Journal of Natural Disaster Science, Volume 26, Number 2, 2004, pp101-107

A study of the Cognitive Structure of Conflict over Disaster Mitigation Projects
Hiroyuki SAKAKIBARA1, Hisanori KAKU2 and Kazushi KIDERA3
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Yamaguchi University
2-16-1 Tokiwadai, Ube, Yamaguchi, 755-8611, Japan
2
Ohashi Architecture Office3
TVQ Kyushu Broadcasting CO. LTD.

1

(Received for 10 Jun., 2004 and in revised from 7 Jan., 2005)

ABSTRACT
Projects for disaster mitigation such as reservoirs often change the natural and social environments of a region.
If people have different opinions on such changes, these projects may cause conflicts. Participatory disaster mitigation requires a mechanism for managing such conflicts. To promote stakeholders involved in a conflict to acompromise, it is necessary to understand the structure of the conflict. This study focuses on the relationshipbetween people’s recognition about a conflict and final outcome of the conflict. First, a model involving players’
game-making process is constructed, and it is shown that opinion-summarizing rules can affect the outcome of aconflict. Second, a survey of people’s cognitive structure of a conflict was made, and the results show the possibility of polarization between people’s recognition and game theoretic model.

1. INTRODUCTION

2. GAME THEORY BASED CONFLICT MODELING

Projects for disaster mitigation, such as reservoirs, oftenchange the natural and social environments of a region. Whenpeople have different opinions on such changes, projects may
cause conflict. Participatory disaster mitigation requires a mechanism for managing such conflicts.
To get stakeholders involved in a conflict to compromise, it isnecessary to understand the structure of that conflict. Game theory
is often used for to analyze conflict. The non-cooperative gamemodel consists of players (stakeholders involved in a conflict),strategies (actions which a player can take), and payoffs (players’
numerical evaluations of the outcomes of conflict). In game theory, it is assumed that combination of players’ strategies and an outcome have one-to-one correspondence. In an actual conflict, however, stakeholders may perceive the same conflict differently.
Additionally, people’s cognitive structures may differ from thestandard game theoretic model, and inappropriate recognition may
lead to an inefficient outcome. Conflict management needs toincorporate a process for sharing knowledge about a conflict.
This study focuses on the relationship between people’s
recognition of a conflict and the final outcome of that conflict.
The study consists of two parts, model analysis and survey analysis. In the first part (Section 3), a model involving players’ gamemaking process is constructed. It shows that opinion summarizing
rules can affect the outcome of a conflict. In the second part(Section 4), a survey of people’s cognitive structures of a conflict
is made. Results show the possibility of polarization between people’s recognition and game theoretic model.

2.1 Non-Cooperative Strategic Form Game
Game theory is often used for modeling an interactive decision-making situation. Game theory is classified into cooperativeand non-cooperative game, depending on whether a binding agreement exists. The non-cooperative strategic form game is defined
hereafter.
Definition 2.1 (Myerson, 1991)
A strategic-form game is any Γ of the form
G = ( N ,(Q i )i ŒN ,( Pi )i ŒN )(2.1)

Where N is a nonempty set and, for each i in N, Q i is a nonempty
set and Pi a function from P Q j into the set of real numbers R.
j ŒN

N is a set of players who correspond to stakeholders in a conflict. Each player in N has the set of strategies Q i . Q = P Q j is
j ŒN

the set of strategy profile. For any strategy profile θ, the number
Pi (θ) represents the payoff that player i can obtain if strategy profile c is realized.
Strategy profile θ* is the Nash equilibrium if the following
inequality is satisfied;
Pi (q * ) ≥ Pi (qi ,q -*i ),"i Œ N ,"qi ŒQ i
*

(2.2)

(θi ,θ−i ) is the strategy profile by which player i chooses strategy
θi and the other players choose the same strategies with θ*. The
equilibrium of a game is usually interpreted as the outcome of aconflict.

KEY WORDS: Disaster Mitigation, Participatory Planning, Conflicts, Experimental Game

102

H. SAKAKIBARA, H. KAKU AND K. KIDERA

2.2 Players’ Recognition on the Structure of a GameAs stated in 1, the stakeholders in a conflict about disastermitigation often have different recognition on the conflict.
Examples of non-cooperative game models that describe behaviorsof players who do not share the knowledge about the structure of aconflict are, incomplete information game of Harsanyi (1967,1968) and learning model (ex. Fudenberg and Levine, 1998 andYoung, 1998). In the incomplete information game, the probability distributions of elements of the game are common knowledge ofthe players. In contrast, in the learning model, expectations ofother players’ behavior are formed by repetitive plays of the samegame. i.e., the learning model assumes that trial and error is permitted in the model. Additionally, as Oechssler and Schipper(2003) mentioned, players in the learning model learn about “Howshould we play?,” but not about the structure of the game.
Whereas Bayesian equilibrium in the incomplete information
game is determined by the objective probability distributions of theelements of the game, for subjective equilibrium by Kalai andLehrer (1995), players own subjective expectations on probability
distributions of elements of a game, and decisions are made basedon those expectations. If subjective and objective expectations
accidentally are consistent, then subjective and objective equilibrium also are consistent. Even if expectations are not same, subjective and objective equilibrium can exist simultaneously without
correct recognition of the structure of the game. From the viewpoint of experimental game, Oechssler and Schipper (2003)
showed that players may not recognize the structure of a gameeven after repetitive play. They also showed that the player withwrong recognition may be able to behave the way as the player
with correct recognition.
In conflicts on disaster mitigation, the structure of conflictvaries depending on each case, and it is difficult to form expectation by repetitive play. In each conflict, players need to form gamestructure and share the recognition about it. In the following sections, the interactive decision making situations in which players
do not share the knowledge on the structure of a conflict are analyzed. In section 3, a model incorporating players’ opinion summarizing process is described. When players need to reflect theirsupporters’ preferences for their behaviors, they summarize thesupporters’ opinions in order to construct a game. In that case, differences of opinion-summarizing rules can affect the outcome of aconflict. Section 4 reports a survey of people’s recognition of aconflict. The survey focuses on correspondence between the strategy profile and the outcome of conflict.
3. DECISION MODEL INVOLVING OPINION
SUMMARIZING PROCESS
3.1 Modeling Agent Game
A model that describes a game in which players behave as theagents of supporters is shown. The relationship between players
and supporters is diagrammed in Fig. 3.1. Supporters 1 and 2 havetheir own preferences for the outcomes of a conflict. The players
as agents behave according to priority orders, which reflect supporters’ preference orders indirectly. Supporter i’s evaluation ofoutcome j is represented by the payoff p ij . Supporter i’s payoff
profile is;Fig. 3.1 Relationship between Players as Agents and Supporters

P i = ( p1i , p2i ,..., pui )(3.1)

The player summarizes supporter’s opinions and derives a priority order. Player i’s priority for outcome j is represented by πij .
Since πij is determined by payoff profile p i and outcome j, we candefine the following function φi.

p ij = f i ( P i , j )(3.2)

Hereafter, φ is called the “opinion summarizing rule.”
Players take actions to obtain the outcome that has the maximum πij . Even if supporters’ preferences are the same, πij may
differ, depending on the opinion summarizing rule.
i

3.2 Modeling a Conflict
In this section, the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution(GMCR) by Fang, et al. (1993) is employed to describe a conflict.
Let N = {1,2,…,n} be the set of players and K ={k1,k2,…,ku} the setof states of the conflict. In this paper, only two player conflicts (N= {1,2}) are discussed. Two-tuple {Di}(i=1,2) is defined as the setof directed graphs such that Di = (K,Vi ). The set of arcs, Vi , denotes
player i’s possible move between states. Let kl km be the arc fromstate kl to state km. kl k m∈Vi implies that player i can move fromstate kl to state km, unilaterally.
To formulate a conflict by the GMCR, payoff functions arealso necessary to be defined. Payoff function Pi specifies the player i’s preference order. If Pi (k l) > Pi (k m), then player i prefers state
kl to state km. In the general definition of GMCR, the states can bepreferred equally. However, in this paper, it is assumed that eachpair of states is ordered strictly (i.e., there are no equally preferredstates.)The GMCR for a 2-player conflict is represented by 4-tuple{N,K,V,P}, in which
N ={1,2}, K ={k 1,k 2,…,ku}, V = {V1,V2} and P = {Pi│i ∈ N}.
Here are other definitions used in GMCR.
a) State k’s reachable list: Si (k) (k∈K)
kk ' ŒVi ¤ k ' Œ Si ( k )(3.3)b) State k’s unilateral improvement (UI): Si (k)+k ' Œ Si ( k ) and Pi ( k ') > Pi ( k ) ¤ k ' Œ Si+ ( k )(3.4)

By means of the GMCR, the conflict over reservoir project is

A STUDY OF THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT OVER DISASTER MITIGATION PROJECTS

modeled. Player 1 is called the opposition group, player 2 the government. For simplicity, possible outcomes are limited to following the four states (K={k1,k2, k3, k4}).
State 1 (k1): Opposition escalates and the project is modified.
State 2 (k2): Opposition escalates and the project is carried out
as planned.
State 3 (k3): The opposition group communicates with thegovernment and the project is modified.
State 4 (k4): The opposition group communicates with thegovernment and the project is carried out as itplanned.
Possible players’ actions are “taking aggressive behavior” and“accepting dialogue with the government” for player 1, and “modifying the project” and “carrying out the project as planned” forplayer 2. The set of possible actions for player i is defined as Ai .
The state where player 1 chooses al1∈A1 and player 2 chooses am2∈
A2 is represented by k (al1, am2 ). Players can change the state byvarying their actions. Player 1 can change the state between k1
and k3 and between k2 and k4, whereas, player 2 can change thestate between k1 and k2 and between k3 and k4. Fig. 3.2 shows players’ possible transitions.
In this study, the above four states are interpreted as the phases of the conflict, and the set of player’s reactions in each state isdefined as “stationary strategy.” Player i’s stationary strategy θi isformulated as follows.

qi : k Æ k ', k ' Œ[Si ( k ) » {k }](3.5)

Under stationary strategy, player’s reaction at each state is determined in advance.
The set of player i’s stationary strategies is defined as Q i .
Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4 show the feasible stationary strategies ofplayers 1 and 2. The combination of players’ stationary strategies,
the strategy profile, is represented by θ.
The outcome of conflict under strategy profile θ is defined as

103

follows.
Definition 3.1
Under strategy profile θ, state k that satisfies the following equation is called the outcome of conflict under θ and is represented byO(θ);

qi ( k ) = k"i Œ N(3.6)

Since each player has four stationary strategies (Figs. 3.3 and3.4), the modeled conflict can be formulated as a strategic-form
game with 16 strategy profiles. Table 3.1 shows the relationships
between the stationary strategies and outcomes. In the strategy
profiles represented by “-”, the outcome defined by (3.6) does notexist.
Players choose a stationary strategy that maximizes its own
payoffs. Nash equilibrium can be formulated as it defined in ordinary strategic form game.
Definition 3.2
Strategy profile θ* is Nash equilibrium if and only if the following relationship is satisfied for each player;
Pi (O(q * )) ≥ Pi (O(qi ,q -*i ))"qi ŒQ i(3.7)

3.3 Opinion Summarizing Rules
In this paper, two types of opinion summarizing rules are supposed.
(a) Outcome-Based Opinion Summarizing

f i ( P i , j ) = pij(3.8)

Fig. 3.2 D1 (Left) and D2 (Right)

Fig. 3.4 Player 2’s Stationary Strategies

Table 3.1

Fig. 3.3 Player 1’s Stationary Strategies

Relationship between Stationary Strategies and Outcomes104

H. SAKAKIBARA, H. KAKU AND K. KIDERA(b) Action-Based Opinion Summarizing
Under the outcome-based opinion-summarizing rule, players
ask supporters to reveal the payoff for each outcome (i.e., players
say “Please let me know your payoffs for outcomes.”). As a result,
πij = p ij is satisfied for each player i and outcome j.
In contrast, players under the action-based opinion-summarizing rule ask supporters to reveal differences in the desirability ofeach action (Players ask supporters, “Which action do you prefer?”). Supporter i’s difference of desirability for player l’s actions
1 and 2 is defined as σil . When σil > 0, supporter i hopes that
player l will choose action 1 rather than action 2. Player i determines behavior based on the revealed (σ1i ,σ2i ).
The Opinion-summarizing rule must satisfy the following
conditions.
(1) Consistency with supporter’s preference

P1i > P3i and P2i > P4i fi p 1i > p 3i and p 2i > p 4i

(3.17)

P1i < P3i and P2i < P4i fi p 1i < p 3i and p 2i < p 4i

(3.18)

P1i > P2i and P3i > P4i fi p 1i > p 2i and p 3i > p 4i

(3.19)

P1i < P2i and P3i < P4i fi p 1i < p 2i and p 3i < p 4i

(3.20)

Obviously, outcome-based opinion-summarizing rule satisfies thepriority of the supporter’s dominant action. Note that equations(3.17) – (3.20) are not necessary and sufficient conditions. The
action is dominant in player’s priority, the action is not necessarily
dominant in supporter’s preference order.
In the following part, action-based opinion-summarizing rulethat satisfies the priority of supporter’s dominant action is formulated. Supporter is assumed to determine σlk according to the following equations.

P1i > P3i and P2i > P4i fi s 1i > 0(3.9)

P1i < P3i and P2i < P4i fi s 1i < 0(3.10)

s 11 = ( P11 - P31 )b + ( P21 - P41 ) (1 - b )(3.21)

P1i > P2i and P3i > P4i fi s 2i > 0(3.11)

s 12 = ( P11 - P21 ) a + ( P31 - P41 ) (1 - a )(3.22)

P1i < P2i and P3i < P4i fi s 2i < 0(3.12)

s 12 = ( P12 - P32 ) b + ( P22 - P42 ) (1 - b )(3.23)

s 22 = ( P12 - P22 ) a + ( P32 - P42 ) (1 - a )(3.24)(2) Consistency with revealed informations > 0 fi p > p and p > pi4(3.13)

s < 0 fi p < p and p < pi4(3.14)

s 2i > 0 fi p 1i > p 2i and p 3i > p 4i

(3.15)

s < 0 fi p < p and p < p(3.16)

i
1

i
1

i
2

i
1

i
1

i
1

i
3

i
3

i
2

i
2

i
2

i
3

Here, 0 £ a £ 1 and 0 £ b £ 1 . a (1 - a ) and b (1 - b ) respectively
are interpreted as subjective probabilities for player 1’s strategies
and player 2’s strategies. A player determines the priority πij ,based on the revealed σil by the following equations.

p 1i = s 1i + s 2i , p 2i = s 1i - s 2i , p 3i = -s 1i + s 2i , p 4i = -s 1i - s 2i (3.25)i
4Consistency with supporter’s preference means that if the supporter prefers outcomes lead from one player’s action dominantly,
supporter reveals that the action is more desirable. Consistency
with revealed information means that player gives priority to theaction which is desirable for the player’s supporter. From conditions (1) and (2), the following property can be derived.
Priority of the supporter’s dominant action
Table 3.2

By equations (3.21) – (3.25), the action-based opinion-summarizing rule is,
f i ( P i ,1) = (a + b ) p1i + ( -a - b + 1) p2i + ( -a - b + 1) p3i + (a + b - 2) p4i
f i ( P i ,2) = ( -a + b ) p1i + (a - b + 1) p2i + (a - b - 1) p3i + ( -a + b ) p4i
f i ( P i , 3) = (a - b ) p1i + ( -a + b - 1) p2i + ( -a + b + 1) p3i + (a - b ) p4i
f i ( P i , 4 ) = ( -a - b ) p1i + (a + b - 1) p2i + (a + b - 1) p3i + ( -a - b + 2) p4i

Relationship between σil and Outcomes(3.26)

A STUDY OF THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT OVER DISASTER MITIGATION PROJECTSThe action-based opinion-summarizing rule formulated in equation(3.26) satisfies the priority of the supporter’s dominant action.
3.4 Nash Equilibrium in Agent GameThe equilibrium under the two opinion-summarizing rules
defined in 3.2 is compared in the case defined as follows.
Supporters 1: P31 > P1 1 > P21 > P41
Supporters 2: P4 2 > P3 2 > P2 2 > P1 2

(3.27)

Whereas supporters of the government prefer that project iscarried out as planned (P42 > P32 , P22 > P12), supporters of the opposition group prefer that the project is modified (P11 > P21 , P31 > P41). If
the project is modified, supporters of the opposition group preferdialogue with the government (P31 > P11). However, if the project iscarried out as it planned, they prefer escalating the conflict.
In the preference of the supporters of governments, the states
where the opposition group accepts dialogue are dominant to thestates where the opposition group is for escalating a conflict (P32 >P12 , P42 > P22). This implies that the priority of the supporters ofgovernment is for dialogue with the opposition group.
When the outcome-based opinion-summarizing rule isemployed, Nash equilibrium strategy profiles are ②−IV and ④−
I. Consequently, from Table 3.2, the realized outcomes are thestates 2 (Opposition escalates and project is carried out as itplanned) or 3 (Opposition group communicates with government
and project is modified). Equation (3.26) shows that the state 3 isdominant to the state 2.
When action-based opinion-summarizing rule is employed, σ11
0σ12 > 0,σ12 < 0 and σ22 <0 are derived from (3.26). From Table
3.2, state 2 may be unique outcome of the conflict, i.e., only the
Pareto inferior outcome can be realized.
4.

SURVEY OF THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE
OF A CONFLICT

4.1 Survey
In section 3, a model including opinion-summarizing rules
was constructed. It showed that the result of conflict might change
depending on the rules. In actual conflicts, opinion-summarizing
rules are based on people’s recognition of the structure of conflict.
Here, a questionnaire is used to survey people’s cognitive structures of conflicts over disaster mitigation projects. First, a respondent was instructed on the background of a hypothetical conflictover a reservoir project. For simplification, only two players, government and opposition group, are assumed. The government
plans and proceeds with the reservoir project. In contrast, theopposition group is concerned about damage to natural environment and opposes the project. Both the government and opposition group have plural action choices. Although the conflict ishypothetical, similar situations occur in a real world.
Given instructions on the conflict, the respondent is asked tochoose i) actions which he or she recognizes as being possible totake on the conflict, and ii) outcomes which he or she recognizes
as being possible to be realized. If people’s cognitive structure ofa conflict is similar to game theoretic model, the choices in i) andii) should be consistent.
We formulated an instruction to explain this hypothetical conflict. Respondents were asked to read the instruction and answer

105

the following questions:
Q1: From your subjective viewpoint, choose the set of possible
actions of the opposition group from the following threeactions. (Choose more than one action.)
A. Taking aggressive behavior
B. Asking for a referendum
C. Communicating with the government
Q2: From your subjective viewpoint, choose the set of possible
actions of the government from the following three actions.
(Choose more than one action.)A. Communicating with the opposition group
B. Suspension of the project
C. No communication and proceeding with the projectQ3: From the set of possible actions specified in Q1 and Q2,choose one action as the most desirable action.
Q4: From your objective viewpoint, choose the set of possible outcomes of a conflict from the following nine outcomes. (Thenumber of choices is not limited.)
・ The opposition group takes aggressive behavior, and the government tries to communicate with the group (AA).
・ The opposition group takes aggressive behavior, and the government suspends the project (AB).
・ The opposition group takes aggressive behavior, but the government does not try to communicate with the group and proceeds with the project (AC).
・ The opposition group asks for a referendum, and the government tries to communicate with the group (BA).
・ The opposition group asks for a referendum, and the government suspends the project (BB).
・ The opposition group asks for a referendum, but the government does not try to communicate with the group and proceeds with the project (BC).
・ The opposition group tries to communicate with the government, and the government tries to communicate with thegroup (CA).
・ The opposition group tries to communicate with the government, and the government suspends the project (CB).
・ The opposition group tries to communicate with the government, but the government does not try to communicate withthe group and proceeds with the project (CC).
Two characters in parentheses in Q4 represent actions that lead aconflict to the corresponding outcome. In the actual questionnaire,these characters are not shown, and the order of outcomes in Q4 israndomized.
As the purpose of this survey was to detect the general properties of cognitive structure of a conflict, the respondent was not necessarily a stakeholder involved in a specific conflict. There were
139 respondents, 99 university students and 40 engineers. Notethat all the students belonged to the department of civil engineering, and most of the engineers were civil ones.
Table 4.1 shows the relationship between the set of players’
possible actions and the corresponding outcomes. As defined in 2,
the combination of players’ actions is the “strategy profile.”
Shaded areas in Table 4.1 represent the strategy profiles when the
opposition group chooses actions A and B as possible and the government actions B and C. If the respondent chooses outcomes outside of the shaded areas or does not choose outcomes included in

106

H. SAKAKIBARA, H. KAKU AND K. KIDERA

Table 4.1

Relationship between the Set of Players’ Possible
Actions and Corresponding Outcomes

Table 4.2

Results of Test I*: 5% significant (null hypothesis is rejected)

ple’s cognitive structure of a conflict is polarized in at least forsome outcomes.

those areas, it signifies that respondent’s cognitive structure ispolarized from non-cooperative game model.
4.2 Survey Result
A statistical test on ratios was carried out to detect people’s
cognitive structures. The population ratios of the two sets aredefined as π1 and π2. The null hypothesis is π1=π2(=p). The)
sample ratios of two samples from the two sets are defined as p1)
and p2 (Sample sizes are n1 and n2). Statistic Z is formulated asfollows.

Z=) )p1 - p2
p(1 - p) (

1
1
+ )
n1 n2

,p =

)
)
n 1 p1 + n 2 p2
n 1+ n 2(4.1)

When the sample size is large enough, Z follows normal distribution. If Z is larger than the threshold, the null hypothesis is rejected and π1 and π2 differ statistically. Results of three statisticaltests are given below.
Test I: Difference between choices of strategy profiles and outcomes))
In this test, sample ratios p1 and p2 were defined as follows.
SUM 2 - SUM 3) SUM 3 )p1 =, p2 =SUM1
N - SUM1(4.2)

SUM1: The number of respondents who chose the corresponding
strategy profile derived from Q1 and Q2.
SUM2: The number of respondents who chose the corresponding
outcome in Q4.
SUM3: The number of respondents who chose the corresponding
strategy profile derived from Q1 and Q2, and chose thecorresponding outcome in Q4.
N: Total number of respondents)
p1 is the ratio of the respondents who chose the correspond)
ing strategy profile and outcome simultaneously, and p2 the ratioof respondents who chose the corresponding outcome out of those
who did not choose the corresponding strategy profile. When the))
difference between p1 and p2 is significant, the choice of outcomes depends on the choice of strategy profiles. This means thatthe strategy profile and outcome are related to the respondent’s
cognitive structure of a conflict and that non-cooperative gamemodel is appropriate to describe that conflict. If, however, the dif))ference between p1 and p2 is not significant, polarization between
recognitions of strategy profiles and outcomes exists.
Table 4.2 shows the results of Test I. The significance levela is 0.05. In some outcomes, such as AC and BC, the difference))
between p1 and p2 is not significant. This result shows that peo-

Test II: Consistency between the Subjective and Objective
Recognitions of Actions
Possible reasons for the polarization seen in Test I are as follows.
1. Having heard or seen about conflicts over reservoir projects,
respondents may already have knowledge about the structureof such conflicts. This prior knowledge might affect theiranswers.
2. Respondents may have answered differently from the subjective (Q1 and Q2) and objective (Q4) viewpoint.
Test II was done to examine the second reason. First, theobjective recognition of actions was defined. If a respondent choseat least one outcome caused by an action in Q4, it was judged thatthe respondent recognized the existence of the corresponding
action objectively. In Test II, objective and subjective recognitionof actions derived from Q1 and Q2 are compared.
))
The sample ratios, p1 and p2 , are defined as follows.
SUM 5 - SUM 6) SUM 6 )p1 =, p2 =SUM 4
N - SUM 4(4.3)

SUM4: The number of respondents who chose the corresponding
action a in Q1 or Q2.
SUM5: The number of respondents who chose at least one outcome caused by the action a in Q4.
SUM6: The number of respondents who chose the corresponding
action a in Q1 or Q2 and at least one outcome caused by
the action a in Q4.
)
p1 is the ratio of respondents recognizing action a objectively)
to those recognizing a subjectively, and p2 is the ratio of respondents recognizing action a objectively to those not recognizing a))
subjectively. When the difference between p1 and p2 is significant, subjective and objective recognitions of the action a are consistent.
Table 4.3 gives the results of Test II. In the oppositiongroup’s actions (Q1), polarization between subjective and objective recognition was relatively significant. This is partly because
the survey respondents consisted of people familiar with public
works projects.
Test III: Difference between choices of objective strategy profiles and outcomes))
The sample ratios p1 and p2 are defined as follows.
SUM 2 - SUM 8) SUM 8 ), p2 =
p1 =SUM 7
SUM 5 - SUM 7(4.4)

SUM7: The number of respondents who chose at least one outcome caused by the opposition group’s action a and thegovernment’s action a’ in Q2.
SUM8: The number of respondents who chose at least one out-

A STUDY OF THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF CONFLICT OVER DISASTER MITIGATION PROJECTSTable 4.3

Results of Test II

Table 4.4

Results of Test III

107

a conflict without examining the interaction of decisions.
However, such knowledge may sometimes prevent them frombehaving strategically. In the case of the conflict over a reservoir
project, the opposition group may hope for dialogue with the governmental agency. If, however, government’s knowledge suggeststhat opposition group prefers aggressive actions, government may
not try to talk with opposition group, and the possibility of compromise is lost.
5. CONCLUSION

come caused by the opposition group’s action a, the government’s action a’ in Q2, and the corresponding outcomein Q4.
As in Test I, the purpose of Test III was to confirm differences
between recognition of actions and outcomes. Based on results ofTest II, choices of the opposition group’s action in Q1 were
replaced by the objective recognition of actions derived from Q4.
))
When the difference between p1 and p2 is significant, the strategy
profile based on subjective recognition of opposition group’s
actions and outcome are related in respondent’s cognitive structureof a conflict.
Table 4.4 shows the results of Test III. Comparison with))
Table 4.1 shows that the differences between p1 and p2 are notnecessarily increased. That is, polarization between recognition ofstrategy profile and outcome is not decreased by removing the difference between the subjective and objective recognition of action.
Polarization may be due to respondents’ knowledge of conflicts inthe past, or their ability to estimate results from context.
4.3 Interpretation of Survey Results
Results of the statistical test show that polarization exists forsome questions between recognition of actions and outcomes,
whereas recognitions have consistency in other. This suggests that
there were people who had prior knowledge of a similar type of
conflict. Such knowledge is supposed to affect people’s cognitive
structure of a conflict.
In some cases, prior knowledge is useful for understanding asituation. For example, people may be able to find equilibrium ofIn this study, people’s recognition about a conflict was analyzed. First, a model involving players’ game-making process wasconstructed. Next, a survey of people’s cognitive structure on a
conflict was made. Results of both suggested that the cognitive
structure of a conflict may affect outcome of the conflict.
In participatory planning, the importance of a coordinator isoften emphasized. One role of a coordinator is to create the“stage” for discussion. This role can be interpreted as promoting
communication between stakeholders. Our findings indicate theimportance of such communication in order to achieve a better outcome.
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