CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONALCHANGE FROM PEDICTABILITY TO
UNPREDICTABILITY
Heather Baser
August 2008

Abstract: After a brief review of the evolution of capacity development to become thecore goal of many development organizations, the paper pulls out relevant lessons fromseveral research studies. A key theme is the unpredictable and unplannable nature of CD
for institutional change. The paper suggests some steps that international development
organizations should consider to address increasing unpredictability, including using
complex adaptive systems to better understand unpredictable situations, deepening theirknowledge base, giving more attention to issues of time and timing, putting moreemphasis on building relationships and developing their capabilities to address capacity
and institutional issues.

The Evolution of Capacity Development
In the 1980s, there was a great deal of criticism of technical assistance (TA)which was seen as self perpetuating and with little sustainable impact. Capacity
development (CD) was seen as a way of re-orienting TA from carrying out specifictasks, to leaving behind increased abilities to carry out activities over the longer term.
One of the definitions used at that time reflected what was a largely technical approachto capacity development – CD is the creation or strengthening of a broad network ofskills, people and institutions to carry out certain functions of development management.
There was much concern about the sustainability of CD efforts and recognition
that technical inputs alone were not adequate and that effective capacity development
needed some intangible inputs such as ownership, participation and demand-led
approaches. The concept of CD was hence enlarged to incorporate these. But with this,
there was a tendency for CD to mean all things to all people or to take on specificflavors depending on the character of the organization concerned. Some of thesedifferent meanings included: As a human resource issue to do with skills development and training at theindividual level. These are usually combined with other interventions such as technicalassistance and functional improvements. This is CD as training.
 As a general management problem-solving approach or a means to the end of
improving delivery or implementing better. This is CD as a means to ensure improved
results and performancei and is the line of thinking in the DAC “good practices” paper ii
which emphasizes the importance of understanding the international and country
contexts, identifying and supporting sources of country-owned change, and learningfrom experience and sharing lessons.
 For symbolic purposes – This is CD as an umbrella concept including ownership,
innovation, partnership, knowledge management, change, scaling up, accountability, etc.

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and a symbol of new thinking and ways of managing development activities. Here CD
is good development practice.
 As having an inherent meaning with operational content. This approach puts
emphasis on the specificity of capacity. This is the approach used in the study done by
the European Centre for Development Policy Management in which I have been
involvediii.
Although this lack of specificity makes discussions about it fluid andamorphousiv, capacity development has become an increasingly important goal for mostdevelopment organizations, with some saying they spend as much as 75% of theirbudgets on the issue. For many international development organizations, capacity
development (CD) is not just another activity to be supported, they see it as at the heartof their espoused values and operational strategiesv. In addition, it is seen as being animportant contributor to broader international goals as stated in OECD/DAC paper, The
Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practicevi:“Adequate country capacity is one of the critical missing factors in current
efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals. Development efforts in many of thepoorest countries will fail… if the development of sustainable capacity is not given
greater and more careful attention.”
In a similar vein, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) vii
emphasizes the importance of capacity development as a mechanism for increasing aid
effectiveness. It stresses ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results
and mutual accountability.
Despite the professed importance of capacity development, there was for many
years little research done within the international development community on the topic.
It is only in the last 5 or 6 years that there has been increased effort to pull together
evidence on what works and what does not. Several studies have been done including: A UNDP study entitled Reforming Technical Cooperationviii which focused on
the weak contribution of technical assistance to capacity development; A World Bank evaluation of the relevance of its support for the public sector in
Africa entitled Capacity Building in Africaix;
 A joint Asian Development Bank/Australian Agency for International
Development study, Pacific Capacity Development Study: Final Report x , which
identifies key factors for successful capacity development in that area; A multi-donor financed study, Capacity, Change and Performance by theEuropean Centre for Development Policy Management on how capacity develops fromwithin a system and how it can be unpacked or broken down; and A second multi-donor led study, still in draft, entitled Effective TechnicalCooperation for Capacity Development under the guidance of JICA focusing on goodpractice and lessons from selected experience in country-led planning, flexibility ofdesign, organizational change management, country-led management, complementarityand organizational learning.
There is another body of literature that has not received a great deal of attention
from the development community: that put out by large civil society organizations andthe private sector, largely in the United States. Discussions on capacity began as muchas 50 years ago and have accelerated over the last 2 decades, resulting in a considerable
body of literature seeking a better understanding of the factors that lead to improved
capacity and hopefully performance. There is considerable reflection in this literature on
how to unpack or break down the concept of capacity, for example, Dave Ulrich and93Norm Smallwood in Capitalizing on capabilities xi and P.H. Fuchs, K.E. Mifflin, D.
Miller, J.O. Whitney, in Strategic Integration: Competing in the Age of Capabilities xii.
What is Capacity?
Applying some of the thinking from the papers cited above and from othersxiii aswell as the analysis of the 17 case studies done for the ECDPM studyxiv, we arrived at
the following three elements of capacity:• Individual competencies – skills, mindsets, motivations & hopes of individuals• Collective capabilities – the skills of a systemxv to carry out a particular function.
It is what enables a system to do things and sustain itself.
• System capacity - overall ability of an organization or institution to create public
value
These elements interrelate, for example, changes in overall system capacity caneither support or undermine collective capabilities.
In addition, we have broken down collective capabilities into 5 core capabilities.
These abilities must go beyond the usual task of implementation, i.e. carrying out
technical or logistical functions or delivering programs. They must extend to thebroader abilities that are needed to make an organization or system endure and performover time. We see these core capabilities as follows: Commit to engage in development activities. This capability is about ownershipand motivation. Organizations must have will, confidence and energy to take action tochange the conditions around them. Without this capability, nothing will change. It is
hence the capability that energizes all the others. In the Indonesia case cited below, forexample, the district regent for South Sulawesi was an enthusiastic supporter who
enthusiastic to local development.
Developing Capacity for Participatory Development in the Context of Decentralization– South Sulawesi, Indonesia
Between 1997-2002, Takalar district in the Indonesian province of South Sulawesi and JICA
introduced a model of participatory development known as ‘SISDUK’ as a means of tacklingrural poverty. Rather than providing goods and services to communities as passive
recipients, SISDUK sought to mobilize community groups through small grants and adevelopment concept that challenged conventional ways of tackling local development. It
demanded a significant change in the way government works, shifting from highly
centralized to local decision making.
JICA played a key role as a facilitator of change, offering a protected space for innovationand learning and for forging collaborative relationships among local actors. Incentives
helped to encourage different stakeholders to embrace change in an otherwise bureaucraticand hierarchical environment. However, in the longer term, broader institutional change
processes such as linking SISDUK with an existing village development program as well as
the legacy of the country’s political economy began to undermine the original objectives.
The opportunity for change opened and closed. Village chiefs assumed some of thedecision-making authority for activities which had previously been decided through bottomup participatory development.
Taken from: Baser and Morgan, 2008, pages 137 and 141.

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 Capability to carry out tasks. This is the most common way of thinking aboutcapacity. These are the skills to carry out functions, provide services, or create otherforms of public value. The emphasis is on functional, instrumental ways of meeting a
set of objectives and fulfilling a mandate. In SISDUK, this included the capabilities ofproject personnel to work within the existing system, to train local NGOs able to docommunity facilitation, and help formalize rules and procedures to support staff in
effectively implementing
 Capability to relate and attract resources – This involves relating and surviving
within the context and in connection with other actors. Organizations could more
effectively pursue their mandated goals if they gained the legitimacy, operating space,control and buffering needed to sustain themselves in difficult contexts. SISDUK wasable, for example, to mobilize community groups to adopt a capacity development
approach aimed at empowering and facilitating village groups.
 Capability to adapt and self-renew – This involves adjusting, often in contexts
where change is rapid. In Indonesia, JICA adopted an approach based on awarenessraising, continuous learning and a process of internalization of new concepts andapproaches. In this regard, the JICA team defined the main purpose of the programme
as being to promote organizational learning, rather than of necessarily achieving
measurable results on the ground.
 Capability to balance diversity and coherence - This is the ability to find theright combination of different capabilities, interests and identities that enable theactivity to move forward but without losing focus or even breaking apart. It requires abalance among the forces acting within or on the system. It seemed as if SISDUK had
difficulty in its relatively short lifespan in developing the balance between technical andpolitical capabilities necessary to ensure its survival. After JICA‟s withdrawal, the key
elements of the SISDUK concept and practice were compromised with the emergenceof new policy priorities, namely to expand the programme across the district and to shiftback to a more bureaucratic mode of planning and budgeting. In hindsight, theprogramme could have benefited from the services of a process facilitator to guide thefurther development of the system, manage the absorption process and hold all
stakeholders to account.
This is not the only way to think about capacity or to break it down. But theessential point here is that, in any activity that purports to develop capacity, there needs
to be an understanding of what it means to the participants, the stakeholders. Withoutthat understanding, there is likely to be disappointment. And many so-called capacity
activities have no such common understanding.
This lack of specificity has contributed to the fact that, despite an acceleration in
the amount of research done both in the private sector and in the international
development community, capacity has still not achieved the legitimacy of an academic
discipline like economics or sociology. It is rarely taught in universities. There are no
research institutes or professional associations or journals devoted to it. In general, its
academic grounding is not strong and it has a limited body of theory for practitioners to
use with confidence. There is also reluctance on the part of the international
development community to draw on material coming out of the private sector. It is thus
still fair to say, as did the Bank in its 2005 evaluation, that:95

“Capacity building has not developed as a well defined area of development practicewith an established body of knowledge about what works in meeting different needs
under different country and sector conditions xvi”.
The literature is particularly limited on how to bring about increased capacity at
the institutionalxvii or macro level.
Capacity Development and Institutional Change
Let us turn now to some of the literature coming out of the development
community and what it says about capacity development and institutional change,
drawing on the studies mentioned above as well as recent work by the Swedish
International Development Agency (Sida) specifically on institutional development.
The UNDP study focused on the role of knowledge management andinformation technology in institutional change, particularly as a means of accessing
global information. It cites other important trends such as the role of process
consultation, and strategy formulation with participatory techniques.
The focus of the World Bank study is the public sector where it finds
considerable variation in success among sectors with support to roads being more
effective than that to heath and education. This is because the roads sector is“characterized by clear goals, stakeholders with a direct interest in change, a known
technique transferable across countries, and readily measurable results.” These factors
are not, however, readily replicable in other sectors where public pressure for change ismore diffuse and it is more difficult to measure and manage for results xviii. The reportadmits, for example, that “Bank support has not done well in proving support for
institutional and organizational development” in the health sectorxix.
The World Bank evaluation also found that “technical assistance has beeneffective when used for a discrete and well-defined technical task and in the context of aclear TA strategy that includes a phase-out plan xx .” However, there was inadequate
synchronization among the various human capacity, organizational and institutional
capacity development activities employed to improve public sector performancexxi.
The ADB/AusAID study identifies a number of key factors influencing successin the cases written for the report. These include many cited in other studies such as
participation and ownership; leadership and vision; getting the incentives right;
harmonization of efforts; effective use of technical advisors; and an enabling
environment. There are also ones which are less frequently mentioned including thecapacity to demand; relevance, readiness and receptivity; investing in understanding;flexibility and adaptiveness; ensuring sufficient time; and taking a systems approach.
The study concludes with four themes emerging from the case research: “the importanceof:1) understanding the context;2) thinking strategically about capacity (i.e. the dynamics of the capacity system,
soft capacities (e.g. leadership, legitimacy, trust, motivations and values), therelationship between capacity and performance, and the role to be played by theexternal intervener;3) programming strategically for sustainable capacity, and
4) learning from experience”xxii.
The focus of the JICA-directed study is on individuals and organizations and is96based on the hypothesis that “particular TC and CD planning and management
processes will help optimize effectivenessxxiii.” The study identifies benchmarks against
the Paris Declaration assessment criteria for ensuring an effective results chain based ona management for results philosophy. It does recognize, however, that “many of theseresults chains and institutional and organizational capacity outcomes are, by their very
nature, iterative and sometimes unpredictable, given changing country and sector
contextsxxiv.” The solution proposed is a long term perspective to guide priorization andsequencing of CD outcomes and help inform the best mix of TC inputs and activities.
The ECDPM study focuses mainly at the organizational level but withconsiderable reflection on the dynamics of capacity development and the role ofinstitutional change. The issues raised include:
Much of the focus of capacity development interventions remains on the overt,
the formal and the recognizable. And yet many of the factors that shape the process of
capacity development – the structures, the patterns of authority and the cultural norms –are part of the informal and hidden institutional system. The nature of the interplay
between the overt and the hidden, and the formal and the informal is a major
determinant of the effectiveness of any effort to develop capacity.
In the ECDPM cases, turning individual competencies and group capabilities
into organizational or system capacity normally required institutional change. Althoughcapacity development was about both first and second order change, improved
performance depended on second order change. Intangible factors such as relationships,
incentives and learning played a key role, as illustrated in the box below describing aparticipatory development model supported by JICA in Indonesia. This case also
illustrates how CD can alter power, resources and access to opportunities, threatening
the foundations of traditional institutions such as village chiefs.
The process of capacity development is shaped by its relationship to contextual
factors, many of these institutional, either formal or informal. The following three kindsof contextual factors appeared in the ECDP cases which are summarized in Annex 1 ofthis paper:
Historical pathways and evolution or how activities fit into the process ofinstitutional, political and organizational change emerging over generations or evencenturies. In some of the cases we looked at, the key to capacity development was todevelop organizations in such a way as to reflect deeper trends and expectations, forexample, COEP‟s xxv goals supported the renewal of democracy in Brazil. In others, newgenerations were determined to overturn old habits and structures, for example, young
mayors in the Philippines pushed for participatory practices as part of improved
governance.
The influence of politics and power. Capacity development was not just atechnical exercise in achieving better development performance: it was also a processthat allocated authority, opportunity, resources and security to some and not to others.
There are winners and losers. Decentralization in the Philippines, for example, brought
more power to local authorities by taking it from central government departments.
High levels of social trust and the ability of people to engage in collective action– Much of the success of the Tanzania Public Sector Reform Program can, for example,
be explained by the social/political situation in the country: a relatively homogeneous
population, one language, a non-political military and comparatively small regional
differences in economic and political power.
Most processes of capacity development must respond in some way to97

accelerating uncertainty and complexity, often at the institutional level – globalization,
decentralization, privatization, etc. Many current assessment and management
techniques such as planning, detailed design and scheduling assume predictability andintentionality and do not cope well with unpredictability.
In almost all of our cases, contexts were shifting, expanding and becoming more
complex. It was a challenge for actors to keep up with what was happening. Whatmattered was not so much the nature of the context but how actors related to it. Those
who consciously faced outwards and had the flexibility to adapt to contextual changes
did better than those who faced inwards. Some tried and succeeded in crafting their own
context because they had operational space, strategic flexibility and the initiative to go
into certain directions.
A report on the support from Sida to institutional development entitled
Changing Rules – Developing Institutions (2006) provides some other useful insights on
institutional change:
ID is a dynamic process that is often gradual, incremental, and not necessarilysmooth. The sequence of activities may also vary. It is a largely organic process thatevolves spontaneously without conscious design. Even formal reform with planned
elements involved unanticipated change which was difficult to foresee. In general, ID iscomplex and may involve changes of rules at different levels xxvi.
Institutional development involves the interaction of several crucial factors:
Initiating and driving factors – There are two kinds of factors, those which initiatechange such as economic crises and those which sustain a process, for example,
providing additional assistance to reinforce a particular reform;
Actors, their roles, incentives and interaction – Some individuals and organizations
promote change, others resist it;
Values and beliefs, perceptions and ideas – This involves changing how people
see the world and their vision of what it should be like;
Other rules, particularly informal – Institutional interrelatedness implies that rules arelinked to each other. The role of informal rules is particularly important because theyoften take precedence over formal rules; andKnowledge – Effective ID involves changing behavior through learning xxvii.
Several factors make ID particularly difficult. There are vested interests inmaintaining the status quo, usually among actors who have incentives and opportunities
to resist change from taking place. The existing institutional set up codifies values andbeliefs which shape perceptions of the world and ideas of how it should be. The fact thatrules cannot be observed results in their not being recognized, especially the informal
ones. Interrelatedness among institutions may render partial institutional change
ineffective because inconsistent rules prevent adherence. All these factors illustrate theembeddedness of institutions in their specific history and context which, in turn,contributes to rigidityxxviii.
The findings on institutional change from the studies cited above suggests thattraditional planned approaches to capacity development work well in situations that can
be clearly defined but that they are less suitable in contexts of unclear goals and diffuse
or weak public support. These situations do not tend to be either predictable orplannable. The rest of this paper will concentrate on capacity development for
institutional change, which is particularly unpredictable, and how it might be addressed.

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Approaches to CD for Institutional Change
Given the experience described above, what approaches to capacity development
might be appropriate when the focus is on institutional change?
In terms of overall planning and implementation approaches, planned change
based on prediction, goal setting, hierarchical structures and top-down design seems tohave limitations, especially where institutional change is concerned. Different models of
thinking and planning are needed that help to clarify the deeper patterns of behavior andrelationships that lie beneath individual events and actions. An alternative to a planned
approach is complex adaptive systems which relies on relationships, interrelationships,
and system energy, with capacity emerging out of their multiple interdependencies andcausal connections.
Complex adaptive systems implies means-based management rather thanresults-based management: the focus is on nurturing relationships and then waiting forresults and capabilities to emerge rather than trying to predetermine them. Controlled
and directed change is seen as having little chance of working over time and may indeed
damage the natural process of change by blocking or curtailing unforeseen opportunities
for innovation. Effective change must work with the natural dynamics and energy in thesystem, not against them. The box below describes how two networks in Brazil, one forpoverty alleviation and the other for health, evolved by nurturing connections andrelationships which eventually generated capacity.
The emergence of capacity: two networks in Brazil
The COEP and Observatório networks in Brazil were first energized by the pursuit of
key values to do with democratization and social justice. They grew organically throughinformal connections and relationships. They refused to set clear objectives at theoutset. A direction and an identity emerged over time. Facilitation, connection andstimulation worked better than traditional directive management. There was no attempt
to develop formal hierarchies at the outset. They experimented throughout the networkwith small projects and interventions. There was a constant exchange of experiences,
information and knowledge. They spun off many working groups, informal
communities and associations. Collective networking capabilities emerged throughlinking and connecting capabilities at the individual and organizational levels.
From Baser and Morgan, 2008, page 79.
Complex adaptive systems sees capacity as emerging or growing through selforganization. Capacity is not assembled like a machine. Instead, it appears to emerge
spontaneously and unpredictably at that point in the evolution of the system which falls
just between being tightly structured and inflexible and being uncontrollable anddirectionless.
The process of emergence as described in the box above can be messy with ad
hoc efforts, formal or informal, to develop skills amidst the normal rush of generalprogramming, problem solving and implementation. People may pay attention to somethings and not others. Some people opt in and others out. Or perhaps a crisis of some
sort has to be faced. At some point, participants either remain in the operational fixing
mode and or else move on to a more strategic approach.

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In addition to a general approach to capacity development, actors need to dosome strategic thinking and acting. Many participants in the ECDPM cases thought
through the potential dynamics of change, using planned strategies in some instancesand emergent or systems approaches in others. Some of the strategies were tacit, others
explicit. Some were conventional, some highly innovative. Some were long, others
short term. But above all, there was a mind at work that contributed to the shaping of
events and ideas about capacity development and institutional change.
Here are some internal and external processes which helped to drive capacity
development in the ECDPM cases and which relate particularly to institutional change,
either by affecting capacity and being affected by it.
Most capacity development strategies include some attempt to counter thecollapse of incentives, rewards and sanctions in the public sector in many low-income
countries. As a result of low salaries and poor working conditions, chronic absenteeism,
corruption, and demoralization have become the norm in many public services and theinstitutional standard has become one of non-performance. Approaches such as the „newpublic management‟ try to change this by inducing results and performance throughincentives and sanctions. These can include salary supplements, performance-based
payments, efforts to boost demand and accountability, greater transparency, andcompetition.
On the other hand, actors in the some of the cases managers relied on values,
meaning and moral purpose to underpin allegiance, loyalty and motivation in a way that
restructuring, incentivizing and strategizing could not. Such values helped to bringabout deeper or second-order change, for example, by engaging public entities in its
campaigns, COEP has helped to change the public discourse on poverty in Brazil.
A critical component for effective capacity development in virtually all of thecases was the creation and protection of operating space – a protected area within
which participants could make decisions, experiment and establish an identity. Such aspace could be physical, organizational, financial, institutional, intellectual,
psychological or political. It created the conditions that allowed a physiological sense ofownership to take hold and, as in the SISDUK example below, it allowed the key
processes of capacity development to evolve.
JICA and buffering: SISDUK, Indonesia
In Indonesia, JICA buffered the SISDUK experiment from the intrusions and pressuresof the local political and administrative system. It provided a space for innovation andexperimentation that lasted for 4–5 years. Its pilot status gave it bureaucratic andfinancial protection. The programme related to a separate set of incentives andaccountability arrangements. And beyond all these arrangements, JICA could defend theprogramme directly using its relationship with the government. Part of the explanation
for later difficulties was the weakening of the operating space put in place during thepilot period.
Source: Baser and Morgan, 2008, page 74.
In many of the ECDPM cases, institutional issues shaped the pattern of
incentives, influenced the behavior of actors and determined the pattern of constraints

100and opportunities associated with capacity development. Sometimes they were laws andregulations with long-standing ways of interacting and with deep historical roots. Or
sometimes they were formal organizations trying to challenge the influence oftraditional institutions. Actors found that changes to laws could be put into place
relatively quickly but informal institutions such as cultural norms changed more slowly.
Some of the cases showed evidence of the effect of demand on developing capacity. In
Ethiopia, for example, the Education Sector Development Program provided forwatchdog groups at the local levels to monitor progress. But it is not clear if demandside approaches by themselves lead inexorably to improved capacity in ways notpossible under a supply-side regime. The classic pattern of citizen demand was apparent
in only a few of the cases. What emerged was a more varied pattern of relationships
between „demanders‟ and „suppliers‟ that worked at different times for different kindsof organizations. In Pakistan, as the box below illustrates, demand was limited by thelack of experience in and tradition of public action.
Demand-side strategies for capacity development: education sector, Pakistan
In Pakistan in the period 1995-2003, a number of mechanisms had either evolved orwere established to increase accountability in order to improve state education services:A national bureau charged with designing the devolution policy and regulations toenhance accountability and service delivery;
Citizen community boards charged with monitoring service delivery, and a bodymandated to develop their capacity;
The Pakistan Bar Association attempted to give legal backing to demands from keygroups to compel improved services; andAlliances with civil society organizations to work on creating greater demand.
These demand-side mechanisms seem to have had limited influence on improving
service delivery. Major constraints still existed on the supply side, including thebureaucracy, which had little commitment to improving educational opportunities;
inadequate pay, leading to low staff morale; low public expectations of the state
education sector; few if any pressures or incentives to perform; and a dysfunctional
budget system. Changing these constraints would require supply-side interventions, atleast initially, to stimulate the bureaucratic and political elites to fight for change.
From: Baser and Morgan, 2008, page 70.
The debate about supply and demand needs to be situated in the context of socialand economic rigidities, often institutional in nature, such as those in the Pakistan
context, which can restrict the ability of people to express their needs.
Three political issues were critical across the cases.
The pattern of restraints/incentives for elites. In some cases, political,
bureaucratic, ethnic, regional or commercial elites were able to form coalitions in
support of capacity development, for example, political leaders in Tanzania and Rwanda
promoted better capacity and performance in the public sector.
The nature and durability of the space for institutional pluralism anddistribution of power.xxix Some organizations were less prepared than others to tolerate
the emergence of new centers of power and capacity. Their interests were better servedby undermining or at least limiting, the capacity of other actors. In the South Africa
technical education case, vested interests in the large educational bureaucracies at both101

national and provincial levels struggled for authority and resources, and finallysucceeded in shifting the emphasis towards maintaining support for public providers.
The degree of societal cohesion and political conflict. This was a positive factor
in the Tanzania case mentioned earlier but a negative one in the Papua New Guinea
cases.
The cases indicate that the presence, or absence, of legitimacy influenced thedevelopment of capacity across a range of circumstances. Organizations that had earnedor had been granted some sort of legitimacy appeared to benefit in terms of improved
capacity. Those with little societal legitimacy such as public agencies with a record ofcorruption did not have much success in developing their capacity through technical orfunctional fixes. Formal organizations seeking legitimacy had to work to groundthemselves in the cultural and institutional values of the society in which they wereembedded.
The analysis above suggests that the planning and control model used
extensively in the international development community has limitations in the context
of capacity development for institutional change which is inherently unpredictable.
Using systems thinking to supplement the planning model would help to provide someinsights into how to unleash energy and drive to get capacity moving. In addition, actors
need to have an understanding of theories of action based on change strategies and how
these can be used to support institutional change.
Conclusions
What would development organizations need to do to support an approach tocapacity development for institutional change based on an assumption of
unpredictability?
Development organizations would first need to accept that in situations of
instability and unpredictability, there are often many stakeholders with different views,
the outcomes are contested, and the means to proceed unclear. Such situations need tobe addressed differently from ones where the objectives are generally accepted and themeans clearly defined or definable. This is the difference between public sector reformin the roads sector and in the health sector. Complex adaptive systems is a possible
alternative to a planning and control model because it focuses on means rather thanunknown ends.
A systems view of capacity development would push participants to think
differently about their work. The complexity and paradoxes of human systems,
including many context–actor relationships, do not conform to a linear cause and effectpattern of effects. Instead, they interact amongst themselves to produce pressures,
opportunities and traps, many of which can not be understood in advance. Actors
would have to think more creatively about the complex interrelationships between
capacity and performance and about collective as opposed to individual action. The
approach would tend to bring out the imagination and ingenuity needed to develop more
effective capacity. And it would contest the conventional view that focusing on
performance outcomes is, by itself, the most useful way to improve a process.
Unpredictability also requires greater attention to the issues of time and timing.
There is often a tension between the long-term objectives of changing major systems
and the reality that windows of opportunity close and stakeholders lose interest withoutsome signs of progress. Development organizations and their country partners need to102

come to a common understanding about the balance between the short- and the longterm, and when it is appropriate to intervene.
Development organizations would also need to give more emphasis to building
relationships so as to develop a deep knowledge of country and regional conditions.
Such knowledge would help to identify champions of change, to understand how they
fit into the broader development context and to recognize windows of opportunity tosupport them. The ECDPM study suggests that there is a robust correlation between
strong, trusting and frequent contacts between development agency partners and theircolleagues and the success of capacity development efforts, especially those focused on
institutional change such as the Tanzania Public Sector Reform Program.
In recent years, international development agencies in general have moved
heavily into donor harmonization, and their field staff spend increasing amounts of timein coordination meetings. This means less time working with partner country colleagues
either on a one-to-one or a small group basis. Much of the work requiring close donor–
partner country contact has been delegated to consultants, and donor agencies no longer
have the corporate knowledge of the country and contacts they once had. There needs tobe a rebalancing between coordination and the acquisition of knowledge throughinterpersonal contacts.
Development agencies wanting to address unpredictable situations would needto invest more in their capabilities to address capacity and institutional issues.
Capacity development would need to be seen as a specialty requiring dedicatedresources along the lines of those in place in organizations like Sida, the AsianDevelopment Bank and AusAID. It would require more incremental planning processes
and more organizational incentives to encourage staff to develop in-depth cultural
understanding of partner countries (rather than moving from one country desk toanother in quick succession). Monitoring and evaluation would have to put moreemphasis on intangible aspects of development such as legitimacy and selfempowerment, as well as on the tangible outcomes.
Donors need to think about their limits. Each organization is situated in aparticular context which allows it certain freedom of movement or space. Each isconstrained by contextual factors. Supporting institutional change requires considerable
organizational flexibility and tolerance for risk taking. Organizations that do not benefit
from these may find it difficult to play a significant positive role in promoting
institutional change.

103Annex 1: The case studies
1. Developing Capacity for Participatory Development in the Context ofDecentralization – South Sulawesi, Indonesia
This case study examines how Takalar district in the Indonesian province ofSouth Sulawesi took up the challenge of tackling rural poverty through the introductionof participatory development and community empowerment methodologies. The caselooks at the range of capacities that were required of various local stakeholders (local
government officials, non-governmental organizations and the communities at large),
examines the processes through which the district, in partnership with JICA, undertook
to develop these capacities, and discusses the broader socio-political challenges
encountered in sustaining interest in and the capacity for participatory development
against the wider background of political and administrative decentralization.
Between 1997-2002, Takalar district and JICA introduced a model ofparticipatory development known as „SISDUK‟. Influenced by a Japanese participatory
development planning concept, it recognizes that all communities possess indigenous
capabilities and resources that can be mobilized to address development needs. Rather
than providing goods and services to communities as passive recipients, SISDUK seeks
to mobilize community groups to help themselves by adopting a capacity development
approach aimed at empowerment and facilitating local (village) institutions. SISDUK isboth a programme facility offering small grants to stimulate community development
initiatives, and a development concept that challenges conventional ways of tackling
local development.
Much like other participatory development methodologies it offers an alternativemodel of local development. In the Indonesian context, the notion of participatory
development is particularly challenging as it demands a significant shift in the way
government works and in the way it sees its relationship with other stakeholders.
Inevitably, many capacity challenges arise, but perhaps most prominent is the issue of
influencing attitude, or mindsets.
JICA assistance to SISDUK came to a close in 2002. Two years on, SISDUK
remains in place, backed up by a local government regulation and financed through thelocal government‟s own budget. Senior management talk enthusiastically about
SISDUK and of the contribution it has made to local development and decentralization.
At the provincial level, training and promotion work continues to be provided. Someeight districts have shown interest in the Takalar experience and are considering doing
something similar in their own localities. Yet despite the achievements SISDUK haschanged in fundamental ways. Key elements of the participatory development system
are no longer being practiced as intended, while many of the capabilities developed are
no longer actively used. The story of SISDUK is therefore as much about thedissemination and sustaining of novel ideas and the inculcation of a different model ofdevelopment as it is about developing specific capabilities.
2. Developing Capacity for Tax Administration – The Rwanda Revenue Authority
In November 1997, the Rwandan transitional parliament passed a law
establishing the Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) as a body corporate charged withadministering the collection of taxes and customs and excise duties on behalf of104

government. The establishment of the RRA marked the beginning of a remarkableprocess of organizational development, which has seen the transformation of thegovernment's capacity to manage revenue collection. In just six years, the RRA has
become a performing and respected institution that has helped increase domestic
revenue generation from 9.5% to 13% of GDP. This is in stark contrast to the situation
prior to the creation of RRA. Revenue collection had been the responsibility of adepartment within the Ministry of Finance that was characterized as incompetent,
inefficient and corrupt.
This case study looks at the first six years of the RRA and identifies the factorsthat contributed to its remarkable achievements. What has transformed it into a
performing and respected institution? What have been the factors driving change? How
important has capacity development been to this record of achievement? How has
external assistance facilitated the process of transformation?
The organisation's spectacular achievements have taken place against thebackground of a country emerging from trauma. After more than 30 years of state
division, ethnic conflict and growing economic malaise, the RRA was born into an
environment that could best be described as hostile. The civil war and genocide had left
one million people dead and nearly three million refugees in exile, the fabric of society
had been torn apart, the state and economy had collapsed and infrastructure destroyed.
In 1997, the Rwandan state was still in a process of reconstruction but had begun tomove to the point where longer-term development issues could begin to becontemplated alongside the ongoing need to deal with issues of regional insecurity as
well as social and political fragility within its borders.
Today, it is clear that the government has succeeded in galvanizing a societal
drive to pick itself up and to work towards becoming a prosperous, secure and confident
society. There seems to be a strong desire to succeed and to prove that the country canre-emerge from the depths of crisis. The drive to perform and the eagerness to succeed
are all-pervasive and go a long way to compensate for the shortages in capacity that thecountry faces. The Rwandan government had also been able to mobilise the support ofsections of the international community that had pledged support to rebuild the country.
Together with its external partners, it has set out an agenda to create a united Rwandan
people sharing common identity and goals. At the heart of this agenda is the fightagainst poverty and the creation of a democratic and inclusive political dispensation.
3. Papua New Guinea’s Health Sector – A Review of Capacity, Change andPerformance Issues
This case study examines the reform process in PNG‟s health sector from acapacity development perspective. It addresses a number of factors influencing capacity
development, change and performance in the sector, including issues internal to the
National Department of Health (NDoH), capacity issues at sub-national levels, theinstitutional „rules of the game‟ that guide attitudes, behavior and relationships in the
PNG context and in the emerging health SWAp, and broader contextual factors. The
study takes the health sector as the main unit of analysis, but with significant regard to
NDoH given its central role in planning, standards and setting overall policy direction.
The report highlights how the different levels of PNG‟s broader „capacity system‟ areinterdependent, with constraints and opportunities at one level influencing possibilities
at the other levels.

105

The Health Sector is presently guided by the fifth National Health Plan – Health
Vision 2010 – which aims to „improve the health of all (5.3 million) Papua New
Guineans, through the development of a health system that is responsive, effective,
affordable, and accessible to the majority of our people‟. Specific priorities include
increased services to the rural majority (85% of the population), many of whompresently do not have access to basic health services.
The government of Papua New Guinea and the donor community are moving
towards a sector-wide approach (SWAp) to health reform, consistent with international
development cooperation trends. AusAID and the Asian Development Bank have been
the major contributors to the SWAp. However, despite significant investments in the
sector in recent years, the health of Papua New Guineans is „at best plateauing‟ and anumber of health indicators are actually declining.
The report contends that while PNG has a fundamentally sound national healthpolicy, implementation has fallen short of the mark. Relying on a capacity development
lens, the report explores some of the reasons why NDoH has been „successful‟ in policy
development, but less so in policy implementation. It suggests that PNG‟s policy
development strengths are rooted in the experience and commitment of senior actors inthe sector and are buttressed by a broad consensus in PNG on the importance of healthservices. Shortcomings in implementation are attributed to a number of factors, some ofwhich are internal to the sector, including management issues, relationships, financing
arrangements, the skills of health practitioners, and external factors, such as theinstitutional rules which affect the behaviour of sector stakeholders. Despite theimplementation challenges, the team noted a number of „success stories‟ which haveemerged.
4. The Role of Churches in Governance and Public Performance – Papua New
GuineaThis case examines the role of Christian churches as institutional actors within
Papua New Guinea‟s governance and service delivery landscape. It considers theircapacity to engage in advocacy and policy related work, as well as to function as apartner of government in the delivery of social services. In so doing, it looks at theinterplay of endogenous change processes and the development of capabilities to see
how these have translated into the performance of various church-based institutions andthe capacity of the church sector as a whole. The positioning of Christian churches as asignificant player within the PNG institutional landscape needs to be understood in thecontext of the role of traditional institutions in PNG society and the struggle of theformal state to establish legitimacy at the local level.
The community of Christian churches in Papua New Guinea (PNG) is very
diverse, ranging from mainstream churches, such as the Catholic, Lutheran and United
Churches, to others with smaller congregations, such as the Baptists and Anglicans. The
Seventh Day Adventists form an important church community in PNG, and there has
been an increase in the number of Pentecostal and Evangelical churches across thecountry. In total, PNG has approximately 150 different missions, sects and freechurches. These church groups entered PNG in several waves since the late 19th century,
and an estimated 99% of the population now identify themselves as Christians. WhilePNG has had relatively long contact with various church groups, some remotecommunities had no contact with the „outside world‟ as late as the 1950s.

106There is a widespread recognition that the churches play a very important role in
PNG society. Collectively, they provide about half of the country‟s health services and– in partnership with government – co-manage some 40% of the primary and secondary
education facilities. Churches also run two of the country‟s six universities and are
responsible for training many of the country‟s teachers and health workers. A number ofchurch groups are also involved in peace and reconciliation activities in areas
experiencing tribal or other types of conflict, while others speak out on the governancesituation and the lack of basic government services in parts of the country.
The churches are seen as having made a significant contribution to development
and modernization, and the introduction of values and morals which are now recognizedin the country‟s Constitution. They have deep roots in PNG‟s diverse communities andcan draw upon considerable social capital to influence change processes at various
levels. Many of the country‟s leaders have been trained in church institutions andcontinue to play a prominent role in shaping PNG society. However, there are some
who believe that religious organizations have also contributed to the decline of PNG‟s
traditional cultural practices and values.
5. COEP – Mobilising against hunger and for life – An Analysis of capacity andchange in a Brazilian network
This case examines a Brazilian social solidarity network, COEP (the Committeeof Entities in the Struggle against Hunger and a Full Life) through the lens oforganisational and social capacity and change. COEP is committed to building a justand inclusive society for all Brazilians, one without hunger and poverty. Its members
include government agencies, parastatals and organizations from the private sector andcivil society. COEP is in fact a network of networks, active federally, in all of Brazil's
27 states, and now also at the municipal level. Its strategies include encouraging its
members to support and participate in development projects to combat poverty,
organizing campaigns to mobilize public and institutional resources to end poverty, andpromoting cooperation among its affiliates in their development work and campaigns.
The COEP experience is of interest to the wider study for several reasons.
It is uniquely Brazilian, part of that country's renewed democracy and of thebroad social movement against hunger. Created by Brazilian initiative, COEP has beensustained by Brazilian resources.
It is an intriguing hybrid - a voluntary nationwide network that embodies many
aspects of a civil society organization, but which operates in the border area between thestate, the parastatal sector, private business and civil society.
It is engaged with the paramount development issues of the day, mobilizing
citizens and organizations to work to end poverty and for social justice. It commands
legitimacy as a development actor, legitimacy that helps to keep these issues on the
public agenda.
Against the background of Brazil‟s recent socio-economic and politicalevolution, the case examines how the network has evolved and identifies the capabilities
that have enabled it to become a thriving and dynamic network active throughout thecountry. COEP's trajectory over its first decade was remarkable by any standards. From
improbable beginnings in 1993, it has grown to include more than 800 organizations. At
critical junctures along the way, it has shown considerable resourcefulness andcreativity, drawing on its substantial internal resources to respond to the dynamics of a107changing environment and its own membership. Four elements stand out:
COEP's strong self-definition: the core values, principles and purposes of the
network were clear from the beginning, and have remained constant.
The network has had creative leadership with strong legitimacy and acapability for strategic thinking.
The network has created effective structures for governance and management,
well suited to its changing circumstances and profile.

COEP has managed a dramatic growth in numbers and geographic scope tobecome a nationwide organization.
6. Capacity Building for Decentralized Education Service Delivery – Ethiopia
This study is one of two that examines capacity building for decentralized
education service delivery. It explores the recent experiences of Ethiopia in reforming
the education sector since 1997 against the background of a broader devolution process
which begain in earnest in 2001. The study examines the institutional environment andbroader governance context and identifies factors that have both facilitated andconstrained the development of capacity across the sector from the classroom level tothe policy making level. It also looks at the role of external partners in supporting thereform process.
Ethiopia is a low-income country with a GNP per capita of only $100 in 2002,
and a Human Development Index ranking of 169 out of 175 countries. Almost 40% of
the population are illiterate and only 24% of pupils complete primary school education.
For the present government, which came to power in 1991 after 16 years of bloody civil
war, education is now a national development priority: nearly 14% of government
budget is allocated to it. The Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP) was
introduced in 1997 as a vehicle for implementing the 1994 education policy, which
envisaged universal primary education by 2015.
The devolution of service delivery was included in the 1995 Constitution, which
provides an unusual degree of autonomy to Ethiopia's 11 regional states. In 1999-2000,
however, studies by the World Bank depicted an administration more akin todeconcentration below the regional level. Regional state governments tended todominate service delivery at the woreda and kebele levels. After a crisis within theruling party (EPRDF), which culminated in a policy 'renewal' in 2001, more genuine
devolution took place. Full discretion was given to elected woreda councils to allocate
unconditional grants from regional state treasuries (initially in the four largest regions).
The federal government was reorganized in 2001. An Office for the
Coordination of Capacity Building (soon converted into a ministry) was established toinitiate capacity building polices, to design and implement related programs in supportof the regions, and to coordinate other related organs of government, including the
Ministry of Education. A national capacity building strategy was also developed as partof the Civil Service Reform Programme launched in 1998, and a plan for implementing
it was put in place to be led by the newly created Ministry of Capacity Building. The
strategy's three elements - human capacity, systems and procedures, and organizational
structures and interrelationships - are based on the understanding that the country will
only achieve its goals if it can coordinate the use of its human resources, institutional
capacity and the procedures to carry out these tasks.

108

7. Networking Collaboratively – The Brazilian Observatório on Human Resourcesin HealthThis case explores the evolution of the Brazilian Observatório on Human
Resources in Health - a network of university institutes, research centers and one federal
office, consisting today of some 13 network „nodes‟ or „workstations‟ , which arecoordinated via a secretariat consisting of staff members of the Ministry of Health andthe Brasilia office of the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO).
This case sheds light on the creation and sustenance of capacity and capabilities
in the context of networks. It provides insights on what capabilities are needed to makenetworking function and how capacity created in the context of networks leads toperformance. It traces the way in which the network has grown into being a significant
actor in the health sector and examines the discrete but crucial role that external partners
played in supporting the development of the Observatório .
The idea for a formal network on human resources for the health sector came to
Brazil in 1998 as part of a PAHO initiative to improve human resources policymaking
throughout Latin America. At that time, policy for human resources planning,development and management in the health sector had become a key concern in various
Latin-American countries. Earlier networking experiences among several healthinstitutes from as early as the 1970s provided a foundation for the Observatório's
implementation in Brazil. A year later, in 1999, the Ministry of Health legally
recognized it as a mechanism to exchange information with which to inform policy anddevelop, regulate and manage human resources in the health sector. But the network
was not created from zero. A long history of multiple processes shaped the cooperation
arrangement. Many of these processes have internal roots and were driven by the
motivation and commitment of individual network members. But there have also been
moments when external support and intellectual inputs proved crucial to the network's
flowering. The PAHO has been particularly instrumental, as it has facilitated, balanced
and stimulated interchanges among actors through its long-term presence in the country.
The Observatório is nationally and internationally recognized as a unique andsuccessful case of state-non-state interaction in health. The network has produced asubstantial amount of valuable information and analyses from its productive interplay
between Brazil's Ministry of Health, PAHO and the network working stations, as well
as from intense horizontal cooperation between network members. Most of thesemembers are active in other health networks as well, which has created an environment
in which intense exchanges and collaboration on issues in public health have been
initiatedanddeveloped.
8. Building the capacity for managing public sector reform: The Tanzania
experience
This case study is about how a country - Tanzania - went about building its
capacity to manage a complex process of institutional and organizational change. It is
not intended as an analysis of the outcomes and impacts of the overall Public Service
Reform Programme (PSRP). Instead, the case study concentrates on the topic of109

capacity development for change management within the public sector. The main focusof analysis is thus on the work of the Public Service Management (PSM) unit within the
President's Office (PO-PSM) as a change manager within the public service rather than
the PSRP as a programme.
The Public Service Management (PO-PSM) unit initially functioned as a project
implementation unit set up to manage public service reform as a conventional aid
project. It was subsequently converted into an established part of government andexpanded in size. The reform process was carefully designed to balance thisconnectedness with Government through tight connection to processes and networks
while providing operating space through some freedom of action.
The Government of Tanzania has been going through various stages of public
sector reform with the help of DFID, the World Bank and some other bilaterals, since
the early 1990s and is seen to have made more progress than many other countries. It
has also made genuine progress in building its own capacity to design and manage
reform. The case looks at how and why this has happened, with an emphasis on theefforts of the Tanzanians involved. While the contributions of international funding
agencies such as DFID and the World Bank were crucial to the progress of the work interms of the provision of advice and financial support, they were not determinant.
Capacity emerges. It is not delivered or transferred. National participants make or breakcapacity development in all cases.
In general, public service reform has more traction in Tanzania than in manyother countries. The actions of government officials have been broadly supportive andthe Tanzanian governing elite appears convinced about the need to embraceglobalization as a key part of any national development strategy. In addition, Tanzania
has gone a considerable distance to depoliticize its policy making and to create space forministries and departments to craft and manage reform programs with politicians
supplying general oversight.
The Government of Tanzania positioned the Public Service Reform Programme(PSRP) in the mainstream of global public sector reform. In the late 1990s, theGovernment, with enthusiastic international support, opted for the wholesale adoptionof a set of reform measures collectively known as the 'new public management' (NPB),
much of which was being applied internationally under the sponsorship of agencies
such as the World Bank and DFID. This preference for foreign models had implicationsin terms of the transfer of organizational practices, absorptive capacity and a heavy
reliance on technical assistance.
9. The National Action Committee Western Cape (NACWC) and technical education
in South Africa
In the period 1994-6, a group of non-profit organizations with support from
Danida sought to introduce a „new institutional form‟ or model for technical educationthat would contribute to reforming the post Apartheid public sector of South Africa
from the outside. The failure of their attempts was largely related to their lack ofunderstanding of wider system constraints, particularly the capability and willingness ofthe public sector to absorb changes in the short term. There was a dilemma of balance
and timing: not enough innovation leads to stagnation but too much scares supporters.

11010. Local Government Support Programme: A case study of local government
capacity development in the Philippines
The Philippines has made significant progress in decentralization anddemocratization over the past decade. Its devolution legislation and local government
system are frequently studied by other Asian countries as a model for decentralization.
However, the process has not been without challenges. In 1991, when the Local
Government Code was enacted, few local governments had the capacity to carry out
their newly mandated functions. The national government and local government
officials themselves identified the urgent need for capacity development and capacity
development assistance for local government units. The national government charged
the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), with responsibility todevelop the capacity of local governments and invited donor assistance. Since 1991
many national government initiatives and donor-assisted projects have supported local
government capacity development with one of the most successful being the Local
Government Support Programme (LGSP), which represents a long-term commitment onbehalf of CIDA to support the Government of the Philippines' decentralization andpoverty reduction strategies.
This case study explores capacity development and related performance
improvement within the context of local governance in the Philippines over a 13-year
period through the experience of the LGSP as well as the DILG which enjoyed different
but complementary mandates to support the decentralization process. It focuses on thedevelopment of 'local government units' (cities and municipalities) that in the Philippine
political structure are a second tier of government with specific functions devolved tothem by the central government, and examines the capacity development strategies
employed to accompany the process of their development. The case describes the local
government units and the enabling and regulatory environment in which they function
as a system that is evolving and becoming stronger at the same time as the individual
local government units are developing. The concept of capacity development presented
in the study is an open systems model that considers capacity development as an
ongoing process that in the case of Philippine local governments has led to related
improvements in local government performance that in turn have resulted in better
services and benefits to citizens.
The case suggests that given the political and social context conducive to
devolution and democratization that existed in the Philippines after the fall of the
Marcos regime, and the enabling policy environment created by the enactment of the
Local Government Code in 1991, endogenous local government capacity development
began to occur. It also suggests that certain external interventions were very effective insupporting and enhancing this endogenous local government capacity development
process because of the approaches and methodologies used.

111

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113

EndnotesiPerformance is the way in which organizations or systems apply their capabilities and the results of thatapplication in terms of the ability to deliver and function. It is about execution and implementation.
ii
OECD, 2005.
iii
Heather Baser and Peter Morgan, Capacity, Change and Performance, 2008.
iv
Although the definition of capacity in the OECD/DAC paper is cited extensively (the ability of people,
organizations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully), it has not been translated, forexample, into systems of monitoring and evaluation which still remain major challenges for many
development organizations.
v
Morgan, 2005, page 3.
viOECD/Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 2006, Paris.
vii
OECD/DAC, The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, High-Level Forum, February 28-March 2,
2005, Paris.
viii
This resulted in 3 books: Capacity for Development, edited by Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Carlos Lopez andKhalid Malek (2002), Ownership, Leadership and Transformation: Can We Do Better for Capacity
Development edited by Carlos Lopez and Thomas Theisohn (2003) and Developing Capacity throughTechnical Cooperation: Country Experiences by Stephen Browne (2002). All were published by Earthscan
in London.
ix
World Bank, Capacity Building in Africa: An OED Evaluation of World Bank Support. Washington, DC:
World Bank.
x
Manila, 2007.
xi
Harvard Business Review, June 2004.
xii
California Management Review, Vol. 42, No. 3. Spring 2000.
xiii
G. Hamel, and A. Heene, 1994, Competence-based Competition, Wiley, P.C. Light in Sustaining
Nonprofit Performance: The Case for Capacity Building and the Evidence to Support I, Brookings
Instituion, K. Kamoche, 1997, Competence-creation in the African public sector in International Journal of
Public Sector Management, vol. 10, #4, and B. Mascarenhas, A. Baveja, and J. Mamnoon, Summer 1998,
Dynamics of Core Competencies in Leading Multinational Companies in California Management Review,Vol. 40, no. 4.
xiv
We did 17 studies based on field experience plus a comparison of two of the cases. They cover a wide
spectrum of capacity situations ranging over different sectors, objectives, geographic locations andorganizational histories.
xv
An entity which maintains its existence and functions as a whole through the interrelationships of its
parts or elements (from Glossary, Capacity, Change and Performance, 2008.)
xvi
World Bank, 2005, page xiii.
xvii
Institutions are structures, norms and rules of behavior, both formal and informal, that shape the social
order of a human community. Institutional change is usually second-order change. By contrast,
organizations are administrative or functional bodies normally with tangible assets such as physical space,funding, staff, and work plans.
xviii
Ibid, both page xv.
xix
Ibid, page 25.
xx
Ibid, page xv.
xxi
Ibid, page xvii.
xxii
Bolger, both from page ii.
xxiii
JICA, page 6.
xxiv
JICA, page 28.
xxv
COEP is the Committee of Entities against Hunger and for a Full Life. It is a network of representativesof some 800 corporate, public and parapublic organizations.
xxvi
Skoog, page xiv.
xxvii
Skoog, page xvii
xxviiiSkoog, page 46.
xxix
See Unsworth

114