アフガニスタン 2024 年 5 月 30 日

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インドネシア2021 年 3 月 29 日ドラフト作成
2024 年 5 月 30 日更新※更新した項目に更新日を記載しています。
1.

一般情報 ............................................................................................................................... 2(1)

人口・地理等 ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞ ............................................................... 2(2)

内政 ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞............................................................................... 22.

人権状況および治安状況 ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞ .................................................. 3

3.

関連する政治組織等、政治活動／政府批判（労働運動含む）の取扱い.................... 5(1)

野党の取扱い等............................................................................................................ 5(2)

政府批判者等の取扱い................................................................................................ 5(3)

パプアおよびモルッカの権利活動家 ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞ ....................... 6

4.

ジェンダー、DV および子ども....................................................................................... 11(1)

女性 ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞............................................................................. 11(2)

女性器切除（FGM/C） ............................................................................................. 125.

LGBT ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞ .................................................................................. 136.

汚職、非国家主体による犯罪、国家による被害者の保護 ......................................... 15(1)

パプアおよび西パプアの過激派勢力等による攻撃 ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞ .
..................................................................................................................................... 15(2)

イスラム教過激派勢力等による攻撃 ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞ ..................... 16(3)

土地の強制収用 ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞ ......................................................... 17(4)土地争い ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞ ..................................................................... 187.

兵役、強制徴集（非国家主体の） ................................................................................. 188.

司法制度・刑事手続 ......................................................................................................... 19(1)

名誉棄損による訴追.................................................................................................. 199.

警察・治安部隊（刑務所等の状況含む） ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞..................... 19

10.

報道の自由 ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞..................................................................... 19

11.

宗教の自由 ..................................................................................................................... 21(1)

イスラム教に対する冒涜罪による訴追等 ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞ ............. 21(2)

アチェ ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞ ......................................................................... 24

12.
(1)

国籍、民族および人種 ................................................................................................. 25
中華系 ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞ ......................................................................... 25
1

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先住民.......................................................................................................................... 27(3)

国籍.............................................................................................................................. 27

13.

出入国および移動の自由 ＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞........................................... 27

略称 ............................................................................................................................................. 281.

一般情報＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

(1) 人口・地理等

ア 外務省「インドネシア基礎データ」（2022 年 7 月 11 日）
4

民族 約 300（ジャワ人、スンダ人、マドゥーラ人等マレー系、パプア人等メラネシア系、中華系、アラブ系、インド系等）

5

言語 インドネシア語

6

宗教 イスラム教 86.69％、キリスト教 10.72％（プロテスタント 7.60％、カトリック 3.12％）、ヒンズー教 1.74％、仏教 0.77％、儒教 0.03％、その他 0.04％（2019 年、宗教省統計）

イ ●CIA「ワールド・ファクトブック‐インドネシア」（2021 年 3 月 25 日閲覧）
Ethnic groups
Javanese 40.1%, Sundanese 15.5%, Malay 3.7%, Batak 3.6%, Madurese 3%, Betawi 2.9%,
Minangkabau 2.7%, Buginese 2.7%, Bantenese 2%, Banjarese 1.7%, Balinese 1.7%,
Acehnese 1.4%, Dayak 1.4%, Sasak 1.3%, Chinese 1.2%, other 15% (2010 est.)…
ReligionsMuslim 87.2%, Protestant 7%, Roman Catholic 2.9%, Hindu 1.7%, other 0.9% (includes
Buddhist and Confucian), unspecified 0.4% (2010 est.)＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

(2) 内政ア 外務省「インドネシア基礎データ」（2022 年 7 月 11 日）
7

略史…
1998 年

アジア通貨危機をきっかけに、ジャカルタを中心に全国で暴動が発生。民主化運動も拡大
ハビビ大統領就任（第 3 代大統領）。

1999 年

住民投票により東ティモールの独立が決定。
ワヒッド大統領就任（第 4 代大統領）。

2

アフガニスタン 2024 年 5 月 30 日

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2001 年

メガワティ大統領就任（第 5 代大統領）。

2004 年

国民による初の直接投票によりユドヨノが大統領に選出。ユドヨノ大統領就任（第 6 代大2005 年

ヘルシンキ和平合意（独立アチェ運動（GAM）との和平成立）。

2009 年

ユドヨノ大統領再任。

2014 年

ジョコ・ウィドド大統領就任（第 7 代大統領）

2019 年

ジョコ・ウィドド大統領再任

…
5

内政

（1）2014 年 7 月の大統領選挙において、ジョコ・ウィドド・ジャカルタ首都特別州知事（当時）が約 53％の得票で当選し、10 月 20 日に正式に就任。
（2）ジョコ政権は、経済・社会政策を最優先課題とし、鉄道、港湾、電力・エネ
ルギー等のインフラ整備及び社会保障の充実を目標に掲げている。
2014 年 4 月には総選挙が実施され 10 月 1 日に新国会議員等の就任式が行われた。
（3）2019 年 4 月に正副大統領選挙・総選挙が実施され、ジョコ大統領が再選された。

イ ●CIA「ワールド・ファクトブック‐インドネシア」（2021 年 3 月 25 日閲覧）
elections: Regional Representative Council - last held 17 April 2019 (next to be held 2024)
House of Representatives - last held on 17 April 2019 (next to be held 2024) (2019)
election results: Regional Representative Council - all seats elected on a non-partisan
basis; compostion – NAHouse of Representatives - percent of vote by party - PDI-P 19.3%, Gerindra 12.6%, Golkar
12.3%, PKB 9.7%, Nasdem 9.1%, PKS 8.2%, PD 7.8%, PAN 6.8%, PPP 4.5%, other
9.6%; seats by party - PDI-P 128, Golkar 85, Gerindra 78, Nasdem 59, PKB 58, PD 54, PKS
50, PAN 44, PPP 19; composition - men 475, women 100, percent of women 17.9%; total
People's Consultative Assembly percent of women NA (2019)2.

＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

人権状況および治安状況

ア ●米国国務省「人権状況報告 2023 年‐インドネシア」（2024 年 4 月 22 日）
概要…
Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful3

アフガニスタン 2024 年 5 月 30 日

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killings; torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by police; harsh and lifethreatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with theindependence of the judiciary; political prisoners; serious abuses in a conflict in Papua,
Central Papua, Highland Papua, South Papua, Southwest Papua and West Papua Provinces(the Papua region), including unlawful civilian deaths or harm, torture, and physical abuses;
serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including unjustified
arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and use of criminal libel laws; serious
restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peacefulassembly and freedom of association; serious government corruption; extensive genderbased violence, including the practice of female genital mutilation/cutting; crimes involving
violence or threats of violence targeting members of racial, ethnic, and religious minority
groups, primarily Papuans; laws in Aceh Province criminalizing consensual same-sex
sexual conduct between adults that were enforced; and crimes involving violence or threatsof violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons.
The government did not systematically take credible steps to identify and punish officials
who may have committed human rights abuses.
Violence between government forces and separatist groups continued in the Papua region.
There were numerous reports of abuses by nongovernmental groups, including armed
groups, against civilians including unlawful or arbitrary killings, physical abuse, anddestruction of property. The government investigated and prosecuted some of these. The
violence displaced thousands of residents. Outside the Papua region, there were numerous
reports of unknown actors using digital harassment and intimidation against human rights
activists and academics who criticized government officials, discussed government
corruption, or covered the violence in the Papua region.

イ ●HRW「ワールドレポート 2024－インドネシア」（2024 年 1 月 11 日）
Indonesian authorities committed or condoned numerous human rights abuses involving
discrimination on religious, ethnic, social, gender, and sexual orientation grounds.
Disadvantaged groups—in particular religious minorities, women and girls, and lesbian,gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people—faced continuing or increasing restrictions
on the rights to freedom of expression, belief, religion, and movement. Military and police
committed abuses with impunity, especially in West Papua, where authorities continued torestrict travel and access by outside media, diplomats, and human rights monitors.
…
New Criminal CodeOn January 2, 2023, President Jokowi signed into law a new criminal code containing
problematic provisions that, if implemented and enforced, would undermine freedoms ofspeech, belief, and association and imperil the rights of women, religious minorities, and4

アフガニスタン 2024 年 5 月 30 日

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LGBT people. The law comes into effect in January 2026.…

…
The new law criminalizes consensual sex outside of marriage and cohabitation of
unrelated persons, permitting intrusions into the most intimate decisions of individuals andfamilies. Since same-sex couples cannot marry in Indonesia, the provisions effectively
render same-sex sexual conduct illegal. The law also recognizes “any living law” in the
country, which could be interpreted as legitimizing hundreds of discriminatory regulations
based on Sharia (Islamic law) that local authorities have imposed in jurisdictions across thecountry, including curfews for women and girls, mandatory hijab dress codes, andprovisions that could impact the rights of LGBT people.
The new law maintains provisions criminalizing abortion and expands criminalization to
include providing information about obtaining abortions or providing information about
contraception to children. The law’s blasphemy chapter was expanded to include an article
criminalizing apostasy. The law also criminalizes speech insulting or demeaning senior
government officials or state institutions and expands articles on criminal defamation and“fake news.”

3.

関連する政治組織等、政治活動／政府批判（労働運動含む）の取扱い(1) 野党の取扱い等
ア ●フリーダムハウス「世界の自由 2019‐インドネシア」（2019 年）B Political Pluralism and Participation
B1 The right to organize political parties is respected, and the system features competition
among several major parties. However, recently the election laws have been amended tofavor large parties by increasing eligibility requirements. Only 12 parties passed
verification processes for the 2014 national elections, down from 48 in 1999. The 2017
General Elections Law requires new parties to undergo a “factual verification” process
which involves confirming the accuracy of submitted documents on parties’ management,
membership, and operations.
…
Communist parties are banned, and those who disseminate communist symbols or
promote communism can face punishment under laws carrying as many as 12 years’
imprisonment.

(2) 政府批判者等の取扱い
ア ●フリーダムハウス「世界の自由 2019‐インドネシア」（2019 年）
D Freedom of Expression and Belief
5アフガニスタン 2024 年 5 月 30 日

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D4
Laws against blasphemy, defamation, and certain other forms of speech may
sometimes inhibit the expression of personal views on sensitive topics, including onsocial media. …In January, an 18-year-old student was found guilty of defaming thepresident on Facebook and sentenced to 18 months in jail.

E Associational and Organizational Rights…
E2 While nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are active in Indonesia, they are subject
to government monitoring and interference. A 2013 law requires all NGOs to registerwith the government and submit to regular reviews of their activities. It limits the typesof activities NGOs can undertake and bars them from committing blasphemy orespousing ideas that conflict with the official Pancasila ideology, such as atheism andcommunism. The government is empowered to dissolve noncompliant organizations
without judicial oversight.
…
Separately, in January 2018, an environmental activist was sentenced to 10 months injail under an anticommunism law, after he displayed a hammer and sickle icon at a protest
against a gold mining company in east Java.

＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

(3) パプアおよびモルッカの権利活動家
ア ●DFAT「出身国情報報告

インドネシア」（2023 年 7 月 24 日）

Secessionists in the Papua province…
3.71 Protests in favour of secession take place inside and outside the Papua provinces,including outside Indonesia. Police raids (or forced entry by ‘concerned neighbours’)
on university dormitories have been reported. Activists claim that they are closely
watched by authorities but the extent and justification of this alleged surveillance is
not clear. The internet may be cut or ‘throttled’ at times of particular conflict, which
can slow the release of already difficult-to-verify information. Activists have been
charged with treason and sent to prison for protests, including raising the Morning Starflag, a symbol of secessionism that is illegal in Indonesia.
…

＜参考＞DFAT「出身国情報報告 インドネシア」（2019 年 1 月 25 日）
Secessionists6アフガニスタン 2024 年 5 月 30 日

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3.73 Individuals engaging in separatist activities can be charged with ‘rebellion’ or‘treason’ under Article 106 of the Criminal Code, which may carry a life prison sentence.
Government Regulation 77/2007 on ‘Regional Symbols’ bans the display of separatist
symbols, and specifically lists the flags used by separatist movements in Aceh, South
Maluku and the Papua provinces.
…

＜参考＞DFAT「出身国情報報告＜入管庁ウェブ＞

インドネシア（仮訳）」（2017 年 12 月 22 日）

パプア 2 州における分離独立主義派…
3.67 パプア 2 州の治安情勢は新秩序時代以来改善してきたものの、相当な規模の警察や軍が依然として存在している。治安部隊が犯している人権侵害に係る報告は継続している。国家人権委員会（Komnas HAM）コミッショナー（Natalius
Pigai）の 2016 年 3 月付報告書により、パプア 2 州では 2014 年 12 月以来、治安職員が関わる「逮捕、虐待及び殺害」事案が少なくとも 700 件起きていることが明らかになった。
…
3.70 政治的な独立支持運動は、2016 年後半にインドネシア全域に亘って決起集会を複数回開いた。12 月 1 日（1961 年に金星旗（Morning Starflag）を最初に掲
げた日の周年記念日）、数百人がジャカルタに集まり、独立を問う住民投票を求めた。警察は放水銃を使用して群衆を追い散らし、100 人以上の抗議参加者を逮捕したが、24 時間以内に大半を釈放した。活動家は 12 月 10 日（国際人権デー）に高地の町のワメナ（Wamena）で、また、（インドネシア軍がパプアをオランダ支配から奪還する作戦を開始した日の 55 周年を記念して）12 月 19 日にインド
ネシアの様々な場所で、更なる決起集会を開いた。全ての事案において、警察はイベントに至るまでの間及びイベントが行われている間、大量逮捕で対応した。
警察は西パプア州の州都マノクワリ（Manokwari）で 11 月 26 日、12 月 1 日に抗議行動を宣伝するパンフレットを配布したとして活動家 14 人を逮捕する一方、
12 月 9 日にはパプア州の州都ジャヤプラ（Jayapura）で「金星」の独立旗をスプレーで吹き付けたとして活動家 18 人が国家反逆罪で勾留された。
3.71 人権団体が 2016 年に報告したところによると、パプア 2 州出身の 51 人は、禁止されている分離独立主義者のシンボル（「金星」旗を含む）の掲示に関する行為で国家反逆・陰謀法に基づき収監されており、その多くは長期懲役刑に服していた。また、国内 NGO の報告によると、治安部隊はパプア 2 州で行われる大半の公開及び私的イベントに参加し、出席者の写真を撮り、威嚇の手段として治安部隊の存在を利用した。さらに、他の人権団体の報告書では、治安部隊が活動家、弁護士、学生及び外国人訪問者（2017 年 4 月に訪問した健康を享受する権7

アフガニスタン 2024 年 5 月 30 日

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利に関する国連特別報告官を含む）も監視したと主張している。
3.72 監視に関する主張はあったものの、国内 NGO はパプア人が一般に独立住民
投票の見通しと恩恵について自由に議論することができる一方、多くの活動家
はパプア 2 州で選挙に立候補することも、支障なくインドネシアを入出国することもできると報告している。複数の著名なパプア組織、活動家、及びコミュニ
ティと教会の指導者は独立住民投票に対する支持を公然と表明してきており、その行為が何らかの結果を招いたようには窺えない。
…

ア ●米国国務省「人権状況報告 2023 年‐インドネシア」（2024 年 4 月 22 日）
POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DETAINEES
NGOs estimated that as of September, there were 28 political prisoners from the Papua
region, either awaiting trial or serving time after conviction under treason and conspiracy
statutes, including for the display of banned separatist symbols.
According to Amnesty International, authorities detained at least 63 Papuans between
January and April for participating in peaceful protests; many were released without charge.
In May the Jayapura court sentenced Victor Yeimo, spokesperson for the
proindependence National Committee for West Papua, to eight months’ imprisonment for
criminal conspiracy, incitement, and treason for alleged involvement in violent antiracism
protests in Papua and West Papua Provinces in 2019. Yeimo delivered a speech at a peacefulprotest on August 19, 2019, but declined to participate in a second protest on August 29,
2019, which turned violent. Media reported he had asked activists to cancel the event, butthey moved forward despite his objections. In July the Papua High Court rejected Yeimo’s
appeal and added four months to his sentence, bringing his prison term to 12 months.
Yeimo’s lawyers reported he was arrested without a warrant and moved to the Mobile
Brigade Corps’ detention center without notification to them. In 2021 the Jayapura court
rejected a challenge to his detention based on these irregularities. NGOs alleged the charges
against Yeimo were a baseless attempt to silence nonviolent advocacy for Papuan
separatism.
Local activists and family members generally were permitted to visit political prisoners,
but authorities held some prisoners on islands far from their families.

A. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, INCLUDING FOR THE PRESS…
Although the law permits flying a flag symbolizing Papua’s cultural identity generally, agovernment regulation specifically prohibits the display of the Morning Star flag in Papua,
as well as the Republic of South Maluku flag in Molucca and the Free Aceh Movement8アフガニスタン 2024 年 5 月 30 日

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Crescent Moon flag in Aceh. NGOs reported that on August 31, police arrested six activists,
including five Papuan students in Jakarta and Surya Anta Ginting, for flying the Morning
Star flag outside the state palace. On September 3, police arrested an activist, Sayang
Mandabayan, at the Manokwari airport for traveling with 1,500 small Morning Star flags.

FREEDOM OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
The law provides for freedom of assembly, and outside Papua the government generally
respected this right. The law requires demonstrators to provide police with a written
notification three days before any planned demonstration and requires police to issue areceipt for the written notification. This receipt acts as a de facto license for thedemonstration. Police in Papua routinely refused to issue such receipts to would-be
demonstrators out of concern the demonstrations would include calls for independence, an
act prohibited by law. A 2016 Papua provincial police decree prohibits rallies by sevenorganizations labeled as proindependence groups, including the National Committee ofWest Papua, United Liberation Movement for West Papua, and Free Papua Movement.

イ ●HRW「ワールドレポート 2024－インドネシア」（2024 年 1 月 11 日）
Papua Provinces, Ethnic Minorities, and Land Rights…
Dozens of Papuans arrested for their participation in widespread anti-racism protests
across Papua in 2019, including Malvin Yobe and Victor Yeimo, were released in 2023 after
serving sentences. Authorities continue to arrest and prosecute Indigenous Papuans forexpressing views in support of peaceful self-determination.
…

ウ ●HRW「ワールドレポート 2021‐インドネシア」（2021 年 1 月 13 日）
Papua, West Papua, and the Moluccas Islands
Indonesian courts tried more than 70 Papuan activists in eight cities, including Jakarta,
for participation in anti-racism rallies at which they unfurled the Papuan Morning Star flag.
The courts found them guilty of “treason” and sentenced them maximum to 11 months inprison, the amount of time already served.
On July 18 in Papua soldiers shot and killed father and son Elias and Selu Karunggu inan apparent extrajudicial execution after they pulled the son aside for interrogation as thetwo were waiting for a boat. On July 24, Indonesian soldiers from Raider 516/Caraka Yudha
battalion allegedly assaulted and killed Papuan teenager Oktovianus Betera after he got intoa verbal dispute with a shop owner who claimed he was trying to shoplift.
9アフガニスタン 2024 年 5 月 30 日

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Rev. Yeremia Zanambani of the Gospel Tabernacle Church of Indonesia was shotdead when feeding his pigs near his house in Hitadipa village, Intan Jaya district, Papua, on
September 19. Hostilities were ongoing in the area between Indonesian soldiers and a FreeWest Papua group during which two soldiers and two non-Papuan Indonesians were killed.
…
In April in Ambon police arrested 23 activists, who participated in flag-raisingceremonies commemorating the 70th anniversary of the declaration of independence of the
Republic of South Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS). The Ambon court foundthree of them guilty, sentencing two to two years and a third to three years in prison.

…
エ ●HRW「パプア人活動家 3 人を釈放せよ：平和的抗議への逮捕が警察による反逆法の濫用を浮き彫りにする‐Arrests for Peaceful Protest Highlights Police
Abuse of Treason Laws」（2019 年 2 月 8 日）…
Police in Timika arrested Yanto Awerkion, Sem Asso, and Edo Dogopia of the West
Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB), a student association,
on December 31, 2018 when they were organizing a prayer gathering to commemorate thegroup’s fifth anniversary. Papuan human rights groups reported that the police arrested andbeat nine KNPB members. On January 7, charges were only brought against the three fortreason (makar) under articles 106 and 110 of the Criminal Code. Article 106 carries amaximum sentence of life imprisonment. They are currently being held in Papua’s capital,
Jayapura.
…
The KNPB, perhaps the largest indigenous youth organization in Papua and West
Papua provinces, advocates for independence of their homeland through a United Nationssponsored referendum. In 2017, Awerkion organized a petition calling on the UN to organizea referendum in Papua. …
On January 3, 2019, more than 80 police without a warrant used batons to forcibly
remove KNPB members from their office in Timika, dismantling their sign board, taking
down a wall with a mural painted with pro-independence symbols, and repainting the entire
building with the red-and-white color of the Indonesian flag. The police said that Papuans
were not allowed to use any Free West Papua insignia or anything with the Morning Starflag, long a symbol of opposition to Indonesian rule.
Since the raid, the office has been used as a joint military-police post. The KNPB filed alawsuit against the forced removal, contending that the police removed them without a court
order to remove them. The police claim that the office was used for “shouting about
freedom.”10アフガニスタン 2024 年 5 月 30 日

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Over the last decade, the Indonesian government has released dozens of people
imprisoned in Papua and the Moluccas Islands for peacefully expressing their politicalaspirations. In December, the Indonesian government released two Moluccan politicalprisoners, Johan Teterisa and Jonathan Riri, who had been imprisoned for treason for morethan 11 years. They were among more than 60 activists arrested and imprisoned for treason
since June 2007 after 28 of them staged a protest dance with the South Moluccan Republic
flag in front of then-President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in Ambon stadium. Now only
six political prisoners, all Moluccan activists, are still imprisoned in Ambon, the Moluccas
Islands, since their 2007 arrests with Teterisa and Riri.
In January 2018, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court rejected a judicial review to annul fivetreason articles, including articles 106 and 110, but found that those articles were often
disproportionally applied against political activists raising the Morning Star flag in Papua.
In its ruling, the court considered the 2011 ruling from the United Nations Working Groupon Arbitrary Detention on the arbitrary detention of Papuan activist Filep Karma, who wasthen serving a 15-year prison term for his 2004 peaceful protest against Indonesian rule.
The working group concluded that articles 106 and 110 were applied disproportionally in
the Karma trial.
…

4.

ジェンダー、DV および子ども＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

(1) 女性ア ●DFAT「出身国情報報告

インドネシア」（2023 年 7 月 24 日）

Violence against women…
3.87 More women than ever are wearing a jilbab. This may be to prevent perceived risk ofviolence in the street or accusations that women who do not cover up are inviting
attention, as well as a reflection of increased religiosity in the country. In-country sources
told DFAT that some non-Muslim women also adapt this practice for the same reasons.
While covering up may lessen harassment, DFAT notes it is still relatively common to
see women in Indonesia without any head covering, and harassment does not necessarily
follow.
3.88 Victims of violence (whether societal or domestic) are often reluctant to report theirexperiences. Many women do not trust police; they lack confidence in the police’s ability
or willingness to help them or may fear that their personal information will become publicknowledge and the subject of gossip in their communities if they do report violence. A
woman would most likely need to report violence to a male officer and may fear that theofficer will not believe her or take action to protect her.
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3.90 Women may be reluctant to leave abusive marriages if they have children. Retaining
custody of children may be difficult (legal proceedings are expensive and take time) andwomen may fear their children will become victims of violence if left behind. Women
may be financially dependent on their husbands, thus leaving an abusive relationship may
cause significant economic insecurity and hardship for a woman or her children.
…
Single women, widows and divorcees
3.93 Women who are not married may face social stigma or harassment, including sexual
harassment, especially if they are divorced. Some women choose to move to Jakarta for
more independence. This option may not be available to women who are financiallydependent on their families or lack work connections in their hometown or in Jakarta.
3.94 Indonesian society is patriarchal and women without husbands have less ‘social
access’; they are less likely to have networks or be invited to social events. This, in turn,can lead to fewer opportunities for social and economic advancement. Divorces can bedifficult to obtain. Indonesia does not have no-fault divorce and women might havedifficulty proving the grounds for divorce.
…

イ ●HRW「ワールドレポート 2024－インドネシア」（2024 年 1 月 11 日）
Women’s and Girls’ Rights
Many provinces, regencies, and cities continued to impose discriminatory dress codes on
women and girls. In August, Indonesia’s National Commission on Violence Against Women(Komnas Perempuan) held its first-ever hearing on mandatory dress regulations, hearing
from female students, teachers, and parents about widespread bullying of those who refuse
to wear the jilbab or hijab. Many of those refusing to comply with the rules, including nonMuslims, continued to face expulsion or pressure to withdraw from school. In several cases,
female civil servants, including teachers and university lecturers, lost their jobs or resigned
for refusing to comply with rules.
…

(2) 女性器切除（FGM/C）
ア ●ACCORD「インドネシアに関するクエリー回答：FGM の広まり、法的な規制と組織」（2020 年 3 月 27 日）(Google 訳)
The spread within the country varies greatly between the provinces: in the east of the12アフガニスタン 2024 年 5 月 30 日

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country it is less than 10 percent (UNICEF, January 2020), the lowest distribution is at 3
percent in the province of East Nusa Tenggara (WHO, 2017, p. 34), while in other provinces
it would reach more than 80 percent. In the province of Gorontalo, for example, it is 83
percent (WHO, 2017, S 34, S. 41).
…
According to UNICEF, RISKESDAS data showed that as many girls up to the age of 12
living in an urban environment were affected by FGM than those living in rural areas: girls
living in urban areas were 56 percent affected by FGM, according to their mothers, while
girls in rural areas were 47 percent affected by FGM. Furthermore, girls with higher
economic status are 53 percent more likely to be affected by FGM than girls who were
attributed to the population with the lowest economic status (47 percent of those affectedby FGM). According to their mothers, girls up to the age of 12 are most likely to be affectedby FGM when the head of household has completed primary or secondary education,according to their mothers. The percentage of girls affected is lower if there is either noformal education or tertiary education. (UNICEF, January 2020)…
According to the organization Terre Des Femmes, FGM is religiously justified inIndonesia. Among other things, it is said that an uncircumcised woman cannot be a Muslim
a and that FGM is understood in Indonesia as a religious ritual. Many Muslim leadersbelieve that the Koran prescribes female genital mutilation. (Terre Des Femmes, December
2019)
…

5.

LGBT
ア ●DFAT「出身国情報報告＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞
インドネシア」（2023 年 7 月 24 日）

Sexual orientation and gender identity
3.97 There is no national law against same-sex sexual relations, but it is illegal in Aceh,
where ‘offenders’ are caned as a judicial punishment for same-sex acts. Nonetheless,
LGBTI people are heavily stigmatised in Indonesia. …
3.98 Despite not being illegal, LGBTI people are sometimes targeted by police. For
example, according to international media, a private ‘gay party’ was raided by police withcharges laid against nine people for ‘obscene acts’ under anti-pornography laws in August2020. Other raids on private homes of suspected LGBTI people were ordered by themayor of Depok in West Java in January 2020. LGBTI people may face charges in the
military, where same-sex sexual activity is illegal. In June 2022, two soldiers weresentenced to eight and nine months’ prison respectively for having male-male sex. LGBTI
people have been dismissed from the police force because of their sexual orientation.
Because of the threat of arrest or extortion, most LGBTI people avoid police.
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イ ●HRW「ワールドレポート 2024－インドネシア」（2024 年 1 月 11 日）
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Officials continued to target LGBT people. In July, advocates canceled a regional
gathering of LGBT activists in Jakarta in response to harassment and death threats from
Muslim conservatives. The ASEAN SOGIE Caucus, a regional organization based in thePhilippines, had planned to hold their annual ASEAN Queer Advocacy Week in Jakarta
during the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit.
On May 28, Pekanbaru police and public security officials arrested 29 women and 28
men in several raided houses in Sukajadi area, accusing them of being “LGBT couples.”

ア ●HRW「ワールドレポート 2021‐インドネシア」（2021 年 1 月 13 日）
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
In Jakarta, police arrested three men after a transgender woman was burned alive on April
7. On Madura Island, police arrested three male suspects after a transgender woman was
robbed and killed in her salon on September 3.
Indonesian authorities continued their assault on the basic rights of LGBT people. On
August 29, police forcibly broke up a party at a hotel, arresting nine men and charging themwith the crime of “facilitating obscene acts” under the pornography law, which
discriminates against LGBT people. East Java police arrested a police officer in
Probolinggo who allegedly had a relationship with another man. In October, the Supreme
Court announced that it had rejected appeals and dismissed at least 16 gay soldiers inseveral court cases including in Bandung, Jayapura, Medan, Semarang, and Surabaya.

イ ●フリーダムハウス「世界の自由 2019‐インドネシア」（2019 年）E Associational and Organizational Rights…
E2 …
Authorities and influential Muslim organizations have continued to intimidate andharass LGBT people and activists. In recent years, authorities have closed a transgenderboarding school, raided a gym and sauna that also functioned as a health center for gay
and bisexual men, and banned or attempted to ban foreign funding for LGBT groups.
Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, has called for LGBT activism
to be criminalized. The cumulative effect of this campaign has been to drive the LGBT
activist community underground, and to hamper groups seeking to provide services to14

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LGBT people.

6.

汚職、非国家主体による犯罪、国家による被害者の保護(1) パプアおよび西パプアの過激派勢力等による攻撃
ウ ●DFAT「出身国情報報告＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

インドネシア」（2023 年 7 月 24 日）

Secessionists in the Papua province
3.65 There is a long-running armed conflict in the Papua provinces related to secessionist
aspirations. Parts of the Papua provinces, particularly the Highlands, are very remote anddangerous. There is a heavy security presence (police and military) in the region.
…
3.67 Violence in Highland Papua has, over a number of years, displaced large numbers ofpeople. Information about the violence is often difficult or impossible to verify becauseof a lack of access to the area by independent observers. Some reporting suggests violenceby security forces is getting worse, although the scarcity of data makes it difficult to verify
these reports.
3.68 The secessionist movement is not united or homogenous; there is overlap, linkages and(sometimes violent) disputes between different secessionist groups. Tribal politics, gang
violence, alcohol-related violence and corruption also play a role in the interaction among
the various groups. Some secessionist groups entirely eschew violence. Violence that isunrelated to secessionism is sometimes incorrectly reported as secessionist violence. For
example, a fire that killed 17 people at a karaoke bar in West Papua province in January2022 was initially thought to be caused by separatists, however it was actually gangrelated.
3.69 Civilians are often the victims of violence, whether by secessionists or security forces,
however the experience of non-combatants is seldom reported and not well-understood.
Papuan society generally, and the conflict over secession in particular, is male-driven andwomen in particular may be subject to, or non-willing participants in, violence.
…

エ ●HRW「ワールドレポート 2021‐インドネシア」（2021 年 1 月 13 日）
Papua, West Papua, and the Moluccas Islands…
No one was arrested for the killing of at least 52 Papuans and migrants from other partsof Indonesia in Deiyai and Wamena during 2019 anti-racism protests. The precise numberof deaths is unknown because the government continued to limit access to Papua in 2020.

15

アフガニスタン 2024 年 5 月 30 日

©難民研究フォーラム https://refugeestudies.jp(2) イスラム教過激派勢力等による攻撃
ア ●DFAT「出身国情報報告＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

インドネシア」（2023 年 7 月 24 日）

Mainstream Islam…
3.35 Given the diversity of approaches to Islam in Indonesia, hard-line Islamic groups,
including the now banned Islamic Defenders Front (‘FPI’) can be influential and can attimes target moderate Muslims. The leader of FPI was arrested in December 2020 for
breaching COVID-19 rules and the organisation was banned and disbanded for their links
to terrorism and ‘public disorder’.
3.36 Outward expressions of Muslim piety have increased since the beginning of thedemocratic period. For example, the number of people wearing the hijab, jilbab (a formof head covering that covers hair, neck and chest), or beards, or going on religious
pilgrimages, has increased, particularly among the middle classes. A rise in interest in
religion does not necessarily reflect a rise in radicalism, however, may reflect current
social pressures as well as longstanding Indonesian social conservatism, which is also
found among non-Muslims.

イ ●米国国務省「人権状況報告 2023 年‐インドネシア」（2024 年 4 月 22 日）
Nongovernmental Impact: Hardline Muslim groups sometimes intimidated perceived
critics of Islam or groups considered heretical. There were multiple reports of harassmentof Muslim families if daughters did not cover their hair. School officials sometimes
intimated girls who did not want to comply with mandatory hijab uniform regulations or
who wore their hijabs incorrectly. In an August incident, a teacher partially shaved the headsof 14 girls in Lamongan, East Java, because their bangs were showing.

ウ ●記事「Indonesia militants adopt political tactics ahead of 2024 polls」日本経済新聞（2023 年 8 月 25 日）
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the al-Qaida-linked militant group in Indonesia, is working to
infiltrate political parties to gain support for its effort to establish an Islamic state in the
Muslim-majority country, analysts and one former militant say.

…
JI's attempts at political infiltration came to the fore when police arrested Farid Ahmad
Okbah, founder of the Indonesian People's Dakwah Party (PDRI) in November 2021. He
was a suspected member of JI's consultative council. A Jakarta court jailed him for three
years for terrorist activities in December.
…
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エ ●HRW「インドネシアで ISIS が 4 回の自爆攻撃に子どもを使う」（2018 年 5月 15 日）Coordinated suicide bombings of three Christian churches and the police headquarters in
Surabaya, Indonesia’s second largest city, on May 13-14, 2018, were repugnant acts ofviolence, Human Rights Watch said today. The attackers intentionally used their own
children, who were between the ages of 9 and 18, to either carry and detonate explosives or
to accompany their parents carrying out the attacks.
…

オ 記事「インドネシア、テロ対策で二正面作戦 法改正で予備軍摘発／脱過激へ
思想教育 子供を洗脳、新種事件への対応急務」（会員記事）日本経済新聞（2018年 6 月 4 日）
インドネシアのジョコ政権はテロ対策を拡大する。反テロ法改正によりテロリ
スト予備軍の取り締まりを強化する一方、若者らが過激な思想に染まらないような思想教育に力を入れる。5 月中旬以降に生じた連続自爆テロ事件では子供まで過激思想に洗脳されて犯行に加わっていた。政権は再発防止に全力をあげる。
…

カ 記事「インドネシア、抗議デモで「6 人死亡」 ジャカルタ州知事」日本経済新聞（2019 年 5 月 22 日）
インドネシア大統領選の開票結果を巡り野党支持者が実施した抗議デモで、首都ジャカルタのアニス州知事は 22 日午前、6 人が死亡し、約 200 人が負傷したことを明らかにした。野党支持者は 22 日午後にも大規模なデモを予告しており、混乱が広がる可能性もある。
…
抗議デモは総選挙監視庁前で発生した。22 日未明に少数の野党支持者が暴徒化
して投石や放火を開始し、治安部隊と衝突した。治安部隊は催涙弾を使用し、デモ隊を強制的に解散させた。警察車両が燃やされる被害も出た。
国家警察は 22 日の記者会見で、69 人を拘束したと発表した。「火炎瓶などで武装していた」として、デモに集まった野党支持者とは別に、計画的に争乱を起こす目的で集まった集団による犯行の可能性を示唆した。
「死傷者数は調査中」としている。地方でも、ボルネオ（カリマンタン）島西部のポンティアナクで交番が放火された。

＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

(3) 土地の強制収用
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ア ●米国国務省「人権状況報告 2023 年‐インドネシア」（2024 年 4 月 22 日）
G. PROPERTY SEIZURE AND RESTITUTION
An eminent domain law allowed the government to expropriate land for the public good,
provided the government properly compensated owners. NGOs accused the government ofabusing its authority to expropriate or facilitate private acquisition of land for development
projects, often without fair compensation.
…
On September 11, thousands protested in front of the Batam Enterprise Agency in the
Riau Islands in response to land clearance planned for the Rempang Eco City project, agovernment-supported industry, trade, and tourism initiative involving foreign investmentsthat critics said was designed without meaningful local consultation. Protesters demanded ahalt to the relocation of at least six villages and claimed the evictions were occurring without
due process. The protest escalated into what onlookers described as a riot, resulting in thearrest of 43 persons accused of vandalism and committing violence against officers.

＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

(4) 土地争い

イ ●米国国務省「人権状況報告 2023 年‐インドネシア」（2024 年 4 月 22 日）
G. PROPERTY SEIZURE AND RESTITUTION…
Land access and ownership were major sources of conflict. According to a report releasedin January by the Agrarian Reform Consortium, a farmers’ advocacy group, 212 agrariandisputes across 34 provinces in 2022 covered approximately 3,800 square miles of land andaffected more than 340,000 families. Police and military sometimes evicted those involvedin land disputes without due process, often siding with business-related claimants overindividuals or local communities.
Contested administrative boundaries, especially in Kalimantan and the Papua regions
where new provinces were created in 2022, contributed to overlapping licenses, ownershipdisputes, unmanaged extractive industries, and corruption.
…

7.

兵役、強制徴集（非国家主体の）
ア ●CIA「ワールド・ファクトブック‐インドネシア」（2021 年 3 月 25 日閲覧）
Military service age and obligation
18-45 years of age for voluntary military service, with selective conscription authorized; 2year service obligation, with reserve obligation to age 45 (officers); Indonesian citizens only
(2019)
18

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8.

©難民研究フォーラム https://refugeestudies.jp

司法制度・刑事手続(1) 名誉棄損による訴追
ア ● HRW 「 WhatsApp 上 の メ ッ セ ー ジ を 理 由 に 投 獄 ‐ Repeal Criminal
Defamation Provisions in Internet Law」（2019 年 3 月 8 日）
On February 26, 2019, the court sentenced Syamlan to 10 months in jail for defamation
for allegedly sending four WhatsApp messages to two banks regarding a company’s
performance. She denies sending the messages. The Indonesian government should repeal
criminal provisions that restrict peaceful free expression online.
…
Syamlan’s husband, Aziz Hamedan had long been the finance director of Pisma Textile
but retired in 2016. The WhatsApp messages are four short sentences, in Javanese language,
sent on June 23, 2017, separately to two bankers in Jakarta – Eximbank Indonesia and Bank
Negara Indonesia officials – that questioned the credibility of Pista Textile, a well-known
textile company that makes sarongs.
…

9.

警察・治安部隊（刑務所等の状況含む）＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

ア ●米国国務省「人権状況報告 2023 年‐インドネシア」（2024 年 4 月 22 日）
PRISON AND DETENTION CENTER CONDITIONS
Conditions in the country’s 526 prisons and detention centers were often harsh andsometimes life threatening, due especially to overcrowding.
Abusive Physical Conditions: Overcrowding was a serious problem, including at
immigration detention centers. According to the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, as ofAugust there were more than 228,000 prisoners and detainees in prisons and detention
centers designed to hold a maximum of 128,656. Despite the release of nearly 50,000
detainees since September 2022, overcrowding posed hygiene and ventilation problems.
The degree of overcrowding at facilities varied; minimum- and medium-security prisonswere often the most overcrowded; maximum-security prisons tended to be at or below
capacity.
…

＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

10. 報道の自由

ア ●米国国務省「人権状況報告 2023 年‐インドネシア」（2024 年 4 月 22 日）
A. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, INCLUDING FOR MEMBERS OF THE PRESSAND OTHER MEDIA
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Freedom of Expression: The law criminalized obscenity, hate speech, and speechdefaming a person’s character or reputation; insulting a religion; spreading false
information; or advocating separatism.
The Attorney General’s Office had the authority to monitor written material and to request
a court order to ban written material. Spreading hate speech or false information was
punishable by up to six years in prison. Language in the law banning obscenity was broadly
applied to restrict speech deemed as offending local morals. Blasphemy was punishable forup to five years in prison but was usually prosecuted under the Electronic Information andTransactions law, which was often used to regulate online speech and carried a maximum
six-year prison sentence. NGOs reported this law was also sometimes used to prosecute
government critics.
On September 19, Palembang District Court sentenced TikTok influencer Lina Luftiawati
to two years in prison and fined her 250 million rupiah (IDR) ($16,400) for “inciting hatred”
against religious groups by posting a video in which she said an Islamic prayer before eating
pork, an act forbidden in Islam. The video garnered more than 13 million views within aweek.
…

イ ●HRW「ワールドレポート 2021‐インドネシア」（2021 年 1 月 13 日）
Freedom of Media…
Journalist Diananta Sumedi served three months in jail in Kotabaru, South Kalimantan,
until August after writing stories about a land dispute between Dayak Indigenous people
and the Jhonlin palm oil company.
…
In September police arrested three student journalists after they joined fishermen on theirboat to protest sand mining on Kodingareng Island, off Makassar. In October, at least 56
journalists were beaten, threatened, and arbitrarily arrested in Malang, Jakarta, andSurabaya, when covering protests against the new job creation law.

ウ ●フリーダムハウス「世界の自由 2019‐インドネシア」（2019 年）
D Freedom of Expression and Belief
D1…

Dozens of assaults, threats, arrests, and other forms of obstruction were directedagainst journalists during 2018, with perpetrators including politicians, police, and20

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military officials. In June, journalist Muhammad Yusuf of the local news
website Kemajuan Rakyat died in police custody, after being detained for weeks on
charges of defamation and hate speech in connection with articles implicating a palm oilcompany in illegal land grabs. His family accused authorities of medical neglect.

11. 宗教の自由(1) イスラム教に対する冒涜罪による訴追等
ア ●DFAT「出身国情報報告＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

インドネシア」（2023 年 7 月 24 日）

Blasphemy and Defamation of Religion
3.29 Indonesia’s Criminal Code prohibits acts or words that insult one of the official
religions. The Electronic Information and Transaction Law (ITE Law) also makes it anoffence to deliberately disseminate information aimed at inciting hatred or using
blasphemous or heretical language. Punishments may be severe; for example, in April
2022 a Christian preacher was sentenced to 10 years in prison for comments he made on
YouTube which a court found were blasphemous. A Muslim cleric who was convicted for
blasphemy against the Bible and hate speech against Christians received a five-monthsentence in January 2022.
3.30 Blasphemy laws are sometimes used against religious minorities, however sources notethey are also sometimes used Muslim-on-Muslim to settle personal disputes, for example
disputes between neighbours. On contentious issues, including blasphemy, once
allegations are spread (often via social media) there is a chance of widespread communal
protests.
3.31 According to the 2021 US Department of State Indonesia International Religious
Freedom Report, there were 67 blasphemy cases in 2020, 43 of which were related tosocial media activity. The report states that sources have noted a trend of increases in thenumber of blasphemy cases and convictions, particularly when viewed over a period of
decades (since the transition to democracy in the late 1990s, for example).
3.32 Politically motivated blasphemy allegations are possible, especially against religious
minorities. There is potential for such accusations to be accompanied by hate speech or,
in rare cases, violence. Overall, such outcomes are unlikely even for religious minorities,
and blasphemy allegations are not a day-to-day occurrence for religious minorities.
…

＜参考＞DFAT「出身国情報報告 インドネシア」（2019 年 1 月 25 日）
Blasphemy and Defamation of Religion…
3.26

In 2018, courts have so far convicted six people for blasphemy. Notably, in August21アフガニスタン 2024 年 5 月 30 日

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2018, an ethnically Chinese Indonesian Buddhist woman called Meiliana received an 18
month prison sentence for blasphemy, after complaining about the volume of the call to
prayer broadcast from speakers at a local mosque in North Sumatra. In response to theperceived affront to Islam, a mob attacked Meiliana’s home, Buddhist temples and several
other ethnically Chinese Indonesians’ homes.. In January 2017 several of the rioters weresentenced to prison, the majority for under four months. A later decision to prosecute
Meiliana in August 2017 came after sustained community pressure, including from hardline Muslim groups, and coincided with the high-profile Ahok case.
…

＜参考＞DFAT「出身国情報報告＜入管庁ウェブ＞

インドネシア（仮訳）」（2017 年 12 月 22 日）

宗教の冒涜/中傷…
3.27 インドネシアで近年起き、今日までで最も注目度が高かった冒涜事件は、中国民族少数派に属するキリスト教徒の元ジャカルタ特別州知事のバスキ・チャ
ハヤ・プルナマ（「アホック」）が関わったものであった。アホックは、イスラム教徒が非イスラム教徒の指導者を選出することを禁じるコーランの一節を引き合いに出して一部のイスラム聖職者が住民を騙したと 2016 年 9 月に示唆した罪で、2017 年 5 月に懲役 2 年の刑を言い渡された。その後の数か月間、アホックの逮捕を要求する一連の大規模なデモが全国で行われた。2016 年 12 月にはこれらのデモの中で最大となったジャカルタでのデモに最多で 50 万人が集まった。
幾つかの強硬派集団がこのデモ行進で顕著な役割を果たした。検察官は冒涜罪
より軽い罪でアホックに有罪判決を下そうとし、公衆はアホックが懲役刑を逃れると見込んでいたが、5 人の裁判官から成る審理パネルは、アホックはコーラ
ンの神聖さを理解していたが、それでもなお意図的に宗教を侮辱する発言を行ったと判示した。
…

イ ●HRW「ワールドレポート 2024－インドネシア」（2024 年 1 月 11 日）
Freedom of Religion and Belief
Provisions in a 1965 blasphemy law (already in effect but expanded by the new criminalcode), and a 2006 religious harmony regulation, continue to place religious minorities atrisk. The 2006 regulation continued to give religious majorities in communities the power
to veto religious activities by minority religions or stop them from constructing houses ofworship, primarily impacting Christians, Shia Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucians.
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even harsher treatment. As in the previous two decades, the government did too little to stop
Islamic groups attacking or harassing religious minorities or to hold those responsible toaccount. For instance, on September 17, dozens of Muslim militants stopped a religious
service held by a Christian group in Depok, arguing it had “no permit” to conduct services.
In March, police arrested a TikTok star, Lina Mukherjee, under the blasphemy law
for posting an online video showing her eating pork after saying an Islamic prayer. In
September, the Palembang district court sentenced her to two years in prison. Islamic groups
have also pressured musical or theater venues to cancel or not host artists deemed to promote
un-Islamic values.

ウ ●Bertelsmann Stiftung「BTI 2020 Country Report – Indonesia」（2020 年）
As with the debate on state identity, Islamic conservatives have in recent years increased
their influence over the workings of political and legal institutions. Given that 87% of its
population are Muslim, Indonesia has traditionally struggled to maintain a balance between
promoting Islamic values and the rights of non-Muslim minorities. While the Indonesianconstitution guarantees the freedom of religion, this right has been increasingly hollowed
out. One indication of this is the rise in the number of blasphemy cases, both against elites
and ordinary citizens. The Chinese-Christian governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama(or “Ahok”), was sentenced to two years in prison in May 2017, following large Islamist
demonstrations against him. In August 2018, a Chinese-Christian woman was convicted of
blasphemy after her complaint about the noise of a mosque loudspeaker triggered a riot in
her hometown of Tanjung Balai on Sumatra. At the same time, LGBTI citizens have faced
the worst attacks on them in living memory, with local state officials since 2018 introducing
a range of local discriminatory regulations and conducting raids aimed at publicly shaming
them. These local regulations add to other, already existing bylaws that enforce Islamic
dress or behavioral codes. These bylaws threaten women’s rights and the ability of religious
minorities to practice their faith, and the acquisition of licenses for non-Muslim places ofworship continues to be difficult. Since 2014, it is reported that approximately 32 churches
and five Ahmadi mosques were closed by Islamist conservative groups or by thegovernment under the pressure of such conservative groups across the Indonesia.

エ ●フリーダムハウス「世界の自由 2019‐インドネシア」（2019 年）
D Freedom of Expression and Belief…
D4 Laws against blasphemy, defamation, and certain other forms of speech may
sometimes inhibit the expression of personal views on sensitive topics, including onsocial media. In a 2018 blasphemy case in North Sumatra, an ethnic Chinese woman was
sentenced in August to 18 months in prison after complaining that the call to prayer at a23

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nearby mosque was too loud.…

E Associational and Organizational Rights…
E2 While nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are active in Indonesia, they are subject
to government monitoring and interference. A 2013 law requires all NGOs to registerwith the government and submit to regular reviews of their activities. It limits the typesof activities NGOs can undertake and bars them from committing blasphemy orespousing ideas that conflict with the official Pancasila ideology, such as atheism andcommunism. The government is empowered to dissolve noncompliant organizations
without judicial oversight.
※前掲＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

(2) アチェ

ア ●米国国務省「人権状況報告 2023 年‐インドネシア」（2024 年 4 月 22 日）
C. TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
OR PUNISHMENT…
Aceh Province had special authority to implement sharia regulations. Authorities there
carried out public canings for violations of sharia in cases of sexual abuse, gambling,
adultery, alcohol consumption, and sexual relations outside of marriage. Same-sex sexual
conduct was a criminal offense in Aceh, punishable by caning; there were no known casesof punishment for this crime during the year. Sharia was not, by regulation, to be applied to
non-Muslims, foreigners, or Muslims not resident in Aceh; however, it sometimes was.
Non-Muslims in Aceh occasionally chose punishment under sharia because it was more
expeditious and less expensive than secular procedures.
…

イ 記事「婚外交渉の男女に公開むち打ち刑、インドネシア・アチェ州」AFP（2019年 3 月 4 日）
インドネシアのアチェ（Aceh）州で 4 日、婚外交渉を持った男女 12 人に対する公開むち打ち刑が執行された。
6 組のカップルは昨年末、州都バンダアチェ（Banda Aceh）のホテルで行われた強制捜査で、婚姻関係にない異性と会っていた、あるいは親密な関係を持ったとして、シャリア（イスラム法）違反で逮捕された。
スマトラ（Sumatra）島の最北端に位置する保守的なアチェ州では、賭博や飲酒、
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同性愛者間の性行為などが犯罪とみなされ、罰としてむち打ち刑が適用される。
世界最大のイスラム人口を持つインドネシアの中でも、シャリアが施行されているのはアチェ州だけ。公開むち打ち刑については、人権団体が残酷な刑罰だと非難しており、ジョコ・ウィドド（Joko Widodo）大統領も中止を求めている。

12. 国籍、民族および人種＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

(1) 中華系
ア ●DFAT「出身国情報報告

インドネシア」（2023 年 7 月 24 日）

Ethnically Chinese Indonesians…
3.8 Hundreds of thousands of protesters demonstrated in Jakarta on several occasions in2016 to demand the detention of the Christian and Chinese-Indonesian Governor of
Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (often referred to as ‘Ahok’), after he was arrested forallegedly insulting Islam. Violence between protesters and police was reported, but notviolence against ordinary citizens, as occurred in 1998.
3.9 Chinese Indonesians experience societal discrimination in the form of negative
stereotypes that portray them as greedy, as criminals or as being associated with China
and its policies. Discrimination of this type increased around the outbreak of the COVID19 pandemic due to the extensive media coverage of China and various claims about theorigins of the virus at the time.
3.10 Risk of societal discrimination against Chinese Indonesians depends on individual
circumstances. Individuals with wealth are less affected; they can use their wealth andconnections with powerful people to protect themselves. Many Chinese Indonesians workin family businesses or within their own ethnic community, which reduces the chances of
discrimination at work. Those without such networks or wealth would be more at risk of
discrimination, but that applies to all Indonesians, not just Chinese Indonesians.
3.11 Memories of the 1998 violence and 2016 protests are still fresh in the memories ofmany ethnically Chinese Indonesians. Some jealousy of perceived wealth can lead tothreats and some Chinese Indonesians keep a low profile as a result. Anti-minority
sentiment is also heightened during election campaigns. Violence has occurred in the past
but is not an everyday experience for Chinese Indonesians.
…

＜参考＞DFAT「出身国情報報告 インドネシア」（2019 年 1 月 25 日）＜参考＞DFAT「出身国情報報告＜入管庁ウェブ＞

インドネシア（仮訳）」（2017 年 12 月 22 日）
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インドネシア華僑
3.6 500 年以上に亘って中国からインドネシアへの移住の波が連続して押し寄せ、インドネシア全域に亘ってインドネシア華僑社会が確立される結果となった。その多くはもはや中国語を話せない。2010 年国勢調査によると、インドネ
シアには 280 万人の華僑が住んでおり、総人口の 1.2 パーセントを構成している。一部のインドネシア華僑は過去に生じた緊張関係のために自認することを嫌がると伝えられているため、この数値は実際より少ないかもしれない。インド
ネシア華僑社会は宗教的に混在している。2010 年国勢調査によると、50 パーセ
ントが仏教徒、20 パーセントがプロテスタント、14.75 パーセントがカトリッ
ク、11 パーセントが儒教徒、3.6 パーセントがイスラム教徒である。インドネシ
ア華僑は文化的理由で、また、異宗教間結婚は行政上の困難さを伴う可能性があるため、自らの民族的及び宗教的集団内で結婚する傾向がある（身分法を参照）。
3.7 スハルト時代の新秩序体制は中国系インドネシア人を様々な差別措置に晒した。法律により、中国語の新聞、学校及び文化的表現は禁止され、中国系インド
ネシア人の多くはインドネシア語の名前をつけるよう圧力をかけられた。1967
年政令（公式には現在も生きている）は、中国系インドネシア人が軍隊に勤務す
るのを禁じており、中国系インドネシア人はインドネシア市民であることを証明する書類を携行しなければならなかった（公式には現在も携行しなければならない）。近年の歴史の項で記述した通り、アジア通貨危機の最中の 1998 年 5月、暴徒はインドネシア華人が裕福であるという共通の誤解により、そのコミュ
ニティを標的にした。1,000 人ものインドネシア華僑が暴動に関係した事件で死亡した。女性は強姦され、商店は焼かれ、又は略奪された。
3.8 新秩序体制が終焉して以来、歴代政権はインドネシアの公共政策から反中国人の側面の大半を排除した。チャイニーズ・ニューイヤー（旧正月）は国民の祝日として祝われている。中国の文化的パフォーマンスと言語は受け入れられており、憲法はもはやインドネシア華僑と「先住」インドネシア人を区別していない。2014 年、当時のユドヨノ（Yudhoyono）大統領は「華僑」を指定するのに用いるインドネシア語をしばしば人種的中傷に関係する言葉から変える規則を発出した。ユドヨノ政権時代の貿易大臣（Minister for Trade）（及び後の観光大臣（Minister for Tourism））やウィドド政権時代のジャカルタ首都特別州知事など
複数のインドネシア華僑が高位の職に就いている。中国系インドネシア人はビ
ジネス社会において、引き続き卓越した活躍を遂げている。
3.9 しかしながら、反中国人感情はインドネシアの社会レベルで存在したままである。中国系インドネシア人の多くは裕福でないものの、国内で最も裕福、かつ、最も著名な企業人の多くは華僑であることが、非中国系インドネシア人の反感の源である。インドネシア人の多くは依然として、中国系インドネシア人が一般の生活に入ってくることについて不安を感じている。2012 年、ウィドド大統
領は、通称「アホック（Ahok）」として知られる中国系インドネシア人（及びキリスト教徒）のバスキ・チャハヤ・プルナマ（Basuki Tjahaja Purnama）を副知事
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候補としてジャカルタ特別州知事に立候補した際、保守的なイスラム集団から強い批判を浴びた。アホックはその後、ジャカルタ特別州知事を引き継いだ。そのようなイスラム集団は 2016 年終わりにアホックを冒涜罪で告発した後、大勢のデモ参加者を動員するための手段としてアホックの民族的及び宗教的背景を利用した（宗教の冒涜/中傷を参照）。
…

(2) 先住民
ア ●HRW「ワールドレポート 2021‐インドネシア」（2021 年 1 月 13 日）
Indigenous Rights
Major Indonesian companies continued to cut old growth forests with impunity. Yet on
May 19, a court sentenced Bongku of the Sakai Indigenous group in Riau to a year in jailfor cutting down 20 trees in a forest that his tribe has claimed in a longstanding disputewith the Asia Pulp & Paper Group.
On April 26, Hermanus, a Dayak Indigenous farmer, died in a Sampit hospital while stillfacing trial for defending his land against Best Agro oil palm plantation. The land dispute
began in 2003. On June 15, his colleagues, James Watt and Dilik, were sentenced
respectively to 10 and 8 months in jail for “stealing” oil palm fruits from land the National
Land Agency had declared in 2011 belonged to the village.
On August 18, police raided the Pubabu Indigenous community on Timor Island,
displacing more than 600 people and destroying 47 homes in a long-lasting land dispute.
…

(3) 国籍ア ●CIA「ワールド・ファクトブック‐インドネシア」（2021 年 3 月 25 日閲覧）
Citizenshipcitizenship by birth: no
citizenship by descent only: at least one parent must be a citizen of Indonesia
dual citizenship recognized: noresidency requirement for naturalization: 5 continuous years＜2024 年 5 月 30 日更新＞

13. 出入国および移動の自由
ア ●DFAT「出身国情報報告

インドネシア」（2023 年 7 月 24 日）

INTERNAL RELOCATION
5.18 Indonesian citizens are legally able to move and reside freely within all territories of27

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the Republic of Indonesia, and Indonesians can and do relocate. There may be
administrative hurdles for travel by NGOs, journalists and others to the Papua provinces,and the security situation, particularly in the highlands, is unpredictable. People of
Papuan ethnicity can and do move in and out of the area.
5.19 Major cities, particularly Jakarta, offer Indonesians greater opportunities for
employment. Presidential Decree No. 25 (2008), based on Law No. 23 (2006) requires
Indonesian citizens who relocate within Indonesia to register with the relevant local
authority within one year of relocation. Registration information is passed to higher
authorities.

イ ●米国国務省「人権状況報告 2023 年‐インドネシア」（2024 年 4 月 22 日）
D. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND THE RIGHT TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY
The law provided for freedom of internal movement and generally allowed for travel
outside the country. The law gave the military broad powers, in a declared state of
emergency, to limit land, air, and sea traffic. The government did not use these powers
during the year.
In-country Movement: The government imposed administrative hurdles for travel byNGOs, journalists, foreign diplomats, and others to the Papua region.

略称
ACCORD

オーストリア出身国・庇護研究ドキュメンテーションセンター

ACLED

武力紛争位置・事件データプロジェクト

AI

アムネスティ・インターナショナル

ARC

難民調査センター

BAMF

ドイツ連邦移民難民庁

CGRS

ベルギー難民及び無国籍者庁

CIA

米国中央情報局

CNDA

フランス庇護権裁判所

CRS

米国議会調査局

DFAT

オーストラリア外務貿易省

DIS

デンマーク移民庁

DRC

デンマーク・レフュジー・カウンセル

EASO

欧州難民支援局

HRW

ヒューマン・ライツ・ウォッチ

ICG

インターナショナル・クライシス・グループ28

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IDMC

国内避難民監視センター

IRBC

カナダ移民難民局

IRDC

アイルランド難民ドキュメンテーションセンター

ジェトロ

日本貿易振興機構

Landinfo

ノルウェー政府出身国情報センター

MRGI

マイノリティ・ライツ・グループ・インターナショナル

OECD

経済協力開発機構

OFPRA

フランス難民・無国籍庇護局

OHCHR

国連人権高等弁務官事務所

OSAC

米国海外安全保障評議会

RRTA

オーストラリア難民再審査審判所

RSAA

ニュージーランド難民地位不服申立機関

RSF

国境なき記者団

UKIAT

イギリス移民難民審判所

UNHCR

国連難民高等弁務官事務所

USCIRF

米国連邦政府国際宗教自由に関する委員会

29