Quiet Deterrence
Building Japan’s
New National Security Strategy

U.S.-Japan Strategic Vision Program

Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation

Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation

QUIET DETERRENCE
Printed July 2014
© Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation
All rights reserved. No part of this report may not be reprinted or copied
without prior permission of the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation.
Publisher: Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation
Art Direction: Masato Kumazawa
Design / Layout: Masatoshi Ohtani, Akiyoshi Murana (PowerHouse)
Illustration: Sachiko Maruyama
Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF)
11 F Ark Hills Front Tower RoP
2-23-1 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-0052, Japan
Phone +81-3-5545-6733
Fax +81-3-5545-6744
URL http://rebuildjpn.org/en/Preface

The Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF) is a think tank established with the aim of forming a vision for the rebuilding of Japan in
the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake and subsequent accident
at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. It was conceived by threepeople – M. James Kondo (then Country Manager, Twitter Japan),Takeshi Niinami (then President & CEO, Lawson, Inc.), and myself.
At the end of September 2011, coinciding almost precisely with RJIF’s
official registration, the Independent Investigation Commission on the
Fukushima Nuclear Accident (hereafter referred to as the “Independent
Investigation Commission”) was launched. This commission delved
into the fundamental causes of the accident, examined the adequacy of
the accident response, and analyzed the political and organization-cultural structures that contributed to the failure of Japan’s nuclear safety
regulations. The resulting report was published initially in Japanese(Discover 21, Inc., 2012) and subsequently in an English language edition by Routledge (The Independent Investigation Commission on the
Fukushima Nuclear Accident, The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station Disaster: Investigating the Myth and Reality, Routledge, 2014).
What this report reveals is that the risks associated with operation of
nuclear power plants have been deliberately downplayed as “unanticipated” and discussion thereof effectively rendered taboo by what has
been called Japan’s “nuclear mura (the Japanese word for village orcommunity),” comprising nuclear advocates in industry, government,
and academia, along with local leaders hoping to have nuclear power
plants built in their municipalities. It describes how Japanese nuclear
safety regulation and operation customs have been mired in the “governance failure” that is deeply ingrained within such nuclear mura
toward suppressing inconvenient opinions. Further to these two points,
the report also sheds light on an “autocratic system of the peacetimeand routine” that has made no attempt to develop crisis management
leadership.

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This failure in Japan’s safety structures, as laid bare by the Fukushima
nuclear accident, raised the specter of doubt in the minds of theJapanese public concerning defects in the “national fabric” of a“nation of human security.” It also elicited questions about flaws inJapan’s structures as a “nation of national security.” Furthermore,
the Fukushima nuclear accident may have been the gravest crisis thenation has faced in the post-war period, but it also presented the greatest crisis yet for the post-war Japan-United States alliance. (For moreon this issue, please refer to my own work, Countdown to Meltdown,
published by Bungeishunju Ltd., 2012.)
It was with the amalgamation of all such issues in mind that RJIF
sought to address as a major research theme the rebuilding of JapanU.S. relations in the age of 21st century geopolitics. And it is to our great
benefit that we have been able to invite former Assistant Secretary ofState for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell (Co-Chairof the Board of Directors, Center for a New American Society [CNAS];
Founding Partner, Chairman and CEO, The Asia Group) and former
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs andSenior Director for Asia Michael J. Green (Senior Vice President for
Asia/Japan Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS];
Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service,
Georgetown University) to join RJIF as distinguished guest scholars,with whom we have launched various efforts in this direction.
In particular, during his residency at the RJIF offices in Akasaka, Tokyo,
spanning more than two months over the summer of 2013, Dr. Green
worked to further deepen research on Japan-U.S. security relations,engaging in high-level exchanges of opinions with Japanese policy
makers including Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The work conducted by
Dr. Green was the catalyst for formation of a team comprised of diplomacy and security experts, headed by Associate Professor Ken Jimbo
of Keio University under the RJIF umbrella. The team engaged in a process of ongoing dialogue with Dr. Green, out of which was created an
initiative for a new national security strategy for Japan. Dr. Campbell
also joined our discussions when he visited Tokyo in July, 2013.

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The primary outcome of this initiative was the “Quiet Deterrence”
report, the full version of which also included comments from Drs.
Campbell and Green. The monthly magazine Chuo Koron featured asummary of this report in its January 2014 edition.
In Japan it is more often than not the case that security policy isdebated through the narrow prisms of constitutional and legal theory,
which serves only to blur the logic and potential of security policies
that are backed by sound intelligence. We believe that this “quiet deterrence” strategy, founded on the realities and contexts of the upheavals occurring in the international political sphere of the Asia-Pacificregion, is of significance in that it has been practically conceptualizedin accordance with security policies and seeks out new horizons forJapan’s national security strategy.
Research Associate Izumi Wakugawa has served as staff director forthis program (coordinated at the time of its inception by Fellow Mikiko
Fujiwara). Ayumi Teraoka, who is a graduate student in Asian Studiesof Georgetown University, has served as program assistant.
June 23, 2014

Yoichi Funabashi(Chairman, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation)

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Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation
U.S.-Japan Strategic Vision Program
Member List

[ U.S.]

Kurt M. CAMPBELL

RJIF Distinguished Guest Scholar
Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asianand Pacific Affairs, Co-Chair of the Board of Directors,
Center for a New American Society; Founding Partner,
Chairman, CEO of The Asia Group, LLC

Michael J. GREEN

RJIF Distinguished Guest Scholar
Senior Vice President for Asia/Japan Chair, Center
for Strategic and International Studies Associate
Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service, Georgetown University[JA PA N ]Ken JIMBOE D I TO R

Associate Professor, Faculty of Policy Management,
Keio University

Nobumasa AKIYAMA

Professor, Graduate School of Law,
Hitotsubashi University		Toshihiro NAKAYAMA

Professor, Faculty of Policy Management,
Keio University

Nobuhiro AIZAWA

Associate Professor, Graduate School of Social andCultural Studies, Kyushu University

Tetsuo KOTANI

Senior Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs

Yoshikazu KOBAYASHIManager, Oil Group,
the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ)

Akihisa Shiozaki

Attorney at Law,
Partner of Nagashima Ohno and Tsunematsu

Yasuhiro MATSUDA

Professor of international politics, the University of Tokyo
Interfaculty Initiative in Information Studies

Yoichi FUNABASHI

President, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation

P rogram D irector

Izumi WAKUGAWA

Fellow, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation

Staff D irector

Mikiko FUJIWARA

Fellow, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation

Ayumi TERAOKA

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences,
Georgetown University

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Contents

Preface 

3Yoichi Funabashi (Chairman, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation)
Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation 

7

U.S.-Japan Strategic Vision Program Member List

Foreword and Assessment 

11

Kurt M. Campbell and Michael J. Green

Introduction 

23Japan-U.S. Strategic Vision Program
Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF)[ C H A P TE R 1 ]Japan in the New Strategic 
Environment

29

The Strategic Context of the 21st Century 

30

Balance of Power and the Strategic Rivalry in the Asia-Pacific 

31

Geopolitical Threats and Risks 32

Geoeconomic Security Challenges 33

Risks of Energy Security 

34Contested Global Commons 

34

Severe Accidents and Natural Hazards 

36

Resource and Fiscal Constraints 37[ C H A P TE R 2 ]Strategizing Japan’s 
National Interest
Security Dimension 
Defending Japanese People, Territory, 

39

40
40

Assets, and Infrastructure
Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: 

41

The Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait
Good Order in the Global Commons 

Economic Dimension 

42
46

Balanced and Sustainable Growth 

46

Sustainable Energy Supply 

47Normative Dimension 

50Japan as a Normative Power in the World 

50

Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Liberal Foundations 

51

Development Assistance 

53[CHAPTER 3]

Advancing Japan’s 
Security Strategy
National Defense Policy Operationalizing Dynamic Joint Defense Force Japan-U.S. Alliance 

55

56
56
57

Upgrading Roles, Missions and Capabilities 

57

Column : Exercising the Right of Collective Self-Defense 59

Column : U.S. Forward Presence in Japan and 62

the Okinawa Base Issue

Alliance Plus-One, Alliance Plus-Sum 
and Regional Cooperation
Enhancing Strategic Relations with Australia, India, 65
65South Korea and Russia
Strengthening Ties with ASEAN 

67Japan-China Relations: 

69“Quiet Deterrence” and “Strategic Partnership”
Column : Japan’s Territorial Integration Policy and 71

the Future of the Asia-Pacific

Global Engagement 73

UN and the Global Non-proliferation Regime 

73

Strengthening the Global Economic and Energy Regime 

75

Disaster Relief as National and Human Security 

78[CHAPTER 4]

Strategy in Action 

81

The Role of the National Security Council (NSC) 

82

Leadership and Inter-Agency Approach 84Intelligence and Risk/Crisis Management 85

Legal Foundation of the National Security Policy 

87Advancing Japan’s Soft Power 

89Investing in the Next Generation’s Human Capital 91Foreword and Assessment
Kurt M. Campbell and Michael J. GreenIt has been our distinct honor and pleasure to work with the authorsof this report over the summer of 2013 at the Rebuild Japan Initiative
Foundation in Tokyo and to now provide a scene setter for the publication of Quiet Deterrense as an alternative for Japan’s National Security
Strategy. The United States needs a strong, confident and proactive
Japan to help uphold a just and stable international order. The authorsof this report outline a strategic vision that would achieve just that.
The report is significant for three reasons. First, it suggests an alternative to the Abe administration’s own national security strategy,
and does so from an independent viewpoint. Many of the concepts inthese pages are reflected in the government’s draft, but the analysis
and candor here are not easily matched in an official report. Second,
the authors represent the best and brightest of Japan’s rising strategic thinkers, with backgrounds in military strategy, regional affairs,
energy, economics and diplomacy. Third, the authors (in our view)
accurately represent the diversity of views within the mainstream ofJapan’s emerging strategic community. They are patriots but not ultranationalists; realists but not hawks; idealists but not pacifists. They
assess Japan’s world role based on an understanding of the sources andapplications of national power. Unlike earlier generations of Japanese
strategic thinkers, they can take no refuge in high levels of national
economic growth, images of pan-Asian solidarity, or free-riding on
the U.S.-Japan alliance. Their recommendations for national strategy
are therefore well aligned both with the emerging dynamics of international relations in the Asia Pacific and with Japan’s own domestic
political scene. This is a highly credible national strategy, and one thatshould be reassuring to Japan’s friends, neighbors and allies.
We believe we can offer a useful opening scene-setter for the reportwith observations in three areas: the importance of grand strategy inan era of changing power dynamics; the significance of Japan’s new
National Security Council in historic and international perspective;

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and a preliminary assessment of this Quiet Deterrence as an alternativefor Japan’s National Security Strategy.

Grand Strategy in an Era of
Changing Power Dynamics
In Democracy in America, de Tocqueville observed that:
A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of animportant undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its
execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measureswith secrecy or await the consequence with patience.¹
This observation could apply as easily to Japan as a democracy as it
does the United States. Numerous scholars and journalists over theyears have dismissed Japan’s incapacity for strategic thought. Kent
Calder has described Japan as a “reactive state”² and Michael Blaker
concluded in his exhaustive studies of Japan’s negotiating style thatTokyo consistently loses the initiative in international affairs by letting domestic bureaucratic and factional feuds undercut external
diplomacy.³ Japan has had more leadership changes than any othermember of the G-8 and post-war history is replete with examples ofJapan reeling from external “shocks” it did not anticipate and could
not manage (soy beans, the dollar, the opening to China, the Gulf War,etc.). When asked about Japan as a strategic player, French President
Charles deGaulle once famously dismissed the Japanese leadership as“transistor salesmen.”
And yet, as Trotsky once observed, “you may not be interested in strategy, but strategy is interested in you!” All major states in an anarchic
environment engage in some form of grand strategy because they must
do so to survive. That strategy may be highly dysfunctional and inefficient, but what matters is whether it is effective. Japan’s postwar strategy of aligning with the United States, minimizing risk in international
affairs, and focusing on economic growth was undoubtedly effective.
The famous Yoshida Doctrine, though never articulated as such, had a12clearly defined set of ends, ways and means –the foundations of grandstrategy. It was based on an accurate assessment of the emerging international order and the distribution of power. To be sure, the Yoshida
Doctrine was repeatedly challenged –by Hatoyama Ichiro, Kishi
Nobusuke and Nakasone Yasuhiro, in particular –and it went throughmultiple iterations. But the same could also be said of the American
Cold War strategies of containment towards the Soviet Union or threecenturies of British grand strategy towards the European continent.
“Strategy” was a bad word in post-war Japan, starting at is does with
the Chinese character for “war.” But Japan had the outlines of a coherent, sustained and domestically supported grand strategy. A state does
not require a Bismark or a Kissinger to pursue generally consistentgoals over time.
The problem, of course, was that the Yoshida Doctrine was premisedon economic growth as both the end and the principle means ofJapanese strategy. With the collapse of the economic bubble in the
1990s the country went through almost two decades of drift, and themagnitude of the demographic and economic restructuring challenges
remain daunting, in spite of the initial success of Abenomics. Yet overthis same post-Cold War period, certain Japanese leaders (particularly
Hashimoto, Obuchi, Koizumi and now Abe) began exploring a broader
context for statecraft, focusing on non-economic ways to manage
the shifting power dynamics in the Asia Pacific region and maintainJapanese influence and security. This “reluctant realism” has reached
its apex with the election of Abe Shinzo as Prime Minister. It is characterized by a focus on the rise of Chinese power and a response premised
not on band-wagoning with Beijing, but rather balancing through internal and external ways and means. Internally, the focus has been lesson increasing the aggregate measures of Japanese military power (thedefense budget has only risen incrementally under Abe and nuclear
weapons are off the table), and instead on institutional changes thatallow more efficient application of Japanese power. The formation of
a National Security Council is one important example. Externally, thefocus has been on alignment –not only with the United States, but alsowith other like-minded maritime democracies along the Indo-Pacific13axis—in order to maintain a favorable balance of power and influence
as China grows.

Japan’s NSC in Historical andInternational Comparison
Prime Minister Abe’s decision to establish Japan’s first National
Security Council system reflects his desire to strengthen his own ability to formulate, articulate and implement grand strategy in an era ofuncertain power. Japan’s post-war political system has been characterized by institutionally weak prime ministers and the stove-piping of
bureaucracies. In part this was the result of political culture. Japan’s
clan system allowed the warlords to check the center’s power, beginning with the Seventh Century constitution promulgated by Prince
Shotoku to limit his own authority at the behest of the nobles (notunlike the Magna Carta in England five centuries later). Even during theSecond World War, the rivalries between the Army and Navy ensured
that the Prime Minister was only first among equals and the Emperor asource of legitimacy rather than decision-making. Japan’s stove-pipednational security system also reflects U.S. strategy after the war, since
the lack of unity-of-command within Japan enhanced American influence and control over Japan’s future trajectory.
Over the past few decades, however, successive American administrations have found that Japan’s lack of coordinated decision-making is amajor liability for the U.S.-Japan alliance. A series of Japanese Prime
Ministers have also endeavored to solidify central decision-making
through administrative reforms. The process began with Nakasone
Yasuhiro in the 1980s, but picked up momentum in the wake of the
1990-91 Gulf War, the 1995 Kobe Earthquake and Aum Shinrikyo chemical attacks on the Tokyo subway system. Prime Minister Hashimoto
Ryutaro’s Administrative Reform Council in 1996 led to recommendations to reinforce the authority of and staff support for both the Cabinet
and the Prime Minister to enhance their control in responding to emergencies, leading to the establishment of the Deputy Chief Cabinet

14

Secretary for Crisis Management.4 Bilaterally, Hashimoto and his
successors strengthened coordination with the April 1996 Japan-U.S.
Joint Declaration on Security, the 1997 review of U.S.-Japan Defense
Guidelines, and passage of the Regional Crisis Law in 1999. In addition,
the 1999 Cabinet Law shifted the initiative for policy formation fromthe Cabinet to the Prime Minister. Further administrative reforms inJanuary 2001 gave the Prime Minister more control over the number of
personal assistants he can appoint and opened the jobs to non-bureaucrats and non-members of the Diet. Koizumi continued the centralization of power with the October 2001 Anti-terrorism Special Measures
Law and the 2003 Contingency Law, both of which enhanced the Prime
Minister’s authority over the Self Defense Forces in times of crisis.
This trend towards centralizing authority over national security andforeign policy represents a departure from Japan’s post-war pacifism,
stove-piping, and passivity, but not a return to pre-war militarism.
In fact, Japan is very much in line with trends around the world. The
establishment of Japan’s National Security Council is therefore timely
and necessary in both historical and international perspective.

Preliminary Assessment on “The Alternative forJapan’s National Security Strategy”
The authors of Quiet Deterrence stress that the new NSC will have three
key functions. The first is to serve as a “launching pad for designingmid- to long-term strategic packages such as a national security strategy.” This is necessary because declining relative economic powermeans that Japan must integrate all instruments of national power tosustain and advance its international position. Stove-piping is no longer a luxury Japan can afford. However, as veterans of the U.S. NSC
process, we can offer a number of cautions. First, articulating a coherent strategic package will depend on whether the Prime Minister himself cares about foreign policy and has a consistent worldview. Abeclearly does. Moreover, he is likely to be in office for multiple years andtherefore able to attract quality staff from outside the bureaucracy (and15to ensure that the bureaucracy does not just wait him out). Second,launching foreign policy strategies from the White House is mucheasier than ensuring those strategies are implemented. The latter
requires buy-in from the relevant bureaucracies and not dictate by fiat
from above. And third, foreign policy strategies must be based on morethan catch-phrases and slogans –they must accurately reflect both the
emerging international system and a set of policies that domestic opinion will sustain.
The second function the authors of Quiet Deterrence highlight is the
NSC role in presiding over crisis management functions. The U.S.
NSC is powerful in part because it is responsible both for longer-term
policy strategy and immediate crisis response. A number of observations from the U.S. NSC experience are relevant in this regard. First, awell-considered long-term strategy is indispensable when responding
to near-term crises. For example, the U.S. NSC knew that it was important to strengthen shared leadership among Asia’s democratic states
and thus moved quickly to form the U.S.-Japan-Australia-India “Quad”
to integrate disaster relief efforts after the 2004 Asian Tsunami. Everydecision in a crisis has potential long-term consequences and no government has time to decide its long-term strategic objectives in a crisis
if they have not done so beforehand. Second, leaders may not choose toutilize established NSC procedures in a crisis. President Kennedy did
not use Eisenhower’s deliberative NSC process when confronted with
the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam (in a way it was fortunate, in the other perhaps not). Prime Minister Kan Naoto’s response to the September 2010
crisis over the Senkaku islands with China was also ad hoc and outsideof normal decision-making channels. It will therefore be important for
the Prime Minister, his National Security Advisor and Chief Cabinet
Secretary to decide at the beginning of their administration how they
intend to manage crises and to make that clear to the NSC staff. The
worst case scenario would be multiple crisis management threads,
with one run by the Chief Cabinet Secretary (a politician), one by the
National Security Advisor (presumably from the Foreign Ministry), andone by the Cabinet Crisis Management Office (from the National Police
Agency). Finally, as the author’s note, it will be critical to develop the16

“capacity to collect information from various channels and sources andsubsequently to integrate, analyze, and present a set of appropriate policy options to the Prime Minister.” In the United States the intelligence
briefings for the President are completely independent from the NSC
to prevent politicization of intelligence, but the NSC does have a critical responsibility to provide all relevant information to the President(including intelligence and also diplomatic and other sources) so that
he can make decisions based on an integrated assessment of what ishappening. We think intelligence briefings to the Prime Minister should
be independent from the NSC, but the NSC should have the authority
to request assessments from the Intelligence Cabinet Counsellor to dotheir own work.
The third function the author’s highlight for Japan’s new NSC is theability to manage high-risk situations that are in the grey zone between“wartime” and “peacetime.” In our view, it is important to think about
this function in terms of proactive development of policies to “shape”
the strategic environment to Japan’s advantage rather than merely
managing potential crises as they hit the inbox. The NSC will itself be a
powerful tool in that regard, particularly as a channel to other NSCs in
the United States, Korea, and now China. However, NSC staff must be
extremely careful not to become too operational or to supplant the roleof the Foreign Ministry in managing Japan’s diplomacy. Even Kissinger
eventually stumbled on China policy because he and the NSC could not
manage all aspects of the complicated U.S.-China relations and associated domestic politics. Japan’s NSC will have a critical duty ensuringthat the Defense, Trade and Finance Ministries do not undercut foreign
policy messages at critical junctures, but would be more effective as acoordinating body rather than the deciders of policy.
There is no certainty about how Japan’s NSC will develop. There areimportant variables, including whether subsequent Prime Ministers
will have the political longevity or interest in foreign policy to attract
the best and brightest staff. When the Truman administration passed
the landmark 1947 National Security Act that established the NSC in
the United States, few would have predicted the variation and scale ofwhat was to follow. Nevertheless, the bottom line is that Japan’s new
NSC will offer a powerful tool to streamline and improve the efficiency

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of Japan’s national security strategies. It is an institutional change that,in itself, could help to revitalize Japanese national power from within.
The draft National Security Strategy prepared by the members of the
RJIF study group demonstrates why.

The Ends, Ways and Means of a New Grand Strategy:
Assessing the Alternative
Quiet Deterrence is a smart and systematic enunciation of ends, ways
and means grounded in the mainstream internationalist view ofJapan’s future world role. The authors rightly assess the importance of
global trends to Japan’s national security, particularly what they call“geo-economics” and the contested global commons, but it is in Asia
that Japan’s own national security is most directly at risk and where
smart strategy will make the biggest difference to the community ofnations.
The report stresses that “the rise of Chinese power has emerged as thedominant force shaping the evolving power game formula in Asia,”
and the authors rightly examine external balancing strategies thatJapan can pursue to preserve a rules-based Asian order. Asia is themost dynamic and important part of the world, and China the greatest
source of uncertainty about Asia’s future. A smart Asia strategy will be
Japan’s most important contribution to peace and stability for the next
50 years.
The authors put the U.S.-Japan alliance as the cornerstone for AsiaPacific stability and state what no American should forget: that “noother regional partner could replace Japan in its role as a host nation
supporting a forward U.S. presence.” But reflecting trends in Japanese
strategic thinking over the past two decades, they state unequivocally that Japan must expand its strategic and economic partnerships
with major players, and seek “a consortium of like-minded seafaring
nations along the ‘long littoral’ across the Indo-Pacific region.”… particularly focused on Australia, India, Korea and ASEAN.” This strategy

18

is absolutely consistent with the U.S. “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia.
Indeed, U.S. policy requires it.
The broad program proposed by the report strikes us as exactly right,
combining diplomatic, economic, soft power, and military tools (andappropriately, in that order). Only with an effective NSC, could sucha strategic program be coordinated and advanced. We would add four
considerations that might shape the next iteration of such a strategy
for Japan’s actual NSC:First, the focus on a consortium of like-minded states in the “long littoral” is sound and is not “containment” in the traditional sense of theword because the strategy does not focus on limiting these nations’economic and political relationships with Beijing. However, several
nations in the long littoral, such as India and Vietnam, have sensitivities to China that will limit their readiness to join any explicit multilateral club that is aimed at China. These nations share Japanese concern
about China’s use of coercion and welcome a more active Japan, but
Japanese foreign policy will have to be subtle and agile to avoid theappearance of any of these nations rejecting closer alignment with
Tokyo. In other words, asking for too much security can result in negative answer that hurts Japanese security in the end.
Second, while opinion polls and elite opinion in the long littoral are all
highly positive towards Japan’s world and regional role, the same cannot be said of Korea. From an American perspective, Korea is the mostimportant of these third nations. Korea is a like-minded democracy, aU.S. ally, and the geostrategic prize Beijing would most likely to denyTokyo and Washington in the future (particularly after unification). We
have confidence in the Korean peoples’ identification with the open
rules-based order sought by the United States and Japan, but worry
that Japanese political leaders’ narrative on the interpretation of thepast is playing directly into Chinese conceits that Korea can be neutralized in the future. We would not expect the authors of this or theofficial Japanese national security strategy to necessarily be explicit
about the burdens of the past, but it is a reality in Japan’s strategic and19diplomatic landscape that cannot be ignored.
Third, while the authors focus appropriately on both deterrence/dissuasion and also reassurance in shaping China’s decisions as a rising power, our sense is that a smart China strategy will require morenuanced reassurance strategies than detailed here. The authors noterightly that multilateralism will be an important regulator on Chinese
behavior –but that will be true until it is no longer true. In other words,
Beijing is influenced by the influence of other states in the ASEANcentered multilateral process in Asia, but the Chinese have also been
willing to sabotage or ignore that process as well. Direct Japan-China
mechanisms for communication, transparency and conflict resolution
will have to be increased.
Finally, we are impressed with the centrality of values in this foreign
policy strategy. Japan has an unambiguous stake in the preservation ofa rules based order and the authors are right to state that human rights
and democracy should be considered not as a “should” but as a “must.”
This consistency is a contrast to the confused U.S. debate about norms
in foreign policy since Iraq (President Obama has described the roleof human rights and democracy very differently in various speeches
over his tenure). It is also important, however, to recognize that putting this principle into practice in statecraft is not easy. Is Myanmar’s
economic opening critical to sustain, even if human rights abuses havere-emerged? Can Japan develop a long-term strategic relationship with
Vietnam when Hanoi’s policies on religious freedom and dissent are atsuch odds with the rest of the states in the prospective coalition on thelong littoral? These are not easy questions (and we two differ on them inmany respects), but the practicalities of implementing a values-based
foreign policy strategy have to be debated not only within Japan’s NSC,
but also with bilaterally with the United States and other like-mindedcountries. It will be important to be realists in the short-term, but idealists in the longer-term.
Perhaps the greatest value in the establishment of an NSC and the creation of a national security strategy document will be the opportunity it

20presents for allies and partners of Japan to think about how they alignstatecraft with a more dynamic Japan. For that reason, the authors ofQuiet Deterrence have done the region and their own government anenormous service.

1.

Al e xis de To c quevil l e , Democracy in America (New York: Vintage, 1945), 240–
245 cited in Walter A. McDougall, “Can the United States Do Grand Strategy,” remarks
before the Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 20102.

Ca l der , K en t E. “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining theReactive State.” World Politics 40, no. 4 (1988): 517–541; subsequent studies of the dysfunctional include: David Arase, “Japan, the Active State?: Security Policy after 9/11.”
Asian Survey 47, No. 4 (July/August 2007): 560–583; and Mike Finnegan, Managing
Unmet Expectations in the US-Japan Alliance. Seattle: National Bureau of Asian
Research, 2009.

3.

Mic ha el Bl a ke r , Japanese International Negotiating Style (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1977); Blaker, Case Studies in Japanese Negotiating Behavior(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2002).

4.

See Cabinet Law Article 15 for the role of Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis
Management (http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/cabinet_law_e.html)

21

Introduction
Japan’s next generation faces an age of dynamically shifting power balances in the Asia-Pacific region, in which the regional security outlook
becomes increasingly complex and uncertain. It is crucially importantfor Japan to envisage the strategic environment of the 21st century,
to reestablish national priorities, to assess and reallocate national
resources, and to reinvigorate Japan’s role in the region and on the
global stage. This requires strategizing of Japan’s national interest in
the transforming world.
Any strategy must begin with identification of the role Japan wants
to play in this world. The country’s modernization process, from thenineteenth century to the present, has been spearheaded by dynamic
industrial networks across the globe. The core driver of Japan’s vibranteconomy continues to be trade and investment in the interdependentworld. Thus, sustaining a secure, liberal, and rule-based international
order conducive to vibrant business activities is indispensable to
Japan’s national strength. At the same time, globalization and the riseof emerging states, which has resulted in a shift of economic gravity
from Europe toward Asia, create opportunities for Japan to reengage
in a dynamic Asia-Pacific region. In this context, realizing a secure andprosperous Asia-Pacific is Japan’s foremost strategic priority.
The prerequisite for peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region in
21st century is to realize a plural security community in which conflict
and war are highly unlikely. The reality, however, is that the region isbeset by the risk of serious strategic confrontation. As described below,
Japan’s diplomatic and security policies now face domestic and international environments of unprecedented complexity:•

The rise of China, the change of distribution of power, the uncertainty of the direction in which China is moving, and its assertiveness towards other countries;

23•The realignment of the United States global strategy and ‘rebalancing’ to the Asia-Pacific region;•

Destabilization of the Korean Peninsula, unexpected scenariosof the unification process, and the possibility of Korea distancing
itself from the United States and Japan after reunification of theNorth and South;•The ‘Balkanization’ of Northeast Asia (conflicts and divisions
related to the territorial and historical problems of Japan, China,
and South Korea, and global tension resulting from them);•

Increase in Japan’s energy costs and the destabilization of its energy
security;•

The public debt risks of both Japan and the United States, andpotential shrinking of their external commitments;•

The population decline and deteriorating national strength ofJapan;

National security strategy should look to the future and formulate
an action plan based on a risk assessment of domestic and international environments. It is essential for national security strategy to set
forth clear priorities based on proactive realism, upon which limited
resources should be put to strategic use to identify national interests.
Redefining of such national interests—referred to here as “strategic
national interests”—can only be achieved through strategic actions.
At the core of “strategic national interests” are the preservation ofJapan’s national territories, waters and airspace, and the protection of
the Japanese people. It is also in “strategic national interests” to deter
any external force from compromising security and changing the statusquo. What is needed is a construct for assuredly effective “quiet deterrence,” built up with a firmness of will and level-headed actions.
Unlike conventional deterrence, which aims at preventing the opponents’ aggression or coercion by making their cost-benefit calculation
more costly than inaction, or simply making it ineffective or unsuccessful in achieving their goals, quiet deterrence aims to avoid unnecessary
provocation and escalation while cultivating capability to deter, defend

24and deny possible aggression. Quiet deterrence goes beyond a military
strategy. It is a strategic concept for shaping the regional security order,
which achieves the balance of power without security dilemma without
suppressing the rise of China or outdoing China, while accommodating
tremendous uncertainties associated with the rise of China.
In the military dimension of quiet deterrence, it is important that Japan
will firmly maintain the determination and stance of protecting one’s
country on one’s own. Japan needs to enforce own defense capability
profile to expand the area of responsibility, especially in Southwest
island chain. Japan will close the window of opportunity for creeping
expansion of Chinese maritime activity by regularized intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and by ensuring air and maritime superiority vis-à-vis China. Japan’s increased responsibility in the
low and medium intensity conflict will ensure seamless U.S. military
engagement in higher intensity conflict, thereby function as an escalation control. Most critical element of the successfully extended deterrence is the deployment of the U.S. combat-ready troops on Japanesesoil. Without in-theater logistical and basing support, pre-planned military operations and augmentation of U.S. forces cannot be achieved.
In this regard, U.S. bases in Japan, especially in Okinawa, remain to bea foundation of deterrence and escalation management.
In the political dimension, China’s political system is being increasingly
vulnerable to the rising political awareness of the public. Nationalism
influences the governance by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Hence, Japan’s deterrence posture must be quiet so as not to cause an
outbreak of reactive Chinese nationalism and not to tempt the Chinese
government to inflame nationalism. The essence of quiet deterrence is
to maintain strategic communications with China, to carry out risk andcrisis management simultaneously, to stabilize the bilateral relationship and maintain peace. This is generally rather close to the domainof “dialogue” in the categorization of “dialogue and deterrence”.
Deterrence is precisely comprehended in the continuation of dialogue,
and dialogue becomes serious when deterrence works.

25

In the normative dimension, memories of the Second World War still
haunt Northeast Asia, and overshadow deepening regional integrationin East Asia. Interpretation of history could easily turn into a politicalgame over the legitimacy of the post war liberal order, which Japan has
played a critical role in laying the foundation of. Japan should realizethat it is in the national interest of Japan not to undermine its goodrecord of global citizenship in the process of building this order. Japan
should strengthen its influence by building upon the trust it gained
over time, which is a central asset for Japan. Quiet deterrence is a ‘diplomatic sense’ to prevent others from setting a political agenda overthe legitimacy in their favorable terms, while striving to keep fairness
in history.
As one step towards the redefining of such “strategic national interests
through Quiet Deterrence,” we propose the following pillars of a strategic vision for Japan:•

Defending global commons and a rule-based liberal international
order

•

Managing the new balance of power in the Asia-Pacific throughmaintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance, enhancing ties with emerging
powers, and constructively engaging China•

Advancing the power-web of alliance, alliance plus-one, allianceplus-sum, and complex patterns of regional security cooperation•

Demonstrating global leadership and promoting Japan’s soft power•

Overcoming population, energy and financial constraints by economic growth and structural reform

In order to secure the future of the Asia-Pacific, we must actively project our influence abroad. Since the end of World War II, the regional
order has been predominantly crafted and maintained by the role of
the United States. As the global balance of power shifts, led by China’s
rapid rise in regional affairs, the diplomatic formula for managing
regional order has begun to diversify. In an age of dynamic power
shifts, however, our national interest requires Japan’s full and seamless
engagement in regional affairs. To formulate a solid rule-based order,

26

Japan must assume leadership in embedding the global commons insuch domains as maritime, space, and cyberspace into compatible
regional commons. Toward a sustainable regional order, moreover,Japan should navigate and preserve stable major power relations by
ensuring strong U.S. engagement in Asia and should encourage China’s
constructive involvement in the region. To rebalance the distributionof regional powers, Japan should empower and build the capacities of
emerging states in Asia, as well as promoting the institutionalizationof regional economic and security frameworks. History has been andprobably will remain a contentious issue in our region. A conversation
on history needs to take place but should not hinder the needed cooperation to tackle the issues facing the region in the future.
As the major interface to projecting Japan’s power abroad, the JapanU.S. alliance must be reinvigorated as the cornerstone of stability inEast Asia. The alliance also needs to adapt to the new power balancein Northeast Asia, provide tailored and effective extended deterrence,
pursue resilient operations, and constantly upgrade role and mission
sharing between the two services. Fulfilling these goals will require
modification of the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Guidelines andthe upgrading of Japan’s role as an alliance partner, including a decision to lift the ban on exercising collective self-defense. Japan also
needs to expand the scope of strategic partnerships abroad with Korea,
Australia and India. Japan’s new engagement in Southeast Asia throughthe capacity building of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) littoral states represents our decisive commitment to securing
the maritime order in the South China Sea. This power-web, anchoredby complex patterns of security networks, provides a renewed opportunity for Japan to multiply its power in the region.
Japan’s defense strategy and the future role of the Self-Defense Forces
are also in need of further evolution. The Dynamic Joint Defense Force
concept adopted in the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG,
2013) systematically demonstrates the Japan Self Defense Forces(JSDF) operational capacity to deal with increasingly severe security
environment including so-called ‘gray-zone’ conflict, by emphasizing

27

continuous and seamless intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, especially in the southwest of Japan. China’s
rapid increase in maritime activities surrounding Japan’s main archipelago, particularly in the seas around the Senkaku Islands, requires
Japan’s indigenous and more robust role in a low- to medium-intensity
conflict at sea. Seamless coordination between the Japan Coast Guardand the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force should be enhanced for
deterrent and stable escalation management capacities.
Japan’s foreign policy starts at home. There will be no ground for strong
foreign commitments without domestic foundation of comprehensive
national power. Therefore, revitalizing the Japanese economy througha vibrant growth strategy is the only path to sustain Japan’s national
resilience through overcoming fiscal constraints and addressing societal shift in the aging population. Promotion of a peaceful environment in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in Northeast Asia, is essential for
Japan’s growth strategy.
Conducting the business of national security strategy demands strong
leadership that mobilizes the whole of the government to advanceJapan’s national interests. In this context, the establishment of Japan’s
National Security Council (NSC) represents a major, decades-spanninginstitutional change, and we must capitalize on this opportunity toadvance the country’s strategic, effective, and timely decision-making
for national security. The NSC must bring about innovation of national
security decision-making by fostering 1) strategy-driven approach, 2)
integration and inter-agency approach and 3) credibility, predictability
and continuity. The NSC brings together the Prime Minister, the Chief
Cabinet Secretary, key ministers, and the NSC Bureau to play a centralized role in analyzing, evaluating, deciding, and delivering the national
security agendas.
February, 2014
Japan-U.S. Strategic Vision Program
Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF)

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[ C H A P T E R 1 ]Japan in the
New Strategic
Environment

The Strategic Context of the 21st Century
The strategic environment surrounding Japan at the dawn of the 21st
century is highly complex and uncertain. In a globalized world, Japan’s
economic interests, trade, investments, production, and business networks reach across the globe. The open and competitive world economic system has enabled Japan’s high economic performance as wellas her access to critical energy and resources. In the dynamic pace ofchange prevailing in the global economy, Japan’s interests remain constant: Sustaining a secure, liberal, and rule-based international orderthat ensures vibrant business activities is indispensable for Japan’snational strength.
In the 21st century, the world is experiencing a major power transition
from West to East. The global political economy’s center of gravity inthe coming decades is increasingly shifting away from the G7 to theemerging economies, leading to a diversification of the worldwide distribution of wealth. Continuing to dominate as the first among equals
in this century, however, the United States stands as the power still at
the forefront. The United States’ strategic ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalancing’ to Asiais, in this context, crucial for the stability and dynamic growth of the
Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, Japan continues to play an indispensable role as a gateway for the United States’ ongoing engagement in theregion. The Japan-U.S. alliance remains the cornerstone of Asia-Pacificstability, and no other regional partner could replace Japan in its role
as a primary host nation supporting a forward U.S. presence.
At the same time, reallocating Japan’s diplomatic and economic
resources to invest in emerging states and economies has become
equally important in the current global climate. Looking ahead to 2030,
Japan must expand strategic and economic partnerships across theglobe in transforming world political economy. China, India, Brazil,
and Russia, followed by numerous emerging economies, have grown toconstitute a major portion of the world’s GDP in the last two decades.
Japan has no choice but to enter into this new global economic playing
field to advance its strategic portfolio. This will require active regional

30

Chapter 1

Japan in the New Strategic Environmentand global engagements; we must expand our networks of cooperation
with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific and globally toensure collective capacity and promote dynamic growth.

Balance of Power and the Strategic Rivalryin the Asia-Pacific
Shifts in the balance of power are a more conspicuous reality in East
Asia than on a global plane. Such change is centered, undoubtedly, inthe unprecedented rise of Chinese power and influence in the region.
In 2010, China surpassed Japan’s nominal GDP and became the world’s
second-largest economy. The shift of relative power superiority fromJapan to China, for the first time since the early twentieth century, created a bilateral relationship wherein China’s GDP and military expenditure are consistently larger than Japan’s—and the gap is rapidly
widening. As Japanese anxiety about China’s military buildup, strategic intentions, and the potential for tension escalation grows, theseconcerns have in turn fueled a bitter domestic debate in Japan about
its national security strategy.
The maritime capability gap between China and the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) littoral states is also rapidly growing.
China's rapid procurement of patrol ships, surveillance vessels and aircraft, submarines, and new-generation fighters is bound to consolidate
its maritime and air superiority vis-à-vis ASEAN neighbors. In tandemwith China’s economic advancement, ASEAN is increasingly feelingthe pressure of China’s assertive diplomacy and charm offensive, with
China’s ‘divide and rule’ approach toward the region being showcasedin the diplomatic standoff in the South China Sea and in China’s heavy
involvement in the Cambodian chairmanship in 2012.
The rise of Chinese power has emerged as the dominant force shaping
the evolving power game formula in Asia. In particular, the strengthening of China’s air and naval power and of its missile capability isheightening the country’s anti-access capabilities with regard to areas

31

where China’s claimed interests are involved, while also heightening
its area denial capabilities in regions where U.S. forward-deployed
forces had previously reigned supreme. In the context of this upgrading of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capabilities, China is exerting greater influence on regional issues, including those involving the
Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, the East China Sea, and the South
China Sea. Moving forward, Japan’s security strategy in the Asia-Pacificregion must be based on a sound assessment of China’s dynamicallychanging status in the power distribution of the Asia-Pacific, of China’s
perspective on and strategy for the Asian security order, and of how
much Japan, the U.S-Japan alliance, and other regional partners canrealistically shape the strategic choices of China (see also ‘Enhancing
Strategic Relations with Australia, India, South Korea and Russia,’
Chapter 3).

Geopolitical Threats and Risks
In addition to the strategic challenge derived from China’s rise, thesecurity environment in Asia encompasses numerous geopoliticalthreats and risks. Heightened tensions in the Korean Peninsula, contested territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, and unresolved Taiwan-Mainland cross-strait relationship issues still remain as
brewing sources of potential conflict.
North Korea constitutes imminent threat and could yield catastrophic
consequence to Japan’s security with its nuclear weapons development, ballistic missile technologies and special operations force. In
particular, series of missile and nuclear tests in past decades increased
the potential for miniaturizing nuclear weapons for warheads andequipping them on ballistic missiles. The North Korean regime under
the new leadership overshadows the predictability of its policy directions, but provocative rhetoric and behavior remain the same.
At the sub-strategic level, tensions between Japan and China over
the Senkaku Islands have involved intrusions by Chinese official and32

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Japan in the New Strategic Environment

paramilitary vessels into Japan’s littoral territories—and the frequencyof such instances has been increasing. Such activities, if not properly
dealt with, could eventually change the status-quo by threatening
Japan’s territorial integrity by undermining Japan’s administrative
control over and access to natural resources in the territory, and potentially compromise its freedom of navigation. The confrontational situation in the area has not yet escalated to the level of armed conflict, but
a diplomatic resolution remains a difficult proposition. Such a resolution would require law enforcement capabilities along with firm assurances to contenders that Japan is squarely committed to and capableof maintaining and controlling the order and security of the territory.

Geoeconomic Security Challenges
Japan’s peace and prosperity are deeply embedded in the globalized
economy. The global supply chain, resource development, financialtransactions, and communication are all keys to maintaining the vitality of Japanese society. The global geoeconomic environment is rapidly
and dramatically changing with the rise of emerging economies suchas China and India, growing geopolitical insecurity such as violent
extremists and socio-political instability in resource rich regions suchas the Middle East and Africa, and increasing tensions over global commons that constitute critical infrastructure to sustain the global economy. Thus, managing the dynamic transformation of the geoeconomic
environment, along with defending and strengthening the prevailingglobal liberal economic institutions, are critical goals for Japan’s peace
and prosperity.
Today’s geoeconomic reality requires Japan to broaden the horizon ofits strategy geographically as well as conceptually. Geoeconomic reality, which affects Japan’s strategic choices, mainly consists of threeelements. First, with the increasing influence of emerging economies,
it becomes more difficult to maintain and strengthen the prevailingglobal liberal economic institutions. Traditional guardians of the liberal order are increasingly challenged by the state-capitalism. Second,33

the global energy and resource demand and supply landscape are also
challenged by the emerging economies. Furthermore, geopolitics overenergy increases its complexity as the socio-political instability of the
Middle East has been intensified after the ‘Arab Spring’ and the ‘shale
revolution’ emerged. Third, the critical global infrastructures such as
cyberspace and outer space, sea lane of communications, or ‘global
commons,’ remain relatively vulnerable to various threats and risks,and require the establishment of rules and norms of governance toensure safe, fair and open access.

Risks of Energy Security
The Middle East, in particular, is at once Japan’s largest energy trade
partner and an epicenter of political instability. After the ‘Arab Spring,’
the political and security environment in the Middle East is fluctuating
and deteriorating. In addition, in the medium- to long-term perspective, demographic and economic changes in Middle East may trigger
shifts in energy politics. Some of the energy supplier states may eventually become consumer states. Were such major supplier states as Saudi
Arabia to undergo this kind of transition, politics over energy prices in
the markets might be significantly strained.
As Japan continues to rely heavily on oil and gas supplies in the Middle
East as its major source of energy access, the region’s potential destabilization should be perceived as an imminent threat to Japan’s survival. With this in mind, Japan must engage more actively in Middle
East affairs, working to help nurture regional stability in the wake of
the Arab Spring movements.

Contested Global Commons
The great maritime common—which provides us the most benefits
when regarded as an open, free highway rather than as a defensive
barrier—constitutes Japan’s strategic hinterland. In other words, good34

Chapter 1

Japan in the New Strategic Environment

maritime order, or ensuring legitimate use of the seas for navigation
and resource exploitation is a pillar of Japan’s security and prosperity. Stability in Asia has traditionally rested on the balance between
the maritime powers and the continental powers in Asia, where neither side could project sufficient conventional weapons into the realmof the other. However, good order at sea is now being challenged inthe ‘long littoral’ along the Indo-Pacific region by growing sea denial
capabilities and excessive maritime claims to reshape the navigational
regimes—including high seas freedom in exclusive economic zones(EEZs)—established in the Law of the Sea.
Today, the vibrant global economy rests heavily on free and fair accessnot only to the global maritime commons, but also to outer space andcyberspace (see also ‘Good Order in the Global Commons,’ Chapter 2).
Japan is among the advanced spacefaring nations that can independently place satellites into orbit and a responsible cyber faring nationthat commits itself to the free flow of information and resilient cyberspace. Outer space provides a platform for communications and forresearch and investigation, while cyberspace has come to play a majorrole in transmitting and sharing information, making it a platform
now indispensable for all kinds of activities in Japan as elsewhere.
Globalization has proliferated advanced technologies and doctrines
around the world, and our defense forces and critical infrastructure
have become vulnerable to asymmetric sudden attacks in the process.
Ensuring good order in those global commons is now essential to thefurther development of the global economy and to stability in theinternational system. Whether the Law of the Sea is able to continue
to maintain good order at sea depends on the outcome of the ongoing‘struggle for law’ in the maritime commons. As the number of users ofouter space and cyber domains will continue to grow, we need common understanding as well on good governance of space and cybercommons.
The development and use of outer space in particular has direct linkages
with national security, and some states engage in space development

35

for national prestige (see also ‘Good Order in the Global Commons,’
Chapter 2). However, as activities in outer space expand, space debris
increases. The protection of the environment in outer space as on land
has thus become an urgent issue. The international community now
faces a turning point in space governance as major states seek an international code of conduct in that frontier. Outer space still remains arealm of international cooperation, but the international community
needs transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBM) for
sustainable space security.

Severe Accidents and Natural Hazards
The Great East Japan Earthquake and Fukushima nuclear accident laidbare the extent to which mega natural disasters and severe industrial
accidents such as those at nuclear facilities can seriously affect thesafety and security of citizens, society, and the state in various ways.
Indeed, such risks may even have security implications in terms of thevery survival and viability of a country.
The world at large has experienced and witnessed various natural andman-made disasters in the past decades, giving rise to huge human andeconomic damages. Hurricane Katrina in 2005, for example, caused a
0.8% drop in U.S. GDP. The 2011 flood in Thailand, meanwhile, incapacitated the production facilities of Japanese companies and led to interruptions in the supply of critical parts on associated assembly lines.
Mega disasters and severe industrial accidents may cause damage not
only within the national economy, but also have effects that spill over
into global production and supply chains.
Under such circumstances, the competitiveness of a country is no longer evaluated based on economic growth and technological innovativeness alone. Rather, the resilience of social and economic systems
against disasters and the quality and effectiveness of crisis management are now equally important elements in determining a country’s competitiveness through ensuring the consistent maintenance

36

Chapter 1

Japan in the New Strategic Environmentof economic activities. Sitting atop an intersection of seismic activity
and with the threat of mega earthquakes still looming on its horizon,
Japan must make it a priority to strengthen the resilience of social andeconomic infrastructures, improve preparedness, and build stronger
disaster relief and management capacity.

Resource and Fiscal Constraints
In order to envision a viable national security strategy, it is increasingly
important to effectively manage certain domestic socio-economic conditions. In particular, the long-term demographic shift taking place inJapan will have profound implications for our mid- to long-term security strategy. The aging of Japanese society may pose some constraints
in both resource allocation and policy options for achieving national
strategic goals. An important part of national security strategy is to
identify and implement measures to overcome such socio-economic
constraints and build a sustainable and robust foundation for economic strength.
With the demographic shift, Japan’s working population will shrink,which is likely to constrain economic growth unless the country continues leading in innovation on transforming economic and industrial structures. The attenuation of the economy would, in turn, spur
another decline in tax revenue. In the meantime, the senior population(those over the age of 65) will reach 31.8% in 2030, and a significant portion of the national budget must be dedicated to social welfare expenditure if the current social welfare system is to be maintained. This
would be a major constraint against allocating toward a proper defense
budget. Given that China will be progressively expanding its military
expenditure in the years to come, such fiscal constraints would prevent
Japan from responding in turn with increases in its own defense budget and may thus pose a serious challenge in establishing a stable strategic relationship vis-à-vis China.
Further, the level of household savings is declining, which will37

affect market capacity to absorb Japanese government bonds (JGB).
Currently, the balance of Japanese public bonds (including JGB) has
reached a record high of 1,000 trillion yen (10.46 trillion U.S. dollar) in
total. But shrinking household savings would limit the market’s JGB
absorption capacity.
In order to sustain the government’s endeavor to strategize on national
security, a stable budget for national defense must be secured. Ongoing
review and rationalization of the current fiscal budget allocation willcontinue to ensure sufficient fiscal resources allocated for security purposes. At the same time, step-by-step increases on consumption tax,
though unlikely to affect overall macro-economic growth, needs tobe implemented. Public relations activities targeting a wide range ofapproaches will help to mobilize public understanding and politicalsupport for budgetary allocation to national security.
More fundamentally, ensuring sustainable economic growth should be
identified as an indispensable element to support viable national security strategy. Resilient and competitive technological foundations andindustrial structures are essential. Therefore, the government needs
to stimulate private investment in key technology areas, which would
contribute to enhancing the Japanese competitiveness and advantage
in the global market.

38

[ C H A P T E R 2 ]Strategizing
Japan’s
National Interest

Security Dimension

Defending Japanese People,
Territory, Assets, and Infrastructure
Defending Japanese people, territory, assets and infrastructure is a toppriority in Japan’s defense strategy. Since the end of the Cold War, theprobability of large-scale conventional military aggression targeting
Japanese territory has declined considerably. However, Northeast Asia
remains a region where weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are being
amassed alongside conventional forces, and where military posturing
and technologies are in a state of constant modernization. Northeast
Asia is also an epicenter of great power competition. Thus, Japanremains exposed to risks and threats that vary in nature and intensity,and we need to reassess priorities and tailor our responses accordingly.
Japan’s defense strategy needs an effective multi-layered structurethat comprise of indigenous defense capability, robust Japan-U.S. alliance and various types of regional security cooperation. At their core,
Japan’s defense doctrine and posture needs constant updating to adapt
to the dynamic security environment. As illustrated in the National
Defense Planning Guideline (2013), Japan needs to build a highly effective joint defense forces in dealing with emerging challenges. These
challenges include North Korea’s missile and nuclear threats, China’s
maritime challenges and escalation scenarios, and various asymmetrical threats like terrorism. All requires Japan’s defense force whichenables conducting a diverse range of activities to be seamless as wellas dynamic and adapting to situations as they demand.

40

Chapter 2

Strategizing Japan’s National Interest

Peace and Security in Northeast Asia:
The Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait
Korean Peninsula
The Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait have long been Japan’s
two most essential geo-strategic regions, with direct ramifications forJapan’s security. Japan has based its North Korea policy mainly on the2002 Pyongyang Declaration, in which the abduction issue is givenhigh priority alongside missile and nuclear issues. Japan has expressed
its determination to bring the issue to a complete resolution. To do so,Japan will need to enhance its strategic communications with North
Korea while retaining a solid deterrence posture and readiness for normalization talks.
Trilateral security cooperation among Japan, the United States, andSouth Korea has also been a reliable framework for Japan to deal
with the North Korea threat. In addition to political, bureaucratic,
and defense exchanges, dialogues, and arrangements, various levels of training and exercises among the JSDF, the U.S. Forces, and theRepublic of Korea (ROK) Forces provide useful and effective opportunities to enhance interoperability and crisis-management capabilities
among the three like-minded forces. Japan will continue to utilize suchopportunities.
Japan also needs to further strengthen its security cooperation with
South Korea on a bilateral basis (see also ‘Enhancing Strategic Relations
with Australia, India, South Korea and Russia,’ Chapter 3). South Korea
is Japan’s most important neighbor, sharing a set of basic values incommon. The bilateral relationship has tended to be subject to thevagaries of the prevailing political situation, but the shared security
concerns, including the continuing North Korea threat and the emerging Chinese military rise, will occasionally remind Japan and South
Korea of the practical necessity for more direct security cooperation
between them. The immediate next step Japan needs to take is to workwith South Korea to define a common strategic vision and objectives
for the peace and prosperity of the region and beyond.

41

From a long-term perspective, an eventual reunification of the Korean
Peninsula cannot be precluded from Japan’s strategic calculation.
Given the existing broad consensus that reunification of the peninsula
should (peacefully) be (initiated by South Korean and) guided by theprinciple of liberal democracy and market mechanism, Japan will clarify its full support for such a reunification and be prepared to work with
South Korea toward it. Future Japan-South Korea security cooperation
should be designed with this long-term vision in mind.
TaiwanAcross the Taiwan Strait, interdependence between the two sides has
increasingly been deepened over the last decades in terms of trade, cultural, and people-to-people exchanges. However, on the security front,
China has not abandoned use of force as a means to resolve the Taiwan
issue and maintains its anti-secession law and a considerable number of ballistic missiles against Taiwan. Taiwan is no doubt a mature
democracy with a growing identity and universal values of its own.
Meanwhile, the Taiwan Relations Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in
1979, has been the only de facto security guarantee provided to Taiwan
by the U.S.
Although Japan does not have formal diplomatic relations with
Taiwan, we cannot ignore the strategic value of Taiwan. Japan continues to see Taiwan as a successful example of democratization and as
an indispensable member of the liberal-order community in the region
and worldwide. Japan will also continue to maintain and strengthen
its practical relations with Taiwan and seek ways to contribute to theenhancement of Taiwan’s security environment.

Good Order in the Global Commons
To secure the contested regional and global commons, Japan commits
itself to:
1. Building rules and regimes by working with the United States,
regional friends, and other international community members,

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Strategizing Japan’s National Interest

including potential adversaries, to develop international rules,
agreements, and regimes to preserve the openness of the regionaland global commons.
2. Engaging key actors by building the capacities of state and nonstate actors that have the will to responsibly protect and sustain
free and fair access to the regional and global commons.
3. Restructuring Japan’s hard power to defend the contested commonsby cultivating capabilities to sustain the openness of the global
commons through a whole-of-government approach, preserving
freedom of action for the JSDF in commons that are contested, anddeveloping capabilities that will enable military operations when
any commons are rendered inaccessible.
Good order at sea requires a liberal approach to the international lawof the sea, as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS). Such an approach assumes freedom of navigation in maritime commons as a community right, protects the sovereign rights oflittoral states over maritime resources, and promotes peaceful solutions to maritime disputes. In addition, Japan will take leadership topromote good seamanship through the 1972 International Regulations
for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGS)—or the ‘Rules of
the Road’—for all vessels and a regional incident at sea agreement(INCSEA) for warships based on the Code for Unalerted Encounters at
Sea (CUES)—which provides safety measures and procedures, and themeans to facilitate communications when ships and aircraft make contact—developed by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).
Japan will seek a consortium of like-minded seafaring nations alongthe ‘long littoral’ across the Indo-Pacific region. This consortium aims
at expanded capacity building programs for navies and maritime law
enforcement agencies in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Horn of Africa,
and the South Pacific. At the same time, it provides a good opportunity
to engage emerging maritime powers such as China for counter-piracy,
fishery conservation, conflict prevention, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance programs as part of confidence building measures.

43

In the outer space domain, Japan commits itself to taking a proactiverole to realize a code of conduct, based on the 2010 EU Code of Conduct
for Outer Space for free and fair use of and access to outer space and fordebris removal. However, it is essential for Japan to prevent any rulethat may hinder development of the country’s own rockets and missile
defense system or impose restrictions on the possession of satellites.
Similarly, a comprehensive ban on ASAT is not in Japan’s interests.
In cooperation with the United States, Japan will facilitate space diplomacy for regime building, space situational awareness (SSA), civil
uses such as global positioning and remote sensing, and TCBM toward
strengthening the alliance. To that end, it is vital for Japan to complete
its own surveillance and early warning satellite system and to enhance
SSA capabilities. In this regard, the European Union (EU) is anotherimportant partner not only for outer space regime building but also
for global monitoring for environment and security (GMES). In the
Asia-Pacific, Japan can utilize the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency
Forum (APRSAF) to engage with China, Russia, India, and ASEAN
member states. Domestically, the government should support businessand research institutions for research and development and humancapital development.
Satellites are not equipped to defend themselves. While future satellites might include defenses of some type, it will be difficult to overcome the advantages that an attacker inherently has. It is importantfor Japan, meanwhile, to create a framework to ban ASAT tests in outerspace to prevent any attack against Japanese and U.S. satellites. On
the other hand, Japan will continue to jointly develop state-of-the-art
missile defense technologies with the United States. The technologies
developed for missile defense could be effective against satellites ofhostile states, since it is easier to attack satellites than ballistic missiles.
In addition, Japan will take measures to protect satellites and groundbased space facilities from cyber-attacks, to which satellite operations
are particularly vulnerable.
Users of the cyber domain oppose intervention by states and44

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international organizations in cyber governance. But since the security problem has become too serious to ignore, good governance in the
cyber domain needs to be sought. As a free country, Japan will continue to work on the protection of internet freedom as an important
diplomatic agenda. It is also important for Japan to take a lead in banning cyber espionage. Additionally, Japan will engage actively in international efforts to define cyber-attacks—particularly regarding whenstates can acknowledge a cyber-attack as a use of force and how states
can retaliate under international law.
Cyberspace is a virtual domain that is more vulnerable than the othertraditional commons. Japan will continue to work with like-mindedstate actors such as the United States, EU/NATO, and India. Given that
Taiwan has been closely monitoring Chinese cyber activities, cooperation with Taiwan should be carefully pursued. Engagement with hoststates of potential attackers is also vital for confidence building and crisis management. The Cyber Security Center, which is to be establishedin FY 2015, should facilitate the necessary ‘multi-stakeholder approach’
to internet governance, involving not only governments, but also businesses and civil society, which have enabled the internet to drive economic growth throughout the world.
Cyber security in peacetime is essential to prevent cyber-attacks inwartime. Japan will seek deterrence by both punishment and denial.
Technologically, deterrence by denial is easier. Japan will develop an
active cyber security posture by developing attack detection, monitoring, and denial capabilities. The key to deterrence by punishment is to
identify the responsibility of attack, rather than the actual attackers,
by tracking the attacks, investigation based on behavior-based algorithms, cyber forensics, intelligence sharing, and mega data analysis.
Accordingly, Japan will have multiple cross-domain retaliation options
and will also construct deterrence in cyberspace in terms of extended
deterrence and collective self-defense with the United States.

45

Economic Dimension

Balanced and Sustainable Growth
Sound economic growth is a cornerstone of Japan’s national power.
Only with the stable financial resources thus mobilized can a government formulate an adequate budget for security measures. Economic
growth also ensures that the safe and culturally rich Japanese wayof life can be maintained and advanced, and creates a solid politicalbase to support the government’s policies. Economic competitivenessalso brings some measure of diplomatic leverage. A large and active
domestic market will attract foreign companies. Moreover, high fiscal
revenues backed by stable economic growth frees up greater financial
resources for a variety of diplomatic actions including increased official development aid. Overall, being a supreme economic power in Asia
enables Japan to maintain its primacy in rule-making activities in thisincreasingly influential region of the world.
While economic growth is an indispensable premise for our national
security, it must be pursued in a balanced and sustainable manner.
Japan takes responsibility for mitigating the catastrophic outcomes ofglobal climate change. Our economic prosperity cannot be designed tobenefit the current generation alone. Rather, Japan’s economic growthand competitiveness must be pursued with due consideration to future
generations’ welfare as well. In fact, Japan has endeavored in earnest
to use less energy to generate each unit of economic growth in thepast, and has thereby become the most energy efficient economy in theworld. Japan will continue to be a model economy for all the world’s
developing economies to emulate in achieving both economic prosperity and energy efficiency at once. It is our responsibility to share
our experiences with other countries in how best to achieve a more46

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balanced and sustainable economy toward avoiding future climatechange-related catastrophes.

Sustainable Energy Supply
The primary goal of Japanese energy policy is to establish a resilient
energy supply structure. In addition to domestic energy resource scarcity, mounting political uncertainties in the Middle East in the wake of
the Arab Spring, active piracies along the SLOCs, and political tensions
in the South and East China Seas are posing new threats to Japan’s
energy supply. We must reinvigorate measures in place to guard against
unexpected energy supply disruption. Given the significance of a stableenergy supply to our economic prosperity, formulating a strong energy
strategy must be a central agenda for our national security and be dealt
with accordingly as an inter-agency issue including sectors from economy, trade, and industry to foreign affairs, defense, and science andtechnology.
Enhanced energy supply resilience will be realized through reductionof energy import dependence. In this way, our economy will be madeless vulnerable to external shocks to the energy supply and our tradebalance will improve through minimizing energy imports. Central tosuch efforts will be to utilize nuclear power plants of confirmed operational safety, as no other available renewable energy is at a sufficientlevel in terms of both cost and volume. We have accumulated extensive
and readily available operational expertise in nuclear power generation. In order to secure public acceptance for nuclear power generationin the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster of 2011, we must
guarantee capable, transparent, and independent regulatory functioning to oversee nuclear power generation and take every possible action
to avoid a similar incident.
In addition, under the changing rules of the game in energy resource
acquisition caused primarily by active equity acquisitions on the partof energy-hungry emerging countries, we must reexamine the roles47

of government and private firms. In order to defend the liberal economic order, we must respect market mechanisms and fully utilize
the dynamics of private firms. Our tightening fiscal budget may makeit more difficult to finance public funding for resource development.
Yet we must also identify the limits of such market liberalism. Energy
resource development requires a massive upfront investment of bothtime and capital, which sometimes conflicts with the private sector’sneed to ensure capital efficiency. In such cases, the government should
step in to facilitate Japanese firms’ investments in energy resource
development. In order to make this public-private partnership more
effective and integrated, the government and private firms must realize that much closer communication is required to understand eachother’s needs and resources. Moving forward, the Japanese government must also encourage Japanese energy firms to consolidate intolarger entities with more capital available to undertake risky energy
development projects.
Yet lowering import dependence is only one side of the coin. Actions
to improve Japan’s resilience must also accompany an effectiveenergy resource acquisition policy. In this regard, our strategy willtake a maritime approach, aiming to ensure open and liberal tradeof energy resources, stable seaborne energy supply flows to the AsiaPacific region from various sources, and security of the SLOC energy
resources. As Japan relies for most of its fossil fuel supply on seaborne
imports, open and liberal energy trading is the primary premise of ourstable energy supply. Against this backdrop, developing and securing
additional energy supply flows from North America, Eastern Russia,
and Africa will make all Asia-Pacific energy importers more resilient
against external supply shock.
Thanks to the ongoing shale revolution, the potential of the North
American energy supply is increasing. We encourage the United States
to minimize its restrictions on oil and gas exports to the Asia-Pacific.
Russia, meanwhile, has two options for exporting its energy resources:
1) the continental pipeline and 2) maritime tanker exports. The country has historically depended on the continental pipeline to Europe but

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now faces a serious problem in the rapid demand destruction occurring in the aftermath of the Euro fiscal crisis. Russia is thus now changing its traditional continental approach and has shown more interest
in increasing maritime exports to Asia. Japan will work to accelerate Russia’s maritime export strategy in the years ahead. At the sametime, the active involvement of Russia’s liquefied natural gas projects
in the Russian Far East and Sakhalin will promote Russia’s maritime
endeavor.
This maritime-based energy resource acquisition strategy cannot,of course, be realized solely by Japan. We must collaborate with theUnited States, who shares Japan’s interests in this strategy, and alsowith ASEAN countries that will rely more on seaborne energy resource
imports from outer regions in the future.
Climate change, though it may not seem an imminent threat to our
security, is in fact a significant and urgent security risk, threatening tocause serious food shortages, unusual and potentially destructive climate phenomena, epidemic disease, and mass displacement. It is ourgeneration’s mission to take immediate actions to mitigate against suchunfavorable climate change-related impacts looming on the horizon.
Japan, as the most energy-efficient economy in the world, must initiate
a global carbon emissions reduction framework based on pragmatism.
Such a framework must be both effective in reducing carbon emissions
and flexible enough to facilitate the participation of all major emerging countries. Target systems based on energy efficiency benchmarking such as through measuring the energy intensity of GDP growth, forexample, are more likely to be accepted by a larger number of developing countries, while a pledge and review system to monitor emissions
will provide the flexibility and lower hurdles necessary for those developing countries to freely join the global framework.

49

Normative Dimension

Japan as a Normative Power in the World
Despite the relative decline in the size of its economy, Japan should
maintain and, moreover, increase its influence in shaping the normative foundation of the emerging world order. In a connected world, agoal nations should pursue cannot be defined solely from a narrowly
defined national interest perspective. National interest has to beembedded in global norms. Japan should not limit herself as a regional
middle power but should accept and willingly assume the role as a
responsible global power. There is a sentiment in Japan that we should
be satisfied with a limited international role, as the domestic issues weface—such as population aging, budget deficits, and ongoing recovery
efforts from 3/11—are in themselves a daunting challenge. However, an
inward-looking Japan is in itself a contradiction, since the peace andprosperity we have achieved for the past half a century was a direct
result of Japan looking outward. This continues to be true today.
Japan is, after all, no longer a rising nation, but a mature nation with a
responsibility to play a major part in laying the foundation for a peaceful, prosperous, and stable international order. To this end, Japan must
reaffirm the basis of its strength. At home, democracy, rule of law,human rights, social justice, and the market economy will continue tobe the guiding principles. These principles, when projected outward,
will serve as a pillar of the rule-based liberal international order, which
will benefit every nation willing to participate and take responsibility
in its maintenance. It was precisely this order that led the economic
growth and the development of democratic institutions in many Asian
countries. And the lessons will continue to be applicable to other partsof the world. Japan should continue to emphasize the principles of50

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freedom, openness, justice, and rule-based order, all of which havecontributed to achieving stability, but at the same time must play afacilitating role for the traditional order to adapt to challenges posedby the newly emerging regional dynamics. Globalization comes with
its own host of merits and demerits; Japan should encourage the former and tame the latter, shaping globalization into a process fairer for
every nation.
To play this facilitating role, Japan’s ability to form a durable and flexible coalition will be absolutely crucial. For this, a facility to nudge, toinfluence, to convince, and in some cases, to coerce will be needed.
Today, competitions among nations are not solely about which canoverwhelm the other with hard power. Rather, the forefront of international politics is about participating in the process of rule-making
to govern the international order. Although this is not about a clash ofphysical strength, competition is fierce nonetheless. A strong nationmust have the ability to contribute to the process and enhance global
governance, but at the same time embed its national interests in thenegotiated outcome. To this end, Japan must further enhance its
capacity as a global normative power.

Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Liberal Foundations
Despite the global economic crisis of the previous decade, globalization will remain an undeniable trend. It will accelerate with the further development of Internet technology and communication tools,
and with means of transportation becoming more accessible to many.
As a result, the level of interdependency will increase to a level neverbefore experienced. We are already at a historic stage where people,
goods, money, and information transcend national boundaries at an
unprecedented quantity and speed. Although the merits of globalization are undeniable—namely in the world becoming smaller andpeople more interconnected—the negatives are clearly there as well.
The threats to human security and to people’s survival, livelihoods,
and dignity are diversifying and intensifying. Those threats include51

the internationalization of domestic conflicts, terrorism, the spread of
infectious diseases, issues of human trafficking and refugees accompanying the expansion of migration, economic crises, spread of poverty-related problems, environmental and climate change issues, andnatural disasters.
In order to cope with this tectonic shift, and to deal with the negative effects of globalization, it will be necessary to increase the level ofgovernance at the national, regional, and global levels. The right mix
of coordination among the three levels of governance must be soughtfor each specific issue. As already outlined, rules are in the making inareas such as the environment, finance, trade, cyberspace, maritime
affairs, and outer space. Rather than responding passively to the issues
as they arise, Japan intends to become an active promoter of rulemaking, with the recognition that it is the obligation of a nation suchas ours to put maximum effort into reaching a just, fair, and effective
order of governance. In this regard, the guiding principle here will befound in universal values such as rule of law, human rights, and liberalfoundations. Japan has a major stake in maintaining and deepening
these values, as the country relies ultimately on an international ordergrounded in these values. However, we firmly believe that enhancement of these values will benefit not only Japan, but also any nation
willing to become an active stakeholder.
Quite often, ‘universal values’ are criticized as being a cover for ‘western values.’ Japan, a nation with a distinct cultural heritage and experience, knows quite well that differences in ‘values’ arise out of distinct
historical, cultural, religious, and moral perspectives and experiences.
However, we recognize the undeniable reality that, as the world shrinks,
universal values are emerging and taking root. This is not solely a matter of moral appeal, but is fundamental in shaping an order of governance that will be fair and agreeable to all parties. In other words,
promoting universal values is not a matter of ‘should’ but of ‘must.’
When pre-modern Japan faced the world in the late 19th century, ourforefathers made a conscious decision that Japan would become anation positioned between the West and the East. Out of such origins,52

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we believe that Japan has a unique role in promoting universal values
and will not hesitate to do so.

Development Assistance
Official development assistance (ODA) is one of Japan’s most important and effective diplomatic tools. Japan’s ODA is highly regarded,
hence, in many parts of the world, the Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) is literally the face of Japan. More recently, ODA is also
an important means of expressing Japan’s gratitude for the solidarity
shown by the international community in response to the Great East
Japan Earthquake.
Although the total amount of Japan’s ODA has shrunk in recent years,
we need to invest utmost efforts into maintaining the current level—and preferably reversing the downward trend. Further reduction of
ODA would hurt Japan’s stature and limit Japan’s diplomatic options.
There is a need to convince the Japanese public that ODA is not justabout a spirit of charity, but is closely tied with Japan’s strategic interests. In order to achieve a free, prosperous, and stable international
community, Japan needs to assist countries that share universal values
and strategic interests. In light of current budgetary constraints, there
is a need to streamline ODA activities and to further enhance effective
and strategic application of existing initiatives. In essence, the goal of
ODA is to bring stability, security, and prosperity to both the world andJapan. We will achieve this through building peace, expanding markets, enhancing knowledge, and building lasting ties between Japanand our international partners.
The current pace and nature of globalization leaves many vulnerable
to transnational threats. Terrorism, climate change, pandemics, poverty, and internal conflicts that spill over borders pose a direct threat
to the well-being of the individual. Recognizing this fact, Japan has
pursued an approach to ODA based on the notion of human security.
Fundamentally, human security seeks to offer protection with a view to53

enhancing the problem solving capability of the individual. Japan has
played a major part in the evolution of this concept and will maintainan active role in its application.
Moving forward, Japan is primed to step into a more strategic use of
ODA toward securing safety and enhancing stability. Already the country has provided technical assistance and training for coast guards
and national police in this direction. Helping to build the capacity ofcoastal states in Southeast Asia through the use of ODA is an area thatJapan must now further explore.
Thus far, ODA and plans to involve the JSDF in peacekeeping operations have, in principle, been planned and implemented separately.
However, many of the development activities conducted under thenotion of human security involve activities in conflict zones. There,
the boundaries that used to divide multi-national forces, peacekeeping
under the mandate of the United Nations, development assistance frominternational organizations, and non-governmental sector activities
are becoming blurred, as all are ultimately involved in nation-building
in some way or another. In many of the failed states today, such as in
Afghanistan, we see these activities taking place not sequentially but
simultaneously. Japan will seek to redesign its development strategies
so that it can play a more active, comprehensive role in such realms.
In the meantime, traditional development assistance activities suchas poverty reduction, education, infrastructure building, and peacebuilding—at which Japan excels—should be maintained despite thedifficult budgetary constraints. This is important not simply becausesuch endeavors boost Japan’s reputation, but because these activities
will ultimately pave the way to peace and security—terms clearly beneficial to us all.

54

[ C H A P T E R 3 ]Advancing
Japan’s Security
StrategyNational Defense Policy

Operationalizing Dynamic Joint Defense ForceJapan’s 2013 National Defense Policy Guidelines (NDPG) adopted
a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, placing emphasis on developing
advanced technology and information, command and communications capabilities and achieving readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, robustness and connectivity in terms of both tangible andintangible resources while giving consideration to the establishment ofbroad infrastructure for logistical support.
As a geographical focus, the NDPG called for reinforcement of defense
preparations for southwestern regions of Japan. This decision was
guided by China’s growing activities both in the air and at sea, alongside the sea change in the military balance of power. Risks and threats
to Japan’s southwestern region could be classified as either 1) low
intensity (i.e., violation of maritime interests by intrusion of fishingboats or marine observation vessels) or 2) medium/high intensity (i.e.,
destruction of base [U.S. Forces and JSDF] and logistics infrastructure[ballistic/cruise missiles, special forces, and cyber-attack], and attackand invasion of Japan’s numerous islands regions). In essence, thedesign of the Guidelines boils down to initiatives borne out of two core
concepts: 1) managing Japan’s own Dynamic Defense, and 2) dynamically maintaining and reinforcing joint actions with the U.S. and U.S.
extended deterrence.
To protect Japan’s maritime interests, Japan will continue to builda defensive wall along the Nansei Islands by reinforcing the JCG,
enhancing ISR capabilities, and introducing amphibious operation
capabilities. The Japan-U.S. alliance is still the key to defeating AntiAccess/Area Denial (A2/AD) threats. Primary roles for Japan under the56

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allied Air Sea Battle (ASB) include tactical air operations, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and air defense. Also critical will be the formationof a rapid-response multi-task force for mine-sweeping, escort missions, fleet air-defense, and law enforcement in distant seas such as the
Persian Gulf.
The most important challenge in the maritime domain is to prevent
any armed conflict among maritime powers. ASB is not a strategy but
a tactical concept that can escalate an armed conflict in the maritime
commons. Japan and the United States should develop ‘offshore control’, or a distant blockade against hostile maritime powers, to slow acrisis down and reduce escalatory pressure. Offshore control does notrely on cyber and space domains, but would require cooperation fromother regional countries along the ‘long littoral’ such as Australia andIndia.

Japan-U.S. Alliance

Upgrading Roles, Missions and Capabilities
Toward meeting newly emerging security challenges, Japan will review
and upgrade current roles, missions, and capabilities (RMC) with
the United States as part of upgrading the Guidelines for Japan-U.S.
Defense Cooperation. Based on the Common Strategic Objectives (CSO),
both regional and global, agreed upon between Japan and the UnitedStates at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC or ‘2+2’) meeting in
February 2005, the JSDF and USFJ have so far placed primary emphasison 1) defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding
Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies,and 2) efforts to improve the international security environment, such57

as participation in international peace cooperation activities.
The 2007 RMC review included international disaster relief (DR) operations, establishing a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological andNuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group, strengthening ballistic missile defense (BMD) and operational capability, and enhancing BMD
system capabilities, among other components. Building on this, the2011 review deepened and broadened security and defense cooperationin expanding joint training and exercises; further studying joint andshared use of facilities; expanding cooperation in ISR activities; transferring SM-3 Block II to third parties; establishing a regular bilateralextended deterrence dialogue; establishing space, cyber, and trilateral/
multilateral cooperation; refining humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), counterterrorism, maritime security, and counterpiracy operations; exploring joint measures to tackle environmental
challenges; and enhancing the CBRN Defense Working Group, among
other initiatives.
Through the past eight years of bilateral defense cooperation between
Japan and the United States, both allies have come to a converged recognition that new security challenges tend to emerge not only from‘gray zone’ situations in which there is no clear distinction between
peace and contingency, but beyond them as well. This marks a fundamental, structural change to the security situation the two allies arefacing. To meet the emerging challenges while building on the aforementioned RMC reviews, Japan will work to upgrade RMC especially inthe following areas:•

Enhancing ISR capabilities and operations, mobile deployment
capabilities (light-armored units), amphibious operation capabilities, and joint operations among the JCG, the JSDF, and the USFJ.

•

Enhancing Japan’s own air-sea capabilities to deal with challenges
from ‘gray zone’ situations to low-medium intensity conflicts.

•

Building Japan’s own capability to manage and control escalation
procedures and timelines in both peace and crisis times.

•

Enhancing Japan-U.S. defense cooperation for high-end operationsin an A2/AD environment, including joint studies and exercises.

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Enhancing regional defense capacity building and revitalizing ODA
activities in East and Southeast Asia toward helping regional friends
and partners to improve their maritime security.

In addition to reviewing and upgrading RMS, Japan must jointly reexamine the existing CSO. Finally, reviewing and upgrading RMC
should be synchronized with Japan’s efforts to eliminate the existing
constraints on Japan’s defense policy, including the issue of collective
self-defense rights, and to take legal measures to protect national andbilateral security and defense intelligence, among other key interests.

Exercising the Right ofCollective Self-Defense
It is widely known that Americans played a primary role inwriting the postwar Japanese Constitution during the occupation in 1946. The document contains a clause that proclaims that Japan forever renounces war and refrains frompossessing a military, by which the intention of the UnitedStates was to prevent Japan from turning into a powerful
enemy again. The ensuing strategic condition soon left ahuge gap between this de jure statement and the de facto
practice of it. The Korean War brought the incipient Cold
War into Asia, forcing Japan effectively to rearm, and catapulted Japan and the United States into devising a security
treaty upon termination of occupation. The treaty was revised in 1960, with stipulations of the United States’ obligation to defend Japan.

The Japanese government has upheld an official interpretation of the Constitution that, when it comes to conflictoverseas, its involvement would be limited to exercisingthe ‘right of self-defense.’ It states, too, that the forces it

59possesses are considered to be not a ‘military’ but ‘selfdefense forces.’ A third official position is that, although theConstitution allows the right of collective self-defense, thegovernment does not agree with any exercise thereof, assuch an action would undeniably go beyond the scope ofthe stated purpose of an absolute minimal capacity for selfdefense.

This de facto–de jure gap yields a political dilemma whose
implications are quite consequential. The United States
would be obligated to defend Japan in accordance with thesecurity treaty, but Japan would be legally barred from reciprocating. Consider a highly plausible scenario, in whichan American naval fleet, engaged in a collective operation
with the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) in
preparation for missile launches, was confronted with anunannounced guerrilla-type attack. Suppose, further, thatthe attack led to a situation short of the need to exercise
self-defense from Japan’s perspective. Participation by the
JSDF would violate the Constitution—given the current
interpretation.

Another plausible situation surrounds the issue of whether
Japan’s Aegis–equipped fleets should intercept ballistic
missiles aimed at U.S. territories like Hawaii, a capacity to
be acquired in the near future. Legally speaking, this is a
non-debate, because the Constitution does not allow the
JSDF to engage in operations. In short, these scenarios—
the exercise of self-defense to guard American fleets or toshoot down ballistic missiles targeting an ally—are essentially outside the allowable options for Japan.

This is the official position of the Japanese government
regarding Article 9 of the Constitution—and one that has

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enjoyed broad support by a public predominantly predisposed toward pacifism. Intellectuals on this side assert that,once the right of collective self-defense is allowed in practice, the ‘safety valve’ would be lifted and Japan would be
perpetually pulled into wars fought by the Americans. Whilesome argue that the actual wording of the Article needs tobe revised in lieu of reinterpretation, this idea amounts toone against exercising collective self-defense in that the
chances for Article 9’s revision are politically nil.

On the other hand, those in favor of constitutional reinterpretation contend that the current interpretation would undermine Japan’s ability to cooperate effectively as an allyof the United States. More specifically, they point out that if
the right of collective self-defense remains ruled out, it confines the Japanese government to a limited set of defense
options in a time when strategic environments shift rapidly,
due in part to advancement of ballistic missile technology
and other such capabilities for defensive purposes. Since
they agree that constitutional revision is politically nearly
unattainable, many believe that reinterpretation by the presiding Cabinet will be the next best option.

Japan is the only country in the world whose government
does not countenance the right of collective self-defense.
The public, in general, continues to show little interest in thematter. Yet a problem as critical as this one requires broad
public awareness and greater participation. Meanwhile, a
few not-unimportant neighboring countries are quite sensitive to any change in the way Japan understands andexercises its self-defense. To minimize room for misunderstanding by key relevant states abroad regarding the intention of constitutional reinterpretation, public diplomacy willplay a crucial role from the outset of the debate.

61

U.S. Forward Presence in Japan andthe Okinawa Base Issue
U.S. forward-deployment of bases and personnel in Japan
has been an essential source of Japan’s deterrence power
against external threats throughout the Cold War and thereafter. For the United States, U.S. forward-deployed forcesin Asian nations, including Japan, have been indisputablesignals of U.S. commitment to the obligations of the JapanU.S. Security Treaty to defend Japan and maintain peaceand stability in Asia during those years. The U.S. bases in
Okinawa, in particular, have played the most critical role inmaintaining the aforementioned deterrence power. In fact,
the US Marine Corps in Okinawa have been an indispensable component of U.S. responses to contingencies on the
Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait.

In 2012, the United States announced its plan to redistribute the deployment of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force(MAGTF) in the Asia-Pacific as part of its review of force
postures in the region. The hub of this plan is relocationof the Marine Corps in Okinawa. On April 27, 2012, thejoint statement of the Security Consultative Committee(‘2+2’) was released, announcing that adjustments will bemade to plans outlined in the 2006 U.S.-Japan Roadmap
for Realignment Implementation (‘Realignment Roadmap’).
Although the Roadmap stipulated 8,000 Marines relocatingfrom Okinawa to Guam, the joint statement indicated thata total of approximately 9,000 Marines would be relocatedfrom Okinawa to locations outside of Japan, and that theauthorized strength of the US Marine Corps forces in Guamwould be approximately 5,000 personnel. The joint statement also clarified that the United States plans to locate

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the MAGTF in Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii.

Prime Minister Abe made it clear that Japan would implement the realignment of U.S. bases in Japan in accordancewith the existing agreements with the United States, andwould seek to reduce the burden on Okinawa while maintaining deterrence. Japan and the United States will work
together to promptly advance the relocation of Marine
Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma and the Okinawa Con­solidation Plan. The return of land currently being occupied
by US MCAS Futenma will become possible in fiscal 2022
or later. Overall, the Realignment Implementation in Okinawa
can be summarized as follows:

MCAS Futenma (total return, shared use approximately
481ha)
1.

Base facility for helicopters: The Futenma Replace­ment
Facility will be constructed in the area from Oura Bay tosouth coast of Camp Schwab.

2. Base facility for aerial refueling tankers: Relocation to
Iwakuni (deploy on a rotational basis to JMSDF Kanoya
Base and Guam).
3. Base function for contingency use: Tsuiki and Nyutabaru
Air Bases and others.
Shared Use:•Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training•

JSDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with
US Forces, while taking into account the noise impact
on local communities

Land Returns:•

The remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa will beconsolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant
land areas south of Kadena Air Base (A detailed consolidation plan is being developed)63

•Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 (total return,approximately 16ha)•

Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (total return,approximately 274ha)•

Naha Port (total return, approximately 56ha) (A replacement facility will be constructed in the Naha Port andHarbor Plan Urasoe-Pier district)•Camp Kuwae (Lester) (total return, approximately 68ha);
Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) (partial return, some of
approximately 596ha)

Regarding the role of MCAS in Japan, in the wake of thenatural disasters of March 2011, U.S. forces in Asia responded quickly and worked seamlessly with the JSDF.
During Operation Tomodachi, the proximity of MCAS
Futenma to Marine ground and logistics units was criticalto the rapid deployment of supplies and personnel in transporting Marine assets within four hours of being tasked.
In fact, helicopters, fixed-wing C-130 aircraft, personnel ofthe 31st MEU, the 3rd Marine Logistics Group, and the 1st
Marine Air Wing from Okinawa were dispatched for HA/DR
operations.

With the rise of China in economic and military terms andthe advent of the U.S. rebalancing strategy in the AsiaPacific region, the role of U.S. forward presence in Okinawa
is also becoming more critical. In particular, in light of theincreasingly assertive and reinforcing Chinese maritime
and naval activities in the East China Sea, including thosearound the Senkaku Islands, the strategic value of U.S. forward presence to Japan’s own security is becoming evenmore significant. Japan will need to redefine the value in its
future strategy toward China in general and in its responseto the Senkaku issue in particular.

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Alliance Plus-One,
Alliance Plus-Sum andRegional Cooperation
Enhancing Strategic Relations with
Australia, India, South Korea and Russia
Japan’s strategic cooperation with key like-minded stakeholders in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific region including Australia, India, Korea and theASEAN countries, has been vital to Japan in maintaining a rule-basedorder and is gaining new momentum as the United States reinforces
its rebalancing strategy in the region. Japan will utilize this network
as a multi-layered front against China’s accelerated targeting of theso-called Island Chains and beyond and also as a dynamo for further
regional economic development.
Japan’s strategic relations with Australia, which is the United States’
most reliable Pacific ally and shares common values, have developed steadily since the 1950s. The 2007 Joint Declaration on Security
Cooperation has made relations even more robust against the common emerging security challenges. To wit, Australia is the only country after the United States with whom Japan has signed and ratified aGeneral Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and an
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). Australia is also asolid leg of the Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Security Dialogue andan active participant in the associated series of pragmatic and effective
trilateral joint training and exercises. Japan will continue to enhanceand institutionalize its strategic cooperation with Australia moving
forward.
Similarly, Japan signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation
with India in 2008 and, since then, has been increasingly active inpromoting more pragmatic and effective strategic cooperation with65

the vibrant democracy and rapidly rising economy. Based on the
Joint Declaration, an Action Plan was issued in December 2009, andother various frameworks of a security dialogue between Japan andIndia have been established, including an Annual Sub-Cabinet/Senior
Officials 2+2 dialogue. It is also notable that Japan-U.S.-India Trilateral
Security Cooperation, including the participation of JMSDF in the‘Malabar 09,’ co-hosted by the United States and Indian Navies in 2009,has been instrumental in strengthening the bilateral security cooperation between Japan and India as well. Japan’s strategic cooperation in
naval and maritime cooperation, as well as cooperation in economic
and cultural areas, will be further strengthened in the years ahead.
Japan came close to signing a GSOMIA and had intensively discussed
the possibility of an ACSA with South Korea in 2012 (see also ‘Enhancestrategic relations with Australia, India, South Korea and Russia,’
Chapter 3). This indicates a mutual agreement on the fundamental
need for closer strategic cooperation between the two Northeast Asian
allies of the United States in the region. Although these processes havebeen suspended mainly due to the issue of history, and the bilateralrelationship could continue to be subject to the political situation of
the time, the shared security concerns and challenges—including theexisting North Korea threat and the emerging Chinese military influence—will continue to remind both Japan and South Korea of thepractical necessity for more direct security cooperation. Japan willcertainly never cease to seek ways to enhance its strategic cooperation
with South Korea.
Japan’s relation with Russia needs a cautious and pragmatic approach.
Although a settlement of the Japan-Russia Peace Treaty remains to be
not promising, both countries are able to dramatically enhance strategic cooperation. Such areas include energy security, developmentin the Far East and Siberia, and the development of new seaborne
trade routes using the Arctic Sea. The two countries share interests ineach of these domains and might fruitfully set precedents for cooperation before tackling a politically more intricate issue like territory.
Meanwhile, Tokyo needs to cultivate trust with Moscow on security-

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related issues like defense exchange and strategic dialogue, especiallygiven the rapid rate of the latter’s military modernization.

Strengthening Ties with ASEAN
Japan’s national interests are deeply entwined with sustaining
Southeast Asia’s waters as an open and peaceful zone, free from military conflict. As 95% of Japan’s energy supplies are shipped and 40%
of exports and imports traded through this channel, keeping Southeast
Asian waters peaceful and open is of prime strategic importance forJapan. Thus, the direction of Japan’s strategy in this area will be toproceed without hesitation in assuming an active and leading role tosecure Southeast Asian seas as a global commons—a sea with freedomof navigation for prosperity.
Foremost among the challenges we face in this arena are the territorial
disputes in the South China Sea. Territorial disputes between China
and ASEAN littoral countries, especially the Philippines and Vietnam,
have created serious obstacles to maintaining the area’s peace andopenness. The fundamental challenge here is the asymmetric power
among the conflicting parties. Both Vietnam and the Philippines lackcapacity in countering either military or economic assertive measurestaken by the Chinese.
Strategies to maintain open Southeast Asian seas encompass three pillars. The first pillar is to enhance the security capabilities of our peer
littoral states in Southeast Asia. To this end, technical cooperationfrom coast guards and monitoring systems in maritime Asia should beenhanced. Demonstrating Japan’s naval security capabilities will also
be critical to becoming a reliable regional partner in times of need. The
JCG, under the initiative of the National Security Council (NSC) willassume a primary role in supporting security measures and building
confidence in ASEAN littoral states, which will, in turn, set the foundation for overall peace in maritime Asia in this era of dynamic changes
in the regional power structure.

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The second pillar for maintaining open Southeast Asian seas relies on
diplomacy. With respect to the strategic importance for Japan of having freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the Malaccastraits, enhancing the level of partnership with Southeast Asian littoral states—especially the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia—iscritical. And among these three countries, Indonesia holds the primary
importance. Indonesia has been a de facto ally to Japan since gaining
independence, and for Indonesia, Japan has been the only country
in ‘the West’ to stand firmly at its side throughout its republican era.
As the center of various Asia-Pacific regional architectures, Indonesia
now holds increasing diplomatic power. With a view to its own national
interests in maintaining geopolitical freedom in maritime Asia, Japan
simply cannot afford to lose a friendly Indonesia. Thus, it is of great
importance to enhance this diplomatic relationship.
Finally, the third pillar in support of open seas in Southeast Asia isdevelopment—on two planes. The first is to support ASEAN’s development as a whole especially in the field of upgrading connectivity among
nations and cities in the region. For example, constructing an EastWest highway corridor in continental Southeast Asia from Vietnam to
Myanmar will greatly contribute to trans-national development andalso to Japanese corporate activity, which has been active in the region
as well. This is particularly important as Japan’s national interest currently relies not only on the maritime Asia passage for its energy supply
and trade, but also on ASEAN’s regional development as a whole as theregion increasingly has become a crucial part of the global supply chain
for Japan. The second plane is development of the social resilience of
the ASEAN countries, especially the littoral zones of the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Indonesia. Regional security starts from the resiliency of
local society. Unlike the urban centers, the coastal cities and regions
among these countries (e.g., Mindanao, Sabah, Sarawak, Kalimantan
and Sulawesi) are relatively underdeveloped. Cooperation and commitment in the local development of this particular region must not
be overlooked, as these areas have been an area of civil conflict, withpotentially harmful ramifications for the overall architecture of peacein the region.

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Through such strategies, Japan has the opportunity to demonstrate its
commitment to bolstering the littoral zone of ASEAN on every level forthe sake of freedom of navigation of the Southeast Asian waters. The
coming years will certainly see continued endeavors in this direction.

Japan-China Relations:“Quiet Deterrence” and “Strategic Partnership”
It is imperative that Japan actively participates in the construction
and maintenance of the international order through establishing strategic partnerships with China. History has repeatedly shown that theexisting international system has destabilized as a result of emerging
countries’ actions to challenge it. Minimizing the chances for systemic
destabilization requires a situation wherein emerging states find aninterest in supporting rather than contesting the international systemas ‘responsible’ powers. Japan needs to help create such a condition.
It goes without saying that both China is highly important to Japan,
as permanent members of the UN Security Council and as formidable
military and nuclear powers. Japan needs to create a proactive strategy
toward China to achieve the following objectives: 1) to deepen trust in
diplomatic relations; 2) to see China playing a responsible role in international society; and 3) to build and develop a cooperative relationship with China on such matters as energy and non-traditional areasof security.
Be that as it may, China is a developing nation, and given the current
situation in which there are severe tensions in relations between Japanand China, the question of how best to approach China is certainly adifficult one. This issue can be classified into short-term and mid- tolong-term processes. In the short term it will be necessary to strategically reopen dialogue with China in order to break through the current
diplomatic impasse. At such a time it will be critical to take care not togive China the mistaken impression that Japan has conceded that a territorial issue exists between the two countries. It would be advisable for69the Japanese government to use diplomatic means to persuade China
to return to a ‘normal’ situation in which diplomatic dialogue is held
on a regular basis.
The objectives of quiet deterrence are not to incur China’s reactive
assertiveness and not to cause an outbreak of Chinese nationalism andnot to tempt the Chinese Government to enflame Chinese nationalism.
The deterrence must also be quiet for Japan and the United States tojointly address this challenge by fully exercising the Japan-U.S. alliance.
The essence of quiet deterrence is effective strategic communication,
through signaling to China on strong mutual commitment of US-Japan
alliance, partnering with Australia, South Korea and Southeast AsianCountries to induce China to work cooperatively for maintenance ofregional security global commons, and strengthened dialogue with
China itself, in particular on risk and crisis management.
Japan-China strategic rivalry could face long and tough roads unless
both find a grand bargain to reach new modus vivendi. Japan-China
relations are too important to fail for regional and global security andeconomy. In the meantime, Japan should maintain ‘quiet deterrence’against China’s attempt to change the status-quo by force.
Yet a fundamental strategic principle is clear and remains the same:
to create a condition whereby China finds its interests in building andmaintaining an amicable relationship, rather than a hostile one, withJapan. The reality of deep economic interdependence between Japanand China is often overshadowed by nationalistic sentiments overpolitical disputes. Overcoming this strategic mismatch is both countries’ urgent task. The most significant questions will be whether theescalation of tensions between the two countries can be held in check
and whether a crisis-management mechanism can be implemented.
Having the Japan-U.S. alliance at its core, the multilateralism will also
be essential in Japan’s strategic approaches. A number of dimensions
necessitate cooperation, including North Korea’s nuclear program,energy development in the East China Sea, and code building on theuse of the high seas. A persistent effort to convince China to return tothe diplomatic table for cooperation is essential not only on economic

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but also on security matters.
Japan’s pursuant for quiet deterrence is also favorable in Southeast
Asia. The greatest challenge for Japan’s security policy towards
Southeast Asia is to deal with Southeast Asia’s complexity in its major
power relations. Southeast Asian countries are often divided over how
best to deal with regional security issues. This is due to their different
national interests, geopolitics, and preferences of their diplomatic relations with China. Most Southeast Asian countries prefer to avoid facing with a strategic choice whether to take side of U.S., Japan or China.
Instead, Southeast Asia is interested in maintaining the balance ofpower among major states that is preferable to Southeast Asia’s strategic position.
Pressuring Southeast Asian countries to take the side of Japan against
China (and the United States against China) will likely jeopardize
Southeast Asia’s cohesiveness, which is the central element of her
strength. Southeast Asia will not perform a collective balancing against
China. Japan’s desirable principles should be based on quiet deterrence against China, then should include the following: 1) encourage Southeast Asia’s own initiatives towards the ASEAN Security
Community in 2015 to further materialize the effectiveness of intraregional security cooperation, 2) smartly assist to build the security
capacity of Southeast Asian littoral states, to minimize the security
dilemma, through financing, training and capacity building.

Japan’s Territorial Integration Policy
and the Future of the Asia-Pacific
An international order based on the rule of law is absolutely essential for ensuring Japan’s safety and prosperity.
But the circumstances surrounding the country’s territorial

71and maritime interests pose increasing challenges. The
Northern Territories and Takeshima are currently occupied
by Russia and South Korea, respectively. While Japan andRussia agreed in the 1993 Tokyo Declaration to resolve theirdispute ‘on the principles of law and justice,’ South Korea
refuses to acknowledge the very existence of a dispute
and, rejecting any judicial resolution, continues to occupy
Takeshima. China has also made assertions with no legal
grounds under international law to justify repeated and dangerous provocations seeking to threaten Japan’s effective
control of the Senkaku Islands.

The disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima
are about the past. Even with disputants making opposing claims, it is still possible to manage such disputes andidentify peaceful means of resolution. As Japan seeks toresolve these territorial issues peacefully without resortingto the use of force, there is no danger of the disputes leading to armed conflict. However, the outcome of the current
struggle over the Senkakus will have significant implications
for the future of the Asia-Pacific. China is challenging Tokyo
over the Senkaku Islands in order to weaken the liberal international order that was established after World War II. If
the confrontation is resolved peacefully, a bright future will
be within closer reach for the region. If it is, on the other
hand, resolved through coercion, the region is more likely toconfront a future defined by Chinese hegemony. And wereit to be resolved through war, the region would, of course,
face a decidedly dark future.

To resolve the disputes over the Northern Territories andTakeshima and ensure that China’s provocations over the
Senkaku Islands do not lead to a confrontation between
Japan and China, the effectiveness of Japan’s own foreign72Chapter 3

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policy and defense efforts as well as of the Japan-U.S. alliance must be maintained and enhanced. At the same time,
Japan must ensure that international public opinion has
an accurate historical and legal perspective on the issues
through conducting sophisticated public diplomacy to inspire the support of the international community in urging
the other claimants to comply with international law.

Global Engagement

UN and the Global Non-proliferation Regime
Japan should have an effective strategy to manage the governance crisis confronting international institutions and should utilize international institutions, in turn, for enhancing its strategic environment.
Such international institutions as the United Nations as well as thenuclear non-proliferation regime, in particular, should be better utilized for enhancing the peace and security environment globally.
Ideally, the United Nations could serve as an important platform to
discuss, establish, and consolidate norms for dealing with threats tointernational peace and security. In particular, threats posed by nontraditional sources of risk, such as terrorism, humanitarian disasters
caused by either armed conflict or natural disaster, and global healthproblems including pandemics. In light of their trans-border natureand the scale of their impacts, such threats cannot be addressed by any
one state acting in isolation. Moreover, in cases of humanitarian crisis,
it may at times even be inappropriate to leave the issue to be dealt with73

by the sovereign state, as the state itself could constitute the cause of
the crisis.
Since unilateral action by any state, including the United States, torestore peace has become more difficult in terms of legitimacy, effectiveness, and sustainability, the role of the United Nations as a mechanism to lend the requisite legitimacy to international collective action
against humanitarian crises is crucial. However, the United Nations asa global governance institution faces its own governability crisis andsometimes fails to address security and humanitarian crises. These
failures arise out of two problematic ‘divides.’ First, while new notions
such as ‘responsibility to protect’ or ‘human security’ assume more
involvement by the international community in cases of deteriorating
human rights and humanitarian conditions within a state, a persistent belief in national sovereignty can bar effective action. The international community remains divided over the prioritization between
traditional national sovereignty and these new international security
concepts. Second, and partly related to the first point, major powers in
the UN Security Council—in particular, the United States and Russia—
are fundamentally divided, and the Security Council thus sometimes
fails to form an international consensus on how to deal with crises. In
this context, Japan must step up to proactively involve itself in shaping
international norms to legitimize multilateral actions against humanitarian crises.
Proliferation of WMD is among the gravest concerns for international
peace and stability. Acquiring nuclear weapons capability could wellprove a major game changer for regional security dynamics. Therefore,
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be placed as ahigh priority in Japan’s security policy. Given their mounting energy
demands, growing economies in the developing world are liable to turnto nuclear power as a source to fill the gap. For example, many countries in the Middle East, where Iranian nuclear ambitions and nucleararmed Israel pose serious challenges, have expressed interest in
introducing nuclear technology. Increasing reliance on nuclear energy
might thus result in the spread of potential nuclear aspirants in terms

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of political will and technological capability.
Under such circumstances, without properly dealing with on-goingproliferation crises such as North Korea and Iran, and without properly
ensuring non-diversion of nuclear technology into military purposes,
the risk of nuclear proliferation will only escalate. In cooperation with
the United States and other like-minded countries, Japan, which hastechnological capabilities and policy expertise, needs to proactively
work to strengthen the IAEA and other multilateral mechanisms aswell as to put in place bilateral commitments, in order to further effectuate the non-proliferation regime.

Strengthening the Global Economic andEnergy Regime
Ultimately, the primary source of Japan’s national power lies in its
economic strength. Our economy is, in turn, deeply embedded in the
globalized economy, and our economic strength cannot be reinforced
without engaging in international economic transactions. Hence,
strengthening the liberal international economic order and enforcing
rules of law, both of which facilitate our economic transactions abroad,will be critically important to our national security. Yet ensuring sucha liberal economic order cannot be realized by Japan’s efforts alone.
Rather, forming an economic cooperation regime with like-mindedcountries is the most effective means to achieve such an end goal, given
the recent deadlock in the Doha Development Round. We must reaffirm that our economic cooperation regime has strategic implications
not only in terms of economic growth but also for national security.
Among several options for an international economic cooperation
regime, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) will be the most highly
prioritized one for Japan. Including other major developed economies
in the Asia-Pacific such as the United States and Australia, as well as
prospective emerging economics like Vietnam and Malaysia, the TPP
includes a well-balanced group of member economies in the region.

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And the benefits to TPP membership are extensive. Sustainable economic growth is realized based on solid rules of law, a transparent
dispute settlement system, and sound labor and environment standards—all of which are included in the TPP’s coverage. Participating in
the TPP will contribute to raising Japanese employment by attracting
international companies and encouraging Japanese companies to stay.
Finalizing and implementing the TPP in a timely manner will therefore
contribute greatly to solidifying the bright prospects opened up to allmember economies, Japan included.
The expansion of TPP membership to a larger number of countries
undoubtedly enhances its benefits. Considering Japan’s interdependent relationship with neighboring economies, inviting them into thepartnership is very important. We must collaborate with our negotiating partners to design and construct a TPP attractive enough to attract
the attention and interest of neighboring countries such as China andSouth Korea.
Participating in the negotiation of the TPP also represents for Japana great opportunity to review the existing regulatory and administrative frameworks and to reform them to enhance our national competitiveness. Agriculture has been the main focus of domestic reform. We
will thus turn this TPP negotiation into a springboard to encourage thedomestic agricultural sector to explore a more outward-looking andinnovative business model under the new conditions.
With a view to the significance of trade strategy for Japan, a control
tower to oversee all trade-related negotiations, such as a Japanese version of the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), willbe established in order to mobilize necessary resources and achieve themost ideal outcome in our trade negotiations. Personnel with close ties
to the Prime Minister and Chief Cabinet Secretary will be appointed toserve as chief of the office, which will oversee and control the vast network of different trade negotiations.
Japan needs also to address some structural changes in the global

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energy market. First, although the magnitude of the impact is still
disputable, the so-called ‘shale revolution’ certainly has the potential
to affect patterns of energy trade—and even politics over energy. The
European energy market, for example, has already been affected by the
U.S. shale revolution, which brought cheap U.S. coal into the European
market and pushed down the price of Russian natural gas. Further, if
the United States achieves self-reliance and reduces its dependency
on the Middle Eastern energy supply, the terms and motives of U.S.
involvement in the Middle East will change. This may have some
impact as well on the U.S.-Japan partnership in the defense of SLOCs
and the stability of the Middle East. Second, the rising energy demandin emerging economies has the potential to render the energy procurement environment more competitive. Indeed, severe competition
among consumer states in the search for energy resources has alreadybegun. Third, political instability, social and economic factors, and therise of energy nationalism in producer states may overshadow the stability of the energy market in the future. In this context, energy nationalism involving excessive government involvement in energy trade andinvestment must be minimized.
Clearly, the present circumstances demand a comprehensive strategy to hedge such risks in the energy market. A more resilient energy
mix based on increased utilization of nuclear power must be pursued.
Building cooperation among consumer states will also help to create
more leverage in shaping market dynamics. For example, reform ofnatural gas markets—which is regionally compartmentalized, withthe price of natural gas in the Asian market pegged to that of oil—will
only be possible through close cooperation among consumer states. As
all Asian countries face their own energy shortage problems, if Japan
could overcome its own post-3/11 energy problem and revitalize theeconomy, the country would be held up as a model country for other
Asian countries in its energy supply approach. Such achievements
would ultimately contribute to the maintenance and rejuvenation ofJapan’s prestige in the region. Minimizing the impact of nationalism inenergy politics will also be pursued through consecutive dialogues inarena such as the International Energy Forum and the G20, where both77

major energy producers and consumers meet.

Disaster Relief as National and Human Security
Japan’s strategic goal of ‘security’ means far more than the absenceof military conflict. In 2011, we reconfirmed that nonmilitary sourcesof conflict, too, can take lives and destroy whole cities on an unprecedented scale. Maintaining security requires a broader and more inclusive vision encompassing areas such as environment, health, foodsafety, and freedom. We cannot be secure without disaster prevention, we cannot build peace without alleviating poverty, and we cannot develop without sustaining the environment and protecting basic
freedoms. These fundamental conditions of what we now understandin the concept of ‘human security’, together with ‘national security,’
are all interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Thus, we would take theinitiative in pursuing this goal both regionally and on a global scale.
In particular, among the prime challenges of our time is environmental degradation. Notably, there are two aspects to this crisis. First is thegrowing frequency of major natural disasters, caused mainly by global
climate change. Second is irresponsible development giving rise toserious environmental degradation, such as through pollution, especially in the rapidly developing economies. It is thus necessary to overcome both of these challenges to enhance security at both national andindividual levels.
Japan’s main strategy will lie in assuming a vanguard role in global
protection against environmental degradation. In this, our greatest
advantage is our experience at home. We have set a standard for development-cum-sustainability despite numerous environmental challenges to date. It is this model of a resilient society that we can hold up
and share with our friends. Toward formulating this resilient society
model as a basis for national and human security, two key foundations
could be fully utilized as part of Japan’s strategy: 1) advanced technology and 2) education.

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Advanced technologies such as energy-efficient and renewable technologies, flood control/water management systems, and recycling
technologies are among the best capital we hold. Japan’s energy-efficient technology-based standard of development must be set as the
new standard of free, fair, and sustainable economic competition andbusiness practice. This would secure a space for Japanese corporations’ activities overseas to be both fair and just. And moreover, as we
now know that 21st century crises and social conflicts often spring fromenvironmental issues, an energy-efficient technology-based standardof development will ultimately contribute to securing peace and social
order in neighboring countries. Second, higher education in this fieldmust be supported in order to gain intellectual hegemony in the area ofenvironmental studies. Japan is now in a position to make significant
intellectual contributions to the global society in ways that could also
contribute to preventing environmental issue-based conflict through a
non-military approach.
In sum, the government should upgrade Japan’s environmental anddisaster management technologies to a higher strategic level. Bothenvironmental issues and disaster management will be core concerns
for human security, peacekeeping, and new development goals in the
21st century. And Japan is in a unique position to make a genuine difference on a global scale. We cannot hesitate in doing so and, moreover,cannot afford to miss this golden opportunity.

79[ C H A P T E R 4 ]Strategyin Action

The Role of the National Security Council (NSC)
The Japanese government established its own National Security
Council (NSC) by greatly expanding the legal mandate of the existing
Security Council and Cabinet Secretariat. An NSC is an organization
specialized in national security and crisis management and designed
to assist the Prime Minister in making important policy decisions. Its
main functions include the integration and coordination of security
policy deemed to be of vital interest to the nation.
The legislation establishing the Council provides a list of tasks the NSC
to fulfill. Foremost among these responsibilities are the design of overall approaches to dealing with situations of armed attacks, anticipatedor not; grave exigencies that would require the Prime Minister’s decision, such as hijackings and terrorist attacks; and other critical matters pertaining to national defense. The proposed NSC differs from theexisting Security Council in that, in addition to the tasks given to thelatter, the new NSC is also responsible for foreign policy in relation tonational security and related issues. Previously, these tasks have been
within the purview of the Foreign Ministry; since the NSC came into
force, it has taken over this responsibility.
More specifically, three key areas stand out wherein the NSC is to playa leading role. First, to be effective, the NSC must function as a launching pad for designing mid- to long-term strategic packages such as anational security strategy. Doing so requires the gathering of a pool oftalented officials from both inside and outside the government who arecapable of making and coordinating national security policy that cuts
across the traditional boundaries of bureaucracy.
Second, the NSC needs to preside over crisis management functions.
It is important to note that modern-day crises like the 9/11 terrorist
attacks and the Fukushima nuclear plant accidents allow very little
time for political decision-making. NSC officials will need to cultivateorganizational readiness to effect policy coordination quickly underconditions that are typically short on actionable information. This, in82

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turn, requires building a capacity to collect information from various
channels and sources and subsequently to integrate, analyze, and present a set of appropriate policy options to the Prime Minister; to facilitate timely decision-making; and to oversee policy implementation by
responsible ministries and agencies.
Third, the NSC must acquire an ability to respond to a host of highrisk situations that may or may not involve arms. These terms easily
cut across the erstwhile threshold between ‘wartime’ and ‘peacetime.’
Whereas the postwar Japanese government used to define armed
attacks demanding a state-directed response and other easy-to-capture
scenarios as threats, contemporary ‘threats’ may be far less dramatic
but with consequences just as far-reaching. For instance, a mere collision between a Chinese fishing boat and a JCG patrol ship could potentially escalate into armed engagement between China and Japan, evenbringing in the United States. This is not merely an arm-chair exercise.
The politics of the Senkaku Islands dispute, for example, have involved
not only China and the United States, but also Taiwan, South Korea,
and Russia.
Responding effectively to such matters will require careful preparationand close coordination on the part of the NSC with relevant organizations including the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Ministryof Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT), the National
Police Agency, and the affected local municipalities. Externally, theNSC needs to be in close contact with its U.S. counterpart. This external
dimension is critical to precluding conflict escalation, because it allows
the Japanese and U.S. NSCs to anticipate how neighboring actors could
respond and to determine how best to respond in turn before a crisis
occurs or the situation further deteriorates. No existing ministries oragencies can take on all of these roles; the NSC alone will have such acapacity.
The policy areas for which the proposed NSC is responsible for arequite wide in scope. Organizational effectiveness, as hinted at earlier, lies in anticipation and preparation. This will enable the NSC to83

effectively address a whole spectrum of crises from high-intensity situations that threaten state survival and citizens’ lives and assets, to lowintensity examples such as isolated ship collisions. Perhaps the biggest
task at hand is to create a united national front by breaking the existingbureaucratic stovepipes.

Leadership and Inter-Agency Approach
We envision to significantly enhance our inter-agency policy coordination capabilities under the newly established NSC to integrate andutilize all the tools of the Japanese government in fostering a wholegovernment approach to guiding the Prime Minister’s decision-making
in the fields of foreign policy and national security. The NSC should
provide a renewed organizational platform for speedy, integrated decision-making by the Prime Minister and cabinet members under various national emergency situations.
In recent years, intergovernmental rivalry and weak cross-agency
integration have been criticized as key obstacles to quick and coordinated decision-making by the government, particularly in the fields offoreign policy and national security. The NSC is expected to provide astrengthened cross-agency forum that will allow the Prime Minister togather his key cabinet members to the decision table in a speedy andflexible manner under the support of an experienced staff independent from bureaucratic interests. The Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet
Secretary, and ministers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) andthe Ministry of Defense (MOD) who are members of the NSC’s ‘Four
Cabinet Member Meeting’ are expected to form a core decision-making
body to lead these key decisions.
The NSC Secretary General, meanwhile, to be appointed by the Prime
Minister, will play a key role in leading the NSC. This individual will bein charge of the overall operations of the NSC, setting policy agendas,
promoting inter-agency coordination, interacting with foreign counterparts, and managing staff. The NSC Secretary General supported

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by two Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretaries in charge of foreign policy
and national security matters, respectively, and manages approximately 50 to 60 staff members consisting mainly of secondees from key
ministries (MOFA, MOD, and the JSDF) and political appointees fromacademia and other related fields. The NSC staff will accelerate interagency policy coordination on a daily basis, to reduce and streamline
the decisions that the key cabinet members have to make.
Certain details of the NSC’s organizational attributes are yet to be
determined, but will be particularly important in ensuring the council’s effectiveness. The NSC Secretary General should be served bya non-politician, with rich experience and knowledge in the fields offoreign policy and national security. This individual, moreover, should
enjoy the strong personal trust of the Prime Minister. The physicaloffice of the NSC Secretary General should be located within the Prime
Minister’s office, with direct and constant access to the Prime Ministerand Chief Cabinet Secretary. Finally, the NSC should be equipped witha permanent ‘Situation Room’, or a designated headquarters facility
within the Prime Minister’s office, providing secure IT and video conferencing capabilities to various key domestic stakeholders and foreigncounterparts.

Intelligence and Risk / Crisis Management
Intelligence
The establishment of a strong and independent intelligence capability
that can accurately assess what is currently happening in the world isan essential component in the design of a nation’s security strategy. At
present, while a number of key ministries house certain intelligence
units and capabilities—including the Cabinet Intelligence Research
Office (CIRO), the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA), theDefense Intelligence Headquarters of the MOD, the Public Security
Department of the National Police Agency, and the Intelligence andAnalysis Service of MOFA—a long tradition of sectionalism and interagency rivalry, combined with weak political guidance in this field,

85

have long served as roadblocks to information sharing and integrated
intelligence analyses (i.e., all-source analyses) across the government
agencies.
The establishment of the NSC provides a unique opportunity to addressthese domestic challenges as well as to expand cooperation with ourallies in the intelligence arena. The NSC will have legal authority tomake intelligence demands of the intelligence community, serving as
an intermediary between politicians’ personal interests and the intelligence community. The Director for Cabinet Intelligence should serveas the central voice to deliver regular all-source intelligence briefings
to the key members of the cabinet, at the same time discouraging
direct reporting from institutions that might wish to circumvent thisprotocol. The government should accelerate its efforts to unify security clearance standards across agencies, while fostering greater information sharing with the United States and other allies on the national
security issues by implementing Act on the Protection of Specially
Designated Secrets, went into force at the end of 2013, for enhancing
the secrecy of important national security information. These changes,
however, will require strong political leadership and determination by
the top government officials, especially the Prime Minister and Chief
Cabinet Secretary.
Crisis Management
Having an experienced and resilient crisis management capability
within the government is also extremely important in protecting ournational security and other interests, as shown in the challenges andlessons from the recent 3/11 earthquake. The Deputy Chief Cabinet
Secretary for Crisis Management is operationally in charge of handling various national emergencies, including natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and nuclear disasters, but excluding matters relating tonational defense. However, as the potential threats to national security become increasingly complex and varied in form, the distinction
between national defense issues and other crisis management issues
becomes less obvious, exposing the government to dangerous ambiguities regarding the ownership of certain emergency situations. We

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should work to specify in advance the details of such emergency operation plans, where the demarcation between the NSC and the Deputy
Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management’s team is not necessarily clear. In this way we can avoid any counter-productive confusion inan emergency situation.
The government’s crisis/emergency communication capability should
also be strengthened. Japan is unique in the sense that the Chief Cabinet
Secretary, who is second only to the Prime Minister in the government’s
decision-making hierarchy, also serves as the administration’s official
press secretary, hosting two daily press conferences. Therefore, undera national emergency situation, a tremendous administrative workload
is placed upon the Chief Cabinet Secretary, risking compromise of both
the government’s crisis reactions and/or external communication. To
address this organizational challenge, Japan should appoint a designated press secretary, especially in anticipation of national emergency
situations.

Legal Foundation of the National Security Policy
The fundamental objective of national security policy is to defend
the nation and contribute to regional and global peace and security
under the constitutional spirit of pacifism and international cooperation. Due to the lack of umbrella law on national security policy, theBasic Plan on National Defense of 1957 is meant to provide legislative
guidance on national security. However, the Basic Plan is not legallybinding and provides only general guidance. It is time to establish anumbrella law which regulates all laws on national security—including,for example, the Act on Establishment of the Security Council, the Self
Defense Force Act, the Armed Attack Situations Response Act, the Act
on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan, the Civil Protection Act,
the Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act, and the Act on Cooperation in
the UN Peacekeeping Operations.
The umbrella law—the Basic Act on National Security—should provide

87the following guiding principles to unify the existing acts as well as any
new legislation. The Basic Act should further strengthen and facilitatea whole-of-government approach to achieving national security while
promoting civilian control by strengthening Diet supervision of the
JSDF. The Act should also effectively regulate the administrative shift
from peacetime to wartime and vice versa.
1. Objectives
The fundamental objective of national security is to achieve national,
regional, and global peace and security under the constitutional
spirit of pacifism, a free and democratic society, and international
cooperation.
2. Legality of the JSDF
The JSDF defends the nation, maintains peace and stability in the Asia
Pacific, and facilitates international cooperation under strict civilian
control.
3. Right to Self-Defense
Japan can exercise the right to individual and collective self-defense
under the UN Charter. The exercise of self-defense needs to be conducted under strict civilian control and Diet supervision. A law that
regulates collective self-defense is necessary.
4. International Cooperation Activities
Given the fact that the security of Japan rests heavily on the stability of
the regional and global environment, Japan should proactively participate in international cooperation activities, especially those that are
UN mandated, when participation meets national objectives. A permanent law on Japan’s participation in international cooperation activities is urgently needed.
5. Intelligence Security
A law that regulates intelligence security is indispensable to achieving
national security. However, due consideration must also be paid to civil
liberties.

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6. Arms Exports
To achieve national security, a robust defense industrial infrastructure needs to be maintained. Accordingly, arms trade and transfers ofdefense technologies meet the national interest. However, due caution
must be exercised so as not to facilitate international conflict.
7. Whole-of-Government Approach
To achieve national security, it is vital to integrate the nation’s political, economic, diplomatic, military, cultural, and scientific resources.
To that end, ministerial cooperation should be promoted across theboard.
8. Territorial Integration
Defending national territory is the fundamental responsibility of astate. A territorial security law is urgently needed to deal with the situation in the East China Sea.

Advancing Japan’s Soft PowerIn the context of national security, the issue at stake is not whether or
not Japan would be favorably regarded, but rather, whether our view ofthe world and the norms and values we cherish would be understoodand supported. In other words, the question to be asked should be, howJapan’s soft power would contribute to creating a strategic environment that is favorable to Japan. In this respect, soft power is extremely
important. Ideally, it would create an intellectual space where Japan’s
foreign policy decisions and national security actions can be implemented with wide support. This is not to degrade activities such as cultural promotion and exchange. However, despite the overlap between
the two concepts, soft power in the context of national security is quite
different from traditional public diplomacy. It directly involves Japan’score national interest and should complement the actions taken topurse those interests.
Hence, soft power in the context of national security is not about89generally introducing Japanese culture to the outside world. Rather,it should be tailored so as to contribute to the specific national interest targets Japan is pursuing. In light of budgetary constraints, it is
not realistic to compete in the sheer magnitude of information Japansends out. Therefore, a strategic mindset is absolutely necessary. The
message should be closely coordinated with the policy implementation
actors and crafted with a deep understanding of the audience in mind.
Soft power in the context of national security does not exist in a vacuum. This suggests the need for an interagency coordinator to oversee
strategic communication whose portfolio is quite different from that ofa public diplomacy officer. It is worth noting in this context that, apartfrom certain contentious issues, Japan’s ideas and messages are widely
accepted around the world. Notably, on those few contentious matters,
there is an undeniable difference in views. Although it does not involve
clashes of raw physical power, the clashes are fierce nonetheless; it isanything but soft.
Needless to say, the most sensitive and difficult issues relate to history. There are two sides to the issue. First is how we can convince theinterested parties, and second, how the outside world perceives ourmessage and our reaction to the issue. Regarding the former, there isno easy solution but to clearly, calmly, and persistently state Japan’s
position using every platform available. Regarding the latter, quick
and emotional responses on the Japanese side have frequently createdmisunderstandings that are often lumped into a single phrase, ‘rise ofnationalism’. This characterization itself has, at times, sparked strong
emotion from the Japanese side, resulting in a negative backlash.
Precisely because the issue is sensitive, the silent majority in Japan has
been rather quiet, which only reinforces the unfortunate impressionthat this single phrase accurately portrays what is going on in Japan.
It may sound paradoxical, but we must first talk about the issue among
ourselves to deepen our understanding of how the outside world perceives it.
Precisely because it is fundamentally an issue of messaging, we musthave a clear understanding of how the message will be received by the90Chapter 4

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intended audience. Soft power in the national security context is not
simply about making a bold statement; it is about achieving foreign
policy goals. In some cases, it might even be wise to deemphasize theissue. The main pillar of the message should always be that, for the pasthalf a century, Japan has been upholding the firm belief that humanrights and democracy are of the utmost importance, and that we intend
to build relationships with our neighbors with an eye to the future.

Investing in the Next Generation’s Human Capital
It is of the utmost importance for Japan to establish a center for developing cutting-edge technology and knowledge, as this is the ultimate
source of Japan’s national strength. Japan has been lagging behind inglobalizing its academic and research institutions; there is now no time
for delay. Japan’s lack of global competitiveness in this respect fundamentally harms Japan’s national interests in the long run. We must nothesitate in investing in cultivation of a future generation able to compete globally.
Japan is in the process of opening up its policy apparatus to civil society. The NSC is one such example, with its establishment geared toward
expanding the horizon of Japan’s policy options and adapting flexibly
to newly emerging issues and circumstances. However, civil society
institutions are not fully prepared at this stage to provide personnel
able to function in such an environment, simply because the ‘revolving
door’ culture did not exist. Although think tanks could be a catalyst,
there are only a limited number of independent public policy research
institutions in Japan robust enough to conduct their own research.
These institutions should be supported mainly by civil society to foster
their independence and healthy distance from the government.
Likewise, Japan has only a limited number of experts specializing
in national security issues and policy. Their mobility is low, and too
many of them see their career as being static. They are dispersed
across universities, think tanks, the media, political parties and private

91enterprises. A sense of community among these people should be cultivated, as this would contribute to policy-generating discussions andhelp promote vital center realism on Japan’s national security policy. It
will be difficult to expect this community to evolve into a pool of potential players overnight. However, without the broadening of the intellectual basis for security policy, an effort to expand Japan’s diplomatichorizon will be incomplete.
Japan has been in relative stagnation for quite some time. Despite
this, the Japanese people are living rather comfortably. But, in somerespects, this comfort prevents us from investing in the future.
Investing in the future inevitably means giving up some of the benefits
we enjoy today. However, without bold, forward-thinking action, there
is no way that Japan can take off again. In the end, the only way Japan
can sustainably take on the constructive role elaborated on in this document is by investing in the future.

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URL:www.rebuildjpn.org