External Autonomous, but Internally Deadlocked
The Gap between Foreign Worker Policy
and Real Development in JapanDavid Chiavacci

Free University Berlin
Institute of East Asian Studies
Ehrenbergstrasse 26-28
D-14195 Berlin, Germany
Tel. +49 30 838 57 116
Fax +49 30 838 57 113
dachiava@zedat.fu-berlin.de
February 2007

1

Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 22

The Gap between Official Foreign Worker Policy and Real Development ................ 3
New Legislation in Switzerland ......................................................................................... 4
Prime Example USA .......................................................................................................... 5

3

External Factors as Explanation for the Gap.............................................................. 10International Human Rights Regime and National Justice System.................................. 10
Particular Interests of Economic Actors........................................................................... 12
Globalization and Regional Integration ........................................................................... 13
Xenophobic Movements and Right-Wing Political Parties ............................................. 15

4

The Internal Dilemma of Foreign Worker Policy ....................................................... 16
Revision of the Immigration Regulation.......................................................................... 17

5

Current Developments in the Foreign Worker Policy in Japan ................................ 18
Discursive Level............................................................................................................... 19
Institutional Level ............................................................................................................ 20
Policy Level...................................................................................................................... 21

6

Final Remarks: Towards a Coherent Foreign Worker Policy in Japan? ................. 22

7

Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 23

1

1

Introduction

In recent years, social scientists have noted an increasing gap between official foreign worker
policy and real development in many advanced industrial economies (Bhagwati 2003;
Cornelius et al. 2004). 1 Although advanced industrial economies are officially curtailingimmigration and strengthening immigration control, an unabating inflow of immigrants is
continuing, especially of non-highly skilled foreign workers. The ability of a nation-state toregulate the inflow of foreign immigrants seems decreasing. After 9/11, the ability or inability
to monitor the national borders and to control immigration has gained a new relevance. It is
increasingly considered a question of national security (Monahan 2006; Rudolph 2003).
Especially conservative commentators regard immigration as a fundamental challenge to thenation-state.
Foreign and Japanese researchers have pointed out a notable discrepancy between official
immigration policy of Japan and real immigration movements into Japan (Douglass andRoberts 1999; Higuchi 2001; Kajita 2001, 2002; Tsuda and Cornelius 2004). In the case ofJapan this gap seems rather surprising. Following the seminal work of Chalmers Johnson(1982), Japan is often regarded as a prime example of a strong state. According to this view,
the Japanese state administration has a comprehensive autonomy vis-à-vis economic interestsgroups as well as civil society. The Japanese state is said to have a strong ability to develop
independently long-term policies in what it perceives as Japan’s national interest.
The topic of this paper is to analysis foreign worker politics in Japan in comparative
perspective with advanced industrial economies of Western Europe and North America. The
main focus is an analysis of the factors that lead to the gap between official policy and realdevelopment in a perspective of political sociology. The main argument of the paper is that
not external factors like the international human rights regime, particular interests ofeconomic actors, changes due to globalization and/or regional integration or the influence ofright-wing movements result in the significant gap between official policy and realdevelopment in Japan. The main factor for the gap is internal, i.e. the institutional setting of
foreign workers policy that leads to a deadlock between ministries and state agencies.
The paper has the following structure. First, the gap between the official foreign worker
policy and the real development in advanced industrial economies is outlined. Secondly, theexternal factors that are identified in the literature are discussed and their relevance in the case1

Foreign worker policy consists of two aspects: (a) border and immigration control and (b) integration policy of
foreign residents. Although both aspects are, of course, interconnected, this paper is primarily concentrating on
the aspect of border and immigration control of the foreign worker policy.

2

of Japan discussed. In the fourth section, the internal dilemma of the Japanese foreign workers
policy is analysed. The focus of this analysis is on the institutional setting of the policymaking process and ideational differences in the perception of foreign worker policy between
involved actors. Afterwards, the current tendencies in the Japanese foreign worker policy will
be discussed. Finally, the main findings are summarized in the concluding remarks. Also, thequestion will be raised if a move towards a coherent foreign worker policy is discernable incurrent Japan.

2

The Gap between Official Foreign Worker Policy and Real Development

In recent years, the foreign worker policy of advanced industrial economies is characterized,
in a very general perspective, by a dichotomisation. The main trend among advanced
industrial economies is to differentiate their immigration policy regarding the skill level offoreign workers. Highly skilled foreign workers are generally welcome in advanced industrial
economies. Competition for highly skilled labour is even increasing among advanced
industrial economies (Mahroum 2001). By contrast, foreign workers policy in most advanced
industrial economies is also characterized by increasing restrictions regarding the inflow of all
those foreign workers that are not considered highly skilled. Moreover, an extension andinstitutionalization of integration policies can also be noted in advanced industrial economies,
especially in those that regarded themselves for many years as non-immigration countries
despite ongoing immigration. These increasing efforts for a better integration of foreign
workers and their relatives are also accompanied in many advanced industrial economies byan anew turn toward assimilation instead of a multicultural integration policy (Back et al.
2002; Brubacker 2001; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Soininen 1999; Vasta 2006). The official
foreign worker policy of Japan fits these general tendencies among advanced industrial
economies. According to the basic stance of the Japanese government policy, which has been
confirmed for several times in recent years, only highly skilled foreign workers are acceptedin Japan. In addition, in view of the increasing numbers of foreign residents, local andmunicipal governments have increased their integration efforts and an urge for a national
integration policy is gaining momentum (Yamawaki 2005).

3

New Legislation in Switzerland
An example for the bifurcation of the foreign worker policy is the new immigration
legislation in Switzerland. In a popular referendum in September 2006, the voters haveaccepted a new legislation concerning immigration policy with a two-thirds majority(SwissInfo 2006). Regarding foreign workers, this new legislation includes a simplified
acceptance of highly skilled foreign labour as well as new restrictions concerning non-highly
skilled foreign labour. It defines also a set of basic goals in the integration policy of foreign
residents in Switzerland. All the more tellingly, these changes concerning the framework offoreign worker policy were generally well accepted. Strong criticism on the new legislation
arose because of planned changes in the Swiss refugee policy (see e.g. Schertenleib 2006).
The proposed tightening in the refugee policy was also the main reason that several politicalparties and non-governmental organizations (NGO) enacted a referendum about the newlegislation. Hence, not only was the new legislation welcomed by a strong majority of thevoters, but only the changes concerning the refugee policy were contended and resulted insignificant opposition to the new law. The new basic policy concerning foreign workers of
opening the Swiss labour market for highly skilled foreign workers, tightening the Swisslabour market for non-highly skilled foreign workers and establishing a general framework
for the integration of foreign residents was generally undisputed.
However, despite the general tightening of immigration policy in advanced industrial
economies for the large majority of potential foreign workers that are considered to not behighly qualified, international migration movements are not decreasing. The inflow of nonhighly skilled foreign workers is even increasing in a number of advanced industrial
economies. This results in a broadening gap between official policy and real development inmany advanced industrial economies.
In the mass media, migration is often highlighted as a major issue for national policy. Even inscientific publications drastic statements about migration are appearing from the second halfof the 1990s onwards. For example, according to Joppke (1998b) migration is a “challenge tothe nation-state”, Sassen (1996) asks if the state is “losing control?” or Weiner (1995)
identifies a “global migration crisis”.

4For over a decade, the analysis of the factors leading to a gap between official policy and realdevelopment has become a crucial topic in international migration analysis.2 After 9/11, thedebate about state ability and immigration has gained a new edge. Control over immigration is
now also regarded as an important national security issue.

Prime Example USA
The prime example for an increasing gap between official immigration policy and realdevelopment is the USA. According to estimates based on national population surveys, thenumber of undocumented immigrants in the USA has more than doubled in the last decadefrom about 5 million in 1996 to between 11.5-12 million in 2006. Since 2000 the averageannual growth of the undocumented population is more than 500,000 (Passel 2006).
Immigration policy and policy concerning the undocumented population has become a major
issue in US-American politics and public debate. Some people have even argued that theundocumented (Hispanic) population poses a “threat” for the unity and identity of the USAmerican society and nation (Huntington 2004a, 2004b). The Bush administration has reacted
to the rising number of undocumented immigrants with an array of policy initiatives, whichshould include a new and comprehensive immigration reform bill and a new US border fence.
While the immigration reform bill is currently still under discussion, the US border fence has
been singed into law in October 2006. Although it will be over 1,100 km long and beequipped with hi-tech surveillance equipment, it effectiveness has been questioned. Moreover,the policy initiatives including the new border fence have met strong resistance and criticism(e.g. Jonas 2006). The Mexican President Fox compared the new fence to the Berlin Wall, andduring spring 2006 undocumented immigrants and supporters organized mass demonstrations
all over the USA.
The research agenda and theorization on immigration policy is strongly influenced and maybe
even dominated by the US example. In fact, it has been argued that in many advanced
industrial economies in Europe the gap between official policy and real development is not ashuge as it may seem on the first look (Lahav and Guiraudon 2006b). Moreover, according toThränhardt (2006), Japan is a prime example for an advanced economy that is still controllingimmigration very efficiently.

2

An overview about new research concerning the gap between official immigration policy and real development
is given by Cornelius et al. (2004) as well as Lahav and Guiraudon (2006a).

5

However, the large majority of foreign and Japanese researchers see also in the case of Japana growing gap between official immigration policy and real development (Douglass andRoberts 1999; Higuchi 2001; Kajita 2001, 2002; Tsuda and Cornelius 2004). After a long andheated debate on immigration in the late 1980s because of the rising number of irregularimmigrants, the basic positions of the postwar immigration policy were reconfirmed in therevision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act that was implemented
1990:
1. Japan is only accepting highly skilled foreign workers in certain occupational areas
explicitly defined by the law.
2. The immigration of non-highly skilled foreign workers or “simple” foreign workers,
as they are often called in Japan, is not recognized and is to be prevented.
However, in reality, non-highly skilled foreign workers have immigrated in large numbers toJapan after the revision. In the early 1990s, during the last year of the so-called bubble
economy, the number of undocumented immigrants strongly increased (see figure 1). Parallelto the economic stagnation of the so-called lost decade the undocumented population
stagnated and began to decrease. Recently, efforts to deport undocumented immigrants havebeen strengthened and the number of irregular immigrants has fallen again below 200,000.
Moreover, foreign and Japanese commentators have pointed out that Japan has kept the frontdoor locked, but has opened some side-doors for non-highly skilled foreign workers. Twomain side-door policies can be identified: Japanese emigrants and their descendants(Nikkeijin) and the foreign trainee program. In the revision of the Immigration Control andRefugee Recognition Act, Japanese emigrants and their descendants up to the third
generations were granted the right to come to Japan with a renewable working visa without
any reservations regarding occupational area. The changes in the immigration law resulted ina fast and strong increase of Nikkeijin returning to Japan. Especially the number of return
migrants from South America increased even during the economic stagnation. This is visible
in the number of Brazilian and Peruvian residents in Japan, the two, by far, most important
countries of origin of returning Nikkeijin (see figure 1). In 2005, their number reached nearly
360,000.

6

Figure 1

Undocumented Immigrants as well as Brazilian and Peruvian residents in Japan, 1987-2005

40000035000030000025000020000015000010000050000
01987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Brazilian and Peruvian residents

7

Undocumented immigrants

The trainee and technical internship programs for foreign workers are the second importantside-door policy of Japan. In the early 1990s, the former trainee program for foreign workers
was reorganized and expanded. The JITCO (Japan International Training Cooperation) was
funded through which also small and medium enterprises (SME) could gain access to foreign
trainees. These programs are officially part of the Japanese ODA (oversea development
assistance) efforts and should enable know-how and skill transfers to the countries of origin of
the trainees. Still, they have been severely criticized in Japan as procurement programs forcheap foreign manpower and have been shaken by several scandals (see Kajita 2001: 204206; Kawakami 2001). Since the late 1990s, the number of foreign trainees and interns
working in Japan under these programs has strongly increased and has reached nearly 100,000
in the year 2005 (JITCO 2006).
Overall, the number of foreign workers and residents has significantly increased in the lasttwo decades. Since the late 1980s the number of legally registered foreign residents has morethen doubled and reached over two million in the year 2005 (see figure 2). Two crucial
discrepancies between the official immigration policy and the real development in Japan canbe identified. First, although officially only highly skilled foreign workers are accepted inJapan, the number of foreign workers in non-highly skilled jobs, as defined by the law, hasstrongly increased in recent years and is by far larger than foreign workers in highly skilledjobs. Secondly, despite the Japanese administration still insists that Japan is not a country of
immigration; Japan has de facto become a country of immigration. The percentage of foreign
population is still small in international comparison with most advanced industrial economies
in the West, but the number of new long-term immigrants in recent years is among the highestof all OECD countries (OECD 2006). Foreign workers are today a crucial factor in theJapanese labour market. Research shows that important export industries and some service
industries are structurally dependent on foreign manpower (Kajita, Tanno and Higuchi 2005;
Nikkei Business 2006). The problems in the field of immigration are, of course, not of thesame magnitude as in the USA or some South European countries, but also in Japan a clear
gap between official policy and real development cannot be denied.

8

Figure 2

Legally Registered Foreign Residents in Japan, 1986-2005

2200000

2000000

1800000

1600000

1400000

1200000

1000000

8000001986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

9

3

External Factors as Explanation for the Gap

In recent years, migration specialists have mainly identified four external factors as reasonsfor the gap between official immigration policy and real development in advanced industrial
economies:
1. International human rights regime and national justice system;
2. Particular interests of economic actors;
3. Globalization and/or regional integration;
4. New xenophobic movements and right-wing political parties.
In the following, the main argument for each of the four external factors is shortly outlined
and its relevance in the case of Japan is discussed.

International Human Rights Regime and National Justice System
In the postwar era, the international human rights regime has been established. Foreign
residents and foreign workers are also covered by the human rights regime. Hence, thetreatment of the foreign population is no longer solely up to the discretion of a nation-state. It
is expected that every nation-state is granting and protecting the basic human rights of its
foreign population.
A number of authors have argued that the international human rights regime is de facto
limiting the state authority and its policy options regarding foreign residents and immigration.
Moreover, because of the international human rights regime the importance of citizenship is
said to have diminished. Foreign residents have as denizens a number of rights that they can
defend through the independent justice system, at least in liberal nation-states (Jacobsen 1996;
Sassen 1996; Soysal 1994; Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001: 101). From the late 1960s onwards,
immigrants and their support groups have successfully enforced their claims based on theinternational human rights regime through legal actions. Through the decisions of
independent courts, the executive and legislative branches of liberal nation-states have partly
lost their authority and their ability to control immigration (Cornelius et al. 1994: 9-11).
Still, other authors have strongly criticised such a view of the strong influence of theinternational human rights regime. Joppke (1998a: 291), for example, has bluntly called theinternational human rights regime “perhaps the single most inflated construction in recentsocial science discourse.” He and others strongly question the impact of the international
10human rights regime on the enforcement of national migration policies, even in liberal nationstates. In fact, the empirical study of Koopmans and Statham (1999) shows little support for astrong impact of an international human rights regime in Germany and the United Kingdom.
The main source for the rights and protection of foreign residents and foreign workers inliberal nation-states is not the international human rights regime, but national legislation andnational justice systems. Furthermore, it can hardly be argued that an international migration
regime is enacted today.3
Still, in the case of Japan, the international human rights regime has been very influential
regarding the rights of the foreign population (Gurowitz 1999). The signing of several
international conventions by Japan has resulted in new legislations and improved legal
positions of foreign population. For example, because of the ratification of the international
human rights convention in 1979 and the Geneva refugee convention in 1981, the Japanesenation-state ended a number of discriminating practices against foreign residents and granted
them the same rights as the Japanese populations (Kondo 2001: 17). However, the relevanceof international norms in Japan is primarily an indicator for the relative weak position offoreign residents in the national legislation. This is clearly in evidence through a comparisonof the role and the influence of national legislation and the justice system in Germany and inJapan.
The basic philosophy of the postwar German constitution, after the dictatorial Nazi regime, isthe protection of individual rights vis-à-vis the nation-state authority. The constitution
guarantees to every resident this protection regardless of a German or foreign nationality.
Moreover, the German constitutional court (Verfassungsgericht) has been very influential inpostwar Germany. It has closely monitored over the compliance of national legislation andstate policy with the spirit of the postwar constitution. In its activities, the constitutional court
played a central role in the policy concerning foreign residents and foreign workers. Several
times the constitutional court has granted ample rights to foreign residents before thegovernment had formulated a policy in these fields (Joppke 1998a: 283-287). A primeexample is the extensive right of family reunification that was granted by the constitutional
court and not by the German government. This extensive right led to chain migration as
foreign workers started to bring their families to Germany.
In contrast in Japan, the governmental authority is not significantly limited or challenged by
the justice system. The post-war Japanese constitution is not containing an article regarding
3

On the possibilities of an international migration regimes and its importance see Ghosh (2000). For a criticalview of these proposals see FFM (2004).

11

the rights of foreign residents (Kondo 2001: 10). Moreover, a court that would be theequivalent to the German constitutional court and that would actively enforce the spirit of theconstitution does not exist in Japan. Japanese courts have very rarely challenged the authorityof the government. Hence, in Japan, an unequal treatment of foreign residents and Japanesenationals has not been regarded to conflict with the post-war Japanese constitution. In
Germany and most others liberal states, such an unequal treatment of foreign and national
population is clearly conflicting with the national legal foundations.
Overall, it can hardly be argued that the international human right regime or the national
judiciary system is significantly challenging the authority of the Japanese state concerning
foreign worker policy. In contrast to many liberal nation-states in the West, the Japaneseconstitution and the Japanese courts have not limited the ability of the Japanese state toformulate and implement a foreign worker policy. Changes in the policy due to the signings
of international conventions are primarily an indicator for the weak protection of foreign
residents in the national legislation. But even after the signing of several international
conventions, the Japanese state has still a large array of policy options from which it canfreely chose.

Particular Interests of Economic Actors
Powerful economic interests groups and their strong influence on state administration are seen
as a second factor that is inhibiting the independent formulation and implementation of theforeign worker policy (Miller 1994). In his seminal article Freeman (1995) has formulated thetheoretical framework of this view.4 According to his perspective the gap between official
policy and real development regarding immigration into advanced industrial economies is dueto the unequal distribution of profits and costs of international migration. While the costs ofimmigration are widely spread on the whole receiving society, the profits are concentrated
among a small number of economic actors that, as employers of foreign workers, gain from
immigration. They have strong incentives to influence the national immigration policy and toshape it to their own advantage. Therefore, immigration of non-highly skilled foreign workers
might not be part of the official foreign workers policy, but because of the influence ofeconomic interests groups the non-immigration policy of non-highly skilled foreign workers
is not at all or only partly implemented. In other words, undocumented non-highly skilled
foreign workers are tolerated.
4

For an updated version see Freeman (2006).

12

A prime example for the ability of economic interest groups to usurp the foreign worker
policy is the USA (Calavita 1992; 1994). Because of the strong lobbyism of employers, theordinances regarding undocumented foreign workers are very weak and are not fully
implemented. Although the US-American state is putting a large effort into controlling its
borders and inhibiting undocumented immigration, effective sanctions against employers of
undocumented foreign workers are not applied. The steady demand for non-highly qualified
foreign workers results in a persisting inflow of undocumented foreign workers, especiallythrough the southern border with Mexico. The result is a large gap between the official
immigration policy and the real immigration flows.
How is the situation in Japan? Economic interest groups are surely also in Japan influential in
the policy-making process. The revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition
Act introduced strict penalties for employers of undocumented foreign workers, but only asmall number of Japanese employers have been convicted for such an offense. Cornelius(1994: 391-392) speaks of a “symbolic” implementation of these new regulations for
employers in Japan. However, the Japanese foreign worker policy is surely not dominated byeconomic interest groups. With the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and the Ministry of Health,
Labor and Welfare (MHLW), central actors in the policy-making process in Japan are“immune” to economic interest groups. This is for example visible in the unilateralcancellation of the visa exemption agreements with Pakistan and Bangladesh (January 1989)
as well as Iran (April 1992). Through these cancellations, the Japanese state effectively
stopped the undocumented immigration from these countries. In recent years, the MOJ has
increased its efforts to find and deport undocumented foreign workers, which has been an
important factor for the significant fall in the number of undocumented immigrants (see figure1). Economic actors surely have an influence in the Japanese foreign worker policy, but the
gap between official policy and real development in Japan is not primarily due to these
influences of particular economic interests that would have impeded an implementation of theofficial foreign worker policy.

Globalization and Regional Integration
A third perspective sees the gap between increasing restrictive official policy and theincreasing international migration movements as a side-effect of economic globalization andregional integration processes. Stronger economic and political ties between nation-states
include also stronger transnational links on the sub-national level that pave the way to new13

migration movements. In this view nation-states can no longer fully control these sub-national
links and the resulting migration movements (Massey 1998; Sassen 1996, 1998).
Transnational connections on the meso-level in the form of social networks and/or of thetransnational migration industry are, in this perspective, identified as the core elements ofinternational migration movements (Faist 1997, 2000; Higuchi 2002). Economic regional
integration like the European Union (EU) or the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)
are accompanied by new migration movements that seem to undermine the ability of nationstates to control autonomously immigration.
A regional or transnational perspective makes a crucial contribution to the study of foreign
worker policy. As the name says it, international migration is an international phenomenon.
In order to fully understand foreign worker policy and its success or failures, one has to study
not only the policies of countries of destination, but also the policies in countries of origin andthe transnational links between origins and destinations. This is also obvious in the case ofJapan.
Several authors stress the influence of globalization in the case of new migration movements
to Japan (Sassen 1993; Sellek 2001). More precisely, the timing of the new internationalmigration movements to Japan is embedded in the development of an East Asian migration
region (Chiavacci 2005). The sharp and sudden increase of Nikkeijin coming from SouthAmerica after the revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act shows
the crucial role of transnational links on the meso-level (Higuchi 2001; Tsuda 1999).
Furthermore, the boom of bilateral economic partnership agreements (EPA) and bilateral free
trade agreements (FTA) in East Asia and South East Asia are sometimes interpreted as apossible first step for a fuller economic integration in East Asia (Kohara 2005; Nakagawa
2006; Taniguchi 2004; Yoshino 2005). Although the number of foreign workers foreseen in
the EPA/FTA that Japan has concluded with regional partners is very limited, these
agreements form the first bilateral agreements of Japan regarding migration in the region. Ifstrong economic integration in East Asia or even an East Asian community would reallymaterialize, one can also expect migration movements in the region of a completely new
magnitude.
However, for the time being, it can hardly be argued that the control of the Japanese borders isundermined by strong transnational links or the economic embeddedness of Japan in East
Asia. To begin with, border control in the case of Japan is significantly simplified by its
peripheral position at the edge of Asia as island. While a long land border is very difficult to14

control even with high-tech equipment, an open sea as natural border simplifies the tasksignificantly.5 Second, the strengths of transnational links of foreign workers in Japan to theircountries of origin are very weak due to the limited rights of foreign workers in Japan. Most
notably the right of family reunification leads to strong transnational links and chain
migration. But because of the nearly complete absence of the right of family reunification for
non-highly skilled foreign workers in Japan, transnational networks and/or the internationalmigration industry are not really challenging the authority of the Japanese state. The only
exemption from these strict rules is the case of the Nikkeijin who can bring their family withthem to Japan. Third, the current immigration movements are still relative small in size, acircumstance that also simplifies the control of immigration for the Japanese state. And finally,
the regional integration in East Asia is still in an early stage. A multilateral agreement in theform of an East Asian migration regime is currently not foreseeable. The International
Organization of Migration (IOM) has tried through the Manila process to start a stronger
consultation regarding migration among state of origins and state of destination in East Asia,
but the process has currently completely broken down. Overall, Japan’s ability to control
immigration is hardly challenged by a regional integration process or transnational links.

Xenophobic Movements and Right-Wing Political Parties
New xenophobic social movements and political parties have been identified as a fourth
external factor that leads to a rising gap between official foreign worker policy and realdevelopment. Through the pressure from ultra-right-wing movements and political parties,
nation-states have been forced to formulate a more restrictive foreign worker policy, but
because of the three other external factors, as discussed above, the nation-state is not able toreally realize this more restrictive foreign workers policy. This may lead to a further
strengthening of xenophobic movements and right-wing political parties that leads again to a
restriction of the foreign worker policy (Freeman 1998: 87).
In Western Europe in an increasing number of countries, xenophobic ultra-right-wing parties
are playing an important role in national politics by gaining a large percentage of the popular
votes. For example, in the recent national elections in Austria in October 2006, the two ultraright-wing parties won together over 15% of the votes: Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ)
5For example, although the USA are often identified as prime example for a weak liberal nation-state that is nolonger able to control migration because of the unrelenting irregular immigration flow from Mexico, it has to be
noted that the immigration movements over the open sea from Cuba and Haiti to the USA have effectively been
stopped in recent years (Guiraudon and Joppke 2001: 4).

15

4.2% and Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) 11% (BMI 2006). Moreover, the two parties
are the result of a split of the FPÖ that let to a weakening of the ultra-right in Austria. In aformer national election back in 1999, the FPÖ was able to attract over a quarter of all votes
and was the second-strongest national party (McGann and Kitschelt 2005: 147).
Since the 1990s, the influence and impact of the radical right in the foreign worker policy isnotable in many advanced industrial economies. However, no significant xenophobic social
movement or ultra-right party exists in contemporary Japan. Frictions between the foreign
population and Japanese in everyday life have been reported (see e.g. Tsuzuki 1998; 2000),
but up to now the Japanese state is not significantly under pressure from right-wing
movements or parties concerning the foreign worker policy.

4

The Internal Dilemma of Foreign Worker Policy

The four external factors behind the gap between the official foreign worker policy and thereal development, which are identified in the literature, have been discussed above. However,none of these four factors can explain the gap between official policy and real development in
the case of Japan. The Japanese state has not lost its ability to control the inflow of foreign
workers due to external factors. Hence, the gap between official Japanese policy and realdevelopment is due to internal factors of the Japanese state. In order to understand the gap
between policy and reality, the Japanese foreign worker policy-making process has to beanalyzed. In such an analysis, two factors are identifiable as the main internal factors for the
gap between policy and reality: the institutional setting of the foreign worker policy and thediscursive background of the foreign worker policy.
Regarding the institutional setting of the state administration in Japan, scholars have pointed
out the pronounced vertical integration of ministries and agencies and the “sectionalism”
between them (Imamura 2006; Lehmbruch 1995; Muramatsu 1997).6 The vertical integrationof national ministries and agencies and their competition for resources leads to a shortcomingin coordination and cooperation among the institutions of the Japanese state. This
segmentation between Japanese ministries and agencies is further strengthened by the rigid
differentiation of authority and the continuity of their responsibilities. Struggles for
6

In Japan, the vertical integration of ministries and agencies and the resulting non-cooperation and conflicts
between them are described as “sectionalism” (sekushonarizumu), but in the administration studies in English
language this term is not used for describing the separatism among state organizations.

16

competences between state institutions are quite frequent and can be very fierce. Especially, if
a ministry or agency tries to extend its competences at the cost of another administrative
institution, normally a long and often openly fought conflict results (for examples, see DeWitand Steinmo 2002; Johnson 1989). The institutional segmentation is further strengthened in
the field of foreign worker policy by the discursive background. Ministries and agencies thatare involved in the foreign worker policy making have completely different perspectives
about the issue.

Revision of the Immigration Regulation
In order to illustrate the influence of internal segmentation and “sectionalism” in the foreign
worker policy, the basic revision of the immigration regulation in the late 1980s and early
1990s is shortly discussed. In the view of the rising number of undocumented foreign workers
a debate about a basic reformulation of the foreign worker policy started in the later 1980s.
Several ministries and agencies proposed at the time new basic foreign worker policy
principles and a revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. After thethen Ministry of Labor (MOL) had published its proposals in a report in 1988 (MOL 1988), a
heated conflict started between the MOL and the MOJ about the foreign worker policy.
Although both ministries had a relative close position and favored a continuity of a restrictive
foreign worker policy, they engaged in a turf war. The MOJ was upset about the proposal of
the MOL to introduce a new work permit scheme for foreign workers, which the MOJ
regarded as an invasion of the MOL into the immigration policy as the MOJ’s sphere. Finally,
the MOL “postponed” its idea of a work permit for foreign workers (Mainichi Shinbun 1988).
The MOJ prevailed in the conflict with the MOL, but business-friendly political actors
reinterpreted its proposal to grant Japanese emigrants and their descendents up to the third
generation a residence visa in Japan without constraints regarding working activities. The
commission of the MOJ had in mind an equal treatment of Japanese emigrants and theirdescendents with the long-term foreign residents in Japan and their descendents, for which apermanent visa was introduced with the revision (Kajita 2002: 21-25). However, businessfriendly agencies and part of the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) saw in the residence visa
for Nikkeijin a possibility to introduce cheap foreign workers to Japan. It was hoped at thetime that the Nikkeijin would easily integrate into the Japanese society thanks to their cultural
proximity (Nojima 1989). A similar process can also be noted in the case of the revision offoreign trainee program in the early 1990s. This time the MOL could prevail with its proposal17

of extending the foreign trainee programs over the MOJ that had rejected this proposal.
However, the MOL wanted to enhance the know-how transfer to industrializing Asian
economies and empowering their economic development with these new foreign trainee
programs in order to reduce the economic gap between industrializing Asian economies andJapan. It was hoped to reduce the migration pressure through these programs. But during theformulation of the new foreign trainee programs, business-friendly policy circle regarded thenew programs basically as possibility to provide SME with cheap foreign workers and wereable to alter the design of the new foreign trainee programs for this goal against the oppositionof the MOJ and MOL (Koike 1996: 24-26).
Overall, the crucial reform years in the foreign worker policy around 1990 were not only
characterised by a turf war between the MOL and the MOJ despite basically similar positions,but also through a hijacking of the policy proposal of the MOL and the MOJ by businessfriendly ministries and LDP politicians. The result of this fragmented and conflictive policymaking process was a policy of the least common denominator, in which an increasing gap
between the official goals of the policy and the real development was pre-programmed in thepolicy itself. Japan officially maintained a very restrictive foreign worker policy, but in reality
it opened a side-door to foreign workers in low-skilled occupations by accepting Nikkeijin.
The foreign trainee program was officially part of the Japanese overseas development aid(ODA), but it was de facto primarily a possibility for SME to gain access to cheap foreign
workers. Although Japan officially maintains to be a non-immigration country, it has de facto
become an immigration country after the revision of the immigration regulation in the early
1990s. This resulted in another gap between official policy and real development. Although
no official integration policy has been formulated on the national level, an increasing numberof foreign workers and their families reside in Japan.

5

Current Developments in the Foreign Worker Policy in JapanThe gap between official policy and real development has not gone unnoticed in Japan, but
after the end of the bubble economy, the debate about the foreign worker policy had cooled
down during the economic stagnation of the 1990s. However, because of the looming
demographic development of Japan a new debate about the necessity and/or desirability of anactive foreign worker policy has started, which has been called the second debate about
immigration (Iguchi 2001). Is the foreign worker policy currently undergoing a significant
18change? Can it be expected that the internal problems of the foreign worker policy making
will be overcome in the near future? This section tries to give a preliminary answer to thesequestions based on an overview of new developments as well as continuities in the foreign
worker policy in Japan on the discursive, institutional and policy level.

Discursive Level
In comparison to the debate in the late 1980s, a number of new developments can be noticed
on the discursive level in the current debate on foreign workers in Japan. First of all,immigration policy and foreign worker policy is no longer simply regarded as a problem, but
is increasingly discussed as an issue (Hirowatari 2005). Foreign workers are no longer only aproblem, with which Japan is confronted and to which it has to react, but foreign workers areseen as a factor for shaping Japan’s future.
The context for this new perception of foreign workers and immigration is, on the one hand,demographic change. In view of the decreasing population, the birth-rate far below
reproduction and a fast ageing society, foreign workers are identified as one possible remedy
to a looming labor shortage. On the other hand, immigration and foreign workers are also
discussed in the context of a possible regional integration process in East Asia.
The current discussion about foreign worker policy is, however, also characterized by strong
continuities. Major actors position the foreign worker policy in the same context as in the firstdebate back in the late 1980s. The MHLW and Rengô, the by far most important nationalumbrella organization of Japanese labor unions, discuss foreign workers primarily concerning
their impact in the labor market and on the working conditions for Japanese workers. The
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and some others business-friendly agencies
as well as business organizations are primarily concerned with the role of foreign workers forthe economic development of Japan. The future of the Japanese nation-state and its assumed
homogenous ethic composition are primarily the focus of conservative politicians whendebating on foreign workers and immigration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) refers
to the foreign workers issue primarily in the context of the international reputation of Japan.
For the National Police Agency (NPA) and the MOJ, the main points of reference in theforeign worker debate are national security issues and (potential) criminal activities of foreign
residents. Although this list of standpoints in the debate is by far not concluding, it shows how
the discussions on foreign worker issues in Japan are still very fragmented and missing a main19

focus, despite the new perspectives in the age of an ageing Japanese society and regional
integration processes in East Asia.

Institutional Level
Significant new developments have also occurred on the institutional level. First, an important
new actor has appeared. Nippon Keidanren, the Japan’s most important and influential
business organization, has published in April 2004 a proposal for a more active andcomprehensive foreign worker policy (Nippon Keidanren 2004). This standpoint is in sharp
contrast to the passive positions of Keidanren and Nikkeiren back in the late 1980s and early
1990s.7 While only SME and their interest organizations clearly favoured a more open foreign
worker policy at that time, today also large corporations, which are generally very influential
in the Japanese policy-making process, are arguing for a broadening of the Japanese foreign
worker policy. A second important change has been the administrative reforms from the later
1990s onwards. This resulted not only in the first comprehensive reorganization of thenational administrative since the end of the Allied occupation, but strengthened also theposition and leadership of the Prime Minister in the policy-making process (Shinoda 2003;
Takenaka 2006).
Still, like at the discursive level, the institutional level of the foreign worker policy is alsocharacterized by strong continuities. “Sectionalism” between ministries and agencies is still
very pronounced in the policy-making process. The communication and cooperation between
actors is, at best, suboptimal. The institutional background of the foreign worker policy
making is still very complex.
Overall, the foreign worker policy making is marked by a continued antagonism between afirst group of actors (MOJ, MHLW and Rengô) favoring a restrictive immigration policy anda second group of actors (METI, MOFA and Keidanren) favoring a more open immigration
policy. Such a split concerning the foreign worker policy is also visible in the LDP and otherpolitical parties.

7

In May 2002, Keidanren and Nikkeiren merged to form Nippon Keidanren.

20

Policy Level
On the policy level three new developments have marked the foreign worker policy. Japan
had come under strong pressure by the USA concerning human trafficking. In the 2004
Trafficking in Person Report of the U.S. Department of State (2004), Japan had been includedin the special watch list of tier two countries. The Japanese government under the leadershipof the MOFA has implemented in reaction to this criticism, among other actions, a new andstricter policy concerning the entertainer visa. This has led to a substantial drop of foreign
entertainer coming to Japan. The second significant change has been the inclusion of a foreign
worker accord into the new FTA/EPA with South Asian economies. Despite strong internal
resistance from the MHLW, MOJ and Rengô,8 these agreements have been pushed trough by
METI and MOFA thanks to the strong support by former Prime Minister Koizumi who
regarded them as a crucial project for Japan. Although the number of foreign workers
intended in the first singed EPA with the Philippines is with 1,000 health workers very limited,these agreements are the first bilateral treaty concerning foreign worker policy that go beyond
an unilateral foreign worker policy of Japan. The third area of change is the policy concerning
highly skilled foreign workers that has been broadened in the hope to attract more highly
skilled foreign workers to Japan.
These examples show that in the case of foreign pressure or leadership by the Prime Ministera policy change is possible. In the case of highly skilled foreign workers a consensus among
all important actors in the foreign worker policy making for an active promotion policy can benoted. However, in other areas a number of policy ideas have been proposed, but no clear
direction is discernable. These areas of deadlock include the questions of a reform of theforeign trainee programs in view of their current serious problems and of a revision of thepolicy concerning Nikkeijin in view of their integration problems. Some actors favoring a
restrictive immigration policy would like to tighten the foreign trainee programs and Nikkeijinpolicy by introducing new strict regulation for the foreign trainees and a Japanese language
test for Nikkeijin (e.g. MOJ 2006). Actors favoring a more open foreign worker program have,on the other hand, proposed to significantly broaden the job fields in which foreign workers
are accepted in Japan. They argue that in view of the demographic development also “semiskilled” foreign workers are needed in Japan in the near future (e.g. METI 2005).
Although in some areas significant change has occurred in the foreign worker policy in Japan,
the general direction of the foreign worker policy is still not clear. The fragmented
8

The supporters of these agreements had also to overcome the strong resistance from the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) and agricultural interests groups.

21

institutional framework combined with different perspectives on immigration leads, at least
for the time being, to a deadlock regarding the basic direction of the Japanese foreign worker
policy. This fragmentation of the foreign worker policy is not limited to ministries andinterests groups; also the LDP and other parties are split concerning the foreign worker issue.
No strong leadership is exerted by the current top politicians of the LDP.

6

Final Remarks: Towards a Coherent Foreign Worker Policy in Japan?

What would be needed to overcome the gap between official foreign worker policy and realdevelopment in Japan? First of all, very strong political leadership of top politicians is
indispensable to overrule the institutional segmentation and “sectionalism” that is currently
still dominating the policy-making process. The politicians should also assume theresponsibility to set strategic goals for the Japanese foreign worker policy. Based on thesestrategic goals a new and coherent institutional setting for the formulation and implementationof the foreign worker policy should be established. If the main strategic goal is to pursue thehitherto official restrictive foreign worker policy, especially regarding non-highly qualified
foreign workers, then the current setting with the MOJ in charge of the foreign worker policy
is still functional. If the main strategic goal is a more open and active foreign worker policy,
then comprehensive institutional reform of the foreign worker policy with the formation of
one comprehensive national agency in power of formulation and implementation of theimmigration and integration policy is needed as has been called for by different sides in recent
years (e.g. Kondo 2002; Nippon Keidanren 2004, Tezuka 2005). The concretes policies andmeasures derived from the strategic direction should be based on the analysis of the realdevelopments and problems in the foreign worker policy in the last 20 years. If a restrictive
strategy is chosen then the foreign trainee program should be cancelled in today’s form andthe residence visa for Nikkeijin abolished. If an extensive strategy is taken, then acomprehensive national integration policy for foreign residents has to be formulated andrealized.
How probable is it that a strategic policy will be formulated in Japan in the near future?
Unfortunately, the likelihood seems rather low. Foreign worker policy is a very thorny issue
and politicians are rather reserved to pick it up. The current problems and costs inflicted on
the Japanese society are still rather low so that the issue is still avoidable for the classe
politique. Despite strongly increasing numbers of foreign workers and foreign residents, Japan22

may still be able to sustain the grand self-delusion to be a non-immigration country. Becauseof the very complex and fundamental discursive background as well as of the fragmented
institutional framework, the Japanese foreign worker policy might also in the near future be ina deadlock that will result in a policy of the least common denominator instead of a strategic
and comprehensive policy.

7

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