広島平和研究

ISSN 2188-1480

第８号
Hiroshima Peace Research Journal

広島平和研究Hiroshima Peace Research Journal

2021年 ３月
March

2021

Vol. 8第８号 Vol. 8

広島市立大学広島平和研究所

広島市立大学広島平和研究所
Hiroshima Peace Institute
Hiroshima City University

広島平和研究
Hiroshima Peace Research Journal

第８号 Vol. 8

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広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8

広島平和研究第8号
目 次
平和研究の窓Three Windows and Critical Peace/Nonviolence Research………………………………………………（Chaiwat SATHA-ANAND）…

5

特集論文：世界の平和と人間の安全保障に対する脅威
世界保健機関の内的変容と課題――財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症…（山越裕太）…

13

CSCE における「民主的平和」と「ウィーンの東」…………（玉井雅隆）…

37

Great Power Relations and Threats to the Liberal International Order……………………………………………………………（Haruko SATOH）…

53

Toward a Global Human Security Governance?
――Progress, Problems, and Prospects………………（Sorpong PEOU）…

71

Global Threats to Peace and Human Security――Finding Regional Solutions to Transboundary Threats in Southeast Asia…………（Mely-CABALLERO ANTHONY and Margareth SEMBIRING）…

91

独立論文
マニラスピーチにおける日本の軍事大国化の否定――福田赳夫の外交理念に着目して………………………（井原伸浩）… 113
Transformation through Normalization――Delineating Justice in the Bangsamoro Peace Process………………………………………………………（Raymond ANDAYA）… 133
投稿規程および審査規程…………………………………………………………… 158
編集後記

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Hiroshima Peace Research Journal
Volume 8
Table of Contents
A Window into Peace Studies
Three Windows and Critical Peace/Nonviolence Research……………………………………………………（Chaiwat SATHA-ANAND）…

5

Special Feature: Threats to Global Peace and Human Security
The Changing Role of the World Health Organization:――Finance, Network, and COVID-19 ……………（YAMAKOSHI Yuta）… 13“Democratic Peace” and “East of Vienna” at the CSCE …（TAMAI Masataka）… 37
Great Power Relations and Threats to the Liberal International Order……………………………………………………………（Haruko SATOH）… 53
Toward a Global Human Security Governance?
――Progress, Problems, and Prospects…………………（Sorpong PEOU）… 71
Global Threats to Peace and Human Security――Finding Regional Solutions to Transboundary Threats in Southeast Asia…………（Mely-CABALLERO ANTHONY and Margareth SEMBIRING）… 91
Research Article
Japanʼs Rejection of the Role of a Military Power in the Manila Speech――Focusing on Takeo Fukudaʼs Diplomatic Idea …（IHARA Nobuhiro）… 113
Transformation through Normalization――Delineating Justice in the Bangsamoro Peace Process………………………………………………………（Raymond ANDAYA）… 133
Author Guidelines …………………………………………………………………… 158
The Editors’ Notes

Three Windows and Critical Peace/Nonviolence Research 5

A Window into Peace Studies

Three Windows and Critical Peace/Nonviolence Research
Chaiwat Satha-AnandProfessor of Political Science, Thammasat University
Director, Peace Information Center, Thammasat University
Introduction: window
Have you ever wondered what the word “window” means?
When asked to write “A Window into Peace Studies” article for Hiroshima Peace
Research Journal, the assignment led me to look up the etymological root, not of the word
“peace” but “window,” a word seemingly common but does conceal something profound.
Here is what I found: the word ‘windowʼ comes from an Old c.1200 Norse word “vindauga” which is a combination of “vindr” or ‘windʼ and “auga”: “eye”, or “to see.” Literally, it is “eye-hole” or “eye-door”. In Old Frisian ‘windowʼ literally means “breath-door.”1
Put another way, window allows us to breathe through and to see something outside ourconﬁnement and beyond.
In my academic life as a peace/nonviolence researcher, I have been touched byextraordinary people whose teachings enable me to breathe and see the world in a particularway. They are my “windows into peace/nonviolence studies.” Through these windows, I
have come to believe that peace studies without seriously taking account of nonviolence
theory and practices leave much to be desired in a world presently consumed by deadly anddestructive conﬂicts.
What follows is a brief discussion of three “teachers” whose ideas constitute the three“windows” through which my understanding of peace/nonviolence has been formed. The
paper then ends with a note on an example of how understanding “windows” as a portal tobreathe and to see inﬂuenced my peace/nonviolence research.
First Window: Glenn D. Paige (1929-2017)
In August 1977, I was only 22 years old when I left Thailand to pursue my graduate study
with the East-West Center scholarship at the Department of Political Science, University

6

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8of Hawai’i at Manoa. A year earlier my university in Bangkok was the site of perhaps themost brutal attack against peaceful protesters ever occurred in Thai society commonly
known as the “October 6, 1976 incident.” At dawn of that fateful day, Thammasat University was viciously attacked by paramilitary groups and government forces. Many whopeacefully protested inside the university were burned alive, some dead bodies mutilated
while bystanders watched as though they were watching a play, not the gruesome killing of
human beings. Thousands of protesters were arrested. A coup d’etat followed and a mostright-wing government with extremely authoritarian control was installed.2
With the bloody episode still in the back of my mind, I took Glenn Paige’s course
titled: “Nonviolent Political Alternatives.” Paige introduced me to literature I had neverknown before. They included Johan Galtung’s classic essay “Violence, Peace and Peace
Research” (1969), Ruth Leger Sivard’s wonderfully informative World Military and Social
Expenditures (1978), Gene Sharp’s magnum opus The Politics of Nonviolent Action (1973),
Robert Cooney and Helen Michalowski’s colorful The Power of the People: Active Nonviolence in the United States (1977), and Gopinath Dhawan’s profound The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi (1957). Through these readings, among many others drawn
both from social sciences and the humanities, and Paige’s teaching, I learned that peace
is not merely an absence of war, but also for people to live free of injustice or structural
violence such as poverty; that global resources wasted on military expenditures robbed
the world of opportunities to peacefully better human lives through social expenditures;that Gandhi’s thought was much more sophisticated upon philosophical reﬂection; that his
was not the only example of nonviolent actions, but there have been so many successful
examples of people from various cultures including in the US who chose nonviolent action
grounded in a radical understanding of a consent theory of power to ﬁght against diﬀerent
forms of oppression.
I still remember the feeling which resulted from taking Paige’s course. It was a mixture of amazement and joy to learn that there were indeed nonviolent alternatives to ﬁght
against violent oppression and massacre; and that they were not ideal but had been put into
practices by real people in history; that great though they are, Gandhi and King are not the
only ones, there have been many others. Some were lesser-known names to me at the timesuch as Danilo Dolci, Cesar Chavez, Dom Helder Camara, or Kenneth David Kaunda.3
Importantly, most who took part in nonviolent movements, both men and women, havebeen nameless heroes.
Moreover, these alternatives could be understood from solid theories while the possibilities of getting rid of/getting out of violence for humans are supported by ground-Three Windows and Critical Peace/Nonviolence Research 7

breaking empirical and scientiﬁc knowledge. Paige’s teaching served as my peace studies
educational foundation that gave me a knowledge-based hope necessary to free myself
from the heavy chain of violence that had earlier trapped me in despair.4
At the defense of my Ph.D. dissertation in December 1981, Paige asked me a question: as a Muslim what would I say to violence carried out by Muslims in the name of Islamaround the world? My first research work once I returned home in 1982 was to look into
how Muslim separatists in Southern Thailand use Islam to justify their violent action.5 Fiveyears later, Paige challenged me again with an invitation to contribute a paper on Islam andnonviolence to the UN ﬁrst ever conference on that subject he organized and held in Bali.
Paige’s critical questions including his nonkilling turn have inﬂuenced my peace/nonviolence research during the next three decades.6
Paige’s teachings constitute a large window that allows me to see that there are indeed
nonviolent alternatives to violence, that these alternatives are based on solid social sciences
and humanities, and that one should dare to raise critical and at times hurtful questions inundertaking a journey as a peace/nonviolence researcher.
Second Window: Johan Galtung (1930-)
The experience of being in a class taught by the legendary Johan Galtung, the person
considered the father of modern peace research by many, was unlike anything else. The
fact that he is ambidextrous, and that he could write all kinds of formulae on several
boards with incredible speed could make one feel a little dizzy at times. On questioning
him how he managed it, he alerted me to the world of mathematics. This is perhaps what
has informed the mathematician Galtung’s numerous conceptual contributions to peace
research.
I have found Galtung’s concept of violence and analytical framework useful for myresearch. It began with a seemingly simple formulation that peace is the absence of violence. But violence is a complicated concept which can be distinguished as direct, structuraland cultural. To work towards peace is to get rid of violence in all three forms. In analyzing
the phenomenon of violence, Galtung’s formulation could be understood in terms of layersof variables. The ﬁrst layer, easily visible, is that of agency which could be construed withagency-related theories such as theory of action. Then the second layer, less visible, is thatof structures and institutions which includes laws, education, and economics which serve
as sources of violence. The third layer, invisible and near pertinent, is the cultural layer
which legitimizes the other two. It is the complex domain of belief systems that include
religions, ideology, language, art, and science.7 For example, at the time of this writing,8

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8

Kazakhstan just abolished capital punishment from its legal system.8 But the success or
failure of death penalty abolition will ultimately depend on to what degree that society’s
culture supports the new structure, namely punishment law for murder cases. If people inthat society believe strongly in retributive justice, sanctioned by some forms of religious or
folk belief, then it will be very diﬃcult for the change to succeed because cultural variables
are the hardest to change.
Galtung’s analytical framework is so important, especially for those working on religions and violence/nonviolence such as myself because it puts to rest once and for all thefalse question of whether a religion such as Islam causes violence. Instead, Islam or any
other religion including the most paciﬁc Buddhism can be used to justify violence.9 This isbecause religions reside within the cultural layer which works as justification, not causation, of violence.
Third Window: Gene Sharp (1928-2018)
In 1980 at a Yokohama regional meeting of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), a question was raised as to whether it would be possible for IPRA to take up
the subject of “nonviolence” as part of its work. A distinguished colleague from Europe
responded that IPRA should not be associated with “pacifism” since it would “discredit
peace research.”10 It is interesting to note that the European colleague equated “paciﬁsm”
with “nonviolence,” and that in his view “nonviolence” or “paciﬁsm” was not an academic
subject worthy of peace research.
At about the same time, Gene Sharp who wrote the now world-famous The Politics ofNonviolent Action 11 was a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Center for InternationalAﬀairs, and just published an award winning essay discussing the implications of civilianbased defense: Making the Abolition of War a Realistic Goal.12 In the same year, Sharp
published Social Power and Political Freedom arguing that in order to effectively tackle
grave political problems namely: dictatorship, genocide, war, and social oppression, there
is a need to rethink politics. The obvious must be questioned because “We usually take thefamiliar for granted, and do not really ‘see’ it. We often fail to ponder that which is unmistakably before us, to give it our close attention, and to ask simple but fundamental questions
about it, as we would if it appeared before us for the ﬁrst time.”13
Studying nonviolent action from Sharp’s The Politics of Nonviolent Action is to learn

Three Windows and Critical Peace/Nonviolence Research 9

to question the obvious in politics, namely the way power works. In addition, it is to understand the theory behind nonviolent action, the numerous historical cases supporting theworld famous 198 methods, and how they work to alter the conﬂict dynamics. Apart fromthese, while serving as a translator of his The Politics of Nonviolent Action into Thai, I havealso learned how Sharp was so careful with language choice for his book as we struggled
for the appropriate translation of the term “nonviolent action.”
Precision of the terms used in nonviolence studies/research is so very significant to
Sharp that he would sometimes chastise me for using the term “nonviolence” loosely in
my works because it broadly covers nonviolent direct action, love of all humanity, passivity and surrender, among others. For him, using “nonviolence” in one’s research is “often
highly ambiguous, contradictory, and even moralistic-all quite unsuited for description andanalysis of conflicts.”14 Therefore the term “nonviolence” “should not be used as a synonym for the technique of nonviolent action, because nonviolent action is often practiced
for pragmatic reasons and is not necessarily tied to a general belief in abstention from all
violence.”15 Those who use nonviolent action may not be pacifists who may support or
oppose the use of nonviolent action. In fact, paciﬁsts who oppose nonviolent action do so
because for them “some methods of nonviolent action may be too conﬂictual, coercive, or
provocative of violent responses.”16
Sharp’s belief about precision is with Tocqueville whose quote he used as epigraphto his Sharp’s Dictionary’s introduction: ‘An abstract term is like a box with a false bottom, you may put in it what ideas you please, and take them out again without being
observed.’17His first two sentences in the book clearly reveal his intention. They read:“Every ﬁeld of study and thought requires clear concepts, terms, and understood meaning.
Without them, description, analysis, communication and the transfer of knowledge are
impaired, if not impossible.”18 For Sharp, such precision is needed for the advent of nonviolent struggles studies/research to help the world cope with deadly threats from genocide
to dictatorship and other forms of tyranny.
Conclusion: a note on “windows” and critical peace/nonviolence research
Looking through the three fantastic windows, and though there are others in my life, thesehave helped me see the familiar with the unfamiliar eyes so that new questions can beraised. Critical peace research framework enables me to place variables in appropriate layers that help elucidate how different faces of violence work to trap humans in its deadly

10

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8space. Then nonviolent action grounded in knowledge from diverse ﬁelds of study in bothsocial sciences and humanities continue to kindle my hope in critical peace/nonviolence
research as knowledge-based alternatives that could help foster a more peaceful world.
Since I began this article with a peculiar understanding of “window,” let me end by
showing how this understanding of “window” as something that helps one “breathes” and“sees” can connect with peace/nonviolence research/studies.
On July 8, 2013, in Lampedusa, a small Italian island some 70 miles from Tunisia
known as North Africa’s “gateway to Europe” where so many migrants have died crossing
from Africa, Pope Francis raised the question: “Has anyone of us grieved for the death ofthese brothers and sisters?” Rephrasing the Pope’s question to underscore the pain it delicately suggests, I am curious about why when seeing the sights of human suﬀering, in thiscase the migrants’, one does not or cannot grieve.19
In meditating on why this is so very difficult, I have argued that the difficulty arises
from a profound sense of human failure to realize how one’s life is connected to others’,
and that to be able to do so-to see their sufferings and to hear the cries of the oppressed,
there is a need to call into question the dominant role of “thinking” as the defining quality of being human. Beyond the critique of “thinking,” breathing is then proposed as analternative epistemic ground necessary for peace/nonviolence in the twenty-ﬁrst century.20
In this sense, “windows” could serve as portals to “see” and “breathe” the world one lives,
both as a peace/nonviolence researcher and a human being.
References

1
2

3

4

5

6

(https://www.etymonline.com/word/window, accessed December 30, 2020).
Thongchai Winichakul, Moments of Silence: The Unforgetting of the October 6, 1976 Massacre in
Bangkok (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2020).
Marjorie Hope and James Young, The Struggle for Humanity: Agents of Nonviolent Change in a
Violent World (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Book, 1979).
For an elaborate treatment of Paige’s inﬂuence on educating me as a peace/nonviolence researcher,see Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Teacher Glenn: how a political scientist educated a peace researcher,”
Journal of Peace Education Vol.15 Issue 3 (2018), 255-266.
Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Islam and Violence: A Case Study of Violent Events in the Four Southern
Provinces, Thailand, 1976-1981(Tampa, Florida: University of South Florida Monographs on
Religion and Public Policy, 1987).
See Glenn D. Paige, Chaiwat Satha-Anand and Sarah Gilliatt (eds.) Islam and Nonviolence(Honolulu: Center for Global Nonviolence Planning Project, Spark M.Matsunaga Institute for Peace,
University of Hawai’I, 1993). Throughout my academic life, I have worked on the subject of IslamThree Windows and Critical Peace/Nonviolence Research 11
and nonviolence, see also Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Nonviolence and Islamic Imperatives (Sparnas,
Sweden: Irene Publishing, 2017).
7
Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization(London, Thousand Oaks, Delhi: SAGE, 1996), 201-207.
8
The Astana Times, January 5, 2021.
9
See Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “’Red Mosques’: Mitigating Violence Against Sacred Spaces inThailand and Beyond,” in Ken Miichi and Omar Farouk (eds.) Southeast Asian Muslims in the Eraof Globalization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 197-220. See also Michael K. Jerryson,
Buddhist Fury: Religion and Violence in Southern Thailand (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2011).
10
Glenn D.Paige, “To Leap Beyond Yet Nearer Bring: From War to Peace to Nonviolence toNonkilling,” International Journal of Peace Studies Vol.2 No.1 (January 1997), 97.
11(Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973).
12(Winner of the Ira D.and Miriam G.Wallach 1979-1980 Awards, sponsored by the Institute for World
Order in New York.)
13(Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980), 13.
14
Gene Sharp, Sharp’s Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflict(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), xiii.
15
Ibid., 193. But elsewhere I have argued that Sharp’s distinction is too restrictive. See Chaiwat
Satha-Anand, “Overcoming Illusory Division: Between Nonviolence as a Pragmatic Strategy anda Principled Way of Life,” in Kurt Schock (ed.), Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on
Nonviolent Struggle (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), 289-301.
16
Ibid., 211.
17
Ibid.The epigraph is from Alexis De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1889), Vol.2, 63.
18
Ibid.,xi.
19
See a philosophical discussion of “grievability” in relation to “equality” of lives in Judith Butler, The
Philosophy of Non-Violence (London and New York: Verso, 2020), 28.
20
Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Breathing the others, Seeing the lives: A Reﬂection on Twenty-ﬁrst-century
Nonviolence,”in Joseph Camilleri and Deborah Guess (eds.) Towards a Just and EcologicallySustainable Peace: Navigating the Great Transition (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 228248.

世界保健機関の内的変容と課題：財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症

13

特集論文

世界保健機関の内的変容と課題：
財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症
山越裕太

神戸学院大学、講師
はじめに本号のテーマ「世界の平和と人間の安全保障に対する脅威」を一考した際に、まず思いつく脅威は戦争であろう。これに人間の安全に関わる様々な脅威も付け加えることができる1。これら多様化した脅威は、特に冷戦後に認識され始めたが、今日の国際社会が多様な脅威に必ずしも十分に対応できているわけではない。それゆえ 1 つの対応策として、平和と人間の安全保障の両立を指向する複眼的平和思想への転換が今まさに求められている、ことを指摘できる2。またこれは、世界の平和と人間の安全保障については、戦争という脅威のみならず、多様な視点や側面からこの問題を捉え直す必要が生じているとも換言できる。そこで本稿では、このテーマを保健衛生分野から考えていきたい。具体的には、世界保健機関（World Health Organization: WHO）の財政やネットワークを分析することで、WHOが果たしてきた役割や、その変化、新たに生じた課題を明らかにする。
ここでは、議論の前提として保健衛生分野と世界の平和や人間の安全保障との関係を整理する。加えて、WHO のこれまでの活動を簡単に跡づける。保健衛生
分野と人間の安全保障の関係は、『人間開発報告書1994』で健康の安全保障として明示された。そこでは発展途上国と先進国の死因の違いや特に健康の安全が脅かされている存在として、貧困層や農村地域、子供が指摘されている。その 6 年後には、人間の安全保障委員会が提出した報告書『安全保障の今日的課題』に再び、
保健衛生分野が人間の安全保障の一側面として取り上げられた3。健康を守ることが人間の安全保障の中核として位置づけられ、地球規模の感染症、貧困に関連した脅威、暴力と危機など、保健衛生分野と人間の安全保障との結びつきが指摘された。加えて、世界の平和との関係では、例えば、第一次世界大戦下に流行した
スペイン・インフルエンザや新型コロナウイルス感染症（COVID-19）など世界的な感染症の流行を想起すれば、保健衛生分野が世界の平和に少なからず影響を与えていることは明らかだろう。
本稿で取り上げる WHO は、その保健衛生分野で中心的役割を果たしてきた。
関連年表の1948年設立以来、感染症に対応するため1969年に国際保健規則を制定

■図表■

14

■関連年表■

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8

関連年表
関連年表
1948 世界保健機関(WHO)設立
1969 国際保健規則採択（コレラ、ペスト、黄熱のみ報告義務）
1978 アルマ・アタ宣言（プライマリ・ヘルス・ケア提唱）
1980 天然痘根絶宣言
1994 UNDP『人間開発報告書1994』(健康の安全保障)
2000 人間の安全保障委員会報告書、BMGF設立、GAVI設立
2003 SARS(国際保健規則改訂プロセスの端緒)
2005 国際保健規則改訂（国際的な公衆衛生上の脅威を対象）
2009 新型インフルエンザ(H1N1)
2012～ MERS
2014～ エボラ出血熱(西アフリカ)
2015～ ジカ熱(アメリカ大陸)
2020～ 新型コロナウイルス感染症(COVID-19)
2020 Jan. 国際的に懸念される公衆衛生上の緊急事態宣言(1月30日)
2020 Mar. COVID-19パンデミック宣言(3月11日)
2020 July アメリカのWHO脱退通知(2021年7月6日脱退予定)

し、1980年には天然痘の撲滅に成功するなど多くの成果を上げた。同時にプライ
マリ・ヘルス・ケアを提唱し、単に感染症に対応するのみならず、すべての人々の健康を保障するために活動している。近年、頻発する感染症の世界的流行については、2003年の重症急性呼吸器症候群（SARS）の流行を契機に国際保健規則が改訂され、国際的な公衆衛生上の脅威に対応する枠組みが整えられた。WHO は
COVID-19の流行に際して、2020年 1 月30日に国際的に懸念される公衆衛生上の緊急事態（PHEIC）宣言、続いて 3 月11日にパンデミックを宣言し、対応している4。
1 / 11
WHO の財政
本稿は以上のような問題関心を出発点にして、主に2000年以降のやネットワークについて検討する。以下、 1 ．世界保健機関財政の特徴では、
WHO 予算の変遷や性質を検討する。続く、 2 ．世界保健機関ネットワークの変容では、WHO ネットワークの変化を指摘したい。そして 3 ．世界保健機関と新型コロナウイルス感染症では、COVID-19への対応と WHO の役割、新たに生じてきた課題を検討する。おわりに、保健衛生分野と世界の平和と人間の安全保障の関係を改めて考察する。
1．世界保健機関財政の特徴（1）予算の推移（1992年から2018年）
本章では、WHO 予算の変遷や性質を明らかにする5。はじめに WHO 予算の推移を検討していく。WHO のプログラム予算（programme budget）は、加盟国分担金（assessed contributions）と任意拠出金（voluntary contributions）の 2 種類で構成される。加盟国分担金は、加盟国それぞれの分担率に従い支払われる資金、任意世界保健機関の内的変容と課題：財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症

15

拠出金は WHO 加盟国と非国家主体を含む多様な主体の自発的な拠出で成り立っている。表 1 （1992-2018年 WHO プログラム予算、加盟国分担金、任意拠出金）
は1992年から2018年までの WHO 予算の各項目の年次推移が示されている6。表 1
では、すべての項目が増加している傾向を指摘できる。しかし、その増加率は各項目で異なり、1992年と2018年を比較すれば、プログラム予算は597％、加盟国分■表 1■

担金は154％、任意拠出金は1,665％の増加率となる。同じく、プログラム予算に占める各項目の割合は、加盟国分担金では70％から18％に減少し、任意拠出金では29％から81％に増加した。つまり、1992年から2018年にかけて WHO 予算の重心が加盟国分担金から任意拠出金に移ったことが明らかとなる。この加盟国分担WHO
表1 ：1992-2018年
プログラム予算、加盟国分担金、任意拠出金（米ドル）表1:
1992-2018年WHOプ
ログラ ム 予算、加盟国分担金、任意拠出金 ( 米ドル)

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

A. プログラム
予算=B+CB. 加盟国分
担金

C. 任意拠出金459,500,680
546,828,285
511,799,615
698,275,598
575,034,742
N/A
668,124,339
786,557,406
978,821,959
932,871,727
817,221,271
969,157,379
1,162,865,000
1,394,396,000
1,732,493,000
1,921,497,000
1,581,335,817
2,103,382,680
1,943,720,992
1,900,006,246
2,017,018,640
2,404,578,672
2,493,604,095
2,298,971,000
2,187,427,000
2,567,277,000
2,737,527,000

324,771,106
365,438,171
364,816,580
481,306,082
359,270,090
N/A
408,386,000
418,751,000
414,093,220
421,279,990
395,219,391
397,306,745
426,925,000
431,550,000
442,000,000
451,115,000
470,062,155
470,062,155
472,557,200
472,557,200
474,609,150
474,640,515
491,865,238
462,651,000
470,036,000
456,712,000
500,751,000

134,729,574
181,390,114
146,983,035
216,969,516
215,764,652
N/A
259,738,339
367,806,406
564,728,739
511,591,737
422,001,880
571,850,634
735,940,000
962,846,000
1,290,493,000
1,470,382,000
1,111,273,662
1,633,320,525
1,471,163,792
1,427,449,046
1,542,409,490
1,929,938,157
2,001,738,857
1,836,320,000
1,717,391,000
2,110,565,000
2,236,776,000

加盟国分担 任意拠出金割合(%)
金割合(%)
=C/A
=B/A
70.7
66.8
71.3
68.9
62.5
N/A
61.1
53.2
42.3
45.2
48.4
41.0
36.7
30.9
25.5
23.5
29.7
22.3
24.3
24.9
23.5
19.7
19.7
20.1
21.5
17.8
18.3

※WHA46(1993), 12; WHA47(1994), 12; WHA48(1995), 12; WHA49(1996), 12;
WHA50(1997), 12; WHA52(1999), 10; WHA53(2000), 12; WHA54(2001), 10;
WHA55(2002a), 12; WHA56(2003a), 6; WHA57(2004a), 12; WHA58(2005a), 12;
WHA59(2006a), 14; WHA60(2007a), 10; WHA61(2008a), 14; WHA62(2009a), 29;
WHA63(2010a), 35; WHA64(2011a), 31; WHA65(2012a), 44; WHA66(2013a), 67;
WHA67(2014a), 72; WHA68(2015a), 72; WHA69(2016a), 174; WHA70(2017a), 128;
WHA71(2018a), 65; WHA72(2019a), 69を基に筆者作成。

29.3
33.2
28.7
31.1
37.5
N/A
38.9
46.8
57.7
54.8
51.6
59.0
63.3
69.1
74.5
76.5
70.3
77.7
75.7
75.1
76.5
80.3
80.3
79.9
78.5
82.2
81.7

16

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8

表2 : 1 9 9 2 - 2 0 1 7 年国連専門機関間任意拠出金比較

表 2 ：1992-2017年国連専門機関間任意拠出金比較（百万米ドル）(百万米ドル)
WHO

FAO

ILO

UNIDO

UNESCO

1992

352

365

150

138

82

1993

357

307

131

139

87

1994

330

267

111

67

77

1995

396

242

106

79

99

1996
1997

341
341

240
241

103
102

67
71

116
130

1998

359

269

98

93

84

1999

331

268

86

88

111

2000

557

314

94

77

198

2001

531

320

115

88

260

2002
2003

776
711

310
310

132
132

89
101

264
303

2004

1,011

317

129

104

317

2005

1,150

317

174

118

351

2006

1,371

425

181

120

291

2007

1,840

425

189

121

228

2008
2009

1,254
1,659

568
568

207
243

124
140

208
179

2010

1,565

891

248

229

323

2011

1,504

899

271

247

309

2012

1,573

775

271

190

391

2013

1,929

744

281

157

369

2014

1,970

805

278

182

365

2015
2016

1,857
1,726

744
770

225
252

250
228

352
246

2017

2,058

751

293

256

261

※UN Specialized Agencies: Voluntary Contributions, 1971-2017(https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/pdfs/Voluntary_Con
tributions_UN_Specialize_Agencies_Voluntary_1971-2017.pdf)(2020年6月27日最終閲覧)を参照し、筆者作成。

金と任意拠出金の重心の逆転は2000年に生じており、それ以降現在まで主に任意
3 / 11
拠出金が WHO の財政の柱となっている7。
この WHO 予算の特徴は、他の国連専門機関との比較において、どのように位置づけられるのだろうか。表 2 （1992-2017年国連専門機関間任意拠出金比較）を検討する8。表 2 では1992年から2017年までの WHO、国連食糧農業機関（FAO）、
国際労働機関（ILO）、国連工業開発機関（UNIDO）、国連教育科学文化機関（UNESCO）の 5 つの国連専門機関の任意拠出金の年次推移が示されている。任意
拠出金という枠組みは WHO 独自の予算枠組みではなく、国連専門機関に広く存世界保健機関の内的変容と課題：財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症

17

在している。この期間、すべての国連専門機関で任意拠出金が増加している傾向を指摘できる。WHO 以外の国連専門機関においても近年、任意拠出金の影響力が高まっている。逆に言えば、加盟国分担金の割合は相対的に減少し、加盟国の影響力が低下しているとも捉えられる。WHO の任意拠出金は、1992年の時点では FAO に次ぐ 3 億5,200万ドルであったが、2017年には国連専門機関の中で最大の20億5,800万ドルにまで増加した。WHO は、他の国連専門機関と比較すると急速に任意拠出金を増加させていた。この表 2 からも WHO の任意拠出金の重要性を指摘できる。
最後に WHO がこの資金をどのように使用しているのか、予算の配分状況を確認する。WHO は2018-19年の予算計画でポリオ根絶計画（10億ドル）、感染症（ 8億ドル）
、事務（7.1億ドル）、保健制度（5.8億ドル）、緊急事態（5.5億ドル）、健康増進（3.8億ドル）、非感染性疾患（3.5億ドル）の予算を計上している9。任意拠出金を柱にして、感染症対策の分野に注力する計画であることがわかる。
（2）任意拠出金の性質
ここでは WHO の任意拠出金に対象を絞り検討を進める。はじめに WHO の任
意拠出金の年次推移を確認しよう。表 3 （1955-2018年 WHO 任意拠出金、累計額）は1955年から2018年までの WHO 任意拠出金の年次推移である。WHO 任意拠
出金は、1956年から取り扱われ、2018年まで増加の一途を辿った10。この任意拠
出金の 1 つの転換点として2000年を指摘できる。なぜなら、2000年から2004年までの任意拠出額（約28億ドル）が、1956年から99年までの43年間の任意拠出額（約27億ドル）を上回る状況に変化したからである。表 1 、表 2 でも指摘した任意拠
出金の重要性や2000年という転換点を表 3 からも指摘できる。
それではなぜ、WHO 予算は2000年を契機に性質を変化させたのだろうか。こ
こでは 3 つの要因を指摘する。 1 つ目はグローバル化とそれに伴う非国家主体の活動拡大の影響である。グローバル化が進むことで非国家主体が国境を越えて活動する機会が増加した。2000年は、後述するゲイツ財団（Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation: BMGF）や GAVI ワクチンアライアンス（Global Alliance for Vaccines
and Immunisation: GAVI）が設立され、保健衛生分野における非国家主体の活動拡
大の萌芽期であった。これら非国家主体の活動拡大が WHO 予算に徐々に影響を及ぼした。 2 つ目は、健康の安全保障の概念化である。先述のように、人間の安全保障の一側面として健康が1994年に取り上げられ、2000年に改めて人間の安全保障委員会で位置づけられた。その結果、保健衛生分野の課題が国際的に認知されるようになり、課題解決に向けた機運や枠組みが整備されていったことも、この変化の背景として指摘できる。最後にそれら外的な要因に加えて、WHO の内的な要因も指摘できる。WHO 予算の不払い問題である。1990年代に WHO 予算の■表 3■
18

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8

表3 : 1 9 5 5 - 2 0WHO
1 8 年W
HO任意拠出金、 累計額 (米ドル)
表 3 ：1955-2018年
任意拠出金、累計額（米ドル）
累計額

任意拠出金

累計額

1955-65

任意拠出金
28,457,836

28,457,836 1992

128,094,226

1,107,576,256

1966
1967

1,567,523
851,102

30,025,359 1993
30,876,461 1994

178,010,066
145,445,848

1,285,586,322
1,431,032,170

1968

2,593,238

33,469,699 1995

209,169,637

1,640,201,807

1969
1970

1,684,749
2,743,315

35,154,448 1996
37,897,763 1997

204,302,894
226,187,743

1,844,504,701
2,070,692,444

1971
1972

6,853,977
5,306,209

44,751,740 1998
50,057,949 1999

262,948,559
367,946,260

2,333,641,003
2,701,587,263

1973
1974

12,224,367
15,823,955

62,282,316 2000
78,106,271 2001

566,289,009
513,391,699

3,267,876,272
3,781,267,971

1975
1976

32,365,549
32,230,869

110,471,820 2002
142,702,689 2003

422,001,880
571,850,634

4,203,269,851
4,775,120,485

1977

35,131,862

177,834,551 2004

735,940,000

5,511,060,485

1978
1979

47,954,729
32,122,078

225,789,280 2005 962,846,000
257,911,358 2006 1,290,493,000

6,473,906,485
7,764,399,485

1980
1981

36,948,457
38,841,213

294,859,815 2007 1,470,382,000 9,234,781,485
333,701,028 2008 1,111,273,662 10,346,055,147

1982
1983

38,539,505
39,609,466

372,240,533 2009 1,633,320,525 11,979,375,672
411,849,999 2010 1,471,163,792 13,450,539,464

1984
1985

35,106,836
38,819,220

446,956,835 2011 1,427,449,046 14,877,988,510
485,776,055 2012 1,542,409,490 16,420,398,000

1986

52,774,919

538,550,974 2013 1,929,938,157 18,350,336,157

1987
1988

61,735,554
79,762,239

600,286,528 2014 2,001,738,857 20,352,075,014
680,048,767 2015 1,836,320,000 22,188,395,014

1989
1990
1991

76,750,178
90,626,017
132,057,068

756,798,945 2016 1,717,391,000 23,905,786,014
847,424,962 2017 2,110,565,000 26,016,351,014
979,482,030 2018 2,236,776,000 28,253,127,014※WHA55 (2002b), 12及び表1を基に筆者作成。1955年から2001年はWHA55(2002b)の拠出額、2002年から2018年は表1の拠出額。

加盟国分担金は、支払遅延や不払い問題が生じ、慢性的な機能不全に陥っていた。
予算改革などが行われていたが、例えば、1995年には、加盟国分担金を78カ国（42％）が全く支払わない事態が生じていた11。この時期 WHO の主な資金源であった加盟国分担金による活動は、困難になっていたのである。
上記の 3 つの要因が折り重なり WHO 予算は2000年を境に性質を変化させたと
2 / 5言える。その結果、新たに生じた任意拠出金の増加という傾向は、加盟国分担金の不足分を補い、活動資金を埋め合わせる役割を持っていた。この変化で見逃せない点は、加盟国分担金と任意拠出金の性質の違いである。つまり、加盟国分担

世界保健機関の内的変容と課題：財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症

19

金と任意拠出金の性質を中長期視点で検討すれば、加盟国分担金は支払遅延や不払い問題がないわけではないが、加盟国が存在する限り、WHO にとって予算の見込みが立つ安定的な財源と位置づけられる。一方の任意拠出金は、加盟国や非国家主体の自発性に依拠している。そのため、中長期的には WHO 予算を不安定化させる効果を持つと言える。付け加えれば、近年の WHO 予算の任意拠出金割合の大幅な増加は、これまで顕在化していないが、WHO 財政の不安定化という課題を生じさせうる可能性を高めていた。後述する COVID-19によってこの課題が一部顕在化したと考えられる。
続いて、任意拠出金の内訳を検討する。WHO の任意拠出金は、加盟国任意拠
出金と非国家主体任意拠出金の 2 つに分類できる。表 4 （2000-2018年任意拠出総計、加盟国及び非国家主体任意拠出金、割合）は2000年から2018年の任意拠出総計と加盟国及び非国家主体の任意拠出額、その割合が示されている。この期間、■表 4■すべての項目で任意拠出金が増加する傾向を見て取れる。注目すべき点として任意拠出金の割合の変化を指摘できる。例えば、2002年と2017年の任意拠出総計に表
4 :：2000-2018年任意拠出総計、加盟国及び非国家主体任意拠出金、割合
表4
2 0 0 0 - 2 0 1 8 年任意拠出総計、 加盟国及び非国家主体任意拠出金、 割合
（米ドル）
(米ドル)
A. 任意拠出総計 B. 加盟国任意 C. 非国家主体
=B+C
拠出金
任意拠出金
2000*
2001*
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

610,900,989
610,900,989
488,326,944
637,981,962
797,510,879
1,014,334,618
1,001,019,664
1,497,044,267
1,111,325,223
1,633,268,963
1,471,163,792
1,427,449,046
1,539,390,127
1,929,938,157
2,001,713,247
1,836,970,206
1,717,219,177
2,110,685,173
2,243,377,613

379,001,890
379,001,890
340,200,692
429,388,865
543,072,714
670,739,839
621,616,005
800,715,980
475,452,020
960,742,930
773,750,281
787,548,199
768,594,748
1,039,295,291
1,032,868,359
1,020,279,072
920,319,765
1,040,549,547
1,164,716,548

231,899,099
231,899,099
148,126,252
208,593,097
254,438,165
343,594,779
379,403,659
696,328,287
635,873,203
672,526,033
697,413,511
639,900,847
770,795,379
890,642,866
968,844,888
816,691,134
796,899,412
1,070,135,626
1,078,661,065

加盟国任意拠 非国家主体任
意拠出金割合出金割合(%)=C/A(%)=B/A
62.0
62.0
69.7
67.3
68.1
66.1
62.1
53.5
42.8
58.8
52.6
55.2
49.9
53.9
51.6
55.5
53.6
49.3
51.9

38.0
38.0
30.3
32.7
31.9
33.9
37.9
46.5
57.2
41.2
47.4
44.8
50.1
46.1
48.4
44.5
46.4
50.7
48.1

※WHA55(2002b), 4-10; WHA56(2003b), 4-9; WHA57(2004b), 4-11; WHA58(2005b), 4-10;
WHA59(2006b), 4-14; WHA60(2007b), 4-12; WHA61(2008b), 4-16; WHA62(2009b), 4-14;
WHA63(2010b), 4-23; WHA64(2011b), 5-19; WHA65(2012b), 5-25; WHA66(2013b), 4-14;
WHA67(2014b), 4-15; WHA68(2015b), 4-19; WHA69(2016b), 4-16; WHA70(2017b), 4-14;
WHA71(2018b), 4-14; WHA72(2019b), 4-12を基に筆者作成。
*2000年及び2001年は、2年間の任意拠出総計、加盟国及び非国家主体任意拠出金を平均した参
考値。

20

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8占める加盟国及び非国家主体任意拠出金の割合を比較すると、加盟国任意拠出金の割合は、70％から49％に低下し、非国家主体任意拠出金の割合は、30％から50％に増加した。近年では、任意拠出総計の約半分を非国家主体が拠出している。
これに表 1 を合わせると、2018年の WHO 予算は、加盟国分担金18％、加盟国任
意拠出金42％、非国家主体任意拠出金39％で構成される計算となる。WHO 予算
は2000年以降、任意拠出金に主軸が移ったが、任意拠出金の内実も徐々に変化し、
非国家主体の拠出割合が増加する道筋を辿った。WHO 予算の約 4 割を非国家主体が自発的に担っている状況は、1990年代の加盟国分担金を主軸とした WHO 予
算から変化していることは明らかだろう。現在の WHO は、単純な国家間合意に基づく国際機関という一般的理解では捉えきれない特徴を有していると言えるの
独立論文「世界保健機関の内的変容と課題：財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症」

かもしれない。一方で、加盟国という枠組みで予算を捉え直せば、加盟国分担金■図表■
及び加盟国任意拠出金を合わせた WHO 予算に占める割合は 6 割程度となり WHO
は未だ加盟国の資金を元に活動しているとも位置づけられる。いずれにせよ重要■表 5■
な点は、WHO 予算の性質は2000年を契機に変容したという点にある。
それでは、任意拠出金は、どのような国家、非国家主体によって拠出されてい表 5 ：2000-2018年加盟国任意拠出金上位
5 カ国及び中国、割合（米ドル）
表5 : 2 0 0 0 - 2 0 1 8 年加盟国任意拠出金上位5
カ国及び中国、 割合 (米ドル)
任意拠出額上位5カ国

-

上位5カ国
総計

イギリス
オランダ
アメリカ
ノルウェイ
イタリア
中国
2000-2001
591,428,193
任意拠出額 190,057,815 169,147,558 147,920,099 48,124,080 36,178,641 340,000
イギリス
アメリカ
カナダ
ノルウェイ
オランダ
中国
2002-2003
583,303,213
任意拠出額 186,656,137 163,561,632 73,985,156 80,457,838 78,642,450 340,000
イギリス
アメリカ
カナダ
ノルウェイ スウェーデン
中国
2004-2005
851,868,894
任意拠出額 255,295,887 226,463,468 172,498,068 101,380,169 96,231,302 4,460,000
アメリカ
イギリス
カナダ
ノルウェイ スウェーデン
中国
2006-2007
949,780,952
任意拠出額 305,668,404 303,593,823 150,849,285 102,395,274 87,274,166 7,305,391
アメリカ
イギリス
ノルウェイ
カナダ
オランダ
中国
2008-2009
911,937,990
任意拠出額 424,540,852 205,510,011 103,923,252 96,356,532 81,607,343 4,232,333
アメリカ
イギリス
カナダ
ノルウェイ オーストラリア
中国
2010-2011
1,087,089,803
任意拠出額 438,285,683 288,952,392 154,147,294 113,889,562 91,814,872 2,951,149
アメリカ
イギリス
カナダ オーストラリア ノルウェイ
中国
2012
545,009,587
任意拠出額 214,918,555 115,690,011 95,333,304 65,782,429 53,285,288 1,710,000
イギリス
アメリカ
カナダ
ノルウェイ オーストラリア
中国
2013
701,674,895
任意拠出額 270,558,531 179,744,341 121,699,438 68,240,578 61,432,007 6,057,062
アメリカ
イギリス
カナダ
ノルウェイ オーストラリア
中国
2014
635,202,747
任意拠出額 300,671,805 155,129,268 79,796,770 49,808,970 49,795,934 7,040,000
アメリカ
イギリス
ナイジェリア
カナダ
ノルウェイ
中国
2015
658,153,919
任意拠出額 305,744,839 195,678,335 67,610,799 47,158,403 41,961,543 2,857,811
アメリカ
イギリス
日本
ドイツ
オーストラリア中国
2016
605,570,493
任意拠出額 324,156,696 133,843,104 68,247,123 39,662,977 39,660,593 5,170,000
アメリカ
イギリス
ドイツ
日本
ノルウェイ
中国
2017
743,143,115
任意拠出額 401,108,929 163,734,475 89,942,082 46,726,068 41,631,561 10,584,499
アメリカ
イギリス
ドイツ
日本
クウェート
中国
2018
787,879,850
任意拠出額 281,063,159 205,262,406 154,538,249 86,516,036 60,500,000 6,315,132※表4のWHO資料を基に筆者作成。

加盟国任意拠出金に占める上位5カ国
総計の割合(%)
78.0
75.8
70.2
66.8
63.5
69.6
70.9
67.5
61.5
64.5
65.8
71.4
67.6

世界保健機関の内的変容と課題：財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症

21

るのだろうか。任意拠出額の大きい上位 5 カ国と非国家主体を取り上げる。表 5（2000-2018年加盟国任意拠出金上位 5 カ国及び中国、割合）は2000年から2018年までの加盟国任意拠出額の上位 5 カ国及び中国の年次推移である。中国は後の分析のため例外的に抽出した。上位 5 カ国の任意拠出額や総計に大きな傾向はみられないが、加盟国任意拠出金に占める上位 5 カ国の割合は常に 6 割を超えており、
加盟国任意拠出金は、主に上位 5 カ国に支えられていることがわかる。その中でも重要な加盟国を指摘すれば、アメリカとイギリスとなろう。両国は2002年から
2018年まで常に加盟国任意拠出金の最大拠出国であった。
続いて、表 6 （2000-2018年非国家主体任意拠出金上位 5 団体、割合）は2000年
から2018年までの非国家主体任意拠出額の上位 5 団体の年次推移である。多様な
非国家主体が拠出しているが、非国家主体任意拠出金に占める上位 5 団体の割合
は例外はあるが 6 割程度となっている。非国家主体任意拠出金も、加盟国任意拠■表 6■出金と同様に、主に上位 5 団体が支えている。また、2000年と2018年を比較する
表 6 ：2000-2018年非国家主体任意拠出金上位
5 団体、割合（米ドル）
表6 : 2 0 0 0 - 2 0 1 8 年非国家主体任意拠出金上位5
団体、 割合 (米ドル)
任意拠出額上位5団体

非国家主体任意拠
上位5団体
出金に占める上位5
総計
団体総計の割合(%)

2000-2001 UNICEF USA
RI
UNFIPWorld Bank Kobe Group
76.7
355,745,901
任意拠出額 198,325,904 61,808,714
60,770,697
21,707,895
13,132,691
2002-2003
GS
BMGF
UNIFIPRI
UNAIDS
51.7
184,442,516
任意拠出額 43,497,610
40,886,824
39,870,584
35,213,809
24,973,689
2004-2005
CEC
UNDP*
UNIFIP
BMGF
RI
61.5
367,796,404
任意拠出額 115,982,518 82,446,318
71,923,926
61,804,897
35,638,745
2006-2007 World Bank**
BMGF
CEC
UNIFIPUNCERF
49.0
640,542,537
任意拠出額 208,964,320 148,174,632 128,127,194 92,596,354
62,680,037
2008-2009
BMGF
RI
EC
GAVI
HLR
64.4
757,162,170
任意拠出額 338,737,334 155,669,958 93,569,572
85,185,306
84,000,000
2010-2011
BMGF
RI
UNDP
GAVI
EC
64.9
868,017,292
任意拠出額 446,161,801 116,565,898 109,890,218 98,832,852
96,566,523
2012
BMGF
GAVI
EC
UNCERF
RI
67.5
520,649,316
任意拠出額 266,405,630 92,582,495
63,786,386
54,937,681
42,937,124
2013
BMGF
GAVI
UNCERFEC
UNDP
63.1
562,080,050
任意拠出額 301,338,333 130,356,707 50,095,877
41,787,631
38,501,502
2014
BMGF
GAVI
RI
EC
UNDP
58.4
565,890,308
任意拠出額 256,521,237 127,754,707 66,516,459
58,639,262
56,458,643
2015
BMGF
GAVI
NPT
RI
UNDP
61.4
501,470,814
任意拠出額 185,272,525 126,421,673 86,252,168
56,302,924
47,221,524
2016
BMGF
GAVI
NPT
RI
EC
64.8
516,344,194
任意拠出額 275,858,618 75,420,327
66,650,000
52,842,093
45,573,156
2017
BMGF
World Bank
GAVI
EC
RI
69.9
747,655,671
任意拠出額 324,654,317 145,568,331 133,365,051 81,956,035
62,111,937
2018
BMGF
GAVI
UNOCHA
NPT
RI
64.0
690,688,421
任意拠出額 228,970,196 158,545,964 135,922,608 85,820,188
81,429,465※表4のWHO資料を基に筆者作成。
*UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund**Fund from GAVI Fund Affiliate
CEC: Commission of the European Communities, EC: European Commission, GS: Glaxo Smithkline, HLR: Hoffmann-La
Roche, NPT: National Philanthropic Trust, RI: Rotary International, UNCERF: UN Central Emergency Responce Fund

22

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8と WHO プログラム予算に占める上位 5 団体の任意拠出金の割合は18％から25％に増加した。近年、加盟国に加え、これらの非国家主体も WHO 財政の中で重要な役割を担いつつあることを改めて指摘できる。これら非国家主体の中でも BMGFと GAVI は大きな影響力を持っている。両主体は2006年から2018年にかけて拠出額で上位 5 非国家主体の中に常に位置づけられている。特に BMGF は2008年から現在まで非国家主体任意拠出金の最大拠出主体である。先に任意拠出金の一般的性質として財政を不安定化せしめる効果を指摘したが、この 2 つの非国家主体については、多くの任意拠出金を安定的に拠出しているため、その意味で任意拠出金にもかかわらず、これまで WHO 予算の安定化に寄与していると位置づけられる。
以上、WHO 予算の推移や任意拠出金の性質を検討することで、2000年以降、任意拠出金の重要性が高まり、その中でも主要な主体としてアメリカ、イギリス
BMGF、GAVI の存在が明らかとなった。
2．世界保健機関ネットワークの変容（1）アメリカとイギリスの任意拠出金の特徴
第 2 章では、アメリカ、イギリス、BMGF、GAVI の任意拠出金の特徴やその関係性を検討する。ここではアメリカとイギリスの任意拠出金の特徴を明らかにする。
表 7 （2010-2018年アメリカ、イギリス、中国項目別任意拠出金）は2010年から2018年までのアメリカ、イギリス、中国の任意拠出額と項目別拠出額が示されている12。この表 7 で初めに指摘できる点は、任意拠出金の内訳が現在では 8 項目に細分化されている点である。この枠組みは、任意拠出金受入側の WHO と拠出元の加盟国それぞれの立場で異なる効果を持つ。WHO からこの枠組みを捉えれば、 8 項目に細分化された任意拠出金は予め使途が分類されており、任意拠出金の増額は各項目の活動を充実させる資金となるが、任意拠出金の増額それ自体がWHO の裁量権を拡大させる効果は持たない。他方、拠出元の加盟国からこの枠組みを捉えると、予め任意拠出金の使途を分類することができ、自らの理念や国益を反映することが可能な枠組みとして機能する。この特徴は、加盟国分担金と比較すると一層明らかとなる。WHO から加盟国分担金を捉えると使途を WHO の裁量で配分できる資金として位置づけられる。反対に分担金支払い国にとっては、
加盟国分担金は、使途を指定できず、任意拠出金に比べ影響力を発揮しにくい資金として特徴づけられる。加盟国分担金の不払い問題などが生起した背景に、このような加盟国分担金と任意拠出金の性質の違いも指摘できよう。この特徴を踏まえれば、2000年以降、WHO 予算の重心が任意拠出金に移動したことは、財政

任意拠出額
A
A'
B
C
D
E
F
2010-2011 438,285,781 428,885,161 97.9
06,104,522
3,296,000
2012
214,918,652 208,109,268 96.8
497,175
5,710,587
601,525ア
2013
179,744,441 179,577,482 99.9
0166,8590メ
844,350-223,627
608,0762014
300,671,905 299,443,006 99.6
リ
2015
305,744,939 304,890,489 99.7
247,1750607,175
カ2016324,156,728 169,089,776 52.2
879,512628,103
90,641,308
62,917,977
2017
401,108,972 172,683,699 43.1
575,617
1,254,350
106,089,211 120,506,052
2018
281,063,206 132,951,856 47.3
41,904
697,175
70,243,619
77,128,605
2010-2011 288,952,468 217,258,416 75.2
10,003,861
9,576,403
11,103,995
2012
115,690,084 84,206,067
72.8
6,693,116
1,208,314
3,804,033
イ
2013
270,558,618 235,366,004 87.0
5,857,104
1,543,210
6,010,768
ギ
2014
155,129,346 121,084,960 78.1
3,664,123
2,314,815
3,816,793
リ
2015
195,678,415 156,864,701 80.2
3,664,122
0
3,816,794
ス
2016
133,843,142 51,066,586
38.2
3,664,122
3,053,435
36,625,090
21,308,871
2017
163,734,497 36,115,276
22.1
3,664,122
3,726,383
75,881,155
18,097,558
2018
205,262,431 52,289,473
25.5
6,067,813
5,740,861
60,686,016
36,380,596
2010-2011
2,951,240
2,681,149
90.9
110,000
50,000110,0002012
1,710,091
1,550,000
90.6
55,00050,00055,0002013
6,057,162
6,057,062
100.0
0
0
0
中
2014
7,040,097
6,820,000
96.9
110,0000
110,000
国
2015
2,857,837
747,81126.2
55,000055,0002016
5,170,059
3,060,000
59.2
55,00055,00002,000,000
2017
10,584,570
7,474,499
70.6
55,00055,00003,000,000
2018
6,315,214
5,205,132
82.4
55,00055,00001,000,000※表４のWHO資料、特に2012年以降刊行の資料を基に筆者作成。
A: 使途指定(Voluntary contributions- specified), A': 任意拠出額に占めるAの割合(%)
B: 人の生殖分野(Special Programme of Research, Development and Research Training in Human Reproduction)
C: 結核予防分野(Stop TB Partnership)(2015年までの項目)
D: 熱帯医学分野(Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases)
E: 準備・調整分野(Special Programmes and Collaborative Arrangments)(2016年以降の項目)
F: 感染症対策分野(Outbreak and Crisis Response)(2016年以降の項目)
G: 用途指定なし(Core voluntary contributions account)
H: 使用範囲指定(Voluntary contributions- core)(2015年まではOther voluntary contributions- coreと表記)
I: 臨時・緊急分野(Contingency Fund for Emergencies)(2015年以降の項目)

表 7 ：2010-2018年アメリカ、イギリス、中国項目別任意拠出金（米ドル）
表7 : 2 0 1 0 - 2 0 1 8 年ア メリ カ、 イギ リ ス、 中国項目別任意拠出金 (米ドル)

■表 7■

G
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
39,298,146
19,778,481
21,781,445
24,248,577
21,895,884
18,125,000
18,438,573
31,744,488
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

H
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1,711,572
000006,711,408
6,711,410
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

I
0
0
0
0
9,436,834
0
1,100,000
5,641,749
2,000,000
000

世界保健機関の内的変容と課題：財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症

23

24

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8

面での WHO の裁量権が相対的に縮小し、国際機関としての自立性が一定程度低下、または活動が硬直化していることを指摘できる。
加えて、任意拠出金は、拠出元の各加盟国で異なる特徴を持っている。アメリ
カは最大の任意拠出金の拠出国であり、その大部分を使途を指定した資金（表 7 ：A）として拠出してきた。2016年からは、WHO の活動の準備・調整分野（表 7 ：E）や感染症対策分野（表 7 ：F）に拠出を開始している。イギリスは、アメリカに次ぐ任意拠出額であるが、近年は各項目に偏りなく拠出している。アメリカと同様に2016年以降は、WHO の活動の準備・調整分野（表 7 ：E）や感染症対策分野（表 7 ：F）に拠出している。英米共に任意拠出金は使途を予め指定した資金（表 7 ：A）が多くを占めるが、イギリスは、WHO 側が使途を決定できる資金（表7 ：G, H）にも拠出している点がアメリカとの違いである13。中国は近年、任意拠出金を増加させているが、英米に比べると未だ少なく、加盟国任意拠出額上位に位置するまでには至っていない。2018年で英米中を比較すれば、アメリカは中国の45倍、イギリスは33倍の任意拠出金を拠出した計算になる。中国も英米と同じ
く主に使途を指定した資金（表 7 ：A）として拠出している。 3 カ国を比較すれ
ば、米中は使途を指定した資金（表 7 ：A）を中心に拠出し、イギリスは WHO が裁量権を持つ項目（表 7 ：G, H）にも拠出している特徴を指摘できる。
それでは、これらの加盟国任意拠出金は、拠出元の加盟国から見てどのように位置づけられるのだろうか。各国の保健衛生分野の開発援助額から検討する14。ア
メリカは2018年に保健衛生分野の開発援助として総額132億ドルを支援した。そのうち51％が 2 国間援助であった。国連関連機関へは5.9％、 7 億7,360万ドルを拠出した。後述する GAVI には 2 億3,380万ドル拠出した。NGO（国内含む）には34％、45億ドルの支援を行った。アメリカの2018年加盟国任意拠出額は 2 億8,100
万ドルであり、国連関連機関への拠出はアメリカの保健衛生分野の開発援助額のごく一部を占めているにすぎない。次にイギリスは2018年に総額33億ドルを支援した。そのうち25％が 2 国間援助であった。国連関連機関へは14％、 4 億7,600万ドル拠出した。後述する GAVI には 2 億9,630万ドル拠出した。イギリスの開発援
助額はアメリカの 4 分の 1 程度であるが、GAVI への援助額ではアメリカを上回る資金を拠出している。最後に中国は2018年に 6 億4,470万ドルを支援した。そのうち88.8％、 5 億7,280万ドルが 2 国間援助であった。国連関連機関へは5.4％、3,500万ドル拠出している。
拠出元の加盟国から2018年の加盟国任意拠出金を捉え直すと、各国の保健衛生分野の開発援助額の一部を占めるにすぎないこと、英米中の保健衛生分野の開発
援助は 2 国間援助が主軸であるが、多様な経路を通じて援助が展開されていることが明らかとなる。

世界保健機関の内的変容と課題：財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症

25（2）BMGF と GAVI の任意拠出金の特徴
次に BMGF と GAVI の任意拠出金の特徴を検討する。BMGF は2000年にゲイツ
夫妻によって設立された15。保健衛生分野の幅広い課題、エイズ、マラリア、結核、家族計画、たばこ、栄養、ワクチンなどの解決を支援している。GAVI は2000
年に設立された保健衛生分野の官民パートナーシップである16。各国政府、WHO、
ユニセフ、世界銀行、BMGF などが参加している。発展途上国での予防接種率を向上させることで人々の健康を守ることを目的に据えている。2018年には6,600万
人の子供に予防接種を行った実績を持っている17。
それでは表 8 （2010-2018年 BMGF、GAVI 項目別任意拠出金）で特徴を検討する。表 7 と同じく2010年から2018年までの BMGF 及び GAVI の任意拠出額と項目別拠出額が示されている。BMGF と GAVI 共に、大部分を使途を指定した資金（表8 ：A）として拠出している共通点がある。BMGF は、2008年から非国家主体の中で最大の拠出主体であり、人の生殖分野や熱帯医学分野（表 8 ：B, D）へも拠出している点が GAVI と異なる。2016年からは WHO の活動の準備・調整分野（表8 ：E）に最高額の配分を行う傾向に変化した。他方、GAVI はその設立目的から明らかなように、ほぼすべてを使途を指定した資金として拠出している。
これら非国家主体任意拠出金をそれぞれの保健衛生分野の開発援助の中に位置
づけたい18。BMGF は2018年に保健衛生分野の開発援助として32億ドルを支援した。そのうち67％、22億ドルを援助を必要とする主体に直接拠出した。国連関連機関へは 3 億7,100万ドル、GAVI に 3 億4,104万ドル拠出している。2018年は英米を超える資金を GAVI に拠出した計算となる。WHO を含む国連関連機関への拠出は2018年の開発援助額の 1 割程度であり、BMGF の WHO への任意拠出は援助の一部を占めているにすぎない。GAVI は2018年の活動のために15億ドルを支出した。GAVI には2016年から2020年にかけて92億ドルが拠出される予定であるが、イギリス（23億ドル）、BMGF（15.5億ドル）、アメリカ（10.9億ドル）、ノルウェー（8.7億ドル）、ドイツ（6.9億ドル）の拠出上位 5 主体で58億ドルを拠出する計画になっている19。本稿で取り上げたイギリス、アメリカ、BMGF がここでも重要な役割を果たしている。
以上から WHO への任意拠出は、2000年以降 WHO と加盟国の相対関係だけでは捉えきれない相互作用が存在することを指摘できる。WHO への任意拠出は、加盟国のみならず、非国家主体を含めた多様な主体及び、それら主体を経由するな
ど複数の経路から拠出され、複雑な関係が構築されていることが浮かび上がる。

A

B

C

D

E

F

2010-11 446,161,801
437,253,849
1,089,654
1,779,127
6,039,171
2012
266,405,630
264,167,356
1,722,090
0516,184B
297,714,926
3,623,407
002013
301,338,333
M
253,658,387
1,924,568
0
938,2822014
256,521,237
G
2015
185,272,525
181,820,644
1,484,778
0
1,967,103
F
94,819,101
5,417,796
2,080,582
170,041,139
3,500,000
2016
275,858,618
94,870,611
4,005,577
1,338,325
224,439,804
0
2017
324,654,317
99,051,511
3,738,560
1,968,153
112,211,972 12,000,000
2018
228,970,196
2010-1198,832,852
98,782,852
0050,0002012
92,582,495
92,582,495
0
0
0
G
2013
130,356,707
130,356,707
0
0
0
A
2014
127,754,707
127,754,707
0
0
0
V
2015
126,421,673
126,421,673
0
0
0
I
2016
75,420,327
70,866,364
00
4,553,963
0
2017
133,365,051
121,164,226
002,516,130
9,684,695
140,356,949
00
4,125,143
14,063,872
2018
158,545,964※表４のWHO資料、特に2012年以降刊行の資料を基に筆者作成。
A: 使途指定(Voluntary contributions- specified)
B: 人の生殖分野(Special Programme of Research, Development and Research Training in Human Reproduction)
C: 結核予防分野(Stop TB Partnership)(2015年までの項目)
D: 熱帯医学分野(Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases)
E: 準備・調整分野(Special Programmes and Collaborative Arrangments)(2016年以降の項目)
F: 感染症対策分野(Outbreak and Crisis Response)(2016年以降の項目)
G: 用途指定なし(Core voluntary contributions account)
H: 使用範囲指定(Voluntary contributions- core)(2015年まではOther voluntary contributions- coreと表記)
I: 臨時・緊急分野(Contingency Fund for Emergencies)(2015年以降の項目)

任意拠出額

表 8 ：2010-2018年 BMGF、GAVI
表8項目別任意拠出金（米ドル）: 2 0 1 0 - 2 0 1 8 年BM GF、 GAVI項目別任意拠出金 (米ドル)

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

G
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

H
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

I

26
広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8

世界保健機関の内的変容と課題：財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症

27（3）スター型からメッシュ型ネットワークへ
上記のような WHO と加盟国、非国家主体の関係を WHO ネットワークの変容として捉え直したい。WHO がスター型からメッシュ型ネットワークへ変容したことを指摘する。
はじめに各ネットワークの特徴を整理する。スター型ネットワークは、図 1（ネットワーク概念図）に示されるように WHO を中心に加盟国が WHO を介して相互作用する特徴を持っている。WHO が中心となり加盟国と協力する形態である。2000年までの加盟国分担金が WHO 予算の主軸を担っていた時期は、このネットワークとして活動していた。スター型ネットワークにおいては、加盟国が主体性を発揮する場面は限られており、むしろ WHO がどのような優先順位や行動計
画で活動するのか、がより重要であり、WHO が主体的な役割を担っていた。
一方、任意拠出金の割合が増加した2000年以降は、メッシュ型ネットワークへ変化したと位置づけられる。メッシュ型ネットワークは図 1 に示されるように
WHO は重要な主体であるが、必ずしも中心点として機能するわけではない。多様な主体間で複数のネットワークが構築されている。2000年以降は、WHO 予算の重心が任意拠出金へ移り、英米、BMGF、GAVI の存在感が高まった。WHO や
これら主体が複数のネットワーク回路を持つハブとして機能している。そこではWHO を介した相互作用もあれば、WHO を介さず相互作用が発生する可能性も生じうる複雑な関係が構築されている。メッシュ型ネットワークにおいても WHO
は重要な主体であることは間違いないが、アメリカ、イギリス、BMGF、GAVI などと連携し、活動する必要が生じていると言える。WHO は解決を主導する主体
20
性よりも調整的役割を求められていると位置づけられる。
■図表■
独立論文「世界保健機関の内的変容と課題：財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症」

このネットワーク形態の変容は、保健衛生分野の開発援助総額の年次推移からも裏付けられる。保健衛生分野の開発援助額は1990年77億ドル、1995年106億ド■図 1■ル、2000年134億ドル、2005年214億ドル、2010年350億ドル、2015年376億ドル、

図１: ネットワーク概念図
加盟国

BMGF

GAVI

WHO

アメリカ

WHO

イギリス

スター型ネットワーク(1990年代)

図 1 ：ネットワーク概念図

メッシュ型ネットワーク(2000年以降)

28

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8

2020年389億ドルと推移している21。注目すべき点は、2000年から10年間の援助総額の増加である。この時期はグローバル化を基調に BMGF や GAVI が設立され、健康の安全保障の概念化の影響も手伝って、WHO 予算の性質が変化した。加えて、2003年には SARS が世界的に流行し、2005年に国際保健規則が改訂された。
このような国際的な課題の浮上とその対応に伴い、援助総額が急増したと考えられる。本稿で取り上げた主体以外にこの開発援助額の増加を支えた主体として
NGO や世界エイズ・結核・マラリア対策基金（グローバルファンド）を指摘できる22。NGO の保健衛生分野の開発援助は2000年には16億ドル規模であったが、2010
年には103億ドルにまで増加した。グローバルファンドは2002年に設置され、2010
年には36億ドルの支援規模に成長している。BMGF や GAVI 以外にも多様な主体
が保健衛生分野に参画し、連携を深めている様子が伺える。それは同時に、保健衛生分野の開発援助総額に占める WHO 予算の相対的な割合の低下やネットワー
クがスター型からメッシュ型へ移行したことを意味するだろう。その過程で WHOは主体的役割に代わり、より調整的役割を求められるようになったのである。
WHO は2000年以降、徐々に予算の性質やネットワーク形態など内的な変容を遂げていた。
3．世界保健機関と新型コロナウイルス感染症（1）ネットワークの変化パターン
第 3 章では、COVID-19への対応や課題を検討する。COVID-19の流行により2020年12月23日現在までに世界で7,791万人が罹患し、約171万人が犠牲となった23。重症急性呼吸器症候群コロナウイルス 2 （SARS-CoV-2）が引き起こした
COVID-19は世界の平和や人間の安全を脅かしたのみならず、社会、経済、文化などあらゆる側面に影響を及ぼしている。
はじめに本稿で位置づけたメッシュ型ネットワークが COVID-19によってどのように変化しうるのか、整理したい。図 2 （ネットワークの変化パターン）では理念型として WHO ネットワークの 3 つの変化パターンを示した。①ネットワー
ク強化・拡大、②ネットワーク部分切断、③ネットワーク全切断である。①の強化・拡大は、COVID-19によってメッシュ型ネットワークが強化される、もしくは拡大するパターンである。主体間の連携が強化されれば、ネットワークは次第に太くなり、容易に切断できない特性を備えるようになる。また、新たな主体がネッ
トワークに参加していくという変化である。②の部分切断は、何らかの原因により主体間のネットワークの一部が切断するパターンである。このパターンではある程度、国際協力は維持されるが、ネットワークから切り離される主体も出てくる。③全切断は、主体間の連携はなく、独自に COVID-19に対応するパターンで図２: ネットワークの変化パターン

世界保健機関の内的変容と課題：財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症

BMGF

アメリカ

WHO

中国

BMGF

GAVI

アメリカ

WHO

イギリス

①ネットワーク強化・拡⼤

GAVI

中国

イギリス

②ネットワーク部分切断

BMGF

GAVI

アメリカ

WHO

中国

29

イギリス

③ネットワーク全切断

図 2 ：ネットワークの変化パターンある。この他、より詳細に変化を検討すれば、ネットワークがそのまま維持される変化なしパターンやネットワークの一部が切断し、新たなネットワークが生まれる①と②を合わせたパターンなどが想定できるが、いずれも理念型の派生パターンとして位置づけられよう。
これら理念型を踏まえ、COVID-19への対応を 3 つの変化パターンの中で整理する。例えば、各国が水際対策や自国へのワクチン優先確保などの単独主義的な行動を進め、WHO やその他主体との連携の優先順位が低下すれば、メッシュ型ネッ
トワークは図 2 の②部分切断に変化していく。それに加え、台湾などメッシュ型
ネットワークから切り離される主体が増加し、アメリカの WHO 脱退（2020年 7月脱退通知）が現実になれば、ネットワークを再編するため③全切断のパターンに変化する可能性も生じる。他方、中国は2020年 5 月18、19日に開催された第73回世界保健総会において今後 2 年間にわたり、20億ドルを拠出することを表明した24。拠出金の内訳などにより性質は変化しうるが、WHO 財政の強化は、①ネッ
トワーク強化・拡大に繋がることが予想できる。WHOも自ら COVID-19に対応す
11 / 11

るため、WHO のための新型コロナウイルス感染症連帯対応基金（COVID-19
Solidarity Response Fund for WHO）を立ち上げた25。個人や団体などが直接 WHOを支援するための枠組みであり、2020年12月23日までに 2 億3,889万ドルが65万を越える個人や団体から拠出された。WHO メッシュ型ネットワークを強化する動きとして位置づけられる。今後も WHO メッシュ型ネットワークは、COVID-19に
よって既に生じた、あるいは生じうる出来事によって理念型の 3 パターンの間を浮動すると考えられる。
（2）WHO の役割とは何か？
最後に COVID-19流行下における WHO の役割を改めて考えたい。WHO の
COVID-19への対応については、中立性への疑義や機能不全、その他課題などが指摘されている26。WHO が役割を果たしていないという指摘は、エボラ出血熱流行

30

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8時にも存在した27。これら感染症対策における批判は、WHO がこれまで天然痘の撲滅宣言、ポリオ撲滅活動に代表される多くの成果を残してきたゆえに生起したものと言える。つまり、これら批判を逆から捉えれば、WHO が感染症対策で主導的役割を演じ、COVID-19に効果的に対応できるという、期待の高さの表れともとれる。他方で、WHO の専門的な知見の提供や共有、ガイドラインの策定、感染状況のモニタリング、ワクチン供給枠組みである COVAX（COVID-19 Vaccine
Global Access）の構築などの活動に鑑みれば、WHO は COVID-19にも適切に対処しているとも考えられる。WHO が、どのような役割を担うべきなのか、という問題が浮上してきているのである。
本稿が検討した財政、ネットワークという視角から WHO の役割を位置づけれ
ば、WHO は2000年以降、徐々に予算の性質やネットワーク形態など内的な変容を遂げ、調整的役割を求められるようになっていた。WHO が感染症の世界的な流行対策で主導的役割を果たすべきという現実の要請と加盟国の協力を基礎に調整的役割を担う WHO の役割が乖離していることが COVID-19への対応の中で顕在化したと言えるのではないか。過去に流行した感染症からも明らかなように、COVID-19の世界的流行に個別主体で対応することは困難であり、WHO が感染症対策で負うべき役割は大きい。しかし、本稿で指摘した WHO メッシュ型ネット
ワークは危機が到来した際に自律的に動き出すメカニズムとは言えない28。加盟
国が国際協力を始めることで初めて WHO が調整的役割を発揮し、メッシュ型ネッ
トワークが機能する。WHO の役割は、今後の国際社会の要請、WHO の特徴、参画する主体の役割などの相互作用の中で調整され、再定位されていくものと考える。COVID-19は WHO が果たすべき役割とは何か、国際機関の存在意義そのものを問い直す必要性を明らかにした。
おわりに
本稿では、WHO の財政やネットワーク、COVID-19への対応を検討した。2000
年以降、WHO はその内実を変化させながら、保健衛生分野や COVID-19へ対応してきたことが明らかとなった。
改めて保健衛生分野から世界の平和と人間の安全保障の関係を考察したい。保健衛生分野は、公衆衛生国際事務局の設立など機能的協力の歴史に鑑みれば、これまで国際協力が成立しやすい分野として位置づけられてきた。そして WHO が掲げる、すべての人民が可能な最高の健康水準に到達するという目的は、人間の安全保障と調和し、WHO は、これまで人間の健康の増進と安全の確保に大きく貢献している。一方で、COVID-19への対応においては、そのような国際協力に加え、国家による単独主義的な行動も一部で目立っている。それは解決を主導でき世界保健機関の内的変容と課題：財政、ネットワーク、新型コロナウイルス感染症

31

る主体や枠組みが主導権を握る望ましい協力の形として捉えられるが、国家が主導する問題解決は、これまでの協力方法に修正を迫り、その範囲や内容を変容させる契機も含んでいる。保健衛生分野で培われた技術や知見を基に国際協力のあり方やその関係性を絶え間なく調整し、COVID-19に対処できる国際協力の形を構築していくことが望まれる。翻って、新たな課題が生じた際に解決方法やそれら関係性を問い直していく思考法は、保健衛生分野に限らず、本号のテーマ「世界の平和と人間の安全保障に対する脅威」についても求められていると言えるのではないだろうか。
注
1

例えば、『人間開発報告書1994』では、人間の安全に対する脅威を 7 種類、 1 ．経済、 2 ．
食糧、 3 ．健康、 4 ．環境、 5 ．個人、 6 ．地域社会、 7 ．政治の安全保障に分類している。UNDP. Human Development Report 1994（NY: Oxford Univ. Pre., 1994）, 24-25.
2
吉川元『国際平和とは何か』中央公論新社、2015年、414頁。
3
人間の安全保障委員会『安全保障の今日的課題』朝日新聞社、2003年、179-212頁。
4
PHEIC（Public Health Emergency of International Concern）宣言はこれまで 5 回宣言された。
2009年 4 月の新型インフルエンザで初宣言以降、2014年 5 月の野生型ポリオウイルス、
2014年 8 月のエボラ出血熱、2016年 2 月のジカ熱、2019年 9 月エボラ出血熱（コンゴ共和国）である。
5
国際機関財政の研究として、田所昌幸『国連財政―予算から見た国連の実像』有斐閣、1996年が上げられる
6
WHO 資料では、表 1 の1992年から1996年までの加盟国分担金は、Eﬀective working budgetと記載され、任意拠出金は、Voluntary fund for health promotion と記載されている。
7
WHO の任意拠出金の重要性を指摘した研究として、田所昌幸、城山英明編『国際機関と日本』日本経済評論社、2004年、第 8 章「WHO」、283-308頁や Vaughan, J. Patrick et al.
“Financing the World Health Organisation: global importance of extrabudgetary funds,” Health
Policy, 35（1996）, 229-245. を上げられる。しかし、いずれも研究も本稿が主に対象にしている2000年代以降の WHO 財政は分析していない。
8
表 2 は Global Policy Forum（GPF）のデータを参照して作成したため、本稿が用いた WHO
資料と任意拠出額が異なる場合がある。表 2 は、GPF の1992年時点の任意拠出金の上位 5
国連専門機関を抽出して作成した。GPF では1971年から2017年までの13の国連専門機関の任意拠出金の年次推移及び任意拠出金総計が示されている。
9
WHA72（2019a）, 18.
10
1955年の任意拠出金は 0 と計上されている。
11
Lee, Kelley. The World Health Organization（GB: Routledge, 2009）, 42.
12
各項目の年次推移が比較可能な2010年以降のデータを抽出した。それ以前、例えば、2009年の項目は、全 8 項目1.Voluntary contributions- speciﬁed, 2.Special Programme of Research andTraining in Tropical Diseases, 3.Stop TB Partnership, 4.Special Programme on Research, Development and Training in Human Reproduction, 5.Roll Back Malaria Partnership, 6.Water Supply andSanitation Collaborative Council, 7.Core voluntary contributions account, 8.Other voluntary contributions- core となっている。WHA63（2010b）, 4-23.

32
13

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WHO 側から捉える任意拠出金の自由度は G（Core voluntary contributions account）が一番高
く、H（Voluntary contributions- core）、A（Voluntary contributions- speciﬁed）の順に低くなる。
拠出元から捉えれば、A（Voluntary contributions- speciﬁed）が自らの考えを最も反映できる項目となる。WHA72（2019b）, 2.
14
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation（IHME）. Financing Global Health 2018: Countries andPrograms in Transition（Seattle, WA: IHME, 2019）.（http://www.healthdata.org/sites/default/
files/files/policy_report/FGH/2019/FGH_2018_full-report.pdf）（2020年 7 月10日最終閲覧）,
53-54, 57.
15
Harman, Sophie. Global Health Governance（GB: Routledge, 2012）, 61-65.
16
Adlide, Geoﬀ et al. “Public-Private Partnership to Promote Health: The GAVI Alliance Experience,”in Clapham, Andrew et al. Realizing the Right to Health（Swiss Human Rights Book Vol.3）（Berne:rüﬀer&rub, 2009）, 539-547.
17
GAVI Facts & figures（updated June 2020）. （https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/
document/2020/Gavi-Facts-and-ﬁgures-June.pdf）（2020年 8 月10日最終閲覧）
18
IHME, op.cit., 60-61.
19
Current period 2016-2020.（https://www.gavi.org/investing-gavi/funding/current-period-2016-2020）（2020年 7 月 8 日最終閲覧）20
図 1 はネットワークを概念的に示したにすぎないが、WHO ネットワークの一部をマッピングした研究も存在する。Hoffman, Steven J. et al. Mapping Global Health Architecture to
Inform the Future（Research Paper）（London: The Royal Institute of International Aﬀairs, 2015）.
（https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20150120GlobalHealt
hArchitectureHoﬀmanColePearcey.pdf）（2020年 6 月27日最終閲覧）
21
IHME, op.cit., 145.
22
グローバルファンド（The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria）は2002年設
立の官民パートナーシップ。発展途上国へ世界三大疾病と言われるエイズ、結核、マラリ
ア対策の資金を提供している。
23
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html（2020年12月23日最終閲覧）
24
https://www.who.int/about/governance/world-health-assembly/seventy-third-world-healthassembly（2020年 8 月24日最終閲覧）習近平の演説は2020年 5 月18日 Session1（12:0018:15）の21分 8 秒から32分 9 秒。
25
https://covid19responsefund.org/en/（2020年12月23日最終閲覧）
26
例えば、詫摩佳代「アメリカと WHO 〜新型コロナを巡って浮上した国際保健協力の課
題〜」2020年 7 月21日（https://www.tkfd.or.jp/research/detail.php?id=3488）（2020年 7 月23日最終閲覧）、秋山信将「新型コロナウィルス対応から見る WHO の危機対応体制の課題」
2020年 5 月17日（https://www.jiia.or.jp/column/challenges-for-WHO.html.html）（2020年 6 月
8 日最終閲覧）。
27
WHO の機能不全については、2009年の新型インフルエンザや2014年のエボラ出血熱流行時にも同様の指摘がなされている。Cueto, Marcos, Brown, Theodore M., Fee, Elizabeth. The
World Health Organization: A History（UK: Cambridge Univ. Pre., 2019）, 320-326.
28
スチュワート・パトリック「グローバルパンデミックと WHO」
『フォーリン・アフェアー
ズ・リポート』2020年、No.8、90-100頁。

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33

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WHA47（1994）A47/19, Financial report（FR）and audited financial statements for the financial
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WHA48（1995）A48/18, IFR for the year 1994. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/177500）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA49（1996）A49/7, FR and audited ﬁnancial statements for the ﬁnancial period 1 Jan. 1994 - 31
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WHA50（1997）A50/8, IFR for the year 1996. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/179601）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA52（1999）A52/13, Unaudited interim financial report（UIFR）for the year 1998: financial
period 1998-1999. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/79275）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA53（2000）A53/17, FR and audited financial statements for the period 1 Jan. 1998-31 Dec.
1999 and report of the external auditor to the WHA. WHO. （https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/79033）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA54（2001）A54/20, UIFR for the year 2000: ﬁnancial period 2000-2001. WHO.（https://apps.
who.int/iris/handle/10665/78741）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA55（2002a）A55/25, FR and audited financial statements for the period 1 Jan. - 31 Dec. 2001
and report of the external auditor to the WHA. WHO. （https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/78481）（2020年 6 月27日最終閲覧）
WHA55（2002b）A55/25 Add.1, FR and audited financial statements for the period 1 Jan. - 31 Dec.
2001: annex: extrabudgetary resources for programme activities. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/78482）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA56（2003a）, A56/28, UIFR for the year 2002: financial period 2002-2003. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/78257）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA56（2003b）, A56/28 Add.1, UIFR for the year 2002: financial period 1 Jan. 2002-31 Dec.
2003: annex: extrabudgetary resources for programme activities. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/78257）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA57（2004a）, A57/20, FR and audited financial statements for the period 1 Jan. 2002-31 Dec.
2003（certiﬁed 30 Mar. 2004）and report of the external auditor to the WHA（1 Apr. 2004）. WHO.
（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/20097）（2020年 6 月27日最終閲覧）
WHA57（2004b）, A57/20 Add.1, FR and audited financial statements for the period 1 Jan. 2002-31
Dec. 2003（certified 30 Mar. 2004）: annex: extrabudgetary resources for programme activities.
WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/20098）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA58（2005a）, A58/26, FR. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/20309）（2020年 6月26日最終閲覧）
WHA58（2005b）, A58/26 Add.1, UIFR for the year 2004: financial period 1 Jan. - 31 Dec. 2005:
annex: extrabudgetary resources for programme activities. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/20310）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）

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WHA59（2006a）, A59/28, FR. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/21317）（2020年 6月26日最終閲覧）
WHA59（2006b）, A59/28 Add.1, FR and audited ﬁnancial statements for the period 01 Jan. - 31 Dec.
2005. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/21318）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA60（2007a）, A60/30, UIFR for the year 2006: financial period 2006-2007. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/22465）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA60（2007b）, A60/30 Add.1, UIFR for the year 2006: financial period 1 Jan. 2006 - 31 Dec.
2007: annex: extrabudgetary resources for programme activities. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/22467）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA61（2008a）, A61/20, FR. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/23482）（2020年 6月26日最終閲覧）
WHA61（2008b）, A61/20 Add.1, FR and audited ﬁnancial statements for the ﬁnancial period 1 Jan.
2006-31 Dec. 2007: annex: extrabudgetary resources for programme activities. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/23484）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA62（2009a）, A62/28, UIFR for the year 2008. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/
10665/2214）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA62（2009b）, A62/INF.DOC./4, Voluntary contributions by fund and by donor for the financial
period 2008. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/2243）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA63（2010a）, A63/32, FR and audited financial statements for the period 1 Jan. 2008-31 Dec.
2009. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/2403）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA63（2010b）, A63/INF.DOC./4, Voluntary contributions by fund and by donor for the financial
period 2008-2009. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/3070）（2020年 6 月26日最終
閲覧）
WHA64（2011a）, A64/29, UIFR for the year 2010: ﬁnancial period 2010-2011. WHO.（https://apps.
who.int/iris/handle/10665/3493）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
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ended 31 Dec. 2010. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/3494）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA65（2012a）, A65/29, FR and audited financial statements for the period 1 Jan. 2010-31 Dec.
2011. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/79547）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
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WHA66（2013a）, A66/29, FR and Audited Financial Statements for the year ended 31 Dec. 2012.
（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/149466）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
WHA66（2013b）, A66/29 Add.1, ANNEX: Voluntary contributions by fund and by contributor for theyear ended 31 Dec. 2012.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/149467）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）, A67/43, FR and Audited Financial Statements for the year ended 31 Dec. 2013.
WHA67（2014a）（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/162693）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
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WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/253058）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）

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WHA68（2015b）, A68/INF./1, Annex to the FR for the year ended 31 Dec. 2014: Voluntary
contributions by fund and by contributor. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/253224）（2020年 6 月26日最終閲覧）
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WHA69（2016b）, A69/INF./3, Voluntary contributions by fund and by contributor, 2015. WHO.
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ﬁnancial statements for 2016. WHO.（https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/274976）（2020年
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CSCE における「民主的平和」と「ウィーンの東」 37

特集論文

CSCE における「民主的平和」と「ウィーンの東」
玉井雅隆

東北公益文科大学・准教授
はじめに
欧州における冷戦を終結させた要因の一つは、1975年に調印されたヘルシンキ
最終議定書に始まる欧州安全保障協力会議（CSCE）である。1990年以降、様々な会議・文書・宣言において民主主義理念（民主主義規範）に対する確認を行っており、特に中東欧諸国において全体主義の復活を防止し民主主義規範の浸透を図るために、CSCE では自由選挙事務所の設置や使節団の派遣などを通じ、民主主
義規範を確固たるものとすることを試みた。このように CSCE、欧州安全保障協力機構（OSCE）では1990年パリ憲章以降、民主主義及び人権の国際規範化が進展し、1999年に合意された OSCE イスタンブール宣言では、本来は国内管轄事項であるはずの国内の政治体制が国際の平和と安定と相互連関関係にある、とされた。これは「包括的安全保障（Comprehensive Security）」概念であり、冷戦終結以降の OSCE 諸活動の総括でもあった。
しかし一方で、OSCE では1994年に開催された CSCE ブダペスト首脳会議でエリツィン（Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin）ロシア大統領が指摘するように、西側の価値観であるとみなされてきた民主主義規範の「押し付け」に対する抵抗もみられた。この「西側の価値観の押し付け」がいわゆる「ウィーンの東（East of Vienna）」
問題である。当該概念に関しては、すでにエリツィン・ロシア大統領の「冷たい平和（Cold Peace）」演説に代表されるように、1990年代に EU・NATO への加盟の可能性が低い CIS 諸国を中心に指摘が行われてきた。このような「ウィーンの東」
諸国では、OSCE のいう「民主主義規範」を表面上は遵守しているように見せかけている。例えばロシアを含めた CIS 諸国では定期的に議会や大統領選挙を実施
し、形式的には複数政党制からなる民主主義制度が導入されている。しかし実態として野党は弾圧されるか、もしくは政府系メディアや行政府などが与党に有利なように行動し、与野党間に不均衡が存在するいわゆる「競争型権威主義体制」となっていることが多い1。即ち、選挙の定期的な開催などで形式的には遵守されているように見え OSCE の民主主義規範は、事実上 CIS 諸国では形式化され、かつその形式化に関して OSCE やアメリカ、EU 諸国からはしばしば批判をされる。
この競争型権威主義体制はロシアのみならず CIS 諸国で広汎にみられる事象で

38

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8あり、欧州連合（EU）や北大西洋条約機構（NATO）に加盟、もしくは加盟候補国である中東欧諸国やバルカン諸国では民主主義規範が確立されているといえるが、CIS 諸国ではアメリカの NGO フリーダム・ハウスの統計資料でも明らかなよ
うに、競争的権威主義化の一途をたどっている。ソ連崩壊時には権威主義的政府の多い中央アジアにおける民主化の旗手と期待されたキルギスタンのアカエフ（Askar Akayevich Akayev）大統領が、政権末期には権威主義化していき最終的には2005年に発生した革命によって政権が打倒されたことをその一例としてあげる
ことができる。
近年のこのような動きに対して、吉川元は「分断される OSCE 安全保障共同体」2と指摘を行っている。即ち、CIS 諸国と欧州諸国の分裂は、はたしてどのように発生したのか。東欧革命以降の CSCE の諸文書では少なくとも分裂を表面上確認することはできないこととの矛盾は、なぜ、どのようにして発生したのか。現状では明確に分裂傾向を見せている欧州国際政治の規範的亀裂を OSCE はなぜ止められなかったのか、そして止めなかったのか。本論文では、欧州の民主主義規範の履行・不履行の明らかな差異、即ち規範の「分断」がなぜ生じうるのか、という点を分析するものである。
1．CSCE における「民主主義」と「安全保障」
1 － 1 ．冷戦期 CSCE プロセスにおける「民主主義」
多くの CSCE 研究者が言及するように、CSCE は1954年に開催されたアメリカ、
ソ連、イギリス、フランスの 4 大国首脳会談におけるソ連外相モロトフ提案であった。前年のスターリン（Joseph Stalin）の死去及び後継者であるフルシチョフ（Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev）の東西両陣営の共存政策に伴い、東西両陣営の軍事的な緊張緩和を目的とするものであった3。
1973年から開始された CSCE 交渉においては、軍備管理や緊張緩和のみならず
環境問題や経済協力など様々な分野の問題が討議対象となった。特に後のヘルシンキ最終議定書では第 1 バスケットとされた安全保障問題の中に、様々な内容が含まれることとなった。この中には第 7 原則において自由主義が西側の主張により盛り込まれることになったが、後に OSCE の規範として人権と並んで重要視される国家体制を問うことになる民主主義そのものに関して問題となることはなかった。また、安全保障問題がいわゆる「ハイ・ポリティクス」とみなされる一方で、人権問題などが「ロー・ポリティクス」とみなされており、関連性に関して議論されることはなかった4。

CSCE における「民主的平和」と「ウィーンの東」 39

1 － 2 ．冷戦終結期の「民主主義」と「平和」
1989年 5 月に開催された CSCE ロンドン情報フォーラム、 6 月に開催された
CSCE パリ人的側面会議において、東側諸国の分裂は明確となっていた。この会
合では西側のみならず東側諸国の一つであるハンガリー代表団にメディア代表が入るなど、東側諸国間においても自由化が進展しつつあったハンガリー、ポーラ
ンド及びソ連と、東ドイツ、ブルガリア、ルーマニア及びチェコスロヴァキアとの間に分断が生じつつあった5。
ソ連はこの会合の冒頭で、「全欧州情報審議会（Pan-European Information Council）」の設立を提案している6。当該提案の中ではソ連は「審議会は相互理解の促進や信頼醸成を行う」としており、またその方法に関してもジャーナリストの行動規範やジャーナリストの権利保護に関しても触れている。一方でチェコスロヴァキア
や東ドイツはネオナチの取締りなど、東側諸国の従来の主張を繰り返していた7。
この点に関する最強硬派であったルーマニアにいたっては、情報の交換が信頼醸成に有用である点を述べつつも、「それ（情報の交換：筆者注）はまた相互の国家の経済的、社会的そして文化的発展の度合いを反映するべきであり、また人々の関心や、安全保障や平和に十分に資することに焦点を当てなければならない」と述べ、従来の東側の見解を反映したものであった8。
このように東西の隔たりが大きく、かつ東側ブロックがかつてのように一枚岩でないことも反映し、最終合意文書提案は東側からはなく、西側提案並びに非同盟・中立ブロック提案のみであった9。ルーマニアなどが最終文書の採択に反対したこともあり、ロンドン情報フォーラムでは最終合意文書の採択が見送られることとなった。またパリ人的側面会議においても同様の事態によって最終合意文書の採択が見送られており、東側諸国における分裂は進展していた。
1989年11月のチェコスロヴァキア、ブルガリア、12月のルーマニアのチャウシェ
スク政権崩壊に至る一連の東欧革命が終了した後の、1990年 6 月に開催された
CSCE コペンハーゲン人的側面会議では東欧諸国の代表団は相次いで共産党政権が付していた CSCE の様々な留保に関して撤回を行った10。このことは東西両陣営間において「民主主義」に関して対立がもはや存在しない、ということであり、西側の「民主主義」が東西両陣営の共通認識となっていたのである。換言すると、
西側の「民主主義」が全欧州の「民主主義規範」としてみなされたということである。
1990年 8 月に始まるパリ憲章準備会合は、途中に湾岸戦争対応を主としたニューヨーク閣僚級会合を挟み、10月まで開催された。この会議では、単に言葉として「民主主義」を唱えるのではなく、コペンハーゲン人的側面会議における具体的な決定内容としての「民主主義」の監視を明確化することとなった。
そのために導入されたのが、選挙監視である。コペンハーゲン人的側面会議に

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広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8

おける決定事項の CSCE 参加各国へ順守しているかどうかという点に関し、その点を監視する機関として、自由選挙事務所の設置が決定され、それまで体制翼賛選挙の経験しかなかった中東欧諸国に対し、自由選挙事務所は自由選挙に関する行動規範などを教育した11。またその行動規範に対する逸脱行為の有無に関して、選挙準備段階から数度にわたり専門家を派遣して監視にあたり、その報告書はCSCE 事務局高級実務者委員会（CSCE Committee of Senior Oﬃcials：CSO）を通じて参加国すべてに回覧されるようにした。
このように、パリ首脳会議並びにパリ憲章では「民主主義」並びにそれを表象するものとしての「選挙」、そしてそれらを制度的に担保する役割を担う選挙監視に関して全参加国の合意形成がなされた。共産主義体制崩壊後の自由選挙が一巡した1991 年夏ごろには、自由選挙事務所 に対し新たな権限を付与することを求める参加国が登場した。その議論の契機はオスロ民主制度専門家会議であった。
オスロ会合では、多数の参加国が自由選挙事務所の選挙監視の実績に対し好意的な姿勢を見せ、自由選挙事務所の選挙監視メカニズムをさらに制度化することを求めた。ただし、オスロ専門家会議はあくまで「専門家会合」であるために、
フランスやアメリカは各国政府の関与による決定を求めていた。そのため、オスロ専門家会議では「求める」という表現にとどまるものであった。特にフランス
は、欧州評議会との権限重複問題に対し懸念を示していた。従来の西欧諸国での枠組みでは、選挙などの民主制度に関する問題は欧州審議会が関与するものであった。しかしここで自由選挙事務所の選挙監視に関して権限強化が実現すると、欧州審議会とどのように調整を図るのか、という問題が存在したが、これは 1 月以降に開催されるプラハ閣僚級会合、ヘルシンキ首脳会議における検討課題とされた。
民主制度・人権事務所が成立したのは、1992 年3 月から開始されたヘルシンキ
首脳会議準備会合における議論の結果であった。ヘルシンキ準備会合では、自由選挙事務所 に従来付与されていた選挙監視機能に人権に関する総合的な監視メカ
ニズムを付与し、民主制度・人権事務所として発展的解消を遂げることとなった。
このように、コペンハーゲン CHD やパリ憲章において参加国間で合意形成がなされてきた民主主義規範は、1999年に開催されたイスタンブール首脳会議における「欧州安全保障憲章（Charter for European Security）」における包括的安全保障（Comprehensive Security）概念へとつながっていくのである12。
2．「民主的平和」と「ウィーンの東」
しかしながら、このような民主主義規範は CSCE／OSCE の全ての参加国に共有されてきたわけではない。本来ならば合意形成した以上、すべての参加国が順CSCE における「民主的平和」と「ウィーンの東」 41

守を期待される規範であるが、その規範に対して反発する国も存在してきた。冒頭にも論じたように1994年に開催された CSCE ブダペスト首脳会議において、当時のロシア大統領エリツィンが「冷たい平和」と発言したように、既にロシアな
どの CIS 諸国からは、西側主導である CSCE の規範形成に対して批判的な視線が向けられていた。
特に1990年代後半からは、西側主導の規範形成とともに CIS 諸国と西側における OSCE の対応の相違などに関して批判が行われるようになった。2000年代に入ってからは「ウィーンの東」という語を用いて、「教師のようにふるまう西側諸国」と「生徒である『ウィーンの東』諸国」の対比が存在し、西側諸国が「教師のように」規範を東側に押し付ける構図を描き出して批判を繰り返した13。具体的には民主制度・人権事務所の選挙監視活動や長期滞在型使節団の活動などにその矛先が向けられてきた。2003年のロシア議会選挙における民主制度・人権事務所、OSCE 議員総会及び欧州審議会議員総会三者合同報告書による選挙批判が、ロシアの態度硬化並びに民主制度・人権事務所への批判のターニング・ポイントとなった14。特にロシアを中心とする「ウィーンの東」諸国は常設理事会の場において繰り返し民主制度・人権事務所の政治化に対し批判を重ね、2004年ソフィア閣僚級理事会ではロシアを中心とする 8 カ国外相、2007年マドリッド閣僚級理事会ではロシア外相ラブロフ（Sergey Lavrov）が再度民主制度・人権事務所を名指しで取り上げる事態にまで発展した15。このようなロシアや CIS 諸国の民主制度・人権事務所に対する批判はそのまま OSCE 本体への批判であり、また OSCE が築き上げてきた民主主義規範に対する批判でもあった。
このような「教師」としての OSCE 及び「ウィーンの西」諸国と、「生徒」としての「ウィーンの東」諸国の対立の構図は、長期滞在型使節団に関しても同様の批判が存在した。CSCE/OSCE では、1992年に展開が始まった OSCE コソヴォ・
サンジャック・ヴォイヴォディナ使節団、OSCE スコピエ使節団を皮切りに、1990
年代後半からは紛争地域ではない中央アジア地域などにも長期滞在型使節団が展開するようになった。旧ソ連諸国でも1992年にはエストニア、1993年にはラトヴィ
アに使節団が展開し、その後 CIS 諸国へと使節団が派遣されている16。
長期滞在型使節団はその使節団毎に任務が異なるものではあるが、基本的にはOSCE 常設理事会において反対がなければ半年ごとに任期が更新される。バルト
三国でもリトアニアと異なり、エストニア、ラトヴィアは国内にラトヴィア・エ
ストニア在住スラヴ系市民の市民権問題が存在していた17。使節団はその任務にそのような問題への対処も含有されていたが、2001年にはラトヴィア使節団、エストニア使節団共に撤退する18。この撤退に関してはそのスラヴ系市民の市民権問題が十分な解決を見ていないにもかかわらず、EU 加盟に伴い撤退したことで、ロシアや CIS 諸国側の OSCE の二重基準批判に一定の正当性を与えてしまうこと

42

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8

地域・国名 OSCE 使節団名20

設立年

終了年

OSCE クロアチア使節団

1996年

2007年

OSCE ザグレブ事務所

2007年

2011年

1997年

継続

バルカン
クロアチア

アルバニア OSCE アルバニア使節団

ボスニア・ヘルツェゴヴィナにおける OSCE 議長国議長
1995年
ボスニア・ 個人代表21
ヘルツェゴ
OSCE サラエヴォ使節団22
1994年
ヴィナ
OSCE ボスニア・ヘルツェゴヴィナ使節団23
1995年

1995年
継続

1998年

1999年

1999年

継続

モンテネグ
OSCE モンテネグロ使節団25
ロ

2006年

継続

セルビア

2001年

継続

コソヴォ

OSCE コソヴォ検証使節団

2015年

OSCE コソヴォ使節団

24

OSCE セルビア使節団

セルビア・ OSCE コソヴォ・サンジャック・ヴォイヴォディナ使節
1992年
コソヴォ
団

1993年26

北マケドニ
OSCE スコピエ使節団27
ア

1992年

継続

モルドヴァ OSCE モルドヴァ使節団

1993年

継続

OSCE ウクライナ使節団

1994年

1999年

OSCE ウクライナ・プロジェクト調整官事務所

1999年

継続

東欧28

ウクライナ OSCE ウクライナ特別監視使節団

2014年

継続

グコヴァ及びドネツクにおけるロシア・チェックポイン
2014年
ト監視使節団継続

OSCE ミンスク事務所

2002年

2010年

OSCE ベラルーシ助言・監視グループ

1997年

2002年

アルメニア OSCE エレバン事務所

1999年

2017年

アゼルバイ
バクー・プロジェクト調整官事務所
ジャン

2000年

2015年

ジョージア OSCE グルジア使節団

1992年

2009年

ベラルーシ
南カフカス

ナゴルノ・ OSCE ミンスク会議における紛争に関する議長国議長個
1995年
カラバフ
人代表

継続

CSCE における「民主的平和」と「ウィーンの東」 43

チェチェン OSCE チェチェン・アシスタント・グループ29

1995年

2003年

1993年

2001年

ラトヴィア OSCE スクルンダ・レーダー基地に関する共同委員会代
1994年
表

1999年

バルト三国
OSCE ラトヴィア使節団

OSCE エストニア使節団

1992年

2001年

OSCE 軍人恩給に関するエストニア専門家委員会代表

1994年

2006年

トルクメニ
OSCE アシハバード・センター
スタン

1998年

継続

カザフスタ
OSCE ヌルスルタン・プログラム事務所30
ン

1998年

継続

1998年

継続

1993年

2008年

2008年

継続

2000年

2006年

2006年

継続

エストニア
中央アジア

キルギス

OSCE ビシュケク・プログラム事務所31

32
タジキスタ OSCE ドゥシャンベ・センターン
OSCE ドゥシャンベ・プログラム事務所33
34

ウズベキス OSCE タシュケント・センター
タン
OSCE ウズベキスタン・プロジェクト調整官事務所
35

表 1 ．OSCE 歴代使節団一覧
国名

選挙監視回数 国名

選挙監視回数

旧西側・冷戦期からの欧州審議会加盟国（ウィーンの西）

旧東側（ウィーンの東）アイスランド

2 （2）

アルバニア

8 （0）

アイルランド

0

エストニア

4 （4）

イギリス

5 （5）

スロヴァキア

4 （4）

イタリア

3 （3）

チェコ

2 （2）

オーストリア

4 （4）

ハンガリー

3 （1）

オランダ

4 （4）

ブルガリア

8 （2）

ギリシア

3 （3）

ポーランド

5 （4）

スイス

3 （3）

ラトヴィア

4 （1）

スウェーデン

0

リトアニア

3 （3）

スペイン

4 （4）

ルーマニア

4 （4）

デンマーク

0

合計（10カ国）

45（25）

ドイツ

2 （2）

44

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8

トルコ

9 （4）

旧ユーゴスラヴィア

ノルウェー

3 （3）

クロアチア

5 （2）

フィンランド1 （1）スロヴェニア

2 （2）

フランス

3 （3）

セルビア

9 （2）

ベルギー

2 （2）

ボスニア

5 （0）
1

ポルトガル

1 （1）

北マケドニア11（1）ルクセンブルク

0

モンテネグロ

7 （0）小計（19カ国）

49（44）

合計（ 6 カ国）

39（7）

北アメリカ

旧ソ連・CIS（ウィーンの東）

アメリカ

5 （1）

アゼルバイジャン

6 （1）

カナダ

2 （2）

アルメニア

6 （1）

小計

7 （3）

ウクライナ

11（1）

合計（21カ国）

56（47）

非同盟・中立ウズベキスタン6 （1）カザフスタン

8 （0）

キルギス

11（0）

アンドラ

0

ジョージア

10（1）

キプロス

2 （2）

タジキスタン

7 （3）

サンマリノ

0

トルクメニスタン

2 （2）

バチカン

0

ベラルーシ

8 （0）

マルタ

2 （2）

モルドヴァ2

13（0）

モナコ

1 （1）

ロシア

3 （0）

リヒテンシュタイン

0

合計（12カ国）

69（10）

合計（ 7 カ国）

5 （5）
その他

アジア

アフガニスタン

1 （0）

モンゴル

3 （0）

欧州連合（欧州議会）

1 （1）

合計

3 （0）

合計

2 （1）

36
表 2 ．OSCE 選挙監視の回数（2005年 1 月 1 日〜2021年12月31日、2021年は予定を含む）（ ）内は、選挙監視活動のうち EAMs、EET の回数である。
（OSCE ODIHR 年報より筆者作成）37
1
マケドニア・旧ユーゴスラヴィア共和国（Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia、FYROM）がギリシアとの交渉を経て、2019年に北マケドニア共和国の名称の使用を開始した。
2
2006年にガガウズ地域にて実施。

CSCE における「民主的平和」と「ウィーンの東」 45になった。即ち、CIS 諸国側からはエストニアやラトヴィアでは人権遵守が不十分であるのに、EU 加盟国であるがゆえに民主主義規範を遵守していると OSCE や
民主制度・人権事務所はみなしたと考えたのである19。
表 2 ．は、民主制度・人権事務所によって実施された選挙監視の回数である。
この表から明白なことは、旧ソ連圏のうち、CIS 諸国の選挙監視実施回数と比較して、「ウィーンの西」諸国の選挙監視回数が極端に少ないことである。またその
選挙監視の内容に関しても2000年以降、「ウィーンの西」諸国へも選挙監視を実施しているが、トルコを除き選挙当日のみの監視活動（Limited Election Observations:
LEOM）、選挙評価使節団（Election Assessment Missions: EAMs）、選挙専門家チーム（Election Expert Team:EET）の派遣にとどまっており、この傾向は旧東側諸国
であっても EU 加盟国にも同様の傾向がみられる。一方で、CIS 諸国などの「ウィーンの東」諸国ではフルサイズの選挙監視が実施されており、「ウィーン」の東西での不均衡となっている。
エストニア、ラトヴィア使節団撤退や、選挙監視の不均衡と並んで「ウィーンの東」諸国から批判が起きた背景には、OSCE 内部の人事問題も挙げることができる。OSCE の民主制度・人権事務所長、少数民族高等弁務官、自由メディア代表並びに OSCE 議長国、いずれの機関も「ウィーンの西」諸国で占められている38。議長国は「ウィーンの東」諸国からは2010年のカザフスタン、2013年のウクライナが選出されているが、それ以外はすべて「ウィーンの西」諸国である。

年

国1991 ドイツ
1992

年

国

2001 ルーマニア

チェコ・スロ
2002 ポルトガル
ヴァキア

年

国

2011 リトアニア

国

2021 スウェーデン

2012 アイルランド 2022 ポーランド40

1993 スウェーデン 2003 オランダ

2013 ウクライナ

1994 イタリア

2004 ブルガリア

2014 スイス

1995 ハンガリー

2005 スロヴェニア 2015 セルビア

1996 スイス

2006 ベルギー

2016 ドイツ

1997 デンマーク

2007 スペイン

2017 オーストリア

1998 ポーランド

2008 アイスランド 2018 イタリア

1999 ノルウェー

2009 ギリシア

2019 スロヴァキア

2000 オーストリア 2010 カザフスタン 2020 アルバニア
表 3 ．OSCE 議長国一覧41年

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広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8

しかも2016年からは「ウィーンの西」諸国が二巡目の議長国となっており、カザフスタンとウクライナを除外した CIS 諸国は議長国の選出から排除されているのである39。
3．OSCE における「分断」と民主主義以上に検討してきたように、OSCE においては「ウィーンの西」と「ウィーンの東」に分断されていることは、参加国の認識からも実際の活動からも明らかである。それでは、なぜ OSCE では合意形成されたはずの民主主義規範に反するよ
うな「分断」が生じたのであろうか。
まず一点目には、規範接続の面から分析することが可能である。規範の確立及び受容に関しては、対人地雷の全廃プロセスについて地雷使用に関する規範の成立過程を分析し、いかに規範がアクターの間で認識され受容されたのか、という点を分析したプライス（Richard Price）の研究が存在している42。このプライスの規範に関する研究によると、類似もしくは隣接する規範の接着（接続）が行われることによって、規範の受容がアクターによって行われることがあり、また第三国（者）による規範受容要求に関しても被要求国の受容可能性を高める、とする。
このプライスの議論を OSCE の議論に演繹すると、OSCE と EU 加盟候補国の民主主義規範受容に関し検討し分析することが可能となる。
OSCE の民主主義規範は前節にて検討してきたように、特に東欧革命以降に展開し確立されてきたものである。そしてその参加国への規範受容に関しては、
CSCE・OSCE の会合などで数度に渡り合意形成がなされ、そして民主制度・人権事務所などの諸機関も設置され、選挙監視なども行われている。しかしながらプライスの議論にあるように、そのような規範受容性を高めるには、OSCE 単体のみの力ではなく、OSCE からは第三者の国際機構である EU や NATO の規範受容への要求が大きなものであったと考えることができる。冷戦終結後に旧東側諸国
が NATO や EU に加盟申請を行った際、NATO も EU も国内統治に関する民主主
義的正当性を要求した。特に EU は1993年のコペンハーゲン欧州理事会において、EU の東方拡大に関して EU のアキ・コミュノテールの国内法との整合性を求めると同時に、民主主義体制の確立を加盟条件とした、コペンハーゲン基準（Copenhagen
Criteria）を策定した。ワルシャワ条約機構解体後に生じた力の空白、ソ連解体後のロシアの政治的不安定化や旧ユーゴスラヴィアでの民族紛争の発生など、旧東側諸国ではそれら諸問題に対処するために EU や NATO への加盟を最大の目標とし、国内の改革を実施した。もちろん CSCE・OSCE の規範創造者としての力は無視することはできないが、同じく第三者である EU の要求が、EU 加盟候補国であり且つ OSCE 参加国が規範を受容する大きな動機となったと考えることができ

CSCE における「民主的平和」と「ウィーンの東」 47

る。
一方で、ロシアが「近い外国」とみなすバルト三国を除く CIS 諸国では、近い将来の EU・NATO 加盟に関してその可能性は低い。EU 加盟候補国であった中東欧諸国とは異なり、「規範受容を要求する」第三者が存在しない。従ってそれらの諸国では、民主主義規範の受容に関して積極的姿勢を示す必要がなかった。即ち、「ウィーンの東」と「ウィーンの西」では、民主主義の規範接続に関する外部からの要因の有無によりその国内的規範受容の対応が相違したのである。
第二に、第一の要因でも検討した「規範」そのものに関する相違である。そもそも OSCE の民主主義規範とは別の規範をロシアや CIS 諸国が自国の行動の正当化要因として用いることで、分断が生じていると考えることが可能である。換言すると、OSCE の民主主義規範（規範 A）が OSCE の諸活動を正当化し、かつ「ウィーンの西」諸国による「ウィーンの東」諸国への批判を正当化する。これに対し、ロシアや CIS 諸国はそれらの活動や批判に対抗するために「対抗規範（規範 B）」を主張し、自国の諸活動に対する正当化を図っているのである。OSCE のいう規範が包括的安全保障概念であるのに対し、CIS 諸国が重視する対抗規範とは、内政不干渉政策などの従来の欧州以外の地域で展開されている国際規範ともいえるものである。
この規範の衝突の典型例は、選挙監視活動である。選挙監視活動は OSCE などの民主主義規範創設者による、規範遵守監視活動である。しかしロシアや CIS 諸国の対抗規範国は、そのような規範遵守活動に関して制約を行うのではなく、CIS
選挙監視団や CIS 選挙監視基準などの創設によって対抗的規範である規範 B を創設し、自国の民主主義規範への抵触を OSCE などの民主主義規範（規範 A）への対抗を行うと同時に自国の行為の正当化を図っている。CIS 諸国は CIS 独自に選挙監視団を派遣し、選挙結果に関して評価を行う。しかし、その評価は常に「公正な選挙であった」とするものであり、OSCE、欧州審議会や EU などの「ウィーンの西」諸国による選挙監視報告書がしばしば選挙結果の公正性に疑問を示すものであることと対照的である43。
即ち規範挑戦国である「ウィーンの東」諸国はそのような CIS 選挙監視団の選挙監視報告書を元に自国の政治体制の正当性を主張し、OSCE や「ウィーンの西」
諸国の民主主義規範に対抗する内政不干渉原則に基づく新たな規範（規範 B）を創設している。この新たな規範を正当性根拠として政権維持の一つの手段としており、OSCE の民主主義規範（規範 A）に関して対抗していると考えることが可
能である。

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広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8

おわりに
OSCE における規範の分断が、なぜ止められなかったのだろうか。その理由として考えられることは、一つには規範が生じた理由にもつながるが、EU や NATOの東方拡大による OSCE 自体の影響力の低下である。EU や NATO の東方拡大が欧州の政治構造や安全保障構造に大きな影響を与えたことは、多くの研究者の指摘するところである。また先にも検討した通り、エストニアやラトヴィアに展開していた使節団は、スラヴ系住民の市民権問題が依然として大きな問題として存在していたにも関わらず、両国の EU 加盟を前にして撤退した。さらにクロアチ
ア使節団は、その撤退理由を明確にクロアチアの EU 加盟のためとしている。即
ち EU 加盟によってそのような使節団が派遣されていた国家は、OSCE の民主主
義規範を遵守するものとして OSCE 側はみなしていると考えることが可能である。
このように OSCE 側が考えている証左としては、先にも検討を行った選挙監視
活動の回数である。確かに EU 加盟国にも選挙監視活動は実施されている。しかしながら、その回数や内容は CIS 諸国よりも少なくより軽度な選挙監視活動であり、OSCE 側から見ると CIS の選挙は不十分なものであり、それに CIS 諸国側も反発している構造がある。この構造が CIS 側に独自の選挙監視基準などを設けさせることになった。この不均衡はこのように OSCE の民主主義規範自体の分断を招き、それが長期化することとなったと考えられる。
2020年に入り感染症（COVID-19）が世界的に拡大し、各国はその対応に追われることになった。この感染症の封じ込めのために各国はロックダウンなどを実施
し、また政府は様々な危機管理対応を行っている。OSCE でも 3 月には自由メディア代表が「パンデミックとメディアの自由」として、政府は真実の情報を流すべきであり、インターネットの遮断はしてはならないなどのメディアの勧告を行っている。また、民主制度・人権事務所も人との接触を避けるために選挙監視体制を制限するなど対応を行っている。
危機管理体制は民主主義や人権の制限につながる可能性があり、「ウィーンの東」諸国のみならず、本来であれば「ウィーンの西」諸国であるハンガリーのオ
ルバン政権が政府権限を無制限・無期間で認める非常事態宣言を出している44。これに対し民主制度・人権事務所は名指しはしないものの、「人権の制限に関しては期間制限と議会の関与を盛り込むべきである」とし、モスクワ人的側面会議に盛り込まれた緊急事態における人権に関する条項を示し、懸念を示す事態となっている45。
OSCE における規範の分裂は、このように従来は「ウィーンの西」であるとされた国、特にハンガリーのように EU・NATO 加盟国であり北大西洋安全保障共同体であるとされる国にも及びつつある。奇しくも CSCE はブダペスト首脳会議で、

CSCE における「民主的平和」と「ウィーンの東」 49

国際機構化が決定された。その OSCE が築き上げてきた民主主義規範が同じブダ
ペストの地で揺れているのは、今後の欧州政治規範を検討していくうえで興味深
い事項である。
注
1

ロシアの例ではないが、競争型権威主義体制に関する国内の研究としては、久保慶一（2013）「権威主義体制における議会と選挙の役割」『アジア経済』第54巻第 5 号、2-10頁。
2
吉川元（2011）「分断される OSCE 安全保障共同体―安全保障戦略をめぐる対立と相克の軌跡」日本国際連合学会（編）『国連研究』第12号、95-122頁。
3
東西両陣営の「共存」は一面では、アジア・アフリカの新興独立国において、東西どちらの体制を採用するのかという、陣営間の体制間競争であった。また米ソをはじめとした東西両陣営の援助競争は一面では、その国の体制を問うものではなかった。このことは欧州においても同様であった。また、陣営内の諸問題に関しても他の陣営は介入をしない、という暗黙の了解が存在していた。
4
冷戦期 CSCE プロセスでは西側諸国は東側諸国における自由権の侵害を批判し、東側諸国
は「社会権」をもとに西側諸国の失業などに関して批判を行っている。しかしながらコペ
ンハーゲン人的側面会議以降、CSCE/OSCE では「人権」に関しては「自由権」が重視されるようになっており、西側的「人権」と西側的「民主主義」は個別のイシューとして俎
上に上った。
5
この会合で、ハンガリーはポーランドと共同提案（CSCE/LIF.6、1989年 5 月 1 日）を行うなど、共同歩調をとっている。
6
CSCE/LIF.2、1989年 4 月26日、ソ連提案。
7
CSCE/LIF.17、1989年 5 月 2 日、東ドイツ、チェコスロヴァキア提案。
8
CSCE/LIF.58、1989年 5 月 8 日、ルーマニア提案。
9
西側提案は CSCE/LIF.59、1989年 5 月 8 日。提案国はスペイン、共同提案国はベルギーカ
ナダ、デンマーク、フランス、西ドイツ、ギリシア、アイスランド、アイルランド、イタ
リア、ルクセンブルク、オランダ、ノルウェー、ポルトガル、トルコ、イギリス、アメリ
カ。また、もう一点の提案は CSCE/LIF.67、1989年 5 月 9 日。提案国は西ドイツ、オース
トリア、ハンガリー、イタリア、リヒテンシュタイン、ノルウェー、ポーランド、スイス。
10
Copenhagen Inf.2,4,5,6．ブルガリア、東ドイツ、チェコスロヴァキアは、前年のパリ人的側面会議において提出していた提案を撤回する旨、参加国に対して通知を行っている。
11
Rob Zaagman（1994）Institutional Aspects of the CSCE Human Dimension after Helsinki-Ⅱ, in
Arie Bloed & Pieter van Djik（eds）（1994）The Challenges of Change: The Helsinki Summit and its
aftermath, Dordrecht: M. Nijhoﬀ, 240-241. また、選挙管理担当者を対象に、選挙セミナーの開催なども行っている。吉川元（1994）『ヨーロッパ安全保障協力会議（CSCE）』三嶺書房、403頁。
12
欧州安全保障憲章第 9 条。
13「ウィーンの東」問題に関しては、欧州では2000年代に入って取り上げられ、研究がはじめられた問題である。我が国においては2011年の吉川元論文においてはじめて、OSCE における分断の分析が行われている。吉川元（2011）前掲論文、95-122頁。また、玉井雅隆（2019）「「ウィーンの東」と「ウィーンの西」−OSCE における分断とその要因」『グローバル・ガバナンス』第 5 号、22-44頁において「ウィーンの東」に関して論じている。なお当該論文では、CIS 諸国（ウィーンの東）側がなぜ OSCE の選挙監視を受け入れるのか、

50

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8という点に関して CIS 側の事情と OSCE 側の事情から分析を実施している。
Frank Evers（2010）OSCE Election Observation – Commitments, Methodology, Criticism, in Kurt
P. Tudyka（ed）（2010）OSCE-Yearbook 2009 ,Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgeselschaft,pp.235-255.
15
MC.DEL/24/00（2000年11月20日）、ロシア・ベラルーシ共同提案がある。この他、ソフィ
ア閣僚級理事会の前に開催された常設理事会では、PC.DEL/630/04（2004年 7 月 8 日提出）
、PC. DEL/1022/04、PC. DEL/1023/04（いずれも2004 年10 月27 日提出）。ソフィア会
合閣僚級理事会では C.DEL/1025/04/Corr.1（2004年12月 1 日提出）。
16
1990年代前半の旧ユーゴスラヴィアにおける長期滞在型使節団に関しては、ローザス（Alain Rosas）（1997）らの研究によると、OSCE の使節団の役割は 4 点に集約される。まず一点目が紛争予防ないし危機管理であり、二点目が平和維持活動、三点目が紛争の仲介、そして四点目が人的側面に関する事項である。ただし、これらの機能の比重は各使節団によって相違するが、旧ユーゴスラヴィアの紛争地域に派遣された使節団以外は、四点目の民主主義規範の順守を含めた人的側面に関する履行状況を監視する役割が大きいものであった。Allan Rosas & Timo Lahelma（1997）OSCE Long-term missions, in Michael Bothe,
Natalino Ronzitti and Allan Rosas（eds）（1997）The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security, The Hague, London: Kluwer Law International,178、及び Antonio Rafael Rubio Plo（2009）
La OSCE y su concepcion de la seguridad. La convergencia de las Organizaciones Regionales
Europeas y de la OSCE en torno a una concepcion integral de la Seguridad, Madrid:Ministerio de
Defensa,117
17
エストニアに関しては Rob Zaagman（1999）Conflict Prevention in the Baltic Area:The OSCEHigh Commissioner on National Minorities in Estonia,1993-1999, International Helsinki Monitor,10（3）,30-44. ラトヴィアに関しては、Guntis Ulmanis（2001）Experience of Co-operatingwith the OSCE HCNM:The Case in Latvia,International Journal on Minority and Group Rights,8（1）,75-77
18
なお、エストニア、ラトヴィア両使節団の任務には明確には「スラヴ系住民」や「マイノリティ」とは書かれていない。しかしながら、「政府と地方自治体レベルの適任な当局との間で、市民権（citizenship）、移民（migration）、言語（language）（中略）などの問題に関して接触を保ち、維持すること（エストニア使節団）」とされており、これらの問題はスラヴ系市民に関する問題であり、明言を避けているがスラヴ系市民の市民権問題も問題の一つとして取り扱うことになる。
19
EU 加盟交渉に伴うスラヴ系住民の問題に関しては、Smith,David J.（2003）Minority
Rights,Multiculturalism and EU Enlargement:the Case of Estonia, Journal on Ethnopolitics andMinority Issues in Europe, 2003（1）,1-37. なお、クロアチア使節団撤退に際しては明確に「EU 加盟のため」としている。
20
OSCE の長期滞在型使節団の名称は使節団（Mission）、事務所（Oﬃce）など様々であるが、これは対象国の要請によるものである。
21
正式には Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Oﬃce for Article IV, Annex 1-B of
the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
22
1995年12月より、ボスニア・ヘルツェゴヴィナ使節団に改組、吸収。
23
1994年〜1995年の間は、OSCE サラエヴォ使節団（OSCE Mission in Sarajevo）。
24
コソヴォ使節団はコソヴォ検証使節団及びコソヴォ・タスクフォースの任務・権限を継承している（PC.DEC/305）。
25
2001年〜2006年の間は、OSCE ポドゴリッツア事務所（OSCE Oﬃce in Podgorica）
26
公式には2001年に OSCE ユーゴスラヴィア使節団（The OSCE Mission to Yugoslavia、後のOSCE セルビア使節団）設立を以て終了とされている。PC.Dec/411参照。
14

CSCE における「民主的平和」と「ウィーンの東」 51
27

1992年〜2010年の間は、OSCE スコピエ紛争波及防止使節団（OSCE Spillover Monitoring
Mission to Skopje）。
28
OSCE では参加国の区分として、ベラルーシ、ウクライナ、モルドヴァの三カ国を「東欧（Eastern Europe）」としている。なお、OSCE の地域区分に関しては例えば OSCE Conflict
Prevention Centre（2018）Survey of OSCE Field Operations（SEC.GAL/110/18, 25 June 2018）参照。
29
この使節団の名称に関しては、ロシアの合意を得るために、「使節団」ではなく「アシスタント・グループ」と名称を変更したものである。Allan Rosas and Timo Lahelma（1997）
ibid.,171.
30
第1221回常設理事会（2019年 3 月28日）にて名称変更を決定。2019年 3 月にカザフスタンの首都であるアスタナがヌルスルタンに改名したことにより、使節団の名称も OSCE アス
タナ・プログラム事務所（The OSCE Programme Oﬃce in Astana）から変更された。なお権限などの変更がなく名称変更のみであるので、会合冒頭に議長国議長（Chairperson-inOﬃce）のスロヴェニアから口頭で伝達、承認された（PC.JOUR/1221）。第1031回常設理事会（2015年12月18日）にて、OSCE アスタナセンター（OSCE Centre in Astana）から変更された（PC.DEC/1153/Corr.1）。
31
第1130回常設理事会（2017年 1 月27日）にて、OSCE ビシュケクセンター（OSCE Centre
in Bishkek）から変更された（PC.DEC/1238）。
32
1993年に OSCE Mission to Tajikistan として設立、その後第418回常設理事会（2002年10月31日）にてドゥシャンベ・センターに変更された（PC.DEC/500/Corr.1）。
33
第1130回常設理事会（2017年 1 月27日）にて、OSCE タジキスタン事務所（OSCE Oﬃce inTajikistan）から変更された（PC.DEC/1238）。
34
1995年〜2000年まで、OSCE 中央アジア連絡事務所（OSCE Liaison Oﬃce in Central Asia）。
2000年に名称を変更した。
35
OSCE 紛争予防センター『OSCE 現地活動団調査』（OSCE Conflict Prevent Centre（2018）
Survey of OSCE Field Operations（SEC.GAL/110/18））、OSCE 紛争予防センター『OSCE 現
地活動団調査』（OSCE Conﬂict Prevent Centre（2020）Survey of OSCE Field Operations（SEC.
GAL/111/20/Corr.1*））より筆者作成。
36
表中の数字には、NAM（Need Assessment Mission）は回数に含まない。選挙監視の回数には長期型及び短期型使節団、限定された選挙監視に関する選挙当日のみの監視活動、選挙評価使節団、選挙専門家チームを含む。なお、表中回数 0 であるアイルランド、スウェー
デン、デンマーク、ルクセンブルク、アンドラ、サンマリノ、バチカン、リヒテンシュタ
インのうち、バチカン以外には NAM が行われている。なお、玉井（2019）前掲論文、31頁より筆者改編・加筆。
37
OSCE の選挙監視は必要性に関する調査使節団によって選挙監視の必要性、選挙監視団派
遣の期間並びに規模に関して報告が実施され、民主制度・人権事務所が長期型選挙監視団
もしくは短期型選挙監視団の派遣を決定する。また、これらは準備段階からの監視活動になるが、選挙当日のみの監視活動や必要性に関する報告書によって選挙の信頼性に問題がないとみなされている場合には、選挙評価使節団が派遣される。この他、選挙専門家チームも派遣される。
38
議長国議長に関しては、1991年の創設時よりアメリカ、ロシアの両大国並びに地理的に欧州に存在しないカナダは議長国議長にならないとする暗黙の了解が見られる。その外のCIS 諸国に関しては、ベラルーシは OSCE との関係がミンスク事務所の職員の入国を拒否するなど、OSCE との関係性がよくない点がある。また OSCE の常設理事会が全会一致制をとっているために、民主主義規範に関して様々な問題を抱える CIS 諸国の議長国議長就52

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任に関して、「ウィーンの西」諸国の賛同が得られないと考えられる。
この他に、「ウィーンの西」諸国ではバチカン、サンマリノ、モナコ、アンドラ、リヒテ
ンシュタイン、ルクセンブルク、マルタが議長国とはなっていないが、いずれもいわゆる「ミニ・ステート」に類する諸国であり、議長国になるための人的資源が不足している。
40
2021年のスウェーデン、2022年のポーランドは予定である。なお、2016年のドイツからは二巡目となる。
41
OSCE ホームページ（https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/former-chairpersons-in-oﬃce）より筆者作成。最終アクセス日は2020年10月26日。表 3 は、玉井雅隆（2019）前掲論文、25頁
を改編・加筆。
42
Richard Price（1998）”Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines”- International Organization,52（3）,613-644.
43
例えば2004 年のウズベキスタン議会選挙では、CIS 選挙監視団はその選挙を「正統性、自由そして透明性が存在している」と評するのに対し、OSCE 選挙監視団は「OSCE やその他の民主的選挙に関する国際基準の重大な欠如に陥っている」とし、批判を加えている CIS 側の評価に関しては、http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/030111d3b474a94cc3256f
790042f6f9?Open Document（2020年 9 月10日アクセス）、民主制度・人権事務所 の評価に関しては www. osce.org/odihr/elections/uzbekistan/41950（2020年 9 月10日アクセス）。
44『コロナ非常事態宣言の無期限延長可能に、ハンガリーに欧州各国が懸念』https://www.
afpbb.com/articles/-/3276990（2020年12月10日アクセス）。
45
https://www.osce.org/odihr/449311（2020年10月 1 日アクセス）。
39

Great power relations and threats to the liberal international order 53

Special Feature

Great power relations and threats to the liberal international order
Haruko SatohCo-Director
IAFOR Research Centre, Osaka School of International Public Policy
Osaka University
The COVID-19 pandemic struck early in 2020, amidst intensifying trade war between the
United States and China and speculations that a cold war may be descending between thetwo (Kaplan 2019). The timing of the pandemic could not have been worse, as the prospectof great power rivalry returning seemed more tangible after a decade of rapid expansionof Chinese influence in global affairs and declining American hegemony. Indeed, as if to
put the current international system under a stress test, the global health crisis highlighted
the fundamental weakness of the United Nations (UN) system to facilitate international
cooperation when it is beset by great power discord and rivalry. The UN’s global healthbody, the World Health Organization (WHO) was the ﬁrst to fall victim, as it failed to rise
above the blame game between China, the source of the new coronavirus, and the US under
the helm of an impetuous “America First” president Donald Trump, who each had a major
hand in crippling the organisation’s ability to guide the world in fighting the new coronavirus. The fate that befell on the WHO echoed the situation at the UN, as the Secretary
General Antonio Guterres’ warning in April 2020 that the global health crisis was “thegravest test since the founding of the Organisation” and that the “unity and resolve of the
Security Council was critical” (Guterres 2020) fell on deaf American ears in particular.1
However, what happened to the WHO or the UN was neither new nor unforeseen.
Great power competition, particularly among the permanent five members of the UN
Security Council who have the veto power, has always been and still is a major factor in
how the UN functions. The UN as an organisation of inter-governmental dialogue andconsensus-building has evolved and maintained its relevance in part because of the vetowhich, as Stoessinger observed during the Cold War when the veto gained its noteriety inthe context of US-Soviet rivalry, “has been not an insurmountable obstacle, but a constant
incentive toward greater inventiveness and improvisation in international problem-solving”(Stoessinger 1973). Rather, the current crisis of the UN system induced by the specter of
US-China rivalry speaks of a more complex and comprehensive challenge to the interna-

54

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8tional system itself, which is the increasingly complex nature of security threats̶traditionaland non-traditional̶in a globalised world, and the pressing need for great power relations
that facilitate rather than obstruct international cooperation. As Richard Haass summarised
the situation: “What makes this a crisis is that the need for international cooperation isgreat. We face not only the revival of great power rivalry but also multiple global challenges, from pandemics and climate change to nuclear proliferation and terrorism, forwhich there are no unilateral answers” (Haass 2020).2
The US-China competition has now spilled well over from the economic sphere, andit will be transformative to the US-led international liberal order. This article argues that,while US-China rivalry is of great concern in itself, it should not be seen or explained
through the lens of the previous great or superpower rivalry between the US and the Soviet
Union. Furthermore, while how their relationship develops has bearing on the future of
the international order, discussing great power relations as something to be managed orbalanced is rather like seeing the tree and not the forest that is also moving. The natureof the international system and how it operates have changed rapidly in the past 30 years
as a result of the global expansion of the liberal international order. Great power relations
and rivalry are interlocked in a larger the process of transforming this liberal international
order toward a “World Order 2.0” (Haass 2017)3 that reﬂects the contemporary world of a
global community that now has elements of a post-Westphalian construct of the world, andin this picture great powers should (ideally) find in their interest to cooperate rather thancompete against each other. This is particularly so for great powers that are able to influence or coerce the behaviour of other smaller states, and by extension facilitate or obstruct,
as the US and China have done over COVID-19, international cooperation that is crucial toaddressing the challenges of non-traditional security issues.
The Cold War and now: the security order
The end of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union and the collapse of thebipolar structure brought back a world where security conditions are not as tightly disciplined and restrained (Bertram 1995; Cooper 2002; Kagan, 2002).4 The high tension of
the Cold War meant that any small provocation or the misreading of the other’s intention
or moves by either the US or the Soviet Union, or by their allies, would trigger a chainof highly charged and frantic diplomatic maneouvres to prevent either side from pushing
the nuclear button, as in the Cuban missile crisis of 1961. The tense security environment
also meant that the other major powers, particularly Britain and France in the Western alli-

Great power relations and threats to the liberal international order 55

ance, had little to no autonomy in their security policy decision-making, even though bothcountries tried to maintain a façade of greatness or grandeur despite signs of diminishinginternational standing and influence vis-à-vis the superpower US, a poignant point that
became clear over the American intervention in the 1956-7 Suez Crisis.
The world today is not divided by ideology nor controlled by the tight leash the two
Cold War superpowers kept on the behaviour of other powers and smaller states. Instead,the non-free world of the eastern camp became liberated from Soviet control, and joined
the “free” world of the West, creating a world connected by a single economic system,
capitalism. But it is no more peaceful than the world of strategic, cold peace under the constant fear of nuclear annihilation; rather, it is the opposite. What we have been witnessing
since the 1990s is the remilitarisation of international politics among the hitherto-boundsmaller states or powers that became unhinged from the iron grip of superpower discipline,“uninhibited by the prospect of an eventual superpower confrontation” (Rothschild 1995).
If the Cold War temporarily stopped the national, regional or subregional clocks from ticking, freezing free interaction (peaceful or otherwise) and evolution of relations between
nation-states̶most born out of decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s and not necessarily
amicable to each other̶then the end of it ushered in the “return of history” (Kagan, 2002)
and a world of anarchy. From the disintegration of Yugoslavia to ethnic, tribal and religious
conﬂicts that erupted in Africa, the Middle East to Asia, liberation also meant re-activatingolder fault lines and feuds, both within and between states. This, combined with the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) amongauthoritarian states and international terrorist groups, like al Qaeda and ISIS, make a potent
new cocktail of security threats.
In this new international condition there may be excessive “securitisation” of all
aspects of everyday life. But an all out war between great powers is unlikely compared to
localised conflicts, such as in the Middle East and Africa. The logic of mutually assured
destruction (MAD) that kept large scale wars between the US and the Soviet Union at bay
is still operative, and nuclear deterrence remains important to the strategic stability between
the nuclear powers (the P-5 of the UN Security Council: China, Britian, France, Russia
and the US) and America’s non-nuclear ally powers, such as Germany, Japan and South
Korea. Thus, the two main US-led regional security set-ups that survived the Cold War, theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and hub-and-spokes system in the Asia-Paciﬁc,continue to function as pillars of order and stability for the respective regions. Countries
in these alliances have the greatest interest in maintaining the liberal international order.

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However, the new revisionist powers, particularly China and Russia and de facto nuclear
states like Iran and North Korea, bring new uncertainties to how the security order might
be organised. To say that the world has simply returned to the age of balance of power does
not accurately describe the complexity of the power struggle in this post-Cold War worldand beyond.
Moreover, the pandemic made it plainly known that the threats to peace and security
do not come in the form of inter- or intra-state conflict alone, they cannot be combatted
with guns and bombs, and that existential threats to societies and states are now more complex than ever. The UN Secretary General Guterres repeatedly warned that the COVID19 pandemic is a “major stressor” in conﬂict or weaker states and a threat to global peaceand security, a point he reiterated in his speech at the UN General Assembly in September.5
The wide-ranging impact of the pandemic on the politics, economy and society of states
and relations between states was a clarion call for the international community to upgrade
eﬀorts to address non-traditional security (NTS) threats that require concerted international
action. Whether they are terrorists, pandemics or climate change, non-traditional security
threats are so called because they cannot be met by one state and require functional, international cooperation.
Needless to say, globalisation had a major part in creating this complex security environment and compounding the challenges for states and the international system to cope.
The unbridled expansion of the neoliberal capitalist model of growth, driven by the ﬁnancial markets trading on “derivatives”, ﬂooded the world market with money, created ultrarich billionaires, and gave face-lifts to urban landscapes globally, but it also impoverishedthe poorer and widened the gap between the rich and the poor even in better oﬀ countries,
from Europe to Asia, especially after the Lehman shock in 2008. The rise of populism
and demagoguery in democracies, the slide to authoritarianism in weaker states, and theresurgence of nationalism globally were political symptoms of the cummulative impact of
globalisation.
Open and liberal economic system propelled global movements of labour, capital andgoods, but this borderlessness also had its downsides, where crime, diseases, terrorism to‘illegal’ migrants, refugees, and incessant exploitation of the natural environment were also
going global: “what goes on inside a country can no longer be the concern of that country
alone” (Haass, 2017). The point about today’s notion of security is in its scope, variationof actors and nature of threats they pose, in that security threats do not come from states

Great power relations and threats to the liberal international order 57

alone, and nor are they only of a military nature. Terrorist threats to states and society haveelicited unconventional responses from states. Post-9.11 America’s global “war against
terrorism”, from the Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq to the Philippines or Indonesia, has far
exceeded the conventional understanding of war in its geographical and operational scope
as well as the nebulous nature of the “enemy” (Dalpino 2001; Daalder & Lindsay 2001).6
The global community and sovereign obligations
Perhaps more than climate change, the deadliness of the pandemic struck a chord in theminds of policymakers and ordinary people alike of the dangers of living in an interconnected world, especially without international cooperation to mitigate them. As aproblematique for the international system and the global community, it has certainly called
into question the concept of “security” that still prioritises nation-state security over nontraditional, human security concerns at all levels of policy making, from the local, national
to the international. The idea that the state-centric notion of security of the Westphaliansystem cannot adequately address them is already well established, at least in academic
discourse and particularly the EU policy circles for whom multilateralism is the norm. Thisapproach gained prominence in the 1990s, where “the concept of security [has] extended…
from military to political, economic, social, environmental, or ‘human’ security’”(Rothschild 1995)7. The UNDP Human Development Report is a cornerstone documentthat introduced the term, “human security” that put human protection from “freedom fromfear” and “freedom from want” as the referent object of security to the international community. It reﬂects an imagined global community where the state is not the only actor nor“central to the whole concept of security,” and international organisations, civil societies,
institutions and multilateralism serve to temper the egotistic behaviour of states to pursue
common interests, such as protecting the planet from environmental catastrophe.
In this conception of international relations, the state itself is a far more compromisedand complex construct today; it is a multifaceted phenomenon (Buzan 1991) that makes the
securing of it an equally complicated task. The nature of the state today sits in the “struggle” between two main systemic forces (or schools of thought in international relations)that inform state behaviour and international relations: the Westphalian system of sovereignstates (the realists) and the realm of international society of international institutions andmultilateralism (the idealists/internationalists or the English school). The two paradigms ofinternational relations are not parallel universes, but they are distinct from each other in theway they deﬁne the notion of sovereignty, which in turn deﬁnes the nature of the state and58

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8relations between states in their conceptual universes. The former operates on the classicalnotion of sovereignty being absolute and indivisible; in the latter, sovereignty is divisible
and can be diﬀused and receded to the background. International organisations like the UN
are a halfway house of the paradox between the two world constructs, because they upholdstate sovereignty on the one hand and yet require member states to surrender it on the otherin order for the organisations to function. In this description of international politics, theconventional balance of power between states constitutes only a part of a more complex,
simultaneous equations to maintain international peace and security, however fundamental
and overriding it still may be to framing international relations as geopolitical competition. Indeed, Akira Iriye has also noted that international organisations that are central to
the global community have played a signiﬁcant role in easing tension in relations between
antagonistic powers, be they among great powers in Europe before 1945 or the US and theSoviet Union during the Cold War (Iriye 2002).
That states can and are willing to surrender sovereign rights is fundamental to theUN system, not to mention the European Union (EU). This notion of sovereignty is fundamental to the conception and expansion of international society or global community.
But Robert Cooper notes that in Europe’s state system this goes even further in breaking
down the “absolutist tradition of state sovereignty” and going beyond nation-states, wherestates have acquired “postmodern” characteristics. The defining element of the state, themonopoly on force is subject to “international ̶ but self-imposed constraints”, and imposing democracy and human rights as qualifying conditions to be part of this system throws
out the idea of non-interference in the domestic aﬀairs of others. In sum, “[a] postmodern
system does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasize sovereignty or the separation ofdomestic and foreign affairs” (Cooper 2002). Haass’ aforementioned World Order 2.0,
where “states have not just rights but also obligations to others” is a similar conception.
(Haass 2017).
However, Cooper also crucially notes that parts of the world are not yet ready to leave
the modern world, and that how to spread the “postmodern idea” is precisely the challenge
to upgrade the world order to version 2.0. Revisionist states like China and India are independent-minded and sovereignty-conscious, with a high priority on strong national defence
that adds to their prestige. They are establishing their foothold as great powers with theview to challenging the Western dominated status quo, the liberal international order. This
also reﬂects a deeper, historical tectonic plate that inﬂuences today’s international politics.
For, regional conﬂicts, civil wars and threats of international terrorism are in some respects

Great power relations and threats to the liberal international order 59

violent manifestations of the desire for recognition and respect by the nations and peoples
hitherto marginalised or subjugated in the last 200 years, while their world was beingorganised and ruled ﬁrst by Western imperial powers and then by the superpowers during
the Cold War. The rising new powers, particularly China, have the strong desire to have a
say in how the world should be organised. The US is also a sovereignty-conscious power,
and is capable of behaving unilaterally, as has been prominently so during the Trumpadministration. But US unilateralism is not unknown. What makes the US appear as if it isdiﬀerent from the other sovereignty-conscious, revisionist powers is that it is a hegemonic
power in the current liberal international order. The emergent great power rivalry between
the US and China, thus, has the facet of a struggle over the current liberal international
order.
Great powers behaving badly
̶America’s self-destruction
The next US president-to-be, Joe Biden, has iterated time and again during the presidential
election campaign that one of the ﬁrst things he would do when he assumes oﬃce is to get
the US to rejoin the Paris climate accords and the WHO that Trump had US withdraw from.
Biden has made it clear that in foreign policy his administration’s mission is to restore US
relations with allies, re-commit to multilateralism and free trade, and show the US capability to lead the world again (Biden 2020). How much of these can be successfully achieved
is up for speculation, because America itself is deeply divided as never before; over 70
million voted for Trump who has embraced autocracy, cronyism, irrationality, and bigotry,
and sold the idea of American greatness based on the unbridled expression of free will. To
convince these Trumpians that free trade is better, working with democratic allies is better,and that America is great because of its ability to shape and lead the world is not an enviable task in the political culture of hyper bipartisanship.
We must also be mindful that “Americans have never been enamored with the liberal international order” (Wright 2018), constituted by alliances, institutions and the US
military security guarantee to protect them. This would also include America’s global
role in protecting “public goods” to keep an open and ruled based order, such as freedomof navigation. As Thomas Wright points out, in reference to the post-1945 phase of thereconstruction of Europe and Asia, the internationalist-minded “policy elites... couldn’t
drum up enough political support for the idea until they could sell it as a vital part of the
struggle with the Soviets” (Wrght 2018). In the post-Cold War era of US unipolarism,

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Americans have time and again expressed frustration that the US cannot be the policemanof the world. The perception that the security burden is not shared proportionately has beena perennial problem between the US and its NATO allies and Japan. From the League of
Nations before 1945 to the UN Convention on the Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS), the Kyoto
Protocol, the International Criminal Court,8 the US has opted out of some key international
treaties and accords. Even though the liberal international order is its creation, the US is
not necessarily a natural multilateral player nor consciously bearing the responsibility toprotect the world out of a sense of altruism; it does so to the extent that Americans are able
to accept that the cost and burden of US leadership to protect others ultimately serve US
national interests.
But a striking aspect of Trump’s America has been the senseless destruction of theliberal international order of alliances and institutions that the US led to build, to the detriment of America’s own position vis-à-vis China and Russia, the two revisionist powers thatﬁnd the liberal international order threatening to their regimes. Trump has been obsessing
with checking China’s growing inﬂuence in trade, ﬁnance and technology, which in itself
is not surprising. But his strategy has contributed to actually weakening America’s strategic bargaining position vis-à-vis China in his all out “America First” policy that made nosense. He imposed tariﬀs on allies and friends, from Canada, Mexico and Japan to the EU.
He pulled the US out of a string of international treaties and agreements, from the Paris
Accord, the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP), the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (theso-called Iran nuclear agreement), to the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty.
Trump’s dislike of multilateralism and disregard for fact-based reality and science, the twotraits that were problematic from the beginning of his presidency, were especially consequential. His misleading tweets and dysfunctional COVID-19 task force that ignored theadvice of public health oﬃcials and epidemiology experts abetted in making the US one of
the worst hit countries in the world. As the world watched in disbelief the rising death tollsin the US, Trump’s America sent out the message that the most powerful nation had neither
the inclination nor the capability to lead the world out of the pandemic.
̶China’s self-destruction
Xi Jinping’s China, on the other hand, had its own challenge in winning the trust from therest of the world in the absence of US leadership, as the country was implicated in controlling the information about the new virus coming out of the WHO in order to save face, as
succinctly summarised in the article in The Atlantic (Gilsinan 2020):

Great power relations and threats to the liberal international order 61
The most notorious example came in the form of a single tweet from the WHO account on
January 14: “Preliminary investigations conducted by the Chinese authorities have foundno clear evidence of human-to- human transmission of the novel #coronavirus.” Thatsame day, the Wuhan Health Commission’s public bulletin declared, “We have not foundproof for human-to-human transmission.” But by that point even the Chinese government
was oﬀering caveats not included in the WHO tweet. “The possibility of limited humanto-human transmission cannot be excluded,” the bulletin said, “but the risk of sustainedtransmission is low.”9No amount of subsequent charm diplomacy to help aﬀected countries, such as sending
face mask and testing kits to Europe or promising vaccines to weaker states from Africa
to Southeast Asia, has been enough to shake off the suspicion toward the authoritarianregime, let alone be seen as a desirable alternative to the US as a global leader. In 2017,
Xi Jinping impressed some to speculate that China may be the “new champion”10 of theliberal international order for his keynote to the World Economic Forum in Davos, where
he defended globalisation in an ostensible jibe at Trump’s turning toward protectionism andtrade wars. However, the pandemic struck at a time when the downside of China’s growing
global inﬂuence was ﬁnding its way to international conversations and commentaries about
the country’s hubris and coercive behaviour. In the seventh year since the launch in 2013,
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) began to lose its initial appeal as China’s altruistic
contribution to global economic development, as the project became increasingly identiﬁed as a vehicle of Chinese debt-trap (or crony) diplomacy and “salami-slicing” strategy.
The consequences of the over-reliance of the world’s economies ̶ from Europe, Africa toAsia, not to mention the Americas̶on Chinese money and supply chains have been relative losses of political, economic and geostrategic freedom from Chinese inﬂuence for the“client” states.
Futhermore, mounting accusations of human rights abuse toward the Uyghurs andTibetans, political unrest in Hong Kong over Beijing’s breaching of the international agreement of “one country, two systems” until 2047, and the threatening tone and actions toward
Taiwan since the election of President Tsai Ing-wen were all painting a poor, if not dangerous, picture of China in the eyes of the international community. China’s eﬀort to exclude
Taiwan from the WHO has been received particularly poorly in the context of the COVID19 pandemic. Countries as well as businesses and academic institutions are pressured totreat Taiwan or Tibet “correctly”, to acknowledge them as part of China and not a separate
entity, often with threats to withdraw ﬁnancial support or trade deals. The bullying side of

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China’s “wolf warrior diplomacy” has done little to enhance the “soft power” appeal thatthe country so craves. In addition, the coronavirus outbreak attracted international attention
to China’s domestic conditions, from poor hygiene in wet markets, government information
control, propaganda and surveillance, and persecutions of “dissenters” by the authorities(such as the whistle-blower doctor in Wuhan). The lack of transparency and accountability in the country’s public health governing structure only added to China’s trust-deficit.
If China was aspiring to challenge US hegemony in the liberal international order, Xi
Jinping was doing a poor job: As a hegemon, the US (even under Trump) appears far more“benign” than China being one.
̶Others in sober reﬂection
The absence of US leadership and China’s inability to ﬁll the global leadership gap during
the pandemic not only put the future of the liberal international order in doubt, but put othermajor powers in Asia and Europe to recalibrate, although more as cautious adjustments
than overhauls, their relationships with both the US and China. Two related issues regarding the US stand out as pivotal for those with a higher stake in the maintenance liberalinternational order, America’s “democratic” allies in Europe and Asia.
First, the Trump administration’s foreign policy shook America’s standing with traditional security allies. Trump’s disdain for NATO as “obsolete”11 aside, his demands on
America’s security allies in Europe and Asia (particularly Japan and South Korea) to share
more of the security burden by increasing their defence spending, are not especially new.
Previous four presidents have all expressed similar frustrations with reluctant allies, particulary Germany and Japan that are the richest of US allies but also highly dependent on
US security guarantee. Donald Trump, however, did it in a shockingly undiplomatic manner accompanied by damaging actions, such as withdrawing from the INF and announcing
to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty (that includes Russia), not to mention the abrupt
withdrawal of US special forces from Syria in the autumn of 2019 without informing theNATO allies who also had troops. But what added insult to injury and deepened the mistrust of Trump’s views toward alliances was his unabashed boasting of friendly relations
with autocrats and authoritarian regimes, who have been and are considered adversaries
to democracy and open society.12 German Chancellor Angela Merkel drew the line when
she refused to attend the G-7 meeting hosted by Trump that would include the Russian
President Valdimir Putin.
These US actions not only belittled relations with allies and friends and ignored con-

Great power relations and threats to the liberal international order 63

fidence building measures with adversaries, but also undermined the long-term strategic
cohesion of America’s trans-Atlantic and trans-Paciﬁc security communities that allow the
US to project power across the globe. Francois Godement and Gudrun Wacker describe
the problems as manifested in relation to China: “[Fairly] convergent views on China’s
domestic and international trends have been overshadowed in the last years by debates on
multilateral institutions and alliance politics. This, and perceived diﬀerences over values,
has impacted large sectors of European public opinion – in some cases, almost as large as
China’s authoritarian and aggressive behavior. US demands to the EU or member states foralignment with the US agenda (including threats of secondary sanctions, end of cooperationand information sharing, etc.) have not been helpful” (Godement & Wacker 2020).13
This brings us to the second point, which is about the role of democracy in US leadership. For the self-apointed custodians of the liberal international order, particularly theWestern powers, the Brexit movement in the UK to leave the European Union (EU) andthe “Make America Great Again” Trumpsim in the US were an ominous sign for opennessand democracy as the underpinning principles for the economic and political aspects of
the liberal order (Ikenberry 2011; Kundnani 2017), as both countries saw the hollowing
out of their democratic institutions and the closing of “borders” by their own leaders. And
the security dimension of the order was in peril after 4 years of the Trump administration’s
often impetuous and transactional foreign and security policy decisions. Trump’s incessantattack on the government agencies and institutions of democracy in the US itself, including the media which he infamously declared are the “enemy of the people”, was deeply
worrisome. Facts and truth became contestable with the news outlets divided over partisanlines, and with the Republican Party refusing to call out Trump’s authoritarian behaviour
based on lies and cronyism, disoriented the public’s relationship with government agencies,
from the police, the intelligence community to public health authorities. The success withwhich he had managed to incite hatred and violence and deepen the cleavage in American
society, particularly over race, became apparent in the presidential election in November. Although Joe Biden has won, the closeness of the race has not been an inspirational
moment for American democracy, although the number of votes for both men exceeded
previous records. The critical issue here is that the erosion of the image of America as astrong democracy weakens its “soft power” appeal and the legitimacy base of the country
to be the leader of the liberal international order.
In Asia, the geopolitical situation is both diverse and tense, and the regional order is in
ﬂux. Moreover, the order is not organised around principles of human rights and democratic

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広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8values as in Europe. In the absence of an overarching security architecture, principles of
non-interference and respect of state sovereignty in the classical Westphalian sense havea stronger meaning in the conduct of relations between states. Here it has been China’s
ruthless pursuit of great power status and economic and military threats towards countries
that resist or question Chinese actions that stirred the region’s anxiety about US leadership. From territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas, the authoritarian takeoverof governance in Hong Kong, the diplomatic steps to isolate Taiwan and to the retaliatory
intimidation of Australia that called for transparency regarding the origins of the coronavirus, there are few states that have been spared of the Chinese attempt to shake the post-war
status quo of the US’s hub-and-spokes system of bilateral alliances and the San Francisco
system. The impact of unfettered Chinese expansion of political and economic influence
without eﬀective US counterbalancing policies and actions is most prevalent in this region.
The Trump administration has abetted in China’s adopting a more aggressive diplomaticand military behaviour in the region by waging a trade war and portraying China as thenext “evil” enemy, and shaking the confidence of allies and friends in the US by forcing
them to choose sides. But this situation had actually been developing since George W
Bush’s “strategic engagement” and Barack Obama administration’s ambiguous “Pivot toAsia” policies that essentially gave China manoeuvring space to develop militarily thanacting as a leash that other Asians, especially Japan, may have preferred.
The countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the only
regional grouping that is remotely comparable to the European Union (EU), are particularly
wary of their manoeuvrability to hedge between the larger powers to the north, namely
China, Japan and the US being choked by Chinese dominance. To be fair, they have always
tried to avoid entanglement in great power rivalries since the Cold War days, and to that
extent ASEAN states have been wary of taking the side of US as well. However, this cautious stance toward the US is nothing comparable to the sense of threat and suspicion that
ASEAN harbours toward China. The ﬁgures in the annual survey conducted by the Instituteof Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore prove it: 52.2% acknowledge that China is themost inﬂuential political and strategic power in Southeast Asia, while the number is 28.7%
for the US. Yet, at the same time, 53.5% see China as a threat to ASEAN country’s interestsand sovereignty, compared to 21.8% for the US, 5.0% for Japan, and 3.5% for the EU. On
the other hand, in the question regarding ASEAN’s options in US-China rivalry, 48% chose“enhance ASEAN resilience and unity”, while 31.1% chose “not siding with China or US”.
In terms of conﬁdence to “do the right thing to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity and governance”, over 60% have little or no confidence in China and just under 50%

Great power relations and threats to the liberal international order 65

for the US. In this question, Japan and the EU receive 61.2% and 38.7% conﬁdence rating
respectively. In fact, only 10.5% see China as a “responsible stakeholder that respects andchampions international law,” compared to 15.4% for the US, 51% for Japan, and 68% for
the EU.14 As ASEAN’s preferences for multilateralism and rule-based international orderdemonstrate, as reﬂected in the high expectations toward Japan and the EU to “do the rightthing”, the restoration of trust in the US is a challenge for the next Biden administration.
Middle powers and the reform of the liberal international order
Europe has recently woken up to the threatening aspect of working with China without areliable US, and began to revise their global strategy,15 as individual states and collectively
as the EU. Any illusion in the early 2000s that the liberal international order can transformanti-West (or US) great powers, China and Russia, to become responsible stakeholders
and become “more like us” is now gone. Instead, they have chosen to engage China where
cooperation is possible and desirable, such as in the UN Conference on Climate Change(COP 21) and the nuclear agreement with Iran, while strengthening their defence against
China on issues that concern the coherence and security of the entire bloc, from telecom,
critical infrastructure, business ownership to the upholding of democracy and human rights.
In this strategic outlook, there is a conscious effort of European states, notably France,
Germany and the Netherlands, to be engaged in the Indo-Pacific, and to work with Asian
powers, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia and ASEAN in areas of security as well as
on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Europe appears also more mindful of reforming the liberal international order, where in the past the inconsistencies and controversial
aspects have gone ignored, especially where the notion of liberal and open are concerned.
The liberal international order has the element of Western liberal thought based on theuniversality of human rights and “liberal” democracy. The wave of democratization that has
swept across the globe in post-Cold War decades has often been understood as the triumphof the Western liberal order over the socialist model of political economy.16 Wealth creation
through capitalism and political liberalization (or democratization) were supposed to go
hand in hand, and at the end of the road history is supposed to ‘end’ with the proliferationof liberal democracies. This Western-centric idea of how the world should be organised (orwhere the world should be headed), based on the notion that liberal values are universal,
has been buttressed by the institutions, norms, rule and regulations of Western design thatbind̶and indeed organize̶international politics today. This part of the liberal international order package is not necessarily appreciated as “universal” as the West would like

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to think by the rest of the world (Kundnani 2017).17 This includes the democratic countries
such as Japan and South Korea that have a greater stake in maintaining this order becauseof their role as US security allies.
Indeed, human rights and liberal values are arguably central to the discourse between
West and the rest, notably revisionist, authoritarian powers like China and Russia but notjust them, as an area of negotiation, if not outright contestation, in the course of a more
complex and intense intercourse between the West and the rest. For example, both thedeveloping and developed states in East Asia question a list of universal values, especiallythose enshrined as basic human rights that need to be respected, not because they necessarily disagree with the Western proposition, but because they are embedded as codes ofconduct in international agreement and institutions with penalties (such as sanctions andintervention) for violation and abuse in the current UN system. Moreover, this unversalist pretention has been perceived as privileging the status quo of the affluent West (or thehaves), if not as a legacy of colonial domination. The discomfort had less to do with thevalidity of the actual values per se, but more to do with how they are expressed, promoted
or protected in the international arena, such as the liberal logic of humanitarian intervention (or R2P) that allows the transgression of state sovereignty by the “international community” because of the universality of human rights. It is no accident that Japan, which isan ardent supporter of the UN and the concept of human security, keeps its distance fromthe concept of R2P in part because it permits the overriding of state sovereignty (the otherreason being R2P risks military intervention).
This situation reﬂects the broader problem of the hypocrisy in the UN system, where
the disagreement over who has the power or even the authority to ensure compliance on acluster of internationally protected human rights (at least on paper) needs to be ironed out.
Improving international institutions and regimes, such as the make-up of the permanent
members of the UN Security Council or who sits on the UN’s human rights commission,
to better reﬂect the reality today that has morphed beyond recognition from the original set
up is certainly an important international political agenda toward restoring a sense of global
community. Asians, now more confident than they have ever been in modern times, have
had reasons to bemoan and defy Western dominance over issues of cultural, political andeven philosophical import to any political society. This is their post-colonial era position,and one that would include Japan because its experience with modernisation was statusseeking in the Western dominated world. And, as European powers seek enhanced strategiccooperation with the powers in Asia to reform and maintain the rule-based internationaal

Great power relations and threats to the liberal international order 67

order, they need to be mindful that democracy’s path in Asia may not lead to the liberal democratic model in the West, but that it is being shaped out of the social and political struggle
in pushing back postcolonial legacies, including the strong role of the military, resisting theWestern imposition of “universal” vales while keeping a guarded stance against China.
Conclusion
The US-China rivalry has made apparent that there is a need for a more robust international
consensus on the extended definition of security, especially among great powers, where
the referent object is not just the sovereign state. Another aspect of this systemic change
would involve conscious eﬀorts to address issues in the post-colonial dimension of global
politics today, where the legacies of Western domination and subjugation of the world
persist and inform the toxic Manichean worldview of the West versus the rest, or Us versus
the Others. Japan once tried to impose its reactionary, Occidentalist order through the East
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, and failed catastrophically. China, in principle an anti-colonial
regime and mindful of this Japanese past, negotiated the anti-hegemonic clause in the jointstatement in 1972 that normalised relations between the two. But the irony is that China
is behaving in almost in the same way as Imperial Japan did 80 years ago. China appears
driven to seek great power status with ultra-patriotism and nationalist pride, fed by the narrative to restore Chinese greatness by overcoming 100 years of humiliation. In this picture,
how the current liberal international order evolves would be contingent upon two things:
how the post-Trump US engages with China, in relation to America’s allies and friends, and
how China can avoid the trap of repeating Japan’s mistake.
Needless to say, the theoretical and philosophical discussions for this less state-centricdeﬁnition of security are anchored in the English school and liberal internationalists. But
more often than not their contribution is obscured by the disagreements within the academic discipline of international relations theory, if they are not pitted against the dominantrealists and neo-realists to compete for an authoritative voice. A discernable challenge is
how much impact the academic, theoretical debates have on policymakers, particularly
those in the foreign and security policy community of great powers. This is not to say thatthe theoretical world that offers a more nuanced approach to international relations has
had no bearing on the real policy world and conducts of great powers. Nor do the realists,
particularly prevalent in the US, only see the world in the classical balance of military
power terms, if only because of the “discovery” of the utility of power of persuasion, or
soft power, as an eﬀective tool of American diplomacy in winning friends in the Cold War.

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But in mainstream policy discussions about geopolitical competition between the US andChina, there appears little room for nuance.
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Richard Haass, “The UN’s Unhappy Birthday”, Project Syndicate, 10 September 2020. https://www.
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3Richard Haass. “World Order 2.0”, Project Syndicate, 24 January 2017. https://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/globalized-world-order-sovereign-obligations-by-richard-n--haass-201701?barrier=accesspaylog
4
Christoph Bertram, Europe in Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War (New York:
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en/story/2020/04/1061502; Edith M Lederer, “UN chief: pandemic threatens peace and risks
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1 Global Security Threat,’ Head of UN Says”, The New York Times, 16 September 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000007046988/nursing-home-coronavirus.html?playlistId=video/
coronavirus-news-update
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Ivo H. Daalder & James M. Lindsay. “Nasty, Brutish and Long: America’s War on Terrorism”,
Brookings, Article, 1 December 2001. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/nasty-brutish-and-longamericas-war-on-terrorism/
Catharin E. Dalpino. “The War on Terror in Southeast Asia”, Brookings Op-Ed, 19 December 2001.
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7
Emma Rothschild. “What is Security?” Daedalus, Summer 1995, Vol. 124, No. 3, 53-98.
8
Susan M. Akram, “US punished the International Criminal Court for investigating potential
war crimes in Afghanistan”, The Conversation, 2 September 2020, https://theconversation.
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Global Times, 3 November 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1205542.shtml
9Kathy Gilsinan, “How China Deceived the WHO”, The Atlantic, 12 April 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/04/world-health-organization-blame-pandemiccoronavirus/609820/
10
Thomas E. Kellogg. “Xi’s Davos Speech: Is China the New Champion of the Liberal International
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11
James Masters and Katie Hunt, ‘Trump rattles NATO with “obsolete” blast’, CNN Politics, 17 Jan.
2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/16/politics/donald-trump-times-bild-interview-takeaways/.
Joyce P. Kaufman, “The US perspective on NATO under Trump: lessons of the past and prospects
for the future”, International Aﬀairs, Vol. 93, No. 2, 2017, 251-266. https://www.chathamhouse.org/

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Philipp Rotmann, Sarah Bressan, Sarah Brockmeier, “New Expectations: Generation Z and
Changing Attitudes on German Foreign Policy”, Global Public Policy Institute, 6 June 2020. https://www.gppi.net/2020/06/06/new-expectations-generation-z-and-changing-attitudes-on-germanforeign-policy
Meghan McGee, “Europe Needs to Push Back Against Trump”, Foreign Policy, 20 July 2020.
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Francois Godement and Gudrun Wacker. “France and Germany Together: Promoting a European
China Policy”, Policy Paper, Institut Montaigne and Gemeainnützige Hertie-Stiftung, November
2020, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/publications/promoting-european-china-policy-franceand-germany-together?&extc=RWA91cc
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The State of Southeast Asia: Survey Report 2020, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/
TheStateofSEASurveyReport_2020.pdf
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Rosa Beckmann and Ronja Kempin, “EU Defence Policy Needs Strategy”, SWP 34, September
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kmp.pdf
Raluca Csernatoni, “EU Security and Defense Challenges: Toward a European Defense Winter?”,
11 June 2020, Carnegie Europehttps://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/06/11/eu-security-and-defensechallenges-toward-european-defense-winter-pub-82032
Philippe Le Corre, “The EU’s New Defensive Approarch to a Rising China”, 1 July 2020, Carnegie
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Phillip Stephens, “Three compass points for an EU-China policy”, Financial Times, 4 June 2020.
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16
As John Dunn has written: “Seen as a whole, this is a disenchanted and demoralized world, all too
well adjusted to lives organized around the struggle to maximize personal income... If this is thetriumph of democracy, it is a triumph which very many will always ﬁnd disappointing.” John Dunn,
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17
Hans Kundani, “What is the Liberal International Order”, Political Essay, The German Marshakk
Fund of the United States, no. 17, 2017.
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Toward a Global Human Security Governance? Progress, Problems, and Prospects 71

Special Feature

Toward a Global Human Security Governance?
Progress, Problems, and Prospects
Sorpong Peou
Professor of Global Peace and Security,
Department of Politics and Public Administration, Ryerson University
Introduction
Much has been written about human security (Hanlon and Christie 2016; MacFarland
and Khong 2006; Peou 2019a, 2014a), but more work is still needed to help us assess theoverall impact of this concept on human life over the last 25 years. The 1990s was one of
the most optimistic decades in world history. In 1989, the UN General Assembly declared
the 1990s as “the decade of international law.” The decade is also known as the “sanctions
decade,” as the number of sanctions imposed on regimes that violated international law
increased exponentially (Cortright and Lepez 2002, 2000). In the middle of that decade,human security as a concept and a global policy objective also emerged. Proponents ofthis concept also developed a vision for a new system of global governance capable ofaddressing global challenges, such as threats to human security (Commission on Global
Governance 1995). Human security and global governance together gave rise to what may
be called global human security governance (GHSG). Overall, the 1990s looked set tobring a greater sense of optimism about the future of humanity.
This article takes stock of GHSG and argues that the last two decades have witnessed
an overall decline of activity in the idea of human security, as a global policy commitment
to making the world more humane has weakened. Evidence points to the growing realitythat the idea of securing people has once again been succumbing to the traditional conceptsof national security and regime security, as it did after World War II. Part of the problem
can be found in a lack of conceptual clarity and some of the policy instruments adopted byproponents of human security. Economic development, sanctions, military intervention,
peacebuilding and criminal prosecution, regarded as policy instruments to protect people orpromote human security, have proved to be either insuﬃcient or ineﬀective and might havebeen counter-productive.

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Global Human Security GovernanceThis section sheds light on human security as a concept and briefly discusses its historical development. The concept is distinct from others also related to security, most notably
national security, regime security, collective security, common security, comprehensive
security, cooperative, and global security (Peou 2014a; Capie and Evans 2002). Although
the terms used to characterize human security are not completely new, the concept was formalized only in the mid-1990s at the time when the concepts of global security and global
governance also emerged.
The concept of human security can be disguised from other concepts of security byanswering four basic questions: What is the referent object of security? What is being
secured against? Who provides for security? How is security provided? (Terriff et al.
1999). Based on these questions, human security is not the same as national security. The
realist referent object of national security is states, which function as the primary actors ininternational politics under anarchy. National security is about the security of states, whichhave been legally recognized as sovereign since the Westphalian Peace Treaty was signed
in 1648. States are subject to no higher body of authority and in need of protection fromexternal and internal threats to their interests, the most important of which is survival. In
other to ensure their survival, states are assumed by political realists to pursue the policy of
maximizing their security or power through the building of national defense systems andmilitary alliances, as well as through maintaining adversarial but stable balance-of-poweror balance-of-terror systems. Nuclear deterrence is an important military doctrine. The
accumulation of national wealth is another state priority. The term of economic security has
also been used to redeﬁne national security, not only associated with the security of states
but also of their populations or national citizens (Leﬄer 1990).
Critics of national security point to the reality in many states in which politicalregimes are insecure. Regime insecurity is one related to political regimes that exist in institutionally weak, failing and failed states because of their lack of political legitimacy. Suchregimes are usually illegitimate because they are not democratically elected or come to
power by coercive means and then resort to repressive violence as the method of maintaining power and security. For instance, they may even use biological and chemical weapons
in response to internal security threats like military coups, insurgencies, and domestic rivals(Koblentz 2013).
Human security is not the same as collective security either. The latter concept isbased on the assumption that the preponderance of power (not the balance of power) helps
maintain international peace and security (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991, 1998). The inter-Toward a Global Human Security Governance? Progress, Problems, and Prospects 73

national community has the collective power based on international law to protect statesand punish state aggression. As one scholar puts it, “Collective security operates on thestrength of an authoritative decision by a body of the international community” (Dinstein
2005: 278). States can still protect their national interests (such as ensuring their survival
based on the principle of self-defense) but can do so by forming an international community in which they all are under the universal obligation to act collectively when oneof them behaves aggressively in violation of international law. The United Nations (andits predecessor the League of Nations) represents that community whose members are
assumed to comply with international law and take collective action to punish any aggressor state regardless of whether it is an ally to any of them.
Common security as another concept is also different from national and collective
security in that more emphasis is placed on international disarmament and arms control,
as well as a commitment by states to their joint survival. The Independent Commission on
Disarmament and Security (1982) was the ﬁrst to develop this concept under the chairmanship of Olof Palme, whose report stresses that no state can ensure its security at the expenseof another’s. The Commission states that, “A doctrine of common security must replace
the present expedient of deterrence through armaments. International peace must rest on acommitment to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual destruction” (Ibid.: 139, italics
original). Proponents of this concept do not seek to abolish military force immediately but
seek to temper it with the process of diplomatic reassurance. Military deterrence is still relevant but must be balanced by the need for states to reassure one another of non-oﬀensive
intentions by also adopting the strategy of “non-provocative defense.” Ultimately, however,the concept of common security necessitates real policy steps toward nuclear and conventional arms control and disarmament.
The economic component of security receives greater emphasis in the concept ofcomprehensive security, which was first coined by Japanese Prime Minister Masayoshi
Ohira in 1980. Although it remains state-centric, the concept is broadened and deepened
to include economic security and diplomacy (Akaha 1991). In the 1980s, Japan became
known as a “trading state” and was not known as a military power. As a resource-poor
country in need of natural resources from other countries in order to produce and export
manufactured and high-tech goods, Japan placed its priority on economic development
without at the same time sacriﬁcing the need for military security. A major component of
economic security is energy security, which has also been associated with the idea of environmental security.
The end of the Cold War further witnessed global efforts to promote the concept ofcooperative security, based on the assumption that state security can only be achieved

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広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8through cooperation rather than competition or self-defence alone. Like common security,
cooperative security recognizes the need for arms control and disarmament; however, thelatter places more emphasis on the need to promote multilateral cooperation among states
through various policy measures and instruments such as non-proliferation of weapons,security- and conﬁdence-building measures, peace operations, and economic development.
The objective is to either reduce damage caused by war or prevent war from breaking out
and to build and maintain peace, which can be achieved when states in this security framework recognize that they have an equal right to security and that their security is mutuallyinterdependent (Zellner 2010).
The concepts of security discussed so far are largely state-centric, but one of the twoconcepts that is more people-centered are global security and human security. Although one
can make the case that the two concepts are two sides of the same coin, it is worth emphasizing that global security is more comprehensive than human security in that it covers justabout everything, from military to nonmilitary security. For instance, the Commission on
Global Governance deﬁnes global security as inclusive of national, international and humansecurity, as well as the security of our planet earth. National security includes the protectionof boundaries, institutions and values but is not exclusive of human protection, more thanjust ruling elites. Survival of states is still recognized, but the security of people is just as
or more important. According to the Commission, “the security of people must be regarded
as a goal as important as the security of states. Ultimately, the two objectives are not in
conﬂict: states cannot be secure for long unless their citizens are secure” (Commission on
Global Governance 1995: 81).
Upon closer examination, the concept of human security has been regarded as more
important than national security in that the latter cannot be used to justify political leaders
taking action to consolidate power by silencing the domestic opposition and suppressing
their citizens or their human rights. However, it may also be useful to clarify here thathuman rights and human security are not quite the same, although some of their conceptual
elements overlap. Human rights are concerned with the way in which governments treat
their own citizens who are assumed to enjoy such individual rights as civil and politicalrights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Thus, international human rights law
is quite broad and has a long list of its violations, not all of which are about human security.
Adopted in 1948 by the UN General Assembly and part of international human rights law,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains rights, including two fundamental
elements of human security. Its Preamble states that, “disregard and contempt for humanrights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, andthe advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief andToward a Global Human Security Governance? Progress, Problems, and Prospects 75

freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common
people” (Italics added). These human rights can also be traced back to 1941 when U.S.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) delivered a major speech that laid out four freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear
(Engel 2016; italics added). Human security is more speciﬁcally about freedom from fear
and want, as deﬁned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1994).
Freedom from both fear and want refers to the idea that individual human beings,
not just states or their leaders, are the key referent object of security. According to UNDP,“human security is people-centred” (UNDP 1994: 23. Italics added). Proponents do not saythat all humans are equally insecure, as some more secure than others. They pay most of
their attention to civilian populations who are most vulnerable to physical and non-physicalviolence, such as victims of war and mass atrocities as well as other serious forms of deprivation, such as unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, hunger, poor health, and lack of medicalcare.
The UNDP idea of human security has led proponents in two different but arguably
mutually reinforcing approaches: development-based” and “protection-based” (MacFarland
and Khong 2006). Freedom from fear means freedom from direct or physical violence,
which includes a number of threats to community security and personal security such assectarian and ethnic violence, threats from the state (physical torture), threats from otherstates (war), threats from other group of people (ethnic tension), threats from individuals organgs against other individuals or gangs (crime and street violence), and threats directed atchildren based on their vulnerability and dependence (child abuse). Proponents of freedom
from fear pay close attention to the tragic events after the end of the Cold War, such as
intra-state armed conﬂicts and mass atrocities that took place in countries like the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, where unarmed civilian populations based on their religious andethnic backgrounds were subject to what came to be known as mass atrocities like war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. In short, the legal foundation of freedom
from fear is built not only on international human rights law but also on various other institutions such as international humanitarian law and international criminal law and global
norms such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Bellamy 2011).
The development-based approach gives priority to freedom from want or the absenceof indirect or nonphysical violence. This aspect of human security is centered on the ideaof prevention rather than intervention, bottom-up rather than top-down, placing emphasis
on social-economic and human development rather than coercive international intervention. Proponents of this freedom also pay much attention to the threat of environmental
degradation as a major threat to human survival (Mohajan 2015). They adopted the idea

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広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8of “sustainable development,” formulated by the World Commission on Environment andDevelopment (1987:8) making the case that development is “sustainable” when it “meetsthe [human] needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs.” Global climate change and the loss of biodiversity have givenrise to the politics of scarcity. Thus, there is a need to preserve our global commons andensure environmental security if our human welfare and security are to be maintained.
There is also a sense of urgency to get diﬀerent actors to take collective action that would
reverse environmental threats (Brainard et al. 2009). In September 2015, for instance, 193
UN member states adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with 17 goals toensure world peace and prosperity for people and the planet.
The policy instruments designed to ensure and enhance freedom from fear andfreedom from want include the following: smart sanctions, military intervention (peace
enforcement and peacekeeping), and peacebuilding (democratic and rule-of-law institution
building as well as international criminal justice through the work of international criminal tribunals and courts, such as the International Criminal Court or ICC), and economic
development (Peou 2019a, 2014a). The role of other nonstate actors such as global civilsociety organizations (such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and various international development organizations)play a formal and informal role in helping to protect people and contributing to their socioeconomic wellbeing.
In short, GHSG is narrower than what some scholars refer to as global security governance (Sperling 2007) in that human beings are the key referent object of security. Broadly
deﬁned, GHSG is a system of governance made up of formal and informal institutions (i.e.,international law) and processes in and through which diﬀerent actors (state and nonstate)
take collective action to address threats to human freedom from both fear and want. States
and nonstate actors (especially international organizations like the United Nations, theEuropean Union, the African Union, and the ICC) are capable of taking collective action
through relying on the above policy instruments to ensure and enhance the twins of freedom.
Mission Accomplished?
The extent to which individual human beings around the world have become more securesince the mid-1990s when the concept of human security was formalized and entered the
security lexicon is a matter of debate and further research. What is clear is that the idea of
human security has been confronted by several major challenges and appears to be on theToward a Global Human Security Governance? Progress, Problems, and Prospects 77

decline in terms of policy practice, as the concepts of national and regime security haveregained momentum.
On one hand, some proponents of human security have observed some positive developments in recent years. In the Asia-Paciﬁc, for instance, they highlight what major countries like Australia, Japan and South Korea have done to improve human security. Australia
is said to have coordinated with Japan, Indonesia and the Pacific Islands Forum on thisfront. Japan has engaged in peacebuilding in fragile states. Some Japanese writers characterize the Japanese approach to human security on the basis of the “Tokyo Consensus”(Hoshino and Satoh 2016). Even sovereign-centric states like China appear to be moving
slowly in this direction, despite the fact that human security has yet to appear on the government’s policy agenda and despite China’s “people-ﬁrst” doctrine (Tow 2016; Ren and
Li 2016; Zhang and Zeng 2016).
On the other hand, much of what has been positively observed tends to highlight
freedom from want in terms of policy commitment to such issues as health care, energy
security, and sustainable development, and yet few of these have been accomplished invarious parts of the world. A proponent of development-based human security has this tosay, “despite the commissions, resolutions, reports, declarations and a multimillion-dollar
Trust Fund, and despite the consensus of like-minded countries on the protection of people,
human security is far from having been achieved, or even adopted as a global – let alone
national – goal” (Tadjbakhsh 2014: 2). In her assessment, “the term ‘human security’still courts rejection twenty years after its inception” (Ibid.). This is not to suggest that noprogress has been made in terms of human development. One indicator of this progressis poverty reduction: “global poverty has fallen substantially, with a major portion of thedecline attributable to China. Even when China is omitted from the sample, poverty reduction is still considerable” (Fosu 2017: 306).
But efforts at meeting human security objectives are far from ideal, as the policy
objective to promote freedom from want has been meet with growing challenges. Whenbroadly defined, the promise of human security as a global policy agenda also remains
unfulfilled. While the general human development index shows an overall improvement,
global poverty remains a threat to people. Although “[p]overty rates in the developingworld have decreased dramatically over the past decades” (Wietzke 2019), many people
remain poor. According to the United Nations, more than 700 million people still live under
the international poverty line of $1.90 a day and most of them belong to Southern Asia
and Sub-Saharan Africa. High poverty rates remain evident in conflict-affected countries(UNDP 2016). By 2018, many of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals remain unfulfilled. Even in the Asia-Pacific, where economic growth has been impressive, states are

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not even on track to achieving any of the goals in 2030. According to a UN report (ESCAP2019), for instance, progress in some areas (such as ending poverty, access to quality education, as well as affordable and clean energy) remains limited; however, trends in otherareas have even been negative. Clean water and sanitation, economic growth and decent
work, as well as responsible consumption and production show negative trends.
Other developments have not been particularly encouraging either. The system ofglobal health governance, for instance, has come under challenge when Covid-19 became
a global pandemic early in 2020. By early 2021, the virus had infected almost 100 million people and claimed more than two million lives. Lack of international cooperation to
mitigate the threat quickly became evident. A group of scholars have this to say about thelack of coordination on global health: “COVID-19 has highlighted the need for action at
local and national scales, as well as cooperation that is multilateral for providing global
public goods” and “closer coordination” among states in the area of economic nationalism
is required (Oldekop et al. 2020: 3). Global trade governance has weakened since the Doha
Round of trade negotiations began to stall and has since made no progress, giving way toregional and bilateral trade agreements (Cohn 2016: 260). The trade ‘war’ between China
and the United States escalated, proving to be harmful to multilateral trade, and is likely tocause collateral damage in the Asia-Paciﬁc. Global energy governance also has to confront
with the reality of growing geopolitical competition among states, as ﬁnite energy resources
are fast-depleting (Lehmann 2017).
Geopolitics appears to be making a comeback (Walt 2018; Mead 2014; Kaplan 2014;
Mearsheimer 2014 and 2006). The terror attacks on the United States on 11 September
2001 turned world politics backward: more war on terrorism with a renewed emphasis on
national security. The U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 were driven
by the United States’ alleged policy to reassert its hegemonic position in world politics(Butt 2019) and produced deadly consequences, such as the global spread of terrorism, therise of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), counterterrorism, and an internationalized
civil war in Syria. Major ﬂashpoints around the world continue unabated. In the Near Eastand Middle East, the major ﬂashpoints include the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict, the wars in
Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, the threat of Iran’s regional ambitions and its nuclear program.
The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 exacerbated diﬃcult relations between Russia
and the West (Mearsheimer 2014). In Northeast Asia, North Korea’s nuclear threat continues. In South Asia, the standoﬀ and territorial disputes among three nuclear protagonists –China, India and Pakistan – remain unresolved.
The rise of China has also complicated relations among states in and outside East
Asia, as territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas as well as the Taiwan StraitToward a Global Human Security Governance? Progress, Problems, and Prospects 79

have escalated in recent years. Under President Xi Jinping who claims to be committed to
the SDG agenda, China continues to spend much on defence and protects political regimesthat are undemocratic, corrupt, and abusive of human rights. Beijing has sought to build a“world-class military” by 2049 (Fravel 2019). China has been accused of using its development assistance to promote its national interests, establish security alliances, and undermine
eﬀorts by Western democracies to promote democracy, human rights, and good governance(Dreher and Fuchs 2015; Naim 2007; Tull 2006). For its part, Japan has been transformed
from a state once characterized by commercial pacifism to one that shows an inclination
toward realism (Peou 2021; Green 2001). Tokyo has built its first aircraft carriers andplans to buy more advanced military aircraft (42 F-35s and 105 F-35As) over the next 10
years. Japan, whose military alliance with the United States has survived the Cold War, isreevaluating its dependence on the latter’s security guarantees as it is confronted with thepossibility it might need to prepare for war (Smith 2019).
Since the turn of the 21st century, global military spending has also increased. Total
global military spending in 2018, for instance, rose to $1,822 billion. China (with $250
billion) and the United States (with $649 billion) alone represent half of the amount (SIPRI
2019a). Global arms sales are still moving in a similar upward trend. In 2017, arms sales
and military services by the world’s top 100 arms-producing and military services companies reached $398.2 billion, representing an increase of 44% since 2002. The companies
based in the United States (with $226.6 billion) accounted for 57% of the amount, followedby those based in Russia (with $37.7 billion) (SIPRI 2018). According to the StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute, “The volume of international transfers of majorarms in 2014 – 18 was 7.8 per cent higher than in 2009 – 13 and 23 per cent higher than in
2004 – 2008” (SPRI 2019). In Asia and Oceania, to where 40% of global arms sales wentfrom 2014 to 2018, the five top importers were India, Australia, China, South Korea, andVietnam. The second largest importer region was the Middle East, which received 40% of
global arms imports in the same period (SIPRI 2019b).
At the same time, global spending on peace operations is nowhere close to global
defence spending. Global eﬀorts at global peacekeeping and peacebuilding remain woefully
limited (Peou 2014b). Currently the UN Department of Peace Operations leads 14 peacekeeping missions around the world, most of which are in Africa. As noted, global militaryspending has increased and far exceeded spending on peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
The UN budget approved for the 14 peacekeeping operations deployed around the world,most of which were in Africa (from July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2019) was comparatively
miniscule: only $6.69 billion. Between 2006 and 2017, the UN Peacebuilding Fund, which
was designed to prevent a relapse into violent conflict, allocated only $772 million to 41

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広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8countries (UN 2019).
Meanwhile, armed conflicts and political violence around the world (especially in
the Middle East and North Africa) as well as other nontraditional sources of insecurity
continue. They have produced large numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees
who are among the world’s most vulnerable and insecure groups. More than 70 million
people had been forced out of their home by 2018 and nearly 30 million of them wererefugees. According to a UN report, “the world is witnessing the highest levels of displacement on record” (UN n.d.a.). A report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime also showsthat homicidal violence in 2017 killed far more people worldwide (464,000) than armed
conﬂict (89,000) and terrorist violence (26,000) in the same year, representing an increase
from 362,000 in 1990. According to the report, “Between 2015 and 2017 the total numberof homicide victims worldwide increased by 4 per cent, or around 19,000 victims.” “If thistrend continues,” says the report, “target 16.1 (‘significantly reduce all forms of violence
and related death rates everywhere’) under Sustainable Development Goal 16…set in 2015,
will not be met by 2030” (UNODC 2019: 11).
Overall, according to the global peace index of the Institute for Economics & Peace(IEP 2020: 1), which measures global peacefulness by covering 99.7 percent of the world’s
population, “the level of global peacefulness deteriorated, with the average country scorefalling by 0.34 per cent. This is the ninth deterioration in peacefulness in the last twelve
years.” The largest factors that contributed to the deterioration in peacefulness are terrorism
and internal conflict, despite a decline in terrorism-related deaths. The number of natural
disasters has also seen a threefold increase in the last four decades and the total economic
cost associated with this phenomenon jumped to $200 billion in the 2010s from $50 billion
in the 1980s (Ibid.: 1).
The question remains: Why is it that the idea of human security appears to havemade no significant impact? There may be many reasons, some of which can be readily
identiﬁed. Conceptually, there is no global consensus on what human security means, andthis makes it diﬃcult for the global policy community to take collective action to address
threats to human security. Critics have pointed to the lack of conceptual clarity. Roland
Paris (2001) was among the ﬁrst critics to make the case against the concept by questioning its usefulness because it lacks a precise deﬁnition and because its proponents prefer tokeep the concept expansive and vague. The concept of human security is something thatmost people can talk about, but one of the main challenges is the extent to which it canbe operationalized. One of the questions is: If human security covers almost everything,what is not human security? The concept has certainly opened a Pandora’s Box: it almost
means diﬀerent things to diﬀerent people. This concept has become amorphous to the point

Toward a Global Human Security Governance? Progress, Problems, and Prospects 81

where any collective action required for ensuring the security of individual human beings
has become extremely difficult, if not impossible, to be taken. As noted, the concepts ofnational and regime security have become increasingly pervasive.
Theoretically and empirically, scholars and policy makers disagree on how to implement the human security agenda. Some advocate a “bottom-up” approach (Hanlon andChristie 2016). Others adopt a “top-down” approach in favor of military intervention,
economic sanctions, and judicial deterrence (Peou 2014). States, especially powerful ones,
continue to maximize their power and security far more extensively than what they havedone for humanity. The world is not decisively moving toward global human security governance. Some progress has been reversed. Realism continues to cast a shadow over thevision for a more humane world.
Challenges to Human Security: Global
Actors and International Policy Instruments
In spite of their noble vision for a more humane world, proponents of human security havelargely engaged in making normative arguments, one of which is that states alone cannot
address global challenges such as armed conflicts and mass atrocities and that nonstate
actors should play a greater role. Evidence appears to challenge this thinking and the policy
instruments developed to realize the vision are limited in terms of effectiveness or evencounterproductive.
The trouble with the normative thinking on human security is that it tends to overstate
the utility of nonstate actors, most notably intergovernmental organizations like the United
Nations, international nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations.
In fact, an argument can still be made: States remain the best provider of human security
Barry Buzan still makes a compelling argument when making the following remark: statesremain “a necessary condition for individual security because without the state it is notclear what the other agency is to act on behalf of individuals” (Buzan 2001: 589). While
the state remains the best, if insuﬃcient, actor in ensuring human security, national governments have yet to place the security of individuals beyond their national borders as a toppriority on their policy agendas.
Even countries that keep human security on their policy agendas still largely adhere
to national security. With the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union, anti-EU
populism, illiberal nationalism and the inability of EU members to speak with one voice on
major foreign and defence policy issues, regional integration in Europe has become unraveled (Walt 2019; Gramer 2019). Although many democratic states within the European

82

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8Union are treated as post-Westphalian, those in the Asia-Pacific are not moving in thisdirection. In the Asia-Pacific whose countries are known for their economic ‘miracles,’states remain Westphalian in policy orientation as they remain wedded to state sovereignty
and security, still “preoccupied with protecting autonomy and independence, retaining agatekeeping role, and avoiding external interference in domestic and constitutional arrangements” (Sperling 2007:282). According to William Tow, “in the Asia-Pacific context, thestate largely remains the referent object of security and the securitizing agent” (Tow 2016:10). National security also continues to shape Australia’s foreign policy agenda (Waltonand Akimoto 2016). In short, governments in various regions of the world remain committed to the concept of national security or regime security, moving nowhere much closer tothe idea of human security.
Moreover, the idea of human security appears to suffer from implementing certain
policy measures that have proved to be insuﬃcient, ineﬀective, and even counterproductive. It is interesting to recall that Franklin Roosevelt’s idea of freedoms did not pave theway for the development of human security after World War II and may have contributed
to the strengthening of national security, the emergence of the Cold War, global terrorism
and the war on terrorists around the world, and possibly the post-Cold War resurgenceof geopolitics. The American president’s idea was evidently designed to prepare theAmericans for a collective war against the Axis Powers and survived his presidency. The
fear of holocaust, the fear of communism and the enlargement of national security wereinstead justiﬁed in American foreign policy. The four freedoms were pursued “everywherein the world” (Hitchcock 2016) but may have produced unintended consequences. The U.S.
policy ended up reinforcing and reiterating American exceptionalism, as well as stimulating
American imperialism that sparked “hatred intense enough to motivate terrorist attacks on
the United States” (Costigliola 2016: 186).
It is also questionable whether economic growth would produce the overall enhancement of human security. On one hand, economic growth in various parts of the world
appears to be insuﬃcient in ensuring the security of people because of poor national governance, as evidenced by the challenges that states in Africa still face (Peou 2019a: 175-76).
On the other hand, impressive economic growth in East Asia has not made people in theregion fully secure either. States that are economically developed or developing (such as
Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam) tend to increase defence spending or maintain high defence expenditures. Most noteworthy is the fact that Japan, one of
the world’s most developed countries, used its newfound wealth to complete its rearmament in the late 1980s by turning its Self-Defence Forces into a modern, technologicallyadvanced force (Smith 2019). More can be said about China: Driven by economic growth,Toward a Global Human Security Governance? Progress, Problems, and Prospects 83

it has increased defence spending.
Smart sanctions as a policy instrument have been adopted by the United Nations andits members, such as those in the European Union and the United States, to change statebehavior or stop human rights violations, and to counter to terrorism committed by nonstate actors, but it remains a controversial measure. As pointed by one writer, “a targeted
sanctions regime is now the preferred Security Council sanctions instrument. Indeed, allof the recent sanctions measures imposed by the Security Council have been targeted”(Stephanides 2002: ix). Since the mid-1990s, this policy tool has been reﬁned and implemented to avoid collateral damage (Cortright and Lepez 2002). It is assumed that this policy tool has been eﬀective not only in minimizing pain for vulnerable civilian populations
in target countries but also in improving human rights in non-target countries (Carneiro,
Christiane De Andradelucena 2014). Some ﬁndings, however, suggest that civilian populations in target countries suﬀer, but those in non-target countries beneﬁt from sanctions. As
one scholar puts it, “sanction activity may yield increases in respect for human rights at the
global level, but that increase likely comes at the expense of those that live in states where
human rights sanctions are imposed” (Clay 2018: 134). Overall, however, some scholars
even talk about the end-times of human rights (Hopgood 2014). Others point to the worldwide retreat of liberal democracy (Freedom House 2019; Economist 2018).
What is clear is that the “sanctions decade” has not given rise to a global system inwhich the concept of human security prevails upon those of national and regime security. In
fact, sanctions have exacerbated geopolitical competition to the detriment of human security. The recent U.S. sanctions on Iran imposed by the Trump administration, for instance,
have not only harmed the Iranian economy but also “empowered anti-US forces within
Iranian politics, and armed conﬂict with the US remains a possible outcome” (IISS 2019).
The sanctions imposed on Syria have resulted in human suﬀering, despite the fact that its
government has been the target. Nour Samaha (2019) is correct in making the conclusionthat “sanctions can never be ‘smart’.” Instead of weakening the repressive regime in Syria,
the U.S. and E.U. sanctions have strengthened it. The West “needs to be far more honest
about the counter-productiveness of a tool, and particularly sectoral sanctions, which willproduce little in its stated intentions and instead have a detrimental impact on the wider
population” (Samaha 2019). The cases of North Korea and Myanmar show smart sanctions
still cause human insecurity (Peou 2019b).
Military intervention for human protection has been a controversial topic. As noted
above, the amount of spending on international peacekeeping is miniscule when compared
to global military spending. Even some democratic countries like Canada and Norway thatused to embrace human security also have no longer explicitly embraced the concept (Peou84

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 82009). When it came to power in 2006, the conservative government shelved the concept
and slashed the funding. The country “dropped out of sight internationally as a promoter ofthe concept” (Small 2016: 1). The liberal government, formed after the 2015 election, didbetter in terms of its commitment to human rights, but the Canadian contribution to peacekeeping diminished substantially: only 68 troops in 2017 and 112 in 2016. During the Cold
War and into the 1990s, Canada was the world’s top contributor to UN peace operations(with over 3,000 troops).
For proponents of human security who embrace the norm of Responsibility to Protect(R2P), the use of force is necessary when civilian populations are being massacred or comeunder the threat of mass murder; however, outcomes are not always desirable. For instance,
they view NATO’s military attacks on Libya in 2011 as the ﬁrst instance of R2P in action,
this was “the ﬁrst time that the Security Council has authorized the use of military force forhuman protection purposes against the wishes of a functioning state” (Bellamy 2011: 263).
The NATO intervention in Libya proved to be harmful to many people in this country andglobally divisive. It has now become clear that the intervention has yet to make the peopleof Libya more secure. Bellamy writes: “the form of intervention in Libya was highly imperfect, that it delivered indirect and patchy protection at best, and that it placed the region’s
long-term stability in the hands of fractious rebels about whom little is known” (Ibid. 269.
Italics added). Developments since 2011 have been detrimental to human security. According to Mark Curtis (2019), “the West’s war in Libya spurred terrorism into 14 countries.”
Alan Kuperman (2015) regards the military action as an “abject failure”: Not only has
the country “failed to evolve into a democracy,” but it also “has devolved into a failed
state.” According to a report by Amnesty International (2019: 1), “Militias, armed groups
and security forces continued to commit with impunity crimes under international law
and gross human rights violations and abuses, including war crimes, throughout the year.
Clashes between competing militias resulted in an increased number of civilian casualties.
Thousands of people were held indefinitely without any judicial process following arbitrary arrest, including many detained since 2011.” Human Rights Watch (2018) also painta grim picture of post-2011 Libya. Worse still, no collective action has been taken in thename of R2P to put an end to the civil war that broke out in 2014 in Syria (Nasser-Eddine,
M. 2012), a country that has become a major battleground for geopolitical competition
between major powers, most notably Russia and the United States. NATO’s intervention in
Libya angered Russia, but its failure has also emboldened the latter to play a more activerole in the Middle East and Northern Africa (O’Conner 2017).
The pursuit of international criminal justice also does not appear to become more
effective than the use of military force and economic sanctions, despite the optimistic

Toward a Global Human Security Governance? Progress, Problems, and Prospects 85

assumption that international criminal tribunals and courts would be able to help end armed
conﬂicts and mass atrocities or deter them. The establishment of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) in 2002 does not seem to have produced any signiﬁcant eﬀects on the actionsof political regimes that violate human rights or threaten the security of their own people.
The ICC and other criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Court of Cambodia have not yet made many parts of the world safer forcivilian populations. Cambodia has moved away from a nascent democracy back toward a
one-party state (Peou 2019). Many countries in East Asia are still under authoritarian rule.
Ethnic violence is still pervasive in Myanmar, where ethnic cleansing has been committed
by the military-dominated regime against Rohingya civilians. According to one scholar,“neither the ICC nor R2P can confront the underlying causes of many conﬂicts: to do that
requires a commitment to radical change in international economics, not international politics or international law” (Ainley 2015: 53).
All in all, the global use of economic, military and judicial threat to change bad political behavior since the 1990s has not given rise to an international system based on the ideaof human security. From Cambodia to Indonesia and East Timor and from Myanmar to
North Korea, the threat of judicial punishment directed at ruling elites tend to be ineﬀective
or detrimental to the security of civilian populations (David and Holliday 2006; Peou 2016,2014a). Instead of giving up power, authoritarian leaders dig their heels in when coming
under threat and hold on to power even if it means causing human suﬀering. According totheir work on Myanmar, for instance, Roman David and Ian Holliday (2012: 136) argue
that, “our experts deﬁed much activist opinion in holding that revoking both policies had
the best chance of promoting thoroughgoing reform inside the country.” Their experts
advocated a combination of policy actions: the lifting of sanctions and guarantees of nonprosecution. Thus, proponents of sanctions, judicial punishment or its threat and military
humanitarian intervention may need to reﬂect more critically on the fact these policy tools
have been ineﬀective and may even contribute to human insecurity.
Conclusion
Overall, the last decade of the 20th century ushered in the idea of human security but thefirst two decades of the 21st century began to witness an overall decline of policy interestin the promotion of human security. The future for global human security governance is far
from ideal since states are far from obsolete and international organizations as well as othernon-state actors have not yet become the primary agents of change. The vision for a more86

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8humane world appears to have been sliding back to the old world where states continue topursue their national interests and political regimes in many weak states seek to enhancetheir security at the expense of human interest, as they spend more on national defence thanon peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Part of the problem is that the concept of human security is ambitious but amorphous, thus making it diﬃcult for states and other actors to takeeﬀective collective action. Moreover, policy instruments such as smart sanctions, militaryintervention for human protection, and international criminal justice have not delivered
decisive results. In fact, they have proved to be either ineﬀective or even counterproductive.
In short, it is not an over-exaggeration to conclude that the vision for a world governedby human security continues to grow dim. Global human security governance needs to bestrengthened, but much more must be done. One of the steps that needs to be taken now is
to draw lessons from past failures by closely and honestly examining what has gone wrong,
including the way policy instruments were designed and implemented.

Dr. Sorpong Peou is Full Professor in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Ryerson University and a member of the Yeates School of Graduate Studies.
He is a Member of the Eminent Persons Group at the Asian Political and International
Student Association and was President of Science for Peace, based at the University ofToronto. From 1999 to 2010, he was Professor of International Security at Sophia University (Tokyo, Japan), Canada-ASEAN Fellow and Fellow at the Institute of Southeast AsianStudies (Singapore). He has written extensively on peace and security issues. His forthcoming book is entitled, Peace and Security in Indo-Pacific Asia: IR Perspective in Context(Routledge 2021).
Note: This article is a substantially revised version of my article (Peou 2019a). Permission to republish parts of the original article was granted by the EDITOR-IN-CHIEF of
the journal.
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David Walton, and Rikki Kirsten. Routledge.

Global Threats to Peace and Human Security: Finding Regional Solutions to Transboundary Threats in Southeast Asia 91

Special Feature

Global Threats to Peace and Human Security:
Finding Regional Solutions to Transboundary Threats in Southeast Asia
Mely-CABALLERO ANTHONY
Professor of International Relations; Head, Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies,
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;
Margareth SEMBIRING
Associate Research Fellow; Centre for NTS Studies, RSIS, NTU, Singapore
1. Security in a Changing Global Environment
Much has changed in the notion of security, brought on and defined by the significant
changes in the global environment. In the post-Cold War era, the state centric, militaryorientated understanding of security was critiqued to be inadequate as new threats emergedthat were detrimental to the national security. Issues like environmental degradation, economic security and energy security began to gain attention in international policy discourses
and international relations as these issues were deemed to be drivers of domestic unrest andinternational conﬂicts (Mathews 1989, Ullman 1983). Mathews (1989) for instance argued
that resource mismanagement could result in acute transboundary challenges such as forced
migration, which in turn, could result in social and ecological stresses to receiving communities. Homer-Dixon (1994, 1999) went further to argue that there is a causal relationshipbetween environmental stress and violent conﬂicts noting that the impact of environmental
stress on aﬀected, marginalized communities generate frustration and resentment expressedin violent actions.
Changes in the global security environment did not only result in an expansion of
the notion of security beyond military threats to states but also drew attention to threats toindividuals as the other referent object of security. As the incidence of interstate conﬂicts
dramatically decreased while the number internal conﬂicts surged, the security concerns ofindividuals and communities compelled a new thinking on security (Buzan, Waever and de
Wilde 1998). From the pre-occupation of national (read state) security came a new security
concept called human security which argued for paying more attention to threats faced byindividuals, groups and communities (UNDP 2004, Hampson 2002, Paris 2001, Newman2010). According to Mahbuh Ul Haq, we “need to fashion a new concept of human security

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広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8that is reﬂected in the lives of our people, not in the weapons of our country” (Ul Haq citedin Bajpai 2000).1 The 1994 UNDP operationalizing of the concept outlined 7 threats tohuman security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security,
personal security, community security and political security, and clustered along “freedom
from fear” and “freedom from want” (UNDP 1994: 23).
In the last two decades since the adoption of the human security in academic andpolicy platforms, the kinds of threats to human security have expanded, largely driven by
evolving changes in the global environment. The looming threats of climate change havedrawn attention to extreme weather events, catastrophic natural disasters, massive displacement of population, and food and health security among others. That these issues haveshown to have transborder impact and scope, as well as compound human security threats
have significantly reinforced the need to take a multilateral approach to address thesetransboundary challenges. The rationale being that unless the impacts of these transnational
challenges are addressed and mitigated collectively, these issues can escalate into threats to
global peace and security.
The transnationality of these threats to human security further led to the introductionof the concept of non-traditional security (NTS). Conceptually, NTS shares the conceptual
space of human security, but regards threats to human security like climate change andenvironment as challenges to the well-being and security of not only individuals but also
states. As defined, non-traditional security issues are challenges to the survival and wellbeing of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climatechange, environment degradation and resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime. It is in this conceptualization that human security is explicitly linked to nontraditional security issues; that human needs are best met and protected when the economy
is functioning well, pollution levels are low, food, water and energy are adequately available, society is resilient to disasters, and criminal activities are curbed. These cross-cutting
issues often defies unilateral remedies and require comprehensive – political, economic,
social – responses, as well as humanitarian use of military force (NTS-Asia, cited in
Caballero-Anthony, 2016).
Against this background, this article looks at the kinds of non-traditional security
issues endangering human security and examines how these threats are addressed in Southeast Asia. By focusing on climate change and environmental issues, we argue that while

Global Threats to Peace and Human Security: Finding Regional Solutions to Transboundary Threats in Southeast Asia 93

regional states through ASEAN have put in a lot of effort in addressing these challenges
collectively, more can certainly be done to deal with these issues comprehensively. These
include confronting difficult challenges such as resources, working around the norms of
non-interference and sovereignty and recognizing the environment as an important referentof security. At the very least, these comprehensive approaches help ensure human security.
2. Dealing with transnational security challenges in Southeast Asia and beyond
Transnational security threats like climate change bring dire consequences to both societies
and states. These threats are often complex and cross-cutting in nature, and their impact
are diﬃcult to reverse when we look at desertiﬁcation and loss of habitat caused by climatechange. More importantly, national solutions are often inadequate to respond to these complex and transborder threats and would thus require regional and multilateral cooperation(Caballero-Anthony 2016).
The need to foster and strengthen regional cooperation in dealing with transnational, non-traditional security threats has gained a lot of traction in the ASEAN region
and beyond. This is reflected in the official deliberations in ASEAN and the ASEAN-ledregional institutions such as the ASEAN Plus Three, the ASEAN Regional Forum, theASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and the East Asia Summit. Civil
society groups across the region and track-two networks like the Council for Security andCooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) have also been advocating for greater regional
and international cooperation in their various policy platforms. More significantly, nontraditional security has now become part of the security lexicon not only within Asia but
also beyond the region.
Adopting a comprehensive regional approach to security challenges has been the
ASEAN story. For most of its 53-year history, the security thinking in ASEAN is that
security can only be achieved comprehensively, with economic development and politicalcooperation being the core pillars of regional peace and security. The close nexus between
security and development and the need to have a comprehensive approach have been
notable features in ASEAN’s security practices. This approach remained consistent over theyears but was recalibrated with the adoption of the 3-pillared ASEAN community, namely:
the ASEAN Political-Security community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) in 2003.

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The APSC and its relations to the other Community pillars are interesting as it issigniﬁcant. Mindful of the changing nature of security threats confronting the region thatwere becoming transnational such as environmental degradation and irregular migration,
the APSC was geared to raise the level of political and security cooperation in ASEAN toa higher plane. In its latest iteration, the APSC is seen as a means to “ensure a rules-based
and inclusive community in which peoples enjoy human rights, fundamental freedoms andsocial justice, live in a safe and secure environment with enhanced capacity to respondeffectively to emerging challenges…” (ASEAN 2015). It has 4 constituent elements: (1)a rules-based, people oriented, people-centred community bound by shared values andnorms, (2) a resilient community…with enhanced capacity to respond effectively and ina timely manner to challenges for the common good, (3) an outward-looking communitythat deepens cooperation with external parties, and (4) a community with strengthened
institutional capacity through improved ASEAN processes and coordination with ASEAN
institutions (ASEAN 2015).
The APSC is signiﬁcant in that it revealed the decision of ASEAN member states tore-think and calibrate their security practices in order to make the association more relevantin changing times and enhance its capacity to respond effectively and in timely manner
to emerging transnational threats. In effect, the APSC is both a normative and functionalframework of security cooperation. It is an approach that also encourages regional solutions to regional problems, based on the understanding that ensuring national and regional
security requires working beyond borders.
The approach of the APSC in stepping up cooperation on security issues is the same
approach that informs the modalities in the other 2 pillars of the ASEAN community. Thisis particularly important to the ASCC as well given that issues like the environment andclimate change are placed under this pillar. ASEAN has also been promoting the so-calledcross-pillar approach to dealing with transnational challenges giving the cross-cutting
nature of these threats. In brief, the 3-pillars can also be regarded as the pathways to peaceand human security.
3. Threats to regional peace and human security: why regional and multilateral
cooperation matter?
There is a long list of non-traditional, transnational issues that pose threats to regional peaceand security in Southeast Asia. In this section, we highlight threats that revolve around theGlobal Threats to Peace and Human Security: Finding Regional Solutions to Transboundary Threats in Southeast Asia 95

issue of environmental security and climate change. We discuss why these issues threaten
the security and well-being of states and societies across borders. We then examine whythese transnational issues require regional, multilateral approaches and assess how thesehave been addressed at the regional level. Reﬂecting on these experiences, we then attempt
to engage the current conceptualization of human security in light of environmental security. Instead of treating it as a one-way relationship where environmental security acts as a
pre-requisite and contributor to human security, we suggest that the interaction between thetwo needs to be bi-directional. This means that ensuring environmental security necessarily requires humans to be aware of environmental limitations and treat the environment as
another referent of security that needs protection.
3.1 Haze
Forest ﬁres and attendant transboundary haze are a recurring issue in Southeast Asia. Thisissue has its historical beginnings in the early 1980s (Gellert 1998) and repeated itself frequently with the most recent being in 2019. Although not occurring uniquely in Indonesia,
forest ﬁres resulting in major episodes of transboundary haze pollution have been the ones
originated from the country. The clearing of lands, most notably peatlands, for palm oil
planting purposes through burning is believed to be the main reason behind the intractableproblem. Burning is largely perceived as the most cost-eﬀective means to clearing lands,
and factors that may lead to uncontrollable ﬁres include weak law enforcement, inadequate
regulations against forest burning, overlapping rules and regulations across government
agencies, strong patronage culture in the plantation sector, draining of peatlands, and a lackof resources for firefighting capability (Sunchindah 2015). It was suggested that an overwhelming majority of these forest ﬁres were deliberately set by private companies and theirsub-contractors instead of small farmers doing slash-and-burn (Varkkey 2012). Ultimately,
the various economic interests in the plantation sector are seen to be the major driver thatsigniﬁcantly weakens other priorities, including commitments to protect the environment.
The ﬁre incidences have brought serious environmental, health, economic and political consequences. During the 2015 haze episode, hundreds of thousands of people suﬀeredfrom respiratory infections in different provinces in Sumatra and Kalimantan islands ofIndonesia (The Jakarta Post 2015). The number of asthma cases in some areas of Malaysia
doubled during the same period (O’Callaghan 2013). Concerns over health implications
also led to a temporary closure of schools in Malaysia and Singapore (Today 2015; Lee etal. 2016). The latest incident in 2019 in Indonesia saw the deaths of a 69-year-old resident
in the Riau Province who tried to quench fires that reached his farmland, two siblings of

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7 and 11 in West Kalimantan Province, one ﬁre-ﬁghter in Jambi province, and at least six
farmers in Riau, West Kalimantan, and Central Kalimantan provinces (Rayda, 2019). In
September 2019, the air quality index reached hazardous levels of 580 in Pekanbaru, Riau
Province, and 347 in Jambi province, forcing schools to close and residents to stay indoors(Rayda 2019).
The economic implications are equally concerning. The smoke haze has repeatedly
forced flight cancellations and hurt the tourism industry (Kojima 2016). The 1997 forest
fires exacted about USD 3.1 billion in damages on agriculture and forestry and USD 1
billion on short-term health and the tourism sector (Glover and Jessup 1999). Indonesia
suffered USD 4.1 billion worth of damages whereas Malaysia and Singapore incurred
about USD 321 million and up to USD 78.8 million losses respectively (Glover and Jessup1999).
The situation was worse in 2015, as Indonesia’s economic losses reached USD 16.1
billion (The World Bank 2016). Agriculture, forestry, and environment were among thehardest hit with losses and damages totalling USD 13.0 billion (The World Bank 2016).
Companies and small-holder farmers of estate crops such as palm oil, rubber and coconut
suffered an estimated USD 3.1 billion of losses (The World Bank 2016). Farmers’ livelihoods were similarly aﬀected with USD 1.7 billion of losses in food crops, which signiﬁed
lower incomes for farmers and subsequent implications in their capacity to secure food(The World Bank 2016). In the health sector, the Indonesian government registered 19
deaths and more than 500,000 acute respiratory infection cases within two months after thestart of the haze (Agence France-Presse 2015). Immediate health costs amounted to USD
151 million with additional lost wages due to sickness standing at USD 3.8 billion (TheWorld Bank, 2016).2 Challenges in managing forest ﬁres and attendant transboundary smog
are mostly evident in their recurrence. Regardless of various measures that have been taken
at the national level, the regional reach of the otherwise domestic issue prompted Southeast
Asian countries to take a collective approach to solve the problem. Following the 1997
haze crisis, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states drafted
the 1997 Regional Haze Action Plan (RHAP) that devised regional cooperation measuresin three areas: prevention, monitoring and mitigation of land and forest fires (ASEANSingapore Secretariat 1997). It sought to strengthen the capacity of the existing ASEAN
Specialised Meteorological Centre (ASMC) for early warning and monitoring system andestablish a mechanism to deploy regional ﬁre-ﬁghting operations.

Global Threats to Peace and Human Security: Finding Regional Solutions to Transboundary Threats in Southeast Asia 97

In 2002, the ASEAN member states adopted the ﬁrst legally binding “ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution” (“Haze Agreement”) that sets provisions for monitoring, assessment, prevention and response, technical cooperation and scientiﬁc research,
institutional arrangements and procedures (ASEAN 2002). Aside from envisioning a joint
emergency response, the Haze Agreement calls for the establishment of the “ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control” to facilitate cooperation andcoordination among ASEAN member states to manage forest ﬁre and haze issues.
After all ASEAN member states ratiﬁed the Haze Agreement, with Indonesia being the last
one to do so in 2014, the Roadmap on ASEAN Cooperation towards Transboundary Haze
Pollution Control with Means of Implementation (“Roadmap”) was first drafted in 2016.
The Roadmap aims for transboundary haze-free ASEAN by 2020. It identiﬁes eight strategic areas that include implementing the Haze Agreement, sustainable management ofpeatlands, agricultural land and forest, strengthening regulations and their implementations,enhancing cooperation in information and technology, public awareness and cross-sectoraland stakeholders’ participation, securing adequate resources, and reducing health and environmental risks and protection of global environment.
Although the 11th Meeting of the “Conference of the Parties to the ASEAN Agreement
on Transboundary Haze Pollution” on 29 October 2015 in Hanoi has endorsed Indonesia’srequest to host such a Centre (ASEAN 2015a), and the Roadmap envisioning it to be fully
operational in 2018, the Centre is yet to be established up to the present time. This signals
challenges in implementing the regional treaty, which is further evidenced in a series offorest ﬁre incidents that continued to occur even after the adoption of the Haze Agreementin 2002. The Agreement’s limited reach in influencing and transforming the domestic
contexts, such as overlapping land use and weak environmental law enforcement in Indonesia, could be the reason behind its apparent ineﬀectiveness from stopping the ﬁres fromrecurring. The current Indonesian President Joko Widodo, however, has taken improved
measures to address the problem, especially after the major ﬁre in 2015. These include theestablishment of the Peatland Restoration Agency (Badan Restorasi Gambut or BRG) in
2016 (Humas 2016), the launching of One Map Policy in 2018 (Mufti 2018) which idea
was initiated by then President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2011 (Aqil 2020), the moratorium of palm oil concessions in 2018 (Sapiie 2018), and the permanent moratorium on
new forest clearance in 2019 (Today, 2019). The BRG aims to rehabilitate about 2 million
hectares of degraded peatlands in seven Indonesian provinces within five years (Reuters
Staff 2016), and the One Map Policy envisions to solve overlapping land claims in the
country. Both initiatives are due for completion this year.

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Regardless of the absence of a Centre, ASEAN member states continue their cooperation on forest fires and transboundary haze through existing mechanisms such as regularmeetings among environmental ministers or oﬃcials. In times of very serious forest ﬁres,
member states have also rendered assistance to the aﬀected neighbour by sending in theirﬁreﬁghters to help douse the ﬁres.
3.2. Climate change
Climate change has been framed as a threat multiplier, given the cross-cutting and grave
impact that a change in the global temperature above 1.5 degrees centigrade. Like economic security, the impacts of climate change such as more frequent and intense weather
events threaten human lives and livelihood which directly aﬀect millions of people acrossthe world. The multiplicity of risks associated with climate change like food and water
security are also well-established drivers of conflict, that can in turn destabilise alreadyvulnerable regions, including Southeast Asia.
Climate change therefore has received lot of attention in ASEAN not least becauseof the region’s vulnerability to the risks of the changing climate that include increased
frequency of unprecedented heat extremes and heavy rainfall events leading to intensiﬁed
flooding (ADB 2017), and their potential socio-economic implications particularly, but
not limited to, food security. The frequency and intensity of weather-related disasters suchas ﬂoods, tropical storms and landslides have increased in the last half a century, and economic losses have consequently been on the rise (The ASEAN Secretariat 2017).
In Southeast Asia, 362,000 lives had been lost as result of natural disasters between
2000 and 2016 and had affected 250 million people (ESCAP 2017). The economic loss
had also been staggering. For example, Thailand’s ﬂoods in 2011 caused more than USD
45 billion in economic loss and damage whereas the Philippines’ Typhoon Haiyan in2013 inﬂicted USD 10 billion in loss and damage (ESCAP 2017). Floods in Thailand thatstarted in July 2011 and lasted for a few months were the worst in ﬁfty years prior (Reuters
Staﬀ 2011). The ﬂood crisis inundated large parts of human settlements, farms, infrastructures, and many other areas, affecting 12.8 million people (Poaponsakorn and Meethom2013), displacing more than 165,000 (The World Bank 2012), and resulting in 728 deaths(Poaponsakorn and Meethom 2013). Some 9,859 factories were aﬀected, and 600,000 jobs
were lost (Poaponsakorn and Meethom 2013), triggering fear of further economic hardshipfor individuals and families. Moreover, considering Thailand’s role as the world’s top rice
exporter, the flooding that affected 16,558.55 km2 of agricultural area (Ministry of Agri-Global Threats to Peace and Human Security: Finding Regional Solutions to Transboundary Threats in Southeast Asia 99

culture and Cooperatives 2011) rose concerns over rice shortage and food security. Healthimpacts saw more than 700 cases of food poisoning or diarrhea, 12 cases of leptospirosis,
7 cases of chicken pox, 2 events of chemical intoxication, 26 cases of conjunctivitis, and2 cases of measles between October and early December 2011 (Department of Disease
Control 2011).
Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 was the fastest moving and strongest typhoon ever measured
since 1945 whose recurrence is estimated to be within 200 years (Takagi and Estaban2016). The sheer scale of the disaster saw more than 7,000 deaths, more than 4 million
people displaced, 1.1 million homes destroyed (Sherwood et al. 2015), 14 million people
aﬀected, and 6 million people losing their sources of income (BBC 2014). Health concerns
included treating the injured, attending to pregnant and nursing women and newborn children, breaking out of diseases such as measles, polio, dengue, and typhoid, treating noncommunicable diseases such as heart attacks and diabetes, as well as trauma and other mental health problems (WHO 2014). Additionally, 1.1 million tonnes of crops that included
coconut, rice and corn, were similarly affected (FAO n.d.) thereby posing food security
concerns.
Challenges posed by climate change are being addressed at multiple levels in ASEAN.
In response to the frequency of natural disasters happening in the region as a result ofclimate change, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management andEmergency Response (AADMER) which came into force in 2009. AADMER is a legallybinding agreement that allows ASEAN to establish a number of regional mechanisms tohelp its member states cope with the devastating impact of natural disasters and provide
critical assistance in disaster response and assistance (The ASEAN Secretariat 2010). Thesemechanisms include the establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management (AHA Centre) which was launched in 2011 as
the operational and technical body of AADMER. The AHA Centre essentially facilitates
the cooperation and coordination among ASEAN members of states, with the United
Nations, other international organisations and dialogue partners of ASEAN for disasterassistance and emergency response in the region. The AHA Centre also works closely with
the national disaster oﬃces of every ASEAN state. In times of disasters, the AHA Centre
deploys the ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) andcoordinates the deployment of relief items to disaster-aﬀected areas in the region (The AHA
Centre 2018).

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ASEAN also conduct disaster simulation exercises to test, practice, review and assess
ASEAN’s emergency response. These exercises are the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
Disaster Relief Exercises (ARF DiRex). In order to test interoperability of disaster relief
forces, the ARDEX, in particular, helps to improve the Standard Operating Procedure for
Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency
Response Operations (SASOP). The ARF DiREx, on the other hand, is a large-scale disaster scale exercise bringing all 27 participating members and involving multiple partners andstakeholders. Both exercises which are held every two years also serve to promote capacity
building through exchanges of skills and expertise in the ﬁeld of disaster relief.
The challenge of improving the adaptive capacity of states and communities to
respond to the diﬀerent impacts of climate change is also addressed on several fronts andat diﬀerent levels. At the national level, various legislations and initiatives are being done.
Collectively, ASEAN member states express their commitments, aspirations and positions
on climate change through various declarations and statements.3 The regional cooperation on climate change is not manifested in jointly-agreed actions such as establishinga legally binding emission reduction target or commitment to set aside a certain budget
for decarbonisation efforts. Rather, it aims at building national capacity to mitigate andadapt to climate change through sharing of knowledge and best practices at the regional
level, technology transfer, ﬁnance and investment (ASEAN 2012), and collaborative timebound projects with extra-regional partners. Examples include projects with partners on
the Sustainable Use of Peatland and Haze Mitigation in ASEAN (2018-2023), the ASEAN
Peatland Forests Project (APFP) (2009-2014), and SEAPeat, and two projects with India
that aimed at enhancing ASEAN capacity for climate change projections, assessments ofimpacts, and adaptation. ASEAN also put forward a Programme on Sustainable Management of Peatland Ecosystem (APSMPE) (2014-2020) in support of the implementation of
the ASEAN Peatland Management Strategy (2006-2020).
The main body in charge of various aspects of climate change cooperation is theASEAN Working Group on Climate Change (AWGCC) established in 2009. The AWGCC
is also tasked to serve as a consultative forum that brings together different ASEAN
Sectoral Bodies whose work relate to climate issues such as energy, forestry, agriculture,transportation, science and technology, and disaster management. To support the operationalisation of the ASCC Blueprint 2025, the AWGCC Action Plan was formulated andwas integrated into the ASEAN Strategic Plan on Environment (ASPEN) 2016-2025. The

Global Threats to Peace and Human Security: Finding Regional Solutions to Transboundary Threats in Southeast Asia 101

AWGCC Action Plan identiﬁes ﬁve programmatic areas namely adaptation and resilience,
mitigation, technology transfer, climate ﬁnance, and cross-sectoral coordination and global
partnerships (ASEAN n.d.(a)). Lead countries are to develop detailed workplans to implement proposed activities within the ﬁve programmatic areas, implement them in coordination with other ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat, and update the AWGCC
of progress regularly. Similar to the usual approaches in ASEAN, the proposed activities
listed in the AWGCC Action Plan also heavily focus on capacity building that includes
conducting assessments and studies, forums and dialogues, trainings and workshops, aswell as producing handbooks and reports.
In addition to the AWGCC, climate change is also considered in the plans of other
ASEAN Sectoral Bodies (Letchumanan 2010). For example, in the energy sector, ASEAN
aspires to have 23 percent of renewable energy (including hydropower of all forms andsizes) in the total primary energy supply (TPES) by 2025, 35 percent of the renewableenergy share in ASEAN’s installed power capacity by 2025, and 35 percent energy intensity reduction based on 2005 level (ACE 2020). The implementation of the ASEAN Planof Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2016-2025 (ACE 2015) is divided into two
periods namely the ﬁrst phase (2016-2020) that focuses on energy security, and the second
phase (2021-2025) that emphasises on energy transition. Similar to the AWCGG Action
Plans, the APAEC’s strategy for renewable energy is primarily geared towards capacity
building through network creation and information sharing through dialogues, trainings,
guidelines, and studies.
Another example is in the transportation sector. The ASEAN Transport Strategic
Plan 2016-2025 identiﬁes pursuing sustainable transport as part of its strategic goals (TheASEAN Secretariat 2015). Regional cooperation for sustainable transport aims at crafting
policy framework for cleaner fuels and vehicles and environmentally friendly ships, green
freight and logistics, in addition to conducting trainings and seminars, and developing
guidelines and monitoring framework.
The 2016-2025 Vision and Strategic Plan for ASEAN Cooperation in Food, Agriculture and Forestry includes climate change adaptation as one of its strategic thrusts. Listed
action programmes highlight the importance of developing capacity at the national level.
These include increasing R&D investments, promoting good agriculture practices, building the capacity of small-scale producers, managing and maintaining natural resources,
pursuing resilient agro-forestry system, integrating gender issues, and providing access to102

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8climate-related ﬁnancing (ASEAN 2015b).
Part of the regional eﬀorts done by ASEAN to mitigate the impact of climate change
on food security, particularly with regard to availability and access, is the ASEAN Plus
Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) mechanism, which provides a ʻvirtual stockpile’ of rice that is made up of rice pledges/commitments by ASEAN Plus Three countries(i.e., ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea). There is also the ASEAN Food Security
Information System (AFSIS), which focuses on systematic collection, analysis and dissemination of food security related information as part of its early-warning mechanisms onfood security.
3.3. Marine Pollution
One environmental concern that does not often get much attention in marine pollution.
Marine pollution, especially plastics, emerged as a major issue in ASEAN following an
influential study that shows Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia
being ranked among the top 10 polluters in the world in 2010 (Jambeck et al. 2015). Annually, 8 million metric tons of plastics enter the ocean in addition to the existing 150 million
metric tons already trapped in the marine environment (Ocean Conservancy n.d.). Of 4.8
to 12.7 million metric tons of plastic waste entering the oceans in 2010, the ﬁve countries
contributed about 28% of the total amount (Jambeck et al. 2015).
Waste can enter the oceans as a result of sea-based activities, such as through discharges from ocean vessels, military operations and ship casualties, as well as land-based
activities, including eﬄuents of untreated domestic and industrial waste, port and harbour
operations, agricultural and aquaculture production, and mining activity. Marine pollutionaﬀects not only the marine life such as marine mammals (Jones 1995), turtles (Bjorndal etal. 1994), seabirds (Azzarello and Vanvleet 1987; Moser and Lee 1992) and crustaceans(Laist 1997), but also poses threats to food security for many people in Southeast Asia who
depend on marine harvest for their food sources (Vo 2013). Plastic debris may transfer
toxic materials to the food chain (Teuten et al. 2009), thereby causing health issues for
those who consume contaminated seafood (Wu et al. 2017). The fishing and tourism sectors, which contribute signiﬁcantly to the regional economy (Moore 2008; Gregory 2009),
are similarly be aﬀected.
ASEAN member states recognised the transboundary nature of marine pollution challenges and convened Conference on Reducing Marine Debris in ASEAN Region in 2017

Global Threats to Peace and Human Security: Finding Regional Solutions to Transboundary Threats in Southeast Asia 103(ASEAN Cooperation on Environment 2017) to discuss the matters collectively. It was thenfollowed up by a series of regional meetings to promote opportunities for cooperation suchas the 5th Our Ocean Conference that was hosted by Indonesia in October 2018. The issue
also made it into the agenda of the 13th East Asia Summit held in Singapore in November
2018 (ASEAN 2018).
In 2019, ASEAN issued two landmark documents on marine pollution, namely the
Bangkok Declaration on Combating Marine Debris (“Declaration”) and the ASEAN
Framework of Action on Marine Debris (“Framework”). The Declaration highlights commitments to reduce marine waste, particularly from land-based activities, by strengthening
national laws and regulations, engaging private sector, promoting innovative solutions andcircular economy, strengthening the role of science, research and development, increasing
public awareness, and enhancing regional, international, and inter-sectoral cooperationand collaboration (ASEAN 2019). The Framework identifies four priority areas, namely
policy support and planning; research, innovation and capacity building; public awareness,
education and outreach; and private sector engagement (ASEAN n.d.(b)). Among suggested activities that include capacity building through trainings, and information exchange
through dialogues and information sharing, and translating relevant international laws, theFramework also puts forward a potential collaborative action by establishing the ASEAN
Centre on Combating Marine Debris and developing an ASEAN agreement on management of marine debris pollution.
4. Conclusion
The discussion above on how ASEAN has dealt with transnational environmental threats,
including climate change, presents a number of observations on how regional organisations
advance regional solutions to transnational security problems. Based on ASEAN’s comprehensive approach to security, and seen through the adoption of the APSC and interwoven
with the ASCC and AEC, ASEAN has committed to a number of regional agreements andestablished a number of regional mechanisms geared to raise the level of cooperation to ahigher plane (The ASEAN Secretariat 2019). The regional cooperation on these different
environmental challenges reﬂects the desire of ASEAN member states to address them collectively given their transboundary repercussions on human security and thus build regional
capacity to respond eﬀectively.
A decade since the adoption of the APSC and the 2 other community pillars, regional

104

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8agreements like the AADMER for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in response
and the Haze Agreement were adopted and ratiﬁed. These agreements allowed ASEAN toestablish mechanisms like the AHA Centre, institutionalize the ARDEX and DiRex; andinstitutionalize regular consultations and assistance in dealing with forest ﬁres and mitigating the impact of transboundary haze. We also see regional frameworks and action plans
being crafted like the ASEAN Framework of Action on Marine Debris aimed at beefing
up regional capacity through trainings, and information exchange through dialogues andinformation sharing. In sum, it can be argued that these Agreements are the building blocksof the evolving normative structure that underpins the APSC as a rules-based communitythat is able to respond eﬀectively to transnational security challenges. They inform shared
thinking, develop shared practices and strengthen norms to manage regional challenges.
Nonetheless, implementation of many of these regional commitments/agreements
face signiﬁcant challenges. While there are remarkable eﬀorts in implementing AADMER
in the area of HADR, particularly the establishment of the AHA Centre, plans to establish
a dedicated Centre for transboundary Haze that will coordinate joint responses is yet tobe realized. Whether a dedicated regional agreement and a Centre will also be set up toaddress marine debris pollution remains to be seen. Moreover, even with the progress
made by the AHA Centre in dealing with natural disasters, there are pressures to review its
mandate to expand its work to deal with man-made disasters like the humanitarian crisis
in Myanmar’s Rakhine state and provide assistance to Rohingya refugees. In this regard,collective responses to transboundary challenges compel ASEAN members to also confront
challenges to its norms of non-interference while preventing internal conﬂicts to escalate
and become serious threats to regional peace and security.
The heavy emphasis placed on assisting national governments instead of focusing on
regional positions on diﬃcult issues like humanitarian crisis reﬂects the limits of ASEAN
as an inter-governmental organization advancing regional solutions to transboundary issues.
It further underscores the thinking that national responses play the most critical role inaddressing various security challenges facing the region, including environmental threats.
It is important to note that regional approaches are not necessarily able to reach and address
the underlying challenges that have rendered existing national initiatives less eﬀective inthe ﬁrst place. These include competing priorities and other speciﬁc problems at the domestic level. As such, although ASEAN might have formulated regional frameworks to guidenational actions, created platforms to enable exchanges of information and best practices,and forged collaborative projects with partners and donors, their progress on enhancingGlobal Threats to Peace and Human Security: Finding Regional Solutions to Transboundary Threats in Southeast Asia 105

human security in the region has been modest. Thus, the goal of APSC to raise regional
cooperation to a higher level would need much more commitment from member states
while confronting and balancing diﬃcult and competing priorities.
As this paper has argued, environmental security is arguably the most important determinant of human security considering the ubiquitous utilisation of environmental provisions
in human life. Yet, at the practical level of policies and actions, the current approach indealing with the complexity of environmental challenges remains sectoral in nature. Thissiloed approach also explains the generally slow progress at the national, regional, andglobal levels. In other words, addressing environmental problems within sectoral agenda
means sectoral priorities sits at the front and centre of policy-making processes, subject todelays in endless negotiation and accommodation of interests while the environment is left
to adjust or manage accordingly.
At the regional level, ASEAN has acknowledged the cross-sectoral nature of environmental problems, and has perceived that a task-force that acts as a consultative and coordinating body may be better able to streamline approaches to environmental problems thatmultiple ASEAN sectoral bodies are attempting to deal with either directly and indirectly.4
It is argued, however, that unless the deﬁnition of environmental and human securities areharmonised and understood as an integral unit, the tension between competing needs islikely to remain.
In light of numerous existing environmental challenges that are expected to further
intensify given greater pressures coming from increasing population and economic growth,
the conceptual approach to environmental security may therefore need an urgent rethinking.
While human security has been a useful concept and approach to policy thinking to ensure
human security, there is also a need to frame the environment as a security object thatneeds protection for humans. In other words, the means to achieve human security must be
done also with the framework of ensuring environmental security. Respecting the limits ofhuman action is arguably what environmental security is all about.
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The Jakarta Post. 2015. “Hazardous air quality detected in Kalimantan and Riau.” September 28, 2015.
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/09/28/hazardous-air-quality-detected-kalimantan-andriau.html (accessed November 30, 2020).
The World Bank. 2012. Thai Flood 2011: Rapid Assessment for Resilient Recovery and Reconstruction
Planning. Bangkok: The World Bank.

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The World Bank. 2016. The Cost of Fire: An Economic Analysis of Indonesiaʼs 2015 Fire Crisis.
Jakarta: The World Bank. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/643781465442350600/Indonesia-forestﬁre-notes.pdf (accessed November 30, 2020).
Today. 2015. “Malaysian Schools Close for 2 Days due to Haze.” October 4. https://www.todayonline.
com/world/asia/malaysian-schools-close-2-days-due-haze (accessed November 30, 2020).
Today. 2019. “Indonesia President Makes Moratorium on Forest Clearance Permanent.” August 8.
https://www.todayonline.com/world/indonesia-president-makes-moratorium-forest-clearancepermanent (accessed November 30, 2020).
Ullman, Richard. 1983. “Redeﬁning Security,” International Security. 8, no. 1: 68-86.
UNDP. 1994. Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security, http://www.hdr.
undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-1994.”
Varkkey, Helena. 2012. “Patronage Politics as a Driver of Economic Regionalisation: The Indonesian
Oil Palm Sector and Transboundary Haze.” Asia Paciﬁc Viewpoint. 53, no. 3: 314-329.
Vo, Si Tuan, John C. Pernetta and Christopher J. Paterson. 2013. “Status and trends in coastal habitatsof the South China Sea.” Ocean & Coastal Management, 85, part B: 153-163.
Waever, Ole, “Securitisation and Desecuritisation”, in On Security, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz.
46-86, New York: Columbia University Press.
World Health Organization (WHO). 2014. “Turning Crisis into Opportunity: Typhoon Haiyan One Year
On.” November. https://www.who.int/features/2014/typhoon-haiyan-2014/en/ (accessed November
30, 2020).
Wu, Zhai, Ye Xu ,Minggang Cai, Sha-Yen Cheng, Huorong Chen, Dongren Huang, Kai Chen, Yan Lin,
Tianyao Li, Mengyang Liu, Hengxiang Deng, Minjie Ni, and Hongwei Ke. 2017. “Metals in theﬁshes from Yongshu Island, Southern South China Sea: Human health risk assessment.” Journal of
Toxicology, Article ID 2458293.

Notes
1

Mahbub ul Haq, “New Imperatives of Human Security”, RGICS Paper No. 7, Rajiv Gandhi Institutefor Contemporary Studies (RG(CS), Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, New Delhi, 1994, cited in Kanti
Bajpai, Human Security: Concept and Measurement, Kroc Institute Occasional Paper #19,OP*1,
August 2000.
2
The World Bank, The Cost of Fire: An Economic Analysis of Indonesia’s 2015 Fire Crisis, February
2016, Jakarta: The World Bank, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/643781465442350600/Indonesiaforest-ﬁre-notes.pdf
3These include ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability (13th ASEAN Summit in 2007),ASEAN Declaration on COP-13 to the UNFCCC and CMP-3 to the Kyoto Protocol (13th ASEAN
Summit in 2007), Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment (3rd
EAS Summit in 2007), Joint Ministerial Statement of the 1st EAS Energy Ministers Meeting (2007),
Ministerial Statement of the Inaugural EAS Environment Ministers Meeting (2008), ASEAN Joint
Statement on Climate Change to COP-15 to the UNFCCC and CMP-5 to the Kyoto Protocol (15thASEAN Summit in 2009), Singapore Resolution on Environmental Sustainability and Climate
Change (11th AMME in 2009), ASEAN Action Plan on Joint Response to Climate Change (12thAMME in 2012), Declaration on Institutionalising the Resilience of ASEAN and its Communities
and Peoples to Disasters and Climate Change (26th ASEAN Summit in 2015), and Declaration
on ASEAN Post-2015 Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change Agenda (27th ASEAN
Summit in 2015).

Global Threats to Peace and Human Security: Finding Regional Solutions to Transboundary Threats in Southeast Asia 111
4

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Fifth ASEAN State of the Environment
Report, Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, 2017 http://environment.asean.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/01/SOER5.pdf

マニラスピーチにおける日本の軍事大国化の否定：福田赳夫の外交理念に着目して

113

独立論文

マニラスピーチにおける日本の軍事大国化の否定：
福田赳夫の外交理念に着目して
井原

伸浩

名古屋大学情報科学研究科・グローバルメディア研究センター
序論
1977年 8 月、福田赳夫首相は東南アジア諸国を訪問し、その最後の歴訪地マニラでのスピーチ（以下、マニラスピーチと略記）で、いわゆる福田ドクトリンを発表した。なかでも、ドクトリン第一原則は、以下の通りである。
第一に、わが国は、平和に徹し軍事大国にはならないことを決意しており、そのような立場から、東南アジアひいては世界の平和と繁栄に貢献する1。
同ドクトリンは、東南アジア、ひいてはそこからさらに拡大した領域での国際秩序形成に、日本が経済のみならず政治分野にまで踏み込んで取り組む姿勢を示した、「大国」外交および積極外交の理念としての重要性を有する2。なかでも第一原則に対する ASEAN 諸国指導者による評価は高く、実際、例えばマニラで福田がスピーチした際、軍事大国にならないとのくだりに最大の拍手があったとされる3。同スピーチを現場で聞いたフィリピン大統領フェルディナンド・マルコス（Ferdinand Marcos）は、ASEAN 諸国民が、経済大国日本の軍国化および核武装化について懸念を持っていると率直に語ったうえで、それを否定した福田ドクトリンを高く評価した4。歴訪後に現地報道を分析した外務省報道課も、ドクトリンのなかで第一原則におおむね一致して高い評価が与えられたとした5。
マニラスピーチに第一原則を盛り込むようイニシアティブを発揮したのは、ほ
かならぬ福田自身である。外務省が用意したスピーチの第一稿に軍事大国のくだりはなかったが、これを読んだ福田が加えるよう指示し、しかも諸原則のうちの第一にするよう注文づけたのである6。その意味で第一原則は、外務省の草案にあったその他の原則と性格がやや異なるといえよう。福田はさらに第一原則を、
マニラスピーチの「中心」と位置づけるほどだったが7、軍事大国化の否定は、当然のことを言っているに過ぎないとも解釈できる。平和主義は戦後日本外交の一貫した原則であり、国内世論に鑑みても、あるいは隣国や同盟国米国との関係に鑑みても、当時の日本が「軍事大国」を目指す政治的選択肢は、ほぼなかったか

114

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8らである。また、自民党内の右派・タカ派としばしばみなされ8、改憲派にも与していた福田が、マニラスピーチでは憲法 9 条の理念に則った原則を謳ったことについての違和感もしばしば指摘される9。福田は、なぜ第一原則をマニラスピーチに盛り込んだのだろうか。
本稿は、福田が数々の論考で発表していた外交理念を手掛かりとして、上記課
題を解こうとするものである（実際、彼の外交理念は、マニラスピーチに強く反映されている）。すなわち、①福田の外交理念の内容や主旨、生まれた経緯を明らかにしたうえで、②それが他の政権による平和主義外交といかなる意味で性格を異としたかを明確化し、そのうえで、③福田の東南アジア歴訪に至る過程で、軍事大国化の否定がいかなるかたちで論じられ、マニラスピーチに盛り込まれたか説明する。軍事大国にならないとの決意は、第一原則だけでなく、マニラスピー
チの他の個所でも述べられているため、そこで示された理念も分析対象とする。
また、第一原則は、日本が軍事大国とならないことを宣言すると同時に、「そのような立場から、東南アジアひいては世界の平和と繁栄に貢献する」とも述べている。つまり、日本は軍事大国化せず平和に徹するという理念と、その国力にふさわしい平和と繁栄に関する国際貢献をするとの理念が、有機的に結び付けられて表明されている。そのため、こうした「平和と繁栄」への貢献に関する福田の理
念も、本稿は説明対象とする10。
先行研究の多くは、分析レベルが福田個人に設定されておらず11、これを明らかにできない。政策決定者のアイデアに注目する須藤の研究もあるが12、その焦点は、福田というより外務省の政策企画者（policy entrepreneur）に当てられている。歴訪を通じて「平和国家」日本のイメージが発信されたと指摘する昇の研究もあるが13、これも福田個人の理念を分析対象にしているわけではない。一方で、福田の理念や思想を分析対象とした研究として、「全方位外交」の具体的表れが福田ドクトリンであるとする若月の研究や、福田の外交思想を取り上げた井上の研究もある。両者は、日本が軍事大国にならず、その余力を途上国への援助に向けるという福田の考えが、佐藤栄作政権に遡ることを指摘し、また、福田の考えを知る手掛かりとして、1972年に福田が発表した『平和大国の設計』を取り上げている14。しかし、同文書で表明された福田の外交理念は、佐藤政権以前から形成されていた形跡があり、その点は研究の空白となっている。
そこで本研究は、以下四節にわたって、福田の外交理念が、いかに軍事大国化の否定をめぐるマニラスピーチの原則に盛り込まれたかを分析する。第一節は、軍事大国にならないとする福田の外交理念の概要を論じ、第二節では、そうした理念に佐藤政権が与えた影響を整理する。ここでは、日本が軍事大国化するのではないかとの言説に対し、佐藤政権がしばしば反論しており、同政権で要職を務めた福田もそれに加わっていたことを概観する。第三節は、そうした福田の外交マニラスピーチにおける日本の軍事大国化の否定：福田赳夫の外交理念に着目して115

理念と、同じく平和主義や軍事大国化の否定を訴えていた田中角栄政権のそれが、いかなる意味で異なったか論じる。そのうえで第四節は、福田政権において、軍事大国化の否定がいかに語られたかを、彼の東南アジア歴訪に至る過程を概観しながら検討する。資料については、福田やその他関連する政治的指導者の執筆した論考や、外務省外交史料館所蔵資料その他の行政文書を中心に用いる。また、必要に応じて、新聞や福田に関する論考をこれに加えたい。
1．福田の外交理念（1） 国内開発の観点からの軍事大国への反対
1929年に大蔵省へ入省し、48年に退職した福田の官僚時代は、恐慌から日本が戦争に突入していき、その惨禍を経験し、その後の混乱から復興していく時期と重なる。福田の外交理念も、大蔵官僚として経済の最前線からこれを目撃し、諸問題に取り組んだ経験に起因したものが多い。日本の軍事大国化と関連するもの
としては、戦時中に軍部から大蔵省に対する予算要求が「天井知らずに増えていく」過程を目の当たりにしたことが挙げられよう。その例として福田は、昭和11
年度と12年度の国家予算（決算ベース）と軍事費を回顧録で紹介している。すな
わち、11年度は総枠22億82百万円のうち、10億78百万円47.2％が軍事費だったのが、翌12年度には、47億42百万円に総枠が跳ね上がり、しかも軍事費が32億71百万円と、69.0％を占めるに至ったのである15。
戦後、福田は、これが国内経済や開発に問題を引き起こしたことを根拠に、日本の軍事大国化に反対している。福田によると、戦前の日本の経済力は、例えば72年の15分の 1 に過ぎなかったが、それでも日本は世界一を誇る帝政および共産
ロシアの大陸軍に匹敵する陸軍を持ち、かつ、世界一の米国海軍、世界二の英国海軍を合わせて相手にするに足る海軍を持とうとした。戦前の平時基準年次でも国家予算のうち軍事費が45％を占め、当時、極めて重要性が高いとされていた鉄の生産量のうち 7 割が軍需、準軍需に充てられたのである。こうした軍事優先政策により、鉄道、道路、上水道、下水道、住宅など、国土建設や都市づくりの面で、日本は欧米先進国から数十年遅れてしまったというのである16。
（2） 憲法の平和主義
政治家となった福田は、やがて日本民主党に参加し、岸信介の側近として改憲派に与していった。1955年の保守合同時には、中村梅吉や井出一太郎らとともに
日本民主党の政策協定の起草委員に名を連ね、自主憲法の制定を自民党の政綱に盛り込むのに一役買っている。福田によれば憲法は、「銃と剣で押し付けられたもの」であり17、例えば英語の直訳調たる日本語等は問題であるから、日本人の手

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広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8によって作り直すべきものだった18。占領下で制定された憲法は、例えばフランスでは無効とされ、ドイツでは独立後に効力を失うと規定されており、これは憲法の性質上当然の考え方だと福田は論じた。福田によると、独立国となった日本の国民は、日本国憲法に対し、「全面的にこれを再検討して、真に国民のものとす
るか、或いは改定するか破棄するかという発言の機会を与えられた」のである19。
しかしながら、福田は改憲に積極的であっても、平和主義に変更を加える意図を持たなかった。実際、福田は、他国への侵略や、軍事力を背景とした外交を可能にするような改憲には反対だとし、平和主義や国際協調主義は堅持すると明言している20。しかも、その後の福田は改憲について、必要性は感じるものの、実現しようとすれば大変な「消耗」を引き起こすため、「今は適当な時期ではない」という姿勢をとるようになり21、ついぞその「適当な時期」が訪れたとして、改憲のイニシアティブをとることはなかった。観念上はありうる改憲だが、大きな犠牲と労力を払い、他の多くの問題を棚上げして取り組んだとしても、どれほど時間がかかるか見えない不確かなものに福田の目には映ったのである22。改憲に関するこうした趣旨の発言は、60年代から政界引退後に至るまで、散発的になされていることから、福田のこうした消極姿勢は、一貫していたと考えられる。したがって福田がマニラスピーチで憲法の一節を引用し、憲法 9 条の理念を誇り高く謳っていることと、自身が改憲主義者であることは、福田にとっては矛盾しない。
（3） 核兵器保有に反対する観点からの軍事大国化の否定
また、福田による「軍事大国」化の否定は、核保有への反対にも起因する23。これは、日本国民に広がる強い反核感情はもちろんのこと、核兵器の発達により「相手国への攻撃あるいは報復が、同時に自国の破滅を招くという事態」になること24、さらには核を使用した大規模戦争が、「人類の死滅であり、地球の終わり」にすらなるため、第三次世界大戦は当面起こりえないという観点からも呈されていた25。
実際、例えば SALT（Strategic Arms Limitation Talks：戦略兵器制限交渉）で1972年に合意が成立し、それにともなって東西の緊張緩和が進んだことを、核を使用しな
い、また、その開発に多額の資金を注入して国民を破たんさせてはならないという動きの結果だと福田は論じた26。また、核攻撃が当事国（民）あるいは人類全体を危機に陥れるという見方の広がりを根拠に、もはや核を含む強大な軍事力をただ単に持てばよい時代ではなく、そうした科学のあり方を政治が「指導」する時代だとも福田は述べている。こうした「時代の変化と新時代の意義を明確に認識することが、新しい日本の進むべき道を決める根本」であるがゆえに、「新しい日本が強大な軍備を持つことは愚かといわざるを得ません」としたのである27。
福田の盟主、岸は、「反核外交」を展開したことで知られるが、そうした岸の影マニラスピーチにおける日本の軍事大国化の否定：福田赳夫の外交理念に着目して117

響を福田の核に対する考え方にも見て取れる。岸は、平和利用に限定されている
日本の核技術も、進歩すれば日本の核保有の潜在的可能性を強めることになり、それが、軍縮や核実験禁止問題などで日本の国際的発言力を強めると論じたことがある28。これに対し福田は、岸のように日本の核保有の可能性に言及することはなかったものの、核兵器を持つに足る経済力と技術を有した日本が、あえて核を持たず、外国の侵略に対して守るに足る軍事力にとどめれば、国際平和、軍縮
および核兵器の廃絶を訴えるうえで強い立場でいられると主張した29。
ここで福田が重視したのが、核保有による「軍事大国化」をしないことで強調できる日本の稀有な立場である。すなわち第一に、核兵器を投下された唯一の国家であり、さらに非核三原則を有する唯一の国家という「特殊な立場」にある日本が、「核を持つことの愚かさを強調する」ことに意義があるとの指摘である30。
第二に、日本は「力がなくてただ口先だけで平和、平和、といっている国とはちょっと違う」31。当時、世界有数の経済力と科学技術を有した日本は、福田によると「米ソの核を含む強大な軍事力にも対抗し得る軍備は持てる」32。つまり、世界でも一級の軍事大国になろうと思えばなれるし、仮にそれが実現すれば、そうした強大な軍事力を背景とした外交を推進し、相応の国益を獲得できるかもしれない。そんな日本が、他国の侵略から自国を守るに足る軍事力にとどめていることで、軍縮や核廃絶の訴えが「千金の重みを持つ発言」となり、平和や軍縮を論じるうえで非常に強い立場にあらしめると福田は主張した33。つまり、福田の言葉を借りれば、「力もない国」が核保有しないのではなく、「力はあるけれども核は持たぬ、他の諸国も同調されたいという立場をとり得るのはわが日本だけ」なのである34。これと関連して第三に、福田はこれを、世界における日本の「神聖な使命」だとか35、日本が「世界を核の惨禍から救う大きな柱になる」36などと表現し、核の脅威を取り除くという世界的な課題で、大きな発言権と推進力を有することを誇り高く謳った。
（4） 軍事大国に代替する国家像
一方、世界の核保有国が核武装をやめない限り日本の防衛は不可能であるので、そこは米国に頼らざるを得ないというのが福田の考えであった37。福田は「自主防衛論者」であり、自らの身は自ら守り、最終的には米国の庇護から抜け出ることが必要だと訴えていたが、実際のところは、これについて国民的合意が形成されていないとして、日米安保体制を堅持する姿勢だった38。また、彼が言うところの「自主防衛」とは、あくまで必要最小限度の防衛力整備にとどめるべきものであり、憲法の範囲内に限定すべきものだった39。後年の福田の言葉を借りれば、日本は「虎や狼」になるべきではないが、「ハリネズミぐらいには」なるべく早くなるべきなのである40。したがって、福田の自主防衛論は、日米安全保障体制を

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否定するものでもなければ、軍事大国を目指すものでもないし、むしろ、核保有
しない前提として日米安全保障体制が位置付けられていた。
一方、福田は、そうした米国の傘の下で「暖衣飽食」する日本の姿を非難した。
日本は、重要資源や、輸出品市場の多くを海外に依存しているが、これを維持す
るには、世界中に平和で繁栄した市場が存在し、さらに海外諸国との友好および貿易が不可欠である。その意味で世界の平和と繁栄が、日本の平和と繁栄に不可欠なのだが41、経済の伸長にともない、そうした分野への国際的責任と役割が増しているにもかかわらず42、日本は米国の庇護のもとに安住し、世界の平和と繁栄のために、実効ある努力をしていないとした43。理念的には、「連帯」（磨きをかけた自身の能力を、社会公共や人のために尽くすべきだとする考え方）を唱え44、
これを国際社会にも当てはめて、自国の平和や繁栄のみを追求するのではなく、「あらゆる国との提携を深め、世界の繁栄の中に日本の繁栄を見出だそうとする国際連帯の姿勢」が必要だと論じた45。また、福田は「世界の中の日本」や「アジアの中の日本」という語も用いて、国際社会の一員として、世界平和に対するできる限りの責任を遂行することを唱え46、特に軍備を持たない日本としては「せめて後進国の開発に力を尽すくらいのことは当然の責務」だとして、途上国への経済開発援助を積極的に進めるべきだと主張した47。
このように、経済的パワーの伸長を背景に、途上国への経済協力促進を福田が主張した背景には、外交を進めるうえで軍事力の相対的重要性が、以前ほど高くないという彼の考えもあった。たしかに、かつて「大国」は、強い軍事力を持つ国を意味していたし、実力ある発言をなし得るには軍事力が不可欠だった。しかし、戦争の勝者が国威を宣揚し、国際社会で尊敬を得られる時代ではなく、むしろ武力行使は弾劾され、武力で得た領土や権益も認められない大勢にある。こうして戦争を最後の切札としない外交のあり方が求められているなか48、日本の軍事大国化は不適切としたのである。
こうして福田は、軍事大国になるより経済大国となり、その余力で途上国に奉仕する方が価値を持つとの理念を持つに至った49。そうした国々の国民の生活を向上させ、社会を安定させるための援助を行うかたちで、世界の平和および繁栄に貢献すべきだし、できるという主張だった50。上述の通り軍事力の重要性が相対的には低下するなか、世界の平和や繁栄に対する日本の貢献は、憲法 9 条ゆえに軍事力を通じてのものではないが、「それでいい時代になってきた」のである51。
2．佐藤政権による軍事大国化の否定
日本は軍事大国にならないとする福田の理念は、彼が要職を務めた佐藤政権の影響も強く受けている。佐藤政権時、日本の軍事力拡大や、果ては「軍国主義復マニラスピーチにおける日本の軍事大国化の否定：福田赳夫の外交理念に着目して119活」を懸念する言説が、国際社会の一部に広がっており、同政権はその否定に取り組んでいた。例えば、60年代末から佐藤政権の外務大臣を務めた愛知揆一は、
米英のアジアからの漸進的撤退が予想されるなか、日本が軍事力を拡大して空白を埋めるのではないかという見方があるとか、当時 GNP が世界三位に到達し、今後も高い成長率が見込まれていた日本の国際政治面での方向性が、大きな国際的関心事となっていると指摘していた。愛知は、戦時中の記憶とあいまって、日本の方向性について「憂慮と危惧」の念を持つ海外論調が大部分であると論じ、なかには日本が軍事力強化に向かい、70年代末に核武装へ進むと予想するものまであると指摘している52。こうした懸念が生じるのは、愛知によると、日本のようにかつて「軍事的冒険」を試み、その後平和国家に変容した国家や、経済規模が大きいのに、それに見合う軍事力を持っていない国家に前例がないためである53。
これに対して佐藤やその政権の閣僚は、日本の防衛予算が、対 GNP 比の 1 ％にも満たないこと、平和憲法（およびそれに対する大部分の国民の支持や改正の難しさ）および非核三原則を強調して否定を繰り返している54。例えば愛知は、上述の言説を、以下の理由を挙げながら「根拠のない誤解」と断じた55。すなわち、日本は自主防衛拡充という方針の下、防衛支出を漸増させているものの、その伸び率は顕著なものではないし、対 GNP 比はむしろ減少している；平和主義を基礎とする憲法の制約により、日本は攻撃兵器を持てないし、自衛隊の海外派兵も不可能であるうえ、国民の大多数がこの憲法を擁護している；さらに国民の大多数
は、核兵器保有を明確に反対しており、政府もこうした国民の総意のうえに平和
憲法擁護や非核三原則の遵守を打ち出し、核拡散防止条約にも署名しているからである56。
同じく軍事大国化否定の典型例であり、かつ福田の外交理念に佐藤政権の与えた影響の大きさを端的に示す例が、1970年10月の、佐藤による国連25周年記念会期での演説である。佐藤はここで、強大な経済力を有する国がそれに見合う軍事力を保有するのは、世界の歴史において「普通の姿」だが、日本は国力の大部分を軍事目的に割く意思はないとした。日本としては、経済成長で得た余力をもって、世界の平和建設に貢献するとの決意であるとも述べている。また、佐藤は同演説で、全世界の繁栄と平和を図ることが、自国の安全と繁栄を確保する所以だと日本国民は確信しているとも論じている。さらに、日本は開発途上国との平和的な経済協力を重視しており、とりわけアジアの安定を実現するため、経済・社会的発展に協力するとも述べた57。後に見るように、これらはいずれも、福田の外交理念と合致し、マニラスピーチとも共通点が多い。
こうした努力にもかかわらず、日本が軍事大国化するとの懸念は根強く残っていると、愛知の後、外務大臣に就いた福田は認識した。福田によると、彼がこの認識を強めた契機は、1971年の天皇訪欧である。これに外務大臣として随行した

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福田は、訪問先の首脳らと会談する機会を得たが、その際、「日本はこれからどうするのです？いよいよ軍事の方に手を染めるのでしょうか？核を持つことになるのでしょう」と「口をそろえて」言われたと証言している。しかもこうした日本の軍事大国論は、ヨーロッパだけでなく、米国の識者にも生じ始めていると福田は論じている58。こうした福田の認識は、彼が首相に就任する以降も継続することとなった。
福田は、1972年の第68会国会において、「わが国は、諸国民の公正と信義に信頼してその安全と生存を確保しようとの理想をかかげ、経済上その力を持ちつつも、
軍事大国への途は選ばないことを決意しております。これは史上類例をみない実
験への挑戦であります」とする外交演説を行っている。これは憲法前文の文言を引用しつつ、軍事大国となる潜在性を持ちつつも、あえてそうはしないとする佐藤の国連演説に則った内容だった59。また、この演説は、軍事大国にならないという選択を「史上類例をみない実験への挑戦」だとして、誇り高く謳う姿勢がみられる。福田の前任の外務大臣である愛知も、「経済力と軍事力との間のアンバランスがそのままで維持されることはあり得ないというのが、歴史の教訓から引出される経験的事実だというのなら、われわれは長い時間をかけても、軍事力なき経済大国が立派に存続し繁栄しうることを立証してみようではありませんか。
」と、軍事大国化の否定を誇り高く発信している。愛知によれば、日本は「多くの点で歴史上自ら先例を作りつつある」のであり、「歴史の教訓は教訓としても、その前にすくんでしまってはならない」のである60。その意味で、「誇り高き」福田の姿
勢も、佐藤政権の影響が見て取れる。
3．田中政権期との違い
東南アジア歴訪を成功させた福田としばしば対照的に語られるのが、自身の歴訪中に反日デモや暴動に直面した田中角栄政権である。もちろん平和外交は、歴代政権が採用してきた日本外交の支柱であり、田中政権もこれを踏襲していた。
例えば田中は平和外交の内容として、①近隣諸国を中心とした国際緊張緩和の努
力、②米国をはじめとする自由主義諸国との友好関係の維持・促進、③国連の平和維持機能の強化および国連を中心とする軍縮の促進および④とくに日本の安全と関係の深い極東および東南アジアの開発途上国に対する積極的経済援助を挙げている61。外務省も、軍事大国化する意識がないことを東南アジア諸国に向けてもアピールする必要性を認識していた。実際、田中の東南アジア歴訪を前に用意した発言メモで、「経済大国」は必ずしも「軍事大国」にならず、日本は憲法ゆえのみならず国民の意思として専守防衛に徹していることを説明する必要があると指摘するなど、佐藤政権の方針を踏襲していた62。

マニラスピーチにおける日本の軍事大国化の否定：福田赳夫の外交理念に着目して

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しかしながら、軍事大国にならないという決意に関し、福田の外交理念と田中政権以降の外務省によるそれには、若干の差がみられる。というのも、日本の「軍事大国化」に関する懸念を福田は重く見ていたのに対し、田中政権期以来の外務省は、決定的な外交課題と認識していたとはいい難いためである。たしかに、日本のような「経済大国は必然的に軍事大国化」するという見方は、国際社会において依然として強く、東南アジア諸国でもそうした懸念が生じる客観的要素が少なからずあると、外務省も認識していた。実際、日本にとって GNP 比 1 ％以下に抑制していた防衛費も、個々の ASEAN 諸国にとっては自国軍事費の10倍以上にのぼる。さらに、日本と東南アジアは地理的近接性が高く、日本の「軍事大国化」
が東南アジアに深刻な安全保障上の脅威をもたらすことは、歴史が証明済みだった。また、占領期の日本兵による残虐行為の記憶や、家庭、学校およびマスメディ
ア等から若者らが得た知識が、現地の反日感情や、「日本軍国主義復活」の懸念につながり得ることも、70年代半ばにはすでに外務省も把握していた。加えて、日米安全保障体制は、日本の軍事力増強や核保有の必要性を低め、したがって「日本の軍事大国化」を抑制するとの見方もあったが63、その存続が確かか、不安視する声もあった。グアム・ドクトリンや沖縄返還など、60年代末から米国は東南アジアでの軍事的コミットメントを低減させていたし、その過程で、様々な米国の政治家や高官が、日本の防衛体制の不十分さを指摘し、是正の必要性を訴えていたためである64。こうして、日本が過度に「米国離れ」して自主外交志向を強め、核兵器保有を含む「軍事大国化」を成し遂げ現状変更勢力になるのではないか、さらには「新たな大東亜共栄圏の構築」を図るのではないかという懸念につながり得る状況にあった65。
ただし、当時の外務省アジア局にとって、日本の「軍事大国化」に関する懸念
は、誤解の産物に過ぎず、一定の配慮を要するとしても、決定的な課題ではなかった。実際、同局は、日本の再軍備に関し、憲法上の、あるいは政治上の強い制約があること、国民のほとんどが平和主義であることおよび徴兵制が敷かれていな
いことが現地指導者にある程度認識されていると論じている。また、太平洋戦争の終結から30年ほど経過しており、当時の記憶も徐々に薄れているとも指摘していた。むしろアジア局は、東南アジアにおける反日感情の主たる原因について、日本による経済的プレゼンスの高まりや、邦人のビヘイビアに対する現地民の反発等、非軍事的な要素をより強調していた。実際、東南アジアの反日感情に関する報告書でも、「日本の軍事大国」については、経済・文化・社会的要因と比べて言及が少ない66。
また、福田政権とは対照的に田中政権期の外務省は、軍事はもちろん政治・経済面でも、日本の国際的役割を受動的かつ限定的なものと構想していた。その現状認識は、以下の通りである。すなわちアジアには米中ソ間の「利害の均衡」や、

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それに基づく相互抑制の萌芽が存在する。これを、例えば米中接近により共産主
義諸国相互の影響力を引き離すことで、西側陣営にとって有利に進展させる期待も持ち得る。しかし、これはあくまで米国を中心とする大国間外交の領域であり、日本になし得ることは、「状況の変化に即応しつつ、かかる進展をエンカレッジすること」にとどまる。田中政権末期の地域政策課が、これらを「日常活動に徹する」ものと表現したように、外交政策に新味を持たせるような野心的な姿勢は感じられない 67。
その一方で地域政策課は、日本がアジアにおける上記の「均衡」を崩す存在にもなりうると論じていた。この地域における日本のウェイトの大きさは、経済力を主要因としてはいるものの、政治面・心理面・さらには軍事面においてすら影響力を有する可能性があり、地域のバランスの重要な構成要素となっているためである。なかでも軍事面の懸念として、日本に近いアジアの国々、とりわけ東南
アジア諸国は、日本の「経済力のダイナモの行く方に疑念」を持っている。

「大国」の割に軍事力を持たず政治的影響力も大きくない日本が、対外面の方向性に不明瞭な印象を与えることは、ある程度不可避であり、日本の国際情勢の変化に対する反応ぶりは、政治、経済、心理、さらには軍事面での「現状変更」を予想外に加速させる波及効果を持ちうる68。
そのため同課は、日本が「アジアにおける既存のバランス」を急激に変更することのないように、自らのウェイトの大きさを意識した不断かつ細心の選択が必要と論じた69。これは本来、受動的な役割であるものの、地域政策課によると、日本の場合にはむしろ積極的な意義を持ち得るとされた。なぜなら、米中ソ間に「利害の均衡」が成立したとしても、その均衡点は静態的でなく、大国相互の関係やアジアの情勢によって絶えず変化することが予想されるため、そうした変化が「暴走」や「逸脱」に至らぬよう「適当な重みを持つ「分銅」が必要だから」である。
しかも、域外大国間で利害関係の均衡が成熟すればするほど、政治的・軍事的影
響力に限界のある日本でも、「この均衡の磁場における欠かせない要素となる」というのが、アジア局地域政策課の読みだった70。そのため、日本が「能動的に大きく事を起こすよりも、賢明なバランサーとして機能することが、アジアの安全保障に寄与する道」とされた、その国際的地位に鑑みて日本は、「華々しい役割」
を志向すべきでないのである71。
こうしたバランスの維持という観点から外務省は、既存の集団的、個別的安全保障枠組みを重視するとし、特に、日米安全保障体制をその基軸とした72。これは、第一に、同体制が、アジアの自由主義諸国にとって安定要因となっており、さらに大国間の利害均衡に資するからである。実際、地域政策課は、米国のプレゼンスがもたらす「歯止めがなければ事態は均衡よりも流動化に向かう」と論じていた73。それに加えて第二に、日米安全保障体制が、再軍備の可能性を含む日

マニラスピーチにおける日本の軍事大国化の否定：福田赳夫の外交理念に着目して123本の影響力拡大をチェックする役割を担うからである。同課によると、中国はもちろん、東南アジア諸国もそうした認識を有していた74。そのため外務省は、米国による東南アジアでのプレゼンスの維持、とりわけ、日米安全保障体制の維持による、同地域内の軍事的均衡を重視したのである75。
このように日本の国際的役割を受動的なものにとどめる地域政策課の姿勢は、しかし、田中歴訪の一年後には改められることとなる。その理由として第一に、
ASEAN 諸国側の対日姿勢が大きく転換した。インドシナ半島の国々が共産化したことに危機感を募らせた ASEAN 諸国が、相互の経済協力を活性化させ、日本の経済協力を歓迎するのはもちろん、積極的な姿勢でコミットするよう要望するまでになった。第二に、ベトナム戦争中は米国の路線から大きく外れることが困難だった外務省だったが、同戦争の終結とともに日本独自のイニシアティブが可能となった76。そして第三に、1975年 9 月、西山健彦が地域政策課長に就任したためである。日本の国際的役割を明確化し、特に南北問題に積極的な貢献を日本が果たすべきと考える西山は、76年 2 月に第一回 ASEAN 首脳会議が開催された頃から対 ASEAN 積極外交を推進した。福田の東南アジア歴訪に関する研究では、
西山のほか、アジア局の中江要介局長、枝村純郎審議官、谷野作太郎南東アジア
第二課長および外務省と福田の連絡役を務めた小和田恆秘書官のイニシアティブが強調されるが77、福田の首相就任前は、対 ASEAN 外交のイデオローグと評された西山のイニシアティブが顕著であった。これら地域政策課による姿勢転換により、「連帯」や「世界の中の日本」を訴え、日本外交の受動的姿勢を改めようとす
る福田の理念と外務省の方向性との一致度は高まった。
とはいえ、日本が軍事力を強化するのではないかとの見方は、ASEAN 加盟国
内にくすぶっていた。例えばフィリピン大統領マルコスや78、同国外務長官カルロス・ロムロ（Carlos Romulo）もそうした指摘をしていた79。インドネシア外相のアダム・マリク（Adam Malik）が述べたように、日本による東南アジアへの積
極的コミットメントが要請されているとしても、軍事力強化や、軍事面での協力や援助は望まれていなかったのである80。したがって、日本外交の受動的姿勢を改めようとしつつも、軍事大国化は拒否した福田の姿勢は時宜にかなったものであった。実際、第一原則は、日本がその突出した経済力を軍事力に転嫁し、その結果、「東南アジアで大国間の争いが起こり、地域が不安定化する」との懸念する
一部の国々に安心感を与えることとなった81。
4．歴訪まで1976年末に首相となった福田は、東南アジアで日本の「軍事大国化」に関する懸念が、今もなおあると考えていた。後に福田が第一原則をマニラスピーチに盛124

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り込んだ理由として述べたように、経済大国日本が軍事大国になって、アジア諸国を侵略する事態を危惧する国家があると考えていたのである。マニラスピーチ
は、第一節で述べたような論拠をもって、こうした懸念を解消しようとするものだった。すなわち、「経済小国だったが軍事大国であった」戦前の日本と、GDPの0.88％しか軍備に充てていない今日を対比させ、「日本は戦争を機に、どの国がなんといおうと強力な軍備を持たない」との決意を今一度表明するものだった。
そのうえで日本は、こうしてできた経済上・財政上の余力で世界の「遅れた」国々の社会を安定させようとしているのであり、「軍事力以上に世界平和に貢献する」としたのである82。ただし、その前提として、日本が核保有を含む軍事大国化を目指す必要性を減じる日米安全保障体制を維持する必要があった。
内閣成立から 3 ヶ月にも満たない1977年 3 月に福田は、首相就任後最初の外遊先として米国を訪問し、カーターとの首脳会談に臨んだ。その主眼は、大統領選
挙戦で在韓米軍撤退を謳っていたカーターに、米国の東南アジアにおける軍事プ
レゼンス維持を確約させることにあった。そこで福田はカーターとの首脳会談で、
在韓米軍撤退問題に慎重な対応をとることや、アジア太平洋での米国によるプレ
ゼンス維持を確約するよう求めた83。その際福田は、米国政権がアジアに引き続き関心を維持しているのか、アジアの非共産主義諸国が懸念しているようだとカーターに伝えている84。この結果、会議後に発表された日米共同声明では、日米協力関係が、アジア太平洋地域の「安定した国際政治構造にとって不可欠」であり、
日米安全保障条約が、「極東の平和と安全の維持に大きく寄与してきていることに留意し、同条約を堅持することが両国の長期的利益に資するものであるとの確信を表明」した85。さらに、同宣言でカーターは、「アメリカが、太平洋国家として、今後ともアジア・太平洋地域に強い関心を持ち、同地域において積極的かつ建設的な役割を引き続き果たすことを再確認」しつつ、「アメリカがその安全保障上の約束を遵守し、西太平洋において、均衡がとれ、かつ柔軟な軍事的存在を維持する意向」を述べた。在韓米地上軍の撤退に関してもカーターは、韓国のみならず
日本とも協議した後に、朝鮮半島の平和を損なわない形で進め、米国は韓国の防衛に関する約束を引き続き守ると明言した86。
翌 4 月には、フィリピンのマルコス大統領が訪日した。福田とマルコスの首脳会談は二度にわたったが、その両方でマルコスは、「執拗」なまでに米国のアジアにおける軍事的プレゼンスに関する福田の感触を引き出そうとした87。すなわち、第一回首脳会談では、日本と ASEAN の安全保障が相互に影響しあう点を指摘しながら、米国によるフィリピンの軍事プレゼンスに関心を持つよう福田に要請した。そのうえで、カーター政権が、東南アジアにおける軍事プレゼンスを「どの程度まで、またいかなる段階を経て削減して行くのかがはっきりしない」と述べ、米国がどこまで軍事プレゼンスを継続するのかに疑問を呈した。これに対し福田マニラスピーチにおける日本の軍事大国化の否定：福田赳夫の外交理念に着目して

125

は、米国軍撤退後の同地域諸国による不安をふまえてカーターと議論したことや、その際大統領が、「アジアの安定のために約束したことは守る、またプレゼンスもこれを大きく変更することはない」と言っていたことを伝えた88。第二回会談においてもマルコスは、米国のフィリピンにおける軍事プレゼンスが維持されると見てよいかと福田に尋ねている。米国の軍事政策を述べる立場にない福田は、カーターが朝鮮半島その他のアジア諸国のコミットメントを守ると述べていたことをあらためてマルコスに伝えた89。
さらに福田は、日本の専守防衛のあり方について詳しく説明した。第一回会談
では、核について日本は米国に依存し、持たない方針であるとともに、日米の安全保障体制は維持されるとの見方を示している90。さらに第二回会談では、日本は強大な軍備を持てるにもかかわらず、自衛のみを目指し、他国の脅威となっていないし、そうなることもないとの決意を強く示している：核兵器に関しては非核三原則を堅持しているが、これに他国が倣うことを期待するのは「あまりに理想主義的である」；そこで、世界の平和を維持するために、日本は日米安全保障体制を堅持しているし、これを変更する意図もない；防衛費を GNP の 1 ％以内にとどめる考えである；これは、戦前の 6 ％を大きく下回り、残った余力は国内開発（住宅や下水道など）および世界の諸国への協力に向けたい；経済協力を GNP の0.7％、そのうち ODA は0.28％を77年の目標としている91。これらはいずれも、上述した福田の外交理念に則っていることがわかる。
1977年 5 月29日から 6 月 1 日までには、シンガポールのリー・クアンユー（LeeKuan Yew）首相が訪日し、福田首相や鳩山外相らと会談した。リーも、カーター
政権下の米国によるアジア安全保障政策の変更に不安と憂慮の念を持っており、福田はカーターとの会談について説明することで、その懸念払しょくに努めた。
しかし、これらはリーの安心を得る説明足り得なかった。リーは、米国政府が在韓兵力の撤退を貫くと予想し、「我々は、去る 3 月の日米首脳会談で、福田総理がカーター大統領を説得してくれることを期待していたが、結局、米国側が在韓米
地上軍の全面的撤退の方針を変更しなかったのには落胆させられた」と述べている92。日本記者クラブでの会見では「アメリカに具体的な軍事的役割を期待する
ことは、東南アジアのどの国にとっても利益にならない」と、もはや軍事的な意
味でも米国は頼りにならないかのような発言をするほどであった93。
ただし、リーは米国による軍事プレゼンス撤退後の日本の動向に懸念を示した
りはせず、むしろ、米国によるアジア政策変更に対応するべく、ASEAN の自助努力に日本をコミットさせることに熱心だった。リーは福田に、 8 月の ASEAN
首脳会議の目的を、「域内の経済協力を強めることを確認し、アメリカのアジア政策の変更に対処していく決意を世界に示すこと」と論じている94。実際、 8 月のクアラルンプールでの ASEAN 首脳会談における最大の議題は何になるのだろう126

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か、と問うた鳩山に対しリーは、経済協力であろうと見方を示し、「自分はこれだけに限る」と述べている95。したがってリーの関心は、経済協力だけに限られていた。
1977年 8 月に、福田は初の日本−ASEAN 首脳会議に出席した。日本のスタン
スは、これまで述べてきたように、「経済力と技術を提供して経済発展に協力し、平和と繁栄の基礎造りに貢献する」というものであり、この考え方に基づけば、
96「軍事的役割を演ずることは絶対にありえない」。日本の軍事大国化を否定し、経済力を持って国際貢献する旨を福田は示したのである。まず、福田は、憲法の戦争放棄や非核三原則を挙げ、これを国民的総意であると論じた。さらに、経済力が戦前の25倍に達した現在の日本は、「仮に軍備を行うとしたら、この経済力と技術力では世界一の軍事力が保持しうるかも知れない」のに、実際は経済力の0.88％
しか充てていない点を強調した。そのうえで、この余力を世界の民生安定に使用することで平和に貢献したい旨を明言したのである。すなわち、「一国の安全は軍事力によってではなく、民生の安定によって守るべきで、今後とも経済協力はさらに強化していきたい」とした97。つまり、福田は、これまで述べてきた彼の理念の通り、軍事分野での支出増大よりも、開発途上国、特に ASEAN に対する援助増大に努めたいと述べたのである。
その後、それぞれの東南アジア諸国訪問を経て、最後の訪問地フィリピンにおけるマニラスピーチにつながるのである。その内容は、これまで述べてきた福田の外交理念に一致している。すなわち、過去の歴史をみれば、経済大国は同時に軍事大国であったが、日本はその道を選ばない。その理由として、「諸国民の公正と信義に信頼してその安全と生存を保持」するという憲法前文の文言が、72年の外交演説と同様に用いられている。
さらに、この文言を「歴史上かつて例をみない理想を掲げ」たものだとして、また、核兵器を製造する経済・技術的能力を持ちながらも、その保有をあえて拒否している点を「史上類例を見ない実験への挑戦」だとして、誇り高く謳っている。矢野は、福田の東南アジア歴訪について、「日本は過去に悪いことをしたという自虐的な反省めいたものが影をひそめ」、「むしろ、前向きの自信を持って」臨んだと指摘したが98、これが特に当てはまるのが第一原則なのである。アジア局参事官（当時）としてマニラスピーチの第一稿を執筆した枝村純郎も、第一原則に関する説明が「誇り高い調子で貫かれていて卑屈さの影もない」とし、経済大
国が軍事大国にならないことを、「史上類例を見ない実験への挑戦」だと「格調高く謳いあげられている」ことを、その根拠に挙げている99。こうした「誇り高さ」
も、上記72年の外交演説を踏襲したものであり、さらには日本の軍事大国化を否定した際に愛知が見せたスタンスにも通じるものであった。
また、人口稠密で資源に乏しい日本は海外諸国との交流と協調が必要であるこマニラスピーチにおける日本の軍事大国化の否定：福田赳夫の外交理念に着目して

127と、軍事大国化を拒否する日本の選択が、アジア地域ひいては世界全体の基本的利益に資すること、日本は他国を脅かす存在にならず、持てる力を国内外の平和的建設と繁栄に向け、世界平和・安定・発展に貢献することがマニラスピーチで謳われている。これらも資源の輸入や製品の輸出を実現するため、世界中で繁栄した市場および海外諸国との友好が日本には肝要であり、そのためには、自国の平和や繁栄のみを追求するのではなく、あらゆる国々と提携を深めつつ、世界の平和・繁栄のなかに日本の平和・繁栄を見出だすべきとする福田の理念に合致していた。そしてこれらの議論が、福田ドクトリン第一原則としてまとめられているのである100。
結論
以上、本稿は、軍事大国化を否定した福田ドクトリン第一原則の有する意味について、彼の外交理念を手掛かりに分析した。すなわち第一・二節は、マニラス
ピーチに盛り込まれた福田の外交理念について、外務官僚時代から岸政権を経て、佐藤政権での経験から強い影響を受けていたことを指摘した。第三節では、同じく軍事大国化を否定していた田中政権と、福田政権の違いを明らかにした。すな
わち、田中政権の頃から外務省は、福田に比して日本の軍事大国化に関する
ASEAN 諸国の懸念について深刻ではなかった。その一方、東南アジアにおいて受動的な国際的役割を構想していた田中政権期の外務省に対し、福田はより積極的な同地域における平和・繁栄への貢献を模索した。こうした役割が軍事分野に拡大するとの懸念が生じ得るところであったが、福田が軍事大国化の否定をそれまでの政権に増して強調したため、ASEAN 諸国指導者に安心感を与えたのである。そのうえで第四節では、東南アジア歴訪に至る過程で、福田が軍事大国にならないとする理念を繰り返し述べたことを論じた。外務省にとっては確認するまでもない当然のこうした理念も、東南アジア諸国にとっては、確実なものではな
いことに福田は気付いており、その発信を愚直に繰り返したのである。
注1「福田総理大臣のマニラにおけるスピーチ（わが国の東南アジア政策）」1977年 8 月18日、マニラ、『わが外交の近況』22号、1978年 8 月、326-30頁。
2
矢野暢「福田歴訪および「福田ドクトリン」の背景―求められる日本の東南アジア政策の構築―」アジア調査会（編）『アジア時報』91号、1977年11月、2-3頁；須藤季夫「変動期の日本外交と東南アジア」日本政治学会編『危機の日本外交―70年代（年報政治学）』
岩波書店、1997年、43頁、50-52頁；外務省『わが外交の近況』大蔵省出版局、1978年、44頁；小和田恆『参画から創造へ―日本外交の目指すもの』都市出版、1994年、44頁。
3
枝村純郎「インドネシア・フィリピン訪問とマニラ・スピーチ」『外交フォーラム』2009
年 1 月号、98頁。

1284

広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8

Remarks of President Ferdinand E. Marcos during the Luncheon tendered by Prime Minister
Fukuda, Manila Hotel, August 18, 1977. その他、例えば同国外務長官のロムロも軍事大国にならないという原則を高く評価した。御巫発外務大臣宛「総理の東南アジア諸国訪問（ロムロ外務長官と本使とのこん談）」、（TA）R054846 6594、1977年 8 月29日、外務省外交史
料館所蔵文書、2010-0033, SA-1-3-1.
5「福田総理東南アジア歴訪の成果とマニラ声明―ASEAN 各国紙の報道と論評」昭和52年
8 月27日、報道課、外務省外交文書『福田総理東南アジア諸国訪問資料』、2010-0031。
6
枝村純郎「物語「福田ドクトリン」から30年、第 7 回、「福田ドクトリン」の誕生」『外交フォーラム』2008年 8 月、82頁。
7
福田赳夫『回顧九十年』、岩波書店、1995年、280頁。
8
枚挙に暇がないが、例えば小宮山千秋「福田赳夫論」『政経人』第19巻第 1 号、1972年 1月。
9例えば若月は、一般に党内右派と目された福田が、日本は「平和国家」として必要最小限度の軍備保有にとどめ、その経済的余力を途上国の自立および発展に使用することで、国際社会に貢献するという「穏当な方針」を掲げたことについて、「いささかの意外性を持つ者も少なくないであろう」と指摘している。また、井上は、一方では党内ナショナ
リストないし「タカ派」であり、他方ではそれと対照的な国際主義者や平和主義者という、福田をめぐる相反するイメージを挙げ、後者が実像だったと述べている。若月秀和『「全方位外交」の時代―冷戦変容期の日本とアジア・1971〜80年』日本経済評論社、2006
年、2-3頁；井上正也「福田赳夫―「連帯」の外交―」増田弘『戦後日本首相の外交思想―吉田茂から小泉純一郎まで―』ミネルヴァ書房、2016年；井上正也「福田赳夫首相の外交思想（講演会抄録 2014年現代史研究所連続研究講座：戦後日本首相の外交思想）」『現代史研究』東洋英和女学院大学現代史研究所、第11号、2015年、53頁。
10
枝村純郎「「福田ドクトリン」から三十年―理念主導の外交」日本国際問題研究所ホーム
ページ、http://www.jiia.or.jp/column/200804/09-edamura.html（accessed 23 Apr 2019）。
11
昇亜美子「東南アジアにおける日本イメージと日本外交―1970年代を中心に―」大石裕／
山本信人編『イメージの中の日本：ソフトパワー再考』慶応義塾大学出版会、2008年；
曺良鉉「1977年福田赳夫首相東南アジア歴訪と日本の東南アジア政策形成―「福田ドクトリン」をめぐる通説の批判的検討」『国際関係論研究』第22号、2004年；若月秀和「福田ドクトリン―ポスト冷戦外交の「予行演習」―」『国際政治』第108号、2000年；その他、
田中康友「ポストベトナムの東南アジア安定化政策としての福田ドクトリン―外務省アジア局の政策形成プロセスに着目して―」『アジア研究』第45巻 1 号、1999年。
12
Sueo Sudo, “The Road to Becoming a Regional Leader: Japanese Attempts in Southeast Asia,
1975-1980,” Pacific Affairs, 61（1）1988; Sueo Sudo, Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New
dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy（Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992）；
前掲、須藤「変動期の日本外交と東南アジア」；須藤季夫「「アイディア」と対外政策決定論―福田ドクトリンをめぐる日本の政策決定過程」『国際政治』第108号、1995年。
13
前掲、昇「東南アジアにおける日本イメージと日本外交」
14
前掲、若月『「全方位外交」の時代』 4 頁；前掲、井上「福田赳夫―「連帯」の外交―」
250-1頁；前掲、井上「福田赳夫首相の外交思想」
15
前掲、福田『回顧九十年』40-2頁。
16
福田赳夫「当面の政局を語る」『経済時代』第37巻第10号、1972年10月、16頁 ; 福田赳夫
「先行すべきは民族改造―列島改造だけでは歪んだ社会が―」『政経人』第19巻第10号、1972年11月、20-1頁。
17『朝日新聞』1968年 2 月26日。

マニラスピーチにおける日本の軍事大国化の否定：福田赳夫の外交理念に着目して
18

129

福田赳夫、臼井吉見「倉石発言は日本のタメ息」『文芸春秋』1968年 5 月号、104頁。
福田赳夫「鳩山内閣民主党の公約は斯くして実行できる―国民生活はどうなる」『実業之世界』第52巻第 5 号、1955年 5 月、31-2頁。
20
岸信介、河野一郎、福田赳夫、後藤田正晴、田中角栄、中曽根康弘『私の履歴書―保守政権の担い手』日本経済新聞出版社、2007年、158-9頁；前掲、福田、臼井「倉石発言は日本のタメ息」104-5頁。
21『朝日新聞』1977年11月 5 日。
22
田原総一朗「福田赳夫：わが自民党とのたたかい」『中央公論』第110巻第 1 号、1995年、63頁。
23
福田赳夫「奇跡の発展の三つの推進力」『経済展望』1971年 2 月 1 日号、23頁。
24
田中宏編『福田赳夫：保守革命に賭ける』読売新聞社、1974年、170頁。
25
前掲、福田「当面の政局を語る」16頁。ただし、原水爆を用いた戦争が絶対ないというような楽観論に立っているわけでもない。田中角栄、福田赳夫、船田中「新春放談」『政策月報』自由民主党、第72号、1962年 1 月、60-1頁。
26
福田赳夫「今日の内外情勢と日本の進路」『経済時代』第38巻第11号、1973年11月号、16-7頁；福田赳夫「日本精神を再建する年」『経済展望』第46巻第 1 号、1974年新年号、27-8頁。
27
前掲、田中『福田赳夫』170-1頁。
28
岸信介『岸信介回顧録』廣済堂、1983年、395-6頁。
29
前掲、福田「当面の政局を語る」16頁。
30
瀬長亀次郎の質問に対する福田の答弁。「第八十回国会衆議院会議録」第四号、『官報号外』昭和五十二年二月四日。
31福田赳夫「歴史の教訓に学ぶ平和大国への道」『朝日ジャーナル』Vol.27, No.45, 1983年、13頁。
32
福田赳夫、小竹即一「 党内革命 で党風を刷新―転換期を迎えた自民党―」『政経人』、第20巻第 3 号、1973年 3 月、40頁。
33
前掲、福田「当面の政局を語る」16頁。
34
竹入義勝の質問に対する答弁。「第八十回国会衆議院会議録」第四号、『官報号外』昭和五十二年二月四日。
35
前掲、福田「日本の財政と安保条約」 7 頁。
36
前掲、福田「七十年代の日本経済の課題」。
37
福田赳夫「日本の財政と安保条約」『実業之世界』第66巻第12号、1969年12月、 7 頁。
38
『朝日新聞』1969年10月 3 日。
39
『毎日新聞』1970年 5 月23日。
40
前掲、福田『回顧九十年』311頁。
41
前掲、福田「大事争うべし」15-8頁；前掲、福田「当面の政局を語る」16頁；福田赳夫「平和大国の設計」『経済時代』第37巻第 7 号、1972年 7 月号、9-10頁。
42
福田赳夫「転機を迎えた国際情勢と日本の国際的責任」『経済展望』1971年43巻 1 号、28頁。
43福田赳夫「国民総理解で前進すべき時」『経済展望』40巻 1 号、1968年 1 月、26-7頁。同様の議論として、例えば福田赳夫「日本国民に課せられた今後の使命―社会、国、世界に対する責任を自覚せよ―」『経済時代』33巻 2 号、1968年 2 月、30-3頁。
44
同上；福田赳夫「インフレ克服が最大の急務―世界に誇れる平和福祉社会建設のために―」『政経人』第20巻第 7 号、1973年、22頁。
45
福田赳夫「挙党体制で難局を乗りきる」『経済時代』第38巻第 1 号、1973年、17-8頁。
19

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衆議院本会議の代表質問、1965年 1 月27日、引用は、福田赳夫「使命遂行に当って自信と信念と勇気を」『経済時代』第30巻第 3 号、18頁。その他の例として、福田赳夫「激動する世界の中の日本」『経済展望』第37巻第10号、1965年 6 月、23頁。
47
福田赳夫「転機に立つ日本の進路 成年式を迎えた新日本と国民の覚悟」第37巻第 2 号、1965年 2 月、13頁。
48
福田赳夫「国際協調と日本」『実業之世界』、1972年 1 月、第69巻第 1 号、20頁。
49
福田赳夫「平和国家建設への道を誤るな」『政経人』第20巻第12号、1973年12月、23-4頁。
50
前掲、福田「今日の内外情勢と日本の進路」16-7頁；前掲、福田「日本精神を再建する
年」27-8頁。
51
福田赳夫、多田実「新春対談 福田大蔵大臣にきく」『時の動き』1971年1/1、 9 頁。
52
愛知揆一「これからの日本外交」『世界の動き』、No.228、臨時増刊号、1970年 9 月、11-2頁；「第26回国連総会における愛知首席代表一般討論演説」ニューヨーク、1971年 9 月27日、『わが外交の近況』16号、424-33頁。
53
ジェームズ・レストン「佐藤首相会見記」『中央公論』昭和46年11月号、141、144-5頁。
54
同上。
55
「第26回国連総会における愛知首席代表一般討論演説」ニューヨーク、1971年 9 月27日、https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1972/s47-shiryou-2-1.htm（accessed 31 Oct2020）。
56
愛知揆一「これからの日本外交」『世界の動き』、No.228、臨時増刊号、1970年 9 月、11-12頁。
57「国連25周年記念会期における佐藤総理大臣演説」昭和45年10月21日、https://www.mofa.
go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1971/s46-shiryou-2-1.htm（accessed 9 Aug. 2018）。
58
福田赳夫「大事争うべし」『世界と日本』No.10、1972年、14-5頁。
59「第68回国会における福田外務大臣の外交演説」昭和47年 1 月29日、https://www.mofa.
go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1972/s47-shiryou-1-5.htm#k331（accessed 29 Sep. 2019）。
60
前掲、愛知「これからの日本外交」11-2頁。
61「総理東南アジア訪問用発言メモ」昭和48年12月、アジア局、外務省外交文書「田中総理東南アジア諸国訪問」2010-5051。
62
同上。
63
例えば、久保卓也「日米安全保障条約を見直す」1972年、『データベース「世界と日本」』
http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldpn/documents/texts/JPSC/19720600.OIJ.html（accessed
14 Apr. 2014）。
64
例えば、田久保忠衛「手放しの楽観許さぬ日米関係：わが国への責任分担要請強まる」『世界週報』1976年11月16日 4 頁；田久保忠衛「日本外交、戦後最大の難関に：賢明な選
択には知恵と勇気が必要」『世界週報』1976年 2 月24日 4 頁。
65
例えば、Telegram, American Embassy（Hereafter AM）Tokyo to secretary of State, Washington
D.C. “US-Japanese Relationship, Problem of Readjustment,” 1st Oct. 1971, Record Group, 1970-73, POL JAPAN-US, Box 2407,（hereafter RG）59, Subject Numeric Files（hereafter SNF）
National Archives II, College Park, MA（hereafter NA）; Memorandum of Conversation, 20 September 1971, RG 59, SNF, 1970-73, POL JAPAN-US, Box 2406, NA；「東南アジア及び韓国における対日批判問題（1）―分析―」昭和49年 3 月31日、アジア局、外務省外交文書「ASEAN 諸国日本公館次席会議／対日批判問題」2010-0041、2-5頁、32-3頁。
66
前掲「東南アジア及び韓国における対日批判問題（1）」4-5、24-8頁。
67『アジアの安全保障と我が国の立場』昭和49年10月 7 日、ア地政、外務省外交文書「本邦外交政策／対アジア」2012-1483。

マニラスピーチにおける日本の軍事大国化の否定：福田赳夫の外交理念に着目して
68

131

同上。
『インドシナ、ASEAN、ビルマ』昭和49年 7 月 5 日、ア地政、外務省外交文書「本邦外交政策／対アジア」2012-1483。
70『アジアにおける我が国の政治的役割について』昭和49年10月 8 日日、ア地政長、外務省
外交文書「本邦外交政策／対アジア」2012-1483。
71
前掲『インドシナ、ASEAN、ビルマ』。
72『アジアの安全と平和』作成年月日不明 外務省外交文書、「奔放外交政策／対アジア」
2012-1483；前掲『インドシナ、ASEAN、ビルマ』。
73
前掲『アジアの安全保障と我が国の立場』
。
74
同上。
75
前掲『インドシナ、ASEAN、ビルマ』；前掲『アジアの安全と平和』。
76
友田錫『入門・現代日本外交』中央公論、1988年、60頁。
77
Sudo, “The Road to Becoming a Regional Leader,” op cit.
78
「マルコス大統領のものの考え方」アジア局、昭和52年 7 月、外務省外交史料館所蔵文書、「福田総理東南アジア諸国訪問／フィリピン」2010-0034。
79
御巫大使発外務大臣宛「総理の東南アアジア諸国訪問（A）」1977年 7 月12日、（TA）
R043615、外務省外交史料館所蔵文書、「福田総理東南アジア諸国訪問／フィリピン」
2010-0033。
80
Newsweek, 20 Jun 1977。
81
ラム・ペンエ「福田ドクトリン30周年と日本・ASEAN 関係」『国際問題』No.565（2007年10月）、54頁。
82『福田総理会見記録（EC 常駐記者）』、昭和52年 9 月20日、情報文化局海外広報課、外務省外交文書「本邦外交政策／対アジア」2012-1485。
83
若月秀和、2012、「福田赳夫研究―一九七〇年代を中心に」『立教法学』第86号、154頁。
84『福田総理内外合同記者会見想定問答集』、1977年 8 月、外務省、外務省外交文書「福田総理東南アジア諸国訪問」2011-0345。
85
日米共同声明、 3 月22日、『世界週報』1977年 4 月 5 日、17-19頁。
86「福田赳夫内閣総理大臣とジミー・カーター米大統領との間の共同声明」ワシントン、
1977年 3 月22日、『わが外交の近況』21号、82-4頁；前掲、福田『回顧九十年』272-4頁。
87「マルコス大統領の訪日（要旨）」昭和52年 4 月30日、南東アジア第二課長、外務省外交記録「マルコス・フィリピン大統領夫妻訪日（国賓）」2010-0191。
88「福田総理・マルコス比大統領二者会談 議事要録（テート・ア・テート会談部分）」昭
和52年 5 月 4 日、ア東二、外務省外交記録「マルコス・フィリピン大統領夫妻訪日（国賓）」2010-0191。
89「マルコス大統領・福田総理第 2 回会談 テート・ア・テート会談の内容」昭和52年 4 月
27日、ア東 2 、外務省外交記録「マルコス・フィリピン大統領夫妻訪日（国賓）」20100191。
90
前掲「福田総理・マルコス比大統領二者会談 議事要録（テート・ア・テート会談部分）」。
91
前掲、「マルコス大統領・福田総理第 2 回会談」。
92
「福田総理・リー・シンガポール首相会談録」昭和52年 5 月31日、ア東二、外務省外交文書『リー・シンガポール首相訪日』2010-0386。
93「ASEAN 強化に日本の協力要請：リー・シンガポール首相来日」『世界週報』1977年 6 月
14日、8-9頁。
94
同上。
69

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広島平和研究：Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Volume 8「鳩山外務大臣・リー・シンガポール首相会談録」昭和52年 5 月31日、ア東二、外務省外交文書『リー・シンガポール首相訪日』2010-0386。
96「福田総理内外合同記者会見想定問答集」1977年 8 月、外務省、25頁、外務省外交文書『福田総理東南アジア諸国訪問資料』、2010-0031。
97
原発外務大臣宛「日本・ASEAN 首のう会議」1977年 8 月 8 日、ア地政、外務省外交文書「ASEAN 文化基金」2010-3453。
98
矢野暢『東南アジア政策 : 疑いから信頼へ』サイマル出版会、1978年、25頁。
99
前掲、枝村「「福田ドクトリン」から三十年―理念主導の外交」。
100
前掲「福田総理大臣のマニラにおけるスピーチ」。

Transformation through Normalization: Delineating Justice in the Bangsamoro Peace Process 133

Research Article

Transformation through Normalization: Delineating Justice in theBangsamoro Peace Process
Raymond Andaya
Research Student,
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
University of Tokyo
Abstract
This article explores how the justice aspect of peacebuilding has been dealt with throughthe Program for Normalization between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), in relation to the Bangsamoro
conﬂict and peace process in Mindanao. Using a transformative justice model of analysis,
it is argued here that the early-stage implementation process of the Parties’ normalizationagreement demonstrates their transformative interpretation of justice, by addressing its
political, socioeconomic, legal, and psychosocial dimensions. This article contextualizes
these four elements of transformative justice through the implementation milestones ofthe peace process’ normalization track: security, socioeconomic development, conﬁdencebuilding measures, and transitional justice and reconciliation.
Introduction
A United Nations Security Council statement deﬁned peacebuilding as a process “aimed atpreventing the outbreak, the recurrence, or continuation of armed conﬂict” through “a wide
range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms.”1 A successful peacebuilding strategy is one that meets the following criteria: “relevance, coherence and consistency of programmes and actions; the consent and cooperationof the authorities of the State concerned where they exist; continuity and conclusion of
the process; cooperation and coordination among organizations and other actors involved;
and cost eﬀectiveness of the overall peacebuilding operation.” As a comprehensive eﬀort
aimed at sustainable peace, therefore, peacebuilding must involve mechanisms that aim forlong-term transformation in a post-conﬂict society’s security, political, economic, and legal
dimensions. Mani (2002) argues that while it is mainly a political task, peacebuilding is a

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process that “rebuilds fractured relationships between people” (15). Considering this comprehensive view of peacebuilding, Lambourne (2014) argues that justice “must [therefore]
be seen as more than transitional: it must set up structures, institutions and relationships topromote sustainability” (22).
Transformative justice theory posits that, based on principles of transformative
peacebuilding, justice is manifested through four key elements or aspects: accountability,or legal justice; psychosocial justice, including truth and healing; socioeconomic justice;and political justice (Lambourne 2014: 24). This article utilizes Lambourne’s transformative justice lens to analyze how the justice aspect of peacebuilding has been dealt withthrough the Program for Normalization between the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), in relation to theBangsamoro conﬂict and peace process in Mindanao. The Comprehensive Agreement on
the Bangsamoro’s (CAB) implementation process has been divided into two main thrusts:
the political-legislative track and the normalization track. The political-legislative track
has achieved signiﬁcant milestones through the passage of Republic Act No. 11054, or theBangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), on 27 July 2018, and the ratiﬁcation of the Law throughplebiscites conducted on 21 January and 6 February 2019. The BOL serves as the statutefor the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM)
that replaces the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) proclaimed the ratification of the BOL on 25 January 2019. With
the ratification of the BOL, the MILF-led Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) took
over as the interim government that will exercise legislative and executive functions as
stipulated in the BOL.
Meanwhile, the normalization track serves as a complementary process to the political-legal aspect of implementation. As deﬁned by the Agreement, normalization is a process
whereby conflict-affected communities can “return to conditions where they can achieve
their desired quality of life, which includes the pursuit of sustainable livelihoods and political participation within a peaceful deliberative society.” A report from the Office of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) further stipulates that “normalization
aims to ensure human security in the Bangsamoro and to build a society that is committed
to basic human rights where individuals are free from fear of violence or crime and wherelong-held traditions and values continue to be honored” (OPAPP Annual Report 2019: 20).
This article analyzes the implementation process for the CAB’s Annex on Normalization,
signed on 25 January 2014. It traces the implementation milestones of normalization since
the fulfilment of the political-legal track’s objectives in January 2019 and argues that theprocess of normalization in the Bangsamoro peacebuilding project engenders a holistic,Transformation through Normalization: Delineating Justice in the Bangsamoro Peace Process 135‘transformative’ perception of justice, with the aim of sustaining political momentum forlong-term peace.
This article is structured as follows. To set up the conceptual foundations of theapproach taken in the analysis, it builds a framework based on literature explaining therelationship between peace agreement implementation and the normalization of political
relations, as well as the intersection between justice and the transition to peace. Second, it
illustrates the progress that the normalization track of the peace process has achieved since
the ratification of the BOL in January 2019. This is deemed to be a significant juncture,with the BOL facilitating implementation of the CAB’s provisions, including those underthe Annex on Normalization. This section looks at the aggregate implementation of the four
aspects of the Annex: security, socio-economic development, confidence-building measures, and transitional justice and reconciliation. This is followed by an appraisal of how the
implementation process of the Annex on Normalization has, so far, treated the conceptionof justice, through the lens of transformative justice theory’s four aspects: political, socioeconomic, legal, and psychosocial justice. Fourth, the article returns to its argument that theearly-phase, aggregate implementation of the normalization agreement for the Bangsamoro
deals with the normalization-justice nexus through a transformative justice lens. Finally,
the article concludes with recommendations for further research on the junctions between
peace agreement implementation, normalization, and post-conﬂict justice.
1 Implementing Normalization and Justice(1) Normalization through Peace Agreement Implementation
This article suggests that an analysis of the contents of a peace agreement, and its implementation process, can provide meaningful clues to understand the intersection between
the normalization of political relations and the concept of justice in a post-conﬂict society.
In order to understand the relationship between normalization provisions and post-conﬂict
justice interpretations, this article, therefore, attempts to make sense of the structural andprocedural aspects of the CAB’s Annex on Normalization. A peace agreement’s overall
impact to the durability of peace depends on the dimensions of interactions it institutionalizes. More specifically, a peace agreement that addresses interactions in political, social,
cultural, economic, and legal spheres “eradicates sources of noncompliance and, in consequence, improves the sustainability of cooperation” (Badran 2014: 214). The successful
implementation of an agreement is also seen as a “concrete signal of a genuine commitment
to peace” which, according to the literature on civil war termination states, is enhanced
by factors like the presence of a third-party actor guaranteeing compliance to the negoti-

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ated settlements (Hoddie & Hartzell 2003b; Walter 1999; Stedman 1997), and a high levelof economic development in the transitioning state (Hoddie & Hartzell 2003b; Doyle &Sambanis 2000).
The literature finds further that the following aspects of peace agreement design
have a significant impact on viable implementation. First, the inclusion of provisions forpolitical, military, territorial and economic power-sharing increases the likelihood of success because it signals conciliatory intent and stabilizes the transition process (Hartzell& Hoddie 2003a). Some studies find that while rebel-military integration may result inpeacebuilding failures due to poor implementation (Glassmyer & Sambanis 2008), multiple dimensions of power-sharing institutions foster a sense of security between former
belligerents and encourage self-enforcing peace (Hartzell & Hoddie 2003a). Other studies contend that besides transitional power-sharing institutions, two other safeguards thatfacilitate constructive relationships between former adversaries, and lead to more viable
implementation, are dispute resolution and verification mechanisms (Joshi, et al. 2017).
Lastly, given the literature’s acknowledgement of the importance of power-sharing arrangements to implementation success, the scholarship has expanded towards a discussion on
the exclusion-inclusion debate in peace agreement design discourses. Most civil war peaceagreements contain provisions on territorial power-sharing in the form of autonomy grants.
However, the grant of autonomy through territorial power-sharing does not always address
the issue of non-dominant minorities within the sub-state level of governance in the autonomous territory (Wise 2018). Exclusion of these sub-state level minorities may pose a threat
to the aggregate implementation of other peace agreement provisions. Also crucial to thedebate on the exclusion-inclusion dichotomy is the involvement of civil society. Scholars
argue that civil society participation increases the peace process’ legitimacy by addressing
the deficiencies of negotiations dominated by macro level actors (McGregor 2006), andaddresses the exclusion problem through a range of options for involvement in Track One
negotiations (Paﬀenholz 2014). Civil society actors help reduce the risk of relapse to conﬂict when they are part of negotiated settlements (Nilsson 2012).
Despite extensive provisions on power-sharing, both signatory and non-signatory
actors can defect from their commitments when the concessions make them militarily or
politically vulnerable compared to their adversary (Bekoe 2005). Commitment problems
exist when parties do not trust each other and fear repercussions (Kirschner 2014), or when
there is clear uncertainty on the part of certain actors – a situation that can be exploited byextremists (Kydd & Walter 2002). Spoilers inside and outside of the peace process can halt
the momentum of implementation (Stedman 1997). While it can very well be a problem ofcommitment arising from mistrust and fear, spoiling can also be attributable to the vague-

Transformation through Normalization: Delineating Justice in the Bangsamoro Peace Process 137

ness of an agreement, causing actors to interpret it in different ways, and eventually, apotential deterioration of the political and security situation (Shedd 2008). These problemsof commitment and potential spoiling led scholars to question whether negotiated settlements can, in fact, contribute to sustainable peace. In designing peace agreements, then,scholars suggest setting up and implementing proper security sector reform (SSR) (Toft2009), and instituting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs that
can identify incentives for returning to violence, to extend the durability of peace (Aghedo2012).
The literature informs this article that the practice of designing and implementing anegotiated settlement is a complex undertaking which may or may not lead to sustainable
peace depending on the suitability of its provisions, the inclusion or exclusion of stakeholders, and the ability to mitigate problems of commitment and spoiling. In terms of its immediate and long-term impact to the normalization of politics between former belligerents,
peace agreement implementation can be seen as both “an integrated collection of parallel
and reinforcing processes” (Joshi & Quinn 2015: 871), and “an outcome that normalizes
political relations between hostile groups, solves commitment problems and addresses
the root causes of civil conflict” (Ibid.: 869). Having established an implementation process’ ability to demonstrate former adversaries’ resolve in normalizing political relations,this article now examines how implementation addresses the core issues that caused the
protraction of the conﬂict and peace process. At the heart of conﬂict resolution and peaceagreement implementation are questions on how justice is understood in the context of
normalizing politics, and how justice will be sought in the transition.
(2) Implementing Justice in the Transition
In a transition to democracy, agreements settle political violence by reforming the state, andcreate the political condition to transform the relationship between levels of government
and post-conflict society (Zambakari 2013). A peacebuilding project after a civil war, on
the other hand, faces practical challenges that are diﬀerent from cases of transition from a
repressive state. In such case of post-civil war transition, strategies of prosecution, truthtelling, reparations, and reform are not easily transferrable to deal with justice claims,“where the problem of ex-combatant integration requires at least consideration of locallevel, restorative justice approaches,” (Arthur 2009: 360) to address complex issues of selfdetermination, power sharing, wealth sharing, re-integration of combatants, and war crimes.
Peace agreement design and implementation, therefore, must consider both procedural
justice (the process) and distributive justice (the outcome) and their relationship with the
durability of peace (Druckman & Wagner 2019).

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While it is widely recognized that some form of justice is necessary, confronting thepast is especially challenging in contexts where “victims and perpetrators unavoidablyinteract, whether in the political arena or in the street” (Kritz 2004: 15). In some cases,‘temporal distance’ is necessary in post-conflict efforts, whereby former belligerents
allow a certain amount of time to pass before confronting past abuses to avoid a return
to violence, whereas in others, avoidance in dealing with the past is seen as “a necessary
price for obtaining a peace agreement” (Ibid.: 15-16) and a decision made based on theimperatives of realpolitik. In this context, recent practice by mediators and negotiators intransitions from civil wars has utilized the conceptual framework of ‘Dealing with the Past’(DWP), developed by the Bern-based peace research institution swisspeace and the Swiss
Federal Department of Foreign Aﬀairs. The DWP framework aims to be a holistic approachfounded on four pillars: the right to know, the right to justice, the right to reparations, andthe guarantee of non-recurrence. It recognizes that “every context has its own history,
culture, religions, languages and traditions which inﬂuence the ways a society may choose
and is able to deal with the past,” and argues that “top-down approaches and externallyimposed measures will neither receive the needed legitimacy nor build a sustainable process” (A Conceptual Framework for Dealing with the Past 2016: 15). The contextual andinclusive nature of DWP allows it to be viewed as part of “a broader set of interconnectedtransformations” (Ibid.: 17). While it aims to transform relationships on a more collective,societal level through symbolic acts such as oﬃcial apologies and commemorations, it may
also endeavor to change political structures through constitutional reform. A DWP framework allows former belligerents to prioritize political stability and the silencing of weapons
whilst acknowledging international norms of human rights and humanitarian law in theirpeace accords (Zoller 2004: 69). Indeed, the post-conflict phase is a complex period that
may involve a comprehensive mixture of options for dealing with past abuses such as using
tribunals and truth commissions, reinforcing prior eﬀorts in the spheres of justice and theconstitution, strengthening actors and public forums for dialogue and negotiation between
civil society and government, and supporting the creation of a factual history of past events(Massard 2004: 13).
Given the complicated nature of the peace-justice nexus, Lambourne (2014) argues
that justice “must therefore be seen as more than transitional: it must set up structures,
institutions and relationships to promote sustainability” (22). The transformative justiceframework she suggested incorporates locally relevant principles of “both retributive andrestorative justice in accountability mechanisms, as well as structures and relationships
to support future respect for human rights and the rule of law” (Ibid.: 21). There are four
elements or aspects of transformative justice: accountability or legal justice; knowledge

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and acknowledgement of truth; socioeconomic justice; and political justice (Ibid.: 24-32).
This is the perspective of justice and peacebuilding espoused here. This article takes theview that the normalization of political relations in the peacebuilding process for theBangsamoro exhibits transformative justice principles by not focusing solely on institutions and processes for accountability or legal justice. The Annex on Normalization of the
CAB, therefore, is not just an agreement on the political structures and institutions that canfacilitate an environment conducive to peacebuilding, but also a mechanism that speaks toproponents of transformative justice, who call on both sides of the conflict to address thelegal, psychosocial, socioeconomic, and political aspects of justice.
2 The Annex on Normalization’s Implementation: Through a Transformative Justice Lens
From a review of the literature above, this article builds a conceptual framework thatweaves together the usefulness of peace agreement implementation analysis with emerging
theories on the intersections between justice and peacebuilding. This conceptual framework
is utilized in this examination of the presence of transformative justice elements in thenormalization process for the Bangsamoro, as manifested in the Annex on Normalization of
the CAB. The following analysis traces the implementation of the four aspects of the Annex(security, socioeconomic development, confidence-building measures, and transitional
justice and reconciliation) by applying the four elements of transformative justice theory:
political, socioeconomic, legal, and psychosocial justice. This framework is summarized in
the ﬁgure below:
The normalization track is an important second step towards peace in Mindanao, with

1

Adapted from Lambourne’s (2014) Elements of Transformative JusticeThe normalization track is an important second step towards peace in Mindanao, with thepolitical-legal track reaching a significant milestone through the passage and ratification of the

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the political-legal track reaching a signiﬁcant milestone through the passage and ratiﬁcationof the Bangsamoro Organic Law and the creation of the BARMM. Executive Order No.
79, signed by President Rodrigo Duterte on 24 April 2019, set forth the implementationof the Annex on Normalization of the CAB and the creation of the Inter-Cabinet Cluster
Mechanism on Normalization (ICCMN), the institution in charge of coordinating andmobilizing government agencies in the implementation of the Program for Normalization.
The ICCMN operates through support from the international community,2 and through theenvironment created by the ceaseﬁre between the GPH and the MILF.3 The following section is an analysis of the progress of the Normalization Program since the completion of
the political-legal track in January 2019. Based on the conceptual framework exhibited in
the ﬁgure above, it traces how transformative justice principles manifest in the Annex on
Normalization’s four aspects of security, socio-economic development, conﬁdence-building
measures, and transitional justice and reconciliation. The following examination is founded
on a review of the Annex on Normalization and related peace agreements, news articles
detailing the recent progress of the Normalization Program, reports from the Transitional
Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) such as the Listening Process Report andthe Land Report, oﬃcial reports from the OPAPP, and interviews with key informants. 4(1) Ensuring Security: Joint Efforts in the Decommissioning Process
The security aspect of the Normalization Program under the BOL contains provisions on
the creation of a Joint Peace and Security Team (JPST), the decommissioning process of
MILF forces and weapons, the disbandment of private armed groups (PAGs), the programfor small arms and light weapons management, the redeployment of the AFP, and the detection and clearance of unexploded landmines. The creation of the JPST is a crucial aspectof security transformation in the region. It is composed of members of the national government’s military and police forces and the BIAF-MILF, as designated by the AFP, the PNP,
and the BIAF-MILF. Camp Abubakar in Barira, Maguindanao, a former MILF camp, wasturned over to the JPST, and will serve as its headquarters as it safeguards the weapons
turned over during the decommissioning process under the auspices of an International
Decommissioning Body. The construction of the facilities in the Camp Abubakar barracks
was funded by the OPAPP and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). OPAPP
Undersecretary David Diciano has stated that the turnover of the camp, and the other ten
barracks that will be constructed later on, “symbolizes [their] desire to ensure the implementation of the security component of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro(CAB)” (ABS-CBN News, 2020). The JPST and its personnel will serve until 2022, when
the interim government ends its term in oﬃce (Pareno 2019).

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These efforts to create a joint security institution conjointly functions with thedecommissioning program for former MILF combatants. A multi-nation Independent
Decommissioning Body (IDB), chaired by Turkey, and composed of three foreign (Turkey,
Norway, and Brunei Darussalam) and four local experts, was tasked to conduct verification, validation, and decommissioning weapons. At the time of writing, 12,000 or about 30
percent of the estimated 40,000 firearms held by former MILF combatants have alreadybeen recovered. Observers have lauded the phased decommissioning process, but somehave remarked that it can only help build sustainable peace if private armed groups in theregion are also dismantled (Maitem & Navales 2020). In this regard, the BOL called upon
the National Task Force for the Disbandment of the Private Armed Groups (NTF-DPAG)in the Bangsamoro Core Territory and the Adjacent Regions IX to XII. Under Memorandum Circular No. 83 (s.2015), the Task Force was created to oversee “policy planningand implementation of the program for the disbandment of the PAGs.” The NTF-DPAG’s
mission is critical in the decommissioning process because there may still be weapons
presently owned by individuals and families, who are reluctant to surrender weapons dueto the security risks posed by private armed groups in Mindanao. To address these security concerns, the new BARMM authorities may need to conduct dialogues and negotiateagreements with private armed groups at the regional, provincial, or city/municipality
levels (International Crisis Group 2019).
The success of the phased decommissioning process is crucial to the security aspectof the Normalization Program and is necessarily associated with the progress gained by
the political-legal track of the peace process. The advancement of the Normalization Program, and the sustainability of peace in the BARMM itself, is contingent upon the political
momentum for peace efforts from both the GPH and the MILF. Jimenez-Damary notes,
for example, that reconstituting the GPH Peace Panel, such as at the beginning of a newadministration, “puts things on hold” and poses “difficulties in getting back on the righttrack.” This, according to her, can be said about the implementation of the decommissioning process when the current Duterte administration replaced the Aquino government
in 2016. Despite the “tricky” role that political will plays in the peace process, JimenezDamary finds hopeful prospects from the current administration’s decision to prioritize
the creation of the BARMM and the BTA, and the schedule currently being followed byboth parties in the decommissioning process. The current proposed Bill for the creationof a National Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission for the Bangsamoro(NTJRCB) is also a signiﬁcant breakthrough, but its passage into law will likewise depend
on whether or not the government considers it a political priority. (C. Jimenez-Damary,personal communication, 7 December 2020).

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Whether political milestones lead to a more stable security environment will dependon their ability to address the concerns of conflict-affected communities and the otherthreats to peace on the ground. It should be noted that while changes in the political, legal,
and institutional frameworks of the country are essential to begin the long process ofhealing and reconciliation, some are skeptical about the ability of laws and institutions toaddress the multiple drivers of armed conﬂict in Mindanao (Listening Process Report 2017:
164-165). Even as a joint security assessment is underway to prevent a security vacuum,and institutions such as the NTF-DPAG are put in place, potential threats to peace andsecurity remain for stakeholders of the Normalization Program. Some observers perceive
institutions like the JPST as merely an “ad hoc organization with unclear authorities andresources,” that gives the MILF fewer tools and legal authority to counter the growth of
extremist armed groups in the region (Abuza & Lischin 2020: 18). Hence, the threat ofviolence from other militant Moro groups remains,5 especially from those that have pledged
allegiance to Islamic State ideology. Furthermore, a United States Institute of Peace (USIP)
Report mentions intra-Moro political competition through private armies of political dynasties, as an endemic security challenge for the Bangsamoro and the rest of Mindanao (Abuza& Lischin 2020: 14-17). Likewise, violence related to a culture of rido (inter-generational
clan disputes) has, over the years, become intertwined with the conﬂict between rebels andthe national government. Participants in the TJRC Listening Process have expressed mixed
feelings concerning ‘blood revenge’ through rido. While some were in favor of some formof reparation as an alternative to retributive justice, others doubted the ability of reparations or livelihood support and ﬁnancial assistance to create an environment for sustainable
peace, claiming that the painful memory of the armed conﬂict has made them more vulnerable and “less human” (Listening Process Report 2017: 167-170).
(2) Socioeconomic Development: A Program for Camp Transformation
The BOL recognizes that a crucial aspect of transition and normalization is the accelerationof “implementation of development eﬀorts for the rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of the BARMM” (Philippine News Agency 2019). Community-based programs
that reinforce social cohesion while addressing the needs of former combatants, internallydisplaced persons, and aﬀected communities are recommended by the Law. The Annex on
Normalization provides for a comprehensive plan to transform the six previously acknowledged MILF camps6 into productive communities. This process has been initiated prior to
the formation of the BARMM administration and includes camp transformation projects“for basic and life sustenance, scholarships, school buildings, farm-to-market roads andother infrastructure components” (Ibid.). A Task Force for Decommissioned Combatants

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and their Communities (TFDCC) was instituted to deliver socio-economic and development interventions for MILF decommissioned combatants and their communities to help
them transition to civilian life. The TFDC’s intervention program will be implemented inthree stages7 through formal engagement between government agencies, and involves projects for social protection, capacity development, and livelihood assistance (OPAPP Annual
Report 2019: 25). Meanwhile, a Working Group on Vulnerable Sectors was also instituted
to recommend interventions for vulnerable sectors such as widows, orphans, people withdisabilities, and detainees and their families (Ibid.: 26).
Key to the sustainability of socioeconomic development in former rebel camps are
the funding initiatives aimed at helping address the poverty inextricably linked to thearmed conﬂict. For example, the multi-donor Mindanao Trust Fund (MTF) grant facility,
administered by the World Bank, has been facilitating international development assistancesince 2005. Donors such as the European Union, the Swedish International Development
Agency, and the United States Agency for International Development have contributed
to support community-driven economic development programs. The MTF has provided
assistance in the form of livelihood and infrastructure, pre- and post-harvest facilities,
bridges and water systems, and functional literacy programs to barangays within the six
acknowledged MILF camps (Mindanao Trust Fund n.d.). The Fund also helped in training
the Camps Transformation oﬃcers in community organizing and project monitoring, while
also assisting people’s organizations (Trust Fund Recipients) through capacity-building
projects aimed at maintaining community infrastructures for enterprise and income generation (The World Bank 2018).
More recently, the EU, which is a major contributor to the MTF, together with the
Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) committed to a60.5 million euro grant for two development projects in Mindanao. Part of the grant (35.5
million euro) will be used for the Mindanao Development Authority-operated Mindanao
Peace and Development (MINPAD) program for agricultural cooperative financing andother infrastructure projects. The other 25 million euro will be allocated for the Support
to Bangsamoro Transition (SUBATRA) program. The five-year SUBATRA project forcapacity-building aims to help develop the three branches of the BARMM government:
the executive branch, in its implementation of transitional policies; the BARMM Parliament, in its legislative, oversight, and representation capacity; and the Bangsamoro Justice
System, in its adjudication competence based on international human rights standards(Inquirer.net 2020). Earlier in August 2019, the Duterte administration suspended negotiations for acceptance of such loans and grants from countries that co-sponsored and voted
in favor of the 11 July 2019 United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution that sought

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a comprehensive report on the human rights situation in the Philippines, amidst charges ofextrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. A memorandum lifting the suspensionof loan and grant acceptance was issued on 27 February 2020, facilitating the EU grants for
Mindanao and the BARMM.
The transformation of formerly rebel-dominated areas, through the government’s
efforts and the international community’s support, is an important step towards attaining
socioeconomic justice in the Bangsamoro. The focus on providing socioeconomic intervention programs for former combatants, and their families and communities, stems from anunderstanding of the pattern of exclusion that has stunted development opportunities for
Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples. The TJRC’s Listening Process sessions reveal thatthe deliberate withholding of public resources, the negative profiling of all Bangsamoro
and indigenous peoples as ‘bad elements’ or ‘rebels,’ and the preferential treatment towards
predominantly Christian communities in terms of access to basic services and development opportunities, are among the deep-rooted causes of economic marginalization in theregion (Listening Process Report 2017: 98-102). These have not only led to widespread
impoverishment but have also had a negative impact on the demographic landscape of theBangsamoro and the rest of Mindanao. Some examples expressed in the Listening Process
sessions are families migrating to places they deem safer than their war-torn communities, and female Moro migrant workers being exposed to exploitation abroad from foreign
employers (Ibid.: 102).
(3) Confidence-Building Measures: Beyond Amnesty Grants
The search for legal justice is a contentious aspect of conﬂict transformation. Considering
this, the Annex on Normalization provides that “the Government shall take immediate steps
through amnesty, pardon, and other available processes towards the resolution of cases of
persons charged with or convicted of crimes and oﬀenses connected to the armed conﬂict
in Mindanao.” Safe conduct passes were issued to some MILF leaders to allow them toparticipate in formal matters related to the BTA. For example, MILF commanders who may
have pending cases were given passes to attend the oath-taking of the BTA on 22 February
2019. Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, chair of the MILF and commander-in-chief of the decommissioned Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), stated that the nomination of BIAFoﬃcials for positions in the BTA is part of the organization’s transformation from a revolutionary to a more governance-oriented organization. He explains that “the main target oftransformation is the MILF top leadership both holding political and military assignments,”
and that for a revolutionary organization transitioning into an institution of governance,“there is no distinction between those holding political and military assignments” (Arguillas

Transformation through Normalization: Delineating Justice in the Bangsamoro Peace Process 1452019). The OPAPP reported that it is coordinating with the Department of Justice regarding
amnesty grants and pardons for MILF members. A joint Technical Working Group (TWG)
will be formed to address issues concerning the issuance of amnesties and to consider otheravailable processes through the Presidential Committee on Bail, Recognizance, and Pardon(OPAPP Report 2019: 28).
The granting of amnesties to former rebel leaders may be perceived as a removal of
culpability for atrocities committed in relation to the conflict. However, it can be argued
that the amnesty process has been delineated for its conditionality to the continuation of
the peace process and the implementation of other aspects of the normalization process.
Jimenez-Damary, an international law expert and human rights lawyer who was also thegovernment designate to the TJRC, explains that while indeed, there are internationallyrecognized prohibitions on the granting of blanket amnesties, parties in peace process may
have to agree on amnesty provisions as determined by the context of the conflict and theintended purpose of such grants. She further reiterates that transitional justice and reconciliation advocacy must not be aﬀected by discussions on amnesties, and that the Peace Panels
have agreed on eﬀorts to have amnesty grants in line with international standards throughthe TWGs (C. Jimenez-Damary, personal communication, 7 December 2020). Julkipli
expressed concerns, however, regarding the difficulties associated with the processing ofpending amnesty cases. He notes that a situation in which “the parties are close to the ﬁnal
phase of decommissioning, while questions on pending amnesty cases are still up in theair” is a signiﬁcant hurdle for the normalization process’ goals of accountability and truthtelling. He further remarks that while “it is easy for the Parties to agree on and put out anamnesty proclamation,” there are thousands of amnesty cases that need to be processedin multiple courts. For the beneﬁt of former combatants, the government must realize theurgency of these processes, and wield the same amount of commitment as in the decommissioning program (M. Julkipli, personal communication, 11 December 2020).
Notably, the parties appear to interpret conﬁdence-building as a process that manifests
beyond the level of negotiations and related legal processes. Hence, they agreed that theCamp Transformation Program, and the formation of a Joint Task Forces on Camps Transformation (JTFCT), are equally necessary ‘confidence-building measures’ in the Annex
on Normalization. By building “peaceful and productive communities” and providing“social and physical infrastructures and… access to economic opportunities,” the partiesare ‘building conﬁdence’ in the normalization process from the ground up. (OPAPP Annual
Report 2019: 26). The logic behind this, according to Julkipli, is that the transformation of
the former rebel camps is considered as one of the ‘initial steps’ that can happen while theParties are determining how to roll out the security- and justice-related aspects of the Nor-

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malization program (M. Julkipli, personal communication, 11 December 2020). In essence,the parties consider ‘conﬁdence-building’ not only as a provision for legal justice mechanisms that are necessary for the normalization of political relations, but also as an extensionof socioeconomic development strategies for the Bangsamoro. Since 2015, the JTFCT
has been in partnership with the government’s Department of Agriculture in distributing
agricultural supplies and machineries and has delivered other infrastructures such as solar
power systems and Alternative Learning Systems (ALS) for conﬂict-aﬀected communities.
Apart from these, capacity building of people’s organizations on project management andparticipatory area development are also being conducted. As per the 2019 OPAPP Report,
the JTFCT, through its engagement with the Bangsamoro Planning and Development
Authority (BPDA-BARMM), has been crafting the comprehensive development for Camp
Bilal as the pilot area for the Camps Transformation Plan (Ibid.: 26).
As this section demonstrated, the parties in the Bangsamoro peace process, throughthe Annex on Normalization and the succeeding Executive Order that provides for its
implementation, perceive confidence-building measures in two ways. First, the amnesty
grants for MILF members had a strategic political purpose, in consideration of the longterm, broad political landscape of normalization. While this is an important indicator of
the Parties’ commitment to normalization, the arduous amnesty grants process involving
judicial mechanisms must be approached more seriously, so as not to affect the progressachieved in the decommissioning process. Second, building conﬁdence can be a bottom-up,
economically motivated approach towards a comprehensive peace process, as demonstrated
by the inclusion of the Camps Transformation Program under the confidence-building
measures provision of the Annex. Indeed, the parties, through the Annex on Normalization, move beyond the misperception that conﬁdence-building measures are only relevantin the military field, and utilized them as mechanisms to “improve relationships, humanize the other, signal positive intentions and commitment, and avoid escalation” (Mason& Siegfried 2013: 57). At this early stage of the normalization process, both parties arecarefully treading around the issue of dealing with accountability and impunity, given
their potential implications to the sustainability of peace in the region. The parties’ careful
attitude towards impunity concerns is mirrored in the TJRC’s “future-oriented approach to‘dealing with the past,’ that is sensitive to the Bangsamoro and Filipino context” (Report of
the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2016: xviii). The TJRC’s utilization of a DWP framework proposes an “incremental and ﬂexible approach that combines
mutually reinforcing efforts in the fields of truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of
non-recurrence, while promoting reconciliation initiatives on the national, regional, andlocal levels” (Ibid.: xx). While the TJRC explicitly recommended that the parties recognize

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victims’ right to a fair remedy and the state’s duty to investigate and prosecute, a holistic
DWP approach and its recommendations on the right to justice is only a component ofa Bangsamoro and national peace agenda that will be sequentially implemented throughshort-, medium-, and long-term measures. As evidenced by the inclusion of the Camp
Transformation Program, conﬁdence-building is an ongoing long-term process that starts
from the ground up and does not diminish in importance even when conflict parties havealready built the political and legal foundations of sustainable peace.
(4) Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Dealing with the Past
Finally, this section concerns itself with how the parties have so far dealt with the provision on transitional justice during these early stages of the normalization process. Castillo(2014) argued that developing a transitional justice mechanism for conﬂict-aﬀected peoples
of different backgrounds in the Bangsamoro “must be informed by a knowledge of thediversity of understandings of the past and present, of various notions of truth(s) and theability to tell it, the advantages and pitfalls of truth-telling, the weight of emotions, betrayal,
mistrust and memory, as well as people’s desires regarding justice, reparation, relationshipwith others, and reconciliation” (29-30). This argument is in line with the transformative
justice model’s psychosocial justice aspect espoused in this article. The theory explainsthat psychosocial justice must involve knowledge and acknowledgement of four diﬀerent
types of truth, as adopted from Parmentier’s (2003) model of transitional justice: forensic or factual truth; personal or narrative truth; social or dialogical truth; and healing or
restorative truth. Lambourne’s (2014) model argues that perpetrators’ acknowledgementof their atrocities, and their impact on victims, are crucial in justice, reconciliation, andpeacebuilding (Lambourne 2014: 28). Hence, conﬂict parties, even during the early phaseof a normalization process, must take appropriate measures to acknowledge their culpability for actions done in relation to the armed conﬂict.
Chaired by a Swiss expert and joined by one representative each delegated by the
GPH and the MILF, the TJRC assumed the role of studying and recommending “appropriate mechanisms to address legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people, correct
historical injustices, and address human rights violations and marginalization through landdispossession, towards healing and reconciliation” (OPAPP Annual Report 2017: 28). The
ICCMN was tasked to lead the implementation of the recommendations in the reports of
the TJRC, while on 16 August 2019, the parties signed the Terms of Reference for a Transitional Working Group (TWG) on Transitional Justice and Reconciliation that will formulate a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations (OPAPP Annual Report
2019: 28). The establishment of the TJRC, as well as the DWP framework inherent in its

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mandate, is critical for the parties’ knowledge and acknowledgement of truth. Officiallyconvened on 27 September 2014, the TJRC submitted a comprehensive report to the parties
in December 2015 which was later released to the public in March 2016. Submitted to the
Panels in February 2017, the 2016 Report was later followed by a Listening Process Report
and two reports speciﬁcally focusing on matters of land dispossession.
The exclusive focus on land dispossession through two reports, Dealing with the Past
and Land Dispossession and Land: Territory, Domain, and Identity, was in recognition of
two important considerations, according to Julkipli. First, the issue of land dispossession
involves fundamental technicalities, such as determination of hectarage and reassignmentof borders, which require rigorous study. Second, the land issue is a critical component of
not only Moros’, but also of indigenous peoples’, narrative of the conflict in Mindanao.
Their story of being driven to the margins using land tenure mechanisms of colonial andpost-colonial governments is central to the Bangsamoro conflict narrative (M. Julkipli,
personal communication, 11 December 2020). Further substantiating the importance ofaddressing land dispossession issues at the heart of the conﬂict, the Bangsamoro Parliamentestablished the Office of the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Land Reform of the
BARMM (MAFAR-BARMM). The Oﬃce has distributed Certiﬁcation of Land OwnershipAward (CLOA) titles for a total of 1,200 hectares of land to pre-assessed farmer-recipientsand Agrarian Reform Communities (ARC) in the region. The MAFAR-BARMM aims to
distribute more CLOAs for some 2,000 hectares before 2020 ends (Maulana 2020).
To learn the technical aspects of utilizing the DWP framework, the GPH and MILF
designates to the Bangsamoro TJRC attended capacity-building workshops facilitatedby the Swiss Government and swisspeace. Jimenez-Damary recalls having reservations
about the ‘hard line’ that separates victims and perpetrators in the original version of theframework, which was based on the Principles against Impunity Concept introduced by
Louis Joinet and Diane Orentlicher. This understanding of the relationship between victims
and perpetrators, however, does not always apply to the local realities of the Bangsamoro
conflict. According to Julkipli, the absence of a rigid dichotomization between victims
and perpetrators in Bangsamoro conﬂict narratives ﬂows from “a very Filipino concept ofvictimhood,” related to people’s stories of resilience, bravery, sacriﬁce, and heroism as told
in their version of conﬂict narrative. For example, there are people who were victimized byatrocities related to the conflict that will not claim to be ‘victims’ because it goes against
their version of events in which they are supposed to be resilient and brave (M. Julkipli,
personal communication, 11 December 2020).
The TJRC, then, modiﬁed the DWP framework introduced by the Swiss into one that
does not distinguish between victims and perpetrators in terms of their ability to accessTransformation through Normalization: Delineating Justice in the Bangsamoro Peace Process 149

their “right to know, right to justice, right to reparation, and the guarantee of non-recurrence.” The resulting framework, as it appears on the TJRC’s reports, is one that “ensuresprinciples of applicability, ownership, and acceptance” (C. Jimenez-Damary, personal communication, 7 December 2020) and “takes into account the dynamic relationship between
victims and perpetrators” (Report of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2016: 77-78). As a future-oriented approach, the Framework requires short-, medium-,and long-term interventions to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations, thereby
producing an environment that encourages reconciliation. Rather than being retributive, theFramework’s decidedly restorative nature aims to transform social and political identitiesof victimization into “a new sense of ‘belonging,’ by which individuals enjoy rights andduties of citizenship as part of a new social contract” (Ibid.: 78).
Considering this framework of conflict transformation, the TJRC’s Consultationand Listening Processes were crucial in identifying the four intertwined issues at the rootof the conflict: “the Bangsamoro narrative of historical injustice frames their collective
experience of legitimate grievances, in particular as they relate to the far-ranging effects
of marginalization through land dispossession and widespread human rights violations[emphases added]” (Ibid.: 62). These four issues, which also became the foundation of
the TJRC’s mandate, are the consequences of “three mutually reinforcing phenomena:”systemic violence expressed in political, socioeconomic, and cultural exclusion; a cultureof impunity; and deep neglect by the state. To understand how these phenomena resulted
in the four issues at the root of the conflict, the TJRC sought the expertise of facilitators
and key informants coming from diverse backgrounds. The list of facilitators included both
men and women, from academics to NGO staff, of either Moro, indigenous, or Christianbackground, with the ability to speak in the local language of participants from various
areas of the Bangsamoro. This diversity among facilitators helped ensure participants’ comfort and security in sharing their truth about the conﬂict. The manuscripts that came out ofthese Listening Process sessions are now housed in the Swiss Embassy in Manila under thesafekeeping of the Swiss Government. The ﬁndings from these sessions, then, became thebasis for the TJRC’s recommendations to the Peace Panels (C. Jimenez-Damary, personalcommunication, 7 December 2020).
The TJRC’s most important recommendation, however, is the creation of the
NTJRCB, which will be charged with the implementation of a Transitional Justice andReconciliation Program. From a psychosocial justice perspective, the recommendation tocreate an NTJRCB is aimed at operationalizing the DWP framework through the national
body’s four proposed sub-commissions: Bangsamoro Historical Memory; Impunity and thePromotion of Accountability and Rule of Law in the Bangsamoro; Land Dispossession in

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the Bangsamoro; and Bangsamoro Healing and Reconciliation (Report of the Transitional
Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2016: 83). At the time of writing, a Bill (HB No.
4003) that will institutionalize the recommended NTJRCB is being discussed by the 18th
Congress’ Committee on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity, and is a refiled version of theone submitted during the 17th Congress, which did not prosper beyond the committee level.
The recent reﬁling is considered a “timely” eﬀort, coming in the wake of a violent incident
in which at least nine Muslim farmers were shot dead by unknown perpetrators in Kabacan,
North Cotabato on 28 August 2020. Ishak Mastura, the MILF representative in the TJRC,
warned that such incidents “can ﬂare up” without an institution that can investigate within a
DWP framework (Quismorio 2020). Observers have noted, however, that the reﬁling of theBill is currently not considered as one of the priority legislations for this Congress. According to Julkipli, it does not appear to have enough backing from the Peace Panels throughthe OPAPP and the BTA, thereby creating a disconnect between peace efforts from thelegislative and executive branches of government (M. Julkipli, personal communication,
11 December 2020). Jimenez-Damary notes that for this Bill to pass the committee level,
there must be concerted eﬀort from the government, through the administration’s legislative
liaisons in the Congress and the Senate, in making it a political priority. Another importantconsideration is ensuring that the Bill passes as proposed, without substantive additions thatmay dilute its purpose. Jimenez-Damary recalls a consultation session in Congress in which
representatives suggested adding provisions to the Bill which are not directly related to the
proposed mandate of the NTJRCB, as recommended by the TJRC. According to her, thisis indicative of a “capacity gap in terms of understanding transitional justice” and its rolein sustainable peace in the Bangsamoro. She remarks that there must be a comprehensive
lobbying eﬀort mainly from the Bangsamoro constituency, through the assistance of civilsociety organizations that are most active in the region, and from other constituencies that
see a peaceful Bangsamoro as a manifestation of a national Filipino identity founded onprinciples of multiculturalism (C. Jimenez-Damary, personal communication, 7 December2020).
3 Transformative Justice amidst Normalization
This analysis of the intersection between justice and the process of normalizing political
relations was perceived through a transformative lens. This perspective shifts the “focus
on ‘transition’ as an interim process that links the past and the future, to ‘transformation’which implies long-term sustainable processes embedded in society” (Lambourne 2014:19). In long drawn-out peace processes, such as the Bangsamoro case, post-conﬂict societyTransformation through Normalization: Delineating Justice in the Bangsamoro Peace Process 151

may have multiple justice needs that require local, cultural sensitivities to co-exist withwestern worldviews of transitional legal justice (Ibid.: 19-20). Transformative justice, then,must exist within a sustainable process that pays “attention to the needs and expectationsof local affected populations, as well as a coordinated focus on the multi-dimensional or
multidisciplinary aspects of peacebuilding, incorporating attention to all the dimensionsof human security” (Ibid.: 23). Placing transformative justice within the context of a normalization, therefore, implies going beyond the establishment of structures and formal
mechanisms as benchmarks of successful conﬂict transformation.
This article investigated whether transformative justice has been apparent in theBangsamoro peace process, through an analysis of the manifestations of political, socioeconomic, legal, and psychosocial justice in the Bangsamoro Normalization Program’s earlyphase of implementation. The examination of the Annex on Normalization’s implementation delivers the following ﬁndings. First, concerning the political element of transformative justice. Indeed, it can be argued that the Annex on Normalization and its four aspects(security, socio-economic development, confidence-building measures, and transitional
justice and reconciliation) require some consideration of political justice for its successful implementation. This is because political justice involves institutional transformation
by making the different branches of government accountable to the general population.
Essentially, both the national government, the MILF through the BTA, and the rest of the
BARMM leadership, must be answerable to Bangsamoro society through proper implementation of all aspects of the Annex on Normalization. In this article, political justice wascontextualized through the Parties’ recent efforts to address peace and security concerns
amidst the normalization process. Institutional transformation is expressed, mainly throughestablished intergovernmental relations between the State and the BARMM, as well as thephased decommissioning process and the NTF-DPAG, tasked to deal with private armed
groups, related to a culture of political dynasticism that is rampant in the region. The
maintenance of peace and security is contingent upon the ability of the Parties to sustain
political momentum for the eﬀectiveness of these mechanisms. Second, socioeconomic justice, typically understood in terms of ﬁnancial and material compensation, such as throughrestitution or reparation, was contextualized through the Parties’ recent efforts to direct
socioeconomic transformation in communities where former MILF camps were located.
The Camps Transformation Program has been complemented by international support
through funding for economic development, with the aim of turning former camps into productive communities. Third is the aspect of legal justice or accountability. This comes froma recognition that “a focus on accountability and prosecutions for war crimes and other pasthuman rights abuses that does not rebuild relationships through some kind of restorative

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process, is unlikely to overcome the societal divisions that undermine peace and security”(Lambourne 2014: 25). This is, then, related to the fourth element of transformative justice:
psychosocial justice, or the knowledge and acknowledgement of truth. Eﬀorts towards theachievement of psychosocial justice were manifested in the formation of the TJRC, theimplementation of its mandate within a DWP framework, as well as recent actions by theParties to adhere to the TJRC’s recommendations, such as the reﬁling of the Bill that would
create the NTJRCB. In the absence of this national institution for transitional justice andreconciliation, upholding psychosocial justice, and therefore the knowledge and acknowledgement of truth in post-conﬂict society, is contingent upon the political will of the stateand other stakeholders, and their keenness to fully implement the justice-related aspects of
the Annex on Normalization.
Scholars have investigated how political relations shape the implementation oftransitional justice strategies in the form of both retributive and restorative mechanisms(Vinjamuri & Snyder 2015). Proponents of either reconciliation or traditional justice notethat both options have confronted challenges in implementation (Ibid.: 316). In a processof normalizing political relations after protracted peace negotiations, the gradual responseof conflict parties towards transitional justice and accountability claims can often be dismissed as politics “tainting the purity of the legal process” (Ibid.: 319). Furthermore, thistransformative justice-guided analysis of the Annex on Normalization for the Bangsamoro
peace process allowed this author to investigate the transitional justice-related elementsof normalization in the context of an implementation process dominated by security- andsocioeconomic-linked agreement provisions. In implementing normalization with justicein mind, as in the Bangsamoro peace process case, instituting transitional justice and reconciliation mechanisms can be particularly diﬃcult. Amidst the early-phase implementation process of normalization, legal and transitional justice concerns are being approachedthrough a gradual, but holistic manner, consistent with a transformative justice view inpeacebuilding. Predicting whether this approach leads to the advancement of post-conﬂict
justice and the achievement of lasting peace is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it offers a way to assess how the Parties in the Bangsamoro peace process have, sofar, viewed the relationship between post-conﬂict justice and the normalization of political
relations. Justice and reconciliation amidst normalization may take a backseat against otheraspects of the peace process due to temporal and sequencing considerations, but they must
be upheld through eﬀorts like truth-telling, reparations, and guarantees of non-recurrence(M. Julkipli, personal communication, 11 December 2020). These eﬀorts do not necessarily have to depend on the presence of a formal institution such as the proposed NTJRCB.
Structures and formal institutions alone will not foretell the success of transitional justiceTransformation through Normalization: Delineating Justice in the Bangsamoro Peace Process 153

advocacy in a post-conflict society and must not be seen as an end in itself (C. JimenezDamary, personal communication, 7 December 2020). While institutions can ultimately
contribute to national healing, the process of normalization in the Bangsamoro can only bea fruitful and sustainable endeavor if the Parties commit to legal and psychosocial aspectsof justice as much as its political and socioeconomic facets.
Conclusion
This article’s argument about the manifestations of transformative justice in the implementation process of the Annex on Normalization makes limited claims about the finality ofjustice in relation to the Bangsamoro conﬂict. As an appraisal of the early-phase implementation of the normalization track in the peace process, the full implementation of the Annex
of Normalization’s provisions has yet to be determined; certainly, the milestones achievedin the ﬁrst two years of the normalization track do not ascertain the Parties’ ability to attend
to justice claims or to sustain peace in the long term. In relation to this, the inability of
the Parties to secure the creation of an NTJRCB in the early stages of the normalization
track cannot be dismissed as a preference for the implementation of other aspects of theNormalization Program over its transitional justice element. The literature on sequencing ofpeace agreement implementation states that certain processes are implemented before others, as necessary preconditions. Because “diﬀerent areas of accord content exert diﬀerent
eﬀects at diﬀerent stages of a peace process,” (Joshi & Quinn 2015: 889) some provisions
are deemed to have a more stabilizing eﬀect on the peace process than others. This article,
therefore, hopes to make a modest contribution to understanding how normalization politics aﬀects perceptions of justice in the implementation phase of peace agreements, during
which conflict parties have yet to institutionalize any post-conflict justice mechanisms.
In the Bangsamoro case, the implementation of the Annex on Normalization facilitated atransformative view of justice, that considers not only accountability or the legal aspect,
but also its political, socioeconomic, and psychosocial dimensions. This article encourages
further research concerning the sequencing of implementation of peace agreements, as well
as research on how justice is perceived in the absence of institutionalized transitional justicemechanisms for peacebuilding processes such as in the Bangsamoro. The simultaneous andsequential interactions between the politics of normalization and peace agreement implementation on the one hand, and justice on the other, may have significant implications inunderstanding how post-conﬂict justice institutions develop in cases of intractable conﬂicts.

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Notes
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

United Nations, Security Council, Security Council Addresses Comprehensive Approach to Peacebuilding in Presidential Statement. SC/7014, 20 February 2001, https://www.un.org/press/en/2001/
sc7014.doc.htm.
A Bangsamoro Normalization Trust Fund (BNTF) was created on 30 May 2016, organizing a multidonor trust fund for the Normalization Program. The Peace Implementing Panels selected the WorldBank as the Fund Manager, with the Australian Government and the European Union expressing
their support for the Fund (OPAPP Annual Report, 2019: 29).
The Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities (ACGH), signed on 18 July 1997 during
the onset of peace negotiations with the MILF, facilitated the creation of the following relevant
institutions: the Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), which ensures
the implementation of the ceaseﬁre and takes appropriate action when it is violated, and includes the
Local Monitoring Teams (LMT), the Joint Ceaseﬁre Monitoring Posts (JCMP), and the Joint Task
Forces (JTF); the International Monitoring Team (IMT), which is a third party mechanism composedof international military, police, and civilian monitors observing the ceaseﬁre and conducting ﬁeld
veriﬁcations for reported violations; the Civilian Protection Component (CPC), which is an NGO-led
mechanism of monitoring the Parties’ compliance to their commitments, and helps protect civilian
population and property; and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), which is a coordinative body
between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) on the
one hand, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces-MILF (BIAF-MILF) on the other, tasked with
disseminating information on criminal activity within or near MILF communities (OPAPP Annual
Report, 2019: 30-32).
Using an online video conferencing platform, interviews were conducted with key informants:
Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, lawyer with specialization in human rights law and international
humanitarian law and former GPH designate to the TJRC (7 December 2020), and Mohammad
Al-Amin Julkipli, Moro lawyer and former GPH alternate to the TJRC (11 December 2020).
Islamic State Lanao (Maute Group), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Ansuar Khalifa Philippines, andthe Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) faction led by Abu Turaife are indigenous militantgroups that have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (Abuza & Lischin 2020: 17).
In February 1999, the government acknowledged six MILF camps: Camp Abubakar as-Siddique in
Maguindanao, Camp Bilal in in Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, Camp Omar ibn al-Khattab in
Maguindanao, Camp Rajamuda in North Cotabato and Maguindanao, Camp Badre in Maguindanao,Camp Busrah Somiorang in Lanao del Sur.
The three-stage implementation process of the enhanced socio-economic program fordecommissioned combatants and their families include: (1) settling in and transitioning for a year
from the time of the final decommissioning; (2) normalizing and transforming spanning 7 to 18
months; and (3) stabilizing within 18 to 36/48 months. (OPAPP Annual Report, 2019: 25).

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⑵ 「巻頭言」、「活動報告」及びその他原稿については、この規程に基づく審査の対象としないものの、編集委員会の裁量により編集上の修正を行うことができる。
第３条

審査及び掲載⑴ 前条第1項に掲げる審査は、原則として、2名の匿名査読者による査読により行い、その結果に基づき、編集委員会が原稿の掲載の可否を決定する。
⑵ 査読者による査読の依頼に際しては、以下の点を考慮した上で査読者を選定する。
なお、外部査読者については、依頼条件を満たす場合には謝金を支払うこととする。
⒜

当該分野の専門乃至その分野に近い人を査読者候補とする。

⒝

原則として1名は学内から、他の1名は学外から選定する。

⒞

投稿者を指導した経験のある者は、原則として除外する。

⑶ 査読手続のための評価方法（評価シートの書式を含む）については別途編集委員会
にて定める。
第４条

編集委員会による依頼原稿の審査

編集委員会が依頼する原稿については、査読者による査読を省略することができる。
第５条

改正

この規程の改正については、編集委員会が発議し、教授会による承認により決定する。
附則
この規程は、教授会の承認を得た日から起算して1箇月を経過した時点から施行する。
なお、同規程が施行されるまでの期間は、これまでの編集において確立された慣行に則った査読手続を適用する。
（2016年9月29日教授会承認。同年10月29日施行）

121
161

Regulation for Evaluating the Manuscripts Submitted for Publication in
Hiroshima Peace Research Journal
I. Objectives
Article 1. This Regulation provides for the purpose of ensuring fairness and transparency inevaluating the articles submitted to the Hiroshima Peace Research Journal (HPRJ), as well as toclarify the peer review procedures.
II. Article Types and Areas of Evaluation
Article 2.
(1) Types of articles to be evaluated based on the Regulation shall be “research paper”,,” “researchnote” and “book review.”,” “activity report” and other types of manuscripts are not subject to review based(2) “Foreword”,
on the Regulation, but they can be edited at the discretion of the HPI Editorial Committee.
III. Evaluation and Publication
Article 3.
(1) When carrying out evaluations mentioned in paragraph 1 of the preceding Article, thesubmitted articles are normally peer-reviewed by two anonymous reviewers, and the Editorial
Committee shall decide if the articles should be accepted in accordance with the peer review
results.
(2) Upon request of peer review, reviewers shall be selected in consideration of the following
criteria:⒜ Experts in the concerned field and/or reviewers whose area of expertise is close to the field.
⒝ As a general rule, one reviewer will be selected from Hiroshima City University, and theother from outside the University.
⒞ In principle, those who have taught the author shall be excluded.
It is to be noted that the honorarium will be paid to the external reviewers, in the case thatthe request condition is satisfied.
(3) The Editorial Committee shall decide the evaluation method for the peer review procedures
including the form of the evaluation sheet.
IV. Exemption from Evaluation
Article 4. Articles that the HPI Editorial Committee request to submit shall not be subject topeer review by reviewers.
V. Amendments
Article 5. Amendments of this Regulation shall be proposed by the Editorial Committee and be
approved by the HPI Research Staff Meeting (RSM).
Supplementary Rule This Regulation is deemed to be in effect from the time that has elapsed one
month from the date of the approval of the RSM. It should be noted that the peer review
procedures in line with the established practice in the editing shall be applied until the Regulationenters into force.
(Approved by the Research Stuffa Meeting on the 29 September 2016 and in effect 29 October
2016)

編

集

後

記

『広島平和研究』第 8 号は、「世界の平和と人間の安全保障に対する脅威」という、近年、ますます注目されている重要なテーマを扱っています。巻頭の「平和研究の窓」は、アジア太平洋平和研究学会（APPRA）の創設メンバーで平和学の分野で著名なタイの学者 Chaiwat Satha-Anand 教授からの寄稿です。同教授は、平和と様々な暴力の形態について考察し、暴力の被害者への対応のあり方について「 3 つの窓」という興味深い提案を行っています。
特集論文
本号は「世界の平和と人間の安全保障に対する脅威」を共通のテーマに、 2 本の和文論文と 3 本の英文論文、合わせて 5 本の特集論文を掲載しました。神戸学院大学の山越裕太氏は、世界保健機関（WHO）が果たしてきた役割、その変化、新た課題を明らかにしています。新型コロナ感染症の禍に苦しむ世界で、WHO への期待が高まるなか、時宜にかなった論文であります。東北公益文科大学の玉井雅隆氏は、CIS 諸国と他の欧州諸国との間に次第に深まるウィーンの「東」と「西」の分断要因を、OSCE 地域共通の自由・民主主義規範の対立に焦点をあてて分析し、旧ソ連諸国の民主主義の危機を論じました。
3 本の英文論文のうち、大阪大学大学院国際公共政策研究科（OSIPP）の佐藤治子氏による論文は、アクターとして国家中心のウェストファリア・システム内の国際関係の進化を分析した上で、国家安全保障を優先するウェストファリア・システムの下では人間の安全保障の達成がいかに困難であるかについて論じています。人間の安全保障に関する Sorpong Peou 氏の論文は、政治学における人間の安全保障研究がどのように進化したかについての広範な研究です。Peou 氏は、特にグローバルガバナンスに与える人間の安全保障概念の影響について悲観的な立場をとっています。シンガポールの南洋理工大学の Mely-Caballero Anthony 氏とMargareth Sembiring 氏との共著論文は、領土と主権に関心を有する国家優先の伝統的な安全保障概念との比較の上で、非伝統的な安全保障概念を検証しています。
また、東南アジアに焦点を当てて環境安全保障の分野の現状も分析しています。
独立論文
名古屋大学の井原伸浩氏による福田ドクトリンに関する論文は、第二次世界大戦後の日本の東南アジア外交の転機となる福田ドクトリン、なかでも日本は軍事大国化せず、平和に徹するとする第一原則の外交理念の形成過程の分析です。最後は、東京大学大学院研究生である Raymond Andaya 氏の論文です。彼は、フィリピンのバンサモロ和平プロセスを分析し、ドゥテルテ政府によって長年の反乱がどのように終結したかを検証しています。紛争解決に移行期正義の枠組みが応用されたことを論証した点が注目されます。
いずれの論文も現代の平和問題を考える上で、大変示唆的なものと思われます。
是非ご一読下さい。
（編集委員会）

広島平和研究 第 8 号
Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, Vol. 8
2021年 3 月10日

発行

発

行：広島市立大学 広島平和研究所
所長 大芝 亮〒731-3194
広島市安佐南区大塚東3−4−1
電話082-830-1811
ファクス 082-830-1812

編

集：広島平和研究所 編集委員
ナラヤナン・ガネサン（編集責任者）、
河上暁弘、吉川元
編集事務担当 吉原由紀子