The EVOIKOS Incident and Activity of the Japan
Disaster Relief Team (Outline)
Nobuyuki Matsumura
National Strike Team
Maritime Safety Agency
1.Introduction
As the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is referred to as a lifeline, needless to say,
it is an extremely important point for marine traffic of various Asia n countries in
the Far East, in particular, Japan.
In the Singapore Strait, a collision between tankers occurred, and about 28,00 0
tons of the heavy oil, which was loaded, was spilled in the sea. If we assume thespill volume of heavy oil at the time of the Russian tanker NAKHODKA incident(January, 1997) as about 6,200 tons, the volume 28,000 tons is equivalent to 4 to 5times the spill volume when the incident occurred to the Russian tanker.
To cope with this incident, the Japanese Government dispatched the Japan
Disaster Relief Team to Singapore.
2.Outline of the Incident
At around 9 p.m. (local time) on October 15, 1997, when the tanker EVOIKOS(75 ,000 gross tons, registered in Cyprus, loaded with 120,000 tons of marine fueloil) sailing east from the United Arab Emirates to Singapore was navigating
through the Singapore Strait, a collision occurred with another tanker ORAPIN GLOBAL (129,000 gross tons, registered in Thailand, empty vessel), heading west
at the west side of the Raffles Lighthouse near the central part of the Strait. The
collision occurred in a manner in which the bow of the ORAPIN GLOBAL pierced
into the port bottom near to the position just in front of the bridge o f EVOIKOS,
and the cargo tank of EVOIKOS was damaged. Thus, heavy oil (Marine Fuel Oil:
Equivalent to Class C Heavy Oil), which was loaded to it, was spilled.
A large portion of the vessel was scraped off by the collision, and the center tank
became visible. The severe impact of the collision could be easily imagined.
Furthermore, oil which is believed to have spurted out at the time of collision wasadhered to the bridge as well as to the top portion of the funnel.
If the oil, which had been loaded, were crude oil instead of heavy oil, the possibilityof fire would have been great.
According to the initial information, the spill volume was 3,000 to 4,000 tons .
However, according to the information of the following day, it was revised to about
25,000 tons. The final figure of the spill volume was announced as a bout 28,000

tons.
3.What is the Japan Disaster Relief Team?
The Japan Disaster Relief consists of three supporting forms, namely, ①dispatchof the Japan Disaster Relief Team, ②supplying of Relief Supplies, and ③fund
relief depending on the request of the governments or international agencies of theoverseas disaster-stricken countries which were struck by large scale disasters
such as earthquake and flood in the developing countries, in particular.

The Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDR) is based on the “Law Regarding theDispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team,” and it was established with thepurpose of conducting international disaster relief activities in quick response to
the request of the governments or international agencies of the disaster-stricken
countries, by dispatching the necessary personnel promptly. As duties of theJDR, activities such as ①relief activities, ②medical activities, and ③activities for disaster emergency measures and disaster restoration. TheJapan Disaster Relief Team consists of “relief team,” “medical team,” and “expertteam.” For each disaster, in accordance with the request of the disaster -stricken
country as well as scale and type of the disaster, the teams are adequately
combined, and dispatched through the Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA).
As activity records of the Japan Disaster Relief Team, since the enactment of theaforementioned Law in 1987, about 40 teams (total about 500 persons) have been
dispatched to disaster areas all over the world. Almost all of them were natural
disasters such as earthquake, flood, typhoon, and volcano eruption.
Aspersonnel dispatched to oil spill disasters, in 1991, at the time of the Gulf War, by
the destruction of the coastal petroleum facilities, large volume o f crude oil had
been spilled in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the Japan Disaster Relief Team(expert team) for recovering the crude oil spill was dispatched to Saudi Arabia twotimes. Thus, the dispatch to Singapore on this occasion was the third time as thedispatch for oil spill disasters.
Outline of the Japan Disaster Relief System

Flow Chart until the Japan Disaster Relief Team is Dispatched4.Dispatching of the Japan Disaster Relief TeamIn the evening of October 16, a request for support was made by the Singaporean
Government to the Japanese Government. The Maritime Safety Agency had
already received information regarding the incident in the morning of October 16,and they were studying what cooperation could be made. As a result of theadjustments made among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA, and Maritime
Safety Agency, in the evening of October 17, the dispatch of the Japan Disaster
Relief Team was decided. The dispatch team consisted of 6 members, that is,
one ex pert from the Maritime Disaster Prevention Division of the Maritime Safety
Agency, as the leader, 4 persons from the Maritime Safety Agency, National StrikeTeam, and one personnel from JICA as a person to coordinate the operation. O fcourse, rescue cooperation activities to combat the oil spill will be conducted, but
the promotion of friendly relations between the two countries is also included in theduties.
This is a characteristic matter since the Disaster Relief Team isdispatched from a governmental organization.
As for the materials andequipment supplied, there were 2 units of weir-type oil recovery equipment, 2 unitsof air-charging-type booms, and 3 units of oil storage barges (delivered separatelyas air cargoes).
The Disaster Relief Team departed in the morning of October 18, and after arrivingin Singapore in the evening, support cooperation activities were conducted toSingapore by giving guidance and executing collection of information, adjustments,
local investigation, and marine oil spill combat activities (oil recovery operations),
as well as giving advice related to oil spill combat measures.

5.Characteristics of the Incident(1)Meteorological and Oceanological Conditions
Singapore is located in a tropical zone almost on the equator. The atmospherictemperature exceeds 30℃, and the sea water temperature is 28℃ or higher.
The wind was extremely weak, almost a windless condition, and there were nowaves. The sea surface was calm as a mirror. The tidal difference in this sea
zone is very large, and places where the tidal current is fast reach 4 or more knots
per hour.
Furthermore, at the time this incident occurred, the fire, which started in the forests
of Indonesia in late June, was not yet under control, and smoke from the forest firedensely covered this area. Owing to the air pollution by smoke (This was locallyreferred to as HAZE), the visibility was extremely bad.
Under suchmeteorological and oceanological conditions, it is believed that the following
influences and effects existed.
i)Estimating from the damaged state of the collided tankers, it is believed t hat oil
spilled out in an extremely short period of time. The oil which was loaded to theEVOIKOS was marine fuel oil (380 cSt / 50℃) or the so-called “Class C Heavy Oil.”The high sea water temperature makes the viscosity low. If we assume thetemperature as 28℃, it is estimated that the viscosity become s 1,200 to 2,000cSt). Thus, we think that the dispersion of the oil spill was very fast.
ii)Although it was Class C Heavy Oil, it is believed that the low viscosity which was
due to the high sea water temperature was in the range where the effect of oil
treating agent can be anticipated in the initial stage. The oil treating agent usedin order to correspond to this incident is referred to as Type II, and we are told that
it was self-agitating type. (In Japan, this type o f oil treating agent still cannot beused.) In this sea zone where there is no agitation energy based on wind andwaves, it is perhaps a very effective type of oil treating agent in particular.)iii)We think that the fast tidal current promoted diffusion and movement.
Fortunately the direction of the tidal current at the time of the incident was in thewestward direction, and together with the westward flow of the marine current in
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, in the initial stage, the spilled oil moved
towards the west. If, for instance, the tidal current had been in the eastward
direction, the oil spill might have reached Sentosa Island, the main sightseeing
place of Singapore, as well as the East Coast. Subsequently , the drifting oil
continued moving back and forth by the dominating tidal cur rent, and gradually
moved towards the west (northwestern direction). Furthermore, subsequently, ina windless state, significant drifting ashore of oil spill did not take place. (Ofcourse, drifting ashore of the oil spill w as found in small islands close to theincident site.)iv)In a windless state, it is estimated that the oil which spread on the surf ace ofthe mirror-like sea surface did not mix with the sea water, but remained in an oil
slick state, and the small volume of volatile matters contained in the oil evaporated,
thereby increasing the viscosity. Thus, the situation was quite different from thecase of NAKHODKA incident in which the heavy oil spill mixed with the sea waterand emulsified (i.e. became mousse-like), and increased in viscosity as well asvolume.
On October 19, when we conducted field investigation (i.e. 4 days after theincident), it seemed that the drifting oil slick increased considerably in viscosity,and the passing of the vessel caused ripples, but the thin oil slick broke into small
pieces at the crest of the waves. When the oil slick was scooped up with thehands, it felt as if the viscosity was far above 10,000 cSt. We judged that oil inthis state would be difficult to disperse with oil treating agents.
v)The air pollution by smoke (HAZE) which generated in Indonesia greatly affected
one of the most important activities of investigating and monitoring the state of oil

spill from the standpoint of executing combat operations of oil s pill at sea. In
particular, it is believed that the people concerned became very frustrated when
they were deprived of the opportunity of investigating the oil spill state from anaircraft, several times.
Although the Singaporean Government and the spiller planned investigation of t hespill state by aircraft, because of the bad visibility caused by the HAZE, it isreported that they had to either give up the flight or even if the flight had beenmade, they could not grasp the conditions of the sea surface.
(2)Circumstances of Singapore
Besides the natural conditions, the domestic circumstances of Singapore, mainly
the following matters influenced (especially in the good sense) the oil spill combat
operations and the activities of the Japan Disaster Relief Team.
i)Sightseeing and Fishing Activities
Singapore is one of the foremost sightseeing places in the world. As sightseeing
spots, there are the coastlines themselves as well as places facing the co asts.
The main sightseeing places are Sentosa Island and the East Coast. Thus,Singaporeans feared oil spill pollution of these places, and made prevention of thedrifting ashore of oil spill to these places one of their priority ma tters. Actually, inthe case of Sentosa Island, installation of booms to prevent drifting ashore of oil
spill was made at an early stage. Fortunately, by the help of natural conditions asmentioned before, the worst scenario of oil drifting ashore to these places wasavoided.
In addition, the fishing activities of Singapore are not so active. According tohearsay, the number of registered fishing ships is extremely small. Each time anoil pollution incident occurs, the greatest concern is always the influence it will
have to the marine resources, and the fishing activities. This is true in Japan, inparticular.
ii)Security, Hygiene, Traffic, Communication, Lodging, Meals Although theseelements are not directly related to the oil spill combat activities, and the same
may be said when coping with domestic incidents, in the ca se of overseas
dispatching in particular, they are matters of great concern. If the period of stay
becomes long, all the more so.
From such a standpoint, Singapore was one of the best places. As for security , itis reputed as one of the safest countries in the world. As for hygiene, the country
is very clean, and tap water is drinkable. Furthermore, medical institutions arecomplete.
Transportation facilities are good, and the servicing of roads is advanced. T hecommunication conditions are also good, and communication can be made withportable telephone from any place, even at sea.

As for lodgings and meals, since Singapore is a sightseeing site, the hotel
circumstances are good, and there is no worry regarding meals.
Besides the above, in the case of overseas dispatch, it seems that there areproblems related to visa, immigration control, customs, quarantine, and preventive
injection, but here in Singapore, there were no such worries, and dispatch
activities were carried out smoothly.
iii)Local Offices of JapanIn Singapore, needless to say of the embassy, there are JICA Office, Office ofJapan Association for Preventing Marine Accidents as well as many offices ofJapanese companies.
Not only during the dispatch period, but also even before
the dispatch, the team was blessed with various type of support and cooperation.
iv)Cooperation of MPA
As a matter of fact, support cooperation of oil spill combat activities cannot be realized
without the full cooperation of the receiving side.
In our case, both the Disaster Relief Team as well as the materials and equipment
necessary for oil recovery were dispatched. However, actual recovery operations
cannot be performed with them alone. Ships are necessary for the opera tion,and the number of operators is insufficient. Furthermore, coordination andcooperation such as communication means for contacts and adjustments,
receiving of recovered oil, etc. are necessary. These necessary items were allarranged by MPA.
For instance, operation platform vessels (recoveryoperations ), tugboats (to tug the operation platform vessels), small boats (forpulling the booms), 5 persons from the Civil Defense Force (operators), andLiaison Officer (contact and coordination) were arranged. For these matters, wereceive d the great cooperation of SEMCO.
By the above-mentioned cooperation, the oil recovery operations of the Japan
Disaster Relief Team became possible. That is, “The cooperative activities wererealized by cooperation.”v)EARL - Materials and Equipment Base of the Petroleum Association of Japan In
Singapore, EARL, a world famous company specializing in oil spillcountermeasures has its base. This is a base, which has experts, materials andequipment, vessels, knowledge, technology, as well as performance records
related to oil spill combat. At the time of the NAKHODKA incident, a Disaster
Relief Tea m came to Japan with their materials and equipment, and conducted oil
spill combat activity. In addition, the materials and equipment base of thePetroleum Association of Japan is equipped with materials and equipment tocombat the oil spill.
This means that it is in a very advantageous environment for developing largescale oil spill combat activities to correspond with the oil spill.
6.Conclusion

During the activity of the recent EVOIKOS incident, we were concerned of the following.
i)Cooperative activity ― What kind of activities can be expected from the country
receiving the cooperation? ―ii)Communication — The language to be used.—iii)Safety control — Accident resulting in injury or death
Oil spill incident is not merely a problem of a certain country, but a problem
common to all countries of the world. Thus, framework as an international
commitment such as incident prevention and compensation system are prepared,and each country is making efforts to prepare an oil spill combat system.
However, at the time a large scale oil spill occurs, there is a limit to what one
country can do, and the influence is not restricted to one country. There arecases in which the influence spreads to neighboring countries. According to theOPRC Treaty, promotion and international cooperation are recommended for
preparation against and correspondence to oil pollution incidents. Furthermore,even in the vicinity of the Sea of Japan, settling on a plan involving the Northwest
Pacific Action Program (NOWPAP) based on regional sea plan of UNEP is being
advanced, and operations towards establishment of cooperative relation are being
started. Under such circumstances, even for Japan, in future the opportunity ofinternational cooperation may increase even further, but never decrease.
An even better international cooperation is required. In order to achieve this, I
firmly believe that improving the capability of responding to such matter s in Japan
will lead to the anticipated international cooperation.