September 19th, 2019—the Tokyo
District Court found three former
TEPCO executives, Chairman Tsunehisa
Katsumata and Vice Presidents Ichiro
Takekuro and Sakae Mutō, NOT GUILTYof criminal negligence resulting in the2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster.
The verdict rewrites history to castnuclear accidents as unavoidable, paving
the way for future nuclear disasters.

FUTABA HOSPITAL

JSDF-led evacuation delayed for days
because of the nuclear meltdown. 44
patients died as a result.

March 12, 2011 5:44am / Residents within a
10km radius of Fukushima Daiichi ordered toevacuate. This includes 436 patients at Futaba
Hospital and an adjoining nursing home.
March 12, 2011 3:36pm / Reactor 1 explodes.
JSDF departure delayed over 24 hours untilradioprotective gear arrives.
March 14, 2011 morning / JSDF arrive. 132
people evacuated. Evacuation takes over 10hours. No food or drink. 6 people die during it.
March 14, 2011 9:15pm / JSDF ordered to leave
because of high radiation levels, abandoning 89
patients.
March 15, 2011 9:00am / Rescue operations
restart, but cancelled after 2 hours because ofradiation levels.
March 16, 2011 / Evacuation completed. 44
dead because of delays caused by the nuclear
meltdown.

TSUNAMI SAFETY

Trial evidence proved that TEPCO knewof a tsunami risk 9 years before 3.11.
They made plans to implement tsunami
safety measures in 2008, but cancelledthem after learning the associated costs.
2002 (NINE YEARS before 3.11) / MEXT’s
Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion(HERP) publishes a longterm evaluation ofearthquake activity in the area. It concludes there
is a 20% chance that a M8.2 earthquake will
strike in the next 30 years. Based on this report,
the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)
regulating the Japanese nuclear industry orders
TEPCO to calculate the height of any resulting
tsunami. TEPCO says it will comply, then doesnothing.
September 2006 / NISA orders all nuclear power
plants in Japan to evaluate how safe their facilities
are from earthquakes and tsunamis based on theHERP study, and report the results.
July 16, 2007 / TEPCO’s mega-plant, KashiwazakiKariya, goes offline due to extensive damagefrom the Chūetsu earthquake. TEPCO finances
dive into the red.
January 2008 / TEPCO requests tsunami heightcalculations from its daughter company.
February 16, 2008 / First meeting with TEPCO
executives on tsunami safety measures.
March 18, 2008 / Detailed tsunami heightcalculations reported to TEPCO. Predictedtsunami height: 15.7 meters.
June 10, 2008 / Meeting with Mutō explaining
tsunami safety measures. Mutō requests next
steps to implement measures.

July 21, 2008 / Expenses associated withearthquake safety measures reported to Mutōand Takekuro. Costs: 5237 billion yen total (about50 billion USD). These estimates did not include
costs for tsunami measures.
July 31, 2008 / Mutō’s June 10 request fulfilled.
Tsunami plans ready to implement. But Mutōends the meeting by asking the Japan Societyof Civil Engineers (private research foundation
funded by power companies) to redo the tsunami
height calculations. TEPCO cancels all tsunami
preparation measures. Internal email: “They were
saying what would the economic impact be if
Fukushima shuts down [for construction] while
even Kashiwazaki is offline.”
February 11, 2009 / Meeting. Nearly all nuclear
power plants besides those owned by TEPCO
scheduled to finish their final NISA reports byNovember 2010. Only TEPCO submits its report
2 years late. TEPCO does not submit a midterm
report, with handwritten notes “issues,” “can’tsubmit,” “under scrutiny.”
February 6, 2011 / TEPCO tries to delay its
final report until March 2016. NISA requests anexplanation.
March 7, 2011—four days before 3.11 / TEPCO
finally reports the 15.7 meter tsunami height
prediction to NISA.
March 11, 2011 / M9.1 earthquake and 15 metertsunami strike Fukushima Daiichi, leading to apower outage and meltdowns in three reactors.
BY COMPARISON, tsunami safety measures
implemented at the Tōkai Daini Nuclear Power
Plant under the direction of a TEPCO employee
prevented a nuclear disaster when the tsunami
struck on 3.11.

9/19 VERDICT

WHAT CAN I DO?

Denies the need to guarantee safety from
nuclear disaster—in fact, argues that no suchlevel of safety was ever sought by the public.
This is contradicted by the basic pillar of pre2011 national nuclear policy: absolute safety
from nuclear accidents. The 1992 Ikata Supreme
Court verdict also clearly states that the nationalgovernment must hold power companies toa safety standard guarding against even theslightest chance of nuclear disaster. This is a
catastrophic verdict that rewrites history tolegitimate nuclear negligence, and ensuresthat nuclear disasters will continue to occur inJapan.

SUPPORT the plaintiffs
Join the Supporters’ Group:https://shien-dan.org/english-form/

Does not discuss the severe cirucmstances underwhich Futaba Hospital patients had to evacuate.
Does not acknowledge that despite multipleattempts, JSDF could not immediately evacuate
everyone because of the nuclear meltdown.

SHARE this information
Feel free to print and distribute your own
copies of this flier, post on social media,
or organize a teach-in. If you are an artistor have translation skills, please take theinitiative to translate information about thenuclear disaster, make infographics, andotherwise help spread the word. Contact
justicefrom1f@protonmail.com to coordinate.

Denies that tsunami preparation measures wereexplained to TEPCO executives on trial, despite
irrefutable evidence that they had heard such
explanations and made plans based on them.
This upheld defendants’ claims that they “did notremember” hearing information relayed to themat meetings.
Does not make a conclusion about thefundamental argument of the trial, which
was whether the tsunami measures TEPCO
considered could have prevented the nuclear
disaster. It avoids this question entirely, acquitting
the defendants with the logic that (1) only
shutting down the reactor could prevent anuclear disaster, and (2) no one specifically told
the defendants to shut down Fukushima Daiichi.
Ignores the fact that other power plants avoided
nuclear disaster by implementing tsunami safetymeasures.

Donate:
郵便振替口座口座番号:02230-9-120291
口座名:福島原発刑事訴訟支援団
ゆうちょ銀行 (他の銀行、金庫等からの振込)
店名(店番):二二九(ニニキユウ)店 (229)
預金種目:当座
口座番号:0120291

FOLLOW for updates
Twitter: @shien_dan
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Youtube: 福島原発刑事訴訟支援団
ORGANIZE a solidarity action
Demonstrate at TEPCO offices and Japanese
embassies/consulates
Send public messages of support
Boycott TEPCO investors
LEARN more
Read plaintiffs’ statements at epubfukushima.
com. See fukushima311voices.com for news.

TEPCO

東京電力福島第一原発事故の刑事責任

傍聴速報
CRIMINAL TRIAL
September 19, 2019 Verdict

東京電力旧経営陣 3 人が業務上過失致死傷罪で強制起訴された裁判
裁 104 号法廷において、20 人を超える証人を呼ぶ集中審理が行われ９月５日の公判で、東電で原発の耐震対策を担う地震対策センターさんが、12 ～ 14 年にかけて検察官に行った「供述調書」が、指定弁かにされました。
そこで語られた驚愕の事実は、「有罪」を確信するに“NOT GUILTY”//////////////////
MAKING WAY
FOR THE NEXTN U C L E A RDISASTER

2018 年９月５日傍聴記

人見 や

山下センター長の供述調書によると、「長期評価に沿った津波対チェックに必須である」という実施方針が、勝俣被告、清水社長、武陣が出席する「御前会議」で承認された。
当時「御前会議」は、最高意会よりも、強い決定機関だったのだという︕
しかし、東電設計に津波高を解析させたところ、15.7 メートルといを叩き出してしまった。
対策の沖合防波堤の試算は数百億円オーダーが終わるまで原発を止めろ」と言われるリスクを怖れ、卓袱台を返し
武藤被告は防波堤を造らなくて済むように、「専門家への根回し」「直し、低減化」を指示︕ 事故の原因は、これら東電経営陣の誤判断かなのに、どうして２度も不起訴にしたのか。
いまや市民の手で「被告」となった３人は、「長期評価は信頼度が低いなかった」
とか、トンデモない言い訳を繰り返して、無罪を叫んでいる
恥を知れと言いたい。
恥を知れと言いたい。
恥を知れと言いたい。