Vol.15 No.1 July 2012

Forty Years since the Reversion of Okinawa:
Masaaki Gabe
Where Has Justice Gone?
May 15 is the memorial day of Okinawa’s reversion to Japanesesovereignty, and this year marks its 40th anniversary.
There have been a variety of changes observed in the past 40
years. Today many entertainers from Okinawa have gained fameand popularity, Uchina-yamato Guchi (a hybrid of the Okinawan
language and Japanese) attracts people from the Japanese
mainland, high school students from Okinawa compete well at the
biannual national baseball tournaments, and Okinawan young
people are proud of their Okinawan indigenous culture which wasonce regarded as “backward.” Things which have not changed
about Okinawa, however, include the vulnerable prefectural
finances on which a number of public works are dependent, theweak local economy as represented by one of the lowest average
income per capita in the country, and the US bases which haveremained in Japan’s southernmost prefecture for decades.
Local financial and economic situations may change,depending on factors such as the condition of the world economy,
the “limited government” policy of Tokyo, changes in ruling party,
and the domestic economic system. Local people in Okinawa mayof course bring about changes by means of their own wisdom andinnovation. In contrast, however, little change can be expected
regarding the US bases in Okinawa whose existence are closely
related to the issue of national security, which is determined bynational politics. Politics is a process of decision-making by
citizens, and is what determines the foundations of the country. Ina sense, little change regarding the US bases in Okinawa may
mean stable politics, as represented by the long-time government
administration of the Liberal Democratic Party. The summer of2009 witnessed a historic regime change in Tokyo; needless to say,this was a manifestation of the will of citizens. Nevertheless, up to
the present time, it can still not be said that this political change
has brought about changes to the US bases in Okinawa.
The US bases in Okinawa were reduced by 10 percent during thefirst decade since the reversion. This was implemented under arealignment plan which accompanied the reversion in the form of
the transfer of control to the Self-Defense Forces or returning theland to local residents. At the same time, the actual implementationof this took as long as a decade due to the stipulated condition thatalternative facilities needed to be built in other bases which could
then carry out the functions to be transferred. Another reason
related to the confused land ownership existing among local landowners. Confused land registration meant that lands could not be
used even after they were returned, therefore ownership firstneeded to be clarified which required a significant period of time.
The cause of this confusion can be attributed to the way the US
paid the rents for these lands. These rents were covered by abudget allocated by the US government which was distributed
according to areas claimed by local land owners. Through thisprocess, the US hastened to construct bases without assuming thefuture return of the lands, thus leaving land ownership ambiguous.
In fact, claims of a number of land owners were accepted without
verification and were reflected in the land registration which ended
up becoming confused. The resulting total area of lands claimed by
the locals was larger than the actual area; nevertheless, this was
settled within the budget that the US had allocated.
During the first decade following Okinawa’s reversion, theUS bases were indeed reduced. Nevertheless, the lands werereturned piecemeal, and as a consequence, not only the landowners but also the local government were unable to embark upondevelopment of the returned lands. The resulting stalemate may
stand as a lesson for what procedure should be pursued regarding
the future return of US bases to Okinawa.
In 1996, a new US base realignment plan was announced
after almost the same length of time as the US occupation of
Okinawa, which was 27 years, had passed since Okinawa’s
reversion in 1972. The trigger for this was a rape committed bythree US soldiers against a Japanese girl which occurred in
September 1995. The incident drew much attention not only fromwithin Japan but also from abroad, and the then Clinton andHashimoto administrations swiftly took action.
The 1995 rape incident revealed to the world the high densityof US bases in Okinawa and the burden this imposed on local society.
As a consequence, however, the interest of people outside Okinawa
focused solely on what had been going on in Okinawa since 1995,
despite the fact that the present situation had been developing since1945. On the other hand, when they talk about present-day Okinawa,
the people of the prefecture begin from the Battle of Okinawa which
took place in 1945. These days fewer and fewer people recall the
Ryukyu Kingdom of the pre-modernization era which is now regarded
as somewhat “unreal.” The present-day Okinawa accommodating
the US bases is apparently more “real” to the people of Okinawa.
Pressured by the call from Okinawan people for a realignmentand reduction of the US bases which surged up following the rapeincident, on April 16, 1996, the US and Japanese governments
announced that they had agreed on the return of 20 percent of the
US bases to Okinawa. This agreement was named the “SACO
agreement” after the name of the Special Action Committee on
Okinawa which brokered it. Out of the areas which were agreed tobe returned, 80 percent were part of the Northern Training Area
located in northern Okinawa. For the sake of political consideration,
also included was the Futenma Base (a Marine Corps Air Station)
which is located in the middle of an urban area in central Okinawa.
Although the area of the Futenma Base represented less than 10
percent of the total areas agreed to be returned, it was hoped thatits return would reduce a great deal of the danger, fear and noiseproblems that the local people had long been suffering.
The SACO agreement further included areas which had beenleft untouched due to the requirement for the provision of alternative
facilities, as in the case of Naha Port, and delays in compensation
payments or development of specific plans for the lands to be
returned. The Northern Training Area and Futenma Base in particularwere regarded as keys to the realignment of the US bases.
Nevertheless, their return was conditional on the construction ofalternative facilities within Okinawa Prefecture. Considering thedifficulties in implementing the reduction plan during the first
decade following the reversion, it may be reasonable to argue thatthe feasibility of the SACO agreement is decidedly problematic.
Sixteen years since the agreement was made, today a large
portion of the areas already agreed to be returned remain untouched,with very little land returned and alternative facilities prepared foruse. From the total of 5,002 hectares, the area that has actually
been returned amounts to only 343 hectares or seven percent (as ofMarch 2010). A notable example is the Futenma Base which has
not yet been returned despite previous agreements. The reduction
plan of US bases in Okinawa can be thought of as something like a
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1firework. When it is launched, it looks grandiose. However, its
allure soon fades away in the dark, leaving only smoke. When it isseen from a distance, a dull bang is heard a little while after theallure fades away. To the eyes of the people of Okinawa, the abilityof the US and Japanese governments regarding the realignment of
US bases in Okinawa is only losing its allure.
The Bush administration which came to power in 2001 pursued an“Anything but Clinton” policy, which was particularly apparent
with regard to security policy. In fact, the Bush administration
embarked on a strengthening of US military power almost to theextent witnessed during the Cold War era. This was a policy shift
from “responsive” to “active,” and was aimed at capacity
improvement in order to overwhelm other countries, with aparticular focus on missile defense and special force operations.
The architect of this policy change was the then Secretary of
Defense, Ronald Rumsfeld. It was reported that, when he visited
Okinawa in November 2003 and observed the Futenma Base fromthe air, Rumsfeld recognized the dangers of the base and statedthat it should be closed and the SACO agreement revised (TheMainichi Shimbun, February 13, 2004). Although the Japanese
government subsequently denied his words, the dangers of theFutenma Base are palpable should one actually visit the site andperceive how close it is to residential areas.
The policy change aimed at strengthening US military power
was expanded into a major realignment of US forces abroad. In
this context, discussions between the US and Japanese
governments regarding the US bases in Japan were first initiatedtowards the end of 2003, and gained momentum around the start of2005. In February of that year the two governments held the
US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, or so-called “2 plus
2” meeting, between the Secretaries of State and Defense from the
US side, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the DirectorGeneral of the Defense Agency from the Japanese side, in which a
basic policy was confirmed and work towards realignment
initiated. The outcomes of this meeting were first announced in
October 2005, and then as a Joint Statement on May 1, 2006. The
details of the realignment plan were called the “2006 Roadmap.”
The Roadmap describes the details of the realignment of US
forces in Guam, Okinawa and on the Japanese mainland, which is
to be completed by 2014. It also states that Japan is to be
responsible for 60 percent of the estimated total operational costsof 10.3 billion dollars. This financial agreement was signed as the“Guam International Agreement,” and it was ratified in Japan in
May of the same year. (No ratification was necessary by the US
Congress since the agreement was an administrative agreement.)
Thus, the financial burden on Japan was mortgaged for the cost of
facility and infrastructure development in Guam.
The relocation of the US forces from Okinawa was describedin the “2006 Roadmap” as follows: approximately 8,000 marine
force personnel and their approximately 9,000 family dependents
are to be transferred from Okinawa to Guam; at the same time, theFutenma Base is to be returned after its functions are transferred to
the Camp Schwab area in northern Okinawa where new replacement
facilities should first be constructed through the reclamation of
adjacent marine areas. Regarding the number of personnel to betransferred, the figure that Japan originally suggested was lower which
was 7,000 at the time of the report in 2005, but it was finally decided
as 8,000. This final figure which was suggested from the US side
may imply that there was a lower necessity for a large number ofmarine force personnel to be stationed in Okinawa, since Guamwould henceforth be more appropriate for force deployment as a
US security hub for areas including the western Pacific and theIndian Ocean. The “warrant” for the realignment as claimed by the
US was the threat of an “Arc of Instability.” Nevertheless, thesuspected nuclear development of Iran and the DPRK seems to becontinuing, and the US administration is seeking the withdrawal ofContents
2

US forces from Afghanistan scheduled for 2014 following thattaking place in Iraq. In this context, this “warrant” is no longer
being mentioned. It has already become an “old-fashioned” word.
The US bases in Okinawa that were planned to be reduced in
the “2006 Roadmap” include those that were agreed to be returnedin the SACO agreement but still remain unreturned, and also those
newly added with the condition to prepare alternative facilities in
Okinawa Prefecture and Guam. In other words, both the SACO
agreement and the “2006 Roadmap” include those areas which wereleft unreturned despite their scheduled return and others with acondition to prepare alternative facilities. However, while the former
stipulates the alternative facilities are to be constructed within
Okinawa Prefecture, the latter stipulates the alternative sites are to bein Okinawa Prefecture and Guam. The US and Japanese governments
are only repeating the still unrealized relocation plan which has been
deadlocked due to the requirement for the provision of alternative
facilities, with some newly added bases also to be returned.
The realignment brought forward under Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld began coming apart due to the issue of the financial
burden on the US that was set out in the Guam International
Agreement. While Japan accepted its own financial burden, therationality of that for the US was questioned in the US Congress
where the agreement was not put on the table for ratification. As aresult, the expenditure was cut from the budget for the 2012 US
fiscal year, leading to the suspension of the relocation plan itself.
On February 8, 2012, the US and Japanese governments
announced that they had agreed to revise the “2006 Roadmap” inorder to break this deadlock. This marks six years since the conclusionof the Roadmap which targeted the completion of relocation by
2014, and 16 years since the SACO agreement. Notwithstanding
the recent announcement, as discussed earlier, only a small fractionof the US bases in Okinawa have been reduced since the SACO
agreement, and with the Futenma Base also left unreturned, thelives of the residents in the vicinity are still endangered.
Since the announcement, the media has begun to report thepossible contents of the revisions that the Noda and Obamaadministrations were likely to make. According to these reports, thetwo governments were going to announce part of the revision on April
25. Nevertheless, this was postponed since agreement by the US
Congress had not been obtained. The revised contents that were
expected to be announced included the provision that, while the
Futenma Base would remain in use for the time being, the US bases
in Okinawa would be returned either immediately, or after the transferof the marine forces to Guam, or after the construction of alternative
facilities elsewhere within Okinawa Prefecture. The bases to be
returned are all included in the SACO agreement and the “2006Roadmap” which have been left unreturned to date. Moreover, it issaid that these bases which were originally split into five slots for
return will be further split into smaller pieces numbering a total of 13.
Since the reversion of Okinawa, the realignment and reduction of
US bases in Okinawa has long been a major issue, and the US andJapanese governments have concluded several agreements in thepast. However, it has not yet been realized. The reasons for this arethat the Japanese government does not firmly demand it, the planencounters opposition from the US military, and that the sites foralternative facilities which are required for relocation are confined
to within Okinawa Prefecture, especially on its main island.
Moreover, it is also the responsibility of the Japanese people whohave consistently overlooked the timid stance of their own
government regarding this issue. The consequences of politics
should be solved by politics. What we see now, however, is solelythat justice has been lost.
Director of the International Institute for Okinawan Studies,
the University of the Ryukyus

Forty Years since the Reversion of Okinawa: Where Has Justice Gone?
Masaaki Gabe… …………………………………………………… 1-2
A Visit to Kaminoseki after 3/11
Masae Yuasa… ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3
What Are the Intentions of North Korea?
Yeongho Kim……………………………………………………………………………………………… 4-5
My Approach to Peace Studies Vol. 2“Viewing the World by Uncovering ‘Hidden Realities’: No Peace without Justice”
Nobuo Kazashi… ……………………………… 6-7
Diary………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 8

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.15 No.1, July 2012

A Visit to Kaminoseki
after 3/11
Masae Yuasa

In September last year, I visited Kaminoseki Town in the Kumage
District of Yamaguchi Prefecture, where an electoral campaign for
mayor was approaching its end. Kaminoseki is a quiet fishing town
surrounded by the Seto Inland Sea. The town area extends to thesouth part of the Muroto Peninsula and islands. From the ceter ofthe nearest city Yanai it takes at least half an hour by car to reachNagashima, the largest island connected to the peninsula by abridge, where its town hall is situated.
I saw a group of seven or eight middle-aged men sitting onstone steps at the port near the town hall. They looked as though
they were enjoying their chat under the clear, blue autumn sky. The
laid-back atmosphere of a small fishing town was soon broken bya loud voice from a speaker attached to a campaign car. As the carof the incumbent Mayor Kashiwabara approached, the old men
slowly stood up and waved their hands to welcome him. Threeelderly women who were sitting on chairs across the road did thesame. They had apparently gathered outside to welcome thecandidate back to his office after a full day of campaigning. The
candidate replied by repeating a formula phrase. “Thank you. I will
do my best.” After seeing off the campaign car, the men driftedaway and the women sat back down and began chatting again.
The recent mayoral election marked the ninth time since thetown mayor first presented a bid on a nuclear power plant plannedby the Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc. (Chuden) in 1982. During
the past three decades, the residents of the town have been split
into two groups over the plan. The central force of the opposing
side is led by the residents of Iwaishima, which is a small island
four kilometers from the planned construction site, Tanoura, acrossthe sea. From Iwaishima, Tanoura is in full view, although it wasinvisible from any other area of the whole of Kaminoseki Town
due to the mountains that lie in between. It means the residents
will have to live literally “facing” the nuclear power plant everyday. It is said that the residents have had doubts about the “safety”
of the nuclear power plant from the beginning because quite a few
men from the island who had worked at nuclear power plants inother prefectures revealed the reality of radiation effects on plant
workers and the dangers of nuclear power plants.
This led to a decades-long opposition movement in order toprotect the lives of the residents and the indispensable naturalenvironment, such as fishing grounds and the wider ecosystem.
Their past actions include the “Monday demonstration” which hastaken place over 1,000 times, formal visits to appeal to Chuden
and Yamaguchi Prefecture as well as the central government, sit-in
protests at the construction site, lawsuits, and elections. The
opposition movement has now become their lifework.
Nevertheless, their voices reached neither Chuden, the central
government, nor Japanese citizens. In 2009 Chuden submitted an
application to construct nuclear reactors to the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry. It was a serious setback for the
movement but the Fukushima nuclear accident has turned the tide.
Chuden had to halt its landfill work. This gave the movement a
hope of winning the recent mayoral election, although in the past,
the eight candidates from the opposition group had all lost.
I asked the three elderly women whether they thought theconstruction would actually happen. They answered, “We don’tknow, but whatever the outcome, we won’t be around to see it.” Theoldest among them, aged 94, lives alone in a house in front of theport. She looked happy when she talked about her granddaughter
who commutes from Hikari City to a fishery cooperative in
Kaminoseki, and has lunch with her every day. The town has serious
aging and depopulation problems: about 50 percent of the population
is over 65 and the number of residents has halved over the past 30
years and stands at only 3,500 today. With reduced fishing catches
and no new industries coming in, the plan for a nuclear power
plant has been regarded as the key to the future development of
Kaminoseki. The town has to date received 4.5 billion yen from thecentral government in the form of subsidies for the construction ofa nuclear power plant, and another 2.4 billion yen from Chuden as
a donation. Such “nuclear power plant money” was partly spent on
the construction of a luxurious public bathing facility costing 900
million yen as a tourist resource. But it is also indispensable to thedaily lives of the people of Kaminoseki. It has been used forbuilding or maintaining a community meeting place, a dental
clinic, and also to cover the costs of nurses and a local bus service.
A townsman who I met at one of the few sightseeing spots,
Shikairo, said with resentment, “Even children now know that
nuclear power plants are dangerous.” Nevertheless, he said that hecould not vote for the mayoral candidate who opposed the nuclear
power plant because supporting that candidate would meanacknowledging that the nuclear policy of the town for the past 30
years had been a mistake. If Kaminoseki residents admit their own
fault, they cannot demand that the central government and Chuden“take their responsibilities for having tossed Kaminoseki about,”
should the plan be abandoned. According to the man, the damage
that Kaminoseki Town is going to suffer is not only financial but
also psychological. It is not uncommon to find people whosefamilies have split up due to their differing stances towards theplan. If the plan is not realized, he argued that the damage should
be compensated somehow by those who are responsible.
In the end, the election concluded with the victory of
Kashiwabara who supports the construction. His share of the votes
was 67.4 percent, which was the highest amongst any of the former
candidates. Despite this record-breaking figure, those residents who
voted for him apparently had various reasons for doing so. According
to a survey conducted by The Chugoku Shimbun at five polling
stations, among supporters of Kashiwabara, 20.7 percent answered“against” or “no opinion” when asked about the construction plan.
In the prefectural assembly last June, Governor Nii of
Yamaguchi Prefecture stated that he had no intention of extending
the permission for Chuden to reclaim the land necessary for theplant, which expires in October 2012; in that case, a nuclear power
plant can no longer be constructed on the proposed site. Hisannouncement was made after 11 out of 13 municipal assemblies
within the prefecture submitted written statements expressing theirconcern about the Kaminoseki construction plan, following therecent nuclear accident in Fukushima. It should be noted, however,that Governor Nii added the words “for the time being” to theabove statement and he stressed that he would cooperate with thecentral government in its energy policy and also respect the local
policy of Kaminoseki. Moreover, when the aforementioned
permission expires in October, Nii will have retired and, therefore,
will no longer have responsibility for actually putting his words
into effect. At the same time, when he assumed the post lastSeptember, Prime Minister Noda stated that construction of a new
nuclear power plant is “realistically speaking, difficult.” However,in March this year he showed a flexible stance, stating that there
could be instances in which decisions could be made on a case-bycase basis. In the same month, Kaminoseki Town gave permission
to Chuden for continuous occupancy of the coastal area of Tanoura
where the construction of the plant is being prepared. Although it
has not been specified when the actual start of construction would
take place, Chuden is maintaining its intention to push the planforward while “asking for the understanding of local residents.”
In the meantime, those who oppose the plan are continuing
their battle. Four people have been sued for 47.92 million yen indamages for disrupting the landfilling process. One of the four, an
Iwaishima resident, says with determination that he regrets nothing
about the previous 30 years of painful struggle because the issue
concerns a matter of life and death. His battle indeed relates to all
the lives of those people who have been involved in the past, allliving things alive now, and those that are yet to be born.
The tremendous damage caused by the Fukushima nuclear
accident seems to be challenging each individual living in
Hiroshima to ask what should be done about the nuclear power
plant in Kaminoseki, which is planned by Chuden, whose head
office is located in Hiroshima. We need to make a moral judgment
regarding this issue.
Professor at the Faculty of International Studies,
Hiroshima City University

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3What Are the Intentions ofNorth Korea?
Yeongho Kim
North Korea has a peculiar regime which cannot be found in any
other country. That peculiarity is represented by its Juche ideology,
military-first policy, and the recent hereditary power succession
to the third generation. The reason why such a small nation-statedraws attention in East Asia is due to North Korea’s development
and possession of nuclear warheads and long-range missiles.
Nevertheless, as in the case of many other countries, it
seems that North Korea’s behavior stems from not only coercion
but also consensus, and is founded upon not only emotion but
also interests. If this is the case, North Korea’s behavior may beconsidered “rational” which is aimed at proving the legitimacy
of its power.
This paper will examine North Korea’s intentions based ona discussion of the legitimacy of its regime.

The Juche ideology, military-first policy,
and hereditary system
North Korea’s former leader Kim Jong-il, who was the General
Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and also Chairman of
the National Defense Commission of North Korea, passed away
in December 2011 and was succeeded by his third son, Jong-un,
who assumed the posts of First Secretary of the Workers’ Partyand First Chairman of the Defense Commission. According to
Kim Jong-il’s first son, Jong-nam, the late leader once said that
he would not let his sons succeed him. However, a hereditarytransfer of power has taken place for the second time. While theinfluence of Confucianism cannot be denied, the primary factor
which led to this hereditary succession was the importanceplaced upon genealogy.
In North Korea, there has been no experience or idea ofelections, revolution or coup d’état as a means of power transfer.
The only possible warrant for power transfer was, as was the casewhen Kim Jong-il succeeded Kim Il-sung, the “brilliant succession
to the Juche cause.” In other words, the legitimacy of powertransfer was given to hereditary succession based on genealogy.
While the warrant for power succession is genealogy, thatfor the use of power is the Juche ideology which emphasizes
self-reliance in terms of philosophy, politics, economy anddefense. This unique ideology emanates from North Korea’s
aversion to the Sadae ideology, or diplomatic policy of asubservient attitude, which was applied in modern Korea. In
particular, this stance was a consequence of taking a balance
between China and the USSR which were antagonistic towards
each other during the 1960s. It can be argued that Juche
represented a means to survive amid the antagonism between
these two communist powers. It is noteworthy that the aversion
to Sadae and inclination towards Juche was also observed inSouth Korea in the Cold War era, during which the southern halfof the Korean Peninsula was under an authoritarian rule, as
revealed by statements of Park Chung-hee.
Kim Jong-il further elevated the Juche ideology, which was
originally developed by Kim Il-sung, to the nation’s “soleideological system.” In the 1980s, it was further formulated into
the “concept of a socio-political living organism.” This concept
holds that the Leader of the nation-state is the brain, theWorkers’ Party the nervous system, and the people are the body.
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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.15 No.1, July 2012

It also holds that while the life of a person’s body is finite, thatof the socio-political organism is eternal whose existence is
inseparable from the Leader and the Party. During the first three
years following Kim Il-sung’s death and power succession by
Kim Jong-il in 1994, North Korea was hit by flood disasters andeconomic turmoil. At that time, Kim Jong-il announced a new
slogan under which he attempted to overcome the economic
difficulties through military and spiritual strength. The name ofthe slogan was “the Arduous March” which was modeled on that
undertaken by anti-Japanese partisans led by Kim Il-sungthrough a freezing blizzard.
The end of the “Arduous March” campaign was announced
at the close of the 1990s; nevertheless, the military-first policy
was not abandoned. Rather, it was strengthened so that “themilitary represents the people, the nation-state and the Party.”
Furthermore, the new 2009 Constitution stipulates that the Juche
ideology and the military-first policy are North Korea’s official
state ideology. Thus, the military-first policy was elevated to themilitary-first “ideology” to which an equally high importance
was attached as the Juche ideology, and North Korea’s statesystem became a “military-first regime.”
Why does North Korea still cling to the “military-first
ideology”? The first reason for this is that North Korea
apparently intended to utilize the military to block the spillover
effects of democratization occurring abroad, such as the collapseof the Eastern Bloc and the Tiananmen Incident in China. North
Korea attributed the collapse or weakening of the socialist statesystem in these countries to the fact that their militaries
maintained a neutral position in domestic politics.
The second reason is North Korea’s strong suspicions offoreign culture which may accompany the globalization of themarket economy and external pressure for a “peacefultransition” of the North Korean political system. The Sunshine
Policy which was first implemented by South Korea in 1998
was, for instance, firmly rejected by the North as a“philosophical and cultural infiltration of imperialism.”
The third reason is North Korea’s strong fear of the US
which initiated wars against Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and2003 respectively. This fear of the US dashed hopes for anormalization of North Korea’s diplomatic relations which had
arisen during occasions such as the Inter-Korean Summit andreciprocal visits of US and North Korean high officials in 2000,
and also the Japan-North Korea Summit in 2002.
In modern times, economic development and income
distribution, or “people’s lives” in the North Korean sense, areindispensable factors for the legitimacy of political power.
People’s lives are naturally of great importance to the legitimacyof the North Korean regime. In fact, Kim Il-sung once said that
he hoped his people could “have white rice and meat soup,” andthese words were taken by Kim Jong-il as important “teachings”
of his father. As a consequence, the son set the political goal of“improving people’s lives” which was attempted by means of“reform and opening up” of the country several times in the past.
Notwithstanding this however, why is North Korea developing
nuclear warheads and long-range missiles, and leaving its people
to starve?

Development of nuclear warheads andlong-range missiles
In North Korea, there is an acute shortage of energy, theoperating ratio of factories is extremely low, military equipment
is far from adequate, and military training is ineffective. As
such, energy is vital to the North Korean economy. Therefore
the continued nuclear development can be seen as coming about
as a result of a weighted allocation of resources. It may be more
precise to say that North Korea continues its nuclear
development not “despite” but “because of” economic collapse.
Why then does it concentrate resources on nuclear
development instead of economic improvement itself? This isdue to the military might of the US and its security allianceswith South Korea and Japan which pose a great threat to thesurvival, not to mention the prosperity, of North Korea.
When North Korea is seen on a map that is turned upside
down, it is palpable that the country is surrounded on three sides
by South Korea, Japan and the US, both by land and by sea.
China and Russia which now lie below North Korea on the map
do not play for it the role that the US does for South Korea andJapan. Both the Yellow Sea (or the West Sea in Korean) to theright of the country and the Sea of Japan (or the East Sea in
Korean) to the left are frequently venues for US-South Korea or
US-Japan joint military exercises. North Korea is militarily
surrounded, with its “frontline” on the sea being the area where
the recent sinking of the corvette Cheonan and military attack on
Yeonpyeong Island occurred. This area lies only 100 kilometersfrom both Pyongyang and Seoul, and is only slightly farther than
10 kilometers off the nearest coastline of North Korea.
The threat that North Korea likely feels may be appreciatedby imagining a similar scenario for Tokyo. China and Russia
have recently implemented joint military exercises in the Yellow
Sea. Had these exercises taken place only 100 kilometers from
Tokyo, and also joined by North Korea, and these three statesstaged joint military operations which included nuclear attacks,
Japan would almost certainly have got into an incomparably
greater panic than that which occurred in the aftermath of North
Korea’s recent satellite test. Such is the threat that North Korea
may feel regarding joint military exercises by the US, Japan andSouth Korea, or possible preemptive, or even nuclear, attacks
carried out by the US.
The Korean Peninsula, as well as Japan, is surrounded by
nuclear superpowers, and North Korea has been a target of
possible nuclear and preemptive attacks by the US, whether
independently or in cooperation with South Korea or Japan. On
the other hand, North Korea’s military capability is far fromcomparable to that of the US, even though it possesses Nodong
missiles. This means that the threat to North Korea posed by the
US, Japan and South Korea is far greater than vice versa. Thiscan be seen as a “threat imbalance.” Moreover, the US has
recently carried out preemptive attacks and the overthrow ofregimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite its often provocative
announcements, North Korea may well have been intimidated
by these military actions by the US.
One may argue that the military operations of the US,
Japan and South Korea are defensive actions unlike thosecarried out by North Korea. This argument may not necessarily
be valid when one considers the US “nuclear umbrella.” The useof the word “umbrella” may give the impression that it has someform of protective function like a “shield,” since an umbrellaprotects its user from the rain or the rays of the sun. However,the “nuclear umbrella” is merely one side of the same coin thatis nuclear policy, with the other side being the “reliable nuclear

deterrence.” In this respect, the “nuclear umbrella” is actually
not a “shield” but a “spear.” Therefore, it is not accurate to argue
that North Korea is offensive and the US, Japan and South
Korea are defensive, nor vice versa.
North Korea stresses that the nuclear issue on the Korean
Peninsula was caused not by its own nuclear development, butby the US’ deployment of nuclear weapons and its antagonistic
diplomacy since the 1950s. It is hard to deny this assertion.
Although no nuclear weapon was used during the Korean War,North Korea suffered indiscriminate bombings and to this date,it has been exposed to the constant nuclear threat posed by the
US. The US, Japan and South Korea have their respective
collective memories relating to past wars, whether they focus on
the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the attack on
Pearl Harbor, the Vietnam War or the colonization of the
Korean Peninsula. North Korea similarly has its own collective
memories. Since any nation-state pursues its survival as well as
prosperity, it may be natural to assume that North Korea ispressing forward with nuclear development for the sake ofsurvival, reflecting the threat imbalance and the country’s
memories of former wars.
At the same time, as the foreign policy of a nation-state canbe either hawkish or dovish, for the sake of its survival that ofNorth Korea can also be either of the two. In fact, the second
Japan-North Korea Summit in 2004, a series of agreements
made in the Six-Party Talks since 2005, and the second InterKorean Summit in 2007 represent dovish actions, while North
Korea’s missile and nuclear testing in 2006 and 2009 are
hawkish. Despite such a possibility for dovish behavior, missile
tests conducted by North Korea face criticism and sanction,
while no similar criticism is made regarding those conducted by
the non-signatories of the NPT, India and Pakistan. This double
standard is attributable primarily to the troubled political
relationship that exists between North Korea and the US whichfurther leads to the former’s hawkish behavior. Therefore, it canbe argued that such hawkish behavior does not necessarily
amount to reckless provocation, but is rather derived from apursuit of survival and sovereignty which is intended to support
the legitimacy of the state.
Nevertheless, it is still true that the continued pursuit ofnuclear power and missiles by North Korea will undermine
efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation, further aggravate
US-North Korea relations, and destabilize the East Asian region.
The US and North Korea have been in conflict for the sake of“peace” or for the purpose of “nuclear deterrence,” and othercountries in the region have been fearing that this antagonism
will lead to actual armed conflict.
In order to have North Korea choose dovish, instead of hawkish,
behavior in pursuit of survival and prosperity, the related parties
are also required to choose not only hawkish but also dovishbehavior towards their “enemy.” More specifically, in order toachieve common security in East Asia, the armistice agreementof the Korean War needs to be changed to a peace accord, andcomprehensive denuclearization pursued which requires efforts
towards denuclearization not only from North Korea but also
from the US, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia. Although
this may sound like a cliché, such efforts should produce far
lower risk and cost than continuing to live with the decades-longcease-fire coupled with the risk of incidental armed conflict
which could be caused by the “game of nuclear chicken” or ofregime change facilitated by force of arms.
Professor at the Faculty of International Studies,
Hiroshima City University

Visit HPI’s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/modules/peace_e/index.php

5My Approach to Peace Studies

Vol. 2

While specializing in contemporary philosophy, Professor Nobuo Kazashi of Kobe University has for many years
been involved in various Hiroshima-based activities that call for peace. On this occasion, Professor Kazashi who
has previously taught at Hiroshima City University will discuss his personal activities which are the implementationof what is known as “exposure” in the field of Peace Studies.

Viewing the World by Uncovering “Hidden Realities”:
No Peace without JusticeNobuo Kazashi
Hiroshima as a place for “exposure”“Exposure” is an approach advocated in Peace Studies by which
one explores a way of solving issues through actually entering
problematic areas and exposing oneself to that reality. In thisrespect, Hiroshima is a unique place for “exposure” since one
may have opportunities to look into not only the city itself, butalso the wider world through encounters with various people in
Hiroshima. I have felt this on many occasions since moving tothis A-bombed city in April 1994 as a member of the teaching
staff at the newly-established Hiroshima City University.
The recent nuclear accident in Fukushima seems to call into
question the roles that Peace Studies can actually play in society.
Witnessing the still unforeseeable, unstable and perilous
situation regarding the nuclear power plants, and having Peace
Studies not as my core research area, I cannot help but hesitate
discussing “my approach to Peace Studies.” Nevertheless, I
would like to relate my experiences of being involved in various
Hiroshima-based activities directed towards peace, or
experiences of “exposure,” during the past ten years or so in thehope that by doing so I can make my humble contribution.

Peace education and differences at the individual level:
the atomic bombings and the Holocaust
When I was in charge of a course entitled “Contemporary
Thought” at Hiroshima City University, I often encounteredsurprising comments from students. At the university, more thanhalf of the students come from Hiroshima City and have received“peace education” in some form or another. These students are
surprised to hear that students from other prefectures have notexperienced “peace education” at schools as they have.
This is an example of difference in perception. Whatfurther surprised me was that even students from Hiroshima
have varying perspectives regarding so-called “A-bomb/peaceeducation.” Some students saw the crucial importance of sucheducation and hold dreams of working globally, such as for theUnited Nations. At the same time, quite a few others confessedthat through “A-bomb education,” they had been simply
overwhelmed by the woefulness of the atomic bombings and theseverity of nuclear issues, and that the learning had left themwith something of a negative psychological impression.

6

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.15 No.1, July 2012

Moreover, there were even some students who said that theirteachers were “not serious.” To their eyes, the teachers seemed
to be only teaching what they had been told to do, and thestudents doubted whether the teachers themselves were actuallyseeking a means towards solving nuclear issues. I myself knowof some teachers who are highly motivated and continuously
seek ways to improve their teaching methods. However, it might
often become difficult for adults, who have got more or lessused to the reality of the nuclear age, to understand the crueltyof being instilled with an apocalyptic image about the earth
which might be destroyed in a nuclear war, and thereby being
deprived of a sense of unconditional trust in this world.
I pondered about a similar difficulty when I coordinated agathering for Israeli writers and researchers in autumn 1999. I
learned that in Israel education about the Holocaust is given
significant weight in a similar respect as “A-bomb education” inHiroshima and all students are required to visit the Holocaust
History Museum in Jerusalem, and most importantly that each
student receives psychological support from counselors both
before and after the visits.1

Depleted uranium (DU) ammunition:
the military use of nuclear waste
After I moved to Kobe University in October 2001, my activities
in Hiroshima calling for peace further intensified. This cameabout as a direct result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The then US
President George W. Bush declared that if necessary he would
not refrain from ordering a preemptive nuclear attack, so theworld became further endangered by the threat of nuclear war.
In response to this, between late April and early May 2002 a
Hiroshima-Nagasaki anti-nuclear delegation for peace wasorganized which visited New York and some other cities in the
US. Having received Takashi Morizumi’s book, Children of the
Gulf War, from a friend prior to leaving Japan, I spoke about
issues relating to DU ammunition at an anti-nuclear symposium
held at American University in Washington, DC. But this event
made me realize the need for English publications about DU.
Upon returning from the US, I asked some of my friends towork together to publish an English version of Morizumi’s book.2
DU is nuclear waste which is a byproduct of the productionof enriched uranium that can be used for nuclear weapons and innuclear power plants. There is an enormous amount of nuclear
waste around the world totaling over 1.5 million tons, and, as
everyone knows, how to dispose of this material has become avery serious problem. In the US studies were started, and one of
the “solutions” was to use it in weapons. Because it is both very
hard and heavy, DU is regarded as “ideal” material for
penetrators of anti-tank rounds. Moreover, because it is nuclear
waste, it can be obtained without incurring a financial burden on
the military industry.
However, DU burns spontaneously on impact producing andemitting particles into the air, and these particles are highly toxic
and possess approximately 60 percent of the radiation of naturaluranium, with a half-life of 4.5 billion years. If DU particles enter
the cells in the human body, those cells as well as surrounding
ones will be exposed to alpha rays, causing internal exposure toradiation. At the same time, unexploded DU shells corrode andcontaminate the surrounding area. In fact, in the Gulf War
approximately 800,000 thirty-millimeter shells each containing
about 300 grams of DU were used, and consequently over 300
tons of DU was dispersed into the environment. Such immoral
munitions are being used in contemporary war.3 Subsequently,
there has been an increase in the number of sufferers of cancer
and congenital abnormality which are likely to have been caused
by DU shells used not only on battlefields but also militarytraining sites around the world and in production facilities in the
US. Consequently, the indiscriminate damage that DU shells can
inflict on the human body and the environment has caused theseweapons to be regarded as inhumane weapons and become thesubject of international debate.

The most severely damaged are children
Towards the end of 2002 when the outbreak of war in Iraq was
becoming more likely, two medical doctors travelled all the way
from Iraq to Japan. The two doctors, Dr. Jawad al-Ali of Basrah
University and Dr. Hussam al-Jormakly of Baghdad University,
also came to Hiroshima. The visit was made as a result of theirdesperate hope that the use of more DU shells in future war must
be avoided at all costs in order to avoid a further increase insufferers.
In response to their appeal, a “citizens’ investigation & peacedelegation” was organized in mid-December of that year, and wevisited Iraq in order to see for ourselves the damage caused by
DU. Responding to an appeal by photo-journalist Naomi
Toyoda, the delegation consisted of 16 members who included
people born in Hiroshima and residents of the city such as Ms.
Haruko Moritaki. During the 10-day stay in Baghdad and Basra,
our days started early in the morning and ended late at night. We
visited local hospitals and schools, and had opportunities toexchange opinions with local government officials and NGO
members. One of the most memorable occasions was a visit to
the “tank graveyard” where DU-destroyed and highly
contaminated tanks have been dumped.
In Baghdad, we visited Al-Mansour Children’s Hospital,
which was filled with an unusual, heavy atmosphere quite
different to that in the surrounding city. The dim hospital was
full of children who were lying in bed, accompanied by theirfamilies. Doctors took us to each ward where we were greetedby the mostly quiet family members of the patients. They seemed
to be begging us to pass on what we saw there to the world –– thereality that small children were suffering and dying.
Unlike the majority of the families, however, we also met amother who raised her voice, “Many foreigners have been here
and taken photos, but that has made no change at all!” All we
could do was accept her sorrow and anger without a word. On

the other hand, some other mothers were willing to have theirdying children photographed, or welcomed us with smiles andreceived the paper cranes and toys we had brought for them.
On March 2, 2003, in Hiroshima, 6,000 people gathered toform the human letters “NO WAR, NO DU!” and out of its
organizing committee the “NO DU Hiroshima Project” wasbegun in June of the same year.4 Four months later, in October,
we became more committed to the anti-DU campaign byparticipating in the launch of the International Coalition to Ban
Uranium Weapons (ICBUW).

Dilemma between common sense andinternational politics
On May 3 last year, a gathering took place in Hiroshima under
the title “The Iraq War and Inhumane Weapons: Eight Years
since the Iraq War,” with three medical doctors from Fallujah
General Hospital in Iraq. In Fallujah, located 50 kilometers westof Baghdad, intense attacks by the US took place in 2004.
Consequently, the incidence of congenital abnormality and otherserious diseases showed an alarming increase. In November 2009
The Guardian reported that local medical doctors were deeply
shocked by the severity of the situation and were pleading forhelp from international society,5 and, in April of the following
year, it was reported that the WHO had finally announced thatthey would carry out an independent investigation in Iraq.
While their report on the real situation in Iraq was shocking,
Dr. Samira al-Ani expressed her gratitude to “Japanese people
who continued to help the people of Fallujah while the world
seemed to have forgotten us.” She also expressed “a hope for the
future of my hometown, Fallujah,” which she “could feel for the
first time after seeing Hiroshima which has achieved an
unbelievable recovery.” Less than a week later, however, theGreat East Japan Earthquake and the nuclear accident inFukushima occurred, and the three Iraqi doctors were forced toreturn to their country in the middle of their training in Tokyo.
The UN General Assembly adopted DU-related resolutionsin 2007, 2008 and 2010. Nevertheless, these resolutions are notdemanding a ban on the use of DU weapons, but are merely
requesting opinions on the issue from each member state andaffiliated organization. This is a great disappointment for me,
especially as I have long been involved in the international antiDU campaign together with my colleagues from Hiroshima. In
the international political arena it is not easy to gain approval forthe common-sensical “precautionary principle.” However, theDU issue should be reconsidered as part of the entire “nuclear
cycle” and some solution must be found for it: next year marks
the 10th anniversary of the Iraq War.6
Professor at Kobe University /Director of “NO DU Hiroshima Project”
1 For related information, please refer to Nobuo Kazashi, The 21st Century for
Philosophy: The First Step from Hiroshima, Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Culture
Foundation, 1999.
2 This 34-page publication was circulated across the world by those people who weredeeply concerned about the DU issue. The number of its copies exceeded 20,000.
3 Hiroaki Koide, “Why DU weapons must definitely be banned: Uranium is toxic” inNobuo Kazashi, Katsumi Furitsu and Haruko Moritaki ed., Towards a World without
Uranium Weapons: Challenges Taken by ICBUW, Tokyo: Godo-shuppan, 2008.
4 For more details, please refer to Hiroshima Appeal for Banning DU Weapons,
Hiroshima: NO DU Hiroshima Project, Aug. 2003. The number of copies of thispublication, in Japanese and English altogether, reached nearly 20,000.
5 On Mar. 4 of the following year, the BBC also reported the same story, but it was
accompanied by a statement, “It has been suggested that they used white
phosphorus and shells tipped with depleted uranium during the conflict [inFallujah in 2004], but this has not been proven.”
6 For more details of the anti-DU campaign, please visit the following website:
http://icbuw-hiroshima.org/

Visit HPI’s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/modules/peace_e/index.php

7March 1 ‒ June 30, 2012

◆Mar. 1 Robert Jacobs facilitates, as part of his Global
Hibakusha Project, a dialogue on Skype between students from
the Marshall Islands and Hiroshima City University (HCU) about
hibakusha issues, held at HCU.
◆Mar. 15-19 Narayanan Ganesan attends the Annual Conferenceof the Association for Asian Studies and participates in aroundtable discussion on recent developments in Myanmar, heldin Toronto, Canada.
◆Mar. 20 HPI Vice-President Kazumi Mizumoto gives lecture“What to Learn from the Study Tour to Cambodia” at a review
session of the Study Tour to Cambodia organized by theHiroshima International Center (HIC), held at HIC.
◆Mar. 22 Mizumoto serves as the Vice-Chair at the 11th
meeting of the Exhibition Review Committee of the Hiroshima
Peace Memorial Museum, held at the museum.
◆Mar. 23 Mizumoto attends a meeting of the “reconstruction
and peacebuilding” section of “A Hiroshima for Global Peace”
Plan, organized by Hiroshima Prefecture, held at the Hiroshima
Prefectural Office.
◆Mar. 26 Mizumoto attends the annual meeting of the Advisory
Research Group of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, heldat the International Conference Center Hiroshima.
◆Mar. 28 Mizumoto attends as a Task Force member a meetingon “A Hiroshima for Global Peace” Plan, organized by Hiroshima
Prefecture, held at the Tokyo office of Hiroshima Prefecture.
◆Mar. 31 Makiko Takemoto presents paper “‘Peace’ and Peace
Movements in 20th Century Germany” at the 22nd meeting of
the Society of Modern German History of West Japan, held at
Kagoshima University, Kagoshima.
Mikyoung Kim presents paper “North Korean Human◆Apr. 1
Rights in East Asia: Issues, Responses and Reactions” at thepanel session “History, Structure, and Norms: Dynamic East Asiaaround the Korean Peninsula” during the Annual Convention of
the International Studies Association, held in San Diego, CA, US.
◆Apr. 2Sung Chull Kim presents paper “Quasi-Alliance, USIntervention, and Domestic Politics: Controversies between
Japan and South Korea” at the panel session “The Role ofAlliances in Foreign Policy” during the Annual Convention of
the International Studies Association, held in San Diego, CA, US.
▽Mikyoung Kim gives special lecture “North Korean Refugees
in East Asia” at the Center for Asia and Pacific Studies, San
Diego State University, San Diego, CA, US.
◆Apr. 4-14 Ganesan conducts field research in Yangon, Myanmar.
◆Apr. 17 Mizumoto attends a meeting of the “reconstruction
and peacebuilding” section of “A Hiroshima for Global Peace”
Plan, organized by Hiroshima Prefecture, held at the Hiroshima
Prefectural Office.
◆Apr. 27 Mizumoto attends a meeting on human resource
development for reconstruction and peacebuilding of “A
Hiroshima for Global Peace” Plan, organized by Hiroshima
Prefecture, held at the Hiroshima Prefectural Office.
◆May 2 Mizumoto gives lecture “Hiroshima and the Danger of
Nuclear Weapons” to a group of Japanese and American students
on the California University Program of Meiji Gakuin University,
held at Aster Plaza, Hiroshima.
◆May 3 Akihiro Kawakami gives lecture “The Peace

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS● Published by● Printed by

8

Constitution: Tested and Challenged” at a meeting organized by
the Prefectural Association of Kumamoto Citizens to Protect thePeace Constitution, held in Kumamoto.
◆May 12 Mizumoto gives lecture “The Meaning of Studying
the Hiroshima Experience” at the Hiroshima Peace Forumorganized by the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, held atthe Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
◆May 12-13 Mizumoto and Sung Chull Kim present papers“The Framework of Northeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free
Zone and its Realization: A Model of Security Cooperation” and“Immigration Policies in East Asia and Related Human Rights
Issues” respectively, at a workshop “An Open Community in
Asia,” sponsored by the One Asia Foundation, held at HPI.
◆May 20 Kawakami gives lecture “3/11 and Local Autonomy /Decentralization” at a meeting organized by the Hiroshima
Prefectural Headquarters of the All-Japan Prefectural andMunicipal Workers Union, held at Workpia Hiroshima.
◆May 21-29 Ganesan conducts a research trip to Bangkok,
Chiang Mai and Mae Hong Son Province of Thailand toinvestigate exiled Myanmar ethnic communities.
◆May 29-Jun. 1 Mikyoung Kim participates in the Convention
for Overseas Council Members of the National Unification
Advisory Council of the Republic of Korea, held in Seoul, Korea.
◆Jun. 4-10		 Ganesan participates as a member of a training
team in a workshop on peace and reconciliation in Naypyidaw,
Myanmar.
◆Jun. 7 Mikyoung Kim gives lecture “Japan’s Nuclear
Pacifism: Seen from the Post-3/11 Perspective” to members of
the Jinju City branch of the National Unification Advisory
Council of the Republic of Korea, held in Fukuoka.
◆Jun. 18-30 G a n e s a n p a r t i c i p a t e s a s a m e m b e r o f a n
international team in a training session for Myanmar academics
and civil servants on public policy and Southeast Asianinternational relations, held in Yangon, Myanmar.
◆Jun. 22-26 Mikyoung Kim participates in the inauguralconference of the “Beyond the Korean War” project, sponsoredby the University of Cambridge and organized by Yonsei
University, held in Seoul, Korea.
◆Jun. 26 Mizumoto gives special lecture “The Current Stateand Tasks of Peace Research” at a training program for Level II
Certified Nursing Administrators organized by the Hiroshima
Nursing Association, held at the association.
——Visitors——◆Mar. 6 Rotary Peace Fellows from the ICU Rotary Peace
Center.
◆Mar. 8 Deputy Secretary General Huaifan Chen and fourother members from the Chinese People’s Association for Peaceand Disarmament.
◆Mar. 29 Professor Carole J. Petersen, Director of the Spark M.
Matsunaga Institute for Peace & Conflict Resolution, theUniversity of Hawaii at Manoa.
◆May 18 Associate Professors Kyoko Amano and Cheryl Shore,and students from the University of Indianapolis, IN, US.

Vol.15 No.1（July 25, 2012）

Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University（Editor: Yuko Takahashi）
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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.15 No.1, July 2012

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