Hiroshima Peace Institute

Memories of Hiroshima and Narratives of the Nation StateBy Akiko Naono
Hiroshima evokes various memories in the minds of people across the globe.
It is remembered by some as one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century. Suchremembrance embraces "the spirit of Hiroshima," an unwavering hope for theabolition of nuclear weapons and the realization of lasting world peace. On theother hand, Hiroshima reminds others of Japanese aggression in the Asia-Pacificduring World War II, notably the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the Nanjing
Massacre. In fact, many Americans justify the dropping of atomic bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki by saying they hastened the end of the war, saving
thousands of lives as a result. In addition, many Asians and Pacific islanders who
lived under Japanese colonial rule often say the atomic bombs liberated them fromJapanese aggression. The conflict surrounding remembrances of Hiroshima ispartly generated by the hegemony of national narratives in shaping publicmemories of the bombing. In other words, Hiroshima memories are produced
largely as narratives of the nation state, which divide the agents of remembrance
into national subjects, and in turn create antagonism among them. Given thatantagonism exists in the practice of remembrance, how can we create a more
hospitable memory of Hiroshima?
Public memory is produced in the fields of power, such as the media andpopular culture, through political, social, and cultural battles over how to remember
past events. The public memory of the atomic bombing in Japan has been produced
largely as Japanese national narratives since 1954, when a Japanese fishing boat
was exposed to radiation fallout near the Bikini Atoll, where the United States
tested a hydrogen bomb. Many Japanese saw the incident as the third tragedy
involving nuclear weapons after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Such a perception helped
nationalize memories of the atomic bombing. The most emblematic of thenationalization of atomic bomb memories is the phrase, "Japan is the only nation tohave suffered the catastrophe of an atomic bombing." These national narratives
assign the atomic bomb victims the subject-position of "the Japanese" throughremembering the bombing as a Japanese tragedy. This in turn subjugates (colonial)
memories of non-Japanese atomic bomb survivors and victims, such as Koreans, inthe making of the public memory of the bombing. Put another way, byremembering the atomic bombing as a Japanese tragedy, national narratives remember Japan's former colonial subjects, who were mobilized as "Japaneseimperial subjects" during conflicts in the Asia-Pacific, as "non-Japanese," thereby
erasing their memories from the public memory of the bombing.
Since the early 1990s, when voices interrogating Japan's war responsibility
gained much visibility in discourses on the Asia-Pacific War, the public memory of
the bombing in Japan has undergone a fundamental change. Memories of former
colonial subjects, such as Korean atomic bomb survivors, became more visible in
the field of Hiroshima memory production. A similar shift in the public memory
can be identified in the testimonies of Japanese atomic bomb survivors, who refer
not only to their victimization, but also to their role during the war as thevictimizers of those who suffered from Japanese military aggression. While thischange should be welcomed, it could also work to reinforce the hegemony of

CONTENTS

Memories of Hiroshima and Narratives of the Nation State(by Akiko Naono) ‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥１
How to Realize Pledges to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons: HPI International
Symposium on July 29, 2000‥‥２〜４
HPI Research Project on New Interventionism―Aims and Methods ‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥４〜５
The Research Project on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century―Reporting Current Nuclear Policy and Denuclearization‥‥‥‥５
Thoughts on Policy Research in Central Asia
(by Nobumasa Akiyama) ‥‥‥‥‥６
Prospects for the Role of the UN and Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century―Reflections from the UN Conference on Disarmament Issues
in Akita (by Masamichi Kamiya) ‥‥７
DIARY‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥８

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.2 November 2000

national narratives. Many Japanese intellectuals interpret the testimonies of theatomic bomb survivors as "the typical victim consciousness of the Japanese," ifthese testimonies did not refer to Japan's colonial aggression, and accuse thesurvivors of being consumed by their own victimization. This kind of interpretation
reduces the testimonies of Japanese survivors to national narratives, and in turnreinforces the hegemony of these narratives in the field of public memory
production.
While the national narratives remain hegemonic in the public memory ofHiroshima, they cannot completely subsume personal memories of the survivors.
Many testimonies written by the survivors describe how they searched for theirfamily members throughout the city in the immediate aftermath of the bombing,and how they cremated the bodies of their loved ones. The survivors mourn thedeaths of their loved ones and question why they survived while the people they
love died. These affective elements in the testimonies cannot be reduced to national
narratives, which attempt to contain memories of the bombing within the boundaryof the nation state.
Moreover, there are elements in memories of the survivors that cannot be
represented in narrative forms. Many survivors express the unspeakable nature of
their experiences: "Only those who experienced the atomic bombing canunderstand what it was like," is a typical comment. This impossibility ofrepresentation may be attributed to the traumatic nature of their experiences.
Trauma is an event that cannot be understood fully as it occurs, even to the one
who is experiencing it; in other words, trauma is an event inaccessible not only tothose on the outside looking in, but also to those who experienced it. Given thenature of trauma, the testimony of a traumatic event cannot become a complete
story, nor have narrative closure. This lack of narrative closure can be identified inmany of the testimonial accounts of the atomic bomb survivors, especially thosethat were written during the early post-war period.
In addition, there often appears a loss of signification in the narrative
representation of trauma, where there is an unbridgeable chasm between the words
that attempt to describe the event and the event itself. One of the primary examplesof this loss can be seen in the use of ordinary words to describe an extraordinary actof violence. The use of ordinary words to represent experiences related to theatomic bombing can be identified in the descriptive narratives accompanying thepictures drawn by atomic bomb survivors, which illustrate the immediate aftermathof the dropping of the atomic bomb. For example, some survivors use the phrase"lined up like sardines" to describe the countless dead and injured bodies lying
along the river; others describe the dead bodies awaiting cremation as "piled up likedaikon radishes." These gaps between the event and the words used to describe it
testify to the unrepresentability of the atomic bomb experiences, and challenge us
to imagine the realm beyond what is already understood. Yet, are we able torecognize these elements in survivors' narratives that testify to matters beyond theexisting framework of intelligibility? Or are we only listening to what theirnarratives literally convey, reducing them to intelligible narratives, such as "thespirit of Hiroshima" and "the Japanese victim consciousness," without attending towhat the loss of signification may signify?
There are those affective elements in the survivors' memories, such as theirmourning over the death of their loved ones, which are not reducible to the national
narratives of Japan. Moreover, there are those memories held by the survivors thatcannot be represented in narrative forms. Yet, survivors' memories are often
subsumed under the narratives of the nation state in the battles over the making of
the public memory surrounding Hiroshima. So long as national narratives remain
hegemonic, it is very difficult to produce a more hospitable memory of Hiroshima.
To bring this hegemony into crisis, we must produce dissonance in the national
narratives of the bombing by bringing the subjugated memories and the affective
and unspeakable elements in survivors' testimonies into the public memory ofHiroshima. This dissonance must be articulated to become a counter-hegemonic
force in the field of memory production, and ultimately produce a more hospitable
memory of Hiroshima.

−1−

Naono is a former visiting research fellow at HPI.

Visit HPI's web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

How to Realize Pledges to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons
HPI International Symposium on July 29, 2000
Following the decision at the NPT Review Conference held in New
York in April and May 2000 to commit itself to an "unequivocal
undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the totalelimination of their nuclear arsenals," the Hiroshima Peace Institute(HPI) held an international symposium to discuss ways to realize thosepledges at the International Conference Center, Hiroshima, on July 29.
The symposium looked at the prospects for a world free of nuclear
weapons, and discussed what needs to be done to accomplish thepledges made in New York. The panelists were Prof. Mitsuru Kurosawa
of the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University;
Seiichiro Noboru, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to theConference on Disarmament; Hiromichi Umebayashi, president of Peace
Depot; Rebecca Johnson, executive director of the Acronym Institute;and Cathleen S. Fisher, senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center.
The symposium was part of the Research Project on Nuclear
Disarmament in the 21st Century, launched by HPI earlier this year.
Kurosawa, the project leader, acted as moderator.
Kurosawa opened the symposium with an evaluation of the review
conference. Later, Noboru explained the main points of discussion,
details of the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish
the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and the role played at thePractical Measures Must Follow Proposals
Mitsuru Kurosawa
Of the many contentious issues discussed at the 2000
NPT Review Conference, three are particularly worthy ofnote. First, there were conflicts among the five nuclearweapon states (N-5) over the relationship between
national missile defense (NMD) and the Anti-ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty, with Russia, China and France
fiercely opposing the United States' attempts to deploy NMD. The N-5,
however, agreed in a joint statement issued at the beginning of the second
week that it was necessary to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty "as acornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions ofstrategic offensive weapons." This equivocal wording allows room for wide
interpretation, with the United States focusing on "strengthening" the treaty
and the other nuclear powers on "preserving" it.
Second, the "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states toaccomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals" was agreed. Initially,
the nuclear-weapon states asserted that they were prepared to give an
unequivocal undertaking only to achieve the "ultimate goals of a complete
elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete
disarmament," but the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and countries of the NonAligned Movement (NAM) insisted on an unequivocal undertaking toaccomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Following a compromise,a treaty on general and complete disarmament was covered by a different
paragraph, and the phrase "engage in an accelerated process of negotiations
and...take steps leading to nuclear disarmament within five years," which the
NAC had demanded, was removed from the final document. We should often
remind the nuclear-weapon states of the undertaking and take practical steps
immediately, challenging though that will be.
Third, there was little substance to "practical steps" for nuclear
disarmament in the future, because of the reluctance of nuclear-weapon states
to be innovative, and a regression in the final document from the chairman's
working paper. The positive atmosphere for nuclear disarmament was notcreated due to confrontation among the nuclear-weapon states over the NMD
and the ABM. Moreover, China was reluctant to facilitate disarmament, andopposed the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), its moratorium, increasedtransparency and de-alerting status. Russia also tried to impose a condition ofpreserving strategic stability on some of the nuclear disarmament steps.
Practical steps for nuclear disarmament can be analyzed on three different
levels. The first concerns multilateral issues. The final document includes
multilateral issues, such as the early entry into force of the CTBT, a
moratorium on nuclear tests until then, the start of FMCT negotiations at theConference on Disarmament (CD) and the establishment of a subsidiary bodyfor nuclear disarmament at the CD.
The second level concerns bilateral issues. The final document calls forthe early entry into force and full implementation of the START II, as well as
the conclusion of the START III at the earliest possible date.
The third concerns the measures among the N-5. The following six steps
toward nuclear disarmament were agreed: 1. Further efforts for the unilateral
reduction of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon states. 2. Increased

Visit HPI's web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

By Kazumi Mizumoto

conference by the Japanese government. Umebayashi said that from thepoint of view of Japanese NGOs, Japan, compared with the New Agenda
Coalition, had set its sights too low regarding nuclear disarmament
diplomacy. He argued that Japan should maintain its security treaty with
the United States, but without a dependence on the latter's nuclear
umbrella.
Johnson, who is known for her work with international NGOs,
described the conference as a great success, but warned against
overstating its positive aspects. She said practical steps needed to betaken before the next NPT Review Conference in 2005. Fisher, who hasorganized projects on the elimination of nuclear weapons at the Henry L.
Stimson Center, emphasized the obligation of the United States, thebiggest nuclear-weapon state, to overcome its misgivings and promote
the elimination of nuclear weapons. At a question-and-answer session,
members of the public quizzed Noboru about Japan's diplomatic efforts.
Prior to the symposium, all of the panelists visited the Hiroshima
Peace Memorial Museum, laid flowers at the A-bomb memorial
cenotaph, and reiterated their common goal, despite some differences of
opinion, of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Mizumoto is an associate professor at HPI.
transparency surrounding nuclear weapons capabilities and agreements on
nuclear disarmament. 3. The reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons. 4.
The reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapon systems. 5. A
diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies. 6. The involvementof all nuclear-weapon states in the process toward the elimination of nuclear
weapons.

Kurosawa is a professor at the Osaka School of International Public
Policy, Osaka University.

Japan's Efforts Helped Forge Agreement
Seiichiro Noboru
Trends in disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation
over the last couple of years have been far from favorable.
In addition, a failure by the conference to produce
practical results might cause a further deterioration ininternational relations, casting a shadow over global peaceand stability. However, the conference succeeded inapplying the brakes to that negative trend. Still, multilateral negotiations andtalks among the N-5 will require a huge effort if commitments made at theconference are to be turned into action.
The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) concentrated its efforts on realizing an"unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the totalelimination of their nuclear arsenals," removing the word "ultimate" from that
undertaking. In talks with the Japanese delegation, the ambassador of Mexico,
an NAC member, said that, given the nuances of the Spanish-language,"ultimate" could mean "never," adding that he would never agree to a
document that contained the word.
France and Russia resisted the NAC argument until the very end, and thedispute remained unsettled even after negotiations between the N-5 and the
NAC over the weekend. The Mexican ambassador stunned the conference
when he said that he regretted the deadlock between the NAC and the N-5, but
believed there was no further room for compromise. It looked as if anagreement would elude the conference.
I urged them not to give up so easily because of a diplomatic
disagreement over wording, since our decisions may affect the future of
mankind. I insisted that all those involved immediately contact their prime
ministers or foreign ministers for guidance on making concessions andreaching a compromise. The issue was resolved on the morning of May 18.
The agreement, however, is nothing more than a proclamation of the goal of
the elimination of nuclear weapons; of greater importance is how to achievethat goal.
As the only country to have been the victim of an atomic bombing, Japan
presented a practical eight-point proposal with Australia on nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation, seven of which are reflected in the final
document. Japan also helped create the consensus that led to the adoption of
the final document, mediating between different groups and bridging the gap
between nuclear-weapon states and the NAC. In addition to our roleconcerning the "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of−2−

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.2 December 2000

nuclear arsenals," we provided momentum toward consensus on the morningof the final day, when the conference was on the verge of breaking up over the
Middle East. Japan pointed out the serious implications of failure, and read out
a message from Foreign Minister Yohei Kono urging conciliation among theparticipants.
It is necessary to consider what the future holds for the campaign toeliminate nuclear weapons. First, since the signatures and ratifications of 14
more nations are necessary to achieve the entry into force of the CTBT, it isimperative that we strengthen our appeal to these nations, and establish aninternational monitoring system. Second, Japan has taken the initiative over the
past years in promoting the FMCT treaty. A few nations are very reluctant tosign up to it, but we must start negotiations as soon as possible. Third, the firstcommittee of the UN General Assembly will be held this autumn. Since themission to gain a commitment to the elimination of nuclear arsenals at the NPT
Review Conference is complete, we now need to explore a new resolution thatwould help further nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Fourth, Japan
should seize every opportunity to urge both the United States and Russia toaccelerate START negotiations, while calling on other nuclear-weapon states
to make independent efforts toward nuclear disarmament. Serious
consideration should be made of the effects NMD would have on Japan's
security.

Noboru is ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to theConference on Disarmament.

Japan's Proposals Too Modest
Hiromichi Umebayashi
In the context of the role played by Japan, theoutcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference turned
out as I had expected. Conversations with Foreign
Ministry officials before the conference gave me areliable yardstick with which to measure the Japanese
government's approach to nuclear disarmament againstthat of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC). During negotiations, I realizedthat the Japanese government opposed the skepticism of NAC toward thenuclear-weapon states, and that in this respect, it believed that the NAC's
approach was inappropriate.
When we pressed the Japanese government to vote in favor of the NAC
resolution tabled at the UN General Assembly last year, a Japanese Foreign
Ministry official argued that the NAC had failed to get through to the
nuclear-weapon states, and had been unable to follow up on the resolution.
On the other hand, he said, Japan had been able to establish lines ofcommunication with the nuclear-weapon states and to win concessions fromthem during such negotiations.
At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the Japanese government madean eight-point proposal that contained what it described as stances that could
realistically be supported by the nuclear-weapon states.
However, the final document has gone farther than at least two of theJapanese proposals. Goals that the Japanese government regarded as realistic
turned out to be too modest. Contrary to the government's belief that theNAC would fail to influence the nuclear-weapon states, negotiations
between the two parties formed the core of the final document-future steps
for nuclear disarmament. It is a cause for great joy that the conference cameup with a better final document, but a disgrace for Japan that it should havemade such proposals in the first place.
While the NAC plans to enlist the support of international public
opinion in its diplomatic efforts, Japan doggedly clings to a step-by-step
approach limited to individual negotiations primarily with the United States.
This explains why the Japanese government's target was so unambitious.
Moreover, while the NAC appeals for the elimination of nuclear weapons
for the sake of humankind, Japan subordinates this goal to its relations with
the United States. Critically, Tokyo is not even aware this is the case.
Furthermore, there has been political confusion regarding therelationship between the Japan-U.S. security framework and Japan's nuclear
elimination policy, with the result that political debate in Japan on
disarmament is being strangled by the security alliance. The Japanese
government's policy of seeking gradual decreases in the nuclear-weapon
states' stockpiles-with elimination the ultimate goal-while at the sametime stressing the importance to Japan's security of the U.S. nuclear
umbrella, is logically and morally unsound. It is necessary, therefore, tomake clear that Japan will no longer depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella byaccommodating the elimination of nuclear weapons within the Japan-U.S.
security framework as the first step, and the Japan-U.S. security framework
should eventually be replaced by a regional non-military cooperative
security system.
It is important to note the "...diminishing role for nuclear weapons insecurity policies" agreed at the NPT Review Conference. This agreement is
a commitment made by not only nuclear-weapon states, but also by all NPT
members. Japan, too, should meet its commitments in this area.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.2 December 2000

The National Defense Program Outline, which stipulates Japan's current
defense policies, contains three policies related to nuclear weapons. The firstis to "adhere to the three non-nuclear principles." Japan needs to restore
confidence in this policy by, for example, removing the suspicion that
nuclear weapons are brought into Japan. The second is to "rely on the U.S.
nuclear deterrence against the threat of nuclear weapons." It will besignificant internationally that Japan clearly confirms, as a first step, that
nuclear deterrence applies only to "the threat of nuclear arms," and not toattacks, for example by North Korea, using biological and chemical
weapons. Such extension of nuclear deterrence to threats of biological andchemical weapons contradicts moves toward a "...diminishing role fornuclear weapons in security policies." The third is to "play a positive role in
the international effort for nuclear disarmament." Japan can play a positiverole if it is able to achieve the two aims given above. I expect Diet members
to make much greater efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Umebayashi is president of Peace Depot.

Civil Society Can Play Role Toward 2005
Rebecca Johnson
The outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference
was a great success, but the gains should not be
exaggerated. The conference gives politicalunderpinning to the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion on theuse or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and provides
the non-nuclear weapon states and civil society with
better tools provided they continue to employ effective strategies andtactics. But, like Article VI for much of the 1970s and 1980s, the words
adopted in 2000 will mean nothing without political will and pressure.
The NPT parties gave consensus to the "unequivocal undertaking by
the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals," together with several practical steps in fulfillment of the
1995 pledge for systematic and progressive efforts to implement the NPT's
Article VI. However, many have pointed out that the absence of a timetable
is a weakness. Even attempts to give a target date to entry into force of the
CTBT were thwarted. The paragraph on the fissban urged the CD toconclude the treaty within five years, but that was as far as advocatesmanaged. It was clear that attempts to push for a timetable would have been
blocked by the weapon states, so the New Agenda Coalition and others did
not push it. Despite making little headway on the priority issues of CTBT
and fissban, the NPT 2000 plan of action contained some important
commitments, such as further reducing the role and operational status of
nuclear systems, addressing (with a view to withdrawing and eliminating)tactical nuclear weapons, increasing transparency, applying the principle ofirreversibility to nuclear arms control and disarmament measures, andfurther progress in disposing of fissile materials from dismantled warheads.
Such steps have been the core of civil society demands for many years,
and NGOs worked hard with governments to get the nuclear-weapon states
to agree to this more concrete programme of action. Many therefore regard
the 2000 NPT document as a five-year plan, tool and lever for us to use. We
will now be looking for ways to increase public attention and apply
political pressure regarding each item in the plan. Two aspects of the final
document are particularly noteworthy:
First, the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear weapons
provides the strongest-yet political interpretation of the Article VI
obligation, and has been accepted publicly by all the NPT weapon states.
Second, the practical steps are not linear, but mutually complementary andreinforcing. This represents the multistranded application of unilateral,bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral measures, which need to be addressedin parallel as part of the overall process of reducing the legitimacy of andreliance on nuclear weapons. Some of these issues require more research,especially on technical and verification aspects. Civil society has theresources to help, even to initiate and lead, such studies.
Of course, many NGOs would like the nuclear powers to get talks
underway, leading to a convention on the abolition of nuclear weapons. But
there is plenty of material in the adopted plan to keep the N-5 productively
occupied for the next five years while the political, technical andinternational conditions are made ready for the non-nuclear weapon states
to demand consideration of a global prohibition and elimination regime.
Politics shaped the 2000 outcome, including the ghost at thewedding-national missile defense (NMD). International and economic
relations, and particularly the fate of NMD in light of the U.S. elections,
together with changing relations among the major powers, will likely
determine how much of the ambitious plan is achieved between now and2005. Each step in the plan needs a specialized strategy for implementation
and a public campaign to create the necessary political will to make it
happen. That is the task before us.

−3−

Johnson is the executive director of the Acronym Institute.

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U.S. Must Place Trust in Multilateral Approach
Cathleen Fisher
The chances of implementing the undertakings
made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference will
depend on the outcome of three larger debates thatframe consideration of U.S. policies.
The first debate concerns the role of nuclear
weapons in national policy and in international security, and therelationship between nuclear deterrence and defense. The failure of the
U.S. Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test-ban Treaty, for example,
reflects the steadfast belief of some that the United States must retain themeans of preserving, or even enhancing, its nuclear arsenal against
future, unknown threats. And while many factors are driving the U.S.
national missile defense (NMD) program, enthusiasts of missile defenses
point to the inadequacy of deterrence to counter regional missile threats
as justification for NMD.
The problem is that NMD proponents want to deploy a system
whose benefits are uncertain at best and whose costs and risks are bothsizeable and evident. The next administration, whether Republican or
Democrat, is likely to review the current plans for NMD, but the debate
in the United States now appears to be about how and when, notwhether, to build NMD. A move by the United States to deploy NMD
unilaterally, and to withdraw from the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty,
could have profoundly negative consequences for a broad range of arms
control and disarmament efforts.
Allied nations and nongovernmental organizations who might wish
to avert the deployment of NMD must engage in the broader debate
about the role of nuclear weapons and the role of defenses in the futureinternational security environment. Any debate about the role of nuclear
weapons in national policy must include discussion of extended
deterrence. And this debate must take on the issue of missile defenses.
Difficult questions like "Is the technology ripe?" and "Are American
threat assessments accurate?" can and should be asked.
The second debate concerns the future of arms control anddisarmament in the 21st century. The question is whether the current
tools and institutions of arms control and disarmament can be effective
in a world of multiple and multiplying nuclear powers. There are manyin the United States who express great skepticism about the value ofarms control. Where arms control is not valued, however, there can belittle concern about the potential damage to the arms control edifice from
U.S. missile defense plans.
Arms control and disarmament concepts and institutions need an
overhaul. The role of the New Agenda Coalition in the recent review
conference is a promising example of the power of creative alignments
and approaches.
The third debate concerns the value of multilateral approaches tosecurity and of treaty-based constraints and international law as opposed
to unilateral action. The preponderance of American power 10 years
after the Cold War has given rise to an arrogant- and ultimately
dangerous- mind-set among many American policy makers andofficials. This attitude bespeaks a new unilateralism, a distrust anddislike of multilateral entanglements and international commitments that
may bind American power and constrain American actions. It is basedon a mistaken, but familiar, belief that nations must rely on "self-help" ifthey are to survive and protect their peoples and interests.
American policy makers and the U.S. Congress in particular need tobe reminded that unilateralism is a false alternative. The most profoundthreats to U.S. security and to the security of all nations can no longer becountered effectively through "self-help." The spread of disease,environmental degradation, ethnic conflicts that transcend artificiallydesignated national borders require-indeed demand-the cooperationof many. Nowhere is this truer than with regard to efforts to combat the
spread of nuclear weapons or to reduce the chances that these weapons
will ever be used again.

HPI Research Project on
New Interventionism-Aims and Methods
By Nobumasa Akiyama
The Hiroshima Peace Institute launched the "Research Project on
the Legitimacy and Rationality of New Interventionism," related to thethird research theme of HPI. The members of the project are listed on
page 5.
The project's objective is to conduct a multidimensional evaluationof intervention in domestic conflicts by international society, the sourceof much debate since the end of the Cold War. The examination will bebased on two notions: legitimacy and rationality. The logic used tojustify the behavior of various actors in international society in time of
conflict is to be analyzed from the point of view of moral, legal andpolitical legitimacy, as well as the rationality of policy decisions, such as
target-setting, objectives, methods, and the timing of intervention.
Although I will leave the precise definition of new interventionism
to future studies, this research project is so named to facilitate acomprehensive investigation that brings together the many actors
involved in conflict resolution.
In recent years, a more diverse collection of members ofinternational society has intervened in domestic conflicts and theirresolution in the name of humanitarianism. Such activities include not
only military intervention in the form of UN peacekeeping operations
and multinational forces, but also aid and rescue operations by NGOs
and international organizations. The media has also expanded its role toinclude agenda setting.
This type of analysis is necessary given that any intervention in
conflicts by international society cannot be properly evaluated without
focusing on the diversity of the actors themselves-who affect thecharacter, significance, development and termination of modern
conflicts-or without analyzing their characteristics and behavior.
The increasing presence of the media, for instance, greatly affects
decision making by the interveners with regard to agenda setting and theforming of notions of justice. In addition, it is necessary to clarify,
through objective and relative analyses, the impact of NGO activities,
such as helping refugees and supplying food, on the overall resolution of
conflicts and in terms of justice in international relations.
Humanitarian intervention can no longer be said to be a new issue,
but HPI's research project aims to once more assess the validity of new
interventionism by examining specific cases and comparing them withthose in the past, and to discuss the contribution Japan-through its
government and citizens-can make to conflict resolution.
Members of the research project met for the first time on July 27 todiscuss their priorities and overall direction. At the second meeting on
Sept. 8, the project leader, Toshiya Hoshino, associate professor at the
Osaka School of International Public Policy, and fellow project member
Tetsuya Yamada, research fellow at the Japan Institute of International
Affairs, made presentations on the cases of Kosovo and East Timor,
followed by a discussion. Akira Nakata, assistant manager in thedevelopment and cooperation division at the international department of
the Japan Red Cross Society, and Kenji Isezaki, a senior minister in theTransitional Authority of East Timor, were invited to the third meetingon Oct. 13. Their respective reports are titled "Rescue Operations by theInternational Red Cross in Areas of Conflict" and "The Challenges andDilemmas Facing UNTAET."
The project will release a report by the end of fiscal 2001. In
addition, the latest information on the project, including the summary of
discussions at regular meetings, will be shown on HPI's Website.

Fisher is a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center.

Visit HPI's web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm−4−

Akiyama is a research associate at HPI.
Continued on Page 5

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.2 December 2000

The Research Project on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century-Reporting Current Nuclear Policy and Denuclearization
By Kazumi Mizumoto
The Research Project on Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century
is led by Prof. Mitsuru Kurosawa of the Osaka School of International
Public Policy, Osaka University. It was set up in April 2000, and held its
third, fourth and fifth meetings on July 7, Sept. 29, and Oct. 20.
At the third meeting, Shinichi Ogawa, chief of the first research
office of the National Institute for Defense Studies, gave a presentation
titled "Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Arms Control Policies in the
United States."
In his speech, he outlined the nuclear deterrence policies of theUnited States, namely: (1) Primary deterrence based on retaliatory
capabilities, (2) The nuclear umbrella, covering NATO, Japan and South
Korea (extended deterrence), and (3) No nuclear attacks against nonnuclear states unless it is attacked by such states in alliance with or incooperation with nuclear-weapon states (conditional negative security
assurance).
Ogawa then explained the aims of Washington's proposed national
missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD) programs,
and the domestic debate surrounding their development and deployment.
He also discussed current nuclear arms control policies: (1) Nuclear
non-proliferation policies to deal with nations suspected of developing
nuclear weapons, such as North Korea and Iraq, (2) Nuclear
disarmament policy, with the advancement of the Second and Third
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START II and III) between the
United States and Russia at its core, and (3) The revision of the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
In the second presentation, Naoki Kamimura, associate professor at
the department of international studies, Hiroshima City University,
discussed "Non-nuclear Policy and Alliance-The Case Studies ofAustralia and New Zealand in the 1980s."
First, he argued that involvement in alliances as part of national
security policy restricts the promotion of non-nuclear policies, and viceversa, and touched on nuclear weapons and alliances involving theUnited States in the 1980s. He talked about the history of the antinuclear movement, which began in response to the deployment ofintermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe, and discussed thecontroversy over the loading of nuclear materials by naval vessels andtheir calls at Danish ports, and the promotion of the South Pacific
Nuclear-weapon Free Zone.
Kamimura explained the different policies of New Zealand, whichwithdrew from its nuclear alliance with the United States after thepassage of the 1987 Nuclear-free Act, and Australia, which continues torely on U.S. nuclear deterrence. Behind the differences, he said, weresuch factors as a gap in the perception of threats to the respective
countries. Based on a comparison between the stances of Australia and
New Zealand, Kamimura called on Japan to conduct a wide-ranging
national debate on the U.S.-Japan alliance and non-nuclear policies.
At the fourth meeting, Sadayoshi Takagawa, a former counselor at
the Japanese Embassy in Brazil and director general for research at theJapan Intercultural Academy of Municipalities, gave a presentation titled"Non-nuclear Policy in Brazil."
He began by outlining the strategic environment in the SouthAmerican country. Brazil is of strategic importance, he said, because it
faces the southern Atlantic Ocean, a passageway to southern Africa for
Europeans and Americans seeking rare metals, and shares borders with10 countries.

He said Brazil had all but won the struggle with Argentina forsupremacy in the region. According to Takagawa, Brazil, now a nonnuclear state, developed nuclear energy and weapons during the military
regime from 1964 to 1984, adding that it developed 20%-enricheduranium in 1988. Following the transition to a civilian government in
1985, Brazil's military power was reduced and public opinion turned
against nuclear energy after the nuclear accidents in Chernobyl in 1986
and Goia^ nia in 1987.
During the Collor administration from 1990 to 1992, Brazil began
establishing a nuclear non-proliferation regime, and accepted mutual
inspection and safeguards with Argentina through a joint declaration oncommon nuclear policy and other measures. In 1994, Brazil ratified theTreaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America(Tlatelolco Treaty). In 1998, it ratified the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test-ban Treaty (CTBT) under thecurrent administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Today, Brazil is
promoting nuclear disarmament as a member of the New Agenda
Coalition.
Takagawa said Brazil had been motivated to develop nuclear
weapons by its rivalry with Argentina and its opposition to the UnitedStates. Brazil then relinquished its nuclear weapons program, he said,
because of the handover of power from the military to a civilian
administration, the receding threat posed by Argentina and new attempts
to improve its international standing by other means.
Hirofumi Tosaki, research fellow at the Center for the Promotion of
Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Japan Institute of International
Affairs, spoke about "Nuclear Weapons Control and Non-proliferation in
the Middle East."
Tosaki said that Israel is believed to possess between 100 and 200
nuclear weapons, but continues to refuse to disclose this fact; that Iraq
possesses great quantities of uranium and a small amount of separated
plutonium, and that it is secretly developing nuclear weapons; and that
Iran is suspected of attempting to develop nuclear weapons throughimporting nuclear reactors from China. He said that Libya had also
attempted to obtain nuclear weapons, but had failed due to economic andtechnological factors.
Nuclear issues in the Middle East were the subject of discussion at
NPT review conferences in 1995 and 2000. The final document at themost recent conference contained a commitment to promote theaffiliation of non-parties, such as Israel, and to make efforts to establish
a weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
Tosaki said the goal of future nuclear weapon control and nonproliferation in the Middle East is "to abolish nuclear weapon
capabilities in Israel and to create an environment where all countries in
the region do not have to suspect each other of nuclear-related
activities." He stressed the importance of advancing the Middle East
peace process, resolving conflicts among Islamic nations in the Middle
East, abolishing biological and chemical weapons, controlling ballistic
missiles, and creating a strict verification system.
At the fifth meeting, Fumihiko Yoshida, an editorial writer at The
Asahi Shimbun, talked about nuclear strategy and defensive weapons,and Mizumoto reported on nuclear policy and non-nuclear policy inJapan.

Mizumoto is an associate professor at HPI.

Continued from Page 4

Members of the Project on New Interventionism
Toshiya Hoshino, associate professor, Osaka School of International
Public Policy, Osaka University
Yukie Osa, managing director and deputy secretary general,
Association for Aid and Relief
Kenji Kanasugi, senior assistant for policy coordination, foreign policy
bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Hideaki Shinoda, research associate at the Institute for Peace Science,
Hiroshima University

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.2 December 2000

Akiho Shibata, associate professor of international law, Okayama
University
Jun Tsubouchi, assistant professor of international relations,
Yamanashi University
Shuichi Habu, deputy international editor, international news
department, The Yomiuri Shimbun
Tetsuya Yamada, research fellow, Japan Institute of International
Affairs
Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor, Hiroshima Peace InstituteNobumasa Akiyama, research associate, Hiroshima Peace Institute−5−

Visit HPI's web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

Thoughts on Policy Research in Central Asia
By Nobumasa Akiyama

I visited Ashgabad, the capital of Turkmenistan, from Sept. 26
through Oct. 4 to attend the 6th SPF Issyk-Kul Forum. Thisconference brought together researchers and specialists ineconomics and regional studies from Central and East Asian
countries, and Russia and the United States to discuss regional
cooperation in Central Asia. The forum was sponsored by the
Sasakawa Peace Foundation and was hosted by the government of
the Republic of Turkmenistan.
I sensed a degree of self-restraint within the arguments madeby researchers from Central Asian republics, possibly as a result of
implicit pressure from their respective social and politicalcircumstances. Although I felt uneasy about exchanging opinions
under such circumstances, we were able, in the end, to conduct
some very useful discussions. Below is a summary.
The conference covered various aspects of regional
cooperation, including the relationship between states and Islamicgroups, and development strategy. Relations between Central
Asian states are troubled due to the dispersion of various ethnic
groups across national borders. Ethnic-minority opposition groups
are sometimes supported by members of the same minority living
in a different country, and neighboring countries are involved inborder disputes. Rivalry also exists over regional leadership.
Although confidence among states is a prerequisite for effective
regional cooperation, there have been few opportunities for thosestates to build that confidence. The lack of confidence was also
evident in discussions among researchers, who tended toemphasize the political ramifications of any statements made.
It seems that even local researchers are unable to obtainaccurate information with which to analyze the current situation inCentral Asia. They mistrust government statistics, and thearguments about political groups, such as Islamic anti-governmentorganizations, rely, to some extent, on rumor, hearsay and news
articles based on similarly spurious sources. As a result, a great
deal of time and energy was spent at the conference defining suchterms as Islamic fundamentalism and anti-governmentorganizations. It should be noted, however, that the discussion ofterminology is part of the political game of legitimization that isinevitable when confrontation between various political groups indifferent countries is involved.
During a discussion on the establishment of a stable politicalsystem, a local researcher brought up the establishment of civilsociety, a relatively novel concept in the region. Although I agreed
with the thrust of her argument, I have my doubts about the
propriety of such an idealistic notion in a region where nationwide
governance is weak, and the reconciling of Islamic tradition andsecular democratic principles elusive. A more fundamental
problem in the region, it seems, is the absence of a just social
system that secures democratic rights and prevents social exclusion
and injustice, such as corruption among officials and anunderground economy ruled by gangsters. Under thosecircumstances, "democratic" elections alone are insufficient toaddress popular grievances. Theoretically, the priority must be tostep up efforts to implement a fair system of governance for thewhole of each state. In reality, that will be extremely difficult.
A researcher from Turkmenistan told me privately that while
he was angered by the high levels of corruption in his country andVisit HPI's web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

others in the region, the situation was somewhat different to thatseen in former Soviet states. Soon after independence, he told me,
the Turkmenistan government had eliminated the mafia, former
rulers of the black-market economy. That explains, I suppose, thepopularity of Turkmenistan President Nyazov, even though his
dictatorial rule led foreign observers to describe the country as the"North Korea of Central Asia." Nyazov's people appear to believe
he is trying to clean up the country's political and social systems in
the name of stability, and applaud his somewhat reckless policy of
allocating 60 percent of income derived from sales of natural gas
to public investment (according to the Central Bank ofTurkmenistan).
Local researchers and policy makers are irritated by calls forthe application of Western theories of market economics todevelop Central Asia, citing the gap between Western economic
theory and the realities of the region's economy. They often voicedissatisfaction with economic reforms based on the structuraladjustment policy insisted on by the World Bank and theInternational Monetary Fund. They referred to Kyrgyzstan, once
considered the ideal student of participation in the global economy
and a member of the World Trade Organization, which finds itself
in the midst of an economic crisis despite faithfully implementing
economic reforms.
The gap has also widened in terms of economic cooperation
between the West and Central Asia. A banking consultant from theEuropean Commission whom I met on the flight to Turkmenistancomplained about that country's attitude toward the training ofbankers. "They tend to pick up on those aspects of the overall
theory that justify their behavior. They are not sincere about
learning, and they do not care about unfair (banking) systems," hesaid. Sources at the Turkmenistan Central Bank, meanwhile,
criticized the European program for failing to provide badly
needed knowledge and expertise.
Nevertheless, Central Asian researchers see European
integration as a model for regional economic cooperation. Given
the high profile of European economic integration, it isunderstandable that Central Asian specialists wish to discuss theEuropean experience. However, I believe they are grasping at
quick-fix solution to their problems, and are too readily
overlooking the incompatibility of Western theories with Central
Asian realities.
Some in Central Asia argue that the region has lessons to learn
from China, which has begun introducing market principles while
retaining its socialist autocracy. But another possible role model
exists for Central Asia in the form of countries in Northeast Asiaand members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN), most of which have achieved democratization andeconomic development via means other than World Bank andIMF-led reform, or socialism. In addition, Japan, South Korea,
Singapore, Malaysia and other Asian countries may be more
willing to initiate opportunities for intellectual exchange, thereby
contributing to the further development of Central Asia.

−6−

Akiyama is a research associate at HPI.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.2 December 2000

Prospects for the Role of the UN and Nuclear
Disarmament in the 21st Century−Reflections from the UN Conference on Disarmament Issues in Akita

By Masamichi Kamiya
The United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues washeld in Akita City, Japan from Aug. 22 to 25, 2000. The
disarmament conference, marking its 12th year, is held annually inJapan. This year's event was sponsored by the UN Department for
Disarmament Affairs and the UN Regional Centre for Peace andDisarmament in Asia and the Pacific. It was supported by theJapanese Foreign Ministry and the Akita municipal government.
The timing of this year's conference was particularly
significant. First, it was the last disarmament conference to be heldin Japan this century. It took place prior to the UN Millennium
Summit, and just after the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Lastly, it
was held in Akita, a city devastated by some 12,000 bombs from
more than 130 aircraft from the night of Aug. 14 through the earlyhours of Aug. 15, 1945-the final raid of World War II.
The conference was titled "Disarmament and the United
Nations in the 21st Century: Strategy and Action." It was divided
into five sub-themes: "Strategies for Peace and Security"; "NewApproaches to Peace and Security in Northeast Asia"; "Eliminating
Nuclear Dangers"; "Conventional Weapons"; and "Concluding
Session."The four days of discussions focused upon such issues as therole of the United Nations, regional approaches in the Asia-Pacific,
the outcome of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and the peaceful uses ofnuclear energy, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, andsmall arms.
This article will examine the role of the United Nations, andoffer an analysis of the NPT Review Conference, recent
developments on the Korean Peninsula and the national missile
defense (NMD) program, all of which attracted comments at theconference.
Regarding the role of the United Nations in the 21st century,
Yasushi Akashi, former UN Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs and former president of the Hiroshima Peace
Institute, made several points. First, he said the United Nations
should strive to both shape and represent international public
opinion. Second, that it should coordinate international trade,investment and political affairs. Third, he said it must do more to
codify norms of international behavior, and fourth, it must step up
its activities in the field.
Regarding the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Tariq Rauf ofthe Monterey Institute in the United States struck a pessimistic
note, saying he did not believe that the nuclear-weapon states werehonest enough to proceed with nuclear disarmament, despite
having made an unequivocal undertaking to its realization in a final
document adopted by the review conference. His assessment may
be right in light of the failure of the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva to agree "a programme of work" at its closing session on
Sept. 14 this year.
On recent developments on the Korean Peninsula, Seo Hang
Lee, a professor at the South Korean Foreign Affairs and Trade
Ministry's Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, said
the unprecedented inter-Korean summit meeting between South
Korean President Kim Dae Jung and North Korean leader Kim
Jong Il had "opened a new chapter in inter-Korean relations basedon reconciliation and cooperation." However, others said it was too

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.2 December 2000

early to tell whether the apparent rapprochement between the two
Koreas was genuine, since the leaders' joint statement had made no
specific mention of bilateral security issues.
NMD prompted several interesting exchanges. Many
participants were strongly critical of the program, believing it
would upset the momentum for nuclear disarmament. China andRussia were particularly antagonistic toward NMD. Benjamin Selfof the Henry L. Stimson Center in the United States said, withsome provocation, that if NMD could help the United Statesrecognize the disutility of nuclear weapons and lead it to begin
unilateral disarmament, then the program might indeed assist thegoal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Self argued that since
Washington is thinking about how and when NMD is deployed,
not whether it is developed, the international community has noalternative but to use NMD to promote nuclear disarmament.
The conference dealt with other issues concerning nuclear
weapons and small arms. In a message quoted in the conference
program, Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono stated: "The UN
Disarmament Conference...has made great contributions to theactivation of discussion about disarmament, and it has obtained
high evaluation as a forum for deepening national understandingon these issues."
It is difficult to gauge just how useful this series of Japanbased annual conferences have been. But it can be said that the lasttwelve conferences have resulted in some advances in international
disarmament efforts. Specific proposals made at previous
conferences, such as a proposal to formulate the UN Register ofConventional Arms at the Kyoto conference in 1991, andinitiatives to curbing the proliferation of small arms at theNagasaki conference in 1995, illustrate this. In the same years
those proposals were made, the UN General Assembly exploredthem and drew up specific measures.
Lastly, conferences of this kind have a profound impact on
civil society. On the afternoon of the second day, six conference
representatives joined 77 students from all 23 junior high schools
in Akita city to discuss peace and disarmament. The
representatives sat on the stage, while the students sat around thetable originally reserved for the conference participants. It was thefirst time this type of meeting had been held at the conferences.
During a question-and-answer session, the students raised honest
and candid questions, demonstrating their concern for the issue ofpeace. They were peace messengers in the truest sense.
The involvement of local children reflected Akita'scommitment to peace activities at the municipal level. At the sametime, the program offered a lesson for other cities in Japan,
including Hiroshima, in how to raise awareness of peace anddisarmament among young people.

−7−

Kamiya is a visiting research fellow at HPI.

Correction
The surname of the associate professor at Hiroshima City University
mentioned in "Members of the project" (Page 5, Vol.3 No.1 July 2000) shouldhave read Naoki Kamimura. We regret the error.
EditorVisit HPI's web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

June 1, 2000 - October 31, 2000
◆June 3
Ikuko Togo gives a presentation, "Struggling Between Universalism and Relativism−What U.S.
Human Rights Diplomacy is Asking For," at a session titled "Sovereignty and Human Rights," at thesemiannual conference of the Peace Studies Associations of Japan, at Daito Bunka University.
◆June 7-9
Masamichi Kamiya attends the Sixth United Nations Symposium on Northeast Asia in
Kanazawa, "Further Promotion of the Kanazawa Process into the 21st Century," at Kanazawa Bunka
Hall, Japan, organized by the United Nations Association of Japan.
◆June 9-10
Kamiya attends an international symposium, "The Role of NGOs in Conflict Prevention," at the
Takanawa Prince Hotel in Tokyo, organized by the Japan Institute of International Affairs.
◆June 15
Kamiya attends the second Board of Directors Meeting of the Japan Center for Preventive
Diplomacy at the International House of Japan in Tokyo.
◆June 20-21
Kazumi Mizumoto attends a study group meeting, "Exploring Japan's proactive peace andsecurity strategies: the case of the nuclear umbrella," organized by the National Institute for Research
Advancement (NIRA) in Tokyo.
◆June 24
Mizumoto attends a workshop of the Hiroshima research group on developing countries at
Hiroshima University. The event featured a lecture on the social and economic thought of Mahatma
Gandhi by Kazuya Ishii, associate professor at Kagawa University.
◆June 27
Akiyama attends a workshop on Caucasus sponsored by and held at the Research Institute for
Peace and Security (RIPS).
◆June 28
Mizumoto attends a workshop held at and organized by the Tokyo Foundation. The workshop
featured a lecture on the forward presence of U.S. armed forces and the Japan-U.S. military alliance by
Akihisa Nagashima, a researcher at the Tokyo Foundation.
◆June 30
Mizumoto delivers a lecture, "The present situation and the problems of peace research," held atand organized by the Hiroshima Prefectural Nursing Association.
◆July 2-6
Akiyama acts as coordinator at the 14th Transcultural Seminar of the Association forCommunication of Transcultural Study in Miyagi.
◆July 3Mizumoto attends the 131st workshop of the Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University.
The workshop featured a lecture on war responsibility in the postwar period in Finland by Prof. Hiroshi
Momose of Hiroshima City University.
◆July 4-8
Kamiya takes part in a fact-finding mission to Cambodia on the issue of small arms and light
weapons, organized by the Japanese government.
◆July 7
HPI's Disarmament in the 21st Century project team hold their third meeting.
◆July 12
Kamiya meets with foreign trainees from India and Pakistan belonging to the 2000 Hiroshima
International Cooperation Program at the HPI.
◆July 14
Mizumoto attends a study group meeting, "Exploring Japan's proactive peace and security
strategies: the case of the nuclear umbrella," organized by NIRA in Tokyo.
◆July 17-19
Kamiya acts as an advisor at an open-ended and informal consultation regarding small arms at
the United Nations in New York.
◆July 18
Akiyama attends the 2nd symposium on Central Asia, sponsored by the Central Asia ResearchInstitute, and held at the Japan National Press Club.
◆July 26
Mizumoto attends the annual general meeting of a research group on reference material at theHiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
◆July 27
HPI's Legitimacy and Rationality of New-Interventionism project team hold their first meeting.
◆July 29
HPI sponsors an international symposium on nuclear disarmament in the 21st century.
◆July 30
Akiyama participates in a workshop organized by the Strategic Studies Fellowship Program,sponsored by and held at RIPS.
◆July 31
Mizumoto attends the "23rd Forum on New Thinking on Security Issues," held at and organizedby the Tokyo Foundation. The forum featured a lecture on the U.S.-Japan military alliance in the 21st
century by Kurt Campbell, senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
◆Aug. 4
Mizumoto and Kamiya attends an international symposium, "Expanding the Nuclear-freeUmbrella," held at the Hiroshima International Conference Center, organized by The Asahi Shimbun,
the Hiroshima municipal government and Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation.
◆Aug. 5
Mizumoto reports on the latest developments in nuclear elimination at the Co-op Rainbow
Gathering for Peace in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, held at Hiroshima YMCA Hall, organized by theJapanese Consumers' Co-operative Union.
◆Aug. 18
Mizumoto attends a study group meeting, "Exploring Japan's proactive peace and security

strategies: the case of the nuclear umbrella," organized by NIRA, in Tokyo. The meeting featured areport on assistance in dismantling Russian nuclear arsenals by Toshio Sano, director of the arms
control and disarmament division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
◆Aug. 19
Akiyama acts as a coordinator at Peace Forum 2000, organized by the Hiroshima Junior
Chamber.
◆Aug. 19-28
Akiyama visits Washington, D.C., to conduct research into the Agreement for Civil Uses ofAtomic Energy between the Japanese and United States governments.
◆Aug. 22-25
Kamiya attends the UN Conference on Disarmament Issues in Akita, held at the Akita Castle
Hotel, organized by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs.
◆Aug. 28-29
Mizumoto and Akiyama attend an international workshop on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation at Takanawa Prince Hotel in Tokyo, organized by the Center for the Promotion of
Disarmament and Non-proliferation, and the Japan Institute of International Affairs.
◆Aug. 29
Kamiya delivers a lecture on peace education to teachers and staff at Ozuka Elementary Schoolin Hiroshima.
◆Sept. 2
Mizumoto delivers a lecture, "Peace in the 21st century-The principal of the Constitution ofJapan and the experience of Hiroshima," at a meeting of the Hiroshima Branch of the Japan Congressof Journalists, held at the Hiroshima International Conference Center.
◆Sept. 7
Akiyama delivers a lecture, "Politics and Administration of Japan," at a general orientation forparticipants in a training program operated by the Japan International Cooperation Agency.
◆Sept. 8
HPI's Legitimacy and Rationality of New-Interventionism project team hold their second
meeting.
◆Sept. 26-Oct. 4
Akiyama visits Ashgabat in Turkmenistan to present a report, "Social Foundations for National
Reconciliation in Tajikistan: Lessons from East Asian Experiences," at the 6th SPF Issyl-Kul Forum,sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.
◆Sept. 29
HPI's Disarmament in the 21st Century project team hold their fourth meeting.
◆Oct. 3Mizumoto attends an international symposium, "Security and nuclear weapons in northeast
Asia," at Kosai Kaikan, organized by the Strategic Peace and International Affairs Research Institute at
Tokai University.
◆Oct. 5-15
Kamiya visits the UN headquarters in New York to attend an open-ended and informal
consultation regarding small arms.
◆Oct. 6
Mizumoto attends a study group meeting, "Exploring Japan's proactive peace and security
strategies: the case of the nuclear umbrella," organized by NIRA, in Tokyo.
◆Oct. 7
Togo gives a presentation, "Democracy and Women's Human Rights," at the session "Genderand Politics," organized by the Japanese Political Science Association, at Nagoya University.
◆Oct. 10
Mizumoto and Akiyama give keynote speeches at a workshop on Hiroshima and Japan's nuclear
policy, attended by UN disarmament fellows at HPCF.
◆Oct. 13
HPI's Legitimacy and Rationality of New-Interventionism project team hold their third meeting.
◆Oct. 20
HPI's Disarmament in the 21st Century project team hold their fifth meeting.
◆Oct. 28
Mizumoto delivers a presentation, "Nuclear and Peace: The Viewpoint of Hiroshima andInternational Politics," at a workshop organized by the Hiroshima research group on developing
countries, at Hiroshima University.
-Visitors to HPI◆July. 20
Dr. Kimberly M. Zisk, visiting research fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies inTokyo and associate professor at Columbia University, New York
◆Aug. 2
Niu Qiang, deputy secretary general, and other members of the Chinese People's Association for
Peace and Disarmament◆Aug. 7
Dr. Marcos Antonio dos Santos Reigota, professor at the University of Sorocaba in Brazil◆Aug. 10
Dr. Gerrit W. Gong, director of the Asia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS) in Washington, D.C., and Ms. Taeko Teramae, an A-bomb witness◆Sep. 26
Max Kwak, director of Kansai American Center, and Yasuo Satake, media specialist at the U.S.
Consulate General◆Oct. 5
Members of the broadcasting club of Hiroshima Kokutaiji High School◆Oct.11
Misa Fukunaga, former field officer at the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) officein Oekussi, East TimorHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS
●Issued by Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University
Hiroshima Mitsui Bldg. 12 th Floor 2-7-10 Otemachi, Naka-ku, Hiroshima 730-0051 JAPAN●Printed by Sanko Ltd.

Visit HPI's web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm−8−Vol.3, No2 December 6, 2000
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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.2 December 2000