Unclassified

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

26-Nov-2012___________________________________________________________________________________________English text only
NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCYCOMMITTEE ON THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONSNEA/CSNI/R(2012)16
Unclassified
OECD-NEA Piping Failure Data Exchange Project (OECD-NEA OPDE) Final Report

JT03331584
English text only

Complete document available on OLIS in its original format
This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation ofinternational frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENTThe OECD is a unique forum where the governments of 34 democracies work together to address the economic, socialand environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to understand and to help
governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate governance, the information economy and thechallenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides a setting where governments can compare policy
experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international
policies.
The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The European Commission takes part in the work of theOECD.
OECD Publishing disseminates widely the results of the Organisation’s statistics gathering and research on economic,
social and environmental issues, as well as the conventions, guidelines and standards agreed by its members.

This work is published on the responsibility of the OECD Secretary-General.
The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official
views of the Organisation or of the governments of its member countries.

NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCYThe OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) was established on 1 February 1958. Current NEA membership consists of
30 OECD member countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom
and the United States. The European Commission also takes part in the work of the Agency.
The mission of the NEA is:– to assist its member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international co-operation, thescientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe, environmentally friendly and economical use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as well as–

to provide authoritative assessments and to forge common understandings on key issues, as input to government
decisions on nuclear energy policy and to broader OECD policy analyses in areas such as energy and sustainable
development.

Specific areas of competence of the NEA include the safety and regulation of nuclear activities, radioactive waste
management, radiological protection, nuclear science, economic and technical analyses of the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear law
and liability, and public information.
The NEA Data Bank provides nuclear data and computer program services for participating countries. In these andrelated tasks, the NEA works in close collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, with which it
has a Co-operation Agreement, as well as with other international organisations in the nuclear field.

Corrigenda to OECD publications may be found online at: www.oecd.org/publishing/corrigenda.
© OECD 2011
You can copy, download or print OECD content for your own use, and you can include excerpts from OECD publications, databases and multimedia
products in your own documents, presentations, blogs, websites and teaching materials, provided that suitable acknowledgment of the OECD as source
and copyright owner is given. All requests for public or commercial use and translation rights should be submitted to rights@oecd.org. Requests for
permission to photocopy portions of this material for public or commercial use shall be addressed directly to the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) at
info@copyright.com or the Centre français d'exploitation du droit de copie (CFC) contact@cfcopies.com.

2

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16
THE COMMITTEE ON THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS“The Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) shall be responsible for theactivities of the Agency that support maintaining and advancing the scientific and technical knowledge
base of the safety of nuclear installations, with the aim of implementing the NEA Strategic Plan for 20112016 and the Joint CSNI/CNRA Strategic Plan and Mandates for 2011-2016 in its field of competence.
The Committee shall constitute a forum for the exchange of technical information and forcollaboration between organisations, which can contribute, from their respective backgrounds in research,development and engineering, to its activities. It shall have regard to the exchange of information between
member countries and safety R&D programmes of various sizes in order to keep all member countries
involved in and abreast of developments in technical safety matters.
The Committee shall review the state of knowledge on important topics of nuclear safety scienceand techniques and of safety assessments, and ensure that operating experience is appropriately accounted
for in its activities. It shall initiate and conduct programmes identified by these reviews and assessments inorder to overcome discrepancies, develop improvements and reach consensus on technical issues ofcommon interest. It shall promote the co-ordination of work in different member countries that serve tomaintain and enhance competence in nuclear safety matters, including the establishment of joint
undertakings, and shall assist in the feedback of the results to participating organisations. The Committee
shall ensure that valuable end-products of the technical reviews and analyses are produced and available tomembers in a timely manner.
The Committee shall focus primarily on the safety aspects of existing power reactors, othernuclear installations and the construction of new power reactors; it shall also consider the safety
implications of scientific and technical developments of future reactor designs.
The Committee shall organise its own activities. Furthermore, it shall examine any other mattersreferred to it by the Steering Committee. It may sponsor specialist meetings and technical working groups
to further its objectives. In implementing its programme the Committee shall establish co-operative
mechanisms with the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities in order to work with that Committee
on matters of common interest, avoiding unnecessary duplications.
The Committee shall also co-operate with the Committee on Radiation Protection and Public
Health, the Radioactive Waste Management Committee, the Committee for Technical and Economic
Studies on Nuclear Energy Development and the Fuel Cycle and the Nuclear Science Committee on
matters of common interest.”

3

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

4

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Structural integrity of piping systems is important for plant safety and operability. In recognition of this,information on degradation and failure of piping components and systems is collected and evaluated byregulatory agencies, international organisations (e.g., OECD/NEA and IAEA) and industry organisations
worldwide to provide systematic feedback for example to reactor regulation and research and development
programmes associated with ageing phenomena, non-destructive examination (NDE) technology, inservice inspection (ISI) programmes, leak-before-break evaluations, risk-informed ISI, and probabilistic
safety assessment (PSA) applications involving passive component reliability.
Several OECD Member countries agreed to establish the OECD-NEA Piping Failure Data Exchange
Project (OECD-NEA OPDE) to encourage multilateral co-operation in the collection and analysis of data
relating to degradation and failure of piping in nuclear power plants. The scope of the data collection
includes service-induced wall thinning, part through-wall cracks, through-wall cracks with and without
active leakage, and instances of significant degradation of piping pressure boundary integrity.
The project was formally launched in May 2002 under the auspices of the OECD/NEA. Organisations
producing or regulating more than 80 % of nuclear energy generation worldwide contributed data to theOECD-NEA OPDE data project. In February 2009, eleven countries1 signed the OECD OPDE 3rd Termagreement (Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Korea (Republic of), Japan, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland and United States of America). Upon completion of the 3rd Term (May 2011), theOPDE data project was officially closed to be succeeded by the OECD-NEA “Component Operational
Experience, Degradation & Ageing Programme” (CODAP).
A key accomplishment of the OPDE project is the establishment of a framework for the systematiccollection and evaluation of service-induced piping degradation and failure. Numerous databaseapplication projects have been pursued by the project members. These applications have been essential in
improving database structure and database field definitions. Looking forward, CODAP will serve as animportant resource for nuclear engineering professionals actively involved in plant ageing management
research as well as in the validation of degradation mechanism mitigation strategies.
This final project report describes the status of the OECD-NEA OPDE database after 9 years of operationfrom May 2002 to May 2011, and gives some insights based on ca. 3800 piping failure events in the
database.

1

Belgium participated in the project during the 1st and 2nd terms but decided not to participate in the 3rd term (2008-2011) of the
project.

5

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

6

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

TABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 5
FIGURES ........................................................................................................................................................ 8
TABLES ......................................................................................................................................................... 8
1.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 92.

OPDE OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE........................................................................................................ 11

3.

OPDE ORGANISATION ...................................................................................................................... 15

4.

QUALITY ASSURANCE & DATA QUALITY .................................................................................. 17

5.

OPDE DATABASE STRUCTURE ...................................................................................................... 19

6.

OPDE DATABASE FINAL VERSION................................................................................................ 23

7.

WORKSHOPS AND DATABASE APPLICATIONS ......................................................................... 31

8.

DATABASE ACCESSIBILITY ........................................................................................................... 33

9.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PLANS............................................................................................ 35

10.

REFERENCES................................................................................................................................... 37

11.

BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................................. 39

APPENDIX A: LIST OF POTENTIAL DATABASE APPLICATIONS .................................................... 41
APPENDIX B: OPDE PROJECT REVIEW GROUP PRG ACTIVITY REPORT ..................................... 43

7

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

FIGURES

Figure 1: OPDE 2008:1 Database Opening Screen ...................................................................................... 19
Figure 2: Database Input Forms .................................................................................................................... 20
Figure 3: Database Tables & Roll-Down Menus .......................................................................................... 20
Figure 4: Database Sample Queries .............................................................................................................. 21
Figure 5: Database Relationships.................................................................................................................. 21
Figure 6: An Example of Nuclear Power Plant Information in OPDE ......................................................... 22
Figure 7: OPDE Database Structure ............................................................................................................. 23
Figure 8: Pipe Degradation & Failure by Calendar Year.............................................................................. 26
Figure 9: Pipe Degradation & Failure as a Function of In-Service Time [Years] ........................................ 27
Figure 10: Socket Weld Failures in the database ......................................................................................... 27
Figure 11: Stress Corrosion Cracking as a Function of Time ...................................................................... 28
Figure 12: OPDE Data Submissions by Geographical Region……………………………………………. 29
Figure 13: Flow of Information for a Typical Database Application .......................................................... 32

TABLES

Table 1: OPDE Completeness Index (CI) Definitions .................................................................................. 18
Table 2: High-Level Summary (i) of Database Content ............................................................................... 25
Table 3: High-Level Summary (ii) of Database Content .............................................................................. 25
Table 4: Project Review Group Meetings 2002-2011 .................................................................................. 43

8

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

1.

INTRODUCTION

Structural integrity of piping systems is important for plant safety and operability. In recognition of this,information on degradation and failure of piping components and systems is collected and evaluated byregulatory agencies, international organisations (e.g., OECD/NEA and IAEA) and industry organisations
worldwide to provide systematic feedback for example to reactor regulation and research and development
programmes associated with ageing phenomena, non-destructive examination (NDE) technology, inservice inspection (ISI) programmes, leak-before-break evaluations, risk-informed ISI, and probabilistic
safety assessment (PSA) applications involving passive component reliability.
Reviews of service experience with safety-related and non safety-related piping systems have been ongoingever since the first commercial nuclear power plants came on line in the 1960’s. In 1975 the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission established a Pipe Crack Study Group (PCSG) charged with the task of evaluating thesignificance of stress corrosion cracking in boiling water reactors (BWRs) and pressurised water reactors(PWRs). Service experience review was a key aspect of the work by the PCSG. Major condensate andfeedwater piping failures (e.g., Trojan and Surry-2 in the U.S.) due to flow accelerated corrosion (FAC) resulted
in similar national and international initiatives to learn from service experience and to develop mitigation
strategies to prevent recurrence of pipe failures. Early indications of the significance of thermal fatigue
phenomena evolved in the 1970s, and, again, systematic reviews of the service experience enabled theintroduction of improved piping design solutions, NDE methods, and operating practices.
In parallel with these focused efforts to evaluate service experience data and to correlate the occurrence ofmaterial degradation with piping design and operational parameters, initiatives have been presented toestablish an international forum for the systematic collection and exchange of service experience data on
piping. An obstacle to the use of the database by other countries of national qualitative and quantitative
pipe failure information is that criteria and interpretations applied in the collection and analysis of eventsand data differ among the various countries. A further impediment is that the descriptions of reported
events and their root causes and underlying contributing factors, which are important to the assessment of
the events, are usually written in the native language of the countries where the events were observed.
To overcome these obstacles, the preparation for the OECD Pipe Failure Data Exchange (OPDE) Project
was initiated in 1994 by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI)2. In 1994 SKI launched a 5-year
R&D project to explore the viability of creating an international pipe failure database. During this period
SKI hosted meetings to present results of the R&D and to discuss the principles of database development
and maintenance.3 Since May 2002, the OECD/NEA has formally operated the project under thecoordination of the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI). The first term of the Project
covered the years 2002-2005, the second term covered the period 2005-2008, and the final term covered
the period 2008-2011. This report summarises the final project results of the OPDE Project after nine yearsof operation from May 2002 to May 2011.

2
3

Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) as of July 1, 2008
In September 1996 SKI organised the “Initial Meeting of the International Cooperative Group on Piping Performance” withparticipants from thirteen countries. Again, in September 1997 SKI organized the “Seminar on Piping Reliability” (SKI Report
97:32); this time with participants from eleven countries.

9

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16In May 2011 the Project Review Group (PRG) approved the transition of OPDE to a new, expanded
OECD-NEA Component Operational Experience, Degradation & Ageing Programme (CODAP). A first
CODAP National Coordinators Meeting was held at NEA Headquarters in November 2011. The CODAP
PRG Membership corresponds to that of the OPDE, with two additional member countries (Slovak
Republic and Chinese Taipei). The CODAP project builds on the success of OPDE and a related OECDNEA data project, the SCAP-SCC Working Group.
In 2006 the SCC and Cable Ageing Project (SCAP) was established under the auspices of the OECD/NEA
to assess, due to their implication on nuclear safety and their relevance for plant ageing management, two
subjects: stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and degradation of cable insulation. The project ran successfully
from June 2006 to June 2010 [1].
Fourteen NEA member countries joined the SCAP project in 2006 to share knowledge and by 2010,seventeen countries had joined the project. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and theEuropean Commission also participated as observers.
The objective of the SCAP coordinated project was to share the corporate knowledge and operating
experience, to understand the failure mechanisms, and to identify effective techniques and technologies toeffectively manage and mitigate active degradation in nuclear power plants. The specific objectives of the
project were to:•••Establish a complete database with regard to major ageing phenomena for SCC and degradation ofcable insulation through collective efforts by OECD/NEA members;
Establish a knowledge base in these areas by compiling and evaluating the collected data andinformation systematically;
Perform an assessment of the data and identify the basis for commendable practices which will
help regulators and operators to enhance ageing management.

The scope of the SCAP SCC Working Group covers class 1 and 2 pressure boundary components, reactor
pressure vessel internals and other components with significant operational impact, excluding steam
generator tubing. The entire SCC database consists of an event database and general information. The
general information consists of regulations/ codes and standards, inspection/ monitoring/ qualification,
preventive maintenance/ mitigation, repair/ replacement, safety assessment, and R&D. Together thesecomprise the knowledge base.
Following the completion of the SCAP project, SCC Working Group participants were interested in someform of continuation and discussions were initiated to explore possible alternatives. It was recognised that
there are many aspects very similar to those existing in OPDE and the concept of a new project wasenvisaged to combine the two projects into the “Component Operational Experience, Degradation &Ageing Programme” (CODAP). The objective of CODAP is to collect information on passive metallic
component degradation and failures of the primary system, reactor pressure vessel internals, main process
and standby safety systems, and support systems (i.e., ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3, or equivalent). It also
covers non safety-related (non-Code) components with significant operational impact. It is intended that
CODAP will also include information on age-related degradation of buried tanks and plastic piping.

10

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

2.

OPDE OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

OPDE has established an international database on pipe degradation and failures in commercial nuclear
power plants in 11 OECD Member Countries. The database supports the following activities:• Trend analysis, including ageing analysis• Statistical analyses to determine pipe failure rates and rupture frequencies for use in risk-informed
activities (e.g., loss-of-coolant-accident frequency assessment, internal flooding initiating frequency
assessment, high-energy-line-break frequency assessment, RI-ISI ∆-risk assessment, etc.)• Source of data parameters for input to probabilistic fracture mechanics codes. The database is also asource of information on degradation susceptibilities and degradation rates for use in the verificationand validation of probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) codes.
• Degradation mechanism analysis (DMA) in risk-informed ISI (RI-ISI) applications• Development of defences against recurring (e.g., systematic) pipe failures• Exchange of service data in order to pinpoint potential generic implications of a specific, significant
pipe failure.
The OPDE Project addresses typical metallic piping components of the primary system, main process andstandby safety systems, and support systems (i.e., ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3, or equivalent, piping). It
also covers non safety-related (non-Code) piping, which if leaking could lead to common-cause initiating
events such as flooding of vital plant areas. As an example, raw water systems such as non-essential
service water, circulating water or fire protection could be significant flood sources given a pipe break. In
other words, the OPDE database covers degradation and failure of high-energy and moderate-energy
piping as well as safety-related and non safety-related piping.
Included in the database are events that result in remedial action (e.g., replacement, repair) with or without
reactor shutdown to cold shutdown condition. The types of degradation or failure include service induced
inside diameter pipe wall thinning and non through-wall cracking as well as pressure boundary breaches,such as pinhole leaks, leaks, severance and major structural failures (pipe “breaks” or “ruptures”). For pipe
flaws that do not penetrate the pipe wall or weld/weld heat affected zone the OPDE work scope
encompasses degradation exceeding design code allowable for wall thickness or crack depth as well assuch degradation that could have generic implications regarding the reliability of NDE/ISI techniques. In
summary, the following types of degradation and failures are considered:• Non through-wall defects (e.g., cracks, wall thinning) interpreted as structurally significant and/or
exceeding design code allowable• Through-wall defects without active leakage; leakage may be detected following a plant operationalmode change involving for example depressurization and cool-down, or as part of preparations for
NDE• Small leaks (e.g., pinhole leaks, drop leakage) resulting in temporary or permanent repair

11

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16• Leaks (e.g., leak rate within Technical Specification limits)• Large leaks (e.g., through-wall flow rates in excess of Technical Specification limits)• Severance (pressure boundary failure attributed to external impact or vibration fatigue)• Rupture (major structural failure).
In May 2002 the starting point for the Project was an in-kind contribution by SKI in the form of aninternational pipe failure database in Microsoft® Access. This database included pipe failure data for theperiod 1970 to 1998, and it contained approximately 2,300 records. During the first term of the project theemphasis was on validating the content of the SKI in-kind contribution, improving and streamlining thedatabase structure and data input format, and populating the database with new failure data for the period
1999 to 2003, as well as with pre-1998 records.
During the second term (2005-2008) an Online-version of the database was implemented to facilitate datasubmission. Authorised users can access the Online-version via a secure server operated by the NEA
Information Technology (IT) Group. An effort was initiated to encourage plant operators to directly input
failure records via the Online-version. Database user IDs and passwords were provided by NEA-IT torespective National Coordinator for distribution within the country.
During the third term (2008-2011), online data submissions were made by plant operators in Canada andSwitzerland. Insights and lessons learned from implementing and using the OPDE Online Database weretransferred to the SCAP-SCC project [1].
Signatory countries can use the database content to generate their own qualitative and quantitative piping
reliability insights. An international co-operation for quantification of piping reliability parameters may beestablished separately in the future should the participating organisations wish to do so.
In May 2011 the Project Review Group (PRG) approved the transition of OPDE to a new, expanded
OECD-NEA Component Operational Experience, Degradation & Ageing Programme (CODAP). A first
CODAP National Coordinators Meeting was held at NEA Headquarters in November 2011. The CODAP
PRG Membership corresponds to that of the OPDE, with two additional member countries (Slovak
Republic and Chinese Taipei). The CODAP project builds on the success of OPDE and a related OECDNEA data project, the SCAP-SCC Working Group.
In 2006 the SCC and Cable Ageing Project (SCAP) was established under the auspices of the OECD/NEA
to assess, due to their implication on nuclear safety and their relevance for plant ageing management, two
subjects: stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and degradation of cable insulation. The project ran successfully
from June 2006 to June 2010 [1].
Fourteen NEA member countries joined the SCAP project in 2006 to share knowledge and by 2010,seventeen countries had joined the project. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and theEuropean Commission also participated as observers.
The objective of the SCAP coordinated project was to share the corporate knowledge and operating
experience, to understand the failure mechanisms, and to identify effective techniques and technologies toeffectively manage and mitigate active degradation in nuclear power plants. The specific objectives of the
project were to:Establish a complete database with regard to major ageing phenomena for SCC and degradation of cableinsulation through collective efforts by OECD/NEA members;
12

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16
Establish a knowledge base in these areas by compiling and evaluating the collected data and information
systematically;
Perform an assessment of the data and identify the basis for commendable practices which will help
regulators and operators to enhance ageing management.
The scope of the SCAP SCC Working Group covers class 1 and 2 pressure boundary components, reactor
pressure vessel internals and other components with significant operational impact, excluding steam
generator tubing. The entire SCC database consists of an event database and general information. The
general information consists of regulations/ codes and standards, inspection/ monitoring/ qualification,
preventive maintenance/ mitigation, repair/ replacement, safety assessment, and R&D. Together thesecomprise the knowledge base.
Following the completion of the SCAP project, SCC Working Group participants were interested in someform of continuation and discussions were initiated to explore possible alternatives. It was recognised that
there are many aspects very similar to those existing in OPDE and the concept of a new project wasenvisaged to combine the two projects into the “Component Operational Experience, Degradation &Ageing Programme” (CODAP). The objective of CODAP is to collect information on passive metallic
component degradation and failures of the primary system, reactor pressure vessel internals, main process
and standby safety systems, and support systems (i.e., ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3, or equivalent). It also
covers non safety-related (non-Code) components with significant operational impact. It is intended that
CODAP will also include information on age-related degradation of buried tanks and plastic piping.

13

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

14

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

3.

OPDE ORGANISATION

Each participating country was represented by a National Coordinator. The OECD/NEA is responsible foradministering the project according to OECD rules. To assure consistency of the data contributed by the
National Coordinators the Project operated through the Clearinghouse. The Clearinghouse verifies whether
the information provided by the National Coordinators complied with the OPDE Coding Guidelines(OPDE-CG). The OPDE Project Review Group (PRG) controlled the project with support from theOECD/NEA project secretary and a Clearinghouse.
The PRG ran the Project and meets at least once perannum. The PRG responsibilities included but were
not limited to the following types of decisions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Secure the financial and technical resources necessary to carry out the ProjectNominate the OPDE Project chairperson
Define the information flow (public information and confidential information)
Approve the admittance of new members
Nominate project task leaders (lead countries) and key persons for the PRG tasks
Define the priority of the task activities
Monitor the progress of the Project and task activities
Monitor the work of the Clearinghouse and quality assurance

The third term OPDE participating countries and organisations are listed below:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Canada (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission)
Czech Republic (Nuclear Research Institute, REZ)
Finland (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority)
France (Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire)
Germany (Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit)
Japan (Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organisation)
Korea (Republic of) (Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety and Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute)
Spain (Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear)
Sweden (Swedish Radiation Safety Authority)
Switzerland (Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate)
United States of America (Nuclear Regulatory Commission)

Belgium (Electrabel and Tractebel) participated in the first and second terms, but decided not to join thethird term of the project.

15

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

16

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

4.

QUALITY ASSURANCE & DATA QUALITYThe OPDE Quality Assurance Program (OPDE-QAP) establishes the organisational and technicalprinciples and measures for quality assurance and monitoring of the work during operation of the OPDE
Project to ensure high quality of the end product (the database with companion reports and publications).
The OPDE-QAP applies to all activities in the project and wasto be followed by all project participants.
To achieve the objectives established for the OPDE database, a Coding Format was developed. This
Coding Format is reflected in the Coding Guidelines. The Coding Guidelines are built on established pipe
failure data analysis practices and routines that acknowledge the unique aspects of passive component
reliability in heavy water reactor and light water reactor operating environments (e.g., influences bymaterial and water chemistry).
For an event to be considered for inclusion in the OPDE database it must undergo an initial screening for
eligibility. An objective of this initial screening is to go beyond the abstracts of event reports to ensure that
only pipe degradation and failures according to the work scope definition are included in the database.
Data quality is affected from the moment the service data is recorded at a nuclear power plant, interpreted,and finally entered into a database system. The service data is recorded in different types of information
systems ranging from work order systems, via ISI databases and outage summary reports, to licensee event
reports or reportable occurrence reports. Consequently the details of a degradation event or failure tend to
be documented to various levels of technical detail in these different information systems. Building an
OPDE database event record containing the full event history often entails extracting information frommultiple sources.
The term “data quality” is an attribute of the processes that have been implemented to ensure that any
given database record (including all of its constituent elements, or database fields) can be traced to thesource information. The term also encompasses “fitness-for-use”, that is, the database records should
contain sufficient technical detail to support database applications.
In OPDE, a “Completeness Index” (CI) is used for database management purposes. It distinguishes
between records for which more information must be sought and those considered to be complete(Table 1). Each record in the database is assigned a CI, which relates to the completeness of theinformation in the database relative to the requirements of the Coding Guidelines.
The “Completeness Index” is also intended as a database filter for determination of the‘fitness-for-application’. The range of possible database applications covers advanced applications (e.g.,
the study of effect of different water chemistries on specific degradation susceptibilities), risk-informed
applications (e.g., technical basis for degradation mechanism assessment in risk-informed ISI programme
development, or statistical parameter estimation in support of internal flooding PSA), and high-levelsummaries of service experience trends and patterns. Advanced database applications would normally relyon queries that are based and the subset of the overall database content consisting of those records forwhich CI = 1. By contrast, high-level database applications would draw on information from the entire
database content.
17

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16
Completeness
Index
1

2
3

Description
Validated – all source data have been reviewed – no further action is
expected
Validated – source data may be missing some non-essential information –no further action anticipated. The term “non-essential” implies that
information about piping layout (including location of a flaw) may not beknown exactly but can be inferred based on other, similar events (at thesame or similar plants)
Not validated – validation pending

Table 1: OPDE Completeness Index (CI) Definitions

18

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

5.

OPDE DATABASE STRUCTURE

OPDE is a relational database in Microsoft® Access. It includes information on pipe degradation andfailure in light water reactors and heavy water reactors for the period 1970 to 2011. The opening screen of
the Access version (Figure 1) includes the user terms and conditions.

Figure 1: OPDE 2011:1 Database Opening Screen
OPDE data entry is managed via input forms, tables, roll-down menus and database relationships. Databasesearches and applications are performed through queries that utilise the tables and data relationships. The
database structure is presented in Figures 2 through 6.

19

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

Figure 2: Database Input Forms

Figure 3: Database Tables & Roll-Down Menus

20

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

Figure 4: Database Sample Queries

Figure 5: Database Relationships

21

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

Figure 6: An Example of Nuclear Power Plant Information in OPDE
Implemented during 2006, an ‘Online’ version of the database (or web-OPDE) allowed for datasubmissions over the Internet via a secure server located at the NEA Headquarters. Access to web-OPDE is
restricted and password protected. Automated e-mail notifications were issued whenever an action was
required by the database user. There are four user security levels:
1. NEA Administrator. The NEA IT department is responsible for security issues, including allocationof user names and passwords. The NEA Administrator has full access to the entire database.
2. OPDE Clearinghouse has access to all data and can input new data and modify data. The
Clearinghouse can also download data for quality control and upload data.
3. National Coordinators can input and modify data access all their national data, and download thedata with associated supporting information when so decided by the PRG.
4. Operators can input new events, modify and access their own data. The intended user at this level
would be for example an engineer at a nuclear power plant.
The structure of the Online version of the database is identical to the Microsoft Access version (Figure 7).
Relative to the latter database version, the Online version also allows the attachment of electronic
supporting documents (e.g., photographs, drawings, root case analysis reports) to a database record.

22

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

FAILURE DATANPP Information

Plant Population Data
Apparent Cause

Method of Detection

Code Class

Plant Location

Collateral Damage

Plant Operational States

Component Type

Plant Systems

Corrective Action

Process Medium

Event Category

QA Index

Event Type

Repair Time Class

Impact on Operation

Size Class by NPS

Leak Class

System Groups_1

Material Designations

Weld Configuration

Material Types
Roll-down menus

Figure 7: OPDE Database Structure
The database input process started with an event report (can be a Licensee Event Report or equivalent
document) and supplemented as necessary with an associated condition report, root cause evaluation report
and/or structural evaluation report. Next the event was classified per the Coding Guidelines to accurately
describe the applicable piping component reliability attributes and influencing factors, as well as
operational impact (if any), collateral damage (if any), etc. There are 63 database fields per data record.
Most of these database fields are supported by roll-down menus that consist of carefully defined keywords.
These keywords act as data filters when querying the database for a particular set of records. All databaseapplications begin by defining a query, which consist of data filter criteria that are defined using the SQL
programming language.
Throughout the project, the password protected database was distributed twice annually to respective
National Coordinator on a CD. New data records could also be downloaded from the Online-version.

23

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

24

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

6.

OPDE DATABASE FINAL VERSION

The final version of the 3rd term of the project, OPDE 2011:1 includes approximately 3800 records on pipe
failure data from 321 nuclear power plants representing ca. 9300 reactor-years of commercial operation.
49% of the records relate to PWRs, 44% to BWRs and 4% to PHWR.4 Tables 2 and 3 provide high-levelsummaries of the database content.5
Nominal Pipe Size (NPS)[mm]
NPS ≤ 15
15 < NPS ≤ 25
25 < NPS ≤ 50
50 < NPS ≤ 100
100 < NPS ≤ 250
NPS > 250
Total:

Number of Database Records by Failure TypeNon ThroughActive
Structural
Wall Crack / Wall Thinning
Leakage
Failure
55
235
21
136
904
43
77
307
20
220
248
15
322
334
39
591
197
29
1401
2225
167

Table 2: High-Level Summary (i) of Database Content
Degradation / Damage
Mechanism
Corrosion (incl. crevice corrosion,
pitting, galvanic corrosion,
microbiologically induced
corrosion)
Design, construction & fabrication
errors (flaw initiation)
Erosion-corrosion & flowaccelerated corrosion
Stress corrosion cracking (incl.,
ECSCC, IGSCC, PWSCC, TGSCC)
Thermal fatigue (incl. thermal
stratification, cycling and striping)Vibration fatigue (low-cycle, highcycle)e‘Other’ (incl., erosion-cavitation,
fretting, severe overloading/water
hammer, strain induced corrosion
cracking (SICC).
Total:

Number of Database Records by Failure TypeNon ThroughActive
Structural
Wall Crack / Wall Thinning
Leakage
Failure
52

331

8

83

226

9

203

331

51

891

280

0

62

59

3

63

810

48

47

188

48

1354

2225

167

Table 3: High-Level Summary (ii) of Database Content

4

The PWR event population includes events in WWER reactors in Czech Republic and Finland.

5

These summaries exclude on the order of 220 French records from 1980 to 2004 for which validation is still pending
as of May 2012. The validation will be completed during the 1st Term of CODAP (2011-2014).

25

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16
For an event to be considered for inclusion in the OPDE database the NC must screen the event for
eligibility. However, the collected information reflects the different national reporting thresholds as well as
different in-service inspection requirements and practices. Therefore the level of service experience
coverage differs between the countries that are represented in the project.
In the database through-wall flaws are characterised by “Quantity Released”, “Leak Rate Class”, and“Flaw Size.” Event reports may not always include details about a through-wall flaw such as duration,leak/flow rate or total quantity released. Knowledge about piping system design and operating pressure andtemperature and flaw size usually enable best estimate quantitative assessment to be made of themagnitude of a pressure boundary breach.
Examples from the database are illustrated in Figures 8 to 12. All of these Figures are based on raw datafrom the database and do not reflect application specific data processing or analysis.
In Figure 8 the lack of events in the early 1970s is indicative of the low number of plants which had beencommissioned. The outliers in the early 1980s are due mainly to the stress corrosion cracking issues in
BWR plants. The flow assisted corrosion issues in the PWR class 4 systems from the 1980s are notincluded in the scope of the database. The apparent difference in the trends shown in Figures 8 and 9 isrelated to the difference in the number of plants in operation for a given year, which has increased over theperiod covered by the database.
300

200

150

100

50

0

19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10

Number of Database Records

250

Figure 8: Pipe Degradation & Failure by Calendar Year

26

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

350

300
OPDE Pipe Failure Records (19702011)300

No. of OPDE Database Records

250
200

200
150
150

100
100

50

Plant Population That Produced Pipe Failures

Plant Population that Produced Failure
Event Population

250

50

0

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

0
Piping Component Age at Time of Failure [Years]

Figure 9: Pipe Degradation & Failure as a Function of In-Service Time [Years]
Figure 9 shows the event population as a function piping component age at the time of failure. Included in
Figure 9 is the plant population that produced the pipe failure event population as recorded in the OPDE
database. It is important to recognise that Figure 9 does not portray any possible effects of plant age on thepotential degradation susceptibility of piping.

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

Figure 10: Socket Weld Failures in the Database
27

08

06

10
20

20

20

02

00

98

96

94

92

90

88

86

84

82

80

78

76

74

72

04
20

20

20

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

70

0%
19

Socket Weld Failures in Database - % of Safety Related Piping Failures

45%

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16
Figure 10 shows that socket weld failures continue to cause plant outage and loss of MWh produced. The chartshows the number of socket weld failures as the percentage of all pipe failures in safety-related piping systems.
A large percentage of fatigue failures in commercial nuclear power plants are due to vibration fatigue of socket
welds.
120

100

80

ECSCC/TGSCC
IGSCC
PWSCC

60

40

20

20
10

20
08

20
06

20
04

20
02

20
00

19
98

19
96

19
94

19
92

19
90

19
88

19
86

19
84

19
82

19
80

19
78

19
76

19
74

19
70

0

Figure 11: Stress Corrosion Cracking as a Function of Time
Figure 11 shows that stress corrosion cracking is still an issue for nuclear power plants. This Figure
includes BWR SCC experience (IGSCC), PWR SCC experience (PWSCC), and LWR experience (ECSCC
and TGSCC, mainly of small-bore piping systems). The IGSCC incident rate during 1983 through 1986
reflects mandated inspections. The IGSCC incident rate post 1986 reflects effects of various mitigation
initiatives (e.g., improved water chemistry environment, stress improvement, new materials).
Figure 12 shows database submissions by geographical region. As noted, the collected information reflects
the different national reporting thresholds as well as different in-service inspection requirements andpractices. Therefore the level of service experience coverage differs between the countries that are
represented in the project.

28

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

OPDE Database Content by Region

Europe24%

Asia
5%
Americas
71%

Figure 12: OPDE Data Submissions by Geographical Region

29

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)1630

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

7.

WORKSHOPS AND DATABASE APPLICATIONSAt the June 2004 National Coordinators Meeting hosted by the Nuclear Research Institute, REZ(Czech Republic), the Project Review Group (PRG) decided to organise a Workshop on OPDE databaseapplications. The OPDE database is both user-oriented and application-oriented. The PRG worked
extensively on these two aspects while designing the structure of the database and defining its technicalcontent. Prior to the end of the 1st Term it was considered that the National Coordinators and theirorganisations could give valuable insights on this work by reporting on actual or planned applications.
The objective of the Workshop, held in Seoul, Republic of Korea on 8 December 2004, was to discuss
applications of the OPDE database. The Workshop addressed two questions:• How has OPDE database been used?
• What can OPDE database be used for?
The Workshop Proceedings are documented in OPDE/SEC(2004)4 (March 2005) [2]. These proceedings
include 11 presentations covering three types of applications:
1) Qualitative evaluations of failure trends and patterns,
2) Risk-informed applications in support of RI-ISI programme development or probabilistic safetyassessment, and
3) Advanced applications supporting material science research.
The main conclusions concerning possible applications are reproduced in Appendix A.
Applications for workshops were initiated by members. In order to promote use of the database in member
countries the PRG has arranged a number of half day workshops and training sessions in connection with
PRG meetings. In addition to these there have been several opportunities to present the OPDE database atinternational meetings and conferences. Examples of these contributions are listed in Chapter 10.
As an example of national initiatives to pursue database applications the Nordic PSA Group withrepresentatives from utility groups in Finland and Sweden launched a multi-year research and development
effort to develop a piping reliability parameter handbook to support future risk-informed applications
involving piping reliability [3, 4]. Figure 13 illustrates the flow of information for a typical databaseapplication.

31

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

Regulatory inspection reports
Deviation Reports
LERs / AOs / ROs / WOs

Plant Operating Records / Logs

RIISI Applications

ISI Summary Reports

ISI Program Plans / ISI Database

Isometric Drawings

ASME Section XI Relief Requests

Piping Design Information

Population Data
Plant

A&E

SystemEvent Data
Component

Locations per isometricdrawing(s)Metallurgical
data

Fabrication data
Weld data

Installationdata

Event Date

Affected System(s)Narrative w/description of
impact on operations

Service History
Component

ISI

FAC Program

Method of
Detection

Water Chemistry /H2-injection (BWR)
WOR

IHSI

Replacement

Data Retrieval & Validation
Statistical
Analysis

Classification according toattributes and influences

FailureModes

Identify degradation mechanism(s)DataAnalysis

Applications
PSA

PFM

Piping Reliability Parameter dB
RIISI

Leak frequencies by
Attributes & Influence Factors

Conditional Rupture
Probabilities by Attributes &Influence Factors

Statistical Distribution Parameters

Figure 13: Flow of Information for a Typical Database Application
In 2008 the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) of the OECD-NEA and the European
Commission Joint Research Centre (EC-JRC) sponsored the “Workshop on Risk-Informed Piping Integrity
Management” [5]. The main objectives of this workshop were to examine and discuss the results andconclusions of the OECD/NEA and EC-JRC coordinated risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI)
methodologies benchmark (RISMET) [6] and to present and discuss the results and applications of OPDE.
In 2011 the CSNI Working Group on Risk (WGRisk) launched a project entitled “Use of OECD Data
Project Products in Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA).” The objectives of the project are to identify
and characterize current uses of the OECD data projects, including OPDE and CODAP. The
OPDE/CODAP PRG members are responding to a WGRisk survey directed at the development ofrecommendations for enhancing the usefulness of data project products.

32

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)168.

DATABASE ACCESSIBILITY

OPDE is a restricted database and its access is limited to participating organisations that provide input data
including nuclear power plants. In the course of 2012 the OPDE and SCAP-SCC databases will be merged
into CODAP. The CODAP database is available on the Internet via a secure server located at the OECDNEA Headquarters. Access to the CODAP database (with the embedded OPDE 2011:1 database) is
restricted to the CODAP PRG members.

33

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

34

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

9.

9.1

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PLANS

Conclusions

During the first term the original objectives of the project were achieved and an operational database waslaunched successfully. Participating organisations committed to continued involvement in the project.
One of the main activities of the 1st and 2nd Terms of the project was continuous database maintenance.
That is populating the database with new information as it becomes available. The database format was
simplified and finalised during the 1st Term and has not been changed. The main activities of the 3rd Termof the project focused on continuous database maintenance and finalization of the Online version of thedatabase.
Throughout the three project terms, the database was run under Microsoft® Access. A recognised limitationor problem with the Access software is the incompatibility of the different software versions. The database
was distributed to participating organisations on a CD in three versions (Access 97/98, Access 2000 andAccess 2003). To improve and streamline database input and database distribution a web based userinterface was introduced during the 2nd term of the project. Data input became independent of Microsoft®
Access. The ‘Online’ version of database is located at NEA Headquarters in Issy-les-Moulineaux (France)and project participants have access via a secure server.
9.2

Planned Activities – 2011 & Beyond

In May 2011 the Project Review Group (PRG) approved the transition of OPDE to a new, expanded
OECD-NEA “Component Operational Experience, Degradation & Ageing Programme” (CODAP). A first
CODAP National Coordinators Meeting was held at NEA Headquarters in November 2011. The CODAP
PRG Membership corresponds to that of the OPDE, with two additional signatories (Slovak Republic andChinese Taipei). The CODAP project builds on the success of OPDE and a related OECD-NEA data
project, the SCAP-SCC Working Group.
At the end of 2011, the OPDE and SCAP-SCC databases were merged to form the new CODAP event
database; an entirely web-based system both for entering new events and also for downloading thedatabase. During the 1st Term of CODAP focus will be on enhancing the user interface of the Online
Version to allow for advanced database queries and report generation. CODAP will continue to encourageand promote practical database applications. The Project will therefore continue to arrange workshops inmember countries as requested to promote use of the database, industry involvement, and training of
personnel.
In parallel with the new event database, CODAP will establish an online Knowledge Base (KB). The
objective of the KB is to improve the understanding of degradation mechanisms, and to make available
information on regulatory responses to passive component failures. The KB will include basic information
on safety assessment approaches, regulations, codes and standards, inspection, monitoring andqualification practices, preventative maintenance, mitigation, repair and replacement. Specific activities
planned for the 1st Term of CODAP include:35

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16•

Implementation of the Online CODAP Event Database (CODAP-ED). During the first year of thefirst term, respective National Coordinator will submit event data on flow accelerated corrosion(FAC) for calendar years 2000 to date.

•

Implementation of the Online CODAP Knowledgebase (CODAP-KB). Starting with FAC,
degradation mechanism specific information will be uploaded to the KB.

36

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

10.

REFERENCES[1] OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. Technical Basis for Commendable Practices on Ageing
Management – SCC and Cable Ageing Project ) SCAP), NEA/CSNI/R(2010)5, 2010.
[2] Nuclear Energy Agency, OPDE Workshop on Database Applications, OPDE/SEC(2004)4,
Issy-les-Moulineaux, France, 2005.
[3] Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. Reliability Data for Piping Components in Nordic Nuclear
Power Plants “R-Book” Project Phase I, Research Report 2008:01, Stockholm (Sweden), 2008.
[4] Swedish Radiation Safety Authority. Reliability Data for Piping Components in Nordic Nuclear
Power Plants – R Book, Phase 2, Research Report 2011:06, Stockholm (Sweden), 2011[5] OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. Risk-Informed Piping Integrity Management. Workshop
Proceedings, NEA/CSNI/R(2009)2.
[6] OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. EC-JRC/OECD-NEA Benchmark Study on Risk Informed InService Inspection Methodologies (RISMET), NEA/CSNI/R(2010)13, 2010.

37

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

38

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

11.

BIBLIOGRAPHY[1]

Lydell, B., Mathet, E. and Gott, K., “OECD Pipe Failure Data Exchange (OPDE) Project: A
Framework for International Cooperation in Piping Reliability,” Proc. American Nuclear SocietyInternational Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Detroit, Michigan, 2002.

[2]

Lydell, B., Mathet, E. and Gott, K., “OECD Pipe Failure Data Exchange Project (OPDE) – 2003
Progress Report,” ICONE12-49217, Proc. ICONE-12: 12th International Conference on Nuclear
Engineering, Arlington, Virginia, 2004.

[3]

Reck, H. and Schulz, S., “Internationale Betriebserfahrung mit Rohrleitungen in Kernkraftwerken:
Fortschritt des OECD Pipe Failure Data Exchange (OPDE) Datenbank Projektes,” MPA Seminar 32,
Stuttgart, Germany, 2006.

[5]

Viglasky, T et al, “The OECD Pipe Failure Data Exchange Project – Validation of Canadian Data,”
ICONE12-89176, Proc. ICONE-14: 14th International Conference on Nuclear Engineering, Miami,
Florida, 2006.

[6]

Choi, Y.H. and Choi, S.Y., “Socket Weld Integrity in Nuclear Piping under Fatigue Loading
Conditions,” Nuclear Engineering and Design, 237:213-218, 2007.

[7]

Simonen, F.A., Gosselin, S.R., Lydell, B.O.Y. and Rudland, D.L., “Application of Failure Event
Data to Benchmark Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Computer Codes,” PVP2007-26373, Proc.
2007 ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping Division Conference, San Antonio, Texas, 2007.

[8]

Lydell, B., Huerta, A. and Gott, K., “Progress with the International Pipe Failure Data Exchange
Project,: PVP2007-26278, Proc. 2007 ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping Division Conference, San
Antonio, Texas, 2007.

[9]

Lydell, B., “The Probability of Pipe Failure on the Basis of Operating Experience, PVP2007-26281,
Proc. 2007 ASME Pressure Vessel and Piping Division Conference, San Antonio, Texas, 2007.

[10] Lydell, B., Huerta, A. and Gott, K., “Characteristics of Damage & Degradation Mechanisms in
Nuclear Power Plant Piping Systems,” PVP2008-61914, Proc. 2008 ASME Pressure Vessel andPiping Division Conference, Chicago, Illinois, 2008.
[12] Nuclear Energy Agency, OPDE 2011:1 Coding Guideline (OPDE-CG) & User’s Guide, OPDE
PR01, Version 05, Issy-les-Moulineaux, France, 2011.
[13] Lydell, B. and Riznic, J., “OPDE – The International Pipe Failure Data Exchange Project,” Nuclear
Engineering and Design, 238:2115-2123, 2008.

39

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)1640

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

APPENDIX A: LIST OF POTENTIAL DATABASE APPLICATIONSWorkshop on database applications and possible improvements to the database held in Seoul, Republic ofKorea, on December 8, 2004.
Applications
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Trend analyses of degradation processes: general and related to specific systems or components
Identification of new degradation mechanisms
Effectiveness of ISI programmes – flaws not detected by prior inspections
Effectiveness of mitigation measures
Understanding of root causes of failures
Hazard plots
Comparison of service data and probabilistic fracture mechanic calculations using different codes
Leak rate versus flaw size correlations
Flooding risk assessment
LBB
Risk informed inspection – support to expert panels
Piping damage frequency
Piping rupture frequency for PSA
Aging management programme
Source of information for solving practical piping problems
Source of information for specifying locations for measurements such as temperature
Classing of piping
Recommendation for content of incident reports
Experience feedback, operational experience
Input to Structural reliability codes
LOCA frequencies
Significance determination process
Accident sequence precursor
Generic structural integrity
Proactive materials degradation assessment

Advancing the OPDE database••••

Inclusion of pipe stress data in database
Roles of service data versus statistical estimation versus PFM input
Inclusion of passive component failures in risk informed applications
Pipe failure parameter handbook
Operating temperatures for PWSCC

41

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)1642

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

APPENDIX B: OPDE PROJECT REVIEW GROUP PRG ACTIVITY REPORT

During the nine years of the OPDE Project, the Project Review Group met on eight-teen (18) occasions(Table 4). In addition two joint OPDE & SCAP SCC Working Group meetings were held to formulate thetransition of the two database projects into the new CODAP event database and knowledge base.
Table 4: Project Review Group Meetings 2002-2011
MeetingDate(s)Location

OPDE1, Project Kick-off Meeting

May 17, 2002

NEA Headquarters

OPDE2, National Coordinators
MeetingNovember 1819, 2002

Stockholm, Sweden

OPDE3, National Coordinators
Meeting
OPDE4, National Coordinators
Meeting
OPDE5, National Coordinators
Meeting

April 28-29,
2003
November 1314, 2003

Washington, DC, USA
Cologne, Germany

June 1-2, 2004

Rez, Czech Republic

OPDE6, National Coordinators
Meeting

December 8-10,
2004

Seoul, Republic of
Korea

OPDE7, National Coordinators
Meeting
OPDE8, National Coordinators
Meeting
OPDE9, National Coordinators
Meeting
OPDE10, National Coordinators
Meeting
OPDE11, National Coordinators
Meeting
OPDE12, National Coordinators
Meeting

May 11-12,
2005
October 25-26,
2005
April 20-21,
2006
November 1617, 2006
May 14-15,
2007
November 7-8,
2007

Note
Hosted by the Swedish Nuclear
Power Inspectorate (now Swedish
Radiation Safety Authority, SSM)
Hosted by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Hosted by Gesellschaft für Anlagenund Reaktorsicherheit (GRS)
Hosted by the Nuclear ResearchInstitute
Hosted by Korea Institute of
Nuclear Safety (KINS) and Korea
Atomic Energy Research Institute(KAERI). OPDE Applications
Workshop was held on December 8,
2004

Leuven, Belgium

Hosted by Electrabel/Tractebel

Ottawa, Canada

Hosted by the Canadian Nuclear
Safety Commission (CNSC)

NEA Headquarters
Madrid, Spain
Villigen, Switzerland

Hosted by Consejo de Seguridad
Nuclear (CSN)
Hosted by the Swiss Federal
Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI)NEA Headquarters

OPDE13, National Coordinators
MeetingJune 2-4, 2008

OPDE14, National Coordinators
Meeting
OPDE15, National Coordinators
Meeting
OPDE16, National Coordinators
MeetingNovember 4-5,
2008
May 27-28,
2009
February 16-16,
2010

NEA Headquarters

1st Joint OPDE & SCAP-SCC
Meeting

February 17,
2010

NEA Headquarters

Madrid, Spain
Tokyo, Japan

Hosted by CSN and meeting held inconjunction with the “RiskInformed Piping Integrity
Workshop”
Hosted by the Japan Nuclear Energy
Safety Organization (JNES)NEA Headquarters

43

Agreement-in-principle to establish
a new project by combining the
OPDE and SCAP-SCC projects

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16
Meeting
OPDE17, National Coordinators
MeetingDate(s)Location

October 13-14,
2010

OECD Convention
Centre, Paris, France

2nd Joint OPDE & SCAP-SCC WG
Meeting

October 15,
2010

OECD Convention
Centre, Paris, France

OPDE18, National Coordinators
Meeting

May 17, 2011

OECD Convention
Centre, Paris, France

44

Note

NEA Secretariat presented the Joint
OPDE & SCAP-SCC project. Nameof new project: OECD-NEA
Component Operational Experience,
Degradation & Ageing Programme(CODAP)
Final OPDE meeting (Figure 14).
The first CODAP meeting was heldon May 18-19, 2011

NEA/CSNI/R(2012)16

Figure 2: OPDE Class of 201145