TASMAN SPIRITTHE INCIDENT AND RESPONSE- A TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVEHugh Parker
Technical Team Manager (AMEDEUS)
The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation(ITOPF? )PAJ International Oil Spill Symposium 2004
“New Dimensions in Oil Spill Response after the PRESTIGE ”- Compensation and Response Technology 26th & 27th February 2004, Tokyo, Japan?

ITOPF Ltd. Staple Hall, Stonehouse Court, 87-90 Houndsditch LONDON EC3A 7AX
The views expressed here are thos e of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of
ITOPF Directors, Members and Associates.

TASMAN SPIRITThe Maltese tanker TASMAN SPIRIT (87,584 DWT) grounded at the entrance toKarachi Port, Pakistan at about 13.00 hours local time on 27th July 2003. Thevessel was carrying 67,800 tonnes of Iranian Light crude oil loaded at Kharg
Island and also had 440 tonnes of heavy fuel oil in aft bunker tanks. The
grounded tanker was subjected to continuous stress from the heavy swell of theprevailing south-west monsoon. In the course of inspections on board it became
apparent that most of the cargo tanks had been ruptured, whilst the bunkertanks remained intact.
The owners appointed salvors under Lloyd’s Open Form. The owners also hireda succession of small tankers and barges for the purpose of shuttling and storing
oil lightered from the casualty. In the course of the following weeks roughly halfof the crude oil cargo and most of the bunker fuel was successfully transferredfrom the casualty.
ITOPF was notified of the incident on Day 1 by the P&I insurer, the American
Club, and was requested to stand by to attend the incident on-site. Over thenext few days a full evaluation was made of the incident and the area potentially
under the threat of pollution.
The availability of suitable spill response
equipment and personnel was ascertained locally, regionally and globally (OSRL,EARL, NRC). Contact was maintained with the American Club’s correspondents
in Karachi and general advice was provided through them to the Karachi Port
Trust (KPT), the government authority in charge of oil spill response activity.
In light of the potential severity of the incident and reports of oil drifting ashore
onto the main tourist beach in Karachi (Clifton Beach) and entering Karachi Porton flooding tides, a decision was taken on 8th August for ITOPF to attend theincident. After a comprehensive assessment of the nature of the oil pollution
threat, the type and quantity of oils on board the casualty, the nature andlocation of resources at risk, and the existing capabilities in-country for oil spill
response it was concluded that a high oil treatment rate and rapid response
capability were essential to meet the threat of a sudden large oil release fromthe casualty. These twin requirements could only be satisfied by aerial2dispersant application. Approval for large-scale dispersant use was given by KPT
and from the Pakistan Environment Protection Agency.
The cargo removal operation had started and by 10th August two loads of crude
oil with a combined total of 13,000 tonnes had been transferred from TASMANSPIRIT. However, on 11 th August the tanker began to show signs of breaking up
and ITOPF recommended to KPT and the American Club the urgent mobilisationof equipment, materials and personnel from OSRL and subsequently also fromEARL. The American Club contracted with OSRL for the provision of anequipment package to be airlifted from the UK, and a Hercules C-130 aircraftwith aerial dispersant spraying equipment (ADDS Pack) to be dispatched fromEARL in Singapore. A dozen oil spill response personnel from OSRL and EARL
were also mobilised. The UK government agreed to provide dispersant from its
stockpiles and a consignment of 100 tonnes was air-freighted to Karachi, arrivingon 15th August.
As predicted, the tanker broke in two overnight, 13/14th August, and several
thousand tonnes of crude oil were spilled from no. 3 cargo tanks. Much of thespilled oil quickly stranded on Clifton Beach, but significant quantities remained
afloat both inside and outside Karachi port. Dispersants were applied offshore
from the ADDS Pack in response to two distinct pollution events on 14th and 22nd
August involving the progressive break-up of the tanker. About 30 tonnes ofdispersant were applied to prevent floating oil from drifting towards dense
mangrove forests to the east of Karachi.
The severe pollution of Clifton Beach created very strong oil vapours causing
considerable discomfort to local residents and clean-up personnel.
Local
hospitals reported many cases of headaches, nausea and dizziness and schools
in the vicinity were closed for a short period. Clean-up work was also hamperedby the lack of suitable disposal sites for collected oily waste. Agreement was
eventually reached to dispose of collected oily sand at one of the municipal
waste sites serving Karachi City.
Oil entering the port of Karachi was confined by deploying booms at suitablecollection sites, and in total some 140 tonnes of oil were recovered by skimmers.

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KPT also deployed vessels to apply dispersant on oil drifting through the port
entrance.
After several interruptions the salvors succeeded in removing over 35,000 tonnesof cargo and most of the 440 tonnes of heavy fuel oil bunkers from TASMANSPIRIT. After completion of the cargo transfer operation about 1,000 tonnes
remained un-recovered due to the constant agitation by wave action in damaged
tanks. This was treated by adding dispersants to the tanks in question.
Once the cargo had been removed from the casualty, beach cleaning anddisposal of oily waste were undertaken by various authorities following strategies
recommended by ITOPF. At a meeting on 10th October, the Crisis Coordination
Committee set up by President Musharraf accepted that cleaning of Clifton Beach
had achieved as much as could reasonably be expected and that the beach was
sufficiently clean for re-opening to the public.
It is thought that about 30,000 tonnes of cargo were spilled. Given the lightcharacter of the crude and the high mixing energy in the many damaged cargotanks generated by the incessant heavy swell, it is likely that most of the spilled
oil dispersed naturally. Repeated surveys conducted after the tanker broke in
two showed little or no impact on mangroves, salt pans and other sensitive
resources. The geographical extent of shoreline oiling was limited to a ten-mileradius around the grounded tanker. The main reason for such limited impact isthe low persistence of Iranian Light crude.
In response to requests from Pakistan authorities, the IMO sent two experts toKarachi to assist KPT with advice on emergency response measures and later ona further expert on the formulation of claims following guidelines set out in theIOPC Fund Claims Manual. Additional experts were provided by UNEP and IUCN
to advise on the issue of potential environmental damage. The authorities areundertaking a monitoring programme to evaluate the effects of the oil spill on
the environment. A three-month fishing ban was imposed by the Marine Fisheries
Department along the coastline directly affected by oil, extending five nautical
miles offshore.

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