i

WMD in Asia-Pacific

Edited byPeter Hayes, Tanvi Kulkarni,
Chung-in Moon & Shatabhisha Shetty© 2022 Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament(APLN). Copyright of individual chapters is maintained by the chapters’ authors.

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any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Attribution should include
the following information:Peter Hayes, Tanvi Kulkarni, Chung-in Moon, and Shatabhisha Shetty (eds.), WMD in AsiaPacific. Seoul, South Korea: Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation andDisarmament, 2022.
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All the external links were active on 23/03/2022 unless otherwise stated. Digital material andresources associated with this volume are available at www.apln.network
ISBN Digital (PDF): 979-11-978202-0-5
DOI: 10.979.11978202/05
Cover image created by Sophia Mauro, CC BY.
Copyedited and Compiled by Maureen Jerrett.
The papers in this book were first presented at the ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the
Asia Pacific Workshop’, December 1-4, 2020, organized by the APLN. The workshop and the
publication of this book are funded by the Asia Research Fund (Seoul).

Contents__________________________________________________________________
CONTRIBUTORSv

PREFACEviii

1. SURVEYING THE WMD LANDSCAPE IN ASIA-PACIFICPeter Hayes and Shatabhisha Shetty

1

SECTION I
2. A LOOMING STRATEGIC ARMS RACE IN THE ASIA-PACIFICREGION: FROM A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE
Luo Xi47

3. ASSESSING THE MODERNIZATION OF NUCLEAR POSTURES
Petr Topychkanov

59

4. NUCLEAR- CAPABLE MISSILES
Nick Hansen

74

5. NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (NC3)
IN ASIA-PACIFICPeter Hayes

129

6. STATUS OF EXISTING AND EMERGING ASIA-PACIFIC SPACEPOWERS CAPABILITIESNamrata Goswami

171

7. THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONJohn Carlson

199

8. EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
IN A PANDEMIC WORLD
Allan Behm

224

9. CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE ASIA- PACIFIC: HISTORY,SCIENCE, AND FUTURE PROSPECT
Jonathan Forman and Alexander Kelle25310. ASIA-PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONSAND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN THE PANDEMIC ERARichard Pilch and Miles Pomper

280

SECTION II
11. INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR DYNAMICS
Rakesh Sood314

12. NUCLEAR ESCALATION IN A TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS?
Robert Ayson

342

13. ASYMMETRIC WMD THREATS: DPRK NUCLEAR, CYBER, AND
BIO-CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITIES
Sang-Hyun Lee

366

SECTION III
14. GREAT POWER RISK REDUCTION MEASURES AND LESSONS FOR
THE ASIA-PACIFIC
Dmitry Stefanovich390

15. TRILATERAL STRATEGIC CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN
SOUTHERN ASIA
Feroz Hassan Khan409

16. IS A NUCLEAR DOMINO IN NORTHEAST ASIA REAL AND
INEVITABLE?
Chung-in Moon

441

17. NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONES IN ASIA
Tuya Nyamosor464

18. NPT-TPNW STANDOFF: WHO CAN BREAK THIS GRIDLOCK?
Nobuyasu Abe487

19. HOPE BECOMES LAW: THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITIONOF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Richard Tanter

502

Contributors

ABE Nobuyasu is a former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and a
Commissioner of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission and former Japanese ambassador in
Vienna for the IAEA and other international organizations, Riyadh, and Bern. Email:nobuy.abe@gmail.com
Robert AYSON has been Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington since2010 and works in close association with the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University of
Wellington, New Zealand. Email: robert.ayson@vuw.ac.nz
Allan BEHM is Director of the International and Security Affairs Program at The Australia
Institute in Canberra, Australia. Email: allan@australiainstitute.org.au
John CARLSON is an independent consultant on nuclear safeguards, disarmament, and arms
control and nuclear governance, affiliated with the APLN, the International Luxembourg Forum,
the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
Email: john.carlson.safeguards@gmail.com
Jonathan FORMAN served as Science Policy Adviser at the Organisation for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons (OPCW) from 2013-2019, and has been a Non-resident Scholar at James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies since 2019. Email: jonathan654@yahoo.com
Namrata GOSWAMI is an independent scholar on Great Power Politics, Space Policy, Alternate
Futures,andFrameworksofConflict

Negotiation

andResolution.

Email:

namygoswami@gmail.com
Nick HANSEN is a Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) Affiliate and an
imagery technology expert. Email: neh55@aol.comvPeter HAYES is the Director at Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, California, Research Director of
APLN, Research Director at Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation andDisarmament (APLN), and Honorary Professor at the Center for International Security Studies,
Sydney University, Australia. Email: phayes@nautilus.org
Alexander KELLE a Senior Researcher at the Berlin Office of the Institute for Peace Researchand Security Policy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg, Germany. He served as a Senior Policy
Officer at the OPCW from February 2013 to December 2019. Email: kelle@ifsh.de
Feroz KHAN is a Research Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California and the former Director of Arms Control andDisarmament Affairs in the Strategic Plans Division, Joint Services Headquarters, in Pakistan.
Email: fhkhan@nps.edu
Tanvi KULKARNI is Policy Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (APLN) and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict
Studies, New Delhi. Email: kulkarnit@apln.network
Sang Hyun LEE is President of the Sejong Institute in Seoul, South Korea and President of the
Korea Nuclear Policy Society (KNPS). He is a member of Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Korea-US Nuclear Policy Leadership
Initiative (NPLI). Email: shlee@sejong.org
LUO Xi is a Research Fellow at the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA)
and has a PhD in International Politics from Renmin University of China. Email:luoxi524@126.com
MOON Chung-in is the Chair of the Sejong Institute, South Korea, Vice Chair of the Asia-Pacific
Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and the former
special adviser for Unification, Foreign and Security Affairs to the ROK President. Email:cimoon@yonsei.ac.kr
Marty NATALEGAWA served as Foreign Minister of Indonesia (2009 – 2014). He is a memberof the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Advisory Board on Mediation; the UNSG’s Advisory
Board on Disarmament and the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmamentvi

Research. He is the Chair of the Board of Members of Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for
Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. Email: chair@apln.network
Tuya NYAMOSOR served as Foreign Minister of Mongolia from 1998 to 2000. She is a Board
Member of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.
Email: n_tuya05@yahoo.com
Richard PILCH is the Director of Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Programat the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Middlebury Institute ofInternational Studies. Email: rpilch@middlebury.edu
Miles POMPER is a senior fellow in the Washington DC office of the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). Email: mpomper@miis.edu
Shatabhisha SHETTY is Executive-Director of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear
Non-proliferation and Disarmament and former Deputy-Director and co-founder of the European
Leadership Network (ELN). Email: shettys@apln.network
Rakesh SOOD is a former Indian diplomat, columnist, writer and expert on foreign affairs and aDistinguished

Fellowatthe

ObserverResearch

Foundation,

New

Delhi.

Email:

rakeshsood2001@yahoo.com
Dmitry STEFANOVICH is a Research Fellow at the Center for International Security, Primakov
National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO RAS). Email:stefanovich@imemo.ru
Richard TANTER is a Senior Research Associate at Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, California,
and Honorary Professor in the School of Political and Social Sciences at the University of
Melbourne. He is immediate past president of the Australian board of the International Campaign
Against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). Email: rtanter@nautilus.org
Petr TOPYCHKANOV is a Senior Researcher in SIPRI’s Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control
and Non-proliferation Programme, working on issues related to nuclear non- proliferation,
disarmament, arms control and the impact of new technologies on strategic stability. Email:Petr.topychkanov@sipri.org

viiPreface
Marty Natalegawa

Since preparation of WMD in Asia-Pacific commenced in 2018, the world has plunged into a global
pandemic, experienced unprecedented climate change-induced firestorms and floods, and standson the precipice of nuclear war in Europe due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The world is now more fractured and less capable of addressing such global existential threats thanat the end of the Cold War. Two decades of opportunity to build cooperative security at all levels
of international human affairs were squandered, and then the world plunged into accelerating
conflict over the last decade.
Many old conflicts deepened while new ones emerged out of the failure to address underlying
drivers such as poverty, inequality, discrimination, and outright oppression as authoritarian rulers
crushed social movements seeking to address these core issues and exploited division to seize andcentralize power while confronting adversaries at home and abroad with threat and violent
intervention.
At the same time, many militaries grew in size and strength. The world is awash with armament
for sale and military technology is also freely available enabling the rapid diffusion of the latest
hardware and software to more nations for local production and deployment, including software,
missiles, logistics, and in many cases, nuclear, chemical, or biological warfare capabilities known
as “weapons of mass destruction” or WMD—the subject of this book in the Asia-Pacific region.
APLN set out to survey the vast array of such capabilities in the Asia-Pacific, including all typesof WMD and to provide an authoritative description of these means of destruction in an accessible
format that would be freely available to policy makers and decision-makers. Thus, as each chapter
was completed, it was posted immediately rather than waiting for the entire book before
publication. Now that all nineteen chapters are complete, they are compiled in this book to giveviii

scholars, students, journalists and interested readers a benchmark reference. It should be read in
conjunction with APLN’s previous reference book, Nuclear Weapons: The State of Play 2015.1
WMD in Asia-Pacific covers all types of WMD—admittedly with a focus on nuclear weapons as
the most dangerous of these capacities. It includes all the states possessing such capabilities in the
Asia-Pacific region. It provides the necessary historical perspective to understand why WMD is
so widespread. And it is multifaceted in that it covers not only the systems themselves, but provides
windows into how each party views their particular insecurities that drove them acquire and deploy
WMD.
Fortunately, the book does not dwell only on the bad news about WMD in each conflict in theregion and at the global level affecting the region. It also provides some waypoints on how tonavigate out of the security dilemmas involving WMD in each conflict, and also some novel
suggestions for new approaches to controlling WMD in the Asia-Pacific region.
Adoption of urgent risk reduction measures, resumption of arm control dialogues and agreements,
and progress on nuclear disarmament in each WMD-laden conflict are now extremely urgent--andalso essential to reduce tension so that states can respond cooperatively to humanity’s otherinterlinked existential threats, climate change and pandemics.
APLN would like to thank the primary donor to the WMD in Asia-Pacific book project, the Asia
Research Fund in Seoul. We also acknowledge the contribution to this book by APLN partners
Nautilus Institute and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition at Nagasaki University,and also the work of independent peer reviewers for each chapter of the book and too many to list
here. You know who you are, thank you.

Marty Natalegawa,Chair, APLN
March 2022

1 Free download:

https://cnnd.crawford.anu.edu.au/publication/cnnd/5328/nuclear-weapons-state-play-2015.

ix

WMD in Asia-Pacific

1. Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-PacificPeter Hayes and Shatabhisha Shetty

Introduction
We begin the first section of this chapter by introducing the term “Weapon of Mass Destruction”(WMD) and how it is used in the phrase “WMD landscape”—both of which are widely used but
are also conceptually problematic. Next, the chapter summarizes a set of seven nuclear force traits
that come with the possession and deployment of nuclear weapons, and that force possessor states
to make tradeoffs that characterize their nuclear force posture. These include: making possessionof nuclear weapons capacities more or less opaque versus transparent; ensuring that nuclear
weapons are always available for use versus are never be used without legitimate direction;
maintaining centralized, dictatorial authority to use nuclear weapons versus decentralizing andeven pre-delegating authority to use; limiting nuclear weapons to counterforce or military-onlytargets with minimum civilian casualties versus “counter-value” or population targets, often wholecities; and achieving “minimum” deterrence based on imposition of unacceptable risk to a nuclear
aggressor (that they would be hit by at least some nuclear retaliation after making nuclear firststrike) versus insisting that a nuclear aggressor faces “mutual assured destruction” irrespective ofthe level of destruction wrought on the victim of a nuclear first strike. The section explains how
nuclear weapons are used to create threat and the paradoxes that result from attempting to useannihilative WMD threats against other states.
In the chapter’s second section (Surveying the WMD Landscape), we present the summary reports
from seventeen authors from the three “cockpits” of war and nuclear war in the Asia-Pacificregion. The overview begins with Luo Xi’s description of the triangular nuclear competition
between the United States, Russia, and China, and their nuclear force modernization programs.
Petr Topychkanov expands the scope to include the modernization programs of India, Pakistan,and North Korea to those of the great powers, and the problem that opacity creates for strategic© 2022 Peter Hayes and Shatabhisha Shetty, CC BY 4.0

1

Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacificinstability. Nick Hansen presents the missile delivery systems of each nuclear-armed state in theregion, and he examines the bewildering diversity of missiles deployed or under development by
these states. Peter Hayes delineates the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3)systems employed by each nuclear-armed state in the region, without which nuclear weapons could
not be used and worse, serve as “force multipliers,” and any one of which could lead to loss ofcontrol of nuclear weapons and nuclear war. Namrata Goswami shows how states are moving
vertically into space for many different WMD-related operations and to compete with each otherin this domain in ways that could trigger war and nuclear war. John Carlson takes the horizontal
direction and shows how states obtain latent nuclear weapons capabilities in the region and theneed to put sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and materials under multinational control. Allan
Behm finds that nuclear extended deterrence is based on an inherently incredible bluff and istherefore an irremediably flawed basis for a national security strategy that increases the risk of
nuclear war. Jonathan Forman and Alexander Kelle review the history of chemical weapons use
in the region in wartime and for deterrence and the problem presented by modern chemical industry
and innovation for maintaining the modern non-use norm for chemical weapons. Richard Pilchand Miles Pomper examine how the coronavirus pandemic may enable the re-emergence of banned
bio-weapons and the motivation that some nuclear-armed and non-nuclear states may have toobtain chemical weapons in lieu of using or obtaining nuclear weapons.
From these WMD-weapons capacities, we turn to where they might be used in three locations in
the WMD-landscape, viz, South Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Taiwan Straits. Rakesh Sood traces
the evolution of the Indian-Pakistan conflict embedded in an inherently triangular nuclear threat
system with China. Perhaps in no other nuclear-prone conflict is the weight of colonial history so
directly linked to the adoption of nuclear forces. As Sood explains, the 1947 partition of Pakistanfrom India leading to multiple clashes, wars, and now state-sponsored, cross-border terrorism
makes it critical that minimal crisis management communication and dialogues commence toreduce the risk of nuclear war in the Indian-Pakistan conflict. In the second zone of possible
nuclear war, the Taiwan Straits, Robert Ayson argues that it is urgent to reverse the current
spiral of political and military confrontation between the United States and China thatrecognizes both of vital interests in the Straits and that therefore they must find ways to reduce
the risk of war and nuclear escalation such as no-go zones and other confidence building
measures. Shifting from East to Northeast Asia, Lee Sang-Hyun contends that the key risk of2

WMD in Asia-Pacificnuclear war now resides in the asymmetric nature of the DPRK’s conventional, cyber, andnuclear forces compared with the United States and the ROK and that the only way forward
is to engage the DPRK and enable it to become a “normal” state via a peace process.
The search for ways to exit from or eliminate altogether the WMD-landscape is tackled first by
Dmitry Stefanovich who notes that Cold War era treaties have mostly unraveled and in any case,
did not ameliorate the threats of war in the Asia-Pacific region, making it imperative to identify
ways to concretely reduce by measures such as limited deployment zones for launch platforms,
testing activities, warhead storage, modernizing hotlines, and applying international law more
stringently to nuclear operations in this region. In the Pakistan-India-China nuclear triangle, Feroz
Khan identifies a range of trilateral confidence building measures including linked conflict
resolution processes, conventional force restraints, and nuclear restraints on unilateral, bilateral,and trilateral bases across a range of possible political, military-nuclear, conventional-nuclear, andeconomic spheres. To curb possible nuclear proliferation by Japan and/or the ROK, Moon Chungin examines and dismisses the various arguments mustered by pro-proliferation policy currents ineach country, and he notes that it is urgent to reinforce official reluctance to entertain nuclear
armament by increased civil society education and mobilization in each state. Tuya Nyamosor
shows how the three nuclear weapons-free zones (NWFZs) that exist in the region emerged,
compares their regulatory provisions, and notes the near-term applicability of the NWFZ concept
to Northeast Asia. Richard Tanter highlights the rapid ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibitionof Nuclear Weapons in the region and the practical and legal obstacles to expanding its jurisdiction
to encompass the nuclear weapons and nuclear umbrella states.
The third part of this chapter (Conclusion) returns to the seven key tradeoffs that nuclear armamentdemands each nuclear-armed state make, listed above; and presents the orientation made by eachnuclear state from these combined choices. From this review, we find that while they share manyof the dilemmas that nuclear armament poses, each attempts to resolve these dilemmas in theirown way. For the most part, they do not think alike about nuclear weapons, are not committed tothe same norms of behavior or rules of the road, and lack even a common vocabulary for discussingor managing nuclear risk in this region. Nonetheless, we identify eight ways that the risk of nuclear
war and other WMD may be reduced and eventually eliminated. These include minimizing therole of nuclear weapons; controlling the diffusion of disruptive technologies and separating nuclear
from non-nuclear forces; slowing and reversing the interlinked nuclear domino effect and the arms
3

Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacificracing generated by nuclear modernization programs; creating the peaceful conditions that reduce
the risk of war in the first place; undertaking numerous, incremental, and immediate nuclear risk
reduction measures in each and every nuclear-armed state; delinking and separating the conflicts
in each conflict zone to reverse the potential for cascading conflict up and down the nuclear
weapons hierarchy; subordinating nuclear weapons and related deterrence to higher level,
existential goals, especially climate change and pandemic response; and expanding the landscapein which nuclear weapons are not allowed into defined zones or are prohibited altogether on anational basis.

The “WMD Landscape”
The Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (APLN)
informs and energizes public opinion, especially high-level policymakers, to take seriously thevery real threats posed by nuclear weapons and to achieve a world in which they are eventuallyeliminated. To this end, in 2019 APLN convened a group of experts to address critical issues
related to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (hereafter WMD) in the Asia-Pacificregion. The global pandemic that erupted in 2020 disrupted APLN’s plan to bring these experts
together and instead, led to a virtual workshop spanning four days in December 2020 at which
their work was presented.
This chapter introduces their work. But first, we define what is meant in this book by the term
“WMD” and present the concept of a “weapons of mass destruction landscape.” Next, we offer asummary tour of the key features of WMD infrastructure, force structures, capabilities, envisioned
uses, and finally, antidotes, at various locations across the Asia-Pacific WMD landscape. Alongthe way, we find that all nuclear-armed states make seven critical tradeoffs that shape their nuclear
identity and their willingness to control and/or disarm their nuclear forces. We conclude thisintroduction by drawing eight lessons drawn from this review of the WMD landscape in the AsiaPacific region, each of which has implications for the prospects for resumption of WMD control
and disarmament and possible policy measures that might realize such an agenda.

4

WMD in Asia-PacificWeapons of Mass Destruction
In this book, WMD is used broadly to refer to weapons that cause mass casualties that distinguishthem from non-WMD weapons. Readers should note that the very concept of WMD is contested,1
politicized, and is not defined legally at the international level although it appears in arms control
treaties. 2 The basic idea was well stated by the 1948 UN Commission for Conventional
Armaments as encompassing “atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal
chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which havecharacteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons
mentioned above.”3
Because of the unique effects associated with nuclear weapons, these are the primary WMD
addressed in this book. This focus is not to deny the lethal potential of chemical and biologicalweapons. Indeed, this book identifies where nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons havefeatured in Asia-Pacific’s WMD landscape and may do so again. But it mentions radiologicalweapons only fleetingly, and does not cover emerging weaponry with potential to achieve similarlevels of effect to WMD such as swarming drones, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, etc.

1 Michelle Bentley outlines these contextually driven shifts in “WMD” in “War and/of Words: Constructing WMD in

US Foreign Policy,” Security Studies, 22, 2013, pp. 22-68 at: https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.757164
and in her Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Foreign Policy, The Strategic Use of a Concept, Routledge, 2014.
2 Specifically, WMD are referred to in three international treaties that do not define the term, viz, the Seabed
Treaty that prohibits “nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction” from being placed on the “seabedand the ocean floor, and in the subsoil thereof”; the Outer Space Treaty that bans placement of “nuclear weaponsand other weapons of mass destruction” on celestial bodies except Earth; and The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
applies the ban to include fractions of Earth’s orbit. See Z. Kallenborn, Are Drone Swarms Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Future Warfare Series No. 60, The Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series No. 60, U.S. Air
Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, May 6, 2020, p. 5.
The phrase also appears in the preambles to the Latin American nuclear weapons free zone treaty and in the
proposed Middle Eastern WMD-free zone, and the biological and chemical weapons convention, but not the Treaty
on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. See S. Carus, Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Center for the
Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Occasional Paper, No. 8, National Defense University Press, Washington,
D.C., January 2012, p. 21. It also appears in the Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime agreements,
and in the UNSC 2004 1540 resolution related to regulating non-state actors; and UNSC resolution 1540 (2004)
that requires all states to “fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent
proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction.” Interestingly, resolution 1540 explicitly defines
the scope of the resolution to apply to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (and defines these weapons) but
does not define the term WMD. UNSC Resolution 1540, April 28, 2004, at:https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540%20(2004) However, the 1995 UNSC resolution
984 on assurances to NPT-party non-nuclear weapons states is delimited to nuclear weapons only.
3 Ibid, S. Carus, Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” p. 5 and 12.

5

Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-PacificThis choice follows from the physics of nuclear weapons. No non-nuclear WMD match theprompt, vastly destructive power that may be delivered globally and near-instantaneously by
nuclear weapons, nor the centrality of the threat of nuclear annihilation to the conduct ofinternational relations since World War II. Arguably, only nuclear weapons pose a clear andpresent danger to the existence of the human species—especially when use in nuclear war may
degrade or even destroy human resilience and capacity to manage the other existential threats thatafflict humanity.
A further complication is the intimate relationship between potential use of nuclear weapons andconventional weapons which may accumulate enormous casualties over time in large-scale
conflicts. Paroxysms of conventional war likely will be the launch pad for any plausible nuclear
war. In many respects, nuclear and conventional weapons are joined at the hip and, as will beevident in the chapters on regional flashpoints in this book, cannot be separated.
The “WMD Landscape”
Policymakers and analysts often refer to the “WMD landscape” as if the contours and features ofthis “threat landscape” can be surveilled and mapped like any geo-spatial terrain.4 For example,
for Paul Bernstein and his colleagues at the US Center for the Study of WMD, the term refers to“The complex and dynamic nuclear landscape … along at least four axes: regional nuclear
proliferation, nuclear terrorism, great power nuclear relations, and the security implications ofincreased interest in nuclear energy.” 5 For the US defense Intelligence Agency, it covers: “1.
Increasing numbers or capabilities of weapons in existing programs. 2. Enduring security threats
to weapons and material. 3. Countries developing new delivery systems with increased capabilities.
4. Countries developing nuclear weapons with smaller yields, improved precision, and increased
range for military or coercive use on the battlefield. 5. Countries developing new nuclear weapons

4 For example: “Biological weapons occupy an interesting role within the WMD landscape as contagious pathogens

can be used to create a large strategic outbreak, non-contagious pathogens can target operational forces orpopulations, and toxins are effective for assassinations.” Patrick Terrell, “North Korean Collapse: Weapons of Mass
Destruction Use and Proliferation Challenges,” The North Korea Instability Project, June 2017, p. 8, at:https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/NKIP-Terrell-WMD-Use-and-Proliferation-Challenges062217.pdf
5 P. Bernstein et al, “The Future Nuclear Landscape,” CSWMD Occasional Paper 5, April 1, 2007, p. 1, at:https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/693747/the-future-nuclear-landscape/

6

WMD in Asia-Pacificwithout conducting large-scale nuclear tests.”6 For John Krzyzaniak writing in The Bulletin of theAtomic Scientists, it describes a risk ledger—in 2020, for example, “new nuclear risks emerged,
old risks reappeared, and, although no risks really went away, there were some positive signs.” 7
For Vipin Narang, it means simply “the strategic environment.” 8Given that this widely used phrase has no conventional meaning, what exactly are the features of“WMD” that constitute such a landscape and signify a possessor’s WMD capacity and intentions
that together make up threat?
Typically—at least in the West—WMD in the form of nuclear force structures are described withreference to those that ensure its survivability, its ability to strike an adversary and overcome
defenses, and its targeting range. 9 Metrics are assembled such as numbers of warheads, missile“throw-weight” and explosive power, numbers and diversity of naval, aerial, land-based delivery
platforms that constitute monads, dyads, or triads, and range of various delivery system. Oftensuch portrayals are simplistic, speculative, and sometimes downright deceitful. Such portraits may
be supplemented with an attributed declaratory and operational doctrine, a strategic-cultural
profile, and an account of the supporting nuclear-industrial infrastructure.10

6 US Defense Intelligence Agency, Global Nuclear Landscape 2018, February 2018, at:https://dod.defense.gov/portals/1/features/2018/0218_NPR/img/Global_Nuclear_Landscape_2018_Fin
al.pdf
7 John Krzyzaniak, “The 2020 nuclear landscape, in the shadow of a pandemic,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

December 29 2020, at: https://thebulletin.org/2020/12/the-2020-nuclear-landscape-in-the-shadow-of-a-pandemic/
8 A. Rej, “Vipin Narang on the global nuclear landscape: hype and reality,” The Diplomat, April 13, 2020, at:https://polisci.mit.edu/news/2020/vipin-narang-global-nuclear-landscape-hype-and-reality
9 David Arcenaux and Kyungwon Suh describe these typical parameters as specified by Albert Wohlstetter; andthen develop metrics that describe the delivery platforms that contribute to these three critical attributes, and thediversification of these platforms that enhance the putative deterrence capacity of a state (they identify seven, viz:“submarine-launched missiles, strategic land-mobile missiles, rapid fueling technologies, nuclear-tipped cruise
missiles, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, deliverable strategic nuclear weapons, and tactical
nuclear weapons.” In “Nuclear Platform Diversification: A New Dataset,” unpublished paper, May 18, 2021 via
email. See video seminar, David Arcenaux, “Nuclear Platform Diversification: A New Dataset,” Managing the Atom,
Harvard University, May 5, 2021, at: https://harvard.zoom.us/rec/play/tRBavuokQb5IaqQvzMHH-

2upXaWBvZI2P8hq7gOGtHvIVzWmXTwzMJzCkxOGanX8gxIZuE_mdUVSzer.dKBHZuvtjR0Nd0XE?startTime=1620237212000&_x_zm_rtaid=AhPK9IEnSaqu0cQ1pIfstQ.1621357119
985.a8a436189e56e22a2c8dc5a384487180&_x_zm_rhtaid=35
10 K. Kartchner et al, Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Culturally Based Insights into

Comparative National Security Policymaking, Springer-Link, 2009, at:https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9780230618305

7

Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacific
Unfortunately, this type of depiction reduces the true complexity of a nuclear force to a few
common attributes that in reality amount to one nuclear-armed state’s threat perception projected
onto another. Worst case assumptions predominate, and adversarial intention is rarely addressed,
let alone interrogated while the rationality and legitimacy of one’s own force structure are rarely
examined. Some analysts attempt to overcome the limits of parochial analysis by investigating thedeterminants of nuclear force structure and the variation within the diversity thereof by quantitativeand statistical analysis of “domestic constraints, bureaucratic politics, conventional threats, nuclear
rivalries, and nuclear alliances.” 11 But most often, detailed accounts proceed by stand-alone orcomparative, qualitative case studies grounded in history, and structured by assumptions andhypothetical arguments that attempt to derive general lessons for strategic practitioners andpolicymakers.12 These too exhibit bias, especially in the selection of cases. 13 And, much of theliterature is focused on Euro-Atlantic security affairs and systematically ignores the historicalexperience of WMD in Asia-Pacific. Yet, many of the nuclear “near-misses” during the Cold War
and most of the post-Cold War near-misses occurred in the latter region, not the Atlantic-European
security sphere.
In this chapter—drawing on the subsequent chapters—we use a broad conceptual framework
shown in Table 1 to capture the choices made by all nuclear-armed states, whether on purpose or
by default. These include making possession of nuclear weapons capacities more or less opaqueversus transparent; ensuring that nuclear weapons are always available for use versus are neverused without legitimate direction; maintaining centralized, dictatorial authority to use nuclear
weapons versus decentralizing and even pre-delegating authority to use; limiting nuclear weapons
to counterforce or military-only targets with minimum civilian casualties versus “counter-value”
or population targets, often whole cities; and achieving “minimum” deterrence based on
imposition of unacceptable risk to a nuclear aggressor (that they would be hit by at least somenuclear retaliation after making nuclear first-strike) versus insisting that a nuclear aggressor faces“mutual assured destruction” irrespective of the level of destruction wrought on the victim of a

11 E. Gartzke, J. Kaplow, R.N. Mehta, “The Determinants of Nuclear Force Structure,” Journal of Conflict Resolution,

58:3, 2014, p. 486, at: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002713509054
12 Bennett and Smoke present a summary account of this approach in A. George, A. Bennett, Case Studies andTheory Development in the Social Sciences, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005. .
13 See the penetrating critique in C. Achen and D. Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case
Studies,” World Politics, 41:2, January 1989, pp. 143-169.

8

WMD in Asia-Pacificnuclear first strike. These abstract choices are revisited at the end of this Introduction in the context
of the Asia-Pacific region as represented in subsequent chapters.

*Table 1 Note: NC3 stands for nuclear command, control, and communications.

How these nuclear postures generate nuclear fear in the minds of their adversaries, and how nuclear
threat is perceived and experienced, varies greatly across each region. Each nuclear-armed state
reveals different declaratory rhetoric, deployments, and force disposition such as alerts or forwarddeployments to send signals about intention to nuclear adversaries who perceive them as “early
warning.” For such “messaging” to work, nuclear-armed states need some kind of shared
vocabulary.
One such language is that of the nuclear forces that speak for themselves. Nuclear forces areembodied in physical locations such as factories that make fissile material for warheads—or thewarheads themselves--scattered across the landscape. These sites may be identified and observed
from afar—although satellites in space may be as close as one can get to some sites. Among themost threat-laden fixtures are silos, airfields, and ports, and related mobile delivery platforms suchas submarines or bombers that may be tracked by various technical apparatus. There are also
nuclear warhead testing sites, and missile testing ranges which may be observed close up or,
depending on available national technical means, from great distance. These physical structures
are the terrain contours and architecture of the force structure that constitute the visible WMD
landscape. However, it may also contain “blank spots” that are kept hidden, or they only exist so
briefly that only states that are pre-positioned and equipped can map some critical elements of
WMD (such as launch exhaust trails on satellite infrared sensors, missile trajectories on radar andtelemetry from re-entry vehicles).
9Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacific
When the object of analysis itself is difficult to discern in a given locale, then standard qualitativeand quantitative accounts of nuclear forces based on attributed indicators are essentially
speculative because they are based on interpretation which is notoriously subject to bias, cultural
assumptions, or political bias, and being held secret, not subject to well-informed crossexamination. At best, these accounts provide only indirect indication of the intention that may beembodied in these physical artifacts. Minimal disclosure and concealment of physical forces are
standard practice of nuclear-armed states in this region. Even the United States practices a “neitherconfirm-nor-deny” policy when it comes to nuclear weapons. A haze of ambiguity hangs over andobscures the WMD landscape. Clarity based on transparency is rare and often provided by mistakerather than on purpose.
Yet all nuclear-armed states—even the most opaque—need to provide some information about
their capacity to adversaries, if only to keep them guessing or to remind them that deterrence isoperative, even if the adversary has no immediate intention to attack. Otherwise, ignorance is bliss
for an adversary and nuclear weapons have no utility. Thus, nuclear weaponeers must carefully
calibrate what to reveal or to deny in order send messages about their capacity and intention toadversaries if they are to affect the perceptions and shape the behavior of adversaries and allies,
not to mention domestic audiences. Indeed, to maintain a constant dark cloud of nuclear threat
over a WMD landscape requires impressing adversaries that WMD threats are a clear and present
danger, and not a figment of someone’s disturbed imagination. Nuclear-armed states go to
extraordinary lengths to maintain this perceived threat, for example, by staging nuclear war“exercises,” mating warheads to missiles or loading them onto bombers at times of high tension,increasing alert levels at missiles and airfields, moving missiles around and dispersing bombers,or putting submarines to sea, to name but a few. In short, nuclear-armed states try hard to impress
the other of their ability to bounce their rubble and to reduce them to a smoking, radiating ruin ina nuclear war if they don’t change their tune or back off.
Unfortunately, the most important aspect of observable nuclear force deployment is not therevealed capacity per se, but what it says about intention because the latter is what makes therevealed capacity a threat. Intention is not a directly observable feature of the WMD landscapebecause it inheres in intangibles such as nuclear threat rhetoric, operational doctrine in manuals,organizational structures, analog and digital control systems, the personae of nuclear commanders
manifested in their decision-making style, and the decision-making process itself that first10

WMD in Asia-Pacificconstitutes their agency and then enacts their intentions in the form of orders translated into actions
that ultimately—should nuclear war erupt due to loss of control of the weapons, accident, or
purposeful strikes—become visible as nuclear detonations in the observed landscape of targets
likely observed by only a few survivors or possibly no-one at all and therefore, devoid of meaning.
Thus, while it is possible to glimpse the nuclear forces and supporting physical infrastructure, there
is no way to divine intention with any surety or clarity because the meaning of nuclear threats isalways ambiguous, uncertain, and inherently irrational. Often, decision-makers do not articulate
their intentions even as they act let alone that of their adversaries. Even with the benefit ofhindsight, it is almost impossible to confidently specify intentionality due to the notoriously poor
historical veracity of memoirs and the biases and failures of memory on the part of decisionmakers.
A survey of the WMD weapons landscape in the Asia-Pacific region encounters a further
methodological obstacle in that “Asia-Pacific” is an Orientalist construct that defines the region
with reference to what it is not—that is, not Europe or the United States. “Asia-Pacific” is not aunit of geo-political behavior in itself, nor a shared identity for anyone who comes from or acts inthis geographical area. As will become evident in this book, although the dilemmas encounteredwhen nuclear weapons are introduced into a conflict are universal, the specific forms of WMD ineach part of “Asia-Pacific” are locale and conflict-specific and must be analyzed separately at eachsite of potential use at the global, regional-multilateral, and bilateral levels. As we shall see insubsequent chapters, the dynamics of generating threats using WMD—especially from nuclear
weapons--in this region are distinctive and do not follow any playbook from the Cold War or otherregions.
Chemical weapons have a long history and were used in modern war until banned by the Chemical
Weapons Treaty in 1997—and since then, by outliers such as Syria. Biological weapons also havea long history of development with only isolated deployment in the modern era since they werebanned in 1975. And other than two actual nuclear attacks in 1945, nuclear weapons have not beenused since then. Only the threat of nuclear use has been deployed, widely, to structure international
relations by forcing leaders to take the risk of nuclear war and self-damage into account in theirdecisions. Thus, to date, it is primarily the prospect of resumed WMD use that is the specter thatdefines the WMD landscape, not widespread use itself.
11

Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-PacificYet, it is worth repeating. The worst kind of WMD use, nuclear war, has been fought only once,
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, and then only against a non-nuclear state. Since then,no-one has ever exchanged nuclear weapons fire in a war, only nuclear threats. The next use of
nuclear weapons would transform the landscape in which people live in radical ways, stopping
time, annihilating nature, incinerating whole cities in a flash, eliminating all meaning invested byhumans. Until nuclear next-use, all this war-making is imaginary—until it’s not. Ironically, eventhe envisioning of nuclear war has no common basis because the interpretation of the nuclear
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and of the many near-misses since then, diverge across thestates party to these conflicts--the claims of hibakusha (survivors of nuclear bombing) to define
the past as the basis of future nuclear horror notwithstanding. It is incumbent upon us, therefore,
to envision these horrific futures anew as precisely as possible to first understand, and second
avoid them, which is the reason for taking this excursion across the WMD landscape.

Surveying the WMD LandscapeWith these qualifications in mind, we will traverse the WMD terrain guided by twenty authors
who are deeply imbued with knowledge of each state and conflict involving WMD, with AsiaPacific defined loosely as stretching from South Asia to Northeast Asia. We proceed in threestages—by first mapping the lowlands and badlands of conflict zones, then examining how andwhere conflicts may erupt into paroxysms of violence due to the presence or use of WMD, andfinally, mapping some of the pathways whereby the landscape may be left behind, rid of WMD
threats either partly or forever, to be replaced by a “post-WMD” or “WMD-free” landscape, theinterim version of which is known as a WMD- or nuclear weapons-free zone.
Thus, the first section establishes baseline knowledge about what is known or may be inferred
about the status of WMD in the Asia-Pacific region at various locales and trends in WMD
proliferation and deployment in regional conflicts. The second section focuses on where wars
involving WMD might begin in three locations—South Asia, the Taiwan Straits, and Korea—
while examining how asymmetric force structures and future proliferation may increase the riskof the next-use of WMD, especially nuclear weapons, in each conflict. The third section examines
how the risk of wars involving WMD in the region might be reduced or even eliminated altogether.

12

WMD in Asia-PacificGreat Power Nuclear Triangle—the Rise of China
The book commences by describing the baseline status of and trends in vertical and horizontal
proliferation of WMD across the entire region. Writing from the China corner of the great power
strategic triangle with the United States and Russia, Luo Xi observes that this relationship has
become intrinsically trilateral rather than primarily bilateral as it was during the Cold War. She
notes that many of the road rules and signposts designed to keep the United States and Russia(formerly the Soviet Union or FSU) from colliding have been abandoned, and that all three of
nuclear great powers are modernizing their nuclear forces and introducing “post-ballistic” missile
technologies that create new risks superimposed on many of the old. She emphasizes that thenuclear game at the global level is now more complex because each player sizes their nuclear force
not only against the other great powers who field triadic nuclear forces with global reach, but
against a range of middle and small powers, and even against non-state actors.
Importantly, she argues that “unrestrained nuclear competition between the United States andRussia may complicate future bilateral arms control negotiation and potentially effect China’s
cognition of its own nuclear retaliatory capabilities.” That is, China is not a passive actor on thereceiving end of nuclear threat, if it ever was. In the past, China relied on its ability to absorb a
nuclear first strike but then retaliate to inflict enough damage to not only deter such a strike, butalso armor it against any attempt to use nuclear threats against it as was attempted by the UnitedStates during the Korean War and aftermath in the Taiwan Straits and the 1969 Soviet-China clash
at the Amur River.
Today, however, China may respond directly to possible US deployment of previously prohibitedground-based intermediate-range missiles in the western Pacific. It may increase the survivabilityof its nuclear forces by deploying multiple warheads on missiles and experiment with hypersonicboost-glide vehicles that reduce warhead delivery time and early warning to even less than thatassociated with ballistic missiles. In fact, some claim that China has already done so, in advanceof Russia and the United States.14 Finally—and this development became public after the writing

14 M. Yeo et al, “Hypersonic and directed-energy weapons: Who has them, and who’s winning the race in the Asia-

Pacific?,” Defense News, March 15, 2021, at: https://www.defensenews.com/global/asiapacific/2021/03/15/hypersonic-and-directed-energy-weapons-who-has-them-and-whos-winning-the-race-in-the-asiapacific/

13

Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacificof this chapter, China may be expanding its ground-based missile force substantially with three
new missile fields with up to two hundred silos under construction. 15
Luo concludes that the three great nuclear powers should undertake urgent nuclear risk reduction
measures in the context of the P5 group, that is, the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council (all of which are nuclear-armed). But she notes also that China may be more likely toparticipate in arms control than arms reduction talks because the former are not only inherently
more comprehensive in nature than the latter—requiring, for example, that emerging technologies
and nuclear-conventional entanglement be addressed—but may also require the participation ofother powers with relatively smaller arsenals such as those deployed by the United Kingdom,France, and India. Also, a comprehensive and inclusive nuclear arms reduction dialogue would
necessarily encompass how best to resolve regional conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, SouthAsia, and Northeast Asia so that they are no longer potential regional theaters of nuclear war, withthe potential to escalate to global nuclear war between the three nuclear great powers. She suggeststhat a multilateral dialogue should aim to persuades nuclear-armed states to switch from “launch
under warning” to “launch under attack” with a related operational policy whereby nuclear
weapons are kept undeployed at central depots on low alert levels, concurrent with declaration of
a common “No First Use” policy.

15 J. Warrick, “China is building more than 100 new missile silos in its western desert, analysts say,” Washington

Post, June 30, 2021, at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-nuclear-missilesilos/2021/06/30/0fa8debc-d9c2-11eb-bb9e-70fda8c37057_story.html
H. Kristensen, “China’s Expanding Missile Training Area: More Silos, Tunnels, and Support Facilities, February 24,
2021, at:https://fas.org/blogs/security/2021/02/plarf-jilantai-expansion/
M. Korda, H. Kristensen, “China Is Building A Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field,” July 26, 2021, at:https://fas.org/blogs/security/2021/07/china-is-building-a-second-nuclear-missile-silo-field/
James Cameron examines the differing interpretations of this construction in “China’s Silos: New Intelligence, Old
Problems,” War on the Rocks, August 12, 2021, at: https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/beijings-silos-newintelligence-old-problems/?utm_source=AM+Nukes+Roundup&utm_campaign=c0a7b157d9EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_07_25_12_19_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_547ee518ec-c0a7b157d9391728633
See also H. Kristensen, M. Korda, “China’s nuclear missile silo expansion: From minimum deterrence to medium
deterrence,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1, 2021, at: https://thebulletin.org/2021/09/chinasnuclear-missile-silo-expansion-from-minimum-deterrence-to-medium-deterrence/

14

WMD in Asia-PacificModernization of Nuclear Forces
Next, Petr Topychkanov assesses the modernization of nuclear force postures, especially thedecision to stop de-emphasizing nuclear weapons by expanding the roles attributed to nuclear
weapons in rhetoric, operational doctrines, war plans, and deployments. He observes that this trend
is part of a broader shift to geostrategic competition and distrust, and resurgence of the concept oflimited nuclear warfighting both within the global nuclear triangle of nuclear great powers, butalso at the regional level in South Asia and Northeast Asia.
Thus, as soon as the United States withdrew from the US-Russian Intermediate Nuclear Forces(INF) treaty, it tested an extended-range ground-launched cruise missile, with clear intent to deploy
it against China (which was not party to the INF treaty and has concentrated its nuclear-armed
missile development in this intermediate range capable of attacking US west Pacific allies as well
as US territory such as Guam).
Russia too, he notes, is developing and testing new nuclear weapons such as the Burevestnik
nuclear-powered long-range cruise missile, the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater drone, theKinzhal air-launched supersonic missile, the Sarmat silo-based heavy ballistic missile, and the
Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle while rapidly restocking and modernizing most of its existing
strategic rocket force.
For its part, according to Topychkanov, China maintains that the “sole purpose” role of nuclear
attack is to employ nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear strike, rather than keeping open
the option to use them in a conventional war, as is explicitly kept open by the United States, Russia,
and Pakistan. However, China remains opaque as to how many nuclear weapons it deploys leaving
open the possibility that it is expanding its arsenal significantly. At the same time, its apparent
intent to deploy nuclear ballistic missile submarines along with nuclear warheads, presumably
outside China’s territorial waters, suggests a major shift in the previously conservative control
system in China’s nuclear arsenal to include possible pre-delegation of use of nuclear weapons to
deployed submariners.
Topychkanov explains that India has earned a place at the great power table but is also trapped incounterforce dilemmas in its relationship with Pakistan. It has obligated itself to observe “no firstuse” against China and Pakistan, but Pakistan has not reciprocated and relies heavily on the threat

15

Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacificof early nuclear use to deter an Indian conventional war against it, especially over Kashmir. At thesame time, India lacks nuclear forces able to survive a Chinese nuclear counterforce attack.
Finally, he concludes that the DPRK presents a particularly problematic case due to its nuclear
opacity. The DPRK has not made available an official nuclear doctrine that shapes its posture andsets external expectations as to what to expect of its nuclear forces either routinely or in a crisis.
This opacity reduces its adversaries to a guessing game as to what the DPRK’s nuclear forces arefor in a crisis—compellence, deterrence, or some other purpose such as domestic mobilization
around a unified “nuclear weapons identity.”
Topychakanov concludes that increasing the transparency of nuclear forces is the most important
overarching imperative that bears on every nuclear-armed state in the region, and it is central toregaining “strategic stability” in international relations, that is, stable mutual deterrence thatostensibly is the reason to have nuclear weapons in the first place.
Nuclear-Capable Missiles in Asia-Pacific
A nuclear weapon is often reduced to a nuclear explosive device that is “weaponized” into adeliverable warhead. But a warhead without a delivery system can only blow up its possessor; andall delivery systems also require launch platforms and associated NC3 infrastructure. A nuclear
weapon therefore consists of the combination of NC3, launch platform, delivery system, andwarhead. This is a more expansive but also more logical definition of a nuclear weapons than the
narrower, conventional definition as a nuclear explosive device that releases energy from acontrolled fission or fusion reaction. 16
Nick Hansen describes the incredible array of missile delivery systems deployed or underdevelopment by the six nuclear weapons states in the Asia-Pacific region, including those that
employ fixed or mobile land-based launch platforms, submarines, and aircraft-launched missiles.
Nuclear weapons states also have non-missile delivery systems for gravity nuclear-bombs,
torpedoes, and tactical nuclear weapons for ground-use, but they rely on ballistic missiles for the
16 For example, a nuclear weapon is defined as: “Complete major assembly (i.e., implosion, gun, or

thermonuclear) in its intended ultimate configuration, or in a disassembled configuration for a
temporary period of time, which, upon completion of the prescribed arming, fusing, and firing sequence,is capable of producing the intended nuclear reaction and release of energy,” Glossary, US Departmentof Defense, Nuclear Matters Handbook (2020 revised), at:https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm//NMHB2020rev/glossary.html

16

WMD in Asia-Pacificmost part due to their combined speed of delivery and geographical reach to overwhelm any
possible defense against nuclear attack, although cruise missile-delivered nuclear weapons are partof the picture for lesser nuclear wars using aircraft-launched nuclear weapons.
In each nuclear-missile endowed state, Hansen traces the evolution of their missile arsenal into abreathtaking diversity of missile systems. Although there are many possible drivers in eachnuclear-armed state that explain this bewildering diversity, including domestic determinants suchas service rivalry, political-bureaucratic interest and pork barrel politics, the cumulative
momentum built up by decades of scientific and technical missile (and space rocket) R&D andtesting, engineering cultures, and design philosophies that affect accuracy and reliability
performance, the military-industrial base and availability of critical materials such as those needed
for liquid versus solid propellants and hardware such electronics needed for guidance systems,
access to testing sites to miniaturize warheads deployable on missiles or to test the missiles
themselves over instrumented test ranges, doctrinal dogma such as the necessity of the threelegged nuclear triad and related counter-value (low accuracy, big warheads to kill cities) versus
counterforce (high accuracy, small warheads needed to kill military targets) requirements, themajor factor undoubtedly is geo-strategic, that is, the nature and number of adversaries, theirlocation relative to a given nuclear-armed, missile-endowed state, and the target set and challenge
presented by the target states’ nuclear and conventional forces including their vulnerable NC3
nodes, the wily exploitation of the adversaries worst fears whatever the true capability of one’s
own proliferating missile types, and the competitive dynamic between nuclear missile armed
adversaries that leads to competitive, matching development and deployments irrespective of themilitary logic of system acquisition and possible use.
Thus, there are many historical trajectories for each nuclear-armed states missile proliferation withvarying combinations of unilateral and competitive acquisition of missile capabilities stretchingover many decades, as is the case with US-FSU/Russian or US-Chinese missile acquisition, butalso radically different pathways taken by breakout states like the DPRK that skip some phases
altogether to leapfrog into long-range missile status, whereas, others like Pakistan remain focusedon intermediate and short-range missiles. In short, Hansen argues, the strategic context matterswhen it comes to understanding the profusion of missiles in Asia-Pacific.

17

Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-PacificHansen observes that arms control and disarmament treaties and agreements that controlled thevertical (by nuclear-armed states) and horizontal (by non-nuclear armed states) proliferation of
missiles has largely collapsed, and the remaining controls are unravelling quickly. As more statesacquire missiles, including new missile types such as hypersonic delivery systems launched frommissiles the area covered by their missile range begins to overlap, creating a new layer ofcomplexity and potential risk to nuclear crisis and possible escalation. It is urgent, therefore, tocontrol not only nuclear weapons, but also missiles, to reduce and eventually eliminate the risk of
nuclear war—a topic addressed in later chapters of this book.
NC3 “Force Multipliers”
Peter Hayes notes that nuclear or missile test sites, nuclear fuel cycle or warhead production
factories, and nuclear delivery sites and platforms such as silos, ports, or airfields, are all visible
either at least fleetingly or all the time. But when it comes to nuclear command, control, andcommunications (NC3), these systems are much harder to identify and to characterize. Nuclear
command posts may be identified above or below ground where supreme political and militarycommanders likely would assemble to deliberate and then fire their nuclear weapons —if they
were not “decapitated” first in a nuclear preemptive strike by their adversary. Some of the larger
early warning systems such as radars or satellite ground stations can be observed, as can the largeantennas that transmit orders over very low frequency radio signals to submarines with nucleararmed missiles.
But for the most part, NC3 is nowhere to be seen on the WMD landscape. Yet, without nuclear
command-and-control and their supporting information sensors and communications
infrastructure, nuclear weapons could not be used. Moreover, high performance NC3 multiplies
the lethality of the weapons themselves by increasing their speed and precision. Ironically, thesesystems themselves are also the most important targets to be hit early in a nuclear war, even moreso than nuclear weapons themselves.
What matters when it comes to NC3, Hayes argues, is not how one or another NC3 system stands
alone but how adversarial NC3 systems interact to create risks which may originate in potential
misreading of early warning information (“false positives” that advise leaders that their state isunder nuclear attack when it isn’t), technological failure (which could lead to accidental

18

WMD in Asia-Pacificdetonation), or organizational pathology (whereby an individual or a unit acts in a way that leads
to nuclear escalation contrary to the intention or orders of the supreme nuclear command).
Why does NC3 matter? Since the Cold War began, a serious incident between nuclear weapons
states with the potential to escalate to nuclear war has occurred on average once every three years.
In each of these, NC3 was integral to the near-miss. In 2022, the beat goes on.
The three great power nuclear-armed states —the United States, Russia, and China —now haveglobal or near-global reach. Each has satellite and ground-based communication andobservation—especially radar—sensors that match their long-range nuclear-weapon delivery
platforms and systems. Their NC3 systems combine Cold War analog legacy systems with ultramodern digital systems, often shared with conventional forces. In all three cases, these global NC3
systems are complex, rely on high technology, and likely will fail badly under the real stress of
nuclear attack, making it difficult to control nuclear war or to terminate it once one breaks out.
At the other end of the spectrum are small nuclear-armed states like the DPRK. Pyongyang has
likely built an NC3 system that is dedicated solely to nuclear forces to preserve Kim Jong Un’ssole control of nuclear weapons. Thus, Kim Jong Un likely relies on a relatively simple NC3
system with political commissars who manage the warheads, and the military who deploy missiles
ready to be mated with warheads.
Northeast Asia is not the only location with multiple NC3 systems in play in the Asia-Pacificregion. Given that India has an advanced scientific and engineering infrastructure and a globallycompetitive IT sector, one can safely infer that India’s current NC3 relies heavily on cable,
especially fiber-optic cable, microwave links, and radio links including non-dedicated satellite
links between nuclear warhead sites that are sufficient to support dispersed missile launcher sites
and fighter-bomber units on various airfields. However, how effective such communications areto support India’s mobile nuclear weapons remains an open question.
Like India, Pakistan’s physical NC3 infrastructure of command centers, communication nodes,
networks, and early warning systems are not robust, especially those related to its deployment oftactical nuclear weapons near the contested Kashmiri border in times of war.
Hayes notes that all nuclear-armed state in the Asia-Pacific region confront five shared NC3
dilemmas. These are: (1) the contribution of NC3 to the risk of nuclear war due to its inherent
19Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacificvulnerability and the incentive to strike NC3 systems first or lose one’s own NC3 system, (2) NC3
modernization and disruptive technology, (3) nuclear decision-making and commander
accountability under international law pertaining to NC3, (4) complexity and the global NC3
system, and (5) the pandemic-nuclear nexus and NC3.
Hayes points out that there is no consensus as to what procedures should be implemented in all
NC3 systems to ensure a minimum of accountability in the form of checks and balances to block
manifestly illegal and insane strike orders from being implemented. It is for this reason that theTreaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons includes NC3 systems in its scope, although it has
yet to develop a practical set of recommendations that would allow NC3 systems to align with thecore values of this treaty. He proposes a Global NC3 Code of Conduct that might serve as aninterim step to more stringent controls on NC3 systems.
Emerging Asia-Pacific Space Powers Capabilities
Namrata Goswami extends the WMD landscape from Earth into space. Long dominated by theUnited States and Russia, but with China catapulting past Russia in the last decade and India also
entering into the space domain, the strategic landscape now includes not only the atmospheric exit,
brief transit through space, and atmospheric re-entry of warheads during tests, or, as would occur
in a nuclear war, hurtling towards targets, but also near-permanent constellations of geostationaryor orbiting military intelligence and communication satellites that are integral to collecting
intelligence on targets and communication of nuclear strike orders.
Thus, just like US Space Command and Strategic Command that provide space-based support for
nuclear forces along with a vast array of ground-based stations and terminals, Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) now has its own Space Force (PLASSF) which, unlike the US space force,fuses China’s military and civilian space sectors. China’s strategic goal, writes Goswami, is todisplace the United States as the premier space power, and to secure itself from US military attackon ground or in space. Like the United States and Russia, China now has its own geospatial
positioning system based on satellites endowing it with an independent ability to guide missiles totargets such as aircraft carriers—provided it can find and track them with other intelligence means.
Although it lags behind China, India too invests heavily in space launch capacity, has sent missions
to the Moon and Mars, and also like China, used a missile to destroy a low-earth-orbit satellite.
Pakistan has advanced missiles able to provide space launch rocket services but lags far behind

20

WMD in Asia-PacificIndia in satellite and space activities. But to compete with India and to support long-distance,
offshore (especially submarine) operations, Pakistan will likely seek China’s assistance to develop
space-based capacities just as it did with its nuclear weapons program. Japan is responding to
China’s expansion into space by developing its own space launch and satellite programs. The
DPRK is the weakest entrant into the space race, but its long-range missiles give it the capacity toboost payloads into space that might eventually equip it with independent satellites.
Goswami envisions that war involving these space-based assets could erupt from many different
angles given the number of conflict dyads that exist in the Asia-Pacific region. “Because conflictsystems are linked,” she avers, “we can expect horizontal proliferation specifically wherecompetition is pre-existing in dyads. Japan’s counterspace capabilities will encourage
development of counter-space capability by North Korea. North Korea, already incentivized tocreate an ASAT to deter the United States, will accelerate to keep pace with any South Koreancounterspace developments. Pakistan, seeking parity and deterrence with India, and contesting
leadership in the Islamic world has incentives to develop ASAT capability.” Any of these states
could jam, dazzle or laze the others satellites. From there, all bets are off.
Beyond the cislunar space between Earth and the Moon, the great powers are developing thecapacity to project power to Mars and asteroids, based on stepwise lunar settlement and beyond.
The appetite of great powers to proliferate vertically the reach of their weapons of mass destruction
has no apparent limit.
Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Horizontal Proliferation
John Carlson brings us back to Earth by examining horizontal proliferation arising from theconstruction and operation of nuclear fuel cycles spread across the region. The region already is a
nuclear-armed crowd, containing three of the five NPT-designated nuclear weapons states(NWS)—the United States, Russia, and China—and three non-NPT nuclear-armed states—India,
Pakistan, and the DPRK—the only NPT non-NWS to have left the NPT (in 2003) and armed itself
with nuclear weapons. Each developed a fuel cycle to provide it with fissile material, although
India, Pakistan and the DPRK depended on outside suppliers and technical support along the way.
The safeguards system implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna rests
on non-nuclear weapons states providing access and transparency to inspectors to ensure that any
diversion of significant quantities (sufficient to make a nuclear warhead from enriched uranium or21

Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacificplutonium) is identified quickly enough to allow the international community to respond before aweapon is produced and tested. In cases such as Japan, this conversion or latency period may be
so short as be almost zero, requiring very high levels of monitoring and access. In others, the period
may be months or years, in which case IAEA’s safeguards provides confidence to other states that
non-nuclear neighbors intend to stay that way.
Yet, intention may be disguised by secrecy. In such instances, Carlson states: “Where a statedevelops enrichment or reprocessing capabilities in secret this is a clear sign of proliferation intent.”
Also, intention may evolve over time: “The situation is not so clear,” he avers, “where a statedevelops such capabilities openly, under IAEA safeguards. The state may be deliberately
establishing a nuclear weapon option—in this case motivation still precedes capability, but thestate’s intention is not obvious. On the other hand, the state at that time may be genuinely
committed against acquiring nuclear weapons is not obvious.” That is, “what is unthinkable today
might be considered a necessity tomorrow. In such a case capability could influence motivation.”
For this reason, acquisition of enrichment or plutonium production and processing capability
always generates a demand for information to be provided by nominally innocent parties to statesconcerned about the risk this latency poses to their own security. If a non-nuclear state alsoacquires dual-use technologies that are useful to weaponize fissile material, other states may holdthat there is prima facie evidence that nuclear weapons proliferation is now underway and demand
more intrusive access to determine what is going on. Suspicions are doubled and tripled whenother weapons-specific testing or development and testing of warhead delivery systems are
identified or observed—as occurred most notoriously in this region with the DPRK’s nuclear
breakout in the last three decades.
If such activity is undertaken by a state in an insecure geo-strategic context, international concern
may lead to counter-proliferation threats and deployments of conventional and/or nuclear forcesthat in turn accelerate the proliferation activity that are the cause for concern in the first place—and even lead other states to entertain acquiring their own nuclear forces, as Japan and the ROK
have done at different times.
Carlson envisions that the only way to reverse these cycles of suspicion and mutual threat making
is to shift legitimate but sensitive fuel cycle activities from national to multinational control. This
management approach is applicable not only to non-nuclear states with latent nuclear weapons

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WMD in Asia-Pacificcapabilities via their fuel cycle activities, but also to nuclear possessor states that are disarming
nuclear weapons but retain large stocks of fissile material and the capacity to move it quickly fromcivilian to military use. Until then, nuclear fuel cycles criss-cross the strategic landscape withconstant risk of nuclear armament in areas previously devoid of nuclear threat.
Double Bluff and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World
Allan Behm dissects the logic and underlying assumptions of “nuclear extended deterrence”—thedistinctly American practice of projecting nuclear threat from home-based and forward-deployed
nuclear weapons. Of course, there is no doubt that the United States is capable of using nuclear
weapons in the region against adversaries such as China, Russia, or the DPRK. The criticalquestion if whether it ever would do so on behalf of an ally, that is, are such threats against anothernuclear-armed state ever credible, and from the view point of a nuclear-umbrella state, are theputative gains of marginal deterrence so gained worth the countervailing threats that may be madeby the potential adversary, including risk-taking to force the United States to back off. While theUnited States and a potential nuclear adversary trade threats, Behm suggests that the state to whicha nuclear umbrella is extended is left in a precarious position in which its existential security
depends on an incredible threat working against a highly motivated adversary that amounts to anuclear bluff.
In sum, “Extended nuclear deterrence theory has gradually morphed into a kind of deterrence
theology —a belief system founded on a codified set of indemonstrable doctrines. The validity ofthe system rests on five implausible and ultimately unprovable propositions: that the guarantee isabsolute and unconditional, that nuclear exchange escalation can and will be controlled, that theguarantor will accept the fact and consequences of a nuclear attack on behalf of the client state towhich deterrence is extended, that the decision maker will make rational choices based on the logicof the guarantee, and that any possible aggressor will make its decisions based on the same
strategic mindset as the guarantor. But each of these propositions is unsupportable.”
It follows, argues Behm, “Since none of these propositions is necessarily true, the validity ofextended nuclear deterrence is ultimately dependent on irrationality—the irrationality of theguarantor decision maker accepting unimaginable consequences on behalf of a third party. The
fact that the dynamics of war, which are instinctive and visceral, can be considered and analyzed
rationally does not render them rational. And the obverse is true: while it may be comforting, it is23

Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacificirrational for the client state to regard extended nuclear deterrence as an ultimate guarantee ofnational security.”
Possessors of nuclear weapons always cast a shadow over other states, even if they do not intend
to do so. But according to Behm, the introduction of nuclear extended deterrence in contested areasof the strategic landscape in Asia Pacific adds a volatility to conflicts rather than creating stability.
Chemical Weapons History, Science, and Future Prospect
As if the prospect of nuclear war arising from nuclear extended deterrence is not enough, thespecter of chemical weapons remains present in this region. Jonathan Forman and Alexander Kellerevisit some of the darkest episodes of past wars to remind us of the experimentation and use ofchemical weapons by Japanese imperial forces in China, the chemical armament of the great
powers, US forward deployment of chemical weapons in Japan and its pursuit of “chemical
extended deterrence” against DPRK chemical weapons in the Cold War, the stockpiling of homegrown chemical weapons by the ROK, and the removal and destruction of these stockpiles under
the rubric of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention. (Here, as Forman and Kellerman explain,“chemical weapons” refers to chemicals with toxic properties used to harm humans and animals,
which excludes incendiary chemicals, explosive chemicals, and herbicides). Echoing this dark
history, Japan and China conduct a joint, cooperative removal and destruction of residual Japanesechemical weapons from China that continues to this day, even during the pandemic.
As with nuclear fuel cycle facilities and fissile material, many chemicals are dual-use, that is,
widely used in innocent commercial activity but also usable as weapons. Moreover, thedevelopment of other types of chemicals (such nanomedicines that target specific cells or tissues)
expands the range of possible chemical attacks compared with the indiscriminate nature ofchemical gases or weapons used in the past. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons that supports the Chemical Weapons Convention designates laboratories at the member
state level including China, ROK, Russia, Singapore, and the United States to detect chemicals
that may be weaponized and to support verification while states such as Japan and Malaysia havecounter-chemical weapons laboratories.
Forman and Kelle observe that the general trend is that less states possess chemical weapons today,
thereby reducing the chances that they would be used in war. Although there is no publicly
available hard evidence, the DPRK is widely assumed to be the only state in the region with a24

WMD in Asia-Pacificdeployable chemical weapons arsenal for use in artillery and rocket shells. A credible threat ofnon-state actors weaponizing commercially available chemicals also exists in the region since theJapanese cult Aum Shinrikyo used sarin gas in the Matsumoto and Tokyo subways in 1994 and1995 respectively.
Biological Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence in the Pandemic Era
Completing the dismal picture of WMD in the region, Richard Pilch and Miles Pomper examine
the potential re-emergence of already banned biological weapons due to the pandemic on the one
hand, and the possible incentive to obtain chemical weapons on the part of already nuclear-armed
states face in posing a credible threat of use of nuclear weapons on the one hand, or the difficultythat some non-nuclear states face in obtaining their own nuclear weapons in the first place.
Biological weapons have an odious history in the region starting with Japan’s biological weapons
program in China involving experimentation on prisoners of war that killed more than 10,000
prisoners of war and others and use in attacks that killed upwards of 200,000 people, mostly
civilians. During the Cold War the United States developed biological weapons, but in 1971 itunilaterally banned its own use. The Soviet biological weapons Cold War program was aimed at
the United States and China, and it continued development of such weapons even after joining the
Biological Weapons Convention that came into force in 1975. Although the DPRK possesses thematerials and skills to make biological weapons, there is no evidence that it seeks or has such at
the moment, and none of the other nuclear powers in the region such as India or Pakistan arethought to have offensive biological weapons.
Due to the potency of bioweapons, some nuclear-armed states such as the United States and India
have reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to bio-attacks on their forces, thereby
raising the possibility of a mistaken attribution of a natural outbreak or natural pandemic that leads
a state to use nuclear weapons. This risk is particularly salient to the Korean conflict where the
DPRK has long held that it was attacked by US bioweapons in the Korean War, albeit falsely.
Thus, the DPRK may be inclined to view a natural outbreak as originating from the United Statesor the ROK as part of their effort to destabilize or remove the regime. In short, how biologicalevents that might be attacks are attributed is a critical issue that bears on the risk of war and nuclear
war, and there is no clear common understanding between nuclear possessor states on this issue.

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Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacific
The raw materials and technology for biological weapons are dual-capable and spread across theentire region. The primary bulwark against misuse of these building blocks or actual deployment
is early detection. Thus, Pilch and Pomper argue that states should create a pro-active network ofdetection, using many of the same tools that are essential to monitoring and then responding tospillover of pathogens from natural reservoirs that lead to pandemics such as coronavirus SARSCoV-2 or better known as COVID-19.
The pandemic reminds us that bioweapons also present a unique non-state actor attack vector
whereby an already infected individual sets out to spread contagious disease with potentiallydevastating health and psychological impact on targeted populations. Such an individual may bemotived by ideology or state-sponsored and would present great difficulty in attribution andresponse.
India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation
In Section 1 we saw that WMD range from the molecular to extra-terrestrial and that thecapabilities to make and deliver such weapons are scattered across the Asia-Pacific region. Of thethree types of WMD, the threat is heavily weighted on the nuclear end of the scale in East Asia
and South Asia, dominated by six of the world’s nine nuclear-armed states and three of its nuclear
umbrella states.
In this section, we examine how these weapons might be used where vital interests of states collide
in Northeast Asia, East Asia-Taiwan, and South Asia.
Rakesh Sood traces the evolution of the Indian-Pakistan conflict embedded in an inherently
triangular nuclear threat system with China. Perhaps in no other nuclear-prone conflict is theweight of colonial history so directly linked to the adoption of nuclear forces. As Sood explains,the Indo-Pakistani conflict is rooted in the very creation of these two states and the 1947 partitionof Pakistan from India and their claims to both govern Kashmir and Jammu leading to multiple
clashes, wars, and now state-sponsored, cross-border terrorism.
India’s nuclear arsenal was adopted to project nuclear threat against China and Pakistan and tocountervail their nuclear threats to India, whereas Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is aimed only at India
to offset India’s conventional and nuclear forces. India’s two-front nuclear challenge combinedwith its No First Use doctrine requires it to rely on conventional military and non-military means

26

WMD in Asia-Pacificto respond to Pakistan’s incursions, enabling Pakistan in turn to assert its prerogative of nuclear
first-use and to forward-deploy its tactical nuclear weapons to emphasize this choice.
Sood examines seven instances of conflict between India and Pakistan, five of which came after
1998 by which time both were nuclear-armed and nuclear threat began to play an explicit role. If
these instances prove anything, it was that nuclear threats by India could not stop Pakistanisupported terrorist attacks or conventional conflict with it, and that risk-taking including that
presented by tactical nuclear weapons deployed in conflict zones by Pakistan worked to activate
third parties to intervene to prevent further escalation, short of the nuclear threshold. In effect,
Pakistan relies on risk-taking to induce third parties to intervene with India on its behalf at theheight of crises—a strategy that has worked on multiple occasions. Sood finds that the UnitedStates was key in recent instances of such “climb down” diplomacy, with Saudi Arabia and theUnited Arab Emirates also playing a role. China too was involved, but India is not likely to accept
this role in the future. “In short,” he concludes, “external actors may not be able to provide offramps in the future as readily as in the past.”
Given these realities and Pakistan’s likely continued use of terrorist attacks on Indian targets toinitiate conflict with India and the improbability that the international community will prevail on
Pakistan to change this strategy, the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation will continue no matter
how much India tries to block Pakistan. It is critical, therefore, that minimal crisis management
communication lines are kept open and, in the future, bilateral and trilateral dialogues begin on
shared understandings on a range of nuclear-related risks at the earliest possible time.
Taiwan Straits
If Pakistan and India have developed a tripwire for escalation to nuclear war in their contest
over disputed territory, Robert Ayson argues that the People’s Republic of China (hereafter
China) and the United States have set up the conditions that could spiral to nuclear war in the
Taiwan Straits due to the intersection of political friction between China and Taiwan (overwhich China claims sovereignty, recognized implicitly by most states) with US -China
strategic competition.
Ayson argues that although it is not easy to start a nuclear war in the Taiwan Stra its, the risk
is real and derives from the asymmetry of forces in the conventional military balance between

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Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacific
China and the United States on the one hand, and the propensity of the Taiwanese leadershipto seek independence on the other.
Historically, the United States’ ability to muster massive conventional naval and aerial force
in the Western Pacific buttressed by its willingness to arm Taiwan to defend itself provided
overwhelming superiority to China’s mainland-based forces. But over the decades, thebalance has tilted to the point that China can now pose a lethal missile threat to US aircraft
carriers and regional airbases such as Guam, Okinawa, and Kunsan as well as Taiwan itself
while mounting a cross-strait invasion force. Not since the 1958 Quemoy Matsu crisis has theUnited States had to entertain the risk of nuclear escalation over the Taiwan Straits as it must
do today.
The “balance of resolve” between the United States and China, suggests Ayson, is based on
their perception of each other’s ability to dominate as they escalate to ever greater
conventional and then nuclear force, and their resolve that the benefit of victory is worth
paying the price of such escalation. There remains little doubt that the United States ultimately
has superior nuclear forces with which to punish China’s nuclear and conventional forces.
The issue is how to avoid approaching the nuclear threshold of China or the United States andwhich state is more or less deterred by nuclear threat at lower levels of violence th an all-out
nuclear war. Escalation by either side using cyberwarfare, nuclear or conventionally -armed
dual use missiles, and other steps could lead to a “murky twilight zone” between rapid
escalation and crossing the nuclear threshold.
At stake for China is the political legitimacy of its leadership if it does not assert sovereign
control over Taiwan should it declare independence. For the United States, its reputation as agreat power patron to its allies at a global level is on the line, in what is the f irst great test of
declining US hegemonic power against China rising from centuries of humiliation at the handsof the West.
Given that there is no way to easily reduce the stakes in the Taiwan Straits conflict, Ayson
suggests that the antagonists reduce ambiguity by creating no-go zones whether in cyberspaceor physical space, reinstating tacit understandings about the status of Taiwan, and signalingthat attacks on command-and-control systems are off limits, all of which are necessary to theirmutual recognition of the “urgency of enhanced communication, cooperation and restraint.”

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
DPRK Asymmetric Nuclear, Cyber, Bio, Chemical Forces
As with the India-Pakistan and Taiwan Straits conflicts, the risk of nuclear war in Korea is rooted
in a division of a nation combined with unresolved historical conflicts. Lee Sang-hyun suggeststhat the DPRK’s “asymmetric” military capabilities enable it to overcome the inferiority of its
conventional military force by exploiting weaknesses of countervailing US-ROK and UNC allied
forces. Accordingly to Lee, the core of its asymmetric forces are its nuclear weapons, missiles,
cyberwarfare forces, ad chemical and possibly biological weapons. Given the DPRK’s asymmetricforce advantages and the small geographical area in which war would be fought, the ROK has
invoked US nuclear extended deterrence to offset its vulnerability to these asymmetric threats.
The DPRK is estimated to have between twenty to sixty nuclear weapons as of early 2021. It has
demonstrated short and intermediate missile delivery systems and possibly the ability to fire along-range missile that would hit the US mainland.
Since the collapse of the Kim-Trump summit in Hanoi in 2019, the DPRK tested a host of shortrange, solid-fueled missiles that may be capable of delivering nuclear warheads. It also displayednew, huge long-range missiles that have yet to be tested, perhaps signaling an intent eventually todevelop multiple re-entry vehicle payloads—although it has yet to test even a single re-entry
vehicle on a long-range missile. It has also fired missiles from underwater signaling an intent to
deploy nuclear weapons at sea in the future.
Lee suggests that DPRK cyberattacks rather than nuclear attacks against US-ROK forces arecheaper and more likely to succeed. Cyberattacks can be launched early and with some level ofambiguity in the runup to a conflict, so they are not only cheaper and faster to use than conventionalor nuclear weapons, they are also more adaptable to signaling resolve and to inflicting damage on
the vulnerabilities of US and ROK highly informatized weapons systems, and also against criticalinfrastructure such as banks, public utilities, and even nuclear reactors, all of which are vulnerable
to cyberattack.
The DPRK may also have chemical and biological weapons, but Lee notes there is little hard
information available whereas its nuclear and cyber weapons are already well demonstrated. Leesuggests that the DPRK might use nuclear weapons to make China intervene in a conventional
offensive against the DPRK that occurs either inadvertently or on purpose across the Demilitarized
Zone. It might “asymmetrically escalate” by delegating use authority to commanders in an obvious
29Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacific
way to impress on adversaries its appetite to take risk as a way to force some accommodation ofits demands—not unlike Pakistani deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to forestall Indian
conventional attack in a crisis. Such asymmetric use necessitates the DPRK keeping enoughnuclear weapons in reserve to be able to stop escalation to all-out ad/or nuclear war if engaged indangerous provocation or offensive but limited conventional operations against the ROK.
Standard confidence building measures are unlikely to work with the DPRK, concludes Lee, inpart due to the nature of the DPRK’s polity, but also because the wellsprings of trust have beenpoisoned for so many decades by all parties to the Korean conflict. As the standoff is likely tocontinue and even deepen for the foreseeable future, in addition to acquiring offsetting capabilities
to the DPRK’s asymmetric forces, Lee concludes that it is prudent to press the DPRK to become“a normal state in Northeast Asia via a peace process on the Korean Peninsula in the long run.”
Risk Reduction Measures
In section 3, authors scan the horizon for possible ways to reduce the risk that WMD—especiallynuclear weapons—use might be used and related non-proliferation and disarmament strategies in
Asia-Pacific.
Dmitry Stefanovich observes that the most important Cold War era arms control and incident
prevention agreements were bilateral between the United States or one of its allies and the former
Soviet Union. These treaties codified lessons learned from nuclear crises such as to the need tokeep lines of communication open, and they led to the jointly developed concept of “strategic
stability,” that is, nuclear commanders should always act in ways that reduce the adversary’s
incentive to attempt a disarming nuclear first-strike. He notes that none of these treaties were aimed
primarily at the Asia-Pacific region. In any case, legacy arms control agreements that createdcommon security and increased transparency that extended to this region have mostly unraveledwith the United States and Russian emphasizing instead reliance on military and nuclear
capabilities and increased ambiguity. Perhaps most worrisome is that the new generation ofleadership in each great power has not lived through the horrors of World War II, the Cold War,and many of the “local” wars in which millions perished. Few if any have ever seen a nuclear
explosion first-hand.
Stefanovich suggests that rather than proposing improbable strategic arms treaties or abstract,high-level “risk reduction” architecture at the level of P5 (the five permanent and nuclear-armed

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WMD in Asia-Pacificmembers of the UN Security Council), it is more useful to identify ways to concretely reduce risk
in each of the specific nuclear-prone bilateral and multilateral “deterrence equations” in which
nuclear threat is present. He suggests that risk reduction measures be focused on five common
interests of all nuclear-armed states. These are (a) setting limits on the number and patrol areas ofballistic missile-firing submarines to reduce fear of leadership-decapitation or force-disarming
strikes using submarine-launched missiles fired from a short distance offshore below early warningradars and arriving in only a few minutes; (b) decoupling nuclear weapons from aircraft staging
bases so that non-strategic nuclear weapons are more transparent and less easily deployed without
being noticed; (c) establishing a regional, multilateral long-range missile and space launch rocket
notification regime drawing on networked, national early warning radars that would enable states
to monitor and verify compliance with the regime and departures therefrom; (d) establishinghardened, modernized, and harmonized multilateral hotlines between the capitals of the region fortransmission of missile launches and for crisis communications to depoliticizing incidents that willassuredly occur by design or by accident; and (e) reinforcing the now customary nuclear use taboo
by more stringent application of the Law of Armed Conflict to nuclear operations of all kinds.
Trilateral Confidence Building Measures in South Asia
Taking up the Pakistan-India-China nuclear triangle outlined by Rakesh Sood in section 2, Feroz
Khan identifies trilateral confidence building measures to reduce this risk. As Khan puts it: “At
the trijunction of three nuclear-armed countries, the potential of major regional military crises—
either between India and Pakistan or India and China—is increasing, and it could escalate to amajor conventional war and nuclear catastrophe.”To find such measures is not easy given the long trail of failed past agreements and bilateral peacemaking initiatives between India and Pakistan on the one hand, and China and India on the other.
Khan recognizes that shifts in the strategic landscape itself—in particular, in the geoeconomics oftrade, investment, and financing of infrastructure between China and India—contain clues as towhat might work instead of repeating past failures.
He notes that China’s primary strategic concerns lie to its east and north, and the negative trends
on these fronts evokes its growing military and nuclear force capabilities that create anxiety for
India which responds with its own upgrade of nuclear forces thereby driving Pakistani threat
perceptions. As noted by Sood and affirmed by Khan, India’s no-first-use posture with respect to31

Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacific
China drives it to pose a conventional military response to Pakistani provocations or attacks, under
Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. Pakistan in turn attempts to drive down this threshold by forwarddeploying tactical nuclear weapons and making its own use doctrine ambiguous.
Faced with this escalation interlinkage, Khan proposes that China, India, and Pakistan undertakea trialogue or trilateral dialogue noting that it is critical to overcome media hype and domestic
political fearmongering that has driven past crises. More concretely, he suggests that the previously
bilateral strategic restraint regime (SRR) between India and Pakistan in 1998 that comprises oflinked conflict resolution processes, conventional force restraints, and nuclear restraints betransformed into a trilateral SRR by adding China and capitalizing on the agreement to undertake
regional conflict resolution by (a) conducting two separate sets of bilateral conflict resolution; (b)promoting economic interdependency and shared prosperity; (3) restraining conventional forces
with deployment limits and low force zones; (4) restraining nuclear threat by doctrinal assurance
and non-alerting status; and (5) establishing a modernized nuclear hotlines at level of head of state
while also expanding the scope of the existing India-Pakistan non-attack agreement to include nonattack on nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) including cyberspace.
In short, according to Khan the way forward is to transform the region from the existential securitycentric relationship into one that is more of an economic-centric relationship. Whether this ispossible in a post-pandemic period is unclear, but the vision is clear.
Nuclear Proliferation by ROK and Japan?
Moon Chung-in examines the prospects that Japan and/or the ROK might seek independent
nuclear forces due to the resurgence of pro-nuclear weapons policy currents in both countries
driven in part by the threat posed by the DPRK’s nuclear breakout in a falling domino-like effect.
If this were to occur, the conditions for “mutual probable destruction” would be proliferated in
Northeast Asia and any chance of restoring a modicum of “strategic stability” would be lost
irrevocably.
In the ROK, Moon finds that there is a teleological school that promotes ‘nuclear sovereignty’
based on the logic of ‘nuclear for nuclear’ and seeks nuclear armament regardless of American
stance. It competes with an instrumentalist school who push for a conditional, independent nuclear
armament based on enhancing the credibility of US nuclear extended deterrence by either
redeploying US tactical nuclear weapons (withdrawn in 1991) or by engaging in a NATO-style

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WMD in Asia-Pacificnuclear weapons-sharing agreement on a bilateral or trilateral (NEATO) arrangement. The
instrumentalist school has the upper hand in the public debates, but both advocate that the ROK
shift from nuclear latency to nuclear armament—posing a challenge to American nuclear
hegemony in the region, dooming any denuclearization deal with the DPRK, and raising the threatof Japanese proliferation that would assuredly follow from the ROK nuclear armament.
In fact, likewise driven by the DPRK’s nuclear armament and related missile testing, Japaneseconservatives have reactivated old Japanese debates about an independent nuclear force with aview primarily to using Japan’s nuclear weapons latency as a political weapon in relations with anever-more assertive China. Unlike the ROK, Japan’s public opinion polls show the majority of the
population to be opposed to Japan’s nuclear armament to the deeply rooted nuclear taboo
originating in the Hiroshima-Nagasaki traumas, and Japan is also constrained by its adoption in1967 of its three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, producing, or introducing nuclear
weapons. But as with the instrumentalist school in the ROK, the pro-nuclear weapons policy
current in Japan enables Japan to try to be a tail wagging the superpower dog, that is, to push theUnited States to raise the credibility of its nuclear extended deterrence commitments to Japan inspite of US disinclination to do so under multiple US presidents since the turn of the century.
Both the ROK and Japanese governments have resisted being drawn into this loose talk of nuclear
weapons proliferation and observe stringent monitoring and verification of their nuclear materials
facilities and stocks of fissile material. Thus, while these two states could break out very quickly
and have the necessary missile delivery technology also available, neither is likely to do so shortof a major alliance rupture or an actual war in the region that shreds American credibility. Bothare committed to increasing conventional forces to deter their respective adversaries, and whilethese pro-nuclear policy currents have some cross-border connections with each other as well aswith similar voices in the United States that support the idea of allied proliferation, civil society
groups in the ROK and Japan are forming countervailing coalitions opposed to nuclear armament
while also addressing the risk of counterforce dilemmas arising from conventional forces that may
evoke more, not less nuclear threat from the DPRK and even China.
As the South Korean survey data shows, supporters of nuclear armament can change their view
after being exposed to data related to costs and constraints of going nuclear. Thus, there should benational and international efforts to educate citizens on the danger of nuclear weapons by33

Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacificdisseminating timely and objective information. Moon notes further that ROK pro-nuclear
sentiment declines when political and military tension falls in the peninsula, suggesting that themost constructive way to avoid further nuclear dominos falling in Northeast Asia may be to makepeace in Korea as fast as possible.
Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones
Regional nuclear weapons-free zones (NWFZs) are one of the oldest risk reduction measures that
endure in spite of great power transitions and regional turbulence. NWFZs provide security not
only to the non-nuclear weapons states party to a NWFZ treaty, but also to the nuclear weapons
states in the region. Three such zones exist in the region, viz: the South Pacific, Central Asia, andSoutheast Asia NWFZs, plus the Mongolian NWFZ recognized as such by the P5 if not underinternational law.
Tuya Nyamosor examines how each of these NWFZs were created. Although all follow thestandard UN treaty NWFZ format, they are also tailored to local circumstances. The South Pacific
Zone not only responded to French nuclear testing in the Southwest Pacific, but banned all nuclear
testing—peaceful or otherwise. It also gave Indonesia confidence that Australia would not arm
itself with nuclear weapons. The Southeast Asian NWFZ extended its jurisdiction to transit ofnational waters and to the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, putting pressure on the
nuclear weapons states who have so far refused to sign and ratify the treaty. The Central Asian
NWFZ is the first zone in which nuclear weapons had been deployed (in Kazakhstan) and removed
at the end of the Cold War, has two bordering nuclear-armed states, and encounters volatileconflicts in all directions. As a former nuclear test site is located in the region, it has strong
environmental rehabilitation provisions as well as banning nuclear tests. Finally, Mongolia has
pushed hard to get political recognition of its unilateral nuclear weapons-free status and promotes
learning from and coordination with other NWFZs.
In spite of these achievements, these NWFZs have limited utility. Recognized in the NPT itself as
a valuable way to reduce the threat of nuclear war, NWFZs are only an interim step on the longroad to nuclear disarmament. Indeed, the guarantees provided by nuclear-armed states to the nonnuclear parties of non-attack with nuclear weapons are based ultimately on their ability to revert
to nuclear threat should a non-nuclear state break out, or should a nuclear weapons state threaten
to or actually use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state party to the treaty. And, to34

WMD in Asia-Pacificdate none of the treaties have been ratified fully by nuclear-armed states, giving them legal
enforcement resting on domestic, not the force of international law.
Nonetheless, drawing on these and other precedents (especially from Latin America), Northeast
Asia has been proposed for the next NWFZ in the region, partly to enable the denuclearization of
the Korean peninsula, but also to contain the proliferation impulses in the ROK and Japan.
Prospects for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
Given the failure of the nuclear-armed states to resolve their conflicts with each other or nonnuclear states, and given the increasing dependence on nuclear threat as a basis of international
relations, many civil society organizations and many states have concluded that it is time to revolt
against the hegemonic role of nuclear weapons and to simply ban them outright. This sentiment,
motivated in large part by revulsion at the humanitarian impacts that a nuclear war would have onhuman populations as well as putting Earth’s biosphere at risk, led to the campaign for the Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) signed into existence in New York in 2019 andratified to come into force on January 22, 2021. The TPNW covers the entire gamut of nuclear
weapons activity, not just the fissile material or delivery system. This includes all the supporting
infrastructure that makes nuclear weapons usable and nuclear war possible, including that hosted
by non-nuclear states (often but not always nuclear umbrella states). It also bans threatened use of
nuclear weapons. Predictably, the nuclear-armed states in the region have either rejected the treaty
altogether or simply ignored it; US nuclear allies have also rejected it; but as of mid-2021, nine
ASEAN member states signed and four ratified the treaty, and nine of the Pacific Island states
party to the South Pacific NWFZ signed or acceded to the treaty.
Nobuyasu Abe explores how to overcome the gridlock between the TPNW and the NPT. He
suggests that the credibility of the NPT must be restored by the NPT Nuclear Weapons Statesmaking real nuclear disarmament progress, deceleration of their modernization and competition,and undertaking risk reduction measures alongside regional conflict resolution and new nuclear
weapons free zones, strengthening the IAEA safeguards system, blocking the naval propulsionhighly enriched uranium loophole in the NPT, and preventing small reactor deployment.
Concurrently the TPNW ratifying states must address the missing elements of their proposedprohibition regime on robust verification for proposed measures, clarify key definitions in thetreaty itself and enter into dialogue with NPT states, and hopefully participate in the covid35

Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacificpostponed NPT review conference when it finally takes place. He suggests that a number ofcountries are well placed to build bridges between NPT and TPNW states such as New Zealandand Indonesia in the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, he argues that it is critical to maintain thehistorical memory of the horrific consequences of past nuclear bombings to delegitimate andconstrain nuclear use.
Richard Tanter also identifies the practical and legal obstacles that block the TPNW from making
a credible claim to have banned nuclear weapons on a universal basis. In particular, the monitoring
and verification requirements to determine compliance are complex and confront many dual use
systems that will be difficult and even impossible to disentangle from systems that support nuclear
operations, directly or indirectly. These tasks lie at the core of the TPNWs potential to actuallyoffer a nuclear weapon elimination pathway in contrast to its ability to stigmatize or delegitimate
nuclear weapons of mass destruction, important as these tasks may be to reducing the utility of
nuclear weapons to possessor states.
Tanter identifies a number of key tasks that must be undertaken to advance the TPNW agenda,
including dialogue between regional nuclear umbrella and prohibition states, pushing for clarity
on nuclear guarantees from the United States to allies and related risks, and doing everything
possible to make one or more nuclear-armed state in this region abandon its nuclear armament andcommit to the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Conclusion
As noted earlier, we observe that WMD, especially nuclear weapons, confront commanders withthe same imperatives and confront them with the same dilemmas wherever they are located.
Arguably, these shared features of WMD landscape force all possessors of nuclear states to maketradeoffs along the same axes of choice, either purposely or by default. To remind, these tradeoffs
include the following:
1. Transparency versus opacity: Making possession of nuclear weapons capacities transparent
so that the weapons speak for themselves (for example, by revealing location of nuclear forceson a regular schedule in a manner that can be monitored and verified by an adversary
exemplified by US-Soviet/Russian arms control treaties, or testing of nuclear weapons or

36

WMD in Asia-Pacificperiodic testing of missiles to demonstrate capability undertaken by all nuclear armed states todate17) versus keeping capacities opaque to increase uncertainty and to minimize vulnerability(for example, by withholding all visibility and access, for example, to suspect chemical plants
or biological research facilities such as chemical weapons capabilities developed andundeclared by the ROK even in the course of dismantlement, and even using deception tomislead an adversary as to status of nuclear forces or commander propensity to use—as when
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger “secretly” alerted US nuclear forces from October 13-30
1969 to put pressure on the Soviet Union to pressure Hanoi to end the Vietnam war). 18
2. Certainty versus uncertainty: Declaring intention to use nuclear weapons clearly, openly,
and with certainty (for example, by having dedicated, nuclear-only forces such as US strategic
missiles, openly forward-deploying tactical or theater nuclear weapons, or adopting a “No FirstUse” policy matched by demonstrable practice of separating warheads from delivery systems)
versus creating uncertainty as intention to use (for example, by making ambiguous, bellicose
threats, testing in the midst of a tense military standoff, as occurred in the Donald Trump-Kim
Jong Un rhetorical war in 2017).
3. Positive versus negative control: Ensuring that nuclear weapons always available for use
with effective positive controls (for example, maintaining Launch on Warning posture,
automated launch systems and hardened communications) versus ensuring that they are neverusable without legitimate direction with effective negative controls (such as two-person rules,
separation of warheads from delivery system, Permissive Action Links).
4. Individual versus group decision-making: Maintaining dictatorial decision-making,centralized control, and authenticated authority to use nuclear weapons (for example, in the
United States and the DPRK where one person has absolute authority to order that nuclear
weapons are launched) versus group decision-making, decentralized control, and even predelegated authority to use nuclear weapons (for example, in Russia, India, and China—
although the group decision-making may collapse into a single commander under duress).
5. Counterforce versus counter-value targeting: Limiting nuclear weapons to counterforce or
military-only targets with minimized civilian casualties (which only the United States and

17 With the possible exception of Israel.
18 See W. Burr, J. Kimball, Nixon’s Nuclear Specter: The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam

War, University Press of Kansas, 2015.

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Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-PacificRussia have the technical means to do, even in principle, given the need to identify and target
precisely military targets that may be moving quickly, although it is a reasonable presumptionthat US and Russian targeting quickly veers into de facto counter-value targeting based on“military necessity” due to unstoppable escalation once a nuclear war begins) versus planningto detonate them on “counter-value” or population and/or economic recovery targets, either
deliberately or as “collateral damage” from targets hit out of military necessity (as is surely
almost inevitable given the short range and imprecise real-time targeting capabilities of China,
Pakistan, and the DPRK).
6. Minimum versus maximum deterrence: Achieving “minimum” deterrence derived fromassuring that a first-strike nuclear aggressor is likely to be hit by surviving nuclear forces evenafter absorbing a first-strike, irrespective of the level of destruction wrought on the target of a
nuclear first strike (long China’s strategic goal, possibly that of India with respect to China,
Pakistan with respect to India, and the DPRK with respect to the United States) versus strivingfor “maximum” deterrence based on escalation dominance at every step and ultimate “victory”
in a nuclear war (as appears to be the strategic goal of the United States with respect to all its
adversaries by creating, testing, displaying key elements of the nuclear triad, Russia withrespect to the United States and China by its own emulation of US practices supplemented byextreme delivery system diversification and testing activity, and India with respect toPakistan).
7. Autarchic versus interdependent nuclear security: Striving for autarchic nuclear security
based on nuclear threat (evidently China, Russia, DPRK, and India’s posture) versus
interdependent nuclear security created by collaboration with allies and even with adversaries
via technology sharing and sales, and by mutual arms control and/or disarmament agreements(as enshrined in US nuclear alliances with Japan and the ROK, and possibly Pakistan andIndia).

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WMD in Asia-Pacific

In Table 2, we cluster states with respect to how each state made each tradeoff. Unsurprising, thechoices that states make on each of these tradeoffs diverge, in some cases radically. The overall
posture of a given state is the result of all seven choices, whether these are made explicitly or defacto. There is no a priori reason that the choices made by a given state should be consistent. In
fact, organizational theory suggests the opposite. Nonetheless, this broad-brush treatment
highlights the variation in how nuclear-armed states project nuclear threat, cause fear in the mindsof their adversaries, and themselves perceive and experience nuclear threat. Driven by theimperative inherent in arming with nuclear weapons but shaped by unique local internal andexternal factors, each state reveals its own nuclear threat modus operandi which becomes manifest
in its revealed intentions, declaratory rhetoric, deployment patterns, and use of forces such as alerts
or forward-deployments to send signals about intention as warnings to nuclear adversaries.
Thus, one finds that all nuclear weapon states “speak” with a common vocabulary of the various
elements of nuclear threat-making such as bases, missile test ranges, WMD factories, deploymentsites and platforms (such as silos, airfields, ports, ships, missiles and aircraft)—but the shared
vocabulary may not convey the same meaning to those using it; and it does not extend to many
elements that are deliberately not displayed, may be completely invisible such as command posts,
39

Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacificcommunication nodes, organizational structures, or are shared with or indistinguishable with
infrastructure that supports conventional forces.
For all these reasons, the stories inscribed in a “WMD landscape” are specific to each nuclearprone conflict. We find from the investigations reported in this book that there are no simple
rulebooks nor overarching principles that determine how nuclear weapons affect international
relations in a specific, nuclear-prone conflict. Even norms of behavior in relation to WMD are hard
to come by. None are universally accepted by nuclear weapons possessor states, and all arecontested in one way or another by one or more nuclear-armed state. Some states declare that they
will not be the first to use nuclear weapons; others assert that prerogative and reject No First Use
as mere declaratory rhetoric. To date, perhaps the only nuclear norm that might be held to beuniversal in the region is the view that nuclear weapons must never be used again, the “nuclear
taboo.” Whether and how long that view will hold is anyone’s guess.
Moreover, there are no travel guides on how to exit from this WMD-laden landscape, especiallythe areas saturated by nuclear threat. How the common dimensions of nuclear threat combine
uniquely in each of the nine nuclear forces, and how each nuclear command perceives nuclear
threat via its own strategic prism means that not only are the nuclear forces of each nuclear-armed
state incommensurate, but also, no two nuclear threat-based relationships are the same—especiallywhen three or more states armed with nuclear weapons are party to the same conflict.
Consequently, the terrain and contours that capture how nuclear weapons are embodied in the
WMD landscape are convoluted and twisted, sometimes grotesquely, in ways that are specific toeach nuclear threat relationship and to each actual conflict in which nuclear threat is employed,
the latter also being in flux as geopolitical circumstances shift over time.
That said, we find eight broad themes emerged in the course of this survey that are common acrossthe entire region and demand that policy makers and stakeholders respond in ways that reduce therisk of nuclear war and promote the control and disarmament of WMD, especially nuclear
weapons. These include:
1. Nuclear, chemical, and (to the extent that they still exist and are deployable) biologicalweapons are inextricably intertwined with conventional forces in international conflicts.
Because one or both nuclear-armed states or their allies in such a conflict fear that they may
be overwhelmed by conventional attack, these nuclear possessor states supplement and even

40

WMD in Asia-Pacificsubstitute for conventional deterrence with nuclear threat. Perhaps more often than not,possession and reliance on nuclear weapons reveal strategic weakness, not strength, and are aweak straw on which to base a national security strategy. It follows that all states should
minimize the role of nuclear weapons and recess those that exist while rectifying conventional
force deficits, or use non-military means to ameliorate or resolve conflict over time.
2. Relatedly, the diffusion of low-yield nuclear weapons, disruptive technologies and ever morelethal conventional weapons accelerates this intermingling and blurring of nuclear andconventional forces that increases the risk of war and thereby, nuclear war. It is critical,
therefore, to interrupt this self-reinforcing cycle of conventional conflict laden with nuclear
threat, especially in the Korean peninsula, Taiwan Straits, and in South Asia, noting that theparties to these conflicts range from non-state actors (Taiwan) to small and medium powers(DPRK, Pakistan) to great powers (India, China, the United States and Russia). It follows thatstates likely should re-structure their conventional forces as they disarm nuclear forces to avoid
gaining overwhelming counterforce superiority that otherwise will incentivize an adversary to
substitute nuclear force for conventional forces if they forego “equalizing” nuclear weapons.
As an interim measure, nuclear-armed states should disentangle their nuclear and conventionalcommand, control, and communications systems and delivery systems. In short, conventionalarms control and disarmament are integral to the realization of nuclear disarmament andnuclear non-proliferation.
3. Once adopted by a state, nuclear weapons beget more nuclear weapons. First, the real andimagined threats posed to adversaries generates either vertical proliferation whereby a nuclear
adversary expands their own nuclear armament to maintain “escalation dominance” so that it
cannot be coerced by the other—an imperative that then ratchets across multilateral nuclear
conflicts to cause other, less capable nuclear-armed states to respond in kind. Or, it activates ahorizontal nuclear domino effect whereby a non-nuclear state perceives increasing nuclear
threat and actively seeks and then obtains its own nuclear weapons. The reverse is also thecase, with the implication that successful multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament
must commence at the top of the nuclear hierarchy to reduce the pressure on lower ranked, lesscapable nuclear-armed states to proliferate with nuclear weapons.
It is critically important therefore that nuclear-armed states put their nuclear modernization
programs on hold and re-examine these commitments to reduce cost and risk, and to avoid
41Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacificgenerating action-reaction arms racing, especially cascading effects across the rank hierarchyof nuclear-armed states that are linked to more than one adversary. Interim measures thatfacilitate such pauses and buy time include nuclear weapons-free zones, modernized nuclear
hotlines, and new rules of the road agreements.
4. The risk of nuclear war is incrementally and inexorably rising. This finding follows from theincreasing number of nuclear-armed states, the risk that non-state actors may obtain and use
WMD, and the all too real possibility that nuclear commanders may lose control of their
weapons leading to war and nuclear war at times of high tension and crisis. Conversely, we
see that when peace takes hold and tensions fall, the risk falls correspondingly.
5. Practical and realistic risk reduction measures should be taken in each nuclear conflict
relationship that ameliorate the core, nuclear-prone conflicts. Such measures must create thepolitical and military conditions that allow vertical and horizontal proliferation to be reversedand create the geo-political space to realize “mutually assured interdependence” based oncommon values and shared interests, especially shared economic prosperity and ecologicalsustainability. Small steps may prepare the way for bigger steps and ideal but implausible
measures should not be allowed to block tangible ones that kick-start a dynamic of arms control
and disarmament. Possible measures include submarine-free zones, separating warheads fromdelivery systems, missile and rocket launch notification, shared early warning, and adoptionof a global NC3 code of conduct based on the Law of Armed Conflict.
6. Nuclear and other WMD operate and are interlinked at global, regional, and national levels.
The three global great powers not only confront each other’s nuclear threat, but they are also
party to regional conflicts that involve middle and small nuclear-armed states and aresusceptible to non-state terrorism. The nuclear forces that great powers deploy against eachother also threaten their lesser nuclear adversaries, leading them to offset an increased threatwith additional nuclear forces of their own. Due to this cascading effect down the entire global
hierarchy of nuclear-armed states, each state has a strong interest in pushing the three global
nuclear powers to create new multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament frameworks
that relieve the pressure on lesser states.
7. Truly existential threats such as global pandemics or global climate change demand immediate
reduction of tension between nuclear-armed and nuclear umbrella states. Even a small nuclear

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war could disable the ability of the international community to manage these twin global crises,
and there are at least three locations in this region in which nuclear war is all too possible.
Conversely, the steps taken to resolve conventional conflict, reduce nuclear forces, and lower
the risk of nuclear war create conditions in which chemical and biological weapons are evenless likely to be used than they are already and would also create the political-security
conditions that would enable joint efforts to overcome other existential threats.
8. We are witness to an epochal shift whereby the primary conflict axis is between nuclear
weapon and umbrella states to one in which non-nuclear, non-allied states must now be
considered. The nine nuclear weapons and thirty nuclear-umbrella states which rely on nuclear
threat now confront the rest of the world—of which eighty-six states have signed the Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as of the time of writing this paper. 19 By thisratification, the prohibition states in this region are increasing their non-nuclear commitments
made already in nuclear weapons-free zones in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific,
and Mongolia, and if this trend propagates into a Northeast Asian WMD or nuclear weaponsfree zone, then the nuclear-armed and nuclear umbrella states will find themselves underincreasing diplomatic pressure to find common agendas with the nuclear prohibition states.
For example, as John Carlson points out in this book, nuclear and non-nuclear weapon statesneed to employ multilateral safeguards on all fissile materials stockpiles in a manner that ismonitored and verified to internationally agreed standards rather than the currently
discriminatory system that exempts weapons fissile material from international inspections.
In his famous study Landscapes Of Fear (1979), Li-Fu Yuan explained that people have always
lived in fear due to anxieties caused by exposure to threatening natural and artificial environments,
in an attempt to impose order and predictability. 20 Yuan did not contemplate nuclear foreboding,but others geographers such Kenneth Hewitt have after describing the horrific fate that befellscores of cities from conventional and nuclear annihilation in World War II. 21 The scale of thekilling of whole cities is one reason why nuclear target lists are the most secret aspect of WMDpractice by states. In the few instances where targeting has been unveiled, it has been shown to be
19 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, UNODA, https://treaties.unoda.org/t/tpnw
20 Li-Fu Yuan, Landscapes of Fear, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1979.
21 K Hewitt, “Place annihilation: area bombing and the fate of urban places,” Annals of the Association of American

Geographers, 73:2, June 9983, pp. 257-284.

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Surveying the WMD Landscape in Asia-Pacificspectacularly irrational, exemplified by the targeting of tiny Ulan Bator in Mongolia, admittedly
then a Soviet satellite state, by a 1-10 megaton thermonuclear weapon by the US Strategic Air
Command in 1959; 22 and by the utterly insane planned overkill on Russian targets in the US
strategic target list as late as 1991. 23
Most people targeted directly or as collateral damage by nuclear weapons today are either unawareof living in the shadow of nuclear weapons, or they find themselves unable to do anything about
it given the social and political distance separating them from those who are targeting them with
nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, civil society in the Asia-Pacific region was the progenitor of thepush to create the prohibition treaty, for which the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in 2019. Civil
society will continue to propagate strongly for the treaty in this region. Mayors for Peace, and thechampion nuclear survivor cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are powerful voices in this push withunassailable moral authority.
The nuclear prohibition states have made explicit the profundity of their commitment to hold thenuclear weapons and nuclear umbrellas states accountable, proactively, and before a nuclear war
occurs. Meanwhile, nuclear-armed and nuclear umbrella states have reaffirmed their equal andopposite commitment to retain nuclear weapons, in effect, indefinitely. How long it will take forthe first nuclear-armed or nuclear-umbrella state in this region to renounce nuclear threat andcommit to nuclear prohibition is anybody’s guess. Perhaps it will be the DPRK that overturns the
22 Strategic Air Command, “Atomic Weapons Requirement Study for 1950…sm 129-56,” June 15, 1956, released

under US FOIA request to National Security Archives, at: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb538-Cold-WarNuclear-Target-List-Declassified-First-Ever/
Ulan Bator is designated in the urban-industrial target list at: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb538-ColdWar-Nuclear-Target-List-Declassified-First-Ever/documents/1st%20city%20list%20complete.pdf
23 D. Rosenberg describes the fantastic overkill in US nuclear war plans in “Nuclear War Planning,” in M. Howard etal, edited, The Laws of War, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1994, pp. 160-190. See also D. Rosenberg, The
Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,” International Security, 7:4, Spring, 1983,
pp. 3-71, at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2626731 The discovery between 1985-1991 of the full loss-of-control of US
nuclear targeting by senior military and political leaders, and the targeting in some cases of hundreds of nuclear
weapons on target sets in the US nuclear war plan is recounted by Frank Miller in “PART II: FRANK MILLER’SNARRATIVE” in F.C. Miller and G. Butler, “Masters of the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise,” chapter 23, in Butler,
George Lee. Uncommon Cause - Volume II: A Life at Odds with Convention - The Transformative Years, Outskirts
Press, Kindle Edition, October 2015. Miller notes: “At some point, presumably in the 1970s, the war planners at the
JSTPS [Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff] (without informing the Joint Staff or OSD, much less the White House
staff) had decided to define a “city” in such a manner that had the President ordered a strike that included thecities withhold, all of those cities would nevertheless have been obliterated.”

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WMD in Asia-Pacificestablished nuclear disorder by not only denuclearizing itself but by joining the prohibition treaty,
forcing the ROK to follow suit. Or perhaps civil society will turn another nuclear umbrella state
into a mouse that roared, following in the path of the Philippines anti-nuclear constitution (1986)
followed by New Zealand’s anti-nuclear legislation (1987). In the long run, therefore, we conclude
that bottom-up, nuclear arms control and disarmament will commence in a mutually reinforcing
dynamic that will reduce nuclear risk until the weapons are abolished and ultimately eliminated.
Until then, we can only hope that our luck holds.

45Section 1

A LOOMING STRATEGIC ARMS RACE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: FROM A
CHINESE PERSPECTIVE
Luo XiASSESSING THE MODERNIZATION OF NUCLEAR POSTURES
Petr Topychkanov
NUCLEAR- CAPABLE MISSILES
Nick Hansen
NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (NC3) IN ASIA-PACIFICPeter Hayes
STATUS OF EXISTING AND EMERGING ASIA-PACIFIC SPACE POWERSCAPABILITIESNamrata Goswami
THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION IN THE ASIAPACIFIC REGIONJohn Carlson
EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN A
PANDEMIC WORLD
Allan Behm
CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: HISTORY, SCIENCE, AND FUTURE
PROSPECT
Jonathan Forman and Alexander Kelle
ASIA-PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE IN THE PANDEMIC ERARichard Pilch and Miles Pomper

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2. A Looming Strategic Arms Race in the AsiaPacific Region: From a Chinese Perspective
Luo XiIntroduction1
Nuclear weapons have become integral to Russia’s reclamation of its major power role after thecollapse of the former Soviet Union. It began a nuclear modernization program in the late 1990s,
which is still ongoing. According to President Vladimir Putin’s report in late 2019, modernizedequipment now accounts for eighty-two percent of Russia’s nuclear triad. 2 Russia’s declaratory
policy is to develop and deploy nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, prevail in a regional
war—a strategy known as “escalate to de-escalate.”
Russia’s strategic modernization program has three elements. First, it is routinely replacing aging
warheads and delivery systems with new, more advanced ones. Russia’s nuclear triad consists ofland-based international ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles(SLBMs), and strategic bombers. The land-based component of the strategic triad includes two
versions of the SS-27: Mods 1 and 2. The focus of the current and larger phase of Russia’s
modernization is the SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM (known in Russia as RS-24 Yars), which is equippedwith four multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Russia is also developing
the heavy multiple-warhead ICBM (SS-X-29), known as Sarmat, which will replace the SS-18 in
2021.3 As for the sea-based component of its nuclear triad, Russia has already announced a plan

1 This paper was prepared for the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the Asia-Pacific Workshop, organized by

the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN) in December 2020. A
version of this paper was published in the China International Strategy Review in June 2021 under the title,“Competition between great powers and a looming strategic arms race in the Asia–Pacific.”
2 Russian Federation Defence Ministry, “Supreme commander-in-chief of the Russian Federation Attends Extended
Session of the Russian Defence Ministry Board Session.” Press Release, December 18. 2018,
http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12208613@egNews
3 RIA Novosti, Russia to Develop New Heavy ICBM by 2020, December 20, 2010,https://sputniknews.com/russia/20101220161856876/© 2022 Luo Xi, CC BY 4.0
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A Looming Strategic Arms Race in the Asia-Pacific Region: From a Chinese Perspective
to build five and purchase two more new Borei class submarines (Project 955A) to replace theolder Delta IV SSBNs (Project 667BDRM) after 2023.4 Russia has also resumed production of the
Tu-160 aircraft in 2019 and is expected to field the first ten Tu-160M2s before 2027.
Second, Russia has begun to modernize its tactical nuclear weapons. As of early 2020, Russia isestimated to have a stockpile of about 4,310 nuclear warheads that are assigned to long-range
strategic launchers and shorter-range tactical nuclear forces. 5 Of these, about 1,870 are
nonstrategic warheads.
Third, Russia has begun to develop, test, and produce new “exotic” types of nuclear weapons. In
March 2018, President Putin listed five new nuclear-capable weapons systems:
1. a nuclear-armed, maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicle (the Avangard), currently carried
by a modified SS-19, and soon to be carried by an SS-29
2. a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile of “unlimited” range (the Burevestnik) topenetrate an adversary’s missile defense systems
3. an air-launched ballistic missile purportedly intended to target ships (the Kinzhal)
4. an SS-18 follow-on ICBM with modern features to penetrate missile defenses (the Sarmat)
5. a deep-diving, unmanned, nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed underwater delivery vehicle(the Poseidon) that is scheduled for delivery in 2027 6
In February 2019, President Putin announced an additional nuclear-powered anti-ship hypersoniccruise missile (the Tsirkon) to the Russian nuclear weapons inventory. All these programs illustratethat Russia is determined to continue its reliance on nuclear weapons as a key element of its
national security strategy. The new and “exotic” nuclear weapons provide means to augment
existing nuclear forces with systems that are not counted under the New Strategic Arms Control
Treaty (New START), now extended by the United States and Russia for five years by Presidents
Biden and Putin.

4 Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda, “Russian nuclear forces 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2020, Vol.76,

No.2, pp.102-117.
5 Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda, “Russian nuclear forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.76, No.2,
pp.102-117.
6 President of Russia, Presidential Address to Federal Assembly, March 1, 2018,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957

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These dynamics of Russian nuclear arms replacement, modernization, doctrine, and deployment—along with those of the United States—converge to suggest the new nuclear arms race between the
United States and Russia will be different from that of the Cold War. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, the Soviet Union and the United States had approximate parity in the number of deliverable
weapons in their nuclear arsenals. Their key strategic nuclear objectives were to obtain sufficient
capacity to inflict a certain level of assured damage to the other one in a retaliatory strike. Driven
by the reality of assured retaliation and near certainty of mutual annihilation in a nuclear war, thetwo nuclear superpowers had little incentive to pre-emptively strike the other’s strategic nuclear
forces. During the second half of the Cold War, Soviet leaders became uncertain of being able toindefinitely maintain a posture of guaranteed retaliation and mutual annihilation. 7 Three decades
after the Cold War ended, we find the principles which guide the numbers or size of nuclear
weapons have changed. On the one hand, the United States re-emphasized nuclear deterrence,
boosted its nuclear modernization, and acted skeptically towards arms control measures. Thus, theguiding principles that shape the size and type of US nuclear forces have shifted from preserving
strategic stability between the nuclear great powers to countering strategic threats from nuclear
adversaries, whether they be small, medium, or great powers. Conversely, Russia’s nuclear
modernization is still motivated in part by Moscow’s strong desire to maintain overall numericalparity with the United States. For the Russian leadership the US ballistic missile defense systemconstitutes a real future risk to the credibility of Russia’s retaliatory capability. Consequently,
Russia began to research and develop new nuclear systems to counter deployment of US missile
defenses. This unrestrained nuclear competition between the United States and Russia may
complicate future bilateral arms control negotiation and potentially affect China’s cognition of its
own nuclear retaliatory capabilities.8
Apart from the major powers, more regional states have undermined efforts to restrain missileproliferation by acquiring the scientific, technological, and industrial capabilities to produce bothballistic and cruise missiles. 9 The DPRK, India, and Pakistan have declared their possession of
nuclear weapons and demonstrated their ability to use ballistic missiles. The DPRK test-fired an
7 Brendan R. Green and Austin Long, “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear

Balance,” Security Studies, 2017, Vol.26, No.4, pp.606-641.
8 Charles L. Glaser, C. L., and Steve Fetter. 2016. “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and US
Nuclear Strategy toward China,” International Security 41 (1), pp.49–98.
9 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “The Delivery Systems Threat,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, December 30, 2015, http://
www.nti.org/learn/delivery-systems/

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A Looming Strategic Arms Race in the Asia-Pacific Region: From a Chinese Perspective
inter-continental range ballistic missile, which can reach at least the US West Coast, some 8,000
kilometers distant. India flight-tested a system with a range of 3,500 to 5,000 kilometers. Pakistan
also has intermediate-range ballistic missiles able to carry nuclear warheads over 2,750
kilometers. 10 Evidently, states will continue developing or acquiring missiles and related
technologies, despite interdiction, international condemnation, sanctions, and asymmetric efforts
to limit them.

The “Post-INF” Capabilities and Major Powers’ Strategic Interactions
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) ended in 2019, but the issue of INF-range
missiles remains. Russia’s alleged treaty violations and China’s increasing conventional andnuclear armed missile capabilities drove the United States to withdraw from the treaty. The former
Trump Administration held that if the United States remained bound by the INF treaty limits, thenit would be increasingly at a disadvantage with respect to Russia and China. American analysts
argued that China has deployed thousands of land-based intermediate-range ballistic and cruise
missiles, and ninety-five percent of them would violate the INF if China was party to it—which,of course, it is not.11 After the US INF withdrawal, Russia decided to suspend its obligations underthe INF treaty as a countermeasure. The current Biden Administration remains greatly concernedwith Russia and China’s potential employment of nuclear and conventional armed intermediaterange ballistic and cruise missiles and may try to seek negotiations on a global treaty to ban them. 12
The termination of the treaty means that the Asia-Pacific has entered into a “post-INF” era inwhich, as explained below, “post-ballistic” capabilities become a priority in military planning ofthese states and tripolar great power strategic interactions become more complex.
The “post-ballistic” capabilities arise from emerging technologies such as advanced guidance andstealth technology. Enhanced by these new technologies, a new generation of cruise missiles and

10Missile Threat, Missile Defense Project. Lasted updated July 31, 2021,

https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/shaheen-3/
11 Jacob Stokes, “China’s Missile Program and US Withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, Feb.4,2019, p.2.
12 Sharon Squassoni, “How the Biden Administration can Secure Real Gains in Nuclear Arms Control,” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, March 30, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/03/how-the-biden-administration-can-securereal-gains-in-nuclear-arms-control/

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WMD in Asia-Pacifictactical (shorter-range) ballistic missiles gained greater accuracy, reliability, and affordability thanthe long-range ballistic missiles. Modern cruise missiles can fly at low altitudes, which make themless visible to radars coverage and more difficult to detect and defend against. Shorter-range
ballistic missiles, with their accuracy measured in meters, have become effective tools for taking
out high-value, well-defended targets inside an adversary’s territory.
These attributes, however, leave target nations with very limited ability to counter the newgeneration of missiles in wartime. Hypersonic vehicles with speeds of Mach 5 and above, forexample, can drastically reduce the timelines for attack and response. The further proliferation of
hypersonic missiles and the related technologies may cause miscalculation and misperception.
Hypersonic weapon systems are divided into hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise
missiles. The United States, Russia, France, Japan, China, and India are all pursuing theseweapons. Russia has already deployed early versions. Furthermore, the growing popularity of dualcapable missiles, when equipped with either conventional or non-conventional warheads, are also
destabilizing and could lead to devastating deterrence failures because the payload ambiguity
increases uncertainty in a crisis and, thereby, the stakes of not striking first.
Russia has tested and fielded a new ground launched cruise missile system (9M729) that the UnitedStates claimed violated the INF treaty since May 2013.13 Over the last two decades, China has
deployed several new models of land-attack and anti-ship conventional cruise missiles, which areviewed by the United States as providing what it calls “Anti-access/Area-denial” (A2/AD)
capability. On 3 August 2019, the day after the United States withdrew from the INF Treaty, then
US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper revealed that the United States aims to deploy INF-range
missiles in the Asia-Pacific to counter China’s “A2/AD” capabilities. 14 At the same time, thePentagon initiated a study to evaluate whether the United States needed new military capabilities
to offset any advantage Russia and China might acquire by deploying a ground-launched cruise
missile of INF range (between 500 and 5,500 kilometers). The potential US Army and/or Marine
Corps options to deploy land-based intermediate-range missiles in this region include theintermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with hypersonic glide vehicle, with a range of 4,000
13 US Congressional Research Service, Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, 8 February 2019.
14 Robert Kobza, “Another Tool in the Toolbox: Using Intermediate-Range Missiles to Counter A2/AD in the Pacific,”
Georgetown Security Studies Review, 2 December 2019: 11.

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A Looming Strategic Arms Race in the Asia-Pacific Region: From a Chinese Perspective
km; the Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), with a range of less than 2,500 km;
the Improved Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), with a range of less than 700 km; andthe Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), with a range of 499 km.15
The potential deployment of the previously prohibited ground-based INF-range missiles by theUnited States in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in the western Pacific, may increase thecomplexity of trilateral great power strategic interactions. In response, some Chinese scholars havesuggested that China should increase the survivability of its nuclear forces by deploying multiple
warheads on missiles and experiment with hypersonic boost-glide vehicles. 16 Some analysis
outside China even speculated that Beijing might change its longstanding no-first-use (NFU)
commitment and the minimum nuclear deterrence posture.17 Yet to date, China has upheld its NFU
commitment to non-nuclear states, in spite of the speculation of some in Washington that it would
amend its NFU policy in the near future.
As for Russia, President Putin announced Russia will deploy new missile systems and augment its
missile defenses in its eastern regions. 18 Russia also took other countermeasures that enhance SinoRussian military ties and help China to boost its own missile defensive systems. 19 The SinoRussian military cooperation between their respective missile defense systems can be traced backto US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2002. Driven by the potential
development of the aforementioned missiles by the United States, Sino-Russian relations gained a
new momentum recently, which was named a “comprehensive strategic partnership” by China 20
and “an allied relationship” by Russia.

15 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Post-INF Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific: Political Viability and Implementation

Challenges,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 30 June 2020: 3.
16 Tong Zhao, “China in a world with No US-Russia Treaty-Based Arms Control,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for
Global Policy, 1 April 2019.
17 Andrey Baklitskiy, “What the End of the INF Treaty Means for China,” Carnegie Moscow Center Commentary, 2
December 2019, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/80462
18 Stephen Blank, “After the INF: Russia’s Propaganda and Real Threats,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6 September 2019,https://Jamestown.org/program/after-the-inf-russias-propaganda-and-real-threats/
19 “Russia is Helping China Build a Missile Defence System, Putin Says,” Guardian, 4 October 2019.
20 “China and Russia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, online,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/dozys_664276/gjlb_664280/3220_664352/

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WMD in Asia-PacificWill China Join the Trilateral Arms Control Negotiation?
In early 2019, the Trump Administration began to push for a trilateral arms control that would
include the United States, Russia, and China. Then-president Trump noted that “Russia and China
and us are all making hundreds of billions of dollars worth of weapons which are costly andridiculous.”21 In April 2020, the US State Department released a report titled, “US Priorities for
Next-Generation Arms Control,” which outlined US priorities for “next-generation arms control”
involving both Moscow and Beijing.22 The United States tended to cite China’s participation as apre-condition of the extension of the New START. The treaty limits deployed US and Russianstrategic nuclear forces. Additionally, it facilitates inspections and exchanges of information on
the status and movements of their intercontinental ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.
At the time, US proposals to trilateralize New START appeared disingenuous given that therelatively small Chinese nuclear forces are not equivalent to those of the United States andRussia.23 Leaving aside the quantitative and qualitative differences of China’s nuclear force, its
warheads and relevant delivery systems are stored at separated locations, which means the existing
counting rules in New START are not suitable to China.24 Several Chinese spokespersons rejected
the Trump administration’s calls officially, arguing that the two nuclear superpowers should bear
the main responsibility of reducing their arsenals to lower levels. 25 From Beijing’s perspective,
any request for a trilateral arms control dialogue from the United States is more a litmus test of its
campaign of maximum pressure towards China on a range of policy issues and an excuse for its
withdrawal from the treaty for non-substantive reasons. China is also worried that verification of

21 Sonne P. and J. Hudson, “Trump Orders Staff to Prepare Arms-control Push with Russia and China,” The

Washington Post, April 25, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-orders-staffto-prepare-arms-control-push-with-russia-and-china/2019/04/25/c7f05e04-6076-11e9-9412daf3d2e67c6d_story.html
22 Christopher A. Ford, “US Priorities for Next-Generation Arms Control,” Arms Control and International Security
Papers, Volume 1, Number1, April 06, 2020.
23 According to Kristensen’s assessment, Russia and the United States each maintain approximately 4,000
operational nuclear weapons, while China has around 300, cited from Kristensen H. M. and M. Korda, “Status ofWorld Nuclear Forces”, Federation of American Scientists, April, 2020, https://fas.org/issues/nuclearweapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/
24 Leanne Quinn, “China’s Stance on Nuclear Arms Control and New START,” Arms Control Now, 23 August 2019,https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2019-08-23/chinas-stance-nuclear-arms-control-new-start
25 Director-General FU Cong’s Interview with Kommersant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic ofChina, October 16, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1824545.shtml

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A Looming Strategic Arms Race in the Asia-Pacific Region: From a Chinese Perspective
its forces under a trilateral treaty could help to detect and weaken Beijing’s limited nuclear
retaliatory capabilities, which rely in part on opacity and ambiguity to compensate for its limited
nuclear force.
China’s negative attitude towards trilateral strategic arms control negotiation doesn’t mean that
China does not support the international disarmament and non-proliferation process. As apermanent member of the U.N. Security Council and a nuclear-weapon state, China has played
constructive roles in other multilateral nuclear-related negotiations. In the 1990s, China actively
led negotiations on military-to-military confidence building and risk reduction. It signed themultilateral 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and participated in the international
monitoring systems being set up to detect nuclear explosions around the world. China pushed fora treaty preventing an arms race in outer space. 26 China also played a supportive role innegotiations leading to the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal aimed at limiting that country’s
pathways to developing nuclear weapons. In the non-proliferation of missiles and theirtechnologies, although it has not participated in any of the world's major export control
mechanisms except for joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, China joined the Hague
International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) and pledged to halt
missile exports in 1992, 1994, 1998, and 2000. In August 2002, China promulgated its own missile
export control regulations and lists that corresponded closely to the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) guidelines.27 In 2003, China applied to join in the MTCR but was blocked by theUnited States.
When the United States shifted its China policy from engagement to containment under the Trump
Administration—a posture likely to be maintained under the Biden administration—China became
even more sensitive to the United States’ trilateral arms control initiative. Nonetheless, China
embraces dialogue underpinned by fair, equitable, and concrete principles. China will participate
in negotiations when involved in a broader set of negotiating partners such as France and theUnited Kingdom with similar levels of nuclear forces rather than being singled out. All five
officially recognized nuclear weapon states (the so-called “P5”) have convened and collaborated
26 Nancy Gallagher, “China on Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Strategic Stability,” CISSM Working Paper,August 2019: 2.
27 Robert J. Einhorn and Gary Samore, “Ending Russian Assistance to Iran’s Nuclear Bomb,” Survival, Vol. 44, No. 2
2002: 12.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificsuccessfully on the Iran negotiations. From Beijing’s perspective, the P5 format might be more
appealing than the prospect of negotiating alone with only the two nuclear superpowers. The P5
will be a good place for Beijing to negotiate confidence building measures such as the No First
Use (NFU) principle. Some Chinese scholars even support the notion that China should enter into
nuclear arms control dialogues rather than nuclear arms reduction negotiations because the concept
of arms control is more comprehensive than arms reduction. 28

Reducing the Risks of Dangerous Strategic Arms Races
The rapidly worsening global security environment now exacerbated by the global pandemic has
led to several missile control treaties or agreements being abandoned or facing an uncertain future.
The ABM Treaty and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty collapsed. The terminationof the INF Treaty highlights that bilateral arms control ultimately would not curb the geographicalspread and technological advancement of missiles. The former Trump administration announced
its withdrawal from the Open Sky Treaty. The 2010 New START, the only remaining treaty on
limiting strategic ballistic missiles and strategic bombers, was going to expire in February 2021
and was saved only at the last moment by its extension by the Biden administration. Under Trump,even nuclear testing was put back on the agenda with unfounded American claims of theresumption of Chinese nuclear testing—which would have contravened the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban’s “zero-yield” standard.29 This reinforces just how far the negative trend wentin the United States. Although many observers hope the Biden administration will reverse thistrend, structural trends at the global level involving the nine nuclear-armed states, and the chaotic
state of American domestic politics and nature of its foreign policy, mean that no-one can predict
its stance on these issues for longer than a few years.

28 Wu Riqiang, “Trilateral Arms Control Initiative: A Chinese Perspective,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 4September 2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/09/trilateral-arms-control-initiative-a-chinese-perspective
29 US State Department, “Executive Summary of Findings on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” Bureau of Arms Control, Verification andCompliance, April. 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Tab-1-EXECUTIVE-SUMMARY-OF2020-CR-FINDINGS-04.14.2020-003-003.PDF

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A Looming Strategic Arms Race in the Asia-Pacific Region: From a Chinese Perspective
China opposes arms racing outright due to its cost and potential strategic risks. From the Chineseperspective, the situation could be improved by the following measures. First, states should
strengthen and enlarge the existing institutions of missile control. A combination of deteriorating
great-power relations, uncertainties about the impact of emerging technologies, and the fact thatsome “post-INF” missiles are inherently attractive to states, with low political and legal barriers toacquisition and use, has undermined controls on missile proliferation. There is no universal norm,
treaty, or agreement which governs the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession,transfer, deployment, or use of missiles. Apart from the bilateral missile control treaties, therelevant mechanisms include unilateral (export controls), coordinated among exporting states as
the MTCR, or multilateral but not legally binding and far from universal measures such as the
HCOC. Despite its imperfections, the MTCR—the only existing multilateral arrangement covering
the transfer of missiles and missile-related equipment, material, and technology relevant toweapons of mass destruction (WMD)—has brought a significant degree of order to containing the
spread of ballistic missiles. The HCOC, an offspring of the MTCR and a useful set of voluntary
confidence building measures, refers only to one category of missiles.
The existing regulations covering missiles fall far short of those that would avoid a costly andpotentially deadly arms competition. For those concerned and responsible states in this region, it
is time to act now, or we will find ourselves bested by a destabilizing missile arms race. These
existing instruments should give proper priority to cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles andeven missile defense. The scope and number of their participants should be enlarged. A regional
missile-limitation regime that provides prior notice of missile and satellite launches to enhancetransparency and predictability would also offer great strategic benefits to all states in the region. 30
Second, all states—but especially the great power nuclear armed states—must do everything
possible to avoid the risk of war and nuclear war. States that possess nuclear-armed missiles mustensure that no accident or incident ever happens. All the nuclear-armed states should take thefamous saying “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” as a common
understanding and restrain their development and employment of any nuclear ballistic or cruise

30 Kurosaki Akira, “Moving Beyond Deterrence and Missile Defense,” INESAP Briefing Paper, No.13, November

2004, http://www.inesap.org/sites/default/files/Briefing13_04_0.pdf

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WMD in Asia-Pacificmissiles. Nuclear-armed states should be divided into three levels according to the quantity or
quality of their nuclear weapons. Each level should have different responsibilities.
The first level is Russia and the United States which, as nuclear superpowers, have more thanninety percent of the world’s nuclear warheads. The deterioration of great power relationships has
increased the possibility of a nuclear arms race. Their negative attitudes toward arms control havebecome a major barrier to the progress of international non-proliferation. The nuclear superpowers
should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines by rejecting preemptive
nuclear strikes or declaring that the sole use of nuclear weapons is as “the last resort” to defend
their national security.
The second layer includes France, Great Britain, and China, the other three permanent membersof the U.N. security council. It is imperative to encourage these states to make more contributions
to the international arms control process.
The third layer involves the four de facto nuclear states, India, Pakistan, the DPRK, and Israel,
who are neither members of the P5 nor parties to the NPT. Their rights to exploit nuclear energy
peacefully should be respected. Meanwhile, every effort should be made to limit and reduce therisk of a nuclear war or conflict between India and Pakistan to boost the denuclearization processof the DPRK, while guaranteeing their national security.
Last, but not the least, the new arms control and disarmament dialogue must directly address the
new factors that could increase the risk of accidental or inadvertent nuclear conflict, mostimportant, the potential destabilizing effects of new non-nuclear weapon technologies such as
ballistic missile defense, anti-satellite weapons, and precision-strike missile technology. The
emerging advanced technologies supplement and even enhance nuclear weapons while offering
non-nuclear states capabilities with which to offset the projection of conventional and nuclear
forces by the great powers. With the widespread applications of emerging technologies, nonnuclear military facilities and platforms may degrade nuclear decision-making and increase therisk of an accidental nuclear war. Thus, Track 2 dialogues on emerging technologies and some
non-nuclear weapon systems might develop workable proposals to reduce the resulting risks.
The continued high alert levels of American, Russian, British, and French warheads to support“launch on warning” is another risk that deserves urgent attention. Moreover, Russia and the57

A Looming Strategic Arms Race in the Asia-Pacific Region: From a Chinese Perspective
United States each possess huge counterforce capabilities, which threatens not only each other but
lesser nuclear adversaries with a decapitating and disarming first-strike. In contrast, China, India,
and Pakistan reportedly keep their nuclear weapons un-deployed at central storage facilities on
low alert levels. Their retaliatory strike capabilities are based on the principle of “launch underattack,” not “under warning.” Already in 1994, China proposed that the P5 should agree to adopt
NFU, which could lay the foundation of developing codes of conduct to decrease the risks. 31
Recognizing the NFU principle could lessen the risk arising from misperception andmisunderstanding of the preemptive strike posture on the one hand and sustain the taboo against
nuclear employment on the other.

31 Zhengqiang Pan, “A Study of China’s No-First-Use Policy on Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear

Disarmament, 1, No.1, 2018: 115-136.

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WMD in Asia-Pacific

3. Assessing the Modernization of Nuclear Postures
Petr Topychkanov

Introduction
The increased of salience of nuclear weapons is a visible trend among all nuclear-armed states.1
The recent doctrinal changes tend to lower the nuclear threshold. In the regions of Europe, East
Asia, and South Asia, the concept of limited nuclear war surfaces again after the years ofabandonment. Political turmoil between nuclear-armed states and their allies and the introductionof new technologies add significantly to shocking the strategic stability relations of countries
possessing nuclear arsenals. This chapter explores the doctrinal changes in nuclear-armed statesthat might make closer the risk of first nuclear use.
Nuclear doctrines have a dual character. When discussing the nuclear doctrine, or strategy,
observers sometimes describe under this both the doctrine and military plans, which are not always
the same. As it was noted in a study on Russian nuclear doctrine, “the usual practice is to draw aline between two aspects of military doctrine: the political and military-technical aspects. Until
recently, the former aspect was regarded as the more stable one, while the latter, which determines
the means, forms, and methods of warfare, as the more dynamic and changeable.” 2 This passage,
however, is relevant to any nuclear doctrine.

1 Tytti Eräst and, Tarja Cronberg, “Opposing Trends: The Renewed Salience,” (SIPRI, Stockholm: April 2019) p. 3-4.
2 Valentin Larionov, and Andrei Kokoshin, Prevention of War: Doctrines, Concepts, Prospects, (Moscow: Progress

Publishers, 1991) p. 13.

© 2022 Petr Topychkanov, CC BY 4.0

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Assessing the Modernization of Nuclear Postures

Change in Nuclear Doctrines and Force Postures
United States of America
The Trump administration approved the most recent nuclear doctrine of the United States in 2018.
In comparison with the previous version of 2010, it made significant changes, mostly in response
to growing threats from Russia, China, and the DPRK, specifically to the alleged violations of theIntermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by the former. The document mentioned
Russia’s so-called “escalate-to-de-escalate” concept and offered the US response to it. 3
The doctrine witnessed the expansion of US flexibility regarding nuclear options, including lowyield ones. The rationale behind this, as explained in the text, is to preserve “credible deterrence
against regional aggression.”4 This change explicitly confirms that nuclear employment by theUnited States is possible in regional conflicts in sub-strategic scenarios.
In support of these changes, the nuclear posture announced the commencement of research anddevelopment of conventional ground-launched intermediate-range missiles.5 In August 2019, lessthan three weeks after its withdrawal from the INF Treaty, the United States flight tested amodification of the Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missile from the Mark 41 Vertical Launch
System. 6 Another flight test of a ground-launched ballistic missile of the intermediate-range
happened before the end of 2019. The deployment of a new missile is possible in the near futurein the Asian-Pacific region to deter China. Such a deployment was viewed as desirable by former
United States Secretary of Defense Mark Esper.7
The Russian and Chinese reactions to these developments indicated their concern about theconsequences of the lowered nuclear threshold and triggered an arms race. 8 However, the US
3 “Nuclear Posture Review,” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington: Feb. 2018) p. 8.
4 “Nuclear Posture Review,” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington: Feb. 2018) p. XII.
5 “Nuclear Posture Review,” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington: Feb. 2018) p. 10.
6 Aaron Mehta, “Watch the Pentagon test its first land-based cruise missile in a post-INF Treaty world” Defense

News, 19 Aug. 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/08/19/pentagon-tests-first-land-basedcruise-missile-in-a-post-inf-treaty-world/
7 Aaron Mehta, “Is the US about to test a new ballistic missile?” Defense News, 13 Nov. 2019,https://www.defensenews.com/space/2019/11/13/is-the-us-about-to-test-a-new-ballistic-missile/
8 N. Patrushev, “Videt” tsel,” [Acquiring target] Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 11 Nov. 2019,https://rg.ru/2019/11/11/patrushev-ssha-stremiatsia-izbavitsia-ot-mezhdunarodno-pravovyh-ramok.html;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s

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WMD in Asia-Pacificnuclear posture states that these measures are defensive—reactive to the growing threats from
Russia, China, and the DPRK—and make nuclear employment less probable.
The unique character of the US nuclear posture is not only about a commitment to allies to use
nuclear weapons to protect them from nuclear and non-nuclear threats, but also about an extensive
list of threats being deterred by the nuclear capabilities of the United States. The United States isonly one of the nuclear-armed states that pretend to have effective deterrence against cyberthreats.9 Addressing the volatile security environment, the nuclear posture of the United States
does not accept the concepts of no first use and sole purpose of nuclear weapons. It retains
ambiguity regarding the concrete scenarios within which this country will use nuclear weapons.10
These changes in the US nuclear posture are accompanied by US reservations regarding further
bilateral limitations. The US president repeatedly indicated the desire to proceed with a trilateral
nuclear arms control agreement with China and Russia.11 Given China’s refusal to this format until
all three countries have similar nuclear arsenals, 12 the risk of a nuclear arms control anddisarmament dead-end is highly possible.
RussiaDuring the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union, the predecessor of the Russian Federation, was a
proponent of a no first use pledge.13 In its first post-Soviet military doctrinal document, “Basic
provisions of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation,” approved in 1993, a negative
security assurance with two exceptions replaced this pledge. First, Russia reserved the right tostrike first under an armed attack by a non-nuclear weapon state being in alliance with a nuclear
weapon state. The second case was a joint aggressive action by a non-nuclear weapon state and an

Regular Press Conference on August 26, 2019,” 26 Aug. 2019,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1692042.shtml
9 “Nuclear Posture Review,” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington: Feb. 2018) p. 38.
10 “Nuclear Posture Review,” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington: Feb. 2018) p. VII, 22.
11 TASS, “US seeks major arms control deal with Russia and China, Trump says,” 4 Nov. 2019,https://tass.com/world/1086822
12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s
Regular Press Conference on November 5, 2019,” 5 Nov. 2019,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1713475.shtml
13 R.L. Garthoff, “Continuity and Change in Soviet Military Doctrine,” ed. B. Parrot, The Dynamics of Soviet Defense
Policy (The Wilson Center Press: Washington, 1990), p. 159.

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Assessing the Modernization of Nuclear Postures
allied nuclear weapon state. 14 In both cases, there was an explicit reference to NATO as an allianceof non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear-weapon states.
In the version of 2000, the military doctrine of Russia mentioned for the first time the concrete
circumstances under which the country would use nuclear weapons. With some changes, these
conditions remained the same in subsequent versions. In the most recent version of 2014, Russia
reserves “the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of
weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against
the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the stateis in jeopardy.”15 The document mirrors the US posture in terms of protecting allies and responding
to an extensive list of threats with the nuclear deterrent, except for cyber.
In the Western scientific and expert literature, it has become commonplace to argue that theRussian nuclear doctrine is pre-emptive. The focus of the debate on the Russian pre-emption is on
the concept of escalate-to-deescalate; in other words, plans for a limited nuclear strike to stop
conventional aggression. Russian representatives officially and unofficially deny the existence of
this doctrine.16
The escalate-to-deescalate concept is doubtful in the context of the Russia–US/NATO
juxtaposition in the European region. There is a common belief in Russia that any armed conflictwith the United States and NATO will quickly escalate to global and full-fledged nuclear war. 17
Vladimir Putin made the most recent statement about that in his Presidential Address to the Federal
Assembly while commenting the low-yield nukes option of the US 2018 Nuclear Posture Review:“Any use of nuclear weapons against Russia or its allies, weapons of short, medium or any range

14 “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” Federation of American Scientists,

https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html
15 Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “The Military
Doctrine of The Russian Federation,” 29 Jun. 2015, https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029
16 TASS, “US Claims on Russia”s ‘Escalation for De-Escalation’ Doctrine are Wrong – Envoy,” 9 Apr. 2019,https://tass.com/politics/1052755
17 “’Ogranichennoi’ yadernoi voiny mezhdu SShA i Rossiei ne budet po opredeleniyu” [Inherently There Will not Be
a "Limited" Nuclear War between USA and Russia], Vesti FM, 18 Jan. 2018,https://radiovesti.ru/brand/61009/episode/1642882/

62

WMD in Asia-Pacificat all, will be considered as a nuclear attack on this country. Retaliation will be immediate, withall the attendant consequences.”18
On the other hand, there are indications of possibilities of Russian use of nuclear weapons preemptively, regionally, and in a conventional armed conflict. The military doctrine of 2014
portrayed nuclear weapons as an essential deterrent for “preventing an outbreak of nuclear military
conflicts involving the use of conventional arms (large-scale war or regional war).”19 The 2017
naval doctrine described the following role of tactical nuclear weapons: “During the escalation of
military conflict, demonstration of readiness and determination to employ non-strategic nuclear
weapons capabilities is an effective deterrent.” 20 The most recent strategic exercise, “Thunder2019,” had a scenario resembling the escalate-to-deescalate concept: “The situation escalates along
the perimeter of the Russian borders amid the persisting conflict potential, as a result of which athreat emerges to the country’s sovereignty and its territorial integrity.” 21 These examples showthat Russia’s pre-emptive nuclear use in a regional conflict with conventional forces involved
cannot be entirely dismissed.
Meanwhile, Russia’s leadership keeps describing Russia’s nuclear posture as defensive. 22 It
combines the elements of the “launch-under-attack” and “launch-on-warning,” and some Russianauthors describe it as a “reciprocal counter-strike.” How long the doctrine will remain defensive
is unclear, given the demise of the INF Treaty and the risk of intermediate-range missiles
deployment in Europe. These developments might cause a change of the defensive posture to an
offensive one. In any case, the ambiguity of the Russian nuclear posture may grow.

18 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” President of Russia, 1 Mar. 2018,

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957
19 Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “The Military
Doctrine of The Russian Federation,” 29 Jun. 2015, https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029
20 Russia Maritime Studies Institute, “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of
Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030,” 28 Sep. 2017,https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Russia%20Maritime%20Studies%20Institut
e/RMSI_RusNavyFundamentalsENG_FINAL%20(1).pdf?sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=fjFDEgWhpd1ING%2Fn
mGQXqaH5%2FDEujDU76EnksAB%2B1A0%3D
21 TASS, “Russian strategic nuclear forces” drills not aimed against third countries — top brass,” 14 Oct. 2019,https://tass.com/defense/1083017
22 President of Russia, “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club,” 18 Oct. 2018,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848

63Assessing the Modernization of Nuclear Postures
Russia is also developing and testing new offensive weapons. It has recently announced the
Burevestnik nuclear-powered long-range cruise missile, the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater
drone, the Kinzhal air-launched supersonic missile, the Sarmat silo-based heavy ballistic missile,and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. 23 It has reportedly already replaced 82 per cent of theweapons and equipment of the Strategic Rocket Forces with new systems. 24 The US official
position is that these weapons are destabilizing. 25
China
For several decades after its first nuclear test in 1964, China maintained a restrained nuclear
posture. The Chinese leadership assigned its nuclear weapons a “sole purpose” role, to be
employed only in response to a nuclear strike. 26
The most recent 2015 nuclear doctrine of China repeats the main principles of this restrained policy,
including the no first use pledge and unconditional negative security assurances for non-nuclear
weapon states and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The document highlighted the defensive characterof the nuclear posture.27
Reflecting these principles, China keeps its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for
deterring probable adversaries. Chinese nuclear weapons probably do not need to be at high alert.
China may have its nuclear warheads separated from delivery systems. 28 The alert level will onlychange in crises.
Some aspects, however, may indicate the changing nature of China’s nuclear doctrine. Among the
UN Security Council's five permanent members, or P5 countries, only China refuses to declare the23 “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” President of Russia, 1 Mar. 2018,

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957
24 President of Russia (2018), “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” 1 March,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 accessed 7 May 2020.
25 http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/21998264/united-states.pdf
26 Zhenqiang Pan, “A study of China’s No-First-Use Policy on Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear
Disarmament, 2018, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 115.
27 Information Office of the State Council, “China’s Military Strategy,” May 2015,
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm
28 Shannon Kile and Hans Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2019. Armaments, Disarmamentand International Security, (SIPRI, Stockholm: 2019) p. 318.

64

WMD in Asia-Pacificscale of its nuclear arsenal. The state justifies this opacity by the small number of its nuclear
weapons and their greater vulnerability if the number is disclosed. These explanations however,
do not remove concerns about the growing size of China’s nuclear arsenal, which according tosome assessments, could exceed the those of France and the United Kingdom. 29 China’s promise
to join multilateral nuclear arms control when the nuclear arsenals of the United States, Russia,
and China are of similar sizes,30 suggests China’s unwillingness to join any arms control in theforeseeable future.
China’s practice of keeping the nuclear arsenal de-alerted in peacetime is uncertain. Beijing has
never confirmed this practice and never declared it as a de-alerting measure. In the absence ofofficial statements, it is hard to assess open-source reports that China separates warheads fromdelivery systems.
In fact, the path of China’s nuclear arsenal development may make this practice unfeasible. China
pursues credible sea-based nuclear deterrence. Currently, it has four operational submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBM) of Type 094, and the next generation submarine Type 096 will
be launched in 2020. 31 However, the SLBM submarines will be a credible deterrent only if nucleartipped missiles are on board. This development would mean the end of China's practice of demating warheads from delivery systems. Also, China is pursuing the replacement of silo-based
liquid-fueled missiles with new mobile solid-fuel systems, such as three-stage missiles Dong Feng31/AG (DF-31/AG) and Dong Feng-41 (DF-41). With the ranges of 11,200 and 12,000 km
accordingly, these weapons may replace the obsolete silo-based ICBMs. 32 Again, theoperationalization of the new mobile weapons would contradict the practice of de-mating
warheads from delivery systems.

29 A. Arbatov, “China and Stability,” eds. A. Arbatov,

V. Dvorkin, and S. Oznobishchev, Russia and Dilemmas of
Nuclear Disarmament, (IMEMO, Moscow: 2012), p. 33.
30 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Maintaining Global Strategic Stability, Reducing
Risks of Nuclear Conflicts. Statement by H.E. Mr. Fu Cong, Director-General of the Department of Arms Control of
MFA at the 16th PIIC Beijing Seminar on International Security,” 16 Oct. 2019,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1708326.shtml
31 Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2019,” P. 36, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf
32 Shannon Kile and Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2020. Armaments, Disarmament andInternational Security, (SIPRI, Stockholm: 2020), p. 357.

65

Assessing the Modernization of Nuclear Postures
Another new development may be related to the possible replacement of the retaliatory posturewith launch-on-warning. The 2013 edition of the Science of Military Strategy offered thefollowing option: “If we can indeed confirm that the enemy has launched nuclear missiles against
us, we can quickly launch nuclear missiles in retaliation, before the enemy’s warheads reach anddetonate over the targets to cause real damage to us.” 33
Shifting from the delayed retaliation to launch-on-warning would constitute a significant change
in China’s nuclear operation.34 It would require early warning. The recent statement of the Russianpresident Vladimir Putin, who mentioned the ongoing cooperation between Russia and China on
the space-based early warning, suggests China’s interest in early warning capabilities.35
FranceAt first look, the nuclear posture of France is defensive with a relatively high threshold. France’s
2017 Defence and National Security Review, one of its most recent doctrinal documents, portraitedthe nuclear arsenal as the last-resort weapon. 36 France signaled there is no place for nuclear
weapons in offensive scenarios. 37 The state does not intend to achieve any gains on the battlefieldwith nuclear weapons. France no longer has a nuclear triad. Its arsenal contains only air- and seabased capabilities.38
On closer scrutiny, however, France probably has the highest level of ambiguity among the P5
countries regarding the circumstances under which it would employ nuclear weapons. Its doctrine
states that the French nuclear deterrence capabilities protect France “from any aggression against
our vital interests emanating from a state, wherever it may come from and whatever form it may

33 Cited in: Michael Chase, “China’s Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and Challenges

for the United States,” Asia Policy, Jul. 2013, no. 16, p. 60.
34 Tong Zhao, “Kitaiskaya strategiya i voennye programmy,” [Chinese strategy and military programs] Arbatov, A.,
Dvorkin, V., Politsentrichnyi yadernyi mir: vyzovy i novye vozmozhnosti [Polycentric nuclear world: challenges andnew possibilities] (Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow: 2017), p. 91.
35 President of Russia, “Valdai Discussion Club session,” 3 Oct. 2019,http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719
36 Ministère des Armées, “Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale,” 2017, p. 72-73,
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/514684/8664656/file/2017-RS-def1018.pdf
37 Ministère des Armées, “Dissuasion,” 11 Jan. 2017, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/politique-dedefense/dissuasion/dissuasion
38 Shannon Kile and Hans Kristensen, “French Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2019. Armaments, Disarmament andInternational Security, (SIPRI, Stockholm: 2019) p. 316.

66

WMD in Asia-Pacifictake.”39 This has created fertile soil for speculation because the “vital interests” is a vague notion
not directly linked to sovereignty.
Statements made by French officials indicated that the nuclear arsenal might be a deterrent against
non-nuclear threats as well, including conventional and terrorist ones. 40 The planned nuclear
modernization process in France during the next two decades reflects concerns about emerging
threats, such as cyber offence and anti-satellite capabilities. 41
The correlation of France’s nuclear posture with its membership in NATO produces additional
ambiguity about France’s nuclear policy. France’s government sees its nuclear arsenal as a meansfor protecting common European “vital interests” and as contribution to global nuclear deterrenceby NATO, along with the United States and the United Kingdom. 42 At the same time, France
remains outside NATO’s nuclear planning process. France is not a part of the NATO extended
deterrence posture. The concrete circumstances challenging European and NATO security underwhich France would employ nuclear weapons and how France would synchronize and measure its
nuclear response in concert with the responses from other NATO allies therefore remains unclear.
United Kingdom
Unlike other nuclear-armed states, the United Kingdom has set a concrete unilateral limit on its
nuclear stockpile: 180 nuclear warheads with 120 warheads operationally deployed in the mid2020s. In comparison to United States, Russia, China, and France, the United Kingdom
demonstrates a maximum level of transparency of its nuclear posture and capabilities vis-à-vis
non-nuclear weapon states. For instance, the United Kingdom became a core country of the Quad

39 Ministère des Armées, “Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale,” 2017, p. 72,

https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/514684/8664656/file/2017-RS-def1018.pdf
40 B. Tertais, “La France et la dissuasion nucléaire: concept, moyens, avenir,” (Direction de l”information légale etadministrative, Paris: 2017) p. 107.
41 Direction de l”information légale et administrative, “Dissuasion nucléaire: quel financement pour sa
modernisation,” 13 Jul., 2017, https://www.vie-publique.fr/en-bref/19689-dissuasion-nucleaire-quel-financementpour-sa-modernisation
42 Sénat, “Rapport d ́information fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forcesarmées (1) par le groupe de travail “La modernisation de la dissuasion nucléaire,” par MM. Xavier Pintat, Jeanny
Lorgeoux, co-présidents, MM. André Trillard, Pascal Allizard et M. Claude Haut, sénateurs,” 23 May 2017, p. 56,
https://www.senat.fr/rap/r16-560/r16-5601.pdf

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Assessing the Modernization of Nuclear Postures
partnership investigating the role of non-nuclear weapon states in verifying nuclear-warhead
dismantlement.43
In its 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, the United
Kingdom reaffirmed its commitment not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS-parties to the NPT.
However, the 2015 document stated that the government reserved the right to “review thisassurance if the future threat, development or proliferation of these weapons make it necessary.”
It also highlighted the continuous process of reviewing its nuclear posture “in the light of theinternational security environment and the actions of potential adversaries.” The United Kingdom
did not rule out the first use of nuclear weapons.
The Strategic Defense and Security Review of 2015 kept some level of ambiguity regarding“precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate their use, in order to not simplify
the calculations of any potential aggressor.”
The UK government’s standard practice is to have a ballistic missile submarine on deterrent patrol
at any given time. The authorities claim that the missiles on the submarine are not on launch-readyalert.
The United Kingdom is currently replacing its Vanguard-class submarines with a Dreadnoughtclass. The first of the new class will enter service in the early 2030s. It is expected that the newclass will constitute the backbone of the United Kingdom’s continuous at-sea deterrent into the2060s.
India
India does not have an official nuclear doctrine. By the decision of the Cabinet Committee on
Security (CCS) dated January 4, 2003, “India’s nuclear doctrine can be summarized as follows:(1) building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent; (2) a posture of no first use: nuclear
weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indianforces anywhere; (3) nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict

43 T. Erästö, U. Komkomžaitė, and P. Topychkanov, Operationalizing nuclear disarmament verification, (SIPRI,

Stockholm: Apr. 2019) p. 10.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificunacceptable damage.”44 Although India is committed to no first use of nuclear weapons and plansa retaliatory strike only, its nuclear forces are not yet survivable and reliable enough to endure a
potential adversary’s nuclear attack.
India has declared that it will adhere to credible minimum deterrence policies. For India, the main
goal is to prevent the use of WMD by another state. In the case of India, minimum nuclear
deterrence requires: (a) sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces; (b) arobust command and control (C2) system; (c) capable intelligence and early warning capabilities;(d) comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with the strategy; and (e) the will
to employ nuclear forces and weapons.45 In attempting to increase the credibility and effectivenessof its nuclear weapons as a deterrent, however, India fails to limit itself to minimum deterrence.
Also, since India does not currently possess effective second-strike capabilities (e.g., SLBMs), andis actively developing its ballistic missile defense (BMD), many experts doubt that New Delhi
adheres strictly to the NFU policy. 46 If India's BMD architecture achieves completion, it might
create a feeling among the political leadership of the national ability to intercept the majority ofincoming missiles from Pakistan. It would potentially convince them to act more aggressively
without fear of Pakistan's retaliation.
Pakistan
Pakistan has declared that it will adhere to minimum deterrence as well. As Pakistani Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif said on May 20, 1999, “nuclear restraint, stabilization and minimum
credible deterrence constitute the basic elements of Pakistan’s nuclear policy.” 47 For Pakistan, thegoal is to prevent a war in which India uses WMD and conventional weapons against it.

44 “Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalization India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Press

Information Bureau, (Government of India, New Delhi, 4 Jan. 4, 2003)
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html
45 Arpit Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia: China, India and Pakistan (Sage: New Delhi, 2005), p. 229.
46 I. Khalid, “Nuclear doctrine: ramifications for South Asia”, South Asian Studies, vol. 27, no. 2 (July–Dec. 2012),
p. 319.
47 “Remarks of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, on Nuclear Policies and the CTBT, National DefenceCollege, Islamabad, May 20, 1999,” Cit. in: Ayaz Ahmed Khan, “Indian Offensive in the Kargil Sector,” Defence
Journal, Jun. 1999, http://www.defencejournal.com/jun99/indian-offensive.htm

69Assessing the Modernization of Nuclear Postures
In contrast to India, Pakistan plans to use its nuclear weapons not only against political andeconomic centers, but also against conventional forces in India’s territory, or in Pakistan’s territory,should India invade.
Pakistan’s deployment patterns change according to risks of pre-emption and interception. For
example, Pakistan regards the US–India nuclear deal of 200848 as creating a change in regional
circumstances because it allows India to improve its nuclear arsenal, and US cooperation helps
India to develop its BMD systems. In response, Pakistan defends its right to increase the numberof nuclear warheads in its arsenal and its nuclear delivery systems. This is why Pakistan refuses tosupport the CTBT or FMCT. According to some Pakistani experts, even if India signs and ratifies
these treaties, Pakistan will not be interested in following suit.49
There is a danger that India’s expanding capabilities in both defensive and offensive arms may
provoke an asymmetric response on the part of Pakistan, including sabotage and terrorism.
Pakistani experts realize that such a response would have an extreme destabilizing effect, but thischoice can be driven by internal factors and implemented despite the experts’ opinion.

When are Nuclear-armed States ready to Strike First?
A state’s readiness for the first use of nuclear weapons makes it an instrument of warfighting. An
intention of using nuclear weapons first goes beyond the nuclear deterrence goal of preventing theadversary’s first strike via one’s own survivable retaliatory capabilities. First nuclear use isassociated with disarming and decapitating attacks. The first nuclear strike capabilities may beseen as a response to adversary’s conventional superiority (by preventive strike means) and to theadversary’s disarming and decapitating strike capabilities (by pre-emptive strike means).

48 Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government ofIndia Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Agreed Text, 1 Aug. 2007,https://web.archive.org/web/20080915224216/http://www.hcfa.house.gov/110/press091108h.pdf
49 R.A. Siddiqi, “The politics of US–India nuclear deal”, Strategic Studies, no. 4 (2015), http://issi.org.pk/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/SS_No_4_2015_Dr-Rashid-Ahmed.pdf

70WMD in Asia-PacificPutting the nuclear-armed states on a line from the most offensive nuclear posture to the least one,
Pakistan would probably be first, and the United Kingdom would be last.
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has an unequivocally offensive nature with their exceptional reliance on
first use due to both strategic necessity and technical characteristics. Facing India's conventional
superiority, doctrinal shifts, and political support for cross-border surgical strikes, Pakistan has torely on the tactical nuclear weapons in several scenarios, including a hypothetical invasion by India.
Russia might be considered as a nuclear-weapon state, having a nuclear posture closest to the
Pakistani one. Perceiving the variety of strategic offensive and defensive systems in the UnitedStates and its NATO allies as a threat to the Russian nuclear arsenal, the latter keep relying on
nuclear weapons to face this challenge.
The third position tentatively belongs to the United States due to its objective situation and militarycapability. It has no incentive for the first use of nuclear weapons. However, the provisions of its
doctrine and allied obligations result in at least declaratory reliance on the concept of the first use
of nuclear weapons.
The United States is followed by India, with its obligation of no first use. It is most likely that inpractice it will continue to maintain the capability of disarming strike against Pakistan but remain
vulnerable for a counterforce strike by China. India assumed the obligation of no first use to avoid
provoking a pre-emptive strike on the part of China or Pakistan.
The fifth position goes to China. From the beginning, it assumed a declarative obligation of nuclear
no first use without any reservation. However, China’s retaliation strike capability is insufficientcompared to the superior forces of the United States and Russia. Over time China will certainly
accumulate such potential vis-à-vis the United States and Russia and improve offensive(counterforce) capabilities of its nuclear forces.
The sixth country is France, whose doctrine relies on nuclear deterrence for a wide variety of
purposes, including the first use of nuclear weapons. Yet neither its nuclear forces nor its
geostrategic situation, being a NATO member-state, implies either feasibility or necessity for firstnuclear use.
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Assessing the Modernization of Nuclear Postures
The United Kingdom occupies the last position. The country has debated complete renunciationof nuclear weapons as well as first use. The United Kingdom defines the idea of first use vaguely,
probably deeming it unnecessary but trying to avoid additional political complications with theUnited States and NATO.
Finally, there is Israel and the DPRK, which so far could not fit in the ranking for various reasons.
As was mentioned above, nuclear doctrine has a dual meaning as a political document andoperational plans. Since Israel maintains silence regarding its nuclear arsenal, it cannot have apublic policy on nuclear weapon use. This is the main reason why discussion on the nuclear
doctrine of Israel has to remain speculative. The only possible way to describe the posture isthrough the term of deliberate ambiguity. 50
The DPRK case requires a particular focus. First, despite several official statements on nuclear
weapons purposes,51 this state lacks an official public nuclear doctrine. Second, having accepted
denuclearization as a long-term goal, the DPRK’s leadership has agreed to the possibility ofremoving its nuclear arsenal from its strategic calculations, though in a distant future. Finally, theDPRK continues building regional nuclear warfighting and nuclear inter-continental deterrence
capabilities.52 According to the Japanese official assessment of 2019, the DPRK has miniaturized
nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads. 53 How do these efforts reflect the military
doctrine of the DPRK, and how do they comply with the long-term denuclearization goal? These
questions remain unclear so far.
In sum, the military strategies of most nuclear-weapon states have lowered the threshold for theuse of nuclear weapons.

50 L.R. Beres, “Changing Direction? Updating Israel”s Nuclear Doctrine,” Strategic Assessment, Oct. 2014, vol. 17,

no. 3, p. 94.
51 Ministry of Foreign Affairs DPRK, “DPRK Will Bolster Nuclear Deterrence at Maximum Speed: Foreign Ministry
Spokesman,” 1 May 2017, <http://www.mfa.gov.kp/en/dprk-will-bolster-nuclear-deterrence-at-maximum-speedforeign-ministry-spokesman/>; “Kim Jong Un meets nuclear weapons researchers, guides nukes manufacturing,”
Pyongyang Times, http://www.pyongyangtimes.com.kp/?bbs=21666
52 M.B.D. Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs,” (Congressional Research Service,
Washington: 6 Jun. 2019) p. 2.
53 “Defense of Japan 2019” (Ministry of Defense, Tokyo: 2019) p. 96.

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WMD in Asia-PacificConclusion
The political and expert communities in nuclear-armed states must awake to the fact that, without
progress towards a nuclear-weapons-free world, it will be impossible to curb the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
It is therefore in line with the long-term interests of nuclear-armed states to progress toward ahigher level of transparency of their nuclear doctrines and planning with regard to their strategic
and non-strategic nuclear forces, their condition, and their development plans. This need is
especially crucial in the context of the US-Russia-China relations to realize limitations of theirstrategic offensive arms.

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Nuclear-Capable Missiles

Nuclear-Capable Missiles
Nick Hansen

Introduction
Six countries with nuclear weapons and missiles capable of carrying them (hereafter “nuclear
missiles”) were examined in this study. It is interesting to note the diversity of the missiles in eachcountry and the history of when they acquired each type. Diversity can be explained by where they
are launched from: land, sea (including sub surface) or air, the ranges of the missiles: short to longrange, and the basing mode for land-based missiles: mobile and silo. Many other factors also enterin to these decisions but the major one is the enemy country and its location relative to thepossessing state.
Table 1 shows how these countries planned and deployed nuclear missiles. 1 Compared with two
decades ago, this table now shows a high level of nuclear-missile activity.

1 If the square is blank, it shows the country is not developing this type of missile or its status is unknown.

© 2022 Nick Hansen, CC BY 4.0

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
Table 1: Nuclear-capable missiles in six Indo-Pacific countries 2

United States and Russian Nuclear Missiles
Long-range, nuclear-capable missiles were developed and deployed as an extension of the UnitedStates and Soviet post-World War 2 bomber aircraft and German V-missiles. Throughout the Cold
War they deployed various nuclear-capable missiles in hardened silos and on mobile vehicles,
2 The United States and USSR/Russian strategic bombers have carried nuclear equipped ALCMs for around 40

years.

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Nuclear-Capable Missiles
ballistic missile submarines, and various bomber aircraft. The START treaty (Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty) limited and reduced the numbers of these weapons significantly to what theUnited States and Russia have today. The New START treaty will continue for five years until
February 2026. No other treaty restricts nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pacific region beyond theselimits in two of the six states with nuclear missiles.
The timing, situation between countries, geography, and available technology largely determines
nuclear weapons development. The United States and former Soviet Union were allies during
World War 2 but as they became adversaries, both deployed nuclear weapons in the 1950s. Eachdeveloped tactical and strategic platforms that could deliver nuclear warheads. Tactical weapons
included short- and medium-range missiles to fight a war in Europe and the western Pacific. Longrange missiles were deployed to destroy homeland targets from afar, either from the own homelandor from at sea on submarines.
Both deployed families of inter–continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from the 1950s to the mid1960s. The ICBM was the weapon of choice as bombers became more vulnerable to improving air
defenses. To extend the life of the bomber fleet, standoff cruise missiles that launched outside theadversary’s air defense zone were developed. The bombers with these types of missiles are still
deployed and each state plans to use them until at least the mid-21st century. Both countries
consider their fleet of SSBNs (Submersible Ship Ballistic Missile Nuclear) as the most survivableleg of their respective nuclear triads.
The United States and Russia are in the process of replacing each element of the nuclear triad. Of
the two, Russia is further along. The United States is just getting started. Russia has deployed four
new Borei SSBNs and plans to add another six. These submarines carry a new SLBM, (submarinelaunched ballistic missile), the Bulava. Russia is also replacing its ICBMs with new missiles andhave ordered ten new Tu-160MS bombers and are designing a Tu-PAC stealth bomber.
The United States plans on replacing its 400 silo-based 50-year-old Minuteman 3 ICBMs with the
new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) missile and its Ohio Class SSBNs with Columbia
class SSBNs that will enter service in 2031. The long-range bombers will also be replaced startingin 2025 by a new stealth bomber, the B-21. One hundred of the B-21 bombers have been orderedalong with a new Long Range Stand Off Missile (ALCM).

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WMD in Asia-PacificPeoples Republic of China (PRC)
The PRC tested it first atomic bomb in 1964 and its first ICBM in May 1980. It deployed eighteenof these liquid fuel DF-5 ICBMs that were upgraded in 2015. Over the next 35 years China built
out its nuclear triad with mobile ICBMs and currently deploys six SSBNs with at least seventytwo launch tubes. It has begun to test a next generation of SLBMs and construction of a new classof SSBN to carry it. It also finished building about 100 new H-6K intermediate-range bombers
and began production of the H-6N bomber capable of carrying a variant of the DF-21 ballistic
missile. A new H-20 stealth bomber with an estimated range of 8,500 km is expected to begin
testing in late 2021 or 2022.
The biggest surprise in 2021 was the discovery of over 200 missile silos under construction in thewestern desert for DF-41 solid fuel ICBMs. This discovery and the other additions to the nuclear
triad shows that China may double their nuclear weapons arsenal by 2030—as asserted by the US
Department of Defense.3 This development wouldportend a huge departure from their 30 years ofdeterrence and possibly also their declaratory doctrine of no-first use.
India
India has joined the nuclear triad club late and is now adding modern delivery systems. The
strongest part of their triad is ground-launched ballistic missiles. The nuclear-capable Prithvi 1 and
2 and Agni 1 to 5 missiles are mobile and include short- and intermediate-range weapons with an
ICBM under development. India’s naval SSBN force currently consists of two operational
submarines with two more under construction. The two existing SSBNs have a total of thirty-six
short-range missiles, but some or all of these will be replaced with twelve intermediate-range
missiles in the near future. The aircraft triad piece consists four types of short-range fighterbombers. They mainly carry unguided free fall bombs. However, forty Su-30MKI fighters have

3 “Two decades later, the PLA’s objective is to become a “world-class” military by the end of 2049—a goal firstannounced by General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2017. Although the CCP has not defined what a “world-class” militarymeans, within the context of the PRC’s national strategy it is likely that Beijing will seek to develop a military by
mid-century that is equal to—or in some cases superior to—the U.S. military, or that of any other great power that
the PRC views as a threat.” US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments involving the People’s
Republic of China, 2020, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, at:https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORTFINAL.PDF

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Nuclear-Capable Missiles
been modified to carry the BrahMos supersonic nuclear capable cruise missile. BrahMos missiles
are also launched from ground Transporter, Erector, Launchers (TEL), surface ship, andsubmarines. A hypersonic version of this missile is under development.
India’s large number of short to medium range missiles reflects their primary historical nuclear
adversary was Pakistan. Over the last 20 years, however, China has become a major problem for
India as the two countries have had several skirmishes along India’s northern border with China.
These actions and the fact the China has become Pakistan’s primary arms supplier has probably
driven India to deploy IRBMs and to develop their ICBM.
Pakistan
Since the Partition, Pakistan has viewed India to be its mortal enemy. All Pakistani deployed
missiles were developed with India as their target. Pakistan is also close to developing a nuclear
triad. The ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles are the largest portion of this triad. The
Mirage 3 fighter-bombers can deliver nuclear bombs and some were probably modified to carry
the Ra’ad-1 nuclear-capable cruise missile. The Ra’ad-2 longer-range version is planned to replace
the older version beginning in 2021. The Babur-3 nuclear-capable cruise missile is the submarine
version of missile and was tested at sea in 2017 and 2018. It is possible it will be deployed on thethree current Agosta class submarines and the eight Hangor class submarines ordered from China.
Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK)The DPRK’s nuclear-capable missiles today are land-based and mobile. They are short- tointermediate-range operational missiles, with at least three intercontinental range missiles underdevelopment. September 2021 was a very busy month for testing new missiles. The first of thesewere two long-range ground launched cruise missiles. The DPRK reported these were successful.
Next were three short-range ballistic missiles that were successfully launched from a rail train car.
These were quickly followed by a ground launch what they called the HS-8 hypersonic missile. Its
booster appears to be a one third shorter version of the HS-12 IRBM. Then on 19 October 2021
they launched a short-range missile probably from the submerged Gore submarine and clamed it
was successful.
The DPRK is testing an intermediate-range submarine ballistic missile and modifying a
conventionally powered submarine with three launch tubes for these missiles. This submarine is78

WMD in Asia-Pacificexpected to be in the water in 2021/2022. They may also be building a nuclear powered submarinewith six launch tubes although there is no hard evidence of this intention. The DPRK’s air force
also has at least two types of aircraft that are capable of carrying gravity nuclear bombs. There isno publicly available data, however, to indicate any of them have been modified to carry thesebombs or any nuclear-armed missiles.
DPRK has a very diverse arsenal of missiles. How this came to be is not typical. The DPRK firstacquired Soviet Scud missiles from Egypt, copied them and deployed them against the ROK and
US forces in the ROK. They soon determined there was a market for these missiles in the Mideast
and Pakistan and sold not only the missiles but also the factories to make them. They scaled up thetechnology and produced a longer-range missile that also sold. With time, they established a strong
relationship with Iran and continue to work with them on the latter’s space program.
The DPRK were assisted by Russia or Ukraine to obtain high energy fuel engines. They were also
assisted by China on solid fuel motors and commercial trucks, which they modified into TELs.
The DPRK continues to surprise most experts on what they will do next. But it is self-evident thatthe DPRK’s highest priority is to develop an ICBM that threatens the US mainland.

Missiles in Detail
The nuclear-capable missiles discussed in this chapter are all offensive weapons launched fromsilos, vehicles, surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. They are classified as ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles, and a few are hybrid missiles, mainly the new hypersonic glide vehicles. The
ballistic missiles can have one to four stages, where cruise missiles usually have a booster and asustainer stage. Missiles can have solid fuel motors, liquid fuel engines, or a combination of bothto power them, and Russia is now developing a nuclear engine.
In this chapter, missiles are grouped together by maximum range: Close 50 to 300km, Short 300
to 1,000km, Medium 1,000 to 3,000km, Intermediate 3,000 to 5,500km, and Intercontinental 5,500
to 15,000+km. Submarine and air launched missiles are listed as SLGMs (submarine-launchedguided missiles) and SLBMs and ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles) followed by their ranges.

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The typical ways these ranges are shown are by range rings radiating out from the country orlaunch site. Maps in most media presentations show these rings to compare the various missiles acountry has deployed and the areas they cover. If not updated, these graphics can show bogus
information. For example some DPRK rings maps include the Hwasong-10 (Musudan) IRBM andHwasong-13 (KN-08) ICBM as deployed when they are terminated programs and the Unha 2/3(Taepo Dong-2) as an ICBM when it is a space launch vehicle. Shorter-range missiles usually
carry lower yield nuclear warheads where throw weight is restricted. Longer-range missiles can
carry one large warhead or multiple warheads, some with a post boost vehicle so they can be
independently targeted.
This essay divides missile states into three groups. Group one includes United States, Russia,
People’s Republic of China, and India. These countries all have operational nuclear triads thatconsist of land-based missiles, either in silos and mobile vehicles or both, sea based ballistic or
cruise missiles in nuclear submarines, and airborne cruise missiles or bombs. Group two consistsof countries that have nuclear weapons that are mainly deployed on ground vehicles. These
countries include Pakistan and the DPRK. Group three comprises countries that do not currently
have nuclear weapons but have the capability to produce the warheads and the missiles to carrythem. These countries include Japan, the ROK, and Taiwan. A fourth country, Indonesia, was notincluded because it currently has limited capability to develop nuclear weapons and the missiles
to deliver them. Group one and two countries are discussed in this essay.
If one sorts these countries according to those that are currently missile or missile component
proliferators, one finds that this the list includes China, Russia, and the DPRK. A few of thecountries that received missile-related material are in Group two—Pakistan, India, and the DPRK.
In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, Pakistan received liquid fuel missile technology from the
DPRK and solid fuel technology from China. The DPRK reverse engineered Soviet liquid fuelScud missiles received from Egypt and sold the missiles they made to several Mid-Easterncountries and Pakistan.
Most of the countries with the exception of Pakistan have space launch vehicle (SLV)
programs. The majority started using rockets derived from earlier missile programs; these include
the United States, Russia, China, and India. Japan received early help from the United States. The

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ROK received the Atlas design and manufacturing plant from the United States in 1974, and Russia
provided the first stage for the ROK’s first KSLVs.
All missile and space-launch rocket countries have developed satellites and satellite components.
The most advanced are the Group one countries plus Japan. These are followed by the ROK and
Taiwan. With Chinese help, Pakistan has a modest capability and the go-it-alone DPRK has themost primitive program having launched and orbited two satellites, neither of which became
operational.
In the last few years two new classes of hypersonic weapons have matured and begun deployments.
These are hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) launched by a rocket before gliding to a target andhypersonic cruise missiles powered by high-speed air-breathing engines or scramjets. Russia hasstated they deployed an HGV in December 2019 identified as Avangard aboard two SS-19 ICBMs
and armed them with a nuclear warhead. China also has the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile(MRBM) that reached initial operating capability (IOC) in 2019 and is a DF-ZF HGVs mounted
on a DF-16 ballistic missile. They have reportedly not decided if these weapons, once they are
deployed, will be nuclear- or conventional-armed or dual-capable. The United States has indevelopment at least four hypersonic missiles but has not decided to deploy any of them yet. As
of mid-2010 they have made decisions these hypersonic weapons would only be conventionallyarmed. India also has a hypersonic cruise missile under development with help from Russia. The
DPRK had their first launch of a hypersonic missile in September 2021.
United States of America
In the 1950s, the United States deployed both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons systems
consisting of surface-to-surface missiles, submarine-launched missiles and air-launched missiles
from bomber aircraft. In the 1960s and 70s the US nuclear triad consisted of 1000 Minuteman 1
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), forty-one George Washington class submarines eachcarrying 16 Polaris SLBMs with single warheads, and B-52 heavy bombers.
Due to the various Strategic Arms Treaties with the USSR/Russia, the United States reduced its
nuclear capable weapons today to 400 silo-based Minuteman 3 ICBMs with one warhead, 44 Fifty Minuteman silos are reportedly unmanned and on warm standby—that is, can be quickly made operational.

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fourteen Ohio class submarines each armed with 20 Trident 2 D5 missiles 5 with up to ten
warheads but normally these missiles carry only four today; and 20 B-B-2A and 46 B-52H 6
nuclear-capable bombers. The B-2As are only authorized to carry nuclear gravity bombs whereas
each B-52H may be loaded with up to twenty nuclear-capable ALCMs (AGM-86B cruise
missiles). The B-52s are no longer are authorized to carry nuclear gravity bombs. The 62 B-1
heavy bombers in service today have not been nuclear capable since 2007 when their nuclear
capability was disabled for START treaty compliance.
The New START Treaty went into force in 2011 and was set to expire 5 February 2021. On thatdate the United States and Russia agreed to extend this treaty until 5 February 2026. On February
5, 2018, both the United States and Russia announced they had met the New START limitations,which limits the number of nuclear warheads and launch systems for long-range nuclear capable
weapons as of March 2019 to the following:• number of nuclear warheads - 1,550, United States 1,365, Russia 1,461• deployed long-range delivery vehicles-700, United States 656, Russia 524• deployed and non-deployed launchers and delivery vehicles: United States 800, Russia 760
With the exception of the nuclear gravity bombs carried on the 20 B-2 bombers all the other US
warheads are carried by missile systems.
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles, Land Based
The only operational ICBMs today are the 400 Minuteman 3 missiles deployed at Malmstrom Air
Force Base (AFB), Montana, Minot AFB, North Dakota, and F.E.Warren AFB, Wyoming. The
three-stage solid fuel missile is 18m in length and 1.67m in diameter and has a range of 9700
kilometers plus. The first of these missiles was loaded in an operational silo in April 1970 and had
three re-entry vehicles (RV). With the START 2 treaty these missiles were De-MIRVed to one RV
5 Four of the 18 Ohio Class SSBNs were converted between 2002 and 2006 to SSGNs and no longer are nuclear

capable. Each can carry up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles. In addition four of the missile tubes on the remaining
fourteen Ohio class SSBNs were deactivated in 2011 In anticipation of the New START treaty for a total of fifty-six
launch tubes no longer nuclear capable.
6 Eighteen B-52H are in reserve and 12 more are in long-term storage. The B52H bombers are starting a big upgradeby getting new engines and electronics that will keep them in service into the2050s. See "Rapid Fire, AgelessBomber," The American Legion Magazine, November 2021, p 56.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificstarting in 1996. Today the 400 deployed Minuteman 3 missiles continue to have only a single
warhead. Currently four to five Minuteman 3 missiles are tested from Vandenberg AFB each year
to a mid-Pacific impact area located at Kwajalein. For the remaining about ten plus years that
Minuteman 3 will be operational, the yearly launch rate will fall to two to three per year becauseof a dwindling supply of these missiles.
The United States Air Force is in the early phase of replacing the 400 Minuteman 3 ICBMs. The
program is identified as the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). It includes a new missile
and much of the ground-based infrastructure at the three existing Minuteman missile bases. The
Minuteman 3 system will be well over 60 years old in 2027-29 when the GBSD begins
deployment.
The GBSD missile is in development and will consist of three solid fuel stages and is planned tocarry a single RV with a W87 Mod 0 nuclear warhead. The current plan is to produce 642 missiles
to replace the 400 deployed Minuteman 3 missiles. The other 242 missiles are for flight tests andspares to be used over the 50-year lifetime of the GBSD. Due to the change of administrations in
2021 these dates and numbers may change. 7
SLBMs
To be compliant with the New START Treaty the Navy reduced the number of Trident 2 D5LE 8(UGM-133) missiles carried by each of the fourteen Ohio Class SSBNs from twenty-four totwenty. Currently there are total of 280 Trident 2 D5LE missiles operational in the United States
Navy and sixty-four in the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy. Each US missile now has a single
nuclear warhead, but when first deployed they had three MIRV warheads. This Trident 2 D5
missile was first tested in January 1987 from a flat pad at the Cape Canaveral Air Force Stationand first launched from a submarine in March 1989. Its first deployment took place in 1990. The
missile is 13.58m long and 2.11m in diameter. Its stated range is 12,000km (7,500mi), but its exact
range is classified.

7 John A. Tirpak, “New GBSD To Fly in 2023; No Margin Left for Minuteman - Air Force Magazine,” Air Force

Magazine, June 14, 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/new-gbsd-will-fly-in-2023-no-margin-left-forminuteman/
8 “Reduce the Number of Ballistic Missile Submarines,” Congressional Budget Office, November 13, 2013,https://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2013/44770

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Currently eight Ohio Class SSBNs are based at Naval Base Kitsap, Washington State, and six arebases at Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia. Two of the converted Ohio-Class SSGNs are
based at both of these bases. These SSGNs are each loaded with 154 Tomahawk BGM-109 cruise
missiles that are not nuclear-capable.
The Columbia-Class SSBN program, the replacement for the Ohio-Class SSBN, is under way. The
first will enter service in 2031. The current plan is to deliver one of these submarines per year withall twelve to be completed by 2042 and remain in service until 2085.
The new submarines contain sixteen missile tubes for a total of 192 Trident 2 D5LE (Life
Extension) missiles with each planned to carry four9 warheads. This is the same missile carried by
the Ohio class SSBNs today. The first of these missiles went into service in 1990 on the Ohio classsubmarines. Life extensions are planned to remain in service on the Columbia Class until 2042.
The missiles will have about a 50-year lifetime. There is no information on a replacement missile
system at this time.10
ALCMs carried by Long-Range Bombers
The United States currently operates two types of nuclear-capable strategic bombers. These are
the 70 year old B-52H Stratofortress models and the newer 30 year old stealth B-2 Spirits. The 20
B-2 bombers are now only authorized to carry nuclear gravity bombs. The United States also
operates a third long-range bomber, the B-1 Lancer, that since 2007 is no longer nuclear-capable.
Sixty two of these bombers are currently in service.
There are fifty-eight B-52H bombers in service with eighteen in reserve and twelve more in longterm storage. The B-52H bombers are equipped to carry up to twenty nuclear capable AGM-86B
Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM). The aircraft are no longer authorized to carry nuclear

9 Correction made by author on March 24, 2022. The original sentence said ‘single’ instead of ‘four’ warheads.
10 Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues

for Congress” (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 30 June 2021); “Columbia-Class Submarine,”
Wikipedia, accessed September 6, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Columbiaclass_submarine&oldid=1042774524; Huntington Ingalls Industries, “Huntington Ingalls Industries Awarded
Contract for Construction of First Two Columbia-Class Submarine Modules,” Huntington Ingalls Newsroom,
November 23, 2020, https://newsroom.huntingtoningalls.com/releases/huntington-ingalls-industries-awardedcontract-for-construction-of-first-two-columbia-class-submarine-modules; “Columbia Class,” General Dynamics
Electric Boat, accessed September 7, 2021, http://www.gdeb.com/about/oursubmarines/columbia/

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WMD in Asia-Pacificgravity bombs. The AGM-86B has been in the inventory since 1982 and 1715 were produced. The
missile is 6.3m in length and 620mm in diameter. It is subsonic at 890km/h and has a nominal
range of 1,100km (680mi).11
The US Air Force (USAF) plans to replace the AGM-86B with a new cruise missile, the Long
Range Stand off (LRSO) AGM-181. This missile will be capable of being armed with either
nuclear or conventional warheads. The USAF awarded a contract on 1 July 2021 for engineeringand manufacturing development that, with options, could be valued at about $2 billion. The
AGM181 would be deployed on B-52H, B-2, and the new B21 bombers late in the decade. The B21s will be based at three existing bomber bases: Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota; Whiteman AFB,
Missouri; and Dyess AFB, Texas. 12
The B-21 Raider is the new intercontinental stealth bomber that will enter service in 2025 and will
replace some or all of the B-52H, B-1, and B-2 bombers. The initial order is for 100 B-21s, withpossible future orders. The aircraft will be able to deliver conventional and nuclear weapons. It isalso possible that the AGM-183A Hypersonic Glide Vehicle would also be carried on the B-21
bombers. The first B-52H is currently going through integration for the AGM-183A missile. The
B-21s will be based at three existing bomber bases, listed above. Like the Minuteman replacement
program, the numbers of the LRSO/AGM-181 and AGM-183A missiles and B-21 bombers may
be cut back by the 2021 administration. 13
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles
The US Department of Defense (DOD) has at least three Hypersonic Glide Vehicles currently
under development. These are Air Force, AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response weapon;
Army, Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (RHW); and Navy, Intermediate Range Conventional

11 Missile Defense Project, “AGM-86 Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM),” Center for Strategic and International

Studies, last modified July 31, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/alcm/
12 O. Pawlyk, “The Air Force is discussing plans to house its new B-21 stealth bombers,” Military.com , January 15 2021,
at:https://www.businessinsider.com/air-force-discusses-building-hangar-for-future-b21-stealth-bomber-20211?r=AU&IR=T
13 “B-21 Raider,” U.S. Air Force, July 6, 2021, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/2682973/b21-raider/85

Nuclear-Capable Missiles
Prompt Strike (IRCPS). In addition DARPA is doing research on the Hypersonic Technology
Vehicle-2.14
All are designed to carry conventional warheads to ranges of 1,500-3,000 nautical miles (nm).
According to official DOD statements none are planned to fly greater that 3,000nm or be armed
with nuclear weapons. The Army and Navy have combined their programs. The Army plans to
deploy it’s first battery in Fy2023. The Navy’s program will come online two years later. The B52 and the future B-21 bombers would probably carry the AGM-183A if it were deployed. Flighttesting has begun and an early operational capability is now planned for late FY 2022. 15
Russian Federation (Russia)
The former Soviet Union (USSR) deployed its nuclear triad in the 1950/60s on a pace with theUnited States. By the end of the Cold War, all elements of the now Russian triad had been upgradedwith new launchers, missiles, and support equipment. After signing the various arms control
agreements with the United States, one class of missiles were eliminated (IRBMs) and limits on
strategic weapons (ICBMs), SLBMs, and long-range bombers were put into place. As the Cold
War ended and Soviet Union broke apart, US-Soviet era arms control treaties were continued with
Russia. The strategic weapons Russia inherited from the USSR became the treaty-counted
weapons. Many of these are still deployed and operational today.
ICBMs
Russia is upgrading and replacing much of the older Soviet nuclear weapon systems anddeveloping unique new weapons. New START is the last remaining nuclear treaty between thetwo countries, and Russia and the United States agreed to extend it for five years until 5 February
2026.
The USSR deployed its first ICBM in 1957 and development of these missiles continues with
Russia.

14 Steve Trimble, “ARRW Revealed,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 26, 2021.
15 “U.S. Hypersonic Missile Upgrade Concepts Are Now Advancing,” Aviation Week Network, July 16, 2021,

https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/us-hypersonic-missile-upgrade-concepts-arenow-advancing

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Table 2: Russia’s ICBMs Currently Deployed
Missile16

Status

SS-18/Satan

46 Heavy ICBM operational in silos

SS-19/Stiletto

2 operational silos with the Avangard WH

SS-25/Topol

36 operational, mobile being phased out

SS-27/Topol-M1

78 operational mobile,

SS-29/Sarmat

Heavy ICBM being deployed, replaces the SS-18

The Soviets/Russians developed and tested sixteen ICBM missile systems since 1957 anddeployed thirteen of them. Of the deployed systems, four are in service in 2020 and one is being
installed. This number does not include the many variants of most of the deployed systems

SS-18 Mod-6
The liquid fuel SS-18 Satan, considered a heavy ICBM, replaced the SS-9. It was deployed in SS9 silos in 1974 and it has appeared in six variants with only the single warhead Mod 6 deployed
today. The initial operational capability was in 1975. As of 2020, Russia has forty-six SS-18 Mod6 missiles operational and the SS-29 Sarmat is replacing them at the Dombarovsky Air Base and
the Guards Rocket Army at Uzhur
SS-19M4 with the Avangard HGVs
Of the nearly 400 SS-19 missiles that were deployed in the 1980s, twenty remained in service in2016 and two SS-19M4s were in service in 2020. These two were located at the Dombarovsky
ICBM site with Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV) warheads. It was reported that twelve
Avangard would be deployed using the SS-19M4 booster until the Sarmat heavy ICBMs are

16 These missile names and designated numbers are those given by Western intelligence agencies and are notthose used by the Soviet military.

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deployed. The Avangard HGV was one of the new weapons released by President Putin in his
February 2018 speech.17
SS-25 Topol, RS-12M
This missile is identified as Sickle by the United States and has a Russian program name RT-2P.
The SS-25 Topol is a three-stage solid fuel mobile ICBM with a single warhead. At its high point,
400 of the SS-25 missiles were deployed. About thirty-six of the SS-25 missiles were reportedly
deployed in early 2020 and will be phased out in two to three years. Currently the SS-27M1 andSS-29M2 missiles are replacing them.
SS-27 Topol-M, RS-12M1 mobile and RS-12M1 siloThis missile has been named Sickle B by the United States and has a Russian program name RT2PM2. The SS-27 appears to be an improved SS-25 and was deployed in a mobile version as Mod
1 and Mod 2 silo version. Only eighteen Mod 1s were deployed at the Teykovo ICBM Base andsixty mod 2s at the Tatishchevo missile site. The Russians announced in 2009 that production of
the SS-27 missiles was complete. It is probable that no more will be deployed. This limited
deployment may have been in response to the launcher limits of the New START treaty. 18
SS-27 Mod 2, RS-24 (Yars) mobile and silo versions
The Yars RS-24 was identified by the USAF National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC)
as similar to the SS-27 Mod-1 and not a new missile as claimed by Russia. The United States
identifies it as the SS-27 Mod2. However, Russia has said it is a new missile and should be
identified as such. In addition, a rail-transported version of the missile identified as RS 24 BZhRK
Barguzin, designated the SS-X-32, was under development. Because of lack of funds, however,
Barguzin development was frozen in December 2027.19
SS-X-31 Frontier, RS-26 Rubezh, (Avangard booster)17 Missile Defense Project, “Avangard,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified July 31, 2021,

https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/avangard/
18 Missile Defense Project, “RT-2PM2 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1 “Sickle B”),” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, last modified August 2, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-27/
19 Missile Defense Project, “RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2),” Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified
August 12, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/rs-24/

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
The RS-26 is a two-stage missile with upgraded Yars first and second stages. The United States
claims that it replaces the SS-20 IRBM eliminated by the INF treaty and can only fly to theminimum ICBM range with a light or no warhead. Its first test from Pletesk on 27 September 2011
failed. But on its second test on 23 May 2012, it flew 5,800 km to the Kura impact site on
Kamchatka. Three additional tests on 24 October 2012, 6 June 2013, and 18 March 2015 flew
200km from Kapustin Yar to the Sary Shagan impact area.
The SS-X-31 missile is estimated to be 12m long and 1.8m in diameter. On 22 March 2018 Tass
reported all work on Rubezh had been put on hold until the end of 2027. Work on the Avangard
HGV would continue for deployment on other booster rockets. 20
SS-29 (Satan 2), RS-28 (Sarmat) Heavy ICBMThe SS-29 is the replacement for the more than 30 year old SS-18 Satan heavy ICBM. Russian
officials state that the missile with begin serial production in 2020 and enter service in 2021, adelay of five or six years from the initial first service 2016 date. The missiles will be deployed at
the two remaining SS-18 sites, the Dombarovsky Air Base and the Guards Rocket Army at Uzhur,
and will be deployed in modified SS-18 silos. The SS-29 is a two-stage rocket, 35.5m long and
3m in diameter. The maximum range is 18,000km with ten MIRVs. Avangard HGVs are alsoplanned to be warheads for SS-29 booster rockets. Russia also has more than 120 SS-18 and SS19 non-deployed missile silos that are preserved for future potential new ICBMs.21
Russian SLBMs
At the end of the Cold War in 1991, Russia inherited sixty-two SSBNs with 940 launch tubes
compared to the United States with thirty-four SSBNs and 632 missiles, as a result of the STARTand then New START treaties. As of late 2020 Russia has eleven operational SSBNs with 180
missiles. They also have four project 955A Borei-2 submarines deployed and plans for at least two
more. These will replace the remaining Delta-3 and 4 submarines. They have also retained one
Typhoon Program 941UM SSBN as a Bulava SLBM test submarine.

20 Missile Defense Project, “RS-26 Rubezh,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified July 31,

2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-x-31-rs-26-rubezh/
21 Missile Defense Project, “RS-28 Sarmat,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 17, 2017, lastmodified July 31, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/rs-28-sarmat/

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There are three types of SLBMs currently operational in the Russian Navy. The oldest is the liquid
fuel SS-N-18 Stingray on one Delta-3 submarine in the Pacific Fleet. The SS-N-18 missile will be
replaced in one or two years by the solid fuel Bulava SS-N-30 when the next Borei SSBN arrives
in the Pacific. There are 6 Delta-4 SSBNs operational on the North Fleet and each carries sixteen
liquid fueled Skif SS-N-23 SLBMs for a total of ninety-six launch tubes. The North and PacificFleets currently each have two Borei class SSBNs. The North Fleet has one Borei with sixteen
launch tubes and a Borei-2 with twenty tubes. It is probable that the Northern Fleet will get at least
four more Borei-2 submarines and the Pacific Fleet at least two more.
SS-N-32 RSM-56 Bulava SLBMThe RSM-52 Bulava SS-N-32 missile is the third solid propellant SLBM deployed by the RussianNavy and it appears to be a distant relative of the Topal M SS-27. The one remaining Typhoon,
Dmitriy Donskoy, was modified from 1990 to June 2002 to be the test submarine for the Bulava
SS-N-32 missile. It had twenty launch tubes, one of which was fitted with a Bulava launcher forthe new missile.
The Bulava missile is a three-stage missile with stages one and two solid fuel and stage threeliquid. It is 12.1m long and 2m in diameter. It carries six to ten warheads and has a range of 8,000
to 10,000km. First stage tests were completed in late 2004, and tests from the Dmitriy Donskoy
began in 2005. These tests into 2009 had six failures in thirteen flights. Tests were then put on
hold until October 2010. In June 2011 the first test from a Borei submarine took place. Because of
failures more testing took place. The Russian Navy finally accepted the missile into service in June
2019. Its range is greater than 9,000km.22
Kanyon weapons systems, Poseidon/Status-6/ Skif seabed-launched variant
Kanyon has been referred to as a “new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered undersea
autonomous torpedo.” Not a true missile, it is not covered by the New START Treaty. The firstmention of this weapon was on Russian television in 2015, and President Putin highlighted it in
his February 2018 national address. The weapon was estimated to be capable of traveling

22 Missile Defense Project, “RSM-56 Bulava (SS-N-32),” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 10,

2016, last modified August 2, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-32-bulava/

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WMD in Asia-Pacificthousands of nautical miles at about 70-100 knots at depths of 1,000m. It has been designed to bea strategic weapon to destroy naval bases, ports, and coastal cities with a two-megaton nuclear
warhead detonated under water. Estimates are Kanyon will become operational in the late 2020s.
The torpedo is 24m in length and 1.6m in diameter. Underwater testing was reported to have begun
in December 2018, but systems tests could have started in 2016. The massive torpedo will becapable of being launched from the Sarov test submarine, the Khabarovsk class of operational
submarines, the Belgorod special mission submarine (crewed but not controlled by the RussianNavy), and possibly from launchers emplaced on the seabed. 23
Sarov B-90 Test Submarine
Construction of the test submarine Sarov B-90 began in Nyhny Novgorod in 1988 as a Kilo classconventional powered attack submarine but was stopped because of funding in 1998 when it was
40 percent complete. It was moved via the inland waterway to the Sermash shipyard in
Severodvinsk sometime around 2003 and construction resumed. It was renamed Sarov B090. It
was heavily modified with a nuclear electric power plant and a single large torpedo tube about
25m long 2m in diameter in the bow. It was accepted into Navy service in August 2008. Tests of
the Status 6 torpedo started at least by September 2009 in the White Sea.24
Belgorod SSN
The second unit that carries the Status 6/Skif nuclear torpedo is the afore-mentioned Belgorod
Project 09852 Special Mission Submarine. The Belgorod was an unfinished Oscar-2 SSGN thathas been extensively modified starting in 2012 and finally launched in April 2019 from theSermash shipyard. The Belgorod is manned by the Navy but operated under the Main Directorate
Deep Sea Research (GUGI). GUGI’s main missions are underwater intelligence and placement of
weapons and sensors on the sea floor. The Belgorod is reported to be the longest submarine the

23 Charlie Gao, “Russia’s Deadly Status-6 Nuclear Torpedo: 1 Fact You May Not Know,” The National Interest,

March 2, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia%E2%80%99s-deadly-status-6-nuclear-torpedo-1-factyou-may-not-know-46002; H.I. Sutton, “Analysis - Russian Status-6 Aka KANYON Nuclear Deterrence and Pr 09851
Submarine,” Covert Shores, December 19, 2016, http://www.hisutton.com/Analysis%20-%20Russian%20Status6%20aka%20KANYON%20nuclear%20deterrence%20 and%20Pr% 2009851%20submarine.html
24 “Russian Submarine Sarov (B-90),” Wikipedia, last modified May 29, 2021,
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Russian_submarine_Sarov_(B-90)&oldid=1025823327

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world. It entered the White Sen in June 2021 to start sea trials and could be delivered to the
GUGI/Navy probably in 2022. 25
Khabarovsk SSNs
The first of a new Khabarovsk Class, Project 09851, SSNs is planned to be launched in the fall of
2021 from the Sermash shipyard. 26 Work started on this submarine in 2014 and three more arereportedly to be built. The second of these is reported to be under construction. These submarines
are based on the design of the Borei class SSBNs minus the section that carries the ballistic
missiles. Like the Belgorod it will carry six of the Status 6 nuclear torpedoes mounted in the bow.
If all four of these submarines are built, then two will likely be delivered to both the Northern andPacific fleets.
Seabed based Status 6/Skif launched variant
A question that needs to be answered is why was the Belgorod modified to carry the Status 6
nuclear inter-continental torpedoes? Russia already had the Sarov test submarine and the first ofoperational Khabarovsk Class submarines that will carry six of the Status 6 torpedoes will belaunched in the fall of 2021.
Where does the very expensive Belgorod that does not report to the Navy and has several othermissions fit? One of the possibilities is a test sub for the procedures to handle and load the six
torpedoes for crews that will man the Khabarovsk subs. A second possibility is the Belgorod hadspace for these weapons and made it available to the Navy so there would be six more weapons in
the Northern fleet. Although possible, neither of these possibilities is realistic because the Navy
does not operate the Belgorod and the submarine will have other very sensitive missions, such as
cable tapping, installing underwater sensors, and sonar imaging foreign targets.

25 H.I. Sutton, “New Details of Russian Belgorod “Doomsday” Submarine Revealed,” USNI News, February 25, 2021,

https://news.usni.org/2021/02/25/new-details-of-russian-belgorod-doomsday-submarine-revealed
26 Xavier Vavasseur, “Russia’s Khabarovsk Submarine to Be Launched in Fall 2021,” Naval News (blog), April 19,
2021, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2021/04/russias-khabarovsk-submarine-to-be-launched-in-fall2021/

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Skif version of Status-6 launcher on the seabed
A few reports mentioned a seabed-based Skif version of the Status 6 torpedo, but it is not known
if this variant exists. If it does, that would explain perhaps that the Belgorod and GUGI would be
involved. Belgorod could be the delivery means to place the Skif torpedoes in their protective
enclosures undetected on the seabed and probably under the ice during winter. The Skif system
would need reliable, secure, and redundant communication links to send status and local
surveillance data back to the onshore command authorities. That authority would require returnlinks to update targeting data and issue launch orders.
A ready-made communication system that will exist in the Arctic is the Russian project Harmony
underwater listening system. To power the Harmony sensors, GUGI has developed small nuclearpowered electrical generators that also sit on the seafloor. These generators could also power the
Skif launchers. Harmony already has all the facilities needed to support the Skif system including
providing surveillance of the specific Skif deployment area and the surrounding sea. 27
ALCMs carried by Russian Long-Range Bombers
Tu-160MS Blackhawk Bombers
Russia has two long-range bombers, the 40 year old Tu-95MS Bear H and the 30 plus year old Tu160MS Blackhawk (Russian name White Swan). Production of the Tu-160MS began in 1981 andthirty-six bombers were produced through 1987. At the fall of the USSR, Russia had seventeen
and the Ukraine had nineteen of the bombers. They returned eight to Russia and elevyn were
scrapped. A new Tu-160MS was assembled from leftover parts and delivered to the Air Force in2017, and there was a further order for 10 aircraft that are under construction. Of the remaining
Tu-160MS, as of March 2020, sixteen were included in the bomber count for the New START
treaty.28

27 Garmoniya/Harmony - RUSOSUS, GlobalSecurity.org,

https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/russia/harmony.htm
28 “Tupolev Tu-160,” Wikipedia, accessed August 23, 2021,
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Tupolev_Tu-160&oldid=1040318700

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Tu-95MS Bear H Bombers
The Tu-95MS was based on the design of the 1950s Tu-95A/B and modified with new engines
and electronics. Construction began in 1981 and it entered service in 1987. A production run of
sixty-five to seventy of these bombers ended in the late 1980s. Sixty-three were counted in 2010
for the New START Treaty and fifty-five are in service as of 2020. Modernization of these
airplanes has continued. The Tu-95MS are planned to remain in service until 2050s as an engine
replacement program and new electronics installation are underway.
Stealth Bomber Tu-PAC DA nearing testingRussia also has under construction a Tupolev PAC DA stealth strategic bomber prototype.
Planning for the aircraft began in 2009, and building of the prototype began early 2020 to becompleted in 2021. If successful this aircraft would be built in small numbers and not enter service
until the late 2020s.29
Kh-101/102 Raduga stealth cruise missile
The Tu-95MS and Tu-160MS bombers are being configured to carry the Kh-101 (conventional
warhead)/102 (nuclear warhead) ALCMs. The Tu-95MS can carry eight missiles on under wingpylons and the Tu-160 can carry twelve missiles internally. These missiles are replacing the Kh15SM Granet/AS-15 Kent that has been in service since 1984 are still carried on the bombers thathave not yet been upgraded.
The Kh-101/102 has a range of 4,500-5,500km and a speed of 900km/h. These missiles are
subsonic, fly a low altitude profile (30-70m off the ground), and can receive updated target
information while on-route. The Kh-102 is a standoff nuclear missile for the Russian strategic
bombers. The Kh-101/102 entered service in 2012.
An improved version of the Kh-101/102 identified as the Kh-BD is set to enter service on the Tu160MS bombers in 2020. Its range has been extended out to 6,000 to 7,000 km. 30

29 Kris Osborn, “PAK DA: Russia’s Mysterious Stealth Bomber Is Coming,” The National Interest, July 20, 2021,

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/pak-da-russias-mysterious-stealth-bomber-coming-190021
30 Douglas Barrie, “Kh-101 Missile Test Highlights Russian Bomber Firepower,” IISS (blog), February 8, 2019,https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2019/02/russian-bomber-firepower

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Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM)
One of the new weapons President Putin called a strategic missile in his 1 March 2018 state of thenation address was the nuclear-capable Kinzhal ALBM. The Kinzhal, one of the new hypersonicglide vehicles (HGV), is 8m long and 1m in diameter. It is based on the Iskander short-range
ground launched missile. The Kinzhal entered service in December 2017 and has been launchedby Mig-31K long-range fighter aircraft and Tu-22M3M medium range bombers. These aircraft are
flown by the Russian Aerospace Force (VKS). In 2016 the VKS planned to upgrade 30 their 60
operational Tu-22M3 bombers to the M3M variant to carry 4 Kinzhal missiles.
The Tu-22M3M has a range of 7,000km and the Kinzhal, when launched from that aircraft, has astated range of 3,000km. The New START Treaty does not cover the Tu-22 M3M and the Kinzhal
Kh-47M2 missile, yet they could hit nearly all US targets and have become a major concern to theUnited States. As of mid 2020 there is no evidence the Russians plan to put these missiles on theirinter-continental Tu-160MS or Tu-95MS bombers any time soon.31
New ground/surface ship-launched missiles
9M730 Burevestnik/SSC-X-9 SkyFall nuclear powered nuclear armed cruise missile
The Burevestnik missile is 12m in length including its 3m-booster solid rocket, needed for launch.
The booster is dropped after it is expended and the missile continues using its nuclear power plant.
For testing it is launched from a permanent rail, hydraulically elevated at about 45 degrees. The
missile is probably subsonic, flies at low altitude on an unpredictable track, and has an unlimited
range.
The testing history of this missile is not well known. The US initially identified this missile as the
KY-30. The KY identifies some phase of the program was tested at Kapustin Yar. This may havebeen airframe and launcher testing without the small nuclear power reactor. The 9M730
Burevestnik program, starting in 2014, built a major test complex at Kapustin Yar that was
operational by mid 2016. Consisting of a launch pad with a permanent rail launcher, a pad support
area that normally has ten green painted van trailers and a 36m X 16m bunker. Four hundred and

31 Missile Defense Project, “Kinzhal,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 27, 2018, last modified

July 31, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kinzhal/

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twenty-five meters directly in front of the launch pad is a large triangular bermed impact area for
testing the booster rockets used at launch. The movable shelter that encloses the launch rail andmissile was in place by July 2017 indicating full missile tests could take place. The only evidence
tests may have taken place at this time is the activity inside the bermed impact area.
Testing then appears to have moved to the Arctic on Novaya Zemlya at a small isolated site
identified as Pan’Koro. This launce site was built in a remote area from 2013 to 2016. The tests
were conducted from a concrete pad with an environmental shelter that moved on tracks forward
before the test. Four tests were reported between November 2017 and February 2018, all of which
failed after take off. The November 2017 test flew for two minutes and went 22 miles (35.4km)
before it failed, but it was assessed as a partial success.
On his 1 March 2018 state of the nation speech President Putin included the 9M730 Burevestnik
missile. Sometime in 2018 or early 2019 testing shifted to a launch pad at the Nyonoska/Nenoska
Missile Test Range on the shore of the White Sea. The pad had been used to test naval ballistic
missiles and the launch tube was removed by 2016. The new launch pad was probably completein late 2017 and was similar to pads at Kapustin Yar and Pan’Koro. The launch azimuth is 90
degrees over the White Sea. The first test from this pad may have been in mid 2018 and it was alaunch failure. An explosion of a Burevestnik missile on 8 August 2019 occurred during an
underwater recovery operation that killed seven people. Reports on the explosion stated the missile
had been under water for about one year. That was probably the missile from the launch failure in
mid 2018. No further tests from Nenoska have been reported.
On 29 January 2019 it was reported a Burevestnik missile was launched from Kapustin Yar and it
was considered a partial success. Also noted was this was the first launch in nearly a year. There
have been thirteen reported launches of the Burevestnik missile. Two were considered to be partial
successes. If tests continue and the results improve, a decision could be made to deploy the
Burevestnik missile. Recent 2020 activity at the Pan’Koro test area indicates the program may beready for more testing. Any deployment probably would not occur until the late in this decade. 32

32 Thomas Newdick, “It Looks Like Russia’s Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Test Program Is Back In Business,” The

Drive (blog), October 21, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37191/it-looks-like-russias-nuclearpowered-cruise-missile-test-program-is-back-in-business

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
3M22 Tsirkon (Zircon)/SS-N-33 ship/submarine-launched hypersonic cruise missile
The Tsirkon hypersonic missile is in the late stage of its development and is expected to become
operational in 2023. Tsirkon was developed as an anti-ship missile and is launched from the 3S14 vertical launch systems from several classes of Russian Navy ships and can also be launchedfrom the new Yasen-class submarines. Tsirkon also has the capability to attack ground targets. On
24 December 2019 President Putin said a land-based version of this missile was being developed,
probably to replace the old anti-ship missiles that are deployed. There is a report that the Tsirkon
is nuclear capable.
Testing may have begun from a Tu-22M3 supersonic bomber in 2012/13. This may have been to
test the scramjet. In 2015 testing from a ground platform took place—probably to integrate themissile with its booster. Its first success was reported in 2016. Testing continued with a launch in
April 2017 when it attained the speed of Mach 8. Further tests took place in June 2017 andDecember 2018. The first tests that used a naval ship were successfully launched from the Admiral
Gorshkov in early January 2020 while in the Barents Sea, to a target in the Northern Urals at a
distance of 500km. The Gorshkov was again used for a test on 7 October 2020 from the White Sea
when, for the first time, it destroyed a naval target in the Barents Sea at a 450km range. The latest
test was also from the Admiral Gorshkov in the White Sea to a target in the Barents Sea 350km
away. It took place on 19 July 2021 and was successful.
The Tsirkon missile is 10-12m in length. It uses a solid fuel booster rocket to get it supersonic so
the liquid fuel scramjet engine can start. The missile’s range is 1000km, and it flies at an altitudeof 28-29km and at speeds on Mach 8-9. Its warhead weight is 300-400kg. It is noteworthy thatIndia announced they would use the same scramjet Zircon technology for their joint hypersonicmissile, BrahMos-2.33

33 Mark Episkopos, “Russia’s Tsirkon Hypersonic Missile Keeps Inching Closer to Reality,” The National Interest (blog),

February 2, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia%E2%80%99s-tsirkon-hypersonic-missile-keepsinching-closer-reality-177512

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People’s Republic Of China (PRC)
The PRC is not party to arms control treaties and therefore is not treaty-limited to the numbers of
warheads or types of launchers they can build and deploy. Thus, the PRC was free to announce
that it plans to double its strategic nuclear arsenal by 2030. In mid 2021 two new bases for silolaunched DF-41 ICBMs were identified under construction in the western desert. The first locatednear Yumen with 120 silos and the second 380km northeast of Yumen at Hami with 110 silos, inaddition fourteen training silos were reported at the Jilastal training area.
The PRC already reached a goal of achieving its triad with the deployment of the Type-094 type
SSBN that carries the JL-2 ICBM. Currently six of these submarines are operational with twoentering service in 2020. The land-based component of the triad currently consists of the following
ICBMs: twenty 1970 vintage DF-5 silo based missiles, about tenty-five DF-31 mobile missiles,
and thirty to forty DF-41 road mobile missiles. The strategic bomber fleet consists of about 160
H-6s, a greatly upgraded variant of the 1950s Soviet Tu-16. Under development is the PRC’s first
dedicated strategic bomber, the stealth H-20. Although some reports indicated that it was to be
displayed to the media in November 2020, in fact it was not. It is unlikely to enter service until thelate 2020s.34
Chinese SLBMs
JL-1 SLBM/CSS-N-3
The PRC’s first attempt at a Chinese SSBN was one Type-092 SSBN Xia Class carrying twelve
Jl-1 ballistic missiles. The submarine was commissioned in 1987 but had numerous problems andconducted one patrol inside Chinese regional waters. The submarine is probably no longer
operational. The JL-1/CSS-N-3 is a two-stage solid fuel missile with a range of 1,700km. It is a
close relative to the DS-21 MRBM.

34 Kris Osborn, “China’s New H-20 Stealth Bomber to Arrive This Year,” The National Interest (blog), July 21, 2021,

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-new-h-20-stealth-bomber-arrive-year-190085

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WMD in Asia-PacificJL-2 SLBM /CSS-N-14
Six Type-94 Jin-Class SSBN each carrying twelve JL-2 ICBM range missiles are operational. The
first submarine was commissioned in 2010 and the sixth in 2020. The six Type-94 SSBNs are allbased at the Sanya Submarine base on the southern tip of Hainan Island.
The JL-2/CSS-N-14 is a two-stage solid fuel missile with a range of 8,000-9,000km. It is a close
relative to the DF-31 ICBM. Its test program is similar the CSS-N-3, probably with shore launches
in the mid 1980s and the first test from the Golf SSB in 2001/02. The first successful launch froma Type-94 SSBN was in 2009. The missile is 13m in length, 2m in diameter and can carry a 1
megaton RV or 3-8 MIRVs.35
JL-3 SLBM/CSS-N-?
The JL-3 missile testing began before the first Tang-Class Type-96 SSBN that will carry it
commenced. Reportedly, construction of the first of six Type-96 submarines, each with sixteen
launch tubes began in 2020.
The JL-3 missile appears to have been first tested in August 2017 probably from the shore site andthen from a new test submarine with two launch tubes, identified as a Qing-Class Type-32 test
submarine. Tests have continued in 2018 and 2019 with launches from the Bohai Sea to the Gobi
Desert impact area. The JL-3 is considered an ICBM with a range of up to 12,000km. It is a close
relative to the road mobile DF-41 ICBM. It may take until 2025 to integrate it with the new Type96 SSBN.36
Chinese Land-Based Ballistic Missiles
China’s land-based missiles range from greatly upgraded 1970s silo based DF-5 (CSS-4) liquid
propellant ICBMs to late 1990 DF-31 and 2010 DF-41 road-mobile ICBMs. The PRC also has
several MRBMs and long-range cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. These missiles are operated
by the PLA rocket force, formally the Second Artillery Corps. The construction of two new silo

35 “JL-2 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile,” Military Today, accessed September 8, 2021, http://www.military-

today.com/missiles/jl2.htm
36 “JL-3 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile,” Military Today, accessed September 8, 2021, http://www.militarytoday.com/missiles/jl3.htm

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based DF-41 launch complexes will add at least 200 plus ICBMs when completed, probably in
2023.37
DF-5 Mods 1 and 2, CSS-4 B and C ICBMThe DF-5 is a two-stage liquid fuel missile 32.6m long with a diameter of 3.35m. Its range is
12,000 to 15,000km. The DF-5 missile was first tested in the 1971 and entered service in 1981. It
is deployed in three brigades each with six silos. The latest versions of this ICBM are the DF-5B
and 5C that entered service in 2015. There are ten DF-5B launchers, each having three warheads
for a total of thirty. There are eight DF-5C launchers, each with ten MIRVs for a total of eighty
warheads. The DF-5 missile is the base for the Chang Zheng (CZ- 2,3, and 4) satellite launchvehicles with over 230 launched since 1975 and still in use today.
DF-31, 31A, 31AG / CSS-10 ICBMThe DF-31 missile is a three-stage solid fuel missile. It’s road-mobile and is the land-based variantof the submarine launched JL-2 ICBM. The first successful flight was in August 1999. It was
accepted into service in 2006. The DF-31 has a range of 7,200-8,000km. An improved version
identified as DF-31A with a range of 11,200km entered service in 2007. To get the extended range
the third stage was lengthened. A third version identified as DF-31AG/DF-31B is the DF-31A
missile on a new TEL.
The DF-31A is reported to be 18.4m in length with the first and second stages 2m in diameter andthe third stage, 1.5m. It is cold-launched after being vertically erected by the TEL. Reports varyon the number of DF-31A missiles deployed, but between twenty-five to thirty is a likely number.
It carries a single 1 megaton thermonuclear weapon. The KT-2 satellite launch vehicle is based on
the DF-31.38

37 Chun Han Wong, “China Appears to Be Building New Silos for Nuclear Missiles, Researchers Say,” Wall Street

Journal, July 27, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-appears-to-be-building-new-silos-for-nuclear-missilesresearchers-say-11627401364
38 “DF-31,” Wikipedia, accessed July 15, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=DF31&oldid=1033682099

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WMD in Asia-PacificDF-41, CSS-20 ICBMThe DF-41 is the newest and largest of the PRC’s solid fuel ICBMs. It was first tested in July 2012
and accepted into service in 2017. The missile is cold-launched and has been deployed in a canisteron an eight axle TEL. Reports have mentioned silo- and rail-based modes. A probable DF-41
training silo was identified at the PLARF nuclear missile training area near Jilanti in the Gobii
desert. In 2021 fourteen more silos were seen under construction at Jilanti. About 230 probable
operational silos were reported under construction for the DF-41 missiles in the western desert. A
test from a rail car was reported in December 2015, but there is no evidence it has been deployed.
The missile has three stages and is 21m in length and 2.25m in diameter, with a range of 14,000
to 15,000km. Since 2012 there have been at least elevyn DF-41 launches. Reportedly, there are up
to twenty-four to thirty of these road mobile missiles deployed and probably none yet of the siloor rail-based missiles.39
Nuclear-Capable MRBMs and IRBMs
The PRC has several missiles that are nuclear-capable with shorter ranges. The most prominent
are the DF-21/CSS-5 range MRBM. These missiles are dual mode and can carry nuclear andconventional warheads. The range of these missiles is around 2,500km. A version of the DF-21
was used to launch the Chinese anti-satellite interceptor in January 2007 and is the basis for theKT-1 & 1A satellite launch vehicles.
The DF-26 IRBM is a two stage solid fuel IRBM with a range of 3,000 to 4,000km. The missile
entered service in 2016 and it is estimated 80 missiles are deployed with another 80 reloads. Thesemissiles are dual mode and can carry nuclear and conventional warheads. An anti-ship version
may be under development.

39 “New Missile Silo And DF-41 Launchers Seen In Chinese Nuclear Missile Training Area,” Federation of American

Scientists (blog), September 3, 2019, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/09/china-silo-df41/.; Missile Defense
Project, “DF-41 (Dong Feng-41 / CSS-X-20),” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 12, 2016, lastmodified July 31, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-41/

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DF-17 HGVThe DF-17 is classified as an MRBM but its real claim to fame is that it is probably the first
deployed hypersonic glide vehicle (HGC). The DF-17 is boosted by a DF-16B short-range missile
and carried by a modified DF-16 TEL. The HGV is identified as DF-ZF. It was tested at least ninetimes between January 2014 and November 2017, was displayed in a parade in October 2018, andreached IOC in 2019.
The DF-17 is about 11m in length and 1.2m in diameter. The DF-16 booster accelerates to Mach
5 (6125km/h) before the DF-ZF HGV is released. The range of the DF-17 is 1800 to 2500km.
Deployment of at least one brigade at a missile site across from Taiwan has taken place. 40
PLAAF Long Range Bombers, H-6K and H-6N
Two versions of the H-6 aircraft, the K and N models, make up China’s current strategic bomber
force. The K model was tested in 2007 and as of 2020 about 100 of these bombers are in service.
The N model went into service in 2019 and at least 4 of these bombers have been seen. It has beenreported that the yearly production rate for the N model is about six per year. The N models haveseveral improvements over the K models. They have a fueling probe for air-to-air refueling togreatly extend their range and in place of the bomb bay the capability in the centerline to carry asingle variant of the DF-21 ballistic missile, a DF-17 missile with a DF-ZF hypersonic glide
vehicle (HGV) or a supersonic DF-100 cruise missile. In addition, the H-6N bomber can also carry
the WZ-8/DR-8 hi-speed short-range reconnaissance drone.41
CJ-10A (called DF-10 until 2011)
The K models of the H-6 bomber can carry the CJ-10A cruise missile. The latter is a subsonicmissile with a range of 1,500km powered by a single turbofan engine. It appears to have been
derived from the Soviet Kh-55 cruise missile. Six missiles can be carried under-wing mounts. The
missiles can have a nuclear or conventional warhead. Other variants of this missile are ground-

40 Ankit Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile Armed With a Hypersonic Glide

Vehicle,” December 28, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-newly-testedballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/
41 Greg Waldron, “H-6 Evolves from Cold War Relic to Beijing’s Hammer,” Flight Global (blog), September 4, 2020,
https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/h-6-evolves-from-cold-war-relic-to-beijings-hammer/140043.article

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WMD in Asia-Pacificand ship-launched. Currently this missile is the PLAAF’s only stand-off weapon for the strategic
bomber fleet.
CH-AS-X-13
The CH-X-13 is an air-launched variant of the DF-21 MRBM. It currently can be launched only
from the new H-6N bomber, modified with launch position along the aircraft centerline. The
missile has two stages and a range of 3,000km. The missile has been tested at least five times
between December 2016 and January 2018 and probably more since then. This missile may be
deployed by 2025.42
DF-17 carrying a DF-ZF HGVThe DF-17 missile seen being carried on a H-6N bomber appears similar to the ground-launchedmissile discussed in the previous section. It is mounted semi-recessed into the fuselage along thecenterline position of the aircraft underside. See the previous discussion of this new missile.43
CJ-100 /DF-100
The CJ-100 is a high supersonic (Mach 4.5Km) cruise missile powered by a ramjet engine. The
two canisters carying the ground-launched version were seen in the October 1, 2019, parade
painted DF-100. A video shows the missile as it exits one of the canisters. The propulsion needed
to start the ramjet is provided by two or three segments of a DF-11 or 15 SRBM solid fuel motor.
The airborne missile has an estimated range of 2,000km and increases the H-6N bombers
unrefueled strike range out to 6,000km.44

42 H. I. Sutton, “China’s New Aircraft Carrier Killer Is World’s Largest Air-Launched Missile,” Naval News (blog),

November 1, 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/11/chinas-new-aircraft-carrier-killer-is-worldslargest-air-launched-missile/
43 Greg Waldron,“ Chinese H-6N appears with mysterious ballistic missile,” FlightGlobal, October 19, 2020,
https://www.flightglobal.com/defence/chinese-h-6n-appears-with-mysterious-ballistic-missile/140671.article
44 Orion_INT, “Demystifying The DF-100: A Deeper Look At China’s Mysterious Cruise Missile,” Overt Defense(blog), August 2, 2021, https://www.overtdefense.com/2021/08/02/demystifying-the-df-100-a-deeper-look-atchinas-mysterious-cruise-missile/103

Nuclear-Capable Missiles
H-20 Stealth Bomber under development
The H-20 has been under development since the early 2000s and is the first dedicated bomber
developed by the PRC. Reports indicate it will be a long-range subsonic flying wing stealth aircraft
to complement the H-6 aircraft and eventually will replace some of them. The aircraft has not yet
flown, but tests are expected in the early 2020s. If the tests are successful construction could begin
in 2025 and it could enter service by the late 2020s. The bomber will be capable of carrying nuclear
and conventional weapons with a range estimated to be greater than 8,500km without aerial
refueling. The H-20 will probably be capable of carrying some of the new missiles being developed
for the H-6N.45

India
India has joined the nuclear triad club late and is now adding modern delivery systems. The
strongest part on their triad is ground-launched ballistic missiles. The nuclear-capable Prithivi 1
and 2 and Agni 1 to 5 missiles are mobile and include short-to intermediate-range weapons withan ICBM under development. The naval SSBN force currently consists of two operational
submarines with two more being built. The two units have a total of thirty-six short-range K-15
ballistic missiles, but some or all of these will be replaced with twelve intermediate-range K-4
missiles in the near future. The aircraft triad piece consists of four types of short-range fighterbombers. They mainly carry unguided free fall nuclear bombs. Forty Su-30MKI fighters have been
modified to carry the BrahMos supersonic nuclear capable cruise missile. BrahMos missiles arealso launched from ground TELs, surface ships, and submarines. A hypersonic version of thismissile is under development.
India’s land-based missiles
India has developed and deployed both long-range ballistic and cruise missiles and has a very
active space launch program. Most of the long-range missiles have been tested from the facilities

45 Peter Suciu, “Xian H-20 Stealth Bomber: Is This What It Will Look Like?,” 19FortyFive (blog), January 28, 2021,

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2021/01/xian-h-20-stealth-bomber-is-this-what-it-will-look-like/104

WMD in Asia-Pacificon Abdul Kalam Island. The old name for this facility was Wheeler Island and it is also called theIntegrated Test Range (ITR). 46
Ballistic missiles
India has two lines of land-based missiles, Prithvi and Agni. The Prithvi 1 and 2 are single stage
liquid fuel missiles and Prithvi 3 uses solid fuel. The first two have been deployed, are probably
operational, and are operated by the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). Prithvi 3 is an anti-ballistic
missile, the development of which is complete. Deployment is planned in three to four years toprotect the capital city.
Prithvi surface-to-surface missiles
Prithvi-1 was first tested in 1988 and came into service in 1994. The range of the missile is 150km
and it is 8.5m in length and 1.1m in diameter. The upgraded Prithvi-2 was first tested in 1996 andentered service in 2003. The propellant tanks were extended to increase its range to 250km. The
measurements are length 9.4m and diameter at 1.1m. The Indian Navy’s version of this missile isidentified as Dhanush, and it had been deployed on at least two surface ships. The Dhanush has
been used as a target for the ABM program. These missiles are dual capable with nuclear andconventional warheads.
The Prithvi- 3 is the booster for India’s Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Anti Satellite Missile(ASAT). The ABM is a hit-to-kill vehicle and has been tested a reported nineteen times. The
program has completed testing and is waiting for a decision to deploy it first around the capital. It
is non-nuclear.47

46 The launch site for most if not all the Agni missiles is Abdul Kalam Island (formerly Wheeler Island). During thetesting the missiles are moved from a retractable shelter to the launch point by a rail TEL on Pad 1. When the tests
are shown on video this rail TEL usually can be seen. This rail TEL is part of the test equipment and not an
operational deployed TEL. It could be that seeing the test rail TEL has caused the identification that some of thesemissiles are actually operationally launched from rail TELs.
47 Malcolm Claus, Brian Cloughley, and Nick Hansen, “Kill Vehicle, Examining India’s ASAT Missile (Standing Tall)”,
Janes Intelligence Review, June 2019.

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Nuclear-Capable Missiles
Agni family of ballistic missiles
There are two sub-families Agni missiles. The Agni 1, 2, and 4 make up one and the Agni 3 and 5is the other. Available information on the Agni is at best confusing and at worst wrong. All Agni
missiles are solid fuel and are nuclear-capable.
India developed much of its solid fuel technology in the 1980s and early 1990s for their spacelaunch programs with the help of the Soviet Union.
Agni-1 is a short/medium-range single stage solid fuel missile with a 700 to 1,200km range. Flighttesting began in 1989.48 It mounts a single warhead and is carried on a truck TEL. Agni-1 enteredservice with the 334th Missile Group and became operational in 2007. It was estimated that nearlytwenty of the launchers for this missile were deployed. The missile is 14.8m long and 1m indiameter.
The Agni-2 is a medium-range 2-stage solid fuel missile, with an 820 to 2,000km range. It mounts
a single warhead and appears to be rail mobile with the 335 th Missile Group. It entered service in2008 and became operational in 2011. It is estimated only about ten of these missiles were
deployed. The missile is 21m long and 1m in diameter
The Agni-4 was initially called the Agni-2 Prime. This two-stage missile has an intermediate range
of 3,500km and mounts a single warhead. The truck mobile missile was deployed and became
operational in 2019. About ten of these missiles have been deployed. This missile is about 20mlong and 1m in diameter.
The Agni-3 is the first of the 2m diameter solid fuel missiles. It is a two-stage missile, 16.3m inlength, and is classified as an intermediate-range missile with a range of 3,200km+. The first testof the Agni-3 was in July 2006, and it went into service in 2011. This missile has been reported asrail mobile but that is questionable. A NASIC 2017 report showed India had deployed fewer thanten of these missiles. By late 2020 that number had certainly increased. The latest test on 30
November 2020 failed.

48 AGNI-1, Missiles of the World, CSIS Missile Defense Project, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/agni-1/

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
The newest member of India’s ballistic missile family is the Agni-5. Some consider it to be an
ICBM and others an IRBM. Its range is over 5,000km but some assert a strike range of 6,000km.
The missile has 3 stages, is road mobile, and is enclosed by a canister for environmental protection.
The missile is cold-launched from the canister. The first test took place in April 2012 and it enteredservice in 2019. This missile uses the first and second stages of the Agni-3 with a new third stage.
The Agni-5 is 17.5m long and 2m in diameter. The number of missiles deployed is unknown—
probably less than ten. The Agni-5 was last launched on 27 October 2021.
Is there an Agni-6 under development? India has not mentioned an Agni-6, but there is speculationthat one is being developed. 49
Long-range cruise missiles
The Nirbhay long-range cruise missile can carry conventional and small nuclear warheads. The
missile is subsonic and powered by a turbojet engine with a range of 800 to 1,000km. It measures
6m long and 0.5m in diameter and is launched from a wheeled TEL. The first test in 2013 failed,
but subsequent tests starting in 2015 were successful. It was developed by India and has a limited
deployment. These Nirbhay and the BrahMos-1 missiles were deployed in 2020 by India to support
the continuing border conflict with China.
Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV)An Agni-1 rocket was used as the booster for two tests of India’s indigenous hypersonic cruise
missile. The first test in June 2019 failed after launch. The second test on 7 September 2020 was
successful. The booster lofted the missile up to 30km to start the scramjet that achieved a Mach 6
speed. There are three more tests planned, making it a weapon capable of carrying conventionaland nuclear warheads. 50

49 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 76, no. 4 (3July 2020): 217–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2020.1778378
50 “Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle,” Wikipedia, accessed August 21, 2021,
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hypersonic_Technology_Demonstrator_Vehicle&oldid=1039857461

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Nuclear-Capable Missiles
BrahMos 2 Hypersonic Cruise Missile
The BrahMos 2 missile is under joint development by India and Russia. Initial flight-testing wasin Russia and will soon begin in India. Like the BrahMos-1, when deployed, this missile will
launch from ships, submarines, aircraft, and land mobile vehicles. The Indian development plan isto achieve Mach 4.5 by 2015 and Mach 6/7 by 2026/27 with deployment by 2028. The Russiandeveloped scramjet engine from the Zircon missile will power the missile. The range of the missile
is 450-600km at speeds of Mach 7 (8,500km/h). 51
Indian SLBMs
The third leg of India’s triad is just now coming into being. It consists of the INS Arihant nuclear
submarine that has four missile tubes and currently carries twelve K-15 missiles, three in eachtube. The INS Arihant is currently completing sea trails, while the long-range K-4 missile iscompleting testing. Also part of the SSBN project is a large new submarine base, INS Varsha,
nearing completion on the east coast south of Visakhapatnam. In addition, two new VLF antennas
and bunkered transmitter and C3 building were added to the existing VLF station at INS
Kattabomman. These new communications systems will allow the national command authority
positive control of the deployed SSBN force —that is, assurance that nuclear weapons are available
for immediate use at all times.
The SSBN INS Arihant has four missile tubes and can carry twelve K-15 missiles or four K-4
missiles. The second SSBN INS Arighat has eight missile tubes and can be loaded with twentyfour K-15 or eight K-4 missiles or a combination of each. It is expected the two SSBNs being built
will have the same configuration as the INS Arighat.
The K-15 missile is an underwater-launched two stage solid fuel short-range SLBM. Its range is
750m and has a single warhead. Development began in the late 1990s leading to land-based tests
from Abdul Kalam Island. In February 2008, the tests moved to a submersible pontoon barge.
After a successful barge test series, testing from HIS Arihant began November 2015 with a final

51 “BrahMos-II,” Wikipedia, accessed August 9, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=BrahMos-

II&oldid=1037838310

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WMD in Asia-Pacifictest series of three missiles launched on 11 and 12 August 2018. It was declared operational laterin August. The K-15 missile is 10m long and 0.74m in diameter. 52
The K-4 is classified as medium-range missile with a range of 3,500km. It is a two-stage solid fuelnuclear capable missile that is underwater-launched and carries a single warhead. It was probably
developed as a variant of the Agni-3. An ejection test was conducted from a submerged barge inNovember 2010. Also from the barge, a powered flight took place on 24 March 2014, as did a teston 7 March 2016, both successful. The next barge tests took place on 19 and 24 January 2020 andwere the final developmental tests before the missile would go into production. There have been
no launches to date of the K-4 missile from either of the SSBNs that are capable of launching it.
The K-4 missile is 12m long and 1.3m in diameter. 53
India has a 5,000km K-5 missile under development that could be ready for testing in 2022. Thismissile could be launched from the INS Arighat class SSBNs. India is also looking into a K-6
missile that would have a range of 6,000 to 8,000km and require a new S-5 Class submarine. The
missile would be significantly larger, that is, greater than 12m in length and 2m in diameter.54
Anti-satellite (ASAT) program
India has attempted two anti-satellite tests from the Abdul Kalam Island. The first on 12 February
2019 was a launch failure and the second on 27 March 2019 was a success. It used a kinetic hitto-kill vehicle and destroyed a dedicated target satellite launched on 24 January 2019. The ASAT
kill vehicle was boosted to match the target’s orbit by a 2-stage solid fuel rocket before the killvehicle was separated from it. This booster was reported to be a modified Prithvi-3 missile
designated the PDF Mark 2/XSV-1. The latter is the same basic missile used for the ABM systemand does not carry a nuclear warhead. The TEL carried ASAT is 13.2m long and 1.4m indiameter.55

52 “Sagarika (Missile),” Wikipedia, accessed August 13, 2021,

https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Sagarika_(missile)&oldid=1038587463
53 “K-4 (Missile),” Wikipedia, accessed July 24, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=K4_(missile)&oldid=1035239009
54 Arfa Javaid, “K Missile Family of India: Here’s Everything You Need to Know,” Jagranjosh.Com (blog), October 6,
2020, https://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/k-missile-family-1601983618-1
55 Malcolm Claus, Brian Cloughley, and Nick Hansen, “Kill Vehicle, Examining India’s ASAT Missile (Standing Tall),”
Janes Intelligence Review, June 2019109

Nuclear-Capable Missiles
Aircraft launched nuclear capability
India has two aircraft, sixteen Mirage 2,000H, and thirty-two Jaguars configured to carry nuclear
freefall gravity bombs as a secondary mission. They have also modified forty of their SuMKI
fighters to carry the BhraMos non-nuclear cruise missiles. The only nuclear-capable missile intheir inventory is the Nirbhay cruise missile. The air-launched version of the missile is still underdevelopment and was photographed under the centerline of a SuMKI fighter.
A second new missile under development is the Long-Range Land Attack Cruise Missile(LRLACM). This missile will have a 1,000km range. It is planned for use by all three Indianservices with its first tests begining in early 2023. If successful it could become operational in late
2020s.56

Pakistan
Since the Partition, Pakistan has viewed India to be its mortal enemy. All Pakistani deployed
missiles were developed with India as their target. Pakistan is closing in on a nuclear triad of its
own. The ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles are the largest portion of this triad. The
Mirage 3 fighter-bombers can deliver nuclear bombs and some were probably modified to carry
the Ra’ad-1 nuclear capable cruise missile. The Ra’ad-2 longer-range version is planned to replace
the older version beginning in 2021. The Babur-3nuclear-capable cruise missile is the submarine
version of the missile and was tested at sea in 2017and 2018. It may be planned to go on the threecurrent Agosta class submarines and the eight Hangor class AIP submarines ordered from China
in 2017.
Pakistan has three active missile test ranges. Liquid fuel Ghauri missiles were tested from the northof the country at the Mashhood firing range also called the Tilla missile test range. Since Pakistan
adopted solid propellant missiles, only an occasional troop-training Ghauri launch now takes place
at Tilla. The solid fuel ballistic and cruise missiles are launched from two closely spaced test ranges

56 Krishnan M. Anantha, “India Set to Develop Long Range, Land Attack Cruise Missile,” OnManorama, February 6,

2020, https://www.onmanorama.com/news/india/2020/02/06/india-defexpo-long-range-land-attack-cruisemissile.html

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WMD in Asia-Pacificlocated on the south of the coast of Sonmiani Bay. The newest of these test ranges is called theWinder missile test range where the Shaheen longer range solid propellant and cruise missiles tests
take place. The older and larger Sonmiani test center is 19km to the southeast of Winder. The early
Hatf-1-3 was tested here and the ground launched cruise missile crew training for the Hatf9/NASR may be done here.
Pakistan’s land-based missiles
All of Pakistan’s land-based ballistic and cruise missiles are operationally launched from roadmobile TELs.
The Hatf 1 and 2 shortrange missiles date back to the late 1980s. The Hatf-1A may still be in thefield today and a newer version of the Adali Hatf-2 with a range of 200 miles entered service in2015, and ten may be deployed. The Hatf-3 Ghaznavi is a solid fuel missile with a range of 300km.
This missile is derived from the Chinese DF-11 with a conventional warhead transferred to
Pakistan in 1992. Pakistan made these missiles nuclear-capable and the first flight was on 26 May
2002. It became operational in February 2004 with the Army Strategic Forces Command. Fewerthan fifty of these missiles are deployed and the missile was last tested on 19 August 2019.
Testing of the Hatf-1-3 missiles probably began in the late 1980s to early 1990s at the Sonmiani
test range. The the missiles were fired into the desert on a 314 degree azimuth.
The Shaheen solid fuel missiles
The Hatf-4/Shaheen 1 missile also was derived from Chinese missiles, the M-11 and M-9. Testingof the solid fuel motor and flight sets was transferred to the Winder test range. Motor test werecompleted July 1997, the missile was converted to be nuclear-capable and shown to the public in
the March 1999 National Day parade. Flight tests from Winder followed and 750km range Hatf-4
was accepted into service in 2006. An improved version of the missile, the Shaheen-1A with a
900km range was tested in November 2014 and is operational. The single stage Shaheen-1 and 1A
are 12m long and their diameter is 1.0m. Less than 50 are deployed.
The Shaheen-2/Hatf-6 is a two-stage solid fuel MRBM first seen in the October 2003 National
Day parade. Its development may have had help from the Chinese M-18/DF-11. The first test took
place in March 2004 from the Winder test range and it went into service in April 2008. The range
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Nuclear-Capable Missilesof this missile is 2,500km and less than fifty are thought to be deployed. Its length is 17.5m anddiameter is 1.4m and is carried on a WS21200 Chinese TEL.
The Shaheen-3/Hatf-10 is a two-stage solid fuel MRBM Based on the Shaheen-2 with a 2mlengthened second stage. The first test of the missile was on 9 March 2015 and a second test on 11
December 2015, both successful. A Shaheen-3 missile was seen erected on Pad 2 at Winder on 28
January 2018 during a training exercise and VIP visit, but it was not launched. No additional testsof the Shaheen-3 have been reported. Since this missile is a Shaheen-2 with a longer 2nd stage andthe Shaheen-2 is operational, it is probable that two tests were adequate. The Shaheen-3 may haveentered service in 2019-2020. The missile is 19.3m in height and 1.4m in diameter. The Shaheen3 has a range of 2750km and is carried on a Chinese TEL the WS51200.
The Shaheen-3 is the booster for the 3 stage Abebeel MIRVed MRBM. The Chinese also werereported to have helped with the MIRV technology carried on the Ababeel missile. The Ababeel
was tested from Winder only once on 24 January 2017 and was reported to have been successful.
In a “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment” March 2, 2018, US Lt. General
Ashley DIA stated “Pakistan conducted the first test launch of its nuclear-capable Ababeel ballistic
missile, demonstrating South Asia’s first MIRV payload.” 57 Why there have been no additional
tests is unknown. The missile has not been deployed or seen in a parade.
The Ababeel stands 21.5-22.1m high and the booster and second stage diameter is 1.4m—the sameas the Shaheen-3—and the payload faring is 1.7m in diameter. The second stage has been extendedin place of the Shaheen nose cone, and a 1.7m third stage added below the payload. This isprobably the post-boost vehicle needed to target the warheads. The payload shroud is 3.4m longand separates after second stage ignition. The three war heads are mounted on the third stage andare released independently. 58

57 Robert Ashley, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment,” Defense Intelligence Agency, March

6, 2018, https://www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-Testimonies/Article-View/Article/1457815/statement-for-therecord-worldwide-threat-assessment/
58 Missile Defense Project, “Ababeel,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 12, 2017, lastmodified July 31, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ababeel/112

WMD in Asia-Pacific
Ghauri/Hatf-5 liquid fuel missiles
The Ghauri missiles are single stage liquid propellant missiles. Between twelve to twenty-four of
the DPRK’s Nodong-1 missiles were purchased by Pakistan in the late 1990s and renamed Ghauri.
The first test of the missile launched by a North Korean crew occurred in April 1998 and failed,
as did a second test in April 1999. A third test took place in May 2002 and was a success. The
Ghauri entered service in January 2003. Three more tests took place in 2004 for troop training.
These missiles have a MRBM range of 1,250km. 59
Pakistan has improved the No dong-1 (Ghauri–I) missiles originally purchased by Khan ResearchLaboratories (KRL) in Kahuta by extending the propellant tank 1m to get longer range andimproving the warhead. In some reports these missiles were identified as Ghauri-2 with a range of
1,800km. The liquid engine test stand at KRL was built for the Ghauri program. Most if not all
twelve known Ghauri missiles have been launched from the Mashhood Firing Range (also called
the Tilla Missile Test Range) into either the Southwest desert or Arabian Sea.
A planned two stage Ghauri-3 missile with a 3,000km range had its funding cut in 2000 and was
terminated in 2004. The last known test launch of a Ghauri was October 2018. If Pakistan only
purchased twenty-four missiles and twelve have been launched, then this missile likely is being
phased out. The Ghauri-2 is 18m long and 1.35m in diameter.
NASR/Hatf-9
The NASR/Hatf-9 is a nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missile. It was first tested at Windar
on 19 April 2011. It was launched again five times and was seen on pad 3 at Sonmiani on 1 May
2018. The most recent launch was on 24 January 2019. It probably entered service in 2013 after
four missile salvo. The NASR missile is probably a modification of the Chinese solid propellant
Norico AR series launched from a four tube TEL. It is capable of launching low yield nuclear andconventional weapons to a range of 60-70km. The missile is 6m in length and 0.4m in diameter. 60

59 Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2012).
60 Ankit Panda, “Pakistan Conducts Second Nasr Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile Test in a Week,” The Diplomat,

February 4, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/pakistan-conducts-second-nasr-nuclear-capable-ballisticmissile-test-in-a-week/113

Nuclear-Capable Missiles
Babur-2/Hatf-7 cruise missile
The Babur-2/Hatf-7 cruise missile is designed to carry both conventional and nuclear warheads.
The missile is boosted from its launch tube by a solid fuel rocket and is then powered by a turbojet
engine. The Babur missile may be a reverse-engineered US Tomahawk missile that was recovered
unexploded from a US airstrike on Afghanistan on 10 August 1998. The Babur-1 is nuclearcapable and can carry conventional payloads. The missiles were first tested on a single launcher
from the Winder test range in August 2005. The range of the Babur-1 was estimated to be 350km.
The Babur-2 is launched from a quad TEL with the first launch in April 2018. This missile has an
estimated range of 700km and is 6.25m long and 0.52m in diameter.
Babur-3
The Babur-3 is the first missile that is planned to be Pakistan’s sea-based part of the triad. The
missile has been tested twice from a barge in the Arabian Sea, in 2017 and again in 2018. It is to
be installed on Pakistan’s three Agosta submarines and later probably on the ten Hangor
submarines ordered from China. Today there is no evidence that this missile has been tested further
or deployed. It has an estimated range of 450km. 61
The Ra’ad/Hatf-8 air launched cruise missile (ALCM)
These Ra’ad missiles, along with gravity bombs, are the airborne component of Pakistan’s triad.
It is deployed on the Mirage 3 EA fighter aircraft. They probably plan to deploy the missile on the
JF-17 fighter being purchased from China. The heritage of this missile is possibly from a South
African missile but has not been confirmed. The test of the first version of the missile was inAugust 2007 and had a range of 350km. The Ra’ad-2 version has the range extended to 600km.
This version was shown in a March 2017 parade and it has been significantly modified. The latest
test of the Ra’ad-2 missile was on 16 February 2010 and it achieved a 600km range. The missile
is 4,85m long and 0.5m in diameter.62

61 Reuters, “Pakistan fires 'first submarine-launched nuclear-capable missile'”, Staff Writers, Islamabad (Reuters)

Jan 9, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-missiles-idUSKBN14T1EL
62 “Hatf-VIII (Ra’ad),” Wikipedia, accessed August 8, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=HatfVIII_(Ra%27ad)&oldid=1037799321

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WMD in Asia-Pacific

Democratic People’s Republic Of Korea (DPRK)The DPRK’s nuclear capable missiles today are land based and mobile. They are short tointermediate range operational missiles, with at least three intercontinental range missiles underdevelopment. They are also developing a long-range submarine ballistic missile and are modifying
a conventionally powered submarine with three launch tubes for these missiles. This submarine is
expected to be launch in 2021/22. Their air force also has at least two types of aircraft that arecapable of carrying gravity nuclear bombs. There is no publically available data, however, toindicate any of them have been modified to carry these bombs.
Hwasong-5(SCUD A), 6(SCUD B) and 7(Nodong 1&2)63
The DPRK got its start with long-range missiles with Soviet SCUD B missiles obtained from Egypt
in the 1970s. The North Koreans reversed engineered these missiles and identified them as
Hwasong-5. Tests began in the late 1980s from the Tonghae missile range. They then improved
the missiles and called them Hwasong-6 and deployed them internally and sold them to mainly
Middle East countries. The DPRK became the largest supplier of missiles to Iran during the IranIraq war from 1980 to 1988 and set up a production facility for these missiles in Iran in 1985. The
sales of missiles and the construction of production facilities for missiles became a large source of
currency for the DPRK. As of 2020 fewer than 100 of the Hwasong 5/6 and their variants are
deployed in the DPRK. The latest variant is the 1,000km extended range Scud first launched in
2016.
The next missiles in the SCUD/Hwasong-5 line were the Hwasong 7, commonly known as
Nodong-1(Rodong-1). These were up-scaled Hwasong-6 missiles and tested from the Tonghae
missile range from 1900 to1993. The first customer for the Hwasong 7 missile was Pakistan, whichpurchased twelve to twenty-four of them and called them Ghauri. They were delivered
unassembled in 1997. The DPRK set-up an assembly facility in Pakistan for these missiles but nota full production facility. Iran was the second client for the Hwasong-7 and called them Shahab-3.
63 Please note there are three nomenclatures in use for North Korean missiles: DPRK Hwasong-1-X, US and ROK KN-

01-X and some were given names by the U.S. based where or near where they were first launched from,
Taepodong, Nodong and Musudan. To confuse even more, the Musudan was never launched from Musudan. For
this section the use of the DPRK Hwasong naming will be used where possible.

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Nuclear-Capable Missiles
Testes began in 1998 and it entered Iranian service in 2003. The Shahab-3 is the first stage of the
Iranian Safir space launch vehicle. In the DPRK in 2020 there were fewer than 100 Hwasong-7
deployed.64
Paektusan (Taepodong-1) and Unha (Taepodong-2) Space Launch Vehicles
Starting in the mid to late 1990s the missile program seems to have turned into a space launch
program. The first of the rockets was called Paektusan (Taepodong-1) and it used a Hwasong7(Nodong) first stage, a Hwasong-6(SCUD) second stage, and a small solid fuel third stage. It was
launched from the Tonghae only once on 31 August 1998. This was a one off mission that failed
to put a small satellite into orbit but did prove out staging and control systems. It was not a weapon.
Next came the larger Unha (Taepodong-1/2) rocket with a first stage of four clustered Hwasong-7
engines, a second stage with a probable Hwasong-6 engine, and a possible Iranian third stage. The
first launch Unha-1 was from Tonghae on 4 July 2006 and it failed after around 40 seconds. The
next launch on 5 April 2009 was called an Unha-2. It was another satellite attempt that failed
during the third stage. After this mission, the launch program was moved to the Sohae Satellite
Center where starting on 12 April 2012 three Unha-3 SLVs have been launched. One failed andtwo successfully launched satellites into orbit. Since the 7 February 2016 launch they have notattempted another Unha-3 space launch as of November 2021. In a later DPRK article it statedthey had six more Unha rockets and had assigned space missions to each of them.
This short discussion of the Paektusan and Unha rockets has been included because in many
documents they are listed as missile weapons.
Hwasong-10 (Musudan) and Hwasong-13 (KN-08)
The Hwasong-10 missiles along with the Hwasong-7(Nodong) were first shown to the West in a
10 October 2010 parade in Pyongyang. The Hawasong-13 was first seen in the 15 April 2012
parade. The design of both missiles probably began in the late 1990s. The parade missiles were
probably not flight articles. Also propellant for both missiles is probably IRFN/Kerosene similar
to the older Hwasong 5, 6 and 7 missiles and the Unha space launch vehicles.

64 Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2012).

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
The Hwasong-10 (Musudan) is single stage missile 12m in length and 1.5m in diameter. The
missile was first reported to be an IRBM but was probably an MRBM. It is mounted on ademilitarized Russian SS-20 TEL that was remilitarized in the DPRK to again carry a missile, theHwasong-10.
The flight test program began in April 2016 and included eight launches of which only one was
successful on 22 June 2016. Testing ended in October 2016. Three or four of these tests explodedon or near the TELs destroying them. None of these tests took place from an established missile
test range; they were all from unimproved field sites. The Hwasong-10 was last seen in a paradein 2016 and was not present in the 2017 and 2018 parades. By all accounts the program has
probably been terminated and the TELs given to the Hwasong-12 and other missile programs. The
Hwasong -10 was never deployed.65
The Hwasong-13 (KN-08) is a three-stage liquid fuel mobile missile, reported in the West to havean ICBM range. It was first seen in the 5 April 2012 parade carried on a Chinese 8 axel WS-51200
tractor. Probable Hwasong-13 engine testing was observed at the Sohae Haasong-13 engine test
stand first in late 2012 when the first stage was seen on the pad. Testing again started in mid 2013
and in March 2014 and was seen again in August 2014. Testing was terminated by 2015 whenconstruction began to modify the test tower and add two new propellant bunkers and a mobile
concealment building. These projects were completed by early 2016 and needed to ready theengine test facility for the higher energy propellants used in the upcoming tests, and Kim’s visits.
No confirmed launches of the Hwasong -13 have been reported. There is speculation, however,that one or two of the last Hwasong-10 test failures may have been Hwasong-13s. Four new
missiles paraded in 2015 were identified as the KN-14 or KN-08 Mod 2. The missiles were carriedby the same TELs as the Hwasong-13 and only seen in the 2015 and 2016 parades. The missiles,
six of them, were last seen on a warehouse floor at the Tae-Sung Machine facility in the video

65 Missile Defense Project, “BM-25 Musudan (Hwasong-10),” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August

8, 2016, last modified July 31, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/musudan/

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taken during Kim’s visit to inspect the fission bomb on 9 March 2016. The KN-14 missiles werevery probably fakes. Neither missile was ever deployed.66
Hwasong-12 (KN-17) IRBM and Hwasong-14 (KN-20) ICBM
Starting in September 2016 testing of high-energy propellant rocket engines began at the Sohae
test stand. A second major test took place in March 2017. An assessment of the type of engine
being tested was it is probably a liquid propellant RD-250 type, based on the Soviet engine. The
RD-250 uses hypergolic propellants, UDMH fuel, and N204 oxidizer. These tests were very
important as Kim attended and heaped praise on the test engineers after they were successful.
Four Hwasong-12 missiles were first seen in the 17 March 2017 parade carried on TELs that had
previously been used by the Hwasong-10 missiles. It is a single stage missile using the RD-250
type engine with four vernier steering engines all using high-energy propellants. The missile is
16.5m in length and 1.5m diameter and an estimated range of at least 5500km. The Hwasong-12
was the first of the new missiles to be tested with three tests in April 2017 that all failed. The forth
missile was launched on a lofted trajectory with an apogee of 2,111km. Successful launches on 29
August and 15 September were to long ranges of 2,700km and 3,700km. Both flew over Japan andcaused an international incident. In April 2017 Kim threatened to bracket the US island of Guamwith four missiles, probably Hwasong-12s, but never did it. The Hwasong-12 is the replacement
for the failed Hwasong-10 missile and fills the IRBM range gap. 67
The Hwasong-14 is classified in some reports as an ICBM. It is the second of the new missiles toappear. It was first seen in a video of it first launch on July 4, 2017. The second launch occurredon July 28, 2017. Both of these launches were successful. It is carried on the same WS-51200 TEL
that had carried the Hwasong-13 (KN-08) missile. Eight of these WS-51200 vehicles werepurchased from China in 2011 as logging trucks. These were then converted into Hwasong-14
TELs by the DPRK. They have also probably been copied and produced internally.

66 David Webb, “KN-08 / Hwasong-13,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, January 2017,https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/north-korea/hwasong13/
67 Missile Defense Project, “Hwasong-12 (KN-17),” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 16, 2017,
last modified July 31, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hwasong-12/

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A small number of these TELs, one or two, were probably modified in the mid 2010s to launch
the Hwasong-14. But when seen in parades starting in 2018 the Hwasong-14 was being carried ona semi-truck trailer and not by the TEL it was launched from in July 2017. At least four of these
TELs were also modified to carry an unidentified canister missile in the April 17, 2017 parade.
Four more modified TELs with three additional axils were seen in the October 2020 paradecarrying the Hwasong-16 missile. Why the Hwasong-14 was not on a TEL is possibly because of
there were no TELs available.
There have been two tests of the second new missile the Hwasong-14. Both were lofted trajectories
and impacted in the Sea of Japan. Apogee of the July 4,2017 test was 2,803km and the 28 July
2017 test was 3,700km. It is not clear that the reentry vehicle survived. The missile is 19.8m inheight and 1.85m in diameter and uses a RD-250-type engine and four vernier steering engines. It
is not known how many of these missiles exist or if they are currently deployed. The Hwasong-14
is probably the replacement for the Hwasong-13 that was not deployed.68
Hwasong-15 (KN-22) ICBM and Hwasong-16 (KN-27) ICBMThe Hwasong-15 large mobile ICBM was first shown to the world in a video of its first and only
launch on 29 November 2017. The video shows Kim inspecting the launch preparations, thelaunch, and the celebration after a successful mission. Four of the missiles were next seen in the 8
February 2018 parade and again in the 10 October 2020 parade. One of the HS-15 missiles wasseen on the floor of the EXPO on 11 October 2021 at the military exhibition in Pyongyang. There
have been no further sightings or launches of the missile.
The November 2017 test was on a lofted trajectory and it reached an altitude of 4,475km andimpacted in the Sea of Japan. Based on the lofted trajectory it has been estimated its operational
range could be 13,000km with a payload of 1,000kg. The Japanese reported the reentry vehicle
failed, however, other observers disagree. The missile’s first stage uses a gimbaled two-chambered
RD-250 type engine. The second stage engine is not known but is probably a version of the single
chamber RD-250 type. The Hwasong-15 is about 22.5m in length and 2.4m in diameter.

68 Missile Defense Project, “Hwasong-14 (KN-20),” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 27, 2017, lastmodified July 31, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hwasong-14/

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The missile is carried on a modified version of the Chinese WS51200 logging truck with a ninth
axel and a new cab. Eight of these trucks were reported to have been imported in 2011.
Modifications as a TEL, they were probably done by the March 16 Truck Factory in Pyongsong,
DPRK, that added the missile erection system and its controls. Like the Hwasong-12 and 14s, thismissile TEL also has a detachable launch stand allowing it to move away in case of a early launch
failure.
The Hwasong-16 (KN-27) was the October surprise the DPRK said they would have when four ofthese missiles were paraded in Pyongyang the night of October 10, 2020. The Hwasong-16 is thelargest liquid fuel mobile missile ever developed. It has not been flight-tested as of mid November
2021 and its development status is unclear. Therefore, the ICBMs shown at the parade were likely
to have been engineering models. Estimates of its range is over 13,000km with a payloads of 2,000
to 3,500kg kg.
The only available information on the Hwasong-16 missile is the parade imagery provided by the
DPRK and the analysis derived from it and the photo from EXPO on 11 October 2021 at the
military exhibition in Pyongyang. The close up parade photos of the missiles had measurementsthat are probably good to plus or minus five percent. Its length is 25.2m and diameter is 2.73m.
The length of the first stage is 15.5m, the second stage is 5.0m in length and has the same 2.73m
diameter, and the nose cone is 5.1m long and tapers from the second stage to the rounded 1.0m
diameter front end.69
Because the engines on each missile were covered by a red plastic, it cannot be confirmed theengines were even present or the same RD-250 type used by the Hwasong-15 missile. There aresome clues, however, they probably are. The first is on some of the missiles the red plastic is
wrapped around each chamber and that can be measured at 0.8m in diameter. That is the diameterof the RD-250 chambers. The red plastic on the missiles shows there are four nozzles at the end of
the first stage. The missile’s first stage probably uses two gimbaled two-chambered RD-250 typeengines and they are movable to provide the steering during first-stage flight. The rear of the firststage is flared out about 0.2 m likely to provide clearance for the nozzle’s movement. There is no
way to identify the engine used in either the first or second stage, but good assessments are a two
69 “Hwasong-16,” Wikipedia, accessed August 29, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Hwasong-

16&oldid=1041233316

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WMD in Asia-Pacifictwo-chambered RD-250 type engine in the first stage and a single two chambered RD-250 in thesecond stage.
The nose cone is 5.1m long and tapers from 2.73m at its base to 1.0m at its rounded top. It iscapable of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and the required
post-boost vehicle needed to target them. However, the DPRK is unlikely to have the technology
for these systems. To date, there is no evidence of any testing of more than a single re-entry vehicle
or of a post-boost vehicle. They could however deploy multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) that aredesigned for release to bracket a target to ensure its destruction.
The four 11-axle TELs that transported the four Hwasong-16s in the parade are likely to be thelargest ever built. The TEL itself is about 29.5 m long and about 4 m wide. The Hwasong-16transport-erector portion includes the cab and the carrier that has the erector. The TEL has twentytwo 1,800 mm -wheels controlled independently and driven by a drive shaft from the diesel engine
behind the cab. Three hydraulic jacks on each side of the carrier are extended to the ground tostabilize the erection process. The jacks are positioned to support the weight of the carrier as it
shifts during the erection process
The big questions are when will the first test launch occur and where will it be launched. With thecurrent data available these cannot be answered. A good guess at the second question is it will not
be from an established test range but from a remote unprepared location. The answer to the firstquestion is known only to Kim and his engineers, but probably later in 2021 or 2022.
HS-8 Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV)
September 2021 was full of more surprises as on 29 th an announcement and a photo just after
launch of the HGV, were realest. Then at the EXPO on 11 October 2021, at the military exhibitionin Pyongyang, the missile and its TEL were displayed. Almost no information was released on the
launch other than it was fired from the western side of the country. From the announcement, it was
not clear that it was a complete success. The photos of the HGV taken at the EXPO were morerevealing. The booster is a three quarters length HS-12 IRBM. The HGV has orange stripes painted
on it that are similar to those on the HGV launched on 29 September. These are use for opticaltracking. The TEL is similar to the one that carried the HS-14. More tests can be expected.

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Shorter-range ground launched ballistic missiles
The Pukkukson-2 (KN-15)
The Pukkukson-2 is a two stage solid fuel track vehicle-mounted MRBM. The missile was firstobserved in a video of its first launch on February 11, 2017, at the Riku-dong training facility
4.2km from Kusong, with Kim supervising. Six of these missiles were seen in the April 15, 2017,
parade. Kim also attended the second and last known launch on May 21, 2017. Both the February
and May tests were lofted trajectories and were successful. Kim then declared the Pukkukson-2
ready for mass production. It was reported deployed in 2019.
The Pukkikson-2 is a land-based variant of the submarine based Pukkukson-1. It is 10m in lengthand 1.5m in diameter with an estimated range of 1,200 to 2,000km. It is cold launched from a tube
in the vertical position from a tracked vehicle. It is probably a replacement for some of the
Hwasong-7 (Nodong 1 and 2).70
The KN-23
The KN-23 is a short-range single stage solid fuel missile and either is a Russian-built Iskander-1
missile or a copy of it. It is hot launched off the rear of the TEL. The missile was first seen in the
February 8, 2018, military parade. The first of eight launches occurred on May 4, 2018. The missile
has been seen launched from both wheeled and tracked TELs. The most recent launch of the KN23 was on July 31, 2019.
Both the 4 axle wheeled and tracked TELs carry two missiles. The missiles are 7.5m in length,0.95m in diameter, and have a range of 450km with a 500kg warhead. These missiles are probably
replacing the Hwasongs 5 and 6 SRBMs.71
Probable KN-23-2/ KN-28
In the January 14, 2021, military parade six larger versions of the KN-23 missile were seen
mounted on five axle ten-wheel truck TELs. The truck beds have been extended about 1.5m to

70 Missile Defense Project, "Pukguksong-2 (KN-15)," Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 5, 2017,

last modified July 31, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/pukkuksong-2/
71 Missile Defense Project, "KN-23," Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 1, 2019, last modified July
31, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kn-23/

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WMD in Asia-Pacificaccommodate the fifth axle and longer missile. The truck bed is similar to the first KN-23, but thecab is a new design. The missile appears to have the same nearly 1m in diameter and is about 1m
to 1.5m longer. As of mid-August 2021 no Hwasong number has been identified but the KN-28
may have been assigned to these missiles.
Two of the new missiles were launched on 25 March 2021 at 7:06 am and 7: 25 am (Japan Standard
Time) from South Hamgyong Province. According to North Korean’s KCNA news agency they
impacted in the East Sea for a range of 600km with a 2,500kg warhead and hit their target. Kim
did not attend the launches. Senior official, Ri Pyong Chol, supervised the launches.
The ROK and Japan probably had sensors that observed some or all of these flights. They takeissue with the ranges and warhead weight given by the DPRK. Their conclusions suggest thesemissiles flew around 450km with a smaller warhead. They believe the DPRK inflated the numbers
to make their missile technology look better. The 1-1.5m of additional solid fuel rockets could
have increased their range possible out to 600km, however.72
Rail launched KN-23/28
Yet another September 2021 surprise was three KN-23/28 missiles launched from an open rail car,two on September 15 and one on September 28. The DPRK reported both missiles were successful
and flew to 800km at an altitude 60km. Photos released by the DPRK of both dates show themissile launches from a mountain location with a railway tunnel in the background. These trainsconsisted of an engine, boxcar, and the open car with two KN-23/28 missiles. This car appeared
to have a similar truck erector launcher system installed in it. The placement of the launch near arail tunnel was meant tell how they plan on hiding the trains.
KN-24
KN-24 is a mobile short-range single stage solid propellant ballistic missile similar in appearance
to the US Army MGM-140 ATACM. The missile was first tested on 10 August 2019 when two
were launched with Kim in attendance. It was hot launched from the rear of the tracked TEL from72 Vann H. van Diepen, “Initial Analysis of North Korea’s March 25 SRBM Launches | 38 North: Informed Analysis ofNorth Korea,” 38 North (blog), March 30, 2021, https://www.38north.org/2021/03/initial-analysis-of-north-koreasmarch-25-srbm-launches/123

Nuclear-Capable Missiles
inside an open ended rectangular enclosure. Two more were launched on August 16 and the last
two launches were on 21 March 2020. The latest sighting of these missiles was in the January 14,
2021, military parade when six tracked TELs were seen, each with two missiles. These missiles
were inside rectangular enclosures with the front-end open so the missile warheads were seen.
The KN-24 has been measured to be 4.5-5.5m in length and 0.7-0.85m in diameter. It has flown
to ranges from 230km to 410km on non-ballistic trajectories. It is estimated to be able to carry a
400-500kg warhead and has been launched with the two missiles from the same TEL, 5 minutes
apart.73
DPRK submarine launched ballistic missiles
The DPRK has demonstrated it has the capability to develop and successfully launch two
submarine ballistic missiles, the Pukkuksong-1 and 3. To do this they had to first build theinfrastructure that allows the construction and testing of all the elements that make up the weaponssystem. For the missiles these included the solid rocket motors, the launch tubes, and cold gas
ejection system. These were tested first on shore then from a submersible barge and then from a
conventional test submarine. On top of this, they were building an extensive hardened submarine
base probably for the operational missile submarines near Sinpo. This is a very expensive
program.74
Probably as result of the costs, Kim took a special interest in the program by visiting most of theelements involved. Among them was a test at the solid motor test facility and a test at the shorebased ejection test facility. He supervised the checkout and loading on the test submarine of the
Pukkuksong-1 missile and its launch. He observed most the Pukkuksong-1 launches from thebarges and test submarine.
In a most visible appearance he visited the submarine construction hall at Sinpo to assess the
progress on the conversion of a 1950s vintage R-class submarine into a Pukkuksong missile

73 Missile Defense Project, "KN-24," Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 15, 2020, last modified July

31, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kn-24/
74 Nick Hansen, “North Korea Building New, Larger Submarine Pens,” HIS Janes Defence Weekly, July 27, 2016.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificsubmarine with three launch tubes. That was in mid 2019, but this submarine has not entered thewater as of October 2021.
Pukkuksong-1 (KN-11)(Bukkeuksong-1) SLBMThe Pukkuksong-1, based on a range estimate of 1,200km, is considered MRBM range.
Development of this missile began in the early 2010s. A dummy mass model missile went throughejection tests at the Sinpo test facility in October and November 2014. In December 2014 it went
through more ejection tests from the barge and more tests with a test missile in April and May in2015. In November 2015 it was reported an ejection test caused some damage to the conning towerof the test submarine so testing went back to the submersible barge. The submarine was repaired
and in April and July 2016 missiles from the submarine failed shortly after launch. The first true
success was the launch occurred on 24 August 2016 when the missile flew on a lofted trajectory
to a range of 500km. As of October 2021 there have been no additional launches of the
Pukkuksong-1.
The Pukkuksong-1 is two-stage solid fuel missile with an estimated range of 1,000 to 1,500km. It
is 9m in length and has a diameter on 1.5km. Pukkuksong-1 was first seen in launch videos in2015. Six missiles on naval trucks were first seen in 15 April 2017 parade. This missile is closely
related the land mobile Pukkuksong-2.
The Sinpo-1/ Gorae-SSB is the test submarine for the Pukkuksong-1 missile. It was first seen at
the dock in Sinpo in 2014. It was built to test launch the Pukkuksong-1 missile and was reported
to have damage to the conning tower during its first launch of the missile on 28 November 2015.
This submarine went on to launch three more Pukkuksong-1 missiles in 2016. The last, on 24
August 2016, was successfully launched on the lofted trajectory.
Based on the material above there is a reasonable chance the Pukkuksong-1 program spun off theland launched Pukkuksong-2 system. However, the Pukkuksong-1 may have been only to proveout the various technologies for future SLBMs. Its two main test components are the submersible
barge and the Sinpo-1 submarine, both of which will find use in the Pukkuksong-3 missile test

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program. It was probably this barge towed from Sinpo to Wonsan that launched the Pukkuksong3 missile on 2 October 2019. 75
Pukkuksong-3 (KN-26) SLBMThe Pukkuksong-3 SLBM has been seen twice, the first in a wall poster in August 2017 at theChemical Materials Institute during Kim’s visit and again on 2 October 2019 in three photos
released by the DPRK of its only launch. Kim also witnessed a test of what was probably its solid
fuel motor at the Magunpo Solid Rocket Motor Test Facility in March 2016. The Pukkuksong-3
has never been seen in a parade and was not displayed at the EXPO on 11 October 2021 at the
military exhibition in Pyongyang.
The Pukkuksong-3 is a two-stage solid fuel missile. Because it was seen only in the three still
photos just coming out of the water with nothing in the background, its length and diametermeasurements are estimates and vary considerably. They range from nearly 8m to 10.6m in lengthand 1.5m to 1.8m in diameter. Please note these estimates are not far from those of the
Pukkuksong-1 that are 9.7m in length and 1.5m in diameter that was can be launched from thesubmersible barge and the Gorae/Sinpo-1 test submarine. Based on the similar sizes of the
Pukkukson 1 and 3 it is expected the Pukkuksong-3 will use the barge and Gorae test SSB for
future tests.
The missile was cold launched from probably the Sinpo submerged barge, off the Wonsan coastand flew a lofted trajectory with an apogee of 910km and a range of 450km. That works out to an
estimated range of 1,900km if flown on a normal trajectory. This test was successful. More tests
from the barge and Gorae/Sinpo-1 test submarine can be expected probably from the Sinpo area.
The modified R-Class submarine with three launch tubes will probably carry the Pukkuksong-3
SLBM. It has been in the Sinpo submarine construction building since before 2019 and is estimatedit will be launched in 2021/2022. It is interesting this building has two submarine construction
ways but the video only covered the modified R-Class submarine on the south way.

75 “Pukkuksong-1,” Wikipedia, accessed August 6, 2021, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Pukkuksong-

1&oldid=1037427898

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The Pukkuksong-4 and Pukkuksong-5
This short write up is placeholder for two new long-range missiles seen in a 2020 and a 2021
parade. The Pukkuksong-4 was on the same type truck trailer as the navy’s Pukkuksong-1 seen in
the April 2017 parade, but it was painted olive drab and not navy blue. Seated on the bench in frontof the missiles were four army soldiers. It is possible it will be a mobile army missile.
The Pukkuksong-5 is a Pukkuksong-4 with and elongated second stage. It is carried on the exact
same trucks the Pukkuksong-4 used. The only difference was the missile shroud extended past thebench and the bench was removed. Since it was painted olive drab, it could also be a land mobile
missile. Both of these paraded missiles were either fakes or early engineering models. They were
not flight articles.
Possible Pkkuksong-6 short range SLBM
To the surprise of most DPRK analysts the DPRK conducted a test of an underwater launchedshort-range ballistic missile from Sinpo on October 19, 2021. The missile was probably launchedfrom the Gorae test submarine, but it could also have come out of the submergible barge. The
DPRK did not release the name of the missile, but from the video it is probably a variant of the
KN-23. No accurate dimensions can be determined from the photos. The only estimate is the sizeof the launch tube on the Sinpo-1. The tube had to fit the Pukkukson-1 missile that was reported
to have a length of 9.3m and a diameter of 1.5m. The KN-23 would easily fit into this launch tube.
The mission for the development of the submarine launch short-range missile is unknown.
Long-Range cruise missiles
The DPRK never had a long-range cruise missile until September 12, 2021, when they launched
two from a ground TEL. The missiles are a descendent of the Soviet/Russian Kh-55/AS-15 of themid-1980s. These missiles were then deployed to extend the range on the TU-95 strategic bombers
and carried nuclear weapons. These DPRK missiles are ground-launched and probably have aground attack mission. The big question is what country sold them the technology. Russia, China,
and Iran have modern versions of these missiles, and Iran obtained them from Ukraine in 2001.

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Conclusion
This chapter describes the missiles-deployed or under development by the six nuclear weapons
states in the Asia-Pacific region. Nuclear weapons states rely on ballistic missiles for the most partto deliver WMD, especially nuclear warheads, due to their combined speed of delivery andgeographical reach to overwhelm any possible defense against nuclear attack. Asia-Pacific statespresent a myriad of lethal missiles, the development and deployment of which is driven by many
domestic and international factors, but especially the presence of an external missile threat leading
to offsetting, action-reaction missile development. Thus, it is evident that US-Russian and USChinese missile advances are primarily the result of competition, whereas in other cases (theDPRK and India, for example) missile acquisition is a three or even four-way dynamic whereby
the most capable missile sets the range and lethality standard that drives the other states to match,albeit often in a-symmetric ways that use new missile technology such as hypersonic missile
speeds to leapfrog the old.
Treaties and agreements that controlled missile proliferation by the US and USSR/Russia in thetwentieth century have either collapsed or are no longer fit for purpose. The New START treaty
needs to be renegotiated to include the new nuclear weapons that did not exist when the original
treaty went into effect. This treaty could be the starting point for a more comprehensive agreement
to include the other nuclear states. It is urgent, therefore, for states to find ways to reduce theimmediate risk of war posed by rapidly advancing missile systems and to resume the search forways to reverse the tide.
For some states, their strategic context suggests that missile reduction measures must accompany
those aimed at missile control in agreements with the United States and Russia, whether
undertaken bilaterally or trilaterally. For others, bilateral measures will suffice to meet strategic
imperatives and in some instances such as the DPRK, unilateral missile disarmament may be thebest available option, provided these are implemented as part of a comprehensive security solution
with its adversaries and partners.

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5. Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications(NC3) in Asia-PacificPeter Hayes

Introduction
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (hereafter NC3) is one of the least known but
arguably most critical dimension of nuclear forces in Asia-Pacific. Put simply, NC3 combines
wetware (people), hardware (sensor, communications, and control technology), and software(digital code that enables the digital elements to connect people with machines, although much of
the technology is analog inherited from a pre-digital era in the older nuclear-armed states). The
purpose of this combination is to enable commanders to target, operate, control, and use nuclear
weapons by receiving data and advice from sensor systems and people tasked with interpreting it,
to make decisions, and to send orders to nuclear forces to move, go on alert, or to strike targets.
Most treatments of nuclear forces focus on nuclear warheads (type, number, megatonnage, andfissile material) and delivery platforms (type, range, accuracy, tactical versus theater versus
strategic) and simply take NC3 as given. There is a reason, however, that David slung his stone
into the forehead of Goliath rather than his musculature. Without a head connected to a body, a
nuclear force is useless. Disregarding NC3 misses, it is perhaps the most critical element of making
nuclear war. Therefore, it behooves us to pay attention to it.
Also, NC3 is arguably a potent “force multiplier” that makes a given combination of nuclear
warheads with delivery systems far more lethal (if the NC3 systems are relatively robust andreliable) or—if destroyed by counter-NC3 attacks—far less able to annihilate an adversary in a
first, retaliatory, or indeed, any strike at all (the “perfect” counter-NC3 strike being one that simply
decapitates the nuclear forces of an adversary or vastly limits the damage incurred from its forces
attacking one’s own forces and/or society). Thus, more capable NC3 may substitute for additional© 2022 Peter Hayes, CC BY 4.0

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Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-Pacificnuclear forces at a given force level, making additional forces unnecessary even when adversarial
forces expand or improve qualitatively. Or they may even offset reductions in nuclear forces.
Conversely, “improved” counter-NC3 forces may undermine such perceptions and force-enabling
characteristics of NC3, and thereby increase the risk of first-strike instability between nucleararmed adversaries. The worst case is improved NC3 forces combined with expanding nuclear
forces and increasingly effective counter-NC3 forces, implemented either by one side creating an
illusion of nuclear escalation and warfighting dominance; or, if implemented by both sides,
increasing the perception that going first is the only option to limit damage from the inevitable
first strike by a nuclear adversary given their NC3 vulnerabilities.
NC3 does not loom large in arms control or disarmament literature, with significant exceptions. In
the American Cold War, use of NC3, which was distilled in the acronym NC3I for nuclear
command, control, communications, and intelligence in standard theoretical and policy use in the
mid-eighties, NC3 was indistinguishable from NC3I. That’s because NC2—nuclear commandand-control—relied indispensably on communication systems—the third C in NC3—tocommunicate information from nuclear commanders in the command chain to and from nuclear
forces and, in turn, to convey information from sensor systems that provided early warning, target
identification, and damage assessment needed for nuclear commanders to make decisions, selectstrike options, and issue strike orders with nuclear forces.
Because these “national technical means” (NTM) were viewed as integral to sound nuclear
decision making and indispensable to the operation of nuclear forces before, during, and after anuclear war, many US-Soviet strategic nuclear arms control agreements included clauses banning“interference” with NTM. Otherwise, because NC2 and supporting communications systems are
so opaque, making it impossible to verify compliance with various measures that might have beentaken to control NC3 systems in these agreements, NC3 simply doesn’t appear in strategic arms
control agreements. And there are few tacit understandings let alone norms on behaviors related
to NC3 and counter-NC3 operations.
Moreover, analysts of NC3 mostly assumed that “more NC3” is automatically better. After all,who could object to increasing negative controls over nuclear weapons (those organizational andtechnical measures that ensure nuclear weapons are never used by mistake) or positive controls

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WMD in Asia-Pacificover nuclear weapons (those organizational and technical measures that ensure nuclear weapons
are always available for immediate use, the underlying basis of nuclear threat that creates theperception that nuclear retaliation is inevitable and therefore nuclear first use is never rational, theessential foundation of strategic deterrence and “stability” in nuclear threat dyads)? Thus, goes theargument, more NC3 means more bang for the buck at same or lower cost, and less risk of nuclear
war due to enhanced strategic stability. So why worry about NC3-related arms control, let alone
disarmament?
Unfortunately, this perspective was highly subjective, introspective, and parochial. In reality,
nuclear armed states are in a conflict relationship, and a relationship is always based oncommunication of intention and capability—as was explained long ago by the first generation ofstrategic theorists. Such communication can take many forms—statements of doctrine, politicalthreat rhetoric, back-channel messages, diplomatic demarche, changes in alert levels, force
deployments, forward deployment, nuclear warhead and delivery platform testing…the nuclear
practitioner’s repertoire is quite extensive, even for small monadic forces, let alone “mature”
triadic forces with global reach deployed by the United States, Russia, and China today. Amongthe most important information that is sent by one nuclear antagonist to another is that obtainedby communications intelligence systems of what an adversary’s nuclear command is saying to its
own forces combined with direct observation via NTM of status and operations of deployed
nuclear forces. Thus, sensors create information flows that continuously link adversarial forces inwhat is correctly termed “NC3 interdependence,” thereby creating what a “tightly coupled” USSoviet NC3 system (Paul Bracken),1 and a “gigantic interacting system” (Ash Carter)2 , although
they did not analyze the resulting global dynamics of this NC3 “metasystem” even when it was
relatively simple during the Cold War.
Today, with fifteen nuclear weapons and nuclear-delivery states each endowed with distinctive
national and in some cases (NATO) multinational NC3, global NC3 interdependence is vastly
more complicated to the point of true complexity and can no longer be ignored. It is now criticalthat NC3 be analyzed for its direct contribution to the increase or reduction of nuclear risk—

1 P. Bracken, The Command of Strategic Forces, Dissertation, Yale University, 1982, p. 39.
2 Ashton Carter, “Sources of Error and Uncertainty,” in A. Carter, J. Steinbruner, and C. Zraket, ed, Managing

Nuclear Operations, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1987, p. 635.

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Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-Pacificdepending on the contextual circumstances, and that policy measures be taken to control anddisarm NC3 systems, not just the warheads and delivery systems for nuclear weapons. To not doso would be like analyzing the efficacy of global air traffic control systems without revealing thelocation of air traffic control towers, the frequency, procedures, and language used and harmonized
by ICAO, and paying no heed to the communication systems employed to coordinate aircraft
movement and to synchronize aircraft movement across whole airspaces under different routine
and emergency circumstances. Anyone who proposed running air traffic control without minimaltransparency, common standards and procedures, and interoperable communication systems
sharing sensor data from radars and satellites would be dismissed or isolated (think airlines thatassiduously avoid traversing DPRK airspace). Yet, that is the situation today with respect to NC3.

Definition Of NC3
To proceed, we first need a working definition of NC3. There is no agreed definition of NC3,
however between or within nuclear armed states. It’s not even clear that all nuclear-armed stateseven use such a term. Or if they do, whether it captures the same meaning and scope as its dominant
usage in American and allied nuclear forces. 3 The concept is most developed in the United Statesand its allies, and in Russia, where it has long been the subject of military and budgetarydefinitions, although these have varied over time.
At a basic and universal level, the NC3 system connects senior nuclear commanders with their
nuclear forces and enables them to control their use at all times. Control is a critical concept whenit comes to nuclear weapons given their uniquely destructive capability. It is translated by many
procedures, measures, and organizational systems, some of which may work against the otherwhen it comes to combining negative and positive controls in routine, crisis, and wartime nuclear
weapons operations. Also integral to NC3 is the notion of legitimacy and authority—the nuclear

3 For example, Fiona Cunningham reports that there is no open-source clear definition of “NC3” with Chinesecharacteristics, although there are various command and control concepts in the Chinese literature that relate toelements of NC3 as defined by the United States and NATO. See Fiona Cunningham, "Nuclear Command, Control,and Communications Systems of the People’s Republic Of China", NAPSNet Special Reports, July 18, 2019,https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nuclear-command-control-and-communications-systems-ofthe-peoples-republic-of-china/132

WMD in Asia-Pacificcommander must be accountable under domestic and international law. And there must be systems
to ensure that command decisions are authenticated and that nuclear weaponeers know thatcommands that they receive and act on are authentic and legal.
American nuclear weaponeers have long held that NC3 systems must be as reliable, robust, andcapable to deter nuclear strikes.4
In this view, NC3 is a system. It is made up of all the elements that enable a weapon to be
deployed, including appropriately trained personnel, parts, and the systems that allow an NC3
apparatus to work all the way from commander to weapons operator. The fit between the weapon
and the NC3 system is never perfect.
The United States made a clear public statement as to what is meant by NC3. The US
Department of Defense’s Nuclear Matters Handbook (2020 edition) states:
The U.S. command and control is necessary to ensure the authorized employment andtermination of nuclear weapons operations, to secure against accidental, inadvertent, or
unauthorized access, and to prevent the loss of control, theft, or unauthorized use of U.S.
nuclear weapons. The President’s ability to exercise authorities is ensured by NC3. 5
It then goes on to state that NC3 can only be understood with reference to NC2:
In order to understand NC3, it is important to define nuclear command and control (NC2).
NC2 is the exercise of authority and direction, through established command lines, overnuclear weapon operations by the President as the chief executive and head of state. NC2
is supported by a survivable network of communications and warning systems that ensure
dedicated connectivity from the President to all nuclear-capable forces. The fundamental
requirements of NC2 are that it must be assured, timely, secure, survivable, and enduring

4 Termed C³1: Ashton B. Carter, “The Command and Control of Nuclear War,” Scientific American 252, 1 (Jan,1985): 32-39, 32. Carter’s work on vulnerability was preceded by a seminal paper by D. Ball, Can nuclear war becontrolled? Adelphi Papers, 1981, 21: 169, pp. 1-2, at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/05679328108457385
5 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Matters Handbook, chapter 2, accessed October 3, 2020, at:https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nmhb/chapters/chapter2.htm

133Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-Pacificin providing the information and communications for the President to make andcommunicate critical decisions throughout the crisis spectrum. 6
Elsewhere, it states more succinctly that “NC3, managed by the Military Departments, nuclear
force commanders, and the defense agencies, provides the President with the means to authorize
the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis.” 7
Viewed functionally, DOD states:
NC3 assures the integrity of transmitted information and must be survivable to reliably
overcome the effects of a nuclear attack. NC3 performs five critical functions:•detection, warning, and attack characterization•

nuclear planning•

decision-making conferencing•

receiving presidential orders•

enabling the management and direction of forces8This functional capacity in turn is nested in supporting communication systems:
NC3 relies on terrestrial (e.g., land-based secure and non-secure phone lines and undersea
cables), airborne relay (e.g., E-4B and E-6B), and satellite (military and commercial)
sensors to transmit and receive voice, video, or data. The ability to move trusted data andadvice from sensors to correlation centers, from presidential advisors to the President, fromthe President to the NMCC, and from the NMCC to the nuclear weapons delivery platforms
depends on NC3…These encompass a myriad of terrestrial, airborne, and satellite-based
systems ranging in sophistication from the simple telephone, to radio frequency systems,
to government and non-government satellites. Some of these systems are expected to beable to operate through nuclear effects, while others are expected to be subject to nuclear
effect disruption for periods ranging from minutes to hours.9

6 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Matters Handbook, op cit.
7 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Matters Handbook, op cit.
8 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Matters Handbook, op cit.
9 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Matters Handbook, op cit.

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WMD in Asia-PacificFigure 1 shows this nesting of the various elements of NC3, starting with nuclear commanders at
the center, linked to nuclear weapons systems, and linked in turn to external sensor systems bycommunication systems.

Figure 1. Nested NC3 Systems.
Source: Figure 2.2. NC3 Weapon System and AFPEO/NC3 & AFNWC/NC Responsibilities, in “Special Management
Nuclear Materiel Management,” Air Force Materiel Command Instruction 90-204, 4 May 2016, p. 10 released under
US FOIA request to Nautilus Institute.

These generic definitions of the elements of US NC3 are translated into binding directives by
military combatant commands. The US Air Force, for example, states:

NC2.—Nuclear Command and Control, NC2, is the exercise of authority and direction by
the President, as Commander in Chief of U.S. Armed Forces, through establishedcommand lines, over nuclear weapon operations by military forces; as Chief Executive
over all Government activities that support those operations; and as Head of State overrequired multinational actions that support those operations.

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Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-PacificNC3.—Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications, NC3, is the collection ofactivities, processes, and procedures performed by appropriate commanders and support
personnel who, through the chain of command, allow for decisions to be made based on
relevant information, and allow those decisions to be communicated to forces for
execution. NC3 is a system of systems, stretching across services, combatant commands,
and other DoD entities. 10execution. NC3 is a system of systems, stretching across services,
combatant commands, and other DoD entities. 11
This reference to a “system of systems” is important. A system of systems is inherently complex.
The US NC3 system is a sprawling patchwork of systems operated by each service, much of which
is not inter-operable. And because the US military has three nuclear weapons forces run by its airforce (missiles and bombs) and navy (submarine), each with global reach, it really operates threeglobal NC3 systems, plus the fusion of these systems in the decision-support systems that extend
to the Joint Chiefs and the US president, and then back to nuclear forces who must act on decisions.
This very complexity is subject to the Byzantine Generals problem and may result in unanticipatedcybernetic feedbacks, logical flow errors, and inadvertent outcomes.
A simplified, functional definition of the complete meaning of NC3 in terms of supremecommander control of nuclear weapons is provided in Table 1. Arguably, however achieved, thesefunctions are universal among all nuclear-armed states in one way or another.

10 US Air Force, “Air Force Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3), US Air Force Instruction 13-550,

October 2, 2014, p.21, released under US FOIA request to Nautilus Institute.
11 US Air Force, “Air Force Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3), US Air Force Instruction 13-550,
October 2, 2014, p.21, released under US FOIA request to Nautilus Institute.

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
Table 1: Critical NC3 Functions_______________________________________________________•

detection, warning, and attack characterization•

nuclear planning and targeting•

decision-making•

receiving orders•

enabling the management and direction of forces_______________________________________________________
Source: Based on US Department of Defense, Nuclear Matters
Handbook, chapter 2, accessed October 3, 2020, at:https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nmhb/chapters/chapter2.htm_______________________________________________________
Before turning to practical, plausible, and desirable NC3 policy measures, we need to first survey
the uneven terrain of NC3 in the Asia-Pacific region that captures seven of the nine nuclear-armed
states (Russia, China, the United States, Israel, Pakistan, India, North Korea) that are inextricably
linked by mutual nuclear threat relationships.
Before analyzing what must be done with respect to NC3 to reduce the risk of nuclear war and toresume nuclear disarmament in the current context, we first describe the NC3 systems of eachnuclear-armed state in this region.

NC3 Systems in Asia-Pacific
US NC3NC2 (defined above as nuclear command and control) is conducted in nuclear command posts, themost important of which are in the White House, the National Military Command Center at thePentagon, at Strategic Command HQ in Omaha, and at the unified command HQs in Hawaii andNATO HQ in Brussels. These are supplemented by a variety of mobile command posts, includingpresidential and the Air Force E-4 National Airborne Operations Center, the Navy’s E-6 Mercury
TACOMO aircraft, and various lang-based mobile backup centers (see figure 2).

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Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-PacificFigure 2. National Military Command System Connectivity to the Forces (2001).
Source: Robert Critchlow, Nuclear Command and Control: Current Programs and Issues, Congressional ResearchService, RL33408, May 3, 2006, p. 7.

NC2 is supported and connected across nodes and with sensor and early warning systems on the
one hand, and nuclear forces on the other, by a range of communications systems, adding the third
C to NC3. These systems provide connectivity to NC2 whereby data and messages are sent via
wireless and cable, some dedicated to nuclear forces, some shared with non-nuclear forces. The
wireless networks use the entire spectrum from extremely low to ultra-high frequencies. Some areline-of-sight, some wrap around the Earth, and some are directed at satellites and are then sent
back down to ground receivers or sideways to other satellites before being sent back to Earth.
Some frequencies are hard to interfere with, while some work better in an atmosphere “perturbed”
by nuclear detonations. Some have been hardened against the electromagnetic pulse emitted by anuclear detonation while many have not, and some are able to penetrate the surface layer of theocean to reach submarines. Antenna size and weight determines which delivery platform can use
with which frequency-based system. In the digital era, NC3 now includes computer and cyber

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WMD in Asia-Pacificsystems that are integral to computation, fusion, and transmission of data and messages overconnectivity provided by digitized communications systems.
Over seven decades of nuclear warfare, each military service has developed its own
communications systems, many of which are not able to be received by those of the other service.
That is, they are not interoperable. The same problem arises with regard to nuclear allies within
NATO and other US nuclear umbrella states such as Japan and the ROK. Figure 3 shows the NC3
systems operated primarily by the US Air Force. Figure 4 shows the NC3 systems operated
primarily by the US Navy.

Figure 3. US Air Force and Other NC3 systems.

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Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-PacificFigure 4: US Navy Strategic Communication Systems.
Source: “Figure 13 depicts the nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) infrastructure needed for mission
communications while performing a strategic deterrent patrol. The BCA [broadcast control authority] provides theinterface to the NC3 system for delivery of EAMs. Take charge and move out (TACAMO) aircraft and surface ships relay
EAMs [emergency action messages] if there is a failure of the primary reception paths. The simultaneity point indicateswhen multiple communications paths will be available for use.” M. Seime, Common Submarine Radio Room: A Case
Study of a System of Systems Approach, thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014, p.33, at:https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/43998

This global nuclear decision-making and communications apparatus would be useless without theability to sense via many means the state of the world. The most important US nuclear sensors arethose that provide early warning of nuclear attack. The earliest warning of missile attack comesfrom satellite-based infra-red sensors that see the heat of missile launch and exhaust. From
forward-deployed radars, it would get the earliest confirmation by a physically disparate sensor if
in range. If not, arcs of long-range radars in Alaska, Greenland, the UK, and on the three coasts ofcontinental United States, supplemented by ballistic missile defense and NATO radars plus radars

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WMD in Asia-Pacificmonitoring space, serve to identify missile launches and against whom they are targeted.12 A
nuclear detonation detection system also operates in the United States to confirm actual nuclear
attack on the United States. All this warning from 24/7 monitoring converges on ground stations
where it is assessed continuously for false alarms or discounted as non-missile events, notably in
the National Military Command Center in Washington, DC, the Global Operations Center at Offutt
AFB, NE, and the headquarters of the North American Aerospace Defense Command andCheyenne Mountain in Colorado.
When the nuclear communications infrastructure is combined with the nuclear command system,
it is truly vast—so much so that it exceeds the ability of managers to grasp. As the Defense
Information Systems Agency—the entity within the US Department of Defense responsible for
integrating all these elements to ensure that nuclear command-and-control provided the necessaryconnectivity between national command authorities and nuclear forces—stated in 2010, “There isno one NC3 system. The NC3 system as it exists today is a patchwork of disparate systems, eachwith its own characteristics. There is no one operating system or coding language. 13 The truecomplexity is revealed in the evolution of estimates of the number of systems that constitute NC3.
In 2017, for example, US General Robin Hand stated that “There are a huge number—107 different
systems to get our hands around.”14 In 2019, a STRATCOM official estimated that there were 109
such systems.15 At the same workshop, Jeffrey Larsen stated, “ Depending on who you ask andhow they count, the US NC3 system consists of as many as 160 different systems: satellites,
aircraft, command posts, communication networks, land stations, radio receivers, and so on—a

12 Jeffrey Larsen, "Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications: US Country Profile", NAPSNet Special Reports,

August 22, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nuclear-command-control-andcommunications-us-country-profile/
13 Answer to Question 1 at: Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications System Operational Assessment
Program, Solicitation Number: HC104710R4009, Agency: Defense Information Systems Agency, Office:Procurement Directorate Location: DITCO-NCR, August 4, 2010, at:https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=ca9ed977f427844fb095c1e170a579ee&tab=core&_c
view=1
14 S. Magnuson, “Exclusive: Interview with Gen. Robin Rand, Head of Air Force Global Strike Command,” National
Defense Magazine, November 14, 2017, at: http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2017/11/14/globalstrike-command-tackles-atrophying-nuclear-command-control-systems
15 Presentation at NC3 and Global Stability, workshop, Stanford University, January 22-23, 2019. See Peter Hayes,
Binoy Kampmark, Philip Reiner, Deborah Gordon, "SYNTHESIS REPORT–NC3 SYSTEMS AND STRATEGIC STABILITY: A
GLOBAL OVERVIEW," NAPSNet Special Reports, May 05, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-specialreports/synthesis-report-nc3-systems-and-strategic-stability-a-global-overview/141

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-Pacificsystem of systems perhaps too complex for any one person to totally understand. “16 By 2020, US
Under Secretary of Defense Ellen Lord testified, “The NC3 portfolio comprises a complex
architecture of more than 200 systems that allow detection of threats, support decision making,and enable force direction.”17 As a senior commander in charge of US NC3 systems stated in 2019,“I am confident that the NC3 system will work. I just don’t know how and why it works. 18
Russian NC3NC2 in the former Soviet Union, now Russia, is dominated by the need to command and control
the long-range nuclear missiles that constitute the bulk of its nuclear forces. A substantial fractionof these missiles is located in Siberia, far from the high command in Moscow. Russia also operates
missile firing submarines but generally keeps them close to home-based anti-submarine forces toprovide some cover against US forces tracking Russian submarines from air and sea. It also has
long-range bombers that—like their American and Chinese counterparts—need communication
systems at long-range. In the past, Russia based intermediate range rockets in the Far East, butthese were removed under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty, leaving only shorter-range
missiles along the border with China, some bombers, and a strategic missile submarine force thathas been reconstituted in Kamchatka after a long period at the end of the Cold War, when no suchforces operated in the Russian Far East/Pacific region.
Russia’s primary modern nuclear command post, the National Defense Command and Control
Center, was opened in 2014 and contains within it the Nuclear Strategic Forces Command andControl Center. This Center manages nuclear weapons operations as directed by Russia’s political

16 Jeffrey Larsen, "Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications: US Country Profile," NAPSNet Special Reports,

August 22, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nuclear-command-control-andcommunications-us-country-profile/
17 Statement of The Honorable Ellen M. Lord Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Before
the Strategic Forces Subcommittee Committee on Armed Services United States Senate U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Policy, Programs, and Strategy in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2020 and the Future
Years Defense Program May 1, 2019, at: https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/download/lord_05-01-19
18 At the NC3 Systems and Strategic Stability: A Global Overview workshop, January 22, 2019, under Chatham
House Rule. A month later, General John Hyten stated in testimony that he “I really can't effectively explain” why
the NC3 systems works. In US Strategic Command, “U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Northern Command SASC
Testimony,” March 1, 2019, at:https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/1771903/us-strategic-command-and-us-northern-commandsasc-testimony/142

WMD in Asia-Pacificand military leaders. 19 Russia has two, possibly three underground nuclear command and control
bunkers, one at Kosvinsky Kamen in the Northern Ural Mountains, and another at Mt. Yamantau
in the Southern Ural mountains (the latter may have shut down and likely was a government
continuity relocation site similar to the US Rock Raven facility outside of Washington, DC). Eachof the military services (Strategic Rocket Force, Navy, Airspace Force, and the Army has its own
command post with communications and computing support. In November 2020, Russian
President Putin revealed that Russia has activated a new underground nuclear command bunker
and, like the United States, also has stationary and mobile command posts spread across thecountry.20 How many of the dispersed nuclear command posts around Moscow (said to be about
eighty in the early 1980s) remain today is unknown.21

Figure 5. Former Soviet Union Strategic Communications Systems (Airborne Left, SSBN Right).
Source: V. Yarynich, C3I: Nuclear Command, Control Cooperation, Center for Defense Information, Washington DC,
2003, p. 135 et passim, at: https://www.scribd.com/doc/282622838/C3-Nuclear-Command-Control-Cooperation

19

Leonid Ryabikhin, "Russia’s NC3 and Early Warning Systems", NAPSNet Special Reports, July 11,
2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/russias-nc3-and-early-warning-systems/
20 J. Trevithick, “Putin Reveals Existence Of New Nuclear Command Bunker, November 11, 2020, The War Zone, at:https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37569/putin-reveals-existence-of-new-nuclear-command-bunker-andsays-its-almostcomplete?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWVRObE5tTmlPR00wTURCbCIsInQiOiI4eWhUa3E4d2x6amRaeVBOQnVlK0lrcEJRSTNlY1
JidUhtVEZJU2xUSUU2T05vSm1HZTNEVmx0XC9uajE4MWpWSVwvM0ZuWjJSR2xQWHZWXC9jNEs3eUtGV3o1SVNO
d2RcL3F1TlpcL2YyT3E3VVdKREl4ekI4YmNOaSs2ZTdubWlibU1EIn0%3D
21 K. Lippold, U.S. and Soviet Strategic Command and Control: Implications for a Protracted Nuclear War, thesis, US
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, March 1989, p.124, at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/26326

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Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-PacificRussia’s strategic communications relied on an extensive array of radio and cable communications
across frequencies and media to link these command posts with nuclear forces located acrosseleven time zones. Communications included landlines, radiotelephone, microwaves, andsatellites. The mainstay of connectivity was long-haul HF communications which was thensupplemented by satellites operating in low orbit and in elliptical orbits during the Cold War.
The system also reportedly has an automated launch system as well as a rocket. These were to be
fired as a last resort and were dedicated to transmitting fire orders in extremis to nuclear forces
should Russia’s nuclear command posts be incapacitated or destroyed in a war.
As American nuclear forces shifted from bomber to missiles in the early 1960s, the former Soviet
Union developed its early form of missile-detection radar. These became operational in 1970 in
the form of two “Dnepr” radars near Murmansk and Riga and the Command Post near Moscow.
The former Soviet Union {FSU] also began to develop its early warning satellites, although theseremained far behind American satellite capabilities to provide a two-echelon missile tracking
system that provided 360-degree monitoring along all borders. At the end of the Cold War andthroughout the 1990s, the now-Russian early warning system more or less collapsed. For a period,
Russia operated its forces without any operating early warning satellites, and the radars were alsodegraded by age, lack of funding, and de-staffing. In 2014, the decaying legacy satellite system
was down completely, 22 leaving Russia solely reliant on its old radars.
Today, Russia has deployed two new modern Voronezh radars and a new constellation of early
warning satellites known as the United Space System, or EKS, that have restored Russia’s ability
to detect early and confirm missile attack. However, by admission of the experts contracted toconstruct the system, it remains error-prone, especially the ground components.23

22 “Russia’s satellite nuclear warning system down until November,” The Moscow Times, June 30, 2015, at:https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/06/30/russias-satellite-nuclear-warning-system-down-until-novembera47799
23 Sergei Boev, the lead designer, explained in 2015, “The system’s ground echelon…is a uniquely complicatedtechnical system and malfunctions cannot be excluded. Here a lot depends on how the system’s various components
interact with one another: the false alarms that can occur in one station must be quickly analyzed and verified by thecommand post.” In “Revealed: Russia’s ambitious new ICBM early warning system,” Sputnik News (19 August 2015,
at: https://sputniknews.com/russia/201508191025927540-russia-nuclear-early-warning-system-development/

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WMD in Asia-PacificOverall, the Russian system is far flung but highly centralized and top down compared with therelatively flat and distributed American nuclear command and control system. During the Cold
War, the former Soviet Union’s (hereafter FSU) pyramidal structure made the Russian systemprone to an error made at the top and center that is propagated quickly throughout the whole system,
whereas the American system, being more devolved into regional commands, tends to not
propagate errors across different parts of the world. Whether this remains the case today is aninteresting question.
Chinese NC324
Like Russia, China’s NC3 imperatives are dominated by its small land-based nuclear missile force.
Unlike the United States and Russia that sport a triad, China has been a monad until recently when
it began to develop a naval (strategic missile submarines) leg, 25 and a possible dual-capable longrange aerial (bomber) leg. China’s NC2 system is Chinese Communist Party-controlled. They
make nuclear weapons decisions in conjunction with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which
operates the Second Artillery Force since 1966 that fielded nuclear missiles, renamed the PLA
Rocket Force in 2016. Their leading policy that shaped its NC3 system was to field a small nuclear
force sufficiently robust to retaliate after absorbing a first strike from a nuclear adversary, such as
the United States, and after 1969, the FSU.
In 1986, the PLA established the Central Emergency Command Center (CECC) for continuity of
government under attack. The primary underground hardened site built inside a mountain underYuquanshan in Xishan outside Beijing, with two sub-centers reportedly at Wuwei (Langzhou
military region) and Mianyang (Chengdu military region, later increased to five nodes with theaddition of Taiyuan (Beijing military region), Luushan (Jinan military region), and Weining

24 This section draws on F. Cunningham, "Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Systems of the People’s

Republic Of China," NAPSNet Special Reports, July 18, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-specialreports/nuclear-command-control-and-communications-systems-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/
25 T. Zhao, Tides of Change: China’s Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines and Strategic Stability, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, October 24, 2018 at: https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/10/24/tides-of-change-china-snuclear-ballistic-missile-submarines-and-strategic-stability-pub-77490

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Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-Pacific(Chengdu military region). Other military command bunkers reportedly existed in Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region along with another 29 hardened bunkers connected by cables.26
In the early decades of nuclear armament, China used primarily radio communications andtelephony to connect nuclear commanders with forces. Starting the 1990s, the PLA laid muchfibre-optic cable and integrated microwave communications. Starting the early 1990s, China used
DFH commercial satellites for military communications, and deployed its first military FH-1
military communications satellite in 2000, now supplemented by fiber-optic cables laid in the
1990s, and satellites.27
China’s communication systems are dual use, supporting conventional and nuclear traffic between
nuclear commanders and forces. Since 1998, China has semi-automated the issuance of nuclear
strike orders and related messages to mobile missile brigades housed in underground tunnels or on
the move, allowing central commanders to monitor movements and launches. Once China sends
its strategic missile and nuclear attack submarines into the open ocean, it will use low frequency
radio towers and transmissions to communicate orders, supplemented by airborne relay systems
and satellite downlinks. Mobile missile launch units moving freely on the surface may be assumed
to have field communication networks including telephone, videoconferencing, and command
networks over wireless and satellite networks.
Because China’s nuclear forces are configured to launch only after nuclear attack, it hashistorically had only minimal early warning radar coverage. As Cunningham explains:
China has three phased array ground-based radars, similar to U.S. PAVE PAWS radars,
located in Heilongjiang province in the country’s northeast, Fujian province in its southeast,and Xinjiang in its northwest. Improving China’s strategic warning capabilities was an
explicit priority for the PLA in China’s most recent 2015 defense white paper. China has
26 Ta-chen Cheng, “China’s nuclear command, control and operations,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, no

7, March 5, 2007 pp. 169-170, at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26156651?seq=1. Stephen Polk states that as ofearly 2000s, China’s NC2 is located at three sites: in Beijing, at the Central Military Commission office in the Ministryof Defense, the General Staff Directorate hardened bunker in western Beijing where the PLA controls its nuclear
forces and issues orders, and the Second Artillery now PLA Rocket Force headquarters nearby in Qinghe. S. Polk,“China’s Nuclear Command and Control,” in Lyle J. Goldstein, ed, with Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Nuclear ForceModernization, Newport Paper Twenty-two, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 2005 at: https://digitalcommons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=newport-papers
27 S. Polk, op cit, p. 17.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificno space-based missile attack early warning system but is likely to be developing one. A
space-based early warning system would enable China to shift to a launch-under-attack
alert status if it chose to do so in the future. A Chinese space-based early warning systemis, however, unlikely to be operational for approximately another decade. 28
The same retaliatory doctrine of launch-after-or-under-nuclear attack only requires China to beable to detect a nuclear attack. This reportedly was built starting in 1974 and is a national reporting
network of enormous significance to the credibility of China’s nuclear force. 29
DPRK NC3
In comparison with the great powers that are nuclear-armed, DPRK’s nuclear command andcontrol system is relatively simple, as is its current force structure and supporting connectivity.
DPRK law states clearly that Kim Jong Un is the supreme nuclear commander of the DPRK. In
2014, the Strategic Rocket Command was renamed and became the Strategic Forces Command.
This change was to create a direct chain of command from Kim Jong Un to nuclear forces via
automated missile launch systems to ensure that his orders are followed. 30 Having only land-based
intermediate and largely untested long-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, theDPRK has a nuclear monad, although it has begun to develop submarine-launched missiles that
could carry nuclear weapons in the future.
The DPRK has likely built an NC3 system that is dedicated solely to nuclear forces, both topreserve Kim Jong Un’s sole control and to avoid any risk of loss of control due to organizational
cybernetics or confusion arising from dual use communications and weapons systems that poseissues of queuing and priorities for message delivery. Although the high echelons of the DPRK
military at the Joint Chiefs and Corps-level commands reportedly use computer-based C3 systems,

28 Cunningham, op cit.
29 Ibid.
30 This section relies on Myeongguk Cheon, "DPRK’S NC3 SYSTEM", NAPSNet Special Reports, June 06,

2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/dprks-nc3-system/

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Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-Pacificthis does not extend to lower echelons in the conventional military, which relies mostly on
telephone, radio, cable, and couriers, with fiber optic extending to forward echelons. However,fiber optic cable is likely to have been laid between the supreme command and missile and warheadbases, and from these bases to preselected sites for transporter erector launchers, to wait andreceive orders that may be dispatched with very short time frames from decision to launch, given
the complete lack of long-range early warning systems in the DPRK that would identify andrespond to a US nuclear attack.
Similar to China, the DPRK’s NC3 system includes a party control element at each critical point
to ensure political loyalty and compliance with directives from above. It is likely that the DPRK’s
warheads are not mated to its missiles most of the time and are kept under the control the Korea
Worker’s Party’s Central Military Committee. When ordered, a nuclear ordnance unit would
receive warheads under party control and transfer them to missile units for mounting them. Thistransfer is a particularly fraught and perilous aspect of control in the DPRK NC2 system, andpolitical commissars surely play a key role in ensuring that this integration is achieved during
exercises and would do so in wartime.
Indian NC3
Not much tangible may be said in this section for the simple reason that there is almost no countryspecific data about the NC3 architecture in India.
NC3 in India is understood to support the Nuclear Command Authority that manages its nuclear
and missile forces and would authorize use of nuclear weapons with an operational command baseestablished as early as 1998 on the outskirts of New Delhi. 31 But the command post locations,nodal-network structure, and its multiple, service-based 32 and likely non-interoperable
communication systems have not been described in any detail in open source.
Given that India has an advanced scientific and engineering infrastructure and a globallycompetitive IT sector, one can safely infer that its current NC3 system relies heavily on cable,
31 M.V. Ramana and Lauren J. Borja, "Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in India", NAPSNet Special

Reports, August 01, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/command-and-control-of-nuclearweapons-in-india/
32 Rakesh Kumar, Indian Nuclear Command and Control Dilemma, thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
September 2006, pp. 31-32 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/2639?show=full

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WMD in Asia-Pacificespecially fibre-optic cable, microwave links, and radio links, including non-dedicated satellite
links between nuclear warhead sites, sufficient to support dispersed missile launcher sites andfighter-bomber units on various airfields.33 However, how effective such communications formobile nuclear weapons has become remains an open question.34 According to former advisor to
India’s Prime Minister, Shyam Saran, India’s nuclear command authority is connected to forces
with radiation hardened, redundant, and secure nuclear communications systems with “back-up”
facilities.35 Indian Cabinet Committee on Security reportedly has approved the construction ofalternate chains of command, implying multiple command sites and communications systems forthe contingency of loss of the primary nuclear command and control system.36 India’s Strategic
Forces Command, according to one blogger, “provisions the primary and alternative command
posts, operations rooms, and communication.37
India also now operates missile-launching submarines and, in 2014, activated a naval very low
frequency (VLF) transmission station for communicating with the deployed submarine at
Kattabomman in Tamil Nadu on the southern tip of India. 38 In 2017, the Indian navy announced it
would build a second VLF transmitting facility at Pudur in central India. 39
India has two potential nuclear adversaries to monitor, Pakistan and China. In 2002, India acquired
missile warning radars from Israel and reportedly deployed two of these units, which have been
upgraded to support ballistic missile defenses. 40 Given range limitations and the extremely shortflight times of missiles fired from Pakistan, these radars have limited utility of providing

33 S. Smith, Assessing the Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan, thesis, Naval Postgraduate

School, Monterey, December 2002, p. 47, at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/3272
34 R. White, “Command and Control of India's Nuclear Forces,” The Nonproliferation Review, 21:3-4, 2014, p. 270,
at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2014.1072994?tab=permissions&scroll=top
35 S. Saran, “Is India’s Nuclear Deterrent Credible?” India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, April 24, 2013, p. 11, at:
http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2013/05/Final-Is-Indias-Nuclear-Deterrent-Credible-rev1-2-1-3.pdf
36 A. Ahmed, “Indian Nuclear Command and Control,” Indian Defence Review, part 2, July 13, 2011, at:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/indian-nuclear-command-and-control--ii/
37 A. Ahmed, “Indian Nuclear Command and Control,” Indian Defence Review, part 1, July 12, 2011, p. 2, at:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/indian-nuclear-command-and-control-i/
38 “VLF Transmitting Station Commissioned at Tamil Nadu,” Indian Navy, Press Release, no date, at:https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/vlf-transmitting-station-commissioned-tamil-nadu
39 K. Mahesh, “Navy to reach ships and subs from Pudur,” Times of India, December 27, 2017, at:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/62261258.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=tex
t&utm_campaign=cppst
40 J. Yogesh, F. O'Donnell, “India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and Dangers,” Georgetown University Press,
2019, Kindle Edition, p. 55.

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Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-Pacificmeaningful early warning to India of attack from either Pakistan or India. India’s satellite
capabilities provide enhanced strategic warning but are limited in their technical capacity.
Electronic, communications, and human intelligence will factor into India’s decision-making
calculus more than long-range sensor systems, although its expanding space program may shift
this balance in its NC3 system.
Pakistani NC3
As with India, little is known publicly about Pakistan’s NC3 system. Like India, the NC2 or nuclear
high command organizational structure is reasonably understood. As Feroz Khan summarizes thissystem:At JSHQ [ Joint Service Headquarters], the communication systems of the three services,along with civilian and military intelligence agencies inputs, are integrated to produce a
net assessment of threats that is available to the highest civilian and military leadership.
JSHQ is responsible for the organization and functioning of the National Command Center(NCC), which links the conventional force military operations, naval operations, and airforce operations into an integrated system (CC3). After SPD was formed, its C2I2 SR
Directorate evolved a dedicated nuclear (strategic) communication system (NC3). At NCC,
a common operational picture (COP) is available that merges all national surveillance andreconnaissance capabilities, integrating satellite, drones, and other information means fromall three services. The communication system is backed with several redundancies and is asecure, dedicated communication system with procedures that are updated as theinformation age evolves and new innovations in cyber, space, and information technology
domains are introduced.41
However, the actual physical infrastructure of command centers, communication nodes andnetworks, and early warning systems has not been described in open sources in recent history.
Shaun Gregory provides the best—albeit very dated—description of the communication systemthat supports Pakistani NC2:

41 Feroz Hassan Khan, "Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3): The Case of Pakistan", NAPSNet

Special Reports, September 26, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nuclear-commandcontrol-and-communications-nc3-the-case-of-pakistan/150

WMD in Asia-PacificPakistan relies on a variety of space and land-based communication systems to assure
nuclear connectivity and the continuity of centralized control. Some of these systems arecommercial and others dedicated military networks. System robustness is underpinned byredundancy, the simple idea that if one or more systems fail others will be available to taketheir place. Pakistan’s PASCOM network provide peacetimes army-wide land-line and, for
GHQ and corps HQ, mobile phone connectivity; the DEFCOM and PATCOM networks
provide satellite, fibre-optic, microwave and switching system connectivity; while the
SATCOM network enables corps connectivity through VHF vehicle radio sets, fieldexchanges and faxes. Pakistan has also been the recent beneficiary of US tacticalcommunications system upgrades – most notably Falcon II, to enable better US–Pakistaninteroperability in the war on terror. Despite these arrangements, connectivity through thestages of conflict escalation to the nuclear level is not assured. At least four factors
undermine system robustness in Pakistan: (1) the high costs of ensuring full-network
redundancy; (2) the technical fragility of communication systems; (3) the vulnerability of
the nuclear communication networks and nodes to electronic counter-measures, physicalassault, technical dependency; and (4) the particularly rigorous demands of mobile
basing.42
Pakistan’s satellite capacities are also feeble 43 and the entire network appears highly vulnerable todisruption, counter-measures, and physical attack. At least part of its commercial fiber-optic
network traverses India although it has dedicated military fiber-optic cables to support
conventional forces. Even with codes, radio is considered unsafe for strategic communications, so
it is likely used only for routine communication for NC2 purposes, if at all.
Like India, Pakistan has deployed a missile firing submarine and built a VLF station at Hameed
near Karachi to communicate with it at sea. 44 The vulnerability of this facility and the demanding

42 S. Gregory, “Nuclear Command and Control in Pakistan,” Defense & Security Analysis, 23:3, 315-330, 2007, at:https://doi.org/10.1080/14751790701573907
43 G. Mujaddid, “The Next Decade of Nuclear Unlearning: Command and Control and Management of Pakistan’s
Nuclear Weapons,” in F. Khan et al, edited, Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Next Decade, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, June 2014 at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/45142
44 U. Ansari, “Pakistan Unveils VLF Submarine Communications Facility,” Defense News, Nov 16, 2016, at:https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2016/11/16/pakistan-unveils-vlf-submarine-communications-facility/151

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-Pacificcommunications requirements of mobile missiles and possible deployment of tactical, forwarddeployed nuclear weapons near the border with India raises the troubling possibility of earlydelegation of use authority to forward commanders in a crisis. 45
Likewise, Pakistan’s early warning system has limited range and is fragile. It has access tocommercial satellite photography but for military purposes, depends almost entirely on the UnitedStates and China for strategic satellite support in a crisis. Its air defense radars are short range andprovide limited warning of incoming aircraft or cruise missiles aimed at disabling its NC3 nodes
and networks.46

Key NC3 Issues
The preceding sections defined NC3 as a critical dimension of nuclear forces, and outlined theNC3 systems, including early warning systems, of the five nuclear-armed states in the Asia-Pacificregion. This section introduces six key NC3 issues: (a) the contribution of NC3 to the risk of
nuclear war; (b) NC3 modernization and disruptive technology; (c) nuclear decision-making andcommander accountability under international law pertaining to NC3; (d) complexity and theglobal NC3 system; and (e) the pandemic-nuclear nexus and NC3.
NC3 and Nuclear Risk
In section 2, we noted that NC3 is a force multiplier that represents a threat to a targeted state due
to its ability to enhance the lethality of nuclear forces and to fight nuclear wars that are less thanall-out global paroxysms of nuclear violence that end human existence. NC3 missions in thislimited nuclear war context include precision targeting of adversarial NC3 sites and systems tostun and degrade its ability to retaliate with nuclear attacks, retargeting weapons on new targets
based on intra-war intelligence (reallocating weapons from already empty silos and alreadyannihilated targets onto new targets such as missiles on the move), terminating nuclear war

45 F.H. Khan, Going Tactical: Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture and Implications for Stability, IFRI Security Studies Center,

Proliferation Papers 53, Paris, 2015, at: https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp53khan_0.pdf
46 J. Yogesh, F. O'Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia, op cit, p. 320.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificoperations, and reconstituting own forces to prepare for the next war. These NC3 attributes lead totwo types of operational problems.
The first is the vulnerability of many parts of the NC3 system. Although nodes can be buried in
mountains and network hardware can be hardened against nuclear effects such as electro-magnetic
pulse frying of electrical circuits and electronics, nuclear detonations are so powerful that once
nuclear war begins, no-one knows if and for how long nuclear command and control will continue,
or if it will continue at all.
Nuclear-armed states responded to vulnerability with a combination of hardening and proliferationof transmitting and repeater sites and redundant networks to make it impossible for a rational
adversary to entertain the idea that a disabling strike on NC3 was a practical option. All that a
nuclear-armed state has to do is to create a sufficiently resilient system that it can get out somenuclear strike orders to forces to “rip off an arm,” that is, cause sufficient damage to an adversary
to deter it from ever attacking—even if it has already destroyed its enemy with a first strike.
Nonetheless, the reality is that for all the billions of national treasures invested in NC3 hardening,
the sheer explosive, thermal, and radiative power of nuclear detonations is likely to rapidly degradeeven the best NC3 system.

For this reason, many NC3 practitioners argue that the primary concern for nuclear risk is not thevulnerability of NC3 systems, but their propensity to cause errors of two types.47 The first is a false
negative error, that is, the nuclear commanders are told by early warning systems that they are notunder attack, when in fact they are, and they fail to launch in retaliation. The corrective for thistype of error is to invest heavily in strategic and tactical surveillance and reconnaissance sensors
and reporting systems, which nuclear-armed states have done in different and highly uneven ways.
The failure to notice that the former Soviet Union had emplaced nuclear armed missiles in Cuba
was a slow-motion version of this error as the Cuban Missile Crisis might have been avoided if
this activity had been flagged before the missiles arrived or were installed.

47 Ashton Carter, “Sources of Error and Uncertainty,” in A. Carter, J. Steinbruner, and C. Zraket, ed, Managing

Nuclear Operations, The Brookings Institution, 1987, pp. 611-640.

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Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-Pacific
The second is a false positive error wherein nuclear commanders are told or come to believe thatthey are under attack when in fact they are not, but they go ahead and launch anyway against
another state. There are many examples of this kind of error in the historical performance of US
and Russian NC3 systems. Often these false positives are based on hardware or software failure,or human error. 48 In other cases, they are inadvertent due to organizational cybernetics andprocedural flaws whereby even a perfectly performed sequence of actions still leads to failure dueto the sequencing of the steps between different parts of the organization, or its interaction withthe adversary in an unanticipated way. 49 An especially pernicious variant on the false positives
that may afflict NC3 systems is the problem of third-party catalysts who set out to induce a nuclear
war between two or more other nuclear-armed states in the hope that they will come out unscathedor on top after a nuclear war. (There is a non-state version of this problem, which is the apocalyptic
terrorist entity that seeks to end the world for a religious or other reason50).
The final way that nuclear risk is affected by NC3 is by malevolent or disloyal elements that may
disrupt nuclear operations. The former is exemplified by non-state actors such as terrorists seeking
to wrest control of nuclear weapons or delivery platforms as has occurred multiple times inPakistan already. The latter refers to the possibility of coups in which nuclear weapons are notcentrally controlled as may have happened with the attempted coup during the Algerian war inwhich nuclear warheads were vulnerable to seizure at the French testing site in the Sahara 51 andduring the attempted coup against former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev when it was notclear who controlled the nuclear codes. 52 These are examples of the Byzantine General problem

48 Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety, Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, Princeton, New Jersey 1993
49 P. Bracken, The Command of Strategic Forces, Dissertation, Yale University, 1982, p. 39.
50 Gary A. Ackerman, "The Non-State Dimension of Nuclear Command, Control and Communications," NAPSNet

Special Reports, August 29, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/the-non-state-dimensionof-nuclear-command-control-and-communications/51 See the account of the coup and disputes related thereto in Benoît Pelopidas, "France: Nuclear Command,
Control, and Communications," NAPSNet Special Reports, June 10, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnetspecial-reports/france-nuclear-command-control-and-communications/
52 M. Dobbs, “During the Soviet Coup, Who Held Nuclear Control? Gorbachev Lost Command, Probers Say,” NewYork Times, August 23, 1992, at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/08/23/during-the-sovietcoup-who-held-nuclear-control-gorbachev-lost-command-probers-say/a4732610-679e-4f6e-be69-f0cf3f9eba85/
and C. Bohlen, “Gorbachev Lost Nuclear Control, Russians Report,” New York Times, August 23, 1992, at:https://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/23/world/gorbachev-lost-nuclear-control-russians-report.html

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WMD in Asia-Pacificwherein network dynamics and individual components generate random control failures thatcannot be anticipated in advance nor controlled in the moment. In the NC3 system, this problem
is one in which one of the command elements controlling nuclear weapons is traitorous to thesupreme command, but no-one knows which, making coordination dangerous. The most extreme
version of this problem is when a supreme commander turns out to be an agent of a hostile stateor becomes insane but retains formal command over nuclear forces. President Trump may havebeen the first example of this version of the Byzantine General problem turned on its head.
NC3 modernization and disruptive technology
All the nuclear-armed states in the region are modernizing their nuclear forces, whether they arerecent arrivals or originate in the mid-twentieth century. The nuclear great powers, especially theUnited States, China, and Russia, combine old analog with digital computer and communications
systems and an array of platforms for transponders and sensors on Earth and in Space. Onto thiscombination of modern digital-legacy analog, they are superimposing and grafting on rapidly
emerging technologies including drones, cyberwarfare, and highly automated data processing now
moving into artificial intelligence and early applications of quantum computing andcommunications.53 These new technologies have the potential to disrupt existing NC3 systems.
By enhancing NC3 operations, these new technologies may reduce negative and positive errors,
thereby reducing nuclear risk; but they can also potentially reduce confidence in the resilience androbustness of NC3, stimulating notions of early first use of nuclear weapons to limit damage in theface of apparent nuclear attack by an adversarial nuclear-armed state. To the extent that these newtechnologies are driven to enhance conventional military forces, they also create an increased riskof nuclear-conventional entanglement whereby an adversary sees conventional operations as
nuclear and feels obliged to act first to avoid being pre-empted.
A new dimension of NC3 is the way that commanders, especially the supreme commander, is not
only supported by the classified, vertically compartmentalized and official NC3 systems but is also

53 Elsa B. Kania, "Emerging Technologies, Emerging Challenges—The Potential Employment of New Technologies inFuture PLA NC3", NAPSNet Special Reports, September 05, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-specialreports/emerging-technologies-in-future-pla-nuclear-command-control-and-communications/ and Peter Hayes,"Nuclear Command-and-Control in the Quantum Era", NAPSNet Blue Peter, March 29,
2018, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/nuclear-command-and-control-in-the-quantum-era/

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Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-Pacificembedded in social media, which may be used for official signaling of nuclear threat and is linked
to early warning systems that monitor social media for indicators of nuclear threat such as mobile
unit movements, etc., with obvious potential to enhance false positive errors in the interpretationof nuclear attacks.54
Nuclear Decision-Making and Commander Accountability
All organizations, including militaries armed with nuclear weapons, are made up of individuals
interacting in patterned behaviors that becomes routines, standard operating procedures, and often
guided by historical lessons such as how the last war was fought. They all have commanders at the
top that make the ultimate decision on whether to use nuclear weapons—or not. Apart fromdifferent cultural orientations and historical trajectories, however, the individuals that rise to the
top implement very different versions of what may be called the “n-person” rule, that is, how many
people must participate in the decision, how that final decision is made, and who, if anyone, has
veto power.

Table 2 below shows representations of simplified decision-making agents produced by Alex
Wellerstein. Each diagram portrays who makes the ultimate decision to fire nuclear weapons (seenotes to Table for detailed explanation) Diagram A shows how the system works in the UnitedStates and likely also in the DPRK. In this absolute nuclear rule model, only the president and the
DPRK’s Supreme Leader (currently Kim Jong Un) can order a nuclear strike, which then goes tothe top military officials who send the order out to nuclear forces. There is no military or civilian
authority or figure who must first sign off or who can countermand this order. A manifestly illegal
order may be disobeyed under international law, but that may not stop a determined supremecommander from circumventing an official who says no.

54 See Nautilus Institute, Technology for Global Security, Preventive Defense Project, "Social Media Storms andNuclear Early Warning Systems: A Deep Dive and Speed Scenarios Workshop Report," NAPSNet Special Reports,
January 08, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/social-media-storms-and-nuclear-earlywarning-systems-a-deep-dive-and-speed-scenarios-workshop-report/ and H. Williams and A. Drew Escalation by
Tweet: Managing the New Nuclear Diplomacy, Centre for Science & Security Studies, Kings College, London, July
15, 2020, at: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/csss/assets/10957%E2%80%A2twitterconflictreport-15july.pdf

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
Table 2: Nuclear Command Authority Decision Models

Notes: The diagrams in this text are meant to illustrate several real and hypothetical ways in which nuclear command
authority might be transmitted and translated into action. The characters on the far left are civilian state authorities(in gray). The character with the star on their hat is a top-level military authority (in green). The
satellite/radar/computer represents the human and technical complexities of the command, control, andcommunications systems that transmit orders to, finally, the lower-level military figure (in green, no hat) who
represents the officers who actually carry out the order with regards to the “shooters” (bombers, submarines,
missiles, etc.).
Green arrows represent the ability to give positive or negative authority, whereas white arrows, in principle, aremeant to be implementations of orders. Half-green arrows indicate the order only contains part of the necessary
authority (one full green arrow is necessary for an order to be authenticated, so two half-arrows). One can ask
whether every white arrow will flow naturally or whether there is the possibility of “push back” of some sort (e.g.,
a “veto,” whether sanctioned or as either deliberate disobedience or just failing to convey orders forward), but inprinciple the white arrows are not intended to be “vetoes.”
Source: Alex Wellerstein, "NC3 Decision Making: Individual Versus Group Process", NAPSNet Special Reports,
August 08, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nc3-decision-making-individual-versusgroup-process/157

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-PacificAccording to Wallerstein, this same one-person rule may also operate in India and Pakistan:

In India, this authority resides in the Prime Minister as head of the Political Council of the
Nuclear Command Authority. In Pakistan, the nuclear capability was initially vested in the
President of Pakistan as head of the National Command Authority, but it transferred (firstprocedurally, then legislatively) to the Prime Minister in 2010. It is unclear if these systems
look like the flow in diagram “A,” but they may. 55

In China (see Diagram E) the heads of two civilian committees are required to initiate nuclear use.
As the same person (President Xi) is currently the head of both committees, this system of checks
reduces to a variant of A, absolute nuclear authority.

In Russia, paraphrasing Alex Wellerstein, three people (the president, the minister of defense, andthe chief of general staff) carry the codes that enable them to authorize a nuclear strike. And at
least two “votes” are necessary, portrayed by one full green arrow). States Wellerstein:

Whether any one of these votes is privileged (e.g., is the President always required?), is
unknown. Note that the Minister of Defense frequently has military rank, but this is not
required (and several have not been military personnel), hence their ambiguous
representation here. The Chief of General Staff has always been a high-ranking military
officer. The activation of the “chegets” [nuclear codes] appears to go directly into thecommunication systems without an intervening officer.
It’s possible that the Russian president may have special voting powers in this schema such that
only that figure can initiate the order, but at least one of the others must concur, in which casesome form of veto exists over the absolute power to fire nuclear weapons. (See Diagram D).
President Trump’s turbulent and uneven use of nuclear threat has raised the issue of whether
absolute power to start nuclear war should lie with only one person. As is evident from this

55 A. Wellerstein, "NC3 Decision Making,” op cit.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificoverview, however, the n-person question is universal, and some international consensus togenerate a new norm on this score is badly needed. Moreover, the laws of armed conflict and otherinternational law that define commander accountability on when and if use of nuclear weapons isever legal demand that procedures that are universally agreed to should be implemented in all NC3
systems. This will ensure a minimum of accountability in the form of checks and balances to block
manifestly illegal and insane strike orders from being implemented, ever. It is for this reason that
the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons includes NC3 systems in its scope, although it
has yet to develop a practical set of recommendations that would allow NC3 systems to align withthe core values of this treaty, even during the disarmament period when NC3 becomes more
important than ever due to the vulnerability associated with holding small nuclear forces that
reduces the assured ability of a nuclear-armed state to retaliate against a pre-emptive strike.
Complexity and the Global NC3 System
None of these NC3 systems, including their early warning and decision-making structures, exist
in splendid isolation. Each is part of at least one nuclear-prone relationship constituted in part by
the projection of mutual nuclear threat.
During the Cold War, this global threat and NC3 system was relatively simple, being either twoor three way, depending on when China entered the picture (and subsuming the UK and France
into the anti-Soviet bloc). At the time, Paul Bracken argued that the two NC3 systems were
inextricably linked and tightly coupled, and the activities of one could generate spastic or
pathological responses in the other, in a series of spiraling, interdependent effects whereby NC3
could be both cause and effect of the risk of nuclear war (see Figure 6). Nuclear weapons havebecome integral to Russia’s reclamation of its major power role after the collapse of the former
Soviet Union. It began a nuclear modernization program in the late 1990s, which is still ongoing.
According to President Vladimir Putin’s report in late 2019, modernized equipment now accounts
for eighty-two percent of Russia’s nuclear triad. 56 Russia’s declaratory policy is to develop and

56 Russian Federation Defence Ministry, “Supreme commander-in-chief of the Russian Federation Attends

Extended Session of the Russian Defence Ministry Board Session.” Press Release, December 18. 2018,
http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12208613@egNews

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Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-Pacificdeploy nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, prevail in a regional war—a strategy known as“escalate to de-escalate.”
Russia’s strategic modernization program has three elements. First, it is routinely replacing aging
warheads and delivery systems with new, more advanced ones. Russia’s nuclear triad consists ofland-based international ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles(SLBMs), and strategic bombers. The land-based component of the strategic triad includes two
versions of the SS-27: Mods 1 and 2. The focus of the current and larger phase of Russia’s
modernization is the SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM (known in Russia as RS-24 Yars), which is equippedwith four multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Russia is also developing
the heavy multiple-warhead ICBM (SS-X-29), known as Sarmat, which will replace the SS-18 in
2021.57 As for the sea-based component of its nuclear triad, Russia has already announced a plan
to build five and purchase two more new Borei class submarines (Project 955A) to replace theolder Delta IV SSBNs (Project 667BDRM) after 2023.58 Russia has also resumed production of
the Tu-160 aircraft in 2019 and is expected to field the first ten Tu-160M2s before 2027.
Second, Russia has begun to modernize its tactical nuclear weapons. As of early 2020, Russia isestimated to have a stockpile of about 4,310 nuclear warheads that are assigned to long-range
strategic launchers and shorter-range tactical nuclear forces. 59 Of these, about 1,870 are
nonstrategic warheads.
Third, Russia has begun to develop, test, and produce new “exotic” types of nuclear weapons. In
March 2018, President Putin listed five new nuclear-capable weapons systems:
6. a nuclear-armed, maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicle (the Avangard), currently carried
by a modified SS-19, and soon to be carried by an SS-29
7. a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile of “unlimited” range (the Burevestnik) topenetrate an adversary’s missile defense systems
8. an air-launched ballistic missile purportedly intended to target ships (the Kinzhal)
57 RIA Novosti, Russia to Develop New Heavy ICBM by 2020, December 20, 2010,https://sputniknews.com/russia/20101220161856876/
58 Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda, “Russian nuclear forces 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2020, Vol.76,
No.2, pp.102-117.
59 Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda, “Russian nuclear forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.76, No.2,
pp.102-117.

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9. an SS-18 follow-on ICBM with modern features to penetrate missile defenses (the Sarmat)
10. a deep-diving, unmanned, nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed underwater delivery vehicle(the Poseidon) that is scheduled for delivery in 2027 60

In February 2019, President Putin announced an additional nuclear-powered anti-ship hypersoniccruise missile (the Tsirkon) to the Russian nuclear weapons inventory. All these programs illustratethat Russia is determined to continue its reliance on nuclear weapons as a key element of its
national security strategy. The new and “exotic” nuclear weapons provide means to augment
existing nuclear forces with systems that are not counted under the New Strategic Arms Control
Treaty (New START), now extended by the United States and Russia for five years by Presidents
Biden and Putin.

These dynamics of Russian nuclear arms replacement, modernization, doctrine, and deployment—along with those of the United States—converge to suggest the new nuclear arms race between the
United States and Russia will be different from that of the Cold War. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, the Soviet Union and the United States had approximate parity in the number of deliverable
weapons in their nuclear arsenals. Their key strategic nuclear objectives were to obtain sufficient
capacity to inflict a certain level of assured damage to the other one in a retaliatory strike. Driven
by the reality of assured retaliation and near certainty of mutual annihilation in a nuclear war, thetwo nuclear superpowers had little incentive to pre-emptively strike the other’s strategic nuclear
forces. During the second half of the Cold War, Soviet leaders became uncertain of being able toindefinitely maintain a posture of guaranteed retaliation and mutual annihilation.61 Three decades
after the Cold War ended, we find the principles which guide the numbers or size of nuclear
weapons have changed. On the one hand, the United States re-emphasized nuclear deterrence,
boosted its nuclear modernization, and acted skeptically towards arms control measures. Thus, theguiding principles that shape the size and type of US nuclear forces have shifted from preserving
strategic stability between the nuclear great powers to countering strategic threats from nuclear
adversaries, whether they be small, medium, or great powers. Conversely, Russia’s nuclear
60 President of Russia, Presidential Address to Federal Assembly, March 1, 2018,

http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957
61 Brendan R. Green and Austin Long, “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear
Balance,” Security Studies, 2017, Vol.26, No.4, pp.606-641.

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Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-Pacificmodernization is still motivated in part by Moscow’s strong desire to maintain overall numericalparity with the United States. For the Russian leadership the US ballistic missile defense systemconstitutes a real future risk to the credibility of Russia’s retaliatory capability. Consequently,
Russia began to research and develop new nuclear systems to counter deployment of US missile
defenses. This unrestrained nuclear competition between the United States and Russia may
complicate future bilateral arms control negotiation and potentially affect China’s cognition of its
own nuclear retaliatory capabilities.62
Apart from the major powers, more regional states have undermined efforts to restrain missileproliferation by acquiring the scientific, technological, and industrial capabilities to produce bothballistic and cruise missiles. 63 The DPRK, India, and Pakistan have declared their possession of
nuclear weapons and demonstrated their ability to use ballistic missiles. The DPRK test-fired aninter-continental range ballistic missile, which can reach at least the US West Coast, some 8,000
kilometers distant. India flight-tested a system with a range of 3,500 to 5,000 kilometers. Pakistan
also has intermediate-range ballistic missiles able to carry nuclear warheads over 2,750
kilometers. 64 Evidently, states will continue developing or acquiring missiles and related
technologies, despite interdiction, international condemnation, sanctions, and asymmetric efforts
to limit them.

The “Post-INF” Capabilities and Major Powers’ Strategic Interactions
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) ended in 2019, but the issue of INF-range
missiles remains. Russia’s alleged treaty violations and China’s increasing conventional andnuclear armed missile capabilities drove the United States to withdraw from the treaty. The former
Trump Administration held that if the United States remained bound by the INF treaty limits, thenit would be increasingly at a disadvantage with respect to Russia and China. American analysts
argued that China has deployed thousands of land-based intermediate-range ballistic and cruise
62 Charles L. Glaser, C. L., and Steve Fetter. 2016. “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and

US Nuclear Strategy toward China,” International Security 41 (1), pp.49–98.
63 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “The Delivery Systems Threat,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, December 30, 2015, http://
www.nti.org/learn/delivery-systems/
64Missile Threat, Missile Defense Project. Lasted updated July 31, 2021,
https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/shaheen-3/

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WMD in Asia-Pacificmissiles, and ninety-five percent of them would violate the INF if China was party to it—which,of course, it is not.65 After the US INF withdrawal, Russia decided to suspend its obligations underthe INF treaty as a countermeasure. The current Biden Administration remains greatly concernedwith Russia and China’s potential employment of nuclear and conventional armed intermediaterange ballistic and cruise missiles and may try to seek negotiations on a global treaty to ban them. 66
The termination of the treaty means that the Asia-Pacific has entered into a “post-INF” era inwhich, as explained below, “post-ballistic” capabilities become a priority in military planning ofthese states and tripolar great power strategic interactions become more complex.
The “post-ballistic” capabilities arise from emerging technologies such as advanced guidance andstealth technology. Enhanced by these new technologies, a new generation of cruise missiles andtactical (shorter-range) ballistic missiles gained greater accuracy, reliability, and affordability thanthe long-range ballistic missiles. Modern cruise missiles can fly at low altitudes, which make themless visible to radars coverage and more difficult to detect and defend against. Shorter-range
ballistic missiles, with their accuracy measured in meters, have become effective tools for taking
out high-value, well-defended targets inside an adversary’s territory.
These attributes, however, leave target nations with very limited ability to counter the newgeneration of missiles in wartime. Hypersonic vehicles with speeds of Mach 5 and above, forexample, can drastically reduce the timelines for attack and response. The further proliferation of
hypersonic missiles and the related technologies may cause miscalculation and misperception.
Hypersonic weapon systems are divided into hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise
missiles. The United States, Russia, France, Japan, China, and India are all pursuing theseweapons. Russia has already deployed early versions. Furthermore, the growing popularity of dualcapable missiles, when equipped with either conventional or non-conventional warheads, are also
destabilizing and could lead to devastating deterrence failures because the payload ambiguity
increases uncertainty in a crisis and, thereby, the stakes of not striking first.

65 Jacob Stokes, “China’s Missile Program and US Withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

Treaty,” US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, Feb.4,2019, p.2.
66 Sharon Squassoni, “How the Biden Administration can Secure Real Gains in Nuclear Arms Control,” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, March 30, 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/03/how-the-biden-administration-can-securereal-gains-in-nuclear-arms-control/163

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-PacificRussia has tested and fielded a new ground launched cruise missile system (9M729) that the UnitedStates claimed violated the INF treaty since May 2013.67 Over the last two decades, China has
deployed several new models of land-attack and anti-ship conventional cruise missiles, which areviewed by the United States as providing what it calls “Anti-access/Area-denial” (A2/AD)
capability. On 3 August 2019, the day after the United States withdrew from the INF Treaty, then
US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper revealed that the United States aims to deploy INF-range
missiles in the Asia-Pacific to counter China’s “A2/AD” capabilities. 68 At the same time, thePentagon initiated a study to evaluate whether the United States needed new military capabilities
to offset any advantage Russia and China might acquire by deploying a ground-launched cruise
missile of INF range (between 500 and 5,500 kilometers). The potential US Army and/or Marine
Corps options to deploy land-based intermediate-range missiles in this region include theintermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with hypersonic glide vehicle, with a range of 4,000
km; the Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), with a range of less than 2,500 km;
the Improved Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), with a range of less than 700 km; andthe Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), with a range of 499 km.69
The potential deployment of the previously prohibited ground-based INF-range missiles by theUnited States in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in the western Pacific, may increase thecomplexity of trilateral great power strategic interactions. In response, some Chinese scholars havesuggested that China should increase the survivability of its nuclear forces by deploying multiple
warheads on missiles and experiment with hypersonic boost-glide vehicles. 70 Some analysis
outside China even speculated that Beijing might change its longstanding no-first-use (NFU)
commitment and the minimum nuclear deterrence posture.71 Yet to date, China has upheld its NFU

67 US Congressional Research Service, Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, 8 February 2019.
68 Robert Kobza, “Another Tool in the Toolbox: Using Intermediate-Range Missiles to Counter A2/AD in the Pacific,”
Georgetown Security Studies Review, 2 December 2019: 11.
69 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Post-INF Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific: Political Viability and Implementation
Challenges,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 30 June 2020: 3.
70 Tong Zhao, “China in a world with No US-Russia Treaty-Based Arms Control,” Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for
Global Policy, 1 April 2019.
71 Andrey Baklitskiy, “What the End of the INF Treaty Means for China,” Carnegie Moscow Center Commentary, 2
December 2019, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/80462

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WMD in Asia-Pacificcommitment to non-nuclear states, in spite of the speculation of some in Washington that it would
amend its NFU policy in the near future.
As for Russia, President Putin announced Russia will deploy new missile systems and augment its
missile defenses in its eastern regions. 72 Russia also took other countermeasures that enhance SinoRussian military ties and help China to boost its own missile defensive systems. 73 The SinoRussian military cooperation between their respective missile defense systems can be traced backto US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2002. Driven by the potential
development of the aforementioned missiles by the United States, Sino-Russian relations gained a
new momentum recently, which was named a “comprehensive strategic partnership” by China 74
and “an allied relationship” by Russia.

Will China Join the Trilateral Arms Control Negotiation?
In early 2019, the Trump Administration began to push for a trilateral arms control that would
include the United States, Russia, and China. Then-president Trump noted that “Russia and China
and us are all making hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of weapons which are costly andridiculous.”75 In April 2020, the US State Department released a report titled, “US Priorities for
Next-Generation Arms Control,” which outlined US priorities for “next-generation arms control”
involving both Moscow and Beijing.76 The United States tended to cite China’s participation as apre-condition of the extension of the New START. The treaty limits deployed US and Russianstrategic nuclear forces. Additionally, it facilitates inspections and exchanges of information on
the status and movements of their intercontinental ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

72 Stephen Blank, “After the INF: Russia’s Propaganda and Real Threats,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6 September 2019,https://Jamestown.org/program/after-the-inf-russias-propaganda-and-real-threats/
73 “Russia is Helping China Build a Missile Defence System, Putin Says,” Guardian, 4 October 2019.
74 “China and Russia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, online,
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/dozys_664276/gjlb_664280/3220_664352/
75 Sonne P. and J. Hudson, “Trump Orders Staff to Prepare Arms-control Push with Russia and China,” The
Washington Post, April 25, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-orders-staffto-prepare-arms-control-push-with-russia-and-china/2019/04/25/c7f05e04-6076-11e9-9412daf3d2e67c6d_story.html
76 Christopher A. Ford, “US Priorities for Next-Generation Arms Control,” Arms Control and International Security
Papers, Volume 1, Number1, April 06, 2020.

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Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-PacificAt the time, US proposals to trilateralize New START appeared disingenuous given that therelatively small Chinese nuclear forces are not equivalent to those of the United States andRussia.77 Leaving aside the quantitative and qualitative differences of China’s nuclear force, its
warheads and relevant delivery systems are stored at separated locations, which means the existing
counting rules in New START are not suitable to China.78 Several Chinese spokespersons rejected
the Trump administration’s calls officially, arguing that the two nuclear superpowers should bear
the main responsibility of reducing their arsenals to lower levels. 79 From Beijing’s perspective,
any request for a trilateral arms control dialogue from the United States is more a litmus test of its
campaign of maximum pressure towards China on a range of policy issues and an excuse for its
withdrawal from the treaty for non-substantive reasons. China is also worried that verification of
its forces under a trilateral treaty could help to detect and weaken Beijing’s limited nuclear
retaliatory capabilities, which rely in part on opacity and ambiguity to compensate for its limited
nuclear force.
China’s negative attitude towards trilateral strategic arms control negotiation doesn’t mean that
China does not support the international disarmament and non-proliferation process. As apermanent member of the U.N. Security Council and a nuclear-weapon state, China has played
constructive roles in other multilateral nuclear-related negotiations. In the 1990s, China actively
led negotiations on military-to-military confidence building and risk reduction. It signed themultilateral 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and participated in the international
monitoring systems being set up to detect nuclear explosions around the world. China pushed fora treaty preventing an arms race in outer space. 80 China also played a supportive role innegotiations leading to the 2015 multilateral Iran nuclear deal aimed at limiting that country’s
pathways to developing nuclear weapons. In the non-proliferation of missiles and theirtechnologies, although it has not participated in any of the world's major export control
77 According to Kristensen’s assessment, Russia and the United States each maintain approximately 4,000

operational nuclear weapons, while China has around 300, cited from Kristensen H. M. and M. Korda, “Status ofWorld Nuclear Forces”, Federation of American Scientists, April, 2020, https://fas.org/issues/nuclearweapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/
78 Leanne Quinn, “China’s Stance on Nuclear Arms Control and New START,” Arms Control Now, 23 August 2019,https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2019-08-23/chinas-stance-nuclear-arms-control-new-start
79 Director-General FU Cong’s Interview with Kommersant, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic ofChina, Oct.16, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1824545.shtml
80 Nancy Gallagher, “China on Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Strategic Stability,” CISSM Working Paper,August 2019: 2.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificmechanisms except for joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, China joined the Hague
International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) and pledged to halt
missile exports in 1992, 1994, 1998, and 2000. In August 2002, China promulgated its own missile
export control regulations and lists that corresponded closely to the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) guidelines.81 In 2003, China applied to join in the MTCR but was blocked by theUnited States.
When the United States shifted its China policy from engagement to containment under the Trump
Administration—a posture likely to be maintained under the Biden administration—China became
even more sensitive to the United States’ trilateral arms control initiative. Nonetheless, China
embraces dialogue underpinned by fair, equitable, and concrete principles. China will participate
in negotiations when involved in a broader set of negotiating partners such as France and theUnited Kingdom with similar levels of nuclear forces rather than being singled out. All five
officially recognized nuclear weapon states (the so-called “P5”) have convened and collaborated
successfully on the Iran negotiations. From Beijing’s perspective, the P5 format might be more
appealing than the prospect of negotiating alone with only the two nuclear superpowers. The P5
will be a good place for Beijing to negotiate confidence building measures such as the No First
Use (NFU) principle. Some Chinese scholars even support the notion that China should enter into
nuclear arms control dialogues rather than nuclear arms reduction negotiations because the concept
of arms control is more comprehensive than arms reduction. 82

Reducing the Risks of Dangerous Strategic Arms Races
The rapidly worsening global security environment now exacerbated by the global pandemic has
led to several missile control treaties or agreements being abandoned or facing an uncertain future.
The ABM Treaty and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty collapsed. The terminationof the INF Treaty highlights that bilateral arms control ultimately would not curb the geographicalspread and technological advancement of missiles. The former Trump administration announced
81 Robert J. Einhorn and Gary Samore, “Ending Russian Assistance to Iran’s Nuclear Bomb,” Survival, Vol. 44, No. 2

2002: 12.
82 Wu Riqiang, “Trilateral Arms Control Initiative: A Chinese Perspective,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 4September 2019, https://thebulletin.org/2019/09/trilateral-arms-control-initiative-a-chinese-perspective167

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-Pacificits withdrawal from the Open Sky Treaty. The 2010 New START, the only remaining treaty on
limiting strategic ballistic missiles and strategic bombers, was going to expire in February 2021
and was saved only at the last moment by its extension by the Biden administration. Under Trump,even nuclear testing was put back on the agenda with unfounded American claims of theresumption of Chinese nuclear testing—which would have contravened the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban’s “zero-yield” standard.83 This reinforces just how far the negative trend wentin the United States. Although many observers hope the Biden administration will reverse thistrend, structural trends at the global level involving the nine nuclear-armed states, and the chaotic
state of American domestic politics and nature of its foreign policy, mean that no-one can predict
its stance on these issues for longer than a few years.
China opposes arms racing outright due to its cost and potential strategic risks. From the Chineseperspective, the situation could be improved by the following measures. First, states should
strengthen and enlarge the existing institutions of missile control. A combination of deteriorating
great-power relations, uncertainties about the impact of emerging technologies, and the fact thatsome “post-INF” missiles are inherently attractive to states, with low political and legal barriers toacquisition and use, has undermined controls on missile proliferation. There is no universal norm,
treaty, or agreement which governs the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession,transfer, deployment, or use of missiles. Apart from the bilateral missile control treaties, therelevant mechanisms include unilateral (export controls), coordinated among exporting states as
the MTCR, or multilateral but not legally binding and far from universal measures such as the
HCOC. Despite its imperfections, the MTCR—the only existing multilateral arrangement covering
the transfer of missiles and missile-related equipment, material, and technology relevant toweapons of mass destruction (WMD)—has brought a significant degree of order to containing the
spread of ballistic missiles. The HCOC, an offspring of the MTCR and a useful set of voluntary
confidence building measures, refers only to one category of missiles.
The existing regulations covering missiles fall far short of those that would avoid a costly andpotentially deadly arms competition. For those concerned and responsible states in this region, it
83 US State Department, “Executive Summary of Findings on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,

Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” Bureau of Arms Control, Verification andCompliance, April. 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Tab-1-EXECUTIVE-SUMMARY-OF2020-CR-FINDINGS-04.14.2020-003-003.PDF

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WMD in Asia-Pacificis time to act now, or we will find ourselves bested by a destabilizing missile arms race. These
existing instruments should give proper priority to cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles andeven missile defense. The scope and number of their participants should be enlarged. A regional
missile-limitation regime that provides prior notice of missile and satellite launches to enhancetransparency and predictability would also offer great strategic benefits to all states in the region. 84
Second, all states—but especially the great power nuclear armed states—must do everything
possible to avoid the risk of war and nuclear war. States that possess nuclear-armed missiles mustensure that no accident or incident ever happens. All the nuclear-armed states should take thefamous saying “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” as a common
understanding and restrain their development and employment of any nuclear ballistic or cruise
missiles. Nuclear-armed states should be divided into three levels according to the quantity or
quality of their nuclear weapons. Each level should have different responsibilities.
The first level is Russia and the United States which, as nuclear superpowers, have more thanninety percent of the world’s nuclear warheads. The deterioration of great power relationships has
increased the possibility of a nuclear arms race. Their negative attitudes toward arms control havebecome a major barrier to the progress of international non-proliferation. The nuclear superpowers
should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines by rejecting preemptive
nuclear strikes or declaring that the sole use of nuclear weapons is as “the last resort” to defend
their national security.
The second layer includes France, Great Britain, and China, the other three permanent membersof the U.N. security council. It is imperative to encourage these states to make more contributions
to the international arms control process.
The third layer involves the four de facto nuclear states, India, Pakistan, the DPRK, and Israel,
who are neither members of the P5 nor parties to the NPT. Their rights to exploit nuclear energy
peacefully should be respected. Meanwhile, every effort should be made to limit and reduce the84 Kurosaki Akira, “Moving Beyond Deterrence and Missile Defense,” INESAP Briefing Paper, No.13, November

2004, http://www.inesap.org/sites/default/files/Briefing13_04_0.pdf

169Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) in Asia-Pacificrisk of a nuclear war or conflict between India and Pakistan to boost the denuclearization processof the DPRK, while guaranteeing their national security.
Last, but not the least, the new arms control and disarmament dialogue must directly address the
new factors that could increase the risk of accidental or inadvertent nuclear conflict, mostimportant, the potential destabilizing effects of new non-nuclear weapon technologies such as
ballistic missile defense, anti-satellite weapons, and precision-strike missile technology. The
emerging advanced technologies supplement and even enhance nuclear weapons while offering
non-nuclear states capabilities with which to offset the projection of conventional and nuclear
forces by the great powers. With the widespread applications of emerging technologies, nonnuclear military facilities and platforms may degrade nuclear decision-making and increase therisk of an accidental nuclear war. Thus, Track 2 dialogues on emerging technologies and some
non-nuclear weapon systems might develop workable proposals to reduce the resulting risks.
The continued high alert levels of American, Russian, British, and French warheads to support“launch on warning” is another risk that deserves urgent attention. Moreover, Russia and theUnited States each possess huge counterforce capabilities, which threatens not only each other but
lesser nuclear adversaries with a decapitating and disarming first-strike. In contrast, China, India,
and Pakistan reportedly keep their nuclear weapons un-deployed at central storage facilities on
low alert levels. Their retaliatory strike capabilities are based on the principle of “launch underattack,” not “under warning.” Already in 1994, China proposed that the P5 should agree to adopt
NFU, which could lay the foundation of developing codes of conduct to decrease the risks. 85
Recognizing the NFU principle could lessen the risk arising from misperception andmisunderstanding of the preemptive strike posture on the one hand and sustain the taboo against
nuclear employment on the other.

85 Zhengqiang Pan, “A Study of China’s No-First-Use Policy on Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear

Disarmament, 1, No.1, 2018: 115-136.

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WMD in Asia-Pacific

6. Status of Existing and Emerging Asia-PacificSpace Powers Capabilities
Namrata Goswami

Introduction
The Asia-Pacific is a key region in international relations today. Host to major powers like China,
India, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and Singapore, the combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP)purchasing power parity (PPP) of the region was estimated to be the largest in the world in 2020,
pre-pandemic assessments. 1 Interestingly, despite the COVID 19 pandemic, China has seen
positive growth rates as the largest contributer to Asian economic vibrancy. 2 By 2030, the region
is forecasted to contribute 60 per cent of global growth.3 Among the major space faring nations in
the Asia-Pacific, China will become the world’s largest economy by 2050, according toPricewaterhouseCoopers, followed by India at number two and the United States (US) at number
three.4 Indonesia is forecasted to be the fourth largest economy; South Korea will be 14th in overall
world ranking.5 Among those forecasted to lead, China and India are Great Powers, followed bymajor powers like Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia. China, India, and Japan are major space
faring nations with independent capacity to launch into space, with ambitions for space settlement
1 Wang Huiyao, “In 2020, Asian Economies will become larger than the rest of the world combined-here’s how,”World Economic Forum, July 25, 2019, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/07/the-dawn-of-the-asiancentury/ (accessed July 26, 2021).
2 Jonathan Cheng, “China is the only major economy to report economic growth for 2020,” The Wall Street Journal,
January 18, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-is-the-only-major-economy-to-report-economic-growthfor-2020-11610936187 (accessed July 26, 2021).
3 Praneeth Yandamuri and Zara Ingilizian, “In 2020, Asia will have the World’s Largest GDP. Here’s What that
Means,” World Economic Forum, December 20, 2019. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/asia-economicgrowth/ (accessed September 21, 2020).
4 PricewaterhouseCoopers, “The World in 2050,” https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/economy/the-world-in2050.html (accessed September 28, 2020).
5 Will Martin, ‘RANKED: This will be the 32 most powerful economies in the world by 2050,” Business Insider,
February 17, 2017. https://www.businessinsider.com/pwc-ranking-of-biggest-economies-ppp-2050-2017-2(accessed September 21, 2020).

© 2022 Namrata Goswami, CC BY 4.0

171Status of Existing and Emerging Asia-Pacific Space Powers Capabilities
and space resource utilization. South Korea has had its own space agency since 1992: the Korea
Aerospace Research Institute. 6 The context within which the current space activities of space
faring nations are occurring has changed as well. Unlike during the Cold War, when the focus wason ‘Great Power Competition’ for prestige and ideological reputation, with ‘flags and footprints’
missions, today, the focus is on space utilization and development, of which prestige is but a minor
part. One can gauge this in the articulated space ambitions of the United States,7 China,8 India,9Japan,10 and South Korea.11
Given the emergent space power focus in the Asia-Pacific, this report highlights the space power
capabilities of the two Great Powers in space in Asia (China and India). This is followed by asection on horizontal and vertical proliferation of space warfare capabilities. 12 The report discusses
the institutional and legal regimes and constraints on space weaponization, explains certain worstcase militarization scenarios, and presents alternative space demilitarization pathways.

Defining Space PowerPower is the ability that Country A wields over Country B to get Country B to do something, which
Country B would not otherwise do. It is the ability to influence others to do what you want themto do.13 It also implies an ability to prevent others from doing what they want, especially if it is notin your interest. Sometimes, such power is wielded to prevent others from including agendas in
6 Korea Aerospace Research Institute. https://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub01_01.do (accessed September 21, 2020).
7 The White House, National Space Council, “A New Era for Deep Space Exploration and Development,” July 23,

2020. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/A-New-Era-for-Space-Exploration-andDevelopment-07-23-2020.pdf (accessed September 21, 2020).
8 Statement of Dr. Namrata Goswami Independent Senior Analyst and Author 2016-2017 Minerva Grantee Before
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on “China in Space: A Strategic Competition?”
April 25, 2019. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Namrata%20Goswami%20USCC%2025%20April.pdf(accessed September 28, 2020).
9 Raghu Krishnan, “ISRO’s Big Space Plans: Take a Look at the Missions the Space Agency has Lined up in the
Coming Years,” The Economic Times, September 8, 2019 (Accessed September 21, 2020).
10 “Moon Shot Japan’s Era of New Space,” CNBC, n.d. https://cnb.cx/36kfA5q (accessed September 21, 2020).
11 An, Hyoung Joon, “South Korea’s Space Program: Activities and Ambitions,” Asia Policy, April 24, 2020.
https://www.nbr.org/publication/asia-in-space-the-race-to-the-final-frontier/ (accessed September 21, 2020).
12 Peter Garretson, “What War in Space Might Look Like Circa 2030-2040?” Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center, August 28, 2020.
http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/What_War_In_Space_Might_Look_Like_In_The_Next_One_To_Two_Decades.
pdf (accessed September 28, 2020).
13 Robert Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science, 2:3 (December 1957), pp. 201-15.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificdiscussions that may not be in your interest. 14 An example of this is the ability of the permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to pressurize and prevent other countries
from discussing issues that are detrimental to their or their allies’ interest. Therefore, power, ininternational relations, is the capability to influence, persuade or coerce others to do what is in
one’s own interest. By extension, spacepower is an extension of comprehensive power: the abilityof Country A to persuade or coerce Country B to behave in a manner in space that is beneficial toCountry A’s interests. It includes the ability to deter harmful behavior, either by denial or bypunishment. Brent Ziarnick in Developing National Power in Space A Theoretical Model defines
spacepower as “the ability to do something in space.” 15 Ziarnick develops his definition from
Brigadier General “Billy” Mitchell’s 1925 definition of airpower “as the ability to do something
in the air.”16 Ziarnick quotes Colonel David Lupton, who defines spacepower as “the ability of anation to exploit the space environment in pursuit of national goals and purposes and includes theentire astronautical capabilities of a nation.” 17 The US Space Force’s Capstone Doctrine, publishedin 2020, states that “national spacepower is the totality of a nation’s ability to exploit the spacedomain in pursuit of prosperity and security.”18 The Capstone Doctrine identifies four instrumentsof national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). “Military
spacepower enables a nation to protect and defend space-based sources of economic power.
Military operations exist in space to preserve and advance all equities of national spacepower.” 19
It is critical to realize that while there are generalizable definitions of spacepower, when
operationalized within the context of a particular country, the concept of strategic culture has an
impact on how states behave/will behave in outer space. Strategic culture can be defined as a sumof a nation’s assumptions about its reality (threats, opportunities) based on which policy choices
are preferred over others. These policy choices are informed by the state’s political culture

14 Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” The American Political Science Review,

56/4 (Dec., 1962), pp. 947-952
15 Brent Ziarnick, Developing National Power in Space A Theoretical Model (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company
Inc, 2015), p. 12.
16 Ziarnick, Ibid.
17 Ziarnick, p. 12.
18 Space Capstone Publication, “SpacePower Doctrine for Space Forces” United States Space Force, June 2020.
https://www.spaceforce.mil/Portals/1/Space%20Capstone%20Publication_10%20Aug%202020.pdf (accessed
September 28, 2020).
19 Ibid.

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reflecting both continuity and change over time.20 Political Culture is “a short-hand expression fora ‘mindset’ that has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative
behaviors, problems [emphasis added], and solutions which are logically possible.” 21 For instance,from a strategic culture perspective, China’s aim is to win the competition for influence and power
projection, especially with the help of outer space, and without bloodshed so that its value system(especially that guided by President Xi Jinping’s thought), is established and legitimized. 22 Given
that space has such deep consequences for how society is run today, including via the civilian,commercial, and military uses of space, “the purpose of space strategy is to ensure access to anduse of space.”23 To maintain access requires space capacity. It is therefore important to examine
the profile of the space powers’ capabilities.

Profile of Each Space Power’s Capabilities
This section offers an assessment of the Great Powers in space (China and India) and their spacecapacities.
China
China has one of the most ambitious space programs in the world. Funded annually with a budgetof approximately $8 billion, China has ambitions to establish a permanent space station by 2022,
a lunar research outpost by 2036, a Solar Power Satellite (SPS) transmission capacity fromgeostationary orbit (GEO) by 2050, and to establish itself as the world leader in space by 2050.24
China has invested in developing its military space capacity to augment its information warfare
capacity for military command and control (CnC), precision navigation, and timing (PNT) for

20 Namrata Goswami, “Explaining China’s Grand Strategy through the Lens of Strategic Culture,” The Space Review,May 18, 2020. https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3944/1 (accessed September 28, 2020).
21 Stephen Peter Rosen, “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,” International Security, 19/4 (Spring 1995),
pp. 5-31.
22 Robert Lawrence Kuhn, “Discerning the Essence of Xi Jinping Thought,” China Daily, March 26, 2018.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201803/26/WS5ab8a6aaa3105cdcf651457f.html (accessed September 28, 2020).
23 John J. Klein, Understanding Space Strategy The Art of War in Space (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), p.
21.
24 Namrata Goswami, “The Economic and Military Impact of China’s BeiDou Navigation System,” The Diplomat, July01, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-economic-and-military-impact-of-chinas-beidou-navigationsystem/ (accessed July 26, 2021).

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WMD in Asia-Pacificindependent missile launch and tracking as well as sea-based launch for avoiding detection. In thecommercial sphere, Chinese private companies like OneSpace have already launched to space in2019 and have plans for developing reusable rockets. Within the last two years (2018 onwards),
China has seen investments of up to $2 billion in its private space sector.
Civilian Capability
China has an independent space launch capability and has a demonstrated human presence in Low
Earth Orbit (LEO) via its Tiangong space station. China has achieved humanity’s first landing on
the lunar far side, and it has also launched its second independently conceived Mars mission. As
of April 1, 2020, China has 363 satellites, the US has 1,327, Russia 169, and India 118.25 On June23, 2020, China launched the 55th satellite of its BeiDou Navigation System (BDS) according itself
a fully independent, self-reliant Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) as an alternative to
the US Space Force-maintained Global Positioning System (GPS). With this launch, “China is
now able to extend influence in a multidomain environment (land, sea, and space) via its BeiDouspace system, which provides navigation to aircraft, submarines, missiles, as well as commercial
services dependent on such navigation.” 26 This Chinese information infrastructure consists ofundersea cables, (in which China is dominant), space-supported links, and other Earth-based links.
China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) determined in April 2020 that
services like space information, and associated incorporated services like 5G, satellite broadband,
artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, and the Internet of Things (IoT) are part of its “NewInfrastructures” list.27 BeiDou offers an alternative to GPS, enabling China to further consolidate
its hold on global infrastructure and rulemaking, form partnerships and alliances and to control thestandards for information technology, mobile devices, 5G, self-driving cars and drones, and thebroader IoT. It offers China an influence mechanism whereby countries dependent on BeiDou
would hesitate to criticize China on political issues such as Tibet, the South China Sea (SCS), or
Taiwan. This increases China’s ability to coerce and compel. Wang Jingang, the chief deputy

25 Union of Concerned Scientists, “UCS Satellite Database”, November 30, 2018. https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-

weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database (accessed on September 28, 2020).
26 Namrata Goswami, “The Economic and Military Impact of China’s BeiDou Navigation System”, The Diplomat, July
1, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/the-economic-and-military-impact-of-chinas-beidou-navigationsystem/#:~:text=By%20Namrata%20Goswami&text=On%20June%2023%2C%202020%2C%20China,for%20its%20B
DS3%20navigation%20constellation (accessed September 23, 2020).
27 Ibid.

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designer of the BDS-3 satellites, has described his work as a “rare chance to devote my intelligence
to a symbolic national project.” He points out that “people still mainly depend on navigation by
GPS, supplemented by BDS,” but hopes that “in a few years, people can be navigated mainly by
BDS.”28 In January 2019, China established its first state-funded Space-Based Solar Power (SBSP)
plant in Chongqing, a concept supported by Li Ming, the vice president of the China Academy ofSpace Technology (CAST). 29 The base plant is being constructed under the guidance of the
Chongqing Collaborative Innovation Research Institute for Civil-Military Integration(CCIRICMI) in Southwestern China in partnership with researchers from Chongqing University,
CAST's Xi'an Branch in Shaanxi province, and Xidian University. An initial investment of $15
million has been made by the Bishan district government for the SBSP plant. Technologies being
tested include SBSP satellites in GEO using automated assembly and wireless powertransmission.30 Xie Gengxin, Deputy Head of CCIRICMI, has stated that:We plan to launch four to six tethered balloons from the testing base and connect themwith each other to set up a network at an altitude of around 1,000 meters… these balloons
will collect sunlight and convert solar energy to microwave before beaming it back to
Earth. Receiving stations on the ground will convert such microwaves to electricity anddistribute it to a grid… if everything goes well, a Chinese solar power station will be put
into orbit about 36,000 kilometers above Earth and start generating power before 2040. 31
China is also investing in its space launch capacity. Its latest rocket, the Long March 5 (which iscapable of launching 14 metric tons to geostationary orbit (GEO), 25 tons to low earth orbit (LEO),
and 8.2 tons to trans lunar injection) successfully launched in December 2019. The success of thislaunch was critical given the China Mars Mission (Tianwen) was launched on the Long March 5
on July 23, 2020. Also, the Long March 5 launched China’s Chang’e 5 lunar sample return missionin November 2020 and sunsequently will launch China’s eleven planned missions to construct its

28 “From Compass to BeiDou: Chinese Wisdom Help Navigate Belt & Road”, China Daily, November 19, 2018.

https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201811/19/WS5bf25cb3a310eff303289946.html aAccessed September 28,2020).
29 “China Starts to Build World’s First Space-Based Solar Power Plant”, CGTN, February 18, 2019.
http://www.ecns.cn/news/economy/2019-02-18/detail-ifzeratr8870758.shtml (accessed on April 18, 2019).
30 Pan Zhaoyi, “China Starts to Build World’s First Space-based Solar Power Plant”, CGTN, February 18, 2019.
https://news.cgtn.com/news/3d3d514f34597a4e32457a6333566d54/index.html (accessed on April 17, 2019).
31 Ibid.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificpermanent space station (Tiangong) by 2022. In addition, China is developing the Long March 9,which is designed to carry a payload of 140 metric tons to LEO, a 50-ton spacecraft to a lunar
transfer orbit, and a 44-ton payload to Mars transfer orbit. 32 Importantly, in its justifications for
the Long March 9, China listed three goals: to launch a Mars robotic exploration mission requiring
41 tonne payloads; to launch manned Mars and deep space missions; and to construct an “orbital
solar power plant with 10,000 MW capacity, massing some 50,000 tonnes, requiring 620+
launches.”33
One of the core missions for China in civil space is its China Lunar Exploration Program (CLEP).
Following the successful landing of the Chang’e 4 on the far side of the moon on January 3, 2019,
Wu Yanhua, deputy head of the China National Space Administration (CNSA) announced that by2019 year-end, China will launch Chang’e-5, to bring lunar samples back to Earth (accomplished
December 2020). This would be followed by Chang’e-6, aimed at bringing samples from the South
Pole; Chang’e-7, which will survey the South Pole for evaluating its composition; and Chang’e8, which will test key technologies, like 3D printing, to lay the groundwork for the construction ofa scientific base on the moon.34 Critically, scientists at the Technology and Engineering Center forSpace Utilization of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) have tested 3D printing technology
in micro-gravity by successfully completing a ceramic testing technology in 2018.35 According toWang Gong, Director of the CAS Key Laboratory of Space Manufacturing Technology, this willbuild a Chinese capability to construct bases on the moon and Mars, as well as in-situ resource
utilization and space manufacturing with space-based resources.36 Using ceramics is instructive as
it is similar in composition to lunar silicate particles. China tested growing life organisms likecotton seeds, Arabidopsis, and potatoes on the lunar surface with its 3kg bioregenerative life
support system aboard the Chang’e 4, with only the cotton seed sprouting. This is in pursuance of
32 Zhao Lei, “Super Powerful Long March 9 Said to Begin Missions around 2030,” China Daily, March 11, 2019.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/11/WS5c859b62a3106c65c34edcc0.html
33 As quoted from Journal of Rocket Propulsion, January 2011, in
https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/cz-x.htm (accessed July 26, 2021).
34 “China unveils Follow-Up Lunar Exploration Missions”, Xinhua, January 14, 2019 at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-01/14/c_137743015.htm (accessed on April 18, 2019).
35 “China Focus: China Pioneers Ceramic 3D Printing in Micro-Gravity”, Xinhua, June 19, 2018 at
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/19/c_137265536.htm (accessed on April 17, 2019). Richard P.
Appelbaum, et.al., Innovation in China: Challenging the Global Science and Technology System (Polity, 2018).
George S. Yip and Bruce McKern, China’s Next Strategic Advantage: From Imitation to Innovation (MIT Press,
2017).
36 “China Focus: China pioneers Ceramic 3D Printing in Microgravity”, n. 34.

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building human capacity to settle and survive on the lunar surface. China’s CLEP is not only aimed
at lunar scientific missions, but it is also a long-term space presence development strategy toincrementally build capacity for lunar and asteroid mining. The Moon offers the best chance ofbuilding space-faring capacities on a planetary body because it is not difficult to reach from Earth.
This aspect is recognized by Wu Weiren, the chief scientist at CLEP. He states that, “our shortterm goal is to orbit the Moon, and land on the Moon, and take samples back from the Moon…our
long-term goal is explore, land and settle. We want our manned lunar landing to stay for longer
periods and establish a research base.”37 China also developed its relay satellite in May 2018, with
the Queqiao, or Magpie Bridge, being placed in the L2 Halo orbit to serve as a communication
relay satellite from the Chang’e 4.38 Queqiao can peer into the Lunar polar craters, enabling future
landing zones for China’s probes in the shadowed regions. Lieutenant General Zhang Yulin,
former deputy commander of China’s Manned Space Program and former Deputy Chief of theArmament Development Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC), now with theStrategic Support Force (SSF), specified the significance of the Moon in 2016 when he stated that,“the earth-moon space will be strategically important for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation.”39 Yulin indicated in that same interview that China will be investing in building capacity
to generate solar power in space. He was clear on what China’s space program’s focus should bein the long term, “The future of China's manned space program, is not a moon landing, which isquite simple, or even the manned Mars program which remains difficult, but continual explorationof the earth-moon space with ever developing technology.”40
Military Space Capacities
China is developing its military space capacity. China’s space program is directed by the State
Administration on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), which

37 “What does China want to do in Space”, BBC, April 20, 2016 at https://www.bbc.com/news/av/36089689/what-

does-china-want-to-do-in-space (accessed on September 17, 2020). Marina Koren, “China’s Growing Ambitions inSpace”, The Atlantic, January 23, 2017 at https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/01/chinaspace/497846/ (accessed on April 18, 2019).
38 Luyuan Xu, “ How China’s Lunar Relay Satellite Arrived in its Final Orbit”, Planetary Society, June 15, 2018 at
http://www.planetary.org/blogs/guest-blogs/2018/20180615-queqiao-orbit-explainer.html (accessed on
September 17, 2020).
39 “Exploiting Earth-Moon Space: Chinese Ambitions after Space Station”, Xinhua, March 08, 2016 at
http://m.chinadaily.com.cn/en//2016-03/08/content_23775949.htm (accessed on September 17, 2020).
40 Ibid.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificfunctions under the direction of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). 41
Consequently, China appreciates the vital role that space plays for CnC, PNT, informationizedwarfare, space access and presence, space-based communications systems, and developing
counter-space capabilities via-a-vis the adversary. In 2007, China tested its anti-satellite (ASAT)
capability. Such ASAT technologies have been further refined in 2010, 2013, and 2014,
enhancing their capabilities (without generating space debris as did its 2007 test). Open sources
report that the SSF is training with ASAT missiles aimed at US satellites. These ASAT systems
include a variant of the HQ-19 surface-to-air missile (utilized in tests in 2007 and 2010), the DN2 (2013), and the DN-3 (in the tests of 2015, 2016, and 2017). According to the National Spaceand Air Intelligence Center (NASIC) report, Competing in Space:
China has military units that have begun training with anti-satellite missiles. Russia isprobably also developing an anti-satellite missile. These missiles can destroy US and allied
space systems in low Earth orbit, making intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, andcommunications satellites vulnerable. 42
In 2015, China institutionalized a separate space service with the establishment of the People’s
Liberation Army Space Force (PLASSF). The PLASSF, for the first time, brings together China’s
growing military space assets into a single unit, aimed at dominance across the spectrum of air,space, and cyber. An independent BDS adds to China’s military CnC as well. China can now
independently guide missiles and bombs onto fixed targets without fear that the United States
would turn off navigation services. China can now also guide its missiles very close to the target,
after which a terminal seeker can provide active guidance for precise targeting. BeiDou augments
independent military CnC by allowing precise knowledge of the location of one’s own forces, andthe ability to precisely target and provide navigation for military forces and strikes. This capability
strengthens China’s ability to coerce or compel others within its sphere of interest, such as on
issues like the South China Sea, Taiwan, or Hong Kong. An independent BDS coupled with 5G

41 “Ministry of Industry and Information Technology”, The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, at

http://english.gov.cn/state_council/2014/08/23/content_281474983035940.htm (accessed on September 17,2020).
42 National Air and Space Intelligence Center, “Competing in Space”, December 2018 athttps://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/16/2002080386/-1/-1/1/190115-F-NV711-0002.PDF, p.21 (accessed on
September 20, 2019).

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means real-time military CnC and devastatingly accurate automated weapons systems.43 China’s
military space capacity is geared towards building an independent capability to build into a systemof comprehensive power with ASAT capability, informationized warfare, orbital presence, deep
space missions, and lunar missions. It encompasses both military and civilian assets into one
ideological mooring.
Commercial SpaceIn the past few years, China has been developing its commercial space capacity. Under the
direction of President Xi Jinping, China has been enabling the development of its private
space sector. This was made a priority in 2014 when the State Council of the Communist
Party of China (CPC) released Document 60 to encourage China’s private space sector. 44
Since then, there have been larger investments in China’s private space sector as well as afocus on civil-military integration. 45 Since 2016, China’s private funding has seen an
increase to about $2 billion annually. 46 Private space companies have already achieved
orbital launch and are investing in developing critical technologies like reusable spacelaunch capacity. Amongst the known private space companies, Onespace is one of the firstcompanies to successfully launch to sub-orbit,47 followed by attempts made by Linkspaceand Landspace. In August 2019, Linkspace experimented with the first Chinese reusable
launch vehicle, when its rocket reached a height of 300 meters above ground and thenlanded back intact. 48 Beijing Interstellar Glory Space Technology Ltd or iSpace
launched its rocket Hyperbola 1 into orbit in July 2019, marking the first such

43 Namrata Goswami, “The Economic and Military Impact of China’s BeiDou Navigation System”. n. 25.
44 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, “Guiding Opinions of the State Council on

Encouraging Social Investment in Investment and Financing Mechanisms in Key Innovation Areas Document 60.”
November 16, 2014. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-11/26/content_9260.htm (accessed September
28, 2020).
45 Zhao Lei, “Civil-Military Integration will Deepen,” China Daily, March 3, 2018
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201803/03/WS5a99d67ca3106e7dcc13f437.html (accessed August 3, 2020).
46 Michael Sheetz, “China Increases Investment in Emerging Private Space Industry,” CNBC, October 10, 2018, ,https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/10/china-increases-investment-in-emerging-private-space-industry.html(accessed August 3, 2020)
47 Reuters, “China Launches First Rocket Designed by a Private Company,” May 17, 2018.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-launch-china-onespace/china-launches-first-rocket-designed-by-aprivate-company-idUSKCN1II0FK (accessed August 3, 2020).
48 “China Successfully Launches Largest Reusable Rocket,” Global Times, August 10, 2019.
https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1160951.shtml (accessed August 3, 2020)

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WMD in Asia-Pacificsuccessful orbital launch by a Chinese private company. 49 In January 2021, iSpace
attempted (and apparently failed) to launch into orbit China’s first reusable rocket, theHyperbola-2.50
India
India, like China, views space as part of its grand strategy and as a tool to defend and expand its
power. Like China, India has an independent space launch capacity, has launched missions to theMoon and Mars, and tested an ASAT capability. India has also established a separate space service
with the establishment of the Defense Space Agency in 2019. Some of India’s civilian, military,and commercial space capacities are detailed in the next section.
Civilian Space Capacities
India possesses civilian space launch capacities, which are cost effective, not due to reusability but
to lower manufacturing costs. This includes the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) and the
Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). India has the capacity to launch multiple
payloads, including a record breaking 104 satellites, which were launched on a single mission in2017, 51 a record since broken by SpaceX in January 2021 with the launch of 143 satellites on asingle rocket.52 In another record for India, 29 satellites were launched to three different orbits in
2019. 53 India launched its first Moon mission in 2008 with its Chandrayaan 1 lunar orbiter
mission. This mission included NASA’s Moon Mineralogy Mapper (M3),which helped confirm
the presence of water ice on the lunar surface. 54 In 2014, India successfully sent a Mars orbiter,

49 Reuters, “Chinese Rocket Startup Puts Satellites into Orbit for First Time,” Reuters, July 25, 2019.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-space/chinese-rocket-startup-puts-satellites-into-orbit-for-first-timeidUSKCN1UK0KY (accessed August 3, 2020).
50 China’s iSpace suffers failure with second orbital launch attempt - SpaceNews, February 04, 2021,
https://www.space.com/chinese-startup-ispace-rocket-launch-failure (accessed July 26, 2021).
51 Barry Ellen, “India Launches 104 Satellites From a Single Rocket, Ramping Up a Space Race,” The New York Times,
accessed June 13, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/15/world/asia/india-satellites-rocket.html
52 Jonathan O’ Callaghan, “SpaceX Launches Rocket with 143 Rockets The Most Ever Flown on a Single Mission,”
Forbes, January 24, 2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanocallaghan/2021/01/24/spacex-launches-rocketwith-143-satellites--the-most-ever-flown-on-a-single-mission/?sh=4d89933027fd (accessed July 26, 2021).
53 Indian Express, “Explained: What makes PSLV-C45 special,” April 2, 2019.
https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/pslv-c45-rocket-launch-indian-space-research-organisation-isroc5653610/ (accessed September 28, 2020).
54 NASA, “Chandrayaan-1 Moon Impact Probe,” n.d.. https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/missions/chandrayaan-1/indepth/ (accessed March 9, 2020).

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Mangalyaan, at a low cost of US $74 million. 55 In September 2019, while India failed with its
lunar lander, it did succeed with its Chandrayaan 2 lunar orbiter entering lunar orbit in August
2019 to map the lunar poles.56 India’s ambition to scale higher in outer space was evidenced in2018 when Prime Minister Modi announced that India would send a man or woman into LEO by
2022, in a mission called Gaganyaan.57 Subsequently, four Indian astronauts began a year-longtraining exercise in Russia’s Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center (GCTC), but the mission has
been delayed by the Covid-19 pandemic. 58 India’s civilian space capacity is utilized in othersectors as well, like the geospatial information system, Prospective Fishing Zones (PFZs), accurate
weather forecasts, financial and telecommunication services, as well as tele-education services. 59
Military Space Capacities
India’s military space sector took off after India had to reckon with ‘intelligence failure’ during
the Kargil War of 1999 against Pakistan, when Indian agencies failed to pick up intelligence on
infiltrators crossing the Himalayan border. Consequently, India developed its first Technology
Control Satellite (TES) in 2001. In 2004, in order to collate intelligence within a single body, India
established the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO). In 2008, as a response to
China’s ASAT test in 2007, India established a separate Integrated Space Cell within the Integrated
Defence Services Headquarters, followed by the Space Security Coordination Group (SSCG)
under the National Security Adviser. RISAT-2, which was launched in 2008, was India’s first
dedicated military satellite, 60 followed by the GISAT-7 in 2013. 61 India’s NavIC (Navigation
55 Ipsita Agrawal, “These Scientists Sent a Rocket to Mars for less than it cost to make ‘the Martian,” Wired, March

17, 2017,. https://www.wired.com/2017/03/these-scientists-sent-a-rocket-to-mars-for-less-than-it-cost-to-makethe-martian/ (accessed March 10, 2020); Sanjay Kumar, “India Joins Elite MARS Club,” NATURE, September 24,
2014, https://www.nature.com/news/india-joins-elite-mars-club-1.15997 (accessed September 17, 2019).
56 Jason Davis, “Chandrayaan-2 Enters Lunar Orbit,” The Planetary Society, August 20, 2019,http://www.planetary.org/blogs/jason-davis/chandrayaan-2-successful-loi.html (accessed March 9, 2020).
57 Press Trust of India, “Gaganyaan, India’s first manned mission, set to be a reality by 2022,” Live Mint, August 15,
2018,. https://www.livemint.com/Politics/glFe56EP0V2EkF25mQshXO/Narendra-Modi-announces-Gaganyaan-inIndependence-Day-speech.html (accessed June 13, 2019).
58 “Star City adventure: Take a sneak peek into India’s first space crew training in Russia,” Russia Today, February
17, 2020, https://www.rt.com/news/480892-india-first-space-crew-russia/ (accessed February 18, 2020).
59 Government of India, Department of Space, Indian Space Research Organisation, “Vision and Mission
Statements,”. https://www.isro.gov.in/about-isro/vision-and-mission-statements (accessed March 10, 2020).
60 EO Portal Directory, “RISAT-2 (Radar Imaging Satellite-2).” https://earth.esa.int/web/eoportal/satellitemissions/r/risat-2 (accessed June 12, 2020).
61 Rajat Pandit, “India’s first military satellite successfully launched,” Times of India, August 30, 2013.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Indias-first-military-satellite-successfullylaunched/articleshow/22168268.cms; (accessed June 12, 2020).

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WMD in Asia-PacificIndian Constellation), which is part of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) and has been
identified as an ‘allied system’ by the 2020 US National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) under
section 1601, subtitled, Space Activities. 62 In March 2019, India launched its Mission Shakti
ASAT test against its own target satellite Microsat-R. 63 The ASAT test demonstrated India’s
capability to hit adversary objects (interdict and intercept) in space. The test was described by the
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a deterrent asset against attack on India’s space
infrastructure. 64 In a tweet on March 27, 2019, the Prime Minister stated, “#MissionShakti is
special for 2 reasons: (1) India is only the 4th country to acquire such a specialized & modern
capacity. (2) Entire effort is indigenous. India stands tall as a space power! It will make India
stronger, even more secure and will further peace and harmony.” 65 Following the test, Prime
Minister Modi directed National Security Adviser Ajit Doval to work on a space power doctrin
and to set up the contours of a Defense Space Agency and a Defense Space Research Organisation.
Commercial SpaceAs in China, India’s commercial space sector has taken off, with companies like Bellatrix 66
working on rocket propulsion, R-beam working on wireless transmission, Blue Sky Analytics 67
working on space-based Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) for pollution
monitoring, Dhruva Space68 building small SATS, Satsure69 mapping supply chain infrastructure,
and TeamIndus70 focusing on building spacecraft and lunar landers. Another company, Exseed
Space, is the first private Indian space start-up to succeed in building and launching its own satellite

62 “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020,” Congress.gov. December 20, 2019.

https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1790 (accessed March 16, 2020)
63 Loren Grush, “India Shows it Can Destroy Satellites in Space, Worrying Experts about Space Debris,” The Verge,
March 27, 2019. https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/27/18283730/india-anti-satellite-demonstration-asat-testmicrosat-r-space-debris (accessed March 11, 2020)
64 “India’s A-SAT Not Against Any Country: PM Modi,” The Times of India, March 27, 2019.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pm-narendra-modi-address-to-nationhighlights/articleshow/68592668.cms (accessed on September 25, 2020).
65 Narendra Modi @narendramodi, Twitter, March 27, 2019.
https://twitter.com/narendramodi?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1110801488
559759360%7Ctwgr%5Eshare_3&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Ftimesofindia.indiatimes.com%2Findia%2Fpmnarendra-modi-address-to-nation-highlights%2Farticleshow%2F68592668.cms (accessed September 25, 2020).
66 Bellatrix Aerospace Website. http://www.bellatrixaerospace.com/ (accessed June 14, 2019).
67 Blue Sky Analytics Website. https://blueskyhq.in/about (accessed October 13, 2019).
68 Dhruva Space Website. https://www.dhruvaspace.com/ (accessed February 18, 2020).
69 Satsure Website. http://www.satsure.in/ (accessed June 14, 2019).
70 TeamIndus Website. https://medium.com/teamindus (accessed June 14, 2019).

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on a SpaceX Falcon 9 international commercial launch.71 In light of this, the Indian Departmentof Space has established NewSpace India Limited (NSIL) – a state funded and controlled
enterprise – to further commercialize and privatize India’s space capacities. 72 It remains to be seen
if, like China, India’s new space companies are able to build their own space launch systems anddevelop reusability as a key feature.
The next section highlights trends in horizontal and vertical proliferation of space warfare
capacities with plausible probes to include countries like Japan, Iran, Pakistan, the United States,
Russia, and Australia.

Trends in Horizontal and Vertical Proliferation of Space Warfare Capabilities
Given the increase in space power projection capacities for Asian Great Powers, China and India,
what can we anticipate in terms of horizontal and vertical proliferation in space warfare capacities?
To clarify, the concepts of horizontal and vertical proliferation have been drawn from the literature
on nuclear weapons proliferation and generalized into the literature on space weapons systems.
“Horizontal” proliferation refers to nation-states or nonstate entities that do not have, but are
acquiring, nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials for producing them. 73 To
extend this explanation to space weapons, horizontal proliferation would mean the acquisition of
space capabilities by nation states and non-state entities that do not have them and that “areacquiring…or developing the capability and materials for producing them.” “Vertical”
proliferation refers to nation-states that possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their stockpilesof these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or

71 Surendra Singh, & Srinivas Laxman, “India’s first private satellite launched,” Times of India, December 4, 2018.

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/space-x-launches-indias-first-privately-built-satellite-exceedsat1/articleshow/66937238.cms (accessed June 14, 2019).
72 Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Department of Space, “New Space India Ltd,” July 24, 2019.
https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=192201 (accessed March 9, 2020)
News18, “Sitharaman Launches New Space India Limited, ISRO’s Commercial Arm to Market, Sell Products,” July 5,
2019. https://www.news18.com/news/business/sitharaman-launches-new-space-india-limited-isros-commercialarm-to-market-sell-products-2219263.html (accessed July 7, 2019)
73Victor W. Sidel, MD and Levy, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Abolition,” Am J
PublicHealth.
2007
September;
97(9):
1589–1594.doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2006.100602;
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963312/ (accessed September 27, 2020).

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WMD in Asia-Pacificdeveloping new weapons.” 74 By extension, space weapons-related vertical proliferation would
mean proliferation of space weapons and additive missiles by nation-states that already possess
space warfare capacities and are “increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving thetechnical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons.” 75
Horizontal Proliferation of Space Warfare Capabilities in Asia
Is there an increase in horizontal proliferation of space warfare capacities in Asia? That is, aremore nation states and non-state entities that do not have space capacities planning on acquiring
these space capacities to include warfare capacities? Given the growing economic dependence ofsocieties on space-based assets, it is more or less likely that states will be increasingly looking toharden their space assets and to create mechanisms of both deterrence and compellence if anadversary nation or entity threatens its space assets.
Japan, which has historically (1969) mandated its space assets for purely civilian purposes, iswaking up to the defensive and military implications of space. In 2018, Japan’s then Prime
Minister, Shinzo Abe, highlighted the priority of space to modern military systems and the added
requirement to develop Japan’s military space capacities. Since 2008, under Japan’s basic spacelaw, the use of space for military purposes was allowed under strict guidance. Creating a robust
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) in partnership with the United States, Australia, and Europe
was highlighted as a critical need.76 In April 2020, the Japanese Diet passed a bill that establishedthe Space Domain Mission Unit (SDMU) within the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). The
SDMU is aimed to be fully functional by 2023. Yuka Koshino relates:
In 2017, the JSDF began operating its first X-band communication satellite as part of themodernisation of its command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure. In 2019, its naval ships began touse precision timing signals from Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS)—satellite

74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Suzuki Kazuto, “Space: A New Battleground for Space,” Nippon.com, December 5, 2018.

https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a06101/ (Accessed September 27, 2020).

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navigation constellation—as a back-up for the US Global Positioning System. Japan is also
developing a space-based ballistic-missile early-warning system.77
Japan is developing a ground-based deep space radar that can monitor satellites in Geostationary
Orbit (GEO). With China testing its first Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapon in 2007 and further
improvement of such a capacity, Japan is now developing a SSA satellite with a fitted opticaltelescope that can carry out the dual activities of watching for space debris and conducting ASAT
missions. Japan is also working on developing a satellite interceptor, primarily to counter satellite
threats from China, with a final decision still pending as of the date of this writing. Japan’s National
Defense Guidelines of 2019 and Medium-Term Defense Program (2019-2023) highlight theimportance of space for Japan’s strategic thinking and deterrence capabilities. Japan’s SelfDefence Forces (JSDF) are tasked with carrying forward the country’s space capacities. 78 The
linkage between ASATs and ballistic missiles underscores the ability of such systems for bothoffense and defense. Japan has its “own multi-tier defense system against ballistic missile attacks,
by such means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to the Aegis-equipped destroyers
and deploying the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).”79 Japan is building radars at a cost of$1 billion by Lockeed Martin, while at the same time focusing on developing an integrated air
and missile defense (IAMD), and not limited to Aegis Ashore, two sites of which it cancelled inJune 2020 due to costs.80 Japan’s sense of urgency is driven by geo-political factors, including
tensions over the disputed islands in the East China Sea. Japan’s 2019 White paper on defense
identified China as a threat for the first time, based on China’s fast military modernization. 81
Japan is a maritime nation that has approximately 6,800 remote islands as part of its territory andthe sixth largest territorial waters/exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In order to respond to various
contingencies in the seas and airspace around Japan promptly and seamlessly, the MOD/SDF
77 Yuka Koshino, “Japan’s new Space Domain Mission Unit and security in the Indo-Pacific region,” IISS, May 1,

2020. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2020/05/japan-space-domain-mission-unit-security (Accessed
September 27, 2020).
78 Daniel Darling, “Japanese Government Consider Launching a Satellite Interceptor,” Defense & Security Monitor,
August 26, 2019, https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/wordpress/2019/08/26/japanese-government-considerslaunching-a-satellite-interceptor/ (accessed September 27, 2020).
79 Ibid.
80 Tim Kelly, “Exclusive: Japan may still build Aegis Ashore despite reports of cancellation, sources say” Reuters,
July 10, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defence-aegis-exclusive/exclusive-japan-may-still-buildaegis-ashore-despite-reports-of-cancellation-source-says-idUSKBN24B0W4 (accessed July 26, 2021).
81 Ibid.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificvessels and aircraft habitually engage in warning and surveillance activities. Particularly in the
East China Sea, there have been an increasing number of cases in which foreign vessels conduct
activities by unilaterally asserting the rights of their country based on claims that are incompatible
with the existing order of international law. Thus, the necessity for constant and continuous
monitoring and surveillance by destroyers and other vessels is increasing. 82
Consequently, interceptor missiles like the SM-3 are under development in collaboration with theUnited States as a new feature of Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system.83 This is being
built with the DPRK’s missile capabilities in mind. Of note, Japan has an advanced space programwith independent space launch capacities spearheaded by the Japan Aerospace Exploration
Agency (JAXA).84
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is another country to watch for thehorizontal proliferation of space capable weapons systems. While the DPRK has not yet
demonstrated anti-satellite capabilities, it has developed jamming capacities within a particulargeographic area. That said, ballistic missiles can evolve into a counter space capacity, so missile
developments need to be closely monitored. In 2017, DPRK tested its first intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM), Hwasong 14 (8, 500 -13, 000 km and the Hwasong 15 (13, 000 km). Morecritically, these ICBMs were developed by its space launch program, Unha (Taepo-Dong 2). Someof the other DPRK operational missiles are the Pukguksong-3 (KN-26)-1900 km-Submarine
Launch Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), Pukguksong-2 (KN-15)-1, 200-2,000 km Medium Range
Ballistic Missile (MRBM), No-Dong, MRBM-1, 200 km-1, 500 km, and Taepodong-2 (SLV)4,000 km-10, 000 km. 85 In 2016, the DPRK claimed that it had successfully put an Earthobservation satellite, Kwangmyongsong-4, into orbit with a lift off from the Sohae launch facility
in western DPRK.86 In July 2019, the DPRK also demonstrated a “newly-developed large-caliber

82 Ministry of Defense, Japan, “Effective Deterrence and Response,” 2017.

https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2017/DOJ2017_3-1-2_web.pdf (accessed September 28, 2020).
83 Ibid.
84 “Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency”, https://global.jaxa.jp/ (accessed September 27, 2020).
85 “Missiles of North Korea,” CSIS Missile Defense Project, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/ (accessed
September 27, 2020).
86 Mike Wall, “North Korea Launches Satellite into Space,” Space.com, February 08, 2016,
https://www.space.com/31860-north-korea-satellite-launch.html (accessed September 27, 2020).

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multiple launch guided rocket system,” with a range of about 250 km.87 All these developments
point to horizontal proliferation with potential for space weapons systems.
Iran has been attempting to launch its satellite into space for some time now. In February 2020, it
failed to launch its Zafar 1 communications satellite into orbit. On April 22, 2020, the Aerospace
Forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) successfully launched its first military
satellite, Noor (light) into LEO, on its rocket Qased (messenger), from the secretive Guard Basenear Shahroud, 400 km from Tehran. General Hossein Salami, the Head of the IRGC stated, “today,
the world’s powerful armies do not have a comprehensive defense plan without being in space,and achieving this superior technology that takes us into space and expands the realm of ourabilities is a strategic achievement.”88 The IRGC claimed the satellite reached an orbit of 425 km
above Earth. Again, this can be directly linked to space launch and counter-space capacities. Iran
has a ballistic missile program, with the Shabab-3, having a range of 1,000-1,300 km. According
to Steven Hildreth:Longer range versions of the Shahab-3, variously referred to as Shahab-3 variants, theShahab-3A, Shahab-3B, and Shahab-4, and a BM-25, may have range capabilities of
1,500-2,500 kilometers. These missiles potentially could reach targets throughout the
Middle East, Turkey, and into southeastern Europe. Some have reported that perhaps
several dozen or more of these missile types may be deployed and operational. Some
Chinese, DPRK, or Russian involvement is suspected. In 2006, Iran announced thesuccessful test of a Fajr-3 MRBM comparable to the Shahab-3, although US and Israeli
intelligence analysts reportedly expressed skepticism.89
The Shahab-3-MRBM-1, 300 km, Ghadr-1-MRBM-1, 950 km, Soumar-cruise missile-2,000 km3,000 km, and Sejill-MRBM-2,000 km are some of the operational missiles. 90 There are reportsthat Iran may also possess Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs)-ranges less than 1000 km

87 Vann H Van Diepen, “North Korea Unveils New “Multiple Launch Guided Rocket System,” August 6, 2019,https://www.38north.org/2019/08/vvandiepen080619/ (accessed September 27, 2020).
88 Amir Vahdat and Jon Gambrell, “ Iran Guard Reveals Secret Space Program in satellite launch,” Associated Press,
April 22, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/0b45baa8a846f55e058e98905e290ce5 (accessed September 27, 2020).
89 Steven A. Hildreth, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program: An Overview”, Congressional Research Service, February 4,
2009. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS22758.pdf (accessed September 27, 2020), p.3.
90 “Missiles of Iran,” CSIS Missile Defense Project. https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/iran/ (Accessed September
27, 2020).

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WMD in Asia-Pacificdeveloped with the help of China, DPRK, and Russia.91 Iran is also known to have passed on
missiles to non-state entities like Hezbollah and Yemen’s Houthi rebels. 92 Waller says that:
The type of ballistic missile technology used to launch this satellite could deliver nuclear,chemical, or even biological weapons to “wipe Israel off the map,” attack US bases andallies in the region, and even US and NATO installations as far away as Western Europe.
One particular concern about Iran having nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles
is the fact that it creates a deterrent umbrella under which the jihadist regime would havea free hand to continue and even escalate their sponsorship and directsupport for terrorism
around the world [emphasis added]. Countries with such deterrent are less concerned about
punitive or retaliatory strikes because of that capability.93
Australia is another country in the Asia-Pacific that has recently established a space program. The
Australian Space Agency is focused on securing satellite communications, weather forecasting,and now has a roadmap till 2028 on securing Australian space assets. 94 Australian strategic thinker,
Malcolm Davies, urges Australia to establish its own space command. Davies argues:
Ideally, we need to reorganise Defence in a manner that recognises that space is anoperational domain in its own right, just like air, sea, land and cyber. It’s not merely an
enabling adjunct…Does that mean Australia needs its own space force? Certainly, the ADF[Australian Defense Forces] needs a ‘space command’ within the RAAF in which space
operations, doctrine and capability development are managed by a cadre of space
professionals. Defence also needs an unclassified space strategy that informs those

91 Hildreth, n. 89 p.4
92Jonathan Saul, Parisa Hafezi, Michael Georgy, “Exclusive: Iran Steps up Support for Houthis in Yemen’s War:

Sources,” Reuters, March 21, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-iran-houthis/exclusive-iransteps-up-support-for-houthis-in-yemens-war-sources-idUSKBN16S22R (accessed September 27, 2020).
93 Tommy Waller, “Did Iran just demonstrate they can take down the United States?”, SecurityGrid, no date (n.d).
https://securethegrid.com/did-iran-just-demonstrate-they-can-take-down-the-united-states/ (accessed
September 28, 2020). Also see Peter Vincent Fry, “Nuclear EMP Attack Scenarios and Combined-Arms CyberWarfare,” Report to The Commission to Assess The Threat To The United States From Electromagnetic Pulse (Emp)
Attack, July 2017.
http://www.firstempcommission.org/uploads/1/1/9/5/119571849/nuclear_emp_attack_scenarios_and_combined-arms_cyber_warfare_by_peter_pry_july_2017.pdf (accessed September 28, 2020).
94 “Australian Space Agency,” https://www.industry.gov.au/strategies-for-the-future/australian-space-agency(accessed September 27, 2020).

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functions in an accountable way. These would be good steps to formally embrace in thenext defence white paper. 95
Already ADF joint doctrine recognizes the critical importance of space, especially as a ‘center ofgravity’ in information-based military systems. Given the expansion of China and Russia’scounter-space capabilities, and Australia’s dependence on space for reconnaissance, command andcontrol, navigation, and precision guidance, analysts are urging Canberra to develop its own
counter space capabilities..96
Pakistan is another country to watch with regard to horizontal proliferation. Pakistan is a nuclear
weapons state with advanced missile capacity. Pakistan’s Space & Upper Atmosphere ResearchCommittee (SUPARCO) launched its first sounding rocket, Rehbar-1, in 1961. Badr-1 and BadrB, two experimental satellites were launched in 1990 and 2001. 97 Given its rivalry with a GreatSpace Power like India, Pakistan is likely to utilize its relationship with China to develop its spacecapacity, as it has in its nuclear weapons program. 98 Given the connections between spacecapabilities and a country’s missile development, some of Pakistan’s missiles to watch are the
Shaheen -3-MRBM of 2, 750 km range, Haft 6 (Shaheen) 2-MRBM-of 1,500-2,000 km range, andHaft 5 Ghauri-MRBM of1,250-1,500 km range.99
As a thought experiment, the following trajectories can be noted with regard to horizontal
escalation in space:

95 Max Blenkin, “ADF Urged to Establish Aussie Space Command,” SpaceConnect, January 30, 2020.

https://www.spaceconnectonline.com.au/operations/4107-calls-for-adf-to-establish-space-command-to-manageaussie-space-operations (accessed September 27, 2020).
96 Malcolm Davies, “The Australian Defense Force and Contested Space,” The Strategist, August 15, 2019.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-australian-defence-force-and-contested-space/ (accessed September 27,2020).
97 “Pakistan’s Space Programme,” http://www.suparco.gov.pk/downloadables/03-Pakistans-Space-Programme.pdf(accessed September 27, 2020).
98 Ali Ahsan & Ahmad Khan, “Pakistan’s Journey into Space,” Astropolitics, 17/1 (February 2019): 38-50.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14777622.2019.1578933?src=recsys&journalCode=fast20(accessed September 27, 2020).
99 “Missiles of Pakistan’, CSIS Missile Defense Project, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/pakistan/ (accessed
September 27, 2020).

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1. In warfare: Country A attacks Country B’s aircraft carrier; Country A funds
unconventional war in Country B; Country A attacks Country B’s satellites—
Country B attacks Country A’s launch facilities.
2. In an arms race: Country A acquires hypersonic missiles; Country B acquires aspace-based missile defense system.
3. In a crisis: Country A blockades Country B’s port—Country B blockades Country
B’s Moon base.
Vertical Proliferation of Space Warfare Capabilities in Asia
“Vertical” proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and are increasing
their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their
weapons, or developing new weapons. By extension to space weapons proliferation, this would
mean proliferation of space weapons, and missiles, by nation states that do possess space warfare
capacities and are “increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technicalsophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons.” 100
China
China, as mentioned before, is acquiring new military space capabilities and improving its existing
capacities. More importantly, China’s military space capacities are directed by its civil-military
fusion strategy. This space capacity is augmented by the establishment of the PLASSF, which is atheatre command-level enterprise. The PLA is also in control of China’s space program. China’s
2019 defense white paper described space as a “critical domain in international strategiccompetition” and stated the security of space provided strategic assurance to the country’s nationaland social development. 101 Space forms an integral part of China’s comprehensive national power
and military strategy. Securing China’s outer space assets is a key priority. While the aim is tobring informational warfare capacities together, President Xi Jinping has urged the PLASSF to

100 Victor W. Sidel, MD and Levy, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Abolition,”n.73.
101 “China National Defense in a New Era,” 2019 White paper on Defense,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm (accessed September 28, 2020).

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prepare a doctrine for a future that sees China dominating the cislunar space 102 and beyond.
Prioritizing the network-centric warfare approach, China is committed to developing its ASAT
capacities in LEO and GEO.103 Key bodies are the Space Systems Department, which is in chargeof PLA space operations, from launch, surveillance, and missile tracking, to space warfare doctrine
and concepts. The space capacities that China is developing for countering adversaries are kinetic
kill, direct ascent, co-orbital inspection satellites, electronic warfare (satellite jammers), groundbased lasers, space robotic capacities including a robotic arm, and reconnaissance andsurveillance—all of which will help create space access for itself and deny access to adversaries
in times of conflict. As stated earlier, the PLASSF is training with ASAT capabilities, and China’s
missile systems create added value. The SC-19, which is modeled on the DF-21C ballistic missile,
is China’s primary ASAT weapon, with a range of 2150 -2, 500 km.104 Besides, China possesses
the DF-26 IRBM, a land-attack and anti-ship missile, the DF-21A and DF 21E (nuclear tipped),
and is predicted to possess 375 MRBM/IRBM missiles by 2025, up from 250 in 2020.105 Most
critically, about 75 of those missiles will be equipped with ‘hypersonics,’ especially the DF-17.106
China has also increased their nuclear warheads, from 290 (2019) to 320 (2020). 107 From thesedevelopments, it is clear that China is increasing its stockpile and refining its military spacecapacities.
India
As mentioned earlier, India has invested in developing its military space capacities to include an
ASAT test in March 2019, establishing a Defense Space Agency ,and calling for the establishment
102 Cislunar is the volume of space contained between the Earth’s surface and the Moon’s orbit.
103 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic ofChina,” Annual Report to Congress, 2020, p.65. (accessed September 27,2020).
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORTFINAL.PDF
104 “SC 19 Anti-Ballistic Missile Interceptor,” Global security.org.
https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/sc-19-abm.htm (accessed September 27, 2020).
105 Hans M. Kristensen, “The (Other) Red Storm Risings: INDOPACOM China Military Projection,” Federation ofAmerican Scientists, September 15, 2020 (accessed September 27, 2020).
https://fas.org/blogs/security/2020/09/pacom-china-military-projection/
106 Hans M. Kristensen, “The (Other) Red Storm Risings: INDOPACOM China Military Projection,” Federation ofAmerican Scientists, September 15, 2020 (accessed September 27, 2020).
https://fas.org/blogs/security/2020/09/pacom-china-military-projection/
107 “Nuclear Weapon Modernization Continues but the outlook for arms control is bleak,” SIPRI, June 15, 2020.
https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/nuclear-weapon-modernization-continues-outlook-arms-controlbleak-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now (accessed September 27, 2020).

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WMD in Asia-Pacificof a Defense Space Research Organization aimed at developing counter space and counter value(attacking critical infrastructure) capacities. In June 2019 and September 2020, India conducted
hypersonic tests with the launch of its hypersonic technology demonstrator vehicle (HSTDV),
which reached a speed of Mach 6 (2 km per second). The HSTDV was launched on the Agni
missile solid proponent rocket motor. The 2020 test utilized an indigenously built scramjet engine.
The next step would be to develop long range hypersonic cruise missiles. The Brahmos supersoniccruise missile (which is being developed with Russian assistance) reaches a speed of 2.8 Machwith a range of 400 km. 108 India has 150 nuclear warheads (2020 estimate). It has an array of
missiles, including the Prithvi II and Agni I- surface-to-air Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM)
with a range of 350-700 km.109 The Agni III is an IRBM with a range of 3,000 km to 5000 km.
The Agni V is an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with a range of 5,500 km. The Dhanush
submarine launch ballistic missile (SLBM) has a range of 300 km. The K-15 (Sagarika or B-05)
was deployed in 2017 and has a range of 700 km. 110 India has launched an indigenously built longrange cruise missile, Nirbhay, a nuclear-capable, solid fuel missile that can reportedly reach top
speeds of 0.6-0.7 Mach and can strike land targets at a distance of up to 1,000
kilometers. According to reports, it can be launched from multiple platforms, has loitering
capability, and the first test of the air-launched variant is expected to take place in 2021.111
Some of the trajectories based on insights from the section above on vertical escalation could be
as follows:
1. In warfare: Country A kills Country B’s PNT satellite; Country B kills two ofCountry A’s PNT satellites.
2. In an arms race: Country A acquires 1 ASAT, Country B acquires 5 ASATS.

108 Rajat Pandit, “India Successfully Tests Scramjet technology for Hypersonic Missiles,” The Times of India,

September 8, 2020. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-successfully-test-scramjet-technology-forhypersonic-missiles/articleshow/77973889.cms (accessed September 27, 2020).
109 “Prithvi,” Federation of American Scientists. https://fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/prithvi.htm (accessed
September 27, 2020).
110 India Missile, November 2019. https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/india/delivery-systems/ (accessed
September 27, 2020).
111 Franz-Stefan Gady, “India Test Fires Nuclear-Capable Nirbhay Cruise Missile,” The Diplomat, April 15, 2019.
https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/india-test-fires-nuclear-capable-nirbhay-cruise-missile/ (accessed September
27, 2020).

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3. In a crisis: Country A puts its space forces on alert, Country B puts its space forceson alert.

Linked Conflict Systems; Linked Security Dilemmas
Proliferation and escalation in Asia are characterized by linked conflict systems and linked security
dilemmas 112 between pre-existing competing dyads: China-Japan, China-India, Japan-South
Korea, DPRK-South Korea, and India-Pakistan.
China seeks to secure itself from a US military intervention by acquiring an ASAT capability anda Strategic Support Force. India and Japan feel threatened by China’s capabilities. In response,
India develops an ASAT and defense space organization. Japan follows its ally, the United States,and begins developing a dedicated defense space organization and counter-space capabilities.
Similarly, because US conventional forces pose an existential threat to the DPRK and Iranianregimes, these regimes have strong incentives to develop missiles,113 ASATs, and single-strikecatastrophic deterrents such as High-Altitude Electro-Magnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High-Altitude
Nuclear Detonation weapons. 114
Because conflict systems are linked, we can expect horizontal proliferation specifically wherecompetition is pre-existing in dyads. 115 Japan’s counterspace capabilities will encourage
development of counter-space capabilities by the DPRK. Already incentivized to create an ASAT
to deter the United States, the DPRKwill accelerate to keep pace with any South Korean counter

112 Herbert Butterfield “The greatest war in history can be produced without the intervention of any great criminals

who might be out to do deliberate harm in the world. It could be produced between two powers, both of whichwere desperately anxious to avoid a conflict of any sort.” As quoted in Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A
Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies, 18:3, 587-623. DOI: 10.1080/09636410903133050. (accessed September
28, 2020).
113 Nuno P. Monteiro, “Unrest Assured Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3(Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40. https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064 (accessed
September 28, 2020).
114 Clay Wilson, “High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power Microwave (HPM) Devices: Threat
Assessments,” Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, March 26, 2008.
https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/files/Ebomb.pdf (accessed July 26, 2021).
115 Daniel S. Geller, “Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads,” International Studies Quarterly, 37/2 (June 1993),
pp. 173-193.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificspace developments. Pakistan, seeking parity and deterrence with India, and contesting leadershipin the Islamic world, has incentives to develop ASAT capabilities.116
One could imagine initiation and escalation to space conflict in virtually any of the dyads. The
DPRK and South Korea, both with relatively fewer satellites, might jam each other’s satellites ina period of hostility, and one of them might take the step of escalating with a kinetic ASAT
attack. 117 Similarly, a China-Japan skirmish over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could involve
jamming or lasing each other’s reconnaissance or communications satellites, or might result indangerous practices of close approaches of co-orbital inspection satellites.
Were the DPRK to be suspected of orbiting a HEMP satellite, we could imagine Japan feelingforced to shoot it down or to attack it co-orbitally, as that might pose an existential threat to Japan.
Tensions between Pakistan and India would likely result in jamming, dazzling, or lasing of eachother’s reconnaissance and communication satellites with escalation incentivizing ever greater
demonstrations of resolve, potentially including a limited kinetic exchange. The lead-up to suchan event might see China siding with Pakistan and conducting close inspections of India’s satellites
to encourage a sense of vulnerability to a two-front war.118 Alternately, India’s fears of a two-front
war with China over its eastern and western disputed borders could cause a heightened sense ofalert, sending indications and warnings to China that India was postured for a pre-emptive strikein space, encouraging China to make similar moves.
Finally, Japan and South Korea are likely to participate in the US Artemis program, and thereby
have national assets on or in the vicinity of the Moon. At some point India will also have a spacestation and likely operations on the Moon. China is likely to be able to project power over cislunar
distances, and its history of imposing pressure on the geographic periphery suggests that Chinamight hold these targets at risk directly or through plausibly-deniable grey forces to express

116 Asad Hashim, “Pakistan Expresses ‘Grave Concern’ Over Indian Space Weapon Test,” Al Jazeera, April 3, 2019.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/03/pakistan-expresses-grave-concern-over-indian-space-weaponstest/?gb=true (accessed September 28, 2020).
117 Peter Pry, “How one North Korean Nuclear- Armed Satellite Could Cripple the US Military,” The Hill, December
5, 2017. https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/363326-how-one-north-korean-nuclear-armed-satellitecould-cripple-the-us (accessed July 26, 2021).
118 Ananya Das, “China carried out multiple attacks against Indian satellites: Report,” Zee News, September 23, 2020.
https://zeenews.india.com/india/china-carried-out-multiple-attacks-against-indian-satellites-report-2311905.html

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displeasure, or to expose vulnerability, as happens with the harassment by fishing and coast-guard
vessels.

Legal Implications and Concluding Thoughts
This section highlights some of the legal implications of horizontal and vertical space proliferationand offers some concluding thoughts. The foremost document that lays out the legal parameters
for state behavior in outer space is the “Treaty On Principles Governing The Activities Of States
In The Exploration And Use Of Outer Space, Including The Moon And Other Celestial Bodies,”
commonly referred to as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) signed in 1967. OST Article III stipulates
that “States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space,including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including theCharter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security andpromoting international co-operation and understanding.”119

More specifically, Article IV of the OST states:

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects
carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty
exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations andfortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvreson celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific researchor for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or
facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also
not be prohibited.120

119 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 2222 (XXI). Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of Statesin the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html (Accessed September 28,2020).
120 Ibid.

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The OST in Article VII holds states liable for damages caused:

Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose
territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to anotherState Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component
parts on the Earth, in air or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. 121

The 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects builds upon
OST Article VII specifying that “a launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation
for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, and liable fordamage due to its faults in space. The Convention also provides for procedures for the settlementof claims for damages.”122 There are other international mechanisms that limit and constrain theusage of nuclear weapons in space and/or transfer of missile technology. These are “Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water” signed
between the US and the erstwhile U.S.S.R in 1963. 123 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT)124 signed by the US and China but not ratified by either (Russia has ratified it) and theMissile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 125 There is also a stipulation of noninterferencewith national technical means (i.e. reconnaissance and commercial satellites).126

That said, if we are to tackle the challenges of horizontal and vertical proliferation of military spacecapacities, especially keeping in mind the escalation scenarios outlined above, how would these121 Ibid

122 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), “Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects,” https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introliabilityconvention.html (accessed September 28, 2020).
123 U.S. Department of State, “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, andUnder Water”, 1963. https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/199116.htm (accessed September 28, 2020).
124 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,”
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/ctbt/ (accessed September 28, 2020).
125 Missile Technology Control Regime, https://mtcr.info/ (accessed September 28, 2020).
126 Sarah M. Mountin, “The Legality and Implications of Intentional Interference with Commercial Communication
Satellite Signals,” U.S. Naval War College, 90, 2014. https://digitalcommons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=ils (accessed September 28, 2020).

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treaties/regime help deescalate the conflict? On one hand, treaty obligations can be cited. On theother hand, states face no consequences for creating debris (for example, caused by ASAT testsby China, the United States, Russia, or India), where national security of critical infrastructure
trumps international obligations with no enforcement mechanisms in place. International U.N.
backed sanctions against either China or Russia for ASATS and other space militarization acts will
be vetoed by China and Russia, using their permanent member privilege in the U.N. Security
Council. The space future that we need to anticipate besides orbital presence and support for
terrestrial military forces is countries developing military power projection capacities beyond GEO
to cislunar space and the Moon. This is a realistic scenario given the United States, China, Russia,
and Japan are aspiring to establish human presence on the lunar surface by 2040. This changes the
dynamic of space. Already, the PLA SSF leadership highlights the significance of the Earth-Moon
space for China’s national rejuvenation. The United States has identified the Moon and extractionof resources as a vision. Japan has plans to establish a lunar settlement by 2040. Russia announcedplans to establish a lunar presence by 2040 as well. 127 China and Russia signed a Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MoU) in March 2021 to jointly establish a lunar base. 128 Given these changes inspace discourse from purely tactical to strategic, we need to factor such scenarios into ourassumptions of status and space behavior by space faring nations in the Asia-Pacific.

127 Namrata Goswami, “Moon Race, National Space Legislation and Executive Orders on Ownership of Lunar

Resources: Is it Enough to Regulate the Domain of Space?”, Medium, June 12, 2020.
https://medium.com/@namygoswami/moon-race-national-space-legislation-and-executive-orders-on-ownershipof-lunar-resources-is-it-b120e5d6fe5 (Accessed September 28, 2020).
128 “China, Russia Ink Accord on Building Scientific Research Station on Moon,” Xinhua, March 09, 2021,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-03/09/c_139797869.htm (accessed July 26, 2021).

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7. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle andHorizontal Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific Region
John Carlson

Introduction
Horizontal proliferation refers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states additional to thosealready possessing such weapons. Nuclear weapons cannot be produced without fissile materials,
namely, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or separated plutonium. Producing these materials
requires respectively uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The difficulty ofdeveloping these capabilities remains a major obstacle to nuclear proliferation.
Historically, states pursuing nuclear weapons have usually sought to develop enrichment or
reprocessing facilities in secret. An alternative approach, however, is to establish these openly, as
part of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. Enrichment and reprocessing are described as sensitive
nuclear technologies because they are potentially dual purpose: they were developed originally for
military purposes and a state that acquires these capabilities for peaceful use could decide to turnthem to producing nuclear weapons. A state with such capabilities is described as having nuclear
latency. This is not to say that a state pursuing enrichment or reprocessing intends to produce
nuclear weapons, but such a state presents the international community with a dilemma: how toensure the spread of fuel cycle capabilities does not increase the risk of nuclear weapons
proliferation. This paper discusses this problem with particular reference to the Asia-Pacificcontext.
Asia-Pacific Region
This paper adopts the delineation of the Asia-Pacific region used by APLN (the Asia-Pacific
Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament): the area comprising North© 2022 John Carlson, CC BY 4.0

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Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific. This is an extensive and diverse
geographic area. States in the region include:•

Two of the five nuclear-weapon states recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT)—China and Russia;•

Three of the four nuclear-armed states not parties to the NPT—India, Pakistan, and theDPRK.

The United States, while outside the region, is deeply engaged in the region, including throughdefence alliances with several states.
Reflecting the competing interests of these various states, the Asia-Pacific is notable for containing
a number of areas of tension and conflict, actual and potential, between nuclear-armed states. In
this regard critical interactions include those between India and Pakistan, India and China, theDPRK and the United States and US allies; and China and the United States. As will be discussed,
strategic threats, instabilities, and uncertainties contribute to proliferation pressures—asdemonstrated by the actions of India, Pakistan, and the DPRK in developing nuclear weapons andby public debate about doing so in Japan, the ROK, and elsewhere. The region thus figures
prominently in global proliferation concerns.
What is Meant by Horizontal Proliferation?
In the nuclear context, horizontal proliferation refers to an increase in the number of states with
nuclear weapons. In the mid-1960s when the NPT was negotiated it was feared that the number ofstates with nuclear weapons would increase substantially, from the five that existed at that time topossibly twenty-five to thirty by 1990. Horizontal proliferation is distinct from verticalproliferation, which refers to an increase in the number of nuclear weapons held by nuclear-armed
states, exemplified by the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s
and 60s. Unless a contrary intention is indicated, proliferation is generally taken to mean
horizontal proliferation.
Horizontal proliferation can be thought of as having three phases. The first phase, the pre-NPT
period, lasted from 1945 to the conclusion of the NPT in 1968. In this period the United States’
monopoly over nuclear weapons was broken first by the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the United

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Kingdom, France, and China also acquired nuclear weapons. When the NPT was negotiated these
five became the recognized nuclear-weapon states. Over this period many other states wereactively considering acquiring nuclear weapons, a situation which prompted the negotiation of the
NPT.
The second phase lasted from the conclusion of the NPT until the treaty’s indefinite extension in
1995. Over this period the NPT’s membership gradually expanded and by 1995 was close touniversal. During this period, however, nuclear weapons were developed by India, Israel, andPakistan. These states never joined the NPT and remain outside it. Also, during this period South
Africa developed nuclear weapons, while outside the NPT. Subsequently South Africa dismantled
its nuclear weapons—so far the only nuclear-armed state to do so—and joined the NPT in 1991.
Towards the end of this period, as the NPT drew closer to universality, the term proliferationacquired its contemporary meaning: the pursuit of nuclear weapons in violation of the NPT. The
most familiar example is Iraq, which established a secret nuclear program. Because this program
had no obvious links to its declared program, it eluded detection for many years. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found Iraq was in non-compliance with its safeguards agreementin 1991. As a consequence, Iraq’s actions also constituted a violation of the NPT. In addition toIraq, the IAEA has found five other states in non-compliance with their NPT safeguards
agreements, two during this period: Romania (1992) and the DPRK (1993). The DPRK is notablefor being the only case of NPT violation where the state concerned has succeeded in acquiring
nuclear weapons.
The current phase dates from 1995. The NPT is now almost universal, with only India, Israel, andPakistan remaining outside, together with the DPRK, which withdrew from the treaty in 2003.1
During this period the IAEA found three further states in safeguards non-compliance: Libya(2004), Iran (2006), and Syria (2011). All six safeguards non-compliance cases included
development or acquisition of enrichment or reprocessing technologies in secret, in violation ofsafeguards agreements and the NPT.

1 The validity of the DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT has not been definitively determined. The IAEA sought

guidance from NPT parties on the legal status of the withdrawal but such guidance has not been forthcoming. See
IAEA Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprknuclear-safeguards.

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In contrast to these non-compliance cases, preparation for nuclear weapons does not necessarily
have to proceed in secret. In the 1970s there were a number of cases where the transfer ofenrichment or reprocessing capabilities was sought openly, for ostensibly peaceful purposes. These
included supply by France of reprocessing plants to the ROK, Pakistan, and Taiwan, and supply
by Germany of a reprocessing plant to Taiwan and enrichment and reprocessing plants to Brazil.
These transfers were discontinued due to international concerns about their potential proliferation.
India’s 1974 nuclear test, using plutonium in violation of peaceful use assurances given to Canada
and the United States, alerted governments to the dangers of misuse of supplied technology, andthese various proposals for supply of sensitive facilities added to these concerns. The outcome was
the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1974. The objective of the NSG wasto prevent nuclear proliferation by controlling the export of materials, equipment, and technologythat can be used to produce nuclear weapons.
Finally, it is noted that the term horizontal proliferation could also apply to the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by non-state actors. This involves a different range of issues to proliferation bystates and is beyond the scope of this paper.

The Non-proliferation Regime and Proliferation-sensitive Technology
The Non-Proliferation Treaty, concluded in 1968, is the centrepiece of the non-proliferation
regime. The NPT’s key provisions are summarized as follows:•

The states that had conducted a nuclear test prior to 1967 were categorized as nuclearweapon states. There are five such states: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom,France, and China. The nuclear-weapon states commit not to assist others in acquiring
nuclear weapons (Article I).

•

All other parties are categorized as non-nuclear-weapon states. These states commit not toseek nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear material to verify
that nuclear energy is not diverted to producing nuclear weapons (Article III).

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The NPT is expressed not to affect the right of the parties to research, production, and useof nuclear energy for peaceful purposes provided this is in conformity with the treaty. The
parties undertake to cooperate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Article IV).

•

All parties undertake to pursue nuclear and general disarmament (Article VI).

The NPT is complemented and reinforced by a number of other treaties, arrangements, andmechanisms, including:•

IAEA safeguards: These are of crucial importance as the verification mechanism for the
NPT’s non-proliferation provisions. The key objectives of IAEA safeguards are the timely
detection of diversion of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear
weapons and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

•

Bilateral agreements, particularly nuclear cooperation agreements applying peaceful use
and safeguards conditions. Notable in this regard are agreements that require the supplier
party’s prior consent to enrichment and reprocessing, or expressly exclude these activities.

•

Regional treaties, such as the Euratom Treaty and the various nuclear weapon-free zone
treaties.2•

National export controls on nuclear and nuclear-related materials, items, equipment, andtechnologies, especially as coordinated through the NSG.

•

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

•

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

As noted earlier, the impetus for negotiating the NPT was the concern that the number of states
having nuclear weapons would increase substantially unless something was done. While theUnited States and the then Soviet Union were particularly concerned about the potential spread ofenrichment and reprocessing capability, the NPT does not refer to specific technologies. When thetreaty was negotiated it was believed proliferation risk would be limited because only the nuclearweapon states and a small number of other advanced industrialized states would have enrichment

2 The Asia-Pacific region has three nuclear weapon-free zones: the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, the Southeast

Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, and the Mongolian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. Neighboring the region is theCentral Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.

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and reprocessing capabilities. It was envisaged that technology holders would provide fuel cycle
services to other states, removing any need for these other states to establish such capabilities
themselves.
With the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen that the problem of the spread of enrichment andreprocessing was not well anticipated in the drafting of the NPT. There are two aspects to thisproblem: the ability of further states to obtain these technologies was underestimated, and too
much reliance was placed on the ability of IAEA safeguards to provide timely warning in the eventof misuse of these technologies.
It is now known that during the NPT negotiations UK officials warned their US counterparts that
centrifuge enrichment presented a serious risk to the NPT’s objectives. Unfortunately, this warning
was not heeded, and the language in the treaty draft was not amended to address the problem. Thiswarning proved prescient, as there has been a gradual spread of proliferation capabilities,
particularly centrifuge enrichment technology, accelerated by black market activities, notably
involving the Pakistan-based AQ Khan network. The relative ease of concealing centrifuge plants,
and the potential speed of break-out, mean that in certain diversion scenarios, discussed below,
adequate warning time cannot be assured.
Reprocessing raises timeliness issues that can be even more acute. Where stocks of separated
plutonium are held, there is a real possibility that if a state diverts plutonium and has made thenecessary preparations in advance, it could fabricate the plutonium into nuclear weapons wellbefore effective international intervention is possible.
Today, as shown in Table 1, in addition to the five nuclear-weapon states and the other four
nuclear-armed states, there are at least six non-nuclear-weapon states currently operating
enrichment plants, and one (Japan) with reprocessing capability.

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Table 1: States with Demonstrated Enrichment and/or Reprocessing Capability(Past or Current)3
Nuclear-weapon states

Non-NPT nucleararmed states

These states have both enrichment andreprocessing capabilities
United States
RussiaUnited Kingdom
FranceChina

India
Pakistan
DPRK
IsraelNon-nuclear-weapon states
Enrichment
capability

Reprocessing
capability

Argentina
BrazilGermany
Iran
Japan
Netherlands

Japan

Australia
South Africa

Belgium
Germany
Italy

Note: For the non-nuclear-weapon states shown in italics the enrichment and/or reprocessing activity is no longer
current. In some cases, these activities were only small-scale.

Factors Relating to Proliferation Risk
Broadly speaking the possibility of a state deciding to pursue nuclear weapons will be influenced
by three factors: capability, motivation, and the barriers and disincentives to proliferation.
It can be debated whether motivation or capability comes first. They may be closely related andtheir sequencing can differ from case to case. The typical image of proliferation—exemplified by
Iraq—involves a state deciding to pursue nuclear weapons and then setting out to develop thenecessary technical capabilities. In this case motivation precedes capability. When a state develops
enrichment or reprocessing capabilities in secret, it is a clear sign of proliferation intent.
The situation is not so clear, however, when a state develops such capabilities openly under IAEA
safeguards. The state may be deliberately establishing a nuclear weapon option—in this casemotivation still precedes capability, but the state’s intention is not obvious. On the other hand, thestate at that time may be genuinely committed against acquiring nuclear weapons. The problem is,once the state has the relevant capabilities it thereby has a nuclear weapon option if circumstances
3 Iraq is not included because at the time its enrichment program was terminated, its output was small.

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The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Horizontal Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific Regionchange—what is unthinkable today might be considered a necessity tomorrow. In such a casecapability could influence motivation.
Nuclear weapon capability
The capability to develop nuclear weapons can be broken down into a number of key elements:
1. Production of fissile material
2. Nuclear weaponization
3. Deployment of nuclear weapons
1. Production of fissile material: First and foremost a state considering pursuit of nuclear
weapons requires the capability to produce fissile materials 4—HEU or separated plutonium. Thisrequires the state to have enrichment or reprocessing facilities. Accordingly, when a state without
enrichment or reprocessing seeks to establish these capabilities it is inevitable there will beinternational questioning, if not concern, about the state’s intentions. Export controls applied bymembers of the NSG discourage, but do not exclude, such projects.
Enrichment: In the case of uranium enrichment, no state planning to produce HEU is going toadmit to this. Globally, production of HEU for civilian use has ceased (with some very limited
exceptions), so any production of HEU would immediately attract international attention.
Accordingly, a state developing enrichment capability would claim to be doing so solely for
producing low enriched uranium (LEU) reactor fuel. 5 However, there is no inherent technicalbarrier to using any of the currently established enrichment technologies to produce HEU.
Centrifuge facilities in particular can be readily adapted for producing HEU. Time would be
required to reconfigure a facility to produce HEU, thus providing some warning of the state’s
intentions. However, this warning time could be fairly short, a matter of weeks or even days. If thestate has the capability to manufacture centrifuges it is more likely to establish clandestine facilities
for high enrichment, thus avoiding the warning that would result if it was seen modifying declaredfacilities.

4 For safeguards purposes the IAEA uses the term unirradiated direct-use material instead of fissile material.
5 LEU is typically in the range three to five percent U-235.

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While LEU cannot be used directly in weapons, LEU can be used as feed for higher enrichment,
substantially shortening the time to produce HEU. 6 Hence stockpiling of LEU in bulk form
(especially enriched uranium hexafluoride–UF6) may have a proliferation significance.
Reprocessing: In terms of proliferation risk, reprocessing is more problematic than enrichment
because in normal operation the product of a reprocessing plant is weapon-usable material. 7
Further, in the normal operation of reprocessing plants it is usual to have substantial quantities ofseparated plutonium on hand, providing the opportunity for rapid diversion to weapon production.
Considering that the IAEA’s significant quantity8 for plutonium is only 8 kilograms, a plutonium
inventory of just one tonne—modest by industry standards—is sufficient for well over 100
weapons.
Other means of acquisition: While the focus here is on states’ establishing the capability to
produce fissile material, it should not be overlooked that fissile material may also be acquired byinternational transfer: either by legitimate imports, e.g., research reactor fuel; critical assembly
fuel or MOX9 fuel; or by illicit procurement, e.g., purchase on the black market or by theft or
seizure. While generally the quantity of fissile material that could be imported is relatively limited,in the case of plutonium in the form of MOX the quantity could be sufficient for a small nuclear
arsenal.
2. Nuclear weaponization: Weaponization is a shorthand term for the range of activities,
additional to acquisition of fissile material, necessary to produce a nuclear weapon. These include
nuclear weapon design and associated modelling and calculations, high-explosive lenses and6 Almost ninety percent of the enrichment effort to produce weapon grade HEU (ninety percent U-235) is

expended in reaching five percent U-235 (the upper end of typical LEU). To reach ninety percent enrichment,
starting with five percent enriched LEU, requires much less enrichment effort compared with starting with naturaluranium; in other words, this can be achieved with a much smaller plant.
7 With some reprocessing processes the output is a plutonium/uranium mix, rather than pure plutonium, but theplutonium is not difficult to separate. Historically the states with nuclear weapons produced low burn-up
plutonium (predominantly comprising the isotope Pu-239) for this purpose, but in principle almost all plutonium isconsidered to be weapon-usable.
8 The significant quantity (SQ) is the quantity for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device
cannot be excluded.
9 MOX comprises a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides.

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implosion testing, specialised high-energy electrical components, high-flux neutron generators,
and design and testing of warhead re-entry vehicles.
In contrast to nuclear materials and facilities—where IAEA safeguards provide a well-establishedsystem for verifying peaceful use—in the case of other items and materials of possible application
to nuclear weaponization it is much more difficult to monitor states’ activities, 10 and many of these
could be pursued in secret. Further, many of these activities, items, and materials are dual-use, thatis, taken in isolation they do not necessarily indicate an intention to manufacture a nuclear weapon.
Some, but not all, involve items on the NSG dual-use list. 11 The purpose of a single dual-use
activity may be ambiguous, but a combination of such activities may more clearly indicate theexistence of a nuclear weapon program.
In assessing the significance of apparent weaponization activities, an essential question is whether
the state is known to have fissile material or the capability to produce it. This in itself, however, is
not necessarily conclusive. It is possible that detection of weaponization activities may be the firstindicator that a state already has an undeclared (and so far undetected) program to produce fissile
material or may indicate that a state intends to divert safeguarded fissile material in the future.
3. Deployment of nuclear weapons: The principal capability issue here relates to nuclear-capabledelivery systems. While in theory nuclear weapons could be delivered by unconventional means,e.g., truck, fishing boat, or shipping container, in reality these would be of interest only to terrorists.
A state requires credible nuclear deterrence based on a delivery system that will perform reliably
and has a high probability of avoiding interception. In view of the vulnerability of aircraft, ballistic
missiles are the preferred delivery method. Hence, discovery that a state has a ballistic missile
program will be a warning sign. Given the substantial costs and accuracy limits of ballistic
missiles, development of such missiles may well indicate an intention to deploy highly destructive(i.e., nuclear) warheads.

10 Prohibitions and monitoring arrangements for certain weaponization-related activities were included in the IranJCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) as Section T of Annex I.
11 IAEA, “Communication Received from the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the International Atomic Energy
Agency regarding Certain Member States’ Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-related Dual-use Equipment,
Materials, Software and Related Technology,” Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.11/Part 2a, 18 October 2019,https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r11p2.pdf

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An indication of relevant capabilities is given by the Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant
Transfers under the Missile Technology Control Regime, that is, missiles with a range exceeding
300 kilometers and a payload exceeding 500 kilograms. A state developing missiles exceedingthese parameters is not necessarily seeking a nuclear capability (for example, it may say it isengaged in space research), but such development will be grounds for suspicion, especially whereother indicators are present, such as apparent weaponization activities, safeguards violations, andso on.
Other aspects of nuclear weapon deployment include organization and training of specialist
military forces, development and promulgation of nuclear doctrine concerning the use of nuclear
weapons, and establishment of command and control systems for nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weaponization and nuclear delivery and other deployment matters are beyond the scopeof this paper, but these can give rise to indicators and observables which could have implications
relevant to the fuel cycle, for example, indicating that a state’s interest in the fuel cycle may be
dual-purpose.
Motivation to acquire nuclear weapons
Motivation is the result of a stimulus or incentive that influences a government to act in a certain
way. There are several reasons why a government might decide to pursue nuclear weapons,
including its perception of threats and the need for a military deterrent, the desire to exert influence
over other states, and notions of prestige and national pride. While these are political sentiments,
they can be given tangible form discernible to other governments and observers through statements
made and actions taken.
The principal indicator for a state’s motivation is its strategic environment. Relevant questions
include:•Whether the state is located in a region of tension;•

Whether it is, or believes itself to be, under military, economic, cultural, or religious
threat;•Whether it is involved in military or political confrontation with other states.

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The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Horizontal Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific Region
The clearest example of a region of tension is the Middle East, and it is no coincidence that of thesix safeguards non-compliance cases that have occurred to date, four have involved states in or
closely associated with the Middle East. 12 The Asia-Pacific region contains two areas that can beconsidered regions of tension: South Asia and North Asia, particularly the Korean Peninsula.
Motivation can be seen at play in the Korean Peninsula. First there is the action of the DPRK indeveloping nuclear weapons. The DPRK maintains it did this in response to threats by the UnitedStates—hostile statements, sanctions, military exercises, and the ongoing armistice (that is, theabsence of a peace settlement) have all been contributing factors. In response to the DPRK’s
actions, many people in the ROK and Japan have argued for these states to acquire their own
nuclear deterrent. This situation illustrates two points:•

Acquiring nuclear arms does not improve a state’s security, especially if it motivatesneighbors to do the same.

•

Military alliances can be an important factor affecting motivation to pursue nuclear
weapons. As long as the ROK and Japan have confidence in their alliances with the UnitedStates their motivation to pursue nuclear weapons will be reduced, and vice versa—ifconfidence in the alliance is lacking, an independent nuclear deterrent might seem morenecessary.

Not only can alliances reduce the motivation to pursue nuclear weapons, oversight by the alliancepartner (the United States) will reduce the opportunity to do so, as was seen in US interventions
against proposed transfers of proliferation-sensitive nuclear technologies in the 1970s.
Barriers and disincentives to proliferation
Proliferation barriers can take two forms, technical or political (or institutional).
Technical barriers: These could include design features in nuclear facilities that can reduce oreven eliminate the risk of proliferation. In the case of uranium enrichment this does not seem
practicable—there is no technical barrier to using any of the currently established enrichment
technologies to produce HEU.

12 Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria.

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WMD in Asia-PacificTechnical barriers may be possible at the back-end of the fuel cycle. Here the fundamental questionis, is it essential to recycle plutonium? In the case of thermal reactors (such as light water reactors)
plutonium recycle is not necessary from a technical standpoint and cannot be justified
economically (discussed further below). Proliferation risk can be avoided simply by not
reprocessing.13
Plutonium recycle is required only if fast breeder reactors (FBRs) become economically viable.
Where plutonium recycle technologies are developed, proliferation resistance and safeguards bydesign should be built in. This principle has been adopted by the Generation IV International
Forum.14 Consistent with this approach, recycle technologies that do not produce plutonium inreadily accessible form are preferred to reduce the risk of proliferation and also sub-national theft.
Concepts include liquid fuelled reactors (such as molten salt fast reactors) with online reprocessing(where the reprocessing unit is connected to the reactor, unwanted materials are removed and theplutonium-bearing stream is recycled directly back to the reactor). Another is pyro-processing,currently the subject of a joint study by the United States and the ROK.15
With pyro-processing, plutonium is not fully separated but remains in a highly radioactive mix
with uranium, actinides, and fission products. Proponents maintain the process cannot produce
pure plutonium and is therefore proliferation-resistant. US experts dispute this, and proliferationresistance is a major aspect of the US‒ROK joint study. Even if pyro-processing does not fully
separate plutonium, it could still have proliferation significance by making the task of theproliferator easier. This is because the product of pyro-processing represents a very substantial
quantitative reduction (by a factor of ten to twenty-five) compared with spent fuel at the start ofthe process, allowing the proliferator to use a much smaller scale plutonium separation facility
than would otherwise be required.
Political and institutional barriers and disincentives: These take several forms. Considering thatall states that currently do not have nuclear weapons are non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the

13 J. Carlson, L. Spector, M. Pomper, The Other Fissile Material: Strengthening National and International Plutonium

Management Approaches, CNS, December 2018, https://nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/op42the-other-fissile-material.pdf
14 The Generation IV International Forum, https://www.gen-4.org/gif/
15 The US-ROK Joint Fuel Cycle Study is outlined at page 52 of the 2015 US-ROK nuclear cooperation agreement,
https://irp.fas.org/news/2015/06/123rok.pdf

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The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Horizontal Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific Region
NPT, and the development of nuclear weapons by such a state would violate the NPT, the principal
deterrent to a would-be proliferator is the probability of detection by IAEA safeguards and thelikely consequences of detection. These include Security Council sanctions and the risk ofintervention, including military action, by states that consider themselves threatened. The
proliferating state will be gambling that it can maintain secrecy long enough that by the time it is
discovered it is too late for other states to intervene. If the state succeeds in acquiring nuclear
weapons, however, it faces international sanctions that are likely to have a profound impact on its
economy, and it will become an international pariah.
With regard to disincentives, one would hope the state is capable of a rigorous analysis of thedangers of proliferating. A state with nuclear weapons becomes a nuclear target. It is at risk of
nuclear war, whether by deliberate actions or by mistake, miscalculation, or unauthorized actions,either by its own forces or by an adversary. Far from guaranteeing its security, possession of
nuclear weapons will be an ongoing source of danger.
From a longer-term perspective, all states, even those outside the NPT, benefit from an effective
non-proliferation regime that minimizes the number of states with nuclear weapons. There is no
doubt that the more states have nuclear weapons, the more likely they will be used. The risk for a
proliferator is that its actions will motivate others to do the same—so the “advantage” of acquiring
nuclear weapons will be temporary. In due course the state’s adversaries will also be nucleararmed, so its security situation will be much worse than before.
Institutional barriers to proliferation include export controls that aim to prevent access to sensitivetechnologies, equipment, and materials. On the positive side, incentives to maintain good nonproliferation standing include access to nuclear energy technology, fuel, and cooperation, as wellas wider economical and technical benefits.
More intrusive safeguards, monitoring, and transparency measures could be introduced for statesthat have enrichment or reprocessing programs, but in case of misuse there can be no absoluteassurance of timely warning, or that effective intervention will be possible. The most effective
institutional barrier is to avoid national enrichment and reprocessing programs. National programs
can be obviated by multilateral arrangements, such as fuel supply guarantees and multilateralcontrol of proliferation-sensitive facilities. These matters are discussed in section six of this paper.

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Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Hedging
Considerations of nuclear capability and motivation come together in the case of a state that has
nuclear latency. Nuclear latency refers to the situation where a state has established, under apeaceful nuclear program, dual-use capabilities that could be used to produce nuclear weapons.
The concept of nuclear latency applies to those non-nuclear-weapon states that have current
capabilities in enrichment or reprocessing (there are six such states, see Table 1). It might also
apply to those states that had such capability in the past, depending on how quickly the capability
could be re-established. In addition, the concept is relevant to states seeking to develop enrichment
or reprocessing capabilities as part of their nuclear power programs.
Nuclear latency might be inadvertent, e.g., while a state with uranium enrichment and/or
reprocessing capabilities thereby has the basic capability to produce fissile material for nuclear
weapons, it may well have (at least in foreseeable circumstances) no intention of doing so. On theother hand, nuclear latency could also be deliberate—a state could establish enrichment or
reprocessing capabilities with an eye to having an essential component for a nuclear weapon option
should its strategic circumstances change at some future time.
If nuclear latency might be an unintended consequence of having certain technologies, nuclear
hedging refers to a deliberate national strategy of establishing the option of acquiring nuclear
weapons within a relatively short time frame. Compared with latency, nuclear hedging has a much
shorter time horizon, ranging from several weeks to at most a few years. The shorter time framereflects the level of preparation—hedging implies the state not only has fissile material production
capacity but is also undertaking at least some weaponization activities and developing or acquiring
nuclear-capable delivery systems.
Some of the indicators which could point to an interest in nuclear weapons were outlined above.
However, some of these indicators will be difficult to detect—so an apparent absence of indicators
is not necessarily reassuring—and even if detected, the purpose could be ambiguous. The only
visible indicator that a state is hedging may well be that it is pursuing an enrichment or
reprocessing program that lacks a technically and economically convincing rationale.

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The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Horizontal Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific Region
Energy security is a justification for fuel cycle capabilities. States that pursue enrichment andreprocessing commonly cite energy security or energy independence as a rationale. Looking firstat uranium enrichment, this is technologically demanding and is strongly affected by economies
of scale. The commercial enrichment market is dominated by a small number of suppliers,
principally Russia and Urenco (Germany, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). The UnitedStates and France were major suppliers but the technology they used (gaseous diffusion) became
uncompetitive, and today they both use Urenco technology (centrifuges). As Table 1 shows, a
handful of states have developed national enrichment programs, but the great majority of stateswith nuclear power programs buy enrichment services on the international market.
For some years the international market has been in substantial over-supply, and enrichment prices
are very low. Global annual enrichment capacity is 66.7 million SWU 16 compared to global annual
demand of 57.5 million SWU. Russia’s capacity is 28.7 million SWU and Urenco’s is 14.9 million
SWU. For some time, it is likely that growth in global demand will be offset by increases in China’s
capacity (currently 10.7 million SWU). In these circumstances there is no convincing economic
case for additional states to develop uranium enrichment capacity. Concerns about security ofsupply, if any, can be addressed by appropriate fuel supply assurances or by buying into an
established operation.
Historically, security of supply has also been cited as a rationale for reprocessing. In the early yearsof the nuclear industry, it was thought that uranium was scarce and would become increasingly
expensive. In response, the concept of fast breeder reactors (FBRs) was developed. FBRs would
maximise production of energy from uranium through separation and recycle of plutonium. Doing
this necessitates reprocessing. Plutonium was seen as a national energy resource: recycling would
reduce dependence on imported uranium and enrichment services.
The historic rationales for reprocessing and use of plutonium fuels no longer apply. It is clear that
plutonium fuels are not required to ensure the sustainability or reliability of nuclear energy.
Uranium is abundant and low-cost. Reprocessing is vastly uneconomic for light water reactors, the

16 SWU refers to Separative Work Units, a metric of isotopic separation capacity. Given in full the metric is SWU peryear (SWU/yr), but in this paper it is abbreviated to “SWU” for convenience.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificpredominant type in use today: plutonium is more expensive than use even of very high-costuranium (including extraction of uranium from seawater).
The high cost of reprocessing is reflected in the massive surplus of plutonium. As at the end of
2018 (the most recent figures available) civilian stockpiles of separated plutonium (349 tonnes)
greatly exceeded the quantities of plutonium in military programs (220 tonnes). Although theinternational Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium highlight the importance of balancing
plutonium supply and demand, lack of demand has prevented this. The lack of a use for plutonium
has led to the United Kingdom closing its reprocessing operations.
Currently only Russia and India are actively pursuing development and deployment of FBRs.
Japan and France have terminated their FBR programs. France’s Atomic and Alternative Energies
Commission (CEA) has announced that in the current energy market the industrial developmentof fourth-generation reactors is not planned before the second half of this century.
Most states with nuclear power programs have either decided to proceed with the once-throughfuel cycle, where spent fuel will be disposed of as a waste material or have adopted a wait-and-see
attitude. From a technical perspective, most spent fuel can be stored for many decades, so there is
no pressing reason to commit in the near term to final disposal or to recycle.
With regard to energy security, the main challenge for nuclear power is not security of fuel supply
but public and political confidence, which is most impacted upon by safety concerns. Rather thanpursuit of complex nuclear technologies in the name of energy independence, energy security isbest served by pursuing energy diversity and, in the nuclear sector, by a total commitment to safety
in all aspects—design and construction, facility upgrades, and operations.
A problem of scale
The fundamental issue is that the fissile material production capacity required for a nuclear weapon
program is very small compared with commercial-scale operations. Even a modest industrial
capacity can provide a substantial weapon capability and a short breakout time.

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The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Horizontal Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific Region
In the case of uranium enrichment, the capacity required to produce sufficient LEU for the annual
fuel requirements of just one typical light water reactor is around 110,000 SWU. A “small”
commercial plant is two or three million SWU. The capacity required to produce sufficient HEU
for one nuclear weapon in one year is only 5,000 SWU (or less than 1,000 SWU if using LEUfeed).
In the case of reprocessing, a modern reprocessing plant can have an annual throughput of 800
tonnes of spent fuel, separating about 8 tonnes of plutonium (this is the scale of Japan’s Rokkasho
plant and the French plant proposed for China). An output of 8 tonnes of plutonium is 1,000 times
the IAEA significant quantity figure of 8 kilograms.
Because it is difficult to tell what the state’s intentions are, or to predict what they may be at somefuture time, from a non-proliferation perspective the fewer national enrichment and reprocessing
programs there are the better, and vice versa, the more widespread these capabilities become, thegreater the risk of proliferation, now or in the future. If a number of states decided to pursue thesecapabilities there is the risk of virtual arms races, undermining international trust and destabilising
the non-proliferation regime.

Prospective Fuel Cycle Developments in the Asia-Pacific Region
Leaving aside states with nuclear weapons (China, India, Pakistan, and the DPRK), currently Japanis the only state in the region that has enrichment and reprocessing activities. The ROK isundertaking research on a type of reprocessing, pyro-processing, and has shown interest in uranium
enrichment. Australia has had uranium enrichment research and development projects but has no
current or planned activity in this area.
Japan has both enrichment and reprocessing. Japan’s enrichment capacity, based on centrifuge
technology, is relatively small, 75,000 SWU, about two-thirds of what is required to meet theannual fuel requirements of a single typical light water reactor. Notwithstanding the global
oversupply, there are plans to increase Japan’s enrichment capacity twenty-fold, to 1.5 million
SWU.

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WMD in Asia-PacificJapan has been engaged in reprocessing since the 1970s. The first reprocessing plant, at
Tokai-mura, was closed in 2006, but Japan proceeded with a much larger plant at Rokkasho—annual capacity 800 tonnes of spent fuel, output around 8 tonnes of plutonium. Rokkasho is readyto commence operations but start-up has been deferred several times, currently until 2022.
Meanwhile, Japan has accumulated almost 46 tonnes of separated plutonium, 9 tonnes in Japanand the balance held in the United Kingdom and France. It makes no sense to add to this very
substantial stockpile.
It is hoped Japan will make the current moratorium on Rokkasho permanent, or at least extend it
until such time, if ever, that there is a genuine need for the plutonium. Although Japan has alongstanding and strongly held commitment against nuclear weapons, the threat of DPRK nuclear
weapons has prompted calls in Japan to maintain fuel cycle capabilities to ensure a nuclear weapon
option.17 This has led to some unease about the proliferation potential of the Rokkasho project.
In the ROK the nuclear research establishment also sees FBRs as important for the future and, tothis end, has been researching pyro-processing for some time. Pyro-processing became an issue inthe renewal of the US-ROK nuclear cooperation agreement in 2015. The ROK sought US consent
to reprocessing and recognition of a right to enrich. In response to ROK concerns about fuelsecurity, the renewed agreement provides US nuclear fuel supply assurances. The agreement refers
to possible enrichment or reprocessing in the ROK, but this would require the further agreementof the parties. The ROK and the United States are conducting a Joint Fuel Cycle Study on spent
fuel management, including assessment of the viability of pyro-processing and safeguards andproliferation aspects of this technology. This study is expected to be completed in 2021.
The possibility of enrichment and/or reprocessing in the ROK is viewed with concern in the region
and in Washington, and in the ROK itself. 18 Such activities would be disruptive for efforts tonegotiate a denuclearization process with the DPRK. Concerns are exacerbated by calls in the

17 See for example, the remarks by Japan’s former defense minister, Satoshi Morimoto, prior to his

appointment,which was reported in the Japan Times on 6 September 2012:https://web.archive.org/web/20121013202153/www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20120906b4.html
18 E. Lim, South Korea’s Nuclear Dilemmas, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Volume 2, 2019,https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2019.1585585

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The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Horizontal Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific Region
ROK for an independent nuclear deterrent and the high levels of support for this (sixty percent ormore) shown in public opinion polling.19
Overall, for both the ROK and Japan (and also China) there is a strong argument for deferring thedevelopment of plutonium-recycle technologies until it can be demonstrated that they are actuallyneeded. If or when such development does proceed, it should be conducted under arrangementsthat fully address proliferation concerns.
Australia has had two R&D projects on uranium enrichment: a centrifuge project from the mid1960s to the mid-1980s, and a laser-based project, SILEX, from the early 1990s to 2007 when the
project was transferred to the United States for further development. In addition, there was a
private sector study into the establishment of an enrichment industry in the 1970s. Initially thislooked at the Australian centrifuge technology but finally settled on Urenco technology.
Eventually the study was terminated for commercial reasons and also because of a change ofgovernment. The basis for these various projects was the possibility for Australia to value-add on
its substantial uranium exports.
Reflecting anti-nuclear sentiment, in 1999 legislation was passed prohibiting the licensing of fuelcycle activities in Australia, including uranium enrichment. This prohibition remains in place
today.
The possibility of Australia enriching uranium for export continues to be raised from time to time
and was thoroughly examined by the South Australian Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission in2015‒16.20 The Commission concluded that with an oversupplied and uncertain global market
there was no opportunity for commercial development of uranium enrichment in Australia for theforeseeable future. If enrichment were pursued, the Commission recommended this should be ona multilateral basis with the participation of partner countries to address the issue of nuclear
latency. In a submission to the Commission the national government expressed support for the
principle of multilateral control of sensitive stages of the fuel cycle. The Commission

19 Rachel Oswald, ‘Southern Discomfort’, Pulitzer Center, 10 April 2018,https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/southern-discomfort
20 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Royal Commission Consultation and Response Agency, ‘Nuclear State-Wide Engagement’(Royal Commission, 2016), https://nuclear.yoursay.sa.gov.au/the-report The author was a member of theCommission’s Expert Advisory Committee.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificrecommended that the South Australian government seek repeal of the national prohibition against
fuel cycle activities so any proposals that arise could be considered further, but because of the poor
economic prospects the government did not adopt this recommendation.
The Commission’s principal recommendation was in favour of establishing an international spent
fuel repository in South Australia. Bipartisan consensus was lacking for this to proceed. In theabsence of bipartisan consensus, no nuclear developments are likely to proceed in Australia.21
Taiwan As noted earlier, Taiwan sought reprocessing capabilities in the 1970s. The 1974 nuclear
cooperation agreement between the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan
contained the standard provision proscribing enrichment or reprocessing without US prior consent.
When the agreement was renewed in 2014 Taiwan forswore enrichment and reprocessing, what is
known in the United States as the “gold standard” for nuclear cooperation agreements. 22
Vietnam had an ambitious plan to build up to ten nuclear power units by 2030 and negotiatedproject agreements with Russia and Japan. It concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with theUnited States in 2014. The United States pressed Vietnam to forswear enrichment andreprocessing, but Vietnam declined to do this and instead expressed in the agreement its intent torely on existing international markets for nuclear fuel services, rather than acquiring sensitive
nuclear technologies. In 2016 Vietnam decided to postpone both the Russian and Japanese reactor
projects indefinitely due to economic conditions, and the future of Vietnam’s nuclear power
program is uncertain.
Other Southeast Asian states that were planning nuclear power programs but deferred them foreconomic and other reasons include:

21 On 15 September 2021 Australia, the US and the UK announced a proposal to provide Australia with nuclear-

powered submarines. This proposal does not involve Australia producing nuclear fuel. See the author’scommentary, “AUKUS Nuclear-Powered Submarine Deal – Non-proliferation Aspects”,
https://www.apln.network/analysis/commentaries/aukus-nuclear-powered-submarine-deal-non-proliferationaspects
22 The “gold standard” first appeared in the 2009 US-United Arab Emirates agreement.

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The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Horizontal Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific Region
Indonesia The 2017 National Energy General Plan to 2050 excludes major nuclear capacity infavour of increases in oil, gas, and renewables and a focus on small-scale nuclear plants.23
Malaysia the year 2030 had been suggested as the earliest date for construction of a nuclear power
plant, but more recently the Prime Minister has ruled out use of nuclear energy. 24
Thailand The current Power Development Plan, for the period to 2037, has no provision for
nuclear energy.25
In addition, the Philippines, which had a power reactor in the 1980s that was never started, isreported to be considering nuclear power again, but as yet no decisions have been taken. 26
In South Asia, Bangladesh has two Russian-supplied power reactors under construction,scheduled for completion in 2023‒2024 and 2024‒2025. Russia will supply the fuel and take backspent fuel.27
None of these states has any plans for pursuing enrichment or reprocessing capabilities.
Finally, mention should be made of Myanmar. In the period 2000‒2011 the military regime’s
links with the DPRK led to concerns about a possible nuclear weapon program. Following theestablishment of a civilian government in 2011, Myanmar affirmed its commitment to nonproliferation. Myanmar signed a safeguards Additional Protocol in 2013, though this has not yet
been ratified. Myanmar is engaging with the IAEA and participates in the Asia-Pacific Safeguards
Network.

23 F. Todd, “Analysing the Development of Nuclear Power across Southeast Asia,” Nuclear Engineering

International, August 5, 2019, https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/features/development-nuclear-powersoutheast-asia/
24 Nor Ain Mohamed Radhi, “Malaysia Won’t Use Nuclear Power, Says PM,” NST Online, February 10, 2020,
https://www.nst.com.my/news/government-public-policy/2020/02/564295/malaysia-wont-use-nuclear-powersays-pm
25 “Power Plan Backed along wIth 2 Plants,” The Nation, January 24, 2019,http://www.nationthailand.com/Economy/30362896
26 Sustainability Times, “The Philippines Is Eyeing Nuclear Power as a Green Option,” Sustainability Times (blog),
March 13, 2020, https://www.sustainability-times.com/low-carbon-energy/the-philippines-is-eyeing-nuclearpower-as-a-green-option/.
27 “Nuclear Power in Bangladesh - World Nuclear Association,” Nuclear Power in Bangladesh, accessed October 27,
2021, https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/bangladesh.aspx,
accessed 15 April 2020.

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WMD in Asia-PacificConclusion - Minimising Proliferation Risk
Horizontal proliferation is usually thought of in terms of clandestine nuclear programs. Actions
taken to counter such programs have included strengthening IAEA safeguards and export controls.
The risks from nuclear latency—states developing proliferation capabilities openly as part of theirsafeguarded nuclear programs—are recognized, but avoiding latency has not attracted the samelevel of attention as clandestine programs.
The NSG Guidelines 28 ask suppliers of enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment, or
technology to encourage recipients to accept, as an alternative to national plants, supplierinvolvement and/or other appropriate multinational participation in resulting facilities. The
Guidelines also ask suppliers to promote multinational regional fuel cycle centres. These
Guidelines, however, do not amount to a commitment against further national projects and, ofcourse, they are applicable only where transfers are involved. They do not apply to wholly
indigenous projects.
The pursuit of national enrichment and reprocessing programs highlights the latency/hedging
dilemma. While every state wants energy security—to which nuclear energy could make animportant contribution—this does not necessitate every state, or even many states, having national
programs in proliferation-sensitive technologies. States need to see energy security, not in narrow
technology terms (pursuit of fuel cycle capabilities), but in a much wider context. Paradoxically,
having such programs could be counterproductive to a state’s broader security interests, either
directly, due to the threat perceptions and reactions of other states, or more generally through aweakening of the non-proliferation regime. A large part of addressing the latency/hedging problem
will be to help states to understand and think constructively about this national security paradox.
The only sure way to address the issues of nuclear latency and hedging is to reach international
acceptance that proliferation-sensitive stages of the fuel cycle should be under multilateral rather
than national control. A new international framework for the nuclear fuel cycle is needed,emphasizing international collaboration in place of national programs. Key elements in the new

28 NSG Guidelines, Part I, paragraph 6(e).

221The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Horizontal Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific Region
framework would include multinational fuel cycle centers, international fuel supply guarantees,
and fuel leasing.
Multinational approaches are not an unrealistic aspiration. Already there are practical precedents
with important characteristics that can be built upon in future models, including:•

Urenco, the European enrichment group, where there is a treaty providing for mutual
oversight of facility operations by the treaty parties, as well as separation between facility
operators and technology design/manufacture (in effect a black box arrangement).

•

The International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC), Russia, which provides enrichment
customers with supply guarantees overseen by the IAEA, and also the opportunity for
equity participation in the project.

•

The IAEA LEU Bank, operated by Kazakhstan on the IAEA’s behalf.

•

A form of fuel leasing is provided by Rosatom (Russia), which supplies fuel assemblies
and takes back spent fuel from a number of customers.

The key factor with sensitive facilities is multinational, rather than wholly national, control.
Multinational participation provides transparency of facility operations and inhibits possible
takeover by the host state, especially where this would violate treaties. An additional inhibitor is
supply of technology under black box arrangements, where this is practicable. This precludes
clandestine replication, and builds delays into any misuse scenario, providing greater opportunity
for intervention.
If in the future the viability of plutonium recycle is established, an appropriate model might benuclear “islands” in which fast reactors and associated recycle processing facilities are physicallyco-located under multinational control.
Fuel banks need not be physical, as with the IAEA LEU Bank in Kazakhstan, but could be virtual,as with the fuel supply guarantee provided by the IUEC. Under multinational arrangements virtual
fallback supply could be provided by a number of suppliers. 29

29. For more on multinational arrangements see Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, IAEA, 2005,

http://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/7281/Multilateral-Approaches-to-the-Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle and J.

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WMD in Asia-PacificMultinational approaches should not be looked at in isolation but considered in the context ofpossible further complementary non-proliferation and confidence-building mechanisms, such asenhanced transparency, nuclear weapon-free zones, and regional safeguards arrangements.
In current circumstances there is no urgency to proceed with new or deferred enrichment or
reprocessing projects. As discussed, the global enrichment market is substantially over-supplied,
and there is no sound technical or economic rationale for reprocessing unless the viability of fast
reactors is established, which is by no means assured and in any case is decades away.
Accordingly, a constructive approach would be to defer any current plans and allow time todevelop multinational, including regional, solutions. To this end, regional studies could be initiatedon the concepts discussed here.
While multinational approaches are usually framed in the context of the risk of horizontal
proliferation—the focus of this paper—this is also an issue for disarmament. In the future thepotential for rapid break-out from arms control and disarmament commitments will be just as greata concern as the potential for break-out from non-proliferation commitments by nuclear weapons
states using a residual surge capacity to reverse direction. The parties to arms control anddisarmament negotiations can be expected to seek appropriate confidence-building measures tocover ongoing fuel cycle activities. Accordingly, there could be interest in adapting approaches
developed for the ROK, Japan, and other non-nuclear-weapon states to also apply in the future to
China, India, and Pakistan.30
Clearly gaining support for multinationalization of proliferation-sensitive stages of the fuel cycle
will be challenging. However, achieving a future free from the danger of nuclear war requires achange in current mindsets, from an emphasis on national fuel cycle programs to new approaches
based on the common interests of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, energy security, andstrengthened international collaboration.

Carlson, Multinational Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, in Routledge Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation and
Policy, J. Pilat and N. Busch eds, Oxford, 2015.
30 Of course the issue is equally applicable to the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel.

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Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World

8. Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear
Deterrence in a Pandemic World
Allan Behm

Introduction
The global community is slowly coming to accept that it may be living not in a post-COVID-19
world but in a world of rolling outbreaks where waves of infection and death afflict populations
unpredictably. Along with climate change and nuclear weapons, this is the new threat to humansecurity and, like the other two threats, may constrain humanity’s existence in the absence of aneffective vaccine. Ian Dunlop has pointed out that the pandemic itself is related “to human-induced
climate change, which stems from our use of fossil fuels, agriculture and land-clearing.”1 As weset about burning ever more fossil fuel, clearing ever more land, accelerating the decline of
biodiversity, bringing human populations ever closer to wild animal populations, and forcing
animal species to seek refuge in conurbations for their very survival, we expose human beings tounheralded forms of zoönotic disease. In recent decades, these have included HIV, bird flu, SARS,MERS, and the Hendra, Ebola, and Zika viruses.
Desertification and deforestation engender habitat loss that forces species that have neverpreviously been in contact to migrate into shared refuges around new food resources.
Anthropogenic changes to the global landscape and atmospheric warming are not only affecting
weather patterns but also creating new forms of health threat. Climate change is a risk multiplier.
It affects the well-being of populations, the availability of food resources, the security of

1 See Ian Dunlop, “The really big and tough issue is the environment says Ken Henry,” Pearls and Irritations, 8 July

2020 https://johnmenadue.com/the-environment-the-really-tough-one/© 2022 Allan Behm, CC BY 4.0

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WMD in Asia-Pacificcommunities, and ultimately the stability of governments, all of which play into the causes ofarmed conflict and war.
Climate change and the coronavirus pandemic have both induced a potentially fatal paralysis inmany world leaders and fatalistic inertia in many of the world’s communities—and for the same
basic reason. As a species, it appears that human beings are unable to accept the systemicinterdependence between people, other animal species, and the natural world in general. In themost morbid of senses then, the global community is currently facing two catastrophes for the
price of one. And, what is more, the inter-connectedness of planetary systems places the three mostpressing threats to human existence—climate change, pandemics, and nuclear weapons—in thesame decision space. Each of these threats constitutes a “wicked problem” where solutions are“messy,” iterative, and constantly morphing.
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on global security is yet to be seen. But what is clear fromthe so-called first wave is the massive debilitation of human populations in the United States, India,
Europe, and parts of Central and South America. Even China, Japan, and South Korea have been
hard hit, though early controls reduced the relative levels of harm across the population. And at
this stage of the pandemic’s evolution, the global economic cost is unknown —but it will bemassive. Taken together, the health and economic consequences of the pandemic constitute a
substantial challenge to national security, making populations less resilient, more vulnerable tomilitary threats, and less able to invest in and sustain significant military operations. And wheresome states may regard the emerging weakness of other states as an opportunity for saber-rattling
and aggressive rhetoric (China and India have exchanged fire in the Galwan River valley, whilethen President Trump and members of his cabinet engaged in rhetorical exchanges with China),
others may respond in similar fashion by engaging in political warfare to exploit social divisions
generated by the pandemic. Australian and US concerns regarding alleged Chinese cyber andinformation attacks are emblematic of the insecurity that attends COVID-19.
It is already evident that the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting the readiness of military forces. The
US aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt was an early casualty, as was its captain who drewattention to the plight of the crew and was promptly dismissed from his command. 2 Over 20
2 See ABC report “Sailor from USS Theodore Roosevelt dies of coronavirus after captain fired for raising concerns

about outbreak,” ABC News, 14 April 2020 https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-14/us-navy-sailor-from-uss-

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Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World
percent of the carrier’s crew tested positive for the virus, and at least one died. The captain, who
also succumbed to the disease, was subsequently dismissed from the US Navy, and the US Navy
Secretary who dismissed him was also fired. A US marine on exercises in the Northern Territory
was also diagnosed with the coronavirus infection, re-introducing the virus to the Northern
Territory following a sustained period of no cases. 3 The clear message is that military forces are
as vulnerable to a pandemic as the civilian population, with unforeseeable consequences for
operational readiness and effectiveness.
In view of the Nuclear Posture Review 2018 and its lowering of the boundary between
conventional and nuclear warfare, the threshold for nuclear use may well be reduced considerably
if key elements of the US military were hors de combat due to the pandemic. For their part, China
and Russia have exploited the uncertainties surrounding the coronavirus by stepping up theirsurveillance and associated military activities along their borders. The imperative to win, as
distinct from survive, opens a pandora’s box of terrifying scenarios in times of pandemic.
As some commentators have noted, including a former Australian Prime Minister, 4 the potential
for the pandemic to provide a pathway to armed conflict has increased. And with the prospect ofwar, there is the possibility of nuclear exchange. The link between COVID-19 and Weapons ofMass Destruction (WMD) cannot be ignored, even if the relationship cannot be properly mapped.
That is the nature of “wicked problems.”
The COVID-19 pandemic is also changing the way nations think about the health security of their
populations. Setting aside the defiant willfulness of the Trump administration’s response to thepandemic, matching only that of the Bolsonaro government in Brazil for its cavalier incompetence,
most governments have looked to internal solutions to their pandemic management problems.
Mutatis mutandis, they have instituted quarantine controls by closing their borders to international

theodore-roosevelt-dies-of-coronavirus/12147482 and Barbara Starr and Michael Nedelman, “US aircraft carrier
hit by major coronavirus outbreak returns to sea,” CNN Politics, 21 May 2020
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/19/politics/uss-roosevelt-return-to-sea/index.html
3 See Steve Vivian, “US marine tests positive for coronavirus in the Northern Territory,” ABC News, 10 July 2020
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-07-10/nt-coronavirus-update-new-case-confirmed-us-marine/12442232
4 See, for instance, Andrew Tillett, “US-China tensions could lead to hot war: Rudd,” The Australian Financial
Review, 4 August 2020 https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/us-china-tensions-could-lead-to-a-hot-war-rudd20200804-p55ib9 See also Kevin Rudd, “Beware the Guns of August – in Asia,” Foreign Affairs, 3 August 2020
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-03/beware-guns-august-asia

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WMD in Asia-Pacifictravelers, imposing strict controls on the social intercourse of their populations, locking down
districts and regions, expanding their medical services, constructing ‘pop-up’ hospitals,
establishing mobile testing facilities, and generally imposing heavy costs on their economies as
they try to maintain both services and incomes.
Apart from some formalized cooperative arrangements between individual laboratories andpharmaceutical companies that are otherwise competing to discover a vaccine, nations have notestablished international cooperative arrangements for the broader management of the pandemic.
No nation has contracted out its coronavirus management to any international agency ororganization (including the World Health Organization), far less to another state. This is lessbecause the WHO has not discovered or manufactured a vaccine (that is not its role), but rather areflection on the unwillingness of many governments to accept and follow WHO pandemic advice.
Rather than acting collaboratively, many national leaders have pursued a ‘go it alone’ policy
towards both containing and managing the virus. Some might even describe it as a ‘dog eat dog’
approach. And Trump’s attempt to corner the vaccine market by persuading Germany’s CureVac
company to move its research facilities to the United States, and to retain the Gilead company’s
Remdesivir production for sole US usage, highlights the triumph of national over internationallycollaborative approaches to what is fundamentally an international problem affecting humanity as
a whole.
It is curious that the ‘go it alone’ approach of so many of the US allies in managing their COVID19 responses has been in sharp contradistinction to their longstanding preparedness to transfer
ultimate responsibility for their security to another power, which is the consequence of extended
deterrence.
So, this paper questions why states might contract out fundamental aspects of their national
security to more powerful states (‘extended deterrence’) and how credible is the so-called
protection they might receive in return.

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Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic WorldThe Problem of Trust
The COVID-19 world is one where trust is in retreat. Populations’ trust in their leaders andgovernments, already in the doldrums for many years,5 will continue to decline as citizens’ hopesof ‘a return to normal’—frequently promised by their governments—remain unfulfilled.6 But trust
is not only in decline within nations. It is in decline between nations. As The Lowy Institute hasreported, “in 2020, Australians are less trusting of most countries around the world than in thepast.”7 Trust in China has more than halved over a two-year period, while trust in the United States
has declined from a high of 83 percent during President Obama’s administration to just over 50
percent in 2020.8
In a world where trust—both between citizens and the state, and between states—is in decline, thebarking of the dogs of war grows louder. That doesn’t necessarily make war inevitable. But it does
make it more likely, and it makes states feel more insecure, which in turn makes them look to theirdefenses. For Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea,
locked into alliances with the United States, the comfort of the nuclear guarantee looks even more
attractive. But is the guarantee to be trusted? More to the point, is the United States to be trusted
to deliver on that guarantee? And even more to the point, was Trump to be trusted to put Chicago
at risk to protect Canberra, or Washington to protect Tokyo?
Reliance on the nuclear deterrent capabilities of a major power is much more a statement ofnecessity than one of trust. But if, ultimately, that reliance is insufficient though necessary fornational security, what’s the point? If it is not grounded in trust, then it is groundless. That is thedilemma on which extended nuclear deterrence rests for its credibility.
In important respects, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed that trust, or its absence, is the global
community’s Achilles heel. Trust, and its absence, are pervasive qualities, affecting all aspects of

5 See OECD, “Trust in Government,” https://www.oecd.org/gov/trust-in-government.htm
6 See Christopher Ingraham, “Coronavirus will undermine trust in government, ‘scarring body and mind’ for

decades, research finds,” The Washington Post, 5 July 2020
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/05/coronavirus-pandemic-trust-government/
7 See Lowy Institute Poll 2020 at https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/tags/trust-in-global-powers/
8 Loc.cit.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificindividual, communal, and national decision-making and behavior. This is a matter to which weshall return in due course.

Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence
Ultimately, the doctrine of deterrence rests on fear: it is no accident that ‘terror’ is intrinsic to thevery word.9
The theoretical principles underlying the doctrine of extended deterrence were well articulated by
Paul Huth, writing in The American Political Science Review in 1988.10 With estimable caution,
Huth ended his analysis with the following observation:
The defense of allies from external threats is an enduring feature of the competition
between states for spheres of influence in the international system. Extended deterrence,
however, can be a very difficult and demanding task for foreign policy leaders…The
credible threat of military force is required to convince the potential attacker that the
military costs of changing the status quo are high, but skillful diplomacy is also required
to assure the potential attacker that the political costs of continued peace are acceptable. 11
Therein one sees the fundamental problem with the doctrine of extended deterrence: what at one
level appears to be a force-on-force solution to a force problem, dependent on the superior
firepower and destructive forces of the deterring power, is at another level a political problem
dependent on nimble management of the political and psychological uncertainties attendant upon
Clausewitz’s dictum “war is the continuation of policy by other means.”
George Schultz, Secretary of State in US President Ronald Reagan’s administration, has put thenuclear deterrence dilemma with characteristic precision.

9 For an excellent examination of the modern evolution of deterrence, see Andrew Brown and Lorna Arnold, “TheQuirks of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Relations, Vol. 24, No. 3, (2010), pp. 293-312
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/The-Quirks-of-Nuclear-Deterrence.pdf
10 See Paul Huth, ”Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 82,
No 2 (June, 1988), p. 424 https://www.jstor.org/stable/1957394?read-now=1&seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents
11 Paul Huth, art.cit., p. 439

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Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World
Nuclear weapons were, and are, the gravest threat to humanity’s survival. Their effect inpreventing wars has been overrated and reports of the damage they cause tend to be brushedaside. New studies show the major impact of their use on the climate and agriculture
beyond all the other effects that we knew about previously. To depend on nuclear
deterrence indefinitely into the future, especially when other means of deterrence areavailable, is foolhardy.12
The more populist architects of extended deterrence were rather like the medieval scholastics
whose philosophical presuppositions and axioms enabled them to explore the relationship between
materiality and immateriality—the reductio ad absurdum encapsulated by the question “how manyangels can dance on the head of a pin?” How does one ‘play with the mind’ of a potential adversarycontemplating the materiality of war by confronting them with the immateriality of uncertainty as
to whether a third party might apply overwhelming force? Extended deterrence assumes a linearity
between armed aggression and its resolution that ignores both the non-linear character of warfare(Clausewitz’s ‘fog’ and ‘friction’) and the decision chaos that comes with uncertainty. 13 Yethistory confirms repeatedly that the immateriality of policy eventually overwhelms the materialityof war.
The logical gymnastics of deterrence can be seen in the confected binary between counter-value(the adversary’s cities and economic infrastructure) and counter-force (the adversary’s militarysystems). To imagine that an adversary will refrain from a counter-value defense on the grounds
that the attack is counter-force is to ignore both history and human psychology. The destruction ofRotterdam, Cologne, Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki—all counter-value targets—demonstrates that what might appeal to military planners in theory (destruction of industrial andmilitary targets) does not conform to what happens in practice. Moreover, as Fred Kaplan points

12 See George Schultz, in George P. Schultz and James E. Goodby (eds), The War That Must Never Be Fought:

Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2015), p. xv
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/goodby_shultz__the_war_that_must_never_be_fought_-_scribd.pdf
13 Uncertainty was embedded in Clausewitz’s analysis of war. See Vladimir Rauta, “Clausewitz’s Fog and Friction
and the Military Transformation Fiction,” Conflict and Security (University of Nottingham), 2 December 2013
http://nottspolitics.org/2013/12/02/clausewitzs-fog-and-friction-and-the-military-transformation-fiction/

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WMD in Asia-Pacificout in his remarkable history The Bomb, the internal logic of counterforce drives the dynamics ofan inevitable arms race. 14 Signal-giving and signal-reading are not the same thing.
Extended nuclear deterrence is an artefact of US alliance policy in the immediate post-WW2 years:
the nations that ‘enjoy’ the extended nuclear deterrence that the US nuclear arsenal affords them
are all joined to the US through a set of alliance arrangements that places the US at the center of
their national defense. Consequently, extended nuclear deterrence is very much a security
preoccupation of the United States and its allies. It is not something to which defense planners in
Brazil or Indonesia, or China for that matter, turn their minds. The former Warsaw Pact members,
for instance—the forced acolytes of the former Soviet Union that wasted no time in escaping theclutches of the Soviet Union following glasnost—did not enjoy a similar relationship with their
dominant partner. They were not in any effective sense covered by a nuclear umbrella in the waythat NATO members thought themselves to be. So in a strategically unbalanced world, only theallies of the United States live in the security bubble of extended nuclear deterrence.
It is a curious phenomenon that most deterrence theorists are also deterrence enthusiasts. Like
theology, deterrence theory takes on the guise of a faith-based discipline masquerading as anevidence-based science. Yet its foundation principles are axiomatic rather than observable facts.
Its practitioners are often the ‘true believers’ providing a kind of theoretical basis that legitimizes
what military planners were probably intending to do anyway. The arguments for deterrence,
especially nuclear deterrence, can be as ingenious and sophisticated as they are novel and specious.
In a recent academic journal article, for instance, two Australian scholars argued that by signingon to the institutional arrangement that delivers US nuclear deterrence to safeguard Australia
against an overwhelming aggressor—the ANZUS treaty—Australia acquires the ability to
influence the direction of US nuclear policy, and defense policy more broadly.
In general, maximizing influence over U.S. strategic policy has been an important motive
for U.S. allies seeking to participate in nuclear cooperation. For instance, Australia only
began to highlight U.S. extended nuclear deterrence in its 1993 Strategic Review, due toan underlying anxiety that the United States was considering detaching itself militarily
from the Asia-Pacific after the Cold War…Moreover, Australia’s White Papers contain an
14 Fred Kaplan, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals and the Secret History of Nuclear War (New York: Simon andSchuster, 2020), p. 78.

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Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World
implicit “sole-purpose” declaration that relates U.S. extended nuclear deterrence (in thecase of Australia) exclusively to nuclear threats.15
Whether the institutional frameworks that purportedly deliver deterrence are truly able to lendauthority and credibility to a weaker party in their efforts to influence the policies of their major
ally is moot—more an expression of hope than a reflection of experience.
A more agnostic approach to the place of deterrence in security planning was evidenced by Patrick
Morgan in 2012.
Much of the discussion, indeed worry, about deterrence now has to do with familiar
concerns: credibility, target rationality, fitting deterrence carefully to the situation(tailoring), possible/actual first-strike capabilities, and so on. More analysis is neededstressing what became, over time, the most important dimension of Cold War deterrence—system security management. This is management for a world now trying to reorderinternational politics and security to make deterrence steadily less relevant, with thatmanagement resting much less on nuclear deterrence in particular, and with ordinary
deterrence more prominent and often meant to help sharply improve international
politics.16
But keen interest in and re-evaluation of deterrence theory does in part explain why, in recent
decades, the two terms of art—‘extended deterrence’ and ‘extended nuclear deterrence’—have
tended to conflate. 17 ‘Extended deterrence’ relied on the willingness of a third-party ally withsuperior conventional forces to use those forces in the defense of the less militarily powerful allyagainst an aggressive third party. The proliferation of nuclear weapons encouraged the UnitedStates and its allies to bring nuclear forces into the deterrence equation: the potential aggressor had
to calculate whether he would be prepared to employ nuclear weapons in armed conflict with a
15 See Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neil, “Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia:

Toward an institutional perspective,” Contemporary Security Policy, vol 38 (2017), issue 1,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2016.1257214
16 See Patrick M. Morgan, “The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today,” Contemporary Security Policy,
vol. 33 (2012), issue 1, p. 98, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2012.659589
17 See, for instance, Steven Pifer, Richard Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin Indyk, Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth
Pollack, “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, May
2010, where the terms are used more or less interchangeably, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/06_nuclear_deterrence.pdf

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Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) against the prospect of a nuclear sanction imposed by theUnited States.
But the progressive withdrawal of US ground forces from Germany and the Republic of Korea, 18
along with the re-drawing of nuclear-use thresholds in the Nuclear Posture Review 2018, has added
considerable ambiguity to the use of nuclear forces to deter conventional attacks in Europe andAsia. Accordingly, ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ has come to dominate consideration ofdeterrence policy.
A surprising consequence of this conflation is that, for the United States, the effectiveness ofextended nuclear deterrence is increasingly judged in terms of allies’ expressions of reassurance
rather than the absence or reduced likelihood of armed conflict.
Their conflation is due, in part, to the progressive legitimization of nuclear weapons and their use
resulting from long-term weapons production and possession by the NWS (as identified by the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT) and their unwillingness and inability to embark on
nuclear arms elimination as required by the NPT. It is due in part to the intellectual laziness thathas begun to characterize much of what passes for strategic policy analysis and formulation. It is
due in part to an intellectual sleight-of-hand whereby the presuppositions and axioms underpinning
the simpler concept of ‘extended deterrence’ have been maneuvered into position as the conceptual
foundations of the more complicated and elusive idea of ‘extended nuclear deterrence.’ And it isalso an inevitable consequence of the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review 2018,
which postulated a lowering of the nuclear-use bar by contemplating nuclear first-use inconventional warfare.
. . . Deterring nuclear attack is not the sole purpose of nuclear weapons. Given the diverse
threats and profound uncertainties of the current and future threat environment, U.S.
nuclear forces play the following critical roles in U.S. national security strategy.
••

Deterrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack;Assurance of allies and partners;

18 For a particularly insightful analysis of nuclear security issues on the Korean peninsula, see Paul K. Davis, Peter

Wilson, Jeongeun Kim and Junho Park, “Deterrence and Stability for the Korean Peninsula,” The Korean Journal of
Defense Analysis, vol. 28 (1), March 2016, pp. 1-23,
https://www.kida.re.kr/frt/board/frtBoardJatsxmlPop.do?idx=2233

Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World••

Achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails;
Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future.

These roles are complementary and interrelated, and we must assess the adequacy of U.S.
nuclear forces against each role and the strategy designed to fulfill (sic) it. 19
The review continues:
The United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme
circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners.
Extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks.
Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on the U.S.,
allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear
forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.20
The credibility of extended deterrence rests on the supposition that the superior forces of apowerful state would come to the aid of the forces of a less powerful state (generally a NNWS)
were it subject to armed aggression by an opposing powerful state. It is the basic assumption onwhich the North Atlantic (NATO) Treaty, the still contested Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between the United States and Japan, 21 and the ANZUS Treaty rest—that the UnitedStates would come to its allies’ assistance in the event of an armed attack by an opposing state,with or without the implied threat of nuclear weapons use.
There are, however, three intrinsic disjunctions in the extended deterrence formula: that theinterests of the more powerful deterring state would necessarily align with those of the lesspowerful state, that the more powerful state would in any circumstance be prepared to expend
blood and treasure on behalf of the less powerful state, and that the benefits of confronting an
19 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review February 2018, p. 20

https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINALREPORT.PDF (Emphasis is by the author).
20 Office of the Secretary of Defense, op. cit., p.21. A curious reader might wonder how France and the United
Kingdom regard their inclusion under the US extended nuclear deterrence umbrella. Emphasis by the author.
21 While it is a major advocate of nuclear nonproliferation, Japan continues to pursue a hedging policy that retains
the possibility of nuclear weapons development by preserving the ability both to enrich uranium and to reprocess
plutonium. As is the case with other US allies, there remains a reservoir of doubt about the effectiveness andreliability of the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the US-Japan Treaty. See, for instance, Mark Fitzpatrick,“How Japan Could Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs, 3 October 2019https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2019-10-03/how-japan-could-go-nuclear

234

WMD in Asia-Pacificopposing powerful state would outweigh those costs. “My enemy’s enemy is my friend” mightresonate with some, but “my friend’s enemy is my enemy” may not be true in mostcircumstances.22
There is a superficial attractiveness in rationalizing hope. The hopeful press for deals from thepowerful, often without realizing the extent to which the powerful are driven by self-interest.
Concessions come at a price. And the powerful deploy their policy sales agents who confect allkinds of sophistries to persuade the customer to buy their wares, particularly when the customer isgullible. In pressing Australia to accept a ‘soft’ treaty with Japan in the immediate post WW2
period, the United States was prepared to accept Australia’s demand for a security guarantee
against the possibility of Japan’s eventual re-armament. So the ANZUS treaty, which is scarcely
more than an agreement to consult, provided Australia with the ‘extended deterrence’ that an
insecure and nervous Australia demanded. 23
Yet, so far as this author has been able to determine, none of the contemporary negotiators
envisaged the use of the US nuclear strike capability to defend Australia against any putative
Japanese aggression. Australia’s insecurity pathologies continued to infect its strategic concerns
during the 1950s and 1960s—dominoes in South East Asia and deep worries about Indonesian
aggression during Konfrontasi (1963-66). But the assistance provided to the United Kingdom todevelop its nuclear weapons (the provision of the Monte Bello and Maralinga test sites) and its
own ambitions to develop a nuclear capability notwithstanding, Australian planners seem not tohave given serious contemplation to a nuclear defense of Australia by the United States.
Konfrontasi, of course, brought Australia a serious reality check on the real strategic utility ofAustralia’s extended deterrence expectations provided by the ANZUS treaty. In 1963, Prime
Minister Robert Menzies decided to test the waters. Australia’s commitment of forces to thedefense of Malaysia against Indonesian ‘Confrontation’ in 1963 was made on the assumption that,were Australian forces to come under direct attack by Indonesian forces, the United States would
22 The logical anomaly inherent in these two propositions was explored by Thomas Schwartz in “The friend of myenemy is my enemy, the enemy of my enemy is my friend: Axioms for structural balance and bi-polarity,”
Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 60, Issue 1, July 2010, pp. 39-45.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/mathematical-social-sciences/vol/60/issue/1
23 For an excellent and concise analysis of the negotiating history of the ANZUS Treaty, see Joseph M.Siracusa, “TheANZUS Treaty Revisited,” Security Challenges, vol. 1, no. 1. Pp.89-104
https://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/vol1no1Siracusa.pdf

235Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World
commit forces to support Australia. Discussions between the US Under-Secretary of State for
Political Affairs Averell Harriman and the Australian government in June 1963 skirted around US
policy in South East Asia, with Harriman apparently taking a broader interpretation of the ANZUS
treaty than President Kennedy subsequently adopted in his conversations with Prime Minister
Menzies and Treasurer Holt, and the Australians apparently hearing what they wanted to hear.
So when Menzies met Kennedy in July 1963, the key topic of conversation was the applicabilityof the extended deterrence assumed by Australia’s interpretation of the ANZUS treaty to an
Australian force under attack in Malaysia. Menzies was confident that ANZUS applied in such asituation. Kennedy was equivocal. 24 In a subsequent conversation with Treasurer Harold Holt,
Kennedy was more forthright: the United States was not going to be the backstop behind UK andAustralian forces in Malaysia. Kennedy is recorded as saying, “We have not said ‘if you[Indonesia] do so and so [attack British or Australian forces] the result will be war with the UnitedStates.’”25
As the record shows, there was no “blank check [sic]” extended to Australia. The limits of the
ANZUS treaty, and consequently the limits of extended deterrence, were clearly established.
Consultation did not mean contribution. The United States certainly had the military mass to deter
Indonesia had it chosen so to do, but it was not prepared to encourage Australian reliance on
Indonesia’s possible uncertainty concerning US intentions.
The nail in the extended deterrence coffin was driven home by President Nixon with theenunciation of the Guam Doctrine in 1969. The United Staes sought to ensure that nations
expecting US military support in times of tension or conflict at a minimum provided for their own
self-defense.
Coming as it did during the Vietnam War, when the United States was both stretched and stressed,
the Guam statement made it clear that the United States was not some kind of global savior.
Speaking during a stopover in Guam, Nixon said that the United States “is going to encourage andhas the right to expect” that “military defense . . . will be handled by, and responsibility for it taken
24 See note 3 to the Memorandum of Conversation between US President Kennedy and Australian Treasurer

Harold Holt, 2 October 1963 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia,
document 337 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d337
25 This statement is quoted in the document cited above.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificby, the Asian nations themselves.” 26 The message was not lost on either Australia or New
Zealand.27 And, for his part, President Trump drove the message home in his remarks at the NATO
Headquarters in Brussels in May 2017, when he upbraided NATO members for not paying “theirfair share,” a situation he saw as being “not fair to the people and the taxpayers of the UnitedStates.”28 And not one to let a bone go without chewing on it a bit more, Trump reiterated his
views in London in December 2019 when he said “[The NATO budget] was going down for close
to 20 years . . . you wouldn’t have had a NATO if you kept going that way.”29
NATO members might want to consider the credibility of both extended deterrence and extended
nuclear deterrence in the contemporary strategic circumstances of Europe, especially in the lightof French President Macron’s description of NATO as “brain dead.”30

Bluff, Double Bluff, and Reverse Bluff
The origins of extended deterrence theory in modern times lie in the dominant and overwhelming
military force of the post-WW2 United States. Try as it did, the Soviet Union was no match(witness the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, a near-run thing but ending in a Soviet back-down), andno other power, including China after its acquisition of a nuclear weapon, had any chance of staring
down the United States. So the threat of an armed US intervention on behalf of its NATO, Japan,
ANZUS or SEATO allies, and the certainty that the United States could use its military power with
impunity (even when there was no certainty that the United States would actually use its military
power) was enough to deliver effective deterrence, at least until the late 1950s.

26 See Document 29 (editorial note), Foreign Relations of the United states 1969-1976, Vol. 1, “Foundations ofForeign Policy, 1969-1972” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/d29
27 See Hugh White, “A very unreassuring bombshell: Richard Nixon and the Guam doctrine, July 1969,” The
Strategist, 25 July 2019 https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-very-unreassuring-bombshell-richard-nixon-and-theguam-doctrine-july-1969/
28 President Trump, remarks at the unveiling of the 9/11 and Article 5 Memorial and Berlin wall Memorial, 25
May 1017 https://nato.usmission.gov/may-25-2017-president-trumps-remarks-911-article-5-memorial-unveiling/
29 President Trump after the 1:1 Meeting, London, 3 December 2019 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-nato-secretary-general-stoltenberg-11-meeting-london-united-kingdom/
30 See “A president on a mission,” The Economist, 9 November 2019. Also, “Emmanuel Macron warns Europe:
NATO is becoming brain-dead,” The Economist, 7 November 2019https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/11/07/emmanuel-macron-warns-europe-nato-is-becoming-brain-dead237

Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World
More than that, it delivered comfort to the more apprehensive allies of the United States—theEuropean NATO member with their concerns about the Soviet Union, and Australia and New
Zealand with their generalized insecurity about China and potentially Indonesia—that theirdefense would be guaranteed by the United States.
Yet doubt has lain at the heart of deterrence theory from the beginning. It was elegantly summed
up by Henry Kissinger in 1979. “…European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic
assurances that we cannot possibly mean or if we do mean, we should not want to execute because
if we execute we risk the destruction of civilization.” He went on to say:
If there is no theater nuclear establishment on the continent of Europe, we are writing thescript for selective blackmail in which our allies will be threatened, and in which we will
be forced into a decision whereby we can respond only with a strategy that has no military
purpose but only the aim of destruction of populations. I ask any of you around thisconference table: If you were Secretary of State or Security Adviser, what would you
recommend to the President of the United States to do in such circumstances? How would
he improve his relative military position? Of course, he could threaten a full-scale strategic
response, but is it a realistic course? It is senseless to say that dilemma shows that
Americans are weak and irresolute. This is not the problem of any particular administration,
but it is a problem of the doctrine that has developed. 31
Strategic change, however, has transformed the credibility of force-based ‘extended deterrence,’
Russia’s changed force posture, and President Putin’s confidence and assertiveness in the face ofthe decline of US influence in both Europe and the Middle East, have brought a revised capability
and psychological alignment that challenges the United States (and Trump) directly, changing the
calculation balance from the preponderance of US force to the credibility and reliability of US
intent.
Moreover, China’s rise as a strategic power in Asia and the relative decline in US dominance havebegun to concern the treaty allies of the United States, particularly Japan and the Republic ofKorea. Australia is not immune from this concern. The issue here is the automaticity of a US force

31 Henry Kissinger, “NATO – The Next Thirty Years,” speech at the Palais d’Egmont, Brussels, 1 September 1979, pp.

11-13) http://findit.library.yale.edu/images_layout/fullviewnoocr?parentoid=11781220

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WMD in Asia-Pacificresponse to the threat of armed aggression—a confidence that the treaty might be expected toprovide—as distinct from the uncertainty (in the minds of both the aggressor and the threatened
party, as it happens) generated by deterrence. The credibility of US commitment to the defense of
its Asian (and antipodean) allies rested on US conventional dominance and the belief that China
would not initiate the use of nuclear weapons. The change in the conventional balance has
diminished the credibility of US extended deterrence.
So, for Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, reliance on the US preponderance of force toguarantee deterrence of possible armed aggression by China has also given way to a reliance on
the intent of the US to honor its treaty arrangements. In other words, in both Europe and North
Asia, reliance on strategic bulk has been replaced by a reliance on strategic bluff. Just how reliable
is that?
The answer to that, in contemporary circumstances, is probably not very. The tension between
materiality and immateriality was well captured by Steve Fetter and Jon Wolfsthal in 2018.
If we are fighting and likely to prevail in a conventional war on the Korean peninsula, using
nuclear weapons could lead to a more devastating nuclear attack by the North on South
Korea and stalemate any conventional conflict. Yet, failing to respond could expose pastcommitments to use nuclear weapons as a bluff and the call into question the credibility of
the United States on all security and military matters. That is why President Obama andmany past presidents have sought to limit the conditions under which the United Statesmight use nuclear weapons so as to not create a commitment trap that may force it into an
unnecessary use of nuclear weapons. 32
It is curious that something as fundamental to the survival of humanity as the avoidance of nuclear
war should now be premised on techniques employed by gamblers to enhance their chances of
winning. It is important to note in this context that gamblers are usually not concerned with orinterested in other players’ losing. They are interested in winning, even when their position appears
weak. They maximize their position by imposing psychological uncertainty on their opponents,

32 Steve Fetter and Jon Wolfsthal, “No First Use and Credible Deterrence,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear

Disarmament, Vol. 1, Issues 1, 9 April 2018https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1454257

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Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World
causing them to ‘fold’ or otherwise to lose. In games of chance, bluff can condition the choices
and decision of opponents without materially changing the intrinsic odds.
Bluff is intrinsic to certain games of chance. But the randomness in a game of chance is known
and predictable following the laws of probability, whereas armed conflict is characterized by
ambiguity, discontinuity, and decision-making that, as in games of chance, cannot always be
assumed to be rational. Accordingly, the threat calculus assumed by extended deterrence andextended nuclear deterrence is never stable, but rather exists in the world of Clausewitz’s “fog”
and “friction.” So for the beneficiary of extended nuclear deterrence in particular, the assumptionthat any US president, especially President Trump, would trade New York for Tokyo, San Diego
for Seoul, or Cleveland (Ohio) for Canberra is to pin a security hope on an improbability.
And the improbability, of course, cuts at least three ways: the aggressor’s uncertainty that theUnited States will contemplate such a trade; the uncertainty of the state subject to attack that theUnited States will defend it; and the uncertainty that the United States would accept a nuclear
attack on behalf of an allied state.
It might be suggested that the apparent fragility of both the extended deterrence and extended
nuclear deterrence doctrines and their increasing reliance on bluff has been addressed by The
Nuclear Posture Review 2018, cited above. By lowering the nuclear use threshold to contemplate
nuclear strike in the circumstances of conventional war, it might be argued that the bluff has been
replaced by the double bluff—the pretense to have less power (because of assumed constraints on
possible use) than is actually the case, but the determination to use that power if and whennecessary.
The Nuclear Posture Review 2018 depends, for its strategic foundations, on the 2018 National
Defense Strategy, which proposed both modernizing the nuclear triad and strengthening
alliances.33 It may be, of course, that The Nuclear Posture Review 2018 envisages the possibilityof a significant increase in defense spending by the allies and client states of the United States, as
demanded by President Trump and as recommended by numerous national strategiccommentators, thereby reducing the likelihood of a call on the extended (nuclear) deterrence

33 See “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” US Department of Defense, p. 6 and 8https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

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WMD in Asia-Pacificcapabilities of the United States. But in either scenario—a lower first-use bar or a lower likelihoodof demand—the fact remains that extended deterrence continues to rest on a foundation of bluff
and variations of bluff. That is no basis for national or population survival.
Survival depends on the ability of citizens and their governments to act in concert to mitigate andeliminate threats. Whether those threats arise from the inability of mankind to understand that it isas subject to the laws of nature as other beings are, or the preference of so many of the world’s
leaders for nationalism and ideology in place of vision and hope, their mitigation and elimination
depends on common purpose and a shared moral compass based on the dignity and value of eachhuman being by virtue of our shared humanity. Whether it is survival in the face of climate change,
pandemics, or nuclear weapons, human agency is key.
In the immediate post WW2 years, the United States exercised some of that agency. But as
America’s moral and strategic superiority continue to erode, the United States runs a higher riskthat it might simply be unable to make good on its military commitments. The relative erosion of
the conventional military dominance of the United States exacerbates the declining confidence ofallies, and perhaps of the United States itself, that the United States will win a conventional war.
Its global strategy is increasingly likely to be exposed as an extended nuclear deterrence bluff
masquerading as a certainty—that the preponderant nuclear forces of the United States will provide
the reverse bluff that persuades the state contemplating a conventional attack to desist because of
its certainty that nuclear weapons will overwhelm its superior conventional forces. But, as withthe double bluff, the state of certainty rests not with the state providing extended nuclear
deterrence, but with the ‘aggressor’ state contemplating the conventional attack, confident that theunwinnability of a nuclear exchange will prevent its occurrence. Here again, all forms of bluff fail,destroying the intrinsic credibility of deterrence. The intention of the deterring state remains
ambiguous and uncertain, while the aggressor state will remain reasonably confident that a nuclear
response to a conventional attack is too subject to escalation to be more than a bluff. The positionof the dependent ally or client state is precarious at best.
This is a situation that Hal Brands and Eric Edelman contemplated, at least in passing, in their
Avoiding a Strategy of Bluff: The Crisis of American Military Primacy. “As American superiority

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Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic Worlderodes . . . the United States runs a higher risk that it might simply be unable to make good on its
military commitments; its global strategy is increasingly likely to be exposed as bluff”. 34
While expressing their confidence in the continuing extended nuclear deterrence posture of theUnited States, they identified the fundamental flaw in the applicability of the doctrine.
Yet like geopolitical retrenchment, the idea of substituting risk for cost contains serious
liabilities. Simply hoping that exposed commitments will not be challenged might work—
for a while. But this strategy carries an enormous risk that at some point those guarantees
will, in fact, be tested and found wanting, with devastating effects on America’s reputationand credibility. The United States could experience its version of the “Singapore
moment”—an episode, as when the Japanese captured that supposedly formidable British
redoubt and sank much of its Far Eastern battle fleet along the way, when a great power’s
strength and promises are revealed to be an empty shell, and its image as a strong andcapable actor in a key part of the world never recovers. Along the way, a strategy of bluff
would likely weaken deterrence and reassurance on the installment plan, as allies andadversaries perceive a shifting balance of power and understand that U.S. guarantees are
increasingly chimerical. The United States could therefore end up with both thedestabilizing consequences of retrenchment, along with the risk of conflict that comes fromhanging on to preexisting obligations. 35
This flaw has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, where the United States has retreatedfurther from global engagement, shredding and shedding its credibility along the way.
Consequently, both the putative adversary and the ultimate security guarantor, as well as its allyor client, are caught up in the same world of strategic uncertainty that renders extended deterrence(of any form) itself uncertain and ultimately inoperable.
Extended nuclear deterrence theory has gradually morphed into a kind of deterrence theology—abelief system founded on a codified set of indemonstrable doctrines. The validity of the system

34 Hal Brands and Eric Edelman, Avoiding a Strategy of Bluff: The Crisis of American Military Primacy (Washington:

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017), p. 12
https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Strategic_Solvency_FINAL.pdf
35 Loc.cit., pp. 21-2.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificrests on five implausible and ultimately unprovable propositions: that the guarantee is absolute andunconditional; that nuclear exchange escalation can and will be controlled; that the guarantor will
accept the fact and consequences of a nuclear attack on behalf of the client state to which
deterrence is extended; that the decision maker will make rational choices based on the logic of
the guarantee; and that any possible aggressor will make its decisions based on the same strategic
mindset as the guarantor. But each of these propositions is unsupportable.
•

The guarantee can never be absolute and unconditional: war and the threat of war takes
place in time and space, and is consequential upon political developments over which theguarantor may have no control or input. If, for instance, the guarantor considers thatthe client state has contributed to its own misfortune, it may sanction both the client state
and the adversary, but may not commit to armed conflict itself.

•

Escalation cannot be controlled because the decision space is essentially chaotic. The factthat tactical planners can think about and design control mechanisms does not mean thatin the circumstances of war things go as planned. Discontinuities and the associatedcrises are intrinsic to the conduct of war.

•

The guarantor will not write a blank check for the client whereby the guarantor takes total
liability for the consequences of a nuclear exchange, including directs attacks upon anddestruction of its people and property.

•

The logic of the guarantee implies that the guarantor decision-maker will accept theconsequences of a nuclear strike, which is not a rational thing to do.

•

The stability that extended nuclear deterrence is intended to establish depends on allparties accepting the same nuclear use, response, and escalation rules, sharing the same
strategic mindset, an impossibility when neither the strategic intent nor the strategic
objectives can be the same or even converge.

Since none of these propositions is necessarily true, the validity of extended nuclear deterrence isultimately dependent on irrationality—the irrationality of the guarantor decision maker accepting
unimaginable consequences on behalf of a third party. The fact that the dynamics of war, which
are instinctive and visceral, can be considered and analyzed rationally does not render themrational. And the obverse is true: while it may be comforting, it is irrational for the client state toregard extended nuclear deterrence as an ultimate guarantee of national security.
243Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World‘The logic of nuclear war’ is perhaps the most dangerous oxymoron ever devised. The ability toconceptualize the inconceivable and to construct analytical structures does not create reality or
substantiate validity. Any decision, on whatever grounds, that may lead to the annihilation ofhumanity is tantamount to auto-anthropophagy: self-consumption that can be contemplated as adystopian concept but cannot be executed sanely or rationally. Earlier in this paper, reference wasmade to Fred Kaplan’s The Bomb. An enthralling, powerful, and ultimately shocking journey
through the nuclear age, Kaplan sums up the insanity of nuclear deterrence and nuclear war.
With the spread of the bomb came a logic—a stab at a strategy—on how to deter its use in
warfare. The logic involved convincing adversaries that you really would use the bomb in
response to aggression; part of that involved convincing yourself that you would use it,which required building certain types of missiles, and devising certain plans, that would
enable you to use them—and before you knew it, a strategy to deter nuclear war became
synonymous with a strategy to fight nuclear war. And when crises arose, the logic
encouraged, almost required, escalating the cycle of threats and counterthreats, just up to
the point where deterrence and war converged, in order to maintain credibility. The
compelling, and frightening, thing about the logic was that, once you bought into its
premises, you fell into the rabbit hole; there seemed no exit. The [US] presidents who fell
into this hole, who faced the abyss where the logic led, avoided its end point—avoided
war—by scrambling out of the hole, snapping out of the logic, like snapping out of a bad
dream.36
The logic of deterrence, if there is one, ultimately depends on the use of force, whether
conventional or nuclear, to sanction an adversary’s actions when deterrence has failed. The logic
of deterrence is self-annihilating.
Apart from the logical, policy, and systemic disfunction of deterrence theory, Kaplan also
identifies a fundamental institutional flaw in the exercise of deterrence and the decision to initiate
a nuclear strike. The decision and responsibility rests solely with the president of the United States.
There are no checks and balances. At a time when US President Trump’s handling of thecoronavirus pandemic has displayed confusion, impulsiveness, indecision, panic and vacillation,

36 Fred Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 297-8.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificthere were no grounds for confidence that the president was capable of determining a strategicallycredible and morally appropriate course of action in the face of nuclear brinksmanship. To apply
a moral calculus, or even a strategic calculus, one must understand what it is.
If there is a single lesson that the coronavirus pandemic might deliver to US citizens, the allies of
the United States, and the global community at large, it is this: the US Congress must address thisfundamental flaw in US decision-making by developing a robust protocol determining precisely
the powers exercisable by the president, the mechanism by which key decisions are reviewed, andthe limits on Executive authority. The issue here is not to cloud or distribute decision-making.
Much has been written about the complexity and compression of crisis decision-making,37 withgroup decision-making models appearing even more fraught than those where there is a single
point of decision. But, following President Truman’s instinct, the US president needs civilian
counsellors that might at least include the vice president (as president of the US Senate), theSpeaker of the House of Representatives and the chief justice.
While a “no first use” policy may serve to constrain a delusional or ‘madman’ president frominitiating a first strike on an adversary, it does not assist a decision-maker acting to respond to an
adversary’s first strike, where early warning systems may or not be reliable, early warning signals
may or may not reach the decision-maker in immediate real-time, and the decision-maker may or
may not have time to deliberate on the consequences of decisions taken or not taken.
Morton Halperin has proposed a bold solution to this problem. The United States should adopt a
firm policy of no strike based only on warning. Rather, it would contemplate nuclear weapons
retaliation only after nuclear weapons have exploded on the US homeland, on US forces wherever
they might be, or, perhaps, on allied forces. 38

37 See, for instance, John R. Harvey, “US Nuclear Command and Control for the 21st Century,” NAPSNet Special

Reports, 24 May 2019 https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/u-s-nuclear-command-and-controlfor-the-21st-century/, Alex Wellerstein, “NC3 Decision Making: Individual versus Group Process,” NAOSNet Special
Reports, 8 August 2018 https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nc3-decision-making-individualversus-group-process/ and Jeffrey G. Lewis and Bruno Tertrais, The Finger on the Button: The Authority to Use
Nuclear Weapons in Nuclear-Armed States, James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, February 2019https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Finger-on-the-Nuclear-Button.pdf
38 Morton H. Halperin in correspondence with the author of this paper.

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Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World
While US nuclear war plans have contemplated response to unprovoked attack, there are in realityno ‘black swans’—unpremeditated nuclear attacks without indicators or warnings. Even nuclear
terrorism would have indicators. Whether the indicators and warnings are detected and heeded isanother matter. This is where gaming, scenario planning, and rehearsal come to the fore, allowing
decision-makers to practice the doomsday art. But given that the decision to use or not to use
nuclear weapons is the most politically and strategically consequential decision a president may
ever make, and that the US democracy is what gives the president the authority and power to takesuch a decision, the counsel of the highest national office holders would seem appropriate.
Accidental nuclear war would be a total rejection of civility and rationality in the conduct ofrelations between states. The global community has a deep and abiding interest in ensuring that itnever happens, and its survival depends on it. Is it too much to demand of the NWS, even thoselike Russia that appear willing to use nuclear weapons for coercion as well as deterrence, that theynegotiate NC3 protocols to ensure that they are bound by the same decision rules, and that they
subsequently force the other states possessing nuclear weapons to follow the same protocols? If it
was possible for the P5 plus Germany and the EU to negotiate a nuclear deal framework with Iranin 2015 (sadly abandoned by the Trump Administration) there may be hope that controls on thepossible acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by one state could inspire the negotiation ofcontrols on nuclear weapon use by states that already possess them.
While this should have been done in 1968 when major powers signed the NPT, it is never too late
to return to the negotiating table. Perhaps the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will
provide the stimulus needed to that end.

The Alternative to Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence:
Nuclear Disarmament
The sudden appearance of the COVID-19 pandemic has been a stark reminder of humanity’svulnerability to massive shocks. In a world of nuclear weapons, the existential threat to humanity
deriving from their use far outweighs whatever benefit small states might seek to derive fromhiding under the nuclear umbrellas of powerful states. The domains of pandemic management,

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WMD in Asia-Pacificclimate change mitigation and adaptation, and nuclear arms control and disarmament are
remarkably similar. In each case, the world is at risk because of the denialism of some world
leaders, the intransigence of others, and the chronic inertia of the world’s citizens. And again, inthe case of nuclear disarmament and climate change, the major treaty that underpins global efforts
towards disarmament and the mitigation of global warming has been undermined by the constantshift of the “middle ground” away from high aspiration towards the lowest common denominator
as key players erode the substance of earlier agreements.
It might be argued that extended nuclear deterrence is a way of balancing the uncertainties
attaching to the continued presence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the Nuclear Weapon
States (NWS) and the security costs incurred by the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) in the‘twilight zone’ between a nuclear armed world and a nuclear disarmed world. This would be
analogous, however, to aiming for a kind of ‘nuclear herd immunity’: let the pathogen proliferate
until there is an immunity equilibrium. But ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ is not some kind of
nuclear security vaccine. At best, it is a prophylaxis. At worst, it is delusory, the security equivalentof ‘snake oil.’
The NPT is often described as “the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime.”39 The
problem is that the non-proliferation edifice is essentially a façade resting on a single corner, andthat corner is crumbling. The question that faces the parties to the NPT is whether they want tostrengthen the edifice—and the cornerstone—or whether they are prepared to see the NPT go theway of the New-START—desuetude.
Either way, there is much at stake. Reinvigorating the NPT will take enormous diplomatic effort
on the part of the NNWS and significant concessions (and diplomatic sensibility) on the part of
the NWS, especially those states that implicitly provide protection to the break-out states like Iran,
Israel, and North Korea. Would it be too much to ask the NWS—all of them—to revitalize the1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances so as to provide greater confidence to eachother and the NNWS that nuclear weapon use could be prohibited and the weapons themselves
eliminated? Desuetude, on the other hand, is the easy way out where blame can be allocated, the39 See, for example, John Carlson, “Is the NPT Still Relevant? – How to Progress the NPT’s Disarmament Provisions,”

Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol. 2, 2019 Issue 1
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2019.1611187

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Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World
finger pointed at disarmament idealists and so-called nuclear weapon realists alike, and the global
community left captive to a dangerous stalemate. The parallels with the UN Climate Change
Commission’s Conference of the Parties (COP) are uncanny.
Yet the abandonment of the NPT, like the abandonment of the Paris Accords and President
Trump’s abandonment of the WHO in a time of pandemic, would sound the death knell for boththe legitimacy and the effectiveness of the measures that are already in place pursuant to the treaty.
The nuclear proliferation restraints and the nuclear fuel cycle safeguards, along with theinstitutions that manage them, that have taken the global community half a century to construct
would be in the gravest jeopardy. The danger here is less with the mavericks and pariahs of thekind that have broken away previously from the global consensus, dangerous though they be, than
it is with the ‘break out’ of major economic and political powers that may feel that there is no
strategic option in an unconstrained world but to be similarly unconstrained. Turkey and Saudi
Arabia are two states that appear already to be reviewing their options.
The perceived and real failure of extended nuclear deterrence is exactly the kind of developmentthat could encourage the so-called defense realists in Germany, Japan, the ROK, and Australia tofollow the path chosen by Israel, India, Pakistan, the DPRK and potentially Iran—the developmentof a nuclear weapon capability.
We have already seen glimmerings of this malaise. Paul Dibb, one of Australia’s best-known
defense commentators, coyly raised the question in late 2018, neither advocating the developmentof a nuclear weapon nor dismissing it on either moral or strategic grounds. While the subliminal
strategic concern was China’s massive expansion of its conventional military capabilities to“threaten us seriously” (invoking a kind of antipodean force de frappe),40 Dibb surprisingly puts
the question in terms of our alliance with the United States.
. . . We face a stark dilemma: increasing uncertainty about US extended nuclear deterrence
versus the daunting alternative of acquiring our own nuclear deterrent. The other alternative
is to simply accept (as we did in the Cold War) that we are a nuclear target and take our

40 The French force de frappe doctrine is a policy based on dissuasion and retaliation in the event of a conventional

war threat, as well as the threat of a nuclear war.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificchances. My view is that Australia should at least be looking at options and lead times.
Doing so doesn’t commit us to proliferating. 41
Another leading Australian defense commentator, Hugh White, is no less adamant that the nuclear
weapons question is one “we will not be able to avoid over the decades to come.”42 The fact thattwo of Australia’s leading defense thinkers should revisit an issue that Australia’s ratification of
the NPT might have been thought to have resolved is noteworthy. And that their so doing caused
barely a ripple, except for an elegant rebuttal by Ramesh Thakur, is also noteworthy. 43 But thesedevelopments are not simply a sign of the uncertainty that distinguishes the contemporary world.
They are also a sign that the ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ has failed, and that the NPT has failed
to deliver the confidence and security that it was intended to do. As Andrew Brown and Lorna
Arnold noted a decade ago,
The effectiveness, extravagance and risks of nuclear deterrence need to be carefully
reassessed, because, unlike deterrence in the animal kingdom, it contains the seeds ofspecies destruction rather than promoting individual preservation. Whenever a state
decides to acquire or renew nuclear weapons in the name of deterrence, it feeds nuclear
proliferation.44
The return to consideration of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by NNWS is also, of course, asign that defense commentators are more inclined to view the nuclear weapons issue through thelens of military force rather than through the lens of securing and maintaining the peace. That, theymight say, is their job. But whether contemplating nuclear war—a war that ultimately cannot be
won—and building the systems to conduct such a war is a morally defensible way to maintain thepeace is the core strategic question, because it contemplates annihilation as preferable to defeat.

41 See Paul Dibb, “Should Australia develop its own nuclear deterrent?” The Strategist, 4 October 2018https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/should-australia-develop-its-own-nuclear-deterrent/
42 See Hugh White, How to Defend Australia (Melbourne: Latrobe University Press in conjunction with Black Inc,
2019), p. 231.
43 See Ramesh Thakur, “The bomb for Australia?” (Parts 1-3), The Strategist, 17 January 2018, 19 January 2018 and22 January 2018 https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/bomb-australia-part-1/;
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/bomb-australia-part-2/; https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/bomb-australiapart-3/
44 See Andrew Brown and Lorna Arnold, art.cit., p. 308.

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Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic WorldAs President Reagan said, “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”45 The peace,
however, can be won, and that is the job of an engaged and sustained international diplomacy.
Winning the peace is the task that the global community now confronts in more urgent terms thanever before, and a more active and focused diplomacy is the task that governments must now sign
up to more than ever before.

Rebuilding Trust, Leadership, and ConfidenceThis essay began with the somber observation that, in the COVID-19 world, trust is in retreat. It
is imperative that the western democracies embark on rebuilding global trust as a matter ofurgency. Uncertainty can breed fatalism. Christopher Clark’s magisterial The Sleepwalkers
described how short-termism, unsubstantiated assumptions, carelessness and a measure ofdeviousness led the global community into the catastrophe of WW1. Europe’s leaders may havebeen well-meaning, but they were incompetent. There was a trust deficit that matched both theirleadership incompetence and their complacency.
Building trust is the business of diplomacy, and the COVID-19 world demands a significant
reinvestment in diplomacy by all nations, but particularly by the world’s leading economies (theG20).
And if trust is in short supply, so too is leadership. It is no longer adequate to look to the world’s
great powers to provide the leadership to which the global community has become accustomed
since the end of WW2. The much-vaunted international rules-based order did not happen by
accident: it was an artefact of post-WW2 leadership, not just by Presidents Truman andEisenhower, but by the leaders of countries large and small who wanted to avert the possibility of
the cataclysm that was WW2. Remarkable people like Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant, from
Sweden and Burma (Myanmar) respectively, were able to provide the leadership that the global
community so needed.

45 President Ronald Reagan, Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 25 January

1984 https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/federal-records

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And with that leadership came the confidence that marked the second half of the twentieth century,
the Cold War notwithstanding. Through cooperation, the global community can manage theconsequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, just as it can reduce the threat of nuclear war throughdisarmament negotiations and the effects of climate change by setting and meeting agreed targets.
And that, as history shows, is easier and less costly than reconstruction and rehabilitation after
catastrophic events.
So, quite simply, the nations represented at the COVID-19 Pandemic-WMD Conference have noalternative but to take up the challenge of a sustained disarmament campaign. As the evolutionary
biologist and psychologist David Barash has written, “undoing the ideology—verging on
theology—of deterrence won’t be easy, but neither is living under the threat of worldwide
annihilation.”46 None of the nations represented here have the power to recreate the past. But they
can ride on its back to shape the future. They need to follow as five-point program:•

As a high priority, they must reinvest in their negotiating capacity—the people and thedomain expertise necessary to push the disarmament agenda forward. Each nation
represented at the COVID-19 Pandemic-WMD Conference has power. But they need toappreciate the force of Hans Morgenthau’s observation that the quality of national
diplomacy is the most important of the factors that make for the power of the nation. 47•

They must re-engage with like-minded countries to create the community of nations
necessary to give body and ballast to the constructive and convergent policies that mustbe at the center of a new set of rules to disarm the world effectively. This is not a recall tothe ‘usual suspects’—the well-intentioned Western countries—but the newly emerging
powers like Indonesia and Vietnam, Nigeria and Kenya.

•

They must militate to ensure that Russia and the United States rekindle the New-START
negotiations and bring China into their dialogue.

46 David Barash, “Nuclear deterrence is a myth. And a lethal one at that,” The Guardian, 14 January 2018https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/14/nuclear-deterrence-myth-lethal-david-barash
47 Hans J. Morgenthau with Kenneth Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Pursuit of Power and Peace, 6th ed.
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986): 105. See also Anthony Lang, “Phronesis, Morgenthau and Diplomacy,” EInternational Relations, 7 November 2013 https://www.e-ir.info/2013/11/07/phronesis-morgenthau-anddiplomacy/251Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World•

Those that are allies of the United States, particularly Australia and Japan, must leverage
their historical defence relationships to persuade the United States that nuclear war isnever in the interests of the United States or its allies.

•

And it is of critical importance that the members of the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the other nations of Asia—the economic powerhouse of the 21 st
century—play their part in building a safer world. Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand,
Malaysia, and Singapore must be heard.

At this point, the prospects of advance and sustained progress may look bleak. That is precisely
why collective action is needed. For the NNWS, there are three issues that need early resurrection:
the proposed cut-off of the production of fissionable material; the proclamation of a ‘no first use’by the NWS and the other states possessing nuclear weapons; and the further strengthening of the
IAEA safeguards and inspections regime and their application to the NWS. It must be understoodthat the NWS are not special cases, but rather deviant cases that have failed to honor their
obligations under the NPT.
This is the challenge facing all nations represented at the conference. Failure to meet this challenge
is to fail the generations to come.

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WMD in Asia-Pacific

9. Chemical Weapons in the Asia-Pacific: History,
Science, and Future Prospect
Jonathan Forman and Alexander Kelle

Introduction1
From ancient times through 20th century wars, chemicals as weapons have a long history, with
development and use of chemical weapons by both state and non-state actors. Since 1997, with theentry-into-force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the nations of world have agreed
to eliminate chemical weapons and allow the verified destruction of stockpiles declared bypossessor States. The Asia-Pacific region2 includes three possessor states: Russia, the ROK, andthe United States, as well as chemical munitions abandoned by other states in past wars, mostnotably by Japanese forces while retreating from China at the end of the Second World War. The
DPRK, however, remains outside the CWC and is widely believed to maintain a chemical weapon
stockpile. Alongside the efforts of states at chemical demilitarization, chemicals have continued
to be used in harmful ways by terrorist groups and in targeted attacks that are linked to several
Asia-Pacific States.
Science and technology have provided us with advancements well beyond the state-of-the-art that
produced the chemical arsenals of 20th century militaries and is often called out as a challenge to

1 The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of OPCW. Alexander

Kelle’s contribution to this report has benefitted from a grant of the German Foundation for Peace Research to the
IFSH, grant number SP03/05/2020. This support is herewith gratefully acknowledged.
2 In this narrative, we focus on the internationally recognized states of Asia-Pacific that make up the Pacific Rim,
excluding Central and South America and New Zealand. These are: Australia, Canada, China, Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK), Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Malaysia, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau,
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Tonga,
Tuvalu, United States, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.

© 2022 Jonathan Forman and Alexander Kelle, CC BY 4.0

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Chemical Weapons in the Asia-Pacific: History, Science, and Future Prospect
maintaining the norms of the CWC. Yet, we also see scientific research with potential to strengthen
capabilities to control, prevent, and respond to chemical threats; andrecent examples of chemical attacks have not showcased the adoption of advanced technologies,
as much as they have demonstrated unexpected approaches for deployment of previously known
chemical weapons. The misuse of chemistry to harm people, the verification of destruction ofchemical arsenals, and the effective mitigation and response to chemical threats requires a soundunderstanding of the underlying scientific basis of chemical weapons and associated technologies.
These activities also require transdisciplinary technical capabilities. At the same time,
disarmament and non-proliferation instruments like the CWC have set clear boundaries on whatdefines a chemical weapon and what chemical weapon related scientific research and development
is allowed. This report will discuss the history of chemical weapons use and programs, progress inchemical disarmament, and aspects of the science and technology that informs these efforts. The
chapter concludes with an assessment of the current state of affairs and provides an outlook on the
future prospects for chemical weapons use and mitigation in the Asia-Pacific.

Chemicals in War and the Prohibition of Chemical WeaponsChemicals have seen use in war throughout history from ancient to modern times, 3 , 4 withweaponized chemicals encompassing a broad range of substances and harmful effects. Familiarand historical examples include incendiary mixtures such as “Greek fire” 3 and napalm, 5 , 6
pyrophoric materials such as white phosphorus (commonly used for illumination and generation

3 A. Mayor. Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World;

Overlook Press: New York, 2003.
4 For a history of 20th century CBW use see (a) J. Tucker. War of Nerves. Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al
Qaeda, New York: Pantheon, 2006. (b) The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume 1: The Rise of CB
Warfare, SIPRI, Stockholm 1971, https://www.sipri.org/publications/2000/problem-chemical-and-biologicalwarfare.
5 “Army Talks About Napalm Chemical Corps reveals some technical information on the chemistry andmanufacture of incendiary gels”. Chem. Eng. News 1954, 32, 27, pp. 2690–2692. DOI: 10.1021/cenv032n027.p2690.
6 M. Lumsden. Incendiary weapons. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, MIT Press, Cambridge,
Mass., 1975, pp. 227-249.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificof smoke),6 poisons for coating the tips of weapons,3,7 gun powder (invented in 10th century
China 8) and explosives,9 toxic and asphyxiating gases (such as chlorine),4,7,10 blistering agents(such as sulfur mustard),11 nerve agents (such as sarin), 12 and herbicides (the most infamous being
agent orange which was used in conflicts in Malaya and Vietnam).13
Asia-Pacific states began contributing to international efforts to restrict the use of chemical
weapons in the 19th century. In 1874, an initiative was put forward by Czar Alexander II of Russia,
which led to the Brussels Declaration Concerning Laws and Customs of War. The declaration
included a ban on the use of poison and poisoned weapons within its prohibitions; however, it
never entered into force.14 The discussions that began in 1874 did lead to agreements on banningpoisons and poisoned weapons, as well as the use of projectiles that diffuse asphyxiating ordeleterious gases through provisions found within the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. 15
Before the first-world war, Asia-Pacific states party to these Conventions included China, Fiji,
Japan, Korea, Russia, and the United States, additionally territories and colonies in Asia-Pacificwould have been obligated to these Conventions through colonial powers that were party to theHague Conventions (which included the major world powers of the day). 16

7 Kim Coleman, A History of Chemical Warfare. Palgrave Macmillan, United Kingdom, 2005. DOI

10.1057/9780230501836.
8 J. Kelly. Gunpowder: Alchemy, Bombards, And Pyrotechnics: The History of The Explosive That Changed The World.
Atlantic Press, 2004.
9 G. I. Brown. The Big Bang: A History of Explosives. Sutton: Stroud, UK, 1998. ISBN 0-7509-2361-X.
10 S. Everts. “When Chemicals Became Weapons of War.” Chem. Eng. News 2015, 93(9), 21;
https://chemicalweapons.cenmag.org/when-chemicals-became-weapons-ofwar/#:~:text=The%20release%20of%20poison%20gas,Haber%2C%20the%20weapon's%20main%20advocate
11 J. McManus, K. Huebner. “Vesicants.” Critical Care Clinics. 2005, 21(4), pp. 707-18. DOI:
10.1016/j.ccc.2005.06.005.
12 S. Costanzi, J. H. Machado, M. Mitchell. “Nerve Agents: What They Are, How They Work, How To Counter Them”.
ACS Chem. Neurosci. 2018, 9 (5), pp. 873– 885. DOI: 10.1021/acschemneuro.8b00148.
13 J. Stellman, S. Stellman, R. Christian, T. Weber, C. Tomasallo. “The extent and patterns of usage of Agent Orange
and other herbicides in Vietnam.” Nature 2003, 422, pp. 681–687. DOI: 10.1038/nature01537.
14 International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Brussels, 27 August 1874; available at:https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/135
15 (a) Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning
the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 29 July 1899; available at: https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/150. (b) Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its
annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907; available at:https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195
16 The USA did not ratify the declaration on the use of projectiles for delivering asphyxiating or deleterious gases.

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Chemical Weapons in the Asia-Pacific: History, Science, and Future Prospect
With the First World War giving rise to the use of toxic chemicals on a scale never before seen in
the history of war,3,7,10 the Hague Convention bans on poisons and gases were short lived. Thiswar saw chemicals deployed on industrial scales, as well as research and development that led to
the weaponization of new types of chemicals posing both breathing and skin contact hazards. The
first recorded use of chemicals in World War I was the firing of tear gas by French forces in 1914,17
and by the end of the conflict numerous other chemical substances, many with far greater lethality
and hazardous properties, had been tested and/or deployed in battle.4,7,10,17
The use of chemicals in World War I gave rise to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This agreementbanned asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and analogous liquids, materials, or devices in war,
and also bacteriological methods of warfare. 18 The Protocol allowed states to ratify withreservations allowing the use of the banned weapons against states not party and in retaliation to
an attack using banned weapons. By the mid-1930’s, States Parties from Asia-Pacific included
Australia, Canada, and Russia (as the Soviet Union). Chemical weapons were still used in theregion in World War II by Japanese forces in China,19 and tear gas was deployed against enemy
combatants by the United States in the Vietnam war. 20 Both Japan and the United States had signed
the Geneva Protocol in 1925, but these states did not ratify/accede to the protocol until 1970
(Japan) and 1975 (USA) respectively.18 China became a State Party to the Geneva Protocol in 1952
and Vietnam in 1970, With the exception of Kiribati, Micronesia, Marshal Islands, Nauru, Palau,
Samoa, Singapore, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu, which are not party to the protocol, the other States in
the region joined after World War II.18

17 S. Everts. A Brief History of Chemical War: For more than 2,000 years human ingenuity has turned natural andsynthetic poisons into weapons of war. Distillations May 11, 2015;
https://www.sciencehistory.org/distillations/a-brief-history-of-chemicalwar#:~:text=Three%20substances%20were%20responsible%20for,%2C%20phosgene%2C%20and%20mustard%20gas
18 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare. Geneva, 17 June 1925; available at: https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/280
19 (a) Japanese Chemical Weapons Program, Federation of American Scientists;
https://fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/cw/. (b) A detailed Japanese report on chemical weapon use in China recently
became available: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/07/08/national/history/detailed-report-documentsjapans-use-nerve-agents-second-sino-japanese-war/
20 M. Meselson. “Tear Gas in Vietnam and the Return of Poison Gas”. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2015, 27(3),pp. 17-19. DOI: 10.1080/00963402.1971.11455334.

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WMD in Asia-PacificDuring the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union produced large stockpiles of chemical
weapons, including highly toxic organophosphorus nerve agents,12 and programs to develop new
types of chemical weapons continued in a number of states. 12 Discussions to ban both chemicaland biological weapons began again at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1968. The
Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention opened for signature in 1972, 21 but the negotiations
that eventually led to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 22 which comprehensively
prohibits chemical weapons, continued. It was not until 1993, that the CWC opened for signature,with its entry-into-force in 1997.
The CWC opened a new era in prohibiting chemical weapons. Unlike the multilateral treaties thatpreceded it, with exception of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), it was acomplete ban on an entire class of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In contrast to the BTWC,
however, it created an implementing organization, the Organisation for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons (OPCW),23 and included a verification regime. Today there are 193 States
Parties to the CWC. 24 Only four world states remain outside this Convention; only one of thesestates is in Asia-Pacific, the DPRK. The successes of the CWC were recognized by the award of
the Nobel Peace Prize to OPCW in 2013 for its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons. 25
The CWC prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, or
use of chemical weapons. State Parties must destroy chemical weapon stockpiles and chemical
weapon production facilities in their possession. As of March 2022, 71,614 (99%) of the 72,304
metric tonnes of chemical warfare agents declared by States Parties have been destroyed underinternational verification. 26 Of the ninety-seven declared chemical weapons production facilities,
seventy-four have been destroyed and twenty-three converted to other (allowed) uses, all underinternational verification.26 States Parties must also participate in a verification regime that allows
21 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) andToxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc
22 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
their Destruction; Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; www.opcw.org/chemical-weaponsconvention/
23 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; www.opcw.org
24 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Member States; www.opcw.org/about-us/member-states
25 The Nobel Peace Prize 2013. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2013/summary/
26 (a) Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by the Numbers; www.opcw.org/media-centre/opcwnumbers. (b) Further details on summary statistics of implementation of the CWC can be found in OPCW Annual
Reports, available at: www.opcw.org/resources/documents/annual-reports257

Chemical Weapons in the Asia-Pacific: History, Science, and Future Prospect
international inspectors access to their chemical facilities, including commercial production sites. 27
These states must also implement national laws that include provisions for the regulation of
production and transfer of certain “Scheduled” chemicals. 28 Additionally, the CWC contains
Articles for providing assistance and protection for States Parties in the event of a chemical
incident,29 promoting and supporting peaceful uses of chemistry, and scientific knowledge sharing
and collaboration.30 Furthermore, the CWC bans the use of riot control agents (e.g., tear gas) as aweapon of war,31 but it does not provide for any restrictions on the use of riot control agents forlaw enforcement purposes 32 (national laws of the individual states govern such use).
The history of chemical weapons focused on chemicals typically described as poisons (toxic
substances) and toxic gases, while the CWC introduced a more precise definition, where “chemical
weapons” are defined by one or more of the following criteria:33(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited
under this Convention [the CWC], as long as the types and quantities are consistent withsuch purposes.
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic
properties of those toxic chemicals specified in point (a) above, which would be released
as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices.

27 Fact Sheet 5: Three Types of Inspections; Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: The Hague,

November 2017.
28 Annex on Chemicals. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use ofChemical Weapons and on their Destruction; Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The Hague,
2020; www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/annexes/annex-chemicals/annex-chemicals
29 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Capacity Building (Assistance and Protection);
www.opcw.org/resources/capacity-building. See also CWC Article X: Assistance and Protection Against Chemical
Weapons; www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-x-assistance-and-protection-againstchemical-weapons
30 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Capacity Building (International Cooperation);
www.opcw.org/resources/capacity-building. See also CWC Article XI: Economic and Technological Development;
www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-xi-economic-and-technological-development
31 See CWC Article I: General Obligations www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-i
32 For “Purposes Not Prohibited,” see: Definitions and Criteria, paragraph 9; www.opcw.org/chemical-weaponsconvention/articles/article-ii-definitions-and-criteria
33 See CWC Article II: Definitions and Criteria, paragraph 1; www.opcw.org/chemical-weaponsconvention/articles/article-ii-definitions-and-criteria

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WMD in Asia-Pacific(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employmentof munitions and devices specified in point b above.

Criterion (a) is a complete prohibition of “toxic” chemicals and their precursors, unless thatchemical has a legitimate use (and any state possessing that toxic chemical can show that theamounts it possesses are consistent with that legitimate use). Criteria (b) and (c) are also importantas they indicate a chemical weapon does not need to be a discrete chemical substance; it can also
be equipment or munitions used in the weaponization of that chemical.
Applying criterion (a) required the drafters of the CWC to define the term “toxic chemical”:“Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals,
regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are
produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.” 34
It follows that when referring to WMDs, under international law, chemical weapons are
specifically chemicals whose toxic properties are used to harm humans and animals, which
excludes incendiary chemicals, explosive chemicals, and herbicides from being considered“chemical weapons” (unless these chemicals are used in a manner that intentionally exploits their
toxic properties against humans or animals).

The History of Chemical Weapons and their Prohibition in Asia-Pacific
The Asia-Pacific region has been exposed to the development and use of chemical weapons byboth state and non-state actors over the past century. This section of the paper will discuss thishistory of chemical weapon usage and the participation of states from the region in the global
chemical weapons prohibition regime codified in the 1993 CWC. It will focus on chemical
weapons programs and use by Imperial Japan, the United States, the Former Soviet Union (FSU),

34 IBID, paragraph 2.

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Chemical Weapons in the Asia-Pacific: History, Science, and Future Prospect
the People’s Republic of China, the ROK, and the DPRK. In addition, the most notorious case ofnon-state actor use of chemical weapons, by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult, is briefly presented.
Of the eight states that have declared possession of chemical weapons to the OPCW, 35 three areregional states: the United States, Russia (declaring the stockpile of the FSU), and the ROK.
However, the history of 20th century chemical warfare saw another regional power, Imperial Japan,
use chemical weapons during the first half of the 20th century. The Japanese Imperial Forces had
produced a number of chemical weapon agents, including phosgene, mustard, and lewisite. Before
and during the Sino-Japanese war some of these were used in China. At the end of the war Japan’s
chemical weapons in China, estimated at about 700,000 munitions, were dumped into rivers orburied. “Most of the Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China are buried in the Haerbaling
District of the City of Dunhua, Jilin Province.19 With the entry into force of the CWC in 1997,
Japan has assumed responsibility for destroying the chemical weapons it abandoned on Chinese
territory. This process began in 2010 36 and, given the large number of chemical munitions
involved, is going to last for some more years to come.
Apart from the abandoned chemical weapons left behind on its territory, China only declared to
the OPCW that it had destroyed all its past chemical weapon production facilities (CWPFs) andonly conducts defensive Chemical Weapons (CW) research, which is permitted under the CWC.
While China never declared that it transferred chemical weapons to another state in the past, during
Albania’s chemical weapon destruction process some chemical munitions were discovered with
Chinese markings on them. 37 While this would be consistent with Albania not having declared a
CWPF, the origin of some of its chemical munitions was never fully clarified.

35 The following states have declared chemical weapons to the OPCW: Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Russia,

ROK, and the United States. See P. Walker. “Three Decades of Chemical Weapons Elimination: More Challenges
Ahead.” Arms Control Today 2019; https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-12/features/three-decades-chemicalweapons-elimination-more-challenges-ahead. As of November 2020, all states except the United States havecompleted the destruction of the declared stockpiles. The United States estimates completion in 2023. Further
information on the US chemical weapon destruction program is available from: Program Executive Office,Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives; https://www.peoacwa.army.mil/
36 Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2010, C-16/4, OPCW: The Hague, 29
November 2011; www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/CSP/C-16/en/c1604_e_.pdf
37 M. V. Tompkins, Albania’s Chemical Weapons Con, The Nonproliferation Review, 2009, Vol.16, No.1, pp. 65-77;
Ivan Lebedev, “Allegedly Chinese-Made Chemical Weapons Found in Albania,” ITAR-TASS News Agency, January
11, 2005.

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The United States amassed the world’s second largest declared chemical weapons stockpile withover 28,000 metric tonnes of CW produced and located in several different CW storage facilities(CWSF). Due to legislation passed by the US Congress, CW destruction facilities (CWDF) had to
be built at each of the CWSFs. While the largest part of the US CW stockpile has been verifiably
destroyed, protests against some of the planned destruction technologies led to delays in thedestruction process at two CWDFs. 38 Currently, the completion of CW destruction in the last two
remaining facilities – Pueblo, Colorado and Blue Grass, Kentucky - are scheduled for 2023.39
The FSU accumulated the world’s largest declared chemical weapons stockpile of 40,000 metrictonnes of nerve and blister agents in bulk storage as well as munitions, these were spread overseven CWSFs. Like all other possessor states, Russia, as successor to the FSU was unable to meetthe destruction deadline of April 2007, as contained in the CWC. With the assistance of the UnitedStates and other Western states the Russian Federation completed destruction of the declared FSU
chemical weapon stockpile in September 2017. 40 However, Russia has been accused of being
behind two assassination attempts involving the use of military-grade nerve agents in 2018 41 and2020,42 and some Western states believe that Russia has not fully declared or stopped its entire
chemical weapons program. 43,44 While the Western states have expressed condemnation of Russia

38 See Chemical Weapons: Destruction Schedule Delays and Cost Growth Continue to Challenge Program

Management,
GAO-04-634T, United States Government Accounting Office, 2004; https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-04-634t.
39 See the US government implementing agency’s vision statement at https://www.peoacwa.army.mil/about-peoacwa/.
40 “OPCW Marks Completion of Destruction of Russian Chemical Weapons Stockpile”; www.opcw.org/mediacentre/news/2017/10/opcw-marks-completion-destruction-russian-chemical-weapons-stockpile
41 M. Peplow. “Nerve agent attack on spy used ‘Novichok’ poison Chemical weapon used in U.K. assassination
attempt was developed by Soviet Union during Cold War” Chem. Eng. News 2018, 96(12);https://cen.acs.org/articles/96/i12/Nerve-agent-attack-on-spy-used-Novichok-poison.html.
42 R. Stone. “How German military scientists likely identified the nerve agent used to attack Alexei Navalny”,
Science 8, September 2020; DOI: 10.1126/science.abe6561.
43 (a) S. Costanzi, G. D. Koblentz, “Controlling Novichoks after Salisbury: revising the Chemical Weapons Convention
schedules.” The Nonproliferation Review, 2019, 26(5-6), pp. 599-612. DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2019.1662618. (b)“EU imposes sanctions on Kremlin chiefs over Alexei Navalny poisoning”, The Guardian, 15 October 2020;
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/15/eu-announces-sanctions-against-kremlin-chiefs-over-alexeinavalny-poisoning
44 (a) US Department of State, Compliance With the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Condition (10)(C) Report, Washington, D.C.,
June 2020; https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-10C-Report-Unclassified-Version-for-H.pdf.
(b) US Department of State, Compliance With the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Condition (10)(C) Report, Washington, D.C.,
April 2021; https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/2021-Condition-10-c-Report.pdf.

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for these incidents, mechanisms within the CWC to address non-compliance have been invoked
only to a limited extent.45
An officially unidentified chemical weapon possessor state known in OPCW publications as “A
State Party“ is widely understood to be ROK, which ratified the CWC in 1997 and declared its
chemical weapon stockpile and a production facility. 46 According to one estimate the size of
ROK's stockpile was 3,126 metric tonnes.47 Following media reports, the ROK’s military built andoperated a CWDF to eliminate all chemical munitions at a site in Yeongdong Chungcheong. 48 The
ROK completed destruction of its stockpile in July 2008 as the second possessor state to do so. 49
The DPRK has neither signed nor ratified the CWC. However, in 1989 it acceded to the 1925
Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons, but not theirdevelopment, production, or storage. Estimates by the United States and ROK authorities of a
DPRK chemical weapons stockpile have varied over time, but since the 1990’s seem to have
revolved around the figure of 5,000 metric tonnes of various chemical warfare agents stockpiled,including highly toxic nerve agents. 50 It has also been reported that the DPRK has assisted otherstates, such as Syria, in their chemical weapon acquisition efforts. 51 Any efforts, pursued either
bilaterally, or by the OPCW, to draw the DPRK closer to the CW prohibition regime have so fargone unanswered.
The notion of DPRK possessing a well-developed chemical weapons program, including so-called“binary chemical warfare agents,” received further support when Kim Jong-nam, the half-brother

45 Only the clarification procedure in Article IX (2) has been used. O.Meier, A. Kelle, “The Navalny poisoning:

Moscow evades accountability and mocks the Chemical Weapons Convention”;
https://thebulletin.org/2021/10/the-navalny-poisoning-moscow-evades-accountability-and-mocks-the-chemicalweapons-convention/ Additional provisions include challenge inspections (CWC Article IX), investigations of allegeduse (article X), measures to ensure compliance (CWC Article XII), and procedures for settlement of disputes (CWC
article XIV); www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention
46 SIPRI Yearbook 1998, p. 461, footnote 19; https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/archive
47 See https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/rok/cw.htm
48 Report: Korean Army Built Factory to Destroy Chemical Weapons, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 9 May 2000, quoted
at https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/south-korea/
49 SIPRI Yearbook 2009, pp. 419-20; https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/archive
50 International Crisis Group, North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs, Asia Report N°167, 18
June 2009; www.crisisgroup.org
51 Ibid, pp. 9-10; M. Schwirtz, “UN Links North Korea to Syria’s Chemical Weapons Program,” The New York Times,
27 February 2018; https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/27/world/asia/north-korea-syria-chemical-weaponssanctions.html

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WMD in Asia-Pacificof DPRK leader Kim Jong-un, was attacked with what subsequently was identified as the nerve
agent VX at Kuala Lumpur airport in Malaysia in early 2017. 52 The attack was conducted by two
female assailants (one a national of Indonesia and the other of Vietnam) who each smeared his
face with a cloth, which has led experts to conclude that two components of a binary version of
VX were applied. Kim Jong-nam died shortly after the attack on the way to hospital. This attack
was met with international condemnation and the adoption of additional sanctions, for example,
by the United States. 53 The DPRK denied any involvement and refused to cooperate with
Malaysian authorities investigating the incident. 54 In 2019 the charges against the accusedIndonesian citizen of the incident were dropped by Malaysian authorities. Subsequently, “theaccused from Vietnam was sentenced to three years and four months jail,” which concluded thelegal proceedings resulting from the 2017 VX incident.55
The most notorious case of terrorist chemical weapon use in the Asia-Pacific was carried out by
the Aum Shinrikyo doomsday cult during the mid-1990s. Two attacks with the nerve agent sarin
were conducted in the city of Matsumoto in 1994 and in the Tokyo subway system in 1995 leading
to the deaths of nineteen people and temporary hospitalizations for over a thousand more. 56 As
investigators suspected that the first of the two incidents had been committed by the cult, and withcult members aware that the police were conducting a criminal investigation, the cult stopped
running its CWPFs in early 1995. When a police raid appeared imminent, the cult hastily staged
the Tokyo subway attack with sarin-filled plastic bags that were placed on three subway trains andpunctured to allow sarin vapors to escape from the packaging. Besides the crude dispersal
mechanism, another important aspect of Aum Shinrikyo employing chemical agents lies in theirfailure to weaponize biological agents—chemicals were their fallback option—after the

52 D. Bradle. “VX nerve agent behind Kim Jong-Nam’s murder,“ Chemistry World, 24 February 2017;https://www.chemistryworld.com/news/vx-nerve-agent-behind-kim-jong-nams-murder/2500460.article#/
53 “OPCW Executive Council Condemns Chemical Weapons Use in Fatal Incident in Malaysia”;
https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2017/03/opcw-executive-council-condemns-chemical-weapons-usefatal-incident;
54 C. Vestergaard, Chemical Assassination: The Role of International Organizations, Commentary, 2 March 2017,
available at: https://www.stimson.org/2017/chemical-assassination-role-international-organizations/.
55 Malaysia: Statement by H.E. Ambassador Ahmad Nazri Yusof Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the
OPCW at the Ninety-First Session of the Executive Council, OPCW: The Hague, 10 July 2019, p..2;
https://www.opcw.org/resources/documents/executive-council/ec-91
56 J. Tucker, War of Nerves. Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda, New York: Pantheon Books 2006, pp.
333ff.

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Chemical Weapons in the Asia-Pacific: History, Science, and Future Prospectdifficulties they encountered with biological weapons proved insurmountable. 57 As the very
detailed investigation after the attacks showed, Aum Shinrikyo had considerable resources at its
disposal that were put into its chemical weapon program, which resulted in nineteen fatalities. Thisshows that chemical weapons do not automatically present an easy path for terrorists to induce
mass casualties, albeit mass disruption was clearly a significant result of the attack.
While subsequent terrorist activities have not reached the level of disruption or casualties of the
Aum Shinrikyo attacks of the 1990s, terrorism in the Asia-Pacific region continues to be a threatand some terrorist groups moving to the use of unconventional weapons, including chemical
weapon agents, cannot be excluded. 58 An important group of states that seeks to prevent dual-use
chemical materials and technologies from getting in the hands of proliferators or terrorists has
become known as the Australia Group. Founded in the mid-1980s, three states from the AsiaPacific region participate in the activities of the group: the United States, Japan, and the ROK. 59

Science, Technology, and Chemical Weapons
The CWC is a treaty underpinned by science and technology, which, for review of treaty
implementation, and in the discussion of what the future may bring, is a central theme. 60 Thissection seeks to examine some of the scientific dimensions and how scientific and technologicalchange are viewed in the context of chemical disarmament and the broader prohibition of chemical
weapons.

57 See M. Leitenberg, “The Experience of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo Group and Biological Agents,” in B. Roberts(Ed.) Hype or Reality: The “New Terrorism” and Mass Casualty Attacks, Alexandria, VA: CBACI, pp. 159-170.
58 S. Mullins. “Terrorism in the Indo-Pacific: The Year Gone By and the Road Ahead.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs,
Summer 2020, 4-35; https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/08/2002311969/-1/-1/1/MULLINS.PDF.
59 For a listing of States participating in the Australia Group, see:https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/theaustraliagroupnet/site/en/participants.html.
60 (a) J. E. Forman, C. M. Timperley. “Chemical Disarmament in a Technologically Evolving World.” In Responsible
Conduct in Chemistry Research and Practice: Global Perspectives; E. T. Contis, A. Campbell, D. Phillips, B. Miller, L.
Brown, L., (Eds.); ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 2018; Vol. 1288, pp. 3– 35.
(b) J. E. Forman, C. M. Timperley, S. Sun, D. van Eerten. “Chemistry and Diplomacy.” Pure Appl. Chem. 2018, 90(10),pp. 1507– 1525. DOI: 10.1515/pac-2018-0902.

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WMD in Asia-PacificChemical weapons are defined by the toxidromes they induce. 61 Traditional military chemical
agents fall into four classes: choking agents, blood agents, blister agents or vesicants, and nerve
agents.62,63 Table 1 describes these classes and provides representative examples of the chemicals
they include. It also indicates the approximate order of increasing toxicity amongst the agents(nerve agents are the most toxic, requiring smaller exposure concentrations for lethal doses ascompared to the other classes).
The Annex on Chemicals of the CWC is a set of schedules that lists chemicals associated withmost of the traditional warfare agents and their precursors.28 It should also be appreciated that achemical weapon can be derived from any chemical exploited for its toxic properties—not justthose that appear in the Annex. For example, chlorine is not listed in the Annex, yet has been
implicated as a chemical weapon in the conflict in Syria. 64 The CWC Schedules were developed
based on 20th century military arsenals with the specific purpose of providing a tool for manageable
verification measures. There are three Schedules, each containing a set of sub-schedules
representing specific chemicals or groups (“families”) of closely related substances. 65
Schedule 1 is comprised of chemicals that have been developed, produced, stockpiled, or used as
chemical weapons, notably vesicants and nerve agents (key nerve agent precursors, and the toxins
ricin and saxitoxin66 are also included).28 Schedule 2 lists chemicals that possess sufficient lethal
or incapacitating toxicity to enable them to be used as chemical weapons and also chemicals thatcan serve as precursors for the toxic chemicals listed in Schedules 1 and 2. 28 Schedule 3 is61 G. R. Ciottone. “Toxidrome Recognition in Chemical-Weapons Attacks.” N Engl J Med 2018; 378, pp. 1611-1620.

DOI: 10.1056/NEJMra1705224.
62 “What is a Toxic Chemical?” Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; www.opcw.org/work/whatchemicalweapon#:~:text=General%20Purpose%20Criterion%20%E2%80%93%20Intent,not%20prohibited%20by%20the%20
Convention
63 S. Costanzi. “Chemical Warfare Agents.” Kirk‐Othmer Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology 2020; DOI:
10.1002/0471238961.0308051308011818.a01.pub3.
64 See for example: First Report by the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) Pursuant to Paragraph 10
of Decision C-SS-4/Dec.3 “Addressing the Threat From Chemical Weapons Use” Ltamenah (Syrian Arab Republic)
24, 25, and 30 March 2017, S/1867/2020, 8 April 2020, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The
Hague; www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/04/s-1867-2020%28e%29.pdf
65 G. Pontes, J. Schneider, P. Brud, L. Benderitter, B. Fourie, C. Tang, C. M. Timperley, J. E. Forman. “Nomenclature,
Chemical Abstracts Service Numbers, Isomer Enumeration, Ring Strain, and Stereochemistry: What Does Any ofThis Have to Do with an International Chemical Disarmament and Nonproliferation Treaty?” Journal of Chemical
Education 2020, 97, pp. 1715–1730. DOI: 10.1021/acs.jchemed.0c00547.
66 A. M. Sierra, R. Martinez-Alvarez. “Ricin and Saxitoxin: Two Natural Products That Became Chemical Weapons.”
J. Chem. Educ. 2020, 97(7), pp. 1707–1714. DOI: 10.1021/acs.jchemed.9b00841.

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Chemical Weapons in the Asia-Pacific: History, Science, and Future Prospectcomprised of chemicals that have been produced, stockpiled, or used as chemical weapons, or canserve as a precursors for chemicals in Schedules 1 and 2.28
Table 1. Selected Chemical Warfare Agents62,63
Class

Choking
AgentsRepresentative

Toxidrome

Absorption

Chemicals

throughlungs

induces alveoli to secrete fluidthat builds up in the lungs andchokes the victim.

Dispersal

Schedules

Toxicity67

3A01

Phosgene

Chloropicrin

CWC

Gas

3A04

(chlorine is

Chlorine

unscheduled)

Absorbs through lungs and skin,and inhibits cellular oxygen use

HydrogenBlood(e.g., preventing blood cells

cyanideAgentsfromtransporting

oxygen).

Gas

Damages vital organs in central

Cyanogennervous,chloridecardiovascular,

and

3A02

3A03

respiratory systems.
Blister
Agents(Vesicants)

Absorbs through lungs and skin.
Burns skin, mucous membranes,

Sulfur mustardand eyes. Forms blisters on skin,windpipe,andlungs.

1A04

Skin

Nitrogenblisters are large, give rise toMustardsevere burns, and can be lifethreatening. Exposure can lead

Liquid,aerosol

1A05

Lewisite

1A06

Absorbs through lungs and skin,G-series

1A01

Inhibits(e.g. Sarin)

1A02

to blindness and permanent
respiratory tract damage.

Nerve
Agentsthe

enzymeacetylcholinesterase,whichleads to accumulation of the

V-series

neurotransmitter(e.g. VX)

acetylcholine

in synapses between nerve cells,
overstimulation of nerve signal

Liquid,aerosol

1A03

1A13
Novichoks

1A14

Increasing

67 This is illustrative, there can be overlaps between classes when comparing specific chemicals.

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WMD in Asia-PacificClass

Representative

Toxidrome

Chemicals

transmission. Symptoms include
lacrimation,
sweating,

salivation,
blurredvision,Dispersal

CWC
Schedules

Toxicity67

1A15
Carbamates
1A16

headache, breathing difficulty,
vomiting, seizures, loss of bodycontrol, muscle paralysis, andunconsciousness,

which

in

sufficient exposure dosages canlead to death.

Unlike the Schedule 1 chemicals, many Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals have significant economic
importance, and some are actually used to produce consumer products,68 this illustrates one of the
difficulties with banning chemical weapons. Industrial facilities that produce chemicals and manyindustrial chemicals themselves are dual-use in nature and can be used for chemical weapons
programs, which is why the CWC’s verification regime includes inspections of chemical
production facilities that produce discrete organic chemicals not found in the schedules. 69
While the CWC bans riot control agents for use in warfare, it does not list or identify these agents.
Rather, it only provides criteria: a riot control agent is: “any chemical not listed in a Schedule,
which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which
disappear within a short time following termination of exposure”.70 OPCW’s Scientific Advisory
Board (SAB) provided non-binding guidance on chemicals that could conform to these criteria, 71
68 Most Traded Scheduled Chemicals 2022. 2022, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: The

Hague, The Netherlands. www.opcw.org/resources/declarations/most-traded-scheduled-chemicals-2022.
69 See (a) CWC Article VI: Activities Not Prohibited Under this Convention; www.opcw.org/chemical-weaponsconvention/articles/article-vi-activities-not-prohibited-under-convention#:~:text=Article%20VI,Activities%20Not%20Prohibited%20Under%20this%20Convention,not%20prohibited%20under%20this%20Convention (b) Parts VI-IX of the CWC’s Verification Annex; www.opcw.org/chemical-weaponsconvention/annexes/verification-annex/part-i-definitions
70 See CWC Article II: Definitions and Criteria, paragraph 7; www.opcw.org/chemical-weaponsconvention/articles/article-ii-definitions-and-criteria
71 (a) “Advice from Scientific Advisory Board of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on riot
control agents in connection with the Chemical Weapons Convention.” C. Timperley, J. Forman, P. Aas, M. Abdollahi,
D. Benachour, A. Al-Amri, A. Baulig, R. Becker-Arnold, V. Borrett, F. Carino, C. Curty, D. Gonzalez, M. Geist, Michael;
B. Kane, Z. Kovarik, R. Martinez-Alvarez, B. Mikulak, N. Mourao, S. Neffe, E. Noguiera, P. Ramasami, Ponnadurai; S.
Raza, V. Rubaylo, A. Saeed, K. Takeuchi, C. Tang, F. Trifiro, F. van Straten, A. Suarez, F. Waqar, P. Vanninen, M. ZafarUz-Zamen, S. Vucinic, V. Zaitsev, M. Zina, S. Holen, F. Izzati; RSC. Adv. 2018, 8, 41731-41739. DOI:

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Chemical Weapons in the Asia-Pacific: History, Science, and Future Prospect
but conformity can also depend on factors broader than the identity of the chemical. These include
exposure duration and concentration, physical surroundings and environmental conditions, and theunderlying health of those exposed. 72
Animals, plants, fungi, and microbes can also produce toxic substances; these are referred to as
biological toxins.73 Chemicals found in living systems that regulate life processes (bioregulators),
are also potentially toxic, 74 although weaponization of bioregulators presents a number ofdifficulties.75 Being chemicals, toxins and bioregulators are subject to the restrictions of the CWC
if used for prohibited purposes, while also being considered biological toxins if used for prohibited
purposes under the BTWC, creating an overlap of prohibitions for “mid-spectrum agents” between
the two treaties (Figure 1). The presence of ricin (a plant toxin) and saxitoxin (produced bycyanobacteria and responsible for paralytic shellfish poisoning) on the CWC Schedules illustrates
the treaty’s purview in this realm. However, many other toxins with potential for harmful uses
exist.73 Given the potential to acquire toxins from natural sources, these substances are commonly
considered as security threats, as illustrated by a 2019 foiled plot to use the toxin abrin in
homemade bombs in Indonesia. 76

10.1039/c8ra08273a. (b) Response to the Director-General’s Request to the Scientific Advisory Board to Provide
Consideration on Which Riot Control Agents are Subject to Declaration Under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
SAB-25/WP.1, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands, 27 March 2017;www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/SAB/en/sab25wp01_e_.pdf
72 (a) R. J. Haar, V. Iacopino, N. Ranadive, S. D. Weiser, M. Dandu. “Health impacts of chemical irritants used forcrowd control: a systematic review of the injuries and deaths caused by tear gas and pepper spray.” BMC Public
Health 2017, 17, pp. 831. DOI: 10.1186/s12889-017-4814-6 (b) C. Rothenberg, S. Achanta, E. R. Svendsen, S. E.
Jordt. “Tear gas: an epidemiological and mechanistic reassessment”. Ann N Y Acad Sci. 2016, 1378(1), pp. 96-107.
DOI: 10.1111/nyas.13141.
73 (a) V. Pitschmann, Z. Hon. “Military importance of natural toxins and their analogs.” Molecules 2016,
21, 556. DOI: 10.3390/molecules21050556. (b) B. G. Dorner, R. Zeleny, K. Harju, J A.
Hennekinne, P. Vanninen, H. Schimmel, A. Rummel; “Biological toxins of potential bioterrorism risk:
Current status of detection and identification technology.” Trends in Anal. Chem. 2016, 85, 89-102. DOI:
10.1016/j.trac.2016.05.024.
74 S. Bokan, Z. Orahovec Z. “An Evaluation of Bioregulators/Modulators as Terrorism and Warfare Agents.” In
Technology for Combating WMD Terrorism, P. J. Stopa, Z. Orahovec (Eds.), NATO Science Series (Series II:
Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry), vol 174. Springer, Dordrecht, 2004. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-2683-6_3.
75 Convergence of Chemistry and Biology: Report of the Scientific Advisory Board’s Temporary Working Group.
SAB/REP/1/14, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 26 June 2014, The Hague, The Netherlands;
www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/SAB/en/TWG_Scientific_Advsiory_Group_Final_Report.pdf
76 V. Arianti, “Biological Terrorism in Indonesia,” Diplomat, 20 November 2019.

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
The CWC sets down obligations intended to be of an unlimited duration, 77 while the pace of
scientific discovery, and with it our perception of the boundaries of scientific disciplines, continues
to advance.78 Scientific developments, especially in the field of chemistry, can bring great benefits
to humankind, and under the provisions of the CWC, States Parties are obliged to ensure chemistry
is not used in violation of the Convention. Yet, continued discoveries in chemistry continuously
raise security concerns. 79
The number of known chemicals increases by millions of substances every year, while the CWC’s
Annex on Chemicals has only seen one update since 1993 when it was originally agreed on. This
was the addition of four groups of new types of nerve agents following the Skripal poisoning in
2018.41 The new schedules (1A13-1A16) entered in force in June 2020. 80,81,82
As modern science reveals more about the molecular world underpinning life processes, new typesof toxic chemicals tailored to attacking specific biological functions are a potential outcome. 83 The
development of nanomedicines targeting specific types of cells, tissues, and organs to deliver
payloads of therapeutic or even toxic chemicals (which is effectively how nanomedicine-based
chemotherapy agents function) elicit similar concerns.84 There are clear pathways to poisoning andharm. There are also practical considerations, as the properties of a chemical intended to beweaponized may differ from those required of a chemical to be used for medical purposes under
77 See CWC Article XVI: Duration and Withdraw, paragraph 1; www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-xvi-duration-and-withdrawal
78 G. M. Whitesides. “Reinventing Chemistry.” Angew. Chem., Int. Ed. 2015, 54, pp. 3196-3209.
79 Preventing Chemical Weapons: Arms Control and Disarmament as the Sciences Converge; M. Crowley, M. Dando,
L. Shang (Eds.); Royal Society of Chemistry: London, 2018.
80 S. Costanzi, G. D. Koblentz, “Controlling Novichoks after Salisbury: revising the Chemical Weapons Convention
schedules.” The Nonproliferation Review, 2019, 26 (5-6), pp. 599-612. DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2019.1662618.
81 L. Howes, “New nerve agents added to Chemical Weapons Convention Novichok and carbamate compounds are
the first added to the treaty since it came into force.” Chem. Eng. News 2 December 2019;https://cen.acs.org/policy/chemical-weapons/New-nerve-agents-added-Chemical-WeaponsConvention/97/web/2019/12
82 M. Peplow. “Nerve agent attack on spy used ‘Novichok’ poison Chemical weapon used in U.K. assassination
attempt was developed by Soviet Union during Cold War” Chem. Eng. News 2018, 96(12);https://cen.acs.org/articles/96/i12/Nerve-agent-attack-on-spy-used-Novichok-poison.html
83 Report of the Scientific Advisory Board’s Workshop on Chemical Warfare Agent Toxicity, Emergency Response
and Medical Countermeasures, SAB-24/WP.2, 14 October 2016, The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands; www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/SAB/en/sab-24wp02_e_.pdf
84 K Nixdorff. “Advances in the Targeted Delivery of Biochemical Agents,” pp. 259-292 In Preventing Chemical
Weapons: Arms Control and Disarmament as the Sciences Converge; M. Crowley, M. Dando, L. Shang (Eds.); Royal
Society of Chemistry: London, 2018.

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Chemical Weapons in the Asia-Pacific: History, Science, and Future Prospectcontrolled conditions. Development of nanomedicines for chemotherapy has revealed examples of
toxic chemicals targeted against specific types of cells (tumors) that are not always more effective
than untargeted (and less expensive) approaches. 85 This in turn introduces a degree of uncertainty
as to the risk of such approaches as chemical weapons.
Covered by Biological Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC, Article II)
Poisons (Toxic Chemicals)Classical CWA

Chlorine

Phosgene

Sulfur Mustard

Nitrogen
Mustard

Lewisite

G- and V-Series
Nerve Agents

Infectious Agents
Small

Large

Other Toxic

Molecule

Molecule

Chemicals

Toxins and(Protein)

Bioregulators

ToxinsIndustrial

Genetically
Modified
BWA

Mid-spectrum Agents

Viruses
Conotoxins

Chemicals

Botulinum
Saxitoxin

ToxinsTailored andmodifiedPharmaceuticals

Tetrodotoxin

Ricin

Bacteria andViruses

CentralSubstance P

Nervous
System-Acting

BWA

Bacteria

Chemicals

Agricultural

Classical

Staphylococcal
enterotoxin B

Neurokinin A

Chemicals

Rikettsia

Anthrax

PlagueSmall Pox

Tularemia
Covered by Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention(BTWC, Article I)

Figure 1. Biochemical Threat Spectrum from Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA) to Biological
Warfare Agents (BWA)86
Note: The chemical and biological agents listed are intended to be illustrative, not comprehensive. Solid borders
between the example columns are absent in the representation as this is meant to illustrate a continuum.
85 Y. Min, J. M. Caster, M. J. Eblan, A. Z. Wang. “Clinical Translation of Nanomedicine.” Chem. Rev. 2015, 115(19),pp. 11147–11190. DOI: 10.1021/acs.chemrev.5b00116.
86 Adopted from J. E. Forman, C. M. Timperley. “Chemical Disarmament in a Technologically Evolving World.” In
Responsible Conduct in Chemistry Research and Practice: Global Perspectives; E. T. Contis, A. Campbell, D. Phillips,
D., B. Miller, L. Brown (Eds.); ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 2018; Vol. 1288,
pp. 3– 35.

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WMD in Asia-Pacific

The application of chemicals intended to incapacitate has led to concerns on the use ofpharmaceutical-based substances that act on the central nervous system (CNS). 87 Aerosolized
dispersal of chemicals intended to incapacitate by Security forces that ended the Dubrovka Theater
Siege in Moscow in 2002 88 resulted in fatalities among both hostages and terrorists. In theaftermath, an intensive review began within OPCW’s SAB 87, 89 alongside equally intensive
deliberations among CWC States Parties on security concerns of chemicals intended for use inincapacitation roles, especially in regard to law enforcement usage. 90 In 2021, the States Parties
adopted a decision by vote to “affirm that CWC States Parties understand that the use ofaerosolized CNS-acting chemicals is inconsistent with law enforcement as a purpose notprohibited by the Convention”. 91,92 Pertinent to the debates leading up to this decision have beensuggestions that development of aerosolized incapacitating chemicals for law-enforcement
purposes may be a back-door entryway for the development of new chemical warfare agents.93
While the outcome of the debate on the CNS-acting chemical issue was a decision of the States
Parties, this was not a decision of consensus. At the vote, 128 States were present, eighty-five
voted yes, ten voted no, and thirty-three abstained. There were fourteen Asia-Pacific States present,

87 R. J. Mathews. “Central Nervous System-Acting Chemicals and the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Former

Scientific Adviser’s Perspective.” Pure Appl. Chem. 2018, 90(10), pp. 1559– 1675. DOI: 10.1515/pac-2018-0502.
88 S. Jeffery. “The Moscow theatre siege A chronology of events following the storming of a Russian theatre by agang of heavily armed Chechen militants”. The Guardian, 28 October 2002;
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/28/chechnya.russia6
89 Central Nervous System Acting Chemicals – Considerations from the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board, 28
November 2017; www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/SAB/en/SAB_Considersations_on_CNSActing_Chemicals_2003-2017.pdf.
90 See for example: (a) Joint Paper: Aerosolisation of Central Nervous System-Acting Chemicals for Law Enforcement
Purposes. RC-4/NAT.26, 30 November 2018, The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The
Hague, The Netherlands; www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2018/11/rc4nat26%28e%29.pdf. (b)Russian Federation: Aerosolisation of Chemical Nervous System-Acting Chemicals for Law Enforcement Purposes,
RC-4/NAT.9, 21 November 2018, The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The
Netherlands; www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2018/11/rc4nat09%28e%29.pdf.
91 Decision on aerosolised use of Central Nervous System-acting chemicals adopted by OPCW Conference of States
Parties, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 1 December 2021; www.opcw.org/mediacentre/news/2021/12/decision-aerosolised-use-central-nervous-system-acting-chemicals-adopted.
92 The summary of the voting is available in Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session of the Conference of the States
Parties, C‑26/5, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, 2021;
www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2021/12/c2605%28e%29.pdf.
93 M. Crowley, M. Dando. Central Nervous System Weapons Dealt a Blow. Science 2022, 375 (6577), 153-154. DOI:
10.1126/science.abn6132.

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Russia and China, who had previously called for further discussion on the issue,94,95 voted against
the decision, while Indonesia and Vietnam abstained. 92 Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, theMarshall Islands, Palau, Philippines, ROK, Singapore, and the United States voted in favor.92
A chemical weapon (like any weapon system or technology) requires multiple components andconsiderations for use. This is seen within the CWC definition of a chemical weapon that covers
both toxic chemicals and equipment for deploying the chemicals as weapons, even when theequipment contains no toxic chemicals. An advanced chemical weapons capability requires morethan chemicals. Capabilities to produce and dispose of chemicals (chemical engineering), toprotect against indiscriminate chemical effects (protective equipment, decontamination, andmedical countermeasures), and to engineer and design the delivery systems are also necessary. It
is a highly transdisciplinary endeavor. 96 Maintaining the chemical weapons programs of the Cold
War required significant resources, as has the destruction efforts required by the CWC. 97 Suchexpertise and resource requirements might create a barrier to entry for initiating a traditional 20 thCentury state-level program. However, events in Syria and the assassination scenarios witnessedover the last few years41,42,52 illustrate novel approaches to the weaponization of chemicals. Thisdraws attention once more to scientific developments that are potentially enabling for such
purposes.
It is estimated that there are more possible chemicals with drug-like effects than there are atoms
in the universe, 98 an observation that does little to ease security concerns over new chemical
discoveries. From a scientific perspective, exploring this “chemical space” to find new chemicals
94 Russian Federation: Understanding Regarding the Aerosolized Use of Central Nervous System-Acting Chemicals

for Law Enforcement Purposes, EC-93/NAT.6, 6 March 2020, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands;
www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/03/ec93nat06%28e%29.pdf
95 People's Republic of China: Statement by the Delegation of the People's Republic of China to the OPCW at the
Ninety-Fifth Session of the Executive Council, EC-95/NAT.30, 6 October 2020, Organisation for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands;
www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/11/ec95nat30%28e%29.pdf
96 Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on Developments in Science and Technology for the Fourth Special
Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, RC4/DG.1, 30 April 2020, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands;
www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/CSP/RC-4/en/rc4dg01_e_.pdf
97 See for example Chemical Munitions: Cost Estimates for Demilitarization and Production, U.S. Government
Accountability Office, NSIAD-86-1FS: 1985; https://www.gao.gov/products/128358
98 A. Mullard A. “The drug-maker's guide to the galaxy.” Nature 2017, 549(7673), pp. 445-447. DOI:
10.1038/549445a.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificwith superior properties to those we have now (as materials, medicines, and more) is a source of
excitement for societal benefit. In pursuing these benefits, chemistry, which like so many scientificfields, embraces emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and automation to aid in the
discovery process, 99 and this gives us innovation, a faster pace of scientific development, andfurther security concerns.
Research involving chemical warfare agents in pursuit of better and more effective protective
equipment, decontaminants, and medical countermeasures is on-going.83,96, 100 , 101 The
transdisciplinary nature of scientific discovery is as important here as it is for developing weapons.
Much of the expertise and research on more effective ways to counter chemicals weapons takes
place in well-resourced state-funded laboratories, and the OPCW facilitates a network of
Designated Laboratories across member states.102 These laboratories develop analysis methods todetect chemical agents to support verification, share procedures, and collectively participate inproficiency testing. 103104 The laboratory network serves to strengthen the CWC’s verification
99 See for example: P. S. Gromski, A. B. Henson, J. M. Granda, L. Cronin. “How to explore chemical space using

algorithms and automation.” Nat Rev Chem 2019, 3, pp. 119–128. DOI: 10.1038/s41570-018-0066-y.
100 C. M. Timperley, J. E. Forman, M. Abdollahi, A.S. Al-Amri, A. Baulig, D. Benachour, V. Borrett, F. A. Cariño, M.
Geist, D. Gonzalez, W. Kane, Z. Kovarik, R. Martínez-Álvarez, N. M. Fusaro Mourão, S. Neffe, S. K. Raza, V. Rubaylo,
A. G. Suárez, K. Takeuchi, C. Tang, F. Trifirò, F. Mauritz van Straten, P. S. Vanninen, S. Vučinić, V. Zaitsev, M. ZafarUz-Zaman, M. Saïd Zina, S. Holen. “Advice on assistance and protection provided by the Scientific Advisory Boardof the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: Part 1. On medical care and treatment of injuries
from nerve agents.” Toxicology 2019, 415, pp. 56-59. DOI: 10.1016/j.tox.2019.01.004.
101 C. M. Timperley, M. Abdollahi, A.S. Al-Amri, A. Baulig, D. Benachour, V. Borrett, F. A. Cariño, M. Geist, D. Gonzalez,
W. Kane, Z. Kovarik, R. Martínez-Álvarez, N. M. Fusaro Mourão, S. Neffe, S. K. Raza, V. Rubaylo, A. G. Suárez, K.
Takeuchi, C. Tang, F. Trifirò, F. Mauritz van Straten, P. S. Vanninen, S. Vučinić, V. Zaitsev, M. Zafar-Uz-Zaman, M. SaïdZina, S. Holen, J. E. Forman, V. Suri. “Advice on Assistance and Protection from the Scientific Advisory Board of theOrganisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: Part 2. On Preventing and Treating Health Effects from Acute,
Prolonged, and Repeated Nerve Agent Exposure, and the Identification of Medical Countermeasures able to Reduceor Eliminate the Longer Term Health Effects of Nerve Agents.” Toxicology, 2019, 413, pp. 13-23. DOI:
10.1016/j.tox.2018.11.009.
102 Designated Laboratories; www.opcw.org/designated-laboratories. For a current list of Designated Laboratories,see (a) Note by the Director-General: Status of Laboratories Designated for the Analysis of Authentic Environmental
Samples, S/1893/2020, 2 September 2020, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The
Netherlands; www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/09/s-1893-2020%28e%29%20%281%29.pdf. (b)Note by the Technical Secretariat: Status of Laboratories Designated for the Analysis of Authentic Biomedical
Samples, S/1904/2020, 2 October 2020, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The
Netherlands; www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/10/s-1904-2020%28e%29.pdf
103 Recommended Operating Procedures for Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament 2017 Edition. P.
Vanninen, (Ed.), University of Helsinki: Helsinki, Finland, 2017.
104 C. M. Timperley, J. E. Forman, M. Abdollahi, A.S. Al-Amri, I. P. Alonso, A. Baulig, V. Borrett, F. A. Cariño, C. Curty,
D. González Berrutti, Z. Kovarik, R. Martínez-Álvarez, R. Mikulak, N. M. Fusaro Mourão, P. Ramasami, S. Neffe, S. K.
Raza, V. Rubaylo, K. Takeuchi, C. Tang, F. Trifirò, F. Mauritz van Straten, P. S. Vanninen, V. Zaitsev, F. Waqar, M.
Saïd Zina, M.-M. Blum, H. Gregg, E. Fischer, S. Sun, P. Yang. “Advice on Chemical Weapons Sample Stability and273

Chemical Weapons in the Asia-Pacific: History, Science, and Future Prospect
regime (these laboratories have been central to the analysis of samples and independent reportingof results from chemical weapon related fact-finding).105 Additionally, the network exemplifies
international scientific collaboration (a norm of the CWC). States in the Asia-Pacific with
Designated Laboratories include Australia, China, ROK, Russia, Singapore, and the United States.
Other regional States also have laboratories with capabilities for countering chemical weapons(most notably, Japan 106 and Malaysia107), but these laboratories are outside of the OPCW network.
New scientific developments with relevance to the CWC may also emerge from scientificcommunities beyond the specialized laboratories. Here, the chemical industry is not only a key
driver of innovation, but it is also a key stakeholder in upholding the CWC’s verification regime. 108
Industrial chemistry also facilitates the diffusion of chemical expertise and knowledge on a global
scale. Asia-Pacific states have a significant chemical industry presence. Globally, chemical
production and sales is dominated by China (responsible for more than 44% of 2020 global
chemical sales), with the United States (12.3%), Japan (4.1%), the ROK (2.9%), and Russia (1.1%)
also in the top ten chemical producing nations. 109
Overall scientific output from Asia-Pacific mimics trends seen in global chemical production anddominates global scientific outputs (across all fields and sectors). The greatest amounts of global
research and development funding are seen in China, USA, and Japan, with ROK and Russia also

Storage Provided by the Scientific Advisory Board of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons toIncrease Investigative Capabilities Worldwide.” Talanta 2018, 188, pp. 808-832. DOI:
10.1016/j.talanta.2018.04.022.
105 See for example S. Mogl, P. Siegenthaler, B. Schmidt. “Chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict.” Spiez
Laboratory Annual report 2013; 2013; pp. 26 – 33;
https://www.labor-spiez.ch/pdf/en/dok/jab/88_003_e_laborspiez_jahresbericht_2013_web.pdf
106 The Japanese National Research Institute of Police Science participated in a recent OPCW Proficiency Test, see:
Note by the Director-General: Evaluation of the Results of the Fifth Official OPCW Biomedical Proficiency Test,
S/1903/2020, 2 October 2020, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The
Netherlands; www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/10/s-1903-2020%28e%29.pdf
107 See for example paragraphs 12.1 to 12.2 of Summary of the Third Meeting of the Scientific Advisory Board
Temporary Working Group on Investigative Science and Technology, SAB-28/WP.3, 4 June 2019, Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands;
www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/06/sab-28-wp03%28e%29.pdf
108 Report of the Scientific Advisory Board's Workshop on Trends in Chemical Production, SAB-26/WP.2, 19 October
2017, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands;
www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/SAB/en/sab-26-wp02_e_.pdf
109 FACTS & FIGURES of the European chemical industry, cefic; https://cefic.org/a-pillar-of-the-european-economy/.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificin the top ten.110 Research and development funding as a proportion of a State’s GDP is the highest
worldwide for the ROK (4.35% in 2021 as compared to 2.88% for the US and 1.98% for China).110
In 2020, China produced the greatest amount of global scientific publications (23% of the world
total, with more than 669,000 produced), followed by the United States (15.5%). Japan (3.4%),
Russia (3.1%), and the ROK (2.5%) are also in the top ten. 111 Science is also international withcollaborations across regions and states entrenched within the scientific enterprise (in bothindustrial and academic sectors). For the 2020 publication output, 22% of publications from
Chinese scientists were co-authored with scientists from at least one other state. For scientists fromthe United States, 40% of 2020 scientific publications included international coauthors (26% wereco-authored with scientists from China, 5.3% with scientists from Japan, and 4.5% with scientists
from ROK).111
The scale of the scientific enterprise is daunting when considering how to answer calls formonitoring science to ensure states parties to the CWC or BTWC are not caught off guard. There
are many scientific discoveries that could enable new ways to access, produce, and/or weaponize
toxic chemicals, which in turn might be an entry-point for non-state actors and/or terrorists. Yet,the use of any technology, old or new, requires certain expertise, resources, and tacit knowledge,
and especially for new and emerging technologies there will always be uncertainties with respect
to the potential risk of harmful use. 112
While the prospects of scientific advances for proliferation and lowering barriers for use ofchemical weapons raise concerns, recent chemical weapons attacks have included chlorine gas (achemical known for more than 200 years),113 crude preparations of sulfur mustard,114 setting a

110 P. Heney. 2021 Global R&D Funding Forecast released. R&D World, 2021;

https://www.rdworldonline.com/2021-global-rd-funding-forecast-released/.
111 2022 National Science Board Science and Engineering Indicators: The State of U.S. Science and Engineering.
National Science Foundation, National Science Board, and National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics,
Alexandria, VA, USA; https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20221. .
112Measures to Prevent Hostile Use of Toxic Chemicals by Non-State Actors, S/1291/2015, OPCW, The Hague, 26
June 2015; www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2015/en/s-1291-2015_e_.pdf.
113 Chlorine, Royal Society of Chemistry, Periodic Table; https://www.rsc.org/periodic-table/element/17/chlorine.
114 (a) See paragraphs 9.17 to 9.18 of Report of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Scientific Advisory Board, SAB25/1*, 31 March 2017, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands;
www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/SAB/en/sab2501_e_.pdf. (b) Note by the Technical
Secretariat: Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding Alleged Incidents in Marea,275

Chemical Weapons in the Asia-Pacific: History, Science, and Future Prospect
sulfur mine on fire to generate toxic gases, 115 and assassinations scenarios with nerve agents (inone case by wiping binary precursors in succession onto an individual’s face 52). Theseobservations are noteworthy in that they are not employing cutting edge scientific andtechnological advances. Furthermore, low technology approaches to chemical attacks (including
the use of industrial chemicals rather than traditional chemical warfare agents) 116 are consideredsignificant security threats.
The medical countermeasures currently available for nerve agents were introduced in the 1950s
and 1960s, but the wealth of research demonstrating potential improvements has not beentranslated into operational use.83,100,101 Similarly, despite advanced understanding of molecularbiology, the mechanism through which sulfur mustard forms blisters is not fully understood, 83Error!
Bookmark not defined.

limiting effectiveness of available treatments. There is need for continued

research and development to counter and respond to chemical weapons, as well as a need tomaintain skills and knowledge to counter the chemical weapons of the past.
Access to scientific expertise and enhanced technical capability plays an important role incountering chemical threats. There is need to be able to recognize, prevent, and mitigate the effects
of chemical attacks and unexpected uses of new technologies. This is reflected inrecommendations from the OPCW SAB for drawing on scientific advances to strengthen
implementation of the CWC, respond to chemical threats both familiar and unknown, and to build
greater confidence in verification and compliance.96, 117 However, just as certain expertise,
Syrian Arab Republic, August 2015, S/1320/2015, 29 October 2015, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands; www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2018/11/s-13202015_e_.pdf.
115 O. Björnham, H. Grahn, P. von Schoenberg, B. Liljedahl, A. Waleij, N. Brännström. “The 2016 Al-Mishraq sulphur
plant fire: Source and health risk area estimation.” Atmos. Environ. 2017, 169, pp. 287-296.
116 D. Russell, J. Simpson. “Emergency planning and preparedness for the deliberate release of toxic industrial
chemicals,” Clinical Toxicology, 2010, 48(3), pp. 171-176. DOI: 10.3109/15563651003698042.
117 (a) Investigative Science and Technology: Report of the Scientific Advisory Board’s Temporary Working Group,
SAB/REP/1/19, 1 December 2019, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The
Netherlands;
www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/11/TWG%20Investigative%20Science%20Final%20Report%20%20January%202020%20%281%29.pdf. (b) J. E. Forman, P. Aas, M. Abdollahi, I. P. Alonso, A. Baulig, R. BeckerArnold, V. Borrett, F. A. Cariño, C. Curty, D. Gonzalez, Z. Kovarik, R. Martínez-Álvarez, R. Mikulak, E. de Souza
Nogueria, P. Ramasami, S. K. Raza, A. E. M. Saeed, K. Takeuchi, C. Tang, F. Trifirò, F. M. van Straten, F. Waqar, V.
Zaitsev, M. Saïd Zina, K. Grolmusová, G. Valente, M. Payva, S. Sun, A. Yang, D. van Eerten. “Innovative Technologies
for Chemical Security,” Pure Appl. Chem. 2018, 90(10), 1527-1557. DOI: 10.1515/pac-2018-0908. (c) Verification
Report of the Scientific Advisory Board’s Temporary Working Group, SAB/REP/1/15, 11 June 2015, Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands;276

WMD in Asia-Pacificresources, and tacit knowledge are needed to weaponize chemicals, these same considerations arealso necessary for realizing the capabilities needed to effectively counter the proliferation ofchemical weapons. States with greater science and technology resources are expected to be better
equipped to draw upon more advanced expertise and capability.

Current Status and Future Prospects
Possession of chemical weapons by states in the Asia-Pacific has decreased significantly over the
past two decades, thereby reducing the probability that such weapons would be used in a traditional
war between States. However, a big unknown is the DPRK. Both the timing of a DPRK accession
to the CWC and the size of any chemical weapons stockpile that it would declare in such a scenario
remain a matter of speculation. If the DPRK accedes to the CWC, then the standard operatingprocedures for possessor states, as spelled out in the treaty, would not likely apply. Rather, a muchhigher involvement of the OPCW and, potentially, states from the region would likely be required
to ensure the safe and irreversible destruction of DPRK chemical weapons under internationalverification. In preparing for this contingency, the case of dismantling the declared Syrian
chemical weapons stockpile may offer lessons.118
While the prospect of a traditional military conflict involving chemical weapons among CWC
States Parties seems unlikely, this has not prevented malign uses of chemicals by states as
illustrated by the recent high profile poisonings with nerve agents that have been linked to Asia
Pacific states. In addition, there are larger concerns within security communities of the erosion of
the norms against chemical weapons upon which the CWC is founded. Future prospects forovercoming these issues rests with the political will of the states involved, including the will to
use tools available in the CWC for addressing non-compliance.
Considering the recent uses of chemical warfare agents, the threat of chemical terrorism whether
by non-state actors or those with state sponsorship is a real possibility. A number of Asia-Pacificwww.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/SAB/en/Final_Report_of_SAB_TWG_on_Verification__as_presented_to_SAB.pdf
118 See Ralf Trapp, Lessons Learned from the OPCW Mission in Syria, Report submitted to the Director-General of
the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW, 16 December 2015; http://www.the-trench.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Trapp-20151216-OPCW-Syria-lessons-learned.pdf

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Chemical Weapons in the Asia-Pacific: History, Science, and Future Prospect
states have experienced acts of terrorism and/or have active insurgencies. 119 While the majority ofreported terrorist attacks are not chemical, the specter of chemical terrorism looms large and is not
unknown. A recent study using data from the Global Terrorism Database identified 321 chemical
attacks from 1970-2015, while South Asia was the region of the greatest number of these incidents,
chemical attacks have also occurred in Australia and Oceania, East Asia, Eastern Europe, North
America, and South East Asia, all of which are regions home to Asia-Pacific States.120 Measures
to mitigate and prevent chemical terrorism include as a basis the implementation of CWC
provisions and their prohibitions into national laws and regulations that can be used to bring
perpetrators to justice. In addition, strengthening chemical security measures in sectors ranging
from healthcare and emergency medicine, 121 to chemical industry and civil defense, can aid in
dealing with such terrorist attacks should they occur.
Non-traditional chemical threat scenarios represent another potential route for intentional chemical
attacks. The large industrial base present in the Asia-Pacific presents potential targets for attacks
on infrastructure that could result in chemical releases. Such attacks might also occur throughcyber vulnerabilities, which requires non-traditional considerations toward chemical security ingeneral.122
The Asia-Pacific is home to five of the world’s top ten most highly resourced and funded states
for scientific and technological research and development, as well as five of the top ten chemical
producing states. Recent chemical incidents have demonstrated that low technology and nontraditional chemical threat approaches pose significant challenges. For traditional 20 th century
chemical weapons programs, the components and formats of chemical weapons systems are wellunderstood, and key commodities and materials for their production are found under export control
regimes to reduce proliferation risk (for example control lists from the Australia Group 123 and
119 S. Mullins. “Terrorism in the Indo-Pacific: The Year Gone By and the Road Ahead.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs,

Summer 2020, 4-35; https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/08/2002311969/-1/-1/1/MULLINS.PDF
120 C. Santos, T. El Zahran, J. Weiland, M. Anwar, J. Schier. Characterizing chemical terrorism incidents collected by
the Global Terrorism Database, 1970-2015. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2019, 34(4), 385–392.
121 M. Court, B. Edwards, F. Issa, A. Voskanyan, G. Ciottone. “Counter-Terrorism Medicine: Creating a Medical
Initiative Mandated by Escalating Asymmetric Attacks.” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 2020, pp. 1-4. DOI:
10.1017/S1049023X2000103X.
122 The United States Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) provides insights into security concerns
related to chemical infrastructure; https://www.cisa.gov/chemical-facility-anti-terrorism-standards.
123 Australia Group Export Controlled Chemical Weapons Precursors, available at:https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/theaustraliagroupnet/site/en/precursors.html

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WMD in Asia-PacificWassenaar Arrangement124 that include chemical agents and their precursors). Low technology
approaches, however, can draw upon non-traditional components and commonly available
chemicals to enable attacks. These approaches challenge how to think about preventing the reemergence of chemical weapons and preparedness for countering chemical attacks in a 21st century
world. The chemical attacks we have witnessed (and those likely to come in future) are notfollowing the doctrines of the Cold War that influenced negotiation and drafting of the CWC.
As the CWC approaches its 25th anniversary in April 2022 (and beyond), the prohibition ofchemical weapons will increasingly benefit from science and technology as a source of innovationand opportunity to better detect, prevent, and/or respond to chemical threats. The OPCW SAB has
provided useful views from where guidance can be drawn,96,117 and scientific contributions from
Asia-Pacific alongside collaboration among (and beyond) the regional states will certainly have asignificant role. Ultimately, however, it is the actions and decisions of the States Parties of the
CWC, not the science and technology they possess, that will drive success in prohibiting chemical
weapons and preventing their re-emergence.

124 The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies

Control Lists, available at: https://www.wassenaar.org/control-lists/279

Asia-Pacific Perspective on Biological Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence in the Pandemic Era

10. Asia-Pacific Perspective on Biological Weapons
and Nuclear Deterrence in the Pandemic Era
Richard Pilch and Miles Pomper

Introduction
This article provides an Asia-Pacific perspective on biological weapons and their relevance tonuclear deterrence in the pandemic era. The entire class of biological weapons is banned byinternational law; however, biological weapons are generally less costly and less technicallychallenging to develop than nuclear weapons. Conversely, nuclear weapons are openly possessedby multiple countries in the Asia-Pacific despite their corresponding cost and technical complexity.
These two types of weapons of mass destruction—biological and nuclear—do not exist in isolation
but in a multifactorial geopolitical environment where the threat and control of one impact that of
the other.
A third factor that holds the potential to influence this dynamic is the increasing likelihood ofnatural outbreaks and pandemics. The Asia-Pacific has been the source of the majority of recent
natural outbreaks with global impact, including SARS (2003), H5N1 and H7N9 influenza, andnow COVID-19, a trend that is expected to continue as surging population growth and industrial
expansion brings humans into closer contact with novel disease agents and their animal reservoirs.
Such natural events might be misinterpreted as deliberate biological attacks or used to mask them,with the potential for nuclear escalation in the balance.
In the following sections, we explore potential intersections of biological and nuclear weapons in
the pandemic context. First, we describe the threat of biological weapons, including history, threat
assessment methodology, and specific threats in the Asia-Pacific region. Next, we review options
for biological weapons control. Finally, we discuss nuclear deterrence and escalation in the context© 2022 Richard Pilch and Miles Pomper, CC BY 4.0

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WMD in Asia-Pacificof both natural and deliberate biological events. We conclude with a summary of key points andrecommendations for regional security and stability.

Threata. Historical Context: 20-21st Century Bioweaponry
The biological warfare (BW) programs of Japan, the United States, and Soviet Union/RussianFederation provide a representative timeline of State-level BW activities in the 20-21st century.
Japan. The modern era of BW is rooted in the interwar period but arrived with Japanese BW
activities during World War II and the coincident Second Sino-Japanese War. 1 While the UnitedStates, United Kingdom (UK), and Canada had active BW programs during this timeframe, only
the Japanese extensively employed biological weapons against civilian and military populations
both in captivity and in the field. In all, the Japanese BW program’s experimentation on captives
and prisoners of war, conservatively estimated, took over 10,000 lives, while field usage led to thedeath of as many as several hundred thousands of men, women, and children. 2
Japan participated in Geneva disarmament discussions in the 1920s but did not ratify the 1925
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (“Geneva Protocol”), which prohibits the use of chemical andbiological weapons of war, until 1970. 3 In fact, as the Geneva discussions were ongoing, Shiro
Ishii, a young Army doctor and Lieutenant at the time, recognized that because the world wasagainst the development of biological weapons (and especially if these weapons were to be
officially banned), the Japanese would likely benefit from their possession and use in coming wars.
Ishii, who possessed both an MD degree and a PhD in microbiology, further noted that BW did
not require iron and other raw materials that were difficult for the Japanese to acquire and would

1 For a historical overview of BW, see Seth Carus, “The History of Biological Weapons Use: What We Know and

What We Don’t,” Health Security, vol 13, no 4 (2015).
2 For an in-depth account of Japanese BW activities, see J. Guillemin, Hidden Atrocities. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2017).
3 https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4784.htm

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Asia-Pacific Perspective on Biological Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence in the Pandemic Era
likely be far less costly than conventional weapons despite comparable or even greater lethality.
Ishii ascended rapidly to become Japan’s primary catalyst for BW research and development.
During the 1930s, Ishii’s efforts evolved from a small lab at the Tokyo Army Medical School’s
Department of Immunology to the so-called “Togo Detachment” (after Ishii had changed his nameto Hajime Togo to maintain secrecy) to facilities in Manchukuo (Manchuria), a region defined by
the borders of China’s three north-eastern provinces. In Manchuria, after working temporarily inthe town of Harbin and then for an extended period at a relatively advanced research station at the
Zhong Ma Prison Camp in Beiyinhe, Ishii settled on Pingfan (a.k.a. Heibo), a cluster of villages
approximately twenty-four kilometers south of Harbin, as the primary site of Japan’s BW program.
The program was largely carried out under the auspices of the Epidemic Prevention and Water
Supply Unit, also known as Water Purification Detachment 731 or “Unit 731.” Unit 731 explored
the weapons utility of numerous biological agents, including Bacillus anthracis, which causes
anthrax; Yersinia pestis, which causes plague; and such food- and waterborne pathogens as Vibrio
cholerae and Salmonella and Shigella species. Prisoners were often used in experiments to thisend, including direct challenge testing by ingestion and injection as well as incendiary testing at
Anta Station, Pingfan’s proving ground. Incendiary experiments included the field testing of two
different Japanese-made bombs, the Ha and the Uji. The Ha bomb was composed of 1,500
cylindrical projectiles immersed in a half-liter of anthrax solution and walled by thin steel; upon
impact, the shrapnel would cause anthrax-infected wounds over a diameter of roughly forty meters.
The Uji was an “eggshell” bomb with walls made of porcelain instead of steel, and was used todeliver fleas infected with Y. pestis into Chinese civilian populations during the war.
Ishii was transferred from Unit 731 in 1942 and replaced by Lieutenant General Masaji Kitano,previously second in command of the BW program, but he was reappointed Chief of Detachment
731 in March 1945, after which he orchestrated the dismantlement and cover-up of the Unit’s
operations. Soviet forces in the region captured and eventually tried twelve Japanese soldiers for
BW-related activities, while the United States offered immunity in exchange for information on
the program. A Washington sub-committee for the Far East, representing a cross-section of
military branches, divisions, departments, and offices, addressed the decision as follows:

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WMD in Asia-Pacific“Data already obtained from Ishii and his colleagues have proven to be of great value inconfirming, supplementing, and complementing several phases of US research in BW, andmay suggest new fields for future research. This Japanese information is the only known
source of data from scientifically controlled experiments showing the direct effect of BW
agents on man. In the past it has been necessary to evaluate the effects of BW agents on
man from data through animal experimentation. Such evaluation is inconclusive and far
less complete than results obtained from certain types of human experimentation… Since
it is believed that the USSR possesses only a small portion of this technical information,and since any ‘war crimes’ trial would completely reveal such data to all nations, it is feltthat such publicity must be avoided in interests of defense and security of the US. It isbelieved also that ‘war crimes’ prosecution of Ishii and his associates would serve to stop
the flow of much additional information of a technical and scientific nature.” 4
Ultimately, the Japanese BW program failed to produce a reliably effective biological weapon
despite its actual deployment of BW in the field, demonstrated for example by the 1941 attack of
Changteh in which V. cholerae was apparently used as a BW agent by the Japanese but thenboomeranged, leading to nearly 10,000 cholera cases and 1,700 deaths among their own troops. 5
The United States. By the end of World War II, the United States maintained a well-funded BW
program of its own. Like Japan, the United States did not ratify the Geneva Protocol until after thewar (1975) and deliberately retained the right to retaliate-in-kind to any BW attack. In a June 8,
1943, speech President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated:“Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. Thiscountry has not used them, and I hope that we never will be compelled to use them. I statecategorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unlessthey are first used by our enemies.”6
The US BW program began with the 1941-1942 establishment of the War Bureau of Consultants(WBC) under Dr. Edwin B. Fred, professor of Bacteriology at the University of Wisconsin, and
4 US War Department. War Crimes Office. Judge Advocate General’s Office. Appendix B. Declassified 8 July 1977.
5 S. Riedel S. “Biological warfare and bioterrorism: a historical review.” Proc (Bayl Univ Med Cent). 2004;17(4):400-

406. doi:10.1080/08998280.2004.11928002.
6 https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/4784.htm

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War Research Service (WRS), a parallel civilian agency. WRS evaluated biological agents forweapons utility and passed the most promising candidates on to the Chemical Weapons Service(CWS, which was established near the end of the First World War) for offensive and defensive
application, signifying a transfer from civilian to military oversight. In 1944, the WRS wasabsorbed by the War Department, eliminating the civilian component and consolidating BW
research and development under CWS’s Special Projects Division. The Special Projects Division’s
parent CBW research and pilot plant center was housed at the US Army’s Camp Detrick, later
renamed Fort Detrick, in Frederick, Maryland. Fort Detrick became the recognized epicenter of
the US BW program, and today still houses key defensive research facilities including the UnitedStates Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).
Also within the War Department, the U.S. Biological Warfare Committee (USBWC) wasestablished to work in conjunction with the Special Projects Division, and George Merck, notable
pharmaceutical entrepreneur and chair of the WRS prior to its dissolution, was appointed USBWC
chair responsible for final decisions of mass production and use. Merck summarized BW-related
accomplishments during World War II in a report to the Secretary of War as follows:
1. Development of methods and facilities for the mass production of microorganisms andtheir products.
2. Development of methods for the rapid and accurate detection of minute quantities of
disease-producing agents.
3. Significant contributions to knowledge of the control of airborne disease-producing
agents.
4. Production and isolation for the first time of a crystalline bacterial toxin, which has
opened the way for the preparation of a more highly purified immunizing toxoid.
5. Development and production of an effective toxoid in sufficient quantities to protect
large scale operations should this be necessary.
6. Significant contributions to knowledge concerning the development of immunity inhuman beings and animals against certain infectious diseases.

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7. Important advances in the treatment of certain infectious diseases of human beings andanimals, and in the development of effective protective clothing and equipment.
8. Development of laboratory animal propagation and maintenance facilities to supply thetremendous number of approved strains of experimental animals required forinvestigations.
9. Applications of special photographic techniques to the study of airborne microorganisms
and the safety of laboratory procedures.
10. Information on the effects of more than 1000 different chemical agents on living plants.
11. Studies of the production and control of certain diseases and plants.7
Postwar BW efforts initially focused on B. anthracis, botulinum toxin, and other agents. In 1953,
Pine Bluff Arsenal, formerly a manufacturing center for magnesium and thermite munitions
outside One Bluff, Arkansas, was repurposed for BW and CW production. Its biological plant,
renamed the Directorate of Biological Operations (DBO), became the BW program’s primarylarge-scale production facility with an operating budget that ballooned to $7 million per year by
1969.
Field testing was primarily conducted at Dugway Proving Ground approximately eighty miles west
of Salt Lake City, Utah, where it was established as a CW testing facility by the Army in 1942 andremains active today. Open-air BW testing was also conducted by the Deseret Testing Center(DTC), established in 1962 to obtain empirical data on BW use. Tests were conducted in various
locations often outside of the continental United States, for example, attacking a makeshift naval
fleet on multiple occasions under Project SHAD (“Shipboard Hazards and Defenses”). 8
On November 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon unilaterally banned all offensive BW activities
by the United States. The United States was in possession of a nearly eighty-ton BW stockpile at

7 US Department of the Army. US Army Activity in the US Biological Warfare Programs. Volume I, 24 February 1977

(UNCLASSIFIED), pp. 70-1.
8 See, for example, Institute of Medicine 2007. Long-Term Health Effects of Participation in Project SHAD
(Shipboard Hazard and Defense). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/11900

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the time. The ban was followed by a similar ban of toxin weapons less than three months later,
justified by the president as follows:“These decisions have been taken with full confidence that they are in accord with theoverall security requirements of the United States. These decisions also underline theUnited States support for the principles and objectives of the United Kingdom Draft
Convention for the Prohibition of Biological Methods of Warfare. The United States hopesthat other nations will follow our example with respect to both biological and toxin
weapons. The renunciation of toxin weapons is another significant step, which we arewilling to take unilaterally, to bring about arms control and to increase the prospects ofpeace.”9The UK Draft Convention for the Prohibition of Biological Methods of Warfare referenced byPresident Nixon would become the first international treaty to ban an entire class of weapons—
the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The BWC prohibited the development, production,and stockpiling of biological weapons, marking a significant step forward from the 1925 Geneva
Protocol’s limitation of BW use only. The United Kingdom, the United States, and Soviet Union(along with a number of other nations) were signatories of the Convention from its inception, April
10, 1972. Upon ratification by these three countries—the depository states—on March 26, 1975,
the BWC went into force.
The Soviet Union and Russian Federation. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union did notdiscontinue its BW program with the establishment of the BWC. 10 Soviet BW efforts began in the
1920s but accelerated after World War II and revelations of the Japanese, United States, United
Kingdom, and Canadian BW programs. In the 1950s, the Kirov Institute became the lead BW
research and development institute under the Soviet Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) 7 th Directorateof the General Staff, headed by Colonel-General Yefim I. Smirnov. Two additional MOD institutes
were established: a virology institute near Zagorsk (now renamed Sergiev Posad) and a combined
bacteriology institute/production plant in Sverdlovsk (now renamed Yekaterinburg). In 1979, an

9 The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXII, No. 1594, January 12, 1970, pg. 227.
10 For an abbreviated history of the Soviet BW program, see Zilinskas RA. “The Soviet Biological Weapons Programand Its Legacy in Today’s Russia.” Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Occasional Paper No. 11(National Defense University Press; Washington, DC: July 2016).

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WMD in Asia-Pacificaccidental release of B. anthracis spores from the Sverdlovsk institute caused a large civilian
inhalational anthrax outbreak that led to closure of the production plant and relocation of bacterial
production activities to Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan. The three MOD facilities—Kirov,
Zagorsk/Sergiev Posad, and Sverdlovsk/Yekaterinburg—remain the core of Russian military
biological activities that are widely assessed as both offensive and defensive in nature but the
specifics of which are largely unknown.
By 1970, the program had successfully weaponized B. anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Y.
pestis, Coxiella burnetii, Rickettsia prowazekii, Brucella species, Venezuelan equine encephalitis
virus, smallpox virus, and botulinum toxin. Many of these agents were tested on Vozrozhdeniye
Island in the Aral Sea, the Soviet Union’s primary open-air testing location for biologicalweapons since the 1950s.
While the Soviet Union’s primary focus throughout the Cold War was the United States, multiple
inside sources have indicated that the Soviet BW program may instead have focused on China,
particularly in the late 1960s. The Soviet Union and China shared a 4,300 km Sino-Soviet borderwhere escalating military clashes culminated in overt conflict in 1969, prompting Moscow topublicly threaten and privately consider a preemptive nuclear strike on China’s fledgling nuclear
program. 11 Numerous Soviet weapons scientists have cited China’s overwhelming population
advantage as a key driver of Soviet BW activities during this period given the clear utility of BW
against human populations.12
In the early 1970s, the establishment of the BWC and the coincident advent of potentially dualuse genetic engineering techniques provided a strategic opportunity for the Soviet Union to gain amilitary advantage by significantly expanding its BW program. Influenced by respected scientist
Yuri Ovchinnikov and led by YI Smirnov under the Ministry of Defence (MOD) General Staff’s
newly-formed 15th Directorate (which replaced the 7th Directorate), the expanded BW programapplied genetic engineering and other modern biotechnologies to develop enhanced or novel

11 See, for example, M. Gerson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict.” (Center for Naval Analyses: November 2010.)

https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0022974.A2.pdf. See also:
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/index2.html
12 M. Leitenberg and R.A. Zilinskas. “The Soviet Biological Weapons Program.” (Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 2012.) Page 207.

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biological weapons. As MOD facility activities continued, the 15th Directorate established a large,ostensibly civilian component of the BW program called Biopreparat, which comprised numerous
geographically-dispersed institutes responsible for conducting both offensive and defensive BW
research and development. Key Biopreparat facilities—including its primary civilian bacteriology
institute the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology and Biotechnology, Obolensk(SRCAM)13 and primary civilian virology institute the State Research Center of Virology andBiotechnology (VECTOR)14— continue to work with dangerous pathogens for defensive purposes
today.
The Soviet Union formally dissolved on December 25, 1991. In 1992, Russian President Boris
Yeltsin ordered the cessation of offensive BW activities and publicly stated that the Soviet Union
had conducted an offensive program in violation of the BWC. 15 Whether enhanced or novel
biological agents were successfully weaponized before the program’s disbandment is uncertain;
however,

programdefectors

reportedsignificant

achievements

employingmodernbiotechnological techniques, 16 and open source scientific publications revealed the successful
application of such techniques to enhance BW surrogates of B. anthracis17and the smallpox virus 18
during the 1990s.
It is unclear what if any such activities continued into the 2000s; however, a widely publicized2012 essay by then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin calling for the development of genetic weaponssystems renewed concerns that the Russian Federation may be pursuing BW capabilities in breachof the BWC. Prime Minister Putin’s essay read:“In the more distant future, weapons systems based on new principles…genetic,
psychophysical and other technology) will be developed. All this will…provide entirely

13 See https://www.obolensk.org/eng/index.htm
14 See http://www.vector.nsc.ru/
15 John-Thor Dahlburg, “Russia Admits It Violated Pact on Biological Warfare,” Los Angeles Times, September 15,

1992, https://lat.ms/3wbbur6
16 See, for example, Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman. “Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert
Biological Weapons Program in the World, Told from the Inside by the Man Who Ran It.” (New York: Random
House, 2000).
17 A.V. Stepanov, L.I. Marinin, A.P. Pomerantsev, N.A. Staritsin, “Development of novel vaccines against anthrax inman.” J Biotechnol. 1996;44(1-3):155-160. doi:10.1016/0168-1656(95)00092-5.
18 S.N. Shchelkunov, S.B., Stavitskii, L.I. Batenko, et al., “Viral chimeric protein including a determinant of myelin
basic protein is capable of inducing allergic encephalomyelitis in guinea pigs.” Biomed Sci. 1991;2(5):493-497.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificnew instruments for achieving political and strategic goals. Such high-tech weaponssystems will be comparable in effect to nuclear weapons but will be more ‘acceptable’ interms of political and military ideology.”19
While the implications of President Putin’s statement on genetic weapons remain clouded, theRussian Federation continues to invest heavily in potentially dual-use genetic research anddevelopment, with the expressed goal of becoming a world leader in the technical space. 20
Summary. This brief timeline of key State-level BW activities in the 20-21st century provides
useful context for subsequent analysis of biological threats and options for control, with key points
as follows:•

States have successfully developed biological weapons in the past but have largely refrained
from deploying them, with the notable exception of World War II-era Japan.

•

Historical motivations for developing biological weapons included perceived strategic
advantage and deterrence, including the ability to “retaliate in kind.”•

While the BWC uniformly banned biological weapons, it was unsuccessful in preventing
significant BW advances by the Soviet Union (as well as other States such as Iraq).

•

Modern biotechnological advances have lowered technical barriers to biological weapons
development while reducing cost, such that technologically sophisticated States like theRussian Federation are capable of developing enhanced or novel biological weapons and,more broadly, potentially dual-use biological capabilities are now widespread in mostcountries around the world.

19 Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Rossiiskaya Gazeta. February 20, 2012.
20 See for example http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201904260007?index=1&rangeSize=1;

https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-52470990

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b. BW Threat Assessment Methodology
To systematically assess State-level biological threats, we typically evaluate two key contributing
factors: capability (i.e., whether a potential actor has the technical capability to pursue or enact thethreat), and intent (i.e., whether a potential actor has the motivation to pursue or enact the threat).
Assessing BW capabilities. To establish the capability to mount a biological attack, four key
technical hurdles must be overcome: a pathogenic (or toxigenic) strain of a biological agent mustbe acquired, a sufficient amount of the agent (or toxin) must be produced, the agent must be
formulated for stability and effectiveness during storage and delivery (not an absolute
requirement), and the agent must be successfully delivered. Accordingly, a BW capability may beboiled down to three primary building blocks: pathogens, infrastructure, and expertise. (figure 1).
Figure 1. Building Blocks for a Biological Weapon(1) The hazardous biological agent itself 1(2) The equipment/infrastructure necessary for its acquisition, production, formulation,and delivery as a weapon 2(3) The expertise necessary for the same 2
1 Mostbiological agents are widely available in both nature and the laboratory (wherelegitimate research, e.g., on pathogenesis and therapy, is performed).
2 Both the equipment/infrastructure and expertise necessary to produce a bulk amount of agent,

formulate it, and deliver it are largely dual use in nature, meaning that the same materials andthus knowledge required for the peaceful development and production of experimental andcommercial products like food additives, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, and vaccines can bediverted with relative ease toward weapons-related applications.

Pathogens are widely available in laboratories around the world and ubiquitous in the environment.
Infrastructure and expertise are similarly available across academia and industry because of theirdual-use nature, meaning that the same materials and knowledge utilized for peaceful purposes
may be diverted toward illicit ends with relative ease. Therefore, in the absence of such highly290

WMD in Asia-Pacificsuspect BW signatures as blast chambers and field-testing facilities, we must be able to gauge
intent to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate BW-related activities.
Technological change. Emerging technologies continue to lower technical barriers to establishinga BW capability while reducing cost. For example:•

Acquisition. De novo gene synthesis enables the synthesis of known or novel pathogens
in the laboratory. Examples including polio virus (2002), 1918 pandemic influenza virus(2005), Ebola virus (2019), and SARS-CoV-2 (2002).

•

Production. Single-use and clean-in-place technologies enable covert BW development
while additive manufacturing and cloud laboratories enable perpetrators to circumvent
existing dual-use technology controls.

•

Delivery. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) enable remote dissemination of biologicalweapons at low risk to the perpetrator.

Assessing BW intent. Biological weapons development requires a conscious and necessarily
covert decision to invest money, human and material resources, and time in contravention tointerventional law. Indicators of interest in or pursuit of biological weapons may be derived fromstatements by political leadership, state media reports, government budgetary allocations, andscientific publications or lack thereof. Additional data sources include social media posts,
electronic communications (Internet, tweet, text), and online communities, chat rooms, andmessage boards. Ultimately, understanding a potential proliferator’s motivations is extremely
challenging in the absence of timely and accurate intelligence.
c. BW Threats in the Asia-Pacific
China. While the People’s Republic of China has played a central role in the historical context ofBW as described earlier—both having suffered BW attacks at the hands of the Japanese andhaving been suggested as a potential target of Soviet biological weapons due to neighboring
China’s large population advantage—there is no corroborated evidence in the open source
domain that China has ever maintained an offensive BW program, past or present.
As noted above, biological weapons development requires a conscious and necessarily covert
decision to invest money, human and material resources, and time in contravention to291

Asia-Pacific Perspective on Biological Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence in the Pandemic Era
international law. China acceded to the BWC in 1984,21 and has submitted annual Confidence
Building Measure (CBM) reports—which aim to improve cooperation of States Parties under theConvention, including CBM F on “Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive
biological research and development programmes” 22—since 1989. China has restricted thesesubmissions to States Parties only, such that their contents are not publicly available; 23 however,
it is reasonable to assume the contents of these submissions are consistent with China’s
unwavering formal position that it has never engaged in offensive BW activities. 24
The US State Department’s 2019 report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Compliance Report) statedthat “[i]nformation indicates that the People’s Republic of China (China) engaged during thereporting period in biological activities with potential dual-use applications, which raises
concerns regarding its compliance with the BWC,” and “[t]he United States does not havesufficient information to determine whether China eliminated its assessed biological warfare(BW) program, as required under Article II of the Convention.” 25 The report further states thethat “[t]he United States assesses China possessed an offensive biological warfare program fromthe early 1950s to at least the late 1980s…China’s CBM reporting has never disclosed that it
ever pursued an offensive BW program.” While it is unclear what information led the United

21 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) andToxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, UNODA, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc
22 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Guide to Participating in the Confidence-Building Measures of
the Biological Weapons Convention, Revised Edition, 2015, Geneva: United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs. https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/DE1EE44AFE8B8CF9C1257E36005574E4/$file/cb
m-guide-2015.pdf
23 See: https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/state/china
24 For sake of completeness, it should be noted that some Chinese authors of unknown influence have suggested
that China should consider BW as a viable and perhaps even more humane alternative to other forms of war. For
example, a 2006 paper by Ji-Wei Guo of the Department of Medical Affairs, Southwest Hospital, Third Military
Medical University, Chongqing argued that “[m]odern biotechnology…can be used to bring damages and injuries toindividuals in war in a more accurate and effective fashion. Different military biotechnologies can be chosen inaccordance with different pathogenic factors to meet different military goals. The attack, therefore, will wound
different levels of specific gene, protein, cell, tissue, and organ. It no doubt will be more effective to cause
damages than conventional weapons, yet the nonlethal effect will remain to be civilized in terms of postwar
reconstruction and hatred control.” Ji-Wei Guo, The Command of Biotechnology and Merciful Conquest in Military
Opposition, Military Medicine, Vol. 171, November 2006.
25 US Department of State, 2019 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, andDisarmament Agreements and Commitments (Compliance Report). Washington DC: US Department of State, pp.
45-46, https://www.state.gov/2019-adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-anddisarmament-agreements-and-commitments-compliance-report/

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WMD in Asia-PacificStates to cite an “assessed” BW program on behalf of China, the US position on China’s dualuse capabilities is certainly accurate: as described in the previous section of this paper, virtually
all countries possess the building blocks for a BW capability, and as a global technology leader,
China’s corresponding capabilities are more advanced than most. The question is whether China
would attempt to pursue such a capability in breach of its BWC obligations?
While countries such as the Soviet Union and Iraq have breached the BWC in the past, an argument
can be made that each country’s breach was strategic—the Soviet Union to gain an asymmetricadvantage over the United States in the great power competition that characterized the Cold War(as well as, possibly, possessing a mass casualty weapon to counter neighboring China’s
population advantage, as noted), and Iraq to counter superior military manpower and perceived
WMD threats in the region (e.g., on the part of Iran).26 Would pursuing an offensive biologicalweapons capability similarly fit China’s prevailing strategy?
China’s grand strategy is founded upon technological superiority and economic expansion in the
Global South. That strategy has enjoyed remarkable success—China’s corresponding Belt andRoad Initiative has engaged more than 60 countries and invested over $200B in infrastructuredevelopment to date. 27 However, one enduring risk to the strategy’s ultimate success is theperception of China on the global stage. A negative perception would undermine China’s ongoingsoft power investment, which might explain the PRC’s concerted efforts during the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic not only to project strength but to emerge as a global leader in the area ofglobal health security.
The discovery of a covert offensive BW program in China would threaten not only China’s
external relationships with both partner nations and key international organizations like the World
Health Organization (WHO), World Trade Organization (WTO), and World Bank, but also
China’s internal stability. Biological weapons are widely abhorred, perhaps nowhere more so thanin China (where, as noted, the Chinese people suffered BW attacks at the hands of the Japanese
during the Second Sino-Japanese War that coincided with World War II).28 And China has other,
26 Republic of Iraq, Biological Full Final and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) to the United Nations, September 1997,

Chapter 1.8.1.
27 See, for example, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative
28 See, for example, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/04/world/germ-war-a-current-world-threat-is-aremembered-nightmare-in-china.html.

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Asia-Pacific Perspective on Biological Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence in the Pandemic Era
more predictable military options for area denial and deterrence, which form the basis of its
national military strategy. 29
In summary, there is no indication in the open-source domain—including statements from Chinese
leadership, state media reports, government budgetary allocations, and scientific publications orlack thereof—that China maintains an offensive BW program, despite access to the necessarybuilding blocks.
North Korea. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the BWC in 1987
but has submitted no annual CBM reports since 1990. 30 The US State Department’s 2019
Compliance Report stated that “[t]he United States assesses that the Democratic People’s Republicof Korea has an offensive BW program and is in violation of its obligations under Articles I and
II of the BWC,”31 but little information is available in the open source domain to support or refute
the US position.32 Despite public denials of the existence of an offensive BW program, which theUnited States claims has been in existence since the 1960s, the DPRK’s strategic need to “counter
US and South Korean military superiority” (per the US Compliance Report) might provide thenecessary motivation to pursue biological weapons in contravention of international law, and the
DPRK’s open breach of international law in the nuclear sphere may lend some credence to thisnotion.

29 See, for example, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-new-2019-defense-white-paper; andhttps://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF145/CF145.chap7.pdf
30 “Status of the Treaty, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling ofBacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction,”http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc; “BWC confidence building measures,”http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc; https://bwc-ecbm.unog.ch/?field_form_year_tid=555
31 US Department of State. Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments (Compliance Report), 2019, Washington DC: US Department of State, pp. 4748, https://www.state.gov/2019-adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-anddisarmament-agreements-and-commitments-compliance-report/
32 For various open source assessments and commentary on North Korea and biological weapons, see, forexample: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT486/RAND_CT486.pdf;
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/201710/North%20Korea%20Biological%20Weapons%20Program.pdf;
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/science/north-korea-biological-weapons.html;
https://www.38north.org/2019/01/jparachini013019/; https://thebulletin.org/2017/07/potemkin-or-real-northkoreas-biological-weapons-program/

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WMD in Asia-PacificA 2015 media event by leader Kim Jong Un provided some insight into the DPRK’s dual-use
capabilities that could be diverted toward BW efforts if the intent existed. Kim toured the
Pyongyang Biotechnical Institute, a pesticide facility that publicly-shared photographs revealed to
be well-equipped for the production of Bacillus thuringiensis, a biopesticide that is related to B.
anthracis.33 Many Western analysts have connected this media event—perhaps as a veiled threat—with the widely publicized, inadvertent shipment of viable B. anthracis spores by the US’s
Dugway Proving Ground to dozens of laboratories in multiple countries around the world,
including the ROK, over a period of years.34 Research collaborations between North Korean andforeign scientists that might advance dual-use biological capabilities have also been welldocumented, including work on Bacillus species related to B. anthracis.35 These open source data
points, while establishing that the DPRK (like most countries around the world) possesses thebuilding blocks for a biological weapon, provide no definite evidence that the DPRK either
possesses or is in pursuit of such weapons.
India, Pakistan, and other nations of the Asia-Pacific. Both India and Pakistan are original
signatories of the BWC and ratified the Convention in 1974. 36 Despite their status as nuclear
powers, neither country has been assessed as possessing an offensive BW program, though bothmaintain extensive dual-use capabilities within their burgeoning tech sectors. Likewise, no otherAsia-Pacific countries are assessed as possessing an offensive BW program despite widespreaddual-use capabilities.

33 Melissa Hanham, “Kim Jong Un Tours Pesticide Facility Capable of Producing Biological Weapons: A 38 NorthSpecial Report,” 38North, July 9, 2015, https://www.38north.org/2015/07/mhanham070915/
34 US Department of Defense, Review Committee Report: Inadvertent Shipment of Live Bacillus Anthracis Spores by
DoD, 2015, Washington DC: US Department of Defense, http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2178546dod-anthrax-review-committee-report-23july2015.html?_ga=2.3006899.22627998.15991573231221756464.1596566377
35 See: https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/op43-dprk-international-scientificcollaborations.pdf The report cites 224 international collaborations with North Korean scientists in the biology
domain between 1958 and 2018.
36 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) andToxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, UNODA, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc

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Control
Options for BW control span the sequential steps along the timeline leading up to, including, andfollowing a biological attack: (1) the decision to pursue a BW capability; (2) the successful
development of a biological weapon, namely by overcoming the above-described four key
technical hurdles of acquisition, production, formulation, and delivery; (3) the decision to use thisweapon; and (4) successful attack. A systemic approach to establishing corresponding BW controls
follows the “seven D's” of national security: dissuasion, disarmament, denial, disruption,
deterrence, detection, and defense, each of which is discussed in turn below. 37
Dissuasion. The goal of dissuasion is to decrease an adversary’s interest in and pursuit of
biological weapons. The primary mechanism of dissuasion is international policy, including
incentives and disincentives (e.g., sanctions) that influence the international political environment
to decrease BW demand. A secondary mechanism of dissuasion is to reduce vulnerabilities to limit
the likelihood of success or anticipated impact of a biological attack, making the use of biologicalweapons an unappealing choice.
Disarmament. The goal of disarmament is to eliminate existing BW capabilities. The primarymechanism of disarmament is the BWC. The BWC consists of fifteen short sections, or Articles,
four of which (Articles I, III, IV, and X) are of particular relevance. Article I contains the primaryprohibition against biological weapons.
Each State Party … undertakes never in any circumstances to develop,
produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
2. Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. (BWC, 1972: 2)

37 Richard Pilch, “Arms Control Measures,” in Heggenhougen, H.K., International Encyclopedia of Public Health, 2nd

Edition (San Diego: Elsevier Inc., 2016).

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Article III restricts the transfer of all items covered by Article I to substate actors, including
terrorist groups:
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipientwhatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or
induce any State, group of States or international organizations to
manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons,
equipment or means of delivery specified. … (BWC, 1972: 2)
Article IV affirms the need for national measures to impede proliferation in accordance with theprovisions of the Convention.
Each State Party to this Convention shall … take any necessary measures toprohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or
retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery
specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under
its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. (BWC, 1972: 2)
Article X preserves ‘peaceful’ applications of corresponding dual-use capabilities:… the economic or technological development of States Parties to theConvention or international cooperation in the field of peacefulbacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange ofbacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for theprocessing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins
for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.
(BWC, 1972: 3–4)
Denial. The goal of denial is to prohibit development of new BW capabilities via security, export
control, and scientific oversight of biological weapon building blocks, i.e., pathogens,infrastructure, and expertise. Security measures are primarily applied in laboratories, which houseeach of these building blocks, in particular pathogens. Historically, the vast majority of attempts
to illicitly acquire pathogen have involved a laboratory “insider,” defined as anyone withlegitimate access to the laboratory. Thus, security measures traditionally reflect an “inside-out”
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approach, such that the insider is addressed first, beginning with personnel reliability programs tominimize the potential for insiders, then protecting pathogens at the point of storage (e.g., a secured
freezer) and point of use (e.g., a secured laboratory), and expanding outward out from there tosecure pathways into and out of the laboratory, the respective building, and the facility as a whole.
The primary source of dual-use infrastructure is purchased on the open market. Thus,
import/export and transfer controls are necessary to permit legitimate purchases while monitoringpurchase orders for red flag indicators that might suggest nefarious intent. So-called “Know-YourCustomer” guidance uses national and international control lists such as the US Department ofCommerce Bureau of Industry and Security’s Entity List to screen purchasers. 38 Purchased items
are similarly screened against national and international control lists such as the Common Control
Lists of the Australia Group, an informal international body charged with harmonizing global
export controls related to biological and chemical weapons 39 and evaluating for discrepancies inmaterials or quantities from those anticipated based on the purchaser’s declared business.
Scientific oversight is performed in conjunction with the above security and export control
activities to address the third biological weapon building block, relevant expertise. This expertisecan come from former weapons programs or from legitimate scientific programs, by way of direct
personnel hire, open sharing of information (e.g., in scientific publications), or intangible transfers
such as phone calls, faxes, or emails. The knowledge of former bioweaponeers and the so-called
brain-drain phenomenon remain of concern with respect to the former Soviet offensive BW
program. These concerns are primarily addressed by cooperative programs designed to bring thesescientists into the international scientific community and aid them in establishing legitimate
research collaborations. Open transfer of information stems from the virtually unlimited amountof science with potential dual-use implications, most of which holds the potential for vast benefits
and thus requires oversight measures founded on the principle of scientific self-regulation, suchthat national and international scientific communities establish their own boundaries for suchactivities (and any resulting data) to maximize benefits while minimizing risks. Patentapplications, declassified military documents, and other so-called gray literature require a similar

38 US Department of Commerce, “Entity List,” Bureau of Industry and Security,

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern/entity-list
39 “The Australia Group,”https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/theaustraliagroupnet/site/en/index.html

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WMD in Asia-Pacificapproach. The oversight of intangible transfers is a special case that generally necessitates national
legislation in accordance with Article IV of the BWC.
Disruption. The goal of disruption is to interdict new BW capabilities or a biological weapon itself
before or upon reaching the prospective end user. Such disruption measures include border andmaritime security programs, import/export, and transfer control measures mirroring thosedescribed previously, and, perhaps most importantly, the diligent “tasking” of intelligence systems
to identify trafficking networks. Unfortunately, because both biological weapons-related activities
and the resulting weapons have few signatures and are readily concealable (i.e., weapons are smallenough to be hidden on a person in many cases), disruption measures have proven challenging incomparison to, for example, those targeting radiological materials, which possess signatures thatare clearly identifiable by dosimeters and the like. Thus, while disruption remains a necessary
barrier in the biological threat continuum, its contribution may be limited.
Deterrence. The goal of deterrence is to prevent the deployment and employment of biologicalweapons. Deterrence primarily involves the criminalization of any biological weapons-related
activity (including use), backed by a substantial law enforcement capability. Corresponding
national legislation in accordance with Article IV of the BWC—for example, the US Biological
Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989—has been invoked on numerous occasions in the past two
decades to convict perpetrators of biological weapons-related plots and activities. 40
Detection. The goal of detection is to ensure early warning of attack to enable effective
intervention. In general, a biological attack is most likely to be detected in one of two ways. First,
a detection system “alarm” may be triggered. Second, populations (animal or human) may begin
to fall ill.
In the first instance, detection systems may identify an increased level of a biological agent over“background” levels that exist naturally in the environment, suggesting a biological attack and thus
setting in motion a dedicated response. In the United States, for example, both military and civilian
systems are in place to this end, with the civilian BioWatch program active in over thirty
undisclosed US cities.

40 See, for example, https://www.france24.com/en/20200326-tunisian-handed-ten-years-for-ricin-bomb-plot-in-

Germany; https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/16-819/16-819-2018-08-27.html

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In the second and arguably more likely instance, ill animal or human populations andepidemiological trace-back may lead to awareness of a common exposure, with certain
characteristics of that exposure indicating a biological attack, for example, occurrence of an
unusual disease for an area or animal, or the unusual presentation of a given disease in humans(e.g., if a patient presents with respiratory symptoms and signs indicative of an inhalational
exposure as opposed to symptoms and signs that would be expected from infection via morecommon routes of natural exposure). Affected populations may be identified by individual
diagnosis and case reporting to public health agencies, sentinel surveillance in which
representative subsets of a population are monitored for trends in such indicators of illness as overthe-counter pharmaceutical sales and child absenteeism (animal populations may be similarly
monitored), or syndromic surveillance in which subsets of a population are monitored for certain
constellations of symptoms and signs associated with, for example, flulike, respiratory,
gastrointestinal, cutaneous, or neurological illness.
Other possible ways in which a biological attack may be detected include law enforcement
interdiction, whether pre-attack, at the time of attack, or postattack; an allegation by a state or nonstate entity that it has been subjected to an attack; notification or tipoff, possibly on the part of theperpetrator; or identification and subsequent characterization of a visible substance such as apowder.
Defense. The goal of defense is to ensure effective response in the event of attack. This catch-all
term encompasses crisis and consequence measures that rely on a field-tested incident response
capability; adequate health-care surge capacity; the availability, mobilization, and administrationof therapeutic countermeasures; rapid and reliable forensics to ensure attribution; and ready,proven decontamination technologies. Notably, the adequate safety of responders and healthcare
workers is of primary consideration in crisis and consequence management and is critical inpreventing exposure to persistent agents and/or propagation of infection. Perhaps mostimportantly, good communication, which serves as the backbone of all defensive efforts not only
among those involved in a response but extending to policymakers and the general public, cannot
be overemphasized. The improved understanding of specific disease pathogenesis and therapy, as
well as the validation of approaches to mass casualty response, attribution, and environmental
remediation, will contribute considerably to defense efforts in the future.

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Nuclear Deterrence in the Pandemic Era
To this point, we have described the threat and control of biological weapons in a vacuum. The
reality of biological weapons threats and their control is far more complex, however. For example,
the Asia-Pacific is home to multiple nuclear-weapon states—how does their nuclear deterrent
capability impact the threat and control of biological weapons? Furthermore, natural outbreaks andpandemics might be misinterpreted as deliberate attacks, or used to mask them—how do we avoid
nuclear escalation and potential brinksmanship when we are unable to discern an outbreak’s
origin? In this section, we grapple with some of these real-world challenges in the Asia-Pacific,
with the goal of deriving practical recommendations for regional stability and security.
Nuclear doctrine and pandemic context. The pandemic context carries a neglected risk for the
Asia-Pacific region: the risk that nuclear-weapon states operating in the region could not only
mistake a natural pandemic or accidental biological release for an intentional biological weapons
attack but compound this error by responding with a nuclear attack. After all, many of these states
have published nuclear doctrines that declare that they are prepared to respond to biologicalweapons attacks with nuclear ones, leaving open the question of how and when such attacks would
be attributed. In particular:
United States. The United States has wrestled openly with the question of whether to retain theoption of responding to a perceived BW attack with nuclear weapons but continues to maintainthat option. In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), for example, the Obama administration
debated whether to adopt a “universal policy that the ‘sole purpose’ of US nuclear weapons is todeter nuclear attack on the United States and our allies and partners,” but backed away from doing
so in part because of the perceived need to deter biological weapons. Thus, while strengthening its‘negative security assurances’ that “the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations,”
the NPR included a caveat for biological weapons: 41

41 See U.S. Secretary of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of

Defense, 2010), 15–16, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=777468

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Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of biotechnology development, the United States reserves the right to make any
adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution andproliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter thatthreat.
The 2010 NPR went on to state that:In the case of countries not covered by this assurance—states that possess nuclear
weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation
obligations—there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear
weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against theUnited States or its allies and partners.”
The former Trump administration in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review did not make explicit
changes when it came to how it would respond to a potential biological attack. More generally it
appeared to broaden the potential use of nuclear weapons, however, particularly against nonnuclear-weapon states:
The United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in
extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies,
and partners. Extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear
strategic attacks. Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are notlimited to, attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or
infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command andcontrol, or warning and attack assessment capabilities. 42

42 U.S. Secretary of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review 2018 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense,

2018), 21, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINALREPORT.PDF

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It also pointed to “the proliferation of highly-lethal biological weapons” as a form of technologicaluncertainty that could change the threat environment and “dramatically affect US nuclear force
requirements, policy, and posture.”43
Russia. Russia, likewise, has promulgated a military doctrine which retains the option of
responding to a perceived biological attack with a nuclear one. 44 For example, its 2010 military
doctrine stated that Russia “reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to theutilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies.” 45
In Early June 2020, Russia released a new document titled, “On Basic Principles of State Policyof the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” that outlined the threats and circumstances that
could lead to Russia’s use of nuclear weapons. The document lists a number of threats that Russia
might face and circumstances under which it might consider the use of nuclear weapons. It
indicates that Russia could order a nuclear strike in response to the “use of nuclear weapons orother types of weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or
its allies.”46
China. China continues to declare that it will not engage in the first use of nuclear weapons andhas not carved out any exceptions. 47 In the past, this declaratory policy was buttressed by China’s
small and largely un-mated arsenal. China has moved to a larger, more diverse arsenal, however,including naval systems where operational warheads are not separated from missiles.
Concurrently, military experts in China are engaged in a growing debate about either abandoning
the no-first-use doctrine altogether or carving out exceptions. Outsiders, meanwhile, increasingly
question the credibility of Beijing’s no-first-use declaration.

43 Ibid 14.
44 For an excellent summary of Russian military doctrine, see Amy Wolff, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine,

Forces, and Modernization , Congressional Research Service, No. R45861 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Research Service, July 20, 2020) https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45861
45 “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” approved by Russian Federation presidential edict on 5
February 2010,”https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf
46 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 2020. “On Basic Principles of State Policy of the RussianFederation.” Moscow, June 2. https://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmame
nt/-/asset_publisher/rp0fiUBmANaH/content/id/4152094
47 Information Office of the State Council of China. 2015. “China’s Military
Strategy.” http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm

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North Korea. North Korean suspicions of the United States and the ROK could lead the DPRK tomistake a natural outbreak/pandemic or laboratory accident for a deliberate nuclear attack. Ever
since the Korean War, when it falsely accused the United States of employing BW, 48 Pyongyang
has been primed for a biological attack from the United States or the ROK. Therefore, a natural
outbreak (particularly if it appears first in the DPRK) is likely to be viewed as a deliberate attack
until proven otherwise. And Pyongyang also is primed to believe that even in the case of a natural
outbreak, the United States or the ROK can be expected to exploit the crisis as an opportunity for
subversion and a threat to the regime. 49
India. India has long and loudly proclaimed that a cardinal principle of its nuclear doctrine is that
it will not engage in the first use of nuclear weapons. However, it has been largely overlooked thatfor two decades this policy has included a significant caveat when it comes to biological weapons.
India’s 2003 nuclear doctrine states that “in the event of a major attack against India, or Indianforces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with
nuclear weapons.”50 Interestingly, this caveat was not included in the initial draft doctrine India
released after its 1998 nuclear tests. 51
Pakistan. Given India’s overwhelming conventional advantage, Pakistan has refused to renounce
the first use of nuclear weapons. Government officials have not spoken specifically, however, on
how Pakistan might respond to a chemical or biological attack. Whether and how these declaratory
policies would play out under real-life circumstances is far from clear, however. These doctrines
are primarily intended to communicate to potential adversaries as a form of deterrence. In the end,
policymakers will decide, in the moment of crisis, how to respond to any outbreak and thepossibility that it might stem from the use of biological weapons.
Bioterrorism and nuclear escalation. As we have seen, deciding that an outbreak is natural,
accidental, or intentional is highly challenging. Furthermore, this attribution challenge could be
48 Milton Leitenberg, “False Allegations of U.S. Biological Weapons Use during the Korean War,” in Anne L. Clunan,

Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin, eds., Terrorism, War, or Disease? Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008) 120-143.
49 Correspondence with North Korea expert Joshua Pollack, 8 September 2020.
50 Prime Minister’s Office. 2003. Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India’s
Nuclear Doctrine. New Delhi: Government of India.
51 Kumar Sundaram and M. V. Ramana, “India and the Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” Journal for
Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, 1:1, 152-168, DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2018.1438737

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WMD in Asia-Pacificintentionally or unintentionally exacerbated by non-state actors to leverage nuclear escalation for
their own purposes.
For example, a millennial terrorist group such as Al Qaeda or ISIS could launch a biological attack
against countries such as the United States, the DPRK, or Russia with hopes that it would beperceived as an attack by that country’s adversary, with consequent retaliation. Or Kashmiri
militants with links to Pakistan could launch such an attack against India with or without support
from Islamabad and with or without publicly acknowledging their responsibility. Alternatively,
such militants could claim that what was in fact a natural outbreak on either side of the line ofcontrol was a BW attack, bringing nuclear escalation dynamics into play. The potential for thelatter such effort is illustrated by a 1994 plague outbreak in Western India which was initiallysuspected to be a bioterrorist attack. 52
Discerning between natural and deliberate outbreaks. As described in the “detection” discussion
above, there are two most likely scenarios in which a biological attack may play out: a detection
system may be triggered, or human or animal populations may begin to fall ill. While the former
scenario is largely specific to an attack (though false positives commonly occur due to detectionof natural biological agents above expected background levels), the latter scenario requires thatthat the outbreak’s origin—natural versus deliberate 53 —be determined to inform nuclear
deterrence and, potentially, escalation options.
Initially, suspicion of a deliberate attack would likely be low in the absence of unique indicators(e.g., detection system alarm, law enforcement interdiction, allegation, tipoff, or visible substancesuch as a powder). Thus, a typical epidemiological investigation would most likely be conducted
to determine the who, what, when, where, why, and how of the outbreak. First, investigators would
perform case histories and interviews to determine who is being infected, by what disease agent,
52 Ron Barrett, “The 1994 Plague in Western India: Human Ecology and The Risks of Misattribution,” in Anne L.

Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin, eds., Terrorism, War, or Disease? Unraveling the Use of Biological
Weapons (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 49-71.
53 In practice, as we have seen with the SARS-COV 2 pandemic, investigators actually might have to distinguishbetween three scenarios—natural outbreak, accidental laboratory release, and a deliberate attack. See, forexample, Felippa Lentzos, “Natural spillover or research lab leak? Why a credible investigation is needed todetermine the origin of the coronavirus pandemic,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1, 2020,
https://thebulletin.org/2020/05/natural-spillover-or-research-lab-leak-why-a-credible-investigation-in-needed-todetermine-the-origin-of-the-coronavirus-pandemic/. For the purposes of this paper, however, we have simplified
the discussion to leave out this potential scenario,

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when did infection occur, and in what location; this is called “descriptive epidemiology.”
Investigators would then seek to determine how infection occurred and why by assessing (a) the
epidemiological triangle for indicators of convergence that would enable spillover of the infecting
agent from its natural reservoir to humans, and (b) the infecting agent genome for indicators ofgeographical and temporal spread; this is called “analytical epidemiology.” Throughout theinvestigative process, findings may suggest the possibility of a deliberate attack, as summarized infigure 2.
Figure 2. Potential Indicators of Deliberate Attack
Descriptive Epidemiology
Multiple, geographically-dispersed index cases are identified
Infecting agent is a traditional biological warfare agent
Infecting agent is unusual for location or time of year
Symptoms are unusual or unexpected (e.g., pulmonary symptomatology)
Animal populations are affected in concert with humans
Animal effects are unusual or unexpected for the species
Analytical Epidemiology(a) Epidemiological Triangle Assessment
Lack of recognizable animal-human interface (e.g., exposure to sick animal, tickbite)
Epidemiological traceback of multiple cases to a common location or exposure(b) Genome Assessment
Infecting agent genome matches known weapons strain
Infecting agent genome displays “frozen evolution”
Infecting agent genome has been engineered / edited

The epidemiological triangle is a simplified representation of the relationship between (1) adisease agent, typically in an animal reservoir; (2) a human host; and (3) the environment, which
form the three points of a triangle. The lines of the triangle that connect these points can be longor short and can be lengthened or shortened. The goal of the assessment is to determine whether
the lines have shifted in a way that has brought the infecting agent (or its animal reservoir) into

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WMD in Asia-Pacificcontact with the human host. Initially, assessment focuses on tracing back human cases to any
known animal reservoirs, whether exposed through direct contact, consumption of byproducts, oranother route. If no epidemiological link is apparent, investigators can seek to identify risk
factors that might enable such exposure by asking the following key questions:•Has the human population expanded into areas where the disease agent resides in animalreservoirs, for example, due to wildlife trade, deforestation, or industrial farming?

•

Has the disease agent expanded into human populations, for example, due to animalreservoir overgrowth, vector population overgrowth (e.g., ticks, fleas), or interspecies
spillover?

•Has the environment brought animal and human populations closer together, for example,
due to short-term meteorological shifts or longer-term climate shifts?

Like the epidemiological triangle, the infecting agent’s genome may also hold clues to theoutbreak’s origin. This is especially true for viral agents, and RNA viruses in particular, where
mutations routinely occur as the virus replicates (i.e., reproduces, which requires infection of ahost cell). Mutations that offer a selective advantage for the virus survive, providing a geospatial
and temporal map of the outbreak based on prevailing mutations. By comparing the infecting
agent’s genome with the genomes of well-characterized reference strains in the public domain,investigators can (1) identify the closest known relative of the infecting agent; and (2) determine
whether the infecting agent’s genome has amassed mutations consistent with known patterns of
natural emergence. Investigators can further determine whether the infecting agent’s genome soclosely resembles a given reference strain that a period of limited or no replication is likely. Suchso-called “frozen evolution,” when an infecting agent’s genome lacks the expected accumulationof mutations over time, suggests that alternative origin hypotheses such as a laboratory accident
or deliberate attack must be explored. 54
Based on descriptive and analytical epidemiology findings, investigators may collect and/or
analyze additional animal, human, or environmental samples with the goal of closing information
gaps in the prevailing origin hypothesis. For example, if contact with an animal reservoir is

54 See, for example, D.J. Pascall D, K. Nomikou, E. Bréard, S. Zientara, AdS. Filipe, B. Hoffmann, et al. (2020) “Frozen

evolution” of an RNA virus suggests accidental release as a potential cause of arbovirus re-emergence. PLoS Biol
18(4): e3000673. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3000673

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suspected, investigators may collect animal or environmental samples at the suspected animalhuman interface, whether a market, farm, abattoir, or in the wild; analysis of these samples may
identify the reservoir or provide additional clues that can be traced back epidemiologically andgenetically. “Banked” human samples predating the outbreak may also be tested to this end. Often,
such clinical samples are retained for extended periods of time and may be revisited for further
analysis, for example, if they came from patients with clinical presentations resembling the current
outbreak. 55 In addition, investigators may actively collect human samples that might indicate
exposure or infection in so-called sentinel populations at the animal-human interface; for example,
serological testing of hunters or wildlife traders may identify antibodies against the agent causing
the current outbreak, indicating exposure that may then be traced back to an animal reservoir. 56
If findings of the outbreak investigation suggest the possibility of a deliberate attack, law
enforcement must become involved either at the national level, possibly with support from otherstates, or at the international level under the UN Secretary General’s Mechanism (UNSGM), likely
in coordination with other relevant international organizations such as the World HealthOrganization (WHO) or World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). A law enforcement
investigation would likely be initiated involving additional sample collection, careful
documentation of chain-of-custody, and analysis in an accredited laboratory to ensure the integrityof evidence in a court of law; supplementary evidence collection and examination; targeted patient
and witness interviews; and coordination with intelligence officials regarding adversarycapabilities and motivations.
Despite a national or international investigative body’s best efforts, it may not be possible todefinitely determine the origin of a particular outbreak. For example, a 1942 outbreak of tularemia
among German and Soviet troops during the Battle of Stalingrad has been alternately attributed tonatural and deliberate causes. The most widely accepted explanation cites natural convergence on

55 For example, banked samples from a December 2019 patient with influenza-like illness and pneumonia in France

were retested after the emergence of COVID-19 and found to be positive for the pandemic coronavirus, thus
predating all previously identified cases outside of China. See A. Deslandes, V. Berti, Y. Tandjoui-Lambotte, et al.,‘’SARS-CoV-2 was already spreading in France in late December 2019.’’ International Journal of Antimicrobial
Agents. Volume 55, Issue 6, June 2020, 106006. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijantimicag.2020.106006
56 See, for example, P. Dovih, E.D. Laing, Y. Chen, D.H.W. Low, B.R. Ansil, X. Yang, et al. (2019) ‘’Filovirus-reactive
antibodies in humans and bats in Northeast India imply zoonotic spillover.’’ PLoS Negl Trop Dis 13(10): e0007733.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.000773

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WMD in Asia-Pacificthe epidemiological triad as the likely cause: the war’s disruption of the local grain harvest led topopulation overgrowth of infected rodents, which passed the disease to both armies. 57 However,allegations that the outbreak was caused by a Soviet biological attack have persisted, including on
the part of former Soviet bioweaponeers themselves. 58
A similar debate today might spark an unfounded nuclear escalation spiral, the evidentiary basisof which becomes lost in the “fog of war.” Similarly, imprecise analysis, for example themisinterpretation of environmental interferents as has commonly occurred with fielded biologicaldetection devices, 59 might inadvertently lead to an asymmetric response. The risk of misattributing
a natural event as a BW attack necessitates a deliberate, data-to-decisions approach thatemphasizes degrees of certainty when determining proportional response. At a minimum, nuclearweapon states must carefully consider how they operationalize doctrines the leave open thepossibility of a nuclear response to a perceived BW attack.
Asymmetric opportunities for exploitation of a natural outbreak or pandemic. As described
previously, we typically assess the threat of a deliberate biological attack by evaluating the two
key contributing factors of capability (i.e., whether a potential actor has the technical capability to
pursue or enact the threat) and intent (i.e., whether a potential actor has the motivation to pursue
or enact the threat). A predisposing or concurrent natural outbreak holds the potential to alter eachof these threat dimensions while also conferring potential advantages on the perpetrator, forexample the ability to mask a BW attack since symptoms such as fever and flu-like illness arecommon across a range of infections regardless of origin. Options for control include disruption,
deterrence, and defense.
From a capability perspective, natural outbreaks offer targetable reservoirs for acquisition ofharmful biological agents while potentially enabling production, formulation, and delivery
57 See, for example, M. Leitenberg M and R.A. Zilinskas, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program. Cambridge,

Harvard University Press, 2012; and Geissler E. Alibek, Tularemia, and the Battle of Stalingrad. CBWCB 69+70,
September/December 2005.
58 Ken Alibek, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World,
Told from the inside by the Man Who Ran It. (New York: Random House, 1999.)
59 Institute of Medicine (US) and National Research Council (US) Committee on Effectiveness of National
Biosurveillance Systems: Biowatch and the Public Health System. Biowatch and Public Health Surveillance:
Evaluating Systems for the Early Detection of Biological Threats: Abbreviated Version. Washington (DC): National
Academies Press (US); 2011. Available from: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK219708/ doi:
10.17226/12688; pg. 50.

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requirements to be circumvented if the agent causes contagious disease. Illicit attempts to acquirebiological agents during outbreaks has been documented; for example, the apocalyptic cult Aum
Shinrikyo, which perpetrated the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995 (sarin is a chemical
weapon), reportedly attempted to acquire Ebola virus by posing as medical workers during a
1992 outbreak in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo).60 During outbreaks ofcontagious disease such as influenza and COVID-19 (Ebola virus does not cause contagious
disease), an ill constituent may be all that is needed to deliberately infect a target population; forexample, a 2020 threat assessment by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) statedthat “[m]embers of extremist groups are encouraging one another to spread the virus, if
contracted, to targeted groups through bodily fluids and personal interactions.” 61
In 2019, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) completed a detailed
assessment of the risk that Islamist terrorists might use infected humans to spread a contagious
disease. Our experts found that Islamist terrorists, and extremist groups more generally, are notbound by ideological or psychosocial norms that prohibit such behavior. In addition, the use of
infected humans to spread a contagious disease requires comparatively limited technical knowhow on the part of the perpetrator. And one of the primary limiting factors to such an attack—recruiting humans willing to infect themselves—does not apply in this case because potential
perpetrators are those who are already infected with the virus. Our experts concluded that suchan attack “could prove to be highly lethal to the targeted population(s), provide a low cost
weapon, have a traumatic psychological shock value…undermine a country’s public health andmedical infrastructure’s ability to respond, and erode faith in the government’s ability to protect
the public.”62
From the perspective of intent, any potential perpetrator seeking a radical leveling approach—whether an asymmetrical state actor like the DPRK or a motivated terrorist organization—may be
influenced by the demonstrated impact of natural outbreaks/pandemics to pursue biologicalweapons. For example, COVID-19’s public health, economic, and social impact has unequivocally
60 See, for example, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/5/4/99-0409_article
61 https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/25/us/missouri-man-killed-fbi-investigation/index.html
62 J.M. Bale, N.A. Hynes, and T.J. Reidy, Assessing the Risk of Islamist Terrorists using Human Vectors to Deploy

Contagious Pathogens. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Report for the Smith Richardson
Foundation (2019).

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WMD in Asia-Pacificdemonstrated the vulnerability of US and global populations to biological threats, whether ofnatural or deliberate origin. In our global society, pathogens have ready access to much of theworld, traveling on or inside humans, animals, plants, or commerce. The US healthcare system islean and depends on global supply chains, both of which contribute to capacity limitations during
a large-scale event. Medical countermeasures such as diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccinesrequire resources and time to develop, test, and deploy. Citizen compliance with risk-reduction
measures is influenced by civil liberties communication deficiencies and confusion spurred byfractured leadership at the state and federal level, and, importantly, disinformation from maligninfluence campaigns. And perhaps most notably, the economic fallout of COVID-19 has been far
more severe than anticipated.
Options for preempting the exploitation of a natural outbreak or pandemic include disruption,
deterrence, and defense. Disruption involves the interdiction of a potential actor as he attempts toacquire or spread the causative agent. Deterrence involves preventing the use of the agent as aweapon by ensuring severe consequences, whether through criminal legislation or various meansof retaliation that include nuclear options in the extreme. Defense involves a range of measuresthat reduce the potential impact of an attack.

Conclusion
The Asia-Pacific has witnessed BW attacks on military and civilian populations, the first and only
use of nuclear weapons, and now the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 and the global COVID-19
pandemic. Excluding Russia, the region is home to three historical nuclear powers—China, India,
and Pakistan—and one emerging nuclear power, the DPRK. Like most countries around the world,countries of the Asia-Pacific possess dual-use biological capabilities that could be diverted to an
offensive BW program, though no such program exists based on available information in the publicdomain. Countries in the region should be monitored for indicators of intent to enable early
identification and mitigation of any such divergence.
The region comprises more than half of the world’s population and is projected to amass morethan half of the world’s GDP in the next twenty years. Such unchecked population growth,industrial expansion, and corresponding ecological disruption increases the likelihood that novel
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disease agents will come into contact with naïve human populations, leading to emerging
infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics. Because biological events of both natural anddeliberate origin may be met with nuclear deterrence, escalation, or even use, corresponding origin
investigations must bridge epidemiological and law enforcement principles and involve
international bodies such as the UNSGM as appropriate. At the same time, given the risks ofunclear or incorrect attribution, countries should, at a minimum, reconsider how they
operationalize doctrines which leave open the possibility of a nuclear attack in response to aperceived BW attack. Natural biological events may also be leveraged for illicit ends, and therefore
must be met with controls that include disruption, deterrence, and defense.
Ultimately, the Asia-Pacific’s unique combination of nuclear-weapon states, dual-use
biotechnological advance, and ecological disruption provide opportunities for intersection thatwarrant the highest level of vigilance on the part of regional stakeholders and their allies.

312Section 2

INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR DYNAMICS
Rakesh Sood
NUCLEAR ESCALATION IN A TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS?
Robert Ayson
ASYMMETRIC WMD THREATS: DPRK NUCLEAR, CYBER, AND BIO-CHEMICALWEAPONS CAPABILITIES
Sang-Hyun Lee

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11. India-Pakistan Nuclear Dynamics
Rakesh Sood

Introduction
The long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan took on a sharper edge with wider regionaland even global implications when both countries announced their emergence as nuclear weapon
states in 1998. Any expectations that this would lower tensions were soon belied. The nuclear
discourse has been dominated by Western analysts. And, since both the Indian and Pakistani
strategic communities were familiar with it, it provided the dominant framework for understanding
the new nuclear relationship. It made dialogue easier even though the underlying politics andgeography bore little resemblance to the ideology-driven Cold War-world. For Pakistan, theWestern attribution that the India-Pakistan theater was a “nuclear flashpoint” was also politicallyconvenient as it kept Western attention focused on Kashmir.
This paper seeks to unpack the India-Pakistan nuclear dynamics by taking an empirical look at thedifferent crises beginning from the late 1980s. The first section deals with the origins of the IndiaPakistan conflict and how the changing internal political dynamics have influenced and shaped thenuclear dynamic. The second section compares the nuclear doctrines of both countries as well as
the current nuclear capabilities and future plans for their nuclear arsenals. Since neither country
has released official figures about its arsenal, the estimates of capabilities are drawn from the
Global Nuclear Database published by the U.S.‒based Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. The third
section covers the numerous crises since the late 1980s with relevant references to domestic
political drivers. Two of these pertain to the pre-1998 and the rest to the post-1998 period. The
fourth section shows the role of external actors and how India and Pakistan drew different
conclusions from the crises. The fifth and final section concludes the essay by outlining steps thatcan be taken, unilaterally, bilaterally, and globally, to lengthen the nuclear fuse and to ensure thatthe nuclear threshold is not crossed.
© 2022 Rakesh Sood, CC BY 4.0

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
One could certainly suggest unilateral measures that, on the one hand, India could take to restore
normalcy in the state of Jammu and Kashmir or, on the other, that the civilian government inPakistan could take to reduce the role of the military in policymaking. However, these are beyond
the scope of this paper as they entail taking a deep dive into domestic politics of both countries. In
any case, the prospect that either would take such actions in current times are about as likely as
global elimination of nuclear weapons. This paper accordingly focuses on the more realistic
scenario, based on the assumption of continued hostile relations between the two neighbors, butalso on the assumption that there is a shared convergence in seeking to prevent inadvertent
escalation that might lead to unintended consequences and, ultimately, to nuclear war.

Origins of a Troubled RelationshipIndia and Pakistan have been locked into a conflictual relationship since they both became
independent in 1947, arising out of the partition of British India. The British rulers divided India,
creating Pakistan as a separate homeland for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent, on the
grounds that Hindus and Muslims constituted two separate nations—the concept of the “two nation
theory.”1 Within months, India and Pakistan were locked in a conflict over the state of Jammu andKashmir, which had legally acceded to India but was claimed by Pakistan on the grounds that it
was a Muslim majority state. After four inconclusive wars in 1947-48, 1965, 1971, and 1999, thestate of Jammu and Kashmir remains a disputed territory with India in possession of roughly twothirds of the erstwhile state and the remaining under the control of Pakistan. The 740 km boundary
in the state of Jammu and Kashmir is called the Line of Control, while the remaining 2,400 km
border between the two countries is the “international boundary,” which is not disputed.
Today, however, it is clear that Kashmir is not the only source of conflict. Nor can the conflict be
explained in terms of a continuation of the “two nation theory” because there are more than 170
million Muslims in India accounting for 14.2 percent of India’s population, up from less than 10
percent in 1951. In comparison, Pakistan’s population is 210 million; Hindus account for less than

1 The two nation theory posits that Hindus and Muslims are two separate nations and therefore Muslims shouldhave their own homeland distinct from a Hindu majority India. The Muslim League, led by Muhammed Ali Jinnah,
used this to raise the demand for a separate homeland for Muslims.

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2 percent of its population, down from 12 percent in 1951 because many Pakistan Hindus, finding
themselves reduced to second class citizens, have either converted or migrated. Moreover, when
the glue of religion proved unable to hold East Pakistan and West Pakistan together, leading to its
eastern wing emerging as Bangladesh in 1971 after a brutal suppression widely described as“genocide,” the “two nation theory” was unambiguously controverted.2
As a new state, Pakistan consciously turned its back on its sub-continental civilizational roots thatit shared with India and sought to redefine its identity anew, in the name of Islam. However,Pakistan found it difficult to reconcile the notion of a modern state with its founding ideology. The
Muslim clergy represented by Jamaat e Islami, led by Maulana Maudoodi, had an uneasy
relationship with the Muslim League, the political party led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah that had
spearheaded the call for a separate homeland of the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent. The
clergy suspected the League of using religion for political ends while actually desiring a modern
state rather than one based on Islamic law (shariah). The desire for a national identity rooted inreligion became the first source of divergence with India whose leaders sought to create a secular,
plural, and democratic state.
The second source of divergence came with the decline of political parties in Pakistan, leading tolong periods of military dictatorship. From 1958 to 1971, from 1977 to 1988, and from 1999 to
2008, Pakistan was under army rule, taking its toll on political parties and weakening institutions
like the judiciary and media. Even with the restoration of democracy in 2008, the military still
plays a leading role, especially where security, defence, and foreign policy are concerned.
Repeated involvement of the military in governance has led to a militarization of the state.
Perpetuating a hostile relationship with India has become necessary for the military to retain its
role in the country’s political life.
Further, like authoritarian rulers in other countries, the military rulers often sought to legitimize
their coups by presenting themselves as defenders of not just the frontiers of the state but also
guardians of Pakistan’s Islamic ideology. The military rulers relied on the street power of the
2 The census figures are drawn from the first census in both countries conducted in 1951, the 2017 census in

Pakistan, and the census estimations for India just before the 2019 elections. A new census in India is due in 2021.
A recent report in the New York Times also highlights the demographic trend in Pakistan,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/world/asia/pakistan-hindu-conversion.html?referringSource=articleShare

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WMD in Asia-Pacificmullahs (Islamic religious leaders), a technique that was effectively used by General Zia ul Haq.
It cast the hostility with India into a “jihad,” a fight between the Muslim and the infidel, deepening
the divide. Defining an identity by negating its subcontinental civilizational roots and making it“non-Indian” has remained Pakistan’s dilemma. The military-mosque nexus shifted it from nonIndian to “anti-Indian,” changing the historical narrative and locking not just the state but also thepeople into a relationship of hostility.3
On 6 February 2020, Pakistan’s retired military officer, Lt. Gen Khalid Kidwai (who headed theStrategic Plans Division or SPD from 2000 to 2013 and is an adviser to Pakistan’s Nuclear
Command Authority) spoke at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London on
strategic stability. He identified four drivers of Indian policy as Hindutva philosophy, seeking toerase the “sense of humiliation of a Hindu nation of a thousand years of Muslim rule;” restorationof the perceived glory of Hindu India, going back to 300 BC; India’s “quest for regional
domination,” particularly in relation to Pakistan; and finally, a “self-delusional one way
competition with China,” by aligning with the United States as an Indo-Pacific power.4 Lt. Gen(retd) Kidwai’s thinking is not new; it is reflected in official military writings in Pakistani training
institutions and has played a major role in defining Pakistan military’s strategic culture. It istherefore unsurprising that the army felt threatened by, and quickly stymied the few attempts byelected civilian leaders to improve relations with India (by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 1989
and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999).
Four key themes may be identified in the Pakistani military’s strategic culture, of which three
directly affect its relationship with India and the fourth does so indirectly. First, the Pakistani army
considers the partition to have been an unfair process and therefore it considers it “incomplete.”
This view explains their obsession with Kashmir as well as the role of the army as the “guardian

3 Many authors have written extensively about Pakistan’s search for an identity, but I have relied on the writings ofthe eminent Pakistani-American historian Dr Ayesha Jalal, recipient of Pakistan’s highest civilian awards Sitara – eImtiaz for her work. Dr Jalal’s works include The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand forPakistan, New York: Cambridge University Press. (1985); The State of Martial Rule: The origins of Pakistan's
political economy of defence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1990); and The Struggle for Pakistan: A
Muslim Homeland and Global Politics, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press(2014).
4 See “Keynote Address and Discussion Session with Lieutenant General (Retd) Khalid Kidwai,” February 6, 2020, at:https://www.iiss.org/events/2020/02/7th-iiss-and-ciss-south-asian-strategic-stability-workshop

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of Pakistan’s ideological frontiers.” Linked to this factor is the conviction that India remains
implacably opposed to the “two nation theory,” has never accepted partition, and does not accept
the existence of an independent, sovereign Pakistan. Proof of this proposition to the Pakistani
military is India’s role in the 1971 war that led to the break-up of Pakistan, with East Pakistan
seceding to declare itself as independent Bangladesh. The third theme is that India is a hegemon
and poses an existential threat to Pakistan because it seeks to impose a regional security andeconomic structure on South Asia with the goal of converting its smaller neighbors into satellite
states. In their view, such Indian ambitions must be thwarted. The fourth theme has to do with
Afghanistan, which has never accepted the Durand Line as the border with Pakistan. In the past,
Pakistan sought “strategic depth” in Afghanistan. It has become increasingly paranoid about Indian
presence in Afghanistan and the possibility of collusion between India and Afghanistan todestabilize Pakistan’s Pashtun and Baloch borderlands.5
Pakistan has sought to compensate for its disparity with India in terms of size, population, andeconomy by resorting to asymmetric warfare and seeking alliances. Having been a frontline statein the United States’ covert war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989,
Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) successfully weaponised “jihad” as the instrument toradicalize groups to undertake terrorist strikes and low-intensity conflict. Pakistan was no stranger
to asymmetric warfare, having previously supported insurgencies in India that included the Naga
insurgency from East Pakistan in the 1960s, Sikh militancy in the 1980s, and, since 1990, by
waging a proxy war through the training, equipping, and infiltration of terrorists into Kashmir in
the name of “jihad.”

5 For the role of the Pakistani army in shaping the politics of Pakistan, I have relied on Hussain Haqqani, a former

Pakistani journalist who also served as the Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the United States. He wrote, among
others, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace(2005) and Dr. C Christine Fair, a U.S. academic, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War, Oxford
University Press, 2014.

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WMD in Asia-PacificDuring the Cold War, Pakistan was a member of two U.S.‒led military alliances—SEATO (South
East Asia Treaty Organisation) 6 and CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation). 7 Since the 9/11
attacks in the United States in 2001, after which the United States and other countries became moreconcerned with the global implications of jihadi terrorism, Pakistan has strengthened its ties with
China. In addition to the cooperation in conventional, nuclear, and missile sectors, China has also
emerged as by far the largest source of foreign investment in Pakistan. The strategic underpinning
between the two is apparent since India and China have an unresolved boundary dispute and foughta war in 1962. In 2020 the situation worsened, leading to clashes between these two great powersthat caused casualties for the first time in 45 years.
In May 1998, both India and Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests, declaring themselves
nuclear weapon states and adding a new dimension to their hostile relationship. Many would argue
that the nuclear shadow over the relationship existed even earlier. Some would go back to January
1972 when, after the creation of Bangladesh, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto convened
Pakistan’s nuclear scientists exhorting them that the only guarantee for ensuring Pakistan’s
territorial integrity was to develop nuclear weapons. Or, even earlier after the unsuccessful 1965
war when he famously declared “we will eat grass if we have to, we will make the nuclear bomb.”8
Others would link the nuclear shadow to India undertaking a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) in
1974, or the U.S. attempt at coercive nuclear diplomacy by bringing in the aircraft carrier USS
Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 war, or even earlier to 1964, when China
announced its entry onto the world’s nuclear stage, after having inflicted a humiliating defeat on
India in the border conflict in 1962.9

6 SEATO was created in 1954 and included the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand,

Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan to prevent Communism from spreading in the region. It was disbanded in 1977
after the end of the Vietnam war.
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/seato
7 Originally called the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and renamed CENTO in 1959, it included the United States, the United
Kingdom, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey and was disbanded after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979.
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/lw/98683.htm
8 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press,2012).
9 For a history of the Indian nuclear program, see George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global
Proliferation, University of California Press (2002) and Ashley Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between
Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal, Rand(2001). For Pakistan, see Feroz Hassan Khan’s book in the previous
footnote.

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India-Pakistan Nuclear Dynamics
The India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry is just another dimension of the more deep-seated hostility
between the two countries. What this hostility means is that resolving the Kashmir conflict would
not normalize the relationship because Pakistan sees India as an existential threat and thisperception is not going to change easily, certainly not as long as the military continues to dominate
its security and foreign policymaking, and perhaps even beyond that because a new historicalnarrative has taken root in Pakistan. Some of the recent Hindutva-tinted rhetoric from the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India only serves to convince the Pakistan military that India’ssecularism was always a sham and that it is just a matter of time until the liberal-secular urban elitein India will be marginalized and yield to the majoritarian Hindu impulse.

Evolving Nuclear Doctrines
The nature of warfare changed fundamentally when the United States dropped the first atomic
bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, followed by a second attack on Nagasaki three days later.
It was clear then that the sheer destructive power of nuclear weapons was qualitatively different
from any other weapon system. This remains true today. The biggest conventional bomb is the
GBU Massive Ordnance Air Blast with an explosive yield of 11 tonnes of TNT equivalent; incomparison, the Hiroshima bomb was 15 kilotons (kt) or 15,000 tonnes. Today, the nuclear
arsenals of many states contain weapons with yields in the megaton range and even the tactical
nuclear weapons have yields of 0.5 kt or more. This realization contributed to the nuclear taboo, aterm referring to the moral force behind the fact that nuclear weapons have not been used since1945. though there were numerous instances during the Cold War when the taboo was close tobeing breached.
The only use of nuclear weapons occurred when the United States was the sole possessor of nuclear
weapons. By the time the former Soviet Union exploded its nuclear device in 1949, the Cold War
had already begun, as reflected by the division of Germany and Europe into East and West. The
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a U.S.-led military alliance for the defence ofWestern Europe, was created in 1949 and a Soviet-led Warsaw Pact came into being in 1955
following West Germany’s induction into NATO in 1953. The United States and the former Soviet
Union were soon locked into a qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms race. This political,

320

WMD in Asia-Pacificeconomic, and military competition based on the threat of nuclear annihilation between two
nuclear superpowers has shaped the growth of a nuclear theology.
Two schools of deterrence theory soon emerged in the United States. One was led by Bernard
Brodie, a political science professor who had served at the U.S. Department of the Navy during
World War II and later spent nearly two decades at RAND Corporation. Brodie held that deterrence
is automatic and ensured through retaliation because the one who initiates the nuclear attack cannot
be certain that the adversary’s entire nuclear arsenal has been eliminated. The following idea is
attributed to Brodie: “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win
wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other purpose.”
The other school was led by Albert Wohlstetter, a mathematics major with a strong focus onmodelling economic and business cycles, who had worked at the U.S. War Production Board
during World War II and who, like Brodie, later moved to RAND. Although he too believed in
massive retaliation, he felt that ensuring second strike capability needed larger arsenals andsurvivability to prevent a nuclear Pearl Harbor. He used modelling studies based on weapon yields,
bomber ranges, accuracies and reliabilities of systems, and blast resistance in what became theclassic basing studies for the U.S. Strategic Air Command. For Brodie, the risk of retaliation wasan adequate deterrent while for Wohlstetter, it was the certainty of retaliation with large numbersthat was necessary for deterrence to work. Given that the nuclear arms race led to the two nuclear
superpowers accumulating more than 65,000 nuclear weapons at its peak, it is clear that
Wohlstetter carried the day.10
Acceptance of Wohlstetter’s approach gave rise to new concepts of flexible response, escalation
dominance,

counter-value

andcounterforce,survivability,compellenceand“prevalence” (implying an extension of compellence when deterrence has broken down, by
ensuring control of limited use at each step to prevail). It is counterfactual to enquire whether thisconceptual evolution contributed to a stable deterrence posture between the United States and its
allies on the one hand, and the former Soviet Union on the other. It certainly ensured, however,that the nuclear arms race continued because the two countries were engaged in an all-out rivalry

10 The U.S. debate on deterrence has been captured by Bernard Brodie in his writings, the first being The Absolute

Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. Harcourt, 1946 and Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,”
RAND Paper P1472, The Rand Corporation 1958, https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P1472.html

321India-Pakistan Nuclear Dynamics
in political, economic, and conventional and nuclear military dimensions. During the best
documented nuclear crisis, that is, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the United States had anarsenal of 25,540 bombs whereas the former Soviet Union had only 3,346. Despite this imbalance,
deterrence clearly worked. It nevertheless established the ground rule of mutual vulnerability as
the basis for deterrence. As the former Soviet Union achieved numerical equivalence in its arsenal,
the concept of managing the nuclear arms race by introducing equivalent strategic capabilities
through arms control gained prominence.
Deterrence stability was underwritten by “parity” and “mutual vulnerability.” The latter was
codified by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Eventually, the United States withdrew
from the ABM Treaty in 2002. But for most of the Cold War, the two nuclear superpowers sought
to restrain the nuclear arms race and to preserve strategic stability through arms control agreements
like SALT, START, and INF, the last in the sequence being New START in 2010. Finally, they
tried to manage crises through hotlines, nuclear risk reduction centers, and early warning systems.
It is important to recall that during the 1970s and 1980s, nuclear stability did not appear to be
assured and many believed the Cold War was unlikely to end peacefully or that the nuclear taboo
would last as long as it has. Documents declassified after the end of the Cold War also indicate
there were some tense occasions, some inadvertent, and some a result of misperception arising out
of system glitches. In these cases, it was pure luck, and not arms control measures, that ensured
that nuclear weapons were not launched. The trinity of deterrence stability, arms race stability, andcrisis management stability formed the vocabulary of nuclear arms control, the essence of thenuclear theology referred to above.
The prism of U.S.‒Soviet bipolarity, however, does not help much in understanding Indian andPakistani nuclear doctrines and their mutual security crises, although Western analysts tend to viewit through this prism. The key difference is that the United States and former Soviet Union reflecteda degree of symmetry in terms of their arsenals and doctrinal approaches, relying on mutual
vulnerability and assured second strike capability, once the Soviet Union had caught up with theUnited States. Further, given their position as nuclear superpowers, it was possible to look at theUnited States‒Soviet Union equation as a standalone nuclear dyad. In contrast, the India‒Pakistan
relationship is marked by asymmetry in terms of doctrinal approaches, as elaborated below.
Secondly, since India declared itself a nuclear weapon state in 1998, it has maintained that its

322

WMD in Asia-Pacificcapability was intended as a deterrent against both Pakistan and China whereas Pakistan defines
its capability as India-specific. Given these differences, it is not possible to see the India-Pakistan
equation in terms of a dyad.
The geopolitical shift from Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific also shows the presence of many
more nuclear actors in an increasingly crowded geopolitical space. It includes the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the return of major power rivalry, with the United States,
Russia, and China added into the mix of multiple rivalry equations as well as the United States’
treaty allies—Japan and South Korea. The region therefore hosts multiple nuclear dyads, but eachdyad may be linked to other nuclear actors, creating a loosely linked “nuclear chain.” The creationof a nuclear chain has made the search for nuclear stability in today’s world more elusive at a time
when the old arms control agreements are being discarded in response to changing politicalrealities.
India first laid out the elements of its nuclear doctrine in a paper titled “Evolution of India’s
Nuclear Policy,” tabled by then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in parliament shortly after
the 1998 nuclear tests. The paper made it clear that India did not see nuclear weapons as weaponsof war fighting, but in a more limited role, intended to address nuclear threats through deterrence.
The prime minister’s speech and the paper were followed by another draft paper prepared by a
newly constituted National Security Advisory Board and circulated in 1999 to elicit wider
discussion. A more succinct and authoritative text was released in 2003 following a meeting of the
Cabinet Committee on Security.11 The key elements of the doctrine were:•

Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent, based on a triad that includes landbased, sea-based, and airborne delivery systems.

•

Sustaining a posture of nuclear no-first-use vis-à-vis nuclear armed states and non-use of
nuclear weapons vis-à-vis non-nuclear weapon states.

11 “Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy, Paper Laid on the Table of the House,”

https://media.nti.org/pdfs/32_ea_india.pdf and Government of India, “The Cabinet Committee on Security
Reviews perationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Ministry of External Affairs Press Release, 4 January 2003,
https://mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/20131/The_Cabinet_Committee_on_Security_Reviews_perationalization_of_Indias_Nuclear_Doc
trine+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine323

India-Pakistan Nuclear Dynamics•

Ensuring nuclear retaliation in response to a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indianforces anywhere, inflicting massive and unacceptable damage.

•

Retaining the option of nuclear retaliation in response to a chemical or biological weapons
attack.

•Continuing the moratorium on nuclear explosive testing.

•Remaining ready to join Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations.

•

Ensuring strict export controls on nuclear and missile-related materials and technologies.

•

Continuing commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world through global,
verifiable, and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

Since India’s doctrine makes clear that its nuclear weapons are only to deter a nuclear threat or
attack, India needs additional capabilities to deal with threats of sub-conventional and conventional
conflicts. By eschewing a warfighting role for nuclear weapons, India is able to duck thetemptations of a nuclear arms race with Pakistan or China. Given the short distances between India
and these two potential adversaries that compress time available for decision-making, India
believes that it is not possible to make a distinction between “tactical” and “strategic” nuclear
weapons or their use. This reflects another departure from the United States‒Soviet approaches
that provided a 25-minute interval for a missile launched from the mainland to reach a target on
the adversary’s mainland. In the U.S.‒Soviet arms control vocabulary, long-range vectors wereconsidered “strategic” and systems with ranges below 5,500 km were further divided into
intermediate, medium, and short-range systems. Extended deterrence assurances to allies in
Europe and Asia also introduced political compulsions for forward deployment of U.S. and Soviet
weapons that were attributed tactical or battlefield roles. Such distinctions undoubtedly contributed
to the arms race but do not exist in South Asia.
Pakistan has chosen to give its nuclear weapons a different role. It prefers to retain a degree of
ambiguity claiming that it strengthens deterrence while maintaining that its nuclear capability is
India-specific, and, consequently, its size will be determined by India’s arsenal. Although Pakistan
states that it maintains a minimum credible deterrent (sometimes also called a minimum defensive
deterrent), its role is not just to deter nuclear use by India but also to act as an equalizer against
India’s conventional superiority. Pakistan therefore rejects the idea of a no-first-use policy. In
2002, it had first declared “four red lines that could trigger a nuclear response: occupation of a324

WMD in Asia-Pacificlarge part of Pakistan territory by India, destruction of a large part of Pakistan’s military capacity,
attempt to strangulate Pakistan’s economy, and creating political destabilization.”12
Pakistan’s doctrine has since evolved to “full spectrum deterrence” as Pakistan has added shortrange nuclear armed systems for tactical use (60 km range Hatf IX or Nasr ballistic missile) and isalso adding a number of cruise missile systems with dual capability. The Nasr was flight tested in2011 and, according to a statement by the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Directorate,13 it“adds deterrence value to Pakistan’s Strategic Weapons Development Programme at shorter
ranges.” The Nasr could carry “nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy” and isa quick response system with shoot and scoot capabilities (which can fire and then quickly
relocate). According to Lt. Gen (retd) Kidwai, Pakistan’s range of nuclear weapons provide “fullspectrum deterrence, including at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.” By deliberately
lowering the nuclear threshold, Pakistan believes it strengthens deterrence and as Lt. Gen (retd)
Kidwai explains “it is the Full Spectrum Deterrence capability of Pakistan that brings theinternational community rushing into South Asia to prevent a wider conflagration.”14
Neither India nor Pakistan have made any official statements regarding the sizes of their nuclear
arsenals. Analysts are therefore left to derive estimates based on fissile material production
capacities, occasional press releases about missile launches, and other indicators about likely
inductions of new delivery systems. According to the Stockholm International Peace ResearchInstitute’s database on World Nuclear Forces, India is estimated to have produced approximately
156 warheads by January 2021. 15 These are currently distributed over seven delivery platforms
and increasing at the rate of about ten warheads every year. The delivery platforms include two
12 The first reference to these red lines is in a report of an Italian think tank Landau Network dated 14 January

2002. The report can be found here: https://pugwash.org/2002/01/14/report-on-nuclear-safety-nuclear-stabilityand-nuclear-strategy-in-pakistan/. This is borne out by Brig (Retd) Feroz Hassan Khan in his paper Going Tactical(IFRI, September 2015) Footnote 58.
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp53khan_0.pdf
13 ISPR Press Release dated 19 April, 2011, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=1721
14 The history of Pakistan’s nuclear program has been documented by Brig (retd) Feroz Khan in Eating Grass: The
Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2012), while the Pakistani nuclear doctrine quotations
also draw upon two lectures by Lt Gen (retd) Khalid Kidwai at the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference on 23 May
2015 (transcript - https://carnegieendowment.org/files/03-230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf) and a subsequent one at
the IISS on February 6, 2020, https://www.iiss.org/events/2020/02/7th-iiss-and-ciss-south-asian-strategic-stabilityworkshop
15 Hans M Kristensen and Matt Korda, “World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2021, (Oxford University Press),pp.333-412 https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/yb21_10_wnf_210613.pdf

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aircraft (Mirage 2000 and Jaguar, both originally deployed in the 1980s), four land-based ballistic
missiles (Prithvi II, Agni I, Agni II, and Agni III, each capable of carrying a single warhead withranges from 350 km to 3,000 kms) and one submarine-launched ballistic missile (K-15 Sagarika
with a range of 700 kms) for its nuclear-powered submarines (SSBN). Given these ranges, theIndian triad is still an exercise in the making.
India’s stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium (its arsenal is entirely plutonium-based) is
considered adequate for 200 warheads, but plutonium production could increase depending on how
its Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor project develops. 16 The Indian land-based missile program waslaunched in the mid-1980s but the Prithvi II was inducted only in 2003. The Agni-series of landbased missiles are solid-fuelled systems and road or rail-mobile. Two land-based systems, Agni
IV and Agni V, are currently under development with ranges of 4,000 and 5,000 km respectively.
There is speculation that Agni V may carry Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles(MIRVs), but it would mean reducing range and, unless China develops a missile defence system,
there would be little military need for MIRVs on Agni V. MIRVs may become more likely once
India develops missiles with ranges over 8,000 km. The indigenous SSBN programme has sufferedlong delays and only one SSBN has completed sea trials. Another SSBN is expected to becommissioned next year and India is likely to build three or four more SSBNs. The K-15 has alimited range of 700 km. Such a short range only enables India to target southern Pakistan. To
target coastal China, the submarine would need to get to South China Sea. Another SLBM K-4
with a range of 3,500 km is being tested and will eventually replace the K-15. India is also
developing a ground-launched cruise missile that was finally flight-tested up to 700 km in 201716 “Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR),” Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vigyut Nigam Limited,https://bhavini.nic.in/userpages/viewproject.aspx

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WMD in Asia-Pacificafter numerous failures. There are rumours that this missile may be dual-capable (it can serve inboth conventional and nuclear roles) though there are no official statements to indicate this.
Table 1. India’s Nuclear Forces.
Source: SIPRI; Bulletin of Atomic Scientists; Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

Class
Aircraft

SRBM
MRBM
IRBM
ICBM
SLBM
Cruise Missile

INDIA
Estimated Nuclear Warheads = 156^
Missile Name
Range
Mirage 2000H
1850 km
Jaguar IS
1600 kmPrithvi-II
250-350 km
Dhanush (Ship-launched)250 - 400 km
Agni-I
700 - 1,200 km
Prahaar
150 kmAgni-II
2,000 - 3,500 km
Agni-III3,000 - 5,000 km
Agni-IV
3,500 - 4,000 km
Agni-V
5,000 - 8,000 km
Sagarika/K15*
700 km
K4
3500 km
Nirbhay
800 - 1,000 km

StatusOperational
Operational
Operational
Operational
Operational
In development
Operational
Operational
In development
In development
Operational
In development
In development* India is also developing a land-based, short-range version (750 km) of the K-15 submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM)—known as the Shaurya. However, there are no official
government statements to confirmed this. Only three or four flight tests of the Shaurya havebeen reported.
^ Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda, “World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2021,
Oxford University Press, pp.333-412, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/202106/yb21_10_wnf_210613.pdf

Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile is estimated at 165 warheads17 as of January 2021, and estimated to
grow to 220 to 250 warheads by 202518 in view of an ambitious expansion of both its uranium
enrichment and plutonium production capacities. In addition to the Kahuta enrichment plant,
17 Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda, “World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2021, (Oxford University Press),pp.333-412, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/yb21_10_wnf_210613.pdf
18 Kristensen, Hans M., and Robert S. Norris. “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2015.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71,
no. 6 (November 2015): 59–66. https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340215611090

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another has been built at Gadwal, and three plutonium production reactors have been added at the
Khushab complex during the last decade. In 1998, Pakistan reportedly tested both types of devices,
based on highly enriched uranium and plutonium. It is estimated that Pakistan’s fissile material
inventory of 3,400 kg of highly enriched (90 percent) uranium and about 280 kg of plutonium isenough to produce between 236 and 283 warheads.
Pakistan’s delivery platforms include Mirage III/V and F-16 aircraft, and there are reports that thewithholding of additional aircraft supplies by the United States and France emerging as a key
Indian strategic partner, Pakistan would in future rely on the JF-17, jointly developed with China
for a nuclear role, possibly using Ra’ad, an air launched cruise missile. It has six operational landbased ballistic missile systems Abdali (Hatf-2) range of 200 kms, Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) range of 300
kms, Shaheen 1 (Hatf-4) range of 750 kms, Ghauri (Hatf-5) range of 1,250 kms, Shaheen 2 (Hatf6) range of 1,500 kms, and the most recent Nasr (Hatf-9) with a range of 60 kms. All are solidfuelled except for the Ghauri, which is liquid-fuelled and is a variant of the DPRK’s Nodong
missiles that Pakistan acquired in the 1990s in exchange for sharing nuclear enrichment
technology. Shaheen 1 is based on the Chinese M-9 missile supplied in the 1990s. Pakistan has
also tested Shaheen 3 with a range of 2,750 kms. In 2017 it also tested Ababeel, a new missile with
MIRV capability. Hatf 2,3,4, and 9 are dual-capable, in keeping with Pakistan’s policy ofambiguity, and are deployed in garrisons close to the Indian border.
Pakistan has also developed a ground launched Babur (Hatf-7) and the air-launched Ra’ad (Hatf8), both nuclear-capable cruise missiles. Currently, efforts are underway to improve their ranges.
Babur was originally tested at 350 kms. More recent tests indicate the range has been nearly
doubled. Ra’ad was also deployed with a range of 350 kms, but its newer versions indicate a rangeof 550 kms. A sea-launched version of Babur with a range of 450 kms has been tested both fromsurface and underwater launch platforms. It will eventually be deployed on the diesel-electric
Agosta submarines or the newer Yuan class Type 041 submarines being acquired from China.

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Table 2. Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces
Source: SIPRI; Bulletin of Atomic Scientists; Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

PAKISTAN
Estimated Nuclear Warheads = 165^
Class
Missile Name
Range
StatusMirage III/V
2100 kmOperational
Aircraft
F16 A/B**
1600 kmOperational
Hatf 1 (1, 1A and 1B)
70 - 100 km
Operational
Nasr (Hatf 9)
60 - 70 km
In service
Battlefield SRBM
Abdali (Hatf 2)
180 - 200 km
Operational
Ghaznavi (Hatf 3)
300 kmOperational
SRBM
Shaheen 1 (Hatf 4)
750 - 900 km
Operational
Shaheen 2 (Hatf 6)
1,500 - 2,000 km
Operational
Hatf 5 "Ghauri"
1,250 - 1,500 km
Operational
MRBM
Ababeel
2,200 km
In development
Shaheen 3
2,750 km
In development
Babur (Hatf 7)
350 - 700 km
Operational
Cruise Missile
Ra’ad (Hatf 8)
350 kmIn development** Reports of some of the US-procured F-16 aircrafts being modified by Pakistan for anuclear weapon delivery role are yet unconfirmed.
^ Kristensen, Hans M., and Matt Korda, “World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2021,
Oxford University Press, pp.333-412, https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/202106/yb21_10_wnf_210613.pdf

Pakistan’s development of battlefield and dual-capable systems has generated widespread
concerns. In the 2018 Threat Assessment, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats said,“Pakistan continues to produce nuclear weapons and develop new types of nuclear weapons,
including short range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, air launched cruise missiles, andlonger-range ballistic missiles. These new types of nuclear weapons will introduce new risks for
escalation dynamics and security in the region.”19 In the 2017 South Asia Strategy issued by theWhite House, the Trump administration had urged Pakistan to stop sheltering terrorist

19 Worldwide Threat Assessment by Daniel Coats on 13 February 2018https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf

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organizations and emphasised the need “to prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming
into the hands of terrorists.” 20 Pakistani officials have rejected these concerns indicating that
Pakistani missiles are in stored separately from warheads and are only put together at the eleventhhour.

Crises Under a Nuclear Shadow
Given the sources of insecurity and the doctrinal asymmetry, it is hardly surprising that India andPakistan have very different interpretations of the crises that have raised concerns about nuclear
escalation. The first case of nuclear signalling can be dated to the Operation Brasstacks crisis in
1987. India had undertaken a large-scale military exercise on the Pakistan border leading toapprehensions in Pakistan that India was preparing to launch a major attack. In late January, A. Q.
Khan, widely considered the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, gave a surprise interview to avisiting Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar during which he admitted that Pakistan possessed a nuclear
bomb and would not hesitate to use it in case of war with India.21 Given Khan’s high-level security
clearance in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program at the time, it is reasonable to assume theinterview had been cleared by the Pakistani military authorities. There is widespread conviction in
Pakistani security circles that the nuclear threat worked, and India backed down. Indian observers
maintain the crisis had peaked days earlier and de-escalation was under way before Khan madehis statement.
The second crisis occurred in May 1990 when there was an uprising in Kashmir, and India steppedup the presence of its security forces amid rumours that Pakistan’s military might try to takeadvantage of the situation. Based on satellite imagery, the United States concluded that Pakistan
was preparing to move its nuclear weapons and dispatched deputy national security advisor Robert
Gates to Delhi and Islamabad in a bid to defuse the situation. The crisis subsided and Foreign

20 Text of Donald Trump’s speech https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/full-texts-of-donald-trumps-

speech-on-south-asia-policy/article19538424.ece
21 Kuldip Nayar informs us: 'Pakistan has nukes,' Deccan Herald, 29 August 2018,https://www.deccanherald.com/specials/kuldip-nayar-informs-us-pakistan-has-nukes-689623.html

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Secretary level talks resumed the following month. Both these incidents took place before Pakistan
acknowledged possession of nuclear weapons and consequently the signalling was indirect.
The situation changed after the 1998 nuclear tests and nuclear signalling became more explicit in
the crises thereafter. If there was any expectation that the overt nuclear situation might bring aboutsome stability by introducing an element of restraint, it was soon dispelled. Barely had the ink
dried on the forward-looking Lahore Declaration and the related Memorandum of Understanding
on nuclear confidence building measures—signed during Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s
historic visit to Lahore in February 1999—when the Kargil conflict erupted. In a pre-emptive
move, Pakistan intruded across the Line of Control (LoC) to occupy certain heights that threatened
Indian access into the Ladakh region. It was a brazen attempt to alter the territorial status quo.
India mounted an uphill assault and deployed the air force but in a restrained manner as the aircraft
were directed not to cross the LoC. Widespread international concern at such reckless behavior
and heavy casualties eventually forced Pakistan to withdraw and retreat across the LoC. It later
emerged that the Pakistani political leadership had not been fully briefed about the pre-emptive
move by the army generals. Growing internal differences eventually contributed to the ouster ofthe civilian government in a military coup in October 1999, which led to a decade of military rule.
Clearly, Pakistan saw its nuclear capability as a shield under which it could seek to alter the
territorial status quo, confident in its assessment that Indian retaliation would be deterred as it
believed had happened in the earlier crises.
The next crisis was precipitated by an attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 by twointernationally proscribed terrorist groups based in Pakistan—Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) and Jaish e
Mohammed (JeM). India responded by mobilizing its army along the border in early 2002. In an
address to the nation on 12 January 2002, General Pervez Musharraf sought to defuse the situationby condemning the “terrorist attack” and announcing a ban on five jihadi organizations, including
LeT and JeM. He declared that no organization would be allowed to carry out terrorist strikes
within Pakistan or anywhere else. Before matters could stabilize, tensions escalated again in May
when three Pakistani fedayeen (suicide attacker) attacked an army camp at Kaluchak killing 34
Indian soldiers and their family members. As Indian rhetoric sharpened, in June, General
Musharraf warned that if India attacked, Pakistan retained the option of first-use of nuclear
weapons. Consequently, the United States, Russia, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom
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engaged in active diplomacy to mediate a de-escalation of the crisis. The United States needed
Pakistani military cooperation on the Pakistani-Afghan border in its war against Al Qaeda and the
Taliban, and eventually tensions eased when Pakistan began to dismantle the terrorist training
camps and the launch pads close to the LoC. Finally, a ceasefire across the LoC was announced in
November 2003 that lasted for five years. However, according to Lt Gen (retd) Kidwai, India’s
coercive exercise had failed as the Indian military had “lost the advantage of relative asymmetry
in conventional forces because of Pakistan’s nuclear equalizer.”
The five-year ceasefire laid the grounds for a promising backchannel dialogue. The peace wasbroken in November 2008 by an audacious strike by LeT terrorists who arrived by boat andsimultaneously attacked a number of targets in Mumbai. There was credible evidence that the ISI
was involved in the attacks. The newly elected democratic government in Pakistan initiallypromised to cooperate in the investigation, even offering to send the ISI chief to India though theoffer was subsequently withdrawn. It sparked a debate in India, however, about the utility of the
no-first-use doctrine that was somewhat misguided because nuclear weapons were never intended
to deter terrorists. That requires a different set of capabilities, which India did not possess. India
therefore relied on international pressure on Pakistan since the Mumbai attack was widely seen as
India’s “9/11” moment. There was strong universal condemnation of the attack, especially because
foreign citizens had also been killed; at the same time India’s strategic restraint was appreciatedby the international community. However, it also exposed the lack of kinetic options available to
India. Nuclear strategic analysts, already unfamiliar with asymmetric nuclear dyads, were now
saddled with the additional challenge of thinking through nuclear deterrence with respect to nonstate actors that enjoyed covert state support.
In 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power and promised a more muscularcounterterrorism policy, both domestically and against Pakistani-aided cross-border infiltration.
The first incident after the current government came to power was a terrorist attack in September
2016 by four JeM fedayeen terrorists against an army brigade headquarter in Uri (in Kashmir), in
which seventeen Indian soldiers were killed. Later in the month India announced that it had carriedout retaliatory surgical strikes destroying the launch pads across the LoC and killing terrorists who
were present there waiting to be sent across, normally done under covering fire by Pakistani forces.
Pakistan denied that there were any surgical strikes, and the situation did not escalate. Prime

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Minister Modi successfully projected the surgical strikes as a sign of newfound Indian
determination that it would not be deterred by Pakistan’s first use threat or tactical nuclear
weapons. In the official briefings, it was described as “target specific, limited calibre, counterterrorist operations across the LoC.” Clearly, the Modi government wanted to show that it was notaverse to raising its coercive rhetoric. The time for “strategic restraint” that had characterized
India’s approach after the Mumbai attack was over. At the diplomatic level, the SAARC (South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) summit was postponed, and SAARC has been inlimbo ever since.
On February 14, 2019, an Indian Kashmiri militant drove an explosive-laden SUV into a convoy
transporting paramilitary forces in Pulwama (Kashmir), killing 46 troops. JeM claimed
responsibility for the strike. With general elections less than two months away, the Modi
government vowed retaliation. Twelve days later, Indian aircraft bombed a JeM training camp at
Balakot in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Pakistan undertook an air attack the following day and as Indianfighters scrambled, in the ensuing dogfight, an Indian pilot ejected from his damaged aircraft
landing in Pakistan territory. He was returned within 48 hours with the United States, Saudi Arabia,
and United Arab Emirates (UAE) claiming to have intervened to ensure safe and early return ofthe captured pilot. Pakistan maintained that there was no training camp at Balakot and that the
Indian aircraft had dropped their ordnance on a hillside. Pakistan’s counterattack the following
day showed its resolve to defend its sovereignty, and the prompt return of the captured pilot
exemplified its responsible behavior. A few weeks later, both sides withdrew their HighCommissioners and these positions have not been restored since.
In the official briefing the day following the Indian air strike, India’s focus was on downplaying
the escalation by pointing out that it was a non-military terrorist target and a pre-emptive strikeas it had advance intelligence, and the Indian operation was now terminated. The rhetoricthrough media channels emphasized, however, that India had called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff andcreated a new normal, in sharp contrast to the official briefing. Lt. Gen (retd) Kidwai maintains
that this was yet another attempt by India to “induce strategic instability” and Pakistan’scalibrated response had “restored strategic stability and no new normal was allowed to prevail.”He suggests that “Pakistan has ensured seamless integration between nuclear strategy and333

India-Pakistan Nuclear Dynamics
conventional military strategy, in order to achieve the desired outcomes in the realms ofpeacetime deterrence, pre-war deterrence and also in intra-war deterrence.”
Table 3. Timeline of India-Pakistan Crises under the Nuclear Shadow.

Timeline of India-Pakistan Crises under the Nuclear Shadow
1986-87
May 1990
May 1998
May-July 1999
2001-02
November 2008
September 2016
February 2019

Operation Brasstacks
Kashmir Uprising
Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests
Kargil Conflict
Indian Parliament Attacks-Operation Parakram (Twin Peaks Crisis)
Mumbai Terrorist Attacks
Uri Terrorist Attack
Pulwama Terrorist Attack - Balakot Airstrikes

Roles of External Actors
In the preceding section, seven instances were examined—two relating to the pre-1998 period, andthe rest after both countries had declared themselves to be nuclear weapon states. The pre-1998
cases can be described as reflecting a situation of “recessed deterrence”—that is, as some Indian
analysts stated, a form of deterrence arising from the existence of their nuclear weapons but not
yet declared by the two possessor states. This posture was overtaken in 1998 when nuclear
weapons began to play an explicit role. It is useful to see what lessons may be drawn from the five
instances after 1998 and the role of the major powers, particularly those of the United States andChina. Has anything changed over the last two decades in this regard, and if so, what?
It is possible to discern five distinct levels of conflict between India and Pakistan:
1. Sub-conventional conflict or attacks by terrorist groups that are based in Pakistan and havean established modus vivendi with the Pakistani authorities, as in their attacks on the Indian
parliament in 2001 or Mumbai in 2008.
2. Hybrid sub-conventional conflict employing both militant groups and regular troops but
trying to deny the role of the latter as in the case of Kargil in 1999.

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WMD in Asia-Pacific3. Conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold.
4. Conventional conflict escalating to the use of tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons.
5. Full-scale conflict with large scale use of nuclear weapons.
The five instances under examination fall in the first two categories. The unmistakable message to
India is that possession of nuclear weapons will not deter such attacks. In each instance, India
faced the challenge of finding appropriate retaliation that could combine both deterrence by denial
and deterrence by punishment while keeping it below the nuclear threshold in line with its nuclear
doctrine of no-first-use.
Since the Kargil crisis involved Pakistan changing the territorial status quo, the Indian objective
was modest but clear—restoration of the status quo ante. In this, it had the support of the entire
international community as Pakistan’s action was seen as provocative. High-level Pakistani visits
by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and by Chief of Army Staff General Musharraf to Beijing to seek
Chinese support elicited quiet rebuffs and provided space for the United States to play the key
diplomatic role in the resolution of the crisis.
The attacks in 2001 and 2008 by Pakistan-based terrorist groups also witnessed the United States
playing a diplomatic role. In the first instance, the Indian army had mobilized on the border andboth armies were face-to-face. However, the United States needed Pakistan to redeploy its forces
to the Pakistan-Afghan border as it had just embarked on its operations in Afghanistan after 9/11.
The crisis took time to defuse until India was satisfied with Pakistani assurances that it would takeaction against groups like LeT and JeM. The 2008 attack in Mumbai created a dilemma for Indiandecision makers. The confessions by one of the terrorists who had been captured alive and mobile
telephone intercepts of conversations between the terrorists and their handlers made it evident that
Pakistani authorities had been involved. The attack exposed weaknesses in India’s coastal security
and was a rude reminder that it lacked appropriate kinetic options. Since the victims included
nationals of other countries, however, India had to be content with international condemnation andpressure.
Pakistan concluded that it was nuclear deterrence that stymied Indian kinetic retaliation. It began
to develop tactical nuclear weapons so that the space for the third category of conflict, namely

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conventional war below the nuclear threshold, could be constricted and that Indian kinetic
retaliation would rapidly escalate matters to the fourth level, involving tactical nuclear weapons.
The Modi government that came to power in 2014 and was re-elected in 2019 sought to dispel the
notion that the threat of tactical nuclear weapons would deter it from kinetic retaliation in response
to a cross-border terrorist attack. According to retired military officers, India had undertaken
retaliatory cross-border operations earlier in response to certain attacks but without much fanfare.
This policy of “restraint” was discarded in 2017 when the Modi government declared that it had
conducted “surgical strikes” across the LoC. Pakistan denied that any such attempt had been madeand claimed that India had merely indulged in artillery firing across the LoC. These conflicting
assertions enabled both countries to satisfy domestic constituencies while providing an avenue forde-escalation, without the involvement of any external actor.
The 2019 Pulwama terrorist attack followed by the Balakot air strike introduced the element of
unintended consequences. Elections in India were due in two months creating a more febrile
political environment. Limiting response to non-kinetic retaliation was not an option. India
mounted an air strike against a JeM terrorist training camp at Balakot. Aircraft crossed over into
Pakistan for the first time since 1971. Further, Balakot was in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province andnot in the contested part of Kashmir under Pakistani control. Both actions were a step up from the2017 surgical strikes. Indian media was quick to claim that Pakistan’s nuclear bluff had beencalled. The unexpected happened the following day when in an aerial dogfight between the two,an Indian plane was shot down. The pilot ejected and landed in Pakistani territory. Amidst risingrhetoric, external actors again stepped in. U.S. President Donald Trump claimed credit for defusing
the situation, as did Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Pakistan claimed “air-superiority” and then took
credit for “responsible behavior” by promptly announcing the return of the captured Indian pilot.
Notwithstanding shrill political rhetoric, the military authorities were cautious and measured intheir statements during 2017 and 2019, taking care not to cross each other’s red lines. On bothoccasions, the Indian side emphasised that the limited objective of the retaliation had been met,
the target was non-military, and the action was pre-emptive as there was reasonable intelligence
about an imminent attack by terrorists gathering at the targeted location. The statements by the
military authorities were carefully worded because notwithstanding the chest-thumping that is the336

WMD in Asia-Pacificstaple of TV talk shows and the loose rhetoric employed by politicians, the military on both sides
is conscious that military options available on both sides are limited, given current capabilities.
If Pakistan had developed a comfort zone that India would be deterred from kinetic retaliation in
response to a cross-border terrorist strike, the Modi government’s actions were a signal that thiswould not be so. The age of paralyzing restraint was over and India would seek to expand theenvelope for a level three conflict. Naturally, the Indian response would depend on the scale ofterrorist attack and the visibility of ISI involvement, as well as Pakistan’s response in terms ofeither cooperating or engaging in denial. Significantly, the Modi government’s action has ensured
that any future Indian government will now be pushed to undertake some form of kinetic action in
response to a cross-border terrorist strike, however limited or modest.
An objective analysis would indicate that the Indian action is not enough to change Pakistani
behavior and the “deterrence by punishment” under current capabilities is merely intended toassuage domestic audiences. India’s limited options help bring in the external actors with “offramp” de-escalation initiatives. In the past the United States has played the key role with others(notably China) playing a more supportive role. In 2019, for the first time, Saudi Arabia and the
UAE indicated that they too had played a role. Traditionally, Saudi Arabia has been a significant
partner for Pakistan, providing oil at concessional rates and financial support to address a balanceof payments crisis, but the Modi government has been active in wooing the Gulf Arab countries.
With the recent United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, how far the United States will remain
engaged in India-Pakistan matters is open to question. Meanwhile, China can be expected to playa more prominent role given its growing investments in Pakistan’s infrastructure, but India isunlikely to find a Chinese role acceptable given the progressive downturn in India-China relations.
Growing U.S.‒China differences may also make China less willing to countenance a leading U.S.
role as it seeks to assert its influence in the region. In short, external actors may not be able toprovide off-ramps in the future as readily as in the past.
Another takeaway is the different approaches that India and Pakistan adopt towards involvementof external actors and the “nuclear flashpoint” hypothesis that is a favorite for Western analysts
and media. Pakistan uses this notion to highlight the centrality of the long-standing Kashmir
dispute, hoping to catalyze some international involvement in the U.N. Security Council thatwould push for its resolution. International involvement is anathema to India; highlighting India’s
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India-Pakistan Nuclear Dynamics
commitment to bilateralism enshrined in the 1972 Shimla Agreement with Pakistan. Further, India
responds to the “nuclear flashpoint” by highlighting Pakistan’s irresponsible behavior of nuclear
saber-rattling (though Indian media and politicians have also been prone to this in recent years),
A. Q. Khan’s well documented proliferation activities that earned Pakistan the sobriquet of a“nuclear Walmart,” and linkages of the Pakistani “deep state” with internationally proscribed
terrorist outfits.
The Western analysts’ playbook was developed during the Cold War to deal with a stand-alone
nuclear dyad, separated by an ocean, and through notions of arms control, non-proliferation, andcrisis management. It is difficult to apply this playbook to asymmetric nuclear situations with theadditional complexity of two neighboring states locked in a long-standing boundary dispute, oneof whom is not averse to using proxy war, forcing the other to search for appropriate retaliation.
The situation is rendered even more complex on account of Pakistan’s ever-closer strategic
relationship with China, with whom India has had a difficult relationship since the 1962 borderconflict and who is becoming increasingly adversarial and contentious.

The Way Forward
Virtually all India-Pakistan crisis escalation scenarios begin with a terrorist strike on Indian
territory, followed by limited kinetic action by India using ground and/or airpower, Pakistaniretaliation, and matters getting into an escalatory spiral. It is worth reflecting as to whether
scenarios imply a tacit acceptance by the proponents of the “nuclear flashpoint,” which Pakistan’sarmy will continue to host and use such terrorist groups in a proxy war against India. Since thisfactor was absent in the United States‒Soviet Union deterrence dyad, it marks the first point of
departure leaving India with the dilemma of discovering the scope and limits of kinetic action
below the nuclear threshold, even as Pakistan seeks to diminish this space with its full spectrum
deterrence policy.
Unless the international community can convince Pakistan to discard the policy of subconventional warfare using terrorists, which has long been part of its tool kit, the risk of inadvertent
escalation will remain. The only countermeasure India can take is to strengthen its coastal and338

WMD in Asia-Pacificborder surveillance and intelligence capabilities to thwart such efforts by restoring deterrence bydenial and enhance its conventional kinetic capabilities, thereby strengthening punitive deterrence.
The drawback is that this posture, which some refer to as “mowing the grass,” will be costly
because it is unlikely to bring about a change in Pakistan’s policy.
Whereas India seeks to enhance its space for kinetic action without crossing Pakistan’s redlines,
however, Pakistan seeks to blur these redlines to flash the nuclear card at the earliest possible time
to draw in external actors. When India and China have periods of tensions on their border, forexample, at Doklam in 2017 resulting in a stand-off that lasted 73 days, and in 2020 in eastern
Ladakh, where the stand-off is ongoing (at the time of writing), the nuclear card has been absent
in these periodic confrontations, even in the political rhetoric. There are two reasons for thisdifference that are worth examining. The first is that both countries, despite the asymmetry in theircapabilities, have adopted a no-first-use policy as a key element of their nuclear doctrine. The
second is that while India and China often allege incursions by the forces of the other side acrossthe Line of Actual Control, there is no attempt by either side to pass this activity off as actions by
non-state militants. These differences are instructive and explain why the nuclear factor does notcast a shadow on India-China boundary tensions even when these two parties engage in lowintensity military escalation. In contrast, Pakistan seeks to lower the nuclear threshold to hype the“nuclear flashpoint” to bring in external involvement to its advantage by constraining India.
Undoubtedly the risks of India‒Pakistan nuclear escalation would certainly diminish if both sides
had a no-first-use policy.
External involvement has often helped in defusing tensions between these two nuclear armed
states. But it is an open question whether this will continue in the future given the changing
geopolitical environment. In the past, China was willing to let the United States take the lead in
the region in such matters. However, growing tensions between the two, coupled with the UnitedStates’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, may change the American and Chinese calculations, leaving
the field open for Chinese diplomacy. Such a shift in great power roles is likely to be unacceptable
to India, which is now increasingly voicing its threat perceptions in terms of a two-front war.
Therefore, erstwhile external actors may not be able to play the same kind of role as in the past.
This contextual shift means that some kind of dialogue between India and Pakistan has become
essential for crisis management. India’s blanket rejection of any dialogue, maintaining that “terror
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and talks don’t go together,” implies a dependence on external actors for an off-ramp outcome andis not politically tenable in the long run.
In the United States‒Soviet Union nuclear standoff, the idea that deterrence was automatic wasblown away during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 when the two came face to face in a full-blown
showdown which brought the world closer to the brink of nuclear war that it had ever been. It also
marked the beginning of a shared realization of the risks of unintended escalation that laid thefoundations of bilateral and multilateral nuclear arms control. Therefore, while doctrinal
asymmetry in the India-Pakistan case imposes its own constraints, the lesson that crisis
management requires a minimal level of communication still holds. It is unlikely to resolve
Kashmir or other fundamental differences; therefore, expectations need to be modest because any
undue expectations will overload the process ensuring its collapse. If it proves its utility, thenperhaps some confidence-building measures can be visualized, but acting on these will likely befurther down the road.
At a regional level, a nuclear dialogue between India and China would help, particularly if Pakistan
could also be drawn into a trilateral no-first-use understanding given that both India and China
have adhered to it. The prospects for this breakthrough seem remote today because China has shiedaway from any nuclear talks with India as its policy remains intent on constraining India in South
Asia. Growing tensions in the Sino-Indian relationship during 2020 have also deepened mistrust.
Similarly, a global no-first-use agreement would put pressure on Pakistan to follow suit, but thisapproach is unlikely given the direction in which U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrines are evolving.
It is worth noting that while nuclear weapons remain the most destructive weapons designed todate, the science at its core is nevertheless 75 years old. In many ways, nuclear weapons are
primitive weapons. A host of new disruptive technologies are emerging that add new complexity
to the old deterrence equations. Foremost among these are missile defence capabilities,
hypersonics—particularly as a dual-capable system—vastly improved surveillance and early
warning systems that permit development of “left of launch” postures, and finally, offensive cyber
activities that can hack into nuclear command and control networks. Pakistan is developing dualuse cruise missile systems and MIRV technologies; India is focusing on hypersonic weapons andmissile defences. Any or all of these can give rise to new types of instability. If the development
and deployment of these technologies are to be regulated and restrained, shared understanding on
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WMD in Asia-Pacificthese new risks must be struck via dialogue. This process could be conducted at a bilateral levelor even at a multilateral level. Similarly, many analysts have cautioned against interfering with
nuclear command and control systems using offensive cyber capabilities; though as relations
between major nuclear weapon states lock in a downward spiral, talks have not been possible. Yet,
it is clear these technological developments will impact the deterrence equations rendering themeven more fragile in the future than in the past.

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12. Nuclear Escalation in a Taiwan Strait Crisis?
Robert Ayson

Introduction
Many of the ingredients are already in place for a Taiwan Strait crisis to precipitate a nuclear
escalation between China and the United States. Some of the background factors that could giverise to such a catastrophe stem from political tensions between Beijing and Taipei over Taiwan’s
future against a wider context of growing great power competition and distrust between China(seen by Taiwan as the principal threat to its security) and the United States (seen by Taiwan as its
main protector). Some of the strategic factors stem from the shifting asymmetries of military
power between China and Taiwan and between China and the United States, which may create
incentives for escalatory options as a crisis grows. And some of the problems are operational,
including the difficulties that may face China and the United States in ensuring clear firebreaks
between conventional military options and attacks which involve, or put at risk, nuclear
capabilities. In general, there is a risk that military postures designed to demonstrate everyday
resolve could stand in the way of heading off further escalation once the first shots are fired.
In addition to examining these various risks, and the connections that could occur between them,
it is also important to consider the reasons why nuclear escalation might be regarded as unlikely.
If we assume that nuclear use in the Taiwan Strait will not occur as a bolt-out-of-the blue attack,at least three major thresholds probably need to be crossed before nuclear war has arrived. First,
there needs to be a serious crisis in the Taiwan Strait (for which there are precedents since the early
1950s) in which the use of military force is threatened and anticipated (ie., a higher benchmark
than the mere onset of a crisis). Second, for the first time in decades, one or more of the three key
actors—Taiwan, China, and the United States—will need to decide to begin using armed violence
to bend a Taiwan Strait crisis in their favor. And this decision needs to be reciprocated if a serious
conventional military escalation is to occur.
© 2022 Robert Ayson, CC BY 4.0

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WMD in Asia-PacificUnless that conventional violence was carefully circumscribed, (and not reciprocated) we wouldat this point already be witnessing the most serious military exchange in East Asia for decades.
But nuclear escalation requires something even more unusual than this. The third requirement isthat the threshold between conventional and nuclear military operations is crossed either by Chinaor the United States (and both if a nuclear exchange is to occur). Crossing this threshold would
constitute the first violent use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world since 1945.
The pressures that play on decision-makers in a serious, escalating crisis, and the possibilities ofoverreaction and misjudgment, bear little comparison to what seems rational in the cold light of apre-crisis day. But to mount a convincing argument that nuclear escalation in the Taiwan Strait isa serious possibility we need to show how the situation can go from A (the current presence oftension in the absence of a precipitating crisis) to B (a serious and escalating Taiwan Strait crisis)
to C (conventional war in the Taiwan Strait) and to D (the use of nuclear weapons). The several
steps in this process allow several opportunities for recommendations about measures the threemain actors might adopt to reduce the chances of escalation, and in particular an escalation that
could lead to the use of nuclear weapons.

Political Conditions: The Context for a Crisis
The strategic relationships that can fuel or dampen down a dangerous crisis in the Taiwan Strait
are not nearly as good as we might want but not as bad as they have been. In the mid-1950s, forexample, these relationships were much worse. Only a few years after the United States and China
had been at war over Korea, in response to China’s bombardment of offshore islands in the Taiwan
Strait, the Eisenhower Administration contemplated using nuclear weapons in response. 1 And thefirst two decades of the 21st century have not produced an obvious parallel to the 1995-96 crisis
where the visit of President Lee to the United States precipitated a dramatic few months in TaiwanChina and China-US relations.2

1 For a recent study, see Pang Yang Huei, Strait Rituals: China, Taiwan, and the United States in the Taiwan Strait

Crises, 1954-1958, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2019).
2 See Robert Ross, “The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait confrontation: Coercion, credibility, and the use of force.”
International Security, 25:2, 2000, pp. 87-123.

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Nuclear Escalation in a Taiwan Strait Crisis?
Peace in the Taiwan Strait depends on mutual restraint between the two great powers. At times it
has been possible to detect an informal understanding where in exchange for Beijing’s decision to
avoid using force, Washington has signaled that its support for Taiwan is conditional on the latteravoiding the most provocative steps towards independence. While Beijing has been uncomfortablewith any level of American assistance to Taiwan, Washington’s deliberate ambiguity about the
support it could or would provide in an actual conflict has suited China in comparison to morerobust US policy alternatives. Given these tacit agreements between the two bigger players, themain source of China-US tensions over the Taiwan Strait often appeared to be Taiwan itself: athird-party catalyst to great power war.
Taiwan’s politics continue to be marked by the emergence of a democratic identity that bucks thetrend away from liberal values apparent in so many parts of the world, including in parts of Asia.
And popular support in Taiwan for independence from China continues to grow. 3 But nearly two
decades after President George W. Bush signaled Washington’s opposition to a Taiwanese quest
for independence, 4 Taipei’s leaders (including in the Democratic Political Party) still tread a
relatively careful line. Their focus has been on establishing for Taiwan an enhanced international
status and promoting Taiwan’s separate political identity without pushing too hard on formal
independence per se.
Yet the modus vivendi of the recent past is at risk. Just five years ago, Scott Kastner referred to an“unprecedented period of détente in cross Strait relations” in making the argument that “the riskof armed conflict has been declining and is likely to decline in the years ahead.” 5 But any such
optimism has been complicated since that time by two less reassuring developments. First, China’s
willingness to tolerate Taiwan’s autonomous political decision-making, never a strong suit, hasbeen diminishing. In other words, Beijing’s redlines may be getting more restrictive. The growing
capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), including vis-à-vis both Taiwan and the3 Dennis V. Hickey, “More and More Taiwanese Favor Independence – and Think the US Would Help Fight for It,”The Diplomat, 3 December 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/more-and-more-taiwanese-favorindependence-and-think-the-us-would-help-fight-for-it/
4 See Dana Milbank and Glenn Kessler, “President Warns Taiwan on Independence Efforts,” Washington Post, 10
December 2003, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/12/10/president-warns-taiwan-onindependence-efforts/374c46e0-6f94-4874-825a-d1a12bdc51b1/
5 Scott L. Kastner, “Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point?: Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between
China and Taiwan,” International Security, 40:3, Winter 2015/2016, pp. 54, 56.

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WMD in Asia-PacificUnited States, give this problem a material edge. But many of the motivating factors are politicaland are closely related to China’s domestic affairs. Appeals for the unification of Taiwan with themotherland have become more pressing as Xi Jinping consolidates his power around therevitalization of the Communist Party’s authority, accompanied by significant doses ofnationalism. Taipei’s leaders will have watched with growing apprehension the recent
developments in Hong Kong, where the new national security law passed by Beijing has turned
the “one country two systems” logic into an historical artifact. 6
Second, the Biden Administration has come to office at a time when US congressional support for
democratic Taiwan and antipathy to nondemocratic China have both been increasing. Walter
Lohman and Frank Jannuzi suggested immediately before the 2020 federal election that “there ismore support for Taiwan in Congress now than at any time in at least 30 years.” 7 America’s
strategic ambiguity, which may have been an off-ramp for past tensions,8 no longer finds many
suitors as China appears more willing to exploit its growing powers of intimidation across theStrait. 9 Members of the Senate’s Armed Forces Committee were told in March 2021 by thePentagon’s Indo-Pacific Commander that China could translate its threats into action in as little as
six years.10 And there is very little sign that the Biden team has any intention of pleasing Beijing
by winding back Washington’s relationship with Taipei. 11
Moreover, rising pressures in the China-Taiwan-US triangle of relationships are not an exception
to an otherwise calm regional geopolitical situation in Asia. If they were, the Taiwan Strait might
6 See Huileng Tan, “Taiwan slams Hong Kong national security law, opens office to help city’s residents,” CNBC, 3

July 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/03/taiwan-slams-hong-kong-national-security-law-opens-office-tohelp.html
7 Walter Lohman and Frank Jannuzi, “Preserve America’s Strategic Autonomy in the Taiwan Strait,” War on theRocks, 29 October 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/preserve-americas-strategic-autonomy-in-thetaiwan-strait/
8 See Brendan Taylor, The Four Flashpoints: How Asia Goes to War, (Carlton VIC: LaTrobe University Press, 2018), p.
163.
9 For a prominent articulation of this point, see Richard Haass and David Sacks, “American Support for Taiwan Must
Be Unambiguous,” Foreign Affairs, 2 September 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/unitedstates/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous
10 See Brad Lennon, “Chinese threat to Taiwan ‘closer than most of us think,’ top US admiral says,” CNN, 25 March
2021, https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/24/asia/indo-pacific-commander-aquilino-hearing-taiwan-intl-hnkml/index.html
11 Chao Deng, “Biden Brushes off China’s Complaints, Sends First Delegation to Taiwan,” Wall Street Journal, 14
April 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-sends-unofficial-delegation-to-taiwan-as-beijing-ramps-uppressure-11618384940

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be regarded as a somewhat localized dispute whose broader consequences could be cushioned bywider currents of regional stability. A Taiwan crisis would have a better chance of being
quarantined in these more favorable conditions. But in the coming years a serious Taiwan Strait
crisis could be egged on by broader political tensions between Beijing and Washington in which
Taipei is as much a passenger as a participant.
The broader relationship between China and the United States has been on a generally downward
trajectory. Great power competition is in vogue. Washington has come to see China as the biggest
threat to America’s interests, and Xi Jinping’s brand of authoritarianism, including abuses against
Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang, as a central challenge to America’s values. A much stronger PLA
which is changing the East Asian maritime military balance, China’s cyberattacks on private andpublic sector organizations in several countries, its expansionism in the South China Sea, andBeijing’s Belt and Road Initiative plan are all being seen through a highly competitive lens in
Washington.
A more competitive great power landscape puts the spotlight on Taiwan’s place in the region’s
strategic geography. So long as it remains outside of Beijing’s control, Taiwan remains an obstacle
to China’s quest to dominate its first island chain, project maritime military power further into theregion, and intensify the costs to the United States of furnishing support for regional allies such as
Japan. Hitherto cooperative parts of the great power relationship have been crowded out, includingby Trump era efforts to decouple important parts of the two economies, and Washington’sdetermination to reduce the involvement in the US market by China’s information technology
companies. The arrival of the Biden Administration has breathed at least some life into hopes for
US-China cooperation, including on climate change. 12 But the basis for that great power
collaboration remains narrow.
Beijing’s crackdown on Hong Kong’s autonomy has made Taiwan’s vibrant democracy only morevaluable to American political leaders. Biden himself has made the commitment to democracy athome and abroad the cornerstone of his Presidency. But the bigger picture is the contest between
the United States and China for military and economic supremacy in Asia. As one of the two great

12 Roger Harrabin, “China and US pledge climate change commitment,” BBC, 18 April 2021,

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56790077

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WMD in Asia-Pacificpower participants in this contest, Beijing has taken umbrage at what it sees as American-led
attempts to contain its growth and question the legitimacy of its return to great power status.
Despite early signs that Trump regarded Xi as a partner on the North Korean nuclear issue, Beijing
became the 45th president’s most convenient international scapegoat, including on the covid-19
pandemic. As the 46th president, Joe Biden has taken issue with the Trump era inclination to apply
trade pressure on America’s traditional allies and partners, a famously counterproductive
approach. But the pressure on Beijing will be hard to undo if Biden is to live up to his domestic
promises of being tough on China. 13 Indeed one of the only current points of bipartisan concord is
the China threat argument, which also has become a key justification for federal spending on
defense and infrastructure.
A background of tension between Beijing and Washington could shape the narrative for a future
Taiwan Strait crisis and its implications for great power stability in new ways. For many years theworld occasionally worried about a fresh crisis between China and Taiwan dragging in the UnitedStates to perform a tenuous balancing act—reassuring Taiwan without provoking China to serious
escalation. But today we might be more concerned that a relatively minor Taiwan Strait problem
involving China and Taiwan will grow quickly into a grander crisis as a symptom of deep USChina tensions. The less that the two great powers trust each other, and the more they regard eachother as adversaries in almost every dimension of policy, the greater the chance that tensions in
the Taiwan Strait become a Sino-US contest for resolve.
The intentions of the two great powers at this point would be divergent. Could China get away
freely with greater intimidation of Taiwan despite Washington’s obligations under Section 2 of
the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by otherthan peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of theWestern Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States” and “to maintain the capacity of
the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize thesecurity, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan?” 14 In other words, might

13 See Brian Flood, “Biden White House Defends Trump China Tariffs in Legal Showdown,” Bloomberg Law, 16

March 2021, https://news.bloombergtax.com/international-trade/biden-white-house-defends-trump-china-tariffsin-legal-showdown
14 H.R. 2479 – Taiwan Relations Act, 96th Congress, (1979-1980), https://www.congress.gov/bill/96thcongress/house-bill/2479

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Beijing achieve two things: a big step towards reunification and an even bigger step towards
regional supremacy? Or would America offer decisive support to Taiwan in a crisis at a time when
Beijing’s commitment to reunification (by force if necessary) has been growing? And in doing so,
could the Pentagon demonstrate that American military superiority in Asia has not been matchedby the PLA’s growing capabilities?
These competitive quests might combine in combustible fashion. Brittle political communications
between Washington and Beijing, coupled with problems in securing military-military dialogue, 15
including the planned Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meeting in 2020, 16 increases the
chances of Sino-American political misjudgments on Taiwan. For its part, Taipei needs to read thesignals accurately. Will its leaders conclude that under China’s increasing pressure the time for
expanding Taiwan’s place in international diplomacy is running out? Will Taiwan be looking evenmore desperately for extra US support as soon as it needs it in the early stages of a crisis? And is
the United States going to be in a position—domestically as well as internationally—to refuse thatrequest? At the same time, will Xi see a Taiwan Strait crisis as an ideal opportunity to test theresolve of Biden’s Presidency in its early stages? What happens if, in an echo of Khrushchev’s
misreading of Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Biden Administration pushes backharder than China expects? The wider backdrop does not appear promising.

From Crisis to War: The Trouble with Asymmetries
Beijing’s estimation of Washington’s resolve becomes even more significant when we factor in
the relationship between political objectives and military action. Inaction may sometimes appear
be the better word here. In 2012 Washington did little to come to the immediate assistance of thePhilippines, a formal treaty ally, when China placed pressure on Manila in a standoff at the
Scarborough Shoal. This is not quite the whole picture. Four years later the Obama Administration
appears to have signaled behind the scenes to China that the United States would not tolerate

15 See Shannon Tiezi, “Another US-China Dialogue Bites the Dust,” The Diplomat, 2 October 2018,https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/another-us-china-dialogue-bites-the-dust/
16 Chun Han Wong, “China a No-Show at Joint Military Safety Meeting with U.S.,” The Wall Street Journal, 17
December 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-stood-up-by-china-at-military-safety-meeting-11608199871

348

WMD in Asia-Pacificattempts by China to begin reclamation activities at Scarborough. 17 And more generally in theSouth China Sea, the United States has continued to conduct freedom of navigation operations 18
to demonstrate the ability of its forces to move unimpeded on, under and above international
waters. But the United States has shown little sign of trying to roll back China’s island building
efforts, let alone Beijing’s militarization of these features.
Taiwan sits in the northern portion of the South China Sea, much closer to the concentration of
PLA firepower than most of the other claimants involved in maritime territorial disagreementswith Beijing. If China was to conduct a sustained campaign of military intimidation of Taiwan aspart of a growing crisis—steps short of the actual violent use of force, including obvious
mobilization, provocative exercises, intercepting Taiwanese aircraft, and explicit threats ofmilitary action—and the United States did little but monitor the situation, would Xi Jinping haveachieved an historical victory? There are multiple precedents for such a campaign of intimidation:from China’s firing of missiles in the 1995-6 crisis which prompted the United States to deploy
two aircraft carrier battle groups in the seas around Taiwan to the more recent intensification of
aircraft flying across the half-way point in the Strait,19 and Beijing’s ongoing campaign of cyberpressure. There is also China’s clear record of military coercion (short of war) in relations withnearby Japan in the East China Sea.

China’s coercive position is strengthening in regard to the Taiwan Strait military balance. Kastnerrefers to a “dramatic improvement in the PRC’s relative military capabilities in the Taiwan
Strait”20 since 2000. A more recent IISS note suggests that while China’s quantitative advantage
has remained relatively unchanged over the last ten years, the PLA’s qualitative advances have
driven the asymmetry further in Beijing’s advantage. 21 Given China’s ability to bombard Taiwan

17 Zack Cooper and Jack Douglas, “Successful Signaling at Scarborough Shoal?” War on the Rocks, 2 May 2016.
18 See Dzirhan Mahadzir, “SECDEF Esper: U.S. Will Keep Up the Pace of South Chins Sea Freedom of Navigation

Operations,” USNI News, 21 July 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/07/21/secdef-esper-u-s-will-keep-up-the-paceof-south-china-sea-freedom-of-navigation-operations
19 See Minxin Pei, “China and the US risk accidental war over Taiwan,” Nikkei Asian Review, 29 October 2020,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-and-the-US-risk-accidental-war-over-Taiwan
20 Kastner, p. 70.
21 Meia Nouwens and Henry Boyd, “Taiwan in the Pentagon’s Spotlight, “IISS, Military Balance Blog, 18 September
2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2020/09/taiwan-pentagon-report-2020

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with conventional ballistic missiles, Beijing does not need the capacity to invade Taiwan to makelife intolerable on the other side of the Strait. China also knows that, to adapt Thomas Schelling,“the power to hurt” Taiwan economically “is bargaining power.”22 Beijing has reasons to believethat its growing military capabilities (in the air and on and under the sea) also give it a greater
ability to impose a blockade on trade dependent Taiwan: the interdependence of the two economies
means this would harm Beijing as well as Taipei, but the latter much more than the former.
China could exploit this power to hurt without its armed forces firing a single shot, even if, as
Brendan Taylor suggests, the blockade would involve PLA forces seeking to control the airspace
above Taiwan and the entry points to Taiwan’s seaports. 23 If time permitted the United Statesmight rally its closest allies around a retaliatory ban on People’s Republic of China (PRC)-flaggedcommercial vessels, seeking to put pressure on Beijing while keeping the crisis in an economic
frame. But the onus could also be on Taiwan to take the next step, by testing China’s willingness
to enforce the blockade, and China’s calculus of what might happen next if it attacked a Taiwanese
vessel or aircraft, including the possibility that the United States would see this as an unacceptable
resort to violence which demanded a response.
How Taipei reads the military intentions of the great powers would be crucial as the threats ofviolent action grew. Taiwan is developing its ability to raise the costs of PLA operations after
China has begun to use force, which puts a premium on force preservation. 24 But Taipei might still
be faced with “use it or lose it” choices in regard to its still limited arsenal of missiles that canreach China’s coastline and which would among the early targets in PLA strikes on Taiwan. 25
These pressures would be even higher if Taiwan had doubts about the prospect of an early and

22 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1966,) p. 2.
23 Taylor, The Four Flashpoints, p. 151.
24 Lee Hsi-Min and Eric Lee, “Taiwan’s Overall Defence Concept, Explained,” The Diplomat, 3 November 2020,

https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/taiwans-overall-defense-concept-explained/
25 See Michael Hunzeker and Alexander Lanoszka, “Taiwan wants more missiles. That’s not a bad thing,” Defense
One, 24 March 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/03/taiwan-wants-more-missiles-s-not-badthing/172887/

350

WMD in Asia-Pacificdecisive American military response. Some analysts seem increasingly concerned just how fast theUnited States could respond in practice with some force elements.26
Moreover, even if US retaliation against China was more or less guaranteed, this would notnecessarily preclude Taiwan from being extensively disarmed (and for extensive harm to be caused
to people and cities) before the US response kicked in. It would be in Taiwan’s interests for China
to know very early in a crisis that PLA forces were already at a real and present risk of adevastating American attack. In such a case Taiwan would have incentives to bring the UnitedStates into the crisis as quickly as possible. Risk-taking would make sense for Taiwan if that iswhat it took to get the United States into the action.
China’s interests in such a situation would be markedly different (and more emphatic than
America’s given the greater political importance of Taiwan to China and of the Taiwan Strait toChina’s security27). Beijing would want to show (a) that Taiwan is certain to bend to its demandsin the crisis, (b) that the United States is not able to prevent that from happening, and (c) that theUnited States is a spent force in Asia. All three of these interests have a common thread: China
must make it clear to the United States that the costs of military involvement in a local dispute are
too high for Washington to bear and for US forces to operate effectively (deterrence by punishment
and denial).
In the two and a half decades since the last serious Taiwan Strait crisis China has substantiallyraised the costs for US military operations close to mainland China and the first island chain.
Washington’s freedom to repeat its approach a generation later—including by deploying aircraft
carriers to the waters near Taiwan—is increasingly complicated by extra risks, not least becauseof advances in China’s growing ballistic missile, submarine warfare, and anti-ship missile
capabilities. With enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (including
satellites), the PLA has more accurate systems that provide it with real options for precision

26 A widely noticed example of this view by a serving US marine corps officer concluded that the United Statesshould return forces to Taiwan to act as a tripwire. See Walker D. Mills, "Deterring the Dragon: Returning US
Forces to Taiwan," Military Review 100:5, 2020, p. 59.
27 See Robert S. Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations,”
International Security, 27:2, Fall 2002, pp. 54-6.

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strikes.28 China’s ability to put US forces at risk is not a question of if. It is a question of how
much.
Beijing would want America to know that the risks of intervention are high even before the US
Commander in Chief decides to deploy forces closer to the Strait (assuming they were not there
already for some reason). In a growing crisis, there would be strong incentives for China tointensify cyber activities aimed at US communications, radar, and command and control systems,
including space-based systems, and to shadow US naval and air forces in the wider region toremind Washington that Beijing is watching every move. China will know that, in turn, its own
C4I systems would be very early targets for an American attack. It will be aware that Washington’s
strategy depends not just on China knowing that the response to its military action in the Taiwan
Strait would be prohibitively costly to Beijing (once again deterrence by punishment) but also on
making China question its ability to achieve the military effects it wishes to in the Taiwan Strait(deterrence by denial).
This equation might also encourage China to conduct very early strikes against Taiwanese targets
in the hope that these could occur before the United States can make it especially difficult for
Beijing to do so. And the longer it takes for that American response to be delivered, the moreterrible the situation could be for Taiwan. To reduce Beijing’s freedom to dictate terms to Taipei,
might there be circumstances where Washington would be inclined to remove military options in
the Strait from China’s hand before they were used? A deepening crisis involving the exchange of
threats, including of military action and economic actions (including sanctions) might well be
stopped before violent action begins. But the chances of avoiding violence decrease as soon as any
one of the actors believes that violence is imminent.
Moreover, the threshold between non-violent and violent action (peace and war) may not be as
clear in all circumstances as one might wish. For example, as the crisis builds, should the UnitedStates treat intensified PLA cyber activities directed at US (and Taiwanese) command and control
systems as something close to a hostile act, or an act of war? How does Beijing read the same typeof attempts coming from the other side? If China issues a bellicose statement on enforcing its East
28 On these themes, see Akira Marusaki, “Developments in China’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities,”

Project 2049 Institute, 23 November 2015, https://project2049.net/2015/11/23/developments-in-chinasconventional-precision-strike-capabilities/

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China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone—and announces a new zone in the South China Sea—
what are the implications for “routine” movements of American maritime vessels and aircraft? 29
How does the Pentagon know what the risks actually are? As Chinese and Taiwanese and Chineseand American maritime force elements come into close proximity with each other, how does eachactor know how the other side will respond to an accidental collision? And would the ramming ofan American vessel by a Chinese ship, 30 apparently on purpose but quickly blamed by Beijing on
American risk-taking, signal a commitment to hostilities or something short of that?
China and the United States have not fought each other for nearly 70 years. That beneficial
situation means we can have some confidence that they can avoid war breaking out in a crisis.
During the Vietnam War, for example, China and the United States quietly sought to avoid a
confrontation between the two of them. 31 But the extended period of China-US peace means there
is no recent precedent for how the two great powers might control escalation once the threshold of
conventional military action between them has been crossed. China’s recent high-altitude disputewith India (another great power), where the use of force bore little resemblance to advanced
maritime combat, 32 is no preparation for escalation control and intra-war deterrence with theUnited States. Meanwhile almost all of America’s recent wartime experiences have been against
decidedly inferior adversaries where achieving US escalation dominance has been an achievable
option for Washington rather than an untested possibility. And Taiwan has minimal experience ofmanaging violent armed conflict involving modern military systems.
China has no recent experience of managing the domestic political pressures for escalation that arelikely to arise once violence in the Taiwan Strait is in play, especially because Beijing would

29 For a recent non-crisis example of China the United States citing a Taiwan Strait transit (by two naval vessels) as“routine” and China calling the same mission a “provocation,” see Minnie Chan, “US in rare double-warship Taiwan
Strait transit after China starts sea drills,” South China Morning Post, 31 December 2020,
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3115955/china-us-tension-american-warships-sail-throughtaiwan-strait
30 On one of the close calls in recent years during a US freedom of navigation deployment, see Brad Lendon,“Photos show how close Chinese warship came to colliding with US destroyer,” CNN, 4 October 2018,https://edition.cnn.com/2018/10/02/politics/us-china-destroyers-confrontation-south-china-sea-intl/index.html
31 Frank E. Rogers, “Sino-American Relations and the Vietnam War, 1964-66,” China Quarterly, 66 (1976), pp. 293314.
32 See Sudhi Ranjan Sen et al, ‘With Stones and Iron Rods, India-China Border Clash Turns Deadly,” Bloomberg, 17June 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-16/china-india-ties-tested-after-border-standofftakes-deadly-turn353

Nuclear Escalation in a Taiwan Strait Crisis?
almost undoubtedly blame the expanding war on Taiwan and its American supporters. It is hard to
avoid assuming that social media pages in China will be full of demands that Taiwan be crushed.
Congressional and public pressure for decisive action to come to Taiwan’s aide may well also
grow in the United States once the fighting has begun.
A great deal will depend on how much the United States wants to restrict China’s escalatory
options. This may sound counterintuitive—surely the more those options are restricted the less wemight be worried about more serious levels of violence. But here asymmetry raises its destabilizing
head once again. China’s leaders will know that many of the PLA’s crucial systems for attacking
Taiwanese targets can be held hostage by the threat of an American conventional attack, and they
will know American military strategy often exploits precision strikes to reduce an adversary’s
ability to use its available forces. Caitlin Talmadge envisions that the United States effort would
not only be focused on “the weapons systems that China could use to strike Taiwan or U.S. military
based or forces in the region” but also “the Chinese C4ISR that would underlie China’s
campaign.”33
Many of China’s newer missile systems are more mobile and survivable than earlier variants. And
Beijing knows its increasingly advanced forces 34 will pose extra costs and risks to United Statesforces entering any sort of Taiwan conflict. But it would be naive for Beijing to conclude that its
rocket forces, aircraft, anti-ship missiles and the platforms they are launched from, and thecommand and control systems which manage these capabilities, were therefore invulnerable toAmerican action. And what happens to Washington’s thinking if it believes that China plans to use
these capabilities against Taiwanese and US targets early, recognizing also that several thousand
American citizens live in Taiwan? Timescales could be squeezed, and quick decisions are notalways the most stabilizing.
We should also guard against the assumption that any military action will be restricted to the
Taiwan Strait. Previous crises may encourage the view that the United States and China have beenable to fashion tacit agreements which limit the spread of their conflict. But in the twenty-first

33 Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional

War with the United States,” International Security, 41:4, Spring 2017, p. 66.
34 For example, see Ian Williams and Masao Dahlgren, “More than Missiles: China Previews its New Way or War,”CSIS Briefs, 16 October 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/more-missiles-china-previews-its-new-way-war

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WMD in Asia-Pacificcentury, the two great powers will need to find extra reserves of political commitment to avoid theescalatory temptations that material factors bring into play. For example, while almost all of theforces that Taiwan might use are confined to that geography (by definition), the same does not
apply to the forces that China and the United States might rely on. The wider spread of relevant
American forces opens up the possibility that they might be targeted by China beyond theimmediate conflict area. And the growth in PLA power projection capabilities gives Beijing
options for targeting US forces which it lacked in earlier Taiwan Strait crises.
China faces the difficult question of how far out from the Taiwan Strait (and the first island chain
more generally) it needs to put US forces at real risk (and perhaps subject them to attack) in orderto reduce America’s ability to intervene decisively. Depending on how responsive it believes
America’s closest regional allies (Australia and Japan) are going to be to American expectationsof assistance in a Taiwan Strait armed conflict, Beijing may need to extend that question beyond
considerations about targeting just US military elements. Beijing will be well aware of American
expectations that Australia would come to its ally’s assistance in a Taiwan Strait war. 35 But it is
the Japan factor that is more complex.
Several factors make a Japan connection possible. For reasons of geographical proximity Tokyo
would see a militarized crisis in the Strait directly affecting its own security. The United States
and Japan are giving increased attention to Taiwan Strait issues in their own relationship, 36 andJapan’s capabilities (including its naval forces) are an important part of East Asia’s militarybalance. There is also the simple fact that America’s plans for military contingencies in the Taiwan
Strait are likely to involve American forces normally based in Japan. This makes attacking targets
on and near Japan’s territory an obvious consideration for Beijing even if it appears as though
Tokyo wishes to stay out of the fight. 37 And if those targets are hit, the chances of a normally (and35 See Brendan Taylor, “Taiwan Flashpoint: What Australia can do to stop the coming Taiwan Crisis,” Policy Brief,

Lowy Institute for International Policy, 25 February 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/taiwanflashpoint-what-australia-can-do-stop-coming-taiwan-crisis
36 See Sheila A. Smith, “Much Ado About Taiwan,” Asia Unbound, Council on Foreign Relations, 21 April 2021,
https://www.cfr.org/blog/much-ado-about-taiwan
37 See Julian Ryall, “Japan troops won’t get involved if China invades Taiwan, PM Yoshiga says,” South China
Morning Post, 21 April 2021, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3130423/japan-troops-wont-getinvolved-if-china-invades-taiwan-pm

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constitutionally) very cautious Japan getting involved (as an act of self defense and also in
conjunction with its larger ally) might well increase.
As if this is not challenging enough, there is no cast iron guarantee that the DPRK will sit backand quietly watch the United States use force in Northeast Asia against Pyongyang’s main
guarantor. If Washington was getting fully distracted by an escalating and increasingly violent
Taiwan Strait crisis, would Pyongyang decide to add to America’s challenges by disruptive action
on or across the parallel? This would be an extremely risky time for the DPRK to be doing this.
And it might not be to China’s advantage. But the regional implications of a Taiwan Strait war
involving the United States and China would be more demanding than a non-violent Taiwan Strait
crisis.
China will also need to deal with the temptation of extending its attacks into another domain
entirely, by targeting the space-based communications systems38 which are crucial for America’s
military command and control capabilities. In turn the United States will also face perverse
incentives of its own which could also encourage escalation. For example, Washington’s national
security policymakers will need to consider how far into China US forces will need to target PLA
forces to restrain Beijing’s useable options. Of the many bases for PLA rocket forces that theUnited States would target in a conventional conflict, not all would necessarily be in coastal
locations adjacent to Taiwan. Deeper strikes may well be envisaged. Which brings us to the biggest
threshold of all.

The Nuclear Dimension
A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait will have a nuclear dimension regardless of whether theUnited States is directly involved. Both Taiwan and China know that the latter is nuclear armed
and could, at least in theory—but in violation of its No First Use policy—use nuclear weapons
against Taiwan.39 The nuclear dimension is intensified if the United States is factored in because
it means that two nuclear-armed great powers are on opposing sides of an armed conflict. It is

38 See Frank A. Rose, “Managing China’s Rise in Outer Space,” Brookings Institution, April 2020, pp. 4-8.
39 The possibility of China relying on nuclear threats against Taiwan is examined below.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificintensified further if we make the plausible assumption that one of the reasons that Taiwan isinterested in protection from the United States is that the latter has nuclear weapons. America’s
arsenal constitutes one of the main appeals of extended deterrence. But it also means that theUnited States needs to factor in China’s nuclear prowess when it considers the assistance it offers
to Taiwan in an armed conflict and the actions it is willing to take against China’s forces.40
There are more deliberate and less deliberate ways in which the threshold could be crossed from a
Taiwan Strait conventional armed conflict to one involving nuclear weapons. In terms of thedeliberate side of the equation, it cannot be exaggerated how big such a decision—by China, by
the United States, and/or by both—would be for course of the war and the course of history. Why
then might either of them be willing to violate the nuclear taboo that has been in place since 1945?
Under what circumstances would such a step make any sense at all as a deliberate policy choice?
We can take some solace that there is no obvious answer to these questions. But there are stillsome more detailed issues that need to be considered. For example, even if China has been
emboldened by its dominant cross-Strait military position to intensify its conventional attacks on
Taiwan as the crisis moves into war, it would end up encountering a different balance of military
power to the extent that the United States becomes involved. Of course, the latter comes with muchgreater immediate risks than it once did. American analysts may be increasingly aware of the costs
and risks of intervening militarily in a Taiwan Strait crisis. They may wonder how quickly theUnited States could reposition its forces for a more protracted conflict with China. Hence
Washington probably has less scope to repeat its 1996 playbook. It is arguably harder for theUnited States to deter a PLA attack on Taiwan today than it was a quarter of a century ago. And it
is certainly much harder for the United States to deter China from coercing Taiwan.
Yet if Taiwanese and American deterrence of China has failed, and China is at war with Taiwan,
Washington may very well decide to commit to a limited conventional war against China.
(Strategic ambiguity raises questions about the time, place, nature, and probability of an American
response. But these questions don’t allow us to conclude that if China attacks Taiwan, the UnitedStates won’t get involved in a fighting war). Notwithstanding China’s ability to put American

40 See Steve Chan, “Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Discerning Resolve and Commitment,” American

Journal of Chinese Studies, 21, June 2014, p. 84.

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forces at risk, American attacks on PLA force elements could have a devastating effect on China’s
military options as the crisis escalates. Some of these measures could be undertaken from a
distance: the United States could hold PLA mainland targets at risk even if China had a momentaryadvantage around Taiwan. And if China initially held the upper hand, Washington might haveextra reasons to put mainland PLA targets at risk.
If the United States pursued some of the conventional military steps implied earlier and degraded
China’s military by attacking PLA forces situated on the mainland, (including through attacks on
missile bases and command systems), then China would face a deteriorating correlation of forces.
China’s sense of vulnerability will be much greater than America’s. There is more than a passing
possibility that Beijing would feel it is time for making choices that mattered was closing in.
Perhaps in anticipation of these American measures, the Communist Party leadership may havealready decided that it is time to use “all options are on the table” language, hinting at nuclear
possibilities. Hinting is about as far as things might go. Writing over a decade ago, admittedly
when the distribution of military power was more strongly in America’s favor, Baohui Zhang
suggested that “the possibility of China threatening first use of nuclear weapons should not be
ruled out when a real crisis in the Taiwan Strait makes U.S. military intervention seemingly
unavoidable,” 41 which also reminds us that there is a difference between issuing a threat andcarrying it out.
But once those American precision attacks have begun (and China’s conventional and nuclear
deterrence has failed to prevent such an intervention) the situation changes. If China’s options tomanage and escalate the conventional conflict seem to be getting scarcer because of the effects ofAmerican strikes—actual as well as anticipated—what remaining choices will Beijing have aside
from crossing the nuclear threshold and putting an end once and for all to its no first use declaratory
policy? This runs against the assessment that “there is no evidence that China envisages using
nuclear weapons first to gain a military advantage by destroying U.S. conventional forces or togain a coercive advantage by demonstrating its greater resolve in a conflict with the UnitedStates.”42 But this envisaging has not been occurring when China is losing a conventional war
41 Baohui Zhang, “The Taiwan Strait and the Future of China’s No-First-Use Nuclear Policy,” Comparative Strategy,

27:2, 2008, p. 165.
42 Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, "Dangerous confidence? Chinese views on nuclear escalation,"International Security, 44:2, 2019, p. 83.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificagainst the United States. And surely the possible targets for a nuclear attack by China would not
be confined to the Strait, unraveling any remaining sense of a tacit agreement to limit thegeographical confines of the conflict. Would Beijing consider nuclear attacks on US territories in
the wider region—including Guam—if it really wanted to exercise some measure of intra-war
deterrence (to make the costs of continuing too great for Washington to handle?) Would it want tohold hostage cities and other targets in the Pacific coast of the US mainland?
The hostage-taking scenario may seem farfetched. But if China judged that America’s
conventional attacks were sufficiently damaging to warrant the use of nuclear weapons, it would
then be obliged to think ahead to what sort of American retaliation would ensue. Any such thinking
would be bound to focus minds on the very significant asymmetry between China’s and America’s
nuclear forces, and the absence of nuclear options on Beijing’s part that might communicate
intentions of fighting a limited nuclear war 43 (however preposterous that notion sounds). But
should escalation dominance in such a situation be judged by capability and doctrine (which would
favor the United States) or by desperation (which might favor China)?
At this point there is also an obligation to consider whether the United States might be the first of
the two nuclear-armed states in this crisis to use nuclear weapons. There is the decades-old
precedent of US nuclear threats against China in a Taiwan Strait crisis (which occurred several
years before China itself had a nuclear arsenal). But the mid-1950s were the era of massive
retaliation strategies, and America’s nuclear weapons were not used. And more than half a century
later, US decision-makers would also have some confidence that many of their military
objectives—including knocking out PLA systems on the mainland—could be achieved by using
advanced conventional systems (e.g., conventionally armed cruise missiles launched from
offshore). Moreover, while some US attacking options would be vulnerable to China’s pressure(including forces based in regional bases) the United States would retain long-range options(including bombers) that would be very hard for the PLA to reach.
But we need to ask whether the United States would use nuclear weapons first in a Taiwan Strait
conflict if the conventional phase of that war was heading strongly in China’s favor? In otherwords, if it looked like China had a good prospect of turning military outcomes in the Strait into a

43 See Cunningham and Fravel, p. 86.

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political victory: unification by force. Taiwan’s future could head in almost any direction,
including forceful absorption into China, without any obvious direct threat to America’s own
survival. Yet Taiwan’s absorption would imply that Washington had been defeated by China in
East Asia. America’s reputation amongst regional allies which depend on it (e.g., Japan and Korea)
would have been seriously affected. Japan’s own security, including against fears of being trapped
alongside a triumphant China, would be imperiled by the PLA’s ongoing presence in a Beijingcontrolled Taiwan. The temptation for nuclear proliferation in East Asia after America’s failure toprotect the interests of its allies would be strong. America’s national security policymakers mightargue that despite the enormous costs of using nuclear weapons, (and the moral opprobrium thatwould follow) at stake in choosing not to use them was the future of the East Asian equilibriumon which many United States vital interests depend.
What then of the less deliberate side of the nuclear ledger? Here I do not have in mind an entirely
accidental nuclear war—one in which no obvious decision to proceed with hostile acts wasinvolved. Instead there are risks in any close military-technical and doctrinal interdependence
between the conventional and nuclear forces of participants in what begins as a limited war in the
Taiwan Strait. The question here is a simple one about a complex situation: can either of the twosides (and especially the United States) put at risk the conventional forces of the other side (andespecially China’s) without also endangering the target country’s nuclear forces? Endangering
nuclear forces is not necessarily restricted to attacks on delivery systems and warheads—e.g., thenuclear armed variants of the PLA rocket forces. Also crucial are the command and control,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems for these nuclear forces, without which theirdelivery to target may be compromised or prevented. At stake here is China’s confidence that it
retains nuclear options in the event of a significant American conventional attack and America’s
confidence that it can attack China’s conventional capabilities without unintentionally putting at
risk China’s nuclear forces, creating more use them or lose them choices for the adversary.

This problem is not confined to considerations of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The late DesmondBall and I argued a few years ago that any colocation of the PLA’s conventional and nuclear
systems could create significant escalatory hazards in a conventional war between China and360

WMD in Asia-PacificJapan, which brought in the United States as Japan’s security guarantor. 44 Similar risks would bein play should some of the same mainland missile bases that China would use in conducting attacks
against Taiwan allow for nuclear as well as conventional options. David Logan argues that whilesome of these comingling problems have been overstated and others remedied by China’s militaryreforms, still more may be emerging. 45 P.W. Singer and Ma Xiu have noted that while it was
assumed that “the PLA was at least separating its nuclear and conventional forces into distinct andgeographically discrete brigades” the deployment of the intermediate range DF26 missile withboth conventional and nuclear payloads portends a new and worrying point of instability. 46 If thevery same missile offers nuclear as well as conventional options to China, the inadvertent
escalation problem raises its dangerous head.
In a thoughtful exploration, Talmadge suggests in the event the United States attacked thecapabilities that China was most likely to use in a missile bombardment across the Strait, China’s
leaders would still retain some of their most significant nuclear options (and the command andcontrol systems that would permit their use). 47 What matters less, she argues, are the technicalinterconnections. What matters more is whether China’s leaders believe (wrongly or rightly) that
the United States had decided on a counterforce mission (conventional or nuclear) designed todisarm China. And this version of the nuclear temptation will grow for China’s leaders, “as more
and more of their conventional and nuclear or nuclear-relevant assets come under threat during a
conventional war.”48 It needs hardly to be said that putting assets under threat is part of the modern
American military philosophy. This would extend to targeting China’s intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance systems, vital to PLA missile systems (and so reducing the threat to US forces)
but also crucial to China’s ability to know what was going on.
Given the analysis presented in the earlier portions of the current chapter, some early signs of thisproblem may appear before any violence occurs in the Strait if the United States and China areprobing, testing, and putting on notice their respective command, control, communication, and44 Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball, “Can a Sino-Japanese war be controlled?” Survival 56:6, 2014, pp. 135-166.
45 David C. Logan, “Are they reading Schelling in Beijing? The dimensions, drivers, and risks of nuclear-conventional

entanglement in China,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 2020, pp. 1-51.
46 P.W. Singer and Ma Xiu, “China’s ambiguous missile strategy is risky,” Popular Science, 11 May 2020.
https://www.popsci.com/story/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/china-nuclear-conventional-missiles/
47 Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear?” p. 83.
48 Talmadge, p. 87.

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computer systems. China will already be scurrying to perceive America’s intentions in the murky
twilight zone between an escalating crisis short of fighting and the firing of the first (kinetic) shots.
For example, what if China assesses that US cyber pressure on its military C4I systems puts at risksome of its nuclear options as well as some of its conventional systems? In an extreme case, might
China conclude that it stands to lose access to some of its nuclear options in a crisis before any
actual and physically obvious fighting begins? Escalatory pressures might then be building more
quickly than the American side realizes well before any (conventional) shots are fired.

Reducing Escalatory Hazards: Some Policy Priorities
An essay such as this is necessarily speculative, and it is easy to let those speculations run wild.
But it seems sensible to believe that China and the United States will do what they can to live up
to the view that nuclear weapons are only weapons of the very last resort, if they are to be used atall. Nuclear war in the Taiwan Strait is not impossible. But it probably means first climbing thelevels from tense calm to escalating crisis and coercive pressure, and then to escalating
conventional armed conflict, before the fateful last threshold is crossed. This means, for example,
that if Taiwan, China, and the United States can stop the escalation at any one of those earlier
stages, nuclear use is especially improbable. There are plenty of moments when the agency ofdecision-makers can intervene. We don’t have to let panic set in about the inevitability of panic
setting in. By the same token, escalation is not bound to stop through some sort of automatic
process. Neither should we assume that China and the United States can fight a conventional war“safely” in the Taiwan Strait because the fear of nuclear escalation puts a natural limit on how
awful things can get. More importantly, China and the United States can’t assume this either!
A lack of clarity around many of these firebreaks is bad news for those who have confidence inthe operation of the stability-instability paradox. We don’t know enough about what dynamics willplay out in a really serious Taiwan Strait crisis to be confident that central deterrence (whateverthat means today) will make a local war a guaranteed non-nuclear affair. It would be unwise fordecision-makers in Washington to assume that China’s No First Use declaratory policy creates asafe zone in practice for America’s behavior below the nuclear threshold. Beyond that threshold,there is also the fascinating but unsettling disconnect between China’s lack of confidence that war

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can be controlled once any nuclear weapons are used and American thinking that still finds a place
for limited nuclear options.49 The latter makes little sense if the other side believes full escalationis almost inevitable.
But there is some good news for those who think that political agency can outweigh strategic
hazards. What may seem like a relentless pathway across multiple thresholds can be halted in its
tracks by decision-makers who get their calls right. Of course, the best way for Taiwan, the UnitedStates, and China to avoid a Taiwan Strait crisis escalating to nuclear use is to avoid a crisis in the
Taiwan Strait. However, that is more a hope than a policy recommendation at a time when ChinaTaiwan political differences are intersecting with greater China-US competition. At the other endof the scale, it might seem an excellent idea to engage China in a discussion about reducing thedangers of inadvertent escalation that stem from the conventional-nuclear connections in its newest
missiles. But would Beijing welcome such a conversation if the outcome risked making it easier
for a strong adversary to attack the PLA’s conventional missile forces without running the risk ofengendering a nuclear response? Does China really want to remove this ambiguity in its entirety? 50
In between these very broad geopolitical settings and concrete military-technological realities,
there are some middle ground escalatory dangers that may be subject to moderation. In particular
this means that the two nuclear-armed participants in any future Taiwan Strait dramas havecommon interests which they ought to be considering.
•

China and the United States need an honest conversation about what incentives can bebrought to bear which encourage serious dialogue, including on arms control, in which
Beijing becomes a more willing and fulsome participant.

•China and the United States need to be involved in discussions on bilateral nuclear arms
control (even if an expanded START process does not appeal to Beijing, and even if aformal agreement is not achieved). This is one way of keeping the two great powers awarethat they have a joint responsibility to reduce the chances of a crisis between themdeveloping a nuclear dimension.

49 See Cunningham and Fravel.
50 On the logic of this ambiguity, see Singer and Ma.

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•

Crisis stability—and the dangers of crisis instability—needs to be a recurring subject in a
renewed process of US-China strategic dialogue and involve military, diplomatic, andpolitical leaders.

•

Both China and the United States need to recognize the risks of the murky zone between
escalating pressure and actual fighting in a regional contingency. They should be aiming
for formal or informal rules of the game on what differentiates unthreatening information
seeking from activities that put their forces at risk, including through cyber operations andother measures short of physical conflict.

•

China and the United States need to have tacit understandings about shared no-go areas ina Taiwan Strait crisis including assets that if attacked would be likely to generate
disproportionate retaliation. These tacit understandings (through convergent unilateral
restraint) will become even more important if formal dialogue remains stifled.

•

Taiwan and the United States need to identify what factors intensify the chances that an
early and dangerous resort to force (by Taiwan or China) will occur in a Taiwan Strait
crisis, and what this means for their understanding of America’s role. This is arguably more
important than a focus on the level of America’s security commitment to Taiwan.

•

Taiwan, the United States, and China have a common interest in all three actors ensuringthat they have redundant C4I systems that allow them to maintain control during an
escalating crisis and conventional conflict, reducing pre-emptive pressures. They should
all signal their reluctance to put these systems at risk in an escalating crisis.

To move forward on most, if not all, of these priorities, there is a deeper requirement. It is unwise
to expect China and the United States to leave their competition to one side. But it is responsible
to expect them to recognize that they do have common interests in spite of that competition, andthat some basic level of cooperation is required to allow their competition to continue. 51 The
United States and China do not need to see themselves as friends or close partners. But they mightwish to think of themselves as adversarial partners, a concept used by Coral Bell in depicting thelimits to competition in US-Soviet relations.52 Because even if their competition leads them into a

51 This is taken from an argument about the superpower nuclear competition in Stanley Hoffmann, The State of

War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Relations, (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 155.
52 See Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management, (Oxford University Press for theRoyal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York, 1971).

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WMD in Asia-Pacificfight over the Taiwan Strait, China and the United States will retain a common interest (sharedwith Taiwan) in controlling the escalation that could come next.
Moreover, if they can push back together on the continuing deterioration in their great power
relationship, they might also reduce the prospects of an especially hazardous Taiwan Strait crisis
developing in the first place. The problem is that this may rely on the reverse taking place. Do thetwo great powers need to find themselves in a very dangerous Taiwan Strait crisis before they both
recognize the urgency of enhanced communication, cooperation, and restraint?

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Asymmetric WMD Threats: DPRK Nuclear, Cyber, and Bio-Chemical Weapons Capabilities

13. Asymmetric WMD Threats: DPRK Nuclear,
Cyber, and Bio-Chemical Weapons Capabilities
Lee Sang-Hyun

Introduction
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK (informally, North Korea) maintains theworld’s fourth largest armed forces, with nearly 1.3 million active personnel, accounting for about
five percent of the total population. More than six hundred thousand others serve as reservesoldiers. The DPRK’s military power poses a constant threat to the security of Northeast Asia as
well as South Korea, Korea, officially the Republic of Korea (ROK).
The regime spent an average of $3.6 billion annually on the military between 2007 and 2017,
according to the US State Department. Although Pyongyang is outspent by its neighbors andadversaries in dollar-to-dollar comparisons and defense experts say it operates with aging
equipment and technology, the regime’s forward-deployed military position and missiles aimed atSeoul ensure that Pyongyang’s conventional capabilities remain a constant threat to its southernneighbor.1 The DPRK is qualitatively inferior to the ROK but has superior conventional forces in
number.
The DPRK maintains a readiness posture capable of carrying out a surprise attack at any given
time by positioning seventy percent of its ground force south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. The
forward-deployed 170mm self-propelled guns and 240mm Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs),
for instance, provide the DPRK with the capability for a large-scale and concentrated surprise firetargeted at the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area.

1 Eleanor Albert, “North Korea’s Military Capabilities,” Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder, updated

November 16, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-military-capabilities© 2022 Lee Sang-Hyun, CC BY 4.0

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WMD in Asia-PacificMore serious than conventional military force are various asymmetric threats posed by the DPRK.
In general, asymmetric threats refer to the use of unexpected means and methods to neutralize theopponent’s strengths and exploit weaknesses to prevent the other party from retaliating. DPRK’s
asymmetric threats consist of its active and increasingly-sophisticated nuclear weapons, ballistic
missiles, bio-chemical weapons, and cyberattacks.
Since the succession of power in 2011, the DPRK has maintained the stability of the regime
through reorganization and reshuffling of the whole state system. The regime is seeking a strategicchange by adopting a new strategic line in 2018 by focusing all efforts on building a socialist
economy, replacing the 2013 ‘byungjin’ policy of simultaneously developing its economy andnuclear weapons.
The DPRK unilaterally withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weaponsin January 2003, is not a party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and has conducted
six increasingly sophisticated nuclear tests since 2006. The DPRK is not a party to the Chemical
Weapons Convention, and is believed to possess a large chemical weapons program. Despite beinga state party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol, evidence
suggests the DPRK may maintain an offensive biological weapons program. 2
The ROK maintains conventional forces that are qualitatively superior to those of the DPRK, but
it cannot avoid relative inferiority in relation to the DPRK’s asymmetric force advantages. In
particular, it relies entirely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for nuclear weapons, and Seoul, a densely
populated area, is close to the border, making it vulnerable to DPRK’s asymmetric threats.

DPRK’s Asymmetric WMD Capabilities
1. Nuclear and Missile Threats
The DPRK declared ‘completion of nuclear weapons program’ in November 2017, and no nuclear
development trend was detected during the reconciliation between the United States and the ROK

2 Nuclear Threat Initiative, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/

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Asymmetric WMD Threats: DPRK Nuclear, Cyber, and Bio-Chemical Weapons Capabilities
from the following year. But it is pushing to upgrade its nuclear and missile capabilities again after
the Hanoi talks broke down.
The DPRK has nuclear fuel manufacturing and enrichment facilities, nuclear fuel cycle facilities,
nuclear reactors such as 5MWe graphite moderated reactors, and nuclear fuel cycle facilities suchas a radiochemical laboratory (reprocessing facility) at Yongbyon Nuclear Science ResearchCenter. It conducted a nuclear test at its nuclear test site in Punggye-ri by manufacturing nuclear
weapons from plutonium produced at its Yongbyon nuclear facility. In addition to the disclosed
Yongbyon nuclear complex and the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, the DPRK is also believed to havea number of unidentified nuclear facilities.
Nuclear weapons development is usually carried out in four stages: acquiring nuclear materials,
manufacturing nuclear explosive devices, nuclear tests, and miniaturization of the warheads. First,
the DPRK should secure enough fissionable material to produce nuclear weapons. To acquire
nuclear fissile materials such as plutonium (Pu) and highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium
production technology, reprocessing technology, and uranium enrichment technology are required.
Second, manufacturing nuclear explosive devices is a step to assemble nuclear materials anddetonators, and it is possible to declare nuclear possession at this stage without the need forreliability verification through nuclear tests. The DPRK officially declared its possession of
nuclear weapons in February 2005 after the Geneva Agreed Framework was scrapped. Third,
nuclear tests are necessary to verify the operation of nuclear explosive devices, improve theirperformance, such as nuclear fission conditions, and increase their power. To that end, the DPRK
conducted six nuclear tests. The fourth stage is to miniaturize and lighten nuclear warheads(diameter less than 90cm, weight less than 1 ton) and secure the reliability of the means of delivery.
Currently, it is believed to be at the fourth stage of its nuclear weapons development program. The
DPRK regime claimed that it achieved standardization, miniaturization, and lightweight of nuclear
warheads after its sixth nuclear test.
Experts estimate that the DPRK is believed to have twenty to sixty nuclear weapons and has
recently come close to having ballistic missile capabilities capable of carrying nuclear warheads
and striking the US mainland. The exact number of nuclear warheads held by the DPRK varies
depending on the evaluation agency and experts, and about twelve additional nuclear warheads are
expected to be produced annually. This is based on the production of a nuclear warhead (Pu 8 kg,
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HEU 20 kg) with an explosive yield of about 20 Kt, and depending on the analyst’s choice of
desired nuclear weapons explosive power attributed to the DPRK and the type and design ofwarhead, a realistic estimate of the DPRK’s capacity and quantity of the warheads varies,
depending on these assumptions.
To enhance its strategic attack capabilities, the DPRK has continuously developed nuclear
weapons. It first gained access to nuclear materials in the 1980s after operating the 5MWe reactor
located in the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex by reprocessing spent fuel rods. It is estimated topossess around 50kg of weapon-grade plutonium obtained from several rounds of reprocessing
spent fuel rods. The DPRK is also believed to possess a substantial amount of highly enricheduranium (HEU), and its ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons seems to have reached aconsiderable level. The amount of enriched uranium that can be produced at the Yongbyon nuclear
facility in 2010 is about two tons per year for 3.5 percent low-enriched uranium, and 40 kilograms
per year for weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium, which can be used to fabricate two small
nuclear weapons. However, assuming that the DPRK is hiding additional uranium enrichment
facilities, the production capacity of highly enriched uranium increases further. As of the end of
2018, a reasonable estimate of the maximum North Korean HEU production capacity andinventory amounts to 200 kilograms and 980 kilograms per year, respectively.3
Table 1: DPRK’s Nuclear Tests.
Sequence

Date

Location

Est. Yield

1

9 October 2006

Punggye-ri Test Site

0.7 - 2 kt

2

25 May 2009

Punggye-ri Test Site

2 - 5.4 kt

3

12 February 2013

Punggye-ri Test Site

6 - 16 kt

4

6 January 2016

Punggye-ri Test Site

7 - 16.5 kt

59 September 2016

Punggye-ri Test Site

15 - 25 kt

6

3 September 2017

Punggye-ri Test Site

70 - 280 kt

3 Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC), North Korean Nuclear Almanac 2020 (in Korean,2020), pp. 39-41.

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Asymmetric WMD Threats: DPRK Nuclear, Cyber, and Bio-Chemical Weapons Capabilities
The DPRK’s progression from the nuclear threshold to a heavily armed nuclear state withintercontinental reach is doing serious damage to the foundations of strategic stability in Northeast
Asia by eroding confidence in the ability and will of the United States to fulfill its security
guarantees to the ROK and Japan. While working for denuclearization, the United States, ROK,
and Japan have also been working to adapt and strengthen deterrence so as to stay ahead of theemerging threat. The US nuclear umbrella, which was designed in very different security
environments in 1991 and 2010, is increasingly outdated for the purpose of deterring the DPRK’s
nuclear threats. Hence, it must be modified to enable improved signaling of collective resolve tostand up to the DPRK’s nuclear bullying. Some experts suggest that we should move toward amore NATO-like posture which is based on ‘nuclear sharing’ in Northeast Asia. At the same time,
it is important to maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities fordeterrence, including missile defense. 4
The DPRK has been focusing on strengthening its ballistic missile capabilities since it announced
the completion of its nuclear weapons construction. After beginning the ballistic missile
developments in the 1970s, it produced and fielded the Scud-B and Scud-C missiles with rangesof 300km and 500km, respectively, in the mid-1980s. In the late 1990s, it fielded the Rodong
missile with a range of 1,300km and, later, the Scud-ER, which are Scud missiles with an extended
range. In 2007, the DPRK fielded the Musudan missile with a minimum range of 3,000km without
a test launch. Through these successive additions to its missile inventory, the DPRK has gained
direct strike capabilities against the ROK and the surrounding countries of the Korean Peninsula. 5

4Brad Roberts, “Living with a Nuclear-Arming North Korea: Deterrence Decisions in a Deteriorating Threat
Environment,” Stimson Center, 38 North Special Report, November 2020, pp. 14-15.
5 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2018 Defense White Paper (2018), pp. 32-33.

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WMD in Asia-PacificFigure 1: DPRK’s Missiles in Inventory or Under Development.6
The DPRK’s nuclear and missile capabilities are rapidly growing. The regime seems to be risking
its national survival on nuclear and missile development, especially after the succession of power
to Kim Jong-un.
Since the collapse of the Hanoi summit, the DPRK has intensively tested short-range missiles witha range of less than 1,000 kilometers on a total of sixteen occasions from May 2019 to August2020. The KN-23 has a pull-up function that makes it move up again in the final stage of the flight,
which is considered similar to the Russian Iskander missile, and is estimated to have a range of up
to 600 kilometers. The KN-24, called the North Korean version of ATCAMS, can fire continuously
and hit the entire Korean Peninsula with a range of up to 400 kilometers. KN-25 and KN-09,
although the DPRK called them multiple rocket launchers, are considered to be short-range
missiles in the sense that it is equipped with guided technology and shows ballistic missile flighttrajectories. Unlike conventional Scuds and Rodong missiles, the KN-23 and KN-24 used solid
fuel to enhance surprise attack capabilities and significantly improve the accuracy of target strikes.
The liquid-fueled Scud and Rodong missiles are likely to be exposed by US intelligence assets
before the launch, but KN-23 and KN-24 can be launched immediately, significantly improving
their survivability and surprise launch capabilities. The DPRK’s new guided weapons are also
considered more difficult to intercept through the ROK-US missile defense system.

6 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2018 Defense White Paper (2018), p. 34.

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Asymmetric WMD Threats: DPRK Nuclear, Cyber, and Bio-Chemical Weapons Capabilities
Although it is not yet certain whether these new short-range missiles can deliver nuclear warheads,
experts say that it may be possible enough. Jeffrey Lewis, a US missile expert, evaluates that the
KN-23 can be equipped with nuclear warheads. Another expert, Michael Elleman, estimates that
the KN-24 is 700 to 850 mm in diameter and is capable of mounting a 60-centimeter diameter
nuclear warhead.7
The DPRK’s rapid progress on intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launchedballistic missile (SLBM) capabilities is also alarming. It unveiled new missile capabilities during
its military parade on October 10, 2020, marking the 75th anniversary of the founding of the
Korean Workers Party. In particular, the two newly introduced strategic weapons attracted theattention of experts. One is the ‘Hwasong-16’ ICBM and the other is the ‘Pukguksong-4’ SLBM.
Hwasong-16, appears to be approximately 25-26 m long and 2.5-2.9 m in diameter—about 4-4.5
m longer and about 0.5 m larger in diameter than the DPRK’s Hwasong-15 ICBM flight tested
once in November 2017. Indeed, the new missile has been correctly characterized as the world’s
largest mobile ICBM—in part because countries with ICBMs generally seek to make their roadmobile ICBMs smaller so they can be more mobile and concealable. It is estimated that the new
missile’s launch weight at roughly 100,000-150,000 kg, compared to some 80,000 kg for the
Chinese DF-41 solid-propellant, road-mobile ICBM and about 104,000 kg for the former Soviet
SS-24 rail-mobile solid ICBM.8
The DPRK, which began developing SLBM in earnest in 2014, successfully test-fired the
Pukguksong-1 and 3. It unveiled Pukguksong-4 at the military parade in October 2020 andintroduced Pukguksong-5 at the military parade in January 2021. Although the Pukguksong-4 and5 have not yet been tested, it is estimated that they will be deployed on a mid-sized submarine ora nuclear-powered submarine planned for the future. The DPRK’s mid-sized submarines, which

7 Jeffrey Lewis, “Preliminary Analysis: KN-23 SRBM,” June 5, 2019, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation

Studies, https://nonproliferation.org/preliminary-analysis-kn-23-srbm/ ; Michael Elleman, “Preliminary Assessmentof the KN-24 Missile Launches,” 38 North, March 25, 2020, https://www.38north.org/2020/03/melleman032520/
8 Vann H. Van Diepen and Michael Elleman, “North Korea Unveils Two New Strategic Missiles in October 10
Parade,” 38 North, October 10, 2020, https://www.38north.org/2020/10/vdiepenmelleman101020/

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WMD in Asia-Pacificwere unveiled in July 2019, are expected to be able to carry at least 3-4 SLBMs, given the volumeof drainage and the shape of the bridge’s renovation. 9
Although this is a new progress in the DPRK’s overall capabilities, some analysts say that these
SLBM missiles could provide only a marginal addition to the threat posed by the DPRK’s muchlarger, increasingly longer range and much more survivable land-based ballistic missile force.
When The DPRK revealed a new type of conventionally powered ballistic missile submarine(SSB), many media sources termed this a ‘game changer’ and their reaction verged on a hystericalatmosphere of fear. But, in fact, the DPRK’s construction of a new-type SSB is far from new. We
do not know either whether the DPRK will build SSB force of at least several boats, which would
be required for a true second-strike capability. The new SSB appears to be based on the 1950svintage Soviet ROMEO-class diesel-electric submarine which are very noisy boats that are thus
highly susceptible to acoustic detection while having only a limited ability to know that they arebeing tracked by enemy submarines. The new-type SSB almost certainly is substantially lesssurvivable than the DPRK’s land-mobile ballistic missile force, and it would be even more
vulnerable if it were to be forward-deployed against the US West Coast or Hawaii. In this sense,
the DPRK’s new SSB is not an “existential threat” nor a “most menacing weapons” Kim Jong-un
has that can get pretty close to the continental United States.10
The last hurdle that the DPRK has to overcome is to complete an ICBM that can strike the US
mainland using atmospheric reentry vehicle technology. Advanced technologies such as ultraprecision flight posture control and composite materials are required to withstand the high heat(more than 7,000 degrees) and pressure caused by the warhead falling at a speed of more than
Mach 20. In March 2016, the DPRK revealed the status of a test for a reentry vehicle, but fromwhat is known by observers, it seems that they have not yet completed the technology. Anothertechnology the DPRK is trying to strengthen its ICBM capability is multiple independentlytargetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). When the DPRK revealed Hwasong-16 during its October
10 military parade, many experts speculated that this missile, which is considerably larger than the
9 Michael Elleman, “North Korea’s Newest Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, Same as the Old One?” 38 North,January 15, 2021, https://www.38north.org/2021/01/north-koreas-newest-submarine-launched-ballistic-missilesame-as-the-old-one/
10 Vann H. Van Diepen, “Cutting Through the Hype About the North Korean Ballistic Missile Submarine Threat,” 38North, September 6, 2019, https://www.38north.org/2019/09/vvandiepen090619/

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Asymmetric WMD Threats: DPRK Nuclear, Cyber, and Bio-Chemical Weapons Capabilities
Hwasong-15, may be designed to carry multiple warheads and decoys to ensure the penetrabilityof America’s missile defenses. Hwasong-16 will need to undergo flight trials conducted over a
couple of years to validate its performance and reliability. Nevertheless, there is circumstantial
evidence that the DPRK is developing MIRV technology. For example, it is likely that Hwasong12, given the fact that it separated in three pieces as it entered the atmosphere in August 2017, wasa post-boost vehicle (PBV) engine test, an important part of MIRV development.
Table 2. DPRK’s Major Missile Inventory11
Category

IRMBs, ICBMs

SLBMs,
Submarines

Name
MusudanHwasong-12
Hwasong-14
Hwasong-15
Hwasong-16
Pukguksong-1
Pukguksong-3

Range
3,000+ km~
5,000+ km~
10,000+ km~
13,000 km
13,000+ km~
1,000km2,000km

Pukguksong-4
Pukguksong-5
Sinpo
class
submarine, also
called the Gorae(whale)Mid-size
submarine
Nuclearsubmarine
KN-23

2,000km3,000km
1,800tondisplacement

KN-24

400km

New
TacticalKN-25(short-range)
missilesKN-09

3,000tondisplacement
5,000+
tondisplacement
600km

400km

250km

Remarks
Operational since 2016
Test launch, May 2017
Test launch, July 2017
Test launch, Nov. 2017
Revealed, Oct. 2020 parade
Test launch, August 2016
Test launch on a barge, Oct.
2019
Revealed, Oct. 2020 parade
Revealed, Jan. 2021 parade
Loadedwith
1
SLBM,
operational

Loaded with 3-4 SLBMs, Shaft
assembly complete
SLBM
capacity
unknown,
design phase
Test launch, May 2019, akaNorth Korean Iskander
Test launch, Aug. 2019, akaNorth Korean ATCAMS
Operational since July 2019,‘Super-large’ multiple launchrocket system
Continuously upgrading, firstrevealed in Oct. 2015, 300mm
rocket artillery system

11 Rearranged from Jungsup Kim, “North Korea’s Tactical and Strategic Weapons Development: Recent Trends,

Evolution of Doctrines, and Their Implications,” Sejong Institute, Sejong Policy Brief (in Korean), March 23, 2021;
other related information was collected from various sources by the author.

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WMD in Asia-PacificSo, what will be the future expectations? It is highly likely that the DPRK will no longer pursue
underground nuclear tests after six nuclear tests. It has not been confirmed whether there are more
underground nuclear test sites other than Punggye-ri. But arguably the DPRK’s 200kT nuclear test
already reached and perhaps exceeded the limit on the size of a nuclear test underground, however,the possibility of an atmospheric nuclear test on land or at sea cannot be ruled out. While the first
five nuclear tests were relatively small, the sixth one was more powerful than all the previous ones
combined. Given these circumstances, it would be reasonable to say that the DPRK’s nuclear
development is now nearing completion. 12
2. Cyber Threats
The DPRK’s continuing economic difficulties have caused not only a lack of conventional war
capability, but also a lax military discipline. It is difficult to maintain offensive conventional
military capabilities against the ROK’s superior armed forces. To overcome these difficulties, theDPRK has focused on developing North Korean-style strategies, tactics, and weapons systems,
and among them, its cyber capabilities are potentially as potent as its nuclear and missile
capabilities.
The DPRK has expanded its cyber capabilities, as manifested by the intensification of statesponsored attacks from the DPRK or its agents that the world has witnessed in the last decade.
Amongst the most blatant offensive cyber-attacks allegedly linked to North Korean-originatedhacker groups are the Sony Pictures attack, the WannaCry attack, and the DarkSeoul attack,although the DPRK consistently denies any involvement with these attacks, or the damage sufferedby them. The DPRK’s cyber army consists of approximately 7,000 hackers, performing a wide
range of activities including theft, denial of service (DDoS), espionage and sabotage.
In fact, the DPRK’s cyber capabilities, including hacking, are considered world-class. Kim Jongun had earlier stressed that “cyber warfare, along with nuclear weapons and missiles, is an allround sword that guarantees the merciless striking capability of the Korean People’s Army.” This

12 Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC), North Korean Nuclear Almanac 2020 (in Korean,2020), pp. 19-20.

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Asymmetric WMD Threats: DPRK Nuclear, Cyber, and Bio-Chemical Weapons Capabilities
was revealed during the National Assembly intelligence committee audit hearing by National
Intelligence Service chief Nam Jae-joon.13
The DPRK’s illegal cyber activities pose a serious security threat not only to the ROK but also to
the international community. The DPRK does not hesitate to launch cyberattacks to secure cash as
its long-standing sanctions have deepened its international isolation.
While the DPRK’s illegal cyber activities in the past focused mainly on the theft of sensitive
information, the DPRK’s behavior has recently changed to cyber-financial theft. To this end, theDPRK has constructed cyberattack capabilities in more diverse and creative ways to generate
revenues for regime survival, in addition to military and strategic purposes. Two main shifts in
Pyongyang’s cyber operations are observed: first, an increase in cyber-attacks aimed at financial
gain; and second, a decrease in the visibility of cyber operations at espionage and information
gathering.14 The DPRK is very interested in cyber foreign currency earnings through hacking. It
is difficult for the ROK to even calculate the amount of damage it suffered from the DPRK’s
cyberattacks.
After the hacking of Sony Pictures in November 2014, the DPRK’s cyberattacks have expanded
into political, military, and strategic targets, as well as seeking financial gains at the same time.
The 2016 hacking cost Bangladesh Bank 81 million dollars and Chile National Bank 10 million
dollars in 2019. The group that attacked the banks was identified as a hacker group called theLazarus Group in the DPRK. Cyber security firm FireEye referred to Lazarus as ‘Advanced
Persistent Threats (APT)-38’ and confirmed Lazarus was linked to the DPRK government or
government-backed military units. Lazarus recently led the hacking of cryptocurrency, which
resulted in losses of more than $500 million. It is suspected that in 2017 and 2018, it hacked mainly
Korean bitcoin exchanges (Bithumb, Coinness, Youbit, and Yapizon) and attacked Japan’s
exchange stations, CoinCheck. 15

13 Joongang Daily, November 5, 2013, https://news.joins.com/article/13048072
14

Chong Woo Kim and Carolina Polito, “The Evolution of North Korean Cyber Threats,” The Asan Institute for Policy
Studies, Issue Brief, February 2019, p. 2.
15 Sang-ho Lee, “North Korea’s Cyberattack Capabilities and Cyber Fundraising,” Monthly North Korea (월간북한),

2020.

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
A US internet security company Recorded Future analyzed in February 2020 that in the DPRK,
where public internet access is prohibited, internet usage has increased by about 300 percent overthe past three years. The report analyzed that the DPRK is making all-out efforts to mine, steal,and produce cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, Lightcoin, and Moreno. In particular, the DPRK isbelieved to have mined more than ten times compared to the previous year by concentrating onMoreno. Moreno is known to be more anonymous than Bitcoin, and is easier to mine than Bitcoin,
which is almost impossible to mine new. 16
The DPRK reacts violently whenever reports of hacking and stealing of the DPRK’s
cryptocurrency are reported. Despite the DPRK’s strong denials, it is almost certain that it uses thestolen cryptocurrency as a means of avoiding sanctions. It is clear that the DPRK, which has
narrow channels of earning foreign currency due to sanctions, will strengthen its activities to earn
foreign currency through hacking attacks on financial institutions around the world or taking away
cryptocurrency. It is always possible however improbable that the DPRK will actually use nuclear
weapons or short or intermediate range missiles against the ROK. But its cyber operations are far
more effective and profitable. The DPRK is training a number of excellent hackers at very low
cost who are able to exploit the huge and porous attack surfaces presented by its leading adversaries
with their open societies and poor cyber-security practices. The DPRK’s cyberattack capabilities
present a far more realistic and immediate threat than its strategic asymmetric weapons such as
nuclear and missile programs, with their massive research, development and deployment costs, or
its conventional military, which requires enormous resources simply to maintain. In short, cyberforces are actually the DPRK’s all-around, most effective asymmetric arsenal.
It is true that North Korean hackers can’t do more direct damage than a nuclear weapon. However,the DPRK can unleash its hackers, even in peacetime, while keeping its nuclear-tipped arsenal in
wait. It is also true that the DPRK isn’t the only country that uses cyberattack capabilities for its
national interest. In comparison with other US adversaries like Iran, Russia, and China, the
DPRK’s propensity to use its hackers for crime—robbing banks and emptying cryptocurrency
wallets, according to US Department of Justice—is outstanding. For example, Iran used cybercapabilities to take aim at Saudi Arabia’s oil production, and Russia has used cyber capabilities tounsettle states in its orbit, especially Georgia and Baltic states. Analysts indicate that Russia and16 Ibid.

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Asymmetric WMD Threats: DPRK Nuclear, Cyber, and Bio-Chemical Weapons Capabilities
Iran will do some disruptive cyber-attacks but less cyber-crime. China’s cyber-warriors also
overlap with cyber-criminal groups but have not done as much in the way of cyber disruption. The
DPRK, in contrast, doesn’t seem to respect those boundaries. It launched several disruptive attacks
against the ROK, including a huge theft of military secrets of ROK’s armed forces. The DPRK isalso believed to be involved in the WannaCry ransomware attack, which infected tens of thousandsof computers and sent several UK hospitals offline in 2017. Pyongyang’s willingness to mix crimewith state-directed cyberthreats makes it almost uniquely problematic. 17
In response to increasing the DPRK’s cybercrimes, US Department of Justice charged three North
Korean individuals for stealing and extorting more than $1.3 billion in cash and cryptocurrency
from banks and business around the world. According to the indictment filed in December 8, 2020,
three defendants—Jon Chang Hyok, Kim Il, And Park Jin Hyok—work for the Reconnaissance
General Bureau, the DPRK’s military intelligence agency. The agency houses hacking units
known by various names, including Lazarus Group and Advanced Persistent Threat 38 (APT38).
The DPRK has previously denied being involved in hacking operations. The indictment builds
upon 2018 charges brought against one of the alleged hackers in connection with the 2014
cyberattacks on Sony Pictures Entertainment. Three North Koreans, operating under several
pseudonyms, were charged for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud including
destructive cyberattacks on entertainment companies, bank cyber-enabled heists, cryptocurrency
heists, and ATM cash-outs. The indictment shows the degree to which the DPRK relies oncybertheft to obtain hard currency under the continuing United Nations and US sanctions, further
isolated by a self-imposed coronavirus blockade. According to prosecutors, the hackers managed
to steal at least $190 million, although nobody knows exactly how much was stolen. Prosecutors
said the North Koreans were unable to get at least $1 billion of the $1.3 billion they targeted,mostly in banks.18
As the coronavirus situation worsens around the world, the DPRK is even attempting to hack into
coronavirus information. It attempted to steal Covid-19 vaccine technology from the US
17 Morten Soendergaard Larsen, “While North Korean Missiles Sit in Storage, Their Hackers Go Rampant,” Foreign

Policy, March 15, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/15/north-korea-missiles-cyberattack-hacker-

armies-crime/
18 Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. accuses three North Koreans of conspiring to steal more than $1.3 billion in cash andcryptocurrency,” The Washington Post, February 18, 2021.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificpharmaceutical company Pfizer, according to South Korean intelligence officials. It is currently
unclear what, if any, data was stolen. The ROK’s National Intelligence Service reportedly briefed
lawmakers about the alleged attack. According to the NIS briefing, the DPRK attempted to hackthe servers of an ROK drug manufacturer to obtain technology information on the company’s
coronavirus vaccine and treatment. 19 In November 2020, Microsoft said at least nine healthorganizations including Pfizer had been targeted by state-backed organizations in the DPRK and
Russia. It said North Korean groups dubbed Zinc and Cerium, and a Russian group nicknamed
Fancy Bear, were responsible. While many of the break-in attempts failed, Microsoft warned at
the time that some had been successful.20 The DPRK closed its borders in January 2020 soon after
the virus began to emerge in China; since then it has yet to report a single case of coronavirus.21
But many public health specialists believe the DPRK is highly vulnerable to the pandemic and that
it is desperately seeking zero cost ways to obtain vaccines so that it may resume domestic economic
activity.
There is much evidence that the DPRK is engaged in various illegal activities in cyberspace. Aslong as the coronavirus pandemic continues and the DPRK’s economic difficulties continue, thecyberattacks will also continue.
3. Biological and Chemical Threats
The ROK government maintains the DPRK began producing chemical weapons in the 1980s andcurrently holds a stockpile of an estimated 2,500–5,000T of chemical weapons. The ROK Ministryof Defense asserts that the DPRK is capable of cultivating and producing various types of
biological agents, such as anthrax, smallpox, and pests. 22 In fact, not much is known about the
DPRK’s biological and chemical weapons programs. There have been no reports of transactions
or proliferation of biological and chemical weapons involving the DPRK in recent years.

19 “N. Korea attempted to steal COVID-19 vaccine, treatment technology via hacking: NIS,” Yonhap News Agency,

February 16, 2021, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210216008451315
20 “North Korea accused of hacking Pfizer for Covid-19 vaccine data,” BBC, February 16, 2021,

https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-56084575
21 “North Korea again claims zero COVID-19 cases after testing roughly 24,500 people,” NK News, December 4,2021, https://www.nknews.org/2021/04/north-korea-again-claims-zero-covid-19-cases-after-testing-roughly-24500-people/
22 Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2018 Defense White Paper (2018), p. 34.

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Asymmetric WMD Threats: DPRK Nuclear, Cyber, and Bio-Chemical Weapons Capabilities
One strong reason to believe that the DPRK may still maintain a chemical weapons program is theassassination of Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son of deceased North Korean leader Kim Jong-il andthe half-brother of Kim Jong-un. Kim Jong-nam was killed on 13 February 2017 when he was
attacked with VX nerve agent at Kuala Lumpur International Airport, Malaysia. Four North
Korean suspects left the airport shortly after the assassination and reached Pyongyang without
being arrested. Other North Koreans were arrested but were released without charge. Two women,
one Vietnamese, the other Indonesian, were charged with murder. They claimed they thought it
was part of a TV show program. DPRK was relisted as a state sponsor of terrorism by the UnitedStates on 20 November 2017, with the assassination cited as one of the reasons.
As for the DPRK’s biological weapons program, known information is even more limited. Manyof the terms used by the US government in discussing the possibility that the DPRK and othercountries are developing or possessing biological weapons are highly ambiguous. Also, there is ahigh degree of uncertainty about what the purported North Korean biological weapons program
actually entails. There is a lack of consistency in the public assessments of the US and South
Korean governments or between the assessments and the policy responses of those governments.
In the final analysis, the DPRK may once have had and may still be pursuing a biological weapons
capability. It is also possible that it never moved beyond research and development of biologicalagents and the establishment of a biotechnical infrastructure that could support future biologicalweapons production. It is also possible that the DPRK program never moved beyond planning or,whatever its previous nature, the program has essentially ended. But one thing seems clear –nothing in the official public record to date indicates that the DPRK has an advanced biologicalweapons program, notwithstanding media reports to the contrary. 23
Although there is a lack of recent evidence regarding the DPRK’s biological and chemical
weapons, we cannot rule out the possibility that it might use them in the worst-case scenario. In
particular, the ROK’s greatest threat is the attack from DPRK long-range artillery deployed along
the DMZ with biological and chemical agent payloads. In fact, this case is more threatening than

23 Elisa D. Harris, “North Korea and Biological Weapons: Assessing the Evidence,” 38 North Special Report,

November 2020, pp. 5-6.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificnuclear weapons or ballistic missiles. ROK plans to use artillery radar to identify and destroy thesource of the threat if the DPRK fires a long-range artillery, but there are fundamental limitations.

DPRK’s Asymmetric Threats: Real or Contrived?
The DPRK claims that it has developed nuclear weapons because of the US hostile policy toward
the DPRK and will continue to strengthen its nuclear deterrent capability to prevent the UnitedStates from invading the DPRK. In traditional nuclear deterrence theory, deterrence usually refers
to the practice of discouraging or restraining other states from taking unwanted actions, such as anarmed attack. It involves an effort to stop or prevent an action, as opposed to the closely related
but distinct concept of ‘compellence,’ which is an effort to force an actor to do something—including stopping something that they are already doing.
The classic literature distinguishes between two fundamental approaches to deterrence. Deterrence
by denial strategies seek to deter an action by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus
denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives—deploying sufficient local
military forces to defeat an invasion, for example. Deterrence by punishment, on the other hand,threatens severe penalties, such as nuclear escalation or severe economic sanctions, if an attack
occurs. These penalties are connected to the local fight and the wider world. The focus ofdeterrence by punishment is not the direct defense of the contested commitment but rather threatsof wider punishment that would raise the cost of an attack. 24 This concept of deterrence can beapplied mainly to strategic relations between powerful countries, but it is difficult to apply it tonuclear strategies of weak countries such as the DPRK. For this reason, various analyses havebeen made on the DPRK’s intentions and postures related to its nuclear weapons.
Assessing the DPRK’s nuclear threats, there are two kinds of threats posed by its nuclear weapons.
One is the intended threat posed by the offensive nuclear doctrine, and the other is an unintended
threat, such as a sudden collapse of the DPRK regime or preemptive use of nuclear weapons by
misjudgment.

24 Michael Mazarr, “Understanding Deterrence,” RAND Corporation, 2018https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE295/RAND_PE295.pdf, pp. 2-3.
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Asymmetric WMD Threats: DPRK Nuclear, Cyber, and Bio-Chemical Weapons Capabilities
According to Vipin Narang, an expert on nuclear strategy, new nuclear weapons states are
generally likely to choose one of three types of nuclear strategies. The first is the strategy of using
nuclear weapons for ‘catalytic’ purposes. This is when a new nuclear power uses nuclear weapons
to bring its existing benefactor closer to its side. A state which adopts this posture has a small
number of nuclear weapons but uses them to get a superpower—usually the United States—tointervene on its behalf. In this sense, the weapons are the catalyst that forces the stronger states tosmooth over regional conflicts. It’s a political strategy that’s designed to strengthen the reliabilityof a superpower patron in a conflict to help the state and is only available to the regional powers.
The second is the ‘asymmetric escalation’ strategy. It refers to the use of nuclear weapons
preemptively to force an end to a crisis or conflict or to gain political advantage. In this posture, astate deploys a nuclear arsenal to present a credible threat of a first nuclear strike, in response to aconventional, non-nuclear attack. This is explicitly designed to deter conventional conflict.
Countries with this posture tend to delegate authority for a strike to certain military leaders—which
may present problems for the rest of the world, since the procedures for using nuclear weapons
may not involve many safeguards. The challenge is really command and control, safely managing
its nuclear arsenal.
The third is the ‘assured retaliation’ strategy. It is a case in which a nuclear weapon is operated
with the aim of avoiding a pre-emptive nuclear strike and ensuring a second nuclear strike with asurviving nuclear weapon. This posture exists when a state develops a sufficiently large anddispersed arsenal to be able to retaliate if it is the victim of a nuclear attack. This is the classic
nuclear strategy where the state is developing nuclear weapons basically to assure the existence ofthe state. This strategy is exemplified by China and India. Having a secure second-strike capability
is designed to deter nuclear use and coercion. The strategic drawback to this posture is that it
sacrifices some deterrent power against conventional conflict. Enemies may assume that limited
conventional battles are very unlikely to escalate and involve nuclear arms. 25
There are mixed analyses on the DPRK’s nuclear posture. The country is likely to threaten the useof nuclear weapons for catalytic purposes to induce China to intervene in the event of a serious

25 Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 2014).

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WMD in Asia-Pacificregime threat from outside. The DPRK’s nuclear strategy, however, is believed to be evolving
toward securing a viable second-strike capability.
It is believed that the DPRK is struggling to develop SLBMs also to secure the ability for asurvivable second-strike capability. It has conducted several rounds of cold-launching test of an
SLBM. Whether successful or not, these efforts mean that the DPRK is trying to diversify its
missile capabilities, threaten Japan beyond the ROK, protect missiles from the US first-strikeattacks, and expand the foundation for retaliatory attacks on the ROK and Japan.
Given the power and number of warheads that the DPRK is developing, it is unlikely to opt for a
strategy to concentrate all of its nuclear forces in the early stages of the war. It will pursue a strategy
to strengthen its nuclear capability enough to withstand retaliation by the ROK-US combinedforces after a limited surprise attack, thereby taking the initiative in the process of developing thesituation and ending the situation in an advantageous position. Its most logical strategy is to end
escalation by using nuclear threats after it caused considerable damage to the ROK with a surpriseconventional attack and before the situation goes to next stage of escalation. 26
Whatever the DPRK’s intention is to use nuclear weapons, the DPRK’s nuclear weapons pose aserious security threat not only to the ROK but also to all states in Northeast Asia. The ROK has
no means of responding to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons except for relying on the US nuclear
umbrella. There is little possibility of developing nuclear weapons independently, at least in theforeseeable future. In this sense, the DPRK’s nuclear program is an existential risk to ROK’s
security.
On the DPRK’s threat perception, the United States shares a similar view. According to a reportpublished by US Congress, House Armed Services Committee, the DPRK continues its unabatedmarch toward full nuclearization under the leadership of Kim Jong-un. In July 2017, the DPRK
successfully launched its first intercontinental ballistic missile, which is likely capable of striking
the United States. Since then, it has continued to build and test increasingly sophisticated nuclear
weapons and missiles, even as it suffers heavy sanctions by the international community. Of
further concern, especially to US security partners ROK and Japan, is the DPRK’s significant

26 Kang Choi, “North Korea’s Nuclear Threats: Challenges and Responses,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Asan

Report, September 2016, pp. 79-84.

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Asymmetric WMD Threats: DPRK Nuclear, Cyber, and Bio-Chemical Weapons Capabilities
production and stockpile of biological and chemical weapons. It also maintains an exceptionallylarge conventional military force, a significant threat to regional allies and US forces in the
Pacific.27
On October 10, 2020, the DPRK celebrated the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’
Party of Korea (WPK), the country’s ruling party. The occasion was celebrated in a grand way,with an unprecedented pre-dawn military parade. Thousands of uniformed military personnel
marched through Pyongyang’s renovated Kim Il-sung Square in perfect unison, trailed by scoresof heavy military vehicles. Kim said that his nuclear weapons “will never be abused or used as ameans for preemptive strike. He clarified, however, that if “any forces infringe upon the securityof our state and attempt to have recourse to military force against us, I will enlist all our mostpowerful offensive strength in advance to punish them.” This was a restatement of the DPRK’s
offensively oriented nuclear strategy, which reserves the right for nuclear first use to deter adverse
military action against its territory or leadership. 28
Regarding denuclearization talks, the DPRK’s position is straightforward. It has consistently used
the term “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” instead of “denuclearization of the North.” Itargues that the United States should completely eliminate its nuclear threat to the DPRK before
removing the DPRK’s nuclear threat. The elimination of the US nuclear threat directly refers to
the dismantlement of its nuclear umbrella pledge. This leads to a ban on the import of strategic
assets such as strategic bombers that fly to the Korean Peninsula every time the DPRK provokes
a missile, and a suspension of ROK-US joint military drills. This is ultimately a demand that leads
to the withdrawal of US troops from the ROK. Unless these demands are met, it seems improbablethat the DPRK will ever denuclearize itself alone. For this reason, denuclearization negotiations
between the United States and the DPRK are expected to be very difficult.
Regarding the DPRK’s cyber threats, a tentative conclusion is that although its cyber operations
are rather unsophisticated and of relatively rudimentary nature, it is rapidly becoming a real andexistential threat to the international community. The DPRK’s cyber capabilities are evolving and27 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, “Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020,” September 23,

2020, p. 25.
28 Ankit Panda, “A Nuclear North Korea’s Wake-up Call,” The Diplomat, October 13, 2020,

https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/a-nuclear-north-koreas-wake-up-call/384

WMD in Asia-Pacificadapting day-by-day. Numerous government and private institutions around the world have been
hit hard by North Korean hacking. The DPRK’s cyberattacks have become more frequent ingeneral as international isolation has intensified due to international sanctions.
Given these realities, how should the ROK respond to the DPRK’s asymmetric threats? There are
not many options for the ROK and the future prospects are not very bright. The DPRK is expected
to continue to strengthen all of its possible military capabilities. In a report at the 8th Workers'
Party Congress, Kim Jong-un ordered the DPRK’s conventional military power to become more“high-tech, intelligent, precise, unmanned, high-performance, and lightweight.” Regarding nuclear
and missile power, Chairman Kim stressed the need to further strengthen nuclear power so that the
DPRK can take more initiative in curbing its nuclear war. Kim Jong-un has disclosed the list of
weapons he wanted: multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), hypersonicmissiles, nuclear submarines, SLBMs, and military reconnaissance satellites—weapons being
competitively developed by the United States., China, and Russia or being developed or boughtby the ROK.29 Given the long timelines—some of them decadal—of some of these objectives, one
may infer that Kim Jong-un is planning to keep the nuclear arsenal for at least as long as his own
leadership might last.
It is not easy to analyze the DPRK's intentions based on the asymmetric threat it poses. This isbecause it not only has standard WMD arsenals such as chemical, biological and nuclear
capabilities, but also a cyberforce of real substance. It may not be appropriate, therefore, for theinternational community (including the United States) to apply to the DPRK lessons learned fromnegotiations dealing with various nuclear, cyber, and biochemical threats in other parts of theworld. This inapplicability arises because the DPRK is a very unusual system. The DPRK which
is ruled by Kim dynasty is sui generis. It is not like Iraq or Iran.
In late January 2021 US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin stated that “Even as we address
accelerating competition by China, we will ensure that we remain fully ready to respond to and

29 Min Hong, “Analysis of the 8th Party Congress of WPK in North Korea (1): Strategic Basis,” Korea Institute for

National Unification, Online Series, January 15, 2021, https://www.kinu.or.kr/pyxis-api/1/digital-

files/1d2bb338-30e8-4fe8-99f3-26640c01fc86
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Asymmetric WMD Threats: DPRK Nuclear, Cyber, and Bio-Chemical Weapons Capabilities
effectively deter nation-state threats emanating from Russia, Iran, and the DPRK.” 30 He also notedthat the DPRK is one of only a handful of countries that pose threats to the United States and its
allies.
Austin explained, “We will seek to impose cost where necessary, while using all of our tools tolower the risk of escalation with our adversaries and respond to challenges below the level ofarmed conflict. We will continue to maintain credible deterrence against advanced threats, and wewill right‑size our mission around the world in a transparent and principled manner.” 31 His remark
is standard boilerplate, especially useless when applied to Pyongyang. 32
Given these evidences, we can cautiously conclude that the DPRK’s nuclear doctrine can besummed up as seeking minimum deterrence against the US while seeking deterrence bypunishment that discourages provocative military actions through threats to impose unaffordable
retaliation on its counterpart. Minimum deterrence requires securing a second strike capability thatallows meaningful retaliation with residual nuclear power after a preemptive strike by the enemy.
For this goal, strategic nuclear weapons should be able to destroy large cities and industrial
facilities in the other country, so the key is to maintain the viability and retaliatory capability ofearly nuclear weapons. This posture is similar to the ‘assured retaliation’ posture, which, according
to the Vipin Narang’s classification, allows direct retaliation against adversaries—that is, theUnited States. For a strategy of minimum deterrence or assured retaliation to be established, thesurvival of the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal and its ability to strike the US mainland are key, and its
recent series of actions support this view. Although the DPRK declared ‘completion of theconstruction of nuclear weapons’ in late 2017, one cannot say that it has established a firm
retaliation capacity against the United States in terms of nuclear military power. Therefore, theDPRK is expected to make continuous efforts to upgrade its nuclear and missile capabilities, atleast for the time being.

30 “U.S. defense chief shortlists N. Korea as ‘nation-state threat’,” Yonhap News Agency, March 5, 2021,

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210305000600325
31 Ibid.
32 Doug Bandow, “Does North Korea Keep Lloyd Austin Up at Night?” The National Interest, March 20, 2021,

https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/does-north-korea-keep-lloyd-austin-night-180585
386

WMD in Asia-PacificConclusions
The asymmetrical threats posed by the DPRK are not only existential threats to the ROK, but theyalso undermine stability in Northeast Asia and pose global threats to the entire international
community. The DPRK’s nuclear capability is estimated to be near completion, with only the stageof weaponization remaining. As a means of delivering nuclear weapons, various ballistic missile
capabilities are rapidly advancing. Cyber threat capabilities are mainly focused recently on cash
extortion through illegal cyber activities as the DPRK’s economic difficulties and international
isolation deepens due to the spread of COVID-19 pandemic. However, cybercriminal capacity
may also be deployed in cyberwarfare, and pose a real threat to US, ROK, and allied forces
operating in Korea. In the case of biochemical weapons, there has been no clear activity orevidence recently, but there is also no evidence that the DPRK has scrapped these weapons
programs. Thus, due to its extraordinary opacity, it poses a real threat to both nuclear and missile,
cyber and biochemical weapons.
As time goes by, the DPRK will upgrade its nuclear and missile capabilities, and its nuclear threats
will expand beyond the Korean Peninsula to a level that challenges regional and global security.
The DPRK is unlikely to give up its nuclear program, which it believes is the best means to ensure
the survival of its regime. It is also difficult to resolve the issue peacefully through dialogue andnegotiations. If this conclusion is correct, then we should devise and implement strategies for the
DPRK on the premise that the conflict will last a long time.
The DPRK will give up only if the cost of possessing nuclear weapons threatens the survival of its
regime. Incentives such as economic aid and a peace treaty alone cannot induce nuclear
renunciation. While leaving open the possibility of dialogue with the DPRK, the realistic response
is to approach the DPRK with the premise that only omnidirectional and active pressure willchange the DPRK’s strategic calculus. A new strategy should be developed, therefore, to make the
DPRK pay more and make it regret missed opportunities for dialogue and to prepare the way forfurther talks aimed at least at slowing if not reversing its accrual of WMD.
If the DPRK’s nuclear capability is enhanced and its threatening rhetoric is further heightened,
ROK’s dependence on US strategic assets will further increase. As geopolitical conditions on the
Korean Peninsula make it difficult to guarantee ROK’s absolute security from DPRK attacks, it387

Asymmetric WMD Threats: DPRK Nuclear, Cyber, and Bio-Chemical Weapons Capabilities
seems inevitable that the ROK will upgrade its offensive and defensive military capabilities while
making full use of various US strategic assets—such as multi-layered missile defense networks,
strategic bombers, Aegis destroyers, nuclear submarines, and nuclear aircraft carriers.
Regarding cyber threats, the ROK must keep a close watch on espionage activities to correctly
estimate the DPRK’s cyber capabilities. It must continuously adapt and build up capabilities tocounter rapidly evolving cyber threats not only in the technical domain, but also through devisingcommon responses with international partners.
The ROK could benefit from establishing closer collaboration, both on a bilateral and multilaterallevel, with countries that have experienced or become the victims of the DPRK cyber-attacks.
Intelligence sharing can help all parties involved to overcome their security problems byaddressing each other’s cyber system weaknesses. Also, sharing the lessons the ROK has learned
from its past with different countries will enhance its position in the international arena as an ‘issue
specific’ security provider. 33
It is very important to seek a military response to the asymmetric threat posed by the DPRK, butthat is not enough. The ROK should strengthen its efforts to induce the DPRK into becoming anormal state in Northeast Asia via a peace process on the Korean Peninsula in the long run. Whileeasing military tensions on the Korean peninsula, efforts should be made to build trust between
the DPRK and its neighbors. In the end, the best way is to make it realize that threatening the ROKor neighboring countries with asymmetric threats will not pay off but will only hasten the end of
the Kim regime.

33 Chong Woo Kim and Carolina Polito, “The Evolution of North Korean Cyber Threats,” The Asan Institute for Policy

Studies, Issue Brief, February 2019, pp. 9-10.

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Section 3

GREAT POWER RISK REDUCTION MEASURES AND LESSONS FOR THE
ASIA-PACIFIC
Dmitry Stefanovich
TRILATERAL STRATEGIC CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN
SOUTHERN ASIA
Feroz Hassan Khan
IS A NUCLEAR DOMINO IN NORTHEAST ASIA REAL AND INEVITABLE?
Chung-in Moon
NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONES IN ASIA
Tuya Nyamosor
NPT-TPNW STANDOFF: WHO CAN BREAK THIS GRIDLOCK?
Nobuyasu Abe
HOPE BECOMES LAW: THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
Richard Tanter

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Great Power Risk Reduction Measures and Lessons for the Asia-Pacific

14. Great Power Risk Reduction Measures andLessons for the Asia-PacificDmitry Stefanovich

Introduction
Risk reduction is one of the major tasks the international arms control, non-proliferation, anddisarmament community struggles with today. Risks in the nuclear domain are among the mostthreatening faced by humanity for the simple reason that nuclear weapons are the most destructive
instruments of war ever deployed and seem to remain so for a long time. 1 If living under constantthreat of nuclear devastation is unnerving, it is even more so when one learns from senior nuclear
decision makers that it was sheer luck as much as good judgement that humanity has survived thislong.2 It is irresponsible to leave the matters of such importance and danger to luck, so some actual
nuclear risk reduction measures have been developed and put in place, with different levels of
success.
There is substantial research on the topic of nuclear risk reduction. 3 This paper focuses on practicaltakeaways and solutions.

1 Other weapons of mass destruction are a great threat to humanity as well, however the immediate destructive

power of nuclear weapons explosion (blast wave, radiation, fire) is simply unmatched by anything else evercreated by people, not to mention the radiobiological effects and long-term contamination. Detailed information
on nuclear weapons effects is available via the Atomic Archive project:https://www.atomicarchive.com/science/effects/index.html
2 Interview with Robert McNamara, The National Security Archive, Accessed November 12, 2020,
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/interviews/episode-11/mcnamara2.html
3 Example: Wan, Wilfred [ed]. 2020. “Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use” Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR,
Accessed November 12, 2020, https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/20/NRR/01© 2022 Dmitry Stefanovich, CC BY 4.0

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WMD in Asia-Pacific

The Evolution of Nuclear Power Learning
Great powers, which can be conveniently defined as “nations that figure most decisively ininternational affairs,”4 unfortunately, tend to compete, and within such competition they regularlyfind themselves embroiled in major crises. Once nuclear weapons entered the equation, theconsequences and risks of these crises grow dramatically. A number of flashpoints during the Cold
War—Suez 1956, Berlin 1961, Cuba 1962, Yom Kippur War 1973, Able Archer 1983, andothers—brought major military powers on the brink of actual warfighting, which could have easily
involved nuclear weapons. Probably the major takeaway from the resolution of all these crises was
the need to set up and preserve lines of communication at all times—either informal (for example,
between Kennedy and Dobrynin in 1962) or formal (hotlines, and, ultimately, Nuclear Risk
Reduction Centers, as well as deconfliction mechanisms). Although the parties involved stilltended to behave in ways that exploited or carelessly incurred risk at times, the intention not tospiral toward nuclear war was clearly demonstrated most of the time.
Even after such major stand-offs, however, many countries retain a chronic habit of mirror
imaging.5 Everyone plans for the worst-case scenario and sees only malign intentions in the other,no matter what the actual declarations behind different military postures or actions. Worst of all,the wrong perceptions of the adversary’s calculus may lead to counteractions that contribute to
speeding up the arms race and increase reliance on ‘hard’ deterrence based on military capabilities,
thereby undermining readiness to pursue joint security mechanisms to ensure national security.
One event that exemplified such logic was the ‘missile gap’ perceived by the US military andintelligence in the 1970s. At the time, the Americans believed that Soviet missile development(both in terms of quality and quantity) was focused on achieving counterforce capability so todestroy most of the US nuclear delivery vehicles in a disarming first strike. Declassified documents

4 “Great power,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, Accessed November 12, 2020,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/great%20power
5 Michael Krepon, “Mirror Imaging,” Arms Control Wonk blog, June 24, 2019, Accessed November 12, 2020,
https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1207629/mirror-imaging/391

Great Power Risk Reduction Measures and Lessons for the Asia-Pacificshow that this was neither the intention nor the actual capability of the USSR, but the US military“counter-buildup” was started and contributed to increased tensions of the early 1980s. 6
Today we have similar dynamics in play with regard to Russia’s alleged but actually non-existent“escalate-to-deescalate” strategy, which is used as a reason by the United States to develop
weapons like low-yield nuclear warheads for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 7
Yet another example is how the US missile defense developments, which are (as of today) still
incapable of substantially undermining strategic nuclear retaliation from any country, drive themilitary in Russia, China, 8 and, to some extent, even the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK) to develop countervailing offensive nuclear weapons which in turn lead to more arms
racing. Of course, the reason to engage in “sword on shield” competition is that there are no limits
on enhancing the “shield,” as was understood long ago, when the original ABM Treaty was signed.
It is noteworthy that the now-adamant Russian belief in the “negative” link between strategic
defensive and offensive weapons is also an example of “learning,” as originally this was an
American idea.
Eventually, ‘proper’ arms control treaties first limiting, and then reducing nuclear arsenals(including destruction of some weapon classes) came into being, and the most important concept
jointly developed and understood by the end of Cold War was that of “strategic stability,” basedon the idea to “remove incentives for a nuclear first strike.”9 This core notion remains relevant
even today, including in ongoing Strategic Stability Dialogue between Russia and the UnitedStates. As President Vladimir Putin disclosed back in November 2020, Russia’s “proposals on
devising a new “security equation,” that “take into consideration all factors affecting strategic
stability with a special emphasis on first-strike capability” were sent to American partners. 10 This
6 Pavel Podvig, “The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn't: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A ResearchNote”—A Research Note, International Security, 33:1, 2008, 118-138, Accessed November 12, 2020,
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.33.1.118
7 Konstantin Bogdanov, “Not-so-Nuclear War,” Russian International Affairs Council, March 10, 2020, Accessed
November 12, 2020, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/not-so-nuclear-war/
8Ankit Panda, (“On 'Great Power Competition'” (Nuclear Risk Reduction Policy Brief No. 1). Geneva, Switzerland:
UNIDIR, 2020, Accessed November 12, 2020, https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/20/NRR/02
9 Soviet-United States Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing
Strategic Stability, 1990-06-01, Accessed November 12, 2020, https://bush41library.tamu.edu/archives/publicpapers/1938
10 Meeting with senior Defence Ministry officials, heads of federal agencies and defence industry executives,
November 10, 2020, Accessed 12 November 2020, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64392

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WMD in Asia-Pacificproposal remains standing and was re-iterated in April 2021, and, hopefully, negotiations can
include other nuclear weapon states as well. 11

Formal and Informal US-Soviet Rules of the RoadAs prefigured previously, one of the most important ways to manage great power competition isto establish a framework of deconfliction formats and communication channels.
The content of existing agreements12 on the prevention of dangerous military activities can be
distilled into three main areas of action:•

incident prevention•

assured communication•

help in the event of an incident

The types of dangerous military activities addressed by such measures, as a rule, include thefollowing:•

entry of military personnel and/or equipment of the one party into the national territory of
the other party, due to force majeure, that is, as a result of unintentional actions;•the use of a laser in such a way that it can harm the personnel or damage the equipmentof the armed forces of the other party;•hindering the actions of the military personnel and/or equipment of the other party in a
way that may cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment;

11 “As the leader in the creation of new-generation combat systems and in the development of modern nuclear

forces, Russia is urging its partners once again to discuss the issues related to strategic armaments and to ensure
global stability. The subject matter and the goal of these talks could be the creation of an environment for a
conflict-free coexistence based on the security equation, which would include not only the traditional strategicarmaments, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, heavy bombers and submarines, but—I would like toemphasize—all offensive and defensive systems capable of attaining strategic goals regardless of the armament.”
Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, April 21, 2021, Accessed April 23, 2021,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65418
12 For example, Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, Accessed November
12, 2020, https://2009- 2017.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm

393

Great Power Risk Reduction Measures and Lessons for the Asia-Pacific•interfering with control networks,13 which may harm personnel or damage equipment of
the armed forces of the other party.

The parties are obliged to undertake measures such as those in the US-Soviet 1989 agreement forthe prompt “termination and resolution of peaceful means, without resort to the threat of use offorce, or any incident which may arise as a result of dangerous military activities.” 14 It is useful tonote that while Russia has concluded several relevant bilateral agreements with the United States,
similar documents have been drawn up and signed by Russia with numerous other countries,
including Greece, Canada, and the Republic of Korea.
In the agreements between the Soviet Union and other countries (mainly NATO members) on theprevention of incidents on the high seas and in the airspace above it, the parties assumed thefollowing obligations:15•

stay at a sufficient distance;•

avoid any manoeuvres that impede action or create a hazard;•

adhere to the standard or other mutually agreed signals;•

not undertake simulation attacks by turning guns, launchers, torpedo tubes, and othertypes of weapons in the direction of the oncoming ship of the other party, not throw any
objects in the direction of the oncoming ships of the other party, and not use searchlights
or other powerful lighting means for illuminating the bridges of oncoming ships of theother party;•

share relevant information on collisions, property damage incidents, or other incidents at
sea between ships and aircraft.

13 This part actually provides some kind of a blueprint for future agreements addressing cyberwarfare andelectronic warfare.
14 Agreement Between the Government of The United States Of America and the Government of the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics on The Prevention Of Dangerous Military Activities, signed January 12, 1989, text at:https://www.jstor.org/stable/20693340?seq=1
15 More details can be found, for example, in the European Leadership Network Policy Brief “Managing Hazardous
Incidents in the Euro-Atlantic Area: A New Plan of Action” by L.Kulesa, T.Frear and D.Raynova, November 2016,
https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ELN-Managing-Hazardous-IncidentsNovember-2016.pdf, Accessed April 23, 2021.

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
Another document, which is even more closely related to the topic of nuclear risk reduction, is theAgreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War between the USSR and the United States. 16 Despite
its high-level goal, however, this agreement is a typical example of a boilerplate set of measures
to reduce risk that largely reiterate existing commitments under international law. According tothis document, the parties undertake to “refrain from the threat or use of force against the otherParty, against the allies of the other Party, and against other countries in circumstances that may
endanger international peace and security.” In the event of a risk of nuclear war, they undertakethe following obligations: “Acting in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, [to]immediately proceed to urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to prevent thisrisk” and to inform the “UN Security Council, the UN Secretary General and the governments ofallied or other countries on the progress and results of the consultations.”
It is noteworthy that the recently released “Basic Principles of State Policy of the RussianFederation on Nuclear Deterrence” 17 to some extent follow the steps of the aforementioned
Agreement when it states (at page 20):
The President of the Russian Federation might, if necessary, inform the military-politicalleadership of other states and/or international organizations about the Russian Federation’s
readiness to use nuclear weapons or about the decision taken to use nuclear weapons, aswell as about the fact that nuclear weapons have been used.
It seems that the array of international agreements in the field of preventing military incidents
between the signatory countries is a valuable tool. Concurrently, the agreements leave room forinterpretation and, in some cases, even provide arguments for the escalation of rhetoric, indicating
the extremely provocative nature of the actions of one side or another in a military confrontation.

16 Agreement Between the United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Preventionof Nuclear War, US Department of States, Archived Content, Accessed November 12, 2020, https://20092017.state.gov/t/isn/5186.htm
17 Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, Accessed November 12, 2020,
https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/?lang=en395

Great Power Risk Reduction Measures and Lessons for the Asia-Pacific

Bringing in Other States: the NPT Regime
The world does not consist only of the great powers. For many countries who do not otherwise
rise to great power status, nuclear weapons capability is viewed as an “entry ticket” to enter thegreat power club. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was established to address thischallenge. The NPT regime itself was and remains mostly related to the reduction of the risk of
nuclear proliferation, not the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. However, its Article VI, providing
for nuclear disarmament, as well as (what is often forgotten) general disarmament, 18 of course
contributes to the nuclear risk reduction as well.
At the same time, the four countries outside of the NPT regime that possess nuclear weapons
complicate nuclear war risk management, but they also present opportunities for local and regionalrisk reduction measures because they are—or should be—universally applicable.
The most significant nuclear risk reduction architecture is that proposed in the so-called P5 format,
that is, between and among the five permanent (and nuclear-armed) members of the UN Security
Council. Regular meetings and statements by the “NPT-legitimated” nuclear weapon states
contribute to greater understanding between these five countries and help to develop or at the very
least discuss some joint initiatives. 19 Moreover, some of the official P5 statements positively affectthe nuclear risk reduction process, for example, the one made in the year 2000 on de-targeting:Emphasizing the essential importance of cooperation, demonstrating and advancing mutual
trust among ourselves, and promoting greater international security and stability, wedeclare that none of our nuclear weapons are targeted at any State. 20

18 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Accessed November, 12 2020,

https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text
19 The European Leadership Network contributes to this process a lot, for example, Accessed November 12, 2020,
https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-p5-process/20 Letter dated 1 May 2000 from the representatives of France, the People’s Republic of China, the RussianFederation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America addressedto the president of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, Accessed November, 12, 2020, https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/411/96/pdf/N0041196.pdf?OpenElement

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Of course, nuclear de-targeting in itself is a big challenge in terms of verification, and, given thecurrent level of technological development, “re-targeting” probably can be done in a matter ofminutes. Nonetheless, such statements highlight the inclination of the great powers to reduce therisk of nuclear war and send the positive, risk-reducing signals to the international community.
Thus, it is most welcome that de-targeting was re-iterated by the P5 in January 2022, together withthe joint statement affirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” 21
Nuclear Taboo, the ICJ Ruling, and the LOAC
So far, the nuclear taboo, understood as the non-use of nuclear weapons in warfighting, has stoodfor the last seventy-six years, and it is augmented with an almost universal cessation of nuclear
tests.
However, this nuclear taboo is more of a customary phenomenon rather than a legal one. In 1996
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered its Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threator use of nuclear weapons,22 which emphasized the controversial nature of the problem in question:
while there are no explicit prohibitions on the nuclear weapons, their characteristics make the Law
Of Armed Conflict (LOAC) challenging to apply, especially in relation to the protection ofcivilians and avoidance of unnecessary suffering to the combatants.
Nevertheless, some nuclear armed states declare adherence to the LOAC in their declaratory
policies. Still, this raises the question about the proportionality, and whether such thing can beachieved if the nuclear threshold were in fact to be crossed by nuclear use.
Currently, it seems, a new direction of research is being developed, which focuses on ‘responsible’or accountable nuclear arsenals. 23 One of its aims is to find a way to establish limits to thedestructiveness of nuclear weapons in possession of every state. This might have the opposite

21 Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms

Races, January 03, 2022, Accessed January 12, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races/
22 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Accessed November 12, 2020, https://www.icjcij.org/en/case/95
23 George Perkovich, Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?, February 11, 2020,
Accessed November 12, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/02/11/toward-accountable-nucleardeterrents-how-much-is-too-much- pub-80987

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Great Power Risk Reduction Measures and Lessons for the Asia-Pacificresults, however, because if there is no threat of regional (if not global) extermination from nuclear
war, some decision makers might become more eager to use nuclear weapons in conflict, that is,break the nuclear taboo. In the worst case, only one nuclear weapon might be used, and when the
dust settles and the sky has not fallen, other nuclear weapons states may become more inclined touse nuclear weapons.
One way to reinforce the nuclear taboo is to act at the level of declaratory doctrine. To this end,
nuclear armed states should commit to a multilateral version of the Reagan-Gorbachev statementthat the nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.24 Such initiatives have been in place
for some time25 and are finally fruitful.26

Rules of the Road: Counter-NC3, Strategic ASW, Cyber and Space Warfare
The previous section argued that rules of the road in the nuclear domain should be continuously
developed and refined. As mentioned earlier, deconfliction agreements and hotlines are imperfect,
but they help to reduce risks, including nuclear risks. Unrestrained competition is bad for everyone,
no matter what some former US officials had claimed.27
There are some domains where such competition is exceptionally damaging for strategic stability,
and such off-road behavior should be tightly constrained by what one might term “rules of theroad.” One of those would be the threats toward nuclear command, control, and communications(NC3) systems that ensure that a nuclear armed state can retaliate under any circumstance (thebasis of strategic stability) while also ensuring that nuclear weapons are never used by mistake.
The nuclear great powers have all invested in upgrading the reliability and survivability of their
24 Joint Soviet-United States Statement on the Summit Meeting in Geneva, November 21, 1985, Accessed

November 12, 2020, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/joint-soviet-united-states-statementsummit-meeting-geneva
25 Lewis Dunn, William Potter, Time to Renew the Reagan-Gorbachev Principle, Arms Control Today,
March 2020, Accessed November 12, 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-03/features/time-renewreagan-gorbachev-principle
26 Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms
Races, January 03, 2022, Accessed 12 Jan, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races/
27 “U.S. prepared to spend Russia, China 'into oblivion' to win nuclear arms race: U.S. envoy,” Reuters, May 21, 2020,
Accessed 12 Nov. 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-armscontrol-idUSKBN22X2LS

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WMD in Asia-PacificNC3 in recent years, 28 the imperative that flows from the possible degradation or complete loss of
the NC3 system is to pre-delegate nuclear use authority to the lower echelons of command, withobvious risks of the potential loss of control at critical junctures that might actually cause a nuclear
war.
Nevertheless, for military planners it might seem extremely useful to target precisely commandand control nodes and centers to limit the warfighting capabilities of the adversary. In case of
conventional conflict. such planning might have some deterrent effect. When nuclear weapons andnuclear deterrence are added to the equation, however, the threat of ‘decapitation’ becomes a grave
concern for any actor.
One of the most sensitive dimensions of strategic stability is the relative vulnerability of the seabased nuclear deterrence. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) on a strategic level can increase SSBN
(ballistic missile-carrying submarines) vulnerability. SSBNs are considered the most survivable‘leg’ of the nuclear triad by most countries. If the highest military-political leadership is concernedwith the survivability of its nuclear arsenal, such concerns might lead such leaders to ‘launch early,’that is, resolve the ‘use it or lose it’ paradox. As of today, however, it is hard to label ASW
capabilities as totally undermining the survivability of the sea-leg of the nuclear triad. The bigger
challenge lies in developing reliable and robust ‘general purpose’ naval capabilities to support
SSBN operations. Possible technological breakthroughs in ASW (machine learning, big data,
networks of unmanned vehicles, etc.) are indeed possible, but, as in other domains, thedevelopment of the submarines themselves (and operational concepts) never stops as well.
Currently, some nuclear powers and their allies consider cyberspace and outer space to be
operational and/or warfighting domains. Although the destructive power emanating from these
domains is often over-stated, extending confrontation between nuclear weapons states is achallenge in its own right to strategic stability. All nuclear-armed and nuclear-ally states recognizethat cyberweapons are a threat to their NC3 systems, and some have declared that such an attack

28 For example, Russia’s president made such a claim at his Meeting with heads of Defence Ministry, federal

agencies and defence companies, “Meeting with heads of Defence Ministry, federal agencies and defence
companies,” President of Russia Official Website, November 11, 2020, Accessed November 12, 2020,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64396

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Great Power Risk Reduction Measures and Lessons for the Asia-Pacificmay result in nuclear retaliation. It is therefore urgent to seek joint solutions that can put the most
crucial elements of the nuclear decision-making infrastructure away from the ‘crosshairs.’29

Collapse of Cold War Arms Control and Resurgent Nuclear Modernization
The Cold War framework is now almost completely collapsed. New people with short or no
memories of the risks or strategic arms control are in charge, and there are many more actors
involved. Gone are the Anti-Ballistic Missile and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaties dueto the US withdrawal. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty is in limbo and the Open Skies
Treaty might not survive 2021. The extension of the New START to 2026 under the Biden
Administration as proposed by the Russian government is a welcome riposte, as it has helped toreduce Russian and American strategic nuclear forces and keep those limited, but it might be notenough to hold back the tide of the coming arms race.
Also, none of these treaties explicitly addressed the Asia-Pacific region, and a resurrection of arms
control might start from there. In general, there is a substantial deterioration of arms control
frameworks and a shift from joint security measures and transparency to ‘hard’ deterrence andambiguity. New nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and platforms are being developed, although
it is yet unclear if these systems will disrupt strategic stability.
The modernization itself might not be inherently something bad: as long as nuclear weapons
remain in the arsenals, it is better to have them in good shape, rather than rusting away.
Nevertheless, the landscape of mutual nuclear (and non-nuclear) deterrence and vulnerabilities isgetting more and more complicated to manage, and therefore the nuclear risks are on the rise.
Shift to Complex Nuclear Risks
Currently there are nine nuclear weapon states, and they can be separated in different ‘baskets’ inseveral ways. One way is to group them into the five NPT-NWS basket (China, France, Russia,

29 Dmitry Stefanovich, “Russia’s Basic Principles and the Cyber-Nuclear Nexus,” European Leadership Network, 14

July 2020, Accessed November 12, 2020, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/russiasbasic-principles-and-the-cyber-nuclear-nexus/

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WMD in Asia-Pacificthe United Kingdom and the United States), the two South Asian nuclear-armed states basket(India and Pakistan) and a third ‘special cases’ basket (Israel and the DPRK).
But there are other ways to categorize them, for example, by “deterrence equations.” The combined
nuclear forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France deter Russia, and vice versa;
China is engaged in nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and India; India vis-à-vis Chinaand Pakistan, etc. Such way of framing grounds the otherwise abstract concept of growing nuclear
risks, including those related to miscalculation and/or misperception, in global and regional
insecurities.
In all these cases, the type of risk and the level of common understanding of the shared risk candiffer between nuclear adversaries. The P5 ‘Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms’ 30 is a good start toovercome these differences, but it is extremely limited. Its long overdue update was finallycompleted in late 2021.31 Relatively professional discussions on doctrines also take place only
within the P5 process and rarely on a military-military basis.
Some rather recent initiatives (for instance, Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament(CEND)32 and the Stepping Stones Approach 33) are trying to find a broader way for the discussion
on nuclear weapons (and disarmament) related challenges, but it remains to be seen how successful
those can be, especially given their self-avowed incrementalism.
Fortunately, many top officials in nuclear weapons states recognize the challenge and argue that
we need to continue the search for nuclear arms control and risk reduction formats that involve all
nuclear weapon states.

30 P5 Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, Accessed November 12, 2020,

https://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/13/14313989580.pdf
31 P5 joint communiqué, 3 December, 2021, Accessed January 12, 2022, https://cdgeneve.delegfrance.org/IMG/pdf/communique_p5.pdf?2488/9bb0569676c7583cdd9a9434539f9c0a22533ff4
32 See https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/
33 See Paul Ingram and Maxwell Downman, “Stepping Stones to Disarmament,” The British American Security
Information Council (BASIC), April 2019, https://basicint.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Stepping-StonesReport-WEB-1.pdf

401Great Power Risk Reduction Measures and Lessons for the Asia-PacificPossible Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures in Asia-Pacific
Before addressing the actual risk reduction measures, it is important to define once again whattypes of risks are managed by such measures. Of the range of possible risks that might lead tonuclear war, two stand out. The first is those that involve any use of nuclear weapons resulting in
nuclear explosions. Such uses can be deliberate, accidental, or mixed (because of miscalculation,
misinterpretation, etc.). The second is nuclear use by non-state actors, including terrorists.
Given the multi-layered, multi-dimensional state of nuclear affairs, and the complicated global andregional military-political landscapes in which nuclear weapons are deployed, the future seems
grim. Yet, because of past crises that generate a pull-demand for risk reduction measures, some of
the tools needed today are already available. The challenge is to make a good use of them.

Figure 1. Summary of compiled ideas, proposals, and recommendations to reduce the risk of
nuclear weapon use.34

34 “Nuclear Risk Reduction: The State of Ideas,” Wilfred Wan, UNIDIR, April 2019, Accessed November 12, 2020,

https://www.unidir.org/publication/nuclear-risk-reduction-state-ideas

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
A great deal of research is underway on nuclear risk reduction that provides options for possible
implementation (figure 1).35
What is needed now is to refine these ideas and tailor them to current and future circumstances
while political will is mustered to implement them. It is also important to keep in mind that there
are no perfect, universal solutions (although sets of best practices are always useful). Nuclear
nations have different nuclear command, control, and communications architecture, technological,
and political culture, possible levels of transparency and attitude to ambiguity, as well as risktaking ability and appetite. Finding the measures that work across these differences will rule outsome approaches that work perfectly for one adversary but not sufficiently well for the other toadopt. “Sufficiently” workable to two or more antagonists party to a given measure might be a key
attribute of the most realistic measures.
The expert community must be patient and polite—and at the same time ambitious. It is a truism
that the ultimate nuclear risk reduction can be achieved through universal nuclear disarmament—
but this, in turn, must be linked with a “conventional disarmament” (as written in the NPT’s Article
VI), and, eventually, total pacification of the Earth—a far reaching ideal agenda that has little,
likely zero prospect of realization in the near future.
Nevertheless, “moonshots” in the nuclear risk reduction are not something to be afraid of, andwidening the scope of the analysis to include totally new types of risk reduction measures might
help. Even the best ideas will take some time to take effect. Serious goals can and should be puton the table, as well as outlining detailed and feasible steps to achieve those.
It is useful therefore to think about nuclear risks in the most practical terms. For example, there
are US nuclear weapons in Europe. 36 The airbases where those weapons are located are probably
more vulnerable than the ones on US soil, including to an attack by non-state actors (activists have

35 See, for example, C. Brustlein, “Strategic Risk Reduction between Nuclear-Weapons Possessors, Proliferation

Papers,” IFRI, No. 63, January 2021 https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/proliferationpapers/strategic-risk-reduction-between-nuclear-weapons
36 Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons In Europe, Briefing to Center for Arms Control and NonProliferation,” November 1, 2019, Accessed November 12, 2020, https://fas.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/Brief2019_EuroNukes_CACNP.pdf

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Great Power Risk Reduction Measures and Lessons for the Asia-Pacificbeen able to gain access to these bases in spite of security systems although they never reached thevaults where B61 nuclear bombs are stored. 37
At the same time, these nuclear bombs make the countries that feel that they are the likely target
for such weapons (that is, Russia) nervous—and they threaten the host countries in turn, probably
with both nuclear and conventional weapons.
What can be achieved to reduce such risks? The easiest step might be to provide more transparency
about missions for these weapons. A next good step can be to de-couple the nuclear weapons from
actual dual-capable aircraft basing, thus, to some extent, achieving symmetry with the way Russia
stores sub-strategic nuclear weapons at “central storages” away from actual battle units. 38
Will such steps reduce risk? Definitely. Is it feasible? Technically, assuredly so: 39 But politically,
these measures face severe political obstacles, there being too much political capital invested bydifferent countries and NATO as a whole protecting this “nuclear sharing” arrangement assomething crucial for allied coherence. 40
Another practical example is Russia, which employs a concept of non-nuclear deterrence in its
military doctrine.41 This concept is advertised as a measure to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons,
and, intuitively, should reduce nuclear risks. But is such reduction actually achieved? From what
the Ministry of Defense says and shows in its presentations, non-nuclear deterrence is based on
essentially dual-capable systems. In a crisis it is quite possible that faced with dual-use ambiguity,

37 David Brennan, “EU Politicians Break Into Air Base Holding American Nuclear Bombs to Protest Weapons

Stockpiling,” Newsweek, 2/20/19, Accessed November 12, 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/nuclear-weaponsair-base-europe-belgium-green- politicians-disarmament-protest-1336908
38 Pavel Podvig, Javier Serrat, “Lock them Up: Zero-deployed Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” Accessed
November 12, 2020, https://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/lock-them-up-zero-deployed-non-strategic-nuclearweapons-in-europe- en-675.pdf
39 For example, a set of possible options of gradual or full withdrawal of the US nuclear weapons from Europe
without undermining ‘NATO cohesion,’ and even providing some role for the dual-capable aircraft of NATOcountries currently involved in the ‘Nuclear Sharing’ is listed in Kamp, Karl-Heinz, and Robertus CN Remkes.
"Options for NATO nuclear sharing arrangements." Reducing Nuclear Risks in Europe: A Framework for
Action (2011): 82.
40 Jessica Cox, “Nuclear deterrence today,” NATO Review, 08 June 2020, Accessed November 12, 2020,
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/06/08/nuclear-deterrence-today/index.html
41 Alexander Yermakov, Dmitry Stefanovich, “Is Non-Nuclear Deterrence Possible?, Russian International Affairs
Council,” June 30, 2020, Accessed November 12, 2020, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-andcomments/analytics/is-non-nuclear-deterrence- possible/

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WMD in Asia-Pacificany probable adversary will treat these as nuclear-armed weapons and will respond accordingly,
possibly with escalatory conventional or actual nuclear first use. Of course, in the end there is achance that such ambiguity might lead to crisis resolution without actual warfighting, but the riskof adversarial misinterpretation and the risk reduction measure actually compounding risk exists.
Can such negative outcomes be avoided? First, it must be said that non-nuclear deterrence
understood as methods of imposing severe military costs on aggressors without going nuclear ishere to stay and is a mainstay now of all the nuclear armed great powers. Long-range precision
conventional weapons are both better suited and more usable to wage war than nuclear weaponsThus, the risk that use of long-range non-nuclear weapons, depending on their targets and theadversaries’ sensor systems, might swiftly lead to nuclear retaliation is real. In Russia’s ‘nuclear
doctrine’ mentioned earlier, for example, this conventional-nuclear cascade is specificallymentioned, “The conditions specifying the possibility of nuclear weapons use by the RussianFederation are as follows: arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking theterritory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies.” 42
Given the state of nuclear arsenals in Asia, and especially in Northeast Asia, the idea of nonnuclear deterrence, nuclear-conventional “entanglement,” and how non-nuclear armament—
especially disruptive technologies—affect nuclear risk reduction should be a major topic ofconsultations, as every country pursues such capabilities.
Last but not the least, it is crucial to consider risks associated with further nuclear reductions ofdelivery systems or actual controls on warheads. On the face of it, reducing the number of weapons
should make it easier to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used by mistake and, therefore, toreduce nuclear risk. Conversely, reducing the number of fielded nuclear weapons may make asituation less stable because the belief in the reliability of their second-strike capabilities might
decrease within the leadership of both the possessor and the probable adversary. This perception
depends on many factors, not just the absolute numbers. Although the number of warheads thateach side has relative to those of the adversary that must be targeted is an important determinant

42 Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, paragraph 19a, Accessed

November 12, 2020, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/1434131/?lang=en405

Great Power Risk Reduction Measures and Lessons for the Asia-Pacificof these perceptions, making mutual reductions is almost a prerequisite for level-dependent risk
reductions to work. It is important to distinguish between nuclear risks and risks related to any war
or armed conflict, as sometimes explicit nuclear threats might prevent breakout of hostilities.
Long-run Strategic Arms Control Futures
Although the prospects for arms control might seem grim, there are good options that can be
pursued. First and foremost, arms control itself must be “re-branded” as mainly an instrument toenhance national security (through transparency and decreased spending, etc.), not something
generally good and positive. With that in mind and given the rather deep asymmetries between
nuclear and non-nuclear strategic arsenals and postures in different countries, the approach toresume nuclear arms control should be two-fold: First, all factors affecting strategic stability
should be defined and agreed upon through consultations. Such consultations can start in several
bilateral formats, then switch to P5 fora, and eventually involve other nuclear weapon states andregional powers.
Second, areas of possible “control” should be defined in these discussions. One of those relates toNC3 systems, or rather, agreements to not target NC3. However, this commitment might bechallenging due to military considerations. If one prepares for war, degrading adversary command,
control, and communications becomes a primary mission. Nevertheless, if there is an agreed
understanding that the states involved do not want and will not try to win in a nuclear war, suchagreement can be achieved.
In the P5 context, there is one single element that all five countries possess: the sea-based leg ofthe nuclear triad, that is, SSBNs. Of course, SSBNs in each case differ in terms of numbers,
sophistication, range, homeporting, and deployment. But there is room to agree on two things:
limit the number of ‘boomers’ on patrol so other countries will not be concerned with possible
decapitating or disarming strike with depressed trajectory submarine-launched missiles fired froma short distance offshore and arriving in a few minutes below early warning radars. Such a limit
on deployment at sea would keep the ultimate retaliatory capability intact and also limit thedevelopment and deployment of long-range ASW capabilities. This might be more challenging
but also have an even higher risk reduction payoff due to the potency of ASW on perceptions of406

WMD in Asia-Pacificboomer-owning countries of their vulnerability to a disarming nuclear first-strike. As a first step,
countries might consider formalizing the existing practices, without reducing anything—effectively agreeing not to increase the number of platforms at sea at any given time. The cost of
doing so would be increased visibility of some SSBN ‘deterrence patrol’ operations that might
become correspondingly more vulnerable to countermeasures, as the adversary will be able totailor their naval posture in terms of numbers and geography to the fixed and transparent numbersof SSBNs. But that cost may be a small price to pay for the overall risk reduction thereby achieved.
In the long run, risk reduction and arms control measures are likely to follow the same pattern:start with declarations of numbers (or doctrines) then proceed to transparency and some unilateralconfidence-building measures, thereafter set some limits and, eventually, agree on reductions withconcomitant verification mechanisms to follow. This standard Cold War formula, however, isprecisely an area with some room for innovation: it seems almost impossible to replicate traditional
bilateral approaches in multilateral formats. Yet the Asia-Pacific region is certainly wheremultilateral measures may be most useful and needed.
One of the easiest possible wins in the region can be a development of a multilateral long-range
missile launch notification regime, which is still absent from the realities of today. There areseveral bilateral regimes (e.g., between Russia and the United States, between Russia and China,
between India and Pakistan) with some exemptions, and there is an existing multilateral voluntary
data exchange framework within the Hague Code of Conduct. Best practices from all of theseformats can be put to good use in the Asia-Pacific region (which can be both narrowed to‘Northeast Asia’ or extended to the Indo-Pacific). Moreover, given the ever-growing capabilitiesof the national Early Warning Systems in the region, there is a possible technical layer providing
a kind of verification capability for such multilateral notification regime (land-based Missile
Attack Warning System layer in Russia completed the upgrades and is now the “Voronezh” radar
network, which is being augmented with multi-band capability; space-based layer of the Missile
Attack Warning System—“Tundra” satellites of the “Kupol” system; Russian support andassistance in developing the Chinese Early Warning system development; well-establishednetwork supporting the US Missile Defense with input from Japan and South Korea).
Another important domain where much can be done with rather limited ‘political’ costs, not tomention actual costs in terms of required resources, is the establishment of hardened multilateral407

Great Power Risk Reduction Measures and Lessons for the Asia-Pacifichotlines between the capitals of the region. This is hardly a new idea, but there is still room for
improvement. Before diving into technical details, a proper Track I discussion on the list of topics
that will be covered by such hotlines is needed. For some countries this might be a good way tolimit the level of hostility with regard to patrols by long-range aviation (heavy bombers, antisubmarine aircraft, etc.) coming near one’s airspace (or into the artificial “Air Defense
Identification Zones,” which are a provocation in itself). Others might be more concerned with theso-called Freedom of Navigation Operations. Nevertheless, having a dedicated communication
network (which can be also used for transmission of notifications mentioned in the previous
paragraphs) will be useful for everyone involved—if not to reduce the hostility itself, but definitely
to reduce the risks of misperceptions and have an instrument to raise concerns. Also, as this would
be a secure communication channel with limited access, it can be an effective tool to de-politicize
possible incidents and solutions.
Finally, one of the most important factors is the political will of the decision makers in every
capital involved. Agreeing to any arms control-like measures always comes with a risk of domestic
opposition raising concerns about ‘surrendering national interests.’ To limit such risks the task ofparamount importance is to find the right labels for any of the relevant measures, that would be
explicitly linked to enhancing both national and international security rather than some goodwill
gestures for the future of humanity.

Conclusion
Risk reduction, deconfliction, incidents prevention, arms control—all these concepts and efforts
are not new. But those are not easy as well. The number and scope of threats to global peace andsecurity (including those of apocalyptic scale) are hardly decreasing. Under such circumstances, it
is a paramount responsibility of national leadership, as well as public, to continue the efforts
focused on limiting and reducing the risks of major military conflicts, as those can easily spiral outof control and lead to nuclear use with the most dramatic consequences.

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15. Trilateral Strategic Confidence Building
Measures in Southern Asia
Feroz Hassan Khan

Introduction
The China-India-Pakistan strategic triangle is emerging in an era of great power competition
wherein power rebalancing is shaping Asia’s strategic alignments. While literature andpublications on the China-India rivalry in Asia and the India-Pakistan conflict are in abundance,
the implications of triangular relations involving the three nuclear armed countries—China, India,
and Pakistan—are few and far between. Scholars find the China-India rivalry somewhat enigmatic;
both countries engage economically but compete strategically. Except for one major war in 1962,
generally, military crises between China and India have been less sporadic, more contained, andamenable to de-escalation through bilateral diplomatic means. 1 In contrast, the India-Pakistan
nuclear dyad is much more deeply complicated and one of the most challenging and dangerous
regional conflicts. The two have fought three major wars, engaged in numerous military crises,
and remain at the brink of crises. The advent of nuclear weapons in South Asia ought to haveinduced efforts toward conflict resolution instead of an arms race imbibed with both countries
investing heavily in conventional and nuclear arsenals.
Given cross-border terrorist attacks and militaries jockeying for better tactical or operational
positions along contested borders in the mountainous trijunction of three nuclear-armed countries,
the frequency of crises is increasing along the China-India border as well as along the IndiaPakistan Line of Control (LoC) in disputed Kashmir region. At the trijunction of three nucleararmed countries, the potential of major regional military crises—either between India and1 Jeffery Gettleman, Sameer Yasir and Kari Kumar, “India and China Faceoff Again at Border as Troops Move In,”New York Times, August 31, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/31/world/asia/india-china-troopsborder.html© 2022 Feroz Hassan Khan, CC BY 4.0

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Trilateral Strategic Confidence Building Measures in Southern Asia
Pakistan or China and India —is increasing, and it could escalate to a major conventional war
and nuclear catastrophe.
At the system level, the evolving balance of power in Asia affects regional stability in South Asia.
China’s meteoric economic growth has catapulted it to great power status, and Beijing is investingheavily in its military to project power, exert influence, and protect energy sources and commercial
shipping lanes, particularly in the Indian Ocean. Hand-in-hand with Beijing’s expanding power is
its growing confidence to uncompromisingly assert its claims on disputed territories on China’s
periphery. Prominent among these are the entire Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh and the
Aksai Chin area—adjoining China’s volatile Tibet and Xinjiang provinces. Recalling India’s
defeat in the 1962 war with China, Indian security managers observe these developments withalarm.
Meanwhile, China-Pakistan relations are closer than ever. They are cooperating on a host ofdevelopment projects collectively known as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
which includes infrastructure expansion, defense research and development, and support for
Pakistan’s civil nuclear energy program. New Delhi interprets the China-Pakistan partnership asa deliberate effort to encircle and contain India and as a wedge driving India and Pakistan further
apart. While China-Pakistan relations deepen and expand, India-Pakistan and China-India
relations are deteriorating. 2 The United States has been a key provider of economic and military
aid to Pakistan, but now Islamabad fears that its strategic relevance to the United States is waning
with the US shift from war against terror in Afghanistan to the great power competition in the
Asia-Pacific theater, part of which would be luring India as bulwark against rising China.
In the meantime, China is advancing its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and influencing regionalcountries as part of its peripheral diplomacy and furthering its network of economic and strategic
hubs. The appealing BRI promises combined with the technological revolutions, create new
grounds for competition, including digital connections between individuals, societies, andgovernments in an unprecedented manner. Consequently, smaller regional countries feel

2 Two recent publications highlight the emerging triangular strategic balancing and power rivalry in South Asia. See

Jeff M. Smith, Cold Peace: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the 21st Century (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014); Andrew
Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

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WMD in Asia-Pacificpressured to choose between major power centers in Asia. 3 Strategically located countries, like
Pakistan, acquire bargaining power to leverage their land and sea connectivity in exchange forstrategic alignment and new technology transfers. These major shifts in international affairs
significantly affect threat perceptions, diplomacy, application of military force, and public
expectations of government performance.
Though China and India are engaged in strategic competition and have had few bilateral security
confidence-building-measures (CBMs), bilateral trade between them is near US$100 billion, andboth engage diplomatically in various multilateral forums and organizations. In contrast, India
and Pakistan currently have numerous CBMs, negligible trade, and virtually no engagement.
Worse, while the frequency of India-Pakistan military crises is increasing, there are few bilateralmechanisms for crisis prevention, no structural off-ramps for crisis de-escalation, and no agreed
framework for nuclear risk reduction.
This paper examines the prospects of triangular CBMs between China, India, and Pakistan as ameans of developing a common agenda for weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
nonproliferation and disarmament strategies. In the first section, the paper traces the history that
led to the triangular strategic construct. The second section explores an appraisal of respective
nuclear doctrines and develops a threat perception matrix. The third examines the existing risk
reduction measures and existing CBMs, and the fourth section assesses prospects of triangular
CBMs and proposes strategic restraint arrangements and risk reduction measures. Finally, theconcluding section assesses strategic futures, draws major conclusions, and offers
recommendations for a common agenda for the Asia-Pacific regarding the risk of nuclear war in
the Pakistan-India-China triangle.

Strategic Triangle: A Historic Appraisal
Perspectives differ as to whether the China-India-Pakistan conflict constitutes a triangularstrategic construct in Southern Asia. According to some, China-India and India-Pakistan are two

3 International Institute of Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2019: An Assessment of Geopolitics (London:

Routledge Taylor and Francis, 2019), 12.

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separate and asymmetric dyadic strategic rivalries with differing sources, objectives, motives,and drivers. However, both sets of rivalries are enduring in nature and are characterized with
ideological underpinnings, territorial claims, and power asymmetry. 4 China and India havediffering governing ideologies—the former is an authoritarian system while the latter is apluralistic democracy. In essence, the China-India rivalry exists at three levels. At the systemlevel, two historic civilizations are rising as major powers in the 21st century and competing for
power and influence in Asia. At the regional level, they have territorial claims and disputed
border alignments, which is a legacy of the previous colonial era. At the domestic level, the twohave different models of governance and political traditions. Both are affected by
ethnonationalism, which has hardened attitudes overtime, making compromise difficult for both. 5
From the Chinese perspective, India and Pakistan are neighbours to its two most volatile
provinces—Tibet and Xinjiang—abutting the Himalayas and Karakorum ranges. In 1949, China
invaded Tibet and knocked on the doorsteps of South Asia. Aksai Chin links Tibet with Xinjiang,
which is critical for China; India claims part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (Ladakh region),
which is also claimed by Pakistan. 6 China rejects India’s former North-East Frontier Agency(now Arunachal Pradesh) and considers it to be part of Tibet (Southern Tibet). Both Aksai Chin
and Arunachal were the battlegrounds in the 1962 war between China and India and subsequentborder clashes, including the recent one in 2020. Since then, India has seen China as its main
rival, though India’s policy toward China at various times has vacillated between appeasement
and aggression.
In 1954, India and China agreed on the Panchsheel principles to govern their bilateral relations. 7
India’s security policy, manifested in the famous slogan Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai (India and China
4According to Paul, “Enduring rivalries are defined as conflicts between two or more states that lasts more than

two decades with several militarized inter-state disputes punctuating relationship in between.” T. V. Paul, ed., The
India- Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3.
5Arunabh Ghosh, “India-China Border Conflict: An Analysis of India-China Row Must Acknowledge Dramatic Growthof Ethno-Nationalism,” Quint Newsletter, June 19, 2020.
6 In June 2020, China and Indian military forces clashed in Galwan Valley in Eastern Ladakh area. In 2017, anotherborder clash occurred in Doklam area, which is at the junction of Bhutan, India, and China.
https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india- china-border-history-relationship-military-rise-of-ethnonationalism-modi-govt-xi-jinping
7 In 1954, Prime Zhou En Lai and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru jointly established Panchsheel, the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual nonaggression;
noninterference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. Cited in

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WMD in Asia-Pacificare brothers), was to bandwagon with China; however, it soon ran into trouble because both failed
to resolve the border dispute inherited from the colonial era. Moreover, when China cracked
down in Tibet, the spiritual leader Dalai Lama escaped and found refuge in India. Border disputes
and the Tibet issue led to a series of China-India border crises, which laid the foundation for
China-India rivalry. Until 1998, China’s dominance outweighed India’s aspirations to competewith China as a peer. Even after the 1998 nuclear tests, India’s attempt to seek parity with China
did not yield desired results immediately. India began to seriously countenance contesting China
almost a decade after the nuclear tests, especially after the United States and India cemented abudding strategic partnership manifested in the U.S.‒India nuclear deal in 2008 whereby theUnited States began encouraging India to claim its status as the Asian counterweight to rising
China.
Despite historical, cultural, and social commonalities between them, the India‒Pakistan rivalry
is fundamentally ideological and much more antagonistic than relations between China and India.
The India-Pakistan conflict dates to British colonial rule of the subcontinent when the rulers
fanned communal problems between Hindus and Muslims to consolidate the British raj. Before
departing, the British partitioned the subcontinent into India—a secular, pluralistic democratic
state with a Hindu majority (with many ethnicities, religions, and languages)—and Pakistan, thecreation of which was based on the demand that Muslims on the subcontinent constitute a
separate Muslim nation-state in a geographically contiguous area. India’s rejection of this notionis the root of the rivalry. 8 This ideological disagreement is compounded by contested territorial
claims and rooted in the core dispute of Kashmir (a Muslim majority state). For over sevendecades, the non-resolution of the Kashmir dispute and other inherited cross-border problems
between India-Pakistan and China-India have resulted in wars, crisis, and the collapse of peace
process and myriad agreements signed between all three countries. 9

Jingdong Yuan, “Beijing’s Balancing Act: Courting New Delhi, Reassuring Islamabad,” Journal of International Affairs
64, no. 2 (2011), http://www.jstor.org/stable/24385533
8Of late, under the Modi regime, the rise of Hindutva and religious discrimination (especially against Muslims) has
undermined India’s democratic credentials and led to violent communal clashes. In turn, this vindicates the
Pakistani two-nation theory and fuels further tensions within the subcontinent.
9This essay uses the terms “Indian administered Kashmir” and “Pakistan administered Kashmir” rather than morepolitically sensitive terms such India occupied Kashmir or Pakistan occupied Kashmir. The Chinese administeredportion of the state of Kashmir is Aksai Chin area and Shaksam Valley that China and Pakistan settled in 1963;413

Trilateral Strategic Confidence Building Measures in Southern Asia
In short, the dialectic of India and Pakistan as two opposing states has created an ideologicalpower struggle in South Asia region, wherein India seeks domination of the Indian
subcontinent, and Pakistan resists it as an anathema to its sovereign existence. Pakistan relies
on external and internal balancing to contest India’s domination. Externally, it seeks allianceor strategic partnerships. Internally, it relies on conventional military and nuclear weapons fornational survival and security.
Pakistan is the weakest leg of the triangular dynamics in Southern Asia. Situated at theconfluence of three geopolitical powerhouses (Russia, China, and India) and at the crossroadsof South and Central Asia, Pakistan is both blessed and cursed by geography. Faced with acutedomestic crises and regional threats, alliance politics have come naturally to Pakistan. For
example, in the 1950s, the United States offered it partnership in Western-led alliances in theCold War. Whereas the United States sought to “contain” the communist axis between the Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and People’s Republic of China, Pakistan’s prime
objective was to survive and balance against its arch-rival India. These fundamental crosspurposes and disconnect in the strategic objectives of the United States and Pakistan resulted indisenchantment with each other that gradually waned their alliance.
The 1962 China-India Himalayan border war brought Pakistan and China together with India
as the common enemy and set in motion the triangular dynamics in the South Asian
conundrum.10 Realizing that alliance with a distant great power (that is, the United States)
might not be of help when in trouble with India, Pakistan sought a special relationship with
China, a neighbouring rising power. The 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars over Kashmir andEast Pakistan, respectively, cemented the China-Pakistan relations, especially after the latter
war led to Pakistan’s dismemberment and Bangladesh’s birth.11

however, India rejects the settlement, lays claim to the area, and considers the settlement illegal. This area now
links China and Pakistan via Gilgit-Baltistan (Pakistan administered Kashmir).
10Pakistan and China quickly settled their border problems immediately after the India-China war. In March 1963,
Pakistan and China agreed to delineate the border between China’s Xinjiang province and Gilgit-Baltistan. Divisionof Pakistan administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir). India protested the agreement blaming Pakistan for ceding
Kashmir territory to China that India has continuously claimed. See Garver, Protracted Contest.
11Small, The China-Pakistan Axis.

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Triangular Nuclear Contest
China, India, and Pakistan began their respective nuclear programs a decade apart from eachother with the previously mentioned undercurrents affecting the decisions to go nuclear. Eachof the three have experienced national humiliation, abandonment of allies, and have a strong
sense of national identity or prestige of power associated with nuclear weapons. 12 China’s quest
for nuclear weapons began in the 1950s after the Taiwan Straits military crisis (Quemoy-Matsu
conflict) with the United States. Long memory of centuries of colonial exploitation, humiliation
at the hands of Japanese occupation in the 1930s–1940s, and the Soviet Union’s abandonmentof China at the peak of Cold War, reinforced China’s determination to acquire a sovereign
nuclear deterrent and ever since self-reliance became the foundation of the Chinese nuclear
policy.
Like China, India is determined to revive its lost pride and take what it perceives as its rightfulplace in the world. Believing itself to be the inheritor of the British raj and imbibed with thepremonition of past glory, India staunchly believes nuclear weapons confer prestige in worldpolitics and this feeds its ambition of achieving great power status. India refused to sign the
nonproliferation treaty (NPT) when it came into force and conducted its first nuclear test in 1974,
which laid the foundation of nuclear competition in South Asia.13 India’s nuclear test in 1974
galvanized the Pakistani nuclear program, shifting it decisively from a hedging capability into afull-scale nuclear weapons program. 14 In addition to sharing centuries of Muslim rule with India
in the subcontinent, Pakistan is the only nuclear-armed Muslim country today and very proud of
its struggle of attaining independence and achieving nuclear capability against significant

12 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, Stanford University Press, 2012: 7-10
13Chinese nuclear tests happened two years after India’s humiliating defeat in 1962 border war. The defeat

continues to have a huge psychological impact on India’s national security and its approach to nuclear
proliferation. See Jacques C Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity. Emotions, and Foreign
Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 171.
14 In the 1970s, there were other developments at the nexus of China, India, and Pakistan region that affected
policies in this critical Cold War period. A series of coups in Afghanistan transpired throughout the decade andculminated in the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan. The Islamic Revolution in Iran overthrew the shah of Iran andcrises between United States and Iran began. Each of these developments brought Pakistan into the eye of thestorm and catapulted its strategic significance, which impacted U.S.-Pakistan relations both positively andnegatively.

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obstacles and nonproliferation challenges. Pakistan staunchly believes nuclear capability is at
the core of its sovereignty, national security strategy, and survivability.
Nuclear Doctrinal Dissonance
After acquiring nuclear weapons, China, India, and Pakistan adopted minimal deterrent
strategies. All three, however, have continued to advance their deterrence capabilities regardlessof their spoken intent. For instance, China need only have a credible minimal deterrent to deter
India but concerns over U.S. advances, especially in ballistic missile defense (BMD), haveforced China to question whether its retaliation would be assured. Presently, India is seriously
considering decoupling its nuclear policy with separate pledges for China and Pakistan. There isongoing debate within India about keeping its first use option open against Pakistan (possibly inresponse to Pakistan’s full spectrum deterrence posture) while maintaining a nuclear no first use
policy against China. 15 India’s increasingly diversified strategic force posture and historicalplans threatening to preemptively snuff out Pakistan's nuclear facilities, 16 regardless of its
rhetoric focusing on China and marginalizing the Pakistani threat, suggest otherwise. Try as it
might, India cannot seem to de-hyphenate itself from Pakistan.17
From the Chinese perspective, South Asia is a secondary focus, and the nature of the IndiaPakistan crisis-ridden relationship especially, distracts China from its primary focus on threats
on its eastern seaboard (East China, Taiwan, South China Seas). China borders four nuclear
states: Russia, India, Pakistan, and the DPRK. In addition, Japan and the ROK are under theextended deterrence of the United States. In China’s threat perception, U.S. pressure to contain
China is increasing, and, consequently, Beijing’s primary focus is on the shifting nature of its
strategic relations with the United States. China’s nuclear relationship with India is a new driveraffecting Chinese strategic thinking.
China’s nuclear policy has been to maintain a “lean and effective” force posture based on selfreliance, an emphasis on no-first use doctrine, and minimum deterrence force posture sufficient

15 Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, andCapabilities,” International Security 43, no. 3 (Winter 2018/19): 7–52, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00340
16 Khan, Eating Grass, 230.
17 Small, The China-Pakistan Axis, 32, 47–65.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificto pose risks of second-strike. China seems to be shifting from this posture to a more assured,second-strike capability. Its primary reliance on medium and intermediate range delivery systems
is moving toward intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs, both road-mobile and silo-based),
multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) missiles, and nuclear-powered submarine
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).18 These transformations have induced strategic anxiety inIndia, which has embarked on its own strategic modernization program, which in turn has affected
Pakistan. Consequently, a strategic chain reaction in Asia drives competition and shifts in
doctrines and nuclear strategies.
After the 1998 nuclear tests, in a letter to President Clinton, India Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee justified India’s nuclear test decision on the perception of the twin threat posed by
China and Pakistan. India’s declared doctrine includes three key elements:
1. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrence force posture that willremain dynamic and subject to threat conditions and change in environment.
2. A policy of no-first use and massive retaliation in response to first nuclear strike on
India’s territory or Indian forces anywhere.
3. India’s right to retaliate with nuclear weapons in response to chemical and biologicalattack on India or Indian forces anywhere.19
It is quite clear that India’s declared doctrine is flexible in interpretation, fluid in force goals,
and conditional on a no-first-use policy. A no-first-use pledge is an unambiguous commitmentthat nuclear weapons will never be used unless the country suffers a first nuclear attack.
However, India imposed two qualifiers to this policy. First, if India’s military forces suffer
nuclear attack “anywhere,” it reserves the right to retaliate with nuclear response. India’s
second qualifier is nuclear retaliation against chemical or biological attack on Indian forces—
again— anywhere. The term “anywhere” implies deterrent protection for the Indian military if
it invades a neighbouring country should that country retaliate with nuclear weapons.

18 Eric Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States, RR-

1628-AF (Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1628.html
19 “The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews operationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Ministry ofExternal Affairs, Government of India, January 4, 2003, https://bit.ly/3jrRvgG

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Trilateral Strategic Confidence Building Measures in Southern Asia
India’s credible minimum deterrence posture is dynamic; “minimum” includes ICBMs,
SLBMs, MIRVs—or anything either China or Pakistan introduces in their inventory. The
credibility of India’s threat of “massive retaliation” is also questionable, given the tightly
coupled geography of the subcontinent. 20 India’s military conceived a concept of limited war
under the nuclear umbrella and refined its operational concept to launch a sudden cross-bordermilitary operation purportedly in response to terror attack in which India believes Pakistan iscomplicit. Colloquially referred to as Cold Start, this combined land/ air operations concept
calls for shallow maneuvers across Pakistan using intense firepower to inflict maximum
destruction and to terminate a war on India’s terms without crossing Pakistani nuclear
threshold.
Pakistan nuclear policy is the opposite of India’s and China’s policy. Pakistan has decided not
to declare any official nuclear doctrine and adopted a policy of deliberate ambiguity. However,Pakistan is not entirely opaque in its declaration on nuclear use. Several publicly declaredstatements from leaders and interviews and speeches from serving officials of Pakistan Strategic
Plans Division (SPD) have explained the contours of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. Pakistan
nuclear doctrine is explicit that its nuclear weapon capability is India-specific and retains theoptions of nuclear first use as last resort to deter a major conventional war.
Like that of India, Pakistan’s “credible minimum deterrence” posture has no fixed ceiling and is
dynamic to respond to qualitative and quantitative threat (from India). Pakistan has also declared
four criteria that would determine its decision on nuclear use: loss of territory, destruction ofarmed forces, strangulation of economy (naval blockade), and domestic instability. 21 These
thresholds are deliberately ambivalent and clearly intended to deter the Indian military and tooffset conventional asymmetry with India. In answer to India’s Cold Start, Pakistan has
introduced battlefield nuclear weapons with a short range of 60 kilometers and announced its

20 For example, were Pakistan to use battlefield nuclear weapons against invading Indian forces on Pakistani soil,

Pakistan considers it inconceivable that India would “massively retaliate,” which would veritably mean causing“unacceptable damage” to India itself.
21 Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy inPakistan,” interview with Khalid Kidwai (Como, Italy: Landau Network-Centro Volat, 2002),
https://pugwash.org/2002/01/14/report-on-nuclear-safety-nuclear-stability-and-nuclear-strategy-in-pakistan/418

WMD in Asia-Pacificnuclear capability will counter a full spectrum of threats at the tactical, operational, and strategiclevels.22
The doctrinal disconnect between China, India, and Pakistan has created an arms race inSouthern Asia. While China and India maintain a no-first-use policy and Pakistan refuses topledge a no-first use commitment, all three are engaged in strategic modernization that includes
entanglements of dual-use delivery capabilities in missiles and aircraft. By creating greater
ambiguity in warheads, the distinction between warfighting and deterrence is further blurred.
Given that three interconnected nuclear capable countries are locking horns at the confluenceof disputed territory of Kashmir in South Asia, it is imperative to construct an architecture ofstrategic restraint regime that ensures deterrence stability. In the next sections, I examine theefficacy of existing structures of risk reduction or conflict management following which I
propose a strategic restraint regime for larger stability and balance in Southern Asia.

Analysis of the Existing Peace Agreements and Confidence Building Measures
The absence of adequate peace and security architectures and risk reduction mechanisms between
the two South Asian dyads is a major concern and a cause for fragile stability. Given the frequency
and intensity of crises between Pakistan and India, the probability of limited war escalating intoa deeper war is far greater than one between China and India. Generally, the border between India
and China had remained dormant for almost three decades until the Doklam (2017) and Ladakh(2020) border crises erupted. Furthermore, India and China have a good track record ofdeescalating crises through political engagement, but they have made no progress toward settling
the bilateral disputes.
India views China as a strategic rival and competes with China to achieve strategic parity. In any
tactical conflict with China, India’s policy is to diffuse the crisis through diplomatic engagement.
For its part, China dismisses India’s threat perception and gives little countenance to any notion

22 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Going Tactical: Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture and Implications for Stability,” IFRI Proliferation

Papers, No. 53, September 2015, French Institute of International Relations at
https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/proliferation-papers/going-tactical-pakistans-nuclear-posture-419

Trilateral Strategic Confidence Building Measures in Southern Asiaof strategic parity with India. China’s policy is to develop good relations with India and with allof India’s neighbours through economic investments, including its BRI.
In contrast, India views Pakistan more in tactical terms; its current policy is to diplomaticallyisolate Pakistan and bear down with its military preponderance in response to alleged asymmetricuse of proxy forces and its resistance to challenge India’s hegemonic ambitions in South Asia.
India is prepared to challenge Pakistani nuclear deterrent and engage Pakistan into a debilitatingarms race, hoping that Pakistan would strategically exhaust itself. On its part, rather than getting
entrapped in an arms competition with India, Pakistan has deepened its strategic partnership with
China to balance against India. Over the past several years, India has perceived China andPakistan as a collusive threat, which means that in any tactical conflict against either China or
Pakistan, India’s response could be on worse case assumption that could potentially move tacticallevel crises into a strategic dimension.23
For all these reasons, it is necessary that China, India, and Pakistan undertake a trialogue as soon
as possible. Nuclear armed states acting on exaggerated threat perceptions raise domestic fears
and public expectations for national security. As in all previous crises in the Southern Asia,
domestic political circumstances will likely remain the proximate cause for crisis escalation.
Media hype during recent crises in the region riles up public emotions, wherein political
expectations are expressed in terms of winning or losing. Decision makers in democracies comeunder intense pressure to explain what kind of concessions political leaders made to theadversary for crisis de-escalation. Of late, during a crisis, public pressure on political and militaryleadership pushes each country into deeper commitment traps than the policymakers would haveotherwise desired.
Conversely, public expectations may greatly increase the stakes in peace and conflict
resolution. Hopes peak when a dialogue process is making positive strides and all sides are

23 Snehesh Alex Phillip, “Don’t Try Any Misadventure amid India’s Tensions with China, CDS Rawat,” The Print (NewDelhi), September 3, 2020, https://theprint.in/defence/dont-try-any-misadventure-amid-indias-tensions-withchina-cds-rawat-warns-pakistan/495246/. Also see Rajat Pandit, “Two Front War is Real Scenario, Says General
Rawat,” Economic Times, July 18, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/two-front-war-is-areal-scenario-says-general-bipin-rawat/articleshow/56324336.cms

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WMD in Asia-Pacificengaged in innovating new CBMs. Public opinion thereby amplifies the dark and light moods
that affect political leaders and complicates their task amid delicate negotiations.
Both dyads have made several attempts to create a peace and security framework to dampen thecompetition and build trust and CBMs. An examination of the past and existing arrangements
reveals those measures that have been adopted indicate desire amongst all three states for durable
peace and security and public demand to eschew violence and defuse crises.
Peace and Security Attempts: China and India
Panchsheel
India emerged from the post-colonial world as the largest country in South Asia, and its first
Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, set the principles of India’s foreign policy objectives in thecontext of the Cold War by declaring that “a deliberate policy of friendship with other countries
goes farther in gaining security than almost anything else.” 24 Despite being criticized forappeasing China, Nehru remained firm on his vision. Along with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai,
he signed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, or Panchsheel, in 1954. Nehru’s visionbecame the central pillar of India’s stated foreign policy philosophy: non-aggression, noninterference, peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, and mutual benefit in all interactions. 25 The
1962 war derailed the Panchsheel foundations of India-China relations. For several years after
the 1962 war, smaller scale China-India border skirmishes sporadically continued until the mid1970s and a brief standoff in 1986–1987.26 China-India relations accelerated between 1988–1996
after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi paid a visit to China. After this visit, the two nations held fivesummits that resulted in two major agreements that laid the foundations of China-India peace
prospects.

24 Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946–April 1961 (New Delhi: Publications

Division, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961), 79,
http://archive.org/details/indiasforeignpol00nehr
25 Priya Chacko, Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004 (New York: Routledge,2013).
26 The last border military exchange was in 1975 (Sikkim). In 1979, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, then Indian foreign minister
visited Beijing, which was the first visit in post Mao era. Another military standoff occurred in 1986–1987 in the
Sumdorong Chu valley (Wangdung area). The border crisis stepped up again after Modi regime took power in 2014.

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India-China Border Agreements: 1993 and 1996
On September 7, 1993, Prime Ministers Narasimha Rao and Li Peng signed the “Agreement on
Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC)” at Beijing’s GreatHall of the People. This agreement was acclaimed as the “first major conventional arms control
agreement between two Asian countries without any role played by third countries.” 27 This
China-India agreement comprises nine articles that developed joint consensus to resolve theboundary question “through peaceful and friendly consultations.” 28 Both agreed to keep bordermilitary presence “to a minimum level compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly
relations,” not to “undertake military exercises in mutually identified zones beyond agreed
levels,” and to “give the other notification of military exercises” along the border. 29 Under theagreement, both sides were required to initiate a process to “appoint diplomats and military
experts to formulate, through mutual consultations, implementation measures for the present
agreement.”30 The establishment of a group of experts made this CBM inherently dynamic andprogressive and also provided a process to address frictions. In essence, this agreement provides
space for the political leadership of China and India to focus on improving bilateral theirrelationship.31
In November 1996, India and China signed a second CBM agreement that comprised twelve
articles during President Jiang Zemin’s visit to New Delhi. Many analysts consider theagreement to be a veritable “no-war pact.”32 This agreement included additional military CBMs
and specifically pledged that “neither side shall use its military capability against the other

27 Swaran Singh, “China-Indian CBMs: Problems and Prospects,” Strategic Analysis, 20, no. 4 (July 1997) 543–559,

https://www.idsa-india.org/an-jul-4.html
28 Singh, China- India CBMs.
29 Singh, China- India CBMs.
30 Singh, China- India CBMs.
31 Singh, “China-Indian CBMs;” Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Jing-dong Yuan, “Resolving the China-Indian Border
Dispute: Building Confidence through Cooperative Monitoring,” Asian Survey 41, no. 2 (2001): 351–376,
https://library.fes.de/libalt/journals/swetsfulltext/14218788.PDF
32 “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic ofChina on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China
Border Areas,” Peacemaker UN, 1996,
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CN%20IN_961129_Agreement%20between%20China%
20and%20India.pdf

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WMD in Asia-Pacificside.”33 Besides reaffirming commitments “to speed up process of clarification” and commence“exchange of maps indicating their respective perceptions...as soon as possible” (Article X), 34
the 1996 agreement also provided principles of “mutual and equal security” and mutual
understanding on military forces deployments of such considerations and “parameters such as
the nature of terrain, road communications, and other infrastructure and time taken to induct/deinduct troops and armaments.” 35 An important element of the agreement pertained tocategorizing offensive weapons to which both sides agreed to prioritize withdrawal and“exchange data on the military forces” to reduce deployments. 36 A major CBM in the ChinaIndia agreement was to “avoid holding large scale military exercises involving more than one
division (15,000 troops) in close proximity to the LAC.” Both sides agreed to inform the otherside on the “type, level, planned duration and areas of exercise” if it involved more than abrigade (5,000 troops) and de-induct “within five days of completion” and provide clarifications
to the other whenever either side sought. Yet another important CBM in the 1996 agreement
included prohibition of any use of “hazardous chemicals, conduct blast operations or hunt withguns or explosives within two kilometers” of the LAC, unless it is “part of developmental
activities” in which case the other side shall be informed “through diplomatic channels or by
convening a border personnel meeting, preferably five days in advance.”37
The 1996 border mechanism agreement required both sides to “strengthen exchanges andcooperation between their military personnel and establishments,” designate points for border
meetings, establish “telecommunication links” between these border points, and establish“step-by-step medium and high-level contacts between the border authorities.” 38 China andIndia agreed to cooperate with each other on any land or air intrusions “because of unavoidable
circumstances like natural disasters” and “extend all possible assistance” to each other. 39
33 Peacemaker UN, “Agreement.”
34 Peacemaker UN, “Agreement.”
35 Peacemaker UN, “Agreement.”
36 The offensive weapons included armoured tanks, infantry combat vehicles, artillery guns (including howitzers)

with 75 mm or bigger calibre, mortars with 120 mm or bigger calibre, surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air
missiles. In addition, two agree that no combat aircraft which “include fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, militarytrainer, armed helicopter and other armed aircraft” shall be allowed to fly “within ten kilometers” of the Line of
Actual Control (LAC) “except by prior permission” from the other side. Peacemaker UN, “Agreement.”
37 Peacemaker UN, “Agreement.”
38 Peacemaker UN, “Agreement.”
39 Peacemaker UN, “Agreement.”

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Finally, both agreed to establish a “China-India joint working group” on boundary questions
and to commence “mutual consultations” to implement the agreement.40
The comprehensive character of the 1993 and 1996 agreements generated an atmosphere ofpeace and amity in which the People’s Liberation Army-Air Force (PLAAF) and Indian Air
Force (IAF) attempted to create a code of conduct and began improving relations, that is, theIAF invited PLAAF officers to visit). 41 In the same spirit, the Indian and Chinese navies alsobegan initiatives to build confidence and remove suspicions and doubts. There were suggestions
for joint naval exercises, and India invited China’s envoy to visit the Indian naval base at Port
Blair in Andaman and Nicobar. 42 By the mid-1990s, China and India had normalized relations
and clearly desired a peaceful resolution of border disputes and intent to engage in economic
activities, turning Asian rivalry into healthy competition. China was surprised when India cited
China as a principal reason for its decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998, which underscoresthat the China-India issues are deeper than the apparent warming of relations manifested in thetwo border agreements.43
The China-India border crises in 2017 (Doklam) and Ladakh (2020) indicate that, despite
existence of structure to prevent violence and crisis escalation, the two peace agreements are
insufficient for settlement of conflict. It seems even more surprising that India and China went
into a military crisis in summer 2020, when in January 2020, both countries had agreed toestablish a military-to-military hotline between India’s director-general military operations(DGMO) and China’s Western Theatre Command. 44 It is unclear if the hotline was establishedwhen the Ladakh crises occurred, but it is clear that the China-India relationship is undergoing

40 Peacemaker UN, “Agreement.”
41 “Officers of PLAAF Have Been Visiting Indian Air Force Bases,” Times of India, December 22, 1995, quoted in

Swaran Singh, “Sino-Indian CBMs: Problems and Prospects,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, accessed
November 5, 2020, https://www.idsa-india.org/an-jul-4.html
42 Singh, “China-Indian CBMs.”
43 Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton also alleged China-Pakistan
nuclear cooperation as another reason for India decision to conduct nuclear tests. “Nuclear Anxiety; India’s Letterto Clinton on the Nuclear Testing,” New York Times, May 13, 1988,
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/world/nuclear-anxiety-indian-s-letter-to-clinton-on-the-nucleartesting.html
44 Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, “New India-China Military Hotline to Become Operational between DGMO andWestern Theatre Command,” Economic Times, January 11, 2020, https://bit.ly/3jtqDx3424

WMD in Asia-Pacifica downward spiral at a time when India-Pakistan tensions on the LoC in Kashmir continue toheat up following India’s suppressive measures in Kashmir since August 2019. Lately, with the
backdrop of the India-Pakistan military crisis in 2019 and the China- India crisis in 2020, Indian
military leaders are more concerned about a two-front collusive threat from China and Pakistan.
India’s current policy is to decouple its dealing with China and Pakistan by reaching China
diplomatically to diffuse the crisis but isolating and not engaging with Pakistan. India’s policy
is counterproductive, however, because it is only bringing China and Pakistan closer.
Peace and Security Attempts: India and Pakistan
The history of peace attempts between India and Pakistan begins immediately after partition
and their war over Kashmir. The 1948 Kashmir war ended by dividing the Jammu and Kashmir
state between India and Pakistan, and after their military forces ceased operations, they
established the Cease-fire Line (CFL). Both sides entered into the Karachi Agreement of 1949
that established the code of conduct of the militaries at CFL—pending the final resolution ofKashmir under United Nations Security Council resolutions. 45 After the 1971 War, India andPakistan signed the Simla Accord in July 1972 and, since then, the CFL became the LoC in
Kashmir.
This accord brought a decade of peace throughout the 1970s; however, from the 1980s onward,
India and Pakistan have undergone a series of military crises.46
Non-Attack on Nuclear Installations and 1991 Military CBMs
In December 1985, Pakistani President Zia-ul Haq visited New Delhi and concluded agreementin principle on “non-attack on nuclear installations,” which was eventually formalized underPrime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi in December 1988. Both prime ministers also

45 One of most durable India-Pakistan treaty was agreed under aegis of World Bank in 1960 known as Indus Water

Treaty, which standardizes river water distribution from Kashmir into Pakistan’s Indus water basin. “Fact Sheet:
The Indus Waters Treaty 1960 and the Role of the World Bank,” June 11, 2018, World Bank,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/brief/fact-sheet-the-indus-waters-treaty-1960-and-the-world-bank
46 India and Pakistan differ in interpretation of the forum on Kashmir. Pakistan insists Kashmir remains a dispute
under United Nations Security Council resolutions to be resolved after a plebiscite. India is adamant that thecouncil’s resolutions are superseded by the 1972 Simla Agreement, which binds the two countries to settle all
disputes bilaterally.

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agreed to establish a “hotline.” 47 While a hotline between the two prime ministers did notmaterialize, the two militaries established hotlines at their respective military headquarters known
as the DGMOs (Director Generals of Military Operations) that have been functional since 1990.
Importantly, the military structures of India and Pakistan are similar compared to those between
China and India, and in the India-Pakistan case there is regular DGMO exchange every Tuesday.
Not long after prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi made their agreement in
December 1988, a new crisis erupted in Kashmir in the summer of 1989. This crisis again brought
India and Pakistan close to another war. Over the next year, the crisis was diffused through U.S.
intervention, which underscores the lack of any bilateral mechanism to end crises between the
two. While relations between India and Pakistan remained strained as the Kashmir uprising wason all-time high, both countries agreed to several military CBMs in 1991.48 In April 1991, India
and Pakistan signed two military agreements in New Delhi “prior notification of military
exercises” and “ prevention of the violation of Airspace.” 49 Taken together, the 1991 Military
CBMs, DGMOs hotlines, and the Karachi Agreement of 1949 on LoC on Kashmir provide bothcountries with robust understanding to regulate and clarify the code of conduct of the two
militaries. Yet, as is the case between China and India, the military CBMs between India andPakistan have proven insufficient to prevent numerous military crises between the two.
Vajpayee Initiatives: The Lahore Agreement (1999) and Islamabad Declaration (2004)
In the mid-1990s, India’s Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral took a bold initiative of reachingout to India’s neighbors to resolve conflicts; the new cordial approach became famously known
as the Gujral Doctrine. In this new spirit of forging regionalism, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif agreed to hold a “composite dialogue” on all issues affecting peace and security in the

47 The hotline is a quick, reliable, and ever-ready communication link available to the leaders particularly in a

military emergency. “India and Pakistan Agree Not to Hit nuclear plants, Los Angeles Times, January 1, 1989,
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-01-01-mn-289-story.html
48 “Confidence Building and Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures in South Asia,” Henry L Stimson Center, June 14,
2012, https:/www.stimson.org/2012/confidence-building-and-nuclear-risk-reduction-measures-south-asia/
49 Two military CBMs were the Agreement on Advance Notification on Military Exercises, Maneuvers, and Troop
Movements and the Agreement on Prevention of Airspace Violations and for Permitting Overflights and Landings
by Military Aircraft.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificregion. 50 Gujral’s successor, Prime Minister Vajpayee, refashioned Gujral’s policy with anaggressive diplomacy towards neighbours, particularly with Pakistan, adding pragmatism andgreater zeal to regional peace initiatives. After the nuclear tests, while both India and Pakistan
were under nuclear sanctions, Prime Minister Vajpayee took a dramatic step of riding on a bus
across the border into Pakistan and brought a peace initiative, which was signed between the two
leaders as the famous “Lahore Declaration 1999.”51 By far, the Lahore Declaration of February
1999 is the most comprehensive agreement between India and Pakistan, the significance of whichis all the greater because it was conducted after the 1998 nuclear tests and embedded both sides’
best hope for peace and security on nuclear subcontinent. Within a few months, however, thisdramatic peace initiative derailed on the heights of Kargil when India and Pakistan fought a short
war in the summer of 1999. The Kargil crisis raised international concerns of nuclear
conflagration in South Asia and shook the trust embedded in the 1991 military CBMs and highpromise of the Lahore Declaration.
Nevertheless, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee continued to pursue peace throughout his tenurefrom 1998–2004. In this period, Vajpayee again took the initiative of inviting President Pervez
Musharraf, the architect of the Kargil war in 1999, to a summit in Agra in summer 2001, but thetwo sides failed to reach an agreement. Violence in Kashmir has continued to derail peace efforts
throughout the post nuclear test period. A terror attack on the Indian parliament in December
2001 resulted in a 10-month military standoff between Pakistan and India in 2001–2002, which
ended with a ceasefire agreement on LoC in 2003. Just before Vajpayee’s term came to an end,he visited Islamabad for a meeting of the regional organization South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and reached an agreement, the Islamabad Declaration, in
January 2004, that included peaceful resolution of conflict.
Vajpayee’s successor, Manmohan Singh, continued peace efforts with President Musharraf
through backdoor channels for nearly four years. During this period, India and Pakistan cameclose to agreement on conflict resolution over Kashmir and informally agreed on a roadmap of

50 “Analysis of Pak- India Composite Dialogue, IPRI Newspaper article, September 2015, Islamabad Policy ResearchInstitute at https://ipripak.org/analysis-of-pak-india-composite-dialogue/
51 “Lahore Declaration,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, last updated February 21, 1999, https://www.nti.org/educationcenter/treaties-and-regimes/lahore-declaration/

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Kashmir solution, which became known as the Musharraf formula. Once again, New Delhi andIslamabad failed to bring to fruition the understanding both leaders had reached privately. 52
Since then, India and Pakistan have drifted so far apart that bringing them back onto a peacefultrack is a colossal undertaking.

Trilateral Strategic Restraint Regime
The historic Lahore Declaration of 1999 included the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding(MOU), which laid down the basis of potential peace, security, and CBMs. As mentioned
previously, India and Pakistan have a long track record of negotiating CBMs but lacked
mechanisms for implementation. 53 One of the key reasons for failure to construct a security
regime in South Asia is the continuing distrust between India and Pakistan and lately between
China and India. Instead of reassuring the countries involved, CBMs lose effect when forward
military deployment, unending violence, and aggressive military posturing continues.
Unpacking the China-India and India-Pakistan agreements reveals the nature of CBMs
negotiated in the 1990s were similar, but India’s approach to dealing with China is different thanwith Pakistan. Karan Sawny, an Indian scholar, observes,
With China, India has had positive experiences with forces pulled back andtensions eased. India believes this is so because there is greater political will
and common desire to normalize relations in the case of China but not so inthe case with Pakistan. 54

52 Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove: An Insider Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Relations

Including Details of the Kashmiri Framework (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 297–353.
53 The Karachi Agreement of 1949; Simla Accord of 1972; Lahore Agreement of 1999; and Islamabad Accord of2004 are some of the impressive bilateral accords. The Lahore MOU seeks developing mechanism for the
implementation of existing CBMs.
54 Karan R. Sawny, “The Prospects for Building a Peace Process Between India and Pakistan,” in Conflict Resolution
and Regional Cooperation in South Asia, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Imtiaz H Bokhari, eds. (Islamabad Policy
Research Institute 2004): 32–40.

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Apart from political will, India’s and China’s force deployments against each other have been far
less threatening and non-violent until 2017 and 2020 compared to India and Pakistan along the
LoC in Kashmir and international border, which involves cross-border firing and casualties.

Trilateral Strategic CBMs
In 1998 after the nuclear tests, Pakistan introduced the concept of establishing a regional
strategic restraint regime (SRR) between India and Pakistan as a foundation of a peace andsecurity architecture as the best way to ensure strategic stability. To date, Pakistan continues tooffer India the SRR, which comprises three interlinked propositions: conflict resolution process,conventional force restraints, and nuclear restraints. Under this concept, the first leg envisagesa political process of engaging in an uninterrupted process of dialogue until a negotiatedresolution to the India- Pakistan conflict could be found. Progress on such steps would ensure afriendly and peaceful environment as envisaged in the premise of all previous agreements. The
second leg proposes a conventional restraint arrangement, which includes subsuming theexisting military CBMs and nuancing it into formal conventional restraint agreements such as
the creation of low military force zones along the border, the identification of offensive forces,
and the process of notification. The third leg proffers a formalized nuclear restraint agreement,
recognizing the existing state of non-deployed nuclear force postures between India andPakistan. The nuclear restraint includes limits on strategic weapons deployments anddevelopment as well as prevention of arms racing, such as missile development restraints on
payload ranges, mutual understanding not to mate missile frame with live warheads, agreement
not to produce or acquire submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBMs), and halt developing or
deploying missile defense. Such a regime would prevent accidental launches, increase the safety
coefficient in nuclear operations, and simplify nuclear management. In essence, the SRR would
formalize deterrence stability through a South Asian version of mutually understood mutuallyassured destruction.55

55 Khan, Eating Grass, 296–301.

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India has continually rejected the proposal citing other security concerns (China) andnational objectives; India therefore refuses to bind itself bilaterally with Pakistan. Also, India
does not want restraints on its conventional force because it has preponderance over Pakistan
but not against China. Pakistan therefore refuses to agree on nuclear restraint and retains its
nuclear-use option to offset conventional force asymmetry.
Over two decades have passed since the SRR was originally proposed. Now that India fears a
China-Pakistan collusion, a trilateral SRR is needed that includes China as well. A new
framework involving political, economic, and strategic commitments from all three states, whichtakes into consideration the new geopolitical shifts and technological innovations, is becoming
essential for stability.56
I propose that China, India, and Pakistan consider a new strategic restraint framework thatinvolves five legs, including:
1. a process of two separate sets of conflict resolution;
2. economic progress and interdependency;
3. conventional force restraints including deployment limits and low force zones;
4. nuclear restraint arrangement involving doctrinal assurance, and non-alerting status; and5. establishing a modernized nuclear hotline at the level of head of state.
The new quadrangle of conflict resolution, economic progress, conventional and nuclear restraint
is the best way forward.
Principles for Creating Conditions for Strategic CBMs
In the case of China and India, the 1993 and 1996 Agreements include principles andmechanisms and, similarly, in the case of India and Pakistan, the Military CBMs of 1991 andthe Lahore Declaration of 1999 provide precedents and a framework for structuring mutual
agreements—either bilaterally or at some stage—trilaterally. It is important that highest-level
56 In the new proposal, I have added economic progress to conflict resolution as fourth element along withconventional and nuclear restraints. Also See Feroz Hassan Khan, “Strategic Restraint Regime 2.0,” in Michael
Krepon and Julia Thompson eds., Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia (Washington D.C.: Henry
L Stimson Center, 2014), 161–174, https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/fileattachments/Deterrence_Stability_Dec_2013_web_1.pdf

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WMD in Asia-Pacificcivil and military leaders identify the most urgent issues of peace and security and agree on
mechanisms to settle these issues. Furthermore, if leaders use economic liberalization measures
as a primary instrument of upgrading interstate relations, economic stakeholders andconstituencies will have incentives to maintain a climate of cooperation and investment.
Emergence of interdependent economic networks and reliance on cross-border trade willtransform the region from the existential security-centric relationship into one that is more of an
economic-centric relationship.
Should economic and trade imperatives displace traditional security priorities, the China- IndiaPakistan confluence in Southern Asia could emerge as a hub of trading states instead of a hub ofseparatism, terrorism, and territorial disputes. Pakistan is geographically positioned to play apivotal role in providing outlets and inlets for both Indian and Chinese trade. Should China, India,
and Pakistan develop mutual trust and collective will to eschew security-centric thinking andprioritize trade, the regional and global markets are ready for a paradigm shift at the fulcrum ofCentral, South West, and South Asia.
Just as there is a symbiotic relationship between conventional and nuclear deterrence, so too areconventional force and nuclear force CBMs interlinked. When countries face asymmetric threats
from superior conventional forces, they rely on nuclear deterrence to offset the imbalance. India
faces a similar asymmetric situation with China just as Pakistan sees asymmetry with India.
Though China and India have pledged not to use nuclear weapons, India’s security concerns arefar from being alleviated. Rather, India now sees twin threats from China and Pakistan. One way
to resolve this conundrum is for China, India, and Pakistan to consider five broad principles thatare derived from previously agreed principles that all three states had signed in separate agreements:• Create a befitting political environment with less tensions and amenability forpeace and security.
• Refrain from the use of sub-conventional strategies and assure each other that force would
not be used to resolve problems.
• Recognize that conventional force balance and physical posture of respective militaries
directly affect nuclear deterrence posture.
• Agree to establish institutional mechanisms to tackle crisis-triggering events at the431

Trilateral Strategic Confidence Building Measures in Southern Asia
onset of crisis as the best way to prevent crisis escalation.
• Consider creating a trilateral framework that is unbiased from the consideration of othercountries’ threat assessments.
Formal Trilateral Conventional Arms Control Agreements
As explained elsewhere in this paper, the doctrinal priorities of each of the three countries aredifferent. India insists on negotiating a no-first use doctrinal agreement without any restrictions
on conventional force. Pakistan is unlikely to agree to this “without shifts in the conventionalbalance of forces, requiring CBMs to demonstrate non-hostile intent.”57 China in any case has
no interest in bilateral discussions on nuclear issues with India (or Pakistan). But as explained
above, all three countries have agreed already to some form of conventional force CBMs witheach other. Therefore, the best way forward to guarantee non-use of nuclear weapons is toevaluate the existing conventional force CBMs of the 1990s and transform them into a formal
conventional force arms control agreement between China, India, and Pakistan and including
shifts in technological maturations of present times.
Some of the key overlap between 1993/1996 China-India Agreements and 1991/ Lahore MOU
are as follows:•

Consensus to resolve all disputes through peaceful and friendly consultations.

•

Military presence at borders to an agreed upon minimum level compatible withnature of terrain, road communications, and infrastructure.

•

Categorize offensive/strike forces and offensive weapons and identify low force
zones and agree to limits of military exercises and timings for notification to all.

•Exchanges of military force data and establishment of leadership and military hotlines.

•

Formulation of joint working groups to review, clarify, and resolve all issues
under the agreements under guidance from civil and military leaderships.

57 Dalis Dassa Kaye, Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia (Santa Monica,

CA: Rand Corporation Study, 2007).

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Military Doctrines
Army. Lately India has nuanced its Army’s proactive doctrine (Cold Start) land operations toinclude surgical strikes involving special forces and combined land-air cross-border strikes.58
The Pakistan army announced the Comprehensive Response Doctrine and its nuclear
establishment laid out the full spectrum deterrence concept. The respective Indian and Pakistaniconcepts reduce confidence if not entirely contradict the existing CBMs. The conventional force
and nuclear force doctrines of both countries are seemingly disconnected and deliberately
ambiguous, which can induce escalatory pressures during crisis. A sustained discussion on“security concepts”—as ordained in the Lahore declaration of 1999—is now important. China is
now part of the equation, especially since India believes that China and Pakistan are actively
collaborating against India.
Air Force. Given that the India-Pakistan crisis in February 2019 involved the two air forces,
future crises are expected to be air-centric. Further, though India considers China as its principal
threat, the majority of IAF activity and bases are on its western border, which increases the force
readiness of the Pakistani air bases. It is about time to review the existing bilateral CBMs anddiscuss trilateral air force CBMs merging the 1991 and 1993/96 agreements.
Navy. China, India, and Pakistan may consider including incidents at sea analogous to theagreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Chinese, Pakistani, and India
navies operate in international waters and in the absence of agreed protocols, rules ofengagements and maritime communications have a potential for unintended maritime crisis.
Given that India has introduced a sea-based nuclear deterrent and that Pakistan is fielding nuclear
weapons aboard a diesel submarine, both of which complicate strategic stability, agreeing to an‘incidents at sea agreement’ between all parties has become extremely important. 59
Joint Military Working Groups. As explained above, in the 1996 agreement, India and China
had already agreed on a joint working group to redress border issues. It is time for all three states
58 Arka Biswas, Surgical Strikes and Deterrence Stability in South Asia, ORF Occasional Paper No. 115 (NewDelhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2017), 7.
59 Muhammad Ali, “Maritime Issues Between Pakistan and India: Seeking Cooperation and Regional Stability,”(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 1-4.

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to upgrade their military-to-military interactions to the highest level and create a dedicatedchannel of conversations between the military chiefs. For such an institutional arrangement, I
propose that the military chiefs create military working groups comprising civil and military
senior leaders to discuss issues on boundaries/ borders, revive and subsume existing CBMs andeschew military operations and activities that defeat the purpose of existing CBMs, and negotiate
new military CBMs. 60 New CBMs should include emerging disruptive technologies such as
cyber, artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons, and the possibility of entanglement of dualuse delivery means.
Non-Deployment of BMD and MIRVs. Another area where all three countries could agree tostall vertical proliferation of delivery means is to pledge not to deploy ballistic missile defense
systems or multiple warhead missiles, which are deemed strategically destabilizing. 61 China,
India, and Pakistan could formalize agreements of reporting to each other their respective
peacetime garrisons of strategic missile units and expand flight testing notifications of all typesof missiles including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, MIRVs, space-launched vehicles, and seabased missiles.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and SAARC. In a recent article the respected Indianscholar Manpreet Sethi has suggested that China, India, and Pakistan formalize low-level alertlevels that formalize the existing state of arsenals in all three countries and suggested all nucleararmed states adopt such an agreement. 62 In 1998, when Pakistan originally proposed the SRR, it
offered formalizing the existing non-alert status between India and Pakistan into a recessed
nuclear posture. Endorsing Sethi’s proposal of formalizing non-alert status,63 I suggest that all

60 Feroz Hassan Khan, “Break the Impasse: Direct Talks Between Army Chiefs” in Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler

and Liv Dowling eds., Off Ramps from Confrontation in Southern Asia (Washington D.C: Henry L Stimson Center,May 2009) 154- 161 at https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/OffRamps_Book_R5_WEB.pdf
61 For analysis of the cascading effect of missile defense, read Michael Krepon, “Missile Defense and the Asian
Cascade,” in Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia, ed. Michael Krepon, 237–270 (New York: Palgrave Macmillion,2004).
62 Manpreet Sethi, Complexity of Achieving Strategic Stability in Southern Asia: An Indian Perspective, Policy Brief
No. 90 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2020),
https://www.nupi.no/nupi_eng/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/Complexities-of-Achieving-Strategic-Stability-inSouthern-Asia-An-Indian-Perspective
63 Manpreet Sethi, Complexity of Achieving Strategic Stability.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificthree countries should start discussing this proposal of creating a framework on institutionalizing
a non-alert arrangement in a specific geographic zone.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) could be the starting point for such a
discussion where at least four major powers—Russia, China, India, and Pakistan—are
members states. I propose declaring Southern Asia (including South Asia, Central Asia,
Tibet, and Xinjiang) as a low-alert zone. Although short of a nuclear weapons-free zone, any
agreements covering territories of SCO and SAARC states would be significant CBMs.
Trilateral Agreement of Non-attack on Nuclear Installations and National Command
System. The 1988 India-Pakistan non-attack on nuclear installations agreement could be
extended to include China. This extension would not only redress one of India’s major
concerns, but I also propose that the scope of the existing India-Pakistan non-attack agreement
be expanded to include non-attack on nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3)
including cyberspace. A trilateral non-attack agreement on nuclear installations and NC3 alongwith formalization of a low-alert status suggested above, would be a monumental CBM thatwould give much resilience to Asian stability.
Dedicated Political and Military Hotlines. Once a series of strategic restraint agreements areformalized between the three countries, I recommend a dedicated hotline between the prime
ministers and foreign offices. Current hotlines between Indian and Pakistani military
headquarters do exist, and they have been very useful during peacetime with routine clarifications
and following standard bureaucratic protocols. The existing hotlines between land-based militaryforces should be expanded to involve air and naval command centers as well.
Military hotlines can help deflate pressures during border crises and complement political anddiplomatic hotlines to de-escalate military confrontation.
To reach any understanding on the above proposals, I suggest that the best forum to initiate sucha dialogue process would be the SCO where all three countries are members. A peace process
under the watch of the highest leadership in each capital is now becoming important. Meanwhile,
all three states must include eschewing the asymmetric strategies against the other in letter and435

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spirit of the SCO, whether it be in Xinjiang; Kashmir, Tibet, Baluchistan/ Khyber Pakhtunkhwa;
Arunachal Pradesh, or anywhere else.
China Removes Objections. China’s insistence of not discussing nuclear issues with India has
been overtaken by geopolitical shifts, strategic modernization, and technological maturation.
China should reconsider its policy and initiate a trilateral strategic dialogue with India andPakistan to redress India’s “collusive threat” perceptions, remove impediments in implementing
existing CBMs, and discuss new CBMs—especially the implications of new technologies on
strategic stability. Discussing strategic issues with India and Pakistan would not confer status to
the two non-NPT states but is necessary for stability in Asia. Russia and the United States
respectively ought to encourage such an initiative.
India Removes Objections. In the same vein, India must now give up its policy of objecting
and resisting international community mediation in this conflict-laden and crisis-ridden
region. The international community now has stakes in the triangular nature and technologicalcomplexities of the conflict. For its part, the international community should no longer deferto India’s objection to external peace-brokers, whose role is necessary in forging Asianstability.
Role of International Players
The international community can play a major role first in recognizing that emerging threat
perceptions of tri-junction of South Asia warrant attention. It is time that the international
community, especially the five nuclear weapons states, accept nuclear subcontinent as anexistential reality. India and Pakistan must be brought into the folds of the nuclear world orderso they can undertake obligations and stakes in the non-proliferation regime.64
Renegotiate and Expand Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces to Asia. After 30 years ofstrategic arms control, the United States and Russia were unable to extend the Intermediate-

64 India is a member of three export control regimes: the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group,and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Both India and Pakistan are vying for membership in the Nuclear Supplier’sGroup. See Feroz Hassan Khan, “Burying the Hatchet: The Case for a ‘Normal’ Nuclear South Asia,” Arms Control
Today, 46, no. 2 (March 2016), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-03/features/burying-hatchet-case%E2%80%98normal%E2%80%99-nuclear-south-asia

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WMD in Asia-PacificRange Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that was one of the epic arms control agreements in the Cold
War. Apart from differing interpretations between Russia and the United States, one of therationales was that the former treaty did not include China. The INF treaty is open forrenegotiating. Should China agree to negotiate, I propose that India and Pakistan be included in
the discussion. It would make no sense that three major powers renegotiate terms of new INF
and not include affected countries in South Asia.
Expanding the Asian Missile Regime. Separate missile notification agreements between the
United States and Russia, China and Russia, and India and Pakistan already exist. The 2005
India-Pakistan flight pre-notification agreement is an important CBM, but it is limited to ballistic
missiles only. It does not include the additional families of missiles, including cruise missiles,
hypersonic cruise, and MIRVs that are now or likely to be in the inventory of both South Asian
nuclear-armed states.
American scholar Frank O’Donnell has proposed a novel CBM of integrating the missile flighttest notification between five nuclear states: United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. 65
Endorsing O’Donnell’s proposal, I suggest expanding the flight-testing to included space launchvehicles (SLVs) outside of which all missile tests must be notified in several stages. As a firststep, I propose bringing India and Pakistan into the existing Russia-China missile agreementthat would be best discussed under the aegis of SCO. 66 Further, India, Pakistan, and China
should also be brought into a new version of “non-interference with national technical means”
clause that are embedded in the US-Soviet/Russia treaties. The 1988 United States-Russia prenotification agreements could be integrated into this unified missile regime. The merger of thethree pairings would go a long way in stabilizing not only the trilateral region but also cover allof Asia.
Trilateral Asian ABM Treaty. One of the key elements of assuring strategic stability in thefirst nuclear age has been the creation of mutual vulnerability and assured retaliation through the

65 Frank O’ Donnell, “Launching an Expanded Missile Flight-Testing Regime,” South Asian Voices, October 19, 2019,https://southasianvoices.org/launching-an-expanded-missile-flight-test-notification-regime/#easy-footnote%20bottom-6-11560
66 China and Russia have only committed to inform each other of flight-tests of ballistic missiles with a 2,000 km
plus range and a trajectory approaching their border. Donnell, “Launching an Expanded Missile.”

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survivability of nuclear forces in the face of a nuclear first strike. Manpreet Sethi and Happymon
Jacob, two established scholars from India, have suggested a trilateral anti-ballistic missile treaty
that would reduce vertical proliferation and increase confidence in stability. 67 In 1998, Pakistan
had proposed a bilateral anti-ballistic missile treaty between India and Pakistan (as part of its
SRR proposal). Now both China and India have embarked in acquiring ballistic missile defenses
and Pakistan is the only one that has thus far not indicated pursuing it, which makes one country
vulnerable and tilts the offense-defense balance in Southern Asia. A trilateral discussion on
Asian ABM involving all three countries is now important.
Multilateral Naval CBMs. All three countries have significant maritime concerns sinceconcepts such as “Indo-Pacific Region” and “Maritime Silk Road” have emerged. In addition,
naval modernizations, port and harbor developments (Gwadar, Hambantota, etc.), and associatedmaritime activities are causing anxieties in all countries in South Asia. Most important of all areconcerns arising with the introduction of sea-based strategic deterrents. The comingling of
conventional and nuclear capable systems in the Indian Ocean and the absence of any
professional interaction of those responsible for operating these nuclear forces is a huge void.
India, China, and Pakistan need an agreed framework to discuss concepts of operations, rules ofengagements, command and control issues, etc., and to commence discussions on new naval
CBM activities and the roles of navies in the new strategic environment in the Indian Ocean.

Conclusion
Since the rise of the Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping as leaders in India and in China respectively,
the triangular conflict in South Asia has intensified. For the past three decades India and Pakistan
engaged in cross-border military crises, military mobilizations, and standoffs. The intensity andfrequency of cross-LoC military crises (including air force combat) also increased in the past five

67 Sethi, Complexity of Achieving Strategic Stability; Happymon Jacob, “Time to Consider A Trilateral Asian ABM

Treaty,” South Asian Voices, June 18, 2019, https://southasianvoices.org/time-to-consider-a-trilateral-asianabm- treaty/. Also see Khan, Eating Grass.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificyears. As analyzed previously, the China-India and India-Pakistan rivalries are unlikely to resolve
given continued border tensions and contested maritime interests in the Indian Ocean.
Nevertheless, there are three potential strategic futures in South Asia:
The first future involves intensification of the China-Indian border tensions that engulfs the
India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, which leads to a broader escalation into maritime domain.
A second future is one in which relative status quo is maintained with all sides failing to agree
on any negotiable position on conflict resolution but informally understanding not to escalate
conflict into a broader war. Such future leaves open sporadic border skirmish and continuing
tensions between the three countries but no serious prospect for issue resolution. A third future
could become possible should all three countries reach some form of modus vivendi andproactively seek cooperation. Such a future would lower tensions and commence dialogue
leading to a sustained peace process.
The trilateral strategic restraint proposal advanced above is only feasible if the third futurematerializes. All sides could then agree to a grand bargain to finally settle the disputed borderregions on common denominator and develop shared maritime interests in the Indian Ocean. All
three sides have core interests in combatting terrorism and maintaining free trade in the global
commons along with good reason to cooperate in multilateral forums on a wide range of global
and regional issues. The possibility of such a cooperative future would most probably happen
only with the facilitation of other major powers.
To achieve such a level of trust and confidence seems a long way away today, even though
China, India, and Pakistan share a clear mutual interest in maintaining strategic stability andrecognize the costs of conflict and benefits of cooperation. They have had shared differences
for decades, which makes it very challenging for their leaders to seize the moment and takeinitiatives for cooperation—especially since all countries are experiencing the impact of
Covid-19. To jump-start such a future, I suggest that India‒China and India‒Pakistancommence separate bilateral dialogues to consider the above strategic CBMs. In the next stage
the three should commence a trialogue on the agreed bilateral CBMs and merge them into acomprehensive trilateral agreement.

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Unfortunately, entrenched cognitive biases and low probability of visionary of like-minded
leadership emerging at the same time in all three states makes such a positive future unlikely inthe short term. The most likely future is one of continuing the current trajectory of land/air crossborder skirmishes and maritime competition while seeking cooperation in areas wherever possible.
In sum, the three countries would be competing as well as seeking cooperation on lowest common
denomination—somewhere between the status quo and increased competition with strategicbalancing and deepening alliance.

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16. Is a Nuclear Domino in Northeast Asia Realand Inevitable?
Chung-in Moon

Introduction“How Dark Might East Asia’s Nuclear Future Be?” This is the title of a working paper on nuclear
domino in Northeast Asia published by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in 2016. Its
editor Henry Sokolsky sent a chilling message: “Long considered unlikely, the prospect of South
Korea and Japan getting nuclear weapons and China and North Korea significantly ramping up
their arsenals has become the next big worry.” 1 In this regional nuclear equation, the key factor isthe DPRK’s nuclear rush that can easily trigger a nuclear domino in Northeast Asia by driving
Japan and South Korea to go nuclear. Both Japan and South Korea have an enormous latency toturn their civilian nuclear programs into nuclear armament. They possess both fissile materials thatcan be enhanced to weapons-grade and the technological capabilities to do so. The nuclear domino
thesis in Northeast Asia became more pronounced as Donald Trump hinted at the inevitability andpossibility of Japan and South Korea going nuclear in his interview with the New York Times on
March 27, 2016.2
Five years after Sokolski’s warning, the nuclear situation in the region seems to have worsened.
In 2017, the DPRK undertook its sixth nuclear testing and test-fired 15 ballistic missiles, including
Hwasung-15, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) aimed at the U.S. mainland. President
Donald Trump responded to the moves by threatening to totally destroy the North at his U.N.
General Assembly speech in September 2017. According to Bob Woodward’s book, Rage, Trump

1Henry Sokolski, ed. How Dark Might East Asia's Nuclear Future Be? (Washington, D.C.: Nonproliferation Policy

Education Center, August 26, 2016), Working Paper 1601: 1.
http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1322&rt=&key=Ian%20Easton&sec=article&author=
2 “Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views,” New York Times, March 26, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html© 2022 Chung-in Moon, CC BY 4.0441

Is a Nuclear Domino in Northeast Asia Real and Inevitable?
deliberated a nuclear strike against the DPRK. 3 Crisis escalation was averted by a series of
diplomatic developments, two inter-Korean summits and the first DPRK-U.S. Singapore summit
in June 2018. But the failure of the second U.S.-DPRK Hanoi summit in February 2019 has led toa protracted stalemate. The unresolved DPRK nuclear quagmire continues to haunt South Korea
and Japan.
The ROK government has been prudent in favoring a negotiated settlement through diplomacy,
but conservative politicians and pundits have been advocating the development and possession of
independent nuclear weapons. For them, the logic of ‘nuclear for nuclear’ is the only viable way
to cope with DPRK threats. Otherwise, they argue that Seoul should seek the re-deployment ofAmerican tactical nuclear weapons and/or NATO type nuclear sharing. Public opinion in South
Korea rather strongly supports the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Tokyo’s reactions have beenequally worrisome. Departing from the long-time tradition of ‘nuclear taboo,’ some Japanesepoliticians and opinion leaders began to raise the possibility of nuclear options. A dangerous
vicious cycle of the nuclear dominoes in Northeast Asia seems on the horizon.
This essay aims at unraveling the dynamic nature of the nuclear domino phenomenon in Northeast
Asia primarily focusing on the DPRK, South Korea, and Japan. The first section examines the
DPRK’s nuclear/missile threats as its trigger. The second looks into South Korea’s public debates
on nuclear options ranging from independent nuclear weapons development to the re-transfer ofAmerican tactical nuclear weapons and the NATO style nuclear sharing. Public opinion on nuclear
weapons will also be analyzed. The third section will trace how developments on the Korean
peninsula have affected Japan’s public debates on nuclear weapons and underlying public opinion.
Finally, it will examine whether the nuclear domino phenomenon in Northeast Asia is real andsuggest ways to prevent the advent of nuclear entanglement.

Assessing DPRK Nuclear and Missile Threats
Of five legitimate nuclear weapons’ states, three (the United States, Russia, and China) arecompeting in Northeast Asia, but an amazing strategic stability has prevailed in the region since1970 that can be attributed to the combination of nuclear deterrence, the fear of mutually assured

3 Bob Woodward, Rage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020): 71.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificdestruction, and the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. Nonetheless, the DPRK’s nuclear
ambition has trembled the region’s strategic landscape. After the first successful test launching ofan ICBM in November 2017, Pyongyang officially declared that it has completed its nuclear
forces.
Since the second nuclear crisis in 2002, the DPRK has made steady progress in its nuclear weapons
capability. 4 It now has nuclear facilities, fissile materials (both plutonium and highly enricheduranium), and 30 to 60 warheads. It is estimated that the DPRK can increase its nuclear arsenal by
six to twelve warheads per year.5 Its delivery capabilities have also remarkably improved. North
Korea now possesses twenty types of short (Scud-B and C, KN-23) and intermediate ballistic
missiles (Nodong) and ICBM (Hwasong-15) as well as SLBM (Bukguksong series), of which
fifteen can carry nuclear warheads.6 The DPRK is also known to have miniaturized its warheads,
making them smaller and lighter. Pyongyang has conducted six rounds of nuclear testing,culminating in the successful testing of a hydrogen bomb on September 3, 2017.
The NPT regime does not allow the recognition of the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state, but theindicators above exemplify that it has completed the process of nuclear weaponization. Kim Jong
Un’s remarks at the Eighth Party Congress of the Korea Workers’ Party (KWP) on January 12,
2021, alarmed the world. He stated that the DPRK has successfully developed tactical nuclear
weapons by mastering their miniaturization and standardization. He also added that it has acquired

4 As to the overview of the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities, please refer to Bruce W. Bennett, Kang Choi, Myong-Hyun

Go, Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., Jiyoung Park, Bruce Klingner, Du-Hyeogn Cha, Countering the Risks of North Korean Nuclear
Weapons (Santa Monica:Rand/Asan, 2021) https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1015-1.html; Open
Nuclear Network, “Analysis of the results of the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea: (February 021)
https://www.oneearthfuture.org/program/open-nuclear-network/publications/8th-congressworkers%E2%80%99-party-korea-1; Patrick Cronin, Fear and Insecurity: Addressing North Korean Threat Perception(Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2021) https://www.hudson.org/research/16752-fear-and-insecurityaddressing-north-korean-threat-perceptions ; Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon (eds.), “Special Issue: Breaking the
Nuclear Deadlock in Northeast Asia: Rethinking the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Korea Observer Vol. 47, No. 4(Winter 2016); Shane Smith, “Alternative North Korean Nuclear Futures,” in Sokolski, op. cit.: 41-50.
5 Siegfried Hecker estimates six per year, whereas the RAND Corporation/Asan report twelve per year. See 38
North, “Estimating North Korea’s Nuclear Stockpiles: An Interview With Siegfried Hecker,” April 30, 2021.
https://www.38north.org/2021/04/estimating-north-koreas-nuclear-stockpiles-an-interview-with-siegfriedhecker/?utm_source=Stimson+Center&utm_campaign=6b91e4ff5038N_RSS_AUTOMATED&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_15c3e20f70-6b91e4ff5046310277&mc_cid=6b91e4ff50&mc_eid=ed6f75f703; RAND/Asan, op.cit.: 36-38.
6 See RAND/Asan Report, op. cit. p.30, table 3.1.;Missile Defense Project, "Missiles of North Korea," Missile Threat,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018, last modified November 30, 2020,
https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/

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the largest hydrogen bombs. In addition, extra-large scale multiple rocket launchers, news cruise
missiles (KN-23), and multiple independently retrievable vehicles (MIRV) were introduced. It is
worthy to note in Kim’s remarks that the DPRK will be developing hypersonic gliding vehicles,
military reconnaissance satellites, and nuclear-powered submarines. These cutting-edge weapons
might be on Kim’s wish list to balance new weapons procurements in the United States and South
Korea.7
Equally troublesome is the DPRK’s assertive behavior since the failed Hanoi summit. Instead of
testing strategic weapons that threaten the U.S. mainland, the DPRK test fired short-range missiles
such as KN-23 (range 600 km, equivalent of Russian Iskander), KN-24 (range 400 km, equivalentof ATAKIM), KN-25 (400 km, mega caliber multiple launchers), and KN-09 (250 km, large
caliber multiple launcher) sixteen times between May 2019 and August 2020, all of which aim at
South Korea and American military bases there. The DPRK also test fired the submarine-launchedballistic missile (SLBM) Bukguksong-3 on the barge in October 2019 and Bukguksong-4 (2,000km) in October 2020 and displayed Bukguksong-5 (3,000 km) at the military parade in January
2021. At a military parade in October, 2020, Hwasong-16 (range 13,000km) was also shown.8
Given the mix of new strategic and tactical weapons, Pyongyang’s intention seems twofold.
Whereas Hwasong-15 and 16 are for securing a minimum deterrence through second strikecapability targeted at the U.S. mainland, short-range ballistic and cruise missiles and SLBMs aredesigned for a tactical deterrence by denial against South Korean forces, American forces in Japanand South Korea, and U.S. reinforcement forces. 9 Furthermore, Kim Jong Un’s instruction at theEighth Party Congress to make tactical nuclear weapons operational has alerted Japan and South

7 Jina Kim, “Analysis of the 8th Party Congress and Implications for National Security and Foreign Affairs,” Korea

Institute of Defense Analysis, Kugbang Rondan No. 1835 (21-3), January 19, 2021 (in Korean).
https://www.kida.re.kr/frt/board/frtNormalBoardDetail.do?sidx=382&idx=1895&depth=3&lang=kr
8 Jungsup Kim, “Assessing North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Threats: An Update,” a paper presented at aninternational joint seminar on “Assessing Northeast Asia Nuclear Domino,” the APLN-Sejong Institute, May 14,
2021 (in Korean).
9 See Jungsup Kim, Ibid; Kim’s analysis of the DPRK’s motives is sharply contrasted with that of the RAND/Asanreport which cites the preservation of Kim Jong Un’s regime, achieving Korean unification in its terms, and seeking
a new power status in the region as principal motives behind the DPRK’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. See
RAND/Asan Report, op. cit: 3-4. But this premise seems troublesome at least on two accounts. First, the DPRK is
the monolithic Suryong (Leaders) system and, thus, theoretically speaking, its leadership is not concerned about
internal challenges to regime security. Second, the DPRK recently amended the preamble of KWP’s by-law
regarding the goal of unifying the South under its terms, implying the abandonment of its united front strategy.

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Korea. Indeed, North Korea’s nuclear/missile capabilities are currently posing ‘existential’ threats
to Japan and South Korea.

South Korea’s Responses: Seek Independent Nuclear Armament
Facing nuclear/missile threats from the DPRK, the South Korean government has taken a firm
position. At a National Assembly speech on November 1, 2017, President Moon Jae-in assured
that South Korea will not seek nuclear weapons not only because the United States is providing acredible nuclear umbrella to the South, 10 but also because Seoul’s pursuit of a nuclear path caninvalidate the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as well as
derail its efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula peacefully. 11
Defying the government position, however, conservative politicians and opinion leaders haveraised strong voices in favor of independent nuclear weapons.12 There are two schools, teleologicaland instrumentalist. The teleological school emphasizes ‘nuclear sovereignty’ based on the logicof ‘nuclear for nuclear’ and seeks nuclear armament regardless of American stance. One of its
proponents argues that “countries without nuclear weapons are not truly independent one” 13 andnuclear weapons are the only way to cope with the DPRK’s nuclear threats and to survive the harsh
Northeast Asia’s strategic reality. For them, nuclear weapons are the end in itself. 14 For the
10 Since the establishment of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command in 1978, the United States has affirmed

extended deterrence to South Korea. After the DPRK undertook its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006, then
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld reassured extended deterrence including its nuclear umbrella to South Korea.
At present, the ROK and the United States jointly operate the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation
Group through which convention and nuclear extended deterrence is discussed.
11 On Moon Jae-in’s Korea Peace Initiative, please refer to Chung-in Moon and John Delury (eds.), Bridging the
Divide: Moon Jae-in’s Korea Peace Initiative (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2019).
12 “Voices demanding nuclear armament are on the rise,” BBC News Korea, September 26, 2017.
https://www.bbc.com/korean/news-41377195 (in Korean); Robert Einhorn and Duyeon Kim, “Will South Korea Go
Nuclear?”, The Bulletin of Concerned Nuclear Scientists, August 2016, https://thebulletin.org/2016/08/will-southkorea-go-nuclear/
13 Gap-je Cho, “Two Reports’ Shock: American experts’ assessment of nuclear armament capabilities in Japan andSouth Korea,” Monthly Chosun, May 2016 (in Korean).
http://m.monthly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?nNewsNumb=201605100035&form=MY01SV&OCID=MY01SV
14Mong-jun Chung, “In front of North Korean nuclear threat, what can we do?”http://blog.naver.com/globalmj/220613981473/; Interview with Cho Gapje, "Nuclear for nuclear is the best
deterrence, balance of terror should be realized,"” Kim Jong-bae’s program, TBS. February 23, 2016.
http://tbs.seoul.kr/news/newsView.do?seq_800=10137770&typ_800=12; “Tae-woo Kim argues ‘ nuclear
armament for self-defense should be open’" Yonhap News, February 1, 2017.

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instrumentalist school, however, an independent nuclear armament is conditional. If nuclear
deterrence is credibly secured by an American nuclear umbrella through either the re-deploymentof its tactical nuclear weapons or a NATO-style nuclear sharing, there is no need for an
independent nuclear path. If not, they argue, South Korea should go nuclear independently. 15 The
teleological school seems a minority, whereas the instrumentalist school a majority. Nevertheless,both schools advocate South Korea’s nuclear latency, posing a serious concern.
Politicians from the conservative opposition party constitute the core of the teleological school.
Won Yoo-cheol, then floor leader of the ruling Liberty Korea Party, the staunchest advocate ofnuclear weapons development, argued that “we cannot borrow an umbrella from a neighbor every
time it rains. We need to have a rain coat and wear it ourselves.” 16 He even suggested that South
Korea should withdraw from the NPT to guard our own destiny. After the Moon Jae-in government
was inaugurated in May 2017, a number of leading conservative opposition politicians followed
his suit. Kim Jong-in, then leader of the conservative opposition People Power Party stated that“unless North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons, we should think about having nuclear
armament.”17 Oh Se-hoon, another opposition party leader and currently Seoul City Mayor, alsoechoed a view that “unless we take the extreme measures [i.e., nuclear armament], the North will
not change.”18 This is a general sentiment among conservative politicians.
Some conservative opinion leaders have been campaigning the pro-nuclear posture. For example,
a staunch conservative hardliner Song Dae-sung argues that “without nuclear weapons, we will
become a slave of North Korean nuclear. Nuclear balance of terror is the only way to deal withhttps://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20170215054700004; Dae-jung Kim, “South Korea’s nuclear weapons, it is well
worthy of debating,” Chosun Ilbo, February 7, 2011 (all in Korean).
https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/02/07/2011020701994.html?form=MY01SV&OCID=MY01SV
15Nakgyu Yang, “Redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons revisted,” Asia Gyeongje, September 19, 2020 (inKorean). https://www.asiae.co.kr/article/2020091810214441111; Eun-cheol Lee, “Cho Kyung-tae’s nuclear
armament proposal is drawing attention,” Busan Ilbo, July 31, 2019 (in Korean).
http://www.busan.com/view/busan/view.php?code=2019073119381781177
16 Requoted from Henry Sokolski, ed. How Dark Might East Asia's Nuclear Future Be? (Washington, D.C.:
Nonproliferational Education Center, August 26, 2016), Working Paper 1601, p. 88.
http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1322&rt=&key=Ian%20Easton&sec=article&author=
17 Il-hoon Hyun, “Kim Jong-in, ‘if North Korea does not give up nuclear, we should deliberate on nuclear
armament,” Joongang Ilbo, November 25, 2020 (in Korean). https://news.joins.com/article/23929344
18 Min-woo Kim, “Oh Se-hoon who joins nuclear armament says ‘unless we take an extreme measure, the Northwill not change,” Chosun Biz, June 19, 2020.
https://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2020/06/19/2020061901282.html

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WMD in Asia-PacificNorth Korea.”19 Chosun Ilbo, the leading conservative daily, has been openly supporting nuclear
armament through its editorials. Kim Dae-jung, its senior editorial advisor, went further byclaiming the DPRK nuclear threat will eventually lead to Japan’s nuclear armament, leaving South
Korea as the only country without nukes in the region. That will be a nightmarish scenario.
According to his line of reasoning, South Korea’s internal debates on the development andpossession of nuclear weapons will send a warning to China, while serving as an effective card toresolve the DPRK nuclear problem. He has then been proposing to place the nuclear armamentissue as a major agenda for the general election and the presidential election. 20 Jeong-hoon Lee, asenior journalist with Donga Daily, concurs with him, but points out that nuclear weapons areinconceivable without nuclear sovereignty that in turn requires an autonomy from the United Stateswith regard to uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel rods. 21
Even some anti-nuke liberals have changed their stance. After the DPRK’s sixth nuclear testing in
2017, Bae Myong-bok, a well-known liberal columnist, advocated the nuclear path as a usefulleverage to denuclearize the DPRK.22 Another liberal, Chung Seong-jang, a leading North Korean
specialist, also claimed that South Korea should have its own nuclear weapons to create a balanceof power on the Korean peninsula and in the region. The DPRK will not give up its nuclear
weapons, and a nuclear balance of power is the only way to cope with the DPRK nuke. He
contended that South Korea should reemerge as a credible middle power with nuclear weaponsthat can prevent the outbreak of war, leading to a peninsular and regional peace through a balanceof power.23 Worrisome is that debates on nuclear weapons are no longer considered taboo. It istantamount to opening the Pandora’s Box.
Apart from the DPRK’s nuclear and missile threats, there are several other factors that drive South
Korea’s public debates on nuclear armament. The growing skepticism of the U.S. extended nuclear
19 Jin-yeo Park, “Report on the publication ceremony of Dr. Dae-sung Song’s Book, ‘We should also have nuclear

weapons’,” Dailian, August 24, 2016 (in Korean). https://www.dailian.co.kr/news/view/586835/?sc=naver
20 Dae-jung Kim, “We should have nuclear weapons,” Chosun Ilbo, January 29, 2019 (in Korean).
https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/01/28/2019012802626.html
21 Seoul’s hard lobbying notwithstanding, Washington currently does not allow the South Korea’s back end of
nuclear fuel cycle in accordance with the ROK-U.S. Civil Atomic Energy Cooperation Accord. See Jeong-hoon Lee,
South Korea’s Nuclear Sovereignty (Seoul: Geulmadang, 2013) (in Korean).
22 Myong-bok Bae, “Korean Peninsula peace through nuclear balance,” Joongang Ilbo, September 17, 2019 (inKorean). https://news.joins.com/article/23578701
23 Seong-jang Chung, “Trump’s redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons vs. South Korea’s independent nuclear
armament,” Ajugyeongje, March 6, 2017. https://www.ajunews.com/view/20170305161349769

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deterrence mattered. Chung Mong-joon, an influential politician and the founder of the Asan
Institute for Policy Studies, coined the term ‘torn nuclear umbrella’ to describe his lack of trust in
an American nuclear umbrella. He also suspected that the United States will not sacrifice Los
Angeles for Seoul. 24 The skepticism has intensified as a result of Trump’s rhetoric and policy.
During his presidential campaign, he suggested he would allow Japan and South Korea to go
nuclear. And his transactional handling of the alliance after the election heightened concerns inSeoul and Tokyo that he might withdraw American forces any time. The nuclear option was raised
as a fallback strategy in the absence of American conventional and nuclear deterrence. 25 Suchthinking is not new. President Park Chung-hee sought a nuclear weapons development when the
Nixon administration decided to reduce and even withdraw American forces from South Korea inthe early 1970s. An argument that alliance is more important than non-proliferation mandate andthat Japan and South Korea should be allowed to seek nuclear weapons as a way of countering
China threats has also contributed to precipitating the public debates.26
Equally critical is the reassessment of South Korea’s nuclear weapons capability. 27 In 2016,Charles Ferguson, then president of the Federation of American Scientists, estimated that South
Korea has up to 4330 bombs’ worth of plutonium at the Wolsong site, assuming a conservative
estimate of about 6 kg plutonium for a first-generation fission device. 28 Suh Kune-yul, acontroversial professor of nuclear engineering at Seoul National University, went further by statingthat “South Korea has plutonium enough to produce 5,000 nuclear warheads of 100 kiloton. If we(South Korea) decide to stand on our own feet and put our resources together, we can build nuclear
weapons in six months with the investment of one billion dollars.”29 There is a wishful thinking

24 Mong-jun Chung, op. cit.
25 Sang-eun Bae, “Former Foreign Minister Min-soon Song says ‘withdrawal of American forces will heighten

demands for independent nuclear armament,” News 1, December 6, 2019 (in Korean).
https://www.news1.kr/articles/?3787092; Chosun Ilbo Editorial, “if South Korea is armed with nuclear weapons,
there is no need for American forces,” Chosun Ilbo, November 13, 2019 (in Korean).
https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/11/12/2019111203527.html?form=MY01SV&OCID=MY01SV
26 Elbridge Colby, “Choose Geopolitics Over Nonproliferation.” National Interest. (February 28, 2014).
https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/choose-geopolitics-over-nonproliferation-9969
27 See Gap-je Cho, “Two Reports’ Shock: American experts’ assessment…,” op. cit.
28 Charles D. Ferguson, “How South Korea Could Acquire and Deploy Nuclear Weapons,” in Henry Sokolski (ed.),op.cit., p.70. An irony here is that Ferguson gave the figures in order to warn South Korea’s moves toward nuclear
armament, but conservative hardliners interpreted them in an opposite way.
29 Hee-seok Park, “Interview with Kune-yul Suh, who says ‘we can have nuclear weapons in six months if we invest
one trillion won…” Monthly Chosun, September 27, 2017 (in Korean).

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WMD in Asia-Pacificthat South Korea can follow the Israeli path. Being a democracy, South Korea can persuade theUnited States and international society to allow its nuclear armament through active lobbying.
Such false anticipation is widely shared among them.30
But going nuclear is not an easy enterprise. There are a myriad of obstacles. 31 The NPT regime
and subsequent international sanctions can profoundly cripple the South Korean export economy
and its civilian atomic industry. The nuclear venture can also invite fierce American opposition,
severely damaging the ROK-U.S. alliance. Despite Seoul’s conservatives’ wishful thinking,Washington will compel Seoul to give up its nuclear moves not only because of risks of nuclear
proliferation, but also because of expected loss of control over South Korea. Indeed, as Chosun
Ilbo’s editorial points out, “there is no raison d’etre for the U.S. to maintain its forces in South
Korea if Seoul acquires nuclear weapons.” 32 Inter-Korean and regional nuclear arms races and thefear of mutually probable assured destruction could jeopardize, rather than enhance, South Korea’s
security. Of these, American opposition has been the most critical factor in dissuading its
proponents from pushing for the independent nuclear option. It is with this understanding that they
have switched their position from the independent nuclear armament to the instrumentalist one
that favors the re-deployment of American tactical weapons and/or NATO type nuclear sharing.
Redeployment of American Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Sharing
American nuclear protection is nothing new to South Korea. During the Korea War, the UnitedStates deliberated using nuclear weapons against North Korea and China.33 In addition, the UnitedStates used to maintain 951 tactical nuclear warheads in South Korea until they were withdrawn
in 1991. Several factors accounted for the decision. At that time, the DPRK did not have any
nuclear weapons, and, thus, strategic justification was lacking. The moral dilemma also mattered.
It was totally unjustifiable for the United States to use tactical nuclear weapons against the DPRK
http://m.pub.chosun.com//client/news/viw.asp?cate=C01&nNewsNumb=20170926241&nidx=26242&form=MY01
SV&OCID=MY01SV
30 See BBC report, op. cit.
31 Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon, “Korea: Will South Korea’s Non-Nuclear Strategy Defeat North Korea’s Nuclear
Breakout?,” in George Shultz and James Goodby (eds.), The War That Must Never Be Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear
Deterrence (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2015), pp. 395-403.
32 Chosun Ilbo Editorial, “if South Korea is armed with nuclear weapons, there is no need for American forces,”
Chosun Ilbo, November 13, 2019 (in Korean).
https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/11/12/2019111203527.html?form=MY01SV&OCID=MY01SV
33 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: Norton, 1997): 479-480.

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without such weapons. And maintaining tactical nuclear weapons was highly labor intensive andexpensive requiring at least two certified technical persons to handle them. There was also a
concern on their seizure, not by the DPRK, but by South Korea’s radical nationalist students.
Moreover, President George H. Bush decided to reduce tactical nuclear weapons deployedoverseas.34
Nevertheless, conservative politicians are now calling for the re-transfer of American tactical
nuclear weapons.35 They argue that DPRK nuclear threats have become real, and the only credible
way to counter is the physical presence of American tactical weapons on South Korean soil. Cho
Kyung-tae, a senior member of the opposition Liberty Korea Party, threatened that “if the U.S.
refused to negotiate on the re-transfer, we should withdraw from the NPT and instantly enter thedevelopment of independent nuclear weapons.” 36 Several others joined the move. 37 An opposition
Liberty Korea Party delegation led by then its president Hong Jun-pyo paid a visit to Washington,
D.C., to lobby for the redeployment. Like Cho, he virtually threatened American congressional
leaders and officials of the executive branch that unless the United States re-deploys tactical
nuclear weapons to South Korea, his party will push for independent nuclear armament. 38 Hongstrongly promoted the idea precisely because of fear resulting from President Trump’s potential
withdrawal of American forces from South Korea. The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons isessential to fill the vacuum that would be followed by the reduction and withdrawal of American
forces. Lee Byung-chul, another liberal pundit, even urged opinion leaders and civil society toengage in public debates on the relevancy of redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons. 39

34 Hayes and Moon, “South Korea…”, op. cit: 405-407.
35 For a concise survey of this perspective, see Gui-geun Kim, “Pro and con on the new debate on deployment oftactical nuclear weapons and rationales,” Yonhap News, September 11, 2017 (in Korean).
https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20170911081000014
36 Eun-cheol Lee, “Cho Kyung-tae proposes a nuclear sharing with the U.S….” Busan Ilbo, July 31, 2019.
http://www.busan.com/view/busan/view.php?code=2019073119381781177
37 Jung-kyu Hong, “Ruling and opposition party members debate on the redeployment of redeployment of tactical
nuclear weapons at the National Assembly,” Yonhap News, September 21, 2016.
https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20160921066451001?input=1195m
38 Yong-in Lee, “American experts oppose Hong Jun-pyo’s proposal on redeployment of tactical nuclear
weapons,”Hankyoreh, October 26, 2017 (in Korean). https://m.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/assembly/816193.html
39 Byung-Chul Lee, “Exchange of deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and withdrawal of American forces in South
Korea,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, August 26, 2019 (in Korean).
https://m.khan.co.kr/amp/view.html?art_id=201908262035025&sec_id=990100

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But the U.S. government as well as congressional leaders showed a cold response. For them, theAmerican commitment to extended nuclear deterrence is firm, and the United States did not have
any tactical weapons to deploy. From a strategic point of view, such redeployment is not desirable
either because it can destabilize, rather than stabilize, the Korean peninsula. Deploying tactical
nuclear bombs to South Korea could tempt the DPRK to launch a preemptive strike rather thandeterring the use of nuclear weapons. Unlike the 1980s, Pyongyang now possesses such strikecapability. American politicians and defense planners were dismayed by South Koreanconservatives’ questioning of the credibility of the current South Korea-U.S. alliance and thestrategy of extended deterrence, which is based on the overwhelming nuclear power of the UnitedStates.40
As the United States rejects the redeployment option, some conservatives in South Korea haveshifted their attention to the NATO style nuclear sharing arrangement. During the Cold War, theUnited States and NATO members in Europe shared nuclear intelligence and developed andexecuted joint nuclear plans based on mutual discussions. There was also a division of labor inwhich five European countries where the U.S. military’s tactical nukes had been deployed would
use their own combat aircraft to drop U.S. gravity bombs. Won Yu-cheol of the opposition LKP
organized a ‘Nuclear Forum in which there have been extensive discussions on the NATO model.
On November 12, 2019, the Forum convened a public session on “How to implement the ROKU.S. Nuclear Sharing” and called for the deployment of American tactical nuclear weapons toSouth Korea and their sharing within the framework of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces
Command. The Forum also demanded the routine stationing of American nuclear-powered
submarines. More importantly, National Assemblyman Won, who once served as chair of the
Defense Committee of the National Assembly, urged the Moon Jae-in government to place theagenda of ‘nuclear sharing’ at the 2019 ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting. 41
Another senior ranking LKP lawmaker, Chung Jin-seok, even proposed the activation of American
submarines with nuclear weapons capability in the region that would be placed under the joint

40 Chung-in Moon, "False premise about N. Korean nuclear capabilities could have disastrous consequences"theHankyoreh, May 17, 2021. http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/995558.html
41 Da-in Rhyu, “National Assemblyman Won Yu-cheol organizes a forum to discuss on how to promote the ROK-US
nuclear sharing accord”. Jeongpil November 12, 2019. https://www.jeongpil.com/173024

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Is a Nuclear Domino in Northeast Asia Real and Inevitable?
operation of Japan, South Korea, and the United States.42 Hong Joon-pyo lent his support to theidea by stating that “if a NATO-style nuclear sharing policy is introduced, the North Korean
nuclear program will be under control, and we will be freed from being slaves to North Korea’s
nuclear program.”43 Several lawmakers joined him in advocating the nuclear sharing. A leading
journalist, Bae Myong-bok, suggested that the ROK Air Force should be trained to be prepared tojointly use American tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Guam in the case of crisis escalationon the Korean peninsula.44
The ‘nuclear sharing’ proposition was boosted partly because of one paragraph in an article on
2018 Nuclear Posture Review in the Joint Force Quarterly by the National Defense University:“The U.S. strategy strongly considers a potentially controversial new concept involving custodial
sharing of non-strategic nuclear capabilities during times of crisis with select Asia-Pacific partners,
specifically Japan and the ROK.” 45 Strictly speaking, however, American nuclear bombs cannot
be “shared.” The right to decide whether nuclear weapons would be used lies entirely with the U.S.
president; tactical nukes in Europe will not work unless the codes are entered in Washington.
Moreover, achieving NATO-style coordination of nuclear policies would require the U.S. Senate
to ratify a “program of cooperation” according to a 1958 amendment of the Atomic Energy Act(McMahon Act). But the chances of the Senate ratifying such a program with South Korea are
effectively nil. According to Nautilus Institute Co-Executive Director Peter Hayes, Germany andcertain other European countries where the U.S. military’s tactical nuclear weapons have been
deployed actually prefer an approach of establishing nuclear deterrence based on tactical nuclear
weapons in the continental United States or elsewhere overseas, based on declarations and thesharing of an extended deterrence doctrine of the same kind adopted by the South Korea-U.S. and
U.S.-Japan alliances. 46 So the wiser choice would be to strengthen combined conventional

42 Jihye Lee, “KLP calls for the examination of Korean style nuclear sharing for the strengthening of nuclear

deterrence,” Polinews, July 31, 2019 (in Korean). https://www.polinews.co.kr/mobile/article.html?no=404942
43 Uijin Hwang, “Hong Jun-pyo insists on the possession of nuclear weapons, Defense Minister Suh Wuk answeredwith a NATO-style nuclear sharing,” Maeil Shinmun, September 16, 2020.
44 Myong-bok Bae, “NATO style nuclear sharing is in fact redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons,” Joongang
Ilbo, December 19, 2019 (in Korean). https://news.joins.com/article/23660659
45 R. Cort, C. Bersabe, D. Clarke, and D. Bello, “Twenty First Century Nuclear Deterrence: Operationalizing the 2018
NPR,” Joint Force Quarterly 94 (3rd Quarter, 2019): 78.
46 Chung-in Moon, “Nuclear sharing” isn’t a thing,” The Hankyoreh, March 22, 2021
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/987761.html

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WMD in Asia-Pacificdeterrence based on trust in the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the United States, while
using diplomatic talks to create opportunities for denuclearization.
Other than nuclear nationalists who argue for unconditional nuclear armament in the name of
nuclear sovereignty, most conservative politicians and pundits appear to follow the instrumentalist
approach in which redeployment of American tactical nuclear weapons or nuclear sharing between
the ROK and the United States is considered as an alternative. The United States is highly unlikely
to accommodate such demands. Likewise, South Korea is bounded by several formidable
obstacles, and, thus, the potential for the nuclear domino phenomenon that is caused by South
Korea seems very low. However, if South Korea seeks going nuclear independently, it is bound to
precipitate it, negatively impacting Japan. How about public opinion in South Korea?
Nuclear Weapons and Public Opinion in South Korea
South Korea’s public opinion about going nuclear has been greatly influenced by Pyongyang’s
behavior. The DPRK’s undertaking of nuclear weapons tests or ballistic missile test launches has
aggravated South Korean public opinion in favor of nuclear weapons, whereas improved interKorean relations coincide with a rising anti-nuke attitude. Genron NPO, a Japanese opinion surveyorganization, has been conducting annual polls regarding Japanese and South Korean public
attitudes on nuclear armament. 47 According to the survey, 59 percent of South Korean respondents
supported the independent nuclear armament in 2016, while 36 percent of respondents opposed.
But in 2017, when the DPRK undertook its sixth nuclear testing and 15 ballistic missile test
launches, those who favored ‘South Korea going nuclear’ rose to 67.2 percent, whereas the figurefor opposition dwindled from 36 percent to 26.7 percent. The 2018 survey revealed quite adifferent outlook, however. In 2018, there were two Korean summits in April and September, andthe first historic meeting between American president and the DPRK leader was held in Singapore
on June 12. Consequently, military tension on the Korean peninsula drastically reduced and the
public responded as such. Those who favored nuclear armament dropped from 67.2 percent in2017 to 43.3 percent in 2018, almost a 25 percent drop. Meanwhile, those who opposed nuclear
armament rose from 26.7 percent in 2017 to 50.3 percent in 2018. As inter-Korean relations stalled

47 “The impression of the partner country has deteriorated in Japanese public opinion, but there are signs ofimprovement in Korean public opinion-Results of the 5th Japan-Korea Joint Public Opinion Survey,” The Grenon NPO,
July 21, 2017 (in Japanese). https://www.genron-npo.net/world/archives/6677-2.html

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following the failure of the Hanoi summit in February 2019, those who supported the nuclear
armament increased to 59.6 percent in 2019 and 56.5 percent in 2020 respectively. On average,
those who support the nuclear weapons reached an upper 50 percent, whereas those who oppose
averaged around 35 percent.
A survey conducted by Gallop Korea in 2017 showed that 60 percent of respondents were in favorof nuclear weapons and 35 percent opposed. An interesting trend is that only 38 percent ofrespondents in their twenties supported nuclear armament, whereas over 60 percent of those sixty
and over were in favor of it. A huge generational gap between the old and the young existed.
Another survey conducted by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in 2014 revealed motivations
that affected public attitude on nuclear weapons. Those who were in favor of nuclear armamentcited, as primary reasons, nuclear deterrence against the North (38.9 percent), international
influence (28.6 percent), national power and status (22.7 percent), and lack of trust in U.S. security
commitment (4.8 percent) respectively. Meanwhile, those who opposed gave different
motivations: unethical nature of nuclear weapons (46.4 percent), triggering of a regional nuclear
arms race (31.2 percent), economic sanctions (9.2 percent), violation of international law (4.1
percent), and reliability of the American nuclear umbrella (3.3. percent). Albeit outdated, the Asan
survey offers us an educated guess on South Korean public attitude on nuclear armament. Whereas
those who support it reveal a strong realist orientation (i.e., deterrence, national power, and status),
those who oppose it show a strong liberalist stance (unethical nature of nuclear bombs, fear of
nuclear domino, economic sanctions, and international law). 48
Public attitude on nuclear armament does not seem to be static. A recent study by Sang-yong Sohn
and Jong-hee Park shows that South Korean voters’ attitude on nuclear armament can change
drastically when and if more information is provided through public debate. Using the method ofexperimental questionnaire, they started with the assumption of 61 percent supporting nuclear
armament and 39 percent opposing it. Figures were drawn from the Gallop Korea survey data.
Then, voters were exposed to public debates on nuclear armament with more information on its
costs and benefits as well as opportunities and constraints. After respondents’ exposure to new

48 Jiyoon Kim, “South Korean Attitudes toward the Nuclear Weapons Development: A Survey Analysis,” a paper

presented at the International Joint Seminar on Assessing Northeast Asia Nuclear Domino, organized by APLN and
the Sejong Institute, May 14, 2021.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificinformation, Sohn and Park estimated, those who support the nuclear armament would decrease
from 61 percent to 38 percent, while those who oppose would rise to 62 percent. Their study
revealed that supporters of nuclear weapons turned out to be most sensitive to information related
to economic damages that could result from international sanctions. Attitude change of those who
oppose nuclear armament was affected mostly by information on the erosion of American security
commitment.49 This implies that public debates and exposure of objective information on nuclear
armament can play an important role in changing citizens’ attitude.
In sum, the DPRK has significantly increased its nuclear and missile threats since 2017, which
South Korea perceives as existential ones. The Moon Jae-in government has been trying to manage
those threats through the mix of extended nuclear deterrence by the United States and diplomaticnegotiation, but conservative politicians and pundits, defying such efforts, have been raising their
voices in favor of independent nuclear armaments. There are two contending schools. Whereas theteleological school advocates the development and possession of nuclear weapons for nuclear
sovereignty and nuclear deterrence, the instrumentalists, realizing structural and institutional
constraints to it, have called for the redeployment of American tactical weapons and/or nuclear
sharing. The teleological school still remains a minority, but a sudden rise in Pyongyang’s assertive
behavior, signs of waning American security commitment, and deepening of strategic instability
in Northeast Asia can readily resuscitate pro-nuke sentiments in South Korea. It is more so because
an upper 50 percent of respondents on average support South Korea going nuclear. Public debate
and exposure to accurate information can change public attitude, however. That is a positive sign.

Japan and Nuclear Domino
Japan is the only victim of nuclear bombing in the world. The tragedy of Nagasaki and Hiroshima
is still deeply and widely ingrained in the hearts of Japanese people. That is why the anti-nuke
pacifist movement has been so strong in Japan. The peace constitution and the American provisionof a security umbrella under the Yoshida doctrine have also served as additional deterrents to thedevelopment of nuclear weapons in Japan. It was in this context that Japanese Prime Minister

49 Sang-yong Sohn and Jong-hee Park, “Do South Korean Voters Really Want Nuclear Armament?” The Korea

Political Science Review 54, no.2 (June 2020): 174-204.

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Eisaku Sato, a one-time proponent of a Japanese nuclear force, put forward in 1967 the Three NonNuclear Principles of not possessing, producing, or introducing nuclear weapons. 50
But North Korea’s nuclear/missile threats, China’s rise and nuclear build-up, and the perceived
erosion of the American commitment to extend nuclear deterrence have renewed debate onwhether Japan should go nuclear. 51 That was the case in the past. When China undertook its firstnuclear test in October 1964, Japan’s response was fierce. The Sato cabinet’s Office of Researchand Intelligence published a report that, while Japan needs to adhere to its non-nuclear position, it
should demonstrate its technological capability for nuclear armament. Japan should engage inlarge scale nuclear and space rocket research. 52 Some conservative political leaders expressed theirsupport of nuclear armament in the past. Kishi Nobuske, former prime minister, stated that“possessing nuclear weapons for self-defense is constitutional” as early as in 1957.” 53 His
grandson and former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo also made the following statement at his speechat Waseda University on May 13, 2002, when he was Vice Minister of Cabinet Affairs: “From a
constitutional point of view, there is no problem with nuclear armament. Once committed, Japan
can have nuclear weapons in a week.” 54 In October 1999, Nishimura Shingo, then Vice Defense
Minister, had to resign from his post because of pressures from civil society after stating thatpossessing nuclear weapons is beneficial to Japan’s national security and that the Japanese Dietneeds to discuss nuclear armament. 55
As in South Korea, the Japanese government has been firm on its non-nuclear position by declaring
its adherence to the three non-nuclear principles. Kato Katsunobu, the incumbent Minister ofCabinet Affairs downplayed debates on the nuclear path by indicating the indispensable nature of

50 Nobumasa Akiyama, “Japan’s Disarmament Dilemma: Between Moral Commitment and the Security Reality,” inGeorge Shultz and James Goodby (eds.), The War that Never Be Fought (Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 2015):
437-480.
51 Ohashi Takushi (大橋拓史), “Nuclear armament under attack, Taboo trend that blocks free discussion,” Sankei,
September 17, 2017 (in Japanese). https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/170917/plt1709170006-n1.html
52 “Japan's nuclear weapons development,” Wikipedia. https://bit.ly/3EaS1ID
53 Ohashi Takushi, op. cit.
54 “Japanese Nuclear Weapons Program,” Wikipedia.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_nuclear_weapon_program/
55 Ishinabe Kei(石鍋圭), “Can the Liberal Democratic Party be called a responsible party without debating on thepossession of nuclear weapons?” Sankei, September 22, 2017 (in Japanese).
https://www.sankei.com/premium/news/170922/prm1709220010-n1.html

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American nuclear deterrence under the Japan-U.S. security system. 56 The government position
notwithstanding, since the DPRK’s sixth nuclear testing in 2017, Japanese conservative politicians
and pundits began to reactivate old debates, which are not on nuclear armament per se, but on
whether Japan should engage in public debates on the subject and whether Japan should maintain
nuclear latency. Kato Ryozo, former Japan’s ambassador to the United States, a vocal advocateof public debate on nuclear armament, argues that “regardless of the American credibility, it shouldbe allowed to have debates on the possession of independent nuclear weapons as the last resort toprotect country’s interest.” And “it is inappropriate to ban public debates because they can belinked to a credible deterrence.”57 By pointing out that there are ‘Four Non-Nuclear Principles’ of
no possessing, no making, no introducing, and no debating. Ishiba Shigeru, former Defense
Minister, asserted that it is time to get away from ‘no debating’ and that “it is not a right attitude
to trust the American nuclear umbrella without any verification.” 58 According to a survey
conducted in 2006, 61 percent of respondents answered that discussion on nuclear options should
not be taboo.59
Those who advocate Japan’s nuclear latency still remain strong. Conservatives in Japan argue thatJapan needs to maintain 54 nuclear reactors and its Monju faster breeder reactor to secure nuclear
latency due to its worsening security environment and waning American security commitment.
Japan must be ready for independent nuclear armament when and if the American nuclear umbrellais gone.60 Ishiba Shigeru also concurs with this position by stating that Japan should maintain theexisting nuclear energy program to secure “a latent nuclear deterrence with which Japan could

56 “Minister Kato stated that American ‘no first use’ policy can undermine Japan’s national security,” Sankei, April

6, 2021 (in Japanese). https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/210406/plt2104060019-n1.html
57 Kato Ryozo, “Japan should have rational debate on the nuclear question regarding gains and losses of thepossession of nuclear weapons”(Kakuhoyu-ni yorieru mono, ushinau monowa nanka: nihonno kakumondaio risetekini ronzeyo),” Sankei, February 2, 2018. https://www.sankei.com/column/news/180202/clm1802020004n1.html
58 Chiba Tomoyuki and Hiroike Keiichi, “Former Defense Minister Ishiba Shigeru calls for verification ofeffectiveness of American nuclear umbrella… How to prevent the nightmare of Korean unification under North
Korea?” (Ishiba Shigeru moto boue-syo- kakuno kasa zikkouse-kensyou-o kitaga hanto-to-itsuno akumu dohusegu?), Sankei September 15, 2017. https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/170915/plt1709150083-n1.html
59 Akiyama, op. cit.: 456.
60 Huruya Tunehira(古谷経衡), “ Ten years after the nuclear reactor incident, reviving voice of nuclear armament,“Asahi Ronza, March 7, 2021 2021 년 3 월 7 일 (in Japanese).
https://webronza.asahi.com/politics/articles/2021030200008.html?page=1457

Is a Nuclear Domino in Northeast Asia Real and Inevitable?
make nuclear weapons in a certain period of time.” 61 In fact, Japan has an immense stockpile offissile materials. As of 2016, Japan is known to have acquired 47.8 ton of plutonium and 1.5 tonof enriched uranium.62 In addition, since Japan has rocket capability to launch satellites into space,developing various delivery vehicles will not pose any daunting challenges. It is not easy for Japanto transform these fissile materials into nuclear bombs because of International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and U.S. regulations. But once committed, Japan can easily emerge as a nuclear
weapons state.
But some ultra conservative pundits advocate for the development and possession of nuclear
weapons to deal with threats originating from the Korean peninsula. For example, Watanabe
Tsuneo, a research fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, advocated a conditional nuclear
armament by stating that “as long as nuclear weapons exist on the Korean peninsula, Japan should
enter nuclear armament. Japan should disarm nuclear weapons when nuclear weapons on the
Korean peninsula are removed.”63 Journalists at the conservative Sankei newspaper also argue that“the advent of North Korea-led unified state on the Korean peninsula will be the worst nightmare
to Japan. If that happens, Japan should consider acquiring nuclear weapons.” 64 Shimada Yoichi,
professor of Fukui Prefectural University, even argued that judged on IAEA’s exceptional
treatment of India, there is an international trend in which sanctions would not be imposed on the
nuclear move of ‘responsible states like Japan.” 65 All these ideas surfaced in Japan immediately
after the DPRK undertook its sixth nuclear testing in 2017, implying that nuclear developments on
the Korean peninsula can bring about significant impacts to Japan. In this sense, it cannot bedenied that there exist perceived chain reactions of nuclear dominos between Korea and Japan.
Nevertheless, it will be hard for Japan to seek a nuclear venture. Its peace constitution, three nonnuclear principles, and Japan’s excessive reliance on American security protection are likely toprevent Japan’s move toward nuclear armament. In fact, as early as 1970, the Sato cabinet
61 Requoted from Akiyama, op. cit.:456.
62 Ian Easton, “Japanese Strategic Weapons Programs and Strategies: Future Scenarios and Alternative

Approaches,” in Sokolski, op. cit:3-34.
63 Sakurada Jun, “Japan’s nuclear armament debate, dashing or avoiding both are too easy going (Nihon no
kakubuso-ron tobitsukunomo kihisurunomo izuremo antsyokusugiru), Gendai Business, October 26, 2017.
https://gendai.ismedia.jp/articles/-/53273?imp=0
64 Chiae and Hiroiko, op. cit.
65 Shimada Yoichi(島田洋一), “Don’t avoid the nuclear armament debate,’ Sankei, September 6, 2017.
https://www.sankei.com/column/news/170906/clm1709060006-n1.html

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WMD in Asia-Pacificconcluded that Japan’s nuclear armament is impossible by citing three reasons: difficulty of
conducting underground nuclear testing, vulnerability of industrial concentrated areas to nuclear
attacks, and diplomatic isolation. It is for these reasons that conservative politicians and pundits inJapan have favored the introduction of American tactical weapons to Japan and nuclear sharing
between Japan and the United States. For example, Ishiba Shigeru once said that “it iscontradictory not to deploy American nuclear weapons in Japan’s soil, while seeking American
nuclear protection.” He then argued for the abolition of ‘non-introduction’ principle of the three
non-nuclear principles, while permitting American submarines armed with nuclear weapons toenter Japan’s ports. 66
In contrast to South Korea, public opinion in Japan is not favorable to nuclear armament.
According to a Sankei/FNN joint opinion survey conducted on September 16 and 17, 2017,
immediately after the DPRK’s sixth nuclear testing, 43.2 percent of respondents supported theinitiation of public debates on the three non-nuclear principles, whereas 55.7 percent opposed eventhe debates. Opposition to the introduction of the American nuclear weapons into Japan was muchhigher. 69.9 percent responded that the introduction of American nuclear weapons is impossible,
and only 26.2 percent supported. As to Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons, 79.1 percent
opposed, whereas only 17.7 percent favored. 67 Another survey by NPO Genron shows a similar
trend. In 2017, those who opposed nuclear armament was 74.7 percent, while only 9 percent
supported. Opposition to nuclear armament was 65.5 percent in 2018, 69 percent in 2019, and 66.7
percent in 2020, respectively. 68 Likewise, public attitudes in Japan are still strongly opposed tonuclear armament as well as the introduction of American nuclear weapons. Moreover, local
governments such as the Hiroshima prefecture and the City of Nagasaki as well as anti-nuke NGOs
such as the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons’ Abolition (RECNA) at the University ofNagasaki, Peace Depot, and Pugwash Japan have been very active in monitoring and resisting any
moves toward nuclear armament.

66 Ishinabe Kei, op. cit.
67 Sase Masamori(佐瀬昌盛), “Under North Korea’s threats, Japan should swift to ‘two non-nuclear principles,”Sankei, September 27, 2017. https://www.sankei.com/column/news/170927/clm1709270007-n1.html
68 https://www.genron-npo.net/world/archives/6677-2.html

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Is a Nuclear Domino in Northeast Asia Real and Inevitable?
In sum, the DPRK’s growing nuclear and missile threats, China’s rise and regional instability, andthe unpredictable nature of American security commitment have fueled public debates on nuclear
armament in Japan. Unlike South Korea, a nuclear taboo deeply rooted in Japanese society has
prevented the advent of an outright support of a nuclear path. Conservative politicians and opinion
leaders, however, have been championing the right to debate nuclear armament and to maintain anuclear latency. Some even suggest the deletion of a ‘non-introduction’ clause of ‘three nonnuclear principles,’ which would allow the deployment of American nuclear weapons in Japan.
Nevertheless, their approach has been cautious. Public opinion is strongly against nuclear
armament as well as the introduction of American nuclear weapons. Thus, even if Japan has
accumulated considerable fissile materials and missile capabilities, any visible moves toward
nuclear armament remain undetectable.

Implications for the Nuclear Domino Phenomenon in Northeast Asia
North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats have greatly heightened the potential for a nuclear
domino phenomenon in Northeast Asia by fostering nuclear temptation in South Korea and Japan.
It is precisely because Japan and South Korea possess fissile materials and technologicalcapabilities. Nevertheless, the nuclear domino is not likely to materialize anytime soon. Both theJapanese and South Korean governments are fully committed to their non-nuclear stance. They
also lend full confidence in American extended nuclear deterrence and, therefore, oppose theredeployment of tactical nuclear weapons and the NATO-type nuclear sharing. Fear ofinternational sanctions and negative impacts on their economy and the civilian atomic industry, apotential rupture in their alliance relationship with the United States, and a dangerous nuclear arms
race on the Korean peninsula and in the region have served as effective deterrents against thenuclear move in Japan and South Korea.
The domestic political and social atmosphere does not seem to favor the nuclear path either. Public
opinion in Japan is strongly opposed to it, and anti-nuke movements by Japanese local
governments and civil society are well organized and constantly on alert. South Korea is somewhat
different from Japan. A relatively high public support and conservative politicians’ efforts topoliticize the nuclear issue, amidst the DPRK’s constant nuclear threats, make South Korea a weak

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WMD in Asia-Pacificlink in the nuclear domino equation. However, public exposure to adequate information on thecosts and constraints of nuclear armament can alter their attitude.
It can be concluded that the Northeast Asia nuclear domino syndrome exists as a potentiality, nota concrete, reality. Failure to mitigate the regional threat environment, negative signals from theUnited States in terms of either weakening commitment to its extended nuclear deterrence or
encouragement of nuclear armament in Japan and South Korea, and abuse and misuse of thenuclear issue for domestic political purposes, can easily turn the current nuclear temptation into
actual nuclear armament, leading to a nuclear domino disaster. Japan and South Korea could easily
be locked into a ratchet effect. The country that gets into nuclear armament first will surely induce
the other to follow the suit. It is more so because of rapidly deteriorating bilateral relations.
What should be done? The most critical step to prevent a nuclear domino in Northeast Asia is to
mitigate its overall security environment. The North Korean nuclear quagmire should be resolved
peacefully. Otherwise, there will be constant nuclear temptation in Japan and South Korea.
China’s nuclear modernization and build-up should also be addressed. The size of China’s current
nuclear arsenal is relatively small compared with that of the United States and Russia, but theUnited States should take a more constructive role in slowing down any strategic arms race in theregion. Improvement of Japan-South Korean relations is essential for the prevention of the nuclear
domino. Protracted antagonistic confrontation between the two countries will be the breeding
ground for a nuclear arms race.
The United States can reshape the nuclear equation in the region in two ways. One is related to its
extended nuclear deterrence. Since the days of the Trump administration, Japan and South Korea
have been suspicious of the American security commitment. Proponents of the nuclear armament
believe the United States would not sacrifice American cities for Seoul and Tokyo. Such
uncertainty has been responsible for propelling public debates on nuclear armament in Japan andSouth Korea. The other is a signal from Washington that the United States would be permissive of
nuclear armament of Japan and South Korea. Such signal may well unleash them from the nuclear
taboo. Thus, it is very important for the United States to manage its signal in which it assures anadequate extended deterrence, while avoiding the tolerant attitude of nuclear venture in Japan and461

Is a Nuclear Domino in Northeast Asia Real and Inevitable?
South Korea. 69 The United States should play a more constructive role in slowing down thestrategic arms race in the region. Improvement in Japan-South Korea relations is also essential forthe prevention of the nuclear domino.
One caveat is in order. The myth of ‘U.S. extended nuclear deterrence’ needs to be unraveled. As
Allan Behm aptly argues, it is neither credible nor rational precisely because the United States,
North Korea, and even South Korea are in fact playing compellence, not deterrence games.70 Whilemaintaining a credible conventional extended deterrence on the Korean peninsula, countries in theregion should deliberate a nuclear weapons free zone in Korea and Northeast Asia with acomprehensive security framework such as the Northeast Asian Security Summit. 71
Chorus of ‘going nuclear’ can surface anytime, depending on the DPRK’s behavior. Hardline
conservatives will try to capitalize on it for the advancement of their cause of ‘independent nuclear
weapons.’ It cannot be ruled out that some people could have a foul play of clandestinely
promoting nuclear latency. International society should stay on alert for this movement bystrengthening its monitoring and safeguarding regime.
Worrisome is the advent of an adversarial coalition among pro-nuke forces across national borders.
Hardline advocates of nuclear weapons development in the DPRK, South Korea, and Japan havein fact formed an adversarial coalition. Such a transnational coalition should be rejected. Civil
society and NGOs in Japan and South Korea should stay vigilant on those dark forces bycultivating solidarity as well as engaging in anti-nuke movements.
Finally, citizen education and sharing of unbiased information related to nuclear weapons andproliferation seems very important. As the South Korean survey data shows, those who support

69Robert Einhorn made this point clearly in his interview with a South Korean media. Jemin Sohn. “Interview with

Einhorn, ‘Chance for South Korea’s nuclear armament is low, but the U.S. should not take it for granted.”
Kyunghyang Shinmun, August 17, 2016 (in Korean).
https://m.khan.co.kr/view.html?art_id=201608170741001&code=970201#c2b
70 Allan Behm, Special Report: Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World,” APLN (Asia-Pacific Leadership
Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament), (October 2020).
https://www.apln.network/projects/pandemic-nuclear-nexus-project/pandemic-nuclear-nexus-scenariosproject_extended-deterrence-and-extended-nuclear-deterrence-in-a-pandemic-world
71 Thomas Pickering, Morton Halpern, Peter Hayes, Chung-in Moon, and Leon Sigal,”Ending the North Korean
Nuclear Threat by a Comprehensive Security Settlement in Northeast Asia,” Nautilus Institute for Security andSustainability (November 2017). https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/ending-the-north-koreannuclear-threat-by-a-comprehensive-security-settlement-in-northeast-asia/

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WMD in Asia-Pacificnuclear armament can change their view after being exposed to data related to costs and constraintsof going nuclear. Thus, there should be national and international efforts to educate citizens on thedanger of nuclear weapons by disseminating timely and objective information.

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17. Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones in Asia
Tuya Nyamosor

Introduction
As the world is entering the third decade of the 21st century, multiple challenges are threatening
the security and the well-being of nations, including the present great power competition. Fractured
relations between nuclear-armed states are crippling the aspirations and efforts towards nuclear
disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States, far from willing to pursue negotiations “in good faith” oncessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament—as prescribed by the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) —seem to be walking straight into that very arms race. They
have also rejected the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) that would ban
the use, threat of use, or possession of nuclear arms. Efforts towards nuclear nonproliferation are
equally in poor shape with the Iran nuclear deal slowly but surely collapsing and the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) continuing on its nuclear path. On the arms control front, the
New START treaty—the last remaining legal instrument providing for the reduction of thestrategic armaments of the two leading nuclear powers, Russia and the United States —is facing
uncertain future. The long-term viability of the NPT itself also looks uncertain given thepredicament described above. If and when nuclear testing is resumed, the crumbling of theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), even before it enters into force, would seriously damage
the entire treaty-based edifice of nuclear disarmament built over decades.
In this context, the upholding of the regional disarmament efforts, in particular the treaty-based
Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZs), appears more crucial than ever. Over one hundred
countries the world over have come forward to create such zones, in a treaty form, to keep theirregions free from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, controlling, possessing, testing, andstationing nuclear weapons. NWFZs also prohibit the stationing of any nuclear explosive devices
by any external state in these zones.

© 2022 Tuya Nyamosor, CC BY 4.0

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WMD in Asia-PacificFive such zones currently exist of which three are in Asia: the South Pacific NWFZ established by
the Treaty of Rarotonga of 1985, the Southeast Asian NWFZ established by the 1995 Treaty of
Bangkok, and the Central Asian NWFZ established by the Treaty of Semipalatinsk of 2006. The
other two are in Latin America and the Caribbean (created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 thatpreceded the NPT) and in Africa (created by the Treaty of Pelindaba of 1996). Mongolia enjoys a
special nuclear-weapon-free status conferred to it by a UN General Assembly resolution 55/33S.
The seabed, outer space, and the Antarctic, not governed by any state, are also nuclear-weaponfree according to international treaties.1 As different from those countries that have chosen to rely
on extended nuclear deterrence—that is on nuclear weapons of an allied nuclear power for theirprotection—the states parties to NWFZs chose to ban nuclear weapons on their territories toprotect themselves from nuclear threats.2
This chapter proceeds in four parts. The first section introduces the principles and objectives of
the NWFZs. This is followed by an overview of Asian NWFZs with an emphasis on their notablefeatures. The next section discusses the ways in which NWFZs contribute to the goal of the totalelimination of nuclear weapons and the last one discusses cooperation and coordination among the
NWFZs.

NWFZs: Principles and Objectives
The concept of zones free of nuclear weapons preceded the conclusion, in 1968, of the NPT thatcreated the global regime prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond those states that
had acquired them prior to the conclusion of the treaty. According to the 1999 UN Guidelines on
the Establishment of Nuclear-Free-Zones3—hereinafter referred to as the UN Guidelines—suchzones are created on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among countries of a region. A

1 Detailed information on NWFZs, including the texts of the treaties establishing them, is available on the websiteof the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) at https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/nwfz/
2 It should be noted that Australia, a close ally of the United States, stands out as a country that has stated andreaffirmed its reliance on the latter’s extended nuclear deterrence while remaining a party to the South Pacific
Nuclear-Free-Zone.
3 UN General Assembly Official Records, Report of the Disarmament Commission—Establishment of nuclearweapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, Fiftyfourth session, Supplement No. 42 (A/54/42), 1999, http://www.undocs.org/A/54/42(SUPP)

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UN General Assembly resolution 3472 (XXX) B of 1975 had stressed not only the regional but
also the legally-binding character of such arrangement by defining NWFZs as “any zone
recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of states, inthe free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention.”4
The UN Guidelines also state that nuclear-weapon-free zones do not prevent the use of nuclear
science and technology for peaceful purposes, and that the countries party to them remain free todecide for themselves, without prejudice to the purposes and objectives of such zones, whether toallow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to their ports and airfields, transit of their airspace byforeign aircraft and navigation by foreign ships in or over their territorial sea, archipelagic waters
or straits that are used for international navigation, while fully honoring the rights of innocent
passage, archipelagic sea lane passage, or transit of passage in straits that are used for internationalnavigation.
In 1956 the Soviet Union first floated the idea to create a weapons limitation and inspection zone
in Central Europe that would prohibit the stationing there of atomic and hydrogen bombs. The
move came as the United States started deploying its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as acounterweight to the Soviet conventional superiority. In 1957, Poland came up with the so-called
Rapacki Plan, which proposed carving out a zone free of nuclear weapons in Central Europe. These
proposals went nowhere given the underlying Cold War tensions in Europe but alerted many to apossibility of regional approaches to disarmament. Northern European countries took an interest.
In 1961, Sweden tabled a proposal at the UN (the so-called Unden Plan) that called on states that
did not possess nuclear weapons to “enter into specific undertakings” and commit to not producing,acquiring, and hosting nuclear weapons.5 Stocker argues that the origins of NWFZs as a regional
approach to nuclear nonproliferation ought to be traced back to this very Swedish proposal which
was backed by the Soviet Union but rejected by the United States.6 It goes without saying that
4 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 11 December 1975 –Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, Thirtieth session, A/RES 3472
(XXX), 1975, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3472(XXX)
5 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assemblyon 4 December 1961—Question of disarmament, Sixteenth session. A/RES/1664 (XVI),
https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/1664(XVI)
6 James Stocker, “Accepting Regional Zero Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, U.S. Nonproliferation Policy and Global
Security, 1957–1968,” Journal of Cold War Studies 17 (2), pp. 36-72, 2015,
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00547

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WMD in Asia-Pacificduring the Cold War, for any initiative—especially on disarmament matters—to get traction
internationally it had to enjoy the support of both superpowers.
An Irish draft resolution submitted that same year, however, enjoyed much broader support. It
called for an international agreement whereby nuclear possessor states would refrain fromrelinquishing control of their nuclear weapons and related technology and non-possessor states
would refrain from acquiring them. 7 According to Stocker, this resolution, which passed
unanimously, paved the way to the international, or global, approach to nuclear nonproliferation
which resulted in the successful US- Soviet Union–led negotiations on the NPT.8
With the NPT negotiations still underway, another project that was quietly supported by thesuperpowers but was of regional nature, came to fruition: in 1967 the first treaty establishing a
NWFZ, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was concluded among countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean. The idea of such a zone was first proposed by Costa Rica in 1958 but it was the Cuban
Missile Crisis of 1962 that caused the regional countries to more energetically pursue the plan. As
opposed to the NPT negotiations that were primarily a US-Soviet undertaking, the Treaty of
Tlatelolco (like the subsequent NWFZs treaties) saw a more engaged participation of regionalcountries in related negotiations and reflected their shared interest in instituting as strong a barrier
as possible against nuclear plans of outside powers.
Both the NPT-making process and great power acceptance of a Latin American NWFZ in the
1960s illustrated the profound realization by major powers, in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile
Crisis and the failure to achieve any progress on “general and complete disarmament,” as well as
the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, that nuclear weapons were here to stay and that agreed measures
had to be pursued, wherever possible, to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and related
technologies. As put by Serrano, “the focal point [then] shifted from measures designed either toremove nuclear weapons from world affairs or to maintain a nuclear monopoly, towards attempts
to make their presence more tolerable. This latter approach enabled both superpowers to share

7 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assemblyon 4 December 1961—Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Sixteenth session. A/RES/1665(XVI). Available at https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/1665(XVI)
8 Ibid.

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responsibility for nuclear matters.”9 Thus the NWFZ came to complement, at the regional level,
the major powers’ effort to globally halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Their support for the Latin
American zone did not, however, translate into a willingness to see NWFZs replicated in all
regions of the world. As history has shown, and as Tago rightly notes, NWFZs were establishedin regions with “a relative absence of security concerns” 10 as opposed to regions where highsecurity concerns led to reliance on a nuclear deterrent provided by a major allied nuclear power.
Hamel-Green has also argued that the existence of conflict, rivalry, or overt hostility within aregion presented a serious barrier to the establishment of an NWFZ. He wrote, “It might be argued
that NWFZs are only feasible in regions where they are least needed.”11 Indeed, in regions suchas Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and North-East Asia, beset by internal and external
security competition and/or alliance politics, initiatives on the creation of such zones did not get
much traction.
According to Serrano, two views have been expressed to explain the emergence of NWFZs.12 The
first held that NWFZs were a first step towards general and complete disarmament. The second
held that they were a wider arms control measure and served as a means to ensure one’s security
against a nuclear danger. The latter view prevailed with time. In a more structured way, Thakur
argues that NWFZs constitute legal mechanisms for nuclear nonproliferation and political steppingstones towards nuclear disarmament. 13 Of course, they are these things in a complementarymanner: since all countries party to treaties establishing NWFZs are party to the NPT they arelegally bound by the treaty’s non-proliferation clause anyway, and inasmuch as they are adisarmament steppingstone, NWFZs are ‘disarmament before the fact,’ as Thakur puts it, the ‘real’

9 Monica Serrano, “Common Security in Latin America, the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco,”

Research Paper by theInstitute of Latin American Studies, (The University of London, 1992), p.2, https://sasspace.sas.ac.uk/3582/1/B12_-_Common_Security_in_Latin_America_The_1697_Treaty_of_Tlatelolco.pdf
10 Atsushi Tago, “The Origins of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones: Security Communities or Substitutes for a ‘Nuclear
Umbrella’?” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2006,
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Tago_Nuclear_Weapons_Free_Zones.pdf
11 Michael Hamel-Green, “Regional Initiatives on Nuclear- and WMD-Free Zones: Cooperative Approaches to Arms
Control and Non-Proliferation,” Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), p.25, 2005,
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/regional-initiatives-on-nuclear-and-wmd-free-zones-cooperativeapproaches-to-arms-control-and-non-proliferation-286.pdf
12 Monica Serrano, “Common Security in Latin America, the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco,” Research Paper by theInstitute of Latin American Studies, The University of London, 1992, https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/3582/1/B12__Common_Security_in_Latin_America_The_1697_Treaty_of_Tlatelolco.pdf
13 Ramesh Thakur, ed., Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p.3

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WMD in Asia-Pacificnuclear disarmament being nuclear weapon states’ compliance with Article XI of the NPT.
NWFZs’ complementarity vis-à-vis the NPT is noted by Fuhrmann and Li who state that “states
are less likely to enter NWFZs if they have not already made nonproliferation commitments or ifthey have incentives to acquire, test, or possess nuclear weapons in the future.”14
The UN General Assembly resolution of 1967 that welcomed the Tlatelolco Treaty established
NWFZs as an international non-proliferation norm by stating that it “constitute[ed] an “event ofhistoric significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promoteinternational peace and security.”15 The NPT reaffirmed this norm by stating in its Article VII that
nothing in that treaty affected the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order
to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. The “total absence”
included the non-stationing there of nuclear weapons by outside powers, which constitutes a muchstronger proliferation commitment that is absent in the NPT. Verification mechanisms provided
for in most NWFZs treaties are also of a more rigorous nature. So in general, NWFZs are afoundational building block of what is known as the international non-proliferation regime.
As for their disarmament impulse, the UN Guidelines do make references to NWFZs’ being “animportant disarmament tool” but only inasmuch as they are “a means of expressing and promoting
common values in the areas of nuclear disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation.” As has
been noted above, since states parties to NWFZs are all non-nuclear-weapon-states and, by
definition, do not possess nuclear weapons, the concept of nuclear disarmament cannot beapplicable to them. But without a doubt, by legally committing to keeping their respective regions
free of nuclear weapons, including by outlawing the stationing of foreign nuclear weapons, and by
introducing legally binding regional protocols on negative security assurance (NSA), NWFZs havecontributed to the global effort towards delegitimizing and eliminating nuclear weapons. It is in
this sense that their establishment “contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear

14 Matthew Fuhrmann and Li Xiaojun, “Legalizing Nuclear Abandonment: The Determinants of Nuclear Weapon

Free Zone Treaty Ratification,”Managing the Atom Working Paper Series, March 2008, Belfer Center for Scienceand International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School,https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Legalizing%20Nuclear%20Abandonment.pdf
15 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assemblyon 5 December 1967 – Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. Twenty second session.
A/RES/2286 (XXII), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2286(XXII)

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disarmament,” as stated in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference and in theTreaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
Further on NWFZs’ disarmament role, the UN Guidelines note that “respect for such zones by
Nuclear Weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.” Here disarmament seems
to connote, in a more general sense, the fight for “a world without nuclear weapons.” In a more
specific and pragmatic way, the UN Guidelines stipulate that Nuclear-weapon States (NWS)16“should be consulted during the negotiations of each treaty and its relevant protocol(s) establishinga nuclear-weapon-free zone in order to facilitate their signature to and ratification of the relevant
protocol(s).”Therefore, cognizant of the importance of engaging the NWS to promote the NWFZ objectives,
the NWFZs negotiators have sought negative security assurances (NSA) from NWS, that is, alegally-binding commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against zonal states.
These are specified in protocols to the treaties establishing NWFZs of which solely the one
attached to the Treaty of Tlatelolco has so far been ratified by all NWS. These protocols also
contain such obligations as ‘respect’ for the objectives of the zones and ‘not contributing to any
act that constitutes a violation of the treaty by states parties to it.’ Protocol ratifications by NWS
have routinely been accompanied by declarations, statements, and understandings that clarify
individual NWS’ stances vis-à-vis the protocol provisions.
Most prominently, these concern transit rights. The NWFZs’ arrangements are ambiguous in thisrespect, and basically are such that individual states parties are free to decide for themselves ontransit and navigation matters. Goldblat views this arrangement as one of the NWFZs’
deficiencies. 17 The others being, among other things, conditionality of NSAs, impossibility toverify the obligation of NWS to respect the zones, silence on whether NWFZs are valid both intime of peace and in time of war, etc. As per the UN Guidelines, States-parties to NWFZs remain
free to decide for themselves on foreign ships and aircraft visits and the transit thereof in or overtheir territorial sea, archipelagic waters or straits “while fully honoring the rights of innocent
16 NWS are states that are formally acknowledged by the NPT as nuclear weapon possessor states. The non-possessors are referred to as non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS).
17 Joseph Goldblat, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment,” The Nonproliferation Review 4(3):18-32, 1997, http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2018/ph241/bashti2/docs/goldblat-1997.pdf

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WMD in Asia-Pacificpassage, archipelagic sea lane passage, or transit passage in straits that are used for internationalnavigation.”
Besides protocols on the granting of NSAs to zone parties, some of the NWFZ treaties containprotocols inviting outside powers to apply their denuclearization provisions in the territories forwhich they had become internationally responsible and which are located within NWFZs.
France is the only country specified in the relevant protocol to the Pelindaba Treaty to sign andratify it, while the United States has signed but not ratified the similar protocol to the Rarotonga
Treaty.
Whatever these deficiencies, over the past decades NWFZs have been an important nonproliferation tool and a regional security enhancer whose objective of keeping entire regions freeof nuclear weapons and their testing has enjoyed broad international appeal and contributed toadvancing the global debate on nuclear disarmament and to reducing nuclear threats.

Overview of the Asian NWFZs
Three nuclear-weapon-free zones are currently in place in Asia, ranging from the seas of the South
Pacific via South-East Asia up to the landlocked landmass of Central Asia. In between, Mongolia
enjoys an official nuclear-weapon-free status. There is an ongoing debate among the expert onprospects for a NWFZ in North-East Asia. The Asian NWFZs extend across a territory of over 19
million square kilometers, and the diversity in their geography, history, and political experiences
explains the variances among them. Goldblat, Hamel-Green, Thakur, Fuhrmann and Li, Roscini,and others have extensively discussed various aspects of the NWFZs. This paper looks at thenotable features and contributions associated with each one of these zones.
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
The first among them, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ), originated primarily fromthe desire of regional countries to put an end to nuclear testing by the United States, Britain, andFrance in the region and stop the dumping of nuclear waste at sea. In 1975, New Zealand tabled aresolution at the UN on a South Pacific NWFZ, which was met with abstentions by all NWS except
China. Due to a conservative hiatus in New Zealand, Australia—which had by then started
positioning itself as an activist middle-power with its own agenda on nuclear matters—took the471

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lead in negotiating the Treaty of Rarotonga on a regional NWFZ, which was signed in 1985 andentered into force in 1986.
In a notable expansion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which bans specifically nuclear weapons“appropriate for use for warlike purposes,” the Treaty of Rarotonga expanded the object of theban, which is defined as “any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing
nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used “and irrespective of whether
it is in unassembled or partly assembled forms. The treaty negotiators deliberately omitted theword ‘weapon’ in its name and went on to ban peaceful nuclear explosions and the dumping ofradioactive waste and other radioactive materials at sea anywhere within the zone, and to preventand not to assist such dumping by non-parties anywhere in the zone. States parties also undertake
not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material for peacefulpurposes to non-Nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) unless subject to the safeguards required by the
NPT, or any nuclear-weapon State unless subject to applicable safeguards agreements with theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The most significant contribution of the SPNFZ to the cause of non-proliferation and disarmamentlies, however, in its stand on nuclear testing. The promoters of the zone have embraced the thinkingof the Australian government on the matter which, at the time, was pushing for a comprehensive
test ban treaty at the international level. The Rarotonga Treaty prohibits the testing of any nuclear
explosive device by states parties—not only of nuclear weapons as is the case in the Treaty of
Tlatelolco—and, in the form of a separate legally-binding protocol, prohibits such testing byexternal powers anywhere within the zone. Thus the Treaty of Rarotonga became the firstcomprehensive test ban treaty albeit with jurisdiction confined to the SPNFZ only. The UnitedStates, however, has yet to ratify the treaty’s non-testing protocol as well as its NSA protocol. A
global Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was concluded a decade later with active effort
by the SPNFZ countries.
The successful conclusion of the Treaty of Rarotonga gave a much needed impetus to negotiations
on an ASEAN NWFZ. For years, Australia and Indonesia had been wary of each other’s
intentions: the Australian military had for a while floated the idea of the country acquiring nuclearweapon capability while Indonesia had started its own nuclear energy capacity. As noted by
Hamel-Green, the SPNFZ “created more conducive conditions for the ASEAN zone in the sense472

WMD in Asia-Pacificof promoting confidence that Australia would not seek nuclear weapons… and the South-East
Asian and South Pacific regions can be said to have headed off at least one potential nuclear rivalry
by putting in place additional regional zone mechanisms for demonstrating commitment to nonproliferation norms.”18
Despite these achievements, the Treaty of Rarotonga has had its share of critics. First and foremost,criticism was levelled against its liberal approach towards port calls by nuclear-armed ships andthe hosting of the US nuclear support installations on the territory of Australia (in fact, none of the
NWFZ treaties prohibit the stationing of such facilities). The Treaty’s stand on these matterslargely stemmed from Australia’s nuclear policy, which combined a bilateral military alliance with
the United States and support for its nuclear deterrence policy with efforts towards enhancing
regional security via multilateral actions.
With the general heightening of tensions in the broader region and the hardening of positions ofvarious actors, it appears that the United States is not considering ratifying the Treaty’s three
protocols any time soon.
The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
The Treaty establishing the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), or the
Bangkok Treaty, was signed in 1995 and entered into force in 1997. Its origins are traced back to
the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality Declaration (ZOPFAN) in which the ASEAN
expressed its cognizance of the “significant trend towards establishing nuclear-free zones for the
purpose of promoting peace and security.” However, it took several years and the end of the Cold
War, and the completion of the SPNFZ for actual negotiations to begin. Twenty-five years on, theBangkok Treaty remains the only NWFZ treaty whose NSA protocol has not been signed by anyof the NWS, let alone ratified.
There are two issues of contention that have prevented the NWS from signing the protocol. The
first concerns the expanded NSA that the NWS are invited to commit to: if all other NWFZ treaty
18 Michael Hamel-Green, “Regional Initiatives on Nuclear- and WMD-Free Zones: Cooperative Approaches to Arms

Control and Non-Proliferation,” Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), p. 6, 2005,
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/regional-initiatives-on-nuclear-and-wmd-free-zones-cooperativeapproaches-to-arms-control-and-non-proliferation-286.pdf

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protocols envisage NSAs granted to states parties to respective zones, the Bangkok Treaty adds tothem all territory within the SEANWFZ. As Roscini notes, “this entails a commitment by the
nuclear weapon states not to launch missiles with a nuclear warhead from ships, submarines, oraircraft located within the zone even if the target is situated outside, and also not to use nuclear
weapons against means of transport (even if they belong to another nuclear weapon state) situatedin the internal waters, territorial sea and, most importantly, exclusive economic zone of the stateparties to the Bangkok Treaty.”19
The inclusion of continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the parties to the
SEANWFZ in its zone of application is another departure from other NWFZs. The NWS,
especially the United States, see this departure as an obstacle to their signing of the protocol. As
put by Tong Zhao,20 for the nuclear-weapon states, the giving of assurances not to use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons in EEZs, where nuclear submarines of a NWS, or any nuclear-armed
country, for that matter, could be staying, would be akin to offering such assurances to one another.
At this moment, the only assurance the NWS have given to one another is that of a mutuallyassured destruction; needless to say that a certain effort towards building trust among those powers
will have to be made to achieve progress in this area.
As it stands, for the NSA protocol to be signed, parties will have to work on devising mutuallyacceptable arrangements on a host of issues, including port calls and transit. For one thing, theBangkok Treaty’s provision on notifying state-parties for them to take decisions on whether toallow port calls, transit by air and sea by foreign ships and aircraft, has not been to the liking ofsome of the countries in the region who are concerned that SEANWFZ parties could use this tochallenge the freedom of navigation of US nuclear-capable vessels. 21 In the meantime, Russia had
made known its position to the effect that it would deem itself not bound by its protocol

19 Marco Roscini, "Negative Security Assurances in the Protocols Additional to the Treaties Establishing Nuclear

Weapon-Free Zones," In Gartner, Heinz, ed. 2011. Obama and the Bomb: The Vision of a World Free of Nuclear
Weapons. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang- Internationale Verlag der Wissenschafte, p. 132,
file:///C:/Users/i/Downloads/SSRN-id1844145.pdf
20 Tong Zhao, “Nuclear-Weapon States and the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,” APLN Policy Brief
No.28, 2017, http://www.apln.network/briefings/briefings_view/Policy_Brief_28__Nuclear_Weapon_States_and_the_Southeast_Asia_Nuclear-Weapon-Free_Zone
21 Christine Parthemore, “The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone: A U.S. Perspective on the Treaty and Its
Future,” APLN Policy Brief No. 33, 2017, http://www.apln.network/briefings/briefings_view/Policy_Brief_33__The_Southeast_Asia_Nuclear-Weapon-Free_Zone:_A_US_Perspective_on_the_Treaty_and_Its_Future474

WMD in Asia-Pacificcommitments should any transit of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices take placethrough the territory of states that are party to the Bangkok Treaty22 prompting subsequent calls to
remove that reservation. And the United States has applied a policy of calculated ambiguity
regarding its nuclear-capable vessels known as “neither confirm, nor deny.”
On top of these tricky issues, the longstanding territorial disputes in the South-China Sea also comeinto play, and the current worsening of the US-China competition writ large serves as a major
discouraging factor for any action on the SEANWFZ. The NWS have on a number of occasions
expressed their general support for a NWFZ in South-East Asia and held consultations to movethe process forward (in late 2021, China even indicated its readiness to sign the treaty) but, at thispoint, there are few indications that any progress is forthcoming.
The Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
The Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) is the first NWFZ established in thenorthern hemisphere “on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region
concerned,” as prescribed in the UN Guidelines. It is also the first NWFZ established in a region
where nuclear weapons had previously been deployed. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union,
one of the Central Asian nations, Kazakhstan, found itself overnight home to over a thousand
nuclear weapons. These were later removed to Russia making it possible for Kazakhstan to join
the NPT as a NNWS. The CANWFZ is also the only zone that borders on two NWS, Russia to thenorth and China to the south, and faces volatility emanating from Afghanistan, South Asia, andthe Middle East.
The Treaty of Semipalatinsk, which established the CANWZ, was signed in 2006 and entered into
force in 2009. Being the last, to date, internationally recognized NWFZ, it benefited a great deal
from the previous experiences on establishing such zones and the thinking that went into them andfrom the expertise and resources accumulated in the United Nations on this matter. Mongolia’s
1992 initiative that declared the country’s territory a nuclear-weapon free zone has served both as
an inspiration and a call for action for Central Asian countries.

22Alexander Kolbin, “The Bangkok Treaty Protocol: Why Still Not Signed by the P5?” Security Index: A Russian

Journal on International Security 19 (4): 63-66, 2013, (In Russian)
http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/11/13730360840.pdf

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The drafters of the Treaty were also able to take into account the substantive developments in theworld of disarmament, such as the Additional Protocol, the conclusion of which is included in theTreaty as one of the undertakings by states parties. The site of the signing of the treaty,
Semipalatinsk, used to be a major Soviet nuclear testing site with a heavy legacy of nuclear-related
infrastructure and environmental degradation and contamination. Hence the treaty has strong
provisions concerning environmental rehabilitation and prohibition of nuclear tests. The latter
closely follows the prohibitions of the CTBT. Also, the Treaty prohibits both nuclear weapons andnuclear explosive devices irrespective of their purpose and in assembled or partly assembled forms
thus emulating the Treaty of Rarotonga. The presence of large quantities of nuclear materials left
behind by Soviet Union’s nuclear activities in the region and the threat of their illicit trafficking
explain the undertaking to follow physical protection standards “at least as effective” as thestandards of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. The Treaty also bans
research on nuclear weapons.
The prospects for the establishment of the CANWFZ have looked rather dim because some of its
parties are members, together with Russia, of a security agreement that provides for mutual
military assistance in case of an aggression. Concerns have been expressed by the United States,
France, and the United Kingdom as to whether this was compatible with the objectives of a NWFZ.
But an article entitled ‘Other Agreements’ still found its way into the treaty which marries theprovision that it does not affect the parties’ rights and obligations under other international treaties
with the provision that parties shall take all necessary measures for effective implementation of
the zone’s purposes and objectives. This wording was deemed acceptable enough for all NWS tosign the treaty’s NSA protocol. The United States, however, has yet to ratify it. The United States
was also adamant that the CANWFZ limit its participation to the five Central Asian countries toprevent a possible move by Iran to join it.
Besides its contribution to strengthening NWFZs’ non-proliferation and test ban norms, the
CANWFZ clearly represents for the countries of the region, all of whom are former Soviet
republics, an instrument for fostering a national security posture that seeks cooperative approaches
in the face of the present and future security challenges.

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WMD in Asia-PacificMongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status
East of the CANWFZ, Mongolia has labored hard to establish and strengthen its internationallyrecognized nuclear weapon free status.23 It started early—just two years after the country shed its
communist past in 1990 and a year after the demise of its former ally, the Soviet Union, by
declaring its territory a NWFZ at the UN. However, since the established practice at the time was(and still remains) that to create such zones a group of regional states had to enter into a legallybinding agreement, Mongolia could not join a region-wide NWFZ for the simple reason that its
only neighbors are Russia and China, both NWS. Mongolia’s attempts at the UN to gain
acceptance of the concept of a single-state NWFZ were overruled by international custom and the
NWS’ disinclination to set a deviating precedent.
But, in the end, the country was able to secure international recognition of its unique status, called‘Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status (NWFS),’ and formalized in the UN General Assembly
Resolution 53/77 D of 1998. It was supported by the NWS via a joint statement by the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council (the P5). The UN resolution (which is a recurrent
resolution adopted every other year) welcomed Mongolia’s declaration of its nuclear-weapon-freestatus and addressed some of the country’s broader security concerns. The P5 joint statement
entitled “Statement on Security Assurances in Connection With Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Status” welcomed the declaration by Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status and reaffirmed,
in regard of Mongolia, the negative and positive security assurances that were individually statedby the nuclear-weapon states and were contained in the Security Council Resolution 984 adopted
in 1995. Both the UN General Assembly resolution and the P5 joint statement raised considerably
the international profile of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status. Importantly, the NWS pledged
cooperation with Mongolia on the implementation of the UN General Assembly resolution.
In 2000, Mongolia adopted a domestic Law on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status that prohibits
developing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring, possessing, or having control over nuclear
weapons; stationing and transport of nuclear weapons by any mode of transport; testing nuclear
23 For a discussion of Mongolia’s nuclear weapon-free status see Nyamosor Tuya, “Mongolia’s Nuclear-Weapon-

Free Status: Recognition vs. Institutionalization,” Brookings Institution’s Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies,
Working Paper (August 2012) available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/mongolias-nuclear-weapon-freestatus-recognition-vs-institutionalization/ and Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan, “The Role of Small States in Promoting
International Security: The Case of Mongolia,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1(2), 2018, pp: 404-435.

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weapons; dumping and disposing of weapons-grade radioactive material and nuclear waste.
Violations of the provisions of the law constitute a criminal offence.
In 2012, Mongolia and the P-5 countries issued parallel political declarations in New York
concerning Mongolia’s status. Mongolia confirmed its commitments under the NPT and its
domestic law, such as the non-stationing of foreign troops and weapons, nuclear and other WMD,
whereas the NWS reaffirmed, in the case of Mongolia, their respective unilateral negative security
assurances as stated in their declarations issued on April 5 and 6, 1995, and affirmed their intent,
as long as Mongolia maintains its nuclear-weapon-free status, to respect that status and not tocontribute to any act that would violate it. The NWS also stated that their joint declaration was
issued taking into account Mongolia’s unique geographic status and that it constituted a politicalcommitment only and did not create legal obligations.
But whatever the legal/procedural intricacies, Mongolia regards itself, by virtue of its domestic
legislation and international recognition, as a full-blown single-state nuclear-weapon-free zone
sharing the same goals and objectives as other NWFZs. Thus, it has worked actively to promote
closer coordination among, and cooperation with, the regional NWFZs. The Mongolian experiencehas shown the importance of the political will and the ability to compromise on the part of a smaller
country and the importance of a cooperative dialogue between NNWS and NWS to promote theircommon interests.
A North-East Asia NWFZ?
Several experts on North-East Asia have advocated a NWFZ for North-East Asia (NEANWFZ),and more so after the end of the Cold War. A cursory look at the region where one finds a nuclear
China, a nuclear Russia, a Japan and ROK allied with the United States and both falling under its
extended nuclear deterrence, and a DPRK pursuing nuclear weapons and missiles programs—allentangled in rivalry—can give pause to observers. Even at the height of the Cold War, however,proposals were made on disarmament and reduction of tension involving even bitter adversaries.
In 1959, the Soviet Union put forward the idea of general and complete disarmament; in 1972, a
study was issued in the United States suggesting the establishment of a NEANWFZ which went478

WMD in Asia-Pacificignored.24 The DPRK had on a number of occasions proposed a NWFZ on the Korean peninsulaalbeit providing no details. In hindsight, the general distrust that reigned supreme during the Cold
War may have nipped in the bud the possible follow-ups that could have prevented the direoutcome the region is facing now.
Proponents of a NEANWFZ have argued that such a zone would represent a cooperative
institutional framework, achieved through peaceful, diplomatic means that can help resolve the
DPRK’s nuclear issues, denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, and bring about sustainable peace tothe region. The reasoning goes that occasional cycles of lapsed negotiations and bursts of heavyhanded rhetoric hardly change anything in the situation on the Korean Peninsula where any conflict
escalation, inadvertent or not, can threaten regional peace in unpredictable ways and undermine
strategic stability there. An NWFZ is seen not only as a non-proliferation tool but also as a security
enhancer. The NWFZs in other parts of the world, negotiated sometimes over decades and thenrecognized internationally both through the authority of the UN and political support by the NWS,
are cited as an example that could be emulated.
Several formulas have been put forward for a NEANWFZ ranging from those focused solely on
the Korean peninsula to those covering most of North-East Asia. Notably, the so-called ‘3+3
formula’ has had some currency among the expert community. 25 It would have Japan, the ROK,
and the DPRK establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone with China, Russia, and the US extending,
via a protocol, negative security assurances to them. A revised 3+3 version suggested an unusual
arrangement whereby the three NWS became direct parties to a comprehensive treaty on peaceand security in North-East Asia that would contain a provision on a nuclear-weapon free zone.26
In a growing recognition of the impossibility of resolving the DPRK nuclear problem without
addressing regional security issues, including peace on the peninsula, a more comprehensive and

24 Chung-in Moon, “Time May Be Right for a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone,” thebulletin.org, August

25,2016, https://thebulletin.org/roundtable_entry/time-may-be-right-for-a-northeast-asia-nuclear-weapon-freezone/
25 Hiromichi Umebayashi, “A North-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon Zone with a Three Plus Three Arrangement,” East
Asia Nuclear Security Workshop. Tokyo, November 11, 2011, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-specialreports/a-northeast-asia-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-with-a-three-plus-three-arrangement/
26 For a detailed discussion see Morton H. Halperin, "A Proposal for a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast
Asia," NAPSNet Special Reports, January 03, 2012, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/aproposal-for-a-nuclear-weapons-free-zone-in-northeast-asia/

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gradual approach has been suggested that would eventually lead to a NEANWFZ. In 2017, theNautilus Institute proposed a comprehensive settlement in North-East Asia that would set up a sixparty North-East Asia security council, end sanctions over time, declare non-hostility, end thearmistice and sign a peace treaty, provide economic and energy aid to the DPRK, and establish a
NWFZ. 27 Similarly, a report by Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition in Nagasaki(RECNA) identified a number of end-goals for the region that included peace settlement of the
Korean War, conclusion of a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, creation of a permanent North-East
Asian regional security forum/organization, establishment of an NWFZ, and a regional energy
security system.28 Dalton has suggested agreeing on a “continuum of objective” that would include
peace regime, denuclearization, diminished salience of nuclear weapons, adjustments to US
extended deterrence, a new security order for the region, and an NWFZ. 29
Given the DPRK’s dislike of multilateral forums and its fear of possible attempts at regime change
once denuclearization is achieved, the big question yet to be answered is about the ways and means
in which such gradual cooperative process could be initiated and further sustained. The bigger
question is can it be successfully navigated amid the troubled relations between the United States
and China that are only set to deteriorate.

Contribution of NWFZs Towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
The Asian NWFZs and Mongolia’s NWFS, as all other NWFZs, came into being as a result of thedesire of the countries in different parts of Asia to enhance their security through halting the spreadof nuclear weapons in their respective regions. This was done by banning through legally-binding

27 Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, Chung-in Moon, Thomas Pickering and Lee Sigal, "Ending the North Korean

nuclear threat by a comprehensive security settlement in North-East Asia,” NAPSNet Policy Forum, June 26, 2017,https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/ending-the-north-korean-nuclear-threat-by-a-comprehensivesecurity-settlement-in-northeast-asia/
28 Policy proposal by a Joint ROK-Japan Workshop, “From Peace on Korean Peninsula to North-East Asia Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone.” Executive Summary of the policy proposal issued by Joint ROK-Japan Workshop “From Peaceon Korean Peninsula to North East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone” held in June, 2019 in Seongnam, South Korea,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2020.1747910
29 Toby Dalton, “From Deterrence to Cooperative Security on the Korean Peninsula,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear
Disarmament 3 (1), 2020, pp:144-156,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/25751654.2020.1747907?needAccess=true

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WMD in Asia-Pacificarrangements, their development, acquisition, manufacturing, possession, testing, controlling, as
well as the stationing of nuclear weapons by external powers. Due to their specific circumstances,these NWFZs do have some variations but by banning nuclear weapons on their respective
territories they have served, and continue to serve, as an important non-proliferation toolcomplementing the NPT.
Over forty years of their existence each preceding NWFZ has enriched the next one to come into
being and, along the way, they have all enriched approaches to disarmament. By their very
emergence and existence NWFZs have considerably contributed to the delegitimization of nuclear
weapons and to multilateral disarmament—as have a host of UN General Assembly resolutions,
including its first one that established a commission to make proposals on the elimination of
nuclear weapons and the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, which advised that negotiating an instrument
leading to nuclear disarmament was an obligation. By the year 2017 when the TPNW negotiations
got under way there already existed a regional foundation on which to build this UN-supported
global effort to stigmatize, prohibit, and eliminate nuclear weapons. That foundation was createdto a large extent by countries inappropriately named the Global South.
The NWS, too, have had a role to play in the emergence of the phenomenon of NWFZs, supportiveas they were of its non-proliferation potential. In fact, one lesson that can be drawn from theexperience of the zonal approach is that to achieve tangible progress in disarmament there has tobe some confluence of interests between NNWS and NWS. Without it, no “bargain,” that isagreement of NNWS to forego nuclear weapons and of NWS to eventually disarm (a side of thebargain that has not been kept), could have emerged in the form of an NPT, and no NWFZs could
have been established.
At this point, the traditional division between the NWS and NNWS on the priorities of the NPT
where the former have stressed nonproliferation and the latter have given equal weight todisarmament is being paired with an emerging division between nuclear-allied NNWS and nonnuclear-allied NNWS (heavily represented in the NWFZs and the Non-Aligned Movement). This
state of affairs does nothing to strengthen the NPT and is damaging to the NWFZs. By rejecting
the TPNW the nuclear-allied NNWS undermine the appeal of the NPT for their non-nuclear-alliedcounterparts who have sought—in vain—nuclear disarmament since day one of the NPT and do
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the same with respect to the NWFZs, which basically came into being as an alternative to extended
nuclear deterrence as a means of protecting countries against nuclear threats. As it stands, relianceon nuclear deterrence, extended or otherwise, simply means an extended lifetime for nuclear
weapons and a postponement of nuclear disarmament for an indefinite time. In Asia especially,
and with an emphasis on North-East Asia, continued reliance on extended nuclear deterrence
practically shuts down the prospects for a NEANWFZ.
It is common belief that, however imperfect, over the fifty years of its existence the NPT, with its
authoritative number of 191 states parties, has helped prevent nuclear proliferation and preserve
international peace and stability and remains the primary source of nuclear stability that needs tobe preserved. And there is general agreement that, however deficient the NWFZs are (chiefly
because of their basic reliance on the signing of their NSA protocols by NWS), they have served
as an effective non-proliferation complement to the NPT and an essential building block thatbuttress the efforts towards eliminating nuclear weapons. Common sense would therefore dictatethat these instruments be handled with care.
It may well be that what is needed, at this juncture, is “a gradual broadening of the zones of theworld from which nuclear weapons are prohibited to a point where the territories of powers which
possess these terrible weapons of mass destruction will be something like contaminated islets
subject to quarantine.” 30 These words by Mexican diplomat Alfonso Garcia Robles who won
Nobel Peace Prize for his work on the Tlatelolco Treaty could serve as an inspiration to the
advocates of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and of the establishment of NWFZs in otherparts of the world. Given the somewhat encumbered field of disarmament-related initiatives andresolutions and coalitions, both NNWS and NWS as well as civil society actors could draw on theexample of seeking the synergy between the regional and the global provided by NWFZs andapply synergetic and cooperative approaches to the global efforts towards advancing disarmament
goals. Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has been quoted as telling the audience in his
address to the 2010 Second Conference of NWFZs and Mongolia that his goal was “to make the30 Michael Hamel-Green, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty and 2018 Disarmament Forums: An Initial Impact Assessment,”

Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1 (2), p.452, 2018,https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/25751654.2018.1516493?needAccess=true

482

WMD in Asia-Pacificwhole world a nuclear-weapon-free zone”31 envisaging a world where nuclear weapons will be
prohibited. Views have been expressed that because of “the parallels in the language andobjectives” such a reading may be of help in integrating the TPNW into the traditional nonproliferation frameworks and easing the TPNW/NPT tension. 32 As Thakur has noted, “If the global
non-proliferation regime is to remain viable, the competing visions reflected in the NPT and theban treaty must be reconciled” to preserve the integrity of the NPT.33 Such reconciliation could
indeed occur through gradual cooperative expansion of NWFZs to other regions that go hand-inhand with some confidence building measures to improve mutual trust. As of today, it certainly
appears as a distant prospect that countries in North-East Asia, South Asia, or the Middle East andCentral Europe, for that matter, would come together and shed their reliance on nuclear weapons
or nuclear deterrence. But a nuclear arms race, a possible disintegration of the NPT, weakened
NWFZs and heightened global tensions leading to an inadvertent nuclear war do not certainly look
like a brighter prospect.

Cooperation and Coordination
In the meantime, with a view to strengthening cooperation and coordination among the NWFZs
and raising their profile in the disarmament arena, the OPANAL (Agency for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) took the lead in initiating regularconferences of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, which are held in conjunction with the
NPT Review Conferences. Three such conferences have been held starting in 2005, and since 2010
they have been held under the auspices of the UN. A UN General Assembly resolution on thematter states that the objective of these conferences is “to consider ways and means to enhance
consultations and cooperation among nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia, the treaty
agencies and interested States, with the purpose of promoting coordination and convergence in the

31 CTBTO, “Making the Whole World a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone” https://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/news-

stories/2010/making-the-whole-worlda-nuclear-weapons-free-zone/
32 Sebastian Brixey-Williams, “The Ban Treaty: A Big Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone?” thebulletin.org, June 21, 2017,https://thebulletin.org/2017/06/the-ban-treaty-a-big-nuclear-weapon-free-zone/
33 Ramesh Thakur, “The Long Road to Nuclear Disarmament,” projectsyndicate.org, 2018, https://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/competing-visions-of-nuclear-disarmament-by-ramesh-thakur-201805?barrier=accesspay

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implementation of the provisions of the treaties and in strengthening the regime of nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation.”34
NWFZs’ cooperation entails not only exchange of ideas and dissemination of information among
themselves but also coordination on matters concerning multilateral disarmament. With the
adoption of the TPNW, cooperation could also extend to stepped-up efforts towards the prohibitionand elimination of nuclear weapons. The Outcome Document of the Second Conference of the
NWFZs and Mongolia stated that that the mere existence of nuclear weapons constituted a threat
to the survival of mankind and their use would have catastrophic consequences for life on Earth,and that the only guarantee against their use or threat of use was their total elimination. It further
stated that their use or threat of use constituted a violation of international law and of the Charterof the United Nations, and a crime against humanity, echoing the Humanitarian Initiative. 35 The
parties also reaffirmed the urgent need to advance towards the priority goal of nuclear disarmament
and the achievement of the total elimination and legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons. 36
These positions taken in the Outcome Document as well as the practical experience of the NWFZs
in prohibiting nuclear weapons in entire regions make them potentially a powerful voice in the
global efforts towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, especially as a partner in the
promotion of the ratification and, eventually, implementation of the TPNW. However, beyond
conferences, practical cooperation among the NWFZs has been limited. No regular mechanismsof sustaining inter-zonal dialogue and communication have yet been devised due, primarily, to thelack of resources, the necessary focus on socio-economic issues, poor institutionalization ofrespective NWFZs, and varying regional security dynamics. For instance, in Asia, the security issues
looked at in the South Pacific and Central Asia can be very different whereas in South-East Asia the
Bangkok Treaty still awaits the signing of its protocol by NWS. But since all NWFZs share a common
interest not only in banning nuclear weapons in their respective regions but also in totally eliminating
nuclear weapons, a clearly defined and feasible set of cooperative undertakings can help take forward

34 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assemblyon 2 December 2009 – Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish NuclearWeapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, Sixty-fourth session, A/RES/64/52, https://undocs.org/A/RES/64/52
35 ‘Humanitarian Initiative’ is a group of over 150 countries that formed by 2013 to promote the adoption of the
TPNW.
36 Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones andMongolia, Outcome Document, 2010, https://undocs.org/en/NWFZM/CONF.2010/1

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WMD in Asia-Pacificthese goals. This could include, among other initiatives, establishment of a global NWFZ
website/portal that could serve both as a center for communication and information for and about
the NWFZs and an aggregator of notable developments in the efforts towards the elimination of
nuclear weapons.37
At this critical juncture, when nuclear-armed states, far from willing to pursue nuclear
disarmament, are engaged in nuclear modernization and a nuclear arms race, states parties to
NWFZ need a renewed commitment to promote the purposes and objectives of NWFZs. For one
thing, NWFZs should continue to urge the NWS who have not done so to ratify the relevant
protocols to NWFZ treaties and withdraw the reservations or unilateral interpretations that haveaccompanied the signing or ratification of these protocols. The failure to do so damages the
NWFZ’ effectiveness and serves as discouragement to other regions contemplating a zonal
approach. It may well be that advances in technology may render less necessary the use of nuclear
weapons in potential missions in NWFZ regions but as long as nuclear weapons exist NWFZs
would want security guarantees extended by way of ratified NSA protocols.

Conclusion
Nuclear-weapon-free zones were established out of the shared conviction of their states’ parties
that their national security was enhanced, not reduced, if they banned nuclear weapons instead of
introducing them. By establishing such zones they have turned entire regions in Southern andNorthern hemispheres into lands where no nuclear weapon is allowed, thus making an important
contribution to the global non-proliferation regime and towards the objectives of the eliminationof nuclear weapons. The protocols to the treaties establishing NWFZs envisage a legally-binding
commitment by NWS, albeit with attached reservations, not to use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against states parties. In the absence of a universal instrument providing such acommitment, this has been a welcome development. In Asia, unfortunately, not a single treaty on
a NWFZ has its protocols ratified by all NWS.

37 For more suggestions, see: Report by the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, “Cooperation

among Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: History, Challenges and Recommendations,” VCDNP Task Force Report,
March 2018, https://vcdnp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NWFZ-TF-Report-final-1.pdf

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Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones in Asia
By banning and introducing the norm of non-possession of nuclear weapons the NWFZs haveplayed an important role in delegitimizing nuclear weapons. Advocates of the total elimination of
nuclear weapons could benefit from the NWFZs’ example of seeking the synergy between theregional and the global and search for ways to reconcile the current misunderstanding between
nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear-allied NNWS with regard to the TPNW.

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NPT-TPNW Standoff: Who Can Break this Gridlock?

18. NPT-TPNW Standoff: Who Can Break This
Gridlock?
Nobuyasu Abe

Introduction
Having secured 50 ratifications, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) cameinto force on January 22, 2021. The treaty’s promoters are determined to win more ratifications,which presently stands at 59. If the treaty is adhered to by a comfortable majority of states, it will
come close to establishing a legal norm in the world. Nuclear weapon-possessing states were firmin opposing the TPNW and, led by the United States (US), campaigned against the signing andratifying of the treaty. The new Biden administration may somehow soften its stance, but in viewof the fact that the US opposition to the idea of a TPNW started not under the Republican Trumpadministration but under the Democratic Obama administration, it is hard to predict the US
attitude. Opponents argue that nuclear disarmament can only be achieved step by step and jumping
to the ultimate abolition and prohibition of nuclear weapons diverts attention from the NPT (Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) and the efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation until
weapons are abolished altogether. While the strength of the NPT itself is placed in doubt, therescheduled NPT Review Conference which, first slated for August 2021 and now for some timein 2022, threatens to become a confrontation between the NPT and TPNW camps. Efforts have to
be made to bridge gaps between the two camps so that they together can move to promote nuclear
disarmament and strengthen nuclear non-proliferation efforts. This paper looks at who can do so
and how.
There are already some signs of softening observed in some allies of nuclear weapons states.
Among the US allies, New Zealand has signed and ratified the treaty. A NATO member—the
Belgian government—has started to show a positive view of the treaty. Kazakhstan, a member of
the Collective Security Organization allied with Russia, has also signed and ratified the TPNW.
© 2022 Nobuyasu Abe, CC BY 4.0

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NPT-TPNW Standoff: Who Can Break this Gridlock?
These states have proved that even allies of nuclear weapon-possessing states can join the treaty.
Having done so, they must now renounce the protection of a nuclear umbrella (in the case of
Kazakhstan) or, they may have already done so (in the case of New Zealand). Two NATOmembers, Norway and Germany, have expressed their intention to participate in the first meetingof the States Parties of the TPNW which is to be held sometime during the course of 2022.
Japan is closely following the US opposition campaign against the TPNW, but in the meantime
expresses its intention to try to bridge the gap between the TPNW’s proponents and opponents. It
organized a group of eminent persons to advise the ways to do this bridging. The group issued athirteen point appeal in April 2019, including reaffirming the commitment of the unequivocal
undertaking by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to accomplish the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals, sustaining and preserving bilateral and multilateral nuclear arms control treaties
and agreements, clarifying their nuclear policies and force postures are consistent with applicableinternational law, especially international humanitarian law, and realization of legally binding
security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS).1 But to date, this Japanese effort has
not achieved any significant progress in bridging the gap. There are minority voices in Japan thatit should search for ways to join the treaty, or at least sign it, or observe the conference of treaty
parties.

NPT—A Treaty Facing the Risk of Increasing Irrelevance
The NPT succeeded in its initial task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons among
potential key players at the time of its entry into force in 1970.2 Countries with sufficient industrial
capability to do so but ultimately did not obtain nuclear weapons included Canada, West Germany,
Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Taiwan’s proliferation program wasblocked, and South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons and joined the NPT. Thus, the NPT did

1 The recommendations were presented in conjunction with the NPT Review process but some of therecommendations refer to “nuclear-armed states” or “all states” such as appeal to ratify CTBT and strengthening
physical protection.
2 For the analysis of the successes and failures of the NPT refer to The NPT at Fifty: Successes and Failures by theauthor, published in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, September 2020,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2020.1824500

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WMD in Asia-Pacifichelp prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It was helped by the establishment of the International
Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) comprehensive safeguard system to monitor the nuclear
activities of those countries that pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons under the treaty. The NPT,
over the years, also succeeded in enticing second tier countries such as Egypt, South Africa, Brazil,
Argentina, Mexico, Cuba, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the DPRK, France, and China, thus
bringing the total number of states parties to 187 by the turn of the century. This outcome washelped by the strong diplomatic efforts of the United States, and subsequently by the end of theCold War. As accession to the treaty was almost universal, a near international norm against
nuclear proliferation was generated.
In the last three decades, however, the NPT has started to show its limitations. Non-adherents, like
India and Pakistan made their own nuclear weapons and the DPRK withdrew from the treaty tobuild its own nuclear weapons. Clandestine nuclear weapons programs had also been proceedingin Iraq, Libya, and South Africa. Some of these have been forcibly abandoned and some were
voluntarily abandoned. During this time, the inability of the IAEA safeguards to uncover nuclear
weapon programs in a timely fashion became evident.
In terms of promoting nuclear disarmament, the NPT cannot claim to be very successful. Even
after fifty years of its existence, there is a long way to go to achieve the goal set out in Article VIof the treaty. As the disappointment of the NNWSs about the slow progress of nuclear disarmament
intensifies, the commitment of those states to adhere to their treaty obligation is weakening. In the
Middle East, the de facto possession of nuclear weapons by Israel, while it is not againstinternational law as it is not an adherent to the NPT, gives a sense of inequality to the surrounding
countries and works to weaken their adherence to the NPT obligations. The 2008 decision by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group to exempt India, non-NPT adherent possessing nuclear weapons, fromits export restrictions also weakened the incentives of some NPT parties to strictly observe the
NPT obligations because the acceptance of nuclear non-proliferation obligation and the access tonuclear supplies and technology were considered a basic bargain underlying the NPT. Goes therefrain: ‘If you can have free access to nuclear supplies and technology even without adhering to
the NPT and still get nuclear weapons, why bother to adhere to the NPT?’
For all these reasons, the NPT faces another challenge to stop further proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Given these evident deficiencies of the NPT, how then might these be overcome and the489

NPT-TPNW Standoff: Who Can Break this Gridlock?
credibility and authority of the NPT be restored? There are at least six major steps that must be
taken to achieve this result.
1. Nuclear Disarmament
In 2009 US President Barack Obama pledged in Prague to work for a world without nuclear
weapons. So, one approach is to simply wait for the nuclear weapon possessing states to work
among themselves to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. But, it was exactly thedisappointment about the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament that led to the adoption of
the TPNW. The fact that none of the nuclear weapon possessing states has shown willingness tojoin the TPNW indicates that they have no intention of giving up their nuclear weapons any timesoon, and, without pressure, they will remain resolute on keeping these weapons. Some nonnuclear states may join the efforts to decelerate the current nuclear modernization and buildup
thereby demonstrating that there are ways to overcome obstacles to nuclear disarmament, or atleast ensure that the nuclear armed states refrain from any move that complicates an alreadycomplex situation.3
2. Regional Nuclear Disarmament
In the absence of concrete progress toward global nuclear disarmament, regional approaches suchas the treaty-based Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) have been important and crucial. Fivesuch zones currently exist in the world and Mongolia has also been designated with a nuclear
weapon-free status. Two more zones – in the Middle East and in Northeast Asia – have been
proposed.
Establishing a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, as envisaged in the resolution
adopted in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, would address Israeli nuclear
weapons and arrest new nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Twenty five years after the
adoption of the resolution, however, there has been little meaningful progress towards therealization of such a zone. Arab states try to adopt a resolution calling for Israel to adhere to the
NPT and accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards, meaning Israel should abandon its nuclear
weapons and prove all the nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. Israel on its part insists that
3 A formula to take care of the current deadlock about the involvement of China in the US-Russian arms control issuggested in The NPT at Fifty: Successes and Failures by the author. op. cit.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificfor a WMD-free zone to be achieved, regional peace and security have to be established.
Practically speaking, these conditions would have to be established concurrently. Thus, both sides
have to show flexibility to realize any meaningful negotiation to achieve a free zone.
In Northeast Asia, if North Korean denuclearization is to be realized, it may be in the course of
establishment of a Northeast Asia NWFZ. In the joint statement of the 2018 US-DPRK presidential
Singapore summit, US President Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK,
and DPRK Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his unwavering commitment to complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.4 The DPRK never agreed to unilateral denuclearization
but rather, to denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula. For the DPRK, this phrase meansthat not only the DPRK abandon its nuclear weapons but the ROK also pledges not to acquire
nuclear weapons and accept strict verification the same way as the DPRK may be required to. Not
only that, DPRK demands that there should be no nuclear weapons stationed in American bases in
the ROK, which also should be verified. President Trump also “committed to provide security
guarantees to the DPRK.”5 For the DPRK however, it is not sufficient for the US to make a politicalstatement to provide security guarantees to the DPRK; instead the US should do so in a legallybinding way backed up by deeds. It follows that if the US guarantees not to invade the DPRK, it
would not need to keep its forces in the ROK. The DPRK sometimes asks for renunciation of thenuclear umbrella by not only the ROK but also Japan. It also asks for the renunciation of the USKorea Mutual Defense Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty. Thus, accommodating all theseNorth Korean demands becomes synonymous with the establishment of a Northeast Asia NWFZ
in which the DPRK, ROK, and Japan become bound not to acquire nuclear weapons, nor to station
any nuclear forces in return for negative security assurance by the United States, China, and Russia.
Abandonment of alliances and the nuclear umbrella will be a subject of negotiations in drafting a
NWFZ treaty.

4 Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit, June 12, 2018,https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-unitedstates-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/
5 Ibid.

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3. IAEA Safeguard System
The Iraq and the DPRK cases demonstrated that existing IAEA safeguards system at the time were
not effective enough to uncover the clandestine nuclear activities early enough to prevent the
progress of the clandestine activities. Thus, the IAEA adopted the model additional protocol to
supplement the existing safeguards so that its inspectors could verify a wider range of sites anduse such methods as taking soil samples of minute radio isotopic particles. The problem is thateven after more than two decades since its introduction, the additional protocol has not been
ratified by key countries of concern such as Iran, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel,and Pakistan, although it has been ratified by more than 130 countries. India has only ratified an
additional protocol regarding limited facilities. The apparent political reluctance to conclude an
additional protocol has to be overcome if the world is to resume nuclear disarmament in a serious
manner.
4. Compliance and Enforcement
The experience of the DPRK and Iran nuclear proliferation highlighted another critical issue
regarding the NPT: how to enforce compliance with the NPT obligation to not acquire nuclear
weapons? Whether the DPRK lawfully withdrew from the NPT or not, it continues to increase its
nuclear warheads. If other NPT parties find that the DPRK can withdraw from the NPT, then thevalidity of the NPT will be seriously damaged, and other countries may use it as a way to acquire
nuclear weapons when the time comes for them to face their own proliferation decisions. This is aquestion common to the NPT and the TPNW. The IAEA itself does not have any strong means toenforce compliance with the non-proliferation obligation undertaken by non-nuclear NPT parties.
Ultimately non-compliance has to be reported to the UN Security Council (UNSC) and it is up to
the Council to enforce compliance. During the agonizing debate concerning the Iranian question,
however, the IAEA Board of Governors had considerable difficulty in reporting Iranian noncompliance with the IAEA safeguard requirements to the UNSC. Although the UNSC had declared
nuclear and other WMD proliferation to be a matter affecting the maintenance of international
peace and security, in practice, it has often had difficulty even addressing the issue of specific noncompliance. It seems that Council members, in particular permanent members, favor certain
countries and resist addressing the question of their non-compliance. For the sake of credibility of
the NPT and the IAEA, the UNSC must execute their responsibility properly and impartially. A
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way to do so, for example, would be to agree beforehand that the IAEA Director-General does not
require the IAEA Board’s consent to report non-compliance, and the UNSC agrees beforehandthat any issue of NPT non-compliance or violation should automatically be put on its agenda.
5. Closing the HEU/naval Propulsion Loophole
An issue that has surfaced over the years concerns the acquisition of Highly Enriched Uranium(HEU) for naval propulsion purposes, particularly for nuclear-powered submarines. Brazil has
been working on a program to develop nuclear submarines. There are arguments in Iran regarding
the acquisition of nuclear submarines. The ROK is actively considering acquiring nuclear
weapons. The AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) arrangement is to help
Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines. There is no provision in the NPT that prohibits theacquisition of HEU or nuclear submarines. The IAEA considers use of nuclear material for“military purposes” as for explosive purposes. Thus, transfer of HEU for naval propulsion is notconsidered diversion from peaceful purposes. Once HEU is placed in a submarine it is not
subjected to the IAEA safeguard inspection. Thus, there is a risk of HEU use for naval propulsion
to be used as a convenient loophole to justify uranium enrichment capability and to produce HEU
that may be quickly converted to nuclear weapons production.
6. Question of Deployment of Small Nuclear Reactors
Further emerging issues concern the deployment of small nuclear reactors to warfronts and using
nuclear propulsion for cruise missiles, drones, and other unmanned vehicles. Americans seem tobe considering the deployment of small nuclear reactors to the warfront to solve power supply
questions in the days when many gadgets and pieces of equipment consume an increasing amountof electricity without interruption. Similarly, small mobile nuclear power plants have been
deployed by Russia and China close to frontlines or on disputed lands. Russia boasts about nuclearpowered cruise missiles, drones, and underwater vehicles that can operate for a far longer timethan using conventional fuel. This generates concerns about the heightened possibility that thesefacilities may be involved and destroyed in military conflicts, or that attacks on the facilities could
cause widespread radioactive contamination in the environment. Scattering many nuclear devices
and material to so many places raises the risk of them stolen or misused by rogue elements. An
attack destroying ballistic missile nuclear submarines would be so enormous that it could493

NPT-TPNW Standoff: Who Can Break this Gridlock?
potentially signal the end of the world. The destruction of small nuclear reactors or small nuclear
propulsion devices may become a matter of daily events and greatly increase the risk ofenvironmental contamination, theft or misuse.

Pros and Cons of TPNW Coming into Force: Analysis
Proponents and opponents of the TPNW have articulated a number of arguments in the course of
bitter debates leading up to its ratification. This section outlines the pro- and anti-positions, andthen analyzes them in search of common ground between the NPT and the TPNW.
Pro-TPNW Arguments
The first such argument is that, once used, nuclear weapons can cause “catastrophic consequences”
that “cannot be adequately addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave implications forhuman survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security,and the health of current and future generations,” the “risks concern the security of all humanity,”and “all States share the responsibility to prevent any use of nuclear weapons.” 6 Thus, nuclear
disarmament and its legality cannot be left to nuclear weapon possessing states, but all the nonnuclear weapon states have a legitimate say on it. Moreover, the proponents adduce the following
reasoning: (a) TPNW will help implement UN General Assembly resolutions calling for nuclear
weapon elimination and the need for compliance with international humanitarian law; (b) TPNW
will “reshape the global normative milieu: the prevailing cluster of laws (international,
humanitarian, and human rights), norms, rules, practices, and discourse that shape how we think
about and act in relation to nuclear weapons.” 7 Even though it does not have an instant impact on
nuclear weapon abolition, the TPNW will “lessen their attractiveness and change the incentive
structures for states that possess them and others that rely on extended nuclear deterrence.” 8 And(c), the ‘step-by-step disarmament’ approach advocated by the NWS has stalled. Among the goals
set at the 1995, 2000, and 2010 NPT Review Conferences, the Conference on Middle East zone

6 Quotations from the TPNW preamble. July 2017, http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8
7 Ibid.
8 Ramesh Thakur, “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament,” The Washington

Quarterly 40 (4), 2017, pp: 71–95, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1406709

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WMD in Asia-Pacificfree of WMD has not moved forward. The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiation has
not started. Only the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been adopted but has
not come into force even after more than twenty years since its adoption.
Anti-TPNW Arguments
Contrary to these propositions, TPNW opponents argue first and foremost that the TPNW “doesnot address the security concerns that continue to make nuclear deterrence necessary, cannot resultin the elimination of a single nuclear weapon and will not enhance any country’s security, norinternational peace and security.” 9 They then present a countervailing chain of logic as follows:(a) Nuclear weapons possessing states remain committed to the obligations of Article 6 of the NPT
on nuclear disarmament, but—given the realities of international security—nuclear disarmament
can only be promoted in a step-by-step manner. Jumping to prohibition and elimination is
impractical; (b) Until nuclear disarmament is attained, nuclear nonproliferation remains a highpriority. The TPNW distracts attention from the NPT and risks weakening NPT-based nonproliferation efforts; (c) The TPNW posits that some treaty parties will join it still holding nuclear
weapons and prescribes procedures to abandon them to fulfill the treaty’s basic obligation to accept
the prohibition and the elimination of nuclear weapons. But, there is as yet no robust verification
procedure to ascertain abandonment of nuclear warheads in the highly contentious real world, notto mention compliance and enforcement procedures.
Evaluating Pro-Con TPNW Arguments in the NPT Context
The TPNW leaves verification procedures to the meeting of States Parties to elaborate after thetreaty comes into force. Article 8 paragraph 1 of the TPNW provides that the “States Parties
shall…consider and…take decisions…on further measures for nuclear disarmament, including:“Measures for the verified, time bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapon
programmes.”10 As the nuclear weapon possessing countries stayed away from the negotiating
conference for the treaty, they were not there to argue for the need for a robust verification process
9 Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the United States, United

Kingdom, and France, July 7, 2017, New York City, https://usun.usmission.gov/joint-press-statement-from-thepermanent-representatives-to-the-united-nations-of-the-united-states-united-kingdom-and-france-following-theadoption/
10 Article 8, paragraph 1 (b) of the TPNW. Italicized emphasis added by author.
https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/a/conf.229/2017/8

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nor to provide expertise about it. So, in a way, the treaty opened a door for the nuclear weapon
possessing states to consider the decision of a verification system, deadlines for elimination, andmeasures to ensure irreversibility. So far, the TPNW only requires that a state undertake
comprehensive safeguards11 while leaving the door open to committing to the additional protocol.
Should the nuclear weapon possessing states ever start reducing and ultimately eliminating their
nuclear weapons in accordance with their Article 6 obligation, they are likely to demand a robust
verification system be established, whether this is part of the TPNW or not; and such a system may
be employed at that time by states party to the TPNW if the disarming state has become a party to
the TPNW. Such warhead dismantlement process may benefit from the studies done by the IPNDV(International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification). 12
Also, the TPNW provides for setting a deadline to abandon nuclear weapons, when and if a nuclear
weapon possessing state joins the treaty. The deadline is to be determined by the first meeting ofStates Parties to the treaty. 13 It may be recalled that nuclear disarmament proponents have longargued for “time-bound,” verifiable, and irreversible elimination of all nuclear weapons. The
nuclear weapon possessing states contend, however, that it is unrealistic to set a definitive date for
elimination in view of the years required to dismantle thousands of warheads and the complex anddemanding verification and compliance measures that will be required. This is a fair question towhich there is as yet no answer from TPNW proponents, and without clarity on the pathway andtimelines, it is unclear that any state would undertake open-ended and absolute commitments todisarm.
A third critical issue is what to do in a case where a breakaway state declares it has acquired nuclear
weapons when every other state has already abandoned their nuclear arsenals? The International
Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) came up with a two-step
approach to get around this question. The first priority is to get the nuclear weapon possessing
states to reduce their holdings to the minimum level possible. Then, they will proceed to the final

11 Article 3, paragraph 2 of the TPNW, op. cit.
12 Refer to https://www.ipndv.org/. On the specific issue of involving NNWS in the warhead dismantlement, refer

to Carlson, John. "Verification of DPRK nuclear disarmament: the pros and cons of non-nuclear weapon states(specifically, the ROK) participating in this verification program", NAPSNet Special Reports, May 19, 2019, andhttps://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/verification-of-dprk-nuclear-disarmament-the-pros-andcons-of-non-nuclear-weapon-states-specifically-the-rok-participating-in-this-verification-program/
13 Article 4, paragraph 1, TPNW, op. cit.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificstage to eliminate their nuclear weapons taking care of the highly demanding final stage issues.14
Recently, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) proposed that
August 2045—the hundred year anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings—should
be declared as the timeline by which nuclear weapons would be eliminated as a potent symbolic
driver that leaves time to negotiate the security issues and to solve the technical issues outlined
above.15 Whereas nuclear abolitionists may complain that this timeline is too slow and poses toomuch cumulative risk even at low levels of the probability that nuclear war may occur; but at least
it is a practical proposal that refutes the arguments of nuclear realists that it may take forever toeliminate all the nuclear weapons—that is, elimination will never be achieved.

Regional Dynamics on NPT and TPNW in Asia-PacificIn the Asia-Pacific region there are three NPT-recognized Nuclear Weapon States (the UnitedStates, Russia, and China); two non-NPT nuclear weapon possessing states (India and Pakistan);and one NPT-defector nuclear weapon possessing state (the DPRK). None of the nine nuclear
weapon possessing states has signed nor ratified the TPNW.
Among the remaining non-nuclear weapon possessing states, a total of twenty states have joined
the TPNW as of February 19, 2021: ten from the Pacific, six from Southeast Asia, two from South
Asia and two from Central Asia. Among them New Zealand, the Philippines and Kazakhstan
deserve special mention as they are in security arrangements with the United States and Russia
respectively.16
Other states allied with a nuclear power have not joined the TPNW, viz, Japan, the ROK, andAustralia allied with the United States, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan allied with Russia.

14 Section 19 of the report of the ICNND provides a set of actions to create conditions for the final elimination

stage. http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/part-iv-19.html
15 Alyn Ware, Vanda Proskova and Saber Chowdhury, “2045: A New Rallying Call for Nuclear Abolition,” InDepth
News, October 2, 2020, https://www.indepthnews.net/index.php/opinion/3934-2045-a-new-rallying-call-fornuclear-abolition
16 New Zealand is in the ANZUS (the relationship was once suspended but resumed in 1996), the Philippines has
Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States, and Kazakhstan is in the Collective Security Organization.

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NPT-TPNW Standoff: Who Can Break this Gridlock?
Uzbekistan has suspended its membership in the post-Soviet Collective Security Treaty
Organization.
Table 1. States Parties to the TPNW in Asia-Pacific.
Sub-region

States Parties

Pacific

Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau,
Samoa, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

Southeast Asia

Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Viet Nam

South Asia

Bangladesh, Maldives

Central Asia

Kazakhstan, Mongolia

Looking forward, Indonesia has expressed its intention to ratify the TPNW. ASEAN member states
are members of the SEANWFZ (Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone) so theoreticallywould not have much difficulty joining the TPNW. The remaining ASEAN members are Brunei
Darussalam, Myanmar, and Singapore. Likewise, the remaining member states of the Treaty ofRarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty) would not have much difficulty joining the
TPNW. The remaining states are Australia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tonga.
Among them Australia is the only state under the US nuclear umbrella. The Marshall Islands, theFederated States of Micronesia, and Palau are north of the Equator and not party to the treaty but
are eligible to become parties should they decide to join. The Marshall Islands has lived under the
shadow of American nuclear tests and consequentially has a strong anti-nuclear sentiment. But,
these states have varying degrees of political association with the United States, which may affecttheir decision on whether to join the TPNW.
Among the members of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, so far, only Kazakhstan
has joined the TPNW. The other members, that is, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, andUzbekistan, theoretically would not have difficulty joining the TPNW.
In contrast, Japan and the ROK, the two non-nuclear states in Northeast Asia, face considerable
hurdles to joining the treaty given increasing nuclear threats from the DPRK. Additionally, Japan
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WMD in Asia-Pacifichas an active territorial dispute with China and a potential nuclear threat from it as well as facing
Russian nuclear forces located in the Russian Far East and in the coastal seas and north Pacific.
Nevertheless, there is a strong internal voice in Japan supporting the TPNW. Civic groups led bymayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have asked the government to join the treaty. Junior partner inthe ruling coalition, Komeito, has asked the government to participate in the first meeting of States
Parties as an observer. This domestic pressure is likely to continue.

Who Can Break the NPT-TPNW Gridlock and How?
As noted above, a number of small, middle, and large powers are committed to bridging the gap
between the TPNW and the NPT, and some of them being allies of a nuclear weapon possessing
state are well-placed to apply pressure in both directions. Outside the Asia-Pacific region, there
are similar voices expressed in Belgium and Canada.
The first chance for the TPNW proponents and opponents to have a meeting of minds may be thenext NPT Review Conference. If they are to move beyond competing for support for theirrespective positions, then both sides will need to reach out to those inclined to support theiropponents. The NWS should show progress in nuclear disarmament efforts, or that they are
determined to make some. They should show that they are working hard to decelerate nuclear arms
modernization and competition, and taking measures to reduce the risk of accidental or inadvertentuses of nuclear weapons. Austria and the other proponents of the TPNW should stress that thetreaty does not weaken the NPT, but rather is compatible with it and that they will be working todevise ways to achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons, for example, by strengthening therequisite disarmament verification measures and the ways to meet treaty non-compliance and theultimate enforcement against states that might try to break out.
The next opportunity to find common ground will be at the first meeting of the TPNW States
Parties when they meet in 2022. It will be an important meeting as the treaty leaves many tasks for
future implementation by the States Parties. These include:
Definition of key articles in the treaty text: What exactly, for example, is meant by Article 1
paragraph e that binds States Parties to never “a(A)ssist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone
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NPT-TPNW Standoff: Who Can Break this Gridlock?
to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty.” 17 Depending on the way
this prohibition is defined, some US allies that host American military facilities, for example,
ballistic missile acquisition radars or strategic communication facilities, may or may not be able
to join the treaty.
Observer status: Rules of procedure including in what manner the meeting allows non-States
Parties to observe. Will states such as Japan that might attend with observers’ status be allowed toattend all the sessions of the meeting? Would they be allowed to speak? Will they be allowed totable a proposal?
Disarmament measures and timelines: as Article 8, paragraph 1 (b) anticipates that States Parties
may take additional measures for nuclear disarmament, including “[m]easures for the verified,time-bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including additional
protocols to this Treaty.”18 The weakness of verification procedures, especially but not only fromthe perspective of nuclear weapon possessing states, is frequently pointed out as a major flaw in
the TPNW. Efforts to elaborate robust verification procedures would help alleviate this concern.
If both sides are serious enough, TPNW States Parties, NWSs, and other non-TPNW members
may organize a working group to elaborate such a verification system, possibly building on theworks done by the IPNDV.
There are further steps that ‘bridging countries’ may undertake to overcome the gaps between the
TPNW proponents and the opponents with those who support the NPT. As noted above, dialogue
sessions may be organized between them to identify ways to find common ground at the next NPT
Review Conference and/or as a side event of the first meeting of the TPNW States Parties. Anotherapproach would be to convene a conference on victim assistance and environmental remediationin parallel with the meeting of the TPNW States Parties. International cooperation to this end isenvisaged in Article 6 of the treaty, and given the nature of such cooperation, willing states andcivil organizations may be invited irrespective of their legal standing vis-à-vis TPNW. Article 6
seems to be modelled after the provision of the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel
landmines. Even though the United States is not a party to the convention, it is active in demining
17 United Nations General Assembly, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, July 7, 2017,

http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8
18 Ibid.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificefforts. Japan is a state that has deep expertise in the area of assisting radiation victims andenvironmental remediation, and domestic support for such activities, and might serve to host sucha conference.
It is also critically important to remind humanity of the horrific humanitarian consequences of theuse of nuclear weapons. Realistically, there is no immediate prospect that nuclear weapon
possessing states will agree to abandon their nuclear weapons any time soon. Thus, it is important
to ensure that the people around the world and, in particular, the political leaders and militarycommanders who are in the position to decide the use of nuclear weapons, are fully aware of theconsequences of the use of nuclear weapons. One way to do so is to invite the people to Hiroshima
and Nagasaki to observe the memorials and to talk to the surviving victims. As the victims are
aging and the memories are fading, innovative methods to let the people become aware of theconsequence are needed.
For the same reason, it is essential that the legal requirements under the laws of armed conflict andother pertinent international law be incorporated into every aspect of doctrinal and operational
planning by nuclear weapon possessing states to prevent the manifestly illegal use of nuclear
weapons and to delimit the cases as much as possible of arguably legal use until the weapons areprohibited and eliminated. All nuclear commanders and weaponeers must understand this and be
ready to act on their obligation to ensure that nuclear weapons are always controlled by the criteriaof discrimination, proportionality, necessity, and precaution to limit collateral damage and protect
civilians from nuclear warfare.
Finally, an all-out global effort by civilian and governmental agencies is called for to support allefforts to ensure the ultimate goals of the NPT and the TPNW are realized. In particular, medical,
legal, environmental, and humanitarian experts should be invited to apply their expertise in eachof these activities.

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19. Hope Becomes Law: The Treaty on theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons in the AsiaPacific Region
Richard Tanter

Introduction
For three quarters of a century, might was treated as right as the number of nuclear-armed statesin the Asia-Pacific region increased from one to now seven. 1 Four of these Nuclear Possessing
States are bound by the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and evolving international laws thatdefine the (il)legality of nuclear weapons and their use, and three are non-NPT states but stillotherwise subject to international law—especially the Laws of Armed Conflict and the ambiguous
ruling by the International Court of Justice in 1996.
The number of states that entered into nuclear umbrella contracts with the United States (“nuclear
extended deterrence”) varied, but at its peak during the Vietnam War, included regional states
party to the SEATO treaty (that is, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, andPakistan), South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and by implication albeit not explicitly at that time,
Australia and New Zealand. These states were implicated via stationing of forward-deployed
nuclear weapons on land or in transit, or by hosting nuclear command, control, andcommunications and early warning facilities, in preparation and planning for nuclear war and were
thereby implicated under international law as also accountable for nuclear threats and use.

1 Seven of the current nine Nuclear Possessing States have a presence in the Asia-Pacific: only Israel and the United

Kingdom have none. France has staked a claim to be an Indo-Pacific power on the basis of its possessions in thetwo oceans. Although the military reality behind this grand, not to say, grandiose, claim may be disputed, thenuclear weapons-capable aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle has been repeatedly deployed to the Indian Ocean. Seefor example, Frederic Grare, ‘France, the Other Indo-Pacific Power’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,'
21 October 2020.

© 2022 Richard Tanter, CC BY 4.0

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The Asia-Pacific states not party to this system of nuclear threat known to Strategic Air Commandas ‘Rest of World’ or just ROW was simply assumed to have no agency and no rights or prerogative
to exert jurisdiction over the conduct of nuclear war and were bullied or cajoled to become
members of the NPT except for the three standouts—India, Pakistan, and North Korea.
Now the non-nuclear rest of the world, especially clearly in the Asia-Pacific region, has stood up
and declared enough. For the ‘rest of the world’ hope has become law—irrespective of what thenuclear-armed states do or say. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will enter into
force for its States Parties on 22 January 2021 after the requisite fifty out of eighty-four signatories
completed ratification on October 16th. The end came in a rush—sixteen ratifications amid the
pandemic this year, including Malaysia, Tuvalu, Jamaica, Nauru, and Honduras since September
30th.2 These ratifications leading to Entry into Force were despite—or possibly, in part, becauseof—a last minute cease and desist demarche from the United States urging governments that had
already either signed or ratified the treaty to withdraw their support.
The US letter to signatories of the TPNW, reported on 22 October, stated that the treaty ‘turns backthe clock on verification and disarmament and is dangerous’:‘Although we recognize your sovereign right to ratify or accede to the Treaty on theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), we believe that you have made a strategic error
and should withdraw your instrument of ratification or accession.’ 3
It is hard to imagine a clearer expression of the dilapidation of the US hegemonic capacity to leadby the creation of nuclear consensus, or even, to coercively counteract even small countries in therebellion from below against the US-led global nuclear order that the TPNW represents.
The rupture of US nuclear hegemony accelerated by former President Donald Trump’s reign ofchaos has energized two competing and opposing trends: on the one hand, the nuclear abolition
movement, epitomized by the TPNW and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017 to theInternational Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which originated in Australia; and on

2 United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, Chapter XXVI, 9: Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons; International Committee of the Red Cross, Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law, ‘2017
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: Ratification Kit’, 24 April 2018.
3 Edith M. Lederer, ‘US urges countries to withdraw from UN nuke ban treaty’, AP News, 22 October 2020.

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the other, the precise reverse movement, with leading policy-makers of major Non-Nuclear
Weapons States publicly re-considering the desirability of developing nuclear weapons
themselves—vide Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Australia – all US allies. The consequencesof these contrary trends are of great significance for the countries of South East Asia and thePacific, which make up the core membership of two neighbouring Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. 4
To be sure, there is no guarantee that the treaty will achieve its aim of impelling a move fromprohibition to elimination. Indeed, as we shall see below, the nuclear-armed and umbrella states(hereafter Nuclear Possessing States and Nuclear Supporting States 5) in this region contest thenotion that the treaty is a valid and universally applicable international law, not least because afundamental principle of international law is that states most affected by international laws must
concur in the creation of that law for it to be binding.6 The nuclear-armed and umbrella states in
the Asia-Pacific region clearly intend to ignore or quash it. And, of course, the entry into force ofa treaty with global intent with as yet only a quarter of the world’s countries as states parties 7 hasa long way to go before it reaches either of its three primary goals: to become binding internationallaw on a larger number of states to the point where it impinges in practice on the behaviour of
nuclear umbrella countries that are not states parties; to induce one or more of those countries to
accede to the treaty; or, more distantly, to contribute to shifting at least one of the Nuclear

4 Michael Hamel-Green, ‘The implications of the 2017 UN Nuclear Prohibition Treaty for existing and proposed

nuclear-weapon-free zones’, Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol. 30, No. 2, (2018), pp. 209-232; and Nautilus
Institute, Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Briefing Book
5 The use of the terms Nuclear Possessing States and Nuclear Supporting States (NSSs) is intended to supersede theunhelpful consequences of relying on terms drawn from the NPT. Both supporters and opponents of the NPT
include Non-Nuclear States. Similarly, the term Nuclear Supporting State refers to states accepting or defending
the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence and reject the claims of the TPNW. In practice, most currently Nuclear
Supporting States are U.S. allies and declared recipients of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, and could therefore
simply be referred to by the more common term of umbrella states. However, there are other states which do nothave a declaratory policy of reliance on END. Two examples of the latter may be Sweden and Switzerland,countries which are neutrals, do not accept defence by extended nuclear deterrence. Both voted for the adoptionof the text of the TPNW, but have since drawn back somewhat. The situation with both is unclear at present.
However, it is possible that other countries may end up as non-umbrella Nuclear Supporting Countries. Sincealmost all Nuclear Supporting States discussed below currently rely on extended nuclear deterrence I will
endeavour to identify uses of NSS which do not involve END.
6 ‘The consent of the states parties to the treaty in question is a vital factor, since states may (in the absence of arule being also one of customary law) be bound only by their consent. Treaties are in this sense contracts between
states and if they do not receive the consent of the various states, their provisions will not be binding upon them.’
Malcolm M. Shaw, International Law, Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition (2018), p. 690.
7 “States parties” is a legal phrase used to denote states that are party to a treaty, whether the noun is singular orplural.

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WMD in Asia-PacificPossessing Countries to towards the status of Nuclear threshold Disarming State (of which more
below).
Yet, for first time since nuclear weapons were first used in war seventy-five years ago, there is an
unambiguous prohibition in international law on their use and possession that will come into
force—and most likely for a majority of states in the world—and in the Asia-Pacific. It is now
reasonable to expect that most of the remaining thirty-four current signatories will ratify, and that
more will join them in time, bolstering the institutionalization of the treaty regime. There are anumber of instances of international regimes with limited full accession, but even so, have carriedconsiderable normative influence beyond the formal membership of the treaty regimes concerned.
At a minimum, all governments supporting the right to possess or rely on the use of nuclear
weapons for their defense polices will now face potential discursive challenges to previously
unchallenged legitimacy on that matter.
If the final, still distant objective of the TPNW is to move from prohibition of nuclear weapons totheir elimination, then the key proximate goals are the full institutionalization of the treaty regime
together with its universalization. Governmental and civil society TPNW supporters in the region
intend to continue campaigning to realize these near-term goals, which will entail engaging in
dialogue with opponents and sceptics of the treaty in the six nuclear-armed and umbrella states.
Thus, much as these nuclear-dependent states may want to ignore the TPNW, they will be forced
to respond to it at home and in regional and global fora, with inevitable impacts on politicalfoundations of nuclear strategy that bear close examination.
One starting point of such dialogues will be a regionally-based dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region.8
The ‘Asia-Pacific’ is a famously flexible, not to say slippery, term, its content, like any otherclassification system, shifting according to purpose. This paper takes a frame of the non-nuclear
states of East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Island states, including Australia and New
Zealand. These regions correspond to the non-nuclear states that make up two well-established
8 I would like to acknowledge the stimulation provided by Professor Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘The Ban Treaty:

Perspectives from Southeast Asia’, Asia-Pacific Leadership Network, Policy Brief No. 71, September 29, 2020.
Professor Caballero-Anthony’s initiative on TPNW dialogue follows on from a fine history of advocacy of regional
security initiatives and for expanding the agenda of what counts as ‘security’ well beyond the traditional confinesof militarily-focussed state security in Southeast Asia. Her argument that there is fertile ground for dialogue inSoutheast Asia is most welcome. From a somewhat distinct position, this paper takes up the challenge to build on
the foundations of her initiative.

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Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ) (the South Pacific NWFZ and the Southeast Asian NWFZ)
and those that make up a proposed third (a Northeast Asian NWFZ).9 (See table 1.) South Asia
is an important and separate “nuclear” region that links China, India, and Pakistan to the Northeast
Asian nuclear threat system, and in turn to the global nuclear threat system involving the UnitedStates and Europe. Important as the region is in terms of the risk of nuclear war, this paper will
not address how the TPNW will enter into the nuclear discourse and evolution of nuclear
commitments in South Asia.
Both the Southeast Asian and Pacific Islands regions show the pattern of sharp division within theregions between a small number of Nuclear Supporting States and a large number of ban treaty
supporters. The three major US nuclear allies have opposed the treaty, sometimes vociferously.
None of the three principal US-allied Nuclear Supporting States—Australia (a member of theSouth Pacific NWFZ), Japan, and the ROK—attended the treaty negotiations, and all three havesubsequently reaffirmed their commitments to reliance on US nuclear deterrence and opposed the
TPNW.10Non-nuclear states overwhelmingly supported the adoption of the treaty text in 2017. Nine of thethirteen ASEAN states have signed with only one, Singapore, showing explicit doubt at any
stage.11 None of the three principal US allies and Nuclear Supporting States—Australia (a memberof the South Pacific NWFZ), Japan, and the ROK—attended the treaty negotiations, and all three
have subsequently reaffirmed their commitments to reliance on US nuclear deterrence and opposed
9 The Mongolian Nuclear Weapon Free Status covers its own territory, and is recognized by the United Nations asconforming to the obligations of a single-state nuclear weapon-free zone under United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 3261 F of December 9, 1974. Nuclear Weapon Free Status of Mongolia, Nuclear Threat Initiative.
10 Some ICAN sources classify Thailand as a United States ally in Southeast Asia, and accordingly reference its
strong support for the treaty to contradict erroneous claims that adherence to the treaty is incompatible withalliance with a nuclear state. There is in fact no foundation for the claim that the treaty prohibits membership in analliance with a nuclear state: what would be prohibited would be a specifically nuclear alliance in terms of Article
1(e) of the TPNW. In any case, use of the Thailand case as a paradigm of a U.S. ally for this purpose is in any case aweak case. The claim for ‘U.S. ally’ for Thailand status is based on the restricted Congressional formulation for
section 644(q) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2403(q)). That category exists for the purpose of
approving certain categories of Foreign Military Sales. The sense in which the NATO countries or Japan, South
Korea or Australia are ‘allies’ of the U.S. is very much more substantial non both sides of the equation. Thailand
and the Philippines do have defence agreements with the U.S., but they are of trivial significance for the U.S. bycomparison. The fact that in the past both countries had much stronger defence relations with the U.S., includingin the Philippines case, hosting nuclear weapons, is not relevant.
11 Singapore, having taken an active part in the treaty negotiations, and apparently positively disposed, abstained
from the vote. According to discussion with diplomatic and ICAN sources, it is not clear what lead to an apparently
last-minute change of voting intention, or final this position will turn out to be.

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the TPNW. On the contrary, the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian States(ASEAN) have in general show strong support for the treaty, and several large states took a leading
part in the treaty text negotiations. All thirteen ASEAN member states participated in the UN
General Assembly negotiations leading to the adoption of the text of the TPNW in July 2017, withall but one voting for its adoption. Nine ASEAN members states have signed the treaty, of whichfour have ratified to date, including Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. All Pacific Island membersof the South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone supported the adoption of the treaty text, andseven (including New Zealand) have signed or acceded to the treaty.
It may be thought that none of this matters in regional diplomacy, but that may well not be thecase. The three Nuclear Supporting Countries are almost wholly isolated from their regional
neighbours in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands. This division from neighbours is especially
important for Australia and Japan, which have both sought closer relationships with Southeast
Asia, and which both have spoken of the need for closer relationships with Pacific Island states in
the face of increasing strategic competition for regional dominance from China.
Dialogue in the region faces a suite of issues and problems regarding movement of the treaty
towards institutionalisation as a regime. All of these issues have regional dimensions. The
effectiveness of regional dialogues about the TPNW will be affected by the following:•

the nuclear ban treaty as rebellion against global nuclear hegemony;•decisions regarding proposals of basing dialogue about the TPNW on a claimed primacyof the Non-Proliferation Treaty;•

debates about the path forward: stigmatisation vs. devaluing and delegitimating nuclear
weapons;•

the critical counterfactual: Can we imagine a Threshold Nuclear Disarming State?

•debates on Nuclear Supporting States and Extended Nuclear Deterrence;•

the regional obstacles to treaty compliance posed by globally distributed systems of
nuclear command, control, communication and intelligence;•a universal human interest in having in place by the time a threshold nuclear disarming
state appears on the horizon a comprehensive verification regime which will be ‘fit for
purpose’ in the circumstances that will prevail at that point—and beyond; and507

Hope Becomes Law: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the Asia-Pacific Region•

the importance of the inclusion of Pacific Island states in regional dialogue about the
TPNW.

The Treaty as Rebellion Against Global Nuclear Hegemony
As noted in section 1, for the past half century, the dominant framework for discussion of nuclear
disarmament has been the division of the parties to the 1968 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty into
two groups recognized under the NPT: Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs) and Non-Nuclear
Weapons States (NNWSs). This NPT division of the world’s states has long been seen as
unsatisfactory, beginning with the refusal in the 1960s by India in particular, then without nuclear
weapons, to join the treaty on the grounds that the NWS/NNWS division amounted to an
illegitimate regime of global nuclear apartheid. The exit of the DPRK from the treaty, and therefusal of subsequently nuclear-armed India, Pakistan, and Israel to join the treaty, have deeply
compromised the treaty’s putative distinction on the basis of ‘recognized’ nuclear weapons
possession. It is a mark of the hegemonic power of the NPT’s framework that its terms of that
distinction have acquired an assumed legitimacy and discursive efficacy well beyond the treaty. 12
Following the entry of the TPNW into force it is more useful to frame global discussions about
nuclear weapons in terms of the division of the world into three main groupings:•

the Nuclear Possessing States (NPSs), made up of the five Nuclear Weapons States‘recognized’ under the NPT plus the other four nuclear-armed states;•

the currently thirty-plus Nuclear Supporting States (NSSs) composed mainly of those
asserting the legitimacy of reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence; and•the largest group, the Nuclear Ban Treaty States (NBTS).

12 In October 2016 ICAN spokesperson Tim Wright made this point in an eloquent critique of the United Kingdom’s

claim to responsible nuclear possession and adherence to the NPT while modernizing its nuclear strike force. The
NPT, Wright argued rightly, ‘is not a licence for five nations to retain nuclear weapons in perpetuity. It does notconfer any legitimacy on their weapons.’ Tim Wright, ‘Do no harm: ban nuclear weapons now’, International
Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons. On nuclear hegemony, see Peter Hayes, ‘Trump and the Interregnum of
American Nuclear Hegemony, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 219-237; and Nick
Ritchie, 'Waiting for Kant: devaluing and delegitimizing nuclear weapons', International Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3(2014), pp. 601–623; and Nick Ritchie, ‘A hegemonic nuclear order: Understanding the Ban Treaty and the power
politics of nuclear weapons’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 40, No. 4, (2019), pp. 409-434.

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WMD in Asia-PacificWhatever the disdainful disregard of the ‘entirely unserious’ 13 ban treaty by the Nuclear
Possessing States and the Nuclear Supporting States, the ban treaty will establish a United Nationsauspiced legal regime based on the presumption of the fundamental illegitimacy and prohibitionof development, testing, production, stockpiling, stationing, transfer, use, and threat of use of
nuclear weapons, and also assistance and encouragement to such prohibited activities.
Nick Ritchie and Kjølv Egeland summarized the rationale behind the concentration on the treaty’s
capacity to reshape the frameworks of nuclear weapons discourse:‘From a theoretical perspective, the purpose of these discursive shifts was to transform thesubjectivities of core actors, which is a central feature of productive power. While the nonnuclear-armed states would be redefined from passive or “subaltern” bystanders to active
stakeholders in humanitarian diplomacy, the nuclear-armed states (especially the NPT
NWSs) would be recast from “responsible nuclear sovereign” entitled to practice nuclear
deterrence to irresponsible possessors of uncivilised weapons of mass destruction.’ 14
The coming expanded nuclear policy debate is about the establishment of norms and practices
derived from the treaty and resistance to such processes.15 As expressed trenchantly and elegantly
by Kjølv Egeland,'The supporters of the ban are aiming to replace the NPT’s distinction between nuclear
haves and have-nots with a distinction between nuclear civilizers and barbarians.’16
The US demarche to TPNW signatory states was extraordinary in its cavalier attitude to good faith
in international law by encouraging signatory states to ignore Article 17 of the treaty permitting
withdrawal only on the condition a state party‘decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty havejeopardized the supreme interests of its country.’

13 Briefing on Nuclear Ban Treaty by NSC Senior Director Christopher Ford, Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, 22 August 2017.
14 Nick Ritchie & Kjølv Egeland, ‘The diplomacy of resistance: power, hegemony and nuclear disarmament’, Global
Change, Peace & Security, vol. 30, no. 2 (2018), p. 132.
15 Nick Ritchie & Kjølv Egeland, ‘The diplomacy of resistance’.
16 Kjølv Egeland, 'Banning the Bomb: Inconsequential Posturing or Meaningful Stigmatization?', Global Governance,
Vol. 24, (2018), p. 18.

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But the US letter was also revealing in its repetition of US government-issued talking points
repeated over the past four years and echoed loyally by Nuclear Supporting States such as
Australia.17 A sample of such claims, most of which have been refuted effectively, would include:•‘The TPNW undermines the Non-Proliferation Treaty.’•‘The TPNW has weaker nuclear safeguards than the Non Proliferation Treaty.’•‘The TPNW disregards the need for verification of disarmament by Nuclear
Weapons States.’•‘The TPNW is incompatible with alliance by Non-Nuclear Weapons State
countries with Nuclear Weapons States.’•‘The day after the TPNW comes into force, there will be just as many nuclear
weapons as there are now.’•‘No state possessing nuclear weapons has signed the treaty—or is ever likely to
do so.’•‘The TPNW and its supporters are creating divisions in the global arms control
and disarmament community.’•‘The TPNW undermines democratic open societies which are committed totransparency about nuclear disarmament, and it protects autocratic andauthoritarian states that are secretive and repressive.’•‘Many states that voted to adopt the text of the TPNW in 2017 now have signers’
remorse: it will never come into force.’

All of these criticisms were aired during the 2017 UN General Assembly negotiations over the textof the TPNW—which, in regional terms, was supported by all but one of the ASEAN states andalmost all Pacific Island states. Further, almost all have either been disproved by the TPNW’s shorthistory to date (little signer’s remorse on display; the precondition for Entry into Force has
arrived); shown to be wilful misrepresentation (how many countries have countries has the NPT
disarmed?; the treaty clearly does not limit alliances with Nuclear Possessing States, justspecifically nuclear alliances); or shown to be simply self-serving (all Nuclear Possessing States

17 See for example, the similarity of the September 2020 letter to NATO, United States Non-Paper: “Defense

Impacts of Potential United Nations General Assembly Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty”; Note by the Secretary,’
AC/333-N(2016)0029 (INV), October 17, 2016, annex 2. f.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificare secretive and repressive when it comes to their nuclear weapons—just ask Mordechai Vanunu).
There are indeed several valid concerns, along with continued misunderstandings, about some
aspects of the treaty, which are discussed below, but most of the list above are now a matter ofunwarranted repetition of debunked claims.
In this year of pandemic, the number of countries that have ratified the treaty under such conditions
is striking: Belize, Botswana, Fiji, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica, Lesotho, Malaysia, Namibia,
Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Tuvalu. That these countries, some ofwhich are relatively small and almost all of which face economic and climatic difficulties, shouldhave taken on the burden of ratification under the added weight of the pandemic suggests a measureof determination on the part of the less powerful of the world’s governments to move the ban treaty
into law. Together with the near universal signing of the treaty by the countries of the Associationof Southeast Asian nations and of the Pacific Island Forum, this pattern suggests there is fertile
ground for proactive dialogue in the Asia-Pacific, in the first instance between government andcivil society organizations from the Nuclear Ban Treaty Supporting States and Nuclear Supporting
States.

Two Key Choices on the Pathway to TPNW Universalization
With the entry of the TPNW into force both proponents and opponents of the treaty enter into a
new strategic setting. There are issues of concern to both sides about how to proceed, and some ofthem are potentially difficult. Two of those issues concern the starting points for ongoing dialogueeach side commonly proposes, both of which require serious thought before the longterm
framework for dialogue is firmly set.
One issue is how to discuss the relationship between the NPT and TPNW: whether the basis ofnegotiations should be the primacy of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the foundation of
global regulation of nuclear weapons. Seeing the NPT as ‘the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime’ and therefore as the starting point for any dialogue on nuclear disarmament
leads some critics of the TPNW into difficulty. To be clear, I believe an assessment of the NPT
regime will conclude that for purposes of nuclear disarmament the Non-Proliferation Treaty iseffectively a dead letter. A simple ecumenical approach will not be productive for dialogue. But
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this is a matter on which reasonable people may differ, and positions on this issue may also shapeshift and differ in subtle but important ways depending on their stance, opening at least thepossibility of some common ground on which to pressure the nuclear-armed and umbrella states
to disarm and reduce nuclear war risk during the disarmament process rather than the current trendof nuclear armament and modernization and increased risk of nuclear war.
The second issue involves a concern with the common framing by proponents of the TPNW of thetreaty’s primary process as stigmatizing the states possessing nuclear weapons and their supportingstates. Clearly, nuclear weapons will continue to give rise to feelings of disgust and revulsion
amongst vast numbers of people, TPNW proponents will face a hard choice as they engage withthose committed to retaining nuclear weapons between continuing to focus primarily on
stigmatizing the admittedly pathological psychosocial aspects of nuclear weapons theory andpractice, versus concentrating on universalizing of the nuclear ban treaty less emotive but no lessexplicit strategies of devaluing and delegitimating nuclear weapons.
The rest of this section examines the contested terrain on the key issues that TPNW and nuclear
weapons advocates will fight to retain the political high ground in each country in the region,
although the degree to which each of these issues is salient in a given polity with their uniquegeopolitical circumstances, location in the world system, and geostrategic experience and related
key historical lessons derived from their histories, will vary. In presenting these arguments, I will
inflect the analysis with my own views on which position is valid and sound taking into accountthe fundamental goals of realizing human security and constructing a peaceful world that issustainable; but wherever one falls on each of these arguments—and readers are welcome to
substitute their own value judgements and views—I suggest that these issues will define the agendaof the debate in the region on the TPNW versus the nuclear status quo.

(a) The NPT is not a starting point for dialogue
Many critics of the TPNW argue that discussion and dialogue about the TPNW should be framedon the basis of the primacy of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the foundation of global

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WMD in Asia-Pacificregulation of nuclear weapons. 18 Insistence on the primacy of the NPT as starting point is often
accompanied by support for a range of arms control, nuclear security, and non-proliferation
measures. Like the NPT, these other measures are based on an explicit or implicit presumption oflegitimacy of nuclear weapons. In fact, it will be important to distinguish between the insistenceon the primacy of the NPT and support for other arms control and nuclear security measures.
There are three fatal flaws to the primacy of the NPT argument.
There can be little objection to dialogues with supporters of the NPT as such, but given the almost
moribund state of NPT discussions in recent years, it would first be appropriate to cast a scepticaleye over the prospects of anything productive emerging from the postponed 2020 NPT Review
Conference, now due to convene in April of next year. There was little evidence of that before its
postponement. The past two decades of NPT RevCons have featured many promises but shown
little or no actual progress or achievement—and certainly none on nuclear disarmament as requiredof the Nuclear Weapons States and their supporters by the NPT’s wholly ignored Article 6. The
NPT is not dead, but there is little likelihood of substantial reform, even just in the form of making
good on the promises of RevCons past. No governments in the Asia-Pacific, (and certainly not the
government of Australia, the regional country most supportive of and hardwired into US nuclear
planning), have shown any serious and sustained commitment to the root and branch proactive
policy renewal process that would be need to make good on the very limited commitments of
RevCons past, let alone the level of globally coordinated effort needed to revivify the NPT. 19

18 Two of the strongest cases for the primacy of the NPT that I know of are by John Carlson and by Allan Behm. See

John Carlson, ‘The 2020 NPT Review Conference and the TPNW factor’, in Viatcheslav Kantor (ed.), Arms Control:
Burden of Change, (International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, 2019), pp. 86-100;
Carlson, ‘Is the NPT Still Relevant? – How to Progress the NPT’s Disarmament Provisions’, Journal for Peace andNuclear Disarmament, vol. 2, no. 1, (2019) pp. 97-113; and Allan Behm, ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference: It’s time to revive a struggling treaty’, The Australia Institute, forthcoming; and Allan Behm, ‘Extended
Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World’, NAPSNet Special Reports, 15 October 2020. It
should be noted that both Carlson and Behm, both experienced in arms control, and disarmament issues within
Australian government roles and beyond, indicate that the level of governmental commitment needed to impel
the reforms of the NPT they urge as essential are very difficult to foresee under current circumstances. Behm: ‘The
problem is that the non-proliferation edifice is essentially a façade resting on a single corner, and that corner iscrumbling. The question that faces the parties to the NPT is whether they want to strengthen the edifice – and thecornerstone – or whether they are prepared to see the NPT go the way of the New-START – desuetude. Either way,
there is much at stake.’ Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World’, p. 17.
19 See John Carlson, ‘Is the NPT Still Relevant?’ and Allan Behm, ‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review
Conference’.

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Secondly, leaving aside the severe limitations of the NPT deriving from the its recognition of five‘approved’ Nuclear Possessing States, there is no indication of a viable route for the four non-NPT
Nuclear Possessing States to enter the NPT regime.
Lastly, and most fundamentally in relation to the TPNW, over the more than fifty years of thetreaty’s existence the five Nuclear Possessing States ‘recognized’ under that treaty have shown noserious willingness to meet their disarmament obligations under Article 6. Half a century isenough: that route is most unlikely to open.
Of course, action to support nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear weapons security, and arms control
are almost always commendable and helpful, but it must be remembered that such initiatives are
distinct from nuclear disarmament and do not function as a substitute for it.
And the situation on nuclear arms regulation is more serious than many critics of the TPNW
recognize. Nuclear arms control is now virtually an endangered species. As Alexey Arbatov put it
in a recent review of the ‘the disintegration of arms control,’‘The world’s ability to muddle through the next phase of international tensions without amajor crisis, and to prevent such a crisis from escalating to nuclear Armageddon, is in
doubt.’20
Every Nuclear Possessing State is committed to ‘modernization’ of their nuclear arsenal, and the
Nuclear Supporting States of the Asia-Pacific are not only not demurring but, in the case of theregional major allies of the United States, are tightening their alliance links, nuclear and otherwise.
Contemporary mainstream reformist policy approaches to nuclear weapons based on the NPT andfading memories of a Golden Age of Arms Control are anaemic, and their likelihood of near-term
major success implausible. To then set the framework of necessary dialogue as one between
supporters of the NPT and supporters of the TPNW seems constraining rather than productive, andnot assistive to discussions of more serious problems facing the universalization and efficacious
institutionalization of the TPNW.

20 Alexey Arbatov, 'Mad Momentum Redux? The Rise and Fall of Nuclear Arms Control', Survival: Global Politics andStrategy, 61, (3): 7-38, (June–July 2019) .

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WMD in Asia-Pacific(b) Devaluing and delegitimating nuclear weapons versus stigmatization
For many proponents of the nuclear ban treaty its immediate utility as international law would be
its norm-forming capability, especially a capacity to stigmatize the use and possession of nuclear
weapons. Egeland’s quotation above epitomizes the positive version of that thought of thenecessity and utility of stigmatization as a key campaigning resource.
Disgust and revulsion from the use or prospect of use of nuclear weapons are entirely
understandable and likely be increasingly unavoidable, and it is hard to deny the role of such
revulsion impelling people towards action on nuclear weapons.21 However, there are reasons to beconcerned about a strategy for universalization of the TPNW based primarily on an uncriticalheightening of stigmatization of nuclear weapons in international society. It may be wise to avoid
a strategy primary based on the trope of stigmatization and its practice for two reasons.
Firstly, stigmatization is not a simple matter of ‘socializing’ a passive transgressive state into apreferred norm, as at least two leading researchers on stigmatisation emphasize. The stigmatization
strategy draws on work over a number of years pointing to revulsion with nuclear weapons as amotivation for opposing their possession and more particularly their use in war. Nina
Tannenwald’s work on the origins and dynamics of the taboo on the use of nuclear weapons hasemphasized the role of the stigma attached to nuclear weapons as a key support for a nuclear taboo,and conversely as an impetus to USgovernment officials to overcome restraints on U. nuclear
weapons use deriving from that stigma. 22
Basing her work on stigma in international society on Erving Goffman’s classic 1965 book Stigma:
Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, Rebecca Adler-Nissen also emphasizes thenormality of stigma in international society, which, she argues is

21 And of course, it is important for supporters of the TPNW to recognize that many serious proponents of nuclear

deterrence as a foundation of global security also feel the same disgust with the prospect of actual use of theweapons in war if deterrence fails. Self-righteousness can be an occupational hazard of peace campaigners.
22 Nina Tannenwald, 'Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo', International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4(Spring 2005), pp. 5–49; Nina Tannenwald, ‘How Strong Is the Nuclear Taboo Today?’, The Washington Quarterly,Vol. 41, No. 3, (2018), pp. 89-109; and Nina Tannenwald, ‘The Great Unravelling: The Decline of the Nuclear
Normative Order’, in Nina Tannenwald and James M. Acton, Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age,(American Academy of Arts and Sciences, April 2018), pp. 6-31. But note also William Walker, 'The absence of ataboo on the possession of nuclear weapons', Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, (2010), pp. 865–876.

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Hope Becomes Law: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the Asia-Pacific Region‘in part constructed through the stigmatization of “transgressive” and norm-violating states
and their ways of coping with stigma.’
Adler-Nissen cautions against the widespread misunderstanding that sees international society
founded solely on common values and norms. Stigma plays a more complex role than is often
acknowledged in some constructivist accounts of states passively absorbing norms through simple
processes of ‘internalization.’ States reacting to stigma or experiencing it are active agents.
Most importantly, Adler-Nissen argues, the potency of stigma can be diminished or avoided
through positive action by the stigmatized, especially when they hold the means and power toreframe negative discourses to their advantage:‘Stigmatized states may strategically cope with their stigma, and may, in some cases,
challenge and even transform a dominant moral discourse.’ 23
Historically one important and salient example in the Asia-Pacific has been the ability of theUnited States to slough off the historical stigma of the first use of nuclear weapons throughcensorship of the human consequences in Japan and construction of a counter-narrative of thenecessity for nuclear first use to ‘end the war’ in the Pacific, contested though that highly effective
account may be from the margins of power. 24
A second reason for caution is that stigmatization, even when it is not simply a discursive tool ofthe powerful against the weak or out-groups, almost always involves at least potential or incipientdehumanization and violence. In contemporary international society Mr. Trump is an adept fromwhom other authoritarian world leaders have learned, and who himself has learned from them. All
nuclear deterrence policy must presume and robustly prepare for the use of nuclear weapons inwar. In practice nuclear deterrence will always involve what we call, when in the hands ofgovernments we dislike, the intent to use weapons of mass destruction, and which should more
properly be regarded in all cases as actions on a genocidal scale. Such deterrence discourses, to be

23 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, ‘Stigma Management in International Relations - Transgressive Identities, Norms, andOrder in International Society’, International organization, Vol. 68, (Winter 2014), pp. 143-176.
24 A second relevant example is that of Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons, a fact ‘politely’ not mentioned inpublic by the United States and its allies in a highly effective fig leaf deflection of stigma of Israel.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificpolitically successful, necessarily start from psychosocial processes of dehumanization of theadversary—those in Judith Butler's useful reminder, whose lives are 'not grievable.'25
Rather than founding the path towards the universalization of the nuclear ban treaty on unreflective
and possibly counter-productive strategies of stigmatizing nuclear weapons, the safer and morerichly generative alternative, as a number of researchers have argued, is to pursue strategies
of devaluing nuclear weapons in defense strategies and delegitimating the possession and use of
nuclear weapons. These two latter strategies are distinct in concept and requirement, and while notopposed, lead to the need for quite different suites of dialogue partners.
De-valuing nuclear weapons involves dialogue and debate with security community
practitioners who support nuclear possession for deterrence and war-fighting, to explore andidentify•

the limits of the military utility of nuclear weapons;•

the counter-productive consequences of their use; and to•develop alternative—and sustainable—non-nuclear security doctrines and practices.

On the other hand, de-legitimating nuclear weapons involves engaging in strategic, political, legal,
and moral discourses involving nuclear weapons to challenge and then vitiate claims of legitimacy
for the use, possession, preparation for use, and assistance for and inducement to use nuclear
weapons. In Nick Ritchie’s words, delegitimation involves‘exposing the divergence of nuclear weapons practices and values from justifiable rules,consent, legal precedent, and the principle of equality.’26
A starting point is to recognize that virtually all existing international law on nuclear weapons
prior to the TPNW explicitly or implicitly legitimizes the right of certain countries to possess anduse nuclear weapons, regardless of the opinions—and the likely fate—of the majority of theworld’s countries. Once the claim of the fundamental illegitimacy of nuclear weapons is posed

25 Judith Butler, Frames of war: when is life grievable? Verso, 2009. Butler also reminds us of the ‘media framing’ of‘who is grievable’ and who are to be the officialised targets of stigmatisation characterising public discourse theUnited States under the Trump administration. See also Judith Butler, The Force of Nonviolence, Penguin Random
House, 2020.
26 Nick Ritchie, 'Waiting for Kant’, p. 56.

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Hope Becomes Law: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the Asia-Pacific Region
systematically, the discussion of why that state of barely registered méconnaissance in the face ofan inherently genocidal existential situation should be tolerated can be discussed openly. 27 Ritchiesuggests delegitimation practices will involve‘withdrawal of popular consent, changing the legal validity of the possession and use of
nuclear weapons, and demonstrating that current nuclear practices and power relations do
not reflect justifiable rules based on shared beliefs prevalent in society—in our case global
society.’28
Both approaches—devaluing nuclear weapons and delegitimating nuclear weapons—can andshould involve both state and civil society agents, at global, regional, and national levels, and will
involve construction of new transnational epistemic and moral communities. 29 Challenges to boththe military utility of nuclear weapons and to the presumptive right of both Nuclear Possessing
States and their dependent Nuclear Supporting States to risk nuclear next use are—in appropriately
diplomatic phrasing—useful frames for regional dialogue between regional TPNW supportingstates and Nuclear Supporting States.
The NPT, as ‘the foundation of nuclear restraint’ in existing international law aimed at regulating
nuclear weapons, has in fact been the most enduring discursive legitimation for the ongoingpossession and use of nuclear weapons, and even then is silent on the four non-NPT Nuclear
Possessing States and likely to remain so. 30

27 Nick Ritchie, 'Waiting for Kant’; Nick Ritchie, ‘A hegemonic nuclear order’; and Ken Berry, Patricia Lewis, Benoit

Pélopidas, Nikolai Sokov and Ward Wilson, Delegitimizing nuclear weapons: examining the validity of nuclear
deterrence, (Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2010). Paradoxically, contrary to its title, Berry et alprovides one of the best reviews devaluing the utility of nuclear weapons.
28 Nick Ritchie, 'Waiting for Kant’, p. 55.
29 See in particular the work of Nick Ritchie.
30 Anna Hood, 'Questioning International Nuclear Weapons Law as a Field of Resistance', in J. L. Black-Branch and
D. Fleck (eds.), Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law - Volume V - Legal Challenges for Nuclear Security
and Deterrence, (Springer, 2020), pp. 11-30; Nick Ritchie, ‘A hegemonic nuclear order’; and Peter Hayes, ‘Trump
and the Interregnum of American Nuclear Hegemony’.

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Can We Imagine a Threshold Nuclear Disarming State?
A common theme of criticism of the TPNW is that the Nuclear Possessing States took no part in
the TPNW negotiations, and that there is no likelihood of any such state joining the treaty. 31
Let us assume, for the purposes of argument, that the current tide of nuclear proliferation is arrested
in its present situation of nine Nuclear Possessing States. Is it absurd to expect any state thatpossesses nuclear weapons would willingly enter into a process of giving them up? The historical
record, to some extent, answers ‘No, it is not absurd,’ pointing at least to the South African caseand to the case of Ukraine. But these two cases are undoubtedly somewhat ‘special cases’—apartheid South Africa in the brink of collapse ensuring its successor majority regime did notpossess nuclear weapons, and Ukraine independent from the former Soviet Union rejecting
continued possession of its inherited but not fully controllable nuclear arsenal in favor of an
explicit non-nuclear status in return for security guarantees. Furthermore, for the sake of clarifying
the argument let us leave aside the fading hopes that the DPRK will one day be persuaded to trade
its nuclear weapons for guarantees of regime survival, security, and financial reward. 32
The critical question is whether there is any reason to think any major Nuclear Possessing State
would voluntarily relinquish its nuclear weapons by seeking to accede to the TPNW? All thinking
through of question of this kind (both con as well as pro) involves a consideration of counterfactuals—the essential but forbidden fruit of social inquiry as Richard Ned Lebow called them.
The United Kingdom is a difficult but plausible candidate. Britain is always distinctive among the
Nuclear Possessing States insofar as it is highly dependent on the United States for its nuclear
weapon system. So extensive is this dependence on the United States that the United Kingdom isbest understood as a client nuclear state of the United States. 33

31 For a recent example see George Percovich, ‘Living with the Nuclear Prohibition Treaty: First, Do No Harm’,Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 November 2020.
32 William Walker’s point about the differences of each of the Nuclear Possessing States paths to that condition
applies particularly to the DPRK. Not only has it a state that has ‘suspended’ its membership of the NPT, but it isalso distinguished by three decades of U.S. and allied attempts to bring the DPRK to voluntarily relinquish its
nuclear weapons. This remains the U.S. objective and guiding principle.
33 The UK is dependent on the U.S. for the leased Trident II D5 missiles to be launched from on its submarines; theAnglicized W76-1 warhead and Mk4/4A re-entry vehicle designed at Los Alamos National Laboratory andmanufactured at Pantex, the General Dynamics Fire Control System, and the MC4700 arming, fuzing, and firing

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At the beginning of the 21st century, Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker set out an argument
to the effect that a successful Scottish independence project would quite possibly render thecontinuation of the United Kingdom’s submarine-based nuclear capacity impractical, mainly forreasons of geography.34 The United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent force of submarines is based at
Faslane in Scotland near Glasgow, with a large nuclear munitions facility at nearby Coulport, andthe ascendant Scottish National Party is committed to closing both bases. Practical options foralternative basing in what would be the remains of the United Kingdom (rUK) are highly
constrained by geography and political considerations.35 It may well be that the government would
have to consider the option of basing its UK nuclear deterrence force in the United States at Kings
Bay, Georgia.36
Since Chalmers and Walker opened discussion of the possible impact of Scottish independence
two decades ago the structural coherence of the United Kingdom has been considerably
undermined, and the probability of Scottish independence heightened, not least by the combined
consequences of Brexit and the pandemic, to say nothing of the fiscal distress of the UK
government. Moreover, in the intervening years the United Kingdom held a surprisingly wideranging public debate on the modernization of its nuclear weapons capacity through the renewalof the Trident missile submarine force. A range of views were represented, including
acknowledgement by defense specialists of difficulties that will be caused by the great cost of
Trident renewal for the United Kingdom’s capacity to participate in global conventional operations
in future US-led multilateral intervention coalitions.

system built at the Sandia National Laboratory (operated by Lockheed Martin). See Nick Ritchie, Attachment 1, ‘USUK Special Relationship’, Written testimony to the House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Sixth Report on
Global Security: UK-US Relations, 18 March 2010,https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaff/114/114we12.htm.
34 Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker, ‘The United Kingdom, Nuclear Weapons and the Scottish Question’ The
Non-Proliferation Review, 9, 1, Spring 2002, 1-15; William Walker, 'The UK, threshold status and responsible
nuclear sovereignty', International Affairs 86: 2 (2010) 447–464; Hugh Chalmers and Malcolm Chalmers,‘Relocation, relocation, relocation’, RUSI Occasional Paper, August 2014; and Ian Jack, ‘Trident: the British
question’, The Guardian, 11 February 2016. See also William Walker, ‘Trident's Replacement and the Survival of
the United Kingdom’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 5, (2015), pp. 7-28;
35 The Scottish government has used the ‘RUK’ abbreviation to refer to a possible future ‘rest of UK’ country or its
government. Jack uses the term ‘rUK’. Chalmers and Chalmers reviewed alternative nuclear submarine homeport
options in detail, arguing that the naval base at Devonport in southern England and Milford Sound in Wales would
be the most likely candidates. Both would present the rUK government with considerable relocation difficulties toovercome.
36 William Walker, ‘Trident's Replacement’ and the Survival of the United Kingdom’, pp. 20, 25, and 28.

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WMD in Asia-PacificComing to power abruptly in July 2016 in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit referendum Prime
Minister Theresa May terminated the Trident renewal debate immediately and authorized thenuclear renewal program. That now seems a long time ago, and it is useful to consider what would
have happened if that debate about the renewal of Trident was taking place in the United Kingdom
under the current circumstances. Much has happened since then to exacerbate strains on Britain’s
identity as a sovereign nuclear power, along with the fiscal and domestic political capability tomaintain a claim to such a role. The still developing Covid-19 pandemic, and in particular theaccompanying perceived functional shrinking of the UK government into ‘the government ofEngland’ on the core matter of health, clearly strengthens the likelihood of another Scottish
independence referendum, with a strong chance of electoral success. Given the compounding
pressures of the present conjuncture on the United Kingdom structurally, fiscally, and in terms ofidentity, it is reasonable to suggest that there would be a much greater weight leaning in the
direction of a negative decision on Trident renewal.
None of this narrative of future possibility is certain. Whether in the event of a successfulreferendum a post-independence Scotland would make good on SNP’s commitment to close theScottish nuclear bases is obviously uncertain, as would be the reaction of the rump UK/English
government to such moves. And even more uncertain would be the response of other governments,
including the other NATO nuclear powers of the United States and France. Nuclear establishments,
especially so closely tied to maintenance of post-imperial status, do not give way without a great
conflict.37
However, the claim, commonly heard in mocking terms from opponents of the TPNW, that it is
impossible to seriously imagine any Nuclear Possessing State of consequence moving to the statusof a Threshold Nuclear Disarming State is simply unsupportable. It may well not happen, but thefrequent denial of a realistic possibility reflects a worrying element of compulsive insistence on
the untested immutability of the global nuclear order. The TPNW as a politico-legal project ofregime formation is rooted in the possibility of such a plausible, though by no means certain, future
development, and provides the foundations of a legal and institutional pathway to the realizationof such a shift in the global order.

37 William Walker, 'International reactions to the Scottish referendum', International Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4, (2014);

and Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker, ‘The United Kingdom, Nuclear Weapons and the Scottish Question’.

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As a result, confirmation of the plausibility of a counter-factual that imagines a significant Nuclear
Possessing State considering nuclear disarmament renders the question of verification of national
disarmament programs more urgent than those who cannot imagine such a possibility willrecognize.
Walker’s views rest on the understanding that not only are the elements of support for nuclear
possession in any given state complex (and probably overdetermined), but that the nine Nuclear
Possessing States are quite distinct from each other than is suggested by the Nuclear Weapon Stateslabel. Drawing together a set of possible contributing elements in a Nuclear Possessing States,
Walker suggested an important research approach to the question of threshold nuclear disarming
states:‘It would be interesting to mount a research project to compare the “distances” of thenuclear-armed states from the disarmament threshold, as assessed in terms of capabilities,
strategies, regulation, identity fixation and institutional entrenchment, among otherthings.’38
These are not simply matters for disinterested researchers. If the TPNW is to have any utility it
must be based on a well-founded assessment of the future historical possibility of its primary
assumption: that there will be a Threshold Nuclear Disarming State, as a prelude to making it more
likely.
The appearance of a Threshold Nuclear Disarming State anywhere on the planet will in itself havea profound political impact, even with the likely uncertainty of whether it would then proceed
over the threshold. The United Kingdom’s nuclear relationship to the Asia-Pacific is now
essentially nil, although the strategic implications of its history of nuclear testing in Australia andKiribati and the Marshall islands continues. Yet even so, the appearance of a Threshold Nuclear
Disarming State even from distant Europe would mark a seismic shift in a region dominated fromthe dawn of the nuclear age by Nuclear Possessing States brazenly and energetically abjuring law
as a form of nuclear regulation.

38 Walker, 'The UK, threshold status and responsible nuclear sovereignty', p. 462.

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Nuclear Supporting States and Extended Nuclear Deterrence
Most currently Nuclear Supporting Countries are allies of the United States, and almost all of thesehave declaratory defense policies explicitly reliant on US extended nuclear deterrence. 39 Relianceby each of these countries on policies of extended nuclear deterrence would violate the TPNW
prohibition on encouragement or inducement to use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in Article
1(e) of the treaty:‘Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a
State Party under this Treaty.’
A government seeking to accede to the TPNW would need to abandon the policy of reliance in US
extended nuclear deterrence and provide convincing evidence to a TPNW Conference of theParties of repudiation of any non-public agreements or policy arrangements with the United Statesto the same effect.
Clearly, in the case of Asia-Pacific allies currently relying on US extended nuclear deterrence for
aspects of their defence—Australia, Japan, the ROK, and, defacto, Taiwan—repudiation of nuclear
deterrence would involve a great change in their strategic outlook, which would be very difficult
to imagine politically, and if it did occur, would involve considerable changes in defense andforeign policy. But conceptually, it is a comparatively straightforward matter. 40
Without pretending that such a policy would be politically straightforward to establish for any ofthese countries, this brief exploration suggests that once an Australian government was committed
to such a position, there might be relatively few obstacles to simply replacing the Extended Nuclear
Deterrence (END) policy with one of full self-reliance—unless the United States created such
obstacles. In practice removal of reliance on extended nuclear deterrence by an Australian
39 The standard list of recipients of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence consists of the 24 NATO allies that do notpossess nuclear weapons (i.e. excluding France and the UK), together with Japan, Korea, Australia, and de facto,
Taiwan. For an argument on the doubt that Australia is in fact an assured recipient of U.S. END, see Richard Tanter,‘“Just in Case”: Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Defense of Australia’, Pacific Focus, Vol. 26, No. 1 (April 2011).
40 See also see also Monique Cormier and Anna Hood, ‘Australia’s Reliance on U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence
under International Law’, Journal of International Law and International Relations, Vol. 13, No. 2, (2017), pp. 3-47;
and Monique Cormier, ‘Running Out of (Legal) Excuses: Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Era of the Prohibition
Treaty’, in Jonathan L. Black-Branch and Dieter Fleck (eds.), Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law Volume V, (Springer, 2020).

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government would be politically very difficult but more straightforward than for the other threeallies in East Asia. All would need to exit from any intergovernmental military or other defense
coordination bodies or institutions with the United States concerning the use or planning for useof US nuclear weapons. Exiting from nuclear institutional linkages would include any secondment
or embedding of defense personnel in United States nuclear-related military, bureaucratic, or
intelligence agency positions. This move would, in theory, be somewhat easier in the Australiancase because US extended nuclear deterrence arrangements with Australia are much more
nebulous, not to say uncertain, than in the East Asian cases.41 Not only are those countries closer
to nuclear threat than Australia, but Japan and the ROK have well developed bilateral nuclear
policy coordination bureaucratic and military structures akin to the NATO Planning Group, which
Australia does not. 42
For campaigners for the universalization of the ban treaty, these Nuclear Supporting Countries
with declaratory policies of reliance on extended nuclear deterrence are probably the primarytargets of the next phase of their work. Experience with the United States response to the New
Zealand repudiation of reliance on extended nuclear deterrence culminating in the passage of the
New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act (1987) suggests the UnitedStates would likely take a similar political approach to any of these countries following New
Zealand and joining the TPNW. In order to limit ‘contagion’ the United States would seek to claimthat such an act would be a violation of what was called in the New Zealand case—incorrectly—
the ‘global indivisibility of extended nuclear deterrence.’
One other issue closely related to calls for US allies that are Nuclear Supporting States to abandon
extended nuclear deterrence in order to join the TPNW has been raised on a number of occasions.
The matter was recently raised on the occasion of the TPNW reaching the ratification requirement
for entry into force, echoing earlier comments by the US government and by critics of the TPNW.

41 On the nebulous, not to say imaginary, characteristics of nature of Australian reliance on U.S. Extended nuclear

deterrence, see Tanter, ‘“Just in Case”’, and in particular, Allan Behm: ‘Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear
Deterrence in a Pandemic World’, NAPSNet Special Reports, 15 October 2020: ‘Extended nuclear deterrence
theory has gradually morphed into a kind of deterrence theology – a belief system founded on a codified set ofindemonstrable doctrines’ (p. 20).
42 See Christine Leah, Australia and the Bomb, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014; and Tanter, ‘“Just in Case.”’524

WMD in Asia-Pacific
Matthew Harries of the International Institute of Strategic Studies summarized the issue in 2017as one of the unfairness and folly of using democratic means to achieve nuclear disarmament indemocratic states, while authoritarian Russia is immune to any comparable domestic pressures:‘The problem is that, when one moves past abstract principles to what the ban will actually
do in practice, the target of the treaty is clear: intentionally or not, it is an attack on the
nuclear-armed democracies—the United States, in particular—and their allies to the nearexclusive benefit of Russia and China... If I were a Russian policymaker, I would beenthusiastically cheering on the ban movement in private, while maintaining anappropriately scornful tone in public.’
Harries is correct that one of the targets of ban treaty supporters is the reliance of US allies on
assurances of extended nuclear deterrence, both in Europe and Asia. Here Harries is following theargument put forward forcefully by the United States ‘Non-Paper’ of October 2016 on ‘Defense
Implications of Potential United Nations General Assembly Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty,’ sent
to all NATO member countries, urging them to boycott the treaty negotiations. 43 Like Harries, theNon-Paper correctly identifies the implications of a treaty as envisaged by its main proponents as
being deeply inimical to the what the United States has at times called ‘the global indivisibility ofextended nuclear deterrence.’ George Perkovich recently updated the argument as Russia‘continues to add to its nuclear arsenal and repertoire of coercion and interference in the internalaffairs of NATO countries.’:‘Thus, the Hippocratic question is whether and how champions of the TPNW could avoid
the harm of rewarding Russian intransigence and penalizing NATO states’ adherence todemocratic norms of free association and lobbying.’
The essential arguments are that peace and the security of democracies in Europe depends on theviability of US extended nuclear deterrence, which the ban will erode, and that the effects of thecoming treaty regime will be imbalanced because it will do nothing to eliminate Russian (and, by

43 George Perkovich, ‘Living with the Nuclear Prohibition Treaty: First, Do No Harm’, Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, 12 November 2020; United States Non-Paper: “Defense Implications of Potential United
Nations General Assembly Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty”, Committee on Proliferation, NATO, 17 October 2016;
and Matthew Harries, ‘The Real Problem With a Nuclear Ban Treaty’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
15 March 2017.

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implication, Chinese) nuclear weapons, while undermining the delicate nuclear policy consensus
achieved by the democratic states. Such a claim assumes that the stigmatizing effects the treaty
proponents intend the treaty to generate have no follow-on effects on such countries or theirstrategic environment.
The ‘Hippocratic’ line of attack—‘first, do no harm’—has a fundamental moral problem in so far
as it necessarily defends the right of use of nuclear weapons for defence: nuclear deterrence policy
must presume a willingness to use nuclear weapons in war if it is to function effectively. Thischarge is a rerun of 1980s arguments about the impossibility of what was then analyzed in termsof a requirement for multilateral disarmament over unilateral disarmament. Moreover, it brings a
distinctly American perspective to NATO and its nuclear operations.
Perkovich outlines the basic argument by applying it not only to US extended nuclear deterrence
as such in Europe but—specifically to its most dangerous component—the ‘nuclear-sharing’
arrangements that has 150 U.S. B-61 nuclear weapons prepositioned on airbases of Belgium,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey. This blunt defense of nuclear-sharing is surprising, sincein earlier work Perkovich showed a more constructive analytical approach to the question of how
countries with END policies should go about assessing their desirability. 44 Percovich helpfully
suggested three questions, somewhat different from his more recent approach:•

What are the actual threats to Australia against which extended nuclear deterrence isinvoked?

•What are the probabilities attached to such threats?

•

Where threats are deemed to be actionable with nuclear response, what alternative
responses or means of addressing the issue exist or could be generated?

44 George Perkovich, ‘Extended deterrence on the way to a nuclear-free world’, Research Paper, International

Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (May 2009); and his comments in ‘Are theRequirements for Extended Deterrence Changing?’ Panel discussion at the 2009 Carnegie International
Nonproliferation Conference: The Nuclear Order – Build or Break (6 April 2009).

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
Here Perkovich provided a useful example of the strategy of constructing dialogue arounddevaluing the utility of nuclear weapons by making explicit and measurable the validity of claims
by Nuclear Supporting States as to the utility or otherwise of nuclear weapons.
Each of these arguments apply to the NATO non-nuclear states as a whole regarding END, as wellas to the five nuclear-sharing states. The ‘Hippocratic’ question also applies to the Asian Nuclear
Supporting States—Japan, the ROK, and Australia—with regard to China. A more useful approach
would be to start with Perkovich’s 2009 questions, separate out the evident folly of the nuclearsharing arrangements and locate the fundamental question of the desirability of NATO as a USled nuclear alliance in the broader questions of reconsideration of Europe’s autonomous foreignand defense policy requirements and capacities.
But, to return the earlier comments on extended nuclear deterrence and the TPNW, even if thepolitics of such a conceptually straightforward shift of policy away from reliance on extended
nuclear deterrence in Nuclear Supporting States seeking to accede to the TPNW are very difficult,they become much more difficult still when a second element in the prohibitions of Article 1(e) of
the TPNW is considered.

Globally Distributed NC3I: Obstacles to Compliance with the Prohibition on
Assistance
A small number of Nuclear Supporting Countries in the Asia-Pacific seeking to accede to the
TPNW face another and very significant obstacle to compliance with Article 1(e) of the treaty.
This obstacle is the prohibition of ‘assistance’ to any of the prohibited nuclear weapons activities
and the implications in the TPNW for compliance of command, control, communications, andintelligence (NC3I) systems that are critical enabling elements for nuclear attack planning andoperations. These systems are typically global in character, both in terms of distribution aroundthe world (and in space), and in the sense of network space.
Paul Bracken recently summarized the global geographic sense of the current NC3I situation as
follows:527

Hope Becomes Law: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the Asia-Pacific Region‘Nine countries now possess nuclear weapons. Five more countries (Germany, theNetherlands, Belgium, Italy, Turkey) have US nuclear weapons positioned on theirterritory. Other nations are so critically involved with US nuclear operations throughwarning, intelligence, and missile defense that for all practical purposes they are part of the
US NC3 system (Japan, the ROK, Australia, Taiwan). This gives at least eighteen countries
in total involved in nuclear or closely related NC3. Globally, no less than thirty six states
are directly or indirectly involved in the projection of nuclear threat against other states(namely, the U.S. and its NATO and Pacific allies, plus the other eight nuclear armed states,
all dependent in one way or another on nuclear command and control systems).’ 45
Four of these US allies lie within the Asia-Pacific, all Nuclear Supporting Countries, all of whichhave defense policies openly reliant on US extended nuclear deterrence, and all, as Bracken putsit, ‘part of the US NC3 system.’ Much less often discussed than in the need to repudiate extended
nuclear deterrence, the manner in which all four major US Asia-Pacific allies host elements of the
US NC3 system on their territory contradicts the prohibition in Article 1(e) on ‘assistance.’46
The issue of NC# systems and the TPNW can only be addressed productively on a foundation ofsubstantial research on systems such as those Bracken refers to, mainly, though not solely,concerning US systems, with an understanding of the technological and political integration of thenationally hosted nuclear-related elements into the US-constructed global assemblages.
Briefly, to take one regional example, Australia hosts several intelligence and military facilities
that contribute to US nuclear operations capability as elements of the US global nuclear command,
control, communications, and intelligence (NC3I) structures. These are juridically ‘joint’
Australian-US facilities operated, according to the Australian government, with the full knowledge
and concurrence of the Australian government. 47

45 This is of course, only a glimpse of Bracken’s concerns in his response to a large set of papers at a Nautilus

Institute workshop on NC3: ‘NC3 in A Multipolar Nuclear World: Big Structures And Large Processes’, NAPSNet
Special Reports, May 14, 2019. See also Peter Hayes, Binoy Kampmark, Philip Reiner, Deborah Gordon, ‘Synthesis
Report–NC3 Systems and Strategic Stability: A Global Overview’, NAPSNet Special Reports, 5 May 2019, andnumerous studies published as Nautilus Institute Special Reports in 2019.
46 I leave aside for the present the issues raised for compliance with Article 1(f).
47 To avoid misunderstanding, in the Australian case, these facilities are today joint in a real sense to a large extent.
In the paradigm case of the Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap in Central Australia discussed below, Australians makeup half of the work force, are present at all levels and all sections of the base, and fill the positions of deputy chief528

WMD in Asia-Pacific
In May 2018 a senior Australian official testified to a parliamentary committee that joining the
TPNW would be against Australia’s national interests, principally because of potential damage to
its alliance with the United States. This potential for damage, he argued, was in large part precisely
because of the nuclear-related elements of ‘joint’ Australia-US intelligence and military facilities
in Australia. The Australian government’s view is that the alliance is made up of‘many separate interlocking structures, understandings, agreements and joint activities andfacilities ... [that are] incompatible with the treaty,’
It is, the official averred,‘impossible, not practical, for Australia to restrict roles under the alliance to non-nuclear
missions.’48
Little further elaboration was provided on that or subsequent occasions.
In fact, such matters have rarely been explained to the Australian public in the six decades during
which the most important of these facilities have been in existence. On the face of it, the official’s
explanation was an extraordinary admission of an apparently willingly accepted integration ofAustralia into preparations for nuclear war and nuclear war-fighting, long hidden from theAustralian public.49

and other senior positions along with Americans. This is quite different from the situation at Pine Gap’s companion
station in the UK, RAF Menwith Hill, which can only be regarded as nominally ‘joint’. On the other hand if a facility
in Australia was built by the US, paid for by the US, and can only function as part of a U.S. globally distributed
technologically system, then it is best regarded as U.S. facility to which Australia has greater or lesser degrees ofaccess. See Desmond Ball, Bill Robinson, and Richard Tanter, Australia’s participation in the Pine Gap enterprise,
Nautilus Institute Special Report, 8 June 2016; and Richard Tanter, ‘Tightly Bound: Australia’s Alliance-Dependent
Militarization’, Global Asia, Spring 2018, Vol.13 No.1.
48 Mr. Richard Sadleir, First Assistant Secretary, International Security Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and
Dr John Kalish, Acting Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office. Extract from testimony
to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Estimates
Hearing, (31 May 2018), pp. 121-125.
49 The most prominent Australian analyst of these Australian nuclear-related facilities, Desmond Ball, frequently
described the way in which ‘American installations in Australia have always been the subjects of continued lack of
candour on the part of the United States and of extraordinary secrecy, evasion and deception on the part ofAustralian governments.’ Desmond Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia, Hale &Iremonger, 1980, p. 10. This was a view Ball maintained until his death in 2016. See also Tanter, The “Joint
Facilities” revisited – Desmond Ball, democratic debate on security, and the human interest, Special Report,
Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 12 December 2012. For a unique exploration of the place of Pine

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While this situation of claimed contradiction between Australia’s alliance obligations and therequirements of possible future compliance with the TPNW may appear to be of parochial
Australian concern, the implications for the countries surrounding it are no less significant andrarely discussed in regional dialogues. Prima facie, Australia could not be compliant with the treaty
unless it either closed the facilities with NC3I linkages in toto or verifiably removed the nuclearrelated elements of the bases.
However, the actual situation of the most important example identified both by the governmentand by its critics, the Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap near Alice Springs in Central Australia,
shows that the government’s blanket rejection of the TPNW because ‘it’s impossible, not practical’to comply with Article 1(e) should be put under scrutiny.
In broad terms, Pine Gap is one of the largest US intelligence facilities outside the United States,with three main functions. It serves firstly as a command, control, and data downlink ground station
to US signals intelligence satellites in geosynchronous orbits above the equator, collecting,monitoring, and downlinking for processing and analysis all manner of electronic emissions within
its satellites’ ‘footprints’ covering most of the earth’s surface from the mid-Pacific to eastern
Africa. Secondly, it carries out the reverse mode of signals collection, with ground antennas at
Pine Gap intercepting, monitoring, and analyzing downlinks from foreign communications
satellites in geosynchronous orbit. 50 Thirdly, it hosts a somewhat separate Relay Ground Stationthat downlinks data from another set of US satellites in geosynchronous orbit carrying large
infrared telescopes that detect the heat bloom of the launch of ballistic missiles to provide both
early warning of missile attack and to assist in the United States, Japanese, and South Korean
missile defence targeting. 51

Gap in Australia and its political culture, see Kieran Finnane, Peace Crimes: Pine Gap, National Security and Dissent,
University of Queensland Press, 2020.
50 Other activities at Pine Gap are of considerable importance to Southeast Asia, as shown clearly in the revelations
by Edward Snowden that Australia’s signals intelligence agency bugged the cell phones of the Indonesianpresident, his wife and other senior officials, and on other occasions intercepted the communications ofIndonesian trade official negotiating with the United States, and offered the product to the US. Pine Gap, alongwith other Australian listening stations made this possible. See the discussion in
Richard Tanter, ‘Indonesia, Australia and the Edward Snowden Legacy: Shifting asymmetries of power’, The Asia
Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 10, No. 3, 10 March 2014.
51 See the research papers on Pine Gap by Desmond Ball, Bill Robinson and Richard Tanter collected as The Pine
Gap Project. Ball and Tanter conducted a parallel research project on Japanese electronic intelligence and U.S.
electronic intelligence in Japan. The books and papers in that project are collected as The Japan SIGINT Project. For

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WMD in Asia-PacificPine Gap’s nuclear connections are multiple, but the most important and immediate way in which
hosting the facility would impede Australian compliance with the TPNW involves the Relay
Ground Station and its linkage to a number of large and powerful Overhead Persistent Infrared(OPIR) satellites. 52 The key salient fact for the TPNW is that the same infrared satellites thatprovide the United States with early warning of missile attack, and which are critical to US andJapanese missile defense, also in time of war provide US strategic nuclear planners withintelligence as to which adversary missiles silos have launched their missiles and are consequently
empty, and those which have not, and are consequently candidate US targets. The data downlinked
from the OPIR satellites is passed automatically through the Relay Ground System to the Mission
Control Station in Colorado in near real time to feed targeting plans of a US second nuclear strike.
To comply with the TPNW’s prohibition on assistance to nuclear weapons activities, an Australian
government would have to undertake one of three possible approaches to the Relay Ground Station
at Pine Gap. Pragmatically, the politically critical question for Australia in each case, after sevendecades of alliance deeply embedded into Australian political culture, is how treaty compliancecould be achieved without leading the United States to terminate the ANZUS mutual security
treaty. All three would be examples of what former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser
proposed as a judicious partial disentangling of Australia from elements of the United Statesalliance as an alternative to unquestioning acceptance of a specious automatic identity ofAustralian and United States strategic interests. 53
One approach would be to give notice to the United States requiring the closure of the entire base,i.e., both the two signals intelligence surveillance systems as well as the Relay Ground Station.
The approach of simply requiring the closure of the base as a whole would have the virtue ofcomprehensiveness, but it would also be very politically difficult to imagine, even in a

one approach to some of the nuclear war implications of that research see Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball, ‘Can a
Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?’ Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 56, No. 6, pp. 135-166, (2014). Thereis a separate question about the Harold E Holt Naval Communications Station at North West Cape which is alongstanding critical communication link to submerged U.S. submarines, historically including both strategicballistic missile submarines and nuclear-armed attack submarines. The extent to which this remains the case on
both counts is an ongoing research question.
52 Pine Gap is currently linked to both legacy Defense Support Program satellites and Space-Based Infra Red System(SBIRS) infrared satellites.
53 Malcolm Fraser, with Cain Roberts, Dangerous Allies, (Melbourne University Press, 2014); Malcolm Fraser,‘America: Australia’s Dangerous Ally’, The National Interest, 16 December 2014.

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counterfactual thought experiment of this kind. Leaving aside arguments about the utility toAustralia of access to the space-based and ground-based signals intelligence systems at the base,the US response would undoubtedly be drastic and would threaten the continuation of the allianceitself—which in Australian political culture would be deemed suicidal for mainstream politicalparties.
In a second, ‘reformist’ approach, the Australian government would have to request, and theUnited States to accept, verifiable binding legal, organizational, and technical limits on specificcategories of the operations of the Relay Ground Station. This second approach would involve
distinguishing ‘defensive’ functions of the OPIR system—primarily early warning of missile
attack from unarguably nuclear war-fighting RGS links and support for US retaliatory nuclear
missile strikes.54 For technical reasons to do with the automatic character of the RGS and remotecontrol of its operations from the United States (rather than at Pine Gap itself), the level of required
verification of operational separation by an Australian government would be almost impossible toachieve, to say nothing of the political obstacles.55
There is a third alternative, however, a more promising ‘reformist’ approach to bringing the Relay
Ground Station into compliance with the requirements of the ban treaty. This third approach isbased on existing redundant communications links the United States has built into its global OPIR
system of satellites and ground stations to guard against destruction of ground facilities like Pine
Gap in war. The existence of communications redundancy indicates a strategically viable andpolitically not wholly impossible pathway to compliance with the TPNW without necessarily
disrupting its alliance with the United States. 56

54 For clarity for the present, let us leave aside arguments as to whether RGS support for U.S. and Japanese missile

defence systems should be regarded as ‘defensive’ and not in inherently a matter of prohibited nuclear assistanceunder the TPNW.
55 These technical obstacles were recognised by defence officials at the time of Cabinet approval of theestablishment of the RGS in 1997. See Richard Tanter, ‘Hiding from the Light’; and Richard Tanter, ‘An Australianpathway through Pine Gap to the nuclear ban treaty’, Pearls & Irritations, 5 August 2019 [extended and footnotedversion].
56 All of Pine Gap’s OPIR satellites have satellite-satellite crosslinks and communications links to U.S. relay
satellites. These enable the crucial warning data to be transmitted from one to another and then downlinked to
the Mission Control Station on U.S. soil without ever relying on the Pine Gap RGS. In addition, U.S. OPIR satellites
themselves can and do downlink directly to dispersed mobile ground terminals in the US, as well as to U.S. combat
commands in around the world, such as South Korea. The RGS at Pine Gap – which is highly vulnerable to attack -532

WMD in Asia-PacificUnder this proposal an Australian government could give reasonable notice to the United Statesrequiring the closure of the Relay Ground Station and the removal of its systems from Pine Gap.
The remaining larger part of the base and its principal signals intelligence functions would be left
unaffected.57 In this situation, if the Australian government gave the United States appropriate
notice—say five years—the Relay Ground Station could be closed without significant detriment
to the performance of the OPIR systems or to genuine US national security interests—although
there would obviously be considerable political turbulence.
This sketch above outlining the strategic, technical, and political aspects of the choices facing an
Australian government seeking to comply with the assistance prohibitions of the TPNW has two
aims.
Firstly, a close examination of the Relay Ground Station’s technical aspects and military roles
suggests that while all of three pathways would be politically fraught, the third pathway shows that
the Australian government’s blanket claim that it would be ‘impossible, not practical for Australia
to restrict roles under the alliance to non-nuclear missions’ can be refuted in the most egregious
example of Australian assistance to prohibited nuclear activities. Of course, this proposal to close
only the RGS leaves questions about nuclear-related aspects of other parts of Pine Gap’s operations
to be scrutinized, but by demonstrating a plausibly viable pathway in the most important caseindicates a line of political and policy strategy against unexamined claims of ‘impossibility.’
And secondly, as Bracken’s survey of US NC3 activities suggests, these globally-distributed
facilities pose obstacles to compliance with the prohibition on assistance to nuclear missions for
major US allies in the Asia-Pacific more broadly, as well as in Europe.
The relevance of hosting NC3 elements is an unavoidable issue for the TPNW regime and its
supporters to consider, not just in several countries in this region, but in many other US allied
states.

provides redundant backup to both the cross-links and the mobile stations systems but is not in itself essential to
the OPIR system’s survival. See Richard Tanter, ‘An Australian pathway’.
57 In addition to Pine Gap’s Relay Ground Station the U.S. has constructed three redundant communication
systems for its DSP and SBIRS infrared satellites to link to their Mission Control Stations, including satellite-tosatellite crosslinks; satellite links to relay satellites; and satellite links to mobile ground stations in U.S. theatrecommands. See Tanter, ‘An Australian pathway’.

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Hope Becomes Law: The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the Asia-Pacific Region

A Verification Regime ‘Fit for Purpose’
The most common criticism of the TPNW has concerned verification. 58 One important line ofcriticism regards the TPNW as a step backwards from the achievement of reforms of safeguards
policy in the NPT. In particular these critics emphasize the absence in the TPNW of a binding
requirement on states parties to tighten safeguards on nuclear facilities by requiring accession to
the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol, rather than just requiring
adherence to the longstanding but less stringent IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
Supporters of the ban treaty argue that in fact only a small group of TPNW signatories to date havenot acceded to the Additional Protocol. Almost all are small states with very limited or no nuclear
energy facilities, for whom the issue is irrelevant in practical terms. As the Australian safeguards
specialist John Carlson has emphasized, however, there are at present three important exceptions
to the claim the Additional Protocol issue does not matter for the TPNW: Brazil, Argentina, andEgypt.
Brazil is a signatory to the ban treaty, and while Argentina and Egypt have not signed to date, allthree countries were active participants in the negotiations in the UN General Assembly leading
to the adoption of the treaty text in 2017. All three countries have expressed interest in nuclear
weapons in the past—Brazil and Argentina seriously. Some analysts are currently concerned about
Brazil’s nuclear-powered submarine program as a stalking horse for a weapons program.
After the fall of the military dictatorships in Brazil and Argentina the two countries formed theBrazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), which
has intrusive bilateral verification features somewhat comparable to the Additional Protocol. The
IAEA itself is a party to ABACC. Egypt has said it will sign the Additional Protocol if Israel does,

58 The most consistent and articulate critic in this region has been the Australian safeguards specialist John Carlson.

See, for example, John Carlson, ‘Nuclear Weapon Prohibition Treaty: A Safeguards Debacle’, Trust & Verify,(VERTIC), Issue 158, (Autumn 2018), pp. 1-6; and John Carlson, ‘The 2020 NPT Review Conference and the TPNW
factor’, in Viatcheslav Kantor (ed.), Arms Control: Burden of Change, (International Luxembourg Forum on
Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, 2019), pp. 86-100.

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WMD in Asia-Pacifica somewhat disingenuous explanation given that the accession of Israel to any NPT verificationagreement is a most unlikely event in the foreseeable future. These three cases undoubtedly remain
important to monitor very closely.59
However, there are two further problems with most verification attacks on the TPNW. One is thatthey often disregard or misconstrue the verification architecture of the TPNW and the framework
character of the treaty. The other, on the contrary, is that they may have too limited a sense of theverification challenges posed by the treaty, both in relation to treatment of Nuclear Possessing
States wishing to join the treaty and, most importantly, in the wide-ranging comprehensive
verification requirements over the necessary longue durée to ensure global confidence thatsuccessful covert reconstruction of a nuclear weapons capacity by a treaty breakout state will be
detected in a timely manner.
The verification architecture of the TPNW is properly understood as a design for‘an adaptive and flexible process to address future challenges, progressively expand its
scope and over time to include more member States, ultimately leading to the eliminationof nuclear weapons.’60
By design, the treaty has deferred precise detail of how claims by nuclear disarming states are to
be assessed for future consideration by the regular Conferences of the Parties (CoPs) specified in
the treaty. The importance of designation of the treaty’s appropriate ‘competent international
authority or authorities’ to develop ‘verified, time-bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear
weapon programs’ for disarmament verification was not ignored by the treaty’s formulators. The
two pathways outlined in Article 4 of the treaty (Eliminate weapons and then join, and Join and

59 ‘Status List’, Conclusion of Additional Protocols Status as of 18 September 2020, International Atomic Energy

Agency. On Brazil, Argentina and Egypt, see, for example Togzhan Kassenova, 'Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An
Evolving Identity', Brief, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2014; Renata H. Dalaqua. ‘“We will
not make the bomb because we do not want to make the bomb”: understanding the technopolitical regime thatdrives the Brazilian nuclear program’, The Nonproliferation Review, Vo. 26, No. 3-4, (2019), pp. 231-249; Leonardo
Bandarra, ‘Brazilian nuclear policy under Bolsonaro: no nuclear weapons, but a nuclear submarine’, Bulletin of theAtomic Scientists, 12 April 2019; and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Beyond Waltz’s Nuclear World: More Trust May be
Better', International Relations', Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 428–445; and 'Egypt', Nuclear Threat Initiative.
60 Jürgen Scheffran, ‘Verification and security of transformation to a nuclear-weapon-free world: the framework of
the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol. 30, No. 2, (2018), pp.
144. Scheffran provides an excellent and detailed explication of the challenges facing the TPNW verification regime
and directions for responses.

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then eliminate) will require complex, and quite likely different, kinds of verification regimes. At
whatever point such thresholds appear on the horizon it will be strongly and evidently in theinterests of the Conference of the Parties to have already dealt substantially, if not fully, with thoseissues.
Obviously, under the heading of the institutionalization of the TPNW, there will be hard questions
about how a ‘competent authority’ will actually be designed, developed, built, and paid for. In themeantime, as Tamara Patton and her colleagues have argued, it is highly desirable for the treaty’s
Conference of the Parties to set up some kind of preparatory scientific advisory body as soon as ispracticable—as was done effectively in the rather simpler case of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty in anticipation of its still delayed Entry into Force. 61
Most critics have focused on the verification of adherence to the TPNW requirements within the
nuclear-fuel cycle and, in particular, looked at accounting for fissile material in terms of bothpossession and production of the kind that the IAEA CSA and Additional Protocol are designed toaddress. Clearly these remain important, and it will be desirable to continue to press for universal
adherence to the Additional Protocol or a functional equivalent such as ABACC or, lesssatisfactorily, through NWFZ provisions. But even so, on fissile material accounting alone, after
the experience of the past ‘surprises’ of Iraq et al, no one should pretend that the current ‘gold
standard’ is the end of the story. There will be new surprises in the future, and the TPNW
architecture allows for addressing those situations.
The other side of the coin is that an abolition treaty regime will involve multilateral verification
capacities considerably more wide-ranging in their concerns, more precise and accurate in theirassessments, and much more demanding in their robustness than anything to date. These will needto endure effectively over centuries rather than years or decades.

61 Tamara Patton, Sébastien Philippe and Zia Mian, ‘Fit for Purpose: An Evolutionary Strategy for the

Implementation and Verification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, Journal for Peace andNuclear Disarmament, Vol. 2, No. 2, (2019), pp. 387-409; Tamara Patton and Alexander Glaser, ‘Nuclear
Verification’, Institute of Nuclear Materials, 58th Annual Meeting, July 2017; and Toby Dalton, Wyatt Hoffman,
Ariel E. Levite, Li Bin, George Perkovich, and Tong Zhao, Toward a Nuclear Firewall: Bridging the NPT’s Three Pillars,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2017, pp.13-21. For a recent review of other approaches tonational and other multilateral disarmament verification centred on the NPT, see ‘Means to Reinforce Research on
Nuclear Disarmament Verification: Report on a Series of Regional Conversations’, Verification Matters: VERTIC
Research Reports, Number 13, (November 2017).

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WMD in Asia-Pacific
What will be required in the way of ban treaty verification capability to persuade virtually all
countries on earth that a nuclear prohibition regime will be sufficiently reliable and robust to detect,in 100 percent of cases, that no country is secretly preparing to reconstitute a nuclear weapon?
What kind of verification issues will have to be faced at the point of a threshold nuclear disarmer
seeking to join the treaty?
Some of the useful accounts to date of these issues include the work of Scheffran, and of Pattonand her colleagues, both drawing on a major 2017 Carnegie Endowment for International Peacestudy titled Toward a Nuclear Firewall: Bridging the NPT’s Three Pillars. Patton and hercolleagues argue that not only will fissile material accounting requirements be more stringent thanat present, but that the treaty’s requirement for ‘verified, time-bound and irreversible eliminationof nuclear weapon programs’ will involve surveillance of much more than the nuclear-fuel cycle.
This expansion of domains of verifications required under the TPNW will involve, both groups
argue, developing ‘a comprehensive set of nuclear weapon program indicators,’ which will address
at least four general domains:•

fuel-cycle and reactor operations;•

nuclear weapons research and development and weaponization;•

weapons delivery and systems (payload) integration; and•militarization.62

This list of broad but compelling set of requirements touches on matters that are today
overwhelmingly the domain of national unilateral verification capabilities, most prominently
involving surveillance of the third and fourth of the broad categories listed above—weaponsdelivery and militarization (itself a much larger and more difficult category to definesatisfactorily). These matters are today mainly discussed within the domain of verification of arms
control agreements.
Patton and her colleagues point out that to date, verification of different elements in contemporary
nuclear weapons assemblages have mostly been dealt with through the NPT and IAEA safeguards,
while others been addressed through bodies such as the Missile Trade Control Regime and the

62 Toby Dalton et al, Toward a Nuclear Firewall; and Tamara Patton et al, ‘Fit for Purpose’.

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Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization’s (CTBTO)International Monitoring System (IMS) has been constructed to detect nuclear detonations. Yet
these exemplars do not fully embrace all aspects of necessary verification capacities for the TPNW.
The CTBTO’s International Monitoring System is a multilateral—and indeed global—UNauspiced verification capability developed to a high level of technical standard in the absence of
the CTBT itself entering into force. One important aspect of the IMS is that it is a multilateralsystem based on the coordination and integration of eighty-nine national monitoring systems—
benefitting from access to seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide detection of
nuclear detonation in 337 facilities worldwide. 63 It is a genuinely multilateral body with a highlevel of technical achievement.
It should be recalled, however, that the IMS is based on the merger of civil/scientific networks ofseismic monitoring of earthquakes with long classified national networks of seismic andradiological detection of nuclear detonations, pioneered and dominated for much of the Cold War
by the United States, which remains the world leader in classified nuclear detonation technology
and analyses.
For the United States, its current nuclear detonation detection capabilities (including the NUDET
sensors on its Global Positioning System satellites and the legacy Defense Support Program
infrared satellites) are considered a part of its suite of National Technical Means of Verification.
These are based on much broader intelligence capacities that may also provide assurance to theUnited States it has the capacity to verify compliance with particular types of control agreements.
These capacities are not separately constructed for verification purposes. Moreover, those
intelligence capacities are closely held, and their functions rarely shared, even with close allies.
They are essentially unilateral capacities, remaining under US government and military control.
In the early 1990s the Japanese National Defence Academy analyst Ushioda Setsuko went to theconceptual heart of the matter facing the TPNW:

63 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, ‘Overview of the verification regime’, [accessed 16 November

2020’]. See also Andreas Persbo, ‘Compliance science: the CTBT’s global verification system’, The Nonproliferation
Review, Vol. 23, No. 3-4 (2016), pp. 318-328.

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WMD in Asia-Pacific‘Verification is today largely unilateral and non-cooperative. Each state makes its own
evaluations; it reacts to any breach of an agreement to which it is a party on the basis of its
own interests. As a result, in the absence of a collective process, verification appears to be
not a guarantee that the agreement will be implemented but a guarantee of the individual
security of the parties.’ 64
The situation Ushioda was describing remains the situation today, and it opens a further set ofissues to be addressed concerning the institutional capacity for verification of the TPNW: how—
if at all—are what are currently National Technical Means of Verification to be brought into theservice of a global collective security project such as the TPNW? At present only a very small
number of countries have any serious capacity to come close to multi-domain global nuclear andspace surveillance, and most countries in the world would have little reason to be confident theirinterests would be pursued with impartiality and diligence by a multilateral verification structure
dominated by the major nuclear powers.
In the context of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the demand for an abolition
treaty regime will not be just for genuinely global multilateral verification capacities fit for
purpose, but itmust endure effectively over periods much longer than any currently existing
verification regime.
Unilateral national surveillance facilities such as Pine Gap, and the global surveillance systems ofwhich they are an integrated part, are potentially, depending on precise requirements, exactly
relevant to address such a situation, and yet seem to be the antithesis of what is required forcooperative security. Unlikely as it may seem, it is worth asking under what institutional, legal,
and security conditions could currently unilateral verification capabilities be brought into a regimeof collective security? More distantly, is it possible to consider genuinely global multilateral

64 Setsuko Ushioda. Satellite-Based Multilateral Arms Control Verification Schemes and International Law.

Dissertation, Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University, Montreal. November 1992, pp. 303-304; Ushioda
Setsuko, ‘Possible Organizational Framework for a Multilateral Monitoring Organization’, The Korean Journal of Air& Space Law and Policy, Vol. 6, (1994), pp. 345-65. See also the discussion of Ushioda and related issues in Richard
Tanter, ‘American Bases in Australia Revisited’, in Brendan Taylor, Nicholas Farrelly and Sheryn Lee (eds.),
Insurgent Intellectual: Essays in honour of Professor Desmond Ball, (ISEAS, December 2012), pp. 206-208, and atslightly greater length in Richard Tanter, The “Joint Facilities” revisited.

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verification institutions on the scale necessary for certainty of the continuing absence of covert
nuclear weapon reconstitution?
To take the now relatively straightforward example of space-based earth observation technology,
there were proposals at the height of the Cold War, originally from France, for the United Nations
to develop an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA), resulting in a UN expert study
focused on space-based imaging.65 While those proposals died under the disdainful gorgon stareof the Cold War nuclear superpowers, it has returned in a number of different forms in the past
two decades.66 In some respects, the idea of an ISMA-like body with a dedicated space-based earth
observation capacity has been rendered at least partially redundant by advances in commercial
space-based imaging potentially widely accessible. However, in the case of either real-timethermal signature detecting of missile launches and detonations, electronic intelligencesurveillance or space security verification issues there has been no such commercially-available
development at the necessary level. 67
With the current pace of nuclear weapon horizontal and vertical proliferation, long-range ballistic
and cruise missile and hypersonic missile proliferation, and the nuclear dimensions of thecompetitive militarization of space, serious assertion of collective rights to verification assurance
capacities is necessary and must engage closely and imaginatively on an informed basis withunilateral national technical means of verification as one starting point.
Lest anyone leap to the conclusion I am arguing for the retention of the Pine Gaps of the world forsuch purposes, the answer is definitely not. But I am asking whether there are ways in which
particular, partial functions of such a facility can be used for collective, multilateral verification

65 Report of the Secretary-General, The Implications of Establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency,

Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York (1983).
66 This paragraph is adapted from Richard Tanter, ‘American Bases Revisited’, pp. 206-207, and Tanter, The “Joint
Facilities” revisited, pp. 45-49 . See Bhupendra Jasani. “International Satellite Monitoring Agency – Has the timecome for its establishment?” Proceedings of Workshop on Safeguards Perspectives for a Future Nuclear
Environment, Cernobbio Villa Erba, Italy, 14-16 October 2003; Trevor Findlay, Compliance Chronicles 1 (December2005); Walter A. Dorn. The Case for a United Nations Verification Agency: Disarmament Under Effective
International Control, Working Paper 26, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, (July 1990); andOffice for Disarmament Affairs, Verification in all its Aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of
verification, (New York: United Nations, 2008).
67 For one discussion of possibilities on the latter see Walter A. Dorn, Tools of the Trade? Monitoring and
Surveillance Technologies in UN Peacekeeping, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations,(September 2007).

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WMD in Asia-Pacificpurposes beyond arms control into the realm of nuclear abolition. It is hard to imagine, but then so
was the idea of a nuclear ban treaty. But what has to be understood is that there has probably neverbeen a political project in human history of such complexity and consequence as a functioning andenduring nuclear abolition verification regime. It has to be commenced somewhere.

The Discursive Consequences of Erasing the Actual Pacific From the AsiaPacific
The design and frame of dialogue processes often has considerable effects on outcomes. Regional
dialogue presumes agreement on what constitutes the region under discussion. In some respects,
the geographical frame is nothing to argue about, but some approaches may turn out to be less—or more—productive, depending on the aim of the dialogue in question. The Asia-Pacific is an
inherently expansive label that can be stretched or constrained in many different ways. ASEAN isan interesting element because as a Southeast Asian entity, it has sought to move beyond internalconsiderations to engender links with East Asian and Pacific states more broadly in its security
and economic dialogue partnerships.
In practice, however, discussion of dialogue in ‘the Asia-Pacific’ often omits reference to or
participation by the Pacific Island states that have been so supportive of the ban treaty. Most aresmall countries and perhaps not significant players in the power politics version of the framing of
the Asia-Pacific. That is true of many of the eighty-four signatories to the TPNW, but the failingsof that perspective were undoubtedly part of the motivation for the UN General Assembly vote of122-1 in July 2017 to adopt the text of the treaty. The Pacific Island Forum may not have the cloutof ASEAN Regional Forum or the East Asian Summit, but it is an effective multilateralorganization in which small states often combine to pressure its larger member states,
especially Australia, over both nuclear and climate issues.
Elision or erasure of the Pacific Island states from the dialogue framework would be regrettable.
Inclusion of the Pacific Island states in dialogue together with the states East Asian Nuclear
Supporting States and the largely pro-TPNW states of ASEAN would be beneficial for twopractical reasons.

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Firstly, the Pacific Island states are mostly small countries where civil society networks have beenand remain particularly strong both within and between states—a valuable characteristic forconstructing dialogue networks.
Secondly, Pacific Island support for the treaty largely derives from the not-so-distant direct
experience of nuclear testing and nuclear colonialism in the region. 68 The ASEAN experience andsituation are thus quite different from that of most of the Pacific Island states. Three Nuclear
Possessing States have tested their nuclear weapons in the Pacific Islands—the United States, theUnited Kingdom, and France. All three did so in Pacific colonial territories—Bikini and Enewetak
in the Marshall Islands, and (United States); Christmas Island (now Kiribati; United Kingdom, andUnited States), as well three locations in Australia (United Kingdom): and the atolls of Moruroa
and Fangataufa in French Polynesia. In the Pacific Islands, self-determination in the face ofongoing colonial possessions and nuclear issues are understandably closely linked. Recognition ofthese interlinked issues would be beneficial for dialogue with the larger and more powerful states.
Two of the key legal and political innovations in the TPNW are the positive provisions set out in
Article 6 to provide for assistance to nuclear test survivors and for remediation of theenvironmental effects of nuclear weapons use or testing in member states. No other element ofinternational law relating to nuclear weapons so directly addresses these matters—certainly not
the NPT. Given the long-term persisting strength of opinion in Pacific Island countries about theenduring human and environmental consequences of nuclear testing by external imperial powers
within the living memory of many citizens of the Pacific Islands, these positive provisions would
seem to provide a promising and fruitful concrete topic for the regional government-civil society
discussions.69 Such initiatives would be particularly useful in bridging the tendency of major statesin ‘the Asia-Pacific’ to overlook most of the eighteen island countries in the actual Pacific.

68 Nic Maclellan, ‘Nuclear Testing and Racism in the Pacific Islands’, in S. Ratuva (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook ofEthnicity, Springer Nature Singapore, 2019.
69 Nic Maclellan, Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons: A Pacific Islands Priority, ICAN Australia, 2017; and Nic Maclellan,
Grappling with the Bomb: Britain’s Pacific H-Bomb Tests, (ANU Press, 2017).

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Themes for Regional Dialogue on the TPNW
What then, are the most productive and urgent themes for discussions in Asia-Pacific dialogue on
the TPNW? There is a considerable range of possibilities. Two contributors to this workshop who
acknowledge the significance of the emergence of the ban treaty present important agendas going
beyond what has become business-as-usual in contemporary commentary.
Allan Behm concludes his savage demolition of the underwhelming approach to nuclear
disarmament by Australian governments, inflected downwards by the pandemic:‘At this point, the prospects of advanced and sustained progress may look bleak. That isprecisely why collective action is needed. For the NNWS, there are three issues that need
early resurrection:•

the proposed cut-off of the production of fissionable material;•

the proclamation of a ‘no first use’ by the NWS and the other states possessing
nuclear weapons; and•the further strengthening of the IAEA safeguards and inspections regime and theirapplication to the NWS.

It must be understood that the NWS are not special cases, but rather deviant cases that havefailed to honor their obligations under the NPT.’70
Behm then suggests a five-point program, one particularly oriented to the Asia-Pacific regional
Nuclear Supporting States and their US ally. To paraphrase abruptly, these countries, including
Australia must•reinvest in nuclear negotiating capacity;•re-engage with like-minded countries;•

work to ensure New START is rekindled, with China involved;•

persuade the United States that nuclear war is never in the interest of the United States or
its allies; and70 Allan Behm: ‘Extended Deterrence and Extended Nuclear Deterrence in a Pandemic World’, p. 19.

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listen to the voices of the ASEAN countries—‘the economic powerhouse of the 21st
century.’

All of these items are salient and urgent to support. None of these agenda items is either in any
way unimportant in themselves or inimical to the advancement of the TPNW. But all are foundedon the continued legitimacy of nuclear weapons possession and use—however much that end stateis understood to be a matter of existential danger. If the primary task is to devalue and delegitimate
nuclear weapons, then these are tasks in parallel, not in place of, that goal. 71
In the context of a review of nuclear command, control, and communications Hayes argues that
‘It is urgent, therefore, to commence dialogue within and between nuclear-armed states on
the legal standards against which NC3 must be measured and transparency with regard to
the achievement of minimum levels of NC3 performance.’
Since NC3(I) facilities are located in each of the Nuclear Supporting States in the region, Hayes’
call for urgent reform spelled out in a clear and concise Global NC3 Code of Conduct is highly
relevant to the region. As with Behm’s agenda, progress toward these important concrete reformsof nuclear weapons operations practice would significantly reduce the likelihood of nuclear next
use. Yet, such a code necessarily legitimates the possession, and use, of nuclear weapons, albeit
with horror.
To distinguish the agendas of proponents of the TPNW to construct productive regional dialogues
to advance the TPNW between supporters of the ban treaty and, on the one hand, Nuclear
Supporting States, and on the other, Nuclear Possessing States, the twin strategies of devaluingand delegitimating nuclear weapons must be added.
Deeply thoughtful ‘reform’ strategies intensely sensitive to the current nuclear dangers such as
those put forward by Behm already point to some required strands of devaluing or questioning the

71 I suspect Behm would agree with me that the primary task, properly understood, is the avoidance of nuclear

next use – for as long as can conceive of. We would differ as to the priority of allocation of scarce political anddiplomatic resources (in government and civil society) to activities leading to that end. My own working
assumption is that we will never know, without doubt, a priori what is the most productive route to a shared goal.
Under that condition, the first rule is to ensure that work towards one pathway does not negate or obstruct or
obscure the other.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificmilitary utility of nuclear weapons, such as persuading the United Staes that ‘that nuclear war isnever in the interests of the United States or its allies.’
Given the historic commitment of governments in Southeast Asia and the Pacific to the goals of
the nuclear weapon-free zones, dialogue with Nuclear Supporting Countries on extension anddeepening of the requirements of those zones will generate questions on both the value of nuclear
weapons and their legitimacy.
To be just a little un-diplomatic, it might be interesting to see what reply an Australian government
would give to a politely worded discussion starter from ASEAN signatories to the TPNW as to
why Australia feels the need for defense based on extended nuclear deterrence. It might be felt at
this point that such a discussion should be unnecessary, for surely the felt need for nuclear defense
would be a matter that the Australian government has spelled out with care and detail in official
public documents as well as in closed door diplomatic settings?
In fact, such is not the case. Defense White Paper and similar references to the rationale for relianceon extended nuclear deterrence are a matter of sentences, not paragraphs, let alone serious
explanation weighing all relevant aspects at an appropriate level of detail.
Since historically, the most long-running answer to that question in the past would have pointed
to a putative nuclear threat from the leaders of ASEAN, such a dialogue could lead to a productive
discussion about the costs and benefits on both sides of nuclear defence.
Similarly, the question of the circumstances under which an Australian government (or that ofJapan or the ROK) believes the use of nuclear weapons to be appropriate would be a matter ofinterest to regional governments inclined to concern on the matter. And it is one that it might bethought an Australian government would have an answer of some detail and argumentative
strength ready to hand.72
At present, it appears to be unlikely that there is such an argument in detail already prepared forsuch purposes. On the only occasion I know of where an Australian government official of any

72 In the following examples I concentrate on Australia as the representative Nuclear supporting State. In the caseof Japan, the only other country in the group I know well enough to risk a comment on, I very much doubt that thesituation is substantially different.

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seniority has attempted to provide an answer to such a question, the result has been deeply
embarrassing. 73 In a fluster of ‘ums’ and ‘errs’ and frantic searching through talking points
provided (to no avail), to the shock of the senatorial questioner, the answer proffered was, in full:‘Senator, as we all know, extended deterrence is something which comes to the fore in asituation of extreme emergency, of a sort that has been referred to in terms of self-defence.’
At a minimum, dialogue with neighboring countries not reliant on nuclear defense would focus
the mind of those reliant on nuclear defence as to exactly how Australia would expect nuclear
weapons to be used, with the supplementary line of discussion as to under what circumstances
would such an action be military utility compared to other approaches to defense under thenominated circumstances.
In the other direction, a dialogue between such sceptic neighbours might involve asking something
like‘What leads Australia to believe it has the right to inflict the human and environmental andstrategic consequences of that policy on neighbouring countries in the event Australia calls on
the United States to make good on its promises?’
Fundamentally, the first use of the establishment of the TPNW regime is not specifically legal: themajority of ASEAN states being states parties to the TPNW will not have a legal effect on Australia
unless Australia specifically invites that outcome. But the most important consequence is that
Nuclear Supporting States will find themselves in the position of having to explain themselves onmatters of what they had hitherto regarded as just ‘obvious,’ not needing any justification beyondvague reference to unspecific threats and unquestioned utility and legitimacy of nuclear deterrence.
Regional dialogue about the utility and legitimacy of nuclear weapons could well, in Ritchie’s
phrasing, lead to a demonstration within the dialogic process ‘that current nuclear practices andpower relations do not reflect justifiable rules based on shared beliefs prevalent in society,’ here

73 See Senator Lisa Singh asking this question of Department of Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Defence

Richard Sadleir in October 2017, ‘Senate Estimates - Question regarding the appropriateness of using nuclear
weapons’, YouTube, 26 October 2017. The two-minute video is well worth watching.

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WMD in Asia-Pacificin the regional dimension of global society, an exploration of accountability for nuclear weapons
support.
Both sets of questions—questioning military utility and legitimacy—are relevant to Japan and the
ROK and could be productively explored in dialogue sets with Southeast Asian and PacificIslands’ partners. Both countries are increasingly concerned to foster closer ties with bothSoutheast Asia and the countries of the Pacific Islands.
Given the importance to the countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands of membership of
their respective Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, dialogue between those countries and Mongolia andregional Nuclear Supporting Countries—Australia (a member of the SPNWFZ) , Japan, and theROK—on the characteristics of NWFZs with their shared accepted intent to constrain nuclear
weapons use could lead to an exploration of pathways for deepening and extending zone
obligations and more explicitly address issues of both accountability for the activities prohibited
under the TPNW, and responsibility for positive support for nuclear test survivors and remediationof nuclear test sacrifice zones.
Such a theme of discussion could have three particular common consequences amongst
participants. Firstly, it may well lay the ground for understanding of shared experiences previously
either not understood or not acknowledged. The example that comes most readily to mind isexactly the shared experience of use of nuclear weapons on their respective citizenries. 74
Secondly, such dialogue could advance discussion of the desirability of a Northeast Asian Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone and the exploration of both particular models and possible pathways.75 All
NWFZ concepts implicitly advance awareness of differing understandings of accountability inrelation to different aspects of nuclear weapons.
Thirdly, successful dialogue to progress understanding of the elements of nuclear constraint inboth the TPNW and NWFZs may provide opportunities for supporters of the TPNW, Nuclear
74 This would include the experiences in Japan of the hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; and in South Korea, theKorean hibakusha in those cities in 1945. In the Pacific Islands, it would include the experience of the survivors(including often military veterans) of US, British, and French nuclear testing – which in the French case continued
until as late as 1996. In Australia, twelve ‘major tests’ of fission weapons were carried out between 1952-1957, but
the more numerous and more environmentally destructive ‘minor tests’ continued to 1963.
75 See Michael Hamel-Green, ‘The implications of the 2017 UN Nuclear Prohibition Treaty for existing and proposed
nuclear-weapon-free zones’.

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Supporting States, and Nuclear Possessing States to find common cause on new pathways toreverse the to date intractable DPRK commitment to nuclear weapons.
Certainly, any element of common cause on matters of nuclear restraint between Nuclear
Supporting Countries and proponents of the TPNW opens small fissures of possibility in thepresumptive unity of END recipients and provider.

In Conclusion: The TPNW in Time of Pandemic and the Other Coming Plague:
Massive Climate Disruption
Many have commented the social and political system stresses imposed by the pandemic and thenexus between morbidity and mortality and the key characteristics of particular political andeconomic structures. Others have commented insightfully on the surprising number of ways inwhich the current pandemic has already exacerbated or multiplied existing dangers of dependence
on nuclear weapons for defense. The significance of the TPNW to move from unquestioned
acceptance of nuclear weapons to universal prohibition as a tool for ultimate elimination isheightened by such an awareness of the manifold impacts of global pandemic in the global social
system.
I would add to such discussion one further element: the now unavoidable impact of climate
disruption and its globally differentially distributed consequences for all aspects of our society andpolitical systems. In a way, the current pandemic is by comparison a reasonably low-level systemstress test, which has not yielded reassuring results. Climate disruption of a known level is now
built into future history for at least another quarter century, assuming that climate mitigation
regimes then decelerate emissions and adaptation is both effective and, on balance, positive.
Essentially we are still in a position where climate disruption in the rich and powerful countries of
the world is not yet socially visible to the level we can expect in time. Of course, climate change
is a matter of discussion, but nothing of the kind that will be reached when the richest parts of theworld begin to experience the equivalents of three or more Hurricane Katrinas a year, with ageneration of visceral fear in those populations of a kind more associated with the experience ofongoing war than with pandemic ameliorated by the prospect of vaccines.

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WMD in Asia-PacificWhatever the structure of regimes of mitigation and adaptation that emerge from the current
relative stasis or at best slow burn on climate, there will be, by the time we reach that point definedby socially visible deep climate impacts in rich countries (to say nothing of The Rest), fear-driven
policy, domestic and international. These developments will inevitably result in processes ofblame, of displacement of accountability, and reciprocal dyads of resentment.
There has already been some examples of displacement of climate accountability from the richer
carbon-indebted countries onto generally poorer tropical rainforest countries through themechanism of paying such countries to not cut down their remaining tropical rainforest. Most
examples have been something of a debacle for the understandable reason that in such countries
rainforests are already a locus of competing interests—often violently so. As such there was an
added burden on those socio-ecosystems of what was represented as ‘a failure to provide carbon
services contracted for,’ as has often been the complaint of rich countries that have entered suchcontracts. Indeed at one point it looked as if some of those countries were about to offer foreign
aid in the form of assistance to police forest management.
This laboured example may be useful to point out that whatever the concern we may have about
the strains on management of the existing global nuclear weapons regime in the stress test of thepandemic, they are likely to be nothing compared to the likely long-lived structures of conflicts
and attributed ‘accountability’ when climate disruption progressed further.
This deeply concerning possibility constitutes, for me, the strongest argument for the urgency ofwork on nuclear weapons prohibition and elimination. If we enter that period of climate conflictwithout something close to nuclear elimination, then the current pandemic stress test will seem but
as nothing.

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Table 1. Non-nuclear weapons possessing East Asian, Southeast Asian, and Pacific Islands states:
status regarding nuclear weapons*These countries are not members of the South Pacific NWFZ, but are eligible to become so if they choose.
Sources: United Nations, Treaties, Disarmament, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 7 July
2017, status as 23 November 2020; South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNWFZ) Treaty of Raratonga, Nuclear
Threat Initiative; Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty (Bangkok Treaty), Nuclear Weapon
Free Status of Mongolia, Nuclear Threat Initiative.

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