2002: Opinions on Japan’s Third National Communication Under theUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Taeko Ando
Representative, People’s Research Institute on Energy and Environment (PRIEE)

I. Introduction of People’s Research Institute on Energy and Environment
The People’s Research Institute on Energy and Environment (PRIEE) is a
non-governmental research organization established in 1978 to carry out a wide rangeof activities. Since 1991, we have especially devoted efforts to review thegovernment’s “The Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook,” which serves as
the basis of Japan’s energy policies. We were the first NGO that made policy
recommendations (published reports in Japanese and English in 1992 and 1993, and areport in book form in 1994) based on our review of the “ Long-term Energy Supplyand Demand Outlook (1990)” and simulations of the supply and demand of energy.
We then reviewed the “ Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook (1994) ” andthe “ Very Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook (December 1996).” Prior tothe 1997 Kyoto Conference, in particular, we analyzed the government’s estimatedamount of CO2 emissions and pointed out the problem areas in the “ Very Long-term
Energy Supply and Demand Outlook” which served as the backbone of the Japanese
government’s policy for the reduction of CO2 emissions. At the Kyoto Conference, we
also presented our simulation of cutting CO2 emissions by 20% of the 1990 level by2005.
In the Joint Meeting of Coordination Subcommittee and Energy Supply and Demand
Subcommittee held to review the “ Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook(July 2001),” we, the People’s Research Institute on Energy and Environment
presented the simulation with the conclusion that “it is possible for Japan to achieve
CO2 reduction by 2010 and to free itself from an energy-wasting society by 2020.”
We offered a concrete vision of energy policies that would realize CO2 reduction
without any dependence on nuclear power. We will point out the problem areas of theReport (Japan’s Third National Communication Under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change) based on our practical experiences mentioned above.
II. About the Report “Japan’s Third National Communication Under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”
1. Problem Areas in Chapter 3 “Policies and Measures”
Chapter 3 of the Report advocated the following: “provides an overview of the specific1measures to achieve the 6% reduction commitment” (p.73, English version); “we will
steadily quantify how to achieve the 6% reduction commitment” (p.75); and“…policies to promote such measures to evaluate and review based on objectivefactors.” (p.75). These messages are not in keeping with the description in section 3.4.2“Promotion of a reduction in Carbon Dioxide Emissions focused on measures related
to energy supply and demand,” the contents of tables 3.1 to 3.5, or the description inthe table.
The tables show the “target amounts,” and the quantitative amounts of theenergy-saving effect and the estimated emission reduction. However, they are justtarget values, not reduction amounts that can be achieved with certainty. It is clear thatthe target values are unlikely to be achieved under the current policy scheme. This isalso evident from the fact that they are to be reviewed in 2004 and 2007 to incorporate
additional policies and measures deemed necessary, as well as the fact that theintroduction of carbon tax has not been incorporated in the measures taken this time
and that there are discussions on its introduction in 2005.
While claiming that it provides specific and quantitative measures, the Report statesthat it is necessary to “reverse the trend for ever-increasing total amounts ofgreenhouse gas emissions to the downward trend at an early stage.” Here, the Report
failed to clarify when this “reversal” of the trend would take place. It is also unclear
whether the present state of leveling off is brought about by implementation of policy
measures, and therefore emissions would eventually turn to decline, or whether it is a
result of a recession, which was notable in 1997 and 1998.
2. Section 4.2.1 “Future outlook for CO2 from energy sources”
The section 4.2.1 “Future outlook for CO2 from energy sources” repeats some of thecontents of the paragraph in section 3.4.2 <Reduction in Carbon Dioxide Emissions
from Energy Sources> (p.78). Its explanation as a future outlook is inadequate.
The Report shall present a future perspective to correspond to Table 2.3 “CarbonDioxide Emission and Removals” and Table 2.4 “Carbon Dioxide Emissions” on p.41.
However, it did not use the sector-based outlook shown in tables 2.3 and 2.4 but
merely described them in the text as the industrial sector, residential/commercial sector,
and transportation sector. The trial calculation was based on the report compiled by theAdvisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy, which makes decisions onenergy policies. It is believed the Report tried to hide the fact that the Committee’sreport only showed the estimated total amount of CO2 in 2010 and did not disclose theestimated amounts for each sector.
In the actual results, most industries are included in the 1A2 Manufacturing Industries
and Construction; however, industries of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries areincluded in the 1A4 Other Sectors (Residential/Commercial Sector andAgriculture/Forestry/Fisheries Sector). As a result, it is not possible to compare the2

numerical values in the Report, which was prepared in such a way as to make it
impossible to review the validity of the future outlook.
By making a comparison of the actual results of FY 2000 and the targets for FY 2010as shown in the following table, the unnaturalness of making theResidential/Commercial sector shoulder a great portion of the required CO2 reduction
becomes evident.
CO2 Emission from Energy Sources and Future Outlook(Unit: million tons of CO2)
Base
FY 2000
FY 2010 Projection
Required Amount ofSector
Year

ActualEmissions

Cases with Additional
Measures

Reduction based on FY
2000 Actual Emissions

Industrial
490
495
462
33
Transportation
212
256
250
6
Residential/
262
318
260
58
Commercial
Residential
138
166
NA?
Commercial
124
152
NA?
Fuel Switching
77
86
80
6Total
1,041
1,155
1,052
103
The base year and the FY 2000 actual results are derived from GHG
Emissions in FY 2000 (Ministry of the Environment).
There is also the “Other “ sector and its emission for the base year is 11.

3. Section 4.3 “Estimation methods” and section 4.3.1 “CO2 emission fromenergy sources”
Here in this section, only simple explanation and a table showing the eight premises
used in estimating future outlook are given. No information on reference materials isprovided, making it impossible for readers in Japan and overseas to evaluate thevalidity of the method used in the estimation.
4. Japan’s Energy Policy and CO2 Reduction after the Kyoto Conference
In order to achieve the reduction commitment of 6% compared to Japan’s base year
level as stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol (COP3), it is necessary to achieve anadditional reduction of 13% (equivalent to approximately 165 million tons of CO2) inaddition to the current measures undertaken. In regards to the “Long-term Energy
Supply and Demand Outlook,” which serves as the basis of Japan’s energy policies,“case with measures” identified in the June 1998 “Outlook” were designated “BAUcase” in the July 2001 “Outlook.” However, it still failed to reduce CO2 emissions to3

the base year level. Thus, “target case,” which is classified as the “case with additionalmeasures” in this Report, was set up this time. It is doubtful, however, that thesemeasures will be effective.
① Issues Concerning New Energy
With regard to the introduction of new energy, although the Report gave the impressionthat various policies have been taken for photovoltaic power generation, wind powergeneration and other new energies; in reality, there were few policies for theintroduction of new energy. The national budget was too scanty to carry out any
large-scale diffusion and promotion, and the policy for introduction lacked a long-term
perspective. For example, photovoltaic power generation was 4.82 million kW(including photovoltaic power generation for housing: estimated approximately 1million units) as described in the additional measures and their effects in Table 3.4“New Energy Measures” (p.102). However, in reality, the amount of subsidy provided
to households that used photovoltaic power generation was cut to one-third in 1997
from one-half of the amount when the policy stipulating subsidization was first
adopted in 1994. The amount of subsidy in 1999 diminished to 330,000 yen.
Furthermore, in the year 2000 the subsidy amount was cut three times in one year
(270,000 yen/kW, 180,000 yen/kW, then 150,000 yen /kW). The amount dropped to120,000 yen in 2001 and to 100,000 yen in 2002, resulting in many people declining
subsidization from 2001. Since the installation cost is about 2 million yen for 3 kW, thecurrent subsidization system discourages the introduction of photovoltaic power
generation. Also, with the allocated budget unused, the current system cannot be said
as a viable measure for CO2 reduction.
② The Issue of Nuclear PowerIn section 3.4.2 “Promotion of a reduction in Carbon Dioxide Emissions focused on
measures related to energy supply and demand,” (p.78), under <Promotion of energy
supply side Carbon Dioxide Emission reduction>, (3) “Promotion of nuclear power” (p.
104), the Report stated “…the construction of new nuclear power plants is requiredwith the aim of increasing nuclear-generated electricity by around 30% by fiscal 2010
compared to fiscal 2000.” This claim is quite impossible.
The amount of nuclear-generated electricity in FY 2000 was 322 billion kWh. (Thecapacity of power generating facilities was 45.24 million kW and the utilization rate offacilities was 81.7%). A 30% (96.6 billion kWh) increase will make the amount of
nuclear-generated electricity to 418.6 billion kWh. However, the facilities’
power-generating capacity as of the end of March 2002 was 45.74 million kW.
Assuming the three generators currently under construction will be completed in 2005,
adding the 3.56 million kW, they will produce a total amount of 49.3 million kW.
Given the capacity of these facilities, when they generate 418.6 billion kWh, theutilization rate of the facilities will be 97%. Assuming another two generators will beadded in 2008, the utilization rate of the facilities will be 93% (estimated using4

information materials from the ４th Electric Power Development Committee underthe Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy. Such hypothesis is quite
unreasonable.
Any CO2 reduction plan that relies on nuclear power shall be abolished. Increasing
nuclear power generation as a measure for CO2 reduction is beyond consideration.
Nuclear power shall not be used because it will create radioactive waste. The lack ofviable solution to deal with nuclear waste will only burden our environment.
III. Our Projection
In April 2001, we presented the scenario and simulation for energy policies—under thetheme of “it is possible for Japan to achieve CO2 reduction by 2010 and to free itself
from an energy-wasting society by 2020—to the Joint Meeting of Coordination
Subcommittee and Energy Supply and Demand Subcommittee for reviewing the“ Long-term Energy Supply and Demand. Outlook” We conducted the simulation of acase (in which GDP is 0%) that would achieve zero nuclear power by 2025 as well as
cut CO2 emission by 7.7% compared to the 1990 level by 2010. In light of Japan’s
economic situation today, the FY 1998 GDP turned out to be minus 2% compared tothe previous year, just as we projected. Due to a lack of energy policies, it was quite
impossible to cut energy consumption and CO2 emission. Thus, besides steadily pursue
energy conservation; we must actively introduce new energy-saving technology, micro
gas turbine, co-generation, fuel cell, etc.
(1) Control energy consumption: The GDP shall be kept at 0%. Efforts shall be madeto refrain GDP from expanding, to maintain the current condition, and to institutechanges in lifestyle and industrial structure.
•In the industrial sector, other than those energy-consuming industries, all otherindustries together shall make an extra 1% annual saving in energy. Industries shallstrive to realize their voluntary action plans.

•The commercial sector shall incorporate energy-saving measures such as insulationin newly constructed buildings.

•The residential sector shall pursue energy saving by increasing the insulation ofexisting housing and upgrading the efficiency of electrical appliances.

•For the transportation sector, improving fuel efficiency is not sufficient. Efforts
shall be made to reduce the number of vehicles and to reduce energy consumption
by actively promoting the use of smaller cars.

(2) In terms of the supply side, the government shall adopt new and drastic energy
policies, and back them up with a national budget large enough to set up a new5

industry. The “Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook” estimated 40
million kl in 2020 and 80 million kl in 2030. Measures shall be taken to accelerate
the realization of these targets.
Nuclear power-generation shall be abolished on a per capital basis (-5.5%) by 2025.
Efforts shall be made to effectuate a shift to a new mix of electricity sources.
Without a daring change in energy policy as mentioned above, reducing CO2
emission in Japan will not be possible.

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