Firm Survival and the Evolution of Market Structure:
The Case of the Japanese Motorcycle Industry∗
Masatoshi Kato
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

This paper explores firm survival and the evolution of market structure in the Japanese
motorcycle industry during 1946–1965. In the post-war era, the number of firms grew rapidly
and peaked in 1953 at 200, and then declined sharply for the first 20 years. As a consequence,
only four firms survived, and the industry evolved to be an oligopoly. To address what caused
the shakeout of firms, we examine the determinants of firm survival. It is found that firms
which made early entry and had previous experience in motor vehicle manufacturing tend tosurvive longer. It is also found that offering high-quality products, broadening product-line,
and avoiding product-line overlap from rivals played significant roles in the survival of firms.
Key words: Firm survival; industry evolution; market structure; motorcycle.

1.

Introduction

This paper explores firm survival and the evolution of market structure in the Japanese
motorcycle industry over the period 1946–1965. An important feature of the industry is thatthe number of firms grew and then declined sharply in the first 20 years during the post-war
era, and consequently the industry evolved to be an oligopoly. To address what factors causea shakeout of producers and consequently shape the structure of the industry, this study
examines the determinants of firm survival.
∗
Very preliminary and incomplete draft. I wish to thank Sadao Nagaoka for valuable advice and suggestions.
I also thank Bronwyn Hall, Yuji Honjo, Hiroyuki Odagiri, Hiroyuki Okamuro, and Hirotaka Yamauchi for theiruseful comments and suggestions. My thanks also go to the participants at a one-day conference on postentry performance in Hitotsubashi University on January 2009, especially James R. Lincoln, for their helpfulcomments. The financial support from the Research Fellowships of the Japan Society for the Promotion of
Science for Young Scholars is gratefully acknowledged. Needless to say, any remaining errors are my own.

1

In the fields of evolutionary economics and organizational ecology, a number of studies have addressed firm survival and the evolution of industries over a long period of time
to address the determinants of market structure. For example, Gort and Klepper (1982)
investigated the diffusion of product innovations in the evolution of market structure, by
examining the spread in the number of producers engaged in manufacturing a new product.
Klepper and Simons (2000) also explored the determinants of firm survival in the evolutionof the US tire industry, and emphasized the importance of technological change in shaping
the structure of the industry. These studies provided important evidence on the evolution ofindustries in several countries, including UK and US. However, research on the evolution ofJapanese industries has been quite limited until now. As is well known, Japanese industries
developed remarkably after the World War II, and consequently some of them achieved highly
competitive positions in the global market (e.g., Porter, 1990). Especially, the Japanese motorcycle industry appears to have special characteristics in terms of industry evolution. In
the post-war era, the industry had experienced a lot of new entry, rapid technological change,
considerable growth in market demand, and a shakeout of producers. As a consequence, while
the Japanese motorcycle industry evolved to be an oligopoly, Japanese successful companies,
Honda, Kawasaki, Yamaha, and Suzuki, became market leaders in the global motorcycle market in the early 1960s. In addition, Porter (1990) argued that the motorcycle industry is themost successful in Japanese industries in terms of world export share.1 Therefore, findings
derived from such an industry may be of some interest to the discussion on the evolutionof market structure. Then, this paper will provide some implications as to how an industry
evolved over time and what factors shaped the structure of the industry.2
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set
employed for this study, including the overview of the Japanese motorcycle industry during
1946–1965. In Section 3, we develop our hypotheses for the determinants of firm survival.
In Section 4, we explain the methods employed in the analyses. The empirical results are

1
Porter et al. (2000) also emphasized that the competitive success of Japanese motorcycle companies was
resulted from their huge cost advantages over Harley-Davidson, BMW, and other western manufacturers.
2
Yamamura et al. (2005) addressed the evolution of the Japanese motorcycle industry over 1948–1964 andexamined the determinants of firm growth and product quality. However, they did not necessarily focus on
the determinants of firm survival (or exit). Also, some studies, including Demizu (2002), examined historically
the Japanese motorcycle industry, with a focus on technological development.

2

presented in Section 5. The final section includes some concluding remarks.

2.

Data

To describe the evolution of the Japanese motorcycle industry, we made every efforts tocollect the detailed data on the Japanese motorcycle industry over the period from 1946 to
1965. The data set employed for this study comes from many sources. First, we obtained
data on motorcycle products mainly from Japanese Motorcycle History (hereafter, JM H),
which is compiled and published in 2007 by Yaesu Shuppan, a Japanese publishing company.
The data source collects data on motorcycles produced during the post-war era, and includes
not only data on the product name, horsepower, engine displacement, and production year
for each motorcycle but also data on the name and headquarter of producers.
However, the JM H does not necessarily cover data on all motorcycles produced during
the observation period, especially for the early years. Therefore, we employ additional data
sources to obtain data on motorcycles unavailable in the JMH ; that is, the History of Japanese
Small Vehicles (Nihon Kogata Jidosha Hensenshi), the History of the Small Vehicle Industry(Kogata Jidosha Gyokai no Ayumi), and Information on Small Vehicles (Kogata Jyoho)(hereafter, ISV ) by Kotsu Taimusu Inc., Kogata Jidosha Shimbum Inc., and the Japan Small
Vehicle Manufacturers Association, respectively. The variables for firm-specific characteristics
are constructed based on information from these data sources.
Based on these collected data, we attempt to identify the years of entry into and exitfrom the motorcycle industry for each firm, but it was cumbersome to identify the timing ofentry and exit for some small-sized producers, because of the limited availability of data. Bycollecting complementary information from some historical studies, such as Nakaoki (1984),
Demizu (1991, 2002), and Ozeki (2002, 2007), we identified the years of entry and exit for
those firms. Further, we used other data sources, such as the company’s web or Google,
to check the years of entry into and exit from the motorcycle industry. Nevertheless, thereis the possibility that these data sources do not necessarily cover data on all motorcycles
produced during the observation period. However, compared to previous studies, including
Yamamura et al. (2005), we can cover a greater number of producers mainly because of
the use of additional data sources. As a result, we obtained a data set for 251 motorcycle
3

producers that entered the motorcycle industry during the period 1946–1965. Using the
newly constructed data set, we examine firm survival and the evolution of market structurein the Japanese motorcycle industry.
Some previous studies suggest that, when industries are new, there is a lot of entry, firms
offer many different versions of the industry’s product, and the rate of product innovation
is high (e.g., Klepper, 1996). Klepper (1996) also suggests that despite continued market
growth, subsequently entry slows, exit overtakes entry and there is a shakeout in the numberof producers.3 In this subsection, we examine data on the evolution of market structure in
the Japanese motorcycle industry over the period 1946–1965.
First, Figure 1 shows the volume of production in the Japanese motorcycle industry
during 1946–1965. In the post-war Japan, only 200 or more motorcycles were produced in
the early years. But, the volume of production had continued to grow rapidly from 1952, andit reached 2 millions of motorcycles in the early 1960s. Figure 2 also describes entry, exit, andtotal number of firms during the observation period. This figure indicates that the numberof entry increased considerably from 1952, and total number of firms peaked in 1953 at 200.
These figures indicate that despite continued market growth, subsequently entry slows, exit
overtakes entry and there is a shakeout in the number of firms. This evolutionary pattern isquite similar to that from some previous studies, including Klepper (1996) and Klepper andSimons (2000).

3.

Hypotheses

To address what factors caused a shakeout of producers in the Japanese motorcycle industry,
we explore the determinants of firm survival and test whether firms with different characteristics exhibit different performance in terms of the duration of survival. In this section, wedevelop our hypotheses for the determinants of firm survival.
First, we discuss the role of order-of-entry in explaining firm survival. As already described in Figure 1, the motorcycle industry started with the production of about 200 motorcycles in 1946. Dowell and Swaminathan (2006) argued that in the early period of an industry,firms face both tremendous opportunities and tremendous uncertainties. In practice, in the3

For discussions on these patterns, see also Utterback and Abernacy (1975) and Utterback (1994).

4early period of the motorcycle industry, technologies for producing motorcycles are primitive,
and they tended to be rapidly improved over time. In such dynamic environments, as suggested by Christensen and Bower (1996), even if firms are ragarded as capably managed at
one point, they may subsequently lose the positions when faced with technological changes.
In this respect, early entrants may not necessarily have advantages than late entrants.
On the other hand, a number of studies have found that early entrants are more likely
to survive longer than late entrants in industries, because of their first-mover advantages(e.g., Klepper and Simons, 2000). Lieberman and Montgomery (1988, p.41) pointed out thatfirst-mover advantages arise from three primary sources, technological leadership, preemptionof assets, and buyer switching costs. First, technological advantages tend to be derived fromthe learning (experience) curve that costs fall with cumulative output, and they are related
to the success in R&D (or patent) races that technological advances are a function of R&D
expenditures.4 The second is that first-movers can obtain advantages by preempting theirrivals in terms of scarce assets. For example, Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) argued
that the first-mover gains advantage by controlling assets that already exist, rather thanthose created by the firm through development of new technology. While such assets may
be physical resources or other process inputs, the assets may relate to positioning in space,including geographic and product spaces. The third is related to buyer switching costs, whichhave been often argued in the strategic management literature. In the context of imperfect
information regarding the quality of products, there is the possibility that buyers stick withthe first brand because of uncertainty (e.g., Schmalensee, 1982). When a buyer chooses a
brand-specific product, the buyer may find it costly to shift to another brand.5
In the case of the Japanese motorcycle industry, early entrants appeared to enjoy technological advantages related to the learning curve or R&D races. In addition, early entrants
may tend to establish more efficient production system and wide distribution networks earlier, and this may be a reason that they could enjoy first-mover advantages. We thus predictthat early entrants are more likely to survive longer than late entrants.
4
For a theoretical model associated with preemptive patenting, see, for example, Gilbert and Newbery(1982).
5
Alternatively, Lieberman and Montgomery (1988, 1998) argued that there may be also cases thatfirst-mover disadvantages arise, including free-rider problems. For additional discussions on first-mover(dis)advantages, see, for example, Lieberman and Montgomery (1988, 1998), Robinson et al. (1994), andTellis and Golder (1996).

5

Why some firms are strong persistently over time has attracted large attention fromscholars in the fields of strategic management and evolutionary economics. Some studies
argued that firms’ capabilities and resources at the time of entry play important roles indifferences of the post-entry performance of firms, and found that they tend to persist overtime. For example, Helfat and Lieberman (2002, p.725) emphasized the importance of preentry history in firm survival and concluded that the greater the similarity between pre-entry
firm resources and the required resources in an industry, the greater the likelihood that a firm
will enter that particular industry, and the greater the likelihood that the firm will survive
and prosper. Carroll et al. (1996) also examined the effects of pre-entry experience on thesurvival of firms in the US automobile industry, and found that automobile producers withprior experience in engine manufacturing have lower death rates than other de alio producers.
In the post-war era in Japan, a number of de alio entrants entered the motorcycle industry from other industries, including the war industry. While there were some de alio entrants
from technologically related industries, there were other de alio entrants, who have no technological experiences. For example, a number of engine and aircraft manufacturers entered
the motorcycle industry, and they tended to have technological experiences closely related to
motorcycles. On the other hand, there were some de alio entrants without technological experiences, such as those from automobile dealers. In addition, there were de novo entrants thathave no previous experiences in other industries before entering the motorcycle industry. For
example, parent-company spin-offs founded by established firms, entrepreneurial spin-offs, orstart-ups entered the motorcycle industry in the early periods.
To examine whether the post-entry performance of firms varies according to their preentry experiences in the motorcycle industry, we distinguish motorcycle producers into experienced firms and inexperienced firms in terms of technological relatedness. Most historicalstudies on the Japanese motorcycle industry argued the importance of engine development
in technological competition, and in practice successful motorcycle producers came from engine and aircraft manufacturing. In this study, therefore, firms with previous experiencesin engine and aircraft manufacturing are regarded as experienced firms, whereas others areclassified into inexperienced firms. Note that there are some firms with unknown pre-entry
experiences, and they are classified as firms with unknown background in the analyses. It is6predicted that experienced firms tend to have technological advantages at the time of entry
than inexperienced firms, and that experienced firms are more likely to survive longer thaninexperienced ones.
Also, we examine the role of product quality in explaining the survival of firms. As somestudies argued, when dominant design may be not yet emerged, firms may have more opportunities for improvements in the early and formative phases of an industry (e.g., Klepper,
1996). Christensen et al. (1998) also emphasized the importance of technology strategies aspredictors of survival in fast-changing industries, using data on the rigid disk drive industry.
Banbury and Mitchell (1995) also found that incremental innovations significantly affect thelikelihood of business survival. In these respects, it is considered that competition for productquality between firms played an important role in their survival.
To examine whether firms with high quality products performed better than those withlow quality ones, we test the effect of product quality on the survival of firms. In the
motorcycle industry, competition for engine development has been fairly severe, and firmsthat was successful in engine development appeared to grow faster than others. Therefore,
we predict that firms that can offer high-quality products are more likely to survive longer
than firms that do not. In this study, we attempt to measure firm’s engine quality as a proxyof product quality. We adopt a similar measure of Yamamura et al. (2005) and measure theengine quality of motorcycles as the horsepower divided by the displacement volume at eachyear. If a firm offers multiple products in a year, the maximum value of engine quality is
regarded as the firm’s engine quality in the year. In addition, a firm’s engine quality in ayear is divided by industry average in the year.
In addition to product quality, we examine the effect of product line length as a productstrategy on the survival of firms. In the field of organizational ecology, the niche widthof an organization means its variance in resource ulitization (e.g., Hannan and Freeman,
1977). Dobrev et al. (2002, p.236) discussed that organizations pursuing strategies basedon operations across a wide range of environmental resources possess a wide or broad niche
and would be classified as generalists. Specialists organizations pursue strategies based on
operations across a tight band of resources. According to this viewpoint, when environmentschange in uncertain ways, generalists organizations typically display lower mortality rates

7

than specialists (Freeman and Hannan, 1983).
Also, as discussed by Sorensen (2000, p.577), in uncertain environments, rational managers can use multiple product offerings to gather information about the distribution of
consumer preferences. Then, Sorensen also argued that selection amongst these offerings canprovide an effective means of aligning the firm’s product line with demand. In addition,
Forfuri and Giarratana (2007) pointed out that especially in highly dynamic industries, firms
might signal an aggressive behavior by entering a large number of product niches. In theserespects, firm’s decision on product portfolio may be fairly important for survival in the early
periods of an industry.
In practice, in the motorcycle industry, while some firms offer motorcycle products in
multiple sub-segments in terms of displacement volume, others offer them only in a single
sub-segment. In the motorcycle industry during the observation period, motorcycle producers
faced demand and technological uncertainty. Therefore, it is predicted that firms with longproduct-line can avoid more uncertainty and they are more likely to survive longer rather thanfirms that do not. In this study, the variable for product line length is measured as the countsof sub-segments at each year, by dividing the motorcycle industry into six sub-segments interms of displacement volume (DV); that is, DV≤50cc, 50cc<DV≤90cc, 90cc<DV≤125cc,
125cc<DV≤250cc, 250cc<DV≤400cc, DV≥400cc. If a firm offers motorcycle products in two
sub-segments in a year, the firm’s product line length is calculated as two in the year. In
addition, a firm’s product line length in a year is divided by industry average in the year.
As an additional variable for product strategies, we consider the effect of product-line
overlap on the survival of firms. Until now, a number of studies argued that firms’ productline overlap with their rivals is crucial in explaining firm survival. For example, as Dowell(2006, p.964) argued, a new entrant to an industry faces a choice of whether to place itself ina position where its product line faces little overlap from rivals, or where overlap is relatively
high. Some firms may choose a position with low overlap to avoid fierce competition between
rivals. Alternatively, other firms may prefer a position with high overlap to that with low
overlap, because a position with low overlap may indicate less opportunities for growth.
In the motorcycle industry, while there were a great number of firms in some subsegments, such as 50cc or 125cc, there were few firms in others, such as 400cc or more.

8

In practice, some firms with low overlap with rivals appeared to survive in the motorcycle
industry. The impact of avoiding fierce competition between firms may be larger than that ofpursuing growth opportunities. We thus predict that firms whose product lines overlap with
their competitors have higher hazard than firms that do not. In this study, the mean countof firms whose sub-segments in terms of displacement volume overlap with the sub-segmentsof the focal firm, which can change over time. In addition, a firm’s product line overlap in
a year is divided by industry average in the year. The definitions and summary statistics ofthese variables are presented in Table 1.
Furthermore, industry-level variables are included in the regressions to control for industry conditions over time. The organizational ecology literature emphasized that founding
conditions, especially density measured as the number of firms, are fairly important in explaining the post-entry performance of firms (e.g., Carroll and Hannan, 1989, 2000; Hannan
and Freeman, 1984, 1989). On the other hand, in the field of industrial organization, industry’s number of firms or concentration is one of major measures regarding the degree ofcompetition, and some studies have examined the effect of concentration on firm survival(e.g., Audretsch and Mahmood, 1994). Therefore, the variable for density at the year ofentry is used to control for initial conditions, and density at each year is also included as anindependent variable to control for industry conditions over time. In addition, we use thevariable for industry growth at each year, which can change over time, to control for changes
in market size.

4.

Methods

In this section, we explain the methods employed in the analyses for the determinants of firm
survival. To test whether firms with different characteristics exhibit different performance in
the Japanese motorcycle industry, we adopt the methodology of survival analysis. Following
some previous studies, we define the duration of survival t as the period from the year ofentry into the motorcycle industry to the year of exit from the industry (e.g., Mata et al.,
1995; Buenstorf, 2007).6 In this study, the duration of survival is only related to the firm’s
6

Honjo (2000a) investigated the determinants of business failure of new firms by estimating a multiplicative
hazards model based not only on age but also on calendar time, and argued that calendar time is more suitable
than age as the time dimension. Following Honjo (2000a), we also estimated the model based on calendar

9activities in the motorcycle industry, and exit does not always mean that the firm has ceased
to exist. In the analyses, we use a nonparametric and a semiparametric methods.

4.1.

Nonparametric method

By using a nonparametric method proposed by Kaplan and Meier (1958), we estimate theduration of survival.7 If all the times at which the event occurs in the sample are ordered,and labeled tj (j = 1, 2, . . . , m), such that t1 ≤ t2 , . . . , ≤ tm , then the Kaplan-Meier estimator,Ŝ(t), which is a standard method to estimate the survival function is given byŜ(t) =

Y
j|tj ≤t

Ã

dj
1−
nj

!

,

(1)

where dj is the number of individuals who experience the event at time tj , and nj is thenumber of individuals who have not yet experienced the event at that time and therefore still“at risk” of experiencing it (including those censored at tj ). Here, let dj denote the numberof firms that exit the motorcycle industry at time tj . Also, let nj denote the number of firmsthat do not yet exit the motorcycle industry at tj and therefore still ‘at risk’ of experiencing
it.
To show differences in the duration of survival between firms, we divide the full sample
into subsamples and examine whether the survival functions differ according to firm-specificcharacteristics. In addition, we test the equality of survival functions between subsamples byusing a log-rank test and a Wilcoxon test.

4.2.

Semiparametric method

Using a proportional hazards model proposed by Cox (1972), we attempt to identify whether
the covariates affect the hazard of firms.8 The proportional hazards model is well-known asa semiparametric approach for survival data, and particularly it is useful to show the effectsof covariates on the hazard of individuals. In the proportional hazards model, the hazard

time, but the result was generally similar to that based on age.
7
For more discussion on nonparametric methods, see, for example, Klein and Moeschberger (2003) and
Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt (2007).
8
We also estimated discrete-time duration models to examine the effects of covariates on the hazard rates.
Estimation results were almost consistent with those with continuous-time duration models.

10

function that represents the instantaneous failure rate, h(t; xi ), is assumed to beh(t; xi ) = h0 (t)exp(β T xi ),(2)

where h0 (t) is the baseline hazard function, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, andxi is a vector of covariates for individual i. With respect to our analysis, it should be notedthat part of covariates can change over time. Let t1 < t2 < · · · < tk denote the ordered
event times during the observation period, and Ri is a set of individuals who have not yet
experienced the event before just prior to time ti .9 That is, Ri indicates firms that continue
to survive until firm i exits. To estimate the parameters, the partial likelihood, L(β), is givenbyL(β) =kYkY
exp(β T xi )h(t; xi )=.
PTj∈Ri h(t; xj )j∈Ri exp(β xj )
i=1

P

i=1

(3)

The log-likelihood function is written aslog L(β) =

k
X





β T xi − log

i=1X

exp(β T xj ) .

(4)

j∈Ri

Maximizing log L(β) gives the estimated parameters without specifying a function form ofh0 (t).

5.

Empirical results

In this section, we present the estimation results using the nonparametric and semiparametricmethods. First, we estimated the survival functions for the survival of motorcycle producers
using the Kaplan-Meier method. To show how the duration of survival varies according
to firm-specific varibles, we compare the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, dividing the fullsample into three subsamples.
The Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for the full sample are shown in Figure 3 (a). We
show the survival estimates by firm-specific variable in Figure 3 (b)–(f). In Table 2, we show
the survival estiamtes at selective years both for the full sample and for subsamples by firmspecific variable. In Table 2, we also estimated the mean duration of survival of motorcycle
9Here, simultaneous events are ignored, but the approximated formulations to calculate the likelihood
function are established by some previous studies. In this study, the Breslow’s (1974) approximation method
is used.

11

producers. In addition, Table 2 shows the log-rank and the Wilcoxon tests for equality inthe survival estimates between subsamples. In Table 3, we show the estimation results using
the proportional hazards model. Because of the correlations between product line length andproduct line overlap, we show additional estimation results without parts of those variables
in Table 3 (ii)–(iv). Also, the estimation result without industry-level covariates is shown in
Table 3 (v).
To examine whether order-of-entry affects firm survival, the full sample is grouped into
three subsamples according to the order of entry; that is, firms that entered the motorcycle
industry until 1951, firms that entered the industry from 1952 to 1954, and firms that entered
the industry after 1954. Figure 3 (b) describes the survival functions by the order of entry. As
shown, earliest entrants have the highest survival rates, and this suggests that earlier entrants
are more likely to survive for longer periods. In Table 2, the equality tests also indicates thatthe survival estimates vary significantly across the subsamples. In Table 3, we examine theeffect of order-of-entry measured as entry year minus 1946, which corresponds to the inceptionof the industry, on the hazard rates. The coefficients of this variable are significantly positivein any models of Table 3. This indicates that order-of-entry is still important in firm survival
while controlling for other factors. This result is generally consistent with some previous
studies, including Klepper and Simons (2000).
With respect to pre-entry experience, Figure 3 (c) suggest that experienced firms tend
to survive longer than inexperienced firms. As shown in Table 2, this finding is statisticallysignificant and consistent with some previous studies, including Carroll et al. (1996). The
finding of Table 3 is also consistent with that of the nonparametric method. Therefore,
this result suggests that firms with previous experience in engine and aircraft manufacturing
had technological advantages at the time of entry, compared to firms without technologicalexperiences.
As for the variable for product quality, Figure 3 (d) indicates the Kaplan-Meier survival
functions by product quality. In Figure 3 (d) and Table 2, the full sample is roughly equallydivided into three subsamples according to product quality at the year of entry; that is, high,moderate and low quality. As shown in Figure 3 (d) and Table 2, firms with high quality
tend to survive longer than those with moderate and low quality. In Table 2, the equality

12

tests also indicate that the survival estimates are significantly different between the threesubsamples. Table 3 indicates that product quality has negative effects on the hazard rates,suggesting that offering high quality products over time increases the likelihood of survival.
The finding suggests that firms with low product quality were forced to exit the industry, andthat competition for engine quality played an important role in firm survival.10 This result
is also generally consistent with that of Yamamura et al. (2005).
In addition to product quality, Figure 3 (e)–(f) indicates the survival estimates by product line length and product line overlap in terms of displacement volume, respectively. In
Figure 3 (d)–(f) and Table 2, the full samples are roughly equally divided into three subsamples according to product line length and product line overlap at the year of entry, respectively; that is, long, moderate and short product-line for product line length, and large,
moderate and small overlap for product line overlap. Figure 3 (e) and Table 2 indicate thatthe survival estimates are significantly different between the three subsamples, and firms
with long product-line tend to survive longer. At the same time, Figure 3 (f) and Table 2
indicates that firms with small overlap tend to survive longer than those with large overlap
with rivals. The results of Table 3 generally support those of the nonparametric method,
although the coefficients of the variable for product line overlap are not significant in models
with the variable for product line length. These results suggest that broadening product-line
and avoiding product-line overlap with rivals over time have significantly positive influenceon firm survival.
With respect to the effects of industry-level covariates, Table 3 indicates that bothdensity at the time of entry and density at each year have significantly positive effects on thehazard rates. The finding is consistent with the argument of organizational ecology literature.
Table 3 also indicates that industry growth has a significantly positive effect on the hazard
rates. The finding suggests that firms are likely to face higher hazard rates in the growing
phase of the industry.

10
Kato (2008) also provided evidence that the market share of Honda increased considerably from the middleof 1950s, and it was caused by the introduction of epoch-making new product, ‘Honda Super Cab,’ which had
the highest quality of engine at that time. In practice, Kato (2008) found that Honda’s relative productquality tended to increase clearly from the late 1950s, which corresponds to the period of the emergence ofSuper Cab. In addition, as Demizu (2002) argued, the engine quality was extraordinarily high compared toother motorcycles, and then became a fairly popular motorcycle in Japan at that period.

13

6.

Conclusion

This paper explore firm survival and the evolution of market structure in the Japanese motorcycle industry over the period 1946–1965. To examine the causes of a shakeout of producers,
we conduct a survival analysis for the determinants of firm survival. We provide evidence
that not only “at entry” conditions but also firms’product strategies have significant effects
on firm survival. The findings indicate that order-of-entry and pre-entry experience significantly affect the duration of survival, and that early and experienced entrants tend to survive
longer. As for product strategies, we found that offering high-quality products, broadening
product-line, and avoiding product overlap with rivals have significantly positive influence onfirm survival.

14

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19

Figure 1: Volume of production in the Japanese motorcycle industry, 1946–1965 (thousand
motorcycles)

20Figure 2: Entry, exit, and total number of firms in the Japanese motorcycle industry, 1946–
1965

21

0.75
0.50

Survival estimates

Entrants until 1951
Entrants during 1951−1954
Entrants after 1954

0.00

0.25

0.75
0.50
0.00

0.25

Survival estimates(b) Order−of−entry

1.00

1.00

(a) Full sample

0

5

10

15

20

0

5

Age (years of production)

15

20

1.00
0.75

High quality
Moderate quality
Low quality

0.50

Survival estimates

0.50

0.00

0.25

(d) Product quality

0.25

0.75

Experienced firms
Inexperienced firms
Unknown

0.00

10

15

20

0

5

10
Age (years of production)(e) Product−line length(f) Product line overlap

1.00

Age (years of production)

20

0.75

Large overlap
Moderate overlap
Small overlap

0.00

0.00

0.25

0.50

Survival estimates

0.75

Long product−line
Moderate product−line
Short product−line

15

0.50

1.00

5

0.25

Survival estimates

1.00(c) Pre−entry experience

0

Survival estimates10
Age (years of production)

0

5

10

15

20

0

Age (years of production)

5

10
Age (years of production)

Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates

22

15

20

Table 1: Definition and descriptive statistics for covariates.
Covariate
Order-of-entry
Experienced firms

Unknown background
Product quality
Product line length
Product line overlap

DensityDensity at entry
Changes in market size

Definition
Entry year minus 1946.
Dummy variable: 1 if having any technological experiencein motor vehicles before entering the motorcycle industry, 0
otherwise.
Dummy variable: 1 if background before entering the motorcycle industry is unknown, 0 otherwise.
Horsepower divided by displacement volume, adjusted by industry average, at each year.
Counts of sub-segments in terms of displacement volume, adjusted by industry average, at each year.
Mean number of firms whose sub-segments in terms of displacement volume overlap with the sub-segments of the focal
firm, adjusted by industry average, at each year.
Number of firms at each year.
Number of firms at entry.
Difference of industry’s volume of production, divided by thevolume of production, at each year.

Note: S.D. indicates standard deviation.

23

Mean
5.638
0.461

S.D.
3.014
0.499

0.227

0.419

1.005

0.262

1.001

0.451

1.000

0.317

84.83
94.37
0.555

61.07
55.29
0.813

Table 2: Summary statistics for Kaplan–Meier survival estimates by subsample.
Survival rates after
Subsample
1 years 2 years 5 years 10 years(Order-of-entry)
Entrants until 1951
1.000
0.943
0.686
0.486
Entrants during 1952-1954 0.753
0.327
0.134
0.018
Entrants after 1954
0.667
0.310
0.119
0.071
Log-rank test: χ2 = 58.35∗∗∗ . Wilcoxon test: χ2 = 51.95∗∗∗

Duration
10.3
3.0
3.1

(Pre-entry experience)
Experienced firms
0.877
0.770
0.591
0.349
Inexperienced firms
0.821
0.373
0.160
0.032
Unknown
0.667
0.242
0.040
0.000
2
∗∗∗
2
∗∗∗
Log-rank test: χ = 79.84 . Wilcoxon test: χ = 52.47

8.7
3.2
2.2

(Product quality)
High quality
0.793
0.567
0.340
Moderate quality
0.744
0.349
0.140
Low quality
0.783
0.325
0.157
Log-rank test: χ2 = 7.07∗∗ . Wilcoxon test: χ2 = 8.25∗∗

0.161
0.053
0.060

5.1
3.5
3.4

(Product line length)
Long product line
0.931
0.690
0.517
0.339
Moderate product line
0.761
0.358
0.156
0.046
Short product line
0.717
0.435
0.217
0.101
Log-rank test: χ2 = 22.34∗∗∗ . Wilcoxon test: χ2 = 16.65∗∗∗

8.5
3.3
3.7

(Product line overlap)
Large overlap
0.763
0.355
0.169
0.071
Moderate overlap
0.722
0.372
0.158
0.045
Small overlap
0.894
0.617
0.404
0.221
Log-rank test: χ2 = 14.39∗∗∗ . Wilcoxon test: χ2 = 13.98∗∗∗
Full sample
0.773
0.411
0.210
0.091

3.6
3.3
6.4
4.0

Notes:
1. N indicates the number of industries.
2. ‘Duration’ represents the mean duration of survival, measured by extending the survival estimates fromthe largest observed year to zero using an exponential survival function.
3. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

24

Table 3: Estimation results: a proportional hazards model.
Covariate
Order-of-entry
Experienced firms
Unknown background
Product quality
Product line length
Product line overlap
DensityDensity at entry
Changes in market size
Wald χ2
Log pseudolikelihood
Number of firms(i)0.275∗∗∗(0.043)−0.735∗∗∗(0.180)0.346∗∗∗(0.095)−0.574∗∗(0.248)−1.260∗∗∗(0.254)0.220(0.167)0.011∗∗∗(0.002)0.003∗∗(0.001)0.696∗∗∗(0.084)173.71∗∗∗−1071.768
251(ii)
0.271∗∗∗(0.042)−0.735∗∗∗(0.179)−0.367∗∗∗(0.097)−1.403∗∗∗(0.251)0.224(0.163)0.010∗∗∗(0.002)0.003∗∗∗(0.001)0.682∗∗∗(0.084)168.79∗∗∗−1073.593
251

(iii)
0.318∗∗∗(0.041)−0.946∗∗∗(0.186)0.324∗∗∗(0.092)−0.978∗∗∗(0.242)0.335∗(0.191)0.010∗∗∗(0.002)0.002∗∗(0.001)0.701∗∗∗(0.083)
157.41∗∗∗−1083.602
251(iv)
0.273∗∗∗(0.043)−0.760∗∗∗(0.179)0.351∗∗∗(0.094)−0.576∗∗(0.245)−1.274∗∗∗(0.251)0.011∗∗∗(0.002)0.003∗∗(0.001)0.695∗∗∗(0.084)175.40∗∗∗−1072.269
251

Note:
1. Standard errors adjusted for 251 clusters are in parentheses.
2. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

25(v)0.109∗∗∗(0.026)−0.850∗∗∗(0.175)0.359∗∗∗(0.105)−0.529∗∗∗(0.254)−1.015∗∗∗(0.226)
0.196(0.172)138.60∗∗−1092.567
251