Vol.21 No.1 July 2018

Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of
the Hiroshima Peace Institute
Hiroshima is the first city ever to be struck by an atomic
bomb. For more than 70 years since the end of World War
II, the city has continued to demonstrate the realities of
its horrible atomic bombing experience to the rest of theworld, under the motto “No More Hiroshima,” thereby
making a certain contribution to deterring nuclear war.
In the meantime, the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI)
was established in April 1998 to serve as an international
center for peace studies. This year, the HPI marks the 20th
anniversary of its founding. Its basic concept comprises
three pillars: 1) communicating Hiroshima’s historicalexperience to people around the world, while establishingan intellectual framework toward nuclear abolition; 2)
working to achieve a “proactive peace” and to resolve
global challenges; and 3) establishing peace studies to bedisseminated from Hiroshima, in the quest for a new peaceparadigm.
Since the establishment of the HPI, the world has
followed a path that is far from Hiroshima’s wishes
for the realization of nuclear weapons abolition, global
peace, and proactive peace. In retrospect, during the
20 years from 1998 when the HPI was inaugurated,
the transient euphoria that came with the end of theCold War dissipated. The two decades began seeing theinternational community return to power politics, with
optimism about globalization running low. In Asia, India
and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and initiated nuclear
weapon development. The Afghan War and Iraq War were
waged to overthrow their respective regimes. After thecollapse of the dictatorships in both Afghanistan and Iraq,
however, the peace-building process has had little successin achieving the expected results. As for the Middle East,
the failure of the Arab Spring and the lingering civil war
in Syria resulted in a substantial increase in the number of

Gen Kikkawa

refugees, which eventually exceeded 65 million, setting
a new record after World War II. Also in Europe, wars
for territorial expansion reoccurred, as exemplified by
the Georgia War and the Ukrainian crisis. Meanwhile,
serious global environmental problems, including threatsof natural disasters caused by climate change and theendless expansion of deserts, have become increasingly
critical, giving rise to a pressing need to resolve theseissues. Notably, East Asia has not shown much progressin institutionalizing peace and international security. The
region has now grown into one of the world’s largest
weapons markets, against the background of a nuclear
war crisis arising from North Korea’s nuclear and missile
development, and arms races driven by China’s expandingrole as a military superpower. Moreover, the peace
maintained by an East Asian balance of power built on
military alliances may be endangered, due to territorialand historical issues.
What are the reasons why nuclear weapons cannot
be abolished? Why do efforts for institutionalizing peacein Asia make little progress? To resolve these questions,
now we should return to the founding spirit of theHiroshima Peace Institute and establish peace studies
from Hiroshima. Through a curious coincidence, thisyear, which celebrates the 20th anniversary of the HPI,
Hiroshima City University obtained permission to set up
a Graduate School of Peace Studies. The HPI is expectedto achieve further development, not only to contribute tohuman security by scientifically analyzing the mechanismsof arms races as well as the structures of national regimes(governance) that oppress people, but also to provide theworld with specific guidance toward nuclear abolition.
(Director at HPI)

Contents

Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Hiroshima Peace Institute
Gen Kikkawa ………………………… 1
HPI Holds the International Symposium“Nuclear Weapons, Governance and Peace in Asia”
Takeshi Yuasa ……………………… 2-3
Coming to Terms with the Nazi Past and Commemorative Culture in Postwar Germany
Miwako Fukunaga ………………… 4
New Development of Japan-Russia Relations under the Second Abe Administration
Takeyuki Hasegawa ………………… 540th Anniversary of the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship
Xu Xianfen …………………………… 6
Hiroshima City University to Inaugurate the Graduate School of Peace Studies(Master’s Degree Program) in April 2019………………………………………… 7
Hello from HPI………………………………………… 7
Diary ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 8

Visit HPI’s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace_e/1

HPI Holds the International Symposium“Nuclear Weapons,
Governance and Peace in Asia”― Introduction of Discussions Primarily on the Situation in the Korean Peninsula ―Takeshi Yuasa
Background and Overview of the Symposium
On March 17 and 18, 2018, the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI)
held the international symposium entitled “Nuclear Weapons,
Governance and Peace in Asia,” co-hosted by the Research Center
for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA), Nagasaki University.
This symposium is the first organized by the HPI in about a year
and a half since the previous symposium “Security Challenges andAgendas in East Asia: Searching for ‘A World without Nuclear
Weapons’” in July 2017.
The previous symposium took place when the uplifting
atmosphere produced by the visit to Hiroshima by then U.S.
President Barack Obama continued to obtain. Already at thattime, we had witnessed North Korea conducting nuclear tests
and launching missiles one after another. This situation raised
awareness of the issues regarding how we should consider the ideal
and reality of the abolition of nuclear weapons, motivating us toorganize the symposium to exchange views, inviting experts frominside and outside of Japan.
This year’s symposium was also held at a time in whichsimilar problems remained to be resolved, but with signs of amajor change. In early March 2018, the Kim Jong-un regime inNorth Korea reached an agreement to hold an inter-Korean summit
with its South Korean counterpart (the inter-Korean summit at
Panmunjom was held on April 27). Furthermore, the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea expressed its intention to denuclearize
the Korean Peninsula and refrain from nuclear and missile testing.
The DPRK also proposed to hold a summit meeting with UnitedStates President Donald Trump, and the United States agreed toit. Although a number of twists and turns are foreseen before therealization of a U.S.-North Korea summit, at present it is expected
to be held as scheduled on June 12 in Singapore.
Under these circumstances, this year’s symposium served
as a venue for us to enjoy unexpectedly timely discussions
in Hiroshima, together with distinguished researchers hailingfrom South Korea and China. As shown in the program of thesymposium, we had the opportunity to discuss various issues regarding
nuclear development and disarmament, governance in relevant
countries, and the roles played by both international organizations
and the regional organizations that sustain regional security.
Articles concerning the above-mentioned discussions will becontributed to a handbook titled “Peace and Nuclear Weapons in
Asia 2019” (provisional title), which is due to be published this fiscal
year. The handbook is intended to make fixed point observations of
the prospects for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Asia,
human security and security community initiatives. Therefore, theorganizers had asked discussants to prepare research reports that
2

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.21 No.1, July 2018

would serve as a basis for compiling the said publication. For thedetails of papers submitted to the symposium, please refer to thoseto be included in the forthcoming handbook.
I would like to introduce the outline of research papers
presented in any of the three sessions on the following themes:“Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Trends and Issues,” “Human Security
and Governance” and “Peace and the Role of International
Organizations in Asia.” Due to limitations of space, however, I
will present only three reports pertaining to the Korean Peninsula
situation, which is becoming a matter of immediate concern.

The North Korean Crisis: Its Characteristics andFuture Challenges
In Session I, Professor Kim Sung Chull presented an essential
argument about the shift in North Korea’s policy, which has justoccurred this spring. Professor Kim examined the context in which
the DPRK had begun to cling to nuclear armament. He pointed
out that North Korea’s nuclear obsession is closely related tothe pre-emptive strike doctrine that emerged in the wake of the
9.11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, and that the
military strategies adopted by the United States after entering thiscentury constitutes the true nature of the threat to North Korea.
To conclude his presentation, Professor Kim underscored five
points, whose outlines are as follows. First, denuclearizationand the establishment of a peace system under the North Korean
regime should be considered inseparable and be promoted in a
step-by-step manner. Second, the key to success in achieving
these goals is to proceed with negotiations by setting a time limit.
Third, South Korea should not simply be a mediator between
the United States and North Korea, but should act as a facilitatorof bilateral communication by reading both countries’ hidden
intentions and communicating these intentions to each country.
Fourth, verification of denuclearization and the establishmentof a peace system should be secured through an agreement via athird party, and needs to be guaranteed by interested countries,
including Japan, and by international organizations. Fifth, although
North Korea hopes to conduct negotiations by giving priority toeasing sanctions on itself, the U.S.-DPRK negotiations must be
centered on achieving the two goals of denuclearization and theestablishment of a peace system.

China’s Nuclear Strategy and Its Implications for
Asia-Pacific Security
In his report (in Session I), Professor Lee Seong Hyon discussed
the nuclear strategy of China, one of the superpowers that holds

the key to improving the situation in the Korean Peninsula.
He gave an overview of China’s nuclear weapons development
history, and analyzed its characteristics. Specifically, China isconsidered to possess an estimated 270 nuclear warheads—a muchsmaller number than other nuclear states. This reflects a uniquestrategy that Mao Zedong employed at the dawn of the nuclear age.
Mao is said to have dismissed the atomic bomb as “a paper tiger”
and tried to limit China’s nuclear weapons production/maintenanceprograms to a small scale. This notion has had a lasting influenceon China’s nuclear strategy till today. However, the fact that Chinais the only nuclear state that has declared its policy to be no firstuse of nuclear weapons. That declaration has had a greater effecton the country’s policy of possessing nuclear weapons.
Even so, just like other nuclear powers, China has the intention
to develop nuclear missile technologies, including a submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM) and stealth functions. In thissense, it can be said that China is promoting the modernization of
nuclear weapons, as is the case with other nuclear states.
In addition to this trend in nuclear development, Dr. Lee
pointed out the significance of China’s perception of the world.
Specifically, he indicated that the People’s Republic of China has
a “revisionist” image of the international order—in the hope of
becoming number one in the world by revising the status quo worldorder led by the United States. The current Xi Jinping administrationstrongly seeks to grow as a military power and modernize its
military forces, as exemplified by its slogan of “China’s dream ofbuilding a strong army.” Some of President Xi Jinping’s remarks
have proved that nuclear weapons are considered to play a central
and revolutionary role in his regime’s military policy. Against the
backdrop of prolonging the life of the Xi Jinping government, Dr.
Lee argued the need for further research into the characteristics
and nature of the policy adopted by a government leader who is
influential in formulating the nation’s nuclear strategy.
Finally, Dr. Lee stressed that it was true that China wants thedenuclearization of North Korea, but has no intention to pursue it
by imposing international or economic sanctions that would bringabout the collapse of the North Korean regime. He concluded that
China would not abandon North Korea, nor impose economic
sanctions that would destroy the Kim Jong-un administration forthe purpose of dissuading DPRK from pursuing nuclear weapons.
This conclusion is right on the mark, given the fact that it wasmade before the first visit of Kim Jong-un to China.

Human Rights Problem and Governance in North Korea
Professor Son Hyun Jin delivered his research report in Session
II. He summarized North Korea’s political structure and domestic
political situation from the perspective of human rights, including
the issue of defectors from North Korea. He analyzed thebackground of North Korea, with its distinctive hereditary systemand dictatorial government, in terms of the following three aspects:
1) complete control of the citizens; 2) complete interruption of
external information; and 3) a mutual surveillance system. His
report also analyzed the characteristics of North Korea’s politicalsystem based on the provisions of its constitution, and pointed out
the importance of the collectivist principle (citing Article 63 of theConstitution of North Korea), along with the Juche ideology andthe military-first policy. The principle of collectivism is thought toproduce the political structure, which neglects the human rights ofindividuals, deprives the people of their humanity, and sacrifices
the people for a single dictator.
As challenges to be addressed in the future, Professor Son
cited the internal issues of North Korea as well as international

issues. Specifically, regarding the former, he pointed out the needfor structural and policy shifts by the DPRK. As for the latter,
Dr. Son referred to the UN Resolution on the Situation of Human
Rights in the DPRK and UN Special Rapporteurs on the Situationof Human Rights in the DPRK, as examples of the international
community’s efforts to improve the human rights situation in North
Korea. Among other issues he pointed out was how to respond toan outflow of refugees should an emergency arise in the future.
(Professor at HPI)◆◆◆PROGRAM ◆◆◆Saturday, March 17(Titles omitted)

13:00～〈Opening Remarks and Orientation from Organizers〉■ YOSHIDA Fumihiko■ KIKKAWA Gen(Vice Director, RECNA)(Director, HPI)

13:20～〈SESSION I: Nuclear Weapons in Asia: Trends and Issues〉

KIM Sung Chull(Professor, Seoul National University, Korea)

The North Korean Crisis: Its Characteristics andFuture Challenges

LEE Seong Hyon

(Research Fellow, the Sejong Institute, Korea)

China’s Nuclear Strategy and Its Implications
for Asia-Pacific Security

FUKUI Yasuhito

(Associate Professor, HPI)

Nuclear Development Program in India andPakistan and Their Influence■ Discussant: YOSHIDA Fumihiko■ Chairperson: Robert JACOBS (Professor, HPI)
15:30～〈SESSION II : Human Security and Governance〉

SON Hyun Jin(Associate Professor, HPI)

Human Rights Problem and Governance inNorth Korea

Narayanan GANESAN

(Professor, HPI)

Human Security and Governance in Southeast
Asia: Major Developments and Issues

XU Xianfen

(Associate Professor, HPI)

Modernizing the Governance System in China■ Discussant: Puangthong PAWAKAPAN(Visiting Research Scholar, CSEAS, Kyoto University)■ Chairperson: YUASA Takeshi (Professor, HPI)

Sunday, March 18
9:30～〈SESSION III: Peace and the Role of International Organizations in Asia〉

NISHIDA Tatsuya(Associate Professor, HCU)

The International Security Environment in Asia

YUASA Takeshi

Changing and Relativizing Shanghai Cooperation
Organizations (SCO)LEE Jong Won(Professor, Waseda University)

East Asian Community Initiatives: History and
Present Situation■ Discussant: IWASHITA Akihiko(Professor, Hokkaido University and Kyushu University)■ Chairperson: KIKKAWA Gen

11:30～〈RECAPITULATION〉

Visit HPI’s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace_e/3Coming to Terms with the Nazi Past and Commemorative
Culture in Postwar Germany
Miwako Fukunaga
Introduction

It is well known that after World War II, Germany has squarely
faced its history of the Nazi period in which it had initiated theHolocaust and large-scale wars of aggression and has continued
various efforts to compensate the victims of Nazi persecution,prosecute Nazi crimes, pursue history education and research,develop memorial facilities, and regulate Neo-Nazism. Below I
will discuss how these activities, called “coming to terms with the
Nazi past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung),” were implemented in the
period during which Germany was divided into East and West, andhow these activities have been reorganized in accordance with thechanges inside and outside Germany after its reunification. Then,
I will conclude this paper by considering the future direction these
activities will be expected to follow.

Development of Activities for “Coming to Terms with
the Nazi Past” in the Period of German Division

Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of
Germany (West Germany), adopted a political policy aimed atformulating anti-Nazi norms after World War II while at the sametime reintegrating into society the former Nazi who had beenpunished through war-crimes trials and denazification carried out
when Germany was under occupation. Subsequently, from theend of the 1950s to the 1970s, there was an activated groundswell
toward proactively confronting the Nazi past, against the backdrop
of a mounting protest movement calling for social liberalizationand the establishment of the left-wing government of Willy Brandt.
In the 1980s, the conservative Helmut Kohl government returned
to a politics of memory, which sought to regain a positive national
history. Meanwhile, this period also saw the further developmentof activities for “coming to terms with the Nazi past,” because theGreens and the Social Democratic Party advocated the relief offorgotten victims of the Nazi regime—such as Sinti and Roma people,
homosexuals, and those who were victimized by the forced sterilization
policy. On the other hand, in East Germany, which established asocialist regime, a more thorough denazification of the judicial andadministrative organs was implemented, and a greater number ofpeople were convicted in the Nazi criminal trials than in West Germany.
However, such practices led to the establishment of the authority of
the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and was used as propaganda tojustify the political system of East Germany as an anti-fascist nation.

New Challenges after Reunification, and Reorganizationof Activities for Coming to Terms with the Nazi Past

The reunification of West and East Germany in 1990 and the end of
the Cold War dramatically changed the environment surrounding
the activities for “coming to terms with the Nazi past,” and raised
new challenges. First, it became urgently necessary for the reunified
Germany to resolve problems that had remained unaddressed—inparticular, compensating the victims of forced labor, the majority ofwhom were from the former Soviet Union or countries in Eastern
Europe. Second, Germany has faced the need for integrating
the activities to come to terms with its Nazi past, which wereseparately undertaken under the respective West and East German
regimes. Third, there have been mounting calls for recognition of
the war damage suffered by Germans, especially the “expulsion”
of German residents from the East European region around theend of war, as well as the damage caused by air raids carried out
by the Allied Powers. Fourth, as generational change and social
multiculturalism proceed, the nation has begun pursuing what theappropriate history education and exhibition ought to be, for young
people who have not experienced the rule of the Nazi regime andfor citizens who have diverse cultural and historical backgrounds.
Fifth, in addition to activities for “coming to terms with the Nazi
past,” Germany has begun reappraising the dictatorship in theformer East Germany (dual approaches for “coming to terms withthe past”). Furthermore, each European country has started to4

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.21 No.1, July 2018shed light on its own involvement in the Holocaust and wartime
cooperation with Nazi Germany, and the international community
has seen an increasing number of comparative studies carried out
regarding various forms of dictatorships and massacres. These facts
reflect progress in the Europeanization of Holocaust remembrance
and in the globalization of initiatives to address the negative
aspects of a nation’s history.
While coping with these new situations and challenges, unified
Germany has taken many measures, including the establishmentof Foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and Future (2000),an organization that aims to compensate the forced labor victims;
the erection of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe (alsocalled the Holocaust Memorial) (2005) in the German capital cityof Berlin; the opening of the Memorium Nuremberg Trials (2010);
and republication of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf (My Struggle),with academic annotations (2016). As the number of people who
lived during the Nazi period decreases, among the activities tocome to terms with the past, “commemorative culture”—which is adomain related to the formation of historical recognition regarding
the Nazi regime and the remembrance of events that had occurredat that time—is assuming greater importance.

Results of Activities for “Coming to Terms with the
Nazi Past” and their Future Direction

As stated above, Germany’s activities for “coming to terms with the
Nazi past” have developed through many twists and turns. These
activities can also be understood as a sustainable “learning process.”
In accordance with the progress made in these activities, Germany
has begun investigating the involvement in Nazi crimes and the
responsibilities for that involvement, not only of the suppression
organizations—such as the Nazi leadership, SS, and Gestapo—
but also of the national defense forces, judicial and administrative
organs, universities, researchers, and even “ordinary people.”
Such a critical approach to the German history of the Nazi
period has led to reconciliations and improved relations withneighboring countries, and to the creation of a political culturethat is sensitive to discrimination and human rights violations,
thereby supporting the democratic system of the Federal Republic(former West Germany/the reunified Germany). While somehave suggested that Germany should break completely with its
Nazi past, the activities for “coming to terms with the Nazi past”
have taken root. This is because the view that these activities areimportant and useful for Germany has become widespread. In theinternational community, “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” in postwar
Germany is regarded as an important model of an approach foraddressing the negative aspects of a nation’s past.
However, it is uncertain which directions the activities for“coming to terms with the Nazi past” will take in the future. In
recent years, immigration and refugee issues, widening inequality,
the British exit from the European Union, and other matters havehelped the right-wing expand its influence in Germany and Europe,
shaking the foundations of democracy. As a result of the German
federal elections held in the fall of 2017, the right-wing politicalparty Alternative for Germany (AfD) made a strong showing andemerged as the third-largest party in the Bundestag. Politiciansbelonging to the party have aroused much controversy by making
racist and nationalist statements. For instance, in a speech in
January 2017, Björn Höcke, parliamentary leader of the Thuringia
branch of AfD, criticized the Holocaust Memorial as a “memorialof shame” and asserted that Germans “need to make a 180-degreechange in their commemoration policy,” showing a negative
attitude toward the nation’s approach to the Nazi past. Now thatsuch a political party has become the top opposition party, thestate of activities for “coming to terms with the Nazi past” and“commemorative culture” may change in the future.
(Part-time lecturer, Faculty of Foreign Languages,
Daito Bunka University)

New Development of Japan-Russia Relations under
the Second Abe Administration― Focusing on the“Yachi-Patrushev Line”―
Takeyuki Hasegawa

In Japan, the second administration of Shinzo Abe started on
December 26, 2012. The administration has developed the prime
minister’s office-led mechanisms for planning, coordinating
and making decisions on Japan’s national security policy, as
represented by the establishment of the National Security Council(NSC) and the National Security Secretariat (NSS). The second
Abe administration has also made major policy and institutionalchanges in the field of security, by formulating the National
Security Strategy and the National Defense Program Guidelines for
FY 2014 and beyond, and developing security legislation. Thesechanges are considered, in turn, to have brought about changes
in Japan’s foreign policy. This article focuses on the diplomatic
policy toward Russia taken by the second Abe administration, andexamines the relationships between Japan’s policy toward Russia
and the above-mentioned policy and institutional changes.
Regarding Japan’s policy toward Russia, the National
Security Strategy drawn up in December 2013 states that “Under
the increasingly severe security environment in East Asia, itis critical for Japan to advance cooperation with Russia in allareas, including security and energy, thereby enhancing bilateralrelations as a whole, in order to ensure its security” (excerpted
from the Cabinet Secretariat website: https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/
siryou/131217anzenhoshou.html). Worthy of special note here is
the fact that the Strategy refers to Japan-Russia cooperation in thefield of security. As is well-known, during the Cold War between
the United States and the Soviet Union large-scale troops of theJapan Ground Self-Defense Force had been deployed in Hokkaido
to defend against the threat posed by the Soviet Union. In responseto the changes in the security environment in the post-Cold War
period, the National Security Strategy points out the importance of
security cooperation between Japan and Russia (see also “Tenki womukaeru nichiro anzenhoshou-kyouryoku [provisional translation:
Japan-Russia Security Cooperation Coming to a Turning Point]”
by Shinji Hyodo, NIDS Commentary No. 33, 2013).
The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 andbeyond includes more detailed descriptions about the aforementioned
Japan-Russia security cooperation. Specifically, these Guidelines set
forth “Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia, including
the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (‘2+2’), highlevel exchanges, and unit-to-unit exchanges in order to deepen
understanding about the intention of Russian military activities anddevelop mutual trust with Russia. In addition, Japan will enhancebilateral training and exercises with Russia to promote regional
stability” (Ministry of Defense: http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/index.html). The Japan-Russia Foreign andDefense Ministerial Consultation (“2+2” Ministerial Meeting),
newly started by the second Abe administration, was suspended
after the first meeting held in November 2013, in the wake of the
Ukraine Crisis and for other factors. However, the second JapanRussia “2+2” meeting took place in March last year. Meanwhile,
the Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX) was jointly held by
the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Russian Navy
Pacific Fleet in October 2014, after the annexation of Crimea by
the Russian Federation in March of the same year. Subsequently
SAREX was suspended for about two years, and then resumed
in January 2017 (“Nichi-ro kyoudou kunren ninen-sankagetsu
buri saikai hatsuka kara [provisional translation: Japan, Russia toresume SAREX on January 20, after an interval of 27 months],”
The Nikkei Online Edition, January 17, 2017).
Among these bilateral security cooperation activities,
dialogues and exchanges, the author pays special attention to theJapan-Russia dialogues through the “NSC channel”—the channelof the (National) Security Councils of Japan and Russia. The
second Abe administration appointed Mr. Shotaro Yachi (former
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs) as its first Secretary General of
the National Security Secretariat. Mr. Yachi can be regarded as acentral figure in exerting the leadership of the Prime Minister’sOﬃce in the field of national security. Since Mr. Yachi took oﬃce
as Secretary General of the NSS, he has held many rounds of talks
with his Russian counterpart, Mr. Nikolai Platonovich Patrushev,
who is the Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council,
and one of President Putin’s most trusted aides. Their first talk
was held in Moscow in March 2014, immediately before theannexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. After the Crimean
annexation, in May of the same year, their second talk was held
again in Moscow (Совет Безопасности РФ: http://www.scrf.gov.
ru/news/allnews/812/; http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/allnews/815/).
Amid the deterioration of Russia’s relations with the UnitedStates and EU countries, Secretary General Yachi and Secretary
Patrushev have continued to hold dialogues. These were meetings
between figures who play pivotal roles in strategy planning andgeneral coordination in Japan and Russia, respectively, and canbe said to constitute a “Yachi-Patrushev Line.” These talks are
considered to have facilitated smooth communication between thetwo countries. In September 2017, Secretary Patrushev who wason a visit to Japan, and his Japanese counterpart Yachi concluded
a memorandum of understanding on cooperation between theJapanese National Security Council and the Russian Federation
Security Council (Совет Безопасности РФ: http://www.scrf.
gov.ru/news/allnews/2278/), through which the “NSC channel”
between the two countries was institutionalized.
Meanwhile, when consideration is given to theinstitutionalization of the NSC channel, it is also necessary to lookat Japan-Russia relations under the regime of the Democratic Partyof Japan (DPJ). Speaking of bilateral relations between Japan andRussia during the DPJ administration, many people would recall
the visit to Kunashiri Island by Dmitry Medvedev, then Presidentof the Russian Federation (in November 2010) as the mostimpactful event. Among other subsequent moves that should not
be overlooked were: the dispatch of disaster relief teams from the
Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defence, Emergencies
and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters to the areas
affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake, which occurred on
March 11, 2011; and the establishment of the Ministry for theDevelopment of the Russian Far East and other political measures
focusing on the Russian Far East, promoted under the second
Putin administration. In September 2012, a Japan-Russia summit
meeting was held on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting in Vladivostok. About one
month after the summit, Secretary of the Russian Security Council
Nikolai Patrushev visited Japan, where he paid a courtesy callto the then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, and held talks with
Mr. Koichiro Gemba, who was the Minister for Foreign Affairs
at that time. Secretary Patrushev and Minister Gemba signed amemorandum between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and
the Secretariat of the Russian Federation Security Council (Ministryof Foreign Affairs of Japan: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/
release/24/10/1023_05.html). This was considered to have laid
the basis for the formation of what later became the so-called“Yachi- Patrushev Line.” In this respect, we can observe a politicalcontinuity transcending the change in the administration. (Thefollowing book describes the continuity between the Democratic
Party of Japan government and the second Abe administrationin detail: “Futatsu no Seiken Kotai: Seisaku-wa Kawatta-noka(provisional translation: Two Regime Changes: Did the policychange?),” Harukata Takenaka (ed.), Keiso Shobo in 2017.)
Although the NSC channel between Japan and Russia has
been institutionalized, it can be thought that its practical functions
are bolstered by the Yachi-Patrushev Line, which is backed by the
diplomatic skills, political clout and other capabilities of these workinglevel leaders in charge of the security councils of their respective nations.
We need to continue to look at the future trends of this NSC channel.
(Research Fellow, the National Institute for
Defense Studies of the Ministry of Defense)
Visit HPI’s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace_e/540th Anniversary of the Japan-China Treaty ofPeace and Friendship
Xu Xianfen
On August 12, 1978—forty years ago—the Treaty of Peace andFriendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China(hereafter, “the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship”
or simply “the Treaty”) was signed in Beijing. Then Prime
Minister Takeo Fukuda watched over the signing ceremony on
TV in his official residence. He is quoted as having said that a“suspension bridge” built between Japan and China had now
been developed into an “iron bridge,” and that he would like toproactively promote bilateral exchange by carrying a heavy loadon this bridge. On October 23 of the same year, then ChineseVice-Premier Deng Xiaoping attended a ceremony to exchange
the instruments of ratification for the Treaty, held at the Prime
Minister’s official residence in Tokyo. At the talk with JapanesePrime Minister Fukuda, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping confirmedthat various relationships between Japan and China after WorldWar II had been summarized legally and politically, and that, inparticular, the peace and friendship between the two countries
had been clearly affirmed. Currently, the Japan-China Treaty ofPeace and Friendship is regarded as one of the four major political
instruments between Japan and China, and the Treaty is said toconstitute the political foundation for the overall development ofSino-Japanese relations.
Originally, the Treaty was first proposed six years before
its conclusion, in the process of negotiations for Japan-China
diplomatic normalization. It was explicitly set forth in Article
8 of the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and
the Government of the People’s Republic of China. The Joint
Communique, announced on September 29, 1972, realized thenormalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations. Its Article
8 reads: “The Government of Japan and the Government of thePeople’s Republic of China have agreed that, with a view tosolidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendshipbetween the two countries, the two Governments will enter into
negotiations for the purpose of concluding a treaty of peace andfriendship.” Considering the fact that Japanese war of aggression
against China once occurred between China and Japan, ChinesePremier Zhou Enlai, who stressed the need to conclude a treatyof peace, suggested that the process for normalizing Japan-China
diplomatic relations should be divided into two steps: first, theleaders of the two countries would declare the normalization of
diplomatic relations in a “joint statement” or “joint communique,”and then each government would go through domestic politicalprocedures and enact legislation to conclude a “peace treaty.” Itshould be noted that the name of the Japan-China Treaty of Peaceand Friendship includes not only the word “peace” but also theword “friendship.” If a “peace” treaty is to attach importance tosettling matters related to a “war” in the past, a “friendship” treaty
would focus on the future direction and define a long-lasting
friendly relationship for the next and future generations. In otherwords, the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship is intended
to inherit the “past,” and usher in and pave way for the “future.”
As for the basic contents of the Japan-China Treaty of Peaceand Friendship, Japan and China reached an agreement, as early
as at the first and second preliminary meetings. The contents
included: the development of relations of perpetual peace andfriendship between the two countries; respect for the principlesof the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of refrainfrom the use or threat of force; respect for sovereignty andterritorial integrity; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs(these were included in Article I) and the further developmentof economic and cultural relations between the two countries(included in Article III). Additionally, both countries confirmed thebasic spirit of signing the Treaty—that the principles enunciatedin the Joint Communique should be strictly observed. On the other
hand, a series of issues regarding Japan-China relations became
highlighted in the process of negotiations. These issues wereaddressed as described below.
6

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.21 No.1, July 2018

The first was the Taiwan issue. China considered this issue
to be diﬃcult for the Japanese side to handle. Based on the idea
of taking “a politically broader view,” from the initial stage theChinese government expressed that “the Treaty does not haveto refer to the Taiwan issue, if the Joint Communique will bereconfirmed in the Treaty.” The second was the historical issue. In
this respect again, the Chinese side announced that “If the JapanChina Joint Communique will be confirmed in the Treaty andthat the principles enunciated in the Joint Communique continue
to be strictly observed in the future, the Treaty does not need totouch upon the issues concerning the termination of the state ofwar, the responsibility for the damage that Japan caused to theChinese people through the war, and the renunciation of Chinesedemand for war reparation from Japan.” In other words, China
settled that both the Taiwan issue and the historical issue would not
become problematic, when the Japan-China Joint Communique
was observed. The third was the renouncement of the SinoSoviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. The
Japanese side showed a strong interest in this issue and insisted
that there was a contradiction between the Japan-China Treaty
and the Sino-Soviet Treaty. However, this issue was settled when
China confirmed as the government’s oﬃcial view that the SinoSoviet Treaty was merely “nominal.” The fourth was the territorial
issue. China explained that the incident in which a large fleet offishing boats appeared in the waters surrounding the Senkaku
Islands (“Diaoyutai” in Chinese) in April 1978 was an “accident.”
Regarding this Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands dispute, Chinese VicePremier Deng Xiaoping suggested “leaving things as they are forthe next 20 or 30 years,” during a meeting with Japan’s Foreign
Minister Sunao Sonoda who was on a visit to China. This was theso-called “shelving” solution.
The fifth was what is called the issue of anti-hegemonism,
which made the negotiations diﬃcult. From the beginning, neither
Japan nor China had any objections to pledging not to seek
hegemony permanently. However, friction arose when the Chineseside contended that the provision, “Each (of the two countries)
is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries
to establish hegemony (in the Asia-Pacific region or in any otherregion),” should be included in the Treaty, but the Japanese side
opposed the provision. Eventually, this issue was settled byincorporating this provision into the Treaty as Article II, and also
by separately adding the so-called “third country provision” asArticle IV, which reads “The present Treaty shall not affect theposition of either Contracting Party regarding its relations withthird countries.”
Now, how should we celebrate this “anniversary”? When
the Treaty marked its 10th, 20th, and 30th anniversaries, adazzling array of commemorative events were held. Examples
included the issuance of commemorative stamps, passionate
commemorative lectures held during mutual visits of the leadersof the two countries, large-scale exchange visits by friendly
organizations, events to deepen exchanges, and the performanceof kabuki in China and classical Chinese operas in Japan. This
year marks the 40th anniversary of the Japan-China Treaty ofPeace and Friendship. During the past four decades, we haveseen significant changes in Japan-China relations. In short, while
economic interdependence in a broad sense has been considerably
deepened, political relations have declined from “amicable” to“distrustful.” Under these circumstances, how should we celebrate
the anniversary? First of all, the institutionalization of Japan-China
relations must be promoted. It is expected that a mechanism forexchanges and discussions at each level and in each field will beestablished to facilitate better communication on a regular basis. I
hope that Japan-China relations will evolve into those resembling
Japan-United States relations or the United States-China relations,wherein both countries can deal with each other.
(Associate Professor at HPI)

April
2019

Hiroshima City University to Inaugurate
the Graduate School of Peace Studies(Masterʼs Degree Program)

Overview◆ Name: Graduate School of Peace Studies, Masterʼs
Degree Program in Peace Studies◆ Degree: Master of Arts in Peace Studies◆ Capacity: 10 students◆ Duration: 2 years◆ Location: 3-4-1, Ozuka-Higashi, Asa-Minami-Ku,
Hiroshima, 731-3194, JAPAN* A Doctoral Degree Program is due to be founded in April 2021
to allow enrolled students to further develop their specialty andcredentials after the Master’s Degree Program.

Curriculum Feature
The Master’s Degree Program of the Graduate School of
Peace Studies is classified into three major tracks: “Social
Science Concepts and Methods,” “Peace Theory,” and“Global/Regional Governance,” each of which is divided into
smaller courses.
◆ Social Science Concepts and Methods

The course “Analytical Approach” teaches fundamental
analytical methods, and the course “Hiroshima and Nuclear
Issues” introduces the threat of nuclear weapons centering on
the atomic bombing experience, heeding the lessons of thehistory and mission of Hiroshima.
[E.g.] Peace studies, global governance, memories ofatomic bombings◆ Peace Theory

The program consists of courses on peace theory related
primarily to international politics and international law,teaching basic analytical approaches as well as analytical
For the latest
information,please visit thefollowing website.

approaches effective for solving complex issues facing
society during this era of globalization.

[E.g.] Nuclear disarmament and nuclear arms control,
peacebuilding, journalism studies◆ Global/Regional Governance

The program consists of courses related to Asian studies,particularly those related to East Asian area studies, throughwhich students can develop insights to grasp the dynamics ofinternational relations and the basic structure of international
system and governance in modern Asia, and their relevancein turn to human security issues.

[E.g.] Korean foreign policies and nuclear issues, peaceand security policies of Japan, internationalorganizations and international systems,
preventive diplomacy

Vision: The Program aims to prepare
students to become:◆ Researchers skilled in qualitative research methodologies
and academic knowledge of conventional peace studies
and related fields, and who have the ability to disseminate
research achievements towards the creation of peace;◆ International civil servants or international NGOs/NPOs
staff capable of planning, investigating and researchinginternational public policy for peacebuilding with outstanding
research capabilities, or national/local public oﬃcials engaged
in domestic public policy and/or international relations;◆ Journalists or mass media experts who can sharply analyze
international/internal conflicts and disseminate analyticalperspectives of peace.

http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/department/c00002162/
c00006584/peacestudies/

Hello from HPISATO Tetsuo
Professor

Dr. Tetsuo SATO was born in Hamamatsu, Shizuoka
Prefecture in 1955. After obtaining his LL.B. fromthe Faculty of Law, Hitotsubashi University and
LL.M. from the Graduate School of Law, Hitotsubashi
University, Dr. SATO, as a Fulbright Scholarship
Grantee, studied and obtained a MALD at the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy in the USA. He also obtained a Ph.D. in Law
from Hitotsubashi University in 1994. He taught at Hitotsubashi University as
Lecturer, Associate Professor and Professor before arriving at the HPI in 2018.
His major publications include Evolving Constitutions of International
Organizations (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996), The Law
of International Organizations (Yuhikaku, 2005, in Japanese) and The
United Nations Security Council and Chapter VII of the UN Charter(Yuhikaku, 2015, in Japanese).

Hello! It is my great pleasure to join anew the HPI,
Hiroshima City University, after working for 34 years at
Hitotsubashi University. I specialize in international law
and will teach courses related to international law andthe law of international organizations in the Graduate
School of Peace Studies to be established next April
at this Hiroshima Peace Institute. Since internationallaw provides a basic framework and principles for thepeaceful coexistence and cooperation of States andpeoples, anyone who would aim to work for peaceand cooperation is advised to have a certain level of
its understanding. International law, while keeping its
decentralized structure, has been greatly transformedby the activities of various international organizations,particularly the United Nations System. I look forward
to discussions with you at this newly built Graduate
School.

Visit HPI’s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace_e/7DIARY◆ Dec. 2 Akiko Naono serves as a panelist at the panel
discussion, “Nobel Peace Prize to the Call to Ban the Nuclear
Weapons” organized by No More Hibakusha ProjectInheriting Memories of the A- and H-Bomb Sufferers, held inTokyo.
◆ Dec. 3 Yasuhito Fukui gives lecture, “Current International
Regulation on Nuclear Weapons” to a meeting of the United
Nations Guides Training in Hiroshima at the Hiroshima Peace
Memorial Museum.
◆ Dec. 5 Robert Jacobs gives lecture, “How Americans
Perceive the Use of the Atomic Bomb in Hiroshima” to ameeting of the United Nations Guides Training in Hiroshima
at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
◆ Dec. 9 Naono gives lecture on how to pass on thememories of the atomic bombing to the future generations atthe Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
◆ Dec. 11 Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) delegation (GenKikkawa, Takeshi Yuasa, Son Hyun Jin, Xu Xianfen and
Makiko Takemoto) visit Sun Yat-sen University, Guanzhou,
China, and have a seminar with the experts.
◆ Dec. 12 HPI delegation (Kikkawa, Kazumi Mizumoto,
Son, Xu and Takemoto) visit the City University of Macau
and Macao Polytechnic Institute, China and conduct seminars
with the local experts.
◆ Dec. 14 Kikkawa gives lecture, “Why We Cannot
Eliminate Nuclear Weapons” to thirty-seven Ube High School
students at the HPI.
2018
◆ Jan. 25 Xu delivers presentation, “China’s Assistance to
the Countries of Central Asia” at a meeting of the HPI “Human
Security Project” held at HPI.
◆ Feb. 9 Narayanan Ganesan gives lecture, “Recent
Developments in the Myanmar Ethnic Peace Process” in the
3rd HPI Public Lecture Series in English at Satellite Campusof Hiroshima City University.
◆ Feb. 16 Jacobs gives lecture, “Discourses of Nuclear
Competence and Catastrophe” in the 3rd HPI Public Lecture
Series in English at Satellite Campus of Hiroshima City
University.
◆ Feb. 19–21 Ganesan trains the Myanmar civil service
on public administration and public policy formulation in
Naypyitaw, Myanmar.
◆ Feb. 19–23 Fukui participates in the Committee for the
Right of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) as an academic
observer in the United Nations oﬃce in Geneva (UNOG) andexchanges views with International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) legal oﬃcers.
◆ Feb. 22 Dr. Peter Kagwanja, Director of African Policy
Research Institute in Kenya, visits HPI and discusses anacademic exchange program in the future with Kikkawa.
◆ Feb. 24 Son gives lecture, “International Relations ofNortheast Asia: Issues of North Korea” in the Memorial
Lecture Series for the 20th Anniversary of the JapanFoundation, Japanese-Language Institute, Kansai in Osaka.
◆ Mar. 5–7 Ganesan trains the Myanmar civil service
on public administration and public policy formulation in
Taungoo, Myanmar.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS● Published by● Printed by

8

December 1, 2017 ― May 31, 2018

◆ Mar. 9 Jacobs gives lecture, “The Invisible Nuclear War
Hidden Inside of the Cold War” and Son gives lecture, “Legal
Status of North Korean Defectors” at the University ofBradford in the UK.
◆ Mar. 12–15 Kikkawa, Mizumoto and Xu visit Northeast
Asian Studies College and School of Administration of Jilin
University in Changchun, Jilin Province, and Institute ofJapan Studies in Liaoning University in Shenyang, Liaoning
Province in China, and exchange views with Chinese
scholars.
◆ Mar. 17–18 HPI holds the International Symposium“Nuclear Weapons, Governance and Peace in Asia,” cohosted by the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition(RECNA) of Nagasaki University at the International
Conference Center, Hiroshima.
◆ Mar. 21 Hitoshi Nagai gives lecture, “The Tokyo Trial: A
Case for Reflection on War and Responsibility” to a meetingof the Nagasaki Youth Delegation at the RECNA, Nagasaki
University.
◆ Mar. 26 Mizumoto and Naono attend the annual meetingof the Advisory Research Group of the Hiroshima Peace
Memorial Museum, held at the Museum.
◆ Apr. 1 Tetsuo Sato is appointed as a professor at HPI. He
works on the book review of an English book comprising
articles on the Whaling in the Antarctic case of theInternational Court of Justice (to be published in the Japanese
Yearbook of International Law, Volume 61, 2018).
◆ Apr. 7 Takemoto attends the book review meeting on
German Peace and Pacifism as an author, held at Komazawa
University.
◆ Apr. 14 Fukui reports on the “Interaction with theInternational Disarmament Law: The Case of Article 36 of
Additional Protocol to Geneva Conventions” in the annual
meeting of Japan Society for Disarmament Studies at
Takushoku University.
◆ Apr. 19 Takemoto attends the first meeting of the
Executive Committee of International Youth Conference for
Peace in the Future (IYCPR) 2018, held at Hiroshima CityHall.
◆ Apr. 19 Delegates of the University for Peace in Costa
Rica visit HPI and discuss future exchange programs forgraduate students with Kikkawa.
◆ Apr. 23–27 Fukui participates in the second session of2020 NPT Review Conference in the UNOG and exchanges
views with Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of The
Provisionary Technical Secretariat (PTS), Preparatory
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Organization (CTBTO).
◆ May. 19 Xu delivers presentation, “Several Questions on
the Study of the Contemporary Chinese Diplomatic History”
at a workshop organized by Toyo Bunko held in Tokyo.
◆ May. 27 Akihiro Kawakami delivers presentation, “AnAnalysis on Revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution
in Relation to Peace and Human Rights” at the Hiroshima
Conference for Jichiken (Research of Local Government) in
Miyoshi City, Hiroshima.

Vol.21 No.1（July 11, 2018）

Editorial Committee (Yasuhito FUKUI, Robert JACOBS, Hitoshi NAGAI, Hyun Jin SON), Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University
3-4-1, Ozuka-higashi, Asaminami-ku, Hiroshima, 731-3194 Japan
Phone: +81（0）82 830 1811
Fax: +81（0）82 830 1812
E-mail: office-peace@m.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp
Letterpress Co., Ltd.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.21 No.1, July 2018

©Hiroshima City University 2018. All rights reserved.