384
CASES AND ISSUES IN JAPANESE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
LAW APPLICABLE TO CHOICE-OF-COURT AGREEMENTS
Koji Takahashi*
Introduction
There can hardly be any disagreement that the procedural effects of choice-ofcourt agreements are determined by the law of the forum (i.e., the law of the place
where an action has been brought, whether it is pursuant to or in breach of the
choice-of-court agreement). Neither can there be any doubt that effect may be
given only to validly formed choice-of-court agreements, and only in accordancewith their meaning and scope. Opinion may differ, however, as to what law is applicable to determine the formation, validity and interpretation of choice-of-court
agreements. Should they also be governed by the law of the forum or should they
be submitted to choice-of-law analysis? If the latter is correct, exactly what are theissues which should be submitted to choice-of-law analysis? Is it permissible tosubject any of such issues to the law of the forum at all? What should be thechoice-of-law analysis for choice-of-court agreements? And, in the final analysis,
how should the law in this area be developed? The present article will discussthese questions through the examination of Japanese law.
I.

The Leading Case

In Japan, the leading case on international choice-of-court agreements is
widely known as the Chisadanecase, the only case in which the Supreme Court
has had an opportunity to consider such agreements. At first instance, the Kobe
District Court found that the choice-of-court agreement in that case had beenvalidly formed without addressing the question what law should be applied to determine the valid formation of a choice-of-court agreement.' The parties did notargue the point but a few of the published comments on the case debated thequestion, one of them arguing that the valid formation of a choice-of-court
agreement should be determined by the governing law of the contract in which
the agreement was contained.' On appeal, the Osaka High Court, presumably conProfessor, Doshisha University Law School, Japan.
Kobe District Court, Judgment, July 18, 1963, H.J. (342) 29 [1963].
2
Hisashi Tanikawa, "Case Comment" Juristo [Jurist], Vol. 350 (1966), p. 135. Cf. Yutaka
Kubota, "Case Comment," Juristo [Jurist], No. 295 (1964), p. 91 (who argued in favor of theapplication of the law of the forum).
Japanese Yearbook of International Law
Vol. 58 (2015), pp. 384-396.

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scious of the scholarly debate, devoted a paragraph to this question and held:'
In determining whether a choice-of-court agreement has been validly
formed, the question which precedes is under what law it should be determined. [...]
It might be thought that the valid formation of the agreement
itself should first be determined under the governing law of the contract inbut since choice-of-court agreements are agreewhich it is contained [...]

ments concerning a procedural conduct and the question relates to the exclusion of the judicial power of the forum, the governing law of the validityof the present choice-of-court agreement is not the governing law of thecontract in which it is contained but the international civil procedure law ofJapan, Japan being the forum in which this question is being considered.
On a further appeal, the Supreme Court observed, "the lower court gave theruling that the international civil procedure law of Japan was applicable only in thethat the choice-of-court agreement had
context of responding to the contention ...
the effect of excluding the court's jurisdiction in the instant case. "I What was meantby the Court in this passage is not entirely clear. It might be intended as a full endorsement of the quoted statement of the High Court; however, it could also beread more narrowly as indicating that the Supreme Court had re-interpreted theHigh Court's statement as relating only to the procedural effect rather than to theformation and validity of choice-of-court agreements. The Supreme Court's intention is further obscured by the fact that the quoted remark was not made in thecontext of discussing formation or validity but, was made in passing, where it gavea short shrift to the appellant's contention that the choice-of-court agreement in the
instant case did not cover a tort claim arising out of the breach of the contract.
Although the Supreme Court in Chisadane did not articulate its own view onwhat should be the governing law of various issues of choice-of-court agreements,
the Court did set forth the following principles (hereinafter, "the Chisadane principles"): (i) regarding the formal validity of an international choice-of-court agreement,
it is not necessary for both offer and acceptance to be delivered by means of asigned document but it is sufficient if the chosen courts are expressly specified ina document made by either or both of the parties and the existence and content of
the agreement are clear; (ii) under the civil procedure law of Japan, effect will in
principle be given to a foreign choice-of-court agreement excluding the jurisdictionof the Japanese courts, if the case does not belong to the realm of exclusive jurisdiction of the Japanese courts, and if the chosen foreign courts would have juris3
4

Osaka High Court, Judgment, December 15, 1969, 29 Minshu (10) 1585 [1975].
Supreme Court, Judgment, November 28, 1975, 29 Minshu (10) 1554 [19751. English
translation is available at JapaneseAnnual of InternationalLaw, No. 20 (1976) p. 106.

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Koji Takahashi

diction in the case; and (iii) effect may, however, be denied to a choice-of-court
agreement if it is "extremely unreasonable and contrary to the law of public policy"(hereinafter, "the public policy test").
II

Background1.

Subsequent Decisions of the Japanese Lower Courts

The lower courts in Japan regularly recite and follow the Chisadane principles. They generally do not discuss what should be the governing law of various
issues of choice-of-court agreements.' In a few cases, the courts did declare thatthe valid formation and effect of choice-of-court agreements were subject to theinternational civil procedure law of Japan before going on to recite the Chisadane
principles.6 But it must be noted that those principles leave open a number ofissues of choice-of-court agreements.
Firstly, the Chisadane principles do not specifically deal with the substantive
validity of a choice-of-court agreement vitiated by mistake, fraud, duress and thelike. In a case where this issue arose, the Tokyo District Court7 refused to apply
Philippine law which was the governing law of the contract containing the choiceof-court agreement. The court instead found it appropriate to determine the validity of choice-of-court agreements by the international civil procedure law ofJapan. The court upheld validity without spelling out the specific norms it applied,neither articulating the precise content of the international civil procedure law ofJapan concerning substantive validity nor applying the Civil Code which contains
provisions dealing with the manifestation of intention tainted by mistake, fraud
and duress.
The issue of formation, as distinguished from validity, of choice-of-court
agreements is also not specifically dealt with by the Chisadane principles. The
E.g. Kyoto District Court, Judgment, January 29, 2015, 2015WLJPCA01296002; Tokyo
District Court, Judgment, September 24, 2008, 2008WLJPCA09248005; Tokyo District Court,
Judgment, April 11, 2008, H.T. (1276) 332 [2008]; Tokyo High Court, Judgment, November
28, 2000 (United Airlines case) H.J. (1743) 137 [20011; and Osaka District Court, Judgment,
January 24, 1992, H.T. (804) 179 [1993].
6
E.g. Tokyo District Court, Judgment, April 19, 2013, 2013WLJPCA04198001 and Tokyo
District Court, Judgment, January 14, 2014, H.T. (1407) 340 [20151. The former expressly
refused to apply Swiss law, the governing law of the contract containing the choice-ofcourt agreement. See also Tokyo District Court, Judgment, June 19, 2006
(2006WLJPCA06190004) for a statement more specifically directed to validity.
7 Tokyo District Court, Judgment, June 19, 2006 (2006WLJPCA06190004). The court devoted
a section of its judgment to the analysis of validity before it proceeded to another section
on effect in which it recited and followed the Chisadaneprinciples.
5

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387

lower courts generally reach their conclusions on formation through factual appreciation.8 Thus, in a case featuring a choice-of-court agreement in an employment
contract, the Tokyo High Court found the core of the problem was whether theemployee understood the terms of the contract prepared by the employer. Notingthat the contract was not written in particularly difficult English and that the employee was given opportunities to ask questions about the terms, the court foundthat the employment contract had been formed and concluded from that findingthat the choice-of-court agreement had also been formed. The court did not
discuss the governing law of the formation of choice-of-court agreements. In another case, the Osaka District Court made no mention of the applicable law when
it held that the choice-of-court agreement, which was contained in a lease contract, could not be found to exist on the ground that the contract was deceitful as
it had been concluded for the purpose of avoiding tax. 10
The issue of interpretation, too, is omitted from the principles laid out by theSupreme Court in Chisadane.The Court did find that the agreement in the instantcase was an exclusive choice-of-court agreement on the reasoning that it clearly
purported to leave intact the option of suing in one of the fora having jurisdictionin the case and exclude other fora. However, the Court did not formulate rules for
distinguishing exclusive from non-exclusive choice-of-court agreements in generalterms. Nor did the Court enunciate any canon of interpretation which should beapplied to interpret choice-of-court agreements. The lower courts have been relying on factual appreciation and their own sense of reasonableness in interpreting
choice-of-court agreements. Thus, in one case featuring an agreement giving oneof the parties the right to decide where to sue from a list of fora, the Tokyo District
Court held it to be an exclusive choice-of-court agreement in accordance withwhat it perceived to be the obvious purport of the agreement as gleaned from theright of choice." The scope of choice-of-court agreements has been interpreted in
the same way. Thus, in one case, the Tokyo High Court found it "extremely unreasonable" to interpret that the choice-of-court agreement in an employment contract with respect to "all claims, complaints, causes of action, and disputes relating
any way to the conditions of employment" should not cover disputes arising after
dismissal. 2 In another case, the Tokyo District Court held that a choice-of-court8

See e.g. the United Airlines case, supra note 5 and Tokyo District Court, Judgment,
October 28, 2011, H.J. (2157) 60 [2012].

9

The United Airlines case, supra note 5. The court devoted a section of its judgment tothe analysis of formation before it proceeded to another section on effect in which itrecited and followed the Chisadane principles.
,0 Osaka District Court, Judgment, January 24, 1992, supra note 5.
1, Tokyo District Court, Judgment, September 24, 2008, supra note 5.
12

The United Airlines case, supra note 5.

388 Koji Takahashi
agreement in a franchise contract covered claims in both contract and tort in accordance with what it found to be the "reasonable and purposive interpretation of
the language and intent" of the agreement. To come to that conclusion, the court
made no reference to French law which had been chosen as the governing law of
the franchise agreement.1 3 Only in one case, the court alluded to the possibility ofinterpreting a choice-of-court agreement under the law governing the contract inwhich it was contained but did not discuss the correctness of that approach.,4
As seen in the forgoing analysis, Japanese courts generally decide the cases byapplying the Chisadane principles. With respect to the issues not specificallycovered by those principles, they generally do not engage in choice-of-law
analysis. Instead, they solve them through factual appreciation or by relying on
their own sense of reasonableness.
An interesting contrast may be made with arbitration agreements. In the
Ringling Circus case,'5 an action was brought in Japan in the alleged breach of anarbitration agreement. The Supreme Court found it appropriate to determine thegoverning law of the valid formation and effects of arbitration agreements primarily
by the will of the parties in accordance with the Japanese choice-of-law rules forcontracts. On the facts of the case, it applied the law of New York (comprising thefederal arbitration law) to determine the scope of the arbitration agreement.
2.

Amendment of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure

The Japanese Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, "CCP") was amended witheffect from 1 April 2012 to codify the rules of international jurisdiction for the firsttime in its history. As far as choice-of-court agreements are concerned, the following provisions were made in Article 3-7 of the CCP:
(1) The parties may decide by agreement the country in which they may
file an action.
(2) The agreement provided in the preceding paragraph shall have noeffect unless it is in writing and is concerned with an action arisingfrom specific legal relationships.
(3) For the purpose of the preceding paragraph, an agreement is deemed
to be in writing if it is recorded in an electromagnetic record (viz. arecord made in an electronic form, a magnetic form, or any other form
unrecognizable to human perception, which is used for information
processing by computers).

14

Tokyo District Court, Judgment, April 11, 2008, supra note 5.
Tokyo District Court, Judgment, June 4, 2010, 2010WLJPCA06048007.

15

Supreme Court, Judgment, September 4,1997, 51 Minshu (8) 3657 [1997].

13

CASES AND ISSUES OFJAPANESE PRIVATE INTERNA77ONAL LAW

389(4) An agreement to file an action exclusively with the courts of a particular foreign country may not be invoked if those courts are legally or
factually unable to exercise jurisdiction.
(5) The agreement provided in Paragraph (1) having as its object a future
dispute arising in connection with a consumer contract shall have effectonly in the circumstances set forth below:(i) where it is an agreement which allows an action to be filed in the
country where the consumer was domiciled at the time of the conclusion of the contract (If the agreement purports to allow an action
to be filed exclusively in that country, it shall be without prejudice
to the right to file in other countries except in the cases provided in
the following sub-paragraph.); or(ii) where the consumer filed an action in the country specified by theagreement or where the consumer invoked the agreement in response to an action brought by the business operator in Japan or ina foreign country.
(6) The agreement provided in Paragraph (1) having as its object a future
civil dispute over individual employment relations shall have effectonly in the circumstances set forth below:(i) where it is an agreement which was concluded when the employment contract was terminated and stipulates that an action may
be brought in the country in which the labor was being supplied at
the time of the conclusion of the agreement (If the agreement purports to allow an action to be filed exclusively in that country, it
shall be without prejudice to the right to file in other countries
except in the cases provided in the following sub-paragraph.); or(ii) where the employee filed an action in the country specified by theagreement or where the employee invoked the agreement in responseto an action brought by the employer in Japan or in a foreign country.
The extent to which the Supreme Court ruling in Chisadane has survived theamendment of the CCP is a matter of interpretation.
With respect to formal validity, Article 3-7(2) has confirmed the writing requirement. The component of the Chisadane principles which is concerned withformal validity has arguably survived as furnishing the precise meaning to thewriting requirement.
The prerequisites for giving effect to exclusive foreign choice-of-court agreements as enunciated in the Chisadane principles have been enshrined in Article
3-7(4) as well as Article 3-10 of the CCP which provides that Article 3-7, among
other provisions, has no application where, with respect to the action in question,
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Japanese courts is prescribed by legislation.

390 Koji Takahashi
The public policy test contained in the Chisadane principles was not given
statutory footing but arguably has survived the amendment since no statutory basis
would need to be found to safeguard the fundamental legal value of Japan. Thus,
the public policy test may be necessary to deny effect to an exclusive choice-ofcourt agreement, if it specifies a country whose judiciary is corrupted or biased, or
if it is concluded to oust the application of Japanese rules of mandatory nature.
The need to rely on it, however, has been greatly curtailed by the enactment ofparagraphs 5 and 6 of Article 3-7. While the courts have been reluctant to find theviolation of public policy until several years ago, 6 there have been several more
recent cases in which the courts found violations. 17 These were cases involving
consumer contracts or individual employment relations.18 They fell outside thetemporal scope of application of Article 3-719 but they would today be decided
under paragraphs 5 and 6 of that article. It is not hard to believe that the findingsof violation in those decisions were influenced by the Act for the amendment of
the CCP whose promulgation preceded those decisions.
3.

Japanese Scholarly Debate

Scholarly debate on the law applicable to choice-of-court agreements can betraced back to two contrasting views expressed in the published comments on thefirst instance ruling in Chisadane. One author said:20
A choice-of-court agreement is a kind of contract and there is a question
under what law its valid formation must be determined. [... If we are tofollow the normal choice-of-law analysis, there is nothing in the instantcontract [in which the choice-of-court agreement is contained] which connects the contract to Japanese law. But I suppose that the formation of the
choice-of-court agreement should be determined by Japanese law as the
In the corresponding period, there was only one known case (Tokyo District Court,
Judgment, September 13, 1999, KaijihoKenkyukaishi [Maritime Law Research Journal], Vol.
154 (2000), p. 89) in which public policy was found to be violated.
17
Tokyo High Court, Judgment, June 28, 2012, LEX/DB 25504140; Tokyo District Court,
Judgment, November 14, 2012, LEX/DB 25483568; Osaka High Court, Judgment, February
20, 2014, H.J. (2225) 77 [2014]; and the Tokyo High Court, Judgment, November 17, 2014,
H.T. (1409) 200 [2015].
18 Among the cases mentioned in the preceding footnote, the cases of the Tokyo High
Court were consumer contract cases and the Osaka High Court case involved consumer
contracts. The Tokyo District Court case concerned individual employment relations.
19
This provision has application to choice-of-court agreements concluded on or after April
1, 2012.
20
Kubota, supra note 2, p. 91.
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391

law of the forum. Because the question is whether an agreement purporting to conclusively exclude the jurisdiction of the Japanese courts has
been validly formed, it should be determined by Japanese law.
Another commentator raised doubt against this view. While apparently admitting that the permissibility of choice-of-court agreements is a matter for the lawof the forum, he argued:2'
Even if it is a procedural agreement, [the valid formation of] a choice-ofcourt agreement itself should, as a preliminary question, be determined by
the governing law of the contract [in which it is contained]. Accordingly,
the agreement in the instant case should be determined by Dutch law.
For quite a while, the view favoring the application of the international civil
procedure law of the forum held sway," principally on the reasoning that choiceof-court agreements are procedural agreements. More recently, however, the perspective that respects the parties' choice of law with a view, inter alia, to protecting
the parties' expectations is gaining ground.23
III. Analysis
1.

Procedural and Non-procedural Issues of Choice-of-court Agreements

It cannot be denied that a choice-of-court agreement is an agreement of procedural character in the sense that it has procedural dimensions. The fact that anagreement has a procedural character, however, does not warrant the assumption
21
22

Tanikawa, supra note 2, p. 135.
E.g. Makoto Hiratsuka, "Case Comment," Showa 45-nendo Jyuyou Hanrei Kaisetsu(JurisutoRinzi Zokan) [Review on Important Cases of the Year 1970 (Jurist Special Issues)](1971), p. 217; Yoshio Tameike, "Case Comment," Kaijiho Hanrei Hyakusen [Selected
Court Cases on Maritime Law] (1973), p. 203; Sueo Ikehara, "Kokusai Saiban Kankatsuken"[International Adjudicatory Jurisdiction], Shin Jitsumu Minjisosho Koza [New Courses on
Practice of Civil Litigation] (1982), p. 36; Satoshi Watanabe, "Case Comment," Kokusaishiho
HanreiHyakusen [Selected Court Cases on Private International Law] (2007), p. 177.
23 E.g. Kazuhiko Yamamoto, "Kokusai Minji Soshoho" [International Civil Procedure Law], in
Hideo Saito etal.eds., ChukaiMinjiSoshoho [Commentary on Civil Procedure Law], Volume
5 (2nd ed., 1991), p. 403; Tsunehisa Yamada, "Kokusai Saibankankatsu no Goui" [Agreement
on International Jurisdiction], Dokkyou Hougaku [Dokkyou Law Review], Vol. 48 (1999),
p. 126; Tadashi Kanzaki, "Goi ni yoru Kankatsuken" [Jurisdiction based on Agreement] in
Akira Takakuwa and Masato Dogauchi eds., Kokusai Minji Sosboho [International Civil
Procedure Law] (2002), p. 140; Takuya Shima, "Case Comment," Juristo [Jurist], No. 1454
(2013), p. 120; Shiho Kato, "Case Comment,"Juristo [urist], No. 1462 (2014), p. 129.

392

Koji Takahashi

that each and every issue pertaining to it is a procedural issue since the agreement
may also have non-procedural dimensions. As put by Hartley: 4[A] choice-of-court agreement has a hybrid nature. On the one hand, it is a
private-law contract: to this extent it falls under the law of contract; on theother hand, it has procedural (jurisdictional) consequences: to this extent,
it falls under the law of procedure. In order to be valid, it must comply
with the normal requirements for a private-law contract. If it is not valid asa contract, it can have no jurisdictional effects. However, once it is decided
that it is valid, we then move from the law of contract to that of procedure
to determine what its effects are [...].
It is, therefore, unhelpful to pin a procedural label on choice-of-court agreements. For the purpose of deciding applicable laws, a better approach would be toconsider which issues are procedural and which are not. The rationale of the
maxim forum regitprocessum (the law of the forum governs procedure) should beunderstood to lie in the significant implications which the procedural issues havefor the exercise of judicial power. Accordingly, only the issues which have such
implications should be characterized as procedural.
Among the number of issues pertaining to choice-of-court agreements, theireffects of conferring or depriving jurisdiction are obviously procedural." The permissibility of giving such procedural effects, too, has significant implications forthe exercise of judicial power and, therefore, should be seen as procedural. The
issues of permissibility are numerous, including whether agreements choosing thecourts situated remotely from the facts of the case may be given effect and whether
ex ante (before the event) choice-of-court agreements may be given effect. The
formation and validity of choice-of-court agreements, on the other hand, have lessdirect implications for the exercise of judicial power and should be regarded as
non-procedural issues, in view also of the fact that the lack of consent and the vitiating factors such as mistake, fraud and duress do not pertain specifically to
choice-of-court agreements but can be relevant to any kind of contract. By thesame token, the issues of interpretation should also be regarded as non-procedural. They include whether the parties' subjective intent prevails over the obTrevor Hartley, Choice-of-court Agreements under the European and International
Instruments (2013), para. 7.01. For similar observations by Japanese authors, see e.g. Katsumi
Yamamoto, "Shouhisha Keiyakuhou to Minjitetsuzuhihou" [Consumer Contract Act and Civil
Procedure Law],Juristo[Jurist], No. 1200 (2001), p. 106; Yamada, supra note 23, p. 123.
25
Not all issues related to the effects of choice-of-court agreements are necessarily
procedural issues. The recoverability of damages for their breach, for example, may beseen as a non-procedural issue: See Koji Takahashi, "Damages for Breach of a Choice-ofCourt Agreement," Yearbook of PrivateInternationalLaw, Vol. 10 (2008), p. 67.
24

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393

jective meaning of the words used, whether the facts after the conclusion of theagreement are admissible for construing agreements, and whether the ambiguity ofa term should be interpreted against the interests of the party drafting theagreement (contraproferentem).
It follows from the foregoing analysis that the issues of formation, validity, andinterpretation of choice-of-court agreements should be regarded as non-procedural
issues. As such, they should be submitted to choice-of-law analysis. Such treatment
can also be supported by the pragmatic consideration, noted earlier,2 6 of respecting
the parties' expectations. However, there is a caveat that must accompany this conclusion, as explained below.
2.

Overriding Mandatory Rules of the Forum

It is generally open to lawmakers to subject any non-procedural issues tooverriding mandatory rules2 7 of the forum which are applicable, to the exclusion of
the otherwise applicable law.
The promotion of legal certainty can be a legitimate justification for creating
overriding mandatory rules. The legitimacy is greater in the area of choice-of-court
agreements, because such agreements are concluded with the aim of securing
legal certainty. Furthermore, it is the reality that the content of law with regard tovarious issues of choice-of-court agreements tends to be obscure. The obscurity isdue partly to uncertainty as to whether and to what extent the normal rules of contract law are applicable to choice-of-court agreements. Thus, it may not be clear
whether the rule of a given legal system which says that a contract need not be
concluded in writing extends to a choice-of-court agreement contained in a contract. Establishing clear rules as overriding mandatory rules would make it certain
what choice-of-court agreements will be sufficient to confer or deprive jurisdictionin the given forum.
This does not mean, however, that laying down overriding mandatory rules
would improve legal certainty with respect to all the non-procedural issues. Where,
for example, a choice-of-court clause is contained in a standard form contract,since such a contract is concluded on a "take it or leave it" basis, subjecting the
choice-of-court clause alone to the overriding mandatory rules of the forum may
defeat the expectation of the parties if, as may often be the case, the standard form
See the text accompanying supra note 23.
27 While it might be considered that procedural rules, too, possess the character ofoverriding mandatory rules, the distinction between procedural and non-procedural issues
seems useful to be maintained since procedural issues are exclusively governed by the lawof the forum, while non-procedural issues are subject to the law of the forum only to the26

extent it lays down overriding mandatory rules.

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Koji Takabashi

has been prepared with the law governing the contract in mind. Careful consideration should be given, with respect to each non-procedural issue, whether establishing clear rules as overriding mandatory rules would be more effective topromote legal certainty than respecting the parties' choice of law.
3.

Observation and Rationalization of Current Japanese Law

From the viewpoint outlined above, the following observation and rationalization may be made of the current Japanese law.
Paragraph 1 of Article 3-7 provides for the procedural effects of choice-ofcourt agreements. The general permissibility of choice-of-court agreements is provided by this paragraph as well as by the public policy test of the Chisadaneprinciple. The permissibility of exclusive choice-of-court agreements in favor of foreign
courts is provided by paragraph 4 of Article 3-7 and Article 3-10. The permissibilityof choice-of-court agreements in consumer contracts and individual employment
relationships are provided respectively by paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 3-7. These
norms form part of the law of the forum and are applicable as such, since they
deal with procedural issues. The enactment of paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 3-7
has significantly improved legal certainty. Prior to the enactment, there had been
inconsistent rulings under the public policy test'8 on the facts which would today
result in consistent decisions under Article 3-7(5).
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 3-7 provide for the formal validity of choice-ofcourt agreements, the exact meaning of which is furnished by the Chisadaneprinciples. Although formal validity is a non-procedural issue, the application of thesenorms in all cases heard in Japan may be explained as the application of overriding mandatory rules.
The lower courts' general tendency of reciting and following the Chisadane
principles is defensible, since those principles either concern procedural issues orconstitute overriding mandatory rules and are, accordingly, applicable as a part ofthe law of the forum. The statement made in some lower court cases that the valid
formation and effect of choice-of-court agreements are subject to the international
civil procedure law of Japan seems, however, too broad to be supportable as itcovers many issues which should be treated as non-procedural. In the same vein,
the approach, implicit in some lower court cases, of determining formation, validity and interpretation solely by the court's own sense of reasonableness cannot
E.g. Tokyo High Court, Judgment, June 28, 2012, supra note 17, reversing Tokyo District
Court, Judgment, February 14, 2012 (LEX/DB 25492239); and Tokyo High Court, Judgment,
November 17, 2014, supra note 17, reversing Tokyo District Court, Judgment, January 14,
2014, supra note 6. Osaka High Court, Judgment, February 20, 2014, supra note 17, also
reversed the judgment of first instance (not yet reported) which had reached a contrary
outcome presumably through the public policy test.

28

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395

be commended.
Conclusion
In the current international legal environment where the jurisdictional rules
prescribed by law often do not produce predictable results, a choice-of-court
agreement is just about the only means available to private parties to secure legal
certainty. The law should be crafted to support that goal. To promote legal certainty, Japanese law may be developed along the following lines.
Firstly, the issues of choice-of-court agreements which may be characterized as
non-procedural (as considered above) should be submitted to choice-of-law analysis,so that the parties may choose the governing law. In this regard, the Supreme Court
would do well to align choice-of-court agreements with arbitration agreements. The
ratification of the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (hereinafter, the Hague Choice-of-Court Convention) would bring about the same effectas much as it submits substantive validity to choice-of-law analysis.9
Secondly, the rules applicable to procedural issues should be clarified, so thatthe vague and omnipotent notion of public policy has a reduced role. It may be
useful to clarify, for example, the permissibility of choice-of-court agreements incertain contracts. Besides consumer and employment contracts, there are contracts
which typically involve parties with unequal bargaining power, such as franchisecontracts, agency contracts, and subcontracts for manufacturing. Should it be considered that choice-of-court agreements contained in such contracts ought to begiven restrictive effects, laying down black-letter rules to prescribe the precise conditions for giving them effect, as do paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 3-7 for consumer
and employment contracts, would improve legal certainty.
Thirdly, consideration should be given to whether there are any non-procedural issues with respect to which establishing overriding mandatory rules would
promote legal certainty. How to distinguish between exclusive and non-exclusive
choice-of-court agreements, for example, is an issue of interpretation to whichrules applicable through choice-of-law process will often fail to provide an unequivocal answer. This issue would benefit from having clear rules applicable as
overriding mandatory rules of the forum. Various solutions are conceivable, including a rebuttable presumption in favor of exclusiveness as stipulated by the29

Under Articles 5(1), 6(a), and 9(a), choice-of-court agreements may be given effect only
if they are not null and void under the law of the State of the chosen court. The law in thiscontext is understood to include choice-of-law rules. See Trevor Hartley and Masato
Dogauchi, ExplanatoryReport on the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention,

para. 125. Available at <http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=publications.details&pid=3959>.

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Koji Takahashi

Hague Choice-of-Court Convention.
Fourthly, the content of Japanese law as applicable through choice-of-law
process to non-procedural issues should be clarified. In view of the frequency withwhich choice-of-court clauses are contained in standard form contracts, it would
be particularly useful to clarify whether the rules for the formation of standard
form contracts31 encompass choice-of-court clauses.
Fifthly, it would be helpful to clarify the choice-of-law analysis for the nonprocedural issues of choice-of-court agreements. It is submitted 2 that where achoice-of-court agreement is contained in a contract, it should, like other terms in
33
the same contract, be submitted to the choice-of-law analysis for that contract,with the result that it becomes subject to the law governing the contract except inwhat will be a rare situation where the parties have chosen a different law specifically for the choice-of-court agreement.

Art. 3(b).
The bill for amending the Japanese Civil Code contains such rules which, if the bill ispassed, are to be inserted as Arts. 548-2 and 548-3 in the Code.
32
For a full discussion, see Koji Takahashi, "Chyuusai Goui oyobi Kankatsu Goui no
Dokuritsusei Gensoku: Jyunkyohou Kettei Process ni okeru Saikentou" [Autonomy of
Arbitration Agreement and Choice-of-Court Agreement: Re-evaluation in Choice-of-Law
Context], Minsho-ho Zasshi [Journal of Civil and Commercial Law], Vol. 147-3 (2012), p. 275.
33 This position is not inconsistent with the Hague Choice-of-Court Convention, since thelatter provides that the law (understood to include choice-of-law rules) of the State of thecourts chosen is applicable (see supra note 29), leaving open the content of the choice-oflaw rules. The Convention contains a provision on severability of choice-of-court
agreements (Art. 3(d)), stating, "[tihe validity of the exclusive choice of court agreement
cannot be contested solely on the ground that the contract is not valid." The severability
principle should not, it is submitted, be understood to extend to the choice-of-law process.
331