The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Accident: Lessons Learned and Policy
Implications
福島第一原子力発電所事故：教訓と意味
The 20th IPPNW World CongressAug. 24-26, 2012, Hiroshima
Tatsujiro Suzuki 鈴木達治郎
Vice Chairman, Japan Atomic Energy Commission：
原子力委員会委員長代理
Note: The views expressed here are of my own and do not necessarily reflect thoseof the JAEC nor the government.

CONTENTS 目次• What Happened (or is happening)?
何が起きたか（起きているか）• Five Major Lessons Learned
５つの教訓• From Fukushima to the World
福島から世界へ

1Location of NPSs within Fukushima

福島原子力発電所の場所

Fukushima Daiichi NPS

Fukushima Dai-ni
NPS

Layouts of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and Fukushima Dai-ni NPS
福島第一と第二原子力発電所
Fukushima Dai-ichi
NPS

Unit 6

Fukushima Dai-niNPS

Unit 5

Unit 4

Unit 1

Unit 3

Unit 2
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 4

Unit 1

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Loss of all power sources due to the Earthquake and Tsunami：
地震と津波による全電源喪失
Grid Line

Note:‐All operating units when earthquake
occurred were automatically shutdown.
‐Emergency D/Gs have worked
properly until the Tsunami attack.

① Loss of offsite power
due to the earthquake

津波の高さ～15ｍTsunami (estimated more than 10m)

TurbineBuilding

Reactor
Building

D/GElevation:
about 10m
Seawater level

Seawater Pump

② D/G Inoperable due to Tsunami flood①＋② ⇒ Station Black Out
All Motor Operated pumps (including ECCS
1pumps) became inoperable

Source: Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency(NISA), April 4, 2011, at IAEA
http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110406‐1‐1.pdf

3Dry cask storage after 3.11 (@Fukushima)
津波後の乾式貯蔵キャスク

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/110909_69.jpg

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Nuclear Emergency: Institutional Arrangement under the Law*
原子力災害対策特別措置法に基づく防災体制

JAECA

原子力委員会PM Office NG 首相官邸
Nuclear Emergency HQ

NSC：
原子力安全委員会

NNISA：安全保安院

Off‐site center NISA+TEPCO
オフサイトセンター

TEPCO HQ：T 東電本社
+PM office

Tmoved toFukushima
Local Gov’t

Fukushima
Daiichiu
福島第一免震棟*Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (ASMCNE)
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Contamination Map by MEXT and DOE(as of May 6, 2011)

Fukushima Chernobyl

Source: T. Kawada, “Current Status of Soil Contamination and how to respond,”
Presentation at JapanAtomic Energy Commission Meeting, May 24, 2011
http://www.aec.go.jp/jicst/NC/iinkai/teirei/siryo2011/siryo16/siryo2.pdf

6Removal of Spent Fuel (SF) from SF pool
使用済み燃料の取出し
SF remain covered by water during and after the accident:
sipping analysis suggests that SF is mostly intact, thoughsome might be damaged by falling objects due to hydrogen
explosion
2. Install refueling machine &1. Remove rubbles byoverhead crane
Buildingcrane
カバー（又はコンテナ）

Cover

天井クレーン
Crane

Fuel
燃料交換機
exchanger
DSピット
原子炉ウエル

Spent
使用済燃料
fuel
プール
pool～～

3. SF transfer by cask～～

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Removal of core debris
破損燃料の取出しDecontamination (to reduce exposure)除染 Plugging the leaky holes 水漏れ修理
 Flooding the containment 冠水 Removal of core debris 取出しContainer

Overhead craneDS pitSpent fuelpool

Work platform

Fromwatertreatment
facility

RPV

Transfer

Spent
Fuel
pool
Expansionpipe

DS pitDebris storage drum

Debris storage
drum (temporary)
Torusroom

To watertreatment
facilityCV

Torus room

Camera, cutting,digging, gripping andsuction equipment

Interim Report of Gov’t Accident Investigation Committee(2011/12/26) 政府事故調の中間報告• Lack of severe accident preparedness for tsunamis
津波と過酷事故に対する準部不足• Lack of awareness of the ramifications of a complex disaster
複雑な災害に対する対応策への意識欠如• Lack of an all‐encompassing perspective
包括的な視点の欠如•The Investigation Committee is convinced of the need of a paradigm shift inthe basic principles of disaster prevention programs for such a huge system,
whose failure may cause enormous damage.

巨大システムのリスクを回避する概念にパラダイムシフトが必要•

It must be recognized that things beyond assumptions may take place. The
Fukushima nuclear accident presented us crucial lessons on how we should
be prepared for such incidents that we had not accounted for.

想定外のことが起こりうるとの認識が必要
http://icanps.go.jp/eng/120224SummaryEng.pdf

9Five Major Lessons from Gov’t Committee* and the Diet
Commission** on the Accident
政府事故調、国会事故調報告より5つの教訓• Man-made Disaster: 事故は人災であった• Emergency Response: “Unprepared”

緊急対策：準備ができていなかった• Protecting Public Health: “Communication Failure”

住民の保護：コミュニケーションの失敗• Regulatory Framework: “Captured by the Nuclear Industry”

規制体制：東電・電事連の「虜」• International dimension: Importance of information disclosureand sharing 国際的側面：情報公開と共有の重要性* Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations, Final Report Recommendations, July 2012.
http://icanps.go.jp/eng/SaishyuRecommendation.pdf** The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC), Final Report, July
2012. http://naiic.go.jp/en/

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“Man-made Disaster”:事故は人災であった• The accident was preventable if the operators andregulators acted properly based on the information
available to them (by the Diet Commission)
事業者と規制当局が入手した情報に基づき適切な行動をとっていれば事故は防げた• The scale of tsunami was “beyond imagination” ofTEPCO and regulators, but that their preventive
measures were insufficient against tsunami and severe
accident. (by the Gov’t committee)
津波は東電と規制当局の「想定外」の規模であったが、津波や過酷事故に対する準備は十分でなかったことも事実である

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TEPCO Has Evaluated High‐Tsunami :東電、保安院は津波の規模を想定していた
Tsunami Study has been
Tsunami Height Analysis（2010） reported to NISA
• 2008: TEPCO studied Jogan‐
Tsunami• June, 2009: TEPCO asked civilengineering society to evaluate
their analysis• June 2009:TEPCO reported toNISA on preliminary results• March 7, 2011: NISA wasbriefed on “possible 10m
height tsunami at Fukushima.”
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/backdrop/20110911.html

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Emergency Response: “Unprepared”
緊急対策：準備ができていなかった• Not only TEPCO and the regulators, but the central
government, in particular the Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters (NERHQs) at the Prime
Minister’s office (PM’s office), was not prepared against
nuclear emergency. （Gov’t committee and DietCommission)
東電、規制当局のみならず、首相官邸と緊急対策本部も原子力防災対策の準備が不十分であった。
• Miscommunication and mistrust among regulators, PM’soffice and TEPCO were the result of poor crisis
management by the government.
コミュニケーションの不足と不信感は政府の危機管理対策が十分でなかったからだ13

Protecting Public Health: “Communication Failure”
住民の保護：コミュニケーションの失敗• Ｔhe government did not use the System for Prediction ofEnvironmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI)
effectively
政府はＳＰＥＥＤＩを効果的に利用しなかった。
• “The government and the regulator are not fullycommitted to protecting public health and safety.”(TheDiet Commission)
国会事故調は、規制当局が住民の健康と安全を守ることに十分コミットしていなかったと結論づけた。
• “Nuclear operators and the regulators should establish asystematic activity to identify all risk potentials from the“disaster victims’ standpoint.” (The Gov’t Committee)
政府事故調は、「被災者の立場」に立ったリスク防護策の立案を提案した。
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Survey of Fukushima Residents by the Diet
Commission: 国会事故調の福島県住民調査結果••

Within a few hours after the evacuation order was issued, themunicipalities communicated the evacuation order to residents,
showing that there was a high level of communication between themunicipal governments and residents.地方自治体からの情報は十分
However, as there were areas in which the municipalities did notreceive evacuation orders from the government, there were major
problems in the transmission process of the evacuation order fromthe government to the municipalities.政府、東電からの情報は不十分

http://naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NAIIC_report_lo_res4.pdf

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Regulatory Framework: “Captured by the Nuclear Industry”
規制体制：東電・電事連の「虜」•“..they (regulators and operators) repeatedly avoided,compromised or postponed any course of action …In fact,
it was a typical example of ‘regulatory capture,’ in which
the oversight of the industry by regulators effectivelyceases. ” （the Diet Commission)「規制当局と事業者は妥協と時間稼ぎを繰り返した…これは事業者を規制すべき当局が機能しない、典型的な『規制当局が虜になっている』状況であった」 （国会事故調、仮訳）• Both reports emphasized the importance of the“independence” and “transparency” for newly establishedregulatory organization「透明性」と「独立性」をもった新たな規制機関の重要性を指摘
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Independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission Proposed by theLDP

Gov’t plan

IndependentCommission

http://www.y-shiozaki.or.jp/contribution/pdf/20120416123546_2cfQ.pdf
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International dimension: Importance of information
disclosure and sharing
国際的側面：情報公開と共有の重要性• Lack of enough and timely information from Japan after
the accident was as one of the reasons for increased
concern over the accident.
日本からの十分な情報が不足していたことが、周辺諸国や国際社会の不安を呼んだ。
• “Ｔhe new regulatory organization must establish anorganizational framework that enables it to provide
information in a timely and appropriate manner during anemergency.” (The Gov’t Committee)
新しい規制機関は、タイムリーで適切な情報提供が緊急事態でもできるような体制を整えるべきだ。

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From Fukushima to the World: 福島から世界へ• We should overcome this man-made disaster withhumble attitude towards nature and science/technologies
人類は、この悲劇的な事故・人災を、自然と科学技術リスクへの謙虚な反省を持てば、乗り越えていく事ができる。
• Let's make Fukushima as a symbol of "recovery".
福島を「復興のシンボル」にしよう• The role of scientists can be extremely important. Closer
collaboration between nuclear engineers/scientists andother fields of scientists, especially, social scientists isdefinitely needed more to improve “safety culture” ofnuclear community.
科学者の役割、とくに人文・社会科学者との協力は原子力ムラの安全文化向上に極めて重要である。
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From Fukushima to the World:福島から世界へ

I sincerely hope that the lessons learned from the Fukushima
accident can be shared by the global community and can be
useful for improved safety and better understanding of
nuclear technology.

福島事故の教訓を国際社会が共有することにより、原子力技術の更なる理解と安全性向上に役立つことを私は信じています。

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