1A Path with No End:
Skill and Dào in Mòzǐ and Zhuāngzǐ

Chris Fraser
Lee Chair in Chinese Thought and Culture
University of Toronto

1. Introduction

How does skill relate to dào 道, the ethically apt path and its performance? Twoearly Chinese ‘masters’ anthologies that make prominent use of craft metaphors imply
profoundly contrasting answers to this question.
For the Mòzǐ 墨⼦, a key to following dào is to set forth explicit models or
standards for guiding and checking performance. By learning to consistently apply theright standards, we can develop the skill needed to follow the dào of the sage-kings
reliably, just as a carpenter uses a set square to produce square corners or a wheelwrightuses a wing compass to fashion round wheels. Following dào—and thus the ethicallife—is strongly analogous to the performance of skills. Like an artisan’s craft, dào has afixed end that can be explicitly articulated.
A sharply contrasting stance is implied by the renowned skill exemplar Páo Dīng
the butcher in the Zhuāngzǐ 莊⼦. Praised for how his every movement in carving up
cattle is perfectly attuned, yielding a display of skill matching that of an exquisite danceor musical performance, the butcher responds that what he actually cares about is dào,
which is ‘advanced beyond skill’. Intriguingly, most of what Páo Dīng says in explaining
this point pertains to how he developed his craft, performs his work, and overcomes newchallenges. The implication is that the process of acquiring, performing, and extending
skills exemplifies dào, yet there is something more to dào than skill.
What is this something more? A skill is the ability to competently perform a taskwith a specified end. In the Zhuāngzǐ, a key difference between skill and dào, I will
suggest, is that dào is unlike skill in having no fixed, predetermined ends. Dào is a
general, open-ended process, one that is continually shifting and transforming. We cannever fully master dào, nor even know exactly where it will lead, as the nature of dào issuch that we must regularly find creative ways of extending it as we proceed along it.

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Nevertheless, discussions in the Zhuāngzǐ make clear that a distinction obtains
between adept and poor performance of dào. Accordingly, there must be factors by whichto distinguish more from less fitting paths or ends to pursue and more from less adroit
ways of pursuing them. Here again, dào is closely intertwined with skill, as evaluations ofdào performance resemble assessments of skill, couched in terms of how effective,
successful, competent, or adroit one’s activity is. If dào has no fixed ends, however, by
what criteria can we assess whether some course of activity amounts to an effective or
adroit performance of dào? A plausible Zhuangist answer, I propose, is that particular
contexts themselves yield provisional grounds for such evaluations. These grounds canthen be revised or replaced in response to developing circumstances and continuing
performance of dào. The resulting approach to understanding and living the good life, I
will suggest, can informatively be labeled an ethics of dào and dé 德 (virtue), referring to
the path we follow and the capacities by which we follow it.
The upshot for the relation between skill and ethics is that in both Mohist andZhuangist thought, a comparison with skills is helpful to understanding the theory andpractise of ethics. For the Mohists, the ethical dào is strongly analogous to a skill. In the
Zhuāngzǐ, skilled performances may exemplify dào, but the flourishing practise of dào
goes beyond skill, because unlike skills, dào has no fixed, determinate ends orboundaries.
2. Dào, Models, and Skill in the MòzǐThe Mòzǐ is a collection of writings by anonymous hands presenting the thoughtof Mo Di 墨翟 (fl. ca. 430 BC) and his followers, who formed one of early China’s mostprominent social and philosophical movements. The Mohists presented China’s firstsystematic ethical and political theories, which are grounded in their distinctive brand ofcommunitarian consequentialism.
As the Mohists and other pre-Han texts use the word, ‘dào’ functions much likethe English ‘way’. ‘Dào’ can refer to an actual method or manner of doing something, as
when the Mòzǐ speaks of the various dàos by which inept rulers decrease the population(20/15).1 It can also refer to a normatively competent or appropriate method of doing
something, as when the texts speak of the dào of making clothing (20/4) or boats andcarts (20/8) and ‘the dào by which to bring order to the people and unify the masses’(12/61). By extension, it can refer more generally to a normatively apt set of practises or
way of life. The Mohists claim, for example that their ethical norm of inclusive care is‘the dào of the sage-kings’ (16/83). In such contexts, dào overlaps what we think of as
morality. For example, referring to obvious moral values, Mohist writers speak of ‘the dào
of benevolence and righteousness’ (25/80).
1

References to Mòzǐ cite chapter and line numbers in Hung (1966).

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Dào is primarily practical, not verbal. Mohist writings regularly pair it withstatements or verbal teachings (yán ⾔), distinguishing explicit expressions orformulations of dào from dào itself. Statements can function as guidelines to direct us in
following dào, and the activity of promulgating explicit teachings may be part of dào. But
dào itself is the normatively apt conduct or practise (xíng ⾏), not merely the verbal
teaching that directs us toward that practise (10/27, 25/25).
Nevertheless, the Mohists see verbal formulations and other explicit standards as
crucial in clarifying and guiding the practise of dào.2 They refer to such guidelines as‘models’ or ‘standards’ (fǎ 法). The Mohist ethical norm of all-inclusive care for everyone
is considered a ‘model’ of ‘the dào of the sage-kings’, for example (15/11, 16/83). The core
Mohist ethical standard of promoting the benefit of all is another prominent model(32/1). One Mohist text urges that no affair of any kind can be undertaken successfully
without the use of models (4/1).
In labeling guidelines such as inclusive care ‘models’, the Mohists expressly
assimilate them to tools that artisans use to guide and evaluate the performance of crafts,
since in Classical Chinese such tools are also called ‘models’ (fǎ). Prominent examples
are the wheelwright’s wing compass and the carpenter’s set square, used to produce
round wheels and square corners and to check whether a particular wheel or corner is
up to standard. As one Mohist text explains, all artisans, whether expert or not, use
models to ‘measure’ their work (4/4). Models do not ensure perfect performance, butthey reliably help the unskilled to improve. ‘The skilled can match the models exactly.
The unskilled, although they can’t match them, by relying on them in their work still
surpass [what they can do by] themselves’ (4/3–4).
The craft analogies imply that practising dào is a matter of performing a skill.3 Asin carpentry or wheel-making, the practise of dào can be clarified, guided, checked, andimproved by reference to explicit models that the performer seeks to emulate. The
models are not identical to dào, not does merely applying the right model ensure that
one follows dào successfully. But models facilitate the normatively apt, skilled
performance that is dào. The right model can articulate dào so clearly that using it togauge what does or doesn’t conform to dào is ‘like differentiating black from white’(27/72).
The process by which models are applied to guide action underscores the
skill-like character of dào performance. Models function as exemplars to be emulated or2

Accordingly, the Mohists hold that dào can be explicitly articulated and that it can taught, two assumptions
that are rejected in the Zhuāngzǐ, as Lisa Raphals discusses in a recent anthology on skill in Zhuāngzǐ (2019:
136–37).
3
A difference between dào and skill is that we can refrain from performing a skill without thereby losing it,
whereas we cannot refrain from conforming to dào without thereby being unethical. Someone who rarely
rides a bicycle does not thereby lose the skill of bike riding, but someone who rarely follows dào loses any

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matched in carrying out a skilled task. In the paradigmatic cases, the carpenter uses thesquare to draw a line and then saws an edge that copies the line. The wheelwright uses
the compass to mark the rim and then shaves the rim or adjusts the spokes until the rim
matches the mark. In more abstract cases, the model might be a norm such as ‘benefiting
people’. If a course of conduct conforms to the norm, we perform it; if not, we avoid it(32/1). Conceptually, the Mohists understand a model such as ‘benefit people’ or‘inclusively care for each other, in interaction benefiting each other’ (15/10–11) as apractical standard to emulate in our course of conduct, rather than a theoretical generalprinciple from which to draw inferences about what to do.
A crucial presupposition drives the Mohist conception of dào as a practical
performance, analogous to a skill, that can be guided by reference to models. The craft
analogies imply that, like making wheels or houses, dào has fixed, specifiable ends. The
compass and square function as clear, useful models only given the ends of producing
round wheels and right-angled corners. Mohist norms such as all-inclusive care function
as models of dào only given an understanding of dào as directed at the end of promoting
the benefit of all, which the Mohists take to be the basic good that explains the moral
values of benevolence and righteousness.
By contrast, Zhuāngzǐ writings typically reject benevolence and righteousness asvalues and question whether dào has any fixed or specific ends.4 A dào with nospecifiable end is a dào for which no models can be established—a dào that transcends
any one skill.
3. An Expert Butcher on Dào versus Skill

The Zhuāngzǐ is an anthology of brief texts from roughly the late fourth to the
mid-second century BC presenting a range of views that later archivists grouped together
under the label of ‘Daoism’. The collection is named after a figure called Zhuāng Zhōu
莊周, about whom little is known, but it is unclear what portion of the material, if any,
can plausibly be attributed to him. The texts offer a rich medley of criss-crossing ideas
and viewpoints sharing various family resemblances; they are probably best read as acompendium of intersecting and overlapping conversations or social media posts than asa systematic attempt to present a unified, integral doctrinal stance. My discussion willtreat selected passages as contributions to a discourse touching on dào and its relation toskill, exploring how various ideas in this discourse relate to each other and drawing out
some of their implications. In some places, the discussion will reconstruct or elaborateclaim to ethical virtue. I suggest the Mohist explanation of this difference would be that dào is skill-like, butsince it is a comprehensive way of life, we cannot refrain from engaging in it.
4
On rejecting benevolence and righteousness, see, for example, Zhuāngzǐ 6/84. (References to Zhuāngzǐ cite
chapter and line numbers in Hung [1956].) On a dào without fixed ends, see, for example, the passage quoted
in section 6 below.

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views in the texts; in others, I may be assembling positions that are only latent in thesource material.
The most well-known discourse on skill in the Zhuāngzǐ—Páo Dīng the butcher’s
explanation of his craft—begins by distinguishing dào from skill and explaining that its
chief concern is with dào, not skill. Yet the remarks that follow are almost entirely about
the butcher’s craft. What, then, does his discussion imply about the relation between
skill and dào?
Carving up an ox for Lord Wén Huì, his master, the butcher steps, leans, andslices as gracefully as if performing an elegant ritual dance to the rhythm of a symphony.
Amazed, Wén Huì asks how skill (jì 技) could reach such heights. The butcher respondsthat what he cares about is dào, which is ‘more advanced than’ or ‘advanced beyond’ skill(3/5). He sketches how he developed his craft and performs it now, how he overcomeschallenges, and the satisfaction his work brings. Wén Huì exclaims that from thebutcher’s remarks he has learned how to ‘nurture life’, or provide what is crucial to living
well (3/12). The text thus frames the discussion as concerned with dào and living well. The
butcher’s remarks are presented as doubly significant, applying to the specific skill ofmeat carving and also to the general concern of living well.
Here, then, is a first respect in which dào advances beyond skill: dào applies not
merely to any one skill, such as the butcher’s, but to living well in general. It generalises
in a way that skills do not. It is not a particular skill, but skilled work such as the
butcher’s can exemplify it—even bloody, filthy work slaughtering oxen and carving meat.
As Guō Xiàng says in his commentary, the butcher’s concern is with the ‘patterns of dào’
(dào lǐ 道理), which he ‘lodges’ (jì 寄) in his skill (Guo 1961: 119). Reflecting this concern
with dào, rather than skill, Páo Dīng talks less about what he does in his work than how
he does it. His focus is on the process, not the concrete technique (how he holds the
knife, for example). This focus reflects the general nature of dào as understood in thiscontext: it primarily concerns how we do what we do—the approach and manner—and
only secondarily what we do—the substance or content. As we will see, however, the how
shapes the what: applying the approach to dào that the butcher illustrates leads us
toward certain sorts of actions and away from others.
Páo Dīng’s remarks can be divided roughly into three parts (3/5–11). First, hedescribes how he acquired his skill. As a beginner, he saw only whole oxen; as anintermediate, after three years of practise, he saw them as if already sliced up, directly
perceiving the joints and seams where the knife would cut. Now, as an advanced expert,
he says, ‘I meet it with my spirit, not looking with my eyes.’ He acts without a reflectively
self-conscious process of observing the ox and deciding how to cut, instead moving
directly on the promptings of ‘spirit’, a more fundamental, automatic mode of agency.5
5

My interpretation here follows the Cuī Zhuàn and Xiàng Xìu commentaries (Guo 1961: 120). For more on
the role of ‘spirit’, see Fraser (2019).

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Next, Páo Dīng describes how he works. He carves smoothly and gracefully
because he ‘complies with natural patterns (lǐ 理)’—cutting along the major gaps, being
guided by the main seams, and thus working in accordance with (yīn 因) what’s‘inherently so’ in the structure of the ox. This way, he says, he never directly hits aligament or tendon, let alone a bone. Through this approach, he boasts, he avoids evennormal wear-and-tear on his knife, having gone a whole nineteen-year calendrical cycle
without needing to sharpen it. There is space between the joints, and the knife edge has
no thickness, he says, so ‘there’s always plenty of room for the blade to wander about.’
Páo Dīng then goes on to explain how, despite his high level of skill, he regularly
encounters intricate, knotty situations in which the grain and gaps are difficult to find.
He cautiously prepares, slows down, focuses his vision, moves the knife subtly, and themeat suddenly comes apart. Having resolved the difficulty, he steps back and looks
around in relaxed satisfaction before wiping and sheathing the knife.
What aspects of the butcher’s remarks generalise, informing us about dào rather
than only meat-carving? What stands out, I suggest, is that dào amounts to a process ofacquiring and exercising competence in detecting and responding to ‘patterns’, finding
one’s way through ‘gaps’, and regularly working through difficulties. The butcher’s
experience implies that this process can be deeply satisfying.
Looking more closely at his descriptions, we can expand on this characterisation.
Undertaking dào involves a lengthy process of learning and internalising a way ofperceiving and interacting with things. Once we have acquired some dào, acting on it
becomes spontaneous and automatic, something we regularly do without reflective
self-consciousness. The adroit practise of dào lies in avoiding obstacles by working with
the inherent grain or pattern (lǐ) of things, according with (yīn) the solid, unmovable facts
about them, and so finding space through which to move. Moreover, if we can makeourselves ‘thinner’, figuratively speaking, reducing the extent to which we collide against
things, we will more easily fit through the gaps and can avoid being worn down.
Crucially, dào is not simply a matter of applying practised expertise to familiar,
routine cases. It also includes regularly extending existing skills by working our way
through unfamiliar, difficult situations, without knowing in advance exactly how we will
do so. Dào refers not only to a well-formed path and a manner of following it; it is also
the spontaneous, creative process by which we find a way forward when the path isdifficult or blocked.6 The recurrent experience of being pulled from our comfort zone
and forced to navigate knotty, unsure terrain is another respect in which we might saythat dào advances beyond skill.7 Presumably, this feature marks a sense in which dào
cannot be taught or handed down to others, since each of us must find a way for6

Dan Robins (2011) emphasizes this point, which I will develop below.
This is Robins’s suggestion (2011). Arguably, however, skills do include a capacity to adapt to newchallenges, albeit within the circumscribed field of the skill.

7

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ourselves. It also helps explain why the butcher nowhere mentions the models (fǎ 法)that are so prominent in the Mohist conception of dào as clearly articulated andsignposted by explicit, determinate standards. Since dào as the butcher presents it
regularly leads beyond familiar, routine cases, it draws on an uncodifiable, creative
capacity for adaptation that cannot be captured by fixed, predetermined standards.8
Páo Dīng’s comments thus depict dào as a process or an approach—how to learn
and proceed adeptly in some field of activity while regularly overcoming challenges. His
own skill exemplifies this process, but the process itself could apply to any activity. This
generality reflects another respect in which dào is distinct from and advances beyond
skill. A skill is not just a process: skills are partly defined by their ends. Páo Dīng is askilled meat-carver not simply because of how he approaches his work but because heproduces cleanly sliced cuts of meat. Skills such as meat-carving come with inherent
ends by which to evaluate performance. Páo Dīng knows he has successfully handled theknotty sections when the meat suddenly comes apart—falling, he says, ‘like a clump ofearth to the ground’. The carpenter and wheelwright perform their skills well when theirwork matches the square or compass and they produce houses that stand firmly uprightor wheels that roll smoothly. Indeed, the process of performing a skill is intelligible assuch only in the context of the defining end to which the skill is directed.
By contrast, if my suggestion above is plausible, dào in this context is a generalprocess without any fixed end. What factors, then, determine whether we are indeed
pursuing dào aptly or poorly? Lord Wén Huì declares that the butcher’s remarks show
how to ‘nurture life’. Perhaps a criterion of apt dào-following is whether a person stays
alive and healthy—indeed, perhaps my suggestion is mistaken, and the end of dào is life.
However, numerous Zhuāngzǐ passages indicate that the adept see life and death as two
aspects of a single process, without privileging life over death (e.g., 5/30, 6/46). It seems
that the Zhuangist practitioner seeks to stay healthy and alive when doing so is theobvious, fitting course but has no hesitation about accepting death when it too seems
fitting. So death need not reflect a failure to follow dào well. The point of Wén Huì’s
remark is not that dào aims at preserving life; it is that the butcher’s descriptions
illustrate the process of how to live a flourishing life.
Dào is advanced beyond skill in applying not just to the pursuit of one or anotherend but to any end. Here an obvious question arises. Does the conception of dào as a8

In this regard, consider the contrast between the Mohist figure of the wheelwright guiding and checking his
work against the compass and the wheelwright depicted in the Zhuāngzǐ (13/68–74), who claims that masteryin cutting wheels rests on an inexpressible, unteachable art of chipping the wood not too slowly or hastily.
The two visions are not necessarily contradictory; cutting wheels could be a subtle art with results thatnonetheless need to be checked against the compass. But the difference in emphasis is informative as to thetwo contrasting conceptions of skill and dào. For further discussion of these conceptions of skill, see Raphals(2019: 133–35).

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process with no specific end cover any activity we might undertake, without constraint?9
Some ends are deplorable. Can a vicious but meticulous and skillful serial killer
justifiably claim to follow dào well? Perhaps guidelines like the Mohists’ fixed,
determinate ‘models’ are needed as constraints to exclude the serial killer from claiming
mastery of dào.
The Páo Dīng story implies that there are indeed constraints. Páo Dīng
distinguishes a mediocre butcher, who changes his knife monthly, from a good butcher,
who changes it annually, from Páo Dīng himself, who has gone nineteen years without
dulling a blade. Clearly, there are better and worse ways of following dào. Arguably, theserial killer’s approach to dào is deeply defective. No matter how skillful his actions may
seem, they will most likely induce retribution eventually, rendering his path a repugnant
failure. But the relevant constraints, I suggest, are neither general nor fixed. They arise
from the process itself, from how well, in a particular context, we conform to the natural
patterns, follow the seams and gaps, accord with what is inherently so, and avoid
obstacles.
What, then, distinguishes how well a particular agent fulfills these criteria? Thisis a crucial question for Dàoist ethical thought. How do we distinguish apt dào frominjudicious dào or adept from inept dào-following in the absence of fixed standards or
ends?
4. Proficiency in the Patterns

The question of what marks competence in dào arises again when we look atZhuāngzǐ passages that focus on dào, rather than skill. Dào itself and adept performanceof dào are described in terms familiar from descriptions of skill, yet no specific,
determinate criteria are given to mark the competent practise of dào.
The ‘Autumn Waters’ dialogue, for example, discusses how dào can guideconduct, explaining dào as Páo Dīng does by appeal to the patterns (lǐ 理) of things(17/46). The practical conditions we encounter are constantly changing, the text holds,
with the result that concrete, action-guiding distinctions that seem appropriate in one
context may need to be reversed in another. Adept performance of dào requires flexible,
adaptive responses, not commitment to fixed norms, as the Mohists advocate. ‘Don’t
constrain your intent, or you’ll be hobbled in following dào…don’t proceed by a single[standard], or you’ll be at odds with dào’ (17/42–43). We are to ‘embrace the myriad things’
and proceed without limits, boundaries, biases, favouritism, or any fixed direction,seeking to accord with how things ‘transform of themselves’ (17/41–47). ‘Knowing dào’ is
9

Steven Coutinho raises a pair of related questions (2019: 97). Does Zhuangist thought have the resources todistinguish skilled performances that reflect sageliness from those that do not? Has it grounds by which todisapprove of, for example, actions that harm others? As the discussion below explains, I think the Zhuāngzǐ
can resolve both issues.

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9equated with ‘attaining proficiency (dá 達) in the patterns’ and thus understanding how
to adapt our conduct to changing situations (17/48). The emphasis on adaptive, contextual
responses to patterns resonates with the account of how the cook conforms to theinherent features of the ox and with descriptions of other Zhuāngzǐ skill exemplars, suchas the whitewater swimmer who flows with the dào of the water (19/52–3), the artisan
whose fingers transform along with things (19/62), or the woodcarver who lays his hand
to work only when he can ‘see’ the finished carving latent in the inherent nature of thewood (19/58).
The prominence of the concept of ‘pattern’ or ‘grain’ (li) in ‘Autumn Waters’ andthe Páo Dīng story reflects the important role of this notion across the pre-Han literature.
‘Pattern’ refers to facts about how things are structured or organised, how they relate toor interact with each other, and how they develop, proceed, or transform. Conforming topatterns is thus a prerequisite for proper or successful action. Misunderstanding or
overlooking them is likely to lead to error or failure. Accordingly, following dào well lies
in finding a path that aligns with the patterns; following it badly is struggling against or
conflicting with the patterns.10 A distinctive feature of the Zhuangist approach is thatthe patterns are understood to be deeply contextual and continually transforming.
How do abstract descriptions of the ideal of adaptively responding to patterns
translate into practise? Two Zhuāngzǐ stories concerning social interactions illustratesuch responses well. The first is a story of failed interaction, the second of a successful
response.
Failure is illustrated by the story of a seabird that serendipitously landed near thecapital of the landlocked state of Lu (18/33–39). Delighted by the bird’s visit—anauspicious omen—the Lord of Lu had it escorted to the ancestral temple, where hehonoured it with a ritual feast and musical performance. Sadly, the bird became upset,refused to eat or drink, and soon died. Despite his good intentions, the lord only harmed
the auspicious guest, because he followed customary norms for honouring a humandignitary, neglecting the reality that music and crowds would only disturb a bird, who
instead needed to fly about, roost in trees, and dine on grubs and bugs. The lesson of thestory is that ‘names stop at reality; what’s right is determined by what fits’ (18/39). To
proceed adeptly, we must set aside labels or titles (‘names’, míng 名) associated withconventional conceptions of right and wrong and instead attend to the ‘reality’ of thesituation (shí 實) and what best ‘fits’ it (shì 適), adapting our actions to the facts (such as
a bird’s normal diet), rather than rigidly following codified standards (such as the ritual
protocol for hosting an honoured guest). To do so, the text explains, is to ‘attain10

Ontologically, then, dào might be regarded as inherent in the patterns. In some strands of Dàoist thought,
it may be regarded as the source of the patterns, referring to the way in which they issue forth. Thesefascinating aspects of dào deserve careful treatment but are beyond the scope of my discussion here, which
focuses on dào as an ethical path.

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proficiency (da) in the patterns (tiáo 條, a synonym of lǐ ) and preserve welfare’ (18/39). In
failing to deal with the bird appropriately, the Lord of Lǔ ineptly disregarded therelevant patterns, with tragic results.
A contrasting, successful interaction with others is illustrated by the story of amonkey keeper who accommodated his charges by adjusting their daily menu (2/38–40).
The keeper announced that the monkeys would get three nuts in the morning and fourin the evening. Preferring a larger breakfast, the monkeys were angry. So the keeper
reversed the allocation: everyone would have four in the morning, three in the evening.
The monkeys were delighted. The keeper ‘harmonised’ (hé 和) the situation by adjusting
the nut distribution in a way that defused the monkeys’ anger at no cost to himself, as thetotal allocation remained seven nuts per day (2/39–40).
This adjustment illustrates what the text calls ‘according-shi’ (yīn shì 因是), or
adaptively and provisionally ‘affirming’ things or taking them to be ‘right’ (shì 是) ‘in
accordance with’ (yīn 因) particular circumstances (2/37)—just as Cook Ding proceeds‘in accordance with’ (yīn) what is ‘inherently so’ in the grain of the meat.11 The
discussion leading up to the monkey story contends that action-guiding distinctions
between ‘this/right’ and ‘not/wrong’ or between ‘so’ and ‘not-so’ are determined by thedào we carry out, which ‘completes’ one among multiple potential ways of proceeding(2/33).12 Apart from the dào we practise, nothing is inherently right or wrong, ‘so’ or‘not-so’. Hence if a path we undertake runs into difficulty, we are free to change direction.
Grasping these points, the adept refrain from ‘imposing-shi’ (wéi shì 為是), or deeming
things this or that on the basis of fixed standards applied without regard for particular
contexts. Instead, they ‘accommodate things in the ordinary’ (2/36). The ‘ordinary’ (yōng庸) is what is useful or effective (yòng ⽤), successful (dé 得), and connects or proceeds
in a proficient, free-flowing manner (tōng 通) (2/36–37). To accommodate things
successfully in some context is to apply ‘according-shì’. Indeed, the adroit practise of dàolies in acting on such provisional, ‘according-shì’ attitudes without knowing one is doing
so—without knowing what the appropriate responses will be, since they are discoveredin the course of our activity (2/37).13 An implication is that, as discussed in section 3, dào
is indeed exemplified by the process of working through the knotty parts without
knowing in advance exactly how we will do so.
11

I follow A. C. Graham (1969/70) in taking yīn shì 因是 to be a set phrase because the two graphs occur
together in the text four times apparently referring to the same idea. As Graham proposed, the phrase yīn shìseems to contrast with wéi shì 為是, which also appears four times, referring to insistently imposing someshì judgment on things.
12
The next several paragraphs draw on the discussion in Fraser (forthcoming), section 3.3.
13
At 2/37, I follow Wang Shumin in taking 因是已 to be equivalent to 因是也. I also follow Wang Yinzhi
王引之 in reading 已而不知其然 as equivalent to 此而不知其然 (Wang 1988: 64). See too Chen (2007:72).

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The monkey keeper’s compromise with his wards thus illustrates a general
conception of dào as an adaptive response to circumstances that facilitates ongoing‘ordinary coping’, or useful, successful, free-flowing movement along a path presented by
the situation. Instead of acting on fixed standards of right and wrong, as the Mohists
advocate, the idea is to respond adaptively to the ‘patterns’ operative in the context. On
this view, the criteria of appropriate action are a cluster of notions such as doing what‘fits’ or ‘accords with’ the ‘reality’ of the particular situation or what ‘attains proficiency’(dá 達) in the ‘patterns’ and ‘harmonises’ with things. An apt course of action will seem‘ordinary’ while being ‘effective’, ‘successful’, and ‘free-flowing’ or ‘proficiently
connecting through’.
The overlap between this cluster of terms and descriptions of skill is striking. In
effect, conduct that accords with dào is conceptualised along the lines of adept skill
performance, using terms implying facility, competence, and proficiency. These terms
again raise the question of what criteria distinguish apt from inapt dào-following. Whatmakes some course of conduct ‘fitting’, ‘harmonious’, ‘successful’, or ‘free-flowing’?
5. The Ends of Dào

How do we evaluate how well some course of action ‘fits’ (shì 適) or ‘flows’ (tōng通) in a concrete context? Since dào in general has no fixed ends, a plausible Zhuangist
answer is that particular contexts themselves provide provisional or pro tanto grounds forsuch evaluations. These grounds can then be revised or replaced as we go along, in
response to developing circumstances and continuing performance of dào.14
Think of our present dào as encompassing our values, interests, and ends, ourcapacities, and our current path and manner of activity. In any given situation, we findourselves proceeding according to some dào. As we do so, we interact with ourenvironment and with other agents whose dào intersects or converges with ours, both ofwhich we must take into account if we are to proceed in a fitting, free-flowing way. Our
initial dào and our relation to the context, including other agents, jointly provide starting
criteria by which to evaluate how well various ways of continuing forward fit thesituation, flow freely, attain harmony, preserve welfare, and so forth. A fitting pathforward will accommodate our ends—and those of others we interact with—as we
proceed with our dào. Our preliminary conception of good ‘fit’ (shi) or ‘success’ (dé 得)
may simply be to continue following our initial dào smoothly, using our existing
capacities to fulfill the provisional values and ends we began with. As we proceed
through concrete, changing circumstances, however, our dào may need to be modified,
and with it our ends and criteria of ‘fit’. Perhaps the dào we are pursuing leads to
obstacles, generates conflict, or creates frustration—all indications of a failure to accord
14

This section draws on the discussion in Fraser (forthcoming), section 4.

Forthcoming in Skill in Ancient Ethics, T. Angier & L. Raphals, eds. Bloomsbury, 2021.

12with the patterns at hand and of poor fit between our conduct and the context. Perhaps
we discover that some of the values or ends we take for granted clash with each other,such that we must modify or forgo some in order to proceed smoothly with others.
Perhaps we adopt new values or ends as we extend our path. In all of these cases, we mayneed to refine or revise our dào, including the internal criteria by which we assess it as‘fitting’, ‘successful’, or ‘free-flowing’.
Cases such as the monkeys and the seabird illustrate this contextual approach toevaluating ‘fitting’ or ‘free-flowing’ activity. The monkey keeper’s initial dào involved
caring for the monkeys and feeding them seven nuts per day, divided among meals in acertain way. The monkeys protested, creating an obstacle to this dào and thereby
indicating a failure to ‘fit’ or ‘flow freely’. For the keeper, the criteria of a fitting,successful way forward were ends such as preserving the monkeys’ welfare, calming
them, and meeting the overall nut budget of seven per day. So he adjusted the allocation
per meal—a relatively marginal feature of his original dào—to accommodate his charges’
preferences while still proceeding in a way consistent with other, more importantfeatures. By criteria such as allocating seven nuts per day, keeping the monkeys happy,
and achieving harmony with them, his modified dào proved ‘competently free-flowing’(tong).
The Lord of Lǔ responded to the seabird’s visit according to an elaborate religious
and cultural dào involving cosmological beliefs about auspicious omens and ritual norms
concerning how to honour visiting dignitaries. Obtusely acting on this dào without
regard for the ‘reality’ of the situation or the ‘patterns’ of avian welfare led to a disastrous
outcome for both sides, as in seeking to honour the bird the lord only harmed it. By boththe lord’s and the bird’s lights, a more ‘fitting’, competent path would have been for thelord to modify his original dào in a way that fulfilled his aim of celebrating the rare visit
while also successfully nurturing the bird. Perhaps, for example, he could have moved
the bird to a wetland sanctuary, affixed a commemorative marker to the tree where it
landed, and conducted a ritual at the ancestral shrine.
Zhuāngzǐ writings offer no specific method for finding such ‘fitting’ courses ofaction beyond proceeding with an open, ‘empty’ (xū 虛) mind, seeking to adapt to the‘patterns’ and ‘what’s inherently so’ without rigidly imposing any preconceived way ofgoing on.15 This continual, subtle process of adjustment again reflects how dào isintertwined with skill. The apt dào is discovered by working our way through intricate,difficult spots in a skill-like manner, much as Páo Dīng delicately feels his way throughthe knotty parts. In doing so, we draw on the tacit capacities that have brought us where
we are without knowing beforehand just how we will proceed next.

15

The notion of an open, ‘empty’ (xū 虛) mind is pivotal to Zhuangist moral psychology. For morediscussion, see Fraser (2014b).

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Moreover, given that dào has no determinate end, in many cases there is unlikely
to be any uniquely correct way to go on. Perhaps, reappraising his nut budget, themonkey keeper could instead have offered four nuts at both meals. Perhaps,
contemplating the monkeys’ happiness, he could have set them free in a forest to findtheir own nuts. Perhaps, reconsidering the bird’s likely preferences, the Lord of Lǔ could
have simply let it fly off and offered a prayer of thanks. Or perhaps, on seeing the bird, hemight have realised it was simply lost and dropped his cosmic-religious interpretation of
the event. The aim is not necessarily to follow the ‘correct’ dào, for there may be no suchthing. It is to find a path that provisionally allows us to move on, balancing various ends
and addressing obstacles or frustrations as best we can. The complex, dynamic nature ofthe ‘patterns’ of things means that any such path must be undertaken provisionally, withhumility. Our initial moves through the ‘knotty’ parts may fail to fully ‘fit’ all of therelevant patterns or may ‘harmonise’ the factors in play partly but not wholly. New
patterns may emerge as we go. Our actions themselves may change the situation, suchthat further responses are needed. A judicious dào-follower will remain perpetually open
to adjustments in the path, aware that, insofar as dào can be said to have a rough, generalaim, it just is the ameliorative process of continually seeking out what ‘fits’ or ‘flows’ inevolving circumstances, by standards of ‘fit’ or ‘flow’ that may themselves also evolve.
So a further respect in which dào is like skill yet goes beyond it is that we must
regularly apply our existing competence to reassess and reform our dào in response tochanging circumstances that may jar with aspects of it as developed so far. In performing
his skill, Páo Dīng finds his way through the knotty parts by making fine adjustments to
his knife-work. By extension, in navigating through the ‘patterns’ we encounter, we allmust make fine adjustments to our dào to find the most fitting path we can. The result
may sometimes be a rather different dào from what we started with.16
6. An Ethics of Dào and Dé

The conception of dào I have been describing entails continually adjusting ourprovisional ends as we navigate through shifting circumstances. For an example of thisview of dào, consider the story of the goose that could not honk, which criticizes the idea,
prominent in some Zhuāngzǐ passages, that being deemd useless by others may be useful
to oneself (see, e.g., 1/42–47, 4/64–75). The story contrasts a mountain tree that grows
large because woodcutters find it useless for timber with a goose that is butcheredbecause it cannot honk (20/1–9). The tree’s being deemed useless led to health andlongevity; the goose’s being deemed useless led to premature death. So, a student asks afictional Zhuāngzǐ, where should we settle? To live well and avoid ‘entanglement’ withthings, should we present ourselves to others as worthy or worthless? Zhuāngzǐ suggests
16

Echoing these observations, Wai Wai Chiu suggests that key features of skillful performance in Zhuāngzǐ
include fluency, fine-tuning, and freedom from previously instilled ways of proceeding (2019: 7).

Forthcoming in Skill in Ancient Ethics, T. Angier & L. Raphals, eds. Bloomsbury, 2021.

14that neither worthiness nor worthlessness is an appropriate aim. Nor indeed is amoderate course between them, seeking to avoid either worthiness or worthlessness.
Instead, he suggests:
Wander about by riding on dào 道 and dé 德…without praise or criticism, now a
dragon soaring in the sky, now a snake slithering along the ground, transforming
together with circumstances, never committing to acting only one way, now
above, now below, taking harmony as your measure. Wandering about with thesource of the myriad things, letting things be things without letting them treat
you as any [fixed] thing….Students, remember this! Make your home only in dào
and dé!17 (20/6–9)
Instead of following any set norm or committing to any one path or end—being useless,useful, or somewhere in between, for instance—the text advocates ‘riding along’ withdào and dé, allowing ourselves to be drawn along fitting paths (dào) through our inherent
virtue or capacity (dé) for finding and following them. To ‘ride dào and dé’ is to wander
about with the flow of natural processes—the mysterious ‘source’ of things—pursuingno particular direction or end by which to praise or blame, proceeding now in thismanner, now in that, undertaking different modes of activity without committing
exclusively to any. We are to shift along with circumstances, seeking only to maintainharmony (hé 和) with things as we flow along, adjusting fluidly without becoming adeterminate ‘thing’ that others could aim to use. No fixed norms or ends capture theadaptive, responsive ‘transformation’ (huà 化) characteristic of employing our inward
dé to follow dào as we encounter it.
In light of passages such as this, I suggest that the Zhuāngzǐ can informatively bedescribed as presenting an ethics of dào and dé.18 The central concepts in this ethics are
not right and wrong or moral virtues and vices, but apt or fitting paths of conduct andthe virtue, or capacity for agency, by which we follow such paths. The focus is on thepath we pursue and how we pursue it—whether the path ‘flows’ or ‘connects through’(tōng 通), ‘fits’ (shì 適), and yields ‘harmony’ and whether our manner of activity
displays the flexibility, resilience, and creative responsiveness needed to find and follow
such a path. Rather than applying familiar moral norms, this ethics assesses conduct andcharacter in terms similar to how we assess the performance of skills: by how responsive
we are to particular situations, how proficient we are at proceeding along a sustainable
course of activity, how resilient and adaptable we are in dealing with change, challenges,
17

An alternative interpretation, reading 鄉 as 向, is ‘Take only dào and dé as your direction!’ Analternative interpretation of the preceding line is to avoid becoming enslaved to things.
18
I elaborate on this proposal in Fraser (forthcoming), section 4, from which some remarks in this section
are drawn.

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15
and misfortune.19 To perform dào well is to find our way through a field of ‘patterns’ (lǐ理) freely and smoothly, with harmony and ease, while avoiding hindrance orobstruction, in a manner akin to the competent performance of an art or a skill. The
good life lies in manifesting dé in such performances and thereby ‘wandering’ (yóu 遊)
through our circumstances, much as Cook Ding’s knife is said to ‘wander’ through thespaces between the joints of the ox (3/9).20 The metaphor of dào as a process of‘wandering’ is telling: dào is not a path toward a specific end or destination, but ameandering course toward nowhere in particular.
This conception of apt conduct and the good life helps to explain the intenseinterest in skills in the Zhuāngzǐ, as skilled performances offer examples of fluid, adaptive
responses to changing circumstances, albeit within the fixed scope of a particular skill,with a particular end. An instructive way of understanding one salient Zhuangist ethicalvision, then, is that the crux of a flourishing life lies in ‘advancing beyond skill’ byextending to life as a whole the open, ready responsiveness familiar from theperformance of skills.21 The ideal—or at least the version of a Zhuangist ideal implied
by whoever compiled the collection’s first chapter, ‘Freely Wandering About’—is to roam
without fixed ends or bounds, relying on nothing in particular and thus following nofixed standards or norms (1/21).
Consider a story from ‘Freely Wandering About’ that contrasts living adeptly with
its opposite, clumsiness, while extending the metaphor of dào-following as carefree
wandering. Zhuāngzǐ’s friend Huìzǐ was given the seeds of a large bottle gourd, whichgrew to produce gigantic, 500-litre fruit. Gourds were typically used as either containers
or ladles. Huìzǐ tried using the giant gourds as containers, but when he filled them withwater, they collapsed, unable to hold up their own weight. He tried cutting them open to
make ladles, but they proved too large to dip into anything. Frustrated, he declared the
gourds useless, he tells Zhuāngzǐ, and smashed them (1/36–37).
Zhuāngzǐ berates Huìzǐ for being clumsy (zhuó 拙) at using big things. Instead ofworrying that the gourds were useless as containers or ladles, he says, why not makethem into floats, climb astride, and go drifting about—that is, wandering—on rivers andlakes (1/42)? Nothing is useful or useless in itself; usefulness is always relative to somenorm or end. Huìzǐ has locked himself into trying to use the gourds according to fixedends inapplicable to rare, gigantic fruit. His narrow-minded competence in conventional
uses of regular-sized gourds renders him clumsy in finding creative uses for unusuallylarge gourds. His mind is overgrown with brambles, remarks Zhuāngzǐ
(1/42)—obstructed, closed off to novelty, and thus inept at finding new ends to fit unusual
situations. Those who ‘ride along with dào and dé’, by contrast, develop a open-minded

19
20

For a discussion of the moral psychology implied by these remarks, see Fraser (2014b) and (2019).
This interpretation of the Zhuangist good life is explored in Fraser (2011) and (2014a).

Forthcoming in Skill in Ancient Ethics, T. Angier & L. Raphals, eds. Bloomsbury, 2021.

16
readiness to go beyond familiar ends to find creative ways to engage with theircircumstances.
7. Conclusion

The Mohists explicitly compare ethical practise to performing a skill. Like a skill,dào has a determinate end, which explicit ‘models’ can guide us in pursuing, much as thecompass and square guide artisans in producing round wheels and square corners. To alarge extent, the ethical life for the Mohists is a matter of mastering the skill of reliably
distinguishing and undertaking what is benevolent and righteous.
For a prominent strand of thought in the Zhuāngzǐ, on the other hand, theperformance of skills can exemplify how to proceed with dào, but dào itself goes beyond
skill, extending to life as a whole the adaptive learning, competent performance, andproblem-solving acumen displayed in skilled activity. Unlike skill, dào is a general,
unbounded process with no fixed aims or purpose. In the course of this process, we findourselves acting on contextually specified models, norms, values, and methods, but these
are continually open to revision or replacement. Circumstances regularly present us with‘knotty’ stretches, prompting us to find creative, adaptive ways of going forward that draw
on but go beyond the capacities and path we have developed so far. Indeed, I suggest, thecrux of dào lies in working our way through such stretches, extending, redirecting, andrefashioning our path. Unlike any skill, or indeed any activity with specified boundaries
and goals, dào is a path with no end—one on which we continually make and remake
our way forward.
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As Coutinho suggests, in a Zhuangist philosophy of skill, ‘living well’ and ‘cosmic wisdom’ are‘manifested in practical adeptness in negotiating our environments’ (2019: 87).

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