HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS
Hiroshima Peace Institute Vol.4 No.2 November 2001
The Current Situation and Japan s Role
Discussed at HPI Symposium

The Global Nuclear Situation
and Japan s Tasks

Little progress in nuclear disarmament after unequivocal undertaking

By Mitsuru Kurosawa

HPI hosted an international symposium titled “Where does the‘unequivocal undertaking’ stand?: The current situation and Japan’s
responsibilities in eliminating nuclear weapons” on July 28th at the Hiroshima
International Conference Center. Despite the adoption by all parties, including
nuclear weapon states, of an unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear
weapons at the 2000 NPT review conference, little progress has been made. In
addition, the missile defense program of the Bush administration has further
complicated the international community’s approach to nuclear issues. The
Hiroshima symposium was intended to shed light on the current situation andto facilitate articulation of opinions on Japan’s role.
Among the panelists was Mitsuru Kurosawa, a professor at the Osaka
School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, and head of HPI’s
nuclear disarmament in the 21st century project. Five foreign experts, who willcontribute to the project’s final report to be released next spring, attended asguest panelists.
In the first session, which dealt with the roles and responsibilities of theUnited States and Russia, Lawrence Scheinman explained research conducted
recently by the Bush administration. The research concluded that the UnitedStates might need an even stronger nuclear capability if the already uncertain
strategic environment deteriorates. The report recommended that Washington
should not sign any agreement that obliges it to abandon its right to restore
nuclear weapons to original levels after cuts have been made.
Roland Timerbaev said coordinated reductions in nuclear weapons
among all nuclear weapon states were most desirable, but acknowledged thatcoordinated unilateral cuts by the United States and Russia were more likely.
He proposed strategic nuclear reductions by the five nuclear states to a total of
4,000 warheads over the next seven years, a suggestion already made by
Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Later, Tariq Rauf pointed out that the multilateral framework of nonproliferation, maintained over the 50 years or so since the end of the war, hadbeen endangered by the unilateralist stance of the current U.S. administration,
particularly its plans for missile defense. He said the time had come for U.S.
allies to put pressure on Washington to re-examine its policies.
In the second session, titled “Advocates of nuclear disarmament andJapan,” Darach MacFhionnbhairr said the obligation of the nuclear states todisarm, stated in Article 6 of the NPT, had been further clarified at the 2000
NPT Review Conference. By the same token, he added, non-nuclear states had
a duty to reject any moves designed to enable nuclear states to renege on theirpromise. Non-nuclear states, he said, should do all they could to ensure that
this “unequivocal undertaking” was not consigned to the historical scrap heap.
Finally, Rebecca Johnson urged the Japanese prime minister and foreign
minister to take the lead in bringing about the early entry into force of theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Japanese people, she said,should make their voices heard at the grass-roots, local, national and international
levels. She advised them to make full use of the media and other democratic
tools to put pressure on nuclear weapon states, and on Japanese and U.S.
officials.
Each session featured an hour-long question-and-answer session
involving panelists and members of the 200-strong audience. HPI published areport on the symposium in November 2001.

No progress has been made since nuclear weapon
states made an “unequivocal undertaking” to eliminate
their nuclear stockpiles at the 2000 NPT Review
Conference. Not surprisingly, the symposium “Where
does the ‘unequivocal undertaking’ stand?” focused onwhat we can do to prompt those states to make good on their commitments. As
experts from the United States, Russia and Canada pointed out, the mostpressing issue is the Bush administration’s plans for missile defense.
First, let us consider the “renewed threat” to which Washington refers tojustify missile defense; the system’s technical feasibility and costs; and its
possible ramifications for international politics. Supporters of missile defense
claim the moral high ground, pointing to the system’s defensive, as opposed tooffensive, nature. But one of the greatest concerns is that the United States ispursuing missile defense unilaterally with no consultation with other states.
Washington’s unilateralism is also evident in its decision neither to ratify
the CTBT nor to endorse controls on small arms, and its refusal to take part innegotiations on fissile material cut-off (FMTC). Instead, the United States
appears determined to make decisions free of interference from other states,
and to decrease its nuclear arsenal unilaterally. That approach, however, also
leaves open the possibility that it will later restore its nuclear stockpile toprevious levels. Pressure must be applied at home and from overseas, andJapan has a duty to object to U.S. policy where necessary.
Japan’s role was discussed in the second half of the symposium. While it
is too weak to negotiate alone on equal terms with its much more powerful
ally, Japan could achieve breakthroughs if it negotiates with the United Statesas part of a group of nations. The political conditions, though, are not ripe forcooperation with members of the New Agenda Coalition. I have proposed thatJapan, Australia and Canada (JAC), all U.S. allies, should come together tonegotiate with the United States. Canada’s devotion to nuclear disarmament isstronger than Japan’s, and Australia is a signatory to the South Pacific NuclearFree Zone Treaty. In addition, the so-called the NATO5, which comprises
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Italy, has urged the UnitedStates to reconsider its policy on the first use of nuclear weapons. JAC and theNATO5 could achieve a great deal if they pooled their diplomatic resourcesand enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament.
In addition to the important role played by Japan’s Foreign Ministry,attention should focus on the policy-making role of the national Diet. For example,
the Foreign Ministry initially opposed a total ban on anti-personnel landmines, butchanged its mind after then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi threw his weightbehind the treaty. Obuchi had come under pressure from Diet members and NGOs.
To achieve nuclear disarmament, Diet members must apply pressure on the prime
minister and foreign minister to reflect their views in foreign policy. By the same
token, it is up to the voters to remind their representatives of the need to makeprogress on disarmament as frequently and as vocally as possible.
Kurosawa is professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy at Osaka University

By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPICONTENTS
The current situation and Japan’s role discussed at HPI symposium
by Kazumi Mizumoto … 1
The global nuclear situation and Japan’s tasks by Mitsuru Kurosawa …… 1
Reports on symposium ………………………………………………… 2~3
UN Conference on small arms: Its outcome and implications by Masamichi Kamiya… 4~5
Research project on nuclear disarmament in the 21st century:
Reports on denuclearization of South Africa and the role of NGOs … 4~5
Research project on new-interventionism:
9th and 10th meetings: The UN humanitarian intervention ………… 6~7
United Nations conference on disarmament in Ishikawa-Kanazawa
by Masamichi Kamiya … 6~7
Employment opportunities at HPI ………………………………………… 8
Diary ……………………………………………………………………… 8●Participants

Lawrence Scheinman

Distinguished Professor at the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies office in Washington, D. C.,
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Roland M. Timerbaev
Chairman of the board and senior advisor at theCenter for Policy Studies in Russia
Tariq Rauf
Director of the International Organizations andNonproliferation Program (IONP), Monterey
Institute of International Studies
Darach MacFhionnbhairr Director of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Government of Ireland
Rebecca Johnson
Executive director of the Acronym InstituteMitsuru Kurosawa
Professor at the Osaka School of International Public
Policy, Osaka University−1−

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Symposium

Where Dose “Unequivocal Undertaking” Stand?

Nuclear Disarmament:

Dealing with Nuclear Issues:

Issues and Prospects for the United States

Russia s Perspective

At this time the policy of the new U.S. administrationis still in the process of being defined. Among other things,
the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture
Review are still in process. In addition, there is scope for Lawrence Scheinman
domestic and international political factors to enter into thepolicy equation. For example, the unexpected shift in control of the U.S. Senate
from Republican to Democratic as a result of Senator Jeffords leaving theRepublican Party to become an Independent has given rise to skepticism overthe Bush administration’s disposition to put greater emphasis on unilateralapproaches to security policy rather than on multilateral arrangements which itsees as a constraint on pursuing the country’s national interest.
The unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament concurred in by
the United States at the 2000 NPT Review Conference maintains continuity
with past administrations and is consistent with the Bush administration’sview favoring reductions in strategic weapons even if on a unilateral as
opposed to formal negotiated basis. The question is less whether theelimination of nuclear weapons should be an objective but rather when andhow and under what circumstances. Context is extremely important in that if
the security system, which is dependent on nuclear deterrence, is to be eliminated,
it must be in circumstances in which it is replaced with an alternative structurethat satisfies national security and meets the international community’s need to
be able to counter aggression. In short, if one wants to build down a security system,
one must simultaneously build up a credible and reliable alternative system.
A recent study by the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) in which
a number of persons now serving in the Bush administration participated,emphasized the continued importance of nuclear deterrence and, given theuncertainties about stability or instability in the security environment, theconsequent need to maintain a capability to support deterrence objectives. This
would, of course, mean the legal and political right to build new weapons, if
deemed appropriate by strategic and foreign policy requirements. That study
concluded that reductions should be determined and carried out unilaterally
and not be the subject of formal negotiations which would deprive the UnitedStates of the freedom to adjust the size of its nuclear forces in keeping withchanges in the strategic environment.
Unilateral initiatives, while useful means of getting a process going andmaking progress in the relatively short term, also have a downside; they are
not legally binding, they are reversible, and they would not normally involve
meaningful verification arrangements. Those three factors, however, areimportant to long-term predictability and stability. The United States shouldlook to a mix of approaches, using unilateral measures to jump start theprocess of reducing nuclear weapons and their relevance while engaging in
multilateral negotiations to lock in agreements that can be reached.
The situation we face today is similar to that of 1945 when the UnitedStates was capable of influencing the entire world. Now, as in the period 19451957, the United States should invest its energy in multinational regimes andsupporting institutions consistent with national interests that control weaponsof mass destruction and conventional weapons and in security arrangementsthat hold out the promise for stability of the international order.

We in Russia are very concerned about the status
and future of arms control and nuclear disarmament.
Even though we had quite a few success stories at the
beginning of the 1990s, there were several negative Roland Timerbaev
developments in the closing years of the decade, such as
the continuing impasse on the Russian-U.S. strategic dialogue, U.S. plans togo ahead with missile defense, and the failure to enforce the START II and the
CTBT.
The world is undergoing a transition from a Cold War system based on
two opposing, and excessively armed, superpowers, toward one with a newframework.
Given the pauses in the bilateral Russia-U.S. talks and the multilateral
Geneva conference on disarmament, the hiatus in the nuclear arms control
negotiation process is bound to continue for some time. What will be done
during this pause? I think one should consider the possibility of coordinatedunilateral steps to downsize the number of Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear
weapons, which has already been suggested by U.S. President George W.
Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Preferably, such steps should be
combined with confidence-building measures and other voluntaryarrangements to improve transparency.
Putin suggested to French President Jacques Chirac during his recent visit
to Russia that the five officially recognized nuclear weapon states, which arealso permanent members of the UN Security Council, begin multilateral talks
on strategic stability. Russia favors negotiating the reduction, withinternational verification, of the five’s strategic warheads from the present
14,000 to 4,000 – with Russia and U.S. cutting down to 1,500 or less – overthe next seven years.
While welcoming this suggestion, I would rather see the inclusion in thenegotiating process or consultations, whatever form they take, of not only theofficial nuclear weapon states but also the other three states that have nuclear
explosive devices – India, Pakistan and Israel – as well as other states withadvanced nuclear capabilities, such as Japan and Germany. As things stand, I
do not believe that any formal and verifiable agreement can be achieved any
time soon.
A solution along the lines of coordinated unilateral reductions is more likely,
so I am very much in favor of internationalizing the process of nuclear disarmament.
One of the most serious problems we face is the problem of the entry into
force of the CTBT. The U.S., China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and some otherstates have yet to ratify it. Alarming media reports claim that the U.S. ispreparing to abandon test moratoriums and resume testing. If these tests do
indeed go ahead, they will signal the end of the moratoriums, which are
currently adhered to by all states capable of experimenting with or exploding
nuclear devices.
Despite these negative developments, I do not wish to appear too
pessimistic. There are, for example, signs that Putin and Bush, who establishedgood working relations in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in June and in Genoa, Italy, in
July, have agreed to speed up consultations. Let’s hope that these consultations
bring about results. I have my doubts, but I still hold out hope.

Dr. Lawrence Scheinman is Distinguished Professor at the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies office in Washington, D.C., Monterey Institute of International Studies. He holds an
M.A. from the University of California, Los Angeles, and a Ph.D. from the University ofMichigan. He also holds a J.D. from New York University’s School of Law.

Ambassador Roland M. Timerbaev is chairman of the board and senior advisor
at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia. He graduated from the Moscow State
Institute of International Relations, and helped negotiate the NPT, the ABM Treaty
and other arms control agreements.

Global Nuclear Problems:

The Future of Multilateral Arms Control
The end of the Cold War has given us the opportunity
to dramatically reduce nuclear weapons and strengthen
multilateral frameworks. The following three points may
be of use to citizens who are attempting to persuade their
Tariq Rauf
governments to take steps to ensure a secure future for us all.
First, Washington is likely to try to act outside the constraints imposed bymultilateral treaties and regimes to promote more than non-proliferation and theabolition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. For the past 50 years,
the international community has striven to build and maintain a multilateralframework designed to ensure stability and predictability. But the postwar
premise that international treaties enhance security ended with the advent of the
new U.S. administration. The Bush administration’s arms control policies andprograms are unlikely to pursue traditional methods of arms control, but tocreate conditions that will allow the United States to act unilaterally in its own
interests. Regarding the 2000 NPT Review Conference, for example, the U.S.
has not said it is unequivocally committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons.
The second point relates to missile defense. The end of deterrence aspromoted by mutually assured destruction (MAD) requires nothing less than

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the abolition of nuclear weapons. But this is not what the Bush administrationis trying to do. In fact, nuclear deterrence will be with us as long as nuclear
weapons exist. The United States has said that a missile defense system
incorporating a robust nuclear offensive capability will create a world that nolonger has to rely on MAD to keep the peace. The United States is trying toconvince its allies that, by deploying missile defense, it will remove theshadow of MAD. However, missile defense will make the world less safe if
China, as many expect, responds by increasing its nuclear arsenal and Russia
feels it has no option but to build new multiple warhead systems.
Third, it is the responsibility of U.S. allies to influence Washington as it
engages in policy reviews, not to wait until the results of these reviews emerge.
They should also remind Washington of its obligation to implement the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty and to take steps toward nuclear disarmament it agreed
to at the NPT Review Conference. I urge U.S. allies to highlight the dangers ofmoving away from multilaterally negotiated treaties toward unilateralism.
Arms control negotiations, now in their 15th year, have not finished yet.
World leaders with ties to the United States should use every opportunity tocounter the unilateralist message U.S. officials are taking to their capital cities.
Dr. Tariq Rauf is director of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation
Program (IONP) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He was educated at
the University of Toronto, and King’s College and the London School of Economics,
both part of London University, and the University of the Punjab in Pakistan.

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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.4 No.2 November 2001

The Current Situations and Japan’s Responsibilities in Eliminating Nuclear Weapons

The Role of Non-nuclear Weapon States
in Advancing Nuclear Disarmament
The challenge of nuclear disarmament has been an
issue between the nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear
weapon states ever since the use of the atomic weapons in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When Ireland tabled the Darach MacFhionnbhairr
resolution at the United Nations in 1958, which launched
the process that resulted in the NPT 10 years later, the role of the non-nuclear
weapon states in driving the nuclear disarmament agenda was already wellestablished. The NPT partnership enabled the non-nuclear weapon states toaddress the weapon states on their legal treaty obligations and to demand theprize of early nuclear disarmament.
The end of the Cold War altered the entire context in which nuclear
weapons and their elimination could be considered. The moratoria on nuclear
testing and the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996 represented a high watermark.
However, by the mid-1990s, the pace of nuclear disarmament had faltered.
The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) was created in response to the unwillingnessof the weapon states to proceed with the disarmament that they had always
promised once the Cold War had ended.
Preoccupied at the lack of resolve by the nuclear weapon states toaccomplish the elimination of their nuclear weapons, Ireland, together with its
New Agenda partners, joined together to examine how our governments mightmore effectively address that complacency and reverse the ineffectiveness ofthe non-nuclear weapon states’ advocacy of nuclear disarmament, which had
left the nuclear weapon states unchallenged in their restatement of the role ofnuclear weapons in their defense postures and policies.
The New Agenda called first and foremost for an unequivocal commitmentby the nuclear weapon states to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.
With this undertaking as a starting point, and agreement on a realistic

The Role of Civil Societyin Nuclear Disarmament
At the end of the Cold War, we believed governments
would take nuclear disarmament into their own hands andstart getting rid of their weapons. We know now that thatwas not to be the case. Now, more than ever, civil society,Rebecca Johnson
has to create the pressure, the conditions, the actions tomake our governments recognize that we do not want to live under the threat ofnuclear weapons. Nor do we want our countries to rely on nuclear weapons or
be dependent as allies of nuclear weapons states.
Civil society can be proud of its achievements in several areas. Years ofpressure for the CTBT and the INF Treaty was created by people desperate forchange; not only nongovernmental organizations, but doctors, scientists, women,
peace movements, city authorities led by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
environmentalists, indigenous peoples and survivors of the atomic bombings.
Missile defence is put forward as a way of protecting the U.S. or othersfrom weapons of mass destruction. If it were genuinely concerned about
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), of which missile delivery is probably theleast likely form, then a sensible WMD defence policy would encompass thefollowing priorities, which would be far more useful than missile defence:
1) security and controls to deny access to the materials (plutonium etc.), i.e. fissile
materials ban, no transport, more cooperative threat reduction programmeswith Russia, better International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoringof stockpiles pending elimination etc.
2) control, reduction, and disarmament policies for missiles – although they can●Questions & Answers
Member of Audience: How likely is the Bush administration to deploy a
missile defense system in space, and how would Russia react?
Rauf: U.S. government officials said that they want to deploy some of theelements of missile defense in space by the year 2004, maybe in Alaska.
Timerbaev: If the U.S. proceeds with missile defense in space, Russia will
have to respond.
Member of Audience: What is the significance of the ICJ advisory on theillegality of nuclear weapons? Was dropping the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima a war crime?
Johnson: At the time Hiroshima was bombed, no-one understood the terrible
effects. Now that knowledge has contributed to the ICJ Opinion. Any
future use of nuclear weapons in a situation like the Hiroshima andNagasaki bombings would certainly be war crimes.
Member of Audience: Even if Japan advocates the abolition of nuclear weapons,other countries will not listen to Japan, which is under the U. S. nuclear
umbrella. What do Americans think about Japan leaving the alliance?

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.4 No.2 November 2001

programme of action, nuclear disarmament could become a realizable goal.
And because this goal would take some time to achieve, certain interim
measures could be undertaken to lessen the risk of the use of nuclear weapons
in the period leading to their elimination. Such interim measures were alreadybeing advocated by some NATO states in the run-up to the strategic concept tobe adopted at the Washington Summit in 1999.
During negotiations with the New Agenda at the 2000 NPT Review
Conference, the nuclear weapons states finally committed themselves
unequivocally to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons as proposed by
the New Agenda. The Final Document of the 2000 Review contains a comprehensive programme of action for nuclear disarmament, including the bilateral,plurilateral and multilateral elements required to achieve a world free of
nuclear weapons. In addition, it includes steps to diminish the role of nuclear
weapons in security policies, to minimize the chances of these weapons ever being
used and facilitate the process of their elimination, to further reduce the operational
status of nuclear weapons, and to tackle the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.
The unequivocal commitment ends the ambiguity that nuclear weapon
states have, over the years, read into Article VI of the NPT. The new politicalcommitment requires them to pursue nuclear disarmament without equivocation. The non-nuclear weapon states must, therefore, insist that this fundamental step is the measure by which all steps involving nuclear weapons will
henceforth be judged.
We must continue to press nuclear weapon states so that our recent
achievements will not quickly be consigned to history. Civil society, too, will
have to be more active than ever to ensure their implementation. This is ourlast and best chance to reverse and eradicate the scourge of nuclear weapons,
to which Hiroshima is a witness and warning to us all.
Dr. Darach MacFhionnbhairr is Director of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Government of Ireland. He holds a doctorate from
University College Dublin, and is primarily involved in international security andmultilateral disarmament issues.

carry conventional payloads and the technology is useful for shooting things
into space, it is well understood that they are primarily intended to deliver
WMD – something could be worked out for peaceful satellite launches.
3) public education about the dangers of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons,
including training emergency services and equipping medical facilities.
4) banning and eliminating all weapons of mass destruction. This entails
reinforcing and implementing the treaties that ban chemical and biologicalweapons and the disarmament agreements associated with the NPT, with
better monitoring, verification, accountability etc., and, furthermore, toinitiate negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention that would ban such
weapons for all time.
With regard to the NPT 2000’s Nuclear Disarmament Plan of Action, civilsociety should consider five approaches: diplomatic, international, parliamentary,national, and local, but there is no room to describe strategies for each in detail.
What can Japan do? Is your government scared of offending the United States,
Japan’s major ally? How can you make the government even more fearful ofoffending you, its citizens – the electorate?
This calls for a well-coordinated campaign to rouse public opinion anddirect the message at elected officials at the local and national levels. How can
we work with governments to repel the threat from weapons of mass destruction?
We can begin by raising awareness of the risks and consequences of nuclear
policies and using our democratic rights to press for changes that will bring us
greater security.
Ms. Rebecca Johnson is executive director of the Acronym Institute. She has
degrees from Bristol University and the School of Oriental and African Studies,
London University, and has worked on security and nuclear issues since the early
1980s.

Scheinman: I think that Japan would be far better able to influence U.S.
policy by staying as a member of the alliance than by leaving it. The
United States values its close relations with Japan and wants to sustain andstrengthen the alliance, not to see it disintegrate.
Member of Audience: But wouldn’t Japan be able to concentrate on
eliminating nuclear weapons by leaving the U.S. nuclear umbrella?
MacFhionnbhairr: Being an ally is an advantage in the sense that Japan istreated as an equal partner. In the initial stages, steps toward nuclear
disarmament would progress within the framework of the alliance. It is
Japan’s responsibility to influence an ally who possesses nuclear weapons.
Member of Audience: Do you think there are enough opportunities forNGO’s to influence the outcome of international conferences?
Johnson: The role of NGOs will be limited once a conference has started, so
the key time to exert pressure is to work on your parliamentarians andgovernments well before the conference takes place, so that you influence
their policy and positions in advance.

−3−

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The UN Conference on Small Arms: Its Outcome and Implications
By Masamichi Kamiyainternational community to ameliorate the problem of SALWs. In his
report, he emphasized the importance of ridding the world of SALWs
and landmines, a process described as micro disarmament.
The Japanese government responded quickly to Boutros-Ghali’splea. Japan has submitted resolutions to the UN General Assembly
every year since 1995, and has played a leading role on the three
preparatory committees for this summer’s UN conference. The Japanese
government’s leadership in this field has won international praise.
The problem should be viewed in both domestic and regional
contexts. It is made more complex because of its close links withnational security, the right of people to bear arms, disarmament,
conflict resolution, law enforcement, organized crime, terrorism, andsocio-economic development. Furthermore, it has proven moredifficult to wage an international campaign against small arms andlight weapons than on landmines, because the former are notuniversally regarded as inhumane. The conference defined SALWs as
handguns, automatic machine guns and any weapon that can be
carried on the person. Anti-personnel landmines were excluded fromthe definition since a ban on them is covered by a separate agreement.
The conference’s main aim was to adopt a programme of action→

The United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UN conference on small arms)
was held July 9 to 20, 2001, at the UN headquarters in New York. The
event was a product of a concerted effort by the international
community to take action for the first time on the issue of small arms
and light weapons (SALWs).
In retrospect, the end of the Cold War gave the world two reasons
to get involved in the SALWs issue. First, the supply of such weapons,
which had little use after the Cold War, increased dramatically in
conflict zones where the United States and the then Soviet Union had
lost their influence as superpowers. Second, as the risk of nuclear war
faded, the world’s attention shifted from nuclear to conventional
disarmament, symbolized by SALWs and anti-personnel landmines.
In the post-Cold War period, African states have suffered most fromthe carnage SALWs can unleash. Civil wars in Somalia, Angola and
Rwanda have killed tens of thousands of people. In the 1990s, according
to the United Nations, SALWs killed at least four million people, 90
percent of whom were civilians, 80 percent of them women and children.
The Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, issued in January 1995
by the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, urged the

Research Project on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century

Reports on Denuclearization in South Africa and the Role of NGOs
By Kazumi Mizumoto
HPI research project on nuclear disarmament in the 21st
century met in May and July to listen to presentations by members
and guest speakers, ask and answer questions and exchange
opinions. On July 27, foreign scholars and specialists due toparticipate in a symposium the following day were invited to address
members of the project. Following are highlights of the meeting:¡The 12th meeting (May 25)
Guest Speaker: Hiroaki Matsui, professor, Faculty ofInternational Relations, Daito Bunka University
Title: “On Russia's Nuclear Policy”
When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,and Belarus inherited its nuclear warheads. After the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty I (START I) was concluded between the UnitedStates and the four countries, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus
handed over their nuclear weapons to Russia and acceded to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear states. Russia
was slow to ratify START II, which was signed in January 1993, due
to deteriorating relations between Moscow and Washington. Russian
President Vladimir Putin persuaded the Duma to support START II,
arguing that a reduction in Russia’s nuclear arsenal would help its
economy. Russia ratified START II in April 2000. In the same month,
the official Russian military doctrine was revised for the first time inseven years. The international situation was described as aconfrontation between “the monopolar power of Western developed
countries, centered around the United States” and “the powers,
including Russia, leaning toward a multipolar world.” The new
doctrine recognized ethnic extremism, religious extremism, andseparatism as threats, and regarding nuclear issues, said that Russia
intended to maintain its status as a nuclear superpower. The doctrine
also made a specific commitment to reductions in nuclear weaponsand no-first-uses provided that the balance of strategic weapons wasmaintained and attempts were made to strengthen the Antiballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty. It should be pointed out, though, that nuclear
weapons are more readily available and Russia’s dependence on themis, in fact, increasing.

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Putin strategy appears to ride out the transitional period until the
economy recovers and conventional military forces have been
restored. The strategy also involves decreasing the number of nuclear
weapons to between 1,000 and 1,500. Russia hopes to boost its economy
and modernize its conventional weapons by exporting arms. The
major obstacle to this is the U.S. missile defense program. In response,
the Russians are using their commitment to the ABM treaty to instigate
formation of a network of opposition to missile defense. Some in
Russia are opposed to that approach, however, since they believe thata prolonged political confrontation with the United States will
damage the national interest.
Guest Speaker: Yoshihiko Fujimoto, associate professor,
Hiroshima University of Economics
Title: “Nuclear Issues in South African Foreign Policy”
In 1993, then South African President F.W. de Klerk admitted that
his country had begun producing nuclear weapons in 1974, and had
had six atomic bombs in 1989, but added that the government had
decommissioned all of them in 1990. That process, from nuclear
development through denuclearization, needs to be viewed in thecontext of apartheid and the resulting international isolation, and thecountry’s return to the international fold following the release fromprison and election as president of Nelson Mandela.
During apartheid, from 1948 through 1994, the Armament
Corporation of South Africa (ARMSOR) was established to help
build a self-sufficient military since arms exports to the country had
been embargoed by the United Nations. South Africa chose to arm
itself with nuclear weapons during that period in response to theworldwide condemnation of apartheid and the country’s ostracism
from the international community.
The rise in African nationalism, the presence of Cuban troops inneighboring Angola and the threat of communism also led the country
in that direction.
So why did South Africa later scrap its nuclear arsenal? First, it
was under considerable international pressure to do so. Second, thethreat from Angola had disappeared with the end of the Cold War.
Third, South Africa wanted once again to become a constructive−4−

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.4 No.2 November 2001

→(POA) that would curb the illicit trade in SALWs and promote thecollection and destruction of excessive and destabilizing weapons inconflict zones. A draft POA prepared by the chairman at the end of thefirst week mentioned the need for a) the positive manifestation ofpolitical will, b) pragmatic plans at the national, regional and global
levels, c) international cooperation and assistance, and d) follow-up
measures. The U.S. representative, however, wished to delete passages
calling for restrictions on the private ownership of SALWs andregulations on supplying SALWs to governments or governmentauthorized bodies. It appeared, for a moment, that the draft POA
would fall at the first hurdle. However, African states, which played aconstructive role at the conference, accepted the U.S. demand, and the
POA was adopted unanimously.
The plan of action emphasizes the responsibility of the state toaddress the problem of SALWs. It urges national governments tostrengthen domestic laws and draw up codes of conduct. National
initiatives must, of course, be supplemented by action at the regionaland global levels.
Second, follow-up measures are an integral part of the POA.
They include plans to: a) to convene a conference no later than 2006
to review progress, b) to convene a meeting of states on biennial basis
to consider the national, regional and global implementation of the
POA, c) to undertake a UN study for an international instrument for
tracing, and d) to consider further steps to enhance international

cooperation in dealing with SALWs.
Third, the POA stresses the importance of partnerships between
governments and civil society, including nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs). NGOs are expected to oversee the collection
and destruction of excess SALWs in conflict zones. Hopes are highamong the international community that the government-civil society
partnership will grow in this vital area.
Finally, several other factors connected with the wider issue ofthe United Nations and disarmament emerged during the conference.
First, by adopting the POA, the international community showed
how serious it was about small arms and light weapons. It wassignificant that all states shared the view that the UN conference was
the beginning, not the end, of the process of eliminating SALWs.
Second, mention should be made of the great contribution of
African states, which had been less visible at previous conferences.
Third, it was agreed that the protection of human security, humandignity and the culture of peace should be an integral part of SALWs
disarmament. These factors had drawn little attention at previous
conferences.
As the representative from Sierra Leone said, SALWs are a matterof life and death. Such weapons are complex, but the international
community has a duty to do all it can to reduce their number.

member of the international community. Finally, the country’s whiteleadership did not want a possible future government led by blacks tohave nuclear weapons at its disposal.
Following its return to the community of nations, South Africa
chaired the Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, trying to serve
as a bridge between North and South. As a member of the New
Agenda Coalition, it is now attempting to forge diplomatic links witha large number of countries.

Hemisphere; the Tlatelolco Treaty (Latin America and the Caribbean);the Rarotonga Treaty (South Pacific); the Bangkok Treaty (Southeast
Asia); the Pelindaba Treaty (Africa); and the Antarctic Treaty.
There were other moves toward denuclearization in the Southern
Hemisphere during the 1990s. In South America, Brazil andArgentina issued a joint declaration on atomic energy policy in 1990,
and reached agreement on establishing an institution to control
nuclear materials a year later. They also acceded to the NPT. In
addition, Argentina, Chile and Brazil ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty.
In the South Pacific, France suspended nuclear testing after it had
resumed in the face of widespread international criticism. The UnitedStates, Britain and France signed the CTBT and a protocol attached to
the Rarotonga Treaty, which was also signed by Vanuatu and Tonga.
There was greater cooperation between the Agency for theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean(OPANAL) and the Pacific Islands Forum, which in turn strengthened
ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). A
resolution calling for the denuclearization of the Southern Hemispherewas passed at the UN General Assembly in 1996. It was opposed,
however, by the United States, Britain and France, with Russia, India,
and Israel abstaining. There is an urgent need to forge greater cooperation
between regional organizations in the Southern Hemisphere and forthem to work more closely with the New Agenda Coalition.

¡The 13th meeting (July 6)
Guest Speaker: Hiromichi Umebayashi, president, thePeace Depot, Inc.
Title: “The Role of NGOs in Nuclear Disarmament, with
Special Interests in Japanese NGOs”
NGOs play an important role in nuclear disarmament. In 1996, forexample, the World Court Project successfully obtained an advisory declaring
nuclear weapons illegal from the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
This particular project began life in the 1980s as an anti-nuclear
campaign in New Zealand. Legal professionals and specialists formed
an international NGO to pursue its goals. And when the NPT review
conference was held in 1995, many NGOs went to the United Nations
to lobby participants and monitor the discussions.
Abolition 2000 was set up to push for an agreement on theabolition of nuclear weapons by 2000. Campaigners drew up a draft
treaty and took their message to people around the world, generating
impetus for new campaigns in the process. They included Trident
Ploughshares 2000, the campaign against the nuclear-related
facilities. The campaign is being held mainly in Scotland. Membersof that group were acquitted of charges of attempting to damage anuclear submarine, an encouraging development for other antinuclear activists. In Japan, NGOs formed the Tokyo Forum, giving
citizens the opportunity to meet directly officials from the Foreign
Ministry.
Speaker: Yoko Ogashiwa, project member; associate
professor, Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima
University
Title: “Denuclearization in the Southern Hemisphere;
Prospects for Interregional Cooperation”
There are five nuclear-free zone treaties in the Southern

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.4 No.2 November 2001

Kamiya is a visiting research fellow at HPI¡Workshop (July 27)
Title: On the Final report of the “Research Project on Nuclear
Disarmament in the 21st Century”
Participants: Lawrence Scheinman, Roland M. Timerbaev,
Rebecca Johnson, and project members.
The research project plans to publish a final report, tentatively
titled “Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century” by next spring. The
report will be written by nine specialists based overseas, including thefive present at the workshop, project members, and Hiromichi
Umebayashi. On July 27, the writers discussed outlines of theircontributions with project members and guests. The workshop ended
an hour later than scheduled after heated and fruitful discussions.

−5−

Mizumoto is an associate professor at HPIVisit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

Research project on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism

9th and 10th meetings : The UN Humanitarian Intervention
extending humanitarian assistance, such as rescuing refugees anddisplaced people caught up in conflicts. In addition, attempts havebeen made to establish better coordination, and to place responses tohumanitarian crises in a single framework. As part of those efforts,
the department of humanitarian affairs has tried to link NGOs, with
their firsthand knowledge, with the Security Council, which decides
whether or not the United Nations should intervene. Thesedevelopments, together with a general upsurge in humanitarianism,are considered instrumental in the growing number of resolutions onhumanitarian interventions.
Seki then discussed problems of decision making in the United
Nations. Accountability and the difficulties in maintaining objectivity
in recognizing humanitarian crises were addressed during thequestion and answer session.
The project met for the 10th time on Aug. 23. Satoru Kurosawa,
director of the global issues division of the planning and evaluation
department of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA),
and Prof. Motomi Tomaru of Tamagawa University Global Education
Center were the guest speakers. Kurosawa chaired the session on a
JICA report on peace building published in March 2001. Following isa summary of Kurosawa’s remarks.
The JICA report comes in three parts. The first part defines theconcept of peace building. The second makes suggestions, and thethird part contains guidelines on peace building within the current
system.
JICA’s involvement in peace building has been born of the belief
that the political-military framework alone is insufficient to achieve
breakthroughs and that developmental assistance is also necessary.
There are three pillars to peace building: Humanitarian emergency→

The HPI research project on new-interventionism met for the 9thtime on June 22 in Tokyo. Kaoruko Seki, humanitarian affairs officer
at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, gavea speech on the role of the United Nations in responding tohumanitarian crises.
The UN Security Council recognizes “threats to international
peace and security” set out in Chapter VII, Article 39 of the UN
Charter in three situations: During civil war, for humanitarianreasons, and to restore democratic government. However, eachresolution is reached after a consideration of the merits of each case,so there are no consistencies in the recognition of threats or in thetype of action taken. This implies that the UN system is unreliable.
Opinion is divided over whether it is possible to establish stricter
standards for UN intervention. This division can be seen in
definitions of human rights abuses, alternatives to military action to
restore peace and the extent to which the United Nations should
pursue them, and the appropriate scale of intervention and methods toensure its success.
The controversy naturally affects conclusions drawn from suchdebates. Some argue that the current system, in which the use of force
is accepted as exceptional, should be reformed into one that more
readily authorizes the use of force. Others counter that force should,
in principle, be prohibited to prevent its indiscriminate use, and thatwhether it is permissible or not should be considered on a case-bycase basis.
The current UN system, which permits intervention, has clear
drawbacks and has prompted the introduction of several measures,notably the setting up of the department of humanitarian affairs. The
department adopts a coordinated, comprehensive approach in

UN Conference on Disarmament in Ishikawa-Kanazawa:

Exploring a New Vision for Disarmament in the 21st Century
By Masamichi Kamiya
The United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in
Ishikawa-Kanazawa met in Kanazawa, Ishikawa Prefecture, from
Aug. 28 to 31, 2001. The meeting, held annually in Japan for the
past 13 years, was attended by 63 disarmament experts from 17
countries. They included government officials, academics andNGO members.
This year’s conference was titled “The evolution of the scopeof security and disarmament in the 21st century.” The topics
under discussion in the Conference included stability andprosperity in Northeast Asia, the multifaceted dimension of
security, weapons of mass destruction, institutions and actors forthe promotion of peace and disarmament, and the UN conference
on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.
In his opening remarks, Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, the UN
Under-Secretary-General for disarmament affairs, voiced thehope that the conference would produce a new definition of
security, and emphasized that both states and NGOs could play amuch bigger role in promoting “sustainable disarmament.”
In a keynote speech, Prof. Robert Scalapino of the Universityof California, Berkeley, analyzed the domestic situations in andbilateral arrangements among states in Northeast Asia necessary
to maintain peace and stability in the region. He was cautiously
optimistic, predicting that the region would encounter ups andVisit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

downs on the road to prosperity.
The following points emerged from the four-day conference:a) the multifaceted nature of security, b) growing number ofactors in disarmament, c) comprehensive nature of disarmament,
and d) crisis in the rule of law and in the multilateral approach todisarmament.
First, speakers favored a broader view of security. Someparticipants, superseding the traditional concept of security,
included human security in their definition, encompassing suchfactors as economic development, environmental protection,
dialogue among civilizations, a culture of peace, the IT revolution
and globalization.
Second, it was pointed out that not only states and the United
Nations but also civil society, particularly NGOs, had an
important role to play in promoting sustainable disarmament.
Third, during a plenary session on small arms, it was argued
that disarmament must be viewed against the background of theemergent needs of the new century. In short, while it is important
to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction (macro disarmament), progress must be made on the disarmament of smallarms and anti-personnel landmines (micro disarmament). A
comprehensive approach to disarmament is indispensable, it wasargued.

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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.4 No.2 November 2001

→

assistance, aid for restoration and development, and the prevention of
conflict recurrence. Efforts to build peace should combine all threeelements. In other words, we must identify the structural causes aswell as factors that trigger the conflict and those that immediately
precipitate the conflict. Any assistance should be designed to negate
these causes. Often, a more refined approach is required that includes,for example, bridging the gap between emergency assistance, therepatriation of refugees, and assistance provided on their return
home.
Analyzing Japan’s system of emergency assistance, Kurosawa
spoke of “air pockets” in the current legal system.
Those air pockets prevent Japan from extending proper
humanitarian assistance during or immediately after a conflict. Japanis supposedly part of the worldwide humanitarian relief systemstipulated in a UN law on peace keeping and other operations. But
Japan’s so-called Five Principles of Peace Keeping Operations
prevent it from truly doing so. Japan Disaster Relief Team is unable
to take part in refugee- relief activities because they can be dispatched
only in the case of a natural disaster. JICA cannot quickly respond to
emergency situations, as it is limited to granting assistance based onagreements between governments. All JICA can do is support NGOsin their endeavors through the Japan Platform organization.
Besides these systematic problems, JICA faces other challenges.
It must get involved in emergency and reconstruction assistance, as
well as playing a role in conflict prevention. It should formulate asocial development plan with the idea of peace building in mind, andtake care not to allow its aid to become one of the causes of conflict.
In short, this means not contributing to the increasing gaps between
rich and poor and not encouraging the unequal distribution of wealth.
Tomaru worked for many years for the UN Development
Program (UNDP), and was loaned to the UN peace-keeping operationin Tajikistan, to the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan(UNMOT), and to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor.
Tomaru reported on conflict resolution in Tajikistan, and the roles of

the UN special envoy and UNMOT.
The conflict in Tajikistan was caused by a combination ofinterregional rivalries inside the country, support from outside for
insurgent groups, and a regional struggle over rights and interests thatcame out of the domestic strife. Central authority rested with ethnic
groups in the Hojand and Kulyab regions, so that other parties, whichwere poorly treated, were attracted to Islamic organizations. This
coalition of disgruntled groups became the main antigovernment
opposition, and the conflict in Tajikistan escalated.
The United Nations sent an inspection team to Tajikistan in 1992,
and set up a liaison office there a year later.
The UN special envoy played a particularly important role inresolving the conflict in Tajikistan. As talks continued between thegovernment and the anti-government forces, the envoy recognized
the links between the government and its ally, and between the antigovernment forces and a country that supported them. The envoy
improved the chances of conciliation by obtaining the cooperation of
all countries involved in the conflict. Both parties decided to work
toward a political settlement rather than continuing to divide thenation through war.
Although UN-mediated reconciliation is regarded as having beensuccessful in Tajikistan, Tomaru pointed out several problems. First,
providing development aid before a peace settlement is reachedcould, in fact, hamper the progress of negotiations. It is important,
therefore, to provide humanitarian assistance while peace talks are in
progress. Help with development should come only after peace has
been achieved. In Tajikistan, the government and opposition forcescame together rather than continue the armed conflict. Though thiswas welcomed, the lack of a thorough disarmament plan meant thatbringing ordinary citizens together took considerably longer.
By Nobumasa Akiyama, assistant professor at HPIUN Conference on Disarmament in Ishikawa-Kanazawa

Fourth, attention focused on the increasingly unilateralist
foreign policy of the United States. Many participants criticized
U.S. missile defense and the possible abrogation of the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty. Some said U.S. unilateralism jeopardized
the international rule of law and the multilateral approach todisarmament.
On the second day, conference participants and students from
Ishikawa Prefecture exchanged views. The youngsters, who haveno first-hand experience of war or the nuclear catastrophe, put agreat deal of effort into the discussions, taking advantage of thisopportunity for them to learn from the mistakes of the past.
One conference participant from Japan and one from the UnitedStates who had attended the above-mentioned programme,
exchanged very impressive views with each other. The Japaneseparticipant, referring to the decrease in the number of students
visiting the Peace Memorial Museum in Hiroshima, said that Japan
must continue to teach its young about what happened in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki 56 years ago. His American counterpart,however, said that doing so might increase feelings of humiliation,
while memories subside of the United States’ strategic reasons for
dropping the bombs.
Ishikawa Gov. Masanori Tanimoto gave a presentation on therole of local governments. Emphasizing the complementary roleof localities in central government-led diplomacy, he gave an
overview of his prefecture’s international activities. Ishikawa
Prefecture, which has sponsored the annual UN Symposium on

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.4 No.2 November 2001

Northeast Asia since 1995, is known for its commitment to peaceand disarmament.
The conference demonstrated that security has become amultifaceted concept; that disarmament should be seen as acomprehensive process; and that the promotion of disarmament
involves an increasing number of actors. In particular, themeeting agreed that it was vitally important for local and national
governments, international organizations and civil society tocooperate to bring about disarmament.
To that end, it would be a good idea to open a branch officeof the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asiaand the Pacific in a city in Northeast Asia. Japan, the only nation
to have suffered the nuclear attacks, would be an ideal venue for
UN functions related to disarmament. For obvious reasons,
Hiroshima and Nagasaki would be among the favored candidates,
as would Ishikawa Prefecture, which has enjoyed peace for thelast 400 years.
It will take time to act on the aforementioned proposal. As afirst step, Hiroshima and Nagasaki should enhance their role inbringing together local governments in Japan through the Mayors
for Peace movement. The world expects a great deal of local
governments, which can bridge the gap between officialdom andcitizens.

−7−

Kamiya is a visiting research fellow at HPIVisit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

July 1 - October 31, 2001
◆Jul. 4 Nobumasa Akiyama attends a seminar, “Reconstruction assistance in
Kosovo and East Timor: Joint evaluation by the Foreign Ministry and United
Nations Development Program (UNDP),” organized by the Foreign Ministry ofJapan, held at the United Nations University.
◆Jul. 6 HPI project team on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century holds its
13th meeting.
◆Jul. 7 Kazumi Mizumoto attends a research meeting of the Chugoku-Shikoku
branch of the Peace Studies Association of Japan, held at Yamaguchi Prefectural
University.
Akiyama attends an international symposium, “On the front lines of conflict
prevention in Asia,” organized by and held at the Japan Institute of International Affairs.
◆Jul. 9-20 Masamichi Kamiya acts as an advisor at the United Nations
Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its
Aspects, held at the UN headquarters in New York.
◆Jul. 14-17 Akiyama attends a seminar organized by the Association forCommunication of Transcultural Studies held in Nago, Okinawa.
◆Jul. 19 Mizumoto delivers a lecture on humanitarian intervention and Japan’scontribution at a meeting organized by the Hiroshima Bar Association’s peace
promotion committee, held at the association’s conference room.
◆Jul. 20 HPI President Fukui delivers a lecture, “From A-bomb city Hiroshima to
the world: Toward nuclear elimination,” at Nara YMCA.
◆Jul. 25 Mizumoto attends a workshop on arms control, disarmament andsecurity organized by the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Nonproliferation, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, held at JIIA. The
workshop featured a lecture, “An evaluation of the non-effectuation of CTBT and
future tasks,” by Prof. Masahiko Asada of Kyoto University.
◆Jul. 27 HPI project team on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century holds aworkshop.
◆Jul. 28 HPI sponsors an international symposium, “Where does the ‘unequivocal
undertaking’ stand?: The current situation and Japan’s responsibilities in theelimination of nuclear weapons,” held at the Hiroshima International Conference Center.
◆Aug. 4 Akiyama attends Peace Forum 2001, run by the Hiroshima Junior
Chamber, as a coordinator and delivers a lecture on peace.
◆Aug. 5 Fukui attends the opening of the World Conference of Mayors for Peace
through Inter-city Solidarity, sponsored by Hiroshima city and Nagasaki city.
Mizumoto takes the chair and delivers a report, “The role of cities and citizens in
the elimination of nuclear weapons,” during a meeting with city residents titled“What we should do to eliminate nuclear weapons.” The event was part of the 5th
meeting of the mayors’ conference.
◆Aug. 23 HPI project team on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism holds its 10th meeting.
◆Aug. 24 Fukui gives a lecture at a meeting organized by the Hiroshima Prefectural
Confederation of A-bomb Sufferers Organizations at Hiroshima Peace Hall.
◆Aug. 27-Sept. 4 Akiyama visits Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM)
in Turkey.
◆Aug. 28-31 Kamiya attends the United Nations Conference on Disarmament
Issues in Ishikawa-Kanazawa, organized by the UN Department of Disarmament
Affairs, held at Hotel Nikko Kanazawa.
◆Sept. 1-24 Ikuko Togo participates in the international visitor program of the
U.S. State Department, as a member of the human security team. She visits
Washington, D.C., New York, Colorado Springs, and Los Angels to exchange ideas
and information with staff of the State Department, the Defense Department, theUnited Nations, and NGOs.
◆Sept. 6 Akiyama delivers a lecture on the politics and administration of Japan ata general orientation meeting for participants in a training program operated by theJapan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).
◆Sept. 14 HPI project team on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century holds its
14th meeting.
◆Sept. 18 Mizumoto attends the first meeting of the Committee for Studying Peace
Policies organized by Hiroshima Prefecture and the National Institute for Research
Advancement (NIRA).
HPI project team on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism holds
its 11th meeting.
◆Sept. 19 Akiyama attends a workshop on disarmament and security, organizedby the Center for Global Communications, at the International University of Japan.
◆Sept. 27 Mizumoto attends an international workshop on nuclear disarmamentand non-proliferation, organized by the Center for the Promotion of Disarmamentand Non-proliferation, the Japan Institute of International Affairs. The workshop
featured a lecture on missile defense by Prof. Shuichiro Iwata of the National
Defense Academy, Japan.
◆Oct. 2 Akira Matsunaga, a research fellow at the EastWest Institute and research
associate at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, gives a lecture, “The background to
the terror in the U.S.: The world of Islamic fundamentalism and its infiltration into
Eurasia,” at a forum organized by HPI.
◆Oct. 3 Akiyama attends a meeting of the Asia-Europe Foundation and theMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in Tokyo.
◆Oct. 9 Fukui attends a reception for UN Disarmament Fellows.
◆Oct. 10 Fukui, Mizumoto, Akiyama and Kamiya meet UN Disarmament Fellows
at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
◆Oct. 12 HPI project team on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century holds its
15th meeting.
◆Oct. 13, 14 Togo attends the annual meeting of the Japanese Political Science
Association at Rikkyo University.
◆Oct. 15 Fukui attends a Japan- Israel exchange program meeting organized by
the Japan Center for International Exchange.
HPI project team on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism holds
its 12th meeting at Toshi Center Hotel in Tokyo.
◆Oct. 16-22 Akiyama visits Thailand and Malaysia, and attends the 7th SPE IssyKul Forum in Kuala Lumpur.
◆Oct. 19 Mizumoto attends the first meeting of the working group of the Committee
for Studying Peace Policies organized by Hiroshima Prefecture and the National
Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA) at Hiroshima Prefectural Government
Office.
◆Oct. 24 Fukui delivers a lecture, “The peace problem in the 21st century,” at a
Soroptimists’ meeting at ANA Hotel Hiroshima.
◆Oct. 25 Benjamin L. Self, a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center,gives a lecture, “Coordinating U.S. and Japanese Responses to Chinese MilitaryModernization,” at a forum organized by HPI.
—— Visitors to HPI ——◆Aug. 3 Niu Qiang, secretary general of the Chinese People’s Association for
Peace and Disarmament
Wen De Sheng, deputy director of the executive office of Chinese Association forInternational Understanding◆Aug. 16 Fazal-ur-Rahman, senior research fellow at the Pakistan Institute ofStrategic Studies◆Sept. 7 Elizabeth Donaldson, language trainee at the Australian Embassy in Tokyo◆Oct. 9 Nassrine Azimi, chief at the New York Office of United Nations Institutefor Training and Research (UNITAR)

ｰｰｰ Employment Opportunities at HPI ｰｰｰ
HPI, based at Hiroshima City University, Japan, seeks applicants for
positions of instructor, assistant professor, associate professor, and/or
professor ranks.
Applicants should have a solid academic grounding in one or more thefollowing areas: theory of peace and methodology of peace research;
the nuclear holocausts in Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the development,
production, deployment, proliferation, disarmament and abolition of
nuclear and conventional weapons; international and domestic war,
peace, conflict resolution, and security in the Asia-Pacific region; andpacifistic ideas, culture, and movements in the Asia-Pacific region.
Candidates should possess, or be in the process of obtaining, adoctorate. Fluency in English is required. Older scholars under 60 are
encouraged to apply. Applications must reach the Institute by
December 20, 2001. All appointments will be effective on dates
between July 1, 2002 and April 1, 2003.

●For further information:
Tel: +81-82-544-7570; Fax: +81-82-544-7573
E-mail: harland@peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp
Before applying, please refer to our Web site at:〈http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm〉

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS

Vol.4, No.2 November 19, 2001
Copyright 2001 HPI All rights reserved●Issued by Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University
TEL +81-82-544-7570 FAX +81-82-544-7573
Hiroshima Mitsui Bldg. 12th Floor 2-7-10 Otemachi, Naka-ku, Hiroshima 730-0051 JAPAN E-mail: office-peace@peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp●Printed by Tokatoo Print Media co., ltd.

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm−8−

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.4 No.2 November 2001