The Korean Position on Alliance Formation and
the Change of Public Trust between Korea and the United States:
The Cheonan Incident and the OPCON Issue
Taewoo Kim
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
ABSTRACTIn macroscopic perspective, the ROK-U.S. alliance has evolved toward adesirable future-oriented one and public trust has been generally robust.
Most South Koreans remember it as an unmatched blessing for theirsecurity and prosperity. In microscopic perspective, however, thealliance was not without ordeals and tribulations, and the public trust notwithout dangerous vicissitudes. Today, many South Koreans regard the2007 OPCON (Operational Control) agreement as a strange decision
made in a strange time, thus representing the era of ordeals. The sinkingof the Cheonan on March 26, 2010, sheds new light on the OPCON issue.
For those South Koreans who think that 2012 is the worst time for the
OPCON transfer and dismantlement of the CFC, the bloody North
Korean provocation reminds us of the Korean War sixty years ago,
distinguishes once again friends from foes, and opportunely rekindles the
OPCON issue. They believe that an indefinite postponement of the
OPCON transfer is what the two nations should do to sustain a more
future-oriented alliance and public trust toward it.

Keywords: Alliance, Korean War, Wartime Operational Control,
OPCON, Cheonan incident, Defense Reform Plan 2020, defense reform

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Introduction
Seen in macroscopic perspective, the ROK-U.S. alliance has been on
the right track of desirable evolution and transformation. After thealliance formed during the Korea War, the two nations passed throughthe long era of unbalanced and unilateral alliance, and are now moving
toward an era of well-balanced and reciprocal one. During the Korean
War, South Korea totally relied on the U.S. for survival, and for the eraof unbalanced alliance that followed, South Korea still heavily relied on
U.S. allies for much of its security and economy. Since the 2000s,
however, with sustained economic growth of South Korea as well aschanges in the U.S. alliance policies, the two nations have beensuccessfully shaping a more future-oriented and sustainable alliance.
During this period, public trust toward the alliance, in the U.S. or inSouth Korea, has never been shaken seriously. For most South Koreans,the alliance and presence of the USFK (U.S. Forces, Korea) isremembered as the pillar of national security that has made the nation’s
miraculous economic growth possible.
Now, no one either in Seoul or Washington objects to the fact thatthe two nations are moving from the military alliance to a morecomprehensive one sharing such political values as democracy, market
economy, and human rights. No one protests the fact that the twocountries pursue a fairer alliance in which South Korea respects the U.S.
strategic flexibility and assumes more burdens for its own defense. No
one opposes South Korea’s duty to intensify cooperation on global issues
such as nonproliferation, peacekeeping operations, and ant-drug, antipiracy, and counter-terrorism activities. Such directions of mutual
understanding and cooperation have been confirmed and reconfirmed via
summits since the inauguration of President Lee Myung Bak in 2008.
Ten Lost Years in the Alliance
Seen from a microscopic perspective, however, the bilateral alliancehas not been without vicissitudes and complications. For South Korea,
for example, the period under the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyungovernments was like ten lost years for the alliance. Of course, there
were discernible differences between the two. The Kim Dae Junggovernment, though its external policies were unprecedentedly
concentrated on North Korea and the so-called Sunshine Policy, neverdenied the importance of the alliance. Despite its leftist propensity, theKim government tried to maintain smooth relations with the UnitedStates, partly successfully, as the Clinton administration also attempted
to engage North Korea. Some South Koreans still remember the two

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presidents, Kim and Clinton, as enjoying a honeymoon over North Korea
policy at that time.
By contrast, the Roh government outspokenly disparaged the allianceand strained the bilateral relations, ardently meeting the DPRK’s(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: North Korea) South Korea
policies. President Roh himself frequently stated that he would not mind
failure of all other external policies if only inter-Korean relations got
better. As a result, the friction between Seoul and Washington becamesalient, their contention became acute. During this period, Seoul’s
external policy was dominated by “Korean nationalism,” and a “rush to
Pyongyang” phenomenon overwhelmed the alliance. It was during thisperiod that the Roh government abruptly pushed ahead with transfer ofthe wartime operational control. Many South Koreans remember thatRoh government’s OPCON initiative invited a thorny and emotional
response from then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who had
been angry enough with Seoul’s straightforward pro-North Korea stance.
This is why some South Koreans remember the 2007 OPCON agreement
as a strange decision on the part of the both sides made in a strange time.
In a nutshell, at least for South Korea, the years of the Roh Moo
Hyun government were a most serious testing period for the alliance.
Public trust with regard to the alliance heavily rolled and pitched, thus
dividing South Koreans between those idealistic nationalists who led andsupported “Korean nationalism” and those realistic internationalists whoworried about the future of the alliance. For the realists, the 2007
OPCON agreement was like a watershed in the history of the bilateralaliance. For them, it was a turning point that helped South Koreansregain their composure and mitigate the dangerous dichotomy of publictrust, and finally select the Lee Myung Bak government in the 2007
presidential election.
Reminiscence of the OPCON Disputes
When the Roh administration began to push ahead with OPCON
transfer in 2005, it frequently shouted such catch phrases as “sovereignty”
and “autonomy.” Proponents of the transfer insisted: “Putting ournational fate at the hands of another country is encroachment upon our
military sovereignty and national pride”; “we have spent much more on
the defense budget than the DPRK for many years and now we arecapable of conducting a war by ourselves”; and “we have no independent
diplomacy without the OPCON transfer.” They turned deaf ears toworrying opinions of the opponents by insisting that the ROK-U.S.
alliance would not wither even after the OPCON transfer and that the US
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dismantlement of the Combined Forces Command (CFC). They also
asserted that South Korea and the U.S. would be able to fully cooperate
for conduct of war through the Allied Military Cooperation Center(AMCC) even after the OPCON separation.
In the meantime, the opponents argued that despite the militarymodernization of the ROK, it would be good to utilize the advanced U.S.
military technologies particularly in the areas of ISR, C4I, and PGM for
better deterrence of North Korean adventurism; that the dissolution of the
CFC would weaken solidarity of the alliance; and that only the CFC
system would ensure superior cooperative war conduct. To overwhelm
the opposing voices, the Roh administration stimulated nationalistic
sentiment of the young generations, who became fascinated by thesovereignty slogans and immediately dominated online public opinion.
So doing, the opposing voices were easily dismissed as “flunkies” or“anti-unification forces.” On top of this, the government muzzled
opposing opinion leaders and experts while many in the mass media
circulated one-sided stories supporting the OPCON transfer. It was under
this huge top-down populist propaganda that the Roh administration
stubbornly pushed for the OPCON transfer and dismantlement of the
CFC. There was neither congressional consent nor consideration by thecabinet. Fortunately or unfortunately, the bloody Cheonan incident is
now shedding new light on the OPCON issue. It may be also a right time
for Americans to look back on what happened then over the important
issue.
The Bloody Cheonan Incident
Like the Korean War in which allied forces fought against theCommunist invaders sixty years ago, the sinking of the Cheonan on
March 26, 2010, which caused the deaths of 46 out of 104 sailors on
board the South Korean naval corvette, once again compelled South
Korea to make a clear discernment between its friends and enemies.
While the forensic investigation to determine the cause of the sinking
was in process, a welcome decision came forth at the first Nuclear
Security Summit held in Washington, D.C. on April 12-13. South Korea,
with U.S. support, was decided as the host of the second Nuclear
Security Summit in 2012. This decision carries important implications
especially because it provides the nation with another pivotal opportunity
to enhance its international status at a volatile time.
On May 20, the civil-military joint investigation team joined byinternational specialists from four foreign countries, announced its final
conclusion that identified North Korea as the culpable actor for thisincident. Shortly after that, President Lee Myung Bak made a public
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statement in which he introduced a series of punitive countermeasures
the ROK government would employ against the DPRK. In response, theU.S. government reassured publicly its full support for the ROK, andfurthermore the U.S. Congress unanimously passed a resolution rebuking
such a diabolical provocation by the DPRK. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, who visited the ROK on May 26, declared: “The investigation
was objective, the evidences overwhelming, and the outcome
inescapable.” Japan took the same stand as the U.S. On the other hand,
China still hesitates to join this international accusation despite the clear
evidence the joint investigation team presented.
The naval disaster at large not only heightened the tension in the Korean
peninsula but also stimulated an emergence of a new Cold War
architecture in Northeast Asia, thus reminding South Korean citizens of
the nightmare of the Korean War sixty years ago. Currently, there is anincreasingly visible confrontation over the Cheonan incident between the
U.S.-ROK-Japan sea power and the DPRK-China continental power.
South Koreans appreciate the U.S.-Japan support, welcome Russia’s
decision to dispatch its own investigation team to double-check what thejoint investigation team presents, and still holds hopes that China as a
responsible member of the international community will soon take aclearer attitude commensurate with its regional leadership.
South Korea’s countermeasures, disclosed by President Lee Myung
Bak’s public statement on May 24 and the following joint press
interview hosted by the three ministers of foreign affairs and trade,unification, and national defense, include: taking the case to the UN
Security Council, prohibiting navigation of North Korean merchantvessels within South Korean territorial seas and approved area of
operation (AAO), stopping all inter-Korean trade save the Kaesong
Industrial Complex, suspending economic assistance except
humanitarian aid, planning ROK-US anti-submarine joint naval exercisesin the Yellow Sea, and resuming its propaganda campaign across theDMZ (demilitarized zone), which was halted since 2004 by an interKorean agreement.
According to the UN General Assembly Resolution in 1974, which
defines an attack against another nation’s army, aircraft, naval ships as
aggression even without a declaration of war, the sinking of the Cheonan
was a definite act of war. Moreover, it is a violation of Article 2 of the1953 Armistice which stipulates “a complete cessation of all hostilities in
Korea” and that of Article 2 of the UN Charter which prohibits “threat or
use of force.” Therefore, the ROK has every legal right stipulated in
Article 51 of the UN Charter to retaliate for the purpose of self-defense
against such an aggression. Nevertheless, Seoul’s initial responses did
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not include any direct military retaliation. In this context, compared withthe degree of flagrance of the DPRK provocation, South Korea’s initial
responses sound rather moderate. Given the fact that a variety of possible
measures, including direct revenge actions, have so far been discussed inand out of governments, one can safely assume that these initial
measures are only part of the options the ROK holds for possible use in
the future.
South Korea’s decision to withhold its really tough options at thisstage reflects its reliance on the possibility of North Korean publicapologies and China’s participation in the international accusation of
North Korea. In this sense, one can say that the Seoul government has
adopted a phased approach.
It is also noteworthy that measures like a shutdown of the Kaesong
Industrial Complex, which could be a serious political liability for the
future of inter-Korean relations, were excluded from the initial list. The
Seoul government is heavily relying on harnessing international pressure
on the DPRK rather than resorting to tit-for-tat reprisals. This clearlyreflects South Korea’s will to protect economic prosperity and stability
by avoiding tension escalation and thereby another all-out war on the
Korean peninsula. In this context, the Seoul government is starting with arather strategic approach.
Of course, the DPRK’s hypersensitivity and temperamental responseto the Seoul’s initial actions is not surprising. Currently, the Pyongyang
government strongly denies involvement in the bloody disaster,
complaining that the “South Korean warmongers are creating aconspiracy,” and threatens a “punitive all-out war against the South.” For
the Pyongyang government, stunned by the surprisingly scientific andinescapable investigation work done by the ROK government, there
seems to be no other option but to react in such way.
Reemergence of OPCON Disputes
While the ROK government’s response toward the DPRK is rather
moderate, it is tough enough toward itself. The Seoul government is now
conducting a comprehensive review of its whole gamut of security anddefense systems. In January 2010, President Lee himself established theCommittee for Advanced Defense to oversee the progress of the Defense
Reform Plan 2020. Following the Cheonan incident, he additionallylaunched an ad-hoc committee for more comprehensive review of thenation’s security system. In line with these efforts, the Ministry of
National Defense (MND) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are working
together to re-prioritize security threats. For instance, the JCS used to put

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a threat of an all-out war on the top of the list, yet now that has been
replaced by a threat of local limited conflicts or provocations. Also, thetwo committees are currently in process of redesigning investment
profiles of defense budget. Many other ways are being considered toenhance the security awareness of the South Korean public, which has
been relaxed significantly during the past two governments. Given thissituation, it is a natural development that the voices calling forreconsideration of the wartime OPCON separation by 2012 have become
stronger. Particularly for many senior citizens who remember how
American soldiers fought for and saved democracy in this once unheardof country, and those veterans and religious leaders who initiatedcollection of 10 million signatures to oppose the OPCON transfer, theCheonan incident provides a valuable opportunity to rekindle the
OPCON issue.
For those who then opposed the 2007 ROK-U.S. agreement on
OPCON separation and dismantlement of the CFC in 2012, there isanother legitimate reason to revisit the issue. Contrary to the assumptions
and expectations of the Roh government in 2005, when it began to tackle
the OPCON issue, threats from the DPRK have increased notably sincethen. Then, the Roh administration pointed to “improved inter-Korean
relations and decreasing threats from the North” as preconditions for the
OPCON transfer. But now, the DPRK has conducted nuclear tests twice,in 2006 and in 2009, becoming a de facto nuclear weapon state. Despite
its faltering economy and extreme destitution, the DPRK has intensified
its military forces by adding 16 more army divisions, 400 more tanks,
500 long-range artillery, and 70,000 more special operation soldiers.
Now, the asymmetric threat from the DPRK is graver than at any time
before. The Cheonan incident enabled the South Korean public towitness the reality of the enhanced security threat in the Korean
peninsula.
The Committee for Advanced Defense recently identified the
DPRK’s belligerent strategies, weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
artillery forces deployed north of the demarcation line, special operation
forces, and submarines as the five major asymmetric threat areas. It
demanded that the MND and the JCS find effective ways to fill thewindows of vulnerability. As the Cheonan incident has focused the
Korean public on the security threats posed by the DPRK, increasing
numbers of South Koreans now support an indefinite postponement of
the OPCON separation. The same support is also felt within the ROK’s
MND and JCS.

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A Less Palpable but Significant Move in Washington
On the other side of the Pacific, there is also an increasing concern
over the OPCON transfer, though not as palpable as in South Korea,
especially since the Cheonan incident. For example, Professor Victor
Cha has suggested that the two allies should postpone the date of thetransfer and take more time to reevaluate the security environment thathas drastically changed since 2007.1 Of course, the U.S. government has
not so far shown any willingness with regard to reconsideration of the
OPCON agreement. Many specialists in Washington still believe, at least
outwardly, that the OPCON transfer should take place as agreed. Someof them advocate it because the OPCON transfer will be commensuratewith “strategic flexibility” as well as with the Obama administration’s
alliance policy in which the U.S. urges its allies to take greater
responsibility for their own defense. Others point out that the transfer isa must-to-do task South Korea should accept sooner or later anyway, andthus it is just a matter of time. Some government officials simply argue
that the decision has already passed the point of no return.
In this context, what is particularly noticeable is the opinion of someAmerican experts requesting the ROK to spend more for its own defense.
Bruce Bennett of the Rand Corporation, for example, argues that the
ROK government should spend 621 trillion won (some $6 billion) of its
defense budget, the amount specified in the Defense Reform Plan 2020
when the plan was first adopted in 2005.2 Such arguments seem to reflect
the views of many other Americans in the government. However, at thistime of insecurity South Koreans want the U.S. government tounderstand that the Defense Reform Plan 2020 will not be a panacea for
all the insecurity elements South Korea faces.
Limitations of the Defense Reform Plan 2020
The Defense Reform Plan 2020 was an alternative designed by the
Roh Moo Hyun government when it began to carry forward the OPCON
transfer. The official goal of the plan was to transform the current
quantity-oriented military into a quality-oriented one using state-of-theart technology and information capability. The plan would reduce
military manpower from 680,” to 500,000 and instead, enhance defense
capability by pouring 621 trillion won into the budget by 2020. Most of
the manpower reduction plans were to take place in the Army while theNavy and the Air Force were to be reinforced under the slogans of “Blue
Ocean Navy” and “Space Air Force.” The plan was revised in 2009; thegoal of investment size was reduced to 599 trillion won and the target of
manpower size was resettled at 517,000.

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In retrospect, the Defense Reform Plan 2020 was an appeasementtactic toward conservative South Koreans who opposed the OPCON
separation. Simultaneously, the Roh government tried to let the
Pyongyang know that the plan did not aim at it. The navy and air force
slogans as well as reduction of the Army’s manpower reflected the Rohgovernment’s intention of assuring that the defense reform plan would
not be directed at the DPRK. In fact, separation of the wartime OPCON
itself would be a great gift for the DPRK, which has long craved
weakening and eventual dissolution of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Likewise,
the Roh administration’s external policies heavily focused on interKorean relations and protection of the Sunshine policy.
The reason why his successor, President Lee, is carrying out the
Defense Reform Plan 2020 is not because it does not know the impure
political motivations behind the plan, but because it still encompasses
elements indicating the correct future direction the ROK military forces
should move toward. Taking the current low birth rate in the ROK into
account, for example, a down-sized military with higher quality oftechnological and information power is what the ROK military should
strive to achieve in the future. Strengthening the Navy and Air Force isalso the right way to be prepared against all sorts of uncertainties in the
post-DPRK era. Nevertheless, the Defense Reform Plan 2020 still
possesses many limitations.
First of all, the ROK as a member of all nonproliferation regimes anda country without any WMD has no means to offset the DPRK’s WMD
threat. This is not a matter of how much money South Korea puts into
the Defense Reform Plan 2020. The only possible solution is continuingreassurance of extended deterrence provided by the U.S. However, thenuclear protection the U.S. provides to its allies is now increasingly hazyunder the Obama administration. Different from the earlier version of
the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) during the Bush administration thatclearly stated that a WMD attack on its allies would meet nuclear
retaliation by the U.S., the new NPR released on April 4, 2010 lists nonnuclear elements such as bilateral alliance relationship, the U.S. security
assurance, the U.S. military presence overseas, and missile defense as the
key deterrence mechanisms. The new NPR reaffirms the nuclear
protection merely by excluding the DPRK and Iran from the countries towhich U.S. applies negative security assurances (NSA). This is why
many South Korean experts express concerns that the Obamaadministration, preoccupied with the vision of a “world free of nuclear
weapons,” may neglect the importance of nuclear protection for its allies.
Secondly, regardless of continuation of the U.S. extended deterrence,
the DPRK’s WMD now poses a different kind of threat: “increased
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easiness and boldness of regional provocations under nuclear blackmail.”
The DPRK is well aware that the U.S. will not use its nuclear weapons
for retaliation as long as the North does not actually use nuclear weapons
against South Korea. Put differently, North Korea has reasons to believethat nuclear blackmail can easily scare South Korea, which fears a total
war against the nuclear-armed North Korea, and limit the South’s
responses to regional provocations. The U.S. extended deterrence isalmost useless in deterring this sort of threat since Pyongyang knows thatuse of nuclear weapons simply for blackmail will not invite U.S. nuclear
retaliation.
It is in this line of logic that I have been persistently stressing foryears that the easiness and boldness of North Korean local provocations
would increase in proportion to its completion of nuclear weapons andthat the Yellow Sea would be the most likely battlefield. The Cheonan
incident amply proves this. Unfortunately, this sort of danger stemmingfrom the lethal connection between the North’s nuclear weapons andmore likelihood of local provocations has largely been neglected by bothgovernments.
As for a remedy to offset and deter this threat, the ROK needs a nonWMD strategic second-strike capability that can be translated into an
ultimate and decisive threat to the very existence of the DPRK. To do so,
the ROK government should develop another defense scheme that goesbeyond the Defense Reform Plan 2020, thus requiring new weaponssystems, including long-distance ballistic missiles and strategic
submarines. Yet, the U.S. simply continues to dissuade the ROK fromdeveloping long-range ballistic missiles for the sake of missile
nonproliferation, revealing that the U.S. does not fully understand thedelicate nature of threat facing its South Korean ally.
Thirdly, even completion of the Defense Reform Plan 2020 does notnecessarily mean elimination of chronic asymmetric threats in the
Korean peninsula. For example, the DPRK has all valuable crucial
targets such as Seoul within the range of its artillery forces, while the
ROK does not. More defense spending does not solve such geographicalasymmetry. To cope with asymmetry in non-material elements requires
much more time and effort. For instance, North Korean soldiers serve formore than seven years while South Korean soldiers do so for less than
two years. This can create a large gap in the degree of their combat skills.
No one can argue safely that an expensive South Korean tank operated
by a newcomer will defeat a cheaper North Korean tank driven by aveteran soldier. Differences in psychological elements such as perceptionof threat and enemy also matter a lot. If South Korean soldiers consider
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vice versa is not true, the South’s economic and technological superiority
will be of no use to win a war against the North.
In fact, the spirit of the ROK military was seriously damaged under
the Sunshine Policy during the two previous administrations. Today,
some recruits as well as newly commissioned officers believe that the
Korean War was triggered by a North-bound invasion. For them, the factthat Seoul was occupied by the Communist forces in four days after theoutbreak of the war on June 25, 1950, or that some 40,000 American
soldiers sacrificed their lives to save people they had never met, is no
more than a part of forgotten history. Of course, a large portion of blame
should go to the teachers who belong to the Korean Teachers andEducational Workers Union (KTU) that was legalized by the Kim Dae
Jung government. They taught distorted and biased modern history in
middle and high schools. Really, South Korea needs more time to correct
the biased history taught in the classrooms, to properly educate soldiersand officers, and to adequately deal with the asymmetric threats. No
matter how much more defense budget the Cheonan incident may makeavailable, the simple increase in amount of money will not dissolve allthese issues. South Koreans want American allies to heed to this reality.
Two Faces of OPCON Transfer
If the wartime OPCON will be separated in 2020 as agreed, both the
ROK and the U.S. will face various consequences. First, there will be aclear distinction between beneficiaries and losers in the ROK. The
OPCON separation will greatly help the so-called “progressive factions,”a minor group that once succeeded at taking power with populist politics,
get new political momentum. This may mean the reincarnation of theSunshine Policy. On the contrary, the mainstream of South Korean
people who are concerned more about national security than about
political gains and wish to remain as a member of the U.S.-led sea power,
will be crestfallen. Above all, the OPCON transfer at the time ofescalated threats from the nuclear-armed North Korea and amid repeatedprovocations on the Yellow Sea will make them feel highly insecure andsuspicious about the future of the ROK-US alliance. In a worst case, an
OPCON separation at a troubled time may compel South Korean
strategic planners to rethink the overall national survival strategies.
The OPCON transfer at a bad time will have both bright and darksides for the U.S., too. It will immediately reduce the U.S. financial
burden and lubricate the “strategic flexibility” policy. However, it will
not take place without far more laborious after-effects. North Korea willinterpret it as increasing uncertainties revolving around the U.S. security
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boldness and easiness of the North’s limited provocations against theSouth. More importantly, such an OPCON separation despite the twonuclear tests of the DPRK, may give the DPRK a false impression that
the U.S. accepts its nuclear arsenals and help the Communist hermit
country further stick to its WMDs. It can send a wrong message to
Beijing, too. China considers such a drastic transformation in the U.S.ROK combined commanding system as a decline of alliance cohesion
and may become increasingly assertive in exerting its influence over East
Asia. Obviously, these developments will be injurious to the U.S. globaland Asian policies. An inescapable conclusion after considering both
good and bad sides is that the wartime OPCON as well as the CFC
should be kept intact at least during this precarious period.
Clearly, 2012 is the worst time for the OPCON transfer. It’s the firstyear of the so-called “Strong and Great North Korea” that the top leadersin the North have long proclaimed. The best way to celebrate it may be ashow of WMD power via another nuclear test or ICBM test launch. It isalso the year Pyongyang will celebrate the 100th birthday of Kim Il-sungand the 30th birthday of Kim Jong-un. In the same year, a change ingovernment or leadership will take place in the U.S., South Korea, andChina. On top of these, the inter-Korean tension has now reached its
peak with the Cheonan incident, pushing the DPRK, which faces
international isolation, to further cling to its own “survival game of thenuke by the nuke and for the nuke.” Now is the time to postpone thewartime OPCON transfer indefinitely and reassess the security
environment on and around the Korean peninsula, as suggested by Victor
Cha. The argument that the OPCON issue has passed the point of no
return since a formal agreement was signed by the two defense ministers
does not sound quite tenable. Any agreement or even treaty can be made,changed, or remade legitimately by another agreement.
However, it has to be the ROK that should initiate new consultations
on the postponement of the OPCON transfer. For this purpose, the ROK
government can reconfirm the will of ordinary South Koreans throughopen public debate, and then suggest additional negotiations to
Washington. Once the U.S. accepts postponement, what the two nations
need will be a summit that will confirm and declare it via a new
agreement.
Conclusion: Toward a More Future-oriented Alliance
In retrospect, formation of the ROK-U.S. alliance was an unmatchedblessing to South Korea for its survival and economic prosperity. This is
the way most South Koreans remember it, though the public trust in thenation toward the alliance has fluctuated from time to time. At least for
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them, the two nations should overcome remnants of the tribulations if
any, and should strive to usher in a more future-oriented alliance. They
prefer that this be an unhampered process, and believe rethinking of the2007 OPCON agreement is one way to do so. This is why many South
Koreans believe that the Cheonan incident will turn out to be a boon in
the long run.
Most South Koreans, even while deeply lamenting the death of the
46 sailors, expect that while the Cheonan incident causes distress today,
it will bring blessings tomorrow for four reasons. First, by perpetratingsuch a heinous crime, the Pyongyang regime is pulling the noose around
its own neck. Undoubtedly, the Cheonan incident will further isolate the
DPRK from the international community. Second, the North’s economic
difficulties, which will be further worsened by international sanctions
and cessation of inter-Korean trade, will undermine the alreadyweakened foundation of the North Korean regime. Third, the incident
clearly taught the South Korean public a lesson, thus renewing the publictrust toward the ROK-U.S. alliance.
Finally, the tragic loss of young lives will eventually turn out to be apriceless blessing for the nation by educating the disillusioned younger
generations about ations the stark security reality they live in. This will
mean a loss of the “revolutionary potential within the South.” Although
the incident may have brought a momentary sense of victory to the
DPRK leadership, the culprit regime will suffer much harsher andprolonged consequences. The bloody Cheonan incident is a timely
reminder to South Koreans of the Korean War sixty years ago, aptly
distinguished friends from foes, and opportunely rekindled the OPCON
issue. This is the bright side of the tragic incident.
Notes:
1

Chosun Ilbo, April 28, 2010.

2“Wartime OPCON and the ROK Defense Reform Plan 2020,” presented at aseminar co-hosted by the Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies and the Korea
Institute for Crisis Management Analysis in Seoul on May 18, 2010).

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