HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS
Hiroshima Peace Institute Vol.6 No.1 July 2003

Special Feature — Issues of the Iraq War

The Iraq War from the Viewpoint of International Law
By Hisakazu Fujita
When we view the recent Iraq War in the light of international law, there
are three broad problems: 1) the legality of starting such a war, 2)
wartime violations of humanitarian law and their punishment, and 3) the
legal status of Iraq after the collapse of the Hussein regime. In thisarticle I would like to discuss the main points of each of these problems.
1. The Legality of Starting the Iraq War
First, we need to consider the preemptive attacks against Iraq by
the U.S. and U.K. within the present legal framework of international
order—that is, within a framework which prohibits war in principle, butwhich permits the use of military force in exceptional circumstances
when it is either authorized by the U.N. Security Council or intended for
self-defense purposes. In this framework, if a war or other internationaluse of force takes place, then at least one of the parties concerned mustbe acting against the principle that prohibits war. (Furthermore, suchaction may constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression as
defined in the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314 [XXIX], i.e. as“the first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter”
or “the invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territoryof another State.”)Inasmuch as the U.S. and U.K. evidently launched a joint militaryattack against Iraqi territory on March 20, 2003 without a U.N. Security
Council resolution, their action must be seen as a violation of theprinciple against war. Is it possible for the U.S. and U.K. to invoke theright of self-defense to justify their action? It is not possible for them toinvoke the right of self-defense as defined in Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter in the absence of an armed attack by Iraq against the U.S. andU.K. President Bush deliberately failed to mention the legal basis forstarting the war in his “ultimatum” speech of March 17 and his
declaration of war on March 19. Instead, he stated that the U.S. had thesovereign right to use force for its national security in light of theobvious threat posed by Iraq. However, a general threat posed by the use
by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. chemical weapons)
allegedly in Iraq’s possession cannot be used as the basis for the exerciseof the right of self-defense.
2. Violations of Humanitarian Law and Punishment of
Responsible Officials
Regardless of whether the military attack by the U.S. and U.K. waslegal or illegal, the war was an international armed conflict between
states, to which international humanitarian law (consisting of customarylaws and treaties) that regulates actions of belligerent states must apply.
The U.S., U.K. and Iraq were all signatories to the Geneva Conventionsof 1949, which are the core documents of humanitarian law, but only the
U.K. was party to the protocols of 1977, which supplemented the
Geneva Conventions. In any event, the fact that the U.S. contended that a
TV broadcast showing American prisoners of war held by Iraq was inviolation of international treaties testifi es to its acceptance of the

CONTENTS
Special Feature — Issues of the Iraq War
The Iraq War from the Viewpoint of International Law by Hisakazu Fujita ………………… 1
The Invasion of Iraq, the U.N., the Threat of U.S. Unilateralism
and the Spirit of Hiroshima by Christian P. Scherrer ………… 2
The Inhumanity of Depleted Uranium Weapons by Kazumi Mizumoto …………………… 3
Countdown in Korea by Wade L. Huntley ……………………………………………………… 4
Publication: HPI, ed., Humanitarian crisis and international intervention:
formulae for restoring peace [Jindo kiki to kokusai kainyu: Heiwa kaifuku no shohosen] … 5“Hiroshima” and “Lucky Dragon” by Hiroko Takahashi ……………………………………… 6
HPI Research Forum
Anti-Personnel Land Mines by Ian Maddocks ……………………………………………… 7
HPI-TAPRI Workshop ………………………………………………………………………… 7
Forthcoming International Symposium:“Terror from the Sky: Indiscriminate Bombing from Hiroshima to Today” ………………… 8
Diary …………………………………………………………………………………………… 8

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.1 July 2003

applicability of humanitarian law in this war.
The almost totally one-sided military campaign in Iraqi territory by
the U.S. and U.K. ended in no more than 20 days. During that period,
however, thousands of Iraqi civilians as well as a number of soldiers,
especially on the Iraqi side, were killed or wounded and there was also
massive damage to Iraqi property. The killing or wounding of soldiersand destruction of human lives and goods that can be regarded as
military targets during warfare are not banned even under humanitarianlaw. Nevertheless, the large number of high-tech weapons, such as
precision-guided cluster bombs and depleted uranium bombs, which
U.S. and U.K. forces used in Iraq as if to show off their power, wereinhumane in that they caused indiscriminate damage and unnecessary
suffering not only to Iraqi soldiers, but also to civilians, including
women and children. While there are no treaty provisions explicitly
forbidding the use of such weapons, the general principles andcustomary rules of humanitarian law, which forbid the indiscriminate
destruction of civilians’ lives and property and such means as to cause
unnecessary sufferings to enemies, make the use of such weapons illegal
under certain circumstances. The same reasoning was employed in the
Shimoda Case, that is, the judgment on the legality of the atomic
bombings passed by the Tokyo District Court on December 7, 1963.
Excuses such as “collateral damage” and “bombing by mistake”
inadvertently resulting from attacks against military targets cannot
absolve the perpetrators of their responsibility for the consequences. In a
war of information, in which both sides mobilize the mass media, it isdifficult to obtain promptly accurate information about destructive anddamage-causing actions taken by either side. Investigations into relevantcases of destruction and damage ought to be undertaken by anorganization like the U.N.
Under the terms of existing international criminal law, serious
violations of humanitarian law are subject to criminal punishment,
whether they are committed by ordinary soldiers or officers (or even bya president as the state’s commander in chief). Even if the International
Criminal Court, recently established in The Hague, has jurisdiction oversuch cases, neither the U.S. nor Iraq is party to the international statutethat established the court. In all probability, only Iraqi “war criminals”
will be tried in U.S. military courts after the war, and that will almost
surely amount to a case of widely criticized “victor’s justice.”
3. Legal Status of Iraq after the Collapse of the Hussein Regime
What is Iraq’s legal status following the fall of Baghdad and thecollapse of the Hussein regime? There are an endless number of legal
questions about this issue, such as whether the Iraqi “state” has ceased
to exist or Iraq is simply “in a state of anarchy,” whether the U.S. andU.K. forces are “occupation” forces or “liberation” forces, etc. However,there is no way to consider Iraq as anything other than a state underwartime (belligerent) occupation, as defined in Article 42 of the Hague
Convention, Laws and Customs of War on Land, because Iraq has comede facto under the power of U.S. and U.K. forces. The authorities of
those occupying forces have obligations to respect existing laws of Iraq,
restore public order and civil life, safeguard individual citizens’ lives andprivate property, and prevent looting. President Bush finally issued adeclaration of the end of the battle on May 1, but the declaration, hesaid, did not signify the legal conclusion of the war. Nevertheless, thedeclaration may be regarded as a signal for the transition from a“wartime,” or military, to a “postwar,” or mixed, occupation of Iraq. In
these circumstances, the source of the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance’s (ORHA) power to take action is likely to bequestioned. The establishment of an interim government in Iraq must be
decided by the Iraqi people themselves. The Iraqi people have also
permanent rights over their natural resources, such as oil, which mustnot be treated as a bargaining chip by foreign companies in their pursuitof selfish interests.

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Fujita is professor at Kansai University

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

Special Feature — Issues of the Iraq War

The Invasion of Iraq, the U.N., the Threat of U.S. Unilateralism
and the Spirit of Hiroshima
By Christian P. Scherrer
Nuclear warfare is not a thing of the past. In 1991, after 46 years ofshame, it was employed again by the USA in Iraq, despite thecompelling forensic and documentary evidence of the horrendous
impact uranium has on humans. On March 2, 2003, some 6,000 people
from Hiroshima and other prefectures gathered in downtown Hiroshima,
about a kilometer from where the first nuclear weapon fell in August
1945, killing hundreds of thousands and devastating the city, to writewith their bodies the message, “NO WAR, NO DU!”
Over six weeks in 1991, U.S. aircraft and missiles systematicallydestroyed lives and life-support systems in Iraq. An equally ferocious
assault by the U.S. air force in March-May 2003 was followed by the
deployment of ground troops by the world’s mightiest nations against a
country that had been thoroughly disarmed of its weapons of mass
destruction by U.N. inspectors over the years! For no plausible military
reason, U.K. and U.S. forces used massive amounts of highly toxic
uranium in the heart of Iraqi cities, threatening the lives and health ofmillions of Iraqi citizens. Since 1991 the death toll has climbed
exponentially and, it is feared, will climb even faster. Uranium kills overgenerations.
Abuse of Terrorist Threats and Spreading Fear of Foreign WMD
Since September 11 (2001) war-mongering by U.S. leaders against
Afghanistan, and later against Iraq and a so-called “Axis of Evil,” hasbeen the most disturbing aspect of a wholesale policy change engineeredby George W. Bush Jr. and his extremist neo-conservative advisers. The
initial bogeys of “Islamic” terrorism and the Taliban quickly gave way tothe threat by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD)!
The resurgent neoconservative project rejects the policies ofdeterrence, containment, and collective security, which had served as themain pillars of world peace and order since 1945. Instead, the newstrategy aims to achieve U.S. supremacy by resorting to aggressive
military interventionism, first strikes, and counter-proliferation measuresagainst “rogue” states, encircling Russia and China, and building
permanent military bases throughout the world.
Fabricated “Threats” as Catalyst for an Unprecedented Arms Race
The threat of terrorism, and Iraq’s WMD, have been used to further
an aggressive agenda dating back to 1992, reformulated in a report
entitled “Rebuilding America’s Defenses” in fall 2000. Six of its authors
now occupy key posts in the Pentagon. Since September 11, 2001, U.S.
military spending has been increased to a staggering US$400 billion,
plus US$80 billion for operations against Iraq, or more than the total
amount spent by the “rest of the world”! Without doubt, the USA has
now become the main threat to world peace.
Today Bush Jr. is seen as the “new global monster.” We see
growing anti-Americanism around the world, threatening to isolate the
USA from the global community, but helping ultimately to defeat U.S.
suprematism.
U.S.-U.K. War for Oil was Illegal, Illegitimate and Immoral—
Compounding the Impact of Genocidal Sanctions
The pretext for war, i.e. claims of Iraq’s possession of WMD andlinks to international terrorism, will boomerang. The U.S. and U.K.
governments used calculated lies. WMD were neither used by Iraq, norhave any been found! Nor is there a shred of evidence of Iraq’s alleged
links to al-Qaeda. The secularist Baath party traditionally sought touproot Islamist tendencies.
U.S.-U.K. committed massive war crimes in Iraq in 2003, waging
terror-bombing with WMD, as it did in 1991, again without harming the
top leaders, who all seem to have escaped. For the third time since the
USA supported Iraq’s aggression against Iran in 1980-1988, the peopleof Iraq have been victimized. As in 1991, the systematic U.S. attacks on
civilian facilities created hell on earth. In addition to the estimated400,000 victims of the U.S.-led coalition’s war against Iraq in 1991,

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

approximately 5,000 Iraqi children have died each month fromwater-borne diseases and malnutrition, according to the World HealthOrganization (WHO), due to genocidal sanctions, bringing the death toll
to 1.5 million!
The new aggression in March 2003 compounded an alreadyappalling situation with the use of an even larger amount—estimatedbetween 1,000 and 2,000 tons—of extremely toxic uranium. Dropped on
densely populated areas, the weapon’s long-term impact will be horrific.
Without a thorough clean-up operation, the affected areas will be unfit
for human habitation for millions of years!
U.S. Neo-Conservative Agenda Excludes the United Nations
The U.S.’s real aims were the removal of Hussein from power, themilitary occupation of Iraq, and the establishment of permanent U.S.
bases and a client regime under U.S. control in the midst of the world’s
most important oil region.
U.S. neo-conservative hawks are fiercely opposed to allowing theUnited Nations any role at all. The world order, as we knew it, with
global institutions centering on the U.N., has been severely damaged.
The entire code of international law as the normative guide for
acceptable state behavior has been massively violated. Bush Jr. and his
team have made clear that they are ready to tear up all multilateral
institutions and violate rules which were previously sacrosanct.
These aims can be accomplished only at a cost to the world’s
leading economic power, the European Union, as well as to other great
powers in our multi-polar world—Russia, China, India and Japan. In
asserting its narrow interests the USA has always been ruthless, but theinvasion of Iraq has broken all taboos, and shattered the trans-Atlantic
system of cooperation. The splits caused by the 1999 NATO war against
Yugoslavia have grown deeper—indeed beyond repair. NATO, as the
only remaining Cold War-era military alliance, is finally ready for therubbish bin of history. Its demise may open the way for a future
defensive alliance against U.S. hegemony.
In polls taken before the Iraq war, close to 80% of Americans
wanted the U.N. to be involved. The Bush team wanted to use the U.N.
as the handmaiden of U.S. interests. This gimmick did not work: France,
Russia and China remained opposed.
In order to sell their war to the U.S. public, the U.S. hawks set up a
“Coalition of the Bullied and Bribed.” However, this could not cover up
the overwhelming opposition to aggressive U.S. unilateralism. Even instates that supported Bush’s global cowboy policy, such as Britain or
Spain, large majorities rejected war; anti-war demonstrations in the U. K.
and the U.S. were among the largest.
No war in recent history was ever so categorically rejected long
before it even started. However, millions of demonstrators rallying under
the slogan “No Blood for Oil!” were unable to defeat a tiny group of
war-mongers. Might triumphed over right.
U.S. Big Oil Had No Role in Iraq
Why did the USA have to attack a country it had had fully under its
military control since 1991 by means of slicing the country into three
sections with Northern and Southern no-fly-zones? Iraq had been a rarecontemporary case of restricted sovereignty in military affairs andeconomic development, with sanctions imposed for an indefinite period
without a re-evaluation. The answer is that the real U.S. aim was notwhat its leaders claimed: they wanted to control the second largest oil
reserves in the world. The Hussein regime had signed oil development
contracts with Russia, China and France to be effective after sanctions
were lifted, cutting out the U.S. Big Oil companies. The USA could thus
play a dominant role in the development of Iraq’s huge oil reserves only
after a regime change.

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Scherrer is professor at HPIHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.1 July 2003

Special Feature — Issues of the Iraq War

The Inhumanity of Depleted Uranium Weapons
By Kazumi Mizumoto
1. What is Depleted Uranium?
Depleted uranium (DU) is a byproduct of the process that produces
enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants.
Natural uranium is a heavy metal that normally contains only about
0.7% of the fissionable U-235 isotope. Separating this isotope leaves theremaining “depleted” uranium with 99.8% or more of the U-238 isotope,
which is non-fi ssionable, and 0.2% or less of the U-235 isotope.
Depleted uranium is roughly 60% as radioactive as natural uranium. The
half-life of U-238, which makes up most of DU’s content, is as long as
4.5 billion years. Because its high specific gravity and density make itsuitable for use as a kinetic energy penetrator, depleted uranium has
been widely used for military purposes since the 1990s.
2. Depleted Uranium Used for Munitions
Depleted uranium is most widely used to make shells that caneasily penetrate the hard steel body of tanks and armored vehicles.
Depleted uranium is contained in the 30mm rounds used by the U.S. Air
Force’s A-10 “tank-killer” aircraft and the 105-120mm rounds used by
the U.S. Army’s M1A1 Abrams tanks. The material is also used in some
U.K. and Russian tank shells, and in the armor of the M1A1 Abrams
tanks. Some scholars believe that depleted uranium is also used in theearth-penetrating bombs called “Bunker Busters,” which destroyed
concrete buildings during the Afghan and Iraqi wars. It is also
speculated that depleted uranium is used in “Cluster Bombs” and 200pound bombs.
3. Dangerous Effects of DU
Although DU is less radioactive than natural uranium, it is still atoxic radioactive substance that emits alpha and gamma rays. DU
exposure may cause serious damage to the human body, including
triggering cancer and leukemia. In addition to contamination of theimmediate areas where DU is used, the shock and heat produced when
DU shells hit targets such as tanks easily aerosolize DU into particles
less than fi ve microns in diameter. These particles can be carried
downwind 25 miles or more, polluting air, soil and water in their path.
According to one estimate, up to 70% of the depleted uranium used on abattlefield may be scattered over a wide area as small particles. The
aerosolized particles are easily taken into the human body through therespiratory system, mucous membrane or wounds, contaminating thewhole body radioactively and chemically.
4. Military Use of DU
DU was reportedly fi rst used by Israeli tanks during the 1973
Arab-Israeli War, but the first significant use of DU weapons was in the
Gulf War of 1991. More than 300 tons of DU shells were used by the
U.S. and the U.K. in 940,000 rounds fired by aircraft and 14,000 rounds
by tanks. The U.S. Air Force used 10,000 DU gun shells (2,750
kilograms) during the Bosnia conflict in 1995 and 31,000 gun shells(8,500 kilograms) in the Kosovo conflict in 1999.
Following the 1991 Gulf War, 186,000 of the approximately
700,000 U.S. troops who served in the battlefields were reported to havemedical problems, most with symptoms known as the “Gulf War
Syndrome.” In Iraq, there have been reports of a dramatic increase in theincidence of cancer and leukemia among former soldiers, birth defects
among children born in the 1990s, and an estimated 250,000 Iraqi
citizens afflicted with symptoms caused by DU. Among veterans who
served in Bosnia and Kosovo, there was a similar increase in illnesses
such as leukemia, which have come to be known as the “Balkan
Syndrome.”

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.1 July 2003

The U.S. government has maintained the position that DU had no
negative effects on soldiers’ health. However, in the U.S., suspicions
grew among veterans who served in the Gulf that DU weapons were thecause of the “Syndrome,” and many veteran associations andnongovernmental organizations (NGOs) started taking a variety ofactions to expose the effects of DU weapons and seek relief for their
victims. Internationally, there have been increasingly vocal calls for aban on DU weapons, relief for victims, and detoxifi cation ofcontaminated areas. In 1996, a resolution banning DU and other similar
weapons was passed by the United Nations Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by a vote of
15 “yes” against 1 “no” (cast by the U.S.), and 8 abstentions. Also, anumber of international conferences on DU weapons have been held in
the last several years in Europe and other regions of the world.
5. Non-Military Use of Depleted Uranium
The accumulation of depleted uranium as a byproduct of enricheduranium started with U.S. development of atomic bombs during WorldWar II. As a result of the nuclear rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union, the U.S. now has a stockpile of 760,000 tons of depleted
uranium; Russia’s stockpile is 500,000 tons. The U.S. started research,development and experiments on the military application of depleted
uranium in the 1950s as a cheap method of disposing of its hugestockpile of the material. Depleted uranium is also stockpiled in the
U.K., France, Germany, China, and other nations. As Japan depends
upon nuclear energy for approximately one third of its electric power
generation, it also has developed a stockpile of 9,600 tons.
Besides its military use, depleted uranium is also used for civilian
purposes, such as counterweights in the wings of aircraft. The Japan
Airlines jumbo jetliner that crashed into a mountain in 1985 wasequipped with 240 tons of counterweights made of depleted uranium.
The aviation industry is gradually switching to the use of tungsten inplace of depleted uranium for counterweights, but many aircraft are still
flying with DU counterweights.
6. Hiroshima and Depleted Uranium
Although the U.S. government has officially admitted that its armed
forces used depleted uranium weapons during the recent Iraq War, it has
not yet provided detailed information. Depleted uranium weapons differ
from conventional nuclear weapons in that they do not destroy theirtargets by a nuclear explosion. However, depleted uranium weapons are
just as morally objectionable as nuclear weapons, since they cause
serious radioactive damage indiscriminately to civilians and combatants
alike, as well as to the natural environment. DU’s toxic effects spreadover a wide area and continue for many years after the end of a war. The
U.S. and U.K. governments do not officially admit any negative effects
of depleted uranium weapons on human health, and stick to the position
that the use of such weapons does not violate international law.
However, in international civil society, the view that DU weapons
clearly violate international law is gaining increasing support. Somemaintain that DU use violates the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (Protocol 1), which prohibits employment of suchmeans of war as may cause unnecessary suffering to people or damage
to the natural environment. It is incumbent on the citizens of Hiroshima,
with their unique historical experience as victims of atomic bombing, todemand inquiries into the damage caused by depleted uranium, relief for
DU victims, and a legal ban on DU weapons.

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Mizumoto is associate professor at HPIVisit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

Countdown in Korea
By Wade L. Huntley
North Korea’s surprise admission last October to a secret nuclear
weapons program based on uranium enrichment triggered a cascading
breakdown of the 1994 Agreed Framework structure that had kept North
Korea’s more advanced plutonium-based nuclear program in check. By
year’s end North Korea had expelled United Nations inspectors,
removed monitoring equipment at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, andmoved to restart Yongbyon’s 5 megawatt (MW) nuclear reactor.
The situation poses a more serious threat to global nuclear
nonproliferation than Iraq ever did. The immediate danger is that North
Korea will restart its plutonium reprocessing facility at Yongbyon.
Under the Agreed Framework, spent nuclear fuel from the 5MW reactor
was verifi ably stored and set to leave the country eventually. By
reprocessing the spent fuel, within a few months North Korea could
extract enough plutonium for a half dozen nuclear weapons (in addition
to the one or two weapons worth of plutonium North Korea probably
already extracted a decade ago). Once extracted, the plutonium could be
dispersed to multiple hidden locations. North Korea would then be
unimpeded in producing nuclear weapons for its own use or exporting
the plutonium worldwide.
Following this course, North Korea would become the first state
ever to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and become anuclear power. This would be a tremendous blow to the NPT — a treaty
that has successfully prevented proliferation around the world andprovides the strongest legal mechanism to compel disarmament by its
five nuclear weapons signatories. In the words of International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed El Baradei, North
Korea’s actions could “open the door for countries to walk away from
nonproliferation and arms control agreements.”
The international community must act decisively to achieve a
nonproliferation outcome in Korea. Because Pyongyang insists onnegotiation directly with Washington, the United States must play acentral role in forging a solution. Unfortunately, the Bushadministration’s de facto policy of “hostile neglect” toward North Korea
has instead contributed to the crisis. Determined to reverse the Clinton
administration’s attempts to engage North Korea, the Bush teameschewed any direct contacts for nearly two years, routinely
characterized North Korea as a threat to U.S. interests, and made clearthat pre-emptive strikes and other strategic policy innovations had North
Korea in mind. In this way, the Bush administration fostered the fragile
conditions within which revelation of the uranium program quickly
precipitated a complete breakdown of U.S. -North Korea relations.
§
Against this backdrop, the Bush administration’s response to the“October surprise” was astonishingly passive — more passive than the
Clinton administration’s reaction in 1993-94. Administration supporters
defended this passive response as pragmatic and sensible in light of thetremendous vulnerability of South Korea should the crisis escalate towar. In fact, the real source of the administration’s timorousness was its
preoccupation with Iraq. Having spent the previous summer heating up
that confrontation, unnamed high Bush officials candidly admitted thatthey were in no mood to take on a second crisis.
Bush offi cials probably assumed that the aggressive policy todisarm Iraq would also intimidate North Korea. But Kim Jong-il also
noticed that with the U.S. preparing for a major war in the Middle East,
U.S. threats to resort to the same kind of coercion of North Korea
simultaneously were far less credible. Kim seems to have judged that
North Korea could afford to make its nuclear gambit overt — and could
not afford to wait.
This explains Pyongyang’s decision, during the now infamous
October meeting, to acknowledge — even fl aunt — its uranium
program. The Bush team appeared unprepared for the constraints its
Iraq policy placed on its capacity to back up its threats. Yet, theadministration also continued to rule out “Clinton-style” direct
negotiations with North Korea. Thus, the administration simply

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

continued its policy of intentional hostile neglect. The result: North
Korea escaped the Agreed Framework’s constraints on its nuclear
program without serious adverse consequences.
§
Trapped in its own policy, the Bush administration now has few
good options remaining.
The current Bush strategy seems to be to hope that intensive
coercive pressure will restrain North Korea from crossing the
reprocessing “red line.” The recent three-way talks in Beijing show why
this approach will probably fail. U.S. conservatives at first hailed North
Korea’s agreement to meet in a multilateral forum as a concession
proving the merits of the administration’s position (North Korea had
previously insisted on bilateral talks). However, North Korea quickly
termed Chinese participation as “mediation” and came to the meetings
emboldened and unapologetic. Administration hard-liners were so
incensed that prospects for further talks may be dimmer now than
before. For long-time watchers of North Korea, the episode was just one
more addition to the long list of failed U.S. attempts to coerce “better
behavior” from North Korea.
If North Korea begins full-scale plutonium reprocessing, a U.S.
military strike to destroy the Yongbyon complex is possible. This would
risk a North Korean counter-attack that could devastate South Korea,
potentially subject Japan to missile attacks, and possibly trigger abroader regional confl ict involving China. Even if escalation was
avoided, a strike on Yongbyon could easily rupture the U.S.-South Korea
alliance; the Bush administration has handled its relationships with
South Korea and Japan so poorly that these allies currently will notsupport even threats of military action.
§
So, a peaceful nonproliferation outcome depends on some kind ofnegotiated settlement; that in turn depends on the Bush team getting
serious about its diplomacy. The issue is not whether to engage or
confront North Korea — although that debate dominates U.S.
policy-making, in fact North Korea does not reciprocate accommodation
any more readily than it cowers to intimidation. Rather, U.S. policy
must involve a nuanced and flexible blending of genuine incentives andcredible sanctions, which, at its core, prioritizes interaction over neglect.
With the Iraq war ended and reprocessing looming, the Bushadministration now seems ready to intensify its confrontation of North
Korea; however, it has yet to exhibit equal fervor in diplomatic outreach.
Unfortunately, recent U.S. military buildups will be ineffectual unless
U.S. diplomacy opens a credible positive path for Pyongyang to abandon
its nuclear programs. In particular, only a genuine U.S. willingness tonegotiate will reassure Japan and (especially) South Korea that the U.S.
takes seriously these allies’ concerns and truly desires to solve the
Korean crisis peacefully.
North Korea’s motivations to develop nuclear weapons arecomplex, but by its own statements the long history of U.S. nuclear
threats against North Korea plays a prominent role. More recently, thecontrast between the U.S. counterproliferation attack on Iraq and its
deference to existing nuclear powers (including Israel, India andPakistan) reinforces global perceptions that nuclear arms remain avaluable source of power and prestige — and perhaps the only means ofdeterring U.S. attack. These circumstances underpin North Korea’s
demand for U.S. non-aggression guarantees as a condition for forsaking
its nuclear program. A negotiated nonproliferation outcome in Korea
must accommodate this condition.
Iraq demonstrated how easily the Bush administration will go to
war. But North Korea does not lend itself to a forced solution. A
peaceful nonproliferation outcome in Korea depends upon the Bushteam finding a way to do the thing that is hardest for it to do: sit down
and talk.

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Huntley is associate professor at HPIHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.1 July 2003

Publication of Hiroshima Peace Institute, ed.,Humanitarian crisis and international
intervention: formulae for restoring peace[Jindo kiki to kokusai kainyu:
Heiwa kaifuku no shohosen].
Tokyo: Yushindo, 2003.
The direst threat to international security, a potential conflict between
the Soviet Union and the United States, disappeared with the end of theCold War. Since that time, humanitarian crises resulting from domestic
conflicts have come to pose the greatest threat to people’s livelihoodand security. Inaugurated in July 2000, the Research Project on the
Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism (Project Leader:
Toshiya Hoshino, Associate Professor, Osaka School of International
Public Policy, Osaka University), set out to explore issues raised bydomestic conflicts, including those in Kosovo and East Timor, and to
examine how the international community should involve itself in
resolving such crises. The findings of the research conducted over the
next two years were published by a Tokyo-based publisher in February
2003.
Excluding Preface and Afterword, the book comprises 11 chaptersdivided roughly into two parts. The first four chapters chiefly discusstheoretical issues in international politics and law. Chapter 1 deals withthe different ways the international community has intervened inconflicts, and summarizes the modus operandi that should be adopted
when moral impulse, legal system and political dynamics come intoplay. Chapter 2, taking NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia as its focal
issue, considers the justifiability of intervention from both legal andpolitical perspectives while making distinction between the legitimacyof resorting to the use of force (jus ad bellum) and the legitimacy of themethod (jus in bello). Chapter 3 views the causes of post-Cold War
domestic confl icts from the perspective of globalization — theglobal-level technological, economic and social re-structuralization thatare taking place — and analyzes the current status of the “globalizationof civil strife.” Chapter 4 looks at the new role of nation-building
assigned to U.N. peacekeeping operations, introduces the concept of“international territorial administration” and examines the issue fromthe standpoint of international law and precepts.
The second half of the book presents actual case studies of theroles of various agents involved in interventions. Chapter 5 compares
the activities of Italy’s humanitarian aid agencies in the Kosovo conflictwith those of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees(UNHCR). It examines the confl ict between humanitarianism andnational interests that continues to affect humanitarian activities, andconsiders how the deleterious effects of the pursuit of national interests
might be overcome. Chapter 6 explores the role of NGOs in humanitarianassistance and provides first-hand accounts of the experiences of frontline workers. The chapter looks objectively at the limitations of NGOs,
while elucidating their huge potential. Chapter 7 deals with issues
confronting journalists when reporting on conflicts, especially thedifficulty of achieving fair and impartial “objective reporting,” anddraws on the author’s own experience of the problem of verifying facts.
Chapter 8 points out the potential significance of regional organizations
providing a model for intervention and acting as a link between“universal logic” and regional circumstances. Chapter 9 analyzes thesituation in Cambodia 10 years after U.N. peacekeeping operations. It
evaluates the achievements of the United Nations Transitional Authority
in Cambodia (UNTAC), and examines the issues that remain unresolved.
Chapter 10 outlines tasks that need to be undertaken in East Timor, where
the author was involved in U.N. peacekeeping operations, and looks at
the difficulties facing the United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor (UNTAET) in creating a governmental institution.
Finally, in Chapter 11, on the basis of the findings of this project,
two main requirements are singled out for successful international

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.1 July 2003

interventions. The first is justice on the part of the intervening party.
The second is a legitimate form of intervention guided by a deep
concern for human security rather than just national security.
By Nobumasa Akiyama, assistant professor at HPI

Humanitarian Crisis and International Intervention:
Formulae for Restoring Peace
Contents
Preface
List of Abbreviations
Chapter 1 — Humanitarian Crisis and International Intervention:
Introduction
Chapter 2 — Legitimacy of “New Interventionism”: NATO’s
Bombing of Yugoslavia
Chapter 3 — Post-Cold War Conflicts and Globalization
Chapter 4 — Transitional Territorial Management, One Form ofInternational Intervention
Chapter 5 — National Interest and Humanitarianism in Conflict: Italy
and UNHCR in Kosovo
Chapter 6 — NGO Activities in Humanitarian Aid: Role, Limits andPotential
Chapter 7 — War Correspondence Today and Its Problems:
Verification of Facts
Chapter 8 — Regional Approach to International Intervention:“Legitimacy” of Intervention and Regional
Organizations
Chapter 9 — Achievements of UNTAC and Tasks Facing the New
Cambodia
Chapter 10 — U.N. Peacekeeping in East Timor: Spoiling the People,
Destructing the Nation
Chapter 11 — International Intervention and Formulae for Restoring
Peace
Afterword
Authors<Preface> Haruhiro Fukui, President, HPI<Chapter 1, Chapter 11> Toshiya Hoshino, Associate Professor, theOsaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University<Chapter 2> Hideaki Shinoda, Research Associate, Institute for Peace
Science, Hiroshima University<Chapter 3> Seiji Endo, Professor, Faculty of Law, Seikei University<Chapter 4> Tetsuya Yamada, Research Fellow, the Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs<Chapter 5, Afterword> Nobumasa Akiyama, Assistant Professor, HPI<Chapter 6> Yukie Osa, Secretary General, Association for Aid andRelief<Chapter 7> Shuichi Habu, Deputy International Editor, International
News Department, the Yomiuri Shimbun<Chapter 8> Jun Tsubouchi, Associate Professor, Faculty of Educationand Human Sciences, Yamanashi University<Chapter 9> Kazumi Mizumoto, Associate Professor, HPI<Chapter 10> Yoshifumi Azuma, former Unit Chief, Economic
Statistics Unit, Department of Economic Development, UNTAET(Arranged in chapter order; positions listed are those held at the time of writing.)−5−

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

“Hiroshima” and “Lucky Dragon”
By Hiroko Takahashi
In the first years following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, theUnited States government sought to deny the widespread radiation
effects of these weapons. Only after the clear evidence provided by the
Lucky Dragon incident following an atomic test in the Pacific nine years
later did the United States grudgingly begin conceding this far-reaching
danger of the use of nuclear weapons.
On September 5, 1945, Wilfred Burchett, a correspondent for the
Daily Express, reported from Hiroshima: “People are still dying,
mysteriously and horribly — people who were uninjured in the
cataclysm — from an unknown something which I can only describe as
the atomic plague.” Concerned about this report, Brigadier General
Thomas F. Farrell, chief of the War Department’s atomic bomb mission(Manhattan Project), issued a statement the following day denying thatthe damage was from radiation. The statement claimed that the atomic
bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were detonated at such ahigh altitude that no radiation remained, and that even if some people
died later, it was because of injuries sustained at the time of the
explosion.
On August 31, 1946, The New Yorker, a weekly magazine,
published a report titled “Hiroshima” by John Hersey, who hadinterviewed atomic bomb survivors in Hiroshima. Three hundred
thousand copies of The New Yorker were sold out from newsstands in
New York within the day. “Hiroshima” later appeared in serial form in
more than 100 newspapers and, in December of that year, was publishedin book form, again entitled Hiroshima, which immediately hit thebest-seller list. Before Hersey’s article, the typical image of atomic
bombs in American society was only a sanitized image from the photosof the United States Air Force. The appearance of “Hiroshima” began
drawing attention under the mushroom clouds.
In this way, concern over Hiroshima and voices questioning thelegitimacy of the atomic bombings heightened enormously from the fall
to winter of 1946. In its February issue in 1947, Harper’s Magazine
carried an article by Henry L. Stimson, ex-Secretary of War, whichargued that “we estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan(the invasion of the main island of Honshu) to its conclusion, the major
fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. I was
informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million
casualties, to American forces alone.” This article was reprinted in all
kinds of magazines and newspapers, and was read by many Americans.
With the publication of the so-called “myth of one million,” the image ofthe atomic bombings as symbolizing the conclusion of World War II
became imprinted in the minds of most Americans.
Later in America, a signature-collecting campaign was conducted
for the Stockholm Appeal issued by the World Peace Council in March,
1950. However, in the setting of the intensifying Cold War and
McCarthyism (at its peak in the early ’50s), the antinuclear movement
was attacked as “communistic.” Thus, the discussion about theinhumanity of the use of nuclear weapons and the peace movement
generally stalled. In its information campaign on measures against
atomic bombs, the Federal Civil Defense Administration claimed, in theearly ’50s, that U.S. citizens could survive an atomic bombing andrebuild the nation as long as they could avoid the heat emission and blastof the atomic explosion. There was no mention of the horrors ofradiation and its serious effects on the human body long after an atomic
explosion.
The Lucky Dragon radiation exposure incident took place in thecontext of this denial of the radiation threat of atomic weapons. On
March 1, 1954, the United States conducted the thermonuclear test code
named “Bravo Shot” at the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The
crewmembers of the Japanese fi shing vessel, the Lucky Dragon(Fukuryu Maru in Japanese), which was 130 kilometers away from the
hypocenter of the explosion, and residents of Rongelap Island, 190
kilometers away, were exposed to radiation, not due to direct heat or
blast of the explosion, but due to radioactive fallout, or “the ashes ofdeath.” Soon after the test, the Lucky Dragon crewmembers were all
hospitalized with very distinct symptoms of radiation exposure.
The tragic fate of the “Lucky Dragon,” namely, the clear evidenceof widespread radiation effects from the test soon gained wide attention.

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

A research vessel dispatched by the Japanese government reported that
contamination by radioactive materials had spread across a wide area of
the Pacific Ocean. In September 1954, Aikichi Kuboyama, the chiefradio operator of the Lucky Dragon, died. However, the United States
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) did not issue a statement about theeffects of the nuclear test for nearly a year.
On the other hand, Ralph Lapp, who was engaged in the Manhattan
Project and had once worked as a scientist in the Department of
Defense, contributed an essay to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists inwhich he pointed out, for the first time among American scientists, thehazardous nature of radioactive fallout, based on data collected by
Japanese scientists. According to the historian, Allan Winkler, thecontroversy over radioactive fallout in the wake of “Bravo Shot” turned
into a public debate, which polarized the scientific world and began tospread throughout American society.
On February 15, 1955, the AEC issued for the first time a statement
concerning “Bravo Shot.” The statement made no reference to thedisaster of the Lucky Dragon, but acknowledged in a very limited way
the effects of the “ashes of death,” or radioactive fallout, from thenuclear test in the Bikini Atoll, which had involved a surface ornear-surface explosion of a thermonuclear weapon. This was followedby an erroneous declaration: “In an in-the air explosion where thefireball does not touch the earth’s surface, by the time they have reached
the earth’s surface, the major part of their radioactivity has beendissipated harmlessly in the atmosphere, and the residual contamination
is widely dispersed.” In other words, there was no need to worry about
contamination by radioactive materials if the explosion took place in
mid-air, as in the cases of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The disaster of theLucky Dragon was thus accounted for not as a repeat of Hiroshima andNagasaki, but as a “new atomic peril.” In addition, the statement gave
the reassurance that people would be able to avoid injury by simply
following government instructions.
Despite the AEC’s statement, the tone of the debate about
radioactive fallout became increasingly apprehensive. Nuclear weaponsthat caused “ashes of death” were now dubbed “dirty weapons.” In
response to mounting public concern, advocates of nuclear tests turnedto the development of “clean weapons,” which, according to Edward
Teller, a leading advocate, were weapons whose radioactive fallout had
been reduced by more than 95%.
In June 1957, hearings on “The Nature of Radioactive Fallout andIts Effects on Man” were held by the Special Subcommittee on
Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of theUnited States. Lapp interviewed former crewmembers of the Lucky
Dragon and Japanese scientists before the hearings, and testified on thedanger of radioactive fallout using the data and verbal evidence he had
obtained during the interviews. Asked by a member of the subcommittee
if “it is possible to fabricate a weapon which is clean,” Lapp insisted thatthe question was inappropriate and that, though one could use the term“relatively clean,” it was impossible to fabricate “clean weapons” that
did not cause radioactive fallout at all.
In 1958, Lapp published the first book on the disaster of the Lucky
Dragon, titled The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon. There he again
discussed “clean weapons,” pointing out that, if 95% of a bomb is clean,
the remaining 5% is still dirty, and maintaining that the small atomic
bombs, which completely destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were100% dirty all the same.
Year 2004 marks the 50th anniversary of the disaster of the Lucky
Dragon which began to open the world eyes to the danger of radioactive
fallout and gave rise to the “controversy dividing the scientific world.”
Still, the United States government continues to try to downplay or deny
the importance of radiation effects. This resistance is especially evident
in recent denials by the U.S. government of any radioactive
consequences from the use of depleted uranium weapons. Fifty years
later, the voices of the victims of radiation exposure (“Hibakusha” inJapanese) are still crying to be heard.

−6−

Takahashi is research associate at HPIHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.1 July 2003

HPI Research Forum
February 28, 2003

Title: Anti-Personnel Land Mines — a Model ofModern Military Practice, and a Challenge
for Peace Activists
Speaker: Dr. Ian Maddocks, Emeritus Professor, Flinders
University of South Australia, and Chairman, Boardof Directors, International Physicians for thePrevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)

It is reported that between 1985 and 1996 the U.S. produced more thanfour million anti-personnel mines. By 1992 the number of anti-personnel
mines that the U.S. exported to Cambodia reached 600,000. During the
1980s and early 1990s the former Soviet Union, China and Italy were
responsible for most of the remaining 5 - 10 million mines produced
annually. Currently, the major producers of anti-personnel mines are
Russia, China and the U.S.
There were thousands of landmine deaths and injuries reported in
70 countries in 2001-02. Among them Afghanistan and Chechnya
produced the largest number of casualties — well over one thousand ineach region. It is estimated that the total casualties of land mines in theworld hitherto could be several million.
Professor Maddocks’ paper takes the viewpoint that the use of alarge number of anti-personnel mines in almost all regions inarms-conflict is similar to a terrorist attack, as these weapons were
scattered not only on the battlefields, but in areas not associated withformal conflict. Hidden as they are, they suddenly and unexpectedlyattack civilians and are a threat that persists for decades. Increasingly,
modern military practice causes far more death and injury to civilians
than it does to combatants. Because of the numerous numbers ofcasualties due to land mines, it is not surprising that anti-personnel
mines have been called “weapons of mass destruction in slow motion.”

In his presentation, Professor Maddocks graphically illustrated theimpact of landmine explosions on the human body with detailed images
and medical descriptions, demonstrating just how inhumane theseweapons are. He made clear why IPPNW includes the prevention of
manufacture, export, deployment and use of land mines as part of its
peace advocacy, along with the prevention of nuclear war and theelimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
In 1997, the so-called Ottawa Treaty — Convention on theProhibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti Personnel Mines and on their Destruction — was adopted and signed by
100 nations. This was the result achieved by the strong coalition
movement of veterans’ group, various peace groups and governments ofsome middle power nations such as Canada, Belgium, Norway andAustria. It was an epoch-making event in terms of getting a majority ofmembers of the United Nations to agree and cut through established U.N.
processes.
The point made by Professor Maddocks, is that such a process,operating outside the usual U.N. mechanisms, could serve as a model forachieving the elimination of nuclear weapons. That suggestion is apotential source of inspiration and encouragement for the people in
Hiroshima who have been tirelessly calling for the abolition of such
weapons ever since August 1945. However, Professor Maddocks also
pointed out the problem that the refusal by key powers, particularly the
U.S., to adhere to such a political process or outcome remains a major
obstacle. When we consider the fact that the U.S. recently waged war
against Iraq, ignoring the established decision-making process of theUnited Nations, it is clearly urgent for us to confront such unjustifiablebehavior, and to develop an effective means to change reliance on
nuclear weapons by working both outside and inside the U.N.
mechanisms.
By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPIHPI-TAPRI Workshop
On February 24 and 25, 2003, the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI), in
conjunction with the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) of
Finland, held a workshop in Hiroshima entitled “Resolution andPrevention of Conflicts and the Role of Civil Society.” The workshop
was part of a research project conducted by HPI with funds provided
by the Science Research Funding Subsidy Program, Basic Research
B, of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology. The on-going project is entitled “Theoretical
Investigation of Conflict Resolution/Prevention and Process of Civil
Society Formation: Examples from Asian Nations.” Its aims are toinvestigate, from the perspective of comparative politics and politicaldevelopment theory, the role of civil society in the resolution of
confl icts and the prevention of their recurrence in Asia and tocontribute to the construction of a theory of civil society in the region.
By comparing the Asia-focused research conducted by HPI withresearch conducted by TAPRI on European examples, the workshop
aimed to identify the historical and geographical factors that could
contribute to formulating a model of civil society in its role as anagent in confl ict resolution. The workshop also discussed theuniversality of the role of civil society in the transition from an
authoritarian to a democratic regime and in post-confl ict
nation-building.
The workshop was divided into four sessions. Session 1
addressed the theme of “Understanding ‘Civil Society’ in the Context
of Peace Building and Political Development.” It analyzed thesignificance of various concepts of civil society and their implications
for democracy and peace in Asia, and the role of civil society insecurity-building in Europe. Session 2 was entitled “The Roles ofCivil Society in Post-Conflict Peace Building.” It drew on East Timor
as an Asian model, examining the process of its achievement of
independence and development and the role of its local civilsociety.The European example came from Macedonia, and thediscussion centered on the complexities of conflict resolution and therole of civil society. A comparative exploration was attempted into the

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.1 July 2003

relationships between
the process of post conflict peace - building
and - establishment andthe process of thedevelopment of civils o c i e t y. S e s s i o n 3
looked at civil society
from the aid-donor’s
perspective. The Japan
Platform, comprisingNGOs, business circles
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is an umbrella organization in
Japan for emergency humanitarian aid. The session focused on thedevelopment of the Japan Platform and the role of civil society, alongwith the role of international organizations in facilitating the buildingof a model for civil society in the Balkans. Session 4 cited as
examples of the role played by civil society in the prevention of
conflicts the development of civil society in multi-ethnic Malaysia
and the process of the achievement of independence by Baltic
countries.
The focus of discussion throughout the workshop was on theelements and conditions conducive to the creation of civil society andthe way actors and organizations involved might conduct themselvesmore effectively. The ideal form of civil society and its role inprevention and resolution of confl ict were discussed from many
angles, including regional characteristics, stages of politicaldevelopment, what political system need be adopted to guarantee thepresence of civil society, and the functional status of such a system.
The workshop was a pilot project of HPI and TAPRI. The two
institutes plan jointly to publish a report based on the discussions at
the workshop.

−7−

By Nobumasa Akiyama, assistant professor at HPIVisit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

International Symposium“Terror from the Sky: Indiscriminate Bombing from Hiroshima to Today”
The bombing of Hiroshima is a typical example of indiscriminate bombing ofcivilians, which is clearly a crime against humanity. Yet indiscriminate
bombing is not a phenomenon unique to Hiroshima, but a common feature ofmodern and contemporary warfare. Large scale aerial bombing targeting
civilians became a major strategy during World War II, resulting in a large
number of victims both in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. With each new
war since World War II, the strategic importance of aerial bombing has
increased, and, it featured, for example, in the Korean, Vietnam, Gulf andKosovo-Serbian Wars. In the more recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq many
civilians, in particular children, women and older people, were victims ofindiscriminate bombing. This symposium examines the history and present
situation of indiscriminate bombing from the viewpoint of Hiroshima, andexplores possible ways of preventing the future occurrence of mass-killingfrom the sky.

Date and Time: August 2 (Sat.), 2003 1:30 p.m.-5:00 p.m.
Venue: Himawari Room, second basement floor (B2)International Conference Center(Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park)
1-5 Nakajima-cho, Naka-ku, Hiroshima
Host: Hiroshima Peace InstituteCollaboration: Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation
How to Attend
Send a postcard to reach Hiroshima Peace Institute by July 30. Write yourname, address, and telephone and fax numbers. Reservations can also bemade by phone, fax or email. Up to 200 people can be accommodated on afirst-come, first-served basis.
Address: Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima Mitsui Building 12th floor,
2-7-10, Otemachi, Naka-ku, Hiroshima 730-0051, Japan
Tel: +81-82-544-7570 Fax: +81-82-544-7573
Email: office-peace@peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp

Panelists:
Ronald Schaffer Professor, California State University at Northridge
Tetsuo Maeda
Professor, Tokyo International University
Marilyn Young Professor, New York University
Eric Markusen Professor, Danish Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies
Yuki Tanaka
Professor, Hiroshima Peace Institute

ＤＩＡＲＹ
February 28, 2003 - June 30, 2003
◆Feb. 28-March 17 Christian P. Scherrer visits East Timor to review, among
other things, the activities of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and theserious crimes unit.
◆March 3-13 Nobumasa Akiyama conducts research in East Timor for“Theoretical Investigation of Conflict Resolution/Prevention and Process of
Civil Society Formation : Examples from Asian Nations”project.
◆March 24-28 Workshop of HPI Research Project on “Comparative Research
into Genocide and Mass Violence” is held at HPI.
◆March 26 Kazumi Mizumoto delivers report on “Cambodia, ten years after
UNTAC: Tasks for Peace Building” to Research Group on Conflict Prevention,sponsored by Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA).
◆March 28-29 Akiyama attends Track II Meeting of U.S. - Japan Commission
on Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Verifi cation in
Washington D.C.
◆April 2-4 Mizumoto delivers report on “The Role of Hiroshima in the 21stCentury: From Destruction to Reconstruction and Reconciliation” atinternational conference commemorating the 55th anniversary of the April 3rd
uprising in Jeju, titled “Genocide, Memory, and Peace: Beyond the Memory of
the April 3rd Uprising,” sponsored by the Research Institute on the April 3rd
Jeju Uprising, held in Jeju City, Republic of Korea.
◆April 7 HPI President Haruhiro Fukui and all other researchers at HPI attend“Hiroshima and Nagasaki Seminar” organized by the cities of Hiroshima andNagasaki to discuss topics of mutual interest with Rotary Peace Scholars fromInternational Christian University (ICU) and local college students.
◆April 16 Fukui gives lecture entitled “Women’s Culture to Nurture the 21stCentury World” at meeting held by International Service Project Hiroshima(ISP).
◆April 29 Mizumoto gives lecture on “The Atomic Bomb Experience ofHiroshima and Its Role in the 21st Century” and Wade L. Huntley on “Seven
Lessons from the Iraq War” at a seminar organized by Meiji Gakuin University
and the University of California at Hiroshima Aster Plaza.
◆May 8 Yuki Tanaka gives lecture on “History and the Present Situation ofIndiscriminate Bombing” at meeting of the Economics Association of Keio
University.
◆May 10-11 Third workshop of HPI Research Project on “Military Violenceagainst Civilians — A Comparative and Historical Analysis” is held at HPI.
◆May 17 Fukui gives lecture titled “On Human Beings” at Mental Care
Association meeting at Kyushu Sangyo University.
◆May 22 Jacques Hymans, assistant professor at Smith College, gives lecture
on “The Bush Doctrine of Preventive War: A Case of Foreign Policy Jujitsu” at
HPI Research Forum.
◆May 22-23 Akiyama attends meeting on “Southern Caucasus in the Context
of New Geostrategical Relationships” organized by and held at Western
University in Azerbaijan and gives report on “Geopolitics in the Caucasus andEnergy Security in East Asia: From a Japanese Perspective.”◆May 24-25 Second workshop of HPI Research Project on“Confidence-Building Mechanism in East Asia” is held at Toshi Center Hotelin Tokyo.
◆June 3-4 Akiyama attends steering committee meeting for project on“Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons”
sponsored by U.S. International Strategy Research Project and held in Geneva,
Switzerland.
◆June 7-10 Scherrer gives two presentations on Rwandan genocide and chairs
two panels at 5th International Biennial Conference of the International
Association of Genocide Scholars in Galway, Ireland.
◆June 13 Public meeting on “HPI Research Project on Legitimacy and
Rationality of New-interventionism” is held at Hiroshima City Plaza for Town
Development through Citizen Exchange.
◆June 24-27 Fukui, Tanaka and Mizumoto attend “Reconsidering
Hiroshima/Nagasaki” conference in Hiroshima, held by the Japan Studies
Association of the United States. Fukui speaks on “Atomic Bombing in
Hiroshima in Historical Perspective” on 24th, Mizumoto on “The Atomic
Bomb Experience of Hiroshima, Its Reconstruction and Reconciliation” on
25th, and Tanaka on “Japan’s Comfort Women” on 26th.
◆June 26-27 Scherrer presents paper on “Perspectives for Accountability for
the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Genocidal Sanctions and Other
Crimes against Humanity Committed in Iraq” at 2nd meeting of the European
Network for Peace and Human Rights in Brussels, organized by the Bertrand
Russell Peace Foundation.
◆June 30 Fukui gives opening speech on behalf of Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba at
meeting of preparatory commission for Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty Organization at Hiroshima International Conference Center.
— Visitors to HPI —◆April 9 Datuk Wira Abu Seman Yusop and 14 delegates from Malaysia.
◆May 19 Kinuko Laskey, member of the Canadian Society of Atomic Bomb
Survivors.
◆May 21 Dr. Otto Hieronymi, Geneva Head of International Relations
Program at Webster University in Switzerland, and 18 students.
◆May 22 Dr. Berit Ås, Professor Emeritus of Oslo University.
◆June 2 Dr. Linda Thomas and another professor of Randolph-Macon
Woman’s College, Dr. Margaret Roman and another professor of College ofSaint Elizabeth, Dr. Yasuhide Kobayashi and two other professors of Hiroshima
Jogakuin University, three students from Randolph-Macon Woman’s College,
and one student from College of Saint Elizabeth, 10 students from Hiroshima
Jogakuin University.
◆June 9 Dr. Daniel Mato, Department of Social Economics, Universidad
Central de Venezuela, and Mrs. Mato.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWSVol.6, No.1 July, 25. 2003
Copytight 2003 HPI All rights reserved!Issued by Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University

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Hiroshima Mitsui Bldg. 12th Floor, 2-7-10 Otemachi, Naka-ku, Hiroshima 730-0051, JAPAN E-mail:office-peace@peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp!Printed by Nishiki Print co., ltd.

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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.1 July 2003