The Reluctant Combatant: Japan and the Second Sino-Japanese War
By: Kitamura Minoru and Lin Siyun
The mainstream view on the Second Sino-Japanese War is that Imperial Japan was bent
on destroying China, and the rest of Asia, for purely selfish reasons. However, carefulanalysis of the global situation, particularly of the social and political development ofChina and the attitudes of the Chinese leadership, indicates that the Chinese were not theinnocent victims of “aggression” as is currently claimed. At the same time, analysis
uncovers a complex environment in which the Japanese operated, an environment thatallowed little room for maneuver. With limited resources, dependence on sea routes for
trade and two powerful and potentially hostile countries within reach, Japan could notafford to make poor decisions concerning regional relationships.
Authors Kitamura and Lin recount the circumstances that ultimately lead to the Second
Sino-Japanese War, demonstrating that the war was neither a Japanese “war ofaggression” or that China was a “helpless” victim.
The authors raise important issues that have been studiously ignored by standard
historical analysis. For example, prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, theconcept of “aggressive war” was meaningless with respect to international law. The
concept was not even widely accepted among the Allies during the Second World War.
Nonetheless, charges of “war crimes” and “aggressive war” which were applied against
Germany were reflexively applied to Japan as well despite vast differences incircumstances. Assignment of guilt to Japan over their “aggressive war” by the Allies
following the end of the war is continuously reinforced today by a peculiar Chineseperception of social status and exaggeration.
Unlike Germany’s war, which evolved into a flagrant inter-ethnic war, Japan struggled tomaintain itself and its interests in the face of western embargos and neighbors that vastly
outmatched Japan in terms of population and resources. A careful reading of history will
demonstrate that Japanese activity in China was not part of an overall conspiracy or plan
to dominate all of China but consistent with the activity of other colonial powers at thetime. In fact, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japanese efforts to feed urban
Chinese were documented in Chinese sources. Japan’s incursions into China was not at
all motivated by race or ethnicity, unlike Germany’s desire to expand at the expense ofother ethnics in central and eastern Europe.
The authors give a close examination of the lead-up into the Second Sino-Japanese War,which casts a different light on standard explanations on the cause of the war. Japanese
entry to war was neither desired nor inevitable. Both China and Japan raced tomodernize in the face of encroachment by the technologically advanced west. Despite
China’s significant lag in modernization and marked social stratification andfragmentation, the Chinese people were induced into fighting Japan and the burden
invariably fell onto the Chinese peasant masses. The consequences of warfare against
Japan were indeed grim and, it has been estimated that more Chinese soldiers were lostdue to induction rather than actual combat. While Japan undertook numerous measures
to protects her own interests in China, as European countries did, and actively sought
compromise rather than war, Japanese failure lead to a prolonged war of attrition.
Given the Chinese philosophy of exaggerated self-promotion while covering up or lying
to cover faults, in particular, in service of the nation, it is unlikely that China will come togrips with what really happened during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Reconciliation
between Japan and China will be extremely challenging at best.