HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS
Hiroshima Peace Institute Vol.7 No.3 March 2005

Goodbye, HPI! Goodbye, Hiroshima!
Time flies like an arrow, as the saying goes, and ever faster as one getsolder. It is hard to believe that, as I write this, almost exactly four years
have fl own by since, in mid-December of 2000, I was offi ciallyintroduced to the local press corps at Hiroshima City Hall as HPI’s
director-to-be. As reported next day by the Mainichi Newspapers (14December 2000), it was already a little over a year at that time since I
had been first contacted about the job in late November 1999 by arepresentative of Hiroshima City University. If that period of indecisionand procrastination is added, not four but five years have flown by since
my mental, as opposed to physical, association with HPI began. And yet,it feels as though all this happened only yesterday.
As I begin to prepare for my departure in a few months, I look backon my life and work in Hiroshima with mixed feelings. On one hand, I
get considerable satisfaction from the growth and development of theInstitute I helped nurture in its infancy. It had three scholars on its
research staff when I arrived; it has seven as of this writing and will
likely have several more by the end of this year as a result of the ongoing
staff search. The increment may not be very impressive quantitatively,
but it is qualitatively far more impressive; despite their modest number,the scholars are all highly talented, knowledgeable, and active, not onlyin strictly academic work within the ivory tower but also in
research-based or -relevant outreach and community service activities.
HPI’s annual international symposia, bimonthly forums, public lecture
series, and peace studies courses taught by HPI’s scholars at the City
University draw substantial and responsive, though uneven andfl uctuating, audiences. I am no less impressed with the quality ofclerical, secretarial, and logistic support for the scholars’ activities that isprovided by the highly motivated and hardworking office staff.
I should also mention that, to my great and pleasant surprise, myformer colleagues, students, and offi ce staff in the Department of
Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, whom I
had, in a way, deserted 10 years ago, when I took early retirement on the
spur of the moment and in the face of their unanimous opposition andprotest, honored me with a big write-up in the spring 2002 issue of thedepartmental newsletter, Political Science at UCSB. Inset with thephotographs of me and the Pyramid of Peace sculpture that stands in thelawn in front of the building housing the department, the article
described HPI and its work and ended with a friendly pep talk: “Hiscolleagues and friends wish him the greatest success.” I have been thus
morally supported and spurred on in my job at HPI not only by local
colleagues and friends but also by those back in California who share
HPI’s and Hiroshima citizens’ longing for and commitment to peace.
On the other hand, I am sad to leave my job at HPI only partiallydone. As widely reported in the local press at the time, I came to

CONTENTS
Goodbye, HPI! Goodbye, Hiroshima! by Haruhiro Fukui …………………………… 1
On the 60th Anniversary of the Bombingof Hiroshima and Nagasaki by Yuki Tanaka ……………………… 2
The NPT Regime and the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons by Mitsuo Okamoto ……… 3
Anti-war Philosophy Developed behind Bars by Hitoshi Nagai …………………… 4~5
Economic Regionalism in Southeast Asia? by Narayanan Ganesan ………………… 5
Research ProjectContention and Cooperation in Northeast Asia …………………………………… 6
HPI Research Forum“Humane Bombing” and “Precision Bombing” in Iraq by Yuki Tanaka …………… 7Japan and Southeast Asia: Opportunities and Constraints by Narayanan Ganesan … 7
HPI’s New President ………………………………………………………………… 8
D i a r y ………………………………………………………………………………… 8

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.7 No.3 March 2005

By Haruhiro Fukui

Hiroshima with a wish or dream to build a “world-class” peace research
institute that would produce and disseminate to the whole world original
work of the highest possible scholarly quality on critical issues of war
and peace. With its current seven-member research staff, however, thejob to build such a major, if not the major, international center of peace
research has only begun. To be sure, another year or two of mydirectorship would not finish the job, and yet I feel sorry and guilty
about leaving at this stage of the ambitious institution-building projectthat I started. It pains me particularly to remember the passionate call formy commitment to attend to my new duties “until the day your [my]bones are buried in Hiroshima,” a call heard during my first official
appearance before leaders of the major local atomic bomb survivors
organizations in early April 2001. To Secretary-General Akito Suemuneof the Hiroshima Prefectural Federation of Atomic Bomb Survivors
Organizations, who said so in so many words at the meeting, and to all
those who felt the same way, I can only offer my sincere apologies andgratitude for their kind thoughts. I am quite confident, however, that HPIwith its current staff and resources, limited as they are, is fully capableof not only surviving as it is but, more importantly, developing into a
truly world-class peace research institute under my successor’s direction.
I leave Hiroshima with some mixed feelings about the city itself,
too. As I said upon my arrival as the HPI director-to-be four years ago,the city struck me then, and continues to strike me now, as a town of
exceptional scenic beauty with layers of green hills surrounding andseveral large rivers flowing right through it. As I also said at the time,
however, it did not otherwise look appreciably different from any othermedium-sized Japanese city. In other words, there is very little to remind
us that it is in fact a city very different from any other—a unique“International Peace Culture City,” as it has been officially named—
except in the confined downtown area centering on Peace Memorial Parkand extending to the Atomic Bomb Dome to the north and to a section of
Peace Boulevard behind the Peace Memorial Museum in the south. As I
suggested a while ago in an op-ed piece published in the Hiroshima
Peace Culture Foundation’s newsletter, most first-time visitors to the city
are likely to be “surprised by the great gap between the Hiroshima as
they had imagined it and the Hiroshima as they see it now” (Peace
Culture, December 2003).
Many such visitors probably wish, as I do, that Hiroshima looked
more like the city as they had imagined it, a city visibly andunmistakably dedicated to peace and the culture of peace. If I could have
my dream come true, I would cover the entire city, rather than just thePeace Park and its immediate vicinity, with graphic, sculptural, musical,
and other symbols of peace. For example, the dove is a universal symbolof peace, and so is the folded paper crane, which is widely associatedwith the well-known young victim of the atomic bomb, the late Sadako
Sasaki. I would have graphic or sculptural images of the dove or thepaper crane displayed at as many public places as possible throughout
the city, including the airports, major railroad stations, bus terminals,
ferry docks, public schools, the baseball stadium, etc., and, perhaps, evendepartment stores and high-rise office buildings. Replicas or photographsof Sadako’s statue on display at such places would send even more
powerful messages of peace and opposition to nuclear weapons to all
who see them. I would also have a variety of music of peace, both classic
and contemporary, routinely played wherever background music is
played in public places.
A dream is a dream, but I would rather leave the city, which has
become as much my spiritual home as its research institute, withpleasant dreams rather than with the grief of parting.

−1−

Fukui is president at HPIVisit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

On the 60th Anniversary.21.
5of the Bombing of Hiroshima 00
2
By Yuki Tanaka
and Nagasaki
Mr. Sunao Tsuboi would appear to be an ordinary healthy elderly
Japanese man except for the large patch of white skin that medical
specialists call “leucoderma,” on his forehead. He is a cheerful
79-year-old, but over the past 60 years he has been critically ill fourtimes, each time being told that he would not survive. He first fell ill
immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima when he was unconsciousfor 40 days. He is presently suffering from prostate cancer. Despite his
illness he has been and still is an active campaigner against nuclear arms
and one of the best-known hibakusha, or victims of the atomic bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In December 2003 he went toWashington D.C., to protest against the permanent display of the “Enola
Gay” in the new wing of the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum. He
was not against the actual display of the B-29 bomber that dropped theatomic bomb on Hiroshima, killing 140,000 people by the end of 1945.
Rather he was against the exhibition of this plane without any
explanation of the consequences caused as a result of the attack that took
so many civilian lives and left tens of thousands of others to suffer
throughout their lives.
Mr. Tsuboi does not expect to be alive when Hiroshima City
commemorates the 70th anniversary of the atomic attack in 2015.
Indeed, it is almost certain that not only Mr. Tsuboi, but also mosthibakusha will have passed away by then, as approximately 5,000
hibakusha have died every year over the past 10 years. Due to the rapidly
diminishing number of hibakusha the “weathering of the Hiroshima
experience” as it is called in Japan has become a serious concern formany citizens of this city in recent years. The number of children fromvarious parts of Japan who visit the Atomic Bomb Museum in Peace
Park on school excursions has also decreased sharply in recent years sothat “oblivion to the Hiroshima memory” is becoming a nationwide
phenomenon.
In one corner of the Hiroshima Peace Park stands the statue of ayoung girl, Sadako, stretching her arms towards the sky. Sadako’s story
is well-known throughout the world, as books in many languages havebeen published about this girl who died of leukemia at the age of 12 in
1955, 10 years after the bombing of Hiroshima. While ill in hospital
Sadako attempted to make 1,000 folded paper cranes, working on these
until shortly before her death, in the belief that she would survive if she
could achieve her goal. As a result of her efforts, the paper crane became
a symbol of peace in Japan. Since her death visiting school groups fromall over Japan have placed thousands of strings of paper cranes aroundher statue in memory of her lost youth and the Hiroshima tragedy. Sadly,
over the past few years, these paper cranes have been set on fi re anumber of times, probably by young people “just for fun.” To prevent
such juvenile crime the city council built a small glass enclosure behindthe statue in which to protect the paper cranes. Security cameras werealso installed. Yet again, a few days before August 6, Hiroshima Day, in
2003, a university student from Kobe broke the glass and set fire to thecranes. When arrested later he confessed that he did it out of frustration
over the grim employment situation facing new university graduates.
The incidents suggest that Sadako’s sorrowful tale, and the plight of theliving as well as dead atomic victims, has become irrelevant to many
young people in Japan.
Today, Japan’s experience as the only nation to encounter a nuclear
holocaust also appears irrelevant to Japan’s leading politicians including
Prime Minister Koizumi. Until Mr. Koizumi became prime minister four
years ago, it was an annual tradition for the prime minister to meet
representatives of the hibakusha for about half an hour or so immediately
after attending the commemoration ceremony in Peace Park on August 6.

Visit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

It was, of course, merely a token gesture for previous successive prime
ministers to make a show of government concern for the health ofhibakusha. Yet even this important publicity gesture was cancelled when
Mr. Koizumi became prime minister, although he still reluctantly attends
the ceremony. Some of his colleagues in the Liberal Democratic Party(LDP), including former Party Secretary-General Mr. Shinzo Abe, thinkthat Japan should develop nuclear arms for defense purposes against
so-called “rogue nations” such as North Korea. Until a decade or so ago,
there were still a few prominent conservative politicians who tenaciously
objected to the nuclearization of Japan and to the dispatch of Japan’s
Self-Defense Forces to overseas war zones. Today, such statesmen nolonger exist within the LDP. Article 9 of Japan’s post-war Constitution
forbidding engagement in any form of armed conflict has so far been
widely supported by the Japanese people, partly because of a strong
desire not to repeat the nuclear holocaust. Recently, however, powerful
voices both within the LDP as well as opposition parties have called for
elimination of the pacifist clause of the Constitution.
For many months now some major Japanese anti-nuclear
organizations and other grass-roots peace movement groups have beenplanning their own events scheduled for August 2005 to commemorate
the 60th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet
these planned events seem to offer few new ideas of how to tackle theproblem of “oblivion to the Hiroshima memory” that pervades both theyounger generation as well as the politicians. It is almost certain thatevents to commemorate the 60th anniversary will be the last chance forsurviving hibakusha to appeal to the world to oppose the idea of
genocide by weapons of mass destruction. I am sure that, in August
2005, they will receive much media attention from all over the world.
However, the real question that the Japanese people should ask
themselves is what they will do after the 60th anniversary in order tokeep alive the Hiroshima memory and to utilize it to construct a peacefulworld without the living voices of the hibakusha.
A Hiroshima A-bomb victim, Ms.Sadako Kurihara, once wrote thefollowing passage in one of her poems:
It was night in the basement of a broken building
Victims of the atomic bomb
Crowded into the candleless darkness
Filling the room to overflowing
The smell of fresh blood, the stench of death
The stuffiness of human sweat, the writhing moans
When, out of the darkness, came a wondrous voice“Oh! The baby’s coming!” it said..........
And so, a new life was born
In the darkness of that living hell..........
We shall give forth new life!
We shall bring forth new life!
Even to our death
What is urgently required for Japan’s peace movement now is a
powerful cry for new life to its own ideas of peace with new perspectives
in order to confront the present world of military violence and terrorism.

−2−(This text was broadcast on BBC Radio 4 on January 2, 2005)
Tanaka is professor at HPIHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.7 No.3 March 2005

The NPT Regime and the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons
By Mitsuo Okamoto
According to a news report by Kyodo News Service dated December 31,
2004, the U.S. will announce at the seventh Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) Review Conference in May of this year its decision to abandon its“unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear weapons.” This
undertaking had been agreed to by the five nuclear powers, i.e., the U.S.,
Russia, the U.K., France and China, at the 2000 NPT Review
Conference. If the U.S. actually reneges on this commitment, it will
accelerate nuclear development in North Korea and Iran, which could
lead to the collapse of the NPT regime.
The NPT was created to prevent by law any increase innuclear-weapon states in exchange for “general and complete
disarmament” by the five nuclear-weapon states. The abandonment of
the “unequivocal commitment” by the U.S. means that it intends toprevent nuclear proliferation not by law but by the force of arms. The
NPT is a one-sided treaty once derided by a former West German
Chancellor as a “temperance movement by alcoholic patients.” However,to our sorrow, it is still the only treaty that can legally bind the U.S. andthe other nuclear powers.
Essential Features and Problems of the NPT
The nuclear weapons myth is deeply rooted, and the developmentof nuclear weapons is relatively easy. Therefore, the number ofnuclear-weapon states would rise rapidly without regulation. China
proved this in 1964. It succeeded in conducting a nuclear experiment on
its own, even after the former Soviet Union stopped offering
technological assistance. The five declared nuclear-weapon states thenhurriedly concluded a treaty to ban development of nuclear weapons,
which is how the NPT was created. It was concluded in 1968 and cameinto effect in March 1970.
The essential features of the NPT are as follows:
1) A ban on the transfer of information regarding the manufactureof nuclear weapons (Articles I and II).
2) The right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the obligation tocooperate with inspections on the part of non-nuclear-weapon
states party to the treaty (Articles III and IV).
3) The obligation to pursue negotiations “in good faith” toward“general and complete” disarmament on the part ofnuclear-weapon states party to the treaty (Article VI).
4) Acceptance of the concept of nuclear-weapon free zones (ArticleVII).
5) A nuclear-weapon state is one which has manufactured andexploded a nuclear weapon prior to 1 January 1967 (This, in
effect, is the approval of possession of nuclear weapons by thefive nuclear-weapon states; the U.S., the Soviet Union, the U.K.,
France, and China). (Article IX).
6) The right to withdraw from the NPT with three months advancenotice (Article X).
The biggest problem with the NPT lies in its inequality, but anotherserious problem is the right to “use nuclear energy for peacefulpurposes.” Unfortunately, the techniques for the peaceful use of nuclear
energy and those for its military use are strikingly similar. In fact, both
India and Pakistan conducted their initial nuclear experiments inexperimental nuclear power reactors. Another problem is the lack of theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections to check theimplementation of obligatory disarmament by nuclear-weapon states,
even though the IAEA inspection of non-nuclear-weapon states issometimes so stringent as to be clear infringements of sovereignty.
The “Logic of Power” or International Law?
Problems with the NPT are discussed at NPT Review Conferences,which are held every five years. The 1995 NPT Review Conference
approved an “indefinite extension” of the NPT on the condition that theComprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nuclear
experiments, be concluded. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, thenuclear abolition stipulated in Article VI was confi rmed and theterminology changed from “ultimate objective” to “unequivocal
undertaking.” Thirteen concrete steps toward the elimination of nuclear
weapons, including the early entry into force of the CTBT, were agreed
upon. The New Agenda Coalition (NAC), composed of seven countries,

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.7 No.3 March 2005

namely Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, andSweden, successfully persuaded the nuclear-weapon states to agree tothis admirable commitment.
If the U.S. now scraps this agreement, the NPT itself will no longer
be in force. The abrogation of the treaty by the nuclear superpower willlead to anarchy in the international community. At this point, thequestion is, will we adhere to international law or the “logic of force”?
U.S. unilateralism leads us back to anarchy and renders international law
meaningless. The rest of the world acting in concert could not defeat the
U.S. militarily, but the Vietnam War proved and the Iraq War is proving
again that military force has its limits.
The 60th Anniversary of the Atomic Bombings and the Task of NGOs
Robert Guillain, a French journalist, stood in the ruins after theatomic bombing and murmured: “I’m ashamed of the West. I’m ashamedof science. I’m ashamed of mankind.” This is the feeling of all decent
men and women. Even during a war, the “ultimate terrorism” of an
atomic bombing is utterly unforgivable. Asked to select the mostsignifi cant news story of the 20th century, American journalists
answered, “The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” Theatomic bombings are an unforgettable, unforgivable incident in humanhistory.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons is terrifying, because theactual use of a nuclear weapon becomes increasingly probable withevery increase in the number of nuclear-weapon states. It was declared at
the NAC conference of foreign ministers in March 2003 that the soleguarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is their total eliminationand the assurance that they will never be produced or used again.
Since the publication of the Nuclear Posture Review in January
2002, the U.S. has been advocating a broader role for nuclear weapons
and promoting the development of new “small” nuclear weapons.
Moreover, the U.S. casually claimed that nuclear weapons play adecisive role in the defense of the U.S. and its allies and friendly nations.
During World War II, Japan committed crimes in neighboring countries
and the U.S. committed crimes in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, yet neither
government admits any sense of guilt.
It will be difficult to motivate the U.S. to change its nuclear policy,
but one survey (Lake Sosin Snell & Associates, 1997) revealed that 84%
of Americans “would feel safer if they knew for sure that no country,
including the U.S., had nuclear weapons,” and 87% favor the eliminationof all nuclear weapons. This finding is a relief. Citizens in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, who stand for abolition of nuclear weapons with such a
deep feeling, should link arms with these American citizens and develop
a hand-in-hand campaign for the abolition of nuclear weapons.
Following the example of the Ottawa Process, which culminated in theConvention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production andTransfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, thiscampaign should include both governments and civil society.
NGOs around the world need to bring an indomitable resolve to the2005 NPT Review Conference in New York this May. NGOs in Japan
have long been preparing for that Conference, holding initial meetings in
Hiroshima on March 27, 2004, in Nagasaki on October 24, 2004 and inTokyo on February 19, 2005. The majority of Japanese people are intent
on the abolition of nuclear weapons. Thirty seven prefectures and 2,289
cities, towns, and wards have declared themselves nuclear-weapon-free
entities. This means 78% of all autonomous communities and more than
80% of the Japanese people are located within nuclear-weapon-free
entities. The NGO “Mayors for Peace,” with Hiroshima Mayor Tadatoshi
Akiba serving as president, is growing rapidly.
In May, we need to go to the U.N. in large numbers and convey ourstrong desire to get rid of all nuclear weapons in the world, a feelingshared by the majority of Japanese people, but apparently not by theJapanese government, which continues to follow U.S. nuclear policy.
This is the task for any NGO that would like to respond to the wishes ofA-bomb survivors and make the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombing
a significant milestone for conquering the evil of the nuclear age.

−3−

Okamoto is professor of Peace Studies at the Department ofInternational Politics, Faculty of Law, Hiroshima Shudo University

Visit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

Anti-war Philosophy Developed behind Bars
—Self Reflection of Japanese War Criminals in a Prison in Muntinlupa—
1. The Philippines and War Crimes Trials
On July 22, 1953, Yokohama Port was crowded with happy people
welcoming back 108 former Japanese soldiers returning home from the
New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, the Philippines, where they had beendetained as war criminals since the end of World War II. After spending
many years behind bars, they had been returned thanks to special
pardons and commutation of sentences ordered by President Elpidio
Quirino of the Philippines. Japan and the Philippines still had no formal
diplomatic relations, since the Philippines refused to ratify the San
Francisco Peace Treaty, even though the country’s representative hadsigned it.
Thus, it was quite surprising that the Philippine President pardoned
Japanese war criminals and permitted return to their home country. In
addition to commuting death sentences to life imprisonment, thePresident issued special pardons and released prisoners, including some
who had been serving life terms. Underlying this decision was no doubt
President Quirino’s expectation that the political effect would benefit
him in terms of compensation to be paid by Japan for damage done
during its wartime occupation of the Philippines, and by extension, in
terms of the Philippine presidential election. Even so, it is amazing thatPresident Quirino, whose wife and children were killed by the Japanesesoldiers, pardoned Japanese ex-combatants. In all probability, however,
he was also motivated by an earnest desire to establish long-lasting
friendly relations between the two countries. Given the anti-Japanesesentiment of the Philippine public, the President demanded that theJapanese government accept the judgments of the Philippine Military
Courts on war crimes, which meant that Japan should recognize the war
crimes committed by the Japanese soldiers. In addition, the President
stated that the released war criminals would be banned from re-entering
the Philippines. The Japanese government accepted all these conditions.
In August 1947, when the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East (Tokyo War Crimes Trial) was under way, in which Japanesewartime leaders were tried by the Allies, the Philippine Army, having
taken over jurisdiction from the U.S. Army, commenced war crime trials
by military commissions established in Manila. There, Filipino judges
decided cases concerning some 150 Japanese ex-officers and soldiers,
who had been kept in custody long after Japan’s surrender. They werecharged with murder and various types of ill treatment of Filipinos
during the war. The court was overflowing with Filipino observers, who
had suffered deeply from Japanese oppression (1942-1945). In thisatmosphere, Japanese defendants were in a tight corner. The militarycommissions sought to place responsibility on individual officers andsoldiers for crimes for which the Japanese military as a whole was
responsible. The defendants’ arguments on grounds of “orders from asuperior” were not accepted as relieving the defendants of their
responsibilities.
At that time in the Philippines, the entire nation shared a strong
anti-Japanese sentiment. The large number of victims of the Japaneseforces, including the families of the President and other high government
officials, made it extremely difficult for the Philippine authorities touphold justice and fairness in their decisions in the face of a strong
public demand for revenge. In this context, the military commissions,which met during the period August 1947-December 1949, returned
guilty verdicts against 90% of the defendants, 79 of whom weresentenced to death.

Japanese war criminals were behind bars in a country far away to Japan’s
south. At the same time, news of the executions reminded the Japanesepublic that the Filipino people still felt strong hostility against them.
Immediately after the war, Japanese newspapers reported on the war
crimes trials in the Philippines, but over time such reports became
sporadic. Thus, this news came as a shock to many Japanese people
when they were beginning to forget about war criminals in thePhilippines.
Surprised and shocked by the news, the Japanese began
campaigning for sentence commutation and release of Japanese war
criminals. Japanese public opinion and government were concerned
primarily about the hardships experienced by imprisoned war criminals
and their families. (At that time, the Japanese public tended tosympathize with war criminals, regarding them as “war victims” rather
than “perpetrators.”) The campaigns were thus by and large one-sided
and ethnocentric, lacking concern for the suffering of the Filipino
people. Few Japanese engaged in those campaigns paid due attention to
the collective violence committed by Japanese military forces and thehardships inflicted on the Filipinos.
In July 1953, both houses of the Japanese National Diet passed a
resolution that expressed the nation’s gratitude to President Quirino and
the Philippine government for pardoning the war criminals. Although theresolution contained expressions of deep gratitude, it did not contain any
specifi c words of apology to the people of the Philippines, who
experienced enormous losses and suffering at the hands of the Japaneseforces.
3. Self-reflection Behind Bars
Many Japanese war criminals were grateful to their Filipino defense
counsels, who, despite harsh criticism heard from other Filipinos,
defended the war criminals with exceptional determination to do justice.
However, many of those on trial felt that the trials themselves were
unfair. Some of the accused even developed the notion that they wereserving as scapegoats. The trials were hasty, fi nding Japaneseeyewitnesses to defend the accused was extremely difficult, the judges
tended to give priority to testimonies of the Filipino victims, and above
all, death sentences followed one after another.
Japanese war criminals imprisoned in Muntinlupa suffered an
extremely powerful sense of isolation and alienation from their homecountry, where postwar reconstruction was progressing day by day.
Those on death row felt despair, tormented by fear of death and thestrong psychological pressure associated with their impending doom.
(The agony of those who survived was intensified greatly following theexecution of 14 war criminals in January 1951.) Fortunately, in prison
they were treated relatively generously by the Philippines authorities;
few suffered violent acts or other forms of private retribution by theprison guards. They also received continual encouragement from theprison chaplain Shunin Kagao, a Buddhist priest dispatched to
Muntinlupa by the Japanese government.
Meanwhile, extended imprisonment in a foreign country offered theJapanese war criminals opportunities to take off the “spiritual armor” of
the Japanese forces, to reflect upon their deeds and to regain humanemotions they had lost during the war. While they were distrustful of thetrials and frustrated by their scapegoat role, they were also forced tocontemplate the reasons for the strong anti-Japanese sentiment thatprevailed across Filipino society. They experienced in person the strong
hostility and anger that Filipino men and women felt toward Japanesesoldiers when they surrendered. They were accused by the militarycommissions, and through their daily contacts with a Filipino prison
director, prison guards and Filipino convicts in the same wards, they
were made keenly aware of their anger toward them.
“As Japan starts down a new road, I truly hope that Japan will fulfill
moral responsibilities and atone for what our country has done to its
neighbors. That is, atone for all crimes and mistakes the country
committed during the war. I truly hope so, because Japan must gaininternational trust to regain its proper position in international society.”
This is the statement of a condemned war criminal, who joined a
discussion held in the prison in February 1952. This statement reflects➡

2. Campaigns for Commutation and Release of War Criminals
Of the 79 defendants sentenced to death, however, only 17 were
executed. If we compare the actual execution rate of the condemned
criminals in the Philippines with that (approximately 80%) of suchcriminals in the custody of the U.S., U.K., Australia, and other Allied
powers, we may conclude that the Philippine authorities spent more timeon reviews and exercised greater caution with respect to the executions.
Fourteen of the 17 executions, including Captain Nakamura’s, hadparticularly great impact on the Japanese public, because these
executions took place in January 1951, when the conclusion of the peace
treaty was imminent, and most Japanese were just beginning to enjoy
peaceful lives. The news of the executions reminded many Japanese that

By Hitoshi Nagai

Visit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm−4−

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.7 No.3 March 2005

Economic Regionalism in Southeast Asia?
By Narayanan Ganesan

For some time now, Southeast Asia has been attempting to enhance
intra-regional trade. While countries in the region collectively groupedin the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have tried
very hard to make that grouping a reality, there have been a number ofnagging problems. The first of the two most ambitious attempts atregional economic cooperation came in 1989 in the form of acollective membership in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
forum (APEC) and the subsequent attempts to create a free trade areaby 2020, with earlier dates for more developed economies. The second
attempt restricted to ASEAN’s geographic footprint was the launch of
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1993 with an initial gestation
period of 15 years that was subsequently reduced to 10 and later, 9years. In other words, AFTA was supposed to have been in place since
2002. The AFTA scheme calls for member countries to reduce tariffs
to between 0.5 % and 5 % through a system of Common Effective
Preferential Tariffs (CEPT).
Both AFTA and APEC have been slow in achieving their goals
and may indeed never achieve them. This pessimistic forecast derives
from an admixture of old and new factors. The old factors include thecommon export items in the primary and manufacturing sectors thatmany ASEAN members export to the same destinations, namely theEuropean Union, Japan, and the United States. This convergence ofexport products and markets makes ASEAN member countries evolve
competitive rather than complementary strategies. Nonetheless,intra-ASEAN trade has significantly grown over the years and now
accounts for about 25 % of total regional trade.
Then, there are problems associated with different levels ofdevelopment and cooperation. In general, the countries that joined
ASEAN later in the 1990s, namely Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, andCambodia, are granted a longer time frame within which to fulfill
their obligations. In addition, economic nationalism in Indonesia andoligopolistic practices in the Philippines have also impeded
regionalism. Finally, pet national projects in individual countries areoften declared infant industries requiring protection and exclusionfrom regional cooperation. Malaysia’s automobile industry andIndonesia’s aircraft industry are classic cases in point.
These old or previously acknowledged problems have been
compounded by a number of new ones like the deterioration of theregional economies after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. One of theclearest lessons learnt in the aftermath of that crisis is that countries
invariably become introverted during times of economic difficulties
and attend to their domestic economies before they push for tradeliberalization and regionalism. After all, the very survival of regimes
may be at risk, if the Indonesian situation serves as an example.

Besides, it is only fair to assume that any government whose
legitimacy is more directly tied to economic performance thanpolitical criteria will have to attend to the domestic situation first.
Regionalism involves tradeoffs and benefits to certain individuals andconglomerates that may be unsettling to patrimonial regimes
accustomed to having control over the allocation and distribution of
resources. Add to these factors widespread skepticism in thedeveloping world over the benefits of free trade and the benign intent
of Washington’s policies, and the outlook dims.
In fact, in recognition of the seeming impossibility of concluding
regional free trade arrangements, many countries have decided to takematters into their own hands and negotiate bilateral free tradearrangements with major trading partners. Singapore, the first country
to realize the futility of region-wide free trade areas, has since 2000
gone on to conclude a number of bilateral free trade arrangements.
Not to be outdone, Malaysia and Thailand have quickly followed suit.
But do multiple bilateral arrangements have the same effect as a fulltrade area? The answer is quite obvious — absolutely not. In fact,bilateral free trade arrangements are a way of tweaking the deal tosatisfy very specific constituencies and issues. “Sensitive” items are
simply negotiated away or excluded. Over time, each country gets to
do exactly what it wants, making appropriate adjustments for power
inequities.
This development of tailor-made economic arrangements clearlygoes against the spirit of free trade as originally envisaged — theutilitarian principle of the greatest good for the greatest number. Yet itis this trend that appears to be taking root in the region. Not only are
individual countries involved in negotiating bilateral tradearrangements but entire regions. The most recent example of thislarger trend is ASEAN’s attempts to collectively negotiate free tradearrangements with China and Japan. Complicating the situation is thepush for East Asian economic regionalism. Whereas ex-MalaysianPrime Minister Mahathir’s push for such a grouping was stoutly
resisted by Australia, Japan, and the United States, it appears to becohering. Beginning with a meeting of finance ministers in 1998 and acurrency swap in 2002, an embryonic East Asian economic
community does indeed appear to be forming. After all, the ASEAN
meeting in Vientiane has agreed to a meeting of the East Asian
Community (EAC) in Malaysia in 2005, just the way Mahathirenvisioned it. And guess what? The caucus does plan to exclude the
Caucasians (read Australia and New Zealand).

his awareness of the perpetrator role played by his country.
As a result of life-and-death struggles on the battlefield and rigorous
self-reflection during subsequent imprisonment, many war criminals
developed strong revulsion against war. One of them on death row said,“Of the many forms of misery and human suffering caused by war, I feelsaddest about the loss of humanity we experienced.” Deploring the factthat a series of battles numbed the normal human feelings of combatants,
he continued, “In battle, human beings became less than human. We
became beasts. War turned us into beasts.” Another on death row wrote
in his diary, “I believe that few people in the world abhor and reject war
with greater fervor than we war criminals.” With Article 9 of theJapanese Constitution (which stipulates renunciation of war) in mind, healso wrote, “The Japanese people should make an all-out effort to ensure
absolute peace and renunciation of war, as stipulated in the new
constitution. That is the only prescription that points us in the correct
direction for the progress of human kind.” Still another condemned todeath wrote in his diary, “I am painfully aware that human beings mustnever again initiate war.” (The last two prisoners were executed in
January 1951, leaving these words behind.) Tormented by the shadow ofdeath, they span their last words to express their remorse and pain, words
that sound to me like an echo of the Japanese people’s honest feelings in
the days immediately after the end of the war.

Ganesan is associate professor at HPI➡
HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.7 No.3 March 2005

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Nagai is research associate at HPIVisit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

HPI Research ProjectContention and Cooperation in Northeast Asia:
Analysis of Domestic-Regional Linkages

The first workshop for the HPI project Contention and Cooperationin Northeast Asia: Analysis of Domestic-Regional Linkages was held
on November 12-13, 2004 in the HPI conference room.
The project’s objective is to examine the problems that interferewith regional security cooperation and to explore solutions to those
problems. Many studies have looked at how to build a multilateral
institution to deal with security issues in Northeast Asia, but previous
studies were not based on extensive analyses of linkage problems
between the domestic politics of individual countries and the region
as a whole.
The HPI project presumes that identifying the problems derivingfrom differing regime types and perceptions of security issues should
precede the construction of a multilateral institutional mechanism. In
searching for the ways and means of regional cooperation, thecomplex linkages between domestic politics and international issues
must be explored. For instance, the Taiwan Strait tension and the
Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue cannot be
understood without examining the linkages to the domestic politics ofnationalism in China and the Bush’s presidency in the U.S.
To discuss the linkages between domestic and regional politics,
Japanese and international experts were invited to the first workshop.
The workshop comprised four sessions: 1) conceptions ofdomestic-regional linkages in Northeast Asia; 2) cases ofdomestic-regional linkages; 3) comparative and transnational effects;
and 4) conclusion.
Participants and paper presentations were as follows.
The fi rst session dealt with the conceptual development ofregionalism and domestic-regional linkages. Haruki Wada addresseddiscourses on regionalism, including his own, and pointed out thecentral importance of peace on the Korean Peninsula to regional
community building. Sung Chull Kim explored layers of linkages forthe analyses of regional contention and cooperation. He noted thatdomestic and transnational organizations are significant actors in thefurtherance of regional cooperation that interstate relations have not
yet achieved.
• Haruki Wada (University of Tokyo)“Northeast Asia as a Regional Community: Its Relevance toDomestic Politics”• Sung Chull Kim (HPI)“Multilayer Politics of Regional Security in Northeast Asia”
In the second session on case studies, country experts discussed
the domestic dimension of foreign policies and impacts on regional
relations. T. J. Cheng’s empirical study of the U.S. case revealed an
institutional difference in viewing regional issues between the
Presidency and the Congress that was stronger than partisan
discrepancy. This illustrates the importance of presidential characterand policy orientation in American foreign policy in this region.
Leszek Buszynski described how the Russian political culture offavoring strong political leadership, like Putin’s, has contributed togreater consideration of the Asia-Pacific region in its foreign policy,
reviving traditional relations with China and North Korea to a certain
extent. Yoneyuki Sugita warned against a rise of bigoted nationalism,
which he identified in a review of Japanese politics since the end of
WWII. Lowell Dittmer and Edward Friedman discussed changes in
Chinese foreign policy on Taiwan and the U.S. as well as increasing
Chinese patriotism, which threatens regional relations. Yong-Pyo
Hong analyzed South Korea’s democratization and the Sunshine
Policy, showing how the latter contributed to the improvement ofinter-Korean relations, while weakening ties with the U.S. In her

Visit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

comparative study, Etel Solingen examined ways of cultivating theinternationalization coalition in each country to promote regional
cooperation.
• T. J. Cheng (College of William and Mary)“Washington’s Policies toward North Korea and the Taiwan
Strait: The Role of U.S. Domestic Politics”• Leszek Buszynski (International University of Japan)“Domestic Consolidation and Foreign Policy in Russia”• Yoneyuki Sugita (Osaka University of Foreign Studies)“Impact of Postwar Domestic ‘Democracy’ on Japanese
Security Policy for Northeast Asia”• Lowell Dittmer (University of California, Berkeley)“Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy”• Edward Friedman (University of Wisconsin, Madison)“China’s Patriotic Preoccupation with Taiwan: The Fragility ofRegional Cooperation”• Yong-Pyo Hong (Hanyang University)“Two Koreas in Northeast Asia: Linkages between Domestic,
Inter-Korean, and Regional Politics”• Etel Solingen (University of California, Irvine)“Domestic Politics and Regional Cooperation in Southeast andNortheast Asia”
The third session focused on non-governmental actors’ activities
and their transnational effects for regional cooperation. James Tang,
Daehoon Lee, and Kazumi Mizumoto discussed the role of NGOs ineach country’s foreign policy-making and the transnational alliancefor peace and cooperation. Mizumoto pointed out that Hiroshima’s
anti-war and anti-nuclear initiatives should strengthen internationalties to increase the efficacy of the peace movement.
• James Tang (University of Hong Kong)“Impact of Non-Governmental Security Forum on PolicyMaking: A Comparative Perspective”• Daehoon Lee (People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy)“Transnational Cooperation among NGOs in Northeast Asia:
Present and Future”• Kazumi Mizumoto (HPI)“Peace Alliance in Northeast Asia: Voice from Hiroshima”
The first workshop was successful in the sense that participants
not only identified the problem of regional contention originating indomestic situations but also reached an agreement on how to deal
with these problems. The solution lies not simply in interstatecollaboration but in multilayer transnational cooperation and theformation of international coalitions in each country. The project will
convene another workshop to review and discuss revised papers in
May 2005 in preparation for publication of an edited volume in thenear future.

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By Sung Chull Kim, associate professor at HPIHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.7 No.3 March 2005

HPI Research Forum
October 29, 2004

Title: “Humane Bombing” and “Precision Bombing” in
Iraq: A Comparative Analysis of Aerial Bombing by
the RAF in the 1920s and by the U.S. Forces in
2003-2004
Speaker: Dr. Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI

Towards the end of World War I, in April 1918, the British government
established the Royal Air Force, historically the first independent air
force in the world. Combining its Naval Air Service and Army Flying
Corps the move sought to strengthen the British airborne and bombing
capability at the time when London had come under repeated attacks byGerman airships and bombers. The main task of the RAF strategic
bombing was to bomb military targets as well as densely populatedindustrial centers in Germany and occupied areas. Yet, the bombing ofindustrial centers aimed not only to destroy military arsenals but also to
break down the morale of German workers. After the war, General
Trenchard and other leaders of the British air forces claimed that British
bombing had made a great contribution to ending the war bydemoralizing German civilians, although their claim did not reflect thefact at all.
Although Britain won World War I, the war efforts had consumed
enormous funds and resources, leaving the management of Britishcolonies badly neglected. The British Empire faced a serious crisis
immediately after the war, encountering popular revolts and violent
political demonstrations in its colonies and mandated territories. Indeed,
the British air power was soon utilized to suppress such revolts anddemonstrations in the territories. For example, in 1920, an air squadron
was sent to Somaliland to suppress a revolt by the local militia. The
bombing destroyed not only the fortresses of the militiamen, but alsoprivate dwellings nearby.

December 10, 2004

Title: Japan and Southeast Asia: Opportunities andConstraints
Speaker: Dr. Narayanan Ganesan, associate professor at HPI

The forum began with an introduction to Southeast Asia, beginning withthe region’s major characteristics, then moving on to the majordifferences between mainland and maritime Southeast Asia. Ganesanemphasized the geographical differences between the two sub-divisions
and the ethno-linguistic and religious differences between the peoples
inhabiting the countries that fall within them. Following thisintroduction, the forum examined a number of issues in Japan-Southeast
Asia relations. These included existing impediments in the bilateralrelationships, the nature of Japanese interests in the region as well as ascaling of perceptions of Japan in individual Southeast Asian countries.
Finally, the talk identified areas in which Japan could assist Southeast
Asia in developmental terms, especially through post-confl ict
reconstruction, enhancing human security, and other peace-related
activities. Recently, human security with individuals rather than states atthe center of consideration has taken center stage in academic literature.
It was argued that Japan can play a far greater role in brokering
peace in Aceh in Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines and Myanmar— a sentiment that was actually conveyed by Japanese Prime Minister
Koizumi during a visit to Southeast Asia in 2000. In the fi rst two
instances, peace agreements have collapsed and military operations areunder way. In Myanmar, a ceasefire is in place between ethnic insurgent
groups and the military junta, but the standoff between the military
government and the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung
San Suu Kyi remains stalemated. Similarly, much developmental work

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.7 No.3 March 2005

Yet it was in Iraq that Britain employed its air forces for the purposeof suppressing local revolts most widely and for the longest period.
Full-scale bombing activities in Iraq by eight RAF squadrons began in
October 1922 and continued until 1932, the year that the British
mandatory rule of Iraq offi cially ceased. Various types of bombs
including delayed and incendiary bombs were dropped in attacks onvillages where militiamen were believed to be hiding, and in some cases
petrol was sprayed over civilian houses in order to intensify the fires
ignited by the bombing. Tents and other types of dwellings of Bedouins
and even their cattle became targets, resulting in the death and injury ofmany women and children. Their conduct was literally “indiscriminate
bombing,” yet the British forces justified this by claiming that theiroperations “proved outstandingly effective, extremely economical andundoubtedly humane in the long run” as they could swiftly put down
revolts and riots.
Eighty years after the British fi rst began bombing Iraq, Iraqi
civilians were again exposed to massive aerial bombardment by the
British and U.S. forces, and many were killed. This time the excuse wasthat weapons of mass destruction would be removed and democracy
would be introduced to their nation. Aerial bombing still continues invarious parts of Iraq, causing further civilian casualties. Yet, the British
and U.S. forces regard civilian victims as “collateral damage” of“precision bombing.”
In my lecture, I first examined the bombing of Iraq by the RAF in
the 1920s, utilizing relevant British military documents and aerial photos
obtained from the Public Record Office in London. Then I criticallyanalyzed the military justifi cation of indiscriminate bombing bycomparing the British conduct in the 1920s with the so-called “precisionbombing” of Iraq by the U.S. and British forces in the recent Iraq War.
By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI

needs to be undertaken in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia after the
cessation of conflict in 1989. There exists a great need for schools andhospitals as well as clean water, sanitation and basic infrastructure. To
assist those in poor agricultural areas, irrigation facilities are alsoneeded, while preventive medicine should target diseases like malariathat claim a large number of lives.
The forum was attended by some 20 persons, including citizens andstaff from the Institute. The talk was followed by a lively question andanswer session that lasted for 30 minutes. Mizumoto from the Instituteprovided the Japanese translation throughout the entire course of theforum, which ended at 5:10 p.m.

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By Narayanan Ganesan, associate professor at HPIVisit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

HPI’s New President
Motofumi Asai was appointed president of HPI effective April 1, 2005.
Asai specializes in international relations, Japanese politics and foreign policy. Admitted to the Faculty of Law at
the University of Tokyo in 1960, he passed his Class I foreign service examination and joined the Japanese Ministry ofForeign Affairs (MOFA) in 1963. While at MOFA, he served as Director of the Division of International Agreementsin the Bureau of Treaties and the Division of Chinese Affairs in the Bureau of Asian Affairs, Councilor at the Japanese
Embassy in Beijing, and Minister at the Japanese Embassy in London. From 1988 to 1990, he served as professor in
the Faculty of Liberal Arts at the University of Tokyo on loan from MOFA. He voluntarily retired from MOFA in
March 1990 to accept professorship in the Faculty of Law at Nihon University (1990-1992), then moving to the Facultyof International Studies at Meiji Gakuin University (1992-2005), where he was Director of the university’s
International Peace Institute (1993-1995). Asai was born in Aichi Prefecture in 1941.

ＤＩＡＲＹ
November 1, 2004 - February 28, 2005

Nov. 5 At a meeting of the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima,lecturer Setsuko Kozawa of Waseda University gives lecture on “TheHiroshima Panels and Peace Movement in Hiroshima.”
Nov. 6 Hiroko Takahashi serves as commentator for Peace Studies
Association of Japan at Keisen University.
Nov. 10 Kazumi Mizumoto gives lecture on “Peace Movement inHiroshima—Its History and Prospect” in the HPI lecture series for
citizens of Hiroshima.
Nov. 12-13 First workshop of the HPI Research Project “Contention
and Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Analysis of Domestic-Regional
Linkages” is held.
Nov. 14 Christian Scherrer participates in the 14th hearing of theInternational Criminal Tribunal for Iraq in Osaka and gives presentation
on “Genocide by Sanctions in Iraq 1990-2003.”
Nov. 17 At a meeting of the HPI lecture series for citizens ofHiroshima, professor Mikiyo Kano of Keiwa College gives lecture on“Hiroshima and Feminism.”
HPI President Haruhiro Fukui, Scherrer, Narayanan Ganesan, Sung
Chull Kim, and Mizumoto meet and exchange information and views
with visiting researchers from the Japan Institute of International Affairs(JIIA).
Nov. 23 Mizumoto attends as panelist and gives lecture on “Peace
Education Suitable for International Cooperation: A Message from
Hiroshima” at the 2nd symposium of the Hiroshima International Peace
Forum organized by Hiroshima Prefecture and Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) Chugoku International Center and held at
Hiroshima International Conference Center.
Nov. 26 Mizumoto attends inaugural meeting of “Peace NGOs
Hiroshima” as director at Hiroshima International Center.
Takahashi gives lecture on “Lucky Dragon Incident and Anti-Nuclear
Movements” in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima.
Nov. 29-Dec. 3 Fukui visits China as member of the 9th Hiroshima
Civic Delegation for Peace and Friendship.
Dec. 1 At a meeting of the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima,
former professor Sayoko Yoneda of Yamanashi Women’s Junior College
gives lecture on “Raicho Hiratsuka as a ‘Citizen of the World’: The
Possibility for ‘General and Global Peace’.”Dec. 3 Takahashi gives presentation on “U.S. Control of Nuclear
Information after WWII” at mini-symposium titled “Hiroshima andNagasaki: How to Report, How to Be Reported” for Hiroshima/Nagasaki
joint course offered by Meiji Gakuin University.
Dec. 8 Yuki Tanaka gives lecture on “Mizuno Hironori’s Philosophy:
The Thoughts of a Military Officer Who Became an Anti-war Activist”
in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima.
Dec. 10 Ganesan gives lecture on “Japan and Southeast Asia:
Opportunities and Constraints” at HPI Research Forum.
Dec. 12 Scherrer interviews Denis J. Halliday, the former U.N.
Assistant Secretary-General, Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, about
his experience with the sanction regime.
Dec. 13 Fukui and Takahashi attend Exploratory Committee for
Renewal Plan of Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

Dec. 15 Tanaka gives lecture on “Godzilla and the Bravo Shot: Who
Created and Killed the Monster” in the HPI lecture series for citizens ofHiroshima.
Hitoshi Nagai gives lecture on “American Studies at Rikkyo University
during World War II” at Rikkyo University.
Dec. 18 Mizumoto gives lecture on “The Current Situation of Nuclear
Weapons in the World” at the training course of the Hiroshima Peace
Volunteer Project sponsored by and held at Hiroshima Peace Memorial
Museum.
Dec. 18-Feb. 24 Scherrer conducts 3rd round of field research in Sri
Lanka, interrupted by tsunami, on the current state of the ceasefire andthe responses of the government, U.N. and international NGOs to thetsunami in minority areas in the Northeast; he interviews all important
government officials, the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), Muslim leaders, politicalparties, the Monitoring Mission, religious leaders, peace groups, civilsociety leaders, U.N. agency staff, academics and experts in North andSouth.
Jan. 12-15 Fukui participates in session 4 “Peaceful Resolution of
North Korean Nuclear Issue” at “International Symposium on Peace andProsperity in Northeast Asia” organized by Uri Party and held in Seoul.
Jan. 22 Mizumoto gives lecture on “The Current Situation of Nuclear
Weapons in the World” in training course for volunteer readers of
A-bomb memoirs organized by and held at Hiroshima National Peace
Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims.
Jan. 26 Kim participates as a discussant in workshop “A Threat
Reduction Program for North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,”organized jointly by JIIA and the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) and held at JIIA in Tokyo.
Jan. 27 Fukui attends and chairs Tokyo meeting of Peace Memorial
Facilities Utilization Council convened by Hiroshima City at Tokai
University Members-Club.
Jan. 29 Mizumoto attends as a commentator the Peace Club for JuniorHigh and High School Students at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
Jan. 31 Fukui attends and chairs Hiroshima meeting of Peace
Memorial Facilities Utilization Council convened by Hiroshima City at
Hiroshima City Hall.
Feb. 8-26 Takahashi conducts research on U.S. nuclear test records at
National Archives at College Park, Maryland.
Feb. 17 Fukui attends Exploratory Committee for Renewal Plan ofHiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
– Visitors to HPI –Nov. 17 Dr. Rajiv Nayan, Mansour Abo Alazzm, Junwei Ma, visiting
research fellows of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), andRika Sasaki, research assistant of JIIA.
Nov. 22 Dr. Silvia Lidia González, historian/journalist in Mexico.
Jan. 6 Dr. George Mousourakis, faculty of law, the University of
Auckland, New Zealand.
Feb. 25 Philip Cordier, second secretary of Embassy of Canada,
Japan. Mirai Maruo, business development associate of the Honorary
Consulate of Canada in Hiroshima.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS

Vol.7, No.3 March 24, 2005
Copyright 2005 HPI All rights reservedPublisher: Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University; Editor : Ayako Yoshida
TEL +81-82-544-7570 FAX +81-82-544-7573
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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.7 No.3 March 2005