Author’s Original Manuscript (AOM)This article has been accepted for publication in Journal of Forest Research, publishedby Taylor & Francis on October 19, 2020.

Citation:
Takahashi, T., Matsushita, K., & Nishimura, T. (2020). Community actions against
anticommons of forests in contemporary Japan: case studies of former common forests.
Journal of Forest Research, 1–7.(on-line)
https://doi.org/10.1080/13416979.2020.1834715

Community actions against anticommons of forests in contemporary
Japan: Case studies of former common forests
Takuya Takahashia*, Koji Matsushitab and Toshiaki NishimuracaSchool of Environmental Science, The University of Shiga Prefecture, Hikone, Japan;
Graduate School of Agriculture, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan; c Nogaku, aconsulting firm for rural communities, Koka, Japanb* Corresponding author: Takuya Takahashi, taka.takuya@gmail.com or
tak@ses.usp.ac.jp1Community actions against anticommons of forests in contemporary
Japan: Case studies of former commons forests
Over the past few decades, many Japanese forest owners and communities havesuffered from the outcomes of anticommons (parcelization) phenomenon. Since
the Edo Era (17th through 19th centuries), many Japanese commons forests havebeen subdivided and placed under private ownership. Individual owners of thesubdivided small forests (carved out from former commons forests) have lostinterest in forestry, resulting in unclear borders. Many owners have relocatedoutside the villages (absent owners) and/or have passed the land down throughgenerations, resulting in unknown ownership. There are several ways toameliorate the anticommons phenomenon in Japan, as illustrated by theseexamples. 1) Despite the expense, a residents’ association successfully reappropriated co-ownership land by “technically” suing the current respective coowners. 2) Some residents’ associations collectively manage subdivided forests
as one unit to reduce the damage caused by animals such as wild boars or deer.
However, the units are still legally separate and owned by individuals. 3) A landowners’ association stipulated that a vacating resident owner must sell her forest
to the remaining residents. These three cases show how motivations, other thanprofits, could help address the anticommons phenomenon. These motivations
include the intent to keep the community’s holding intact in the event ofconsolidation at the municipality level, to protect the land against pest animals,
and to keep the community’s drinking water pure.
Keywords: anticommons; parcelization; absent owners; residents’ association;
Japan

Introduction
Background
Small holding sizes of Japan’s individual forests present huge anticommons (Heller
1998; Heller 2008) challenges for management and utilization of forests’ ecosystemservices in Japan. In fact, 0.1 to 1 ha holdings constitute 58% in terms of numbers (10%2

in terms of areas) of all individual forest holdings in Shiga Prefecture, Japan, a studysite in this paper, as of 1990 (Statistics Bureau, 1993) (Fig. 1). Such holding patterns
have their roots in the history of the common forests in Japan.

(Insert Figure 1 near here)

In Japan, historical division of common forests among commoners started in theearly modern era (the 17th to 19th centuries) of Japan. It is often said that the infiltrationof the market economy into agricultural villages, which had been based on selfsufficient economies, promoted this process. During the 19th and 20th centuries, as theindustrialization of Japanese society went on, the owners of those subdivided forests(parcelization) stopped using forests for traditional purposes (fodder, fertilizer, and fuel,etc.) because they replaced wood harvested from their forests with other industrial
products such as compound feed, chemical fertilizers, and fossil fuel. Increasing
demand for construction wood encouraged the owners of subdivided forests to plantseedlings of relatively fast-growing softwood species such as Japanese cedar(Cryptomeria japonica) and Japanese cypress (Chamaecyparis obtusa). Especially, therecovery and high economic growth that followed World War II in Japan resulted inhigh timber prices and encouraged active tree planting by individual forest owners
while forests in Japan, which had been over-harvested during the war, could not respondto the demand sufficiently at this period. In turn, the high timber prices motivated policy
makers to liberalize wood imports in this period, and the increasing wood imports
resulted in competitive pressure on the domestic wood market and decreasing
profitability of forest management in Japan. Consequently, forest owners have been
losing interest in forest management and ownership. In addition, the new civil code of3

Japan following World War II orders property owners, in principle, to bequeath forests
to their sons and daughters equally, while the pre-war civil code included the traditional
concept of family assets, which were supposed to be inherited by a series of family
chiefs. This new inheritance practice further encouraged parcelisation of individual
forests.
Recent depopulation in Japan had already started in rural areas, especially inmountainous regions of Japan in the 1960s. In many cases, legal owners of forests inrural areas now live in areas far from their forests (absent owners). Since the borders offorests owned by individual owners have often not been clearly recorded and tamperingwith neighbouring forests without proper permission is illegal, on-site inspection byrelated owners is necessary for managing forests. In addition to the low interest of forest
owners in their forests and high transaction costs such as on-site inspection, small sizesof individual forest ownership hinder utilization of forests. Currently, many forest
operators are pursuing low-cost operations, employing machines such as harvesters andprocessors, which are expensive, while high-volume operation is needed. Small-size
forest ownership makes the establishment of economies of scale difficult in many cases.
Policy responses by the Japanese government include the promotion of theassembly of forest operations by forest operators such as forestry cooperatives orforestry companies. Forest operators assemble individual forests for the purpose offorest management, while individual ownership forests remain as they are. However,unclear borders among individual ownership properties or low interest of owners could
again hinder such assembly. Especially, co-ownership with many co-owners and small
individual ownership properties, which were often former common forests in theJapanese iriai system, present tough challenges to the policy makers and forest
operators who are promoting and practicing assembly of individual forests.
4Structure of this paper
In this study, we interpret these challenges as anticommons problems (Heller 1998;2008) and describe three cases in which communities have resolved these problems
themselves in a bottom-up manner (Fig. 2) while we here do not deal with policy-driven
official assembly by forest operators mentioned in the above. The second “Materials
and Method” section presents research methods we employed. The third “Results”
section describes three cases in detail. The fourth “Discussion” discusses about thefindings from the cases and speculating about future development in this line ofresearch.

(Insert Figure 2 near here)

Materials and Methods
We selected three cases in which communities resolved anticommons situations
themselves, in Shiga Prefecture, Japan. Shiga Prefecture is one of 47 prefectures inJapan and has about 1% of the total area and population of Japan. Close to large cities
such as Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe, Shiga Prefecture has a significant manufacturingsector but maintains traditional agricultural landscapes (Fig. 3). Shiga Prefecture
includes the largest lake in Japan, Lake Biwa, and the prefectural government places
much emphasis on environmental protection. We interpret the following to be casestudies conducted in areas where historical subdivision is well advanced, given that the
Kyoto, Osaka. and Shiga region is considered to have been economically advanced in
the early modern era of Japan from the 17th through 19th century. From 2015 through2019, we collected documents/statistical data and interviewed the main players in thecommunities with respect to the initiatives.
5

(Insert Figure 3 near here)
Results
Formal transformation of co-ownership into community ownership (Village A)
First, we present an overview of Village A (Matsushita and Takahashi 2017). This
village is a mountain village with an aging population. In the early modern era of Japan,
from the 17th to 19th centuries, the village was a post town in a mountainous areaconnecting areas on the Sea of Japan and the Kyoto-Osaka area. Currently, thepopulation numbers 32, and 19 (59%) of the residents were 75 years or older in 2015
(Statistics Bureau 2017). The size of the village is about 800 ha based on the property
tax ledger. 1 and most of the area is covered by forests. A majority of the forests are
hardwood forests, which previously produced fuel wood and charcoal raw material.
Besides, the prefectural forestry corporation planted softwood trees on 100 ha of thevillage land under a share-cropping scheme. The corporation returned the plantation
forests to the village because the scheme was not as profitable as originally expected.
Formal transformation of co-ownership into community ownership occurred asfollows. Diverse titles such as former municipalities and co-ownership were found
before the title changes. About 400 ha of forests were registered under the title of theresidents’ association. The remaining forests were registered under the titles of coownership such as “Mr. Tanaka and 10 other people.” Titles for about 90 such forest
stands were identified. The number of “other people” ranged from 10 to 20. Almost

1

Actual figures for the area could be several times greater than those based on the property tax
ledger. This type of discrepancy occurs often with forest lands in Japan.

6

1,000 people who had inherited land claims were found all over Japan. The residents’association sued the 1,000 people so that the village could legally ascertain its rights to
those lands from 2004 through 2015. The residents’ association sent a letter explaining
its intentions, i.e., rectifying legal confusion, to the defendants. A majority of those sued
(defendants) accepted the association’s claim. Many of the defendants did not evenknow about the land. In planning and implementing these actions, the leadership of acouncil member of a municipality, which was amalgamated into the current newmunicipality, as well as the expertise of an official of the prefectural government, wereindispensable. Fund earned as fees from a resort company renting the commons land of
Village A also contributed to this initiative.
The community currently has the following ideas regarding future forest
management. With respect to hardwood forests, a majority (80%) of the village forests,
no specific plan is being considered. With respect to softwood plantation forests (100ha), thinning every 10 years by forest cooperative workers is being considered, meaninga thinning of 10 ha each year. The village is also pursuing a new use of its forests. The
Research Institute for Humanity and Nature (RIHN) began experimentally shifting
cultivation in the village’s forests, collaborating with the residents’ association. On thisexperimental forest land, turnips are grown and harvested each year. Even thoughVillage A has made a progress in establishing community ownership again, it still has
further challenges: Aging and a decreasing population threatens community
sustainability.
We summarize the findings from this case as follows:•

It is possible to transform co-ownership titles with many potential claimants tothe title of the residents’ association through court action.

7

•

A large part of the potential claimants who inherited rights accepted the opinionof the residents’ association.

•

The scheme of authorized community organizations (Ninka chien dantai), a newscheme (1991–) enabling such organizations to own assets, may haveencouraged this initiative.

Informal reintegration for the purpose of reducing damage by wild animals(Village B)
Village B is an agricultural village located on the border between agricultural crop
lands, mainly rice paddy fields, and forested hills. Its population is 97, and 14 residents(14% of the population) were 75 years or older in 2015 (Statistics Bureau 2017). The
area of the village is 76 ha, and forests cover 52 ha. The ownership consists ofindividuals’ 16 ha, shrine/temples’ 3 ha, community district’s 20 ha, and coownership’s 13 ha. The plantation covers 4 ha (mostly Japanese cypress), and naturalforests cover the remaining 47 ha (pine (Pinus densiflora), 32 ha; hardwood, 15 ha).
The remaining 1 ha is an unforested area and bamboo forests.
The informal reintegration of the forests went as follows. The main purpose offorest management is to discourage wild animals such as deer and wild boars fromcoming out of the forests by practicing active thinning and setting up buffer zones
between croplands/residential areas and forests. Thinning of trees of certain sizes
requires professional skills and equipment; individual owners must subcontract forest
operators to conduct thinning. Since timber revenue itself cannot cover the necessary
costs for subcontracting, if a forest owner wishes to receive a forestry subsidy, he/she
must prepare a forest management plan with a certain size of forest (2012–). Therefore,
members of village B jointly prepared an integrated management plan for individual
8forests, as well as shrine/temple, community district, and co-ownership forests in 2012.
The Land Improvement District organization 2 employed their expertise in managementof agricultural land to prepare the forest management plan. In particular, an officer ofthe Land Improvement District led the whole process in the village where he lives in theearly stages of this initiative. Subsidies from the national, prefectural. and municipal
governments, along with timber revenues, covered the cost of thinning. Individualowners agreed that the residents’ association would receive a possible profit without
resolving the border issues. The village had to resolve border issues only with othervillages, not among village members. This is the key to resolving the anticommons
situation in this case. A forestry cooperative implemented thinning as a subcontractor.
After the introduction of this initiative, significant thinning activities took place.
In 2012, six ha of forests in village B and neighboring villages were thinned. Similar
programs were implemented in 70 ha of forests in eight blocks, including 11 villages inthe same city from 2012 through 2014. For the purpose of avoiding outsider ownership,buy-back of forests sold to people living in remote areas took place several times.
While diffusion of the practices in Village B among communities in the samemunicipality has been considered by the forestry cooperative, it is difficult since theowners of plantations with higher value timber are reluctant to go with this type ofsetup.

2

A Land Improvement District is “an agricultural water use organization which has thequalification of a juridical person and implements land improvement projects, operation andmaintenance of land improvement facilities and control of irrigation and drainage incompliance with the Land Improvement Law” (Nagata 1985).

9

Two findings from this case are identified as follows.
•

The specific purpose of reducing damage done by wild animals to agriculture
induced the reintegration of private forest management.

•

Expertise and experience in the management of agricultural lands helped toinduce the reintegration.

Informal reintegration for the purpose of community water source protection(Village C)
Village C is a suburban community close to both a city center and a mountainous area.
In the early modern era of Japan, the village was a post town on one of the five majorroutes of Japan. The village’s population is 179, and 18 residents 75 years or older
constituted 10% of the total population in 2015 (Statistics Bureau 2017). Watershed
forests cover the watershed area for their drinking water, which is provided by thevillage’s small-scale drinking water supply system. The total area of the village is 129
ha, while its watershed forests cover 71 ha. Most of the forests are individually owned
forests. Plantation forests cover 14 ha, and natural forests cover 51 ha, while theremaining 5 ha are unforested or covered by bamboo as of March, 2004 according to theforest register. Japanese cedar constitute 9 ha; Japanese cypress, 2 ha; pine, 38 ha;
Kunugi oak, 5 ha; and others, 14 ha.
Some years after World War II, fuel wood was not in use anymore. A few
owners sold their forests to outsiders. Responding to the situation, the Common Land
Association, an organization of former commoners, was established around 1970 bymore than 30 members, and the members agreed to refrain from abandoning theirforests. The Association planted trees such as Japanese cypress and cedar and bought
10

back forests sold to outsiders. Committee members manage the forests near thecommunity’s water source (less than 10 ha), regardless of who owns them. A charcoal
kiln was built, and charcoal has been produced utilizing waste wood harvested during
forest management. Waste wood from forest management is also used for bonfire fuelfor the village’s shrine. A soy sauce company owner has been an active participant inthis initiative. The soy sauce company emphasizes the importance of clean water for
manufacturing soy sauce. Donations from Association members and voluntary labor
contributions from them have supported this initiative. Advice from lawyers in the cityand from the metropolitan area was employed throughout these processes.
We summarize two findings from this case.
•

The specific purpose of water source protection promoted the informal, ad-hoc
reintegration of water source forests.

•

A local business that relied on the water source led the active forest
management.

Discussion
We compare the above-described three cases in Table 1. We examine the three cases
according to eight criteria, i.e., issue, response, new use, finance, labor, driving force,leadership and legal rights.

(Insert Table 1 near here)

Although we identify few similarities among them on the surface, we can draw
five lessons from the three cases.

11•

Under certain favourable conditions, communities can resolve anticommons
situations and manage or utilize their resources.

•

Initial motivations were benefits other than timber production. These
motivations include maintaining a community with decreasing population,
protecting against wild animals, and protecting a water source. Focusing on
multi-functionality of forests may be a key to resolving aniticommons situations.
At the same time, the reintegration of timber production, which would reducethe costs of forest management, is occurring.

•

Financing from outside institutions and legal assistance are critical. Profits fromtimber production alone cannot make these initiatives happen.

•

Leadership is important in all three cases. One of the most difficult issues inresolving anticommons situations is bringing back the ownership of absent
owners to insider owners or the community. In particular, negotiations with
absent owners require skills, which the leaders in these cases have learned fromtheir experiences outside the village.

•

Keeping insider ownership appears to be important. In the second and thirdcases, buying back the ownership of absent owners was possible because thenumber of absent owners were relatively small. If the number of absent owners
had been large, the initiatives mentioned here would have been impossible.
Lastly, we would like to speculate on the further development of this line ofresearch. Heller (2008) provided a “medical model in structuring solutions (p.191)” foranticommons that consists of prevention, treatment, and alternative medicine.
Alternative medicines include “Gossip, Shame, and Reputation,” “Voluntary
Agreement,” and “Philanthropy.” The solutions presented in this study appear to havecertain similarities to those “alternative medicines” in the sense that solutions in this12

study were also created and tested on the ground and with a bottom-up style. Whatstrengths and weaknesses these “alternative medicines” offer compared to more formal
treatments often provided by official institutions is an interesting question. In fact,
Progressive Property Theorists, a group of legal scholars, pay attention to creative
functions of bottom-up style law-making (Peñalver, 2007). In a similar vein, fromformer common forests in Japan, we may be able to learn novel and innovative
solutions to the tragedy of anticommons.

Acknowledgement
We deeply appreciate the cooperation of residents and professionals in research sites.
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 15H02871.

Acknowledgement
The authors declare no conflicts of interest associated with this manuscript.
References
Heller MA. 1998. The tragedy of the anticommons: property in the transition from Marx
to markets. Harvard Law Rev. 621-688.
Heller MA. 2008. The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks
Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives. New York, N.Y.: Basic Books.
Matsushita K, Takahashi T. 2017. An essay on changes in the titles of forest commons.
J. of For. Commons. 37: 73-75.

13

Nagata K. 1985. History of land improvement districts. Irrigation Engineering andRural Plan. 7: 12-20.
Peñalver EM, Katyal SK. 2007. Property outlaws. Cornell Law Faculty Publications.
Paper 28. http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/28
Statistics Bureau, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery 1993. Forestry
Census Historical Databook (Ringyou sensasu ruinen toukeisyo). 200-201.Tokyo:
Nourin toukei kyoukai.
Statistics Bureau, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2017. National
Census 2015 [accessed 2019 April 23]; [about 5 screens]
https://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2015/kekka.html

14

Figure 1. Individual forest ownership patterns in Shiga Prefecture

15

Figure 2. Conceptual framework of this study

16

Figure 3. Map of Shiga Prefecture

National census borders (similar to community district borders) and forests (green
shade)

Source:https://www.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=bf1517e6867c416d817a46d0b444dc5f#vis
ualizeThe map of the whole Japan cites the digital map (land basic information) published by
the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (GSI) and ESRI Japan’s data on themunicipality borders of the whole country.

17

Table 1. Comparison of three cases
Village

A

B

C

Issue

Decreasing population

Wild animals

Protection of water source

Response

Reintegration of titles

Subsidized program under a unified plan

Voluntary management of individual
forests

New use

Shifting cultivation

Buffer against animal invasion, “sheep”
gardenCharcoal production; bonfire

Finance

Rent revenue

Subsidies; timber sales

Donation from residents; subsidies

Labor

Subcontracting to a forestry
cooperative

Subcontracting to a forestry cooperative

Own labor

Driving forces

Residents’ association

Residents’ association; Land
improvement district

Common Land Association; Shrine
parishioners’ association

Leadership

Former council member

Officer of the land improvement district

Local businessperson

Legal rights

Transformation from co-ownershipto community ownership

Buyback of sold forests; demarcating
outside borders

Buyback of sold forests18