DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

Foreign Pressure
andthe Japanese Policymaking Process:
A Theoretical Framework
Isao MIYAOKA
August 1997
F - 62
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
University of Tokyo
Hongo, Bunkyo-ku
Tokyo 113, Japanmiyaoka@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp1Introduction
This paper presents the theoretical chapter of the dissertation that theauthor is currently writing under the superv ision of Professor J.A.A.
Stockwin of the Univ ersity of Oxford. The prov isional title of thedissertation is The Japanese Policymaking Process: The Response to Foreign
Pressure over Global Environmental Concerns, 1987 - 92. The basic question toanswer and the objectiv es to achiev e in the dissertation can besummarised as follows.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Japan was subject to sev ereinternational criticism s in the area of global env ironm ental issues.
By 1992, consequently, Japan had changed its policies on ozone
depletion, drift-net fishing, and im ports of African elephant iv ory,
while it had not substantially changed its other related policies on,
for exam ple, scientific whaling, and im ports of tropical tim ber. This
raises the question of how and under what conditions foreignpressure led to policy change in this area. In order to answer thisbasic question, the dissertation conducts fiv e case studies on theabov e global env ironm ental issues during the period from 1987 to
1992.
The first aim of this m ulti-case research is to describe Japanesepolicym aking processes in the ev ents m entioned abov e, using a
rev ised v ersion of the policy window m odel designed by John W .
Kingdon, with particular focus on foreign actors, industrial policy
com m unities, and env ironm ental policy sponsors. The underlying
assum ption is that policy change can be explained by the analysis of
the policym aking process. Although the cases selected for thisresearch are critical for an understanding of Japanese global
env ironm ental policy, this thesis does not attem pt to offer acom prehensiv e study of the topic. The second aim is to use theabov e-m entioned case studies as a basis for analytical generalisation
about the policym aking process by which foreign pressure (gaiatsu)
does or does not lead to policy change. For this purpose, this thesis
com pares sev eral propositions suggested by the relev ant literature
with the findings from each of the fiv e cases. Although Japanesepolicym aking processes are too div erse and com plex for sim ple
generalisation, it seem s possible em pirically to draw out som echaracteristics of the process triggered by foreign pressure, and thus
to contribute to further understanding of politics in general.

2First, this paper rev iews the literature concerning the effect of foreignpressure on the Japanese policym aking process. Then, special attention isgiv en to the policy com m unity approach of Martin J. Sm ith, and thepolicy window m odel of John W . Kingdon, which lay the foundation of
the theoretical fram ework for this research. Finally, the questions andpropositions of the dissertation are presented along the line of therevised policy window model.

Review of the Literature
There are som e article-length studies dealing with Japanese global
env ironm ental policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Despite som edifferences in em phasis, W eidner (1989),1 Hollim an (1990),2 Miller andMoore (1991),3 and Maull (1992)4 intuitiv ely share the claim that foreignpressure was the driv ing force bringing about sym bolic or substantiv echanges in global env ironm ental policy in Japan,5 where publicawareness of env ironm ental issues was low and where env ironm ental

1

Helmut Weidner, “Japanese Environmental Policy in an International Perspective:
Lessons for a Preventive Approach,” in Shigeto Tsuru and Helmut Weidner (eds.),
Environmental Policy in Japan (Edition Sigma, Berlin, 1989), pp. 479-552.
2
Jonathan Holliman, “Environmentalism with a Global Scope,” Japan Quarterly (JulySeptember 1990), pp. 284-90.
3Alan S. Millar and Curtis Moore, Japan and the Global Environment (Center for Global
Change, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 1991).
4
Hanns W. Maull, “Japan’s Global Environmental Policies,” i n Andrew Hurrell and
Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), The International Politics of the Environment (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1992),
pp. 354-72.
5Weidner, “Japanese Environmental Policy in an International Perspective,” p. 522;
Holliman, “Environmentalism with a Global Scope,” p. 290; Millar and Moore, Japan and
the Global Environment, p. 18 and p. 38; and Maull, “Japan’s Global Environmental
Policies,” pp. 366-8 and p. 371.
For Japan’s global environmental policy, see also Pat Murdo, “Japan’s Environmenta l
Policies: The International Dimension,” p. 12, JEI Report (Japan Economic Institute,
Washington, D.C., 9 March 1990), and OECD, OECD Environmental Performance Reviews:
Japan (OECD, Paris, 1994).

3

non-gov ernm ental organisations (NGOs) were ineffectiv e.6 Taking theliterature into account, it is perhaps right to assum e at the outset that in
the late 1980s and early 1990s foreign pressure at least gav e im petus tosom e changes in Japanese policies concerning international econom ic
activ ities that were detrim ental to the global env ironm ent.7 In thisconnection, Schreurs (1995) 8 m akes an im portant contribution tounderstanding Japanese policym aking in this policy area by conducting
case studies on ozone depletion and global warm ing. Although she
indicates “a general change in stance on the part of business, the LDP,
and the econom ic m inistries”9 and Japan’s m ore proactiv e stance on
global warm ing, she broadly adm its that Japan was a reactiv e state as
regards the global env ironm ent.10 W hat is m ore im portant, she argues
6

In general, this claim is made in comparison with other developed countries. Regarding
Brazilian policymaking, for example, Hurrell points out the political weakness of t h edomestic environmental movement and emphasises the role of foreign pressure in t h e
Amazonian deforestation issue. Andrew Hurrell, “Brazil and Amazonian Deforestation,”p. 416-8, in Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), The International Politics of theEnvironment (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), pp. 398-429.
7
For further details of Japanese global environmental policy, see Chapter 2 of this thesis.
8
Miranda A. Schreurs, “Policy Laggard or Policy Leader?: Global Environmental PolicyMaking Under the Liberal Democratic Party,” in The Journal of Pacific Asia, 2 (1995), pp.
3-33.
It is a complete fallacy to suppose that foreign pressure always leads to policy change.
Stockwin observes that there is a minimal response in Japan only when foreign pressure
surpasses domestic pressure to an intolerable extent, since the system is quite sensitive tothe latter. As Mikanagi suggests that “gaiatsu works only under particular conditions” (p.
53), however, certain domestic political conditions seem no less important than the levelof foreign pressure in determining whether policy change will occur or not. J.A.A.
Stockwin, “Dynamic and Immobilist Aspects of Japanese Politics,” p. 19, in J.A.A
Stockwin, et al., Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan (University of Hawaii Press,
Honolulu, 1988), pp. 1- 21; and Yumiko Mikanagi, Japan’s Trade Policy: Action or reaction?
(Routledge, London; New York, 1996), pp. 38-53.
9Schreurs, “Policy Laggard or Policy Leader?” p. 33.
Maddock also sheds light on the emergence of domestic forces in Japan that could make i t
a global environmental leader in the near future. Rowland T. Maddock, “Japan and Global
Environmental Leadership,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies (Winter 1994), pp. 37-48.
10Schreurs, “Policy Laggard or Policy Leader?” p. 31. She illustrates this with the case ofozone depletion.
It is generally agreed that foreign pressure plays a crucial role in policymaking in Japan,
the “reactive state,” as Calder calls it. This observation seems most plausible for t h e
mid-1980s onwards, when the United States started to exert direct pressure on Japan to4that foreign pressure did not giv e rise to policy change “until linked tothe interests of dom estic policy actors.”11 This is in line with theobserv ations of prev ious studies on other policy areas by Allison, Calderand Pem pel: foreign pressure on policym aking is effectiv e when there isdomestic support for that pressure.12

In this connection, the concept of a policy sponsor, which Cam pbell
em ploys in his study on Japanese old-age policy changes,13 is worth
m entioning. Although this concept is used in a context that has nothing
to do with foreign pressure, it can be applied to those who support
foreign pressure in the domestic political arena. Campbell proposes that:th e presence or absence of an effecti ve sponsor - one wi th suffi ci ent ski l l s, resources,and dri ve to take ch arge of th e process - i s th e si ngl e most i mportant “vari abl e” i ndetermi ni ng wh eth er and wh en a pol i cy ch ange wi l l occur, and someti mes i ts
content as well.14

In addition, he contends that, in the case of Japanese politics, effectiv esponsors of policy change are generally gov ernm ent m inistries oragencies (“bureaucratic sponsorship”), but, at the sam e tim e, he also
points out the weakness of bureaucratic sponsors: they often face a lack ofresources forpolicy change if

theissue inquestion

becom eschange its policies on, for example, economic liberalisation, foreign aid and international
security arrangements. Kent E. Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation:
Explaining the Reactive State,” p. 518, World Politics (July 1987), pp. 517-41. See also, forexample, Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question (The AEI Press, Washington, D.C., 1992),
pp. 111-113; Mikanagi, Japan’s Trade Policy, p. 38; and Yamamoto Yoshinobu, Kokusaiteki
Sôgoizon (Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1989). P. 98.
11
Schreurs, “Policy Laggard or Policy Leader?” p. 31.
12Gary D. Allinson, “Introduction,” p. 8, in Gary D. Allinson and Yasunori Sone (eds.),
Political Dynamics in Contemporary Japan (Cornell University Press, Ithaca; London, 1993),
pp. 1-14; Kent E. Calder, Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan(Princeton University Press, Princeton; Oxford, 1988), pp. 478-80; T. J. Pempel, “TheUnbundling of “Japan, Inc.”: The Changing Dynamics of Japanese Policy Formation,” pp.
296-306, Journal of Japanese Studies (summer 1987), pp. 271-306.

5

controv ersial.15 The Env ironm ent Agency, which is likely to em erge as apolicy sponsor, is a good exam ple of a rather weak gov ernm ent
departm ent; therefore, if the agency becom es a policy sponsor, it needs tobe assisted, for exam ple by foreign pressure, by dom estic public support,
or by other politically powerful actors such as politicians of the rulingparty.16

Nev ertheless, not only policy sponsors but also those who act against
foreign pressure deserv e attention. A series of policy changes on global
env ironm ental issues from the late 1980s onwards do not m ean that theJapanese elite as a whole becam e the policy sponsors of foreign pressure.
For exam ple, Japan did not change its substantiv e stance on scientificwhaling or im ports of tropical tim ber ev en in the late 1980s and early
1990s, when foreign pressure intensified and when general institutionalchange was under way to accom m odate m ore env ironm ental concerns.17
This policy inertia im plies that the whaling and tropical tim ber
industries successfully resisted any policy changes that conflicted with
their interests. By definition, foreign pressure is exerted with a v iew tochanging dom estic policy or institutions; it follows that such pressure isv ery likely to entail a dom estic schism between those who support it and13John Creighton Campbell, How Policies Change: the Japanese Government and the Aging
Society (Princeton University Press, Princeton; Oxford, 1992).
14
Ibid., p. 47.
15
Ibid., pp. 388-90.
16
In the case of countermeasures against global warming, Schreurs describes the LDP and
the Environment Agency as the policy sponsors. Schreurs, “Policy Laggard or Policy
Leader?”pp. 24-8.
17Ibid., p. 33.

6those who oppose it.18 W hen it com es to foreign pressure which attem pts
to regulate international econom ic activ ities by Japan that harm theenv ironm ent, it is appropriate to pay m ore attention to resistance tochange on the part of those inv olv ed in such activ ities. In other words,
an account of Japanese policym aking on the global env ironm ent seem s
to require analysis of three v ectors inv olv ed in both policy change andinertia: foreign pressure, and two types of dom estic pressure for andagainst foreign pressure. Policy changes, howev er, cannot be explained
only by the aggregation of these v ectors; the reality is m uch m ore
com plicated than such a pluralistic v iew. In other words, it is also
necessary to consider com plex linkages between international anddom estic politics, and intricate dom estic political institutions that hav e
indiv idual autonom y. For this reason, attention is now giv en to thewider literature on foreign pressure.

The literature on foreign pressure
As m entioned abov e, Japan has been labelled a reactiv e state, andconsequently there are sev eral works that concentrate on the effect offoreign pressure on the Japanese policym aking process, m ost notably
those of Schoppa (1997),19 Orr (1990),20 and Mikanagi (1996)21(1) The two-level game model
18

Yamamoto, Kokusaiteki Sôgoizon, p. 93.
Leonard J. Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure can and cannot do(Columbia University Press, New York, 1997).
20
Robert M. Orr, The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power (Columbia University Press,
New York, 1990).
21
Mikanagi, Japan’s Trade Policy.
19

7

Schoppa seem s to be the first scholar to giv e m uch theoretical attention
to the effectiv eness of foreign pressure in relation to Japanese dom estic
politics, and to address the v ery question that this thesis asks: how andwhen does foreign pressure influence the policy process and policy
outcom es? 22 In a case study of the US-Japanese negotiations called theStructural Im pedim ents Initiativ e (SII) and the Clinton Fram ework
Talks, he outlines six synergistic strategies adopted by negotiators, such as“threats,” “participation expansion,” and “alternativ e specification,” andhypothesises the dom estic political conditions under which thesestrategies are m ost likely to be successful. In his conclusion, he confirm ssome of the hypotheses, as follows:• Threats will be m ore effectiv e “if they prom ise to im pose high enoughcosts on the right dom estic actors in the target country, are seen as
ratifiable and otherwise credible, and are perceived as legitimate.”23• Participation expansion will work well “when pressure is able to bring
into the policy process prev iously excluded dom estic actors who
support U.S. demands for their own reasons.”24• Alternativ e specification will be m ore likely to succeed “when Japan
has a big and recognized policy problem in search of proposals that canbe packaged as a ‘solution.’”25

22

Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan. For an earlier version of this book , see Leonard J.
Schoppa, “Two-level games and bargaining outcomes: why gaiatsu succeeds in Japan insome cases but not others,” International Organisation, 47 (Summer 1993), pp. 353-86.
23
Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan, p. 307.
24
Ibid., p. 309.
25
Ibid., p. 310.

8Based on the two-lev el gam e m odel proposed by Putnam ,26 Schoppa’s
study takes som e im portant steps towards focusing on the interaction of
two levels of politics: international and domestic.

This is particularly im portant for the analysis of foreign econom ic policy
because the increasing trend towards econom ic interdependence am ong
nations has blurred the boundary between foreign and dom estic policies
and, consequently, brought m ore dom estic gov ernm ental and nongov ernm ental actors into the m aking of foreign policy.27 For instance, it
is becom ing difficult to m ake and im plem ent foreign econom ic policy
without inv olv ing m inistries and agencies other than the Ministry ofForeign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of International Trade andIndustry (MITI).28 This tendency seem s to be found in the area of global
env ironm ental politics as well,29 in an era when “the world has now
m ov ed beyond econom ic interdependence to ecological interdependence- and ev en beyond that to an interm eshing of the two.”30 In suchcircum stances, few scholars are satisfied with the sim ple ‘rational actor’assum ption, which treats the state as a m onolithic actor, and the26

Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,”
International Organization, 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-60.
27
Arase illustrates some differences between foreign economic policy and foreign policy.
David Arase, Buying Power: the political economy of Japan’s foreign aid (Lynne Rienner
Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1995), pp. 3-4.
28
Mikanagi, Japan’s Trade Policy, p. 94.
For the internationalisation of Japanese ministries and agencies, see Kusano Atsush i ,“Taigai Seisaku Kettei no K i kô to Katei,” in Aruga Tadashi et al. (eds.), Nihon no Gaikô(Tokyo University Press, Tokyo, 1989), pp. 53-92.
29
It should be noted here that many of the activities and policies related to the global
environment fall under the jurisdictions, not of the Environment Agency or the Ministry ofForeign Affairs but, of various economic ministries. Miller and Moore, “Japan and t h e
Global Environment,” pp. 10-12.
30
Jim MacNeill, Pieter Winsemius, and Taizo Yakushiji, Beyond Interdependence (Oxford
University Press, New York; Oxford, 1991), p. 4.

9policym aking process as a black box; i.e. foreign policy is a nation’s
rational reaction to external stim uli. There is general agreem ent that it isbeneficial, from an analytical point of v iew, to grasp the roles of therelev ant actors, and the political relations between them , in thepolicymaking process.

From this perspectiv e, it should be noted that Schoppa still focusesm ainly on international negotiations and the effectiv eness of thestrategies em ployed by negotiators, and consequently defines foreignpressure as “an um brella term for a v ariety of such strategies.”31 In thisdissertation, foreign pressure is seen in a wider context; foreign pressure
can also be exerted unstrategically, for instance by public opinion abroad.
W ith its broader definition of foreign pressure, this thesis seeks toanalyse the role of dom estic actors, and their relationships in m ore
depth. In order to gain a com plete picture of the policym aking process, itis necessary to inv estigate the “intragov ernm ental gam e” as well as thetwo-lev el gam e. For this type of inv estigation, Orr com bines two usefulconcepts: bureaucratic politics and transgovernmental relations.

(2) The com bination of bureaucratic politics and transgov ernm ental
relations
Orr (1990) throws light on the “bureaucratic coalition building” between
the United States and Japan, where the form er exerts influence on thelatter’s foreign aid program m e, by em ploying two analytical tools: the31

Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan, p. 5.

10

concepts of “bureaucratic politics”32 and “transgov ernm ental relations.”
Both concepts are based on the assum ption that the gov ernm ent is not asingle unit, which seem s to be in line with the general agreem ent thatthe age of“Japan, Inc.” is ov er, if it ev er existed.33 The concept of

bureaucratic politics em ployed here is not restricted to “bureaucratic
politics” in Graham T. Allison’s narrow sense: that is politics “as aresultant of v arious bargaining gam es am ong [indiv idual top] players in
the national gov ernm ent;”34 in the context of Japanese policym aking, theconcept also em braces organisational bargaining am ong gov ernm ent
m inistries, m ainly at lev els of bureaus and div isions. In addition, Orr
introduces the concept of transgov ernm ental relations with a v iew to
explaining the role of external pressure from the United States.35 In thecase of Japanese aid to V ietnam in the late 1970s, for exam ple, he showsthat the National Security Council and the State Departm ent of theUnited States m ade a coalition with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MOFA) to put pressure on the Ministry of International Trade andIndustry (MITI) and som e m em bers of the Liberal Dem ocratic Party (LDP)
to stop providing technical aid.36

32

In an earlier work on Japanese aid policy, Rix also emphasises the importance of thisconcept. Alan Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid (Croom Helm, London, 1980), p. 16.
33
Pempel, “The Unbundling of “Japan, Inc.,”” p. 304.
34
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Little, Brown
and Company, Boston, 1971), p. 6. See also Rix, Japan’s Economic Aid, p. 16.
35
Orr, The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, p. 4. He mentions that this approach was
originally discussed by Keohane and Nye. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye,
“Transgovernmental Relations and International Organisations,” World Politics, 27(October 1974).
36
Orr, The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power, pp. 121-2.

11

These two concepts seem to prov ide a good starting point for the
exploration of the Japanese policym aking process with regard to global
env ironm ental problem s. Three points, howev er, need to be m ade. First,
as the abov e exam ple shows, bureaucratic politics is not always abargaining process; som etim es it is a one-way pressuring process. W hen
there is no agreem ent about the allocation of authority am ong
m inistries, or when authority is div ided between sev eral m inistries,
m inistries exercise what Ôtake calls the “bargaining type of influence” oneach other. W hen there is prior agreem ent where authority resides, on
the other hand, interested m inistries exercise the “pressuring type of
influence” on the m inistry with the authority.37 In the latter case, theexercise of influence is unilateral rather than m ulti- or bi-lateral. The
Japanese policym aking processes selected for this research seem close, notto the “bargaining m odel,” but to the “pressuring m odel,” since in m any
cases authority resides with an econom ic m inistry that will protect anindustry under foreign pressure.38

Second, although foreign pressure is likely to produce bureaucratic
politics39 (and this seem s to be true of Japanese policym aking on the
global env ironm ent40 ), it is a m istake to assum e that whenev er foreignpressure is exerted on Japan, a bureaucratic sponsor will em erge, and theinterm inisterial gam e will take place. For instance, it seem s reasonable to37Ôtake Hideo, Gendai Nihon no Seiji Kenryoku Keizai Kenryoku, 2nd edn (Saní tsushobô,Tokyo, 1996), pp. 248-53.
38Ôtake distinguishes these two kinds of influence, and calls them the “bargaining
model” and the “pressure model.” Ibid.
39
Yamamoto, Kokusaiteki Sôgoizon, p. 92.

12

suppose that Japan som etim es acts as a m onolithic state, standing firm
against foreign dem ands deem ed unjustifiable from any Japanese pointof v iew. Moreov er, one should not dism iss the possibility that the Dietm ay becom e the centre of politics, with politicians div ided into those forand those against foreign pressure,41 ev en though the likelihood ofseeing this “cam p conflict” type of policym aking is considered sm all in
the case of global environmental issues.42

Finally, neither of these concepts em braces non-gov ernm ental, econom ic
and env ironm ental actors. Nishikawa does not hesitate to say that “It isregrettable that Orr did not analyze the priv ate sector.”43 This om ission is
ev en m ore questionable in the analysis of global env ironm ental politics.
In the literature on international relations, m any scholars point out thatenv ironm ental groups play an im portant role in this political arena.44
Therefore, it is necessary to em ploy the concept of “transnational
relations,” including “transgov ernm ental relations,” for the analysis ofglobal env ironm ental politics.45 In other words, one needs to consider

40

See, for example, Maull, “Japan’s Global Environmental Policies,” p. 357.
Yamamoto, Kokusaiteki Sôgoizon, p. 95.
42
For camp conflict, see, for example, T.J. Pempel, Patterns of Japanese Policymaking:Experiences from Higher Education (Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1978).
43
Jun Nishikawa, “Deciphering Japan Inc.,” p. 215, Japan Quarterly (April-June 1991), pp.
214-7.
44
See Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics: Dilemmas in
World Politics, 2nd edn (Westview Press, Boulder; San Francisco; Oxford, 1996), p. 16;
Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, “The International Politics of the Environment:
An Introduction,” p.20, in Hurrell and Kingsbury (eds.), The International Politics of theEnvironment (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), pp. 1-50; and Oran R. Young, “Global
Environmental Change and International Governance,” p. 14, in Ian H. Rowlands andGreene Malony, Global Environmental Change and International Relations (Macmillan,
Basingstoke, 1991), pp. 6-18.
45
Keohane and Nye state that “Transgovernmental applies when we relax the realist
assumption that states act coherently as units; transnational applies when we relax t h eassumption that states are the only units.” Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power41

13

cross-national links and influences, not only between gov ernm ent
ministries but also between non-governmental groups.46

Sim ilarly, the concept of bureaucratic politics needs to incorporate nongov ernm ental actors and political actors as well, since “bureaucratic
power is . . . relational in the sense that it em erges from the structure of
LDP-bureaucrats-interest group alignm ents and the political exchanges
that take place am ong them ,” as Okim oto puts it.47 In issues that are nonpoliticised, as is often the case with global env ironm ental issues,
bureaucratic politics can be defined as the process of conflict andcoordination taking place between gov ernm ent m inistries backed by theinterest groups under their respectiv e jurisdiction. Suppose that there isforeign pressure against activ ities by a business group that adv ersely
affect the global env ironm ent, and that this group puts dom esticpressure on a relev ant gov ernm ent m inistry not to regulate it;48 thatm inistry will attem pt to support the business group against otherm inistries who back the foreign pressure, as long as it serv es thatm inistry’s interests. Moreov er, zoku politicians (policy tribes)49 can playand Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Little, Brown and Company, Boston;
Toronto, 1977), p. 25.
46
Maull, “Japan’s Global Environmental Policies,” pp. 366-7.
The formation of such transnational relations is observed in a case study by Hurrell on
Amazonian deforestation, and in a case study by Kusano on the Japan - U.S. orange
negotiations. Hurrell, “Brazil and Amazonian Deforestation,” pp. 414-6; Kusano Atsushi,
Nichibei Orenji Kôshô (Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, Tokyo, 1983).
47
Daniel I. Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Policy for HighTechnology (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1989), p. 226.
48
According to Muramatsu Michio’s survey in 1980, agricultural and economic groups tend
to target the bureaucracy rather than political parties when they attempt to affect t h epolicymaking process. Tsujinaka Yutaka, Riekishudan (Tokyo University Press, Tokyo,1988), p. 119.
49
S a tô Seizaburô defines zoku politicians as “groups of leading MPs, organized around t h einterests of specific administrative agencies, who exert influence on a daily basis on14

an interm ediary role between a m inistry and interest groups, while theruling party can coordinate the com peting interests of different
m inistries, as indicated by Schreurs’ case study on global warm ing. In
short, bureaucratic politics should not be confined to bureaucratic actors
alone. In contrast to Orr’s analysis, Mikanagi’s considers the relationshipbetween a ministry and the private sector.

(3) The ministry-centred approach
Mikanagi (1996) analyses the dom estic conditions under which foreignpressure can hav e a significant im pact on trade liberalisation in Japan, byconducting case studies of the US-Japan trade negotiations, known as theMarket-Oriented Sector-Selectiv e (MOSS) talks, in 1985 and 1986.50 Thisfocus on dom estic factors is based on her finding that “the am ount ofpressure applied to the Japanese gov ernm ent and the degree ofachiev em ent do not correlate.”51 In this analysis, she rejects the debate
about élitism , pluralism and corporatism , which attem pts to characterise
the whole Japanese political system , and em ploys a “m inistry-centred
approach” based on the proposition that each m inistry is different interm s of its objectiv es, its lev el of autonom y and the scope of its policy
instrum ents, all of which affect its capacity to respond to foreignpressure. She argues, for instance, that if there is interm inisterial conflictbehalf of those interests.” S a tô Seizaburô and Matsuzaki Tetsuhisa, “Jimintô Seiken,”Chûô Kôron (1986), p. 92. (Quoted in Hitoshi Abe, Muneyuki Shindô and Sadafumi
Kawato, The Government and Politics of Japan (University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, 1994), pp.
51-2.)
50
Mikanagi, Japan’s Trade Policy.
51
Ibid., p. 52. She maintains that “the international systems-level explanation offers
answers to the question why Japan responds to gaiatsu. However the theoreticalframework offered in this book tries to explain how Japan responds.” Ibid., p. 37.

15

a m inistry is less able to respond, since its autonom y is reduced by otherm inistries’ interv ention.52 In addition, she regards the types ofrelationship between a m inistry and the priv ate sector as an im portantfactor in Japan’s responsiv eness to foreign pressure. This approachav oids the ov er-sim plification of a m acro approach to the Japanesepolicym aking process, and ov ercom es the defects in the works of
Schoppa and Orr by paying m ore attention to dom estic factors, including
the private sector.

Nev ertheless, this approach also has the following three lim itations.
First, Mikanagi puts a m inistry’s possible relationships with the priv ate
sector into four categories:

post-prom otiv e, prom otiv e, restructuring

and regulatory, and argues that the latter category a m inistry finds itself
in, the m ore capacity it possesses to m ake and im plem ent econom ic
policies.53 This typology is, howev er, too sim plistic to analyse the detailsof their relationship or to specify the m echanism s through which a
specific relationship operates, as Mikanagi herself adm its that “theproxim ity of relationship between m inistries and the priv ate sector
v aries from sector to sector and m inistry to m inistry.”54 Second and m ore
im portant, Mikanagi’s work considers the power relationships between am inistry and the priv ate sector only as a zero-sum gam e. This seem s to
be based on her im plicit assum ption that there is always conflict of

52

Ibid., p. 28.
For more detailed account of this typology and its impact on the capacity of a ministry,see ibid.,
pp. 31-7.
54
Ibid., p. 93.
53

16

interest between a m inistry and the priv ate sector: i.e., that the form er
fav ours trade liberalisation and the latter protectionism . In this zero-sum
context, for exam ple, she m aintains that the electronics sector has m ore
power than MITI because the industry, which is at a post-prom otiv estage, depends relativ ely little on the m inistry.55 Finally, politicalinterv ention is outside Mikanagi’s fram ework, which m ainly deals withissues that are not highly politicised. This is why she treats the highlypoliticised issue of forest products as an exceptional case. Although she
em ploys a m inistry-centred approach, there seem s to be no need toignore political interv ention because, like interm inisterial interv ention,
it can be considered a factor lim iting the autonom y of the m inistry inquestion.

The policy community approach
It m ay be possible to im prov e Mikanagi’s approach further byintroducing the policy com m unity approach taken by Sm ith (1993)56 in
the literature on British and United States politics. First, this approachgoes beyond Mikanagi’s typology, and helps in exam ining eachrelationship between a m inistry and the priv ate sector m ore closely
within the structural and historical context of the policym aking process.57
Second, it allows for the possibility of a positiv e-sum gam e, as Sm ith
points out that “By working together, a group and a state agency can
55

Ibid., p. 74.
Martin J. Smith, Pressure, Power and Policy: State Autonomy and Policy Networks in Britain
and the United States (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1993).
57
Mikanagi says that “a broader conception of institutional structure, which describes t h e
structural relationship between state and society, will be useful in analysing how societal
56

17increase each other’s autonom y in relation to other parts of the state.”58
This seem s particularly true where both actors cooperate to resist externalpressure. Finally, it is a flexible approach, which can deal with politicalintervention as well.59

Before looking m ore closely at Sm ith’s approach, it is worth m entioning
the concept of policy networks dev eloped by Marsh and Rhodes (1992),
on which this approach is based. Marsh and Rhodes offer a m odel ofpolicy networks: continuous but changeable structural relationships
between a gov ernm ent m inistry and interest groups at the sectoral or
sub-sectoral lev el.60 In this sense, Marsh and Rhodes regard the policy

interests are represented in the policymaking of a state.” Mikanagi, Japan’s Trade Policy, p.
25.
58Smith, Pressure, Power and Policy, p. 54.
Regarding the relationship between MITI and an industry, for example, Okimoto holds
that “Their relationship is not adversarial or a tug-of -war. They try to pull together inthe direction of achieving common goals.” Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market, p. 144.
59
Smith, Pressure, Power and Policy, p. 7.
60David Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks in British Government(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992).
In Britain, as Marsh (1995) points out, “there has been a significant growth in researchusing the policy networks concept in the last few years.” As Rhodes and Marsh put i t ,however, “The literature on policy networks has varied disciplinary origins,proliferating terminology, mutually exclusive definitions and, especially, varying levelsof analysis.” David Marsh, State Theory and the Policy Network Model (Department ofGovernment, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland, 1995),
p. 1; R.A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, “Policy Networks in B r itish Politics,” p. 18, inMarsh and Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks in British Government, pp. 1-26.
For the policy network concept, see, for example, Marsh and Rhodes (eds.), Policy
Networks in British Government; Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz (eds.), Policy Networks:
Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1991)(in particular, Chapter 2: Patrick Kenis and Volder Schneider, “Policy Networks andPolicy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox,” pp. 25-59); European Journal of
Political Research: Special issue: Policy Networks, 21, 1-2 (February 1992); Koike Osamu,“Seisaku Nettowaaku to Seifukan Kankei,” Chuô Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyujo Kenkyu
Hôkoku, 16 (February 1995), pp. 27-46; and Shinkawa Toshimitsu, “Seisaku Nettowaaku
Ron no Shatei,” Kikan Gyôsei Kanri Kenkyu, 59 (September 1992), pp. 12-9.
With regard to Japanese politics, Okimoto (1989) and Wilks and Wright (1991) apply amore personal concept of policy networks to Japanese industrial policy in different ways.
Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market. Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright (eds.), The
Promotion and Regulation of Industry in Japan (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1991). For a study ofJapanese science and technology policy networks, see Jonathan Lewis, “Collision of18

network as a m eso-lev el concept, which has a role to play between
m acro-lev el analysis, which focuses on the broader relationship between
the state and civ il society, and m icro-lev el analysis, which deals withindiv idual or group behav iour.61 In this m odel, policy networks are also
seen as “political structures which constrain and facilitate actors within
the network” and which thereby affect, but do not determ ine, policy
outcom es.62 This concept seem s to hav e great explanatory power withrespect to global env ironm ental politics, since it can cov er a wide rangeof sectors and sub-sectors, each of which inv olv es a different set of actors
in the policym aking process,63 and since it can be extended totransnational networks.64 Moreov er, Marsh and Rhodes prov ide a useful
typology of policy networks inwhich tightly integrated “policy

Interests: The role of the Ruling Party in Science and Technology Policy,” Japan Forum, 6, 1
(April 1994), pp. 62-72.
There are also some comparative studies using the concept for the analysis of countries
including Japan. See, for instance, Stephen Wilks and Maurice Wright (eds.), Comparative
Government Industry Relations: Western Europe, the United States, and Japan (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1987); Maurice Wright, “Policy Community, Policy Network and Comparative
Industrial Policies,” Political Studies, 36 (1988), pp. 593-612; and David Knoke et a l . ,Comparing Policy Networks: Labor politics in the U.S., Germany, and Japan (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, England, 1996).
61
Rhodes and Marsh, “Policy Networks in British Politics,” p. 1. This is based partly on
the belief that “To pursue micro-level analysis in order to explore personal networks will
provide a wealth of detail but make it increasingly difficult to generalize about policy
networks.” Ibid., p. 22. Marsh also argues that the policy network analysis needs to be
combined with both macro-level and micro-level analyses, in order to explain t h emembership and the policy outcomes of policy networks. Marsh, State Theory and the Policy
Network Model, p. 2. See also Marsh and Rhodes, “Policy Communities and Issue
Networks,” pp. 266-8, in Marsh and Rhodes (eds.), Policy Networks in British Government,
pp. 249-68.
62
Marsh, State Theory and the Policy Network Model, p. 2. and p. 4. In this sense, Rhodes calls
policy networks “an institutional approach.” R.A.W Rhodes, “The Institutional
Approach,” p. 53, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science(Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1995), pp. 42-57.
63
See Robert Garner, Environmental Politics (Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel
Hempstead, 1996), p. 155.
64
Koike, “Seisaku Nettowaaku to Seifukan Kankei,” p. 46.

19

com m unities” and open “issue networks” are regarded as the end-points
on a continuum.65 Garner summarises this typology as follows:
At one end i s th e so-cal l ed pol i cy communi ty ch aracteri sed by regul ar i nteracti on
between a smal l number of l ong-standi ng parti ci pants, usual l y a government agency
and certai n pri vi l eged i nterest groups, operati ng wi th i n a consi derabl e degree ofconsensus and cl osed off both from competi ng groups not accepti ng th e sh ared val ues
and from oth er pol i cy networks. At th e oth er i s th e so-cal l ed i ssue network,
ch aracteri zed by a consi derabl e degree of openness and fl ux, wi th a vari ety ofcompeti ng groups abl e to gai n access (Hecl o, 1978). Th ese are i deal types and mostpol i cy networks wi l l l i e between th e two extremes. Di fferent networks may, ofcourse, be placed at different positions on the spectrum.66

Like Mikanagi, Sm ith takes an approach that focuses on the autonom y ofa gov ernm ent m inistry and its relationships with econom ic and socialgroups.67 On the basis of Marsh and Rhodes’ notion of policy networks,
Sm ith throws light on the resistance of a policy com m unity to externalpressure, and this seem s to be helpful in understanding the effect offoreign pressure on the policym aking process.68 In this regard, it should
be noted that Sm ith’s notion of the policy com m unity is broader thanthat of Marsh and Rhodes in the strict sense, and it includes actual policy
networks close to the ideal type of the policy com m unity. Sm ith argues
that a gov ernm ent m inistry is m otiv ated to form a policy com m unity as
65This typology is based on the following dimensions: membership (number ofparticipants and type of interests), integration (frequency of interaction, continuity andconsensus), resources (distribution of resources within a network and within participatingorganisations) and power.
For details of this typology, see Table 11. 1, Marsh and Rhodes, “Policy Communities andIssue Networks,” p. 251.
66
Garner, Environmental Politics, p. 155.
67
Smith, Pressure, Power and Policy. Regarding the notion of state autonomy, Smith statesthat “the state/state actors have interests of their own and, in certain circumstances, t h eability to transform these interests into policy.” Ibid., p. 49.
68
He defines the role of a policy community as “to prevent change by excluding threats tothe dominant interests.” Smith, Pressure, Power and Policy, p. 76. See also Ôtake, Gendai
Nihon no Seiji Kenryoku Keizai Kenryoku, p. 51.
Unlike Marsh and Rhodes, Smith admits that a policy network can exist not only at t h e
sectoral or the sub-sectoral level but also around a specific issue. Smith, Pressure, Power20

a m eans of extending its autonom y: that is, a m eans not only ofenhancing its ability to im plem ent policy in a relev ant policy area, butalso of protecting its own interests from external threats, including
political and interm inisterial interv entions, by isolating the policy
process. Non-gov ernm ental participants also find it beneficial to form
and m aintain a policy com m unity because it can not only institutionalise
their access to the policym aking process,69 but also create a m echanism toresist external threats that could dam age their interests as well.70
Furtherm ore, he argues that the degree to which a policy network can
withstand external pressure largely depends on the character of the
network.71 In other words, the closer a policy network is to the ideal typeof policy com m unity, the m ore resistant it becom es to externalpressure.72

Sm ith also considers the dynam ic aspect of the policy com m unity.73
W hen new ideas, issues, or groups m anage to enter a policy com m unity,
thenatureofthecom m unity (e.g.

its strong consensus andexclusiv eness) gradually changes. Consequently, it m ov es towards theissue network end of Marsh and Rhodes’ continuum ; and theand Policy, p. 65. Despite this difference, Marsh recognises that Smith is “seen as
associated with” Marsh and Rhodes. Marsh, State Theory and the Policy Network Model, p. 1.
69
In his model, policy communities are seen as structures that privilege certain interests inthe policymaking process. Smith, Pressure, Power and Policy, p. 72.
For an institutional account of Japanese interest group behaviour, see Aurelia George,“Japanese Interest Group Behaviour: An Institutional Approach,” in J.A.A. Stockwin etal., Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1988), pp. 106-40.
70
See Smith, Pressure, Power and Policy, p. 59.
71
Ibid., p. 98.
72
In this connection, Marsh and Rhodes offer two related comments: policy communities or“those networks with a dominant economic or professional interest are the most resistant21

com m unity thus becom es m ore subject to external pressure. In thiscontext, Sm ith

explains the im plications of the entry of othergovernment ministries into an existing policy community as follows:
If a communi ty contai ns more th an one actor wi th pol i ti cal auth ori ty th en th e
abi l i ty of th e communi ty to wi th stand external th reats i s l i kel y to be l ess. In th i s
si tuati on confl i ct can devel op between th e deci si on-maki ng i nsti tuti ons and th i sl eads to confl i ct over terri tory, th e pol i ti ci sati on of th e i ssue area and th e i ncl usi onof an increasing number of groups. Consequently the community is destroyed.74

Thus, if a gov ernm ent m inistry supporting external pressure - that is, abureaucratic policy sponsor - interv enes in a policy com m unity, it ism ore likely thatthat pressure will bring about policy change that isagainst the interests of the com m unity. Sm ith also points out that “Ifcontrov ersy dev elops, well-resourced political actors like Presidents orPrim e Ministers can becom e inv olv ed in the policy arena and thus
rem ov e decision-m aking from the com m unity.”75 In sum , Sm ith’s policy
com m unity approach seem s to prov ide useful insights into the way
foreign pressure leads to policy change or inertia.

In addition, this approach is particularly suitable for the analysis ofJapanese politics because there are considered to be strong structural
relationships between a gov ernm ent m inistry and industries under its
jurisdiction.76 In such structures, trade associations play a critical role as

to change,” and “Policy communities, in particular, are associated with policy
continuity.” Marsh and Rhodes, “Policy Communities and Issue Networks,” pp. 261-2.
73
Smith, Pressure, Power and Policy, pp. 91-8.
74
Ibid., p. 98.
75
Ibid., p. 95.
76
John Creighton Campbell, “Bureaucratic Primacy: Japanese Policy Communities in an
American Perspective,” p. 18 Governance: An International Journal of Policy and
Administration, 2, 1 (January 1989), pp. 5-22.
Muramatsu and Krauss observe that there are “relatively i nstitutionalised
relationships” between elements of the bureaucracy, the LDP and interest groups in Japan,
and call them “issue or interest subgovernments.” Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Krauss,22

interest groups, representing their respectiv e industries in relation to them inistry in charge.77 Although a trade association is superv ised by them inistry, their relationship is founded on m utual dependence.78 The
m inistry depends on a trade association in order to obtain inform ationon the industry, to gather industry opinion, to get the industry’s explicit
or im plicit consent to policy drafts, and to secure cooperation with theindustry in the im plem entation of a policy. On the other hand, a tradeassociation depends on its superv ising m inistry in order to obtain
adv ance inform ation on policy changes, to exercise influence in thepolicym aking process, to request fav ourable consideration when it com es
to the im plem entation of relev ant laws, and to secure authorisation for
their voluntary control.79“The Conservative Policy Line and the Development of Patterned Pluralism,” p. 538, inKôzô Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba, The Political Economy of Japan Volume1: The Domestic
Transformation (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1987), pp. 516-54. W i t hregard to Japanese politics, the concept of subgovernments was first employed byCampbell to analyse Japanese budget politics. John Creighton Campbell, Contemporary
Japanese Budget Politics (University of California Press, Berkeley; London, 1977). Although
this concept is similar to that of the policy community, one of the major differences is t h a t
the subgovernment presupposes the inclusion of a relevant division of the LDP’s Policy
Affairs Research Council. In this regard, however, Ôtake points out that although asubgovernment is usually the exclusive policymaking institution in a particular policy
area, the involvement of the LDP is supplementary so long as there are no budgetary or
legislative implications. Ôtake, Gendai Nihon no Seiji Kenryoku Keizai Kenryoku, pp. 191-2.
Similarly, Tani labels the policymaking alliance an Iron Triangle, and expects that i t
may gradually be broken down by an emerging environmental issue network. Tani
Katsuhiro, “The Legislative Process of the Fundamental Law on the Environment; From
Iron Triangle to Issue Network,” p. 159, Research Reports of the Anan College of Technology 30(March 1994), pp. 145-161.
77
Hiwatari attributes the success of Japanese industrial policy to the “organised
markets,” which are characterised by functional division, oligopolistic competition, andinterlocking business groupings (Keiretsu) . Such markets also seem to enable tradeassociations to act effectively. Hiwatari Nobuhiro, Sengo Nihon no Shijô to Seiji (Tokyo
University Press, Tokyo, 1991), p. 11.
78
Samuels calls the political interdependence of the state and the private sector t h epolitics of “reciprocal consent,” with which he analyses Japanese energy markets.
Richard J. Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State (Cornell University Press, Ithaca;
London, 1987).
79
Nishio Masaru, “S hôchô no Shoshô Jimu to C hôsa Kenkyu Kikaku,” pp. 67-8, in Nishio
Masaru and Muramatsu Michio (eds), Kôza Gyôseigaku, 4 (Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1995), pp. 3976.

23

This m utual dependence is further strengthened by “functional
cooperativ e relationships” between a m inistry and each industry under
its jurisdiction, as Ôtake puts it.80 These relationships are based on thefact that they share fundam entally the sam e perspectiv e; the m inistrytries to see political issues and social situations through the eyes of anindustry, and the m inistry’s interest in enhancing its authority in the
gov ernm ent is closely linked with an industry’s interest in dev eloping
itself. For a m inistry, m aintaining this type of relationship is rationalfrom Junko Kato’s point of v iew that a m inistry sim ultaneously tries topursue “two objectiv es: increasing their (organizational) power andreflecting “social welfare” considerations in policym aking where social
welfare is determ ined by the officials’ technocratic ideas and specialised
knowledge.”81 Such ideas and knowledge seem to be shared by a policy
com m unity; consequently, “social welfare” tends to be defined from thecommunity’s perspective.

The policy window model
The im portance of focusing on the policy com m unity cannot be ov erem phasised, as discussed abov e, but policy change should be analysed ina broader fram ework as well. In this sense, John Kingdon’s policy
window m odel 82 is useful since it can explain the dynam ics of a policy

80Ôtake, Gendai Nihon no Seiji Kenryoku Keizai Kenryoku, p. 254.
Junko Kato, The Problem of Bureaucratic Rationality: Tax Politics in Japan (Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1994), p. 36.
82
John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd edn (HarperCollins
College Publishers, New York, 1995).
81

24

com m unity, and other relev ant factors leading to policy change.
Kingdon, after pointing out the lim itations of increm entalism and therational policym aking approach, introduces a rev ised v ersion of theCohen-March-Olsen garbage can m odel.83 In this rev ised m odel, theseparate stream s of problem recognition, generation of policy proposals,
and political ev ents com e together at certain critical tim es, m ost probably
during the opening of policy windows - “opportunities for pushing pet
proposals or conceptions of problem s,”84 and in the presence of the rightpolicy entrepreneurs.85 The coupling of these three stream s pushes a
giv en subject onto a “decision agenda”86 that are up for a final,
authoritativ e decision, and increases the chance of a policy change. Thism odel em phasises not only the random ness of policym aking, but also
the structural elem ents of the process stream s, of couplings, and of theouter system ;87 it attem pts to explain agenda setting in the problem andthe politics stream s, and alternativ e specification in the policy stream . By
quoting Kingdon, Schoppa pays attention not only to the politics stream
but also to “the possibility that international pressure can affect policy
outcom es by influencing these other stream s,”88 and incorporates thisargum ent in his rev ised two-lev el gam e m odel. In this dissertation, the83

For this model, see Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen, “A Garbage Can
Model of Organizational Choice,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 17 (March 1972), pp.
1-25.
84
Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, p. 20.
85
Another important concept in this model is t h a t of policy entrepreneurs: that is, “people
who are willing to invest their resources in pushing their pet proposals or problems.” Ibid.
This concept is equivalent to the policy sponsor used by Campbell.
86
Kingdon distinguishes two types of agendas: the governmental agenda, “the list of
subjects that are getting attention,” and the decision agenda, “the list of subjects within t h egovernmental agenda that are up for an active decision.” Ibid., p. 4.
87
See Ibid., pp. 206-8.
88
Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan, p. 31.

25

rev erse is attem pted: Schoppa’s m odel is partially incorporated into thepolicy window model, which takes foreign pressure into account.

The policy window m odel, which focuses on the process prior to a final,
authoritativ e choice m ade by presidential decision or by a legislativ e
v ote, can offer an excellent analytical tool for studying Japanesepolicym aking on the global env ironm ent, where the Prim e Minister andthe Diet seem to hav e lim ited roles. For som e issues, howev er, it isnecessary to subm it a bill to the Diet in order to enact a new law, toam end an existing law, or to form ulate a budget, with a v iew toaccom m odating foreign pressure. In this case, opposition parties are also
inv olv ed in the process in the Diet, m ost substantially in the relev ant
standing and special com m ittees that giv e detailed deliberation to bills. 89
In this process, policy change is confirm ed and giv en concrete form
unless opposition parties raise an objection to it, since the ruling party
has already deliberated on the change with the bureaucracy and the
Cabinet before enactm ent. Although policy can also be am ended in theprocess, incorporating dem ands from opposition parties, it is assum ed at
this stage that the legislativ e process can affect policy outcom es only to asm all extent, if at all. In m any cases, sim ilarly, a Cabinet decision ispresum ed to be a form ality, sim ply endorsing a bureaucratic choice.
Therefore, it is crucial to pay careful attention to the pre-decision processthat the policy window model attempts to analyse.

89Abe, Shindo and Kawato, The Government and Politics of Japan, p. 21.

26

Statement of the Questions and Propositions
This thesis seeks to analyse the Japanese policym aking90 process in thearea of global env ironm ental issues; in particular, it addresses thefollowing question:
How and under what dom estic conditions did foreign pressure leadto policy change in the global environmental area in Japan?
In this dissertation, foreign pressure is defined not just as foreignpressure in a lim ited sense, that is the application, by one or m ore
foreign actors, of strong persuasion with the intention of affecting
dom estic policym aking,91 but also includes m ore indirect and latentforeign pressure such as that of public opinion and anticipated reactions
abroad that also affect dom estic actors. This definition of foreign pressure
shouldbedistinguished

from

that

of

foreigninfluence:theunintentional and often unperceiv ed effect of foreign ev ents and ideas
on dom estic politics. From an analytical point of v iew, this distinction isuseful since foreign pressure and influence affect the policy process andpolicy outcom es in different ways. As for policy change, this concept
m eans change, in fav our of the global env ironm ent, in industrial policythat is alleged to have been damaging the global eco-system.
90

Some scholars use “decision making” to mean the same as “policy making” while others
distinguish the two. Robinson illustrates the distinction as follows: “one may refer todecision making by the presidency or by Congress, but together these institutions
constitute part of the total policy-making process of the United States.” James A.
Robinson, “Decision Making: Political Aspects,”
p. 55, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 4 (The Macmillan Company and The
Free Press, New York, 1968), pp. 55-62. This thesis treats these terms in the same way as
Robinson.
91
Renwick and Swinburn define pressure as “the application, by groups, of organizedpersuasion with the intention of affecting decision-making.” Alan Renwick and Ian
Swinburn, Basic Political Concepts, 2nd edn (Stanley Thornes, Cheltenham, 1987), p. 160.
It is not the intention of this thesis to discuss a normative question such as whether apolicy outcome is morally satisfactory or not.

27

The rest of this chapter rev ises Kingdon’s policy window m odel so that it
can reflect the effect of foreign pressure on the policym aking process, andasks the following basic questions: Who were the major participants in theprocess? How and when did foreign pressure affect the problem, the policy, and thepolitics streams? How did the opening of a policy window help in coupling the threestreams? Along with this descriptiv e fram ework, som e propositions
about the policym aking process initiated by foreign pressure aretentativ ely presented, drawing on the rev iew of the literature abov e,
which in turn constitutes a theoretical fram ework for this dissertation.
This section is div ided into three parts: the m ajor participants, the threestreams, and stream coupling with the opening of a policy window.

Major participants(1) Foreign actors
Foreign actors such as gov ernm ents, international organisations andenv ironm ental NGOs exert pressure on their counterparts or on
different types of actors in Japan with a v iew to changing the Japanesepractices or policies considered to hav e adv ersely affected the global
env ironm ent.92 Occasionally they forge a cross-national coalition with
their Japanese counterparts or establish a branch in Japan. For exam ple,
Greenpeace and the W orldwide Fund for Nature (W W F), internationalenv ironm ental NGOs, both hav e a cross-national link with their92

Maull maintains that political pressure also comes partly from “Japan’s transnational
corporations, which have had to confront environmentalist pressures abroad and whichhave begun to suffer from Japan’s bad image as an environmental predator.” Maull,“Japan’s Global Environmental Policies,” p. 366.

28

associate organisations in Japan. Som etim es it is throughsuchtransnational relations that foreign pressure is conv eyed into thepolitical process. As well as the route taken, the kinds of strategies that
foreign actors em ploy m ust affect the policy process, and thus the policy
outcom es, as Schoppa argues. On the basis of the two-lev el gam e m odel,
he proposes that policy change is more likely to occur when foreign actors
em ploy strategies that resonate with dom estic politics. Am ong thestrategies he illustrates, synergistic threats deserv e special attention in
the context of Japanese global env ironm ental policies that drew harsh
criticism from abroad. To borrow Schoppa’s words, foreign threats are more
effective “if they promise to impose high enough costs on the right domestic actors in
the target country, are seen as ratifiable and otherwise credible, and are perceived as
legitimate.”93

The other strategies of alternativ e specification and participation
expansion are m entioned below in the sections on the policy stream andthe politics stream respectively.

(2) Industrial policy community
An econom ic m inistry94 cooperates with those of its industries whose
interests are expected to be jeopardised by foreign pressure, in order that
there will be no policy change disadv antageous to them . This
cooperation can be seen as the protection of their interests by an
93

Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan, p. 307.

29

industrial policy com m unity: an exclusiv e policym aking institution
consisting of a m inistry div ision and a trade association under thediv ision’s jurisdiction, som etim es reinforced by corresponding LDP zoku
politicians.95 In a policy com m unity with a close and dependent
structure, in which m inisterial and industrial interests are fused, am inistry div ision m ay take the initiativ e in resisting foreign pressure,ev en without an explicit request or pressure from the trade association inquestion.96 How resistant a policy com m unity is depends on theautonom y of the com m unity, and policy outcom es are greatly affected by
the nature of the policy com m unity inv olv ed in the process. In thisthesis, it is suggested that the closer an industrial policy community is to what
Marsh and Rhodes call the ideal policy community, the more resistant the community
becomes to foreign pressure.97(3) Environmental policy sponsors
The next proposition in this thesis is that the presence or absence of an effective
environmental policy sponsor affects the political process and policy outcome.
Unless there is a politically powerful sponsor, an industrial policy
com m unity will probably rem ain unyielding in the face of foreign
94

The economic ministries concerned in this thesis are mainly the Ministry ofInternational Trade and Industry (MITI); the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries (MAFF) including the Forestry Agency and the Fisheries Agency.
95
It should be noted that zoku politicians can play the dual role of representing t h einterests in their respective fields, and of coordinating their interests with others in t h e
LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). Relevant to this research are zoku
politicians specialising in commerce and industry, agriculture and forestry, and fisheries,
and the corresponding PARC divisions to which they belong.
96Ôtake, Gendai Nihon no Seiji Kenryoku Keizai Kenryoku, p. 192 and p. 254.
97
See Marsh and Rhodes, “Policy Communities and Issue Networks,” p. 251.
They list the characteristics of polity communities as follows: a very limited number ofparticipants; economic and/or professional interests; frequent interaction; continuity in30pressure, and therefore it is unlikely that that pressure will cause a policychange. As policy sponsors, env ironm ental LDP politicians (KankyoZoku)98 and gov ernm ent m inistries can directly challenge apolicycom m unity.99 For the present, the Env ironm ent Agency and theMinistry of Foreign Affairs are assum ed to hav e becom e policy sponsors
since the form er is m otiv ated by the chance to expand its jurisdiction in
the gov ernm ent, and the latter tends to attem pt to av oid foreign
criticism . Com pared to an econom ic m inistry in a policy com m unity,
which is likely to hav e the authority to change industrial policy under
foreign pressure, these m inistries lack political resources, ev en if they
form a network with env ironm ental NGOs, which are also norm allym uch less politically com petent than econom ic interest groups in apolicy com m unity.100 At the sam e tim e, howev er, they can depend on
foreign pressure, public opinion, the m ass m edia, and som etim es Kankyo
Zoku, instead.

The three streams
As Schoppa argues, foreign pressure can affect policy outcom es by
influencing

the

three

stream s,101

and

by

em powering

policyentrepreneurs. In this sub-section, it is proposed that the occurrence of policychange very much depends on how foreign pressure affects the three streams. For
membership, values and outcomes; a strong consensus; an exchange relationship; and apositive-sum game.
98
It is assumed that many of them belong to the Special Committee on Global
Environmental Affairs of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council.
99
The Director-Generals of the Environment Agency have been appointed Minister for t h e
Global Environment since July 1989.
100
Weidner, “Japanese Environmental Policy in an International Perspective,” p. 505; andTani, “The Legislative Process of the Fundamental Law on the Environment,” p. 155.

31

instance, policy change will be highly unlikely to occur if foreignpressure causes a strong backlash in these stream s: if people feel they arefacing, not an env ironm ental problem , but “Japan bashing”; if a policy
com m unity becom es cautious about the intention of foreign actors’
alternativ e specification; or if a nationalistic m ood pushes politicians totake counterm easures against foreign pressure. Presented below are
Kingdon’s accounts of the structures of each stream , and som e additional
points on foreign pressure that can be added to Kingdon’s m odel for the
purpose of this research.

(1) The problem stream
Probl ems are brough t to th e attenti on of peopl e i n and around government bysystemati c i ndi cators, by focusi ng events l i ke cri ses and di sasters, or by feedback
from th e operati on of current programs. Peopl e defi ne condi ti ons as probl ems bycompari ng current condi ti ons wi th th ei r val ues concerni ng more i deal states ofaffai rs, by compari ng th ei r own performance wi th th at of oth er countri es, or by
putting the subject into one category rather than another.102

Foreign pressure is highly likely to increase the recognition of a problem .
It should be noted, howev er, that the sam e condition can be identified as
different types ofproblem by v arious actors: for exam ple, as an

env ironm ental problem by env ironm ental policy sponsors, as anindustrial problem by an industrial policy com m unity, or as aninternational political problem by the m inistry of foreign affairs, and thePrim e and Foreign Ministers. Following the logic of Kingdon’s m odel,
one can propose that the recognition of an environmental problem can befacilitated when foreign pressure is linked with systematic indicators (for instance,by issuing reliable scientific data warning of a global environmental crisis), with
101

Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan, p. 31.

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focusing events (by using environmental disasters to prove a disputed theory), andwith feedback (by sending letters complaining about Japanese environmental policy
to Japan’s Prime Minister or to a Japanese embassy). In this sense, not only
foreign gov ernm ents but also env ironm ental NGOs, foreign anddomestic, can play a significant role in problem recognition in Japan.

(2) The policy stream
Many i deas are possi bl e i n pri nci pl e, and fl oat around i n a “pol i cy pri meval soup”
i n wh i ch speci al i sts try out th ei r i deas i n a vari ety of ways - bi l l i ntroducti ons,
speech es, testi mony, papers, and conversati on. In th at consi derati on, proposal s are
fl oated, come i nto contact wi th one anoth er, are revi sed and combi ned wi th one
anoth er, and fl oated agai n. But th e proposal s th at survi ve to th e status of seri ous
consi derati on meet several cri teri a, i ncl udi ng th ei r tech ni cal feasi bi l i ty, th ei r fi t
wi th domi nant val ues and th e current nati onal mood, th ei r budgetary workabi l i ty,
and the political support or opposition they might experience.103

Ecologicalideas,

includingenv ironm ental

ethicsandscientificknowledge about the global env ironm ent, play an im portant role in thegeneration of policy proposals in this area. In m any of these respects,
Japan was behind other dev eloped countries, especially the United States,in the late 1980s. This is why NGOs considered env ironm ental educationof the public to be an im portant strategy for changing Japan’s problem atic
policy. In order for Japanese institutions to absorb scientific andtechnological ideas, attention should be paid to adv isory councils set upby m inisters or directors-general who are env ironm ental policy sponsors
or key figures in an industrial policy community.104

102

Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, p. 19.
Ibid., pp. 19-20.
104
For advisory councils, see, for example, Kasa K yôko, “S hôchô no Gaikaku Dantai,
Gyôkai Dantai, Shimon Kikan,” in Nishio Masaru and Muramatsu Michio (eds), Kôz a
Gyôseigaku, 4 (Yuhikaku, Tokyo, 1995), pp. 77-113.
103

33

In the case of an industrial policy under foreign pressure, it is assum edthat at an early stage env ironm ental ideas and ev en policy proposals are
discussed outside the industrial policy com m unity, m ost probably by
env ironm ental policy sponsors and scientists. Nev ertheless, not m any of
their ideas and policy proposals can surv iv e, for the following reasons:first, they are likely to experience strong opposition from the policy
com m unity backed by zoku politicians; second, the adm inistrativ e andbudgetary com petence for an industrial policy norm ally resides with theeconom ic m inistry in the policy com m unity; and third, outsiders often
hav e difficulty in getting sufficient inform ation on technical feasibility.
For these structural reasons, env ironm ental policy sponsors attem pt topersuade the policy com m unity to recognise the existence of anenv ironm ental problem and the need to seek a solution for it. This
recognition is also the v ery dom estic condition that Schoppa suggests isnecessary for the effectiv eness of “alternativ e specification,” a strategy
adopted by foreign actors.105 According to Kingdon’s selection criteria,
m oreov er, the surv iv al of an env ironm ental policy proposal also
depends on political factors such as a national m ood for policy change,and political opposition to the im m obilism of the policy com m unity.
Taking these points into account, it can be proposed that policy change ismore likely to happen when foreign pressure can couple the problem and the politics
streams to the policy stream.

105

Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan, p. 310.

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(3) The politics stream35

Th e pol i ti cal stream . . . i s composed of such factors as swi ngs of nati onal mood,admi ni strati on or l egi sl ati ve turnover, and i nterest group pressure campai gns.
Potenti al agenda i tems th at are congruent wi th th e current nati onal mood, th atenjoy i nterest group support or l ack organi zed opposi ti on, and th at fi t th e
ori entati ons of th e prevai l i ng l egi sl ati ve coal i ti ons or current admi ni strati on are
more l i kel y to ri se to agenda promi nence th an i tems th at do not meet suchconditions.106

As regards the factor of “adm inistration or legislativ e turnov er,”Japanese politics was stable between 1987 and 1992 in the sense that Japan
was always under LDP rule, although the LDP becam e a m inority party in
the House of Councillors in 1989. Thus, two other factors in the politicalstream , public opinion

and bureaucratic politics, need particularattention. First, the emergence of a more environmentally friendly policy depends
on how much foreign pressure affects public opinion on the environment. It is
generally agreed that public concern has put the global env ironm ental
issue high on the agenda in m any dev eloped countries, and that, in theearly 1970s, it did the sam e for the pollution issue in Japan. For thisreason, env ironm ental NGOs often em ploy strategies to m obilise public
support for their causes. In this context, careful attention should also be
paid to the role of the m ass m edia in changing the national m ood on the
global environment.

Next, the question of bureaucratic politics - how env ironm ental policysponsors interact with an industrial policy com m unity - m ust be
addressed to explain the effect of foreign pressure on this stream . Theem ergence of a bureaucratic sponsor is expected to lead to bureaucratic
politics: this is, in m any cases, the process by which the policy sponsor
exerts pressure on the econom ic m inistry at the core of the policy
106

Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, p. 20.

36

com m unity resisting foreign pressure. In this context, attention should
also be paid to the coordinating institutions such as a liaison conferenceof related m inistries, adm inistrativ e v ice-m inisters’ conference, cabinetlev el conference of m inisters for global env ironm ental conserv ation, or
cabinet m eeting, and to the leadership role of the Prim e Minister.
W hether policy change will occur or not depends on the effect of thispressuring and coordinating process on the policy com m unity;107interm inisterial or political interv ention in the policy com m unity m ay
cause policy change. The proposition presented here is that foreignpressure is more likely to bring about policy change if an environmental policysponsor opens up and weakens the industrial policy community in question. It
deserv es m entioning that the transform ation of the com m unity m ay
also be a direct result of “participation expansion,” a strategy of foreign
actors elaborated by Schoppa.108

Stream coupling with a policy window
Kingdon contends that policy change is m ore likely to happen when an
open policy window giv es an im petus to the coupling of the threestream s, and that a policy window is “opened either by the appearance ofcom pelling problem s or by happenings in the political stream .”109 A
policy window opens, for instance, when the global env ironm ental
107

One possible result of the pressuring and coordinating process is the emergence of policysponsors within the policy community involved, which will make policy change moreplausible.
Stockwin observes that “some interministerial clashes result in significant changes inpolicy rather than the inhibition of such changes.” Stockwin, “Conclusions,” pp. 328-9, in
Stockwin et al., Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan (University of Hawaii Press,
Honolulu, 1988), pp. 325-32.
108
Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan, pp. 40-2.

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problem clearly takes a sudden turn for the worse, or when a m ultilateralenv ironm ental conference reaches a political agreem ent. As to the latter,a spillov er effect m ust also hav e operated to open a series of policy
windows in the global env ironm ental issue area during the period 1987
to 1992, when m ajor international env ironm ental conferences were held
one after another.110 It should be noted that since windows are just
opportunities, the prospect of policy change also depends on whether foreign actors
or environmental policy sponsors can make the most of such an opportunity.

The rev ised policy window m odel described abov e will be applied to fiv ecase studies in subsequent chapters. In this way, this thesis will attem pt
to describe the Japanese policym aking processes seen in the fiv e cases,
and then to m ake analytical generalisations about the policym aking
process through which foreign pressure does or does not lead to policychange, by testing the propositions suggested in the model.
(end)

109
110

Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, p. 20.
For a spillover effect on the appearances of a policy window, see Ibid., pp. 190-4.

38