Behavioural FinanceMartin Sewell
University of Cambridge

February 2007 (revised April 2010)
Abstract
An introduction to behavioural finance, including a review of the major
works and a summary of important heuristics.

1

Introduction

Behavioural finance is the study of the influence of psychology on the behaviourof financial practitioners and the subsequent effect on markets. Behaviouralfinance is of interest because it helps explain why and how markets might beinefficient. For more information on behavioural finance, see Sewell (2001).

2

History

Back in 1896, Gustave le Bon wrote The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind,
one of the greatest and most influential books of social psychology ever written(le Bon 1896).
Selden (1912) wrote Psychology of the Stock Market. He based the book‘upon the belief that the movements of prices on the exchanges are dependent
to a very considerable degree on the mental attitude of the investing and trading
public’.
In 1956 the US psychologist Leon Festinger introduced a new concept insocial psychology: the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, Riecken andSchachter 1956). When two simultaneously held cognitions are inconsistent,
this will produce a state of cognitive dissonance. Because the experience ofdissonance is unpleasant, the person will strive to reduce it by changing theirbeliefs.
Pratt (1964) considers utility functions, risk aversion and also risks considered as a proportion of total assets.
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) introduced the availability heuristic: ‘a judgmental heuristic in which a person evaluates the frequency of classes or the probability of events by availability, i.e. by the ease with which relevant instances
come to mind.’ The reliance on the availability heuristic leads to systematic
biases.
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In 1974, two brilliant psychologists, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman,described three heuristics that are employed when making judgments under
uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman 1974):
representativeness When people are asked to judge the probability that an
object or event A belongs to class or process B, probabilities are evaluatedby the degree to which A is representative of B, that is, by the degree towhich A resembles B.
availability When people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the
probability of an event, they do so by the ease with which instances or
occurrences can be brought to mind.
anchoring and adjustment In numerical prediction, when a relevant value(an anchor) is available, people make estimates by starting from an initialvalue (the anchor) that is adjusted to yield the final answer. The anchor
may be suggested by the formulation of the problem, or it may be theresult of a partial computation. In either case, adjustments are typicallyinsufficient.
The most cited paper ever to appear in Econometrica, the prestigious academic journal of economics, was written by the two psychologists Kahneman andTversky (1979). They present a critique of expected utility theory (Bernoulli
1738; von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944; Bernoulli 1954) as a descriptivemodel of decision making under risk and develop an alternative model, which
they call prospect theory. Kahneman and Tversky found empirically that people
underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomesthat are obtained with certainty; also that people generally discard componentsthat are shared by all prospects under consideration. Under prospect theory,
value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets; also probabilities
are replaced by decision weights. The value function is defined on deviations
from a reference point and is normally concave for gains (implying risk aversion), commonly convex for losses (risk seeking) and is generally steeper for
losses than for gains (loss aversion) (see Figure 1 (page 3)). Decision weights
are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range oflow probabilities. The theory—which they confirmed by experiment—predicts a
distinctive fourfold pattern of risk attitudes: risk aversion for gains of moderate
to high probability and losses of low probability, and risk seeking for gains of
low probability and losses of moderate to high probability.
Thaler (1980) argues that there are circumstances when consumers act in amanner that is inconsistent with economic theory and he proposes that Kanneman and Tversky’s prospect theory be used as the basis for an alternativedescriptive theory. Topics discussed are: underweighting of opportunity costs,
failure to ignore sunk costs, search behaviour, choosing not to choose and regret, and precommitment and self-control. The paper introduced the notion of‘mental accounting’ (described below).
In another important paper Tversky and Kahneman (1981) introduced framing. They showed that the psychological principles that govern the perception
2

Figure 1: A hypothetical value function in prospect theoryof decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce
predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different
ways. Shiller (1981) discovered that stock price volatility is far too high to be
attributed to new information about future real dividends.
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) edit Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, thirty-five chapters which describe various judgmental
heuristics and the biases they produce.
In 1985 Werner F. M. De Bondt and Richard Thaler published ‘Does thestock market overreact?’ in the The Journal of Finance (De Bondt and Thaler
1985), effectively forming the start of what has become known as behaviouralfinance. They discovered that people systematically overreacting to unexpected
and dramatic news events results in substantial weak-form inefficiencies in thestock market. This was both surprising and profound. Mental accounting is
the set of cognitive operations used by individuals and households to organize,
evaluate and keep track of financial activities. Thaler (1985) developed a newmodel of consumer behaviour involving mental accounting.
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) argue that, due to framing and prospect
theory, the rational theory of choice does not provide an adequate foundation
for a descriptive theory of decision making.
Yaari (1987) proposes a modification to expected utility theory and obtains a
so-called ‘dual theory’ of choice under risk. De Bondt and Thaler (1987) report
additional evidence that supports the overreaction hypothesis.
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) perform a series of decision-making experiments and find evidence of status quo bias. Poterba and Summers (1988)
investigate transitory components in stock prices and found positive autocorre3

lation in returns over short horizons and negative autocorrelation over longer
horizons, although random-walk price behaviour cannot be rejected at conventional statistical levels.
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) report several experiments that demonstrate that loss aversion and the endowment effect persist even in market settings with opportunities to learn and conclude that they are fundamental characteristics of preferences.
Gilovich (1991) wrote How We Know What Isn’t So, a book about the fallibility of human reason in everyday life. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) present
a reference-dependent model of riskless choice, the central assumption of thetheory being loss aversion, i.e. losses and disadvantages have greater impact on
preferences than gains and advantages. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) model an
economy and show how uncertainty regarding the identities of gainers and losers
can lead to status quo bias. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) discuss threeanomalies: the endowment effect, loss aversion and status quo bias.
Thaler (1992) publishes The Winner’s Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of
Economic Life. Banerjee (1992) develop a simple model of herd behaviour.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) superseded their original implementation ofprospect theory with cumulative prospect theory. The new methodology employs cumulative rather than separable decision weights, applies to uncertain as
well as to risky prospects with any number of outcomes, and it allows different
weighting functions for gains and for losses (see Figure 2 below). I have devel-

Figure 2: Typical probability weighting functions for gains (w+ ) and losses (w− )in cumulative prospect theory
oped a cumulative prospect theory calculator, which is freely available online
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for the Web and Excel.1
Plous (1993) wrote The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making which
gives a comprehensive introduction to the field with a strong focus on the social
aspects of decision making processes.
A value strategy involves buying stocks that have low prices relative to earnings, dividends, book assets, or other measures of fundamental value. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) conjecture that value strategies yield higher
returns because these strategies exploit the suboptimal behaviour of the typicalinvestor.
The equity premium puzzle refers to the empirical fact that stocks have outperformed bonds over the last century by a far greater degree than would be
expected under the standard expected utility maximizing paradigm. Benartzi
and Thaler (1995) offer an explanation based on behavioural concepts: loss
aversion combined with a prudent tendency to frequently monitor one’s wealth.
They dub this combination myopic loss aversion. Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) analysed the behaviour of mutual funds and found evidence of
momentum strategies and herding.
Amos Tversky, one of the world’s most respected and influential psychologists died on 2 June 1996, of metastatic melanoma, at the age of 59. Ghashghaie,
et al. (1996) claim that there is an information cascade in FX market dynamics
that corresponds to the energy cascade in hydrodynamic turbulence. The studyof heuristics and biases in judgment was criticized in several publications by G.
Gigerenzer. Kahneman and Tversky (1996) reply and claim that contrary to thecentral criticism, judgments of frequency—not only subjective probabilities—
are susceptible to large and systematic biases. Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok(1996) found that both price and earnings momentum strategies were profitable,
implying that the market responds only gradually to new information, i.e. there
is underreaction.
In the accounting literature, Basu (1997) finds evidence for the conservatism
principle, which he interprets as earnings reflecting ‘bad news’ more quickly than
‘good news’.
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998) argue that the theory of observational learning, and particularly of informational cascades, can help explain
phenomena such as stock market crashes. Motivated by a variety of psychological evidence, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) present a model of investor
sentiment that displays underreaction of stock prices to news such as earnings
announcements and overreaction of stock prices to a series of good or bad news.
In his third review paper Fama (1998) defends the efficient market hypothesisthat he famously defined in his first, and claims that apparent overreaction ofstock prices to information is about as common as underreaction. This argument
is unconvincing, because under- and overreactions appear to occur under different circumstances and/or at different time intervals. Odean (1998) tested andfound evidence for the disposition effect, the tendency of investors to sell winninginvestments too soon and hold losing investments for too long. Daniel, Hirsh1 http://prospect-theory.behaviouralfinance.net

5leifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) propose a theory of security markets based oninvestor overconfidence (about the precision of private information) and biased
self-attribution (which causes changes in investors’ confidence as a function of
their investment outcomes) which leads to market under- and overreactions.
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) found experimentally that overconfidence andoptimism lead to excessive business entry. Wermers (1999) studied herding by
mutual fund managers and he found the highest levels in trades of small stocks
and in trading by growth-oriented funds. Thaler (1999) summarizes the literature on mental accounting and concludes that mental accounting influences
choice, that is, it matters. Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Research Group(1999) publish Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, a book about fast andfrugal heuristics. Odean (1999) demonstrated that overall trading volume inequity markets is excessive, and one possible explanation is overconfidence. He
also found evidence of the disposition effect which leads to profitable stocks
being sold too soon and losing stocks being held for too long. Hong and Stein(1999) model a market populated by two groups of boundedly-rational agents:‘newswatchers’ and ‘momentum traders’ which leads to underreaction at shorthorizons and overreaction at long horizons. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) found that
institutional investors positive-feedback trade more than individual investors
and institutional herding impacts prices more than herding by individual investors. Veronesi (1999) presented a dynamic, rational expectations equilibrium
model of asset prices in which, among other features, prices overreact to badnews in good times and underreact to good news in bad times.
There is a commonly observed but unexpected negative correlation between
perceived risk and perceived benefit. Finucane, et al. (2000) concluded that
this was due to the affect heuristic—people tend to derive both risk and benefit
evaluations from a common source. Hong, Lim and Stein (2000) propose thatfirm-specific information, especially negative information, diffuses only gradually across the investing public, and this is responsible for momentum in stock
returns. Shleifer (2000) publishes Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance, a quality book that considers behavioural finance vis-à-vis the
EMH. In considering descriptive theories of choice under risk, Starmer (2000) reviews alternatives to expected utility theory. Shefrin (2000) wrote Beyond Greedand Fear, an excellent book on behavioural finance and the psychology of investing. In 2000, in his book Irrational Exuberance, Robert J. Shiller presented
a persuasive case that the US stock market was significantly overvalued, citing structural factors, cultural factors and psychological factors (Shiller 2000).
Kahneman and Tversky (2000) edit the book Choices, Values, and Frames,
which presents a selection of the research that grew from their collaboration
on prospect theory. Rabin (2000) provides a theorem showing that expectedutility theory is an utterly implausible explanation for appreciable risk aversion
over modest stakes. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) showed that past trading
volume provides an important link between ‘momentum’ and ‘value’ strategies
and these findings help to reconcile intermediate-horizon ‘underreaction’ andlong-horizon ‘overreaction’ effects.
Rabin and Thaler (2001) consider risk aversion and pronounce the expected6

utility hypothesis dead. Psychological research has established that men are
more prone to overconfidence than women (especially in male-dominated areas
such as finance), whilst theoretical models predict that overconfident investors
trade excessively. Barber and Odean (2001) found that men trade 45 per centmore than women and thereby reduce their returns more so than do women andconclude that this is due to overconfidence. Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001)
incorporate prospect theory in a model of asset prices in an economy. Grinblattand Keloharju (2001) identify the determinants of buying and selling activity
and find evidence that past returns, reference price effects, tax-loss selling andthe fact that investors are reluctant to realize losses are all determinants of trading. Barberis and Huang (2001) compare two forms of mental accounting by
incorporating loss aversion and narrow framing into two asset-pricing frameworks: individual stock accounting and portfolio accounting. The former was
the more successful. Gigerenzer and Selten (2001) edited Bounded Rationality:
The Adaptive Toolbox, a collection of workshop papers which promote bounded
rationality as the key to understanding how real people make decisions. The
book uses the concept of an ‘adaptive toolbox,’ a repertoire of fast and frugal
rules for decision making under uncertainty. Huberman (2001) provide compelling evidence that people have a propensity to invest in the familiar, while
often ignoring the principles of portfolio theory.
Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman (2002) edited Heuristics and Biases: The
Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, a book that compiles the most influential research in the heuristics and biases tradition since the initial collection in 1982
(Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982). In the Introduction (Gilovich and Griffin 2002) identify six general purpose heuristics (affect, availability, causality,
fluency, similarity and surprise) and six special purpose heuristics (attribution
substitution, outrage, prototype, recognition, choosing by liking and choosing
by default), whilst two heuristics have been superseded (representativeness (replaced by attribution-substitution (prototype heuristic and similarity heuristic))
and anchoring and adjustment (replaced by the affect heuristic)). Slovic, et al.
(2002) describe and discuss the affect heuristic: the specific quality of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’. Daniel Kahneman won the 2002 Bank of Sweden Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for his work on prospect theory,
despite being a research psychologist and not an economist. If it were not for his
untimely death, Amos Tversky, Kahneman’s collaborator, would have almost
certainly shared the prize. Holt and Laury (2002) conducted a simple lotterychoice experiment and found differences in risk aversion between behaviour
under hypothetical and real incentives.
Barberis and Thaler (2003) publish a survey of behavioural finance. More recent developments in decision making under risk have improved upon cumulative
prospect theory, such as the transfer of attention exchange model (Birnbaum2008). Harrison and Rutström (2009) proposed a reconciliation of expectedutility theory and prospect theory by using a mixture model.

7

3

Important Heuristics

Affect The affect heuristic concerns ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’. Affective responses to a stimulus occur rapidly and automatically: note how quickly
you sense the feelings associated with the stimulus words treasure or hate.
Availability Availability is a cognitive heuristic in which a decision makerrelies upon knowledge that is readily available rather than examine otheralternatives or procedures.
Similarity The similarity heuristic leads us to believe that ‘like causes like’and ‘appearance equals reality’. The heuristic is used to account for how
people make judgments based on the similarity between current situations
and other situations or prototypes of those situations.

8

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