The Recent Developments of the International Liability andCompensation Regime
The Supplementary Fund and the Possible Review of the 92 Conventions

Masamichi Hasebe
Legal Counsel
International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds 1971 and 1992

PAJ Oil Spill International Symposium 2004
Tokyo Japan
27 February 2004

INTRODUCTION
The international regime for the compensation of pollution damage caused by oil spills from tankers isbased on two sets of treaties adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
The framework of the regime was originally the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage (1969 Civil Liability Convention) and the 1971 International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1971 Fund
Convention). These Conventions entered into force in 1975 and 1978 respectively.
This 'old' regime was amended in 1992 by two Protocols, and the amended Conventions are known as the
1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention. The 1992 Conventions provide higher
limits of compensation and an enhanced scope of application. The 1992 Conventions entered into force
on 30 May 1996.
The Civil Liability Conventions govern the liability of shipowners for oil pollution damage. The
Conventions lay down the principle of strict liability for shipowners and create a system of compulsory
liability insurance. The shipowner is normally entitled to limit his liability to an amount which is linked
to the tonnage of his ship.
The Fund Conventions, which are supplementary to the respective Civil Liability Convention, provide
additional compensation to victims when the compensation under the applicable Civil Liability
Convention is inadequate. Each of the Fund Conventions established an intergovernmental organisation
to administer the compensation regime, the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds 1971 and1992 (IOPC Funds 1971 and 1992) respectively. By becoming Party to one of the Fund Conventions, aState becomes a member of that corresponding Fund. The Organisations have their headquarters in
London.
The 1971 Fund Convention ceased to be in force on 24 May 2002. This paper deals therefore primarily
with the 'new' regime, i.e. the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention.
On 15 December 2003, 94 States were Parties to the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, and 86 States were
Parties to the 1992 Fund Convention<1>.
The States which are Parties to the 1992 Conventions and the 1969 Civil Liability Convention are listed in
the Annex.
Information on the international compensation regime and the IOPC Funds is available on the Funds’ website at: http://www.iopcfund.org

MAIN FEATURES OF THE 1992 CONVENTIONS
The 1992 Conventions apply to pollution damage (i.e. damage caused by contamination) suffered in the
territory (including the territorial sea) and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or equivale nt area of a State
Party to the respective Conventions.
‘Pollution damage’ is defined in the 1992 Conventions as damage caused by contamination and includes
the cost of ‘preventive measures’, i.e. measures to prevent or minimise pollution damage.
The 1992 Conventions apply to ships which actually carry oil in bulk as cargo, i.e. generally laden tankers,
as well as to spills of bunker oil from unladen tankers in certain circumstances. The Conventions do not
apply to spills of bunker oil from ships other than tankers.

<1>

43 States are still Parties to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention.

The owner of a tanker has strict liability (ie he is liable also in the absence of fault) for pollution damage
caused by oil spilled from the tanker as a result of an incident. He is exempt from liability under the Civil
Liability Conventions only if he proves that:(a)the damage resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a grave natural
disaster, or(b)

the damage was wholly caused by sabotage by a third party, or(c)the damage was wholly caused by the negligence of public authorities in maintaining lights orother navigational aids.

Under certain conditions the shipowner is entitled to limit his liability to an amount which is linked to thetonnage of the vessel.
The limits of the shipowner's liability under the 1992 Civil Liability Convention are:
(a)

for
a
ship
not
exceeding
5 000
units
4 510 000 Special Drawing Rights<2> (SDR) (US$6.6 million);

of

gross

tonnage,(b)

for a ship with a tonnage between 5 000 and 140 000 units of tonnage, 4 510 000 SDR(US$6.6 million) plus 631 SDR (US$923) for each additional unit of tonnage; and(c)for a ship of 140 000 units of tonnage or over, 89 770 000 SDR (US$131 million).

Under the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, the shipowner is deprived of the right to limit his liability if itis proved that the pollution damage resulted from the shipowner's personal act or omission, committedwith the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably
result.
Claims for pollution damage under the 1992 Civil Liability Convention can be made only against theregistered owner of the ship concerned. This does not preclude victims from claiming compensation
outside the Convention from persons other than the owner. However, the 1992 Civil Liability Convention
prohibits claims against the servants or agents of the owner, the pilot, the charterer (including a bareboat
charterer), manager or operator of the ship, or any person carrying out salvage operations or taking
preventive measures.
The compensation payable by the 1992 Fund in respect of an incident is limited to an aggregate amount of
203 million SDR (US$297 million), including the sum actually paid by the shipowner (or his insurer)
under the 1992 Civil Liability Convention.
The 1992 Fund has an Assembly, which is composed of representatives of all member States. The
Assembly is the supreme organ governing the 1992 Fund, and it holds regular sessions once a year. The
Assembly elects an Executive Committee (composed of 15 Member States) whose main function is toapprove settlements of claims <3>.
The 1992 Fund and the 1971 Fund are operated by a joint Secretariat located in London (United
Kingdom) with 26 staff members.

<2>

The unit of account in the Conventions is the Special Drawing Right (SDR) as defined by the International
Monetary Fund. In this paper, the SDR has been converted into US dollars at the rate of exchange applicableon 15 December 2003, ie 1 SDR = US$1.46262.
<3>
During the winding-up period, the 1971 Fund is governed by an Administrative Council composed of all
former Member States.
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FINANCING OF THE 1992 FUND
The 1992 Fund is financed by contributions levied on any person who has received in one calendar year
more than 150 000 tonnes of crude oil and heavy fuel oil (contributing oil) in a State Party to the 1992
Fund Convention after sea transport.
Annual contributions are levied by the 1992 Fund to meet the anticipated payments of compensation andadministrative expenses during the coming year. Each contributor pays a specified amount per tonne ofcontributing oil received. The amount levied is decided each year by the Assembly.
The contributions are payable by the individual contributors directly to the 1992 Fund. A Member State is
not responsible for the contributions levied on contributors in that State, unless it has voluntarily acceptedsuch responsibility.
The Japanese oil industry is the major contributor to the 1992 Fund, paying 20% of the total contributions.
The Italian oil industry is the second largest contributor paying 11%, followed by the oil industries in the
Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, France, United Kingdom, Singapore, Spain, Canada, Germany,
Australia and Norway.
TERMINATION OF THE 1971 FUND CONVENTION
After the entry into force of the 1992 Conventions in 1996, the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the1971 Fund Convention were denounced by a number of Member States. As more States joined the1992 Fund and ceased to be members of the 1971 Fund, the 'old' regime lost its importance.
Under Article 43.1 in its original version, the 1971 Fund Convention would have ceased to be in force
when the number of Member States fell below three. Although many States had denounced the 1971
Fund Convention, it was unlikely that the number of Member States would fall below three in theforeseeable future. For this reason a Diplomatic Conference, held in September 2000, adopted a Protocol
under which the 1971 Fund Convention would cease to be in force on the date on which the number ofMember States fell below 25, or 12 months following the date on which the Assembly (or any other bodyacting on its behalf) noted that the total quantity of contributing oil received in the remaining Member
States had fallen below 100 million tonnes.
Due to a number of denunciations of the 1971 Fund Convention, the Convention ceased to be in force on
24 May 2002 when the number of States Parties fell below 25. The Convention does not apply toincidents occurring after that date. However, the 1971 Fund will continue to pay compensation for claims
arising from incidents which occurred when the 1971 Fund Convention was in force. Once all suchclaims have been paid, the 1971 Fund will be wound up. It is expected that the winding-up procedure willtake several years.
CLAIMS SETTLEMENT
Claims experience
Since the establishment of the regime in 1978, the IOPC Funds have been involved in some 130 incidents.
The IOPC Funds have paid some US$800 million in compensation.
In the great majority of these incidents, all claims have been settled out of court. So far, court actions
against the Funds have been taken in respect of only a handful of incidents.
The largest payments have been made in respect of the following incidents: Aegean Sea (Spain)
US$49 million, Braer (United Kingdom) US$73 million, Sea Empress (United Kingdom) US$49 million,
Nadhodka (Japan) US$179 million, Erika (France) US$68 million and Prestige (Spain) US$71 million.

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Admissibility of claims for compensation
The 1992 Fund can pay compensation to a claimant only to the extent that his claim is justified and meetsthe criteria laid down in the 1992 Fund Convention. To this end, a claimant is required to prove his claim
by producing explanatory notes, invoices, receipts and other documents to support the claim. In mostcases, the Fund provides the claimant with a Claims Form which sets out the information required toenable the Fund to determine whether the claim is admissible and, if so, the quantum of the damage. The
1992 Fund has published a Claims Manual which contains general information on how claims should bepresented and sets out the general criteria for the admissibility of various types of claims.
For a claim to be accepted by the 1992 Fund, it has to be proved that the claim is based on a real expense
actually incurred, that there was a link between the expense and the incident and that the expense wasmade for reasonable purposes.
The IOPC Funds have acquired considerable experience with regard to the admissibility of claims. In
connection with the settlement of claims they have developed certain principles as regards the meaning of
the definition of 'pollution damage', which is specified as 'damage caused by contamination'. In 1994 a
Working Group of the 1971 Fund examined in depth the criteria for the admissibility of claims forcompensation within the scope of the 1969 Civil Liability Convention, the 1971 Fund Convention and the1992 Protocols. The Report of the Working Group was endorsed by the Assembly of the 1971 Fund. The
Assembly of the 1992 Fund has adopted a Resolution to the effect that this Report shall form the basis of
its policy on the criteria for the admissibility of claims.
The 1971 and 1992 Fund Assemblies have expressed the opinion that a uniform interpretation of thedefinition of 'pollution damage' is essential for the functioning of the regime of compensation establishedby the Conventions. The IOPC Funds' position in this regard applies not only to questions of principle
relating to the admissibility of claims but also to the assessment of the actual loss or damage where theclaims do not give rise to any question of principle.
The importance of uniformity of application is obvious, since the oil industry in one Member State pays
for the cost of clean-up operations incurred and economic losses suffered in other Member States. Unlessa reasonably high degree of uniformity and consistency is achieved, there is a risk of great tensions arising
between Member States and of the international compensation system no longer being able to function
properly.
The 1992 Fund considers each claim on the basis of its own merits, in the light of the particular
circumstances of the case. Whilst criteria for the admissibility of claims have been adopted, a certain
flexibility is nevertheless allowed, enabling the Fund to take into account new situations and new types ofclaims. Generally, the Fund follows a pragmatic approach, so as to facilitate out-of-court settlements.
Decisions on the admissibility of claims which are of general interest are reported in the IOPC Funds'
Annual Report.

REVIEW OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMPENSATION REGIME
Increase in the maximum amount of compensation available under the 1992 conventions
In October 2000, the Legal Committee of IMO adopted under a special procedure two resolutions
increasing the limits contained in 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention by some
50.37%. The amendments entered into force on 1 November 2003.
The increased limits of the shipowner’s liability are those set out on page 2 above.
The amendment to the 1992 Fund Convention brought the total amount available under the
1992 Conventions to 203 million SDR (US$297 million).

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1992 Fund Working GroupIn April 2000, the 1992 Fund Assembly established a Working Group to examine the adequacy of theinternational compensation regime established by the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund
Convention. The point was made that although the system had worked well on many occasions, there
were inadequacies in the system.
Maximum level of compensation
During the discussions in the Working Group a number of Member States maintained that in order for theinternational compensation system to retain credibility, the maximum compensation levels should be
sufficiently high to ensure full compensation to victims even in the most serious oil spill incidents. Other
Member States, however, did not see the need to increase the maximum level of compensation over andabove the increases adopted within the IMO in October 2000 referred to above which brought the total
amount available from 1 November 2003 to 203 million SDR (US$297 million).
In light of this difference in views, the Working Group considered a proposal to establish an optional third
tier of compensation by means of a Protocol creating a Supplementary Compensation Fund, which would
provide additiona l compensation over and above the compensation available under the 1992 Civil
Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention.
The delegations representing shipping, insurance and oil interests supported the Supplementary Fund
scheme in principle. It was emphasised, however, that it was important to preserve the sharing of theburden of compensating oil spills between shipping and oil interests.
The International Group of P & I Clubs informed the 1992 Fund that the P & I Clubs, with the support of
shipowners, were developing a proposal for a voluntary increase in the limit of liability for small ships
under the 1992 Civil Liability Convention which would apply only in the States which ratified the
proposed Supplementary Fund Protocol. Although the precise level of the increase has not yet been
decided, it is expected that the limit for small ships will be increased from 4.5 million SDR(US$6.6 million) to about of 20 million SDR (US$29 million).
A Diplomatic Conference was held under the auspices of IMO in London from 12 to 16 May 2003 toconsider the creation of a Supplementary Compensation Fund. After difficult negotiations, a Protocol was
adopted creating such a Supplementary Fund. The main elements of the Protocol are as follows:?? The total amount of compensation available for pollution damage in the States that become Parties to
the Protocol will be 750 million SDR (US$1 097 million), including the 203 million SDR(US$297 million) which will be available from 1 November 2003 under the 1992 Conventions.
?? The Supplementary Fund will be financed by contributions payable by oil receivers in the States
which ratify the Protocol.
?? The Protocol contains a provision for so-called “capping”of contributions, ie that the aggregate
amount of contributions payable in respect of contributing oil received in a particular State during acalendar year should not exceed 20% of the amount of contributions levied. The capping provisionapplies until the total amount of contributing oil received in the States Members of the Supplementary
Fund has reached 1 000 million tonnes or for a period of 10 years from the date of the entry into forceof the Protocol, whichever is the earlier.
?? For the purposes of contributions, it will be considered that there is a minimum aggregate quantity of
1 million tonnes of contributing oil received in each Member State of the Supplementary Fund.
?? The Protocol will enter into force three months after it has been ratified by at least eight States whichhave received a combined total of 450 million tonnes of contributing oil in a calendar year.
?? The Protocol only applies to incidents which occur after its entry into force.
The ratification process is under way in a number of States. The European Union Council of Transport
Ministers has decided that the European Union Member States should, if possibke, ratify the
Supplementary Fund Protocol by 30 June 2004. Norway is also preparing the legislation necessary for-5-ratification. It is possible that the Protocol will enter force during the second half of 2004
Environmental damage and environmental studies
Under the 1992 Conventions, compensation for impairment of the environment (other than loss of profit
from such impairment) is limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or
to be undertaken.
In 2001 the Working Group set up by the Assembly considered a proposal to introduce the concept ofcompensation for environmental damage as a violation of collective property whereby compensation
would be available to the State on the basis of international rights under other Conventions to which it wasa Party, the amount of compensation to be based on the conclusions of environmental impact studies
conducted in accordance with procedures adopted by the 1992 Fund. The Working Group also examineda proposal to change the 1992 Fund’s policy as regards environmental damage to the effect thatcompensation would no longer be limited to cases where the claimant had suffered economic loss and toallow compensation to be calculated through theoretical models.
These proposals were not accepted since it was considered that they went beyond the present definition of‘pollution damage’ in the 1992 Conventions. It was agreed that an examination should be made of what
could be achieved within the present definition of ‘pollution damage’ as regards the admissibility ofclaims for reinstatement of the environment and for cost of environmental impact studies. There was also
support for considering the issue of environmental damage in depth in the longer term.
The Funds had in 1994 determined the criteria for the admissibility of claims for costs of post-spill
environmental studies and for costs of measures to reinstate the polluted environment.
In April/May 2002 the Working Group re-considered the criteria to be applied as regards the admissibilityof such claims. The Working Group prepared a revised text of the relevant section of the Claims Manual.
The revised text was approved by the Assembly at its October 2002 session. The purpose of the revised
text is to clarify the criteria to be applied in respect of such claims, within the legal framework of thedefinition of “pollution damage” in the 1992 Conventions.
Shipowners’ liability and related issues
When the Working Group discussed whether amendments should be made to the provisions in the 1992
Civil Liability Convention regarding shipowners’ liability and related issues, it became clear that there
was a great divergence of opinion.
Representatives of shipowners and their insurers took the view that that the issues relating to shipowners’
liability should not be reopened since to do so would be detrimental to the position of victims of oil
pollution. It was suggested that the 1992 Conventions were intended to create an efficient compensation
regime and had not been intended to ensure the quality of shipping or to punish the guilty party. It was
further suggested that any amendments to the provisions relating to shipowners’ liability would give riseto serious treaty law problems. It was emphasised that it was of paramount importance to maintain theequitable balance between the burdens imposed on the two industries involved, ie those of the shippingand cargo interests. An analysis of oil spills which had occurred in the period 1990-1999 showed that thepresent regime had resulted in an equitable sharing of burden between these two interests.
Theymaintained that the proposal by the shipping industry to increase, on a voluntary basis, the limitation
amount applicable to small ships to around 20 million SDR (US$29 million) would preserve this balance
and that the matter should be re-examined in the light of experience three to five years after the entry into
force of the proposed Protocol establishing a Supplementary Fund.
Representatives of the oil industry maintained that the international compensation regime should ensurethat persons suffering oil pollution damage were compensated promptly but also be consistent with thegeneral objective to improve maritime safety and reduce the number of oil spills. It was emphasised that
it was the sole responsibility of the shipowner to maintain a safe and seaworthy ship. It was suggested
that the latter objective might be compromised by the establishment of the Supplementary Fund, in so far
as it was funded only by oil receivers. In addition, the point was made that a Supplementary Fund
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financed permanently by oil receivers would only distort the balance between the shipowners’ and oil
receivers’ contributions to the regime. It was the oil industry’s view that such a Supplementary Fundwould also shield low quality shipowners from the consequences of their actions and would therefore notprovide any incentive to improve the quality of their ships or the standards of their operations. In order topreserve the balance, it was suggested that this could be achieved either by an increase in the shipowner’s
limitation amount or by shipowners’ participation in the third tier compensation provided by the
Supplementary Fund.
A number of Fund Member States, whilst recognising the short-term benefits of the Protocol establishinga Supplementary Fund and the proposed voluntary increase of the limitation amount for small ships,
considered that it was still necessary to take a long and hard look at the current regime and to increase theshipowners’ involvement on a firm legal basis.
Several Member States expressed the view that increasing the financial burden on shipowners beyond
those already envisaged by the 50% increase that would come into effect in November 2003 and the
proposed voluntary increase for small ships was not justified. Those States also stated that tonnagerelated financial limits were well established in maritime law and stressed the importance of the Civil
Liability Convention remaining consistent with other international maritime compensation Conventions.
In February 2003 the Working Group decided that, in view of the apparent disagreement between the
shipping industry and the oil industry on the extent to which the financial burden of oil spills had beenshared in the past and would be shared in the future, the Director should undertake an independent studyof the costs of past spills in relation to the current and future limitation amounts of the 1992 Conventions.
The Working Group considered that it was important that the study reflected the costs of past spills andthe apportionment of those costs between the shipping and oil industries on the basis of values in 2003
and the likely values in the future, taking into account infla tion indices for individual States. This study is
being carried out.
The Working Group considered a proposal to develop new criteria governing the shipowner’s right tolimitation of liability so as to make it easier to break that right. The view was expressed that the virtuallyunbreakable right of limitation of shipowners had hampered the 1992 Fund from Member States
expressed the view that it was inappropriate to lower the threshold for breaking the shipowner’s right tolimit liability as means of trying to improve the overall quality of shipping, and that in those States’ view
this was best dealt with through other international Conventions, which attached punitive sanctions to noncompliance.
Furthermore, the Working Group considered a proposal that the present provisions on channelling ofliability, which precluded claims for compensation being pursued against a number of parties (eg thecharterer) should be amended so as to revert to the channelling provisions in the 1969 Civil Liability
Convention, which barred only claims against the servants or agents of the shipowner. A number ofdelegations considered that the benefit to victims afforded by the current channelling provisions was ofparamount importance, but supported exploring further a proposal put forward at a previous meeting of
the Working Group to include charterers’ (usually cargo owners) liability in the compensation regime.
The issues relating to shipowners’ liability will be considered further by the Working Group
Other issues
The Working Group has also considered other issues such as the refinement of the contribution system,
problems caused by States not submitting oil reports, the definition of ‘ship’, uniform application of the
1992 Conventions, alternative dispute settlement procedures (ADR) and admissibility of claims for fixed
costs. The discussions on these issues will continue.

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CONCLUDING REMARKSThe international compensation regimes relating to oil pollution damage established under the Civil
Liability and Fund Conventions are one of the most successful compensation schemes in existence over
the years. Most compensation claims have been settled amicably as a result of negotiations.
Although the Conventions were revised in 1992, the main features of the regime were decided in the latesixties and early seventies. It is not surprising therefore that the Contracting States have found that theregime needs to be revisited for modifications in the light of experience, so as to enable the regime toadapt to the changing needs of society and to ensure the regime's survival by remaining attractive to States.
The first steps to that effect have been taken by the increases in the limits of liability and compensation
which entered into force on 1 November 2003 and by the adoption in May 2003 of the Protocol
establishing a Supplementary Fund and by the amendments to the Claims Manual in respect of the cost of
post-spill studies and the costs of reinstatement of the polluted environment. The review of the 1992
Conventions continues.
***

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ANNEX IStates Parties to both the
1992 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention and the1992 Protocol to the Fund Convention
as at 20 December 2003
84 States for which Fund Protocol is in force(and therefore Members of the 1992 Fund)
Algeria
Georgia
PanamaAngolaGermany
Papua New Guinea
Antigua and Barbuda
GreecePhilippines
Argentina
GrenadaPolandAustralia
GuineaPortugal
Bahamas
Iceland
Qatar
BahrainIndia
Republic of Korea
Barbados
Ireland
Russian Federation
Belgium
Italy
Saint Vincent and theBelizeJamaica
Grenadines
Brunei Darussalam
Japan
Samoa
Cambodia
Kenya
Seychelles
Cameroon
LatviaSierra Leone
CanadaLiberia
Singapore
China (Hong Kong Special
Lithuania
Slovenia
Administrative Region)
Madagascar
Spain
Colombia
Malta
Sri Lanka
Comoros
Marshall Islands
SwedenCongo
Mauritius
Tanzania
Croatia
MexicoTonga
CyprusMonacoTrinidad and Tobago
Denmark
MoroccoTunisia
Djibouti
Mozambique
TurkeyDominica
Namibia
United Arab Emirates
Dominican RepublicNetherlands
United Kingdom
Fiji
New ZealandUruguay
FinlandNigeria
VanuatuFranceNorwayVenezuela
Gabon
Oman
2 States which have deposited instruments of accession, but for which
the Fund Protocol does not enter into force until date indicatedGhana
3 February 2004
Cape Verde
4 July 2004

States Parties to the
1992 Protocol to the Civil Liability Convention
but not to the 1992 Protocol to the Fund Convention
as at 20 December 2003
(and therefore not Members of the 1992 Fund)
7 States for which Protocol to Civil Liability Convention is in force
Chile
Egypt
Indonesia
Switzerland
China
El Salvador
Romania
1 State which has deposited an instruments of accession, but for which the Protocol
to the Civil Liability Convention does not enter into force until date indicatedVietnam
17 June 2004

States Parties to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention
as at 20 December 2003
43 States Parties to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention
Albania
Georgia
Nicaragua
Benin
Ghana
Peru
BrazilGuatemalaPortugal
Cambodia
GuyanaSaint Kitts and Nevis
Chile
Honduras
Sao Tomé and Principe
Colombia
Indonesia
Saudi Arabia
Costa Rica
Kazakhstan
SenegalCôte d'Ivoire
KuwaitSerbia and Montenegro
Dominican Republic
LatviaSouth Africa
Ecuador
LebanonSyrian Arab Republic
Egypt
Luxembourg
TuvaluEl Salvador
Malaysia
United Arab Emirates
Equatorial Guinea
Maldives
Yemen
Estonia
Mauritania
GambiaMongolia
1 State which has deposited an instruments of accession, but for which the Protocol
to the Civil Liability Convention does not enter into force until date indicatedJordan12 January 2004

Note: the 1971 Fund Convention ceased to be in force on 24 May 2002-