HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS
Hiroshima Peace Institute Vol.6 No.3 March 2004

Cycles of Retaliation and Hate
The title of this essay immediately brings to mind several ongoing cases,
which all serve to prove and illustrate the degree of intractability of suchcycles.
Exhibits Ⅰ
The conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, for example,
dates back to the late 19th century, one cycle reaching a peak in the
mid-1930s, long before the founding of Israel as an independent Jewish
state in 1948. The latest cycle has not only continued right up to today,
but has intensified, especially after the onset of the first Intifada in thelate 1980s, claiming thousands of lives on both sides.
The recurrent clashes between the Protestant unionists and Catholic
nationalists in Northern Ireland date from the Irish uprisings against
British colonial rule in the 1910s, long preceding the founding of thesemi-autonomous Irish state “Eire” in 1937, and the independent
Republic of Ireland in 1949. The latest cycle, triggered by violent
clashes in 1969, took a toll of several thousand lives on both sides before
it was brought to an end, or so it appeared, by the 1998 peace accord.
The advances made by hard-liners on both sides in the November 2003
Northern Ireland Assembly elections now threaten to unravel the peaceaccord and lead to yet another cycle of unbridled violence anddestruction.
A further example that comes to mind even more readily than eitherof the above-mentioned cases is the United States’ “War on Terrorism.”
This multidirectional war has now been waged for nearly two decades:
against Libya in 1986 following the terrorist bombing of a Berlin disco;against Iraq in 1993 in response to an alleged attempt on former
President Bush’s life; and against Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 inretaliation for the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
The action taken against Afghanistan and Sudan marked a dramatic shift
in U.S. war policy: for the first time, with President Clinton’s personalauthorization, preemptive strikes were launched against targets within
the territories of nations that appeared to have little directly to do withthe events triggering those strikes. The new policy was implemented
with a vengeance in the wake of 9/11, when U.S. and British forces
embarked on a ferocious military campaign against the alleged culprit,
Osama bin Laden and his supporters and protectors, first in Afghanistan
and later in Iraq. The coalition forces, however, have not only failed to
win a decisive victory in either military theater, but appear to havebecome bogged down in a war of attrition with steadily mounting costsin terms of their own lives, money and morale, as well as those of theirenemies.
Theoretical Explanations and Insights
An endless exchange of fire and destruction should strike mostpeople as totally senseless and irrational. War is, as has been saidcountless times, a “lose-lose” game. Why, then, do people play the gameso often? An intuitively plausible explanation to this paradox would bethat people are more emotional than rational and prone to act against
their own best interests. If that is the case, war must be accepted as anormal state of inter-human and inter-state relations.

CONTENTS
Cycles of Retaliation and Hate by Haruhiro Fukui ………………………………… 1
Why Multilateralism for North Korea’s Nuclear Crisis? by Sung Chull Kim …… 2~3
HPI’s Second Public Lecture Series ………………………………………………… 3
New Findings about the Lucky Dragon by Hiroko Takahashi ……………………… 4
Conflict Prevention Efforts and the Role of Civil Society in Ferghana Valley
by Nobumasa Akiyama ……… 5
Coping with America by Wade Huntley …………………………………………… 6
HPI Research Forum
Non-Proliferation, WMD and Terrorism by Lawrence Scheinman ………………… 7
What is North Korea the Axis of? by Gavan McCormack ………………………… 7
Hello from HPI ……………………………………………………………………… 8
Diary ………………………………………………………………………………… 8

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.3 March 2004

By Haruhiro Fukui
T h e r e a r e , h o w e v e r, s o m e w h a t m o r e s c i e n t i fi c , i . e . ,empirically-tested and proven explanations offered by game theory. In
the classic non-zero-sum game known as the prisoner’s dilemma (PD),endless retaliation may be in fact theoretically rational. In the simplest
form of this game played only once, two players act as an imaginary pairof prisoners arrested for an alleged crime and held in isolation cells.
Each is then told that if he confesses to the crime, while his partner
refuses to do so, he will be granted an immediate release and his partner
will serve 10 years in prison; if both partners confess, each will serve 5
years; if both refuse to confess, each will serve, for lack of evidence,
only 2 years. In this scenario, it would be more in the partners’ common
interest for both of them to refuse to confess, i.e., to cooperate with eachother, and share a 2-year prison term, rather than confess, i.e., betrayeach other (“defect” in the jargon), and end up sharing a 5-year term.
Each would nevertheless choose to confess to avoid serving a 10-year
term in case his partner confesses, or, if his partner refuses to confess,
win his own immediate release and let his partner suffer theconsequences. Since both think and act in the same way, both defect andearn a lesser payoff (5 years) than they could have earned had they
cooperated (2 years). In a one-off game, this paradoxical result(“solution”) is in fact not only a rational one but also the most stableone, known as the Nash equilibrium, in the sense that each player could
only be worse off by unilaterally changing his move from defection tocooperation.
If, however, the game is repeated a number of times, mutual
defection is not necessarily the most rational and stable solution.
According to the results of two series of simulated games played oncomputers by international groups of game theorists, mathematicians,
and economists in the early 1980s, the winning strategy in repeated PD
games is not unconditional defection but “tit for tat” (TFT), which
begins with cooperation in the first round, then imitates the opponent’s
previous move in every subsequent round. This strategy leads tocooperation and a mutually more satisfactory result, i.e., a 2-year prison
term rather than a 5-year term for both players. If this strategy
incorporates additional generosity, so that each player forgives andrefrains from retaliating an opponent’s unintended defection resulting
from an error or incomplete information, it becomes even more
successful.
M u t u a l c o o p e r a t i o n i s n o t t h e N a s h e q u i l i b r i u m bu t aPareto-optimum, i.e., a condition in which either player may increase his
own payoff by unilaterally defecting at his opponent’s expense. It istherefore not as stable as mutual defection in a one-off game; it is,however, a realistic condition and generous TFT (GTFT) represents apromising strategy for real-world “games,” which are nearly always
repeated and in which “players” may, unlike prisoners in isolation cells,
communicate with each other.
Exhibits Ⅱ
The 20-year-long civil war between the Buddhist Sinhalese and the
Hindu Tamils in Sri Lanka may be brought to an end, thanks to theapparent willingness of both sides to employ what amounts to the GTFT
strategy. The Tamil Tigers appear to have given up their demand for an
independent state of their own in the eastern and northern provinces of
the country and the prime minister has agreed to a peace negotiation.
There is hope, though only faint one, that a Pareto-optimum solution
may be ultimately accepted by both sides to put an end to the vicious
circle of mutual defections.
The 20-year-long India-Pakistan war over Kashmir may be also
winding down. The Pakistani prime minister’s call for a cease-fire along
the so-called Line of Control in late 2003 has elicited a positive response
from his Indian counterpart. The Indian government is apparently willingto negotiate with militant separatist local groups in Kashmir as well.
Neither the theoretical explanations and insights nor the real-world
developments sketched above are entirely reassuring. Nonetheless, they
offer us a modicum of hope in a world that seems afflicted almost
perennially with endless and senseless cycles of retaliation and hate.
Fukui is president at HPIVisit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

Why Multilateralism for North Korea’s Nuclear Crisis?
By Sung Chull Kim
In view of the absence of substantial agreement on the North
Korean nuclear crisis at the second six-party talk, held in Beijing in
February this year, it is easy not only to despise North Korea for its
immoral tactics but also to distrust the utility of the six-party talks.
It is an obvious fact that North Korea began violating the 1994
Geneva Agreed Framework through its alleged clandestine
development of a uranium enrichment project and by the
reprocessing of the canistered spent-nuclear fuels. In this respect,
North Korea cannot escape blame. However, we may recognize thenecessity of multilateral approach to the crisis, if we examine why
and how the Agreed Framework failed to thwart North Korea’s
continuing desire for a nuclear weapons project.
The 1994 negotiations between the United States and North
Korea that fi nally yielded the Agreed Framework contained a
crucial shortcoming in terms of the structuring of the interactions
between North Korea, on the one hand, and countries such as
South Korea, Japan, and China on the other that apparently sharedsecurity stakes in Northeast Asia. As a framework of negotiation,
the American tradition of taking a unilateralist approach in thisregion underlay the bilateral talks, with the purpose of freezing
North Korea’s nuclear development. As a result of this approach,Pyongyang strengthened its long-standing perception that theUnited States represented the main link to solving all of its
diplomatic and security-related problems. In fact, however, notonly was the North Korean perception wrong in times of changing
international relations in the region, but also the U.S.-North Korea
bilateral talks precluded the potential capacity of neighboring
countries contributing towards the creation of a better security
environment. The neighboring countries had no leverage withwhich to encourage North Korea to comply with the Agreed
Framework, which was in itself an inclusive agreement even if not
well-documented in its overall implementation.
In particular, despite not having participated in the negotiation
process, South Korea and Japan became contributors towards the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO),
which was to provide North Korea with two light-water reactors bya target date of 2003 in return for Pyongyang’s freezing of the useof its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors. For different reasons,South Korea and Japan were practicing checkbook diplomacy, andin turn, such diplomatic practice backfi red within their own
domestic politics.
The American unilateralist approach to the North Korean
nuclear issue demonstrated its ineffectiveness from the start. Long
before the outbreak of the crisis in October 2002, many observers
had foreseen the advent of a crisis. One notable indication surfaced
as the United States and North Korea blamed each other fordelaying the KEDO schedule for the construction of the light-water
reactors. For the United States, North Korea’s test fi ring of aballistic missile in August 1998 cast doubt on Pyongyang’scommitment to the Agreed Framework. The government inWashington entered into a deliberation period in order to develop acomprehensive policy towards North Korea, which was finallypublicized in the Perry Report of October 1999. Meanwhile, inSouth Korea, Japan, and the United States, criticism fermented not
only with regard to Kim Jong-il, but also with their own politicalleaders. This was due to anger on the part of taxpayers in thesedonor countries who felt that North Korea’s missile launch
represented a betrayal of their good intentions.
Separating the missile issue from that of the construction of
the reactors, North Korea then charged the KEDO member
countries in general and the United States in particular withdelaying their construction. More importantly, the existence of thebilateral framework between the United States and North Korea led
the latter to disregard its own responsibility for the delay. As thesituation went contrary to its expectations of progress in therelationship with the United States, North Korea announced that

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Washington had not kept to the terms of the agreement’s Article 2
whereby the two countries should move towards the “fullnormalization of political and economic relations.” No neighboring
country, despite having undoubted security interests in the region,
was able to attempt to reverse the deteriorating trend. Due to thefact that it was framed through bilateral talks based on an American
unilateralist approach, it was impossible to salvage the agreement
even in a situation where its collapse was seemingly imminent.
In this way, the foundations of the Agreed Framework had
been eroded even before the Bush administration’s declaration of
the “Axis of Evil” that discredited the previous Clinton
administration’s foreign policy in general and the Agreed
Framework in particular. In retrospect, the gesture of mutual
recognition, signaled by the Joint Declaration made at the time ofthe visit of Pyongyang’s special envoy, Cho Myong-rok, toWashington in October 2000, could not save the agreement introuble. The reason behind this was that in the late 1990s, North
Korea had begun dealing with Pakistan in order to obtain uranium
enrichment technology in exchange for missiles. North Korea, with
continuing skepticism about American intentions, was pursuing analternative strategy to secure nuclear development. The UnitedStates has strenuously investigated this North Korea-Pakistan link.
However, it has neither made a collective effort, nor initiated amultilateral cooperation among Northeast Asian countries to halt it.
Therefore, the breakdown of the Geneva Agreed Framework
cannot be simply attributed to individual actions, such as Kim
Jong-il’s agreement violation and George W. Bush’s turn towards a
hard-line policy, but it was also due to the absence of a multilateralframework in the region. North Korea paid no attention toneighboring countries, such as Japan and China as well as South
Korea, and simply attempted to make big deals with the UnitedStates. To Pyongyang, there was no existing legal obligation tothese neighbors, whereas for the neighbors themselves, there wasno channel through which they could enforce the assurance of
nuclear-freeze in North Korea.
The multilateral framework, centered on the North Korean
nuclear crisis, is bringing about a change in the relationshipbetween the countries in the region of Northeast Asia. The
framework was first sparked at the tripartite meeting held in April
2003, and was brought about at the first six-party talk in August of
the same year. China, who has become a significant regional power
in comparison to its status in the mid-1990s, has played a pivotal
diplomatic role in coordinating the creation of the multilateraltalks. In addition, the launching of the six-party talk stemmed froma common perception shared by China, South Korea, Japan,
Russia, and the United States that if the crisis was not resolved
through peaceful means, a dangerous coupling effect could arise.
For instance, North Korea’s declaration of itself becoming a
nuclear state might presumably bring about a military build-up in
China and Japan, actual conflict across the Taiwan Strait, and, inthe worst case, another disastrous war in the Korean Peninsula; allof which would result in a nightmare for regional insecurity. In
other words, despite a variety of divergent national interests, North
Korea’s neighbors commonly perceived that Pyongyang’s nuclear
weapons development no longer represented a bilateral issue
between the United States and North Korea. This was the lesson
that they learned from the past experience of being left behind withneither participation nor responsibility.
It is also noteworthy that the multilateral channel does not
represent a panacea for the resolution of the current crisis. The
solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis is a time-constrained
and complex issue. It is time-constrained in the sense that as time
passes, Pyongyang’s nuclear capability may reach a level where it
is more dangerous than the current situation. In particular, uranium
enrichment under a veil of uncertainty, in addition to reprocessing
for plutonium production, is an urgent problem that needs to be

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.3 March 2004

quickly resolved. Meanwhile, peaceful resolution involves atime-consuming sequential implementation of two challenging
requirements: providing security guarantees for North Korea on the
one hand, and dismantling its nuclear projects on the other. If one
takes into account the necessity of channeling other participants’domestic demands, for example the Japanese abduction issue, thenegotiation may be unexpectedly prolonged. This obviously works
against the time-constrained concern.
Nevertheless, all the participants in the six-party talks shouldbe patient in maintaining the multilateral framework. In themeantime, as agreed at the second six-party talk, they should
institutionalize a working-level channel as soon as possible in orderto strengthen the degree of coordination about sequential
procedures. In this way, any agreement reached through themultilateral framework will have a binding influence which cannot
be reversed in an arbitrary fashion. Furthermore, the agreement
will empower the domestic coalition for internationalization ineach country, including North Korea, the coalition which may
reject an introverted nationalist backlash and foster the participants’collaborative potential to yield synergistic effects on othersecurity-related issues, including refugees and human rights.
Kim is associate professor at HPI

HPI’s Second Public Lecture Series
The Hiroshima Peace Institute held, at the Hiroshima City Plaza for
Town Development through Citizen Exchange, its second public lecture
series-ten lectures over two months-between early October andearly December 2003. The first series, conducted during the same period
in 2002, was a great success, reflected by the fact that many of theoriginal 60 participants enrolled in this second course.
In spring 2003, the Iraq War broke out and at least 10,000 civilians
have reportedly been killed by U.S. and British aerial bombing. Since
the onset of the occupation of Iraq by the military troops led by thesetwo countries, many more civilians have been killed and injured either
by the occupation troops, having been mistaken as “terrorists,” or bybeing involved in the attacks by local rebel groups fighting against theoccupation troops. Civilian casualties in Iraq continue to increase. In the
Afghan War two years ago, too, many civilians fell victim to warfare,and that war produced more than a million refugees. Modern warfare
inevitably causes mass killing and injury of civilians.
Reflecting this reality, in 2003 we formulated a series of lectures
under the general theme “War Encountered by Civilians: A Perspective
Towards the Establishment of Peace in the 21st Century.” The purpose ofthis series was to critically re-examine modern and contemporary
warfare from the viewpoint of civilians and to explore ways of avoiding
military conflicts.
At the beginning of this series, we examined how indiscriminate
bombing, i.e., the most typical form of modern mass killing, was firstused as a major military strategy during World War I, and how it wasstrengthened and expanded in the European theater of World War II,
resulting in the deaths of millions of civilians. We also examined theindiscriminate bombing in subsequent wars-Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf,
and so on-though indiscriminate mass killing reached a peak with the
dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of
the Pacific War.
In this lecture series, we also discussed the question of why
international law-the law of war, humanitarian law, etc.-has been so
ineffective despite the fact that it was built on the tragic experiences ofmodern warfare. Why were the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
never pursued as criminal breaches of the Geneva Conventions? This
question was addressed as a classic example of the ineffectiveness ofinternational law.
We also dealt with the topic of U.S. governmental control andmanipulation of information regarding not only the bombing ofHiroshima and Nagasaki but also the nuclear tests repeatedly conducted
after World War II in the effort to mold the popular American acceptanceof nuclear weapons. A lecture on civilian victims of nuclear tests
described the serious damage to the health of islanders and thedestruction of their natural environment in the Southwest Pacific where
many nuclear tests were conducted over an extended period.
More current issues were addressed as well, including
depleted-uranium, small nuclear weapons, the problem of East Timor asa typical example of ethnic conflicts, and the new conflict-prevention

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.3 March 2004

concept called “Human Security.”
A new lecture series is planned for October this year, and it ishoped that we will continue to attract many participants.
By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
Title and Lecturer
No.1 Oct. 1“History and Thoughts of Indiscriminate Bombing: Europe.”
Lecturer:Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
No.2 Oct. 8 “History and Thoughts of Indiscriminate Bombing: The
Asia-Pacific.”
Lecturer:Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
No.3 Oct. 15 “Development of Ideas of International Humanitarian Law:
From a Viewpoint of the Iraq War.”
Lecturer:Masahiro Igarashi, professor at Kanazawa University
No.4 Oct. 22 “‘Victims’ of Regional Conflict: The Case of East Timor.”
Lecturer:Nobumasa Akiyama, assistant professor at HPI
No.5 Oct. 29 “Contemporary Wars and Indiscriminate Killing: From
Vietnam to Iraq.”
Lecturer:Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
No.6 Nov. 5 “Criminality of the Use of A-bombs: Hidden Aspects of the
War Crime Issue and the Control of Information.”
Lecturer:Hitoshi Nagai and Hiroko Takahashi, research
associates at HPI
No.7 Nov. 12 “Human Security: Striving for Sustainable Peace Building.”
Lecturer:Ikuko Togo, assistant professor at HPI
No.8 Nov. 19 “Inhumanity of the Depleted Uranium Weapons: A New
Weapon of Mass Destruction.”
Lecturer:Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI
No.9 Nov. 27 “History and Thoughts of Nuclear Strategies: The Process of
Dehumanization.”
Lecturer:Tetsuo Maeda, professor at Tokyo International
University
No.10 Dec. 3 “Sociology of Indiscriminate Bombing.”
Lecturer:Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPIVisit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

New Findings about the Lucky Dragon
By Hiroko Takahashi
Half a century has passed since the Japanese fishing vessel, the Lucky
Dragon (Fuku Ryu Maru), was exposed to the fall-out from the U.S.
Hydrogen Bomb Test conducted at Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954. However,
it is only now that certain information relating to the event has finally cometo light. This relates to the revelation that the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) investigated the Lucky Dragon’s crew members on suspicion ofespionage.

1. The CIA Investigation into the Lucky Dragon
Sterling Cole, the chairman of the U.S. Congress Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, declared that it was not inconceivable that the Lucky
Dragon crew entered the experimental site with aims other than fishing. In
this statement he was hinting that the Lucky Dragon was exposed toradiation due to its having entered the U.S. designated “danger zone” with
the intention of spying on U.S. military activities. In the May 1, 1954 issueof the Chubu Nippon Shimbun, it was reported that the Japanese police and
the Public Security Investigation Agency had examined the politicalthinking of the crew members of the Lucky Dragon at the behest of theForeign Ministry. However, according to the same newspaper, the Foreign
Ministry declared that it had “never requested the National Police Agency
to investigate the backgrounds of the crew members,” and that theorganization had similarly never received such a request from the U.S.
Furthermore, the Foreign Ministry went on to insist that it “had noconception of why such an investigation should be deemed necessary” andthat “the allegation was totally unfounded.”
However, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Documents released in
the Declassified Documents Catalog: 1998 reveal that Lewis Strauss, thechairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, requested the CIA toinvestigate the alleged spying activities of the Lucky Dragon, and that the
CIA reported the results of its investigation to him. The U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission Documents consist of a total of five pages: the first being a
letter dated April 29, 1954, from Frank Wisner in charge of covert
operations in the CIA to Strauss, followed by a three-page summary of theinvestigation into the Lucky Dragon, and finally a reply from Strauss to
Wisner, dated May 7.
The main purpose of the investigation, titled “CIA Investigation of
Circumstances of Exposure of Fuku Ryu Maru ‘Fortunate Dragon’ toHydrogen Bomb Test,” was to determine whether or not the Lucky Dragon
had entered the designated “danger zone,” and whether the ship hadotherwise exposed itself to the explosion intentionally with the object ofmaking observations and taking instrument readings or for the additional
purpose of providing a basis for anti-American propaganda.
With regard to the first question of whether the ship was actuallyoutside the danger zone, the report says the following: “U.S. officials did
not have the opportunity to check the ship’s log, track charts, navigation
records, accuracy of navigational instruments, or competency of the ship’s
navigator, we have not been able to make an estimate of its actual location.
However, in addition to the Japanese Government’s public announcementthat the ship was outside the danger zone, [Sensitive Information Deleted].”Since the last part of this section is deleted as shown above, it remains
unknown whether the Lucky Dragon was actually outside the danger zone.
However, according to State Department documents, the Japanese Foreign
Ministry submitted copies of the ship’s track charts to the U.S. embassy
after the Japanese government had made a public announcement on theissue. This indicates that the U.S. had a clear opportunity to analyze thetrack charts, on the basis of which offi cials must have reached theconclusion that the Lucky Dragon was outside the danger zone. There is ahigh likelihood that details were deleted from the report about specificJapanese cooperation and the U.S. analyses of the information that was
obtained as a result of this cooperation.
The report also mentions other questions such as: “Was the Japanese
doctor in charge of treating the crew politically suspect?” “Is there any
evidence of special instruments having been on board?” “Is there any
evidence of a rendezvous with a Russian vessel before putting into port?”and “What is the possibility of a substitute vessel having been offered forinspection?” The document concludes that no evidence was found for anyof the questions. As a result of the investigation, Wisner emphasized in a
letter to Strauss, the CIA found no evidence that the Japanese government
had withheld any important information from the U.S.
This document reveals that the Japanese government carried out an

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investigation into the alleged spying activities of the crew members of theLucky Dragon in response to a U.S. request, and that a subsequent CIA
investigation confirmed the reliability of the conclusion of the Japanese
investigation that the crew members were definitely not spying. This showsthat the Foreign Ministry’s statement printed in the Chubu Nippon Shimbun
on May 1, 1954 was in clear contradiction of the facts.

2. Statement by Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission
The Lucky Dragon was exposed to radiation from the “Bravo Shot,”the fi rst explosion in a series of nuclear tests. This series of tests,
code-named “Operation Castle,” included six tests in all, which wereconducted between March 1 and May 13, 1954. Strauss, who requested the
CIA investigation, issued a statement on March 31 on his return to the U.S.
following the second test on March 26. He said that the first and second
tests had both been successful. He also said that the Lucky Dragon incident
had occurred despite careful preparations for the tests, adding that the ship
“appeared to have been missed by the search but, based on a statement
attributed to her skipper to the effect that he saw the flash of the explosionand heard the concussion six minutes later, it must have been well within
the danger area.” His explanation suggested that it was not the U.S. but the
Lucky Dragon itself that was responsible for the exposure of the ship tofall-out from the explosion. While Strauss admitted that 23 crew membersof the Lucky Dragon, 28 American personnel, and 236 residents of the
Marshall Islands had been within the area of the fall-out, he said that “Noneof the American personnel have burns” and that “the 236 natives also appear
to me to be well and happy,” indicating that there was no sign of any illness
caused by the explosion even one month after the “Bravo Shot.”In the series of nuclear tests code-named “Operation Crossroads”
conducted on Bikini Atoll in 1946, initially three tests were scheduled.
However, the underwater explosion of the second test caused great damage
due to radioactive contamination, which led to the cancellation of the third
test by presidential order. In sharp contrast, the series of nuclear tests
conducted during “Operation Castle” in 1954 went ahead as scheduled,even after the Lucky Dragon incident.
As explained above, the CIA investigation into the Lucky Dragon did
not produce the result that Strauss had hoped for. Nonetheless, instead of
admitting their own responsibility for what happened to the Lucky Dragon,
some U.S. test personnel chose to suggest that the Japanese vessel was a
spy ship, and the hydrogen bomb tests actually continued as planned andwere ultimately classed as a “success.” It is true that the Lucky Dragon
incident did spark an international wave of antinuclear public opinion, but
at the time this failed to check the accelerating arms race between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union.

3. The Boundary between Classifi ed and Declassifi ed
Information
Thanks to the recent release of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Documents, it has become clear that the CIA investigation into the Lucky
Dragon was actually carried out despite the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s
denial, and that both Japanese and U.S. agencies cooperated in it. However,in seven locations in the documents, equivalent to a total of about 20 lines,
sensitive information still remains deleted. One wonders what kind of
information is actually concealed in the deleted sections. When I showed
the document to Mr. John Taylor, an archivist at the U.S. National Archives
and a specialist on OSS (Office of Strategic Services) and CIA material, I
received a quite straightforward answer from him. I was told to write andrequest a more complete copy of the document and to send the letter to thefollowing address, together with the document. The first line of the address
is FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) Office, the second line is CIA, andthe third line is Washington, D.C., 20505.
Especially during and after the Cold War, a great many U.S.
government documents have been treated as “sensitive information,” asituation which continues to prevent the public from having access to thetruth. I am looking forward to hearing from the CIA in order to determine
whether the boundary between classified and declassified information ismoving to expand the area of declassified information.

Takahashi is research associate at HPIHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.3 March 2004

Conflict Prevention Efforts and the Role ofCivil Society in Ferghana Valley
By Nobumasa Akiyama
Central Asian countries that gained independence after the collapse of
the Soviet Union have been tackling the challenge of nation-building,
based on the principles of democracy and market economics. Theirendeavors to date have not been necessarily successful. Rather,
particularly in rural areas, the welfare of the people has deteriorated
under unstable authoritarian rule. The collapse of the Soviet Union has
also created new “international” problems.
The Ferghana region, where the republics of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz,
and Tajikistan share borders, is an area of concern in terms of thedeterioration of economic and social conditions. Batken Province islocated in the Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana region, surrounded by
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; there are also enclaves of Uzbekistan andTajikistan within the province. It is not unusual for communities
neighboring each other to have different ethnic identities.
The region is suffering from the legacies of the Soviet era whenstate borders were drawn in a complicated fashion, ignoring the ethnic
distribution of the population and breaking up milieus of daily life. The
central governments of the republics are trying to strengthen bordercontrols in order to establish their own national identities andgovernance. However, due to their failure to establish firm systems ofgovernance, the region is now harboring anti-government groups andIslamic extremists. These groups can move freely back and forth acrossthe borders because of defective border controls. (In 1999, Japanesegeologists in the region were kidnapped by an Islamic extremist group.
The author witnessed incompetent customs and border controls between
the Kyrgyz and Uzbekistan Republics when he visited the region last
October.) Local residents are suffering from a stagnation of the economic
activities which used to extend across the borders during the Soviet era,
but which are now restricted. They are also failing to receive social
services from the central government. Thus the level of socio-economic
life in this region is being categorized at the lowest rank, andmalnutrition, poverty and unemployment are identified as sources oftensions within communities.
There has also been an increase in disputes between communities
over the distribution of resources such as water; this could develop into
an ethnic confrontation, and then become an “international” problem.
Such a development was seen in a case where communities in Tajikistan
were using a water source in the Kyrgyz Republic. According to a survey
by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 75% of the local
population pointed out that disputes arose in relation to irrigation waterand 60% complained about drinking water. The population of the Kyrgyz
Republic relies on Uzbekistan for its energy supply, which also causes
tensions across the border. Such a deterioration of economic and social
conditions may bring about regional conflict.

Kyrgyz Republic

Kazakhstan●

Bishkek

KyrgyzUzbekistan
Ferghana
BatkenProvince

China

In terms of settling disputes between local communities, therelationships between the states or central governments have so far
proved to be obstacles rather than functioning as channels for dialogue
about potential solutions. Intervention by Moscow, which used to be ameans of resolving disputes during the Soviet era, no longer exists as an
option. Thus, what is necessary for local communities to do is to create
mechanisms to resolve disputes in non-violent ways, and for them tobuild confidence amongst themselves. Local communities must leavebehind conventional authority-dependent conflict resolution methods,
and build autonomous mechanisms for preventing and resolving conflicts
by means of acquiring their own capacities to make decisions andresolve problems. In addition, it is also essential to improve the socialand economic environment and people’s general welfare in order toeliminate factors triggering conflict.
Naturally, conflict prevention activities in Batken Province focus on
the improvement of social and economic conditions. Assistance fromforeign aid organizations such as the United States Agency forInternational Development (USAID) and the UNDP clearly reflects anexternal concern for the concept of confl ict prevention throughcommunity capacity-building and the achievement of economic
self-reliance. These organizations also regard local civil society actors
such as NGOs as important implementation partners for such aid
programs.
Recently, the importance of civil society has come to be recognizedin the context of post-conflict peace-building and conflict prevention. In
Batken Province, various types of NGOs are active: some are aiming at
improving the self-reliance of communities being left behind by themarket economy by providing technical assistance for agriculture; others
are organizing seminars and sports events to facilitate dialogue andcooperation between different ethnic groups; other NGOs are trying toease tensions and decrease misunderstanding between different ethnic
groups through radio broadcasts in three languages about administrativeand cultural matters.
To prevent the outbreak or recurrence of conflict, it is necessary totake steps towards the consolidation of democracy and accepted social
norms in order to promote the non-violent resolution of disputes. Local
NGOs, with the assistance of international aid agencies, play an
advocacy role in order to establish such ideas and norms among the local
population and also to increase their capacity to make autonomous
decisions. Civil society actors, and NGOs in particular, are also taking
part in an emerging mechanism which is providing social and public
services in place of the conventional social sectors such as governments,
markets and traditional communities in cases where the services
provided by these conventional sectors are failing to meet the social
needs of the population.
Local governments have come to recognize this potential functionof NGOs. At the national level, authoritarian regimes which tend to
suppress NGO activities are still in power in Central Asia. However, atthe local level, the role that NGOs can play in providing social services
has been established as an essential social function. Although there areconcerns about NGOs with regard to their fragile financial status andreliance on overseas aid, their increasingly important role in civil society
will further the prevention of conflict and easing of tensions between
communities and ethnic groups by developing the capacities for
self-reliance and problem-solving of the local communities and wider
population.

Tajikistan
Akiyama is assistant professor at HPI

Afghanistan

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.3 March 2004

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Coping with America
By Wade Huntley

I was teaching a class of international students here in Hiroshima
recently, with the war in Iraq at the front of all of our minds. Oneof the students asked me: what would be the most effective thing
she could do to promote global peace? In today’s conflict-ridden
world, it is a question we should all consider carefully.
U.S. President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq wasboth a crude violation of international law and a tragic practicalmistake. This action damaged the United Nations, fueled terrorist
ambitions and reinforced fears of American arrogance andbullying. Understandably, the U.S. attack has angered andfrustrated millions around the world; the ongoing suffering of the
Iraqi people sustains rage and exasperation against Bushadministration policies worldwide.
If we conclude that America itself has now become a principal
obstacle to global peace, my student’s question gains focus. The
question becomes: how do we cope with America?
To begin: one key lesson of the Iraq War is that the Bushadministration has insulated itself from world opinion. By ignoring
its failure to gain the explicit U.N. sanction it sought on the eve of
the war, the Bush administration disregarded some of America’s
oldest friends and consummated its increasing unilateralism. Even
now, as Iraq descends into the disaster so many critics predicted,
the administration still refuses to abide the consensus existingoutside the U.S. on the need to reconstitute Iraqi sovereignty
immediately and enable genuine international oversight of thecountry’s ongoing reconstruction.
In the face of this insularity from world opinion, some activists
have urged a confrontational response. But coping with America
today requires not building more walls against it, but building morebridges to it.
The key to this bridge-building is strengthening the global
civil society that is fl ourishing in the 21st century world of
fractured sovereignty. America epitomizes this world: today’s
America is a complex mix of peoples and organizations with
innumerable social, economic and cultural ties around the planet.
As worldwide anti-war demonstrations showed, the potential
effectiveness of a citizen-based global peace campaign is today
greater than ever before.
Stronger linkages to like-minded communities in the UnitedStates are especially vital. As much as the Bush administration
feels unaccountable to world opinion, it is keenly sensitive to U.S.
domestic opinion. As Indian political critic Arundhati Roy
observed at the height of the Iraq War: “The only institution in theworld today that is more powerful than the American government,
is American civil society... More than one third of America’s
citizens have survived the relentless propaganda they’ve been
subjected to, and many thousands are actively fighting their own

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government. In the ultra-patriotic climate that prevails in the U.S.,
that’s as brave as any Iraqi fighting for his or her homeland.”Supporting this community is essential. But strengthening
linkages between peace organizations in the U.S. and in the rest of
the world only begins to provide such support. It is also important
to engage America’s people more broadly: to find opportunities toconvey to average Americans the real detrimental effects of current
U.S. policies, and to offer positive alternatives.
A near-term practical focus of such civil linkage strengthening
could be the U.S. presidential election now less than one year
away. The Iraq War is now likely to be a major issue in thiselection, which is a dramatic recent shift in American politics.
Twelve months ago, most analysts believed that no Democrat who
opposed the war on Iraq could be a credible presidential candidate.
Now the situation has reversed: opposition to the war madeHoward Dean, for a time, a prominent contender for the
Democratic nomination, while Senator John Kerry’s support of last
fall’s congressional resolution supporting war on Iraq continues toshadow his candidacy. But public war opposition may abate. The
current opportunity may not last very long.
These thoughts were in my mind as I received my student’s
question. And so my answer to her was this: if you want to workfor peace, go to America. But don’t just go to Disneyland; go to thehard places in the Midwest and South where the next election will
really be decided. Find the working class people, who most need tohear your voice, and talk to them about what peace means to you. I
warned her: some of the people you meet will be unmoved. But
most will listen, and many will learn. And every single one of themmatters (Florida taught us that).
Of course, defeating Bush’s reelection will not solve all the
problems of current U.S. foreign policy. In the longer-term, beyond
the next election, coping with America today means recognizing afundamental dilemma: U.S. power insulates average Americans
from the effects of U.S. foreign policy in the world. As a result, theU.S. president’s accountability on foreign policy is intrinsicallyweak (the Iraq War is making the upcoming election an exception;
but it will not be a trend). So long as the U.S. is the preeminent
global power, this problem will persist-regardless of who ispresident.
The only solution is a sustained effort on the part of global
civil society, linked with its U.S. counterparts, to keep theAmerican people informed about the consequences of U.S. actionsin the world, and to help activate the American public to hold the
U.S. government accountable for those actions. Fortunately, that isexactly the kind of work that real peace-building is all about.
Huntley is associate professor at HPIHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.3 March 2004

HPI Research Forum
August 22, 2003

Title: Non-Proliferation, WMD andTerrorism: Do Regimes Matter?
Speaker: Dr. Lawrence Scheinman, Distinguished
Professor of the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies office in Washington, D.C.

Dr. Scheinman’s presentation addressed concerns about nuclear
proliferation in the post-9/11 world in which new terrorist threats
have become key security concerns worldwide. Dr. Scheinman argued
that the prospect of sub-state/transnational groups acquiring nuclear
capabilities adds to the long-standing threat of state-level proliferation
on which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is focused.
However, this combination of threats also presents opportunities forreinvigorating the existing nonproliferation regime and its agenda. Dr.
Scheinman observed that the two kinds of threats are “different levelsof the same problem.” Hence, the existing nonproliferation agenda
can serve as a foundation on which to build effective efforts to deal
with new nuclear terrorism threats. Dr. Scheinman discussed several
possible measures:
Safeguards: The safeguarding of nuclear materials that servesstate-based nonproliferation goals can also help counter nuclear
terrorism. Currently 47 states party to the NPT have yet to enter
into treaty-obligated safeguards agreements with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Although these states possess
little or no nuclear material, their lack of basic means to detect
possible transfers of nuclear material through their territory
leaves gaps in the system of global oversight. Closing such gaps
could be a straightforward proposition. In addition, serious
consideration should be given to making adherence to the
Additional Protocol a condition for new nuclear supply
November 14, 2003

Title: What is North Korea the Axis of ?
Speaker:Professor Gavan McCormack, VisitingP r o fe s s o r a t t h e S o c i a l S c i e n c e
Research Institute of the International
Christian University

At the HPI Research Forum on November 14th, 2003, Professor
Gavan McCormack presented a paper on the so-called “North Korean
problem,” one of the most important foreign affairs issues currently
confronting Japan.
Professor McCormack’s paper focused not upon the actualsocio-political situation in North Korea, but upon the popular imageof that country currently held by the majority of Japanese politicians
and Japan’s general population as a whole. It is his opinion that the
popular image of North Korea in Japan is having crucially detrimental
effects upon the ongoing changes to both Japan’s domestic andforeign policies. This image within Japanese society is, Professor
McCormack claims, based upon anger, fear and mistrust of North
Korea, as is typically represented by sensational stories in theJapanese media where themes such as “abduction,” “missiles,”“nuclear programs,” “hunger,” “refugees,” and especially “the violent
and corrupt nature of Kim Jong-il” are repeatedly exploited.
When the wave of popular anger and frustration began to risewith the Nodong missile test in 1993, the Taepodong satellite launchof 1998 and various spy-ship incidents, information about theabductions of Japanese citizens was revealed-a topic which further
aggravated Japanese popular hostility towards North Korea. In
addition, following the September 2002 visit to Pyongyang by Japan’sPrime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, the process of normalization ofrelations between Japan and North Korea reached deadlock whennegotiations between the two governments became entangled over theabduction issue. This series of events heightened the level of popular
hysteria in Japan, thus creating a phenomenon that can be called

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.3 March 2004

agreements and to extending coverage to include dual use items
as well as those on the safeguards trigger list.
Physical Protection: Inherently crucial to effective
nonproliferation, physical protection includes not only preventing
unauthorized access to nuclear material, but also controllingradiological sources and protecting nuclear facilities against
sabotage or attack. These tasks are also crucial to thwarting
nuclear terrorism. Dr. Scheinman urged strengthening andbroadening the 1987 Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, to which dozens of states have not yet even
acceded.
Export Controls: Agreements among key suppliers on export
policies, such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), have been effective components ofnonproliferation. Dr. Scheinman warned against loosening
restrictions on nuclear transfers to states not under full-scope
safeguards, urging instead that activities should be moving
toward converting informal understandings among key suppliers
into formal, legally-binding obligations.
Dr. Scheinman noted the possibility of enlisting the cooperationof non-NPT states India, Pakistan, and Israel, who could support
existing measures in several ways. He cautioned that there are risks
involved with enlisting existing nuclear nonproliferation regimes todeal with non-state nuclear proliferation and terrorism threats, andthat the contributions from existing regimes will not be panaceas.
However, he dissented from the view that these regimes are not suited
to dealing with transnational terrorism. Rather, the interrelated andreinforcing nature of the threat of weapons of mass destruction(WMD)
proliferation and the threat of terrorism, coupled with the potentiallydevastating consequences of the two being joined together, makes the
expansion of existing nonproliferation regimes to cope with newproliferation challenges not only appropriate, but vital.
By Wade Huntley, associate professor at HPI“North Korea Bashing.”
Of course, Professor McCormack does not neglect to recognize
the fact that North Korea is a totalitarian state, in which various
social, political and economic problems, including widespread abusesof basic human rights, deeply affect the lives of North Korean people.
He clearly states that “news of the abductions was shocking; the fears
over missiles or nuclear works are real.” However, it is his opinion
that it will be extremely difficult to break the ice between the twocountries unless we somehow find ways to change Japan’s popular
image of North Korea, which is currently formulated upon various
assumptions, distortions, lies and multi-layered prejudices, and to
approach the “North Korean problem” more rationally.
In relation to the abduction issue, Professor McCormack points
out that the Japanese government has itself so far shown little goodfaith towards the former “comfort women,” “slave laborers,” or othervictims of Japan’s colonial rule in Korea, and is continuing to refuse
compensation demands from those Korean victims. As far as thenuclear missile development issue is concerned, Professor
McCormack also reminds us that Japan has been closely cooperatingwith the U.S. and firmly supporting its nuclear strategy in Northeast
Asia for over half a century. He suggests that it is this nuclear threatthat Pyongyang has long faced, and to which it is now responding by
attempting to create its own nuclear deterrent. In other words, hecritically identifies the fundamental inter-relationship between North
Korea’s nuclear program and Japan’s nominal avowal of the “Three
Non-Nuclear Principles,” while it has actually been supporting asituation of nuclear privilege, in particular with regard to the U.S.,
and has been opposing nuclear disarmament.
We must seriously consider Professor McCormack’s conclusionthat in fact the “North Korean problem” is actually partly amanifestation of Japan’s own “Japan problem.”
By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
His full paper is available on HPI’s webpage:
http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/anew/forum1114e.pdf

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Hello from HPI
Narayanan Ganesan Associate Professor
Dr. N Ganesan joined the Hiroshima Peace Institute inJanuary 2004 after having taught in the Department of
Political Science at the National University of Singapore
from 1990 to 2003. His teaching and research competence
is in contemporary Southeast Asian politics and foreign
policy.

Ganesan notes, “It is a delight to join a research institute that promotes thecause of peace internationally. In spite of all the humanistic, artistic andscientific achievements of the past, the world continues to be plagued byconflicts, both domestically and internationally. Hence, it is a great honor towork towards such a noble cause here.”

ＤＩＡＲＹ
November 1, 2003 - February 29, 2004
Global Situation of Nuclear Weapons and the Non-Nuclear and Nuclear
Nov. 5 Hitoshi Nagai and Hiroko Takahashi give lecture on “Criminality ofDisarmament Policies of Japan” at 5th session of Hiroshima Peace Forumthe Use of A-bombs: Hidden Aspects of the War Crime Issue and the Control oforganized by Hiroshima City and Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation atInformation” in HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City at Hiroshima
Hiroshima International Conference Center. Togo attends international
City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange.
symposium sponsored by Aoyama Gakuin University entitled “Legalization andNov. 8 Yuki Tanaka gives lecture on “The Danger of the Use of A-bombs
Politics in East Asia” as discussant for “Legalization in China: International
during the Korean War” at 4th session of Hiroshima Peace Forum organized by
Human Rights and Domestic Politics,” paper presented by Ming Wan, associate
Hiroshima City and Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation at Hiroshima
professor of George Mason University, U.S. Takahashi gives lecture on “TheInternational Conference Center.
Current Situation of Nuclear Weapons” at 4th training course of Hiroshima Peace
Nov. 11-26 Takahashi researches Lucky Dragon Incident at National Archives
Volunteer Project sponsored by and held at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
at College Park and Library of Congress in Washington, D. C.
Nov. 12 Ikuko Togo gives lecture on “Human Security: Striving forDec. 12 Takahashi gives presentation on “Nuclear Test at Bikini Atoll in 1954
Sustainable Peace Building” in HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City.
and Its Ripple Effects” at meeting of “Empire and Citizens: American
Democracy in Agony” at Kyoto University.
Nov. 14 Gavan McCormack, visiting professor at Social Science ResearchInstitute of International Christian University, gives lecture on “What is North
Dec. 13 Mizumoto gives lecture on “The Current Situation in Cambodia andReconstruction Assistance” at 6th session of “Studying for Peace Building”
Korea the Axis of? ” at HPI Research Forum.
organized by Hiroshima City Citizen & Community Network Foundation andNov. 16-17 Tanaka attends Inaugural Conference “Training and Human
Asian Network of Trust(ANT)-Hiroshima at Hiroshima Women’s Education
Capacity-Building in Post-Conflict Countries” organized by United Nations
Center.
Institute for Training and Research and serves as chair of “Partnerships forTraining in Post-Conflict Assistance: Opportunities and Challenge” held at ANA
Dec. 17 Nagai gives lecture on “American Studies at Rikkyo University during
Hotel Hiroshima.
World War II” at Rikkyo University.
Nov. 19 Kazumi Mizumoto gives lecture on “Inhumanity of the Depleted
Dec. 19 Akiyama gives presentation on “Japanese Support for the
Uranium Weapons: A New Weapon of Mass Destruction” in HPI lecture series
Denuclearization of Russia: New Initiative for Disarmament?” at workshop
for citizens of Hiroshima City.
“Issues of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” organized by andheld at Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan
Nov. 20 Mizumoto attends as committee member conference of core membersfor Hiroshima International Peace Forum organized by Hiroshima Prefecture andInstitute of International Affairs in Tokyo.
held at Floracion Aoyama, Tokyo. Nobumasa Akiyama serves as panelist forJan. 30 Huntley gives lecture on “Losing North Korea: How the Bush
Administration Botched the Nuclear Crisis” at Asia Pacific Research Center,
symposium “Toward a Real International Peace Culture City: Prescription for theCreation of an Attractive City of Hiroshima” organized by Hiroshima Junior
Kobe Gakuin University in Kobe. Mizumoto gives lecture on “Why Nuclear
Chamber and held at Aster Plaza.
Weapons Are Not Eliminated: To Seek New Role of Hiroshima” in Exchange
Gatherings for A-bomb Witnesses, organized by and held at Hiroshima Peace
Nov. 20-22 Sung Chull Kim participates in open discussion at international
symposium “New Century in Northeast Asia: Population Movement andMemorial Museum.
Network Formation in Korean Diaspora” organized by Japan Center for Area
Jan. 30-Feb. 7 Narayanan Ganesan gives lecture on “The Role of Regional
Studies of National Museum of Ethnology and held at University of Tokyo.
Powers in Myanmar’s Political Transition” at workshop on “Myanmar Issues andMyanmar Views: Searching for a Unified Perspective” in Yangon, Myanmar.
Nov. 20-23 HPI President Haruhiro Fukui attends and participates in
discussions at Conference on Regional Integration and Public Goods andJan. 31 Mizumoto serves as commentator at 8th session, conference forplanning meeting for 5th Pan-European Conference on Constructing World
research paper presentation, of the Peace Club for Junior High and High SchoolStudents organized by and held at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
Orders, hosted by United Nations University-Comparative Regional Integration
Studies, Bruges, Belgium.
Feb. 8 Fifth workshop of HPI Research Project “Military Violence against
Civilians-A Comparative and Historical Analysis” is held at Toshi Center
Nov. 21 Mizumoto speaks at “Journalists Forum” workshop at 2nd Nagasaki
Global Citizens’ Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons organized byHotel, Tokyo.
executive committee of Nagasaki Global Citizens’ Assembly and held at
Feb. 14 Fukui serves as coordinator/chair-person at Public Forum on Womenand Peace convened by National Women’s Committee of U.N. NGOs at
Nagasaki Brick Hall.
Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
Nov. 27 Professor Tetsuo Maeda of Tokyo International University gives
lecture on “History and Thoughts of Nuclear Strategies: The Process ofFeb. 16-17 Ganesan gives presentation on “The Future Prospects of
Dehumanization” in HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City.
Interdependence in Southeast and East Asia,” at international seminar “Buildingon Our Success and Investing in Our Future” organized by Fo Guang University,
Nov. 30 Takahashi gives presentation on “Nuclear Test at Nevada in 1955 andthe Civil Defense Program” at Historical Association of Ritsumeikan University
Taiwan and Universiti Kebangsaan, Malaysia, and held in Kuala Lumpur,
26th Annual Convention in Kyoto.
Malaysia.
Dec. 3 Tanaka gives lecture on “Sociology of Indiscriminate Bombing” inFeb. 20 Tanaka and Mizumoto attend as commentators integrated study class
HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City.
on “Encounters, Findings and Peace 2003” for 1st year students at
Itsukaichikannon Junior High School.
Dec. 4 Akiyama serves as panelist for panel discussion “Japan’s Nuclear
Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century” organized by Henry L.
Stimson Center and held at National Press Club, Washington, D.C.
— Visitors to HPI—
Dec. 6 Tanaka gives lecture on “The Current Situation of the Peace
Nov. 27 Zhou Yongming, Standing Council Member of Chinese People’s
Movement in Hiroshima” at HPI to members of Niigata City Adult Education
Association for Peace and Disarmament and 5 other members.
Course, who visited Hiroshima on study trip. Mizumoto gives lecture on “Current
Dec. 5 Dr. Sergio Fernando Morales Alvarado, human rights prosecutor in
Guatemala.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWSVol.6, No.3 March, 25. 2004
Copyright 2004 HPI All rights reserved

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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.6 No.3 March 2004