Hiroshima Peace InstituteVol.5 No.3 March 2003

The Dropping of the Atomic Bombs and a Shadow of the War
Crimes Issue
By Hitoshi Nagai
1. The Protest of the Japanese Government to the U.S.
On his return from the Potsdam Conference, then U.S. President
Harry S. Truman made a radio speech on August 9, 1945, in which heexplained to the American people the reasons for and significance of theatomic bombing of Hiroshima. The logic of saving the lives of American
soldiers, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese military, andthe abuse of prisoners of war by Japanese soldiers were given as reasonsfor the use of atomic bomb. Even immediately after the bombing ofHiroshima, we can find the germination of the logic justifying the atomic
bombing.
As Truman was explaining the significance of the atomic bombing,
the Japanese government was preparing a letter of protest to the U.S.
government. On August 10, it was delivered to Washington through the
Swiss government. In this protest, the Japanese government fiercely
criticized the U.S. government for the atomic bombing, calling it a crime
against international law and humanity, citing Articles 22 and 23 of therules concerning the laws and customs of war on land signed at The Hague
in 1907. The Japanese government also appealed to international opinion
by explaining the intentions of the protest to the International Committeeof the Red Cross. However, such a protest by the government was put
under seal after the end of the war. What lay behind the situation? I would
like to shed light on the root cause of it.
2. Logic to Offset the Atomic Bombings against the War Crimes Issue
On September 2, 1945, Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender,
reaffirmed its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, and promised to
implement the declaration faithfully. Japanese government offices andunits of the army and navy destroyed or concealed official documents inanticipation of the imminent pursuit of war criminals, since paragraph
10 of the declaration had stipulated stern justice to “all war criminals,
including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.”
The General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) soon begana full-scale investigation of war crimes, which caused some resentment
within the Japanese government and military. This is evident to someextent in the document entitled “Concerning the U.S. investigation ofAmerican soldiers executed as a result of a decision taken by the wartime
Japanese military tribunal (Gunritsu Kaigi),prepared by the Secretary of
the Committee Dealing with Postwar Issues (Shusen Shori [Kaigi]),” oneof the records released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is thoughtthat military officials prepared this document probably at the beginning

CONTENTSThe Dropping of the Atomic Bombs and a Shadow of the War Crimes Issue
by Hitoshi Nagai……1〜2
My Opinion about North Korea“Agreed Framework” Faces Imminent Revision by Hajime Izumi………………2
Pyongyang Nuclear Puzzle by Gavan McCormack………………………………3
New Challenges Posed by the International Criminal Court by Ikuko Togo …………4
First Research Workshop on “Confidence-Building Mechanism in East Asia” ………5
HPI’s first public lecture series ………………………………………………………5
HPI Research Forum
Non-Violent Civil Alternatives to War on Terrorism by Regine Mehl …………6
State Terrorism and Human Rights by Mark Selden…………………………6〜7
Scope and Limits of International Solidarity in the 1990s
by Jean-Marc Coicaud……7
Hello from HPI …………………………………………………………………………8
Diary ……………………………………………………………………………………8of September 1945 for discussion at the Committee Dealing with Postwar Issues, the highest policy-making body in the Japanese government
after the end of the war. Its focus was the case of some surviving crew
members of the U.S. planes who were executed in accordance with thedecisions of the wartime Japanese military tribunals. I would like to draw
attention to a statement in this document, which offers a justification of
the execution as a strategy to avoid a thorough investigation by the U.S.
army: “If the U.S. blames us for the execution of that American pilots,
Japan should emphasize at every opportunity that the U.S. should firstand immediately be accused of war crimes for its indiscriminate bombings,
especially the atomic bombings, as a means of forestalling a unilateral
investigation conducted solely by the U.S.”
Reading between the lines of this document, one senses the tension
among the officials concerned, who were on an extreme alert that things
might develop into the prosecution of war criminals. As indicated in thecomment given by an official of the army――“This is not meant to bea protest to be lodged with them, but rather to prepare ourselves”――theatomic bombing issue was not intended as an immediate negotiating cardby the Japanese government. Still, it is interesting that the atomic bombings
should be conceived of as a potential bargaining chip in dealing with thewar crimes issue and in blocking U.S. investigations. We can clearly see
a Japanese eagerness to thwart unilateral U.S. finger pointing by treating
the atomic bombings as a war crime and raising it as an issue to offset
Japanese responsibility for their own war crimes. But there was anothercomment, probably written by an official of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. It reads: “We should not try to offset the issue of the atomic
bombings against the war crimes issue. We will lose our dignity by doingso.” It suggests that there was an opinion current among policy-makers
that questioned the wisdom of raising the atomic bombing issue as acounterbalance to Japanese war crimes.
The logic of offsetting the atomic bombings against Japanese war
crimes was not a unique idea of the military staff. Indeed, it seems more
likely to have derived from civilian government officials. Mamoru
Shigemitsu, the Japanese Foreign Minister, sent a message to the Japanese
legations in Sweden, Switzerland and Portugal on September 13, advisingthem to exploit the atomic bomb question to the utmost in their propaganda
since the Americans were creating an uproar about Japanese mistreatmentof prisoners. A U.S. military official in charge of intercepting and analyzing
this secret telegram cast a keenly observant glance at Shigemitsu’s
statement and wrote in his report that the Japanese leaders intended toplay up the atomic bombings to offset publicity about Japan’s treatmentof Allied prisoners of war and internees.
Similarly, the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni,
wrote to a reporter of the Associated Press: “People of America, won’t
you forget Pearl Harbor? We Japanese people will forget the picture ofdevastation wrought by the atomic bomb.” This message was reported in
the U.S. on September 15, and in Japan on the following day. Such anaction of Prince Higashikuni also seems to have been an outgrowth of thesame logic. In other words, during the early stage of the U.S. occupationof Japan, the illegality of the atomic bombings tended to be seen as a usefulcard for Japan to play to slow down the pursuit of war criminals by the
Allies rather than as a problem in its own right. Statements by government
officials at the time seem to reflect neither a deep understanding of theunprecedented catastrophe caused by the atomic bombs nor a deep concern
for the citizens of the devastated cities. Rather, the offset logic highlights
the fact that concerns about war crimes were growing among Japanesepolitical leaders and for that reason the issue was regarded as a top priority
on the political front. The situation was more serious for the way the war
crimes problem impinged on the question of the postwar treatment ofEmperor Hirohito.
Continued on Page 2−１−Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

My Opinion“Agreed Framework” Faces Imminent Revision
By Hajime Izumi
It has been eight years since the “Agreed Framework” was signed between
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United Statesof America on October 21, 1994. Under this accord, Pyongyang pledged
to freeze for the time being and eventually dismantle its existing nuclear-related facilities. In return, the United States agreed to take the lead inorganizing a multinational consortium to build two safe, proliferationresistant light water reactors (LWRs; 1,000 MWe each) in North Korea.
Thus, a quid pro quo agreement was concluded between North Korea andthe international community.
Since then (or at least until December 2002), North Korea’s nuclear-related facilities in Yongbyong have been “frozen,” and the international
community has implemented its commitment to build LWRs through the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), aninternational consortium established in 1995, while delivering 500,000
tons of heavy fuel oil per year to North Korea. It can thus be said that,for the past eight years, we have been free from the imminent threat ofNorth Korean nuclear weapon development. This is because thecommitment made in the Agreed Framework prevented North Korea frommass-producing weapons-grade plutonium.
However, circumstances have significantly changed since the fall of
2002. When James A. Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asianand Pacific Affairs, visited Pyongyang in October as an envoy, North Korea
admitted that it was pursuing a program to produce highly-enricheduranium for nuclear weapons.
The international community was astonished at North Korea’s“acknowledgement” that a uranium enrichment program was under way
and strongly urged it to promptly eliminate that program in a visible andverifiable manner. In November 2002, the KEDO Executive Board madea statement condemning North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons as aclear and serious violation of its obligations under the Agreed Framework.
The KEDO Executive Board also decided to suspend heavy oil deliveries
beginning with the December shipment as a punishment for the North’s
secret nuclear program (as a result, delivery of approximately 60,000 tonsof the 500,000 tons of heavy oil assigned to be shipped to North Korea
in 2002 was suspended).
However, North Korea did not change its attitude, but took an evenmore defiant stance, threatening to “unfreeze” its nuclear-related facilities
in Yongbyong in December 2002 on the pretext of alleviating energy
shortages worsened by the suspension of the heavy oil deliveries.
Furthermore, North Korea announced in January 2003 that it would
withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the second
time it has done so in the past 10 years.
Such a series of commitment violations by North Korea hassignificantly impaired the effectiveness of the Agreed Framework. It would
now seem difficult to maintain the present Agreed Framework, even if
North Korea dismantles its uranium enrichment program, re-freezes its
nuclear-related facilities, and takes back its declaration of withdrawal fromthe NPT. In such a case, it would be necessary to make amendments to

the Agreed Framework or to conclude a completely new treaty.
Particularly regarding the LWR construction project promoted by
KEDO, given the current atmosphere in the United States, it has become
extremely difficult to carry out the construction of the “Korean standard-model” reactors. We should now recognize that these reactors will not
be completed without the participation of U.S. companies. If the U.S.
government does not conclude a nuclear power agreement with the DPRK,
the Korean standard-model LWRs will never function as atomic reactors,
even though the South Korean government continues to cover most of theconstruction costs and the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO)
continues to undertake the construction work.
Therefore, we need to consider other alternatives in case North Korea
makes some concessions. Possible alternatives include: 1) providing a
conventional thermal power plant instead of the two LWRs; 2) continuing
the construction of one of the LWRs, but replacing the other with a thermal
power plant; and 3) continuing construction of one of the LWRs, but
stopping construction of the other and developing North Korea’s power
grid instead.
As the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, clearlystated, alternative plan 1), described above, has been under discussion in
the United States. The opinion that electric power demand in North Korea
should be met not by nuclear power but by conventional power generation
has become dominant in Washington. North Korea, which has so far
brought about two nuclear crises and twice declared its withdrawal fromthe NPT, is regarded as having virtually renounced its right to pursue thepeaceful use of nuclear energy.
On the other hand, South Korea regards the construction of LWRs
as a “project transcending the national border (38th parallel),” and does
not look favorably on alternative plan 1). This is because, if the LWRs
are built, approximately 80% of the entire construction cost will be paid
to South Korean construction companies. However, if a conventional
thermal power plant is constructed, it will increase the chance forcompanies in other countries to participate in the construction work,
resulting in lower profits for South Korean companies. It is hard to imagine
that the Republic of Korea (ROK) would willingly accept a frameworkin which, while construction of the thermal plant is undertaken bycompanies from other countries, it would continue to shoulder 70% of
the total construction costs. For this reason, South Korea seems to favor
adopting alternative plan 3), outlined above.
As a result, it will be extremely difficult to secure coordination
between the United States and South Korea regarding this issue. Givensuch a situation, Japan must immediately determine what position it willtake toward the North Korean issue. To this end, we should first begin
by raising awareness and interest among the general public in order topromote lively discussions on this matter.
Izumi is professor at University of Shizuoka

The Dropping of the Atomic Bombs and a Shadow of the War Crimes Issue
3. Conclusion
On October 24, 1945, the U.S. government responded to the letterof protest the Japanese government had presented immediately after theatomic bombing. The reply in effect ignored the Japanese protest since
it did not contain any opinion of the U.S. government about the subjectof the Japanese protest, but simply acknowledged the receipt of it. Since
that time, the Japanese government has neither iterated the charges against
the U.S. government nor dared to appeal to world opinion. As a result,it has never been clearly stated as an official Japanese government viewthat the atomic bombings were a violation of international law. The huge
gap between the statement issued by the Japanese government and thosemade by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki regarding the legitimacy

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of the use of nuclear weapons at the International Court of Justice at The
Hague in November 1995 is still fresh in our memory. It is quite possiblethat the firm attitude of GHQ, typified by its control of the press, caused
Japan to shrink back and led to its decision not to further pursue its caseabout the illegality of the use of the atomic bombs. However, it cannot
be denied that the way the issue was framed at an early stage of the U.S.
occupation, namely, the recourse to the logic of offsetting the atomic
bombing issue against the war crimes issue, severely limited policy options
thereafter.

−２−

Nagai is research associate at HPIHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.5 No.3 March 2003

about North Korea
Pyongyang Nuclear Puzzle
By Gavan McCormack
Crisis looms again in Korea. In December Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld declared U.S. readiness to fight wars on two fronts (meaning
Iraq and North Korea), confident of “winning decisively in one and swiftly
defeating in the case of the other.” Steps to refer the disputed nuclear issues
to the U.N. Security Council were foreshadowed and the possibility ofsanctions, intrusive inspections, and an “Iraq scenario” loomed. On New
Year’s Day, President Bush made efforts to talk the situation down, but
the standoff continues. North Korea’s nuclear designs remain shrouded
in mystery, while its political isolation and economic crisis deepen.
The previous crisis, in 1994, went to the very brink of war. It was
settled by the Jimmy Carter mission and a subsequent agreement between
the U.S. and North Korea, known as the Geneva Agreed Framework. North
Korea shelved its graphite nuclear reactor plans in return for an American
proposal to construct light water reactors to generate 2,000 MW ofelectricity by a target date of 2003 and to supply 500,000 tons per yearof heavy oil for energy generation in the interim. Other clauses committed
the two parties to “move towards full normalization of political andeconomic relations” [Article 2] and the U.S. to provide “formal assurances
to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the UnitedStates” [Article 3].
Nine years have passed. There are no light-water reactors. In fact,
there is nothing much but a large hole in the ground and no prospect ofany power generation till around the end of this decade. And, far fromany progress towards the normalization of political and economic
relations, George W. Bush at the outset of his presidency called North
Korea part of an “axis of evil,” and in place of “formal assurances,” talkedof a preemptive attack and indicated a willingness to use nuclear weapons
as part of it.
If, therefore, Pyongyang has plainly departed from the Agreed
Framework, it did so after the agreement had already been substantiallyvoided by the U.S., in respect of the reactor commitment, the promised
normalization and the nuclear guarantee. Its earliest breach seems to havebeen the purchase of centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment,
probably from Pakistan, in the late 1990s. Possession of this technology,
but not its use, was admitted in October 2002. The steps in December
towards restarting the graphite reactors were even more plainly reactive.
However, there is nothing to indicate that either technology is operatingyet.
In 2000, following the William Perry report, there was a briefhoneymoon in North Korea’s relationship with the U.S. The Kumchangri
site, suspected of secret nuclear weapon development, was investigatedand found to be “clean.” Washington developed a grudging respect for
Pyongyang, top-level visits were exchanged and normalization seemed
to be possible. A Pyongyang visit by Clinton did not eventuate, however,
because time ran out, and under George W. Bush the clock was turned
back. The Agreed Framework became a Clinton mistake, something to
be voided and then scrapped. Pyongyang’s current threats to enrichuranium and moves to restart the plutonium-producing reactors are best
seen as a desperate ploy to try to bring Washington back to the conferencetable rather than as an incomprehensible threat to innocent neighbors.
North Korea’s real uniqueness in the nuclear age is in its having lived
under the shadow of nuclear threat for longer than any other nation, fromthe Korean War when General MacArthur had to be restrained from his

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.5 No.3 March 2003

plan to drop “between 30 and 50 atomic bombs” and lay a belt ofradioactive cobalt across the neck of the Korean peninsula, through thelong Cold War, when the U.S. introduced nuclear artillery, mines, andmissiles into Korea to intimidate the non-nuclear North, and after it, whenrehearsals continued for a long-range nuclear bombing strike. After facing
the threat of extermination for half a century, it would be surprising if
North Korea did not now show signs of neurosis and instability.
The people who best know North Korea are the people of South
Korea. There, in late 2002 the anger that was bringing large crowds into
the streets was directed not against North Korea but against America.
Gallup polls show nearly 60% of Koreans in the South no longer believethat North Korea poses a security threat, and a majority also believe
Pyongyang is “sincere in its efforts for reunification.” On 19 December,the election of 56-year old Roh Moo-hyun as president signified the riseof a post-Cold War generation and a new resolve to resist U.S. pressures.
Roh insisted that he would not kowtow to Washington, he would notsupport the imposition of a deadline for Pyongyang’s compliance withinternational demands to end its nuclear program and, if necessary, hewould “guarantee North Korea’s security.”
War against North Korea is virtually impossible if South Korea says
No. Even in 1994, Clinton was shocked to find that South Korea under
its then conservative administration would not commit a single soldier tothe U.S. cause. As president from 1998, Kim Dae-jung concentrated on
his “sunshine” policy of engaging Pyongyang on a broad range of
economic and social issues. Meeting George W. Bush in February 2002,
he reminded him of the 1994 Pentagon assessment that any war on thepeninsula would be likely to cause casualties of astronomical proportions,
including probably more American deaths than for the entire, decade-long
Vietnam War. In Seoul in early December, Richard Armitage wasdisconcerted to find a government more interested in securing a revisionof the Status of Forces Agreement (so that it could discipline U.S. soldiersin Korea in future) than in any talk of war. Under President Roh, this“recalcitrance” is likely to intensify. His readiness to “guarantee North
Korea’s security” suggested that in a showdown South Korea would be
as likely to fight with Pyongyang as against it.
North Korea is easiest to represent as bizarre, incomprehensible, or“evil,” yet like all states it is the product of its history. In this case, one
constructed first around the guerrilla bands that fought against Japan in
the 1930s and their foundation myths, and then around its survival fora half century under the threat of extinction at the hands of the global
superpower. Only when peace is reached with Japan and the U.S. can there
be any prospect of the dissolution of such a “guerrilla state.” Today, drastic
economic reforms, moves to open road and rail links with South Korea(and to join the trans-continental system), the growing network of
economic cooperation being negotiated with South Korea and its apology
to Japan over past misdeeds, all point to a will for change in Pyongyang.
The indications are that it is no longer monolithic, and that powerfulelements want to set aside the guerrilla model of secrecy, mobilization,
absolute loyalty to the commander and priority to the military to pursue
Perestroika (for which in 2001 the Korean word kaegon was coined). They
want to come in from the cold.

−３−

McCormack is professor at Australian National University

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New Challenges Posed by the International Criminal Court

By Ikuko Togo

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is scheduled to be established at
The Hague in Holland by the Rome Statute, which came into effect on
July 1, 2002. This article aims to provide a simple introduction to the
new institution.
1. What is the ICC?
Crimes committed during war or conflict between states have in thepast been tried by special ad hoc courts like the Nuremberg Tribunal,
which tried Nazi war criminals after WW , the Tokyo Tribunal, whichinvestigated Japanese war crimes, the International Criminal Tribunal forthe former Yugoslavia established in 1993 to try Serbian war criminals,
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, set up to investigate
genocide in Rwanda in 1994. In the two earlier tribunals, the winners
were obviously in the position of judging the losers. The last two tribunals
were established by international agreement based upon the decisions of
the United Nations Security Council. In principle, they seem fair, but
judgements are not wholly free from the biased intentions of powerfulstates in the U.N. Security Council. The International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia targeted war crimes and genocide committed
by Serbs, rather than by non-Serbs. In the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, the particular target of judgements was genocide committed
by the Hutu against the Tutsi, although during the disturbances slaughter
was committed by both sides. The ICC, on the other hand, is a permanentinternational judicial body with the authority to try individuals for
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
The International Court of Justice, ICJ, established in 1946, is anotherpermanent court with the power to adjudicate disputes among nations
according to international law. However, its jurisdiction is limited to states.



2. Preparations for the Establishment of the ICC and Progress in
the Ratification of the Rome StatuteLearning from the lessons of the tragic events in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the post-Cold War period, representatives from
160 governments, international organizations and NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) participated in the United Nations
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court in July 1998 and adopted the “Rome Statute of theInternational Criminal Court.” More than 70 states had ratified the Rome
Statute by July 1, 2002, when the treaty came into effect. To date, 139
states have signed the agreement, and 88 of them had ratified it by January
31, 2003.
Although the U.S. was reluctant to approve the establishment of the
ICC from the start, the Clinton administration signed the Rome Statuteon December 31, 2001. However, the present Bush administration issued
an unprecedented declaration in May 2002 to the effect that it would
nullify the U.S. signature out of fear that U.S. soldiers abroad might beheld criminally responsible on political grounds. At present, among thepermanent members of the U.N. Security Council, only France and the
U.K. have ratified the statute. Russia has signed but not yet ratified the
document, and China has not signed it. Japan has not signed either, on
the pretext that it does not have a domestic law authorizing the extraditionof a defendant.

3. What does the ICC Judge?
Massive violations of human rights and crimes against humanity are
not only domestic issues in the countries concerned but are also of great
concern to the international community since they constitute crimes
against human-kind that transcend national borders. The ICC has
jurisdiction over the crime of genocide (killing with the intent ofdestroying a national, ethnic, racial or religious group), crimes against
humanity (murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible
eviction of populations, torture, sexual violence, enforced disappearanceof persons, apartheid, etc.), war crimes and crimes of aggression. However,this last type will not be subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction until aninternational agreement is reached on the definitions of the crimes
involved and the conditions for the exercise of the jurisdiction. Please refer
to Article 5, 121, 123. The jurisdiction of the ICC is neither limited bytime nor region. Moreover, it is not limited to crimes committed in wartime
or in conflict, but its jurisdiction also extends to crimes committed inpeacetime.
4. Limits and Potentialities of the ICC
The ICC is empowered to judge relevant crimes according tointernational humanitarian law, but the following problems should be
noted.
First, although prosecution by the ICC is free from the statute oflimitations, crimes committed before the establishment of the ICC cannot
be prosecuted. Many crimes committed in the past are thus beyond its
jurisdiction.
Second, prosecution is limited to crimes committed either by
nationals of or within the territory of a state which has ratified the Rome
Statute (referred to as state party in the Statute). However, in cases where
the defendant is a national of a state party, where the crime is committed
within the territory of a state party, where a member or members of aforeign military force commit a crime within the territory of a state party,or the U.N. Security Council refers a case to the court, the ICC may
prosecute crimes involving a non-state party.
Third, the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of a criminal require
the cooperation of a state party. The ICC is governed by a basic rule known
as “the principle of complementarity,” which authorizes the ICC to involve
itself only in cases where national courts are unable to deal with a crime.
5. The ICC and the International Community
It was in light of the experiences in the two world wars fought inthe 20th century, followed by a number of other tragic wars and conflicts
that the international community decided to establish a permanentinternational criminal court. However, the efforts and cooperation ofnumerous NGOs around the world provided the actual driving force
behind the movement to establish the ICC.
Whether or not the International Criminal Court will succeed in the
21st century depends critically on how many more states will ratify theRome Statute and whether it proves capable of judging all cases brought
before it fairly and impartially and without regard to the views and interestsof the sovereign states.
Togo is assistant professor at HPIVisit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm−４−

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.5 No.3 March 2003

First Research Workshop on “ConfidenceBuilding Mechanism in East Asia”
On November 2 and 3, the first research workshop was held for the“Confidence-Building Mechanism in East Asia” project at the Hiroshima
Peace Institute.
Prior to the workshop, each participant prepared a draft paper on the
country assigned, focusing on the following discussion points:
1) What are the major and/or contending conceptualizations ofconfidence-building measures (CBMs) in the country concerned?
2) By what policymaking processes are confidence-building measuresdesigned and developed in the country concerned? How are they
actually implemented?
3) How much priority is accorded to confidence-building measures in
the national security policy of the country concerned? How are theireffects assessed and evaluated by the respective government?
Participants engaged in active discussion of the above-mentioned
questions in reference to each country and shared ideas on the issues
affecting confidence-building measures in East Asia at present.
Clear differences emerged among the countries in the priority given
to important security policies. Each country puts into operation CBMs
based on its own conceptualization. Confidence-building in East Asia
should not be narrowly defined as a reference to military measures, as it
is customarily defined in European countries, but more broadly to include
political and economic measures as well. “Confidence-Building Mechanism”
is a new expression, it is a broad and comprehensive concept that need
be clarified and developed in the course of this project.
It was agreed that each participant should prepare a final paper forthe second workshop based on the discussion at the first workshop. The
second workshop will be held in Tokyo on May 24 and 25.

Participants of the first workshop:[Planning Committee]
Yoshihide Soeya, Professor, Dept. of Law, Keio University (Chairman); Akihiko
Tanaka, Professor, the University of Tokyo; Seiichiro Takagi, Director, 2nd Research
Dept., the National Institute for Defense Studies; Hajime Izumi, Professor, Dept. ofInternational Relations, University of Shizuoka (absent); Ikuko Togo, AssistantProfessor, HPI; Nobumasa Akiyama, Assistant Professor, HPI (observer)[Project Members]
Mely Anthony, Assistant Professor, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Gennady Chufrin, Deputy Director, Institute of World Economy and International
Relations (IMEMO), Russia
Changsu Kim, Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, SouthKorea
Fu-Kuo Liu, Associate Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, National
Chengchi University, Taiwan
Benjamin Self, Senior Associate, Henry Stimson Center, U.S.A.
Scott Snyder, Korea Representative, the Asia Foundation
Xu Xin, Associate Professor, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, China
Akiko Fukushima, Head of Policy Research and Senior Fellow, National Institutefor Research Advancement, Japan (absent owing to research travel abroad)

By Ikuko Togo, assistant professor at HPI

HPI’s First Public Lecture Series
The Hiroshima Peace Institute ran its first public lecture series, comprisingnine lectures, over the two months from early October to early December
2002. The lectures were held at the Hiroshima City Plaza for Town
Development through Citizen Exchange every Wednesday evening, eachfor one and a half hours followed by a half hour of discussion. Unlike
our irregularly-scheduled “Forum,” where a guest scholar is invited topresent an academic paper for a predominately specialist audience
working in the field of peace studies and/or activities, this lecture series
aimed to present and explain the results of our research activities to thecitizens of Hiroshima as plainly as possible. It was hoped that the people
who attended this series would be able to utilize the knowledge they gained
to develop their own ideas about peace issues.
The lectures were given under the general title of “Memories andthe Future of Northeast Asia: Towards a Mutual Understanding of Asian
People in the 21st Century.” One of the important purposes of theselectures was to clarify the modern history of Japan’s relationships withneighboring Asian nations, in particular with Korea and China, and to
examine closely the kinds of international frictions caused by memory
gaps about major historical events involving Japan and those neighboring
nations. In other words, the series aimed not simply to trace thechronological details of major international events concerning thesenations but to analyze the causes of important historical incidents suchas the Sino-Japanese War and Japan’s colonization of Korea. This wasfollowed by an examination of gaps in Japanese, Korean and Chineseinterpretations of such events, in an attempt to explore ways to build
peaceful relationships between these nations.
The relationships between Japan and South Korea and between Japanand China have recently improved considerably. In particular, Japan’s
relationship with South Korea became more intimate as a result of theirco-hosting of the World Cup in 2002. Yet, as demonstrated by thecontinuing controversy over school textbooks, ways of interpreting andmemorizing historical events, in particular events related to the AsiaPacific War, is still a cause for serious international frictions in this cornerof Asia. Japan’s relationship with North Korea is also very tense, due tothe abduction and nuclear missile issues. It was thus a timely and

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.5 No.3 March 2003

worthwhile exercise to run this series of lectures to reconsider and discuss
how historical events like the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-JapaneseWar, Japan’s colonization of Korea and invasion of China still affectJapan’s current relationships with neighboring nations, and how we might
overcome such problems.
This lecture series was very popular and attracted well over the 60
people who initially applied to attend. Heated discussion often took place
during question time, and at the end of the series many participants
requested that a similar lecture series be held in 2003. In order to meetthis request, we are planning to run a new course later this year.
By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
Title and Lecturer
No.1 Oct.9 “The Dispatch of Troops to the Korean Peninsula by Hideyoshi Toyotomi−５−――from a Korean Perspective.” Lecturer: Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
No.2 Oct. 16 “The Sino-Japanese War and Yukichi Fukuzawa’s View of Asia.” Lecturer:
Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
No.3 Oct. 23 “The Russo-Japanese War and Ryotaro Shiba’s Historical View.” Lecturer:
Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
No.4 Oct. 30 “Anti-Japanese War: Gaps between Memories and Recognitions.”
Lecturer: Masumi Matsumoto, associate professor at Keiwa College
No.5 Nov.13 “What Is ‘The Responsibility after World War ’?: To Create Orderof Peace in Northeast Asia.” Lecturer: Tetsuya Takahashi, associate professor
at University of Tokyo
No.6 Nov.20 “Various Aspects of the Treatment of Prisoners of War during World
War :A Comparative Study.” Lecturer: Hitoshi Nagai, research associate at HPI
No.7 Nov.27 “The Past and the Present of the Comfort Women Issue Related to
Nationalism.” Lecturer: Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI
No.8 Dec.4 “Memories of Hiroshima: Perceptions and Interpretations of the U.S.,
Asian Countries and Japan.” Lecturer: Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor
at HPI
No.9 Dec.11 “The Future of Northeast Asia: To Deepen Citizens’ Mutual
Understanding.” Lecturer: Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

HPI Research Forum
July 9, 2002

Title: Non-Violent Civil Alternatives to War
on Terrorism

should be in a democratic society. The participants found instead that

Speaker: Dr. Regine Mehl, Director of AFBPRIUB, Peace Research Information Unit,
Bonntools of the U.S. quest for supremacy.

U.S.-influenced media intensified the war drumming and behaved like

Fortunately, sub-state actors have not yet employed the mostdangerous means: 9-11 took place without the use of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Yet, actually, some of the most dangerous means
already used by sub-state actors have been WMD, as in the case of the

The questions Dr. Mehl raised could not be more relevant: “Did 11

Sarin gas attack by the Aum Sect in Japan. There are fears about dirty

September 2001 introduce a qualitatively new kind of terrorism?” “Didn’tbombs and nuclear terrorism. These fears are justified, and the U.N. should

we know that state terrorism and the private use of terrorism as a means

lead the effort to prevent such threats.

to an end has a long history?” “Weren’t the terrorist attacks used by the

The participants discussed evidence that bin Laden is a creation of

U.S. as an occasion to realize its hidden agenda and to teach its allies

the United States. (As analyzed by Ahmed Rashid, author of Taliban andhow to use them for such a purpose?” Meanwhile, aggressive war

Jihad ，and others, Islamist terror was invented 25 years ago and financed

drumming by the U.S. reveals that the hidden agenda again dominates

by the U.S., Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.) An answer to the question “Whatworld politics. Dr. Mehl took a deeper look into the relationship of state

made al-Qaeda turn against its master?” might contribute significantly toand civil society. She called for analysis of the atavistic U.S. regression

an understanding of sub-state terrorism, but the U.S. seems unready tointo a “crusading mentality” against so-called “rogue states.” Indeed, there

address this question. Participants also felt that, if an attempt were madeis need for a critical view of what the U.S. terms “security” andto eliminate al-Qaeda, many other organizations would simply spring up“constabulary duties” (Wolfowitz) mean to us and to those who may

to replace it. It is necessary to address the root causes of sub-state terrorism

become its targets.

――for instance, the Middle East conflict and U.S. blunders regarding

Almost silenced by the phony war drumming, nonviolent and civil

the Israel-Palestine question, as well as its attempt to militarize the Middle

alternatives are all but forgotten. Responses to terrorism need to take into

Eastern region. For many people the “war on terrorism” appears rather

account historical contexts and to be guided by intercultural understanding

to be a war against Islam.

if they are to contribute to a solution. Dr. Mehl called for a cooperative
partnership at eye level. The role of the media is especially important,

By Christian P. Scherrer, professor at HPI

yet most mass media failed to function as the independent powers they

November 12, 2002

Title: State Terrorism and Human Rights;
The United States, Japan and the
Civilians in Twentieth Century Asian
Wars
Speaker: Dr. Mark Selden, professor at the State
University of New York, Binghamton

the Korean War and the Vietnam War. In response to the various military
conflicts that occurred both in Asia and Europe during the 20th century,
a world-wide effort was directed toward establishing international law andlaw enforcing organizations to protect basic human rights, notably thoseof civilians in wartime. Paradoxically, however, serious violations ofhuman rights on an unprecedented scale――in particular those of civilians――have been committed by military forces. These have increased with

The underlying theme of Professor Selden’s paper was the question of

the passage of time, changes in the nature of warfare, and technological

how we should interpret terrorist acts such as that of September 11, 2001,

advance. Moreover, such violations have increased not only in number,the subsequent U.S. war in Afghanistan, a potential war against Iraq in

but also in degree.

the near future and other related occurrences. His comprehensive paper

Selden gave various examples of human rights violations in major

analyzed major wars in Asia involving the U.S. and Japan during the lastwars in Asia to illuminate this paradoxical development. As

century. This kind of broad historical examination is vital for

quintessentially Japanese examples, he cited the Nanjing Massacre, theunderstanding the fundamental nature of modern warfare and present

comfort women system and the vivisectionist experiments conducted onmilitary conflicts.

humans by Unit 731 using biological and chemical agents. As similar

Selden employed two concepts――“human rights” and “the civilian”

examples committed by U.S. forces, he highlighted indiscriminate――as the key to a comprehensive and comparative analysis of different

bombings using napalm, atomic bombs and “agent orange.” A concern

types of wars in Asia, including the Sino-Japanese War, the Pacific War,to protect the human rights of civilians in war situations was evident at

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm−６−

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.5 No.3 March 2003

the international war crimes courts established immediately after World

protect the rights of civilians. The concern expressed by those participants

War II. Yet, as Selden pointed out, there has been a continuity ofwas quite natural because, since September 11, the U.S. government has

indiscriminate bombings against civilians in the Korean War, the Vietnam

issued new military and foreign guidelines which ignore the legacy ofWar, and more recently still in the war in Afghanistan. He defined suchinternational law built upon the experience of wars and conflicts in theindiscriminate bombings by the U.S. as a type of “state terrorism.” He

20th century. Selden’s paper was especially stimulating at a time when

noted, further, the impunity with which the U.S. has been able to commit

concrete ideas were urgently needed to reduce the gap between law andstate terrorism in contrast, for example, to the experience of Germany andpractice and to find peaceful methods to resolve military conflicts.

Japan at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals.
During the discussion time, questions and comments by participants

By Yuki Tanaka, professor at HPI

centered upon the gap between international law and the actual failure to
December 16, 2002

Title: Scope and Limits of International
Solidarity in the 1990s

the U.N. has made a major effort to address them: the Brahimi report andSpeaker: Dr. Jean-Marc Coicaud, senioracademic programme officer in the Peace
and Governance Program, United Nations
University in Tokyo

limitations of the Secretariat and formulate institutional solutions.

subsequent implementation reports by the U.N. do address technicalThe lack of political will among key member states revealed itself
in the reluctance of some permanent members of the Security Council toengage internationally in addressing the humanitarian crises of the past
10 years and in their limited commitment in the search for solutions. The

The main topic of Dr. Coicaud’s lecture was analysis of United Nations

new context in the aftermath of the Cold War brought a measure of change

Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) in the 1990s. Lively discussion

to key aspects of international affairs in the 1990s. There was afollowing the lecture centered on what was meant by solidarity, theredistribution of political power mainly toward the U.S. There was alsoquestion of political will and interplay between the United Nations anda new incentive to extend a sense of international solidarity to the areas

the major powers, especially the U.S.

in crisis. Participants voiced the opinion that in practice there was too

In a review of criticisms of PKOs in the 1990s, Dr. Coicaud
underlined the institutional limitations of the U.N. as a “headquarters

much ethnocentrism and racial bias guiding the U.N. The priority of thenational over the international surfaced as vested interests.

organization.” According to Dr. Coicaud, three institutional limitations

Participants debated that while on the surface much of the 1980s andare at the core of the malfunctioning of the U.N. Secretariat and account1990s was dominated by the human rights rhetoric of the Western powers,

for some of what went wrong in PKOs in the 1990s: (1) the U.N. is a

the U.S. struggle for supremacy all but turned this upside down. It was

headquarters organization, not a global organization, (2) there is a gap

mentioned that in all wars initiated by Western powers since 1945,

between the headquarters and the field, and (3) tension exists between

especially those begun by the U.S., civilian populations were the prime

diplomatic and bureaucratic culture, on the one hand, and operational andtargets; e.g. the bombing of many countries, among them Korea, Vietnam,

military culture, on the other. The headquarters (HQ) seem too preoccupied

Laos, Cambodia and, more recently, Panama 1989, Iraq 1991, Yugoslavia

with themselves to make the world a priority, and the political logic of1999 and Afghanistan 2001-2. Another pattern was U.S.-supported attacks

the headquarters prevails over operational needs in the field. Gaps between

by client regimes on their own populations or neighbouring states, as in

HQ and field are institutional in several aspects; e.g. the fact that field

Indonesia 1965, Chile 1973, and East Timor 1975/76, to name only the

careers and headquarters careers are two totally different career tracks.

deadliest instances.

Officers in the HQ have little knowledge of what the field is about.

U.S. concerns influencing PKOs include the zero casualty and “Force

The classic instance of the latter was the inability of General Dallaire

Protection” policy (no body bags coming home), which have priority overin Rwanda to convince the HQ in spring 1994 that massive killings were

the protection of civilians. As of today, the U.S. abstains almost completely

about to happen, and again, in April 1994, that genocide was taking placefrom all PKOs. Today, the NATO force in tiny Kosovo is larger than theand something had to be done to stop it. Participants saw this example

total number of peacekeepers in the rest of the world!

as proof of the destructive great power interference of France, which was

In the past media reports made it difficult for major powers to shy

in complicity with the génocidaires, as well as of the U.S., which blockedaway from humanitarian crises. Participants mentioned that media

every response.

independence will become problematic in the future with major powers

Participants asked what was meant by solidarity and between whom,trying to control the global flow of information or even censoring by denialreferred to trouble with certain member states and also mentionedof access, as the U.S. did before the October 2001 attack on Afghanistan.

Brahimi’s reform package to improve PKOs. It was suggested that not
all that went wrong in the PKOs of the 1990s had to do with U.N.

By Christian P. Scherrer, professor at HPI

pathologies. As for the self-generated limitations of the U.N. Secretariat,

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.5 No.3 March 2003

−７−

Visit HPI’s web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

Hello from HPI
Hiroko Takahashi Research Associate

Dr. Wade Huntley Associate Professor

Hiroko Takahashi was born in Nishinomiya, Hyogo Prefecture.
She specializes in American history. She studied at Doshisha
University, and graduated from the Master’s Degree Program of
the Department of Cultural History, the Faculty of Letters,
Doshisha University Graduate School (Master of Letters). She
then studied at the Graduate School of the University of Maryland,
mainly at the U.S. National Archives in College Park, where she collected documents
concerned with the atomic bombs and nuclear tests.
Takahashi states: “Documents concerned with the atomic bombs (especially thosecontaining medical information) were strictly controlled by the U.S. government
throughout the 1940s, 50s and 60s. Documents on the Hibakusha casualties caused
by U.S. nuclear tests only began to be declassified in the 1990s. Here in Hiroshima,taking these historical facts into consideration, I would like to consider how to share
this important information with the rest of the world and to communicate it to future
generations.”

Wade Huntley specializes in international security, nuclear arms
control, and Asia-Pacific political relations. He received his Ph.D.
from the University of California, Berkeley, and directed the Peaceand Security Program at the Nautilus Institute located in the samecity. He also served as a Research Associate with the Instituteof East Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.
Dr. Huntley states: “I am very excited by the opportunity to join HPI, and I intend
to develop several types of projects. First, I will undertake policy-relevant research
to increase knowledge and broaden understanding about current U.S. strategic policy
and its effects in East Asia. Second, I will investigate how domestic democratization
can support international peace. Third, I will work to build partnerships between the
Hiroshima Peace Institute and other organizations in the United States and elsewherein the world. With these endeavors I hope to help my colleagues increase theeffectiveness and visibility of HPI throughout the world.”

D I A R Y
October 30, 2002 - February 28, 2003
◆Oct. 30 The HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City is held at the Hiroshima
City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange. Masumi Matsumoto, associate
professor at Keiwa College, gives a lecture on “Anti-Japanese War: Gaps between Memories
and Recognitions.”◆Oct. 31-Nov. 1 Nobumasa Akiyama attends the U.S.-Japan Track II Meeting on Arms
Control, Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Verification held in Tokyo and reports on“Japan’s Approach toward Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materialsof Mass Destruction.”◆Nov. 2-3 The first workshop of the HPI Research Project on “Confidence-Building
Mechanism in East Asia” is held at HPI.
◆Nov. 8 Kazumi Mizumoto attends as a committee member the Peace Policy Promotion
Network Meeting organized by the Hiroshima Prefectural Peace Policy Committee and held
at Chugoku Regional Research Center.
◆Nov. 9 Mizumoto gives a lecture on “Criminal Reports in the Press in Japan and the U.S.:
Comparison Based on Two Actual Cases” at the 30th anniversary symposium of the ChuShikoku Association for American Studies held at Hiroshima University.
◆Nov. 10 Yuki Tanaka and Hitoshi Nagai attend the semiannual conference of the Peace
Studies Association of Japan held at Shudo University and Tanaka gives a presentation on“To Face the Reality of Japanese War Crimes.”◆Nov. 11-13 Christian P. Scherrer attends the International Conference on Post-Conflict
Reconstruction held in Hiroshima by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research(UNITAR) and the Hiroshima Prefectural Government and submits a paper titled “PostConflict Reconstruction: Challenges, Framework, Priorities.”◆Nov. 12 Mark Selden, professor at the State University of New York, gives a lecture on“State Terrorism and Human Rights; The United States, Japan and the Civilians in TwentiethCentury Asian Wars” at the HPI Research Forum.
◆Nov. 13 The HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City is held at the Hiroshima
City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange. Tetsuya Takahashi, associate
professor at the University of Tokyo, gives a lecture on “What Is ‘The Responsibility afterWorld War ’?: To Create Order of Peace in Northeast Asia.”◆Nov. 14-15 Akiyama attends a workshop on “Humanitarian Challenges in Complex
Emergencies” held in Kobe by the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
◆Nov. 15-17 Ikuko Togo attends the annual research meeting of the Japan Association ofInternational Relations held in Hyogo Prefecture.
◆Nov. 20 Nagai gives a lecture on “Various Aspects of the Treatment of Prisoners of War
during World War II: A Comparative Study” in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima
City at the Hiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange.
◆Nov. 22 Mizumoto attends the 3rd working group meeting on “Hiroshima Global PeacePlan” held at Japan Institute of International Affairs under the co-sponsorship of Hiroshima
Prefecture and Japan Institute of International Affairs.
◆Nov. 24 HPI President Haruhiro Fukui gives a lecture titled “On Human Beings” at
Hiroshima University of Economics.
◆Nov. 27 Tanaka gives a lecture on “The Past and the Present of the Comfort Women Issue
Related to Nationalism” in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City at theHiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange.
◆Nov. 29 Mizumoto gives a presentation on “The Diversity of Interpretations and Perceptionsin Japan, U.S., China and Korea of the A-bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki” at Hitotsubashi
University research meeting on the “Memories of Wars and the International Relationships
in the Asia-Pacific Region,” held at Josuikaikan in Tokyo.
◆Dec. 1 Scherrer gives a presentation on the use of depleted uranium weapons titled “Threatsagainst Iraq, Acts of State Terrorism and New Arms Race” at a panel discussion meeting at
the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
◆Dec. 4 Mizumoto gives a lecture on “Memories of Hiroshima: Perceptions andInterpretations of the U.S., Asian Countries and Japan” in the HPI lecture series for citizensof Hiroshima City at the Hiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen
Exchange.
◆Dec. 7 Tanaka gives a presentation on “Crimes against Humanity: Perspectives towards
Revitalizing the Spirit of Hiroshima” at the 22nd International Symposium on “Japan’s Justice:
Domestic and International Dimensions” organized by International Christian University
Social Science Research Institute and the Institute for the Study of Social Justice of Sophia
University and held in Tokyo.
◆Dec. 11 Tanaka gives a lecture on “The Future of Northeast Asia: To Deepen Citizens’
Mutual Understanding” in the HPI lecture series for citizens of Hiroshima City at theHiroshima City Plaza for Town Development through Citizen Exchange.

◆Dec. 12 Akiyama attends a workshop of the Asia Europe Forum for Young Professionals
held in Tokyo.
◆Dec. 16 Dr. Jean-Marc Coicaud, senior academic programme officer in the Peace andGovernance Program at the United Nations University in Tokyo, gives a lecture on “Scopeand Limits of International Solidarity in the 1990s” at the HPI Research Forum. Mizumoto
attends the 4th working group meeting on “Hiroshima Global Peace Plan” held at Japan
Institute of International Affairs under the co-sponsorship of Hiroshima Prefecture and Japan
Institute of International Affairs.
◆Dec. 20 Akiyama attends a meeting in Tokyo of the Research Group on Human Resource
Development in the Field of Disarmament of Conventional Weapons sponsored by Japan
Institute of International Affairs.
◆Jan. 5-11 Mizumoto visits Cambodia to participate in the research program on“Reconstruction Assistance in the Post-Conflict Regions” implemented by the Hiroshima
Prefectural Peace Policy Committee.
◆Jan. 18 Mizumoto gives a lecture on “The Situation of Nuclear Weapons after September
11” at the 8th session of the Hiroshima Peace Forum co-organized by Hiroshima City andHiroshima Peace Culture Foundation and held at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
◆Jan. 20-21 Akiyama attends a steering committee meeting and congress on “Protecting
against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for
Global Partnership” held in London by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
◆Feb. 1 Mizumoto gives a lecture on “Current Issues of the Rehabilitation of Cambodia:
Tasks of Post-Civil War Society” at the Department of Human Environment of Hiroshima
International University.
◆Feb. 2 The second workshop of the HPI Research Project “Military Violence against
Civilians―A Comparative and Historical Analysis” is held at HPI.
◆Feb. 7 Mizumoto gives a presentation on “Hiroshima’s New Peace Policy and the Issuesof Reconstruction in Conflict Regions” at the symposium of the Round-Table Conferenceof International Education sponsored by Hiroshima Prefecture, Hiroshima University and theMinistry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and held at ANA Hotel
Hiroshima.
◆Feb. 7-9 Tanaka gives a presentation on “Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery, Social
Death and Military Violence” at the workshop on comfort women issues sponsored by the
Asia Women’s Fund Foundation and held in Hakone.
◆Feb. 11 Mizumoto gives a lecture on “The Current Situation of Nuclear Weapons” at the
8th training course of the Hiroshima Peace Volunteer Project sponsored by and held at theHiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
◆Feb. 12 Akiyama visits Washington D.C. to attend the workshop on “Japan’s Nuclear Policy”
held by the Henry L. Stimson Center. Mizumoto attends as a committee member the Peace
Policy Promotion Network Meeting organized by the Hiroshima Prefectural Peace Policy
Committee and held at Chugoku Regional Research Center.
◆Feb. 15 Togo attends a meeting of the Research Committee of South-North Sharing
Campaign for Peace & Reunification of Korea in Seoul.
◆Feb. 23 Mizumoto gives a presentation on “The Responsibility of Hiroshima in the Century
of Peace and Humanity” at the 9th session of the “Hiroshima Peace Forum” held at Hiroshima
Aster Plaza.
◆Feb. 24-25 HPI and Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) hold a workshop on“Resolution and Prevention of Conflicts and the Role of Civil Society.”◆Feb. 28 Ian Maddocks, Emeritus Professor at Flinders University, gives a lecture on “Anti-Personnel Land Mines―a Model of Modern Military Practice, and a Challenge for Peace
Activists” at the HPI Research Forum.
― Visitors to HPI ―◆Nov. 19 Dr. David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara,
U.S.A.
◆Nov. 27 Dr. Kathleen Sullivan, Coordinator of the Nuclear Weapons Education and Action
Project at Educators for Social Responsibility Metropolitan Area, New York, U.S.A.
◆Jan. 31 Dr. Gerd-Helge Vogel of Ernst-Moritz-Arndt University, Caspar-David-Friedrich
Institute, Greifswald, Germany.
◆Feb. 21 Toshinori Shigeie, Senior Research Fellow, Akira Shimotori, Project Coordinator,and Dashdorj Bayarkhuu, Sisavath Inphachanh, Tara Kartha, Yin Myo Thu, Visiting Research
Fellows of the Japan Institute of International Affairs.
◆Feb. 25 Dr. Jun Nishikawa, professor of Economic Development, Waseda University.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWSVol.5, No.3 March 26, 2003
Copyright 2003 HPI All rights reserved

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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.5 No.3 March 2003