Russia and the IMF
UEGAKI Akira
Introduction
The subject of this paper may seem to have been discussed
too much in the past and it might be assumed that people would
not be interested in such matters any more. However, I do notthink that this issue has been studied satisfactorily. I would liketo emphasize two problems in the discussions of the last ten years.
The first problem is that we do not know what the IMF demanded from Russia in detail. The discussions have been conducted around vague images of the so-called “Washington consensus.” The second problem is that the IMF has been criticizedin a confusing way. In fact there have been two directions ofcriticisms of the IMF. On the one hand, the IMF has been criticized for compelling Russia to take monotonous neo-liberalmeasures without considering the specific historical and socialfeatures of Russia. On the other hand, it is criticized for failing topursue the consistent “right” liberal policies under the politicalpressure of Russia.1 Curiously both types of criticisms are sometimes unconsciously employed at the same time. These are theproblems for which we have not yet reached answers.

1. Assignments of the IMF and Russia’s
Response
1-1. Programs and Documents
If we intend to examine the IMF’s demands on Russia, wemust inquire into official IMF documents such as the “Letter ofIntent” of the programs and other confidential documents con1 One of the corollaries of the latter criticism is that a large amount of tax
payments of the (American) people has been poured into the black box of
Russia without any returns.

- 61 -

UEGAKI AKIRA

cerning the process of negotiations. However we cannot systematically obtain such documents for all the programs. We use here
several documents named “(Joint) Statement (or Memorandum)of the Government of Russia and the CBR (Central Bank of Russia)” as proxy. The Statement has been published every year
since 1992 and we can regard it as a pledge of the Russian government and the CBR to perform assignments that the IMF gave
Russia in exchange for financial assistance.
Table 1 shows the IMF’s financial assistance programs andtheir reference documents from 1992 through 1999. In the documents quoted in the table, there are many items of “assignments”
from “price liberalization” to “pension reform.” Table 2 showsthat all the assignments given to Russia by the IMF can be divided into three groups: liberalization, stabilization and structuralreforms. Michel Camdessus, managing director of the IMF atthat time, referred to these three elements as “components of apolicy strategy for the transition to a market economy” (Camdessus, 1994).2 Therefore the IMF’s demands on Russia matched thegeneral policy line of that institution.
1-2. Three Stages of the Reform: Liberalization, Stabilization and Structural Reforms
By examining the contents of the statements or memoranda,
we realize that the three groups of the assignments had been
touched on at the same time from the beginning. For example,
the Memorandum for the first program of 1992 referred to all theitems in the liberalization group and included several items in thestabilization and structural reform groups. We can consider thisas an apparent expression of the so-called “big-bang” approach of
the IMF. Camdessus said in the above-mentioned statement, “First,
and most important, the most appropriate course of action is to adopt
a bold strategy. Many countries, including countries of the former
Soviet Union, have by now proven the feasibility of implementing
policies of rapid liberalization, stabilization and structural reform...
2 Camdessus’s words are quoted from the html document and therefore thepages cannot be identified.

- 62 -

Table 1. IMF Loans to Russia
amountapproved
program approval dateamountdrawn

expiry datemillions of US$

SBA(1)

reference document
Document
No.

1049.71049.7

1

(2)

STF

Jun. 30, 1993

1574.31573.3

2

STF

Apr. 20, 1994

1574.31574.3

3

SBA

Apr. 11, 1995 Mar. 26, 1996

6411.46411.4

4- 63 -

5
6
EFF(3), (4) Mar. 26, 1996 Mar. 26, 1999 18990.4

8310.9
7
8

SBA

Jul.28, 1999 Dec. 27, 2000

4529.3647.0

9source that theauthor used

Memorandum on economic policy of Ekonomika i zhizn',
the Russian Federation
No.10, 1992, p.4
Statement on economic policy of the Rossiiskie vesti, 1 Jun.
Russian government and the CBR
1993, p.7
Memorandum on economic policy of Interfax, No.71, 1994
the Russian Federation
Statement of the Russian government Den'gi i kredit, No.3,
and the CBR on medium-term strat- 1995, pp.3-15
egy and economic policy for 1995
Statement of the Russian government Den'gi i kredit, No.3,
and the CBR on medium-term strat- 1996, pp.3-19
egy and economic policy for 1996
Statement of the Russian government Den'gi i kredit, No.7,
and the CBR on medium-term strat- 1997, pp.3-12
egy and economic policy for 1997
Statement of the Russian government Vedomstvennoe prilozand the CBR on economic and struc- henie Rossiiskoi gazety,tural policy for 1998
16 May 1998, pp.4-5
Statement of the Russian government Vedomstvennoe prilozand the CBR on policy for economic henie Rossiiskoi gazety,and financial stability
22 Aug. 1998, pp.4-5
Statement of the Russian government Den'gi i kredit, No.8,
and the CBR on economic policy for 1999, pp.3-15
1999

Notes:(1) = Stand-By Arrangement(2) = Systemic Transformation Facility. This program was suspended in the fall of 1993, andre-started in the spring of 1994. I could not find sources that identify the expiry date.
(3) = Extended Fund Facility(4) = During the program of the EFF, the IMF approved an increase of the EFF and decided togive loans of CCFF [Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility = US$ 2.9 billion] and SRF [Supplemental Reserve Facility = US$5.9 billion] on July 20, 1998.

formaldate of the
documentMar. 1992
Jun. 1993
Apr. 1994
Mar.1995
Feb. 1996
Jul. 1997
May 1998
Jul. 1998
Jul. 1999

Sources:
IMF, 1995, p.109 [ for the first three programs ].
IMF, 2002, p.30 [ for the latter three programs]. Though the original
data were recorded in SDR, the author transferred them into US Dollars by using the annual average exchange rates published in ISF.
IMF, 1998 [ for the note (4)].
On reference documents, the author made the data from the sources
quoted in the table.

RUSSIA AND THE IMF

Aug. 5, 1992 Jan. 4, 1993

name of document

Table 2. “Assignments” of IMF Given to Russia
㩷- 64 -

Note: ٤㧩mention

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UEGAKI AKIRA

Liberalization of prices
Liberalization of trade (imports)
Export liberalization, export quotas, export licenses
Liberalization of currency and capital transactions
Tariff reduction
Exchange rate regime
Stabilization
Inflation
Credit extending of Central Bank, issue of money
Net Domestic Assets
Incomes policy
Fiscal deficit
Subsidy
Refinance rate
Current accountInternational reserve
Structural reform Tax collection, budget consolidation, budgetary revenue transfer
Privatization
State procurement
Tax, VAT
Monopoly, natural monopoly
Bankruptcy, bankruptcy of banks
Ownership of land
Pension system
Stock exchange
Liberalization

㪤㪸㫉㪅
㪈㪐㪐㪉

RUSSIA AND THE IMF

The fact of the matter is that gradualism has not been found to bean effective presentation in any of the three major policy areas”(Camdessus, 1994). However we must note that everything cannot be done at the same time in this world. Therefore, as a matterof fact, the emphasis is to be shifted form one field of policy toanother “gradually.” As for the three groups of the policy assignments above, liberalization is easy to accomplish because it
could be done only by lifting old restrictive legislation, whereas
structural reforms need long-term mechanism design.
In April 1996, Camdessus made an address at the U.S.Russia Business Council in which he emphasized the importanceof three tasks at the beginning of the three-year IMF program for
Russia (see Table 1) (Camdessus, 1996). The three tasks that
Camdessus mentioned were (1) furthering deduction in inflation,(2) building up efficient institutions and effective policy tools,and (3) accelerating structural reform. He also touched on the
problems of energy taxation, liberal trade regime, land registration, legal framework for full privatization, social protection programs, etc. In short, Camdessus thought that the tasks of the IMF
and Russia at that time were stabilization and structural reforms
with some liberalization measures (trade liberalization) not yet
accomplished.
Seven months before the financial crisis of 1998, Stanley
Fischer, former first deputy managing-director of the IMF, statedthat the economic reform of Russia since 1992 had achievedmuch towards economic “normalization” and estimated that the“major policy challenges” still not achieved were fiscal and structural reforms (Fischer, 1998). The former includes tax reform,
which would lead to a comprehensive Tax Code, improvement oftax collection, and strengthening of expenditure management andcontrol, etc. The latter consists of transparent privatization, restructuring and pricing of natural monopolies, urban land and realestate reform, and continuing progress to open the economy toforeign trade and investment, etc. In this case Fischer talked
much about structural reforms and little about liberalization.
The leaders of the IMF admitted the fact that the economic
reform in Russia supported by the IMF has been proceeding from- 65 -

UEGAKI AKIRA

liberalization to stabilization and then to structural reforms. It ismeaningless to criticize the IMF for forcing all the assignments
on Russia at the same time because the IMF showed “bold pragmatism” (Camdessus, 1994) at the functional level of policies.
Anyway, whether a series of reform policies is a “big-bang” or
not depends on time scale. If we compare Russia with Hungary,
where a radical economic reform had begun in 1968, Russia’sreform is the big-bang approach. The important thing here is thatthe economic reform in Russia has its own stages although it canbe estimated as “big-bang” in a comparative perspective.
1-3. Special Assignments to Russia
The IMF is often criticized for compelling its member countries to take the same policy regardless of specific conditions ineach country. Is this the case with Russia? The above-mentioned
fact that the reform measures are divided into three stages is not
specific to Russia but common to the general line of the IMF. We
must search for other features in the assignments expressed inTable 2. By examining the assignments, we can realize that there
are several fields of items specific to Russia in the table.
One is the field concerning “export liberalization, export
quota and export license.” Usually the liberal oriented development strategy recommends “import” liberalization. Why “export”? This is connected with the fact that Russia is one of thebiggest oil and gas exporting countries. The prices of oil and gas
in Russia were extremely cheap in the world market even after thecollapse of the USSR and the difference of the price had to beoffset somehow. For example, the heavy fuel oil price of theRussian Federation 3 was only 12.88% 4 of that at Rotterdam 5 in1992 (Considine and Kerr, 2002, p. 272). Therefore export duties
on Russian oil and gas are justified to stabilize the world energy
market. However, we must consider the other side of the situation. From a liberalist point of view, the export duties could distort the market structure of energy-related-goods at home and3 Ex-refinery price.
4 Calculated by using Moscow Inter-Bank Auction Exchange Rates.
5 Spot market price (f.o.b.).

- 66 -

RUSSIA AND THE IMF

abroad and prevent oil and gas companies from developing effectively. Therefore the IMF had to take a subtle position on the
problems of export liberalization and “appropriate” export duties
in Russia.
The field of “monopoly, natural monopoly” in the group of“structural reforms” of Table 2 is also interesting. Monopoly is
the problem that the IMF is always concerned with, because thedissolution of monopoly is a starting point of making a competitive market economy. However, the “natural monopoly” heremeans the oil and gas industry and other natural resource industries and it has special significance in Russia. Therefore this item
is an assignment of the IMF special to Russia. It is also interesting because the price and trade policy of the oil and gas industry
is closely connected with access to pipelines, which are also monopolized. Again, this is not a problem which can be solved fromthe general policy line of the IMF.
Thirdly, the field of “tax collection, budget consolidation andbudgetary revenue transfer” has a special meaning to Russia.
Russia is a federal country and the structure of tax collecting andbudget spending among federal units is complicated. Therefore
the IMF’s concern with this field is special to Russia. Furthermore, the field bears an interesting relation to the oil and gas industry because the bulk of the tax revenue comes from it.
Table 3 shows how the IMF dealt with these items in the programs from 1992 through 1999. As for the field of “export liberalization, export quota and export license,” it is interesting to notethat the export duties were planned at the beginning of the new
Russia to absorb the difference between domestic and foreign
prices. This is related to the fact that oil, gas and their products
were exempted from price liberalization in 1992, leaving theirprices extremely low compared to the international standard.
However Table 3 reveals that the IMF’s concern was more withthe problems of export quotas and centralized exports that lay at
the center of the complicated structure of Russia’s natural resource exports. This shows that the IMF had been eager to compel the Russian government to get rid of such a privileged system.

- 67 -

Table 3. Special Assignments to Russia

Exportliberalization,
export quota,
export license

Tax collection,budgetconsolidation,budgetary
revenuetransfer

Jun. 1993: (2)To phase out export
quotas, not to expand
centralized exports in
1993, to curtail centralized exports to one thirdof the level in 1993.

Apr. 1994: (3)Mar. 1995: (4)Feb. 1996: (5)To abolish export quotas To abolish export quotas To abolish all exporton all goods except
except in the case ofduties except export
crude oil, diesel oil,international agreeduty on oil from April 1.
electric power, nickel,ments. To apply central- Export duty on oil willcopper, aluminum onized exports only to the be reduced by 50% fromMay 15. To abolish
export of arms andApril 1 and completely
quotas on exceptional
defense-related equipabolished from July 1.
goods at the end of
ment. Export duties will
1994. Export duties will be only measures tobe slashed by December. regulate exports.

To abolish price regula- (No mention)
tions set by monopolist
enterprises and withdrawal of the ceiling of
earning rate, except in
the field of natural
monopoly.

(No mention)

To introduce additional
tax on oil and natural
gas after the liberalization of their prices.

To consolidate all opera- To consolidate all trans- To increase budgetarytions with foreign loans, actions related to foreign revenue by imposing
precious metals and non- exchange, precious
excise on oil, light oil,budgetary funds into a
metals, and gems into
electric energy andsingle federal budget.
the federal budget.
natural gas. To
Transition to the execu- strengthen intertion of the federal
budgetary transfer sysbudget through thetem, to reduce inequality
Treasury (Kaznacheof budgetary spending
istvo) by the end ofamong regions and in
1995. Averageeach region.
monthly excise rate foroil will be indexed
according to Ruble/US
Dollar rates.

To make a plan to receive additional revenue
from tax on energy
related goods.

To introduce a transparent, market-based system of nondiscriminatory access tooil pipelines, effectivefrom April 1. To monitor domestic oil prices.

To enforce antimonopoly law. Plenipotentiary organs will beestablished to regulate
natural monopolies.

UEGAKI AKIRA- 68 -

Monopoly,
naturalmonopoly

Mar. 1992: (1*)
To introduce export
duties to absorb the
difference between
domestic and foreign
prices.

Table 3. Special Assignments to Russia (continued)
Jul. 1997: (6)Exportliberalization,
export quota,
export license- 69 Tax collection,budgetconsolidation,budgetary
revenuetransfer

Jul. 1998: (8)Jul. 1999 : (9)(No mention)

To publish orders on structural To enforce compulsory perireform and new principles for odical reports of monopolized
price formation in the sphere of companies, including Gazelectric energy, the gas indus- prom. To curtail subsidies totry and railway transportation. the gas industry.
Open auction for access to oilpipelines will be organized.

To take several measures to
To make efforts to reduce tax
cut and then extinguish nonarrears in the energy sector
monetary payments in the field including Gazprom. Not toof natural monopoly. Account- permit access to pipelines foring reports of Gazprom, EES
oil companies which have
Rossii, Transneft' will befederal tax arrears.
audited by independent, certificated auditors. To reorganize
Gazprom's regional enterprises
for gas transportation.

To take measures to collect
To take strong measuresunpaid tax from 15 big compa- against companies havingnies. To raise excise on oil. By much unpaid tax (including
April 30, a new law project on organization of special tax
interrelations among federal
inspection).
units and independent regionalorgans will be submitted to theDuma. A plan for the system
of inter-budgetary transfer oftax revenue will be prepared by
July 30.

To take decisive measures
To ensure the transfer of fedagainst big tax payers. To
eral taxes collected in closed
transfer all federal institutions territories to the federal budget.
into the system of budget
To restore the implementation
enforcement through federalof the gas excise tax on antreasury organs. To enlarge the accrual basis.
tax base of excise on gas. To
define conditions for regional
subjects to get transfers, loans
and grants from federal funds.

Note:* = Document No. (see Table 1).

To introduce temporary export
duties on oil, petrochemicals,
timber, ferrous and non-ferrous
metals and other commodities
to increase governmental
revenue.

RUSSIA AND THE IMF

Monopoly,
naturalmonopolyMay 1998: (7)To abolish all the decisions(No mention)
concerning export of oil and oil
products for governmental
needs on March 16. From
January 1, 1998, oil export bygovernmental programs will be
discontinued.

UEGAKI AKIRA

As for the field of “monopoly, natural monopoly,” the dissolution of monopoly in Russia has been, of course, the main concern of the IMF, though any significant dissolution has not takenplace until recently. The IMF was, if anything, interested in the
problem of oil and gas price formation. Here we must pay special
attention to the above-mentioned fact that the domestic prices ofoil and gas were cheaper than the international standard evenunder the monopolistic structure. Therefore the IMF and the Russian government needed a special attitude toward the monopoliesof Russia. This was related to the problems of domestic and export tax collecting. Table 3 further shows that the liberal systemof access to oil pipelines also occupied the attention of the IMF.
Concerning the field of “Tax collection, budget consolidation,
revenue transfers”, most of the issues here are the problems of
how to collect taxes (and unpaid taxes) from the oil and gas industry and how to re-distribute them among Federal units in Russia.6 Here we must note that there are three grounds for the policy
recommended by the IMF. One is to raise tax collection in orderto ease the budgetary deficit. The second is to normalize the pricestructure of natural resources at home and in international transactions. The third is to reduce inequality among federal units incollecting taxes and spending revenues.
In short, the IMF had been very conscious of the specificconditions to Russia and endeavored to cope with them. It is
unfair to criticize the IMF for neglecting Russia’s special economic conditions in its programs. If so, we must investigate how
the Russian government responded to the assignments offered by
the IMF.
1-4. How Did Russia Respond to the Assignments?
Table 4 shows the policies that the Russian government carried out in the three fields of the assignments. By comparing6 The budget consolidation means the unification of special purpose funds
such as “road users’ fund” and “pension fund” into the federal budget.
Even such problems have an important relevance to the oil and gas industry, because crude oil producers were required to pay contributions forthese funds (Considine & Kerr, 2002, pp. 259-261).

- 70 -

RUSSIA AND THE IMF

Table 4 with Table 3, we can see the relationship between Russia
and the IMF in a very concrete way.
At first, it is important to note that the export duties, whichwere recommended by the program of 1992, immediately began
to be reduced during the first year of the reform, but it is alsointeresting that they did not disappear until July 1996, although
the IMF’s programs demanded their reduction and abolishment in
the 1995 program. Table 4 reveals that the export duties on goods
other than oil and gas had been decreasing gradually, whereas
export duties on oil and gas (especially oil) survived long through1996. This may be connected with the government’s needs for
tax revenue that can be most easily attained from the oil and gas
industry. That is why the export duties were re-introduced in
1999 after the currency crisis of 1998.
The second problem evoked from the comparison of the twotables is how to understand the policy on quota and license. We
see curious notions like “strategically important goods,” “centralized exports” and “special exporter status” in Table 4. These are
the words to explain the system in which some exporters are
given a license to deal with “strategically important goods” (forexample, oil and gas) and get quotas to export their products in acentralized administrative way. This system was established inJuly 1992 but had its historical antecedents in the socialist era when
the so-called state monopoly of trade was functioning (Considine &Kerr, 2002, p. 249). What made the situation more complex was
the fact that local authorities had a special interest in selecting
enterprises in their region as special exporters. Such a system is nota favorite way of the IMF and, in fact, it was eager to diminish
and abolish it since the program of 1993, though the Russian government could not thoroughly extinguish it until the end of 1997.
Under the parallel controlled price system of oil, in which theexport prices were higher than domestic prices, it is understandable that to get a quota is “a matter of life and death” for the oiland gas industry in Russia: “The abolition of export quotas would
have diverted most of the oil production in the Russian Federation
to the international non-CIS market, leaving the domestic consumers bereft of supplies” (Considine & Kerr, 2002, p. 248).
- 71 -

UEGAKI AKIRA

Table 4. Russia’s Response to the IMF Assignments
Export liberalization,
export quotas andexport licenses
Jan. 1992: Export duty
introduced for exports including crude oil exports.
Quota and license system is
introduced for exports.
Feb. 1992: The export duty
is reduced and the coverageof tax imposed goods iswidened.

㩷Mar. 1992: The export duty
is reduced.
May 1992: The export duty
is reduced.

Tax collection, budgetaryconsolidation, budgetary
revenue transfer

Monopoly and natural
monopoly
Jan. 1992: State regulations
are introduced on the activi㩷
ties of monopolies.

Feb. 1992: A special regula- Feb. 1992: Royalty paymentstion on monopolies is intro- are introduced for use of the
duced.
subsoil with some exemptions. 40% of the revenue
goes to the Federal government, 30% to the regional
government and 30% to the
local authorities.
Feb. 1992: A geology fee isintroduced. Oil producers are㩷exempted from the levy insome cases.
㩷㩷㩷May 1992: A price regulation tax is introduced.

㩷Jun. 1992: United system ofgas supply is verified to be 㩷of Federal ownership.

Jul. 1992: A system ofregistration of exporting
companies, which deal with"strategically important
goods", is introduced.

㩷㩷㩷
Sep. 1992: The export duty
is reduced.

㩷㩷

Aug. 1992: A price control 㩷
on monopolies is introduced.
Sep. 1992: The price regula㩷tion tax is reduced.
Sep. 1992: Excise is introduced on some types of fuel㩷and energy.
Nov. 1992: The excise isdifferentiated according to㩷production costs. Exemptions
were granted to foreign capital
participating companies.

Jan. 1993: A centralized
export system to meet stateneeds is established. The
quota is provided by competitive bidding. The export duty 㩷is increased with exemptions
provided for centralized
exports and exports underintergovernmental agreements
within the CIS etc.

㩷- 72 -

RUSSIA AND THE IMF
Export liberalization,
export quotas andexport licenses㩷Mar. 1993: Oil exports tomeet state needs are granted
an exemption from mandatory currency conversions.
㩷㩷㩷Monopoly and natural
monopolyFeb. 1993: The state regulated price of natural gas ischanged.

Tax collection, budgetaryconsolidation, budgetary
revenue transfer
Feb. 1993: Transfer ofrevenues into the Price Regulation Fund from oil and gas
companies is abolished. Priceregulation tax is reduced.

May. 1993: A price-freeze
policy on oil products (retail 㩷
price) is lifted [the freeze policy
was introduced in April].
Jul. 1993: The price regula㩷tion tax is abolished.
Jul. 1993: The average㩷
excise on oil increased.
Sep. 1993: The average
excise is reduced with differ㩷
entiation from zero to 42%
according to production costs.

Nov. 1993: The export duty 㩷㩷is reduced.
Dec. 1993: The exemption
Dec. 1993: The geology fee
from mandatory currency
is differentiated.
conversions for exporters forstate needs is extended until
1 Jul. 1994. Exporters of oil, 㩷
gas and other related products for state needs are
exempted from export duty
from 1 January 1994.
Mar. 1994: A resolution of
the government is issued "OnState program for demonopolization of the econ㩷㩷
omy and development ofcompetition in the market of
the Russian Federation" inwhich a system to observe
natural monopolies is planned.
Apr. 1994: The excise ischanged from a percentage㩷㩷
as valorem tax to an equivalent Rbl./t tax.
May 1994: A decree on thecancellation of quotas andlicensing for exports includ- 㩷㩷ing quotas imposed on“strategically important
goods” is issued.
Jul. 1994: The system ofexport quotas and licenses isabolished. The introduction 㩷㩷of new regulations on crude
oil and petroleum products isdelayed until 1 Jan. 1995.

- 73 -

UEGAKI AKIRA
Export liberalization,
Tax collection, budgetary
Monopoly and natural
export quotas andconsolidation, budgetarymonopolyexport licenses
revenue transfer
May-Oct. 1994: Mazut㩷(Heavy oil) exports are duty 㩷free [tax holiday].
Dec. 1994: A resolution isissued to abolish export
quotas, while retaining a㩷measure of control over the 㩷
oil industry through themaintenance of the "special
exporter" status.
Dec. 1994: Mazut (Heavy㩷oil) exports are banned until 㩷Mar. 1995.
Jan. 1995: The export dutyon oil is reduced and that on㩷gas is increased. The system 㩷of quotas and licenses on oil
and oil products is lifted.
Feb. 1995: The principal ofequal access to pipelines is㩷established with some priori- 㩷ties for identified oil producers and joint ventures.
Mar. 1995: The profitability㩷ceiling is abolished for crude 㩷
oil and petroleum products.
Mar. 1995: Presidential
decree "On measures forstate regulation of natural
monopolies in the RussianFederation" is issued. A㩷㩷
federal institution is planned
to be established with theauthority to supervise accessto pipelines and other activities.
Mar. 1995: A decree isMar. 1995: The excise on
issued for disbanding thegas provided by Gazprom is㩷institution of special exportincreased.
ers.
Apr. 1995: Yeltsin announced that the export duty 㩷㩷will be gradually reduced
and abolished.
Oct. 1995: Price-freezing forsome goods and services
including gas is introduced 㩷and planned to continue until
1 Jan. 1996.
Jan. 1996: All export duties
㩷
except those on oil, gas and 㩷other materials are abolished.

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RUSSIA AND THE IMF
Export liberalization,
Tax collection, budgetary
Monopoly and natural
export quotas andconsolidation, budgetarymonopolyexport licenses
revenue transfer
Jan. 1996: The centralized
export system is replaced by 㩷㩷a system of "export for Stateneeds".
Feb. 1996: A ceiling forprices of natural monopolies㩷is introduced and planned to 㩷
be effective until the end of
1996.
Feb. 1996: A resolution isissued to make a list of㩷
economic units which have a 㩷market share of 35% ormore.
Apr. 1996: The export duty
Apr. 1996: The excise on oil㩷on oil is reduced. Other
is increased.
export duty is abolished.
Jun. 1996: The maximum㩷㩷rate of the excise is raised.
Jun. 1996: The excise isreformed and differentiated㩷㩷further according to newfield categories.
Jul. 1996: The averageJul. 1996: All export duties 㩷default rate of excise isare abolished.
raised.
Jan. 1997: Gas prices aredifferentiated according to㩷㩷transportation costs of different places.
Apr. 1997: The maximum㩷㩷rate of the excise is raised.
Jul. 1997: Gas companies
other than Gazprom become 㩷㩷able to use Gazprom's pipelines.
Jan. 1998: The system of"exports for State needs" is 㩷㩷abolished.
Jan. 1999: The export duties
on several goods including Jan. 1999: Regulations on
Jan. 1999: The excise on
crude oil, heavy oil, liquefied monopolized prices arenatural gas is reduced.
introduced.
natural gas and petroleum
products are re-introduced.
Jan.-Dec. 2000: The export Jan.-Dec. 2000: Prices of gas
duties on oil and oil prodand tariffs for (gas) pipeline Jan. 2000: The excise on oil
ucts, are increased severaltransportation are increased is unified.
times during 2000.
several times during 2000.
Sources: Considine and Kerr, 2002, pp.252-263; ROTOBO Research Monthly and otherlegal materials.

- 75 -

UEGAKI AKIRAIn the field of “Monopoly and natural monopoly,” we canfind much evidence that the government tried to hold the reins of
the monopolized oil and gas industry and keep prices within acceptable limits. Here Russia is facing a well-known dilemma thata liberal price policy would lead to free activities of monopolizedcompanies and high prices for their products. It is also interesting
to see that the government allowed the retail prices of oil and gas
to be raised faster than wholesale prices. Table 5 shows the process of price leveling between Russian and world market prices.
This suggests the slowness of price leveling of wholesale prices.
Table 5. Russian Oil Prices Compared with World Prices (%)
Crude Oil
Russian Federation
Producer Prices*
Expressed as a
Percentage of UK
Brent Blend㩷

Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
DieselRussian Federation Russian Federation Russian Federation
Heavy Oil Prices* Gasoline Prices*
Diesel Fuel Oil
Expressed as a
Expressed as a
Prices* Expressed
Percentage of Spot Percentage of Spot as a Percentage ofMarket Prices atMarket Prices at
Spot Market ProdRotterdam
Rotterdam
uct Prices at Rot(unleaded gasoline) terdam
1.71
1.50
1.41

1990

0.74

1995

38.99

53.05

76.05

73.20

1997

47.93

80.13

81.54

95.98

Note: * = Calculated in US$ by using Moscow Interbank Auction Exchange Rates.
Source: Considine & Kerr, 2002, pp. 267-273.

As for the domestic tax, there were several kinds of taxes andother deductions on the oil and gas companies including priceregulation tax, royalties, geology fees and excises. Generally
speaking, there has been a tendency that taxes other than excises
have been disappearing, but geology fees and royalties still existed even in 2001. It must be noted that the geology fees androyalties are revenues of regional budgets (Tabata, 2002, p. 620).
It is important to note that there was a shift of the policy fromexport duties to domestic excises in April 1996, which was prescribed in the program of 1996. This shift had a special meaning
for the oil and gas industry, because the export duties have been
mainly paid by oil companies whereas the gas companies, including subordinate organizations, paid many excises (Tabata, 2002, p.
619). This shift must be in line with the IMF’s consideration that- 76 -

RUSSIA AND THE IMF

taxes on the border would disturb the rational and liberal systemof trade. However, it also had a concrete influence on the profitability of individual companies that would bring the government
and the IMF into the muddle of political-economic interests.
1-5. Dilemmas Faced by the Government and the IMF
The examination above leads us to the conclusion that there
were some dilemmas in the policy decisions of the Russian government and the IMF. Firstly there was the dilemma of “Pricecontrol on monopolies vs. liberal price policy.” This is a wellknown dilemma of economic policy, but in the case of Russia the
IMF was obliged to consider some special conditions. That is, theprices of oil and gas were exempted from price liberalization at
the beginning of 1992 and were kept under government control.
Furthermore, the oil and gas companies were semi-governmentalorganizations and some IMF-oriented leaders of the government
were involved in their management. Therefore if monopolized
prices are to be controlled against genuine liberal thinking7, thenegotiations will not be held between the government and themonopoly but within the government. Although the IMF tried toreduce the extra-profits of the oil and gas companies throughprice policies, its efforts were not enough to settle the problems.
The second dilemma is closely and confusingly connectedwith the first one. That is, the dilemma of “To raise oil and gas
prices to international standards vs. to keep cheap energy prices
for the people.” As explained above, the prices of oil and gas
were much cheaper than those of the international market and thegovernment was to raise those prices to the international standard
not to disturb the order of the price system of the world energy
market. In contrast, the Russian people were accustomed tocheap energy prices and could not have put up with higher energy
prices without some structural price and wage reforms. According to one report, Gaidar refused to include oil prices in the priceliberalization on January 2, 1992 because the freed oil prices
7 According to genuine liberal thinking, a monopoly has a right to settle its
prices freely and those prices cannot be controlled by the government.

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UEGAKI AKIRA

would have compelled the government to pay a huge sum of subsidies to farmers and municipal citizens in order to counterbalance the increased prices of fuel for tractors and family heating,which would have destroyed the purpose of stabilization in the“Shock Therapy program.”8 Gaidar’s worry was a clear expression of this dilemma. One solution to this dilemma is to introduce
export duties, which would have no influence on domestic prices;
however this would generate another dilemma.
The third dilemma is “Tax on the border vs. inland tax.”
Tax on the border is a solution to settle the second dilemma above.
However, it is inconsistent with the general policy line of the IMF.
From the liberal point of view, any tax on the border, even if it is
not an import tariff but an export duty, would isolate the domestic
from the international market and distort the resource allocationof a country. Therefore the IMF recommended a shift from export duties to excises even though it would lead to an increase indomestic energy prices. But here appeared another problem.
There still existed the system of export quotas and export licenses
and, compared with that system, the export duty was more transparent and would have generated a lesser extent of corruption.
The export duty was more recommendable in this regard. Furthermore, the export tax is easier to collect than various inlandtaxes. This was why the government could not abolish the export
duty completely. The IMF’s standpoint has wavered among these
considerations.
The fourth dilemma is “Dissolution of Monopolies vs. tax
revenues.” Some of the above-mentioned dilemmas can be resolved
by dissolution of monopolies. However this is the most delicate
political and economic problem in Russia. At least, from an economic point of view, the dissolution of a monopoly would breakthe most profitable tax base of the country. In spring 2000, Rem
Viakhirev, the chairman of the Gasprom group, suggested dissolution of his group but it is said that he was only bluffing. He
wanted to emphasize that the government would lose its large tax
revenues by the dissolution of Gasprom (Shiobara, 2001, p. 15).
8 Kotz & Weir, 1997 (Japanese version), p. 275.

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RUSSIA AND THE IMF

The dilemmas that the Russian government and the IMF
faced reveal that the situation in Russia was much more complicated than that expected by the IMF. The IMF could not reconcile the problems in a consistent way. However the complexity
led to one simple result.

2. Russia’s Macro-economy and the IMF
2-1. Current Account Surplus and the IMF
Here is one simple fact that we must pay special attention to.
That is, the current account of the balance of payments of Russia
has recorded surplus every year except 1997.9 The only factor
contributing to the continuing surplus of the current account was
the surplus in the goods trade, which recorded surpluses from1991 through 2002 including 1997. Fig. 1 shows how big thegoods trade surplus of the Soviet Union/Russian Federation was
until 2002. The surplus rate in the graph means “exports minus
imports” divided by “exports plus imports.” This rate had been
fluctuating around 5% during the period of Perestroika and fell
into deficit in the last years of the Soviet Union. After entering
the new period of independent Russia, the rate jumped to around
15%. Though the rate showed a downward trend in 1997 and1998, it received an upward momentum again in 1999 andreached a tremendous rate of 40% in 2000. These figures can be
regarded as historically high considering the fact that the averagesurplus rate of Japan was 13.90% in the 1980s (1981-90) and18.97% in the 1990s (91-99),10 at a time when the trade surplus ofJapan was criticized by many trading partners as evidence of “unfair” trade policies.

9 The latest revised version of the balance of payments (on 5 Jan. 2003)
shows a deficit of US$80 million in 1997, though the earlier version (forexample, on 2 Oct. 1998) recorded a considerable surplus (US$3,335 million).
10 Calculated by the author by using IFS.

- 79 -

UEGAKI AKIRA

Fig. 1. Surplus Rate (%)
45.0
40.0
35.0
30.0

%

25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
-5.0

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002year
Surplus rate = (Export -Import)/(Export +Import) [%]Table 6 shows the significance of current account surpluses
and net exports in the Russian macro economy. The percentagesof current account surplus in GDP in 1999-2002 and net exports
in 1998-2001 are, of course, very high, but the figures in 19941996 are not so low by international standards. The percentage ofcurrent account surplus in the GDP of Japan in 1986 was 4.42%,
which was the highest level in the postwar period.
Table 6. Significance of Net Export and Current Account Surplus* ( % of GDP)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000** 2001** 2002
[1] Net export ofgoods andservices
4.6
3.5
4.1
2.9
7.2 17.1
20.1
12.9 㩷
[2] Current
account surplus 㩷
2.1
2.6 -0.1
0.1 13.2
18.4
11.3 9.41
Note: * : [2] = [1] + Net reception of Income (Compensation of employees and Investment income)and Current Transfer.
** : According to the estimate of the IMF, [2] was 17.2% in 2000 and 10.5% in 2001 (IMF,
2003b, p.14).
Sources: [1] = NSR, 1994-2001, p.58.
[2] = Calculated by the author from the data of NSR, IFS, Tseny v Rossii, and Web page ofBank Rossii.

A macro economic analysis of this situation would lead to aconclusion that private savings in Russia could not find the opportunity for domestic investment in 1994-96 and 1998-2001. As- 80 -

RUSSIA AND THE IMF

for the years 1992-93, though an accurate analysis cannot be conducted because of the lack of reliable data, we can envisage asimilar picture if we take account of the large trade surplus andstagnated domestic economy at the time.
The important thing for us is the fact that at the core of thestructure exists the oil, gas and petroleum industry. The surplusof the goods trade, and therefore the surplus of the current account, can be attributed to oil, gas and petroleum exports. Theirprofits have not been re-invested in their own industries but
poured into the trade and transportation sector (see the last part ofthis section). Did the IMF have a sufficient understanding of thissituation?
There is much evidence which leads us to suspect that the
IMF did not expect such a large current account surplus in Russia.
The Memorandum of March 1992 [Document No. 1] reads“these changes of the currency and foreign trade system withappropriate macroeconomic policy will considerably improve theperspective of the Russian balance of payments. However, in1992 the situation of balance of payments remains very serious
mainly because of the solvency crisis in 1991 and the bewilderment of the economic and financial system... A further decreasein exports is expected, because the absence of key productive
resources – raw materials and equipment – will bring large costs
not only for production but also for export. Even if any increaseof gross imports is not expected, demand for foreign financing
will be considerable” (EZh, No. 10, 1992, p. 5). Here is expressed a worry about decreasing exports because of the destruction of production. In reality, exports did not decrease as much as
expected, whereas imports decreased drastically. Therefore thetrade and current account balance maintained a good relationshipin 1991 and 1992 (see Fig. 1).
The Statement of March 1995 [Document No. 4] referred tointernational reserves. It asserted that the Central Bank of Russia
would manage the volume and the structure of official net international reserves in line with the general objectives of credit andfinancial policies. According to the Statement, “the Gross Inter-- 81 -

UEGAKI AKIRA

national Reserves of Monetary Authorities” 11 must not be lessthan US$11 billion at the end of 1995 (DK, No. 3, 1995, p. 7). In
reality the Gross Reserves were US$17.2 billion on 1 January
1996 (VBR, No. 62, 1996, pp. 57-58). As the increase of international reserves is a result of the surplus of current account, thisreveals that the IMF and the Russian government/CBR underestimated the problem of the Russian current account surplus.
The same document argued that the government would takemeasures to stimulate exports and the inflow of foreign capital,
especially in the form of portfolio investment (DK, No. 3, 1995,
pp. 7-8). Of course foreign investment, especially direct investment, is necessary even when the current account is in surplus.
However, the policy mix of export stimulation and the introduction of foreign portfolio investment is a result of an understandingthat the trade balance was in danger and domestic saving wasinsufficient. Again this was not the case.
In the Statement of February 1996 [Document No. 5], thecurrent account balance was said to have become worse becauseof the revival of investment and the drop of the private saving ratein the environment of lower inflation and the slower rate of value
erosion of real assets (DK, No. 3, 1996, p. 4). Here the writers of
the Statement anticipated that the stabilized economy would increase imports of investment goods under the circumstance of theshortage of domestic private saving. The year 1996 did not experience such events. The current account in 1996 recorded far
more surplus than in 1994 and 1995.12
The Statement of July 1997 [Document No. 6] anticipated theGross International Reserve of Currency Authorities would reachabout US$19 billion at the end of 1997 (DK, No. 7, 1997, p. 6).
This target was already achieved at the beginning of June when
the Reserve was more than US$20 billion. The figure increased
to US$24.5 billion by July 1 and kept a high level until the begin11 Central Bank of Russia and Ministry of Finance.
12  As for the Gross International Reserve of Currency Authorities, theStatement anticipates US$20 billion, which is more than in reality. Thismight be connected with the intervention of the CBR in the Ruble-Dollar
market.

- 82 -

RUSSIA AND THE IMF

ning of November. 13 The sudden decrease of the Reserve occurred in November, caused by the international financial disorder starting from Eastern Asia. Since 1996, the Russian government had been taking measures to introduce foreign portfolio
investment and by the middle of 1997 the Russian financial market was deeply involved in world financial competition. Much
short-term capital fled the country and the CBR had to make efforts to keep the currency band (Corridor) using its Reserve. In
only one month the Reserve decreased to the level of US$16.8
billion. In fact, in 1997 the current account fell into deficit andthe Reserve decreased. However the reasons for this were not inline with what the IMF expected.
Right before the August Crisis of 1998, two Statements[Documents No. 7 and No. 8] were issued in which tax collection
and budgetary expenditure were the key issues. As for the international reserve, both documents referred to the sensitive problemof the relation between the reserve assets and the domestic currency circulation, which would have an influence on the interests’
structure of the domestic financial market. The documents considered the very technical problem of whether “to resort or not toresort to the so-called sterilization policy.” This reveals that theRussian Federation was in a delicate position in the international
financial arena.
Surprisingly the current account itself was not mentioned ineither document, though the current account deficit grew rapidly
for the first time since 1992. It is widely believed that one of themain reasons for the current account deficit at the time was theovervalued Ruble under the “Corridor” system. However the
documents insisted on a stabilized Ruble and refused to allow the
Ruble to be depreciated (VPRG, 16, May 1998, p. 4, 22 Aug.
1998, p. 4). Here we see an overly stylized thinking pattern inwhich emphasis was put on the problems of financial mechanisms
and the real economy with its strong oil and gas industry andweak light industry was ignored.
13 The data on international reserves are available at the Website of the
Bank of Russia [http://www.Cbr.ru/].

- 83 -

UEGAKI AKIRAThe IMF was afraid of a current account deficit when the
Russian Federation was accumulating much surplus, whereas it
ignored the problem when the current account was falling into
deficit. To begin with we must understand that the IMF was anorganization that would help a country in a temporary payments
crisis. After it shifted its focus to middle/long term structuralreforms, it maintained its main policy stance in which it will helpa country with a large external debt which cannot be repaid because of current account deficit. The IMF recommends that sucha country tighten the fiscal balance and abandon ineffective industries. According to the IMF, protective measures must not betaken to cut the current account deficit. Rather the country must
open up its borders, expose its industries to international competition and introduce foreign investment. In order to introduce foreign investment, the country must liberalize its international financial system to the effect that capital could move freely throughthe border.
However, Russia is not a country that the IMF had been accustomed to dealing with. Especially we must note the fact thatafter the opening of the financial borders, capital did not so muchcome in but rather fled from the country.
2-2. Revenues of the Oil and Gas Industry and the Liberalized International Financial System
Kuboniwa (2001, 2002) and Tabata (2002) found an interesting fact by using I-O tables of the Russian Federation. According
to them “most oil and gas export revenues are registered in Russian statistics as trade and transportation margins,” and “half ofthe value added originating in the oil and gas industry was recorded in statistics outside of this production sector” (Tabata,
2002, p. 614). More interestingly, they argue that the oil and gas
sector “has not contributed to the state budget proportionally.”
Tabata posits that the oil and gas companies succeeded in evading
tax payments by changing their organizational structure and transferring a substantial amount of profits to their subsidiaries in the
trade and transportation sectors (Tabata, 2002, p. 622). Kuboniwa sets up a hypothesis that the trade activity in oil and gas- 84 -

RUSSIA AND THE IMF

exports is one of the main sources of capital flight from the Russian Federation (Kuboniwa, 2001, p. 157).
The problem is very sensitive and may have some relation
with criminal activities. Therefore foreign researchers face information secrecy and could not follow the real route of money
flows. Nevertheless, we must note the important fact that thesemoney flows have a close connection with the liberalization of
the international financial system strongly recommended by the
IMF.
As is widely known, the liberalization of an international financial system proceeds in two stages. The first stage is liberalization of current transactions and the second is liberalization ofcapital transactions. If a country does not impose any restrictions
on current transactions, it is deemed that it accepts Article VIII of
the IMF Agreement. Many students of international finance anddevelopment economics think that acceptance of Article VIII isonly a starting point and that the problem is whether to go beyond
Article VIII or not.
Also in Russia, the IMF recommended acceptance of theconditions of Article VIII from the beginning. The Memorandumof 1992 [Document No. 1] refers to the new law named “Currency Regulations and Currency Controls,” which enables Russia
to secure convertibility of the Ruble on current transactions forresidents and non-residents. It is very important that banks wereallowed to open foreign currency accounts (EZh, No. 10, 1992, p.
5). In fact the law was issued in June 1992. In the Statement of1993 [Document No. 2], participation of non-residents in the foreign currency markets was to be made more liberal (RV, 1 Jul.
1993, p. 7). The Statement of 1995 [Document No. 4] said that
the Government of Russia and the CBR would talk with the IMF
on acceptance of Article VIII (DK, No. 3, 1995, p. 7). Russia
fully achieved Article VIII status of the IMF on June 1, 1996
(Sapozhnikov, 1999, p. 81).
In the series of discussions there is one striking feature. Thatis, free transactions of foreign and national currencies for nonresidents are repeatedly mentioned, but those for residents haveno special reference except in general expressions. This does not- 85 -

UEGAKI AKIRA

mean that the IMF would like to restrict transactions by Russian
residents, but rather that it was only indifferent to the matter, atleast for the first half of the ’90s. This is in line with the attitudesof the IMF toward developing countries. In the case of developing countries, the key problem is how to leave non-residents free
to have foreign and national currencies in the accounts of resident
banks and repatriate them to the home countries. The foreign
currency account of residents is out of the IMF’s interest because
residents with much foreign currency are few in developing countries. However in Russia there are big companies that have considerable foreign currency in the form of cash or deposits in resident and non-resident banks. These are oil and gas companies
and their affiliates.
As for the capital transactions, the government began to takemeasures to introduce foreign capital into the Russian market in
1996. Here again the freedom of residents to “export capital” wasnot the main concern of the IMF and the Russian government. It
is true that there have been many restrictive decrees and laws on
the free transformation of capital in Russia and many businesspersons criticized Russia for not opening up the country fully tothe international financial market. However, the residents’ freedom of capital transactions was not a matter of concern of the
IMF. Besides, it is not necessary to have full freedom for people
who are eager to make fortunes using the slightest weakness of
the legal institutions. This is different from the bureaucratic problems that foreigners in good faith face when they try to transfer
dollars or bring back Rubles to their home countries. Layard andParker wrote,
In theory dollars were not to be bought as an investment (for“capital-account” purchases) and certainly not held outside thecountry or invested in property overseas. But in practice this rule
was never enforced strongly. In any case, an exporter was always
allowed to retain half of his export earnings in foreign exchange.
Thus Russia had close to full currency convertibility (for current
and capital purposes) from the beginning of the reform. Moreover,banks today are explicitly allowed to adopt an open position in dollars up to specified limits. That is the position for Russians (though
they do not all fully understand it) (Layard & Parker, 1996, p. 63).

- 86 -

RUSSIA AND THE IMF

These words are interesting because they were not written by
those who are critical of the liberal strategy of Yeltsin but those
who are highly praising it. It is especially important that they are
unconsciously talking about residents’ freedoms. Here we see afreedom that the Russian oil and gas industry has been enjoying.

Conclusion
The IMF did not ignore the particular nature of Russia, inwhich the oil and gas industries play a tremendously importantrole in its economy. However, its recognition was too simplistic
to understand the complexity of the matter. Especially the IMF
did not properly relate the problems of revenue flows of the oiland gas industries with the macro economy and international financial system of Russia. That was a big mistake.

References
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1-26.
Camdessus, Michel, Supporting Transition in Central and Eastern
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Experience. IMF’s Webpage, 1994 [http://www.imf.org/external/np/
mds/1995/MDS9502.HTM].
Camdessus, Michel, Russia: Stabilization and Reform. IMF’s Webpage,
1996 [http://www.imf.org/external/np/mds/1996/MDS9604.HTM].
Considine, Jennifer I. and William A. Kerr, The Russian Oil Economy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002
Evrensel, Ayse Y., “Effectiveness of IMF-Supported Stabilization Programs in Developing Countries,” Journal of International Moneyand Finance, 21: 565-587, 2002
Fischer, Stanley, The Russian Economy at the Start of 1998. IMF’s
Webpage, 1998 [www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/010998.HTM].
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Washington, DC, July 20, 1998 [http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/
ft/scr/1998/PR9831.HTM].
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Country Report No. 99/100]. Washington, DC, September, 1999
[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/1999/cr99100.pdf].
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Staff Country Report No. 00/145]. Washington, DC, November,2000 [http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2000/cr00145.pdf].
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and Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion[IMF Country Report No. 02/74]. Washington, DC, April, 2002.
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2003a,
IMF, Russian Federation: Financial System Stability Assessment [IMFCountry Report No. 3/147]. Washington, DC, May, 2003b.
Kotz, David M. and Fred Weir, Revolution from Above: The Demiseof the Soviet System. Routledge, 1997 [Japanese translation:
Uekara no Kakumei: Soren Taisei no Shuen, translated by Yasumasa Tsunoda, published by Shinhyoron Ltd. in 2000].
Kuboniwa, Masaaki, “Rosia Shijou Keizaika no Tokuisei, Shougyou
Margin no Bunseki wo Chuushin to Shite” (in Japanese), Keizai
Kenkyu (The Institute of Economic Studies, Hitotsubashi Univ.), 52,
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Kuboniwa, Masaaki, “An Analysis of Singularities of Russia’s Marketization Using Input-Output Tables,” The Journal of EconometricStudy of Northeast Asia, 4-1, 2002.
Layard, Richard, and John Parker, The Coming Russian Boom: A
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Sapozhnikov, N. V., Valiutnye operatsii kommercheskikh bankov, Pravovoe regulirovanie. Moscow, 1999.
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610-627, 2002.

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RUSSIA AND THE IMF
Abbreviations of Periodicals and Statistics
DK [Den’gi i kredit]
EZh [Ekonomika i zhizn’/ Ekonomicheskaia gazeta]
NSR [Natsional’nye scheta Rossii]
RTs [Rossiia v tsifrakh]
RG [Rossiiskaia gazeta]
RSE [Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik]
VPRG [Vedomstvennoe prilozhenie Rossiiskoi gazety]
VBR [Vestnik Banka Rossii]- 89 -