Vietnam’s Industrial Policy Formulation
To Become a Reliable Partner in Integral Manufacturing
Kenichi Ohno*

The Vietnam Development Forum (VDF) is a joint research project of the National
Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo and the National Economics
University (NEU) in Hanoi. It is part of the 21st Century Center of Excellence (COE)
Program of GRIPS funded by Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology (MEXT). One of the most important objectives of VDF since its establishment
in early 2004 has been to support industrial policy innovation by Vietnam’s Ministry ofIndustry (MOI). For this purpose, VDF has organized a large number of workshops andresearch weeks, published books and research papers1, and staged VDF-MOI joint missions
to Thailand, Malaysia and Japan. VDF has also directly assisted the drafting of motorbike
and supporting industry master plans and commented on the overall, electronics, and automobile master plans of the Vietnamese government. This paper presents a broad conclusion drawn from our policy research. It was originally addressed to Vietnamese policy
makers. By re-presenting it to researchers in development and aid studies, we hope toreceive their comments and suggestions as well.

1. The need for new industrial policy
Vietnam is deeply committed to global and regional integration, andno one doubts the seriousness of this commitment. Vietnam has already taken
many steps to realize this goal, including the completion of the AFTA process,the conclusion of the bilateral trade agreement with the United States, intense
negotiation for WTO accession, and preparation for other free trade areas(FTAs). Work is also progressing in the legal area as the government doubles
its effort to create or amend a large number of laws for consistency with international practices. All this is highly commendable.
However, diplomatic and legal preparations are not enough. In order* A Professor of National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies and the Research Director of theVietnam Development Forum.
1
See particularly Ohno and Thuong, eds., (2005) and VDF (2006b).

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Kenichi Ohno

for Vietnam to truly enjoy the fruits of international integration, its real sector
must also be prepared. Vietnamese firms need to be competitive enough to survive and even prosper in the new open environment where import protection
and special favors are, in principle, no longer allowed. This is the area in which
Vietnam’s preparation is the weakest.
Free-market advocates may argue that, once the economy is open andfree, the market mechanism will activate the ingenuity of the Vietnamese people and the national economy will grow and become more efficient. This argument is too naïve, as the majority of Vietnamese policy makers already know.
The fact is that the balance of power between large advanced economies andlatecomer developing countries is lopsided. Vietnamese firms cannot at present
compete squarely with Toyota, Panasonic, LG or Intel in the global market.
Instead, they must work with these multinational corporations (MNCs) toimprove their abilities and become crucial suppliers in their global value chain.
A good policy is needed to encourage and support this effort.
But what kind of policy is needed, more concretely? The days ofplanning are over. Vietnam can no longer use rigid control to maintain international isolation. The strategy of infant industry promotion, adopted by Japanand Korea in the early postwar period, is also out of the question. Under thisstrategy, domestic industries were protected and nurtured until they became sufficiently competitive. But Vietnam cannot introduce such protection because of
its commitments to WTO and various FTAs.
Even the strategy of FDI-led growth, exercised by ASEAN4 in the
1970s–90s, is no longer applicable to latecomers like Vietnam. Although
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines vigorously absorbed FDI,
they were slow to remove their tariffs, import restrictions, and localization
requirements. In these countries, FDI promotion and industrial protection coexisted for at least a few decades. External barriers were lifted only after they
achieved significant industrial agglomeration. Vietnam, however, is asked toremove barriers now, before such agglomeration occurs.
For this reason, Vietnam’s industrial policy in the 21st century must
be new and different from those of other countries in the past. It must reflect thefact that even newcomers must open up very fast. Globalization is inevitable,
and Vietnam must position itself to become a meaningful player in the global

12Vietnam’s Industrial Policy Formulation: To Become a Reliable Partner in Integral Manufacturing

arena, making sure that its contribution to East Asia and the world will rise overtime. What kind of policy can that be? That is the key question for the Ministryof Industry (MOI) in particular and the Vietnamese government in general toconsider. That is also the question we address in this paper.

2. Weaknesses in Vietnam’s policy formulation
To design and implement industrial policy in the age of strong globalization pressure, Vietnam must overcome two methodological problems. At present, master plans are designed and drafted by a small group of officials assigned
for the task. They work very hard but cannot produce desired results because crucial information and cooperation are lacking. More concretely, the weaknesses ofVietnam’s industrial policy stem mainly from the following two missing links.
(i) The lack of cooperation with stakeholders (i.e., concerned groups) in theentire drafting and implementation process. In the case of industrial master plans, the most important stakeholder is the business community.
(ii) The lack of inter-ministerial coordination within the government in deciding concrete action plans.
These problems are unique to Vietnam; they are not observed in otherhigh-performing East Asian countries. In our missions to Thailand, Malaysia,
and Japan, no serious problems were reported in either government-businesscooperation or inter-ministerial coordination in formulating industrial policy.
The main problem caused by the lack of cooperation with stakeholders is that policy is not supported by the business community and therefore is
not implementable. This problem is particularly acute in sectors dominated byprivate and FDI firms, such as motorbikes, automobiles, and electronics, which
are not under MOI’s direct supervision. Even where state-owned enterprises(SOEs) used to play key roles, in such areas as steel and cement, the share ofprivate and FDI production is rising. The drafting process must involve all key
players, especially private and FDI firms. Without solid channels to absorb theirinformation and concerns, policy remains ineffective.
Another problem caused by the lack of stakeholder involvement is13

Kenichi Ohno

that information and analysis are neither to-the-point nor up-to-date. Even if
MOI drafters are intelligent and hard working, it is difficult for a small team togather all relevant information. This is particularly true with external information such as global industrial trends or the latest strategies of MNCs. Suchinformation should be obtained through close and continuous contact with thebusiness community. A good policy cannot be built on outdated information.
As for the lack of inter-ministerial coordination, the main result is that
supporting measures are simply mentioned without details. Measures outside
the authority of MOI, such as tariffs and tax incentives or a reform of technicalschools and universities, are especially hard to prescribe in detail, since there isno mechanism to discuss and agree on policy measures among related ministries in close consultation. At present, ministries interact only superficiallythrough commenting on mutual drafts and exchanging basic information. Thisis another reason why timely and effective policy implementation is so difficult
in Vietnam.

3. Good policy, modest results
Thailand, Malaysia, and Japan have all constructed effective channels
for stakeholder involvement and inter-ministerial coordination in industrial policy making. Thailand has set up industry-specific institutes and official committees to link the government, businesses, and experts. Malaysia has a three-layer
structure consisting of the Industrial Planning Committee, the Steering Committee, and technical resource groups, which together mobilize several hundred
people to draft an industrial master plan. In Japan, deliberation councils andindustry associations have long been the key instruments for sharing information among all stakeholders at any time. The functions of these institutions are
explained in detail in VDF (2006b).
The experiences of these countries make it clear that Vietnam is far
behind them in industrial policy formulation and that it has much to learn fromthem. It must be admitted that Vietnam’s policy making method is in the earlystage of development. It is still primitive and defective, and inherits many characteristics of the planning days which are no longer valid. Another crucial fact
is that the way to achieve good involvement and coordination is not one, and14

Vietnam’s Industrial Policy Formulation: To Become a Reliable Partner in Integral Manufacturing

Figure 1. Breaking the Glass CeilingTechnical
absorption
Agglomeration

STAGE ONE
Simplemanufacturing
under foreign
guidance

STAGE TWO
Have supporting
industries, but still
under foreign
guidance

Creativity

STAGE FOUR

STAGE THREE

Full capability ininnovation andproduct design as
global leader

Technology & management mastered,can produce
high quality goods

Japan, US, EU

Korea, Taiwan

Thailand, Malaysia
Glass ceiling for
ASEAN countries

Vietnam
Source: Ohno, 2005.

that Vietnam should design a mechanism that is most suitable for its situationand needs. This means that Vietnam must selectively import the good practicesof neighboring countries, with necessary revisions and additions, to suit its circumstances. Since institutional evolution is difficult to forecast or plan with any
precision, the adaptive process will inevitably be a long one with many trials
and errors.
However, a negative lesson from Thailand and Malaysia is also worth
attention. While industry-led growth of Thailand and Malaysia has beenremarkable by the standards of developing countries in general, it falls short of
East Asia’s high performance criteria. These two countries are still unable tobreak through the “glass ceiling” after several decades of industrialization. The
glass ceiling here refers to the difficulty in moving from the second to the third
stage in the path of industrialization that I have described on another occasion(Ohno, 2005).
A developing country in the catch-up process typically starts withsimple assembly to fulfill foreign orders (stage 1), builds industrial agglomeration and supporting industries (stage 2), graduates from foreign guidance tomaster technology and management (stage 3), and finally achieves innovative,

15

Kenichi Ohno

original design capacity (stage 4). I argue that none of the ASEAN countries
has graduated from foreign dependency despite their quantitative achievement.
They still rely heavily on foreign managers and engineers to run their factories
and maintain quality. Since core competence and value creation are not internalized, a risk is always present that industries will shift to China or elsewhere
when circumstances change.
The governments of Thailand and Malaysia are acutely aware of thisproblem and trying to remedy the situation as a matter of top national priority.
Specifically, this requires strengthening small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
and creating linkages among them, developing industrial skills, promoting supporting industries, stimulating R&D, and other efforts in human resource development. Nevertheless, local capability of Thailand and Malaysia still falls shortof the high requirements of Japanese manufacturing FDI. This is a problem thathas been recognized for a long time--at least for two decades--but remains unresolved.
At the risk of over-simplification, we may even say that Thailand andMalaysia are the countries whose governments have succeeded in offering good
policy frameworks but whose domestic businesses remain less dynamic than
expected. The gap between good policy and modest results is especially striking
when we look at the performance of Taiwan and Korea. From the situation of
war devastation and dire poverty, they emerged as leading manufacturers ofhigh-quality products in a few decades. They received foreign technical assistance at first, but the time they spent for learning was relatively short. As soon
as they mastered technology, they sent foreign advisors home. R&D, productdesign, enterprise management, and factory operation are now carried out
entirely by locals. They invest vigorously abroad to expand production networks, and have become Japan’s formidable competitors. And Taiwan and
Korea achieved all this in no more than the time it took for Thailand andMalaysia to reach their current levels.
Why did Taiwan and Korea move up so fast, while Thailand andMalaysia learned more slowly? Is the reason difference in national character, oris it the difference in policy quality? If Taiwanese and Korean people are genetically more suitable for high-quality manufacturing than Thai and Malaysian
people, the government cannot do much to change people’s DNA. But if indus-

16Vietnam’s Industrial Policy Formulation: To Become a Reliable Partner in Integral Manufacturing

trial policies adopted by Taiwan and Korea have been superior in matchingnational aspiration with needed actions, we are compelled to study much deeper
into policy design and implementation to improve the industrial policy framework and content of Vietnam2.
Vietnam at present is a country of weak policy formulation. However,Vietnamese people are frequently praised as skillful, diligent, and persistent incomparison with other peoples in the region. This points to a possibility ofgreatly upgrading the industrial capability of Vietnam once policy weaknesses
are removed.

4. Coping with China
How to cope with China, with its enormous size and rapidly expanding manufacturing capacity, has become one of the most urgent issues for countries all over the world. China has large numbers of managers, scientists, engineers and unskilled workers, ample industrial materials, a relatively high levelof technology backed by a long history of industrialization drive, and a thick
network of overseas Chinese businesses. The China challenge looms large in
the industrial policy debates of Thailand, Malaysia, and Japan. It must also be a
top issue in formulating Vietnam’s new industrial policy.
It is clearly unwise to directly compete with Chinese products in the
global market. To avoid this, a country must differentiate its products from Chinese ones and position itself as a producer complementary to China rather thancompeting with it. If this is done successfully, the country can form a production partnership with China and use Chinese low-cost inputs to its advantage.
The crucial question is how to do this concretely. The proper positioning
requires a clear understanding of the fields in which China excels and the fields
in which it does not.
Since China is a big country, it is not easy to find industrial categories

2

Two facts complicate such a study. First, the policies adopted by Taiwan and Korea were very
different in that the former promoted dynamism of SMEs while the latter featured large businessgroups (chaebols) supported by large banks. Second, the state-led industrialization strategy
adopted by Korea, in particular, is no longer available to today’s latecomer countries under thepressure of globalization.

17

Kenichi Ohnoin which it does not produce. One needs to go into the level of individual products and even different grades of the same products to find a niche. Even then,there is no guarantee that China will not produce that product next year. Many
countries want to promote “high-tech” industries to upgrade their skills andcompete with China. However, the popularity of this strategy must be evaluatedagainst the following precautions: (i) there is a significant gap between national
aspiration and actual capability; (ii) no differentiation will occur if all countries
adopt this strategy; and (iii) China is also targeting such areas.
Thus, finding a niche in terms of specific products, including “hightech” products, has certain limits. The better way to distinguish oneself is toanalyze China’s strengths and weaknesses from the viewpoint of business architecture, as explained below.

5. Integral manufacturing
We propose one concrete industrial strategy for Vietnam in order toovercome the difficulties addressed in earlier sections. The strategy is targetedat building domestic capability in assembly-type manufacturing, such as electronics and electricals, motorbikes, and automobiles, and the production of partsand components for these industries3. Although assembly-type manufacturingindustries differ from one another in some aspects, they are common in thesense that (i) they extensively use metal, plastic, and rubber parts; (ii) productquality depends heavily on the quality of these parts; (iii) they also require
labor-intensive assembly with precision; and (iv) innovation and model changes
are quick and frequent. For this reason, assembly-type manufacturing industries
can to a large extent share the same supporting industries and human resources.
That is why they should be grouped together in strategic planning.
Vietnam’s workforce is particularly suited to labor-intensive assembly with precision, (iii) above, and that is why such FDI inflows are accelerat-

318

Assembly-type manufacturing has been the driving force of economic transformation of Japan,
Taiwan, Korea, ASEAN4, and China, and it is also expected to play the same role in Vietnam.
For other industries, such as garment, footwear, food processing, software, energy, industrial
materials, construction, logistics, trade, telecom, finance, and tourism, other strategies must besought; the argument in this section is not applicable to them.

Vietnam’s Industrial Policy Formulation: To Become a Reliable Partner in Integral Manufacturing

ing in recent years. However, Vietnam must also learn and internalize the otheraspects, (i), (ii), and (iv) above, to fully take advantage of the strength of assembly-type manufacturing. If this is done successfully, assembly-type manufacturing will surely become the main pillar of Vietnam’s industrialization, providing
jobs, improving skills, and raising national income.
Even without any further policy reform, FDI will probably continue
to come to Vietnam and, given sufficient time, the country will reach theincome and industrial levels of Thailand and Malaysia today. However, as
argued above, these ASEAN neighbors remain heavily dependent on foreigntechnology and management. Despite many decades of supporting industry and
SME promotion, their human resources and local parts makers remain too weak
to break through the “glass ceiling” and reach the level of Taiwan or Korea. If
Vietnam does not have a good policy, it is also likely to stop at the level ofThailand and Malaysia today.
Another important consideration noted earlier is that Vietnam isrequired to integrate much more quickly than ASEAN4. Thailand and Malaysia
absorbed large amounts of FDI, but they were not “open” in the sense that they
kept high tariffs, localization requirement, import restrictions, and so on for along time. They used these measures for at least a few decades to develop andprotect their industrial base. Vietnam, in contrast, must open up now, before
building such an industrial base, and face global competition. Vietnam’s industrial strategy must therefore be different from and bolder than those of Thailand
and Malaysia.
Let us now propose a new manufacturing strategy for Vietnam basedon the above considerations.
(1)Vietnam should liberalize its trade and investment regimes unconditionally and more decisively than ASEAN4 did in the past, create the most freeand low-cost business environment in East Asia, and attract a large
amount of FDI without selectivity4 . This decisive openness should be thestrongest selling point in FDI marketing.

4

The only permissible reasons for rejecting FDI are environment, cultural indecency, and national security. This rule should be applied sparingly under transparent criteria.

19

Kenichi Ohno

(2)Linkage between domestic firms and foreign multinationals should be promoted as a matter of highest priority. Vietnamese firms should double
efforts to become suppliers of FDI manufacturers and foreign buyers, andimprove their capabilities. The government should support their effort.
(3)Vietnam should learn the monozukuri5 spirit of Japan’s integral manufacturing, as explained below, as quickly as possible. Vietnam should aim tobecome a reliable developing country partner in high-quality manufacturing with Japan and other developed countries producing integral products.
Professor Takahiro Fujimoto of Tokyo University and his researchteam have come up with a business architecture theory to explain the differences among the manufacturing industries of major economies such as Japan,
China, the United States, Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN countries. This theory
has a significant implication for Vietnam’s industrial strategy. According toProf. Fujimoto, there are two basic architectural types in manufacturing: modular architecture and integral architecture. In modular architecture, the modalityof interaction among components is standardized for easy connection. For
example, desktop computers are a typical modular product in which globallycommon components from various companies are freely combined. By contrast,
in integral architecture, the complexity of interaction is happily accepted, andimprovements are achieved through numerous trials and errors. For example,
automobiles must be manufactured with integral architecture if multiple objectives such as performance, comfort, fuel efficiency, and safety are to be attained
simultaneously. Generally speaking, modular architecture is suitable for obtaining quick results at low cost while integral architecture is appropriate for the
pursuit of ever-higher quality in the long run.

5

20

Monozukuri literally means “making things” or “manufacturing.”

Vietnam’s Industrial Policy Formulation: To Become a Reliable Partner in Integral Manufacturing

Figure 2. Modular versus Integral Manufacturing
Modular manufacturing Integral manufacturingPartsinterface

Parts are common and canbe used for any model

Each product has uniqueparts, specifically designed

MeritsQuick results and flexibility

Endless pursuit of quality

Demerits

No differentiation,excess
entry, low profit, lack of R&D

Much energy and timeneeded to achieve results

Openness, quick decision
Institutional
requirements making, flexible outsourcing

Long-term relations, building
internal skills & knowledge

Performance

Time

Time

Correspondence between products and business architecture is not
fixed; it evolves dynamically with the business strategy of each firm or country,
technical progress, and consumer tastes. In addition, business architecture often
has structural layers in which, for example, modularization may proceed in final
assembly while integration may deepen in components.
Japan is a country of integral architecture, intensely interested in efficient factory operation and product integrity. By contrast, the United States
excels in modularization and is good at slicing the supply chain of a productinto appropriate elements, standardizing them, and making profits by the novelty of combination. China is also a country of modular architecture, but its comparative advantage lies in labor-intensive modular products rather than knowledge-intensive modular products as in the case of the United States. Professor
Fujimoto considers China to be a country of quasi-modularity since its manufacturing features mass production of products with copied design and technology rather than original innovation.
Since the United States and China are both modular countries withdifferent development levels, they are complementary production partners. The

21

Kenichi Ohno

Figure 3. Production Alliances Based on Business Architecture
Integral Countries

China

Potentially no
direct competition
if products arechosen properly

Japan

Modular Countries

TaiwanUSA

ASEAN(Potential)

Industrialized
Developing

Source: Professor Takahiro Fujimoto’s explanation to the joint VDF-MOI missionin Tokyo, June 2005.

former can supply technology and capital while the latter can offer cheap labor
to produce modular products. Meanwhile, Japan is a country of integral manufacturing with high technology, high wages, and an aged population looking fora developing country partner. Using cheap unskilled labor in China and
ASEAN is not enough to fully exploit the potential of integral manufacturing. If
ASEAN, the traditional destination of Japanese FDI, learns to become a manufacturing partner with long-term vision and strong aspiration for high quality,
Japan and ASEAN can form a strategic alliance in manufacturing integral products that are differentiated from Chinese products. However, this allianceremains merely a possibility because no ASEAN country has acquired the necessary skills and attitude for Japanese-style manufacturing. As noted above,
Thailand and Malaysia are currently struggling to become full-fledged manufacturing countries. They still need Japanese managers and engineers to stay,and they depend heavily on FDI parts producers.
To become a partner in integral manufacturing requires ability todesign and operate factories efficiently; maintain, adjust and repair machines;
design parts; produce precision molds and dies; educate highly skilled industrial
Meisters, and so on. These requirements are not new. But the point is that they22

Vietnam’s Industrial Policy Formulation: To Become a Reliable Partner in Integral Manufacturingmust be accomplished well with purpose and tenacity. This will enable ASEAN
to graduate from simple assembly by foreign orders to participation as indispensable players in the global manufacturing network. This will also upgrade theJapan-ASEAN economic relationship to a higher level.
Among ASEAN countries, Vietnam and Thailand are top candidates
for this feat. Vietnam should set a clear goal with appropriate action plans, andthe Japanese government and business community should actively provide technical assistance and business cooperation for this purpose.
This perspective explains why supporting industries (especially highquality plastic and metal processing industries) and human resource development (especially high-level production managers and engineers) are so crucial
for Vietnam. They are needed to significantly raise domestic manufacturing
capability and to differentiate Vietnam from China and other ASEAN countries.
Copying China’s manufacturing style or receiving Chinese technical assistanceis not desirable for Vietnam because these lead to low-price, low-quality competition yielding little profit, as well as a direct clash with Chinese products.

6. Anticipated skill shortages in Japan
Japan desperately needs a developing country partner in integral manufacturing but has found none so far. It needs such a partner because its wages
are too high and its population is aging, making it very difficult to find young
engineers and production managers in sufficient number and quality inside
Japan. The highly skilled postwar baby boomers, born 1947–49, will reachretirement age soon. Those born in 1947 will turn 60 years old in 2007 and will
begin to leave factories. This is called the “2007 problem.” Their skills must betransferred to the next generation but Japan lacks a sufficient number of successors.
According to the White Paper on Monozukuri 6, the number ofmonozukuri workers in Japanese manufacturing was 1.93 million in 2005.
6

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare; and Ministryof Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, White Paper on Monozukuri, 2005.
Data in the text were obtained from a survey by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare on
enterprises with five or more regular employees.

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Kenichi Ohno

Figure 4. Shortages and Surpluses of Monozukuri Workers in Japan
0％

20％

40％

60％

80％

100％

Designing
Plastic and other injection
Pressing
Boring(cutting)
Grinding and polishing
Textile industry skills
Welding
Painting
Production process management
Repairing and adjusting equipment
Shortage1
Shortage3 Adequate Surplus No answer
Shortage2
Note:

These are the survey results on the ten basic industrial skills with the largest
numbers of workers in 2005. Shortage 1, 2, and 3 are shortage in quantity,
shortage in quality, and shortage in both quantity and quality, respectively.
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; Ministry of Health, Labor andWelfare; and Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology,
White Paper on Monozukuri, 2005.

When asked if the “2007 problem” (retirement of skilled workers) was a serious
concern, 30.5% of the manufacturing firms responded yes. Among them, themain reasons for their concern included the long time required for skill transfer(68.5%), lack of younger engineers with enthusiasm (64.5%), and difficulty incommunication between teacher and student due to a large age or skill gap(41.9%).
Figure 4 shows the worker shortages for the ten largest basic industrial skills in Japan. As of 2005, worker shortages are not yet severe, with only
25.6% of the respondent firms reporting skill shortages in quantity or quality(or both), 47.9% reporting adequacy, and 1.7% reporting surpluses (these numbers are averages for the ten skills). However, as time progresses, skill shortages are likely to worsen. Many firms are expected to retain skilled workers
beyond the retirement age, and although this will delay the impact of the 200724

Vietnam’s Industrial Policy Formulation: To Become a Reliable Partner in Integral Manufacturing

problem for several years, Japan will inevitably face skill shortages unless fundamental solutions are found.
I have highlighted Japan as a principal monozukuri partner for Vietnam because Japan is the only country in East Asia that has achieved a highlevel of integral manufacturing. In addition, Japan is already the most important
manufacturing investor in Vietnam. Moreover, if Vietnam masters integral
manufacturing, it can also cooperate more effectively with, for example, German automobile producers or Italian machinery companies. That is why I sincerely hope that high aspiration for assembly-type integral manufacturing will
be incorporated as one of the strategic pillars of Vietnam’s overall industrial
master plan.

References

Fujimoto, T. (2004). Japan’s monozukuri philosophy. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha.
Fujimoto, T., & Shintaku, J. (2005). Architecture-based analysis of Chinese manufacturing industries. Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimposha.
Ohno, K., & Thuong, N. V. (Eds.). (2005). Improving industrial policy formulation.
Hanoi: The Publishing House of Political Theory.
Ohno, K. (2005). Designing a comprehensive and realistic industrial strategy. In K.
Ohno and N.V. Thuong, Improving industrial policy formulation (pp.24–26).
Hanoi: The Publishing House of Political Theory.
Vietnam Development Forum. (2006a). Supporting industries in Vietnam from the perspective of Japanese manufacturing firms. VDF Policy Note, 2.
Vietnam Development Forum. (2006b). Industrial Policy Formulation in Thailand,
Malaysia and Japan: Lessons for Vietnamese Policy Makers. (K. Ohno, Ed.).
Hanoi: The Publishing House of Social Labour.

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