国際武器移転史 第 18 号 2024 年 7 月＜目 次＞
論説
Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere ‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥ MAHITO TAKEUCHI（1）The Nexus of Militarization and Tourism in the “American Lake”: Establishment of Militourism in
Hawaiʻi ‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥ KAORI TAKADA（19）

研究ノート
In Consideration of Nighttime Precision Bombing by the U.S. during World War II: Its HistoricalSignificance and Future Tasks‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥ SATOSHI FUJITA（45）Brain Drain from India to the U.S. during the Cold War: Focus on Technology Transfer and theDevelopment of Highly Skilled Talent ‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥ HIDEYUKI SHIMOTOMAI（63）

講演録
明治大学国際武器移転史研究所主催・第 10 回公開シンポジウム「分断する国際秩序 – 軍
事緊張と平和創造のはざまで –」〝異次元の軍拡〟と沖縄〜旧日本軍と自衛隊の〝沖縄
侵攻〟の比較研究〜‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥ 前泊 博盛（79）

編集後記

明治大学国際武器移転史研究所編

History of Global Arms Transfer, 18 (2024), pp. 1-18

Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere
By MAHITO TAKEUCHI*
This paper analyzes the historical genealogy of the Anglosphere concept in order
to examine the nature of interstate cooperation in the post-global era. Specifically,
it examines the following historical backgrounds: the Greater Britain Initiative inthe late 19th century, Joseph Chamberlain’s tariff reform movement and theRound Table movement in the early 20th century, Winston Churchill’s
international order concept after World War I, Anglobalization after the end of theCold War, the writings of Robert Conquest and James C. Bennett, and Brexit and
the Global Britain Initiative. In order for the Anglosphere to strengthen thespecial relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States and tobuild good relations with Asian and African democracies in the Indo-Pacificregion in the future, the core countries of the Anglosphere, consisting of theUnited Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States ofAmerica, should cooperate with “like-minded countries” such as Japan and mustovercome the racist origins of the Anglosphere concept and the negative legacyof imperialism.

Introduction
Since the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (“Brexit”), based on areferendum on June 23, 2016, the concept of the Anglosphere has gained international
attention. The Anglosphere is widely understood to consist of five countries: the CANZUK
countries, consisting of the United Kingdom and the former Dominion countries of Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand, and the United States, which currently has an intelligence andsecurity alliance with the CANZUK countries called Five Eyes. However, the boundariesof the Anglosphere are geographically elastic and ambiguous, which is one of its politicalattractions, and more recently it has been expanded to include India, Singapore, and Hong
Kong, which were once part of the British Empire. In addition, English-speaking countries
in Africa and the West Indies and Ireland are also included in the Anglosphere, although
this is controversial (Bennett, 2016; Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 1; Kenny and Pearce,
2018, pp. 2, 5; Vucetic, 2011, p. 3).
In this paper, the five core countries of the Anglosphere are the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. It is crucial to determine the character andcharacteristics of these core Anglosphere countries from a historical perspective to predict
future relations with non-white countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, this paper
examines the historical genealogy of the Anglosphere concept to investigate the nature ofinter-state cooperation in the post-global era, seeking to clarify future issues from theperspective of Japan. In Chapter 2, the nature and characteristics of the Anglosphere are* Professor, Nihon University College of Commerce

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MAHITO TAKEUCHI
discussed. Chapter 3 presents the historical origins of the Anglosphere concept, including
the Greater Britain concept of the late 19th century, the tariff reform movement and Round
Table movement of the early 20th century, and Winston Churchill’s concept of aninternational order after World War I. Chapter 4 examines Anglobalization after the end of
the Cold War, the writings of Robert Conquest and James C. Bennett, and Brexit and the
Global Britain concept to understand the present state of the Anglosphere concept.

1. What is the Anglosphere?
First, it is important to understand the character and characteristics of the Anglosphere.
Anglosphere is a relatively newly coined term first used by science fiction author Neal
Stephenson in his 1995 novel The Diamond Age (Stephenson, 1995). However, over the
past 28 years, it has also come to represent a political discourse that refers to Englishspeaking countries that share certain characteristics, such as liberal market economies,
common law, representative democracies, and a history of Protestantism (Kenny and
Pearce, 2018, p. 2). While Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative” emphasizes
ensuring a rules-based international order that includes freedom, democracy, rule of law,and respect for fundamental human rights (Cannon and Hakata, 2022), the concept of theAnglosphere is a broad. It is sometimes used to refer to a broad but ill-defined group ofEnglish-speaking countries that support the idea of freedom and the post-World War II
rule-based international order. However, the Anglosphere has also been criticized andresisted at times because of the imperialistic, Anglo-Saxon racial lineage of its core
countries (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 1).
Proponents of the Anglosphere often praise the development of representative democracy
in England and the United States, citing the Magna Carta of 1215 as a common historicalorigin. However, there is little scholarly evidence to trace the origins of the Anglosphereback to 13th century England. Rather, its origins are more appropriately sought in the riseand fall of the British Empire (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, pp. 5-7). For example, Michael
Kenny and Nick Pearce examined the liberal, democratic, free-market, Protestant, Englishspeaking political culture of the Anglosphere in relation to past Anglo-American imperial
discourses (Kenny and Pearce, 2018).
Particularly since Brexit, at least in political circles, these Anglo blocs have come to be
seen as a better political, economic, and cultural fit for the United Kingdom than theEuropean Union (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 2). This cordon is known as the “global
bloc”. Moreover, these ties are emphasized as a precondition, so to speak, in the new postBrexit British foreign policy of “Global Britain” (Akimoto, 2021, pp. 84-90), which has
been criticized as a return to imperialism, that is, “Empire 2.0” (Utsugi, 2021).
This criticism is rooted in a wariness of the Anglosphere’s imperialist past, especially its
racist origins. As international relations expert Srdjan Vucetic pointed out, the legacy of
empire still haunts the Anglosphere, and it continues to be defined by its racist origins(Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 8). In this sense, it reflects nostalgic notions about
imperialism, as post-colonial critics, led by Edward Said, have criticized (Kenny and
Pearce, 2018, pp. 4-5). Vucetic defined “race” as a “racialized identity,” a social kind thatexists only because people believe in its existence, or an “imagined community,” which is
not real in the biological sense (Anderson, 1983). The Anglosphere’s origins were racist,and the friendship between the expanding United States and the declining United Kingdom

2Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere
was driven by an identity discourse that implied the blood-borne unity and moral
superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race. As the Cold War dragged on and then faded away, theAnglosphere was positioned as the supreme symbol of “liberal internationalism” and the“human rights revolution.” First centered in London and then later in Washington, D.C., theAnglosphere has dominated world international politics for the past 200 years or more. Its
agents, imperialist states, companies, and peoples have colonized and industrialized large
parts of the globe, displacing millions of people by force. As a result, the world is now
globalized, or Anglobalized, by the Anglo-Saxon peoples. The Anglo-American special
relationship, which began with the violent secession of the United States from Great Britain
through the American Revolution in the 18th century, has been all but forgotten andreplaced by a remarkably enduring alliance and close friendship. Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand have gradually established special relationships with the United States as
they have acquired more sovereignty from Great Britain. Through these special
relationships, the “core” of what is now called the Anglosphere, the imperial and civilized
presence in global society, has been formed. Since the early 20th century, leaders of the oldand new Anglo empires have jointly proclaimed moral superiority in the international
community. The Anglosphere is a product of its racist past, a past that may not go away inthe future (Vucetic, 2011, pp. 2, 3-4, 7).
The Anglosphere is similar to the concept of the British world in a broad sense, or the
Anglo-world or English-speaking world, as James Belich and Gary Magee and Andrew
Thompson argued. Indeed, the two concepts are similar.
Belich emphasized the identity of the Anglo-world, or English-speaking world, consistingof the United Kingdom, the former Dominion countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand,etc.), and the United States of America, and described the process by which the Angloworld was formed. He stated that there was a parallel migration from “Old Britain,” theBritish homeland, to the “British West,” the Dominion countries, and from “Old America”,
the Atlantic coastal region of the United States, to the “American West,” the western UnitedStates. Belich noted that, unlike immigration from other imperialist countries, “the Anglo
diaspora began earlier, was more permanent, and its migrants went to reproductions of theirown society” (Belich, 2009, p. 126). Not only famine and deprivation, but also land grants,
assisted passage, charitable endeavor and government campaigns played a role inpromoting immigration. In the 19th century, the Anglo-world experienced explosive
population growth, more so than any other region of the world. Between 1790 and 1930,
the number of English-speaking people increased nearly sixteen-fold, from 12 million to
200 million, and this rapid growth was supported by mass migration from Great Britain to
the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The United States was particularly
popular with Irish immigrants, attracting two-thirds of all immigrants from Britain.
Australia, like New Zealand in the 1880s, became a favorite destination for British
immigrants after the discovery of gold in the 1850s and 1860s. Canada, on the other hand,became the main destination for British immigrants in the early 20th century, who weredrawn by the rapid economic growth of prairie towns. Migration to South Africa remained
limited despite the discovery of gold and mineral resources in the late 19th century(Takeuchi, 2019, p. 4; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 14-15).
Such large-scale migration was made possible by the transportation and communication
revolution that took place during the Victorian era. The increased power and speed ofsteamships dramatically reduced the time and financial costs of long-distance travel.
Merchant shipping was monopolized by Britain, which by the end of the 19th century was3

MAHITO TAKEUCHI
responsible for half of the world’s shipping. The construction of the railroad network in
Great Britain began in the 1830s and was the most developed in the Anglo-world. The top
five countries in terms of per capita mileage traveled by rail in 1875 were the UnitedStates, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Great Britain, opening their vast land areas toimmigration and trade. Meanwhile, the invention of the telegraph shortened time andspatial distances, and telegraph cables laid over land and on the ocean floor enabled almost
instantaneous communication in the Anglo-world (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 15).
Once established, settler societies became embedded in complex transportation andcommunication networks to and from these homelands. Money, people, goods, and services
all moved along these networks, creating strong political, economic, and cultural bonds,
with distinctive patterns of Scottish, Welsh, Irish, and English immigration. Magee andThompson emphasized the importance of British migration to the United States and theDominion countries and the economic networks they formed, as well as the impact of thecultural identity of Britishness on the economic integration of the Anglo-world, using theconcept of a “cultural economy.” They argued that globalization progressed most in thisAnglo-world. Mass consumption expanded in the English-speaking world after 1850, andBritish tastes developed in the colonial markets, facilitating trade with Britain. A sharedsense of Britishness, although exclusionary and white-preferential, not only created trustand interdependence between mother country and settler societies but also helped shapeconsumption preferences. Strong personal ties and attachments increased the consumptionof British products in settler societies. White intra-imperial trade was supported by acommon currency, a common language, and preferential agreements, and cultural ties
generated economic growth in the Anglo-world. It was also a time of deep integration
between the Anglo-American economies. Capital investment flowed freely across the
Atlantic from the City of London, providing funds for expansion and growth. Between
1865 and 1914, over 800 million pounds of British capital was exported to the UnitedStates, representing one-fifth of the world’s capital exports. In return, United States
agriculture enriched the British market, and grain, meat, and cheese were exported in large
quantities to Britain, with a quarter of British meat imported from the United States in 1890
and 70% of British grain imported from the United States by 1900. The economic vitalityof the United States was now undeniable, and massive capital investment, rapid
development of science, technology, and infrastructure, and a growing urban population
fueled the country’s economic growth. Between 1860 and 1900, manufacturing grew
dramatically in the industrial Northeast, its output quadrupled, and the United States
showed the world a new model of capitalism (Takeuchi, 2019, p. 4; Magee and Thompson,
2010, p. 173; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 15-16, 20).
However, it is appropriate to consider such an Anglo-world as related to, but clearly
distinct from, the global political and economic system centered on the United Kingdom,
collectively called the British world-system, or the British world in the broadest sense, asJohn Darwin argued. Darwin saw the Dominion countries as the bridgeheads of the British
world and further emphasized the existence of the British world-system, including thedependencies of the British Empire (India and Asian and African colonies) and the“informal empires” (China and Argentina). However, unlike the Anglo-world, it excluded
the United States (Takeuchi, 2019, pp. 4-5; Darwin, 2009; Kenny and Pearce 2018, p. 14).
In the next chapter, we will examine how the Anglosphere concept, based on the“racialized identity” of the Anglo-Saxon nation revealed above, has been shaped in British
political discourse since the 1860s.

4Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere

2. Origins of the Anglosphere Initiative:
From the Greater Britain Initiative to Churchill(1) The Greater Britain Initiative – Charles Dilke and John Seeley
A small number of specialized studies have sought to understand the intellectual origins of
the Anglosphere concept in Victorian Britain. Duncan Bell, in particular, presented asophisticated discussion of the various imperial federal movements. According to Bell, theorigins of the modern Anglosphere concept, which did not include the United States, can betraced back to discussions on the imperial federation under the Greater Britain initiative
after the late 1860s (Bell, 2007; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 4, 17; Mycock and Wellings,
2019, p. 7). The leading exponents of this theory were the British Liberal politician Charles
Dilke and the Cambridge University historian John Seeley.
Charles Dilke popularized the concept of Greater Britain in 1868 with the publication of
his travel book entitled Greater Britain. He traveled not only to the United States, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand but also to India and the Pacific Islands, each of which heargued was a territory of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, although each country had different
national characteristics based on differences in geography and social conditions. He wrote
the following in the preface to Greater Britain:
In 1866 and 1867, I followed England round the world: everywhere I was in Englishspeaking, or in English-governed lands. If I remarked that climate, soil, manners of life,that mixture with other peoples had modified the blood, I saw, too, that in essentials therace was always one.
The idea which in all the length of my travels has been at once my fellow and myguide – a key wherewith to unlock the hidden things of strange new lands – is aconception, however imperfect, of the grandeur of our race, already girdling the earth,which it is destined, perhaps, eventually to overspread (Dilke, 2009a, p. vii).
Late Victorian thinkers like Dilke were influenced by a virulent type of “scientificracism” focused on social evolution that tended to justify the violent oppression of nonwhite indigenous peoples, as highlighted in recent studies on settler colonialism (Veracini,
2010; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 19). Hence, in Greater Britain, Dilke initially used theconcept of Greater Britain as a synonym for the entire British Empire, but in the latter partof his book, he argued that the concept of Greater Britain should be limited to “Englishspeaking, white-inhabited, and self-governed lands” (Dilke, 2009b, p. 149). Dilke thenargued that “that which raises us above the provincialism of citizenship of little England is
our citizenship of the greater Saxondom which includes all that is best and wisest in theworld” (Dilke, 2009b, pp. 155-156).
On the other hand, historian John Seeley published The Expansion of England in 1883, in
which he used the concept of Greater Britain. Seeley also defined the concept very broadly,
including four large groups of territories outside of England that were settled primarily by
Englishmen and subject to the Queen’s sovereignty [that is, (1) Canada, (2) the West Indies,(3) South Africa, and (4) Australia and New Zealand] and India (also subject to the Queen’s
sovereignty and governed by Englishmen, but entirely settled by different peoples) (Seeley,
2005, p. 10). Like Dilke, however, Seeley’s definition of Greater Britain underwent several
changes in the same book. At one point, he argued that Greater Britain was raciallyhomogeneous (with a few exceptions) and thus could not incorporate India, but later he

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MAHITO TAKEUCHI
argued that there were actually two Greater Britains, one the colonial empire settled
primarily by Englishmen, as mentioned above, and the other India, which he called thedependency. He argued that in important respects they were opposites. Nevertheless,throughout his book, Seeley was keen to emphasize the fundamental differences between
the colonial empire and India and to emphasize the importance of the former (Bell, 2007, p.
8). In fact, Seely stated the following:
Our [British] colonial Empire stands on quite a different footing; it has some of thefundamental conditions of stability. There are in general three ties by which states areheld together, community of race, community of religion, community of interest. By the
first two our colonies [referring to the colonial empire] are evidently bound to us, andthis fact by itself makes the connexion strong. It will grow indissolubly firm if we cometo recognise also that interest bids us maintain the connexion, and this conviction seems
to gain ground. When we inquire then into the Greater Britain of the future we ought tothink much more of our Colonial than of our Indian Empire (Seeley, 2005, p. 11).
Further, Seeley considered the colonial empire as Greater Britain and emphasized thestrength of its ties:
Greater Britain [......] is united by blood and religion, and though circumstances may
be imagined in which these ties might snap, yet they are strong ties, and will only give
way before some violent dissolving force (Seeley, 2005, pp. 50-51).
As one of the standard bearers of the Imperial Federation League (1884–1893), Seeley
envisioned the establishment of a Greater Britain federal government that would unite
England and the colonial empires (Baji, 2019, p. 210). This was because, already in theearly 1870s, the German Empire was rising in Europe and Russia in Asia, and in order tocompete with these countries, England felt the need to federate with its colonial empires,
following the example of the federalization of the United States of America. Seeley statedthat there were two options for the way forward for Greater Britain: One option is for eachof the colonial empires to become independent. In this case, one would have to consider
whether Canada and the West Indies would be better off as U.S. possessions, but in any
case, English name and institutions would prevail, and the mother country would always
continue to be regarded with friendly sentiment, even if secession were to be declared.
Another option would be for England to bring together her very separate colonial empires
into a federal state, as the United States had so easily accomplished. In that case, England
would be a first-class country in terms of both population and area, on par with the UnitedStates and Russia, and would surpass the continental powers. Of course, size is notnecessarily the same as greatness, and mere material size may be sacrificed if it is morally
and intellectually possible to maintain first-class status. However, it is advisable to make adecision on federalization after due consideration (Seeley, 2005, pp. 15-16).
Seeley’s drive for such a federal state was motivated by the belief that science andtechnology (steam engines and the telegraph) had shortened time and spatial distance, justas modern-day enthusiasts of the Anglosphere concept point to Internet technology as an
example:In the last century [the 18th century] there could be no Greater Britain in the true6

Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglospheresense of the word, because of the distance between the mother-country and its colonies
and between the colonies themselves. This impediment exists no longer. Science has
given to the political organism a new circulation, which is steam, and a new nervous
system, which is electricity (Seeley, 2005, pp. 73-74).
Seeley emphasized “liberty” and “democracy” as the political ideology of a Greater
Britain united by such science and technology (Seeley, 2005, p. 7). In this, too, Seeley issimilar to contemporary Anglosphere enthusiasts.
However, in contrast to Greater Britain, which consisted of colonial empires, Seeley, inthe latter part of The Expansion of England, referred to India as an entity that could not be
assimilated into Greater Britain:
England’s connexion with India seems at first sight at least to be in the highest degree
unnatural. There is no natural tie whatever between the two countries. No communityof blood; no community of religion, for we come as Christians into a population divided
between Brahminism and Mohammedanism (Seeley, 2005, p. 185).
The English State is powerful there [India], but the English nation is but animperceptible drop in the ocean of an Asiatic population. And when a nation extends
itself into other territories the chances are that it will there meet with other nationalities
which it cannot destroy or completely drive out, even if it succeeds in conquering them.
When this happens, it has a great and permanent difficulty to contend with. The subject
or rival nationalities cannot be perfectly assimilated, and remain as a permanent causeof weakness and danger (Seeley, 2005, p. 46).
Seeley argued that such dangers could have been avoided in the colonial empires ofGreater Britain. Like Dilke, he justified the violent oppression of non-white indigenous
people, believing that England had occupied “parts of the globe which were so empty”.
There was land for every emigrant who chose to come, and the native races were not in
a condition sufficiently advanced to withstand even the peaceful competition, much lessthe power, of the immigrants (Seeley, 2005, p. 46).
Hence, Seeley made a clear distinction between Greater Britain, which consisted of thecolonial empires, and India, arguing that possession of India would surely increase thedanger to England and make it a serious liability (Seeley, 2005, p. 11). In this sense, Seeley
could be said to have anticipated the late 19th century perspective that emphasized the“global colour line” separating the white and non-white worlds (Lake and Reynolds, 2011).
(2) Joseph Chamberlain’s Tariff Reform Movement and the Round Table Movement
Seeley’s The Expansion of England strongly influenced Joseph Chamberlain, who
promoted the tariff reform movement between 1903 and 1906. Chamberlain was obsessedwith Seeley’s Imperial Federalist movement and not only enrolled his eldest son, Austen
Chamberlain, at Cambridge University, where Seeley was a professor, but also shared
Seeley’s admiration for the United States (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 26-27). The tariffreform movement was initiated by Joseph Chamberlain, beginning with his Birmingham
speech on May 15, 1903. However, his imperial preferential tariff concept did not apply to
Indians and other alien imperial subjects, but only to “our own kinsfolk” or the “white

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MAHITO TAKEUCHI
population that constitutes the majority in all the great self-governing Colonies of the[British] Empire.” In response to criticism that free trade with other countries was
outpacing trade within the British Empire, he responded that trade with the colonies was
growing faster and was more valuable to Britain. This answer was repeated in modern
times by Eurosceptic advocates who emphasized trade with the Anglosphere to counter
trade with the European Union (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 27-28).
Joseph Chamberlain’s campaign for tariff reform was ultimately frustrated by the hostilityof the free traders, who dominated the British political economy, and the working class.
The commercial, financial, and shipping interests centered in the City of London, alongwith the cotton, coal, and shipbuilding businesses, opposed the tariff reform movement, as
did the working class, because they believed that such reform would increase food prices(Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 28).
However, Imperial Federalist movement was later succeeded by Alfred Milner, Joseph
Chamberlain’s ally and commissioner to South Africa, and Milner’s kindergarten,
consisting of young men from Oxford University whom Milner had recruited. Milner’skindergarten was a tight-knit political society organized to serve Milner and his successor,
Lord Selborne, and included Lionel Curtis, a writer and fellow at All Souls College,
Oxford; Leo Amery, the Conservative MP and future colonial secretary; and Philip Kerr,
the future Lord Lothian, who later served as Lloyd George’s private secretary, undersecretary of state to India and British ambassador to Washington (Kenny and Pearce, 2018,
pp. 29-30).
Led by Lionel Curtis, the Millner kindergarten drafted the Selbourne Memorandum of
1907, which proposed uniting South Africa under a new federation, but also advocated for
unification through federation of the entire British Empire. The Round Table movement
was launched as a means to realize these ambitions. Curtis organized a network of Round
Table societies in the Dominions, and Philip Kerr edited the Round Table journals. The first
product of the Round Table movement was the Green memorandum, drafted by Curtis andpublished in 1910. In it, he argued, like the imperial federalists before him, that the British
Empire was now in a struggle for survival. It was particularly vulnerable to German naval
expansion and could only be secured by joint investment in imperial defense and security,especially sea power. He stated that Greater Britain must “federate or disintegrate”. Like
his predecessors, however, his plan was criticized as pessimistic, hasty, and unrealistic. The
Dominion states were not ready for federation, for it was believed that the British
Parliament would not cede its sovereignty to a higher political body. The exclusion of India
and the other dependencies from the federalization concept also annoyed and divided
Curtis’s readers (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 30-32).
The period between the end of the 19th century and the two World Wars was a time ofintensified racial discrimination, as Dominion countries took measures to tighten
restrictions on non-white immigrants. The British government maintained the principle of“imperial citizenship,” or the equal treatment of British subjects throughout the British
Empire, but it also recognized the right of the self-governing colonies to enforce their own
immigration laws. In particular, Indians were still deprived of their self-governing status
and faced racial discrimination in the Dominion countries. At the Imperial Conferences of1921 and 1923, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were persuaded to rescind their racist
laws against Indians (South Africa refused and became isolated), but the tension between
imperial citizenship and the autonomy of the Dominion countries was too great to becontained any longer (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 33-34).

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Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere
It was also during this period that the path to Dominion countries’ exercising the right toself-determination became clear. The Imperial Conference of 1926 issued the Balfour
Declaration, defining the status of Dominion countries as “autonomous Communities
within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any
aspect of their domestic or external affairs, through united by a common allegiance to the
Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations”. This
carefully crafted principle was codified in the 1931 Statute of Westminster, which
established the independence of the legislatures of the Dominion countries, including the
Irish Free State. Paradoxically, the independence of the Dominion countries led to a brief
revival of the tariff reform movement. By the 1930s, the economic depression, the collapseof the gold standard, and the rise of protectionism strengthened the political argument for
an imperial preferential tariff, and when Britain left the gold standard in 1931, theDominion countries also devalued with it and created a sterling area. At the Ottawa
Conference of 1932, Neville Chamberlain, son of Joseph Chamberlain, negotiated anagreement with the empire countries to grant preferential tariffs on each other’s products,
and although Britain gained relatively little form this agreement, an imperial preferential
tariff system was established. Between 1929 and 1938, British imports from Australia andCanada more than doubled, while imports from Argentina fell by almost half (Kenny and
Pearce, 2018, pp. 34-35).
Although the imperial federalists could not create a single political organization thatwould unite the “imagined community” of Greater Britain, the political, economic, andcultural ties between Britain and the Dominion countries nevertheless remained real andstrong.
(3) Winston Churchill’s vision of international orderHistorian Andrew Roberts, who wrote A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since
1900 (2006), a sequel to Winston Churchill’s A History of the English-Speaking Peoples(1956-58), points to the origins of the Anglosphere concept, including the United States, inWorld War I, particularly Winston Churchill’s inaugural speech of the English-Speaking
Union on July 4, 1917 (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 6; Churchill, 2015; Roberts, 2008).
However, it was not until the decisive decline of the British Empire after World War II that
the Anglo-American core of the Anglosphere, “Anglo-America,” was clearly formed. When
World War II began, the Dominion countries sent troops to support Britain, but the heavy
defeats from 1940 to 1942 dispelled any notion that the mother country could guarantee thesecurity of the Dominion countries. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand came to rely on
the United States as the guarantor of their security, Ireland became a republic, and India
gained its independence (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 14, 36).
While Churchill did not use the concept of the Anglosphere in his History of the EnglishSpeaking Peoples, he praised the political and cultural achievements of the Englishspeaking Anglo-Saxon peoples. He noted that the Anglo-Saxon peoples constantly won
wars, expanded trade, and promoted freedom, security, and welfare, all because of theirliberal political culture and institutions. He held to Victorian beliefs about racial hierarchies
and believed in the cultural superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, but he also held a liberal
belief in the obligation to act humanely toward other peoples. Hence, he was sharply
critical of Nazi Germany’s racial exploitation and violence and declared that Britain and
the British Empire would fight to the end against Hitler (Churchill, 2015; Kenny and
Pearce, 2018, pp. 39, 40-41; Legrand, 2019, p. 64; Vucetic, 2011, p. 2).

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When World War II broke out, Churchill, as British Prime Minister, persuaded the UnitedStates to join the European front, and the financial support provided by the United States to
Britain after 1941, mainly through the Lend-Lease scheme, was considered necessary tosupport the British war effort. It was also considered necessary to promote the formation ofa liberal international order and to make the European imperialist powers, especially
Britain, respect the principle of self-determination as expressed in the Atlantic Charter of1941. Churchill, under considerable pressure by the United States to abandon Britain’s
imperialist ambitions, repeatedly made rhetorical references to the common history andfuture unity of English-speaking peoples to resolve such Anglo-American differences of
opinion. For Churchill, the deep historical relationship between Britain and the UnitedStates was the basis for shaping a new international order that would protect the interests of
the British Empire while respecting the ambitions of the United States, safeguarding thesecurity and prosperity of Western nations, and helping to build a new era of liberal
civilization (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 46-47, 49-50).
Churchill’s first public statement regarding the special relationship between Britain andthe United States was the “Iron Curtain” speech that he delivered at Westminster College inFulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946. In his speech, Churchill used grand rhetoric, statingthat Britain and the United States were bound together by an English tradition of
governance, a common heritage of representative democracy and freedom that had evolved
over the centuries and had been carried far by previous generations of immigrants (Kennyand Pearce, 2018, pp. 50-51; Vucetic, 2011, p. 2):
Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organisation will be
gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking
peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth andEmpire and the United States. [......] The United States has already a Permanent
Defence Agreement with the Dominion of Canada, which is so devotedly attached to
the British Commonwealth and Empire. This Agreement is more effective than many of
those which have often been made under formal alliances. This principle should be
extended to all British Commonwealths with full reciprocity. Thus, whatever happens,
and thus only, shall we be secure ourselves and able to work together for the high andsimple causes that are dear to us and bode no ill to any. Eventually there may come - I
feel eventually there will come-the principle of common citizenship (Churchill, 1946).
[......] we must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom
and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world andwhich through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, andthe English common law find their most famous expression in the American Declarationof Independence (Churchill, 1946).
Churchill’s theory of history still has many adherents, many of whom believe that
Churchill was right. In fact, it seems Churchill was right because although decolonization
destroyed the British Empire, it left behind a distinct but loosely knit community deeplycommitted to freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and English as the lingua franca. The“Iron Curtain” speech was delivered precisely as the English-speaking peoples weretriumphing over the fascist axis of Nazi Germany and as they embarked on another war
against Soviet communism (Vucetic, 2011, pp. 2-3). He spoke gravely about these events:

10Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere
A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody
knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organisation intends to doin the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive andproselytising tendencies. [......] From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, aniron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of
the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna,
Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations
around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or
another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing
measure of control from Moscow. [......] The Communist parties, which were very small
in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far
beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police
governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia,
there is no true democracy. [......] Except in the British Commonwealth and in the
United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth
columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilisation. These aresombre facts for anyone to have to recite on the morrow of a victory gained by so muchsplendid comradeship in arms and in the cause of freedom and democracy (Churchill,1946).
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the core countries of the Anglosphere have moved
forward in close cooperation, and their partnership has been shaped by agreements on
defense and intelligence. While on its face this was a matter of collective security against
the Soviet Union, which was building up its armed forces (Legrand, 2019, p. 56), the senseof ethnic community it evoked was undoubtedly rooted in the racial thinking about the statethat Churchill had acquired in his youth (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 53).
At a meeting of the British Conservative Party in 1948, Churchill pointed out that theUnited Kingdom was located at the intersection of “three majestic circles” in international
relations. The first circle was the British Commonwealth and Empire, the second was the
English-speaking world in which the Dominion countries and the United States played an
important role, and the third was United Europe, which he argued Britain was at theintersection of. For Churchill, however, involvement in United Europe was secondary to
his concern for British security and the Anglo-American alliance. This was an issue hebecame particularly interested in during the 1940s because of growing concerns about
whether the United States would continue to provide defensive assistance to Western
Europe in the face of a possible Soviet invasion. By the 1960s, Commonwealth markets
was no longer economically profitable for Britain, and there was a growing desire for
Britain to start over as part of European Communities. The imperialist lineage that
Churchill had so strongly supported appeared to have become obsolete. However, as we
will examine in the next chapter, the Anglosphere concept would not disappear and wouldin fact be revived after the end of the Cold War (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 55-58;
Dilley, 2018).

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MAHITO TAKEUCHI

3. The Anglosphere Initiative Today(1) Anglobalization
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War, the Anglosphere wasresurrected and became a potent way of imagining Britain’s future as a globally deregulated
and privatized economy outside the European Union. This understanding of theinternational order, combined with a political discourse predicting the triumph of“Anglobalization” in the 21st century, came to be seen by the Anglosphere advocates as acelebration of neoconservative liberal imperialism and economic neoliberalism (Kenny and
Pearce, 2018, pp. 4, 140; Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 9).
Understood as having special ties, the five core Anglosphere countries (the United States,
the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) share a common international
language (English) and a common law-based legal system, maintain strong civil societies
born of liberal democratic traditions, promote free trade principles, and have cooperative
military and intelligence services (Legrand, 2019, pp. 56-57; Mycock and Wellings, 2019,p. 9). In this post-Cold War era of “Anglobalization,” new threats to U.S. hegemony havealso emerged. China began its remarkable rise in Asia, and new conflicts erupted in the
Middle East, including the Gulf War. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the
United States led to a war on terrorism, with fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq (Kenny and
Pearce, 2018, p. 132).
In the war on terror, several core Anglosphere countries responded to the military call of
the United States, but political conflicts also arose, especially in the war in Iraq. AustralianPrime Minister John Howard (term 1996–2007), a monarchist who ardently supported theBritish legacy, immediately invoked the ANZUS Treaty after the terrorist attacks in the
United States and sent Australian troops first to the war in Afghanistan and later to the war
in Iraq. However, Australian military involvement in the Iraq War was limited. Canada
refused to contribute supplies to the war in Iraq, and New Zealand decided not to invade
Iraq because of the lack of United Nations authorization for the use of military force. The
Labour government of Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, which came to power in 1997,
invaded Iraq but attempted to get the United States to obtain multilateral support and UN
authorization for the invasion, while using the special relationship between the United
Kingdom and the United States to bridge the gap between the United States and theEuropean Union and seeking to revitalize the Middle East peace process. Unfortunately, allof these efforts failed.
However, the Eurosceptic enthusiasts who supported the Iraq war gained vitality from thedivisions it created. The alliance between the United Kingdom and the United States andthe refusal of major governments in the European Union, led by France and Germany, tojoin the Iraq war were seen as confirmation of the fundamental unity of the United
Kingdom and the United States and of the irreconcilable differences between the United
Kingdom and the European Union. In particular, Canadian Conservative Prime Minister
Stephen Harper (term 2006–2015) shared many of John Howard’s ideological leanings,
was skeptical of the United Nations and other multilateral institutions, and reoriented
Canadian foreign policy toward a neoconservative position. He also promoted policies thatsymbolized Canada’s loyalty to the Crown, such as restoring royal titles to the Canadian
Air Force and Navy and ordering Queen Elizabeth II’s portrait to be displayed in diplomatic
missions abroad. Early in his premiership, Harper delivered a Churchillian speech,
declaring that the “little island [Britain]” and the “great Dominion [Canada]” were forever

12

Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglospherelinked by language, culture, economy, and values (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 5, 133-136,
141-142).
(2) Robert Conquest and James C. Bennett
The Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank in the United States, held conferences on
the Anglosphere in Washington, D.C., and Berkshire in 1999 and 2000. Its leading
participants included Margaret Thatcher, David Davis, Conrad Black, Francis Fukuyama,
James C. Bennett, John O’Sullivan, Robert Conquest, Owen Harries, and Kenneth Minogue(Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 5). Here, we focus on the writings of Robert Conquest andJames C. Bennett, two of the most influential advocates of the Anglosphere.
In his Reflections on a Ravaged Century (2000), Conquest, an authoritative scholar ofSoviet Union history, concluded that the political system in the West was flawed andargued that the European Union had not been the element of strength that some had hopedfor. He called instead for a more fruitful union of the core countries of the Anglosphere.
Conquest himself believed that Britain should remain in the European Union and join the
new association of nations, the Anglosphere, and become a bridge between the two. It was
far more attractive for Britain to maintain historical relations with the core nations of theAnglosphere, built on cultural ties, a common history, and similar political institutions,than to fight to preserve its own sovereignty within the bureaucratic and heterogeneousmodel of the European Union. In Dragons of Expectation (2005), Conquest described how
an alliance of the core countries of the Anglosphere would be organized, claiming that thepresidents of this alliance would be the President of the United States and the Queen ofEngland. This idea gained support from many intellectuals and politicians. Margaret
Thatcher supported Conquest’s idea of contrasting the Anglosphere with the European
Union, saying that an alliance of the core countries of the Anglosphere would redefine thepolitical landscape. This attracted the attention of conservative politicians andcommentators, including Lord Howell, who served as Minister of State for International
Energy Policy at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Conquest, 2001, pp. 267288; Conquest, 2006, pp. 229-230; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 125-128; Howell, 2014).
Meanwhile, James C. Bennett, a technology entrepreneur, wrote The Anglosphere
Challenge (2004), arguing that in the 21st century, the core Anglosphere countries, which
are English-speaking countries, would be likely to cooperate and dominate international
relations. This is because, as a result of the rapid development of global network due to theadvent of Internet technology, English, the lingua franca, has become even more important,and a common English-derived culture characterized by freedom, democracy, the rule oflaw, and basic human rights has become important as a basis for economic cooperation andpolitical and military allegiance within the Anglosphere. At the core of that common
culture was the English tradition of individualism. Bennett noted that advances in digitaland other technologies were breaking down geographic barriers and creating newopportunities for trade with remote areas, and that increased economic cooperation among
the core countries of the Anglosphere foreshadowed the emergence of a loose coalition
with other “like-minded countries.” He also praised the existence of “English-speaking
networks” that unite English-speaking countries and the intelligence-sharing mechanism
known as Five Eyes. Bennett cautioned against the pursuit of multiculturalism in the core
Anglosphere countries and the loss of the “national cohesion” that had enabled the
reproduction of such values, but he stressed that the organic cooperation that characterized
the Anglosphere was far superior to the bureaucratic and artificial projects of the European

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MAHITO TAKEUCHI
Union (Bennett, 2004; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 128-130; Mycock and Wellings, 2019,p. 6).
(3) Brexit, Global Britain, and the Indo-PacificInfluenced by these writings emphasizing the importance of the Anglosphere, theEurosceptics in the British Conservative Party and the think tanks, political magazines,
lobbying groups, and intellectuals surrounding it began to seriously consider the possibilityof an Anglosphere outside the European Union. This trend was further reinforced when the2010 British general election ended the long reign of the Labour Party and a coalition
government of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats was formed (Kenny and
Pearce, 2018, pp. 144-145).
This increased political interest in the Anglosphere was also motivated by the growing
support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which won large numbers of votes in the2004 and 2009 European Parliament elections, and the prospect of a British exit from theEuropean Union became increasingly real. When Poland and other Eastern European
countries joined the European Union in 2004 and the number of Eastern European
immigrants to the United Kingdom increased, Nigel Farage, the leader of the UKIP, said
that remaining in the European Union would make it impossible for the United Kingdom tocontrol the flow of immigrants. He stoked the fears of the British public about immigrationand established the UKIP as a radical right-wing populist party. In the 2014 European
Parliament elections, the UKIP came out on top, winning more than a quarter of the vote.
The party’s breakthrough was one of the most important factors behind Prime Minister
David Cameron’s pledge to hold a referendum on Britain’s exit from the European Union
during the 2015 British general election campaign (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 145, 154).
The UKIP’s manifesto during this period emphasized the history and ties between the UK
and the Commonwealth, arguing that they had been betrayed and ignored by previous
governments. In the 2010 general election, the UKIP positioned itself as the “party of theCommonwealth” and argued for a Commonwealth Free Trade Area. In the 2015 generalelection, it made explicit reference to an Anglosphere. The United Kingdom is not justanother European country but part of the Anglosphere, a global community. Beyond theEuropean Union and the Commonwealth, there is a network of Anglosphere countries thatshare English as the lingua franca, common law, the democratic tradition, and the benefitsof global trade. The UKIP stated that it wanted to foster close ties with these Anglospherecountries, from India to the United States and from New Zealand to the Caribbean. In
addition, after the 2010 general election in the United Kingdom, William Hague, Boris
Johnson, David Davis, Michael Gove, and Daniel Hannan, all major figures in the British
Conservative Party, began to publicly declare the Anglosphere’s potential as acounterweight to the European Union. They sought closer ties with conservative
governments in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and increased engagement with theCommonwealth and Anglosphere countries. David Davis said, “We share history, culture
and language. We have family ties. We even share similar legal systems. The usual barriers
to trade are largely absent” (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 145; Mycock and Wellings, 2019,
pp. 10, 15).
The decision to leave the European Union, formalized in a referendum on June 23, 2016,
led the British government to officially declare its Global Britain initiative based on the
Anglosphere. Boris Johnson, a politician strongly influenced by Churchill’s achievements,
as Foreign Secretary in Theresa May’s cabinet revived the idea of a British military14

Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglospherepresence east of Suez, an idea that had been abandoned since the late 1960s. In a speech in
Bahrain in December 2016, Johnson stated that the UK would open a naval support facility
there, create a resident force in Oman, and establish new defense staff centers in Dubai andSingapore. Also in March 2018, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office submitted amemorandum titled “The Government’s Vision of Global Britain and the Role of theForeign and Commonwealth Office in Supporting and Enabling Government Departments
to Deliver This Vision” to the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs SelectCommittee. While placing top priority on the alliance with the United States, thememorandum declared that the United Kingdom would place emphasis on the Indo-Pacificregion, which would become the center of global economic growth. On September 4, 2021,
after Johnson became Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, a fleet including Britain’s
new aircraft carrier, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, arrived in Yokosuka, Japan. It was a
symbolic event that signaled Britain’s increasing focus on the Indo-Pacific region incooperation with Anglosphere countries (Johnson, 2014; Akimoto, 2021, pp. 84-90; Kennyand Pearce, 2018, pp. 146, 160; Akimoto, 2022, pp. 312-315).

Conclusion
This paper has traced the historical genealogy of the Anglosphere concept from the Greater
Britain concept of the late 19th century to the Global Britain concept after Brexit. In
concluding this paper, I must emphasize the racist origins of the Anglosphere concept. The
legacy of empire still looms over the Anglosphere, and some have criticized its racist
origins, calling it “Empire 2.0.” Its central theme is that defenders of the Anglosphere
everywhere seem to take an overly positive and uncritical view of the legacy of the British
imperial past and express nostalgia for the empire.
The Anglosphere concept appears to be dominated by ideology rather than by economic
interests. Indeed, in the Indo-Pacific region, there are free trade agreements that involve thecore countries of the Anglosphere (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), such as theTrans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In addition, the United States President
Joe Biden has called for an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).
However, the argument presented as the basis for the claim that the Anglosphere countries
are potentially important trading partners for the UK—that UK exports to the
Commonwealth countries have increased much faster than those to the European Union
over the past decade—is questionable. This is because, in aggregate terms, theCommonwealth countries have accounted for a relatively small share of UK exports (6–8%) over the past two decades, whereas the European Union has accounted for almost halfof all UK exports. The relative decline of the European Union as a trading partner is theresult of the rise of China rather than the growing importance of the Commonwealth.
Although Britain hopes to revitalize the Commonwealth through the development of tradewith India, there is still no agreement on the status of countries outside the core
Anglosphere, especially English-speaking countries like India, Singapore, South Africa,and Ireland. It appears to be difficult to actualize the Anglosphere beyond cooperation in
the security field, such as Five Eyes, the Trilateral Security Partnership between Australia,
the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS), and the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia and India (QUAD) (Kenny and

15

MAHITO TAKEUCHI
Pearce, 2018, p. 160; Mycock and Wellings, 2019, pp. 17-18).
Moreover, the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States
has not always been rock solid. In fact, successive political leaders of the United States
have understood British membership in the European Union as a solution to the decline anddismantling of the British Empire. In fact, President Obama opposed Brexit from thisperspective, inviting considerable criticism from those in favor of Britain leaving theEuropean Union. The Trump presidency also exposed the fragility of the Anglo-American
unity and its special relationship (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, pp. 10, 12).
The future challenge for the core countries of the Anglosphere will be how to overcome
the racist origins of the Anglosphere concept and the negative legacy of imperialism towork with the Asian and African democracies in the Indo-Pacific region while maintaining
the Anglo-American special relationship. Japan, as a “like-minded” Asian democracy withsimilarities to the core countries of the Anglosphere, could play a role in bringing thespecial Anglo-American relationship closer together and acting as a bridge between thecore countries of the Anglosphere and the democracies of Asia and Africa. However, forJapan to fulfill this role, it must, like the core countries of the Anglosphere, reflect on andstrive to overcome the negative legacy of past imperialism.
This paper is an English translation of a previously published paper in Japanese (Mahito
Takeuchi, “Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere”, Nihon University College ofCommerce, The Study of Business and Industry, No. 39, 2023). It is part of the research
results of the research project entitled “Research on Alignment among Nations: the Case of
the Commonwealth,” funded by the Nihon University College of Commerce (joint
research) for the 2019–2021 academic years (under the jurisdiction of the ResearchInstitute of Commerce).

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Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere
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History of Global Arms Transfer, 18 (2024), pp. 19-44

The Nexus of Militarization and Tourism
in the “American Lake”: Focusing on
Militourism in Hawaiʻi
By KAORI TAKADA*
Hawaiʻi has stood at the intersection of military strategy and tourism development, serving as a principal home port for the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet while
concurrently becoming a sought-after tourist destination since attaining statehoodin 1959. This paper delves into the intertwined dynamics of militarization andtourism in Hawaiʻi, exploring their evolution into an inseparable nexus. Centeredon Hawaiʻi’s pivotal role in Pacific militarization and tourism, the paper examines the concurrent escalation of military fortification and nuclear proliferation
during the Cold War era. It traces Hawaiian transformation from a strategic military outpost following its annexation by the United States in the 19th century to a
focal point of global wartime air networks during World War II. In addition, it analyzes the resurgence of both military and civil aviation sectors during the Korean War and their subsequent impact on Hawaiʻi’s militarization. Attention is directed towards Hawaiian democratization movement following the Korean War,influencing further militarization efforts and shaping the state’s path to statehood.
It focuses on “militourism” in Hawaiʻi, the center of the “American Lake,” offering valuable insights into the multifaceted relationship between military activities
and tourism development in the region.

Introduction
Since the conclusion of World War II, the operational scope of U.S. military activities in
Hawaiʻi, particularly within the confines of Oahu, has steadily expanded. Joint Base Pearl
Harbor-Hickam has served as the principal headquarter for the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet
and the Air Force Pacific Command, and Schofield Barracks as a site for infantry training
center during the Korean War1. The genesis of mass tourism in militarized Hawaiʻi can betraced back to 1959, when it became the fiftieth state and Pan American World Airways(Pan Am), a prominent U.S. airline, launched Jet Clipper between Mainland and Hawaiʻi inthe same year. The advent of the jet age, epitomized by the introduction of the Boeing 707,
engendered a notable decline in airfares in the 1960s and catalyzed the proliferation of
tourism to Hawaiʻi2. How did these incongruous influences of the military and tourism
coalesce into an indissoluble nexus? Throughout the Cold War era, Hawaiʻi functioned as* Professor, Faculty of Comparative Culture, Otsuma Women’s University, and Researcher, Research Institutefor the History of Global Arms Transfer, Meiji University.
1 Kajihiro [2009], pp. 299-328.
2 Mak [2008], p. 16.

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KAORI TAKADA
the United States’ conduit to the Asia-Pacific region; furthermore, it captivated tourists
with its alluring cultural portrayal as a quintessential Pacific paradise since the earlytwentieth century3. This paper scrutinizes “militourism” in Hawaiʻi.
The concept of militourism, as delineated by Theresia Teaiwa, encapsulates thephenomenon in which military or paramilitary forces facilitate the seamless operation of a
tourist industry and are concurrently obscured by the veneer of said tourist industry. This
paper critically probes the militarization of the Pacific, contextualizing it within the
dynamics of intercontinental relations among Europe, the Americas, and Asia, where theimperceptible within this militarized region. The discourse critically interrogates theerasure of Indigenous communities in the Pacific region. In locales such as Guam, Hawaiʻi,
New Caledonia, and French Polynesia, militarism manifests itself in a manner that bothsustains military installations and fosters tourism, thereby engendering employment
opportunities while simultaneously dispossessing local populations of their land andundermining Indigenous livelihoods. Notably, in Hawaiʻi, the military apparatus has
institutionalized practices such as rest and recuperation (R&R) for servicemembers, and it
oversees not only medical facilities but also a hotel such as Hale Koa Hotel operations4.
Following Teaiwa’s analysis, a notable corpus of research, especially militourism
researches on countries such as Cuba, the Philippines, Guam, Hawaiʻi, and Okinawa haveaccumulated in recent years5. However, studies on militourism typically acknowledge but
do not delve into aeromobilities, namely international civil aviation, which has been
indispensable to global tourism since World War II. This paper endeavors to address thisresearch gap by focusing on the role played by military and civil aviation networks inshaping the postwar international aviation order in World War II era and the subsequent
militarization of the Pacific throughout the Cold War period.
The history of international aviation during the Cold War has gained increasing scholarly
attention since the 1990s. Commencing with the seminal work of Dobson and Engel, which
scrutinized the U.S.–U.K. competition regarding the postwar aircraft industry and theconsequent emergence of international civil aviation during World War II and the Cold
War6, scholars have studied various facets of the interplay between nations. This research
includes examinations of the dispute over the U.S.–Netherlands aviation agreement, theSoviet Union’s withdrawal from participation in the Chicago International Civil Aviation
Conference in November 1944, and t he civil aviation policies of Yugoslavia, whichdeveloped its own air routes amid internal conflicts within the Eastern Block7. Peter Svik’s
insightful analysis, which elucidates the globalization of the Cold War through an
examination of civil aviation policies adopted by both Eastern and Western blocs, is notable
among these studies8. Additionally, research has explored the impact of Cold War militaryand economic aid packages on decolonization efforts and the establishment of air forces
and civil aviation enterprises in regions such as Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. For
instance, Katsuhiko Yokoi’s examination of the Indian Air Force and civil aviation in India
directly addresses the concept of “independence of armes production” in international arms
transfers during the Cold War. Similarly, Waqar Zaidi’s investigates the creation of a
Pakistani air force and Pakistan airlines through the economic and military assistance from
3 Klein [2003], pp. 161-163.
4 Teaiwa [1999], pp. 251-252.
5 See, Gonzalez [2013]; Ginoza [2016]; Lisle [2016]. Also, regarding the linkage between militarism andtourism, See, Special Issue: Tours of Duty and Tours of Leisure, American Quarterly, 68-3 (September 2016).
6 Dobson [1991]; Engel [2007].
7 Van Vleck [2013]; Scott-Smith and Snyder [2013]; Gormly [2013]; Tiemeyer, [2015].
8 Svik [2020].

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The Nexus of Militarization and Tourism in the “American Lake”
the U.S. His work also underscores the role of inter-allied arms transfers and military andeconomic aid in shaping the development of civil aviation during the Cold War9.
While many of these studies have centered on Cold War alliances, the discourse on civil
aviation in the Pacific has revolved around the overwhelmingly influential U.S. civil
aviation sector. Compared to conventional air transportation studies, analyses of Asia–
Pacific civil aviation have focused on contemporary economic evaluations rather than on
historical inquiries. Despite this, the genesis of Pacific civil aviation during the Cold War
period cannot be divorced from the U.S. occupation of Japan. Transportation activities
were further amplified during the Korean War; in addition to the United States, othernations involved in the occupation of Japan operated Pacific routes to facilitate traffic
between these regions10.
Focusing on Hawaiʻi, which has emerged as a focal point of militarization and tourism in
the Pacific, this paper delves into the process of heightened military fortification andnuclear proliferation in the region during the Cold War era. It scrutinizes the trajectory of
nuclear weapon development from the onset of militarization through infrastructure
construction in the Pacific, the Japan–U.S. rivalry involving Hawaiʻi, and the establishmentof the international aviation order following World War II. This study elucidates theconcurrent escalation of military buildup and nuclearization across the Pacific during theCold War and juxtaposes with the burgeoning development of Hawaiʻi as a sought-after
tourist destination.
Initially, the author explores the United States’ ingress into the Pacific during the 19th
century and the subsequent annexation of Hawaiʻi, which precipitated the state’s
metamorphosis into a pivotal military outpost. Hawaiʻi’s transition as a precedent for theland appropriation and coerced relocation witnessed not only in Okinawa and mainland
Japan after World War II, but also across the broader Pacific region. Subsequently, thepaper analyzes the international uproar sparked by the establishment of a global wartime
air network meticulously maintained and operated by the United States. Within the UnitedStates surfaced among federal lawmakers and high-ranking officials within the Departmentof the Navy, who advocated for the acquisition of strategic overseas bases in foreign
territories in the interest of postwar security. Consequently, the U.S. government formulated
a policy aimed at securing strategic bases overseas and challenging the airspace sovereigntyof the British Empire. This contentious stance precipitated the U.S.–U.K. clash concerning
postwar civil aviation, culminating in the establishment of the Chicago/Bermuda system—
the foundational framework of postwar international civil aviation. While extensive
research has been devoted to studying competition in postwar civil aviation on the Atlantic
front, historical analysis of the Pacific dimension, as highlighted earlier, has lagged interms of scholarly inquiry11.
Thirdly, accounting for the U.S. occupation of Japan post-World War II and the militarypresence in Micronesia, this paper aims to elucidate the rapid demobilization of the U.S.
military, the challenges encountered in transitioning military aviation activities to meet
civilian demands. Fourth, an analysis of the Korean War, which precipitated the resurgenceof the struggling military and civil aviation sectors, will be conducted. Additionally, thepaper will scrutinize the process of Pacific militarization that ensued alongside the shift towartime footing. This militarization encompasses not only the establishment of a networkof U.S. military bases but also nuclear testing and deployment in the Pacific region.
9 Yokoi [2020], pp. 325-354; Zaidi [2020], pp. 355-381.
10 Takada [2020b], pp. 291-324.
11 Dobson [1991], pp. 151-210.

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KAORI TAKADA
Attention will be directed toward the militarization of Hawaiʻi throughout the Cold War
period. This will include an examination of the development of housing, resorts, andrecreational amenities tailored to military personnel. Furthermore, this paper will explore
the democratization movement in Hawaiʻi following the Korean War and its subsequent
impact on further militarization efforts in Hawaiʻi. Additionally, the process leading to
Hawaiʻi’s attainment of statehood and the onset of mass tourism with the advent of jet
aircraft will be analyzed. Through this endeavor, the study seeks to elucidate the several
factors that led to the formation of Pacific mass tourism in the jet age, with particularemphasis given to Hawaiʻi’s militourism within the context of making the Pacific “theAmerican Lake.”

1. U.S.–Japan Conflict over the Pacific and Hawaiʻi(1) Annexation of Hawaiʻi by the United States of America and its establishment as abase of operations
During the late 18th and 19th centuries, the rivalry between the United States and Europe
for the Pacific Ocean intensified. Following James Cook’s expeditions, British influenceextended over territories such as Australia, New Zealand, and other southwestern Pacificregions, while French dominions prevailed in much of eastern Polynesia. Notably, only theKingdoms of Hawaiʻi and Tonga managed to maintain their sovereignty amid thisgeopolitical contest. During this period, economic activities such as the lucrative fur tradein the North Pacific, whaling ventures across the wider expanse of the Pacific, and the tradeof sandalwood flourished in the Pacific region. European traders introduced firearms to
Pacific Island communities, thus transforming local dynamics. In response to labor
shortages in British-controlled Australia and Fiji, islanders from the Southwest Pacificwere coerced into servitude, leading to a drastic decline in Indigenous populations due todiseases introduced by European contact12.
European influence was instrumental in the consolidation of the Hawaiian Kingdom in
1795. British advisors John Young and Isaac Davis played pivotal roles in assisting King
Kamehameha I, who unified the islands through military prowess and astute leadership. In
recognition of their contributions, Young and Davis were granted land on Oahu. The
Kingdom of Hawaiʻi emerged as a vital hub, providing essential resources such as waterand food to Westerners, and serving as a crucial whaling station for Western ships. Until
the demise of Kamehameha I in 1819, European influence remained confined to thevicinity of the Honolulu harbor. King Kamehameha, I initiated a centralized system ofgovernance and exerted control over foreign trade and other economic activities. He
monopolized the sandalwood trade, amassing substantial wealth through lucrative traderelations with Europe. Kamehameha I also regulated the conduct of foreigners arriving in
Hawaiʻi. Despite efforts to curb the deleterious effects of alcohol, including the prohibitionof its production and the destruction of several distilleries, the influx of rum and spirits into
Hawaiʻi exacerbated tensions between foreigners and Hawaiians, contributing toalcoholism developing among ruling elites and commoners. Following Kamehameha I’s
passing, discontentment with the rule of his successor, Liholiho, mounted, culminating in arebellion over disputes regarding royal authority and land distribution. While most rebels
were quelled, Power in Hawaiʻi became more decentralized. Liholiho’s ascent to the throne
12 Blackford [2017], pp. 16-17. For more on islanders’ kidnapping (blackbirding), see, Takeuchi [2009].

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The Nexus of Militarization and Tourism in the “American Lake”
as Kamehameha II marked the abolition of the Kapu system, a religious code that governed
Hawaiian society, paving the way for the introduction and spread of Christianity13.
In 1820, American missionaries arrived in the Hawaiian Kingdom, propelled by the
fervor of the Second Awakening, which was sweeping through the United Kingdom and theUnited States. Hailing mostly from New England, these missionaries gradually integrated
into Hawaiian society following the abolition of the Kapu system. Hawaiʻi soon became afocal point for American missionary endeavors and trade. Hawaiian inhabitants, valuing
their associations with the missionaries over the tumultuous presence of violent andinebriated sailors and traders, welcomed the influence of these missionaries, who not only
introduced Christianity to Hawaiʻi but also imparted elements of the United States’ legal
system. Initially, Hawaiian royalty permitted missionaries to reside on land they had
discovered; over time, however these missionaries began to strengthen their position over
Hawaiian land and societal affairs. The Hawaiian population experienced a precipitous
decline due to interactions with Westerners. At the time of Captain Cook’s arrival, Hawaiʻiboasted an estimated population of 400,000; however, by 1823, this figure had dwindled to135,000. By 1893, when the United States orchestrated the overthrow of the Hawaiian
Kingdom, the population had plummeted to a mere 40,00014.
American expansion in Hawaiʻi unfolded against the backdrop of Manifest Destiny on
the mainland. President John Tyler, embroiled in conflict with Congress over domestic
policy and renowned for advocating for the annexation of Texas, prioritized trade relationsin Asia and the Pacific. He championed the expansion of American influence into the
Pacific and extended the Monroe Doctrine to Hawaiʻi, insisting on British non-interferencein the Hawaiian Islands. This policy became known as the Tyler Doctrine. During thesubsequent Polk presidency, the annexation of the Republic of Texas led the United StatesMexican War, resulting in the acquisition of vast swathes in the southwestern United States.
The Oregon Treaty, concluded with the British government, delineated the border between
Canada and the United States. The consolidation of the U.S. West Coast spurred further
expansion into the Pacific Ocean15.
In 1848, the significant alterations were made to the Hawaiian Kingdom’s land tenuresystem. American merchants and missionaries contended that the traditional royal domain
system of the Hawaiian Kingdom hindered Hawaiʻi’s development and advocated for the
adoption of a Western land system known as the Grand Mahele, which facilitated individual
land ownership. Initially, King Kamehameha III and other members of the Hawaiian royalfamily resisted this proposition. However, they were persuaded by an American lawyer
who highlighted the colonization of the continental United States and the Pacific, warningthat the United States would annex the Hawaiian Kingdom if the Grand Mahele was not
implemented. Consequently, in 1850, Hawaiian land became available for sale, with parcels
gradually purchased by white Americans, leading to the land dispossession of Hawaiians
and the expansion of sugarcane plantations by white American planters16.
The white American elite, comprised of missionaries, merchants, and planters,
collectively known as haole, wielded significant political and economic influence within
the Hawaiian Kingdom. Among them, the most influential were the large landowners who
operated sugar plantations that came to be known as the Big Five. In 1873, General John
Schofield and Commander Alexander, posing as travelers, assessed the site for a naval base
13 D’Arcy [2018], pp. 206-219.
14 Hixson [2013], pp. 148-150.
15 Kajihiro [2008], p. 171.
16 Hixson [2013], p. 150.

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KAORI TAKADA
at Pearl Harbor and extolled, “Hawaiʻi is the jewel of the Pacific.” The haole community,
welcoming the military presence in terms of their own security and seeking to reinforce
their ascendency over Hawaiian politics, staunchly supported the construction of the naval
base by the U.S. Navy. Because of their racial and class similarities, haole and military
officers forged a partnership over the control of Hawaiʻi17.
Upon ascending to the throne as the seventh king of Hawaiʻi in 1874, David Kalakaua
discerned the encroachment upon Hawaiian lands and the imminent threat to the kingdom’s
independence posed by white Americans. Recognizing the colonial expansion underway in
the Asian and Pacific regions under Western dominance, Kalakaua embarked on a
diplomatic tour aiming to seek protection for the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom.
His objective was to appeal to Emperor Meiji of Japan to forge an Asian federation withJapan at the helm through an alliance between Hawaiʻi and Japan. Both nations sufferedfrom unequal treaties imposed by Western powers. Kalakaua further proposed matrimonial
ties between the Hawaiian royal family and the Japanese imperial family to solidify theirrelationship. Concurrently, an agreement was brokered between the Hawaiian Kingdom
and the Japanese government to facilitate the migration of laborers, resulting in the arrivalof the first official Japanese immigrants to Hawaiʻi in 1885. However, Kalakaua’s vision ofan Asian federation remained unrealized18.
In 1887, just two years after the Japanese arrived, white militias armed themselves andforced Kalakaua to adopt a new constitution. This was known as the “Bayonet
Constitution,” Article 20 of which reads:
The Supreme Power of the Kingdom in its exercise, is divided into the Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial; these shall always be preserved distinct, and no Executive or
Judicial officer, or any contractor, or employee of the Government, or any person in thereceipt of salary or emolument from the Government, shall be eligible to election to theLegislature of the Hawaiian Kingdom, or to hold the position of an elective member ofthe same. And no member of the Legislature shall, during the time for which he iselected, be appointed to any civil office under the Government, except that of a memberof the Cabinet19.
Hence, the Bayonet Constitution effectively stripped power from the king and consolidated
it in the hands of white Americans while removing Asians from positions of authority. The
enactment of the new constitution coincided with the renewal of the 1875 Treaty ofReciprocity between the U.S. government and Hawaiʻi. This treaty included a provision
granting the U.S. military exclusive use of Pearl Harbor, thereby solidifying the Kingdomof Hawaiʻi as a pivotal outpost for the U.S. navy in the Pacific20.
Following the demise of King Kalakaua in 1891, Queen Liliuokalani ascended to thethrone with the aspiration of restoring Hawaiian sovereignty. Queen Liliuokalani faced
staunch resistance against her efforts to nullify the Bayonet Constitution and institute a new
governing framework. Working in concert with the haole elite, U.S. diplomat Stevens
facilitated the landing of U.S. marine corps aboard the U.S. battleship Boston, effectively
quelling the queen’s bid for constitutional reform. Bolstered by the support of the U.S.
military, the haole faction coerced Queen Liliuokalani into abdicating her throne and
17 Kajihiro [2008], p. 172; Kanuanui [2008], pp. 69,
18 Fujikane [2008], p. 18.
19 The 1887 Constitution [https://hooilina.org/collect/journal/index/assoc/HASH01b8.dir/5.pdf].
20 Lind [1984/ 1985], p. 28; Kajihiro [2008], p. 172.

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The Nexus of Militarization and Tourism in the “American Lake”
subsequently proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of Hawaiʻi in 1893. In response,
U.S. President Grover Cleveland vehemently condemned military intervention as unlawful.
Opposition within the United States to the annexation of Hawaiʻi resulted in two instancesof congressional refusal to ratify the proposed treaty. From the illegal abolition of the
Hawaiian Kingdom to the annexation, Hawaiian royalty continued to protest against theRepublic of Hawaiʻi and its moves toward annexation. However, with the election of
McKinley as president in 1896 and the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898, themovement to annex Hawaiʻi accelerated21.
It was the Pacific submarine cable that made possible the Spanish-American War, fought
over a vast oceanic area. The Legislature of the Republic of Hawaiʻi, occupied by haole,
prepared grants for the laying of the submarine cable between the United States andHawaiʻi. However, members of U. S. Congress, opposing to the annexation of the Hawaiian
Republic, blocked the Pacific Submarine Cable Act. It was the Spanish-American War thatbrought the Pacific submarine cable project to fruition. While fighting the Spanish Navy in
Cuba, the Navy Department in Washington ordered Brigadier General George Dewey,commanding the state-of-the-art Asiatic Fleet, anchored in Hong Kong, to attack the
Spanish Navy in the Philippine archipelago through cable communications. Dewey’s fleet
headed for Philippine waters and defeated the Spanish Navy, winning the battle. Despite
repeated protests by Queen Liliuolaraini, amid the Spanish-American War, Congress passed
a resolution to annex Hawaiʻi in August 1898 22.
After the annexation of Hawaiʻi, a concerted effort to seize land and initiate baseconstruction commenced on the island of Oahu. In 1900, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
initiated construction, culminating in the completion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base by1902. The naval base was to serve as a frontline base for the Philippine-American War thatbroke out in 1899, when Emilio Aguinaldo, the revolutionary leader of Philippine, haddeclared independence. The U.S. Army’s war for control of the Philippines, supported by
the U.S. Navy, continued intermittently until 1907. In 1909, reclaiming a fish farm in
Waikiki facilitated the establishment of Fort DeRussy, now the largest area in the Waikiki
vicinity. In the lead-up to World War I, a series of extensive land seizures occurred on Oahu
to create bases such as Fort Shafter, Fort Lugar, and Schofield Barracks, which were
nestled in the inland mountains. The haole elite collaborated on the construction of thesebases with the military to reinforce white-centric social structures and advance themilitarization of Hawaiʻi and Oahu. From 1911–1914, the U.S. Army Commander in the
Pacific delineated plans to encircle Oahu with a “ring of steel23.
The militarization of Hawaiʻi traces its roots back to the revelation of its significance as awhaling base by the West. The concept of “Manifest Destiny” embraced by the UnitedStates in the 1840s extended to Hawaiʻi, catalyzing the gradual encroachment of American
missionaries and merchants into the Hawaiian Kingdom. As lands within the Hawaiian
Kingdom fell into the hands of white Americans, annexation further facilitated the acquisition and confiscation of land by the U.S. Army and Navy for the construction of bases on
Oahu, notably the Pearl Harbor Naval Base. Subsequent developments included theestablishment of the John Rogers Air Station adjacent to the naval base in 1927 and the
Army Air Corps installation on adjoining land in 1934. By 1938, the deployment of B-17
21 Poblete [2021], pp. 698-699; Silva [2004], pp. 145-147.
22 Headrick [1991], pp. 99-101; Hagan and Bickerton [2007], pp. 88-89; Silva [2004], pp. 197-203.
23 Hagan [1991], pp. 226-227; Hagan and Bickerton [2007], pp. 94-101. After the conquest of the Philippines,

U.S. naval bases were also constructed in Manila Bay and Subic Bay; Lind [1984/ 1985], pp. 28-29; Kajihiro[2008], p. 172.

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KAORI TAKADA
bombers solidified Oahu’s status as a pivotal combined naval and air force bases in Pearl
Harbor to deter the Japanese military forces.24
The military officers, lived in haole community created by wealthy white Americans,shared their political views. A common concern of haole and the military officers was theJapanese immigrants in Hawaiʻi. They had come to fear the political influence of theoutnumbered Japanese labor organization movement, and in 1920 the military intelligencestationed in Honolulu reported that the “Japanese problem” was a “racial problem.”Japanese influence in the Asia-Pacific region after the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo
Japanese War, was one of the factors driving the militarization of Hawaiʻi25.
(2) From the Opening Japan to the Pacific War
Around the middle of the 19th century, whaling activities in the Pacific played a significant
role in shaping the relationship between Japan and the United States. The waters stretchingfrom the Ogasawara Islands to Japan, commonly referred to as the “Japan Ground,” served
as a prime location where sperm whales congregated; thus, the area was attractive towhaling vessels from Great Britain and the United States. In response to whaling andAmerican business circles’ anticipation of fostering trade opportunities with Asia, the U.S.
government dispatched the Black Ship Fleet of the U.S. Navy to pressure the Edo
Shogunate to open Japan to the outside world. This strategic move by the United States
aimed to secure a foothold in the Pacific region26.
In 1856, three years after the arrival of the Black Ships, the U.S. Congress enacted the
Guano Act, which authorized the claiming the possession of unoccupied Pacific islands andthe harvesting of bird droppings (guano), which were known for their utility as agricultural
fertilizer. By 1903, the United States had claimed sovereignty over ninety-four uninhabitedislands and atolls in the Pacific. Among these territories, Midway Atoll emerged as a
strategic site for both a military base for the U.S. Navy and a fertilizer source. Conversely,
following Japan’s opening to the Western world, Japan claimed the ownership of the
Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands in 1876. 27.
Following the Meiji Restoration, the influx of Japanese immigrants to Hawaiʻi and the
U.S. West Coast presented a citizenship dilemma for the U.S. government. In 1885,
pursuant to an intergovernmental agreement between Japan and the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi,
numerous Japanese laborers migrated to Hawaiʻi. However, this became a contentious issue
when the United States annexed the islands. Criticism of Japan’s militarism escalated
following its victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo- Japanese wars, fueling a substantial
anti-Japanese immigration movement in California during the early 20th century. Tensions
reached a peak, resulting in discriminatory practices such as the exclusion of Japanesechildren from schools in California. This situation was eventually resolved throughnegotiations between the Japanese and U.S. governments, culminating in the signing of the
U.S.–Japan Gentlemen’s Agreement in 1907, which was an agreement to refrain from
immigration of Japanese male workers.28.
24 “History of Hickam Field, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaiʻi,” [https://www.15wing.af.mil/AboutUs/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/376269/history-of-hickam-field-joint-base-pearl-harbor-hickam-Hawai’i/].
25 Lind [1984/1985], pp. 29-31.
26 Goto [2017], pp. 39–47.
27 Poblete [2021], pp. 692–693.
28 As for Japanese immigrants to Hawaiʻi and the United States, Azuma [2005], pp. 49-50; After World War I,
the Japanese government endeavored to secure a racial equality clause in the Charter of the League of Nations.
However, due to the indifference of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, this aspiration remained unrealized. See,
Shimizu [1998], pp. 137–162.

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The Nexus of Militarization and Tourism in the “American Lake”
Japan capitalized on an opportunity to expand its influence in the Pacific after Germany’s
defeat in World War I. Prompted by the outbreak of war in Europe, Japan, in alignment
with the Anglo-Japanese alliance, declared war on Germany. This led to the deployment of
naval forces to the Pacific Island region, resulting in the occupation of Micronesia and theestablishment of an archipelago defense force headquarters. Subsequently, Japan asserted
its claim over the occupied German territory of Micronesia, a claim recognized by GreatBritain, Russia, and France. However, President Wilson opposed Japan’s mandate over
Micronesia. Despite this opposition, Japanese rule was acknowledged under the League of
Nations mandate system, and Japan retained its mandate over Micronesia even after
withdrawing from the league. Referring to Micronesia as Nansei Shoto (the South Sea
Islands), the Japanese government encouraged immigration and agricultural developmentin the region. Many of the migrants to Micronesia hailed from Okinawa Prefecture and the
Yaeyama Islands. Japanese immigrants on Rota Island reported that, “Guam is within arm’s
reach of Rota’s ranch,” and “Guam’s residents facing thick American racism29.”
During the interwar period, the Hawaiian ruling class perceived the sizable JapaneseAmerican population to be a challenge. Despite the 1907 U.S.–Japanese Gentlemen’s
Agreement, which did not prohibit the entry of wives, children, picture brides, parents ofJapanese immigrants workers into the archipelago, the number of Japanese immigrants
increased. Japanese immigrant workers organized large-scale strikes, supported by Nisei, todemand higher wages for plantation labor. The 1909 strike aimed to abolish the racial wage
system, while another significant strike in 1920 involved Japanese American and Filipino
workers who sought increased wages. In response to these developments, the local U.S.
military suggested placing Japanese American workers under military control. However, agrowing number of U.S.-born Japanese Americans held U.S. citizenship, posing a challenge
to such proposals. In 1922, the Governor of the Territory of Hawaiʻi urged U.S. President
Harding to address the high percentage of Japanese immigrants in Hawaiʻi, as they
constituted over 40% of Hawaiʻi’s total population of 253,000 in 1920. Efforts were madeto promote tourism as a means of attracting white workers or the white middle class to theislands30.
In the 1920s, Matson Navigation Company and Hawaiian Tourist Bureau, conductedvarious advertising campaigns to the mainland. Hawaiian Tourist Bureau Association ran
an ad about “Honeymoons in the South Seas” in the mainland newspapers and magazines.
It showed local Hawaiian women placing flower leis around the necks of white couples.
Throughout the 1920s, tourism became the third largest economic sector, after sugar andpineapple production. The image of the wealthy white or middle-class mainland Americans
as tourists to Hawaiʻi became widely popularized through magazines and Hollywood
movies. Rather, the presence of Asian residents did not appear there31.
Utilizing the Royal Hawaiian brand, the haole community spearheaded beachdevelopment through the Waikiki Beach Reclamation Project and the construction of acanal between 1921 and 1924. The iconic Royal Hawaiian Hotel opened its doors, followedby the inauguration of the Pink Palace of Royal Hawaiian Hotel in 1927. Despite atemporary setback in tourism caused by the Great Depression of 1929, visitor numbers
rebounded by 1935. Notably, Castle and Cook, a prominent member of Hawaiʻi’s Big Fivelandowners, acquired shares in the Matson Navigation steamship line, which led to the
expansion of its liner service. However, this progress came at the expense of the traditional
29 Ogimi [1934], pp. 135–136 [https://dl.ndl.go.jp/pid/1899980/1/114].
30 Skwait [2010], pp. 83, 94–95.
31 Desmond [1999], pp. 79-80.

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KAORI TAKADA
Waikiki fish farms, which formed a crucial component of the Hawaiian Legislature32.
In 1929, the haole community established the Hawaiian Inter-Island Airline Company.
Subsequently, the Civil Aeronautics Board, established under the Civil Aeronautics Act of1938, granted the airline a permanent operating certificate in 1939. Originally known as the
Island View Airline Company, it was rebranded Hawaiian Airlines in October 1941. The
airline practiced a significant racial policy: it was racially discriminatory in that it
exclusively served the white population of Hawaiʻi. Consequently, Americans on JapaneseAncestors and other people of color, which made up most of the population, were excluded
from utilizing the airline’s services33.
In the 1930s, Pan American Airways established a Pacific route connecting Hawaiʻi to
the U.S. mainland. Pan Am, renowned for its service between Key West and Havana since
1927, swiftly expanded its operations into Latin America and introduced seaplanes to its
Pacific routes in 1935. Pan Am’s primary Pacific route extended from San Francisco via
Hawaiʻi to Midway Island, Wake Island, Guam, Manila, and Shanghai. The introduction of
air services facilitated an influx of affluent visitors to Hawaiʻi. Celebrity visits to theislands were prominently featured in movies and magazines, thus solidifying Hawaiʻi’s
image as a tropical paradise. Additionally, Pan Am inaugurated a South Pacific route from
Hawaiʻi to New Zealand; however, this route was forced to cease operations following theJapanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 194134.
In his address urging a declaration of war, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt branded
December 7th as “a day of infamy.” The attack inflicted severe damage on the battleshipsof the Pacific Fleet moored at Pearl Harbor, while Hickam Air Force Base suffered
substantial destruction, resulting in the loss of numerous military aircraft, including B-17
bombers. The onslaught claimed the lives of 2,402 military personnel, with 1,178 others
sustaining injuries. This brazen attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed the isolationist attitudesof the American populace35.
Japanese victories in the initial stages of the Pacific War posed logistical challenges for
the Allies. However, the Battle of Midway altered the course of the conflict. This
engagement witnessed fierce confrontations between Japanese and U.S. aircraft carriers
coupled with intense aerial skirmishes over the island’s airfields. Japan’s early air
superiority faltered when their main aircraft carriers were sunk at Midway in June 1942,
disrupting the Japanese’s ability to safeguard crucial supply routes. Subsequently, uponsecuring airfields along the islands, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in collaboration
with civilian aviation firms like Consolidated Aircraft Company’s subsidiary, Conceal,
facilitated the transportation of B-17 bombers and other aircraft to Brisbane, Australia. Thisendeavor, known as operation steppingstone, played a vital role in reestablishing U.S.
military air capabilities in the Pacific36.
The U.S. military placed Hawaiʻi under military control to better manage the JapaneseAmerican population. Governor Poindexter and General Walter Short swiftly initiateddiscussions on the proposed military administration and subsequently implemented martial
law. This decision garnered support from Robert Shivers, head of the FBI’s Honolulu
office. Poindexter communicated with President Roosevelt, citing the presence of JapaneseAmericans as the rationale behind the imposition of a military government. Under this
32 Mak [2008], p. 82.
33 Davies [1972], pp. 316–17; Skwait [2010], p. 165.
34 Blower [2017], p. 456; Davies [1972], pp. 247–256; Konzett [2017], pp. 58–59.
35 Dallek [1979], p. 311.
36 Craven and Cate [1958], pp. 175–177.

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The Nexus of Militarization and Tourism in the “American Lake”
regime, habeas corpus was suspended, and the courts ceased operations in Hawaiʻi.
However, unlike the mass internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans on the mainland,
encompassing regions such as California, Washington, Oregon, Alaska, Arizona, and otherremote areas, individual Americans of Japanese Ancestry in Hawaiʻi were able to leadnormal lives under the authority of the Hawaiian military government. Of the 1,569
individuals deemed disloyal or dangerous, 1,466 were of Japanese ancestry, constituting
only 1% of the total Japanese American population37.
Delos Emmons, succeeding General Walter Short, assumed leadership of the militaryadministration in Hawaiʻi. Emmons, a graduate of the Army Air Corps Tactical School who
was trained in flight, was appointed by President Roosevelt as chief of the General
Headquarters Air Force in 1939. Known for advocating the use of bombers to bolster
offensive capabilities, Emmons was chosen to head the Hawaiian command at theinsistence of Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, following the Pearl Harbor attack.
Having previously served as an Army Air Corps officer at Fort Shafter from 1934 to 1936,
Emmons possessed intimate knowledge of Hawaiʻi’s demographics, particularly thesignificant role of Japanese Americans in the local economy. Emmons swiftly instituted apolicy of racial tolerance toward ethnic groups, emphasizing the “Americanism” campaign
among Nikkei while staunchly opposing discrimination against Japanese Hawaiians. In
1943, Japanese Americans were permitted to volunteer for military service, resulting in
12,000 Nisei Hawaiians of the 33,000 all Nisei soldiers serving and eventually forming therenowned 442nd Regimental Combat Team. Through their unwavering dedication,
Japanese Americans demonstrated their powerful sense of patriotism38.
Meanwhile, the military government continued its acquisition of land in the Hawaiian
Islands for use by the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy. By 1944, military-controlled land hadreached a total area of 600,000 acres. Among the areas seized was Kahoolawe Island off
the coast of Maui. Initially leased to Angus McPhee and Harry Baldwin’s Kahoolawe
Ranch Company, the southern end of the island was leased to the U.S. military for bombing
and artillery training in May 1941. After the Pearl Harbor attack, the militarycommandeered the entire island. McPhee and Baldwin demanded that the Kahoolawe
Island be returned, claiming that its role as a training ground had ceased and seeking
reimbursement for their investments. U.S. military authorities rebuffed their requests andretained the island for continued use as a bombing and artillery training area. Consequently,
Kahoolawe Island suffered extensive devastation from bombing and shelling operations39.
Hawaiʻi emerged as a pivotal hub for military intelligence operations in the conflictagainst Japan. The commencement of widespread city bombings during World War II
necessitated enhanced aerial intelligence capabilities to refine targeting accuracy. While inEurope, the utilization of aerial photography maps, crafted by the British military,
facilitated operations, analogous resources for the Pacific theater and Japan were notably
deficient. Recognizing this lacuna, the U.S. Army and Navy, traditionally characterized byrivalry, forged a cooperative alliance to develop aerial reconnaissance and bombing target
maps directed towards Japan. Following the pivotal victory at the Battle of Midway in June
1942, senior leaders within the U.S. Army and Navy commenced efforts to optimize
intelligence operations for greater efficacy.
During World War II, Hawaiʻi emerged as a hub for military intelligence operation for
war with Japan. The intensification of city bombings necessiated accurate aerial
37 Scheiber and Scheiber [2016], pp. 39–41.
38 Scheiber and Scheiber [2016], pp. 42–43.
39 Blackford [2017], pp. 34–35.

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KAORI TAKADA
intelligence, a capability that was lacking for Pacific and Japan. While the British military
had produed aerial photography maps for Europe, similar resources were unavailable for
the Pacific theater. Recognizing the need for collaboration, the previously competitive U.S.
Army and Navy joined forced to develop aerial reconnaissance and bombing target maps ofJapan40.
As various governmental and military entities had initiated intelligence undertakings,
Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, and Chief of Naval Operations, Ernest King,
discerned the decentralized nature of intelligence efforts and advocated for comprehensive
reorganization. Consequently, the Joint Army Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS) were
established in late April 1943. The Naval Aviation Photography Unit (NAPU), operatingfrom an aircraft carrier as its primary vessel, assumed the critical task of capturing
photographic intelligence over Japanese territories, encompassing the Marianas, theCaroline Islands, the Okinawa Archipelago41.
In parallel, the Naval Aviation Photography Battalion undertook multifaceted
responsibilities encompassing public relations photography and strategic aerial
reconnaissance activities. Notably, among the personnel mobilized for this unit was Edward
Steichen, a luminary figure renowned for his contributions to major fashion publications
and advertising ventures during the 1920s and 1930s. Tasked with military advertising
campaigns, Steichen’s unit spotlighted leisure and tourism, particularly during wartime.
Employing aesthetically pleasing and stylish portrayals of servicemembers engaged indaily routines aboard aircraft carriers, these images served as potent recruitment tools for
the Navy. Depictions of soldiers engaged in leisurely activities such as sunbathing
conveyed a sense of American military superiority in the Pacific theater to the domestic
audience42. Furthermore, photographic documentation extended to the environs of Hawaiʻi,
serving as a strategic base of operations. However, these images depicted idyllic scenes ofpalm-fringed beaches, lush South Seas flora, and captivating sunsets, featuring solely whitesoldiers and American citizens while conspicuously omitting representations of the
Indigenous population. Collectively, these portrayals projected Hawaiʻi as an exclusive
military enclave, underscoring its characterization as a U.S. military “playground.43”
During World War II, Hawaiʻi assumed dual roles as a military base for the Pacific War
and a recreational center for service members. Under military governance, Hawaiʻi’s agrarian economy, centered around crops such as sugarcane, underwent a significant transformation into a military-driven economy. The military also wielded control over wartime tourism, reshaping the image of Hawaiʻi, which had been thought of as an exclusive resort
destination frequented by Hollywood celebrities, as depicted in movies and photomagazines of the 1930s. Soldiers stationed in Hawaiʻi found respite through recreational
activities such as Hawaiian music, hula dancing, and surfing44.
However, the influx of military personnel also exacerbated issues such as prostitution andvenereal diseases, leading to the institutionalization and control of prostitution until 1944.
40 Takada [2020a], p. 89.
41 Kreis [2004], p. 116; Central Intelligence Agency [2009], p. ix; Marchio [1996], pp. 116–119. JANIS reports

were digitized by the Constitutional Archives of the National Diet Library as part of the Strategic Bombing
Survey Mission materials. About thirty-two volumes were produced for Japan, including volumes on Kamchatka,
Sakhalin, Taiwan, the Mariana Islands, and the Caroline Islands. The collection corresponding to the Japanese
mainland was produced from late 1944 to early 1945 due to the difficulty of obtaining photographic intelligence.
https://rnavi.ndl.go.jp/kensei/entry/USB-1.php (Accessed: 2019/12/10).
42 Dod [1999], p. 510.
43 Lisle [2016], pp. 102–112.
44 Skwait [2010], pp. 148–149; Connelly [2021], pp. 232–234.

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The Nexus of Militarization and Tourism in the “American Lake”
Seaside areas surrounding naval and air bases were developed into beach resorts, further
enhancing the perception of Hawaiʻi as a leisure destination. Haole, in collaboration withthe military, aimed to transform soldiers into tourists, and they used organizations like theUnited Service Organization (USO) promote the slogan “Hawaiʻi is paradise” to boost
morale. In sum, militourism gained traction during World War II, with Hawaiʻi serving as avital strategic base in the Pacific theater while simultaneously providing rest and recreation
facilities for soldiers45.
The imperialist notion of the Pacific as the “American Lake” which has been prevalent
since the 19th century, was revitalized following the attack on Pearl Harbor. Throughout
the war, the U. S. armed forces seized and occupied huge island territories and atolls fromJapan, converting them into military bases. Additionally, between 1945 and 1947, the U.S.
government implemented policies to assert dominance over the Pacific region, including
placing Micronesia, a former Japanese mandate territory, under trusteeship. In the context
of the war against Japan and the broader effort to establish dominance in the Pacific,
Hawaiʻi played a pivotal role as both strategic military bases and a haven for soldiers
seeking rest and relaxation46.

2. Construction of a wartime global air network andresumption of Pacific civil aviation
The United States initiated the development and establishment of a global air network in
1941. Following the enactment of the Lend Lease Act of 1941, Pan Am, operating undercontracts with both the U.S. and British governments, spearheaded the creation of a South
Atlantic and Trans-African air transportation network. This network strategically linked theburgeoning U.S. aircraft industry with British vital bases across Africa and the Middle East.
The endeavor encountered no resistance within the United States and was widely perceived
as an active measure to bolster support for Britain47. On the other hand, the establishmentof an air network in the Pacific region aimed to leverage existing Pan Am routes centeredaround Hawaiʻi, intending to connect Hawaiʻi with Australia and New Zealand. These
endeavors, initially aligned with the provisions of the Lend Lease Act, were suddenly
disrupted by the devastating attack on Pearl Harbor48.
Based on the Civil Aviation Act of 1938, which positioned commercial airlines as a reserve component of the U.S. air force strength, President Roosevelt mobilized all seventeen
domestic airlines of the United States. However, Pan Am, which had been actively expanding routes to Africa and the Middle East, exhibited reluctance towards military mobilization. Pan Am’s pursuit of post-war operating rights in Africa, a matter discovered by the
British government, further exacerbated tensions, and solidified the British resolve tosafeguard their imperial air network. In July 1942, the British government proposed andsigned a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. government to hold bilateral
British-U.S. aviation negotiations as soon as possible on the issue of international civil
aviation and the right to use bases and airport facilities built with the Lend Lease funds.
Shortly thereafter, however, it was discovered that Pan Am had planned and surveyed the
45 Bailey and Farber [1992], pp. 95–130; Lisle [2016], pp. 99–102; Sasaki [2016], pp. 653–654.
46 Dower [1974], pp. 146–206; Takemine [2015].
47 Ray [1975], pp. 340-58; Van Vleck [2013], pp. 148-151.
48 Underwood [1991], p. 171.

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KAORI TAKADA
construction of an airport in the British protectorate of Muscat-Oman and had applied
directly to the Sultan for the right to use the airport. The British government protested
vehemently to the U.S. government and demanded that Pan Am be excluded from theAfrica-Middle East route. This route was to be operated by the U. S. Army Air Force, Air
Transport Command (ATC) and Pan Am was excluded49.
In response to these developments, the U.S. government established the ATC in June
1942. Tasked with orchestrating a global airlift operation, the ATC, in collaboration withdomestic carriers operating under its purview, initiated extensive airlift missions
worldwide. Pan Am’s involvement in the Africa-Middle East route was terminated in
October 1942, and the company was reassigned to participate in airlift operations acrossthe Pacific in conjunction with the Navy Air Transport Service (NATS). The ATC,
alongside domestic carriers, orchestrated a sprawling airlift service that expanded
significantly over the course of the conflict. By war’s end, the ATC had burgeoned from aforce of 11,000 personnel to a formidable contingent of 300,000 individuals, facilitating thetransportation of 30,000 aircraft to the frontlines in 1942, 72,000 in 1943, and 108,000 in
1944.50
The British government demonstrated foresight in addressing the post-war aviation
challenge. In late 1942, a resolution in the British Parliament voiced apprehension
regarding Pan Am’s integration into the British imperial air network, characterizing theaviation issue as being akin to another “Boston Tea Party.” Harold Balfour, the Air Ministerof Britain, declared that the British government sought to take decisive action on behalf of
the approximately one million workers in the aircraft industry. In response, theInterdepartmental Committee on Aviation Policy, convened by President Roosevelt in early
1943, was tasked to develop U.S. aviation policy. This committee was presided over by
Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle and was comprised of military and civilian
aviation experts, including the Assistant Secretaries of the Army and Navy, the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce, and a representative from the Civil Aeronautics Board of the
Department of Commerce. The overarching objective of the U.S. government’s postwar
civil aviation policy was to secure landing rights at as many airports as possible, thereby
facilitating the transition of airlift operations to civilian demand by assigning internationalroutes to commercial airlines, all while maintaining a robust global military aviation
network51.
However, congressional pressure for base acquisition, coupled with the Department of the
Navy’s desire acquire island bases to make the Pacific Ocean “the American lake.” This led
to increased interest in overseas bases constructed and maintained with Lend-Lease funds.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted a plan in 1943 outlining the framework for securing
overseas bases, which became integral to the U.S. national security system52. Meanwhile,the interdepartmental committee submitted a policy proposal to the Secretary of State
advocating for securing immediate rights to use valuable air facilities for postwar aircommerce. This proposal also emphasized the importance of creating an international civil
aviation organization and initiating negotiations with Great Britain53. Disagreements arose
49 Dobson [1991], pp. 128-129; Craven and Cate [1958], pp. 53-54; Foreign Relations of the United States,
1942, volume 4, The Near East and Africa, 1963, pp. 531-534.
50 Craven and Cate [1958], p. 19.
51 Berle and Jacobs [1973], pp. 482–83; Takada [2011], pp. 82–83.
52 Stoler [1982], pp. 303–21.
53 National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD, “Interdepartmental
Subcommittee on International Aviation Preliminary Report as Adapted March 1, 1943,” Record Group 105 Entry
210 Box 123, pp. 8–9.

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The Nexus of Militarization and Tourism in the “American Lake”
within departments regarding the nature of air agreements: The Department of Commerce
and the Civil Aeronautics Bureau favored bilateral agreements based on airspacesovereignty, while the Interdepartmental Committee recommended a multilateral approach
involving general agreements, including a “fifth freedom” that would allow airlines tooperate beyond right— the right to load and unload cargo and passengers between two or
more countries54.
In the postwar era, international civil aviation was shaped by bilateral aviationagreements between the United States and Britain, which were negotiated at the Chicago
International Civil Aviation Conference in November 1944 and at the Bermuda Conferencein February 1946. At the Chicago Conference, the U.S. advocated for a comprehensive
multilateral agreement that included the “fifth freedom” right for airlines. However, theconference resulted in a commitment to bilateral negotiations. Subsequently, the Bermuda
Agreement, negotiated between the U.S. and Britain in February 1946, became thefoundation for postwar aviation agreements. Although the British government succeeded inlimiting beyond rights of the United State in the conclusion of agreement, the latter
vigorously pursued bilateral air agreements55.
The Bermuda Agreement also addressed Pacific routes. The UK secured the right tooperate a route from Singapore to San Francisco via Hong Kong, Manila, Guam, Wake
Island, Midway Atoll, and Honolulu. Conversely, the U.S. obtained rights to multiple
routes, including one from San Francisco or Los Angeles via Honolulu, Midway, Wake,
Guam, and Manila to Hong Kong, Macau, and various destinations in Asia. Another route
extended from San Francisco or Los Angeles to Dutch Indonesia. Following the Bermuda
Agreement, the British government coordinated with Commonwealth countries and the
U.S. to establish the Pacific route. Hong Kong emerged as a crucial hub between Asia andSoutheast Asia, prompting the UK to develop the Hong Kong Airport to facilitate air travelin the region56.
In response to the dominant air transport capacity of the United States, the United
Kingdom and Commonwealth nations in the Pacific established the South Pacific Airlift
Advisory Committee and launched British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines (BCPA) as a
joint venture. BCPA aimed to operate a trans-Pacific route connecting Australia and theUnited States, thus competing with Pan Am in the Pacific region. The Australian and New
Zealand governments were reluctant to grant fifth freedom rights to U.S. airlines. However,negotiations between these governments and the United States led to the signing of airservice agreements in December 1946 that were like the Bermuda Agreement. Thisagreement paved the way for BCPA to commence operations, flying a route from Australia
and New Zealand to the U.S. West Coast via Hawaiʻi three times a week, starting in 1947.
Meanwhile, Pan Am continued to operate a similar route twice a week57.
After World War II, the rapid demobilization of military airlift units in the U.S. Army andNavy led to significant reductions in personnel and aircrafts. For example, the Army Airlift
54 Dobson [1991], pp. 136–138; Smith [1950], pp. 148-150. On “Five Freedoms of the air” provides (1)innocent passage or over-flight; (2) technical stop for repairs or refueling; (3) the right to pick up passengers
from an airline’s country of origin and disembark them in territory of the other contracting party; (4) the right topick up passengers in the other contracting country and disembark them in the airline’s country of origin; and (5)the right to pick up passengers from the other contracting party and carry them forward to a third-party
destination. The Fifth Freedom is also known as “beyond rights.” See, Dobson [2017], p. 36.
55 Dobson [2017], pp. 52-55.
56 Wang [2022] pp. 45-46; Guyana (Bermuda I) Air Transport Agreement of February 11, 1946,
https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ata/g/gy/114284.htm.
57 Orders [2003], p. 177–178.

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KAORI TAKADA
Command, which had 300,000 personnel and 3,700 transport aircrafts on September 2,
1945, saw its force shrink to 60,000 personnel and 1,500 aircrafts within a year. The focusof airlift routes shifted to the North Atlantic, Europe, and the Pacific, with reduced
operations in the latter region limited to routes such as the North Pacific Great Circle routefrom the U.S. West Coast and via Hawaiʻi. Airlift operations in the South and Southwest
Pacific were handled by the Royal New Zealand Air Force Airlift Command, which
operated a smaller fleet of 600 aircraft in 1947. Similarly, the U. S. Naval Airlift Command
faced rapid demobilization and budget cuts and operated only 116 seaplanes in 194758.
As military airlift operations demobilized, efforts were made to convert airlift activities
to meet civilian demand. Bilateral air agreements with countries such as Ireland, Canada,
and the United Kingdom allowed the U.S. to secure landing rights, and the Civil
Aeronautics Board assigned routes to commercial airlines. In the Pacific, Pan Am
established a monopoly before the war. However, post-war routes were allocated tomultiple companies. Pan Am and Northwest Airlines were assigned routes from the North
Pacific Great Circle to Tokyo and continuing to Shanghai and other parts of Asia. Anothercarrier, United Airlines, received permission to fly a route from the U.S. West Coast to
Hawaiʻi. Subsequently, both Pan Am and Northwest were granted permission to fly to
Hawaiʻi, with Pan Am receiving approval in the same year, followed by Northwest in thefollowing year in 194759.
Between 1945 and 1946, the airline industry experienced a brief period of growth andexpansion. Eager to attract new customers, airlines demanded the production of modern
airliners, leading to the introduction of state-of-the-art aircraft such as the Lockheed
Constellation. Transcontinental and Western Airlines even rebranded itself as Trans World
Airlines (TWA) and began operating Lockheed Constellation aircraft. By 1947, the market
dynamics had shifted dramatically due to the rapid demobilization of military airlift forces,
which flooded the market with surplus transport aircraft, notably the DC-3. These usedaircraft, though considered obsolete for military use, found new demand in the civilian
sector as they could be converted into passenger planes at a low cost. This led to an
overproduction of planes and financial challenges for airlines, which was only exacerbatedby stagnant passenger traffic growth and reduced demand for civil aviation60.
The viability of international civil aviation was further complicated by regulatory issues.
While the Civil Aeronautics Board granted permission for airlines such as Pan Am andNorthwest to fly to Japan in 1946, the General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) in Japan was slow to act. It was not until April 1947 that
GHQ/SCAP allowed these airlines to operate flights to and from Japan. GHQ also limited
the use of civilian airport companies to Haneda Airport in Tokyo, which was under U.S.
military control, while other airports, such as Chitose Airport in Hokkaido in northern
Japan, Osaka Airport (Itami), and Fukuoka Airport, were placed under military authority61.
Moreover, to avoid accusations of monopolizing Japanese civil aviation, GHQ/SCAP
permitted other international airlines, including British Overseas Airways Company,
Canadian Pacific, Qantas, Philippine Airlines, and China Airlines to operate flights to andfrom Japan, albeit restricting them to Haneda Airport62.
58 Williams [1999], pp. 15, 18; Orders [2003], p. 175.
59 Davies [1972], pp. 376-377; Mak [2008], p. 15.
60 Bright [2020], pp. 79–80; Hühne [2017], p. 151.
61 NARA, Record Group (RG) 218 Entry UD 4 Box 28, Enclosure, “Appendix A: Discussion,” 11 October

1945, pp. 6–10; NARA, RG 331 UD 1148 Box 386 G4 Files, “Request for Use of International Civil
Communications by Northwest Airlines, Inc., and Pan American Airways, Inc.,” February 18, 1947, pp. 1–2.
62 Davies [1997], p. 464.

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The Nexus of Militarization and Tourism in the “American Lake”
After World War II, the Pacific Ocean came under significant American influence, withislands that were once fiercely contested now occupied by U.S. forces. Guam, which had
been occupied by Japan during the war, was also reoccupied by U.S. forces. The U.S. Navystrongly advocated for the annexation of the Pacific region, particularly the islands ofMicronesia, which had been under Japanese rule since World War I. However, the State
Department opposed annexation, arguing that it would violate the rights of the island
peoples to self-determination; instead, it supported the idea of establishing a trusteeshipsystem. This difference in opinion between the military and the State Department led tocontroversy within the U.S. government regarding the Micronesia situation63.
While some military officers advocated for the cultural Americanization of Micronesia
through white American settlement, the U.S. used the region as a nuclear test site,
profoundly altering the culture, traditions, living conditions, and ecology of the region’s
Indigenous inhabitants64. Bikini Atoll, located in the northern part of the U.S.-occupied
Marshall Islands in Micronesia, was chosen as the site for the first post-war nuclear tests
due to its remoteness from the Pacific transportation network and its small population, thus
minimizing potential casualties65. President Truman approved the proposal in January 1946,
and preparations were made to conduct the tests. Despite domestic protests andinternational criticism, the first atomic bomb test was conducted on July 1 of that year,
targeting decommissioned U.S. Navy ships and Japanese and German battleships, followed
by a second test conducted on July 25, 194666. The United Nations did not recognize theUnited States’ international trusteeship of Micronesia until 1947, and the U.S. military’s
continued nuclear testing in the region may have been aimed at erasing the political andcultural influence of the Japanese mandate67.
After the atomic bomb tests at Bikini Atoll, the onset of the Cold War became evident inEurope and the Middle East in late 1946 and 1947. In response to the growing threat ofcommunism, President Harry S. Truman announced the “Truman Doctrine” in March 1947,
which aimed to provide military assistance to nations worldwide in resisting communist
expansion. To prepare for the challenges posed by communism, the Truman administration
developed a national security structure, leading to the passage of the National Security Act
of 1947. The National Security Act resulted in the merger of the Departments of the Armyand Navy and the creation of a new branch, the Air Force. Recognizing the criticalimportance of aviation in both military and civilian sectors, Truman established the Air
Policy Commission, also known as the Finletter Commission, led by Thomas K. Finletter,
who had served as a special assistant of Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and a consultant
at the United Nations Conference on International Organization as San Francisco, toformulate national aviation policy. In December 1947, the Finletter Commission issued its
report titled “Surviving the Air Age,” outlining its recommendations for a comprehensive
aviation strategy68.
The Finletter Commission noted the duplication of the Army and Navy airlift forces andrecommended that airlift forces be integrated with the creation of the Air Force. The
committee also emphasized that the combined transport capabilities of the present Armyand Navy airlift forces and civilian airlift companies were inadequate for strategic airlift
63 Foltos [1989], pp. 317–323.
64 Friedman [1997], pp. 49–70.
65 Teaiwa [1994], pp. 84–109.
66 Graybar [1986], pp. 888–907.
67 The South Pacific was militarized and suffered nuclear testing–induced radioactive contamination. It was

not until the mid-1970s that the area was developed for international civil aviation. Kissing [2014], p. 38.
68 Crackel [1998], pp. 63–64.

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KAORI TAKADA
operations responsible for rapid logistics in preparation for future wars, and it
recommended that the transport capabilities of civilian airlift companies be enhanced andmobilized to conduct airlift operations as they had been during World War II. The Air
Policy Board recommended that the Military Air Transport Service, which integrated the
Army and Navy airlift forces, oversee airlift activities to meet the needs of the Army, Navy,and Air Force. Based on these recommendations, the Military Air Transport Service(MATS) was established under the Air Force to oversee airlift activities for the Army,
Navy, and Air Force. Secretary of Defense Forrestal issued a decision in January 1948 toconsolidate the Army and Navy airlift forces and establish the MATS. Airlift routes weredivided into three regions: Europe, the continental United States, and the Pacific. Hickam
Air Force Base in Hawaiʻi was designated as the starting point for flights to Tokyo in the
Pacific region, reflecting the strategic importance of Hawaiʻi in post-war military
operations69.
The intensification of the Cold War brought about challenges such as the Berlin
Blockade, during which West Berliners faced shortages of essential supplies like food, fuel,and medicine. The Soviet Union hoped that these difficulties would force Western powers
to withdraw from West Berlin. However, MATS spearheaded a massive airlift operation
known as the Berlin Airlift, which played a crucial role in ensuring the survival of West
Berliners by airlifting supplies into the city. The Berlin Airlift demonstrated thesignificance of strategic airlift operations in the context of the Cold War, highlighting thecapability of the United States to sustain its allies in the face of Soviet aggression.
Following the success of the Berlin Airlift, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950
further underscored the importance of airlift operations70. The Korean War led to theestablishment of a close partnership between the military and civilian sectors in conducting
airlift operations. Additionally, the conflict prompted further militarization of the Pacificregion, as the United States sought to bolster its presence and capabilities to counter
communist aggression. Overall, the challenges posed by the Cold War propelled therevitalization of U.S. military airlift capabilities and underscored the critical role of airlift
operations in the strategic defense and support of country’s allies.

3. The Korean War and Militarism and Tourism in the “American Lake”
The Korean War played a significant role in facilitating the establishment of military
alliances in the Pacific region. The approval of Japanese commercial airlines was an
outcome of the San Francisco Peace Conference and the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, which
provided for the permanent use of U.S. military bases in Japan. Additionally, Australia and
New Zealand, foreseeing competition for operations in the Pacific, strengthened its
relations with the United States as British military power in the region declined. Bothcountries contributed troops to the Korean War as part of the UN’s forces. Emphasizing theimportance of building alliances in the Pacific, the U.S. government signed security treaties(ANZUS) with Australia and New Zealand, further solidifying regional partnerships71.
The war significantly heightened both U.S. military and civilian airlift operations. MATS
and mobilized civilian airlines played an increasingly crucial role in transporting supplies
69 Williams [1999], pp. 22–23.
70 Williams [1999], pp. 25–27.
71 Orders [2003], p. 190.

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The Nexus of Militarization and Tourism in the “American Lake”
and personnel to Japan, which became a frontline base for the conflict. Prior to the outbreakof the Korean War, the Pacific Division of MATS airlifted an average of seventy tons ofmunitions per month to Japan. However, after the war began, Hickam Air Force Base in
Hawaiʻi saw its role strengthen as MATS’ Pacific Division commenced wartime operations.
Aircraft from various parts of the world, including mobilized civilian planes, landed at
Hickam, which became key military airlift hub on the frontline. In 1952, during the Korean
War, the Air Force established a system for mobilizing commercial airlines for military
purposes. Companies such as Transocean Airlines and the cargo-focused Flying Tigers
were among the first to participate in military airlifts as chartered flights. Additionally,major commercial carriers like Pan Am, Northwest, United, Seaboard & Western, andOverseas National also contributed to military airlift operations between the U.S. West
Coast and Japan. By September 1950, 345 commercial aircrafts had been chartered forthese purposes, although MATS soon faced budgetary challenges72.
A committee was formed within the U.S. government on the request of the Secretary of
the Air Force and the Chairperson of the National Security Resources Administration to
respond to the need to ensure wartime airlift capability. In March 1951, President Trumanissued Executive Order 10219, which mobilized civilian airlines for military service. This
led to a significant increase in trans-Pacific flights, with 40 percent of them being
conducted by commercial airlines. Notably, among the passengers transported were 35 U.S.
soldiers liberated from a North Korean prisoner-of -war camp for whom Hickam Air Force
Base became a symbol of relief and joy73.
Hickam Air Force Base played a significant role in the post-World War II era, serving as
the home base for MATS, which was organized in 1948. In the late 1940s, housingdevelopments were constructed for military families not only in Hickam but also in
garrisoned areas and occupied territories of Japan and Germany. Hickam Base notably
became the site of the first military family housing project in the United States. Various
amenities, such as dormitories for single soldiers, military family housing, restaurants,
gymnasiums, schools, movie theaters, and day care centers, were established on the base.
The housing was designed to resemble suburban housing on the U.S. mainland, featuring
spacious layouts, large gardens, and tropical plants from the South Seas. This initiativereflected the broader aim of creating “Little America” residential areas around the worldthat would mirror typical suburban lifestyles found in the continental U.S.74.
In addition to its role as a residential hub, Hawaiʻi also served as a crucial training base.
In 1951, the U.S. Army established the Infantry Training Center at Scofield Barracks tomobilize and train personnel from various regions, including the mainland U.S., Hawaiʻi,Guam, and American Samoa. The military and the Hawaiian territorial government
anticipated that military personnel visiting Hawaiʻi would contribute to tourism.
Interestingly, the military even referred to trainees as “tourists in military uniforms.”
However, the mobility of military personnel, who often move between bases on themainland and overseas, presents a challenge: it is difficult to accurately account for theirpresence. Consequently, military personnel stationed in Hawaiʻi or visiting for training ortransportation, who may not be officially recorded by immigration authorities, effectively
become transient tourists and consumers during their time in the region75.
72 Crackel [1998], p. 69.
73 Priddy [1994], pp. 12–15; Krejcarek and Chute [1985], pp. 42, 76.
74 Alvah [2007], pp. 21–34; Gillem [2007], pp. 73–121; Krejcarek and Chute [1985], pp. 78–92; Blower[2017], pp. 457-458.
75 Man [2018], p. 80; Morris-Suzuki [2010], pp. 123–124.

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The militarization of Hawaiʻi during the Cold War era was intertwined with the dynamics
of local politics and the struggle for democratization. Prior to this period, the political andeconomic power in Hawaiʻi was concentrated among the haole, especially the Big Five,haole sugar plantation owners and landlords, who were Republican. After World War II,
however, there was a shift in power dynamics driven by the emergence of labor unions andthe mobilization of demobilized soldiers. Postwar Hawaiʻi witnessed the organization ofplantation and dock workers into unions that aimed to address economic exploitation.
However, union leaders were often targeted and labeled communists, leading to the
suppression of labor movements. In response, demobilized World War II veterans,
including Japanese and Chinese Americans, began to advocate for full U.S. citizenship andspearheaded the statehood movement. This movement gained momentum, culminating in
the victory of the Democratic Party in the 1954 Hawaiian congressional elections, known
as the “Bloodless Revolution.” The success of the statehood movement led to its admission
as the 50th state of the United States in 1959. However, this outcome disappointed Native
Hawaiians who had sought decolonization and the restoration of Hawaiian sovereignty.
Meanwhile, Asian Hawaiians, who played a significant role in advocating for statehood,valued their relationship with the federal government, particularly the military76.
The facilitation of statehood and alignment with federal interests, including the military,contributed to the process of militarization in Hawaiʻi. As a result, the expansion of
military bases and functions in the Pacific region, including the establishment of new
training bases, became intertwined with the political and social developments in Hawaiʻiduring the Cold War era. Veterans played a significant role in shaping Hawaiʻi’s militarylandscape, given their affinity for the military and military bases. The U.S. government andmilitary extensively expanded Hawaiʻi’s military capabilities, with Oahu alone hosting
sixteen military bases. Substantial portions of the military budget were allocated to
Hawaiʻi, highlighting its strategic importance in Washington’s Asia-Pacific policy77.
Hawaiʻi also emerged as a crucial hub for U.S. nuclear forces in the Pacific, marked bymultiple nuclear tests conducted in the region. Beginning with the atomic bomb test at
Bikini Atoll in 1946, the U.S. conducted 106 nuclear tests, which had significant
environmental and health implications for the region. The Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test
in 1954, conducted during the Eisenhower administration, had particularly far-reachingconsequences, with radioactive fallout affecting various areas, including Micronesia, Japan,
Australia, India, and Hawaiʻi. The presence of as many as 3,100 nuclear weapons in
Hawaiʻi further proved its pivotal role in U.S. nuclear strategy during the Cold War78.
Moreover, the growing political influence of the Asian population in Hawaiʻi became
increasingly significant in shaping U.S. Cold War policy toward the U.S.-Soviet Union,
especially in the context of Asia’s rising importance. The establishment of the People’s
Republic of China, the end of the Korean War, and the First Indochina War, and theemergence of newly independent Asian and African nations critical of the U.S.–Soviet Cold
War dynamics, highlighted the need for a racially fair approach. In response, commercial
airlines in the United States, such as Pan Am, began reassessing their policies, including
diversifying their workforce to include second-generation Japanese Americans cabin
attendants for the Asia-Pacific routes to accommodate the growing passenger traffic from
Asia, marking a shift toward greater inclusivity and engagement with the region79.
76 Klein [2003], p. 248; Man [2018], pp. 81-82; Skwiot [2010], pp. 161–162.
77 Skwiot [2010], pp. 161-162; Lind [1984/1985], p. 37.
78 Klein [2003], p. 309; Norris, Atkin & Burr [1999], p. 30; Fitzgerald [2022], p. 91.
79 Yano [2011], pp. 2-3.

38

The Nexus of Militarization and Tourism in the “American Lake”
Pan Am ordered the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 jetliners in 1955. Following Pan Am,
many commercial airlines upgraded from using four-cylinder propellor-engine airliners tojet airliners. This was the arrival of the first jet age. The transition to jet aircraft
revolutionized air travel and tourism in Hawaiʻi and the broader Pacific region. While theUnited Kingdom initially led the jetliner market with the de Havilland Comet, a series ofaccidents tarnished its reputation, allowing American manufacturers like Douglas andBoeing to dominate the industry. Pan Am’s introduction of the Boeing 707 marked the
beginning of the intercontinental jet era, with its service reaching Honolulu International
Airport in 1959, coinciding with Hawaiʻi’s statehood80.
Despite the growing political influence of Asian Hawaiians, the economic influence ofthe haole community remained significant. This was evident in the rapid development of
tourist infrastructure, including large hotels like the 650-room Holiday Inn, the 31-story
1,900-room Waikiki Sheraton, and others like the Hawaiian Regent and Hyatt Regency.
United Airlines’ introduction of DC-8s and its efforts to attract more passengers, such assponsoring a Professional Golf Association tournament in Hawaiʻi, further boosted tourist
visits to the islands. The military played a crucial role in the development of Hawaʻi’s
tourism industry, as the introduction of jet aircraft and the expansion of tourist hotels were
often driven by military-related initiatives. This convergence of military and civilianinterests contributed to the popularization of Hawaiʻi’s militourism, or mass tourism, which
had its roots in the facilities and infrastructure established by the military during and afterWorld War II81.
The period between 1950 and 1959 witnessed a significant surge in tourism in Hawaiʻi,with tourist spending increasing by 350% and the number of visitors rising from 34,000 in
1945 to 243,000 in 1959. United Airlines played a role in this growth by introducing
various initiatives, including family fare discount programs and the introduction of thecoach class, which made air travel more accessible to families and individuals alike.
Additionally, military visitors to Hawaiʻi, not accounted for in official tourism statistics,
also contributed to the island’s tourism industry, as MATS was actively involved in military
airlift operations across the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans82.
In 1962, three years after Hawaiʻi attained statehood, the last atmospheric nuclear test in
the Pacific occurred amid heightened tensions between the United States and the Soviet
Union over Cuba. The detonation of nuclear devices led to the forced relocation ofresidents from Bikini Atoll and Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. U.S.
servicemembers stationed in the region witnessed these tests from proximity, with somestationed as close as ten miles away. The Atomic Energy Commission portrayed these
nuclear tests as public spectacles, even allowing local families and schoolchildren toobserve tests conducted in Nevada. The 1962 atmospheric hydrogen bomb test conductedon Johnston Island, just west of Hawaiʻi, was visible from the islands and American
Samoa. Witnesses described the sky turning vivid colors, ranging from lime green tolemonade pink and finally red, creating a surreal and alarming sight. Reports detailed how
residents, tourists, and individuals who resembled soldiers watched the test unfold from
Waikiki Beach. This event underscored Hawaiʻi’s inclusion in the broader Cold War
landscape of nuclear testing and geopolitical tensions83.
80 Engel [2007], pp.173–174; Davies [2007], pp. 40–41, 50–52.
81 Allen [2004], pp. 37–40; Mak [2008], p. 16.
82 Klein [2003], p. 245; Lust [2009], pp. 153–159; Williams [1999], p. 37.
83 Nye [1994], pp. 232-234; “Space bomb in color: EERIE Spectacle in Pacific Sky,” Life, July 20, 1962, pp.

25–34.

39

KAORI TAKADA

Conclusion
This paper comprehensively examined the formation of militourism in Hawaiʻi, tracing its
roots back to the annexation of Hawai`i by the United States in the 19th century. It
highlighted how settler colonialism and the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi paved
the way for white American rule and military control in the region. Japanese immigrants in
Hawaiʻi, who were also spreading across the Pacific as part of Japan’s imperial expansion,
became a focal point of concern for the white elite in Hawaiʻi. The U.S. government andmilitary capitalized on tensions with Japan to assert control over Hawaiʻi, further
militarizing the islands and seizing land for military purposes. This expansion of militarycontrol over Hawaiʻi reflected a renewed imperialist conception of the Pacific as the“American Lake” in the 20th century. The Pacific region, including Micronesia, wasbrought under the influence of the U.S. military, with Oahu emerging as a key strategic
base. Pearl Harbor, serving as the home port of the Pacific Fleet, and Hickam Air Force
Base, established in the 1920s, were pivotal in the military’s operations in the Pacific.
Additionally, the expansion of Schofield Barracks during the Korean War further solidified
Oahu’s role as a critical military hub. Throughout World War II and the Cold War, Oahu’s
military base functions were enhanced, underscoring its significance in U.S. military
strategy in the Pacific region.
The aftermath of World War II saw a clash between the United States and Great Britain
over international civil aviation, particularly in the Atlantic Ocean. This conflict led to theestablishment of the Chicago–Bermuda system, which established the framework for the
postwar international civil aviation. Meanwhile, in the Pacific, the United Kingdom sought
to counter U.S. influence through the establishment of the British Commonwealth Pacific
Airlines (BCPA) with the Commonwealth realms. In the Pacific theater, the United States
granted operating rights to Pan Am and Northwest Airlines for routes between the U.S.
West Coast and Japan. United Airlines was also permitted to operate routes between the
U.S. West Coast and Hawaiʻi. However, Pan Am attempted to monopolize the civil aviation
market in postwar Japan, exacerbating tensions in the region. The situation was further
complicated by the outbreak of the Korean War and the subsequent involvement of theUnited States. This geopolitical context heightened competition and strategic maneuveringin the Pacific, particularly in the realm of civil aviation.
The Korean War had significant geopolitical ramifications, particularly in the Pacificregion. This led to the signing of the U.S.– Japan Security Treaty, which transformed Japan
into a strategic ally for the United States and further militarized the region. Additionally,
military alliances with Australia and New Zealand further bolstered the Pacific’s militarycapabilities. Furthermore, the war increased military activities in the Pacific, with Hickam
Air Force Base in Hawaiʻi becoming a crucial hub for airlift operations to Japan and Korea.
Civilian airlines played a substantial role in troop transport during this period, contributing
to their experience and involvement in Pacific routes. Moreover, Hawaiʻi’s military
function was strengthened after World War II, with the islands becoming a center of air
mobility in the Pacific. The development of infrastructure and recreational facilities in
Hawaiʻi catered to the needs of soldiers and their families stationed there, earning it thenickname “America Town.” Political developments within Hawaiʻi, including the growing
influence of Asian Hawaiians of military veterans, emphasized cooperation with federal

40

The Nexus of Militarization and Tourism in the “American Lake”
government and the armed forces. Simultaneously, economic interests, primarily driven by
the haole minority with significant economic power, prioritized tourism, and landdevelopment, including alliances with mainland capital for hotel construction. Hawaiʻi isbeing granted statehood further facilitated the growth of tourism, which was heralded by
the introduction of jet service by passenger airlines such as Pan Am.
This paper scrutinized the intricate relationship between Hawaiʻi’s transformation into a
tourist destination and its role as a key U.S. military base in the Pacific. The militarizationof Hawaiʻi, particularly through bases like Pearl Harbor Naval Base and Hickam Air Force
Base, played a significant role in shaping the island’s tourism industry. Military personnel
stationed in Hawaiʻi, although not traditionally counted as tourists, contributed to the local
economy and tourism sector. The military’s presence in Hawaiʻi, especially after the Pearl
Harbor attack, led to the development of tourism infrastructure and activities catering tosoldiers and their families. This dynamic would have persisted during subsequent military
engagements, such as the Vietnam War, further underscoring the symbiotic relationshipbetween militarization and tourism in Hawaiʻi. Further research on this topic could provide
valuable insights into the complex interplay between military activities, tourism
development, and local economies in regions with significant military presence. This could
pave the way for a more comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted impacts ofmilitarization on tourism and society at large.
[This work was supported by JSPS Kaken Grant Number 23K01499 and was based on the
Panel Presentation in the American Historical Association Annual Conference, 2024, San
Francisco. RIHGAT supported the author for travel grant to participate in the AHA Annual
Conference, 2024.][The author would like to thank to the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments
on earlier drafts of this article.]41

KAORI TAKADA
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44History of Global Arms Transfer, 18 (2024), pp. 45-61

In Consideration of Nighttime Precision
Bombing by the U.S. during World War II:
Its Historical Significance andFuture Tasks
By SATOSHI FUJITA*This article focuses on the nighttime precision bombing campaign using a latest
radar conducted by the United States Army Air Forces at the end of World War II.
Previous studies have paid little attention to this campaign, which lasted from lateJune 1945 until the end of the war. This article shows that it has historicalsignificance in that the mobilization of science, technology, and industry madepossible certain tactics that were previously considered unfeasible. This campaign
also suggests that the state of science, technology, and industrial policies
determined the way the war was fought. This paper presents the future tasks
whose completion is necessary to illuminate the overall picture of the campaign.
First, it is necessary to clarify how the scientific, technological, and industrial
bases that enabled these tactics were put in place and, second, to elucidate why
oil-related facilities were selected as targets for nighttime precision bombing
operations. By answering these questions, we will be able to offer a fullperspective of nighttime precision bombing operations with the radar and, byextension, understand the characteristics of how the American military fought thewar.

Introduction
This article discusses the strategic bombing campaign against Japan conducted by theUnited States Army Air Forces (USAAF) in the final months of World War II. Particularly,
it focuses on the nighttime precision bombings of petroleum facilities beginning in lateJune 1945, summarizes these operations and results, examines their strategic impacts andhistorical implications, and clarifies future tasks that should be accomplished.
To offer an early conclusion, the operations against petroleum facilities had little
influence on the consequences of the war. Therefore, previous studies have only referenced
them briefly, if ever, and they failed to examine their historical significance1. Although theofficial history of the 315th Bombardment Wing details the personnel, training, and* Author’s Affiliation: Satoshi Fujita, Associate Professor, Department of International Communication, Gifu
City Women’s College.
1 Craven and Cate [1983b:1955]; United States Air Force [1953]; Werrell [1996]; Crane [2016]. The latest
study of the history of the U.S. precision attacks and strategies does not refer to this campaign at all. Rogers[2023].

45

SATOSHI FUJITA
missions of the unit (information on which this article depends heavily), this study does notdetail any industrial, scientific, or technological bases that could elucidate their operations,and it fails to identify their historical implications2.
However, these operations did have historical implications in that they demonstrated theimportance of science and technology, as operations previously considered unfeasible weremade possible with the newly developed radar. In addition, to perform the operation
required not only technological developments but also a certain amount of equipment to be
produced, that is, industrial mobilization. As historian Paul Kennedy suggests, thefeasibility of certain tactics or operations depends on scientific and technological efforts,
and identifying them is important, despite tending to be underestimated3. Indeed, theperformance and success of the nighttime precision bombing depended on many factors.
That is, exaggeratedly, to paint a complete picture of these operations reveals how the US
fought the war.
Concerning the American way of war, especially strategic bombing during World War II,
most previous studies focus on the transition from precision tactics to indiscriminate ones.
Quoting Paul Fussell’s literature, Eiko Ikui points out that the US military placed value on
accuracy in the early stages of the war, but in the latter phase, accuracy and precision was
not considered important and the way of fighting changed to one that prioritized efficiency
and consumed large amount of munitions 4. Some authors accuse the US military of
performing strategic, especially indiscriminate bombing as immoral act5. For them, the US
and the Great Britain (also Germany and Japan) violated international laws stipulating thatany military had not to target innocent civilians. By reflecting the strategic bombing
campaign during World War II from this perspective, however, such authors dismiss the
US’ efforts to pursue a precision attack as a way of more economical and humanitariantactics. After World War II, the US military have continued to do so. As James Patton
Rogers suggests, analyzing the American pursuit of precision “reveals rare insights into theintellectual history, evolution, and character of American warfare6.” Therefore, this article
sheds light into the American way of war by examining previously overlooked operations
during World War II.

1. Summary of the Strategic Bombing of the Japanese Homeland
To place in a context the nighttime precision bombing during the last stage of World War
II, this chapter summarizes the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. First, what is a“strategic bombing”? Attacking an enemy from the air is generally defined as two methods.
One is “tactical,” to support a fighting on the front line, and it involves targeting enemy
forces themself, as well as the roads, railroads, and bridges used to transport personnel andsupply. Although roads, railroads, and bridges are the targets of “strategic bombings,” theaim of a tactical attack is to support ground forces.
The second method is strategic, aiming to diminish the enemy’s war-fighting ability. In
modern wars, especially in total wars, which are fought with all the strength of a nation,
2 Swann [1986].
3 Kennedy [2013].
4 Ikui [2018: 2006] pp. 168-179. See also Schaffer [1985].
5 See Grayling [2006] and Arai [2008].
6 Rogers [2023] p. 2. As mentioned above, however, Rogers does not refer the nighttime precision bombing

campaign with a radar during World War II.

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In Consideration of Nighttime Precision Bombing by the U.S. during World War II
continuation of the war requires industrial productivity to supply munitions and labor
forces to support the productive capability. Therefore, the desirable targets for strategic
bombings are as follows: military arsenals, powerhouses, fuel factories, cities, andcivilians. Bombing cities also has the purpose of demoralizing the civilian population toraise war weariness among them, leading to a quick end to the war.
Furthermore, strategic bombing consists of two methods: precision bombing and area
bombing, where the former aims for the targets mentioned above accurately and withminimum bombers, bombs, and sacrifices of enemy civilian. As detailed later (3-1), theUSAAF preferred this method of bombing from an economic and humanitarian perspective,
but it is technically difficult to pinpoint a target with bombs from the air. Meanwhile, area
bombings target objectives and the surrounding neighborhood, destroying them certainly.
This means area bombings produce greater civilian losses and they are indeed applied todestroy a city itself and kill its civilians as a demoralization tactic.
In both European and Pacific theaters, because the Allies could attack the German andJapanese homelands only by bombing from the air, strategic bombing garnered high hopefrom the war’s onset. It was reflected by the fact that while the US produced about 300,000
aircrafts during the war, it weighed long-range bombers, such as B-17s, B-24s, and B-29s
used primarily for strategic bombing7. Among these, B-29s were the latest and most longrange, so they were most appropriate for attacking Japan proper. The Twentieth Air Force(20th AF) was responsible for bombing Japan, and all heavy bombers received by the 20th
AF were B-29s. During the war, approximately 3,700 B-29s were produced, and over 1,000
among them were delivered to the 20th AF8.
As such, the 20th AF was organized to perform strategic bombing against Japan. The war
against Japan had many theaters, including China-Burma, the Pacific, the Far East, andAlaska, and Air Forces were deployed to each. This meant that each Air Force was subject
to the policies of the commanding general of each theater. In contrast, the 20th AF wassolely responsible for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top military decision maker, and they
could then engage in the bombing of Japan, regardless the policy of each theater. Further,the 20th AF had two bomber commands (BC), the 20th and 21st, the former of whichplaced its headquarters at Kharagpur, India, and conducted a bombing campaign against
Japan, East Asia, and Southeast Asia as a whole from forward bases, such as Chengdu,
China. In addition, the 21st BC, based on the Mariana Islands, which were conquered inJuly and August 1944, carried out a bombing campaign against the Japanese homeland. As
chief portions of the 20th BC were incorporated into the 21st BC later, this article examines
mainly the actions of the 21st BC.
The 21st BC consisted of five bombardment wings (BW): the 73rd, 313th, 314th, 58th,
and 315th Wings, in order of deployment to Marianas. Each BW comprised four
bombardment groups (BG), and each BG was authorized to have 45 B-29s, totaling amaximum BW force of 180 B-29s. However, each BW or BG began operating before theirforce was complete, and the build-up of each force advanced gradually9.
The commander of the 21st BC was Haywood Hansell, Jr., who was an enthusiastic
advocate of “precision” bombing10. Because the Japanese aircraft industry was set as the
7 Approximately 35,000 long-range bombers were produced during the war. The total airframe weight of longrange bombers was 35% of that of all aircrafts built by the war’s end. Craven and Cate [1983c:1955] pp. 352–
353.
8 Muelen [1995]; Office of Statistical Control [1945] p. 179.
9 Craven and Cate [1983b] p. 522.
10 Haun [2019] p. 220.

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SATOSHI FUJITA
primary target at the headquarters of the 20th AF, the 21st BC engaged primarily in
precision bombing against the installations relating to the aircraft industry in the first phaseof the campaign. On November 24, 1944, 21st BC ushered its first operation with 111
B-29s against the Nakajima Aircraft Musashi plant. This operation, however, could not
produce a significant result, so the Musashi plant was attacked repeatedly. Three days later,
the 21st BC targeted Musashi plant again, but no airplane could drop bombs on the primaryobjective. Due to heavy clouds, the units could not conduct visual, that is precision,
bombing, so they dropped their bombs on an urban area set as the secondary target of themission. Many similar cases were seen. For example, the original target of the Ginza air
raid on January 27, 1945, was the Musashi plant. These facts represent the reality of“precision” bombing campaigns11.
The 21st BC changed its policy clearly in late February 1945, and in January 1945,
Hansell was replaced by Curtis LeMay as head of the 21st BC. The headquarters at
Washington hoped that LeMay would make a difference through massive incendiary attacks
on large cities, instead improving “precision” bombing. However, LeMay did not begin thearea bombing operation using incendiaries immediately upon his arrival as the commander.
While he “tested” the incendiary bombing against cities twice, he waited for the number of
B-29s necessary to conduct such an operation to be deployed and readied. On February 25,
his “test” had achieved success with 229 B-29s, so he decided to conduct a full-scale
operation against Tokyo12. Thus, 325 B-29s took off from Mariana Islands toward Tokyo on
the night of March 9, dropping their bombs at midnight from a low altitude (about 9,000ft), and their bodies were made lighter by removing their arms so they could carry more
incendiaries. The extent of the damage caused by this operation has been well documented.
Beginning with the Tokyo air raid, the 21st BC conducted successive operations against
urban areas of large Japanese cities: Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, and again Nagoya. However,the 21st BC involved not only the incendiary campaign, but also some additional
operations. First, the Command engaged in a “tactical” bombing of the Kyushu airfields as
a part of the Okinawa campaign, which began in April 1945 and continued to the middle of
May13. Second, the 313th BW assumed the mining campaign on Japan Sea, Inland Sea, andmore from late March, and it was continued until the war was over. The official history of
the USAAF during the World War II, The Army Air Forces in World War II (hereafter, AAF
in WW II), described that the mining campaign had achieved meaningful results14.
Concerning the incendiary bombings of large cities, the 21st BC targeted the Nagoya
urban area on March 18 and Kawasaki and Tokyo on April 15. After an interval of about amonth, the 21st BC resumed the campaign with raids against Nagoya on May 14 and 17. A
month after that, the incendiary campaign against “large” cities ended with attacks on
Osaka and Amagasaki, flying 511 superforts15. Since then, the 21st BC aimed at middle orsmaller cities populated from 31,350 (Tsuruga) to 323,200 (Fukuoka) with incendiaries
until the war ended16. While attacks against large cities were conducted by almost all forces
available to the Command (300–500 B-29s), middle or smaller cities were bombed by one
bombardment wing (100–180 B-29s). Until the war ended, over 60 cities had been burnedout.
11 Koyama [2018] pp. 29–30.
12 Fujita [2021].
13 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 627–635.
14 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 662–674.
15 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 608–627, 635–644.
16 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 653–658, 674–675.

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In Consideration of Nighttime Precision Bombing by the U.S. during World War II
Despite LeMay’s policy change, precision bombing of war industries, such as aircraft
plants, was not abandoned, and this kind of operation was conducted repeatedly over
several months. For example, the 21st BC engaged in precision bombing operations against
the Musashi plant and Tokyo Army arsenal on August 8, Ogikubo plant of Nakajima andTokyo Army arsenal again on August 10, and Hikari Navy arsenal (Yamaguchi) and Osaka
Army arsenal on August 14. LeMay modified the operational method, such as lowering
bombing altitude and using far heavier bombs to achieve far more meaningful results thanHansell’s operations17.
As stated above, 21st BC involved many kinds of bombing operation since LeMay had
assumed the role of commander. This was possible because personnel and aircrafts were
deployed one after the other to the Mariana Islands, and readied to begin these missions.
The 313th BW, a second unit that arrived at Marianas, began its operation on February 4,1945. In addition, the 314th BW joined the “test” incendiary attack against Tokyo on
February 25, leading to the air raid on March 9 conducted by three BWs. Nighttime
precision bombings with a newly developed radar against oil facilities by the 315th BW
were carried out in the context of building forces and diversifying operations. The next
chapter describes in detail all the operations of the 315th BW based on AAF in WWII, A
Unit History of 315 Bomb Wing: 1944-1946, and the documents of the United States
Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS)18.

2. Missions of the 315th Bombardment Wing
The 315th BW, activated on July 17, 1944, was deployed incrementally from March to
April 1945, having received B-29Bs, a variant of the B-29 dedicated to nighttime
operations and equipped with a new radar device, the AN/APQ-7, to carry out nighttime
precision bombings of oil facilities. The BW consisted of four bombardment groups, the16th, 501st, 331st, and 502nd, in order of deployment at Marianas. The 16th and 501st BGs
conducted their first operations on June 26 and the 331st and 502nd on July 19. It took
about a year from the activation of the BW to the beginning of actual operations, indicatingthat engaging required various preparations, including the deployment of B-29s, theconstruction of bases, and training. These issues will be discussed in another paper.
Table 1 shows all missions by the 315th BW, that is, 15 missions aimed at 9 targets. Totalsorties were about 1,200 and total weight of bombs dropped was 9,084 tons. Bomb weight
per one aircraft was relatively heavy due to using B-29Bs, which were deprived of mostarming to conduct nighttime bombings. Their first mission targeted Utsube River Oil
Refinery (Second Navy Fuel Arsenal, Yokkaichi, Mie), with 35 bombers of the 16th and502nd BGs and dropping 223 tons. The damage of this mission on its own was unclear, but
combined with the damages of mission number 209 on June 17, which attacked Yokkaichi
city, issuing collateral damage to this oil refinery, and mission number 218 on June 22,
which aimed it for a secondary target, the 315th BW’s first mission destroyed 34% of theroof area and rendered 1.6% of the oil capacity (33,870/2,073,080 barrels) unavailable.
This target was bombed on July 9 again, and because of all these missions, half the roof
area was destroyed and 4% of the oil capacity was rendered unavailable (according to
17 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 646–653.
18 The USSBS documents used in this article are mainly Damage Assessment Reports. All have been collectedby the National Diet Library, Japan. Its Digital Collection is made almost entirely available (https://dl.ndl.go.jp/
collections/A00018).

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SATOSHI FUJITA
Table 1. All Missions by the 315th Bombardment Wing
Date of Mission(Mission Number)Primary Target

SortiesNumber of B-29s which
dropped bombs against
primary target

Weight of
Bombs
Dropped (tons)

June 26（232）

Utsube River Oil Refinery(Yokkaichi)

35

33

223

June 29（238）

Nippon Sekiyu Oil Refinery(Kudamatsu)

36

32

209

July 2（245）Maruzen Oil Refinery (Shimotsu)

40

39

297

July 6（255）

Same as above

60

59

442

July 9（261）Same as number 232

64

61

469

July 12（267）

Kawasaki Petroleum Center

62

55

452

July 15（270）Same as number 238

71

61

494

July 19（281）

Nippon Oil Refinery (Amagasaki)

86

85

702

July 22（283）

Ube Coal Liquefaction Co.

82

74

637

July 25（291）

Mitsubishi Oil Refinery and Hayama
Petroleum Company (Kawasaki)

85

77

668

July 28（303）

Shimotsu Oil Refinery

84

78

658

August 1（310）Same as number 267

130

121

1,025

August 5（315）Same as number 283

113

108

938

August 9（322）Same as number 281

109

97

918

143

134

954

August 14（328） Nippon Oil Refinery (Tsuchizaki)

Source: Koyama [2018]. There are some cases in which the number of sorties and the weights of the bombs
dropped differ from those mentioned in the text.

Damage Assessment Report 141, 41.6% of the capacity had been “removed” before theattacks, but in the reports, the amount “removed” was counted as “damage”)19.
The second target was Nippon Sekiyu Oil Refinery (Kudamatsu, Yamaguchi), attacked onJune 29 and July 15, and these missions rendered 60% of the oil capacity (349,000/58,7000
barrels) unavailable20. Then, on July 2 and 6, Maruzen Oil Refinery (Shimotsu, Wakayama)
was attacked by the 315th BW. Like earlier missions, the first of two made a trivial
difference, but the latter destroyed 79% of the roof area. Total tank damages showed that
51.5% was classified as “destroyed” and 37% as “damaged” (total tank capacity was about
a million barrels)21. Curtis LeMay described the latter mission as the most successful radarbombing ever 22, foreshadowing the overall success of nighttime precision bombing
campaigns with the most advanced radar.
19 Damage Assessment Report, no. 141, mission 261 (July 9–10) combined with 209 (June 18), 218 (June 22),and 232 (June 26), July 17, 1945.
20 Damage Assessment Report, no. 179, mission 270 (July 15–16), combined with 238 (June 29), August 15,
1945.
21 Damage Assessment Report, no. 142 mission 245 (July 2) and 255 (July 6), July 21, 1945.
22 Werrell [1996] pp. 199–200.

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In Consideration of Nighttime Precision Bombing by the U.S. during World War II
The next target was Kawasaki Petroleum Center, a complex of Standard Vacuum Oil Co.,
Nippon Oil Co., Mitsui & Co., and Rising Sun Petroleum Co., toward which 60 B-29s flew,
53 of which dropped 452 tons on the primary target. However, this attack destroyed ordamaged only 6% of tank capacity (total 1,334,000 barrels) 23. On July 19, the operation
against Nippon Oil Refinery (Amagasaki) produced “excellent results,” according to a
mission resume 24, and the Amagasaki plant was bombed again on August 9, with theDamage Assessment Report (no. 191) recording the total damage of these missions at about
70% of the original total oil capacity (1,175,400/1,496,700 barrels) 25.
Ube Coal Liquefaction Co., “the largest synthetic oil producer in the Japanese inner zone
outside Manchuria,” was the next target of 80 airborne aircraft, 90% of which dropped 620
tons on the primary target26. Although the results of this mission itself are unclear, the strikeattack report of this operation noted that “excellent results are indicated by scope photos27.”
On August 5, the 315th BW carried out a second raid against Ube plant that resulted in“100% of refinery units and 80% of the stores and workshops damaged or destroyed28.”
According to the Damage Assessment Report (no. 175), the combined results of the 315th
BW’s missions (54.5%) with previous removal (45.5%), the plant became completely
inoperative29.
On July 25, the 315th BW attacked Kawasaki, an operation to which two additionalbomber groups joined. Many targets were bombed, including Mitsubishi Oil Refinery and
Hayama Petroleum Company, toward which 83 B-29s flew, 75 of which dropped 650 tons
on the primary targets30. In addition, on August 1, Kawasaki Petroleum Center was bombedagain with 1,017 tons by 120 B-29s (of 128 airborne). According to the damage assessment
reports, the combined results of these missions are as follows: 537,400 barrels, 38% of
Mitsubishi’s original capacity (1,404,400 barrels) was damaged or destroyed; 334,000
barrels of 761,600 barrels at Hayama plant was rendered unavailable; and half of Kawasaki
Petroleum Center’s tank capacity, all combined with the damage by the mission in midJuly31. Between bombings of Kawasaki, on July 28, the 315th BW attacked Shimotsu Oil
Refinery (different from Maruzen Oil Refinery) and damaged and destroyed 75% of thetotal capacity (927,300/1,246,000 barrels)32.
The last target of the 315th BW was Nippon Oil Refinery, located in Tsuchizaki, Akita
prefecture. This mission was the “longest and largest raid of the war” by 315th 33,
considered generally successful, as 70% of the original capacity was destroyed anddamaged, and “[t]he buildings of the refinery were 98% affected, 87% destroyed and 11%
23 Damage Assessment Report, no. 157, mission 267 (July 12–13), August 3, 1945.
24 Mission Resume for mission 251 (July 19–20). The damage assessment report for this mission recorded thedamage of the attack as 39% of tank capacity (587,300/1,496700 barrels). The history of the 315th BW, however,notes, “Post-mission photo-reconnaissance showed the wing mission on Amagasaki had mixed results.” Swann[1986] p. 102.
25 Damage Assessment Report, no. 191, mission 322 (August 9–10), August 21, 1945.
26 Target Information Sheet, Ube Coal Liquefaction Company, July 20, 1945.
27 Strike Attack Report, no. 130, mission 283 (July 22–23), July 27, 1945.
28 Mission Resume for mission 251 (August 5–6). This attack also damaged or destroyed half of the Ube Iron
Works Co.
29 Damage Assessment Report, no. 175, missions 270 (July 15–16), 283 (July 22–23), and 315 (August 5–6),
August 14, 1945.
30 Mission Resume for mission 291 (July 25–26), August 3, 1945.
31 Damage Assessment Report, no. 173, missions 291 (July 25–26) and 310 (August 1–2), August 10, 1945;
Damage Assessment Report, no. 184, mission 310, August 18, 1945.
32 Damage Assessment Report, no. 172, mission 303 (July 28–29), August 12, 1945.
33 Swann [1986] p. 113.

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SATOSHI FUJITA
gutted and seriously damaged34.” On the same day, when the Japanese government decided
to surrender, the 20th AF carried out full-fledged attacks on various targets with over 800
B-29s. The commanding general of the USAAF, Henry Arnold, hoped “as big a finale apossible” against Tokyo; he planned to call on the Eighth Air Force, a part of which had
been transferred to Okinawa from Europe35. However, his subordinate, Carl Spaatz, argued
that Tokyo was not appropriate for such an operation and proposed to attack various targets,
which Arnold accepted36. As such, the 315th BW completed their mission as usual.
Concerning the achievement of 315th BW, AAF in WW II concluded:
On the whole, the experiment was markedly successful. The formations were able toattack the primary target on every mission, and while the results varied they weregenerally good… USSBS statisticians calculated that 315th Wing bombardiers had
achieved an accuracy rate of 13.5 per cent, as compared with 5.4 per cent achieved,
under more difficult tactical conditions, with the Eagle [AN/APQ-7] radar in Europe37.
Moreover, as with the accuracy of the campaign with the AN/APQ-7, military historian
Kenneth P. Werrell states, “Eagle demonstrated accuracy approximating that of visual
bombing, and on occasion exceeding it38.” The accuracy of the 315th BW’s missions
depended on many factors, so it should not be attributed only to the performance of the
EAGLE radar39. However, LeMay was overly impressed by the achievement of the unit, so
he planned to change the targets of the 315th from oil to nitrogen plants and bridges and to
install the EAGLE radar in the B-29s of the other wings40.

3. Some issues of nighttime precision bombing
In this chapter, the author describes three issues of nighttime precision bombing, the first ofwhich is the USAAF’s strategic bombing doctrine. Second, it is important to identify how
this kind of campaign was made possible and, third, why oil-related facilities were targeted.
3-1. Strategic Bombing Doctrine of the USAAF
The purposes of strategic bombing are, as noted in Chapter 1, destruction of the enemy’s
war capacity by attacking directly the political and industrial core and by demoralizing the
population through targeting non-combatants. Then, precision bombing and area bombing
were assumed as means to accomplish these ends. Precision bombing literally means
dropping bombs on a target, such as a war plant, “precisely,” whereas with area bombing,bombers attack the surrounding “area” of a target. Because the method also hurts thecivilian of the area attacked, it is used to target non-combatants directly.
34 Damage Assessment Report, no. 205, mission 328 (August 14–15), September 10, 1945.
35 Maurer [1983b] p. 463.
36 Craven and Cate [1983b] p. 732.
37 Craven and Cate [1983b] p. 661.
38 Werrell [1996] p. 200.
39 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Oil and Chemical Division, Oil in Japan’s War, pp. 121–123,

National Diet Library Digital Collection. This report lists factors that led to differences in accuracy between theEuropean and Pacific theaters (315th missions), including bombing altitude, opposition violence, and bomb size.
In the European theater, altitude was higher, opposition was more violent, and bombs were lighter than in the
Pacific.
40 Werrell [1996] p. 200.

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In Consideration of Nighttime Precision Bombing by the U.S. during World War II
Within the US Army, the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), which was originallyestablished as the Air Service Tactical School in 1920, studied the doctrine of strategic
bombing. This group was called the “Bomber Mafia,” one of whom was Haywood Hansell.
They established precision bombing as their doctrine, as well as put forth the “Industrial
Web Theory,” which assumes that the various parts of a modern city are connected to andinteract with each other complicatedly like a “web.” Therefore, they considered thedestruction of one important part of a city enough to spread the effect throughout, and they
thought it was technically possible to bomb precisely thanks to the new availability of
B-17, the then-newest long-range bomber, and the Norden bombsight by the middle of the
1930s41.
Moreover, the international law and the moral of a bombing from the air was took into
consideration. In an interwar period, although any treaty that prohibits the bombing ofcivilian was not realized, major powers discussed whether or not it was justified, resulting
in Hague Rules of Air Warfare (1923) that stipulates that “Aerial bombardment for the
purpose of terrorizing the civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property
not of military character, or of injuring non-combatants is prohibited42.” As Arai Shin’ichi
suggests, this Rules functioned as the guides for air warfare of many states43. In particular,
the US government disliked the bombing of civilian from moral perspective. Henry L.
Stimson, then-secretary of state, strongly condemned Japan for bombing of urban arears ofChinchow and Shanghai during the Manchurian Incident, and the President Frankin D.
Roosevelt, in 1939, demanded the belligerent nations not to “undertake the bombardmentfrom the air of civilian populations of unfortified cities…44” Against this backdrop, theACTS developed precision bombing doctrine45.
In a sense, World War II was a spectacular testing site for demonstrating that the strategic
bombing doctrine of the USAAF would work well. Then, both in Europe and the AsiaPacific theater, it became apparent that the doctrine was only theoretical and ideal.
Although the USAAF engaged strategic bombing operations with the Royal Air Force(RAF) in Europe, US precision bombing, that is, daytime visual bombing from a highaltitude, was not only safe but also precise. The RAF, which was involved in strategic
bombing against Nazi Germany from an earlier stage of the war, had already changed thepolicy from precision to nighttime area bombing using a radar46. The USAAF, however,
was adamant that its original method was superior. However, in the daytime, bombers weresusceptible to enemy intercepts, and from a high altitude, crews could not drop bombs ontargets precisely. Although the USAAF continued precision bombing only officially, it
launched de facto area bombing with an attack against Münster in October 1943—thisresulted in the Dresden bombing in February 194547.
Daytime visual bombing from a high altitude, which had not worked in Europe, wasapplied in the war against Japan for certain reasons. First, the headquarters in Washington
set the Japanese aircraft industry as one of the primary targets. Second, the commander of
41 Biddle [2002]; Crane [2016] pp. 14–30; Morris [2017] pp. 112–197.
42 Henke [1993] p. 17.
43 Arai [2008] pp. 73–79.
44 Nakazawa [2014] pp. 81–96; Bennett [2019] p. 22.
45 In addition, economic constraints within the Army Air Corps made precision bombing doctrine desirable.

Biddle [2002] p. 183; Crane [2016] pp. 21–22.
46 Schaffer [1985] p. 35; Webster and Frankland [2006: 1961] pp. 381–417.
47 A military historian Ronald Schaffer detailed that the USAAF’s bombing policy had changed from precision
to area bombing in the European theater. He pointed out that moral consideration had little impact on the process.
Although the USAAF conducted de-facto area bombing, it did not carry out nighttime bombing in Europe.
Schaffer [1985].

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SATOSHI FUJITA
the 21st BC was Haywood Hansell, who had been one of the Bomber Mafia and was anadherent of the doctrine. Third, B-29s were not deployed in the field enough to carry out
area bombings successfully against a city on a broad scale48. In any case, as mentioned
above, Hansell could not garner an achievement with precision bombing and so was
replaced by LeMay as the commander. While he engaged in an area bombing campaign
with incendiaries, LeMay continued precision bombing missions to bring successful results
gradually. Even he, however, could not succeed with nighttime precision bombings49.
By placing in this context nighttime precision bombing with a radar by the 315th BW, its
historical significance becomes clear. That is, it can be said that a series of missions by the
BW is the best example that the latest technologies overcame various difficulties involved
in daytime visual (precision) bombing. These missions had a minor impact on the result of
the war because they were carried out in the final stage of the conflict, and they were aimed
at oil-related facilities, which had not been considered essential targets, as will be detailed
later50. However, this example demonstrates that science and technology are crucial factors
in modern war in that they can make possible operations previously viewed as impossible.
If the war had not ended in August 1945, the USAAF might have returned to its doctrine
and produced results with minimum civilian losses. In other words, if nighttime precisionbombing had been feasible earlier, the USAAF would not have changed its policy to area
bombing with incendiaries. In this sense, this case shows that science and technology havea considerable impact on methods of conducting a war. It will be discussed how the successof the missions by the 315th BW influenced the US’s later methods of engaging in war51.
3-2. What made nighttime precision bombing possible
In the previous section, the author notes that science and technology had overcome the
obstacles involved in daytime visual bombing, a process that can be summarized asfollows: the Radiation Laboratory established at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
succeeded in developing the AN/APQ-7 (EAGLE) radar, which had a higher resolution
than the existing radar system, the AN/APQ-13; Western Electric received an order for themass production of the EAGLE; it was decided that the B-29B, a variant of the B-29 fornighttime operations, would be equipped with the EAGLE; Bell Aircraft was asked to
produce all B-29Bs, and 653 B-29s were manufactured by September 1945, 311 of whichwere B-29Bs 52. This meant that nighttime precision bombing could be achieved bymobilizing not only science and technology but also the industrial capabilities that couldmass-produce these radars and the bombers equipped with them. Although it is importantthat scientific, technological, and industrial bases could influence the way a war is fought,
this aspect will be examined in other articles. Here, this paper summarizes the facts
48 Fujita [2021].
49 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 546–576, 646–653; United States Air Force [1953] pp. 169–172. A historian

John W. Dower said that the news of repeated bombings against cities and massive destruction and Japanese
victims numbed the sensibilities of public and media. For example, on May 30, 1945, the New York Times
reported the 6 bombings on Tokyo caused the deaths of a million, or perhaps 2 million of Japanese. Dower points
out that despite the highly exaggerated numbers, neither the quality paper which reported it nor the American
public who read it had any doubts. Dower [2010] pp. 183–184.
50 A USSBS’s report concluded that “[t]he contribution of the bombing offensive against oil to the Japanese
defeat was therefore negligible. The war had already been won by the blockade.” USSBS, Oil in Japan’s War. p.
65.
51 In the Korean War, the U.S. Air Force tried nighttime operations, including precision bombing with shortrange navigation (SHORAN) radar. USAF [1953] pp. 197–211.
52 The number of B-29Bs produced by Bell was determined from the following websites, Aircraft Serial
Number Search (http://users.rcn.com/jeremy.k/serialSearch.html) and USASC-USAAS-USAAC-USAAF-USAF
Military Aircraft Serial Numbers--1908 to Present (https://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_serials/usafserials.html).

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In Consideration of Nighttime Precision Bombing by the U.S. during World War II
concerning the development of the radar and the production of B-29Bs.
To begin with the development of EAGLE, recommended by Vannevar Bush, who wasthen-president of the Carnegie Institution in Washington, D.C., President Roosevelt
established the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) in June 1940 and the Officeof Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) in June 1941 to mobilize scientists andengineers in preparation for war. The role of both institutions was not research anddevelopment, instead enabling studies by personnel and research institutions for certain
research and issuing contracts for such53. The OSRD’s funding amounted to half a billion
dollars by the end of the war54. It was the NDRC that recommended the establishment of alaboratory to research primarily microwaves, that is, radar, at the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology (MIT), eventually becoming the Radiation Laboratory (Rad Lab). In sum, theOSRD funded 114 million dollars to MIT, which was made the biggest contractor of theOSRD55.
EAGLE was developed at Rad Lab, after which flight experiments were successfullycompleted in May 1944. Western Electric initially received an order for 612 EAGLEs, but
it eventually took on the responsibility to produce 1,660. This, however, did not proceedsmoothly. The idea of a higher-resolution radar with high-frequency microwaves had been
embraced as early as November 1941, meaning it took about 2 and a half years to complete
the flight experiments. One reason for such a long time needed was that because thefeasibility of the EAGLE was considered questionable within Rad Lab, it was notnecessarily highly prioritized. Although MIT and Rad Lab were abundant funding,economic and human resources were naturally so limited that Rad Lab had to set priorities
based on the importance and feasibility of each development. The relatively low priority of
EAGLE inevitably led to the delay of the research and development of the equipment andthe achievement of more precise bombing operations56. To make clearer the picture ofnighttime precision radar bombing, it is necessary to place in this context the overall policy
and direction of Rad Lab or the OSRD, but this point will be examined in other articles.
Concerning the production of B-29B, as previously noted, it was B-29B, a variant of the
B-29, that was equipped with an EAGLE, and Bell undertook the production of them all.
Originally, it was Boeing that developed and manufactured B-29s, so why did Bell sign acontract to produce them? As it happened, not only B-29s, but also many goods saw theirproduction charged to companies under license contracts other than those that developed
them. In the case of B-29s, Boeing produced them at the Wichita second plant in Kansas
and the Renton factory in Washington. In addition, government-owned factories wereconstructed at Omaha, Nebraska, and Marietta, Georgia, where Glen L. Martin Company
would operate the former and Bell the latter. It was called government-owned, contractoroperated (GOCO) when private companies operated plants funded federally57. Thus, theproduction of B-29s and B-29Bs had to be placed in the context of U.S. industrial
mobilization.
Since the author has few primary documents to clarify why Bell was charged to produce
53 Stewart [1948] pp. 7–51.
54 Larry Owens notes that the OSRD issued almost 2,300 contracts with 321 industrial institutions and 142

academic and other non-profit institutions. Owens [1994] pp. 526, 565–576.
55 Owens [1994] p. 565.
56 Brown [1999] 192–193; Office of Scientific Research and Development, National Defense ResearchCommittee, Division 14, Radar: Summary Report and Harp Project, vol. 1 of Summary Technical Report ofDivision 14, NDRC, pp. 75–77 (Downloaded from the Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/
item/2015490937/ [Last access, March 15, 2024]).
57 For GOCO, see Wilson [2016] pp. 62–83.

55

SATOSHI FUJITA
B-29Bs, this paper describes how Bell came to produce B-29Bs and the pace at which they
were manufactured. In January 1940, the U.S. Army Air Corps envisaged a Very Heavy
Bomber (VHB) having a higher performance than the existing Heavy Bombers, such as the
B-17 (Boeing) and B-24 (Consolidated Aircraft Corporation). The USAAF signed acontract with Boeing for prototype aircrafts in September, but concerned with the speed ofcompletion, the USAAF reached agreement with the company for the construction of the
Wichita second plant in June 1941 before prototype flying, and in July, it ordered 1,050
B-29s. Martin and Bell was also asked to build the B-29s 58. In December 1941, theconstruction of a new factory at Marietta was planned, and then in May 1942, it was
decided formally that Bell would operate the plant. Due to the delay in the completion of
the new plant and the lack of manpower, it was as late as November 1943 when Bellproduced their first B-2959; eventually, the Marietta plant would deliver 205 B-29s by theend of 1944, all of which were ordinary B-29s.
As late as around October 1944, the USAAF considered the production of B-29Bs and
B-29Bs equipped with EAGLE60, and in November, it was decided to organize a unit of
EAGLE-equipped B-29Bs. Then, in December, the 315th BW was notified that the special
unit would be their own61, and the first B-29Bs by Bell–Marietta were delivered to the315th BW in February or March 194562. Further, the 16th BG, one unit of the 315th BW,
received an almost authorized force (45 B-29s) by May, and on June 26, the 315th BW
began its first mission. Therefore, it was impossible for the 315th BW, dedicated tonighttime radar precision bombing, to be ready begin start their operations without theeffort of Bell in mass-producing B-29Bs, totaling over 300. However, questions remain:
why was Bell asked to manufacture B-29Bs, what challenges did Bell face with the change
in specifications, and what was the position on B-29B production in the overall B-29
production plan? These are future issues.
3-3. Why were oil-related facilities targeted?
That nighttime radar precision bombing became possible with technological and industrial
bases is a completely different issue from the fact that oil-related facilities were targeted
for operations. In this section, the author explains the reasons for the latter.
The Army Air Corps had adopted precision bombing as its strategic bombing doctrine,
based on which the USAAF identified power plants and oil facilities as important targets inthe European theater. However, the USAAF did not consider oil plants essential to thebombing campaign in the war against Japan. Thus, in November 1943, a report of theCommittee of Operation Analysts (COA)63 listed merchant shipping, steel production, theantifriction bearings industry, urban industrial areas, aircraft plants, and the electronics
industry as strategic targets to be prioritized. The following October, another report of thecommittee set the aircraft industry, urban industrial areas, and shipping (“by all available
means, including mining”) in order of priority64, but neither mentioned oil-related facilities.
58 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 6–7.
59 Muelen [1995] p. 54.
60 Lauris Norstad to Curtis LeMay, October 5, 1944, 20th Air Force-Official File (2), Pentagon Series, Project

Subseries, Box 27, Lauris Norstad Papers, 1930–1987, National Diet Library, Japan.
61 Swann [1986] p. 27.
62 Swann [1986] p. 40; Mann [2004] p. 30.
63 COA was created by the directive of Henry Arnold in late 1942 to discuss and recommend bombing target
and analyze “the rate of progressive deterioration that should be anticipated in the German war effort as a resultof the increasing air operations.” Craven and Cate [1983a:1949] pp. 349, 353–354.
64 Craven and Cate [1983b] p. 552.

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In Consideration of Nighttime Precision Bombing by the U.S. during World War II
This is because a blockade or attack on oil tankers directly was more efficient thanbombing inland oil plants, at least concerning the Japanese oil industry. In fact, Japaneseoil production capacity was already reduced by these operations by the time the 21st BC
undertook its operations. Nevertheless, oil-related plants were attacked from June 1945, but
why? To answer this question, AAF in WWII explains:
By April, however, AAF intelligence had come to the opinion that the petroleum
industry in Japan was in so critical a state that the destruction of facilities and stores
would react immediately upon the tactical situation. Consequently, LeMay and Lt. Gen.
Barney M. Giles, who came to Guam as the deputy commander of the Twentieth Air
Force, eventually decided that during its combat-testing period the 315th Wing would
devote its efforts exclusively to oil targets. This decision had the enthusiastic
indorsement of Gen. Carl Spaatz, slated to command all B-29’s under USASTAF [U.S.
Army Strategic Air Force], who had been an ardent advocate of the oil campaign in the
ETO [European Theater of Operations] 65.
The argument that the destruction of oil plants had become “critical” is unsound because
they were bombed sporadically by then, and the Japanese oil production capacity further
worsened due to other operations, such as blockades and mining around the Japanesewaters 66. Two reasons can be offered for why oil facilities emerged as the target ofnighttime precision bombing with EAGLE.
First, there remained few targets that the 21st BC could attack, as the top-priority target,
the aircraft industry, was near utter destruction due to the ongoing efforts of precisionbombing under LeMay’s command. For example, because of missions toward the
Mitsubishi Heavy Industry Nagoya Engine factory and Musashi plant of Nakajima on April
7, as well as Musashi again on April 12, the Musashi plant’s operations came to a halt 67.
Then, on July 24, the final precision bombing of aircraft factories was carried out when 625
B-29s destroyed seven targets. LeMay had modified his tactics, such as using 2,000-poundbombs and lowering the bombing altitude to ensure a precise result. Thus, missions against
the aircraft industry by the newly arrived 315th BW would have a negligible effect.
Besides, by June 1945, the targets of nighttime area bombing shifted from larger cities to
middle and smaller cities, and it was decided at the end of 1944 that B-29Bs equipped with
the EAGLE would be deployed to the 315th BW. In contrast to precision bombing, area
bombing did not necessitate precision attack, and this is because area bombing could be
carried out in nighttime with an existing radar. Therefore, it must be nonsense that an
EAGLE-equipped unit would carry out such missions. Over 60 Japanese cities were leveledby area bombing campaigns, despite a study of new targets in June 1945 listed only 25
cities. In retrospect, the destruction of over 60 cities can be judged excessive. The
incremental build-up of the 21st BC led to the excessiveness. Sorties of the 21st BC permonth had risen steadily, along with the number of B-29s deployed to Marianas (Figure 1).
If the 315th BW had joined the campaign against middle or smaller cities, only some lesssignificant cities would have been added to the list of cities destroyed. In sum, it would
have been unnecessary for the 315th BW to attack existing targets with other units.

65 Craven and Cate [1983b] p. 660.
66 USSBS, Oil in Japan’s War, pp. 45-66.
67 Craven and Cate [1983b] pp. 647–648.

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SATOSHI FUJITA
Figure 1. Sorties per Month and B-29s Deployed to 20th AF

Source: Koyama [2018] and the Office of Statistical Control [1945].

Therefore, another target system for the 315th BW was needed, but oil plants showed
little reason to be attacked. Nevertheless, they were chosen as targets for the unit because
they were considered best for the “test” of the newly developed radar set, which is thesecond reason oil plants were selected. Furthering this point, an official history of the 315th
notes, “Japan’s oil refineries provided ideal test targets because they were relatively
undamaged, well-defined, and located near the coastline,” so bombardiers could easily
identify their targets with EAGLE 68. Werrell suggests that if the war had not ended inAugust, the 315th BW, which completed the test successfully, would have conductedmissions to more significant inland targets, including bridges69. Indeed, the USAAF set
railroads and stations as primary targets in the final days of the war, and on August 14, thelast day of the war, the 21st BC bombed the Marifu railroad yards (Iwakuni station) in
Yamaguchi with 115 B-29s, a mission that implies a gradual shift in priority from urban
areas to transportation systems.
There were other cases in which modern technologies or embraced tactics were “tested”
in battlefields. For example, the firebombing against Tokyo on February 25, 1945, wascarried out as test of area bombing with incendiaries, and the success of this test led to the
March 9–10 air raid. (Other tests were conducted on Nagoya on January 3 and Kobe on
February 4, but they were judged as failures.) More explicit instances include the atomic
bombings. Where and how the atomic bombs would be used was discussed from April
1945. Further, it was decided in an earlier phase that the bombs would be used against
cities of a certain size. When desirable cities were selected, the condition was that any
68 Swann [1986] p. 123; Werrell [1996] p. 199.
69 Werrell [1996] p. 199; Swann [1986] p. 122.

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In Consideration of Nighttime Precision Bombing by the U.S. during World War II
target city should face minor damage from strategic bombing by the time of the atomic
bombings, so the suffering from the nuclear attacks could be examined. Because this would
be impossible if target cities were leveled, strategic bombing missions were prohibitedagainst cities listed for the A-bomb, including Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Kokura. These facts
suggest that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not the most important strategic targets for
destruction as early as possible, which was the case with petroleum facilities.

Conclusion
This article summarizes the nighttime precision bombing campaign using the new radar by
the 315th BW, which demonstrates its historical significance and suggests the challenges topainting a clearer overall picture. Although this campaign had a negligible impact on theconsequences of World War II, it is of great historical significance in that the industrial,
scientific, and technological mobilization enabled the realization of missions previously
considered impossible. The way of engaging in war itself depended on the wartime
mobilization of industry, science, and technology, and importantly, the timing of themissions and their feasibility depended on the priorities in research and development andthe pace of weapons and equipment production. If the USAAF had achieved precisionbombing earlier, would it have carried out an area bombing campaign on such a scale?
To clarify the overall picture of the nighttime precision bombing campaign with radar, thefollowing problems must be addressed. The first is how industrial, scientific, andtechnological bases were established to make possible such a campaign. Rad Lab at MIT
developed EAGLE, so the history of its development should be clarified by placing it in thecontext in which the Rad Lab was set up and the overall research trends at the time. In
addition, Bell assumed the production of B-29Bs equipped with EAGLE, so it must be
explained how and why the AAF contracted with Bell. In doing so, the contract should beplaced in the overall picture of the development and production of B-29s. Second, it must
be understood in detail why petroleum facilities were chosen as the targets of EAGLE
missions. As already mentioned, the choice of oil facilities strongly implies that themissions had an experimental aspect, which seems to reflect how the U.S. military engagedin war. Therefore, it can be said that a clearer understanding of the precision bombing
campaign with EAGLE would shed light on how the war was fought by the U.S. military.

59

SATOSHI FUJITA
References
Arai, Shin’ichi [2008] History of the Bombing from Air (Kubaku no Rekishi), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Bennett, John [2019] “Reaping the Whirlwind: The Norm of Reciprocity and the Law of Aerial
Bombardment during World War II,” Melbourne Journal of International Law, vol. 20.
Biddle, Tami Davis [2002] Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American
Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Brown, Louis [1999] Technical and Military Imperatives: A Radar History of World War II, New York:
Taylor & Francis.
Crane, Conrad C. [2016] American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil,
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate [1983a:1949] eds., Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942
to December 1943, vol 2 of The Army Air Forces in World War II, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air ForceHistory.
Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate [1983b:1955] eds., The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June
1944-August 1945, vol 5 of The Army Air Forces in World War II, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air ForceHistory.
Craven, Wesley Frank, and James Lea Cate [1983c:1955] eds., Men and Planes, vol 6 of The Army Air
Forces in World War II, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History.
Dower, John W. [2010] Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, Iraq, New York: W. W. Norton.
Fujita, Satoshi [2021] “The Interaction Between Wartime Economy and Military Strategy: The Shift toArea Bombing in the Strategic Bombing Campaign against Japanese Homeland,” The Journal of
American Economic History (Amerika Keizaishi Kenkyu), no. 20.
Grayling, A. C. [2006] Among the Dead Cities: Was the Allied Bombing of Civilians in WWII a Necessity
or a Crime? London: Bloomsbury.
Haun, Phil [2019] ed., Lectures of the Air Corps Tactical School and American Strategic Bombing in WorldWar II, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
Henke, Heinz Marcus [1993] “The 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare: A Contribution to the developmentof International Law Protecting Civilians from Air Attack,” International Review of Red Cross, No. 292.
Ikui, Eiko [2018: 2006] Empire of the Air: America in the 20th Century (Sora no Teikoku: America no
20-seiki) Tokyo: Kodansya.
Kennedy, Paul [2013] Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second
World War, New York: Random House.
Koyama, Hitoshi [2018] Summary of XXI Bomcom Missions, Resume 20th Air Force Missions (Nihon
Kusyu no Zenyo), new edition, Osaka: Toho Syuppan.
Mann, Robert A. [2004] The B-29 Superfortress: A Comprehensive Registry of the Planes and Their
Missions, London: MacFarland & Co.
Maurer, Maurer [1983: 1961] ed., Air Force Combat Units of World War II, Washington, D.C.: Office of
Air Force History.
Meulen, Jacob Vander [1995] Building the B-29, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Morris, Craig F. [2017] The Origins of American Strategic Bombing Theory, Annapolis: Naval InstitutePress.
Nakazawa, Shiho [2014] Henry Stimson and “American Century,” (Henry Stimson to “America no Seiki”)
Tokyo: Kokusho Kanko-kai.
Office of Statistical Control [1945] Army Air Forces Statistical Digest: World War II.
Owens, Larry [1994] “Counterproductive Management of Science in the Second World War: Vannevar
Bush and the Office of Scientific Research and Development,” The Business History Review, vol. 68, no.
4.
Rogers, James Patton [2023] Precision: A History of American Warfare, Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
Schaffer, Ronald [1985] Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II, New York: Oxford
University Press.
Swan, Ralph L. [1986] A Unit History of the 315th Bomb Wing, 1944–1946, Air Command and Staff
College, Air University.
United States Air Force [1953] Development of Night Air Operations, 1941–1952: U.S. Air ForceHistorical Study, No. 92, USAF Historical Division, Air University.
Webster, Sir Charles, and Frankland Noble [2006:1961] eds., The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany,
vol. 1, Preparation, Uckfield, East Sussex: The Naval& Military Press.

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Werrell, Kenneth P. [1996] Blankets of Fire: US Bombers over Japan during World War II, Washington,
D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press.
[This work was supported by JSPS Kaken Grant Number 21K13131. I appreciate anonymous reviewers fortheir valuable comments.]

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History of Global Arms Transfer, 18 (2024), pp. 63-78

Brain Drain from India to the U.S. during
the Cold War:
Focus on Technology Transfer and theDevelopment of Highly Skilled Talent
By HIDEYUKI SHIMOTOMAI*
What led India to produce highly skilled people during the Cold War? Why didsome “brain drain” into the United States? During the Cold War, private
foundations and universities worked with the U.S. government to develop asystematic technical assistance policy based on industry-academia-government
cooperation. The diplomatic intention was also to bring India, which had
maintained non-aligned neutrality, into the Western camp. U.S. technicalassistance led to the establishment of the Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur,
the “MIT of India,” and the training of Indian scientific and technical personnel
proceeded smoothly. However, India did not have the industrial infrastructure toabsorb such highly skilled talent. On the other hand, the United States has faced aserious shortage of human resources in critical fields that are crucial to national
defense. As competition with the Soviet Union intensified during the Cold War, it
became critical to attract young scientists and engineers from home and abroad
became critical. The imbalance in the supply and demand of high-level humanresources between the U.S. and India, along with changes in U.S. immigration
policy, has resulted in the incorporation of many highly skilled Indian talents into
the U.S. scientific and technological community.

Introduction
The presence of Indian immigrants in the modern U.S. economy is large. Especially inhigh-tech sectors such as Information Technology (IT), Asian immigrants are remarkably
active, and many Indian engineers work for GAFAM (Google, Amazon, Facebook (nowMeta), Apple, and Microsoft), big tech companies that are taking the world by storm. They
are highly skilled, specialized, well-educated, and well-paid, leading to the name “model
minority.” In the past, there was a one-way brain drain from India to the United States. In
recent years, however, there has been a growing trend of “brain circulation,” where
outgoing brains return to India and generate profits for the Indian economy, and “brain
retention,” where the brain stays in the country as the Indian economy develops. Thus, the“brains” from India that have driven the U.S. economy are no longer easy to secure. Given
the global talent competition, there is great research interest in whether the United States* Senior Assistant Professor, School of Political Science and Economics, Meiji University

63

HIDEYUKI SHIMOTOMAI
will continue to attract highly skilled talent from abroad.1
Why has the number of highly skilled immigrants from India increased? One of thereasons for India’s emergence as a repository of highly skilled human resources was theinfluence of development and technical assistance from Western countries on developing
countries. During the Cold War, the United States positioned South Asia as a bulwark of
democracy. India, in particular, has gained strategic importance, partly because of the
expectation that it would become the world’s largest democracy. With the establishment of
the People’s Republic of China and the outbreak of the Korean War, strengthening
economic ties through economic aid and technology transfers to India became an important
diplomatic issue in halting the expansion of the communist bloc. Technical assistance,
mainly through the exchange of people and technology, was seen as a cheap and effective
way to create an environment in which private capital could enter the country. The amountof aid to India increased from $89.8 million in 1958 during the late Eisenhoweradministration to $194.6 million in 1960 and to $465.5 million in 1962 during the Kennedy
administration.2 Large private foundations, multinational corporations, and universities
cooperated with the U.S. government to develop a systematic technical assistance policy.
Ramnath was positive about the influence of Western technical assistance, arguing that thetraining of Indians in American companies and the training of engineers in India byWestern experts as career engineers in companies supported the “birth of the profession inIndia.”3 Kumar emphasized the great influence of the soft power of the giant American
foundations that played a role in introducing the U.S. education system in India, which
replaced the British system after World War 2.4 Western governments were involved in theestablishment of the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) to increase their influence, andthe United States supported the establishment of IIT Kanpur to create the “Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) of India,” envisioned by President Nehru. It was a national
project under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, with the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) playing a central role in providing support. Thus, with the support
of western countries, numerous IITs and other institutions of higher learning for highly
skilled personnel have been established. Western-style systems of education and research,
as well as advanced science and technology, have been introduced in India. However, India
lacked the industrial infrastructure to absorb these highly skilled human resources, andsome opted for a brain drain, seeking to use their skills and careers in the U.S.
U.S. immigration policy provided the institutional basis for the absorption of these“brains.” When the Immigration Act of 1965 opened the way for permanent residences in
the United States, many Indian scientists and engineers, including IIT graduates, wereabsorbed into the American scientific and technological community.5 Thus, there was ademand on the U.S. side that controlled the brain drain, including a favorable research
environment and high wages in the United States, changes in immigration policy, anddeclining birth rates.6
However, brain drain from the Third World has rarely been discussed regarding new
immigrants in the study of immigration history. 7 According to immigration historian
1 Widener [2019] pp 35–40.
2 Merrill [1990] pp. 3-5.
3 Ramnath [2017].
4 Kumal [2019].
5 Bassett [2009] pp. 803-804.
6 Sukhatme [1994] pp. 48-52.
7 Suga mentioned the impact of brain drain in analyzing the congressional debate on immigration reform, butthere are few such studies. Suga [2002] pp. 274-275.

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Brain Drain from India to the U.S. during the Cold War
Zolberg, lawmakers did not anticipate that the influx of Asians would be so large and that
non-Europeans would become so dominant and a majority. 8 According to Economist
Timothy J. Hatton, the elimination of the country-of-origin quota system by the 1965
Immigration Act, the use of quota caps, an increase in the number of immediate relatives
through family-based petitions, and an increase in the number of refugees and illegal
immigrants were unexpected. 9 The increase in Asian and Mexican immigration anddemographic changes was not anticipated by Congress at that time.
However, given the state of U.S. science and technology at the time, there is no
coincidence that the United States revised its immigration policy in 1965 to increase thepriority quota for highly skilled personnel. In “Science-The Endless Frontier,” VannevarBush, director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development and a professor at
MIT, warned that the United States would enter the postwar period with a serious shortageof trained scientists.10 A decisive blow came in 1957 with the Sputnik Shock. Once theUnited States fell behind the Soviet Union in terms of science and technology, the trainingof scientists and engineers became a national project. To establish U.S. dominance inscience and technology, the budget for the development of science and technology related
to national defense was significantly increased, beginning with the passage of the National
Defense Education Act in 1958. The recruitment of young scientists and engineers, both athome and abroad, became a critical issue in the United States to survive the competition
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
This paper highlights the critical importance of the U.S. brain drain from India in the
supply and demand of scientists and engineers in the United States and abroad in the 1950s
and the 1960s. This paper specifically focuses on IIT graduates from India, which has
produced a large number of scientists and engineers. In doing so, it illustrates the impact of
the brain drain from India to the United States and the steady supply of highly skilled
immigrants from Asia in the U.S. economy.

1. The Cold War and the U.S. manpower situation
How did the U.S. deal with the shortage of scientific personnel during the Cold War?
Before entering this discussion, it is important to understand that the shortage of humanresources in science and technology became a national issue during World War II and thatmeasures to address this issue have been sought ever since. As scientific expertise andtechnological innovation have become more closely linked to national security, there has
been growing interest in improving science education in the United States. In response to
the shortage of engineers, chemists, physicists, and production supervisors during WorldWar II, the development and training of students for national defense became an urgent
issue. In 1940, the “Engineering Defense Training” program was launched. In 1942, it was
expanded into the Engineering, Science, Management War Training (ESMWT) program
under the supervision of the U.S. Department of Education. Union College faculty andconsultants from General Electric created a variety of courses to meet the needs of wartime
production, including drafting, tool design, and radio communication. More than 1.5
million men and women took courses in the program from 1940 to 1945 to prepare for
8 Zolberg [2008] pp. 337-338.
9 Hatton [2015].
10 Bush [1945].

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HIDEYUKI SHIMOTOMAI
scientific and technical work in war-related industries.11 The Department of Education
invested $60 million in this program to expand the armed forces and provide vocational
and technical education.
Vannevar Bush, who had emphasized the importance of federal support for scientificresearch since World War II, proposed to President Roosevelt at the end of the war thedevelopment of a scientific and technological workforce and a new vision for a federalscientific organization to maintain U.S. scientific superiority. This led to the establishmentof the National Science Foundation (hereafter NSF) in 1950. The U.S. scientific andtechnological community has been clamoring since the war for public funding to strengthen
basic research, create scientific knowledge, and nurture talented young scientists. The
postwar U.S. economy saw a significant increase in science and engineering employment,
reflecting advances in electronics, jet aircraft, space technology, guided missiles, andcommunications, as well as a growing demand for engineers and skilled workers in thesefields. Nevertheless, the education and training of domestic scientists and engineers havebeen lagging. The 1952 NSF Annual Report contains the opinions of representatives of 16
major industries employing scientific and engineering personnel, who expressed concern
about a serious shortage of scientific and engineering personnel, with only 36 percent of
the needed scientific and engineering personnel available. The report also noted thatgovernment agencies, including the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy
Commission, faced similar challenges, and that the shortage of scientific and technicalpersonnel forced serious changes in future expansion plans. According to the report, thenumber of engineers with engineering degrees in the United States declined each year andwas expected to fall to 15,000 by 1955, approximately half the desired level of 30,000 per
year. In the Soviet Union, the number of engineering graduates was expected to increase
from less than 9,000 in 1943 to nearly 50,000 in 1955. The low birth rate during the Great
Depression and the loss of tens of thousands of science Ph. D.s during World War II werethe main reasons for the shortage of scientific and technical personnel in the UnitedStates.12 Although the Soviet economy had always been slow to industrialize, in 1928,
under Stalin’s leadership, the First Five-Year Plan was launched to train engineers. By the
1950s, the Soviet Union was producing more scientists, engineers, and specialists than the
United States, with more than twice as many graduates in these fields each year.13
The Sputnik Shock of 1957 made the development of human resources in American
science and technology a major national issue beyond the scientific community. In fact, on
October 4, 1957, just hours before the launch of Sputnik I, a presidential commission
released its “Report on Soviet Scientific Superiority,” which revealed that the Soviet Union
not only had more professional engineers than the United States but was also actively
providing technical assistance to developing countries. The Soviet Union built technicalinstitutes in Bombay (now Mumbai), India, and Rangoon, Burma (now Yangon, Myanmar),each with 1,000 students and faculty. In addition, by 1957, there were 1.3 million science
university graduates in the United States, compared to 1.5 million in the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, 15,000 students from China and Soviet satellites were studying in the Soviet
11 Armsby [1946].
12 National Science Foundation [1952] The Second Annual Report of the National Science Foundation,

Washington, D.C.: GPO, pp. 25-27.
13 Scientific and Technological Manpower News ROUND-UP, National Committee for the Development of
Scientists and Engineers, Vol. 1. No. 14, December 1, 1957, p. 2 (hereafter only title, volume, number, and date),
Records of the National Science Foundation, Record Group (hereafter RG) 307, Box 1, Office of the Director,
Records of the President’s Committee on Scientists and Engineers, 1956-58, Records of National Record
Administration (hereafter NARA) .

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Brain Drain from India to the U.S. during the Cold War
Union, while 12,000 foreign students were studying in the United States.
Many intellectuals were concerned about the increase in Soviet scientific andtechnological capabilities. Edward Teller, a Hungarian-Jewish nuclear physicist famous fordeveloping the hydrogen bomb, declared in 1957 that the Soviet Union had been leading
the United States in scientific talent for a decade and that the Soviet Union would be theworld’s leader in science for the next decade.14 Among them, the United States was mostconcerned with Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology. By August of
the following year, it had reached a level where the Soviets had launch capabilities.15 How
was the Soviet Union able to build a modern nuclear weapons system at such anastonishing rate almost a decade after the start of the Cold War? One of the reasons for theSoviet Union’s advantage over the United States in missile development was the massive
recruitment of German experts, the “spoils of war” from Germany. Ichikawa, the leading
Japanese historian of science, pointed out that the process of jet aircraft development
involved a huge scale of “plunder of technology” by a victorious nation from a defeatednation.16 Consequently, the Soviet Union successfully produced rockets, jet planes, andnuclear weapons.17 The Soviet Union also took advantage of the brain drain from Germany
to rapidly increase its scientific and technological capabilities, and the United States andthe Soviet Union engaged in a large-scale competition to develop and acquire humanresources during this period.
The Soviet Union also seems to have better prospects than the United States in scienceand technology. Washington columnist Robert Spivak, writing in the New York Post,highlighted the gap between American scientific and technological capabilities. Only 25
percent of American students majored in science, compared to 60 percent in the Soviet
Union. During the previous decade (1950–60), the Soviet educational system produced 1.2
million qualified engineers and scientists, compared to 900,000 in the United States.
Between 1929 and 1954, the Soviet Union’s growth rate was 1,300 percent, dwarfing the
growth rate of the United States by 225 percent. Spivak pointed out that the shortage ofengineers in the United States would continue until 1965, given the “lean generation” of
the 1930s, which had a particularly low birth rate.18
The federal government’s painful experience of falling behind the Soviet Union inscience and technology led to the promotion of science and technology education. The
development of highly qualified human resources in science and technology had become
part of a national project. An example of this focus is the “National Defense Education
Act” of 1958, enacted the year after the Sputnik Shock. The purpose of the law was toincrease the number of students in science, technology, mathematics, foreign languages,
and other fields of study; to provide technical education important to national defense; andto affirm the superiority of the United States, especially in the fields of science andtechnology. Title VIII of the National Defense Education Act, through its Regional
Occupational Program provisions, intended to train students to work in “highly skilled
technical occupations” essential to the defense of the nation and requiring scientificknowledge. The number of students enrolled in Title VIII technical occupation programs
14 ROUND-UP, Vol. 1. No. 3, March 1, 1957, p. 1.
15 ROUND-UP, Vol. 1. No. 13, November 15, 1957, pp. 1-3.
16 For further information, see especially chapter 4 of Ichikawa [2018].
17 Meanwhile, the U.S. was devoting financial and human resources to the production of high-speed computersthat would lay the foundation for today's computer technology. Ichikawa [2018] p. 7.
18 Robert Spivack, “Sputnik Underscores U.S. Shortage of Scientists,” Records of the National Science
Foundation, RG 307, Box 1, Office of the Director, Records of the President’s Committee on Scientists andEngineers, 1956-58.

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HIDEYUKI SHIMOTOMAI
increased from 48,000 in 1959 to 148,426 in 1962. By discipline, reflecting thedevelopment of computer technology and the demand for trained engineers in this field,
electronics accounted for nearly half of all programs, followed by mechanical and electricalengineering. Together, these three fields account for 75 percent of the total.19
As we have seen, the results of this professional training were certainly accumulating, it
was not always possible to ensure a stable supply of scientists and engineers who could
compete with the Soviet Union. For example, according to the 1961 Bureau of Labor
Statistics estimate of the demand for scientists and engineers in the civilian economy, thegrowth rate of scientists and engineers was about four times that of the labor force as awhole, with a 75 percent increase from 314,000 to 548,000 between 1959 and 1970 for
scientists and a 90 percent increase from 782,000 to 148,000 for engineers. The total
number of scientists and engineers was expected to increase by about 85 percent, fromapproximately 1,096,000 to 2,032,000.20 A second study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
which produced more detailed and accurate demand projections, arrived at the sameconclusions as the first study, with minor differences in numbers. Between 1960 and 1970,
fewer than 765,000 new scientists and engineers were available to fill more than one
million job openings, and the shortage that was evident in the 1950s and the early 1960s
may have worsened, according to the Division of Labor Statistics.21 While the demand forscientists and engineers continues to increase owing to space exploration and economic
growth, the supply of scientists and engineers remains insufficient. Many were retiring orchanging jobs, and 14 percent of engineering graduates found jobs in other fields.
Therefore, the need to recruit not only new graduates with bachelor’s degrees in scienceand engineering but also those with degrees in other fields as well as non-college graduatesworking in technical occupations had to be met by any means possible. Indeed, within a
few years of the enactment of the National Defense Education Act, it was not possible tofully meet these manpower requirements. Therefore, the government has begun to serious
search for foreign scientists and engineers.

2. Global technology transfer and high-level talent development network
This section describes the process of developing a workforce from Asia, especially India,
that could compete with the Soviet Union, which occurred concurrently with thedevelopment of scientific and technological human resources.
During the Cold War, the United States positioned South Asia as a bulwark of democracy
and implemented aggressive development and technical assistance policies. India, inparticular, gained strategic importance, partly because of the expectation that it would
become the world’s largest democracy. The Soviet Union’s involvement in India’s
economic development since the mid-1950s and private diplomacy were instrumental in
supporting and promoting socialist modernization. On the Indian side, the Soviet Union
was also seen as a key player in India’s security against the Chinese Communist Party andpro-U.S. Pakistan. 22 From this Indo-Soviet cooperation, large private foundations,
corporations, and universities worked with the U.S. government to develop a systematic
19 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Education for a Changing World of Work, Appendix I
Technical training in the United States, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1963.
20 Michael [1962] p. 420.
21 Stambler [1963] p. 1282.
22 Dyakonov [2023] p. 90.

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Brain Drain from India to the U.S. during the Cold War
technical assistance policy. U.S. technical assistance to developing countries was primarily
the work of private companies and foundations. There was a reason why government
officials placed so much emphasis on private organizations in their economic assistanceactivities abroad. Foreign governments were more receptive to the advice of privateorganizations, which were unofficial ambassadors of the United States abroad than toofficial representatives of the U.S. government. 23 In an attempt to strengthen mutual
understanding with other countries without jeopardizing strained international relations, therole of private contractors in local relationships and personal networks was important. In
this way, private organizations played an important complementary role in U.S. diplomacy
by establishing good relationships with foreign governments and local private organizations
before U.S. government foreign assistance began in earnest.
The Ford Foundation, which played a major role in providing development assistance tothe Third World on behalf of the government, was a prime example of the impact of privateorganizations. IIT Kanpur and the Indian Institutes of Management in Ahmedabad,Calcutta, and Bangalore were established with support from the Ford Foundation. This
investment, the foundation believed, was necessary not only to support India’s domestic
future (e.g., combatting poverty) but also to expand the free world, including the promotionof democracy and incorporation into the Western camp. However, the introduction ofAmerican-style elite education was intended to foster the production of an Indian scientificand technological elite that would support an anti-Soviet and pro-American stance in nonaligned and neutral India. With this in mind, in August 1965, the Ford Foundation awarded
a two-year grant of $1.45 million to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), a
world-renowned leader in basic and applied science and engineering, to support the Birla
Institute of Technology (BITS). This grant was used to build an international system ofexpertise with MIT at the helm. During the decade of support from the Ford Foundationand MIT, more than 3,000 undergraduate and 1,000 graduate students were trained.24
The Kanpur India-U.S. Program (1962-1972) is a prime example of U.S. science
diplomacy during the Cold War. IIT Kanpur was established in 1960 by Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru with support from the Ford Foundation to promote Indian science andtechnology. In 1962, nine American universities (MIT, California Institute of Technology,
Carnegie Institution of Technology, Princeton University, University of Michigan,
University of California, Purdue University, Ohio State University, and Case Institute ofTechnology) agreed to provide technical assistance to develop the IITs, “Institutes of
National Importance.” This program aimed to promote individual freedom and growth bycreating an intellectually open environment for both students and faculty that could not be
achieved within the rigid hierarchical structure of the traditional Indian university system.
Many intellectual and psychological conditions for IIT Kanpur were present in U.S.
technical education and thus welcomed U.S. collaboration. Funding was provided for U.S.
personnel, in-service training for Kanpur faculty from the consortium institutions, and thepurchase of equipment, teaching materials, and books not available in India. The program
also provided comfortable housing on the IIT campus for U.S. faculty and their families
and attracted many talented young researchers.25 The program was unique in that young
faculty members under the age of 40 were hired to facilitate student advising, and up to 25
23 Jerome Jacobson Associates, The Use of Private Contractors in Foreign Aid Programs, Special Committee toStudy the Foreign Aid Program, U.S. Congress, Senate, 85th Congress 1st Session, Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1957, pp. 34-59.
24 Leslie and Kargon[2006] p. 122.
25 Sukhatme [1994] p. 70.

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HIDEYUKI SHIMOTOMAI
American staff members provided Indian students with an interdisciplinary research
program that met high international quality and research standards. After taking common
courses for the first three years, students were divided into specialized areas of study. By
1972, Kanpur had become a leading center in India for the education of engineers andscientists, both undergraduate and graduate, and for research in engineering and science.
However, it has been suggested that these interactions with American researchers
contributed to the brain drain from India to the United States. At this point, Prime Minister
Nehru’s vision of building an ‘Indian MIT’ and developing a highly skilled workforce for
India’s future has been betrayed.
Thus, the Ford Foundation contributed significantly to the development of humanresources in science and technology in India and India’s economic independence. At thesame time, however, the number of students studying in the United States also increased
rapidly from 10 to 15 per year before the war to 800 by 1955. The Ford Foundation’s rolein fostering human networks between the United States and India has also had a significant
impact on the international movement of highly skilled human resources.26
Figure 1 illustrates this discussion. Since the 1950s, the United States, as a technicalsender has made significant contributions to the establishment of higher research andeducational institutions and the development of highly skilled human resources in India
through active development assistance and technology transfer. This was because the U.S.Soviet rivalry was not only about military power but also about socio-economic
achievements, such as living standards, levels of industrialization, and cultural andeducational development.27 In other words, India and other Third World countries wereinvolved in technical assistance competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. These
activities were mainly carried out by private foundations, corporations, and universities,
and academic and cultural exchanges between the U.S. and India stimulated international
labor migration. As a result, some Indians trained through U.S. technical assistance were“brain drained” to the United States, following a change in U.S. immigration policy in the
1960s. India, as the recipient of the technology transfer that should have taken place,consequently experienced a loss of human resources. Thus, technology transfer to Asia
eventually became a means for the United States to acquire highly skilled human resources.

26 Ford Foundation, Annual Report, 1956, p. 102.
27 The IITs, designed to educate advanced, world-class scientists and engineers, were supported by several

countries: Kharagpur was jointly established by the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, and the Soviet
Union; Bombay was supported by the Soviet Union; Madras (now Chennai) was supported by West Germany;
and Delhi was supported by the United Kingdom. See Yokoi [2022] Chapter 8.

70Brain Drain from India to the U.S. during the Cold War
Figure 1.

Technology transfer and brain drain of highly skilled personnel

Figure 1. Technology transfer and brain drain of highly skilled personnel
1950s～

Technical Assistance Policies: industry-academia-government cooperation

technology

technology sender

receiver1990s~

USA

India

brain circulation

talent acquisition

Establishment of the IITs and1960s～ brain drain

human resource

Transformation of U.S. Immigration

U.S. immigration policy has been one of the key factors facilitating brain drain indeveloping countries. After World War II, U.S. immigration policy prioritized highly
skilled and knowledgeable individuals. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
marked the beginning of the practice of selecting immigrants based on their individual
skills. The Act placed skilled immigrants at the top of the immigration quota priority list
and created the H visa, which opened the door to the legal admission of temporary labor
immigrants. In addition, the Immigration Act of 1965 established a new standard forselecting immigrants who would contribute to the development of the United States. It
required all immigrants to obtain labor certifications issued by the Department of Labor foroccupations in high demand in American society and established a mechanism for allowing
short-term employment for those with special skills that were useful and essential to theUnited States. This change in the law was motivated by the need for workers in fields that
could not be supplied domestically because of the remarkable growth of various industries,
including national defense, and the increased demand for scientific, technical, and otherprofessional workers after World War II. While the Department of Labor consistently
supported the issuance of immigrant visas to a wide range of qualified scientists andengineers due to nationwide labor shortages, these decisions were based on the prospect ofhigh long-term demand for workers. Demand for workers is expected to grow at an evenhigher rate in the following decade.28
Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz was a leading advocate for increasing the number ofhighly skilled immigrants through immigration reform. During the 1965 immigration bill
debate, Wirtz cited the shortage of doctors, nurses, scientists, and other important
professionals in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s, arguing that the new1

28 United States Congress, House of Representatives, The Brain Drain into the United States of Scientists,Engineers, and Physicians, Washington, D.C.: United States Congress, House of Representatives. GPO, 1967, p.
13 (hereafter cited as The Brain Drain, 1967).

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HIDEYUKI SHIMOTOMAI
immigration legislation would increase supply in these and other areas. He argued thatfacilitating the entry of immigrants with particularly useful skills would encourage an
inflow of highly skilled immigrants and also serve the interests of American labor demand
and welfare, especially in filling positions in industries in which labor was in short supply.
In addition, Wirtz further articulated his expectations for addressing skill shortages. In
summary, of the approximately 97,600 annual quota immigrants who entered the country
between 1959 and 1962, up to 48,600 entered the U.S. labor market. It was positive that the
new immigration law would increase the number of admitted immigrants, especially thosewith higher education and exceptional skills with special experience to fill labor shortages.
Under the current law, approximately 8,800 professional and technical workers enter thelabor market annually as quota immigrants. Between 1952 and 1961, 14,000 physicians,
surgeons, and 28,000 nurses helped alleviate shortages in the medical field. In addition,
4,900 scientists, nearly 1,100 physicists, 12,000 engineers, 9,000 machinists, 7,000 tooland die makers, and other skilled immigrants were admitted to the United States, which
was crucial because of the short supply of such professionals. 29 Wirtz recognized thesignificant contribution of highly skilled immigrants to the U.S. economy in the past, andhe intended to bolster supply through immigration reform.

3. Brain Drain from India – IIT as a Case Study
The postwar U.S. immigration policy moved away from earlier race-based criteria andrelied on priority criteria based on the recognition that individual knowledge and skills are
an important source of national strength. As a result, immigrants of Asian origin werewelcomed to fill the shortages of highly skilled workers. In 1966, for the first time in U.S.
history, immigrants from developing countries accounted for more than half of all
immigrants (51%). By 1970, this amount had exceeded 60 percent. This increase wasparticularly significant for Asian immigrants, increasing from 16,622 (5.7% of total
immigrants) in 1965 to 88,418 (23.7% of total immigrants) in 1970. While the Philippines
sent the largest total number of immigrants, the largest jump was in Indian immigration,
which increased more than 17-fold, from 582 in 1965 to 10,114 in 1970.30
From 1956 to 1966, the number of scientists, engineers, and physicians who immigrated
to the United States as immigrants nearly doubled, from 5,373 to 9,534. In 1966, thenumber of Indian immigrants was 896, more than double that of Filipino immigrants, 397.
Indian immigration continued to grow, and by 1970, Indian immigrants accounted for 22
percent of all scientists and engineers entering the United States (see Figure 2).

29 Statement of W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor Before the Subcommittee on Immigration andNaturalization Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 500 General Records of the Department of Labor, Office of theSecretary of Labor Records of the Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz, 1962-1969, RG 174, Box 278,
Immigration and Naturalization 1965, NARA.
30 Friedman [1973] pp. 39-40.

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Brain Drain from India to the U.S. during the Cold War
Figure 2. Percentage of Immigrants by Country of Origin of Scientists and Engineers Entering the United States,

Figure 2. Percentage of Immigrants by Country of Origin of Scientists and EngineersEntering the United States, FY1970

FY1970Scientists & Engineers
13,300

India
22%

Others38%

Philippines
12%
CanadaKorea Germany
2%

3%

Taiwan

UK7%

9%

7%

Source: National Science Foundation［1972］Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians from Abroad: Trends
Source: National Science Foundation [1972] Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians from Abroad: Trends
Through Fiscal Year 1970, Washington, D.C.: GPO, p. 3.
Through Fiscal Year 1970, Washington, D.C.: GPO, p. 3.

Not only does the number of immigrants increase, but so does the number of temporary
residents, including foreign students, on student visas. By 1970, about 40 percent of
temporary residents in professional occupations, such as scientists, engineers, and doctors,
had changed their status to permanent residences and chose to remain in the United States.
Of the 13,372 working in the category of scientists and technicians, 62 percent (8,294)
were from Asia, and up to 53 percent of them had a change of status. Another important
indicator in the non-immigrant category was the number of aliens who received doctorates
in science and engineering from U.S. universities. Between 1960 and 1970, Asian PhDs
increased from 44 to 49 percent of the total, with Chinese and Indian PhDs accounting for
70 percent of this increase.31 This provided a channel for people of Asian descent to obtainwork opportunities without entering the United States as immigrants. Gregory Henderson,a senior research officer at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research,
described primary and student visas as “launching pads for immigration.”32 For example,
Asian students studying at American universities remained in the United States after
31 Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs Division, Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International
Scientific Mobility: Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974, p. 66 (hereafter cited as Brain Drain, 1974).
32 The Brain Drain, 1967, p. 15.

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HIDEYUKI SHIMOTOMAI
graduation, representing a large knowledge-based industrial workforce.33
Why did so many Indians leave the United States? One reason is that neither Indian
government research institutions nor domestic industry had an adequate industrial base toabsorb advanced human resources. According to India’s 1961 Census, the overall
unemployment rate for scientists and engineers was 10.4 percent, and 18.6 percent were
employed in jobs outside their field of expertise. Developing countries’ inability to offer
attractive compensation to highly skilled personnel weakened their bargaining power, andthey lost their brains to richer countries offering higher wages. The Times of India, anEnglish-language newspaper in India, described the brain drain to the United States as a“subtle neocolonialist robbery” and reported on the gravity of the situation.34 Since the1960s, many Indian white-collar workers and professionals have emigrated to Englishspeaking countries including the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. Research
has found that 76% of 1.8 million Indians aged 16 years and above in the U.S. and 45% of
the same age group among 847,000 Indians in the UK were engaged in high-skilledoccupations in 2019.35 The brain drain of white-collar jobs from India to the West during
the Cold War was one of the origins of the Indian diaspora, which continues to this day.
IIT graduates were at the center of the brain drain, as they produced a large number ofhighly skilled human resources. Although IITs were established to make India self-reliant,many IIT graduates chose to take their careers and skills to the United States. For Kanpur’s
brightest students, the IITs were only a step toward graduate school in the United States.
For IITs, competing with American universities with financial and research resources forPh.D. students had become a major challenge. Due to Kanpur’s close ties with American
engineering universities, its graduates went on to work at the forefront of Americancomputer development.
Although it is difficult to quantify the size and impact of brain drain from IIT, a study
that followed the path of graduates from 1973 to 1977 found that of the 1,262 graduates, 30
percent had a bachelor’s degree, 14.7 percent had a master’s degree, and 14.7 percent had a
PhD, with the primary destination being the United States.36 For electrical engineering
graduates, the percentage was even higher, with over 40 percent of the graduates migrating
abroad. The majority of graduates who remained in India were also willing to enroll in
American universities if financially supported, and international labor migration todeveloped countries was inevitable because of the desire for better working conditions,
economic treatment, and guaranteed opportunities for growth as scientists and engineers.
The decline in the U.S. birthrate and the oversupply of professional jobs in South Asia, thefact that India’s wage levels were one-fifteenth to one-twentieth of those in the UnitedStates until the 1990s, and the lack of demand for qualified scientific and technicalpersonnel in the Indian private sector also contributed to the brain drain.37
Brain drain has been identified as a more serious problem for developing countries
because, compared to developed countries, they do not have a rich pool of human resources
at home and lack the institutional means, including financial resources, to retain them.38
33 Biradavolu [2008] p. 9.
34 Times of India, April 17, 1969, p. 8.
35 Potnuru, Thakur and Kumar [2023] pp. 2-3.
36 Sukhatme [1994]. There are no exact data with which to compare Kanpur, but it is believed that a similar

percentage is likely.; Bassett [2009] pp. 803-804.
37 Sukhatme [1994] pp. 51-52.
38 On the other hand, brain drains are not as serious for developed countries because they can offset them byusing their abundant financial resources to bring back human resources or by increasing the domestic supply ofhuman resources. The U.K. and Canada have been able to cope with brain drain to the United States by accepting

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Brain Drain from India to the U.S. during the Cold War
The 1967 U.S. Congressional Report on Brain Drains described severe brain drains indeveloping countries. While the United States provides millions of dollars in financial aid
to developing countries, it casually robs the seeds of future leaders in science, medicine,and technical knowledge. Developing countries are reluctant to send their human resources,
which are more valuable than food and machinery, to other countries.39
Nevertheless, advocates of highly skilled immigration in the United States have somepoints. The United States could not weaken its economy to discourage immigration andshould not reinstate discriminatory immigration restrictions, which facilitated brain drain in
the United States. According to a brain drain report, an attempt to correct the injustice ofthe discriminatory quota system (the Immigration Act of 1965) paradoxically created a new
problem. This is because the Immigration Act of 1965 provided a powerful incentive forprofessionals from developing countries to migrate to developed countries, thus depriving
them of their required talent.40
How has the brain drain from developing countries benefited the United States?
According to The Brain Drain, 1967, based on an estimate of about $20,000 per scientist
for education and training, a total of 4,390 scientists, engineers, and physicians fromdeveloping countries came to the United States in FY1966, contributing about $88 million
to the United States. Of these, 2,563 were scientistic professionals from 13 countries thatare major recipients of U.S. aid programs, which alone contributed more than $50 million
to the United States. This more than offsets the $40,285,000 disbursed in U.S. aid funds,
effectively reversing U.S. efforts to help developing countries. This is called “reverse
foreign aid.”41 Using India as an example, U.S. economic aid (debt and loan approvals) to
India in FY1972 was $428.5 million, but India’s cost of educating professionals to emigrate
to the U.S. was $107.4 million, and the estimated cost of education saved by the U.S. was$279.2 million.442
The number of Indians immigrating to the United States in the technical and professional
workers category rose from 54 in 1965 to 1,750 the following year.43 The number of Indian
students also tripled between 1958 and 1968, from 2285 to 8221, with 35 percent of themseeking permanent residence in the United States. In particular, IIT graduates accounted for
40 percent of all Indian engineering students who immigrated to the United States between
1960 and 1985, and in some fields, this percentage exceeded 60 percent. Thus, IIT
graduates were absorbed in the American engineering community and incorporated into theAmerican-dominated science and technology empire. 44

Conclusion
Many highly skilled individuals who emigrated from India to the United States during theCold War continued to thrive in the U.S. economy. Many Indian immigrants were scientists,
engineers, doctors, and other professionals who entered high-tech fields, such as aircraft,many professionals from the Third World. The Brain Drain, 1967, p. 4.
39 Brain Drain, 1974, p. 2.
40 A study on professional migration in Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey found that 50 percent of scientists trained
abroad have not returned home, and Argentina has lost 5,000 engineers to migrate in recent years. Brain Drain,
1974, p. 35.
41 The Brain Drain, 1967, p. 7.
42 Brain Drain, 1974, p. 250.
43 Bassett [2016] p. 288.
44 Yokoi [2022] p. 287.

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HIDEYUKI SHIMOTOMAI
electronic communications, software, and computer development. In the early 1970s, theaverage per capita income of the Indian community was higher than that of other ethnic
groups. 45 IIT graduates have been particularly active in the U.S. business community,
including Sundar Pichai, CEO of Google’s parent company, Alphabet; Nikesh Arora,
former vice president of Softbank Group; and Parag Agrawal, former CEO of Twitter (nowX). This economic power and social status have also fueled political activity, and today the
Indian community is part of a powerful political lobby, with a strong network of politicalleaders and parties in their home country.
As this paper shows, the current success of Indian immigrants in the United States isgrounded in the development of highly skilled human resources through U.S. technicalassistance policies during the Cold War and the change in U.S. immigration policy toaccept such human resources. Looking at the domestic situation in the U.S., there was asevere shortage of scientific and technical personnel after World War II, and for the U.S. tosurvive the Cold War with the Soviet Union, it was necessary to actively accept highly
skilled human resources from India and other Asian countries. From the U.S. perspective,
the foundation for becoming the world’s leading scientific and technological power has
much to do with promoting the acceptance of highly skilled human resources from Asia
during the Cold War.
These times have changed; however, countries around the world now have preferential
admission policies for advanced talent from abroad. Recently, IIT graduates are
increasingly doing business in India rather than studying or working in the United States,
and the career paths of advanced Indian talent are changing. Brain drain in the UnitedStates is no longer as obvious as it was in the past. In contrast, the possibility of brain drainfrom the United States is now being considered for the first time in U.S. history.
[Acknowledgements: I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuablecomments.]

45 Sahay [2009] p. 11.

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Brain Drain from India to the U.S. during the Cold War
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HIDEYUKI SHIMOTOMAIEnterprise, Vol. 97, No. 9.
Yokoi, Katsuhiko [2022] A Socio-Economic History of International Arms Transfers, Nihon Keizai
Hyoronsha.
Zolberg, Aristide R. [2008] A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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『国際武器移転史』第 18 号（2024 年 7 月）
，79-93 頁

講演録

明治大学国際武器移転史研究所主催・第 10 回公開シンポジウム「分断する国際秩序－軍事緊張と平和創造のはざまで－」〝異次元の軍拡〟と沖縄～旧日本軍と自衛隊の〝沖縄侵攻〟の比較研究～
前泊 博盛＊

はじめに
かつて復帰前のアメリカ統治下の沖縄には 1300 発のアメリカ軍の核ミサイルが配備されていた。1950 年～ 60 年代、アメリカはいざというときは沖縄から中国やソ連など当時の共産国に対し、核ミサイルによる「核威嚇」を公然と行っていた。現在、ロシアのプー
チン政権は「核威嚇」により NATO のウクライナ戦争参戦を阻止している。かつてのアメリカ軍の対ロ・対中戦略と同じ対応である。
岸田文雄内閣が進める 43 兆円もの「異次元の軍拡」は、誰が何のために仕掛けた軍拡なのか。そして軍拡が、この国に何をもたらすことになるのか。沖縄ではいま凄まじい勢
いで自衛隊基地の建設とミサイル部隊の配備が進んでいる。79 年前のアジア太平洋戦争
で戦場となり、住民の 4 人に 1 人が犠牲になった経験を持つ沖縄では、自衛隊の配備に「既視感」すら抱く。沖縄への旧日本軍・32 軍の急配備は、米軍から沖縄住民を守るためではなく、本土決戦のための時間稼ぎのための“捨て石”とされ終戦交渉のための「戦果」を挙げる最後の決戦の場とされた。1945 年のアメリカ軍の沖縄上陸を前に、旧日本軍は主力部隊を台湾に移動し、長く沖縄に米軍を引き留めるための持久戦、消耗戦を展開した。
軍人を超える住民の被害が増大し、軍隊と共に沖縄本島南部へ移動した住民の多くが犠牲になった。自衛隊の配備強化は旧日本軍同様に沖縄を再び“捨て石”にするために部隊を配備する自衛隊による〝沖縄侵攻〟の様相である。
戦後、沖縄の歴史を調査研究した歴史・政治学者のジョージ・H・カーは、その著書『琉球の歴史』で「日本の政府はあらゆる方法をもって琉球を利用するが、琉球の人々のために犠牲をはらうことを好まない」（序文、1953 年 6 月 15 日刊）と断じ、日本にとって沖縄
はいざという時の「Expendable」（支出可能な代用品、消耗品）と評している。では、アメリカにとって日本はどうであろうか。
〝台湾有事〟騒動の中で、日本はアメリカの
expendable となる可能性はないのであろうか。異次元の軍拡の動きの中で、増額された予算の多くがアメリカ製の軍需品・武器・装備品購入に充てられる可能性もある。有事騒動＊沖縄国際大学経済学部地域環境政策学科教授。1960 年 11 月 11 日生まれ、明治大学大学院政治経済学研究科博士前期課程修了（経済学修士）、琉球新報記者、編集委員、九州大学大学院助教授（日米安保論）、
論説委員長などを経て 2011 年４月から現職。

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『国際武器移転史』第 18 号（2024 年 7 月）

が日本をアメリカの軍需産業の「expendable」とするのか。検証を試みた。

１. 核問題と沖縄
いわゆる「本土復帰（沖縄に関する施政権の米国から日本への移管）」前のアメリカ統治下にあった沖縄には核ミサイル（メースＢ、ナイキ・ハーキュリーズ）が配備されていた 1）。その数は、1300 発にも上っていた。核配備の危険性は、有事の攻撃目標となる「基地ターゲット論」に加え、平時における核管理の困難さからくる演習被害（核爆発の危険性）などが指摘されてきた。沖縄においても米軍那覇サイト（現・那覇空港）で、1959
年 6 月 19 日に核弾頭を搭載した核ミサイルが誤って発射されたことが NHK の取材によって 2017 年に明らかになった。
史実は沖縄放送局ディレクターの松岡哲平氏らが取材し NHK スペシャル「スクープドキュメント 沖縄と核」（2017 年 9 月 10 日放送）で公表された。NHK はアメリカ空軍の兵士として沖縄に駐留していたロバート・オハネソン氏（取材時＝ 74 歳）ら 1960 年代初め、
アメリカ統治下の沖縄で、アメリカ空軍の兵士として駐留していた複数の証言者を取材し、アメリカ軍が開発した中距離核ミサイル「メース B」が配備されていた問題を告発した。
メース B は射程距離約 2400 キロで、ソ連の一部と中国大陸の大部分をその射程内に入れていた。核弾頭の威力は 1 メガトンで広島型原爆（15 キロトン）のおよそ 70 倍の威力を持っていた。
オハネソン氏は核ミサイルの配備・発射訓練中に那覇サイトで、核ミサイルの誤発射事故が起きたことを明らかにした。核ミサイルは幸運にも爆発はせず、那覇沖合に着水し、米軍によって回収された。事故の際、誤発射されたミサイルによって体の一部を切断された米兵がいたことなどが証言で明らかになった。
当時の沖縄の地元紙「沖縄タイムス」は、事故発生翌日の紙面で、米軍発表による「ミサイル発射寸前に発火」と誤発射を報じたものの米軍から「核弾頭搭載」との広報はなかったが 2）、NHK スペシャル「沖縄と核」では、当時、整備担当の元米兵の証言として「核弾頭は搭載されていた」「発射に備える訓練中に兵士が操作を誤り、ブースターが点火した」「核爆発を起こしていたら那覇が吹き飛んでいた」との内容を放送した。米軍内部文書か
ら「核兵器の事故はアメリカの国際的地位を脅かす」「全ての情報は関係者以外、極秘と

1）アメリカ国防総省『核兵器の管理と配備の歴史：1945 年 7 月～ 1977 年 9 月』
（History of the Custody and
Deployment of Nuclear Weapons: July 1945 through September 1977）=1999 年に国防総省が機密解除した文書。
2）『沖縄タイムス』1959 年 6 月 20 日。出典は松岡鉄平［2017］『沖縄と核』、新潮社、158 ～ 159 頁。

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分断する国際秩序－軍事緊張と平和創造のはざまで－（前泊博盛）する」との記述も明らかにされた 3）。
翌 6 月 20 日の沖縄タイムス紙面では米軍司令部情報部の発表として「ミサイルが水平状態で一部発火、その発射火薬で操作員一人が即死、他の五人が負傷した」としているが、核搭載ミサイルとの情報はなく「事故原因はまだ分からない」との記述にとどまっていた。
当時、整備工として那覇サイトにいた元米軍作業員の男性（取材時＝ 81 歳）は NHK 報道を受けた 2017 年 9 月の沖縄タイムスの取材に「サイト 8（那覇サイト）の点検日で、レー
ダー施設から発射台に向かったが、手前の兵舎で止められた。兵舎のハウスボーイから『ミ
サイルから火が出て、黒人兵が亡くなった』と聞いた」と証言している。男性は核弾頭搭
載ミサイルとは聞いておらず「騒がれないよう、一部の事実は公表し、核弾頭のことはひた隠しにしたのだろう」と推察している 4）。
一方でもう一つの地元紙「琉球新報」は、核誤射「戦争」指令で 1959 年の那覇基地ミサイル事故が起きたことを、元整備兵の証言として報道している。元整備兵によると那覇のナイキ基地には、東シナ海に面して 2 台の発射台が備えられ、少なくとも 4 発のミサイルが常備されていた。発射台周辺はフェンスや擁壁、丘に囲まれ、「外からは見えない場所だった」という。
一連の報道を受け沖縄県は報道内容の事実関係を、外務省に文書で確認した 5）。
確認内容は以下の通りである。
外務省に対する沖縄県の質問（１）本土復帰前の沖縄に核兵器は配備されていたか（２）本土復帰時に沖縄に配備されていた核はどのような方法で撤去されたか（３）復帰前に 1300 発の核があったと報道されているが事実か（４）1959 年の核ミサイル誤発射についての事実関係（５）現在、沖縄に核兵器は配備されているか（６）有事の際は沖縄に核兵器を持ち込み可能とした「核密約」に関する外務省の見解－など。
沖縄県からの問い合わせに対し、外務省は明確な回答がないまま現在に至っている。
沖縄への核配備ついては、沖縄返還交渉の段階で地元沖縄からは「核抜き、本土並み」
返還を基本とするスローガンが打ち出された経緯があり、復帰と同時に日本の「非核三原

3）松岡鉄平［2017］『沖縄と核』176 頁。出典は History of the 6313th Air Base Wing 1 January through December
1962 マクスウェル空軍基地所蔵 請求番号 0462340.
4）『沖縄タイムス』2017 年 9 月 12 日付。
5）「沖縄核配備、沖縄県が質問 外務省に有無を確認」『琉球新報』2017 年 9 月 27 日。

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『国際武器移転史』第 18 号（2024 年 7 月）則」が沖縄にも適用されることとなったはずである。
しかし、その後返還交渉の過程における佐藤栄作政権による「核密約」の存在が明らかになった。核密約によると「米国政府は、核兵器の沖縄への再持ち込みと、沖縄を通過させる権利を必要とする。沖縄に現存する核兵器貯蔵地である、嘉手納、那覇、辺野古並びにナイキ・ハーキュリーズ基地を、何時でも使用できる状態に維持しておき、極めて重大な緊急事態が生じた時には活用できるよう求める。
」6）
この核密約は、現在も継続されている可能性がある。1969 年の沖縄核密約によれば名護市辺野古にある辺野古弾薬庫は、沖縄に再び核兵器が持ち込まれる際の核兵器の貯蔵地の 1 つであり、2019 年以降、辺野古弾薬庫では 13 の弾薬庫の新設と弾薬組み立てエリアの更新が進められ、2024 年 3 月現在、ほぼ完成している。そのうちの施設は「核弾薬庫特有の回の字型のコンク

新たな核弾薬庫整備とされる米軍辺野古弾薬庫

リート隔壁構造」が指摘されている 7）。
ほかにも嘉手納弾薬庫内にメース B 発射基地と同じ構造の弾薬庫の存在も明らかになっており、新たな核配備、核シェアリングの問題も水面下で論議されている。

２. 中台危機と米国の「核威嚇」
1958 年沖縄配備の米核兵器による中国への「核威嚇」事件も朝日新聞によって 2021 年
５月 30 日に明らかになった。朝日報道によると米国核戦略家のダニエル・エルズバーグ
氏（取材時＝ 90 歳）は、機密文書をもとに、1958 年 8 月の第二次台湾海峡危機の際、米国は中国への核攻撃を検討し、限定的な核爆弾投下でも中国が引かない場合は「北は上海に至るまで深く核攻撃を行う以外に選択肢はない」と米統合参謀本部議長が語っていたと証言した 8）。
6）太田昌克［2011］『日米「核密約」の全貌』筑摩書房、282 頁。
7）『琉球新報』2019 年 4 月 24 日付（本文中の写真も同記事より転載）。
8）『朝日新聞』2021 年 5 月 30 日付。

82分断する国際秩序－軍事緊張と平和創造のはざまで－（前泊博盛）

当時のアイゼンハワー大統領政権の核戦略の中心は「いかなる武力衝突も核戦争に頼る」という「大量報復戦略」だったとし、アイゼンハワー大統領自身が「あらゆる戦争は
核戦争にならざるを得ない」と語っていたとしている。
第二次台湾海峡危機では、当初は通常兵器による中国の台湾侵攻抑止を試みる方針
だったものの、中国側が金門島の主権の主張を取り下げなければ「核兵器を使わなければいけないと考えていた」と、エルズバーグ氏は証言している。
米国の中国に対する核威嚇に対し、当時のソ連のフルシチョフ第一書記は「中国に全面的に味方してあらゆる兵器を使」うと核報復を示唆したが、米国は「核先制使用の結果、
台湾や沖縄が消え去っても受け入れるつもりでいた」と証言した。
証言報道の 2 年後の 2023 年６月 17 日、ダニエル・エルズバーグ氏の訃報が伝えられ、新たな証言を得る機会は失われた。
証言したエルズバーグ氏は、1931 年４月、シカゴ生まれで米政策研究機関「ランド研究所」に勤務していた際に歴代米政権がベトナム戦争の泥沼化を隠蔽していたことを知り、7000 ページに及ぶ機密文書をニューヨーク・タイムズ紙などに提供し、同報道はベトナ
ム反戦運動の機運が高まる一因ともなったとされている。
AP 通信は「当時のニクソン政権によって、スパイ行為などの罪で起訴されたが、公訴棄却となった。ハリウッド映画『ペンタゴン・ペーパーズ／最高機密文書』（2017 年）のモデルにもなった」9）とエルズバーグ氏の経歴を報じている。
復帰前、アジア太平洋における核戦略のキーストーン（要石）とされていた沖縄は、米
中関係、米ロ関係、そして台湾有事の際に核攻撃の拠点となり、核報復によって消え去る
運命にあったという証言は、現在の「台湾有事」報道の中で、看過できない史実として深刻に受け止める必要がある。
戦後、日本本土から切り離されて沖縄が「米軍統治下」に置かれた背景には、1947 年 9月の「天皇メッセージ」の関連性も指摘されてきた。1947 年 9 月 22 日、側近の寺崎英成を通してGHQに伝えられた昭和天皇のメッセージである。昭和天皇は寺崎氏を通してマッ
カーサー元帥の顧問であるシーボルト氏に対し「アメリカが日本に主権を残し租借する形
式で、25 年ないし 50 年、あるいはそれ以上、沖縄を支配することは、アメリカの利益になるのみならず日本の利益にもなる」との趣旨を伝えていた 10）。天皇メッセージは、昭和
天皇による「日本が自ら沖縄を米国へ提供すると申し出」たものとして記録されてきた。
9）ＡＰ通信 2023 年 6 月 17 日。
10）「天皇メッセージ」（1947 年 9 月 22 日） 訳文出典は沖縄県『沖縄県史 各論編７ 現代』8-9 頁。脚注「天皇メッセージ訳文」 訳文は安仁屋政昭ほか［1987］『沖縄と天皇』あけぼの出版 234 頁。

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『国際武器移転史』第 18 号（2024 年 7 月）

一方で、天皇メッセージに先立つ 1947 年 6 月の段階で、日本占領を統括する進駐軍（GHQ）のマッカーサー元帥は 1947 年 6 月 27 日に行われたアメリカ人記者団との懇談で「沖縄を米軍が支配し、空軍の要塞化すれば非武装国家日本が軍事的真空地帯になることはない」と明言している 11）。その際、沖縄について「この諸島の住民は日本人とは民族的に同一ではなく、日本の経済福祉に貢献せず、しかも日本人はこの諸島の所有を認められることを期待していない」と日琉同祖論を否定。
「琉球の住民は日本人ではなく、本土の日本人と同化したことがない。それに日本人は彼らを軽蔑している。彼らは単純でお人よしであり、琉球諸島におけるアメリカの基地開発により、かなりの金額を得て比較的幸せな生活を送ることになろう」と踏み込んでいた 12）。
マッカーサー元帥は「琉球人は日本人ではなく、日本人は琉球人を軽蔑している」との認識をもとに、日本人の持つ琉球人への差別意識を戦後の沖縄の分割統治に利用し、奄美大島を含む琉球列島を日本と異なる文化圏、社会圏とみなして分離支配を企図し、実施したとみることもできる。
マッカーサー元帥の日本・琉球観に影響を与えた可能性があるのが、1956 年１月１日に沖縄で発刊された歴史・政治学者ジョージ・Ｈ・カー（George H.Kerr）13）の『琉球の歴史』である。カーは米軍に依頼されて琉球の占領政策に向けて琉球王国の歴史を調査、分析し、『琉球の歴史』を執筆している。その序文で「日本の政府はあらゆる方法をもって琉球を利用するが、琉球の人々のために犠牲をはらうことを好まない」と記述し、日本にとって琉球は「expendable（消耗品、支出可能な代替品）」と記述している。
日本にとって琉球（沖縄）は、エクスペンダブル（消耗品）であり、本土決戦のための時間稼ぎとして「捨て石作戦」が展開され、終戦後は、戦後の日本国憲法で放棄した交戦
権、軍隊、武力、戦争の手段を補う「非武装国家日本」の軍事的空白を埋める手段として代替機能を持たされていると、米国側が記録している。
台湾有事問題を考える際、「台湾有事は沖縄有事」との言説の下で、岸田文雄政権が加速する自衛隊の南西諸島シフト、ミサイル部隊の先島配備強化、沖縄本島への自衛隊弾薬庫新設、ミサイル部隊配備などをみると米国が指摘してきた「エクスペンダブル＝沖縄」の位置づけが、より現実味をおびてきている。

11）ロバート・Ｄ・エルドリッヂ［1999］「ジョージ・Ｆ・ケナン、PPS と沖縄」
『国際政治のなかの沖縄』（日
本国際政治学会編集・発行）、41 頁。
12）前掲書、40 ～ 41 頁。
13）ジョージ・Ｈ・カー［1956］『琉球の歴史』琉球列島国民政府、序文。

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分断する国際秩序－軍事緊張と平和創造のはざまで－（前泊博盛）

３. 沖縄と本土の温度差
2023 年 2 月、筆者は衆議院予算委員会に野党側から参考人招致された。5 兆円規模から一気に 6 兆円規模へと拡大される「異次元の軍拡」に対する反対、警告の立場から供述した。その中で、沖縄住民と本土住民との間にある温度差について、台湾有事にも自分たちは犠牲にならない、戦争に巻き込まれることがないとして敵基地攻撃能力の保有や異次元の軍拡を容認する本土住民の「傍観者的好戦論」に対し、戦争が始まれば戦場となり逃げ惑うか、シェルター生活を余儀なくされる沖縄住民の「当事者的非戦論」を提示した。
さらに説明を補強すると「傍観者的好戦論」とは、「私たち国民は戦場に行かない」ことを前提に「自衛隊は国民を護る兵力。敵基地攻撃能力は必要。軍事力強化はやむを得ない。いざとなったら日米安保で米軍が日本を守ってくれる」という好戦論と日米安保基軸の安全保障論である。
これに対し「当事者的非戦論」は、「戦争になれば国民は無力。戦場で殺されるか、自国政治指導者に兵にされ殺す側で戦場に行くか、拒否して刑務所で強制労働させられるか、国外逃亡かの選択しかない」との立場に立ち、戦争回避を唯一、最優先の戦略として「外交、経済安保で戦争回避」を主張し、「好戦的政治家の排除」を打ち出すものである。
政府は 2024 年 3 月 29 日、台湾有事など不測の事態に備えて南西諸島住民らが二週間ほど避難できる新たなシェルターの整備指針を公表している。
「広域避難が困難で国民保護法に基づく国民保護訓練を実施する沖縄県の先島諸島を対象に、国が設計や建設費用を負担する」という 14）。
シェルターはミサイル攻撃や航空機からの攻撃、さらに陸上侵攻やゲリラ・特殊部隊からの攻撃に対し、対処できる新築の公共、公用施設で、外壁厚さ 30 センチ以上の鉄筋コ
ンクリートの建設が想定されている。沖縄を戦場と想定するシェルター建設が既成事実化
されて推進されることに対する地元の反応も「歓迎」と「反対」に二分されている。
「なぜいま異次元の軍拡なのか」―そんな問いを国会議員らに投げた。2023 年 2 月 16日の衆議院予算委員会終了後、参考人招致され答弁を終えた筆者に駆け寄ってきた複数の自民党重鎮らは口々に「我々もしらないところで異次元の軍拡は決められている」（石破茂・元防衛大臣、岩屋毅・元防衛相）と語っていた。
一体、この軍拡は誰が何のために、党内議論も回避し、国会論戦も回避しながら、憲法違反の「専守防衛撤回」「敵基地攻撃能力の保有」「自衛隊＝軍隊強化」「軍需産業の支援と国営化検討」などを一気に進めているのであろうか。

14）『日本経済新聞』2024 年 3 月 30 日付。

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『国際武器移転史』第 18 号（2024 年 7 月）

「安保関連三文書」の改定を行った 2022 年 12 月 16 日の公表文書によれば、日本の軍事予算は 23 年度から 27 年度までの 5 年間に 43 兆円が投入され、軍備と弾薬が爆発的に整備強化される方針となっている。特に弾薬は 2022 年度の 2,480 億円から 2023 年度には 8,238
億円と 3.3 倍に激増している。
2023 年度に 6 兆円を超えた防衛予算は、24 年度には 7 兆 7 千億円を超え、25 年度以降は10 兆円規模まで一気に増大する見込みとなっている。増産された武器、弾薬は主に南西諸島に送られ、鹿児島県の鹿屋基地、馬毛島新航空基地、奄美、沖縄本島、宮古島、石垣島、与那国島に加え佐賀県や長崎県など九州全域を巻き込む軍事基地強化が加速している。
九州、沖縄県民にとって「仕掛けられる台湾有事」で、実害を被る可能性が高まっているとの危機感が高まりつつある。
そんな中で、昨年（2023 年）11 月 10 日から 20 日にかけて、沖縄近海では自衛隊最大規
模の日米統合訓練・実動演習が実施された。演習には離島防衛専門の水陸機動団（自衛隊版海兵隊）など自衛隊隊員 3 万 800 人、軍用車
両 3500 両、艦艇 20 隻（陸海空の統合作戦）、戦闘機など軍用機 210 機に、米軍 1 万 200 人も参加し中国を念頭に演習を実施している15）。未曽有の大規模演習に中国側も反発し、軍事演習を行うなど対抗手段を展開し16）、沖縄周辺は緊張感に包まれた。しかし、大規模演習の実態が大きく報道されることもなく、国民の多くが気付くことはなかった。
大規模軍事演習前の 11 月 5 日、石垣島では開催された石垣市民の「石垣島祭り」に、石垣島に配備された陸上自衛隊が軍服でパレードに参加し、軍の存在を市民に強くアピール
した 17）。市民生活の中に自衛隊が深く入り込んだことを実感させた。
かつて復帰前の沖縄には、自衛隊基地はゼロであったが、復帰直後に「防空」中心に航空自衛隊など 3 施設が配備された。
「自衛隊＝旧日本軍」とする県民の多くが自衛隊配備

15）「自衛隊統合演習きょうから開始 民間空港・港湾や公道も使って訓練」『朝日新聞』2023 年 11 月 10 日。
https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASRC96SVRRC9TPJB006.html#（2024 年 5 月 6 日閲覧）。
16）「中国、軍事演習の『常態化』目指す」ロイター配信、2024 年 1 月 18 日。
17）写真提供、下地幹郎・元衆議院議員。

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分断する国際秩序－軍事緊張と平和創造のはざまで－（前泊博盛）

反対運動を展開し、自衛隊員の制服での成人式参加を阻止、反対する激しい闘争も行われた。しかし、復帰から 52 年が過ぎ、56 施設まで増えた自衛隊基地に対する反発は薄れ、離島住民にまで広く受け入れられるようになっている。
「自衛隊は災害救助隊。台風被害の救済、救助や急患輸送などで世話になってきた。監視部隊という形で島に来てくれるというので誘致した。誘致で数百人規模の自衛隊員が移駐し、児童生徒も増え、複式学級も解消された」と、自衛隊の与那国島移駐を容認した外間守吉・前与那国町長は誘致の利点を挙げた 18）。
しかし、ふたを開けると「監視部隊ではなくミサイル部隊を配備され、島を戦場にされる危険性が出てきた。話が違うと訴えたが、時すでに遅し。もう自衛隊は止められなくなった」と振り返り、「だまされた」と外間前町長は抗議している 19）。
与那国に加えて配備された石垣島では、陸上自衛隊の基地がさらに拡大強化され、米軍とも共同使用されることが 2023 年 12 月 6 日、明らかになった 20）。
沖縄の地元紙の報道によると防衛省は 2024 年度にも、陸上自衛隊石垣駐屯地（石垣市）の施設拡大に着手し、駐屯地西側の用地を新たに取得し、現在計画中の訓練場を今後さらに広げ、米軍との実動・図上訓練での共同使用も想定している。
2024 年度当初予算で関連経費を計上し、警備隊や業務隊のほかに 12 式地対艦ミサイル（SSM）を扱う部隊、03 式中距離地対空ミサイル（中 SAM）を運用する部隊が同基地に所属し、中距離多目的ミサイルや 81 ミリ迫撃砲も備え隊庁舎には地下施設も整備されていることが明らかになった。自衛隊は琉球石灰岩の強度試験にも着手し、基地の地下化の検討を進めている 21）。

４. 重要土地利用規制法の危険性
米軍基地や自衛隊基地が強化、拡充される沖縄県民にとって有事の動きをキャッチする
ために必要な情報収集手段をも規制する「重要土地等調査法」（令和 3 年法律第 84 号）22）による注視区域・特別注視区域の指定拡大も脅威となる。軍事基地周辺の土地所有や反対運動などの規制なども行われることから「重要土地利用規制法」と呼ばれ、警戒されてい

18）筆者の質問に外間守吉・前与那国町長が回答 2023 年 2 月 11 日。
19）同上。
20）「石垣陸自 施設拡大へ 来年度にも用地取得 米軍と共同使用も想定」『沖縄タイムス』2023 年 12 月
6 日。
21）同上。
22）重要土地等調査法＝重要施設周辺及び国境離島等における土地等の利用状況の調査及び利用の規制等に関する法律 ( 令和 3 年法律第 84 号）。

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『国際武器移転史』第 18 号（2024 年 7 月）る。
指定は、基地機能の阻害行為を防止することなどを目的に、妨害電波の発信をキャッチし阻止したりするほか、米軍基地や自衛隊基地周辺の一定面積以上の土地の売買の氏名、使用目的などの届け出を義務化するもの。特に基地周辺の外国資本による土地の売買を監視するものとしているが、反対運動なども規制対象となるため「言論の自由」の侵害となり、沖縄県内では辺野古新基地建設に対する反対運動が狙い撃ちされるとの懸念も出ている。
指定は 2023 年 12 月の 184 か所の注視・特別注視区域指定を承認したが、これまでに指定された全国399 か所を加え、合計で 583 か所が指定・承認されている 23）。今後は外資系を含む基地周辺地域の所有や利用状況などの調査が実施される。
目に見えない形で市民生活への筆者が新聞記者時代に入手した秘密文書

監視体制が徐々に進められている。
政府による特定秘密保護法（2013 年 12 月）の制定によって、政府や官僚による恣意的な秘密指定の乱発、濫用によって国民の知る権利が大きく侵害されている。
政府にとって都合の悪い情報の多くが告発を免れ、国民の権利や生命・財産を侵害する
政府犯罪、官僚汚職などが「国家機密」の壁に阻まれ、メディアのアクセスを困難にしている。特定秘密保護法は「知る権利」を侵害し、このままではこの国の国民主権の土台すら揺るがしかねない状況となっている。

５. 辺野古新基地建設問題の 6 つの不合理性
沖縄における米軍基地問題の最大の課題、争点となっている普天間・辺野古問題について簡単に問題点を整理しておきたい。
世界一危険な基地とされる米海兵隊普天間飛行場は、28 年前の 1996 年の日米特別行動委員会（SACO）合意によって返還が 10 施設とともに合意された。SACO 合意を象徴する返還合意であった。しかし、その後の「普天間基地代替施設の建設・提供」条件がネックとなり、返還合意から 28 年がたった現在も返還実現に至っていない。
23）「土地利用規制、第 4 弾 184 カ所」『朝日新聞』2024 年 3 月 30 日付（本文中の写真はマル秘、指定前秘密など政府内の機密文書の写真＝筆者撮影）。

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分断する国際秩序－軍事緊張と平和創造のはざまで－（前泊博盛）

その背景には、沖縄本島東海岸の米軍キャンプシュワブ沖埋め立てによる普天間基地の代替施設とされる「辺野古新基地建設」を巡る沖縄県民の過半数を超える強い反対の民意がある。
沖縄県民は SACO 合意以降、示された辺野古沖埋め立てによる代替新基地建設に対して、国政選挙や知事選挙、県議会議員選挙など全県レベルの選挙では、一貫して過半数が反対の意思を投票結果によって示してきた。また二度にわたる県民投票でも、建設反対の意
思を明確に示してきた。しかし、政府は裁判闘争も含めて沖縄の民意を蔑ろにしてきた。
普天間・辺野古問題を整理すると下記のような論点が浮き彫りになっている。
① 法的不合理性⇒環境アセスの不備、裁判の不法性、行政に傅く司法による三権分立の崩壊② 政治的合理性⇒選挙結果の軽視と無視、県民投票の結果の軽視と無視③ 軍事的合理性⇒普天間代替機能の不備、辺野古新基地の軍事的機能不備④ 経済的合理性⇒基地建設費の日本負担、2 兆 5 千億円（県試算）の費用対効果⑤ 環境的合理性⇒環境アセスの不備、サンゴの破壊、ジュゴンの不保護⑥ 行政的合理性⇒全体計画・予算の不備、アセスの不備、警備費の水増し
辺野古新基地建設問題については「辺野古基地は、米軍の名を借りた自衛隊新基地建設」（保守市長）との指摘がある。また軍事アナリストの小川和久氏は那覇市内で開催された沖縄県主催の名護市辺野古米軍新基地建設の埋め立ての賛否を問う「2・24 県民投票
フォーラム」の中で「有事の際には使い物にならないのが辺野古。普天間の半分もない。
狭すぎて有事に必要な 50 機の駐機が不可能。全く役に立たない基地。建設を強行する理由は、サンズイ（汚職）以外には考えられない」と厳しい指摘をしている 24）。
また辺野古基地建設の困難さは、防衛省によっても埋め立て開始当時から「軟弱地盤の存在」が確認され、7 万 7 千本もの砂杭工事を必要としているものの、日本では水深 60メー
トルまでしか工事実績はなく、辺野古海域での90メートルの水深での工事実績はないため、工事の難航が予想されている。
また辺野古周辺の活断層の危険性も指摘されている。莫大な建設費は 2 兆 5 千億円（沖縄県試算）との指摘もあり、政府は当初、県の指摘に対し「大げさ」（防衛相）などと反論していたが、その後は「試算困難」（安倍首相）としたうえで、工事費を当初の 3600 億円から 9300 億円（2018 年 12 月）に上方修正している。しかし、この工事費も 2023 年 9 月
段階で予算の 46％を使用しながら工事の進捗率は 14％にとどまるなど、沖縄県の試算に
24）沖縄県主催「名護市辺野古米軍新基地建設の埋め立ての賛否を問う県民投票（24 日）について考えるフォーラム」（2019 年 2 月 7 日）での小川和久氏の発言。

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『国際武器移転史』第 18 号（2024 年 7 月）

近づく内容となっている 25）（辺野古
新基地建設工費に関する 90 頁の図は「東京新聞」2023 年 9 月 5 日付
朝刊から転載）。
また完成後の懸念として米軍が運用上の課題としている「米軍の航空法違反」の可能性も指摘されている。周辺の辺野古弾薬庫や国立沖縄高専の建物で米軍基準高度制限がクリアできない可能性が、当の米軍からも指摘されている 26）。
辺野古新基地建設の長すぎる建設工事期間の問題も指摘されている。政府によると今後、完成までには 13 年ほどさらに必要で、その間は政府が「世界一危険な基地」とする普天間基地の危険性を放置することになる。米軍は「普天間の代替基地は普天間」（2023 年 11 月、米海
兵隊幹部＝記者会見）と語るほど、建設される辺野古新基地建設の必要性について否定的な見解を公表するようになっている 27）。さらに環境破壊問題もあり周辺の7万4,000 群落のサンゴの移植も不可能で、ジュゴンの生息域の主食となるアマモの喪失など米国でも保護されるジュゴンの生息域破壊に対する課題も指摘されている 28）。
米海兵隊司令官の中には「辺野古移設も米軍は一度もお願いしていない。逆に第 3 海兵隊遠征軍は HQ のグアム移設が必要になり、逆に迷惑している。辺野古は日本の大手ゼネコンとその族議員が絡んでいるので、辺野古は推進、続行されている。しかも官邸が絡んでいる」と指摘する声もある 29）。埋め立て工事を担うゼネコンの利権について、今後検証する必要がある。
25）『東京新聞』2023 年 11 月６日付。
26）「集落・弾薬庫、高さ制限超 国内航空法も逸脱 辺野古新基地 安全規制は有名無実化」『琉球新報』
2018 年 04 月 13 日付。
27）『琉球新報』2023 年 11 月 11 日。
「【深掘り】米軍幹部が「普天間維持」に言及で波紋」『琉球新報』2023 年 11 月 11 日付。
28）沖縄県「辺野古新基地建設問題（普天間飛行場の辺野古移設）について」
ページ番号 1017415 更新日 2024 年 3 月 13 日（https://www.pref.okinawa.jp/heiwakichi/
futenma/1017409/1017415.html 参照）。
29）在沖米海兵隊幹部への筆者インタビュー（2021 年 10 月 11 日 那覇市内）。

90分断する国際秩序－軍事緊張と平和創造のはざまで－（前泊博盛）

米海兵隊の司令官らは「軟弱地盤問題が修正できなければ軍事的な影響を与える恐れもある」「代替施設よりも普天間基地の方が軍事的に優位性が高い」30）と新基地建設に消極的な立場から直截的な発言を行うようになっている。
そもそも辺野古新基地建
設計画は、米海兵隊（1966年）と米海軍（1967 年）によって計画書が作成されていた。しかし、当時はベトナム戦争の最中でもあり、沖縄の施政権の日本返還交渉が本格化しつつあったこともあり、建設計画は見送られてきた経緯がある。添1966 年に作成されたアメリカ海兵隊の辺野古基地計画

付の設計図は、1966 年に作成 さ れ た 海 兵 隊 辺 野 古 新 基 地 建 設 計 画 図（
「GENERAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN
MARINE

COORPSAIR

FACILITYHENOKO,OKINAWA,RYUKYU ISLANDS」1966

年 1 月 17 日）である。ついでだが、この建設計画で注目されるのは、現在の計画で難航している大浦湾側の軟弱地盤エリアが工事対象から外された計画となっている点にも注目しておきたい。日本政府は、この米海兵隊や米海軍による辺野古新基地建設計画について十分な検討を行っていない可能性がある。そうでなければ、なぜ軟弱地盤を回避した計画を策定できなかったのか。確認する必要がある。

６. 台湾有事と沖縄
ところで、日本が台湾有事に軍事介入する理由は何か。日本と米国は 1972 年の米中、
日中国交回復を契機に「中華人民共和国と中華民国（台湾）は一つの中国」として承認、認識を明らかにしてきた。
それにもかかわらず、台湾問題を「内政問題」としてきたはずの日本が中華人民共和国
による台湾問題に武力を伴う介入を想定している理由は何か。
「上海コミュニケ」（1972
年 2 月 21 日）では、米が平和五原則として「一つの中国」の認識を表明し、「92 合意（共識）」（1992 年）でも「台湾と中国は一つの中国」を再確認している。

30）『琉球新報』2023 年 11 月 5 日。

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『国際武器移転史』第 18 号（2024 年 7 月）

習近平政権による台湾への武力介入による統合には「中国の武力介入 3 条件（習近平政権）」が明示されている 31）。①台湾の内乱、②台湾独立の動き、③外国の介入・内政干渉の３条件である。米国政府の資料によれば、「中国の武力侵攻のトリガー（きっかけ）」は、
以下のように想定されている。
①台湾が独立を宣言したとき。
②台湾が国連に加盟申請を行うなど独立に向かう動き。
③台湾内部の混乱。
④台湾の核武装の動き。
⑤台湾が平和維持軍の駐留を要請したときその点からは日本と米国による「内政干渉」が、米中関係、日中関係の悪化を招き、台湾有事を日本有事、沖縄有事へとつなぐ動きへとつながっている。
一方で、筆者が 2022 年末から 2024 年初頭までの間、共同代表の一人としてかかわってきた台湾や中国の軍事専門家やシンクタンクとの「台湾有事を起こさせない・沖縄対話プ
ロジェクト」の中で中台関係者らから「なぜいま日本は台湾有事と騒いでいるのか」との声を多く聞かされた。日本だけが大騒ぎしているような印象であった。
台湾に至っては、2024 年１月に実施された「台湾総統選挙」では対中独立志向の強い
民進党が勝利したものの、同時期に実施された立法院議員選挙では対中融和の国民党が過半数を占めるなど、台湾民意の絶妙なバランス感覚が注目を集めた。
対中関係においては、日本と米国のトップによる密接な対話が必要であり、アジアにおける武力行使や戦争回避について、丁寧かつ慎重な外交術の展開が求められている。

まとめにかえてここ数年の間に沖縄では自衛隊基地が急速に整備され、ミサイル基地の運用が開始されている。那覇に拠点を置く陸上自衛隊第 15 旅団は、岸田政権によって旅団から師団への格上げが決定されている。師団とは局地戦を展開できる規模の戦闘能力を持つものであり、かつての沖縄戦を戦った旧日本軍第 32 軍の沖縄配備と重なるものがある。巨大な部隊の配備は、沖縄を戦場化することにつながりかねないとの危機感が沖縄戦を生き抜いた
戦争体験世代を中心に高まっている。

31）岡田充・元共同通信記者、山下裕貴・千葉科学大学客員教授らが論考で指摘（山下は自衛隊沖縄地方
協力本部長、東部方面総監部幕僚長、第三師団長、陸上幕僚副長、中部方面総監などの要職を歴任し特殊作戦群の創設にも関わる。2015 年、陸将で退官）。

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分断する国際秩序－軍事緊張と平和創造のはざまで－（前泊博盛）

旧日本軍による「捨て石作戦」は、沖縄を本土の人身御供にする計画であった。そしてまた始まった旧日本軍と同じような日本軍（自衛隊）の沖縄への配備強化は、戦後、アメリカの政治・歴史学者のジョージ・H・カーの指摘通り「沖縄は日本のエクスペンダブル（消耗品）」とされようとしているのであろうか。
沖縄の戦場化を想定する「台湾有事」は、いったい誰が、何のために仕掛ける戦争であろうか。そして台湾有事を理由に強化される「異次元の軍拡」は、新たな戦争を抑止するためのものなのか、それとも戦争への準備であろうか。
主権者たる国民は、新たな戦争への道に導かれることがないように、日本政府による意
図的な軍拡プロパガンダに翻弄されることなく、国内外の複数のメディアを常にチェックし、「ファクト（事実）とエビデンス（証拠）」に基づく確度の高い情報を精査し、受発信できる情報ネットワークの構築に挑む必要がある。
特に核兵器など武器や弾薬の動き、戦闘機や潜水艦などの輸出入の動きについては十分な警戒心を持って注視したい。
（了）

93

編 集 後 記
第 18 号は論文 2 本、研究ノート 2 本（使用言語はいずれも英語）、講演録 1 本で構成されています。英文による論考が大部分となっているのは、研究インスティテュートとして、
世界的視野で研究を発信・発展させたいと考えているからです。
竹内論文は、19C 後半から現代に至る英国の世界的展開を概括しつつ、Brexit 以降の英国の国家間連携のあり方を「アングロ圏」という視角で整理し、それにコミットする日本の問題点も指摘した包括的で意欲的な論考です。
高田論文は、世界有数の観光地ハワイの成立が、米国による太平洋地域の軍事拠点形成と民間航空輸送でのジェット機普及にどれほど依存していたかを、「ミリツーリズム」
をキーワードに歴史的に検証した興味深い論考です。
藤田氏の研究ノートは、第二次大戦末期アメリカの B29B 爆撃機による日本の石油施設
夜間精密爆撃作戦の背景に、長距離爆撃機の量産化と高解像度レーダー開発があったことを指摘し、作戦と産業動員の関連に着目することの重要性を指摘したものとなっています。
下斗米氏の研究ノートは、冷戦期のアメリカの対外援助や移民政策の変化を丹念に整理し、フォード財団等によるインドの工科大学支援等で育成された科学技術エリートがアメリカへ移動＝頭脳流出するプロセスをデータに基づき解明したものとなっています。
日本語の講演録は、沖縄国際大学前泊教授が本研究所の第 10 回シンポジウムで講演された内容をまとめたものです。
「台湾有事」を理由に特に沖縄で現在進行中の「異次元の軍拡」を、再び沖縄を「消耗品」扱いするのか、という厳しい問題提起がなされています。
このように、本号には歴史的検討から現状分析的なテーマまで含まれておりますので、読者からの忌憚のないご意見・評価をお待ちしております。また、昨今の武力紛争の深刻化に対しても、和平のみちを求めて学術的視点から発信し続ける所存です。

（白戸 伸一・しらと しんいち）

95

編集委員横井勝彦（明治大学名誉教授 編集委員長）

須藤 功（明治大学 本研究所長）

榎本珠良（明治学院大学）

松永友有（横浜国立大学）

竹内真人（日本大学）

田嶋信雄（成城大学名誉教授）

纐纈 厚（山口大学名誉教授）

鈴木 淳（東京大学）

赤津正彦（明治大学）

塙 武郎（専修大学）

渡辺昭一（東北学院大学）

福士 純（東京経済大学）

森元晶文（中央学院大学）

永岑三千輝（横浜市立大学名誉教授）『国際武器移転史』第 18 号
2024 年 7 月 19 日印刷

2024 年 7 月 26 日発行

編集・発行 明治大学国際武器移転史研究所
代表者 須藤 功
連絡先住所 〒 101-8301 東京都千代田区神田駿河台 1 − 1
明治大学グローバルフロント 16 階明治大学国際武器移転史研究所
Email: rihgat_journal@meiji.ac.jp
URL: http://www.kisc.meiji.ac.jp/~transfer/
印刷・製本 株式会社 サンヨー