Hiroshima Peace Institute

A Step in the Right Direction:
An Analysis of the 6th NPT Review Conference
By Mitsuru Kurosawa
Introduction : Good Start Despite Pre-conference Pessimism

Conference Structure

The general mood going into the recent NPT review conference wasone of pessimism. The previous five years had seen little or no progressin disarmament, as India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, the U.S.
Senate refused to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty(CTBT), and the implementation of START II (the 2nd Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty) between the United States and Russia stalled. In
addition, U.S.-Russia, and U.S.-China relations soured due to the
expansion eastward of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
U.S. plans for National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile
Defense (TMD) systems, and the conflict in Kosovo.
Once the conference got underway, however, unexpected progress
was made, not least because the Russian Duma ratified START II and
the CTBT shortly before it began. Another factor was the establishment,on the first day of the conference, of subsidiary bodies, a demand that
had been made by non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). The NNWS
had wanted the bodies to be set up to discuss measures related to"nuclear disarmament" and "the Middle East." The U.S. initially
opposed the both. On the latter request, made by Egypt and Middle East
nations, a compromise was reached whereby the issue would form partof a discussion on "the region of the Middle East."
For the first two weeks of the conference, however, consensus
eluded participating nations. Despite this, the committees began work on
drafting a final document in the third week. Given the number ofdifferences remaining, it looked unlikely that the final document,
proposed at the end of the third week, would be adopted. However,agreement was reached after the conference was extended by a day.
The discussions that paved the way for the adoption of a final
document were held in six forums. Main Committee I addressed thenon-proliferation of nuclear weapons and disarmament, while its
subsidiary body dealt with the future steps toward nuclear disarmament.
Main Committee II discussed safeguards and nuclear weapon-free zones,
while its subsidiary discussed regional issues. Main Committee III
looked at the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Each of these forums
contributed to the drafting of the document, as well as discussing ways
to strengthen the review process at plenary meetings.

The confrontation between the five nuclear-weapon states (P5) andnon-nuclear weapon states, and/or that between the P5 and the NonAligned movement (NAM) had dictated the structure of previous NPT
conferences. This time, we witnessed considerable conflict among thenuclear-weapon states, particularly between the United States andRussia, and the United States and China, over NMD and the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
Another new and powerful factor was the emergence of a group of
non-nuclear weapon states called the New Agenda Coalition (NAC),
which negotiated directly with the P5 right to the end of the conference.
The coalition includes four NAM countries (Egypt, Brazil, Mexico andSouth Africa), and three non-NAM nations (Sweden, Ireland and New
Zealand). In addition, another new group NATO5 (Germany, Italy,
Belgium, Netherlands and Norway) appeared as the European Union's
pro-disarmament faction. Japan and Australia came forward early on
with a joint proposal on non-proliferation and disarmament. Although
Canada did not join, the possibility remains that these three countries
will formalize their grouping at future conferences.

CONTENTS
A Step in the Right Direction: An Analysis of the 6th NPT Review Conferenceby Mitsuru Kurosawa‥‥‥‥‥１〜２
HPI Web Site Carries Reports, Commentary on NPT Review Conference‥２
Concrete Steps Must Follow P5 Pledge to Eliminate Nuclear Arsenals
by Rebecca Johnson ‥‥‥‥‥３〜４
NGO Involvement Enhances Value of the Review Conference Outcome
by Masamichi Kamiya ‥‥‥‥‥‥４
New Zealand's Anti-Nuclear Philosophy an Example for Others ‥‥４
HPI Launches Disarmament Project ‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥５
Prospects for the NPT Review Conference:
Kurosawa Addresses HPI Workshop‥５
East Timor Refugee Crisis Proof of Need for Recovery Plan
by Misa Fukunaga ‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥６
The Kosovo Conflict and Italy by Nobumasa Akiyama ‥‥‥‥‥‥７
DIARY‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥８

Main Points of Discussion
The relationship between the NMD and the ABM treaty proved tobe the most complex issue facing the conference. Russia and China
attacked the United States over the NMD, and many NNWS that are notallied with the United States advocated retaining the ABM treaty in its
current form. During the second week, the P5 issued a common
statement which included "preserving and strengthening the treaty," anambiguous approach that seemed to satisfy critics of the P5. China andRussia were satisfied by the P5's clear statement of "preserving" theABM treaty. For its part, the United States left open the option ofamending the treaty in the name of "strengthening" it. This compromise
helped put the problem aside for the time being.
The second most important issue was the P5's commitment to theelimination of nuclear weapons. The NAC placed priority on obtaining"an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States toaccomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals." During thesecond week, the P5 proposed using the word "ultimate," only to be met
by demands from NAC for a more "substantial" commitment. China had
supported an unequivocal undertaking from the outset, while the UnitedStates and Britain wanted "conditions" attached, and France and Russia
were opposed. In the end, agreement was reached, but a NAC proposal
for "concrete steps within five years" was scuppered. The third key issue
was the future of nuclear disarmament negotiations. The final document
retreated the previous objective of "the immediate commencement andearly conclusion" of a fissile material cut-off treaty, and urged to set up a
subsidiary body for nuclear disarmament at the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, not as a body to "negotiate" nuclear
disarmament, but merely as one to "deal with" it.
Fourth, the subjects of transparency and irreversibility, which werebroached two or three years ago, were included in the document, albeit
in a watered down form.

Future Steps and Obstacles
1) The clause related to early entry into force of the CTBT contains thephrase, "in accordance with constitutional processes." This was inserted−1−Visit HPI's web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

at the request of the United States, and indicated its intention to oppose
the treaty as long as the Senate does the same.
2) A moratorium on nuclear testing was adopted without problems,
proof that progress has been made since the previous conference.
3) With regard to negotiations in the CD regarding a cut-off treaty, NAC
opinion was reflected in the document, which said, "taking into
consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation
objectives." However, they did not obtain a commitment to theimmediate commencement of negotiations. Instead, the final text waswatered down, saying, "The Conference on Disarmament is urged toagree on a programme of work which includes the immediate
commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to theirconclusion within five years."
4) The establishment of a subsidiary body in the CD to deal with nuclear
disarmament was requested, but the terminology was again changed
from "negotiating."
5) The range of application of the "principle of irreversibility" wasextended to include "other related arms control and reduction measures"at the request of the P5, thereby diluting its effect.
6) The P5 did agree to an "unequivocal undertaking" to "accomplish thetotal elimination" of their nuclear arsenals. The NAC also compromisedby agreeing to the removal of a commitment to "engage in an
accelerated process of negotiations and to take steps leading to nuclear
disarmament" by 2005.
7) The early entry into force and full implementation of START II andthe speedy conclusion of START III were urged, and "preserving andstrengthening the ABM treaty" was also included. The reference topreservation satisfied China and Russia, while the United States was
happy to the interpretation that "strengthening" the treaty could also beinterpreted as amending it.
8) A trilateral initiative by the United States, Russia and theInternational Atomic Energy Agency to place all excess fissile materials
under IAEA supervision was welcomed by all parties.
9) Concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament to be taken by all nuclearweapon states were proposed, but Russia succeeded in inserting theclause, "in a way that promotes international stability and based on theprinciple of undiminished security for all." The six steps require P5
nations to: reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally; to increasetransparency; to further reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons; to further
reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; to promote a
diminishing role for nuclear weapons; and to engage as soon as appropriate
in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
In the original proposal, transparency was to be applied to stores ofnuclear weapons and fissile materials, but in the final document,
transparency was limited to nuclear weapons capability. Furthermore,
the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI (to support

further progress on nuclear disarmament) was weakened after it wasreferred to as "a voluntary confidence-building measure" in the final
document.
A condition was imposed stating that the reduction of non-strategic
nuclear weapons be "based on unilateral initiatives," and in a clauseproposing that nuclear weapon states reduce the operational status of
their nuclear weapons, explicit references, such as "de-alerting," were
removed.
With regard to the diminishing role of nuclear weapons, a NAC
proposal to eliminate the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons wasaltered to "minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used." The useof the word "minimize" was agreed to by Japan, Germany and otherallies. In addition, a clause referring to the process of eliminating waschanged from "as soon as possible" to "as soon as appropriate."
10) A recommendation that excess fissile materials be verified by the
IAEA was weakened by the addition of the words "as soon aspracticable."11) Regarding the total disarmament of nuclear and conventional
weapons, the NAC had wanted to place priority on the former. However,P5 countries, particularly France, insisted that general and complete
disarmament refer to both nuclear and conventional weapons.
12) The final document calls on parties to issue reports on progress
being made on the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures,
but they will be required to issue "regular reports" rather than annual
reports, as had originally been proposed.
13) A clause calling for the further development of disarmament
verification capabilities was adopted without significant debate.

Conclusion
To summarize, the fact that a comprehensive final document was
adopted at all is laudable.
However, a detailed study of each section reveals that concretemeasures that might have given teeth to "an unequivocal undertaking by
nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals" were watered down considerably.
Yet the NPT review conference did succeed in obtaining from theP5 an unequivocal undertaking to abolish nuclear weapons. That
commitment, though, is nominal, and lacks substance in the form ofpractical steps. Certainly, more needs to be done to achieve theelimination of nuclear weapons. The issue now and for the 21st century
is exactly what form that commitment will take.

Kurosawa is a professor at the Osaka School of International Public
Policy, Osaka University, and the project leader of the Research Projecton Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century at Hiroshima Peace
Institute.

HPI Web Site Carries Reports, Commentary on NPT Review Conference
The Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) set up a special site carrying news in Japanese from the NPT 2000 Review Conference heldat the UN Headquarters in New York from April 24 to May 19, 2000. The site, part of the institute's home page, carried fresh reports
on major developments at the conference by Rebecca Johnson, executive director of the Acronym Institute in Britain, Jenni Rissanen,
an analyst at the Acronym Institute, Dr. Mitsuru Kurosawa, professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka
University, and HPI research fellows.
Johnson and Rissanen's English-language reports on 18 issues were distributed at the conference venue every day or every otherday, and were also posted on the Acronym Institute's web site during the conference. As soon as the articles were completed, they weree-mailed to HPI, where they were translated into Japanese. Kurosawa, who attended the conference, provided a round up of
developments every weekend, and HPI researchers submitted a total of eight stories.
In addition, the HPI site carries summaries of HPI workshops relating to the NPT review conference and announcements of HPIsponsored symposiums. The sites "Links" section now features official documents from the conference, UN press releases and otheruseful information.
Since the special site was set up, the number of visitors per day to HPI's web site has doubled. E-mail inquiries have also been sent
to HPI. The NPT special site can still be accessed on the HPI web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm
The following people translated the Acronym Institute reports: Minobu Arai, a translator and interpreter, and postgraduate
student at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University; Etsuko Ohara, a former journalist with The Asahi
Shimbun; Tomohiko Kobayashi, postgraduate student of the Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University; Keiko Sakata, a parttime researcher at GENDAI Advanced Studies Research Organization; and Noriko Sado, a research assistant at the Osaka Schoolof International Public Policy, Osaka University.

By Ritsuko Ogawa, coordinator of the international relations office at HPIVisit HPI's web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm−2−

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.1 July 2000

Concrete Steps Must Follow P5 Pledge to
Eliminate Nuclear Arsenals
By Rebecca Johnson
At the close of the sixth review conference of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the nuclear-weapon states
pledged an "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total eliminationof their nuclear arsenals," and agreed to a number of practical steps
towards this goal. The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, hailed theagreement as a "historic consensus" and "significant step." Ambassador
Antonio de Icaza, speaking on behalf of the seven non-nuclear New
Agenda countries (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South
Africa and Sweden) credited with achieving the breakthrough, said theagreements meant that "what had always been implicit has now become
explicit."
Confounding predictions of disaster, the NPT Conference was a
success, at least in diplomatic terms. But do such diplomatic agreements
mean anything when it comes to the real world and national security
calculations? At the 2000 review conference, U.S. missile defence plans
and the impasse in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) overfissile material cut-off (FMCT) negotiations were swept under the carpet
in deals among the nuclear powers. The nuclear tests by India andPakistan were criticised, even as France and Russia raced for nuclear
contracts with India.
The United States' insistence on 'balancing' calls for Israel to adhere
to the Treaty with criticisms of Iraqi non-compliance almost prevented a
final agreement. After the clock was stopped to allow a further 24 hours
of negotiations, a compromise was achieved on the basis of an earlier
statement from the IAEA director general saying that the agency had
carried out inspections, but had been unable to verify that Iraq was incompliance.
In addition to firming up the NPT's Article VI obligation on nuclear
disarmament, the conference's final document underlined the importanceof the START process and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, and called on India and Pakistan to implement the 1998 UN
Security Council resolution (UNSC 1172) to join the CTBT and NPT,and not to weaponise their nuclear capabilities. The nuclear weapon
states agreed to further unilateral efforts to reduce their nuclear arsenals,
including non-strategic nuclear weapons, still deployed in Europe.
Despite China's traditional dislike of transparency, Beijing at the lastminute accepted a commitment to provide more information on its"nuclear capabilities and the implementation of agreements."
Further paragraphs emphasised the need to reduce the operational
status of nuclear weapon systems and to diminish the role of nuclear
weapons in security policies. Mindful of how fissile material andcomponents from dismantled warheads could be recycled to make newweapons, the parties placed importance on applying the principle ofirreversibility to arms control. Finally, all five nuclear weapon states
were called on to engage "as soon as appropriate" in negotiating nuclear
disarmament, a demand that Japan has underscored in successive
resolutions to the UN General Assembly. The New Agenda's dual-track
approach of requiring an unequivocal commitment from the weapon
states and identifying practical, achievable interim steps formed the
backbone of the disarmament negotiations.
Forecasts in the run-up to the 2000 NPT Conference had been
pessimistic. The view was widely shared that any movement made innuclear non-proliferation since 1985 had regressed as a result of anumber of adverse developments, particularly: the nuclear tests by India
and Pakistan in May 1998; the rejection of the CTBT by the U.S. Senate
in October 1999; deadlock in the START process and at the CD in
Geneva; and growing concerns about the impact on nuclear arms controlof U.S. plans for national missile defence.
The negative dynamic was changed by the Russian Duma's
ratification of the CTBT and START II just before the review
conference opened. By contrast, the United States was forced on the
defensive, as countries lined up to criticise U.S. missile defence plans.

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.1 July 2000

The Conference was therefore surprised when China and Russia signed
up to a five-power statement that was open to a multitude ofinterpretations on the ABM treaty. The careful language spoke of"preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone ofstrategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic
offensive weapons." It was clear that the nuclear powers had collectively
agreed to keep the NMD issue out of the NPT.
After three weeks of debates in three committees on nuclear
disarmament, safeguards and nuclear energy, all the positions had beenrehearsed, but few had been resolved. Particular interest was focussed on
two 'subsidiary bodies' − formal working groups open to all NPT
members−on nuclear disarmament and regional issues, including the
Middle East. Chaired by New Zealander Clive Pearson, the NPT parties
in the nuclear disarmament subsidiary body concentrated on forwardlooking ideas, focussing first on the "unfinished agenda," including
START, the CTBT and the "fissban," and then on new or further steps.
The breakthrough came after the nuclear weapon states and the New
Agenda Coalition (NAC) met privately and hammered out a compromise
text, which was eventually accepted by the whole conference.
That left the review and assessment of progress since 1995 in
Committee I, where delegations had strong disagreements over several
issues, including nuclear testing, stockpile reinforcement and nuclear
weapons modernisation, the significance of dismantlements andnumbers of weapons remaining in the arsenals, and the 1996 advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice. That, too, came to beworked on privately and agreed among a small group consisting of theweapon states, the NAC and a few others, including Indonesia (on behalfof the non-aligned states) and three NATO countries.
Did the nuclear powers mean to go so far, or did they becometrapped in a web of their own rivalries? A number of countries put
forward ideas and programmes for action, but the weapon states chose to
do business with the New Agenda Coalition because it was more
pragmatic than the non-aligned movement and represented a wider
constituency than, say, Japan or Canada. In addition, the New Agenda
states had a well-developed strategy and a coherent set of positions andpriorities. Civil society, too, played an important role in providing ideas
and expertise, helping to develop strategies, and keeping up politicalpressure in some of the key countries. The diplomatic skills of theAlgerian President, Abdallah Baali, also played a part, as he refused toaccept failure as an option. Undoubtedly, the weapon states felt underpressure to make stronger commitments than before, in order both toreinforce a non-proliferation regime shaken by the South Asian nuclear
tests and to reassure and appease the non-nuclear states, many of whichwere critical of the weapon states' bad faith after achieving the NPT's
indifinite extension in 1995.
The successful outcome will send a necessary signal to India andPakistan, who may have been hoping for the conference to collapse inacrimony, as it has done on three previous occasions. Moreover, theNPT parties used strong language in denouncing the South Asian
nuclear tests and underscored that "such actions do not in any way
confer a nuclear-weapon state status or any special status whatsoever."But behind all the late night meetings and fine-print negotiations,what have the weapon states actually agreed to? The unequivocal
undertaking reflects the advisory opinion of the International Court ofJustice on the legal obligation to eliminate nuclear arsenals, delinked
from general and complete disarmament. That is important. Afterconsiderable watering down, however, the practical steps are couched as
aspirations and principles, with nothing specific, and there are no target
dates or timetables for achieving any of the objectives.
The conference was a much-needed success, but its impact must not
be exaggerated. Diplomacy can set the standards and expectations, but it
will take concerted political will to translate the words adopted at the−3−Visit HPI's web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

2000 NPT conference into concrete actions towards the real and totalelimination of nuclear arsenals. The 2000 NPT Conference has built on
the decisions of 1995, providing even better tools to hold the weapon
states more accountable, but it is now time to set a date for theaccomplishment of these pledges.

Johnson is the executive director of the Acronym Institute in
Britain.

NGO Involvement Enhances Value of the
For the first time in thesession throughout its three-hour
history of the NPT, a session was
duration. Hopefully, the voices
Review Conference Outcome
convened specifically to allow
By Masamichi Kamiya raised not only by Hiroshima andnongovernmental organizations
Nagasaki, but also by other NGO
attending the recent review conference in New York to speak directly
representatives, will resonate with governments and lead to the early
to government officials from NPT Parties.
abolition of nuclear weapons. According to the United Nations, 141
Two delegations from Japan−one from Hiroshima, headed byNGOs had registered at the review conference as of May 5, a sure
Deputy Mayor Koshi Morimoto, and Nagasaki, led by Mayor Iccho
sign of the level of interest in the event.
Ito−participated in the session and held meetings with Jayantha
There seem to be three reasons why NGOs were given the
Dhanapala, UN Undersecretary General for Disarmament, Abdallah
opportunity to speak at the review conference. First, they had lobbied
Baali, the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the UN, who wasassiduously for the opportunity to take part in the conference. Second,
appointed president of the review conference, and representatives ofgovernments are more inclined than before to take on board the views
other NGOs.
of NGOs. Finally, at international conferences in the 1990s, theBaali made the welcome gesture of chairing the NGO session,
methodology of oral presentations given by NGO members set the
pointing to the importance of allowing NGO representatives to speak
standard for similar presentations. For instance, the UN Conference
formally to NPT conference delegates for the first time.
on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, theFifteen NGO representatives spoke at the session. They had been
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, theselected from countries around the world for their commitment toInternational Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in
speaking up for the interests of civil society. With the exception of the
1994, the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in
opening and closing comments, and an opening address by Ito, 12
1995 and the World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 all
representatives spoke on the following themes: 1) nuclear
featured impressive input from NGOs.
disarmament 2) ballistic missile defense 3) regional proliferation and
The final document adopted at the recent NPT review conference
universality in South Asia 4) regional proliferation and universality incan be considered the kind of roadmap the world desperately needs
the Middle East 5) research and development 6) deterrence 7) law 8)
vis a vis nuclear disarmament at the beginning of the 21st century. In
article IV and alternative energy sources 9) health and environment
this regard, the final document of the review conference can be seen10) indigenous testimony on the nuclear age 11) the need for the
not simply as a culmination of past efforts but as a starting point for
abolition of nuclear weapons from a Russian perspective and 12) thethe acceleration of nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of
personal responsibility of scientists.
nuclear non-proliferation.
In his role as a member of the World Conference of Mayors forIf the messages contained in the NPT final document are
Peace through Inter-City Solidarity, Ito said that he hoped that theinterpreted this way, we are bound to find the right route along which
present NPT review conference would blaze a trail to the abolition of
to achieve our objectives. Whether the roadmap will be used properly
nuclear weapons and assured that these weapons would not be carried
will depend on how both governments and NGOs perform their roles.
into the 21st century.
The vast majority of the people in attendance remained at theKamiya is a visiting research fellow at HPI

New Zealand's Anti-Nuclear Philosophy: an Example for Others
Dr. Kate Dewes, an expert in non-nuclear security policy from New
Zealand, and her husband, retired Royal Navy Commander Robert
Green, gave a workshop on nuclear issues at the Hiroshima Peace
Institute on March 14. Green is Chair of the UK branch of the World
Court Project, whose actions led the International Court of Justice topronounce in an unprecedented Advisory Opinion on July 8, 1996, thatthe threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be illegal. About
20 people, including researchers and members of nongovernmentalorganizations, attended the workshop.
In her presentation, titled "New Zealand's nuclear-free policy,"
Dewes explained the process by which the country, which fell under the
U.S. nuclear umbrella when it became a signatory to ANZUS in 1951,
had transformed itself into a nuclear-free state.
The anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand gathered pace in thelate 1950s after Strontium 90 was detected in women's breast milk. The
presence of the substance was attributed to nuclear tests carried out in
the Pacific Ocean by Britain and the United States. Some years later, asFrance continued underground testing in Moruroa, New Zealand's antinuclear movement, with women at its forefront, was successful in
influencing the policies of the then Labour government of Prime
Minister David Lange. The French government's terrorist bombing ofGreenpeace's anti-nuclear ship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland coincided
in 1985 with the creation of a South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.
In 1987, with New Zealand public opinion having hardened against
nuclear weapons and nuclear power as a result of these developments

Visit HPI's web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

and the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, Lange's administration passed the
Nuclear-Free Act and withdrew from the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Dewes praised the role of civic movements in realizing a nuclearfree New Zealand, as well as in promoting the concept of a Southern
Hemisphere Nuclear Free Zone. She was encouraged by campaigns bysimilar movements calling for Japan to leave the U.S. nuclear umbrellain the near future.
In a presentation titled "Non-nuclear strategies for Japan," Green said
he had been encouraged by the Tokyo Forum report, which recognized theefforts of NGOs and the countries of the New Agenda Coalition.
He was critical, however, of Japan's security policy because it
depends on a nuclear deterrent provided by the United States. "Nuclear
deterrence stimulates hostility, and in order to justify nuclear deterrence
and the nuclear umbrella, we hear from the Japanese government that
there is a threat from North Korea," Green said, adding that Japan should
rely on the United States solely for conventional military support.
Green also called for the establishment of a Northeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone, and a decision by the United States not to deploy atheater missile defense (TMD) system in Japan or Taiwan. Green's
recently published book, The Naked Nuclear Emperor: Debunking
Nuclear Deterrence−A Primer for Safer Security Strategies, features aforeword by New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark. A Japaneseversion will be published in November 2000.

−4−

By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPIHIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.1 July 2000

HPI Launches Disarmament Project
Hiroshima Peace Institute (HPI) launched the Research Project on
Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century in April 2000. To kick start
the two-year project, led by Mitsuru Kurosawa, professor at the Osaka
School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, HPI held an
inaugural meeting on April 14 featuring experts on nuclear
disarmament−who are also part of the project−from universities andresearch institutes in Hiroshima, Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto and other cities inJapan.
The project will examine possible means of carrying out nuclear
disarmament in light of the decisions made at the 2000 Review
Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), held in New York
from April 24 to May 19.
At further meetings, to be held, in principle, once a month, membersof the project will give presentations on their specific research fields.
There are also plans to invite non-member specialists in related fields,
including journalists, policy makers and NGO members, to participate indiscussions and give presentations. The project will also seek periodical
written comment on workshop discussions and reports from specialists
overseas.
The project plans to issue an interim report at the end of its firstyear consisting of essays written by members. Toward the end of thesecond year, the project will release a comprehensive report on issues
associated with nuclear disarmament in the 21st century, including
papers written by non-member specialists from Japan and overseas.
The project was set up as part of HPI's work on four major research
themes − The process of abolishing nuclear weapons and related
issues−announced in July 1998, and is the successor to the Tokyo
Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which wascosponsored by HPI and the Japan Institute of International Affairs. At
the meeting on April 14, members exchanged views regarding theevaluation of the Report of the Tokyo Forum made by various specialists
around the world.
Prior to the launch of the project, HPI invited Kurosawa to make a

P rospects for the NPT Review Conference :Kurosawa Addresses HPI Workshop
Mitsuru Kurosawa, professor at the Osaka School of International
Public Policy, Osaka University, addressed an HPI-sponsored open
workshop titled "Prospects and Tasks for the NPT Review Conference"on March 28 prior to the review conference in New York.
In April, HPI launched The Research Project on Nuclear
Disarmament in the 21st Century to clarify the major issues likely toarise at the review conference, and to examine the future progress of
nuclear disarmament once the conference is over.
Kurosawa began by explaining the characteristics of the Review
Conference as stipulated in Article , Paragraph 3 of the NPT, followedby an overview of the progress made between the first conference in1975 and the fourth conference in 1990. He said the fundamental
objective of the review conference is to check the progress of nuclear
disarmament and the contents of parties' obligations to ensure thatmoves toward disarmament stipulated Article VI are made in good faith.
Referring to the previous review conference in 1995, Kurosawa
explained that the decision to indefinitely extend the treaty was based on
the adoption of two documents, "Strengthening the Review Process of
the Treaty" and "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament."

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.1 July 2000

presentation on the prospects for the NPT Review Conference at aworkshop on March 28. More than 20 researchers, graduate students andjournalists from Hiroshima, Tokyo and Osaka attended the workshop.
As part of the project's activities, HPI plans to hold an international
symposium titled "International Symposium on Nuclear Disarmament in
the 21st Century" on Saturday, July 29, at the International ConferenceCenter in Hiroshima.

By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPIMembers of the project
Project leader
Mitsuru Kurosawa , professor at the Osaka School ofInternational Public Policy, Osaka University
Other members
Tadaaki Joh, professor of law, Hiroshima Shudo University
Masahiko Asada, professor of law, Kyoto University
Osamu Yoshida, associate professor, Hiroshima University
Yoko Ogashiwa , associate professor, Institute for Peace
Science, Hiroshima University
Naoki Kamimura, associate professor, Hiroshima City University
Hirofumi Tosaki, research fellow, Center for the Promotion of
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs
Masamichi Kamiya, visiting research fellow, Hiroshima Peace
Institute
Kazumi Mizumoto , associate professor, Hiroshima Peace
Institute (coordinator)
Nobumasa Akiyama , research associate, Hiroshima Peace
Institute (sub coordinator)

Regarding this year's conference, Kurosawa expressed concern overthe predicted deadlock in discussions of the Main Committee I, which
deals with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. He said the entry
into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the early startof fissile material cut-off (FMCT) negotiations, the progress of START
talks between the United States and Russia, unilateral efforts to reduce
non-strategic nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia, and thedevelopment of nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ)−all of which were
included in "Principles and Objectives" at the 1995 conference−would
be included again in this year's final document.
Kurosawa described as "severe" several unresolved issues
surrounding the conference, such as the impasse in the START process,nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the rejection of CTBT ratification by
the U.S. Senate, friction between the United States and Russia, and theUnited States and China.
Afterward, participants, including researchers and graduate
students, asked questions about the repercussions for nuclear
disarmament of the U.S. Missile Defense plan, Japan's role at the NPT
conference, and nuclear development in Israel. "Nuclear nonproliferation itself is not the aim, but only the means toward nuclear
disarmament," Kurosawa said.

−5−

By Kazumi Mizumoto, associate professor at HPIVisit HPI's web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

East Timor Refugee Crisis Proofof Need for Recovery Plan
By Misa Fukunaga
At the end of October 1999, after a brief respite following thecompletion of an assignment repatriating refugees in Kosovo, I was asked
by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to participate in therepatriation of refugees in East Timor. Southeast Asia, where East Timor is
located, holds special memories for me, as I went to Cambodia for the firsttime in 1993 to engage in work related to peacekeeping activities.
The refugee problem in East Timor arose from the military conflict
between pro-independence and pro-integration factions following areferendum on independence for East Timor on Aug. 30, 1999. When the
UN announced that the people of East Timor had voted overwhelmingly infavor of independence, pro-integration militia calling for unification withIndonesia, together with sections of the Indonesian security forces,
conducted a campaign of violence against people who favored
independence. Most of the territory's residents were forced to leave theirhomes, more than half of them fleeing to neighboring West Timor.
Houses were burned down, and residents accused of being supporters of
independence were set upon, and in some cases, massacred. This madness
and chaos continued until the UN approved military intervention by theInternational Force for East Timor (INTERFET), centered on the Australian
military.
At the time I arrived in East Timor after INTERFET and the United
Nations had already secured the region and just as the latter was establishingan administrative system for the area that would stay in place during thetransition to full independence.
The UN Security Council granted permission to establish the East
Timor UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on Oct.
25, 1999. The organization was formed to oversee the re-establishment ofsafety, law and order in the region, the establishment of a provisional
administration, and the restoration of basic standards of living throughhumanitarian assistance and aid during the transition to independence.
UNTAET comprised a peacekeeping force of 7,500 personnel, including
military observers, 1,000 administrators (as of January 2000), and 950
civilian police (as of March 2000). A UN peacekeeping force was given
responsibility for maintaining public safety.
As a UN organization, UNHCR is in charge of repatriating refugees,
and providing assistance to others doing the same, though it does not fallunder the auspices of UNTAET. True independence will not come to East
Timor until the repatriation of refugees is complete. The United Nations is
responsible for repatriating refugees and restoring the region's security.
International NGOs are also assisting residents, mainly in and around thecapital, Dili.
My work began in Oekussi, a small, isolated region on the northwestern
coast of the island of Timor. Oekussi's isolation dates back to the days when
East Timor was a Portuguese territory. INTERFET arrived in Oekussi on
Oct. 27, 1999, its final destination in East Timor. After learning of theforces' arrival, people who had hidden in nearby mountains came out of
hiding. UNHCR established an office in the region in mid-November.
Most of the population in the area (Oekussi), estimated to number
54,000 at the time of voting, were forcibly driven from their homes. Even
now, about 10,000 remain in West Timor. There were virtually no violent
incidents prior to the referendum in the area in which I was working. But as
the day of the vote arrived, private militias stepped up their activities,
eventually destroying 98 percent of the area's homes.
For three months from Dec. 4 to the end of February, I was in charge ofrepatriating refugees and assisting returnees by, among other things,
distributing aid andmonitoring people's living
DILI
conditions. I began thiswork just as the rainy
OECUSSIseason began. As the region
EAST TIMOR
is mountainous, thecondition of the roads
worsened, making it
difficult to repatriate people
to their homes for some

Visit HPI's web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

time. However, whenever I
witnessed people returningsafely to their villages
and tearfully embracing
relatives, with expressionsof relief and smiles on Relief goods are unloaded from a helicopter in a
mountainous area of East Timor.
their faces, I felt keenly
aware of the importance of assisting refugees.
The local office in Oekussi had a permanent international staff of
between two and four people that included a French official dispatched fromthe UNHCR headquarters in Geneva, a Dutch person and a UN volunteer
from Bangladesh. Each member of the staff had experience of assisting
refugees in conflict zones. The local staff totaled seven people, including
drivers, all of whom were former refugees of evacuees. From early morning
until evening, the office staff toured the area in four-wheel drive vehicles.
Our office was a local government building loaned to us by UNTAET
that had been badly damaged in the conflict. During my stay, the building
had no roof, windows or doors, with protection from the elements coming in
the form of a plastic sheet. Later, however, as rebuilding got under way, thebuilding was supplied with an electricity generator and perhaps became themost comfortable structure in Oekussi. The building became a resting place
for us and members of other international organizations.
There remains an almost palpable mistrust between Indonesia and East
Timor. Most of the refugees staying in West Timor are uneasy about theirliving conditions and personal safety after repatriation. Furthermore, theEast Timorese are skeptical about the motives of those who took refuge inWest Timor, doubting whether they will help in rebuilding the area or
securing its independence. Indeed, intimidation of refugees in West Timor
by local militias has slowed the rate of repatriation.
Oekussi location made it difficult for many NGOs to get involved there,
and even UNTAET's activities were at first affected by insufficient aid fromthe Dili headquarters. The region, surrounded by Indonesian territory, wasforced to rely on sea or air shipments from Dili. This meant cooperationfrom INTERFET was indispensable. However, the areas under thejurisdiction of the UN and of INTERFET differed, and we therefore had adifficult time securing assistance. INTERFET saw its most important task as
being that of maintaining law and order. The repatriation of refugees wasway down on its list of priorities. On the other hand, there would have beenno humanitarian activities immediately after the conflict had it not been forthe cooperation of a military force.
It has been nearly eight years since I first became involved in postconflict recovery in places such as Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, andnow East Timor. I have always been struck by a desire to share the ideas ofpeace and recovery with people who have suffered as a result of war. My
work has included assisting voting and democratization, helping repatriate
refugees, and extending humanitarian assistance. But these activities are justpart of the overall quest to rebuild and rehabilitate these war-torn regions
and countries. Of greatest importance is finding a way of linking recovery
assistance with development and the establishment of peace.
When conflict breaks out in impoverished countries, it interferes with
their sustainable development. The crux of the matter is shortening the timerequired to move from an initial period of emergency humanitarianassistance to the process of long-term recovery. Major aid-giving nations, inaddition to the United Nations, must hammer out concrete plans for recovery
in former conflict zones. On a personal level, I hope to continue working
with people faced with the daily struggle of living amid conflict, and whose
desire is simply for peace.

Fukunaga is a former field officer at the UNHCR office in Oekussi. She
also worked as a staff member at UNTAC's election management in
Cambodia; at UNDP's representative office in Rwanda; at UNDP's
representative office in Kirghiz and at UNHCR's Pristina office. She wasalso involved in election supervision in Bosnia, and acted as an observer
during general elections in Cambodia. She is the author of "An Energetic
Diary of Cambodia."−6−

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.1 July 2000

The Kosovo Conflict and Italy

National Interests in Humanitarian Assistance
By Nobumasa Akiyama

Given its history and geographical location in the Adriatic Sea,
opposite the Balkan Peninsula, it was hardly surprising that Italy became
involved in last summer's conflict in Kosovo. The Italian government
made a difficult decision in allowing NATO aircraft to use bases on its
soil, since its constitution prohibits participation in wars. In addition,
anti-U.S. sentiment in Italy had heightened after 20 people died when a
U.S. military aircraft struck a ropeway line in February 1998. After theNATO military campaign began, Italy, faced with public opposition to
the bombing and a desire to play a leadership role in southeast Europe,
was among the first Western European countries to call for a negotiatedsettlement.
Of greatest concern to Italy was the exodus of refugees from
Kosovo. The Italian people believed that allowing a large number ofrefugees to cross the Italian border would present a challenge to thecountry's national security, in addition to posing some difficult
humanitarian questions. Indeed, the Italian government's very survival
hinged on keeping the influx of refugees to a bare minimum.
The Italian government acted with appropriate haste. On March 29,
five days after NATO began bombing Belgrade, the government
declared a national state of emergency, and dispatched the naval
transport vessel, San Marco, to Albania carrying tents, sleeping bags,
buses, ambulances and Red Cross personnel. The fact that the Albanian
government did not issue an emergency statement requesting aid until
April 3, and that the UNHCR increased the number of personnel it
dispatched the Albania / Kosovo border on April 2, illustrates just how
swift Italy's response was.
Operation Rainbow (Missione Arcobaleno), provided refugees withassistance and coordinated personnel, from soldiers to NGO volunteers.
The Department of Civil Protection (DPC), a body belonging to thePrime Minister's office that oversees disaster-relief activities, formulated
relief activities. The DPC was set up in 1992 after a volcanic eruption
near Naples in 1980 prompted discussion about improving the country's
response to disasters.
The organization's work involves foreseeing, predicting andpreventing natural disasters. It is also involved in various interorganizational aid and recovery activities. In the case of natural
disasters, it supervises and coordinates the activities of firefighters, thepolice, the military, the Red Cross, as well as research institutes andvolunteer groups. To date, it has been involved in 55 domestic and 24
overseas relief operations, including the January 1995 Great Hanshin
Earthquake in Japan.
In Kosovo, the military and volunteers were participating in an
overseas mission together for the first time. The military was needed tomaintain order and to support transportation work. Volunteer groups
registered with the DPC now number about 1,770. About 6,200 people
worked as volunteers in Kosovo during the campaign. It was also thefirst time that the DPC had coordinated overseas volunteer activities.
Operation Rainbow initiated an impressive fund-raising campaign
in Italy, and as a result, raised a total of 128.6 billion lira in contributions
and received a total of 2,100 containers of supplies. Throughout Albania,
18 refugee-aid facilities (10 of which were refugee camps) were built,
housing about 30,000 Kosovar refugees and providing about 30,000
people with relief goods.
Italy's quick response to the Kosovo crisis is rooted in its experience
coping with refugees during the Albanian crisis of 1997. At that time,about 27,000 refugees crossed the sea to Italy, which simply was notprepared to handle them and experienced problems as a result. In Marchthat year, an Italian naval vessel collided with a boat loaded withrefugees, 80 of whom drowned after the boat sank.
Italy played a key role in the multinational army organized by
European countries to transport relief goods. Memories of Italy's

HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.1 July 2000

annexation of Albania during both World Wars gave rise to strong
domestic opposition to any military involvement in Kosovo.
Nevertheless, Italy dispatched of troops to handle the refugee crisis andto fulfill its "international responsibility."
Although Operation Rainbow proved effective in providing aid torefugees and in preventing a further influx into Italy, several problems
remained unsolved. When providing aid activities for Kosovar refugees
in Albania−a third party−Italy experienced difficulties maintaining
lines of communication with local authorities in the war-torn province.
At the time, Kosovo's local governments were rife with politicalcorruption and misadministration, and its central government appeared
unable to bring them to heel. Under those circumstances, aid activities
could not be left to administrative bodies in Albania. At the same time,
however, Italy did not want to be seen to be infringing on thesovereignty of the host country through its aid activities.
Other issues surfaced that were associated with coordinating aid
activities among countries and international organizations. A report
titled "The Kosovo Refugee Crisis," which was published in February
2000 by UNHCR, talks of a lack of coordination between bilateral aid
activities and those of international organizations such as UNHCR, andthe competition between those activities. Italy, for instance, made a
Cabinet-level decision to send a mission to Kosovo without consulting
UNHCR. Italy was also critical of what it saw as UNHCR's tardy
response to the refugee crisis. On the other hand, some reportedly were
unhappy that the Italian government had proceeded with its own aid
activities without sending relief goods to NGOs already on the ground in
Kosovo.
It was also pointed out that the goodwill of the people of Italy might
not have been translated into practical help. According to a media report,a large amount of relief goods contributed by the public piled up at theport of Bari instead of being delivered to the refugees. (An official in
charge of the goods said the government and NGOs had agreed toforward the remaining supplies to other locations on Aug. 2, two days
before the refugee camps were closed, and that, after taking into accountrelief supplies sent to Turkey in the aftermath of last year's earthquakes,
only 1.2% of the total remaining supplies were not utilized.)
The managers of the refugee camps were accused of diverting aid
supplies to the Albanian Mafia, an accusation that resulted in the
demotion of the DPC minister and mounting suspicion of thedepartment's domestic aid activities.
Most people doubt Italy would be able to adopt the same strategy
should a similar situation arise again overseas. Rotating volunteers andtaking care of them once they are long distances away is not easy (InKosovo, volunteers worked for short periods before being replaced.)
Governments' primary task is gauging the level of the threat posed to its
own country by a crisis overseas. They also have to give careful thought
to the political ramifications of sending troops overseas.
After the Great Hanshin Earthquake, the Japanese government's
crisis management system was harshly criticized, as was the level ofcommunication and coordination between governmental bodies. Tokyois cautious about sending Self-Defense Force troops overseas to takepart in disaster-relief missions, a task they perform very well on homesoil. It may not be possible to directly apply the "Italian model" to Japan,
but it nonetheless serves as a useful example of how to deal with the
problems of offering humanitarian assistance.
(Note) This paper was based on research carried out in Brussels andRome in March 2000 while the author was participating in the European
Union Visitors Programme.

−7−

Akiyama is a research associate at HPIVisit HPI's web site at http://serv.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/English/index.htm

DIARY
March 31, 2000 - May 31, 2000
◆March 6-16
Nobumasa Akiyama participates in the European Union Visitors
Programme in Brussels and Rome.
◆March 9-10
Kazumi Mizumoto attends an international symposium, "Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy and Non-proliferation: A Challenge for 21st Century," atKojimachi Kaikan, Tokyo, organized by the Study Group on Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Policy.
◆March 14
A workshop on nuclear issues is held at Hiroshima Peace Institutefeaturing addresses by Kate Dewes, co-chair of the governing Labour Party's
Policy Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, and Robert Green, a former
British Royal Navy Commander.
◆March 22
Mizumoto delivers a lecture on current international nuclear situation aspart of "What we should know about Hiroshima," an awareness project
organized by the Hiroshima UNESCO Association, at Hiroshima Peace
Memorial Museum.
◆March 28
A workshop titled "Prospects for the NPT Review Conference" is held atthe Hiroshima Peace Institute, featuring a keynote speech by Prof. Mitsuru
Kurosawa at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka
University.
◆March 31
Mizumoto attends the "19th Forum on New Thinking on Security Issues"
held at and organized by the Tokyo Foundation.
◆April 7
Mizumoto attends a workshop, "Exploring Japan's Proactive Peace andSecurity Strategies: The Case of the Nuclear Umbrella," organized by the
NIRA in Tokyo.
◆April 10-June 10
Akiyama participates in the Henry L. Stimson Center ConfidenceBuilding Measures Fellowship Program in Washington, D.C.
◆April 14
HPI's "Disarmament in the 21st Century," project team hold their firstmeeting.
◆April 17
Masamichi Kamiya attends a meeting of the Center for Preventive
Diplomacy, held at the International House of Japan in Tokyo.
◆April 23-May 5
Kamiya visits New York to observe the Sixth Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty Review Conference.

◆April 24-27, May 15-20
Akiyama visits New York to observe the Sixth Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty Review Conference.
◆April 28-May 11
Mizumoto visits New York and Washington, D.C., to conduct research
into the Sixth Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference.
◆April 28
Mizumoto and Akiyama report on Japan's nuclear non-proliferation policy
at a roundtable discussion at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C.
◆May 17
Mizumoto attends a workshop, "Exploring Japan's Proactive Peace andSecurity Strategies: The Case of the Nuclear Umbrella," organized by the
NIRA in Tokyo.
◆May 18
Mizumoto delivers a lecture at a meeting of Hiroshima Bar Association.
◆May 20
Mizumoto attends the annual convention of the Japan Association forInternational Relations at the Nagoya Congress Center.
◆May 22-24
Akiyama participates in Confidence-Building Measures/Energy Working
Group Meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.
◆May 26
HPI's "Disarmament in the 21st Century" project team hold their second
meeting.
◆May 27-28
Mizumoto attends the second annual conference of the Japan Association
for United Nations Studies at Aoyama Gakuin University in Tokyo.
−Visitors to HPI−
◆March 12
Ambassador Abdallah Baali, president of the Sixth NPT Review
Conference, the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the UN◆March 23
Silvia Lidia Gonzalez, a researcher at Sophia University in Tokyo◆March 28
Masafumi Kaneko, visiting fellow at the Center for Non-Proliferation
Studies, the Monterey Institute of International Studies◆April 13
Takeshi Kamiyama, director of research coordination at the Japan Instituteof International Affairs

International Symposium on
Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century
Hiroshima Peace Institute will organize an international symposium on nuclear
disarmament in Hiroshima on July 29, 2000. The symposium, which is open to the
public, will feature an analysis of discussions and decisions at the recent NPT review
conference in New York, and will examine the prospects for nuclear disarmament in the
coming century. Experts in disarmament, foreign policy, international law and national
security from governmental and non-governmental bodies will serve as panelists.

TOPICS

Theme: "Nuclear Disarmament in the 21st Century"
Panelists:
Prof. Mitsuru Kurosawa

Dr. Hiromichi Umebayashi
Ms. Rebecca Johnson

Professor at the Osaka School of International Public
Policy, Osaka University
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to theConference on Disarmament
President of the Peace Depot
Executive Director of the Acronym Institute

Dr. Cathleen S. Fisher

Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center

Amb. Seiichiro Noboru

Date:

July 29, 2000

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Venue: The "Himawari" room in the second basement (B2) of the International
Conference Center, Hiroshima

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HIROSHIMA RESEARCH NEWS, Vol.3 No.1 July 2000