Vol.21 No.2 March 2019

Prospects for the Situation on the
Korean Peninsula
The year 2018 saw epoch-making changes regarding thenuclear issue of North Korea. On April 27, a historicalinter-Korean summit was held at Panmunjom, where themilitary border is drawn between North and South Korea.
And on June 12, in Singapore, a U.S.-North Korea summit
was held for the first time in history.
The Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed the Panmunjom
Declaration, in which the two Koreas declared that theywould put an end to the armistice that had lasted for 65
years since the Korean War, transforming the armisticeinto a peace treaty. South and North Korea also confirmed
the common goal of realizing, through complete
denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
Meanwhile, in the joint statement at the Singapore
summit, President Donald J. Trump of the United Statesof America committed to providing security guarantees
to North Korea, and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the State
Affairs Commission of the Democratic People’s Republicof Korea reaﬃrmed his firm and unwavering commitment
to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Above all, it is extremely significant that both parties
confirmed a mutual goal of realizing a nuclear-free Korean
Peninsula, through a process of complete denuclearization.
However, controversy exists as to whether the
expression “complete denuclearization” means “complete,verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID)” of
North Korea’s nuclear program, as demanded by theinternational community. What North Korea means by
denuclearization is not only to denuclearize North Korea,
but also to denuclearize the entire Korean Peninsula byensuring that the United States does not deploy its nuclear
weapons on the peninsula so that no nuclear threat is
leveled at the DPRK. While the United States demands
that North Korea fulfills CVID regarding its nuclear

Hyun Jin Son

weapons and all other nuclear capabilities, North Korea
requires the United States to abandon its hostile policy
and to take actions to guarantee its regime in a secureand reliable manner. Denuclearization of North Korea
and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula shouldbe implemented based on the principle of reciprocity.
To date, the fundamental mutual interests regarding
the denuclearization process between the two countries
have not yet been coordinated. It will, therefore, require
additional time to put the process into practice. North
Korea is not likely to carry out complete denuclearization
unless it is certain it can obtain maximum benefits fromthe guarantee for its regime and denuclearization.
It is important to conclude a comprehensive agreementon the complete denuclearization and the building of alasting and robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
What is most important, however, is to restore confidence
among the countries concerned, including the UnitedStates and the DPRK. Needless to say, the U.S-North
Korea negotiations held in the past resulted in failure:
primarily because of strong mutual hostility and distrust.
Now South Korea and North Korea have emerged fromthe existing confrontation and mutual distrust, and arestanding at the crossroads of political change toward not
only concluding a peace treaty by declaring an end of the
Korean War, but also toward establishing a regime forpeace on the Korean Peninsula and a multilateral security
framework for Northeast Asia. Japan should also continue
to sincerely tackle outstanding problems between Japan
and North Korea based upon mutual trust, as reaffirmedin the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration of 2002, until
the normalization of their diplomatic relations is realized.
Accepted 21 December 2018
(Associate Professor at HPI)

Contents

Prospects for the Situation on the Korean Peninsula
Hyun Jin Son ………………………… 1
International Symposium“Opening the Door to Peace: The Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons and Beyond”
Akiko Naono ……………………… 2-3
The Rohingya Issue in Myanmar
Narayanan Ganesan ………………… 4
Legal Implications of Adding the Existence of the SDF to the Constitution of Japan
Akihiro Kawakami ………………… 5
Hiroshima Peace Seminar 2018
Hitoshi Nagai ………………………… 6
HPI Public Lecture Series 2018“‘Postwar’ Reconsidered: Historical Perspectives”
Makiko Takemoto …………………… 6
Commemorative Lectures Held in October Harkens Opening of the Graduate School of Peace Studies
Takeshi Yuasa ………………………… 7
Hello from HPI………………………………………… 7
Diary ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 8
Visit HPI’s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace_e/1International Symposium“Opening the Door to Peace:
The Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons and Beyond”
Akiko Naono

To commemorate both the 20th anniversary of the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) and the tenth anniversary of the Chugoku Shimbunʼs Hiroshima PeaceMedia Center, an international symposium entitled “Opening the Door to Peace: The Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons and Beyond” was held on July22, 2018. The event was co-hosted by Hiroshima City University, the Chugoku Shimbun, and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA)
at Nagasaki University, and was supported by Hiroshima City and the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation. In 2017, some progress was made in efforts
toward nuclear abolition, as exemplified by the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), and the award of the Nobel Peace
Prize to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). However, nuclear states have turned their backs on the TPNW. The UnitedStates and Russia have promoted the modernization of their nuclear arms, and are even poised to carry out a preemptive strike. Although the U.S.-DPRK
summit, the first of its kind in history, was held in June 2018, there has been no specific progress toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, andthe future situation there is impossible to predict. While Japan calls itself the only country in the world to have suffered a nuclear attack, it has increased
its dependence on the nuclear deterrent provided by the United States, supporting the U.S. policy that suggests the possible use of small nuclear weapons.
Moreover, in its nuclear policy, the Japanese government adheres to promoting the reuse of plutonium that can be used as a component in nuclear weapons,earning the mistrust of the international community. With the Doomsday Clock showing two minutes to midnight warning of a nuclear war crisis, what can
we of the civil society do to move toward a “world without nuclear weapons?” The front-line specialists invited to the symposium as panelists talked about
the challenges and prospects for the future regarding this issue, while analyzing the situations inside and outside of Japan from various angles.

Keynote lecture“The Beginning of the End of Nuclear Weapons”

Tim Wright (Treaty Coordinator, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons [ICAN])
In 2007, when we launched the International Campaign to Abolish
Nuclear Weapons, or ICAN, we were determined to amplify the voicesof A-bomb survivors, in order to convey the devastating damage
wrought by nuclear weapons to people around world, and to promote
public awareness that nuclear weapons are arms that jeopardize theexistence of humanity. In July 2017, 122 states voted to adopt theTreaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. (TPNW). Amongthem, 50 states signed the treaty immediately after its adoption. The
TPNW will enter into force once a total of 50 states have ratified or
acceded to it. As of July 22, 2018, 12 nations have ratified the treaty,
indicating progress towards its coming into effect. Comparing withother treaties ten months after the opening for signature, the TPNW
had the same number of ratifications as did the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) at the ten-month mark, and one more than the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC). The Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) each had justfour ratifications. Despite these statistics, a number of Japanese media
outlets reports that the pace of TPNW’s ratification is unusually slow,
giving the impression that the arguments of the nuclear-arms states’
are more reasonable and gaining greater support, and consequently
taking sides with the argument of the nuclear-armed states, which are
downplaying the level of support for the nuclear weapons ban treaty.

Although the Japanese government paints itself as a sensible “bridgebuilder” between nuclear-armed and nuclear-free nations, by rejecting
the ban treaty Japan has actually sided with the group of nuclear states.
The TPNW does not prevent a state party from maintaining an
alliance with a nuclear-armed state—Japan could remain an ally of theUnited States. Of the 17 states designated by the U.S. government as“major non-NATO allies,” 11 cast a vote in favor of the treaty. Thereis also significant public support for the treaty in four of the NATOcountries that host U.S. nuclear weapons on their territory. In my own
country, Australia, the main opposition political party, Labor, expressed
its commitment to join the nuclear weapons ban treaty when it next forms
a government. In Australia, there is a clear disconnect between public
opinion and government policy. This disconnect is particularly evident inJapan. However, ultimately, it is not up to politicians but to the Japanesepeople to decide whether the country will sign and ratify the treaty.
Naysayers told us that we would never succeed in securing amandate from the UN General Assembly to negotiate this treaty. But
we did. Then they told us that the negotiating conference would not
result in a treaty being adopted. But it was adopted. Now they tell usthat the treaty will never enter into force. But it certainly will. Again,
we will prove them wrong. And we will continue proving them wrong
until every last nuclear weapon is dismantled.

Panel Discussion“‘Two Roads to Abolish Nuclear Weapons’Reconsidered”
Seiji Endo (Professor, Faculty of Law, Seikei University)
Nuclear abolition can be realized by concurrently taking two
pathways—the first is to simply eliminate nuclear weapons, andthe second is to create a mechanism for preventing war. The second
pathway is needed because, as long as the idea that nuclear weapons
are required in case of serious conditions that may occur in the futureremains, it is difficult to achieve nuclear abolition. The Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is one of the goals on
the first pathway that will advance nuclear elimination. However,the Japanese government did not join the TPNW, and only a small
portion of the Japanese public is strongly critical of the government’s
non-participation in the treaty. This is probably because it is widely
thought that Japan can protect itself through its dependence on
the U.S nuclear weapons, or that it should firmly maintain nuclear
technologies as a potential nuclear deterrence, against the backdrop of

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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.21 No.2, March 2019Japan’s distrust toward North Korea’s nuclear and missile programsand toward China. However, the reason why China and North Korea
armed themselves with nuclear weapons was to counter the military
threats posed by other countries. An attempt to ensure the securityof one’s own country based on nuclear deterrence can lead to theproliferation of nuclear arms.
To realize nuclear abolition, in addition to prohibiting nuclear
weapons, it is necessary to establish such international relations thateliminate the need to possess or use these arms. International relationsin Northeast Asia carry a deep mutual distrust. Nevertheless, countries
in the region should make efforts to build a trustful relationship witheach other, to create international relations under which nuclear
weapons are no longer needed.

“The Road to Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula After the US-North Korea Summit”
Hyun Jin Son (Associate Professor, Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University)
The historic U.S.-DPRK summit was held on June 12, 2018. Thissummit was an unprecedented event aimed at overcoming 65 yearsof hostilities between the two countries that has continued since the
Korean War, and establishing new U.S.-North Korea relations. In
April of the same year, South Korea’s President, Moon Jae-in, andNorth Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong Un held an Inter-Korean summit
for the first time in eleven years. The two leaders confirmed theircommon goal of realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, throughcomplete denuclearization. However, it is uncertain whether or not
the expression “complete denuclearization” means the so-called“complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization” (CVID),
which the international community demands of North Korea.
The joint statement signed at the U.S.-DPRK summit reaffirmed
North Korea’s commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean

Peninsula, but CVID was not included. As compared with past writtenagreements concluded regarding North Korea’s nuclear issue, thestatement fails to articulate the specific content and implementation
period of the measures to be taken, leaving them as matters to be
determined at working-level consultations in the future.
The most important challenge to realizing the complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is to restore confidence
between the United States and North Korea, and to improve theirbilateral relationship. The primary reason for the failure of the U.S.DPRK negotiations held so far has been the strong mutual hostility
and distrust. However, the recent U.S.-North Korean summit
underlined the establishment of their new relationship, marking thefirst steps toward confidence building between the two countries.

“Japan’s Nuclear Trilemma: Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nuclear Deterrence,and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle”
Tatsujiro Suzuki (Director and Proessor, Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition [RECNA] at Nagasaki University)
As the only country that suffered an A-bomb attack in the war,
Japan has conveyed the inhumanity of atomic weapons to the world.
However, the country declared its non-participation in the Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons due to the harsh environment
surrounding international security. This represents a dilemma faced
by Japan’s nuclear policy, which relies on the extended nuclear
deterrence of the United States. Japan is also caught in anotherdilemma—despite upholding nuclear abolition as its national credo,
Japan has a potential nuclear deterrent derived from its uraniumenrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities, by implementing
the nuclear fuel cycle as the pillar of its nuclear policy.
To overcome Japan’s nuclear trilemma, it is vital to establish
a security policy that does not rely on nuclear deterrence. If thedenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula could lead to the creation ofa nuclear-weapon-free zone in the peninsula, then a “Northeast Asia
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone” may be created, toward which, Japan
can add its support. As proposed in “A Comprehensive Approach toa Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone,” published by RECNA
in 2015, one of the most important points involving the Northeast
Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone is that the United States, China, andRussia, which are the nuclear weapon states surrounding South Korea,
North Korea, and Japan, would pledge to guarantee that they would
not attack or threaten to attack non-nuclear weapon states or North
Korea with nuclear weapons. If they promise to do so, South Korea
and Japan can withdraw from the nuclear umbrella. To extricate itself
from the above-mentioned trilemma, Japan also needs to review thenuclear fuel cycle so as to reduce its plutonium stockpile.

“In a World with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons:
Challenges Lie Ahead for Citizens in Hiroshima”
Yumi Kanazaki (Staff Writer, Hiroshima Peace Media Center, Chugoku Shimbun)
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is an indispensable
step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. I would like to cite
the three challenges that Hiroshima should address now, to havethe TPNW take effect and put stronger teeth into the treaty. The
first challenge is to close the gap between A-bombed cities and theJapanese government’s nuclear policy. There are many lessons to belearned from ICAN, which has striven to encourage governments totake actions at both the international level and the national level, by
establishing clear targets and effective strategies, and by promoting
information sharing through SNS and other tools. Second, we must
continue to make efforts to convince nuclear states that the possessionof nuclear weapons will not be permitted, even though these nations
would not gain direct influence if the TPNW comes into effect. We
should also protest against these states whenever they take wrong

actions related to the nuclear policies and strategies. Finally, I
would like to point out that, after the establishment of the treaty, it
is becoming increasingly important to question the folly of somecountries trying to protect themselves and their people with thesemost inhumane weapons, based on the devastating experiences of the
hibakushas. These A-bomb survivors have not only visited many partsof Japan, but have also traveled around the world, to convey theirexperiences of the atomic bombings. Their tireless efforts underlie
the adoption of the TPNW. Going forward, we have to pass on theexperiences of the survivors to future generations and develop moreyoung people in their 20s, 30s and 40s who will work toward the goalof abolishing nuclear arms. We also need to verify whether the actual
devastation wrought by the atomic bombings has been sufficiently
understood.

At the panel discussion, panelists engaged in lively discussions concerning the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the prospects for having
the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons enter into force, and the roles of A-bombed cities. They also answered questions from theaudience. Several of the panelists stressed that it was important that ordinary citizens urge politicians to make stronger efforts to work toward nuclear
disarmament, and connect with each other, transcending national borders. These panelists also pointed out that it was essential that Japan broaden
the discussion about the elimination of nuclear weapons, without leaving it to experts, that A-bombed cities express their intentions to the Japanese
government, and that we all continue raising our voices without giving up, while imaging a world free of nuclear weapons.
In the session “Messages from Hiroshima,” Ms. Emiko Okada, an A-bomb survivor, talked about her experience of the atomic bombing and hersincere wish for nuclear abolition, and Ms. Mayu Seto, a singer-songwriter from Hiroshima, conveyed her desire for peace through performing hersong, “Colorful World.” Since the symposium came immediately after the torrential rains that hit western Japan, it was uncertain whether the event
could be held as scheduled. Nevertheless, the symposium attracted 260 participants, including many young people. I would like to express my sincere
gratitude to all presenters and participants of the event.
(Professor at HPI)
Visit HPI’s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace_e/3The Rohingya Issue in Myanmar
Narayanan Ganesan

The Rohingya issue in Myanmar has deep historical roots and canbe traced at least in part to British colonization of the country andits impact on domestic politics. The first major impact came about
after the British victory in the First Anglo Burmese War from 1824
to 1826 when Burma lost Arakan (now Rakhine) and Tenasserim
states (the former bordering present day Bangladesh) to the British.
Annexation of Arakan state meant that there could then be a freeflow of peoples from the Indian sub-continent to Burma as a result.
This impact would lead to a strong hostility between the local
Rakhine (Arakan) Buddhist population that was home to its own
Kingdom in the past and the new Muslim settlers who came to beviewed as illegal migrants.
The British would go on to fight another two more wars
with Burma before colonizing the entire country by 1889. Thelong drawn out conflict with the British led to the country being
controlled by Britain from 1890. King Thibaw Min and his wife
were exiled to Ratnagiri in India. And the British began their ruleof Burma from India which lasted until before the outbreak ofWorld War II in 1939 when it was separated from India.
Following their defeat and subjugation the Burmese evolved
a deep distrust of foreigners. This included not only the British but
also the Indians, Chinese and Thais who were regarded as historical
rivals. The rivalry with Thailand was especially exaggerated. In
the case of India, the British victory meant that Burma lost control
of its borders and large numbers of Indians settled in the country.
Given their familiarity with the English language and long dealings
with the British they soon dominated the Burmese civil service
as well as the economy. The Chettiar (Hindu) money lenders who
often took land as collateral for loans were especially loathed.
The local hostility against Indians increased tremendously andthis would eventually lead to occasional anti-Indian riots up to
the 1960s. That and the military junta’s nationalization drive inthe mid-sixties led in turn to the exodus of Indian businessmen
and professionals from the country. In fact until today, Indians arereferred to as kalar in the country and it is deemed a derogatory
word with negative connotative value.
Apart from piecemeal rule over the country, the Britishcolonization of Burma had other serious consequences as well.
The first of these was the reification of ethnicity. The British
meticulously catalogued all the indigenous ethno-linguistic groups
and counted a total of 135 such groups in 1939. Additionally,
they also divided the country into ethnic states and used ethnicity
for cataloguing as well as political control of the country. Owing
to heavy forestation in the highland areas of the country and thethreat of malaria, the British only managed to colonize the lowland
areas that were then referred to as Ministerial Burma. They thenallowed the local highland chieftains to continue ruling under thesupervision of the “frontier areas administration”.
The reification of ethnicity led in turn to deep divisions within
the country especially into the post-colonial period. The Bamar
majority that accounts for about two-thirds of the population
were primarily lowlanders who also monopolized political power
and looked down on the highlanders as less civilized. British
4

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.21 No.2, March 2019preference for highlanders for soldering also meant that they
were disproportionately represented in the Burmese Army. Thispreference would later on pit the highlanders against the lowlanders
over issues of politics and policy and lead to the establishment ofa large number of ethnic insurgent armies that would fight against
the government.
The reification of ethnicity meant that the 135 ethno-linguistic
groups catalogued by the British came to be regarded as indigenous
to the country and those not on the list were regarded as outsiders
with attendant negative stereotypes. And since the migrants into
Rakhine state were not one of the catalogued groups until today
Myanmar authorities do not recognize the term Rohingya and will
not use it. This is for fear of inadvertently assigning them oﬃcial
status. Consequently, they are invariably referred to as Bengalis
suggesting that they are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.
On account of this “illegal” status, their rights have always been
severely curtailed and they are generally tightly controlled. Suchcontrol extends to their freedom of movement and employment,
marriage, and land rights. And owing to the fact that they are
Muslims and do not blend in with the local Rakhine Buddhists, they
have always been periodically persecuted. Such persecution occurs
both with the local Rakhines as well as those holding political power
and the military. The civil war between East and West Pakistan in1971 worsened the refugee exodus into Burma and enlarged theMuslim population, much to the chagrin of the locals.
There are a number of other complications to the conflict.
Myanmar has a Buddhist majority population and there are
elements within this population including the monastic order thatare virulently anti-Muslim. Such elements often spew hatred andencourage violence against Muslims. In 2012, as a result of such
violence some 200 people, mostly Muslims, were killed and some
140,000 people became internally displaced and continue to live
in refugee camps. The military which ruled the country after a
1962 coup is also engaged in violence from time to time like thatin 2017 that led to the displacement of some 700,000 Muslims into
Bangladesh. That violence was however preceded by a terrorist
attack on police stations that killed 10 policemen. Hence theviolence that followed was justified as a clearance operation to get
rid of extremists.
The borders between Myanmar and Bangladesh are separated
by narrow rivers and therefore notoriously difficult to control
for population movements. Both countries have poor state andenforcement capacity that worsens the situation. And Rakhine
Buddhists also have a deep seated hatred against the majority
Bamar ethnic group as well blaming the latter for annexing their
kingdom and failing to develop it after independence. High levelsof poverty and low levels of development also exaggerate thepotential for violence. Given the general hatred against the Rakhine
Muslims, it is very difficult for politicians to defend them evenwhen persecuted. Also the military continues to retain tremendous
independence and power (accorded by the 2008 Constitution) and
its actions are diﬃcult to control.
(Professor at HPI)

Legal Implications of Adding the Existenceof the SDF to the Constitution of Japan
Akihiro Kawakami
1. Proposed revisions to the Constitution to add theexistence of the SDF

Recent years have seen increasing arguments concerning
constitutional revisions. Most noteworthy is the proposal made by
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on May 3, 2017 to add a paragraph(e.g. paragraph 3) or a new article (e.g. Art. 9-2) to the Article 9 of
the Constitution concerning the existence of Japan’s Self-Defense
Forces (SDF), while maintaining the current paragraphs of the
Article 9 (paragraph 1: “renunciation of war”, paragraph 2: “nonpossession of armed force and other war potential” and “denial ofright of belligerency”). The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
has also been poised to submit a four-point constitutional revision
draft to the Diet: clarifying the status of the SDF; adding a provision
for emergency powers; providing a clause on the elimination of theHouse of Councilors constituencies comprising multiple prefectures;and development of the educational environment.
The draft revision presented by the LDP March 22, 2018
proposed adding the following clauses to the current Article 9:
Article 9-2: The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall notprohibit Japan from taking necessary measures for selfdefense to guarantee the nation’s independence and peace aswell as the security of the nation and its citizens, and for these
purposes, Japan shall maintain the Self-Defense Forces as anational military defense, with the prime minister, who shallbe the head of the Cabinet, as its supreme commander, as may
be provided by law.
(2) The SDF shall operate pursuant to the approval of the Diet andother such controls, as may be provided by law.
What are the legal implications of these clauses if they areadded to the Constitution? I would like to discuss this matter briefly.

2. Legal implications of adding/not adding theexistence of the SDF in the Constitution

Fundamentally, it can be said that even if the SDF stays within
the confines of the pacifist Constitution, the acknowledgement oroﬃcial recognition of the SDF’s presence could more than “confirm
the status quo” in Japan. It would have a significant impact on thecivil society and constitutional order of Japan.
What is important here is that the unconstitutionality of the
SDF has always been called into question under the current Article
9 and that the burden of proving the constitutionality of the SDF’s
presence and its activities (including new activities) is on theJapanese government (in the Diet or before the court).
The government always needs to prove the claim that the
SDF is not an unconstitutional “war potential”; that the SDF does
not constitute “military forces” that a “normal sovereign state”
has concerning its belligerent rights; or that the SDF is not a
military organization that defends other countries or uses force asa means of settling international disputes. A normal sovereign state
conducts activities based on a negative list system, an approachthat prohibits activities that do not conform to the law, whereas theSDF, whenever assuming a (new) assignment or engaging in a (new)activity, is required to verify the legitimacy of such an assignmentor activity under a positive list approach (because the presenceof the SDF is not stipulated in the Constitution and, if anything,
the clause advocating that forces and other belligerent rights will
never be maintained is included there). Clearly spelling out theexistence of the SDF in the supreme law would cause a shift of the
SDF’s presence from a “positive list approach” to a “negative list
approach.”Moreover, the acknowledgement of “military publicness” (theidea that permits a government to provide legitimacy and publicity
to military activities to the extent that human rights are limited forthe sake of military purposes) under the Constitution would bringcrucial legal consequences. Dr. Toshihiro Yamauchi argues that thelegal acknowledgement of the SDF’s presence might potentiallylead to: (1) the validation of Japan’s so-called “legislation for peaceand security (2015)”; (2) the maintenance of limitless potential
for war (e.g. legal approval to possess offensive weapons, such as
ICBMs, long-range strategic bombers and offensive aircraft carriers);(3) the legitimation of military conscription; (4) the hollowing-outof the civilian control and democratic control of the authority touse military force; (5) strengthening of discipline for self-defense
oﬃcials; (6) rampant military secrecy; (7) mandatory land seizures
for the SDF’s own use; (8) impacts on lawsuits against SDF bases(noise-related lawsuits to demand flight bans and compensatory
damages, as well as those claiming the unconstitutionality of
SDF bases); (9) increasing military expenditure; and (10) theformation of a military-industrial complex or a military-academic
complex (Toshihiro Yamauchi, “Critical Examination of Arguments
Concerning Abe’s Proposal to Amend Article 9,” August and
September 2017 Issues of Law and Democracy).
One contentious point in particular is that the LDP’s draft
revision specifies the SDF as “necessary measures for self-defense”
rather than “at the minimum necessary level for self-defense.” Thisis open to the interpretation that the exercise of the full-fledged,
unlimited, right of collective self-defense can be constitutional.
Moreover, the drafted provisions of the Article 9-2 (1) include thephrase “the prime minister, who shall be the head of the Cabinet.”
Unlike the provision “the prime minister, on behalf of the Cabinet,shall possess the right of the supreme command authority of the
SDF” in Article 7 of the Self-Defense Forces Act, this could beread as the prime minister being capable of serving as supremecommander of the SDF without convening a Cabinet meeting toobtain the consent of Cabinet members. The provision “[The SDF
shall] operate pursuant to the approval of the Diet and other suchcontrols” of the new paragraph 2 (2) of Article 9 could mean that
the SDF may not be subject to the approval of the Diet, dependingon the provisions of the law. In other words, the prime minister
could use force/belligerent rights on his/her own authority, withoutobtaining the consent (prior consent, in particular) of the Diet or
the Cabinet, which will be another crucial point of discussion.
(See Yamauchi’s paper mentioned earlier, and Miho Aoi, “TheImplications of Stipulating the SDF in the Constitution,” Taking theConstitution Seriously, edited by Shojiro Sakaguchi, Koji Aikyo
and Miho Aoi; Nippon Hyoron-sha, 2018, etc.).

3. How constitutional revisions should be discussed

Specifying the existence of the SDF in the Constitution would havesignificant legal implications. One important point of discussion
surrounding constitutional revision is not how marvelous measures
can be implemented if the revised provisions are effectively
operated, but whether it is possible or not to ensure that such newprovisions can never be abused. A legal system (a Constitution,in particular) must be designed to prevent the person in power, nomatter who has political power, from abusing the legal system. In
this respect, I am deeply concerned about the lack of any sense of
caution concerning the legal abuse of power in recent debates on
constitutional amendment.
(Associate Professor at HPI)
Visit HPI’s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace_e/5Hiroshima Peace Seminar 2018
In 2018, the Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) marked the 20th
anniversary of its establishment at Hiroshima City University in April
1998. The HPI will play a central role in the Graduate School of Peace
Studies, which the University will be opening in April 2019. On thiscommemorative occasion, the Hiroshima Peace Seminar 2018 was heldon August 24 and 25, during which trial lectures were delivered by
HPI faculty members. Under the overall theme “Perspectives on Peace,
Conflict and War,” each faculty member approached a range of subjects
from the perspectives and viewpoints of their own specialist fields.
On the first day of the seminar, five faculty members took therostrum to present lectures on the theme of “History and Society.”
Professor Akiko Naono discussed the changes in ways of narrating atomic
bombing experiences and their meaning, in her lecture “Experiences of
the Atomic Bombing and Postwar Japan.” Professor Robert Jacobs madea presentation (in English) entitled “Beyond Hiroshima and Nagasaki:
The History of 2,000 Nuclear Weapon Tests and Global Hibakusha,”in which he talked about the global increase of nuclear victims due tothe radiation exposure caused by nuclear accidents as well as nuclear
weapon tests after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. In her speech“History of German Peace Movements and Japan,” Associate Professor
Makiko Takemoto traced the history of how German peace movements
were formed. The lecture by Professor Hitoshi Nagai, “Reflections on
the War and Responsibility: In the Case of the Tokyo Trial,” discussed
the context in which the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(Tokyo Trial) were held, along with the characteristics of the trial. At theend of the first day, Associate Professor Xianfen Xu talked in her lecture,“Japan-China Relations for 40 Years after Conclusion of the Treaty ofPeace and Friendship,” about the history of Japan-China relations thatcelebrated the 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendshipconcluded between the two countries, as well as the present situation andthe future prospects for their relationship.

Hitoshi Nagai

The second day’s theme was “Law and Politics,” on which
five faculty members gave lectures. In his speech “Roadmap toward
the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” Associate Professor
Hyun Jin Son analyzed the situation in the Korean Peninsula from theperspectives of the nuclear issue and international relations. Professor
Narayanan Ganesan delivered his lecture entitled, “Conflict andCooperation in Southeast Asia” (in English), in which he discussed theconflicts, cooperation, and mechanisms for easing tension in Southeast
Asia. Under the title, “Changing International Order and Sovereign
Nations: Regarding Post-Soviet Union Countries,” Professor Takeshi
Yuasa analyzed the factors for changing the international order of postSoviet Union countries, based on Max Weber’s arguments. The lecture“Development of the International Humanitarian Law and the Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” given by Associate Professor
Yasuhito Fukui discussed the historical and legal status of the Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons from the aspect of International
Humanitarian Law. Professor Tetsuo Sato explained about the legal
status of the use of armed force (war), and the mechanisms and issues ofregulations under the United Nations system in his lecture, “Considering
the United Nations Regulations on the Use of Force in the International
Community: The Perspective of International Law.”
The Hiroshima Peace Seminar has been organized annually since2015, when it was first held as a project commemorating the 70th
anniversary of the atomic bombing. In previous years, the seminar’s
intended audience was graduate students, public servants, and those in
the media. This year’s seminar invited a broader range of participants,
including high school students, university students, and ordinary citizens.
More than 30 attendees attentively listened to the lectures, and wereactively involved in the question-and-answer sessions.
(Professor at HPI)HPI Public Lecture Series 2018

Postwar Reconsidered: Historical Perspectives
Makiko Takemoto

The Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) held a public lecture series in fiscal
year 2018 at the GOJINSHA Wendy Hito-Machi Plaza. The title of theseries was “‘Postwar’ Reconsidered: Historical Perspectives.” Even
though more than 70 years have passed since the end of World War II,
the word “postwar” is often used in Japan, not only as a simple historicalterm meaning “after the war,” but also as a term which is combined withJapanese culture and identity. How we understand “postwar” is related
to how we discuss and understand the issue of war and peace, and thedevelopment and history of Japanese society. The lecturers, titles andcontents of each lecture are as follows.
The first lecture (October 19) was “The Narrative of Japanese
Postwar History” by Ryuichi Narita, Professor at Japan Women’s
University. He looked back to the historiography of the concept of“postwar” and analyzed the changes of the image of “postwar” andperception of Japanese society.
In the second lecture (October 26), Akiko Naono, Professor at HPI,
gave a lecture on “Memories of the Atomic Bombings and Responsibility
for the Damage.” She analyzed the historical and sociological changes
to the debates on the responsibility of the U.S. for the atomic bombing,memories of the survivors, their consciousness and their relationship to
the U.S.
The third lecturer was Makiko Takemoto, Associate Professor

6

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.21 No.2, March 2019at HPI, who talked about “Perceptions of ‘War’ in Postwar Germany”(November 2). She showed the differences of the perceptions of“postwar” and the discussions on war and peace between Japan and(West-) Germany.
The fourth lecture (November 9) was “How did the Japanese View
Lt. Onoda?: Narratives about the Japanese Stragglers in the Philippines”
by Hitoshi Nagai, Professor at HPI. He analyzed postwar Japanesesociety through the narratives about stragglers, especially focused on Lt.
Hiroo Onoda who returned from the Philippines to Japan in 1974.
In the fifth and final lecture (November 16), Akihiro Kawakami(Associate Professor at HPI) talked about “Article 9 of the Constitution
as the ‘Symbol of Postwar Japan’.” He explained the discussion on
Article 9 and the debates on the “Peace State” focusing on the case ofpoliticians and intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s.
The number of interested attendees for the audience exceeded thecapacity for this lecture series and we had to determine the attendees
by ballot. We would like to apologize to the people who were unable toattend as a result and thank them for their interest in our lecture series.
The content of each lecture will be published as a HPI booklet in March
2019. The booklet will also be available on our website.
(Associate Professor at HPI)

Commemorative Lectures Held in October Harkens
Opening of the Graduate School of Peace Studies
Takeshi Yuasa
On October 27, 2018, Hiroshima City University (HCU) heldcommemorative lectures for the establishment of the Graduate Schoolof Peace Studies, at the Satellite Campus to introduce the graduate
school that will be opening shortly. These lectures were given by two
researchers who will join the graduate faculty from academic year 2019.
Dr. Ryo Oshiba (Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University) delivered
a lecture entitled “Global Governance and World Order,” and Dr.
Tadashi Okimura (Professor, The University of Shimane) presented alecture entitled “Climate Change Issues: How International Society Is
Responding.” Although the lecturers discussed the subjects in line with
their specialized fields, unexpectedly, they both focused on how to resolve
policy challenges confronting the international community, which is an
important issue to be addressed by peace studies in the future. Dr. Oshiba
and Dr. Okimura also shared the same opinion that not only national
governments but also corporations, nongovernmental organizations, andvarious other stakeholders should participate in the decision-making
process, in order for the international community to promote “governancewithout government.” They also expressed the same view that theprospects for such global governance is not necessarily bright thesedays, when we see a widespread trend towards “one’s own country first”
policies, driven by U.S. President Donald Trump.
The Hiroshima Peace Seminar was held in August last year, which
also shared the objective of promoting the new graduate school. At theseminar, full-time faculty members of the Hiroshima Peace Institute took
the podium enabling us to introduce the lineup for the Graduate Schoolof Peace Studies to the general public. Soon, we will welcome the firstbatch of students and the new graduate school will commence in earnest.
We look forward to seeing the new graduate school begin to serve as avenue for productive education and scholarship.
Universities are considered to have entered an age oftransformation. In Japan, where the population of young people has beenon the decline, there is a glut of universities and graduate schools, andwe have already reached the time in which universities cannot achieve

their intake quotas for undergraduate courses. In the future, there will
be an accelerating shakeup, with not a few universities falling by thewayside as failed competitors. In parallel with changes in the foundationsof learning as an occupation, which is rather familiar to us, I think thatthe foundations of learning in a more essential sense are also being
undermined. U.S. President Trump calls media outlets that are critical ofhim “fake news.” Meanwhile, information based on flimsy evidence isrampant on social media (including social networking sites), which somethink may even have influenced the results of the presidential election.
This is the reason why it is said that now we live in the “post-truth” era.
On the other hand, in the present age, people believe they can develop
their intelligence without attending universities, by obtaining knowledge
and information through social networking channels and the Internet.
I believe that in this age, as members of the new graduate school,
students and faculty should address this common challenge—that is,
to hone their intelligence while pursing “peace” as the keyword, andfittingly based in Hiroshima. There are plenty of tasks toward making the
new graduate school a venue for passionate learning. For example, Mr.
Motofumi Asai, the former President of HPI, made a proposal “to elevate
Peace Studies even to the position of being the raison d’être of HCU” (seeHiroshima Research News, Vol. 13 No. 3, March 2011). Although this
proposal was advanced before the concept for the new graduate school
was established, it is very interesting. He wrote his idea as follows: “Onthe academic side, Peace Studies should become a fundamental factor
which interlinks HCU’s three faculties and graduate schools… On theadministrative side, the HPI President should assume a newly createdpost whose duty it is to oversee Peace Studies on the scale of the entire
university.” This idea is ambitious but worth paying attention to. I lookforward to the future of the Graduate School of Peace Studies, which willbe created based on a sincere reflection of the achievements of the HPI todate over more than two decades—while at the same time remembering tobuild on the old ways of doing things to develop something new.
(Professor at HPI)

Hello from HPI
Kyung Jin HA

Associate Professor,
Hiroshima Peace InstituteDr. Ha Kyung Jin was born in 1982 in the Republic ofKorea. After graduating from Ewha Womans University
in South Korea, and completed her doctoral course at
the Graduate School of Interdisciplinary Information
Studies, The University of Tokyo. She obtained a PhD
in Interdisciplinary Information Studies. She taught at
The University of Tokyo Interfaculty Initiative in Information
Studies as an Assistant Professor etc., before arriving at the HPI to assume
her present position in October 2018. She specializes in sociology and media
communication. Her single-authored books and papers include: Public Relations
no Rekishi Shakaigaku—America to Ninon ni okeru <Kigyo Jiga> no Kochiku(Historical Sociology of Public Relations: Construction of “Corporate Identity”
in the U.S. and Japan), from Iwanami Shoten, Publishers (2017); Public
Relations no Joken—20 seiki-shoto no America shakai wo tsujite (Conditionsof Public Relations—through the American Society in the Early 20th Century),
published in Shiso “Thought” magazine, vol. 1070 (2013); “Koho” Aru Public

Relations no Ruikei—1960 nendai Kankoku ni okeru Seifu
Communication wo Megutte (A Type of Public Relations—Regarding Governmental Communication in South Korea
in the 1960s), published in Journal of Mass Communication
Studies, vol. 79 (2011).

Greetings
My name is Ha Kyung Jin and I have recently joined the facultyof the Hiroshima Peace Institute. As my area of specialty, I pursue
media and communication studies, with particular focus on thetheories and history of public relations. In recent years, it has
become an important task for the international community to shapepublic opinion and consensus on a global basis. I will be teaching
the Journalism Studies and Global Communication courses, inboth of which I would like to discuss the roles of communicationthat will facilitate dissemination of the significance of peace andencourage the creation of a peaceful world. I also look forward totalking about media literacy, which will help local governments
and civic groups to shape public opinion and deepen people’s
understanding of political problems, through the public lectures andvarious activities offered by the HPI.

Visit HPI’s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace_e/7DIARY◆ Jun. 16 Tetsuo Sato delivers a presentation, “How We Could
Read ONUMA Yasuaki, International Law in a Transcivilizational
World (Cambridge University Press, 2017)” at the International
Law Colloquium (No. 390), the University of Tokyo (to be
published in Tokyo Review of International Law, No. 7, 2019).
◆ Jun. 17 Kazumi Mizumoto attends the 2nd meeting on Peace
Declaration organized by the City of Hiroshima, held at theInternational Conference Center Hiroshima.
◆ Jun. 28–July 1 Yasuhito Fukui participates in the 3rd UN
Review Conference on the Programme of Action on Small Arms
and Light Weapons (New York, USA).
◆ Jul. 3 Makiko Takemoto presents a lecture, “Hiroshima andPeace Movements in Japan and Germany” at the joint seminar“Themes of the Past in Japan, Germany and Australia” of Chuo
University and the University of Western Australia, held at Chuo
University in Tokyo.
◆ Jul. 12 Hyun Jin Son presents a lecture, “Japan-Korean
Relation after the US-North Korea Summit” at Japan-Korea
Friendship Association in Shimane.
◆ Jul. 13 Mizumoto attends the 3rd meeting of the Peace
Declaration organized by the City of Hiroshima, held at the City Hall.
◆ Jul. 14 Xianfen Xu delivers a presentation on “China’s
Memory of Hiroshima-Nagasaki” at a workshop of KAKENHI(Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research) by Kyoto University ofForeign Studies, held in Kyoto City.
◆ Jul. 27 Hitoshi Nagai presents a lecture, “The Historical
Documents of a Japanese War Criminal in the Philippines:
Focusing on Former Lieutenant General Shizuo Yokoyama”
to the 9th meeting of the Media Material Seminar at the Kyoto
Museum for World Peace, Ritsumeikan University.
◆ Jul. 28 Mizumoto presents a lecture, “Hiroshima and Peace” atthe training course for domestic journalists organized by the City ofHiroshima, held at the International Conference Center Hiroshima.
◆ Jul. 30 Gen Kikkawa presents a lecture, “Is International Peaceand Human Security Compatible?” to 30 students of UNESCOIICBA (International Institute for Capacity Building in Africa).
◆ Aug. 2 Fukui participates in the international symposium
organized by the Center for Peace of Hiroshima University andspeaks on “The Treaty on prohibition of nuclear weapons and its
future challenge.”◆ Aug. 4 Akiko Naono presents a lecture on the memory of theatomic bomb experiences at the “Future Leaders’ Program for
Global Peace” seminar series organized by Hiroshima Prefecture.
◆ Aug. 5 Mizumoto presents lectures, “Understanding theDifferent Cultures: Ethnicity, Culture and Religion” and “TheInhumanity of War and the Inhumanity of Nuclear Weapons” at
the “Future Leaders’ Program for Global Peace” seminar seriesorganized by Hiroshima Prefecture.
◆ Aug. 7 H. E. Thulani Dlomo, ambassador of South Africa toJapan visits the HPI, and discusses with Kikkawa on ways toabolish Nuclear Weapons.
◆ Aug. 13–15 Narayanan Ganesan trains the Myanmar civil
service on public administration and public policy formulationin Kyaingtung, Shan state, Myanmar.
◆ Aug. 23–25 Fukui participates in the 4th Conferenceof States Parties (CSP4) to the Arms Trade Treaty, held at
Chinzanso, Tokyo.
◆ Sep. 3–5 Ganesan trains the Myanmar civil service on

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS● Published by● Printed by

8

June 1 ― November 30, 2018

public administration and public policy formulation in Shwebo,
Sagaing region, Myanmar.
◆ Sep. 4 Mizumoto presents a special lecture, “The Current
State and Tasks of Peace Research” at a training program forLevel II Certified Nursing Administrators organized by and heldat the Hiroshima Nursing Association.
◆ Sep. 6 Sato attends the annual meeting of the JapaneseSociety of International Law held in Sapporo.
◆ Sep. 9 Robert Jacobs facilitates a meeting of hibakusha from
Hanford and the Nevada Test Site at Southern Utah University
in Cedar City, Utah, USA.
◆ Sep. 10 Son joins the discussion and serves as a moderator
at the forum, “The Past and Future of Korea-Japan Relations”
organized by the Consulate General of the Republic of Korea
in Hiroshima and Dongseo University, held at the GOJINSHA
Wendy Hito-Machi Plaza, Hiroshima.
◆ Sep. 12–14 Jacobs attends the annual conference of the
National Association of Atomic Veterans in Portland, Oregon,
USA.
◆ Sep. 15 Naono presents on the politics of the categorizationof the war sufferers through legal and institutional arrangementsstat the 91 Annual Conference of the Japan Sociological Society,held at Konan University.
◆ Sep. 19 Akihiro Kawakami presents a lecture, “Local SelfGovernment and Argument for Constitutional Amendment in Japan”
hosted by the Citizens Policy Research Committee in Tokyo.
◆ Sep. 20–21 Fukui participates in the Stockholm Security
Conference 2018 organized by SIPRI and comments in the session
on emerging technology and international law. Furthermore heexchanges views about nuclear issues at SIPRI on Sep. 23.
◆ Oct. 4 Jacobs, Son, Takemoto, Xu and Kyung Jin Ha hold aseminar with the trainees of North Korean defectors at the HPI.
◆ Oct. 6 Kawakami presents a lecture, “Peace Power of
Citizens and Local Government and Argument for Constitutional
Amendment in Japan” at National Conference for Jichiken(Research of Local Self-Government), held in Kochi City.
◆ Oct. 27 Fukui reports on the ‘proliferation financing’ at
the international law seminar of Kyoto University.
◆ Nov. 1 Kikkawa presents a lecture on “What is International
Peace?” to 28 high school students of Meitou High School, atthe HPI.
◆ Nov. 7 Xu presents a lecture, “How Japan Faces Global
China” in Asian Community Lecture Series at Nagasaki
University.
◆ Nov. 27 Ha serves as a panelist at the panel discussion,“Visioning the Future from the New Past: Thinking about Post
2020 Public Relations” in Japan’s first large-scale conference on
public relations, held in Tokyo.
◆ Nov. 28 Ganesan delivers a lecture, “The 2018 Malaysianelection and its impact on domestic politics” at the Centre forSoutheast Asian Studies, Bonn University, Germany.
◆ Nov. 29 Takemoto presents a lecture, “No Euroshima:
Hiroshima and Anti-nuclear Movements in Germany” at a
meeting of the German-Japanese Society in Bonn, held at Bonn
University, Germany.
◆ Nov. 30 Ha presents a lecture, “Electrified Postwar Japan: An
Analysis of the Electricity Company’s PR Strategy” to forty-seventrainees of King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI), held at the HPI.
Vol.21 No.2（March 15, 2019）

Editorial Committee (Yasuhito FUKUI, Robert JACOBS, Hitoshi NAGAI, Hyun Jin SON), Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University
3-4-1, Ozuka-higashi, Asaminami-ku, Hiroshima, 731-3194 Japan
Phone: +81（0）82 830 1811
Fax: +81（0）82 830 1812
E-mail: office-peace@m.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp
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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.21 No.2, March 2019

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