巨龍と若獅子たち
ー高等教育における中国アセアンの関係ー• アンソニー・ウェルチ• シドニー大学• 広島大学高等教育研究開発センター

THE DRAGON AND THE
TIGER CUBS.
• COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE CHINA –ASEAN RELATIONS IN THE HIGHER EDUCATIONSECTOR• Anthony R. Welch, University of Sydney• (Fulbright New Century Scholar, Boston College)

Knowledge Economy (1)• Higher Education is widely seen as a pillarof 21st century ‘knowledge economy’• Yet, tensions exist between spirallingdemand for H/Ed. , and decreasing state
capacity (willingness) to sustain resourcelevels.
• In the process, universities are widely
pushed to engage in income diversification.

Knowledge Economy (2)• Pressure to marketise higher education takes different
forms (more research links with industry, or otherentrepreneurial activities).
• Part of the pressure is to market programmes including to
new ‘clients’ (formerly students).
• This is helping fuel marketing of cross-border trade ineducational services, in response to rising demand for suchprogrammes.
• OECD estimated that, around 2000, such trade totalled
more than US$30 billion annually. Significantly more now.

Knowledge Economy (3)• Developed economies are increasinglycharacterised by dominance of service sector trade(incl. education).
• But in the global order, not all H/Ed systems, norall H/Ed. institutions (HEIs) are equal. Examples• Some countries are nett importers of ed’l. services,others are major exporters.
• Implications in the Asia Pacific area, especiallyChina & ASEAN ?

THE SETTING• REGIONAL INTEGRATION - A China ASEAN
FTA (CAFTA) would encompass a population of
1.7 billion, and regional GDP of US$2 trillion +.
If Japan joined: almost 2 billion population, withGDP of several US$ trillion.
• China ASEAN trade totalled US$39.5 billion in2000, growing by 20% p.a. 1991-2000. 2008 tradeis estimated to reach US$ 200 billion• China’s accession to WTO is leading to sometrade liberalisation, including in services sector.

GLOBAL AGREEMENT on
TRADE IN SERVICES (GATS)• Previously, international education waslargely promoted for reasons of cultural
exchange, and educational improvement.
Status and prestige factors?
• Growth of a global market in H/Ed., hashelped fuel rise in service sector trade.
• Ed’l. exports comprise around 3% of totalservice sector trade, worldwide.

Earnings from Cross border
Education

1989
AUSTRALIACANADA
UKUSAOECD 2002: 99

US$Millions
584
530
2,214
4,575

1997
% of total
US$
service exports Millions
6.6
2190
3.0
595
4.5
4,080
4.4
8,346

2000
% of total
service exports
11.8
1.9
4.3
3.5

US$Millions
2,155
796
3758
10,280% of total
service exports
11.8
2.1
3.2
3.5

Cross Border Services in
Education
ModeExplanation

ExamplesSize & Potential

1. Cross Border Supply

The service, rather
than the person, crosses
the border

Small, but growing
Swiftly, withconsiderable growthpotential, esp. via ICT

2. Consumption Abroad

The consumer moves tothe country of thesupplier
The provider uses or
establishes facilities in asecond country

3. Distance education
4. Education Software
5. Virtual education(including corporatetraining)Students who study in
Another country.

3. Commercial Presence

4. Presence of Natural
Persons

Persons travelling to a
Second country toprovide a service
Adapted from OECD 2002: 92.

Currently, the largest
share of international
education.
3. Local university, or Growing phenomenon,
Satellite campus.
with strong likelihoodof growth Private providers,
Including language & IT
Professors, teachers,
Given rising professional
Educational consultants mobility, also likely togrow strongly.

North South Inequalities• Cross border trade dominated by OECDmember states
COUNTRYUSAUKGERMANYFRANCE
AUSTRALIAJAPANOECD 2002:94 NB.

No. of STUDENTS
451,934
232,538
178,195
130,952
99,01456,552% OF TOTAL OECD
31%
15%
12%
9%
7%
4%

Dominance of English LanguageCountries• English language providers account for 70% of allinternational H/Ed enrolments from Asia Oceania(1999).
• USA still by far largest provider, but declining in
relative importance (49% 1995, 44% 1999, now
around 30% ).
• Growth of other providers (Australia 12% 1995
13% 1999; UK 7% 1995 11% 1999)• Mandarin (Putonghua) speakers as numerous in
the region as English speakers (each c. 1billion)REGIONALISM. Destinations of students from Asia-Oceania, 1995 and 1999, by percent.
Destination 1995
STUDENT Europe
ORIGINAsia25
Oceania

OECD 2002:97

EUAmericas

23

54

AsiaOceania
21

Destination 1999

EuropeEUAmericas

302847

AsiaOceania
23

THE CHINESE DRAGON• China’s economic and political weight are growing.
Exports grew from US$62 billion to US$249 billion 19902000. Real GDP growth grew by an annual 10%. FDI into
China grew from US$3.5 billion to US$40.8 billion (2000),US$72 billion in 2006, with dual impact on the region.
(China’s ASEAN FDI US$ 30b in 2006, 60% of which
went to Singapore).
• Within China, however, regional inequalities are growing,including in education.
• China recently signed TAC and FTA with ASEAN, and istaking a more active diplomatic role internationallyTHE ASEAN THREE• Malaysia, Singapore, and Viet Nam are very different.
Country

Size ofpopulace(millions)

GDP Per Capita
GNI
US$ (US$ PPP)
billions

Services
as %of GDP

23.8
90.0
7,910
41.9
Malaysia
4.1
92.7
22,85068.3
Singapore
79.5
31.2
2,070
39.1
Viet NamWorld Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, OECD 2003

Hi Tech Adult
Goods as Illiteracy% of (aged 15manuf. +)Exports
56.9
59.7
--

12.6
7.7
7.5

Gov’t. Ed.
Spending
As % ofGDP(2000)
7.5
3.7--

THE ASEAN THREE (2)• But there are some interesting similarities
COUNTRY

CHINESEPOPULATIONPERCENT OFTOTALROLE INECONOMYMalaysia

5,400,000

29.0Singapore

2,079,000

77.0

Viet Nam

1,000,000

1.5

61% of share capital,
60% of private sector managers
81% of listed firms,
by capitalisation
Before 1975, 80% industry, 100%Wholesalee for foreign trade, 50% retail:1986 Doi Moi 45% of registeredprivate firms 1992.

MALAYSIA
•
••
•

•
•

Of total 23m., 58% are ethnic Malays, 26% Chinese, 7% Indian.
Long history of ethnic discrimination against Chinese Malays (ineducation).
GDP growth of 8%+ in early 1990s dented by regional economic crisisof late 1990s. The Ringgit halved in value.
Knowledge economy and IT are seen as national saviours, bases ofeconomic development. The Multimedia Super Corridor plus
development of ITC infrastructure has created a potential platform forcross-border delivery of services.
Vision 2020 is for Malaysia to have attained developed country status,
but as yet the vision has not become a reality.
Only modest investment and exports to China.

SINGAPORE• Highly developed economy, with GNI in PPP terms
similar to Australia, HK & Japan. Attracts 60% of total
ASEAN FDI.
• Polyethnic community, 75%+ Chinese ethnicity, manyforeign workers.
• Invested heavily in ICT, with impressive results. Has
become a regional telecommunications hub, and has strong
record of regional service sector trade, including some inChina (which is Singapore’s first choice for FDI).
• Strong economic growth of 1990s fell from 2000, withrising unemployment, and cuts to public sector wages

VIET NAM
••

•
••
•

Population of 80m., but still poor.
Long a tributary state of China, it now looks to China as a model fordevelopment (but also looks to the West).
Only free of war and colonialism since around 1990, after a century or
so of resistance to French, USA, and China.
Resumption of diplomatic relations with Australia in 1975, USA in
1995 led to more investment.
Finally joined WTO in 2007, Current GDP growth of 8% p.a. expectedto persist.
North South differences persist, as do regional inequalities, corruption,competition between ministries, and remnants of the planned economy.

CHINA’s H/ED. SYSTEM
Challenges• Quantity (responding to demand). Number of Public HEIs and Enrolments 1990-2001
Number ofInstitutions

New Students

Graduates

StudentEnrolments

1990

1,075

609,000

614,000

1,206,300

--

1995

1,054

926,000

805,000

2,906,000

140.9%

1998

1,022

1,084,000

930,000

3,409,000

1999

1,071

1,597,000

848,000

4,134,000

2000

1,041

2,206,072

949,767

5,560,900

2001

1,040

--

1,036,300

7,190,700

Year

Percent
Increase

17.3%
21.2%
34.5%
29.3%

QUALITY. Changes in Staff Student Ratios, Chinese Universities, 1985-2001

Year1985
1990
1995
1998
2000
2001

Student Enrolment FTE Academic Staff Staff: Student Ratio
1,703,000
2,063,000
2,906,000
3,409,000
5,560,900
7,190,700

344,000
395,000
401,000
407,000
462,772
531,900

4.95
5.22
7.24
8.38
12.02
13.52

EFFICIENCY• Levels of internal efficiency are not always high:- quality assurance issues- large, cumbersome administration- academic moonlighting- HEIs split between different ministries- administrators can dominate acad. decisions- corruption- Zhu Rong Zhi’s assessment

FINANCE• Declining state support has led to devolution offunding to local/provincial levels.
• Increased entrepreneurial activities by HEIs
• Student fees now comprise perhaps 15% of public
HEI budgets and 90% of private (Minban)• Tuition fees now about 50% of students’ direct
educational expenses

INTERNATIONALISATION (1)• Regionalism can offer local responses to local
problems (indigenisation v internationalisation).
• E.g. Hong Kong was a bridge for/to China (less sonow)• But there are limits:- orientation to US as source of reforms- control by MoE (who invite foreign scholars)- brain drain (of c.1,000 000 Chinese students
overseas, only around 250,000 returned)

INTERNATIONALISATION (2)•Some 100,000 int’nl. students in Chinese HEIs (mostly Asian, esp.
Japanese and Korean)
ASEAN Students in Chinese Universities, 2000 and 2001

ASEAN Students

2000

2001

- Indonesia- Malaysia- Singapore- Thailand- Viet Nam
ASEAN Total
Total International
ASEAN % of total

1947<500854667
647
4,610
52,150
8.84%

1697
632
<500860
1,170
4,854
61,8697.85%

INTERNATIONALISATION (3)• China offers more than 5,000 scholarships ayear, 40% of which are to Asian students• 10% of all subjects to be taught in English(textbooks).
• Green Card system (2004)• Incentive schemes for Chinese diaspora toreturn

CHINA ASEAN H/Ed.
• TRADE ORG’N.
-APEC including UMAP (members include ASEAN 3).
• H/Ed. CONSORTIA- ASEAN Uni’s Network (AUN) has an ASEAN China

Coop. & Exchange Programme.
-APRU has 36 HEIs, from Singapore, Malaysia, China,
and other countries.
-UNIVERSITAS 21 includes 3 Chinese U’s. Singapore,and several other countries

SINGAPORE H/Ed.
• Colonial origins now replaced by regional ambitions to bean Eduhub.
• Highly educated populace, international workforce, andstrong presence in regional service sector trade.
• Strong investment in (H)Ed’n., ITC and R&D• Provides scholarships, including some to China/ASEAN• Many Singaporeans still choose to study abroad, mainly inEnglish language countries. Some do not return.

SINGAPORE CHINA H/Ed.
• 5 planks for more Ed. Trade and collaboration:- Linguistic and cultural affinity (75% + Chinese)- Strong existing China-Singapore trade connections- Singapore’s strong regional presence in service sector- Singapore offers scholarships to ASEAN and China- Singapore China Ministries of Ed. signed MoU (2002),
including an exchange programme etc.
Some institutional examples: NUS Shanghai College;
NUS/Peking IMBA; NTU/Shanghai Jiaotong MBA

MALAYSIA H/Ed.
• Like Singapore, colonial origins now replaced byaspirations to become a regional Eduhub.
• History of ethnic discrimination against its own Chineseminority (pushed into private HEIs, or overseas).
• Many Malaysians study abroad, not all return.
• Private universities became legal from 1996 (now 11
private U’s., 4 branch campuses, 16 private University
Colleges (and more than 650 colleges).
• By early this century, about 19,000 international
enrolments, 5000 at universities

MALAYSIA CHINA H/Ed
• Despite ¼ population Chinese origin, very
few Chinese enrolments (120?)• Little evidence of staff or student exchanges• Minor evidence of private sector linkages

VIET NAM H/Ed.
• H/Ed development affected by legacy of war,struggles for re-unification.
• Significant economic constraints persist• Low levels of quality, pay ( moonlighting) andlow efficiency. Also corruption, competition
between ministries.
• Introduction of people’s universities (cf. China),with plans for major growth of private sector by2010, but problems of quality, and corruption
persist.

VIET NAM CHINA H/Ed.
• The most difficult to trace fully.
• Many more Vietnamese students at Chinese
universities than the reverse.
• Main Vietnamese example is of language
training for Chinese students and staff.
• Some bi-lateral MoUs, including byspecialist HEIs., but hard to determine how
active.

China-ASEAN H/Ed.
Relations - Summary
T able 27. China-ASEAN Cross Border Educational Services – a Summary
Singapore

Mode I

Mode IIMode IIIMode IV

NTU Management
Training(by distance)

Chinese students at
Singaporeuniversities.

NUS FUDA(Shanghai College)
FUDA NUS

NTU Management
Programme(in Shanghai)

Singapore students
at Chinese
universities

NUS PEKING(IMBA)SJTU NTU (MBA)Malaysia

Viet Nam

Tsing Hua Exec.
Programme.
Chinese students at
Malaysianuniversities.

INTI college(Beijing Campus)

Malaysian students
at Chinese
universities
VNU language
coursesfor Chinese students

Vietnamese students
at Chinese
universities
Notes: Italics indicate Chinese exports; non italics indicate Chinese imports

Chinese consultants
trainingVietnamese?

CONCLUSION•••••••

More research is needed on Asia Pacific service sector trade (ineducation)., as less data exists.
Singapore’s wealth, better infrastructure, including ICT, leaves it best
positioned of ASEAN 3. Malaysia less so (+ ethnic discrimination),
Viet Nam in part adapting ‘Chinese model’.
China’s growth in ed’l. services growing, and with potential for more,
as its int’nl. role grows. Confucius Institutes, but wider demand, too.
All four countries are nett importers, and will remain so?
Considerable scope for more regional trade and collaboration in Ed.,
offering local solutions to local problems. South-South collaboration.
Significant problems of regulation of private sector, including crossborder programmes and institutions, remain. Transparency?
Equity issues – dominance of North, and English language systems.