CEAC Commentary introduces outstanding news
analyses and noteworthy opinions in Japan, but it
does not represent the views of CEAC as an institution.

June 13, 2006

The Idea of New International Order China Is
Seeking and An East Asia Community (4)By AMAKO Satoshi
4. Coordination of Regional Integration in East Asia and Alliance Politics – Japan Holds
the Key
How are other countries in Asia responding to China’s moves toward the establishment of anorganization for regional cooperation in East Asia, and what influence are China’s moves likely
to have on the regional order in the Asia-Pacific region? Before examining these issues, theregion’s extremely disproportionate structure in terms of the size of states needs to berecognized. The table below compares China, Japan, South Korea and ASEAN in terms ofterritorial area, population, GDP and per-capita GDP.
10,000 km2Population (mil.)GDP (US$100 mil.)

Per-Capita GDP (US$)

China

960 (66%)

12.9 (64.5%)

14,100 (20.6%)

1,090 (2.5%)

Japan

38 (2.5%)

1.3 (6.5%)

44,500 (65%)

32,610 (74.3%)

South Korea

10 (0.5%)

0.5 (2.5%)

4,339 (6.3%)

8,982 (20.5%)

ASEAN (10 members)

448 (30%)

5.3 (26.5%)

5,553 (8.1%)

1,164 (2.7%)

Within the ASEAN10+3, China commands an overwhelming share of about 65% of both area ofterritory and total population. In terms of GDP, Japan accounts for 65%, Japan and China
combined account for a little over 85%, and Japan, China and South Korea combined accountfor about 92%, indicating that the share of Northeast Asia is far larger than that of Southeast
Asia. Whatever institutional framework is built, the disparity of this magnitude is likely to be of
extreme significance in considering the role and influence of each component member of theEast Asia Community.
In retrospect, the idea of the East Asia Community without the United States dates back to the“East Asian Economic Group” (EAEG, later EAEC) proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir in 1990. The United States strongly opposed the idea, and Japan’s cool response
following the U.S. opposition effectively shelved the scheme, but the idea was clearly theprototype of the “East Asia Community” under discussion today. Learning from the experiencesof the “Asian monetary crisis,” ASEAN leaders are now hoping to boost the “Asian regional
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economic strength” by strengthening economic relations within Asia and also to maintain
ASEAN’s initiative in dealing with the two big regional powers of China and Japan. SouthKorea, for its part, has proposed and actively promoted the EASG (East Asia Study Group) andEAVG (East Asia Vision Group), both advocated by President Kim Dae Jung, and taken apositive toward the establishment of the “mechanism for Japan-China-South Korea
cooperation.” However, it is also true that these countries and areas entertain concerns and asense of vigilance against a sudden strengthening of China’s leadership. Thus, for them, Japan’s
presence is essential.
How does the United States view moves toward regional cooperation in East Asia? At a seminaron China in Washington on May 16, 2002, cosponsored by George Washington University and
the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), former U.S. Ambassador to China J.S. Royemphasized that the United States would accept “East Asia’s regional economic integration aslong as it does not discriminate against the United States.” On the other hand, he voiceddeep-rooted concern about China, saying “the rising power of China might destabilize Asia’s
politics and the economy, or China might make the same mistakes as Germany and Japan did inthe past.” His statements probably reflect a common perception among Americans. Thus, it canbe argued that Japan’s initiative is crucial in ensuring that the regional integration of East Asia is“not discriminatory but is mutually beneficial and cooperative” for the United States.
Meanwhile, the strategic position of Japan is believed to have risen considerably within China’sown strategy. Prof. Shi Yinhong of the Chinese People’s University, who attracted a lot ofattention for his call for new thinking toward Japan, argued that “it is not enough for China togive top priority to its relations with the United States and maintain good Sino-U.S. relations. . . .
It is necessary to reduce China’s passivity toward the United States and strengthen its diplomaticleverage toward it” and “Japan has a population of over 100 million people as well as
world-class economic might and cutting-edge technology, and thus has all the necessary
conditions for becoming a military power. . . . The forging of closer ties between China andJapan is very important. China will not be able to sustain itself if Japan becomes hostile toward
China, in addition to the United States, Taiwan and potentially India.” Thus, it would be
strategically natural for China to try and encourage Japan to decrease its cozy ties with anddependence on the United States and gain relative independence. Moreover, China apparently
sees Japan as an essential participant in the economic integration of East Asia, sincenon-participation by the world’s second largest economic power would substantially undermine
the international presence and impact of any such integration.
Then, where does Japan itself stand? From the very beginning, Japan was enthusiastic about
regional cooperation. For example, around 1980, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira proposed the“Pan-Pacific Concept.” In 1989, Japan, together with Australia, advocated the establishment ofAPEC. In 1997, at the ASEAN meeting with dialogue partners, Prime Minister Ryutaro
Hashimoto proposed the ASEAN+3 framework. Despite all these initiatives, Japan was rather2

cautious toward the idea of a “community” limited to East Asia, due to its consideration for its
alliance with the United States and its concern over the potential threat of China. However, inNovember 2001, in light of China’s very aggressive strategy for regional cooperation, including
its “accord with ASEAN nations to conclude FTAs within 10 years,” Japan began to worry that
China’s initiatives could sweep in not only ASEAN but the entire East Asian region if Japan
stood by doing nothing. Thus, it came to positively respond and promote “real progress” ineconomic regional cooperation. It then embarked on the building of an EAC as an effort torebuild its own initiatives.
In 2001, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry put forth plans for an “East Asia businessarea” and “East Asia free trade area.” The “East Asia free trade area” scheme envisioned theformation of a free trade region made up of ASEAN countries, which have a low percentage ofintra-ASEAN trade and high dependence on external trade, along with Japan, the newly
industrialized economies (NIES) and China. The concept also assumed improved conditions foreconomic integration in such areas as technical cooperation and financial assistance, which
could be expected to give a further boost to the formation of the “free trade area.” In November
2002, at the ASEAN + 3 Summit, it was decided to create a working group to prepare for theestablishment of the “East Asia free trade area.” At the same meeting, the region’s leaders also
agreed to the Chiang Mai Initiative for currency swap arrangements as a precautionary step for
any recurrence of the monetary crisis, showing steady progress in moves toward regional
economic integration. Japan also reversed its previous reluctance and began to positively
consider the conclusion of bilateral FTAs with ASEAN nations. Then, at the Japan-ASEAN
Summit meeting in Tokyo in late 2003, it officially declared its intention of seeking to build an“East Asia Community.”
Japan’s stance toward economic integration in the region is as outlined above, but Japan remains
lukewarm toward the idea of building a mechanism for regional cooperation in the area ofsecurity. Needless to say, its security strategy is based on the Japan-U.S. alliance, and it remains
extremely cautious toward anything that could loosen that framework. Rather, there exists astrong school of thought that argues that given the problem of North Korea’s suspecteddevelopment of nuclear weapons, China-Taiwan relations, and the potential future threat from
China, Japan’s fundamental security policy should be to strengthen its alliance with the UnitedStates. The formulation of new defense cooperation Guidelines and its decision to participate in
the U.S.-led missile defense scheme apparently represent the concretization of this line ofthought. Thus, the basic stance of the current Japanese government may be summed up as being
positive toward the facilitation of regional economic integration but not considering regional
integration for security.
(This is the text of an article by Prof. AMAKO Satoshi, Professor of Waseda University andMember of the Council on East Asian Community, which was originally posted on thewebsite of “Amako Ajia-ron” (http://eac.cocolog-nifty.com/amako/).)3