HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS
Hiroshima Peace Institute Vol.10 No.3 March 2008

The Historical Significance of the ASEAN Charter
──The Challenge for Japan

By Kimio Kawahara

1. ASEAN’s 40th Anniversary
It is 40 years since the establishment of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN). There is a Confucian saying, “I wavered not at age
40,” indicating a certain level of maturity attained. On November 20, 2007,
in commemoration of its 40th anniversary, ASEAN held a summit at which
all heads of member states signed the historic “ASEAN Charter.” ASEAN
was formed in 1967, shortly after the United States began its bombing
campaign in North Vietnam in an act of intervention in the Vietnamese Civil
War. Since its inception, ASEAN has never once resorted to military force
when a conflict has arisen between its members. It has always succeeded inresolving problems through peaceful talks. This fact, when faced with thefrequent outbreaks of regional conflict and civil strife in many areas aroundthe world in the post-Cold War era−not to mention the wars in Afghanistan
and in Iraq after 9/11 − this “warless” ASEAN Charter has historicsignificance in itself as it stands as a testimony to the achievement of 40
years of non-recourse to force among ASEAN members.
What is more, the articles of the ASEAN Charter, which lay down
future courses of action for member states and peoples, reach out beyond thebounds of ASEAN’s peace pact and involve the East Asian Community
members and the countries of Eurasia. On three salient points, the ASEAN
Charter goes well beyond the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast
Asia (TAC) signed in 1976 following the fall of Saigon.
2. The ASEAN Charter: Three Salient Points
The first point of difference is that ASEAN was originally formed with
the intention of strengthening economic ties, in accordance with members’desires to be no longer at the mercy of the superpowers. United under thisaim were nations with diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. At the time,
the key word was resilience. TAC espoused the strengthening and promotionof national and regional resilience. As ASEAN membership grew to 10
countries and regional coordination expanded to ASEAN+3 and AsiaEurope Meeting (ASEM), member states reinforced their own economic
resilience. Thus in drawing up the ASEAN Charter, the focus was on
bolstering regional resilience. The emphasis made in articles relating to its
purposes and external relations is on relationships and cooperation withpartners outside the region, and on the upholding of ASEAN’s centrality andleadership role as the key proponent in intra-regional coordination.
The second point of note is that ASEAN inserted two additional articles
into the charter that are not spelled out in existing international laws or TAC.
These are intended to ensure that member states are not thrown into
confusion by the designs and interests of the superpowers. In the wake of
9/11, the pursuit of sole supremacy and trans-boundary preemptive strikes
have come to hold sway in the international arena. Thus it has become
necessary to include the following precepts in addition to the principles that
had been hitherto adhered to: those of non-interference in the internal affairsof other member states; respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality,
territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; and the renunciationof invasion, threats and intimidation using military force. The first of these

CONTENTS
The Historical Significance of the ASEAN Charter by Kimio Kawahara… 1<Reflections from Hiroshima: The 7th in a Series>
The Other Hiroshima Council of A-Bomb Sufferers Organizations
by Kazushi Kaneko…………………………………………………… 2〜3<HPI Research Forum>
When Might Does Not Make Right by Lennox Hinds…………………… 3<HPI Research Project>Engagement with North Korea …………………………………………… 4
HPI’s Lecture Series for Citizens of Hiroshima…………………………… 5
The Origins of the Dirty Bomb by Robert Jacobs…………………………… 6<HPI Research Forums>
Is Australia Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution to Abolishing
Nuclear Weapons? by Tilman Ruff………………………………………… 7
Cold War Art and the Bomb in the Exhibition,
The Family of Man by John O’Brian……………………………………… 7
Diary………………………………………………………………………… 8

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.10 No.3 March 2008

two articles concerns respect for the right to be free from interference,
subversion and coercion from external parties, and the second concerns
restraint from policies and involvement in action that undermines thesovereignty, territorial integrity as well as political and economic stability ofmember states, including the use of territory. Using the key word ASEAN,
this may be regarded as a process of generating political resilience.
In this way, ASEAN is strengthening economic power and improving
regional resilience, and to maintain these it is attempting to equip itself with
political resilience by means of the ASEAN Charter. What then is the third
new pillar of the charter? Since its formation, the focus of ASEAN’s
resilience has been on the nation and the region as a whole. The ASEAN
Charter places a new emphasis on the strengthening of people’s resilience.
The respective objectives of the ASEAN Charter are: to achieve a highquality of life for the people of its member states, to develop humanresources to empower the people, to enhance the well-being and livelihoodof the people by providing them with equitable access to opportunities, andto promote a people-oriented ASEAN in which all sectors of society areencouraged to participate in, and benefit from, the process of ASEAN
integration and community building.
After World War II, the nations of Southeast Asia emerged fromcolonial rule and a long history of oppression by powerful nations set out tostrengthen regional resilience, which would allow them to stand their groundagainst the superpowers, through the formation of ASEAN. Now having
achieved this 40 year milestone, ASEAN has declared its intention to ensure
its people’s resilience. Herein lies the greatest historical significance of theASEAN Charter: to achieve the charter’s most important thrust, ASEAN’s
goal is to establish regional autonomy without resorting to force.
3. The U.S. “Smart Power” Strategy and Beyond
Meanwhile, the United States of America has been caught up in thequagmire of the war against terror for six years since the attacks of 9/11. On
November 6 last year, almost coinciding with the signing of the ASEAN
Charter, the study THE CSIS COMMISSION ON SMART POWER: A
smarter, more secure America was published. This was a non-partisan report
prepared mainly by Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage who are also wellknown in Japan. Reputed to have a strong bearing on the diplomatic anddefense policies of the future American president, it manifests a grave senseof crisis, stating that overdependence on military might during the past six
years has led to loss of confidence in the U.S., even among its old allies.
America has the ability to wield both “hard power” and “soft power.” The
former is typified by military force. The latter is exemplified not merely by
cultural assets such as Hollywood movies and American goods but also bypolitical values, the ideas enshrined in the American Constitution and theBill of Rights, economic and educational systems, active participation ininternational institutions, the exercise of sovereignty, and above all the
success of America itself as a nation. However, the report advocates the needfor creating “smart power” that integrates both hard and soft power. No
matter who will get to sit in the Oval Office following the next presidential
election, the study stresses that hope and optimism should be encouraged,
and not fear and anger. It identifies five areas of focus: the revitalization ofalliances and partnerships as well as institutions; promotion of global
economic growth; diplomacy conducted on a long-term basis; economic
integration that includes the disengaged, both nationally and internationally;
and technologies and innovations that address issues of energy and climatechange.
There is a force at work in this thinking which is in common with that of
the ASEAN Charter. America is considering moving away from dependenceon military solutions to effect a major policy change. Yet the report’s
greatest concern is that the most important component, the country’s soft
power resources, is beyond the reach of the government and is heldcollectively by the private sector, civil society, bilateral alliances and nonU.S. international organizations. This may well result in significant problems
when trying to coordinate these resources. The new elements of the ASEAN
Charter should be praised for their historical foresight in proposing aframework which is seeking to assist the strengthening of regional stability
with such problems in mind. In this context it is important to consider what
political action Japan should take. This is a major challenge facing Japan.

−1−

Kawahara is president at Nagasaki Peace Institute

Visit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

＜Reflections from Hiroshima: The 7th in a Series＞

Kazushi Kaneko, Director General, Hiroshima Council of A-Bomb Sufferers Organizations

The Other Hiroshima Council of A-Bomb Sufferers Organizations
Interview and editing by Motofumi Asai
(Interviewed on December 11, 2007)

1. A-Bomb Experience
I passed the entrance exam to the school of maritime technology
in 1941. Although the school normally offered a six-year course, it
was shortened as the war intensified. Therefore when Japan was
defeated in the war, I had already graduated from school and begun
working for a shipbuilding company. Although civilian ships were
all carried off by the government for military use in those days, manyof them were sunk by torpedoes and fuel for them was scarce. I was
not drafted into the military and didn’t have to join the troops.
I was 19 when the atomic bomb fell. Prior to this, my older
brother had been hospitalized in the Imperial Japanese Army
Hospital in Matsue, Shimane Prefecture. Due to the fact that I had
received a telegram informing me that he was in a critical condition,
I took a few days off from work and decided to go to see him. On themorning of August 6th I bought a ticket to Matsue in Kaitaichi
Station, three stations away from Hiroshima Station, and wasstanding on the platform waiting for a train. At that time I noticed
three B-29 bombers flying overhead. Looking up at the sky, I
wondered why the air-raid sirens weren’t sounding. Then I saw
something white falling from one of the airplanes. The next momenta powerful white flash pierced my eyes. Instantly I caught a scent of
danger and dived to the ground. I lost consciousness for a short time.
After regaining consciousness, I looked around and saw people
running away from Hiroshima City. Wondering what had happened,
I followed them. Looking over my shoulder I saw a mushroom cloud
rising above Hiroshima City. It was not the usual pure black smoke
caused by fire but was mixed with red, yellow and purple.
After a while, I had second thoughts and hesitantly walked backto Hiroshima Station so that I could go to Matsue. As I came near
Hiroshima Station, I met people whose faces were swollen beyond
recognition or whose skin hung down from their bodies. I wasworried about my grandfather whose turn it was to go into
Hiroshima City to break down buildings so that potential fires
wouldn’t spread. I tried to enter the city, thinking that I had to savemy grandfather who might be suffering like those whom I had justseen. But the soldiers did not allow me to enter the city and the area
was filled with fire, so I didn’t know what to do. In the end, I had towalk back home, about 10 kilometers from the city. Thus I didn’t
directly experience the atomic bombing, but was exposed to theresidual radiation caused by the atomic bombing on that day.
On August 7, as the Sanyo Line of the Japanese National
Railways wasn’t running, I walked to Hiroshima Station, where I
found that the Geibi Line wasn’t running either. There was a train
from Yaga Station, one stop north from Hiroshima Station, being
used to evacuate A-bomb survivors. So, I took that train together
with the A-bomb survivors to Matsue. I arrived in Matsue in theearly hours of the 8th and went straight to the hospital to see mybrother. (He died on August 15th). I decided to come back to
Hiroshima that same day and met a doctor and nurse on the train who
were going to Hiroshima to assist with the relief work. They asked
me to take them to Hiroshima Teishin Hospital and I agreed. We
arrived at Hiroshima Station a little before 11 o’clock on the 9th. It
was the first time for me to see the whole picture of Hiroshima
following the atomic bombing. What could I say? It was a town of
rubble as far as the eye could see. From Hiroshima Station I could
even see as far as Ujina Port and Ninoshima Island. I was severely
shocked and wondered what kind of powerful bomb it was that could
destroy the city so completely.
What shocked me next was the way that people died. There wasa bridge called “Enkobashi Bridge” in front of Hiroshima Station. I
found several dead bodies there with their arms and legs burned tothe bone and their bellies swollen but unburned. They did not appear
to be human any more; they were just things. I felt strongly that thebomb had transformed humans into something else. After a while,
military trucks carrying dead bodies came to the bank of the River
Enko in front of Hiroshima Station. Soldiers started to line up these

Visit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

dead bodies, pour kerosene over them andthen cremate them. This seemed a terrible
way to cremate people. Besides, it made me
wonder how one could distinguish thebones from one another if the dead bodies
were cremated that way. The unidentified
bones of 70,000 people were placed into the
Atomic Bomb Memorial Mound in the
Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park in 1955. I
guess that the bones gathered on the riverbank that day were also put into the mound.
Kazushi Kaneko
Dead bodies were cremated that way allover Hiroshima City.
When I took the doctor and nurse to Hiroshima Teishin
Hospital, many A-bombed survivors were lying down on the stonepaved square in front of the gate as if they were fish scattered in afish market. Their skin was stripped off, their muscles appeared fromthe inside, maggots bred over their bodies, the blazing sun shone
down on them mercilessly and an indescribable stench hung in the
air. I felt as if I was hearing the last moaning of tortured people. No
one could imagine that they would survive. Until then I had believedthat Japan would ultimately win the war. But when I saw that scene,
I thought that Japan would surely lose the war.
2. The Hiroshima Council of A-Bomb Sufferers Organizations
I became a member of the Hiroshima Council of A-BombSufferers Organizations in 1988, responding to a request from thecouncil and saying that I would be happy to help them if I could beof any use. It was shortly after my retirement following 40 years ofteaching in school, which I began in 1946. The Chugoku Shimbun
Newspaper wrote on its web page that the Hiroshima Council of ABomb Sufferers Organizations split up because communist-leaning
members held their own conference in 1964. But what I learned fromsenior members of my council was that these members did notvolunteer to leave the Hiroshima Council, but were forced to leave,
mainly because Mr. Ichiro Moritaki, the then-President of theHiroshima Council, refused to register communist-leaning people asmembers in 1964 when the Campaign Against A- and H-Bomb split
due to the confrontation between socialist and communist members.
As a result, communist-leaning members ended up holding theirown conference. Professor Kiyoshi Sakuma of Hiroshima University(who died in 1991) served as the first Director General, followed by
Mr. Masanori Ichioka (who died in 1997). I am the third Director
General.
When France held nuclear tests in 1995, members of bothcouncils staged a joint sit-in protest in the Hiroshima Peace
Memorial Park for the first time. In the general meeting of each
Hiroshima Council in 1997, members of both councils attended theother’s general meeting. I called for the unification of the Hiroshima
Councils in 1998. Ms. Sakae Ito (who died in 2000), the thenPresident of the other Hiroshima Council after Mr. Moritaki (whodied in 1994), agreed with my idea and showed a willingness to work
together. Mr. Tsuboi, who followed Ms. Ito as President, is not anticommunist either. On December 7, 2007, I had an opportunity to talkwith him on peace issues in an interview project organized by The
Chugoku Shimbun Newspaper and found no major differences
between our thinking. We are the same age and both of us retired
from teaching work in March, 1986. Since I formally proposed tounite the Hiroshima Councils, each council’s representative is
supposed to attend and address the other’s general meeting. We havebridged some differences that way. However, the Rengo, theJapanese Trade Union Confederation, behind Mr. Tsuboi is rather
right-leaning and the relationship between the organization and ourcouncil is like a mix of oil and water. Our difficulty in achieving
unification might not be unrelated to Mr. Tsuboi’s respect for the
Rengo. Regarding the prospects for unification, I would like by all−2−

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.10 No.3 March 2008

＜Reflections from Hiroshima: The 7th in a Series＞

means to achieve it while I am in office as Director General. A-bomb
survivors also criticize the Hiroshima Councils, asking why there are
two councils and why they are not united. I agree with this opinion.
Opposing forces take advantage of the separate peace movements ofthe two different councils. If the Hiroshima Councils were united asone, we could exert more influence.
3. Local Grassroots Movements
More than 20 years have passed since I retired from work andagreed to serve as president in my neighborhood association in the
Senogawa area of Aki Ward. Soon after I began this work, I set up
the “Sunflower Peace Group in the Senogawa Area.” Anybody canjoin this group as long as they are interested in honoring peace. We
now have several dozen members and collect 300 yen per person
each month to fund attendance at various peace movements. The
association also helps us to collect signatures and money to join theconference of the Japan Congress Against A- and H- Bombs every
year. We send 15 or 16 members to the world conference of thecongress every August. We also save money and cover travel
expenses for members to attend meetings such as in Iwakuni City,
Yamaguchi Prefecture to oppose the reinforcement of U.S. forces
there. I have also organized a group of A-bomb survivors who were
not previously connected with each other in my neighborhood. We
have made a list of A-bomb survivors in the area, chosen board
members and now hold a monthly meeting by region. According to
the Senogawa Town historical record, 174 people who were forced
to go to Hiroshima City to break down buildings were affected by
the atomic bombing. We built a memorial to commemorate them andhold a memorial service every year. This service has drawn more
people than before, including non-A-bomb survivors. Currently, sixgroups of women’s associations in elementary schools andneighborhood associations also participate in the service. During theservice, students make a vow for peace and present the work they
have done in peace education classes in school. The service
concludes with the students singing a song for peace. We held the15th service this year.
I believe that the key to stimulating the peace movement inHiroshima is through grassroots movements. Grassroots movements
might not bring about discernible results at once, but they will raise
the level of the overall peace movement, while helping people growto understand the current state of Japanese politics. It is important tomake patient efforts to involve more young people and others whoare interested in the peace movement, at the same time as pressing
ahead with grassroots movements. With this in mind, we haverecently established the Senogawa Article 9 Association.
4. Hiroshima City Civil Protection Plan
The Hiroshima City Civil Protection Plan was developed on theassumption that a nuclear weapon will be dropped on this city again.
Such a plan is ineffectual and immoral. The plan is meaninglessbecause we have to consider instead what we can do to abolishnuclear weapons. The premise of planning for another atomic
bombing is equivalent to an approval of the existence of nuclear
weapons. If a nuclear weapon were to be dropped, there is nothing
we can do to protect people. It is nonsense to say that one should dothis or that to protect civilians. Such a statement is inhumane. Our
council is not indifferent to this issue. If both Hiroshima Councils
raised a voice in protest, Hiroshima City might have second thoughts
about this plan. The Seven A-bomb Survivors’ Organizations in
Hiroshima need to take up the problem and hold a meeting to raise
our voices in protest, which we hope will ultimately lead to nuclear
abolition.
Asai is president at HPIHPI Research Forum
July 18, 2007

Title: When Might Does Not Make Right: The
United States Must Be Accountable forInternational Crimes in Iraq
Speaker: Lennox Hinds, Professor, Rutgers University, U.S.

Hinds is a well-known specialist in internationaland criminal law, who has been active inhuman rights movements over many years,
both within the U.S. and overseas. He was
highly critical of the U.S. policies on Iraq even
before the start of the Iraq War. In this forum hegave a detailed analysis of the illegality of the
Iraq War that was initiated by the U.S. and
Lennox Hinds
Britain.
Hinds views the war, started in 2003 by U.S. President George
Bush and then British Prime Minister Tony Blair for the purpose of
procuring oil, as an “act of aggression,” as stated in the U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 3314. Accordingly, he claims that
this war was a “crime against peace,” pursuant to the Nuremberg
Doctrine.
Hinds explained that the U.S. and British governments
perpetrated an “armed attack” against Iraq, and thus triggered Iraq’s“inherent right” to individual and collective self-defense under U.N.
Charter Article 51. In other words, Iraq was clearly the victim in theconflict and had a legitimate right under international law to seek

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.10 No.3 March 2008

U.N. assistance in deterring aggression. Yet, no U.N. member statecame to the defense of Iraq. Hinds criticized this U.N. stance,
claiming that the situation could be equated to the League of
Nations adopting a resolution ratifying Japan’s belligerent
occupation of Manchuria, Mussolini’s belligerent occupation of
Ethiopia or Stalin’s belligerent occupations of Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia. Furthermore, Hinds asserted that Iraq was the first
victim of “Preventive Warfare” since World War II, i.e., the same
doctrine that was adopted by the Nazi regime in Germany. The U.S.
and British governments used this doctrine to justify their action
against Iraq. It should be noted that the Nuremberg Tribunal
rejected this doctrine when Nazi defendants attempted to use it tojustify their invasion of Norway.
If such a preemptive strike without legal justification orevidence was to be repeated worldwide, Hinds warned that it would
result in a lawless world, in which no one would be safe and themost reckless warlord could potentially annihilate the people of theearth with weapons of mass destruction.
Hinds concluded that we must initiate a movement to bringBush, Blair and their lieutenants to trial for committing crimes ofaggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity in order that
their “impunity for egregious crimes under international law” will
not go unrecognized and unpunished in either international courts oflaw or public opinion. He suggested that the trial of Augusto
Pinochet should be seen as a precedent and a model in this case.

−3−

By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPIVisit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

HPI Research ProjectEngagement with North Korea“Engagement with North Korea,” one of the Hiroshima Peace
Institute (HPI)’s Research Projects in progress, is now in its final
stage. This project aims to publish an edited volume that is basedon the papers of the participants of the two workshops held at HPI
on 11-12 December 2006 and at the Weatherhead East Asian
Institute of Columbia University on 8-9 June 2007. As thecoordinator of this project, I will briefly introduce the researchbackground, objective and main findings of the research.
Tension between North Korea and the outside world has
drastically increased over the past few years. In 2006, North
Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile and then anuclear device; in response, the United Nations Security Council
adopted two resolutions that sanctioned North Korea for its
destabilizing behavior. However, the member countries of the
Six-Party Talks−North Korea, South Korea, the United States,
China, Russia, and Japan −reached an agreement in February
2007 over initial steps towards the denuclearization of North
Korea. This agreement aimed at bringing about the shuttingdown and disablement of North Korea’s nuclear facilities and thecomplete declaration of all its nuclear programs, in exchange foraid in the form of the provision of heavy fuel oil. The actual shutdown of the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon in July and thedisablement process of other nuclear facilities that began sinceNovember are regarded as the first accomplishments of the fivecountries’ concerted engagement with North Korea, which areseen as leading towards the common goal of the dismantlementof this isolated country’s nuclear program.
How to continue to make progress in relation to thedenuclearization of North Korea remains a big question, and it islikely that over the coming months the process may undergo
setbacks. Furthermore, “progress” differs considerably from theactual completion of the process. For completion, there needs tobe a parallel substantive change in international relations
centered on the Korean Peninsula, particularly between the
United States and North Korea and between Japan and North
Korea. Inasmuch as the issue of the denuclearization of North
Korea is in itself a complicated and unpredictable exercise, there
has been extensive controversy among policymakers andacademics over the wisdom and legitimacy of engagement as a
strategy used to come to terms with the issue. Critics anddefenders of engagement continue to debate the merits anddrawbacks of proposed policies towards North Korea.
Despite extensive controversy however, there has in fact
been little sustained effort made to explore the theoretical logic
behind engagement or to assess whether or not−and if so, in
what ways−engagement has actually worked on the Korean
Peninsula. The question of engagement is a vital issue for bothscholars and policymakers alike: how the world deals with North
Korea will have ramifications for both regional and global
stability, and it is thus all the more important that policy be
adopted and conducted from a sound theoretical and empiricalbasis.
The purpose of this project is to examine the theoretical basisof engagement as a viable alternative to coercion, and thepractical questions related to the five neighboring states’

Visit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

engagement with North Korea. It deals with the nuclear issue as a
critical though not sole subject in this discussion. Engagementwith North Korea involves negotiations and economic relations
between the relevant states anchored by the Six-Party Talks: inparticular, economic issues have mattered significantly and willcontinue to matter in the denuclearization process. Therefore thisproject deals with the political implications of economic issues aswell as North Korea’s nuclear issue per se.
The principal finding of this research reveals that engagementin general and the Six-Party Talks’ engagement following the
February 2007 agreement in particular represents a viable policy
alternative to coercive strategies. According to proponents ofcoercive strategies, compellence, whether in the form of military
action or economic sanctions, raises the costs of provocative
behavior and, in turn, modifies a state’s behavior. However, in
reality compellence has rarely shown itself strong enough tomodify destabilizing behavior and has in many cases reinforcedthat behavior. In contrast, engagement represents a strategy
whose main function is to defuse a potentially dangerous
situation not by means of threats but through incentives. The
distinguishing feature of engagement is the contention that
positive inducements and an extension of benefits can produce achange in a destabilizing state’s behavior and thereby in the longrun transform that state by creating new interests.
In the North Korean case, a policy of engagement was indeed
eventually arrived at when it became clear that coercive strategies
were unlikely to succeed and were also unlikely to gain the
support of critical actors. On the strength of the mostly positive
moves of 2007, the potential for a long-term agreement between
the U.S. and the DPRK is greater now than it has been in the past
five years. The February 2007 agreement and its follow-up
meetings which have taken place as part of the Six-Party Talks,
including its five working groups, have led to continued, albeit
halting, progress. Regardless of what many may think aboutengagement, it appears to be the only way to facilitate North
Korean denuclearization.
Although there are clearly many remaining potential
obstacles which could derail progress at any time, it is prudent toconsider how best to implement a comprehensive agreement andwhat the actual details and costs of that agreement will entail.
Three potential issues that will require sustained attention overthe coming months are: i) the political issues involved in dealing
with North Korea; ii) the costs and actual problems in
implementing any agreement to decommission nuclear facilities;
and iii) the process of institutionalizing the current negotiations
to ensure continuing progress even if the nuclear issue isresolved. All three issues will likely prove far more difficult toaddress than many observers expect and therefore sustained
attention and engagement will be critical to ensure continued
progress on the Korean Peninsula. The alternative−sliding backinto confrontation and once again reversing whatever progresshas been made−is a sufficiently dangerous path that all countries
would be wise to continue avoiding.

−4−

By Sung Chull Kim, professor at HPIHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.10 No.3 March 2008

HPI’s Lecture Series for Citizens of Hiroshima“Towards Overcoming Barriers between Japan and Korea:
Mutual Understanding and Peace Building between Japan and Korea/Choson ”
The Hiroshima Peace Institute held its eighth public lecture series
entitled “Mutual Understanding and Peace Building between Japanand Korea/Choson,” consisting of five lectures, from November 1st to
29th, 2007 at the Hiroshima City Plaza for Town Development
through Citizen Exchange.
The series is a follow-up version of the lecture series held last year
which covered various pressing issues between Japan and Korea.
However, this year the title was extended from “between Japan and
Korea” to “between Japan and Korea/Choson.” Choson is an ancientname for Korea which is used for the official name of North Korea inthe Korean language.
In this lecture series we invited Hiroshi Nakao, an expert in themodern history of Japan-Korea relations, as guest speaker to examine
the detailed modern history of Japan and the Korean Peninsula. The
period from Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea (during the 1590s) to thedispatch of Korean diplomatic delegations during the Tokugawa
dynasty (17th-19th century) was covered in the third lecture. The
period from the rise of the “conquering Korea” debate in the late
Tokugawa/early-Meiji era (mid-19th century) to the years before thecolonization was examined in the fourth lecture.
From HPI, Prof. Sung Chull Kim discussed the issues of the SixParty Talks for the denuclearization of North Korea in the first lecture.
Prof. Mikyoung Kim analyzed the issue of comparative memories of
war in Japan and Korea in the second lecture and President Motofumi
Asai presented proposals for understanding Japan’s relations with
North and South Korea in the fifth lecture.
Approximately 60 participants attended the lectures throughout
the series, including businessmen, housewives and students, amongwhom were some Korean residents and also a few citizens fromoutside Hiroshima Prefecture.
According to the participant survey conducted following the fifth
lecture, to the question “Has your understanding of peace issues
improved?” 55% answered “very much” and 42% answered “to somedegree.” This reveals that in total, 97% of the respondents had
improved their understanding.
Lecture Summaries(1) Nov. 1 “Engagement with North Korea: The Japanese
Government’s Viable Choice” by Sung Chull Kim, Professor
at HPIAt the outset, Prof. Kim analyzed in detail the international
relations centered on North Korea. He pointed out that all the countries
concerned approach North Korea with different objectives. The issueof highest priority differs depending on the country: “Nonproliferation” for the U.S., “the status quo on the Korean Peninsula”
for China, “economic interdependence and eventual unification” forSouth Korea and “the abduction issue” for Japan. For the U.S., theremoval of North Korea from its list of terror-sponsoring states cannot
be avoided, but for Japan, which is pushing a hard-line policy, this is
not acceptable. Prof. Kim proposed that Japan, instead of relying
solely on sanctions, should adopt a flexible diplomatic approach
towards North Korea, including a forward-looking engagement policy;
he stated that “progress in the nuclear issue may lead to progress in theabduction issue, but not vice versa.”(2) Nov. 8 “Peace, War Memories and Museums in Japan and
Korea” by Mikyoung Kim, Assistant Professor at HPIProf. Kim compared the narratives and thoughts shown in the
exhibits of the Yushukan War Museum in Yasukuni Shrine, theHiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, the Independence Hall and the
Seodaemun Prison History Hall. The first two are located in Japan andthe other two in South Korea. Prof. Kim also pointed out that, based on
surveys of college students from the two countries, whereas Japanese
students expressed perceptions of South Korean society as being“hard-working,” holding “strong emotions,” and “pride,” Korean
students described perceptions of Japanese society as being “obscene,”“cruel” and “ordered,” and that this represents a huge gap between the
two. Finally, she emphasized that by overcoming ethnocentrism andthrough the promotion of peace-oriented history education, bothsocieties should endeavor to build mutual trust and collaboration.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.10 No.3 March 2008

(3) Nov. 15 “Why the Quartercentenary of Chosen Tsushin
Shi (Korean Diplomatic Delegation)? Jinshin Invasion and
Chosen Tsushin Shi ” by Hiroshi Nakao, Visiting Professor at
Kyoto University of Art and Design
Diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea have broken off in
the past due to the two invasions of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, brutality
during Japan’s occupation and the abductions of tens of thousands of
Koreans to Japan. In order to restore the relationship, Tokugawa
Ieyashu took the strong initiative to invite the Chosen Tsushin Shi
delegation to Japan which was successfully achieved in 1607. An
improvement in Japan-Korea relations was necessary for the new
Tokugawa dynasty to expand its trade with East Asia including China.
Prof. Nakao described Hideyoshi’s invasion plan into the AsianContinent, atrocities committed on the battlefield by Japanese soldiers,
negotiations between Tokugawa and the Korean government, andvarious scenes of interchange between ordinary Japanese citizens andKorean delegations during their visits to Japan through the use ofvideo and other historical materials.
(4) Nov. 22 “From Good-Neighbor Diplomacy to the ConqueringKorea Policy: Japan-Korea Relations of the late-Tokugawa/
Meiji Period” by Hiroshi Nakao
Twelve Chosen Tsushin Shi delegations were dispatched during
the Tokugawa period of which the first three were called “Kaito
Sakkan Shi” which literally means a delegation to respond to Japan’soffer and to return abductees kidnapped by Hideyoshi. During the
Tokugawa era a stable Japan-Korea relationship was maintained,
good-neighbor diplomacy between the two countries continued andthe Chosen Tsushin Shi brought various aspects of Korean culture to
Japan. However, a group of ideologues who pushed to conquer Korea
emerged among the proponents of imperial Japan at the end of theTokugawa period. The new Meiji government shifted to hard-line
diplomacy towards Korea through actions such as dispatching awarship to Kanghwa island in Korea in order to open up its ports for
trade. Subsequently, descriptions of Chosen Tsushin Shi thatsymbolized the good relationship between Japan and Korea
disappeared from Japan’s school history textbooks and then Japan
initiated the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War. Prof. Nakao
concluded his lecture by casting doubt over “whether the historical
recognition shown in the novel Saka no Ue no Kumo [Clouds over the
Steep Path] written by Ryotaro Shiba was accurate.” The noveldescribes the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War as marking
the starting point of Japan’s militarism.
(5) Nov. 29 “Japan and Korea/Choson: Invitation to Tasha
Kankaku (Sense of Otherness) and Imagination” by Motofumi
Asai, President at HPIDuring its history, Japan has continually looked down on the
Korean Peninsula without valid reason, the only exception to thisbeing the Tokugawa dynasty. After World War II, Japan and South
Korea concluded the Treaty on Basic Relations and the Agreement
Concerning the Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and
Claims and Economic Cooperation in 1965, by which the Japanese
government officially asserted that all historical issues were now
settled. In recent years, although the Pyongyang Declaration signed by
Japan and North Korea in 2002 maintained that the two countries“would make every possible effort for an early normalization ofrelations,” the Japanese government’s position has been that “nonormalization of relations will be possible without a solution of theabduction issue.” Japan has also not been sincere in dealing with theissue of Korean atomic bomb survivors. What exists in common
among these attitudes is a lack of Tasha Kankaku, or “sense ofotherness” as mentioned by Maruyama Masao and the missing“Imagination” expressed by Oe Kenzaburo. Finally, HPI President
Asai pointed out that even here in Hiroshima, in an atomic-bombed
city, we have lacked “Imagination” in the process of creating the Civil
Protection Plan.

−5−

By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPIVisit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

The Origins of the Dirty Bomb: The U.S. Military and Radiological Weapons
By Robert Jacobs
multiple disasters
which would befalla modern city, blasted
The Other Hiroshima Council of A-BombSufferers
Organizations

In May of 2002, the U.S. government arrested Jose Padilla, a U.S.
citizen, on suspicion of being an agent of al-Qaeda and ofplanning to detonate a “dirty bomb” in an American city. Dirty
bombs are “radiological weapons” and are different from nuclear
weapons. Nuclear weapons trigger a nuclear chain reaction that
releases the vast energies contained within atoms. A dirty bombis a bomb containing conventional explosives that is packed withradioactive substances that are dispersed into the surrounding
environment causing widespread radioactive contamination; it
does not involve an actual nuclear chain reaction. In this sense, it
is a “poison weapon” since it spreads a deadly poison −radioactivity − by means of an explosion. A dirty bomb isunlikely to cause considerable physical impact from the
explosion itself, but rather a catastrophic impact from thecontamination of a particular urban area with deadly radiation.
Time magazine reports that, “dirty nukes are what you mightchoose to build if you’re unable to create a real nuclear
bomb...the assumption has been that forces who would build adirty nuke would do so because it’s far, far easier.” iHowever, in October of 2007 Associated Press military
reporter Robert Burns published a story that shed some light on
who has considered using such weapons in the past. Burns
describes secret 1948 U.S. plans, “approved at the highest levelsof the Army,” to use “radioactive materials from atomic bombmaking to contaminate swathes of enemy land or to target
military bases, factories or troop formations,” or even toassassinate “important individuals such as military or civilian
leaders.” iiThis memo was dated July 1948, not quite three years after
the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. During this period, inboth Japanese cities the U.S. had set up the Atomic Bomb
Casualty Commission to study the effects on human beings ofradiation exposure. The first year after the bombings ofHiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. conducted nuclear weapon
tests at the Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific. The second Bikini
test − Test Baker − involved detonating a nuclear weapon
underwater. This test resulted in such high levels of residual
radiation in the area that it forced the canceling of a scheduled
third test because the levels were so high.
In the official top-secret evaluation of the Bikini tests, written
in 1947, we can begin to see a reexamination of the bomb as aradiological weapon by the U.S. military, and the starting point of
the memo that Burns discovered:by one or more atomic bombs and enveloped by radioactive
mists. Of the survivors in contaminated areas, some would
be doomed to die of radiation sickness in hours, some indays, and others in years. But these areas, irregular in sizeand shape, as wind and topography might form them, would
have no visible boundaries. No survivor could be certain he
was not among the doomed and so, added to the terror of the
moment, thousands would be stricken with a fear of deathand the uncertainty of the time of its arrival.”“Thousands, perhaps millions, of refugees would rushfrom the city in panic, breaking down remaining
transportation facilities, congesting highways, and creatingin their flight new hazards to life. Among the refugees, forthe moment unidentifiable from the rest, would be numbers
whose contaminated clothing and any other goods they
carried could establish in others the fear of dangerous
radioactivity, thus creating a unique psychological hazard.” v
It was clear that the military had a vivid grasp of the powersof this new weapon. It saw that the atomic bomb could be
effective both as a weapon of devastating impact and also as aradiological weapon, capable of poisoning vast areas beyond its
immediate effects of blast and heat. Further, military planners
quickly saw the obvious possibility of using radiation as a terror
weapon aimed at destroying the enemy’s civilian population. The
U.S. military would soon develop and test such radiologicalweapons as “radiological mists” and “radiological sand”
separately from nuclear weapons. It was just such weapons that
Rep. Albert Gore Sr. (D-Tenn) had in mind when he advocatedcreating a radioactive “death belt” to “quarantine” North Korea
from South Korea in 1951.vi
So while current Western fears may paint the dirty bomb as acheap alternative to “real” nuclear weapons for terrorists, it was
the nation in sole possession of the first nuclear weapons that also
first designed and built radiological weapons. Perhaps this is justone more of the many examples of “blowback” being experienced
as a result of the history of U.S. militarism.
Jacobs is assistant prefesser at HPI“When a bomb is exploded underwater, lethal residual
radioactivity assumes an importance greater than thephysical damage caused by the explosion...the detonation ofa bomb in a body of water contiguous to a city would vastly
enhance its radiation effects by creation of a base surge
whose mist, contaminated with fission products, anddispersed by wind over great areas, would not only have an
immediately lethal effect, but would establish a long term
hazard through the contamination of structures by thedeposition of radioactive particles.” iiiThis was among the reasons that it was concluded that “thebomb is preeminently a weapon for use against human life andactivities in large urban and industrial areas.” iv The report went
on to offer a vivid psychological portrait of the effectiveness ofusing radioactivity as a weapon:“We can form no adequate mental picture of the

Visit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

i Mark Thompson, “What is a ‘Dirty Bomb’?” Time (June 10, 2002).
<http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,182637,00.html>
ii Robert Burns, “U.S. Considered Radiological Weapon,” USA Today (Oct.
8, 2007). <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-10-08radiological-weapon_N.htm>
iii JCS 1691/3, Enclosure D, June 30, 1947, pp. 57-89.
iv JCS 1691/3.
v JCS 1691/3.
vi “Atomic Death Belt Possible,” Science News Letter 59:17 (April 28, 1951),
p. 261.

−6−

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.10 No.3 March 2008

HPI Research Forums
September 26, 2007

Title: Is Australia Part of the Problem or Part of
the Solution to Abolishing Nuclear Weapons?
Speaker: Dr. Tilman Ruff, Associate Professor, the Universityof Melbourne, Australia

Ruff is an infectious diseases and publichealth physician, an adviser to internationalorganizations including UNICEF and WHO
on immunization in Australia, Southeast
Asia and the Pacific region. Ruff has shownstrong interest in human rights and peacesince his youth and was a founding member
Dr. Tilman Ruffof the first secondary student group ofAmnesty International in Australia. He is former president of theMedical Association for Prevention of War (Australia), is a
Director of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear
War, and Australian Chair of the International Campaign toAbolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). This gives him a wide
knowledge, both from a medical and political standpoint, of war
and nuclear weapons.
Ruff was highly critical of the double standard in Australian
government policies (under then Prime Minister John Howard),
which, on the one hand, had supported the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty, but at the same time was backing
possible U.S. use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states,
including pre-emptive attacks. The Howard government, which
met resounding defeat in the election in November 2007, was oneof the first governments to dispatch military forces to Iraq, andsubsequently to occupy the country in cooperation with the U.S.
December 6, 2007

Title: Cold War Art and the Bomb in the
Exhibition, The Family of Man (1955)
Speaker: Dr. John O’Brian, Professor, the University of British
Columbia, Canada

Among the most successful and influential
photographic exhibitions ever presented in
the history of modern photography was The
Family of Man exhibition first presented at
the Museum of Modern Art in New York
City in 1955 by curator Edward Steichen.
This exhibition was eventually seen by over
Dr. John O’Brian
9 million people in 61 countries (including
almost one million people in Japan), and was reproduced in a best
selling book in several different languages. Just what was at thecore of this powerful exhibition?
Fortunately, for a gathering of citizens and scholars in
Hiroshima, the renowned art historian John O’Brian of the
University of British Columbia, Vancouver presented a
Hiroshima Peace Institute Research Forum on 6 December 2007
to examine the intent and effect of The Family of Man exhibition.
Richly illustrating his talk with images taken from the original
exhibition as well as historical images to provide context,
O’Brian examined both the intent and content of the exhibition.
He found that throughout the exhibition there was both apresence and an absence of the Atomic Bomb.
“The Family of Man,” explained O’Brian, “was intended to
be a benign demonstration of American political values.” This
was achieved through the collection of photographs which

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.10 No.3 March 2008

and Britain. Howard also expanded military, including nuclear,cooperation with the U.S., such as on destabilizing missile
defence. Howard expanded U.S. military facilities, training andexercises in Australia, representing a vital military asset for the
U.S. if it were to use nuclear weapons in Asia or the Middle East.
Ruff also criticized the Australian government’s uranium mining
and export policies, claiming that Australia was actuallycontributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons through its
export of uranium to many parts of the world, under safeguards
which could provide little more than an illusion of protection.
Regarding Australian policies against global warming, Ruff
claimed that these were severely deficient, lacking vision andsubstance for development of a sustainable energy future. In his
power-point presentation, he vividly illustrated the devastating
environmental destruction and pollution resulting from uranium
mining in Australia.
Throughout his presentation, Ruff analyzed various negative
factors in Australia working against the ultimate aim ofabolishing nuclear weapons. He emphasized the necessity for achange of government in order to reverse this situation andintroduce more positive policies. This political change actuallycame about on November 24, 2007 when a new Labor
government was voted into office, committing to withdraw
Australian combat forces from Iraq and reverse Howard’s plan tosell uranium to India. It has strongly supported the developmentof a Nuclear Weapons Convention−a comprehensive treaty toabolish nuclear weapons, and reactivation of the Canberra
Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI“conveyed collective emotions” rather than “historicallycontingent” images. Therefore the exhibit was full of images offamilies eating, at work and at play, generations interacting witheach other and other universally shared human experiences thatcut across cultural and racial boundaries, thereby demonstrating
the commonalities of the human experience. What the curators
intended was to convey a sense of the human family thattranscended political, racial, or class boundaries. The exhibition
painted a picture of a common family of people around the world
who were living lives essentially similar to one another: in thisway the “democratic” medium of photography was employed toportray the “democratic” family of man.
The single color image included was that of a mushroom
cloud from a thermonuclear weapon test taken in 1952 in the
Pacific Ocean. It was one of the few images that did not show
human beings. In international presentations of the exhibition,
this color image was replaced by a black and white photograph ofthe thermonuclear test. Another controversial image was aphotograph showing the lynching of a black man in the American
south. This photograph was also removed, leaving the exhibition
without its two most violent images.
O’Brian argues that curator Steichen’s intent was to present
both the image of the H-Bomb and also the world that it
universally threatened to annihilate in order that viewers might
grasp the enormity of the threat of nuclear weapons. However,O’Brian concludes that in this regard Steichen failed: “theaffirmative thrust of the exhibition smothered whatever potential
may have existed for the representation of nuclear tragedy.”−7−

By Robert Jacobs, assistant professor at HPIVisit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

November 1, 2007-February 29, 2008

◆Nov. 2 HPI President Motofumi Asai gives lecture on “Japan andInternational Society in the 21st Century” at 150th lecture meeting of“Seminar for Everyone in Yamanobe Town” organized by Board of
Education in Yamanobe Town, Yamagata Prefecture.
◆Nov. 3 Asai gives lecture on “War and Peace” at 2007 commemorative
meeting of promulgation of Japanese Constitution on Nov. 3, organizedby executive committee of “Meeting for Japanese Constitution” inOkayama Prefecture.
◆Nov. 5-24 Hiroko Takahashi gathers documents on ABCC at Texas andWisconsin, U.S.
◆Nov. 9 Kazumi Mizumoto gives lecture on “Hiroshima and Peace” atprogram “Societies, Development and Environment” of Japan Foundation
Middle East Fellowship Program for Intellectual Exchange,
at HPI.
◆Nov.16 Asai gives lecture on “Ideal Peace Education in Nuclear Age”
at 34th education meeting organized by and held at Junior High andSenior High Schools of Tsukuba University, Tokyo.
◆Nov.17 Asai, as panelist, participates in symposium “‘Revision’ of
Fundamental Law of Education and Future of Education” organized byand held at Junior High and Senior High Schools of Tsukuba University,
Tokyo.
◆Nov.21 Mizumoto gives lecture on “International Contribution and
Activities for Nuclear Disarmament from Hiroshima” at “World Contact
Lecture Meeting” held at Hatsukaichi High School, in Hatsukaichi City,
Hiroshima Prefecture.
◆Nov.22 Asai gives lecture on “Our Constitution” at meeting organized
by Article 9 Association (A9A) Group for Care Providers, in Tokyo.
◆Nov.22-25 Narayanan Ganesan presents paper entitled “The 2006
Military Coup and Its Impact on Democracy in Thailand” at Third Annual
Congress of the Asian Political and International Studies Association(APISA) held in New Delhi, India.
◆Nov.23 Asai gives lecture on “Let Us Question New Anti-Terrorism
Special Measures Law and Our Current Peace Movement” at lecture
meeting organized by executive committee of group against revision ofJapanese Constitution in Tokyo.▽Yoshiaki Sato presents paper on“Towards Cosmopolitan Law in East Asia” at 17th New Zealand AsianStudies Society International Conference held at University of Otago, N.Z.
◆Nov.24 Asai gives lecture on “How to Prevent Japan from Becoming
Warmonger State” at meeting of music and lectures to protect Article 9,organized by liaison center of A9A Group in Kure, Hiroshima Prefecture.
◆Nov.25 Asai gives lecture on “New Anti-Terrorism Special Measures
Bill” at “Union- Nagoya Meeting 11.25 to Express Protest in Enactmentof New Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law,” organized by its
executive committee, in Nagoya City, Aichi Prefecture.
◆Nov.30-Dec. 4 Mikyoung Kim collects data on Northeast Asian
security in Tokyo.
◆Dec. 1 Mizumoto gives presentation on “Recent Trends Surrounding
Nuclear Weapons” at public lecture meeting organized by ResearchGroup on Reference Materials of Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum,
held at the Museum.
◆Dec. 2 Asai gives lecture on “Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities” at welfare seminar organized by NPO Aichi Center for
People with Disabilities, in Nagoya City, Aichi Prefecture.
◆Dec. 8 Asai gives lecture on “Article 9 of Japanese Constitution andJapanese Diplomacy” at lecture meeting organized by A9A in Onomichi
City, Hiroshima Prefecture.
◆Dec.10 Mizumoto gives lecture on “Current Situation and Task of Aidin Cambodia” at General Meeting to establish Hiroshima-Cambodia
Association, held at Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation.
◆Dec.12 Robert Jacobs delivers lecture titled “Survival in 10 Easy
Graphics” at Ritsumeiken University, Kyoto Prefecture.
◆Dec.16 Asai gives lecture on “‘Revision’ of Japanese Constitution and
Our Tasks” at “Course to Learn Japanese Constitution” organized by
Kagawa Trade Union Congress for Peace and Democracy, in Kagawa
Prefecture.
◆Dec.17 Sato gives lecture on “Institutionalization of ASEAN?” atInstitute of Social Science Comparative Regionalism Project (ISS CREP)
special seminar held at University of Tokyo.

◆Dec.20 Hitoshi Nagai gives lecture on “Institute for American Studies
of Rikkyo University during World War II” at Rikkyo Univerisity,
Tokyo.
◆Dec.28 Takahashi comments at book review meeting of Hiroshima
Dokuritsuron [Essay on the Independence of Hiroshimas] by Takuma
Higashi organized by Open City Hiroshima in Hiroshima Prefecture.
◆Jan. 4 Ganesan conducts field research in the northern Shan statesalong the Sino-Burmese border in Myanmar.
◆Jan.10 Mizumoto gives lecture on “International Contribution from
Hiroshima” at “World Contact Lecture Meeting” held at Daimon HighSchool, Fukuyama City, Hiroshima Prefecture.
◆Jan.12 Jacobs delivers lecture titled “Nuclear Weapons in Context” tostudents from the CIEE program in Tokyo at Hiroshima Peace Memorial
Museum.
◆Jan.13 Asai gives lecture on “Peace and Social Security” at “Learning
Course of Social Security in Hiroshima” organized by Hiroshima City
Employees’ Union, in Hiroshima City.
◆Jan.18 Sung Chull Kim presents paper entitled “Framing Northeast
Asian Security” at Sentosa Roundtable on Asian Security organized byand held at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore.
◆Jan.20 Mizumoto gives lecture on “Civil War in Cambodia,
Reconstruction, and Aid from Hiroshima” at first Lecture Meeting on
Cambodia, organized by Hiroshima-Cambodia Association, held at
Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation.
◆Jan.27 Asai gives lecture on “Miku, the World, and Japan” at lecture
meeting organized by group to enrich medical treatment and child-carefor children with disabilities in western part of Hiroshima, in Hatsukaichi
City, Hiroshima Prefecture.
◆Feb. 7 Asai gives lecture on “To Secure Rights of People with
Disabilities” at workshop for workers at facilities for people withdisabilities, organized by Association of Institutions for People with
Mental Disabilities in Kinki Region, in Kobe City, Hyogo Prefecture.
◆Feb. 9 Asai gives lecture on “World Trend, and Near Future of Peace,
Constitution and People with Disabilities” at workshop for facility
managers organized by Japan Association of Community Workshops for
Disabled Persons, in Osaka Prefecture.▽Mizumoto gives lecture on“Current Global Situation of Nuclear Weapons” at training course for
Hiroshima Peace Volunteer Project sponsored by and held at Hiroshima
Peace Memorial Museum.
◆Feb.16 Asai gives lecture on “Japanese Constitution in Our Daily
Lives” at lecture meeting on Japanese Constitution organized by
Fukuyama Chapter of Hiroshima Bar Association in Fukuyama City,
Hiroshima Prefecture.
◆Feb.17 Asai gives lecture on “Peace, Life, and Human Rights” at
lecture meeting organized by Suzukake Welfare Institution for People
with Disabilities, in Aichi Prefecture.
◆Feb.22 Asai gives lecture on “To Protect Rights of Children andCreate Peace” at lecture meeting organized by executive committee forprotecting children in Hiroshima, in Hiroshima City.
◆Feb.23 Asai gives lecture on “Six-Party Talks and Prospects ofNormalization of Japan-North Korea Relations” at lecture meetingorganized by Study Group of North and South Korean Issues in Kure
City, Hiroshima Prefecture.
◆Feb.24-Mar.5 Mizumoto visits Cambodia as member of Reconstruction
Aid Project in Cambodia, organized by Hiroshima Prefecture and JICA.
◆Feb. 29 Sato gives lecture on “EC Secondary Law as Institutionalized
Cosmopolitan Law” at workshop on “The Ideal and the Actual in theEuropean Union” organized by General Research Institute and held at
Seigakuin University in Saitama Prefecture.
−Visitors to HPI−
◆Feb.19 Noriko Koide, Board of Cooperative Educational Services, 11
students of Valley Stream Central High School, U.S., and 9 students and
Jun Sato, teacher, of Sanyo Girls’ School.
◆Feb.29 Alfred Chunda, Director, Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Republic of Zambia.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS

Vol.10, No.3 March 26, 2008
Copyright 2008 HPI All rights reserved●Publisher: Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University; Editor: Ayako Yoshida
TEL +81-82-544-7570 FAX +81-82-544-7573
Ote-machi Heiwa Bldg. 9F/10F 4-1-1 Ote-machi, Naka-ku, Hiroshima 730-0051, Japan. E-mail: office-peace@peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp●Printed by Takatoo Print Media co., ltd.

Visit HPI’s website at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm−8−

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.10 No.3 March 2008