研究ノート

Rwanda’s Place on the Digital Silk Road:
Discussing Rwanda Vision 2020 fromthe Perspective of Chinese Development
Assistance
Eco Hamersma

INTRODUCTION
The Republic of Rwanda has just completed its 20-year development plan,Rwa nda Vision 2 02 0. I n this a rticle, we will be looking at some of thecontributions of the People’s Republic of China ( PRC), through Official
Development Assistance (ODA) and alternative forms of assistance, in working
towards some of the development pla n targets. Chinese developmental
assistance to Rwanda has been described as atypical and represents a gap inthe existing knowledge of Chinese developmental aid to Africa (Lisimba &Parashar 2020, pp.13–14). The rationale is that Chinese assistance predominalty
targets those larger resource-rich coastal African countries for easy exportationof raw materials. Meanwhile, Rwanda is a small landlocked and resource-poor
country with a history of aid dependence (Ibid., p.2).
As we shall see in the Vision 2020 strategy, Rwanda’s chosen developmental
t rajector y is heavily focused on boost ing capacity in I n format ion a nd
Communications Technology (ICT; MINECOFIN 2012). As such, we will
primarily focus on Chinese developmental assistance from the perspective ofdigitalization. This assistance fits perfectly within the PRC’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) framework, of which the digital side is one of the under-studied
aspects of Chinese developmental assistance. Therefore, by taking Rwanda as acase, we hope to learn more about the process of Chinese digital development
assistance. While Lisimba and Parashar (2020, p.2) intentionally disregarded
Chinese aid in the development of the service sector, this article hopes to show
how exactly this overlooked perspective can bridge the aforementioned271

研究ノートk nowledge gap a nd pa r t ia l ly expla i n Ch i nese i nterest s i n Rwa nda . A
particularly noteworthy example of this is the projects undertaken by Chinese
multinational technology company Alibaba, outlined in this article.

I. Rwandan Development, from Human Resources to Digital
Infrastructure
When surmising Vision 2020, we find it forgoes traditional industrialization andsets the ambitious goal of transitioning directly from a low-income agriculturebased economy to a middle-income service-oriented economy and knowledgebased society by the year 2020. This goal is to be achieved by utilizing aframework consisting of six pillars: good governance, specifically focusing on
the rule of law and accountability, plus transparency in how it uses scarce
resources; human resource development, particularly on the development of ICT
skills necessary in a knowledge-based society; a private sector-led economy thatwill stimulate private investment; infrastructure development to enable ICTdevelopment; market-oriented agriculture away from subsistence farming; andfinally regional and international economic integration (MINECOFIN 2012).
Twenty years later, things seem to be going well for the small landlocked
nation. Perhaps the most significant indicator of this is in the pillar of good
governance. In the Corruption Perception Index published three years ago,
Rwanda ranked 48th, better than such Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) members as South Korea and Italy, with only thepeople of Botswana perceiving their government as less corrupt among all other
African nations (Transparency International 2018). Furthermore, Rwanda has
been attempting to reduce inequality, having successfully increased indicatorssuch as life expectancy, literacy, primary school enrolment, and spending on
healthcare (Hutt 2016). The most considerable improvement has been genderequality, evidenced by the highest percentage of female members of parliamentin the world (Mwambari 2017; Bruce-Lockhart 2015).
Rwanda is already working on facilitating the creation of a private sector led
economy, with the ultimate goal to drive the primary engine of the economy
through the process of self-investment by the local population, creating a272

Rwanda’s Place on the Digital Silk Road: Discussing Rwanda Vision 2020 from the Perspective of Chinese Development Assistancerecursive process of economic self-improvement. This economic improvement
has also meant that instead of exporting raw materials, as Rwanda had done in
the past, there is now a greater focus on value-adding. Concerning the move tomarket-oriented agriculture, two ongoing programs that aim to increase
production are transforming the rural landscape (World Bank 2017). Throughthe wise investment of minimally available tax resources, Rwanda hastransformed from a subsistence agriculture society, with minimal export toEurope, to one that is more broadly market-oriented, shipping its products as
far as the Middle East and China (CCTV 2016).
Shifting to digital development, Vision 2020 and crossover development planssuch as the National Strategy of Transformation 1 (NST1) have increased
productivity as their main driving force in the push for greater digitalization.
The development of e-commerce to increase the global reach of Rwandan small
to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the development of digital payment
systems are expected to level the socio-economic playing field by increasing
access to markets and services as well as boost government capacities. The
Rwanda National Payment System Strategy (RNPS), the first step in the selfexplanatory scheme ‘Towards a Ca shless Rwanda 2018-2024’, outlined
government initiatives to promote the development of a cashless society byincreasing the availability of digital infrastructure, including payment points,
and increasing access to digital payment methods, as well as offering tax
incentives. In the plan, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the
National Bank of Rwanda was set to transition to an entirely cashless policy for
all government transactions by 2018. Beyond infrastructure, the plan focuses on
increasing digital literacy among the population and ensuring that competingsystems remain interoperable (NBR 2018).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, these developments have gone into overdrive,
seeing an increase of 485% in the weekly value of digital payments in the first
four months of 2020 (See Figure 1). Starting in June 2020, more than twenty
thousand of Kigali’s taxi drivers have stopped accepting cash (DW 2020; Bester& Carboni 2020). Also, tackling the pandemic itself has been facilitated by theincreased capacities that digital platforms have made available to the Rwandan
government (RURA 2020; IMF 2020).
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研究ノートFigure 1, Increases in the value of payments passing through the MomoPay digital
payment application in the period from 5 January 2019 to 19 April 2020. On 19
March 2020, the Rwandan government waved all-digital payment fees, initiating a397% increase in weekly transaction volume. 1 USD was equal to approximately 956
RWF on the 19th March of 2020.

Source: Centre for Financial Regulation 2020.

A recent World Bank report by Niyibizi et al. (2020) concluded that Rwanda has
the potential to build on previous achievements to work towards a prosperous
future. Though emphasizing the low starting position, particularly whencomparing several metrics with South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, and Ghana, thepotential is present . However, this is dependent on maintaining strong
leadership, institutions, and a reputation as a stable and agreeable partner ininternational exchange. To understand how Rwandan political development is
intricately tied to the socio-political development of the nation, we need to lookat some of the unique governing characteristics.

II. Socio-Political Factors Affecting Rwandan Development
While it would be easy to take most of the developmental progress as positive
developments, it should nevertheless be noted that there are also detractors to
the Rwandan developmental model, especially among those critics of the idea ofapplying Rwanda as a model for the rest of Africa. Rwanda’s development274

Rwanda’s Place on the Digital Silk Road: Discussing Rwanda Vision 2020 from the Perspective of Chinese Development Assistanceprocess has come at the cost of certain fundamental human rights, for example,
freedom of expression and freedom of association (Sundaram 2017). Such
repression is seen as necessary by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), thepopulist ruling party which has led the country since the end of the civil war in
1994, as they believe that only the RPF can bring prosperity to the nation. Suchidealism, however, might be self-serving as economic power is accumulated in
the hands of party members (AFP 2017). This monopolization of resources
makes it exceedingly difficult for opposition parties to campaign effectively.
None of which, however, no matter how distasteful from the perspective ofingrained democratic values, is a direct, clear counter to the exportability of the
Rwandan model. After all, we are dealing with a country that might beconsidered emulating the Chinese model, a highly successful authoritarian statecapitalist system that is equal to none in bringing the most significant numberof people out of poverty in the 21st century (UN 2015, p.15). For the much moredamning counter to universality in the application, one first needs to understandthe Rwandan political economy as put forth by Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012).
They a rg ue t h at t he Rwa nd a n gover n ment is s how i ng t endencie s ofdevelopment a l pat r i mon ia l ism . Th is concept a lso refer red to a s
neopatrimonialism, is defined as the situation in which the ruling elite of acountry acquire and centralize the management of resources to improve boththeir income a nd secure the cooperation a nd loyalty necessary for the
maintenance of their power.
Neopatrimonialism is the advancement of patrimonialism as defined by Max
Weber ( Beekers & G ool 2 012 , pp.11–12). Weber out lined tendencies inmonarchical or tribal systems to dominate either via the maintenance oftraditional bureaucratic systems, such as in the Roman or Chinese Empires, or
via feudalistic allegiances, which often include family ties, as per feudalism
during medieval Europe (Ibid.; Guliyev 2011, p.577). Similarly, pre-colonial
Rwanda, where a similar serf-lord relationship developed from 1860 onward, canbe considered feudalistic in this sense ( Pottier 2 0 02 , p.13). The criticalunderstanding of power at that time was that it was seen as the personalpu r v iew of t he p er s on c h a rge d w it h it s exerc is e , t he re su lt of we a kinstitutionalization in pre-modern states (Guliyev 2011, pp.577–578). With appeals
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研究ノートto tradition being one of the core sources of legitimacy for the maintenance of
these structures. Neopatrimonialism is the evolution of this concept within
structures provided by the modern state.
In the context of postcolonial states such as Rwanda, the state, with its
ostensibly permanent multilayered bureaucratic departments and institutes,
becomes the representation of the ideal employment opportunity within
economically disadvantaged regions. For a job-hungry populace, the stability,
prestige, and potential for advancement provide hope in an otherwise difficult
economic environment lacking opportunities for entrepreneurship (Beekers &Gool 2012, p.12). In this modern development, neopatrimonialism necessitates
the precarious balance between the elite’s self-enrichment with the necessary
wealth distribution required to maintain their position within the bureaucratic
appa rat us ( I bid . , p.13 ; B o ot h & G olo oba - Mutebi , p. 3 8 6 ) . However, t hetraditionalist legitimacy has been abandoned, with instead administrators of
postcolonial societies having to purchase their legitimacy from their necessary
allies, creating branching networks of layered hierarchical interdependence.
As Guliyev (2011, p.584) outlines, it is erroneous to equate patrimonialism withinefficiency or dysfunctionality from a conceptual standpoint. Other nations thathave been described as showing indicators of neopatrimonialism have beenhighly successful in development. When China started its economic liberalization
process, it also relaxed administrative control by the central government andthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over local administrations to increase
economic efficiency. Careers in officialdom, however, still required CCP
appointment, with privileges being bestowed based on obedience. Meanwhile, its
socialist past exacerbated neopatrimonialistic tendencies due to the corruption
potential of the centralized distribution of goods and services (Wu 2015, pp.285–
286). Overall, the scale of China’s economic growth maintains the CCP’s
legitimacy, while the one-party system allows for leeway compared to the direct
challenge from rival political groups.
Under neopatrimonialism in ostensibly democratic nations, a strong leader needs
to establish internal and external authority to avert the threat of electoral
defeat. Electoral defeat for the ruling party would damage the developmental
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Rwanda’s Place on the Digital Silk Road: Discussing Rwanda Vision 2020 from the Perspective of Chinese Development Assistanceprocess. It would trigger a shift from long-term investments to short-term gains
to appease the electorate, and deliver on campaign promises. Meanwhile, astrong authority is needed to avoid internal corruption, otherwise kept in checkby democratic processes. Commentators have noted that in Rwanda, this isachieved through peer shaming (Allison 2017). When such conditions aremaintained, patrimonialism can be beneficial.
These undemocratic tendencies necessarily require the suppression of dissenting
voices, which means that states undergoing this mode of development forgo
simultaneous development in the sphere of human rights. For many other
African states, this is simply not feasible. The Rwandan political system is theresult of the nation’s historical processes. In other countries, strong opposition
parties, weak internal corruption suppression mechanisms, and variations onregionalism and ethnocentrism make applying the Rwandan model difficult andpotentially even dangerous to attempt.

III: Rwanda’s Place on the Digital Silk Road
There are many examples of China’s infrastructure development in Rwanda
with varying degrees of success (Lisimba & Parashar 2020; Mugabe 2019;
Musoni 2012). Topping out the list of Rwanda’s largest prestige projects
undertaken by the PRC has to be undoubtedly the new administrative complex
in the capital Kigali. This complex, housing several government offices, including
the office of the prime minister, was a gift from the PRC government to the
Rwandan government. It was officially opened by Zheng Jianbang, one of the 15
incumbent vice-chairmen of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference (Tasamba 2019). This project and a wide
variety of other projects all fall within the framework of the BRI.
The BRI is the CCP’s major project for the integration of Asia, Europe, andAfrica along the old Silk Road via trade and infrastructure networks (CCP 2017,p.8). The CCP has been criticized as growth-dependent, meaning that its sourceof legitimacy stems from increasing the Chinese people’s general well-being. To
sustain this growth, China needs to expand its products to new markets andacquire the necessary resources that facilitate production. This has led Lisimba
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研究ノートand Parashar (2020, p.8) to argue that Rwanda makes an odd partner in the
BRI scheme considering its small population, small relative size, and lack ofnatural resources. Indeed, approximately 12,6 million Rwandese do not evencover half of Beijing’s population. That is not to say Chinese investments nevertouch small, impoverished states, as with the example of Djibouti, an evensmaller, poorer, and less populated African state. However, Djibouti’s geography
makes it one of the world’s most strategically vital chokepoints in maritime
trade (Jeong-ho, 2019; CRS 2019). Conversely, Rwanda is a landlocked nation not
located near any such significant geographic features.
Nevertheless, Chinese aid to Rwanda has been rising steadily (Lisimba &Parashar, 2020; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2012, p.399). Moreover, while most of
the major infrastructure projects of the BRI have thus far garnered significant
discourse and scholarly interest, until now, little has been said about Chinesedigital development assistance to Rwanda. Nevertheless, the concept of digital
ODA, when technologically advanced states offer assistance with the digital
integration of developing economies and the tackling of digital issues, isbeginning to take hold in the minds of policymakers. One reason for thisincreased interest is the geostrategic challenge posed by the Chinese BRI’s
digital components (Okano-Heijmans & Vosse 2020).
Kuo (2016) presents us with a possible rationale for what had been seen as
aberrant Chinese interests in Rwanda, arguing that the creation of a Chinese
hub in Rwanda is in line with the Vision 2020 strategy; with the development ofspecial economic zones being an indication of this developing logistics network.
While there is definite merit in this assertion, more interesting is what Kuo
mentions in passing; the adoption of Chinese digital payment systems such as,
for instance, AliPay by Alibaba and WeChat Pay by Tencent. California State
University’s James Rea (2 02 0) outlines the challenge the CCP poses toentrenched systems of global finance: creating regional hubs for financial
services to further Chinese investments and deepen the integration of thesealternative digital payment systems, erecting what Rea calls a ‘pivot point for
global economic integration’ outside the control of what China views as Western
financial institutions. In this sense, Chinese Digital ODA can be seen as an
attempt at the disruption of the Bretton Woods System dominated by the West.
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Rwanda’s Place on the Digital Silk Road: Discussing Rwanda Vision 2020 from the Perspective of Chinese Development Assistance

As explained by Bräutigam (2011), it is challenging to qualify Chinese aid as
ODA . While ODA is a part of Chinese assista nce, we should primarily
distinguish direct financing and non-concessional state loans from aid used tofoster further Chinese investment. The latter focuses on creating circumstancesthat benefit the grafting of Chinese business within the developing nation. In
the next section, we will cover the Electronic World Trade Platform, one aspectof a broader tapestry of elements in the alternative commercial and financial
system being developed by China.

IV. Alibaba and the Electronic World Trade Platform
Initially founded in 1999 as an online marketplace for Chinese SMEs, Alibaba
has grown to encompass a wide variety of services from e-commerce toemerging sectors such as cloud computing and financial technology (Chen 2017).
The most prominent entry in the latter category being the aforementioned
payment platform Alipay. Today, the digital monolith Alibaba is a massive statebacked corporation with the resources to offer developing countries like Rwanda
the necessary infrastructure to manage their SMEs’ global market access. The
company’s founder, Jack Ma, has indicated that Alibaba’s overseas projects havebeen direct support to the BRI (Linliang 2019, p.95).
During the celebrations marking the 70 th anniversary of the founding of the
PRC, Rwandan Minister of State Nduhungirehe commented that the BRI offers
several benefits to the East African nation, including boosting economic
development , increasing reg iona l integ ration , a nd increased access to
infrastructure (Xinhua 2019). According to Chinese state media, Rwanda’s
particular developmental strategy with its heavy emphasis on ICT development
has seen progress in integration with the BRI’s digital sphere (Wei 2019). In2018 Rwanda and Alibaba signed agreements tying its SMEs into the Alibaba
digital infrastructure, becoming the first nation to join the Electronic World
Trade Platform (EWTP). In the words of the Alibaba promotional campaign,
this platform is designed to change the rules of international trade. By providing
global commerce infrastructure to developing nations, the EWTP should allow
SMEs to compete with established businesses in the developed world. This
process is a cornerstone of the BRI’s digital endeavors to internationalize
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研究ノートChinese homegrown tech giants (Seoane 2020).
At its core, the EWTP framework is slated to take care of the public-privateinteractions to facilitate cross-border e-commerce. An example of EWTP
interfacing with governmental systems occurs in Belgium, the only European
member of the EWTP. Belgium has developed a digital customs clearance
system known as BeGate, which has since been connected with the EWTP’s
public service platform, allowing merchants to speed up customs clearance
times by effectively managing their declarations (eWTP n.d. B; Federal PublicService n.d.). This is a trust-based system, allowing those certified merchants to
declare large volumes, which can then enter the country immediately. Only
those selected by customs control for inspection would be delayed entry into
Belgium (ISSUU 2020). As such, Alibaba’s logistics arm Cainiao, operating fromthe Belgian city of Liège, can connect directly to BeGate via the EWTP,
automating a significant portion of the administrative process almost entirely
from within the Alibaba ecosystem. For SMEs, this means lower costs andsignificantly increased efficiency of cross-border trade.
In 2019 the China-Rwanda Business Forum was held in Zhejiang, during which
the Rwa nda Development Boa rd, a cabinet-level governmenta l agency
responsible for the inter-departmental facilitation of investment in the Rwandan
economy, signed four memoranda of understandings. Three of which were
between entities of the Alibaba Group. Including the extension of the EWTP
framework utilizing the Alibaba digital infrastructure (MINICOM 2019). Solereliance on Alibaba as an infrastructure provider creates the potential for a
new type of digital dependence on China. While the EWTP narrative is one ofinclusive globalization, at the same time, it is positioning as a counter to Silicon
Valley’s digital hegemony. Today, the argument presented by the EWTP is thatthey represent a private sector-led initiative (B20 2016, p.5; eWTP n.d. A).
However, as Seoane (2020, p.77) rightly points out, this is counter to the stateled consultative development model of the CCP, and as such would undoubtedly
lead to conflicts of authority. Particularly considering Alibaba itself has not been
exempted from state control. Conversely, it is difficult to assess where ODA
ends, and commercial interests begin as a nominally private entity.

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Rwanda’s Place on the Digital Silk Road: Discussing Rwanda Vision 2020 from the Perspective of Chinese Development Assistance

Figure 2 , diagram of what Alibaba refers to as the‘API Economy.’APIs or
Application Programming Interfaces are one of the methods computer programs use
to interact with one another. This diagram outlines Alibaba’s monetization plan,
allowing companies to integrate their products into the Alibaba ecosystem andgiving them access to accumulated and aggregated data collected by individual
users of Alibaba products or services. Individual users are often unaware of thenature and/or quantity of their data being shared and to which third parties thisdata is being transferred.

Source: Alibaba Cloud 2020.

Alibaba’s push for ecosystem integration, the process in which various formerly
distinct platforms come to utilize Alibaba infrastructure, would aid it in therace for data accumulation. This so-called ‘Big Data’ is highly sought after bymajor technology firms worldwide due to the benefits analysis of this data canbring; for instance, via predicting user behavior, allowing for effective targeted
advertising. Vision 2020’s goal of promoting a private sector-led economy could
see a significant boost under the EWTP by increasing the reach of Rwandan
SMEs through e-commerce, providing the ability to reach a global audience.
However, if Rwanda does not manage its back-end infrastructure, as Belgium
does for instance with its homegrown BeGate customs clearance platform, andfurther outsources such vital infrastructure to Alibaba or other foreigninterests, it could negatively impact Rwandan national security by losing sightof the nature of the information exchange.
Furthermore, merely creating a level digital playing field is not enough tocompete with Chinese SMEs (Seoane 2020, p.78). A single glance at Western
e-commerce platforms such as eBay highlights this, with a near-total market
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研究ノートdominance for low-end goods such as cheap electronics or textiles originatingfrom China. Although it is still far too early to tell, simple productivity factors
could end up deciding the success of Rwandan SMEs within the EWTP system
while further lending credence to the argumentation that Chinese aid shows
non-aid characteristics. Additionally, we can see the massive geostrategic
benefit Chinese protectionist policies for the stimulation of a homegrowntechnology sector have had. The sheltered internal market has allowed them togrow to the level where they are now competing with the OECD DAC for
influence in Africa. Whether this is a case of strategic foresight or the result ofa series of side-effects to domestic policies remains open to future studies.

V. Conclusion
Previous research has shown that Rwanda’s historical and social contexts haveresulted in the growth of a unique developmental trajectory where economic
development has progressed at a steady pace while stagnating human rights.
Gu ided by Vision 2 0 2 0 , Rwa nda h a s t a ken severa l cues f rom Ch i n a’s
development, particularly when looking at the priority given to digital
infrastructure, tools, and capacities. Especially now, with the COVID-19
pandemic, it seems specific transitions, such as to a cashless society, havereceived a more generous impulse. Overall, digitalization itself can be a great
tool to further economic growth. As outlined, the success of the Rwandan
model of development is based on the maintenance of neopatrimonialism.
Therefore, the likelihood that Rwanda will see further digital development thatis akin to that of the PRC is a possibility. Much like the PRC, internal stability,
particularly of political structures, will be considered paramount within theruling elite’s developmental process. Regime change in a neopatrimonialist
structure would lead to reverberating changes down the hierarchical ladder. To
avoid this, it might make Rwanda susceptible to implementing further measurescurtailing human rights.
Unlike China, with its burgeoning technology sectors, which were allowed to
grow in relatively sheltered circumstances due to strong protectionist measures,
R w a nd a h a s t o de a l w it h t h e r e a l it i e s of it s c u r r e nt deve l o p me nt a lcircumstances. As a result, Rwanda does not have the technical capacities
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Rwanda’s Place on the Digital Silk Road: Discussing Rwanda Vision 2020 from the Perspective of Chinese Development Assistancenecessary to construct high-tech infrastructure on the scale required totransition the country from a predominantly agricultural society to a middleincome state with a focus on ICT. China offers a solution to realize a part of its
digital dreams set out in Vision 2020, for instance, via agreements such as theElectronic World Trade Platform (EWTP). This project makes it possible for
Rwanda to develop its e-commerce sector rapidly and, as a result, increase
economic output by increasing its SME’s market access.
Lacking advanced homegrown ICT development means Rwanda has less control
over various aspects of the technology. Ultimatly, the EWTP’s backbone
infrastructure systems remain under the control of Alibaba and, by extension,
the PRC. Despite this, if Rwanda develops its interface with the EWTP as
Belgium has done regarding its customs clearance system and remains in firm
control over those systems, the dangers can be minimized. Meanwhile, there
are still privacy concerns brought about by digitization; questions raised about
to what degree Rwanda wants to follow the lead of other regions with highinternet penetration in allowing its citizens’ data to become a commodity.
We might be witnessing the development of a new form of digital dependency.
As more of these technologies become required to maintain daily affairs andthe more integrated these technologies become with the economy, the morepotential for various security concerns arise, and the more disruptive a potentialchange would be, particularly when this control can be leveraged for politicalclout. Therefore, we should never underestimate the potential for digitaldependence on service providers.

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Rwanda’s Place on the Digital Silk Road: Discussing Rwanda Vision 2020 from the Perspective of Chinese Development Assistance

Abstract

Rwanda’s Place on the Digital Silk Road:
Discussing Rwanda Vision 2020 fromthe Perspective of Chinese Development
Assistance
Eco Hamersma

Rwanda Vision 2020 was the 20-year development plan that aimed to guide thenation’s development from a low-income agricultural society to a middle-income
service-oriented society with a heavy emphasis on ICT. Overall, Rwanda has
been making steady progress in national development, increasing various
metrics from their relatively low starting position. Some of this progress has
been made with international development assistance, including that of China.
However, compared to other Chinese projects in Africa, the Rwandan caseseems to be an outlier in the Chinese modus operandi. This article postulates
that the Rwanda- China cooperation is different from other Africa- China
initiatives. This difference is especially observable through an interrogation of
the flow of Chinese service sector investments. This perspective is often ignoredin literature, particularly alternative financial systems that use digital paymentsor that intergrate e-commerce networks
Rwanda has been described as a neopatrimonial state. This means that theruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has centralized the management of
resources for rent seeking, to secure cooperation, and maintain power. One of
the negative caveats of this type of political structure is that its continuation
tends to lead to human rights suppression. This is concerning because, firstly,
the prioritization of economic development and specifically in the ICT sector,
might lead to the adoption of not just the tools necessary for e-commerce, butalso the digital repression tools for which China has become famous. Secondly,
because the ruling party’s legitimacy stems mainly from the continuation of
economic growth, it might lead to selling out long-term security for short-term
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研究ノートgains. As such, this paper shows that there is a risk of new forms of digitaldependence and that Rwanda’s specific socio-economic circumstances havecreated the potential for digitalization to be used for authoritarian purposes.
As a result of its historical legacy, Rwanda currently lacks the homegrowncapacity for rapid digitalization. At the same time, China is developing the Beltand Road Initiative (BRI), seeking to integrate markets further and spread soft
power influence. Now the digital aspects of the BRI integration process canfacilitate part of Rwanda’s digital dream. This article contains an outline ofseveral of these developments, which were selected because of their timely
nature; the rapid adoption of cashless payment systems resulting from the
COVID-19 Pandemic and Rwanda’s entry into the Chinese megacorporation
Alibaba’s Electronic World Trade Platform (EWTP). At its core, the EWTP
framework is slated to take care of the public-private interactions to facilitatecross-border e-commerce. The issues discussed here, which are now coming to
the foreground in Rwanda, are set to expand rapidly across the developingworld in the near future. As such, more interest should be placed on digitaldevelopment assistance within the frame of developmental studies.
Keywords: Alibaba, China, Digital ODA, Electronic World Trade Platform,
Neopatrimonialism, Rwanda, Vision 2020.

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