Crisis Management in the ASEAN + 3 countries
Migration: In Search for Proper Management
Introduction
A crisis is “specific, unexpected and non-routine events or series of events that create high levels of
uncertainty or threat or perceived threat to an organisation’s high priority goals”. 1 For ASEAN (and +Three), the “high priority goals” are to create “an organisation that would help bring about a Southeast
Asian region of peace, freedom and prosperity for our peoples”. 2 This reflects ASEAN’s “desire andcollective will to live in a region of lasting peace, security and stability, sustained economic growth, sharedprosperity and social progress, as well as promote ASEAN interests, ideals and aspirations”. 3

However,within ASEAN, there exist a number of “crises” and mini-crises” which arise from “highly complex
circumstances”. Such crises tend to take place in a political space, where the level of states’ preparedness
and responses are crucial. Many of these situations may be “intense, deadlocked, and extremely difficult toresolve” such as man-made and natural disasters, disputes over the South China Sea, mixed and forced
migration, various health risks, etc. Some attract the attention of the international community such as thecase of irregular movement in the Andaman Sea but, often times, interest has faded away until the crisis reemerged. Such crises do not just affect neighbouring countries or regions, but they could become threats tothe very purposes of the region and its dialogue partners themselves. Crisis management is the procedurethrough which states and organizations interact in striving to effectively react to an emergency that threatens
the safety and well-being of the people. 4 Without proper management, the crises mentioned earlier willdefinitely hinder the “high priority goals” which are peace, security, prosperity and the social progress of
ASEAN and beyond.
This paper is based on the discussion held in Bangkok, Thailand, on June 10, 2016 hosted by the Thai
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Higher Education Commission, Thai Ministry of Education and the AUN
Secretariat with additional research to ensure a solid academic quality for policy recommendations.
Experts/Representatives from 8 ASEAN Member States namely Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand as well as Plus 3 including China, Republic of Korea and

1

Management Association, Information Resources , ed, (2013), Crisis Management: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, andApplications , p.812, https://books.google.co.th/books?id=R9HAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA812&lpg=PA812&dq=Crisis+management+is+the+process+by+which+an+organization+deals+with+a+major+event+that+threatens+to+harm+the+organization,+its+stakeholders,+or+the+general+public.&source=bl&ots=0NqiqB
Wjn&sig=TC9Aas9PohDalRQ_DgMmf9LxfJs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjM2sbW9uLKAhVUkY4KHcahANMQ6AEIPzA
J#v=onepage&q=Crisis%20management%20is%20the%20process%20by%20which%20an%20organization%20deals%20with%
20a%20major%20event%20that%20threatens%20to%20harm%20the%20organization%2C%20its%20stakeholders%2C%20or%
20the%20general%20public.&f=false , accessed 13 January 2016.
2
ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2025 : Forging Ahead Together,
http://www.asean.org/storage/2015/12/ASEAN-2025-Forging-Ahead-Together-final.pdf, accessed 13 January 2016.
3
Ibid.
4
Management Association, Information Resources , ed, Ibid.

1

Japan have presented the papers and participated in the discussions. At the end of the Meeting,recommendations were made which are reflected in this report.
The paper serves as the summary of the rich discussions. It aims to understand the situation of mixed
migration in the ASEAN context and how ASEAN has dealt with them so far. It also attempts to analyse thedifferent responses, or lack thereof, of ASEAN (and the plus 3) to such highly complex situations in order
to assess effectiveness of the existing policies and mechanisms in the region in addressing the issues inorder to provide recommendations for a regional approach to migration. Ultimately, the purpose of thispaper is to propose concrete recommendations and ways to manage and prevent the crisis.
As of 2015, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was home to approximately 630 million
people. 5 The proportion of people’s movements within the region is rapidly rising. Migration has become
an important and integral component of development in the region and its dialogue partners. The causes of
migration may vary from one country to another but more and more common problems are poverty, violent
conflicts, discrimination, persecution and other forms of human rights violations. In addition, environmental
migration and displacement through other causes are becoming increasingly prevalent in the region.
Irregular and mixed migratory flows are also key trends in ASEAN. Irregular migration is the cross-border
flow of people who enter a country without that country’s legal permission to do so. Mixed migratory flows
are complex population movements including both voluntary and forced ones. The most common forms of
migration in the region are irregular labour migration, trafficking for labour and/or sexual exploitation.
Unfortunately, people who flee from persecution, discrimination or armed conflict are, often times, also
considered as migrants in irregular situation. Although migration has been always in the region, ASEAN
has never had any comprehensive policy to deal with it. Most agreements and policies in ASEAN deal
mainly with movements of skilled labour or professions.
Although the issue of migration is not new to ASEAN (and the Plus 3- China, Japan and South Korea), anddespite an increasing number of maritime movement, the situation has not been recognized by ASEAN
member states as a “crisis”. This increase in maritime movements and a loss of life at sea which has added
to the already flourishing people-smuggling and human-trafficking networks in the sub-region calls forproper solution and management. Unless migration is properly managed, it will have permanent andintensifying negative impacts on countries in the region. Forced migration, if not properly and consistently
addressed, contributes directly to smuggling, trafficking and transnational crime. What is lacking in theregion currently is a collective, comprehensive and coordinated response to challenges associated with bothsudden and entrenched practices of displacement, regardless of causes.

5

Statistics Times 27 March 2015 at http://statisticstimes.com/population/asian-countries-by-population.php and Selected BasicASEAN Indicators, August2015. , http://www.asean.org/images/2015/september/selected-keyindicators/table1_as%20of%20Aug%202015.pdf, accessed 13 January 2016.

2

Situation of mixed migration in ASEAN and plus 3.
Intra-ASEAN Labor Migration
Out of around 625 to 630 million population in the 10 AMS, labour forces make up of around 285 million.
The 2013 data showed that ASEAN labour movement made up of 4.1 % of the total world labour migration.
The countries receiving most labour forces from within ASEAN are Singapore (18.1%); Malaysia (25.7%)
and Thailand (53.3%).The countries sending most labour forces to within ASEAN include Myanmar(29.2%); Indo (18.3%); Malaysia (15.5%); Laos (13.7%); and Cambodia (11.4%). 6 Labour migration
contributes significantly to economic development of ASEAN countries. For example, by 2011, 63% oflabour forces of Singapore are foreigners. In Malaysia, 13% of labour forces is labour migration. Singapore
is most dependent on foreign labour. 7 Despite their contribution, there are problems.
Uneven economic development within the region has facilitated intra-ASEAN labor migration. Withdifferent economies of scale, countries within ASEAN have drawn different types of workers into different
sectors of their economies in accordance with their levels of economic development. In effect, this has led
to an unlevel playing field where relatively richer countries are at the top, the medium income countries arelocated in the middle, and the poorest ones are relegated at the bottom. The situation has been aggravatedwhen these migrant laborers have not been protected by legal frameworks of the receiving countries due totheir lack of proper documents or those have been confiscated by recruitment agencies. There are also
people who come from countries where state-imposed conflict is regarded as rather a norm than an
exception. In effect, the different levels of economic development in line with certain political contexts hascreated the hierarchy of victims from least to worst.
It’s important to reiterate that Singapore is the country which attracts the most highly skilled laborers fromcountries in ASEAN and outside of ASEAN. Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore are the top three countries
in ASEAN which received large number of migrants from non-ASEAN countries. At the same time,
Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, and Cambodia are the top five states in ASEAN which export thelargest number of workers to other ASEAN countries. These are relatively low skilled laborers. The case ofdomestic workers was highlighted in the presentation. It was found out that they have been subjected toabuses and exploitation. According to latest FARSIGHT Report, forty percent of the world’s estimated fifty
two millions domestic workers have worked in the Asia-Pacific. Within that forty percent, over two million
laborers are from Indonesia and Philippines. Over sixty percent of domestic workers abroad haveexperienced exploitation. 8
ASEAN+3 Labor Movement:
In order to promote economic development and connectivity within the region, governments including
Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar have come up with Special Economic Zones (SEZs) geared towards
building infrastructure and logistics systems. These projects have been strategically planned and put in place
along regional “economic corridors,” areas where the host countries have provided conducive policies for
6

Nguyen Huy Hoang, Migration in Southeast Asia, Problems and Solutions, Power Point Presentation made during the NEAT
Working Group Meeting, Bangkok, 10 June 2016.
7
Ibid.
8
FARSIGHT. 2016. Modern Slavery in East Asia: Protecting the Rights and Promoting the Autonomy of Domestic MigrantWorkers from Indonesia and The Philippines. Creative Commons. http://un-act.org/publication/view/modern-slavery-in-east-asiaprotecting-the-rights-and-promoting-the-autonomy-of-domestic-migrant-workers-from-indonesia-and-the-philippines/, accessed
7 June 2016.

3

the purpose of attracting investment such as deregulating the labor market; tax-incentives; and longer leases
for foreign investors. Towards the end of the day, SEZs along economic corridors can indirectly influence
ASEAN’s labor corridors, contributing distinctive characteristics such as the rise of irregular migration
which can easily lead to all forms of abuses. This is especially true when there is uneven development in theregion. For example, countries with enormous sums of capital such as China, Japan, and South Korea caneasily invest in SEZs in GMS countries where the incentives for investment are provided.
Meanwhile, Northeast Asian countries, especially Korea, have become a large marriage market for migrants
from Southeast Asia. Some of these are subject to exploitation or discrimination. At the same time, Japan
has mostly adhered to the “isolationist policy” on migration though there has been a call for reformpertaining to migration policies among different sectors in society. 9 Migrant workers in Japan are not fully
protected by the Japanese law. This is especially true when these migrants are temporary workers such as
interns 10.
Trafficking in Persons in the context of ASEAN+3:
The definition of human trafficking was widely argued and discussed until the ‘Palermo Protocol’ where thefirst internationally agreed definition was made. Why do people engage in trafficking in Persons? The
simple answer is that it makes a good business. According to the International Labor Organization 2014,
money involved in TIPs is $150.2 billion per year, and it has involved 20.9 million people. Perpetrators
make on average $4,000 per victim. In Asia, the profits (highest compared to other regions) made under theforced labor are $51.8 billion annually. The Asia-Pacific is by far the most affected region in the world byabsolute numbers of 11.7 million people. 11 Interestingly, within the Asia-Pacific, the most extensive flows
of migration and TIPs can be found in the Greater-Mekong Sub-region (GMS: Cambodia, China, Lao PDR,
Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam). 12 Indeed, the key characteristics of migration within the Greater Mekong
Sub-region are a “fast-growing migration flow within and outside the sub-region; irregularity of movement;labor exploitation and violation of human rights with minimal legal support services”. 13 As a result, any
irregular migrants can easily be the victims of TIPs. Nevertheless, most of the victims of TIPs tend to comefrom the countries in ASEAN.
TIPs in the GMS occurs for a wide range of purposes including “for forced labor in the fishing and seafoodindustries, in agriculture, construction, domestic servitude or begging; as well as for sexual exploitation orforced marriage”. 14 This typology can be seen in the case of Cambodia in which Cambodian male migrants
are mostly trafficked to Thailand for fishing industry, to Malaysia as domestic workers, and to China(females) for marriage.
9

Policy Brief from the Japan Meeting 23rd -24th January. 2016. Integration of Migrants and Social Policy Issues: Reflection fromJapan, Korea, and Thailand towards Creation and Inclusive Society. Kobe University Research Center for Promoting
Intercultural Studies (PROMIS). Kobe, Japan.
10
Toko Sekiguchi, Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2015. “Japan Skirts Immigration Debate by Offering ‘Internships’ to Foreigners.”
http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-skirts-immigration-debate-by-offering-internships-to-foreigners-1429049533, accessed 7 June
2016.
11
Boll, Sebastian. 2014. Workshop on Migration and Human Trafficking in Thailand’s Lower North. (March 17, 2015).
[Workshop].
12
United Nations Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT). 2014. UN-ACT Project Brief. UN-ACT..
http://un-act.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/UN-ACT-Project-Brief.pdf , Accessed 7 June 2016.
13
Nguyen Anh, Dang. 2016. “Female Labor Migration in the Mekong.” Paper presented at the 4th Mahidol Migration Center
Regional Conference in the Era of Transnational Migration hosted by Institute for Population and Social Research (IPSR),
Mahidol University. Nakhon Pathom, Thailand, 28-30 June 2016.
14
United Nations Action for Cooperation against Trafficking in Persons (UN-ACT). 2014. UN-ACT Project Brief. UN-ACT.
http://un-act.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/UN-ACT-Project-Brief.pdf, accessed 7 June 2016.

4

It is worth mentioning here that the issue of bride trafficking has become very pressing in the region. Facedwith a mostly-male gender imbalance, countries such as China, Korea, and Taiwan are increasingly seeking
to import brides from ASEAN countries. According to the study by Fang, there could be around 30 million
bachelors in China by 2020. 15 In effect, many young women in countries such as Cambodia, Lao PDR,
Myanmar, Vietnam have become vulnerable to be trafficked to China for forced marriage.
Despite an estimated 21 million people in conditions of forced labor, the 2015 US State Department’s TIP
report indicated that only 44,462 victims of trafficking were identified globally in 2014. In the same year,
only 10,051 alleged traffickers were prosecuted, leading to only 4,443 convictions. What does this mean? Itmeans that in most of the TIPs cases, the perpetrators tend to escape punishment. In addition, the number ofvictims identified are much less than the overall number of victims in reality.
National and Regional Framework and Trafficking in Persons
Since the nature of migration itself involves transnational problems related to migration of a country, theycan easily spill over to other countries. Where a state lacks a legal framework covering migration, this canaffect the overall migration situation of the region. In other words, the problems regarding migration in one
country have entangled neighboring countries such that it has become a regional problem. Thus, there is aneed to call for both a national and regional framework to tackle this growing crisis.
In terms of a national framework, several countries in ASEAN have the TIPs law per se while China, Lao
PDR do not have the TIPs law. 16 This becomes more problematic and complicated when the problem
involves two countries: one with a country where the TIPs law exists and one where the TIPs law does notexist. This difficulty refers to the incompatibility of national legislation of the sending and receiving
countries.
With regard to a regional framework, ASEAN recently adopted the ASEAN Convention Against
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP) in 2015. 17 ACTIP has produced several
positive aspects regarding TIPs. First, it has gotten all ASEAN members to recognize the significance ofTIPs issues and their ramifications. Second, it is the first time that ASEAN has addressed this issue througha regional legal framework. Third, the Convention directly addresses the issues related to Trafficking in
Persons per se. Fourth, it offers a clear definition of a Minor: “Child means any person under 18” (Article2[d]).” This can easily help prevent the case of Child Trafficking in the future. However, the Convention
has some loopholes. These loopholes include a non-legally binding mechanism and prioritizing nationalsovereignty over regional concerns. These points can be seen in Article 4 of the Convention.
Article 4: Protection of Sovereignty

15

Fang, Lan. 2014. “The Jiangxi Township Doing a Brisk Trade in Cambodian Wives.” Caixin Online, August 12..
http://english.caixin.com/2014-08-12/100715994.html, accessed 24 July 2016.
16
Philippines “The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003” (2003); Brunei “The Trafficking and Smuggling Persons Order”(2004); Myanmar “The Anti-Trafficking In Persons Law” (2005); Indonesia “The Eradication of the Criminal Act of Trafficking
in person” (2007); Malaysia “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act” (2007); Cambodia “The Law on Suppression of Human
Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation” (2008); Thailand “The Anti-Trafficking In Persons Act, B.E. 2551” (2008); Vietnam “Anti
Human Trafficking Law” (effective January 1, 2012); Singapore “Prevention of Human Trafficking Act” (2014). See Lim (2015)
for further detail. Lim, Janina. 2015. “Looking back: First anti-trafficking law in Southeast Asia.” Rappler, May 26. Accessed
August 19, 2016. http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/94362-looking-back-ph-first-anti-trafficking-law-asean
17
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 2015. ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: 27th ASEAN Summit.
http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/2015/November/actip/ACTIP.PDF, accessed 7 June 2016.

5

1. The Parties shall carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign
equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.
2. Nothing in this Convention entitles a Party to undertake in the territory of another Party the exercise of jurisdiction andperformance of functions that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other Party by its domestic laws.

In effect, the ACTIP could be rendered ineffective since it has no enforcement instrument. In addition, it
might not have any influence on TIPs as long as the domestic laws of a given country authorize the officialsof that country to handle or resolve a given case unilaterally.
As can be seen from what was discussed earlier, ASEAN does not have policy and clear agenda on labour
migration in general despite the ASEAN Mutual Recognition Agreements which limited to skilled workers
only. And, in spite of the existence of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection of the Rights of MigrantWorkers, the violations of their rights and abuses are continuing. The ASEAN Intergovernmental
Commission on Human Rights, the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of
Women and Children as well as the ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declarationon the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers, are not in the position, until now, to monitor their
human rights situation.
As said, the ACTIP was adopted and open for ratification but not yet enter into force. This convention could
have been a useful instrument to protect victims of trafficking if it was not subject to national legislation as
it would have served as a regional standard to respond to issues of trafficking in persons. What is also
problematic in ASEAN is about forced migration on which ASEAN does not have any common approach.
Forced migration 18
Whilst migrants choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to
improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons,asylum seekers and refugees cannot safely return home 19 as they were forced to leave the country of origin
because of persecution, discrimination, exploitation and human rights violations. In addition, in many
countries of the region, there are also those stateless persons who are not recognized by any states.
In 2015, according to UNHCR, “(t)he Asia and the Pacific region is home to 7.7 million people of concern
to UNHCR: they include 3.5 million refugees, 1.9 million internally displaced people (IDPs), and 1.4
million stateless people. The majority of the refugees originate from Afghanistan and Myanmar. The
Afghan refugee population constitutes the largest protracted situation in the world. Up to 96 per cent of all
Afghan refugees live in the neighbouring Islamic Republics of Iran and Pakistan, which have generously
hosted them for over three decades. In Southeast Asia, the “Myanmar situation also remains a key operation.
An estimated 500,000 refugees from different ethnic groups have been fleeing for several decades in search

18

Parts of this section were drawn from the paper jointly prepared by Sriprapha Petcharamesree and Francis Tom Temprosa,
Intractable Human Rights Situations and the ‘Failed’ International Response to Crises: The Case of the Plight of Refugees andRefugee-like Situations in Asia and the Pacific, presented at the Global Class room, Venice, 8-13 May, 2016.
19
UNHCR, Refugee or Migrants : Word choice matters, 11 July 2016, http://reliefweb.int/report/world/unhcr-viewpointrefugee-or-migrant-which-right-11-july-2016, accessed 14 July 2016.

6

of protection from ethnic conflict and violence.” 20 This includes Karen and Karenni in Thailand, Chins in
Malaysia, Rohingyas in Bangladesh and large urban populations in cities across the region.” 21 Over two
thirds live outside camps, mainly in urban environments where they often find inadequate protection,
leading to onward irregular movement by sea. Many of them are more vulnerable than those in camps andtheir protection needs are often inadequately addressed. Although not confined to the boundaries of a camp,
the freedom of movement of these urban refugees is often limited. Many lack documentation and risk
detention and deportation.” 22 The same report reveals further, “detention practices and other forms ofrestrictive asylum policies continue to spread, limiting refugees’ access to basic services and socioeconomic rights. Lack of status and documentation prevents them from legally accessing the labour market
and they become victims of exploitation, with women and adolescent girls particularly vulnerable to sexual
exploitation.” 23 The cases mentioned above are known to the international community, and reports on
issues are not lacking.
In East Asia and the Pacific, the 2015 UNHCR sub-regional operations profile shows that as at December
2015, an estimate of more than 350,000 refugees are found in the sub-region. Australia, Papua New Guinea,
New Zealand, Japan, Republic of Korea, Nauru, and Hong Kong have, in different numbers, refugees intheir territories. China alone is the origin of about 210,815 refugees while being the host of 301,057
refugees. 24 In Southeast Asia, according to the data compiled by UNHCR, as of 29 February 2016, a total of
13,829 persons of concern (refugees and asylum ‐seekers) are found in Indonesia. About 7,000 are fromAfghanistan, the rest is from Myanmar, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Iran, Palestine, Pakistan, Iraq and others. 25

In Malaysia, “asylum seekers and refugees generally reside in urban areas, with the vast majority
originating from Myanmar. Other groups are from Sri Lanka, Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Iraq and Somalia.
Approximately 40,000 people residing in Malaysia are considered stateless; the majority are ethnic
Tamils formerly from India.” 26 The figures do not include those found in Sabah and Sarawak. According to
the last count, around 80,000 Filipino refugees registered in Sabah, of which some 61% are documented and
39% are not. 27 It was further noted that as at June/August 2015, 63% of 153,880 ‘peoples of concern wereclassified as refugees while 35% as asylum seekers (applicants). A further 120,000 stateless and ‘various
individuals’ are not included. Compared to the tens of thousands above, Refugee Status Determination and20

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2015). UNHCR regional operations profile - Asia and the Pacific.
Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02d8ec6.html, accessed 30 Jan. 2016.
21
UNHCR, (2015), UNHCR Global Appeal 2015 Update, p.122, http://www.unhcr.org/5461e5f7a.pdf, accessed 20 August 2016.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
UNHCR. (2015a). UNHCR sub-regional operations profile - East Asia and the Pacific. Available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45b276.html, accessed 20 June. 2016.
25
UNHCR Country Profile, http://www.unhcr.org/50001bda9.pdf, accessed 9 Apr. 2016.
26
CaLP, Country Profile : Malaysia, http://www.cashlearning.org/downloads/poc-workshopcountry-profilemalaysia.pdf,
accessed 20 August 2016.
27(i) UNHCR Malaysia, ‘Figures at a Glance,’ April 2016. (ii) UHNCR, ‘UNHCR Factsheet – Malaysia,’ August 2015. (iii) UNHCR,‘Malaysia – Statistical Snapshot,’ June 2015. (iv) UNHCR, ‘Malaysia – 2016 Plan Summary – Filipino Refugees in Sabah

7

Resettlement (as at August 2015) was only 6,116 and 7,257 respectively. These figures do not include
undocumented migrants, who are believed to number from 2m-4m. Malaysia does not differentiate between
the asylum seekers and undocumented workers; legally both are deemed ‘illegal immigrants’. 28
In Thailand, as of December 2015, there were in total 625,256 persons of concern to UNHCR including
110,372 Refugees, 8,166 Asylum Seekers and 506,197 Stateless Persons. Majority of asylum seekers andrefugees are from Myanmar. 29
Of these countries, Indonesia has the smallest cohort. Hundreds of asylum seekers from many countries
other than Myanmar and Bangladesh keep arriving there as they are not deterred by Australia’s Operation
Sovereign Borders.
It is critical to note that figures of refugees, asylum-seekers, and those in refugee-like situation, in somecases, are difficult to verify. The figures may not themselves translate to intractability, but the lack ofcredible statistics and verifiable figures on refugee influx would contribute to intractability and eventually acrisis.
Despite the fact that the region has been, for over two decades, experiencing economic growth, a growing
number of people are seeking asylum, and this trend is continuing; at the same time, international attention
is decreasing, as these situations are not considered “crisis situations” when compared with what has been
happening in Europe or Africa. However, one should not forget that this situation of forced migration
around the region is a persistent and increasing regional phenomenon. Unless properly managed, it will
have permanent and intensifying negative impacts on countries in the region. What is lacking in the region
currently is a regional governance of migration as well as a collective, coordinated response to challenges
associated with both sudden and ongoing episodes of displacement, regardless of cause. Forced migration,in whatever form, including refugees and stateless persons, if not properly and consistently addressed,
contributes directly to, and can be exacerbated by, smuggling, trafficking, and transnational crimes.
Forced migration, as already stated, is not new in ASEAN states. It has, however, been kept ‘below-theradar’, with little public disclosure and even less discussion. 30The reasons for this include;•••

It is not in the interests of states that are not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol to assume
internationally binding legal responsibilities for” irregular” people movements;
Any policies adopted by recipient states that are seen as welcoming of irregular migrants will encourage such flows,
strengthen people smuggling and trafficking networks and further burden national systems;
Governments recognise that irregular migrants are highly vulnerable to exploitation and can benefit their economies but
wish to retain discretion as to if and when to remove them;

28

Ibid.
UNHCR Country Profile , Thailand, 2015, Power Point presentation by Steven C.M.Wong, NEAT Working Group on Migration
Forced Migration: The ‘Not-So Silent’ Crisis, Bangkok, 10 June 2016.
29

30

Ibid.

8

•
•

In certain cases, institutional linkages form between government officials and vested groups, such as private companies
or even human smugglers/traffickers;
Irregular migration can be a political and social liability to governments of the day. 31

Wong, however, argued that “keeping forced migration quiet is becoming/has become untenable, especiallywith highly publicised incidents of people trafficking and international scrutiny”. 32
The Andaman Sea crisis in May 2015 served as a wakeup call for ASEAN or at least some AMS directly
affected by the crisis to deal with the situation. How the issues of forced migration have been dealt with by
the region so far.
Responses (or lack of responses) to forced migration.
It can be seen from the study above that despite some common characteristics, the responses to the issues
have not been the same except the adoption of common notion of “irregular movement”, irregular migration”
or”illegal migrants” subject to arrest and deportation. The responses (or lack thereof) to the forced
migration in ASEAN and East Asia, as well as efforts made by the respective regional entities concerned,
and the international community through the Bali Process are as follows;
ASEAN + 3
The world still recalls the influx of refugees called the ‘boat people’ from Indochina in the 1970s and early
1980s. The situation pushed the international community and ASEAN to find approaches to solve theproblem. This initiative, known as the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), was an agreement brokered by
ASEAN with the UNHCR and resettlement states in the West, in response to ASEAN member states’
concerns. At that time, member states were providing refuge as countries of ‘first asylum’. 33 At theconclusion of the CPA, the Indochinese camps in Southeast Asia were all closed. The CPA brought an end
to the exodus of Laotian and Vietnamese asylum-seekers, and provided the means for the continued
resettlement of refugees and special immigrants, as well as the safe return of those found not to meetinternational refugee protection criteria. 34 The CPA was considered a ‘successful’ one, and there have beencalls by the international community for a second CPA when ASEAN/South East Asia was facing the flowsof another ‘boat people’ from Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka, many en route to Malaysia and now
Indonesia. The CPA was launched despite the fact that, by that time, no country in South East Asia was aparty to the 1951 Refugee Convention.

31

Ibid.
Ibid.
33
Petcharamesree, Sriprapha. (2015). ASEAN and its approach to forced migration issues, The International Journal of Human
Rights, 20(2), pp. 173-190.
34
Robinson, 1998 cited by Petcharamesree, Ibid.
32

9

Table 1. Treaty parties at 1 April 2016 (No reservations nor Declarations are noted) 35
1951 Refugee Convention and/or Protocol

CAT

ICCPR

China

Yes

Yes

No

Hong Kong SAR (China)

No

Yes

Yes

Japan

Yes

Yes

Yes

North Korea

No

No

South Korea

Yes

Yes

BruneiNo

Burma (Myanmar)

No

No

No

Cambodia

Yes

Yes

Yes

Indonesia

No

Yes

Yes

Laos

No

Yes

Yes

Malaysia

No

No

No

Mongolia

No

Yes

Yes

Philippines

Yes

Yes

Yes

Singapore

No

No

No

Thailand

No

Yes

Yes

Viet Nam

No

Yes

Yes

Timor Leste

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes (but purported withdrawal)

No (but signed on 22 September 2015)

Yes
No

As shown in the Table, all Plus 3 (China, Japan, South Korea) are party to the 1951 Refugee Convention
whilst only three countries in South East Asia are parties to the said convention, two of which are membersof ASEAN (Cambodia and the Philippines). According to UNHCR, “most countries in South-East Asia do
not have any legislation regulating the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees, and UNHCR conducts refugee
status determination in the absence of a national asylum system”. 36 UNHCR further noted, “three countries
in South-East Asia have national asylum systems at varying levels of development. One country has limited
35
36

Compiled by Savitri Taylor, The Diplomat, 31 July 2015
Petcharamesree, Ibid.

10

processing for certain groups under an ‘admissions board’ process. A number of States without national
asylum systems generally consider refugees and asylum-seekers to be illegal migrants, who as such aresusceptible to detention, expulsion, refoulement and other serious protection risks”. 37
But, the sub-regional context has changed, and this determines the way ASEAN deals with the issues ofrefugee and refugee-like situations. The absence of a large-scale exodus, such as the one during the
Indochina period, gives the false impression amongst ASEAN members that forced migration is not asignificant problem. As such, ASEAN members do not yet see it as a problem that is at a point where
ASEAN needs to act as a group. 38 Issues of forced migration, has never been discussed at the ASEAN highlevel discussions. Even on a humanitarian basis, ASEAN could not find a common approach to address theissues, such as the irregular maritime movements. The situation was not considered by ASEAN as a “crisis”.
ASEAN as a group has failed to respond collectively to the Rohingya problem. However, the three affected
members—Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand—have initiated regional discussions on the issue of ‘irregularmovement of people’ into Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand in an effort to find “a solution to the crisis…
and its serious impact on the national security of the affected countries.” Meanwhile, the Thai governmentorganised a special meeting in Bangkok on Irregular Migration in the Indian Ocean on 29 May 2015, which
aimed at generating a regional response to ‘the alarming rise in the irregular movement of persons in the
Indian Ocean.’ The meeting adopted a number of ad hoc measures and agreed to share responsibilities,
including engaging in further discussions and bilateral consultations in accordance with existing regional
mechanisms and frameworks. 39
As shown in the table, the Plus 3 countries are party to 1951 Refugee Convention. However, Japanese
government has been criticized for their harsh refugee policy. To be noted that Japan is a major donor to
UNHCR. The country has also accepted 11,000 Indochinese refugees after the late 1970s. In 2009, it hasannounced plans to become Asia’s first resettlement country when it began accepting Myanmar refugees
from camps in Thailand under a pilot scheme in 2010. 40 However, the most recent record of refugee
resettlement to Japan has not been positive. For example, in 2014, Japanese government granted refugee
status to just 11 people, out of 5,000 applicants. 41 In 2015, only 27 applicants for refugee status/resettlement

37

Ibid.
Ibid.
39
Press Releases: Special Meeting on Irregular Migration in the Indian Ocean. (n.d.) [pdf],
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/dase/dv/dase0610_4_pressrelease1_/dase0610_4_pressrelease1_
en.pdf , accessed 15 July 2016.
40
Yuki Moriya/Hye-Jeong Yoo, ed. Kitty McKinsey/Leo Dobbs , 18 May 2009 , and “Welcome to Japan: first Asian country
joins UNHCR’s resettlement programme”, http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2010/9/4ca1dbe66/welcome-japan-first-asiancountry-joins-unhcrs-resettlement-programme.html , accessed 15 July 2016.
41
Aljazeera, 24 January 2016, Japan rejected 99 percent of refugees in 2015 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/japanrejected-99-percent-refugees-2015-160124070011926.html, accessed 18 July 2016.
38

11

were granted out of 7,586 applications. 42 The policy towards refugees and asylum seekers of Japan isgetting more limited despite its international obligations as party to 1951 Refugee Convention andcommitment made in 2009 during the visit of the UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner for Protection,
Erika Feller 43 during which she noted, however, “that it can still be difficult for asylum seekers to enjoy
basic rights and live decently in Japanese communities while waiting to be recognized as refugees. Feller
stressed that detention practices needed to be reviewed”. 44 To be noted further that Japan is one of very few
countries in ASEAN + 3 to have a refugee system in place with the Refugee Recognition Act.
As for South Korea, in her visit made in 2009, Erika Feller also called for “more support from bothgovernment authorities and the Korean public to become a leading asylum country in the region”. 45 “South
Korea is a very important country in this region. It can offer very good examples to the rest of the region interms of integrating protection cases. A lot of experience has been accumulated by helping North Koreans
who came into South Korea,” she said. “We hope that some of this experience will also be used to develop
integration programs for third country nationals. South Korea which is also party to the 1951 Refugee
Convention has asylum legislation called the Korean Refugee Act was adopted in 2012 and enter into effectin 2013, making the Republic of Korea the first Asian country to have an independent law for refugeeprotection. 46
Just to recall, the Republic of Korea became a signatory of the Refugee Convention in 1992, shortly
thereafter inserting just a few articles into its domestic immigration laws to adhere to the required
procedures of refugee recognition under the Convention. By 2008, applications for refugee status had notexceeded 2,000, and the number of recognized refugees remained around 100. While it was undeniable that
Korea had made steady progress in refugee protection, the pace was deemed unsatisfactory and public
criticism was common. 47 South Korea started the pilot resettlement program for Refugees from Myanmar
stranded in the camps in Thailand early 2016.
At least, as we could see, there is no lacking of refugee system in the Plus 3, but there is no system forasylum seekers and refugees put in place yet in ASEAN. However, some AMS such as Indonesia, Malaysia
and Thailand, have been assisting those forced to migrate on humanitarian basis.

42

Ayako Mie, Japan Times, 20 May 2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/20/national/japan-take-150-syriansexchange-students-criticism-harsh-refugee-policy/#.V5MwyqIXV3M, accessed 18 July 2016.
43
Yuki Moriya/Hye-Jeong Yoo, ed, Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
Judge Seongsoo Kim, One Year After the Korean Refugee Act, http://www.reflaw.org/one-year-after-the-korean-refugeeact/#sthash.tjGn4DiN.dpuf, accessed 18 July 2016.
47

Ibid.

12

There is also other mechanism in ASEAN which could be considered as possible mechanism to respond toforced migration. In the paper presented by U Than Tun, Country Coordinator of NEAT Myanmar it wasnoted that “the 1997 ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime has since conducted biennially the ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) in the region. The Declaration, inter alia, discuss
responses to the 8-category of transnational crime including trafficking in person and illegal migration. Since
then APT Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime(AMMTC + 3) has been convened to discuss challenges
to the same eight areas inclusive of the illegal migration of the APT framework. The ASEAN Regional
Forum(ARF) is also addressing the migration issue as an official event of its framework” 48

He further noted that in the ASEAN+ Plus Three Cooperation Work Plan 2007-2017, “the issue of illegal
migration and human trafficking in the region have been raised for careful consideration . The transportation ofillegal immigrants and human trafficking which are conducted on extended fishing boats and forged registry arerampant in the region. The NEAT Working Group on Maritime Cooperation Meeting held in August 2015
mentioned about opportunity for all the countries in the region to work together on this illegal migration issue. It
also needs to create policy and legal infrastructure as well as legal enforcement mechanisms with more holistic
approach to mitigate illegal migration in the region”. 49 It could be observed, however, that in the discussions

forced migration was discussed in this framework as part of transnational crime and those who cross theborders regardless of causes are perceived as “ illegal migrants” and/or victims of trafficking.
Another forum that all 10 AMS and Plus 3 dealing with issues of migration (irregular) are part of is the Bali
Process. Established in 2002, the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related
Transnational Crime (otherwise called “Bali Process”) is a voluntary and non-binding regional consultative
process co-chaired by the Governments of Australia and Indonesia, comprising over 45 member countries
and organizations, with some observer countries and organizations (Regional Support Office to the Bali
Process, 2014). Many states in Asia-Pacific are part of the process. The process, which is not an institutional
response, was born after a series of high profile cases of people smuggling (which involved asylum-seekers)
in the waters between Australia and Indonesia happened from 2000 to 2001, and the countries met in 2002
to discuss the problem, resulting in a ministerial conference that brought together almost 40 countries, andnow continues with more ministerial conferences and issue-oriented workshops. 50 One of its aims is topromote adherence to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Organised Crime
Convention) and two of its supplementary protocols, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by
Land, Sea and Air, and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially48

Than Tun, Migration (People Mobility): The Situation in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea, paper presented at the NEAT
Working Group on Migration, 10 June 2016, Bangkok.
49
50

Ibid.
Emmers, Greener-Barcham, & Thomas, 2006

13

Women and Children. It does not directly promote principles under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its
Protocol.
The process began in 2002, but was reactivated only in 2009 when Australia experienced increases in thenumber of asylum-seekers, given the conflict in the Middle East and other places in Southeast Asia, andunfortunately, the discourse was increasingly ‘securitised’ and focused on transnational crime, restrictive
for asylum-seekers . 51 The framing of the Process is related to trafficking and human smuggling, and not torefugee protection or asylum. This is despite the fact that asylum and refugee movements are at the nexus oftrafficking and human smuggling concerns in the Asia-Pacific region. Alas, the region remained home tothe oldest and biggest refugee populations. A possible repercussion of this approach is also the continued
fragmentation of the issues between dichotomies of people smuggling-trafficking and asylum.
It is to be noted that UNHCR has tried to (re)introduce an agenda for refugee protection since 2009 in theBali Process; however, the influence of Australia is heavy, emphasising the collective responsibilities ofother countries in the region, who are not parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention, to prevent onward flows
of asylum seekers to Australia and appealing to their mutual interest in preventing irregular migration.52
So, on forced migration, Bali Process could be useful if it has been properly used and no politicization of
the forced migration issues and not conflating them with smuggling and trafficking.
We can see that responses to issues of migration, voluntary or forced have been ad hoc and inadequate.
Although 2 of the Plus 3 have the asylum system in place but policies and political will are still lacking. The
AMS prefer to address the issues on bilateral basis. Any discussions which could be helpful for both statesand peoples are yet to be concretised.
Recommendations
A. For labour migration and traffickingi.
To adopt comprehensive and appropriate legal frameworks which combine preventive, protective,
and prosecutorial measures in tackling the issues of irregular migration.
ii.
To actively and seriously engage in a discussion on migration at regional forums, such as ASEAN,
using the Bali Process.
iii.
To develop a comprehensive regional data center of migrant workers who have worked in APT
countries.
iv.
To enhance regional collaboration among APT countries regarding migrants. This can be done
through the APT Migration Network where the participation of government officials, academics andmigrants themselves becomes crucial to help tackle migrant-related problems.

51
52

Kneebone, 2014.
Ibid.

14

v.
To encourage all AMS to ratify the ASEAN Anti-Trafficking Convention and make each state’s
national laws in line with regional and international standards.
vi.
To establish workable APT migrant welfare measures in order to guarantee the social and humansecurity of migrant workers.
vii.
MOU regarding labor protection among ASEAN countries. Accelerating the process of drafting an
ASEAN legally binding Instrument.
B. Forced Migration
i. Implement status determination if not by countries concerned, UNHCR should be enabled to do so in atimely manner;
ii. Closer cooperation between source countries and the countries of transit/destination to enable legal andvoluntary take-backs of those that do not qualify for refugee status. Apart from bilateral government-togovernment protocols, this should be accompanied by social development projects in source countries,
possibly with ASEAN Plus Three assistance.
iii. Signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol must be encouraged to measure up to
their international obligations in terms of resettlement and mutual assistance. For this purpose, ASEAN andother Asian countries should collectively draft a resolution in the United Nations and engage in diplomatic
overtures with recipient countries.
iv. Countries which are facing labour shortage such as Brunei, Malaysia and Thailand can offer work rights
to those that have acquired refugee status. Important to note that the offer of work rights, however, are nottantamount to naturalisation and more permanent solutions must be sought.
v. Putting in place a system of registration which would be clearly advantageous from a national security
point of view. A regional data centre should be considered and exchange of information should be
strengthened.
C. Mechanisms
i. Make full use of existing structures, such as forums like ASEAN and the Bali Process. Utilising existing
frameworks will ensure that, generally, countries will be in a (much) better situation to broker morepredictable and effective responses, and take preventative action.
ii. Setting up an overall mechanism to facilitate and improve maritime search and rescue in the region. The
focus of addressing forced migration should, first and foremost, be on the humanitarian protection of
refugees.

15

iii. A regional monitoring and protection mechanism on migration. This multilateral mechanism also has torespond to regional crisis and seek for regional solutions.
iv. Addressing issue of citizenship which is becoming a trans-border issue. Lack of citizenship is finally atime bomb for all societies and could be a threat to national security. Birth registration is one of the mostimportant measures to prevent statelessness.
v. A Forum for Policy Dialogue between Track II and the ASEAN leaders in order to come up withconcrete recommendations.
vi. Sharing good practices of law enforcement and legal support between APT.

16