No.19, June 2013

RIHE International

Seminar Reports
COMPARISON OF UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE
USA, UK, FRANCE AND JAPAN
Report of the International Seminar on
University Governance, 2012
Organized by: Research Institute for Higher Education, Hiroshima University

Research Institute for Higher Education
HIROSHIMA UNIVERSITYRIHE International Seminar Reports
No.19, June 2013

Report of the International Seminar on
University Governance, 2012

COMPARISON OF UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE
USA, UK, FRANCE AND JAPANResearch Institute for Higher Education
HIROSHIMA UNIVERSITYComparison of University GovernanceUSA, UK, France and Japan
Edited and Published by
Research Institute for Higher Education
Hiroshima University
2-2, Kagamiyama 1-chome
Higashi-Hiroshima, 739-8512 Japan
TEL: +81-82-424-6240, FAX: +81-82-422-7104
http://en.rihe.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/
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733-0833, Japan
TEL: +81-82-277-6954, FAX: +81-82-278-6954
June 2013
ISBN978-4-902808-81-0﻿i

FOREWORD

Traditionally, in the US and UK it has been assumed that an autonomous
university management is absolutely necessary for the proper functioning of auniversity. Continuous reforms in both countries since the 1980s have notchanged that basic assumption, although there have been some attempts bygovernments to ensure that the input of public funding was matched byresponsiveness on the part of the institutions. The concept of “governance”
describes the organizational arrangements by which the institution manages its
own policies in response to external pressures, including pressure fromgovernment.
In contrast with that basic understanding of university autonomy, in mostcontinental European countries, such as France, and also in Japan, thegovernment has tightly controlled universities, in terms of both their organization
and activities. In these countries, the concept of “governance” is often lacking,as institutions were not expected to have a direction of their own, as distinct fromthe directives of government. In the state centered model, there is still muchthat needs to be studied in relation to how to govern universities.
However, especially since the 1990s, due to a higher expectation for
universities would contribute to a strong economy but use less public money,
institutional autonomy has grown overall in most higher education systems, evenin those countries where government control over public universities used to bevery strong. This has created opportunities for universities to manage
themselves efficiently through empowerment, corporate status, introduction of aboard of trustees and block grants, determining their own profiles and strategies.
Such organizational integration and improved managerial capability within
universities have presented the following basic questions:• Does more higher formal autonomy than before create lower autonomy inreality?
• Do HE reforms stimulate teaching performance and research productivity?
• How do reforms change the relationship between the state and university?
• Do HE reforms of internal governance have any effects on teaching andresearch?

ii
My sincerest thanks to the four speakers whose activities are internationallyrecognized: Dr. Ellen Switkes, Senior Associate, Center for Studies in Higher
Education, University of California, Berkeley／Assistant Vice President Emerita,
University of California Office of the President, USA; Dr. Stéphanie
Mignot-Gérard, Maître de Conférences en Gestion, IAE Gustave Eiffel et IRG(Université Paris-Est Créteil)／Chercheur Associée, Centre de Sociologie desOrganisations, Sciences Po et CNRS, France; Dr. Baharam Bekhradnia, Director,
Higher Education Policy Institute (HEPI), UK; Jun Oba, Associate Professor,
Research Institute for Higher Education (RIHE), Hiroshima University, Japan,
who contributed to the reflection on these important issues.
I hope that this volume, the record of the International Seminar, will
advance the understanding of those who are interested in the governance ofuniversities in USA, UK, France, and Japan.
June, 2013
Masashi Fujimura
Director and Professor
Research Institute for Higher Education,
Hiroshima University

CONTENTS
Foreword

Masashi Fujimura ························································ i

Presentations
Presentation 1

Governance at the University of California: An example of faculty
involvement
Ellen Switkes ······························································

1

Presentation 2

The Governance of Higher Education in England
Bahram Bekhradnia ····················································· 23

Presentation 3

The Transformation of University Governance in France (1999-2011)
Inertia, Institutionalization and Change
Stéphanie Mignot-Gérard ················································

49

Presentation 4
University Governance Reforms in Japan – incorporation of national
universities –Jun Oba ·····································································

71

Comment
Comments and Questions on the Presentations of University GovernanceFumihiro Maruyama ······················································

Appendices99

1. Seminar Program····································································· 105
2. List of Participants ··································································· 107

Acknowledgement

We would like to acknowledge the invaluable contribution of Professor
Charles R. Barton, University of South Carolina Beaufort, USA, who edited all
the manuscripts in this report.

Masashi Fujimura
Director & Professor,
Research Institute for Higher Education,
Hiroshima University

Presentations

RIHE International Seminar Reports, No.19, 2013

1
Page

Governance at the University of California:
An example of faculty involvement

Ellen Switkes

Introduction
The University of California (UC) is a large public university system. It
serves as the research arm of the State of California. There are 10 campuses,
each with considerable autonomy. There is a President of the UC system and a
Chancellor at each campus.1 There are 9 general campuses in Berkeley, Davis,
Los Angeles, Irvine, Santa Cruz, Merced, Santa Barbara, San Diego, Riverside
and a specialized health science campus in San Francisco. The University
offers a full range of undergraduate, graduate programs, and graduate
professional programs at one or more campuses including 6 medical schools, 4
law schools, dental, veterinary medicine, nursing, engineering, business, to namea few. Over 232,000 students are enrolled including 182,000 undergraduatesand nearly 50,000 graduate and professional students. The University receives
over 105,000 applications to its freshman classes and enrolls over 36,000
freshman at the 9 general campuses. Of these 88 percent are California
residents, and 6 percent are international students (over 1/3 of whom are from
China). Almost 40 percent of UC undergraduates come from low income
families and are the first in their families to attend college. UC campuses eachenroll a much larger percent of low income students than any other leading
public or private research university in the United States. A third of allSenior Associate, Center for Studies in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley;
Assistant Vice President Emerita, University of California Office of the President, USA,e-mail: eswitkes@berkeley.edu
1
For a brief description of the UC campuses and a map see: http://www.universityofcalifornia.
edu/campuses/

2

Governance at the University of California

Page

undergraduate degrees that UC awarded in 2011 were in science, technology,
engineering and mathematics, compared to one quarter at comparison
universities.
An important factor molding higher education in California is the California
Master Plan for Higher Education, first established in 1960. The Master Plan
defines the roles of various sectors of higher education in the State for the
University of California, the California State Colleges and Universities,
community colleges and private universities and colleges. The Master Plan sets
eligibility for admission to the University of California at the upper 1/8 ofgraduating high school seniors. Students in the upper 1/3 of graduating highschool seniors are eligible to attend one of the 23 California State College andUniversity campuses, and any student over 18 is eligible to attend one of theover 112 California Community Colleges. The Master Plan promotes a robusttransfer program, and approximately 30 percent of seniors graduating from a UC
campus had transferred in their junior year from a community college.
At the University of California, 41 percent of all faculty have tenure. For
those faculty in tenure or tenure track positions, 86 percent have tenure.
Academic freedom and the unsupervised structure of faculty life results infaculty who don’t see themselves as traditional employees and who take great
liberty in advising and criticizing their employer in ways one wouldn’t find inother sectors (Balderston, 1995). Tenure means that faculty can have a
different impact on governance in higher education then can a worker in factory
who can be more easily fired. Tenure has an important impact on governance –university presidents can and are fired, not so easily the faculty (Corson, 1960).

The players
This section describes a variety of players who share governance of the
University of California and explain the role of each and how they interact.
The Regents of the University of California
Early in the history of higher education in the United States, governing
boards actually provided for the governance of institutions. Most no longer are
actively involved in routine governance, but they do control the institution byarranging for the administrative structure and by appointing and removing thepresident and other chief officers (Corson, 1960).
Under the State Constitution, the University of California is governed by aEllen Switkes Page
3
Board of Regents.2 The Regents Standing Orders govern major issues relating
to faculty including outside employment, the privilege of a hearing before theAcademic Senate, tenure, sabbatical leaves, emeritus status. Most other matters
are delegated to the President and/or Chancellors. Even though the Regents nolonger actively govern the University, the Board appoints and removes thepresident and other chief officers, and arranges for the administrative structure(Balderston, 1995). An important feature of the University of California is its
autonomy from direct control of the State of California. Because the University
has constitutional autonomy, the Governor, legislature and other state officials
cannot direct the University’s activities. The State government can only
recommend that the Board of Regents take certain actions, but cannot compel it
to do so. Even though the Governor appointments the Regents, once they
become a member of the Board of Regents, individual Regents act independentlyof the Governor and cannot be removed. By and large, this autonomy removes
the University from political or bureaucratic control by State government.
There are normally 26 members of the Board of Regents. The Governorof the State of California appoints 18 of the Regents. Regents must then be
confirmed by the State Senate. The Senate has up to one year to confirm a
Regent. Occasionally after serving most of the first year, the Senate fails to
confirm a Regent, and then the Governor names another individual. Currently
there are 12 appointed Regents, 4 were appointed by former Governor Gray
Davis and 8 by former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.3
Many of the Regents are important members of the California business
community, including active and retired business executives. Others areimportant political or cultural figures. One is publisher and chief executive
officer of a national Spanish language newspaper; another is former head of amajor motion picture studio. Some have served on state or local public boards
and commissions. Appointed Regents serve 12-year terms and may bereappointed. The current appointed Regents have terms that expire between
2013 and 2022. Overlapping terms insure continuity.
In addition to these appointed Regents, there are others who hold officebecause of their positions. One of these is a student Regent. A second student,
the incoming Student Regent, also sits with the Regents but is not a voting
member. That means that two students sit with the Regents and provide a2

http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/about.html; http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/bylaws/bl5.html
3
As of November 2012.

4

Governance at the University of California

Page

student perspective.
The Student Regents are nominated by student
government organization and are selected by the Regents.
There are seven ex-officio Regents. Four are elected officials – theGovernor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the Assembly, Superintendent of
Public Instruction. In addition, the President and Vice President of the Alumni
Associations of the University of California serve as Regents as does the
President of the University of California.
Finally, there are two faculty members who sit on the Board of Regents.
They are the head of the systemwide Academic Senate, called the Chair and theVice Chair of the Academic Council. Faculty representation is an importantfeature of the Board of Regents. However, the faculty have intentionally kept
their status as non-voting members which preserves their impartiality.
The Governor attends Regents meetings only when major issues that are ofconcern to the Governor’s office are being discussed. The Governor’s presenceat the meetings raises the political visibility of Regents actions considerably.
The other elected officials who serve on the Board also seldom attend meetings,
but may come from time to time if there are issues of interest.
The Governor is officially the President of the Board of Regents.
However, the Regents select among themselves a chairman and vice chairman to
one-year terms. The Chairman of the Regents presides over the meetings inclose coordination with the President of the University.
The President brings almost all items to the Board and sets the agenda forthe meetings. However, Board members may introduce their own items, someof which may be politically sensitive or further political ambitions of a Regent orelected officials.
The Regents meet six times a year, in September, November, January,
March, May, July, usually in San Francisco, but on occasion at another campus
location. These are public meetings. The public can listen to meetings via
live Internet audio broadcasts. Meetings are attended by the Regents, President,
Chancellors, other university officials, including the Treasurer, Secretary andGeneral Counsel of the Regents, plus Vice Presidents and other officials of the
Office of the President and staff who come to address specific items.
In addition, a section of the meeting room is reserved for the press, and asection of the meeting room is reserved for the public. Most sessions of the
Regents begin with a public comment period. A contentious issue such as
student fee increases or collective bargaining for staff will usually produce alarge public audience and long list of public speakers, and occasional
demonstrations. University police provide security.

Ellen Switkes Page5
Activity of the Regents is conducted through 10 committees.4 Most ofthese committees meet during the Regents meeting and all Regents canparticipate in the discussion, but only committee members can vote. The items
endorsed by the committees are then brought to the Board as a whole forapproval and adoption. A schedule of the meetings and the committee agendas
are published in advance.5
The Board of Regents has delegated a broad range of authority andresponsibility to the President of the University, to campus Chancellors and to
the Academic Senate in matters relating to academic programs.
Most academic decisions are made at the campus level, but the Board ofRegents approves certain things such as the establishment and disestablishmentof colleges, schools, graduate divisions, and organized multi-campus research
units. The Board also takes direct action on issues related to the State budget.
Office of the President
The Office of the President is headquartered in Oakland, California, not far
from the Berkeley and San Francisco campuses and houses the President of the
University, Treasurer, Secretary to the Regents, General Counsel and Chief
Auditor and their staffs for a total of around 1,620 employees. The web
address: www.ucop.edu describes the office: “The Office of the President is thesystemwide headquarters of the University of California, managing its fiscal andbusiness operations and supporting the academic and research missions across its
campuses, labs and medical centers.”
Regents policy describes the general expectations of the President6 some ofwhich are to direct the management and administration of the UC system infulfillment of its educational, research and public service missions, be theacademic leader defining and leading implementation of the University’s vision,
serve as primary external advocate, ensure legal and ethical compliance, promote
diversity, manage resources and “consult with the Academic Senate on issues ofsignificance….”
The Office of the President is a complex organization. The Provost andExecutive Vice Presidents for Academic Affairs acts for the President in his
absence. Currently there are 7 other Vice Presidents with responsibilities for4

http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/committ.html
http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/meetings.html
6
http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/policies/1500.html
5

6

Governance at the University of California

Pagebusiness operations, financial affairs, external relations, legal affairs, healthsciences and services, agriculture and natural resources, institutional researchand oversight of the Department of Energy National Laboratories in Berkeley,
Livermore and Los Alamos.

FACULTYCHAIRSDEANSDIVISION SENATE

CHANCELLORSACADEMIC VICE CHANCELLORSCOUNCIL OF
CHANCELLORSACADEMIC PLANNING
COUNCIL

ACADEMIC COUNCIL

VCs for Research
Graduate Deans
Undergraduate VCs
University Librarians

COUNCIL OF VICE
CHANCELLORSPRESIDENTPROVOST

Library Council
Council of Undergraduate VCs
Council of Graduate Deans
Council of Research VCs

REGENTS--------Line Administration
Academic Senate

Combined Administration and Senate

System-wide Groups (informal roles)

Source: C.J. King (personal communication, 2012)

Figure 1. University of California Academic GovernanceEllen Switkes Page
7
Chancellors and campus administration
Each of the University’s campuses is headed by a Chancellor who is theacademic and administrative head of the campus. Although the University ofCalifornia is a single system, campuses have considerable autonomy in many
areas to craft their own identity and vision. Figure 1 shows the major
components of academic governance. Each Chancellor works closely with the
Academic Vice Chancellor who is also called the Provost, to administer thecampus. There are Vice Chancellors for Research, Vice Chancellors for
Undergraduate Affairs and for Graduate Affairs (Graduate Deans) as well as Vice
Chancellors for Student Services and Admissions. Figure 1 also shows theparallel structure of administration and committees on a campus andsystemwide.
Ten campus provide colleagues for UC administrators to share informationand for advice and consultation, all working under the same sets of policies,
procedures and restrictions with the same or very similar issues. This provides
a built in peer counseling system not available to university administrators
working in most colleges and universities. Even in other areas where there areregionally organized meetings of similar officials from neighboring institutions,they all confront different parameters even when dealing with similar concerns.
Having a built in set of colleagues for university administrators is an important
asset for the University of California. Figure 1 shows some of the councils thatmeet regularly in person, by phone or videoconference to address academic
issues of mutual concern across the system. A parallel set of councils meets forbusiness affairs and other areas of the University’s activities. Consultation
among officials at campuses and systemwide levels is continuous.
Who the faculty are
Faculty titles are given to individuals who have teaching responsibilities.
These individuals may also have other responsibilities such as research andservice. There are over 19,000 individuals both full-time and part-time who aremembers of the faculty of the University of California in a variety of titles eachconferring a different set of privileges and duties. The full-time equivalent isabout 16,000. Tenured and tenured track faculty number around 9,300 in titlesof Assistant Professor, Associate Professor and Professor. Tenured and tenure
track faculty are members of the Academic Senate. Other faculty titles also
confer membership in the Academic Senate. These other titles are largely in the8Governance at the University of California

Pagehealth sciences disciplines, and because these faculty are supported largely fromclinical income and grant support, the University cannot guarantee continuity of
support, and these titles do not confer tenure. In addition, a small number offaculty are in tenured Lecturer titles. All of these faculty are members of the
Academic Senate which numbers around 12,000 individuals.
The University of California uses different titles to appoint faculty who are
not members of the Academic Senate. There are about 7,400 faculty who are
not members of the Academic Senate, including lecturers, clinical and adjunctfaculty who may be part time or full time.
Only members of the Academic Senate are involved to any degree in
University governance. Other faculty such as lecturers may also be invited toparticipate in curriculum or other planning activities in their department, but are
rarely involved in campuswide governance activities.
In the remaining sections of this paper, reference to faculty will be to those
who are members of the Academic Senate unless otherwise stated.
The Academic Senate
The Academic Senate is an organization primarily of tenured andtenuretrack faculty, some untenured health science faculty as well as some
additional administrative titles including President, Vice Presidents, Chancellors,
Vice Chancellors, Deans, Provosts, Directors of academic programs, the chief
admissions officer on each campus and in the Office of the President, registrars,
the University Librarian. The Senate is organized into a Division at each
University of California campus as well as a parallel systemwide organization.
The Academic Senate is defined in the Standing Orders of the Regents, andhas been granted certain duties, powers and privileges.7 Most of those duties,
powers and privileges involve establishment of committees to advise thePresident and the Board of Regents on conditions for admission, for certificates,
and for degrees, on libraries, to advise the President on the University budget
and to advise the Board of Regents, “on any matter pertaining to the conduct andwelfare of the University.” Each Division of the Academic Senate similarly
advises the Chancellors on matters pertaining to the conduct and welfare of thecampus and on campus budgets. In addition, the Academic Senate is directly
empowered to authorize and supervise all courses and curricula and to selectbooks for publication by the University of California Press.
7

http://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/bylaws/so1052.html

Ellen Switkes Page
9
The delegations of authority from Regents to the Academic Senate impose asignificant responsibility on the faculty for the maintenance of the quality of
research and teaching at the University.
The Academic Senate has
responsibility for defining the quality of the students entering the UC;
monitoring and maintaining quality of academic programs; through peer review,
maintaining excellence of the faculty; monitoring faculty welfare issues
important to recruitment and retention; and advising on budget issues to channel
resources to maintain quality academic programs. The Academic Senate has
authority to conduct hearings in disciplinary cases to enforce standards of faculty
conduct; and authority to conduct hearings in grievance cases to ensure fairness
and academic freedom (Simmons, 2009).
Faculty members of the Academic Senate have multiple opportunities tomake their views known. They are members of a department, which is itself acommittee of the Academic Senate. These faculty on each campus are also
members of the campus Division of the Academic Senate which does its work
both through an elaborate committee structure but also through meetings of theentire Division and/or representative assemblies. (See section below on
Academic Senate Committees)
Meetings of the entire Division and/or representative assembly on each
campus takes place several times a year to meet with the Chancellor or othercampus officials and for discussion of Senate business. However, most of thework of the Academic Senate takes place through an elaborate committee
structure. There may be as many as 25 Academic Senate Committees, somemeet regularly, even weekly such as the Committee on Academic Personnel,
some meet only if needed such as the Committee on Privilege and Tenure. On
the campus, the Chairs of the major Senate Committees make up an executive
council that meets monthly, often including consultation with the Chancellor or
Provost. The chairs or representatives of the major Senate committees fromeach campus also form a parallel systemwide committee that meets either
monthly or as needed. For example, the chairs of the Committee on Academic
Personnel on each campus meet together several times a year as a systemwide
Senate Committee on Academic Personnel. For many years these meetings
involved travel to a central meeting site, either at the offices of the Office of the
President in Oakland or on a campus. Some of these meetings now take placeby phone or videoconference.
The chairs of major systemwide Senate committees also serve on the
Academic Council, which includes members of 8 systemwide committee chairs,plus the division head of each campus plus the Chair and Vice Chair of the10

Governance at the University of California

Page

Academic Council. The Academic Council meets 10 times during theacademic year. Its Chair and Vice Chair are also the faculty representatives to
the Regents and are included in many major administrative committees toprovide the voice of the faculty. For example, the Academic Council chair hasa seat at the President’s Cabinet meetings. New officers of the Academic
Senate are selected each year. In most cases the vice chair becomes the chair sothat a faculty member who becomes the vice chair of the Academic Council
commits to two years of service in the Senate Office located in a prominent
location within the Office of the President’s building in Oakland on the same
floor as the President, Provost and Secretary of the Regents. For faculty fromSouthern California campuses, this involves long periods away from their home
campus and from family as well as substantial travel. The Chair and Vice Chairof the Academic Council, as well as some of the Council members are relievedof all teaching duties during their Senate service.
The 25 systemwide Academic Senate Committees are listed on the website.8
Committees on campuses are approximately equivalent with some variation.
These committees may meet up to 11 times each academic year. Some
committees meet much less often or as needed. Committees that meet mostoften are the Academic Council itself, the Board of Relations and Admissions
with Schools, Coordinating Council on Graduate Affairs, University Committeeon Educational Policy, University Committee on Planning and Budget,
University Committee on Research Policy.

Shared governanceThis section provides several examples to illustrate the close relationship offaculty and administration in governance at the University of California.
Critics say that the UC faculty have too much power resulting in a process of
consultation and faculty evaluation of proposals that is cumbersome, slow andinefficient and may block innovative change. However, participation in some
aspect of governance by virtually all members of the Academic Senate creates asense of ownership that is very strong among the faculty and a collective senseof responsibility for the quality of the University’s academic programs and its
excellence (Simmons, 2009). Several of these examples are actions dealing
with individual faculty members, but others are broad based policy issues.

8

http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/senate/committees.php

Ellen Switkes Page
11
Approval of Academic Programs
First issued in 1993, a Compendium of Universitywide Review Processes
for Academic Programs, Academic Units, and Research Units was compiled by ajoint administrative/Senate committee to gather the various policies governing
the processes to establish, transfer, consolidate, change the name or, discontinue
and disestablish graduate degree programs, schools and colleges and research
units.9
Chief among the Compendium’s guiding principles is that academic
programs, academic units, and research units work best when both faculty andadministrators are supportive of them. All review and approval processes
should promote mutual endorsement of any proposed action. At the same time,
the Regents explicitly delegated to the faculty responsibility for courses andcurricula. The faculty, through the Bylaws of the Academic Senate, haveplaced authority for graduate academic and professional programs with asystemwide Academic Senate committee, the Coordinating Committee on
Graduate Affairs. The Coordinating Committee on Graduate Affairs must
approve proposals for a new graduate degrees or graduate programs. Approvalby the President and/or Regents may also be required. Authority forundergraduate programs rests with Divisional Senate committees responsible forundergraduate education (including the approval of new courses). The
Compendium processes reflect the delegation and distribution faculty andadministrative powers on the campuses and systemwide.
Policy development
All 10 campuses of the University of California rely on a single policy
document for academic personnel policy, the Academic Personnel Manual(APM).10 This is a large document that covers policy regarding University
academic appointees, recruitment, appointment and promotion, salaryadministration, benefits and privileges. Policies in the APM undergo bothmajor and minor revision, and new and revised policies are formally issued by
the University President.
Policy changes can originate from many sources. Academic Senate
committees and individual faculty can suggest problems that should be910

http://www.ucop.edu/ucophome/coordrev/ucpolicies/documents/compendium_jan2011.pdf
http://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel/academic-personnel-policy/index.html

12

Governance at the University of California

Pageaddressed by policy changes. Chancellors, Provosts, Deans or other campus
administrators can suggest changes. Administrative offices on campuses or at
the Office of the President can suggest changes. The University’s attorneys canidentify unclear, ambiguous or otherwise problematic policy provisions. A newpolicy provision on dismissal of tenured faculty will be discussed in more detailbelow, but it was identified when impending changes in federal law regarding
mandatory retirement were announced around 1986.
In general, whatever the original source of the suggestion for policy
revision, the systemwide office of Academic Personnel is charged with staffing
policy revision. Often there will be very informal discussions with the Chair
and Vice Chair of the Academic Council and individual campus Provosts todetermine if there is any support for a new policy or a policy revision. If so, theAcademic Personnel staff will draft a concept outline or other preliminary
document to sound out the stakeholders about the suggested change. The
concept outline may be circulated to Provosts, to appropriate Academic Senate
Committees and others for preliminary feedback. This preliminary review isgenerally not extensive unless the policy change is a major one in which casethere may be several rounds of preliminary discussion before a consensus isreached. Based on feedback, a new policy will be drafted in formal policy
language with the goal of incorporating it in the Academic Personnel Manual.
Before adoption, the policy undergoes extensive review. It is sent toChancellors. The Chancellors will prepare a response by sending the proposal
to deans, other campus administrators, to all academic departments and otherinterested groups. For major policy changes, department faculty will include
discussion of the new policy in department meetings. The department chair
will summarize the comments and forward them to the dean who will summarize
comments from other departments and forward them to the Provost’s office
which will summarize the campus comments and incorporate them into a
response from the Chancellor to the President.
Simultaneously to this review by Chancellors, the proposal is also sent to
the Academic Council Chair for discussion by the Academic Senate. The
Academic Council Chair will send the proposal to the heads of the 10 campus
divisions as well as to appropriate systemwide Academic Senate Committees.
For major policy changes, the entire faculty or a representative assembly will
discuss and comment. The head of the Academic Senate Division on each
campus will circulate the proposal to campus Senate committees. The campus
Academic Senate committees will discuss and summarize their comments for thehead of the campus Division for discussion at the systemwide Academic Council.

Ellen Switkes Page
13
The campus Academic Senate Committees will also send their comments with
their representative on the systemwide Academic Senate Committees fordiscussion at these committee meetings. The Academic Senate committee
heads also serve on the Academic Council and carry their committee’s comments
there. One can see that individual faculty have multiple avenues to commenton new policy proposals. And the Academic Senate and the Office ofAcademic Personnel also have multiple informal and formal avenues to collectfaculty input. If there is general support for a new policy, but concern over thedetails, there may be several iterations of this review process. However, ingeneral, by the time formal review takes place, detailed wording will have beenreviewed informally by many parties, and a second formal review can be
avoided.
Having multiple reviewers read a proposed policy avoids many potential
blunders of well intentioned policy drafters who may overlook avoidable
complications (Simmons, 2009). Note that the opportunity to comment is notjust faculty who are active in campus or systemwide Academic Senate
committees, but virtually all faculty have notice of new policy and an
opportunity to comment through their department, Dean and Chancellor, but also
through their Academic Senate representatives on campus and systemwide
committees. Not all individuals or committees or constituencies agree with allpolicy changes in concept or in detail. However, the President is very reluctant
to issue new personnel policy unless there is general agreement among theCampus Provosts and the Academic Council.
This type of consultation with over 12,000 faculty is cumbersome? New
University Presidents and Chancellors are often astounded by the complexity
and time involved in faculty consultation. This consultation is time consuming
and complicated, but the university is a complex organization too big to beadministered solely by a central authority. If several iterations or a proposed
policy are required, it may take several years to develop and issue a new policy.
This type of consultative process is an important component of shared
governance, and as frustrating and slow as it sometimes seems, it results in apolicy manual that has broad support and very carefully worded policies.
Extensive consultation filtered through many committees, department
discussions and individual comments avoids many pitfalls unanticipated bypolicy drafters. (Simmons, 2009)

14

Governance at the University of California

Page

Peer review of faculty performance and post tenure evaluation
Policies at most universities including the University of California call forannual meetings of individual faculty with the department chair or dean to
discuss performance issues and plans for the future. In some cases, this review
is used by the chair or dean to assign salary increases for the upcoming year.
However, these annual reviews are often perfunctory and may be skipped
entirely. Except when a promotion is being considered, the annual review is aconfidential discussion between the chair or dean and the professor.
The University of California does not rely on annual reviews to judge
faculty merit. UC has a long history and one that is unique among Americancolleges and universities of peer review of faculty performance. With over
12,000 faculty of various types, substantive annual reviews are impractical.
Rather detailed faculty reviews are carried out on a schedule (see Table 1) of
every two years for untenured Assistant Professors, then of 3 to 4 years fortenured Associate Professors and Professors. These reviews take placethroughout a faculty career until retirement. Of the 10 UC campuses, theBerkeley campus conducts the most thorough reviews, and that process is
described here.
Table 1. Professor series academic year 2012
Rank

Step

Years at Step

Salary – US$

Assistant Professor

I
II
III
IV
V
VI
I
II
III
IV
V
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
------

53,20056,40059,50062,90066,00069,20066,10069,30073,20077,70083,70077,80083,80089,90096,400103,300
111,800
121,000
131,000
142,000

Associate Professor

Professor

Ellen Switkes Page
15
Table 1 shows the rank and step for Assistant Professors, Associate
Professors and Professors along with normal years at each level. Note that after
Professor V, there is no normal years at step, but campuses normally review
these faculty on a 4 year schedule. The corresponding salary at each rank andstep is the minimum salary for that level for faculty on an academic year
appointment (9 months). The rank and step indicates academic progress. The
actually salary may be higher than the minimum and often is.
Merit review
The details described here illustrate the degree to which faculty run thereview of each other and in doing so, maintain high standards of excellence.
In the spring, faculty who will be reviewed the following year are notified.
The faculty member assembles a review dossier that includes summary of his or
her accomplishments during the review period and a discussion of plans for the
next review period. The dossier contains a record of teaching accomplishments,
courses taught in this review period, numbers of students taught, evaluation ofteaching effectiveness, number of graduate students supervised, researchaccomplishments, papers delivered, publications, evidence of university service
such as committee service, evidence of public service such as service on local or
national disciplinary organizations.
This dossier is then discussed by department peers. In large departments,
there may be a personnel committee that does this review, in small departments,
the department faculty as a whole or sometimes only the more senior faculty will
review the dossier. A vote is taken about whether the faculty member is very
meritorious, below par or substantially below par. This review by faculty peers
is one of the most important factors that ensure the continued excellence of thefaculty of the University of California. Faculty are motivated by the knowledge
that their colleagues, the other members of their department, will be reviewing
their dossier and will discuss and then vote on their performance. Faculty wantto make sure their dossier has a record of excellent research, teaching and service.
The department chair summarizes the department discussion and vote. The
chair may also add a separate evaluation. The dossier moves to the dean who
will review dossiers from several departments. The dean will also add a
recommendation about faculty merit to each dossier. The dossier then goes to a
campus committee of the Academic Senate called the Committee on Academic
Personnel, or on the Berkeley campus it is called the Budget Committee. This
committee will review files of all faculty undergoing review. A rotating 3 year
membership on this committee ensures continuity of standards. At larger

16

Governance at the University of California

Pagecampuses the Committee on Academic Personnel may review over 600 dossiers
each year. For a detailed account of the review see Switkes (1999) which
discusses the detailed processes to reconcile differences among reviewers.
Some campuses have simplified the review process somewhat, bydelegating authority for merit increases which have unanimous support to deanswith a later review by the Academic Personnel Committee for quality control.
Standards of performance are well articulated in the Academic Personnel
Manual and are discussed in orientation sessions for new faculty and in faculty
handbooks and other documents. There are published standards for teaching,research and creative activity, professional competence and activity, university
and public service in APM 210-1d.11 Not only are standards articulated, but
information on appropriate evidence is included as well. These policies wererevised and expanded in 1978, drafted by a UC Los Angeles professor of law.
These policies underwent extensive review and consultation at the time and inminor modifications since then. This is a document that originated from thefaculty, has been adopted by the faculty and has strong has support of the faculty,
even though it is formally issued by the University President. This is example
of faculty setting high standards for themselves to ensure excellence.
The outcome of a review may be award of a merit increase and a move up
the salary scale on Table 1 and a salary increase. Exceptionally meritorious
faculty may move at an accelerated rate or move more than a single step. The
review may also result in no merit increase if performance does not meetstandards. This is not a perfunctory review as annual reviews with thedepartment chair tend to be, but a detailed review by peers of faculty
performance, and occurring on a regular schedule throughout the faculty career
until retirement.
Promotion review
A promotion involves a more rigorous review than a merit increase.
are the stages in a faculty career that are defined as promotion steps:

These

1. Moving from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor.
This promotion confers tenure.
2. Moving from Associate Professor to Professor.
3. Moving from Professor step V to Professor VI.
This is considered a major step in the UC faculty review process and is11

http://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel/_files/apm/apm-210.pdf

Ellen Switkes Page
17
treated like a promotion. It is not unusual for faculty to be held at step
V and make no further progress or to make slower progress. Criteria forthis promotion are more rigorous that criteria for advancement toProfessor V.
4. Moving from Professor step IX to above the top of the scale.
This confers what is called “above-scale” status and is awarded to the
University’s most senior and accomplished faculty. Criteria to advanceto above-scale status is more rigorous that criteria to advance to Professor
VI.
In addition to the steps for a merit review, a promotion includes a review ofthe entire previous career dossier. Letters from outside reviewers are gathered
to supplement the assessment of faculty performance by department colleagues.
In addition, the campus assembles a special ad hoc committee of 3 to 5 faculty
members from departments in related and unrelated disciplines who are tasked
with a thorough review of the promotion dossier. This ad hoc committee issues
a detailed report and recommendation. Each ad hoc committee reviews only
one case and reviews it in depth. Participation on ad hoc committees is an
important example of university service.
Steps along the review process for merit review and promotion are sharedwith the faculty member under review, and the professor is offered an
opportunity for comment and rebuttal. Only names of outside reviewers andnames of the members of the ad hoc committee are confidential (Switkes, 1999).
Post-tenure evaluation
Post-tenure evaluation has been a topic of discussion for more than 25 years
in the American higher education community.
At most colleges anduniversities in the United States, a faculty file is almost never reviewed by peers
except at promotion steps. Discussions at the annual review with thedepartment chair or dean are normally private and confidential. The type of
post-tenure evaluation that occurs at University of California campuses
throughout the faculty career is very unusual. From time to time, legislatures atpublic universities and governing boards at private universities call for increased
post-tenure review to address perceptions of poor performance among seniorfaculty. Some call for the abolition of tenure in the mistaken belief that nothaving a tenure system will result in a more productive senior faculty. Faculty
Senates and faculty unions strongly rebuff the efforts to put significant
post-tenure evaluation in place because of reasonable concerns that these18

Governance at the University of California

Pageevaluations will be used to dismiss faculty (Hoffman, 2012). College
presidents may be subject to votes of no confidence if they propose a post-tenure
evaluation program. In contrast, the purpose of University of California
post-tenure evaluation is not to target poor performers but rather to encouragecontinuing excellence by making post-tenure review a regularized and routine
peer review for all faculty.
Following World War II, American public universities expanded toaccommodate large increases in enrollment. As the faculty who were hired
during this time became tenured, there was concern that the percent of facultywith tenure would become excessive. However, what has happened recently isthat large increases in enrollment and declining state support for public
education has resulted in increased use of lecturers or other non-tenure track
faculty, and the percent of faculty with tenure has decreased over time.
Dismissal for incompetence
The UC policy on dismissal for incompetence is another example of faculty
involvement in policy development and also illustrates faculty involvement inmaintaining standards.
The United States eliminated mandatory retirement for most employees in1986 with exceptions for certain senior executives, safety officers and university
faculty. Mandatory retirement was expected to be eliminated for higher
education faculty in 1994 unless the university community could provide
convincing argument to change the mind of Congress (Hammond, 1991).
Major research universities in the United States argued that the existing age
profile of faculty retirement would predict that the end of mandatory retirement
would result in delayed retirements of many senior faculty. Before 1994,
faculty at many major research universities including the University ofCalifornia often delayed retirement until the then mandatory retirement age of 70.
Elimination of mandatory retirement was predicted to result in an ever aging
faculty with fewer opportunities for faculty renewal, fewer spaces for younger
faculty and increasing payroll costs. At major research universities, this is what
has happened.
Starting in 1986, the University of California looked closely at its existing
policies to ascertain what changes, if any, would be needed to address the end of
mandatory retirement. One change that was made was to tighten the faculty
review process. Some individual faculty and departments had made mutual
agreements to delay regular faculty reviews. Some faculty felt their work wasEllen Switkes Page
19
below standards and didn’t want to be embarrassed by a peer review. With
concurrence of the Academic Senate, a new policy was issued that required that
all faculty be reviewed at least every 5 years, no exceptions. When this newpolicy was implemented at one campus, several faculty retired immediately, but
one professor had a major advancement. In the past, he had convinced his
department to delay his review, but his work was excellent, and when he was
finally reviewed, his excellent work was rewarded.
With mandatory retirement, faculty who were not doing good work could
be counted on to retire. In all but the most egregious cases, this seemed like areasonable way to deal with older faculty who had performance problems.
With the end of mandatory retirement, it would no longer be possible to rely
mandatory retirement to deal with performance problems.
In addition
performance problems can arise at any time in a career, not only among older
faculty.
Dismissal of tenured faculty for poor performance was clearly going to be acontentious issue among faculty. A few tenured faculty had been dismissed in
the past for “moral turpitude” including sexual harassment and other illegal
activities. The university administration approached the issue of dismissal for
performance problems very cautiously and proposed a policy to demote poor
performers with a reduced rank and reduced salary. The feeling was that
demoted faculty would then have incentive to retire to avoid adverse impact on
their pensions. Surprisingly, the reaction to this proposed new policy on
demotion for poor performance was loud and angry. The faculty was united in
opposition.
Individual faculty members who worried about their own
performance reasoned they were not bad enough to be dismissed, but maybe they
could be demoted. The Academic Senate itself then recommended a policy ofdismissal for incompetence rather than a policy of demotion. The standards
needed to be very high and include considerable due process. The policy on
dismissal for incompetent performance was finally issued in 2000. 12 The
process for such a dismissal is long and complicated. In fact, the purpose isalmost never to invoke this policy but rather to have it available to threaten touse it if an incompetent professor fails to separate voluntarily, and to have it
available if needed.

12

http://www.ucop.edu/acadpersonnel/apm/apm-075.pdf

20

Governance at the University of California

Page

Faculty dismissal
While this paper will not discuss the detailed procedure for dismissal forincompetent performance, the general policy for dismissal of tenured faculty is
another example of faculty involvement in university governance. If theuniversity administration recommends dismissal of a tenured professor for any
reason, the professor is entitled to a hearing by a committee of the Academic
Senate, the Committee on Privilege and Tenure. It is fairly standard atuniversities in the United States to have such a committee and to guarantee theright to a hearing. The Committee on Privilege and Tenure hears evidence andmakes a recommendation to the Chancellor. In almost all cases, the Chancellor
accedes to the recommendation of this Committee and forwards a
recommendation to dismiss to the President, and the President forwards therecommendation to the Regents. The Professor has an opportunity to appear
before the Regents. If the Regents agree with the recommendation of the
President, the dismissal may take place immediately or at a designated date in
the future. In the United States, colleges and universities which fail to provide
such a hearing by faculty peers may be sanctioned by the American Associationof University Professors (AAUP).13

Conclusion
What makes the University of California one of the top ranked universities
in the United States? Former University Provost C. Judson King has outlined
some of the reasons. Among these are 1) a single set of policies in the
Academic Personnel Manual that apply to all faculty on all 10 campuses, jointly
developed by faculty and academic administrators working together to develop
and review new and revised policy; and 2) in depth review of all faculty on aregular schedule by faculty colleagues. Add to that list constitutional autonomy
which is vitally important to protect the University from governmental politicaland bureaucratic interference.
Several examples of detailed involvement of faculty in governance at the
University of California have been presented. UC faculty complain about
serving on so many committees and about the time involved in peer review.
University administrators new to the University are astonished by the complexity
13

http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/statementon+proceduralstandardsi
nfaculty+dismissal+proceedings.htm

Ellen Switkes Page
21of shared governance. However there is clear consensus among faculty that thecurrent system of shared governance has benefits which far out way thecomplexity. Faculty involvement in shared governance has worked very wellfor this public university. The University has a tradition of hiring young faculty
and fostering their successful careers. Many faculty have long university
service. They come to understand and value their role in university governance.
University of California faculty feel empowered and responsible for their
university. Their personal reputations are enhanced when they work for a firstquality institution (Simmons, 2009).
While the final and formal decisions makers are often Chairs, Deans, otherAcademic and Administrative Officers, the President or Chancellors, Trustees orRegents (Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1973) prior consultation
with the faculty and its concurrence is an essential component of a successful
university administration and a mark of successful leadership. It is the faculty
who maintain excellence, not just from their individual excellence in teaching
and research, but in their involvement in university governance that creates agreat university.

References
Balderston, F. E. (1995). Managing today’s university: Strategies for viability, change, andexcellence (2nd ed.). Jossey-Bass.
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. (1973). Governance of higher education: six
priority problems; a report and recommendations. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Corson, J.J. (1960). Governance of Colleges and Universities. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hoffman, E. (2012). Holding faculty accountable. Inside Higher Ed. Retrieved November 8,
2012, fromhttp://www.insidehighered.com/views/2012/10/30/essay-need-meaningful-post-tenure-review
National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Mandatory Retirement in Higher Education,
Hammond, P. B., & Morgan, H. P. (1991). Ending mandatory retirement for tenured
faculty : the consequences for higher education. Washington, D.C.: National Academy
Press.
Simmons, D.L. (2009) Shared governance at the University of California, an overview.
Retrieved fromhttp://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/senate/resources/SHRDGOV09Revision.pdf

22

Governance at the University of California

Page

Switkes, E. (1999). University of California peer review system and post-tenure evaluation.
Innovative Higher Education, 24(1), 39-48.

RIHE International Seminar Reports, No.19, 2013

23
Page

The Governance of Higher Education in England

Bahram Bekhradnia

Introduction
You have been kind enough to give me a good long time for mypresentation, so I plan to cover three broad and related areas in my talk.
First I will describe the arrangements for governance of the higher
education system in England. Second I will identify some of the issues thathave arisen recently that in my view require changes to the present governancearrangements. And third I will briefly make some suggestions for changes.
Two other points to make by way of introduction – there are two aspects ofgovernance that I will be dealing with – the governance of individual universities
and the governance of the HE system as a whole, though I shall be focusing on
the former. And finally, please bear in mind that most of what I have to say
concerns England. Much of it applies to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
as well, but they have their own HE systems and they are diverging. But
although I shall be speaking about England, I do believe that much of what I say
is generalizable as principles that will apply here and in other countries as well,including, perhaps, in Japan.

Part I

Current governance arrangements

Background
One essential characteristic that all English universities have in common isthat they are private bodies – they are not owned by the state nor are they

Director, Higher Education Policy Institute (HEPI), UK, e-mail: b.bekhradnia@hepi.ac.uk

24

The Governance of Higher Education in EnglandPage

governed by the state. They have their own independent governing bodies thatare the supreme authority in the institution. And although much of it has beeneroded in recent years, universities in England retain a great deal of autonomy.
Indeed a recent survey by the European Universities Association found them tohave the most autonomy of any university system in Europe.
1
Having established that they have these extremely important characteristics
in common, nevertheless, the institutions which make up the English higher
education sector have diverse backgrounds and traditions which are reflected intheir constitutional arrangements and the structure and powers of their governing
bodies. They can, however, be divided into two broad groups. In the case of
the so-called pre-1992 universities, the constitution and powers of the governing
body are laid down in, and limited by, the charter and statutes of the institution.
For the so-called post-1992 universities and colleges, they are laid down in the
Education Reform Act 1988 (as amended by the Further and Higher Education
Act 1992 – that is why they are called the post-1992 universities), together with
the instruments and articles of government or equivalent. Some institutions arecompanies limited by guarantee, in which case the memorandum and articles ofassociation incorporate the provisions of the instruments and articles ofgovernment.
Pre-1992 universities
The pre-1992 universities themselves are a diverse group. They include
the ancient universities of Oxford and Cambridge, the federal University of
London, the ‘civic’ universities founded in the late nineteenth and early twentiethcenturies, the former university colleges which awarded degrees of the
University of London, the group of universities established in the 1960s, and thecolleges of advanced technology which achieved university status following the
Robbins Report of 1963.
Post-1992 universities and colleges
Most of the post-1992 universities are former polytechnics which until 1988
were part of, and funded by, local education authorities (LEAs) and awarded
degrees validated by the Council for National Academic Awards. The
Education Reform Act 1988 transformed them into independent corporations.
Subsequently the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 enabled these1

Much of what follows is taken from the Guide for Governors, published by the Council of
University Chairmen http://www.hefce.ac.uk/media/hefce1/pubs/hefce/2009/0914/09_14.pdf

Bahram Bekhradnia

25
Page

institutions to award degrees in their own right, and to acquire the title ofuniversity. So the law created universities from what had previously beenpolytechnics.
Legal status of institutions
Although the institutions in the current higher education sector are diversein origin, size and organisation, they share the following characteristics. Theyare:
 legally independent corporate institutions
 bodies with charitable status
 accountable through a governing body which carries ultimate responsibility
for all aspects of the institution.
The legal status of particular institutions can, however, take different forms,
as described below.
Pre-1992 universities
Most of the pre-1992 universities were established by a royal charter
granted through the Privy Council – an arcane body originally established toadvise the monarch, and now with some small residual duties like approving
changes to the charters of chartered bodies – with an associated set of statutes.
This form of organisation is known as a chartered corporation.
The structure of governance for each university is outlined in the
instruments of its incorporation (i.e. the Act or charter and the statutes). The
charter and statutes can only be amended on application to the Privy Council.
Most universities have supporting governance arrangements in the form of
ordinances and regulations.
Post-1992 universities and colleges
The Education Reform Act 1988 established as higher education
corporations (HECs) certain higher education institutions in England previously
maintained by local education authorities. The Act stipulated that any HEC
should be conducted in accordance with articles of government approved by the
Secretary of State.

26

The Governance of Higher Education in England

Page

Structure and governanceI now turn to the structure of governance for the pre-1992 HEIs and for the
post-1992 universities and colleges. However, although these structures can be
described in general terms, there are considerable differences at the institutional
level in terms of detailed arrangements, particularly for pre-1992 universities.
Pre-1992 universities[Governing body]
The governing body of these institutions is normally called the council andis the governing body of the university. It is responsible for the university’s
finances and investments, and for the management of the university estate andbuildings. It has authority to make contracts on behalf of the university and toenter into loans and mortgage agreements. In many cases it also has
responsibility for the oversight of learning and teaching and research.
University statutes will normally state that, subject to the powers of the senate inacademic matters, the council has responsibility for the conduct of all the affairsof the university. The council will carry out many of its functions throughcommittees: in particular it will often have, jointly with the senate, a resources or
strategy committee which is responsible for planning the development of theuniversity, bringing together academic priorities, financial considerations andbuilding needs.
It is an important principle that the governing body has a lay majority, thatis a majority of members who are external and independent, i.e. not staff orstudents of the university. Its membership is specified in the statutes by class of
appointment and will typically include officers of the university, both lay andacademic; co-opted members; elected staff members; and student
representatives.
Following the report of the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher
Education (the Dearing Report) and the report of a subsequent review into theoperations of universities (the Lambert Review), universities undertook reviewsof the size of their governing bodies. There should be a balance of skills andexperience sufficient among members to enable the institution to meet its
primary responsibilities and ensure stakeholder confidence. A governing bodyof no more than 25 members is generally thought to represent a benchmark ofgood practice.
Governing bodies meet regularly, and normally not less than four times ayear. A great deal of business will be conducted through committees concerned

Bahram Bekhradnia Page
27
with finance, property and capital development, or through joint committees of
the council and the senate concerned with university strategy, resource allocationor employment, with the committees bringing forward recommendations for thegoverning body’s approval.
[Senate]The senate is responsible for regulating and directing the academic work of
the university. In some cases, the statutes state that power in academic matters(for example the awarding of degrees) rests with the senate; but even where thestatutes do not explicitly state this, the senate is regarded as the authority on
purely academic matters. Constitutionally, the senate reports to the council.
The council – or governing body to use its colloquial name – is the supreme
authority in a university. Decisions of the senate on academic matters whichhave financial or resource implications are subject to approval by the council.
Conversely, decisions by the council which have academic implications (forexample the creation or closure of an academic department) are subject to“consultation” with the senate (but only consultation – the Council makes thedecisions), and the senate would normally be the initiating body in such matters.
The senate is chaired by the head of the institution. Unlike the governing
body its membership is drawn from within the university, except where
representation is accorded to external institutions for academic purposes. It
consists of academic staff, with the proportion of staff in the various grades(professorial, non-professorial, research etc.) varying among universities.
Student representatives are also included. Senates vary in size from under 50 towell over 100 members.
Specific senate responsibilities normally include: academic strategy
 promotion of research approval of content of the curriculum and new programmes academic standards
 procedures for the award of qualifications
 appointment of internal and external examiners policies and procedures on examinations
 criteria for admission
 student discipline.

28

The Governance of Higher Education in England

Page[Officers]
The statutes of the pre-1992 universities provide for a number of officers,
including the following.
Chancellor
The chancellor, who is generally a distinguished public figure often with no ties
to the university, is formally the lay head of the university and the chair of thecourt. The role is largely ceremonial – for example, the chancellor presides atdegree congregations – but may include other non-executive functions.
Pro-chancellor
The pro-chancellor (or one of the pro-chancellors if there is more than one) will
normally be the chair of the governing body. The chair will be elected to thepost by the governing body from among its lay members.
Other
pro-chancellors will assist the chair, for example through chairing committees.
Treasurer
The treasurer is also appointed by the governing body from among its lay
members.
Head of the institution
The statutes of many pre-1992 universities define the head of the institution(most commonly entitled vice-chancellor, principal, director, rector or provost)as the chief academic and administrative officer of the university. The head of
the institution is the chief executive of the university.
The head of the institution has overall responsibility for the executive
management of the institution, and is accountable to the governing body for the
exercise of these responsibilities. He/she is responsible for ensuring that theinstitution is well connected to its stakeholders. He/she is identified as thedesignated officer of the institution, which means that he/she is responsible for
ensuring that the institution complies with the terms and conditions specified by
the Funding Council for the use of its funds, and may be called to give evidence
before Parliament. The head of the institution also chairs the senate.
Deputies to the head of the institution (most commonly entitled pro or
deputy vice-chancellors or principals) are normally appointed by the governing
body for a fixed period of time. In some institutions, these appointments are
now made on a permanent basis. These officers assist the head of theinstitution, but sometimes continue to carry out academic duties.

Bahram Bekhradnia Page
29
Registrar
The registrar is often the head of the administrative staff and will sometimes also
be designated in the statutes as secretary or clerk to the governing body and thesenate and other statutory bodies. The registrar is answerable to the head of theinstitution for his or her administrative responsibilities. In some universities,
all the senior administrative officers – such as the bursar, finance officer, estates
officer, personnel officer, and academic registrar – report to the registrar. In
others, some of these officers report directly to the head of the institution.
Post-1992 universities and colleges
Looking now at post-1992 universities, fundamentally, we are similar, if not
the same as those of older universities, with subtle differences, as described
below.
[Governing body]
The articles of governance of the post-1992 universities state that the
governing body shall be responsible for:
 determining educational character and mission of the institution and foroversight of its activities
 using effectively and efficiently its resources, the solvency of the institution
and safeguarding its assets
 approving annual estimates of income and expenditure appointing, grading, suspension, dismissal and determination of the pay andconditions of service of the head of the institution, the clerk to the governing
body, and such other senior post-holders as the governing body may
determine setting a framework for the pay and conditions of service of all other staff
 appointing external auditors.
So they are very similar to the old universities, but more formalised with
their functions more explicitly spelled out.
The 1992 Further and Higher Education Act and the instruments ofgovernment state that the governing body shall consist of no fewer than 12 andnot more than 24 members (plus the head of the institution unless he/she chooses
otherwise). Of the appointed members:
 up to 13 must be independent members, namely people appearing to theappointing authority to have experience of, and to have shown capacity in,

30

The Governance of Higher Education in EnglandPage

industrial, commercial or employment matters or the practice of any
profession, and who are not members of staff or students of the institution
or an elected member of the local authority
 up to two may be teachers of the institution, nominated by the academic
board, and up to two may be students of the institution, nominated by thestudents
 at least one and not more than nine shall be co-opted members, nominatedby the members of the governing body who are not co-opted members.
At least one of the co-opted members must have experience in the provisionof education.
Subject to the above maxima and minima, the governing body itself candetermine the number of members in each variable category, but must ensurethat at least half of all members of the governing body are independent members.
Or another way of putting it is that it is a requirement that fewer than half of themembers of the governing body should have links with the university.
Governing bodies should meet not less than four times a year. A great dealof governing body business may be dealt with through committees.
[Academic board]
The academic board in the new universities is equivalent to the Senate in
the old, and is responsible for academic affairs, including academic standards,
research, scholarship, teaching and learning, and courses at the institution, andfor considering the development of the academic activities of the institution,subject to the overall responsibilities of the governing body and the head of theinstitution.
The power to award degrees rests with the governing body. The academic
board’s responsibility for the administration of any awards is therefore by virtueof delegation from the governing body.
The articles specify that the academic board should normally consist of not
more than 30 members, although exceptionally membership of up to 40 may bepermitted. Additionally, the articles state that individuals in senior management
positions (i.e. deputy and assistant principals, deans of faculty or equivalent,heads of schools and departments) must make up at least 50 per cent of themembership – so the character of the Senates in old and new universities differs.
[Officers]
The articles of government of the post-1992 universities and colleges make

Bahram Bekhradnia Page
31
provision for each institution to appoint to senior posts.
Chancellor
Some post-1992 universities have appointed chancellors who may, among othernon-executive functions, carry out ceremonial duties – for example, conferring
degrees at degree congregations.
Chair of the governing body
The chair of the governing body is appointed by the governing body from amongits independent members.
Head of the institution
Subject to the responsibilities of the governing body, the head of the institution isthe chief executive of the institution, and is responsible for:
 making proposals to the governing body about the educational characterand mission of the institution, and for implementing the decisions of thegoverning body organizing, directing, and managing the institution and leadership of thestaff appointing, assigning , grading, appraising, suspending, dismissing, anddetermining – within the framework set by the governing body – the pay
and conditions of service of staff other than the holders of senior posts
 the determination, after consultation with the academic board, of theinstitution’s academic activities, and for the determination of its otheractivities
 preparing annual estimates of income and expenditure, for consideration by
the governing body, and for the management of budget and resources,
within estimates approved by the governing body maintaining student discipline and, within the rules and procedures
provided within the articles, for the suspension or expulsion of students on
disciplinary grounds and for implementing decisions to expel students foracademic reasons.
The head of the institution, working with the secretary or clerk to thegoverning body, must ensure that the governing body receives proper andappropriately timed information to fulfil its responsibilities.

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Deputy (or deputies) to the head of the institution
The deputy (or deputies) to the head of the institution assist the head of theinstitution and have specific management responsibilities. In some institutions
they are appointed on a permanent basis and in others for a fixed term. They
may be responsible for providing leadership in academic or related functions.
In some instances they may be designated as pro vice-chancellors.
Secretary (or clerk) to the governing body
The secretary or clerk to the governing body normally has other management
responsibilities within the institution. Some are designated as secretary,registrar, deputy or pro-vice-chancellor.
Functions of the governing body
So it will be seen that the governing body has ultimate responsibility for all
aspects of a university. At the highest level it includes approving the strategicplan of the university, the key policies that set its direction and appointing thesenior staff including the vice-chancellor. But it also includes human resources
policies (including setting salary scales and levels, and establishing processes fordiscipline and dismissal of staff), overseeing the management of the estate(universities own their own premises), ensuring audits are carried out and being
responsible to The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) andParliament for their audits. Essentially, the governing body embodies the
University. In some respects, it is the University. Not the staff, not thestudents, but the governing body.
The funding council
So that is how universities are governed internally. Turning now tonational governance, a key feature in England (and actually the rest of the UKtoo) for the past 100 years, and now repeated elsewhere in the world, is that theGovernment does not have direct dealings with individual universities. 100
years ago the University Grants Committee was established as a ‘buffer body’ tocome between the government and universities and to perform some of the key
functions in dealing with universities that might otherwise have been performedby the government. Buffer bodies are generally bodies created by theGovernment to perform some of their functions, but which are to a greater or
lesser extent independent of the Government. Although they are part of themachinery of government, they are outside the relevant ministry.

Bahram Bekhradnia Page
33
The functions of buffer bodies classically include the allocation of funds.
That has generally been the starting point. However, it is generally also thecase that the allocation of funds cannot be divorced from other aspects ofregulation of the sector, and that these go hand-in-hand with the more general
oversight and planning of higher education and its development. So the buffer
bodies in higher education often have the functions of planning and regulating
the higher education sector, as well as deciding on the distribution of funds
between universities.
That is the case in England where HEFCE was formed by the Further andHigher Education Act 1992, to fund higher education in England.
The role of the Funding Council is to distribute public funds made available
through Parliament via the relevant ministry and to provide advice on thefunding needs of higher education to the Secretary of State. It necessarily also
gets involved in policy making for the development of the sector.
Relationship of the funding council with the government
Until now, the main source of funding for higher education has been the
grant made available annually to the Funding Council. The grant is determined
after the announcement of the Government’s public expenditure plans.
It is the responsibility of HEFCE to determine how the grant is to beallocated to individual institutions. HEFCE determines annually:
 the total number of funded students in the sector based on data collectedfrom institutions
 the number of additional students to be funded to meetgovernment-planned student numbers
 the block grant for teaching and research allocated to each HEI
 special funding and earmarked capital to be used to secure change or fundactivities that cannot be secured through core funding.
In making the grant available to HEFCE, the Secretary of State can impose
conditions which must be met by all institutions, or by all institutions of aparticular category – but not individual universities. The Secretary of State canalso require HEFCE to impose a condition of grant on an individual institution
relating to the level of fees it charges, but otherwise conditions cannot be
imposed on individual institutions, nor can they be framed by reference toparticular courses or programmes of research (including the content of suchcourses or programmes and how they are taught, supervised or assessed), nor canthey refer to the criteria for selecting and appointing academic staff or admitting

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students. So the system is clearly designed to avoid any possibility ofpoliticians getting involved in academic matters.
Members of the HEFCE Board are appointed by the Secretary of State; arepresentative of the Secretary of State is entitled to attend as the Assessor at
HEFCE’s board meetings, but not to take part in the decision-making process.
Although appointed by the Secretary of State, note that board members are notfor the most part political appointments – generally you cannot tell the politicalaffiliation of the members of the Council.
The Board of HEFCE appoints the Chief Executive, who is actually a more
important appointment than the Board members.
Invariably the Chief
Executive has been a very senior Vice Chancellor, and has commanded great
respect; and that has undoubtedly contributed greatly to HEFCE’s success.

Source: HESA finance record 2010-11, HEFCE-funded HEIs
Note 1: This income includes a share of income in joint venture(s) of £121M.
Note 2: This income includes £95M of income that has been passed on to other institutions ororganisations as part of a collaborative project or subcontracted work.
Note 3: We do not have precise data on postgraduate fees paid by UK research councils. Full-time
postgraduate research fees from ‘other ’sources is used to estimate this. (‘Other’ sources are thoseother that the SLC and DH)
Note 4: 2010-11 refers to the academic year ending 31 July 2011.

Figure 1. Sources of income for HEFCE-funded higher education institutions,2010-1122

Source: Guide to funding: How HEFCE allocates its funds.
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/year/2010/201024/

Bahram Bekhradnia Page
35
The funding of higher education
Institutional funding
Higher education institutions attract income from a variety of sources.
The relative proportion of income provided by each source reflects the diversityof institutions’ missions and the markets they serve.
The total income of institutions in 2010-11 was £22.9 billion, of which £7.2
billion (or 31.4 per cent) was provided by HEFCE, the Learning and Skills
Council (LSC) and the Training and Development Agency for Schools (TDA).
Figure 1 shows the main sources of funding in 2010-11 for universities andhigher education colleges. However, it needs to be noted that from 2012
income from tuition fees (SLC/LEA fees) will treble, and grant from the HEFCE
will reduce commensurately.
[Tuition fees]
From 2012, universities are now free to charge tuition fees up to £9,000($14,000) per year. Most are charging the maximum or close to the maximum,
despite some limited controls that are in place that could in principle limit thefees. And as fees have risen, so government grant has reduced. Students
themselves are now the main providers of the funding that universities receive
for teaching them.
Admissions themselves remain the sole responsibility of each HEI, whichsets its own criteria for admission and selects its own students. However, as acondition of being allowed to charge higher fees, universities have to satisfy the
Semi-Independent “Office for Fair Access” that their admissions policies are fair
and will not deter students from poor backgrounds.
The governing body of each institution approves the level of fees for home
and EU postgraduate and part-time students. Some of these students are
self-financing; others are funded by their employers or other organisations. In
the case of postgraduates, some students are funded by central Government,
primarily through studentships from the Research Councils.
Overseas (i.e. non-EU) students are charged higher fees so that their fees
cover the full economic cost of their tuition. Institutions are free to decide whatlevel of fee they charge overseas students.
[Funding council grant]
The funding council is having to reconsider its relationship with universities,
and in particular the method and the purposes for which it distributes its grant,

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now that the grant that it provides has diminished substantially as fees haveincreased. In principle, though, although the amount has reduced, the grantfrom HEFCE falls into the following categories:
 funding for teaching funding for research other related funding Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF).
HEFCE minimises the accountability burden on institutions by allocating
the bulk of its funding using formulaic, conditional allocations, so that
institutions receive a known sum of money as long as they meet specified
criteria.
Funds for teaching and research are all part of a block grant. In otherwords, the institution may distribute the funds internally at its own discretion, as
long as they are used for teaching and research and related activities. Other
funding must be spent on the activities agreed with HEFCE.
Research grants and contracts
In addition to HEFCE support for research, institutions obtain researchfunding through grants and contracts from Research Councils, contracts fromindustrial and commercial firms and government departments, and grants fromcharities and the EU. Where a contract, as opposed to a grant, is provided, thefunder is normally looking for a specific return on its investment.
Business and community engagement
Institutions are increasingly undertaking knowledge transfer and providing
other services to external bodies, often on a commercial basis. The scope ofsuch services is wide-ranging, from advice on business development to thetesting of products and goods, the exploitation of intellectual property, contract
research and the letting of university accommodation. Many universities andcolleges have established separate companies to market their services, withprofits covenanted back to the institution. The University keeps all suchincome, which is not taken into account by the funding council for grantcalculations.
Endowments, donations and other sources of income
Universities and colleges have several other sources of income, including:Bahram Bekhradnia Page37
 income from endowments and trusts to raise money for the institution,
especially through alumni
 donations
 sponsorship of posts (in particular professorial chairs, which are often inareas of immediate interest to the sponsoring company and sometimes for a
fixed term) interest earned on cash balances and investments
 income from exploiting the results of research or inventions which havecommercial applications
 teaching contracts for specific customers (nursing, other professions allied
to medicine, further education, continuing professional development, initialteacher training) fee income from short courses
 income from halls of residence fees and vacation lettings.
The importance of these other income streams varies from institution to
institution: income from invested endowments, for example, tends to be moresignificant in the older universities, and donations tend to be focused onuniversities with medical schools.
Other national governance bodies include
The quality assurance agency
A body owned jointly by the universities themselves and the Government,
responsible for carrying out assessments of the quality of education.
The higher education statistics agency
Responsible for collecting and analysing data from universities.
The office of the independent adjudicator for higher education
A semi-judicial independent body responsible for deciding on complaints thatstudents may bring against their universities.
The office for fair access
Referred to above all stop this is a semi-independent body, created by thegovernment to ensure that University admissions policies are fair and toencourage participation in higher education by students from disadvantaged
backgrounds.

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Part II Governance in England – a critique and suggestions forreform
I now turn to a critique of current governance arrangements, with someprescriptions for how it ought to develop in the future. In this I am drawing
substantially on a report3 produced by my Institute in 2011, written by Professor
Malcolm Gillies, Vice-Chancellor of London Metropolitan University.
The background
State funding is diminishing
By 2015 through their tuition fees students will be the undisputed majority
funders of most English universities. Government increasingly takes on therole of loan facility to students rather than direct funder of institutions for theireducational provision: the government lends the money to the student to pay thetuition fees. Any future government teaching grants to institutions will bemade to priority areas, such as sciences. Through this transition, the state’s
stake, both moral and financial, is weakened and the stake of students, or morecorrectly alumni (because students will only repay the loans that are provided tothem to pay fees after they have graduated), is strengthened. On current
projections, a majority of erstwhile students will still be making repayments
against their government loan well into their fifties, when a majority will still nothave paid it all back.
The global economic crisis
Spectacular failures in banking governance during 2008 have given reason toquestion the growing acceptance of corporate tendencies in university
governance since the late 1990s. Several lessons have been learned from thebanking debacle:
 governors do need to understand the core business over which they haveauthority, and demonstrate a wide range of specialist skills in relation tothat business; the interests of governors do need to be patent and to connect more directlywith the interests of stakeholders and shareholders.
3

University Governance: Questions for a New Era by Malcolm Gillies
http://www.hepi.ac.uk/466-1965/University-Governance--Questions-for-a-new-era.html

Bahram Bekhradnia Page
39
The failures in banking governance have proven hard to correct partly
because of the limits of regulatory authority of any one state.
The pace of change
The slow speed of traditional state regulation as well as of internal academic
processes now directly conflicts with the speed required in entrepreneurial
activity:
 to capture a market niche,
 respond rapidly to changing international trends,
 close down selective operations, or develop new business with external partners.
This changing balance of public and private enterprise affects the balance,needs and speed required of institutional governance. University governancehas been “moving away” from slower forms of civic-minded external andcollegial internal governance, but “towards what” has been less clear.
The neutral space of academia
With an increasing play to market forces both in higher education and in research,
the traditional “neutral space” of academia – based upon its dedication toprofessing the truth without fear or favour – can be threatened. Periodic crisesof confidence in research results, whether in global warming or pharmaceutical
testing or other areas of public interest, illustrate this threat. Within the
curriculum, intellectual liberalism frequently runs up against the dictates of
employability or professional accreditation. Governance has an important,sometimes a required, role in protecting that academic freedom, freedom ofspeech and, hence, academic neutrality.
Such contemporary circumstances as these raise significant, new questions
for the governance of British, and more specifically English, universities: Whoseinterests should governors serve in future? What skills should be required ofthem? What authority should they hold, or should be held over them?
Reflections on the current governance arrangements described above
Governance is about steering, not rowing
In contrast to the more commercial “director”, “governor” implies an oversight,
a trust (hence, the North American and charity equivalent of “trustee”), but not adenial of final responsibility. And what is steered is an education and research

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institution. Education (including teaching and learning) and research are thecore “business” of the university. Indeed, the university could be considered tobe constituted through their synergy. Governors take ultimate responsibility forthis higher education enterprise. Governors may also steer the directions ofother consequential issues, such as employability, community engagement andsocial mobility, but the core business is education and research.
In whose interests?
So that is what they are steering – that much is relatively uncontroversial, andwould be accepted by most people. But more controversial is the question
whose interests should they be serving in steering this enterprise? A university
has many competing interests. Students want a good-quality education andexciting social experiences. Staff want to deliver the core business or support
that delivery. Businesses want well-educated employees and to supply services.
The community wants an intellectual, possibly entrepreneurial, hub. The
bureaucracy seeks “value for money”, while governments want policy outcomes
which will contribute to re-election.
Governor interests?
Any community of governors, too, brings many different interests to the table:
 perpetuation or reform of institutional ethos; connection with local community;
 family tradition or obligation;
 stakeholder representation;
 devotion of professional expertise; political commitment;
 “pro bono” work requirement;
 opportunities for building new business links and commercial connections.
The flux of internal interests
Universities have their competing priorities, for instance, between educationaland research investment, the fostering of enterprise activity, and devotion tocommunity service. There is interest in keeping a healthy financial bottom line
but also in growing scholarly reputation and providing models of intellectual or
moral response to difficult questions. A university is also subject to anever-shifting balance between disciplinary and professional interests, reflectiveof broader trends in society and employment, but also a product of its own

Bahram Bekhradnia Page
41
internal hierarchies of intellect and achievement. Universities cross-subsidise
activities in recognition of these shifting balances as well as to maintain thescholarly “completeness” befitting the very name of “university”.
The state’s interest
Once predominating, and legitimated through its majority funding stake, thestate’s interest becomes of lesser significance and lesser moral authority throughthe coming years of massive cost-shift to the student. While the interests of thegovernment, the bureaucracy and the undifferentiated “public” can be
distinguished from one another, all are diminished through the state’s lessening
funding stake in individual institutions. The “public interest” in future is more
protected through regulation than it was in the past, when it was asserted throughconditions over expenditure of substantial public funds.
But although the state’s not a principal funder any more, higher education
remains a strategic national infrastructure and the state retains a substantial
interest in ensuring its higher education system is successful.
The business interest
Recent UK government policy could have sought a higher contribution frombusiness to university funding, given the hundreds of thousands of new
graduates annually provided to business, but government explicitly sought not to
do so. Its view is that business is there to make profits, and thereby, throughpaying taxes, already contributes enough to higher education costs. Now, in theera of the student as principal funding agent, a majority of students will not gain
any direct benefit from those taxes for their higher education tuition costs.
They will be provided for directly through their fees – not other people’s taxes.
This observation does not mean that business-university links are not vital.
Rather, it suggests that business will continue to command an insignificant
financial stake in most individual universities. Moreover, business-driven
reforms of university governance – as has been the model in England for the past
30 years – need to be reassessed as they envisaged neither such a reduction in thestate’s contribution (to which business contributed) nor such an increase in thestudents’ stake. The business interest, then, comes with an unclear sense of
authority in the newly emerging era. In recent years the business interest has
been more and more represented on most Boards of Governors. This is partly
through a view of government that business people do know how to run abusiness, partly through use of a narrowly conceived “skills matrix” in recruiting
governors, and partly through a greater willingness of business people to take

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part. With this change has grown the largely undebated assumption that theuniversity exists to provide qualified workers for businesses, normally according
to some unstated assumptions of priority, utility or financial advantage tobusiness itself.
Inter-generational interests
The “new era” poses a series of new questions, as well as new answers to oldquestions.
The punitive, sometimes inter-generational nature of muchgovernment policy – not just in England – is apparent. That is what happens
when today’s taxpayers are replaced as the principal funders of universities by
students themselves. There is a regressive intergenerational transfer of liability.
Student interests
With the new funding system, students, through loans or up-front payments, will
eventually be providing the majority of income in a majority of institutions.
This is already the case in several UK universities with high proportions ofinternational or postgraduate students. That is, students, in one way or another,will hold the main financial stake, in many less research intensive institutions
providing as high as 80 per cent of annual income.
Alumni interests
Of course, under income-contingent loan arrangements – as we have in England
and also Australia – it is only after graduation, as alumni, that erstwhile students
start to make their loan repayments. In such cases it is the alumni, then, rather
than current students, who become the largest funders of the institution acrosssucceeding decades. A new governance question emerges of how this major,
even majority, funding stake should be represented in institutional governance?
The closest parallel is that of the private universities of the United States, where
the student investment in high tuition fees leads to power and recognition as
alumni. Sometimes this is reflected in a majority of institutional trustees being
alumni and, in the collegial model, high levels of alumni giving across a lifetime.
Some consequences of the changing times
Changing staff and student relationshipAs co-workers in the institutional enterprise, according to the collegial compact,
staff and students are often subject to similar interests, for instance, in holding
management – and, indeed, governors – to account. In many regards they canBahram Bekhradnia Page
43
do this better than independent (lay) governors because of their daily experienceof institutional life and regular opportunity to witness the implementation ofagreed policies. The changing financial base of universities, however, now
reinforces the difference between staff and students in terms of financial stake.
Where the student becomes responsible for a majority of income – as in so many
institutions – while staff remain the majority of expenditure. This can easily
lead to a more directly consumerist, rather than collegial or communitarian,
relationship between staff and students.
At heart, this debate is between an old ethos of public service, reinforced byhigh levels of government funding, and an emerging ethos of market-oriented
entrepreneurialism that more overtly serves the interests of those paying for theservice: between the interests of little-funding business and that of much-funding
students or alumni, who nonetheless do want a job; between the interests of students or alumni and those of minority funders(philanthropists, private research funders, government) as well as thebroader community; between the ultimate education-and-research purpose of the institution andmore immediate employment and accreditation purposes.
More representative governanceThis growing interests debate, heightened by funding changes in England,suggests newly emerging balances of interests, more directly related to thefinancial stake. It signals a move towards a more overt, more passionate
balance in institutional governance and away from the dispassionate,“independent” adjudication of matters in the interest of an undefined public thatis still found in the current governance arrangements I have described above andmuch governance practice. This may mean a move back to a more
representative model, but now of funding stakes and coalitions of institutional
interests, rather than of diverse community interests through trusteeship of theonce public, or publicly funded, institution.
The institutional interest
The funding changes of coming years underscore the real autonomy ofuniversities. Governors then, while respecting all conditions attached togovernment funding and regulation, must primarily serve the complex of stakesthat is the institutional interest. Where that conflicts with the public interest –for instance, in the setting of tuition fees, disposal of property, or entrance into

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commercial ventures – then the institutional interest can reasonably be expected
to prevail.
Conflicts of interest
At times of rapid change of interests in and of the institution, conflicts will
proliferate. This is not just a technical issue of financial or other gain togovernors or their immediate associates. It involves genuine conflicts between
competing stakeholder groups over institutional priorities, as well as conflicts ofbelief: how much should an autonomous university be acting in more than its
own immediate self-interest? As well, there is the difficult issue of how adispassionate, adjudicational Board starts to embrace the more passionately
articulated stakes of various interest groups.
Some considerations to guide the appointment of governors
So then, given the central importance of the Governing body and thechanging environment, I set out here some of the considerations to guide theappointment of governors.
Responsibilities
Boards of Governors need skills to match their responsibilities. Although there
is some common understanding in the UK of their ultimate responsibilities, howthose responsibilities are exercised in individual institutions is less clear.
Governors are often wary, for instance, of “intruding” directly into traditional
areas of academic self-governance. The Board, for instance, must own thestrategic directions of the institutions, but while some Boards respond to plansbrought forward by their management, others initiate their own processes anddemand of management that they follow their agreed plan. The Board must
approve the appointment of specified senior staff, but how much is it involved intheir selection or recruitment? The Board must ultimately take responsibility
for all academic and administrative activities of the institution, but can it
reasonably be expected to have its own expertise in areas of student complaints,
fee-setting or commercialisation of research? In all these matters the Board
may be more or less hands on. But in all cases the Board has ultimate
responsibility for all these matters.
The skills matrix
Such matrices of professional skills are a common way of assessing theBahram Bekhradnia Page
45
appropriateness of the backgrounds of Board members for the Board’s duties,
and also of selecting new members. Given the inherited main agenda areas of
the Board – such as finance, audit, estates, human resources – it is not surprisingthat professional expertise in these areas is considered advisable or, in somecases, required. Expertise in other designated areas of equality, students’unions, and health and safety may also be desirable, and so feature on the matrix.
Disciplines and backgrounds
Certain configurations of disciplinary (social sciences, humanities, creative arts,
technology, engineering, physical sciences, health sciences) and social(socio-economic, ethnic, gender, regional/international, religious, family/alumni)
backgrounds are clearly desirable for particular universities. In an age ofshifting balances of interest, these need to be considered as carefully as the skills
matrix, lest a university replicate the “people like us” phenomenon of theAnglo-Saxon corporate world.
Core-purpose skills
The Board, above all, must have a good knowledge of the institution’s core
purposes, of education and research. This is not just because finances, estateand human resources are to be devoted in an efficient manner to support
educational and research purposes, but also because the strategic directions of
the university – primarily in education and research – are to be debated,
approved and updated, in light of performance, by the Board. Knowledge ineducation (such as curriculum, assessment, pedagogy, demand, funding) andresearch (fundamental, for example or applied) is only infrequently referenced at
the Board level. This can lead to overall Board incompetence in dealing withcore business or ineffective holding of management to account.
ValuesKnowledge, however, is not enough. Values are equally important, as theyreflect the various goals of the academic enterprise. A university has several
bottom lines. Financial, human-capital and environmental bottom lines, forinstance, reflect different, but hopefully inter-locking, values. Each institution
will have a different balance between these values, reflected in its overall
positioning as an autonomous institution.

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Conclusions
And so in conclusion I return to where I started this critique of present
arrangements in England.
Diminishing state funding
The withdrawal of the state as chief funding agent of higher education creates
new balances in governance authority. The body which can be most expected
to fill that space is the alumni, as they now become the chief funding agent of
most English universities in direct replacement of that state interest, throughtheir decades-long repayment of state-provided loans. The alumni also havethe greatest, life-long stake in the institution’s reputation and its protection.
They understand the institution’s symbolic value.
Global economic crisis
The move towards greater emulation of corporate models from the businessworld, initiated over the last decade, seems to have stalled, in part because of theinadequacy of the model for the corporate world itself and in part because of its
The verylack of responsiveness to changing stakeholder interests.
independence of governor interests in this model does not regularly transplant
well to higher education. The current flurry of employability demands directlyfrom government masks the failure of employers and business directly toestablish a sufficient financial or moral stake within universities. The question
for universities now is how to build more passionate, committed, representative
governing bodies, without damaging existing links with employers or theirinvolvement in institutional employability programmes. Of course, many
alumni will themselves be employers, but the legitimacy of their stake comes
more by virtue of the former than the latter characteristic.
The pace of change
Academia’s slowness to change and conservational approaches towards
knowledge have sometimes been its strength, but may now represent a
dangerous weakness. The necessity to compete in increasingly open markets,with less regulated, often international competitors, poses challenges to all forms
of institutional governance and management, as well as to orderly industrial
relations. That necessity for entrepreneurial speed and confidentiality suggests
more:Bahram Bekhradnia Page47
 delegation of authority to post holders; advisory, rather than determinative, roles for committees; and ambiguous questions of ownership of privileged information.
It also suggests that governing bodies themselves may move to mimic
senior management, through bestowing greater authority upon committee chairs,
in fact, creating a cabinet of chairs. That can raise difficult questions about the
expectations of members of the Board outside this cabinet of chairs, particularly
staff and student members, who may feel they are not full participants indecisions for which they will nevertheless carry responsibility.
Academic neutrality
The most distinctive quality of the university is its neutral space. This
underscores the university’s role as academic standard bearer. In an age of
media spin, naturally partisan government, and the profit-maximising corporate
motive, society looks even more than previously to its universities fortrustworthy research results and verifiable educational standards.
Ifinstitutional autonomy is to be maintained, then new alumni governors are in agood position to reinforce that ethical basis to research and education once heldin trust by the undifferentiated public. Hopefully, they have been inculcated inthat ethic as students.
Interests, skills, authority
Universities are hard to govern. A strongly independent Board is notnecessarily the best guardian of an autonomous university. At moments ofgovernance crisis, and holding no stake of dependency, independent governors
can act to protect their professional or private interests and their reputation overthose of the autonomous institution. Authority is better based in a body that
actively and passionately represents the relative interests of the key university
stakeholders. That representational balance is more likely to be found in a
Board of Governors chosen, and reappointed, for the diversity of its members’
attributes: knowledge of education and research, professional matrix skills,
disciplinary and social background, along with a good understanding of thevalues enshrined in the institutional mission.

RIHE International Seminar Reports, No.19, 2013

49
Page

The Transformation of University Governance inFrance (1999-2011) Inertia, Institutionalization andChangeStéphanie Mignot-Gérard

Introduction
There is a common narrative that universities worldwide have undergone
major organizational transformations in the past two decades. There is at oncea heated debate among scholars about the forces (be they economic,
demographic, technological, or social) that shape these changes, but also about
the nature and the degree of the latter. At the core of these debates stand thecapacity of universities to maintain their traditional priorities and their level ofautonomy.
Among scholarships that address the issue of change in universities
governance, three different perspectives, sometimes overlapping each other, aregenerally adopted.
A first effort consists in questioning the alleged convergence of national
higher education systems either worldwide (Drori, Meyer & Hwang, 2006) orwithin a region, like Europe (Musselin, 2009; Paradeise, Reale, Bleiklie & Ferlie,2009). These studies show that changes may be more or less radical, occur atdifferent times, and affect distinct elements of higher education systems acrosscountries.
The second, and may be the more prolific approach, investigates the impact
of one or several institutional pressures for change on the governance ofMaître de Conférences en Gestion, IAE Gustave Eiffel et IRG (Université Paris-Est Créteil)／Chercheur Associée, Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Sciences Po et CNRS, France,
e-mail: stephanie.mignot-gerard@u-pec.fr

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The Transformation of University Governance in France (1999-2011) Inertia, Institutionalization and Page
Changeuniversities parts of the same national system. Again, change, complexity, andambiguity is pointed out. For example, Paradeise and Thoenig (2012) haveaccounted for the diverse possible range of university responses to the increasingpressure of academic standards of excellence. As for American universities, it
is often claimed that selective research universities may be less subject to market
forces than other institutions, and that a higher level of collegiality is stillprevalent in the former while a managerial approach of governance dominates
the latter. Hence, because of institutional diversity, external demands forchange do not affect all the universities of a given country at the same degree.
Studies that delve more deeply into universities organization and study the‘shop-floor’ levels show that changes may also vary within universities: withrespect to their epistemic cultures and powerfulness, some parts of the same
institution may adapt to change, while others will buffer it, or adopt
window-dressing transformations (Frolich, 2005; Henkel & Vabo, 2000;
Mignot-Gérard & Musselin, 2005). Furthermore, neo-institutionalists haveconvincingly argued that universities may experience big changes in theirsymbolic forms or formal structures while concrete organizational practices
remain stable (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Gumport, 2002).
A third outlook consists in studying national systems of higher education ina multi-level and historical perspective (Kogan & Hanney, 2000; Musselin,2004). Those studies highlight that the different parts of a national higher
education (especially the state, the academic profession, and the universities)
may not be affected by change simultaneously, and that change at one level does
not mechanically transform all the system. The French higher education offersa good illustration of this point. While several national reforms have been put
in place since the end of the nineteenth century to strengthen the universities
autonomy, they have not attained their goal, because, Musselin argues, theyneither affected the state structures nor the profession modes of regulation.
That is the reason why ‘big reforms’ have led to small change at the institutional
level (Musselin, 2004).
This paper departs from an alternative perspective, since it examines andcompares the concrete governance practices within universities in France at two
different time periods. However, the approaches developed earlier are very
useful to point out the complexity of change, but also to identify the different
dimensions that need to be studied when the issue of university governancechange is addressed. This paper will thus draw on a theoretical approach that
integrates the study of academic leaders values and practices; the relations andbalances of power between the actors and organs that participate in the internalStéphanie Mignot-Gérard Page
51
governance of universities; the content of decisions made at the university level;
and the relation between the state, the universities and the academic units.
Part one describes the national reforms led in France since 1968 in the
sector of higher education. In a second part, the research design will bepresented. The third and final part will outline the main findings of our studies.

1. The 2000s reforms in the French higher education:
centralization of university governance and a rising concern for
performance
Since the end of the nineteenth century, the structures of French university
governance remained largely unchanged since the loi Faure of 1968 and the loi
Savary in 1984. The latter aimed at improving the capacity of collective actionof universities. They renewed the universities governance structures, butneither affected state funding to universities nor challenged the‘corporatist-centralised’ model of professional regulation. As a result, these
two laws failed to strengthen the universities capacity of collective action(Musselin, 2004).
In the late eighties four-year contracts were introduced between theuniversities and the Ministry. With the contracts, universities would negotiate asmall part of state funding on the basis of the strategic plans drawn for the next
four years. Albeit a subdued and not visible change, the contracts between theuniversities and the ministry entailed significant modifications in weakening thediscipline-based logic of intervention of the ministry and promoted therecognition of universities as relevant actors within the French higher education
system (Musselin, 2004).
1.1 The “Loi L.R.U.” aims to centralize decision-making in universities
French higher education did not undergo major governance reforms
between the end of the eighties until 2007 when the president Sarkozy came into
office. In 2007, Sarkozy’s government launched the law for the liberties andresponsibilities of universities (L.R.U.). It had two main consequences on
university governance.
First and foremost, the law strengthened the centralization ofdecision-making within universities. The university presidents benefited fromenlarged powers. Regarding governance itself, presidents are now elected by
the senate (while they had previously to be elected by the three deliberative

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The Transformation of University Governance in France (1999-2011) Inertia, Institutionalization and ChangePagebodies altogether), they are given the possibility to renew their mandate one time,
and to designate the external members of the university senate. They also
gained power with respect to staff management, since the LRU gave them thecapacity to allocate individual compensation to staff, and block faculty
recruitment decisions (Legrand, 2007).
The law also strengthened thepreeminence of the senate over the two other governance bodies at the university
level (the council for studies and the council for research) and aimed to increase
its capacity for decision-making by reducing the numbers of its members (from30-60 to 20-30).
Secondly, the universities were given enlarged autonomy regarding
management of their budgets and human resources. With the LRU, all the
resources granted by the state are integrated into the four-year contract
negotiation; more importantly, the universities now pay the salaries of their staff.
All these resources are integrated into a global budget that allows institutions totransform mutually credits into positions. Previously, state allocations touniversities did not include university staff compensation.
1.2 State funding and the increasing measurement of university performance
Moreover, the calculation of the state funding to universities was changed
in 2008 in order to better take into account the universities ‘performance’. For
teaching, 10 per cent of the state funding to universities are now based on
qualitative results (success rate in exams, placement of graduate students on thejob market). For research, it is suggested that 20 per cent of the funds should
be based on ‘performance’.
In addition to the introduction of performance measures in the state funding
formula, an emphasis has been put on research assessment and quality. In
2005-2006 was created a new agency, e.g. l’Agence Nationale pour la Recherche(ANR: French national research council). The ANR role is to fund selectively
research projects coming from universities on a competitive basis after
peer-review evaluations. At the same period, another Agency, Agenced’évaluation de la recherche et de l’enseignement supérieur (AERES), was put inplace to assess all laboratories, higher education institutions and graduate
programs. The research laboratory are graded from ‘A’ to ‘C’ by the AERES;
one important measure of the lab quality that influences heavily the grade finallyobtained, is the number of scholars of the unit who publish in academic journals.
Faculty whose production is under the standard of publications (which isvariable from field to field) are counted as a ‘non-active scholars’.

Stéphanie Mignot-Gérard Page
53
Last but not least, in 2010 was launched a state program, so-called the‘Investissements d’avenir’. Research labs and universities were invited toapply for LABEX (excellent labs) and IDEX (excellent universities) labels. A
jury composed of international scholars was appointed to designate the short listof academic units that would be recognized as excellent institutions and receive
the financial resources dedicated to the program. Finally, a hundred of researchlabs were laureates of the LABEX and eight universities received the IDEX
label.

2. Research design
The paper draws on a set of in-depth studies of universities conducted at
two different time periods. The same research design was applied for all thestudies. For both two studies were simultaneously conducted, one qualitative
based on semi-structured interviews and a quantitative one based onquestionnaires directed to a greater number of institutions and individuals.
In order to grasp the evolutions of the universities internal governance, twoinstitutions that were part of the 1998 sample were studied again in 2010 (South
University & West University).
These studies offer insights into the universities internal governance, by
highlighting the university presidents’ values and leadership styles; the balancesof power between the presidential teams, the collective bodies ofdecision-making at the university level, the university administration and thedeans; the content of the decisions made at the university level.
Table 1. Qualitative studies
1998

2010

Sample ofinstitutions
4 universities
West University
East University
South University
Paris University#
interviews
250

3 universities
Science University
West University
South University

100

Sample ofinterviewees*Actors involved inuniversity governance(members of presidential
teams, elected members ofthe decision-making bodies,deans, department chairs
and labs)*Faculty and staff members
Only actors involved in theuniversity governance

Reference
Mignot-Gérard
& Musselin,
1999

Musselin,
Barrier, Boubal& Soubiron
2012

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The Transformation of University Governance in France (1999-2011) Inertia, Institutionalization and Change
Page
Table 2. Quantitative studies
1999

Sample ofinstitutions
37 universities

2010

All universities#
Sample ofquestionnaires
interviewees
1,660*Actors involved inuniversity governance(members of presidential
teams, elected members ofthe decision-making bodies,deans, department chairs
and labs)*Faculty and staff members
2,598
Only actors involved in theuniversity governance

Reference
Mignot-Gérard
& Musselin,
2000

Chatelain,
Mignot-Gérard,
Musselin &Sponem, 2012

3. Changes in the university governance
A first comparison of the empirical data collected in 1999 and in 2010
brings about a mixed picture of change. Firstly, there is evidence that French
universities retain a good deal of collegiality (3.1). Secondly, the centralizationof decision-making that had surfaced by the end of the nineties has been
reinforced in the recent period (3.2). Finally, the most salient change regards
the tighter relationship between the national evaluations of research performanceand the internal allocation of resources (3.3).
3.1 French universities retain collegial traits
Many studies point to the “organizational turn” of universities worldwide(Krücken & Meyer, 2006). While universities were originally described as
specific organizations (organized anarchies, loosely-coupled systems,
professional organizations), the use of metaphors like “entrepreneurial university”(Clark, 1998), or “academic capitalism” (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997), reflects theidea that universities are perhaps no longer peculiar organizations (Musselin,2006).
Several dimensions may be used to characterize organizations. Amongothers, organizational values and forms of control are at stake when the nature oforganizations is debated. The transformation of universities into organizations
postulates that managerial values become more prominent and tend to replace
traditional academic ones. It is also argued that the control of professionals
relies less on collegial mechanisms (for instance evaluation through peer review,
definition of tasks through professional socialization), but more on hierarchy.

Stéphanie Mignot-Gérard Page
55
3.1.1 Academic leaders’ values: the persistence of academic values overmanagerial ones
As within any professional bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1979), managerial
responsibilities in universities are undertaken by elected or appointed faculty
members. Might the endorsement of a collective responsibility of management
be a driver for adopting managerial values?
The “value” issue is subject to debates in the literature. Studies on
universities in the United States argue that academic values are losing ground forthe benefit of market or industrial values (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997; Gumport,
2002). As far as European higher education is concerned, scholarships
conversely emphasize the strength of academic or scientific values (Barrier,
2011; Henkel, 2000). In the United Kingdom, where New Public Management(NPM) was implemented in a particularly radical form, Henkel (2000) found that
academic leaders in traditional universities were reluctant to a managerial
identity, while leaders of post-1992 institutions were more akin to suchdescription. Trowler (2010) shows that middle-management academics are notparticularly enthusiastic about new public management ideas and principles.
In France, all academic leaders (either university presidents, deans,
department chairs) are elected, usually for fixed-term mandates. University
reforms in France since 1968 have strengthened the managerial role of university
Table 3. Academic leaders’ values
As far as your work is concerned, how important do you consider
the following activities?
(N = 1,514-1,619)
Academic quality… to offer teaching programs whose quality isrecognized by your peers… to produce scholarship of quality in yourpeers’ views
Innovation… that your own research contributes to theadvancement of science… to offer innovative courses
Autonomy% Important
89
90
87
88

… to be autonomous in your research activities

87… to be autonomous in your teaching activities

84

Focus onmanagement… to pay attention to the costs of your activity

67… to raise external resources

60

Social demand… to offer teaching valued by students

67… to produce research useful for your sponsors

53

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The Transformation of University Governance in France (1999-2011) Inertia, Institutionalization and Change
Pagepresidents while they ignored the intermediate-level academic leaders (Musselin,2009). By the end of the nineties, we observed that university presidents held
proactive discourses of change, contrasting with deans’ leadership styles thatremained closer to the ones of primus inter pares (Musselin & Mignot-Gérard,2002). We thus expected to find discrepancies of values between the twogroups of actors. Surprisingly, we found a great deal of consistency of values
between the academic leaders at both level of the university pyramid. In thequestionnaire sent in 2011, several questions aimed at testing the current valuesof academic leaders. Results are presented in the Table 3.
The Table 3 thus reveals that traditional academic values (academic quality,
innovation, autonomy) are considered as far more important than management
issues (costs, fund-raising) or attention to the stakeholders’ demand.
3.1.2 Lateral forms of organizational control
The studies that were conducted by the end of the nineties demonstrated
that the implementation of university policies required persuasion, negotiations,and repeated pressures upon faculty members. In other words, organizational
controls could hardly be achieved without the (explicit or implicit) consent of thefaculty (Musselin, 2006). As an example, a presidential team of a Parisianuniversity planned to close the teaching programs where the numbers of students
enrolled were too small. Instead of cutting these programs unilaterally, heasked the faculty members in charge of those programs to make the case in frontof the university deliberative bodies every year. Ultimately, some of thetargeted programs were closed, not as the result of the president’s decision, but
because the faculty renounced defending their programs at the council for studies(Simonet, 1999). The mobilization of peer evaluation was an additional
mechanism used for enforcing organizational policies. At South University(Mignot-Gérard & Musselin, 1999), the president wanted to restructure two
research teams. Instead of constraining them to take the measures for change,
he claimed that the teams were given a bad evaluation from experts of theirrespective fields two years earlier. He then appointed an ad hoc committee
composed, among other members, of renowned scholars of the institution. The
committee advised the two research teams to change their research agenda, andthey actually did. In that case, the presidential team achieved restructuring ofboth research teams, by drawing on two convergent peers’ expertise.
The studies in the nineties thus brought empirical evidence that the
government of academic communities drew on ‘unobtrusive forms of control’ aswell as on professional reviews rather than on hierarchy. As characterized by

Stéphanie Mignot-Gérard Page
57
Lazega (2001), these “lateral forms of control” are a distinctive feature of“collegial organizations”.
The observations made in 2011 indicate that such collegial patterns arepervasive in French universities. Firstly, the research by questionnaires(Chatelain et al., 2012) shows that the definition of faculty activities is stillcharacterized by a great deal of autonomy and little intervention of the ‘hierarchy’(either deans, department chairs or heads of research labs).
With the recent reforms that place more emphasis on evaluation, it is also ofinterest to ascertain the extent to which evaluation of teaching and research is
implemented throughout universities.
Respondents to the questionnaires that were sent in 1999 and 2011 had toanswer very similar questions about teaching evaluation. The objective was todetermine if the practice of evaluation was developed within French universities,
but also to understand how these evaluations were used. Results are provided
in the Table 5.
Table 4. Perceptions about teaching assessment (1/2)“Would you say that… (Responses of faculty members, N= 1581-1629)% agree… a tight control on your activities is exerted by your director (dean, department
chair, university president, research lab director)”

23… your director has a hierarchical conception of his/her role”

35… you are accountable on your results”

53… that you benefit from a large autonomy in exercising your activities”

65

Table 5. Perceptions about teaching assessment (2/2)
1999 questionnaire
Is there an evaluation of teaching in youracademic unit?

What happens when a faculty receives a
bad evaluation?
- nothing happens- the faculty receives advisorycomments from the dean (ordepartment chair)- the course is suppressed or
handled by a new faculty% yes: 21.9%

2011 questionnaire% yes: 59.9%% not a uniform
evaluation across theunit, but some faculty
ask their students toevaluate their classes:
28.9%
23.2%
14.3%

35.8%
26.1%

4%

5.9%

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The Transformation of University Governance in France (1999-2011) Inertia, Institutionalization and Change

Page

One may firstly observe that the evaluation of teaching is more developed
today than it was in 1999; however, teaching evaluation is not widespread sinceless than 60 per cent declare that their own academic unit actually put it in place.
In addition, the numbers of 2011 indicate that low teaching performance has
little concrete effects, even though the intervention of academic leaders isperceived more frequent in 2011 than it was in 1999.
Similar findings may be drawn for the micro-management of research
activities. There is stronger institutional pressure for assessment in researchthan in teaching … and university leaders show a greater concern for research
productivity (Musselin et al., 2012). In the three universities studied by
Musselin et al. (2012), the budget allotted to research teams was partly
dependent on their grades and the directors of research laboratories were far
from indifferent to these measures of performance1. When members of theirlabs are designated as ‘non-active scholars’, they would provide incentives rather
than sanctions.
[as for the ‘non-productive’ scholars], we adopt a strategy of help rather
than sanction. It may work with some individuals, and fail with others.
Everyone is aware of the risks, and handle the issue accordingly …
anyway, our collective strategy is to help individuals stick to researchrequirements, instead of sanctioning. (a research lab director)
The latter testimony suggests that self-discipline is preferred to managerialintervention. Another illustration of actions initiated by research directors is totry to convince their colleagues to spend less time in teaching in order to put
more efforts in research production; or to encourage ‘non-productive’ colleagues
to publish in collective books supported by the laboratory. However, assuggested by the testimony below, such support might go unheeded and the
responsibility ultimately falls on the individual’s shoulders.
I can give you the example of a young guy, very smart, but he used to
manage a program, which is very much time-consuming. One day, hetalked with one of my doctoral student and they realized that they sharedcommon research interests. So I told him: “well that’s nice, you could
1

However, the degree of attention to these measures may vary, depending on two factors: thedependence of the lab on university research funds (which is higher for research labs inhumanities and social sciences than for the ones in sciences); the extent to which such
performance evaluation is customary for research labs: the less evaluation was rooted into
actual practices, the greatest the resistance to the new instruments (Musselin et al., 2012).

Stéphanie Mignot-Gérard Page
59
work with my doctoral student on this project, I could give you someextra funds…”. I thought that would have been interesting for him, that
he would have been less isolated, … but he turned down my proposal, heturned it down because he felt attacked. (a research lab director)
The empirical findings of both quantitative and qualitative studies thus leadto convergent conclusions: academic values remain strong and go hand in handwith the pervasiveness of unobtrusive forms of management that mix persuasion,
incentives, and reliance on faculty self-discipline.
3.2 The ‘institutionalized centralization’ of universities governance
The studies conducted by the end of the nineties would point out a shift of
the university president function. Presidents in office at that time would saythat their function had become more ‘managerial’; in addition, they would
engage ambitious projects and try to centralize decision-making. This
presidential perception was convergent with the views of academic andadministrative lay members of the universities. In the questionnaire sent to1,660 respondents in 1999, 66 per cent answered ‘yes’ to the question: “Recently,
do you have the feeling that presidential teams have emerged and that theirinfluence over university governance was strengthened?”.
This leadership shift went hand in hand with a greater decision-making
capacity at the university level and with the definition of strategies on issues thatwere previously ignored (Musselin & Mignot-Gérard, 2002).
However, the concrete exercise of presidential power would entail complex
negotiations with the other actors involved in university governance, and notably
with the administration, the deans, and the deliberative bodies at the university
level.
With the administration, the frontier between decision-making andimplementation roles was often unclear and subject to negotiations. In someuniversities, there was very close cooperation between the presidential team andthe administration, and the administrative officers would recognize thepreeminence of the members of the presidential team in strategy making. In
other institutions, the administration would take more part in decision-making,and the overlap of roles would result in conflicts between the presidential teamand the administration chiefs (Mignot-Gérard & Musselin, 1999).
The relation between presidential teams and university councils was also acomplicated one. Elected members of the decision-making bodies used to saythat presidents would prepare the decisions within small governing boards, and60

The Transformation of University Governance in France (1999-2011) Inertia, Institutionalization and Change
Pagecomplained that they were often ‘rubber-stamp bodies’. On the other hand, inthe view of presidents and vice-presidents, university bodies were not just a mere
formality: on the contrary, they would place much effort in preparing mature
decisions in order to receive a large endorsement by the councils; in addition,
they paid a great deal of attention permitting the elected members deliberate
upon their proposals.
The relation with the deans was not less ambiguous than the two latter.
The four presidents studied in the nineties had adopted different tactics: someused to have close and frequent relations with the deans in order to involve theminto the elaboration of university policies, while others would merely inform thedeans of the decisions made by the president and his vice-presidents. In bothsituations, deans were not entirely powerless: when involved in the university
governing board, they had the chance to defend their faculty interests within thisboard; when they were excluded from the presidential team, they would oppose
more passive resistance to university plans by delegating to the lower levels of
authority (departments, research labs) the responsibility to implement university
plans.
In comparison with studies of French universities of the middle eighties(Friedberg & Musselin, 1989), the observations made at the turn of themillennium would thus bring evidence of a strengthened presidential leadershipand certainly a greater capacity of decision-making at the university level. But
still, the multiple trade-offs between the president and his partners would often
result in incremental and marginal change.
We now endeavor to demonstrate that the emerging centralization of powerhas hitherto been institutionalized.
3.2.1 A high degree of cooperation between presidential teams and university
administration
This centralization is firstly reflected in the respondents’ opinions in the2011 questionnaire: 72 per cent (n=1,861) disagreed with the following question:“As far as your university is concerned, have you noticed a decentralization ofdecision-making?”
Another good proxy to measure this process of centralization is thecomposition of presidential teams. This issue was addressed in the twoquestionnaires sent in 1999 and 2011.
These results hence suggest that presidential teams now involve more‘central’ actors than they did ten years ago: on one hand, the participation of thedeans has decreased (from 24 to 14.2 per cent); on the other, the participation of
the administrative heads has slightly risen (from 45 to 52.5 per cent).

Stéphanie Mignot-Gérard Page
61
Table 6. The composition of presidential teams in French universities
In your university, who are the members of thepresidential team?

1999 study(n=1,660)

2011 study(n=2,050)

The president only

4.7%

3.4%

The president and vice-presidents

21.5%

25.3%

The president, (vice-presidents) and the deans

24%

14.2%

The president, vice-president and the administration chiefs

45%

52.5%

Other

4.9%

4.5%

The observations of concrete practices of governance in three universities(Musselin et al., 2012) confirm the higher involvement of the administration to(and cooperation with) presidential teams, as well as the declining participationof the deans.
In all three universities, the president and the administrative chief are close
collaborators. The following statement illustrates it.
Concretely, my work is very tightly related with the president. We meeteach other at least twice a day. Early in the morning, at 7.45 a.m., wereview our projects; at night, I ask for his signature on paper works. We
work on joint projects, there is a good deal of information sharing. This
president is very much involved in the day-to-day management of theuniversity. There is perfect coordination and consultation between us.
(Administration Chief, Science University, 2011)
Contrasting with the findings of the 1998 studies, the administrative andstrategic roles are more explicit today than they were in the past. The membersof the administration express being at the president’s (or vice-president’s) service
and appreciate the support of the latter when they have to implement decisions.
Reciprocally, the vice-presidents respect the leadership of their administrative
counterpart in their respective fields. These results are all the more striking thatthey concern the three universities, even the institution (West University) where
there was an open conflict between the presidential team and the administration
ten years earlier (Mignot-Gérard & Musselin, 1999). This closer cooperation was
accompanied with the recruitment of staff for the central administration, theimplementation of information technologies handled at the university level, theadoption of common norms and rules across the institution, and thecentralization of decisions regarding the allocation of research budgets.

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Page

3.2.2 The decline of deans’ influenceCentralization of decision-making went hand in hand with a decline ofschools’ autonomy, and with the weakening of the deans. Before the Law
L.R.U., the deans already felt dispossessed of the management of research.
Since the reform, they can no longer decide the expenses of their unit, for thisprerogative was given to the president himself. In South University where thedeans were influent actors in the late nineties and would work in close
cooperation with the president, such evolution is patent, and is perhaps all themore harmful that it suddenly broke long-term governing habits.
When I arrived in 1997, no decision was made without the deans’ consent.
At that time, we called it the ‘bureau’. All the decisions had to beendorsed by the deans. The president used to make phone calls to thedeans to avoid conflict. It is no longer the case. The deans have losttheir political weight. On one hand, research has gained importance andthe heads of research institutes were strengthened and they now reached aposition almost equal to the one of the dean. On the other, only theuniversity president holds the right to decide upon expenses and cannot
delegate this right to the dean. When the L.R.U. was initiated, wethought that it would be a revolution within our schools. But in the end,
nothing happened, this measure accompanied a decrease of deans’ power.
(a member of the central administration, South University, 2011)
As a consequence, the limitation of their strategic role has led the deans tofocus more on administrative issues. This feeling is shared across the three
institutions, even at West University where the deans are nonetheless more
involved into the definition of the university policies.
Our function should be strategic since we are elected. But I do not see
clearly how I could have a strategic ambition, except perhaps in the
management of facilities… or provide very concrete help to mycolleagues.
But when it comes to university strategy, e.g. thedevelopment of research, curricular policies, well, the dean is not a
central actor. My feeling is that I am just a link in the chain. (Dean,
West University, 2011)
3.2.3 Collective decision-making bodies more constrained by presidential
decisions
In line with the observations led in the nineties, university presidents
prepare their decisions with their executive team before submitting proposeddecisions to the university councils.
However, the process today isStéphanie Mignot-Gérard Page
63
simultaneously more centralized and more sophisticated than in the past. In thenineties, small sections of deliberative councils (Council for Studies and Council
for Research) would meet under the leadership of a vice-president to prepare thelarger assembly of the council. The executive team (‘bureau’) would meet
regularly and prepare the decisions to be voted at the major university
decision-making body (the senate).
In the universities studied in 2011, the decisions are prepared by a series ofad hoc committees, starting with the president’s inner circle, circulating into alarger team, to end up at the ‘bureau’… before attaining the agenda of theuniversity councils.
During the whole process, the centrality of the university president isremarkable since he participates in all the ad hoc committees and appoints themembers of the latter. The impression of centralization is reinforced by the factthat the president also interacts with individuals within the institution without
necessarily following the line of the elected hierarchy.
The president went to present his strategic project (2010-2012) to large
assemblies of colleagues in all schools. The project came out from thegoverning team without discussion. One colleague commented this tohim: “is everything already planned?”. The president answered: “well,when I come to my class for teaching, I do not ask the students what I am
supposed to do”. (Dean, South University, 2011)
As a consequence, the roles of councils are more and more restricted to atechnical function, rather than a strategic one.
The size of the research council does not help working… and both thepresident and vice-president play a very active role in orienting thedeliberation of the council and I often have the feeling that its role ismore administrative than scientific. Our input into the university
scientific policy is low.
We merely endorse the president andvice-president’s decisions and agendas. (Member of council for research,
Sciences University, 2011)
For the senate, the president’s influence is even stronger than it was before
the law L.R.U.. The latter reform indeed reduced the size of the assembly andchanged the mode of election of this council. In the past, the principles ofelection would guarantee a balanced representation of the different university
disciplines. Since the L.R.U., election of the senate is based on lists built up
upon a collective project for the entire university, regardless of staff, union, or

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The Transformation of University Governance in France (1999-2011) Inertia, Institutionalization and Page
Changediscipline representation. The electoral system provides that the elected list
holds the majority of the seats of the senate. In practice, the lists either endorse
or oppose the presidential project. In the three universities studied in 2011, thegoverning board lists would endorse the presidential team, so that there was
hardly opposition to presidential proposals of decisions2. The findings of thequalitative study are confirmed by the responses to the questionnaire, where 60
per cent of the respondents (n=2,107) declared that “since the law L.R.U., thegoverning board votes are more in favor of the president’s orientations”.
The analysis of balances of powers within institutions thus demonstrates
that a process of centralization that was initiated by the early nineties has beenstrengthened lately. A significant signal of this pattern is the relative
convergence of ‘governing styles’ (e.g. the balance of powers and theinteractions between the presidential team, the deans, the administration and theuniversity councils) adopted by institutions. While in the nineties the systemsof relations between the presidential team, the administration, the deans and thegoverning bodies were pretty diverse, they are more converging towards
centralized governance styles today.
3.3 Tight coupling between national policy instruments and university
governance: the most radical change?
While the two previous sections have successively identified inertia andcontinuity, in this third and last point, we show that national reforms based on
performance on one hand and the internal governance of institutions on the other,are by far more tightly-coupled than they were in the last decade.
The State has always been quite interventionist in the French higher
education system: an important part of university resources come from publicfunds, academic careers are regulated by national committees, governancestructures are uniform across universities, university degrees are national ones,
etc. However, many studies have shown that formal uniformity could conceal alarge variety of practices, while others suggested that state control over local
actions (at the university or departmental levels) was eventually weak. The
ability of university presidents to adapt national reforms to serve their own
2

West University contrasts Science and South University. While the majority list elected at
the CA would endorse the presidential team, the CA played a greater role of opposition since
the list was built against the L.R.U.. They thus vetoed some measures of the L.R.U., but it
was less against the president than an expression of contest against the recent ministerial
policies.

Stéphanie Mignot-Gérard Page
65
university strategies is a good illustration, as shown, for instance, by the
implementation of the Bologna process in French universities (Mignot-Gérard &Musselin, 2005). Besides, due to the “loosely-coupled” (Weick, 1976)
character of universities, a diversity of practices within institutions might also be
observed, as a result of academic units resistance, adaptation, or adoption ofnational rules, norms or instruments.
With recent reforms, it seems more difficult for universities to decouple
their activities from the pressures exerted by their institutional environment.
Among those pressures, the changing national modes of research steering seemto have particularly strong effects on universities internal governance, as was
highlighted by the two studies led in 2011.
The quantitative study points firstly that the indicators to measure teaching
and research performance do not have the same function. While indicators ofteaching performance are mostly used for accountability purposes, themeasurement of research outcomes are rather used for evaluative goals anddecisions of resource allocation (Chatelain et al., 2012).
The qualitative study also shows that the creation of the AERES (see part 1),
combined with the responsibility for universities to decide themselves on theinternal allocation of resources (either budgets or academic/staff positions)
impact the academic leaders’ behaviors. To start with, much effort is put by the
directors of research laboratories in conforming to the requirements of quality
defined by the AERES. Some research teams have thus run auto-evaluations inorder to identify (and solve) their possible weaknesses regarding the AERES
criteria. Conforming sometimes went hand in hand with gaming the rules: inorder to improve the performance of their laboratories, some directors decided to
not count ‘non-active’ researchers of their team by allocating them the status of‘associate researchers’.
People who were not active publishers in academic journals became‘associates’. […] We did this four years ago, and the ones who wereactive researcher four years ago are still today, and the ones who became
associates are still non-active. But as they are only associates, we do notcount them as full members of the team. And as they are not on the list,
they do not receive any individual funding. In the end, we have only
active researchers, as regard of national norms and local norms.
(Research Lab Director, West University, 2011)
Secondly, the measures of research performance influence the internal
decisions of resource allocation. The grades obtained by the labs and thenumbers of ‘active researchers’ are integrated into the funding formula defined at

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The Transformation of University Governance in France (1999-2011) Inertia, Institutionalization and ChangePage

the university level. For example, at Science University, a multiplicative
coefficient was applied to the recurrent budget to the labs (1.1 for a lab graded
A+, 1 for ‘A lab’, 0.9 for ‘B lab’). Furthermore, when the reallocation ofacademic position that was left vacant has to be made (after a retirement for
example) across the university, the latter gives the priority to research teams thatreceived the grade A+.
Thirdly and ultimately, the AERES grades are rationales for restructuring
research teams. Within the three universities that were studied, there areseveral examples of labs that received a B or C and were either absorbed byother labs or had to cut some of their research activities.
Not only do these behaviors illustrate a strong relationship between national
policy instruments and the internal governance of universities, but they also
manifest a noticeable change in the behaviors adopted by academic leaders when
they have to make decisions of resource allocation. In the nineties, whether
university governance bodies had to make choices of retrenchment or to
distribute additional funds to their academic units, these choices were lessselective than they are today. The ‘internal equity’ was the main principle thatserved as a basis for the allocation of budgets between the university schools (orfaculties). Likewise, when the allocation of new faculty positions was
discussed between the deans, research performance was balanced with teachingneeds, and the latter were often a better argument than the former to negotiate a
new position (Barrier, 2005; Mignot-Gérard, 2006).
We hypothesize that the new policy instruments that are currently used forsteering the French higher education have become critical tools of State control.
As argued elsewhere (Mignot-Gérard, in press), the pressure to conform to these
instruments is related to the quantification of quality that they bring about:because evaluations are now publicized, directly connected to resource allocation,
they may create vertical differentiation… which entails a high level of anxiety
that is a powerful driver of actors’ behaviors. The external constraint is thusinternalized and the behaviors change accordingly, even though concrete action
may go against traditional academic values (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Sauder &Espeland, 2009).

Concluding remarks
This paper examined the issue of change in the governance of French
universities. It highlights the complexity of the transformation that universities
in France currently experience. We first point to the non-linear relationStéphanie Mignot-Gérard Page
67
between national reforms and ‘local institutions’. Indeed, the reform thatretained the most attention in the past five years, e.g. the law L.R.U., marked infact the institutionalization of a process (the increase of university
self-governance) that had started more than thirty years ago. The empirical
data presented here also suggests that reforms may have (unintended) side
effects: e.g., the AERES, originally created as an ‘evaluation agency’ has inpractice become a ‘rating agency’ that actually has a strong impact on the latter.
Yet, universities seem to remain organizations where hierarchy is not themain mechanism of coordination, cooperation or control. This paper recallsthat professional norms and evaluations (Musselin, 2011) as well as
self-discipline are more powerful than hierarchy. Here a question has to beraised: to what extent are these mechanisms specific to academic organizations?
Scholarship on modern, liberal organizations indeed point out very similar
mechanisms of control (Courpasson, 2000; Lazéga, 2001). These remarks
point to an interesting paradox. At the time when the French reforms of higher
education more than ever emphasize the ‘institutional autonomy’ of universities,
it seems that the latter have never been more controlled by the ‘evaluative state’(Neave & Van Vught, 1991). Paralleling this movement, while university
presidents have gained greater power within the institution that they govern, theylook at the same time very much constrained by the pressures exerted by their
institutional environment, and their traditional values look more and more atodds with their actual behaviors.

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Page

University Governance Reforms in Japan– incorporation of national universities –Jun ObaIntroduction
In recent years, numerous governments have proceeded with reforms with aview to increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of university systems.
These reforms aimed generally at according greater freedom to institutions and,at the same time, rationalising their governance by clarifying the responsibilitiesof the management, with a shift in power away from departments in the institutional decision-making process (OECD, 2003). The recent reform of national
universities in Japan has also reflected such global trend.
Japanese national universities were, until March 2004, a part of the national
government under the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology (MEXT) and were directly operated by it, although they enjoyedacademic freedom in a limited manner. In 2004, by virtue of National University Corporation Law of 2003 which accorded them the status of national university corporations (NUCs), they were given a legal personality and became moreautonomous in terms of their management. Being detached from the government direct control, central authorities of the NUCs have been required to strategically manage their institutions within the legal framework and given resources,
which have tended to decrease and be allocated on a competitive basis.
After nearly ten years since the incorporation, remarkable changes as wellas problems can now be observed in diverse aspects of the NUCs’ governance.
This article examines the impact and challenges of the recent reform of Japanese

Associate Professor, RIHE, Hiroshima University, e-mail: oba@hiroshima-u.ac.jp

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University Governance Reforms in JapanPage

national universities, focusing on their internal governance1.

1. Incorporation of national universities
This section will outline the NUC system.2
1.1 Background of the reform and the theoretical framework of the NUC system
Japanese national universities, which used to be a part of the governmentorganisation, involved various problems deriving from their legal status as a state
facility. Kaneko (2012) summarises them into the following three types: 1)
internal conflict between state control and academic autonomy, 2) strong resentment about the disparity between the national and the private institutions,and 3) inefficiency of their management. There were many criticisms vis-à-vis
national universities from a wide range of stakeholders in society, particularly
concerning their collegial style of administration.
Incorporation of national universities is one of the reforms driven by New
Public Management (NPM) thinking aimed at improving their efficiency. Thiskind of reform – according more autonomy to national universities and clarifying
their responsibility – had long been discussed by academics as well as by thegovernment, but this idea never gained enough interest or much support among
the academic community in Japan. In spite of reluctance of most national universities, the reform was finally decided in 1999 by the government in the courseof administrative restructuring, and the process was accelerated during Koizumi
administration (2001-2006) which promoted “neoliberal” reforms.
As a result, the design of the NUC system was significantly influenced by
the NPM concept which governed the administrative reform. In particular, thesame scheme used for independent administrative institution (IAI)3 arrangements was adapted to the NUC system. One of the consequences of such designing concerning NUCs’ governance, is that, as is explained below, the president of NUC is given unusually strong powers (Kaneko, 2012). However,1

Specific examples and other information cited in this chapter, unless otherwise noted, comefrom diverse reports of the NUC evaluation committee (NUC-EC) in MEXT and performance
reports of the NUCs.
2
Readers already know about the NUC system may want to skip this section.
3
Government agencies with corporate status delivering various types of goods and services,using management methods of the private sector. The system was developed in the course ofgovernment administrative reform and began operation in 2001.

Jun Oba73
Page

viewed as a whole, although the reform was implemented under the frameworkof administrative restructure, incorporation of national universities was quite inline with reforms of universities undertaken in many countries since the 1990s(Christensen, 2010).
1.2 Relationship between NUCs and the government
Under the NUC system, the budget is allotted by MEXT to each university
as a lump sum (operational grant) including staff salaries, on the basis of a medium-term plan (MTP) prepared by each NUC according to its medium-termgoals (MTG) (Figure 1). The MTG are presented by the MEXT, and are elaborated on the basis of the views of each NUC. The duration of MTG/MTP is six
years, based on which MEXT provide operational grant to NUCs.
Commission on Policy Evaluation and Evaluation of Independent Administrative Institutions (Ministry of Public Management and Home Affairs)

Recommendations,
if necessary

Opinions, if
necessary

MEXT
Minister of
Education

Presentationof MTG

Preparationof MTP

Approval of
MTP

Preparation ofannual plans

Opinions on
MTG/MTP, etc.

Report on the results of evaluation

Consultations on
MTG/MTP, etc.

Drafts of MTG(opinion)

Report on the results of evaluation

Evaluation Committee
for National University
Corporations (NUC-EC)

MTG: medium-term goals
MTP: medium-term plan

Report on the results of evaluation
on education and research
Independent Administrative Institution

National Institution for Academic Degrees and University
Evaluation (NIAD-UE)

Evaluation

Peer review

National university corporations (NUCs)
Source: Author

Figure 1. MTG/MTP and evaluation of national university corporations

The largest source of revenue for national universities comes from MEXT
as an operational grant. It represented 47.7 percent of the total revenue (including external resources) of all the national universities in FY 2004. The operational grant has continued to decline, which has been only partially compensated by the special grant allocated on a competitive basis. As a result, the74

University Governance Reforms in JapanPage

proportion of operational grant in the total revenue has continuously decreased.
Tuition and entrance fees are now own revenue sources for the NUCs. All the
NUCs charge fees according to the standards set by MEXT (535,800 yen fortuition fees and 282,000 yen for entrance fee)4 to almost all of their students,
although they are allowed to raise them by up to 20 percent from the standards5.
In spite of the reduction of operational grant, payment differentiation involves
most often a reduction of fees; only two universities have applied a higher rate
respectively for one of their programmes6.
0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

2004

1,037

2005

1,015

79

138

2006

998

80

143

74

2007

988

78

138

2008

974

79

129

2009

955

98

117

2010

937

87

134

2011

932

94

126

2012

932

210

1,400

131

Other
Teaching and Research (special
grant)
Teaching and Research (general
grant)

Source: Derived from data provided by MEXT

Figure 2. Block funds (operational grant) to the NUCs

Every NUC has to submit a self-evaluation report annually to NUC-EC in
MEXT. Based on the self-evaluation reports, NUC-EC assesses the extent of
attainment of the MTG/MTP of each NUC and complies an annual evaluation
report of the overall performance of the NUCs.
All the reports –self-evaluation reports and NUC-EC’s reports – are published. It should be
noted that NUC-EC’s annual reports include not only overall performance assessment results but also some “characteristic practices” reported by NUCs.
Although NUC-EC stresses that these practices are merely examples that do notnecessarily have to be followed by all the NUCs, it is clear that these practices
are shown as good practices that MEXT recommends NUCs to employ, in order
to meet accountability requirements. Ironically, in spite of the fact that one of
the main objectives of incorporation was to increase the diversity of national
universities, diffusion of good practices by NUC-EC has promoted isomorphic
4

These standards have not been revised since 2005.
The maximum surcharge rate has been increased from the 10 to 20 percent since 2008. As
to the lower limit, there is no regulation.
6
Professional accounting course (Master), Tohoku University (589,300 yen) and Master ofManagement of Technology, Tokyo University of Agriculture and Technology (572,400 yen).
5Jun Oba Page
75
change in NUCs, as seen in the case of academic staff evaluation, which risks
homogenising institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), at least in each stratumof institutions.
After each period of MTG/MTP, overall performance of each NUC is assessed by NUC-EC. In 2008, NUC-EC assessed the first-term performance of
NUCs based on their activities of FY2004-20077. The evaluation report was
published in March 2009, in which the president of NUC-EC expressed his satisfaction, asserting that NUCs had well implemented their MTP and that they
had performed the role of public institutions supported by taxpayers. However,at the same time, he pointed to several problems observed in some national universities, including under-utilisation of enrolment capacities and unsatisfactory
levels of education and research. Evaluation results regarding education, research, administration and finance are provided in the following table.
Table 1. Results of the evaluation by NUC-EC for the period of FY2004-2007(number of NUCs, including inter-university research institute corporations)
Excellent
statusAs planned

Largely asplannedSlightly behind the plan

Much improvement
neededEducation

1

10

79

0

0

Research

3

27

60

0

0

Administration

11

56

18

5

0

Finance

3

83

1

3

0

n=90 (86 NUCs and 4 inter-university research institute corporations)

1.3 Arrangements for governance and management
Traditionally, national universities were managed predominantly based on
the consensus of academic staff, although the scope of their autonomy was restricted under the direct government control. The reform notably extended theauthority of the president and the board of directors (BoD). The president – thefinal decision-maker – is now selected by a president selection committee (PSC),
composed of external and internal members, before being appointed by the Min7

The evaluation of NUC-EC consists of assessment of each NUC’s performance in the improvement of the quality of education and research as well as in the administration. For theformer, NUC-EC receives assessment reports of academic units of national universities prepared by NIAD-UE.

76

University Governance Reforms in Japan

Page

ister of Education8. The section procedure and the term of office of the president are determined by each PSC. In addition, in preparation of extreme circumstances, the Law stipulates dismissal procedures of the president. The
same procedure as the selection procedure applies to the removal of a president.
As shown in Figure 3, the president is seconded by a board of directors,
whose members are appointed by the president. The BoD is to receive recommendations from an administrative council (AC) concerning administrative affairs and an education and research council (ERC) concerning academic affairs.
In addition, there are two auditors, appointed by MEXT and entitled to checkbusiness operations of the NUC.

President selection committee

Both councils areequally represented
on the committee.

Auditors
Selection

External members only

PresidentInternal representatives
designated by
the president
Not less than halfof the members
are from outside.

Executives

External
members

Administrative
council (AC)Deliberate on important matters concerning administration

At least one
executive isfrom outside.

Board of directors(BoD)

Internal representatives
concerning education
and research

Education andresearch council(ERC)
Deliberate on important matters concerning education andresearch

Figure 3. Governance structure of NUCs

Source: Author

Each BoD is composed of the president and executives. Executives are
selected and appointed by the president; the majority of them have been recruited from the professoriate (Kaneko 2007). The maximum number of executives
is defined by the National University Corporation Law; the average number of
executives is 5.8 (CNUFM, 2007). At least one of the executives should comefrom outside the university. Every NUC has to include external persons as
8Minister in charge of MEXT This administrative action is merely a formality; the decision of
the PSC is de facto final.

Jun Oba Page
77
members of the BoD and of the AC, whereas the ERC is composed solely of internal members. In 2005, out of 403 executives (internal and external) in all
NUCs, 80 were from the business community, but most of them (over 80%) arein part-time positions (Honma, 2005). Some NUCs appointed foreigners asboard members.
NUCs have much more discretion over their human resource management.
Before incorporation, the number of staff for each unit was fixed by the government by positions, and each university could not modify its staff quota nor establish new units or restructure existing units without ministerial authorisation.
The staff quota tended to be considered a vested right for each unit, which impeded efficient manpower policy at the institutional level. In addition, permanent clerical staff could be recruited only from among successful candidates of
the national public service examination. High-level secretarial officers wereregularly relocated from one university to another by MEXT. This systemcame to an end at the time of the incorporation, when the appointing power wastransferred from the Minister of Education to the president of each university.
1.4 Academic structures and staff
Although National University Corporation Law does not stipulate academic
structures of national universities, they remain regulated by MEXT on the basisof School Education Law9. This section provides information concerning academic structures of national universities, necessary for understanding their governance issues.
Historically, Japanese higher education has been characterised by a closed
structure, supported by a chair (koza) system, and research-oriented academics(Arimoto, 1996). The Japanese chair system, established in the nineteenth
century and consolidated in research universities10 before the Second World War,was criticised for its rigidity and lack of responsiveness to society (Amano,
2001). Clark (1983) pointed to the problem associated with the chair system –reduced adaptability to change in the expanded higher education system – andthis was especially true in Japan (Ogawa, 2002). Based on School Education
Law, each basic academic unit (faculty or graduate school) has a council (faculty
9

The greater part of this regulation concerns also non-national (private and local public) universities.
10
In other, post-war universities, as a rule a ‘department subject (gakkamoku)’ system has
been adopted, in which staff were allocated according to programmes instead of disciplines(chairs), and not necessarily expected to undertake research (Amano, 2001).

78

University Governance Reforms in Japan

Page

council) to deliberate important matters. The faculty council is composed as arule exclusively of academic staff in each academic unit; it has often worked forits vested interest. Academic structures and education programmes should be
authorised by MEXT according to the Standards for the Establishment of Universities (ministerial ordinance); the validity of programme authorisation is unlimited.
Since the 1990s, traditional academic units have been restructured. Alongwith the expansion of graduate education, chairs were amalgamated into large
chairs (Daikoza), to break down disciplinary boundaries. In 2001, universities
were no longer required to adopt one of the systems (koza or gakkamoku) but
could design a new form of academic unit. In 2007, finally, both systems werewithdrawn from national regulation and each university is now free to organise
its own structure, even though it is still under the control of MEXT via programme approval procedures mentioned above.
Alongside the structural reforms, MEXT has continuously revised the qualifications required for academic staff, so that institutions may recruit different
types of professionals and promote mobility. Notably in 1997, a law relating to
fixed-term employment of university teaching staff was introduced which enabled universities, in particular public universities, to employ academic staff on a
fixed-term contract basis. Incorporation of national universities finally removed related regulation and enabled them to adopt an appropriate personnel
system.

2. Consequences of the reform in relation to internal governanceThis section outlines the consequences of the incorporation of national universities for their internal governance, in particular with reference to the decision-making process, participation of stakeholders, the financial and human resources management, and participation of students.
2.1 Centralisation of the decision-making process
National universities have centralised decision-making by concentrating
administrative powers in the presidents and to a lesser degree executives (BoD).
In terms of the definition of budget plans, both entities – in particular the presidents – clearly exercise strong influence over this decision-making process.
(Figure 4) Furthermore, this tendency has been reinforced during the first period of MTG/MTP. (Figure 5)

Jun Oba Page
79
President
Executives
BoD
Extended BoD
Secretary General
Assistants to the president
AC
ERC
Meeting of the deans and directors
Institution-wide committees
Faculty councils

No.3
No.2
No.1
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

%

100

Source: Adapted from CNUFM (2010)

Figure 4. Entities exerting influence in the definition of budget plans(the three most important)President
Executives
BoD
Extended BoD
Secretary General
Assistants to the president
AC
ERC
Meeting of the deans and directors
Institution-wide committees

Much smaller than before
Slightly smaller than before
No change
Slightly greater than before
Much greater than before

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Source: Adapted from CNUFM (2010)

Figure 5. Change of the role in the definition of budget plans after incorporation

National universities have reduced the number and frequency of meetingsof different committees, and reinforced their management by creating diverse
units in the presidency to consolidate the leadership of the president. Before
incorporation, a significant number of committees were set up in each national
university to build consensus among academic staff members, which was a
time-consuming process. For example, Aichi University of Education reduced
the number of committees from 36 to 24, as well as the number of committee
members from over 400 to around 100. Hitotsubashi University not only reduced the number of committees from 89 to 16 committees and 22 specialisedcommittees but also created some strategic units such as Office for the promotion of international relations, Public relations office and Information systems
management headquarters.

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University Governance Reforms in JapanPage

In many universities, PSCs have made it a rule to take into consideration
the vote by staff members organised in the form of a “reference ballot”, but the
selection of a president is not always dependent upon the ballot outcome. Other top managers in the central offices tend to be selected to strengthen the managerial capacity of the university. According to a survey (CNUFM, 2007), thefactor regarded as most important in potential executives is ability and experience as administrators (Figure 6). Presidents also attach much importance toexpertise in their area of responsibility and the balance of power in the university.
However, if responses in the categories “Strongly agree” and “Agree” are combined, the most important factor perceived to influence the selection is the “policy and wish of the president”. Relationship with academic units – most important in the pre-corporate collegial system – is no longer an influential selection criterion.
Expertise in their area of responsibility
Ability and experience as administrators
Balance of power in the university

Strongly disagree
DisagreeUndecided
Agree
Strongly agree

Relationship with alumni and their associations
Relationship with the local community
Relationship with MEXT
Relationship with academic units
Policy and wish of the president
0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Source: Derived from CNUFM (2007)

Figure 6. Factors regarded as important by the presidents in the selectionof executives

2.2 Participation of stakeholders
Under the NUC system, each national university ought to invite external
persons to participate in BoD and AC. According to a survey realised in 2006
(Honma et al., 2007), the largest majority comes from enterprise management(19.1% for BoD and 29.0% for AC). The second largest comes from the central
government for BoD (10.0%), university management for AC (13.4%).
The extent of involvement of external members in university management
through the AC is varied. Some universities have expressed their intention to
consult their AC in detail concerning their management, including their budgetJun Oba Page
81
allocation. Others intend to consult them only in relation to general directions.
The president of Kyoto University, for example, was reported to have said thatthe council should discuss matters only from a broad perspective (Yokoyama,2004). According to Honma et al. (2007), the vast majority of NUCs are satisfied with the involvement of external members in BoD and AC, but some NUCs
consider their involvement insufficient (Figure 8).

19.1%

Enterprise (management)
Enterprise (R&D)

29.0%

BoD (n=110)

3.6%
3.6%

Government (central)
Government (local)
Legal profession

6.5%

AC (n=307)

10.0%

1.8%

11.4%

2.7%
3.6%

Accountant
University professor

5.5%

0.3%

6.4%

12.4%

3.6%

University manager
Medical services

2.7%
2.7%

Journalist
Other

13.4%

4.6%
4.6%
41.8%

10.7%

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

0.25

0.3

0.35

0.4

0.45

Source: Derived from Honma et al. (2007)

Figure 7. Breakdown of external members of BoD and AC by origin

0%

10%

20%

BoD (n=87)
AC (n=72)

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

58.6%

80%

90%

100%

39.1%

44.4%

44.4%

The NUC utilises effectively external persons’ expertise.
The NUC does not utilise it effectively.

2.3%
11.1%

The NUC utilises it to some extent.
The NUC makes no or very little use of it.

Source: Derived from Honma et al. (2007)

Figure 8. Involvement of external members in BoD and AC, judged by NUCs

2.3 Financial management
Given greater autonomy over financial management, and in the context ofan annual reduction of operational grant, NUCs have taken various measures to
use their resources efficiently. Many universities have focused their reforms on
managerial efficiency in allocation and utilisation of existing resources. All theuniversities have adopted annual budgeting policies and have set aside a budget
at the disposal of the presidents. During the budget alignment process, there82

University Governance Reforms in JapanPage

has been a significant shift of emphasis from “periphery” to “centre” as well asfrom basic funds to strategic or competitive funds. Institutional strategic orcompetitive funds and budget at the discretion of the president particularly increased at the time of incorporation and have continued to increase since then(Figure 9). As a result, between 2005 and 2008, the share of strategic funds inthe institutional budget increased from 3.1 to 4.2 percent and the headquarters’
general expenses from 4.5 to 4.8 percent, whereas academic units saw theirbudget decline (Figure 10).
However, while the central office has reduced budget for academic units(faculties, graduate schools and research institutes), it has relaxed the control
over the utilisation of their financial resources. Between 2005 and 2008, theproportion of NUCs in which academic units had full control of their budget increased from 17.5 to 30.4 percent and partial control from 62.0 to 65.0 percent(CNFUM, 2010).
Increase
Institutional strategic
or competitive funds

Change since the incorporation

Institutional facilities andequipment development
Institutional facilities andequipment maintenancePresident’s budget
Academic units’ strategic
or competitive funds
Deans’ budget

Academic units’ facilities and equipCentral office’s common cost
ment development
Academic units’ facilities and equipAcademic units’ common cost
ment maintenance
Basic education funds for academic staff
Basic research funds for academic staff

Decrease
Decrease

Change before and after the incorporation

Increase

Source: Adapted from CNFUM (2010, Figure 13-3 by K. Shima & Y. Watanabe)
Note: This figure plots mean change values (increase=1, no change=0, decrease=-1) in relation to the budget by item of expenditure.

Figure 9. Change of internal resource distributionJun Oba Page
83
Other

2008

67.4

2005

69.3

4.8

4.5

16.2

16.3

2.7 4.2

4.7

2.5 3.1 4.2

Strategic f unds
Administrative expenses(academic units)
Education & Research expenses(academic units)General expenses (HQ)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Personnel expenses (HQ)*

Source: Derived from CNFUM (2010)
Note: Permanent staff salary is administered by the headquarters.

Figure 10. Budget distribution by item of expenditure

2.4 Human resources management
NUCs have realigned their human resource management systems so thatthey may centralise staff management and strategically make use of given humanresources. Gifu University, for example, passed from a staff quota management
system to a “points system”, allowing deans and other unit directors flexible
staffing within the limit of points allocated to each component11. Many NUCs
have made it a rule that the posts of retiring academic staff should be centrally
managed, not automatically filled by researchers from the same area.
Concerning recruitment of non-academic staff, although some high-levelsecretarial officers are being relocated under the initiative of MEXT, their appointments come under the auspices of each NUC. Some NUCs have begun
recruiting experts in various areas as staff with either academic rank or administrative title. The larger universities have set up diverse units for supporting
education and research activities. In 2004, the University of Tokyo, for example, recruited 10 experts from the business community as associate managing
directors or specially appointed experts. Among these experts was a patent
attorney in the office of intellectual property.
On the other hand, increased autonomy emphasises the need for staff development (SD), particularly in managerial roles. Most NUCs have realigned
their SD programmes and promotion schemes in that direction and revised their
recruitment and evaluation systems. The University of Tokyo advertised somedirector-level positions internally and appointed seven successful candidates tothe positions in FY 2004.
11

A professor accounts for 100 points, an associate professor 78 points, an assistant professor
73 points, and an assistant 60 points (one point corresponds to approximately 100,000 yen).
Each component determines how to utilise its points.

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University Governance Reforms in JapanPage

An increasing number of NUCs have developed their academic staff evaluation systems. Traditionally, evaluation of academic staff members has been
carried out almost exclusively through peer review in Japanese universities.
Although peer review remains the most effective and important evaluationmeans, NUCs have been implementing evidence-based periodical evaluations,being promoted by third-party evaluations including those of NUC-EC. According to a survey realised in January 2008 (Okawa & Okui, 2008), nearly 90
percent of the NUCs have introduced evaluation systems for academic staff.
The introduction rate is lower in the larger universities – slightly more than 70
percent in universities with more than 1,000 academic staff. Concerning theirobjectives, 72 percent of the NUCs aim at reactivating their activities, 71 percentof them aim at improving education, and improvement of research is being
aimed at by the same percentage of NUCs. With regard to use of evaluation
results, few NUCs link them with pay scales or promotion of staff.
2.5 Academic structures and education/research
Although it still seems difficult for most universities to significantly reallocate internal resources from the areas of least need to those of greatest need, certain universities have reviewed their entire academic structures. In 2008, Kanazawa University integrally reorganised its academic structure, by regrouping its
8 faculties and 25 departments into 3 academic domains and 16 sub-domains, tooffer diverse programmes crossing disciplinary borders and to allow students
greater choice of courses and of future careers.
As regards pedagogy and student learning, evaluation of teaching by students has been generalised. ITC has increasingly been utilised for teaching andlearning; most often the relevant system is centrally managed. All the national
universities have been organising activities for improving education and teaching(faculty development: FD)12. An increasing number of NUCs have set up academic support centres for improving teaching and learning (Oba, 2010).
In addition, national universities have increasingly promoted research excellence and cultivated interdisciplinary research programmes to better meet theneeds of society and to maintain and strengthen their scientific excellence. In
many universities, no small part of the resources has been devoted to developing
interdisciplinary approaches that cross borders of existing faculties, gathering
12

FD was made obligatory in 2007 for graduate education and in 2008 for undergraduate
education.

Jun Oba Page85
researchers from different units and outside. The University of Tokyo, for example, set up a Comprehensive Project Group in 2004 directly under the auspices of the president, aimed at combining several disciplines and opening up newhorizons of knowledge. In Yamaguchi University, with its “Research Initiative”
scheme, 43 inter-faculty research bodies were set up by the end of FY 2007.
2.6 Student participation
In contrast to the decrease in academic staff involvement, participation of
students in university governance has been increasingly observed. Traditionally,
students have not been regarded as full members in the campus community, andhave rarely represented themselves in decision-making processes at any level;
whereas in many European countries and the United States, they often have avoice in the university governance structures, although very seldom as a major
influence in these structures (Altbach, 1998). After incorporation, in some national universities, students have been involved as full members in evaluationcommittees and other decision-making organs.
In Okayama University, for example, students and staff members (both academic and non-academic) sit conjointly on a Student – Staff Committee on Educational Improvement, where 37 students are present among 56 members.
The committee has implemented academic staff development activities largely
inspired by students, including the establishment of new courses and improvement of student questionnaires on teaching. According to a survey conducted in

Evaluation of teaching
Evaluation of teachers

Practiced in someunits

Evaluation of academic units

Practiced at theinstitutional level

Evaluation of the institution
Staff development
Peer support
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90% 100%

Source: RIHE (2007)

Figure 11. Participation of students in diverse campus activities innational universities

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University Governance Reforms in Japan

Page

2006 among the NUC presidents (RIHE, 2007), students are involved in evaluating instruction in almost all universities and participate in staff development
activities in more than half of the universities (Figure 11). But in other activities studied in the same survey, student participation remains confined to a limited number of universities.

3. Discussion
In the light of the above-mentioned consequences of the reform, this section
investigates problems associated with governance issues in NUCs after incorporation.
3.1 The legal framework and its implementation
The basic governance structure is stipulated by the National University
Corporation Law. Each NUC has a president13, a board of directors (BoD), an
administrative council (AC) and an education and research council (ERC). Not
only the competences of these organs, their membership (or qualifications), selection process and size (in case of the BoD14) as well as basic decision-making
procedures in NUCs are defined by the Law. The president makes final decisions after deliberations in the AC or ERC and then in the BoD. Although the
Law does not stipulate the governance arrangements in detail, it constraints moreor less NUCs’ initiatives associated with organisational structure and authority
distribution, which may reduce their managerial effectiveness. In fact, as isstated below, participation of stakeholders is not always regarded contributing to
the university management.
In reality, in spite of the existence of a legal framework, various governancearrangements can be found in NUCs (Kaneko, 2012), leaving sometimes statutory organs ineffective or de facto incompetent. For example, the University ofTokyo makes it a rule that the president selection committee (PSC) shall select a
candidate based on the result of reference ballot. Thus, the PSC has no discretion as to the selection process. As a matter of fact, the legal framework inplace is not working in the manner intended in some NUCs and may not be suitable to ensure their effectiveness.
Concentration of authority to the central management has caused various
13
14This is also stipulated by the School Education Law.
The size of the AC and the ERC is subject to discretion of each NUC.

Jun Oba Page
87
problems in NUCs. The new decision-making framework was designed to enable rapid decisions, reflecting opinions from outside the university, among asmall circle of high officers. However, in reality, it is quite difficult to expect
academic executives to have sufficient competence and expertise in university
management, where presidents are selected often on the basis of their academic
achievement and where most academics try to escape from managerial work. It
is impossible for the presidents to assume every responsibility in administration
in a loosely coupled organisation like universities (Weick, 1976). As Bensimon& Neumann (1993) suggest, even in spite of competent leaders, their abilities
have a limit, and therefore teams that are open and equalised in their conceptionof leadership, that view leadership as a shared process should be more effective.
Besides, Osaki (2009) points to problems associated with centralised management in NUCs and calls for devolution to academic units.
Concerning the selection of the president, while several presidents – known
as reformers for their audacious managerial innovations – have been defeated at
the polls (Sakimoto, 2005), the second-ranked candidates have been deliberately
favoured in some universities. Elsewhere, universities have either not employed or have abandoned the voting system entirely. However, presidents selected against ballot results or without voting often lack legitimate authority. In
some cases, first-ranked candidates filed suits with courts to seek revocation of
the appointments as presidents of the second-ranked candidates.
Dismissal of the president of a NUC presents another problem. In the
NUC system, the president is given unusually strong powers: he or she does nothave any supervising body comparable to board of governor or trustees, found in
Anglo-Saxon countries, whose members are either perpetual or externally selected (Kaneko, 2012). The removal of a president, which is the competence ofthe Minister of Education, should be proposed by the relevant PSC. However,
the majority of its members are those appointed by the president, and it is not
responsible for the NUC’s administration, in contrast with governing bodies in
Anglo-Saxon countries. Therefore, it is very unlikely that it will make such a
proposal. In addition, evaluation of the president is not legally stipulated; only
institutional evaluation is defined in the National University Corporation Law.
Kaneko (2012) argues that this logic, deriving from the independent administrative institution (IAI) arrangements, is difficult to apply to universities and that
the MTG/MTP scheme does not provide correct incentives for a better achievement of the NUC. The current arrangements have no provision against
self-righteous behaviour of a president.
Participation of external personalities in the manner provided by the Law

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Page

often lacks effectiveness. According to a survey (Yokoyama, 2005), in FY
2004, the majority of the external members (60.1%) felt that their opinions had
been sufficiently reflected in the decisions of the AC; but nearly a quarter ofthem (24.3%) thought that their opinions had little impact, and 9.4 percent ofthem found only a small number of important matters in the discussion. In
comparison with the same survey carried out the previous year, fewer members
found the council performing a core role in university management (62% against66%), and orienting reform of the university (53% against 60%). Furthermore,
more members feared that the council might become merely a formality before
decisions are taken by the BoD (40% against 35%).
3.2 Organisational structures and cultures
In preparing for incorporation, most national universities tried to constructperfect structures, particularly in the larger research universities, which werelater found to be too sophisticated to be operational (Ikoma, 2004). This lesson
conforms to arguments advanced by numerous researchers that a specific arrangement in governance structure of a university versus another has little implication for its performance (Henkel, 2007; Kaplan, 2004; Kerr, 2001). Kerr
(2001) states that changes in formal governance have generally made little difference and that, where they have, this has been mostly for the worse. An example is that, with the disappearance or diminution of the integrated secretariat
in some NUCs, even miscellaneous issues requiring coordination began frequently going to the presidents, thus reducing the efficiency of the university
management (Isoda, 2005).
Rather than organisational arrangements, many researchers and practitioners call for attention to human-related or cultural issues (Lombardi et al., 2002;
Pope, 2004; Tierney, 2008). An OECD report (2004) called for a need to develop professional strategic managers in the key non-academic functions of finance, personnel, estates, and so on. However, Japanese national universities
are severely lacking in such capacities in their human resources. According toa survey of NUC directors in charge of personnel affairs, non-academic staff arebeing poorly evaluated in terms of number and quality both by field of activities
and field of competence (Figure 12 & Figure 13).

Jun Oba Page
89

Organisational and administrative affairs

Insufficient in number and quality
Sufficient in number but insufficientin quality
Sufficient in quality but insufficient in
numberSufficient in number and quality

Finance and accounting
Personnel and labour management
Facilities and equipment management
Legal affairs
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Source: Adapted from CNUFM (2007)

Figure 12. Evaluation of non-academic staff by board director (executive)in charge of personnel affairs, by field of activity

Planning
Insufficient in number and quality

External negotiations

Sufficient in number but insufficient in quality
Sufficient in quality but insufficient in number

Information handling

Sufficient in number and quality

Foreign languages
0%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Source: Adapted from CNUFM (2007)

Figure 13. Evaluation of competencies expected of non-academic staff byboard director (executive) in charge of personnel affairs, by
field of competence

Development activities should address the entire organisational culture ofeach institution (London, 1995). In Japan, these kinds of activities are all themore necessary as the cultures of universities have changed. Between 1992 and2007, in national universities, academic staff admitting the existence of exertionof strong leadership, autocratic management, poor communication between
management and staff, or lack of involvement in decision-making significantly
increased. On the contrary, they found less adherence of their managers to theprinciple of academic freedom (Figure 14). As a result, a significant divergence of values and understandings in relation to management has been found inuniversities. According to a survey conducted in 2012 by a research group, forexample, performance goals are being clarified more at the institutional level but
less at the faculty level and much less at the department level (Figure 15).

90

University Governance Reforms in Japan

Page

Source: Adapted from Arimoto et al. (2008, Figure 6-2 by M. Fujimura)

Figure 14. Percentage of academic staff acknowledging selected governancerelated practices in their university (1992 and 2007)

Presidents
Goals are clarified

Goals are partially clarified

Executives/VP
Goals are notwell clarified

Deans
Goals arenot clarified

Dep. heads

Source: Unpublished research data by a study group on the university management (Figure by M. Murasawa)

Figure 15. Clarification of performance goals by level of administration (2012)

Jun Oba Page
91
3.3 Participation of the campus community and stakeholders

stronger →Although a genuine institutional policy cannot be developed without involving academic staff members, their participation in the decision-making process has been significantly reduced by the incorporation arrangements. In
many countries, the importance of academic staff involvement in personnel decisions (recruitment and promotion), selection of academic managers, and determination of academic policies and education programmes has been emphasised.
Birnbaum (2004) underlines the fundamental need for shared governance in academic institutions, and regards it as the most effective process through which
academic institutions may achieve their goals. A French experience also showsthat participation of the campus community in the decision-making process is a
key factor for successfully implementing institutional strategies (Frémont et al.,2004). Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the strength of a university is considered to depend significantly on the commitment of academic staff and their identification with their university (Henkel, 2007).

40%

29%

30%

15%

20%
10%
0%

-24%

Bef ore (w hat has happened over thelast five years)
Af ter (w hat is envisaged in the future)
11%

10%
-18%

1%

-5%

-41%

-31%

← weaker

-10%
-20%
-30%
-40%
-50%

Institution-levelcouncil (senate)

Institution-levelcommittees

Academic units(faculties)

Academic units(departments)

Faculty council

Note: Each column corresponds to the difference between percentages of affirmative andnegative responses concerning an enhancement of the authority of each collegial
body. Vertical bars with a negative value indicate that a majority of respondents
have recognised or wish an abridgement of the authority of each body.
Source: RIHE (2007)

Figure 16. Evolution over the last 5 years and envisaged evolution in the
future of the authority of collegial bodies and academic units innational universities, based on responses by presidents

92

University Governance Reforms in JapanPage

In Japan, although the initial NUC system design provided for a system
placing much importance on top-down decision-making, most presidents haveacknowledged the need for academic staff participation. According to a survey(RIHE, 2007), although they have recognised a reduction in the authority of collegial bodies and academic units (except for faculties) over the past years, they
now wish to see an enhancement rather than a reduction of this authority (except
for that of faculty councils) (Figure 16). Many of the more recent studies stressthe importance of consensus building and bottom-up approaches (Amano, 2008;
Osaki, 2009; Uesugi, 2009).
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

President/Management (2003)
President/Management (2005)
President/Management (2008)
BoD (2005)
BoD (2008)
AC (2005)
AC (2008)
ERC (2005)
ERC (2008)
Faculty councils (2005)
Faculty councils (2008)
Institution-wide committees (2005)
Institution-wide committees (2008)

N/A
Very little
involved
Little involved
Involved tosomeextentMuch involved

Source: Derived from CNFUM (2010)

Figure 17. Extent of the involvement in the definition of budget plans

The trend in favour of a wider participation of the campus community has
been confirmed by another survey (CNFUM, 2010). Whereas the authority ofthe presidents in the budgeting process were much reinforced at the time of incorporation, they were less involved in the definition of budget plans in 2008
than in 2005 (Figure 17). The same trend was observed for BoD. By contrast,
involvement of institution-wide deliberative organs – AC, ERC and institution-wide committees – increased their involvement. Notably, faculty councils
also extended their influence in this matter between 2005 and 2008.
As previously demonstrated, participation of external stakeholders is still
problematic. A survey conducted in 2006 of all the external members (directors,
AC members and auditors) points to multiple issues raised by them regarding
university administration including relationship between the managements andthemselves. A more recent study (Uesugi, 2009) reports that there still is muchfrustration between external members and NUC administrations: many externalJun Oba Page
93
members complain that they go merely through pro forma deliberations, whereas
the latter expect external members to know more about the university and toprovide more relevant advice.

4. Conclusion – future of the governance of national universities
In an age of knowledge, the need for advanced education and knowledge isbecoming increasingly pressing. Higher education institutions should meetsuch demands, adapting themselves to an ever-changing society, just as the university has done over time (Sporn, 1999). In terms of university governance,
this change calls for a more complicated decision-making process (Eckel &Kezar, 2006). University reforms undertaken in a vast majority of countries
during the past few decades have encouraged institutions to be more responsive
to changing societal demands with fewer resources, by according them greater
autonomy, rationalising their governance (OECD, 2003).
The incorporation of Japanese national universities adheres grosso modo to
the same logic. This reform accorded them much greater autonomy, and in
search of efficiency, concentrated power to the president and to a lesser extent
the BoD. According to the result of the institutional evaluation concerning thefirst cycle of MTG/MTP, this reform could be regarded as a success. But inreality, as seen in this article, many problems have been observed in terms ofgovernance. A report of the Central Council15 for Education, published inAugust 2012, recommended again enhancement of the leadership of the president in terms of undergraduate education management, criticising the lack ofintegrated efforts in this matter in universities.
Despite the similarities between the incorporation policy and the global
trends in university reform, the NUC system presents some particularities. The
reform of 2004 was only partial (Christensen, 2010) and state intervention remains still strong. However, it is unlikely that the government will give up its
supervisory role for fear that it may not be accountable vis-à-vis the Parliament.
Very delicate managerial operations are required to overcome the principal-agent
dilemma. Along the same line, as seen previously, the legal framework stipulated in the Law seems rigid enough to reduce the effectiveness of NUCs, andmay need rethinking and restructuring. In particular, the presidential leadershiparrangements should be reconsidered, including competences, selection process
and evaluation. In addition, centralisation and devolution as well as participa15

Advisory body to the Minister of Education on overall educational policy.

94

University Governance Reforms in JapanPagetion of the campus community and stakeholders are also issues that should be
addressed.
More fundamentally, NPM, the concept on which the reform was based, is atheory that is far from perfect and leaves many ambiguous questions concerning
its implementation. The extent of change in practice – has varied quite a lot inline with differences in structural constraints, cultural traditions and environmental pressure. In fact it has many critics, particularly concerning its application to higher education institutions (Christensen, 2010; Ferlie et al, 2008). The
effectiveness of its application to university governance and management has notbeen sufficiently attested, and little is known about the effects of the shifts ingovernmental steering paradigms at the institutional level (Amaral, Meek &Larsen, 2003).
What is said above is quite understandable in view of the fact that each
university has a different cultural profile. It is imperative that each NUC beinnovative and find appropriate practices, by building a good team around thepresident and developing staff, with the participation of as many internal andexternal stakeholders in the decision-making process as well as a deep understanding of its organisational culture.

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Comment

RIHE International Seminar Reports, No.19, 2013 Page
99

Comments and Questions on the Presentations ofUniversity GovernanceFumihiro Maruyama

It is my honor to make some remarks on the informative presentations andpapers of three guest speakers from the US, the UK, and France.
First I address the three models of university governance proposed by
Dobbins (Dobbins et al., 2011). The first one is called “the state centeredmodel” which is roughly applied to France, Spain, and Portugal. The stateestablished universities and has strong power to control them through such
instruments as allocating public funds, regulating academic careers, introducing
uniform governing structures, and conferring national degrees. The mission ofuniversity in this model is an implementation of national objectives such as
training in special areas, research and development. The state oversees
program content and provides an itemized budget to the university. Faculty
members and administrative staff are civil servants by state appointment.
The second model is “the academic self-governance model,” also called“the Humboldt” model whose characteristic is collegial control by theprofessoriate with financial dependency on the state. There is no government
intervention in personnel. The university is the Republic of Science whose
mission is to pursue the truth. Thus there is sometimes difficulty coordinating
institutional and state priorities. This model can be applied to Germany, theNordic countries and probably Japan.
The third is “the market-oriented model” which is close to the UK and thestate university in the US. There the university compete for students andfinancial resources. It is managed by the corporate governance idea which
often includes a board of trustees. Block grants are provided to the universityProfessor, RIHE, Hiroshima University, e-mail: fmaruya@hiroshima-u.ac.jp

100 Comments and Questions on the Presentations of University Governance
Page
which it can use at its discretion. The government only involves regulation andincentives for competition and quality. University administration can possibly
dismiss “moral turpitude” or unproductive academics but government cannot.
These are the three different types of university governance but there aresome common trends of change among them. As Bekhradnia notes, there arehigher expectations for university contributions to stronger economy while using
less public money. And university ranking attracts policy makers’ attention.
Thus efficient university management is required everywhere. It is often
achieved by central government empowering institutions, by giving university
corporative status in some countries like Japan and the Nordic countries,
establishing board of trustees like in Germany and France, and giving block
grant instead of itemized budget. There are similar movement in publicfunding allocation from basic to competitive and project funding and providing
centers of excellent programs which appeared in France, Germany, and Japan.
It also can be pointed out that there is a common trend toward themarket-oriented model from the state centered or academic governing model.
Since the 1990s universities have been reformed in developed countries andthere are common key words such as accountability, evaluation, state steering via
performance based funding, product not process control and so on.

Questions in common
University reforms have spread in Europe and Japan since the1990s as
Mignot-Gérard explained in her paper. Most reforms aimed at increased
efficiency and effectiveness of university teaching and research by government’s
empowering university governance, allocating block grants which can be used at
the institution’s discretion, and by introducing performance funding andevaluation by the third parties. However, one social scientist argues that thereform has brought higher formal autonomy than before through empowerment,
but actual autonomy has decreased since more reports, scrutiny, financial
incentives, and acquisition of external fund have been required (Christensen,
2011). We want to know whether this argument is appropriately applied to theUS, the UK, and France.
European and Japanese university reforms in the past two decades aimed at
activating both teaching performance and research productivities although
universities in the US have continuously undergone reforms and there is no
special “reform” or “reform period”. In some countries, the president’s
leadership has been strengthened by the reform of internal governance. How

Fumihiro Maruyama Page
101
does the change of internal governance affect teaching and research activities?
Is there clear evidence which shows teaching performance and research
productivity have been improved in three countries?

Questions on the University of California system
Switkes’ paper describes shared governance at the University of California(UC) system which Dobbins considers a market-oriented model. Switkes
pointed out that in the University of California system faculty are strongly
involved in internal governance and that this contributes to quality andexcellence of academic programs of the university (Switkes, 2012). This isquite an interesting argument because faculty involvement in governance is often
criticized as an obstacle to university reform which aims at activating teaching
and research. Her argument certainly encourages the adherents of the“Humboldt ideal.”
The UC is quite a large system with 10 campuses and over 232,000 students.
It is astonishing that such a huge system has only one Board of Regents who aresupposed to be engaged in final decision making. Questions are raised on thegovernance of such a large system. Compared to the board of trustees inprivate universities in the US, the council in English universities, or board of
directors of national universities in Japan where the number of student varies
from 500 to 20,000, the Board of Regents in the UC system covers both
geographically and academically larger areas than others. Thus one may ask
whether the Board of Regents actually plays a role in decision making or does itjust rubber stamp the decisions made at each campus level. One also wonders
what are the merits of having only one Board of Regents in the governance andwhether it is efficient.
A questionnaire survey reveals that faculty members in Japanese national
universities tended to spend more time on teaching, social service, and internal
administrations after the 2004 reforms, but they spent less time on their own
research. The survey also reveals that faculty also feel fatigued due to spending
more time in preparing applications for research money, their own evaluation
report and evaluation of others and institutions. Faculty members in thenational universities miss the “good old days” before reform when they wereable to devote themselves solely to their own research. Switkes pointed outthat UC faculty spend a lot of time on attending committees and evaluations.
Are there any complaints among faculty members in UC who attend meetingsand may lose their time for research?

102 Comments and Questions on the Presentations of University Governance
Page
Switkes briefly summarizes the complicated processes of academic
program approval and policy development. But readers may have a question
who or which organizations coordinate duplication of academic programs among
UC campuses and the State University system? She pointed out that UC hasconstitutional autonomy but it heavily depends upon funding from the state
government. Thus one may ask whether there is any Governor’s or State’sintervention in academic affairs such as closing unpopular programs or opening
new courses which possibly attract more students?

Questions on governance of universities in England
Bekhradnia pointed out that both the pre-1992 and the post-1992
universities in England have legally independent corporate status and enjoy themost autonomy in European universities. It is a unique system of higher
education and the universities in England are quite different from private
institutions in the US and Japan which are less government controlled than their
public counterparts. US and Japanese private institutions receive less public
subsidies and compensate them by charging students higher tuition. In any
countries there are public universities which were established and controlled by
the state and are pursuing national missions and objectives.
If there are no public or national universities in England, a plausible
question is: which institutions are pursuing national goals and targets? Are thepre-1992 universities including world famous Oxford and Cambridgefunctioning as national universities which achieve national objectives? Or who
and which organizations control and coordinate the national system of higher
education, especially conducts higher education system design and manpowerplanning for certain areas? However, as one continues to read his paperanswers to these questions are found in the section describing “The Higher
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE)” which is a buffer body
between the government and universities. He clearly explains that theHEFCE’s role is not only the allocation of funds but also oversight and planningof universities. It is an independent organization which functions as the central
government does in other European countries and Japan.
As in other developed countries, the state funding in England has been
diminishing. Thus we want to know how this affects the role of the HEFCE,
Does its power over the university decrease? Do universities get moreautonomy while the recent trend has been pointed out as the reverse?

Fumihiro Maruyama Page
103

Questions on university governance in France
University reform in France during the past two decades shares similarities
with Japan’s reform of national universities in 2004. So are some of theconsequences as revealed by one of the surveys. The Center for National
University Finance and Management in Tokyo conducted several questionnaire
surveys to presidents, directors of finance and deans of eighty six national
universities to ascertain the consequences of reform. According to the survey,
university presidents are more likely to prefer their stronger leadership ingovernance but faculty members prefer collegial decision making based uponconsent among faculty members. The surveys also revealed that Japanese
professors tend to spend more time and energy on teaching and social service
and less on their research after the reforms.
Mignot-Gérard’s survey revealed that academic values (academic quality,
innovation, and autonomy) are considered more important than management
issues (costs, fund-raising) by French academic leaders (Mignot-Gérard, 2012,p.8). The survey also revealed that for the use of evaluation results for teaching
and research, self-discipline is preferred to managerial intervention(Mignot-Gérard, 2012, p.10). One understands that this reflects that traditional
values are still kept by French faculty members despite reforms emphasizing
manageability but one wonders if it will last and reform affect changes of thisattitude in the future?
Mignot-Gérard pointed out that ten percent of the total budget for teaching
are allocated by performance and twenty percent for research (Mignot-Gérard,2012). In post-reform Japan, performance based funding has also been
introduced in the national universities, but only 0.5 percent of total budget in thebasic fund has been allocated by performance. Many people initially believedthat the percentage by performance funding was set at a higher percentage – 10
percent or 15 percent of total allocation by the Ministry of Education. However
it has gradually appeared to be difficult to satisfy those who are involved such as
evaluatees and even evaluators, so the final percentage was determined at such alower level. In France how do they implement the performance funding tosatisfy university people through clearing the validity, reliability, fairness andtransparency of evaluation for teaching and research?
The survey shows that in Japan the presidents of national universities
appear to enjoy their strengthened leadership in internal governance. However
there are strong complaints among faculty members that reform only brought
about time-consuming “formalization” which forces academics and staff to work

104 Comments and Questions on the Presentations of University GovernancePage
more according to new implementations (reports, evaluations, applications, peer
reviews) which did not previously exist but reform produced s very little in theirteaching and research? One can imagine from reading Mignot-Gérard’s paperthat the similar complaints are expressed in France also.

Reference
Bekhradnia, B. (2012). The Governance of Higher Education in England. Paper presented at
International Seminar on University Governance at Research Institute for Higher
Education (RIHE), Hiroshima University November 24, 2012.
Christensen, T. (2011). University Governance Reforms: Potential Problems of More
Autonomy? Higher Education, 62: 503-517.
Dobbins, M., Knill, C., & Vogtle, E.M. (2011). An Analytical Framework for the
Cross-Country Comparison of Higher Education Governance. Higher Education, 62:
665-683.
Mignot-Gérard, S. (2012). The Transformation of University Governance in France(199-2011) Inertia, Institutionalization and Change. Paper presented at International
Seminar on University Governance at RIHE, Hiroshima University November 24, 2012.
Switkes, E. (2012). Governance at the University of California: An Example of Faculty
Involvement. Paper presented at International Seminar on University Governance at
RIHE, Hiroshima University November 24, 2012.

Appendices105

Appendix 1: Seminar Program*Comparison of University GovernanceUSA, UK, France and Japan
Date: November 24, 2012
Venue: Hiroshima University

Saturday, November 24
9:00 -

Registration*** Opening Address ***9:30 - 9:45

Masashi Fujimura, Director & Professor, Research Institute forHigher Education (RIHE), Hiroshima University, Japan*** Presentations ***9:45 - 10:30

MC: Yumiko Hada, Professor, RIHE, Hiroshima University, Japan
Presentation 1“Governance at the University of California: An example of faculty
involvement”
Ellen Switkes, Senior Associate, Center for Studies in Higher
Education, University of California, Berkeley ／ Assistant Vice
President Emerita, University of California Office of the President,
USA

10:30 - 10:45

Coffee Break

10:45 - 11:30

Presentation 2“The Reform of the Governance of Higher Education in England:
The gap between rhetoric and reality”
Bahram Bekhradnia, Director, Higher Education Policy Institute(HEPI), UK
Presentation 3“Higher Education Reforms in France: Change or continuity in thegovernance of universities?”
Stéphanie Mignot-Gérard, Maître de Conférences en Gestion, IAE
Gustave Eiffel et IRG (Université Paris-Est Créteil)／Chercheur
Associée, Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Sciences Po et
CNRS, France

11:30 - 12:15*

As of November, 2012106
12:15 - 13:30

Lunch

13:30 - 14:15

Presentation 4“University Governance Reforms in Japan”
Jun Oba, Associate Professor, RIHE, Hiroshima University, Japan

14:15 - 14:30

Comment
Fumihiro Maruyama, Professor, RIHE, Hiroshima University,Japan

14:30 - 14:45

Coffee Break*** Panel Discussion ***14:45 - 16:30

MC: Satoshi P. Watanabe, RIHE, Hiroshima University, Japan
Panelists:
Ellen Switkes
Bahram Bekhradnia
Stéphanie Mignot-Gérard
Jun Oba
Fumihiro Maruyama

107Appendix 2: List of Participants

OVERSEAS PARTICIPANTS
Invited Experts
Ellen Switkes

Senior Associate, Center for Studies in Higher Education,
University of California, Berkeley／Assistant Vice
President Emerita, University of California Office of the
President, USA

Bahram Bekhradnia

Director, Higher Education Policy Institute (HEPI), UK

Stéphanie Mignot-Gérard Maître de Conférences en Gestion, IAE Gustave Eiffel et
IRG (Université Paris-Est Créteil)／Chercheur Associée,Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Sciences Po et
CNRS, France
and another 3 overseas participantsJAPANESE PARTICIPANTS
Research Institute for Higher Education（RIHE）
Masashi Fujimura

Director and Professor

Fumihiro Maruyama

Professor

Tsukasa Daizen

Professor

Futao Huang

Professor

Yumiko Hada

Professor

Satoshi P. Watanabe

Professor

Jun Oba

Associate Professor

Masataka Murasawa

Associate Professor
and another 52 Japanese Participants

As of November, 2012

R.I.H.E. PUBLICATION IN ENGLISH
RIHE International Publication SeriesNo. 1: Kaneko, M. (1987). Enrollment Expansion in Postwar Japan.
No. 2: Guocai, Z. (1989). Higher Education Research in China: An Annotated Bibliography.
No. 3: Abe, Y. (1989). Non-University Sector Higher Education in Japan.
No. 4: Kaneko, M. (1989). Financing Higher Education in Japan: Trends and Issues.
No. 5: Kaneko, M. (1992). Higher Education and Employment in Japan: Trends and Issues.
No. 6: Morgan, J. Keith (1999). Universities and the Community: Use of Time in Universities
in Japan.
No. 7: Arimoto, A. (ed.) (2001). University Reforms and Academic Governance: Reports ofthe 2000 Three-Nation Workshop on Academic Governance.
No. 8: Arimoto, A. (ed.) (2002). University Reforms and Academic Governance
Reconsidered: Report of the Six-Nation Higher Education Research Project.
No. 9: Arimoto, A., Huang, F., and Yokoyama, K. (eds.) (2005). Globalization and Higher
Education.
No.10: Huang, F. (ed.) (2006). Transnational Higher education in Asia and the PacificRegion.

Higher Education Forum
Higher Education Forum Vol. 1 (2003).
Higher Education Forum Vol. 2 (2005).
Higher Education Forum Vol. 3 (2006).
Higher Education Forum Vol. 4 (2007).
Higher Education Forum Vol. 5 (2008).
Higher Education Forum Vol. 6 (2009).
Higher Education Forum Vol. 7 (2010).
Higher Education Forum Vol. 8 (2011).
Higher Education Forum Vol. 9 (2012).
Higher Education Forum Vol. 10 (2013).

Higher Education Research in Japan
Higher Education Research in Japan Vol. 1 (2003).
Higher Education Research in Japan Vol. 2 (2005).
Higher Education Research in Japan Vol. 3 (2006).
Higher Education Research in Japan Vol. 4 (2007).
Higher Education Research in Japan Vol. 5 (2008).

COE Publication Series
No. 6: Construction and Quality Assurance of 21st Century Higher Education (Reports of the2003 COE International Symposium) (2003).
No. 7: Mergers and Cooperation among Higher Education Institutions: Australia, Japan andEurope (Reports of the 2003 COE International Seminar on Mergers and Cooperation)(2004).
No.11: Organization Reforms and University Governance: Autonomy and Accountability(Reports of COE International Seminar) (2004).
No.12: Enhancing Quality and Building the 21st Century Higher Education System (Reports
of COE International Seminar/Eight-Nation Conference) (2004).
No.20: Quality, Relevance, and Governance in the Changing Academia: International
Perspectives (Reports of Changing Academic Profession Project Workshop) (2006).
No.21: A Cross-National Analysis of Undergraduate Curriculum Models: Focusing on
Research-Intensive Universities (2006).
No.22: Gender Inequity in Academic Profession and Higher Education Access: Japan, theUnited Kingdom, and the United States (2006).
No.23: Constructing University Visions and the Mission of Academic Profession in AsianCountries: A Comparative Perspective (Reports of COE International Seminar) (2007).
No.29: Changing Governance in Higher Education: Incorporation, marketisation, and otherreforms  A Comparative study  (2007).

RIHE International Seminar Reports
No. 1: Perspectives for the Future System of Higher Education (Report of the Hiroshima
International Seminar on Higher Education) (1977).
No. 2: Higher Education for the 1980s: Challenges and Responses (Report of the Second
Hiroshima International Seminar on Higher Education) (1980).
No. 3: Innovations in Higher Education: Exchange of Experiences and Ideas in International
Perspective (Reports of the Hiroshima/OECD Meeting of Experts on Higher Educationand the Seminar on Innovations in Higher Education) (1981).
No. 4: Comparative Approach to Higher Education: Curriculum, Teaching and Innovations in
an Age of Financial Difficulties (Reports of the Hiroshima/OECD Meetings ofExperts) (1983).
No. 5: The Changing Functions of Higher Education: Implications for Innovation (Reports
from the 1984 OECD/JAPAN Seminar on Higher Education), (1985).
No. 6: Higher Education Expansion in Asia (Reports from the 1985 International Seminar on
Asian Higher Education) (1985).
No. 7: Public and Private in Asian Higher Education Systems: Issues and Prospects (Reports
from the Third International Seminar on Higher Education in Asia) (1987).
No. 8: The Role of Government in Asian Higher Education Systems: Issues and Prospects

(Report from the Fourth International Seminar on Higher Education in Asia) (1988).
No. 9: Foreign Students and Internationalizaion of Higher Education (Proceedings of
OECD/JAPAN Seminar on Higher Education and the Flow of Foreign Students)(1989).
No.10: Academic Reforms in the World: Situation and Perspective in the Massification Stageof Higher Education (Reports of the 1997 Six-Nation Higher Education Project
Seminar) (1997).
No.11: Higher Education Reform for Quality Higher Education Management in the 21stCentury: Economic, Technological, Social and Political Forces Affecting Higher
Education (Proceedings of the 1999 Six-Nation Presidents’ Summit in Hiroshima)(2000).
No.12: The Changing Academic Profession in International Comparative and Quantitative
Perspectives (Report of the International Conference on the Changing Academic
Profession Project, 2008) (2008).
No.13: The Changing Academic Profession over 1992-2007: International, Comparative, andQuantitative Perspectives (Report of the International Conference on the Changing
Academic Profession Project, 2009) (2009).
No.14: Producing Qualified Graduates and Assuring Education Quality in the
Knowledge-Based Society: Roles and Issues of Graduate Education (Report of theInternational Workshop on Graduate Education, 2009) (2010).
No.15: The Changing Academic Profession in International and Quantitative Perspectives: A
Focus on Teaching & Research Activities (Report of the International Conference on
the Changing Academic Profession Project, 2010) (2010).
No.16: Diversifying Higher Education Systems in the International and Comparative
Perspectives (Report of the International Workshop on University Reform, 2010)(2011).
No.17: The Changing Academic Profession in Asia: Contexts, Realities and Trends (Report of
the International Conference on the Changing Academic Profession Project, 2011)(2011).
No.18: University Management, Present and Future: How and by whom? (Report of theInternational Workshop on University Reform, 2011) (2011).

RIHE International
Seminar Reports
No.19, June 2013

ISBN978-4-902808-81-0