5 December 2002

Current Japan’s Climate Change Policy Package andits decision making process
Kimiko Hirata
Kiko Networkkhirata@qb3.so-net.ne.jp
The new “Guideline of the Measures to Prevent Global Warming”, revised in March 2002, is virtually agovernment climate change policy package and is inserted in the important section, “chapter 3 (Policies andMeasures)” of the Third National Communication of Japan. There are significant problems of this Guideline (inother words, the government climate change policy) and its decision making process.

1. Decision Making Process; Lack of Transparency and Public ParticipationAt well as the previous Guideline of the Measures to Prevent Global Warming in 1998, the new Guideline wasdecided in March 2002 without any public participation and opportunity of public comments.
By January 2002, there were minimum level of open process at the Central Environment Council of the Ministryof Environment and the Industrial Structure Council of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. BothCouncils examined that policies and measures (PaMs) of the previous Guideline were not enough to meet theKyoto target and proposed several PaMs to be introduced additionally. However, after receiving the reports fromthose Councils, the governments’ officials took over the process to revise the Guideline and didn’t reflect reportsof those Councils. Appropriateness of the existing policies was not assessed and most of the policies were simply
maintained. Adjustment of “sectional” polices between ministries was merely concerned. No information or draft
was revealed to public before final decision, even to the members of the Diet (parliamentarians). Thus, theGuideline made by bureaucrats has significant lack of transparency. The guideline decided without public
participation has, of course, little support from public and therefore the effectiveness is quite doubtful. This
opaque process is totally unacceptable and it should never be repeated again.

2. Unrealistic plan to achieve Kyoto Target
From the fact that GHG emissions are still increasing, it is widely recognized that additional measures
is inevitable to meet the Kyoto target. However, the framework of 6% reduction approach in newGuideline kept almost the same as previous one, which was nothing more than a mixture of odds andends of existing policies.
The new Guideline includes already impossible plan, e.g. 30% increase of nuclear power generation,and unrealistic reduction assumption, e.g. reduction from individual activities. Whereas, proved
effective measures, such as carbon-tax, standards for facilities and buildings, and renewable energy
feed-in-tariff law, are not introduced. So-called “Step-by-Step Approach” was used as an excuse foranother delay of implementation.
A number of PaMs are listed in the Guideline, but from our research only about 20% of them has legal
measures that ensure expected reduction. About 40% of them rely on reduction only through publicawareness or individual voluntary action in which there’s no assurance. 30% of them are Industry’s
voluntary action which reductions aren’t also ensured. It shows the Guideline has significant lack ofeffective measures.
At the occasion of ratification, the government missed very important opportunity to review and strengthen
policies and measures, which is quite unfortunate. In order to meet the Kyoto target, it is clear that thegovernment have to revise the guideline fundamentally and start “open” process as soon as possible.

Targets for each of GHG and other segments in the Guideline
1998 guideline

2002 guidelineDomestic

Energy Related CO2

Contents

±0.0%

±0.0%

Reduction

non-energy related CO2, CH4, N2O

-5.0%

-5.0%

OthersInnovative technologies, activities of various sector and public

-2.0%

-2.0%

Fluorinated Gases (HFC/PFC/SF6)

+2.0%

+2.0%

Sinks (domestic)

-3.7%

-3.9%

-1.8%

-1.6%

-6.0%

-6.0%

Kyoto Mechanisms (JI/CDM/IET)
Total(1) Energy related CO2(±0%); It accounts for more than 90 % of Japan’s CO2 emissions and to address its
emissions reduction is most important. However, stabilization target at the 1990 level has not changed andremains insufficient.
(2) Innovative technologies and promotion of further activities of various sectors and public (-2%); It
relies on mid- future technological development and activities of individuals. Even if those are very importantfor climate mitigation and need to be encouraged, the amount of their reduction is hard to predict. It isinappropriate to rely on such unpredictable reduction in order to comply the Kyoto target.
(3) Sinks (-3.9%); The figure (-3.9%) is from the cap that Japan can use as forest managements (under Article
3.4 and JI) stipulated by the Marrakech Accords. After Marrakech conference, the government havechanged its plan to use sinks from -3.7% to -3.9% out of 6% reduction target. However, the background dataof “-3.9%” is not given by the government and remain unclear. Concerning the aging Japan’s forest,
achieving -3.9% from sinks seems impossible and this figure, with no scientific proof, is again very unrealistic.
Aiming to use maximum amount of sinks that the Marrakech Accords allows is very risky, and including such
unpredictable figure to Kyoto target achievement plan dangers whole Japanese climate policy. It should holdto use sinks at a minimum, which is certain to get.
(4) F gases (+2%); The target “2% increase (just looking at F gases a 50% increase) from 1995 level” has notchanged, too. Not only its sharp increase of F gases is very problematic but also its target is significantlyinconsistent with reality. Industries’ own estimate is 0% stabilization of 1995 levels (just looking at F gases a4% increase) in 2010. And actual reduction from F gases by 2001 is about 1.5% out of 6% targets (justlooking at F gases 38% reduction). Recognizing this trend, there’s no convincing reason to keep its highallowance of emission increase. It only gives bad message to industry. It has to be changed to tougher target,immediately.
(5) Kyoto Mechanisms (1.6%); The number “–1.6%”, is not specified in the guideline and it is the remaining
from other categories. Change from previous –1.8% to –1.6% is only the reflection of slight change of thesinks.

3. Insufficient Data and Inconsistent figure
The guideline lacks some important data and it makes entire plan of the Guideline very unclear.
Business as Usual (BAU) Scenario is not clear (not specified in the Guideline)
New guideline only shows the estimated additional reduction from the previous Guideline.
CO2 emissions from Energy Conversion Sector is not clear (not specified in the Guideline)
Within the energy related CO2, the figure of energy conversion sector is missing.
The sum of the reduction of each additional measure is not consistent with the total reduction.
From those insufficient data availability and less information disclosure, it is very difficult to understand the basisof the calculation that government have done for the review and causes a lot of confusion. More precise,sufficient and appropriate information is desperately needed.