Rapid Assessment by the Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDP

The impact of the war in
Ukraine on sustainable
development in Africa

May 2022

THE IMPACT OF THE
WAR IN UKRAINE ON SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
Rapid Assessment by the Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDPEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The war in Ukraine comes at a time when Africancountries are still struggling to recover from thedestabilizing effects of the global COVID-19 pandemic,
which caused deep economic regression, significant
loss of productivity, worsening inequalities, planetarypressures, and in some cases security challenges. It isthreatening to derail development progress in Africancountries, pushing the 2030 Sustainable Development
Goals and the aspirations of the African Union’s Agenda
2063 further out of reach.1
The direct impacts of the crisis in Africa include tradedisruption, food and fuel price spikes, macroeconomic
instability, and security challenges. The crisis pushed
the price of a barrel of Brent oil above the $100
dollar mark for the first time since 2014. At the sametime, food grain prices continued to rise even higher
as supply disruptions from Russia and Ukraine (actualand anticipated) rocked global markets. Food and fuelaccount for over one-third of the consumer price index inmost African countries. The pass-through of consequent
inflation will be swift and hard-hitting, especially forvulnerable groups like women and children.
There are also indirect impacts of the crisis to consider,which include imported inflation, difficult energy
transitions, and a potential geopolitical realignment.
To fully diversify, Europe will have to search for new
providers to fill the remaining two thirds gap. Africa’s
gas producers, like Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, are well
positioned to fill this gap. But there are two immediate
consequences of the increase in the global demand foroil and gas. First, it could undermine progress towards
ensuring a just transition to sustainable energy sources
which are much more environmentally friendly. Second,
it could limit the continent’s access to natural gas in thenear-term as African countries export their gas supplies
to Europe.
The impact of the war could push Africa into serious
debt distress, making countries less likely to meettheir debt obligations. It could also increase inequality
because high food and fuel prices typically hit themost vulnerable households hardest. Reduced accessto electricity and cooking fuel would make morehouseholds multidimensionally poor, while shrinking
budgets may trigger households to dispose of theirassets, thus reducing their ability to cushion themselvesfrom future shocks. Overall, these indirect effects would
constrain overall economic activity and could trigger
social tensions and unrest.

The crisis appears to be a harbinger of a Cold War
redux, which could undermine democratization across
Africa and fuel political instability. A global geo-politicalrealignment could also retard economic development
through the adoption of economic policies andideologies that are not pro-poor, planet-friendly andequitable. Indirectly, economic stress could trigger
violent protests and unconstitutional transfers ofpolitical power.
Moreover, there appears to be a threat to
multilateralism, which could hamper the ability ofdevelopment partners to provide consistent support
that would put African countries back on track to attainshared global development aspirations. Weakened
multilateralism would unravel significant development
progress attained over the past decades and rollback gains made in fighting COVID-19 globally. This is
why the development community, including bilateraland multilateral partners, must redouble their efforts
to provide adequate and timely support across thecontinent.
Priority actions to protect development gains in Africa
would be:1.

Prioritize immediate efforts to expand the fiscal
space in African countries and stabilize African
economies via enhanced bilateral assistance,
innovative multilateral initiatives (including the
expeditious re-channeling of new sources of funds
such as the Special Drawing Rights), increased
liquidity (e.g. through access to central bankswaps or access to IMF emergency windows) anddebt relief (e.g. addressing the slow pace of theCommon Framework that has only started working
with Chad and Zambia on their respective credit
committees).

2. Strengthen resilience to global shocks by
reducing Africa’s dependency on food and fuelimports, accelerating access to energy based ona just transition, de-risking critical investments
in technology and infrastructure, and promoting
innovative approaches to entrepreneurship.
3.

Foster structural economic transformation in Africa
by intensifying support to regional integration andeconomic diversification, and mobilizing resources
to fill strategic infrastructure, health and education
gaps.

1. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-impact-war-ukraine-food-energy-and-finance-systemsiCONTENTS
Executive summaryi

Introduction

1

Prosperity:

The impact of the war on economic growth inAfricaPeople:The human impacts of the crisis on poverty andhunger in Africa

Peace:

ii

2
9Geopolitical impacts on security and governancein Africa

14

Critical time for action18

T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

INTRODUCTION
This note analyses the impact of the war in
Ukraine on Africa’s progress towards theSustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
It focuses on three pillars of the SDGs:
People, Prosperity, and Peace. While mostAfrican countries are still dealing with the
COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine
is imposing additional development,
governance and security challenges
across the continent. We consider the
direct and indirect implications of the war
on Africa, the policy measures that national
governments are adopting as mitigation
measures, and how international
institutions, including UNDP, can bettersupport African countries, as they strive

to withstand the immediate impacts andtake steps to invest in critical capacities
that would build longer-term resilience.
Energy, trade, commodity prices, financial
flows and food prices constitute the major
direct effects, while the indirect effects
can occur through inflation and reduced
demand for Africa’s exports.
Specifically, the direct effects include
higher food and fuel prices, disrupted
trade,
fiscaltightening,widening
inequalities, and governance pressures.
Imported inflation is the major indirect
effect, while waning multilateralism andsecurity threats may also occur.

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T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

PROSPERITY:
The impact of the war on economic growth in Africa

Diagram 1: Direct and indirect economic channels

Oil price effects

INDIRECT EFFECTS

Longer term growth
opportunities for gas-richcountries

Impact on growth

Costly imports

Acceleration of inflation

Slow recovery in the
tourism sector

Heightens the risks of a debt crisis in
AfricaThe war in Ukraine

Reduced supply of energy
from Russia

Financial markets volatility will not befavorable to Africa
Transformation of energy consumption
structure

DIRECT EFFECTS

1.1 Impacts on economic growth
Direct Effects
Oil price effects
The war has led to an increase in energy
and food prices. Russia is the third largest
oil producer, and the price of Brent oil has
increased by 25% since the onset of thewar. Oil-producing countries such as Angola,
Nigeria, South Sudan, Congo, and Gabon
stand to benefit from increased demandand higher global oil prices, as European
countries search for alternative energy
sources. This could have a positive effecton their growth prospects, fiscal balances,current account positions, and reserves.

2

However, African countries will need to
improve the management of these windfall
gains. The current practice of forward saleof oil and significant mandatory payments
will determine the net gains. For Africa'shydrocarbon exporters, the increase in oil
prices is both a gain and a loss. While exports,
foreign exchange earnings/reserves, andgovernment revenue are likely to increase,this could be offset by the increased cost ofrefined petroleum imports - emphasizing theurgency in value addition and industrializationon the continent. Furthermore, the practiceof subsidizing petrol, diesel and kerosene
will further worsen their fiscal and financial
positions.

T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C ALonger term growth opportunities for gas-rich
African countries
African countries can benefit from increased
demand as European countries gradually
reduce their dependence on Russiangas. Several countries, including Algeria,
Tanzania, Senegal, Nigeria, and Mozambique
have significant reserves of offshore andnon-offshore gas. Tanzania, for instance,
anticipates USD 30 billion in foreign
investment to kick-start the constructionof offshore liquefied natural gas projects
in 2023, while Senegal aims to exploit the
40 trillion cubic feet of natural gas that was
discovered between 2014 and 2017. Algeria,
Niger and Nigeria have already signed a
13-billion-dollar agreement to develop theTrans-Saharan gas pipeline.
The United States has announced its
potential to supply Europe with an additional
15 billion cubic meters of liquefied naturalgas (LNG) in 2022, which represents 10% of
the gas that the 27 EU members buy from
Russia. In the medium term, this figure could
rise to 50 billion cubic meters per year andallow Europeans to do without a third of their
Russian imports. Europe will still have tosearch for new providers to fill the remaining
two-thirds gap which Africa is well positioned
to fill.
Costly oil imports
The war is already driving up oil prices at thepump, with adverse effects on transportation
costs and households’ budgets. This trend
is likely to continue in the short-term, as theprices of refined petroleum products suchas petrol, diesel, aviation fuel, kerosene, andlubricating oil increase. Most African countries
are particularly vulnerable, especiallybecause of their over-dependence on limited
sources and their lack of competitiveness inglobal markets.
The diamond market exposed
Countries where Russian companies
mine diamonds will also be affected. With
sanctions already imposed on the diamondindustry in Russia, there is fear that diamonds
from Namibia could be viewed as “blood
diamonds.” The isolation of Russia from theinternational community and the anticipatedshrinkage of investment from Russia may
also affect the Angolan diamond sector.
Tourism sector
The war in Ukraine risks delaying the recoveryof Africa's tourism sector, especially in Small
Island Developing States (SIDS) (Figure 1). If
the war persists, it will slow down the growthin these economies that heavily depend on
the tourism sector. For instance, Russia andUkraine are the 6th largest tourist markets
for Mauritius. To mitigate this, Mauritius isre-engineering its tourism by expanding its
niche markets beyond Europe. Russia also
accounts for the largest tourism market for
Seychelles, with 20.7% of total tourist arrivals
in January and February. With tourism
contributing to approximately 25% of GDP,
Mauritius is expected to face a significant
shortfall in revenue. It may have to accountfor this shortfall by borrowing, amidst its highexpenditure on social protection and otherdevelopment programmes.

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Number of international tourist arrivals

Figure 1: Countries are yet to rebound to pre-COVID levels of international tourist arrivals
2019
2020
2021

10,000,000
8,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000
2,000,000
0South Africa

Mauritius

Cabo Verde

Madagascar

Seychelles

Ethiopia

Kenya

Source: UNWTO

Indirect Effects
The impact on growth
The Russia-Ukraine crisis could jeopardize
the continent's prospects for economic
recovery through indirect channels such as
disruption in energy supplies, inflationarypressures and increased savings. Recent
estimates show that global demand could
decrease by 3%, while global inflation
increases by 4%. Given historical trends,
African exports are forecast to grow by 4.1%
in 2022, as opposed to 8.3% if the war did
not occur. As depicted in Figure 2, increased

inflation will reduce consumption, lower
global growth and, in turn, the demand for
African exports. Additionally, production
shocks are likely to affect economic growth
due to increased energy and transport
costs. Businesses will bear the cost of
rising energy prices and could experience
severe difficulties. The rise in fuel prices also
increases transport costs for manufacturers.
Ghana imports 60% of its iron ore andsteel from Ukraine, 25% of its wheat from
Russia, and 17.6% of fertilizer from Russia.
Tanker delivery costs, for instance, doubled
between February 23 and March 3, 2022.
In Sierra Leone, the increase in the price of

Figure 2: Macroeconomic transmission channels of global economic impacts to Africa
Rise of oil prices
Raw materials
Food prices

Economic sanctions &The war in Ukraine

Increase in savings

Increase in transport costs
Energy costs

Inflation

Decline in
consumer
power index

Decline in
consumption

Decline in
consumption

Decline ingrowthReduction inaggregate demandfor African
products

Increase inproduction cost

Businessclosures

Production
reduction

Decline ingrowthReduction inaggregate demandfor African
products

Reduction in
growthReduction inaggregate demandfor African
products

Source: Authors’ elaboration
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T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

Figure 3: Economic growth trends for selected major African economies
8.0
6.0

Kenya
Ghana

GDP growth rate %4.0
Nigeria2.0-South Africa
2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

(2.0)
(4.0)
(6.0)
(8.0)

fuel (20%) has increased the cost of local
transport by 50%. Some African regions, suchas West Africa are already facing additional
challenges such as uncertainties relating to
COVID-19 and insecurity.
The war will heighten the risks of a debt crisis
Most African countries were implementing
protective social policies to support
vulnerable populations during the COVID-19
pandemic. The current inflationary spiraltriggered by the crisis in Russia and Ukraine
is likely to make countries, which werealready near debt distress, less able to maketimely debt service obligations.
Additionally, as the war affects inflation andeconomic activity, global interest rates arelikely to rise. This could worsen Africa’s debt
position, particularly in countries whosedebt repayments are due in 2022 and2023. Moreover, an increase in domestic
interest rates will have a negative effect on
both domestic debt service payments andSource: IMF (World Economic Outlook)the capacity of Small and Medium Sized
Enterprises (SMEs) to borrow.
Some African countries, including Zambia
and Nigeria, are undergoing post-COVID-19
debt negotiations with the IMF and will haveto find alternative resources to stabilize theirdebt positions.
An acceleration of inflation will have major
destabilizing effects
Increased inflation
macroeconomic risk.

constitutesakey

The destabilization of global supply chainsand production processes has alreadytriggered an increase in prices which has led
to renewed attention to inflation. Increased
inflation due to higher global prices ofenergy, food and raw materials is likely to
reduce households' consumption, income
and savings. This will also have an effect on
public expenditures as governments try tosupport populations by maintaining energy5T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

prices at an affordable level. Tanzania, Ghana,
Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe have alreadyannounced significant fuel price increases.
Figure 4 shows that retail prices haveremained stable in recent weeks despite whatis by definition an oil shock, but it is difficult
to imagine this trend holding up without evenmore governmental interventions and pricecontrols going forward.

depreciation, a drop in equity market prices,
and an increase in risk premiums for bonds.
This could affect resource mobilization,
outflow of foreign direct investment and theissuance of international bonds by Africancountries. Tensions in the international
financial markets will also affect development
financing and hinder progress toward the
SDGs.

Financial market volatility will not be favorable
to Africa

In the longer-term, as the crisis continues
and affects European countries and the
U.S., African countries may receive lessremittances if the host economies of theirmigrants struggle to recover. Fewer Africans(approximately 50,000) live in Russia
compared to other western countries andremittances from Russia are typically low.

The crisis has already caused disruptions infinancial markets. An increase in risk aversion
among investors could trigger capital outflows
from African countries, leading to currency

Figure 4: Gasoline prices at the pump for selected African countries between January and March 2022

2.6
2.4

Zimbabwe

2.2

Gasoline Prices (Litre, USD)

2
1.8
1.6
South Africa

1.4

Lesotho
Zambia1.2
1Sierra Leone

0.8
0.6

24-Jan7-Feb

21-Feb

28-Feb

7-Mar

14-Mar28-Mar

Source: Global Petrol Prices

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T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

1.2 Affordable and clean energy
Direct effects

on petrol and diesel to power their machines
have had to raise prices of goods andservices even as consumers grapple withlower purchasing power.

The war is a threat to the commitments madeat COP26 in Glasgow. To cope with the
COVID-19 pandemic, G20 countries spent atleast USD 14 trillion on health-care systems,
wages, and welfare. Only 6% (about USD
860 billion) was allocated to areas that will
cut emissions; including making buildings
more energy efficient, electronic vehicles
and installing renewables. As the prospect of
economic recession looms, the promises of
COP26 could be pushed into the backgroundin order to deal with the energy shocks as
Europe strives to reduce its dependence
on Russia. Thus, options like the reopeningof coal-fired power plants and increasinghydrocarbon imports to Europe are being
considered.

In the medium term, African governments
must reform their agricultural and energy
sectors to attract more investments andensure greater food and energy security
for their population. This will be necessary
for addressing existing challenges, aswell as enhancing the efficiency and good
governance of public and semi-publiccompanies operating in these sectors.

Indirect effects•

Support countries in redirecting resources
to those most vulnerable to food and fuelprice shocks. This would be critical inpreventing further increases in hunger
and poverty rates as a result of the passthrough inflation effects of the war. In themedium term, African countries should
adopt a holistic approach to overallmacroeconomic management alongwith efficient governance and regulatory
frameworks for countries at risk of critical
destabilization by the inflation crisis.

•

Strengthen support for the accelerationof implementing SDG7. Efforts could bedirected to facilitate the developmentof 300GW of renewable power in Africa
by 2030, improve accessibility, ensure
affordability and reduce persistent energy
inequalities. This will imply supporting

1.3 Rebuilding the prosperity
pillarThree main areas of action could beconsidered to mitigate the impact of thecrisis on the Prosperity pillar:

Due to the current inflation, most low-income
households are currently in a situationof energy poverty, or have no access toelectricity. To reduce their energy costs,
millions of poor households rely on firewood
and charcoal for cooking and heating.
Purchasing power is falling due to the rise infood prices.
In Africa’s industrial sector, the rise in natural
gas prices poses a problem for companies
that use this fuel to manufacture chemicals or
fertilizers. This has added to costs incurredby many businesses who depend on selfgeneration of electricity, as power from thenational grid remains unreliable. Particularly
manufacturers, retail outlets and small
businesses in the informal sector who rely7

T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

countries to modernize their grid andstrengthen their technical capacity
through knowledge and technicalassistance.
These efforts to scale existing solutions
could eventually provide access to clean
and affordable energy to an additional
500 million people, focusing on the mostvulnerable communities. UNDP's energy
compact can support African countries
to mobilize partners within the United

8

Nations system, Member States, private
sector and civil society to increase energy
access.
•Africa's development partners could
provide technical and analytical assistanceto the countries that will be more heavily
hit on issues ranging from energy supply,
food security, foreign exchange reserves,
trade, fiscal sustainability, financial risk
monitoring, and subsidy reforms tostrengthening macroprudential policies.

T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C APEOPLE:The human impacts of the crisis on poverty and hunger inAfricaThe war in Ukraine could have devastating economic consequences on the continent,
including increased hunger and poverty, given the continent's high dependency on foodimports, rising global food prices, and low agricultural productivity.

Diagram 2: Direct and indirect human channels

INDIRECT EFFECTS

Reduced supply of food tocountries → risk of further
hungerLower fertilizer supply →reduced agricultural
productivity
Lower GDP → increased
poverty

The war in Ukraine

Higher global food prices
also increase hunger andpoverty

DIRECT EFFECTS

2.1 Impacts on poverty in Africa
Direct effects
The war in Ukraine can increase poverty in
Africa through three main channels. First,
most households devote a relatively highshare of their expenditure to food relative
to other countries. This suggests that rather
than focusing on sustainability, electricity, andeconomic transformation, most households
are preoccupied with survival.

Second, the war could widen inequality
because high food and fuel prices hit themost vulnerable households. Increased
poverty and inequality would not only reduceoverall economic activity but could also
trigger social tensions and unrest.
Third, due to increased oil prices, the war
could deprive households of basic amenities
such as electricity and cooking fuel, and thusincrease multidimensional poverty on thecontinent. To protect themselves from theseadverse effects, households may result to9T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

disposing of their assets, which would makethem vulnerable to other shocks.
Countries that are highly dependent on foodand fuel imports are the most vulnerable toincreases in poverty. Fuel imports in countries
such as Tanzania, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso
account for more than 20% of total imports
while food imports account for around 3540% of imports in Benin, the Gambia andComoros. Countries such as Senegal arehighly dependent on both food and fuelimports, and are particularly susceptible toan increase in poverty levels.

Indirect effects
The indirect effects of the crisis on poverty
could also result from worsening global
economic conditions. As global commodity
prices and fuel inflation increase, consumption
expenditures will decline. This would lower
global growth and, in turn, reduce aggregate
demand for African exports.
Weaker demand for African exports will
likely slow down economic growth in many
countries, further reducing people’s incomesand straining public resources for poverty
reduction measures. Although it is challenging
to quantify the effects of the war on poverty
in Africa at this point, recent evidence fromexternal shocks in the Economic Communityof West African States (ECOWAS) suggeststhat the COVID-19 pandemic increased
extreme poverty in West Africa by 3%.

10

2.2 Impacts on hunger in Africa
Direct effects
Decreased food supply from Ukraine andRussia will increase hunger
In 2020, African countries imported USD 4
billion worth of agricultural products from
Russia, 90% of which was wheat. Russia andUkraine account for 30% of global wheat
production and 80% of sunflower oil. Africancountries are particularly vulnerable due totheir heavy reliance on imports from Russia
and Ukraine (Figure 5). Egypt is the world’s
largest importer of wheat, with 80% of its
wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine. It also
spends USD 955 million on wheat subsidies.
Other countries that import significant
amounts of wheat from Russia include Benin,
Cabo Verde, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea,
Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon,
Ivory Coast, Mali, and Liberia. Some regions,like West Africa, are less dependent on foodimports from Russia and Ukraine (accounting
for only 1.7% of total calories consumed in thissub-region).
This direct effect on food prices and hunger
could also have spillover effects, as someland-locked African countries rely onneighboring countries that are tied to theRussia-Ukraine markets. For instance, South
Sudan is highly dependent on imported foodsupplies from Uganda and Kenya. Between
2012-2019, it imported about USD 253 million(48% of total imports) from Uganda and USD
30 million (30% of total imports) from Kenya.
Rising food prices, notably cereal (wheat
and maize) in source markets will negatively
affect domestic prices in South Sudan2, thus

2. While increasing prices will negatively affect urban consumers, rural producers could actually benefit, although rural producers
would feel the increased cost of imported fertilizers and both groups would be affected by higher energy (and thus transport) costs.

T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

Figure 5: Wheat and maize imports by origin

Wheat import by origin (%), 2020
Benin

Maize import by origin (%), 2020

100

Egypt

86.0

Congo

14.0

76.7

23.3

Cabo Verde

70.0

30.0

Tanzania

69.6

30.4

Togo

61.0

39.0

DRC

59.9

40.1

Namibia

59.9

40.1

Madagascar

54.2

45.8

Senegal

50.8

49.2

Russia/Ukraine

Madagascar

33.0

67.0

Egypt

26.2

73.8

Morocco 9.6

90.4

Seychelles 7.8

92.2

DRC 7.8

92.2

Rest of the World
Source: UN Comtrade

increasing inflation, food insecurity andhumanitarian needs (estimated at USD 1.5
billion or 30% of GDP).

Indirect effects
Higher global prices of fertilizer would reduce
agricultural productivity in Africa, putting
further pressure on food supply
The war has led to a 21% increase in theprice of fertilizers. Russia is a major sourceof the ingredients used to produce fertilizers,
accounting for 24% of world exports ofammonia and 40% of world exports ofammonium nitrate. In Africa, several countries
have initiated fertilizer subsidy schemes
to protect farmers against rising fertilizer
prices. These costs, which are anticipatedto increase, will further put pressure on thelimited fiscal space in many African countries.

In addition to the rising costs, many Africancountries are struggling to access suppliesof fertilizers. Figure 6 illustrates Kenya’smonthly fertilizer imports from 2020 to March
2022. Imports since the start of the war in
Ukraine are significantly below Q1 figuresduring the two preceding years. Agricultural
yields will be well below average this year.
This scenario is likely to play out in mostAfrican countries.
Higher global food prices would make Africa’s
food imports more expensive, also pushingup hunger
The price of milling wheat exceeded its
historic high following the onset of the war
in Ukraine, to a new record of 351.25 Euros.
Similarly, the prices of other commodities
such as corn and wheat have also increased.
These price increases are likely to be

11T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

Figure 6: Total fertilizer imports in Kenya by year
120000Total Imported in M/T100000
80000
2020

60000

2021
2022

40000
20000
0

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Source: Kenya Revenue Authoritytransmitted to African countries throughcommodity markets. In addition, scarcity
and price spikes could result in hoarding,
speculation and hedging, which could further
increase food prices.
Countries that import a higher share offood typically tend to have higher rates ofundernourishment. In times of economic
downturns – such as global recession,
conflict, or financial crisis – this dependence
on external supply of food (and global foodprices) undermines countries’ ability to feed
their citizens.

Countries such as Congo and Sierra Leone
are at high risk of food insecurity since they
rely on the external sector to a large extent.
Countries like Mozambique and Angola arefacing moderate risk with less dependency
on food imports.
Furthermore, rising oil prices will also increase
competition and demand for sugar cane/beet(for ethanol production) – which is one of
Nigeria’s top imported agricultural products.
As a result, Nigeria’s sugar industries andproducts made with sugar could suffer fromhigher prices, which will likely be passed on
to consumers.

Figure 7: Food prices and insecurity
Food Prices
Country (year on year change %, 3-monthmoving average)

AngolaPrevalence of moderate orsevere food insecurity in the
population (%)

19.3

73.5

(% of merchandise imports)

Botswana

7.2

12.7

50.8

Burkina Faso

14.3

11.6

47.9

31.3

88.3

Congo, Rep.

12

Food imports

Gambia, The

10

28.8

56

Guinea

15.2

26.6

74.1

Lesotho

7.4

28.1

49.7

Madagascar

8

20.2

Mozambique

12.2

19.7

Sierra Leone

19.4

32.3

71.1
83.9
Source: World Bank/IMF

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2.3 African countries’ responses
to the soaring food and energy
pricesAfrican countries differ in terms of their
response to rising energy and food prices.
Prior to the current crisis, some countries(such as Ethiopia, Nigeria and South
Africa) had already introduced domestic
price controls and export restrictions. The
challenge is that such measures guarantee
food security of local populations, but at theexpense of local food producers who wish to
benefit from higher prices. Some countries,
such as Benin, have introduced measures
to ban the exportation of imported products.
Other countries, such as Malawi, Zambia, andUganda, allow domestic prices to fluctuate,
but provide targeted cash transfers to themost vulnerable segments of the population,
especially women in remote areas.
African countries are exploring avenues
for additional resources to replenish andsecure their food stocks, support vulnerable
populations and cope with rising energy
and food prices through subsidies, as well
as deal with the rise in internal and externalinterest rates to contain inflation. Fiscal spaceis needed to support the most vulnerable
households and to help offset rising costs ofliving.

2.4 Rebuilding the people pillar
The national policy responses describedabove are limited by public budgets. There is

scope to support African countries in reducing
poverty and hunger, which had already beenon the rise due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, in order to have long-term impacts,
these responses must address structuralvulnerabilities such as narrow productionand export bases, limited intra-continental
trade, and endemic food and fuel insecurity.
UNDP's new Strategic Offer in Africa
articulates a theory of change that addresses
long-standing structural issues, focuses onbuilding longer term resilience, and puts
countries and communities back on track toattain the SDGs.
Thus, priority actions would include:•

Accelerating agricultural productivity
through modernization. Using technology
and incentives to leverage Africa’s
uncultivated arable landmass is critical forenhancing food security, especially forthe traditionally marginalized population.
The goal should be to lower the share offood and fertilizer imports from foreign
markets.3•

Prioritizing social protection mechanisms
such as temporary basic income. The
aim is to revisit the obstacles of theextension of social protection in Africa inorder to engender a reconsideration ofsocial protection policy. Social protection
systems should be a mixture of social
assistance and social insurance, catering
for differentiated demographics andincome levels.

3. However, this expansion of the agricultural area should be directed in such a way as to not negatively affect critical ecosystems
such as tropical forests. Importantly, considering generally low yield levels on the continent, a substantial increase of food production
could be achieved not by bringing more area under cultivation but by increasing per-hectare yields, for example through the wider
use of irrigation and, generally speaking, more investment into agricultural supply chains.
13

T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C APEACE:
Geopolitical impacts on security and governance in Africa
The consequences of the Russia-Ukraine crisis could transcend economic and social
outcomes. The wider implications could include weakened commitments to democratization,
the resumption of proxy conflicts, undermining of multilateralism, and worsening state-society
relationships across Africa.

Diagram 3: Direct and indirect geopolitical channels

INDIRECT EFFECTS

Geopolitical realignment
Reduction of arms sales

Violent demonstrations

Weakening of support for
democracy andmultilateralism

Recycling of small arms
Border disputes for gas deposits

The war in Ukraine

DIRECT EFFECTS

3.1 Stability, peace, and security
risks

Figure 8: Voting results of African countries for the
resolution on aggression against Ukraine
Support28

Direct effects
Geopolitical realignment
Voting patterns for the United Nations
Russia-Ukraine resolution reveal a possible
return to Cold War-type strategic alliancesthat could re-define geo-political realities
on the continent (Figure 8). This highlights
the sensitivity of the crisis for some Africancountries, perhaps due to the fear of

AgainstAgainst1

SupportAbstained
AbsentAbsent8
Abstained

17
14

Source: United Nations

T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

retaliation(disinformation
campaigns,
election-meddling schemes among others),
significant economic dependence, newRussian diplomatic and military engagements(especially in Mali, the Central African
Republic, Sudan, and Madagascar), pressure
to accommodate domestic public opinion on
Russia, or the need for countries to preserve
their neutrality and non-alignment due toideological factors.
Reduction in arms sales
Over the period 2014-2019, Russia supplied
49% of the weapons sold to Africa. It also
accounted for 20% of arms sales between
2011-2020. Countries such as Algeria, Egypt,
Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria are the major
importers of Russian arms. Russia also
supplies arms to countries such as Nigeria,that face difficulties in purchasing arms
from the United States due to human rights
concerns.
Figure 9: Arms exports from Russia in million USD(2010 – 2021)

Algeria

Egypt

7925

4366

Sudan

313
Nigeria

Ethiopia249

123

Weakening of support for democracy
African countries’ voting patterns in the UN
resolution on the Russian invasion of Ukraine
also raise some concerns regarding thepossibility of a return of authoritarianism on
the continent, and a weakening of democracy.
Between 2000 and 2021, 21 coups d’étatoccurred in 14 African countries. Meanwhile,a growing trend towards constitutional
revisions has resulted in 16 African countries
eliminating or modifying presidential term
limits (13 of them did so in the past six years).
While elections (local, parliamentary, or
presidential) are scheduled to be held in 17
African countries in 2022, the crisis in Russia
and Ukraine offers an opportunity for forced
transitions, which could trigger electoral
crises.

Indirect effects
In the short term, rising food and energy
prices could lead to violent demonstrations
if governments fail to introduce measures toshield the population from the effects of rising
prices. For instance, demonstrations took
place on March 14, 2022 in Sudan to protest
soaring food and fuel prices. The Arab Springis a stark reminder of what is at stake. Foodand fuel price increases precipitated protests
that led to violent socio political upheavals
across North Africa between 2010 and 2012.
The fragility of some African states may raise
fears of destabilization if price dynamics andtheir repercussions are not addressed.

Uganda611

Angola501

Source: SIPRI Trend Indicator
Values (TIVs)

In the longer-term, the war could create
unregulated secondary markets in Africa thatrecycle small arms, and this could serve asimportant sources of arms and weapons forterrorists and separatist movements. Peaceand security could be undermined due toincreased demand for oil and gas production
in fragile regions or countries through the15

T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

resurgence of militarized local protests e.g., Niger Delta. Also, border disputes forgas deposits - e.g., Kenya-Somalia, KenyaUganda, Nigeria-Cameroon — could also bereignited as prices and demand increase.

3.2 Different crisis contexts
across African regions
In recent years, Russia has intensified thepresence of its private military companies(the Wagner Group and the RBS group) in
Africa. Its military involvement in conflictsin Africa has had far reaching implications.
The Mali case shows how Russian influence
could complicate global and regional peace
initiatives, such as the France and European
Union engagement with Takuba forces. As
the war in Ukraine continues, and the Russian
government calls for its private militarycompanies to join the battle in Ukraine (in CAR
in particular, where a reduction of mercenaries
has been noted since the beginning of thewar in Ukraine), redeployments of troops
from African countries could take place (inMali in particular).
In the Horn of Africa, pre-existing conflict,
especially in Somalia, and the recent
escalation of violence in Ethiopia, is an
opportunity for intervention by Russia,
including its ties with Eritrea. In the Central
African Republic, the conflict remains
resistant to a sustainable political solution
in the face of armed groups violating the
Khartoum Peace Agreement signed in 2019.
The Russian presence with a private militarycompany (Wagner Group) - providing an
estimated 1,200-2,000 personnel, weapons,
and military instructors - is seen as part of the
problem as it is strengthening the case for a
military solution rather than for a peace deal.

16

The apparent withdrawal of Russia's private
military companies could be a window ofopportunity to craft peace in these regions.

3.3 Rebuilding the peace pillar
Three main intervention areas can beconsidered:•Strengthening partnerships with regionalorganizations

This war poses some risks to Africancountries to secure political stability, peace,and democratic governance. To respondto African people’s aspirations for peaceand security, the development community
must strengthen its support to regional
mechanisms for peace resolution. Bilateralagencies and multilateral partners must
broaden and deepen their cooperation
with the AU and sub-regional organizations(ECOWAS, etc.) to promote peace processes,
safeguard upcoming elections, and facilitate
conflict resolution initiatives.
•

Strengthening state building, governance,and political inclusion

Africa's development partners must support
Africa’s people, its governments, andinstitutions as they seek to effectively addresspersistent inequalities, weak governance,and violent conflict. These efforts should
be directed to support African countries
to develop new tools and partnerships toaddress the threats (violent protests, electionrelated violence, and violent extremism) totheir stability and peace.

T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A•

Focusing on urban fragility

Africa's rapid urbanization raises greathopes for the continent's ability to leverage
it to transform the population boom into a
demographic dividend. Africa’s cities are
growing by an estimated 15 to 18 million
people each year. However, this rapid
urbanization is also a driver of the fragility
in some African states. The urban suburbs
where the majority of the migrating rural

populations are concentrated are fertile
ground for the development of violent
extremism, which feeds on the poverty andfrustrations of people, especially the youth.
A specific focus is needed on the inclusion of
populations from urban suburbs in accessing
public services, policy-decision making
processes, political representation, andtargeted programmes for youth and women’s
economic and social empowerment.

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T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

CRITICAL TIME FOR ACTION
The war in Ukraine is having dire financial,economic, humanitarian and security
consequences in Europe. As most European
countries emerge from the COVID-19
pandemic, they are faced with a new
emergency with fresh and urgent priorities.
Dealing with the crisis and rebuilding Ukraine
could divert attention and development
assistance. If this happens, the world stands
to lose significant development gains across

Africa and the continent will not be well placed
to build forward faster, stronger, smarter,
more sustainably, and more equitably.
Speaking towards the end of World War
II, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
is reported to have challenged the world
not to let a crisis be wasted, emphasizing
the transformative role that new alliances
could play in reshaping global security and

Figure 10: Post-pandemic scenarios for Africa
Improved access to sanitation

Female poverty headcount(Percent)(Number of people)

100

350,000,000
300,000,000

80

250,000,000
60

200,000,000

40

150,000,000
100,000,000

20

50,000,000
0

0
2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2015

2050

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

2045

2050

Poverty <$1.90 per day

Secondary education gross completion rate

(Percent of population)(Percent)

50

70
60

40

50
30

40
30

20

20
10

10
0

0
2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

SDG Push scenario
18

2045

2050

2015

High damage scenario

Source: UNDP Data Futures

2020

2025

2030

2035

COVID baseline scenario

2040

T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

economic relations. His admonition led, inpart, to the creation of the United Nations.
In like manner, the double-whammy of thewar in Ukraine and the COVID-19 pandemicpresents Africa with a unique opportunity to
re-chart its development trajectory. UNDP’s
influential publication, “Leaving No one
Behind: Impact of COVID 19 on the Sustainable
Development Goals” posits four postpandemic scenarios for Africa — no COVID,
COVID, high-damage COVID, and SDG Push.
The SDG Push scenario entails targeted
investments in green growth, governance,social protection and technology thatwould reposition and reshape Africa’s SDG
attainment trajectory. Under this scenario,
some 100 million Africans will be lifted fromextreme poverty by 2030, and 234 million by
2050.
Moving ahead in Africa in the wake of
the war in Ukraine will require a Big Push.
A collaborative and coordinated multiyear effort is needed to compensate forthe losses, open new opportunities, derisk green transitions, bridge yawning
inequalities, mainstream technology, bolster
regional trade, revitalize manufacturing, andconsolidate inclusive governance. Three
immediate priorities include:

4.1 Intensifying efforts to reframe
development financeurgently step up their efforts to boost theirfinancial support to African countries. For
instance, advanced economies could rechannel a share of their Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs) resources to Africa. This could
be a potential additional source of resources
for countries, cushion against food and oilshocks, and support debt repayment.
This could help provide short-term financial
safety nets to prevent further increases inhunger and poverty in Africa, and also financesome of the long-term transformationalchanges needed to enhance food and fuelsecurity.
It is imperative for the entire development
community to commit to closing the USD 2.5
trillion per annum funding gap to achieve
the SDGs by developing countries. New
partnerships and sources of development
financing are required to meet the risingneeds of future development in Africa.
There is an urgent need to provide
programmatic advice to support domestic
resource mobilization in order to raise the taxGDP ratio from the current 17.5% to more than
24% by expanding tax bases and advocating
for reduction of unnecessary tax waivers andincentives that are detrimental to revenue
generation and local SMEs development.

Both COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine havelaid bare the vulnerability of many Africancountries to the financial transmission of
external shocks.

More should be done to engage theinternational and domestic private sector
in transformative sustainable financing
mechanisms including impact investment
engagements, blended financing, public
private partnerships and International
Financial Institutions (IFIs).

Both regional development banks, as wellas the Bretton-Woods institutions, need to

Existing public sustainable financing
facilities, such as the Global Fund, Global

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T H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

contributed about USD 15 billion in theform of taxes. Digital technologies canstimulate innovation, economic growth,and job creation in critical sectorsof the economy by allowing betterinterconnection of African markets withthe rest of the world. They can also
increase market access and financing
for the marginalized population, usually
excluded by the formal financial system.
Thirdly, digital technologies also help
leapfrog energy efficiency, create smart
grids and are the basis for delivering
energy as a service.

Environment Facility, Green Climate Fund,and Clean Development Mechanism could
be transformative tools for development
financing.

4.2 Resilience in African
economies
Development actors have a key role to playin enabling Africa to transform its natural
resource wealth, by taking advantage of
blue-carbon markets, and green financing
mechanisms. Furthermore, carbon neutral
risk-sensitive investment, de-risking, impact
investment, environmentally sustainableprojects, and sustainable energy investment
are among the critical areas where efforts
could contribute to orienting sustainable
investment in Africa. This would go a long
way towards building resilience to global
shocks.

•Intensifying
supporttoregional
integration and economic diversification:
The African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA) provides a platform to raise
Africa’s low productivity, accelerateindustrialization and promote higher
investment in the continent. Even when
African countries do produce some of
the food and fuel they need, much of it isoften exported, following patterns of tradeestablished in colonial times. Furthermore,as the 2021 AfCFTA Secretariat/UNDP
Africa Futures Report on value chains
has shown, 8 out of 10 value-chains that
could benefit from regional integration
rely on natural commodities. These
chains hold opportunities for increased
value-added higher up the production
ladder. Together, these efforts can make
Africa both more prosperous and lessvulnerable to external shocks such as
pandemics and conflicts.

•

Mobilize the resources to fill intheinfrastructure
gaps(roads,energy, water, health, education,etc.) that are constraining Africa’s
development. Strategic investments in

4.3 Economic transformation willbe the key driver of change for
AfricaIt is critical for Africa's development partners
to reorient global efforts toward supporting
African countries in accelerating thetransformation of their economies. Threelevers could accelerate Africa’s economictransformation:•

20

Harnessing digital technologies andpromoting free and fair competition will
be fundamental in revitalizing African
economies. In 2020, mobile technologies
and services generated USD 130 billionof economic value-added in sub-SaharanAfrica, equivalent to 8% of GDP, andT H E I M PA C T O F T H E WA R I N U K R A I N E O N S U S TA I N A B L E D E V E LO P M E N T I N A F R I C A

infrastructure, energy, transport, andtelecommunications are needed totransform the promise of a free tradearea in the continent into a reality for all
Africans, regardless of gender, affiliation,
location, religion or ethnicity.
•

Revisit the role of the African
continent as a supplier for criticalraw materials. Deploying renewableenergy technologies without taking into
account the mineral demand risks andthe additional carbon emissions fromupstream and end of life activities mayhinder rather than accelerate progress
on SDG 7 and SDG 13.
Understanding and analysing the fullmineral supply chain for low-carbon
technologies are critical to effectively
realize climate ambitions. Africancountries stand at the beginning ofminerals’ supply chains, and developing
sustainable
resource
management
strategies now may offer double wins,
helping both boost economic growth to
reduce climate and environmental risks(and in return have an impact on exports).

21

UNDP
Regional Bureau for Africa