David Hume's Politics:
Inheritance and Renewal of the Traditional Political Thought

INUZUKA Hajime

Discussion Paper Series, No. F-113
Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo
March 2004

http://jww.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/discussion/

David Hume's Politics:
Inheritance and Renewal of the Traditional Political Thought

INUZUKA Hajime(Ph. D; Research Fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science)

This article is to uncover David Hume's politics as a whole, mainly
focusing on his own understanding of the history of political thought1.
1

Hume as a Critic of the Traditional Political Thought?

Where is Hume's position in the history of political thought? He haslong been located as a severe denunciator of social contract theory, which
therefore means for some as one of the founders of modern conservatism,
while for others as the prophet of 'spontaneous' liberalism. This
interpretation has implicitly premised a perspective that lays heavy weighton the importance of social contract theory in the history of politicalthought, and this perspective closely connects with a conventional attitude
that the history of political thought could and should be properly
constructed by relying on the history of philosophy. Thus, A Treatise on
1

This article is a summary of my doctoral thesis, which was submitted to the graduate school oflaw and politics, the University of Tokyo, in September 2002. A draft of this article was read at aworkshop, at Oxford University on 21 July 2003. I should like to especially acknowledge Dr John
Robertson who gave many useful comments, and the late Professor Fukuda Arihiro, my supervisor, whoarranged this workshop.
*** I will cite Hume's texts from these editions; eds. Selby-Bigge, L. A. and Nidditch, P. H., A
Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, 1978; eds. Selby-Bigge, L. A. and Nidditch, P. H., Enquiries
Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, Oxford, 1975; ed. Miller,
Eugene F., Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, Indianapolis, 1987 (also ‘My Own Life’ from here); ed.
Todd, William B., The History of England, From the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688, 6
vols., Indianapolis, 1983 (cited as HE); eds. Colver, A. W. and Price J. V., The Natural History of Religion
and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Oxford, 1976; ed. Greig, John Y. T., The Letters of David
Hume, 2 vols., Oxford, 1932; Two manuscripts from Mossner, Ernest C., 'Hume's Early Memoranda,
1729-40: The Complete Text', Journal of the History of Ideas, IX, 1948, and Mossner, Ernest C., 'David
Hume's "An Historical Essay on Chivalry and Modern Honour" ', Modern Philology, IX, 1947; and anarticle titled 'Of the Authenticity of Ossian's Poems' from eds. Green, Thomas H. and Grose, Thomas. H.,
The Philosophical Works of David Hume, Vol. 4, London, 1875.

1

Human Nature has been treated as a main, systematic text to be interpreted,even when we are talking about Hume’s politics. Indeed, in Book 3 ofTreatise which discussed morals and politics, Hume displayed his
systematic criticism of social contract theory, which also appeared in someessays of Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. However, it must be notedthat Hume himself did not consider social contract theory as an important
trend in the history of political thought. One of his points was that social
contract theory was quite new, strange, and heterodoxical in politics.
Though it has recently become 'the foundation of our fashionable system ofpolitics' (Human Nature, 542), otherwise it is only found in Plato, which isparadoxically used for espousing passive obedience (Essays, 'Of the OriginalContract', 460). So, for Hume himself, what were the traditions in the historyof political thought? To answer this question will clarify Hume's position in
the history of political thought.
When we begin to investigate this question, we encounter acontemporary scheme of interpretation as a barrier to our undertaking. It isa dualistic scheme that has been relied on, in interpreting 18th century
British political thought; we can call it the dual 'wealth and virtue' scheme2.
Since the thread of republicanism in early modern political thought wasrediscovered, the study of 18th century Britain has attracted many scholars
and its image has drastically changed. It is now seen as an era whencontemporary problems on the relationship between politics and theeconomy have just started. It is widely recognized that, in the history ofpolitical thought of 18th century Britain, there were two major threads ̶̶̶ traditional republicanism and its 'modern' enemy (or so-called fathersof the science of economics) ――― that fought each other in a battle, inwhich the latter would eventually subdue the former. The dualistic
interpretative framework of 'wealth and virtue' is as such. On one side, you
can see wealth, modernity, commerce, money, updated science, and socialman; On another side, virtue, ancient society, war, land, outdated belief,
and independent man; Classical republicans are arguing that in order to2This name is borrowed from the title of Hont and Ignatieff (1983).

2

maintain liberty there must be virtue or public spirit, which is now
corrupted by commerce and luxury; Against them, a new wave of thought
has just been formed which is creating the political economy suitable to thecommercial new age. This is the story. In this scheme, Hume has usually
been seen as a apologist for 'wealth' side3. Besides, because republicanism
is supposed in this scheme to be the tradition of political thought, it isconcluded that Hume, as one of initiators of the political economy, rejected
the tradition of political thought, and created a new paradigm for new age,which signifies his position in the history of political thought.
It is certain the 'wealth and virtue' scheme has brought about new
insights on 18th century British political thought. However, it is not allpurpose. For example, when being applied to Hume and treating him as amodernist, the scheme cannot answer the reason why Hume highly
appreciated so-called republicans ̶̶̶ Niccolo Machiavelli and James
Harrington ̶̶̶ and why he would inherit their politics. What's wrong
with the scheme? One of the answers concerns how to understand 'thetradition' and the history of political thought. What is the tradition ofpolitics at all, when we read Hume? It is quite unclear; for nothingpromises that what someone today considers as the tradition is same aswhat Hume did. Thus, when we read Hume, we must at first pay attention
to Hume's own history of political thought, his interpretation of politicalthought, and his own idea of what constitutes the traditions of politicalthought. Indeed, the 'wealth and virtue' dual scheme that depicts rivalry
between republicanism and political economy, was neither Hume's own nor
shared by him. Rather, its view of the history of political thought was far
from Hume's. In Hume's own history of political thought, the main rivalry
lay between moralistic politics and institutional politics, to one of which hedevoted. He was not a founder of new political science who rejected
traditional politics, but both a successor and an innovator of the tradition.
3

See Moore (1977) as a typical one, while Robertson (1983) sets Hume on the border of 'the civil
tradition'. In Japan, where many economists have long been interested in Adam Smith and the formationof the economics, Hume has been more or less a 'wealth'-side thinker as well as Smith. As recent works,
see Sakamoto (1995) and Sakamoto and Tanaka (2003).

3

We shall start with this point.
2'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth': the Moralistic Politics versus
the Institutional Politics
Hume's 'Perfect Commonwealth' is fundamentally based onHarrington's Oceana commonwealth. As it is a plan of a commonwealth ̶̶̶ a government without king ̶̶̶ like Oceana, many scholars have
had trouble in locating this plan within Hume's politics. Some interpreted it
as an irony and a joke to show republicanism as nothing but absurd4, andothers as a response to 'the civic tradition' and a plan of government
suitable to modern commercial large society5.
However, is it proper to interpret Hume's plan within the 'wealth andvirtue' scheme? In 'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth', Hume did not argue
at all on commerce or the relation between politics and the economy6.
Rather in the essay, he focused on the problem of factions and mixed
constitution. Though it is certain Hume understood and appreciated theimpact that the commercial development had brought into modern world,commerce did not cover and subdue all aspects of his political thinking.
Indeed, his criticism against the ancient Graeco-Roman political societies,
especially in Part 2 of Essays, is well known. However, it must be
remembered that he condemned the ancient world not only because of its
underdevelopment in commerce, but also because of the mode of its
political competitions or conflicts ̶̶̶ fierce factions and civil wars atdomestic level, as well as frequent wars at inter-polis level ̶̶̶, inwhich winners often killed losers (Essays: 'Of the Populousness of Ancient
Nations', 404-16; 'Of the Balance of Power', 331-5, 339). The problem of factions

4

Conniff (1976).
Robertson (1983).
6
In fact Hume discussed 'a council of trade', but his constellation of councils in the executive partof the government also derived from Harrington's. 'Perfect commonwealth' has six councils ̶̶̶ ofstate, religion and learning, trade, laws, war, and admiralty ̶̶̶, whereas Oceana has four of states,
war, religion, and trade (Essays: 'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth', 518-9; ed. Pocock, J. G. A., The
Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics, Cambridge, 1992, 122-3, 125-30).
5

4

is also one of his main topics, and it is James Harrington who focused on
this problem. In 'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth', Hume didn't so muchreject, as use and improve Harrington's thinking on factions and his bestever plan of government, which made Hume boast of his own plan as one'to which I cannot, in theory, discover any considerable objection' (Essays:'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth', 516).
Although Harrington was an admirer of 'ancient prudence', henevertheless had reservations. For him, the ancient Roman republic was an'unequal' imperfect mixed government, full of factions that eventuallycollapsed the republic. He saw factions as absolute evils, which led him
against Machiavelli, 'the prince of politicians', who concluded that theconflict between the senate and the people in Rome had brought the
republic liberty and glory7. As factions make commonwealth frail, unstable,
and mortal, they must be annihilated thoroughly, Harrington thought.
Therefore, Oceana has factions-proof institutions. Harrington focused on
institutional arrangements, which would prevent factions from evenarising8.
Roman history taught Harrington to focus on arrangements ofpolitical institutions. His goal was not a new mode of human being or thatof manners. Human beings are inevitably so selfish that it is useless to
suppose they could always be unselfish; Everyone wants a bigger piece of acake, which naturally begets conflict and factions. Harrington thinks
factions must and can be avoided without reformation of manners. This 'is
known even unto girls'. Look at girls separating who cuts a cake from whochooses, he claims. If a commonwealth is given a bicameral legislative inwhich one assembly debates while the other resolves, such an institutionalarrangement will bring order and liberty together to the commonwealth9.

7

Oceana, 33. 37-8, 80, 149-63; trans. Mansfield, Harvey C. and Tarcov, Nathan, Discourses on
Livy, Chicago, 1996, Book 1, chs. 2-8.
8
Fukuda (1997).
9
Oceana, 22-5, 38, 64-6. Harrington highly values the Venetian constitution though 'she consistsof men that are not without sin' (Oceana, 218).

5

Harrington attributed fierce factions and civil wars in Rome to its illmodelled political institutions. Hume has the same opinion as him. As
Hume observed (Morals, 333; Essays: 'Of the Balance of Power', 335), the British
people in the 18th century saw their country so similar to the ancient
Roman republic that they often argued their own politics on the analogy to
Rome's. The Roman republic was at that time an example, in which one
could find lessons about contemporary political issues like mixed
constitution, factions, or the relation between liberty and luxury10. Someargued that the ancient republic declined when its people had lost virtue.
For example, Edward Montagu imputed the Roman fall to deformation of
the manners that was brought about by luxuries from the east, which was awarning to contemporary 18C Britain11. Indeed, it is the moralistic
interpretation like this which laments losses of virtue, that Hume opposes
to.
What has chiefly induced severe moralists to declaim against refinement in the arts,
is the example of ancient ROME, which, joining, to its poverty and rusticity, virtue
and public spirit, rose to such a surprising height of grandeur and liberty; but having
learned from its conquered provinces the ASIATIC luxury, fell into every kind of
corruption; whence arose sedition and civil wars, attended at last with the total lossof liberty. (Essays: 'Of Refinement in the Arts', 275)

Not the corrupt manners of the people, but 'an ill modelled government' is
the real cause of the decline of Rome, Hume replies (276). Even if people
have no virtues, a well-modelled political institution can make the people
public-spirited and give the commonwealth order and liberty. Hume10

On Roman history in 18th century British political thought, see Johnson (1958); (1967); Ward
(1964); Weinbrot (1978); Erskine-Hill (1983); Gunn (1983), ch. 1; Turner (1986); Miller (1994), ch. 2;
Ayres (1997). According to Hume, it was 'an unpardonable ignorance in persons of whatever sex or
condition, not to be acquainted with the history of their own country, together with the histories of ancient
GREECE and ROME' (Essays: 'Of the Study of History', 566).
11Montagu, Edward W., Reflections on the Rise and Fall of the Ancient Republicks, Adapted to thePresent State of Great Britain, London: A. Millar, 1760 (2nd edn.), 223. Similarly, Bolingbroke ascribedthe decline of the Roman republic to loss of 'spirit of liberty' (Remarks on the History of England, London:
T. Davies, c. 1770 [originally written in 1730-1], 20-7).

6

observes that it actually happened in the Roman republic during the Punicwars, when a due balance between the nobility and the people wasmaintained (Essays: 'That Politics may be reduced to a Science', 25)12.
What is important in these Hume's arguments is that he calls the
opponents not republicans but 'severe moralists'13. They emphasize the roleof morals and attribute all political problems to deformation of morals. It ishighly probable that Hume's criticism against 'moralists' politics wastargeted mainly at the Anglican clergy, especially William Warburton and'his Flatterers' ̶̶̶ John Brown14, Richard Hurd, and so on (here we can
include Edward Montagu15) ̶̶̶, whom Hume called 'the Warburttonian
School' and condemned so much that 'I shoud [sic] certainly be ashamed toengage with' (Letters, 1:250; My Own Life, xxxvii)16.
For the 'moralist' Montagu, the fixed maxim that the tradition of'political philosophy' has established is that every flourished state would
collapse from luxury17. Indeed, Hume has the same opinion, that moralistic
politics have become a tradition of politics, but for Hume it is not the only
tradition, rather it is a bad one that must be rejected. Criticizing moralist
politics, Hume advocates institutional politics, which focus on
arrangements of political institutions. In order to refute the moralistic
tradition, Hume is relying on the institutional tradition of politics, among
which Hume sees Harrington as one of the most important figures. It is
misleading to interpret Hume's criticism against 'severe moralists' as a
criticism against republicanism, relying on the dual 'wealth and virtue'

12

It must be remembered that Polybius who was the first to interpret the Roman republic as amixed government in Book 6 of his History, observed the republic just during the Punic wars. Many notes
in Essays shows Hume read him.
13
See also Morals, 181.
14
John Brown condemned contemporary 'effeminized' manners in favour of 'virtuous manners' in
his selling An Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times (1757) and Thought on Civil Liberty(1765).
15
Montagu cited Warburton as his support to argue against atheism in an additional note added to
the 2nd edition of his Reflections.
16
Hume is silent in the texts about who 'severe moralists' are, but his silence is compatible with his
decision not to engage with the Warburttonians. See also Letters, 1:186; 1:248-50; 1:265-6; 1:310; 1:3134; 2:244; My Own Life, xxxvi-vii; Mossner (1980), 307-8. According to Manzer (1996), 347, Hume's
target was not so much republicans as clergy.
17
Reflections, 221-2.

7

scheme, because it fails to help us understand the relation between Humeand Harrington. To see Harrington as an eminent advocate of republicanism
is not Hume's point of view. Hume's own dual scheme was constituted, notof republicanism and its enemy, but of moralistic and institutional politics.
Now we have reached a point where we are able to understandHume's 'Perfect Commonwealth', its aims and its position in the history ofpolitics.
At the opening paragraphs of 'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth',
Hume implicitly showed his own vision of the history of politics, in which
two major traditions had been competing. One is the moralistic tradition
whose concern is the management of individual moral quality. They
'suppose great reformation in the manners of mankind'. Plato's Republic
and Thomas More's Utopia represent this tradition. For Hume it is 'plainly
imaginary'. The other tradition is represented by Oceana. It 'is the only
valuable model of a commonwealth' (Essays: 'Perfect Commonwealth', 514).
However, the story is less straightforward. Just after his praise, Humebegan to criticize some points of Oceana, which have perplexed Hume'sscholars. In addition, Hume's criticisms are targeted at the ones Harrington
emphasized ̶̶̶ rotation, the agrarian law, and an arrangement of thebicameral legislative. It is Hume's ambivalence toward Oceana, which must
be explained.
As to the third point of Hume's criticism, Oceana has two legislative
assemblies, the senate to debate and the people to resolve. Hume took thisfunctional division as not good for liberty, because the senate has in fact aveto before people's vote. Which law is submitted to the vote, it isdetermined by the senate's discretion, therefore, in Oceana 'the wholelegislature may be said to rest in the senate' and the commonwealth is notproperly balanced (515-6). However, it is not a bicameral legislative itself
which Hume rejected. He accepted Harrington's observation thatunicameral legislative will beget such factions and disorder that two
assemblies are needed to prevent them.

8All free governments must consist of two councils, a lesser and greater; or, in otherwords, of a senate and people. The people, as HARRINGTON observes, would want
wisdom, without the senate: The senate, without the people, would want honesty.
(522-3)What Hume is seeking here is a people's assembly that not only resolves
but also debates orderly.
A large assembly of 1000, for instance, to represent the people, if allowed to debate,would fall into disorder. If not allowed to debate, the senate has a negative upon them,and the worst kind of negative, that before resolution. Here therefore is aninconvenience, which no government has yet fully remedied, but which is the easiest
to be remedied in the world. If the people debate, all is confusion: If they do notdebate, they can only resolve; and then the senate carves for them. (523)'Divide the people into many separate bodies; and then they may debatewith safety, and every inconvenience seems to be prevented', he answered(523). Fifty county parliaments constitute 'the people' of the politicalinstitution, and exercise its function separately. In other words, Hume madeuse of confederative structure of the commonwealth in arranging thepolitical institutions. Though Hume modified the arrangement of 'thepeople', he was resolute in inheriting Harrington's creed for bicameral
legislative, and in setting it as the foundation of the mixed constitution like
Harrington.
As to the other two critical points which Hume made of Oceana ̶̶̶ firstly, its rotation ignores the difference of personal qualities, andsecondly, its agrarian law is impracticable (Essays: 'Perfect Commonwealth',515) ̶̶̶, his disagreement is closely connected with his different

opinion about factions.
Rotation and the agrarian law are 'fundamental laws' of the Oceana9Commonwealth, which secure equality of the citizens18. Because
Harrington was keen to avoid factions, Oceana is 'an equal commonwealth'without factions and even without the causes of them. To keep citizens
equal means, from Harrington's point of view, to keep the commonwealthfree from factions. On the other hand, Hume rejects the idea itself thatfactions should and could be totally annihilated. Even if there are no
reasons to oppose each other, 'whimsical and unaccountable' factions willarise, for human beings are naturally factious (Essays: 'Perfect Commonwealth',529; 'Of Parties in general', 56-8).
Besides, 'to abolish all distinctions of party may not be practicable,
perhaps not desirable, in a free government', i.e. in a government in which
political power is divided into several persons or assemblies (Essays: 'Of
Parties in general', 55-6, 59; 'Of the Coalition of Parties', 493)19. Therefore, theBritish government, 'our mixed government', has Country and Court parties
just because of 'the very nature of our constitution' (Essays: 'Of the Parties ofGreat Britain', 65). Factions or parties are essential ingredients of 'a freegovernment'. It is certain that parties 'oft threaten the total dissolution of thegovernment', but they are 'real causes of its permanent life and vigour' (HE,5:556). For Hume, factions have merits as well as demerits. It is no doubtthat factions in 17th century England were 'much too violent', but

18

Oceana, 100.
In 'Of Parties in general', Hume said 'many philosophers' had had a opinion that it is no more
possible 'to prevent such parties' as arise naturally in a mixed constitution, because of 'selfishness
implanted in human nature', than to have a universal medicine or 'perpetual motion'. Here it must be
remembered that Hume condemned Harrington as 'chimerical' (Letters, 2:306; HE, 6:153). For Hume, toabolish factions is chimerical as well as to make a commonwealth immortal.
19

10

Governments too steady and uniform, as they are seldom free, so are they, in the
judgment of some, attended with another sensible inconvenience: They abate theactive powers of men; depress courage, invention, and genius; and produce anuniversal lethargy in the people. (HE: 6.530-1) 20

The problem is not to overbear factions by compulsory equality, but tomake them moderate and to use their vigour. To tame factions, Hume inthis essay proposes an institutional arrangement. Factions must be
institutionalized in the constitution; Canalize factions into the constitutional
mechanism of competition, and then they will not destroy the constitution.
This is the plan of 'the court of competitors', which consists of unsuccessful
candidates (but only runner-ups) in senatorial election (Essays: 'Perfect
Commonwealth', 519, 524, 525).
The chief support of the BRITISH government is the opposition of interests; but that,though in the main serviceable, breeds endless factions. In the foregoing plan, it does
all the good without any of the harm. The competitors have no power of controllingthe senate: They have only the power of accusing, and appealing to the people. (525)

In short, Hume rejected rotation and the agrarian law as institutionalarrangements for the problem of factions, and replaced them with anassembly of the opposition to make factions moderate and controllable.
Modern politics should overcome the outdated ancient politics, andmodern politics have just started with me ̶̶̶ such a view on thehistory of politics Hume did not share. Rather he found a tradition of
institutional politics in the history of political thought, in which he was
eager in taking part. The plan of 'a Perfect Commonwealth' has no20

Who did Hume allude to, when he wrote 'in judgment of some'? It is possible Hume was here
thinking about Machiavelli's interpretation of the Roman history in Discourses on Livy. Harrington
criticized Machiavelli's this interpretation in condemning factions, which Hume could know. For Hume,
Machiavelli's Discourses is 'a work surely of great judgment and genius' (Essays: 'Of the Balance ofPower', 634).

11

discussion at all on virtues or manners, though it is a plan of a republic.
Hume's concern is not morals, but the best arrangement of politicalinstitutions, in compliance with Harrington and the tradition of institutional
politics21. Moreover, Hume is not only a successor of that tradition, but also
an innovator of it. He brought new insights into the tradition, in framing apluralistic constitution which involves institutionalized factions. In this way,
Hume was one of the first to depict constitutional political competition withno logical connections to the division of social classes.
3

Hume's Politics in The History of England

After uncovering the plan of 'a Perfect Commonwealth', Humeproposed in the article a plan to make the British government 'the mostperfect model of limited monarchy'. It was a plan to bring the British
government as near to 'a perfect commonwealth' as possible. By making theHouse of Commons more equally representative and the House of Lords anassembly of quality, its government would have the bicameral legislative of
the senate and the people, instead of the present two poles of the monarch
and the House of Commons (Essays: 'Perfect Commonwealth', 526-7). From thisit can be inferred that, for Hume, the scope of institutional politics is not
limited to the republican form of government. It can be applied to themonarchical government too22. Thus, he was able to treat both forms ofgovernment in the same framework by focusing on institutionalarrangements, whereas Montesquieu emphasized the difference between
monarchy and republic by focusing on 'principle', the human passion which
set each form of government in motion. However, it is certain that not all of

21

Compare with Montesquieu whose interest lies in 'principle', the spirit which moves each formof government. The difference between him and Hume might suggest that 'association of ideas' between
republicanism and virtue, which seems to have strongly been cemented by Montesquieu's definition of
republic, should be reconsidered. This 'association of ideas' has made us unable to understand full aspects
of Harrington's thought and his influences to later ages.
22
But Hume recognizes republic can be better treated by the institutional approach than monarchy,
because the former has no uncertainty in its institution ̶̶̶ no monarch (Essays: 'That Politics may be
reduced to a Science', 15-6; 'Of the Independency of Parliament', 46; 'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth',526-7; 'Early Memoranda', 507). On this point, compare Pocock (1979), 131, with Robertson (1985), 71.

12

Hume's political insights were derived from institutional politics. We will
be able to understand how Hume had incorporated institutional points ofview into his whole system of politics, through surveying his History ofEngland and his discussion on modern (i.e. post-Roman) European
societies.
It is well known that the target of Hume's History was ancientconstitution theory, which insisted that the English government hadconstantly been a mixed balanced government since time immemorial, andcondemned the Stuart Dynasties in the 17th century and the Whig regime in
the 18th as deviations. Hume denied there existed only one ancientconstitution, insisting that England had been 'in a state of continualfluctuation' and had at least three different ancient constitutions (HE, 4:355).
What story did Hume tell, in confuting the continuous story of the ancientconstitution?
Hume's was a story of the development of the European civilization
in England, answered Duncan Forbes. His Hume's Philosophical Politics
was an epoch-making work as well as one of the earliest detailed pieces ofresearch on the politics of Hume's History23. It proved the importance of a'civilized monarchy' concept in Hume's politics; In refuting 'vulgar' ancientconstitutionalism, 'sceptical' Hume created the concept of 'civilized
monarchy', insisting that absolute monarchy in Europe was also a bearer ofthe civilization. According to Forbes, Hume's civilization was primarily alegal, political concept24. Hume observed civilizing processes under amonarchical government, which happened after it established a rule of law
and secured lives and properties of the subjects. In Forbes' interpretation,
discussion on rules of law and justice was regarded as central in Hume'spolitics, which meant that Hume's politics could be best seen as a successorof the natural law tradition that had been maintained by Hugo Grotius,
Samuel Pufendorf, and Francis Hutcheson. Indeed, it is certain and

23
24

Forbes (1975).
Forbes (1970), 15; Forbes (1975), 296.

13

therefore well known that Hume relied on them, especially in Book 3 of A
Treatise of Human Nature and its follow-up, Enquiries Concerning thePrinciples of Morals. However, it is quite unclear how one can interpret, in
this natural law perspective, Hume's discussion on mixed constitution, andespecially on the British constitution after the Revolution. In other words,
as to Hume's History, is it proper to read it as a narrative that depicts the
one-dimensional development of the European civilization in England?
In History and Essays, Hume lists two ingredients of political society.
The one is 'authority' (or 'government'), the other 'liberty'. 'Authority' is'essential' to the existence of civil society, while 'liberty is the perfection ofcivil society' (Essays: 'Of the Origin of Government', 40-1; HE, 6:533)25. Here,
Hume is suggesting that there are two steps in the development of civilsociety. At first 'authority' as an essential is established, and after then'liberty' as a perfection will be added. 'Authority' has priority over 'liberty'
because the former is 'essential', if these two elements confront each other.
What is important in this scheme is the meaning of 'liberty' set against'authority', for Hume gave the concept various meanings. According toForbes, the difference Hume saw between these two elements was not
qualitative, but quantitative ̶̶̶ 'liberty' means more quantity of 'a ruleof law' than 'authority' ̶̶̶, which makes Forbes' readings of History
and of Hume's politics as a whole quite one-sided26.
Indeed, the purpose of 'authority' is to secure justice in order tomaintain peace and order, as Forbes insisted (Essays: 'Origin of Government',
38; Human Nature, Book 3, part 2, sections 7-10; Morals, section 4). Life andproperty are protected from invasions of fellow-citizens, by the existence ofpolitical 'government'. In other words, in a political society that has'authority' as an essential, some kind of so-called liberty is secured.
Nevertheless, this kind of liberty is not the same as 'liberty' as a perfectionof civil society. In the last paragraph of the essay 'Of the Origin of25

The sentences in which Hume used these phrases in History (6:533) were added from the 1778
edition (Price (1966), 154). This implies that, 'Of the Origin of Government', which first appeared in the
1777 edition of Essays and had the same phrases, can be seen as a guideline to understand History. See
also HE, 2:525; 5:356.
26
Forbes (1963), esp. 119; (1970), 15, 20, 33, 39; (1975), esp. ch. 5; (1978), 58.

14

Government' in which Hume directly discussed on the relation between'authority' and 'liberty', he defines a government that also has 'liberty', as'that which admits of a partition of power among several members' (Essays:'Origin of Government', 40-1). Here, 'liberty' means an institutionalized liberty
in the arrangements of political power, and 'liberty' in this sense concerns
about a mode of political power. Its holder is not so much the citizen as aconstitution. A civil society that has 'liberty' has a mechanism in its politicalinstitution, which could prevent political power from being abused, i.e. it
has a mixed form of government27.
These two ingredients of civil society serve in History as indicators,
whose existence signify in which stage a civil society is. A society develops
to perfection gradually, climbing up two steps. In the first stage, it gets
'authority', through establishing an unrestricted political power and a rule oflaw, against social powers and their feuds28. In the second stage, it gets
'liberty' through institutional restrictions of the political power itself, i.e.
through establishing a mixed form of government. This is the scheme ofHistory. Hume finds in English history two stages of its constitutional
development. The first agenda was achieved by the Tudor monarchy, while
the second by 'the Revolution'.
Gothic and feudal government were not mixed governments as havebeen claimed in ancient constitution theory, but no government at all inproper sense, claims Hume. Barons and the clergy ruled the kingdom quite
27

Hume discusses this kind of 'liberty' in other works as 'civil liberty' or 'public liberty'. For
example, he cites Shakespeare as a witness of the manners of Tudor England, arguing the writer did not
mention at all of 'civil liberty', which means a good 'civil constitution' (HE, 4:368). In the essay which has
just the title of 'Of Civil Liberty', Hume sets 'civil liberty' against absolute monarchy, then paraphrasing
each into 'free government' and 'civilized monarch'. In Human Nature, 'public liberty' is replaced with 'amix'd government' (Human Nature, 564; see also HE, 2:519-25). It is better here to point out that, for
Hume, 'a free government' means a mixed one 'being compounded of parts' (Essays: 'Of the OriginalContract', 485).
28
This understanding of absolute monarchy makes Hume criticize John Locke who denied it canbe a civil society (Essays: 'Of the Original Contract', 486-7). As we will see, what is established in thefirst stage is 'a civilized monarchy', apart from 'despotism'. Hume defines 'a civilized monarchy' as an
absolute monarchy in point of the distribution of political power. 'In a civilized monarchy, the prince
alone is unrestrained in the exercise of his authority, and possesses alone a power, which is not boundedby any thing but custom, example, and the sense of his own interest' (Essays: 'Of the Rise and Progress of
the Arts and Sciences', 125).

15

separately by their jurisdiction and de facto force. England then had neither
civil power nor 'regular privileges' both in theory and in practice. It was apre-civil society. It lacked general unilateral political power and laws tomaintain peace and order, whose absence had been substituted by 'thesocial confederacy', patron-client systems under social powers29. In otherwords, aristocrats had made 'any regular system of civil government'
impossible, and at best there was only an 'irregular government' (HE, 2:428,
2:533)30.
Politicians in 18th century Britain who thought of themselves as
successors to Harrington ̶̶̶ now usually called neo-Harringtonians ̶̶ ̶ , did not in fact succeed Harrington's history of England. For
Harrington, no feudal government was worthy of the name 'mixed
constitution', nor the name 'civil society'31. Besides, Harrington did not use
his property-balance theory in order to show the historical changes of thebalance of mixed constitution, while successors did. They ignored
Harrington's history of England and confused his theory of property withthat of mixed constitution, in order that they could show that in England theancient mixed constitution had been established since time immemorial.
Hume's claim that the Gothic and feudal government were no more civil
governments than mixed governments, is a criticism against these selfproclaimed Harringtonians, and it can be seen as a revival of Harrington's
history of England32.
29

See HE, 1:165-9; 1:174; 1:185; 1:254; 1:284-5; 1:361-2; 1:456-60; 1:464; 1:485; 2:20; 2:31;
2:73; 2:283-4; 2:434; 4:355.
30
In Appendixes of History, Hume found 'the aristocracy' in Anglo-Saxon government and feudal
government, but it was not the aristocracy as a form of government in which aristocrats have politicalpower, but simply a de facto rule by the aristocracy. At that time 'the civil union being weak, many private
engagements were contracted' under them (HE, 1.168; 1:456-60). Wexler (1979) and Miller (1990) did
not see 'the aristocracy' as a non-political rule.
31
Oceana, 8-9, 53.
32
On Edward 3rd government which had been claimed as one of the best mixed constitutions by
neo-Harringtonians (for example, Bolingbroke, Remarks on the History of England, 182), Hume regarded'the true genius of that kind mixed government, which was then established' as 'at best, was only abarbarous monarchy' (HE, 2:283-4). He defines the form of government at these pre-civil ages asmonarchy, if it needs classification. Although Hume sees the Magna Carta as an epoch which brought
England a little more regularization of laws and rights, and established 'a more ancient constitution' which
posited between 'still a more ancient constitution' and the Tudor monarchy as 'the ancient constitution'(4:355), he nonetheless denies the Charter changed a form of government. It did not 'innovate in the
distribution of political power' (1:488).

16

It was the Tudor absolute monarchy which brought a rule of law into
England. It had established the monolithic rule of law and the politicalpower, though the monarchs used laws for the purpose of tyranny tosuppress the nobility (HE, 3:48-9; 3:67; 3:115). The Tudor monarchy which
had thus introduced the essential ingredient 'authority', was worthy of thename 'the ancient constitution' (HE, 4:355). Ancient constitution theory saw
the reign of the Queen Elizabeth as one of the best33, but according to
Hume, neither subjects' liberty nor mixed government was establishedunder this Queen. Instead the sovereign power was then at its best. The
Tudor monarchy was an absolute monarchy that was not institutionallyrestricted, and therefore can be called tyranny. In fact, one of the main
claims of History is that the Tudor monarchy was an absolute monarchy, as
well as the first Stuart monarchy that succeeded it34.
However, it didn't mean that the monarch could do anything he/shewanted. It was an absolute monarchy in which no one could restrict themonarch, but not despotism in which anyone but the monarch was a slave.
It's true the parliament did not limit the monarch; the members of it were
just humble supporters of tyranny (HE, 2:277; 3:264; 3:285; 3:320). Thus, insome respect the Tudor monarchy resembled Turkish government (4:360),
but in the final pages of the Tudor volumes, Hume says,
The utmost that can be said in favour of the government of that age (and perhaps it
may be said with truth) is, that the power of the prince, though really unlimited, wasexercised after the European manner, and entered not into every part of theadministration; that the instances of a high exerted prerogative were not so frequent
as to render property sensibly insecure, or reduce the people to a total servitude; thatthe freedom from faction, the quickness of execution, and the promptitude of thosemeasures, which could be taken for offence or defence, made some compensation for
the want of a legal and determinate liberty; that as the prince commanded no33

See Gerrard (1994), ch. 6.
Hume is proud that he is the first to insist 'the family of TUDOR possessed in general moreauthority than their immediate predecessors' (Essays: 'Of the Coalition of Parties', 644).
34

17

mercenary army, there was a tacit check on him, which maintained the government inthat medium, to which the people had been accustomed; and that this situation ofEngland, though seemingly it approached nearer, was in reality more remote from a
despotic and eastern monarchy, than the present government of that kingdom, where
the people, though guarded by multiplied laws, are totally naked, defenceless, anddisarmed, and besides, are not secured by any middle power, or independant
powerful nobility, interposed between them and the monarch. (HE, 4:370)

Tudor monarchy was an 'European' absolute monarchy, and in fact 'any
established liberties of the people' was not infringed under it (4:355, 5:562).
Hume's description was of a 'civilized monarchy' established in England,though in History he did not use this term for the Tudor government.
The second stage in English constitutional history was the 17th
century. During both Stuart dynasties, trial and error for constitutional
reform succeeded, and a mixed form of government was evolved, andfinally established at the Revolution35. However, the path from a civilized
monarchy to a mixed one was not straight. There was no definite plan
beforehand; Political innovations were attempted by enthusiasts who
sought after the true religion; After the collapse of the ancient constitution,
civil society itself was collapsed by religious enthusiasm and the military;
Under the Restoration monarchy, religious conflicts again happened
between the King and the House of Commons. However, under thismonarchy, a dual governmental system in which the political power isshared by both the King and the House of Commons, and correspondingly,
a dual party system of the Court and the Country were established36; The
idea of the constitution gradually and surely changed among the nation. At

35

Hume sees Charles I's Answers to the Nineteen Propositions as the first document which treatedthe English government as a mixed one (HE, 5:572-3). Hume contrasts the mixed constitution which thisdocument implied, with the feudal constitution that John Fortescue described (5:550). Cf. Weston (1965).
36
See HE, 5:556-9. As we have shown before, according to Hume, the Court and the Country areparties which derived from the nature of the mixed constitution, while the party division between Whig
and Tory has close connection with different views on the settlement of the crown (Essays: 'Of the Partiesof Great Britain', 67-9).

18

last, the Revolution made the English government 'if not the best system ofgovernment, at least the most entire system of liberty, that ever was known
amongst mankind' (HE, 6:531).
Thus, Hume described his own history of England with two stages of
its constitutional development. Moreover, this two stages scheme isimportant not only as a scheme of history, but because it is signifying afeature of Hume's politics. Hume has synthesized two traditions of politics
from which he learned, into this two stages scheme. He stresses the firststage because he is a successor of the natural law tradition which focuseson the basic human needs such as peace, order, and security. Hume saw thistradition as one that treats civil power as a prerequisite for those basic
needs, and his concept of 'civilization' relied on this insight of this tradition.
In this point Forbes is right. However, Hume's History and his politics do
not stop here. He set the second stage because he is a successor of
institutional politics, which focuses on the arrangements of political power,
especially on those of mixed form of government.
4

Modern European Political Societies

As we have observed in the previous section, Hume saw two types ofgovernment in modern Europe; civilized monarchies, and a mixed
government that has mixed 'liberty' with 'authority'. The latter has been
'happily' achieved in Britain.
Hume's main concern about contemporary British mixed government,
was a mechanism which maintained the balance of the mixed government
between the monarch and the House of Commons. He made mention of the'influence' of the monarch, as well as the 'jealousy' which the House ofCommons had against the monarch (Essays: 'Of the Liberty of the Press'). Humethinks, although the House of Commons has great share of power,monarch's patronages makes members of the parliament act in concert withthe monarch, which keeps the balance of the constitution. It was because

19the lack of this 'influence' that the Restoration mixed monarchy had notbeen stable (HE, 5:568-70; 6:532). Although it was common amongcontemporary discourses of the Court party to see the 'influence' as abalance-maker37, Hume's argument is unique because he analyses theworkings of the 'influence' with the institutional approach. How does thepolitical institution treat particular interests, and does it canalize particularinterests compatible with the public interest? ̶̶̶ these are Hume's
main interests in discussing the contemporary constitution, especially in
discussing the 'influence'. In an essay 'Of the Independency of Parliament',
he starts the discussion with describing the tradition of institutional politics.
Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system ofgovernment, and fixing the several checks and controuls of the constitution, every
man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, thanprivate interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him,
notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, co-operate to public good.
Without this, say they, we shall in vain boast of the advantages of any constitution,and shall find, in the end, that we have no security for our liberties or possessions,
except the good-will of our rulers; that is, we shall have no security at all. (Essays: 'Of
the Independency of Parliament', 42)Moreover, he paraphrases the same point focusing on mixed government,
When there offers, therefore, to our censure and examination, any plan ofgovernment, real or imaginary, where the power is distributed among several courts,
and several orders of men, we should always consider the separate interest of eachcourt, and each order; and, if we find that, by the skilful division of power, thisinterest must necessarily, in its operation, concur with public, we may pronounce thatgovernment to be wise and happy. If, on the contrary, separate interest be not checked,
and be not directed to the public, we ought to look for nothing but faction, disorder,
and tyranny from such a government. In this opinion I am justified by experience, as

37

Dickinson (1977), 154-6.

20

well as by the authority of all philosophers and politicians, both antient and modern.
(43)

Here again, Hume contrasts institutional politics which 'all philosophersand politicians, both antient and modern' have espoused, with moralistic
politics. The moralistic approach has blamed the 'influence' as a poison tocorrupt virtue and to break the balance of the constitution, but this approachis not proper to realize dynamic mechanisms of mixed political institutions,insisted Hume (44-6).
However, Britain is a 'singular' government because it hasestablished 'liberty' (HE, 5:114; Letters, 2:260-1). For Hume, 'a civilized
European monarchy' is the most typical form of government amongmodern European world. In order to specify Hume's understanding of it, it's
useful to compare with Montesquieu's understanding of the modernmonarchy, whose talent Hume admired (Letters, 1:138), for both wrote about
and admired the modern moderate monarchy separately at almost sametime. Both had the same opinion that the moderate monarchy was amasterpiece of modern Europe, and therefore, at first glance, they seem tohave shared the same image of it.
Hume started his discussion on 'a civilized monarchy' from 1741 and
1742. He says that arts and science (as well as commerce) started todevelop even under monarchical form of government, after it established arule of law and became 'a government of Laws' (Essays: 'Of Civil Liberty', 94).
Law didn't rise naturally in a monarchy, but it could be transplanted intothat form of government, which would reform the monarchy into 'a
civilized monarchy' (Essays: 'Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences',125). What is important in this discussion, is that Hume separated oneperson-government into two kinds; Asian barbarous 'despotism' which
doesn't have a rule of law, and European 'civilized monarchy' which has.
This distinction brought about a trichotomy of government ̶ ̶ ̶'despotism', 'civilized monarchy', and 'free government' (again it is similar21

to Montesquieu's).
Although the distinction between Asian despotism and Europeanmonarchy was then quite common38, it was chapter 4 of Machiavelli's
Prince which Hume explicitly relied on when he argued this distinction.
Though Hume started his discussion on the 'civilized monarchy' withcriticizing Machiavelli's understanding of the monarchy (Essays: 'Civil
Liberty', 87-8)39, in a essay appeared in the same year Hume saw
Machiavelli's observation on the difference between French and Turkish
monarchy in chapter 4 of The Prince, as 'one of those eternal political truths,
which no time nor accidents can vary'. Here Hume paraphrases
Machiavelli's distinction into one which defines the difference between'European' and 'eastern' monarchy40. Machiavelli insisted, and Humeaccepts, that it is the existence of the aristocratic social classes thatcharacterize the European monarchy (Essays: 'Politics a Science', 21-3). Hereagain, this would remind us of Montesquieu's monarchy41.
However, the Harrington-like understanding of the feudal
government separated Hume from Montesquieu. As we saw above, Humeregarded the feudal constitution as a pre-civil society, which was overcome
by absolute 'civilized monarchy'. Feudal barons were mere impediments tothe settlement of political society. On the contrary, Montesquieu, who saw
modern monarchy as a successor to the Gothic and feudal government,
praised the feudal warriors' valour, aristocratic pride and honour, which hedefined as the 'principle' of the monarchy. Although Hume also thinks
highly of these traits ('a sense of honour'), he strictly limits the scope ofthem. Aristocratic love of honour could be harmless and efficient, only if it
is located within polite society, especially formed around noble ladies in38

Koebner (1951).
In this essay Hume regards Machiavelli's understanding as too outdated to understand modernmonarchy such as French. But in History Hume says 'Machiavel, in his Dissertations on Livy, says
repeatedly, that France was the most legal and most popular monarchy then in Europe' (HE, 5:563).
40
There is a possibility that Hume gave focuses on chapter 4 of The Prince because Harrington did
when he distinguished between absolute and limited monarchy (Oceana, 54).
41
See also Essays: 'Of Public Credit', 358, in which Hume regards the aristocratic class as 'a kindof independent magistracy' and 'the middle power' which could resist the deformation of the government
into despotism.
39

22

court. It must be transformed there into an inclination to be 'agreeable' toother persons. Mere warriors' valour is now barbarous and useless, and has
no relation with polished manners of modern Europe (Essays: 'Rise andProgress', 126-34)42. In short, what distinguishes Hume from Montesquieu istheir different understanding of the feudal government.
When Hume argued European polished manners, he excluded not
only the spirit of barons but also of Christianity. It focused on the glory infuture life, and therefore ignored and destroyed the moral codes that thepassion for fame in this world nourished among temporal civil societies43.
It is evident, as Hume himself cites explicitly, that in this political criticism
of Christianity, he relies on the famous argument of Chapter 2, Book 2 ofMachiavelli's Discourses (Natural History of Religion, sec. 10).
As a summary, we can say the following. Hume did not reject thetradition of politics, but inherited and innovated some of the traditions. It isproper to conclude he adjusted the traditions and added new insights
compatible with the new age, rather than to conclude he created newpolitical science for new commercial age.
Although James Harrington was not a blind admirer of the ancientworld, as is evident from his criticism of the Roman government, his
politics was fundamentally based on 'ancient prudence'; ancient politicalinstitutions and the political science of them. The same can be said as to
Machiavelli whom Harrington admired, and Hume who learned a lot fromthese two. It is certain Hume unveiled barbarity of the ancient world, but
his politics were still based on the traditions that had long interpreted andre-interpreted the ancient institutions, events, and politics. Hume was a

42

See also his discussion on chivalry as an origin of modern European manners (HE, Appendix 2;'Authenticity of Ossian's Poem'; and 'Chivalry and Modern Honour'). He focuses solely on 'gallantry',
while criticizing the practice of dueling. Besides, Hume dares to insist that chivalry had derived not from
German but from Roman ('Chivalry and Modern Honour', 56-7).
43
Essays: 'Of the Immortality of the Soul', 592-5. Especially on Catholicism, Human Nature, 599600; Morals, 270; Natural History of Religion, sec. 10. On Protestantism, HE, 5:493-4. According to
Hume, 'morality', or 'civil society' itself, can and should be maintained by 'the punishment by the civil
magistrate, the infamy of the world, and secret remorses of conscience, which are the great motives that
operate on mankind' (HE, 3:472).

23

politician before the break in the history of political thought, after which it
has become unnecessary to read Polybius or Cicero in order to think about
politics.

Ayres, Philip (1997), Classical Culture and the Idea of Rome in Eighteenth Century
England, Cambridge.
Conniff, James (1976), 'Hume's Political Methodology: A Reconsideration of "That
Politics May Be Reduced to a Science" ', Review of Politics, XXXVIII.
Dickinson, Harry T. (1977), Liberty and Property: Political Ideologies in EighteenthCentury Britain, New York; London.
Erskine-Hill, Howard (1983), The Augustan Idea in English Literature, London.
Forbes, Duncan (1963), 'Politics and History in David Hume' (Review of Giarrizzo,
David Hume politico e storico), Historical Journal, VI.
̶ ̶ ̶ (1970), 'Introduction' to his edition of Hume, History of Great Britain,
Harmondsworth.
̶̶̶ (1975), Hume's Philosophical Politics, Cambridge; New York.
̶̶̶ (1978), 'The European, or Cosmopolitan, Dimension in Hume's Science of
Politics', British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies, I.
Fukuda, Arihiro (1997), Sovereignty and the Sword: Harrington, Hobbes, and Mixed
Government in the English Civil Wars, Oxford; New York.
Gerrard, Chiristine (1994), The Patriot Opposition to Walpole: Politics, Poetry, andNational Myth, 1725-1742, Oxford.
Gunn, John A. W. (1983), Beyond Liberty and Property: The Process of Self-Recognitionin Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, Kingston.
Hont, Istvan, and Ignatieff, Michael eds. (1983), Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of
Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, Cambridge; New York.
Johnson, James W. (1958), 'The Meaning of "Augustan" ', Journal of the History of Ideas,
XIX.
̶̶̶ (1967), The Formation of English Neo-Classical Thought, Princeton.
Koebner, R. (1951), 'Despot and Despotism: Vicissitudes of a Political Term', Journal of
the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, XIV.
Manzer, Robert A. (1996a), 'Hume on Pride and Love of Fame', Polity, XXVIII.
24

Miller, Eugene F. (1990), 'Hume on Liberty in the Successive English Constitutions', inCapaldi, Nicholas and Livingston, Donald W. eds, Liberty in Hume's History ofEngland, Dordrecht, 1990.
Miller, Peter N. (1994), Defining the Common Good: Empire, Religion and Philosophy inEighteenth-Century Britain, Cambridge; New York.
Moore, James (1977), 'Hume's Political Science and the Classical Republican Tradition',
Canadian Journal of Political Science, X.
Mossner, Ernest C. (1980), The Life of David Hume, Oxford (2nd edn.).
Pocock, John G. A. (1979), 'Hume and the American Revolution: The Dying Thoughtsof a North Briton', reprinted in his Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on
Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century, Cambridge,
1985.
Price, John V. (1966), 'Hume's Concept of Liberty and The History of England', Studies
in Romanticism, V.
Robertson, John (1983), 'Scottish Enlightenment at the Limits of the Civic Tradition', in
Hont and Ignatieff (1983).
̶̶̶ (1985), The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue, Edinburgh.
Sakamoto, Tatsuya (1995), Hume's Civilized Society, Tokyo (in Japanese).
Sakamoto, Tatsuya and Tanaka, Hideo eds. (2003), The Rise of Political Economy in the
Scottish Enlightenment, London.
Turner, Frank M. (1986), 'British Politics and the Demise of the Roman Republic: 17001939', Historical Journal, XXIX.
Ward, Addison (1964), 'The Tory View of Roman History', Studies in English Literature
1500-1900, IV.
Weinbrot, Howard D. (1978), Augustus Caesar in "Augustan" England: The Decline of aClassical Norm, Princeton.
Weston, Corinne C. (1965), English Constitutional Theory and the House of Lords
1556-1832, London; New York.
Wexler, Victor G. (1979), David Hume and the History of England, Philadelphia.
INUZUKA Hajime <hume@mac.com>

25