論文

Idealism and Pragmatism: The Boxer
Indemnity Scholarship Program and theBeginning of America’s Educational
Diplomacy with China
Guochao ZHAO

Introduction
Started from 1909 and set up to continue for thirty one years, the Boxer
Indemnity Scholarship Program1 (hereafter the BISP) left a notable mark in thehistory of Sino -American relations. This American refund of the Boxer
Indemnity “aided a number of diverse schools and universities throughout
China.” 2 Among them, the most prominent was the establishment in 1911 in
Beijing of a preparatory school, which was the predecessor of Tsinghua
University. 3 During the operation of this educational project, this school trained
and sent “hundreds of Chinese to the United States as students.” Many returned
to China “as doctors, engineers, scientists and teachers.”4 In short, this program“put higher education in China and in the United States within the reach of
thousands of Chinese students.” 5 In addition, Theodore Roosevelt’s 19 08
1

2
3
4
5

The Boxer Rebellion was anti-foreign movement initiated by peasants but supported by
the Chinese government that claimed hundreds lives of foreigners. It broke out inNovember 1899 when rebels’sieged the legation quarter in Beijing, and the rebellion
reached its peak in the summer of 1900. The western powers sent expeditionary troops
to relieve the crisis and occupied Beijing. As a condition for withdrawing, the western
powers demanded the Chinese government to sign a protocol stipulating China’s
obligation to pay an indemnity of 450 million tales of silver (equivalent to 333 million
dollars). The American share of this indemnity was about 25 million dollars, and almost
half of this amount was remitted by the U.S. government in 1908, for establishing schools
in China and sending Chinese students to universities in the United States.
Theodore D. Pappas, “Arthur Henderson Smith and the American Mission in China,”
The Wisconsin Magazine of History 70, no. 3 (1987): 180.
Located in Beijing, Tstinghua University ( 清华大学 ), is one of the most prestigious
universities in China.
Pappas, “Smith and the American Mission,” 180.
Ibid., 182.

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executive order directed that while China paid off its indemnity, the US would
return the surplus indemnity on monthly installments. 6 This remission
arrangement also ensured that the unrest and turbulence of the early twentiethcentury China could not impact the BISP, allowing it to become “the mostimportant scheme for educating Chinese students in America and arguably themost consequential and successful in the entire foreign-study movement oftwentieth century China.”7
While recognizing the benefits achieved by the BISP in educating Chinese,the influence of this scheme was not merely confined to bringing modern
education to China. By remitting a portion of the indemnity and devoting it toeducational purposes, the effect of this “very far-reaching” project was, as an
American government report at the time concluded, “altogether inestimable.”8
Diplomatically, the BISP “has placed the United States, in the minds of theChinese, in a category entirely different from that of any other nationality.”9 It is
hence not surprising that this educational program is often hailed as an “act ofinternational friendship.”10 In other words, the initiation of the BISP exerted
positive effects on Chinese-American diplomacy.
There should be a connection between America’s China policy with theestablishment of the BISP considering it was launched in early twentiethcentury, which is a “watershed in U.S foreign policy.”11 Additionally, it waspreceded by the articulation of the “Open Door Policy,”12 which became
6

Theodore Roosevelt,“Executive Order,”Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, December 3, 1908, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1908/d64.
7 Weili Ye, Seeking Modernity in China’s Name: Chinese Students in the United States,
1900-1927 (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2001), 10.
8 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Chinese Indemnity: Hearings Before the United States
Ho u s e C o mmi t t e e o n Fo re i g n Af f a ir s, Si x t y -Ei gh th C o n g re s s, F ir s t S e s s i o n(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1924), 65.
9 Ibid.
10 Jerry Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door: America and China, 1905-1921(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), 43.
11 Qingjia Edward Wang, “Guest from the Open Door: the Reception of Chinese Students
into the United States, 1900s-1920s,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 1,
no.3 (1994): 55.
12 The Secretary of State John Hay articulated the concept of the “Open Door” in a seriesof diplomatic notes in 1899-1900 which aimed to secure the equal opportunity forinternational trade and commerce in China, as well as China’s administrative andterritorial integrity. The paper will further explain this policy in a subsequent section.

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Idealism and Pragmatism: The Boxer Indemnity Scholarship Program and the Beginning of America’s Educational Diplomacy with China

America’s official policy towards the Far East in the first half of the twentiethcentury.13 In light of the BISP’s establishment at a diplomatically critical time,
when studying this indemnity-for education project, it is necessary to consider
America’s diplomatic priorities.
Yet researchers, especially those in China, tend to look at the BISP as a“single case”14 and rarely put this plan within the framework of U.S. diplomatic
history or the history of Sino -America relations. 15 As a result, it is notuncommon for the BISP to be merely taken as the “second wave of Chinese
student enrollments in American colleges and universities.”16 Despite thisprogram resuming large-scale Chinese student enrollments in American schools,
especially significant after the termination of the Chinese Educational Mission(hereafter the CEM)17, this common assessment needs rethinking. Others claimthat the BISP was America’s second attempt to exert influence on China after
the failure of the CEM.18 Both these two claims may contribute to the formationof a less comprehensive and accurate understanding of the BISP and the CEM.
This paper a nalyzes how Chinese-America n relations inf luenced thematerialization of the CEM and the BISP. It argues that regarding them as “twowaves” of Chinese students coming to American schools, or “two attempts” of
the United States at influencing China only lead to ignoring the importantdifferences between these two educational projects. Studying the backgroundand implementation of the CEM and BISP through the lens of the historicallydynamic China-U.S. diplomatic relationship, the paper reveals that although the
CEM was a Chinese government-sponsored program for American education, it
was both premature and almost entirely the effort of a single individual, rather
13 “Secretary of State John Hay and the Open Door in China, 1899-1900,”Office of theHistorian, accessed September 18, 2021, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/
hay-and-china.
14 Wei Chen, The Game of Education: The Boxer Indemnity Scholarship in the Perspectiveof US China Policy in the Early 20 th Century (Beijing: MA Thesis, China Foreign
Affairs University, 2016), 2.
15 Zongli Guo and Rui Mao, “The Domestic Researches on the ‘Remission of the Boxer
Indemnity’ by the United States in Recent Ten Years,” History Teaching no.5 (2007): 93.
16 Teresa Brawner Bevis, A History of Higher Education Exchange: China and America(New York: Routledge, 2013), 89.
17 Started in 1872 and terminated in 1881, the Chinese Educational Mission (the CEM) is
China’s first government sponsored study abroad program in the United States.
18 Ning Qian, The Chinese Students Encounter America, trans. T. K. Chu (Hong Kong:
Hong Kong University Press, 2002), xvii.

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論文t ha n a government consensus . I n contrast , the America n government
established the BISP with the intention of helping to shape American policy
towards China at the turn of the twentieth century. The US government had
not made the CEM a priority. The BISP, however, was almost entirely designedby American politicians. This discrepancy indicates that the BISP began theuse of education by the United States for achieving its diplomatic goals in China.
In short, whereas the CEM tended to be the work of an individual, the BISP
marks the beginning of America’s educational diplomacy with China. This paper
provides a better understanding of the difference between these two educational
schemes. This very difference, which is constantly ignored, is more significant
than the disparity of the two schemes in their sequence, length, scope and scale
since it helps to identify when and why education became a tool for America’s
diplomacy with China.

The Prematurity and Coincidence in the CEM
Begun in 1872 and operated in the United States until 1881, the CEM was thefirst Chinese government-sponsored study abroad program. As a component of
the “Self-Strengthening Movement”19 from 1872 to 1875, the Qing government
dispatched 120 students in annual installments of thirty students. They were
expected to acquire “foreign techniques” in such fields as military science,
astronomy, mathematics and engineering so that “China could gradually bestrengthened.”20 Consequently, the graduates of the CEM “made groundbreaking
contributions” to the development of China in technology and “served as vital
mediators” between China and the West during the last decades of the Qing
dynasty. 21
Two persons are vital to the materialization of this unprecedented educational
program, respectively Yung Wing and Anson Burlingame. As the first Chinese
19 The Qing government launched the Self-Strengthening Movement in early 1860s, with
the intention of modernizing China through, as a contemporary slogan put it,“Chinesestudies for the essence, Western studies for the practical application.”
20 Guofan Zeng, “The Memorial of Selecting and Sending Intellectual and Bright Lads to
Study Abroad,” in Materials on Modern Chinese History: Self-Strengthening Movement(Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 1961), 153.
21 Stacey Bieler, “Patriots” or “Traitors”? A History of American-Educated ChineseStudents (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), xii.

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Yale graduate, Yung Wing’s years-long urging upon Qing officials the necessityof foreign education was instrumental in the imperial court’s approval of theCEM. 22 Meanwhile, the friendly attitude towards China of Anson Burlingame,
who was the first American minister to China in Beijing from 1862 to 1867,
earned him the appointment of the empire’s first envoy to the West. He led
China’s first diplomatic mission to the United States, in which the delegation
reached the 1868 Burlingame Treaty whose seventh article granted Chinese
students the most favored nation treatment in American public schools. Thus,
scholars believe this very provision is a manifestation of China’s willingness of
opening educational exchange with America. 23 It also suggested a “contractual
basis” the United States offered which later ensured the CEM to be conducted
there. 24 However, a reexamination of Yung Wing’s experience of lobbying for theforeign educational mission, as well as the essence of the Burlingame Treaty,
leads to an entirely different viewpoint.
Yu ng W i ng wa s u n ique a mo ng h i s t r a d it io n a l ly e duc at e d C h i ne s ecounterparts. After being educated in Macao and Hong Kong, he sailed to theUnited States and finished his studies at Yale in 1854. He returned to China one
year later with the determination of enabling the rising generation of China tohave the same education that he had25, but soon found there was no space fordisplaying this ambition. Despite concluding that Western education is “the mostfeasible method” to reform and regenerate China 26, it was considered irrelevantto the civil servant examination system by which young Chinese achieved fameand prosperity. This made study abroad unappealing. Nor could he present his
scheme to any influential official as he planned. 27 His efforts therefore yielded
little fruit during the first five years after his return. 28 Obviously, Yung Wing’s
foreign education project for the reformation and regeneration of China was
22 “Mr. Low to Mr. Fish,”Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States,
July 12, 1872, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1872p1/d84.
23 Biyin Liang, The Study on Sino-American Cultural Exchange in Modern History(Guangdong: Sun Yatsun University Press, 2009), 75.
24 Biying Liang, Chen Lanbin and the Diplomacy of Late Qing Dynasty (Guangdong:
Guangdong People’s Press, 2011), 97.
25 Yung Wing, My Life in China and America (New York: Henry Holt Company, 1909), 15.
26 Ibid., preface.
27 Joseph H. Twitchell, “An Address Delivered before Kent Club of the Yale Law School,
April 10, 1878,” in My Life in China and America, 89.
28 Ibid.

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conceived when the foundation of its implementation in that empire was nearly
impossible. Even the initiation of the Self-Strengthening Movement did not bringconverts to Yung Wing’s plan. The government’s conservatism remained.
This campaign did, however, bring Yung Wing an opportunity to meet thepowerful official Zeng Guofan ( 曾国藩 ).29 Unsure of Zeng’s own inclinations, Yung
Wing put his study abroad plan “in the background” during his first interview
with Zeng. 30 Subsequent work as a translator gave him further access toimportant officials, but until 1870, most of them heard his educational plans withindifference. 31 His attempt in 1867, one year before the Burlingame Treaty was
concluded, at bringing his foreign education plan to the imperial court also fellthrough. Though he made a meticulous arrangement by using three otherproposals as the chaperon and placing his scheme second in the sequence to
avoid giving it too much prominence, he could not find anyone to present theideas on his behalf. 32
It was the 1870 Tianjin Massacre ( 天津 教 案 )33 that accidentally helped bring
Yung Wing’s scheme to fruition. To settle the aftermath, a commission including
Zeng Guofan was assigned to negotiate with foreign representatives, and Yung
Wing joined as interpreter. He took this chance to restate his plan, and used
this riot to illustrate its necessity. 34 This time, Zeng agreed to incorporate theplan in a memorial to the throne and the approval from Beijing marked theconsummation of Yung Wing’s efforts and the realization of the CEM.
Yung Wing’s effort to establish the CEM reveals the unlikelihood for the
Chinese government to solicit a most favored nation clause for its students inthe negotiation of the Burlingame Treaty. Evidently, the imperial government
had no intention of sending students abroad when this treaty was concluded
29 As the Viceroy of the Liangjiang area ( 两 江 总 督 ), Zeng was one of the most powerful
officials in the 1860s and was a major advocate of the Self-Strengthening Movement. The
Liangjiang area ( 两江地区 ) included the Provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi and the cityof Shanghai ( 江 苏 省、安 徽 省、江 西 省、上 海 市 ). He was in charge of the political, civil
and military affairs in of these places.
30 Wing, China and America, 52.
31 Twitchell, “Address before Kent Club,” 92.
32 Wing, China and America, 60.
33 The Tianjin Massacre broke out in the summer of 1870, and was caused by the locals’
misunderstanding the work conducted by the Roman Catholic Church in the city. It
resulted in the burning down of foreigner-owned properties such as a church andhospital, and the murder of several priests and nuns.
34 Twitchell, “Address before Kent Club,” 92.

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since the CEM could have been further delayed without the Tianjin Massacre.
As hard as Yung Wing worked, therefore, the provisions to educate students in
America owes more to the intention and designs of the United States.
Except granting Chinese students the most favored nation treatment in
American public schools, the seventh article of the Burlingame Treaty offered
the same privileges to Americans in Chinese schools controlled by thegovernment. Additionally, it also provided freedom for Americans concerning
establishing and maintaining schools in China where foreigners were permitted
to reside. It is noticeable although the Burlingame Treaty features theapplication by a Western power of the principle of reciprocity to China for the
first time, the use of its certain provisions, however, is “neither very common oreven likely.”35 That is to say, some clauses may only be paper promises made tomaintain the treaty’s appearance of reciprocity. In addition, as the preamble of
the Burlingame Treaty claims, this agreement was concluded based on
circumstances that had arisen during the ministerial term of Anson Burlingame
in China. It was a period when the two countries “were not important to, oreven interested in, each other,”36 and the involvement of America in China wasmainly confined to having a “relatively small but profitable trade.”37 In light of
this, it can be assumed that the most favored nation treatment for Chinese
students was another “paper promise” since America’s interest in that empire
had not yet extended to training Chinese.
This assumption can be confirmed by investigating the correspondence
between the U.S. legation and consulates in China and the Department of Stateduring the period when Burlingame was in office. This was nearly the same
period Yung Wing was pleading for the CEM’s adoption. Diplomatic documents
show no specific interest in providing education to Chinese, and this again
suggests the lack of interest in this provision from the American side. Similarly,
there was no mention of the matter as to Chinese establishing schools in
America or Americans attending Chinese public schools. The only education35 John Schrecker,“‘For the Equality of Men-for the Equality of Nations’: AnsonBurlingame and China’s First Embassy to the United States, 1868,”Journal of AmericanEast Asian Relations 17, no.1 (2010): 29.
36 Guoqi Xu, Chinese and Americans: A Shared History (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2014), 29.
37 David L. Anderson, Imperialism and Idealism: American Diplomats in China, 18611898 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 10.

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related project that received constant urging was establishing an interpretertraining school in China. Such demand demonstrated China’s marginality in the
diplomatic concerns of the United States.
Due to the insufficiency of interpreters in American consulates in China, theirconsuls were “compelled to request the aid of missionaries in their interviews orcorrespondence with Chinese officials.”38 Seeing that interpreters are “vital tothe efficiency of our consular service and measurably to the honor of ournation,” the Chargé d’Affaires Samuel Williams claimed “the country must
educate them.”39 Recognizing the duties of interpreters such as deciding casesin consular court and corresponding with native officials are “extensive anddifficult,” George Seward, the Consul General in Shanghai, believed such a school
could make his consulate “comparatively effective.”4 0 Furthermore, thoseinterpreters were also expected, in the future, to become consuls conversant
with the language and customs of China.41 Considering the consulates of manyother powers in China “are all supplied with trained interpreters,”42 this plan
aimed at bringing the consular institutions of America in that empire, to thesame line with theirs, and, as Burlingame stated, reflects “lasting honor upon
our beloved country.”43
Although neither Anson Burlingame nor Secretary of State William Sewardleft any records from the Burlingame Treaty negotiations44, this treaty aimed tosolve problems that emerged during Burlingame’s tenure. As having trained
38 “Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward,”Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, May 19, 1862, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1862/ch18.
39 “Mr. Williams to Mr. Burlingame,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, October 2 4, 1865, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1866p1/d375.
40 “Mr. G.F. Seward to Mr. Burlingame,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, September 16, 1865, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1866p1/d376.
41 “Mr. Williams to Mr. Burlingame,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, October 2 4, 1865, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1866p1/d375.
42 “Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, May 19, 1862, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1862/ch18.
43 “Mr. Burlingame to Mr. Seward,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, November 18, 1863, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1864p3/
d396.
44 Frederick W. Williams, Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese Mission to the Foreign
Powers (New York: Scriber’s, 1912), 144-5.

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interpreters was the only educationally relevant subject, whose importance wasunanimously agreed upon by American diplomats in China, it should not be
missed in the negotiation. Namely, with a provision allowing Americans toestablish schools in China, the education-themed seventh article was originallymeant to establish an interpreter training school, while the most favored nation
clause for Chinese students only served to sustain the treaty’s surface appeal toreciprocity.
In sum, the CEM was launched when the governments of both China and theUnited States were still largely indifferent to having Chinese students in
American schools. On the contrary, it came into being largely through theefforts of Yung Wing who seized a chance accidentally provided by a riot andturned a treaty stipulation’s original purpose on its head. His lobbying overmore than a decade cannot be overlooked. It is therefore fair to call him the“head and front” of this project.45 Nevertheless, the lack of support he received,
and the rather haphazard way the educational provision made its way into the
Burlingame Treaty suggests that the CEM was not a priority for either
government.
In fact, the indifference continued even after the CEM students arrived in
America. Neither Chinese nor American governmental officials were involved
even in helping them find accommodations. Instead, Yung Wing carried out thistask with the advice of his friend and president of Yale, Noah Porter, and withhelp from members of the Connecticut Board of Education.46 The BISP, bycontrast, would demonstrate an entirely different set of priorities.

The Open Door Policy that Resulted in the Surplus Indemnity
for the BISP
The significance of China to the United States increased during the interval
between the termination of the CEM and the initiation of the BISP. Especiallyin late 19 th century, the maturing of the industrial revolution of America
45 Twitchell,“Address Delivered before Kent Club,”87.
46 Bieler, “Patriots” or “Traitors”? 6. However, before the BISP students were sent to theUnited States, the Foreign Office of China solicited the assistance from the American
Government in the matter of “providing suitable homes for them in America.” See “TheForeign Office to Minister Rockhill,” Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, July 14, 1908, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1908/d58.

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increased its commercial interest with China, while its acquisition of thePhilippines demonstrated America’s growing economic interests in the Pacificregion.47 As William Sulzer, a long-serving New York congressman claimed in
1898, American businessmen should look to the Pacific because the greatvolume of trade and commerce will be westward during the coming century.48
In the meantime, with little political clout and no territory, America’s presencein China was still relatively weak compared with Europe and Japan.49 So whenthose nations secured their own spheres of inf luence in China in 189 8 ,Americans faced the potential of being excluded from Chinese markets. 50
Out of apprehension that exclusive spheres of influence may jeopardize
America’s rights under its treaties with China, Secretary of State John Hay in1899 released diplomatic notes to powers are active in China. 51 Hay requested
them to declare non-discriminatory treatment within their respective spheres,to all vessels and merchandise regardless of their nationality and to assure
equal opportunity for commerce and trade. 52 This principle was in danger nosooner than its release since the powers’ expeditionary armies aimed to relieve
the Boxer crisis took advantage of their march to Beijing in 1900 by securing
their own concessions along the way. 53 Seeing that the United States preferred
to trade with China as an entity54, Hay went a step further in his circular notesby advocating the necessity of preserving the territorial and administrative
integrity of China for “equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese
Empire.”55 Together, Hay’s notes from 1899 and 1900 built a connection between
the commercial interests of the United States and the integrity of China, and47 Ronald Shaffer, Toward Pearl Harbor: the Diplomatic Exchange between Japan and theUnited States, 1889-1941 (Princeton: Marcus Weiner, 1991), 3.
48 Paul A. Vard, “William Woodville Rockhill and the Open Door Notes,” The Journal ofModern History 24, no.4 (1952), 375.
49 “John Hay and the Open Door.”
50 Shaffer, Toward Pearl Harbor, 5.
51 Those nations included Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia.
52 “Correspondence Concerning American Commercial Rights in China,” Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States, September 6, 1899, https://history.state.
gov/historicaldocuments/frus1899/ch30.
53 “John Hay and the Open Door.”
54 Shaffer, Toward Pearl Harbor, 7.
55 “Circular Note of July 3, 1900, to the Powers Cooperating in China, Defining the
Purposes and Policy of the United States,” Foreign Relation of the United States,
Appendix, Affairs in China,, July 3, 1900, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1901China/d4.

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constructed the so called “Open Door Policy,” which became “the basis” of the
Far Eastern Policy of the United States for decades in 20th century. 56 Moreover,at the time when the European powers and Japan were aggressive towards theterritory of China, this policy seemed more moderate and promised some
protection for Chinese territory, and thus contributed a “special relationship”
between the two nations. 57
The formation of the Open Door Policy in 19 0 0 symbolizes the end of
America’s “Jackal Policy” 5 8 in China during the 19 th century, a policy ofachieving rights with the British in the vanguard. 59 As the first independent
China policy of the United States, the Open Door Policy indicated its growinginterest in the Far East and was adhered to in the following decades by the
successors of Secretary of State John Hay.60 Its first application was in the 1901
international negotiation in Beijing for the settlement of the Boxer Rebellion andresulted in an excessive indemnity which was later devoted to establishing the
BISP.
America’s adherence to the Open Door Policy in the negotiation can be
exemplified by the correspondence between Secretary of State John Hay andUS representatives at the scene. Unlike the European powers such as Germany,
whose representative claimed China shall pay “the last cent of her expenses,”61
Americans presented an entirely different attitude towards the indemnity
amount. They believed an exorbitant sum could hurt China’s purchasing power62,
and even result in the disintegration of China.63 Either of these outcomes wasconsidered detrimental to America’s commercial interests in China. Therefore,
concluding that China could not pay a lump sum more than 150 million dollars,
Hay instructed Minister Edwin Conger to use his “utmost effort” to have theindemnity made “as reasonable as possible.”64 To ensure the implementation of
56 Paul A. Varg,“William Woodville Rockhill’s Influence on the Boxer Negotiation,”PacificHistorical Review 70, no.3 (1949): 370.
57 “John Hay and the Open Door.”
58 Anderson, Imperialism and Idealism, 10.
59 David Gedalecia, “Letters from the Middle Kingdom,” National Archives, accessed
September 10, 2021, https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2002/winter/gedalecia-1.html.
60 “John Hay and the Open Door.”
61 Varg, “Boxer Negotiation,” 378.
62 Chen, the Game of Education, 18.
63 Biyin Liang, Liang Cheng and China in Modern History (Guangdong: Sun Yatsun
University Press, 2011), 247.

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the Open Door Policy, the secretary specifically cabled American Commissioner
William Rockhill in Beijing that the indemnity needed to be paid in money
rather than in territory.65 Three weeks later, Hay declared his government’s
preference for increased privileges and administrative reforms from China, overa large cash indemnity. 6 6 As the date for deciding the indemnity amountapproached, Hay approved Rockhill’s suggestion in regard to reducing the lumpsum, with compensating commercial advantages. 67 Thus, during the Boxer
negotiation the US’s three major concerns were a moderate indemnity,commercial privileges and maintaining China’s territorial integrity.
To ensure the demands could be met, John Hay entered an inflated indemnity
claim amounting to 250 million dollars which was two times higher than
America’s actual losses and expenses during the Boxer Rebellion. Intending to
reduce this amount by half if other powers followed suit68 , he took the excess asa “bargaining counter” to convince other powers to reduce their claim and tosecure privileges in trade.69 But the result fell short of his expectation since thenegotiation was dominated by the European powers.70 Consequently, thebargaining strategy failed and left China with substantial debt. This madereturning the surplus one of Hays’ top priorities.71
It can be seen that the excess indemnity that eventually financed the BISP
resulted from America’s Open Door Policy. In consideration of Hays’ policy
advocating for a reasonable and moderate indemnity, returning the excessive
amount was consistent with this principle. In other words, the indemnity fundpaid for the initiation of the BISP, and demonstrates that the effort was
64 “Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger,”Foreign Relation of the United States, Appendix, Affairs in
China, January 29, 1901, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1901China/d231.
65 Mr. Hay to Mr. Rockhill,” Foreign Relation of the United States, Appendix, Affairs in
China, April 8, 1901, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1901China/d260https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1901China/d260.
66 “Mr. Hay to Mr. Rockhill,” Foreign Relations of the United States, Appendix, Affairs in
China, April 29, 1901, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1901China/d267.
67 “Mr. Hay to Mr. Rockhill,” Foreign Relations of the United States, Appendix, Affairs in
China, May 10, 1901, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1901China/d269.
68 Ibid.
69 Michael H. Hunt, “The American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity: A Reappraisal,”
The Journal of Asian Studies 31, no.3 (1972): 542.
70 Varg, “Boxer Negotiation,” 379-80.
71 William Rockhill, “Correspondence between William Rockhill and Theodore Roosevelt,”in The Chinese Students Encounter Americans, 221.

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fundamentally part of America’s official policy towards China.

The Idealism and Pragmatism in the BISP
Congress approved return of the indemnity in 1908. The establishment of the
BISP in the following year provides further evidence that the BISP was a
project reflecting American policy goals. Secretary of State Elihu Root would
claim that his government’s returning the excess indemnity was the intention“from the first,” 72 but discussion over exactly how to use the funds began long
before America actually returned them.73 That is to say, education was not the
only option for how to use the money.74 In addition, the anti-American boycott in
19 0 5, resulting from the mistreatment of Chinese in the United States,
temporarily soured US - China relations. For a time President Theodore
Roosevelt even suggested the refund might be impossible.75 In the end, devoting
the money to establish the BISP was based on America’s own interests, as wellas its perceptions of what was best for China.76 As a result, the BISP reflects
both American altruism and self-interest, or its idealism and its pragmatism,
which were the twin poles of American relations with China.77
After independence from Britain in 1783, the United States desired to build anational identity featuring freedom, equality, virtue and reason over Europe’s
autocracy and imperialism.78 Its government, believed renovating Asia throughsocial and political sympathies, is “sublime and beneficent.” 79 When it came todiplomacy with China, Americans “believed and would like Chinese to believe
72 “The Secretary of State to the Chinese Minister,”Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, June 15, 1907, https://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1907p1/d153.
73 Hunt, “Remission of the Boxer Indemnity” 547.
74 For example, Professor Jeremiah Jenks of Cornell University suggested the surplus of
the indemnity should be devoted to currency reform in China, Willard Straight, theConsul General in Mukden, proposed the fund should be used to establish a bank in
Manchuria, while Yuan Shikai ( 袁世 凯 ), an influential Chinese official, urged the money
be used to build railroads and to develop mining in China.
75 William Martin, Awakening of China (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1907),251.
76 Hunt, “Remission of the Boxer Indemnity” 541.
77 Ibid., 551
78 Chen, The Game of Education, 4.
79 Tyler Dennett, “Seward’s Far Eastern Policy,” The American Historical Review 28, no.1
(1922): 47.

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they were set apart from British and other colonists by high ideals andmorals.”80 This mindset continued well into the turn of the 20th century when
American policy makers believed that China’s salvation lay in modern Westerneducation, which could cure all social and political ills. 81 As a result, promoting
the reformation and civilization of China through education, became a consensus
among Americans in government and society who were passionate about
Chinese affairs. 82 Among those idealists, Arthur Smith was a particularly
prominent representative.
As a missionary in China for fifty-four years, he earned his reputation as “theAmerican Statesman of China,” and his books on China attracted the interest ofpresidents and diplomats the world over for their detailed information on that
empire. 83 In one of his books dedicated to those who recognize the duty of theWest to promote the welfare of China 8 4 , he argued that using the surplus
indemnity to educate Chinese students in America could make future outbreaks
similar to the Boxer Rebellion more difficult. 85 According to him, such an act
would also demonstrate how the United States put morality ahead of its
material interests, and that America would treat China with honesty, fairness
and under the motto “America assists the East.”86
In 1906 during his audience with Theodore Roosevelt, Smith’s suggestion to
use the surplus indemnity for an educational purpose triggered Roosevelt’s firstinterest in linking the fund to education. Subsequently, he asked Secretary Rootto take relevant actions. 87 Roosevelt’s favorable attitude towards the BISP canbe found in his 1907 annual address to the Congress in which he asked for theauthority to remit and refund the surplus indemnity. As he noted, the United
St ates shou ld help Ch i na “adapt it sel f to moder n cond it ions” t h roughencouraging and attracting her students to come and take courses in American
schools. He urged American educators, to “take concerted action toward this
80
81
82
83
84

Chen, The Game of Education, 4.
Pappas, “Smith and the American mission,” 180.
Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door, 15-22.
Pappas, “Smith and the American mission,” 163.
Arthur H. Smith, China and America To-day: A Study of Conditions and Relations(New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1907), preface.
85 Ibid., 220.
86 Ibid., 239.
87 Lawrence F. Abbott, Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Doubleday, 1919),
146.

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Idealism and Pragmatism: The Boxer Indemnity Scholarship Program and the Beginning of America’s Educational Diplomacy with Chinaend.” 88 One year later, the President further pointed out the importance of
implanting Western ideals in Asia to avoid a “dreadful future clash” between
the two civilizations. “If we wait until to-morrow,” he warned, “we may find that
we have waited too long.”89
Clearly, the BISP contained the expectation that America would uplift China
through implanting its ideals, knowledge and culture. This reflects a strain of
idealism in US diplomacy. But the BISP was not a purely charitable project, notonly because the money for its operation was originally obtained by anexcessive charge on China, but because the U.S. also aimed to have its own
demands met from this project.
However righteous Smith ’s words were on the devotion of the surplus
indemnity for education, he also cited a memorandum and opinions that reveal
the other side of American motivations. The memorandum was from the
President of the University of Illinois, Edmund James, to Roosevelt in 1906,
which aimed to welcome Chinese students, and to expand America’s global
influence through education. 9 0 The nation that succeeds in educating the
Chinese youth, he wrote, will “reap the largest possible returns,” in “moral,
intellectual and commercial influence.” 91 Expecting foreign educated Chinese
could take important positions in the future, he saw a chance for America tocontrol China’s development in the “most satisfactory and subtle” way, by the“intellectual and spiritual domination of its leaders.”92 “Trade follows moral andspiritual domination far more inevitably than it follows the flag,”93 he argued, so
he was concerned about the inflow of Chinese students to Europe. He reckoned
after their return, they would recommend English, French or German for“positions of trust and responsibility” in China and would prefer their goods
over those of America.94
88 “Message of the President, Annual,”Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of theUnited States, December 3, 1907, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1907p1/message-of-the-president.
89 Theodore Roosevelt, “Awakening of China,” HathiTrust, November 28, 1908, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=nnc2.ark:/13960/t8md47n33&view=1up&seq=1&sk
in=2021.
90 Poshek Fu, “Trans-Pacific Cultural Connections: The University of Illinois and China,”
Journal of American-East Asian Relations no.24 (2017): 27.
91 Smith, China and America To-day, 214.
92 Ibid., 215.
93 Ibid., 218.
94 Ibid., 215.

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論文James was not alone in advocating for the promotion of American interests in
China through educating Chinese students in the United States. His views were
echoed in 1910 by the American consul-general in Shanghai, who contended
that an American-trained Chinese could supply orders to American companies
because of his intimate acquaintance with American commercial products. 95
Politicians in the United States held the same point. As a letter from the
Department of Commerce and Labor in 1910 to the Department of State noted,
having Chinese students educated in America could familiarize them with
American institutions, civic life and business, and would inevitably benefit thecommercial interests of the United States.96 Walter Hines Page, an influential
editor and diplomat agreed. He noted that in the future foreign-educatedChinese students would exert a strong influence “in governmental, educational,
financial and industrial way,” so welcoming and training them was the mostdirect way for America to acquire trade and intellectual influence in China.97
It can be seen that in early twentieth century, the significance of educating
Chinese students in America to its political and commercial interests in China
was widely recognized by American politicians, diplomats, educators andmissionaries. Such interests became increasingly important to the United Statesat the turn of the century as a result of its own growing national strength and
its Pacific ambitions. While the US was still a relatively weak power forced touse moral and political suasion in Asia, it chose education and the BISP as apragmatic means to pursue its larger political and economic ambitions.
Support for the BISP was not, however, inevitable. There was in fact a major
competing proposal for how to use the indemnity that had much more to dowith finance than education. This plan was the Manchurian Bank Project,
jointly presented in 1907 by Xu Shichang, the Viceroy of Manchurian and Tang
Shaoyi, the Governor of Mukden.98 Having witnessed Japan’s increased influencein Manchuria following the Russo-Japanese War, the Chinese government saw
the urgency of strengthening their position in that region.99 In particular they
saw the possibility of using the remitted indemnity as a security for an
95
96
97
98

Wang,“Guest from the Open Door,”61.
Ibid., 67.
Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door, 44.
Mukden ( 奉 天 ) was the capital city of Manchuria, the current name of this city is
Shenyang ( 沈阳 ).
99 Hunt, “Remission of the Boxer Indemnity,” 551.

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Idealism and Pragmatism: The Boxer Indemnity Scholarship Program and the Beginning of America’s Educational Diplomacy with China

American loan to establish the Manchurian Bank which would then financerailroad construction and other development projects. It was, as Tang Shaoyi
noted, “an instrument of foreign policy as well as internal development,” because
it would create “a concrete interest” for America that would neutralize Japan’s
influence in Manchuria.100
Xu and Tang believed Americans would welcome the Manchurian Bank
project. Japan’s enhanced influence in Manchuria, which Americans deemed apotential market and investment outlet101 , made it a “primary threat to theOpen Door.”102 Consequently, many American policy makers believed that theymust aggressively counter the threat of Japan.103
Willard Straight, the American Consul General in Mukden from 1906 to 1908,
was a particularly important voice in promoting American investment inManchuria. He arrived in Mukden determined to keep Manchuria’s door open
through investing in transportation and development projects.104 These would,
he believed, weaken Japan’s hold in Manchuria and increase American influence.
Therefore, when Xu and Tang presented Straight their bank-indemnity proposal,
he called it a “rare opportunity” of furthering China and his own country’s
interests in Manchuria.105 Despite Straight’s support, the bank proposal collapsed
when the chief of the consular bureau instructed him to withdraw from plansfor disposing the Boxer Indemnity funds.106
America’s repudiation of the Manchurian Bank Project demonstrates the
Roosevelt Administration’s realism-based Far East diplomacy. The acquisition of
the Philippines made the United States a power in the Asia-Pacific region.107 At
the same time, however, the Philippines formed America’s “heel of Achilles”
because they were, as Roosevelt maintained, “temptation in Japan’s way” andmade “the present situation with Japan dangerous.”108 As a “political realist,”109
100 Ibid.
101 Sidney L. Pash, The Current of Wars: A New History of American-Japanese Relations,
1899-1941 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014), 23
102 Ibid., 18.
103 Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door, 30.
104 Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East: A Study in Diplomacy
and Power Politics, 1895-1914 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016),
139-140.
105 Hunt, “Remission of the Boxer Indemnity,” 552.
106 Wilbur J. Carr to Straight, Februrary 10, 1908, cited in Hunt, “Remission of the Boxer
Indemnity,” 552-3.
107 Shaffer, Toward Pearl Harbor, 7.

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文

Roosevelt decided to compromise with Japan to ensure that the Philippines,
which were decisive to America’s position in East Asia, remained under US
control. The 19 0 5 Ta ft-Katsura Ag reed Memora ndum of Conversation
exemplified this ideology.110
The Manchurian Bank Project threatened Japan’s postwar Manchurian policy,
which was promoting economic supremacy111, and Roosevelt feared that Japan
would retaliate by threatening American interests in the Philippines. Left alone
in Manchuria, however, Japan could focus its attention there and leave thePhilippines to US control.112 The signing of the 1908 Root-Takahira Agreement113
placed Manchuria within the Japanese Empire114, and symbolized the official US
withdrawal of support from the Manchurian Bank Project.
Both the BISP and the Manchurian Bank Project envisioned reforming China,
and subsequently promoting American interests and influences. The US was
deeply concerned about the potential for Japan to menace the Philippines, andthis strategic landscape shaped the US Government’s decision to promote
educational exchange over the Manchurian bank plan. As one scholar notes, the
BISP, “would strengthen ties between the United States and China andstrengthen China without angering Japan.”115 This demonstrates that the BISP
was not a simple measure to promote education, but was connected in muchlarger geopolitical interests between China, Japan and the US.
108 Roosevelt to Taft, August 21, 1907, cited in Zabriskie, Rivalry in the Far East, 136.
109 Thomas G. Paterson et al, American Foreign Relations: Volume 2: Since 1895 (Stamford:
Cegage Learning, 2014), 56.
110 The Taft-Katsura Agreed Memorandum of Conversation was reached in July 1905
between the Secretary of War William Taft and Katsura Taro ( 桂太 郎 ), the Prime
Minister of Japan, during the former’s visit in Tokyo. By recognizing Japan’s suzerainty
over Korea, the United States obtained Katsura’s promise that Japan “does not harbor
any aggressive design whatever on the Philippines. After the memorandum was signed,
Theodore Roosevelt cabled Taft that “I confirm every word you have said.”
111 Pash, The Current of Wars, 24.
112 Ibid., 26.
113 The Root-Takahira Agreement was reached on November 30, 1908, between the
Secretary of State Elihu Root and Takahira Kogoro ( 高平小五郎 ), the ambassador ofJapan to the United States, in Washington. The agreement stipulated that the UnitedStates and Japan shall maintain the “existing status quo” on the Pacific Ocean and“respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in said region.” Willard
Straight called this agreement “a terrible diplomatic blunder.” See Paterson et al,
American Foreign Relations, 59
114 Pash, The Current of Wars, 25.
115 Bieler, “Patriots” or “Traitors”? 44.

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Idealism and Pragmatism: The Boxer Indemnity Scholarship Program and the Beginning of America’s Educational Diplomacy with China

Conclusion
Despite both the CEM and the BISP enabling Chinese students to pursue
their education in America in a large scale, there is a considerable difference
between these two educational projects from the perspective of Sino-America
relations. The CEM was a project predominantly initiated by a persistentindividual with the help of certain accidental factors at a time when both China
and America were fairly indifferent to each other. The BISP, on the other hand,
was an American-led project from the beginning. The fund for its operation was
generated by the implementation of America’s official China policy, and became
available after the approval of Congress. Its primary aim was to benefit
America’s increasingly important commercial and strategic interests in China
followed by the intention of strengthening and uplifting China, and was
ack nowledged by A merica ns in educat ion , business a nd polit ics . Thisacknowledgement reflected the America’s idealistic and pragmatic approach
towards China at the turn of the twentieth century, and built the foundation for
the establishment of the BISP. The U.S. Government’s repudiation of theManchurian Bank Project and its preference for the BISP show American
policymakers calculating their country’s strategic position in the Far East andits relations with other powers operating there. This predilection further
embodied the connection between the BISP and the diplomacy of the UnitedStates.
Through analyzing the respective processes of the materialization of the
CEM and the BISP from the prospective of China-America relations, this paper
refuted the assumption that the BISP was merely a follow-up project of theCEM. In fact, both the Chinese and American governments were fairly
indifferent to the CEM when it was launched. The BISP, by contrast, wasinitiated amid the almost unanimous recognition of the beneficial effects ofeducating Chinese on America’s interests in China. Such recognition was rooted
in the principles of America’s China policy, as well as in its strategic andrealistic consideration of the power balance in the Asia-Pacific region. Hence, bypresenting this fundamental difference, the paper identified the BISP as theroots of geopolitics at the heart of America’s educational diplomacy with China,
and revealed the evolving nature of the diplomatic relationship between China
and the United States.
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Idealism and Pragmatism: The Boxer Indemnity Scholarship Program and the Beginning of America’s Educational Diplomacy with China

Abstract

Idealism and Pragmatism: The Boxer
Indemnity Scholarship Program and theBeginning of America’s Educational
Diplomacy with China
Guochao ZHAO

Started from 1909 and set up to continue for thirty one years, the Boxer
Indemnity Scholarship Program (hereafter the BISP) left a notable mark in thehistory of Sino-American relations. This educational scheme was funded byAmerica’s remission of a surplus of an indemnity stipulated to pay for the Boxer
Rebellion, and it put American higher education within the reach of thousandsof Chinese students. These students then assumed important positions after
returning to China . Therefore, the BISP is widely considered the mostimportant scheme for educating Chinese students in America, and could evenbe the most consequential and successful foreign study project in twentiethcentury China.
Despite the BISP’s influence, however, many scholars have studied it outside
the larger framework of Sino-American relations. Instead, it has been pairedwith the earlier Chinese Educational Mission (hereafter the CEM) terminated in
1881, which is China’s first study abroad project in America, and understoodwithin the context of Chinese student enrollments in America, or as America’s
second attempt at influencing China through education. However, considering
the nearly three decades separating these two educational schemes, it seems
that simply confining these two episodes to the field of education research is notenough. A new, broader perspective is required.
This paper places both the CEM and the BISP in the context of ChinaAmerica relations. It shows that the fundamental differences between these two
programs demonstrate the constantly dynamic relations between the UnitedStates and China. The CEM was largely a preliminary project launched by one
individual’s effort when neither China nor America had any particular interest
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in building a relationship. The BISP, by contrast, was an American-led program
aimed at promoting America’s interests in China, reflected the idealism andpragmatism of America’s China policy at the turn of the twentieth century, as
well as its realism-based diplomacy in the Far East.
Through a comparison of the CEM and the BISP, this paper demonstrates theevolving nature of US-China relations in the late nineteenth and early twentiethcenturies. Additionally and more importantly, it identifies when and why
education became a tool for America’s diplomacy with China.
Key Words: Boxer Indemnity Scholarship Program, Chinese Educational
Mission, educational diplomacy, US-China relations

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