U.S. President George W. Bush clarified his plans for acomprehensive national missile defense system in a speech on May 1.
The system proposed by his predecessor, Bill Clinton, was more
limited, comprising between 20 and 100 missiles, intended tointercept enemy missiles in mid-flight, deployed at ground bases in
Alaska and other locations. Bush emphasized his system’s
effectiveness, but did not clarify what form it would take. It is safe tosay, however, that Bush would like to see interceptors based at sea
and in space, as well as on the ground. He is also interested in boostphase interception, or destroying missiles just after they are launched.
It seems that Bush is leaving his options open, and is happy to invest
in both systems and see which one turns out to be more viable.
The “Bush system” is different from the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI), nicknamed “Star Wars,” proposed by theadministration of Ronald Reagan. It is right, though, to call it the “sonof Star Wars,” as the U.S. administration has resumed all of thevarious missile defense studies –– at considerable cost in terms ofmoney, time and human resources –– that began with SDI.
Bush intended his May 1 speech as reassurance for Russia, achallenge to China, and a screwball to his allies, notably Japan andEuropean countries. He said: “We (The United States and Russia) are notand must not be strategic adversaries.” He went on: “We should work
together to replace this (the Anti-Ballistic Missile) treaty with a newframework that reflects a clear and clean break from the past.” The Bushadministration has rejected the ABM treaty as “residue” from the Cold
War, while Russia continues to adhere to it. For Russia, the Bushadministration’s renouncement of the treaty was inevitable. Bush,however, did not dare say as much during his speech. His intention was toleave the door open for Moscow to take part in building a new framework.
The Bush administration has dismissed Clinton’s Russia policy
as “romanticism,” and is set on policy reform. Russia, which has been
given the diplomatic cold shoulder by the Bush administration, wascertainly intrigued by the speech and stressed the possibilities fordiscussion with Washington. Sergei Stepashin, the former Russian
prime minister, said he did not want to see a repeat of the arms race hebelieved the Soviet Union been dragged into by Reagan’s “StarWars.” Sergei Markov, a Russian political analyst, said Bush said thebare minimum about his plans, but added that it was the kind of
speech Russia had been waiting for. His comments support the viewthat Russia is not about to turn its back on the United States.

CONTENTS
Missile Defense and the Bush Administration by Yoichi Nishimura … 1
Obstacles to Inter-Korean Dialogue by Scott Snyder ………………… 2
Research Project on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century–– Nuclear Issues in China, Russia and South Asia, and a NuclearWeapon Free Zone in the Northern Hemisphere ……………… 3〜5
New-interventionism Project Mission Visits East Timor ………… 4〜5
Building Peace and Stability in the Balkans –– The European Center’s
Research-Educational Project by Todor Mirkovic ………………… 6
Research Project on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism― Intervention’s Negative Legacy; the Involvement of NGOs …………… 6
HPI Research Forum: Chemical Weapons and Japan ………………… 7
International Symposium: Where Does “Unequivocal Undertaking” Stand?
–– The Current Situations and Japan’s Responsibilities in
Eliminating Nuclear Weapons …………………………………… 7
DIARY ………………………………………………………………… 8

Bush referred to China only in passing. When the Clinton
administration delayed a decision on the deployment of national
missile defense (NMD), the then U.S. National Security Adviser,
Samuel Berger, told reporters: “One of the concerns about an NMD
system is the impact it will have particularly in Asia, where, although
the Chinese already have plans to increase their ICBM program, it’s
not inconceivable that that system would accelerate those plans. That
could have an effect on India, that could have an effect on Pakistan,Japan, et cetera.” However, the Bush administration seems ready toignore China’s feelings. As one U.S. Department of Defense official
put it, China will strengthen its missile arsenal regardless of what theUnited States decides to do.
China appears unconvinced by American claims that NMD is not a
direct challenge to its missiles. Furthermore, China is concerned that thepossible deployment of a theater missile defense (TMD) system in
Taiwan would give the independence movement greater momentum. To
Beijing, a United States that is already a powerful nuclear force, with a
missile defense shield at home and in Taiwan, would be more likely totake bold military steps in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Straits.
Japan and European countries, meanwhile, have been left toreflect on Bush’s belief that NMD would protect them, too. In his
speech, Bush said: “Today’s most urgent threat stems not fromthousands of ballistic missiles in Soviet hands, but from a small
number of missiles in the hands of these states –– states for whom
terror and blackmail are a way of life. They seek weapons of mass
destruction to intimidate their neighbors and to keep the United Statesand other responsible nations from helping allies and friends instrategic parts of the world.” His remarks were intended to warn
European and Asian allies that they, not the United States, are most at
risk of ballistic missile attacks, and thus would benefit from theprotection offered by NMD. This represents a change in emphasis
compared with the Clinton administration, which began looking at
NMD halfway through its tenure in response to Republican pressure.
The device for the boost-phase interception of missiles, a newpiece in the NMD jigsaw to have appeared since Bush becamepresident, would theoretically be positioned aboard a U.S. warship
located off the Korean Peninsula, ready to intercept North Korean
long-range missiles immediately after they are launched. Although its
technical effectiveness has not been proved, it is clear that the UnitedStates expects such a system would also be used to defend Japan.
Other developments have drawn U.S. allies into missile defense
plans. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has suggested
removing the distinction between national and theater missile
defense. By doing so, he hopes to address European criticisms that
NMD and TMD constitute separate defense plans for the UnitedStates and Europe. Instead, the Bush administration is beginning to
combine NMD and TMD in its quest for a truly global missile shield.
The Japanese government has so far expressed only an“understanding” of NMD, while focusing on TMD, which, it says, istechnically different and needs to be properly understood since it has
ramifications for the defense of Japan. However, as long as the UnitedStates continues to blur the differences between the two systems,
Japan’s stance will become increasingly untenable.

−1−

Nishimura is Deputy Foreign News Editor at The Asahi Shimbun.

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Many events have been organized in South Korea in June tocommemorate the first anniversary of the inter-Korean summit inPyongyang from June 13 to 15, 2000, which remains an historic highpoint in the inter-Korean dialogue process. However, the surprisingly
strong momentum of last summer and autumn has ground to a virtual
halt, and these commemorations may now seem more like a deathwatch rather than a celebration of inter-Korean reconciliation efforts.
Many analysts, including Pyongyang’s blustery Korean Central News
Agency and some South Korean analysts, have targeted the new Bushadministration as the cause of the slowdown, but there are many otherfactors standing in the way of renewed progress in the inter-Koreandialogue.
The most significant obstacles are economic. The fundamental
inducement for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
to come to the negotiating table with South Korea in the first place
was the promise of economic benefits as a vehicle for tension
reduction. The first step in this process was the initiation of theHyundai tourism project at Mount Keumgang, which was launched at
the end of 1998. The North Koreans initially received cash paymentsof US$25 million a month in return for allowing South Korean
tourists to take hiking trips to the North to see beautiful mountainviews that had been immortalized in proverbs and landscape paintings
for hundreds of years.
The Mount Keumgang project was never financially viable, but it
was politically important to jumpstart inter-Korean dialogue. It also
had sentimental value for recently deceased Hyundai Group
Chairman Chung Ju Yung, who negotiated the project directly withDPRK Chairman Kim Jong Il. The Hyundai Asan company does nothave the cash flow to sustain regular payments to North Korea.
Hyundai Group companies can no longer provide financial or in-kind
subsidies to the project as they face their own problems ofrestructuring and financial survival, and tourist demand has dropped
by at least half since the project began. A bailout of the project by theSouth Korean government would be greeted with suspicion andwould contradict corporate restructuring principles that are central to
the Korean economy’s overall health and attractiveness to foreign
investors. The future of the Mount Keumgang tourism project is verymuch undecided.
Plans to assist North Korea’s economic rehabilitation by
providing Social Overhead Capital (SOC) –– essential if the North isto have the infrastructure to be globally competitive –– have also
ground to a halt.
The most visible symbol of renewed links between North andSouth Korea has been the proposed rebuilding of an inter-Korean
railroad and highway connection across the demilitarized zone
(DMZ). But this project appears unlikely to go forward as the North
Koreans have made no effort to begin construction work on their sideof the DMZ, despite the fact that de-mining and railway construction
work have begun in South Korea. The inter-Korean militaryagreements that were necessary to determine jurisdictional and safety
procedures for workers inside the DMZ have also not been ratified,despite initial progress at the working level.
The railway project is important because it would provide a direct
link to North Korea and to the proposed Kaesong Industrial Zone
envisioned by Hyundai Group Chairman Chung Ju Yung. Although
the government-owned Koland Corp. has taken over planning for thatproject, South Korea’s own economic slump has dampened public
enthusiasm for it.

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The “Berlin Declaration,” in which President Kim Dae Jung
pledged that South Korea would provide wide-ranging help to rebuild
North Korea’s economic infrastructure, was a catalyst for interKorean summit preparations. However, North Korean demands fortwo million kilowatts of energy assistance put forward at the lastround of ministerial-level dialogue last December were not acceptedby the South Korean side; rather, the South proposed a survey ofNorth Korea’s current energy needs and infrastructure to determine
how best to respond. Moreover, the North Korean proposal raised
American concerns that North Korea’s request for energy was a wayof side-stepping its nuclear obligations under the Geneva Agreed
Framework, which includes a pledge by the United States to provide
energy to North Korea in return for the dismantling of Pyongyang’s
indigenous nuclear program.
These economic obstacles are now being overtaken by politicalproblems that could derail inter-Korean dialogue for a long time. The
first political obstacle is low public approval for President Kim Dae
Jung’s government, which is widely viewed as having failed to solve
South Korea’s most pressing economic and social problems. Many
blame Kim Dae Jung for pursuing inter-Korean progress at theexpense of South Korea’s domestic agenda. Second, domestic prepositioning for the next South Korean presidential election has
already begun, distracting Korean attention from the North to otherissues. Third, political coordination among the United States, Japan,
and South Korea remains critical, but has been overtaken by domestic
issues in all three countries.
Finally, the DPRK has made a strategic error in linking progressin inter-Korean relations to the policy review of the new Bushadministration, further complicating prospects for inter-Koreandialogue. Progress in inter-Korean relations will inevitably draw theUnited States into dialogue with the North on a range of issues andcreate positive momentum; however, the lack of inter-Koreandialogue is good evidence for those who feel that the North’s
intentions deserve a skeptical response. Moreover, the Bushadministration will expect new progress in inter-Korean dialogue tomove forward in conjunction with its own renewed negotiations with
the DPRK. In addition, the DPRK’s consistent targeting of Japan for
criticism is a tactical and strategic error, given that it will needJapanese capital to support its own rehabilitation.
The success or failure of the current dialogue does not rest with
the United States; the ball is clearly in North Korea’s court. In fact,
South Korea has served almost the entire game and has used up
almost all of the balls in play, with only a few returns by the North. As
a result, the game may be almost over. The big gamble Kim Dae Jung
took in depending on Kim Jong Il for his own political success could
prove to have been a starry-eyed failure.
Only the leadership in Pyongyang can open the door to true
progress, verification, and greater transparency in dialogue with
South Korea, the United States, and Japan, laying the foundations fora relationship built on trust. Neither Kim Dae Jung nor President Bushis in a position to pull the door open without some positive, concrete,and substantive moves by Pyongyang.
Scott Snyder is the Korea Representative of The Asia Foundation
and author of “Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating
Behavior.” The views contained here are his own and do not necessarily
represent those of The Asia Foundation.

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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.4 No.1 July 2001

The Hiroshima Peace Institute’s Research Project on
Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century held four meetings
between January and April 2001. The meetings featured
presentations by project members and guest speakers.
Following is a summary of the presentations.

4) the use of nuclear fuel-cycle technology in dismantling warheads.
However, dismantlement projects will face difficulties if the Bushadministration’s attitude toward the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty continues to harden and Russia continues its support for Iran’s
nuclear energy program.

¡The 8th meeting (Jan. 26)

Guest speaker: Hisako Iizuka, lecturer, Musashino Junior College
Title: “Nuclear Development in China”

Guest speaker: Yoshio Endo, assistant professor, Institute of World
Studies, Takushoku University
Title: “Nuclear Issue in South Asia –– A View from Pakistan ––”“Global Trends 2015,” a report recently released by the CIA for
the Bush administration, makes several predictions about IndoPakistan relations. It says:
1) That India will expand its counterattack capability based on“minimum deterrence;”2) that Pakistan will deploy nuclear weapons and missiles based on“minimum deterrence,” and that its arsenal will not necessarilyreflect the size of India’s; and3) that India and Pakistan will build up their nuclear and missile
forces over the next 15 years, making theirs the world’s mostserious nuclear problem.
India and Pakistan both became nuclear states following theirtests in 1998, and developed their own theories of minimum
deterrence. India proposed a No-first-use (NFU) Pact, insisting that it
would use nuclear weapons only in retaliation, while Pakistan
proposed a No-war Pact, virtually asserting its right to strike first with
nuclear weapons. Pakistan has been promoting itself at home andabroad as a responsible nuclear-weapon state, having established the
National Command Authority (NCA) and the Pakistan Nuclear
Regulatory Authority (PNRA). India, meanwhile, has pushed its
policy of isolating Pakistan by opposing Afghan terrorism, improving
its nuclear missile technology, and conducting tests on a new type of
missile, the Agni-II.
A greater effort is required at the global level to establish a more
inclusive Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and, atthe regional level, to foster better relations between India andPakistan.

Since it became a communist state in 1949, China has regarded
nuclear development as integral to its modernization. It has also been
an important factor in sustaining the legitimacy of the Communist
Party’s rule.
The decision to develop a nuclear capability was made by Mao
Zedong in January 1955, prompted, no doubt, by the knowledge that
the United States had considered using nuclear weapons during the
Korean War. China’s nuclear development, however, proceeded
without Russian technology as a result of Sino-Soviet tensions andNikita Khrushchev’s wish to seek peaceful co-existence with theUnited States. China’s belief in the necessity of nuclear weapons
increased after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. It tested its firstatomic bomb in 1964 and carried out a successful test on a hydrogenbomb only three years later.
Although many scientists were persecuted during the Great
Cultural Revolution, Mao and Zhou Enlai protected those closely
involved in the nuclear development program. China and the UnitedStates began exchanging nuclear technology during the presidency ofRichard Nixon following a rise in Sino-Soviet tensions in 1969 and
Sino-U.S. rapprochement in 1971. During the era of Deng Xiaoping’s
leadership, China reinforced its defense technology and conducted
one or two nuclear tests a year from 1980 to 1996, while attempting toreassure the rest of the world with references to “no-first-use,”“preservation of peace” and “self-defense.” But the 1991 Gulf War
forced China to admit that its weaponry was outdated. In addition, thecollapse of the Soviet Union showed the perils of relying too heavily
on military might for political legitimacy.
China’s nuclear development program has continued, and isintended as a deterrent to U.S. nuclear forces. China, in tandem with
Russia, will continue to oppose American unilateralism andWashington’s plans for national missile defense.

¡The 9th meeting (Feb. 13)
Guest speaker: Yasuhide Yamanouchi, professor, Center for
Global Communications, International University of Japan
Title: “Japanese Nuclear Security Cooperation with the CIS
Countries: Present Situation and Prospect”

After the end of Cold War, the Group of Eight (G8) nations became
more aware of the need to dismantle warheads in the former Soviet
Union. The G8 spent about $2.7 billion on the denuclearization of theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS) between 1992 and 1999
under the Mutual Threat Reduction (MTR) Program. Japan contributed$300 million. That sum included $200 million pledged by Japan at theG8 summit in Cologne in 1999. It has been used to dispose ofplutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads in fast breeder reactors
and to help decommission Russia’s Far East fleet of submarines.
Japan’s diplomatic contributions are diverse and include:
1) An MTR program led by the United States at the global level andimplemented in cooperation with the rest of the G8;2) nuclear disarmament in the Russian Far East, which in turn affects
U.S.-Japan security ties;3) the promotion of comprehensive nuclear disarmament, an
important issue for Japan; andHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.4 No.1 July 2001

¡The 10th meeting (Mar. 30)
Speaker: Tadaakira Joh, professor, Hiroshima Shudo University
and project member
Title: “Recent Movement Toward the Establishment of NuclearWeapon Free Zones in the Northern Hemisphere”

According to a resolution passed by the UN General Assembly in
1975, nuclear-weapon free zones must have strictly fixed boundaries;
be inspected by international teams before the countries concerned
can comply with treaty obligations; and be respected by nuclear
weapon states.
Nuclear-weapon free zones are designed to:1) Provide negative security assurance for non-nuclear weapon states;
2) promote regional disarmament;3) strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime; and4) promote confidence building and preventive diplomacy.
Nuclear-weapon free zone treaties were signed in Latin America,
the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and Africa, with the first threehaving come into effect. In the Northern Hemisphere, a nuclearweapon free zone in Mongolia was recognized by a UN General
Assembly resolution in 1988.

−3−

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Five Central Asian countries are currently negotiating a nuclearweapon free zone. The parties wish to:1) Maintain their security in the post-Soviet era;2) dismantle strategic nuclear weapons possessed by Kazakhstan andcomplete that country’s denuclearization;3) avoid a repeat of the Chernobyl nuclear accident; and
4) deal with the effects of radiation from a former nuclear test site in
Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan.
However, the existence of a security treaty between Kazakhstan andRussia that includes nuclear issues is proving to be an obstacle tonegotiations. Western and Central Europe should also think seriously
about establishing nuclear-weapon free zones.
Speaker: Nobumasa Akiyama, research associate, Hiroshima
Peace Institute and project member
Title: “The Complexities of Nuclear Issues in North Korea: Nonproliferation, Containment, and Energy Supply”

The North Korean nuclear issue comprises three main elements:
Its geographical spread, which encompasses East Asia, South Asia,and the Middle East; its policy ramifications, ranging from nuclear
non-proliferation to the security of Asia; and economic and energy
issues in North Korea itself and their linkages with other issues, suchas missiles and nuclear weapons, economic aid and non-proliferation,
disarmament and the strengthening of alliances, and disarmament andmissile defense.
Concern over North Korea’s nuclear program grew in the early

1990s when Pyongyang refused to allow the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect the Yonbyon nuclear facility andannounced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT). However, the United States and North Korea managed toreach a compromise in the 1994 Agreed Framework. Nonetheless, theframework itself is problematic: Its aim is not disarmament but nonproliferation; it accepts a continuation of the current situation in
North Korea; and it does not obligate either party to comply with theagreement.
North Korea regards nuclear weapons and missiles not as military
hardware per se but as bargaining chips. The Bush administration has
indicated that it wishes to cooperate with the North, but has switched
the United States’ emphasis from dialogue to deterrence. It supports
Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine policy,” and emphasizes close cooperation
with Japan and South Korea. Missile defense will, of course, have aconsiderable bearing on U.S.-North Korean relations.

¡The 11th meeting (Apr. 27)
Guest speaker: Junichi Abe, senior research fellow, the Kazankai
Foundation
Title: “Chinese Nuclear Arsenal: Its Build-up Process and Problems”

China’s nuclear development began around 1955, and grew out of
mistrust of the Soviet Union which feared being involved in a war with
the United States –– a fear born of the Korean War. China initially
expected support from the Soviet Union, but was left with no choice→

A research mission formed by the project on the legitimacy
and rationality of new-interventionism visited East Timor fromFeb. 14 to 21. Its aims were to observe the work of the UN Transitional
Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) and non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) in the areas of peace-keeping, peacebuilding, and reconciliation in post-conflict East Timor, and togauge the contributions made toward peace and stability in the areaby the international community. The mission also surveyed
problems that might arise as a result of the involvement ofinternational actors. Below is a brief report on the mission’s
activities, commentary on attempts to rebuild East Timor’s society,and some remarks on the “Timorization” of the country’s social
system. Particular attention will be paid to the role of NGOs.

Reconstruction in Dili
The mission flew into Dili, the capital, from Denpasar. It took
ages to clear passport control, which was administered by local
officials supervised by UNTAET. Timorization, or the process ofhanding over all administrative functions to local staff by theinternational staff of UNTAET was under way. Passport control is oneof the new functions of the state to have emerged with the withdrawalof Indonesian forces. Currently, however, East Timor is under thecontrol of UNTAET, whose name was stamped on our passports byimmigration officials. We did not need a visa to enter the country.
We stayed at a hotel owned and operated by Australians.
There, we met engineers and specialists dispatched by the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The hotel was a simple
structure: The bedrooms resembled freight containers –– only they
had a window, a door and air-conditioning. We shared shower andtoilet facilities with other guests. The restaurant was in a nearby
cottage. The town itself appeared safe, although we came acrosslots of buildings that had been gutted by the Indonesian military

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and the Timorese militia. Some of them were being rebuilt. Chineseand Portuguese restaurants were open for business, and we even saw
several Internet cafes opened for UN and international aid workers.
I did not notice a marked shortage of goods at marketplaces, andsupermarkets were open for business.
However, prices remained very unstable, and much of theemerging economic activity was targeted at the international staffof UNTAET and NGOs. The economic gap between them andlocal people had created a distorted economic structure. Among the
locals, too, a gap had opened up between those working for orserving UNTAET and NGOs, on the one hand, and those who werenot, on the other. Some earned money by renting their property to
UNTAET staff at outrageously high rates. The situation outside
Dili was far worse. In Ainaro and Cova Lima, which we visited,
power lines were down and electricity was in very short supply,
while markets were short of goods.

Importance of NGOs
The mission conducted interviews with UNTAET and NGO
staff and aid workers. We were greatly impressed with thecommitment shown by NGOs to building peace in post-conflict
East Timor. One UNTAET member called East Timor a“showcase” for NGO aid activities. That comment was no doubt
inspired by the sheer scale and variety of their activities. Suchgroups were engaged not only in the distribution of aid but also in
civic education, the building of social infrastructure, and theprevention of further conflict through reconciliation. Their presence
was integral to UNTAET’s reconstruction and reconciliation
efforts, since they could collect useful and detailed information on
the ground that could later be used by UNTAET.
One NGO, for instance, took advantage of its role in handing out
aid to find out about conflicts over the distribution of aid and−4−

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.4 No.1 July 2001

→

but to continue its nuclear development program alone. It conducted
its first successful nuclear test, on a steel tower, in 1964, followed byan airborne test a year later and a hydrogen bomb test in 1966.
China abides by what it calls a “minimum deterrence strategy,”which promises nuclear retaliation against urban centers in the hostilenation. It has also pledged “no-first-use” –– neither use nor threat to use
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states –– but Taiwan
appears to have been excluded from that pledge. China seems likely
to shift its nuclear strategy to one of “limited deterrence,” enabling it
to address threats from several types of nuclear weapons, both tacticaland strategic.
China’s nuclear arsenal consists of about 400 weapons, twothirds of which are missile warheads, usually unloaded. Most of its
missiles are of the old type that use liquid fuel and do not have a firststrike capability. Its tactical missiles are stationary and unlikely tosurvive an attack and be used in retaliation. China is in a transitional
phase, developing a new generation of missiles that ignore
disarmament and control regimes. Its priority is modernizing its
nuclear force, borne of a belief that it cannot call itself truly developed
unless it has nuclear weapons and missiles.
Guest speaker: Kori Urayama, research assistant, the Tokyo Foundation
Title: “U.S.-Japan Perception Gap over Missile Defense Cooperation”

Since North Korea test-launched a Taepodong missile in 1998,
the Japanese government has shown a positive attitude toward U.S.Japan joint technology research on theater missile defense (TMD). In

1999, the two countries issued a memorandum of understanding that
included an agreement to begin studying the feasibility of an uppertier Navy Theater Wide (NTW) system, a component of TMD.
However, doubts about the feasibility of missile defense have dogged
the project from the outset.
Supporters of TMD say that it would reinforce the U.S. nuclear
umbrella and strengthen defense cooperation between Washington
and Tokyo. They argue that TMD would enhance regional stability by
preventing China from becoming the dominant regional power andnuetralize nuclear capabilities, thereby acting as a form of arms
control.
Critics say, however, that TMD would increase Japan’s dependence
on the United States, and that other American allies, too, would be
relegated to a more passive role. Bilateral talks would be nominal,
they say, adding that a serious gap exists between the “global” missile
defense system advocated by President Bush and existing the level of
missile defense technology.
Finally, there is a perception gap over missile defense between
Japan and the United States. Washington appears to believe that there
is widespread public support for missile defense in Japan, since nostrong opposition has been voiced. In truth, however, Japan has yet toclear a proper debate on the pros and cons of missile defense and, asa result, its position is unclear. It is time Japan had that debate andadopted an equivocal stance on missile defense.
By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI

New-interventionism Project Mission Visits East Timor

attendant tensions within individual communities. The organization
did not attempt to prevent trouble from happening, but rather
assessed, through observation, the real cause or causes of the
problem, thereby enabling the communities concerned to resolve
their differences at a more fundamental level and restore long-term
mutual trust. That, it seemed, was the real path toward reconciliation.
For this and many other reasons, NGOs were playing a vital role in
the reconstruction and rehabilitation of East Timorese society.
Yet the NGOs have reached a turning point. They may now
have to redirect the focus of their work as the situation in East Timor
shifts from its emergency phase –– in which the provision of foodand shelter has been the top priority –– to one of development, whichemphasizes the importance of infrastructure and economic activity.
Concerns exist, too, about the extent to which East Timor depends
on foreign aid. While foreign agencies have achieved much to be
proud of, their presence has given rise to fatigue and frustration on
the part of local people and foreigners alike. Graffiti on a wall in Dili
read: “UN Go To Hell.” We also heard an argument over the wisdomof levying a tax on showy NGO activities. Many NGO members
appeared aware of these resentments and their potential for trouble,
and were mindful of the need to readjust their activities toward
promoting sustainable self-reliance among the Timorese.
Another matter of concern is the level of cooperation between
UNTAET and NGOs, and among NGOs themselves. Public healthand sanitation policy offers a good example. Many NGOs operate
in this field in different regions and work according to their own
criteria and methods. Organizations involved in policy planningand project operations differ from one region to another, and theiractivities are not very well coordinated. No single policy frameworkor standard for NGO operations exists in East Timor. For instance,in public health policy, NGOs also tend to concentrate policy
resources to provide full services in one or a few specifically targetedareas, while UNTAET wishes to implement comprehensive,
nationwide programs even though they do not satisfy the sufficientlevel of services. Although UNTAET and NGOs share a common

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.4 No.1 July 2001

goal –– that of building a viable East Timorese state –– their methods
are different. There is an important lesson here: The need for more
serious consideration of how international agencies can carry out
effective assistance activities in a coordinated way.

Final Remarks
The economy of East Timor is in fact in worse shape than it
was under Indonesian rule, and it is natural to suppose that some inthe country prefer things the way they were. But the most serious
obstacle to real progress is the country’s shortage of humanresources. East Timor has fewer than 20 medical doctors and only
two qualified lawyers. More high school teachers and public sector
managers are also urgently needed, since Indonesians dominatedthese areas before independence. As a result, East Timor lacks thesocial infrastructure to make independence work. Some observers
argue that the country’s independence came far too early to be of
any real benefit. However, the international community was asked
to provide help to East Timorese in their quest for independence
and freedom, despite the many difficulties they faced. Internationalsociety knew that would be no easy task, but it could not ignore thedesire of local people for independence and their fervent wish to be
free from violence and to secure social and political rights. Being
in East Timor itself and talking to people on the ground made us
feel that any discussion of the appropriateness and timing of
independence was irrelevant. We also believe that we ought to beaware of the realities of the situation in East Timor while
conducting research on theoretical aspects of peace-building andinternational assistance.
The mission was led by Toshiya Hoshino of Osaka University.
He was accompanied by Jun Tsubouchi of Yamanashi University,
and Nobumasa Akiyama of the Hiroshima Peace Institute, who
acted as coordinator.

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Akiyama is a research associate at HPI.

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

By Todor Mirkovic
The Balkans, the least developed region of Europe and one of themost unstable areas in the world, is faced with numerous, mostly
unpredictable, threats and challenges. Recent events in the Balkans–– the demise of the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia,
the international sanctions imposed against Yugoslavia, and NATO’s
military actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and against
Yugoslavia in 1999 –– had widespread economic, social, ecologicaland other consequences.
The European Center for Peace and Development (ECPD) at the
University for Peace (San Jose, Costa Rica) has included in its midterm plan and program of work a very complex and multidisciplinary
project titled “THE BALKANS IN THE 21st CENTURY ––Possibilities of Building Ways and Conditions for Peace and Stability
in the Balkans.” The ECPD intends to use its 15 years of experienceand all of the intellectual and other skills at its disposal to help leadthe Balkans out of their current situation toward one in which newconflicts are prevented and peace, development and cooperation
promoted. Building a culture of peace, tolerance, coexistence andbetter understanding among ethnic and religious groups and nations isamong the ECPD’s prime objectives. The project will be implemented
through a variety of activities, including: 1) the development andimplementation of a program for peace education in the Balkans; 2)
carrying-out research projects and/or case studies on crucial issues in
the region; and 3) organizing international conferences andconsultative and other meetings aimed at realizing the project’s aims.
The ECPD is giving priority to the elaboration and implementationof the program of education for peace and research on problems of theenvironment and sustainable development, including irradiation
generated by industrial, medical, research and military activities. The
ECPD has launched this significant project to benefit Europe ingeneral and the Balkans in particular, and expects to win the supportof domestic and international organizations that are interested inbringing peace and stability to this part of the world.

The seventh meeting of Research Project on the Legitimacy and
Rationality of New-interventionism was held on Feb. 27 in Hiroshima.
The eighth meeting was held on April 12 in Tokyo. The theme of theformer was the legitimacy of intervention under international law.
Akiho Shibata, associate professor of international law at Okayama
University and a project member, made a presentation titled“Intervention as International Law Enforcement? –– Doctrinal
Development in Japan.” Maiko Ozawa, a Ph.D. candidate at theGraduate School of Law, Kyushu University, made a speech titled“Humanitarian Intervention in the Modern World: International
Conflict or Internal Conflict?”
Shibata analyzed why acceptance of “intervention” had not takenroot in the Japanese academic community of international law
specialists. He focused on how many Japanese academics have cometo question intervention as a means of law enforcement or forcible
conflict settlement and why they regard their negative view asrepresentative of the mainstream interpretation of international law.
He discussed the history of the theoretical study of international law
and the way social changes in postwar Japan have nurtured anaversion to the use of military force. The existing system, some argue,is defective in the way it confirms violations of international law as
well as in the selection of executors and execution of the law.
Nevertheless, they do not rule out the possibility of intervention to
uphold international law in situations where peaceful settlement ofconflicts is unsuccessful.
Ozawa made a presentation on the judicial precedent set by theInternational Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1986 over the Americanintervention in Nicaragua. She discussed Nicaragua’s contention that
the United States violated international law by using military force,and the counterargument made by the United States that it was simply
exercising its right to collective self-defense. She touched on related
issues, such as the principles of noninterference in the domestic affairsof another country and of the protection of human rights. She offered
an interpretation of international conflict settlement and collective
self-defense as described in the UN Charter. Post-Cold War changes

in the concept of humanitarian interference, as demonstrated in
Kosovo, were also discussed.
At the project’s eighth meeting, Yukie Osa, secretary general of
the Association for Aid and Relief and a project member, gave apresentation titled “By-product of Humanitarian Intervention: Cluster
Munitions Deployed in Kosovo.” Hiroaki Ishii from the Tokyo officeof Peace Winds Japan (PWJ) made a presentation titled “Emergency
Humanitarian Assistance of Peace Winds Japan –– Kosovo’s Case.”
He also talked about Japan Platform, a new initiative to coordinate
the efforts of Japanese NGOs, businesses and government bodies in
the area of emergency assistance.
Osa argued that unexploded cluster bombs were a negative
legacy of humanitarian intervention. Cluster bombs comprisequantities of smaller explosives, which break up while airborne andscatter across targets on the ground. Some of them fail to explode,creating a risk to civilians similar to that posed by land mines. They
can be found both in rural and urban areas, impacting the lives oflarge numbers of people. Critics say dropping non-guided cluster
bombs from a high altitude is simply shifting the risk away from thepilot to the civilians below. Osa questioned the legitimacy of such amethod of military intervention for humanitarian purposes that itself
poses a threat to life by leaving such negative legacies as cluster
bombs. Further consideration should be given not simply to thelegitimacy of intervention but also to who will handle the negative
legacies of intervention, she said.
Ishii talked about PWJ’s activities in Kosovo, and offered usefulsuggestions regarding the feasibility, limits and methods of NGO
involvement in post-conflict emergency humanitarian aid. He outlined
an ideal framework for Japanese NGOs and discussed how theiractivities should proceed alongside military action. He made a solidcase for greater involvement of NGOs in government activities andsupported his argument with references to PWJ’s experience in
Kosovo.

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

Dr. Todor Mirkovic is Special Adviser for Peace Studies andProject Manager at the European Center for Peace and Development,
the University for Peace, which was established by the United Nationsin Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

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By Nobumasa Akiyama, research associate at HPIHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.4 No.1 July 2001

A research forum on Japan’s role in disposing of chemical
weapons was held at the Hiroshima Peace Institute on May 7, 2001.
The forum, organized by the HPI, included discussions on weaponscontaining chemical gas abandoned in China by the former JapaneseArmy. The keynote speaker was Shuji Shimokoji, deputy director of
the Center for the Promotion of the Disarmament and Nonproliferation at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. The forum
was attended by more than 20 researchers, experts and journalists
with an interest in poisonous gas weapons produced in Okunojima
island in Hiroshima Prefecture before and during World War II.
Shimokoji talked about the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), the disposal of abandoned chemical weapons by
the Japanese government, and future challenges. Following are themain points of the discussion:
Broadly speaking, chemical weapons are those designed to cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm, according to the
CWC. The treaty bans two kinds of chemical agents: harassing agentsand casualty agents. The production of chemical weapons began in thesecond half of the 19th century. Mustard gas (Yperit), so named becauseof its smell, was developed in 1917 during World War I, and marked the
beginning of the full-scale use of poisonous gas in battle. About 100,000
people died from and an estimated million people experienced longterm side effects of the mustard gas used in World War I.
Controls on the use of chemical weapons appeared at about thesame time. Their use was banned at the Hague Peace Conferences in1899 and by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. However, loopholes remained,
as many signatories reserved the right to use them in retaliation andagainst non-signatories. In the 1930s, Italy used chemical weapons inEthiopia, and Japan was rumored to have done so during the SinoJapanese war. After World War II, harassing agents were used during

the civil war in Yemen and the Vietnam War in the 1960s. Casualty
agents were used in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. An outright ban
on chemical weapons was negotiated for the first time at the Geneva
Conference on Disarmament in 1968. The CWC, which prohibits theuse, development, production and stockpiling of such weapons, wasconcluded in 1993.
Japan ratified the convention in 1995, with its obligations under
the treaty going into effect two years later. Since it obligates its
signatories to dispose of chemical weapons abandoned on foreignsoil, the Japanese government is responsible for disposing of themassive quantities of weapons abandoned in China by the former
Japanese Army. In 1990, the Chinese government notified Japan of
the whereabouts and amounts of the abandoned chemical weapons.
Since 1991, Japan has conducted 16 on-site surveys, but has faced
several problems.
First, the number of the abandoned weapons is enormous. China
estimates there are two million shells, while Japan puts the number at
700,000. Safely disposing of them will not be easy. Second, themajority of them are buried and need to be dug up. Third, the weapons
are very old. Deformed, cracked and/or rusting shells are extremely
difficult to dispose of. Fourth, special disposal technology will beneeded as many of the shells contain arsenic.
The 20-member Office for Abandoned Chemical Weapons, partof the Prime Minister’s Office, is responsible for the disposal of theseweapons. Such operations, however, must be carried out with thecooperation of citizens. The amount of time, cost and technicaldifficulties involved mean that the disposal of the chemical weaponsin China will be no easy task.
By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPIINTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

Where Does “Unequivocal Undertaking” Stand?
–– The Current Situations and Japan’s Responsibilities in Eliminating Nuclear Weapons
More than a year has passed since the five nuclear-weapon states pledged an “unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the totalelimination of their nuclear arsenals” at the 2000 NPT review conference. How is that undertaking reflected in the current situation?
What can Japan do as a non-nuclear weapon state? Six panelists, including overseas experts from the United States and Russia, adiplomat from one of the New Agenda Coalition countries –– which are calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons –– and thehead of an international NGO will suggest ways in which to realize this important undertaking. Members of the audience will be
encouraged to participate in the debate.
Panelists:
Dr. Lawrence Scheinman
Amb. Roland M. Timerbaev
Mr. Tariq Rauf
Amb. Darach MacFhionnbhairr
Ms. Rebecca Johnson
Prof. Mitsuru Kurosawa
Date and time:
Venue:
Organizer:

Distinguished Professor of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies office inWashington, D.C., Monterey Institute of International Studies
Chairman of the board and senior advisor at the Center for Policy Studies, Russia
Director of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program (IONP),
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Director of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs,
Government of Ireland
Executive director of the Acronym Institute, UK
Professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University

July 28, 2001 1:30 p.m.〜4:30 p.m.
The Himawari room, second basement floor (B2), International Conference Center, Hiroshima
Hiroshima Peace Institute

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.4 No.1 July 2001

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Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

D I A R Y

March 1, 2001 - June 30, 2001
◆March 4 - 10
Nobumasa Akiyama visits the United States to attend a preparatory meeting of
an international seminar organized by the Association for Communication ofTranscultural Study.
◆March 9 - 11
Masamichi Kamiya participates in the 13th United Nations Regional
Conference on Disarmament in Katmandu, Nepal, organized by the UN
Department for Disarmament Affairs.
◆March 13 - 14
Kamiya attends an international symposium titled “Culture of Prevention ––Multi-Actor Coordination from the UN to Civil Society,” organized by the Ministryof Foreign Affairs of Japan.
◆March 15
Akiyama attends a workshop on disarmament and security organized by theCenter for Global Communications at the International University of Japan.
◆March 16
Akiyama attends an international symposium, “Challenges Facing Japan in
the Twenty-First Century,” organized by the National Institute for Research
Advancement (NIRA) in Tokyo.
◆March 19
Kazumi Mizumoto attends an international workshop on nuclear disarmamentand non-proliferation organized by the Center for the Promotion of Disarmamentand Non-proliferation, the Japan Institute of International Affairs.
◆March 19 - 29
Kamiya acts as an advisor at the third preparatory committee for the UN
conference on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, held at the United
Nations in New York.
◆March 23
Akiyama participates in a workshop on the Caspian Basin, organized by the
Research Institute for Peace and Security.
◆March 26
Akiyama participates in a meeting on the Caspian Basin, organized by the
Research Institute for Peace and Security.
◆March 30
HPI’s project team on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century holds its 10th
meeting.
◆April 2-6
Mizumoto visits the Truman Library in Kansas City, Miss., to study reasonsfor the atomic bombing of Hiroshima for a Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum
project.
◆April 4
Akiyama participates in a workshop on preventive diplomacy organized by
Prof. Yukio Kawamura of Waseda University at Waseda University.
◆April 11
HPI President Haruhiro Fukui meets representatives of seven A-bomb
survivors’ organizations. Fukui also visits with Prof. Mitsuru Kurosawa of the
Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, and Mr. Toshiya
Hoshino, an associate professor at the school.
◆April 12
Fukui meets Mr. Tomoya Kawamura, director of the Center for the Promotionof Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs; Dr.
Akio Watanabe, director of the Research Institute for Peace and Security; and Dr.
Yasushi Akashi, chairman of the Japan Center for Preventive Diplomacy.
HPI’s project team on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism
holds its 8th meeting.
◆April 13
Fukui meets Amb. Hisashi Owada, president of the Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs; Amb. Yuji Miyamoto, director-general for arms control andscientific affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Dr. Toshiki Mogami,
professor of International Christian University; and Dr. Sadako Ogata, former UN
high commissioner for refugees.
Mizumoto and Akiyama attend the 39th Afternoon Seminar of the Tokyo
Foundation. The seminar featured a lecture on the situation on the Korean
Peninsula from the viewpoint of China by Mr. Jiang Longfan, vice president of theNortheast Asia Research Institute, Yanbian University.
◆April 25
Mizumoto attends the 40th Afternoon Seminar of the Tokyo Foundation. The

seminar featured a lecture on the current situation in Okinawa and proposals by Mr.
Ryunosuke Megumi, a journalist.
Mizumoto attends the 31st Forum on New Thinking on Security Issues,organized by the Tokyo Foundation. The forum featured a lecture, “Revision of the
Self-Defense Forces Law and the Japan-U.S. Alliance,” by Cmdr. Mark Taylor Staples.
◆April 26
Fukui meets Prof. Makoto Katsumata, president of the International Peace
Research Institute, Meiji Gakuin University; and Prof. Tomohisa Sakanaka, former
director of the Research Institute for Peace and Security.
Mizumoto attends the 41st Afternoon Seminar of the Tokyo Foundation. The
forum featured a lecture on public-private partnership in the United States by Prof.
Shinichi Ueyama of Georgetown University’s graduate school.
◆April 27
Fukui meets Dr. Lee Jong Won, professor of international politics at Rikkyo
University; and Dr. Takeshi Ishida, professor emeritus of political science at Tokyo
University.
HPI’s project team on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century holds its 11th
meeting.
◆May 11
Mizumoto and Akiyama attend the 42nd Afternoon Seminar of the Tokyo
Foundation. The seminar featured a lecture, “The Bush Administration and Asian
Policy of the United States,” by Dr. Mike Mochizuki, associate professor at George
Washington University.
◆May 18 - 20
Mizumoto (May 18 only) and Ikuko Togo attend the annual convention of theJapan Association for International Relations at Kazusa Akademia Park in Chiba.
◆May 24 - June 2
Akiyama attends an international conference in Baku, Azerbaijan, on the
country’s economic development, sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.
He later makes a speech at Tafaccur University.
◆May 25
HPI’s project team on Nueclear Disarmament in the 21st Century holds its
12th meeting.
◆May 30
Fukui attends a meeting on the preservation and use of the building that wasonce the Hiroshima branch of the Bank of Japan.
◆June 2 - 3
Mizumoto attends the semiannual conference of the Peace Studies Associationof Japan at Seikei University.
◆June 8Togo attends the preliminary meeting of the human security team, which ispart of the international visitor program organized by the U.S. Department of State,at the Tokyo American Center.
◆June 14
Akiyama delivers a lecture on the politics and administration of Japan at a
general orientation meeting for participants in a training program operated by theJapan International Cooperation Agency.
◆June 16
Mizumoto gives a lecture on the current situation and problems of peace
research, held at and organized by the Hiroshima Prefectural Nursing Association.
◆June 22
HPI’s project team on the Legitimacy and Rationality of New-interventionism
holds its 9th meeting.
–– Visitors to HPI ––◆March 21
Takayuki Miyashita, press secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan◆May 2
Prof. Takao Takahara of the department of international studies, Meiji Gakuin
University
Students from the University of California◆May 29
Dr. Johannes Preisinger, consul general of Germany◆June 14The Education and Research Corps for East Asian Studies, Korea University

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS

Vol.4, No.1 July 23, 2001
Copyright 2001 HPI All rights reserved●Issued by Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University
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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.4 No.1 July 2001