Proposed ASIFMA Principles for
Public Cloud Regulation
March 2021

Disclaimer
The information and opinion commentary in this ASIFMA – Proposed ASIFMA Principles for Public Cloud
Regulation was prepared by the Asia Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (ASIFMA) toreflect the views of our members. ASIFMA believes that the information in the Paper, which has beenobtained from multiple sources believed to be reliable, is reliable as of the date of publication. As
estimates by individual sources may differ from one another, estimates for similar types of data could vary
within the Paper. In no event, however, does ASIFMA make any representation as to the accuracy orcompleteness of such information. ASIFMA has no obligation to update, modify or amend the informationin this Paper or to otherwise notify readers if any information in the Paper becomes outdated or
inaccurate. ASIFMA will make every effort to include updated information as it becomes available and in
subsequent papers.
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ASIFMA is an independent, regional trade association with over 140
member firms comprising a diverse range of leading financial institutions fromboth the buy and sell side including banks, asset managers, accounting and law
firms, and market infrastructure service providers. Together, we harness theshared interests of the financial industry to promote the development ofliquid, deep and broad capital markets in Asia. ASIFMA advocates stable,
innovative and competitive Asian capital markets that are necessary tosupport the region’s economic growth. We drive consensus, advocate
solutions and effect change around key issues through the collective strengthand clarity of one industry voice. Our many initiatives include consultations
with regulators and exchanges, development of uniform industry standards,
advocacy for enhanced markets through policy papers, and lowering the costof doing business in the region. Through the GFMA alliance with SIFMA in the
U.S. and AFME in Europe, ASIFMA also provides insights on global bestpractices and standards to benefit the region.

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Contents
I.

Introduction to the public cloud ...................................................................................................5
Shared responsibility model ......................................................................................................................................5
Benefits of public cloud .............................................................................................................................................6
How public cloud can enhance operational resilience ..............................................................................................7
Regulatory support for public cloud ..........................................................................................................................8

II. Regulatory fragmentation creating challenges to cloud adoption ..................................................9III. ASIFMA’s proposed principles for public cloud regulation ........................................................... 10
Principle 1: Recognising the benefits of public cloud ..............................................................................................11
Principle 2: Supporting ongoing dialogue ...............................................................................................................11
Principle 3: Supporting technology-neutral and activity-based regulation.............................................................11
Principle 4: Supporting harmonisation of public cloud requirements ....................................................................11
Principle 5: Supporting a principles-based and outcome-focused approach to cloud regulation ..........................12
Principle 6: Risk assessment and due diligence of public cloud arrangements and CSPs .......................................13
Principle 7: Supporting free movement of data ......................................................................................................14
Principle 8: Approval and notification requirements ..............................................................................................15
Principle 9: Concentration risk ................................................................................................................................16

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I.

Introduction to the public cloud

Cloud computing offers an adaptable and versatile way to consume a range of information technology(“IT”) services, such as business applications, data storage or processing power. Cloud is offered ‘as aservice’, where IT resources are provided on-demand and the location of the physical hardware andapplication are largely extraneous to the users. Cloud computing is rapidly becoming the norm for IT
processing and data storage solutions and is offered both by major and niche vendors.
In this paper, we are focusing on public cloud. In a public model, cloud infrastructure is provisioned foropen use by multiple organisations. It may be owned, managed, and operated by a business, academic,or government organisation, or some combination of them. It exists on the premises of the Cloud Service
Provider (“CSP”)1.
Whilst all cloud models and services are important for financial institutions (“FIs”), the use of public cloudis of greater interest and scrutiny within the industry today largely because of the increasing adoption of
public cloud within the industry (both by FIs and their third-party providers), and the differentiators
associated with public cloud versus other models (private cloud or traditional on-premises IT).

Shared responsibility model
Public cloud has different implications for the responsibilities of FIs and CSPs, for areas such as
management of data centres and infrastructure (e.g., servers), security (e.g., data access), and risk andcompliance (e.g., the applicability of regulatory requirements). Known as the ‘shared responsibility
model’, both the FI and the CSP take responsibility for activities, such as security and compliance, that are
required for running a public cloud service. The CSP manages elements such as the provision of servers,
networking, and data centre facilities, whilst the FI is responsible for aspects such as customer data,
security, application management and user access. This model can also extend to sharing responsibilities
for IT controls and risk management requirements (for example, both parties owning and managing access
controls for areas which they are responsible for). Nevertheless, this shared responsibility model does notmean that FIs discharge their ultimate accountability on CSPs, as the ultimate liability for any FI activity
will always be held by the FI.

1

AFME (2019): The Adoption of Public Cloud Computing in Capital Markets
https://www.afme.eu/Portals/0/DispatchFeaturedImages/AFME%20Cloud%20Paper%20November%202019%20Fi
nal.pdf

5

Benefits of public cloud
The use of public cloud brings significant benefits2 to the financial services industry in the areas of risk
mitigation, innovation, cost savings and productivity gains:
Risk Mitigation• Effective risk mitigation, such as increased operational resilience, to ensure continuity of service
by distributing the risk of disruption across a greater range of infrastructure, both on-premises
and off-premises;• Compared to on-premises environments, the locational diversity of CSPs’ infrastructure greatly
reduces geographic concentration/systemic risk;• Benefit from the cybersecurity capabilities and tools of the CSPs who invest billions in advanced
cybersecurity capabilities and tools, thus offering better protection;• Cloud offers FIs the capability to architect and build workloads that are able to withstandoutages and security threats.
Innovation• Greater business agility and innovation, providing computing capacity for experimentation anddevelopment (Platform as a Service (“PaaS”), Software as a Service (“SaaS”)), reducing project
lead times, and increasing scalability. Flexible usage allows FIs to run IT workloads or applications
as required, such as developing reports or data analytics, without needing to retain a large IT
footprint (Infrastructure as a Service (“IaaS”), PaaS, SaaS);• Access to advanced technologies and capabilities, such as data analytics, machine learning andartificial intelligence (“AI”), which FIs cannot get in any other way, or at the same cost, quality andspeed. These advanced technologies enable FIs to deliver better products and services to theircustomers, improve their ability to fight financial crime and manage risk;• Enhanced client experience and service offerings, quickly developing, testing, and rolling out new
products or features to FI’s functions and clients;• Cloud can help FIs achieve their sustainability goals. With fewer data centres and use of moreshared resources through the use of cloud, FIs can improve their sustainability credentials.
Cost savings• Reduced spend on procuring physical hardware and facilities, such as on-premises data centres
and the associated operations and maintenance required, by moving to on-demand usage ofservices on a pay-as-you-go basis (e.g., IaaS, PaaS and SaaS) frees up resources for upgrades toinfrastructure and digital capabilities, which ultimately results in better services for clients;• Improved overall cost management, as cloud adoption is generally a business-wide strategy rather
than at the level of individual business units (although adoption may start within specific2

AFME (2019): The Adoption of Public Cloud Computing in Capital Markets
https://www.afme.eu/Portals/0/DispatchFeaturedImages/AFME%20Cloud%20Paper%20November%202019%20Fi
nal.pdf

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functions). Consumption can be monitored at a granular level, providing greater transparency andcontrol.
Productivity gains3• Increased operational efficiency, allowing for increased speed and agility in existing IT and
operations processes, through greater automation and self-service tools;• Higher team productivity by providing access to proven tools that IT teams can use to develop
systems. In addition to improved productivity in non-IT functions, using cloud-enabled analytics
and other advances such as AI and machine learning, organisations are able to improve decision
making, leading to greater cost efficiencies;• The public cloud allows users to take new products and services to market quickly.

How public cloud can enhance operational resilience
The role cloud can play in enhancing operational resilience became even more prevalent in 2020 in lightof the Covid-19 pandemic. As the pandemic evolves, the FI services industry is increasingly focusing on
digitisation in which cloud plays a key enabling role. Indeed, the ongoing Covid-19 situation has proventhat cloud can help organisations improve their operational resilience in different ways. It has allowed thewhole industry to be more resilient, to effectively manage operational risks, and ultimately to be ‘part ofthe solution’ to recover from the pandemic:• CSPs’ core business is to provide a highly resilient infrastructure to protect against hardware
failures, natural disasters, power outages and threats. To achieve this, CSPs make considerable
investments in security and to develop best in class protections.
• CSPs rely on geographically distributed data centres located far apart, and isolated from eachother across zones and regions, thereby minimising the risk of contagion and single point of
failure.
• The redundant nature of cloud, which basically means the CSP having more than one ‘copy’ of
data, systems and equipment across regions, ensures the availability and continuity of systems
and services even in the event of unexpected failures. This is further reinforced by the possibility
to transfer data, including critical functions, between server locations.
• Cloud elasticity allows for a very flexible, customised and real- time use by FIs who can react
instantly and efficiently to market conditions. In response to peak demands, they can easily scale
up with minimised service disruptions and without the need for on-site physical presence. Thishas been absolutely crucial in the pandemic situation, where both employees, through increased
and secure remote working capabilities, and customers, through secure and reliable digitalaccess to banking, were positively impacted.
• Cybersecurity: the controls and security protocols of the CSPs complement and further enhancethose of FIs.

3

BCG (2019): Ascent to the Cloud: ow Six Key APAC Economies Can Lift-off Ascent to the Cloud: How Six Key APAC
Economies Can Lift-off (bcg.com)

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Regulatory support for public cloud
Regulators in the region already recognise the benefits of cloud, e.g., the Monetary Authority of Singapore(“MAS”) in Section 6.2 of their Guidelines on Outsourcing: “[Cloud services] can potentially offer a numberof advantages, which include economies of scale, cost-savings, access to quality system administration as
well as operations that adhere to uniform security standards and best practices. [Cloud services] may also
be used to provide the flexibility and agility for institutions to scale up or pare down on computing
resources quickly as usage requirements change, without major hardware and software outlay as well as
lead-time. In addition, the distributed nature of [cloud services] may enhance system resilience duringlocation-specific disasters or disruptions.”4
The European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) in their ‘Guidelines on outsourcing to cloudservice providers5’ in paragraph 2: “Acknowledges that cloud outsourcing can bring benefits, including
enhanced flexibility, operational efficiency, and cost effectiveness, with potential positive outcomes forfirms and investors.” ESMA had adopted many principles of the European Banking Authority’s (“EBA”)
recommendations under its ‘Recommendations on outsourcing to cloud service providers6’ report thatdetailed in paragraph 4 that “Cloud outsourcing services are much more standardised, which allows theservices to be provided to a larger number of different customers in a much more automated manner andon a larger scale.” And that “Cloud services can offer a number of advantages, such as economies of scale,flexibility, operational efficiencies and cost-effectiveness.”
The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision describes cloud as an “enabling technology” that provides
the underlying infrastructure for many FinTech activities and other technology solutions7 utilised by thefinancial services industry.
The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) in its May 2020 Consultation on the
Principles of Outsourcing8 highlights several advantages of cloud-based infrastructures, including
improved accessibility, cost efficiency, demand scalability, always-on availability, and improved security.

4

MAS (2016): Guidelines on Outsourcing https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/Regulations-and-FinancialStability/Regulatory-and-Supervisory-Framework/Risk-Management/Outsourcing-Guidelines_Jul-2016-revisedon-5-Oct-2018.pdf

5ESMA (2020): Guidelines on outsourcing to cloud service providers esma50-157-2403_cloud_guidelines.pdf(europa.eu)

6

EBA (2017): Final Report – Recommendations on outsourcing to cloud service providers EBA BS 2017 XX (Final
draft Recommendations on Cloud Outsourcing).docx (europa.eu)

7

BCBS (2018): Sound Practices: implications of fintech developments for banks and bank supervisors Sound
Practices: implications of fintech developments for banks and bank supervisors (bis.org)

8

IOSCO (2020): Principles on Outsourcing – Consultation Reporthttps://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD654.pdf

8Regulators have also recognised the role that cloud can play in enhancing the sector’s operational
resilience, e.g. the UK Prudential Regulation Authority in their ongoing 2019 consultation paper9 on
outsourcing and third party risk management in paragraph 1.9: “These changes in firms’ reliance on
outsourcing and third parties bring potential benefits and opportunities, including, in the case of Cloud,potentially enhanced resilience compared to firms’ on-premise data centres (provided that firms oversee
the provision of Cloud services effectively and take appropriate steps to protect their applications anddata)”.

II.

Regulatory fragmentation creating challenges to cloud adoption

Whilst the above benefits of public cloud are recognised, adoption and implementation of public cloud by
FIs can be complex due to sometimes conflicting regulatory requirements. Regulators diverge on
approaches to regulation of public cloud services and CSPs driven by views of innovation risk, nationalsovereignty, competition and systemic risk, all of which contributes to FIs having to manage their CSPs ina fragmented way, to address such jurisdictional differences.
For FIs that have decided that cloud will be part of their (global) strategy, there continue to beconsiderable hurdles caused by differing regulatory frameworks across jurisdictions, both specific tofinancial services, as well as regulation and legislation targeting data privacy and security10. The challenges
stem from inconsistent requirements (e.g. around audit and cybersecurity), and varying regulatory
frameworks, ranging from treating cloud as being automatically a form of outsourcing (e.g. MAS
consultation on Notices to Banks and Merchant Banks on Management of Outsourced Relevant
Services11), to treating cloud as critical third-party service providers (e.g. the draft EU Digital Operational
Resilience Act12, the Korean Financial Services Commission (“FSC”) Proposed amendments to theElectronic Financial Transactions Act13) and considering oversight of CSPs.

9

BOE (2019): Outsourcing and third party risk management - https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/consultationpaper/2019/cp3019.pdf?la=en&hash=4766BFA4EA8C278BFBE77CADB37C8F34308C97D5
10

ASIFMA (2020): Addressing Market Fragmentation Through the Policymaking Lifecycle
https://www.asifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/asifma-fragmentation-paper-f20200804.pdf

11

MAS (2020): Consultation Paper on Notices to Banks and Merchant Banks on Management of Outsourced
Relevant Services Consultation Paper on Notices to Banks and Merchant Banks on Management of Outsourced
Relevant Services (mas.gov.sg)

12European Commission (2020): Draft regulation on Digital Operational Resilience for the financial sector
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020PC0595

13

Korea FSC (2020): 의안정보시스템 (assembly.go.kr)

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Examples of regulatory challenges include:• Rule-based (versus risk-based) prescriptive framework on cloud adoption in many jurisdictions
which impedes a uniform cloud-based architecture deployment, needed to support a global
network;• Differing standards and regulatory requirements across jurisdictions on materiality/criticality
thresholds, data protection, encryption requirements, approval requirements, third-party audits,risk governance, certifications, requirements on access by regulator to data stored on public cloudetc. Public cloud strategies are global so these regional or local differences and inconsistencies
are problematic as they will lead to a fragmented architecture for FIs resulting in increased
complexities and risk;• Data localisation requirements (or regulations amounting to ‘de facto’ data localisation
requirements) which leads to restrictions on cloud locations and ownership of CSPs;• Lack of level-playing field due to inconsistent requirements for FIs, digital banks and ‘BigTechs’;• Regulators’ concerns regarding the resilience of CSPs, market concentration and the potential
impact of CSPs on financial stability;• Hindrance to cloud adoption due to at times challenging outsourcing regulations including forexample complicated and lengthy regulatory notification/approval requirements.

III.

ASIFMA’s proposed principles for public cloud regulation

Whilst authorities and regulators generally acknowledge the advantages public cloud can bring, they areat the same time concerned about concentration risk, data access, cybersecurity and resilience.
Regulators regionally have been taking different approaches to addressing these concerns with someregulators taking a supportive stance and others implementing certain requirements pertaining to public
cloud that can present blockers to adoption.
Recognising that there is a growing need regionally for an aligned approach for the regulation of public
cloud to better serve consumers and markets without compromising the core regulatory objectives ofprotecting consumers and systemic stability, we outline in this paper nine suggested high-level principles
to public cloud regulation.
Principle 1: Recognising the benefits of public cloudPrinciple 2: Supporting ongoing dialogue
Principle 3: Supporting technology-neutral and activity-based regulation
Principle 4: Supporting harmonisation of public cloud requirements
Principle 5: Supporting a principles-based and outcome-focused approach to cloud regulation
Principle 6: Risk assessment and due diligence of public cloud arrangements and CSPs
Principle 7: Supporting free movement of data
Principle 8: Approval and notification requirements
Principle 9: Concentration risk

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ASIFMA and its members look forward to discussing these principles with regulators and authorities in
Asia and globally. We hope these principles can inform the conversation, facilitate the dialogue between
FIs and policy makers, drive regulatory harmonisation and support adoption of public cloud in the financial
services industry whilst also addressing regulators’ concerns.

Principle 1: Recognising the benefits of public cloud
Regulators should recognise and embrace the benefits (see section I) that public cloud can bring and thefinancial services industry should be empowered to make use of cloud services in a way that is compatible
with local laws and regulations. We expect that in the foreseeable future, cloud technology will become
the norm. Any regulatory development will need to keep pace with the trend to ensure that the financial
services industry can take advantage of technology efficiently to maintain a competitive edge and leverage
the risk and resiliency benefits that cloud provides, as compared to the maintenance of legacy
infrastructure.

Principle 2: Supporting ongoing dialogue
Regulators, the financial services industry and CSPs should have an ongoing open dialogue. We encourage
regulators to facilitate and/or participate in multi-stakeholder public-private technology forums and‘compliant by design’ solutions, to aid in early identification and resolution of key regulatory issues andconcerns. We also encourage regulators to play a proactive role in clarifying misconceptions, certainly injurisdictions where there is no clarity on whether the use of cloud is allowed (e.g. for sensitive or core
workloads) or subject to which conditions.

Principle 3: Supporting technology-neutral and activity-based regulation
Regulators should support technology-neutral and activity-based regulation to ensure a level playing field
and to support innovation and technology adoption. A competitive level playing field is needed to ensure
all firms involved in the financial services industry adhere to the principle of ‘same activity, same risk,same regulation’. A level playing field for all financial services industry participants is essential to manage
risk, whilst supporting competition and innovation. This means that existing regulation should be
deployed and applicable to entities who may currently be outside the financial services regulatory
framework but are conducting the same or similar activities as regulated FIs.

Principle 4: Supporting harmonisation of public cloud requirements
Regulators should support greater regional and global harmonisation in public cloud requirements andsupervisory practices by promoting a consistent and globally aligned framework for authorisation,
implementation management and reporting, in order to remove barriers to adoption. Such regulatoryalignment and coordination can be managed through global supervisory colleges, supervisory information
sharing and collaboration with the aim to prevent disparate regulatory requirements which are resourceintensive to comply with and can distract from the fundamental management of risks. In the absence ofharmonisation of regulatory principles and frameworks across geographies, we suggest regulators explore
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reliance on equivalence, deference or substituted compliance decisions, and more reliance placed onhome supervisor supervision of multi-national institutions.
Regulatory coordination and dialogue at the global level is essential to design common principles andapproaches to cloud regulation and rules that could then be implemented nationally to avoid
fragmentation as much as possible. FSB and IOSCO are well placed to play this coordinating role andconvene meaningful discussions for a for multi-stakeholder exchange to include supervisors,
policymakers, FIs and CSPs. Common approaches to risk assessment and control frameworks recognisedby regulators and/or international sector-specific certification schemes could also be beneficial to create
assurances to the industry.
Whilst the debate around direct financial regulatory oversight of CSPs is evolving, regulators need toconsider that any direct oversight initiative should not become a barrier for competition in the market,
eliminating the providers who cannot afford the costs of regulatory oversight compliance and leaving only
the big players in the market.
Any local/regional approaches to public cloud regulation could pose significant challenges to FIs operating
across borders. For example, limitations in one region may make the deployment of a global process to acertain service provider impossible. If regions diverge in their limitations regarding different providers,then there may be no providers with which FIs could work on a global level. While outright bans remain
unlikely, different approval processes or IT security requirements placed on the providers may result in
regulatory risk that defeats the business case for such activities. Such an outcome would form a regulatory
barrier to innovation and the modernisation of FIs’ IT estates resulting in continued complexity, including
greater reliance on end-of-life systems, and ultimately greater risk.

Principle 5: Supporting a principles-based and outcome-focused approach to cloud regulation
Any regulation pertaining to FI’s usage of public cloud should be principles-based and outcome-focused,taking into account the cross-border nature of cloud and to enable the financial services industry to
implement it practically. Such principles-based approach will avoid regulation becoming stale astechnology changes and will avoid the need to finetune/add on adjuncts which can lead to overly complex
regimes. It will also provide the flexibility needed for FIs to implement the appropriate controls for theactivities they are conducting in a risk-based and proportionate manner, which is important for FIs. Bybasing their controls and compliance on an analysis of the risk posed by any activity or process, FIs candesign mitigation strategies tailored to the specific risk and which allow the flexibility needed to accountfor the possible decrease or increase in risk posed by the activity.
• Regulators should refrain from micromanaging cloud adoption and refrain from introducing a newrisk category for cloud, and instead focus on systemic issues and resilience and seeking assurancein financial service’s pre-existing governance, information security and outsourcing requirements.
• Regulators should ensure adequate transparency in their principle-based requirements and theirregulatory expectations for FIs’ cloud adoption. Regulators should also ensure consistent andtransparent application of the principles (e.g., refrain from imposing additional or obscure
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•

•

requirements during the course of regulatory examinations where these requirements are notpart of the written regulation).
We recommend an accountability-driven approach, where regulators specify the principles
around managing/mitigating risks relating to cloud usage, and leave it to FIs to implement the
principles within existing frameworks, such as third-party risk management or outsourcing
requirements, IT risk management requirements, disaster recovery/business continuity
management requirements and/or privacy laws, in order to create the security
measures/framework to be adopted for public cloud.
Regulators should allow FIs to assess the specific cloud services they intend to use to determine
whether they are outsourcing, by leveraging existing assessment frameworks. Each cloudarrangement should be subject to an assessment for identifying the particular risk attributes suchas service, scope and infrastructure, involved. If all cloud models (e.g., SaaS versus IaaS) were to
be treated in the same way and subject to heightened regulations, such regulations may stifle theability to realise the benefits of cloud technology, while not being commensurate with therelevant risks. A blanket designation that all usage of public cloud is outsourcing, for example, is
not a sensible approach as it does not take into account real risk, which should be determined by
the use case and the data classification.

Principle 6: Risk assessment and due diligence of public cloud arrangements and CSPs
• Regulators’ due diligence requirements for FIs should focus on the control objectives/outcome
and should not prescribe specific requirements or controls.
• FIs should perform appropriate due diligence on CSPs and should leverage existing supplierguidelines/regulations and technology risk management guidelines for guidance on the risk
assessment and due diligence requirements of public CSPs.
• Regulators should allow FIs to use certifications based on international standards andindependent or external (pooled) audits/assessments which can be conducted regularly andshared with regulators and clients to facilitate the due diligence process of CSPs. Further, use of
joint industry audits or other collaborative reviews of CSPs could reduce the burden on FIs and
CSPs of duplicative information requests where a CSP serves common FI clients. Such audits havetaken place successfully in recent years in Germany.14• Subcontracting: We suggest that due diligence conducted in respect of a sub-contractor should
be of a standard that is proportionate to the risk involved and should not be at the same level ofdetail and scrutiny as compared with due diligence conducted of a CSP which is directly contracted
by a regulated entity. In many instances, regulated FIs would not be granted the same level of
direct access to the sub-contractors for the purpose of undertaking due diligence. Furthermore,regulated FIs generally have the contractual benefit of its service providers being liable for theservices provided by its sub-contractors.

14

BaFin (2020) https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BaFinPerspektiven/2020/bp_201_cybersicherheit_en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5 referring to the establishment by Deutsche Börse, of the
Collaborative Cloud Audit Group (CCAG) in 2017. This industry-wide initiative, involving several major European
financial institutions and insurance companies, was reported in 2020 to have conducted audits of global CSPs suchas Microsoft on behalf of its members.

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Principle 7: Supporting free movement of data
• Regulators should support cross border data flow with appropriate controls if sensitive data is
being transferred and continue to identify and remove rules and requirements which impede theability to adopt global cloud strategies.
• Cross-border collaboration between regulators is necessary to realise regulators’ legitimate rightto access data for prudential and market supervision and to limit the risk of disparate andpotentially conflicting data access and sharing requirements imposed by different jurisdictions.
• Regulators should focus on ensuring the FIs’ relevant data remains accessible from theirjurisdiction, and not on the data being stored in a specific jurisdiction. (e.g., FIs should not be
required to maintain local duplicate copies of data that they store on the cloud).
• FIs should have in place adequate policies and controls to ensure that data relating to regulated
activity that they are responsible for supervising remains accessible, regardless of where suchdata is stored. FIs should ensure proper data protection and consider all legal and regulatory
considerations for the jurisdiction(s) where data is held. We refer to the ASIFMA 2019 ASIFMATechnology-Neutral Principles for Virtual Data Storage. 15
It should be noted that imposing overly restrictive regulatory requirements for cloud use by FIs can resultin “de-facto” data localisation as no cross-border operating model can satisfy such onerous and often
conflicting regulatory requirements. Global FIs typically consolidate their systems in a single global hub,which offers services to the rest of the firm. In contrast, data/technology localisation policies require
discrete technological builds in specific jurisdictions and further segregate local systems from global hubs.
In effect, this exposes FIs to greater cybersecurity risks by creating a more decentralised environment thatneeds to be safeguarded, which further inhibits central oversight and information sharing across borders.
Some noteworthy supportive and enabling examples and approaches to cross-border data flow include:• UK-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement16: According to the UK’s Department
of International Trade, this recently agreed trade deal will “enable free flow of data whilst
maintaining high standards of protection for personal data” and introduce “a ban on data
localisation, which will prevent British businesses from having the extra cost of setting up servers
in Japan.”• UK-Australia Free Trade Agreement17: Although this is currently being negotiated, in a position
paper the UK said it “will seek to guarantee the free flow of data and eliminate unjustified data
localisation requirements” and noted that “[e]liminating unjustified data localisation
requirements further reduces costs to businesses trading overseas, which can be prohibitive forSMEs.”

15

ASIFMA (2019): Technology-Neutral Principles for Virtual Data Storage 2019-06-virtual-data-storageprinciples.pdf (asifma.org)

16

UK Gov (2020) Press Release: UK and Japan agree historic free trade agreement
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-japan-agree-historic-free-trade-agreement
17
UK Gov (2020) Policy Paper: UK-Australia free trade agreement: the UK’s strategic approachhttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uks-approach-to-negotiating-a-free-trade-agreement-withaustralia/uk-australia-free-trade-agreement-the-uks-strategic-approach14• US-Japan Digital Trade Agreement18: In the DTA the US and Japan agreed to refrain fromprohibiting or restricting cross-border transfers of information “solely on the basis that they arecross-border in a manner that modifies the conditions of competition to the detriment of a covered
person.” According to the US Trade Representative, the agreement ensures “that data can betransferred across borders, by all suppliers, including financial service suppliers.”• US-Mexico-Canada Agreement19: According to the US Trade Representative, this comprehensive
agreement will “[e]nsure that data can be transferred cross-border, and that limits on where data
can be stored and processed are minimized, thereby enhancing and protecting the global digital
ecosystem.” With respect to the financial services sector specifically, the USMCA includes“[u]pdated provisions to allow for the cross-border transfer of data and an updated market accessobligation.”• Singapore-US Joint Statement on Financial Services Data Connectivity20: Among other things,“[t]he United States and Singapore recognize that the ability to aggregate, store, process, andtransmit data across borders is critical to financial sector development” and agree to both oppose
data localisation requirements and ensure “financial service suppliers can transfer data, including
personal information, across borders by electronic means if this activity is for the conduct of thebusiness of a financial service supplier.”• Joint Statement of Intent on Data Connectivity between Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and The
Monetary Authority of Singapore21: BSP and MAS recognise that the ability to aggregate, store,
process, and transmit data across borders is critical to the development of the financial sector.
• Singapore Digital Economy Agreements22: Singapore has executed a Digital Economy Partnership
Agreement (DEPA) with Chile and New Zealand and a Singapore-Australia Digital Economy
Agreement (SADEA) with Australia. Singapore is currently negotiating a Digital Economy
Agreement with Korea and the UK. According to Singapore’s Ministry of Trade and Industry, both
DEPA and SADEA include provisions “to allow data to flow freely across borders and prohibit the
localisation of data except for legitimate purposes such as personal data protection”.
Principle 8: Approval and notification requirements
Regulators should not require pre-notification or approval for material public cloud arrangements. Rather,a regulated entity that commences a material cloud arrangement should keep an inventory of thearrangements that should be available to the regulator upon request.

18

US Treasury (2019): Agreement between the Unites States of America and Japan concerning digital trade
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/japan/Agreement_between_the_United_States_and_Japan_
concerning_Digital_Trade.pdf
19
US Treasury: US-Mexico-Canada trade fact sheet https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/fact-sheets/modernizing20
MAS (2020): US-Singapore Joint Statement on Financial Services Data Connectivity
https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/media-releases/2020/united-states-singapore-joint-statement-on-financialservices-data-connectivity
21

MAS (2020) Joint Statement of Intent on Data Connectivity between Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and theMonetary Authority of Singapore Joint Statement of Intent on Data Connectivity between Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas and The Monetary Authority of Singapore (mas.gov.sg)

22

Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore Digital Economy Agreements (mti.gov.sg)

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If regulators are not content with this proposal a regulated entity that commences a material public cloudarrangement should notify its regulator of the arrangement as soon as possible thereafter.23 We
recommend that any such notifications should be on a platform (critical systems/infrastructure) basis
rather than based on specific applications (e.g., SaaS applications, deployments to IaaS environments).
If any pre-notification requirements are truly deemed necessary, we recommend that regulators adopt a
streamlined, pragmatic and transparent notification procedure with reasonable timelines that provides
certainty to the industry. Regulators should also provide flexibility and allow such notifications to be madeat a higher level, such as for an overall system platform development plan or a cloud migration plan; andin case any additional notifications are considered necessary throughout the plan, FIs and regulators canwork together early to identify and focus their attention only on the critical components of the plan.
We strongly discourage a need for formal approval as it creates additional bureaucracy for all parties,
without clear value-add to the regulator in exercising its supervision responsibilities.

Principle 9: Concentration risk
In respect of the potential systemic risks arising from the concentration of third-party services, it isimportant to differentiate between the concentration risks that may exist where multiple regulated FIs
use a common CSP (sector-wide concentration risks) and instances where a group is dependent on a single
CSP for the provision of outsourced tasks (internal dependency).
• Sector-wide concentration risk: We believe that assessment of concentration risk in the sector
should be done by authorities in close partnership with the financial services industry. For risks ofthis nature, authorities (e.g., supervisory bodies) are well positioned to have oversight at anindustry level, as compared to FIs individually due to lack of visibility of which CSPs are used byother FIs. We believe, however, that any such assessment should not restrict the choice ofoutsourcing arrangements or providers available to FIs. The focus should be on operational
resilience and reducing the risks arising from e.g. the impact of a disaster or insolvency event,rather than reducing concentration itself, which we believe would be difficult and require
undesirable sacrifices to security, efficiency and innovation. In seeking to mitigate systemic risk,
it is important that authorities avoid placing additional complexity or restrictions on an FI’s ability
to make commercial decisions and adapt to emerging business models and technologies, as somesolutions to address industry-wide concentration risk currently proposed by authorities24 (e.g.,
exposure limits, rotation mechanisms) may limit the FI’s ability to make commercial decisions andadapt to emerging business models and technologies.
• Internal dependency: In terms of an assessment of possible concentration risks within a firmcaused by multiple cloud outsourcing arrangements with the same CSP, we recommend that firms
should be able to undertake this as an internal assessment, based on risk appetite, and not be
23

ASIFMA (2018): Proposed Leading Principles for Regulation of Outsourcing https://www.asifma.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/leading-principles-for-regulation-of-outsourcing.pdf.

24

E.g. European Commission (2020): Draft regulation on Digital Operational Resilience for the financial sector
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020PC0595

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mandated to assess this on stipulated metrics that are set in regulatory guidance. Such an
approach could affect the ability of a regulated FI to manage its oversight obligations andcontinuously enhance its resilience capabilities. Individual FIs can and should be able to practicetheir incident and risk management in this area.
Exit Plans: We caution against the imposition of prescriptive obligations on FIs in order to mitigate
concentration risks, and we maintain that FIs should have the freedom to select their third-party
service providers and not be mandated by regulations to exit or duplicate their outsourcing
arrangements or third-party services. While exit plans are feasible in the event of a medium tolong term migration away from a CSP in a controlled and planned manner, they should not be
used to address concentration risks. This is because such attempts at migrating the service could
result in further operational risks such as mass migrations from a service which may destabilise
markets, creating a potential for cascading outages. Emphasis on exit planning shifts the focus
from resilience to replacement, when transitioning services during a business disruption may
expose the FI and its customers to greater risk than ensuring effective recovery of services. Exit
plans should be a last resort. Regulators should also weigh the concentration risk in relation to
moving to cloud storage versus the risk of the alternative, which is using the FI’s own data centres.
Engineering, cyber and architectural best practices of CSPs often exceed on-premise capabilities
and regulators should recognise that CSPs offer solutions to improve security, operational
resilience and portability for FIs.

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