「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析

GENDER, ELECTION, AND WOMEN’S PARLIAMENTARYREPRESENTATION: ANALYSIS OF THE 2019 GENERAL ELECTION
Ani Soetjipto(University of Indonesia)
Abstract
The result of the 2019 Indonesian General Election (i.e., presidential and national
parliament) highlighted women’s increasing representation at the national level (Dewan
Perwakilan Rakyat/House of Representatives) and the provincial level (Dewan
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi/DPRD Provinsi, or Provincial Legislature; andDPRD Kabupaten/Kota, or District/Municipality Legislature). A quota of 30% women inparliament was adopted but not attained: women’s parliamentary representation inIndonesia at the national level has reached the average number for East Asia and PacificCountries, namely, 20% in 2018 (IPU, 2019).
However, women’s representation in parliament is based on gender representationand substantive representation, in which women MPs can introduce transformative
political notions (politics of difference) and new policy priorities, proposals, and public
policy benefits for women and other minority and marginalized groups. In this article, I
argued that the increasing statistical representation of women has no correlation withand does not guarantee the outcome of pro-women policies or policies in favor of othermarginalized and minority groups.
I propose that the statistical representation (descriptive representation) has nolinkages with substantive representation. Issues related to the meaning ofrepresentation, political parties’ nomination of women and internal democracy, as wellas patronage, dynasty politics, and oligarchy lead to the entrapment of a higher numberof women MPs into a shallow symbolic representation, debilitating the progress toachieve substantive representation after the four election cycles since 2004. Ironically,
the elected women MPs tend to perpetuate and reproduce the traditionally masculine
brand of politics rather than transform unequal gender relations.

Key words: election, quota, women’s representation

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「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析

Introduction
In post-1998 Reformation Indonesia, women’s participation in the public arena andformal politics is less constrained than in the prior era. Wide-open access for women toparticipate and contest in elections has been observed at all levels of government, fromthe village to the national level, and this achievement is encouraging.
The number of women in public positions has been increasing annually. Therefore, I
propose that the phenomenon of increase in women’s participation in Indonesia’democratic space is due to the 1998 Reformation. This increase in women participatingand entering formal politics is helping preserve democracy. Politics is no longer an arena
denied to women. Today, women participate as equals with men in politics.
Notable progress is also evident in the more equitable regulations for women’s
participation in politics and those for the public, who have ceased their antagonistic
stance against women participating in politics. However, despite this progress, a criticalview of this novel situation is necessary.
The number of women in the Indonesian Parliament (i.e., Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat orHouse of Representatives [DPR]) is increasing
The percent and number of women in the Indonesian Parliament (i.e., the national level),according to the 2019 General Election (i.e., presidential and national parliamentary)
result, is 20.52% and 118 of 575 total members, respectively. This number is the highest
in Indonesian history, since the first election in 1955. According to a 2020 global gender
gap index, of 153 countries, Indonesia ranks 85th, with a score of 0.700 (0 = imparity, 1 =parity), which is a satisfactory score. This percentage is below the global average forwomen’s representation in parliament, which is 25%. However, Indonesian women’s
parliamentary representation at the national level has attained the average for East
Asia and Pacific Countries, which was 20% in 2018 (IPU, 2019)
Women’s political empowerment and representation in the Indonesian Parliament
requires further efforts to close the gender gap and advance from “descriptive
representation” to “substantive representation.” Notably, the quality of representation
has been declining. Campaigns for highly competitive elections are expensive, and most
women candidates cannot afford this cost. This situation increases patronage politics
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「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析

and direct vote buying. The power of capital and practices of oligarchic politics are abarrier that excludes capable, independent women candidates. A stereotype in Indonesia
is that that women lack capacity. This stereotype may decrease the amount of money
donated to women candidates, perpetuating practices of oligarchic politics, for example,“buying” the candidates by financing their campaigns.
The phenomenon of women engaging in transactional politics and oligarchy and their
weak bargaining position have resulted in their not implementing transformative
politics (politics of difference), for example, introducing policy priorities, proposals, andpublic policies that benefit women and other minority and marginalized groups.
In this paper, I distinguish between the terms “sex” and “gender.” The term “sex” denotes
the biological differences between women and men; the term “gender” denotes the social
constructs of those distinctions. The concept of gender politics allows analytical distancefrom the biological/sexual politics that treats men and women as binary oppositions inpolitical practices.
The term “politics” is often used by political scientists to refer to the formal processes
and institutions of the government and elections. The feminist movement added two
meanings of politics to the traditional male-centered, majority-centered definition:
politics for women should encompass informal politics and the dynamics of everyday
life—“The personal is political” (Okin, 1979; Squires, 1999), and politics is “power
relations that permeate all levels of social life, including relations within the private
sphere of home and family” (Butler, 1990). In this paper, I define gender politics as theconcept of power relations shaping elections and gender that is continuously constructed
and redefined in specific political contexts.
In this paper, I critically analyze the increase in women’s representation in Indonesian
legislative bodies after the 2019 General Election. I argue that the increasing number ofwomen in national parliament has no correlation with and does not guarantee theoutcome of pro-women policies or policies in favor of other marginalized and minority
groups.
I argue that descriptive/statistical representation has no linkages with substantive
representation. Issues related to the meaning of gender representation, political party
26

「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析

nominations, and internal democracy, as well as patronage/dynasty politics/oligarchy,
lead to the entrapment of a higher number of women MPs into shallow symbolic
representation, debilitating the progress to achieve substantive representation after thefour election cycles since 2004. Women MPs ironically perpetuate and reproduce
masculine politics rather than transform unequal gender relations.

Theoretical framework
The literature on women, gender, elections can be categorized into research on electing
women and women being elected. In this paper, I focus on how women are elected topolitical office, namely, to the national parliament. Norris and Lovenduski (1995)
analyzed the supply and demand model of political recruitment. They proposed that the
number of women elected is a combined result of the qualification of women as a groupto run for political office, namely, their resources and motivation, and the desire or
willingness within the elite’s perception of women’s abilities and experience.
In addition to the literature on why women are underrepresented in national
parliaments, there is a large body of literature that uses the type of electoral system toexplain the structural and contextual factors that shape women’s access to parliament.
This type of analysis raises an argument that the percentage of women elected tends tobe higher in countries with a proportional representation electoral system than incountries with majoritarian electoral arrangements (Salmon, 2006). A proportional
representation system tends to be organized around multimember districts, in which
there is more than one person elected that makes way for women to be included within
the total seats available in each district.
The dramatic increase and shift in women’s representation have increased the amountof literature on the adoption of the policy of gender quotas as a “fast track” to increase
women’s representation in the Indonesian Parliament (Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2009).
Some perspectives recognize that women’s participation and representation add values
essential for a democracy. Other perspectives are deeper than the explanation of the“politics of presence” of women in political institutions.
This growing body of literature has addressed the degree to which women in political
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「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析

office translates into advancing women’s issues in policy making, that is, the relationshipbetween the “descriptive” and “substantive” representation of women (Pitkin, 1967).
Political theories have presented various arguments on women’s interests andperspectives as means to support the efforts of increasing women’s politicalrepresentation (Philips, 1995; Young, 2000). However, the notion of women’s interests
remains controversial (Molyneux, 1985). As a result, scholars have identified women’sissues by using various methods.
In the first section of this article, I present the Indonesian political background post1998 Reformation. The drastic shift to democracy, with political parties and electoral
reforms, was the political context of how the discussion on women’s politicalrepresentation in Indonesia gained political momentum. To explain the narrative of
women’s political representation in Indonesia, I apply the logic I observed in Norris andLovenduski (1995), Dahlerup (2006), Ann Philips (1995), and Irish M Young (2000).
In the second section, I present the result of the 2019 General Election on the basis of
the political database of Cakra Wikara Indonesia (CWI), an Indonesian nonprofit andnonpartisan policy research, as well as data collected from the Center for Political
Studies at the University of Indonesia (Puskapol UI). Next, I present a critical analysisof the statistical data from CWI and Puskapol UI, focusing on the gender dimension of
women’s nomination by political parties, the background of women elected to office, andthe gender quota in the Indonesian electoral system.
In the last section, I highlight findings from the second section and develop a deeper
analysis than in the second section on the meaning of women’s representation in theIndonesian Parliament, namely, the connection between “descriptive” and “substantive”
representation. I draw conclusions by examining elected women MPs’ background, which
is highly dominated by dynasty politics and the professional/business sector, and thequotas that undermine women MPs’ ability to be independent of the party that
nominates them. The large sum of money required for campaigns to win elections
entraps women candidates and officials into serving the interests of the sponsors of theircampaign, rather than enabling these women to act responsively to their constituents aselected MPs.

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「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

I.

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析Country Political BackgroundIndonesia is the world’s third-largest democracy. The authoritarian regime under General
Suharto that dominated the country for more than 30 years was overthrown in 1998.
Today, the political system is a presidential system. The president, as chief of state andhead of government, is elected in a general election held every five years.
The last presidential election was held in 2019, in which President Joko Widodo wasreelected with 60.8% of the vote. The cleric Kyai Ma’ruf Amin succeeded Jusuf Kala asvice president in Jokowi’s second term.
The Indonesian Constitution, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 (1945 Constitution),guarantees fair participation for all citizens in politics. Article 27 subsection 1 states thatevery citizen is equal before the law and government and is obliged to respect the law
indiscriminately.
Indonesia’s political system is the outcome of several Constitutional Amendments passed
after Suharto was overthrown. Since 1998, the Constitution has been amended four times(1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002). In 1999, the First Amendment regulated the limitation of
the president and vice president serving two terms. In 2000, the Second Amendment
added refined articles on human rights and a regulation to broaden regional autonomy. In
2001, the Third Amendment concerned a direct presidential election by the people;
subsequently, it regulated that the legislative institution would be a two-chambersystem—DPR and Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah/DPD)—
and formed the National Permanent and the Independent General Election Commission(Komisi Pemilihan Umum/KPU). In 2002, the Fourth Amendment added a regulation on
the judicial institution, restructuring by forming new institutions: the Constitutional Court(Mahkamah Konstitusi/MK) and Judicial Commission (Komisi Yudisial/KY).

Party and the electoral system in Indonesia post-Reformation
Reform and democratization in Indonesia have resulted in many renewals in politicalparty institutions. Political openness has eliminated the limitations on and control ofpolitical parties that were imposed by the authoritarian Suharto regime. The establishment
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「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析

of new parties no longer experiences oppression. Reforms of the party system during theReformation Era were aimed at strengthening party institutionalization, promoting thesimplification of the party establishment, and establishing national-scale parties.
Reforms of laws regulating political parties were conducted. The first reform wasconducted by passing Law No.2/1999 on political parties; this reform was revised andbecame Law No.31/2002; the latest revision was Law No.2/2008. Forty-eight politicalparties participated in the 1999 General Election. In the 2004 General Election, 24
parties participated, and in the 2009 election, 38 national parties and six local parties
participated in Aceh. In the 2014 election, 12 national parties and three local parties
participated in Aceh. The latest election had 14 national parties and four local parties
participating in Aceh.

The Post-Reform Electoral System in Indonesia demonstrates that the combination of
proportional and majoritarian systems has been adopted by Indonesia since 1999. The
adoption of the combination system was implemented in the 2004 General Election andthe 2005 Regional Election (Pilkada serentak). The shift from a closed list system,
implemented by only choosing the party’s symbol in 1999, to a proportional semi-openlist representation, implemented by choosing the party and candidate in 2004, was
combined with direct presidential, regional head, and regional representative (DPD)
elections, featured on SNTV on 2004. Since 2009 and Constitutional Court Decision no
22-24/PUU-VI/2008, Indonesia has implemented a proportional open list system forparliamentary (DPR/DPRD) elections.
The evidence of the shift in election law since Reformation is Law No.3/1999 on electionsand Law No.12/2003, Law No.10/2008, Law No.8/2012, and Law No.7/2017 on theelection of parliament members.

Women’s political representation

Holding direct elections for the legislative and executive branches represented a signaturereform away from authoritarianism. Women’s political representation since then has beenon the political agenda as an aspect of the democratic reshaping of Indonesia. Under
Suharto’s authoritarian regime, the portion of seats in the national parliament at the sub30

「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析

national level was smaller than women’s representation in the population. Activists hadargued for greater women’s political representation as a core pillar of democratic reform.
The political momentum of Reformasi in Indonesia that promoted the reform of politicalparties and the adoption of a proportional representation system in the legislature and anelectoral system is considered favorable to electing women candidates to parliament.
Activist and feminist movements in the heyday of Reformasi also argued for the need to“jump start” women’s parliamentary representation by adopting a women’s quota. Thisaffirmative strategy was supported by UN Law No 12/2003 on the election of parliament
members. Parts of this law encourage parties to “consider” aiming for at least 30% womenon the party lists of candidates for multimember electoral districts and at national andprovincial levels.
The provision on women candidacy through an affirmative mechanism is stipulated in
Article 65 Subsection 1:
Political parties participating in election may propose their candidate for national
parliament/ provincial parliament/regency and city parliament, while considering
women’s representation for at least 30%.

In the 2004 election, after suggesting the quota of 30%, women’s representation increased
from 9% (1999) to 11.8% (2004) at the national level. The result was disappointing,particularly for women activists who had been actively lobbying to have the quota
adopted. At first, the political climate was hostile toward the suggested quota because it
was considered “un-democratic.” The law stipulated no sanctions against noncompliant
parties. In addition, women were often placed in unwinnable positions at the bottom ofparty lists. This policy failure, merely suggesting rather than mandating a quota, led tofurther lobbying for a strengthened quota. A coalition of nongovernmental organizations
drafted a clause subsequently included in the 2008 Law on Election (Law No. 10/2008),
which obligated parties to include on their party lists a minimum of 30% womencandidates and at least one women in the top three candidates (semi-zipper system); in
Article 53 Law No. 10/2008, the following is stated: “The list of candidates as referred toin article 52 shall contain at least 30% of women’s representation.” In Article 55 Law No.
10/2008, the following is stated: “In the list of the candidate as referred to in subsection
1, in every 3 persons there shall be at least one woman candidate.”
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「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析

In September 2008, Law No. 10/2008, containing regulations on the zipper system andquota policy, was appealed by two candidates for the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah
Konstitusi). They argued that the regulations were antithetical to the principle of equality.
Judges dismissed the case on the grounds that the state was obliged to promote substantive
equality. However, the court ruled in favor of the petitioner on another ground: theydecided on an open list system such that parties would lose their power to direct the votes
to candidates placed on the top of the party lists (Detik.com, 2008). The candidates elected
would be the women or men who received the most votes.
Court Decision No. 22-24/PUU-VI/2008 ruled that candidates had to campaign as
individuals rather than as party blocs so that the position on the party lists became lessrelevant in gaining a seat. This competition then encouraged the rise in patronage anddirect vote buying, practices considered barriers to capable, independent womencandidates.
The political climate increased in favorability in 2009 because all major parties supported
the idea of increasing the number of women in parliament. Potret Keterpilihan
Perempuan di Legislatif pada Pemilu 2009 (Puskapol UI, 2013) states that six of the 38
parties participating in the 2009 election did not fulfill the quota, and five parties placed
women in one of the top three positions, as required by the law. However, overall, 34.7%
of candidates for the national legislature were women, resulting in an increase in women’s
representation to 17.6%, close to the world average of 19%.
During the 2014 election campaign, the KPU increased its enforcement of the quota.
Election Commission Regulation (PKPU) No.7/2013 enforces the obligation of politicalparties participating in an election to nominate 30% women as candidates in every
electoral district and to have one woman candidate in every three persons. Any party that
did not fulfill this requirement in any district would be disqualified from competing in thesaid district. During the 2014 election campaign, the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment
and Child Protection (KPPA) enacted media campaigns encouraging voters to electwomen candidates. Data from the book Potret Keterpilihan Anggota Legislatif Hasil
Pemilu 2014 (Puskapol UI, 2015) demonstrates that the proportion of women candidates
increased to 37%, and women won 17.3% seats in 2014 in the national parliament, lessthan the number of seats in 2009.
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「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析

The law on elections was again revised to Law No.7/2017. The regulation on theaffirmative policy for women in elections is the same as that in the prior law (No.8/2012).
To enforce the regulation, the KPU and the PKPU oblige every political party in theelection to nominate at least 30% women as candidates in every electoral district. In its
placement, parties must obey the regulation that states the following: “Of every 3 persons
there shall be at least one woman candidate.” The Decision Letter of the Ministry ofJustice and Human Rights (SK Menkumham) further obliged political parties to have 30%
of women on their political board. In 2019, the number of women in the national
parliament was 20.52%, the highest number in the history of Indonesia.

Table 1
Women’s representation

Source: CWI.Dataspasial.id

In 2001, in the Third Constitutional Amendment, the Indonesian Legislative Institution
adopted a two-chamber system comprising the DPR and the DPD. The DPD Election
does not implement a gender quota, and women have been strongly represented in the
DPR: 26.5% in 2009 and 25.8% in 2014. In 2019 (Table 2), the percent of women in the
DPD increased to 30.88%. This percent fulfilled the quota and was celebrated. The
relative success of women candidates is attributed to the lack of involvement of political
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「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析

parties in the nomination of candidates. Candidates are judged on an individual basis, andsuccess is linked to the candidates’ individual political network and community work.

Table 2
Women’s representation in the Regional Representative Council

Source CWI. dataspasial.id

Women’s representation in Provincial and District Parliament
The decentralization stipulated in the Second Amendment in 2000 intended to decrease
the distance between the individuals in power and their constituents. The local parliament(provincial and district/municipality) comprises directly elected representatives in
multimember electorates subject to the candidate quota in the election law. In 2009,
women were elected to an average of 16% of the seats in 33 provincial parliaments and
12% in district parliaments; these percentages are lower than that of the national
parliament (Puskapol UI, 2013). In 2014, the proportion of women members in theprovincial parliament was 14.6% of the seats in 33 provincial parliaments and 14.2% in
403 district parliaments (Puskapol UI, 2015). The number of women elected was diverse
across Indonesia, for example, in Papua Barat, one woman (2%) was elected, and in North
Sulawesi, of the seats in the local parliaments, 30% belonged to women.

34「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析

The data presented in Table 3 depicts the result of the 2019 election. The percent of
women’s representation at the provincial level is 18.01%. In some provinces, such as
Central Kalimantan and South Sulawesi, women have more than 30% representation inprovincial parliaments; in other provinces, such as West Sumatra, Bangka Belitung, andWest Nusa Tenggara, women have less than 5% representation in provincial parliaments.
Several analysts have identified that the contestation at the local level in the period of
democratization is linked to the local, old culture (customary institutions, conservative
religious values), which in some cases has invoked social constructs of gender thatstrengthen male privilege and exclude women from politics (Robinson, 2018). Such anargument explains women’s low representation in some districts/municipalities. Other
reasons for women’s low representation at the local level are socioeconomic conditions.
An analysis of the correlation between the Human Development Index and women’s
electability in the Indonesian Parliament found the following: areas with a highrepresentation of women, such as DKI Jakarta, Lampung, and North Sulawesi, areexamples of provinces with the highest HDI rank in Indonesia; provinces with aconsistently low representation of women (less than 10%), such as Aceh, West Sumatra,Bali, NTB, and NTT are examples of provinces with a low rank in GDI and GEM.
(Puskapol UI, 2015).
Table 3
Women’s representation in Provincial Parliaments on 2019No

Province

Men

Women

Total

% women

seat
1

Aceh

72

9

81

11.11

2

North Sumatra

87

13

100

13.00

3

West Sumatra

62

3

65

4.62

4

Riau

53

12

65

18.45

5

Jambi

47

8

55

14.55

6

South Sumatra

57

18

75

24.00

7

Bangka Belitung Islands

43

2

45

4.44

8

Bengkulu

38

7

45

15.56

9

Lampung

66

19

85

22.35

35

「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析

10

Riau Islands

40

5

45

11.11

11

Jakarta

83

23

106

21.70

12

West Java

96

24

120

20.00

13

Central Java

94

26

120

21.67

14

East Java

99

21

120

17.50

15

Jogjakarta

45

10

55

18.18

16

Banten

71

14

85

16.47

17

Bali

47

8

55

14.55

18

West Nusa Tenggara

64

1

65

1.54

19

East Nusa Tenggara

54

11

65

16.92

20

West Kalimantan

56

9

65

13.85

21

Central Kalimantan

29

16

45

35.56

22

South Kalimantan

44

11

55

20.00

23

East Kalimantan

44

11

55

20.00

24

North Kalimantan

31

4

35

11.43

25

North Sulawesi

32

13

45

28.89

26

Central Sulawesi

33

12

45

26.67

27

South Sulawesi

59

26

85

30.59

28

West Sulawesi

40

5

45

11.11

29

Southeast Sulawesi

38

7

45

15.56

30

Gorontalo

33

12

45

26.67

31

Maluku

34

11

45

24.44

32

North Maluku

33

12

45

26.67

33

Papua

47

8

55

14.55

34

West Papua

38

7

45

15.56

Total

1809

398

2207

18.03

Source CWI.dataspasial.id

II.

Result of the 2019 Legislative Election

On May 21, 2019, the KPU announced the final result of the 2010 Legislative Election(Kompas.com, 2019). Of the 16 political parties that participated in the election, nine36

「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析

passed the parliamentary threshold of 4% and gained seats in national parliaments.
Those nine parties are the (1) Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan/PDIP) - 19.33%; (2) Great Indonesia Movement Party(Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya/Gerindra) - 12.57%; (3) Golongan Karya/Golkar 12.31%; (4) The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) - 9.69%; (5)National Democrat Party (Partai Nasional Demokrat/Nasdem) - 9.05%; (6) Prosperous
Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/PKS) - 8.21%; (7) Democrat Party (Partai
Demokrat) - 7.77%; (8) National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional) - 6.84%; and(9) United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP) - 4.5%.
The four new parties (Garuda, Berkarya, Partai Persatuan Indonesia/Perindo, andPartai Solidaritas Indonesia [PSI]) debuted in the legislative race but did not pass theparliamentary threshold. As had been generally predicted by analysts, the new parties
had difficulty passing the parliamentary threshold of 4% or obtaining at least 5 million
votes.
Data in Table 4 demonstrate that the political parties that did not pass theparliamentary threshold had the highest numbers of women candidates: Indonesia
Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia/PKPI) with 55%, theGaruda Party with 48%, and the PSI with 48%; the strongest winner, the PDIP, Golongan
Karya (Golka), and Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) had the fewest womencandidates. This finding illustrates the questionable commitment of big parties tonominate women as strong candidates.

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「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析

Table 4
Nomination of Women Candidates in the 2019 election based on Political Parties
Political Parties

Women Candidates

Total Candidates

%

Women

Source: CWI.Dataspasial.id

I compared the number of women’s nominations in the 2019 election with those of the2009 and 2014 elections (Table 5), and the number of women candidates has been
increasing for three election cycles. Notably, electoral votes for women also increased in
the three election cycles. It is a positive sign that the public was neither hostile nor
against women in politics and willing to vote for women candidates.
Data in Table 5 demonstrate that the number of women candidates and vote acquisition
increased. However, the gap between women’s vote acquisition and seats obtained isnotable. The percentage of women’s seats in the national legislature is lower than thepercentage of their vote share. There are several explanations for the cause of the gap.
The nomination of a higher percentage of women candidates did not necessarily translate
into more seats for women. Evidently, what appears to matter most was not the overall
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number of women nominated by parties but the position of women candidates on theballot. Most women candidates were not placed in winnable positions on the list, namely,in the top spots of the ballot and/or in districts of party strongholds. Another reason for
the gap was the implementation of the parliamentary threshold of 4% that led to the lossof votes. Parties such as PKPI, Garuda, and PSI had more than 45% women candidates
but were eliminated from the race for not passing the 4% parliamentary threshold.
Table 5
Number of women candidates, women’s vote share, and seat allocation

Source: CWI.dataspasial.id

The statistical data of women’s political representation in the 2019 National and Local
Election (provincial and regency/city representatives) is presented in Table 6. In the past
two elections (2009, 2014), at the national level, women’s representation in the DPR was
17.86% in 2009, 17.32% in 2014, and 20.52% in 2019. At the provincial level, women’s
representation was 16% in 2009, 14% in 2014, and 18% in 2019. At theregency/municipality level, women’s representation was 12% in 2009, 14% in 2014, and
15% in 2019.

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Table 6
Women’s seats in the House of Representatives, Provincial Representative,
Regency/City Representative in the 2019 election

Parliament

Women’s representation

Total Seats

House of Representatives

20.52%

575

Provincial

18.03%

2,207

15.25%

16,975

Representatives
Regency/City
Representatives*Data of 11 Regency/City Representatives are not available

Source:CWI.dataspasial.id

Women Candidates on the party list and the Zipper System
After Constitutional Court Decision No. 22-24/PUU-VI/2008, the rank of candidates onparty lists was less relevant in gaining seats; parliamentary seats were now gained byreceiving the most votes. This decision had substantial implications for the gender quota
and zipper system in the election law. Before the Court Decision, a seat was gained basedon the position/rank of the candidates on the party list. Women were often ranked inunwinnable positions at the bottom of party lists, undermining their probability of being
elected, such that it was close to zero. Therefore, the zipper system was designed toprevent political parties from placing women candidates at the bottom of party lists.
The quota and zipper system mandated that political parties have a minimum of 30%
women candidates on their lists and at least one woman in the top three candidates.
Thus, the gender quota and zipper system, regarding proportional representation in theelectoral system, enhanced the likelihood that women would be elected, specifically whenranked 1–3 on the party list. Although the rank of candidates on the party list is
decreasing in relevance, most of the women elected as MPs (nearly 50%) were candidates
ranked number 1 on the party list. Data in Table 7 demonstrate that most of the women40

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elected to the DPR (85.48%) were candidates ranked number 1–3 on the party list.
Nearly 50% (48.72%) of the women elected were ranked first on the candidate list. No
women candidates ranked seventh or lower were elected to the DPR.
The importance of ballot position has led to intense competition among candidates within
political parties. Each Indonesian political party has a mechanism for allocating ballot
positions. Some parties allow party boards, dominated by men, to decide. Other parties
prefer parliamentary incumbents when considering ranks for candidates, reinforcing theexisting gender imbalance. Political parties also often place their strongest candidates
higher on the ballots, which I observed in several electoral districts. (Perdana & Hilman,2020). Widespread practices of selling ballot positions to the highest bidder further
disadvantage women, who already have less access than men to funding and connections
that may facilitate such transactions (Amalia, 2019; Hillman, 2018).

Table 7
Number of Women Elected to the House of Representatives on the Basis of Candidacy
NumberCandidacy

Numberof

Women Percentage

NumberCandidates

1

57

48.72

2

29

24.79

3

14

11.97

4

5

4.27

5

5

4.27

6

6

5.13

7

1

0.85

8

0

0

9

0

0

10

0

0

Total

117

100

Source: CWI.dataspasial.id41

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Background of women elected to parliament
Women candidates made significant gains in the 2019 General Election, securing 20.52%
of the seats in the DPR and 30% in the DPD.
The introduction of the open list voting system in Indonesia further emphasizedcandidates’ campaign and their capabilities to raise funds, increasing the pressure on
women candidates disadvantaged by having less access than men to the clientelistic
network that influences candidate selection, positions on the party list, and the resources
necessary to engage in the common practice of vote buying (Perdana, 2019).
Unsurprisingly, an increasing number of elected women are relatives of male politicians
or dynastic figures with access to campaign funding (Puskapol UI, 2019).
The background of elected women in the DPR in 2019 is presented in Chart 1: 53% were
professionals, 41% had familial ties to political elites, and 6% were party activists(Puskapol UI, 2019). In the local parliaments, the backgrounds of women representatives
were similar to those at the national level.

6
41

53

Professionals
Political Connections/ Relatives
Political Activists

Chart 1
Background of the women MPs with political connections who received the most votes

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Table 8
10 Women in the National Parliament who received the most votes

No Name

Rank

Electoral

Partyin the district

Total

Backgroundvotes

ballot1

Puan

1

Maharani

CentralPDIP404,034

Java 5

Daughter of former
president
Megawati(Political
Connection-

Dynasty Politics)
2

Adriana1

Dondokambey

North

PDIP

213,224

Sulawesi

Wife of Governor
North

Sulawesi(Political
Connection-

Dynasty Politics)
3

Eva Juliana

1

CentralNasdem

189,376

Professional

Java 5
4

Esti Wijayati

3

Jogjakarta PDIP

176,306

Party Activist

5

Rieke

Diah 1

West Java PDIP

169,729

PublicPitaloka
6

Lestari

7
1

Moendiyat
7

Sri wahyuni(Professional)

CentralNasdem

165,009

Java 2
5

FigureBusinesswoman(Professional)

East Java Nasdem

161,1027

Wife of Ponorogo
Head District, East
Java

(Political

Connection-

Dynasty Politics)
8

Teti
Rohatiningsih

2CentralGolkarJava 8147,905

Wife of Mayor of
Cilacap, West Java
(Political
Connection
Dynasty Politics)

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「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）910Rachel1

ジェンダー・選挙・女性の政治的代表性――2019年インドネシア総選挙に関する分析West Java Gerindra 145,636

PublicMaryam2(Professional)

Puti

East Java PDIP

Guntur 2

Sukarno2

139,794

FigureGranddaughter offormerpresident

Sukarno (Political
Connection
Dynasty Politics)
Source: Puskapol, 2019.
The turnover in the 2019 election is notable. The turnover rate has been consistently
higher for women than for men (Puskapol UI, 2019). The turnover rate for women inparliament increased from 60% to 67% in 2019, and the rate for men decreased from 56%
to 49%. Men and women candidates who have served only one term in parliament
struggle to gain experience and act as effective lawmakers, specifically MPs whose priorcareer track had less exposure to politics. The high turnover rate increases the difficulty
for women MPs to gain a foothold in parliament.

III. Discussion
Political representation
Hana Pitkin (1967) identified four types of political representation: (1) authorized, inwhich a representative is legally empowered to act for another; (2) descriptive, in which
the representative stands for a group by sharing similar characteristics such as race,
gender, ethnicity, or residence; (3) symbolic, in which a leader stands for national ideas;and (4) substantive, in which the representative aims to advance a group’s policy
preferences and interests.
On the basis of Pitkin’s categorization of types of political representations, the legal
gender quota has achieved its aim to increase women’s statistical representation,aligning

with

Pitkin’s

explanationofdescriptive

representation.

Descriptive

representation is when a legislative assembly is said to be representative of its

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constituents, formulating a miniaturized model or a microcosm of society. Women are
equal citizens; therefore, men and women should have equal power in public decision
making.
In an influential formulation, Ann Philips (1995) described four possible reasons forincreasing women’s representation: (1) provide role models; (2) promote justice; (3)articulate interest; and (4) improve democracy because the participation of women will
introduce different values and concerns into political debates. Drude Dahlerup (2006),
in her well-known study of Scandinavia, examined six areas in which increased women’s
representation might significantly affect political life: (1) the decline of sexual
harassment, (2) the performance and efficiency of women politicians, (3) a moreconsensual style and family-friendly working arrangements, (4) political discourse andthe redefinition of “political concern,” (5) the feminization of political agendas, and (6)the broader social and economic empowerment of women.
Suzanne Dovi (2008) criticized the normative arguments for women’s representation byasking whether the mere presence of “any” women would do. A focus on sex may obscurethat a woman is also constituted by her other identities. Dovi argued that a substantive
representation requires “preferable group representatives.” In line with Dovi’s
arguments, Irish Marion Young (2000) asserted further that women of underrepresentedsocial groups should be present in political institutions to facilitate these groups’
representation because their position in society creates a shared social perspective
among group members. Jane Mansbridge (1999), however, remained cautious regarding
the arguments about “women” as a group because of the risk of promoting essentialismor the notion that members of certain groups have an essential identity that all membersof the group share. Learning from the ideas of feminist thinkers, such as Ann Philips,
Irish Young, and Suzane Dovi, and experiences in Scandinavia, the nation with thehighest women’s representation in politics, would benefit Indonesian women activists’lobbying of the parliament on the gender quota.
The link between descriptive and substantive representation, according to Laurel
Weldon (2002), relies on the understanding of the essence of women’s representation andits importance that aims for actual substantive representation, as well as therelationship between individual experiences and group perspectives. She concluded that“substantive representation of women needs integral collaboration with women45

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movements and women’s focal points in the policy agency and institution, rather only
depending on the mere presence of women in parliament” (Weldon, 2002).
Considering Weldon’s argument, the statistical increase in women’s representation in
the Indonesian Parliament has no correlation with and does not guarantee the outcomeof pro-woman policies or policies in favor of other marginalized and minority groups. The
DPR in 2014–2019 did not pass crucial women’s rights legislation such as a bill toeradicate sexual harassment, a revision of the criminal code, a gender-equality andjustice bill, a domestic workers rights bill, and other bills that favor women and othermarginalized groups. The local legislature has not progressed in securing and advocating
policies to protect women and marginalized individuals despite the increase in women’s
representation in several regions. Notably, the National Commission on Violence against
Women (Komnas Perempuan) reported that 154 discriminative policies are harmful towomen, including poor and marginalized women, and other minority groups, including
religious and sexual minorities. These policies directly discriminate against women interms of the politicization of women’s bodies and restrictions on freedom of expression(policing women’s clothes), criminalization against women (eradication of prostitution),
impoverishment, and degradation/removal/neglect of rights of protection and legal
certainty. Other policies restrict religious freedom and discriminate against genderminorities. (Komnas Perempuan, 2010).
Advocacy for public policies in favor of women and other marginalized groups remains a
critical gap between the movement of electoral and nonelectoral politics. Grassroot
movements fighting for women’s rights, indigenous peoples’ rights, domestic workers’
rights, the environment, and people with disabilities in Indonesia are much moreprogressive than the progress in electoral politics.

Problems of political parties
The analysis of the result of the 2019 election illustrates the consequential influence ofpolitical parties in selecting and promoting a minimum of 30% women candidates. The
capacity of different political parties to secure seats for their women candidates
eminently varies, and the structures of political parties are substantial obstacles for
women’s candidacy and the promotion of women’s issues. The success rate by party ofwomen candidates also fluctuates with each election. During the last two elections (201446「東アジアにおけるジェンダーと政治」Booklet Series 3（IGS Project Series 19）

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and 2019), the PPP was the only party successful in consistently securing a high numberof seats for women candidates. The PKS also increased its percentage of women MPs,
from 2.5% in 2014 to 16% in 2019 (Table 1).
Nasdem has been the only political party to achieve the quota (i.e., 30% seats for theirwomen candidates). Unlike the parties that ask their prospective women candidates tocompete for positions and votes without access to the parties’ resources, Nasdem
developed a four-pillar strategy to support its women candidates. First, the party
commission conducts a survey to assess the potential and electability of the womencandidates across the electoral district. This step eases the need for candidates to selffund polling and surveys. Second, Nasdem declared that candidates would not pay fees
to run for office under their flag. Third, Nasdem provided a degree of logistic support for
its women candidates, including campaign tool kids (a banner and name cards). Fourth,Nasdem offers financial subsidies for candidates who receive at least 100,000 votes intheir electoral district (Perdana, 2019).
The PSI has implemented a similar system. As a new party, the PSI nominated 48%
women candidates in the election. The PSI claimed to be a political party for millennials
and targeted women, youth, and interfaith groups. The PSI was eliminated fromparliament because it did not pass the 4% parliamentary threshold. Regarding the moreestablished parties, such as the PDIP, Golkar, and Gerindra, they have consistently
nominated fewer women candidates than the other parties have in the past two elections.
The parliamentary threshold in the last election seemed to negatively affect the increase
in women’s political representation because it eliminated political parties with thehighest percentage of women candidates, such as the PKPI, Garuda, and PSI (Table 4).
Ikasarana & Novitasari (2019) also highlighted women’s representation in internal party
structures. Nearly half of the women candidates listed as number 1 or 2 in larger parties
such as the Democratic Party, Gerindra, and the PPP concurrently hold positions in theparty structure. More women in strategic positions in the structure could increase theprobability of more women at the top of the list. Notably, only 11 women in the politicalparties in Indonesia have gained such strategic positions or are currently in positions.

Patronage, dynasty politics, and oligarchy
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The domination of dynasty politics in Indonesian elections is not a new phenomenon.
Similar practices were observed in the authoritarian Suharto regime. The difference inthe dynasty politics in the New Order (Suharto’s regime) era and Reformation Era iswhich groups hold the highest concentration of power: in the New Order era, a small
group of people close to Suharto held the highest concentration of power, and in the
Reformation Era (i.e., contemporary Indonesia), this concentration of power is expanded
to the lowest level—adults with political connections at any level have greater chance toenter the politics. The practices of dynasty politics pose a substantial problem to the poor
regeneration process of political parties. Dynasty politics occupying the spaces andpositions in political parties causes the low number of new, potential, and capablecandidates to be nominated in elections.
Well-known MPs (Table 8), such as Puan Maharani, Puti Guntur, Teti Rohatiningsih,
Adriana Dondokambey, and Sri Wahyuni, are linked to dynasty politics. A similar
phenomenon is also found in politics at the local level. Nominated candidates withfamilial ties indicate that Indonesian politics has the short-term aim of winning elections
and securing seats rather than acting in favor of long-term sustainable regeneration.
Implications of dynasty politics/clientelism create substantial problems because theyobstruct the democratic internal mechanism of the party through the cooptation of theinterests of elite leaders. Parties often do not have a benchmark to evaluate the quality
and competence of their candidates in their undemocratic admission process. The final
decision is made by the party head or a small group of political elites in closed processes
that lead to the obstruction of democratic internal political processes. In the closed
processes of decision making, power is highly concentrated in a small group ofindividuals (oligarchy) and usually involves money politics. The individuals who control
the money and funding possess substantial power, have the authority to control anddictate the terms of the nomination, and are generally the source of funding for financepolitical campaigns. When the candidates win the election, they must pay back themoney their campaign received.
During the 2019 election, many businessmen, successful entrepreneurs, and venture
capitalists were candidates. As Chart 1 demonstrated, most elected MPs areprofessionals (53%). Advances in democracy in Indonesia have stalled because of the48

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negative effect of the power of capital and oligarchy. Oligarchs work systematically to
influence public policy such that it benefits their interests.
Based on the analyses in this paper, I conclude that descriptive/statistical representation
has no correlation with substantive representation. Issues related to the meaning ofrepresentation; political parties’ nomination of women and internal democracy; andpatronage, dynasty politics, and oligarchy lead to the entrapment of women MPs into
providing shallow, symbolic representation, debilitating the progress to achieve
substantive representation of women in politics.

References
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Butler, J. (1990). Gender Trouble. New York: Routledge.
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Pemilu-2019-24-Oktober-2019.pdf___________________. (2019). Prospek Keterwakilan Perempuan di Posisi Pimpinan

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Dahlerup, D. (2006). Women, Quota and Politics. New York: Routledge.
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執筆者／Author
Dr. Ani Widyani Soetjipto
インドネシア大学政治社会政治科学科准教授、同大学大学院ジェンダー研究プログラム教員。修士（国際関係学、ワシントン州立大学 1989 年）、博士（国際関係学、パジャジャ
ラン大学 2017 年）。現在、インドネシア汚職監視委員会（ICW）理事。
Transnationalisme : Peran Aktor Non Negara dalam Hubungan Internasional ( Transnationalism:
The Role of Non State Actor in International Relations), Yayasan Pustaka Obor (2018) ほかインド
ネシアのジェンダーと政治に関する著作、論文多数。

Ani Soetjipto is senior lecturer in the Department of International Relations, Faculty ofSocial and Political Sciences, University of Indonesia and lecturer at the Graduate GenderStudies Program, University of Indonesia. Ani get a degree in Political Science from the
University of Indonesia and Master of International Studies from The Jackson School ofInternational Studies, University of Washington in Seattle, USA in 1989 and Doctor ofInternational Relations from Padjadjaran University in 2017.
Besides teaching at the University, Ani actively involved in various civil society andwomen organization in Indonesia. She is currently a Board members of IndonesianCorruption Watch (ICW).
Her latest publication is; Transnationalisme: Peran Aktor Non Negara dalam
Hubungan Internasional (=Transnationalism: The Role of Non State Actor inInternational Relations), Yayasan Pustaka Obor (2018).

52