Konsult (Sweden), NRG (The Netherlands), AECL (Canada),
Scientech and PNNL (United States) and about 50 Russian experts. This in-depth safety analysis led by IRSN, was the firstof this type conducted in Russia for an RBMK type reactor.
In Ukraine, the authorities decided in 2003 to commission the two VVER-1000 reactors on the Khmelnitski and Rovno sites(K2-R4) the following year. Their construction had been interrupted during the 1990s. In the context of a European contract
signed by Riskaudit, subsidiary of IRSN and its German counterpart GRS, the two organisations presented the Ukrainian safety
authority (SNRCU) in 2004 with a report on the safety of these reactors, allowing for modernisations carried out or planned.
The Ukrainian operator then submitted, for approval, an improvement plan for the reactors taking into accountthe recommendations expressed. Reactors K2-R4 were placed in service in the second half of 2004. IRSN and its partners arecontinuing to provide SNRCU with technical support in the context of the technical appraisal of requests for authorisation
regarding the implementation of modernisations planned after start-up of the two reactors.

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RISKAUDIT
RISKAUDIT is a European group

Second edition of the annual seminar for cooperation on hazardous
industrial sites, on 23 March 2004 in Ville-d’Avray (France), attended
by about 100 key players: experts, industrial firms, nuclear operators,
administrations, representatives of associations and professional societies,
and members of Local Information Commissions (CLI).

of economic interest (EGEI)
founded in 1992 by IPSN and GRS
to coordinate joint international
projects. Since its founding,
RISKAUDIT has managed morethan one hundred projects involving

Depending on the state of progress of the projects
concerned, assessments may be focused on defining
safety objectives or requirements, determining
weak points to be corrected, assessing improvement
programmes, and analysing and evaluating detailed
solutions proposed by operators.
This cooperation is mainly carried out in the context
of contracts managed by Riskaudit, a subsidiaryof IRSN and GRS, and financed by the European
Commission (PHARE and TACIS programmes) orby the European Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment (EBRD).
In 2004, IRSN contributed to some 30 projects,
mainly in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine.
Cooperation in this part of the world is seeing new
developments with the setting up in Russia and,in the near future, in Ukraine of the “Global partnership against the spread of weapons and materialsof mass destruction” adopted by G8 in 2002. In thiscontext, IRSN took part, in 2004, in the preparationof a number of projects regarding nuclear safety,
radioactive source management and physicalprotection of installations and nuclear materials.

its two parent establishments
and other European and American
technical safety organisationsin the context of programmes
to provide assistance to Eastern
European countries in nuclear
safety, financed by the European
Commission and EBRD.
RISKAUDIT has its headquartersin Fontenay-aux-Roses(Hauts-de-Seine) and two
permanent offices in Moscow(Russia) and Kiev (Ukraine).

Lithuania
Belarus
Russian Federation

Czech Rep.
Slovakia
Hungary
Bulgaria

UkraineKazakhstan

Armenia

RISKAUDIT’s activities in Central and Eastern European countries.

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Designers, manufacturers
Operators

IRSN,
R&D on risks

Parliament

IRSN,
public expertise

Publicauthorities

Build
the relationshipAcadie, a joint assessment toolInterested parties(CLI)
Civilian society

In 1997, the French Ministries of the Environment

The reform of 2002 incorporates safety andradiation protection, separates the functionsof technical policy, study and R&D policy,
and operators’ policies.

and Health entrusted Mrs Sugier with the missionof forming a pluralist group in order to assess
the leukaemia risks which could result fromexposure of the inhabitants of the Nord-Cotentin
area to ionising radiation. The study, conductedby the Nord-Cotentin Radioecology Group, GRNC,

Expertise
and assistancefor civilian society

led to the design of a calculation tool which
included, in particular, a database containing
the parameters of transfer to the environment.
Development of this tool continued until,
in June 2004, the Acadie software was unveiled.

IRSN embarked upon an approach to
involve the interested parties that wasconsistent with the guideline adopted
by the government for greater transparency in the field of nuclear and radiological risk management.
The opening up of IRSN’s expertise to civilian society
involves, in particular, pilot actions which may leadto the setting up of groups with pluralist expertise,similar to GRNC, in order to deal with complex or
disputed topics. This undertaking also requires participation in national and international networks for
information, promotion and feedback as well as
the creation of such networks.
In order to make headway in this matter, theInstitute organised a second seminar on concerted
action, in March 2004, around the industrial sites
of Ville-d’Avray (Hauts-de-Seine). About one
hundred participants (associations, experts,
representatives of administrations and nuclear andchemical industries) were able to exchange viewson this occasion with the prospect of a change in
the governance of industrial activities.
Furthermore, in the context of their protocol, IRSN
and the French national association for local
information commissions (ANCLI) organised ameeting, on 24 March, to define actual concrete
actions. The topics cover, in particular, monitoringof the environment and releases. A survey targeting
three CLI had already ascertained their expectationsin these fields.

This application for the calculation of internaland external effective doses allows GRNC members(associations, foreign experts, institutions,industrial firms and operators, etc.) to performtheir own dose calculations and to share dataon the assessment of the radiological impact.

Furthermore, at the initiative of IRSN, a round table
to discuss the subject of transparency attracted
experts in public debate, CLI members, journalists
and associations. It revealed high expectations withregard to IRSN as a public expertise organisation.

1999

2003

Publication of results
and circulation of
the calculation programto GRNC members

Setting up of an
IRSN/COGEMA working group
Objective :Assure the future of the GRNC
calculation program

More than 1 gigabyteof files, utilisation
requiring programming
knowledge

ASN, Nuclear safety authority
New COGEMA order ondischarges stipulating, in
Article 32, that:

Utilisation by
all GRNC members
not possible

2004

Drawing up
an effective dose
calculation programthat is easy to use andaccessible to all GRNC
members"The estimation of doses […]is subject to evaluation by
the Nord-Cotentin
radioecological group (GRNC)
whose opinion is made public
and presented to CSPI."

Manufacture of a dose assessment tool accessible to interested parties.

I R S NA N N U A L

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1

crisis exercise
related tothe securityof installations

3

103

198

9

crisis exercises
related to the safetyof Defence-related
installations

technical notices
related to the safetyof Defence-related
installations andactivities

inspections
related to the control
of nuclear materials

32

meetings of safetycommissions and small
groups of experts

support missions
carried out byinternational inspectors
to check nuclear andsensitive materials

54

participationsin national andinternational
working groups

Aerial view of the Charles-de-Gaulle aircraft carrier.

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2 0 0 4IRSN ACTIVITIES IN 2004

Defence nuclear
expertise
In accordance with the decree relating to IRSN dated 22 February 2002,
the Assistant Director General in charge of implementing the Institute’s Defencerelated missions, has a specific department, the DEND, which conducts expert
appraisals, tests, studies and research related to:the protection and control of nuclear and sensitive materials;
the protection of nuclear installations and transportations of radioactive
materials against malicious acts;the safety and radiation protection of Defence-related installations and activities.

> 156 Assessing the safety of military nuclear systems,
basic nuclear installations and Defence-relatedtransportations> 159 Protection and control of nuclear and sensitive materials> 164 Protecting installations from malicious acts
> 166 Managing emergencies caused by malicious acts

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DEFENCE NUCLEAR EXPERTISEA S S E S S I N G T H E S A F E T Y O F M I L I TA RY N U C L E A R
S Y S T E M S , B A S I C N U C L E A R I N S TA L L AT I O N S
A N D D E F E N C E - R E L AT E D T R A N S P O RTAT I O N S

Aerial view of the Marcoule site (Gard).

Assessing the safety of military nuclear
systems, basic nuclear installations
and Defence-related transportations

TECHNIC AL SUPPORT WITH REGARDTO NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGIC AL RISKO P E R AT I O N A L S U P P O RT I N T H E
EVENT OF A CRISIS OR
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY

In 2004, IRSN examined the safety of
installations, laboratories and plants
involved in National Defence on thebasis of the dossiers transmitted by
the operators concerned, and gave its
recommendations to the DSND.
Activities concerning Defencerelated laboratories and plants
In 2004, IRSN examined the safety of installations
operated by CEA’s Military Applications Division(CEA/DAM) or by COGEMA. These two operators
conduct all the operations (production, storage,
processing) necessary for the supply of nuclear
materials for weapons and the manufacture offuel for nuclear propulsion reactors. They are alsoin charge of cleaning up production installations
which have now been shut down.The risks presented
by these installations are very varied, dependingon the missions assigned to each installation.
Different specialists from different IRSN units havetaken part in expert appraisals in fields as varied
as civil engineering or risk prevention related to
criticality, fire, exposure to ionising radiation andthe dispersal of radioactive material.
For the COGEMA establishment in Marcoule (Gard)and the installations on this site, the Institutetransmitted recommendations to the DSND on thefollowing:■ the implementation of an internal authorisation
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2 0 0 4■ an authorisation request for releases and water
sampling;■ the revision of the operating authorisation forthe conventional waste recycling plant;■ receiving and processing incinerable waste fromdifferent sources.
The Institute also monitored operations carriedout in the framework of the definitive shutdownof the UP1 plant. IRSN transmitted recommendations to DSND on the following:■ cleaning-up of the stores;■ storing of waste created by the definitive shutdown operations;■ risks associated with cutting operations, including
hot spots;■ work done on an evaporator in the UP1 plant;■ updating of the general operation rules;■ operations to clean up the dissolvers.
IRSN monitored the COGEMA establishment in
Pierrelatte (Drôme) and the installations on this site.
Within this framework, IRSN transmitted recommendations on the following:■ introduction of a production line within the recycling and elaboration plant (URE);■ flooding that occurred in the Rhône valley inDecember 2003;■ commissioning of the processing and salvaging
workshop after improvement works were carried out;
■ dismantling operations on annexes of gaseous
diffusion plants (GDP).

Le Vigilant, a French nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SNLE).

Activities concerning naval
propulsion reactors
In 2004, IRSN gave its opinion on the modifications
that the Navy plans to make to basin 8 at Brest’snaval dockyard, with a view to increasing the docking
capacity for SNLE such as Le Triomphant. The
Institute also analysed the radiological surveillance
programme drawn up in anticipation of the stopover by Charles-de-Gaulle, the aircraft carrier, inthe port of Le Havre.
In 2004, IRSN followed the design process of thenext generation of French nuclear attack submarines(see Focus p. 157) and assessed the latest safety
dossiers on Le Vigilant, allowing DSND to issuefavourable recommendations on the final operating
permit. IRSN examined the safety of the test reactor(RES) in 2004. This installation, located within thearea of the secret basic nuclear installation (INBS)“Nuclear Propulsion” at the CEA centre in Cadarache(Bouches-du-Rhône), will replace the RNG installation currently operating.
The RES installation is made up of a “pit” part anda “reactor” part, under construction. The “pit” partneeded for reactor operations is already built. It
can be used to store fuel and other naval propulsion
boiler equipment.
At the end of 2003, CEA requested a temporary

Model of the reactor test installation underconstruction in Cadarache (Bouches-du-Rhône).

permit to use the pit part of the RES installation.
To this end, it transmitted a provisional safety reportand general operating rules. In 2004, IRSN examined
how the civil engineering works behave when subjected to the different possible stresses.The evaluations also concerned:■ the inherent risks at the “reactor” construction
site (fall of crane, etc.);■ criticality risks associated with the storage of fissile materials in the different channels of the pit;
■ the risk of the fuel dewatering;■ the risks associated with dynamic containmentloss;■ the risk of fire.
In addition, IRSN examined the radiation protection
measures taken by the operator.The operator took

FOCUS

BARRACUDA PROGRAMME
Since 2001, IRSN has supported the control exerted
by the DSND on the development of the BARRACUDA
programme, the next generation of French nuclear
attack submarines.
Even before the examination of the preliminary safety report scheduled
for 2005, IRSN studied several important safety aspects in 2004 –the architecture of security systems and the risks associated withthe presence of conventional weapons on board a ship, for example.
The security systems are designed to bring the nuclear reactor backsafely and maintain it in safe conditions in the event of an accident.
To ensure this, IRSN checks that the architecture of these systems
and the design of their components can guarantee a level ofreliability equal to the safety objectives assigned to submarines like
Barracuda. These objectives take into account the fact that thesubmarines will be docked and maintained at the French Navy’s
naval bases located in urbanised areas.
The DGA made suggestions for procedures and IRSN assessed themand passed them on to the DSND.

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DEFENCE NUCLEAR EXPERTISEA S S E S S I N G T H E S A F E T Y O F M I L I TA RY N U C L E A R
S Y S T E M S , B A S I C N U C L E A R I N S TA L L AT I O N S
A N D D E F E N C E - R E L AT E D T R A N S P O RTAT I O N S

A working meeting for defence nuclear expertise teams.

great advantage of the experience acquired in similarstorage installations (EDF spent-fuel pits, port pits,etc.) to optimise the doses used.
As the monitoring of operations carried out in the“pit” part requires a lot of human intervention, IRSN
examined the measures taken by the operator regarding
possible human error during handling activities inparticular (ergonomics of bridge control boxes, trainingof agents, organisation of operations, etc.).
IRSN’s assessment report was used as a support
document in the Reactor Safety Commission meetingon 9 and 10 November 2004 at Cadarache.

Activities concerning radioactive
sources
As part of the gradual implementation of the new
regulations on radiation protection (decree No. 2001592 of 5 July 2001), IRSN listed about 10 installationsin 2004 whose radioactive sources now come under
DSND control. This number should soon increase
following changes to regulations and the resulting
transfer of authority.This concerns installations whose
authorisation was issued by the CIREA before 2002.
For these installations, IRSN monitors movements ofsources by issuing the necessary forms and recording
the movements in the national inventory of radioactive
sources.

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PUI-related activities
In 2004, IRSN transmitted technical recommendations
concerning the internal emergency plans (PUI). It
examined:■ the PUI and the accident situations covered by the
PUI at COGEMA’s establishment in Pierrelatte;■ INBS’s PUI called “ Basin 8 ” at Brest’s naval dockyard(Finistère).
In addition,IRSN analysed the evolution of geo-mechanicalstability at the Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls. This
expert assessment particularly concerned the mechanisms responsible for instabilities observed at theseatolls in the past, the pertinence of the monitoring
system installed and also the evolution of rockmovements.

Crisis exercises involving INBSs
and SNMsIRSN took part in three national crisis exercises related
to “Defence” in 2004. In addition to the main exerciseof the year, which took place in November at COGEMA’s
Pierrelatte site (see Focus p.133), two exercises werecarried out at Mont-de-Marsan’s air base (Landes) andToulon’s naval base (Var):■ the first simulation involved a weapon in a fire. It
tested relations between the technical units of IRSN
and those of the air force;■ the second one concerned a nuclear attack submarine(SNA). Prior to this exercise, work had been carriedout to adapt the CTC organisation and develop specificdocumentation. This work was carried out in close
collaboration with naval staff from the French Navy.

Determining the isotopic compositionof plutonium.

Protection and control of nuclear
and sensitive materials
There are several aspects to theprotection and control of nuclear andsensitive materials: physically protecting, monitoring and accounting for
nuclear materials, tracking transportations and applying international
controls on the non-proliferation ofchemical and nuclear weapons.
Physical protection of nuclear
materials
The physical protection of nuclear materials is
ensured by a series of material and organisational
measures designed to guarantee an in-depth
defence that is appropriate to the risk of theft ordiversion of these materials.These measures include
delaying systems, detecting systems, access control
systems and response resources.
Public authorities, under the responsibility of the
Ministry of Industry (HFD), define the required
objectives as regards physical protection and verify
that the measures implemented by nuclear
operators and possessors of nuclear materials ensurecompliance with these objectives.
IRSN places its technical expertise at the disposalof public authorities to assess the efficiency ofphysical protection measures adopted or proposedby operators and possessors.
In this matter, IRSN’s expertise specifically concerns:■ the capacity of installations or equipment toresist theft or diversion of materials;■ the pertinence of procedures for access to nuclear
materials and the removal of these materials fromtheir containments or from establishments thatpossess them;■ the capacity of systems to detect the loss or theftof nuclear materials.
In 2004, IRSN analysed about 80 dossiers sent by
operators and possessors of nuclear materials.
In addition, IRSN personnel carry out inspections
for the HFD in installations possessing nuclear
materials. The aim of these inspections is to checkin situ the implementation and operational natureof the measures to protect and control nuclear
materials and the measures to protect them frommalicious intent (application of articles L.1333 andL.1332 of the Defence Code, respectively). About
50 inspections were carried out in 2004. For someof them, the Institute took in situ measurementsof the protection systems’ physical characteristics.
At international level, in 2004, the Institute directed
an IPPAS mission organised by IAEA in Iran. IRSN
was also involved in teaching at internationalcourses on design basis threats in Iran and physicalprotection of research reactors in the Republic ofSouth Africa.
Moreover, in cooperation with the United States
Department of Energy (US DOE), IRSN developed
an assessment method and training course oninternal threats. The aim of this initiative is tosuggest to the IAEA that a document based on thismethod be published in the “Tecdoc” section withthe associated training course.

TECHNIC AL SUPPORT WITH REGARD TO
NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL RISK

Monitoring and accounting
for materials
At the request of HFD, IRSN examines the measurestaken by operators to monitor and account for
nuclear material held in installations. It proposes
any corrective action it deems necessary, especiallyI R S NA N N U A L

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Marking of nuclear material packages.

regarding the risk of theft, loss or diversion ofsuch materials. IRSN then checks that the operators
take HFD’s requirements into account and reportsback to HFD.
In this respect, the Institute analyses the reports
required by regulations and carries out technicalinspections of installations.
In particular, it examines the measures implemented
by operators to:■ have precise, quantitative and qualitative
information on all the nuclear materials that enterand leave the installations;■ track the materials, i.e., always know where they
are located, what they are used for and the opera-

tions they undergo (movements, transformations,etc.);■ check that the actual stock of materials heldcorresponds to the accounting figures they are
obliged to keep updated.
In 2004, IRSN analysed about 140 dossiers transmitted by operators within this framework. About
30 technical meetings were required to carry out
these analyses. In addition, IRSN produced nearly
100 analyses of nuclear material inventory reports.
In addition, IRSN personnel carry out inspections
for the HFD in installations possessing nuclear
materials.The aim of these inspections is to ascertainthat regulations applying to the possession of these

FOCUS

IMPACT OF THE NEW EURATOM REGULATION ON NATIONAL CONTROLIRSN is responsible for updating the accounting declaration rules on nuclear materials according
to the requirements of authorities and industrial firms, so that the former can fulfil their role ascontrollers and the latter can comply with their statutory obligations.
A specific feature in France is the strong link between the accounting required by the law of July 1980 and that required by
European regulations.
In 2004, IRSN studied the impact of the latter on the 85,000 annual accounting declarations. IRSN is to study changes thatshould be made to declaration rules because firstly modifications have been made to the information required and declaration
methods, and secondly the control of waste processing facilities has been handed over to EURATOM.
The preliminary study underway aims to assess the impact on IRSN’s work load, the modifications that need to be madeto the information system used for national accounting of nuclear materials, and the definition of a new interface with
operators’ information systems.
The results of the study will be discussed with the authorities and industrial firms in 2005, so as to come to a precise
definition of statutory and operational changes. 2006 will be devoted to carrying out these changes, which will include
a renovation of national accounting support documents. All this, associated with reinforced training, should be operational for
all French nuclear operators at the beginning of 2008.
One of the difficulties will be ensuring compatibility between the computer application of national accounting andthe operators’ computer applications, while at the same time coordinating the production start of the different computing tools.

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Preparing an irradiated fuel transport convoy
in Cherbourg (Manche).

materials are respected. For the record, regulations
distinguish between installations subject to a priorauthorisation and installations subject to a priordeclaration, depending on the nature and quantityof materials possessed.
In 2004, IRSN carried out more than 70 inspectionsat installations subject to a prior authorisation,
several of which involved physical measurements
to test materials. In addition, the Institute carriedout about 20 technical inspections of installations
subject to a prior declaration.
As well as this ongoing activity, IRSN took moretargeted action regarding certain installations, after
anomalies or malfunctions were discovered. The
most notable example is the discovery, in 2004, of
nearly 400 kg of depleted uranium that were notaccounted for in the records. It was found on thesite of a company specialised in metal recovery.

Transporting nuclear material
IRSN manages transportation dossiers and tracks
the transportation of nuclear materials on behalfof HFD. Current regulations oblige transportcompanies that have received prior ministerial
authorisation to abide by measures relating to theorganisation of movements and their declaration.
Within IRSN, it is the Operational transport section(EOT) that performs this mission. Its scope ofcompetence includes the transportation of nuclear
materials via road, rail, river, sea or air. Thesetransportations must be declared to EOT fifteen days
before the planned date of transport. Thus, about
1,700 trans-portations are declared to EOT every
year. On receipt of the transportation notice, thefollowing checks are carried out:
■ the dates and times;■ the appropriateness of the physical protection

in relation to the material being transported;■ the validity of authorisations held by transporters

and any of their subcontractors, who also have tobe approved by the Ministry;■ the route taken;■ the members of the team;■ the means of transport, which must also haveobtained ministerial approval according to the natureand quantity of nuclear materials transported.
When the transportation is confirmed, EOT gives
its consent for the movement of materials andinforms all the authorities and organisations
concerned (Ministry of Industry [HFD], Ministryof the Interior [including DDSC], Ministry of Finance[customs]). EOT is also responsible for the smoothrunning of very sensitive transpor-tations, to ensurethat nuclear materials are cons-tantly protected
and controlled in an appropriate manner.
In 2004, EOT monitored a special internationaltransportation: the transportation of military
plutonium between the United States and France(EUROFAB operation). On this occasion, EOT
prepared the dossiers on the transport equipment
authorisations and approvals, on the transportation
plan approval and on the real-time monitoring of
movement throughout French territory, including
territorial waters.

International controls
on non-proliferation
International treaties, to fight proliferation or forbid nuclear and chemical weapons of mass
destruction, implement supranational systems ofcontrol. In France, IRSN provides assistance andtechnical support to authorities in charge ofI R S NA N N U A L

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Checking nuclear material transport packages.

monitoring these inspections.
The inspection systems implemented by the Treatyof Non-Proliferation, the Treaty of Rome and theChemical Weapons Convention may be different,
but they all involve international officers checking,in declared facilities, the information transmitted
by States to international inspection bodies (IAEA,
Euratom, OPCW).
Within this framework, IRSN acts on behalf ofFrench authorities, collecting and preparing the
French declarations to inspection bodies.
It is also in charge of ensuring the smooth runningof international inspections in French nuclear or
chemical facilities.To this end, it prepares the inspections, accompanies them (as representative of Frenchauthorities) and negotiates the practical aspects of
the inspection with the inspection team.
As part of the technical support it provides French
public authorities, IRSN carries out a prior analysisof the technical documentation that sites send to
the inspection bodies. IRSN also assists Frenchauthorities by analysing and keeping up withchanges to national or international regulations
relating to the fight against proliferation. Whennecessary, it takes part in interministerial work andjoins groups of international experts set up by the
OPCW or IAEA.
In 2004, IRSN prepared and transmitted to the
OPCW:■ the annual declaration on the activities of chemicalsites listed in France in 2003 (over 130);■ the annual declaration on the planned activities
of chemical sites listed in France in 2005.

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It processed and sent to the European Commission:■ 610,000 lines declaring movements and stocksof nuclear materials;■ 260 notifications on the import or export ofnuclear materials;■ the programme of activities for the 220 declared
French nuclear facilities;■ the list of about 250 French possessors of small
quantities of nuclear materials (plus the value of
their stocks).
It prepared and sent to the IAEA:■ the monthly and six-monthly accounting reports
on stocks of nuclear material in France subject tosafeguard agreement measures;■ the monthly and six-monthly accounting reportson the international transfers of crude materials
and ores;■ 500 notifications on the import or export ofnuclear materials;■ France’s initial declaration for the application of
the additional protocol (see Focus p.163);■ France’s quarterly declarations on the export ofnuclear equipment.
IRSN accompanied OPCW’s seven inspections ofFrench, civil, chemical facilities. It also accompanied
verifications carried out on the inventory of nuclear
materials in 27 French facilities.
It took part in opening discussions between theEuropean Commission and French authorities
concerning the definition of international proceduresfor inspecting new facilities.
As far as regulations are concerned, 2004 saw thearrival of one decree and three amending orders

Manipulation in the Euratom laboratory
at the La Hague plant (Manche).

FOCUS
for the application of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. During the same period, draft legislationon the application of the additional French protocol
was transmitted to the Council of State.

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
Since 30 April 2004, the effective date of the additional
protocol to IAEA’s safeguard agreements covering
all the European Union, the control of nuclear materials,
initially provided for in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of 1970 and the safeguard agreements that followed, hasbeen extended to include research and development and nuclear facility
equipment.
The secretariat of the Interministerial Technical Committee has been
put in charge of implementing the additional protocol in France withtechnical support from a specialised IRSN department.
In 2004, IRSN put together a declaration manual which was sent
to a selection of 1,700 bodies at the beginning of May.
Industrial firms and research centres working on various subjects
related to the nuclear fuel cycle were contacted but so wereboilermakers, pump and tube manufacturers, etc.
At the same time, IRSN provided telephone assistance to industrial firms
on a dedicated line.
In September, the French declaration was drawn up on the basisof declarations made by the French bodies concerned. This involved agreat deal of compilation work. The declaration was sent to the IAEA
on 28 October 2004 within the set deadline, i.e. 180 days from theeffective date of the protocol. For future declarations, IRSN will
regularly contact about 150 entities.

Recording of operators’ declarationsin accordance with the supplementary protocol.

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DEFENCE NUCLEAR EXPERTISE
P R O T E C T I N G I N S TA L L AT I O N SFROM MALICIOUS ACTS

Nuclear power plant at Dampierre-en-Burly (Loiret).

Protecting installations
from malicious acts

TECHNIC AL SUPPORT WITH REGARDTO NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGIC AL RISK

DEFINING AND IMPLEMENTINGN AT I O N A L A N D I N T E R N AT I O N A L
RESEARCH PROGRAMMESAs far as security is concerned, thegeneral context has changed and thishas led the HFD to seek possible
improvements to regulations related
to the protection of nuclear installations
from malicious acts, given the reassessment of threats associated with suchacts.
Improving regulations
Within this context, IRSN was associated in thedefinition of a new set of reference threats in 2004.
These reference threats specify the characteristics
and resources attributed to aggressors and are used
to size the physical protection systems of nuclear
facilities and check that they are appropriate. The
Institute also suggested that these regulations
should include provisions on the protection of
nuclear materials with regard the risks of loss, theftor diversion and provisions on the protection of
nuclear facilities and materials from malicious acts.
The aim is to produce a set of coherent protective
measures based on a global conception of protection
systems.
IRSN was keen to specify:■ the respective missions and responsibilities ofpublic authorities and operators;■ the protection objectives that operators should
respect;■ the general principles to apply when designingand using physical protection systems (defence in164

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2 0 0 4depth, material measures, security guards andorganisational measures);■ the nature of the installation areas to be protected,
with the associated protection instructions;■ how to manage requirements that could turn out
to be contradictory in terms of nuclear safety andphysical protection of installations;■ the approval process of statutory dossiers required
from operators;■ the method and content of protection studies(relating to malicious acts) and security studies(relating to theft of nuclear materials).To be specific,
protection studies should be based on a sensitivity
study aimed at assessing the radiological consequences of a malicious act and also on a vulnerability
study that assesses how difficult it would be to carryout such an act;
■ the scheduled review process that should be
implemented to ensure that the protection system
is appropriate;■ the declaration process for events related tomalicious acts;■ the control and inspection process.

Studying and developing assessment
tools
In 2004, IRSN continued working on the structuralresistance to malicious acts programme. It aims
to assemble tools that can predict the damage that
weapons or explosives can cause to structuresand equipment.These tools are used when analysing
the dossiers sent in by operators.

Physical protection.

There are two stages to this work:■ listing all the possible “targets” and the destructivemeans involved in the reference threats;■ classifying the “targets” and destructive means
into categories which, once grouped together, define
all the generic cases that have to be dealt with.
A matrix of cases is thus produced, made up of“weapon/target” pairs. To give a few examples,
reinforced concrete structures, tanks, piping andsome mechanical systems that act as safety devices
are considered as targets.

in the far field or the specific approach for loading
in close field;■ numerical models from mechanics calculation
codes. The studies carried out using mechanics
calculation codes are complementary to those
conducted via analytical methods: numericalsimulation provides more accurate results, makes
it possible to introduce more complex and more
realistic models and to determine the evolutionof local parameters.

Two categories of tools have been developed:■ simplified tools that are quick to use, based on

analytical methods. Analytical methods are used
to develop numerical simulation tools requiring
only limited resources. The main advantage isthat they are quick to use and this makes it possible
to carry out parametric studies. These methods
usually allow us to correctly determine themagnitude of the stresses we want to study. For
example, they are used to study how reinforced
concrete walls react to the blast of an explosion

Studying and developing assessment tools for the physicalprotection of installations.

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DEFENCE NUCLEAR EXPERTISE
MANAGING EMERGENCIES CAUSEDBY MALICIOUS ACTS

Defence crisis exercise at a military base.

Managing emergencies caused
by malicious acts
Exercises relating to the applicationof the July 1980 law

TECHNIC AL SUPPORT WITH REGARDTO NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGIC AL RISKAt the request of HFD, IRSN organises exercises related
to installation protection. They aim to test thedecision-making process and the coordination andinterfaces between the parties involved (operators,
public authorities).

Defence crisis exercise at a military base.

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Therefore, in 2004, the Institute:■ started to prepare and organise a large-scale exercisethat will take place in 2005;■ examined the lessons to be learnt from a similar
exercise held in 2003.
IRSN is also in charge of managing crisis situations
relating to nuclear materials. It organises nuclear
material inventory exercises during crisis situations
with a view to testing the effectiveness of the system
set up for this purpose. In 2004, an exercise wasconducted at the CERCA facility in Romans (Isère) andthe ORPHEE facility in Saclay (Essonne) (see Focus
p. 167).

Nuclear materials inventory crisis cell.

FOCUS

CRISIS EXERCISE INVOLVING THE INVENTORYOF NUCLEAR MATERIALSThe aim of the exercise is to carry out an unexpected test to check theability of one or more installations to detect the disappearance of nuclear
materials and thus find out whether the disappearance of the materials
could escape the attention of the operator of the installation in question.
To do this, operators have a very short time to carry out an inventory targeted at the typesof materials suspected of being diverted or stolen.
Several crisis units are implemented for this purpose:■ at IRSN, a unit grouping together the business managers of the installations concerned anddifferent experts in charge of monitoring, accounting, transporting and ensuring the physicalprotection of the nuclear materials. It reports to the HFD on the evolution of the situation andthe initiatives it takes,■ at the head offices of the operating companies concerned and at the installations, units decideon the action to take and follow the progress of operations. They report on the progress ofverifications to HFD and IRSN.
These units communicate with the media in their area of expertise, within the frameworkof simulated media pressure.
Operators take the required measures until an accurate view of the situation is obtained.
Encrypted networks are used between the different units to exchange classified information
if necessary (isotopic quantity or composition of sensitive nuclear materials for example).
The lessons learnt from these exercises enable us to improve the systems that would
be implemented in the event of a real crisis (written procedures, means of communication, etc.).
The exercise conducted in 2004 enabled us to find a means of improving the identificationof material on one of the sites.

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167

3
168

I R S NManagement
and Support

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Management and support

Research
for understanding

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164

press requests
processed77%

of staffare employed by IRSN and100

men/yearin terms of time spenton international
activities

64

people from IRSN
participated ininternational expert
groups68%

of IRSN personnel areengineers, researchers
or managerial staff

32%

of IRSN personnel
are technicians or
employees providing
technical andadministrative support

170

23%

were seconded from CEAat the end of 2004

106

people were hired
in 2004

3,218

hours of teaching/training
were given

1,150,000

euros were spent on training

126

trainees were received
by IRSN in 2004

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MANAGEMENT
AND SUPPORTScientific and technicalexcellence> 172 Scientific and technical excellence> 175 Scientific and technical knowledge engineering> 176 Security> 178 Quality: IRSN’s certification projectI R S NA N N U A L

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SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXCELLENCESCIENTIFIC AND TECHNIC AL EXCELLENCE

Meeting of the central echelon of the department of scientific and technicalexcellence and quality.

Scientific and technical excellence
Competence plays an important rolein ensuring the credibility of theInstitute’s work and earning the trustof its partners, customers and society.
This competence lies in the scientificand technical excellence of its teams
and its research and expertise
activities.
Seminar on scientific and technicalexcellence
Therefore, with this in mind, IRSN decided to clarify
its policy and orientations. So on 16 March 2004,
IRSN organised a seminar on the scientific andtechnical excellence of its activities in Le Vésinet.
After this seminar, the Institute’s orientations
regarding the implementation of a policy ofscientific and technical excellence at IRSN wereformalised. This policy is based on the following
three objectives:■ promoting scientific and technical excellence
within the Institute;

A PhD student in the radioecology lab using a binocular
microscope to select larvae.

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2 0 0 4■ implementing an internal system to assess thescientific and technical excellence of the Institute’s
activities;■ developing activities that contribute to IRSN’s
outreach. It was presented to the Scientific Board
on 15 November 2004 and to the Board of Directors
on 28 January 2005.
Debates at the seminar highlighted the advantagesof setting up a committee on scientific excellence
that would coordinate and monitor the progressof action taken to achieve and obtain recognitionof scientific and technical excellence.

Launching of targeted scientific andtechnical assessments – a pilot project
Targeted assessments can concern all the Institute’s
scientific or technical activities (services, expert
appraisals, research, studies). They are conductedby independent experts who have not been involvedin the activity in question and who are from outside
the Institute if possible.
To establish the type of questions to be asked andthe practical details of these assessments in
consultation with the teams concerned, it has been
decided to conduct a certain number of pilot
operations. These assessments concern:■ the results of a research programme;■ a scientific collaboration;■ the reorientation of a research programme;■ an expert appraisal of safety;■ a team.
These assessments are in progress and should
gradually lead to a convergence of ideas on thegeneric aspects of the assessment process, despite
the diversity of subjects and teams concerned

Training throughresearch
Every year, IRSN receives about
20 doctorands (18 in 2004) and
15 post-doctorand trainees

Discussion between a PhD student and his tutor in
the Cadarache radioecology and ecotoxicology
laboratory (Bouches-du-Rhône).

who contribute to relations
with the academic world.
Therefore, most of
the advisors for theseundertaken at IRSN are
researchers from outside
the Institute.
IRSN wishes to reinforce its
training through research
initiative, so in 2004 it started
to draw up a plan aimed atincreasing the number of newtheses to 30 per year andthe number of post-doctorandplacements to 30 per year.
At the same time, the Instituteencourages its researchers to
support the authorisation tosupervise research (ASR), thus
showing its willingness to open
up to the world of university
research.

(phasing of assessments, support documents, natureof questioning, etc.).

Establishing indicators for an overall
scientific and technical assessment
Scientific and technical assessment with theestablishment of indicators is another approach –these indicators must be in-house tools for attaining
improvement objectives. They should be used toposition the Institute in relation to the outside
world. They should finally contribute to therecognition of the scientific and technical qualityof its production.
Links are being initiated with the Observatoiredes sciences et des techniques. The aim is to enter
into the circle of research organisations currently

trying to standardise indicators to make them ascomparable as possible.

Implementing action to promote
cross-unit scientific awarenessIn-house scientific and technical awareness actions
are gradually being organised in order to shareknowledge and better identify, coordinate anduse the cross-departmental action of the operational
units.
In 2004, two subjects were defined for which there
is a need of experience exchange within the Institute:the use of MONTE-CARLO codes and the use ofexperimental designs. In 2004, a state of the art
was conducted on the MONTE-CARLO codes.

Draft version of a scientific andtechnical excellence programme
The aim of implementing such programme is toensure a better understanding, transparency andrecognition of the Institute’s activities, thus
specifically contributing to the promotion ofscientific and technical excellence, to its implementation and its recognition by the outside world:■ training through research and teaching;■ scientific activities;■ scientific and technical assessment;■ outside recognition;■ exploratory research.
This programme is also a management tool, allowing
us to set objectives when strategic orientations
have to be developed, to monitor the progress of
the action taken to achieve these objectives or tosuggest changes.

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SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXCELLENCESCIENTIFIC AND TECHNIC AL EXCELLENCE

Secretaries from DESTQ (Department for Scientific and Technical
Evaluation and Quality) at the reception desk of the seminar on scientificand technical excellence on 16 March 2004.

Relations with universities andscientific organisations
These are essential for a research body like IRSN.
Although the Institute is orientated towards
acquiring knowledge related to its expertise, outside
experts should be allowed to give their opinion on
this research, to analyse it, evaluate it and enrich
it with new ideas. Given the very wide scope of its
missions, the Institute should call upon outside
skills to complement its own skills. Forming
relationships with universities is a good way ofdeveloping and improving the skills that are usefuland essential to IRSN.Through these relationships,
IRSN experts can take part in the training given atthese universities and Grandes écoles and in thisway enable the Institute to acquire a reputation,
attract young people and fulfil its training mission.

When studies are carried out jointly with Universities, Grandes écoles and CNRS laboratories,
cooperation agreements concerning the joint
research and the hosting of trainees are signed. In
2004, cooperation agreements were signed withvarious universities (see box).Within the frameworkof the national cooperation agreement with the
CNRS signed in 2003, eight specific agreements
on various subjects were signed with different CNRS
laboratories: “comparison of numerical models
for calculating percolation through dykes”,“modellingof geo-chemical perturbations in the near field of
waste stored in a deep clay repository”, “paleoseismicity of Middle Durance fault in the regionof Manosque”, “characterisation of sources andprocesses at the origin of natural radioactive tracers(U234, U238, Ra222) in a fractured environment”, etc.

Agreements between IRSN and universities signed in 2004
■ 6 January: agreement with the Institute of Nuclear Physics, Lyon, a CNRS / University of Lyon 1 joint research unit (UMR).
■ 13 January: agreement with FAST, a CNRS / University of Paris 6 joint research unit (UMR).
■ 19 January: agreement with the laboratory of fluid mechanics and acoustics, a CNRS / École centrale de Lyon

joint research unit (UMR).
■ 28 January: agreement with the Toulouse Institute of Fluid Mechanics, a CNRS / INP Toulouse joint research unit (UMR).
■ 28 January: framework agreement with the University of Pau.
■ 18 March: agreement with Géosciences Rennes (UMR / CNRS).
■ 30 March: agreement with the laboratory of hydrosystem ecology, (CNRS / University of Toulouse 3 UMR).
■ 17 May: framework agreement with the ARMINES association.
■ 17 May: agreement with CEREGE (CNRS / UMR).
■ 4 August: agreement with the department of civil engineering and construction (CNRS / ENTPE UMR).
■ 2 November: framework agreement with the University of Versailles - Saint-Quentin.
■ 24 November: agreement with the laboratory of analysis, topology, probability (CNRS / University of Aix-Marseilles 1 UMR).

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Library of the Scientific Information Resources
Centre.

Scientific and technicalknowledge engineering
Activities in scientific and technicalknowledge engineering (ICST) concern
two main fields: scientific and technicalinformation (STI) and management of
IRSN’s archives. The purpose is tofacilitate and expand access to IRSN’s
scientific and technical documentationthat engineers and researchers needto fulfil their missions.
In 2004, several projects were launched to meetthese two objectives.
The Centre for Scientific Information Resources (CRIS)
completely reorganised its Intranet site to makeits range of services more accessible.A club for CRIS
users was set up to improve these services. There
were discussions on the possibility of extending accessto include electronic journals.The CRIS,in collaboration

with the club of users, chose an online bibliographicaldatabase. This tool completes the bibliographicaldatabases made available to IRSN personnel.
The Archives project was also launched in 2004.
Indeed, IRSN has kept the archives of the former
IPSN and OPRI. The project involves collecting the
12 km of existing archives in order to present the
French Department of Archives and CEA (of which
IPSN was a division) with a statement, and to provide
the Institute with a tool that will allow the gradualintroduction of a sustainable archive management
organisation. At the end of 2004, an inventory of
more than 50% of the archives had been drawn up.
Finally, IRSN set up an organisation allowing it todraw up annual reports on training through research,teaching and publications. These reports provided
several of the figures presented in this report.

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SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXCELLENCESECURITY

Active sample laboratory: radiological check to verify the non-contamination of afume chamber laboratory.

Security
In terms of security, the action undertaken by IRSN in 2004 concern boththe security of facilities and the securityof personnel.
Bringing the Institute’s facilities andactivities up to standard, IRSN conducts
most of its activities in facilities inherited from theformer OPRI and CEA, some of which require a lotof work to bring them up to technical and regulatory
standards. In order to define priorities, a major
action plan was drawn up in 2004 concerningfacilities presenting a high level of risk and whichplay a strategic role in the Institute’s missions.
Work started at the Le Vésinet site (Yvelines),
with the renovation of electrical installations andthe ventilation of facilities for measuring environmental radioactivity.
IRSN security indicators
2004

4.35
0.03
0

2003

0
2.9

2002

0.03

Industrial accident frequency rate*for IRSN employees
Severity rate***Number of accidents with work stoppage
multiplied by one million and divided
by the number of hours worked.
**Number of working days lost multipliedby 1,000 and divided by the numberof hours worked.

176

Authorisations allowing laboratories to possessand use radioactive sources within the frameworkof the Institute’s research programmes were alsobrought up to standard. In 2004, 80% of theselaboratories (excluding activities conducted inauthorised ICPEs) obtained the necessary authorisations from the DGSNR in accordance with the
Public Health Code. It should be noted that IRSN
inherited more than 1,300 radioactive sources,
including 900 that are unusable and for which adisposal provision was drawn up at the time of CEA
and IPSN’s separation. In 2004, an agreement was
signed with all the source suppliers, mainly the CEAI R S NA N N U A L

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2 0 0 4(80% of the sources requiring disposal), and thisallowed 20% to be eliminated.

Staff training
In 2004, 764 employees followed a basic-security
training course, 450 of whom followed it because
they were newcomers to the Institute.
In addition to these general training courses, specifictraining courses are organised, mainly within theInstitute. In 2004, 93 employees were trained inradiation protection and 31 in the transportationof radioactive material.

Radiation protection of workers
The Institute took several initiatives to implement
the decree of 31 March 2003 relating to labour
protection. For example, it appointed radiation
protection officers (RPO) for the sites in Le Vésinet,
Agen (Lot-et-Garonne) and Les Angles (Vaucluse).

Security at the sites
A local security team was set up at the Le Vésinet
site in 2004, which enabled us to make a precise
diagnosis of risks and an assessment of the facilities’compliance with regulations. Preventive action was
targeted at outside companies working on thesite and at the reduction of fire risks. This involved
the systematic implementation of prevention plans
and security protocols during the loading andunloading of dangerous goods by outside companies
and the reduction of fire loads within the facilities.
At Cadarache (Bouches-du-Rhône), operations at
the classified facility for environmental protection

The Institute’s regulated
facilities and activities
Checking the dose rate on a radioactive sample.

Activities subject to the Code of the Environment(amended decree of 21 September 1977 relating toclassified installations for the protection of
the environment (ICPE),■ ICPEs subject to an authorisation:- 11, 9 of which are covered by sections 1,700 (useor storage of radioactive substances).

were taken over by the Institute and new facilities
subject to an authorisation (AMANDE and EPICUR)
were commissioned.This led the Prefect to request
an in-depth revision of the 1986 bylaw whichapplied to the Institute. In 2004, the Inspectorateof listed facilities wrote the draft general requirements on the basis of the updated description of
the activities and releases of IRSN’s facilities.

■ ICPEs commissioned:- CEZANE AMANDE, a facility that produces
neutron radiation beams within the framework of
dosimetry programmes (Cadarache);- EPICUR, a cobalt-60 irradiator used to assess
the behaviour of iodine under radiolysis orradiation (Cadarache).
■ ICPEs subject to declaration:- 15, 14 of which are covered by sections 1,700.
■ ICPEs commissioned:- gammametric test bench to analyse rocks andstudy radionuclide transfer mechanisms in the soil
and subsoil (Fontenay-aux-Roses, Hauts-de-Seine).
Activities subject to the Code of Public Health(amended decree of 4 April 2002 relating to
the protection of persons from ionising radiation).
Number of permit requests filed with the DGSNR
in 2004: 19.
Number of permits issued: 14 (5 are being examined).
Personnel exposed to ionising radiation:■ category A: 114;
■ category B: 678.

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SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXCELLENCEQUALITY

2005

PREPARATION• Improvement loop tools• Process definition• Organisation• Quality policy• Training

STATE OF THINGS• Self-evaluations• Management reviews• Improvement plans

BE AWARE OF
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEENTHE CURRENT QSAND THE TARGETED QSDEFINE IMPROVEMENT ACTIONS2006

BUILDING
THE PROCESSESOPTIMISINGQUALITY SYSTEM• Process managers• Objectives and indicators• Deployment of
improvement loop

• Improvement plans• Dealing with differences• Internal audits

IMPROVING QUALITYSYSTEM IN FORCEMOCK AUDIT AND
CORRECTIONS• Improvement plans• Dealing with differences• Internal audits

SUBMITTINGCERTIFICATION DOSSIER

MIGRATE CURRENT QSTO THE TARGETED QSRUN THE IMPROVEMENT
LOOP> CERTIFIABLE QS

The main stages of the certification project.

Quality: IRSN’s Certification project
Launched in the summer of 2003, theCertification project consists in implementing a management system basedon quality at IRSN with a view toobtaining ISO 9001 certification for
the Institute by 2006. In 2004, thefoundations of this project were laid.
The main results of the work carried out within
this framework in 2004 are:■ a detailed schedule of the project was drawn up,
taking into account the tasks falling to the Institute’s

different quality managers and the tasks related
to the deployment of the system in all the units;■ most of the unit heads and quality managers
received training in the Process approach and therequirements of standard ISO 9001;■ efforts went into making personnel aware of theaction undertaken, i.e., the quality Intranet site wasreorganised and several brochures were preparedpresenting the various aspects of this action tostaff;■ the three main aspects of the Institute’s quality
policy were explained: satisfying its partners and

FOCUS

RENEWAL OF ACCREDITATIONS FOR THE SAMPLE ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT
The IRSN department in charge of sample processing and metrology for the environment (STEME)
obtained the renewal of its COFRAC accreditations until 2009, according to the baseline of standard NF EN
ISO 17025, for programmes 135 “Laboratory analysis of radionuclides present in all types of samples from the environment”,
and 99/4 “Analysis of chemical contaminants in animals, in their products and the foodstuffs intended for humans andanimals: radionuclides”.
COFRAC accreditation offers companies, consumers and public authorities a guarantee of confidence in the services
provided. As a signatory of the multilateral, European, mutual recognition agreement for tests, calibrations and certificationand equivalent international agreements, the COFRAC is also a passport to exportation.
Preparing renewal audits involves putting together a large number of documents.
Activities covered by accreditation include:■ the measurement of tritium in fresh water and sea water;■ the measurement of global beta radioactivity index (air-aerosol);238■ the measurement of alphaPu, 239+240Pu, 241Am emitting radionuclides in water;
14■ the measurement of C in solid samples;■ the measurement of gamma emitting radionuclides in fresh water, solid samples and aerosol sampling filters.
Audits to monitor accreditation will be held in 2005 and the scope will be extended to include the measurement of uranium
in water.

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CERTIFICATION

2004

Audits
In 2004, 21 internal audits werecarried out at IRSN. These
audits were a continuation of
the work that had been carriedout in previous years.
Among these, we find twointer-relating audits: the one,preparatory to the audit
carried out in spring 2004 by
the IAEA on the French baseline
for the radioactive materialtransport safety, and the one
from the Reactor section of
the process Elaboration ofa notice for a standing advisorygroup. Moreover, to anticipate
the gradual increase in
the audit programme linked to
the Certification project,
the team of auditors has been
considerably strengthened.

Accreditations
andcertifications
The IRSN currently has six
accredited units (ISO 17025)

customers (internal and external), demonstrating theprofessional nature of its various activities and in somecases, the benefits to society of its activities;■ IRSN’s quality organisation was clarified. This is basedon the distinction between the line of action, composedof the chain of command in charge of defining and implementing the system’s various measures (presenting thestate of things, defining objectives and indicators, drawing
up action plans, implementing improvements, etc.) andthe network of different quality managers in charge of
coordinating, developing and monitoring the system andproviding method support to the Institute’s different
units;■ each unit, at various levels of hierarchy (Institute,
management, department, etc.) drew up a quality inventory taking stock of the existing situation and comparing
it to the standard requirements. After the inventories,
these same units held management reviews at which
action plans appropriate for each unit were drawn up;■ on 27 September 2004, IRSN’s management review
was held and the Institute’s plan of action until the nextmanagement review was drawn up.

and two certified units(ISO 9001 version 2000).
In 2004, we saw the renewal ofaccreditations held by
the ionising radiation
dosimetry laboratory (forthe calibration of measuring
instruments used in photon
dosimetry) and the department
in charge of sample processing
and metrology forthe environment(see Focus p.178).

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180

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MANAGEMENT
AND SUPPORT

Communication> 182 Communication

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COMMUNICATIONC O M M U N I C AT I O NIRSN web portal.

Communication
There are three main fields of communication at IRSN:in-house communication,
information to the public on nuclear
and radiological risk and reputationbuilding and promotion of the Institute,a multi-skilled public expert.
In-house communication
It helps encourage a sense of belonging to IRSN
by developing a shared culture.
The main initiative of the year in the field of inhouse communication is the creation of Repères IRSN,
the quarterly 16-page house journal containing a
4-page supplement for each operational department. This medium aims to inform people of all
the different jobs and activities at the Institute, tohelp them understand the new organisation andthe strategy of IRSN. Four issues were publishedand circulated between
February and December
2004. A readershipsurvey was conducted
and the conclusions
were quite positive:
people read Repères
IRSN and look forward
to it. They appreciate
the content and theregularityofitspublication.
As far as the Intranet isconcerned, efforts were
put into providing inforIntranet portal.

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2 0 0 4mation on daily life at the Institute and on moreregular updating, via more dynamic sections. We
will continue our efforts to make the Intranet abetter organised and more widely used interactive
tool.
Finally, in 2004, the construction of the Institutealso led to the creation of its visual identity witha new logo: development of a graphic charter, an
editorial charter and the deployment of these tools
via stationary, signposting, outfits worn by response
personnel, etc. In-house support on the use of thesecharters was given at the Institute’s different sites.

Information
The aim is to provide information of reference thatis explanatory, educational and documentary, andsuited to every audience. Relations with the press
also have to be conducted by fulfilling their requirements.
As far as informing the public is concerned, IRSN
continued action with the general public andprofessionals in 2004 (see Part 2,Public information
chapter).
As far as media relations are concerned, the Institutepromptly responded to press requests (164 requests
and six TV reports), gave its own news (15 press
releases) and provided in-depth information
allowing a better understanding of events. As wellas the Institute’s real-time watch on the media
and on public debate on nuclear matters, relations
with the media also included a meeting with the

IRSN’s house journal.

AJE in 2004 and the organisation of two press trips:
to Chernobyl (Ukraine) for the FGI closing conference(5 and 6 October), and to Cadarache (Bouches-duRhône),for the last test in the PHEBUS-FP programme(18 November).

low level radioactive elements, etc.) and five cards
on “training” (radon metrology in buildings, etc.)
were distributed, especially during the shows andconferences the Institute attended.

Reputation-building and promotion
This should help establish the reputation of theInstitute:■ as a scientific expert working for public authorities,
operators and society in France and Europe;■ as an organisation that encourages exchanges
with civil society;■ as an expert that helps people understand nuclear
and radiological risks.
In 2004, the Institute’s reputation-building andpromotional action included the publication oftechnical data cards highlighting the services that
the Institute provides, i.e., 10 data cards on “products”(radiotoxicological analyses, quantification ofPart of the communication team and the communication
management network at IRSN.

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184

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MANAGEMENT
AND SUPPORTHuman resources
and social relations> 186 Human resources and social relations

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HUMAN RESOURCES AND SOCIAL RELATIONS
H U M A N R E S O U R C E S A N D S O C I A L R E L AT I O N S

Welcoming young people and PhD students.

Human resources
and social relations
Human resources: an active policy tosupport the development of IRSN

Discussions were initiated andactions launchedindividual and collective interviews were organisedwith managers in 2004. These should lead to a
training programme on how to assume hierarchicalresponsibilities;■ managerial staff pay: after improvements to thepay grid of employees and non-managerial staff
in 2003, discussions and negotiations started in 2004
on how to simplify and boost the pay system for
managerial staff, engineers and researchers. IRSN
wants to be able to attract young people, better
reward those who assume responsibilities, possess
expertise and achieve personal results and it wants
to motivate its staff throughout their career.

IRSN’s management of human resources is in linewith the Institute’s global project.Within this framework, several schemes were launched in 2004:■ developing a line of Experts: IRSN wishes todevelop its employees’ career prospects and offer
new and motivating careers through the creationof a line of Experts. Employees who distinguishthemselves through their recognised skills andnoteworthy productions will be appointed to theposition of Expert. Their position shall be defined
through missions fully contributing to the accomplishment of objectives set out in the Institute’s
scientific and technical policy and its recognition
within the international scientific community;■ strengthening management: IRSN reaffirmed
the central role that unit managers play in making
the Institute’s strategy operational and inmotivating their teams to achieve this. In this spirit,

The policy governing human resources management
was redefined, and initiatives concerning its mainprocesses were taken in 2004.The aim was to defineor revise these processes and then formalise themto make them clearer and more effective.
■ Recruitment: the recruitment process wascompletely reformulated – simplification of theadministrative management of dossiers and clearer
follow-up by operational units. The Director of
Human Resources will systematically interview theapplicants who have been pre-selected by thedepartments.This will provide managers with advice
and a wider point of view, thus helping themmake their decision.
■ The annual interview: the annual interview isa good individual and collective management tool.
It has been completely redefined to effectively

Significant initiatives were undertaken
in terms of human resources management in 2004. In line with the orientations defined by the Institute, they
are based on the key objective: using
competence as the basis of humanresources policy.

Pyramid of ages
More than
60 years
50 to
60 years
40 to
50 years
36 to
40 years
31 to
35 years
25 to
30 years
Less than
25 years
175 150 125 100 75 50 25

Men
Women

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meet IRSN’s priorities and ensure the dynamic
management of its human resources.
■ Mobility: in 2004, employees joined organisations
outside IRSN in order to pursue and enlarge theircareers. Mobility is one of IRSN’s main objectives,and it intends to sign agreements with researchbodies in France or abroad. This will make it more
open to the scientific community and contributeto the development of relations with its main
partners.

An evolving workforce
On 31 December 2004, IRSN had 1,471 employees
for a target workforce of 1,515 positions: 77% of
the employees are under permanent contract (CDI)
with IRSN, and 23% are seconded to the Institutefrom CEA. Managerial staff, engineers and researchers represent more than two thirds of the total
workforce and the average age is quite young, with
48% of women and 38% of men between 25 and35 years of age. Women represent 45% of IRSN’s
human resources.

Social policy
IRSN’s social environment was clearly defined in2003 (Board of Directors, Works Committee,
personnel representatives, occupational safety,
health and working conditions committee (CHSCT),etc.), and the company-wide agreement signed in
2003, together with a series of additional agreements signed in 2003 and 2004, provide employeeswith a high level of protection within a context ofactive and constructive industrial relations.
During 2004, negotiations between management
and labour were held according to a fixed schedule.

They concerned the choice of a new mutual insurancecompany offering a much better cover of healthexpenses for the same cost, the signing of anagreement on non-managerial staff pay grids, andthe signing of a salary settlement for 2004.
The works committee and personnel representatives
held regular meetings in 2004. This represented a
total of more than 40 meetings. The works
committee has been directly in charge of all its
missions since 1 January 2004 so its work load has
increased.
2004 also saw a gradual increase in the openingof IRSN’s company saving plans.At the end of 2004,
just over 20% of employees subscribed to them.
Moreover, the Institute defined its housing assistancepolicy and chose two partner-collector organisations.
Finally,a direct loan system for personnel has enabled
about 15 employees to receive financial aid tobuy a house/flat or a vehicle.

Breakdown
according to sex

Receiving young people
In 2004, IRSN received 63 young researchers undera thesis contract, 18 of whom were hired during theyear. During the same period, 27 post-doctorands
worked at the Institute, 12 of whom arrived in 2004.
IRSN provided 107 higher-education students withplacements, 74 of whom were post-graduate
students or coming from engineering schools.
The Institute signed eight new contracts of apprenticeship and two contracts of qualification.These young
people are mainly preparing senior technician orengineering diplomas in electronics, chemistry andinformation technology.

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Men 55%
Women 45%

Breakdown according tosocioprofessional category

Engineers, researchers andmanagerial staff 68%
Non-managerial staff 32%

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HUMAN RESOURCES AND SOCIAL RELATIONS
H U M A N R E S O U R C E S A N D S O C I A L R E L AT I O N S

INSER, training management software.

Breakdownof training hours
per field in 2004

Continuing professional
development
Further professional training contributes to thedevelopment of the skills that the Institute requires
for its different fields of activities. 40,000 training
hours were given in 2004, for a total teaching costof 1,150,000 euros.
Two particular points are to be noted for 2004:■ the implementation of new software to manage
training: in the second half of 2004, the acquisition

Economy, management 2%
IT 13%
Languages 18%
Management, communication 5%
Project quality 9%
Security 10%
Science and Technology 43%

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2 0 0 4and installation of dedicated software enabled us
to prepare an inventory of the training needs for2005. Training courses on the centralised anddecentralised use of this software were given andthis will be continued in 2005, especially forreporting requirements;■ a consolidation of scientific and technical training:
scientific and technical training represented 40%of training hours and 42% of teaching costs.

> Glossary

ACT Advanced Communication Tool –counting measurement system that can
rapidly determine the radiation ofradionuclides incorporated by a person

networking tool used within
the framework of the SARNET

Aplasia Arrest or insufficiency in[A ]■ADN Accord européen pour le transport[B]
B4C Boron carbide used as a neutron
absorber in the control rods that equip themost recent French reactors as well as theboiling water reactors in service in Europe■■

the development of a tissue or organ■

de marchandises Dangereuses par voie deNavigation extérieure (European provisions
concerning the international carriage of
dangerous goods by inland waterway)
AECL Atomic Energy of Canada Limited■

AFA 3GLr AA Advanced Fuel Assembly■(2nd generation assembly) – name given toa certain type of fuel assembly

AREVA Industrial group including
the companies AREVA T and D, COGEMA,FRAMATOME, FBFC, COGEMA logistics,
ANP, TECHNICATOME and FCIBADIMIS Computer database related tothe suspension of radionuclides■■

BAM BundesAnstalt für Materialforschungund -prüfung (German Federal) – Institutefor materials research and testing■

ARMINES Association for contractual■

BARRACUDA Programme dedicated toresearch, partner of French Engineering
Schools■

the next generation of French nuclear
attack submarines

ASR Authorisation to Supervise Research■

AFAQ Association Française d’Assurance■

de la Qualité (French Quality Assurance
Association)

ASTEC Accident Source Term Evaluation■

AJE Association of journalists specialised

Code – Scientific software used to simulatea core meltdown accident in a water reactor,
from the initiating event to the release ofradioactive products out of the containment.
It is developed jointly by IRSN and GRS

in the environment

ASTRAL ASsistance Technique en

Alpha (α) Radiation composed of helium 4Radioprotection post-AccidenteLle(Technical assistance in post-accident
radiological protection). Quantifying
the transfer of radioactive elements tothe agricultural environment following
a nuclear accident.

AFSSAPS Agence Française de Sécurité■

SAnitaire des Produits de Santé (French
Agency for the Safety of Health Products)■■

nuclei, highly ionising but not very
penetrating. A sheet of paper is sufficient
to stop alpha radiation
AMANDE Accélérateur pour la Métrologie■

et les Applications NEutroniques en
Dosimétrie Externe (Accelerator for
metrology and neutronics applications forexternal dosimetry) – IRSN, Cadarache
ANCLI Association Nationale des■Commissions Locales d’Information(French association of local informationcommissions)■

Basemat Foundation of reactors in nuclear
power plants■

BECARRE Essais de dégradation de Barres
En CArbure de boRe et RElâchements
associés (Tests on the degradation of boron
carbide control rods and associated releases)■

Becquerel (Bq) Official international unit
for radioactivity measurement. The becquerel
is equal to one disintegration per second■

Beta (β) Radiation composed of electrons■of negative or positive charge.
A few-millimetre air screen or a simple
sheet of aluminium can stop this type ofradiation
Biokinetics Refers to all the accumulationand excretion kinetics of an element in an
organism■

ASTRID Assessment of Source Term for■

emergency Response based on Installation
Data

BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour■

Explosion

ATPu Plutonium technology facility(COGEMA)

BNI Basic Nuclear Installation

ATUe Enriched uranium treatment

BORIS Bioavailability Of Radionuclides In

des Déchets RAdioactifs (French National
agency for radioactive waste management)

workshop

ANTHRO-Si Prototype of a whole-body(Association Vinçotte Nuclear) - Belgium

Soils. European project aiming to study the
behaviour of radionuclides in former
Russian nuclear weapon complexes whereliquid radioactive waste was injected in-depth

ANDRA Agence Nationale pour la gestion
■

■

■

■

AVN Association Vinçotte Nucléaire■I R S NA N N U A L■■

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Burnup fraction Thermal energy produced■by nuclear fissions in a fuel mass unit. It ismeasured in megawatts-day per ton (MWj/t)
BWR Boiling Water Reactor■

ÉLectriques essais glObaux (Global test
electrical cabinet combustion)

associated with chronic exposure toionising radiation

CAROL CAmargue-RhÔne-Languedoc,
project for studying the distribution of artificial
radionuclides in the Lower-Rhône region

CHSCT Comité d’Hygiène de Sécurité et

CARTORAD Software used to map

CICNR Comité Interministériel pourradioactive measurements

la gestion des Crises Nucléaires et Radiologiques(Interministerial committee for the managementof nuclear and radiological crises)

■

■

[C]

CASTEAUR CAlcul Simplifié des Transferts■

CABRI Test reactor concerning fuel safety■

used by IRSNCABRI REP-Na Water reactor with sodium■

loop
CABRI-CIP CABRI International Program■with water loop
Caesium (Cs, atomic number 55) Noble,

dans les cours d’EAUx Récepteurs(Simplified calculation of transfers inreceiving waterways). Simplified calculationof transfers of radioactive elements into
receiving waterways for impact studies
on accidental releases like routine releases
from fuel cycle plants
CATHARE Advanced thermal-hydrauliccalculation code used to study
the behaviour of pressurised water reactors
in accident situations■■

toxic metal whose characteristics arecomparable to those of potassium
CALIBAN Experimental reactor■■

CIEMAT Centro de Investigaciones■

Energéticas, MedioAmbientales y
Tecnológicas (Research centre for energy,
environment and technology), Madrid – SpainCIP Competitivity and Innovation■

framework Programme
CIREA Commission Interministérielle desRadioÉléments Artificiels (Interministerial
commission for artificial radioelements)■

CIS bio international Company thatdevelops biomedical technologies forindustrial and commercial purposes■(CEA-Valduc), which can produce intense
pulses of neutrons and fission gamma rays

CATHARE-SIMU Version of the CATHARE

Callovo-Oxfordian Layer of sedimentary

CDI Open-ended contract■

CAMARI Certificat d’Aptitude à Manipuler■

des Appareils de Radiographie ou
de radioscopie Industrielle (Certificate
attesting the ability to handle radioscopy
and industrial radiography equipment)

I R S NCENELEC European committee forelectrotechnical standardisation■

CESAR Software of the ASTEC system■simulating the thermal-hydraulics ofthe primary and secondary systems ina water reactor
CHIP Experimental program on■

CARMELA IRSN research program on fires■■(French atomic energy commission)

realisation of atomic fuels (Romans – Isère)■

CARMELO Combustion ARMoires

CEA Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique■the instrumentation of radiologicalprotection, which can reproduce neutron
spectra like those found at workstations
in facilities (IRSN, Cadarache)in nuclear facilities aimed at gaining
further insight into electrical cabinet fires

code adapted to the SIPA simulator

CERCA Company for the study and the

CANEL Experimental installation for

■

■

■

rock from the Jurassic period (160 million
years) which is the layer studied in the Burelaboratory

190■

des Conditions de Travail (Health, safety andworking conditions committee)

CLI Commission Locale d’Information(Local information commission)■

CMS Cote Majorée de Sécurité (Maximum
design flood level)■

CNAM-TS Caisse Nationale d’Assurance■

Maladie – Travailleurs Salariés (French
employee’s national health insurance fund)
CNES Centre National d’Études Spatiales(French space agency)■

CNRS Centre National de la Recherche■

Scientifique (French national organisation
for scientific research)“Iodine chemistry in the primary system”
of a PWR during a core meltdown accident

COFRAC Comité français d’accréditation

CHRONIC RAD EPID Research project

COGEMA Compagnie générale desmatières nucléaires (French generalcompany for nuclear materials)■

carried out within the framework of 6th FPRD
and dealing with epidemiological cancers

A N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4■

(French accreditation committee)■

COGIC Centre opérationnel de gestion
interministérielle des crises (Interministerial
operational crisis management centre)■

COMURHEX Company that converts■

Uranium into metal or hexafluoride
CONRAD Radiological consequences –software used to simulate the dispersionof accidental radionuclide releases into
the atmosphere and the short-term impact

CRISTAL New French criticality package

and small and medium sized firms)■

developed as part of a joint project
between IRSN, CEA and COGEMA. It aims
at assessing the criticality risk in all nuclear
fuel cycle plants and transport packages
where fissile materials are used■

Containment Building or reactor building.
■

Leaktight concrete building housing thereactor pressure vessel, primary system,
steam generators and main auxiliaries
ensuring reactor safety
CORE COoperation for the REhabilitationof living conditions in contaminated areas –programme concerning 15 Byelorussia
villages, financed by the UNDP, the World
Bank, the EC, the diplomatic representationsin Minsk and Belarus. CORE operators
include Médecins du Monde, Patrimoinesans Frontières, University of Caen,
National Agronomic Training Institute ofParis-Grignon, IRSN, CEPN, the French
Ministry of Agriculture, FERT, À tous vents
du monde, Mutadis■

COWAM 2 COmmunity WAste■

Management 2 – research programme
initiated as part of the 6th FPRD, coordinatedby Mutadis and in which IRSN participates.
The programme aims to improve
the governance of radioactive waste
management and storage in Europe
CPHR Centro de Protección e Higiene de lasRadiaciones (Centre for health andprotection against radiation). Scientific andtechnical unit of the Nuclear Energy
Agency based in Havana■■

DATARAD Database of radioactivity■

measurements
DCN DCN company, former shipbuilding
division of the DGA (French defence
procurement agency)■

Criticality Risk of uncontrolled fission■

phenomena in fissile materials
Criticality accident Uncontrolled chain■

DDASS Direction Départementale des■fission reaction triggered in anenvironment containing fissile materials
such as uranium-235 or plutonium-239

Affaires Sanitaires et Sociales (French
department direction of health and social
affairs)

CRPPH Committee on Radiation■

DDSC Direction de la Défense et de la■Protection and Public Health (NEA)
CRSSA Centre de Recherches du Service de■Santé des Armées (Army health service
research centre)

Sécurité Civiles – Ministère de l’Intérieur(French directorate of civil defence andsecurity – Ministry of the Interior)
DECOVALEX DEvelopment of COupled■

CTB Centre de Traitement des Brûlés
■models and their VALidation against
EXperiments(Treatment Centre for Burn victims)
Percy hospital, Clamart

DEND Direction de l’Expertise Nucléaire
de Défense (Department for nuclear
defence expertise) - IRSN■CTC IRSN’s emergency response centre■

CTGF/CCN2 Connective Tissue Growth■

FactorCTHEN Centre Technique d’Homologation

DGA Direction Générale pour l’Armement(French defence procurement agency)

des Équipements Nucléaires (TechnicalCentre for nuclear equipment approval)

DGAC Direction Générale de l’Aviation
Civile (French Civil Aviation Authority)

CTHIR Centre Technique d’Homologation

DGSNR Direction Générale de la Sûreté

de l’Instrumentation de Radioprotection(Technical centre for the radiologicalinstrumentation approval)

Nucléaire et de la Radioprotection(French department for nuclear safety
and radiation protection)

■

■

■

■

■

DISCO German experimental programme■■

CRIS IRSN centre for scientificinformation resources

DATANET SARNET experimental database

network[D]
DAM Direction des Applications Militaires■

on the direct heating of the reactor
containment when corium is ejected out ofthe vessel – DISpersion of Contamination
test bench (IRSN – Saclay)

du CEA (CEA’s military applications division)

DISPRO Near-field dispersion

DARPMI Direction de l’Action Régionale et

DIVA Dispositif expérimental pourdes PMI (Department for regional action

l’Incendie, la Ventilation et l’Aérocontamination■

I R S NA N N U A L■■

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4191

(Experimental system for fire, ventilation
and air contamination)

ECORAD International Conference

involving eco-toxicology and radioactivity

ESTRO European Society for Therapeutic
Radiology and Oncology

DM1 Modifying decision No.1 of IRSN budget

EDF Électricité de France (French national
electric utility)

EURANOS European approach to nuclear
and radiological emergency management

EDZ Excavation Disturbed Zone

EURATOM European Atomic Energy

EMRAS Environment Modelling for
Radiation Safety

Community■■

Dosimetry Detection, by assessment or■

measurement, of the dose of radiation(radioactivity) absorbed by a substance ora person■■■

DOSMAX DoSimetry of aircrew exposure■

ENUSA Empresa Nacional del Uranio, SA(Spain) – Spanish nuclear organisation –(Industrias Avanzadas S.A.)■

during solar Maximum. Research
programme conducted as part of the 5th FPRD
and in which IRSN took part

ENVIRHOM IRSN research programme
aimed at studying radionuclide accumulation
processes and the biological effects, during
this accumulation, induced in the livingorganisms of plants, animals and humans
subjected to chronic exposure■

DPPR Direction de la Prévention des■Pollutions et des Risques majeurs
du ministère de l’Écologie et duDéveloppement durable (French department
for the prevention of pollution and risks
from the Ministry of Environment andSustainable Development)
DRASS Direction Régionale des Affaires

EORTC European Organisation for■

Research and Treatment of Cancer■

Sanitaires et Sociales (French regional
department of health and social affairs)
DRIRE Direction Régionale de l’Industrie,■de la Recherche et de l’Environnement(Regional directorate of industry, researchand environment)

EOT Operational transport section (IRSN)■EPICUR A cobalt-60 irradiator used toassess the behaviour of iodine underradiolysis (Cadarache)■

EPR European Pressurised Reactor■

EPR Electron Paramagnetic Resonance■

DRT Direction des Relations du Travail■(Staff relations branch)(France)

DSND Delegate for nuclear safety and

EPRD Forecast statement of revenue andexpenditureradiation protection for activities andinstallations related to defence

EPRI Electric Power and Research Institute (US)

■

■

■

ERICA Environmental Risk from Ionising
Contaminants Assessments andmanagement■

EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction■

and Development

ES Konsult Consulting firm specialised inrisk assessment, safety, quality assurance(Sweden)■

EC European Commission■

ECC European Community Commission■

192

I R S N■■EURODIF European uranium enrichment
by gaseous diffusion plant(COGEMA, Pierrelatte – France)■

EUROFAB The project named EUROFAB■(for “FABrication en EUROpe”) is part ofthe programme for disposal of Russian andAmerican military plutonium exceeding
defence requirements
EUROSTRATAFORM European margin■

strata formation – research programmeof the 5th FPRDEVIDOS Evaluation of individual
dosimetry in mixed neuton-proton fields –research programme financed by
the European Community within
the framework of 5th FPRD■EXTREME Research programme aimed atstudying the consequences of extreme
climatic events on the transfers ofradioactivity between in the compartmentsof the environment■■

EPS2 Level-2 probabilistic safetyassessment. IRSN is currently assessing the
900 MWe reactors[E]■

A N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4[F]
FASSET Framework for ASSessment ofEnvironmental ImpacT■

FBFC Société Franco-Belge de Fabrication■de Combustibles (Franco-Belgian fuelmanufacturer)
FGI French-German Initiative for■

Chernobyl

FIRST Further Improvement of Radiotherapy■of cancer through side-effect reduction by
innovative application of adult Stem cells
transplantation for prevention andTreatment of deterministic radiation
effects
FLAMME_S Software developed by IRSN■

that simulates in a simple manner theevolution of carbonated product fires ininstallations made up of mechanicallyventilated, confined premises
FLAMME_S/SIMEVENT FLAMME_S■

software combined with SIMEVENT
software that simulates a fire in a groupof premises connected by a ventilation
system and doors

emitted by the disintegration of radionuclides.
This type of radiation is stopped by
concrete or lead screensl’Industrie (French Senior Defence Officialof the Ministry for Economy, Finance andIndustry)

GATeL Génération Automatique de Tests à

HLLL High-Level and Long-Lived■

partir d’une description Lustre(Automatic generation of tests froma lustre description)

HLLLW High-Level and Long-Lived Waste■

HRD Human Resources Division■

HTR/VHTR High Temperature Reactor/VeryHigh Temperature Reactor (United Kingdom)

GDP Gaseous Diffusion Plants■■(INBS Pierrelatte)
GEIE Groupement Européen d’Intérêt
■Économique (European economic interest
grouping)
GIF Generation IV International Forum■■■GP Standing advisory group

IARC International Agency for Research on
CancerGPR Standing advisory group of experts
for nuclear reactors

ICARE-CATHARE Software that accurately■■

Paroi (Liquid fuel fire interacting with a wall)
FPRD Framework Programme for Research■and Development (European Community)
FPT-3 PHEBUS FP test dedicated■to studying the effects of B4C on
the degradation of a reactor core andon the release of fission products■■

describes the reactor core degradation up
until tank rupture during a core meltdown
accident

GPU Standing advisory group of experts■

for plants
GRNC Groupe Radioécologie du Nord-Cotentin(Nord-Cotentin radioecology group)■

FS 65 900 Fresh MOX fuel shipping

GRS Gesellschaft für Anlagen – und
Reaktorsicherheit (Germany)

container

GWj/t Fuel burnup rate. Giga Watt days■■

Fuel assembly Cluster of fuel rods,

connected with a metallic structure,used in nuclear reactors
FzK Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe –■per tonne of fuel. The customary unit formeasuring fuel assembly irradiation, i.e.,
the energy extracted from the assembly inthe reactor per tonne of initial uranium■

la Protection de l’Environnement(Classified installations for the protectionof the environment)
ICRP International Commission on
Radiological Protection
ICSBEP International Criticality Safety■

Benchmark Evaluation Project
ICST Ingénierie de la Connaissance■

German advanced nuclear research centre

Scientifique et Technique (Scientific andtechnical knowledge engineering)

[H]

[G]

ICPE Installation Classée pour

■

■

■

[i]
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

GLP-2 Glucagon-Like Peptide■

FLIP Feux de Liquide en Interaction avec une■

IEC International ElectrotechnicalCommission■

HAEA Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority■

Hematopoietic cells Cells where red blood

IFREMER Institut Français de Recherche■

method used in French power plants

cells are formed

pour l’Exploitation de la MER (French research
institute for exploitation of the sea)

Gamma (γ) Highly penetrating but not

HFD Haut Fonctionnaire de Défense du

IGR Institut Gustave-Roussy (Gustave

very ionising electromagnetic radiation,

ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et deRoussy Institute) - France

GALICE Name of a fuel management
■

■

■

■

I R S NA N N U A L■

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4193

INBS Secret basic nuclear installation

IUR International Union of Radiology

TRIPOLI-4 code, developed by CEA (France)

INERIS Institut National de l’Environnement
industriel et des RISques (French national
institute for the industrial environment andhazards)

IUR International Union of Radioecology

MEDD Ministère de l’Écologie et du

■

■

■

■

MEDEC French health exhibition[K]

InVS Institut de Veille Sanitaire■(French health watch institute)■

Développement Durable (French Ministry
for Ecology and Sustainable Development)■

MEDICIS ASTEC system software used to■

K2-R4 Abbreviations for phase 2 of the■

IPPAS International Physical Protection

Advisory Service

Khmelnitsky power plant and phase 4 of
the Rovno power plant, both in Ukraine

IPS 47 OECD/CSNI’s International Standard

kV KiloVolt■■

simulate ablation of the basemat bya melted reactor core
MELODIE Model for the long-term
assessment of buried radioactive waste■■

Problem dedicated to calculations on the THAI
tests carried out in Germany and TOSQUANMELOX MOX fuel manufacturing plant(COGEMA Marcoule – France)■

IPSN Institut de Protection et de Sûreté
■[L]

Nucléaire (French institute for protection
and nuclear safety)

Mesenchymal Relating to embryonic■

LERISS Laboratoire d’Étude et de Recherche

connective tissue

en Instrumentation Signaux et Systèmes(Laboratory that carries out studies andresearch in signals and systems instrumentation)mGy Milli Gray – unit of absorbed■

IRMA Cobalt-60 IRradiation unit with test■

facilities to study the behaviour ofMaterials and equipment to irradiation(IRSN – Saclay)

LFI Initial finance law■

IRPA International Radiation Protection■

LMND Laboratoire de Métrologie et de

MIMAUSA Memory and IMpact ofDosimétrie des Neutrons (Laboratory for
Neutron Metrology and Dosimetry),
IRSN – Cadarache

MLLL Medium-Level Long-Lived■

Association
IRSN Institut de Radioprotection et■de Sûreté Nucléaire (French Institute forradiological protection and nuclear safety)■■

simulates the progress of a fire, gas, smoke
and structures in confined spaces withmechanical ventilation
ISO International Standard Organisation
■

[M]

■

MORET Monte-Carlo code for simulationof neutron transport (multi-group
approximation) to calculate the effective
multiplication factor (Keff) of 3-D complex
systems
MOX Fuel of uranium (natural or depleted)and plutonium oxides■

M5 Type of pressurised water fuel cladding■

ISO 9001 European standard for quality■

management systems

MARN French nuclear risk management
aid committee■

Isotopes Elements whose atoms have the■same number of electrons and protons, but
a different number of neutrons. They havethe same name and the same chemical
properties. Around 325 natural isotopes
and 1,200 artificially created isotopes are
currently listed

194■

urAniUm mines: Summary and Archives■

LPG Liquified Petroleum Gas

ISIS Calculation software that precisely■

radiation dose of the International System
of Units

I R S NMCNP (Monte-Carlo N-Particule

MOZART Analytic tests to study
the oxidation kinetics of clads under air■■

Transport). Monte-Carlo code forsimulating the transportation of different
particles: neutrons, photons, electrons,
coupled neutrongamma. This code, developedin Los Alamos (USA), is the same as the

A N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4

MRI Magnetic Resonance Imaging■

mSv Milli Sievert – unit derived from dose
equivalent of the International System of Units■

MWe MegaWatt electric■[N]Nuclear materials Materials which could

ORME Observatoire Régionalbe used to manufacture a nuclear explosive
device. They are defined according to theirfissile (for a fission device), fusible (for athermonuclear bomb), or fertile (capacity
to produce fissile or fusible materials)
characteristics. French legislation covers six
nuclear materials: plutonium, uranium,
thorium, tritium, deuterium and lithium 6(deuterium and lithium 6 are not radioactive)

Méditerranéen de l’Environnement(French mediterranean environment
observatory)■N4 N4 series – series of 1,450-MWe■pressurised water reactors operated by EDF
NAIMORI Novel Approaches in■

the Management Of the Radiation Injury European project
NEA OECD Nuclear Energy Agency■

NF-PRO Near Field Processes■

NNC National Nuclear Corporation Firm of nuclear services consultants(United Kingdom)■

NNSA-NSC National Nuclear Safety■

Administration (United States) –Nuclear safety centre (China)
NOD-SCID Line of immunodeficient mice■(non obese-diabetic/severe combined
immunodeficiency)

Nuclear safety Set of measures taken■

at all levels of design, construction, operationand decommissioning of the nuclear
installations to prevent accidents and limit
their effects■

ORPHEE Experimental, pool-type nuclear■

reactor with a rated power of 14 MWth
(CEA Saclay – France)[P]
P4 Plant series comprising eight,■

1,300-MWe, water-pressurised reactors
at Paluel, Flamanville and Saint-Alban
P’4 Plant series comprising twelve,■

NUPEC Nuclear Power Engineering■

1,300-MWe, water-pressurised reactors –the most recent French reactors

Corporation – Japanese nuclear safety
organisation

PACA Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur region(France)■

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission■(United States)
NRG Nuclear Research and consultancy■

PANAME Method developed by IRSN toquantify the reliability of operating actions■[O]
OECD Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development

PASEPRI Action plans for the monitoring ofpatient exposure to ionising radiation

Board (United Kingdom)

OECD/CSNI Organisation for Economic

PATRAM International symposium

NSA Nuclear Security Agency (United

Cooperation and Development/Committee
on the Safety of Nuclear Installations

on PAckaging and Transportationof RAdioactive Materials

OECD/NEA OECD Nuclear Energy Agency

PCO Operational control centre

OEDIPE Tool for assessment of

PCRDT Framework Programme forGroup (The Netherlands)
NRPB National Radiological Protection

■

■

■

■

States)NSRR Nuclear Safety Research Reactor■(Japan)

■

■

■

■

■

Nuclear fuel Fissile material (capable of■undergoing a fission reaction) used ina reactor to develop a nuclear chain
reaction. After being used in a nuclear
reactor, this is referred to as irradiated fuelNuclear island Assembly comprising■

the nuclear boiler, the installations relating
to the fuel and the equipment needed tooperate and ensure the securityof this assembly■Technological Research and Development

personalised internal dose

PHARE Poland-Hungary Assistance for
Reconstruction of the Economy – European
assistance programme for reconstructionof polish and hungarian economies■

OJ Official Journal■

OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition■of Chemical Weapons
OPERA IRSN permanent environmental
radioactivity observatory

PHEBUS FPT3 FPT-3 test of the PHEBUS-FP

OPRI Office de Protection contre les

PHEBUS-FP IRSN experimental programmeon the degradation of a nuclear reactor
core and the release of Fission Products (FP)■■programme■■

Rayonnements Ionisants (French office forprotection against ionising radiation)I R S NA N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4195

PHENIX 250-MWe fast neutron reactor

production during the degradationof a reactor core■

PIC Common interest program■

RNIPP Répertoire National Individuel desPersonnes Physiques (National register of persons)■

RPO Radiation Protection Officer■

PICSEL Propagation of solid fuel fire in■a laboratory and plant environment[R]

PIV Particule Image Velocimetry■

PKL Primar KreisLauf – test loop used for■

Radiation protection Set of measuresintended to ensure health protection of
the population and workers using ionisingradiation sources■

inherent dilution phenomena
Plant unit Power production unit including■

a boiler and a turbo-generator set. A nuclear
plant unit is mainly defined by its type ofreactor and the power of its turbo-generator
Plutonium (Pu, atomic number 94).
■

Transuranic chemical element. The isotope
239 has a half life of 24,110 years■

neutrons■

elements whose nuclei spontaneously
disintegrate into other elements emitting
ionising radiation
Radioelement Natural or artificial

radioactive element
Radionuclide Radioactive isotope of an■

PNNL Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (United States)■

POLLUTEC International trade fair for■environment-related equipment,
technologies and services for industry

SAE Annual statistics for public and■private health establishments
SARA Automated monitoring of aerosol■

Radioactivity Property of certain chemical■

PN3 “Trace detector” dosimeter for[S]element
RASSC Radiological Safety Standards■

Committee (IAEA)

radioactivity
SARNET Severe Accident Research■

NETwork of excellence – a European
network of excellence on water reactor
core meltdown accidents – 6th FPRD project
SATURNE Experimental installation withan extractor hood aimed at studying
the progress of a fire■

SC 45B “SECNUC exercise” –“Nuclear Safety” exercise■

PPI Special response plan

RBMK Graphite reactors fromthe ex-Soviet Union

Primary system Reactor coolant system

RECI RECombiner of Iodine – experimental

SDMV Synchronised Distributed Mapped

operating in a closed loop, comprisinga series of components ensuring thecoolant fluid circulation used to extract
the heat given off by the reactor coresystem used to assess the influence ofrecombiners on the chemistry of iodinein the containment (IRSN, Saclay – France)

Values

PRISME Propagation of a fire for

distance TRANsport and bioavailability ofradionuclides in marine sediments

■

■

■

elementary, multi-premises scenarios
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment■

PUI Internal emergency plan■PWR Pressurised Water Reactor■■■

REP-Na Experimental programme inthe sodium loop of the CABRI reactor
aimed at studying the behaviour of fuelduring a power transient■

reactor (France)
RIA Reactivity Insertion Accident■

programme aimed at studying hydrogen

196

I R S NSEBIM Brand of valves■

SECNUC Nuclear safety
SEVESO The Seveso accident, that happenedin Italy in 1976, gave its name to a European
directive on industrial accident risks■■

RHF Laüe Langevin Institute’s high-flux

■

■

■

RES Test reactor

QUENCH German experimental■

an RIA-type transient developed by IRSN■REMOTRANS REMObilisation, long■

[Q]

SCANAIR Software used to calculate

RNG New generation reactor■

A N N U A L

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4SFR Société Française de Radiologie■(French radiology organisation)
SFRP Société Française de RadioProtection(French society for radiation protection)■

SGDN Secrétariat Général de la Défense
Nationale (French general secretariat fornational defence)■

SICN Industrial nuclear fuel company■(CEAI) (nuclear fuel fabrication plant)

SIEVERT Information and assessment

SSD Department for the safety of

TOSQAN TonuS Qualification ANalytique –system of the exposure to cosmic radiation
during flights

radioactive waste (IRSN)

Experimental containment used toreproduce a small-scale accident scenario
enacting a hydrogen risk in a nuclear
reactor containment (IRSN Saclay – France)■

SIGIS Information and management■

system for the national inventoryof ionising radiation sources■■

SSI Swedish radiation protection authority■

SSTC State Scientific and Technical Centre(Ukraine)■

TPO Thrombopoïetin
■STARMANIA Station for the study of■

SIGMA Graphite block containing■

radioactive sources, producing a “realistic”
field of mainly thermal neutrons(IRSN, Cadarache – France)

airborne contamination transfer andmechanical strength under incident andaccident conditions (IRSN Saclay – France)
STE Technical operating specifications,■

SILOETTE Pool-type teaching reactor■(CEA/Grenoble)■

in a ventilation system developed as partof a joint project between IRSN, SGN and
COGEMASIMO Mining company in western France■(CEA)
SIPA Pressurised water reactor accident■

simulator developed and used by IRSN
SIPA/SCAR “Simulator CATHARE Release” –■a joint project conducted by IRSN and EDF
aimed at integrating the thermal-hydrauliccode CATHARE 2 into IRSN’s SIPA 2 simulator■

TVO Teollisuuden Voima Oy –■■STUK Stäteilyturvakeskus – Radiation andnuclear safety authority (Finland)
SUNSET Statistical calculation tool that,■SYLVIA Software system used to study■

ventilation, fire and air contamination
SYMBIOSE Systemic approach■for modelling the fate of chemicals
in biosphere and ecosystems[U]
UF6 Uranium hexafluoride■

UNSCEAR United Nations ScientificCommittee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation■

when combined with software that simulates
physical phenomena, can be used to study
the effect on chosen calculated responses
of uncertainty concerning some parametersand data entered into the software

UOX3 Fuels with an initial U235 content■

of 4.5 % and a burnup fraction of 60 GWj/t
UP1 Biggest plant for the reprocessingof spent nuclear fuels with a viewto them being recycled in France(Cogema Marcoule – France)■

UP2-800 Irradiated nuclear fuel■reprocessing plant located at the Site in
La Hague (Cogema – France)

SISERI Ionising radiation exposure■

monitoring information system
SKI Swedish nuclear power inspectorate

TRG Translational Research Groupeffluent treatment centre
STI Scientific and Technical Information■

SIMEVENT Software simulating aeraulics■

Finnish electricity company■

SILOE Pool-type reactor (CEA/Grenoble)

TranSAS Transport Safety Appraisal Service■

SNA Nuclear attack submarine[T ]SNCF Société Nationale des Chemins

TACIS Technical Assistance forde Fer français (French national railway
company)

Commonwealth of Independent States –European assistance programme forthe reconstruction of economies in
the new independent states■■

SNLE Nuclear-powered ballistic missile■

submarine■■

TONUS Code developed by the CEA
on behalf of IRSN that uses models thatgovern the distribution of hydrogenin the containment■

SNR Fast breeder reactor■

SNRCU State Nuclear Regulatory■

Commitee of UkraineI R S NVHE Very High Efficiency■[W ]TID Total Indicative Dose■

SNM Military nuclear system[V ]A N N U A L

WHO World Health Organisation■

R E P O R T

2 0 0 4

197

> Contents
1. News, strategy and organisation> Foreword by J.-F. Lacronique and J. Repussard . . . . . . . . . 04
> Foreword by M. Brière . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 06
> IRSN missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 07
> IRSN in 2004: Report and perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . 08
> Main events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

> Organisation: A short description of IRSN . . . . . . . . . . . 14
> Activity 2004 : Key figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
> The Board of Directors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
> The Scientific Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
> Organisation chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
> IRSN sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

2. Activities in 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

• Research activity on radon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

. . . . . . . . . . 02

Description of programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Research and public service missions . . . . . . . . 28
> Defining and implementing national
and international research programmes . . . . . . . . . . 30
• Support for the safety assessment of operational reactors . 30
• Research into the ageing of PWR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
• The fuel and its management during
normal and accident operating conditions . . . . . . . . . 31
[ Modelling of irradiated fuel behaviour in a reactivity[ Understanding the radon concentration mechanisms
in buildings ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
[ Use of radon as a geological probe ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

• Epidemiology of nuclear workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
[ Coordination of European projects on the epidemiology
of ionising radiation ]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

• Improvements in radiation protection[ Cosmic radiation: the DOSMAX project ]insertion accident (RIA) ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

• Modifications to the CABRI installation . . . . . . . . . . 34
• Research work into severe accidents
with core meltdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
[ SOURCE TERM programme ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

. . . . . . . . . . 62

[ ANTHRO-Si project ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
. . . . . . . . . . . 65

• The AMANDE installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
• The radioprotection of patients: consequencesof radiotherapy on healthy tissue present
in the radiation field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
[ European moves in medical radiation protection ] . . . . . . . . 67

[ FPT-3: final test under the PHEBUS-FP programme ] . . . . . . . 38

• Irradiation and contamination accidents[ TOSQAN programme ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

[ Improvements in the diagnosis of cutaneous• Safety of plants, transport and dismantling . . . . . . . . 40
[ CRISTAL V1.0: new version of the CRISTAL package ] . . . . . . . 41

• Waste-related research activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
[ Innovations in the MELODIE software ] . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

• Incorporation of human factors in the design processes . . 46
• Research activity in the fire and aerodispersion fields . . . 46
[ Behaviour of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) ] . . . . . . . . . . . 47
[ PRISME experimental programme ]. . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

[ PICSEL experimental programme ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
[ SYLVIA software platform ]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

• Research on earthquakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
• Radioecology research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
[ Launch of the ERICA European programme ] . . . . . . . . . . 51
[ Launch of the EXTREME project ]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

[ The ECORAD congress ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

• Research into the metrology of radionuclides
in the environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

• Influence of exposure chronicity on the behaviour
and toxicity of radionuclides:
the ENVIRHOM programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

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radiation syndrome ]. . . . . . . . . 68

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

[ European FIRST Project ]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

• Management of post-accident situations . . . . . . . . . 73
• International cooperation to improve control
over radiological and nuclear risks. . . . . . . . . . . . 73

[ International conference on the FGI results ] . . . . . . . . . . 74
[ Development of cooperation between IRSN and the NRC ] . . . . 75
[ End of the European ASTRID project ]. . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

• New recommendations concerning radiation protection . . 77
> Contributing to training in radiation protection . . . . . . 78
• An activity to help prevent risks and their possible
consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
[ Training on radon ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

> Permanent monitoring in matters of radiation protection . 81
• Radiological monitoring of the environment . . . . . . . . 81
• Monitoring ionising radiation sources . . . . . . . . . . . 83
> Public information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
• Information and communication activities . . . . . . . . 84
[ EUROSAFE 2004 forum ]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Technical support and assistance for publicauthorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

[ Real action taken by the CTC ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129[ Exercise in dealing with victims of a radiological attack ]radioactive material ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131• Support in managing post-accident situations. . . . . . 132[ Pierrelatte exercise ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133[ Incident at Fessenheim ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
[ Incident at Cattenom ]. . . . 130[ Exercise in dealing with an accident involving transported> Technical support with regard to nuclear
and radiological risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
• Reactor safety analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

[ CD-Rom – “Information on nuclear risk and how it is managed” ]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

. . 134. . . . . . . . . . . . 93

• Operational support in case of crisis . . . . . . . . . . . 135[ Examination of feedback from 2000-2002 ] . . . . . . . . . . 94

[ Plan to renew mobile resources ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135[ Insulation defect on valve actuators ][ EPR Reactor: collaboration with Finland ]. . . . . . . . . . . 95

[ Safety of the CABRI experimental reactor ]. . . . . . . . . . 96

Contractual services of expert appraisal,
research and measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136• Support for the safety assessment of operational reactors . 98
[ Comparative study of PSAs applied to safety-related events ]> Services related to statutory requirements . . . . . . . . 138• Radiological testing of water intended
for human consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138• Radon detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138• Radiation protection of workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139• Conformity of materials and equipment . . . . . . . . . 140. . . 99

• Ageing of pressurised water reactors . . . . . . . . . . . 101• Fuel in normal and accident operating conditions . . . . . 102[ IRSN’s opinion on the “MOX Parity” dossier ] . . . . . . . . . 102• Examination of risks associated with severe
core meltdown accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104[ Basemat at the Fessenheim power plant ]. . . . . . . . . . 104[ Non-nuclear third-party expertise ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141[ EPR corium recovery system ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105> Services not related to statutory requirements . . . . . . 142• Study regarding the presence of radionuclides
in the Toulouse urban area sewer system . . . . . . . . . 142• Operational radiation protection services . . . . . . . . 143• Radioecology services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143• Operating method for radon measurement . . . . . . . 144• Services concerning dispersal of contaminants . . . . . . 144• Safety expertise for future reactors to follow EPR . . . . . 106• Safety of plants, transport and dismantling . . . . . . . . 107• Examination of safety dossiers concerning mining waste
and participation in the writing of regulations . . . . . . 111[ MIMAUSA programme ]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112• Human and organisational reliability . . . . . . . . . . . 114[ Integration of human factors in the design of modifications[ Probabilistic safety assessments applied to industrial sites ] . . . . 145

to EDF power plants ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115• Dosimetry services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146• Assessment of dose received by the foetus• Fire protection of installations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116[ Fire PSA ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

during a diagnostic examination on a pregnant woman . . 149• Radioecological impact studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118• Earthquake and flood risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119• Environmental monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120[ Consulting and assistance for healthcare professionals ] . . . . . 149• Collaboration with Eastern European countries . . . . . . 151[ Assistance to Eastern European countries ] . . . . . . . . . . 151[ Setting up the national network for environment radioactivity• Expertise and assistance for civilian societymeasurements ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120• Technical support in the field of radon . . . . . . . . . . 121• Radiation protection response and assistance . . . . . . 122• Radiation protection of workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122• Radiation protection in the medical field . . . . . . . . . 124

Defence nuclear expertise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154> Assessing the safety of military nuclear systems,
basic nuclear installations and Defence-relatedtransportations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156[ Radiographic examinations in sports medicine ] . . . . . . . . 124[ Joint IRSN /AVN /GRS guide to safety assessment ][ BARRACUDA programme ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157. . . . . . 125> Protection and control of nuclear and sensitive materials . 159[ Strengthening cooperation with Chinese safety
and radiation protection organisations ]. . . . . . . 153[ Impact of the new Euratom regulation on national control ] . . . 160. . . . . . . . . . . 126[ Hosting trainees from Chinese safety organisations ] . . . . . . 127[ Additional protocol ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163> Operational support in the event of a crisis or radiologicalemergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128• Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128> Protecting installations from malicious acts . . . . . . . . 164

3. Management and support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168• Quality: IRSN’s Certification project . . . . . . . . . . . . 178> Scientific and technical excellence . . . . . . . . . . . . 170• Scientific and technical knowledge engineering . . . . . . . 175• Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176> Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180> Human resources and social relations . . . . . . . . . . . 184> Managing emergencies caused by malicious acts

. . . . . 166[ Crisis exercise involving the inventory of nuclear materials ]. . . 167

[ Renewal of accreditations for the sample analysis department ] . . 178

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EDITORIAL COORDINATION
Department for Strategy, Development and External Relations
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
SG/DAF: D. Demeillers
DESTQ: F. Bretheau
DEI: N. Chaptal-Gradoz
DPAM: B. Adroguer
DSR: A. Dumas

DSDRE: E. Mur
DCOM: M.L. de Heaulme, H. Fabre
DEND: J. Jalouneix, D. Franquard
DRPH: J. Aigueperse, J. Brenot
DSU: P. Cousinou, S. Clavelle

AUTHORSIRSN with the assistance of Camille Jaunet (La Clé des mots)
PRODUCTION COORDINATION
Communications Department
GRAPHIC DESIGN AND COORDINATIONPRODUCTION ASSISTANCELAO Conseil, ré(craie)action
PRINTINGOPAG
PHOTO CREDITSAREVA: page 42 (diagram) ■ AREVA / Geoffray Yann: pages 40 (top) and 103 ■ AREVA / Jean-Marie Taillat: pages 113 (top) and 156 ■ AREVA /Les films de Roger Leenhardt: page 109 (top) ■ CEA: page 101 (bottom and band) ■ Claude Cieutat: page 142 (top) ■ Cogema / Jean-Marie Taillat:
page 110 ■ DGA (French defence procurement agency): page 157(top) ■ DR: page 106 ■ EDF Multimedia Library / Claude Cieutat: page 31(right) ■ EDF Multimedia Library / Guillaume Lemarchal: page 31 (left) ■ EDF Multimedia Library / Guy Jaumotte: page 93 (bottom) ■ EDF
Multimedia Library / Marc Moreau: page 104 (bottom) ■ EDF Multimedia Library / Mario Guerra: page 164 ■ EDF Multimedia Library / Philippe Brault:
page 95 (top) ■ EDF Multimedia Library / Serge Lohner: page 91 ■ Éric Couderc: page 54 ■ F. Parozzi / CESI: page 75 ■ GRS: pages 74, 86(bottom) ■ French Navy / Romain Veyrié: page 154 ■ Gunther Vincent: pages 26 (middle), 76, 94 (bottom), 96 (top), 97 (top and band), 99(top and band), 102, 128 ■ IRSN: pages 18, 25 (middle), 26 (left), 38 (bottom), 49 (bottom), 53 (bottom), 77, 108 (band), 116 (band), 117(bottom), 122, 127 (bottom), 131 (bottom), 142 (bottom and band), 145, 147, 152, 159-162, 163 (top), 174 ■ IRSN / Claude Cieutat: page 82(top) ■ Stéphane Jungers: pages 92, 103, 105, 106, 116, 129 (bottom), 143, 152, 153 ■ KhNPP Photo: page 151 ■ Mickaël Lafontan: pages 2,5, 18, 20, 22 (left and band), 23 (left), 24 (left), 25 (left), 26 (right), 28, 39 (bottom and band), 41, 42 (top and band), 44 (bottom), 47, 53 (topand band), 58- 61,63, 64, 65 (right), 67-72, 83 (profile), 88-90 (top), 92, 93 (top), 94 (top), 99 (bottom), 100, 104 (top), 107, 109 (bottom
and band),114, 115, 123 (top)-125, 126, 127 (top and band), 129 (band), 130, 131 (top and band), 132, 133 (bottom), 134 (top), 136, 139,
140, 141 (top), 146, 148, 149 (right), 150, 157 (band), 158, 163 (bottom and band), 165 (bottom), 167 (left), 168, 183, 184, 186, 187, 188(profile) ■ Olivier Seignette: pages 6, 18, 22 (right), 23 (middle), 24 (middle and right), 25 (right), 27 (right), 30, 32-37, 38 (top and band),39 (top), 40 (band), 43, 44 (top and band), 45, 46, 48, 49 (top and band), 50-52, 55-57, 62 (band), 65 (left), 66, 78-81, 82 (bottom and band),90 (band), 94 (band), 96 (band), 97 (bottom), 98, 101 (top), 105, 111, 112, 117 (top and band), 118-121, 123 (band), 133 (top and band),134 (band), 135, 138, 141 (bottom), 143, 144, 149 (left), 165 (top and band), 170, 172, 173, 175-177, 179, 180, 184 ■ Olivier Seignette /Mickaël Lafontan: pages 85 (bottom) and 86 (top) ■ SIRPA Air: pages 23 (right), 166 ■ SMO: page 108 (top) ■ Technicatome: page 157(bottom) ■ Thomas Gogny: pages 27 (left), 84, 85 (top and band), 87 ■ TVO: page 95 (bottom)© Communication IRSN
N° ISSN: 1762-0600

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Finance Ledger ofthe Annual Report

2004Didier Demeillers,
Director in charge of Financial Matters

> Contents
04> Management report08> Profit & loss account10> Balance sheet

12> Intermediate management balances

13> Self-financing capacity

14> Variation in liquid funds

15> Forecast and completion reconciliation

Breakdown of resources(in M€)MEDD subsidy 201.9
MINDEF subsidy 2.7
Other subsidies 2
Own resources 35.2
Miscellaneous 3.8

[FINANCE LEDGER OF THE ANNUAL REPORT 2004 ]Management report
aw 2001-398 of 9 May 2001 creating the French health and environmental safety agency merged, in article 5,within a public establishment of industrial and commercial nature named IRSN, part of the Office for protection
against ionising radiation and the Institute of protection and nuclear safety.

L

1. Evolution of the Institute
After the 2002 financial year, limited to ten months

supervision system will be completed in 2005 by(from 28 February to 31 December) and not incorporating

implementing a decision information system, currently

the accounts of OPRI and IPSN, the 2003 financial year

in the course of installation, and the launching ofreally marked the accounting and financial birth ofcost accounting revision which will enable refinement

the Institute with a normal twelve-months period andof cost price relevance.

incorporation in the closing balance sheet of the assets
and liabilities of OPRI and IPSN. The end of 2003 also

The main features of the 2004 financial year, apart

saw finalisation of the new organisation of the Institute.

from extraordinary items, are:

It was transcribed into the Institute’s budget at the■ observance of balances presented for the approval of

beginning of 2004 and was adjusted at the DM1 of

the Board of Directors with the EPRD 2004;

June 2004. This has affected the whole financial year,■ a budget realisation rate of 97.5%, a variation of

more particularly certain investments whose completion

7 M€ due, as to 2.5 M€, to delays in completing certain

was delayed.

investments, and as to 4 M€, to a fall in costs and a

In addition, installation of monitoring per process andsmaller sales figure.

launching of steps towards ISO 9001 version 2000

At the end of the year, extraordinary items disrupted

certification by 2007, marks a stage in the continuous

the 2004 balances:improvement process involving Institute management■ non-payment by MEDD of the counterpart of the

as a whole.

budget deficit consequent on the tax system imple-

Consistent with this quality orientation, major progress

mented on creation of the Institute,budgeted for in EPRD

has been made in improving budgetary piloting of

at 9.2 M€ inc. VAT;

activities, both in forecasting and in realisation, with■ cancellation, in the sum of 1.5 M€ inc. VAT, of thea finer monitoring of activities by using a budgetarybalance of receivable income, established in 2002 atpresentation per client. This economic and financial

an initial amount of 22.5 M€.

2. Profit & loss account analysis
2.1. Income
Operating income(in M€)
MEDD
subsidy
MINDEFsubsidy
Other
subsidiesOwn
resources
Miscellaneous■ 2 M€ for other subsidies, in particular from local

authorities, the level of which stays much the same

2.1.1.

from year to year;

Operating income net of tax rose 10.1 M€ in■ 35.2 M€ of own resources from expert activities orcomparison with 2003 (+ 4.3%).

co-financing of research programmes. The fall in

It totalled 245.6 M€, including:such resources in relation to DM1, balanced by a reduc-■ 201.9 M€ for the MEDD subsidy, representing, aftertion in expenditure of the same amount, is explained

deduction of VAT, the entire allowance shown in LFI,

mostly by disruption, linked on the one hand to the

up by 3.8 M€ in comparison with the preceding

reorganisation adjustment for the whole of 2004, andaccounting period in which a cancellation was effectedon the other hand to uncertainties resulting from theduring the year;

ending on 27 February 2005, of the option period fixed■ 2.7 M€ in respect of the agreement with the ministryfor operators seconded from CEA. However, thisof Defence, as against 2 M€ in 2003;

financing source rose by 3.7 M€ in comparison with

215 200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25

2003
2004

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that of the previous year, consistent with the■ depreciation of 13.6 M€ is lower than the DM1

orientation adopted for diversification of resources;

forecast taking into account the delay in certain■ 3.8 M€ sundry income, including 3.3 M€ fromoperations, and a particularly large reduction incancellation of accruals established in previous financial

comparison with the 2003 provision, due to theyears, 0.1 M€ for industrial property royalties andageing of equipment whose replacement financing

0.4 M€, sundry income on current management.

has not been ensured.

Details of income(in M€)
OperatingincomeThe provision allowance represents a total of 2.9 M€

2.1.2.

including 1 M€ for the dispute following the fuelTotal financial income was 1.4 M€, as against 1 M€

pollution of the Le Vésinet site and 1.9 M€ for waste

in 2003. The DM1 provided for 0.4 M€. The strong

treatment costs;

Exceptional
incomeincrease in this income is explained by the imbalance■ purchases of goods and services was 121.9 M€, as

between the regular payment of subsidies, which

against 125 M€ in 2003. This variation is not veryaccounts for 85% of IRSN resources, and the concen-

significant. It simply reflects fluctuations in activities;

tration of payments at the end of the financial year,■ other charges were 1.2 M€, including 0.9 M€ for can-resulting in particular from the difficulties encounteredcellation of accruals established in previous financial years.

posted completely to working capital consolidation.

50 100 150 200 250

2003
2004

Operating charges(in M€)

in separating the activities of the Institute from thoseof CEA. The stated increase in income, 1 M€, has been

Financialincome2.2.2.
The financial charge and the charge paid for profits

Personneltax (fixed annual taxation) are cited as a reminder.

2.1.3.

The cancellation of the balance of accruals (10.7 M€

Extraordinary income, particularly high in 2003

inc. VAT) made up by the MEDD subsidy for the 2002

(25.2 M€), came down to 6.7 M€ in 2004. 6.5 M€

financial year constitutes the main portion ofrelates to the portion of investment subsidies trans-

extraordinary charges of 13.7 M€. For information,

ferred to the Profit & loss account.The balance, 0.2 M€,

a comparable cancellation of 2.9 M€ was applied in 2003.

corresponds to sundry current management transactions.

Taxes
Depreciation/
Provisions
Purchases
goods-services
25 50 75 100 125 150

2003
2004

Total charges for 2004 were therefore 259.8 M€, as
Total income for the 2004 financial year is therefore

against 261.3 M€ for the preceding financial year.

253.8 M€, as against 261.7 M€ the previous year, thereduction resulting exclusively from extraordinary
operations.

2.3. Result and financing

Details of charges(in M€)
Operatingcharges

2.3.1.

2.2. Charges

The financial year resulted in a loss of 6 M€, asagainst a forecast profit of 1 M€ according to the2.2.1.

revised decision of EPRD, and a profit of 0.4 M€

Financial year operating charges fell by 15 M€ inin 2003. The variation with the DM1 results from thecomparison with 2003 (- 5.8%), to 246 M€.

taking over of an OPRI VAT adjustment of 2.2 M€ andThey are broken down as follows:

especially the non-payment by MEDD of 9.2 M€ of■ overall personnel charges, including employees

the tax deficit.These extraordinary charges have been

seconded from CEA: 102.3 M€, against a DM1 forecast

partly compensated by a higher level of financialof 104.5 M€. This reduction of 2.2 M€ is explained

income, a reduced depreciation charge for the financial

by the deferring of recruitment plans and is to be recon-

year and the balance of 2003 accruals unused in 2004.

Other
charges
50 100 150 200 250 300

2003
2004

ciled with the non-realisation of 4 M€ of services sold;■ taxes: 4.1 M€ as against 4.8 M€ in 2003, including

2.3.2.

1.6 M€ tax on remuneration, and 1.3 M€ made up

The self-financing capacity of the Institute, which

by a provision for contingencies as the method for

was 10 M€ in EPRD,has reduced,due to extraordinary

determining business tax is not yet known. This

operations, to 5.1 M€ as against 10.3 M€ in 2003.

valuation has been revised downwards and justifies

Consequently, financing of investments at 16 M€ isthe reduction in this item from one year to the next;balanced by a large debit of 10.8 M€ on working

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5

[FINANCE LEDGER OF THE ANNUAL REPORT 2004 ]capital, whereas the debit was already 3.2 M€ in 2003.

in its entirety, will be deferred to the next financial

It should be noted that the ex-OPRI investments ofyear and will therefore be financed in 2005 by a debit

1.5 M€, and loans to personnel of 1.2 M€, which EPRD

on working capital, excessive in relation to 2004.

envisaged financing by debit from working capital,
were not entirely realised and will be deferred to the

2.3.3.

next financial year for an amount of 0.73 M€. In the

Despite the fact that IRSN has maintained, apart fromsame spirit, certain investments whose financing

extraordinary items, the equilibrium forecast by EPRD,

appeared in EPRD 2004 and for which a delay inthe financial year shows a new debit from working

realisation did not enable the expenditure to be madecapital of 10.8 M€.

3. Balance sheet analysis
3.1. Liabilities
debts to suppliers and 3 M€ sundry debts. The

3.1.1.

“suppliers” item has returned to an acceptable level

After taking into account the loss recorded in 2004,

in comparison with 2003, which finished with accruals

invested capital comprises a net balance of 34.6 M€,

of more than 70 M€ . IRSN indeed achieved an

12.3 M€ of investment subsidies and 12.4 M€ ofhonourable level in the period taken to pay suppliers

provisions, namely a total of 59.3 M€, as against 67.9 M€

in 2004 and has progressively regularised its modeat the end of the previous financial year.

of operation with CEA, allowing a more natural paceof payment.This situation will reduce the cash reserves

3.1.2.

of the Institute, the weakness of which now requires

Short-term debts of 62.6 M€, as against 100.7 M€

early payment of the subsidy or recourse to external

the previous year, comprise 16.6 M€ tax and social

financing (bank overdraft).

debts, 2.4 M€ advances on pending orders, 40.6 M€

3.2. Assets
Analysis ofshort-term debts in M€

Invested capitalin M€

3.2.1.
Tied-up assets at 50.1 M€, as against 47.9 M€ theprevious year, are itemised as a gross amount of
88.8 M€ and depreciation of 39.7 M€.
This weak variation in tied-up assets represents ageing
equipment of the Institute and weakness in the current
level of investments. As a reminder, the research
reactors, which remain the property of CEA in

Tax and social debts 16.6 (27%)
Debts to suppliers 40.6 (64%)
Sundry debts 5.4 (9%)

Net balance 34.6 (58%)
Investment subsidies 12.3 (21%)
Provisions 12.4 (21%)

accordance with the Institute incorporation decree,therefore do not appear in the balance sheet, but are
directly taken by the Institute as operating charges.

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3.2.2.

Current assets in M€

Details of assets in M€

Current assets are 71.8 M€, as against 120.7 M€ theprevious financial year, and are made up as to 13.5 M€
cash, 9.8 M€ advances on orders; client receivables arestable at 29.8 M€ and finally the balance of 18.7 M€
being sundry receivables, mostly VAT. There was asignificant fall in cash reserves from 44.1 M€ at theend of 2003 to 13.5 M€ at the end of 2004 (see opposite).
This is explained, apart from the financial year deficit,

Cash 13.5 (19%)
Advances 9.8 (13,5%)
Receivables 29.8 (41,5%)
Sundry receivables 18.7 (26%)

by the progressive regularisation of the relationship with
CEA, of whom IRSN is one of its major customers. The

Fixed assets 50.1 (41%)
Current assets 71.8 (59%)

2004 financial year therefore finished with working
capital reduced to approximately 9 M€ as against 20 M€
on 1 January.

Conclusion
Apart from extraordinary items, 2004 was in strict

by the improvement in financial income and a lower

conformity with the commitments undertaken bythan forecast depreciation allowance, but the debit

IRSN before the Board of Directors in observing funda-

from working capital weakens the Institute’s

mental equilibrium in terms of results and effects on

capitalisation, and discussions are in progress withworking capital.

the authorities in order to determine the procedure

The evolution of the balance sheet is contrasting while

to be implemented for reinforcing the financial

the head of the balance sheet has worsened due

standing of the Institute on a long-term basis.

to the strong dip in working capital, there is

The change of tax system, with the application of anonetheless a marked improvement at the end ofprorata VAT regime on 1 January 2005, will eliminate

the balance sheet, with the reduction in time taken

as from that date, all other things being equal, theto pay suppliers, the result of progressive standar-

budget deficit resulting from the tax system set up

disation of the operation of the Institute.

during the creation of the Institute.

Extraordinary items have been partially compensatedF I N A N C E

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[FINANCE LEDGER OF THE ANNUAL REPORT 2004 ]Profit & loss accountIncomeIncome (excluding tax)

2004

2003

2002 (10 months)

Operating income

245,598,908.63

235,482,280.96

213,374,879.80

Net total turnover

35,164,526.17

35,590,211.96

34,611,537.36

Operating subsidies

206,681,399.76

198,098,871.94

178,524,198.90

Write-backs on depreciation and provisions

80,417.64

20,504.32

Transfers of charges

36,839.37

25,349.47

130,164.47

Other income

3,635,725.69

1,747,343.27

108,979.07

Financial income

1,446,579.93

1,018,763.58

1,203,877.45

8,710.77

0.00

31.94

19,953.00

38,568.13

29,626.39

Net income on sale of negotiable investment securities

1,417,916.16

980,195.45

1,174,219.12

Extraordinary income

6,721,564.71

25,211,622.50

5,446.82

Investment subsidies transferred to financial year profit & loss account6,554,482.13

18,742,326.22

5,446.82

167,082.58

6,469,296.28

0.00

253,767,053.27

261,712,667.04

214,584,204.07

261,712,667.04

214,584,204.07

Other interest and equivalent income
Financial write-backs on provisions and transfer of charges
Positive exchange differences

Management operations
TOTAL INCOME
Debit balance = loss

6,045,350.60

OVERALL TOTAL

259,812,403.87

In euros (€)

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Charges
Charges (excluding tax)

2004

2003

2002 (10 months)

Operating charges

245,997,066.23

261,015,076.71

200,437,180.89

Third-party consumption for financial year

158,454,902.47

182,831,266.23

171,834,080.29

Tax, rates and equivalent payments

2,776,145.74

1,381,124.89

3,454,953.91

Personnel charges

65,805,418.98

45,440,248.53

25,120,486.08

Depreciation and provision allowances

17,771,491.98

28,404,363.46

0.00

Other charges

1,189,107.06

2,958,073.60

27,660.61

33,456.39

21,155.29

46,546.63

Interest and equivalent charges

9,805.48

1,881.88

27,264.98

Negative exchange differences

13,650.91

19,199.31

19,281.65

Net charges on sale of negotiable investment securities

10,000.00

74.10

Extraordinary charges

13,763,131.25

260,535.00

3,822.36

Management operations

13,763,131.25

35.00

3,822.36

Financial charges

Capital operations

500.00Depreciation and provision allowances

260,000.00

Tax on profit

18,750.00

Fixed annual taxation

18,750.00

TOTAL CHARGES

259,812,403.87

0.00

0.00

261,296,767.00

200,487,549.88

415,900.04

14,096,654.19

261,712,667.04

214,584,204.07

Credit balance = profit
OVERALL TOTAL

259,812,403.87

In euros (€)
N.B.: The “personnel charges” item varies with the arrival of CEA employees opting for IRSN. This increase is compensated for by a decrease in “third-party
consumption”.

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[FINANCE LEDGER OF THE ANNUAL REPORT 2004 ]Balance sheet
Assets
2004

2003

2002

Gross

Depreciationand provisions

Net

Net

Net

Intangible fixed assets

7,217,293.11

5,475,146.01

1,742,147.10

1,845,335.08

1,470,315.23

Tangible fixed assets

80,366,590.83

33,176,186.78

47,190,404.05

45,435,018.48

13,251,907.41

Financial fixed assets

1,196,078.27

1,196,078.27

635,212.81- 7,092.29

88,779,962.21 38,651,332.79 50,128,629.42

47,915,566.37

14,715,130.35

TIED-UP ASSETSStock and work-in-progress

34,943.08

Advances and deposits paid

9,824,069.06

9,824,069.06

7,758,726.96

27,572,585.76

29,826,904.94

28,178,006.45

35,551,849.76

Operating receivables
Client receivables

29,970,112.77

Other receivables

18,533,312.85

18,533,312.85

79,899,947.86

54,839,848.14

48,503,425.62

143,207.83 48,360,217.79

108,077,954.31

90,391,697.90

1,069.28

1,069.28

1,069.28

Negotiable investment securities

10,938,217.44

10,938,217.44

33,680,806.20

47,177,335.17

Liquid assets

2,565,411.71

2,565,411.71

10,370,525.94

348,995.30

Prepaid charges

72,469.00

72,469.00

241,517.33

CURRENT ASSETS

71,904,662.11

143,207.83 71,761,454.28

160,165,543.10

165,490,614.13

OVERALL TOTAL

160,684,624.32

38,794,540.62 121,890,083.70

208,081,109.47

180,205,744.48

Sundry receivables

143,207.83

In euros (€)
N.B.: The 2002 balance sheet does not incorporate transfer of accounts from OPRI and IPSN.

10F I N A N C E

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Liabilities
2004

2003

2002

Allocation

8,782,859.59

8,782,859.59

Reserves

31,844,160.61

31,428,260.57

Financial year result (profit or loss)- 6,045,350.60

415,900.04

14,096,654.19

Net worth

34,581,669.60

40,627,020.20

14,096 654.19

Investment subsidies

12,297,019.86

18,851,501.99

TOTAL I

46,878,689.46

59,478,522.19

Risk provision

1,260,000.00

260,000.00

Taxation provision

1,300,000.00

Provision for charges

9,882,369.57

8,150,000.00

12,442,369.57

8,410,000.00

0.00

312.42

136,537.10- 248,851.80

Advances and deposits received

2,426,504.71

2,426,504.71

2,426,504.71

Supplier debts

33,998,794.86

79,002,887.85

84,339,390.84

Tax and social security debts

16,649,279.72

11,409,966.28

54,797,484.67

Shareholders’ equity

14,096,654.19

Contingent liability provision

TOTAL II
Debts
Financial debts

Other

39,514,301.48

Debts on fixed assets and related accounts

6,583,920.72

5,386,816.45

6,767,579.81

Other debts

2,792,448.24

2,197,809.41

17,909,218.06

117,764.00

117,764.00

117,764.00

62,569,024.67

140,192,587.28

166,109,090.29

121,890,083.70

208,081,109.47

180,205,744.48

Regularisation accounts
Deferred income
TOTAL IIIOVERALL TOTAL(I+II+III)

In euros (€)
N.B.: The 2002 balance sheet does not incorporate transfer of accounts from OPRI and IPSN.

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[FINANCE LEDGER OF THE ANNUAL REPORT 2004 ]Intermediate management balances

31/12/2004

31/12/2003

Variation%

Joint financing and own receipts

35,164,526.17

35,590,211.96- 425,685.79-1.20 %

Operating subsidies

206,681,399.76

198,098,871.94

8,582,527.82

4.33 %FINANCIAL YEAR PRODUCTION

241,845,925.93

233,689,083.90

8,156,842.03

3.49 %

Third-party consumption

158,454,902.47

182,831,266.23- 24,376,363.76-1.33 %ADDED VALUE

83,391,023.46

50,857,817.67

32,533,205.79

63.97 %

Taxes and rates

2,776,145.74

1,381,124.89

1,395,020.85

101.01 %Personnel charges

65,805,418.98

45,440,248.53

20,365,170.45

44.82 %GROSS OPERATING SURPLUS

14,809,458.74

4,036,444.25

10,773,014.49

266.89 %Write-backs, transfers of charges

117,257.01

45,853.79

71,403.22

15.72 %

Other income

3,635,725.69

1,747,343.27

1,888,382.42

10.07 %

Depreciation and provision allowances

17,771,491.98

28,404,363.46- 10,632,871.48- 37.43 %Write-backs on equipment subsidies

6,554,482.06

2,958,073.60-1,768,966.54- 59.80 %OPERATING CHARGES

6,156,324.53- 6,790,469.53

12,946,794.06-190.66 %Financial income

1,446,579.39

21,155.29

12,301.10

5.15 %CURRENT PRE-TAX RESULT7,569,448.07- 5,792,861.24

13,362,309.31- 230.67 %Extraordinary income

167,082.58

6,469,296.28-6,302,213.70-97.42 %Extraordinary charges

13,763,131.25

260,535.00

13,502,596.25

5,182.64 %-13,596,048.67

6,208,761.28-19,804,809.95- 318.98 %

18,750.00-- 6,461,250.64-1,553.56 %EXTRAORDINARY RESULTTax on profit

18,750.00

FINANCIAL YEAR RESULT- 6,045,350.60

415,900.04

In euros (€)
N.B.: The subsidy paid by MEDD has been withdrawn on financial year production.

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Self-financing capacity

Calculation from GOS

2004

2003

Variation

14,809,458.74

4,030,431.43

10,779,027.31

36,839.37

25,349.47

11,489.90+ other operating income

3,635,725.69

1,747,343.27

1,888,382.42- other operating charges

1,189,107.06

2,952,060.78-1,762,953.72

1,446,579.93

1,018,763.58

427,816.35

0.00

0.00

0.00

Subtraction method
Gross operating surplus+ transfer of operating charges+ financial income(a)± proportion of result on joint operation(b)

33,456.39

21,155.29

12,301.10( c)

167,082.58

6,469,296.28- 6,302,213.70(d)13,763,131.25

535.0013,762,596.25

18,750.00

0.00

18,750.00

5,091,241.61

10,317,432.96- 5,226,191.35

2004

2003

Variation

Financial year net result- 6,045,350.60

415,900.04- 6,461,250.64+ depreciation and provision allowances

17,771,491.98

28,664,363.46-10,892,871.48

80,417.64

20,504.32

59,913.32

0.00

0.00

0.00

to profit and loss account6,554,482.13

18,742,326.22-12,187,844.09- income from neutralising

0.00

0.00

0.00

5,091,241.61

10,317,432.96- 5,226,191.35- financial charges+ extraordinary income- extraordinary charges- tax on profit (if appropriate)
SFC
In euros (€)(a) excluding write backs on provisions(b) excluding allowances for depreciation and financial provisions(c) excluding - income from fixed asset sales- proportion of investment subsidies related to financial year result- depreciation neutralising (account 776)
- write-backs on extraordinary provisions(d) excluding - book value of fixed assets sold- allowances for depreciation and extraordinary provisions

Calculation from net result

Addition method- write-backs on provisions- net result on fixed asset sales- proportion of investment subsidies transferred

SFC
In euros (€)

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[FINANCE LEDGER OF THE ANNUAL REPORT 2004 ]Variation in liquid funds

2003

2004

Variation

CONTRIBUTIONS TO WORKING CAPITAL

-

-

-

WITHDRAWALS FROM WORKING CAPITAL- 3,211,987.17- 10,838,704.97- 7,626,717.80

FLUCTUATIONS OVER PREVIOUS FINANCIAL YEAR

24,283,067.65-- 24,283,067.65+ Variation in operational current assets- 1,755,813.10- 57,807,437.60- 56,051,624.50- Variation in operational debts- 9,209,719.90- 79,279,081.03- 70,069,361.13= Variation in operational working capital requirement

7,453,906.80

21,471,643.43

14,017,736.63- Variation in other credit balances- 17,092,172.01

1,762,645.41

18,854,817.42= Variation in non-operational working capital requirement

17,092,172.01- 1,762,645.41- 18,854,817.42(1) + (2) = variation in working capital requirement
or net redemption of working capital

24,546,078.81

19,708,998.02- 4,837,080.79

VARIATION IN LIQUID FUNDS- 3,474,998.33- 30,547,702.99- 27,072,704.66+ Variation in other debit balances

In euros (€)

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Forecast and completion reconciliation

2004

2004

Variation

BudgetActualActual/Budget

Sale of services

41,147,000.00

35,164,526.17- 5,982,473.83

Public subsidies (c/74)

204,627,000.00

206,681,399.76

2,054,399.76

Other operating income

12,948,000.00

5,286,227.57- 7,661,772.43

Internal transactions

6,490,000.00

6,634,899.77

144,899.77

265,212,000.00

253,767,053.27-11,444,946.73

Personnel charges

104,544,000.00

65,805,418.98-38,738,581.02

Other operating charges

144,147,000.00

176,235,492.91

32,088,492.91

Internal transactions

15,600,000.00

17,771,491.98

2,171,491.98

TOTAL CHARGES

264,291,000.00

259,812,403.87- 4,478,596.13

RESULT (PROFIT)

921,000.00

Profit & loss account
INCOMETOTAL INCOME
CHARGES- 921,000.00

RESULT (LOSS)TOTAL PROFIT & LOSS ACCOUNT BALANCE

6,045,350.60

6,045,350.60

265,212,000.00

259,812,403.87- 5,399,596.13

921,000.00- 6,045,350.60- 6,966,350.60

15,600,000.00

17,771,491.98

2,171,491.98- 6,554,482.13- 6,554,482.13

Transfer of result to SFC table
RESULT
Depreciation provision allowances
Proportion of subsidies transferred to result
Write-backs on depreciation and provisions- 6,490,000.00- 80,417.64

6,409,582.36

SELF-FINANCING CAPACITY

10,031,000.00

5,091,241.61- 4,939,758.39

SELF-FINANCING CAPACITY

10,031,000.00

5,091,241.61- 4,939,758.39

Tangible and intangible fixed asset acquisitions- 17,165,000.00- 15,261,954.13

1,903,045.87

Financial fixed assets- 1,200,000.00- 563,672.28

636,327.72

Financial debt repayment- 132,000.00- 136,224.68- 4,224.68

TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS- 18,497,000.00- 15,961,851.09

2,535,148.91

Summary financing table

Public investment subsidies-

Other resources (excluding internal transactions)

31,904.51

31,904.51-

31,904.51

31,904.51- 8,466,000.00- 10,838,704.97- 2,372,704.97

TOTAL RESOURCESCONTRIBUTIONS TO WORKING CAPITAL
In euros (€)

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Head office
77-83, avenue du Général-de-Gaulle
92140 Clamart – France
Telephone+33 (0)1 58 35 88 88
Mail
B.P. 17 - 92262 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex – France
IRSN website
www.irsn.org

> IRSN sites
Clamart (IRSN head office)77-83, avenue du Général-de-Gaulle
92140 Clamart – France
Tel. +33 (0)1 58 35 88 88
Agen
B.P. 27
47002 Agen Cedex
Tel. +33 (0)5 53 48 01 60

Cadarache
B.P. 313115 Saint-Paul-lez-Durance Cedex
Tel. +33 (0)4 42 19 91 00

Fontenay-aux-Roses
B.P. 1792262 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex
Tel. +33 (0)1 58 35 88 88

La Seyne-sur-Mer
Zone portuaire Bregaillon
B.P. 330
83507 La Seyne-sur-Mer Cedex
Tel. +33 (0)4 94 30 48 29

Le Vésinet
31, rue de l'Écluse
B.P. 35
78116 Le Vésinet
Tel. +33 (0)1 30 15 52 00

Les Angles – Avignon
550, rue de la Tramontane – Les Angles
B.P. 70 295
30402 Villeneuve Avignon Cedex
Tel. +33 (0)4 90 26 11 00

Mahina (Tahiti)
B.P. 519
Tahiti Papeete, Polynésie française
Tel. +33 (0)06 89 54 00 25

Octeville – Cherbourg
Rue Max-Pol Fouchet
B.P. 1050130 OctevilleTel. +33 (0)2 33 01 41 00

Orsay
Bois-des-Rames (bât. 501)
91400 Orsay
Tel. +33 (0)1 69 85 58 40

Pierrelatte
B.P. 166
26702 Pierrelatte Cedex
Tel. +33 (0)4 75 50 40 00

SaclayB.P. 6891192 Gif-sur-Yvette Cedex
Tel. +33 (0)1 69 08 60 00

Head office
77-83, avenue du Général-de-Gaulle
92140 Clamart – France
Telephone+33 (0)1 58 35 88 88
Mail
B.P. 17 - 92262 Fontenay-aux-Roses Cedex – France
IRSN website
www.irsn.org