The 2010 NPT Review Conference and Future Tasks
Kazumi Mizumoto
Introduction
Since the inauguration of President Obama who is advocating a “world
free of nuclear weapons,” his idealistic image seems to have induced
global momentum for nuclear abolition. At the same time however,other people see signs of realistic approaches within the Obamaadministration, particularly in his Nobel Prize speech in December 2009,
the signing of the new US-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty(START) in 2010, and the compilation by the US Department of
Defense of the Nuclear Posture Review which also took place in 2010.
Amid a mixture of hope and suspicion, the NPT Review Conference
was convened at the UN Headquarters in New York in May, and ended
after four weeks of discussions with the adoption of the Final
Document. While the latest NPT Review Conference is being regarded
as a relative success, it is important to examine the fundamental
meaning of the treaty, the historical nuclear circumstances
surrounding its development, the achievements made during the recent
Review Conference and the future tasks that lie ahead of us.
Efforts for nuclear non-proliferation before the development of the NPT
The first efforts for nuclear non-proliferation began immediately after
the Second World War. At the first meeting of the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946, which was ten months after
the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the US delegate
Bernard Baruch made proposals for, among others, the establishmentof the International Atomic Development Authority (IADA), theexclusive control of nuclear material by the IADA, and the prohibitionon the production and the abandonment of nuclear weapons.
As this was the era when the US still had a monopoly over nuclear
weapons, the USSR opposed Baruch’s proposals, assuming that the US
attempt was aimed at nuclear monopolization by itself and the preventionof nuclear development by the USSR. In the second meeting of theCommission, the Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko proposed theprohibition of the possession, production and use of nuclear weapons,
and the international control of nuclear energy. Nevertheless, withneither of the two superpowers having any real intention to put an end
to their own nuclear development, the discussions ended without any
progress and their respective proposals faded away.
In the meantime, there were the initiatives made by non-nuclear
weapon states: at the UN General Assembly in October 1957, the thenPolish President Adam Rapacki presented a proposal to establish a
nuclear-free zone in Central Europe; between 1958 and 1961 Ireland
repeatedly submitted a resolution that sent out a caution against the
proliferation of nuclear weapons both to the UN General Assembly
and to its First Committee. Both proposals were later approved.
A similar attempt was also made by Sweden. In November 1961
this Scandinavian country, in partnership with seven other countries,
submitted a resolution to the First Committee of the UN General
Assembly where it was approved, in order to demand that the UN
Secretary-General conduct a study into the establishment of a “nonnuclear club,” the member states of which would refrain frommanufacturing or introducing nuclear weapons into their territories.

The development of the NPT from a US-Soviet initiative
While all these actions imply that the concern over the proliferation of
nuclear weapons was already present among both nuclear and nonnuclear weapon states by the 1950s, the factor that directly led to thedevelopment of the NPT was an initiative on the part of the twonuclear superpowers, the US and the USSR, from 1964 onwards.
In January 1964, during the Eighteen-Nation Committee on
Disarmament held in Geneva, US President Lyndon B. Johnson
proposed an arms control agenda of five points which included theprohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon
states and international monitoring of nuclear material. He also
submitted a draft non-proliferation treaty to the Committee in August
1965. At the same time, Gromyko, who was now the Soviet Foreign
Minister, put forward a similar draft of a Soviet version at the UN
General Assembly.
At that time, the USSR had intensified its objections to a plan to
deploy US nuclear weapons to NATO member states. The rivalry
between the US and the USSR was reflected in their differing attitudes
towards the transfer of nuclear forces to international organizations
such as NATO, an action which the US accepted while the USSR
prohibited. However, the US shifted its focus from the deployment of
nuclear forces within NATO territories to nuclear non-proliferation,and in October 1966 the US and the USSR agreed to develop a joint
draft non-proliferation treaty.
Between August 1967 and May 1968, the two states jointly
submitted a new draft and several revisions to the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament and the UN General Assembly. Their
proposal was then approved at the UN General Assembly in June
1968, was signed on July 1 of the same year, and put into force on
March 5, 1970.
The NPT system and NPT Review Conferences
The NPT consists of three pillars: “horizontal” non-proliferation, thatis no increase in the number of nuclear weapon states; “vertical” nonproliferation, that is nuclear disarmament of the nuclear weapon
states; and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
There were also three points which generated dissatisfaction on
the part of non-nuclear weapon states. The first of these was an
insufficient provision for nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon
states. The second was the fact that the treaty did not guarantee
reliable security against the use of, and intimidation by, nuclear
weapons for non-nuclear weapon states. The third was inequality
regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
At the same time, a change was made regarding the Review
Conference, which the August 1967 draft had set for five years after
the effectuation of the NPT, following a strong demand from nonnuclear weapon states, to the effect that it would now be held every
five years based upon a proposal from over half of the signatories tothe treaty.
Looking at the reactions of individual states to the treaty, France
and China, who had conducted nuclear tests in 1960 and 1964

Contents
The 2010 NPT Review Conference and Future Tasks
Kazumi Mizumoto ……………… 1−2
Forthcoming International Symposium …………………………… 2
The Iranian Nuclear Issue and the NPT Regime
Shintaro Yoshimura………………… 3
HPI Lecture Series for Citizens of Hiroshima (First Term 2010) … 4

HPI Research Projects ……………………………………………… 5＜Reflections from Hiroshima＞ Vol. 14 ……………………… 6−7
The Past 40 Years of the Movement
Against A and H Bombs in Hiroshima (Yukio Yokohara)
New Face at HPI …………………………………………………… 8
Diary………………………………………………………………… 8

Visit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

1respectively, were rather critical of the treaty, and these two nuclear
weapon states only ratified it in 1992. At the same time, a majority of
non-nuclear weapon states such as West Germany and Japan werecautious of acceding to the treaty. The key intention of the US and the
USSR, the two states which had initially promoted the treaty, was notnuclear abolition or disarmament, but prevention of the disseminationof nuclear weapons to those states capable of nuclear development
such as West Germany and Japan.
Review Conferences have been held every five years since 1975,
as the non-nuclear weapon states demanded. Nevertheless, there wereno significant achievements at the conferences in 1975 and 1980, andit was only in 1985 that a Final Document was adopted for the firsttime unanimously which severely criticized the inactive attitude of thenuclear weapon states towards nuclear disarmament. During the
Review Conference in 1990, the year of the end of the Cold War,while the actions towards nuclear disarmament by the US and the
USSR received a degree of recognition, states of the Non-Aligned
Movement severely criticized the slow progress of negotiations over
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
NPT Review Conferences since the end of the Cold War
Since the end of the Cold War, some progress has been made in the
NPT Review Conferences.
During the 1995 conference, a decision entitled “Principles andObjectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament” was adopted
as an alternative to authorizing the indefinite extension of the treaty as
the nuclear weapon states had demanded. The “Principles and Objectives”
emphasized the following items: implementation of Article 6 of the
NPT which stipulates the obligation of achieving nuclear disarmamentby the nuclear weapon states; completion of the negotiations on the
CTBT by 1996; early completion of the Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty; systematic and incremental efforts by the nuclear weapon
states towards nuclear abolition; expansion of nuclear-weapon-freezone treaties; and negative security assurances (i.e. prohibition of theuse of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states).
Also adopted during the 1995 conference was a “Resolution on
the Middle East” which was aimed at establishing a nuclear-free zone
in the Middle East and encouraging non-NPT signatories such as
Israel to become party to the treaty at the earliest possible opportunity.
On the other hand, the Final Document adopted during the 2000
Review Conference contained 13 points of actions to be taken, such as
an early entry into force of the CTBT, completion of negotiations on
the Cut-off Treaty within five years, and unequivocal commitment tonuclear abolition by the nuclear weapon states. This Final Document
seemed to give hope for further progress in nuclear disarmament.
However, such optimism was significantly damaged by the 9/11
terrorist attacks in 2001 and the new US nuclear policy based on thepolicy of the “war on terrorism” advocated by the former US
President George W. Bush. As a consequence, the 2005 Review
Conference led to no substantial achievements as the US rejected theagreements reached on the two preceding occasions, and ended withno Final Document adopted.
The 2010 Review Conference: its value and future tasks
Despite the setbacks of the 2005 Review Conference, nuclear
disarmament policy based on international cooperation which has
been promoted by the Obama administration since 2009 had broughtsome optimism when the latest NPT Review Conference wasconvened in May this year. On May 28, the final day of theconference, the event ended with a Final Document which was

International Symposium

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.13 No.1, July 2010

What the last NPT Review Conference means to the people of Hiroshima
The last NPT Review Conference was regarded with high expectationby the people of Hiroshima. There seem to be two contrasting views
among them in relation to its results: relief at the adoption of the Final
Document and disappointment at the absence of any specific deadline
for the road to nuclear abolition. Both views accurately reflect thenature of the last Review Conference.
Nevertheless, the history of the NPT indicates that NPT Review
Conferences have been an arena in which non-nuclear weapon states
resist the NPT system, which they see as a mechanism originallyimposed jointly by the US and the USSR, the former rivals in the Cold
War, for the purpose of securing their own monopolization of nuclear
power. Although overly optimistic expectations should be restrained,
this “arena of resistance” should continuously be utilized andcombined with various strategies in order to sustain ceaseless efforts
towards nuclear abolition.
Professor at HPIWhat Should We Do to Advance Nuclear Abolition?:
Reflections on the 2010 NPT Review Conference

Date & Time
: July 31, 2010 1300-1700
Keynote speakers : Hideo Tsuchiyama (Former President of Nagasaki
University)
Douglas Lummis (Political Scientist and Author)
Panelists: Sugok Shin (Human Resources Development
Consultant)Sung Chull Kim (Professor at Hiroshima Peace
Institute)
Robert A. Jacobs (Associate Professor at Hiroshima
Peace Institute)
Yumi Kanazaki (Reporter for the Hiroshima
Peace Media Center, The Chugoku Shimbun)

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adopted unanimously at the UN Headquarters in New York.
The Final Document consisted of 40 pages: the first half containsa Review of the operation of each Article of the NPT, which waspresided over by the Conference Chair Libran Cabactulan; the second
half is entitled “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on
actions.” The conference decided to take note of the former, while thelatter was adopted.
One of the significant achievements found in the Final Document
is the fact that the “recommendation for follow-on actions,” or Action
Plan, assumes the “Principles and Objectives” and the “Resolution on
the Middle East,” both adopted in 1995, and the 2000 Final Document
as its unquestionable basis, and reflects all of the related decisions andresolutions.
The Action Plan contained in the Final Document consists of 64
items: two of these are related to a “world free of nuclear weapons”;
20 to nuclear disarmament; 24 to nuclear non-proliferation; and 18 topeaceful uses of nuclear energy. Apart from the Action Plan, theDocument also contains ten items related to the “Resolution on the
Middle East” and one on the North Korean nuclear issue.
More specifically, the Action Plan contains issues that have long
been of significant importance to many member states, such as early
entry into force of the CTBT, early conclusion of the Cut-off Treaty,
and accession of India, Pakistan and Israel to the NPT. There areseveral new targets included in the Action Plan such as the conveningof an international conference in 2012 on the establishment of a
Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons ofmass destruction, and also a commitment to have the nuclear weapon
states report their actions towards nuclear disarmament to the NPT
Preparatory Committee Meeting to be held in 2014.
On the other hand, some proposals that were strongly demanded
by non-nuclear weapon states were rejected due to opposition from thenuclear weapon states. These proposals included initiating discussions
in 2011 on a commitment to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear
weapon states, and the convening of an international conference in2014 to consider ways and means to agree on a roadmap for nuclear
abolition within a specified timeframe.
Nevertheless, it is at least safe to say that overall the Final Document
can be seen as a success, and it has laid down various actions to betaken towards nuclear disarmament and abolition. Furthermore, theReview contains a number of the most essential points such as thesignificance of nuclear abolition to be achieved within a specified
timeframe, and the need for a nuclear weapons convention.

Coordinator: Kazumi Mizumoto, Professor at Hiroshima Peace
Institute
Venue: Conference Hall “Himawari” (B2F), The International
Conference Center Hiroshima
1-5, Nakajima-cho, Naka-ku, Hiroshima
Co-hosted by: The Hiroshima Peace Media Center, The Chugoku
Shimbun, and Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima
City University
Supported by: Hiroshima City and The Hiroshima Peace Culture
Foundation
For enquiries, please contact HPI at the contact information provided
on page 8.

The Iranian Nuclear Issue
and the NPT Regime
Shintaro Yoshimura
On the 17th and 18th of April this year, Iran convened its own
conference entitled “International Conference on Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation” which was, according to the Iranian
government, attended by representatives of governments and nongovernmental organizations from approximately 60 countries. In
his opening address, Iranian President Ahmadinejad stated that withwars, aggressions, occupation and the stockpiling of nuclear
armaments and weapons of mass destruction, all societies were
widely affected by a sense of threat and insecurity.
The Iranian leader then made several proposals, the first ofwhich was to establish an independent international body forplanning and overseeing the process of nuclear disarmament andnon-proliferation, which was to be entrusted with full authority notby the UN Security Council but by the UN General Assembly. At
the same time, it was also proposed that the membership of thenuclear weapon states in the IAEA should be suspended. Behind
this idea is a perception that legitimate applications of the NPT
have been obstructed by the nuclear weapon states. Other proposals
made during the speech included the revision of the NPT by nonnuclear weapon states, collective efforts to restructure the UN
Security Council, the establishment of a working body for a global
process of disarmament, and Iran’s active commitment to
information disclosure and cooperation.
Iran’s motivation for holding this nuclear conference waspartly attributable to the attempt by the US and some European
countries to make resolutions imposing further sanctions on the“nuclear suspected” Iran for the fourth time. The recent swift
actions of the Obama administration regarding nuclear issues havealso accelerated Iran’s moves in this direction. In particular,
stronger anti-Americanism during the conference was ignited by
the US making Iran, along with North Korea, an exception to its
policy of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon
states, based on its suspicion of Iran’s development of nuclear
weapons in violation of the NPT. Iran was further displeased whentighter control of nuclear materials was proposed during the
Nuclear Security Summit that took place in Washington, D.C.
during the same month, in which Iran was regarded as a terrorismsponsoring state due to its support for Hamas and Hezbollah.
It is debatable whether, amid an intensified nuclear threat on a
global scale, Iran’s severe criticism of the NPT and the UN Security
Council can be labeled as the illogical defense of a “suspicious
nuclear state.” However, it should be noted that Tehran’s claims do
actually point out some undeniable contradictions within the NPT.
The NPT assumes that the nuclear weapon states areunquestionable parties whilst forbidding any other state the right tobecome a nuclear power. The very name of the treaty proves this: itis the Nuclear “Non-proliferation” Treaty, not the Nuclear“Abolition” Treaty. Thoughtless expectation of worldwide nuclear
abolition by means of the NPT may be seen as optimistic. In fact,
the NPT states hardly question the fact that the nuclear weapon

states have continued to conduct research into nuclear
weapons with greater destructive and operational
capabilities. On the other hand, once a country is suspectedof the development of nuclear weapons by the nuclear
weapon states, that country will become a target of
sanctions.
Another “suspected” nuclear and pro-American state,
Israel, should also be examined in relation to the NPT.
Israel, which is not party to the NPT, has never beenquestioned for suspected nuclear possession, even by the
UN Security Council. This is in stark contrast to India andPakistan, two South Asian countries which are also nonNPT states, and which have received severe international
criticism. This underlines the strong tie between Israel andthe US, the nuclear superpower. The NPT allows“exceptions” which reflect international political dynamics,
thus it carries an impediment on the way towards nuclear
abolition.
There are other cases which suggest contradictions thatcan be found in the NPT, one of which being North Korea’s
withdrawal from the treaty in January 2003. The North
Korean issue should be put on the table during the NPT
Review Conference in May, together with the issues of theother non-NPT states discussed earlier. It is unforeseeable
whether productive discussions and outcomes regarding
North Korea can really be expected on this occasion.
Notwithstanding this, how the issue will be dealt with iscrucial to the universal validity of the NPT. At the sametime, as the distinction between peaceful and military use of
nuclear power is determined solely by the IAEA, therelationship between an inspected state and the nuclear
superpowers which are major member states of the IAEA
affects the progress of inspections, as in the case of Iran.
With this unequal “double standard” for the nuclear
weapon and non-nuclear weapon states and for the NPT and
non-NPT states, the NPT can be labeled as an “unequal
treaty.” Unless this significant defect can be overcome, it islikely that no reform of the NPT can bear fruit. It should be
noted in this discussion that behind the rise of suspicion
about Iran’s nuclear development lies this inconsistentcharacter of the NPT, and not the other way round.
What Hiroshima and Nagasaki sincerely call for is theabolition of nuclear weapons. That being so, the people ofthe two A-bombed cities should not be overwhelmed by the
inclination towards nuclear control. The distortions of the
NPT must not be overlooked, but should be adjusted within
a wider framework of action for nuclear abolition, and thisis what the time truly requires.
Professor at Hiroshima University[Written in April 2010]

Visit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

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HPI Lecture Series for Citizens of Hiroshima (First Term 2010)

Perspectives on the 2010 NPT Review ConferenceWith the 2010 NPT Review Conference coming up in May, the first HPI Public Lecture Series of the 2010 academic year
focused on the NPT and its history, looking at actions taken by the nuclear weapon states, Japanese nuclear policy, andefforts and challenges for the citizens of Hiroshima in working towards nuclear abolition.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty: The process

Lecture 1 of its formation and its meaning today(April 9)

Kazumi Mizumoto, Professor at HPI

The theme of the first lecture was the NPT, specifically its
prehistory, formation process and meaning today. The formationof the NPT system can be traced back to the time when,
immediately after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima andNagasaki in 1945, the US proposed international controls on
nuclear power, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
During the Cold War period, the NPT system was prepared forthe purpose of the monopolization of nuclear power by the US
and the Soviet Union, and there was also an intention on the partof the Soviet Union to prevent West Germany from possessing
nuclear weapons. In the formation of the NPT, proposals bysmall countries such as Poland and Ireland also played an
important role. Emphasizing the fact that the actual goal of the
NPT is not nuclear abolition but non-proliferation, and that the
NPT imposes far more obligations on non-nuclear weapon states
than on nuclear weapon states, Mizumoto criticized the neverquestioned fact that the NPT allows the deployment of nuclear
weapons to non-nuclear weapon states by nuclear weapon states.
Towards the end of his lecture Mizumoto emphasized theimportance of solving problems surrounding nuclear weapons ina step by step manner under the NPT system. He stressed that the
NPT system may not be an ideal format for nuclear abolition, but
it need not be written off as an imperfect system, and insteadshould be utilized to achieve nuclear abolition.

Nuclear Weapon States and the upcoming
Lecture 2 NPT Review Conference: The initiatives of(April 16)

President Obama and the US government

Takao Takahara, Professor at Meiji Gakuin University

In the second lecture, Takahara first revisited the history of
nuclear development in the five nuclear weapon states, namely
the US, the Soviet Union / Russia, the UK, France and China. He
then examined the process of the formation of the NPT and thesubsequent responses of the Japanese government. Also
examined were the nuclear possessions of some non-NPT
signatories like India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, although
the last two countries are only suspected of possession, as well as
US nuclear policy under the Obama administration. According to
Takahara, President Obama is taking a more positive attitude
towards nuclear disarmament and the 2010 NPT Review
Conference represents a promising opportunity. However, healso stressed that it should not be overlooked that the US stillclings to nuclear deterrence policy based upon the threat of
possible nuclear attacks, and many of the existing nuclear
weapons around the world are still ready to be launched withinminutes, as was the case during the Cold War period. Lastly,
Takahara emphasized that with the slogan “a world free of
nuclear weapons” gaining stronger currency in the US, thecurrent era is no longer that of nuclear deterrence, and therefore
the “nuclear theology” should no longer be allowed to prevail.

Lecture 3(April 21)

The NPT Regime transformed: The IndoUS Accord and nuclear South Asia
Osamu Yoshida, Professor at Hiroshima University

The third lecture focused on two non-NPT signatories, India andPakistan. Yoshida looked at the process of nuclear development
in India and the fluctuating positions of India and Pakistan in

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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.13 No.1, July 2010

international society during the Cold War. He then examined theIndo-US Accord, explaining the relations between the twocountries after 9/11. In contrast to the deteriorating relations
between the US and Islamic countries and to Pakistan’s alarming
nuclear possession, India has restored its international status,
leading to the conclusion of the Indo-US Accord. Yoshidaemphasized the fact that India clings to a position of possessing
nuclear weapons and has declared not to join the NPT. However,at the same time the country is an active advocate of nuclear
abolition and Indian leaders did have a point when they claimed
that the NPT system allows nuclear weapon states to exclusively
monopolize nuclear weapons. He concluded the lecture bycommenting that the problem is not nuclear weapons per se, butrather the NPT system which does not necessarily lead to nuclear
abolition, and which should be replaced with global approaches
that can resolve various tensions and the real root causes ofconflicts.

The NPT Review Conference and theLecture 4 Three Non-Nuclear Principles: Whatshould we do? What can we do?
(April 28)
Motofumi Asai, President of HPIAsai first looked at the character of the NPT which is largely
influenced by US nuclear policy, and then examined theimportance of the role of non-nuclear weapon states and theequivocal stance of the Japanese government towards the NPT.
Reviewing the nuclear policy of the Obama administration, inparticular the US’ basic stance to justify war, its adherence to theposition as the world’s only superpower, and the great
importance that the US attaches to the US-Japan Security Treaty,
Asai pointed out that there is a lack of grounds for the recent
domestic as well as international trend of high expectation for
President Obama and optimism for nuclear abolition, especiallysince Obama’s speech in Prague in April 2009. Asai also
analyzed Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles and the secret
nuclear arrangements between Japan and the US, and he pointed
out the Japanese government’s dangerous rhetoric used to justify
possible amendment of these Principles by regarding China andNorth Korea as potential threats. To conclude the lecture, heinsisted that “No more Hiroshima/Nagasaki” and “No more war”
should be linked together and formed into a call not only from
Hiroshima and Nagasaki but from the whole country, and thatJapan should leave behind the nuclear umbrella and takeresponsible international leadership in working towards nuclear
abolition.
Despite an irregular schedule, the latest Lecture Series attracted alarge audience on each occasion. All the lecturers received manyquestions which were mostly related to President Obama’s
nuclear policy, Japan and the nuclear umbrella, and nuclear
weapons and terrorists. Although the Japanese press and public
opinion see a hope for nuclear disarmament and abolition fromthe recent US nuclear policy and US-Russian initiative, the fivelecturers equally emphasized the importance of making unbiased
judgments on the NPT and insisted that Japanese people,
particularly the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, should not
rely only on the NPT Review Conference or the leaders of thenuclear weapon states, but should make their own voices heard,
keep balanced perspectives and take the initiative in working
towards nuclear abolition.

Makiko Takemoto, Assistant Professor at HPI

HPI Research Projects
Below are our recently completed research projects.
Culture and Collective Memoryin Northeast Asia

Project period: April 2009 - March 2010
Workshop dates: February 13-14, 2010
Venue: Athens, Georgia, US

This workshop had two aims. The one was to assess collective
memory theories of European origin with empirical cases from
Asia. How might collective memory scholarship look if it emerged in
Asia? I wished to trace integration and diversions between theories
and empirical observations. The second was to amend theshortcomings of the forthcoming volume edited by Barry Schwartz
and I, Northeast Asia’s Difficult Past: Essays in Collective Memory(Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), which represents the outcome of myprevious HPI project “Politics of Regret: Collective Memory inNortheast Asia” (April 2005 - March 2007). The volume is arranged
into three separate sections on China, Japan and Korea. This, I am
afraid, creates a misleading impression that memories of the threecases exist in isolated locations. I would like to accurately project
historical memories interacting with each other over changing
social milieu, lingering sentiments, strategic imperatives,
geopolitics, etc. Amid reemerging discussions on Asian
regionalism, one of the binding ideational commonalities comesfrom an “entangled memory web.” This project actively includes
comparative observations between the West and Northeast Asia,and the dynamic mnemonic interactions between nations and withineach nation in the region.

＜Project members and paper titles＞
蜴Youngshik Bong, American University (US)“The Dokdo-Takeshima disputes between Japan and Korea”
蜴Gary Fine, Northwestern University (US)Jeong-Chul Kim, Northwestern University (US)“Civil society, the state, and memory movement: the biographicalencyclopedia of pro-Japanese collaborators under the Japanese
occupation of Korea”
蜴Jungsun Han, Korea University (South Korea)“Women as designated weeper in postwar films in Japan: gender
and war memory”
蜴Andrew Hoskins, The University of Warwick (UK)
“Memories of the East and West”
蜴Kyoungwon Kim, Hanyang University (South Korea)
Seonjoo Park, Inha University (South Korea)“Memories in transit: loss of ‘Asia’ through translation”
蜴 Mikyoung Kim (project coordinator), Hiroshima Peace
Institute, Hiroshima City University (Japan)“Interaction, integration and diversion: memories of the East andWest”
蜴Yangmo Ku, The George Washington University (US)“Reckoning with historical issues in Japan and Germany: the natureof the ruling coalition and the mobilization of societal groups”
蜴Seung-Joon Lee, National University of Singapore (Singapore)“Politics, memory and national identity construction of Singapore”
蜴Seungsook Moon, Vassar College (US)“Korean memory politics and the presidency”
蜴Barry Schwartz, The University of Georgia (US)“Memory as a cultural construct”
蜴Jungmin Seo, The University of Hawaii at Manoa (US)“The ancient Kokuryo territory disputes between China and Korea”

Mikyoung Kim, Associate Professor at HPIThe Formation, Development andIssues of Peace Constitution
Theory in Postwar Japan

Eiji Ohga, a citizens groups organizer and former secretary to amember of the House of Representatives.
The five workshops will be transcribed in order to produce
research materials. They may further be published in the form ofjournal articles or a book in order that the valuable knowledge can bedisseminated to as many people as possible.

After World War II, the Constitution of Japan (often called the“Peace Constitution”) was promulgated, of which the Preamble andArticle 9 are known as “positive pacifist” articles. Since then, thestudy of the “Peace Constitution” has developed in academic circles.
For the present project, I organized a research group, inviting
pioneering researchers who have contributed to the development of“Peace Constitution” theory in Japan. We held a series of five
workshops from March 24 to 30, 2010, at each of which one of thefive researchers gave a presentation, providing insightfulperspectives and evaluations as well as raising issues relating to the“Peace Constitution.” While the author participated in all of theworkshops as a coordinator, there were also two additional
speakers: Hiroshi Ando, a former professor at the Strategic Peaceand International Affairs Research Institute, Tokai University; and＜Workshops and guest researchers＞
1. March 24 (Tokyo)
Mutsumi Shimizu (b. 1930), Prof. Emeritus at Chuo University
2. March 25 (Kawasaki)
Naoki Kobayashi (b. 1921), Prof. Emeritus at the University of Tokyo
3. March 26 (Tokyo)
Yasuo Sugihara (b. 1930), Prof. Emeritus at Hitotsubashi University
4. March 29 (Sapporo)
Tadakazu Fukase (b. 1927), Prof. Emeritus at Hokkaido University
5. March 30 (Sapporo)Kazuo Ohta (b. 1935), Prof. Emeritus at Rakuno Gakuen University

Akihiro Kawakami, Assistant Professor at HPIVisit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

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＜Reflections from Hiroshima＞Vol. 14
By Motofumi Asai,
President of HPI

Yukio Yokohara

The Past 40 Years of the Movement
Against A and H Bombs in Hiroshima
The latest interview was conducted with Yukio Yokohara who has
served as the Executive Director of the Hiroshima Council Against
A and H Bombs (Hiroshima Gensuikin) since 1972 and as the
Secretary-General of the body from 1986 to 1996. The interview
mainly centered on his activities for the past 40 years and thecurrent situation and tasks ahead for the peace movement inHiroshima, particularly that related to the campaign for nuclear
abolition. Along with this report, his thoughts on peace andHiroshima can also be found in the journal Heiwa Kyo-iku Kenkyu(Annual Report of Researches) vol. 30 (2003) compiled by theHiroshima Institute for Peace Education.

1. My days at Hiroshima Gensuikin
I was born in Tottori in 1941. I first developed an interest in theissue of nuclear abolition when I was an executive member of theJapan Telecommunications Workers’ Union (Zendentsu-: the present
All NTT Workers Union of Japan) and participated in fund-raisingfor hibakusha. As I was appointed General Secretary of theHiroshima branch of Zendentsu- in 1973 (later became Chairman), I
became involved in Hiroshima Gensuikin. Those whose influence
made me decide to come to Hiroshima included Ichiro Moritaki andYasuo Miyazaki: they were all leading figures in the peace
movement in Hiroshima, particularly regarding the issue of anti-A
and H bombs. At first I was serving both in Zendentsu- and in
Gensuikin, but in 1986 I determined to concentrate on the latter andspend the rest of my life in Hiroshima, after receiving a requestfrom Miyazaki and particularly from the charismatic Moritaki. My
living would have been much easier had I carried on with the job at
Zendentsu-, but I decided to devote myself to Gensuikin even at thecost of my living. I think this reveals how motivated I was about
the anti-A and H bombs movement.
The first occasion of political schism within the nuclear
abolition movement occurred in 1960 when those who wereinclined to support the Liberal Democratic Party and the
Democratic Socialist Party withdrew from the movement in
opposition to Gensuikin’s criticism of the Japan-US Security
Treaty. The most crucial factor leading to the political split,
however, was the irreconcilable disagreement between thoseinclined to support the Communist Party and the Social Democratic
Party Japan, over the issue of the nuclear tests conducted by theSoviet Union: the former group defended the tests while the latter
criticized them. This split had a grave effect on the later movementin two respects. Firstly, it led some prominent scholars andintellectuals, such as Seiji Imahori of Hiroshima University, toleave the movement in order to get away from, or avoid becoming
engulfed in, the internal confrontation. This further became asignificant psychological burden for all the people involved and led
citizens and other scholars also to distance themselves from the
movement. Such disaffection still continues today, leaving the
movement stagnated. The second consequence was that the internal

6

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.13 No.1, July 2010confrontation also affected other types of movement, similarly
leading to internal splits within peace and labor movements. Theinternal split within the anti-A and H bombs movement might havebeen unavoidable anyway, but its spill-over effect on to other typesof movement, with the intervention of political parties causing andaggravating the split, was a grave sin.
In such an environment, I held two rules for myself regarding
how labor unions should participate in the peace movement:collective efforts and not a one-way imposition of policy from thelabor unions; and an awareness of and active commitment towards
a variety of issues in society with the labor unions’ resources,
energy and influence, over and above their own concerns about
working conditions. Among many actions I took based upon theserules, I particularly remember two occasions.
The first of these was the sit-in protest held on July 20, 1973,
which we embarked on in reaction to the five-in-a-row nuclear tests
that France conducted at Mururoa Atoll. The practice of sit-in
protest at every nuclear test can in fact be traced back to thisoccasion. (Note: The first sit-in protest was conducted by Ichiro
Moritaki in April 1962 which lasted for 17 consecutive days,
protesting against the nuclear tests conducted by the US and theSoviet Union.) We then initiated similar sit-in protests anddemonstrations in the city that could bring in many people fromoutside individual workplaces. As a result, during the time I was at
Zendentsu-, I believe the peace movement spread widely among
ordinary citizens.
The second occasion was “the Hiroshima Action for Peace”
held on March 21, 1982. The early years of the 1980s saw anupsurge in anti-nuclear movements across Europe following
negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union over the
deployment of INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) in Europe,and the Hiroshima Action was a spin-off of this large-scale
movement in Europe. The Action succeeded in attracting over
190,000 participants, and further spread to Osaka and Tokyo toincrease the total number of participants to more than 1 million.
However, the active involvement of the labor unions in thepeace movement went into an abrupt decline as a result of theformation of the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo) in
1989. Headed by Akira Yamagishi who was a member ofZendentsu-, Rengo lost its enthusiasm for the peace movement
despite my advocating the active involvement of the labor unions. I
said earlier that my decision to concentrate my efforts on Gensuikin
came from a sense of mission, but it is surely the case that mycriticism of such an attitude on the part of Rengo also played an
important role in this decision.
One of the tasks into which I put particular effort during mytime at Gensuikin was the internationalization of the anti-nuclear
movement. For example, I organized an international forum forhibakusha on August 4, 1985, with Moritaki as the head of theorganizing body, to which hibakusha from the Marshall Islands, theNetherlands, the UK, Canada, Malaysia and many other countries
gathered. It was from around this time that a call arose for theformation of a global network for “hibakusha around the world,”
and also that the now internationally-recognized Japanese term
hibakusha came to be widely accepted within Japan too.
We also organized the first World Conference for Nuclear
Victims in New York on September 26, 1987, and the second
conference in Berlin on September 20, 1992, during the latter ofwhich there arose an idea for the establishment of a world
association for nuclear victims. A world association could havebeen truly global as an American participant described it as a“spider’s network.” Had a third World Conference taken place, theidea for a world association for nuclear victims might have cometrue. Nevertheless, the participating organizations from different
countries were all NGOs and therefore lacked financial resources.
In a similar manner, Gensuikin had also weakened in terms of its
financial capability as the number of labor unions enrolled in it had
decreased, thus there was no capability to realize such a world
association.

2. Thoughts on the peace movementin Hiroshima
Having been involved in the anti-nuclear movement for decades,
many thoughts on the peace movement in Hiroshima come to mymind.

“Absolutism” blocking the generalization of the atomic bombings
At one of the abovementioned World Conferences for Nuclear
Victims, I was told by a European participant that Japan was a defacto nuclear weapon state in terms of technical capability, but theJapanese peace movement was too weak to reverse this situation. A
participant from French Polynesia said to me that the atomic
bombings in Japan were something that happened during wartime
unlike the nuclear tragedy of the French Polynesian people whichhappened in peacetime; while another participant from South
Africa questioned me about whether the Japanese people were
aware of being both nuclear victims and nuclear aggressors
themselves.
All these episodes led me to the following conclusion: thepeople of Hiroshima and Nagasaki tend to stick to the idea that
their own experiences of the atomic bombings are absolutely
unique and special; however, that “absolutism” only leads to an
intrusive claim of their own horrible experiences. Another apparent
assumption was that only the hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
could truly understand the horror of nuclear tragedy, thus allowing
no room for others to speak out. However, the atomic bombings in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki should be analyzed from a relativistic
viewpoint within a broader picture of the war in which bothaggression and victimhood are intertwined before the experiencesof the atomic bombings can be generalized in relation to othertragic events. This claim had been advocated only by some early
activists such as Sadako Kurihara and Kiyoshi Matsue.
The need for relativistic analysis of the atomic bombing
became a subject of public discourse around 1994-5. Nevertheless,this discourse shed too much light on hibakusha’s activities ofrecounting their testimonies, leading people to worry about
psychological pressure being placed on hibakusha; thus there havebeen no constructive discussions since. In such a situation, those
who are best suited to break the deadlock are, in my opinion,
scholars, intellectuals and the media. However, as mentioned
earlier, local scholars and intellectuals in Hiroshima still recall the“trauma” from the 1960s and the local media seem to have become

static with no aspirations for novelty as they continue to produce
reports focusing on a particular group of hibakusha. They are notdependable in this respect.

Hiroshima where no active discussions take place
It seems that frank, open discussion is losing its place in Hiroshima.
It wasn’t like that in the old days: in the 1970s when I was involved
in Zendentsu- or in the 1980s when I was committed to Gensuikin,
we lived in an atmosphere in which we were all striving for better
outcomes with countless discussions and were constantly
stimulating each other.
A similar example can be seen in the drafting of the Peace
Declaration which is annually created by Hiroshima City. During
the times of former Hiroshima Mayors Takeshi Araki and Takashi
Hiraoka, the drafting process of the Declaration reflected opinions
of local intellectuals and citizens. In fact, I was told by the scholar
and peace activist Seiji Imahori that he used to be involved in thedrafting process during the time that Araki was in office. And I
myself did the same, as a member of Gensuikin, during Hiraoka’sterm. We suggested that it should mention the need for Japan’s
aggression to be acknowledged, a conviction which was actually
incorporated into the Declaration between 1991 and 1995. It issensible to gather all the wisdom of local experts of various fields
and incorporate it into the Declaration. Nevertheless, this is nolonger practiced nowadays.
At the same time, the internal split of the Hiroshima
Prefectural Confederation of A-bomb Sufferers Organizations(Hidankyo-) should not have happened. They should join hands
again before it is too late, especially now that the average age ofhibakusha is over 75. What hibakusha should now devote theirefforts to is the consolidation of an environment in which they canpass on their activities to second-generation hibakusha. The
problem here is that second-generation hibakusha have no wellestablished idea as to what their activities should be. The lack of
discussion that can be found amongst first-generation hibakusha isalso true for the second-generation. It is a serious concern that if noimprovement can be achieved in the near future, the hibakusha
movement will die out.
Hibakusha ’s activities and the peace movement
It has traditionally been the case that in Hiroshima all peace-related
issues are left on the shoulders of hibakusha. However, hibakusha’s
activities should constitute part of the peace movement as a whole,and it is not the case that the former equates with the latter. At an
early stage, peace activists in Hiroshima used to place hibakusha’s
activities in the forefront of the peace movement, based on arecognition that hibakusha’s activities were part of the entire peace
movement. Nevertheless, this has changed as time passed and now
hibakusha shoulder everything.
It is this overload on hibakusha that has led to the stagnationof the peace movement in Hiroshima as discussed earlier, with noproductive discussions on war or on a Hiroshima spirit taking place,but only reiterations of the damages caused by the atomic bombing.
In fact, issues closely related to the atomic bombings such as
Japan’s war responsibility, reparations and relations with its Asianneighbors used to be taboo in Hiroshima until a certain point in thepast. Those issues of Japan’s aggressive side became subjects ofdiscussion from the mid-1980s; nevertheless, they can more often
than not be seen as an irreconcilable antonym of Japan’s victimhoodeven today. What is still avoided is the most fundamental task,
which is to have thorough discussions in order to face up to the last
war in its entirety.
(Interviewed on April 23, 2010)
Visit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

7New Face at HPITaeko Kiriya, Lecturer
Dr. Taeko Kiriya was born in Yokohama. She obtained a BA from
Hosei University in 2003, an MA from Hiroshima City University
in 2005, and a PhD in Intercultural Communication from Hosei
University in 2009. She then served as a research fellow at theJapan Society for the Promotion of Science (April 2007 - March2009), a part-time lecturer at Hosei University (April 2009 - March
2010), and a member of staff at the Institute for Sustainability
Research and Education, Hosei University (October 2009 March 2010). Dr. Kiriya specializes in intercultural communication, with the topic of the reconstruction of Hiroshima andNagasaki as her current research theme.

I am very glad for the opportunity to join HPI. The incentive formy research on hibakusha came from my personal background:with my mother s family having experienced the atomic bombing
in Nagasaki while my father s side had not, since my childhood I
have always been aware of the serious psychological gap thatexists between hibakusha and non- hibakusha . I wrote myundergraduate dissertation on Nagasaki based on my
grandmother s diary. After completing my Master s thesis on
Hiroshima, I incorporated these two works into a Doctoral
dissertation that I submitted to Hosei University. For my future
research, I would like to examine the reconstruction ofHiroshima and Nagasaki as seen through the eyes ofhibakusha , by comparing and contrasting interviews andarchival materials.

March 1 ‒ June 30, 2010
◆Mar. 1
HPI President Motofumi Asai gives lecture “What is Needed
for Nuclear Abolition: The NPT Review Conference and the Situation in
Japan” at the 3/1 National Meeting Commemorating the 56th Anniversaryof Bikini Day, organized by the Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs,
held in Shizuoka.
◆Mar. 4
Narayanan Ganesan, Yuki Tanaka, Mikyoung Kim andAkihiro Kawakami hold discussions with seven students from the ICU
Rotary Peace Center, held at HPI.
◆Mar. 4-19
Makiko Takemoto conducts a research trip to Bremen,
Germany, to investigate the German peace movement in the 1980s.
◆Mar. 6
Asai gives lecture “The Three Non-Nuclear Principles” at aworkshop organized by the Japan Congress of Journalists Hiroshima, heldat the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
◆Mar. 8Kazumi Mizumoto attends the third plenary meeting of theCambodia Reconstruction Support Project, co-organized by Hiroshima
Prefecture and JICA, held at the Hiroshima Prefectural Office.
◆Mar. 12
Kawakami gives lecture on local governance for an intensive
training course organized by the All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal
Workers Union, held in Tokyo.
◆Mar. 17 Yuki Tanaka and Robert Jacobs lead discussions on President
Obama’s future path with a group of students from Minnesota State
University Moorhead, held at HPI.
◆Mar. 25 Mizumoto attends as a regular member a plenary session of theAdvisory Research Group of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
◆Mar. 25-28
Sung Chull Kim presents paper “Dealing with the Two
Koreas: Japan’s Korea Policy after the Sino-Japanese Normalization” at theannual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, held in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, US.
◆Mar. 26 Mizumoto gives lecture “The Atomic Bombing in Hiroshima
and the Experiences of Hibakusha” to a group of students from the Rokko
Catholic Church of Kobe, held at HPI.
◆Apr. 1
Kazumi Mizumoto and Hitoshi Nagai are promoted toProfessor and Associate Professor respectively. ▽Mikyoung Kim attends a
preparatory committee meeting of the Peace and Reconciliation in East
Asia: Human Rights Protection Study Group, held in Tokyo.
◆Apr. 8-9 Ganesan presents paper “Democracy in Southeast Asia: Some
Reflections on Broad Trends” at the World Democracy Forum held at the
University of Sydney, Australia.
◆Apr. 19 Mizumoto gives lecture “Issues Surrounding Nuclear Weapons”
at the annual meeting of the Chugoku branch of the Japan Bar Association,
held at the KKR Hotel Hiroshima.
◆Apr. 21-22 Ganesan conducts workshop “Bilateral Overhangs in East
Asia” and presents paper “Historical Overhangs in East Asian International
Relations,” held at the Jeju Peace Institute, South Korea.
◆Apr. 25 Mizumoto attends as a moderator the symposium “Prior to the2010 NPT Review Conference” organized by the Japan Association of
Disarmament Studies, held in Tokyo.
◆May 3 Asai gives lecture “Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and
Nuclear Abolition” at a meeting organized by the Gifu Prefectural Centerfor Upholding Protection of Article 9 and several other organizations, heldin Gifu.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS
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8◆May 13 Kawakami gives lecture “Decentralization and Reform ofLocal Assemblies” for a training session organized by the Hatsukaichi City
Council, held at the Hatsukaichi City Hall, Hiroshima.
◆May 23 Asai gives lecture “The Peace Constitution and the Japan-US
Nuclear Military Alliance” at a meeting organized by the Article 9
Association (A9A) Yokkaichi, held in Yokkaichi, Mie Prefecture.
◆May 30 Asai gives lecture “Some Important Points for Peace andSecurity of Japan” at a meeting organized by Nakahiro A9A, held in
Hiroshima.
◆Jun. 5
Kawakami gives lecture “Regime Change and the Peace
Constitution” at a public lecture co-organized by the Yokohama Teachers
Union and the Yokohama Branch of the League of Women Voters ofJapan, held in Yokohama.
◆Jun. 6
Kawakami presents paper “Illegalization and Abolition ofWar” at the Japan Association of Synthetic Anthropology, held in Kyoto.
◆Jun. 7-19
Ganesan participates as a member of an international teamin the training session for university students and faculty members ininternational relations and public policy formulation, held in Yangon,
Myanmar.
◆Jun. 10 Mikyoung Kim presents paper “Nostalgia as CounterHegemonic Narrative: A Discourse Analysis of North Korean Settlers in
the South” and chairs a session “Relations between the North and theSouth,” during the international conference “Regional Reconciliation: The
Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” held at Lingnan University, Hong
Kong.
◆Jun. 11 Mizumoto gives lecture “The Current State and Tasks of Peace
Research” at a training program for Level II Certified Nursing
Administrators organized by the Hiroshima Nursing Association, held in
Hiroshima.
◆Jun. 14 Mikyoung Kim presents paper “Japan and Korea over
Historical Reconciliation” at the Hong Kong University of Science andTechnology, Hong Kong.
◆Jun. 19 Asai gives lecture “Issues of the Japan-US Security Allianceand Ideal Japan-US Relations” at a meeting organized by the 2010 Anpo
Liaison Network, held in Tokyo.
◆Jun. 20 Taeko Kiriya attends as a discussant a session entitled“Thinking about Hiroshima and Nagasaki” during the Spring Research
Congress of the Peace Studies Association of Japan, held in Tokyo.
―― Visitors ――◆Mar. 4
Prof. Masaki Ina, Mari Kotaki and students from the Rotary
Peace Center, International Christian University (ICU).
◆Mar. 17 Prof. Takanori Mita and students from Minnesota State
University Moorhead, Minnesota, US.
◆Mar. 26 A group of secondary school and university students from the
Rokko Catholic Church of Kobe.
◆Jun. 4A group of students from Central Connecticut State
University, US.
◆Jun. 23 Prof. Hisato Morita and students from Chuo University.
◆Jun. 24 A group of international students from the University ofTsukuba.
Vol. 13 No. 1（July 26, 2010）Copyright 2010 HPI, All rights reserved

Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University（Editor: Yuko Takahashi）
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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.13 No.1, July 2010