G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting
Communiqué
Niigata, Japan, 13 May 2023
We, the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, met in Niigata, joined by the Heads ofthe International Monetary Fund, World Bank Group, Organisation for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment, and Financial Stability Board.
We were honored to be joined virtually by the Ukrainian Finance Minister Sergii Marchenko. We
reaffirmed our strong commitment to our united response to Russia´s war of aggression against
Ukraine, which is also an attack on the rule of law and the principles of the UN Charter, and to ourunwavering support for Ukraine for as long as it takes.
In the face of multiple and complex global challenges, we renewed our commitment to upholding thefree, fair and rules-based multilateral system and elevated our engagement with international
partners to new heights through an extensive dialogue to advance international cooperation anddeliver prosperity for all. We highly valued the productive dialogue with Brazil, Comoros, India,
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore. G7 members and Finance Ministers of thesecountries exchanged views on recent global economic developments and major challenges to foster
robust and sustainable growth, and committed to jointly tackle a range of global economic challenges,
fight poverty, and achieve strong, sustainable, balanced, and inclusive global growth.

I. Tackling Immediate Global Challenges
Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine and Support for Ukraine1.

We reiterate our unwavering support for Ukraine for as long as it takes and are united inour condemnation of Russia’s illegal, unjustifiable, and unprovoked war of aggression
against Ukraine. Russia’s war has caused tragic loss of life, destruction of property andinfrastructure, and exacerbated global economic challenges, including through adding to
inflationary pressures, disrupting supply chains, and heightening energy and food insecurity. We
remain determined to foster international cooperation to address the global economic hardships
caused by Russia’s war and its weaponization of food and energy, which are disproportionately
felt by low- and middle-income countries and vulnerable groups. In this context, we steadfastly
reject Russia’s repeated false narrative about the spillover effects of our sanctions on food andenergy security. We call for an immediate end of Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine, which
would clear one of the biggest uncertainties over the global economic outlook.
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2.

We are strongly committed to continue addressing Ukraine’s urgent short-term financing
needs, as well as supporting its neighboring and other severely affected countries. We,
together with the international community, have increased our commitment of budget andeconomic support for Ukraine for 2023 and early 2024 to 44 billion US dollars, which enabled
the approval of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program for Ukraine amounting to 15.6
billion US dollars over 4 years. These supports give Ukraine certainty and enable its authorities
to safeguard the functioning of government, continue the delivery of basic services, carry out
the most critical repairs of damaged infrastructure and stabilize the economy. We look forward
to swift implementation of structural reforms by Ukraine under the IMF-supported program, andthe successful completion of the program’s reviews, which will promote macroeconomic andfinancial stabilization, enhance governance and strengthen institutions, contribute to longer-term
economic sustainability and post-war reconstruction. This will also help to catalyze further
financial support from other countries and institutions as well as the private sector.

3.

We will continue our joint efforts to support Ukraine’s repair of its critical infrastructure,
recovery and reconstruction, including through the Multi-agency Donor Coordination
Platform. We welcome continued engagement by the IMF, the World Bank Group (WBG), theEuropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment
Bank. Given the substantial recovery and reconstruction financing needs, we should expand thedonor base. Mobilizing private capital is also crucial. In this context, we welcome ongoing efforts
to catalyze private resources through providing guarantees and insurance, including by theInternational Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. We
recognize the role of Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) to catalyze private investments
and welcome the launch of the Ukraine Investment Platform in Tokyo on 12 May, to support
Ukraine and affected countries more broadly, through further efficient co-financing and greatercollaboration among the DFIs, together with the EBRD as the leading institution. We look forward
to the Ukraine Reconstruction Conference to be held in London in June.

4.

We reiterate our unwavering resolve to impose and enforce sanctions and othereconomic measures to further undermine Russia’s capacity to wage its illegal, unjustifiable andunprovoked war of aggression. We remain committed to countering any attempts to evade andundermine our sanction measures. Following our Leaders’ statement on 24 February, as part ofour efforts to strengthen the enforcement of our sanctions and other economic measures, wehave initiated sharing typologies of circumvention and evasion and other relevant information
through the Enforcement Coordination Mechanism (ECM). Going forward, we will continue to2strengthen coordination in monitoring cross-border transactions between Russia and othercountries, take further action directed at the Russian financial sector as necessary, and closely
monitor the effectiveness of the price caps on Russian crude oil and petroleum products toensure the measure delivers on its objectives, and take any necessary and appropriate
enforcement actions required. We call on other countries to join our measures against Russia
and efforts to bolster their enforcement. We will also ensure Russia’s sovereign assets in our
jurisdictions remain immobilized in accordance with our Leaders’ statement on 24 February.
Global Economy and Economic Policy
5.

The global economy has shown resilience against multiple shocks including the COVID19 pandemic, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and associated inflationarypressures. Nevertheless, we need to remain vigilant and stay agile and flexible in ourmacroeconomic policy amid heightened uncertainty about the global economic outlook.

6.

We are committed to a stability- and growth-oriented macroeconomic policy mix that
supports medium-term fiscal sustainability and price stability.


Fiscal policy should continue to provide, as appropriate, temporary and targeted support tovulnerable groups suffering from the increase in cost of living and catalyze investment
needed for the green and digital transformations. The overall fiscal stance should ensure
medium-term sustainability and be coherent with the monetary policy stance amid
inflationary pressures.

Inflation remains elevated and central banks remain strongly committed to achieving pricestability, in line with their respective mandates. They will ensure inflation expectations remain
well anchored and will clearly communicate policy stances to help limit negative crosscountry spillovers.



We reaffirm our May 2017 exchange rate commitments.



We reemphasize the importance of supply-side reforms, especially those that increase labor
supply and enhance productivity. We also stress the crucial role of women and underrepresented groups for the long-term success of our economies through promoting inclusion,
diversity and innovation. We look forward to a successful review of the G20/Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance tostrengthen sustainability and resilience of the private sector.

7.

We will continue to work closely with supervisory and regulatory authorities to monitor
financial sector developments and stand ready to take appropriate actions to maintainfinancial stability and the resilience of the global financial system. We reaffirm that our
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financial system is resilient, supported by the financial regulatory reforms implemented after the2008 global financial crisis, including considerable increases in the levels of bank capital andliquidity, an international framework for effectively resolving failing institutions, and strengthened
cross-border regulatory and supervisory cooperation. We will address data, supervisory, andregulatory gaps in the banking system. We support the Financial Stability Board (FSB)’s ongoing
efforts, including for bank prudential and resolution frameworks, to draw out lessons learned
from the recent episodes and the consequent priorities for its future work to enhance financial
stability. We also continue to prioritize addressing vulnerabilities in non-bank financial
intermediation (NBFI). We strongly support the work of the FSB and standard-setting bodies(SSBs) on enhancing the resilience of NBFI, including promoting implementation of the FSB
Money Market Fund policy proposals, addressing structural liquidity mismatches in open-ended
funds, addressing vulnerabilities in NBFI leverage, and enhancing margining practices incentrally and non-centrally cleared markets.
Supporting Vulnerable Countries
8.

We reiterate the urgency of addressing debt vulnerabilities in low- and middle-income
countries amid multiple economic shocks that have disproportionally impacted these countries.
We fully support the G20’s effort to improve the implementation of the “Common Framework” ina predictable, timely, orderly and coordinated manner, providing clarity to participants. We callfor a swift conclusion of debt treatment for Zambia and encourage progress on a debt treatment
for Ethiopia under an envisaged IMF-supported program. We welcome the progress toward the
IMF-supported program for Ghana through the recently provided financing assurances. Beyond
the “Common Framework,” debt vulnerabilities in middle income countries (MICs) should be
addressed by multilateral coordination that involves all official bilateral creditors taking swift
actions to respond to requests for debt treatments. In this respect, we welcome the launch of
the creditors’ meeting for Sri Lanka under the three co-chairs, France (as chair of the Paris Club),India, and Japan, and look forward to a swift resolution as a successful model for future
multilateral efforts to address MICs’ debt issues. We also stress the importance for private
creditors to provide debt treatments on terms at least as favorable to ensure fair burden sharing
in line with the comparability of treatment principle. In this context, the contractual approach,including private creditor incorporating Majority Voting Provisions in future syndicated loan
contracts, can facilitate sovereign debt restructuring. We expect the Global Sovereign Debt
Roundtable led by the IMF, the WBG, and India (holding the G20 Presidency) to facilitate
constructive dialogue among debtors and official and private creditors and look forward to further
work to support predictability and efficiency of the debt restructuring process.

49.

Enhancing debt data accuracy and transparency is crucial to secure credible andeffective debt sustainability assessments. In support of the G20’s initiative on debt datatransparency, we, together with willing other creditors, took the lead through a first data sharing
exercise by providing granular lending data to the WBG for debt data reconciliation. We areencouraged by the outcome of this exercise, which initially identified data gaps amounting to 6.5
billion US dollars in total. With these tangible benefits in mind, we invite all official bilateralcreditors to join the data sharing exercise for debt data reconciliation, including through further
advancing the G20’s initiative in the area of debt data accuracy. We call on private creditors tovoluntarily submit details of their lending to the joint Institute of International Finance / OECD
Data Repository Portal.

10. We strongly support the ongoing work on the evolution of the Multilateral Development
Banks (MDBs). We encourage MDBs to expedite the work to review and transform theirbusiness models to better address transboundary challenges such as climate change,
pandemics, fragility and conflict, which are integral to achieving poverty reduction and sharedprosperity. This evolution should come with the most efficient use of their existing capital. To thisend, we will contribute to developing an ambitious G20 Roadmap on implementing therecommendations of the G20 MDB Capital Adequacy Framework Review and call on MDBs tomake further progress in a comprehensive manner while safeguarding MDBs’ long-term financial
sustainability, robust credit ratings and preferred creditor status. We welcome the ongoing
discussion at the WBG to review its vision and mission, operating model, and financial capacity,
including the first proposal of financial reform that can add up to 50 billion US dollars of financing
capacity over the coming decade. We look forward to further progress at the WBG toward the2023 WBG and IMF Annual Meetings and beyond so that ambitious reforms can be made on acontinual basis and encourage other MDBs to join this initiative for a coordinated approach of
MDBs as a system. In considering the renewed value proposition for MDBs to address global
challenges, we emphasize the importance of a targeted, more systemic approach andmaintaining prioritization on low-income countries (LICs). We also call on MDBs to make thebest use of policy and knowledge support, building on their longstanding experience, align theiranalytical strengths with evolving missions, and explore strengthened approaches to promotemobilizing domestic resources and private capital as well as private sector engagement.
11. We have further advanced our joint efforts to support countries most in need through thevoluntary channeling of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) or equivalent contributions. We
welcome that additional pledges by Japan and France, amongst others, together with ourprevious contributions and commitments, put the global ambition of 100 billion US dollars within5reach and call for the delivery of existing pledges and for further pledges from all willing and ablecountries, especially those which have not yet contributed, to fulfill the ambition. We welcome
the first Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) programs. We also support the IMF’s multipronged strategy, which ensures that the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) cancontinue to provide strong support to meet the growing needs of LICs in the coming years,
including through the IMF achieving its agreed 2021 fundraising targets for the subsidy and loan
resources by the 2023 WBG and IMF Annual Meetings, as well as through exploring the fullrange of options to put the PRGT on a sustainable footing. We will further explore viable options
for enabling the voluntary channeling of SDRs through MDBs, while respecting national legal
frameworks and the need to preserve the reserve assets character and status of SDRs.
12. We are committed to further strengthening financial and economic collaboration andpolitical dialogue with African countries. We underscore the crucial role of private sector
development to foster sustainable and inclusive growth. Together with our African partners, we
cooperate on and support a range of public initiatives to improve the investment climate and tomobilize private investment in Africa, such as the G20 Compact with Africa, as well as on multidonor arrangements to realize Africa’s growth potential. Building on these initiatives, we willcontinue our discussion at the G7 Africa Roundtable in October this year on how to address key
challenges to further mobilize private investment. In this respect, we underline the catalytic roleof foreign direct investment (FDI) in promoting sustainable development, and welcome theefforts by donor and recipient countries as well as international financial institutions to attract
and retain quality FDI through creating an enabling environment for investment, and tostrengthen its linkages with the local economy. Recognizing the threat that conflict poses toeconomic and development gains, we welcome the cessation of hostilities in Ethiopia, call upon
both sides in Sudan to enact a sustainable cessation of hostilities, and express concern overthe deteriorating humanitarian situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) andunderscore the importance of the peace processes in the DRC. More broadly, we welcome theorganization of the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact by France in June to strengthen
the architecture of development and climate finance and address the needs of emerging market
and developing economies (EMDEs).
II. Enhancing Global Economic Resilience
Climate Change
13. We are determined to urgently tackle climate change, through scaled-up action in thiscritical decade, in order to keep the limit of 1.5 degrees global temperature rise withinreach and avoid the worst consequences of climate change, underscoring the6Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s most recent findings. Energy insecurity
caused by Russia’s war of aggression has reinforced our determination to further accelerate ourclimate action and promote an orderly and just transition to achieve our emission reduction
targets by 2030 and reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 or earlier, in a way that
positively impacts jobs, growth, competitiveness and fairness, as well as enhances energy
security. Our temporary support in response to heightened energy prices should be well targetedto the most vulnerable and phased out appropriately in order not to delay the transition to clean,safe and sustainable energy. We also support the FSB Roadmap for Addressing Climate-related
Financial Risks and welcome the related work by other international SSBs. G7 central banks
are committed to addressing the implications of climate change that are relevant to theirrespective mandates. We affirm that price stability and financial stability are important
prerequisites for orderly transition. We also commit to further improving our understanding of
the near-term as well as long-term macroeconomic effects of climate change and different
mitigation policies, including any cross-border and spillover effects that might arise from differing
ambitions and approaches across countries. In doing so, we will take advantage of the networkof our modelling experts and cooperate with the Network for Greening the Financial System(NGFS) and other international organizations, and take into consideration country-specificcircumstances across the globe in climate change and transition pathways.
14. We underscore the need to enhance international cooperation and coordination on
climate change mitigation policies within the G7 and beyond, in particular with EMDEs.
We reaffirm the potential of high integrity carbon markets and carbon pricing to foster costefficient reductions in emission levels, drive innovation and enable a transformation to net zero,through the optimal use of a range of policy levers to price carbon. At the same time, noting thatpolicy mixes with carbon pricing and non-pricing mechanisms and incentives could varyreflecting country-specific circumstances, international cooperation requires thorough mapping
and assessment of diverse mitigation policy instruments. We look forward to advancing the open,
cooperative and inclusive Climate Club, established by G7 Leaders, in collaboration withinternational partners. We support the OECD’s Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation
Approaches (IFCMA) to deepen our understanding of the effectiveness of various policy tools
on mitigating emissions. We also look forward to the future work by the IFCMA on exploring
methodologies for measuring the carbon intensity of goods and sectors. We highlight theimportance of actively engaging with EMDEs, especially the major emitting countries, in orderto achieve net-zero globally by mid-century. In this regard, we support the efforts by the IFCMA
to reach out to non-OECD member countries. We are committed to continuing efforts to swiftly
advance Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) that will help partner countries pursue
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accelerated and ambitious transitions, reflecting their specific circumstances.
15. We will enhance our joint efforts to mobilize climate finance for addressing both
mitigation and adaptation. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the collective climate financemobilization goal of 100 billion US dollars per year to developing countries from a wide variety
of sources as soon as possible and through to 2025 in the context of meaningful mitigation action
and transparency of implementation. We will engage in discussions under the framework of theParis Agreement on a new collective quantified goal by the end of 2024, in close cooperation
with other relevant G7 Tracks. In addition to our continued efforts, we underline the need tobroaden the climate finance contributor base, and the importance of increasing the mobilizationof private climate finance. We remain committed to supporting the implementation andmonitoring of the G20 Sustainable Finance Roadmap, including the transition finance framework.
Transition finance, in line with keeping a limit of 1.5°C temperature rise within reach, avoiding
carbon lock-ins and based on effective emissions reduction, has a significant role in advancing
the decarbonization of the economy as a whole. We encourage the public and private sectors
to enhance availability and credibility of science-based, transition-related information, including
through transition plans supported by credible pathways, which would help promote investmentthat is aligned with an orderly net-zero transition by enabling assessment of the progress ontransition in a forward-looking manner and accounting for the trajectory of financed emissions
that are associated with real economy emission reductions. Given increased frequency andseverity of natural disasters that are exacerbated by climate change, enhanced coordination by
the private and public sectors, especially for vulnerable countries, is critical in promoting disasterrisk finance, including insurance, in order to narrow protection gaps. We support ongoing
initiatives, such as the joint V20 and G7 initiative of a Global Shield against Climate Risks,regional catastrophe risk pools. We encourage more creditors to offer Climate-Resilient Debt
Clauses for loan agreements. We welcome the technical note by the WBG on recent progress
and new frontiers of financial resilience against climate shocks and disasters. We also lookforward to a report by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), in
collaboration with the OECD, on how to strengthen economic and financial resilience against
natural disaster risks by the end of 2023. We also reaffirm our commitment to enhancing
synergies between finance for climate and biodiversity and welcome the historic achievementof the adoption of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF) at the 15th
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD-COP15) in December
2022.

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Economic Efficiency and Resilience
16. The importance of economic resilience has been brought into sharper focus amid therepercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war. Cross-border economic
activities are increasingly viewed through the lens of achieving both economic efficiency andresilience. Recalling the G7 Elmau Summit commitment to ongoing strategic coordination on
economic security, we will work together both within as well as beyond the G7 to enhance
economic resilience globally against various shocks, stand firm to protect our shared values,
and preserve economic efficiency by upholding the free, fair and rules-based multilateral system.
Our efforts to enhance economic resilience should also help accelerate social and economictransformation in our economies and globally by driving progress to achieve deep emission cutsand reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 at the latest and by harnessing thebenefits of digitalization.
17. We commit to further strengthening collaboration among G7 members and beyond toenhance supply chain resilience. Our “High-level Policy Guidance for Public Finance Tools to
Build Resilient Supply Chains in the Era of Decarbonization” published in April, recognizes theurgent need to address existing vulnerabilities within the highly concentrated supply chains ofimportant products for clean energy. Diversification of supply chains can contribute tosafeguarding energy security and help us to maintain macroeconomic stability. To turn theguidance into specific actions, we are currently developing “Partnership for RISE (Resilient andInclusive Supply-chain Enhancement)” with interested countries in collaboration with the WBG
and relevant international organizations with the aim of its launch by the end of this year at thelatest. Through mutually beneficial cooperation by combining finance, knowledge andpartnerships, RISE aims to support low- and middle-income countries in playing bigger roles in
the midstream and downstream in supply chains of clean energy products.
18. We support EMDEs in their efforts to attract “more, better and safe” FDI and thereby
achieve resilient growth. FDI is an important enabler of global economic integration throughits benefits such as job creation, local skills development, and technology transfer. In particular,
it plays an important role in meeting the substantial infrastructure needs of EMDEs. At the sametime, foreign investments in critical infrastructure may pose risks for economic sovereignty. We
will contribute to the work on how to ensure that FDI goes where it is most needed, is of highquality and does not undermine the economic sovereignty of host countries. To this end, wewelcome the implementation of the OECD’s FDI Qualities Initiative, which aims at improving theinvestment climate to encourage more and better FDI into EMDEs with emphasis on productivity
and innovation, job quality and skills, gender equality, and decarbonization. We also support the9OECD to expand and deepen its outreach with non-OECD members and assist them instrengthening their investment frameworks. We call on the OECD to develop a strategy tosupport these efforts.
Financial Digitalization
19. We will continue policy deliberation on digital money to harness the benefits ofinnovation such as payment efficiency as well as financial inclusion while addressing
potential risks to the stability, resilience and integrity of the monetary and financial
system. A reliable, stable, and transparent global payment system is a key foundation for our
economic and financial activities, and Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) could have asubstantial role to play in this context. We recall the Public Policy Principles for Retail CBDCs
agreed in October 2021, stressing that any CBDC should be grounded in, amongst others,transparency, the rule of law, sound economic governance, cyber security and data protection.
In light of increasing demand from EMDEs for policy guidance and capacity development, wewelcome the IMF’s work on a “CBDC Handbook” to be taken forward in close cooperation withand drawing from the inputs of experts and stakeholders including other internationalorganizations, standard setters and national authorities, and look forward to the first set ofdeliverables to be published by the 2023 WBG and IMF Annual Meetings.
20. Effective monitoring, regulation and oversight are critical to addressing financial stability
and integrity risks posed by crypto-asset activities and markets, while supporting
responsible innovation. We look forward to the FSB’s finalization of its high-levelrecommendations by July 2023. We commit to implementing effective regulatory andsupervisory frameworks for crypto-asset activities and markets as well as stablecoinarrangements, which are consistent with the FSB’s recommendations and standards andguidance established by SSBs. We also encourage the FSB and SSBs to promote a consistent,
effective and timely implementation of the recommendations globally to avoid regulatory
arbitrage. We support the FSB and SSBs conducting follow-up work on decentralized finance(DeFi) and multifunction crypto-asset intermediaries. In light of the growing threats from illicit
activities, in particular by state actors, including the theft of crypto-assets for proliferation
financing, ransomware attacks, terrorist financing, and sanctions evasion, we support initiatives
by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on accelerating global implementation of the FATF
Standards on virtual assets, including the “travel rule”, and its work on emerging risks, includingfrom DeFi arrangements and peer-to-peer transactions. We also look forward to the FATF’s
fourth progress report on virtual assets and further work on these initiatives.

10Financial Sustainability and Integrity
21. We underline our commitment to consistent, comparable and reliable disclosure of
information on sustainability including climate. We welcome efforts to enhance theavailability of sustainability information, which will help mobilize investments and unleash thepotential for innovation, productivity gains and emission reduction. We support the International
Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) finalizing the standards for general reporting onsustainability and for climate-related disclosures and working toward achieving globallyinteroperable sustainability disclosure frameworks. We look forward to the ISSB’s future work
on disclosure on biodiversity and human capital, in line with its work plan consultation, which
could enhance investors’ ability to assess companies' value creation from activities related tobiodiversity, investment in their workforce, and diversity, equity and inclusion. We look forward
to the discussions at the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) on
possible endorsement of the ISSB’s two standards. We also look forward to the publication of
the final Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (TNFD) Framework in September
2023 and encourage the TNFD and the ISSB to continue their cooperation.
22. Financial integrity is a cornerstone to preserve the resilience of the global economy andpromote prosperity. It is important to step-up global efforts to combat money laundering,terrorism financing, and proliferation financing. We commit to supporting the increasing role andresource needs of the FATF and its FATF Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) in overseeing theimplementation of the FATF standards across the global network, including in the context of theforthcoming 5th round of mutual evaluations. In this respect, we reiterate our commitment toproviding additional expertise and funding to support this work, and call on the G20, all FATF
members and the IMF and the WBG to also increase their support, and look forward to the IMF’s
AML strategy review and the WBG’s anti-corruption strategy review. In addition to the issues on
crypto assets mentioned above, we commit to the timely and effective implementation of therevised FATF standards on the transparency of beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal
arrangements, which will improve countries’ ability to identify and target illicit finance. We also
support the ongoing work of the FATF to strengthen its standards to enhance global efforts torecover criminal proceeds. The FATF plays a vital role in protecting the integrity of theinternational financial system. In this context, we condemn Russia’s actions, including its
irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, which unacceptably run counter to the FATF’s core principles. We
fully support the decision by the FATF this year to suspend Russia’s membership. We share theserious concerns with the threat posed by the DPRK’s illicit activities related to the proliferationof weapons of mass destruction and its financing that enabled the DPRK’s recent launches ofan unprecedented number of ballistic missiles including ICBMs. We are deeply concerned with11

illicit financing risk emanating from Iran.
Global Health
23. We reaffirm our strong commitment to strengthening the governance and finance of the
global health architecture (GHA). The global community should be better prepared for future
pandemics and other health emergencies, including through strengthening health financing formoving towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC) and promoting a One Health approach. In
this effort, we reiterate our commitment to further enhancing the finance-health coordination andgathering political momentum to further strengthen the G20 Joint Finance-Health Task Force(JFHTF), which is the most suitable platform with a broad-based membership and expected tohelp improve the GHA including by conducting successive gap assessments and monitoring
emerging health threats. We also remain committed to strengthening pandemic prevention,
preparedness, and response (PPR) financing. As a key milestone, we welcome the launch of
the Pandemic Fund (PF), and look forward to the successful execution of its first call for
proposals, focusing on strengthening country and regional capacities for surveillance,laboratories, and human resources/public health workforce. We encourage active participationand increasing contributions to the PF from a broader donor base. Despite this progress,
financing for pandemic “response” requires particular attention. To this end, we agreed to workwith the G20 JFHTF and our international partners to thoroughly assess how the existing
financing sources, particularly untapped funding streams, can be used in pandemic “response”
and to explore a “surge” financing framework that allows us to complement existing mechanisms
through better coordination and deploy necessary funds quickly and efficiently in response tooutbreaks without accumulating idle cash. In this context, we welcome the endorsement of the“G7 Shared Understanding on Enhanced Finance-Health Coordination and PPR Financing” ina joint session with G7 Health Ministers. We reaffirm our commitment to supporting antibiotic
development and welcome the updated antimicrobial resistance (AMR) progress report by theWorld Health Organisation (WHO) and the Global AMR R&D Hub.
International Taxation
24. We re-emphasize ourstrong politicalcommitment

towards the swift

globalimplementation of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework Two-Pillar Solution to address thetax challenges arising from globalization and the digitalization of the economy and to establish
a more stable and fairer international tax system. We recognize significant progress in thenegotiation of the Pillar 1 Multilateral Convention (MLC) and reaffirm our commitment to the swift
completion of the negotiation so that the MLC can be ready for signature within the agreed
timeline. We welcome the progresses in domestic legislation toward the implementation of Pillar
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2 and call upon the Inclusive Framework to work on further administrative guidance for a globallyconsistent implementation. We will further provide developing countries with support forstrengthening their tax capacity to build sustainable tax revenue sources, highlighting theimportance of assistance for the implementation of the Two-Pillar Solution. We welcome theOECD’s “2023 Progress Report on Tax Co-operation for the 21st Century”.
III. Economic Policies in Pursuit of Welfare
25. Our economic and social structures have undergone dynamic and fundamental
transformation. Digitalization, sustainability in particular climate change, inequality, and genderand diversity are just a few examples where important elements of welfare cannot be fully
captured by a single aggregated indicator such as GDP. During our meeting, we revisited thisimportant agenda through a dialogue with Professor Joseph E. Stiglitz, and underscored themultidimensional aspects of welfare.
26. Policymakers need to follow multidimensional indicators for measuring welfare andexplore operational tools to reflect such indicators in policymaking. The UN’s 2025 System
of National Accounts is an ongoing effort to address measurement issues, including throughbetter recording of consumption of free digital products, amongst others. Many authorities andinstitutions are increasingly utilizing complementary indicators for better assessment of
economic welfare using an evidence-based approach. At the same time, we should also
consider how such indicators can be brought into policymaking in a practical and effective
manner, including through budget compilation and performance frameworks. We will continue
to share best practices and deepen our policy deliberation in response to rapid economic andsocial transformation. These efforts will help preserve confidence in democracy and a marketbased economy, which are the core values of the G7.

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ANNEX:
Reports and Documents Received
1.

World Bank Group Report on Preliminary Findings from the G7 and Paris Club Countries Debt
Data Sharing Exercise

2.

World Bank Group Technical Note on Recent Progress and New Frontiers of Financial
Resilience against Climate Shocks and Disasters

3.

OECD Report on Strengthening Clean Energy Supply Chains for Decarbonization andEconomic Security

4.

OECD Note on FDI in Critical Infrastructure, Supporting EMDEs in Attracting More, Better and
Safe FDI

5.

World Bank Group Report on Changing FDI Dynamics and Policy Responses

6.

WHO and the Global AMR R&D Hub Progress Report on Incentivising the Development of New
Antibacterial Treatments

7.

OECD 2023 Progress Report on Tax Co-operation for the 21st Century

8.

OECD Report on Economic Policy Makings to Pursue Economic Welfare

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