論文

The system of Anti-corruption agencies
in Vietnam:
Concept, function, and challenges
Thanh Huyen, Nguyen

Introduction
Vietnam is one of the countries in the 21st-century with significant economic
growth as the country’s annual GDP growth rate reached over 6% during thepast ten years. Despite these economic opportunities and success, Vietnam
faces the challenge of endemic corruption. Corruption accounts for nearly 5% of
Vietnam’s GDP in 1998 (Wescott 2003, p.258). Meanwhile, according to the 2006
Global Integrity Report, Vietnam lost about 3-4% of its annual GDP due tog ra nd a nd petty corruption ( NOR A D 2 011, p.12). I n the 2 019 Viet na m
Corruption Barometer survey held by the Toward Transparency (TT)1, 43% of
the respondents considered corruption as the most critical issue that needs tobe handled, making it the 4th priority following poverty reduction, food safety,
and crime/security (TT 2019a, p.12).
Many researchers believe that corruption started to grow rampantly in
Vietnam after the Doi Moi reform in the second half of the 1980s2 . Essentially,
despite the act of giving and taking bribe and embezzlement were criminalized
under the law from 19453, the word "tham nhũng (corruption)" only appeared forthe first time in official documents of The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)in 1986 4, followed by the promulgation of the first Anti-corruption Ordinance in1998 and the Articles on corruption offenses under the 1999 Penal Code (Dinh2019, p.101). However, this period’s anti-corruption policies were not adequate totackle the problems (World Bank 2004, p.93). In 2005, Vietnam launched a wide
range of reforms, namely adopting the new Anti-corruption law in 2005 anddeveloping a system of multiple anti-corruption agencies (the system of ACAs)
in 2006. In the last 15 years of its development, the system of ACAs of Vietnam
made some progress but also exposed various issues. Hence, a comprehensive
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revision must be made to take a more in-depth look into the current system’s
problems and find solutions to enhance its efficiency.

1. Overview of Vietnam’s corruption situation
1.1. Extent of corruption
F r o m 1 9 9 7 u nt i l 2 01 8 , V i et n a m r a n ke d a r o u n d t h e s e c o n d h a l f o f
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranking. Table
1 demonstrates the variation of Vietnam’s CPI from 1997 until the end of 2019.
Evidently, corruption is not a recent issue of the Vietnamese government.
Although the concept of “corruption” was not officially recognized until 1986,
the fight against bribery and public fund embezzlement began far earlier in the
country. After declaring independence from France in September 1945, theVietnamese government adopted a set of policies to combat bribery, including
the promulgation of Decision number 64 of the President (amended on 25
November 1945) on the establishment of the Special Inspectorate Bureau5 andthe Special Court to investigate and judge laws violations behaviors of public
officers, and the Decision number 223 of the President (amended on 27
November 1946) on bribery offenses. In 1950, Tran Du Chau, the head of theTable 1 Vietnam’s CPI and Ranking from 1997 to 2019
CPI and Ranking before 2011
Year
CPI (*)
Ranking
1997
2.79
43/52
1998
2.5 ▼
74/85
1999
2.6 ▲
75/99
2000
2.6
76/90
2001
2.6
75/81
2002
2.4 ▼
85/1022003
2.4
100/133
2004
2.6 ▲102/1452005
2.6
107/1582006
2.6
111/1632007
2.6
123/1792008
2.7 ▲
121/1802009
2.7
120/1802010
2.7
116/1762011
2.9 ▲
112/182(*) Scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean)124

CPI and Ranking after 2011
Year
CPI (*)
Ranking2012
31
123/174201331
116/177201431
119/1742015
31
111/1672016
33 ▲
113/1762017
35 ▲
107/1802018
33 ▼
117/1802019
37 ▲96/180(**) Scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (veryclean)(Source: Transparency International)

The system of Anti-corruption agencies in Vietnam: Concept, function, and challenges

Ministry of Defense’s Logistics Department, became the first person to be
charged with a bribery offense and received a verdict of death from the jury
(Gregory 2016, p.228). Until recently, a wide range of high-profile corruption
scandals has been exposed, especially since the commencement of the highprofile anti-corruption campaign led by the CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu
Trong in 2016. In about five years (from 2016 until the end of June 2020), theVietnamese government claimed to prosecute 8,883 corruption cases andpunished 110 high-ranking officers on graft and bribery charges, including 8
members of the Central Committee of the CPV6.
The Minister of Public Security To Lam (2019, pp.154-159) observed various
major corruption cases that rocked Vietnam’s social and political system andpointed out three main forms of corruption crimes in Vietnam. The first one isthe collusion between state officials and criminal organizations to create aperfect criminal network. The scandal of Nam Cam in 2003 is a typical exampleof this method. In this corruption scandal, senior police and judicial officers
worked with a mafia-style gang led by Truong Van Cam to cover a variety ofcrimes, including murder, manslaughter, domestic violence, gamble, and usury(Malesky & Phan 2019, pp. 117-118). Bribing the senior state officers to win acontract and receiving a special privilege or tax evasion is the second form. In
this form of crime, criminals do not form a closed group and only maketransactions from time to time. This kind of crime often occurs in projects
involving foreign components, especially the Official Development Assistance(ODA) projects. For instance, in the trial in 2010, Huynh Ngoc Sy - vice directorof Department of Transport of Ho Chi Minh City, and also the leader of theEast/West Highway Project Management Unit, was sentenced to 26 years inprison for the charge of receiving bribe from Pacific Consultants International(PCI), a Japanese consulting company, in exchange for the contract of the
project in 2 0 01 and 2 0 02 . This project was funded by Japan’s ODA anddistributed by JICA (To 2019, pp. 154 -156). The third and last one is theembezzlement of public funds by manipulating the value of the contract. The
embezzlement scandal in 2017 at the Petro Vietnam Power Land Company (PVP
Land), a subsidiary of Petro Vietnam Construction Joint Stock Corporation(PVC), is a good illustration of this kind of crime. In early 2010, Le Hoa Binh,
former chairman of the 1/5 Construction and Services Joint Stock Company,
planned to acquire the entire contract related to the 9,584 m2 of the Nam Dan
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Plaza project in Hanoi, in which PVP Land possess 50.5% of the shares. In
order to buy the share of PVP Land at a lower price than the real value, Le
gave 14 billion VND (equivalent to about 600,000 USD) to Trinh Xuan Thanh,the former chairman of the board of directors of PVC and also the former
Deputy-Chairman of the Provincial People’s Committee of Hau Giang. As aresult, Le acquired the shares with 87 billion VND (about 3.7 million USD) lower
than the real value (To 2019, pp.157-159).
On the other hand, petty corruption takes a deep root in Vietnamese society
not only because of the officers’ power abuse but also the willingness to pay thebribes of the people. According to the Vietnam Youth Integrity Survey 2019 of
TT (2019b, pp.3-4), 57% of the respondents who were in contact with the police
in the last 12 months admitted to paying a bribe. Meanwhile, 40% of the
respondents agree to pay bribes to go to a prestigious school or company. The
situation is the same in the private sector. On the Provincial CompetitivenessIndex 2019 report of Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, among
1,500 surveyed foreign companies in Vietnam, 42.5% of the companies paid abribe during customs procedures (VCCI 2020, p.31), whereas 55% of thecompanies confessed that they paid a bribe to get construction permits in thepast year (VCCI 2020, p. 76). Notably, 7.5 % of the companies claimed that the
informal charges account for more than 10% of their income (VCCI 2020, p. 58).
1.2. Causes of corruption
There are many reasons behind the flourish of corruption in Vietnam. Duong(2015, p. 25) highlighted low salaries for public officials as one of the major
factors pushing officials to engage in corruption. The research of Pham, Vu, &Nguyen (2020, pp.83-85) on the problem of being underpaid in Vietnam’s current
judicial system is a typical example. The authors reported that an ordinary
district judge earns 2,691,000 VND (134.50 USD) per month, while 5,060,000
VND (253 USD) per month is the basic salary of an ordinary provincial judge.
Meanwhile, according to the General Statistics Office of Vietnam, living
expenses for a single working person in 2018 is about 2,545,000 VND (109,86
USD) per month (GSO 2020). Researchers emphasized that this underpaid issue
is the main reason for corruption in the court system (Pham, Vu, & Nguyen
2020, p.85).
On the other hand, Gregory (2016, p. 232) pointed out that the traditional gift126

The system of Anti-corruption agencies in Vietnam: Concept, function, and challenges

giving practice raises corruption risk. Gift-giving traditional practice and “xin –cho (begging-granting)” mindset was also demonstrated in the books of To (2019,
pp. 55-75) and Dinh (2019, pp. 36-52). With this mindset, the people who came toapply for licenses or any other official documents is “begging”, and the civil
servants who issue these papers are “granting”. This mindset exacerbates the
problem of red tape in Vietnam. Furthermore, both researchers believe that
economic inequalities brought by the economic transition from centralization tofree trade and market economy caused a difference in salaries between the
public and private sectors, which can also raise the motivation to commit
corruption. Similarly, ineffective administrative procedures, moral degradation ofa part of officials, and inadequate legal frameworks are internal factors thatcreate favorable conditions nurturing corruption from the inside.

2. The Anti-corruption agencies in Vietnam
2.1. Legal framework
The legal framework for anti-corruption of Vietnam consists of laws covering
a wide range of issues from criminalizing corruption offenses and legalizing theanti-corruption mechanisms to protect whistleblowers (Table 2).
The current legal framework for anti-corruption of Vietnam is based on theAnti-corruption Law and the Penal Code. The former creates the basis for theapplication of the latter. The Anti-corruption law consists of the definition ofcorruption and corruption offenses, related organizations’ responsibilities in thefight against corruption, and assets declarations’ requirements. Whereas thePenal Code provides in detail sanctions to each corruption offense. Whistleblowers protection is provided in Law on Complaints, Law on Reception of
Citizens, and Law on Denunciation.
Furthermore, the Law on Access to Information and Press Law provides alegal framework to practice the citizens’ freedom of speech and freedom ofaccess to information. The legal framework on anti-corruption of Vietnam isconsidered comprehensive, yet the law enforcement faces many problems (GAN2017 ). For instance, neither law assigns a specific agency to protect the
information provider. Adopting the fundamental law differs from case to caseleading to changes in relevant organizations’ responsibilities. As a result, theinformants’ safety is not well protected (Pham 2019, p.215).
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Table 2 Vietnamese legal framework for anti-corruption
NAME OF THE LAWCONTENTCURRENT VERSIONBASIC LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON CORRUPTION OFFENSES
Law number
Promulgated by

1. Anticorruption law

Providing definition and shaping
the concept of corruption andcorruption prevention mechanisms.

: 36/2018/QH14: National Assembly

Chapter/Articles
Promulgation date
Effective date

: 10 chapters, 96 articles: 20 November 2018
: 1 January 2019

Law number
Promulgated by: 100/2015/QH13: National Assembly

Chapter/Articles

2. Penal Code

Criminalizing the crime ofcorruption and defining sanctions.

LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON DENUNCIATION AND COMPLAINTS
Law number
Regulations on denunciation of law
Promulgated by
3. Law on
violations and providing a basic
Chapter/Articles
Promulgation datelegal framework to protect
Denunciation
Effective date
whistleblowers: 25/2018/QH14: National Assembly: 9 Chapter, 97 articles: 12 June 2018
: 1 January 2019

Law number
Promulgated by
Chapter/Articles
Promulgation date
Effective date
Law number
Promulgated by
Chapter/Articles
Promulgation date
Effective date

: 02/2011/QH13: National Assembly: 8 Chapter, 70 articles: 11 November 2011
: 1 July 2012
: 42/2013/QH13: National Assembly: 9 Chapter, 36 articles: 25 November 2013
: 1 July 2014

Law number
Promulgated by
Chapter/Articles
Promulgation Date
Effective Date
Revised on: 103/2016/QH13: National Assembly: 6 Chapter, 61 articles: 5 April 2016
: 1 January 2017: 20 November 2018

Law number
Promulgated by
Chapter/Articles
Promulgation Date
Effective Date

: 24/2018/QH14: National Assembly: 7 Chapter, 43 articles: 12 June 2018
: 1 January 2019

Law number
Promulgated by
Chapter/Articles
Promulgation Date
Effective Date

: 104/2016/QH13: National Assembly: 5 Chapter, 37 articles: 6 April 2016
: 1 July 2018

4. Law on
Complaints

Regulations on complaints against
administrative affairs and behaviorof civil servants.

Code of conduct for the civil
servant when serving the citizens;and the rights and obligations ofcitizens in contact with civil
servants, including denunciations
and complaints
OTHER LAWS AND REGULATIONS

5. Law on
Reception of
Citizens

6. Press Law

7. Law on Cyber
Security

8. Law on Accessto Information

128: Chapter XXI I I - Offenses
Related to Abuse of Power・Section 1. Corruption Offenses (Articles 353 - 359)
・Section 2 . Other Offenses Related to Abuse of Power(Articles 364 -366)
Promulgation date
: 27 November 2015
Effective date
: 1 July 2016
Revised on: 5 July 2017

Regulations on media institution
activities, including articles on
freedom of the press, freedom ofspeech, and administrative
agencies' responsibilities.
This law provides a legal
framework for protecting national
security and public order incyberspace; responsibility of
relevant organizations andindividualsThis law provides a legal
framework to exercise citizens'right to access information andregulations on administrative
agencies' responsibilities.

The system of Anti-corruption agencies in Vietnam: Concept, function, and challenges

HISTORICAL VERSIONS
Law number
Promulgated by: 55/2005/QH11: National Assembly

Law number
Promulgated by

Chapter/Articles
Promulgation date
Effective date
Revised on① 4 August 2007
② 23 November 2012
Effective until
Law number
Promulgated by: 8 Chapter, 92 articles: 29 November 2005
: 1 June 2006:

Chapter/Articles
Promulgation date
Effective date
Revised on: 1 January 2019: 15/1999/QH10: National Assembly

Effective until
Law number
Promulgated by: Chapter X X I - O f fenses
Related to Abuse of Power・Section A. Corruption Offenses (Articles 278-284)
・Section B. Other Offenses Related to Abuse of Power(Articles 289-291)
Promulgation date
: 21 December 1999
Effective date
: 1 July 2000
Revised on:① 3 June 2008
② 19 June 2009

: 03/1998/PL-BTVQH10: Standing Committee of the
National Assembly: 5 Chapter, 38 articles: 26 February 1998
: 1 May 1998
: 28 April 2000

: 1 June 2006
: 17-LCT/HĐNN7: Standing Committee of the
National Assembly: Chapter 9 - Offenses Related
to Abuse of Power(Articles 219-229)

Chapter/Articles

Chapter/Articles: 27 June 1985
: 1 January 1986:

Effective until: 1 July 2016

Promulgation date
Effective date
Revised on① 28 December 1989
② 12 August 1991
③ 22 December 1992
④ 10 May 1997
Effective until

Law number
Promulgated by
Chapter/Articles
Promulgation date
Effective date
Effective until: 03/2011/QH13: National Assembly: 8 Chapter, 50 articles: 11 November 2011
: 1 July 2012
: 1 January 2019

Name of the law: Law on Complaints
and denunciation: 09/1998/QH10: National Assembly: 9 Chapter, 103 articles: 2 December 1998
: 1 January 1999:

Law number
Promulgated by
Chapter/Articles
Promulgation Date
Effective Date
Revised on
Effective until

Law number
Promulgated by
Chapter/Articles
Promulgation date
Effective date
Revised on① 15 June 2004
② 29 November 2005
Effective until: 1 July 2000

: 1 July 2012

: 29-LCT/HĐNN8: National Assembly: 7 Chapter, 31 articles: 28 December 1989
: 2 January 1990
: 12 June 1999
: 1 January 2017

Source: Compiled by author

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2.2. Concept of Anti-corruption Agencies in Vietnam
The concept of corruption was recognized officially for the first time in the
documents of the 6th National Congress of CPV in 1986. Anti-corruption is
mentioned together with the fight against embezzlement of public funds and the“chasing money” mindset7. Corruption at this time was considered a social evilthat can be prevented by the financial inspection method8 . On 26 February
1998, the 10th National Assembly (1997–2002) ’s Chairman Nong Duc Manh9
signed into law the Anti-Corruption Ordinance of 1998, the first legal documents
designed for anti-corruption in Vietnam. The 1998 Anti-Corruption Ordinancereferred to the responsibilities of the heads of state agencies, stressed thei nter na l audit a nd per iodica lly i nspect ion (A r t icle 16), reg u lat ions on
denunciations (Article 18), and responsibility to coordinate with police,procuracies, and courts (Article 31). However, there were no specialized ACA
mentioned throughout the 3 8 Articles of the Ordina nce. The approach
implemented in the latter half of the 1990s was not very efficient. As a result,on the 9th National Congress, held in 2001, CPV admitted the fight against
corruption as a survival matter10.
In 2003, Vietnam signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption(UNCAC). Before ratifying the UNCAC in 2009, Vietnam conducted many
prerequisite studies and preparations, such as participating in the AntiCorruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific organized by the OECD. The
amendment of a new law on preventing and combating corruption in 2005 andthe establishments of anti-corruption bodies were part of a series of actions in
preparation for the implementation of UNCAC (Dinh 2019, pp.106-107). The 2005
Anti-corruption Law consists of 8 chapters and 92 articles, covering five mains
areas: (1) developing the concepts of corruption and regulations against corrupt
acts; (2) providing the guidelines to promote transparency and mechanisms todetect and prevent corruption; (3) building a legal framework for setting up andcoordinating among ACAs; (4) creating general provisions on assets regulations;and (5) defining the role of social organizations and the press in the fight against
corruption. Articles 73 and 75 of this Law introduced the Central Steering
Committee for Anti-Corruption (CSCA) and specialized ACAs inside theGovernment Inspectorate, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Supreme
People’s Procuracy.
The Vietnamese ACAs system concepts became evident in the “National
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The system of Anti-corruption agencies in Vietnam: Concept, function, and challenges

Strategy on Preventing and Combating Corruption Towards 2020” (Resolution
21/NQ-CP dated 12 May 2009). Part II, section 1a of the Resolution, pointed outthat “fighting against corruption is the responsibility of the whole politicalsystem under the leadership of the Party”. Therefore, instead of building an
independent ACA, Vietnam chose to form specialized anti-corruption units
under key agencies of inspection and criminal prosecution process. This “anticorruption relying on multiple laws and institutions” pattern is the second of
three anti-corruption patterns in Asia as presented by Quah (2013, pp.25-29)11.
This pattern’s main characteristic is the diversity of laws and ACAs, but
potentially ineffective due to its overlapping functions, lack of coordination, andfading the country’s anti-corruption efforts. Nevertheless, this system remained
the same, even after adopting the new Anti-corruption Law in 2018.
2.3. Mechanism and function of the Vietnamese ACAs system
The Vietnamese ACAs system is formed by four leading agencies, in which
the CSCA is the top leader. CSCA participates in neither investigation nor
prosecution. The main tasks of CSCA are to give guidance, direct the activities

Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption (CSCA)
The Office of the CSCA (2006‐2012)
Central Office of Internal Affairs (2013 until recent)Government
Inspectorateof Vietnam(GIV)

Ministryof
PublicSecurityThe
Anti-corruption
Bureau(Bureau IV)

The Police
Bureau ofCorruption,
economic
criminal, andsmuggling
investigation(Bureau C03)

Accepting thecomplaints anddenunciations

SupremePeople's ProcuracyofVietnam

The Bureau ofProsecuting andSupervising theinvestigation ofcorruption
cases(Bureau V5)

SupremePeople's CourtofVietnam

The Bureau ofProsecuting andSupervising theinvestigation ofcorruption
cases injudicial
activities(Bureau V6)

Corruption cases investigating and prosecuting process

Conducting
investigations

Prosecuting
Cases

Judiciary

Detecting thecorrupt activities

Figure 1 System of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in Vietnam

Source: Author

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of the whole system, and supervise most essential corruption cases. Other threeagencies were placed under the Government Inspectorate, the Ministry of
Public Security, and the Supreme People’s Procuracy. This co-operation can besummarized in Figure 1.
In general, the denunciations and complaints will be first accepted byinspectors. In most cases, the relevant ministry’s internal inspectors will makethe first move, getting as much first-hand evidence as possible to verify thesigns of the corrupt activities. Only large-scale and attention-grabbing cases are
entrusted to the national inspectors in bureau IV of GIV. Through receiving
denunciations, complaints, and organizing regular/ad hoc inspections, theinspectors classified misconduct behaviors to be either criminal offenses or noncriminal offenses. If they decide the misconduct behavior as a non-criminalof fen s e , t hey c ou ld i mp o s e pu n it ive f i ne s u nder L aw on H a nd l i ng of
Administrative Violations12 or submit recommendations to the top of relevant
agencies13 . Suppose the behavior in question shows clear criminality signals
according to the Anti-corruption Law and Penal Code, the inspectors willtransfer the case file, including the inspection conclusion, to the Police Bureau
C03 under the Ministry of Public Security and request an official investigation.
By implicating the investigation techniques and special investigative means,
which only policies are permitted, such as detention, arrest, and fugitive
warrant, the police will investigate the case and decide whether to file criminal
charges. If there is enough evidence to file criminal charges, they will submit
the case file to the People’s Procuracy following criminal court proceedings
described in the Criminal Procedure Code14. This procedure is also specified in
the Joint resolutions No. 03/2018/TTLT-VKSNDTC-BCA-BQP-TTCP of theSupreme People’s Procuracy, GIV, Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of
National Defense, which took effect on 18 October 201815.
In principle, the police investigation will be conducted after receiving theinspectors’ findings. However, in some cases, both may take action at the sametime. For example, in the bribery offense of Tenma Vietnam - a subsidiary of
Japa n’s plastic product maker Tenma Corporation, local police a nd theinspectors of the Ministry of Finance pronounced to investigate at the sametime after receiving information on 26 May 2020 (Le 2020, Anh & Hoang 2020).
However, it should be noted that the internal inspections of Ministries are thesubsidiary of each ministry and be directed by the Minister. GIV can only132

The system of Anti-corruption agencies in Vietnam: Concept, function, and challenges

supervise and give guidance in terms of technical and professional operations(Inspection Law, Article 17). Also, the Central Inspection Committee of CPV
may conduct independent investigations and propose sanctions against its
members. Furthermore, the State Audit of Vietnam takes part in detecting andinvestigating corruption offenses through auditing procedures. Since theseagencies do not have a department or a team specialized to combat corruption,
we c a n c a l l t hem t he co operat i ng agencies , wh ich for m a tempora r yinvestigation team to cooperate as requested16.
This system of anti-corruption was built in 2006 and remains until now.
Notwithstanding the unchanged system, transferring the CSCA from a stateagency to a CPV’s department since 2013 is a significant effort to strengthen
CPV leadership in combating corruption and targeting high-profile corruption
scandals in Vietnam17. There are two major changes in the structure and thepolitical position of the new CSCA. First, at the time of establishment in 2006,
the CSCA was chaired by the Prime Minister and operated as a department
Table 3 Organizational structures the Central Steering Committee for AntiCorruption (CSCA) in 2006 and 2013
Term

From 2005 to 2012

From 2013 until now

Members

10

16

Affiliate

National Assembly

General Political Department of CPV

Report to- Central Committee, General - General Political Department and General Secretary of
P o l i t i c a l D e p a r t m e n t a n d CPV
General Secretary of CPV- National Assembly

ChairmanN g u y e n T a n D u n g ( P r i m e Nguyen Phu Trong (General Secretary of CPV)
Minister)Vice-Chairman

Deputy Prime Minister- 2 CPV's Central Committees- Deputy Prime Minister- Vice-Chairman of National Assembly- Minister of Public Security (From January 2020)

Committees

・Inspector General of GIV・Minister of Public Security
・P r o s e c u t o r G e n e r a l o f t h eSupreme People's Procuracy
・Chief Justice of the Supreme
People's Court
・Deputy Minister of National
Defense・Inspector General of GIV・Minister of Public Security (2013-2019)
・Prosecutor General of the Supreme People's Procuracy
・Chief Justice of the Supreme People's Court
・Chief of General Political Department of the Ministryof National Defense

・Chief of the State Audit
・Chef of Central Propaganda Department of the CPV
・M inister of Culture, Sports ・Chef of the Central Organizing Commission of CPV
and Tourism
・Secretary General of the Vietnamese Fatherla nd・Central Committee of CPV
Front
・Vice Chairman of the Central ・Chief Justice of the National AssemblyCommittee of Internal Affairs

Source: Author

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under the Vietnamese National Assembly18. From 2013, CSCA was reformed asa department under the CPV, chair by General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong19.
Even being stated as the leading force of Vietnam’s State and society20, the CPV
is not a part of the State administrative system or vice-versa. Undoubtedly, itsorganizational system is formed in line with the state agencies21, which means
the CSCA’s position was changed from inside to outside of state administrative
apparatus. In addition, Article 73 about the establishment and power of CSCA
in the 2005 Anti-corruption Law was abolished in the new 2018 Anti-corruption
Law. Currently, the function of CSCA is based on Resolution No.05-QĐ/BCĐTW
passed by the 11th Central Committee of CPV on 9 April 2013.
Second, the new CSCA members increased from 10 to 16 people, including
four Vice - cha irma ns. Outside of representatives of a ll key agencies ofinvestigation, prosecution, and courts as its precursor, the new CSCA consist of
Chief of the State Audit, Secretary-General of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front(VFF), and two other key persons of CPV (Table 3). The Vietnamese Fatherland
Front is defined in the Vietnamese Constitution 22 as a political alliance and a
voluntary union of all socio-political organizations of Vietnamese both domestic
and overseas and recognized by the government as the representative ofpeople’s voice. The participation of VFF in CSCA conveys the high appreciationof CPV toward civil society’s participation in the fight against corruption.
In summary, in the concept of Vietnamese ACAs system, the right toinvestigate, prosecute, and adjudicate is delegated to different agencies andbased on the principles of independence and checks and balances. Until recently,
the system does not change much in terms of organizations. However, the shiftof its top leader, the CSCA, from a government agency to a CPV’s department
triggers some changes in its operation and performance. By standing outside of
the administrative system and expanding members, consisting of broader
representatives from most relevant organizations, the CSCA gains more
independence and strength to direct the fight against corruption in Vietnam. As
a result, the CSCA became more proactive and open to the public a morecomprehensive range of reports on corruption and corruption trial from 2013.

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The system of Anti-corruption agencies in Vietnam: Concept, function, and challenges

8000

6935

7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000

5870

4996
2959

2770

2628

2160

1219

1000
0

New Proceeding
Cases

Number of
Defendants
2006～2015

Finished Trials

Individuals
Prosecuted in Court

2016～2019

Figure 2 Criminal cases and individuals prosecuted in Court for corruption offenses
investigated by Vietnamese ACAs
Source: Author compiled from Annual report on anti-corruption of GIV, Supreme People’s
Procuracy and Supreme People’s Court of Vietnam

4. Evaluation of Anti-corruption agencies
A. Effectiveness of the systems
According to CSCA, it has supervised 68 cases of corruption investigations
f rom 2 014 to 2 018 , of wh ich 4 0 cr i m i n a l ch a rges were f i led w it h 5 0 0
defendants23. More than 4,300 CPV members have been tried and convicted ofcorruption-related charges during the last five years, of which 56 people werehigh-profile politicia ns a nd 11 members or ex-members of the Centra l
Committee of CPV. In 2017 and 2018, the anti-corruption campaign in Vietnam
gained momentum with many high-profile politicians’ trials. The corruption
Table 3 Evaluation of Vietnam Anti-corruption Agencies’performance
Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Control of Corruption
Score
Rank
-0.54
34.45
-0.62
31.43
-0.61
32.70
-0.53
36.02
-0.48
38.86
-0.44
40.87
-0.43
41.83
-0.45
37.50
-0.58
31.25
-0.49
37.98

Public Trust in Politicians
Score
Rank
3.63
36
3.91
32
3.68
36
3.42
42
3.37
46
3.37
49
3.47
45
3.58
47
3.55
46
N/A
N/A

Source: Author compile from the database of the World Bank

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trials on 22 January 2018 of Dinh La Thang, former Minister of Transport,
former Communist Party Secretary of Ho Chi Minh City, and former Politburo
member, is a typical example. He was convicted of corruption and law violations
that led to embarrassing economic losses charges and be sentenced to 13 years
in prison. In 2020, the ex-Minister of Information and Communications wassentenced to life imprisonment for taking bribes amounting to over 3 million
USD, and the Minister of Information and Communications was sentenced to 14
years in prison on the same charge. Moreover, figure 2 shows the progress ofVietnamese ACAs in dealing with corruption crime over the past few years.
According to the annual reports to the National Assembly of the Prosecutor
General of the Supreme People’s Procuracy, within only four years (from 2016 to2019), the investigative agencies filed 2160 criminal prosecutions, which equaled
to 72% of the total number of cases filed in ten years from 2006 to 2015. These
numbers show a significant enhancement in the investigation of corruption
offenses. Moreover, investigative agencies have finished investigating 61% ofcases in 2018, making notable progress compared with the rate of 48% in 201424,
illustrating significant progress during the last four years.
Even though the CPI grew in 2017 and 2019, Vietnam’s CPI still stagnatedbelow 40 points (out of 100 points), which means that corruption was still asevere problem that the country must face. The problem became apparent after
analyzing the other indices. The Control of Corruption Index (CC) of the WorldBank showed little improvement. Vietnam’s score is relatively low compared tothe median of the rest of the world (-0.3 to -0.2) and even the median of Asian
countries (-0.2 to 0.2). This index illustrates the extent of corruption and “state
capture” of elites for private gains, which means despite the efforts of combating
corruption, both grand and petty corruption are still considered a crucial
problem in Vietnam. As a result, the Public Trust in Politicians Index saw adownward trend from 2010 to 2015 and showed a slight improvement in 2016
before plu ng ing i n 2 018 . Accordi ng to T T ’s 2 019 Viet na m C orr upt ion
Barometer, 46% of the respondents rated the effectiveness of the government’s
anti-corruption effort as “bad” which did not improve much from the rating of
50% in 2016 (TT 2019a, p.18).
B. Advantages and disadvantages of the system
The establishment of anti-corruption departments inside investigative
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The system of Anti-corruption agencies in Vietnam: Concept, function, and challenges

agencies and legislative agencies relieve the potential problems of setting up a
new organization, such as budget issues, recruiting new staffs, and building new
offices. At the same time, the existence of multiple inspective and investigative
agencies provides double confirmation. The corruption case of National Highway
No. 1 connecting to Bac Lieu City’s north gate is a good example. In thisscandal, inspectors of the Ministry of Transport discovered a misspending ofabout 2 .1 bil l ion V N D (about 9 0 , 0 0 0 USD). However, t he St ate Aud its
subsequently announced that the amount in question must be about 51.3 billion
VND (about 2. 2 million USD). This discrepancy was supposed to be themiscalculating of cost per unit and estimated units at some categories (Phuong2017).
In contrast, Quah (2013, pp.25-29) has pointed out that the adoption of multiple
anti-corruption agencies creates loopholes due to overlapping functions and theVietnamese system is not an exception. In essence, the involvement of multiagencies delayed the process. In some cases, it generated chances for suspects
to escape. The escape of Trinh Xuan Thanh, the main suspect in the PVP Landcorr upt ion case, is a ty pica l exa mple. Trin h was convicted of va rious
misconducts, receiving bribery and other corrupt activities while serving aschairman of the Petro Vietnam Construction (PVC) board. At the end of May
2016, the Vietnamese online press reported public news about Trinh’s luxury
car and the 3,200 billion VND (nearly 138 million USD) loss of PVC when Trinh
was the chairman. On 9 June 2016, the Central Office of CVP announced at therequest of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, to investigate the scandals
related to Trinh Xuan Thanh. The Central Inspection Commission of CPV
made the first move to trace the origins of corrupt activities. After receiving
the inspectors’ conclusion on 11 July 2016, the police department secretly
started the investigation at the end of July. Although the Ministry of Public
Defense has confirmed that no inside information was leaked, in reality, Trinhfled abroad from 19 August, right in the middle of the investigation. After ayear of living abroad, Trinh appeared and was prosecuted in July 2017 (Thuy &Nguyen 2017).
On the other ha nd, most of the ACAs of Vietna m are a ffiliated withadministrative agencies; therefore, government intervention is unavoidable. For
example, in the corruption scandal at the state-owned Vietnam Shipbuilding
Corporation (Vinashin) in 2010, several online newspapers skeptically posted the
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article raising questions of government interference in investigation using theInternet, but no further relevant information was provided (Lam 2010). The
reorganization in 2013 provided CSCA with more independence from theadministrative apparatus in comparison with its precursor. However, the haft ofits members is also the chief of administrative agencies. Hence, we can not deny
the potential risk of government intervention in the future.
Lastly, while the GIV and police play a vital role in the Vietnamese ACAs
system, they are the ones who have the most severe corruption problem among
all administrative agencies. In the 2019 Corruption Barometer report, therespondents rated the police as the most corrupt agency (TT 2019a, p.15).
Meanwhile, from 2016 to the present, corruption cases involving inspectors havebeen reported in newspapers every year. For example, in 2016, the bribery
scandals involving traffic inspectors were continuously detected in Can Tho andHa Tinh provinces (VTV24h 2016, Van 2016). While in 2020, inspectors of the
Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of National Defense, and the People’s
Committee of Thanh Hoa province were arrested and charged with bribes one
after another (Yen 2020, Xuan 2020, Moc 2020). These corruption scandals
inside the ACAs themselves are threatening people’s trust in the effectivenessof anti-corruption efforts.

Conclusion
Quah (2011, pp. 456) emphasized that a robust anti-corruption agency needs
to be independent and have adequate capabilities, responsibilities, and resources
to function effectively. His research in ten Asian countries also stressed that asingle agency specialized for sweeping corruption appears to be more effective
than other models by ensuring its independence and impartiality. That might be
a new practical approach to Vietnam to improve the effectiveness of the anticorruption system.
Indeed, Vietnam used to have an independent and powerful agency designed
to fight against public officers’ misconducts back in the second half of the 1940s,
the Special Inspectorate Bureau. The Bureau was launched on 23 November
1945, two months after the independence of Vietnam. The main task of the
Bureau is to oversee administrative affairs and inspect the activities ofgovernment agencies. The Special Inspectorate Bureau was established under138

The system of Anti-corruption agencies in Vietnam: Concept, function, and challenges

the Decree number 64 of President Ho Chi Minh. Article 2 of the Decree
described in general functions and powers of Special Inspectors, including 1) toaccept denunciations and complaints; 2) to investigate, question and examine
documents of administrative agencies to recognize, prevent and detect criminal
offenses; 3) to arrest and detain any governmental official on suspicion of crimes;
4) to confiscate or seal the evidence, use all methods of investigation and filecriminal offense to the Special Court. Special Inspectorate Bureau can evenprosecute the cases that happened before the date of the Decree. Despite thecomprehensive and powerful functions, setting it up in the middle of theVietnam War limited the agency and the Special Court’s activities. They could
operate only in the North Vietnam sphere, and their resources were also far
from adequate (GIV 2011, part 1). As a result, the Special Court was abolishedon 18 December 1949, whereas the Special Inspectorate Bureau was graduallyreformed, evolving to Government Inspectorate of Vietnam. Despite existing for
only a short period, the appearance of an independent and powerful anticorruption agency suggests prospects for future reconstruction of such anagency.

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Endnotes
1
2

3

4
5
6

7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15

16

17

18

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Toward Transparency (TT) is the National Contact in Vietnam of Transparency
International.
The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD 2011, p.141) pointed outthat the economic liberation creating opportunities for corruption. Meanwhile, Duong(2015, p.23) draw attention to problems caused by globalization and integration after Doi
Moi. Later, Gregory (2016, p. 229) mentioned about a consensus among a large proportionof Western observers that after Doi Moi, corruption begun to flourish in Vietnam.
For example, Decision number 223 of Ho Chi Minh president on bribery offenses
a mended on 2 7 November 19 4 6 . A r t icle 13 3 of 19 8 5 Pena l C ode cr im i na l ized
embezzlement meanwhile Articles 226 and 227 of the same Code criminalized the actof taking and giving bribery.
Author’s research.
The Special Inspectorate Bureau was the precursor to the current Government
Inspectorate of Vietnam (GIV 2011).
Information retrieved from the report of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in the
8th meeting of The Central Steering Committee against Corruption, aired on Vietnam
Television (VTV news) on 25th July 2020.
Chapter 5 of Political report of the 5th Central Committee presented at the 6th National
Congress (Phan & Van 2007, p.352).
Chapter 3 of the Five-year socio-economic development plan 1986-1990 (Phan & Van
2007, p. 377).
Nong Duc Manh was Chairman of the National Assembly of Vietnam from 1992 to 2001
(the 9th and 10th National Assembly).
Chapter 1 of Political report of the 8th Central Committee presented at the 9th National
Congress (Phan & Van 2007, p. 777)
The other patterns are (1) Providing Anti-Corruption Law without law enforcement
agency, and (3) establishing independent anti-corruption agency. The former can be seenin Japan while typical examples of the latter are CPIB of Singapore and IACC of HongKong. The third pattern is considered the most effective one (Quah 2013, p.456).
Law number 15/2012/QH13, took effect on 1 July 2013.
According to Articles 55 and 60 of Inspection Law (Law number 56/2010/QH12, tookeffect on 1 July 2011).
Law number 101/2015/QH13, took effect on 1st July 2016.
The first version of the Joint resolutions was Joint resolutions number 03/2006/TTLTVKSTC-TTCP-BCA-BQP, amended on 23 May 2006, replaced by Joint resolutions
number 02/2012/TTLT-VKSTC-TTCP-BCA-BQP on 22 March 2012 before achieving
the current version.
Article 83 of the Anti-corruption Law stipulates only three agencies with specialized
anti-corruption departments, namely the GIV, the Ministry of Public Security, and theSupreme People’s Procuracy. Other agencies have obligations and responsibilities tocoordinate with these anti-corruption agencies.
Part II, section 6 of the Conclusion number 21 at the 5th Plenary Session (7 – 15 May
2012) of the 11th Central Committee of CPV, and the Resolution number 162-QĐ/TW,
dated 1 February 2013 on establishing Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption(CSCA).
Resolution number 1039/2006/NQ-UBTVQH11 of the Standing Committee of National

The system of Anti-corruption agencies in Vietnam: Concept, function, and challenges

19

20
21

22
23
24

Assembly on organization, tasks, powers and operation regulation of the Central
Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption, took effect on 28 August 2006.
Resolut ion nu mber 162 - Q Đ/TW of t he C ent ra l C om m ittee of t he CPV on t he
Establishment of the Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption, took effect on 1
February 2013.
Article 4, Chapter 2 of the 2013 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, tookeffect on 1st January 2014.
The political system of Vietnam includes the CPV, the state system (with the National
Assembly as the highest representative orga n a nd the sole orga n that has theconstitutional and legislative rights, state administrative agencies, and judicial organs),socio-political organizations, socio-professional organizations, and mass associations(Information retrieved from Government Portal of Vietnam).
2013 Constitution, Chapter 1, Article 9.
Speech of General Secretary of CPV at the end of the 14th meeting of CSCA held on
16th August 2018 (Nguyen 2019, pp. 339 – 356)
Author compiled from Annual report on anti-corruption of GIV, Supreme People’s
Procuracy and Supreme People’s Court.

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Abstract

The system of Anti-corruption agencies
in Vietnam:
Concept, function and challenges
Thanh Huyen, Nguyen

The persistence of corruption is a significant problem in Vietnam which
threatens the country's development. From the second half of the 2000s,
Vietnam pursued a wide range of reforms, namely adopting the Anti-corruption
law in 2005 and developing a system consisting of multiple anti-corruption units,
which started in 2006. In 2013, the top leader of the Vietnamese system of
Anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) was reconstructed and changed from an
administrative agency to a department of the Communist Party of Vietnam(CPV), followed by an anti-corruption campaign targeting high-profile officials in2016. These policies made some impressive improvements in dealing withcorruption offenses. However, the system also exposes inefficiency due to its
complication and overlapping tasks and need to be revised. Therefore, thispaper was conducted to systematically examine the concept and functions ofVietnam's Anti-corruption system and illustrate the strong and weak points ofthe system, then discussing a little bit the prospect of establishing a n
independent Anti-Corruption Agency which possesses all powers of detection
and investigation in Vietnam.
Keywords: Vietnam, corruption, anti-corruption agency, sustainable development

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