In te rn a tio n a lc o o p e ra tio n d u rin g th e 1 9 9 1
A ra b ia n G u lf W a r o il s p ill.

T a w f i q ,N . I .
and
D .A . O ls e.n

1

INTRODUCTION

In January of 1991, Iraqi forces initiated the largest oil spill in history when the captainsof the tankers Al Qadasiyah, Hitten, Tarik Ibn Ziyad and Al Mutanabbi were directed todeliberately release their cargoes through specially constructed manifolds into the watersof the Arabian Gulf (Table 1). This deliberate spillage of oil and the subsequent releases
form Mina al Ahmadi and Min al Bakr terminals created the largest spill in history(Tawfiq and Olsen, 1994), more then 40 times larger than the much publicized Exxon
Valdez spill (Table 2).
Coming as it did during a shooting war, the spill and efforts to deal with its massive
impacts were played out in front of the largest gathering of the global media in history.
As a result the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was faced with an environmental crisis ofunprecedented magnitude in a situation in which its actions were going to be under theintense scrutiny of the global media. Fortunately, the nations of the world community,
recognizing the magnitude of the problem, sprang to the assistance of the Kingdom andthe Arabian Gulf environment. The following report summarizes the international
nature of the response to the Arabian Gulf oil spill and, hopefully conveys the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia's appreciation to its friends during this difficult time.

1.1

SPILL SOURCES

Unlike prior spills 1 , whose sources and amounts can be estimated with precision (Koons
and Jahns, 1992), it is unlikely that the actual amount of oil spilled during the 1991
incident will ever be known precisely. MEPA's initial estimates of the spill volume were
between 6-8 million barrels.
Following the war, additional information became
available which indicate that the prior estimate should be revised upward to
approximately 10.8 million barrels. A summary of the best available information on theamount of oil is provided in Table 2.
Input of oil and oil combustion products from the Kuwait oil fires provided a significant(but unknown) additional contribution to the spill. According to Readman et al. (1992)"...from the best available data it can be estimated that over (about) 250 days during
which the wells were burning, some 500**********************
1
Other large spills include the Ixtoc-1 well blowout during 1978 in the Gulf of Mexico(about 4 million barrels), the Amoco Cadiz off Brittany in 1978 (1.6 million barrels), theTorrey Canyon off England in 1967 (900,000 barrels), and the Metula in the Strait ofMagellan in 1973 (380,000 barrels). The much publicized Exxon Valdez 1989 spill in
Prince William Sound in Alaska was only 260,000 barrels.
**********************- 1 -million barrels (67 million tonnes) of oil were emitted or ignited, releasing oil aerosols,
soot, toxic combustion products and gases for atmospheric transport and subsequentdeposition.
Even if only a few percent of those emissions fell out in the coastal marine environment,
they would by far surpass the amounts of crude oil that were spilled."Thus, although the actual amount of oil spilled is not precisely known, it was certainly thelargest spill in history, at least 3 times the Ixtoc blowout in the Gulf of Mexico (3.7
million barrels) and over 40 times larger than the highly publicized Exxon Valdez spill in
Alaska (Koons and Jahn, 1992) and over seven times larger than the previous largest spillin the Gulf which was the 1.5 million barrel Nowruz spill in 1985.

1.2

STRUCTURE OF RESPONSE

In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Meteorology and Environmental Protection
Administration (MEPA) is the central environmental agency with responsibility for
response to oil spill under the 1991 National Contingency Plan for Combatting Marine
Pollution form Oil and Other Hazardous Substances in Emergency Cases. The national
plan provides clear definition of responsibility in times of oil spill and assigns primary
responsibility for protection of facilities to each individual ministry which has facilities
or operations along the coast.
Since the plan had only been in effect for less than one month at the time of the 1991 spill,
the sheer magnitude of the spill, and the war time conditions had not allowed sectorial
ministries sufficient time to prepare and mobilize response. As a result, the spill
response required necessitated strong central coordination which was supplied by MEPAat its Oil Spill Response Center (OSRC) in Dhahran.
The (OSRC) became the focus of the Kingdom's response planning with the exception(s)that the Royal Commission for Jubay1 and Yanbu and Saudi Aramco were prepared tocarry out their responsibilities under the terms of the Plan and thus, took full
responsibility for their own facilities and provided important assistance to MEPA
activities.
Within hours following the announcement of the spill by the coalition forces military,
MEPA began to mobilize national response as well as initiating efforts to gather
additional response as well as initiating efforts to gather additional support from theinternational community which began to offer assistance as realization of the magnitudeof the problem began to appear in the global media.
A key player during this early period was the International Maritime Organization which
established a clearing house for international offers, solicited assistance and, later
established a trust fund which supported clean up activities.

- 2 -The following report provides details about the 1991 response as well as information
regarding what was actually accomplished. In addition, information is provided which
briefly summarizes the current scientific information on the damage to the environment.

1.3

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCEThe Kingdom benefited greatly from all of the international assistance both thatoriginating from governments and assistance provided by the private sector.
In the very beginning, Japan, the United States, Netherlands, United Kingdom and
Norway provided key contributions which enabled the oil spill response center to protect
key strategic infrastructure and begin an effort to protect environmental resources.
International Assistance
The International Maritime Organization (IMO).
IMO played a key role throughout the entire period, coordinating international offers of
response and in the later stages, soliciting funding for clean up activities.
IMO maintained technical coordinators in the oil spill response center throughout the
duration of the response.
The IMO trust fund supported clean up of the turtle nesting beaches at Karan island prior
to the 1991 nesting season as well as clean up of oiled shoreline at Dawhat ad Dafi andJazirat Al-Maqta and cleaned salt marshes at Masharabah.
IMO technical liason were present throughout the spill response period and provided
valuable guidance including design of the mangrove flushing operation at Gurman Island.
Other International Agencies
During the spill response period other international agencies's (UNEP, IAEA, IUCN,
CEC) involvement centered mainly on technical assessment of the environmental aspectsof the oil spill.
In the period following the war the Greenpeace organization carried out a scientific factfinding cruise on the vessel R.V. Greenpeace.
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural resources (IUCN),
which has a long-term involvement in Saudi Arabia's coastal zone and conservation
programs, supported a series of detailed scientific expeditions which dealt with shore-line
impacts, detailed analysis of fishery impacts and potential impacts on the marine
environment from the oil fires in Kuwait. Much if this work, and the results from the Mt.
Mitchell scientific cruises has appeared in a special edition of Marine Pollution Bulletin
in 1994.

- 3 -The Council of the European Community (CEC) in conjunction with Saudi Arabia's
National Commission for Wildlife Conservation and Development (NCWCD) worked toestablish a wildlife sanctuary in the Raz az Zawr, Mussalamiyah and Abu Ali area. The
sanctuary has carried out much of the detailed long-term research on the impacts of thespill.
National Assistance
United States
The United States had a team of highly skilled response advisors, mobilized under their
National Oil Spill Strike Force at the Oil Spill Response Center Within a week of the startof the spill. This team included experts from the U.S. Coast Guard, National Oceanicand Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Army, and U.S. Navy.
The team's major contributions centered on assisting in response organization,
surveillance of the spill and detailed site planning for threatened coastal facilities. An"air eye" surveillance plane equipped with side looking radar was also supplied andprovided important detail on the location and coverage of the slick.
The U.S. also supplied the NOAA research ship Mt. Mitchell to the Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission ( IOC) sponsored investigation of the Gulf environment which
took place following hostilities. This scientific contribution brought together scientists
from throughout the world including many from Gulf nations in a detailed scientificinvestigation.
Japan
Japan provided key contributions to the response as members of the Japanese Embassy in
Riyadh worked closely with OSRC staff to mobilize donations of Japanese spill response
equipment (which was the first to arrive in Saudi Arabia) and, following the war,technical and volunteer assistance to assess damage and clean up damaged habitat.
Of particular note were large quantities of response equipment which began to arrive by
the end of the first week at the OSRC. As Saudi Aramco and the Royal Commission for
the Jubayl and Yanbu industrial cities had installed nearly all of their own equipment by
this time, the Japanese contribution constituted the bulk of the second wave of effort.
In addition, since the Japanese contribution was coordinated through the OSRC, its
availability enabled MEPA to direct its use for protection of some environmental
resources.
Later contributions of technical expertise (through IUCN) and volunteer groups for clean
up of the environment, provided a significant component of attempts to clean up some ofthe damaged environment. The Japanese team of environmental volunteers carried out
clean up activities in the Gurmah Island mangrove forest and restored damage to the
Arabian Oil Company mangrove nursery at Khafji.

- 4 -In the years since the war, Japan has also sponsored a series of scientific cruises with the
RV Umitaka Maru in which Japanese and Regional scientists have continued
investigations of the fisheries and environment of the impacted areas.
Netherlands
The government of the Netherlands underwrote initial involvement of a number of Dutch
companies. Most notable of these was Tanker Cleaning Amsterdam who mounted earlyrecovery efforts and set a standard for efficiency that was used to measure subsequentefforts.
Australia
The Australian government provided skilled advisors as well as oil recovery equipment.
The Australian experts contributed enormously to the later success of the clean up effort.
Following the war, the Kingdom was received an award for environmental achievementfrom the Banksia Environmental Foundation for the success of the international response
which was organized to the oil spill.
Other Nations
Many other nations assisted the effort through donations of expertise or equipment.
Each country supplied skilled and committed individuals who contributed both theirexpertise and many hours of much appreciated effort. These are summarized in Table II.
Commercial offers
Over 500 commercial offers from 23 countries were received by the oil spill response
center. Indeed, one of the major problems faced during the early days was simply
receiving and reviewing the more than 20,000 pages of FAX communications which werereceived on the two FAX machines at the response center.
Many of these companies flew staff to Saudi Arabia and one flew in plane loads ofequipment, skilled manpower and supplies in order to position itself for work in the
response. The technical resource provided by these individual provided a valuable
element of the response effort in the early days.

- 5 -

1.4

AREA IMPACTED BY THE SPILL

The spill trajectory carried out along Saudi Arabia's gulf coast and much of the oil cameashore between Khafji and Ras Abu Ali. Analysis of the 1991 spill trajectory posed adifficult problem for trajectory modelers because it originated from multiple sources overmost of the northern portion of the Arabian Gulf. Eventually it impacted nearly all ofSaudi Arabia's Territorial Sea to some degree (figure 1).
Surveillance data from visual flights, the US Aireye radar plan and the limited remotesensing which was undertaken greatly enhanced OSRC use of the trajectory models. Allof these data were of strategic importance in that they enable the response planners toposition the limited stores of equipment in areas which were indeed at risk rather thanprotecting areas which were unlikely to be hit by the oil.
In all, around 650 km of Saudi Arabia's 765 km coastline was oiled. Impacts ended
north of Abu Ali (Gundlach, et al., 1993; McCain, et al, 1992a; MEPA ,1991a). Indeed,oiling was so heavy, throughout this area, that there is concern that sources of species forrecolonization may be lacking (WCMU, 1991).
The majority of the Kingdom's fishery resources (Figure 2) and its designated sanctuaries
and environmentally sensitive areas (MEPA/IUCN, 1987; CEC, 1994) were in the area
affected by the spill.

1.5

FATE OF THE OIL

Once the oil was released, it followed a variety of pathways into the environment of theGulf. These are summarized in Table 3 which has been reconstructed from data on thevolatility and solubility of the oil under these conditions (Gundlach, et. al., 1985), MEPA
oil spill recovery results (MEPA, 1991b), MEPA coastal survey results (MEPA, 1991a),and UNEP/IOC reports (UNEP/IOC, 1991).
Approximately 75% of the volume of oil can be accounted for by the various shoreline
surveys, Saudi recovery operations (11% of the total spill), volatilization and dissolution
into the water. Approximately 59% of the original spill (6.4 million barrels) has foundits way into the marine and coastal environments.
The fate of the unaccounted oil is currently unknown. Michel et al. (1993) did not
find evidence for large scale sinking of oil in the near shore subtidal in the Abu Ali area.
Some sublittoral was located during the Mt. Mitchell cruise in the area offshore from
Tanagib.

- 6 -

1.6

OIL RECOVERY

Response planners decided early on that, given the limitations of manpower and resources
as well as difficulties posed by the ongoing hostilities, that the most effective response
strategy would be to concentrate efforts on removal of floating oil from the water.
A decision was made to concentrate efforts on shoreline recovery since floating mines
posed a hazard to offshore operations and prevailing winds and currents concentrated theoil in shallow waters along Saudi Arabia's shoreline. Offshore recovery was limited to
Saudi Aramco which operated 9 recovery vessels and recovered a total 146,000 bbls of oil.
The Al Waasit, a NORPOL recovery vessel under charter to Saudi Aramco, recovered
87,000 bbls of this.
Notional and international recovery efforts were concentrated at the various sites shownin Table 8. Offshore and shoreside operations recovered a combined total of 1.44
million barrels of oil/water mixture which, when adjusted for water content amounted for
1,163,457 barrels of oil, a record for oil recovery.

1.7

CLEANUP

Immediately following the spill, MEPA undertook a complete survey of shorelines whichmight have been impacted (MEPA, 1991a, Gundlach et al., 1993, Table 6). A total of
148 sites were identified which could be cleaned of stranded oil. A costed proposal was
prepared (MEPA ,1991c) in which the costs of cleaning all of the sites was estimated to be$540,000,000.
MEPA, with the assistance of IMO experts reevaluated the initial proposal andrestructured it in order to obtain improved operational efficiencies. In the subsequent
proposal, the estimated cost was reduced to $210,000,000 (MEPA, 1991d).
This
reduction also reflected the fact that natural cleanup was taking place at some of the sites.
In addition, some and tests of various clean up methods revealed that natural recovery
would be less damaging to the environment than the proposed clean up.
Revised proposal planned clean up activities were also suggested, utilizing techniques
which had been tested in the course of the KFUPM/MEPA studies (McCain, et al., 1992).
A summary of all cleanup projects undertaken by the OSRC is provided in Table 9.
Specific details of the projects funded under the IMO fund can be found in McMurtrie(1992).

- 7 -

2
2.1

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND STATUS QUOCOASTAL IMPACTS

Despite the intense interest displayed during the war, a peculiar silence has reigned
regarding the Gulf environment during the past few years. Indeed, what little appears in
the media, reflects a very selective reading of the scientific evidence which is how
beginning to indicate that the Arabia Gulf was subjected to serious and potentially longterm environmental damage. Much of this evidence was developed form research carriedout by the Kingdom's scientists in association with IUCN, the European Community, IOC
during the Mt. Mitchell Expedition and the cruises of the Japanese research vessel
Umitaka Maru. These are briefly summarized in the following sections.
Oil Deposition in Coastal Sediments
Research carried out by MEPA, Greenpeace, IUCN and the ROPME/IOC sponsored Mt.
Mitchell cruise all indicated that sediments in the impacted areas are among the mostpolluted in the world (Figure 3). In littoral areas 1-2% concentrations were common.
The oil penetration of the sediments ranged from 2 to 5 cm. (deeper in places due topenetration of animal burrows (CEC, 1992, 1994; Hayes et al., 1993). In the deepest
zone, the oil often remained liquid and some evidence was found of oil from pervious
spills (op, cit.). Deep penetration of hydrocarbons in coarse grained sediments wasconsistently noted by all studies. Some of this oil was eroded and transported into thesubtidal region.
Some evidence of natural degradation was found during studies of bacterial samples fromheavily impacted coastal areas which were found to be dominated by oil-degrading forms
which were at work breaking down stranded and subtidal oil (Al-Hadbrami and LappinSoott, 1993).
Inter Tidal Communities
Algal Mats
Millions of gallons of oil still remain in sheltered halophyte marshes and algal mat
complexes of Dawhat ad Daffi were total mortality of the halophyte community wasobserved (Hayes, et al., 1993).
Limited recovery of these algal mats was found in some areas although algal mats in theheavily oiled Abu Ali area were recovering more slowly (Al-Thukair and Al-Hinai, 1993.)
Two years after the oil spill, no sign of blue-green algal growth was observed in areas
where the tar layer remains on the surface and is not covered by sediments. In areas
where the tar was covered by sediments, extensive growth occurred in a short time
(Hoffman, 1994).

- 8 -Mangroves
Seven mangrove areas were oiled (MEPA ,1991a), among them the extensive mangrove
stand on Gurmah Island (near Abu Ali) which were heavily oiled with 2-3 cm of oil on the
air breathing roots ( McCain, et al., 1992a). There was high mortality of both mangroves
and associated flora and fauna. Damage was particularly heavy in non-sheltered areas
which were frequently covered by high tides. Approximately 30% of the mangroves were
killed by the spill (De Clerck and Coppejans, 1994).
It was observed (op. cit.) that Avicennia marina responded to the depleted ground water
oxygen levels caused by the oil spill by developing high numbers of branchedpneumatophores and adventitious roots, thereby enlarging their aerial roots and lenticels
for gas exchange (Boer, 1994).
During the spill, a clean up effort was initiated in order to enhance this effect and flush
oil from the mangroves with high volume sprinklers (Tawfiq and Olsen, 1993). In
treated areas mangrove density was 3.3 times greater than untreated areas (De Clerck andCoppejans, 1994).
Although some success was achieved by the clean up, on-going studies (op. cit.) indicatethat deterioration continues. Studies of mangrove leaf Sodium to Potassium ratios (anindication of mangrove stress) in February of 1992 in Gurmah and Al Qatif which (an area
not affected by the oil spill; Tokuda, et al., 1992). All of the Gurmah Island samples
showed higher ratios than the samples from Al Qatif, a finding indicative of stress in the
Gurmah Island mangroves. The number of living trees has continued to decling at allsites (Sadiq and McCain, 1993).
Salt-Marshes
Forty-eight separate salt marshes were oiled during the spill (MEPA ,1991a), covering
149km of shoreline. This same survey estimated that 677,000 m 3 of oiled sedimentremain in the oiled salt marsh sites.
Salt marsh plant species were heavily impacted by the spill with 30% mortality of
Halocnemum strobilaceum marsh, 35% of the Arthrocnemum macrostachyum marsh and
99% of the Salicornium marshes completely killed. However 50% of the inter tidal
vegetation did remain alive (Boer, 1994).
Two years later, there were no signs of recovery of damaged inter tidal vegetation within
the Gulf Sanctuary area. Occasional seed germination was observed which contrasted
with high numbers of germinated seeds in unaffected areas.
The only exception to this occurred in one area in which the oil did not seal the surface
but settled into the subsurface sediments (op, cit.)- 9 -As many as 1000 dead crabs per meter of beach were counted and large numbers of otherdead invertebrates were observed in salt marshes (Sadiq and McCain, 1993).
Sand Beaches And Tidal Flats
Sheltered tidal flats (166 km), exposed tidal flats (20 km), coarse sand beaches (292 km)
and fine sand beaches (25 km) were also heavily oiled (MEPA, 1991a). Approximately
556,900 m 3 of oiled sediments were contained in tidal flats and 90,100 m 3 in sandbeaches.
Heavy mortality of inter tidal infauna and macrofauna was reported in both of thesehabitats (Faraj et al., 1992 and Prena, 1992).
No surviving crabs were observed in impacted areas immediately following the spill.
Two years later there was slight recovery in one area studied but not in another. Studiesof the plankton indicated that there was an abundance of material available forrecruitment (Barth and Niestle, 1994).
Burrowing by polychaete worms was observed in some impacted areas, aerating the soil
and increasing the rate of natural breakdown in the oiled sediments.
Meiofaunal recovery has been shown to take around 8 years in studies of the Amoco Cadiz(Bodin, 1988).
Sea Grasses
Sea grass communities surveyed one year after the spill(Kenworthy, et al., 1993) appeared to have recovered from the impacts of the spill andshowed leaf productivity rates similar to healthy plants from other areas. Survival may
have been due to a relative insensitivity to the effects of the oil demonstrated in laboratory
experiments by exposing sea grasses to unweathered Kuwait crude oil (Durako, et al.,1993).
Sampling of the infauna of sea grasses (Jones and Richmond, 1992) indicated as much as aten-fold reduction when compared to samples taken from other non-impacted areas andsamples taken prior to the spill (McCain, 1984; Sadig and McCain, 1993).
CoralsSignificant damage to Saudi coral reefs and associated fish was not observed during theGreenpeace or Mt. Mitchell cruises, IUCN followup investigations (Downing and Roberts,
1993; IUCN, 1991, 1992) nor during other short-term studies which occurred. Two reefs
near Shuaiba in Kuwait exhibited substantial damage.
Histological analysis of total lipid levels in seven genera of shallow water corals suggeststhat oil pollution has no effect on lipid synthesis and photosynthesis (Al-Sofyani, 1993).

- 10 -

Damage to coastal ecosystems, clearly demonstrated by these studies may well takedecades before full recovery can be completed (figure 4).

2.2

FISHERY IMPACTS

Evidence indicates that fishery resources were heavily impacted by the spill. Saudi
Fisheries Company announced that shrimp production was less than 1% of prewar levels(Figure 5) and that the size of the shrimp in the catch caught in 1992 (60-80 per kg) was
significantly smaller than the normal size (20-30 per kg).
Prawn stock abundance was 10% of that present during the 1988-89 season (Matthews etal., 1993) and 1994 catch levels were still depressed, at 25% of pre-war landings.
Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Agriculture closed the fishery from July 15 1991 until October
15 in an effort to enhance resource recovery. Losses have been estimated at $55 million(op. cit.). When the fishery resumed, catch retes were less than half of pre-spill levels(14 kg/hr compared to 32 kg/hr).
High mortality of fin fish was observed, particularly around Gurmah Island where
densities of 1-2 dead fish per metre of beach were observed (op. cit.) and no reproductive
Hamour (Epinephelus suilis), a favorite food fish were observed in the catch(Matthews at al., 1993).
The cause of these impacts cannot be directly attributed to the spill or associated ambient
air temperatures from March to September, 1991 which were of the order of 3-4 ﾟ cooler
than normal in Kuwait and 0.8-2.4 ﾟ in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. This affect has been
attributed in part to reduced solar radiation resulting from the plume from the oil fires(Sadiq and McCain, 1993). Whatever its cause, fish growth and reproduction are
physiologically cued to temperature and a dramatic change such as this is likely to havesome effect.
In addition to temperature, toxicity of the spills and associated slicks was shown tosignificantly affect planktonic fish and shrimp larvae (Sadiq and McCain, 1993). Prawn
larvae and eggs al., 1993). Thus planktonic mortality could be a cause of reduced
landings.

- 11 -

2.3

WILDLIFE IMPACTS

Sea Birds
One of the most highly publicized aspects of the spill was its impacts upon the Arabian
Gulf wildlife resources. It was estimated (World Conservation Monitoring Unit, 1991),
that these included deaths of 15-30,000 off-shore sea-birds, possibly 36 dolphins and 3
Dugongs and three turtles.
In order to treat affected wildlife, a wildlife rescue center was established in Jubail
through cooperation between the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu (RCJY) and the
National Commission for Wildlife conservation and Development (NCWCD).
Commission for Wildlife conservation and Development (NEWCD).
Important technical assistance was recieved from the UK Royal Society for the Preventionof cruelty to Animals. Throughout the period of the spill, the center handled nearly
1300 birds of 28 species (shown in Table 7, from Abuzinada, 1992), several marine turtles
and 24 sea snakes. The center activities received broad media exposure and did much todemonstrate the Kingdom's concern for it's environment.
Post spill population census of sea birds (Symens and Suhaibani, 1994) Would seem toindicate that impacts were greater than previously expected and that populations of Gulf
sea birds were significantly impacted by the spill with post spill population levels reduced
to less than 70% of per-spill levels (Table 8).
Wading shore birds were even more heavily impacted. The Arabian Gulf coast is one of
the world's five major wintering areas for wading birds (Summers, et al., 1987). It has
been estimated ( Zwartz et al., 1991) that 260,000 waders winter in the Saudi Arabian Gulf
coast and up to 4 million in the entire Arabian Gulf. In addition, all waders wintering ineastern Africa and the majority of those in southern Africa pass through the Middle Easton migrations (Symens and Suhaibani, 1994).
Oiling of inter-tidal habitats where they feed while passing through could have serious
implications on their populations. Currently available data clearly indicate a great (8398%) reduction in wader populations but it is not entirely clear whether or not thisrepresents mortality or avoidance of oiled habitats (Table 9).
TurtlesDuring the Mt. Mitchell cruise, oil was observed offshore on Al Arabiyah, Karan (animportant turtle nesting site), Janna and Jinnah Islands. High priority was attached toclean up of the turtle nesting islands. Thus, a major clean up effort was carried on
Karan Island out prior to the 1991 turtle nesting season by Alba International and fundedby the IMO fund. Alba removed all of the oiled sediments from the shoreline andreplaced them with unoiled sediments from the interior of the island and the NCWCD and
UK Military removed the remaining debris from the beaches.
During the 1991 nesting season, Green turtles nested at rates and with hatching successwhich was similar to historic results (Pilcher, 1992). Hawksbill turtles, while laying
similar numbers of eggs (to prior years) only had a 46% nesting success (compared to 87
and 89% in 1986-7 and 80% in 1992).
- 12 -

Although this impact cannot be directly attributed to the spill or a 2.5 ﾟ C reduction in sea
surface temperatures which occurred during the period of the Kuwait oil fires (McCain, etal., 1992b); hawksbill turtles do feed upon benthic invertebrates which tend to concentratehydrocarbons.
A major cleanup effort of these islands was carried out under IMO direction prior to the1991 nesting season in which oiled sediments and debris were removed from the nesting
beaches and replaced with sand from the interior of the islands.
Marine mammals
It was estimated that 14 Dugongs, 57 bottlenose dolphins, 13 humpback dolphins, 2
finless porpose and 8 unidentified cetaceans were killed during the 1991 spill (Preen,1991).

3

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The 1991 oil spill was originally presented as a cataolysmic event and the media werefilled with doomsday prediction for the future of the Region's environment. Whensubsequent analysis indicated that the media claims were overstated, a suspicion
developed that environmental damage had been exaggerated as part of the war-time
propaganda. As a result, public interest waned and the Arabian Gulf environment lostan important ally in it efforts to restore the damaged environment.
Careful scientific investigation which has followed the event clearly indicates that thespill created impacts on a massive scale over much of Saudi Arabia's gulf coast. Over
1.3 million m3 of oiled sediment remain on the coast and over 1.5 million barrels of oilfrom the spill cannot be accounted for and must remain somewhere in the marine
environment. Much of the oil is buried up to 50cm deep and is unavailable toweathering and aerobic bacterial breakdown. In many cases this oil still contains toxic
fractions, posing a continuing risk to colonizing species.
The coastal ecosystem has been massively affected, including decimation of algal mats;oiling of mangroves (which continue to deteriorate), mortality of 30-40% of salt marsh
species; massive mortality of crabs and other infauna of saltmarshes, mangroves andseagrasses and other latent effects which have yet to appear in the scientific literature.
Wildlife were heavily impacted by the spill with an 80% reduction in shorebird
populations and 35% reduction in pelagic seabirds. In addition to this, a significant
reduction in hawksbill nesting success was observed in 1991 and there was some mortalityof marine mammals.
Saudi fisheries were also heavily impacted and there was an apparent collapse of theshrimp fishery in 1991 through 1994 with a consequent cost to the Kingdom of$55,000,000. In addition, fishery researchers noted that the absence of reproductive
individuals of important food species. Such impacts in population structure may takesome time for recovery.
- 13 -

Some communities, such as coral reefs and seagrass vegetation were not substantiallyeffected. There also has been no evidence of massive pollution in the subtidal or during
the Mt. Mitchell cruise in the Gulf sediments. Thus the news is not all bad.
At best, however, the 1991 spill crated massive impacts which are likely to persist for
decades (Figure 6) and which will continue to impinge upon the environment as currently
covered oil is reexposed. It should serve as a reminder to all that efforts should be madeto prevent the use of the environment as a weapon in future conflicts.
The subject of this presentation has centered on the role of international cooperation
during the Gulf War environmental crisis. I have presented, in some detail, both theparticipants in this cooperation as well as the accomplishments which resulted from thisgathering of concerned nations and individuals, who were involved in much of the post
war clean up activities (table 10).
While the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is most appreciative of the enormous contribution
supplied by all and, at the same time, future international cooperation is required both inunderstanding the nature of the environmental damage and in cleaning up andrehabilitating the environment.
Modalities for such cooperation must be developed, based on the lessons provided by the
Gulf spill experience. First and foremost of these lessons is the fact that very few
nations are equipped to deal with large scale environmental disasters of the magnitude of
the Gulf spill. The high costs of maintaining expensive pools of technical expertise andequipment in readiness for an infrequent event are not possible for all but the wealthiestof nations. Essentially bilateral cooperation efforts such as the OSRC lack continuity
and must be reestablished each time an emergency occurs.
Recognizing such limitations, Saudi Arabia recommended in 1991 to UNEP's Governing
Council that a network of Regional Response Centers for response to environmental
emergencies be established, based on the UNEP Regional Seas approach. The Saudi
proposal would involve Regional "depots" of response equipment and networks oftechnical expertise which could be promptly mobilized at the onset of an emergency.
Resources could be shared between Regions if necessary. Funding (in the case of oil
spills) could be obtained after the event through normal liability channels. UNEP has
undertaken some pilot efforts towards that direction.
Regardless, of the future of the UNEP exercise, response to environmental emergencies
will continue to require international cooperation, particularly between wealthy nations
and the underdeveloped nations of the South. We, in Saudi Arabia, as recipients of suchcooperation during our time of need are most appreciative of the need and stand ready tosupport future efforts in this regard.

- 14 -

REFERENCES
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Priority Rehabilitation Program (PRP) for the Environment of the
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Report of the Administrative Committee to the UNEP Governing
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Gulf War Environment
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Group Bull. 63:25-32.

- 20 -

Table 1.

Chronology of Sources of the 1991 Arabian Gulf Oil Spill.

19 January

4 Tankers at Al-Ahmadi released cargoes.

20 January

Oil Release at Sea Island terminal.

23 January

Amuriyah near Mina Al-Bakr Terminal releases cargo

24 January

Al-Ahmedi Sea Island Terminal spill announced.
US was planes attack and sink Iraqi tanker.
Sea Island terminal closed by bombing.

26 January

Mina Al Bakr Terminal oil release.
Ras al Zour refinery at Khafji damaged, results in spill.

27 January

Mina al-Bakr spill announced during Military briefing. "Closed"by bombing over the following days. Gen. Swartzkopf announces
Mina Al-Ahmadi spill as 7 million barrels, Mina Al-Bakr spill as 5
million barrels.

30 January

Ain Salah and Rumailah release remaining cargoes.

4

SLAR flight reports small leakages from all of the above sources.
Central Command reported 3 inc pipe leaking at Mina Al-Ahmadi.
Total of 6 curren low level sources operating. NOAA estimates that
total input is 3-6000 barrels/day 1 . These sources continued until
early June (90 days).

March******************************
1
Leakages from a destroyed pipe rack at Mina Al-Ahmadi, a destroyed loading
platform, a single-point mooring a the Sea Island terminal, the Amuriyah, the Al Bakr
terminal, a storm drain north of Shu' aybah Port, the Al Fao and Tariq ibn Ziyad were
estimated to be releasing a total of 3-6000 bbls/day.
These releases graduallydiminished over a 90 day period. an average figure of 600 bbls/day is used in spill
calculations.
******************************- 21 -

Table 2.
1.

Sources and Estimated Amounts of Oil Released Into Arabian Gulf Waters.

TANKERS 2
Al Qadasiyah
HittenTarik Ibn Ziyad
Al Mutanabbi
Al FaoAmuriyahAin Salah
RumailahTotal (Ton)
Potential (Bbls) 32.

3.

CAPACITY(DWT)
155,211
155,211
118,139
130,266
89,180155,21135,38836,000874,606
6,122,242

TERRESTRIAL SOURCES
Mina Su'ud Refinery 4
Sea Island Terminal(From North Storage Terminal) 5
Mina Al Bakr 3
SUBSEQUENT LEAKAGE FROM BATTLEDAMAGED TERMINALS & SHIPS 6

4.

OIL FROM FIRES

5.

TOTAL VOLUME OF SPILL%RELEASED
90%
90%
90%
90%
20%
20%
20%
20%

RELEASED(BARRELS) 3
977,829
977,829744,276820,676
124,852
217,295
49,54350,4003,962,701

100,000
6,000,000
700,000

54,000UNKNOWN AT PRESENT
10,816,701******************************
2
MEPA, 1991c. The captain of the Smit Tak tug that towed the Al Qadasiyah, Hitten,
Al Mutanabbi, Tarik Ibn Ziyad and Al Fao to their present position reported that they
were fitted with special steel manifolds which permitted them to direct their cargoes
over the side. Oil stains were visible at the outlets of the piping and from hoses lying
over the side. An official of the Kuwait Petroleum Company said that the Al
Qadasiyah and Hitten were each observed to leave the Shu' ayban port fully loaded,
returning two days later empty. Soundings of the vessels by the Kuwait Oil Tanker
Company revealed that about 10% of the cargoes remained. The Amuriyah, Ain Salah
and the Rumailah were all battle damaged and sunk. The Amuriyah is located east of
the Al Bakr terminal and the other two are located in the Khawr Abdallah channel northof Bubyan Island.
3
7 Barrels/ton.
4
MEPA, 1991c. From IMO/Smit Tak Estimates.
5
United Nations, 1991. UN experts examined Kuwait Petroleum Company records
immediately following the liberation of Kuwait. Prior to the war, the North Tank Field
contained 10.7 million bbls. After the war the tanks contained 1.5 million bbls. It
was estimated that 3.2 million bbls were contained in Iraqi defensive trenches, leaving 6
million bbls as the probable amount released into the Gulf
6
NOAA, 1991. Based on visual estimates during SLAR and reconnaissance flights at
an average 600 bbls/dy over 90 days.
******************************- 22 -

Table3.

International Participation in MEPA's Oil Spill Response Center (OSRC)
Operations

Australia
Australian Institute of Petroleum
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
Denmark
Germany
Italy
Japan
Japan disaster Relief Team
Korea
Netherlands
North Sea Directorate
New Zealand
NorwayUnited Kingdom
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
Warren Springs Marine Laboratory
Marine Pollution Unit
United States
U.S. Coast Guard
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
U.S. Army
U.S. Navy
International Organizations
U.N. International Maritime Organization
Commission of European Community Environmentalists
U.N. Environmental Program
International Union for the Conservation of Nature
Greenpeace- 23 -

Table 4.

Fate of oil from 1991 Arabian Gulf Oil spill.

1.

ORIGINAL VOLUME OF SPILL

10,800,000

2.

EVAPORATION OF VOLATILE COMPONENTS (40%) 7

4,320,000

3.

DISSOLVED COMPONENT (10%) 6

1,080,000

4.

FLOATING OIL IN SPILL

5,400,000

5.

RECOVERED OILSAUDI ARABIA 8

1,163,000

OIL ON BEACHESSAUDI ARABIA BEACHES 9
IRAN, QATAR BEACHES 1 0 , 1 1
TOTAL

1,700,000
1,000,000
2,700,000

6.

7.

UNACCOUNTED FOR ........................................................ 1,537,000******************************
7
Gundlach at al., 1985.
8
MEPA, 1991b.
9
MEPA, 1991a.
10IOC/UNESCO, 1991
11
Although the IOC/UNESCO team reported approximately 500,000 barrels of oil along
the Iranian coastline, the mechanism of transport from the 1991 spill is unclear. Recent
oceanographic evidence from the Mt. Mitchell cruise (Reynolds, 1993) has shown a strong
counter current flowing towards the south along the Iranian Coast as well as wind driven
drifts which vary between ENE and WSW at the head of the Gulf. However, lower
salinity water from the Shatt al Arab is transported across the head of the Gulf towards
Kuwait where it remains as a lens in front of the Kuwaiti coast (Reynolds, 1993). Thus,
it would appear that oil deposited from Min al Bakr and several battle damaged tankers in
the Northern Gulf would tend to have been carried by the generally anti-clockwise
circulation patterns and could not have arrived on the Iranian coast.
******************************- 24 -

Table5.

Saudi Arabia's Oil Spill Recovery Operations During the 1991 Arabian Gulf
Oil Spill.

AREA

PARTICIPATINGAGENCIESAMOUNT RECOVERED(BBLS)

Saffaniyah

Saudi Aramco, MEPA

25,887

Tanajib

Aramco15,738

Brice

MEPA

62,286

Sulayq

MEPA

8,675

Bilbul

MEPA, Saudi Aramco

7,744

Tacup Back Bay

Saudi Aramco

77,900

Munifah

Saudi Aramco, MEPA

470,991

Ras Al Zawr

MEPA

Mardumah

RCJY, MEPA, Saudi Aramco
Japan

Abu Ali

MEPA, Germany

556
231,926
6,824

Oil Used on Pits and Roads

87,569Offshore Saudi Aramco

145,000

Total Recovery ･･･････････････････････････････････････････ 1,163,457
Table

6.

Length of shoreline type (Kuwait border to west side of Abu Ali) with lengthof oiled shoreline and volume of oiled sediment (from MEPA, 1991a).

Primary Shore Type

LengthOiled(km)

Length*(%)

Oiled
Sediment
Volume**(m 3 X 1,000)

Seawalls, Piers
Rocky Shores
RiprapFine Sand Beaches
Coarse Sand Beaches
Exposed Tidal Flats
Sheltered Tidal Flats
Marshes
Mangroves
Not Classified
Islands***

12.4
55.5
9.9
60.3
271.1
0.4
132.5
141.2
8.7
17.6
55.4

9.0
36.9
9.9
57.3
263.3
0.4
131.0
124.4
8.7
3.5
-

73
66
100
95
97
100
99
99
100
20
-

0.3
3.2
0.1
22.9
67.2
2.3
554.6
677.7
38.7
-

765.0

644.4

84*

1,367

*
**
***

Percent of total shoreline surveyed.
Approximate volume of oiled sediment/sand.
Excludes six offshore islands.

- 25 -

Table 7.

Bird Species Treated At Jubail Wildlife Rehabilitation Center(Abuzinada, 1992)

Species
Great Crested Grebe
Black Necked Grebe
Great Cormorant
Socotra CormorantGuls & Terns
Herons
Ducks
Miscellaneous
Total

Table 8.

# Treated
280
300
350
400
20
10
5
20
1285

% Released
5%
5%
60%
60%
50%
50%
60%
50%

Impacts of the 1991 Gulf Oil Spill on Sea Birds.
(Symens and Suhaibani, 1994)

Species
GrebesGreat Cormorant
Socotra CormorantGulls & Terns
Miscellaneous
Total

Population
7-10,000
24-30,000
30-35,000
260,000% Mortality50%
22-34%
25%
98% 1 232%******************************
12
There is some evidence that the wading birds may have avoided the areas affected by
the spills so that the post spill population declines may not entirely represent mortality.
******************************- 26 -

Table 9.

Reduction of shore bird populations after the 1991 Arabian Gulf oil spill (fromHarbard and Wolstencroft, 1992).

SpeciesDunlinLittle stint
Lesser sand plover
Redshank
Ringed plover
Greater sand plover
Grey plover
Broad-billed sandiper
Curlew
Bar-tailed godwit
Black-tailed godwit
Curlew sandpiper
Terek sandpiper
Turnstone
Oyster catcher
Kentish plover
Greenshank
Sanderling
Total

Pre-spill
116,000
51,00028,000
9,000
8,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
4,000
3,000
1,000
800
500
200
263,500- 27 -

Post-spill
8.6%
7.5%
17.2%
36.6%
4.9%
8.5%
32.5%
8.5%
28.5%
101.0%
2.5%
42.8%
66.5%
53.4%
49.6%
525.8%
32.5%
335.0%
17.2%

Table 10.

MEPA Clean up projects completed as of 6/1/93 (MEPA, 1991d).

CLEAN UP SITE

ACTION (S) TAKEN

AGENCIES

Karan Island

Cleanup of oiled sand on beach

IMO/ALBA

Gurmah Island

Mangrove Cleanup,using highvolume sea water sprinklers andskimming of freed oil.

IMO/TCA/Japan

Al-Khafji

Cleanup of Mangrove Nursery(As above)

Japan/
IMO/TCA

Dawhat ad Dafi

Cleanup of oiled shoreline,
sand, sea grass and debris

IMO/ALBA

Musallamiyah Bay

Test oil removal methods

IMO/ALBA

Jabal An Nuquriyah

Test methods for flushing

IMO/
Denmark

Masharabah

Salt marsh cleaning

MEPA/IMO/
TCA

Dawhat Sulayq

Methods test of salt marsh
clean up

MEPA/CMC
MartechManifah

Test of DE-SOLV-IT for
shoreline cleanup with water jetting.

MEPA/CMC

Jazirat al Toyor

Test of DE-SOLV-IT and highpressure, hot water for
cleaning rocky shoreline

IMO/LUX/
ALBA

Jazirat Al-Maqta

Cleanup of Oiled Island sandand rock shoreline near Ras
Al Mishab with environmental
release agent and sea water
jetting.

IMO/TCA

Abu Ali

Clean up of beach recovery pits.

CMC/TCA

Mardumah

Beach Cleanup with tilling.
Restoration of temporary oil
recovery pits.

VECO/MEPA- 28 -

Figure 1.

Area of the Arabian Gulf impacted by the 1991 spill. Coverage is provided
from daily reconnaissance flights, SLAR flights, IOC surveys and interviews
with Saudi military personnel stationed on offshore islands. Density andcolor of the dots provides a qualitative estimate of the amount of oil. The
KFUPM/RI spill trajectory for the Al-Ahmadi spill is also shown.

- 29 -

Figure 2.

Location of Saudi Arabian fishery resources (MEPA, 1987).

- 30 -

Figure 3.

Total hydrocarbon concentrations (PPM) from samples in side the area of oil
spill impact and in "Control" areas offshore and to the south of the impact area
(data from Tawfiq, et al., 1993). Results are compared to other figures fromthe literature (shown in the shaded area) from Koons and Jahn, 1992.

- 31 -

Figure 4.

Recovery times for various coastal ecosystems.

- 32 -

Figure 5. Saudi Arabia Shrimp Landings (1964-1992) as provided by the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia Ministry of Agriculture and Water and from Mathews et al. (1992, 1993)
and MEPA (1987).
FIGURES- 33 -