The Nakhodka Spill and Lessons for the Future
Nobutaka Miyazoe
Managing Director
Petroleum Association of Japan
1.

Opening remarks

This is the third international symposium on oil spills to have been held by thePetroleum Association of Japan
In the two previous symposia, we discussed the clean-up operations engaged in by the
Association, and we received valuable instruction from the vast experiences of public
and private-sector authorities from the U.S., Europe, Oceania, the Middle East, andAsia. I am pleased to report that the Association has done all in its power to act on the
deficiencies pointed out to us by these distinguished guests.
As there are some here today who are joining us for the first time, I would like to begin
with a very brief explanation of the "Major Oil Spill Response Program me of thePetroleum Association of Japan.
The Programme began in 1991 with a subsidy from the Japan Ministry of International
Trade and Industry made available in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill.
There are three main thrusts to the program: preparedness and response, research anddevelopment, and international symposia.
The first, preparedness and response, involves stockpiling oil spill response equipmentfor example, booms and oil skimmers-and lending them free of charge for use in cleanup operations should the disaster-response authorities lack sufficient equipment andrequest support. We currently have six stockpile bases and one sub-base in Japan, andfive stockpile bases overseas.
The Association further assists borrowers by arranging for the transportation ofmaterials and equipment and also for the dispatch of supervisors to overseetheir use.
In addition, we provide operational training for potential borrowers.

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The second focus of the program, research and development, seeks to make the clean-up
operations of disaster-response teams more effective. Among the areas we are currently
studying are: 1) the development and provision of a diffusion-drift model of spilled oils,
2) gathering and testing of data on the changes overtime in spilled oils, 3) the selfcleanup mechanisms of the ocean for spilled oils, and 4) safer tanker navigation so as toprevent tanker accidents in the first place. The Association publishes its results fromtime to time so that they are available for the use of interested parties.
The third and final focus of the program is international symposia, which is what weare engaged in today. Our purpose in this is to learn from the experiences of people inJapan and other countries and to tell them about the programs of the Petroleum
Association of Japan.
I would now like to review with you the incident in question. At 2:51 the morning ofJanuary 2, 1997, the Russian tanker Nakhodka, traveling from Shanghai to
Petropavlovsk, broke into two and sank in the Sea of Japan about 106 kilometers
north-northeast of Oki Island off the coast of Shimane Prefecture. The bow of the ship
began to drift. At the time of the accident, the wind is estimated to have been about 20
meters per second, waves 6 meters,
and swells in excess of 4 meters.
The Nakhodka was carrying 19,000 kiloliters of heavy fuel oil, of which an estimated6,240 kiloliters was spilled.
The first step taken by the Japan Maritime Safety Agency was to rescue the tanker
crew. Following that, the Agency, together with the Maritime Self- Defense Force,
began to recover spilled oil. Work had to be repeatedly suspended, however, because ofinclement weather and maritime conditions, which threatened to cause secondary
disasters.
Ultimately, severe weather impeded recovery of the spilled oil at sea, and on January 7
the oil, together with the bow of the tanker, washed ashore at the town of Mikuni in
Fukui Prefecture. Heavy oil would eventually pollute a largeswath of coastline
stretching from Shimane Prefecture to Niigata Prefecture, leaving in its wakesignificant economic and environmental damage. The spilled heavy oil congealed into ahighly viscous mousse.

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After the oil began to wash ashore on January 7, recovery work was undertaken by the
P&I insurance agents, Ground Self-Defense Force, local government, local citizens, andvolunteers.
In spite of these efforts, it was not until the end of April, some four months later, thatthe "Headquarters for Disaster Countermeasures established by the governments of
the affected communities had fulfilled their mission and were able to disband.
This spill was the worst experienced by Japan since the Juliana spilled 7,000 kiloliters
off the port of Niigata twenty-five years ago in 1971.
The challenge before all of us is to use the lessons from the Nakhodka incident tominimize the economic and environmental damage incurred should similar spills occur
in the future.
The Petroleum Association of Japan needs to draw lessons on disaster-response fromthis incident and use them to improve its clean-up operations.
One of the things that the Nakhodka incident has forced us to reconfirm is the fact that
the Sea of Japan is an international waterway used by the ships of many, many
countries. Improving our ability and institutions for cleaning up oil spills in the Sea ofJapan will involve strengthening cooperation among the countries that use its
waterways. We are therefore pleased that the Ministry of Transport, spurred by this
accident, is taking the initiative in this direction.
2.

Response of the Association to the Nakhodka Incident

I would like to review with you the response of the Petroleum Association of Japan to
the Nakhodka incident and report to you our analysis of the results.
(1)Response
On January 5, the third day after the spill and before the oil reached the shore, the P&I
Club, the ship owner's insurance agent, contacted the Petroleum Association of Japan
with its initial request for the loan of materials and equipment.

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In response, the Association delivered skimmers and other equipment to a location
specified by the P&I Club the following day, January 6. In the weeks and months that
followed, the Association made a total of seven loans of material and equipment to the
P&I Club and arranged for its delivery.
After the oil began washing ashore on January 7, the Association received requests forequipment loans from four prefectures (Kyoto, Ishikawa, Niigata, and Toyama), fourelectric power companies (Hokuriku Electric, Kansai Electric, Japan Atomic Power,
and Tokyo Electric), the Fisheries Agency, and two national oil stockpiling companies.
While we had many borrowers to deal with, the Association endeavored to meet all of
their requests and cooperate with the transport of the equipment to the sites where it
was needed.
In the end, we had equipment and materials from all six of our domestic stockpiles onsite and in action at the clean-up.
Most of the transportation was accomplished by land using trucks. Equipment from our
Hokkaido stockpile was transported by aircraft from the Air Self- Defense Force and byferry; equipment from the Okinawa stockpile was transported by private aircraft andferry.
At the peak, the Association provided 8.6 kilometers of solid booms, 4.7 kilometers ofinflatable booms, 22 weir-type oil skimmers (GT-185s and DESMI-250s), 4 Komara 12K
compact oil skimmers, 12 beach cleaners, and 104 Fastanks.
The peak extended for nearly two months from early February through the end of
March, at which time most of the clean-up had been finished.
Most of the equipment and materials lent out was not cleaned, repaired, and returned
to its stockpiles until after the end of May.

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(2)Examples of equipment utilization
The skimmers loaned by the Petroleum Association of Japan went into action on
January 8, the day after the bow of the tanker washed ashore. The first day for which
recovery amounts are known (January 8), the skimmers recovered about 70% of all theoil that would be recovered, 21 kiloliters, which is equivalent to about 105 drum cans.
Later they were also instrumental in the clean-up activities of the Self-Defense Forcesin rough-terrain areas like Anto and Oshima.
The solid booms were ultimately washed away by storms but were wrapped around thebow of the tanker preventing any further spillage of oil from that section of the ship.
Solid booms and inflatable booms loaned by the Association were also strung along thewater intakes of nuclear power reactors.
Fastanks loaned by the Association were used as temporary storage at many sites,
particularly by volunteers.
The beach cleaners were used to recover oil that washed ashore.
(3)Areas where improvements are required
A. Emergency transport
The first issue I would like to discuss is that of transporting materials from stockpiles
to the spill in times of emergency. Basically, this was done extremely accurately andquickly in the Nakhodka spill.
Under the government subsidiary, the Association is only obligated to deliverequipment to borrowers at the stockpile base, but we have gone farther than that toestablish a response system that, at the request of borrowers and with the cooperationof storage and maintenance contractors, is able to deliver equipment quickly tolocations designated by the borrower. This system was set up with studies andverification tests conducted on a stockpile-by-stockpile basis. The fact that we were able
to speedily deliver equipment was because the system worked extremely smoothly, andfor that we must thank all of the cooperating companies involved.

5However, that is no reason to be complacent. We need to check how the system operated
in detail and work with cooperating companies to make any improvements that areneeded.
B. Equipment availability
I would like to first give you some ratios between the equipment held in Association
stockpiles and the amounts loaned out at the peak. For solid booms, we loaned 8.6 of our
20 kilometers, or 43%; for inflatable booms, we loaned 4.7 of 6 kilometers, or 78% ofwhat the Association owned.
Likewise, we loaned 22 out of a total of3O skimmers (GT-185s and DESMJ-250s), or
73%. We also loaned 50% of our beach cleaners. When the spill occurred, we had 88
fastanks. We loaned out all 88, for a lending rate of 100%, and we also imported 48 more
on an emergency basis.
As you can see, in responding to this disaster, we almost emptied our stockpiles. Had
there been another large spill occur at the same time, we probably would have been
unable to respond to requests for equipment loans. That raises the questions of how toincrease our stockpiles in the future and what kinds of equipment need to be increased.
We must also consider whether we need to build more stockpiles along the Sea ofJapan.
However, we should also point out that about half of the equipment we lent out anddelivered to the spill site was not actually used in clean-up operations. This equipment
was held in standby along the long coastline involved.
The oil spill moved along an extensive area of coast, washing ashore at points along theway. There was also a large volume of heavy oil remaining in the sunken tanker and it
was impossible to predict just what would happen with it. Local governments andothers in the affected area made the obvious and correct choice of having clean-up
equipment on hand just in case.
Regardless, there are many factors for uncertainty in how an incident such as this willplay out, and the Association believes that it is important to be able to respond speedily
to requests for loans of standby equipment.

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C. Supervisors and operators
Under the terms of the subsidy, the Association is obligated only to stockpile and loan
oil spill clean-up equipment. However, we also recognize the need to provide as muchsupport as possible for borrowers, so with the cooperation of those involved in thestockpiles, we also sent personnel to supervise the operation of the equipment whenrequested by borrowers.
During the three or so months from January 6 to the end of March, our supervisors put
in about 300 man-days. These supervisors taught workers sent in by the borrowers andSelf-Defense troops called up for disaster-relief by the prefectural governors how to
operate the equipment. In addition, Association employees also put in about 100 mandays on site helping to ensure that equipment was used properly and assistingsupervisors in accomplishing their duties.
This process revealed several problems that need to be addressed.
The first is the lack, in absolute terms, of adequate numbers of supervisors. In
responding to this spill, we loaned out large amounts of equipment to a large number ofborrowers. This resulted in supervision requests from many different locations and for
prolonged periods of time.
The supervisors sent by the Association have their own jobs at their own companies. It
was impossible to ask them suddenly to drop everything for a period of two or three
weeks, both for personal reasons and from the perspective of their employers. In the
future we will need to have a system in place that enables us to smoothly relieve our
supervisors with a group of substitutes. Doing this will require the training of as manysupervisors in as many areas as possible.
We would also note the fundamental problem of there being few people on staff at theborrowers who are able to effectively operate the equipment involved. Up until thispoint, the Association has provided hands-on training mainly for people in the oil
industry. Our experiences with this spill indicate the need to enhance our training
programs and expand the range of their coverage so that we are able to aid a wider
spectrum of people.

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I would like to draw your attention in this regard to the training session we heldat our Okinawa stockpile in May, after the Nakhodka incident. This session was
attended by people form the Maritime Safety Agency and the electric power companies
other than staffs 6 PAJ member companies, and proved very successful.
Ultimately, the people who are sent in to deal with emergencies must be rotated as
required by the different companies involved. The Petroleum Association of Japan looks
forward to making a substantial expansion in its training programs so that, with thecooperation of all interested parties, we are able to train as many supervisors andoperators as possible.
D. Applied operations
Conditions will vary widely from disaster site to disaster site and there is no single
piece of clean-up equipment that is suited to all of them. In some cases, conditions at
the site may prevent clean-up equipment from exerting 100% of its capacity. Thatmeans that we must have a thorough understanding of the different ways in which
equipment can be used and be able to take as much advantage of the equipment asconditions permit. During this clean up, the flotation mechanisms were removed fromthe oil skimmers and they were used as transport pumps for high viscosity oil. We willneed to provide better training in such applied operations in the future.
E. Open sea systems
Up to this point, our system structures and training have mainly envisioned clean-up
operations in closed-in waterways. The Nakhodka incident has taught us theimportance of clean-up operations on the open seas.
This will require that the Maritime Safety Agency be prepared to spray oil dispersanton the open sea from the air during the early stages of a spill. It will also require that
the Association develop systems for open-sea oil recovery that utilize the equipment
currently owned as effectively as possible, and that it engage in ship-based oil recovery
training for open-sea operations.
For instance, the Association should develop a system for emergency loading ofskimmers, booms, and other equipment on 1,000-ton class ocean-going vessels for opensea recovery and induction or lead boom installation. This is something we would like towork on in cooperation with other interested institutions.

8F. Wider variety of joint training sessions
Next I would like to point out the need for a wider variety of joint training. In
cleaning-up this spill, the disaster-relief troops of the Self-Defense Forces made greatuse of the Association is skimmers. The disaster-relief troops receive special training
and are used to operating machinery, so they were able to master the skimmers almost
immediately when our supervisors demonstrated how they worked. The troops werealso able to improvise ways to use the equipment in an efficient and organized fashion
as called for by the natural and other conditions to which they were subject.
This indicates to us that there is much both sides could learn from joint training
sessions in which both the disaster-relief troops and the Association get hands-on
experience with the equipment. While there are institutional issues that will have to beresolved before this can take place, we do wish to discuss with the Self-Defense Forces
how it might be accomplished.
H. Drift forecasting software
The Association has developed forecasting software that runs on personal computers
and is able to predict how spilled oil will disperse and drift during the initial stages of aspill. These predictions can then be used in drafting effective clean-up plans. The
software, which is already in the hands of interested parties, covers the twelve
maritime zones with heavy tanker traffic to Japanese refineries.
However, few Japan-bound tankers travel in the area around Shimane Prefecture,
where the Nakhodka incident occurred, or Fukui Prefecture, where most of the oil
ended up. We did not, therefore, create forecasting software for these areas since weassumed there would be little likelihood of a super tanker having a large spill there.
Ironically, these were the areas where the Nakhodka spill occurred. Having learned its
lesson, the Association is now at work creating drift forecasting software for areas notcovered by the twelve heavy-traffic zones by the end of fiscal 1997. This task has been
given urgent priority, and when completed will enable us to forecast drifts for virtually
all of Japan is territorial waters.

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I. Public relations
During the spill, NHK television reported in a nationwide morning broadcast about the
Association is equipment stockpiles and lending operations. Many local governments
and electric power companies first learned about the Association is work from thisbroadcast and only then did they contact us about loans. This indicates to us that wehave not done enough to publicize our operations to local government bodies. While wehave tried to inform all interested parties about our equipment lending system, weneed to make sure that they are known to the broad spectrum of potential disastervictims.
We would also like to work with these parties in joint response simulations, desk top
exercise, and equipment operations training.
These are the main areas of improvement for the Petroleum Association of Japan that
we have uncovered as a result of the Nakhodka incident. We will be doing all in our
power to overcome these defects and any others that you may wish to advise us of overthe course of this symposium.
3. Other oil spill-related activities
I would like to also take this opportunity to report to you about the Association's
involvement in the clean-up of other oil spills besides the Nakhodka.
(1)Loans of equipment
It has been five and a half years since the Petroleum Association of Japan establishedits first stockpile of oil spill response equipment. During that time we have lent out
equipment for five spills; 1) the spill from the "Sea Prince" tanker in South Korea; 2)
the fuel spill caused when a Chinese cargo ship ran aground near the island of Okushiri
off Hokkaido; 3) the spill from the Russian tanker "Nakhodka; 4) the collision andsinking of the South Korean tanker "Osung" in the waters off Tsushima and 5) crude oilspill from "Diamond Grace" in Tokyo Bay this month. We also lent lighting equipment
for relief efforts for the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.

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(2)Stockpile increases
In March 1997 the Association placed four new kinds of oil spill response equipment in
its domestic stockpiles; 1) beach booms, which are used to gather oil that washes up on
beaches so that it does not disperse; 2) crane sweep systems, which are used to transfer
large volumes of recovered oil from temporary storage to other facilities; 3) oil/water
separators, which are used for easy, on-site separation of recovered oil and water; and
4) inflatable barges, which are used for temporary storage and transportation of large
volumes of oil recovered at sea.
(3)Research into the self-clean-up mechanisms of the ocean
At the International Oil Spill Conference that was held from April 7 to 10 of this year inFort Lauderdale, Florida in the United States, the Petroleum Association of Japan reada paper called "Results of a Long-term Tracking Study of a Coastline Subject to an Oil
Spill," which contained many of the findings from its research into the self-clean-up
mechanisms of the oceans.
The study in question tracked for one year spilled oil concentrations (aromatic andaliphatic hydrocarbons) in the soil and the organisms that live in it along the coastalbottom (the tidal bottom) polluted by the October 17, 1994 spill of crude oil in Wakaura
Bay. This spill polluted the coastline with 570 kiloliters of oil.
The main conclusions reached by the study were:1.All traces of the crude oil from the Wakaura spill had been completely cleaned by theend of the year. There was a rapid decline in spilled oil concentration in the soil andorganisms of the area during the first three to six months after the pollution, and by
one year the concentration had declined to the same levels as observed at other
unpolluted coastlines.
2.In this cleaning, biodegradation by microscopic marine organisms played a major role.
In other words, the pattern of concentration decline was similar to the pattern observedin crude oil biodegradation experiments with sea water collected from the area of thespill.

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(4)Creation of a database on changes over time
Some crude oil will turn into a mousse and become highly viscous depending on theseawater and waves involved. The degree to which this happens differs markedly
depending on the type of crude oil involved. There is, however, no comprehensive,quantitative data on this. The Association has therefore embarked on a project to create
a database on viscosity changes over time in spilled oil. Our target is to have thedatabase cover the fifty major types of oil imported by Japan. We have been conducting
experiments in circulating water channels since 1990 to collect the data necessary.
We currently have data on twenty types of crude oil and one type of heavy oil. We will
be computerizing this data and making it broadly available as a common asset to be
used by those involved in oil-spill disasters the world over.
(5)Upgrades of the drift forecasting software
In April of this year, the Association released a new version of its drift forecasting
software for oil spills in twelve heavy-traffic maritime zones (version 3.0). The newversion is easier to use and has substantial improvements in forecasting precision.
The biggest improvement is that it is now able to directly download and use data on
forecast wind direction and speed from the Japan Weather Association. This data isvital to predicting drifts and it can now be retrieved on-line in real time.
In previous versions, wind direction and speed data had to be obtained by telephoning
to the Weather Association, asking for their forecasts and then inputting it by hand.
This was both time-consuming and troublesome, but the only other choice was tosacrifice forecasting accuracy and use past averages that had been built into thesoftware itself.
The updated version has already been distributed to and put in use by the members of
the Association and others. All of our members are therefore able, if needs be, toretrieve wind direction and speed forecasts on-line from the Weather Association anduse it to create quick and accurate predictions of spill drift in the twelve zones.

12The Japan Weather Association provides wind direction and speed forecasts for thesoftware on a 2-kilometer grid within the twelve zones. Data is available in three-hour
increments for up to forty-eight hours in advance. It is updated twice a day (at 9:00 AM
and 9:00 PM).
This September we will see another boost to forecasting precision as the system moves
to a 1-kilometer grid and wind forecasts for each hour up to 51 hours in advance.
The new software we are creating for previously uncovered areas will be able toretrieve weather data on-line in real time from the very beginning.
At the end of this lecture I would like to demonstrate the software for you by simulatinga large spill. If you would like a copy of the software we are willing to provide it uponrequest, although certain conditions will be attached.
4.The themes of this symposium
Now that the work of cleaning up the oil spilled by the Nakhodka is over, we want totake the opportunity to review our response to the accident and analyze problem areas.
We also wish to hear lectures on advanced technologies from around the world and on
ways of building cooperative systems between those involved in oil spill clean-up. This
information will be of value both to the Petroleum Association of Japan and to all others
in attendance here today as we endeavor to improve and enhance our response systems.
We would therefore like to divide this symposium into two large themes having to dowith response to oil spill disasters.
During the first part, we will hear from those involved in recovery operations for the
Nakhodka spill on their response and areas they see for improvement. Our speakers
during this session will represent: 1) the International Tanker Owners Pollution
Federation, which sent technical advisors to the ship owner 2 s insurance agent toadvise them on spill response; 2) the Maritime Safety Agency, which was responsible
for rescuing the crew of the Nakhodka and overseeing the clean-up of oil spilled by theship; 3) the Ground Self-Defense Force, which was responsible for recovering stranded
oil at the request of the afflicted prefectures; 4) East Asia Response Limited, aSingapore-based firm that was involved in the clean-up at the request of the shipowner; and 5) Fukui and Ishikawa Prefectures, the two prefectures that received theheaviest damage.

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We will also hear from Professor Hiroshi Tokuda, one of Japan is foremost authorities
on marine environmental issues, who will speak on protection of the marine
environment with emphasis on the application of oil dispersants during spill clean-ups
in such a way as to minimize harm to coastal ecosystems.
The second section will feature authorities from overseas who have experience incontrolling spills in their waters under the same sorts of severe weather conditions as
experienced in Japan. We have asked them to relate to us their experiences indeveloping cooperative relationships between: 1) the government and private sectors; 2)
the central and local governments; and 3) regions and countries that are situated alongcommon bodies of water.
Our speakers come to us from: 1) the Norwegian Ministry of the Environment and Oil
Spill Control Association, which is involved in the North Sea area; 2) the British Oil
Spill Response Limited(OSRL); 3) the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre, which will
discuss that country is experiences dealing with spills; and 4) the Marine Spill
Response Corporation and the Ship Escort Response Vessel System of the UnitedStates, who will speak on the US response system and on tanker transportation
systems in Alaska since the Exxon Valdez spill.
Also, we would like to make a report on the Petroleum Association of Japan is findings
from research into safe tanker navigation.
5.Closing remarks
There are probably insufficiencies and deficiencies in our analysis of the response to the
Nakhodka spill, and we look forward to your comments and observations on themduring this symposium. The Association wants to put your ideas to work.
We hope that all in attendance will be able to use the information they gain during this
symposium to prepare for future spills.

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