Hiroshima Peace InstituteVol.5 No.2 November 2002

The Reconciliation of Competing Memories of Hiroshima
Kiichi Fujiwara
In August 2002, a symposium was held in Hiroshima to discuss theexperience of the nuclear attack on Hiroshima, not only from the viewpointof Japan, but also from those of various countries around the world. For
some people, it might seem strange to consider the atomic bombing ofHiroshima from the viewpoints of other countries, since the fact of theatomic bombing in Hiroshima is so obvious that there would seem to be
only one possible interpretation. Why is it necessary then to discussvarious interpretations of the Hiroshima bombing? Some people may ask
such a question. In answering that question, I would now like to think
about the memories of World War II and their diversity.
The task of passing down the atomic bomb experience in Hiroshima,
namely the “Hiroshima memories,” to future generations is not only tokeep alive the memory of the disaster of the war. As the slogan “No More
Hiroshimas” clearly indicates, the objectives of activities for disseminating
Hiroshima’s atomic bomb experience also include promoting the political
option of deterring future wars by remembering the calamities of war,
preventing the use of nuclear weapons and never repeating the tragedies
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Therefore, preserving the Hiroshima
memories has been inseparably connected to the policy demand for a total
abolition of nuclear weapons.
Remembering the past has become the sine qua non for theformulation of present policies. The immense scale of the sacrifices
claimed by that bombing has sustained the longing for the abolition of
all nuclear weapons. Combined with this sense of mission, the Hiroshima
memories have acquired a universal significance.
All this, however, does not lead to multiple tales of Hiroshima. For,
if it is important to disseminate the Hiroshima experience as widely as
possible around the world, there should not be diverse interpretations ofthat experience.
However, people in other countries do not necessarily interpret thenuclear attack on Hiroshima in the same way as those in Japan. Whenvisiting foreign countries, we find that the Hiroshima bombing is
considered from viewpoints vastly different from ours.
For many Japanese, the bombing of Hiroshima was a ghastly eventof mass destruction that heralded the era of nuclear weapons. However,there were people in other countries who regarded the atomic bombing
as an event that marked the surrender of Japan and the end of the Second
World War. From their perspective, far from being an ominous affair
foreboding another “end of the world,” the bombing was the incident thatbrought to an end the long, disastrous war. When many people in
Hiroshima died in the bombing, many elsewhere in the world thought that,
thanks to that event, the war had ended and they could survive. To
exaggerate a little, while the damage caused by the A-bombing was being
discussed in Hiroshima, the same event was associated with the joy of
victory in the rest of the world.
When interpretations of the meaning of the bombing of Hiroshima
thus vary from one region to another, how should we cope with the

CONTENTSThe Reconciliation of Competing Memories of Hiroshima by Kiichi Fujiwara ……1
International Symposium Hosted by Hiroshima Peace InstituteCompeting Memories of Hiroshima: Quest for a New Role of “Hiroshima” for Peaceand Reconciliation in the 21st Century ………………………………………2〜4
The Making of a New State by Christian P. Scherrer ……………………………4〜5
HPI Research Forum: Building Peace in East Timor by Gianni Deligia ……………5
A Perspective on the Revitalization of the Spirit of Hiroshima by Yuki Tanaka ……6
HPI Book Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century:A Message from Hiroshima
Published ………………………………………………………………………………7
Diary ……………………………………………………………………………………8
Employment Opportunities at HPI ……………………………………………………8

variations? Of course, arguments justifying the bombing have no legitimate
basis and are even not worth discussing. However, we need to realize that
it is natural that memories of the war should differ from region to region.
War memories are often different people’s memories of their own
sacrifices. If war experiences are discussed in Nanjing, Chongqing,
Singapore and Manila, the narratives naturally focus on the damage
suffered and the lives sacrificed in those localities. Narratives based on
memories of the same war may greatly differ.
People who narrate their experiences in a devastating war for future
generations tend to expect others to turn their attention to thoseexperiences, too. To the people of Nanjing and Chongqing, any war
narrative that does not mention the Nanjing Massacre and the Chongqing
air bombing is simply unfair and biased. Likewise, to Singaporeans andFilipinos, war histories that do not record the massacre of Chinese in
Singapore and the Death March of Bataan are not worth counting as
histories of the war.
Furthermore, it is not uncommon for people who describe war
atrocities in their countries to be less than interested in the victims of
war in other regions. Those who insist that their sacrifices are the only
authentic experiences of a war do not always open their eyes to the total
picture of the war. As a result, memories of war often turn out to beaccounts of diverse experiences told by people in different regions of theworld.
We have to admit that, in some respects, the Hiroshima bombing
experience has been told solely from our own perspective. Even thoseconcerned with the significance of the A-bombing of Hiroshima in thecontext of world history have not always taken cognizance of the incidents
in Nanjing and Singapore. In addition, it has taken us a long time toacknowledge the suffering of foreign people who were exposed toradiation in Hiroshima.
Just as the people of Hiroshima discussed the A-bombing as theirown disaster, so did people in Nanjing and Singapore talk about theirsufferings in a similar way. The perspectives of people outside Hiroshima
have not only lacked detailed knowledge of the A-bomb disaster but, more
importantly, been strangers’. Therefore, unless the Japanese people turntheir attention to the suffering of the people of Nanjing and Singapore,
the effort to convey Hiroshima’s experience to them is bound to encounter
indifference.
The symposium was an attempt to change those “our own”
perspectives in narrating the war experiences. Even if Hiroshima was acity of great military importance, or a hub of armament factories andmilitary personnel, the violent act of burning to death tens of thousandsof ordinary citizens along with buildings can never be justified. Yet, if
Hiroshima intends to appeal to the universal meaning of its own disaster
experience, it is vital to pay attention to the tragedies of ordinary citizens
who were killed in the war elsewhere in the world. In fact, unless we treat
as our own the war calamity suffered by others in the rest of the world,
we will never be able to disseminate the message of Hiroshima.
With the participation of panelists both from the Korean Peninsula,which was under Japanese colonial rule during the war, and from the north-eastern district of China, which was invaded by Japan, the symposium
adopted an approach designed to turn each panelist’s attention to calamityof war as seen from the perspective of countries other than his or her own.
I believe that, by taking this approach, the participants came to share abroader appreciation of the fact that innocent lives were lost as needlesslyin other countries as in their own and that those victims were in fact theirown. Furthermore, the symposium offered us an opportunity to movebeyond the memories of war unique to each people and view it from thepoint of view of the victims of a global phenomenon that claimed human
lives in many nations and regions. The symposium was thus a memorable
experience not to be easily forgotten.
Fujiwara is professor of International Politics at the University of Tokyo−１−

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International Symposium

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How the War Has Been Remembered:
Hiroshima and the Politics of Memories
A war produces not just a single memory, but various
memories. Conflicts over these different memories
in other words, conflicts caused by the different
ways people remember a war are one of the major
issues in the world today.
Memories of war are rooted in each region’s
Kiichi Fujiwara
experiences and are given different meanings from place to place.
Moreover, these memories are selective. Some memories are rememberedand passed on to others; others are not. Most memories of war are
memories of one’s own suffering. Therefore, a conflict arises whenmemories of individual sufferings, i.e., different memories of war,encounter each other. This symposium was planned with a view topreventing such encounters from becoming a cause of conflict.
The symposium aimed not only to convey the experiences ofHiroshima to the world, but also to learn how the experience of Hiroshima
has been differently perceived in other places in the world. For instance,
Chinese and Korean standpoints could present us with alternative views
and help us to broaden our perspective when talking about the war.
I would like to take up three points pertinent to the relationshipbetween memory and wars (or conflicts). The first point is that memories
of wars are not a problem of the past, but relate to current conflicts. Conflict
between Japan and China over historical perceptions shows this fact
clearly. The second point is that memories of wars vary from region toregion. Individual memories of war (i.e. small memories of war) are linked
to ideology (or big memories of war), resulting in lopsided memories.
We thus need to pay attention to these regionally varying memories. The
third point is that memories of war have great potential for preventing
wars in the future. Japanese people need to do more than remember the
war solely from the point of view of their own suffering. They must also
pay attention to the Japanese aggression abroad and think about whatmeanings the war had to people who lived in different regions. I believethat this should be the foundation on which we make decisions about the
future.
Since the September 11th attacks last year, the use of nuclear weapons
has become a real threat. Also, the rhetoric of “just war” is frequently
employed. As the threat of war increases, so the tendency to interpret
history in one’s own favor also increases. Now is the time to consider
memories of wars in a broader perspective.
Professor in the Graduate School of Law and Politics, University of Tokyo, andVisiting Professor at the Center for Japanese Studies, University of Indonesia.
He graduated from the University of Tokyo in law. After receiving a Master’s
degree from the University of Tokyo Graduate School of Law and Politics, heentered the doctoral program in Political Science at Yale University as a Fulbrightscholar. He specializes in international politics, comparative politics, and politics
in Southeast Asia.

Legacies of the First Nuclear War
In 1945, there were only four nuclear weapons inexistence, but their number increased to tens of
thousands after World War II. The number of nuclear
states also increased. The U.S. has insisted on thelegitimacy of possessing nuclear weapons in the nameof nuclear deterrence. It has also demonstrated to theMartin Sherwin
world that nuclear weapons are a sign of influence and power. The current
situation has its historical roots in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima andNagasaki. But I wonder if those historic incidents were inevitable.
By the time of President Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, the idea
had been germinated that America could win the war and assure an
American-controlled peace if it possessed nuclear weapons. Nuclear
weapons thus became valued as new and potentially all-powerful weapons.
Roosevelt passed on two ideas to Truman. The first was that, after
careful consideration, atomic bombs might be used against Japan withappropriate warning given to the Japanese. The second was that a postwar
U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons would be useful in dealing with theSoviets. At the same time, Roosevelt was fully aware of the dangers of
nuclear weapons as well as their supposed advantages. Roosevelt was aman of experience, confident enough to decide against the use of atomic
bombs in the war if presented with convincing arguments. However, under
the Truman administration, these two ideas of Roosevelt merged. The useof atomic bombs, which would demonstrate their devastating effects andVisit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

in theory bring about a sudden conclusion to the war, came to be seen
and valued as a necessary step in convincing the Soviets that these newweapons were unmatchable. Therefore, the U.S. needed to validate atomic
bombs as real usable weapons by actually dropping them on cities in Japan.
Ironically, the Emperor said in his speech to the Japanese people that
the American use of a “cruel new weapon” was one of the reasons forJapan’s surrender. This helped to convince the U.S. that the atomic bombs
had ended the war, and the use of nuclear weapons in diplomacy was
initiated after the war. The U.S. maintained its atomic diplomacy during
the Iran crisis, the Berlin Blockade and the Korean War. John Foster Dulles,
the Secretary of State under the Eisenhower administration, promulgated
the nuclear-based doctrine of massive retaliation. Though the Kennedy
administration shifted this “massive retaliation” strategy to a defensivemode with the concepts of mutually assured destruction and nuclear
deterrence, it still left nuclear weapons and their deployment against
civilian populations at the center of U.S. national security policy. Afterthe Cold War, it was wrongly believed that the Soviet Union collapsed
because of its arms race against the U.S.
For more than 50 years, public debate over the atomic bombings ofHiroshima and Nagasaki has been distorted. To adequately confront thelegacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we need to consider an alternative
future. The assumption that the atomic destruction of the Japanese cities
acted as a deterrent to future use of nuclear weapons strikes me as moreof a rationalization than a logical deduction. If President Truman had notused the atomic bombs, he would have been asked for the reason after
the war, and would have had to stress the inhumanity of these weapons
and the wrong of using them. Had the U.S. taken that position, the build-up of nuclear weapons after the war would not have been initiated. The
Soviet Union would also not have produced weapons that the U.S. had
rejected because of their inhumanity. But it did not happen that way. It
is still Hiroshima’s mission to cry for “No More Hiroshimas” so that there
will be no more Hiroshimas.
Professor of History at Tufts University, Visiting Professor of American History
at Yale University, and Visiting Professor of International Relations at Wellesley
College. He graduated from Dartmouth College and received a Ph.D. from
University of California, Los Angeles.

Chinese People’s Thoughts on the Atomic Bomb
Explosion in Hiroshima and the Importance of
War Memory for Sino−Japanese Relations
When I first came to Hiroshima, I visited the Peace
Memorial Museum. I learned there that most of thevictims of the atomic bomb were women and children,
non-combatants in the war. Until then, I had felt thatJapanese people stressed only their own suffering.
Bu Ping
But thanks to my visit to the museum, I could understand the feelingsof the Japanese sufferers. If I had not come to Japan and had not visitedthe Peace Memorial Museum, I could not have understood Japanesefeelings about their suffering. Likewise, I imagine that many Japanese
do not deeply understand the suffering of the Chinese, nor have much idea
about Chinese perceptions and feelings as victims of the war.
Until the 1970s, in China, the significance of the atomic bombs wasconsidered to be that they contributed to the early conclusion of the war.
From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, this gave way to the recognition that
the U.S. had dropped the atomic bombs as a political warning to the Soviet
Union, and that the atomic bombings were more important for their effects
on international politics than for their military impact per se. Since themid-1980s, there has been a further recognition that the Japanese needto consider the atomic bombings in connection with their responsibility
for a war of aggression caused by Japanese militarism, and that othernations need to consider the horrible consequences of atomic bombs.
The foregoing is a summary of theoretical ideas accepted by Chinese
scholars. We need to distinguish them from the emotional perceptions ofhistory held by ordinary Chinese people. Most emotional memories of thewar held by ordinary Chinese people are of Chinese suffering and Japaneseaggression, including the Nanjing Massacre, the Chongqing Air Raids,
Unit 731 and comfort women. In Japan, on the other hand, most memoriesof the war are related to its own people’s suffering, for example, in theatomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Tokyo air raids and theBattle of Okinawa.
Mutual understanding and exchanges of historical perceptions haveso far been insufficient. As a result, there is a gap between the findingsof academic research and the emotional perceptions of the war held byordinary Chinese. For instance, there has been insufficient explanation−２−

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.5 No.2 November 2002

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of the suffering caused to the Japanese by the atomic bombings, andChinese people know little about Japanese feelings about the atomic
bombs. If, in addition to our own emotional perceptions of the past, we
also appreciated the emotional perceptions of ordinary people in the othercountry, it would be possible for us to understand each other better andto share a common historical understanding. Therefore, it is necessary for
China and Japan to exchange memories of the war at the grass-roots level.
However, certain historical views to which some conservative Japanesepoliticians and “liberal” scholars adhere hinder improved mutual
understanding.
The Chinese people’s image of the war is Nanjing, while that of theJapanese is Hiroshima. Both Chinese and Japanese people need to extend
the scope of their humanism; the Chinese need to extend theirs from
Nanjing to Hiroshima and understand the cruelty of war as such, while
Japanese need to extend theirs from Hiroshima to Nanjing, so that they
may realize their responsibility as perpetrators of aggression. It is very
important for us to share a historical understanding, especially toinvestigate and understand facts about the history of aggression, if Japan
is to restore its relations with neighboring countries based on mutual trust
and to improve its standing in the international community. Hiroshima
has an important role to play in building a peaceful 21st century, a century
of peace and humanism.
Deputy Director and Professor at Heilongjiang Social Sciences Academy. He
graduated from Harbin Normal University in history. He specializes ininternational relations in Northeast Asia. He is also a specialist in abandoned
poison gas weapons.

Korean Memories of “Hiroshima”andQuest for Reconciliation between
Korea and Japan
There are irreconcilable memories of the war between
Korea and Japan. And Hiroshima has a place in thosememories. Memories of a war are the personal
recollections of people’s own war experiences on thebattlefront or at home. At the same time, they are
Sook-Jong Lee
reconstructed as public memories of war and inherited by later generations,members of which did not experience the war at all. Japanese liberals
view the war as a period when freedom and democracy were suppressed,
while some Japanese nationalists argue that the war was inevitable for
defending Japan’s national interests. Despite these differences, Japanese
all agree that the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki wereinhumane and want to turn Hiroshima into a global symbol for peace andhumanity and a bastion of the anti-nuclear weapons movement.
Korean memories of the Pacific War, on the other hand, naturally
relate to memories of the Japanese colonial rule, and Hiroshima has avery marginal place in those memories. The Korean memories of the war
transcend political and ideological divisions and are consummated as solid
collective memories integrated with the people’s national identity. Many
Koreans view the atomic bombings as a means to bring about victory forjustice. Koreans agree on the horrendous consequences of atomic warfare
and oppose any future use of atomic bombs. On the other hand, they are
eager to point out that the Japanese government has not yet fairly treated
Koreans. Many Koreans criticize Japan for its failure to apologize for its
past colonial rule and accuse it of distorting history. They also suspectthat Japanese tend to overemphasize the tragedy of the atomic bombingof Hiroshima, while trying to cover up their role as perpetrators of crimes.
How can we make Hiroshima a bridge for reconciliation and peacein Asia? It is very difficult to let the memories of war lead to reconciliation.
If we want to reconcile ourselves with each other over what has happenedin the past and build a new relationship for the future, we had better stop
playing the game of victims and accept the fact that we have mutually
irreconcilable memories of the war. Should we not then try to overcome
our nationalisms (and their hidden political goals) that impede
reconciliation between Korea and Japan? In that respect, I would counton the younger generation’s cosmopolitan outlook.
I think that Hiroshima can play an important role in this process ofreconciliation, since no one can deny the universal value of peace that
Hiroshima has constantly upheld since the end of the Pacific War to thisday. The two civil societies of Korea and Japan must support the normsof peace symbolized by Hiroshima. Koreans need to pay due attention
to what Hiroshima stands for. The tasks for the Japanese are morechallenging. When Japan confronts the negative legacies of its own
aggression and learns to consider the atrocities committed by itself alongwith the Hiroshima experience, Hiroshima will become the bastion of

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.5 No.2 November 2002

peace and humanism. When Koreans and Japanese unite in the common
cause of promoting pacifist and humanitarian values, wrangling over theirreconcilable war memories will give way to true friendship and to acommon effort to build a better future in Asia.
Research Fellow at Sejong Institute in Korea. After obtaining a Ph.D. in Sociology
from Harvard University, she has taught at several universities. Her researchinterests include the Japanese political economy, civil society in Korea and Japan,
and political and security opinion studies. She has written extensively on
Japanese political economy, including the Japanese industrial and financial
systems, employment relations, and major public policies. Her works haveappeared in Sejong Institute’s publications and many journals, including Asian
Perspective and International Studies Review. She has also contributed chapters
to books published by the Stanford University Press and Hudson Institute.

The A−Bomb Experience from theHiroshima Perspective and the Roleof Hiroshima in the 21st Century
When I discuss issues related to the atomic bombsand nuclear weapons in university courses, I try totouch on the course the U.S. followed in developing
the atomic bombs and dropping one on Hiroshima.
I also talk about whether there was any possibility
Kazumi Mizumotoof Japan taking measures to avert the atomic bombing. I teach students
about the conduct of the Japanese Imperial Army in China and on the
Korean peninsula, and about Chinese and Korean perceptions of the atomic
bombings and Japan’s defeat in World War II.
This is because Japanese youth would risk making wrong decisions
as members of the international society if they should base them only
on the viewpoints of “Japan” or “Hiroshima” and because dialogue
between Japan and the international community could not even begin if
they did not realize that there are a wide variety of perceptions of events
around the world, each for its own good reasons.
Prior to our discussion of the diverse interpretations and perceptions,however, we must agree at the outset that the atomic bombings, which
indiscriminately killed and wounded a huge number of non-combatants,
were unquestionably inhumane acts. But we often come across argumentsthat ignore this fact and that address other issues that are deliberately
linked to the problem of the atomic bombings. These arguments are often
connected to political, ideological, or nationalist issues and are found inpeace movements at home as well as overseas. We must carefully examine
the substantive message of Hiroshima by purging it of the political andnationalist encumbrances.
Hiroshima has related its experience of the atomic bombing over andover again throughout the post-World War II period with a view toinforming as many people as possible of the facts about its tragic
experience as accurately as possible so as to spare them of the tragedy
of indiscriminate mass killing, no matter where or under whatcircumstances they lived. Each atomic bomb survivor has his/her own
different memories, but feelings of hatred, grudge, and hostility have
gradually been overcome and replaced by a genuine and pure desire forpeace.
The message of Hiroshima, which is supposed to be very simple andclear, sometimes fails to reach the outside world, presumably because thepeople to whom it is addressed live in circumstances we do not know aboutor are faced with problems such that we cannot simply say we did notknow about. Like most other Japanese, people in Hiroshima must pay
serious attention to the colonial policies pursued and the aggression andcrimes against humanity committed by Japan and sympathize with those
who had gone through the devastating experiences caused by the inhumane
Japanese actions.
On the other hand, the theory of punitive justice that Hiroshima
should take full responsibility for Japan’s wartime wrongs is incorrect.
Survivors of the atomic bomb have been discriminated against in theirown society and subjected to constant worries about their health.
Hiroshima should continue to play the role of the witness speaking
to the world against the inhumanity of nuclear weapons in the 21st century,
as it did in the previous century. Also, I hope Hiroshima will have an
infinite amount of sympathy for those who have suffered similarly tragic
experiences and offer helping hands to them.
Associate Professor at the Hiroshima Peace Institute of Hiroshima City University.
He graduated from the University of Tokyo in law. He received a Master’s degreefrom Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He specializes ininternational politics and international relations, with special emphasis on U．
S．
-Japanese relations.

−３−

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The Making of a New State By Christian P. Scherrer

Successful Peacekeeping Operation
Today East Timor is known for one of the most successful U.N.
peacekeeping operations. U.N. fact sheets advertise 20 achievements.
Instead of a success, I believe, when looking at this engagement, weshould rather talk about reparations for the failure in 1975, when the
United States blocked the United Nations from taking action against
the invader thus bearing co-responsibility for the genocide.
The task of my field research in East Timor was to compare therealities found on the ground with the mandate of the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), in order toassess its achievements. The mandate required:providing security and maintaining law and order;International Symposium establishing an effective administration;
 assisting in the development of civil services; ensuring delivery of relief and rehabilitation;
 capacity-building for self-government; establishing conditions for sustainable development; and ensuring that the perpetrators of crimes would be brought to justice.
Achievements in Independent Governance

UNTAET for the most part fulfilled its mandate, though critical issues
remain unresolved. In particular it was able to:provide security through a large and costly U.N. peace enforcement
force initially of 8,700, which was reduced to 6,000 by May 2002;
establish an effective administration;
re-establish state services and recruit 12,000 civil servants;
rehabilitate the country;build sufficient capacities for self-governance and continue this
support with 200 advisors; andnegotiate a fair treaty with Australia on the exploitation of oil
deposits in the Timor Gap.
The May 2002 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
report on Timor portrays the new nation as the poorest in Asia but
as one with considerable future potential. A U.N. trust fund will provide
funds for the period needed to develop these oil resources by 2005.








Positive Outcome, Questions and a Failure
Questions have to be asked about the continued presence of 6,000
peacekeepers. This is in contrast with the modest size of the 1,200strong future national army (half of it already in place) and the lightly
armed, 1,800-strong police force. If this force of 3,000 East Timoreseis sufficient for the future maintenance of security, then there is no
point in having peacekeepers standing by.
Besides the unlikelihood of renewed attacks by Indonesia, there
are practical issues. Compared with productive investments that
contribute to stability, standing foreign armies are a waste of money.
The costs for peacekeeping in East Timor are US$600 million per→

East Timor has endured one of the most tragic histories of any nation
since the 1940s, at which time it was a Portuguese colonial enclavein Dutch-ruled Island Asia. From 1940 Timor became the theater of
one of the bloodiest battles of WWII.
Only 35 years later, Timor went from bad to worse. According
to the shocking evidence found in newly declassified official
documents (published by the National Security Archive at the end of2001), then U.S. President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger gave,
in December 1975, with the complicity of the Australian government,
the green light to the Indonesian military (TNI) for invading the justindependent ex-colony. This led to massive-scale genocide. Every third
Timorese lost his or her life during the next 24 years of occupation!
East Timor became the world’s deadliest country.
The fall of the Suharto regime in May 1998 and a democratictransition in Indonesia opened the way for change. TNI managed toprevent a complete dismantling of the corporatist state structure built
up over 35 years of military rule. The illegal occupation of East Timor
continued until a referendum on its status was held at the end of August
1999, thanks to intense pressure applied by the U.N. and some world
powers. When the 80% vote for independence became known, apremeditated onslaught took place, which left thousands dead and thecountry in ruins.

Competing Memories of Hiroshima: Quest for a New Role of Hiroshima”
for Peace and Reconciliation in the 21st Century

Questions & Answers
Question: Concerns over the use of nuclear weapons are growing because of the new
U.S. nuclear doctrine. How should we cope with this situation?
Fujiwara: It is true that there is now a growing possibility that the U.S. will use its
nuclear weapons. The U.S. is powerful enough to win a war by itself, and this factemboldens the U.S. to act contrary to international frameworks and the opinions ofallied nations. Also, some people in the U.S. administration are beginning to view
nuclear weapons as weapons available in actual wars.
Still, we do not have to give up entirely, because nuclear weapons have not beenused since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, thanks to various factors and circumstances.
Mizumoto: Atomic bomb survivors have devoted their lives to the anti-nuclear
movement. But we should not depend on them forever. Everyone has his or her rightand responsibility to demand peace. Now that there is a decreasing possibility thatJapan’s posture as the sole nation committed to non-nuclear power status will leadto the denuclearization of the world, it should turn to international cooperation todeal with the U.S. problem.
Q: Are there any differences between the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
If President Truman had had a stronger will, could the atomic bombings have been
avoided? When we think about the atomic bombings and World War II in broad

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perspective, including the issues of foreign victims of the atomic bombings and Japan’s
war responsibility, how should we regard the Chinese and Korean victims of theatomic bombings?
Sherwin: The point is that neither atomic bomb was necessary to bring the war to aconclusion in August of 1945. There were members of the Truman administration
who believed that, but their views were not accepted. President Truman could havemade the decision not to use atomic bombs.
Bu: It is difficult for the aggressors and the aggressed to share perceptions of history.
But I believe that our efforts to work on something together in the globalized world,such as holding a symposium, are useful for understanding each other’s views.
Lee: Japan has to accept its own wartime criminal responsibility as it dwells on the
responsibility of the U.S. towards Hiroshima’s victims. Korean victims of the bombing
have not been treated properly in Hiroshima. If you take an approach to the Hiroshimaproblem as if it were a local question, that is, exclusively a question for Hiroshimaresidents, then that undermines the meaning of the Hiroshima atomic bombing itself.
If you want to appeal to the world about the meaning of Hiroshima, you have to
make it a more universal human rights issue. I hope that the Japanese will be morehonest about a very contradictory situation in which they are perpetrators and victims
at the same time.

−４−

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.5 No.2 November 2002

→annum. This is a huge sum compared with the modest total of US$60
million per annum for running the entire government and civil service.
With just 10% of the peacekeeping costs most of the mandate’s
objectives have been achieved by the civilian UNTAET. I conclude
that the number of peacekeepers should be rapidly reduced.
In contrast with these positive achievements, the only area where
the U.N. has failed is justice. Part of this failure owes to the Security
Council and the great powers, e.g. their failure to set up an international
tribunal to deal with crimes committed in East Timor, keeping in mind
that most crimes have been ordered by the TNI leadership. De facto
impunity for serious crimes has thus been reinforced. This has had anegative influence on the internal situation in East Timor, boththreatening peace and security in the long run as well as endangering
democratic transition in Indonesia.

The Need for Justice
Most perpetrators of serious crimes now in East Timorese jails are fromamong the rank and file of the former militia. The “big fish” all managed
to escape to West Timor or to Java. This means that they are out ofreach of the East Timorese judiciary. Indonesian tribunals proved
utterly unable to deliver even a modicum of justice.
Thousands of poor farmers were forced to join the militias in 1999.
With regard to the reintegration of former collaborators and membersof the militia, the UNTAET developed a sophisticated approach basedon the court-relevant classification based on four categories: (1) theorganizers and perpetrators of killings and rapes, (2) those who
participated in violent acts, (3) those who destroyed property or looted,and (4) those who were forced to join the militia. Especially light cases
are those in category (4) who came in the night, under cover of darkness,
to warn of planned attacks.

The Establishment of a Truth Commission
In January 2002 the members of the Commission for Reception, Truth
and Reconciliation (CRTR) were sworn in with a mandate to investigate
crimes committed between April 1974 (Portuguese revolution) andOctober 1999 (after TNI left and INTERFET forces flushed out the

militias) and to formulate recommendations for the government, forwhich the CRTR was given two and a half years. The task seems quite
enormous in view of the limited resources and manpower available.
Most of the returnees from West Timor were integrated into the
local communities without major problems. Since late 1999, however,many killers came back but were refused by the local communities
and redirected to the only large town, Dili. If more of the remaining
refugees return, the probability of the presence among them of similar
serious cases will increase. Monitoring this situation in the local
communities is one of the key tasks of the Regional Commissioners
who were sworn in ahead of independence in May 2002.

Conclusions
If justice cannot be achieved in East Timor, then a dangerous timebomb could explode in the future. Revenge instead of justice could
destabilize the country, and the most highly appraised success of theUnited Nations in recent years could turn into a failure.
The non-existing accountability for state crimes in Indonesia
invites future gross human rights violations by the army, secret services
and special police forces. Impunity undercuts the democratic controlof the army by elected representatives and sabotages the rule of law
in general. Abuses by the army and endemic corruption in the politicalclass could continue.
Of the 21 truth commissions that have been constituted worldwide,
only a few have succeeded in the eyes not only of experts but alsoof the victims of organized violence. There is no model applicable to
the East Timorese case. The commissioners’ first task is to construct
a viable concept for the truth commission that is adequate to local
conditions.
Justice for East Timor and for Indonesia is inescapably linked:
the chief perpetrators are the same. Free East Timor will continue tobe a showcase for democratic and peaceful change in Indonesia. And
only a democratized Indonesia can stabilize the achievements reachedin East Timor.
Scherrer is professor at HPIHPI Research Forum
Title: “Building Peace in East Timor:
U.N. Peacekeeping and the Role of
U.N. Volunteers”
Speaker: Mr. Gianni Deligia, U.N. coordinator for
Bobonaro District, East Timor

Mr. Gianni Deligia spoke about the historical background leading up to
independence in East Timor and visions of state building. This wasfollowed by discussion among the participants regarding the current
situation from various angles.
As East Timor became independent of Indonesia on May 20, 2002,
discussion focused on how to create a completely new social infrastructurein the newborn nation. Other serious issues discussed included theachievement of “justice” and “reconciliation”; the reintegration of a society

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.5 No.2 November 2002

June 6, 2002

fragmented by decades of conflict toward the goal of establishing a nation-state; the shortage of human resources such as medical and legal experts;
and relations between the East Timor government and the U.N., whoserole in the new state will gradually be reduced.
East Timor’s relations with other countries were also covered in thediscussion. A significant challenge for East Timor will now be rebuilding
its relationship with Indonesia in order to stand on its own feet, specifically,
by solving issues concerning inhumane acts committed by the Indonesian
military and by reestablishing economic and trade relations withIndonesia. The presence of fossil fuels in the Timor Gap, a narrow troughin the Timor Sea between Australia and East Timor, has attracted attention
as a major source of revenue, for which international cooperation is alreadyunderway. These topics, among others, were also touched on by someparticipants.

−５−

By Nobumasa Akiyama, assistant professor at HPIVisit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

A Perspective on the Revitalization of the Spirit of Hiroshima
By Yuki Tanaka
Both peace studies and peace movements in Hiroshima have hitherto been
based on the city’s unique experience as the first theater of nuclear
holocaust in the history of mankind. It is therefore not surprising that the
major focus of peace studies here has been on issues closely related tonuclear arms and that its peace movements have also centered on theabolition of nuclear arms. In this regard, Hiroshima has undoubtedly
played an important role so far and its voice, above all that of the hibakusha(i.e., survivors of the nuclear holocaust), carries a certain symbolic weight
in world nuclear dialogue.
Due to the rapidly diminishing number of hibakusha, however, the“weathering of the Hiroshima experience” has become a serious concern
for many citizens of Hiroshima in recent years. In order to confront thisproblem and to revitalize the Hiroshima spirit of aspiring to eternal peace,
it is necessary to re-examine the historical uniqueness of the city in a
wider theoretical framework of modern war, in which the universal
characteristics of modern warfare, notably including the atomic bombingof Hiroshima, can be critically analyzed. In other words, Hiroshima City
still possesses the capability of contributing to the establishment of world
peace, yet that capability must be enlivened by broadening the scope of
peace studies and peace movements in this city and adapting them tocontemporary issues of war and peace.
The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki typifies two kinds of crimes
against humanity indiscriminate bombing and mass killing both ofwhich are common phenomena in modern and contemporary warfare.
Full-scale indiscriminate bombing, which targets and terrorizes non-combatants, was initiated by the Nazis against the civilians of Guernica
in 1937 under the term “strategic bombing.” In the European theater ofWorld War II, indiscriminate bombing to terrorize civilians escalated as
the war intensified, and many civilians in major cities such as Warsaw,
Rotterdam, London, Berlin, and Dresden were victimized with both the
Axis and Allied sides engaging in such bombing, with mass slaughter as
the result. In the Pacific theater too, as Japan started losing the war, many
cities on Japan’s main islands became the targets of U.S. air raids. On
March 10, 1945, about 100,000 people in the Tokyo metropolitan area
were burnt to death within a few hours by fire-bombs dropped from
U.S. B-29 bombers. An estimated one million lost their homes and were
driven from the city. Indiscriminate bombing reached its peak, however,when mass-killing atomic weapons were used to annihilate two Japanesecities in August 1945.
Since then, indiscriminate bombing was repeatedly deployed in the
Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War. Moreover, new types
of weapons were introduced in large quantities for such bombing every
time a war was waged for example, agent orange (a type of chemical
defoliant) in Vietnam and depleted uranium in the Gulf, both of whichcaused serious ecological and environmental damage while exacting adevastating toll on civilians. Despite the claim by military specialists that“pin-pointed bombing” for accurate targeting has become possible thanks
to new technologies, in the Kosovo-Serbian War and the more recent
Afghan War, many civilians were still killed or injured as a result ofbombing “wrongly identified targets.” During the Gulf War, U.S. Air Forces
dropped 88,500 tons of bombs on Iraq, of which 70 percent missed theirtargets. In Palestine many civilians including children and babies are
currently victims of such “pin-pointed” aerial attacks. It has been 57 years
since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, yet indiscriminate bombing
is still employed in many places throughout the world. Furthermore, thedanger of using nuclear arms has suddenly become real in the regional
conflict between India and Pakistan.
The A-bomb dropped on Hiroshima killed between 70,000 and
80,000 people in one second, and it is estimated that a total of 140,000
died by the end of 1945. In Nagasaki, 70,000 people are believed to have

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

died by the end of the same year. The total death toll up to the present
due to irradiation caused by the bombing of Hiroshima is estimated at
approximately 450,000. However, in his announcement of the bombing,
Truman said, “The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped
on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished in this firstattack to avoid, in so far as possible, the killing of civilians.” The politicaland military leaders of the U.S. probably did not use A-bombs against
Japan with the deliberate intention of genocide. Yet, as a result of bombing
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it became clear that the use of nuclear arms
thereafter would be undoubtedly genocidal.
However, mass killing, with genocide as its most extreme
manifestation, is not peculiar to the nuclear holocausts in Hiroshima andNagasaki. Between 1915 and 1916, it is estimated that more than one
million Armenians were killed by Turks in the Ottoman Empire. Fivemillion Jews, as well as a few million people from other ethnic groups,
are believed to have been victims of mass slaughter by the Nazis. Since
the end of World War II, there have been numerous examples of thedeliberate mass killing of civilians for example, in Cambodia, Guatemala,the Congo, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, and in East Timor. According toan article that appeared in the Boston Review, “up to 35 million people
90 percent civilians have been killed in 170 wars since the end ofWorld War II.”
The victims of the A-bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki wereundoubtedly victims of crimes against humanity, regardless of how weassess the decision to use such weapons of mass destruction in order toend the war. Yet what the Japanese also need to remember is the fact that
it was the Japanese Imperial Forces who engaged in indiscriminate
bombing first in the Asia Pacific region. The victims of Japan’s attacks
were Chinese civilians in Nanjing, Wuhan, Shanghai and Chongqing.
Chongqing, in particular, was specifically targeted and suffered more than
200 air raids over three years from the end of 1938, bringing the total
death toll up to 12,000. The Japanese Imperial Forces committed
massacres of civilians in various places in the Asia Pacific region, typified
by the case of the Nanjing Massacre in which at least 300,000 people
were killed. The Japanese were also perpetrators of many other types ofcrimes against humanity, including human experiments using
bacteriological and chemical weapons, the employment of such weapons
against Chinese civilians, the ill-treatment and massacre of prisoners ofwar, the sexual exploitation of tens of thousands of Asian in particular
Korean and Dutch women as “comfort women,” and the like.
Thus, the Japanese, who have had such historical experience, shouldbe able to comprehend the physical and psychological pain of the victims
of crimes against humanity and, at the same time, the heavy responsibilityof the perpetrators of such crimes. In other words, the Japanese have thecapability to understand crimes against humanity (in particular those of“mass killing” and “indiscriminate bombing”) as problems relevant to theirown experience from two opposing viewpoints: one as victims and theother as perpetrators. This dual perspective must be fully utilized toconfront the current situation of war and conflict as well as to promote
peace studies, peace education, and peace movements.
If peace-related activities in Hiroshima can overcome their existing
self-imposed restriction to nuclear issues and revitalize both realms ofresearch and peace action by embracing the above-mentioned perspectives,
Hiroshima will surely contribute to the fields of peace studies, peaceeducation, and peace movements far more widely and effectively. This
would seem to be the way of keeping the peace spirit of Hiroshima
vigorous for many more years to come.

−６−

Tanaka is professor at HPIHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.5 No.2 November 2002

Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century:A Message from Hiroshima”(This book, the fruits of two years of study, proposes concrete measures
toward nuclear disarmament, which should be taken immediately.)
The Nuclear-Weapon States made an unequivocal commitment toeliminate their nuclear stockpiles at the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty(NPT) Review Conference. How should we bring this commitment
into practice in the first 10 years of the 21st century? With this question
and a sense of crisis in mind, the Research Project on Nuclear
Disarmament in the 21st Century of the Hiroshima Peace Institute, led
by project leader Mitsuru Kurosawa, professor at the Osaka School ofInternational Public Policy, Osaka University, has pursued almost
continuous research since the spring of 2000. Its results were compiled
by HPI and published by Horitsubunkasha in September, 2002, under thetitle “Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century:A Message from
Hiroshima.” Five hundred forty-eight (548) pages in length, it is printed
on A5 paper and priced at 5,000 yen.
Following a preface by Jayantha Dhanapala, the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, the book consists of six sections. In
the first section, “The World Situation of Nuclear Weapons,” Japanese,
British, and American contributors analyze an international situation inwhich the U.S. has intensified its unilateral stance since the September
11th attacks. They also analyze the role of civil society and changes in
the role of offensive and defensive weapons.
In the second section, “Nuclear Policies and Nuclear Disarmament
Policies of Nuclear-Weapon States,” specialists from the U.S., Russia, theU.K., and France analyze and propose the process their governments
should follow in nuclear disarmament policies in the future. The specialists
are from four of the five nuclear powers (the exception is China), which
adopted the unequivocal commitment to eliminate their nuclear stockpiles
at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. As the book shows, the outlook fornuclear disarmament still seems bleak, if we depend solely on theinitiatives of the nuclear powers. On the other hand, this section presents
the possibility that one of the declared nuclear states, the U.K., will soon
possess no nuclear weapons.
In the third section, “Regional Issues Caused by Nuclear Weapons,”
current problems are analyzed in three regions: South Asia, the Middle
East and the Korean Peninsula. In South Asia, two de facto nuclear-weapon
states, India and Pakistan, are in a rivalry. In the Middle East, Israel isbelieved to have embarked on nuclear development in the 1970’s, andArab nations have been in conflict with Israel. As for the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), suspected nuclear development
there has been raising concern.
In the fourth section, “Non-Nuclear Policies and Nuclear
Disarmament Policies of Non-Nuclear Weapon States,” Australia, New
Zealand, Canada and Japan are cited as nations that are enthusiasticallypromoting non-nuclear or disarmament policies. In addition, this section
mentions the New Agenda Coalition as an international group eagerly
promoting a non-nuclear policy. Researchers from Japan and Canada, andalso an Irish diplomat, write about achievements so far and future tasks.
In the fifth section, “Concrete Measures for Nuclear Disarmament,”
specific measures for promoting nuclear disarmament are spelled out.
More precisely, this section discusses the following points: the outlook
for and significance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty, the possibility of denuclearization in the Southern
Hemisphere by linking nuclear-free-zone treaties, the role of the U.N. as
an important actor for nuclear disarmament, and the role of NGOs that
support the U.N. in civil society.
In the sixth section, “Conclusion,” based on the detailed discussions
in each chapter, Mitsuru Kurosawa makes a comprehensive proposal oftasks for nuclear disarmament, which should be put into action in the earlypart of the 21st century.
By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPIHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.5 No.2 November 2002

“Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century:A
Message from Hiroshima”
Contents
Preface
Introduction: Purpose and Contents of the ResearchPart 1 The World Situation of Nuclear Weapons
1 Nuclear Disarmament: From the 20th Century to the 21st Century
2 Towards Nuclear Disarmament
3 Shifting Paradigms: The Offense/Defense Debate and Nuclear
Disarmament
Part 2 Nuclear Policies and Nuclear Disarmament Policies of NuclearWeapon States
4 Nuclear and Nuclear Disarmament Policies of the U.S.
5 Nuclear and Nuclear Disarmament Policies of Russia
6 Present at the Creation: Nuclear Weapon Policies and Nuclear
Disarmament Policies of the United Kingdom
7 French Nuclear Policy: More Continuity Than ChangePart 3 Regional Issues Caused by Nuclear Weapons
8 Nuclear Development in South Asia
9 Issues of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East
10 Nuclear Issues in North Korea
Part 4 Non-Nuclear Polices and Nuclear Disarmament Policies of NonNuclear Weapon States
11 Non-Nuclear and Nuclear Disarmament Policies of Australia and New
Zealand
12 Non-Nuclear and Nuclear Disarmament Policies of Canada
13 Non-Nuclear and Nuclear Disarmament Policies of Japan
14 Non-Nuclear and Nuclear Disarmament Policies of the New Agenda
Coalition
Part 5 Concrete Measures toward Nuclear Disarmament
15 Ban on Nuclear Tests and Production of Nuclear Fissile Materials
16 Denuclearization in the Southern Hemisphere; Prospects forInterregional Cooperation
17 United Nations and Nuclear Disarmament: Overcoming a Lost
Opportunity
18 The Role of NGOs, with Special Interests in Japan
Part 6 Conclusion
19 Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century

A List of Authors (Writing Order)
Preface: Jayantha Dhanapala, the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for
Disarmament Affairs
Introduction, Chapter 1 and 19: Mitsuru Kurosawa, professor at the Osaka
School of International Public Policy, Osaka University
Chapter 2: Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director of the Acronym Institute,LondonChapter 3: Cathleen S. Fisher, Associate Director, American Institute forContemporary German Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Chapter 4: Lawrence Scheinman, Distinguished Professor of the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies office in Washington D.C., Monterey Institute ofInternational Studies
Chapter 5: Roland M. Timerbaev, Chairman of the Board and Senior Advisor
at the Center for Policy Studies, Russia
Chapter 6: John Simpson, Director of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear
Non-Proliferation (PPNN), Mountbatten Centre for International Studies,
University of Southampton, U.K.
Chapter 7: Therese Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy
Commission, Paris
Chapter 8: Osamu Yoshida, professor of law at Hiroshima University
Chapter 9: Hirofumi Tosaki, research fellow, Center for the Promotion of
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs
Chapter 10: Nobumasa Akiyama, assistant professor, Hiroshima Peace
Institute, Hiroshima City University
Chapter 11: Naoki Kamimura, professor of international studies at Hiroshima
City University
Chapter 12: Tariq Rauf, Head, Verification and Security Policy Coordination,
Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination, International Atomic
Energy Agency
Chapter 13: Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor, Hiroshima Peace
Institute, Hiroshima City University
Chapter 14: Darach MacFhionnbhairr, Director of Disarmament and NonProliferation Department of Foreign Affairs, Government of Ireland
Chapter 15: Masahiko Asada, professor of law, Kyoto University
Chapter 16: Yoko Ogashiwa, associate professor, Institute for Peace Science,
Hiroshima University
Chapter 17: Masamichi Kamiya, former visiting research fellow at Hiroshima
Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University, currently a staff member of Risshokosei-kai, a Buddhist Organization, Tokyo
Chapter 18: Hiromichi Umebayashi, president, The Peace Depot, Inc.,
Yokohama−７−

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

D I A R Y
July 1, 2002 - October 31, 2002
◆July 6-7 Kazumi Mizumoto attends the spring 2002 research meeting of the Japan Society
for Studies in Journalism and Mass Communication in Niigata.
◆July 9 HPI holds a research forum. Regine Mehl, Director of AFB-PRIUB, Peace ResearchInformation Unit, Bonn, gives a lecture titled “Non-Violent Civil Alternatives to War on
Terrorism.”◆July 11 Ikuko Togo gives a lecture on “Japan in the East Asian Security Environment” ina seminar for senior citizens in Furuichi, organized by and held at Furuichi Ward Community
Hall. Nobumasa Akiyama gives a lecture at an orientation session of the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) in Higashi Hiroshima.
◆July 12 Akiyama gives a lecture on “Japan and the World Situation I: Where Japan Stands
Now” in the second series of the Peace Education Course, organized by and held at Furuichi
Ward Community Hall.
◆July 15 Akiyama gives a lecture in a seminar on economic development policies held by
JICA in Tokyo.
◆July 17-19 Akiyama visits Washington D.C. for preparation of the 16th ACT Transcultural
Seminar organized by the Association for Communication of Transcultural Study (ACT).
◆July 19 Mizumoto gives a lecture on “Japan’s Self-Defense Forces” in the second seriesof the Peace Education Course, organized by and held at Furuichi Ward Community Hall.
◆July 26 Yuki Tanaka gives a lecture on “Japan and the World Situation II: Globalization
and Regional Conflicts” in the second series of the Peace Education Course, organized byand held at Furuichi Ward Community Hall.
◆July 29 Mizumoto gives a lecture on “Hiroshima and Peace” in a course on Hiroshimaof a training program for journalists organized by Hiroshima City, at the Hiroshima
International Conference Center.
◆July 30-August 2 Christian P. Scherrer attends as an observer the annual session of the
U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Geneva,
Switzerland. Scherrer meets with a number of indigenous representatives from around theworld.
◆July 31 HPI President Haruhiro Fukui attends a meeting on the introduction andpropagation of college courses about Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Mizumoto meets Martin
Sherwin, professor of history at Tufts University, to discuss the renovation of exhibits related
to the reasons for the dropping of the atomic bomb, at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
◆Aug. 1 Mizumoto attends the first preparatory meeting for the Peace Policy Promotion
Network Meeting, organized by the Hiroshima Prefectural Peace Policy Committee, at the
Chugoku Regional Research Center.
◆Aug. 3 HPI sponsors an international symposium, “Competing Memories of Hiroshima:
Quest for a New Role of Hiroshima’ for Peace and Reconciliation in the 21st Century,” atthe Hiroshima International Conference Center.
◆Aug. 4 Tanaka meets at HPI a visiting team of Chinese scholars investigating damage
caused by Chongqing air raids to discuss a possible joint research project.
◆Aug. 6 Tanaka meets at HPI the director of Vietnam’s War Remnants Museum to discussa possible joint research project on indiscriminate bombings, and Eugen Eichhorn, professorof mathematics at TFH-Berlin, to discuss college courses on Hiroshima and Nagasaki andpeace education in general.
◆Aug. 7 Mizumoto gives a lecture on “The Issues and Current State of Nuclear Weapons”
at a peace education course, “Do you know the horror of nuclear weapons?” organized byand held at Danbara Ward Community Hall.
◆Aug. 13-18 Tanaka visits the Chiran Peace Museum For Kamikaze Pilots and Kanoya Naval
Aviation Museum for documentary research on kamikaze pilots.
◆Aug. 19 Scherrer meets in Geneva officials of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights (UNHCHR), including the coordinator of the UNHCHR Indigenous andMinority team.
◆Aug. 24-25 Togo attends the Japan-Korea Dialogue on Chinese Studies Workshop at
Rikkyo University.
◆Aug. 26-Sept.15 Tanaka visits Melbourne, Canberra, and Sydney for research on Royal
Australian Navy battleships attacked by kamikaze pilots, and for an interview-based surveyof former Australian naval personnel.
◆Aug. 27 Mizumoto and Akiyama attend a round table meeting with Undersecretary Boltonof the U.S. Department of State, held in Tokyo under the auspices of the Center for the
Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, the Japan Institute of International Affairs.
◆Aug. 31-Sept.6 Akiyama serves as a coordinator at the 16th ACT Transcultural Seminarof the ACT Foundation, in Miyagi.

◆Sept. 2 Mizumoto attends the second preparatory meeting for the Peace Policy Promotion
Network Meeting, convened by the Hiroshima Prefectural Peace Policy Committee, at the
Chugoku Regional Research Center.
◆Sept. 7 Scherrer gives a lecture on “International Terrorism, Its Causes, Security Concerns
and Safety Standards in Different World Regions,” at a meeting of Futaba Ward Community
Hall’s Citizens’ Academy, Phase II, “Science of Peace.”◆Sept. 11 Scherrer attends the meeting on “Considering September 11th and the Resulting
Chain of Violence’,” organized by the Hiroshima Alliance for Nuclear Weapons Abolition(HANWA), at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, and takes part in a memorial service
at the A-bomb cenotaph. Mizumoto serves as a panelist in a symposium, “The Role of Local
Governments for Building Peace in the 21st Century,” at ANA Hotel Hiroshima.
◆Sept. 12 Akiyama gives a lecture at an orientation session of JICA in Higashi Hiroshima.
◆Sept. 14 Togo gives a lecture on “The Changing Power Balance in Asia” at a meeting of
Futaba Ward Community Hall’s Citizens’ Academy, Phase II, “Science of Peace.”◆Sept. 21 Mizumoto gives a lecture on “Is Japan at Peace?” at a meeting of Futaba Ward
Community Hall’s Citizens’ Academy, Phase II, “Science of Peace.”◆Sept. 28 Mizumoto gives a lecture on “Developments Related to Nuclear Weapons in the
Post-World War II World” at the 5th session of the Peace Club for Junior High and HighSchool Students, sponsored by Hiroshima City and the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum,at the Hiroshima Children’s Museum.
◆Oct. 8 Scherrer gives a lecture on “The Abuse of the 9.11 Terrorist Attacks by the Bush
Government and the Crisis of World Peace” at a Peace Forum sponsored by HANWA, at theHiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
◆Oct. 9 Fukui gives a lecture on “My View on Peace” at Kagawa Medical University. Tanaka
gives a lecture on “The Dispatch of Troops to the Korean Peninsula by Hideyoshi Toyotomi
from a Korean Perspective” in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City, at theHiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange. Tanaka, Scherrer,
Mizumoto, Akiyama, and Hitoshi Nagai meet U.N. Disarmament Fellows and discuss nuclear
issues at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
◆Oct. 11 Fukui gives a lecture on “The Peace Problem Now” at an annual meeting of theJapanese Society for Aesthetics, at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
◆Oct. 12 Scherrer gives a lecture on “Gross Human Rights Violations and War Against the
Oromo in Ethiopia” at the invitation of the Hiroshima Group of Amnesty International, at theWorld Friendship Center in Hiroshima.
◆Oct.12-13 Tanaka and Nagai attend the first workshop of HPI Research Project “Military
Violence Against Civilians A Comparative and Historical Analysis,” at HPI.
◆Oct. 16 Tanaka gives a lecture on “The Sino-Japanese War and Yukichi Fukuzawa’s View
of Asia” in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City, at the Hiroshima City Plaza
for Town Development through Citizen Exchange.
◆Oct. 23 Tanaka gives a lecture on “The Russo-Japanese War and Ryotaro Shiba’s HistoricalView” in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City, at the Hiroshima City Plaza
for Town Development through Citizen Exchange.
◆Oct. 26 Tanaka gives a lecture on “War and Sexual Violence: the Uniqueness of the Comfort
Women System and the Fundamental Characteristics of Sexual Exploitation” at the annual
conference of the Materialism Studies Association of Japan held at Takasaki City Universityof Economics. Mizumoto gives a lecture on “Nuclear Disarmament Efforts” at the 6th sessionof the Peace Club for Junior High and High School Students, organized by Hiroshima Cityand the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
Mizumoto gives a lecture on “The Achievements of and Tasks for Hiroshima” at the Hiroshima
Peace Forum organized by Hiroshima City and the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, atthe Hiroshima International Conference Center.
― Visitors to HPI ―◆July 9 Dr. Stein To/ nnesson, Director of International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO),
and J. Peter Burgess, Senior Researcher of PRIO.
◆July 15 Dr. Tetsuo Saito, Komeito member of the Lower House.
◆July 19 Tanya Bennett, Second Secretary at the Australian Embassy.
◆Aug. 5 Dr. Anthony DiFilippo, Professor of Sociology at Lincoln University. Dr. Ramesh
Thakur, Vice-Rector of the U.N. University in Tokyo.
◆Sept. 30 Paul Meyer, Minister and Deputy Head of Mission at the Canadian Embassy.
◆Oct. 10 Partha S. Ghosh, Director at the Indian Council of Social Science Research, and
Dr. Indra Ghosh.

− Employment Opportunities at HPI −Hiroshima Peace Institute at Hiroshima City University, Japan,
invites applications for the positions of research associate,assistant professor, associate professor, and/or professor.
Applicants should have a solid academic background in one or moreof the following areas: peace theory and methodology of peace
research; the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear holocausts; thedevelopment, production, deployment, proliferation, disarmament andabolition of nuclear and conventional weapons; international and civil
war, peace, conflict resolution, and security in the Asia-Pacific region;and pacifistic ideas, culture, and movements in the Asia-Pacific region.
Scholars in Northeast Asian or Southeast Asian area studies are

particularly welcome to apply.
Candidates should possess, or be in the process of obtaining,a doctorate. Fluency in English is required. Mature scholars (underage 60) are encouraged to apply. Applications must reach the Instituteby December 20, 2002. All appointments will be effective on dates
between July 1, 2003 and July 1, 2004.

For further information:
Tel: +81-82-544-7570; Fax: +81-82-544-7573
E-mail: yamazaki@peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp
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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWSVol.5, No.2 November 28, 2002
Copyright 2002 HPI All rights reserved

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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.5 No.2 November 2002