HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS
Vol. 2 No. 1 July 1999

Hiroshima Peace Institute

Final report due on non-proliferation and disarmament
The 3rd Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference meets in New York
Participants in the third meeting of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament pledged anew their commitment
to drawing up a final report that would appeal not only togovernments and international organizations, but also to nongovernmental organizations and the world's citizens. The meeting,which was held on April 9 and 10, 1999, at the Pocantico ConferenceCenter of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, in Tarrytown, New York,was attended by 21 representatives from 17 countries. They plan toadopt the Final Report at the end of the fourth and final meeting, due
to be held in Tokyo from July 23 to 25, 1999.
Participants pointed out that the international situation regarding
nuclear proliferation had improved little since 1996-when theCanberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons drew
up its report-citing the nuclear tests conducted by India andPakistan in May 1998. It was also pointed out that communists andnationalists in Ukraine and Belarus, which had abandoned nuclear
weapons, were insisting on the redeployment of nuclear weapons.
The forum said that such sentiments, which had arisen as a result of
the start of NATO's air strikes against Yugoslavia, ran counter to thecurrent non-proliferation regime.
They agreed that, under such circumstances, the Final Report
should be forward-looking and focused, rather than comprehensive
and broad. It should appeal not only to governments and multilateral
institutions such as the United Nations, but also to individual citizens
and NGOs. They also agreed to state the opinions of the majority andminority in cases where opinion was divided.
It was also stressed that nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia
should be linked with global non-proliferation. Other proposals
included a call for China to become involved in a three-way effort toeliminate the threat posed by ongoing tensions between India andPakistan.
Regarding nuclear disarmament, the committee members
discussed missile defenses, and the need for transparency in China's
nuclear doctrine and to strengthen the role of the United Nations, aswell as the importance of nuclear disarmament, leading to theultimate goal of the abolition of nuclear weapons. However, manymembers said that abolishing nuclear weapons within a given timeframe would be difficult given the current international situation.
They urged that an environment conducive to nuclear disarmamentand non-proliferation be established through the early conclusion of

CONTENTS
Final report due on non-proliferation and disarmament
Feasibility, political appeal keys to Tokyo Forum report's success,by Kazumi Mizumoto
The European Union-Building shared values from diversity,
by Ove Juul Joergensen
Hiroshima's peace role reaffirmed as new century approaches,by Yasuo Hamamoto
Toward a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone,
by Tsutomu Ishiguri
Civil society in conflict conciliation and risk reduction inSouth Asian context, by Ravinder Pal Singh
My opinion, by Masamichi Kamiya
TopicsDiary

START negotiations between Russia and the United States, which
together possess most of the world's nuclear weapons, and othermeasures.
At a press conference held in New York after the meeting,Ambassador Nobuo Matsunaga, vice chairman of the Japan Instituteof International Affairs and co-chairman of the forum, said: "Theinternational situation has developed against a backdrop of nuclear
disarmament since this forum was established in August 1998.
Positive action is needed to promote further nuclear nonproliferation.""For the report to be accepted by every government in the world,
we would like to draw up one that is a step ahead of existing
proposals."
At the end of the meeting, a committee to draft the Final Report
was established, comprising seven members of the forum. At ameeting at the office of Japanese Delegation to the U.N. Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva on May 27 and 28, the committee agreed
to complete the draft by early July.
By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPI

The drafting committee
ChairmanMembers

Michael Krepon
Sergei Blagovolin
Therese Delpech
Joachim Krause
Patricia Lewis
Han Sung-Joo
Secretariat

List of participants(Alphabetical order)

Lt. Gen. Nishat Ahmad
President of the Institute of Regional
Studies, Islamabad

Dr. Zakaria Haji Ahmad
Professor & Coordinator, National
University of Malaysia, Selangor

Amb. Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja
Ambassador of Brazil to France

President, Henry L. Stimson Center,
Washington D.C.

Mr. Pierre Lellouche
Member of the Council, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, France

Dr. Patricia Lewis
Director of UNIDIR, United Kingdom

Prof. Sergei Yevgen'evich Blagovolin Amb. Peggy Mason
Vice President of World Economics andInternational Relations Institute, Moscow

Amb. Emilio Jorge Cardenas
Executive Director of HSBC Roberts
S.A., Buenos Aires

Dr. Therese Delpech
Director of Strategic Affairs Atomic
Energy Commission, Paris

p１

Amb. Rolf Ekeus

p２

Ambassador of Sweden to the U.S.A.

Dr. Robert Louis Gallucci
Dean of School of Foreign Service,
Georgetown University, Washington D.C.

p３
p３

Prof. Han Sung-Joo

p４〜５

Amb. Ryukichi Imai

p６
p７
p８
p８

Mr. Michael Krepon

Professor of Korea University, Seoul
Distinguished Scholar, Institute forInternational Policy Studies, Tokyo

Director of Council Development,
Canadian Council for International
Peace and Security, Ottawa

Prof. Robert O'Neill
Chichele Professor of the History ofWar, All Souls College, University of
OxfordAmb. Qian Jiadong
Senior Consultant of the China Institutefor International Strategic Studies,
Beijing

Dr. Abdel Monem Said Aly
Director, Ahram Center for Political andStrategic Studies, Cairo

Prof. John Simpson
Director of Mountbatten Centre forInternational Studies, University ofSouthampton, U.K.

Amb. Hennadiy Udovenko
Member of Ukrainian Parliament

Dr. Joachim Krause−１−-Co-chairmenDeputy Director of the Research Instituteof the DGAP (German Society for Foreign Mr. Nobuo Matsunaga
Vice Chairman of the Japan Institute of
Affairs)
International Affairs, Tokyo

Feasibility, political appeal keys to Tokyo Forum report's success

Must address link between regional, global non-proliferation and disarmament
By Kazumi Mizumoto

Several reports on nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear
weapons have been published since the early 1990s when, with the end of
the Cold War, it was expected that the United States and the Soviet
Union-which in 1990 possessed 98 percent of the world's nuclear
warheads-would make substantial progress toward disarmament.
However, such optimism rapidly faded with the nuclear tests conducted
May 1998 by India and Pakistan, and attempts by Iraq and other countries
to clandestinely acquire nuclear weapons.
Under these circumstances, the Final Report, to be adopted at the
fourth and final meeting in July 1999 of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, should echo the sentiments of thoseearlier reports. The Tokyo Forum was proposed by the Japanese
government following the nuclear tests in South Asia.
Prior to the final meeting, I would like to clarify several unresolved
issues relating to nuclear disarmament by comparing three existing reports.
An Evolving US Nuclear Posture, published in December 1995 by theHenry L. Stimson Center, proposed the reduction and elimination of
nuclear weapons in four phases. The report stated that the only militaryrole of nuclear weapons was as a deterrent against the threatened use of
nuclear weapons by another state. The report also called for a post-Cold
War reappraisal of the role of nuclear weapons.
It proposed that the United States and Soviet Union reduce their
nuclear arsenals to 2,000 warheads each during Phase I; for all declared
nuclear powers to reduce their warheads to several hundred each in Phase
II; for declared and undeclared nuclear powers to reduce their warheads toless than 100 each in Phase III, and for all countries to eliminate all nuclear
weapons in Phase IV. However, the report noted that outright elimination
might never be achieved, and would take decades even if it were tohappen.
The Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of
Nuclear Weapons, published in August 1996, also called for the eliminationof all nuclear weapons through phased, verified reduction. The report said
the only military utility that remained for nuclear weapons was in deterring
their use by others.
The report proposed that nuclear warheads be reduced to 2,000 eachby the United States and Russia, and then to about 100 warheads each by
all nuclear weapon states. At the same time, it recommended such steps as
taking nuclear forces off alert, removing warheads from delivery vehicles,
and ending the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons. It also called
for measures to prevent further horizontal proliferation, the development ofverification arrangements, and the cessation of the production of fissile
material for nuclear explosives.
In addition, it referred to the use of further U.S.-Russian bilateralagreements, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a cut-off
convention, as well as any no-first-use treaty as possible legal
arrangements for the total elimination of nuclear weapons following aphased reduction. The report, however, did not set out a time frame for
elimination, but said it should be achieved "at the earliest possible
opportunity."
The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, published in 1997 by the
National Academy of Sciences, also recognized the role of nuclear
weapons as a deterrent against nuclear attacks, and pointed out that theirvery existence exerted an "existential deterrence," that is, a deterrent effect"against unrestricted conventional wars among the major powers."
As a first step, the report called for the United States and Russia toreduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to 2,000 each through a
START Ⅲ agreement. It then recommended that the two countries reduce
their respective arsenals to about 1,000 each, and then to a few hundredeach. The three remaining declared nuclear powers should aim for evenlower levels, or no nuclear weapons at all, the report said. The ultimate
goal, the report stressed, is the "prohibition," rather than "elimination" or"abolition" of nuclear weapons.
However, the report also pointed out that, in addition to the benefits,
the prohibition on nuclear weapons might encourage cheating or the overt
withdrawal of nations from the disarmament regime, as well as theinitiation or intensification of conflicts, since the threat of nuclear war
would have been eliminated. The report stated that it is not yet known

when the preconditions for the prohibition of nuclear weapons will be met,
and suggested an expansion in the number and geographical scope of
nuclear weapon-free zones as a possible step toward the ultimate goal ofprohibition.
The above-mentioned reports challenge the notion that nuclear
weapons act as a deterrent against the use of biological, chemical andconventional weapons, and against campaigns by terrorist groups.
However, they do recognize that nuclear weapons can deter nuclear threats
to the population and territory of a NWS or its allies. The Canberra
Commission said that extended deterrence assurances to allies would not
apply in a nuclear weapon-free world, although they would remain, in theform of collective defense arrangements, until the elimination of nuclear
weapons was achieved.
All of the reports propose the phased reduction in the number ofnuclear warheads-to 2,000 or less each by the United States and Russia in
the first phase, to 1,000 or less each by the two countries, with the
involvement of the other three nuclear states in the second phase, and to
hundreds or less by all countries prior to the elimination or prohibition of
nuclear weapons.
None of them sets out a precise time frame for the elimination of
nuclear weapons, although one can surmise that, at their most optimistic,
they are thinking in terms of decades. Nor do they state whether that
ultimate goal is achievable. In other words, they simply set goals, andinclude suggestions as to how they might be achieved.
The proposals on nuclear disarmament and elimination can be divided
into two types-those that appeal politically to international public
sentiment, which wishes to see them accomplished, and those that containconcrete, feasible measures toward achieving the same goal. The abovementioned reports, as well as similar proposals, contain elements of both.
All three reports attach great importance to nuclear weapon-free zones
in such regions as South America, Africa and the South Pacific, and regard
the expansion of NWFZs as a critical step toward the elimination of nuclear
weapons. On the other hand, because they were published before thenuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the reports contain few references orrecommendations concerning nuclear proliferation in South Asia. In
addition, they do not fully address tensions in regions such as the Middle
East and Northeast Asia. To their credit, though, they do contain detailed
discussion of the need to strengthen verification systems, to create astronger international organization, and to control and dispose of fissile
material.
With these issues in mind, I would like to outline five conditions I
believe need to be put in place:First, we need to more effectively promote non-proliferation andnuclear disarmament. The detente that set in after the end of the Cold War
has been challenged by new causes of international instability, such as
intensified regional disputes, nuclear proliferation in South Asia, theemergence of threshold countries and NATO's air strikes against
Yugoslavia.
Second, we need to find solutions to regional problems, such as thetension that exists between India and Pakistan, that take into account theseverity of such problems and appreciate the value of their resolution.
Third, a proposal is necessary that demonstrates the link between
global and regional nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
Fourth, it is important to discuss specific issues with the five declared
nuclear weapon states on an individual basis, as well as to demand that they
fulfill their collective commitment to adhere to the elimination of nuclear
weapons as stated in Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Finally, any proposal should be forward-looking and reassuring. In
that sense, the Final Report of the Tokyo Forum should contain a strong
political appeal, establishing the relationship between nuclear disarmamentand non-proliferation, and the changing international political situation.
And, needless to say, the report should be unambiguous and feasible.

−２−

Mizumoto is associate professor at HPI.

The European Union-Building shared values from diversity
By Ove Juul Joergensen

Ambassador Ove Juul Joergensen, Head of the Delegation of theEuropean Commission in Japan, stressed the importance of closer
cooperation between Europe and Japan in the 21st century during a
lecture at Hiroshima City University on May 26. In his lecture, titled "TheEU Today and Tomorrow," which was sponsored by the Hiroshima Peace
Institute, Juul Joergensen emphasized the merits of sovereign nations
working toward a common goal, while respecting one another's culturalvalues. Following is the summary of his lecture:
The European Union is one of the most fascinating politicalundertakings in modern times, and it is based on an idea. The big idea
behind Europe is a vision. And that vision is peace; peace as theprerequisite for the creation of a Europe in which we can put into practiceour common values of freedom, solidarity, democracy and enterprise.
Having witnessed Europe become the origin of two world wars in thespace of 30 years, founding European statesmen Robert Schuman andJean Monnet saw a way to avoid conflict in pooling the key industries ofcoal and steel, which had once sustained the war effort. The institutions of
the EU are the tools that allow its citizens to put into practice this common
vision, these common values.
The EU is a union of sovereign nations that have chosen, in definedareas, to pool their sovereignty in order to tackle together those problems
where a common policy brings far greater gains than nation states acting
on their own. It is not, and may never be, a country called the UnitedStates of Europe. The EU is also not a means for creating a single culture.
Working together while maintaining this diversity, in other words seeking
the common ground while not ignoring our different cultural backgrounds,
is one of the quiet triumphs of the EU.
All countries in Europe subscribing to the basic values of democracy
and the rule of law are eligible to join the EU. This process of enlargementof the EU to include new members is proceeding. By enlargement, we will
have brought the priceless advantage of political stability, as well as the
expansion of a market, to the continent. The current crisis in Kosovo is areminder of the importance of this stabilizing and democratizing function.
The EU is taking concrete steps to stabilize the situation in the Balkans.

The two biggest recent events of the integration process at work are
the launch of the euro on Jan. 1 this year and the entry into force of the
Amsterdam Treaty on May 1. The euro has eliminated costs and risks,removing the obstacles to trade and investment within the EU. It also
urges companies to strengthen their competitiveness, and requires
governments to implement economic and structural reforms. Thesechanges will eventually become the basis for a vibrant and dynamic EU
economy.
The Amsterdam Treaty defines the political role of the EU in theworld, and intends to strengthen it through formulating clearer common
strategies on external matters.
The EU-Japan relationship is becoming more mature. Until recently,
EU-Japan relations focused mainly on trade, and a lot of time was spent insettling commercial disputes. But they are now fewer and lessconfrontational. Instead, we have embarked on constructive consultationand cooperation in many fields. Science and technology, social policies,
humanitarian aid, multilateral trade, and stabilization of the Korean
Peninsula through the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
are but a few examples.
We welcome the efforts made by the Japanese government tointernationalize the yen and to position it alongside the dollar and the euro
as a key international currency. The EU has a clear interest in seeing therecovery of the Japanese economy.
Japan and the EU share the same belief in democratic values, in themultilateral system and in closer international cooperation. The
watchwords of our relationship in the future should be cooperation inadvancing shared interests based on common values and mutual benefit.
The EU and Japan mirror each other in their parallel post-war search forpeace, prosperity and security. Our efforts to rebuild, to create the societies
we desire, mean we have much in common. There is much potential for anenhanced EU-Japan relationship in the 21st century.
Compiled by Nobumasa Akiyama, research associate at HPI

Hiroshima's peace role reaffirmed as new century approaches
By Yasuo Hamamoto
An international peace conference was held in The Hague, theNetherlands, from May 12 to 15, 1999. It was attended by about 8,000
people representing more than 600 civic groups and non-governmentalorganizations from more than 100 countries. Held under the slogan, "The
Hague Appeal for Peace 1999," the meeting marked the centennial
anniversary of the first Hague International Peace Conference in May
1899. As director of the International Peace Promotion Office ofHiroshima City, I attended the conference with Hiroshima Mayor
Tadatoshi Akiba, who is also president of the World Coalition of Mayors
for Peace Through Inter-City Solidarity, which met during the conference.
In a speech made during a core session on "Disarmament and Human
Security" and at other meetings, Akiba paid tribute to the way hibakusha(survivors of the atomic bombings) had overcome their trauma and lived
their lives with dignity and courage. He said their experiences served as a
powerful argument against the use of nuclear weapons. He also spoke ofthe devotion hibakusha had showed to the cause of world peace and theabolition of nuclear weapons, rather than apportioning blame or exacting
revenge on those responsible for their trauma. It is important, he said, totake concrete steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, since they
represent nothing more than "absolute evil."
At a meeting co-sponsored by the mayoral coalition and theInternational Association of Peace Messenger Cities, both metropolitan
organizations committed to world peace, participants discussed the role oflocal governments in the promotion of human rights and peace, andresolved to build closer ties with representatives of civil society andNGOs from around the world.
Having witnessed many NGO activists play a major part in theconference, I was left with the realization that the 21st century should
become the era of the NGOs. I was also impressed by the powerfulobjections voiced by many people to the attempts by various governments
to justify the exercising of power politics through military force regarding
the crisis in Kosovo.
It was agreed that the use of A-bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 54
years ago was the single most important event of the 20th century.
However, I was uncertain as to whether the conference truly appreciatedthe meaning of Hiroshima, since not one hibakusha was offered a platform
at the opening and closing ceremonies. On the other hand, I became awareof the deep-seated sense of humanity in European countries, borne of thetragedy of the Holocaust. Still, several European countries supportedNATO's air strikes against Yugoslavia, which they said were the only way
to end the policy of ethnic cleansing against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
A few government officials from European countries were even rumoredto have said that the use of nuclear weapons should not be ruled out as alast resort in Yugoslavia. Hiroshima's duty is to find a way to persuade
such people to abandon that kind of thinking.
For the message of the hibakusha-that nuclear weapons are an
absolute evil-to take root throughout the world, we need to take concreteand persuasive steps. Hiroshima's urgent task must be to learn from its
efforts over the past 54 years and find more effective and efficient ways topromote peace.
Hamamoto is director of the International Peace Promotion Office of
the Citizens' Affairs Bureau at Hiroshima City Hall.

−３−

Introduction

The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998,
and the resulting race between the two states to develop nuclear
missiles, have given rise to concern in the international community overfurther nuclear proliferation and stagnation in the disarmament process.
Meanwhile, the five declared nuclear-weapon states (NWS) have failed
to fulfill their obligation to implement arms reduction.
However, the five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been making efforts
to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the region in amove that augers well for nuclear non-proliferation.
To date, about 85 percent of a draft treaty to be signed by thenations was agreed by a United Nations Group of Experts at a meeting
held at the end of April. They pledged to make their efforts to conclude
a draft treaty among the five states at the Sapporo Meeting scheduled tobe held in October.
Once those procedures are completed, the treaty may then be
submitted to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
Conference in 2000.

Definition of a NWFZ

A NWFZ is to make a given zone free of nuclear weapons bystates consisting of that zone that undertake, at their own free will, toprohibit:(a) The production, acquisition, possession or control of nuclear
weapons.
(b) Any assistance for the actions mentioned in (a).
(c) Support for other countries with regard to the actions mentionedin (a).
In signing a Protocol attached to NWFZ treaty, the NWS of China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom and United States undertake not touse or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NWFZ, as well as thestate parties to that treaty.

Background

With the dramatic end of the Cold War following the collapse of
the former Soviet Union in 1991, the five Central Asian states, all ofwhich belonged to the Soviet Union, gained independence. Although
the five Central Asian states welcomed their newfound liberty, they also
found themselves in a volatile and politically unstable region thatencompasses India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. The countries also
found that they share borders with Russia and China.
Under such new political circumstances, the five Central Asianstates had to ensure their individual security, while at the same timeendeavoring to build themselves as independent states and ensure thatthey remained free of Russian influence and control. The attempt toestablish a Central Asian NWFZ is an important part of those efforts.

Background to the Central Asian NWFZ(a) At a summit meeting held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in February 1997,
the presidents of the five Central Asian states adopted the Almaty
Declaration. Part of the declaration resolves: "To call on all Statesconcerned, on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the
Semipalatinsk test site, to support the idea of proclaiming Central
Asia a nuclear-free zone open to accession by other States of theregion." Since NWFZ became an agenda at the meeting, the five
Central Asian states here initiated their focused efforts tomaterialize their initiative.
(b) In September 1997, Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov invited
more than 100 people from five Central Asian states, five NWS,
neighboring countries, states belong to established NWFZs, andresearch institutes around the world to attend a meeting in Tashkent.
At the meeting, the Foreign Ministers of the five Central Asianstates issued a statement, in which they called upon (ⅰ) othercountries to support the establishment of a NWFZ treaty in theregion and (ⅱ) the United Nations to set up a group of experts to
help them to draft the treaty.
(c) At the 52nd U.N. General Assembly in 1997, the resolution, titled"Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,"
proposed by the five states, was adopted for the first time without avote.

Toward a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone
Parties to iron out differences ahead of Sapporo Meeting in October

By Tsutomu Ishiguri(d) At the beginning of 1998, the U.N. Secretary General, whom theresolution requested to support the drafting of a treaty, tried torespond to the request by appointing the Director of the U.N.
Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific.

U.N. Group of Experts

The United Nations decided to form a Group of Experts to assist
the five Central Asian states, which lack human and financial resources,
to develop the NWFZ idea. The Group met for the first time in April
1998, then again in October the same year and in April 1999. Meetingsof the Group also took place in Bishkek in July 1998, organized by
Kyrgyzstan, and in Tashkent in February 1999, organized by
Uzbekistan. By the end of the April 1999 meeting, approximately 85
percent of the draft treaty had been agreed.

Position of the NWS

Following is an outline of the of the five NWS' position, expressedat the Bishkek and Tashkent meetings:(a) The idea of a Central Asian NWFZ could be supported provided thefive NWS are consulted regularly.
(b) The treaty should apply only to the territories of the five Central
Asian states, and an expansion of the zone covered by the treaty inthe future is not acceptable. The Caspian Sea should be excluded
from the treaty.
(c) Although concerns among the five Central Asian states forenvironmental protection is understandable, an appropriate balance
between environmental protection and the original purpose of the
NWFZ should be maintained. (The five Central Asian states had
expressed concern about the rehabilitation of soil contaminated bypast nuclear activities in Semipalatinsk, and urged related
international assistance.)(d) Visits by foreign ships and aircraft to ports and airfields, as well as
the use of airspace by foreign aircraft in the NWFZ, should beallowed.
(e) With regard to "negative security assurance," which prohibits the useor threatened use of nuclear weapons within a NWFZ and as well
the state parties to the treaty, parties to the protocol on "negative
security" should be limited to the five NWS. India and Pakistan
should not be given any status as NWS.

Outline of draft treaty

The draft treaty comprises 19 articles and one protocol regarding"negative security assurance": Article 1 (Definition and usage of terms);
Article 2 (Application of the Treaty); Article 3 (Basic obligations);
Article 4 (Foreign ships and aircraft); Article 5 (Prohibition of testing of
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices); Article 6(Environmental security); Article 7 (Use of nuclear energy for peacefulpurposes); Article 8 (IAEA safeguards); Article 9 (Physical protectionof nuclear material and nuclear equipment); Article 10 (Consultative
committee); Article 11 (Exchanges of information); Article 12(Interpretation of Treaty and settlement of dispute); Article 13 (Other
agreements); Article 14 (Reservations); Article 15 (Signature andratification); Article 16 (Entry into force and duration); Article 17(Withdrawal from this treaty); Article 18 (Amendments); Article 19(Depositary) and the Protocol.

Problems

Several issues have recently been resolved, although several
problems remain:(a) First, there is little doubt that NWFZs are effective, since they
reduce the geographical zone in which nuclear weapons can be usedor threaten to be used. They literally expand the size of nuclear-freeareas. NWFZs are established on the assumption that they will−４−

promote nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. On theother hand, if you look at NWFZ from another aspects, they
presuppose the continued existence of nuclear weapons, as NWS
assure the state parties to NWFZ treaty not to use or threat to use
nuclear weapons. This could be viewed as a contradiction of theoriginal purpose of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear
disarmament. For that reason, the Expert Group inserted a clausecalling on the NWS to promote nuclear disarmament in preambler
paragraph. Article 6 (Obligations toward nuclear disarmament) and
Article 7 (Nuclear-weapon-free zones) of the NPT were alsomentioned.
(b) With respect to the application of the treaty, we should note thatlittoral states of the Caspian Sea are currently in dispute overmaritime borders and the rights to underground resources.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, littoral states, had not shown muchenthusiasm for the treaty, which, they feared, might infringe on theirrespective territorial claims. As a result, discussions on thedefinition of territory have been discontinued. However, at the third
U.N. Expert Group meeting in April, the two states agreed that thetreaty should stipulate, with the exception of Article 1-which
geographically defines the NWFZ as the five Central Asian statesthat the zone apply to the land territory, on waters (ports, harbors,lakes, rivers and streams), and an air space above them in a newly
created Article 2. A concrete definition of the territory was avoided.
Article 2 also stipulates that nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice orin any way affect rights of the Central Asian states in any disputes
concerning the ownership or sovereignty over lands or waters that
may or may not be included within this zone. Kazakhstan andTurkmenistan agreed to these articles, which they felt that thesearticles would not affect their interests concerning the Caspian Sea,
thereby removing one of the biggest hindrances to the treaty's
formulation.
(c) With regard to visits by foreign ships and aircraft to ports andairfields, Article 4 says such visits may not be allowed "if they are
related to the transportation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, installation of materials." However, NWS, suchas the United States, maintain the policy that in general, they do not
divulge whether or not their aircraft and vessels are carrying nuclear
weapons. If Article 4 is to work in practice, the five Central Asianstates would have to insist that NWS declare the possession of
nuclear weapons aboard aircraft and vessels, and then verify any
declaration. Under present circumstances, however, that would be
impossible. It was pointed out that the condition was meaningless,and in some cases, might actually infringe on the sovereign right ofa nation to decide which vessels to allow into its ports. The delegate
from Kyrgyzstan was the only one to withhold support for Article 4,as he had not received guidance from his government. The delegate
from Turkmenistan, a neutral state, said that state would not oppose
the article if it were agreed upon by the four other states, eventhough, he added, it opposes Article 4 as a whole. In one way or
another, overall agreement on the article appears likely in the near
future.
(d) Article 8, which addresses the role of IAEA safeguards, stipulates
that parties would undertake not to provide source or fissionable
materials to any non-nuclear-weapons state-unless that state has
concluded with IAEA a comprehensive safeguards agreement-andto any NWS, except in conformity with applicable safeguards
agreements with IAEA. Kazakhstan was worried that this article
would prohibit the sale of uranium ore and yellow cake. In
response, the IAEA explained that the sale of such materials could
continue, provided the routes of material transportation conformed
with the IAEA safeguards. IAEA added that it might be possible toinclude a condition that uranium ore sold by Kazakhstan not be usedin the production of nuclear weapons. The problem looked as
though it would be resolved after the IAEA decided to write a letterof reassurance on the matter to the Kazakhstan government.
(e) Kyrgyzstan has yet to agree to the preamble and Article 9, because
it is not a signatory to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials. If you look at this article carefully, Article 9
states that the signing and ratification of the convention are notpreconditions for ratifying the treaty. This cleared up amisunderstanding on the part of Kyrgyzstan that, by signing thetreaty, it would automatically become a member of the IAEA,
which requires a regular and obligatory financial contribution, as
well as voluntary contributions. Kyrgyzstan is expected to declare
its support for the article shortly.
(f) There is strong opposition from the NWS to Article 15, which deals
with the enlargement of the number of state parties to the treaty,
including neighboring states contiguous to the Central Asian
NWFZ. I proposed that they need not adhere to Article 15, since
Article 18 stipulates that any amendment of the treaty requires theconsent of all five signatories. Uzbekistan, referring to its friendly
relations with the Caucasus states, emphasized the importance ofArticle 15, while the remaining four states were more agreeable tomy proposal.
(g) Turkmenistan and several other states expressed concern about
Article 13, saying it should not affect their rights and obligations aslaid out in bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements to which
they are already signatories. They argued that the article ran counterto the principles of international law, which holds that establishedtreaties are valid as long as they are not in contravention ofsubsequent treaties, and as such is unnecessary. On the other hand,
Kyrgyzstan, which has a collective defense agreement with Russia,
and relies on Russian troops for the defense of its border, insistedon the inclusion of this article in the final treaty. The parties agreed
to discuss a compromised formulation, which might include thewords, "to the extent compatible with the provisions of this Treaty."

The Sapporo meeting

Upon the kind invitation of the Sapporo municipal government
and the Hokkaido prefectural government, the next meeting of the U.N.
Experts Group will be held in Sapporo in early October. Experts fromthe five Central Asian states have resolved to reach agreement on thedraft treaty among themselves. As I pointed out above, although only afew problems remain, they are proving difficult to resolve. We are notsure whether the parties will reach agreement over articles 15 and 13,
which refer to "the enlargement of zone of application" and "otheragreements," respectively. However, responsibility for formulating thetreaty rests with the five Central Asian states alone, and I am optimisticthat they will come to an agreement. Of course, parts that have alreadybeen agreed may be reviewed at upcoming meetings. It is also possiblethat longstanding rivalries among the five Central Asian states will
result in certain states objecting to proposals made by others. Throughthe past 18 months of negotiations, however, the experts and myself
have established a relationship of mutual trust. I intend to assist theirwork in a fair and constructive manner.
At the Sapporo meeting, the five Central Asian states will exert
their effort to reach an agreement on the draft treaty, and then to
consider how they contact and obtain support from the five NWS. It
will be impossible to formulate a treaty that satisfies all of the NWS; if
they try to do that, they will never be able to establish a NWFZ.
Nevertheless, if the five Central Asian states accept small amendments
presented by the NWS, and signed the amended treaty, it will still
represent an important contribution to regional security. At the sametime, the five Central Asian states will be able to make their own
contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, thus givethe hope for the NPT Review Conference in 2000, which, at present, is
not expected to hear much in the way of concrete results. The five
Central Asian states, which are in the process of building states, will beable to take pride in the fact that they have contributed to the NPT,
which will strengthen ties among themselves.
Ishiguri is director of the U.N. Regional Centre for Peace andDisarmament in Asia and the Pacific.

−５−Introduction

The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998,
and the resulting race between the two states to develop nuclear
missiles, have given rise to concern in the international community overfurther nuclear proliferation and stagnation in the disarmament process.
Meanwhile, the five declared nuclear-weapon states (NWS) have failed
to fulfill their obligation to implement arms reduction.
However, the five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been making efforts
to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the region in amove that augers well for nuclear non-proliferation.
To date, about 85 percent of a draft treaty to be signed by thenations was agreed by a United Nations Group of Experts at a meeting
held at the end of April. They pledged to make their efforts to conclude
a draft treaty among the five states at the Sapporo Meeting scheduled tobe held in October.
Once those procedures are completed, the treaty may then be
submitted to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review
Conference in 2000.

Definition of a NWFZ

A NWFZ is to make a given zone free of nuclear weapons bystates consisting of that zone that undertake, at their own free will, toprohibit:(a) The production, acquisition, possession or control of nuclear
weapons.
(b) Any assistance for the actions mentioned in (a).
(c) Support for other countries with regard to the actions mentionedin (a).
In signing a Protocol attached to NWFZ treaty, the NWS of China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom and United States undertake not touse or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NWFZ, as well as thestate parties to that treaty.

Background

With the dramatic end of the Cold War following the collapse of
the former Soviet Union in 1991, the five Central Asian states, all ofwhich belonged to the Soviet Union, gained independence. Although
the five Central Asian states welcomed their newfound liberty, they also
found themselves in a volatile and politically unstable region thatencompasses India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. The countries also
found that they share borders with Russia and China.
Under such new political circumstances, the five Central Asianstates had to ensure their individual security, while at the same timeendeavoring to build themselves as independent states and ensure thatthey remained free of Russian influence and control. The attempt toestablish a Central Asian NWFZ is an important part of those efforts.

Background to the Central Asian NWFZ(a) At a summit meeting held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in February 1997,
the presidents of the five Central Asian states adopted the Almaty
Declaration. Part of the declaration resolves: "To call on all Statesconcerned, on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the
Semipalatinsk test site, to support the idea of proclaiming Central
Asia a nuclear-free zone open to accession by other States of theregion." Since NWFZ became an agenda at the meeting, the five
Central Asian states here initiated their focused efforts tomaterialize their initiative.
(b) In September 1997, Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov invited
more than 100 people from five Central Asian states, five NWS,
neighboring countries, states belong to established NWFZs, andresearch institutes around the world to attend a meeting in Tashkent.
At the meeting, the Foreign Ministers of the five Central Asianstates issued a statement, in which they called upon (ⅰ) othercountries to support the establishment of a NWFZ treaty in theregion and (ⅱ) the United Nations to set up a group of experts to
help them to draft the treaty.
(c) At the 52nd U.N. General Assembly in 1997, the resolution, titled"Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia,"
proposed by the five states, was adopted for the first time without avote.

Toward a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone
Parties to iron out differences ahead of Sapporo Meeting in October

By Tsutomu Ishiguri(d) At the beginning of 1998, the U.N. Secretary General, whom theresolution requested to support the drafting of a treaty, tried torespond to the request by appointing the Director of the U.N.
Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific.

U.N. Group of Experts

The United Nations decided to form a Group of Experts to assist
the five Central Asian states, which lack human and financial resources,
to develop the NWFZ idea. The Group met for the first time in April
1998, then again in October the same year and in April 1999. Meetingsof the Group also took place in Bishkek in July 1998, organized by
Kyrgyzstan, and in Tashkent in February 1999, organized by
Uzbekistan. By the end of the April 1999 meeting, approximately 85
percent of the draft treaty had been agreed.

Position of the NWS

Following is an outline of the of the five NWS' position, expressedat the Bishkek and Tashkent meetings:(a) The idea of a Central Asian NWFZ could be supported provided thefive NWS are consulted regularly.
(b) The treaty should apply only to the territories of the five Central
Asian states, and an expansion of the zone covered by the treaty inthe future is not acceptable. The Caspian Sea should be excluded
from the treaty.
(c) Although concerns among the five Central Asian states forenvironmental protection is understandable, an appropriate balance
between environmental protection and the original purpose of the
NWFZ should be maintained. (The five Central Asian states had
expressed concern about the rehabilitation of soil contaminated bypast nuclear activities in Semipalatinsk, and urged related
international assistance.)(d) Visits by foreign ships and aircraft to ports and airfields, as well as
the use of airspace by foreign aircraft in the NWFZ, should beallowed.
(e) With regard to "negative security assurance," which prohibits the useor threatened use of nuclear weapons within a NWFZ and as well
the state parties to the treaty, parties to the protocol on "negative
security" should be limited to the five NWS. India and Pakistan
should not be given any status as NWS.

Outline of draft treaty

The draft treaty comprises 19 articles and one protocol regarding"negative security assurance": Article 1 (Definition and usage of terms);
Article 2 (Application of the Treaty); Article 3 (Basic obligations);
Article 4 (Foreign ships and aircraft); Article 5 (Prohibition of testing of
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices); Article 6(Environmental security); Article 7 (Use of nuclear energy for peacefulpurposes); Article 8 (IAEA safeguards); Article 9 (Physical protectionof nuclear material and nuclear equipment); Article 10 (Consultative
committee); Article 11 (Exchanges of information); Article 12(Interpretation of Treaty and settlement of dispute); Article 13 (Other
agreements); Article 14 (Reservations); Article 15 (Signature andratification); Article 16 (Entry into force and duration); Article 17(Withdrawal from this treaty); Article 18 (Amendments); Article 19(Depositary) and the Protocol.

Problems

Several issues have recently been resolved, although several
problems remain:(a) First, there is little doubt that NWFZs are effective, since they
reduce the geographical zone in which nuclear weapons can be usedor threaten to be used. They literally expand the size of nuclear-freeareas. NWFZs are established on the assumption that they will−４−

promote nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. On theother hand, if you look at NWFZ from another aspects, they
presuppose the continued existence of nuclear weapons, as NWS
assure the state parties to NWFZ treaty not to use or threat to use
nuclear weapons. This could be viewed as a contradiction of theoriginal purpose of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear
disarmament. For that reason, the Expert Group inserted a clausecalling on the NWS to promote nuclear disarmament in preambler
paragraph. Article 6 (Obligations toward nuclear disarmament) and
Article 7 (Nuclear-weapon-free zones) of the NPT were alsomentioned.
(b) With respect to the application of the treaty, we should note thatlittoral states of the Caspian Sea are currently in dispute overmaritime borders and the rights to underground resources.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, littoral states, had not shown muchenthusiasm for the treaty, which, they feared, might infringe on theirrespective territorial claims. As a result, discussions on thedefinition of territory have been discontinued. However, at the third
U.N. Expert Group meeting in April, the two states agreed that thetreaty should stipulate, with the exception of Article 1-which
geographically defines the NWFZ as the five Central Asian statesthat the zone apply to the land territory, on waters (ports, harbors,lakes, rivers and streams), and an air space above them in a newly
created Article 2. A concrete definition of the territory was avoided.
Article 2 also stipulates that nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice orin any way affect rights of the Central Asian states in any disputes
concerning the ownership or sovereignty over lands or waters that
may or may not be included within this zone. Kazakhstan andTurkmenistan agreed to these articles, which they felt that thesearticles would not affect their interests concerning the Caspian Sea,
thereby removing one of the biggest hindrances to the treaty's
formulation.
(c) With regard to visits by foreign ships and aircraft to ports andairfields, Article 4 says such visits may not be allowed "if they are
related to the transportation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, installation of materials." However, NWS, suchas the United States, maintain the policy that in general, they do not
divulge whether or not their aircraft and vessels are carrying nuclear
weapons. If Article 4 is to work in practice, the five Central Asianstates would have to insist that NWS declare the possession of
nuclear weapons aboard aircraft and vessels, and then verify any
declaration. Under present circumstances, however, that would be
impossible. It was pointed out that the condition was meaningless,and in some cases, might actually infringe on the sovereign right ofa nation to decide which vessels to allow into its ports. The delegate
from Kyrgyzstan was the only one to withhold support for Article 4,as he had not received guidance from his government. The delegate
from Turkmenistan, a neutral state, said that state would not oppose
the article if it were agreed upon by the four other states, eventhough, he added, it opposes Article 4 as a whole. In one way or
another, overall agreement on the article appears likely in the near
future.
(d) Article 8, which addresses the role of IAEA safeguards, stipulates
that parties would undertake not to provide source or fissionable
materials to any non-nuclear-weapons state-unless that state has
concluded with IAEA a comprehensive safeguards agreement-andto any NWS, except in conformity with applicable safeguards
agreements with IAEA. Kazakhstan was worried that this article
would prohibit the sale of uranium ore and yellow cake. In
response, the IAEA explained that the sale of such materials could
continue, provided the routes of material transportation conformed
with the IAEA safeguards. IAEA added that it might be possible toinclude a condition that uranium ore sold by Kazakhstan not be usedin the production of nuclear weapons. The problem looked as
though it would be resolved after the IAEA decided to write a letterof reassurance on the matter to the Kazakhstan government.
(e) Kyrgyzstan has yet to agree to the preamble and Article 9, because
it is not a signatory to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials. If you look at this article carefully, Article 9
states that the signing and ratification of the convention are notpreconditions for ratifying the treaty. This cleared up amisunderstanding on the part of Kyrgyzstan that, by signing thetreaty, it would automatically become a member of the IAEA,
which requires a regular and obligatory financial contribution, as
well as voluntary contributions. Kyrgyzstan is expected to declare
its support for the article shortly.
(f) There is strong opposition from the NWS to Article 15, which deals
with the enlargement of the number of state parties to the treaty,
including neighboring states contiguous to the Central Asian
NWFZ. I proposed that they need not adhere to Article 15, since
Article 18 stipulates that any amendment of the treaty requires theconsent of all five signatories. Uzbekistan, referring to its friendly
relations with the Caucasus states, emphasized the importance ofArticle 15, while the remaining four states were more agreeable tomy proposal.
(g) Turkmenistan and several other states expressed concern about
Article 13, saying it should not affect their rights and obligations aslaid out in bilateral or multilateral treaties and agreements to which
they are already signatories. They argued that the article ran counterto the principles of international law, which holds that establishedtreaties are valid as long as they are not in contravention ofsubsequent treaties, and as such is unnecessary. On the other hand,
Kyrgyzstan, which has a collective defense agreement with Russia,
and relies on Russian troops for the defense of its border, insistedon the inclusion of this article in the final treaty. The parties agreed
to discuss a compromised formulation, which might include thewords, "to the extent compatible with the provisions of this Treaty."

The Sapporo meeting

Upon the kind invitation of the Sapporo municipal government
and the Hokkaido prefectural government, the next meeting of the U.N.
Experts Group will be held in Sapporo in early October. Experts fromthe five Central Asian states have resolved to reach agreement on thedraft treaty among themselves. As I pointed out above, although only afew problems remain, they are proving difficult to resolve. We are notsure whether the parties will reach agreement over articles 15 and 13,
which refer to "the enlargement of zone of application" and "otheragreements," respectively. However, responsibility for formulating thetreaty rests with the five Central Asian states alone, and I am optimisticthat they will come to an agreement. Of course, parts that have alreadybeen agreed may be reviewed at upcoming meetings. It is also possiblethat longstanding rivalries among the five Central Asian states will
result in certain states objecting to proposals made by others. Throughthe past 18 months of negotiations, however, the experts and myself
have established a relationship of mutual trust. I intend to assist theirwork in a fair and constructive manner.
At the Sapporo meeting, the five Central Asian states will exert
their effort to reach an agreement on the draft treaty, and then to
consider how they contact and obtain support from the five NWS. It
will be impossible to formulate a treaty that satisfies all of the NWS; if
they try to do that, they will never be able to establish a NWFZ.
Nevertheless, if the five Central Asian states accept small amendments
presented by the NWS, and signed the amended treaty, it will still
represent an important contribution to regional security. At the sametime, the five Central Asian states will be able to make their own
contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, thus givethe hope for the NPT Review Conference in 2000, which, at present, is
not expected to hear much in the way of concrete results. The five
Central Asian states, which are in the process of building states, will beable to take pride in the fact that they have contributed to the NPT,
which will strengthen ties among themselves.
Ishiguri is director of the U.N. Regional Centre for Peace andDisarmament in Asia and the Pacific.

−５−

Civil society in conflict conciliation and risk reduction
in South Asian context
By Ravinder Pal Singh
Ⅰ. Background
The role and capacities of the non-government sector, including civilsociety and the legislative branches, in conflict prevention and avoidance
remain under-explored in South Asia. This state of affairs has resulted froma number of reasons which include the following: uncertainties as to theoutcome of such initiatives; threats perceived by the ruling elite as a resultof the dilution of executive privilege; the nation-building concerns of the
security bureaucracies, which regard alternative opinion-making on
security policy making as allowing precedents that could lead todifficulties; and lack of initiatives in parliamentary fora to engage theexecutive branches in a professional debate on security issues.
Conflicts in South Asia are primarily characterized by domestic
insurgencies, mostly driven either by tensions in general between the centre
and the periphery or by major armed conflicts, such as that between the Sri
Lankan government and the Tamils and that between India and Pakistan
over Kashmir. The limitations of the state security processes in the Indian
sub-continent are indicated by the lack of progress in resolving the ongoing conflicts over the last fifty years, such as that in Kashmir. The
difficulties in resolving the tensions between India and Pakistan are also
indicative of the resistance to new initiatives on Kashmir and lack of spacein domestic politics to develop alternative thinking.
Dispute resolution in international relations is inevitably shaped by themanner in which disputes are resolved within countries and by the norms ofdomestic political behaviour within state systems. Domestic politics inSouth Asia are characterized by a permanent atmosphere of a campaign forpolitical power and control. This norm regrettably flows over into the
conduct of relations between India and Pakistan. The dispute over Kashmir
touches the organizing principles of the states.
Any mechanism for conflict prevention and resolution requires
structures for mediation, conciliation and arbitration. Leverage throughinternational support is usually an important element in effecting
conciliation, but in the South Asian countries this quickly arouses
sensitivities, particularly in India, so that the third-party mediation
approach is difficult to get off the ground. India has been rejecting
Pakistani suggestions for third-party mediation in order to prevent any
interference in their bilateral dialogue. Pakistan, on the other hand, assumes
that bilateral dialogue with India is futile, despite such requirements
enshrined in the Simla Agreement. In such circumstances, the possibilities
of moving to new methods of conflict conciliation and risk reduction meriturgent attention.
The modification of existing structures, such as the South Asian
Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) , to include bilateral
security questions might be one possible means of developing new regional
initiatives for designing conflict prevention and conflict avoidancemechanisms. However, this is considered to be an impediment in the
SAARC process. India's concerns with such mechanisms within the
SAARC framework are driven by the fact that it is the only country which
has common borders (and therefore potentiality of disputes) with all other
SAARC member countries except Sri Lanka, and by the likelihood of all
the SAARC countries making India a target of common criticism. Other
than low-key cooperation on security-related issues such ascommunications, meteorology, environmental protection, and the fightagainst drugs and terrorism, SAARC has not been able to shape any
meaningful cooperation in the political and security spheres. This is
primarily due to the heightened sense of confrontation between India andPakistan.
Given the limited space for negotiations which the executive branchesof the governments in these two countries have, until and unlessparliamentary initiatives get under way and become sensitive to thedifficulties in the negotiation process, a political solution will be difficult toachieve without broader public consensus. Such an initiative would also
provide political space and alternatives for negotiations by the executive
branches of the two governments.
In view of the above, the participation of the civil societies in the twocountries in their respective security opinion-making processes should be
examined and the role of the legislative branch in this regard should bebroadened. The role and potential contribution of NGOs comprising
members of the two parliaments, religious leaders, eminent persons andexperts in academia and the media needs to be examined. The aim should
be to identify approaches to conciliation on the principles of social justiceby using endogenous expertise and knowledge while guarding against the
intrusion of Partisan interests in the process.

Ⅱ.Approaches to conflict avoidance
A comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and avoidance
would need to be built with the following objectives:(ⅰ) building a broader coalition of the interested publics in orderto reduce the risks of war;(ⅱ) strengthening the implementation of and commitment to nonviolent conflict avoidance processes; and(ⅲ) identifying means and methods to overcome the resistance topeace-building that is rooted in bureaucratic inertia, ignorance
and vested interests.
The criteria required for a successful conciliation process would
include the following essential elements:-impartiality regarding the issues in the dispute;-independence from all parties to the conflict;-the respect and acceptability to all protagonists; and-the knowledge and skill to deal with the issues.
Ⅲ.A conciliation commission
As previous efforts in negotiating a lasting solution to the conflict
between India and Pakistan have not borne fruit because of the wide gap inthe expectations of the two protagonists, it may be worthwhile for the civilsociety in India and Pakistan to become actively involved in three important
areas of national security, namely: (ⅰ) conciliation building; (ⅱ) risk
avoidance; and (ⅲ) conflict prevention.
It would be useful to think in terms of setting up a conciliationcommission comprising Indian and Pakistani members of their respective
parliamentary defense committees, jurists, economists, independent security
experts and eminent persons as representatives of civil society. Such acommission should exclude government officials and political leaders in
office. It should function according to a well-defined code of conduct that isbased on the principles of impartiality, accountability, neutrality andindependence. The findings of the commission should provide guidelines togive effect to a reconciliation process. These guidelines should be placed
before the two parliaments to recommend specific measures to theirrespective governments as well as implement initiatives for conciliation andrisk reduction.
Since the recommendations of the conciliation commission would not
be binding on the two governments, the argument of executive privilegethat the executive has the exclusive right to deal with national disputes-does
not hold. Since the findings of the conciliation commission would be
advisory to the parliaments, there are better possibilities of identifying
creative alternatives for effecting reconciliation. The media and the NGOs
can then build up broader public opinion to examine public responses tosuch recommendations.
The conciliation commission could also identify confidence-building
initiatives that can be taken by civil society. It must set up centres for theprevention of incitement, risk reduction, early warning and conflict
avoidance to alert and advise the respective societies and the parliaments ofindicators of emerging tension between the two countries which could
adversely effect the maintenance of peace. These centres should activate awell-defined risk reduction and conflict prevention process which should be
operationalised between the governments and in the parliaments.
A parliamentary conciliation commission and a risk reduction centre
could risk either being seen by the executive branches and bureaucracies inthe two countries as an alternative centre of power and opinion-making or
creating checks which might further reduce the diplomatic space fornegotiations. These disadvantages should be addressed if the scope andfunctions of such conciliation and risk reduction process are to be defined
clearly and operate transparently.
Ⅳ.Conclusion
This approach aims to broaden the participation of civil society in security
opinion making in a formal way and heighten its stake in maintaining
peace. The need is to identify alternative approaches to promoting conflict
resolution and to work towards transparent conciliatory objectives rather
than the two societies remaining hostage to tardy political and bureaucratic
negotiations that have not borne results in the last five decades.

−６−

Singh is a senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute.

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NATO air strikes and the spirit of The Hague-a reappraisal of international law
By Masamichi Kamiya

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's air strikes against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, which lasted 79 days from March 24 through June
10, 1999, are still fresh in our memory. NATO justified the attacks by saying
they were necessary to prevent Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic fromcontinuing his policy of ethnic cleansing against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
In mid-May this year, an international peace conference titled "The
Hague Appeal for Peace 1999" was held in The Hague, the Netherlands. It
was organized by members of civil society and non-governmentalorganizations, not governments. The conference was held to commemorate
the 100th anniversary of the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899, which
had attempted, at the governmental level, to promote general disarmamentand codify a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.
This year's conference was attended by more than 8,000 representatives ofcivil society and NGOs.
Humanity was witnessing both the significance of peace and the horrorof war as the centenary conference began. The international community is ata crossroads, where it has to ponder its future course.
Some scholars of international law point out that little has beenaccomplished since the Hague Conferences 100 years ago. However, in his
book, "Swords into Plowshares," published by Random House, Inis L.
Claude, Jr. argued, "…[T]he Hague System of international relations…was
significant enough to figure as one of the major contributions of thenineteenth century to present-day world organization."
At the Hague conferences (the second Hague Conference took place in1907), several treaties and conventions for the peaceful settlement ofinternational disputes, as well as those governing the conduct of wars, were
formulated. One such treaty was the Convention for the Pacific Settlement ofInternational Disputes of 1907.
The League of Nations, founded in 1920, succeeded the abovementioned framework. Article 12 (1) of the League's Covenant states: "Themembers of the League…agree in no case to resort to war." At the same time,
however, the League left in place the possibility that a nation could resort towar after a three-month cooling-off period pending arbitration, judicial
decision or a report by the League's Council.
To close up this loophole, the General Treaty for the Renunciation ofWar, known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, was codified in 1928. This treaty
was an unequivocal manifestation of the international community's desire atthat time to make war an illegal act. Article I of the treaty requires parties tothe convention to renounce war as an instrument of national policy for the
resolution of international disputes.
The anti-war spirit of the convention was inherited and strengthened by
the United Nations upon its foundation in 1945. Article 2 (4) of the U.N.
Charter states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force…" For the first time in history, theinternational community unequivocally declared its determination that
disputes ought to be settled by peaceful means. The fact that the United
Nations comprised 185 states as of June 1999 makes the declaration all themore significant.
Unfortunately, however, the peaceful settlement of disputes is avulnerable ideal because the political will of a state, determined by notions ofnational interest, often outweighs its legal obligation to the international
community. Proof of this can be found in NATO's decision to carry out air
strikes against Yugoslavia.
It is true that legitimization for military actions under U.N. auspices canbe found in Chapter VII (U.N. Enforcement Actions) of the U.N. Charter.
Since the Gulf War in 1991, it has become more acceptable for the United
Nations or another third party to intervene militarily in a particular country
for humanitarian reasons.
Nevertheless, a nation's sovereignty must be respected, in keeping withthe traditional interpretation of international law as stipulated in Article 2 (7)of the U.N. Charter, which talks of non-interference in domestic affairs.
Disputes ought to be settled peacefully, and any action to enforce a peace,
including military action, must be authorized by the United Nations in theform of a Security Council resolution.
Put another way, enforcement actions taken by the United Nations
should be a last resort after all other avenues of negotiation have been

exhausted. In international relations, once the United Nations identifies athreat to peace, a breach of peace or an act of aggression, the Security
Council can authorize military actions, regardless of the fact that it
encroaches on the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. Whatmatters most is the legitimacy conferred on such operations by the United
Nations.
NATO embarked on its air strikes in the absence of a specific U.N.
resolution, which would have justified its actions. But as was mentioned
earlier, NATO justified its actions by pointing to the humanitarian disaster
unfolding in Kosovo. It could be argued, due to the tragedy of World War Ⅱ,a rationale exists in Europe that miritary intervention is just provided it isintended to counter inhumane acts.
Given the complexities of the situation, it is difficult to judge thevalidity, or invalidity, of NATO's actions. The key lies in making a
distinction between the legal legitimacy and moral justification for NATO'sactions so that they may be examined in the context of international law.
NATO's military action in Yugoslavia taught the international
community several important lessons.
First, they showed that the rule of international law is sometimes
vulnerable to power politics. Second, that members of the international
community do not necessarily agree on the conditions under which militaryintervention on humanitarian grounds is permitted. And third, they provedthat the international community is divided on how it interprets thelimitations of national sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.
As a result, we must put all our effort into nourishing an international
environment in which each nation respects and abides by the codified rule ofthe pacific settlement of international disputes, the so-called spirit of The
Hague. To that end, one suggestion would be to call an international
conference to re-examine the legitimacy of NATO's actions against
Yugoslavia, and to re-evaluate international law in the context of thepeaceful settlement of disputes.
In addition, the international community must move forward setting inmotion a renaissance of the United Nations. In other words we must work to
rebuild a U.N.-centered international system as we seek to establish a new
post-Cold War international order. Needless to say, the United Nations,which is by no means a perfect organization, should be reformed as theworld evolves. Top of the agenda for reform must be the democratization of
the Security Council, particularly the issues of increasing the number ofpermanent members of the Security Council, and the application of thepower of veto.
The above proposals sound mediocre. However, bearing in mind theplight of the people of Kosovo, and our resolve that the tragedy there neverbe repeated, the international community has a duty to take innovative steps
toward constructing a safer world, while learning from the lessons ofNATO's air war. For that to happen, both governments and civil society atlarge will need to demonstrate wisdom and a willingness to act. Only thatwill offer hope to the people of Yugoslavia. This kind of multidimensional,
global approach could act as a driving force in making the 21st century the
century of peace.
Kamiya is visiting research fellow at HPI. The views expressed in thisarticle are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the stance of HPI.

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ＴＯ ＰＩ ＣＳ-line
UNIDIR launchesreon
database on search institutesnal
HPI offers courlasetioinnsin, tepernacateiostudies
reTOPICSTOPICS

IDIR), witharmament Research (UNThe U.N. Institute for Dis rnational Peace Research Instituteolm Inte
support from the Stockh rnet database to the public.
(SIPRI), has opened its Inte as DATARIs, which offers information
The database, known
disarmament andworking in the areas of itute's Web site
inst
about research institutes
the
ugh
thro
ed
ess
be accinternational security, candir.
at http://www.unog.ch/uni about 350 institutes from more than 70
The database featured
es themselves areof May 1999. The institut information atate
countries as of the end
upd
password, to add and.
able, through use of awith up-to-date information
any time, providing users eloping a local database since 1989, and
UNIDIR has been dev
However, the timery of research institutes.
been too long,has published a directo
had
tion
lica
pub
tion andlag between data collec n outdated at the time of publication,
oftemeaning that data was e will finish inputting data related to all
itut
UNIDIR said. The inst
of by the end of the year.
h as the name,1,200 institutes it knows
general information, sucvid
The database pro es
information onaslress of institutes, as wel
location and e-mail add tions and the institutes' own databases.
research projects, publica on-line search engine that will turn up
anas the titles of
DATARIs also features
search keywords, suchinformation based on in which an institute is located, and the
publications, the country also adds and updates information for. It
address of its Web site do so themselves.
totimes since
institutes that are unable
accessed about 21,000 rmation on
The database has been
info
of
rce
represents a unique sousecurity, which
January. "The databaseinternational relations and rmation that is
of
d
fiel
the
in
h
arc
rese
info
er
oth
and
it
ting
duc
research centers are con Anita Bletry, DATARIs secretary at,"otherwise hard to find llow Pages' of IR research," she added.
'Ye
UNIDIR, said. "It is thein internationale registered for a course
About 180 students hav blished by Hiroshima Peace Institute
esta
ies,
City University inrelations and peace studin campus of Hiroshima
in April 1999, at the ma ima. The number of students is about three
Asaminami Ward, Hirosh when the course was first publicized.
dtimes larger than expecte s, Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor,
Two HPI researcher
ible for a series ofprofessor, will be responsand Ikuko Togo, assistant the fourth period every Wednesday on
lectures to be given in al Relations and Peace Studies.
Contemporary Internation the lectures will include "The Process
Topics discussed inin Hiroshima andng of Atomic Bombs
Leading to the Droppi ce-Preventive Measures and Solutions toPea
Nagasaki," "War and
Quo on the Korean
flict" and "The Status
War, Civil War and Con ." The lectures will feature comprehensive
Peninsula, and its Future al security, human rights violations anddiscussion of internationinternational
related issues.
scholars in the field of Fujiwara and
HPI invited renowned
chi
Kii
ors
fess
pro
sity
Univerpolitics, including Tokyo t lectures in June. Fujiwara delivered aduc
Akihiko Tanaka, to con urity and peace-keeping on June 2, andlecture on collective sec d "East Asian Security in the 1990s" on
Tanaka gave a lecture title
orical aspect ofJune 30.
l not only with the hist ary situation,"We would like to dea
por
tem
con
but also with theinternational relations, ng daily," Togo said.
which seems to be changi ents who have registered for the course,
Eighty of the 177 students, are thirdnded for second-year stud
which was originally inte according to the university's academicts,
and fourth-year studen
affairs department.

D I A RY

March 1-June 30, 1999
◆March 2-6◆May 10Masamichi Kamiya visits New York to prepare for the 3rd meeting of theMizumoto participates in a workshop titled "The Role of the United Nations inTokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
the 21st Century," sponsored by the Japan Association for U.N. Studies, at the◆March 13
United Nations University in Tokyo.
Kazumi Mizumoto attends the 2nd meeting of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Citizens◆May 22
Meeting to Demand the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, held in Nagasaki.
Kamiya participates in the Yomiuri International Forum, "Dealing with the North◆March 18-20
Korean Crisis-What Japan, the United States and North Korea Should Do," inKamiya participates in the 11th meeting of the U.N. Disarmament ConferenceTokyo.
in the Asia-Pacific Region in Katmandu.
◆May 27-28◆March 18-24
Mizumoto participates in a meeting of the drafting committee for the final
Nobumasa Akiyama visits New York and Washington, D.C. to conduct research
report of the Tokyo Forum in Geneva.
on the security environment in Northeast Asia.
◆June 1-5
◆March 22-23
Kamiya participates in the 5th U.N. Symposium on Northeast Asia, "Northeast
Ikuko Togo participates in a workshop, "The Role of the U.N. in the 21st
Asia Dialogue and Cooperation Beyond 2000," hosted by the U.N. Association
Century," sponsored by the Japan Association for United Nations Studies, inof Japan, in Kanazawa.
Hakone, Shizuoka Prefecture.
◆June 18-24◆March 25
Akiyama attends an international conference, "Future of the Nation State," held
Mizumoto delivers a lecture titled "The Political and Administrative System inin Strasbourg, France.
Japan" to foreign trainees at the Japan International Cooperation Agency
Visitors to HPI(JICA) at Hiroshima International Center in Higashihiroshima.
◆March 2◆April 2
Lawrence Scheinman, professor of international policy and director of theMizumoto and Kamiya visit the Japan Forum on International Relations in
Washington office of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, visits theTokyo to discuss the establishment of the Center for the Promotion ofTokyo
office of HPI.
Preventive Diplomacy.
◆May 11◆April 9-10
Mr. Tleukhan Kabdrakhmanov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Japan, and his
The 3rd meeting of the Tokyo Forum is held at Pocantico Conference Center,
wife, Nagima, visit HPI.
which belongs to the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, in New York.
◆May 26◆April 12-14
Ambassador Ove Juul Joergensen, head of the Delegation of the European
Mizumoto and Akiyama visit several research institutes in New York andCommission in Japan, visits HPI.
Washington, D.C. including the U.N. Center for Disarmament in Asia and thePacific, the Henry L. Stimson Center, the Monterey Institute of International
Studies, the National Security Council and the Armitage Associates.
The No. 1 and No. 2 issues of Vol. 1 of Hiroshima Research News mistakenly car◆May 4-9
ried an incorrect address for the Hiroshima Peace Institute Web site. The correct
Akiyama visits New York and Washington, D.C. to meet participants in aaddress is <http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/>. We apologize for the error.
workshop on North Korea, to be held in Tokyo in July.

「HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS」 Copyright 1999 HPI All rights reserved
Vol.2, No.1 July 20, 1999

●Issued by Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University●Printed by Seikosha Ltd.

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