Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

Chapter 1
Overview: National Movements
and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences
Izumi Ohno1

This chapter provides an overview of the experiences of national movements for quality andproductivity (kaizen) in selected countries in Asia and Africa. The chapter consists of two parts. The
first part (sections 1-1.–1-3.) discusses why national movements are needed in countries which lackprivate sector dynamism. Drawing on the experiences of four countries, it discusses the factors thathave contributed to successful national movements and the lessons learned from cross-cutting
perspectives. The second part (section 1-4.) briefly reviews national movements for kaizen in four
countries—Japan, Singapore, Burkina Faso, and Botswana—from comparative perspectives, withspecial attention to the factors that have contributed to their successes and failures. In doing so, it also
intends to provide a summary of the remaining chapters, which contain case studies of national
movements for quality and productivity improvement in the four countries.
1-1. Why is a national movement necessary?
A national movement is a policy involving the entire population for a decade or more, to transform the
popular mindset toward hard work, teamwork, and creativity. Particularly, the movement for quality
and productivity improvement is a national effort of many public and private stakeholders to attaineconomic and social progress, involving active participation of business, industry, workers,
government, academia, community groups, and other interested parties (Prokopenko, 1999). Why issuch a policy effort necessary, and what are key ingredients for success?
Many developing countries suffer from weak private sector response. Firms are too passive. Workers
do not learn skills; job hopping is rampant. Short-term speculation is preferred over long-term
investment in manufacturing technology. Under such circumstances, good policy alone may not induce
dynamic growth. What is required is a spiritual revolution in a country where a relaxed attitude toward
production and services rules. Then, policy must go much deeper than just providing infrastructure or
unleashing the power of markets. The country must be engaged in a national campaign to transformpeople’s values, mindsets and aspirations.
If mindset change does not come spontaneously from the private sector, the state may have to force itfrom the top until it becomes part of the national culture. In this sense, a national movement requires a
1

Professor, GRIPS Development Forum, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS).

1Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

conscious policy effort; it is not just a collection of individual projects. Policy will bear no fruit if its
spirit and goals are shared only within a narrow circle of political leaders, government officials, andexperts and academics. To be successful, a comprehensive and self-sustaining system of principles,
implementing mechanisms, and necessary resources backed by the state’s will and popular passion are
required.
Such a forced national movement may work brilliantly, but may also fail. While permanent state
guidance detached from market forces or popular sentiment is inconsistent with the development of amarket economy, temporary use of such an approach is not only permissible but may even be highly
effective in the early stage of economic take-off. Such top-down persuasion has produced significant
lasting performance in some countries as well as failure in others—as seen in socialist production
drives with collective farms and state-owned factories. A national movement is a double-edged sword.
If it is to be adopted, it must be designed with knowledge and care. Systematic policy learning frominternational experience is essential to avoid mistakes.
In the 1950s, Japan launched a kaizen movement for quality and productivity improvement featuring
Quality Control Circles (QCCs). 2 In the 1970s, Korea launched the Saemaul Movement whichtransformed Korean villages significantly. In the 1980s, Singapore engaged in the Productivity
Movement in which even taxi drivers talked about productivity. After these movements, thesecountries became more productive and competitive. Several African countries also introduced QCCs
and productivity movements with foreign assistance, with a mixed degree of success. Therefore, it isimportant to review the country experiences of national movements and understand the factors fortheir successes and challenges with due attention to the country-specific context.
1-2. Country cases to be examined in this report
Policy for creating national movements can be designed and implemented in various areas. In light ofstrong interest shown by the Ethiopian government during the course of Japan-Ethiopia industrial
policy dialogues, this report focuses on creating a national movement for quality and productivity
improvement. In particular, it will review the experiences of the following four countries.
• Japan’s quality and productivity improvement (kaizen) movement (1950s- ), with US assistance:
The origin of Japan’s kaizen movement was the quality control (QC) method imported from theUnited States (US) in the post-WW2 period. Japan quickly assimilated and developed this as its
own management practice method; it began to produce results which even surpassed the2

It should be noted that even in Japan, workers were lazy, short-sighted, and hardly productive in the early 20th century(Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, 1901). Disobeying company rules and executive orders were the norm rather thanthe exception. Through the effort of private firms and public policies, these “ungovernable” workers were transformed into
kaizen workers half a century later.

2

Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

performance of American manufacturers. Compared with the original US model, the adapted
method emphasized process orientation, worker participation, and hands-on pragmatism. Thismethod, which came to be known as kaizen, spread rapidly among Japanese companies, large andsmall, to form a core of the Japanese monozukuri (making things) spirit.
• Singapore’s productivity movement (1980s- ), with Japanese assistance: Singapore is the first
country where the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) provided comprehensive
technical cooperation—in a venture called the “Productivity Development Project”—to transfer
Japan’s know-how in quality and productivity improvement. This project was requested by thethen-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to the Japanese government. With his strong commitment andleadership, the Productivity Movement was launched in 1981. The JICA project supported a
substantial part of this initiative by mobilizing Japanese experts during 1983–1990. Singapore
successfully internalized, scaled up, and institutionalized the Productivity Movement. Based on
this experience, Singapore came to offer technical cooperation for productivity improvement indeveloping countries, including neighboring ASEAN countries and Botswana.
• Burkina Faso’s QCC movement (1990s- ), with the World Bank and Japanese assistance: Burkina
Faso is a country where Japan’s QCC activity was introduced in the 1990s, under the World
Bank-supported technical assistance program (partly funded by the Japanese government throughthe Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) Fund). The World Bank’s support lasted
for about eleven years, mobilizing Japanese experts to support the pilot implementation of QCC
activity and the establishment of an organization charged with QCC promotion. The project
enjoyed strong interest among the Burkinabe policy makers and businesses, and QCC activity
was implemented in selected companies and public organizations throughout the 90s. Even after
the completion of the World Bank support, some companies continue to practice QCCs.
Nevertheless, the extent of the diffusion of QCCs remains limited, and there are institutional
challenges to sustaining the QCC movement.
• Botswana’s productivity movement (1990s- ), with Singaporean assistance: Botswana launched
the productivity movement in the early 90s. The Singaporean government provided technicalcooperation from 1991 for about ten years at the request of the president of Botswana. Based on
the experience of their JICA-supported project, Singaporean experts assisted in the establishmentof the Botswana National Productivity Center (BNPC) and the launch of an awareness-raising
campaign. The productivity movement was introduced in both the private and public sectors, andthe BNPC has played a key role in promoting productivity awareness. Nevertheless, Botswana is
yet to make substantial progress in translating “awareness” into practical action for productivity
improvement on the ground.

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Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

1-3. Factors affecting the success of national movements for quality and productivity
improvement
The experiences of these four countries and other national movements (such as Saemaul Movement inSouth Korea) suggest that six factors are critical for designing and implementing a national movementthat can successfully transform the mindset of the people.
• Strong personal commitment of the top leader• Establishment of core organizations responsible for quality and productivity improvement (suchas national productivity organizations)• Supporting institutions and mechanisms at central and local levels• Massive campaign for mass participation• Authorized and standardized training programs and materials for those concerned• Developing private sector capability, especially, fostering expertise of private productivity
management consultants.
First, the movement must be launched and sustained by a top leader with strong personal interest andcommitment. Second, there is a need to establish core organizations (e.g., national productivity
organizations, QCC centers) responsible for implementing and coordinating various activities related
to quality and productivity improvement. Since productivity improvement depends on both national(economic and structural policies and the quality of public administration) and micro (the quality ofmanagerial, professional and labor resources) levels, the institutional mechanism to support the
productivity movement should embrace both aspects (Prokopenko, 1999). Third, related to this,
supporting institutions and mechanisms must be created at the central and local levels. This could
include the establishment of a high-level national council with a central ministry or agency assuming
the role of the lead organization (or national productivity organization) and the secretariat to thenational council, and regional, district, and community-level mechanisms for productivity promotion(Prokopenko, 1999). It is important to note that the national productivity organization is not the only
entity promoting productivity improvement; rather, it should coordinate with other institutions in a
catalyst role. By networking and helping other institutions, the national productivity organization
should help build a strong, supportive institutional infrastructure.
Fourth, public awareness campaigns are a crucial element of productivity movement. To change
people’s attitudes, massive campaigns are effective for fostering positive attitudes, values, and aculture of productivity. Public awareness campaigns should target not only workers and managers, butalso government officials and politicians, professionals, students, and the general public. Highly
visible incentive and recognition mechanisms should also be implemented at the national and local
levels. Various instruments can be mobilized, such as TV, public speeches by senior government
officials, and national conventions. Also, award programs are effective for promoting campaigns to4

Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

reward good performers and stimulate interest in best practices and corporate efforts to excel. Fifth,
authorized and well-designed training programs must be created to educate government officials incharge as well as private leaders and participants of the movement in the frontline of implementation.
Sixth, the movement must continue for a sufficiently long time, typically over a decade or more, withevolving emphasis. The movement can be initiated and led by the government at the initial stage, but it
must be gradually transferred to the private sector. This is critical for fostering a feeling of ownershipof the productivity movement by individuals. To this end, it is important for core organizations to train
private management consultants so that they support productivity improvement at industry andcompany levels.
At the same time, it is important to note that country-specific factors might affect the outcome ofnational movements. These include: (i) drivers of the productivity movement, (ii) the degree of private
sector dynamism, and (iii) the level of technology to be introduced in the movement.
On the first point, while political drive is absolutely necessary, economic incentives are crucial tosustain the national movement. Thus, it is important to understand what drives the movement and how
strong these factors are. Second, the degree of private sector dynamism matters. Where a dynamic
private sector exists, it can take a lead in initiating, scaling-up, and sustaining productivity movement,
and the government can play a supportive role. This was exactly the case of Japan. However, if theprivate sector is weak as in the case of many developing countries, the government is required to leadthe introduction, adaptation, and development of the productivity movement. Under suchcircumstances, the productivity movement must start with top-down instruction to encourage
grassroots participation. Private sector dynamism also includes the absorptive capacity to learn, adapt
and internalize foreign technology. So, the educational and training levels of the general workforce
become important. Third, the level of technologies to be introduced for the productivity movement candiffer, depending on the stages of development: developing countries may wish to focus on basics ofkaizen such as 5S and QCCs, while more advanced countries like Taiwan and Korea may wish toaddress R&D and technological innovation in the productivity drive (see Appendices 2-3). Because
each country differs in these three aspects, special attention must be paid when designing the policy
for a national movement for quality and productivity improvement.
Tables 1-1 and 1-2 show, respectively, how the four countries differ in light of the six determinants for
success, as well as country-specific factors that might affect the outcomes of national movements.

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Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

Table 1-1. Overview of Quality and Productivity Movements (1): Factors for SuccessJapan

Singapore Burkina Faso Botswana

○
○

○
○

△
△/×

△
△

(private)(public)(publicÎprivate)(public)

○
○

○
○

△
△

△
△

(national
movement)(national
movement)

Training programs andmaterials

○

○

△

△

Fostering private sector
capability (productivity mgt.

○

○

×

×

LeadershipCore organization
Supporting institutions
Massive campaign

consultants)
Note: Assessment by the GRIPS Development Forum: ○good, △moderate, ×poor.

Table 1-2. Overview of Quality and Productivity Movements (2): Country-Specific Factors
Japan
Drivers of
productivity
movement

Singapore

StrongStrong• Domestic• Need forexport drive(resourcepoor country)• Domestic• Perceived poor
work ethics• Need for FDI
attraction(resource-poor
country)

Degree ofStrongModerate
private sector • Private sector- • Govt.-led
led national
national
dynamismmovement

External
support

US & Europe

Burkina Faso

Botswana

Moderate

Moderate• Domestic +• Domestic
External• Perceived poor
• Need to enhance
work ethics
supply-side• Need for economic
response during
diversification
SAP(resource-richcountry)

Weak

Weak

• Govt.-initiatedmovement• Govt.-initiatedmovement

WB/Japan

Singapore

movement

Japan

SAP: Structural Adjustment Program.
Note: Assessment by the GRIPS Development Forum.

In Table 1-1, Japan and Singapore score good marks compared to Burkina Faso and Botswana.
However, Japan and Singapore differ in the nature of leadership and core organizations. The Japanesekaizen movement was led by the private sector. It was driven domestically, namely by a sense ofurgency for post-war economic reconstruction and export drive. In contrast, Singapore’s Productivity
Movement was initiated by the government and led by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew himself, wholamented the poor work ethics of the Singaporeans. So, the domestic drive was strong. At the sametime, the presence of foreign direct investment (FDI) companies served as important benchmarks forassessing Singapore’s productivity level and made policymakers aware of the need for its

6Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

improvement. Being a resource-poor country, Singapore desperately needed to attract FDI to sustain
growth.
In Burkina Faso and Botswana, the movement was initiated by the governments. In Burkina Faso, the
QCC movement was launched by the government in response to the Structural Adjustment Programagreed with the World Bank in the early 90s. The Burkinabe government also came to regard the QCC
activity as a key instrument to enhance the supply-side response to the reform program. In this sense,
the drivers of the Burkinabe QCC movement were both external and domestic. In Botswana, theleadership perceived poor work ethics and the need for economic diversification from heavy
dependence on mineral resources. The productivity movement was driven domestically, initiated by
the government. Respective governments created the core organizations charged with QCC promotion(Burkina Faso) and the productivity movement (Botswana), and there was a certain level ofcommitment of key government officials and the private sector. These experiences suggest that it ispossible to apply Japanese-style management in countries with different socio-cultural contexts.
Nevertheless, the initial efforts in Burkina Faso and Botswana are yet to produce a lasting change inthe popular mindset. The diffusion in QCC activity and practical implementation of productivity
improvement on the ground are yet limited, and the private sector capability remains weak. In Burkina
Faso, the core organization has been gradually transferred to non-government, non-profit organizations,which currently face the challenge of institutional sustainability after the completion of donor support.
1-4. Synthesis of country case studies (Summary of Chapters 2-5)This section analyzes the experience of national movements in the four countries, especially in light of
the above mentioned factors for success and failure. It also gives attention to country-specific factorsthat have affected the outcomes of the national movements. First, the Japanese experience will bepresented as a case where a national movement was driven by the private sector. Then, the experiencesof Singapore, Burkina Faso, and Botswana will be shown as cases where government-led national
movements have taken place. The three countries vary in the degree of leadership commitment, private
sector dynamism, possibility of attracting FDI and so on; this has led to different results in theirrespective national movements.
1-4-1. The experience of the private sector-led movement: Japan
Japan’s productivity movement was driven by a sense of urgency for post-war economic recovery andindustrial catch-up. The devastation of WW2 made both the government and business sectors work
hard to improve the quality and productivity for exporting processed products. At that time,“Made-in-Japan” was perceived as “low-price and low quality,” and quality and productivity
improvement was high on the national agenda. Also, throughout the second half of the 1940s and 50s,

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Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

the Japanese labor movement was ideologically leftist and radical, and there was an acute need to
introduce cooperative labor-management relations in the economy (Prokopenko, 1999). The Japanesebusiness and government leaders were eager to learn the QC methods developed in the US, as well as
the harmonious labor-management relations promoted by the British Productivity Council at that time.
Leadership and core organizations: In Japan, the private sector took the initiative to create the coreorganizations responsible for introducing, adapting and disseminating a method for improving quality
and productivity. Three non-profit, private organizations spearheaded this initiative—the Union ofJapanese Scientists and Engineers (JUSE), the Japan Productivity Center (JPC), and the Japan
Management Association (JMA). As summarized in Figure 1-1, these organizations played active rolesin three critical stages of technology transfer: (i) learning new technologies from advanced Westerncountries; (ii) examining the adaptability and validity of technologies in Japan and making necessary
adjustments; and (iii) diffusing new technologies (see Chapter 2).3
Figure 1-1. The Role of Private Sector Organizations in
Introduction, Development and Diffusion of Foreign Technologies

At the first stage, many study missions were dispatched to the US and Europe. Also, foreign experts
were invited for lectures. Mission reports and lecture notes were widely disseminated among theorganization members. Foreign text books and materials were translated and distributed to companies
and researchers, as well. At the second stage, various committees and working groups were established,3

See chapter 2 for details. JUSE contributed to quality improvement in Japan, with greater emphasis on the transfer anddiffusion of production management technology from an industry-wide perspective. JPC contributed to the development of
productivity improvement movement from a macro-socioeconomic perspective. JMA contributed to the development ofJapanese industry through “noritsu” (efficiency) improvement towards scientific management.

8

Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiencescomprised of experts and researchers from industry, government, and academia, to study theadaptability of foreign technologies and make necessary adjustments. Pilot projects were also
implemented. So, the private organizations did not simply diffuse Western technologies in their
original forms; foreign technologies were adapted to the Japanese context through self-study. At thethird stage, various measures were mobilized for diffusing quality and productivity improvement
technologies and developing the private sector capability for providing consultancy on practicalproductivity improvement methods and techniques. The measures included consulting services for
guidance and advice; education and training; qualification and certification systems; and a nationwide
campaign through an annual award ceremony, conventions and seminars, and newsletters andpublications.
Top management of all three organizations had a strong sense of mission and commitment todeveloping companies and industries to realize Japan’s postwar economic recovery. Their strong
leadership was critical to learning the knowledge and technology from the US and Europe, adapting
them, and diffusing kaizen movements nationwide.
The history of the establishment of the JPC exemplifies the strong commitment of visionary leaders ofsuch private organizations. By the early 1950s, Europe was rapidly recovering from the WW2
devastation with US assistance (Marshall Plan) and embarking on a productivity movement based oncollaboration between employers and workers. In 1951, Mr. Kohei Goshi (who later became the firstchairman of the JPC), visited Europe as a member of a Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of
Corporate Executives)4 mission. He was convinced of the need for a productivity movement in Japanand thought that this issue must be broadly shared with the entire business sector. Upon his return, Mr.
Goshi invited major business organizations (e.g., the Japan Federation of Economic Organization(Keidanren), the Japan Federation of Employers’ Association (Nikkeiren), and the Japanese Chamberof Commerce) to collaborate for the establishment of the JPC.
The Japanese government had also recognized the need for productivity improvement. In 1954, theCabinet adopted a policy for productivity improvement. The Enterprise Bureau of the Ministry ofInternational Trade and Industry (MITI) planned to set up a productivity organization. However,business leaders insisted that the JPC be created as a private organization. Finally, the JPC wasestablished in 1955, funded by both public and private sectors, on the premise that the government
would not intervene into the JPC spending policies and personnel affairs. A government-businesscoordination committee was established in 1955, attended by vice ministers of various ministries andthe JPC-selected private sector members. The coordination committee was chaired by a private sector
4

Keizai Doyukai is a private, non-profit, non-partisan organization that was formed in 1946 by 83 far-sighted businessleaders united by a common desire to contribute to the reconstruction of the Japanese economy. Now, its membershipcomprises approximately 1,400 top executives of some 900 large corporations.

9Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

representative. During 1955–61, the JPC received support from the US government on various
activities, such as sending study missions, inviting experts, collecting materials and information, andmaking movies about technologies.
Training programs, massive campaign, and network organizations: To increase the awareness ofbusiness managers, executives, production managers and employees of the importance of improving
quality, productivity and efficiency, all three organizations held conventions and symposiums todiscuss specific themes. Furthermore, they all promoted nationwide public relations and education
activities, such as the Deming Prize and the Japan Quality Medal (JUSE), the Japan Quality Award(JPC), and the JMA Human Resources Development Excellent Award (JMA).
An often-cited example in this regard is the QCC movement initiated and diffused by JUSE. Thisshows how the US-originated concept and techniques of statistical QC have been adapted anddisseminated nationwide, with the initiative of the private organizations. In July 1950, Mr. Koyanagi,
Managing Director of JUSE, took the initiative to invite Dr. W. D. Deming, renowned American expert
on statistical process control, to Japan. Dr. Deming held a series of lectures and seminars, teachingbasic principles of statistical QC to executives, managers, and engineers of Japanese industries. Histranscript of the eight-day course on QC was compiled from stenographic records and distributed for afee. The lectures inspired many participants, and JUSE immediately established “the Deming Prize” in
1951, with the aim of rewarding Japanese companies for major advances in quality improvement. The
awards ceremony is broadcast every year in Japan on national television.
The QC movement introduced at the workshop level in the 1950s was developed into the QCC by the
1960s. To promote the movement, JUSE created nationwide networks—at the central and regional andprefectural levels. At the central level, in 1962, the QCC Center was created as a national registration
system. Educational materials were developed and distributed through journals and field quality
centers, etc., providing a common framework for workers from different companies. In 1963, QCC
Conventions began where diverse companies and circle members presented their problem-solving
successes. Local chapters and regional branches of the QCC Center were also created. It was at thischapter level of the QCC Center that much of the normal learning about circles and quality control
took place. Chapter activities included running QCC Conventions (held throughout the country),
arranging for factory tour exchanges and various study meetings. The membership unit of the QCC
Center was the local factories of national corporations. Large numbers of workers, including shop andoffice floor workers, were involved in these local-level activities. Through chapter activities, a feelingof solidarity and mutual development has been forged among workers across their companies. QCC
activity was promoted by broadcasting training programs on radio/TV and publishing journals. In this10

Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiencesway, JUSE successfully created mass organizations and networks for QCC movement (Cole, 1989).5
Supporting institutions: A comprehensive approach was taken to quality and productivity
improvement. Various national systems were established to support the quality and productivity
improvement efforts. These include:• Standards system (JIS: Japan Industrial Standards, from 1949)• Public research organizations (testing and research centers that meet the industrial needs of local
communities)• Export inspection system (1957)• Shindan system (small and medium enterprise (SME) management consultants system),6 etc.
For example, when certifying products for the JIS label, not only the products themselves but also thefactory’s quality management systems and facilities were examined in light of whether they had
enough capacity to meet the standards. Also, public research organizations conducted tests andinspections and provided technological information to local SMEs (prefectures, and municipalities).
An export inspection system was introduced to improve the quality of export products. On-site
inspections were conducted annually by government organizations. As a result, the percentage ofrejected products decreased, and product quality was improved. Under the shindan system, advice wasprovided to SMEs on the adoption of scientific management methods and new technologies. A visiting
consulting system was established in 1952. These systems were mutually reinforcing.
Development of private sector capability: All three organizations have provided training programsfor company managers and workers on theoretical knowledge, practical skills and techniques required.
Furthermore, they have created qualifications and certification systems, such as QC Specialist (JUSE),Management Consultant (JPC) and CPE Qualification (JMA), which have contributed to developing
the abilities of those who are engaged in technology transfer and diffusion and maintaining theirabilities above a certain level. Qualification and certification have also helped increase customers’
trust in the personnel who are engaged in technology transfer and diffusion.
Here, it is important to note that Japanese companies had personnel with sufficient educational
background and technical knowledge to absorb foreign technologies and make them Japanese.
Subsequently, many companies developed their own systems of kaizen, including the globally known
Toyota Production System (developed by the Toyota Motor Corporation) and jishukanri(self-management) activity in the steel industry. These efforts laid a solid foundation for establishing
the so-called Japanese production management system. Instead of heavily relying on external
5This paragraph is based on Cole, Robert E. (1989).
In Japanese, shindan means enterprise diagnostic and advice. It is a state-authorized and supported system or enterprise andadvisory services targeted mainly at SMEs in both manufacturing and services. Shindanshi is a specialist who diagnosis andgives advice to SMEs, concerning various management issues.
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Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

management consultants, Japanese companies have endeavored to train their workers to develop
in-house systems for quality and productivity improvement.
Specific factors for Japan: As explained above, the Japanese kaizen movement was initiated withstrong ownership of the private sector. Also, with the support of private organizations such as JUSE,
the JPC, and the JMA, companies endeavored to learn and internalize their own production
management system. With the existence of such a dynamic private sector, Japan did not face a serious
problem with the sustainability or the development of private sector capability. All three of theorganizations possessed the capacity to absorb the new technologies and techniques introduced fromthe West. Furthermore, the companies’ top management and engineers had enough knowledge tounderstand the relevant skills and techniques and the desire to adopt them. Factories also had workers
capable of absorbing the new technologies.
1-4-2. The experiences of government-led national movements
1-4-2-1. Singapore
Singapore succeeded in inculcating the spirit of productivity into its residents. From the early days of
independence, productivity was high on the agenda of the Singaporean government. The Productivity
Unit was created in 1964, and it was upgraded to the National Productivity Center in 1967 and to the
National Productivity Board (NPB) in 1972. In 1979, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew remarked that“Workers here are not as proud of or as skilled in their jobs compared to the Japanese or theGermans.” Lee Kuan Yew met with a number of Japanese companies active in Singapore and Mr.
Goshi, then the chairman of the JPC, and became interested in Japan’s productivity movement. He wasconvinced of the need for a productivity movement in Singapore, and in 1981, the Productivity
Movement was launched. Multitudes of programs and massive public campaigns were introduced until
even taxi drivers talked about productivity. After five years of awareness-raising, the focus shiftedfrom national promotion of productivity to company-level promotion. Model company projects andcompany-based consulting were implemented.
At a request from Lee Kuan Yew, JICA assisted this national initiative with its first large-scalecooperation, the Productivity Development Project, from 1983–1990. A number of the JPC experts
were dispatched by JICA and provided technical cooperation throughout the period. The productivity
campaign was actively promoted in the public sector as well, linked with a civil service reform
program. Notably, Singapore adapted the Japanese QCC and developed it into Work Improvement
Teams (WITs) to improve the performance of the workforce in the public sector.7
7

A WIT is a group of civil servants from the same work unit, irrespective of divisional status, who meet regularly to solve
problems, examine improvement opportunities, and develop problem solving skills.

12Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

Tripartite cooperation among the government, employers, and labor unions is a key institutionalfeature of Singapore’s Productivity Movement. This again was inspired by the Japanese kaizen
movement experience. The National Productivity Council (NPC) was established in 1981 as anoversight and policy coordination body for productivity movement. The NPC was chaired by the State
Minister of Labor (later by the State Minister of Trade and Industry) with high-level representationfrom the government, employer groups, unions, and academia. The NPB was restructured andexpanded to carry out its mission of promoting productivity concepts and culture nationwide. It also
served as the secretariat to NPC.
Immediately after the establishment of the NPC, the government launched the Productivity Movement,
which evolved in the following three stages (Figure 1-2).
• Awareness stage: create widespread “awareness” of productivity among companies and theworkforce.
• Action stage: translate “awareness” into specific programs to improve productivity at theworkplace.
• Ownership stage: encourage “ownership” of the Productivity Movement by private companies.
Figure 1-2. Evolution of the Productivity Movement in Singapore

Strong political will and policy persistence transformed Singapore into a very competitive nation withhigh productivity. By the early 1990s, Singapore began to teach productivity skills to developing
countries in East Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. As such, Singapore is widely regarded as a

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Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

successful case of a government-led productivity movement. As Chapter 3 explains, it is possible tosay that all of the following six determinants for success were in place in Singapore’s Productivity
Movement.
• Strong commitment of visionary top leadership, namely, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew• Establishment of national productivity organizations by the government, under a tripartite
cooperation mechanism. With the oversight of the NPC, the NPB coordinated and promoted the
diffusion of the Productivity Movement by organizing massive awareness campaigns,
implementing training programs and consultancy for skills upgrading, and developing manuals andtraining materials. Various groups and institutions were involved, facilitating the scaling-up of the
Productivity Movement.
• Supporting institutions and mechanisms. Related to the above, Singapore’s Productivity Movement
were made possible by the establishment of centralized oversight and coordination mechanisms,
strong involvement and support of key stakeholders (public sector, unions, employers, andacademia), and sharing productivity gains among those stakeholders.
• Massive public campaigns. Singapore dedicated five years to awareness raising. The NPB mademajor efforts to disseminate productivity culture to the public. The slogan “Together We Work
Better” and the mascot character of Teamy Bees were adopted; November was designated as
Productivity Month; and the Prime Minister delivered a productivity speech for seven consecutive
years.
• Production of authorized and standardized training programs and materials. With JICA support,
various training manuals and promotional materials were produced and utilized. The areas covermanagement and supervisory development, labor-management relations, QCCs, industrial
engineering, total quality control, audio-visual technology, production management, occupationalsafety and health, consultancy for SMEs.
• Developing management consultancy capability in the private sector by designing systems andincentives to mobilize those trained under the JICA project. The NPB allowed people from theprivate sector to participate in training fellowships in Japan. Those trained became NPB Associate
or Referral Consultants. Thus, a pool of consultants was created to supplement NPB’s effort inreaching out to industries.
1-4-2-2. Burkina Faso
In 1989, the Burkinabe government introduced QCCs on a pilot basis, at the recommendation of theWorld Bank. A Japanese task manager (Mr. Hiroaki Suzuki)8 of the World Bank, who was inspired by
the Burkinabe spirit of teamwork, proposed the possibility of introducing QCCs in Burkina Faso,
8

See Suzuki (1993) for the background and the initial phases of the World Bank and Japan PHRD supported project of QCC
implementation.

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Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

which was favorably received by the government. Both the Burkinabe government and the WorldBank regarded QCCs as a means of complementing the Structural Adjustment Program by enhancing
the supply-side capacity of the economy. The technical assistance project was launched, funded by theWorld Bank and the Japanese government (through the PHRD Fund) and implemented during
1989–2000. As such, the driver of the QCC introduction was external, but it was fully owned by thegovernment. Throughout the period, a team of Japanese experts (JUSE) visited Burkina Faso
periodically to help establish the core organization, conduct training and seminars, and implement
pilot QCCs in selected companies and public organizations.
Initially, the government assumed responsibility for QCC promotion. In the late 1990s, the QCC
Promotion Unit was created within the Ministry of Export Promotion. In 1992, the Burkinabe QCC
Association (ABCERQ), non-government, non-profit organization, was established to support anddisseminate QCC activities. For the initial few years, the QCC Promotion Unit continued to serve as
the secretariat of ABCERQ; but gradually, the responsibility was transferred to ABCERQ. From 1995,
ABCERQ became independent of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Mining (former Ministry ofExport Promotion), assuming full responsibility for conducting seminars and training, implementing
pilot QCCs, organizing annual National QC Conventions, etc. ABCERQ also started to collectmembership fees and to charge for consulting. Throughout the 1990s, QCC activity attracted strong
interests from senior policymakers and business. With the support of the World Bank/Japan PHRD
project, ABCERQ played a central role in the diffusion of QCCs in both private and publicorganizations. In 2002, ABCERQ was reorganized into the Burkinabe Quality Management
Association (ABMAQ) by expanding its functions to include the International Organization forStandardization (ISO), quality management, and SMEs.
Figure 1-3 shows the evolution of the QCC movement in Burkina Faso. Roughly, the World
Bank/Japan PHRD project evolved in three phases: (i) the pilot phase, which supported seminars andpilot implementation of QCCs, the creation of the QCC Promotion Unit in the Ministry of Export
Promotion, and staff training; (ii) technology transfer to private companies; and (iii) technology
transfer to public organizations. The latter two phases supported the expansion of pilot QCCs
implementation, skill training at the factory sites, production of manuals and training modules, andcreation and capacity development of ABCERQ.

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Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

Figure 1-3. Evolution of the QCC Movement in Burkina Faso

A notable feature of the Burkinabe case was that the awareness and action stages were combined in the
promotion of QCC movement. This is different from the case of Singapore, which dedicated the initial
five years to awareness raising before moving into the action stage. In Burkina Faso, pilot QCCs
activity was linked with annual National QC Conferences. With high-level attention and good
publicity, National QC Conferences motivated the members of pilot QCCs to present the best resultsof their activities. The first National QC Conference was held in July 1991, with the attendance ofhigh-level government officials (six ministers, including the Minister of Finance and Plan, the Ministerof Industry, Commerce and Mining, and the Minister of Civil Service and Modernization of Public
Administration). The day was designated as “Quality Day.” Annual National QC Conferences continueeven now.
Even after the completion of the World Bank support (in 2000), some companies remain committed toquality and productivity improvement and have developed their own QC systems, taking acomprehensive approach. They continue to practice QCCs, and ABMAQ (previously ABCERQ) offers
training and seminars. This suggests that the Japanese-style QCCs can be introduced in Burkina Faso,
if proper adjustments are made to fit the local context (see Chapter 4). Nevertheless, the extent of the
diffusion of QCC activity remains limited, and there are institutional challenges to sustaining the QCC
movement.

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Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

The first challenge is the sustainability of the core organization, i.e., ABMAQ, both technically andfinancially. Technically, ABMAQ experts and QC managers of companies have had difficulty updating
their knowledge and techniques for quality and productivity improvement. The absence of Japanese
FDI in Burkina Faso has limited opportunities for local experts and companies to constantly access thelatest knowledge and techniques. Now that ten years have passed since the project completion,
ABMAQ experts and QC managers of companies are being replaced by the second generation ofmembers who have not received skills training from Japanese experts. Financially, ABMAQ faces thechallenge of securing sufficient revenues to cover its administrative and operational costs. Due toeconomic stagnation, companies (especially SMEs) are reluctant to pay for membership fees. As aresult, the size of AMBAQ membership remains small, which limits the expansion of its training
programs. Moreover, ABMAQ faces competition from private consulting companies, which specializein Western management techniques.
Another challenge is the lack of a coordinated approach among quality-related institutions (such as
standards and testing). As explained earlier, in Japan, the government set up various complementary
systems, which mutually reinforced each other to improve quality and productivity. In Singapore, theestablishment of centralized oversight and coordination mechanisms ensured the strong involvement
and support of key stakeholders and other institutions. In Burkina Faso, the government’s attention toquality is yet insufficient, leaving AMBAQ and the other institutions fragmented and uncoordinated.
In short, the Burkinabe government showed a certain level of leadership and interest in the QCC
promotion in the early days of its introduction. The government took the initiative to create ABCERQand helped its transition to a non-profit organization (which later became ABMAQ). QCC pilots were
enthusiastically implemented in selected companies and public organizations, and national
conventions and campaigns were organized. However, it may be said that leadership has not beenstrong enough to transform enthusiasm at the organizational level into a national movement. In light ofthe six factors for success, Burkina Faso has faced the following challenges with national movement:•

Sustainability of the core organization, technically and financially, especially after donor-funded
project is over.

•Lack of a coordinated approach among quality-related institutions (which is related to top
leadership problem).

•

Developing private sector capability, especially, fostering expertise of the second generation of
QCC experts.

1-4-2-3. Botswana
In 1993, the government of Botswana launched a productivity movement with two main features: (i)the introduction of Singapore-inspired WITs, adapted from Japan’s QCCs; and (ii) the establishment of17

Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

the BNPC, based on a tripartite cooperation mechanism (Modisi, 1996). The driver of the movement
was domestic, namely, the urging of President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire himself. President
Masire perceived that Botswana has a problem of loose ethics (“a culture of laxity”) that prevailed in
the civil service and led to a productivity deficit. Being dependent on mineral resources, the country
also had been urged to diversify the economy. At a request by President Masire to thethen-Singaporean Prime Minister Gho Chok Tong, the Singaporean government provided technicalcooperation for productivity improvement from 1991 to the early 2000s.
First, the Singaporean model of WITs was introduced in 1993 as the basis for the Strategy for
Productivity Improvement in the Public Service. A twinning arrangement between the Botswana
Institute of Administration and Commerce (BIAC) and Singapore’s Civil Service Training Institute
was adopted as the instrument for transplanting WITs into Botswana (World Bank, 1996).
Second, the government established the BNPC in 1993 as a national productivity organization, aimed
at promoting productivity consciousness in Botswana. The BNPC was created as a parastatal, publicorganization, which reports to the Minister for Presidential Affairs and Public Administration.
Drawing on the Singaporean experience, a tripartite board was established, comprised ofrepresentatives from the government, employers’ and workers’ organizations, and a few otherstakeholders, to provide oversight of the BNPC activity. The scope of the BNPC activities covers boththe public and private sectors.
The BNPC made major efforts to raise public awareness on productivity. A series of seminars on
productivity were undertaken for both the public and private sectors, including ministers,
parliamentarians, and chief executives (Modisi, 1996). “Productivity Week” was launched. At the
district level, District Productivity Improvement Forums (DPIFs) were created, which were tripartiteand had a community-based structure and were conceived as networks of change agents from thegovernment, private sector organizations, community and non-government organizations. The idea
was to share productivity information with the productivity movement tripartite.
However, a recent study (Chapter 5) shows that the BNPC has focused too much on public awarenesswithout progress on the implementation of practical productivity enhancement on the ground. Despite
twenty years of awareness-raising effort, the involvement of the private sector in practical activity for
quality and productivity improvement has been limited. In particular, since SMEs cannot afford
consulting fees, they have faced difficulty in accessing practical guidance and advice on productivity
improvement. Moreover, the BNPC has had problems attracting and retaining qualified andexperienced experts, and there have been frequent staff changes.

18Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

In sum, the Botswana experience indicates that there was enthusiasm and commitment of leadershipwhen the productivity movement was introduced. The core organization was created and supported by
the government, and massive campaigns were implemented. However, in light of the six factors for
success, Botswana is yet to achieve progress on implementation of productivity improvement on the
ground. The experience of Botswana shows the following challenges with the national movement.
• Sustainability of the core organization, especially retaining those experts who received
professional training for quality and productivity improvement.
• Difficulty of making progress at the action stage (going beyond the awareness stage), especiallypractical implementation of productivity improvement at the industry and company levels.
• Developing private sector capability, especially, fostering the expertise of private, productivity
management consultants.
1-5. Implications for Ethiopia—toward a national movement for kaizen
Regarding the six determinants mentioned in this chapter, Ethiopia does not have problems ofleadership, since kaizen was driven by strong commitment of the top leader. During the two-year
period of JICA support (the Study on Quality and Productivity Improvement in Ethiopia, from October
2009 to May 2011), pilot company projects were implemented, and their results have been
disseminated; the JICA experts conducted training for the staff of the Kaizen Unit of the Ministry ofIndustry (MOI) to transfer relevant skills and techniques; and a national plan has been formulated todisseminate kaizen activities for manufacturing companies. As a result, kaizen has come to be known
among policy makers and business managers in Ethiopia. Based on these achievements, the Ethiopian
government has decided to establish a core organization responsible for quality and productivity
improvement, i.e., the Ethiopian Kaizen Institute (EKI). The Kaizen Unit of the MOI, created in 2009as the counterpart of the above JICA study, has been upgraded into the EKI with functional
strengthening. At the request of the government in November 2011, JICA has begun new support theinstitutionalization of the EKI in such areas as organizational development, human resource
development, and nationwide dissemination of kaizen.
The experiences of national productivity movements in the four countries suggest that Ethiopia may
wish to pay special attention to the following points when it endeavors to disseminate and scale up
kaizen through a national movement.
First, as the core organization, the EKI must assume various functions such as kaizen promoter,catalyst, mobilizer, capacity builder, and so on. These include: formulating overall policies, plans, andprograms for kaizen dissemination; providing training of trainers and developing authorized andstandardized training programs and materials; conducting diagnosis and consulting services throughmodel company projects; creating national awareness on quality and productivity, and establishing

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Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

mechanisms for nationwide outreach, including micro and small enterprises (MSEs) and the future
workforce through technical and vocational education and training (TVET). Such functions cannot berealized by the EKI alone. There is a need to establish a mechanism for overall coordination of kaizen
dissemination to ensure smooth implementation of these activities. Furthermore, in developing
training programs and materials, it is important that the government, private sector, and academia
work together to study the adaptability of foreign technologies and make necessary adjustments
tailored to the Ethiopian context. This is what the Japanese and Singaporean experiences suggest.
Second, it is important to be mindful of the three stages of a national movement—i.e., awareness,action, and ownership—and consider the role of the EKI in each stage. Building a national movement
is a long-term undertaking and must continue over a decade or more, with evolving emphasis.
Singapore spent the initial five years raising productivity awareness and moved to the action stage byintroducing specific programs at the workplace (e.g., model company projects, management
consultancy programs for local companies). Then, it moved to the ownership stage to encourage
private and public organizations to lead the Productivity Movement. Burkina Faso combined theawareness and action stages by linking QCC pilots with annual QCC National Conventions. Botswana
has faced difficulty translating “awareness” into concrete action. Since Ethiopia has already
implemented kaizen pilots at model companies with JICA support, it may be effective to combine
awareness with action stages in the future.
Third, among the three stages, the ownership stage is critical to self-sustain the national movement.
However, this is the most difficult stage. Conscious policy efforts are necessary on two aspects. First,
it is important to sustain core organizations technically and financially—especially after thecompletion of donor support. Over the medium-term, the EKI should have a strategy for how toconstantly update kaizen knowledge and techniques. One option might be to link the transfer of kaizen
technology with an FDI attraction strategy. Financially, the government should commit to supporting
the EKI for a sufficient time. These are the experiences drawn from Singapore, Burkina Faso, andBotswana. At the same time, the Japanese case suggests the importance of working with businessassociations from early on. Second, it is necessary to gradually strengthen private sector capability sothat companies can develop their own systems of kaizen and that capable management consultants canbe nurtured and scaled up in the country. Awards may be effective to stimulate interests in bestpractices and motivate excellence. Certification and qualification systems may be also useful for
retaining capable national experts and developing private management consultants.
Lastly, as the experiences of Burkina Faso and Botswana suggest, it is necessary to recognize that inthose countries where the presence of FDI (for manufacturing in particular) is limited, donor support
might play a larger role in updating the knowledge and techniques on kaizen. The situation is different
from East Asia, where Japanese companies shifted their production bases in the mid-1980s and20

Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

assisted their local partners to learn kaizen philosophy and practices. Therefore, in Africa and othercountries which have limited access to FDI, donors may wish to consider providing “light” technicalcooperation programs even after they have completed comprehensive support. For example, it would
be useful for donors to dispatch short-term experts for seminars and training and/or organize
international conferences to share best practices. Such “light” cooperation would help those countries
gain regular access to the latest necessary knowledge and techniques. The countries may also wish to
formulate FDI attraction strategies, targeting multi-national and Asian companies (not limited toJapanese ones) which have mastered kaizen practices.
The transferability of Japanese-style management practices, such as kaizen, to the socio-economic
environment of developing countries is a hotly debated issue. The experiences of JICA’s kaizen
assistance programs suggest that the diffusion of kaizen philosophy and practices is already observablein some parts of the developing world (Ohno, Ohno and Uesu 2009).9 The case studies included inthis report also confirm that efforts are being made by local institutions to introduce Japanese-stylequality and productivity improvement and assimilate it in the country-specific context. However, theintroduction must be conducted with proper leadership and with adjustments that reflect theuniqueness of the targeted society. Moreover, a few years of pilot implementation is not enough tocreate popular mindset change. This is why having a national movement becomes so important. For
this reason, the country case studies on national movements should serve as useful references for
Ethiopia and other developing countries to understand key factors for its success and failure.

9
Please see GRIPS Development Forum (2009) for the discussions on applicability of kaizen to different socio-culturalcontexts.

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Chapter 1. Overview: National Movements and the Synthesis of Selected Country Experiences

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for Learning: Small-Group Activities in America, Japanese, and Swedish Industry, University ofCalifornia Press.
GRIPS Development Forum ed. (2009), Introducing KAIZEN in Africa, October.
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Kikuchi, Tsuyoshi (2011), “The Roles of Private Organizations in the Introduction, Development and
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