Vol.22 No.2 March 2020

International Symposium:“Towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons and Crimes Against Humanity”
Tetsuo Sato
On Sunday, December 15, 2019, the Hiroshima Peace Institute held an international symposium titled “Towards a World Without Nuclear
Weapons and Crimes Against Humanity” together with the Chugoku Shimbun and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition,
Nagasaki University, with support from Hiroshima City and the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation. About 280 people attended thesymposium.
Following the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) in 2017, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in 2018
to Ms. Nadia Murad, an Iraqi Yazidi, and Mr. Denis Mukwege, a doctor in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, both of whom haveappealed for the elimination of crimes against humanity. This fact indicates growing international interest in the serious infringement of
human rights, including nuclear damage. As exemplified by the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and thefoundation and subsequent activities of the International Criminal Court (ICC), this growth in interest is also proven by recent progress inthe establishment and enhancement of legal systems for regulating or abolishing nuclear weapons as the means of ultimate violence, andcrimes against humanity. This symposium focused on identifying challenges to be solved and considered actions to be taken by civil society
through examining the international community’s past and current efforts to eliminate serious infringements of human rights—including
crimes against humanity—through the implementation of mechanisms based in the ICC. Below are summaries of the speeches, reports andpanelist’s comments presented in the symposium.
Keynote Speech“Breaking Vicious Cycles of Violence: The Mission and Role of the International Criminal Court (ICC)＂
Kuniko Ozaki (Former Judge of the International Criminal Court)
While the International Court of Justice (ICJ) judges
international disputes, the ICC, founded in 2002, is a courtthat pursues individual criminal responsibility on the basis ofinternational law.
The ICC can prosecute individuals (but not States ororganizations) for four kinds of crimes: genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression. The ICC exercises
its jurisdiction over these kinds of crimes that were committed
on the territory of a State Party, or committed by a national of aState Party in July 2002 or later. However, if the United Nations
Security Council refers cases to the ICC based on its authorization,
crimes committed on the territory of, or by a national of a nonState Party will be subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction. In conformity
with the doctrine of subsidiarity, the ICC exercises its jurisdiction
only if States relevant to the crimes have neither the ability nor
intention to investigate and prosecute the suspects.
A major problem faced by the ICC is that it has no
authority to carry out compulsory investigations and needs
cooperation from relevant States in arresting suspects andcollecting evidence. While the ICC currently has 122 States

Parties, which account for about two-thirds of the UN Member
States, the ICC faces difficult challenges in terms of universality.
The U.S., Russia, China, and many major Asian States have
not joined the ICC States Parties. Since Asia has many areas
prone to conflict, the serious infringement of human rights, or
crimes against humanity, the fact that such areas are not subject
to the ICC’s jurisdiction proves the ICC’s lack of universality
and effectiveness in the true sense of the word. Moreover,States Parties can withdraw from the ICC, as Burundi and thePhilippines recently did.
The ICC Judicial Divisions have so far examined 27 cases,
including four cases with final judgments of “guilty” and one
case with a final judgment of “not guilty” in the appellate court.
The ICC has been strongly criticized for its unsatisfactory
achievements compared with the length of time and costs
required since its founding. Japan joined the ICC in 2007 andcurrently contributes the largest share of expenses (about 16%).
Although Japanese judges have been continually appointed, theICC has only 13 Japanese staff members, which is an extremely
low figure.

Contents

International Symposium
Tetsuo Sato ………………………… 1-3
International Workshop 2019
Gen Kikkawa ………………………… 3
From Climate Change to Climate Emergency
Tadashi Okimura ………………… 4-5
Public Lecture Series FY 2019
Makiko Takemoto …………………… 5
South Korean A-bomb Victims’ Movement
Yuko Takahashi …………………… 6-7
Current Situation of the Crimea Issue and Pursuit of “Peace”
Takumi Kosugi ……………………… 7
Diary ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 8

Visit HPI’s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace_e/1Special Speech“Inhumanity and the Regulation of Nuclear Weapons”
Takashi Hiraoka (Former Mayor of Hiroshima City)

Despite the inhumanity of nuclear weapons, the U.S. has insistedon the legitimacy of its use of atomic bombs until today. In postWWII international politics, a nuclear armaments race based on
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence was started, and the road to theabolition of nuclear weapons has long been extremely rugged.
In his judicial decision on the world’s first lawsuit case filed
over the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons (the Shimoda
case in 1963), Chief Justice Toshimasa Koseki judged that theatomic bomb attacks violated international law. The plaintiff—
Ryuichi Shimoda—lost the case, but the trial was significant as astarting point for the renewed public recognition of the necessityof legal assessment.
In 1994, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to
ask the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to render its advisory
opinion on the question: “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons
in any circumstance permitted under international law?” As thethen Hiroshima City Mayor, I emphasized the necessity of aninternational treaty banning nuclear weapons, but the Japanese

government simply continued to claim that what the mayors ofHiroshima and Nagasaki said “differed from the position of theJapanese government.” In 1996, the ICJ decided that “the threator use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to therules of international law,” but the decision continues, “the Courtcannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstanceof self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would beat stake.” Since the ICJ decision thus did not clearly indicate thenecessity of banning nuclear weapons, the possibility of legallyjustifying the use of nuclear weapons has remained.
In 2017, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
was adopted. This treaty’s legal provisions against the inhumanityof nuclear weapons and deterrence, which label them as “evil,”demonstrate considerable progress. Nevertheless, the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the U.S. and Russia
expired in 2019, heralding a new nuclear armaments race.

Expert Reports“The Use of Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Does It Constitute a
Crime Against Humanity / War Crime in All Circumstances?”
Akira Mayama (Professor, Graduate School of International Public Policy, Osaka University)
Customary law does not prohibit States from “possessing”
nuclear weapons. According to the concept of belligerent
reprisal, to hinder an enemy’s illegal act, every State is allowed
to commit an illegal act if there is no other means, and such an
act is not generally prohibited by international humanitarian law.
This means that nuclear weapons may be used legally in somesituations, and this principle offers the legal foundation for thedoctrine of nuclear deterrence.
International humanitarian law does not treat collateral
damage itself as illegal until it has indiscriminate effects. The
use of weapons that will have indiscriminate effects without
exception if used is prohibited, so treaties and customary law
prohibit the use of chemical or biological weapons. However,there are conflicting arguments on whether the very use of
nuclear weapons is prohibited by customary law.
The use of weapons that are of nature to cause combatants
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is also prohibited,

so the prohibition of use of chemical or biological weapons has
been established in terms of both treaties and customary law. The
argument that nuclear weapons can be classified as “weapons thatare of nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering”
especially in consideration of injuries and suffering that can becaused to combatants by thermic rays and radiation emitted bythem seems to me tenable, so I believe that this argument can beused to lead to the prohibition of nuclear weapons themselves.
Then, how about individual responsibility for the use of
nuclear weapons? Because the existence of indiscriminate effects,
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering makes the use of
weapons a war crime, regardless of the types of weapons, aconsiderable portion of use of nuclear weapons can be substantiallyviewed as war crimes. Crimes against humanity denote massacres
or mass oppression of people beyond groups of limited members, so
this concept may also help ensure that the use of nuclear weapons
in non-international armed conflict will be punished.

“Protecting the Dignity of Life: How the United Nations Addresses Crimes
Against Humanity?”
Yasue Mochizuki (Professor, School of Law and Politics, Kwansei Gakuin University)
Crimes against humanity are atrocities against the entire
human race, so various declarations and treaties on suchcrimes have been formulated since WWII ended. The outcome
document adopted at the 2005 World Summit counts crimes
against humanity among serious crimes that the international
community must address. States are no longer allowed to neglectsuch criminal acts within their territories on the basis of State
sovereignty, so the international community is expected to takeevery possible action to address them, including enforcement
measures.
While addressing crimes against humanity requires
measures to be taken before and during their occurrence andagainst the criminals, the aims of post-conflict measures are toprevent the recurrence of conflict and construct a new society
where peace can be maintained. An important challenge in such
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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.22 No.2, March 2020

a case is how to address past crimes against humanity. In pursuitof “transitional justice” in a period when a regime is replacedby another regime, people have identified what the perpetratorsof severe crimes, including crimes against humanity, did andcreated and published reports on who had been victimized andby whom in order to identify crimes against humanity, blame theperpetrators, and officially recognize the victims.
The International Commissions of Inquiry and the UN
Human Rights Council Mechanisms, both of which were
established by the UN Human Rights Council, not only carry out
inquiries and disclose their results but also encourage efforts toprevent criminal acts. The Mechanisms’ collection and storageof information also constitute preparations for lawsuits against
and punishment of perpetrators, and function to support trials
that will be held at the ICC in the future.

“Preventing Armed Conflict and Crimes Against Humanity: Lessons fromField Practices and Actions to Be Taken”
Rumiko Seya (Director, Japan Center for Conflict Prevention [JCCP])
During the 74 years from 1945, when WWII ended, to today,
Japan has not been directly involved in war and has maintained
peace. However, the world has experienced a total of about 550
cases of conflict during the same period. Many of these cases
are characterized by repetition in the same State or region. When
conflict occurs in a State or region, the State or region becomesthe focus of worldwide attention. However, when conflictoccurs in another State or region, the former State or region isquickly forgotten. Many such States or regions in the processof reconstruction can experience another case of conflict andconsequent violence in the form of crimes against humanity.
While the reported number of conflict casualties over the past 71
years amount to at least 12 million, the actual figure is likely to
be 10 times larger than the reported figure. We aim to be as close
to people suffering conflict as possible to relieve their sufferingand make their voices heard by people around the world. Half ofconflict victims and refugees are children.

The activities of the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention(JCCP) include activities for preventing and settling conflicts(training conflict mediators; building a system for preventing
conflict in the early stage; preventing young people fromcommitting extremist violence or terrorist attacks), protecting
victims and helping them become self-reliant (offering businesstraining; fostering entrepreneurs; providing psychologicalcare for victims; giving refugees legal advice and information
about protection), facilitating harmonious coexistence between
conflicting groups (building peaceful and inclusive multinational
communities; raising public awareness of violence and conflict
prevention in cooperation with local communities). In addition,
we are often engaged in human resource development andcapacity building in conflict areas to ensure that victims andperpetrators will be able to play a leading role in solving
problems. Specifically, we operate in South Sudan, Turkey,
Kenya, Syria, and Somalia.

In the panel discussion, Mr. Fumihiko Yoshida, Director of the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University,and Mr. Tomomitsu Miyazaki, Chief Editorial Writer for the Chugoku Shimbun, posed questions, and the moderator (Tetsuo Sato) sharedquestions from the audience. Then, the speakers answered these questions. Comments given during the panel discussion included: “TheICC identifies and punishes leaders or agitators who are responsible for crimes to make changes in the structure of a chain of violence
between groups and contribute to settlements in post-conflict society,” “The UN General Assembly can play a role in confirming theopinion of the international community even if the Security Council cannot function;” “Fostering young people who have the intention
or aspiration to serve as role models for children or other areas in conflict prevention training will lead to regional peace,” and “Japan’s
reliance on the U.S.’s nuclear umbrella is contradictory to its membership of the ICC and Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions in 1977,
which includes provisions that prohibit belligerent reprisals. Moreover, five junior writers of the Chugoku Shimbun gave “Messages from
Hiroshima Youth,” which included an introduction to their activities and proposals on new initiatives. I would like to take this opportunity
to extend my deep gratitude to the speakers and audience.
(Professor at HPI)International Workshop 2019:
East Asian Crisis and the Future of the Japan-South Korea
Relationship"
On November 16, 2019, the International Workshop 2019:“East Asian Crisis and the Future of the Japan-South Korea
Relationship” was held at Hiroshima City Bunka Koryu
Kaikan. Amid the progressive deterioration of international
relations in East Asia, North Korean nuclear development inparticular has further exacerbated international tensions in thisregion. To make matters worse, East Asia has neither a regionalorganization aimed at peacebuilding nor a common security
organization. What will happen to the future of fragile East
Asian peace, which has been maintained based on a balance ofpower? The workshop aimed to explore the structure of the East
Asian crisis in international relations and consider common
challenges in the region and solutions to them.
[Part 1] (closed) The common theme of Part 1 was the“Road to Institutionalization of Permanent Peace in East Asia.”
Jin Chang Soo, Senior Researcher at the Sejong Institute,delivered a report titled “South Korea-Japan Relationship andEast Asian Cooperation,” and Tadashi Okimura, Professor
at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, reported on the “Current
Condition of Non-military Security Cooperation andChallenges Therein.” In addition, Gen Kikkawa, Specially
Appointed Professor at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, reported
on the likelihood of the establishment of an East Asianequivalent to the Commission on Security and Cooperationin Europe (CSCE) under the title “Reconsidering the CSCE.”
Although all participants agreed on the importance of
establishing a multinational security cooperation system, they
did not reach an agreement on effective measures to achieve it.
[Part 2] At the public workshop held in the afternoon of

Gen Kikkawa
the same day as Part 1, three experts on Japan-South Korean
relations delivered reports on the common theme “Crisis in theJapan-South Korea Relationship.” After Jin Chang Soo gave areport titled “Memories of History and the South Korea-Japan
Relationship,” Nam Ki Jeong, Professor at Seoul National
University, and Kan Kimura, Professor at Kobe University,
delivered reports on the same theme the “Current Condition of
the Japan-South Korea Relationship and the Challenges Ahead”
from their own perspectives. Lee Jong Won, Professor at Waseda
University and a specialist in East Asian international relations,discussed with Jin Chang Soo the causes of disputes between
Japan and South Korea while focusing on the differences in thepositions of the Japanese and Korean governments.
[Part 3] Part 3, which was also open to the public, wasdevoted to the common theme “Current Condition of theSanctions Against North Korea and the Challenges Ahead.”
Satoru Miyamoto, Professor at Seigakuin University, reported
on the “Current Condition of the UN Policy on North Korea
and the Challenges Ahead,” and Hyun Jin Son, Associate
Professor at the Hiroshima Peace Institute delivered a report
titled “Current Condition of the Sanctions Imposed by
Japan, the U.S., and South Korea Against North Korea andthe Challenges Ahead.” Finally, Masakatsu Ota, senior staff
writer of Kyodo News, reported on “North Korean Nuclear
Development and the Future of U.S.-North Korea Summits.”
The participants in the afternoon sessions sat for a panel
discussion, and Ryo Oshiba, Director of the Hiroshima Peace
Institute, concluded the workshop by giving summary comments.
(Specially Appointed Professor at HPI)

Visit HPI’s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace_e/3From Climate Change to Climate Emergency:
Forefront of Global Environmental Action
Tadashi Okimura
The issue often called “chikyu-ondanka” (global warming)in Japanese, viewed as a typical global environmental issue,
is generally called “climate change” internationally. In fact,
Assessment Reports compiled since 1990 by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the 2007 Nobel Peace Prizelaureate, have consistently used the term “climate change” in theirtitles. While the often-used “chikyu-ondanka” implies that the earth
is warming gradually, I suppose that “climate change” may remind
many people of the recent cases of extreme weather. At the venueof the 25th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 25) to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC), held in December 2019, further steps were taken toemphasize the terms “climate crisis” and “climate emergency”
instead of “climate change.” The two photos below show
advertisements posted along a passage from the subway station
nearest to the COP 25 venue. These advertisements pointed out thatthe situation we are now seeing arise should no longer be describedby the term “climate change” but instead be called “climate

Photo 1: “Don't call it change, call it climate emergency”(taken by the author)

Photo 2: “17.2 million people leaving their homes becauseof climate disasters is not a change.” (taken by
the author)

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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.22 No.2, March 2020

emergency” and urged many citizens, including conference
attendees, to take urgent action to solve the issue.
What will result from further rises in temperature and climatechange? A familiar example may be the increased frequency of
extreme weather, such as changes in rainfall patterns as recently
observed in Japan. Other examples include heat waves andincreased dryness due to temperature increases, and the adverse
impacts on the living environment, vegetation, agriculture, etc. ofchanges in rainfall patterns, such as heavy downpours, floods, anddroughts. There has been growing concern that these can force
people in developing countries, which lack the ability to adapt
to these adverse impacts compared with developed countries,
to leave their homes as climate migrants or cause conflict overwater resources and fertile soil resources. I believe that people
in Hiroshima, who experienced successive torrential downpoursin western Japan in 2018, can easily understand that the adverse
impacts of climate change will also incur very high social costs indeveloped countries. As seen in the successive typhoons that struckeastern Japan in 2019 and news coverage of severe forest fires thathave affected Australia since September 2019, it can be said that
we are more frequently finding ourselves in situations that can be
described as a climate emergency.
The Paris Agreement adopted in 2015 stipulates holding theincrease in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. The Special Reporton Global Warming of 1.5°C, published by the IPCC in 2018,
asserts that robust differences are expected if global warming
reaches 1.5°C versus 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and that
limiting global warming to 1.5°C will be safer than 2°C. However,the UN Environmental Programme’s latest report (Emissions Gap
Report 2019) finds that global temperatures have already increasedby 1.1°C above pre-industrial levels, and that, if all unconditional
Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement
are fully implemented, there is a 66% chance that the warming
will be limited to 3.2°C by the end of the century. It is projected,
regrettably, that we will continue to suffer the adverse impacts ofclimate change, and that our living environment will not remain thesame as today but will deteriorate.
The atmospheric CO2 concentration measured in Ryori, Iwate
Prefecture, by the Japan Meteorological Agency increased from358.6 ppm in 1992, when the UNFCCC was adopted, to 366.5 ppm
in 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. In 2009, which
was initially planned to be the target year for the decision on thenext regime following the Kyoto Protocol, the concentration was
389.8 ppm. In 2015, when the Paris Agreement was adopted as theregime following the Kyoto Protocol, the concentration amounted
to 403.4 ppm. The concentration in 2018 (preliminary figure) was
412.0 ppm, which is more than a 50 ppm increase in 26 years.
While a quarter century has already passed since the first sessionof the UNFCCC COP was held in 1995, the atmospheric CO2
concentration has continuously increased during this period.
Since the Paris Agreement was adopted as subsequent action

guidelines, effective action to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions has been more strongly pursued in climate change
negotiations. In the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate
Action, launched in 2016, the results of conferences by theme,
such as energy and industry, or by region are compiled into annual
reports to inspire not only governmental but also corporate andcivil action. Nevertheless, such action has spread only amongpeople interested in climate change. To address this situation, COP
25 used a logo including the motto “Time for Action” to visuallyhighlight the urgent necessity of action to address the climate
emergency, and the conference also delivered a strong message
through the media to citizens about the necessity for action to
reduce GHG emissions.
Against such a backdrop, the 16-year-old environmental
activist Greta Thunberg, who was widely seen as a candidate forthe 2019 Nobel Peace Prize, launched a school strike in 2018. In
her speech posted on TED.com (Japanese subtitles available), she
describes what made her start the strike (“Greta Thunberg: The
disarming case to act right now on climate change.” Retrieved
January 20, 2020). Her movement has attracted a large number of
supporters, especially among the young, leading to a worldwide
movement named Friday for Future for young people advocating
immediate action to address climate change. Her speech at COP

24 in December 2018 was given in a restrained manner despite its
strident message that “We cannot solve a crisis without treating
it as a crisis.” Nevertheless, significant action did not follow
in a satisfactory manner after that. In response to this situation,
Greta delivered a speech with a harsher tone and content at the2019 UN Climate Action Summit. Since it was one month before
the announcement of that year’s Nobel Peace Prize, her speechreceived massive media coverage and triggered heated controversy,
which has continued until today.
It might be a reality of international politics that, even if theappeal for revolutionary change in the international community, suchas climate change action, or international peace is widely acceptedby civil society, it will take a long time for the international regime
to change. However, in response to the climate crisis or climate
emergency, rather than climate change, movements toward social
or economic reforms have emerged and been expanding around theworld. I believe that the answer to the question of how effective theParis Agreement will ultimately be in mitigating the adverse impactsof climate change may be in the action that every one of us takes,
instead of being in vaguely imagined international initiatives thatremain someone else’s responsibility.
(Professor at HPI)

Public Lecture Series FY 2019:

Peace and Governance Issues in Asia
Makiko Takemoto

The Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) held a Public Lecture
Series in the fiscal year 2019 at Gojinsha Wendy HitoMachi Plaza. Its title was “Peace and Governance Issues in
Asia.” While globalization has flourished since the end of
the Cold War, the dangers for the global community, suchas environmental issues and international terrorism, arebecoming increasingly serious. At the same time, politicalhindrance of global peace building can be widely seen, forexample in the case of Brexit and the rising nationalism inmany countries. To bring this situation to the fore, the lecture
series explored themes such as what is global governance andwhat are the factors which are hindering global governanceand what kind of specific challenges does this pose in Asian
countries. As usual the series was attended by approximately
one hundred people per lecture. With their many questions,the lecture series became very lively and successful. The titles
and contents of each lecture were as follows.
The first lecture (Oct. 4) was “The Theory and Practiceof Security Community Building,” by Gen Kikkawa (Professor
at HPI). He explained the history of European security
community building, its outcomes and the present crisis. Thenhe examined the present situation for the East Asian case andthe direction of global peace and security.
Tadashi Okimura (Professor at HPI) gave a lecture on
Oct. 11, titled “Global Environmental Issues and Global
Governance.” He focused on the climate change issue as a

global issue and the responses of international society. He also
analyzed both the challenges for global governance and thefactors which are hindering the solutions for environmental
issues and global governance.
The third lecture (Oct. 18), “The Evolution and Limits of
Global Governance,” was presented by Ryo Oshiba (Director
and Professor at HPI). He introduced the theory of global
governance from the perspective of international politics
and explained several actual cases for global peace-building
among civil societies.
Hyun Jin Son (Associate Professor at HPI), talked about“Challenges in East Asia’s Military and Nuclear Governance,”in the fourth lecture (Oct. 25). He focused on the North
Korean nuclear development issue and explained the roles of
the related countries in the denuclearization process of North
Korea as well as security issues in East Asia.
The fifth lecture (Nov. 1), was “Theory and Reality of
the Collective Security by the United Nations: Cases in Asia,”
by Tetsuo Sato (Professor at HPI). Sato clarified the functions
and problems of the UN Collective Security System by first
analyzing its mechanism from a theoretical viewpoint, andthen examining several cases involving Asian countries.
The contents of these lectures will be published as an
HPI booklet which will be issued in March 2020. They will
be available on the HPI website.
(Associate Professor at HPI)

Visit HPI’s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace_e/5South Korean A-bomb Victims Movement:
Its Development up to the Legal Battles in the 1990s

Yuko Takahashi
The attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs by theUnited States in 1945 victimized not only Japanese but also nonJapanese people. Among them, the largest number were Koreans,
whose number is said to have been 70,000 or even 100,000. Today
there are approximately 2,200 survivors living in the Republic ofKorea who are registered with the Association of Korean A-bomb
Victims, to be discussed later. (In the Democratic People’s Republicof Korea, 60 survivors have been identified as of the end of 2019.)
These South Korean-resident A-bomb victims, or hibakusha, havebeen committed to their movement demanding that the Japaneseand South Korean governments provide relief and compensation.
From the 1990s onwards, they concentrated their efforts on bringing
lawsuits, demanding the Japanese government extend to them thecoverage of the A-bomb Survivors’ Support Law (hereafter the
Support Law) and issue them the Hibakusha Certificate. This article
examines the movement of South Korean-resident hibakusha fromits early stage in the second half of the 1960s to the mid-1990s when
their legal actions gained momentum.
The beginning of the movement of Korean hibakusha in an
organized form can be traced back to the establishment of the
Association of Korean A-bomb Victims (hereafter the Association)in 1966. At this early stage, they primarily demanded the South
Korean and Japanese governments help them rebuild their normal
life. However, they could not achieve this, or even actively support
their movement, due to the contemporary social and politicalenvironments in which criticizing the bombings would put them inrather vulnerable positions: the then Park Chung-hee governmentof South Korea put priority on anti-Communist policies andeconomic development of the country; in South Korean society,it was widely understood as that the atomic bombings liberated
Korea from Japanese colonial rule; and South Korea was in asolid security alliance with the United States, the very country that
conducted the 1945 nuclear attacks.
Meanwhile, it was citizens’ organizations in Korea and Japanthat supported the Association, particularly the Korea Church
Women’s Conference (from South Korea); the Korean Residents
Union in Japan, or Mindan; the National Council for Peace
and Against Nuclear Weapons, or KAKKIN; and the Citizens’
Association to Relieve Korean A-bomb Victims (all from Japan).
Their effort to provide Korean hibakusha with medical andfinancial support was necessarily limited which, nevertheless,later stimulated the Association to demand the Japanese and South
Korean governments provide medical support.
The year 1978 was a turning point for Korean hibakusha’s
movement. Korean hibakusha Son Jin-doo from Busan broughta lawsuit in Japan in 1972, demanding Fukuoka Prefecture andthe Ministry of Health and Welfare to withdraw their decision not
to issue him a Hibakusha Certificate on the ground that his placeof residence was not in Japan, a condition that was not stipulated
in any hibakusha support laws. In 1978, Son won his lawsuit at
the Supreme Court. His victory had a historic significance in two
respects: a Korean hibakusha won a lawsuit in Japan; and that thedecree admitted that the A-bomb Survivors Medical Care Law thatwas in effect at that time should not only be understood as social
security but also as state compensation. Following this decree, theAssociation gained courage and confidence, and became moreengaged in direct negotiations with the Japanese government todemand medical and social relief.
Son’s victory produced another effect: the Japanese andSouth Korean governments agreed on initiating a project to invite
Korean hibakusha to Japan for medical treatments. However, there
were several restrictions as to those hibakusha who were eligible
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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.22 No.2, March 2020

to go to Japan, and the project halted only after six years due tothe financial burden on the South Korean government. Anotherdisappointment for Korean hibakusha was that the project was
regarded by the Japanese government as a “humanitarian” measure
instead of part of state compensation. In fact, even today theJapanese government denies state compensation for hibakusha,
including Japanese hibakusha.
Once the project halted, Korean hibakusha began petitioning
the Japanese government for state compensation of 2.3 billion
dollars. Their demands through letters of petition, public gatheringsand demonstrations were supported by collaborating citizens from
Korea and Japan. Their collective actions also gained momentum
in the midst of the democratization of South Korea and theintensifying controversy over war responsibility between Korea
and Japan. As a consequence, the governments of the two countries
began discussing the Korean hibakusha issue. However, theoutcome was not state compensation but “humanitarian” medical
subvention of 4 billion yen provided by the Japanese government.
This temporary subvention might have been “helpful” forKorean hibakusha. But this was not without problems: its use waslimited to certain purposes such as partial subvention of medical
expenses and construction of a residential facility for hibakusha;
and it was estimated that the subvention would be exhausted in
2003. Korean hibakusha were desperate for state compensation,
but with more and more hibakusha passing away every year,
they decided to focus on a more realistic demand than statecompensation—that is, the application to overseas hibakusha of
the Support Law that was enacted in 1994 by amalgamating thetwo preceding hibakusha support laws.
This was the direct catalyst for a series of lawsuits from the
1990s onwards. Since then, a number of Korean as well as otheroverseas hibakusha brought lawsuits, while backed mainly bygrassroots supporters from Japan. There had been a number ofrestrictions for overseas hibakusha in the Japanese hibakusha
support system, such as the invalidity of the Hibakusha Certificate
outside Japan, and requirements to travel all the way to Japan
to apply for the Certificate and allowances. These barriers wereabolished one by one as a result of a series of lawsuits brought by
Korean and other overseas hibakusha. In September 2015, the full
application of the Support Law to overseas hibakusha was finallydecreed by the Japanese Supreme Court.
As we have examined above the movement of Korean hibakushafrom the second half of the 1960s to the mid-1990s, it can be argued
that while their final demand has always been state compensation,
their primary demand has changed over the course of their decadeslong movement: rebuilding their normal life, medical relief to beprovided by the Japanese government, state compensation, andthen the application of the Support Law to overseas hibakusha.
Although it took them decades to achieve the full applicationof the Support Law, it should be stressed that even during thepreceding period, their tenacious movement already bore somehistoric outcomes, with the tireless support by citizens from Korea
and Japan. A prominent example is certainly Son’s legal victoryin Japan in the 1970s when the issue of Japan’s war responsibility
was not yet as widely discussed in Korea and Japan as today.
However, it can also be argued that their movement wascompelled to compromise. When the governments-led medical
project was initiated in the 1980s, Korean hibakusha were required
to receive medical examinations by Japanese doctors to be selected
for the project. In a similar manner, to be eligible for relief basedon the Support Law, which is now fully applied to overseas
hibakusha following the 2015 decree at the Supreme Court, KoreanCurrent Situation of the Crimea Issue andPursuit of Peace

Takumi Kosugi

Introduction
Almost six years have passed since the beginning of the Russianannexation of Crimea, that is, February 27, 2014, the day on
which Ukrainian President Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych lost
his position and fled to Russia. It seems that as time goes by, theRussian annexation of Crimea has been increasingly removed fromthe focus of international attention despite the serious worldwide
concern that the incident aroused as a serious challenge to the orderof international law.
Meanwhile, the current situation seems far from one of“peace” in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Various international
agreements on solutions to the problem have not functioned
effectively, and the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine of theOrganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has
reported that violations of the cease-fire agreement are an everyday
occurrence, even at the start of 2020.
A realist might conclude that Crimea was captured by Russia
acting as a “regional Great Power” and especially a nuclear-weapon
State, and that the international community has no binding means
to regain Crimea. I acknowledge the necessity of such a realistic
analysis of the current situation, but I believe from the perspectiveof peace studies that it is also important to reconsider the questionsof why the conflict in Ukraine occurred, how such conflict can beprevented in the future, and what the desirable “peace” looks like.
Though with awareness of these essential questions, for reasonsof space, I will devote this article to proposing a new perspective of“peace” by focusing especially on language issues in Crimea.
Developments Before Armed Conflict Arose
Why did armed conflict occur in Ukraine? I will begin byclarifying developments prior to the conflict.
In November 2013, when preparations for the signing of
the agreement on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
(DCFTA) between the EU and Ukraine were suspended, theantigovernment movement against the Yanukovych administration
gained strength, resulting in casualties in December of that year.
On February 21, 2014, President Yanukovych fled to Russia,
and the next day the Ukraine Parliament formed an interim
administration headed by Oleksandr Valentynovych Turchynov
as acting President. Immediately after the interim administration
was formed, the Ukraine Parliament made a nationalist move; on
February 23, 2014, on the initiative of rightists’, the parliament
voted for a bill that would repeal the Law on the Principles of
the State Language Policy (hereinafter, “Language Law”), whichallowed the use of minority languages for some public purposeson certain conditions (though this bill was later vetoed by acting
President Turchynov). This move was a massive shock especiallyto people in eastern Ukraine, many of whom speak Russian as theirnative language, and aroused distrust in the interim administration.
The language issue served as a factor behind the conflict.
Protection of Russian Speakers
In this situation, Russian troops without insignia occupied Crimea.
The Russian government sought reasons to justify its deploymentof armed forces abroad, which is prohibited by internationallaw. It can be said that one of the reasons was the “protectionof Russian speakers,” as seen in the fact that, after the Ukraine
Parliament voted for the bill for repealing the Language Law,
active discussions about the necessity of giving Russian nationality
to Russian speakers in Ukraine broke out in Russia, mainly in the
Russian Federal Assembly. However, the international community
did not accept this reason as justifying Russia’s act.
It is thought that the “protection of Russian speakers” has long
been viewed as political rhetoric and is thus dismissed without
being deeply discussed. Nevertheless, the Russian claim cannot
be seen just as a sophism, because violation of linguistic rights
would have severe impacts on particular linguistic groups, andinfringement of the right to use native languages during elementary
education in particular might hamper the development of children
in the linguistic groups and consequently harm those groups in thelong-term. The nationalistic move of the Ukraine Parliament could
have seriously infringed the human rights of Russian speakers in
Ukraine, which included not only Russian nationals. This meansthat the Ukrainian government could have harmed even Ukrainian
nationals whose native language was Russian. In this sense, theRussian claim to protect Russian speakers should not be ignored.
Conclusion
This article proposes viewing the claim of “protecting Russian
speakers,” which has been treated just as Russia’s political rhetoric,from a new perspective, that is, the perspective of linguistic rights.
Even if the armed conflict were settled, it would be doubtful that
local people could live “peacefully” with their linguistic rights
being violated by their own state. This means that a cease-firewould never equal “peace.”
In addition, given the current situation, it seems that
restoration of the border area between Russia and Ukraine to thepre-conflict status will be quite difficult and that peacebuildingin the conflict area will not easily advance. I believe that it isimportant for us to actively consider what “peace” for the local
people is without resorting to stereotypes, rather than being overly
pessimistic about the current condition.
(Student in the Graduate School of Peace Studies)

Continued from Page 6

and other overseas hibakusha first need to be certified as hibakushain accordance with the Japanese hibakusha support system. These
examples represent that in order to receive relief, Korean as wellas other overseas hibakusha ironically need to be recognizedas hibakusha as defined under the Japanese support system, thecategory which does not necessarily reflect their real experiencesof the bombings and may even rule out some hibakusha.
The Korean hibakusha’s movement has centered on
issues of hibakusha relief, state compensation, and Japan’s war
responsibility. In more recent years, they are facing other issues
too, such as genetic influences on later generations and also
the continuation and succession of the movement. It is time forthem to explore a path for their future movement, while closelycollaborating with hibakusha in other countries, including Japan,
and also expanding the focus to include hitherto undertreatedissues such as relief for North Korean hibakusha who have long
been abandoned by the Japanese government on the ground of theabsence of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Their
movement needs to focus on the realization of hibakusha relief andalso state compensation without being hindered or restricted bysocial and political circumstances.
(Citizen Researcher at the Institute for North East Asian
Research, the University of Shimane)

Visit HPI’s website at http://www.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/peace_e/7DIARY◆ Jun. 8 Tetsuo Sato attends the Board of Councilors of theJapanese Society of International Law held in Tokyo.
◆ Jun. 11 Kazumi Mizumoto attends the 2nd meeting on thePeace Declaration organized by the City of Hiroshima, held at
Hiroshima City Hall.
◆ Jun. 16 Kyungjin Ha participates in Japan Society for
Studies in Journalism and Mass Communication 2019 Spring
Conference as an organizer of the workshop, “Possibilities ofRegional and Media Studies: Case of Hiroshima, City of Peace,”at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University.
◆ Jun. 20 Hitoshi Nagai gives a lecture, “Hiroshima from the
Global Perspective,” at Hijiyama Girls’ Senior High School,
Hiroshima.
◆ Jul. 10–12 Nagai conducts research on the Philippines war
crimes trials in Metro Manila, the Philippines.
◆ Jul. 11 Mizumoto gives a special lecture titled“Contributions for International Peace II,” at a training
program for Level III Certified Nursing Administratorsorganized by and held at the Hiroshima Nursing Association.
◆ Jul. 14 Yasuhito Fukui gives a lecture titled, “Proliferation
Financing and its Future Challenges,” to the 10th Anniversary
Annual Conference of the Japan Chapter of the Asian Society ofInternational Law held at Meiji Gakuin University.
◆ Jul. 16 Robert Jacobs gives a lecture titled, “Rising Oceans
and Disappearing Nuclear Test Sites: the Marshall Islands,
French Polynesia and Kiribati,” to the International Conventionof Asian Scholars in Leiden, Netherlands.
◆ Jul. 18–19 Gen Kikkawa gives a lecture titled, “Northeast
Asia Political Reconciliation and an Avenue to Cooperation in
Northeast Asia—Reconsideration of the CSCE,” at the Northeast
Asia Forum 2019, held at Liaoning University, China.
◆ Jul. 26–28 Jacobs conducts field research at the site of thefirst uranium mine in the world in Jáchymov, Czech Republic.
◆ Jul. 28 Mizumoto gives a lecture to local newspaper
reporters titled, “Hiroshima and Peace,” at a training programfor domestic journalists organized by the City of Hiroshima,
held at International Conference Center Hiroshima.
◆ Aug. 20 Hyun Jin Son attends as a facilitator the “Hiroshima
Junior International Forum” organized and held at Hiroshima
Prefecture.
◆ Aug. 28–30 Before the commencement of the TICAD-VII
meeting, Fukui visits the secretariat office of the meeting in
Yokohama to talk with H.E. Nohke, Japanese Ambassador to
Egypt etc. about African development policy.
◆ Aug. 28 Ha contributes a column, “Three Books Reading in
Hiroshima,” to Web Chuko–Shinsho.
◆ Sep. 4 Sato serves as moderator and commentator on a panelof the annual meeting of the Japanese Society of International
Law held in Shizuoka.
◆ Sep. 6 Kikkawa gives a lecture titled, “Changing Pacifismof Japan,” at the Japan Center, Liaoning University, China.
◆ Sep. 6 Akihiro Kawakami gives a lecture titled, “The
Article 9 of Japanese Constitution and Constitutional Revisionin Japan,” hosted by JICHIRO (All-Japan Prefectural andMunicipal Workers Union), Kyushu Branch in Oita.
◆ Sep. 18 Kawakami gives a lecture titled, “The Age of Crisis
of Democracy and Constitutional Revision in Japan,” hosted by
Kagoshima Peace Forum in Kagoshima.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS● Published by● Printed by

8

June 1 ― November 30, 2019

◆ Sep. 22–25 Xianfen Xu and Mizumoto visit the Instituteof Japan Studies, Liaoning University, Shenyang City, China,
to promote mutual cooperation in the area of education andresearch.
◆ Oct. 5 Xu presents a lecture titled, “What is the Normal
Track of Japan-China Relations?” at the Hiroshima Peace
Seminar 2019, held at Hiroshima City University.
◆ Oct. 20 Tadashi Okimura gives a lecture titled, “Effectivenessof United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:
Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement,” at the 2019 Annual
Convention of the Japanese Association of International
Relations held at Toki Messe Niigata Convention Center.
◆ Oct. 21–23 Narayanan Ganesan trains the Myanmar civil
service on public policy formulation and research methodology
in Naypyitaw, Myanmar.
◆ Oct. 29 Jacobs gives a keynote lecture titled, “Seeing theUnseeable,” in the Hanes Visiting Artist Lecture Series at the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA.
◆ Nov. 3 Kikkawa gives a lecture titled, “One Hundred Years
History of National Self-determination—The Dilemma of
Nation-building and State Building,” at the Autumn Conferenceof the Peace Studies Association of Japan held in the Universityof Niigata Prefecture.
◆ Nov. 7 Makiko Takemoto discusses peace and international
understanding with eight students from Nagoya University
Affiliated Lower Secondary School at the Satellite Campus ofHiroshima City University.
◆ Nov. 13–15 Fukui participates in discussions on the
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) at the CCW(Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons) Meeting ofHigh Contracting Parties held in the UNOG in Geneva.
◆ Nov. 14 Xu, Ha and Takemoto give lectures on peace forfifty-eight students from Morimura Gakuen High School at
Hiroshima City University.
◆ Nov. 16 Okimura, Kikkawa and Son present papers, Sato
joins as a respondent and Ryo Oshiba provides the concluding
remarks to the East Asia Crisis and the Future of Japan-Korea
Relations Workshop 2019 held at Hiroshima City Bunka Koryu
Kaikan.
◆ Nov. 16 Kawakami gives a lecture titled, “The Constitutionof Japan and Peace from the Viewpoint of Local SelfGovernment,” hosted by Kagoshima Local Self-Government
Institute in Kagoshima.
◆ Nov. 19 Ganesan gives a public lecture titled, “TheEthnic Peace Process in Myanmar,” at the Bonn International
Conversion Centre in Bonn, Germany.
◆ Nov. 20 Ganesan gives a public lecture titled, “SinoJapanese Interests and Rivalry in Southeast Asia,” in Dusseldorf,
Germany sponsored by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
◆ Nov. 27 Ha gives a lecture titled, “PR-ing Films: Dentsu
Production and its Film Archive” to the 13th Workshop of theArchive Project of Documentary Films at the University ofTokyo.

Vol.22 No.2（March 26, 2020）

Editorial Committee (Yasuhito Fukui, Robert Jacobs, Hitoshi Nagai, Xianfen Xu), Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University
3-4-1, Ozuka-higashi, Asaminami-ku, Hiroshima, 731-3194 Japan
Phone: +81（0）82 830 1811
Fax: +81（0）82 830 1812
E-mail: office-peace@m.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp
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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS Vol.22 No.2, March 2020

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