CHAPTER 7. EFFECTS OF TRADEMARKS
Section 1. General Remarks
I. Nature of Trademark Right
1. Trademark Right
A trademark right is the exclusive right to use a registered trademark with respect todesignated goods or services. The right is initiated upon registration of the mark.
(Sections 18, 19 and 25).
2. Characteristics of the Trademark Right
The subject of a trademark right may be described as an intellectual product orintangible property. However, its purpose is not for cultural advancement, as is a
copyright. It is a kind of "industrial property" and its contribution is for "industrial
purposes" (protection of users) (Section 1). The protection of industrial property
focuses on patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade
names, indications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair
competition. (Paris Convention, Article 1, Paragraph 2). Under the Japanese legal
system, a trademark right is one of the "industrial properties." The term, "industrial
properties", is usually used narrowly and indicates the rights covered by the four main
laws; namely, the Patent Law, the Utility Model Law, the Design Law and theTrademark Law. A broad definition of "industrial properties" includes various rights
covered by the trade name provisions in the Commercial Code and the Unfair
Competition Prevention Law. Whether interpreted broadly or narrowly, the Trademark
Law is included in the definition of "industrial property rights." The terms "intangible
property right" and "the Intangible Property Right Law" cover, in addition to the broad
definition of industrial properties, copyright (and the Copyright Law) and theAgricultural Seed and Seedlings Law.
3. Characteristics of Trademark Rights before Trademark Registration
The Trademark Law of Japan, which is based on the "registration principle" oftrademark law, does not grant an exclusive right to a trademark application before themark is registered. It does acknowledge, however, "a right that has accrued due to filingthe trademark application" once the application is filed and a provision concerning aright to obtain a patent is applied mutatis mutandis to a trademark application. (Section
13(2); Patent Law, Sections 33, (4)-(7)). Some of the rights associated with aninvention (patent rights) are applicable and similar to trademark rights in some respects.
The prevailing opinion considers the right that accrues upon the filing of a trademark
registration to be a public right and is based upon the belief that a trademark right isestablished by registration. (See p. 682 of Amino. Kiyose holds the view that the
public right is granted in order to protect an incomplete trademark right before filing.
See p. 57 of Kiyose. Many others opine that a trademark right is both public and private,
or in-between.). Unlike the rights of an application, namely, a right to request a nation
to grant a trademark right, a trademark right is an inherent "private right" to claim

1exclusive possession of a trademark as between individuals.
4. Exclusive Property Right
A trademark right is not a relative right or a claim right against a particular person, but
is an exclusive right effective against the general public. A trademark right is an"absolute right that is similar to a real right in nature." (It is a "quasi-real right" because
its subject is intangible property). It carries with it exclusivity; it is a right toexclusively use a particular trademark on particular designated goods. According toOno, a trademark right protects the connection between the mark and its designatedgoods or services. The purpose is not to exclusively control a two-dimensional mark,but to protect the reputation represented by the mark (connective function) (Ono,"Unfair Competition Prevention Law", Hara Taikan (retirement) (Second volume), p.
953).
A trademark right is not a personal right connected to the specific status of an individual
though it does have proprietary value. It may also be transferred or assigned. As aresult, it is considered a "property right." Furthermore, because a trademark right isused with respect to intangible property, exclusive possession of a registered trademark
with respect to designated goods or services, it falls under the category of "intangible
property right."
5. Number of Trademark Rights
If a trademark has two or more designated goods or services, the trademark registrationis considered to attach to each of such designated goods or services (Section 69). It isalso considered to be a single registration for a single trademark. However, in a trial forcancellation of a mark or for invalidation of trademark registration, surrender of a
trademark right, or any action affecting its registration, each item of the designatedgoods or services is treated individually. A trademark right initially affects eachindividual item of goods or services; renewal registrations are also considered to apply
to each individual item of goods or services. The trademark rights for two or moredesignated goods or services may be viewed by some scholars as "a group of trademark
rights." If this were the case, Section 69 is fictitious. In such a case, it may beconsidered a reasonable and cautionary (Yoshiwara=Takahashi, p. 130) or declaratory
provision (Amino, p. 573).
II. Entry into Effect of Trademark Right
1. Definition of Trademark Registration
A trademark right commences when the mark to be used is registered (Section 18 (1)).
This "registration for establishment" is a registration ex officio. By virtue ofregistration, a trademark is established. Registration of a trademark is also a "condition
for entry into force", "condition for continuance" and "condition for prevailing against athird party." Trademark registration is one of the "actions for establishing rights"
included in administrative dispositions.
2. First-to-file Principle

2

The Trademark Law of Japan adopts a registration basis to determine establishment oftrademark rights, as opposed to a "first-to-use" system. It further adopts a "first-to-filerule" instead of following the principles of prior use.
Because a trademark system that looks only to registration to determine establishment isfound to be defective, practically speaking, the first-to-use principle is adopted as well.
The Law provides protection for a trademark that is unregistered but well known to the
public (Section 4(1)(x). A trial for invalidation under Section 46 (1)(i) may be held
when one party attempts to register a mark that indicates goods or services connectedwith another person's business. Similarily, even if the owner of a well-known trademark
fails to renew the trademark, a trademark registration made by others with respect tosuch trademark will be rejected and the registration by the owner will be permitted. The
Trademark Law also has a provision providing for rights accrued by virtue of "prioruse" (Section 32).
3. Adoption of a Registration-Based Trademark System
Some countries adopt a "first-to-use" trademark system; that is to say, a right comes into
effect by virtue of use. It is difficult in this type of system, however, to confirm if a
trademark is in fact being used. It is especially difficult to determine when the
trademark began to be used. Therefore, the right may be unstable and may tend to cause
disputes. In such situations, the system does not serve to protect owners of the right.
These are some of the reasons the Trademark Law of Japan adopts the "registration
principle." According to this principle, the process of the trademark registration begins
from filing of an application, and the trademark right comes into effect upon registrationof its establishment by the decision of the Commissioner of the Patent Office.
Although the registration principle is excellent in stabilizing rights, it has some weak
points. Because use of the mark is not a requisite for registration, this system may be
abused, causing many unused registered trademarks to exist. This results in a great
number of unused trademark registrations preventing the public from freely choosing
trademarks for use. They also cause unnecessary trouble during examination for
trademark registration. For this reason, the Trademark Law shifts the burden of proof ina trial for cancellation of an unused trademark registration in order to reinforce anobligation to use trademarks.
Every country is trying to harmonize the registration principle and the first-to-use
principle. There is no country which adopts either one of the principles to the complete
exclusion of the other. (See "Chapter V, Section 1 "Registration Principle and First-toUse Principle", p. 88 of this book).
Section 2. Effects of Trademark Right
I. Effects of Trademark Right
The owner of a trademark right shall "have an exclusive right to use the registeredtrademark with respect to the designated goods or designated services (Text of Section
25). The owner of a trademark has such "exclusive right" in order to protect the accrued

3reputation with respect to designated goods or services and is entitled to take civil or
criminal proceedings against any person infringing his or her right.
The effects of a trademark right extend throughout the country, but not beyond theterritory (for example, Japan) within which the Trademark Law is enforced. The
trademark rights in each country are independent.
The practical content of a trademark right is derived from the purposes of theTrademark Law. The protection of a trademark right refers primarily to the protectionof the function of a registered trademark. It is based on a balance between theprotection of the owner of a trademark right and the protection of consumers.
Accordingly, the infringement of a trademark right should not be limited to "an act toaffix the registered trademarks of another without limitation." Instead, it should be
defined as an act that impairs a function of a registered trademark. In Section 36(Injunctions) and Section 38 (Presumption, etc. of amount of damages) of theTrademark Law, only the term "infringement of a trademark right," appears without
definition. The definition of which acts are to be regarded as infringement depends on
the interpretation of the particular circumstances of each case. (Such instances include
a case of concurrent import of genuine products which is an infringement as a matter ofform but is not considered to be an infringement, and removal of trademarks without
permission which is deemed legitimate if an infringement is limited to an infringing
person's act to affix registered trademarks without limitation.)
II. Active Effects
1. Scope of a Right to Use (and the Right to Prohibit Others from Using)
The right of trademark is an exclusive right to use a registered trademark (or any
trademark identical to the trademark) with respect to the designated goods or designatedservices (or any goods or services identical to the designated goods or services). This is
known as the "right of use"(active effects).
The scope of a right to use is limited to a "registered trademark" (or any identicaltrademark). It is, however, unreasonable to interpret that "identical" means "exactly
identical" in this case. "Identical trademark" is interpreted to be a trademark which isregarded to be generally accepted as identical. (As recognized by precedent, or by acommonly accepted idea. See, for example, Toyosaki p. 393).
The owner of a trademark may prohibit a third party from using a registered trademark
or a similar trademark with respect to the designated goods or services, or from using a
registered trademark or a similar trademark with respect to the designated goods orservices or any goods or services similar to the designated goods or services. This is
known as the prohibitive right (negative effects) discussed in the Trademark Law. Third
parties can freely use the trademark so long as the use does not enter the scope of theprohibitive right, which allows the owner of the trademark to prohibit any other use of
the trademark that is in the scope of the prohibitive right. The prohibitive right provides
for civil and criminal penalties under the law for offenses of trademark infringement.
Although the scope of the prohibitive rights is typically defined, there are cases where

4disputes have arisen regarding the scope of the rights. Under one Supreme Court case(the case of Kozozushi), the similarity of the marks contradicted the findings ofconfusion making the scope of the prohibitive right relative and variable. Under theformer "associated trademark system" (Section 7 of the former Trademark Law), theregistration of similar trademarks was required to receive the protection of theprohibitive right. Lawsuits involving the scope of a prohibitive right became even moredifficult due to the abolition of this system.
2. Effects of Right of Use and Prohibitive Right
The owner of a trademark right has an exclusive right to use the registered trademark
with respect to the designated goods or services (Section 25). The owner of a trademark
has a right to use trademarks without interference from others (right of use) as well as aright to prohibit others from using his trademarks (prohibitive right). The former rightserves to ensure stable use of trademarks, which is a key point of the trademark system
based on the registration principle, while the latter right serves to support theexclusiveness intrinsic to industrial property rights.
The owner of a trademark may continue to use his own registered trademark that falls
within the scope of similarity of another person's trademark without interference fromthe exercise of a prohibitive right by others until his trademark registration is officiallyinvalidated (except where the use conflicts with any right of others or the owner isabusing his right). The owner of the trademark will not be required to discontinue theuse of his trademark, if he uses it within the scope of his right of use, unless the use of
the trademark conflicts with any right of others or is deemed to be abusive. According
to Article 6 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law (prior to revision) any exercise
of a trademark right was not regarded as violation of the Unfair Competition Prevention
Law. This legislation was based in part on the idea that any trademark right should be
respected because it was granted by the nation through a due examination process. It
was also based on the reality that when a trademark is registered without awareness ofthe existence of a well-known trademark, the Unfair Competition Prevention Law may
be applied after the registration is invalidated under the Trademark Law (trial forinvalidation).
However, at that time, acts of unfair competition by trademark owners were notpermitted under a theory that such acts are abusive. (Vol. 35, No. 7, Supreme Court,
Minshu, p. 1129, Oct. 13, 1981; Vol. 8, No. 8, Osaka District Court, Kaminshu, p. 1628,
Aug. 31, 1957; Vol. 17, No. 7-8, Tokyo District Court, Kaminshu, p. 729, Aug. 30, 1966
and many other cases; See Ono, "Annotations", p. 456 f.) Section 6 of the former
Unfair Competition Law was abolished for this reason. Because the provision that gavepriority to trademark rights was abolished without sufficient discussion, the viewpointthat presumes that trademark rights are effective upon obtaining a trademark registrationand the viewpoint that treats the Trademark Law and the Unfair Competition Prevention
Law equally are currently coexisting. Therefore, the legal argument is not currently
stable. The Report submitted when the former Article 6 of the Unfair Competition
Prevention Law was abolished predicted that the current situation would not changeeven after the provision was abolished. Facts sufficient to deny the use of a trademark
must be presented in order to deny one a right to use a trademark, even if there is noneed to go so far as to require any evidence of abuse. We must be aware that the5function of registration is to stabilize trademark usage, and that that function cannot
simply be denied by mere assertion that the Unfair Competition Prevention Law has
been violated.
The purpose of the prohibitive right is to protect the business reputation of the owner ofa trademark right. Therefore, in a case where a person other than the trademark owner
imports and sells a genuine product, the act will not be deemed to be an infringement
unless it degrades the reputation of the owner.1 This is because the act will not change
the quality of the product nor impair the function of the trademark in any way. However,if the act is likely to impair the reputation of the trademark owner (such as erroneous
evaluation of the quality), it will be regarded as an infringement of the trademark. (Vol.
25, No. 5, **Supreme Court, Keishu, p. 739, Jul. 20, 1971).
Currently, there is a controversy in Europe over selective distribution systems andtrademarks. A selective distribution system is a system that endeavors to maintain acertain image of excellence by distributing cosmetics or other luxury products only
through qualified distributors. Should genuine products be sold at low prices despite
this situation, the brand image or the advertising function of the trademark is considered
to be impaired. The controversy centers around whether discount sales of genuine
products under the selective distribution system should be regarded as an infringementof a trademark right. The argument is hotly contested from both sides with the supportof influential theories in the areas of the trademark law and economics.
3. Expanding the Effects of Trademark Rights
Under the Trademark Law, the effective scope of the prohibitive right is expanded to agroup of acts which are deemed to be an indirect infringement (Section 37, (2)-(8)).
Historically, the Law attempted to expand such effects under the associated trademark
system and the defensive trademark system. Although the defensive mark systemremained, the associated trademark system, an idea that originated in England, wasdiscontinued under the pretext of promoting registration shortly after England
abandoned it. Although it was discontinued, the significance of the associatedtrademark system will be discussed below.
(1) Definition of former associated trademark system(a) If a person registers a trademark that is similar to an existing trademark on any
goods or services that are similar to the designated goods or services of the existing
mark, such registration will impair the rights of the prior registered trademark (Section
4 (1) (xi)). The new trademark will not be registered. However, if the new registration
is made by the owner of the prior trademark, the registration does not infringe thetrademark right of another, nor is it likely to cause confusion. 2 Therefore, the1

A trademark right is based on territorial principles. If any goods to which a trademark islegitimately applied, which are for sale in a foreign country, are imported and sold in Japan, where
the trademark owner did not intend to offer the goods for sale, the act will be deemed to be an
infringement of a trademark based in Japan. (Vol.2, No.1, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p.71, Feb.
27, 1972).
2
If the trademark concerned belongs to the scope of a prohibitive right of another person's trademark
right at the same time, neither trademark will be registrable. This is commonly called, "mutual kick-6

registration by a trademark owner of a mark in conflict with another registeredtrademark of his own was permitted under certain conditions. This was the "associatedtrademark system" (Former Section 7).
(b) Characteristics of associated trademarks
First, the registration of similar trademarks called "associated trademarks" waspermitted because the owner of both trademarks was the same person. Because thetrademarks had this special connection, the Trademark Law prohibited their separationand transfer (Former Section 24 (2)).
Second, the associated trademarks could be used defensively. If even only one of the
trademarks was being used continuously, no person could demand a trial to cancel theregistration of any of the trademarks (Section 50). The situation was not affected even
if the remaining trademarks not being used satisfied the requirement for the trial forcancellation (Former Section 50 (2)).
Third, it was provided that, if only one of these associated trademarks was continuously
being used and not the others, the renewal of the registration of the trademark was not tobe rejected solely because the remaining trademarks were not in use (Former Section
19(2)(ii)).
(c) Problems and reason for discontinuation
One serious problem existed due to the special provisions that governed theexamination of applications and the requests for a trial for cancellation or for renewal ofregistration. Many people took advantage of the benefits of the associated trademark
system and used the provisions to obtain an excessive number of so-called "stock
trademarks." This resulted in an increase in unused trademarks. It also led to theemergence of groups of trademarks in "chains." Trademark A, Trademark
B.........Trademark D, and then Trademark E.... in this way, each trademark became
associated with the next trademark one after another. These trademarks, which werecalled, "trademarks associated in a chain", sometimes formed a group of as many as
1,000 trademarks (Daishinin (former Supreme Court, Minroku, ** p. 715, May. 21,
1920). This increased the burden on the patent office and caused a delay in handling theexaminations. Under the associated trademark system, it was obvious that the numberof registered trademarks in Japan had increased at an abnormal rate and equaled to thetotal number of registered trademarks in Europe. The abnormal number of registeredtrademarks caused such a problem that third party businesses had a greatly limited
choice of trademarks when adopting a new trademark.
The Law revised in 1996 discontinued the associated trademark system, and allowed theseparation and transfer of similar trademarks as well as the division and transfer ofidentical trademarks. Some preventive measures were taken, from the viewpoint ofpublic interest, in order to avoid confusion after the revision. However, many problems
remained unsolved, probably because the measures did not function sufficiently.
(d) Problems in connection with the discontinuance of the associated trademark systemout or mutual exclusion."7

c In many cases, the range of trademarks similar to the registered trademark concernedor the range of goods similar to designated goods is ambiguous. Under the associatedtrademark system, the owner of a trademark right was able to clarify the scope of his
prohibitive right by holding associated registered trademarks, serving to prevent
disputes.
Because each of the associated trademarks was independent from the others, eachsatisfied the requirements for registration and did not qualify as unregistrable under
Section 4. As such, associated trademarks were not different from individual
trademarks. For example, if the scope of one trademark owner's prohibitive rightoverlaps that of a third party, the use of neither trademark may be prohibited within theoverlapping scope. This phenomenon often occurred among the associated trademarks
owned by various parties. This overlap caused trouble in registration as well as withinfringement, and became commonly known as "mutual kick-out or mutual exclusion."(Vol. 6, No. 4, Tokyo District Court, Kaminshu, p. 718, Apr. 15, 1955).
d Similar trademarks owned by the same person
As of the 1996 revision, the rights of the now abolished associated trademarks existingon April 1, 1997 were deemed to have become regular trademark rights as of the samedate, as a transitional measure. Similarly, applications for registration of associatedtrademarks that were pending on April 1, 1997 were deemed to have become individual
trademark applications (Section 4 of the supplementary provisions of the 1996 revised
Trademark Law).
Since April 1, 1997, when the owner of a registered trademark files an application forregistration of a trademark similar to his own mark (both of which used to be treated asassociated trademarks), the request will be made for an individual trademark
registration and the new trademark will be so registered if there is no reason forrejection.3
e Separation and transfer of similar trademarks, and division and transfer of identicaltrademarks and confusion
Because Section 24(2) of the former Trademark Law was deleted, the new law allows
the separation and transfer of a trademark right related to similar trademarks. Similarly,
the deletion of Section 24 (1) of the former Trademark Law has given way to theprovision allowing the division and transfer of identical trademarks in respect of thedesignated goods and services that are similar to each other.
These changes have led to two problems. First, the transfer of a trademark right to adifferent person limits the filing due to the above-mentioned mutual exclusion. Second,
the transfers may cause confusion among similar trademarks.
f Prevention against confusion resulting from transfer of trademark rights(a) Right to demand an indication to prevent confusion
Once the separation and transfer of similar trademarks and the division and transfer ofidentical trademarks are permitted, similar trademarks are allowed to exist concurrently.
3

The revision of deleted or amended any reference to the provisions related to associated trademarks.

8This can cause confusion of source. In order to resolve this problem, a new provision
concerning a request to demand an indication to prevent confusion has been added(Section 24(4)).
For example, in a case where the result of the transfer of a trademark right causes thetrademark rights used for similar or identical goods or services to come to belong todifferent persons, if the situation is likely to cause any damage to the business interestsof the owner of a trademark right (or the owner of a right of exclusive use), such owner(or right holder) may request the owner of the other trademark right to make a suitableindication so as to prevent any confusion between the goods or services concerned(Section 24 (4)). This right to request an indication to prevent confusion poses various
practical problems that will be discussed in greater detail below (p. 252).
(b) Trial for cancellation due to confusion
In a case where the result of the transfer of a trademark right causes the trademark rights
used for similar or identical goods or services to come to belong to different persons andwhere one owner uses his registered trademark for the purposes of unfair competition,or as a designation for goods or services in a way which may cause confusion withgoods or services connected with the business of the owner of other registeredtrademark (or the owner of the right of its exclusive or non-exclusive use), either party
may demand a trial for the cancellation of the trademark registration (Section 52- 2).
The trial for cancellation may not be demanded if five years have lapsed from the dateon which the owner of a trademark right ceased to use the trademark (Section 52
applied mutatis mutandis to Section 52(2)(ii)). When the trial decision ordering
cancellation of a trademark registration has become final and conclusive, the trademark
right will become extinguished (Section 54(1)).
In a case where the owner of a trademark right has been granted a trial decision ordering
cancellation of its trademark registration, the owner may not obtain a trademark
registration for the same or a similar trademark, for the designated goods or designatedservices covered by the trademark registration or for goods or services similar thereto,
until five years after the trial decision was final and conclusive (Section 52 (2) andSection 15(1) applied mutatis mutandis to Section 52-2(2)).
(2) Defensive marks(a) Definition
The Trademark Law addresses similar trademarks and similar goods or services andgrants a prohibitive right to a registered trademark owner to protect such similar
trademarks and similar goods or services. This serves to protect the function of a
trademark that indicates source. The prohibitive right does not extend to dissimilar
goods or dissimilar services.
The more widely-recognized a registered trademark has become among consumers, themore likely it is to cause confusion of source if it is used with respect to dissimilar
goods or services. In such a case, the reputation represented by the well-known
trademark might be degraded. The exclusivity, distinctiveness and advertising ability of
the well-known trademark is also likely to be impaired. Consumers who have confused9the different trademarks may be disappointed. To combat this, the Trademark Law
established the defensive mark system. Under this system, the owner of a trademark
right may, under certain conditions, extend his prohibitive right to goods and services
other than those similar or identical to the designated goods or services covered by theregistered trademark (Section 64 f.).
(b) Conditions for obtaining registration of defensive marks
The following conditions must be fulfilled in order to obtain the registration of
defensive marks (Section 64)
c "The registered trademark is well-known among consumers as an indicator for thedesignated goods that are connected with the owner's business"
The same expression, "well-known among consumers", appears also in Section 32(prior use) and Section 4(1)(x) (Unregisterable trademarks). However, in this provision,
the trademark is required to be extremely well-known in light of the legislation
surrounding Section 64. It must be a "big name" trademark.
The Trademark Examination Guidelines provide the following guidance: (Trademark
Examination Guidelines, p. 71)
1. The phrase, "in the case where the trademark is well known" means "in the casewhere the trademark becomes famous"
2. The degree of prominence of the trademark shall be judged according to thefollowing standards:(1) The time when the trademark related to the defensive mark registration (hereinafter"original registered trademark") began to be used, the term of use, the territory of use,
the range of goods or services for which the trademark is used and other conditions;(2) How widely the original registered trademark is advertised and how widely thetrademark is known:(3) The size of the business of the owner of the original trademark right, conditions of
the business (production and marketing, etc.), goods traded by the firm in connection
with the designated goods or services;(4) Whether the Patent Office is well aware that the original registered trademark isfamous.
d "When the use of the registered trademark by any other person with respect toservices other than the designated services covered by the registered trademark andsimilar goods or services is likely to cause confusion between such services or goods
and the designated services in connection with his business" (Section 64(1)).
The term, "confusion", is used here in a broad sense. Therefore it includes confusion
with any services or goods that are generally regarded to be connected with the firm thatis the source.
The Trademark Examination Guidelines provide as follows:4"Whether any confusion will be caused with respect to the source of the goods orservices shall be comprehensively judged, taking the following conditions pertaining to
how the designated goods or services on which the original registered trademark is used4

Trademark Examination Guidelines, p.72.

10

are related to the goods (services) designated in an application for defensive markregistration into consideration:(1)"Trademark in respect of goods"
With respect to the relationship with dissimilar goods, goods in question shall beconsidered as part of the same general business if they share the manufacturer,
distributor, handling system, materials and the ways they are used, etc. With respect tothe relationship with dissimilar services, services in question shall be considered as partof the same general business in view of the provider, content of the services and articles
used for providing the services.
"Trademark in respect of services"
With respect to the relationship with dissimilar services, services in question shall beconsidered as part of the same general business in view of the provider, content of theservices and things used for providing the services.
With respect to the relationship with dissimilar goods, goods in question shall beconsidered as part of the same generalbusiness in view of the manufacturer, distributor,
handling system, materials and articles for use in the provision of services.
(2) In situations other than those referred to in (1), the source of the goods or services
for which the mark is to be registered is generally recognizable as closely connectedwith the original owner of the registered trademark right.
e "A mark which is identical with the registered trademark"Similar marks may not be registered. In one case, the court held that "The defensive
mark system is designed to expand the prohibitive effects of the registered trademark to
goods not similar to the designated goods on the condition that there is a possibility ofconfusion. Therefore, the owner of a trademark right may obtain a defensive markregistration only for a mark identical to the registered trademark; namely, the mark of
the registered trademark itself." For instance, the application for registration of a mark,"Mercedes-Benz" in Class 18, similar to "MERCEDES-BENZ", a big name car
trademark was rejected (No. 1326, Tokyo High Court, Hanji, p. 145, Jul. 27, 1989).
When the owner of the trademark, "SCOTCH", a mark used in respect of the designatedgoods of the former Class 69, "sound magnetic recording tapes for electromagnetic
sound reproduction apparatus, and any other goods classifiable in this class," filed forthe registration of a defensive mark with respect to the identical mark to apply to"kitchen utensils" in the former Class 19, the Patent Office rejected the registration on
the grounds that (a) the well-known and famous mark, "scotch", is indicated in small
letters, and (b) goods in both classes are quite different from each other in terms of
manufacturer, stores, and uses. However, this trial decision was canceled later because"SCOTCH" in capital letters also became well-known due to the fame of "scotch" insmall letters, and there was a possibility of causing confusion if someone applied thetrademark to kitchen utensils. For the above reason, this case met the requirement forregistration of a defensive mark (No. 1563, Tokyo High Court, Hanji, p. 134, Jun. 30,
1996).

11

Considerations for registration of a defensive mark do not include the Section 3
requirements regarding distinctiveness from other goods or services or the Section 4
reasons for which a trademark is unacceptable for registration that are required for aregular trademark application. (Section 68(2)). This is because the basic trademark has
already passed examination. The next question, then, is whether a trademark including
the generic name of goods or services is qualified for examination for a defensive mark,if an application for a defensive mark registration is filed with respect to the goods orservices other than the designated goods or services. The Trademark Examination
Guidelines provide that a defensive mark registration will be approved, if an application
for such registration is filed with respect to a trademark including the generic name of
the goods or services to be used on any goods or services other than the designatedgoods or services, provided that the trademark satisfies the remaining conditions." (P. 72
of the Trademark Examination Guidelines)
However, the procedures for the registration of regular applications are applied mutatis
mutandis to the filing or examination of the registration of defensive marks (Section
68(1)). An application for trademark registration may be converted into an application
for registration of a defensive mark (Section 65).
Since the provision of Section 8 (First-to-file rule) is not applied mutatis mutandis to
Section 68(1), more than one registrations can be made with respect to the same
defensive mark.
(c) Effects
If a defensive mark is registered, the prohibitive range of the trademark right (principal
trademark) forming the basis of the defensive mark will be expanded.
The following acts are deemed to be an infringement of the principal trademark right (orexclusive trademark right) as stipulated in Section 25 (Effects of a trademark right).
(i) Use of a registered defensive mark (hereinafter simply referred to as "defensivemark") in respect of the designated goods or designated services;(ii) Acts of holding, for the purpose of assignment or delivery, the designated goods onwhich or on the packaging of which the registered defensive mark has been applied;(iii) Acts of holding or importing articles which are for use by persons to whom theservices are provided;(iv) Acts of assigning or delivering articles which are for use by persons to whom thedesignated services are provided and to which the registered defensive mark has been
applied, in the provision of the services;(v) Acts of holding goods bearing a reproduction of the registered defensive mark forthe purpose using such a mark in respect of the designated goods or designated services;(vi) Acts of assigning or delivering, or of holding for the purpose of assignment ordelivery, goods bearing a reproduction of the registered defensive mark, for the purpose12

of causing such defensive mark to be used in respect of the designated goods ordesignated services;(vii) Acts of manufacturing or importing foods bearing a reproduction of the registereddefensive mark for the purpose of using such defensive mark, or causing it to be used,in respect of the designated goods or designated services.
The effects of the defensive trademark right extend only to trademarks identical with theoriginal trademark, and to goods or services identical with the designated goods orservices to which the original trademark applies and do not extend to similar trademarks,
similar goods or services. Confusion does not necessarily occur with respect to similar
trademarks, or similar goods or services. Because the Unfair Competition Prevention
Law also serves to double-protect trademarks in addition to the expeditious and simple
registration procedure, the effects of defensive trademark right are limited in order toavoid excessive protection.
Arguments or defenses based on the prior user's right or a non-voluntary license due to
use prior to the request for an invalidation trial is also allowed. The registration of any
trademark, identical to a defensive mark, that is to be applied to any goods or services
identical to the designated goods or services covered by the defensive mark registration
will be refused (Section 4(1)(xii); See Section 2, III (2) "Relative Reasons for
Unregistrability", p. 133, supra).
Because the use of a defensive mark cannot be anticipated, the rules for cancellation of
trademark registration due to non-use (Section 50), cancellation of registration of
trademarks used in any misleading way (Sections 51 and 53), establishment of rights of
exclusive use and non-exclusive rights (Sections 30 and 31), and establishment ofpledges (Section 34) are not applied to defensive marks. The provision that allows anagent or a representative of a person who has a trademark right to demand a trial forcancellation in cases of illegitimate registration (Section 53-2) are applied mutatis
mutandis (Section 68, Paragraph 4) to defensive marks.
(d) Transfer and extinguishment
Because the defensive mark registration aims to expand the protection of the principal
trademark right, it cannot be independent from the principal trademark right. Therefore,
if the principal trademark right is transferred, the right based on a defensive markregistration will be transferred together with the principal trademark right (Section 66,(2)). On the assumption that defensive mark registration covers the entire principal
trademark right, when the principal trademark right is divided, the right based on the
defensive mark registration will not remain in part nor be transferred in part together
with the divided principal trademark but it will be extinguished (Section 66(1)).
The term of a right based on a defensive mark registration shall be 10 years from thedate of establishment of the registration. A request must be made to renew theregistration. Unless such request is made, the right will be extinguished (Section 65-2).
A trial for invalidation of a trademark registration may be demanded (Section 68(4)), if
one or more of the requirements for registration are not met (Section 64). Once a
decision for invalidation has become final and conclusive at trial, the trademark right13

will become extinguished. In the case where the owner of the right based on a
defensive mark fails to renew the registration of such mark, or where an application forregistration for such renewal does not meet the conditions for the renewal (Section 64),
the defensive mark right will be extinguished. In such a case, Section 11-1 through 11-3of the Trademark Examination Guidelines will be applied mutatis mutandis (See Section(b) concerning conditions for registration). "In such a case, how the principal trademark
is currently used must be fully considered" (p74 of the Trademark Examination
Guidelines).
(e) Problems in preventing unfair competition
The defensive mark system is applicable only to trademarks identical to registeredtrademarks. Its prohibitive effects do not extend to trademarks, goods or services
beyond the designated range. The system does not affect the registration of a trademarkthat is only similar to the principal trademark used on similar goods or services. People
seldom try to make an exact copy of a registered trademark. They usually use a
trademark similar but different only in a few respects (except for some cases ofillegitimate copy goods which aim at as close as possible resemblance). Where marks
are copied exactly, the defensive mark system does not typically have a direct effect.
This is one reason why defensive marks are unpopular. Additionally, the procedure forregistration of a defensive mark is troublesome. And despite such trouble, the defensive
mark system does not work very effectively when necessary. It seems as though thesystem would be useful only in cases where evidence is needed to show how famous themark is.
III. Negative Effects
1. Definition
The owner of a trademark right has the ability to stop the acts of a third party that harm
the value of the trademark right. This is called the negative effect of the trademark right.
The negative effect applies to everything within the trademark's scope of protection
from direct infringement to indirect infringement as defined by Section 37 of theTrademark Law. The scope of protection of trademark rights covers "identical orsimilar goods and/or services" and "identical or similar trademarks."
2. Identical or similar goods and/or services(1)
Goods and services(a)Defining the concept of goods and services
The concept of goods and services is, along with the concept of the mark, mostfundamental to Trademark Law. Its significance exceeds the trademark's scope ofprotection and the infringement of trademark rights.
Trademarks have value as a relational concept, linking the goods/services they represent
with the marks that are used. Neither goods nor services, or marks, are subjects ofprotection per se. Trademark protection is concerned with the protection of "good will,"
the interdependence of the trademark and the goods or services it represents. Its
purpose is to protect the trust or reputation regarding the origin of the goods or services

14

represented by the trademark. Furthermore, the concept of "identity or similarity ofgoods and/or services" is fundamental to the Trademark Law and one by whichapplication for trademark registration is judged.5
Concepts of "goods" or "services" play major roles in the Trademark Law, and in theinterest of expediency, they will be explained here primarily in the context of "identity
or similarity of goods and services."(b)Definition of "goods"
The Trademark Law does not expressly define goods or services. The most likely
reason for this is due to discrepancies that may be caused when the nature oftransactions undergo a change. For our overview, goods shall be defined as the tangible
properties that can be exchanged on the market for money or other products withbusiness being the objective.
Securities, such as bonds and debentures; stocks, shares certificates, and bills;"intangible" properties such as inventions and design; and "real estate," which is landbound, are not considered "goods." In addition, products that are taken for personal use
immediately upon completion and used solely for private consumption are not "goods"
because they are not objects of business transactions.
(c)Definition of "services"
Services are deeds performed for the benefit of another person that can be taken
independently to have business as their objective.
Specifically, they are services provided for consumers by workers employed inindustries such as advertising, finance, construction, transport, accommodation and foodservices. Services that complement another service or sale of goods (e.g. free delivery
or mending of purchased goods, courtesy bus rides offered by hotels) are not "services"because they are complementary and not services with business as their objective intheir own right.6 However, if goods bought at a department store are delivered free ofcharge to the buyer by a subcontractor who is an independent delivery company, thennaturally the subcontractor's services will come under transport services.
(2) Identical or similar goods or services(a) Identity of goods or services" Identical" goods or services is defined here not to mean that they are physically andliterally the same thing. This differs from the way the word is used in criminal
procedures for example, when the goods in question are the same actual goods orservices. "Identical goods or services" in the Trademark Law is the notion of degree ofidenticalness when comparing two or more goods or services.
For goods or services to be perceived as identical, it is not necessary for every
characteristic to correspond to that of the other goods or services in question. The
nature of the product, its effect and usage, and the nature of the service, its effects and56This idea is one reason given for unregistrability in Chapter 5.2, 4 (1) (xi), amongst others.
See page 25 "Registration procedures of service marks" Review Board for Amendment.

15

usage as they are interpreted by society are carefully considered to determine whether
they are identical or not. It is not dictated by the law; it is a necessary interpretation of
the law. In the past, "identical" tended to be interpreted too narrowly and strictly,
resulting in rulings that worked to the advantage of illegal competitors. It was therefore
deemed necessary to introduce the phrase "similarity of goods."7
Producers, retailers and providers are free to name goods and services as they like.
Identical goods and services may possess more than one name just as one name may be
used for goods and services that are not identical. It is therefore important not to makejudgements on the identity of goods and services on the basis of the names given tothem.
(b) Similarity of goods and services
Judgment is passed on whether goods and services are similar or not by taking into
account the circumstances surrounding the manufacturing and transactions of goods,
their quality, usage and the like. The same applies for services: circumstances
surrounding the provision of and transactions of services, their quality, usage and thelike. An effort is made to disassociate any special attachment to a trademark perhaps
because of its prominence. 8 Rulings are ideally based on whether an identicaltrademark being attached to more than one good or service would cause confusion.
Socially conventional interpretation is taken into account as well as the fact thatcircumstances surrounding transactions change over time. Consequently views on thesimilarity of goods or services inevitably change over time. (The Supreme Court's
ruling tends to take into account the prominence of actual trademarks when focusing on
the probability of confusion regarding the trademark's origin, should it be used on both
goods or both services.)
One ruling on "similarity of goods" states: "we should not simply be concerned with thepossibility of goods themselves being mistaken in transactions. Rather we ought to notethat even if there is little fear of the goods themselves being mistaken for another, if
circumstances such as sharing the same manufacturer or retailer mean the use ofidentical or similar trademarks leading to a misunderstanding regarding the origin of thegoods, then they will be considered similar. (For cases on mistaken origin: Vol. 15, No.
6, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 1730, Jun. 27, 1961. also Vol. 17, No. 9, Supreme Court,
Minshu, p. 1155, Oct. 4, 1936. Vol. 18, No. 5, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 938, Jun. 16,
1964., Vol. 22, No. 12, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 2559, Nov. 15, 1968.) Academia is
divided into two camps: one groups subscribes to the theory that trademarks protect
against confusion over source the other believes that the protection is against confusion
over goods. (For the Confusion over Source theory see Miyake p. 187, Shibuya p. 328,
Amino p. 583, Eguchi/Hara "Taikan Kinen" Vol. II
p. 925, Ono "Standards for Differentiation of Goods" Kigyouhou Kenkyu No. 111 p.
13.) The theory that trademarks protect confusion of source can be further divided into
7

The concept of "similarity of services" followed with the introduction of registration of service
marks at a later date. See Nakamura, p.224.
8
According to Vol.51, No.3, Supreme Court, Minshu, Mar.11, 1997, regarding the "Kozozushi" case,the courts do in fact take into account the prominence and other special attachments of the trademark
in their ruling.

16

actual confusion and an abstract confusion; however, the Supreme Court rules on thebases of actual confusion over source. Regarding the theory that trademarks protect
against confusion over goods, Kaneko-Someno p. 383 judges on the attributes of thegoods in previous cases. Toyosaki p. 370 judges on whether the source could bedetermined by disregarding the trademark and looking at the goods only. (For further
categorization see Nakamura p. 228.) Despite the great separation in the schools ofthought, the Patent Office bases its decisions firmly on the "Standards on Similarity ofGoods and Services in Accordance with The Classification of Goods and Services"(Edited by Trademark Department, Patent Office. Revised edition 1998 herein called
Standards on Similarity.) The Supreme Court deals with specific confusions regarding
the origin of goods or source in line with the stance taken by the Patent Office. The
recent so-called "Pony" case (No. 1548, Tokyo High Court, Hanji, p. 132, Aug. 3,
1995.) whereby "shoes, boots" and "Jikatabi (traditional Japanese soft shoes)" wereruled as having the same source (manufacturer) is an example of the confusion theory inpractice.
Courts have not yet ruled on how this applies to services, but a review of the decisionon service trademarks (business indication) relating to the Unfair Competition
Prevention Law, Section 1 (1)(ii) (prior to revision) is useful. It is worth noting,however, that the nature of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law considers the issueof confusion central to the concept of similarity, so much so that if there is confusion
over the source of goods, then they must be similar. Moreover, despite the Supreme
Court's stance that similarity and confusion are two separate issues, their ruling seems toindicate that they consider the two the same.
(c)Standards on similarity of goods or services
The "Standards on Similarity of Goods or Services" which outlines just that, ispractically important because deliberation can be conducted speedily and consistency ismaintained. Unfortunately when scrutinized, even this is not an absolute. This isdiscussed in the "Standards on Similarity of Goods or Services in Accordance with 'TheClassification of Goods and Services.'" It is proper for all on the examining committee
to deal with actual cases using this uniform standard but depending on the case, the fact
remains that the Patent Office (page viii of "Standards on Similarity of Goods orServices") and courts can reach a decision that is inconsistent with this standard. (Thesupreme court's ruling cannot be interpreted from a confusion theory point of view withany consistency.) Even so, these standards are utilized in all deliberations and rulingsand need to be carefully considered in lawsuits. These standards can even be taken asde facto evidence of transactions.
The Standards on Similarity offers guidelines to help define the similarity of goods, thesimilarity of services, and the similarity of goods and services in regard to Trademark
Law, Section 4(1)(xi) (Trademark Examination Guidelines, p. 34, 35) as follows:In deciding whether goods are similar, the following standards need to be considered asa whole. In principle, the Standards on Similarity of Goods and Services will be used.
(i) Do the manufacturing sections coincide?
(ii) Do the retailing sections coincide?
(iii) Do the ingredients and quality coincide?

17

(iv) Does their usage coincide?
(v) Do their potential consumer groups overlap?
(vi) Is their relationship one of finished product and component?
In deciding whether services are similar, the following standards need to be considered
as a whole. In principle, the Standards on Similarities of Goods and Services will beused.
(i) Do the means of provision, purpose or location coincide?
(ii) Do the products that accompany the service coincide?
(iii) Do their potential consumer groups overlap?
(iv) Do they belong to the same business sector?
(v)
Are the same laws governing the business related to these services and theemployers?
(vi) Is the same employer providing these services?
In deciding whether goods and services are similar to one another, the following
standards need to be considered as a whole and then the specifics of each one examined
separately.
(i) Is the same employer generally dealing with both manufacturing/retail of the goods
and the provision of services?
(ii) Do the purpose of the goods and the services coincide?
(iii) Is the retail location of the goods the same as the location of the service provided?
(iv) Do their potential consumer groups coincide?
(d) "Similarity of goods and services" and "Classification of goods and/or services""Similarity of goods and services" is not the same thing as "classification of goods
and/or services"(Trademark Law Section 6, Trademark Order Section 1, Trademark
Enforcement Regulations, Section 6). "Classification of goods and/or services" is used
relative to application and examination. Goods are classified from Class 1: "Chemical
products for industrial, scientific or agricultural use" to Class 34: "Cigarettes, smokingrelated articles and matches." Services are classified from Class 35: "Advertising,business management/administration and clerical work" to Class 42: "Food services,….programming of electronic calculators and other services not already covered by theother classes." The Patent Office has the right to determine to which "class" a new
product or new service will belong and the responsibility to inform the applicant of its
decision.
The 1996 Amendments introduced a new "one-application" system for simultaneous
application for more than one class. The clause, "within the class (of the classificationof goods and services) prescribed by the Cabinet Order" was deleted from Section 6 inorder to enable filing for more than one product for various classes at the same time.
In contrast, "similarity of goods and services" relies heavily on the consumers'
perception and in practice has to be decided in courts. Consequently, a standard against
which the goods or services can be measured in their similarity to other goods orservices is essential in trademark examination rulings. It is a mistake to regard the
Patent Office's "Standards on Similarity of Goods or Services" merely as a guideline; itneeds to be upheld as having more authority than it is perceived to have at present. In

18current practice, the ultimate decision rests with the courts. Goods and services areclassified for the convenience of examination, taking the similarity of the goods andservices into account as an important factor for decisions on classification. Because of
the differing nature of the two concepts, some classes contain goods or services which
are obviously dissimilar: "beds" and "frames "(both class 20), "combs" and "pots" (21),"advertising" and "stenography" (35). On the other hand, goods/services that areconsidered similar are classified into different groups: "futon" (24) and "bed" (20), "hairaccessories" (26) and "comb" (21), "telephone repairs " (37) and "telephone rentals"(38).
(e) "Attached Table to Cabinet Order" and "Attached Table to Ministerial Decree"
The current laws classify goods and services in accordance with International
Classifications.
The "Classification of Goods/Services" includes a "Table Attached Pursuant to Cabinet
Order," 9 which is broadly set by the Trademark Enforcement Regulations, anddesignated according to Trademark Law Section 6(2) and the "Ministerial Decree"10
The Ministerial Decree is based on the assumption that the Ministerial Decree of the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry is designated according to the Trademark
Enforcement Regulations 1 to deal with classification of goods and services.
The goods and services which appear in the "Table pursuant to Ministerial Decree" havebeen further categorized into subsections. The table may be used to indicate thedesignated goods/services for filings. It is only an example and new products may bedesignated for registration. The Patent Office has a Classification Examining Officespecializing in such matters.
"International Classification" refers to "International Classification of Goods andServices for Registration of Signs Based on the Nice Agreement," which was set up to
enable the use of a single system of categorization of goods and services, common to
the international community. It comprises the "Table According to Class (which
includes the notations) " and "Table of Goods/Services in Alphabetical Order." Japan
has been using International Classification as its primary system since April 1 1992.
Additionally, the Nice Agreement has undergone a few amendments. (6th Edition in
effect from January 1 1992, 7th Edition in effect from January 1 1997.)(3)
Transferring(a)Significance of Transferring
Trademarks (or defensive marks) applied to designated products that were classified
under the old system of classification are transferred to the class to which they should
belong in accordance with the current International Classification.
At present, five different systems of classification coexist, making search andexamination procedures extremely complicated. The five classification systems are: 1.
9

Attached Table to Trademark Enforcement Order 1. Attached Table to Trademark Enforcement
Regulations.
10
Attached Table to Enforcement Regulation 6. Attached Table to the Ministerial Decree ofInternational Trade and Industry.

19

Classification under the 1899 Law, 2. Classification under the 1909 Law, 3.
Classification under the 1921 Law, 4. Classification under the 1959 Law, 5. Trademark
registrations filed after April 1, 1992 under the current International Classification. The
Meiji/Taisho Classification had problems such as the lack of clarity regarding scope ofrights. To complicate matters further, the old listings were not transferred according toInternational Classification at the time of renewal.
If the system was left as it was, there was real fear that the smooth running of theTrademark system would be jeopardized. Even if future changes took place inInternational Classification, failure to transfer the previously designated goods andservices would exacerbate the distortions in classification. With this in mind, goods andservices designated by registered trademarks and classified under the Japanese systemwere all transferred under the 1996 Amendments into classes according to International
Classification. (Supplementary Provisions, 2 and 30)
In order to maintain trademark rights under the old system of classification, it wasnecessary to transfer previously registered trademarks to the present system ofclassification within a limited time period, as stated below.
(b) Summary of the Transferring Procedures
1. Trademark owners obligation to transfer
The owner of trademarks filed prior to March 31, 1992 (and therefore classified
under the old system) must apply to transfer registration between 6 months prior to
expiration and one year after expiration (Supplementary Provisions 2, 3).
2. Application for Transfer
Application for transfer began to be accepted in stages from April 1, 1998. The
first date for application was to be designated by the Commissioner of the Patent Office.
(Supplementary Provision 2(2)). Practically speaking, the official bulletin of September
4, 1997 announced that applications for transfer regarding trademarks originally filed
prior to January 10, 1922 would be accepted.
When the initial application date is announced, the owner of the trademark right has toapply for transfer between 6 months prior to the first expiration date that falls 6 months
after promulgation, and a year after that expiration date. (Supplementary Provisions,
3(2)).
This period roughly coincides with the period for renewal for trademark rights, enabling
application for transfer to be made at the same time as that for renewal. (An application
form for each must be submitted separately.)
3. Examination and Registration
Upon receipt of the application for transfer of registration, the Patent Office will
examine whether "the designated goods for which registration should be transferred"
include any goods deemed unsuitable and whether the application itself is valid. Uponfinding any reason for rejection, a letter will be sent, to which the applicant may
respond with comments and amendments. If the reason for rejection is not corrected, an
examination into the rejection will take place; if the outcome is unsatisfactory, the20

applicant may take the case to the Tokyo High Court to seek cancellation of the decision.
Details regarding transfers of registration are listed in the Trademark bulletin (a formal
arena for objection does not exist but a new system for ruling on unsuccessful transfer
of registration is being set up.)
The important thing to remember is that trademark rights that were not transferredduring the specified time will cease to be valid after the expiration date and renewal will
not be considered. For this reason, the Patent Office will issue two consecutive
reminders to the owner of trademark right informing them of the dates for application
procedures.
The Trademark Examination Guidelines states the following regarding transfers:(Trademark Examination Guidelines, p. 77 f.)
1. Supplementary Provisions, 6(1) will be treated as follows:(1) When the designated product of the trademark about to be transferred is notclassified according to the classes set out for goods/services, it shall be considered as"not satisfying the criteria listed in the Supplementary Provisions, 4(1)." The same canbe said if the designated product of the trademark about to be transferred is notpractically within the scope for that product.
(2) The listed class of the goods or services is the class that shall be applied on the day
the application is filed.
(3) If enough evidence is found to show that the designated product, whose registration
is about to be transferred, did not exist when the trademark registration was filed, then
the transfer shall be rejected on the basis that it is practically outside the scope of thedesignated product.
(4) The product in question will be treated as pertaining to the designated product if,
when the it is viewed in terms of its quality, form, use and function (in addition to its
concept and market convention), it is effectively the same type as the designatedproduct.
For example, however, if the designated goods are specified as "wooden desks," there isno need to include "metal desks" in the designated goods.
2. Any changes or broadening adjustments for products that are being considered fortransfer that appear on its application form will be accepted. (This is true of productsthat have already been amended by prior submission of amendment papers).
If, however, the amendments take the product outside the scope of the designatedtrademark right that is being submitted for transfer, then according to Supplementary
Provision 6(1), the application for transfer will be refused.
3. In the event the trademark right ceases to exist during its application for transfer (forexample, due to non-application for renewal, expiration due to a rejection of the renewal,
abandonment, invalidity or withdrawal of all designated goods related to the trademark
right), the request for transfer will be turned down.

21

4. In the event of abandonment, invalidity or withdrawal of one part of the designatedproduct of the trademark right, the abandoned, invalid or withdrawn part will be
examined to see if it coincides with, or includes, the product for which transfer ofregistration is being submitted. If it is, it will be deemed to be outside the scope of thedesignated product of the trademark right and the request for transfer will be rejected.
3. Identity or Similarity in Trademarks(i) Identity in Trademarks(a) Identity in Trademarks
Trademarks are identical if their formation (that is, letters, figures, sign, or threedimensional shape, or any combination thereof or with any color) is identical.
A verbalized name is not a trademark (although in the American Federal Trademark
Law sound trademarks are acknowledged). Therefore, even if two names arepronounced identically, they are not considered to be identical trademarks; if the lettersdiffer, then they are merely similar trademarks. Trademarks using different styles ofwriting (fonts) such as printing or cursive, or the "flowing hand," trademarks using kanji,hiragana and katakana ("Chinese" characters, primary phonetic symbols and secondary
phonetic symbols), trademarks using letters and trademarks using figures that areconceptually similar, may sound the same when verbalized (spoken) but they are notconsidered to be identical trademarks. Examples such as "FUJI (kanji used as in Mount
Fuji)" "FUJI (kanji used to mean 'no other like this one') "FUJI fuji" ('Mt. Fuji' followedby hiragana) "fuji" (hiragana) "fuji" (katakana), and "FUJI"(in alphabets) will allsound the same and have identically pronounced names." Trademarks that have aborder, ones that have place of origin or any other words or symbols attached ("{fuji},""Satsuma fuji," "Ichi-fuji") are not identical to "FUJI"(kanji).
(b) Concept of identity in trademark
According to the narrowly defined concept of trademark identity, trademarks that are
identical in every respect except in color are not considered identical. Similarily, a
trademark using shinchoutai font and one using the gothic font are not similar because
the fonts differ. A trademark using the cursive letters of the alphabet will not be
considered identical to one using printed letters of the alphabet, nor will a trademark
using kanji alphabets placed horizontally be considered identical to one using themvertically. The marks "VHC" and "water-cooled VHC compressor" are without
question not identical despite the fact that it was contested.
A rigid interpretation of identity in certain cases, for example where the trademark has
been revoked because it was not in use for 3 years or more, can actually create illogicalresults which are legally impossible to apply. Circumstances such as prior use may
make a rigid interpretation of the identity impractical. In such cases, before a decision
is made, two factors are taken into account: 1. the likelihood of social convention
considering the two trademarks to be identical, and 2. circumstances surroundingtransactions that are conducted in the particular field of the trademarked goods and/or
services.11 "Trademarks that are considered identical within the scope of their use and11See, for example, the Examination Standards Regarding Approval of Registered Trademark Use,
Trademark Section, Patent Office, Mar. 1978.

22

that are generally accepted as identical" is sometimes referred to as the concept of"identicality" in trademark, as opposed to "the identity" in a strict sense as describedabove. (Takeda 'Similarity in Trademarks" p. 100, Kyoto Law Society Magazine Vol. 7,
No. 8, 1912).
In cases where the trademark has been revoked due to no recorded use for three
years or longer, the definition of identical has been extended to include trademarks thatare "generally accepted as identical" such as: 1. "a trademark consisting of identicalletters with only a modification of font, 2. trademarks which, when spelled or written incharacters of hiragana or katakana (Japanese phonetic characters) or the Latin alphabet,
may imply an identical pronunciation or concept, 3. trademarks consisting of figurescommon in appearance, and 4. other trademarks generally accepted as identical to theregistered trademark.(50.(1))" However, this broad interpretation does not apply toother rulings. ("Chikujo Kaisetsu" Commentaries on the Trademark Law, p. 1143).
It goes without saying that "trademarks that are considered identical within the scope of
their use and that are generally accepted as identical" does not include "hashi" (inhiragana) "hashi" (kanji for 'bridge') and "hashi" (kanji for 'edge'). The latter two are
not even similar, let alone identical. Another ruling relates to "aoboshi" ('blue star') andstated that the use of the word "aoboshi" (kanji), "aoboshi" (katakana) and "BLUESTAR" (English alphabet) might be used without fear of being mistaken with a
trademark that consists of the pictorial representation of a blue star. The court ruled thatthey possessed similarity but they should not be treated as the same in transactions. (Vol.
22, No. 2, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 159, Feb. 9, 1968.).
(c) Trademarks identical in the manner of use
The way in which a trademark is used is entirely up to the owner of the
trademark right. If the trademark is placed directly on the product or on the wrapping,in a two-dimensional fashion or in a slightly three-dimensional fashion, or enlarged ordiminished, the result will not be the creation of a different trademark. (Prior to
Amendment, this often caused a problem when trying to provide practical evidence of a
trademark having been in continuous use when being registered for renewal.
Yamamoto/Kawazu, "Explanation of Trademark Usage and Description of Business(Tsusan Chosakai, 1980.) discusses on p. 64 and following, that even after theamendments regarding the description of the business and explanation of usage, adiagram or photograph with detailed explanations would be of great value to the person
processing the papers.)(2) Similarity in trademarks(a) Definition of similarity in trademarks"Similarity of trademarks" is defined as a likeness between trademarks which, when thetwo marks displayed on their respective products, may lead to confusion over theirsource. (Vol. 15, No. 6, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 1730, Jun. 27, 1961. Vol. 22, No. 2,
Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 399, Feb. 27, 1968. Originally it was regarded simply as an
approximation of the marks, regardless of the nature of the transaction.) The recent
interpretation has gained force to the point where trademarks are considered to be
similar when a risk of the two being mistaken exists. They are considered to bedissimilar when such risks do not exist. (Vol. 51, No. 3, Supreme Court, Minshu, p.

23

1055, Mar. 11, 1997.)
The concept of similarity in trademarks is interpreted in this manner because trademarks
are basically signs for distinguishing one's product from that of another. The purpose of
the Trademark Law is to protect the trademark and thereby prevent confusion of thesource of goods and services. (Section 1.) The Trademark Law applies the key conceptof "similarity in trademarks," together with the concept of "similarity in goods andservices," to various aspects of the Law in order to protect registered trademarks. (In theGerman laws, the scope of the prohibitive right of registered trademarks is "same typeof product" plus "risk of confusion" (verwechslungsgefahr); in our Law it is "similarity
of product" plus "similarity of trademark.")(b) Screening standards for similarity in trademarks(1) "Similarity" is a resemblance, but a set of standards is required in order to judge
exactly what that means. In the Trademark Law, similarity in trademarks not only refers
to the physical resemblance of the marks, but also to the "risk of confusion over thesource" that the visual representation of trademarks used on goods or services may
cause to traders and consumers. Indeed, it is this latter concern that has proved to be theultimate standard for similarity as practiced by the Supreme Court. (Supreme Court,
Mar. 11, 1997, supra.)
Despite the theory, traders and consumers still look at the "appearance" of the trademark
used on goods or services, listen to them being "pronounced" and then think about themeaning of the "ideas" before associating the trademark with goods and services andidentifying them. Because of this, the appearance, pronunciation and concept of the
trademark have been used as the criteria in "screening standards of similarity" so that if
there is risk of confusion regarding even one of these criteria the trademarks being
compared will in principle be judged to be "similar." (Vol. 1, Tokyo High Court,
Mutaishu, p. 280, Sept. 2, 1969.) On the whole, this method suffices in rulings on
similarity and it is what is applied in practice. (In the past, the ruling went so far as tosay that if there was similarity in either the appearance, pronunciation or idea of the
trademarks being compared, the two trademarks would be considered "similar."(Daishinin, Precedents, p. 742, Mar. 14, 1931; Daishinin, Precedents, p. 743, Aug. 20,
1942.)
In summation, the ruling will be based on whether similarity is found in one of thefollowing:(a) "Similarity of appearance" where the appearance or formation of the trademarks arealike and the distinction unclear.
(b) "Similarity of pronunciation" where the pronunciation of the trademarks are alike
and the distinction unclear.
(c) "Similarity of ideas" where the meanings associated with the trademarks are alike
and the distinction unclear.
The rules are empirical and are used in practice (only Shibuya considers them as
forming the structure of similarity.) They are only one means of reaching a decision,
because the real significance lies in the "overall observation" of the trademark. The
ultimate screening standard is not the individual similarity in "appearance,"

24

"pronunciation" and "ideas" but the impression of the whole. Care must be taken to
avoid the propensity for arbitrariness in dealing with "overall observation." But unlessthe risks of confusion as to source can be treated with objectivity, "overall impression"
will be inferior to the empirical rules. The one thing that current theories and actual
rulings agree on is that "similarity and difference regarding trademarks must be viewed
comprehensively, taking into consideration the various elements including thetrademarks' appearance, pronunciation and ideas." ("Shohyo Shinsa Kijun" (Trademark
Examination Guidelines) p. 26).
Recently, the risk of confusion regarding the source of the goods or services utilizing
the trademark has become the ultimate criterion in screening for similarity intrademarks. (Supreme Court, Mar. 11, 1997. Gradual transition of Trademark Law to be
more like the Unfair Competition Prevention Law, supra.). Even so, the risks ofconfusion cannot be predicted subjectively. In cases where (a) trademarks possess
similar visual elements (similarity in appearance) or (b) are pronounced in a very
similar fashion (similarity in pronunciation,) products can easily be mistaken.
Therefore, if either of the two elements is similar, the trademarks will be consideredsimilar. (Feb. 17, 1927 edition of Shohyo Koho, Osaka High Court, Jan. 14, 1927.
Takeda's "Shohyo no Ruiji," (Similarity in Trademarks) includes "concepts". He rightly
argues that if special factors surrounding the transaction are not emphasized, then it is
no different from the rule of thumb method.) However, in cases where it is solely theideas behind the trademarks that are difficult to differentiate (similarity of concept),
confusion over source is unlikely to occur, just as similarity is unlikely to be attributed
to the trademarks if the similarity rests solely with the ideas. In such cases, additional
factors related to the transaction must be found in order to reach a ruling on similarity.
(a) Similarity in appearance
Similarity of appearance occurs when the outward appearance or the visual elements ofa trademark present difficulty in differentiation, posing risks of visual confusion.
There are occasions when trademarks as a whole can be easily mistaken, and whenmajor visual components of the trademark are easily mistaken. When the major
components are what cause the confusion in identity, the trademarks will be consideredsimilar, even if other components are distinctly different. Not because the observation
is terminated upon observance of the major components without consideration for theother elements, but because the trademark is viewed as a whole and the similarities intheir major parts contribute to the overall impression.
(b) Similarity in pronunciation
Similarity in pronunciation is when a trademark is referred to in speech or its
pronunciation presents difficulty in differentiation, each circumstance posing risks ofaural confusion.
Trademarks will inevitably be referred to in speech for transactions. Even if they arevery different in appearance, if the pronounced name is identical or similar and posesrisks of confusion, their similar pronunciation makes them "similar trademarks." If
trademarks are similar due to similarity in pronunciation, it will become apparent
through references to them in speech. It is not determined by consumers' subjective

25

interpretation of the pronunciation.
Deciding what a trademark's pronunciation should be is of significance. (For example,
the combination of two kanji, one meaning 'red' followed by another meaning 'plum' canhave phonetic symbols to indicate that the word is to be read "beni-ume," however"koubai" is another natural pronunciation of the same word. The combination of two
kanji, one meaning 'white' followed by another meaning 'plum' can have more than one
phonetic equivalent: "shira-ume" and "hakubai." Trademark Examination Guidelines p.
26.) Trademarks that are not indivisible such as "FUJI hakucho," where "FUJI" iswritten in a larger size than "hakucho," will be similar to the two separate trademarks"FUJI" and "hakucho" written in respective, approximate sizes. This is also true of
trademarks that have two words positioned at a distance from each other. "Tsurukame
Manju" is similar to "Tsurukame" and "Manju" respectively. There are trademarks that
may have more than one pronunciation and concept. A trademark combining a diagramwith "riratakarazuka (in katakana), Takarazuka (in kanji), LYRATAKARAZUKA" maybe referred to in transactions for expediency and simplicity by part of its name andconcept, as opposed to the name and concept of each of the parts. This is especially true
if the link between the individual parts is weak. More than one pronunciation may arisein these cases. (Vol. 17, No. 12, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 1621, Dec. 5, 1963. Itsinterpretation, Yoshida, "Hyaku Sen" (100 Selected Cases), p. 58. In the "Maru Kome"
case, the ruling was that both "kome" and "yone" were natural pronunciations of thesame trademark. In Sokuho No. 250, Tokyo High Court, Feb. 15, 1996, p. 7072, thesame ruling found that kanji with the meaning 'rice' could be pronounced "kome" and"yone," was reached.)
In the case of trademarks formed by Roman letters, rulings on similarity inpronunciation will be made by observing the linguistic similarity of the word formed by
the alphabets etc. Rulings on similarity of pronunciation from a "voice" or aural pointof view takes many things into consideration. Courts making such a determination will
ask a variety of questions such as the following. 1. What is the common thread between
the two trademarks in terms of tone, volume, intonation, and syllables? 2. Do theyrhyme? 3. Is the sound just before the long or short vowel more strongly heard? 4. Is
the end of the word pronounced softer? 5. Or if the number of sounds is relatively big,
does the impression of the whole sound similar? Judicial cases reveal a wide spectrumof rulings. Suffice it to say that it is not within the scope of this book to go into details,
however the Trademark Examination Guidelines has been listed at the back of the bookfor your reference.
(c) Similarity in ideas
When consumers or traders think of two trademarks and find their meanings to
be difficult to distinguish, a risk of confusion in the intellectual understanding of the
products is created. This is referred to as "similarity in ideas."
There are cases where the appearance and pronunciation of trademarks are different, yet
the ideas create a sense of similarity. Ideas can often act as an additional element indetermining similarity in appearance or pronunciation, but can also be a criterion for
determining similarity in their own right. An example is the ruling that "Seki no
Sonroku" and "Sonroku" are similar (Vol. 27, No. 3, Tokyo High Court, Chitekishu, p.

26

637, Sept. 27, 1995, Appeal Mar., 5, 1996.). Similarily, "Harabeishu" was ruled as
being similar to "Beishu", the artistic name of the doll maker Tokushige Hara. (No.
1560, Tokyo High Court, Hanji, p. 136, Dec. 6, 1995). Similarity in ideas was not the
only factor in this case of similarity but it was central to the court's decision.
The Japanese letter (non-character) trademark "SHISHI" ('lion' in kanji) is similar inconcept to "lion" ('lion' in katakana). The Japanese-version of the English word "lion"
is widely-known in Japan as having the same meaning as "SHISHI." When determining
the similarity between Japanese trademarks made up of words and letters and thoseconsisting of foreign words, it is the extent to which the foreign word is generally
understood in Japan that acts as the screening standard. Therefore, a letter trademark of
a foreign word will be considered similar to that of a Japanese word with the same
meaning if that foreign word is commonly used in everyday conversation. If it is not
used in everyday conversation, then the two will not be considered similar. The same istrue for trademarks whose concepts are presented in the form of a figure.
The notion of trademark similarity has developed from mere similarity inappearance, to similarity in pronunciation and finally to conceptual similarity. When it
comes to decisions on the similarity of trademarks, the idea of conceptual similarity
seems to play only an explanatory role. Conceptual similarity by itself has not always
led to findings of similarity in trademarks, even in cases where the concepts wereidentical (but the other elements were not similar). On the other hand, the trademarks"MICROLON" and "MAKROLON" were ruled as being dissimilar because, despite theresemblance in pronunciation, the syllables "makro" and "micro," would evoke concepts
in traders or consumers that have two distinct concepts. The ruling was based on the
belief that "makro/macro" and "micro" were foreign words that would be understood by
the public in everyday use as being words of foreign origin with opposite meanings.
(Vol. 23, No. 1, Tokyo Supreme Court, Chitekishu, p. 25, Jan. 24, 1991. Also Vol. 48,
Tokyo High Court, Torikeshishu (1995), Mar. 15, 1995.).
(2) Person setting the standards and the timing of standards(a) Reference of the standards
If the ultimate standard for similarity in trademarks is whether there is likely to be
confusion over their source, then it is dependent upon the nature of the people who viewthem. For example, there are people who have an interest in the product in question andpay attention to the trademarks and there are those who are not remotely interested in
the products or the trademarks. There are highly educated people with a good
vocabulary and there are those with little education and a basic vocabulary. There arebusiness people who deal regularly with goods bearing the trademark and their rivals
and those that do not. It is usually the more sophisticated or educated groups of people
in each of these examples that are less likely to be confused. Therefore, the decision as
to similarity depends on which section of the population is targeted by the goods andservices bearing the trademark. Proactive standards for similarity need to take the"consumers of the goods or services" into account in accordance with the aims of theTrademark Law. (Vol. 1, Osaka High Court, Minshu, p. 765, Dec. 18, 1922. Case
2651.3.2. Supreme Court, April 29, 1963. No. 539, Hanji, Supreme Court, p. 30, Oct. 29,
1968). The principal consumers of the goods and services bearing the trademark may
be groups such as the elderly, children, or housewives, and, along with considerations

27

for other goods and services and the milieu of the transaction, the consumers' "generalscope of attentiveness" must be regarded as the standard. Trademark Examination
Guidelines p. 26).
In one example, a consumer wanting to buy an expensive microscope used by experts
and not easily available on the market for individual customers, will possess a greater
scope of attentiveness to the trademark than a customer wanting to buy candy that could
be easily bought by even a child. The former will be unlikely to buy the expensive itemon impulse whereas a customer for the latter, most probably a child, could well buy thecheap candy on impulse. Therefore, it is less likely for confusion to arise even from asmall difference in the trademark of the expensive microscope used by experts than it isfor confusion to arise from the same level of difference in trademarks on items
purchased on a day-to-day basis. The "risks for confusion" will be judged according to
the nature of the product, so that what risks there are in the field of "candies" as a resultof a difference in the composition of trademarks, will pose no risks in the field of"microscopes" where the trademarks possess the same level of compositional difference.
The trademarks for microscopes will not be considered similar. An implication as tocomposition is enough to suggest similarity with respect to the candy, while the samelevel of implied composition is insufficient to imply similarity with respect to asophisticated microscope.
Since the era of the Daishinin (former Supreme Court), similarity been judged with theconsumers, the nature of the goods, and the transaction milieu in mind. (No. 4718,
Osaka Court, Newspaper, p. 20, May 27, 1941. No. 539, Supreme Court, Hanji, p. 30,
Oct. 29, 1968). The rulings on similarity should take into account those who trade andconsume the goods and services bearing the trademark. It is their general depth ofattentiveness that needs to be the standard governing the decisions. Note that the mainconcern is how attentive the general business partners and the customers for the goods
and services are, not that of the business people involved in a particular aspect of thegoods or services in question.
A good example is the ruling on "hanabira mochi", ('Flower Petals' rice cake), a fairly
well-known type of Japanese rice cake which is mentioned in some general dictionaries
and the like and is sometimes referred to as "hanabira" for short. Despite this, thecourt's ruling was that it could not automatically be assumed that the name was familiar
to consumers of "snacks and bread," the class under which the product bearing thetrademark was filed, even if it was familiar to workers dealing in traditional Japanesedesserts and consumers who were particularly fond of them. The ruling was that thephrase "Chigiri hanabira" as a whole was distinctive enough to identify it from otherproducts, the "chigiri" part of the trademark also having been ruled as being dissimilar
to the cited trademark "CHIGIRI" written in kanji. (Vol. 22, No. 1, Tokyo High Court,
Mutaishu, p. 311, Apr. 24, 1990.) Another example of a ruling that is just as extreme isthe case of the trademark "MICROLON" and "MAKROLON" the cited trademark. The
pronunciations of the two seem on the surface to be very alike, but because the tradersand consumers can identify a specific concept from the name as a whole or from onepart of the name, it was ruled that there was no ambiguity between the two, which wereseparate and distinct. The ruling was based on the belief that "micro" and"makro/macro" were words that would be understood by the public in everyday use as

28

being words of foreign origin with opposite meanings, so that they could be considereddissimilar and would not lead to confusion. (Vol. 23, No. 1, Tokyo High Court,
Chitekishu, p. 25, Jan. 24, 1991.)
Because the standard for determing similarity between trademarks depends on theperceived normal depth of attentiveness of business partners and consumers, it must be
pointed out that attention to trademarks in general, or to specific goods and services,changes with the times, just as people's knowledge of foreign words and the milieu oftransactions change. These factors need to be considered when referring to cases fromthe past.
Another point of interest is that the similarity of trademarks for products found aroundthe home is determined primarily with the consumers in mind, whereas the similarity oftrademarks for interim product components is determined primarily with the businesspeople requiring the raw ingredients in mind. But with the recent trend to take the riskof confusion as the ultimate criterion (Vol. 51, No. 3, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 1055,
Mar. 11, 1997.), referring to past cases for guidance has become insufficient. Making
judgments on similarity regarding past cases has always been difficult but applying it sothat a standardized ruling is reached consistently is proving to be a problem.
(b) Timing of implementing standards
The timing of implementation of standards for similarity should take note of thepotential for changes in factors influencing the transactions and the ways in which thatwould affect the risks for confusion regarding the source of the products. Therefore, forcases where trademark rights have yet to come into effect, the time to implement
standards would coincide with the time of the ruling. For cases where trademark rights
have been in force, the implementation of standards coincides with the time that the actof infringement occurred. (The trend to take the risk of confusion as the ultimate
criterion regarding similarity (Supreme Court, Marc. 11, 1997, supra) has led todifficulties in applying the original concept of timing to infringement lawsuits. The
ability to request an injunction and demand compensation for damages has led to an
urgent need to review the whole idea of timing. It is balancing the fluctuating risk ofconfusion caused by current cases against the risk of confusion posed by a specificsimilar trademark. Trademarks that were considered similar at the time the right cameinto effect may now be considered dissimilar due to subsequent media attention brought
about by a publicized trial for infringement. The question of how to determine adequate
compensation for damages in cases where rulings on similarity depend on the timing of
the implementation of standards remains to be answered.)(3) Similarity examination methods(a) Examination at different locations and times
Issues of similarity should be examined following an "interval," as in real lifetransactions, and not as a side-by-side comparison of marks. (Vol. 15, Daishinin,
Minroku, p. 212, Mar. 12, 1911, No. 2312, Daishinin, Newspaper, p. 3, Jul. 15, 1926,
No. 3266, Daishinin, Newspaper, p. 18, Apr. 21, 1931. Vol. 1 Appendix, Supreme Court,
Gyoshu, p. 1936, Nov. 10, 1950). "Detached examination" is a way of observing two
trademarks apart from one another (e.g. in a different location and at a different time).
"Examination by comparison" involves taking the two trademarks and comparing them29

side-by-side in the same location and at the same time. This unsuitable method is often
the one chosen.
When consumers shop, purchases are made in one place and then later in another place.
A product with a trademark advertised may be seen in a certain place at a certain time,
but the consumer will probably pick up the product later in another location. It isbecause of this pattern of decision-making that similarity in trademarks needs to be
examined in a differently (both in time and space) than a straightforward comparison
affords. A side-by-side comparison will allow many details to be absorbed, so that thetrademarks will seem dissimilar. However, when examined at another time, in adifferent venue, they could be considered similar.
It is often mistakenly assumed that detached examination is applied solely in the area ofsimilarity in appearance but this is not the case. Current thought and actual judicial
rulings prove that detached examination is just as applicable to similarity inpronunciation and in concept. Trademark Examination Standards states that trademarks
should be examined for ambiguity by comparing the overall impression that the listenergets when the trademarks are verbalized in one location at a certain time, with theoverall impression he gets when it is verbalized in another location at a different time.
(Trademark Examination Guidelines, p. 28, 6(1))(b) Examination of major component"Examination of the major component" is a method of taking the component thatprovides distinctiveness in the trademark and studying that specifically. In other words,
because the major component of the trademark functions as the indicator of the source,
it makes sense to compare the appearance, pronunciation and concepts derived from thatpart in order to compare with those derived from the major component of the othertrademark. (Kaneko-Someno does not accept the method of examining major
components for appearance, p. 466, but since the examining of the major component isonly a supplementary function of the examination of the whole, it does not seem
necessary to make the exclusion.)
Examination of the major component is frequently used in settling similarity disputes.
(No. 14, Osaka Court, Keiroku, p. 772, Sept. 22, 1910, No. 22, Osaka Court, Minroku, p.
1909, Oct. 16, 1916. Vol. 1, Osaka Court, Minshu, p. 597, Oct. 18, 1922., Vol. 5, Osaka
Court, Minshu, p. 820, Nov. 16, 1926., Vol. 10, No. 7, Supreme Court, Keishu, p. 981,
Jul. 3, 1956., Vol. 17, No. 12, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 1621, Dec. 5, 1963.) However,there may be more than one major component in a trademark; consequently there may
be more than one pronunciation and/or concept derived therefrom.
Fundamentally, trademark similarity should be judged by examining the marks whole;examination of the major component(s) should only be carried out when the whole isinevitably seen as a sum of major component(s) and secondary components.
If the trademark includes a component that describes the quality of the designated goods
or services, it is customary to assume that that particular component does not function
as an indicator of the origin of the product. So a trademark bearing an indication of thequality, raw materials or ingredients of the product ('descriptive words') will be deemed30

similar to an otherwise similar trademark that does not include these supplementary(descriptive) parts.
For example, "super LION" and "LION" are considered similar. Similarly, the"SUPER" part of the trademark "PIONEERSUPER" is a term describing superior
quality and does not function as a distinctive identifier of the product. (Hanrei 2707,
Tokyo High Court, p. 103, Dec. 22, 1988.) In another example, the word "SOFT" in the
trademark "SOFTJOY" describes the footwear's comfort and quality, but does not
function as a distinctive identifier. (Second Term edit. 7241, Tokyo High Court, Hanrei
p. 7, Sept. 6, 1990.) In the case of trademarks using a combination of words where onepart is a letter in general use, they will be compared by omitting the letter part from thetrademark as, for example, with regard to the sake "kiku masaune" (kanji) and "kiku"(same kanji). For trademarks composed of a trade name, trademark similarity will be
judged first by excluding "limited company (or corporation)" or "K.K." the Japaneseequivalent of "Co. Ltd." etc.
Recently the Supreme Court ruled that "KOZO" and "KOZOZUSHI" or"KOZOSUSHI" were not similar (Vol. 51, No. 3, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 1055, Mar.
1, 1997.). However the Tokyo High Court ruled that "KAPPA" and "KAPPASUSHI" or"KAPPAZUSHI" were similar. "SUSHI" is an indicator of the product and thediscrepancy in the two rulings is therefore hard to justify. It is likely that, in futurecases, the Patent Office may disregard the first as erroneous for in cases of infringement
when dealing with standards of similarity. Even so, the "KOZOSUSHI" ruling has
made it easier for those with established trademarks to protect and maintain theirtrademarks.
The well-established part of the trademark is usually the major component of the
trademark. Even if the major component is actually smaller in size when compared tothe secondary components, the pronunciation and concepts are deduced from thedistinctive identifying characteristics of the major component. ("Shohyo Shinsa Kijun"p. 28, 5(1)). In the case of "SEIKO EYE," the cited trademark designated for watchesand glasses, the Supreme Court explained that it was in fact the "SEIKO" part of thewhole that people identified with the famous makers of watches, etc. The "EYE" was ageneral term used for the company's optical goods. As a result, the Supreme Court ruledthat a trademark combining a cross-shape with the letters "EYE" had no similarity with"SEIKO EYE." (Vol. 47, No. 7, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 5009, Sept. 10, 1993.).
However, both trademarks can be used on watches. In which case, the "SEIKO" part of"SEIKO EYE" is identical to the rest of the products that the same company deals in. A
more logical explanation would have been if the "EYE" part of "SEIKO EYE" and thetrademark "EYE" were seen as having similarity in pronunciation.
A trademark can have more than one major component because a combined trademark
may contain many parts that are equally significant. For example, in the "Mandarin
Oriental Hotel" both "Mandarin" and "Oriental" are major components. Theinterrelationships of the trademarks' major components should be closely examined.
There are trademarks that are easily divisible that will not be a unified whole, there arethose in which one part of the major component is weak or has an appendage, and there
are those with two components of equal stature. In such cases, a simplistic examination
after an interval of time and space can create a risk of straying from the facts regarding
the transaction.

31

Some trademarks can be easily divisible for various reasons. The whole may be so longthat it creates difficulty in pronunciation or it may be long and have two major
components, each in its own font. It could also be made up of components withdifferent size letters. In contrast, a trademark that cannot be easily divided is likely to
be short and easy to pronounce in one breath. "Nikkei," the shortened form of a famous
newspaper, was combined with "gift" to form the trademark "Nikkei gift." The court
ruled that the mark would be distinctive and identifiable as a single entity so that there
would not be a similarity with other registered trademarks bearing the word "gift." (Vol.
24, No. 1, Tokyo High Court, Chitekishu, Nov. 12, 1991.). In the same way, "Bessatsu
Friend" (a comic book) was distinctive and identifiable as a trademark of single entity
and unlikely to be confused with "Friend English-Japanese Dictionary," when thetransaction milieu was taken into account. (Vol. 24, No. 1, Tokyo High Court,
Chitekishu, p. 528, July, 28, 1992.).
An important consideration is the traders' and consumers' usual ways of referring tolong trademark. This is not the same as simply chopping up a name that is considered
too long to pronounce. A fairly long trademark such as "KITCHEN HOUSE" is madeup of two words of equal significance and both English words would be familiar in
everyday use. It is simple enough to be pronounced as one name and not divisible
without losing meaning. Because of this, the trademark was considered dissimilar to thetrademark "HOUSE" which combines the letters of the word with a picture of a house.
They differ in both the pronunciation and the concept. (Second Term edit. 7213, Tokyo
High Court, Hanrei, p. 12, Jun. 11, 1990.).
An example of a case where a part of the major component is weak is seen with thecomparison of the trademarks "Mandarin" and "New Mandarin." "New" is the weakercomponent of "New Mandarin" so the two trademarks are considered similar. In
another case, a registered trademark, "PLUS," is designated to various musicalinstruments, stereos and their parts. The defendant used the marks "PIANO PLUS" and"RECORDER PLUS." Both marks consisted of the first component, which was theword indicating the type of product, and the second component, which did not have a
direct link with the product. In terms of identifying one product from another, it was
actually the "PLUS" component that caught the listeners' attention, indicating that thiswas in fact the major component. As a result, the ruling was that the defendant's marks
were similar to the registered trademarks. It is perhaps of little significance but in thiscase, both "PIANO" and "PLUS" are weak components but the former is by far the
weaker of the two. (Vol. 20, No. 1, Osaka Regional Court, Mutaishu, p. 47, Feb. 9,
1988.). Another example is the combined trademark, "lyratakarazuka" (katakana) witha figure, "TAKARAZUKA" (kanji) and "LYRATAKARAZUKA." This is an exampleof the rule of thumb that says if the trademark is long and divisible, not all thecomponents will be remembered nor will they give rise to concepts, but rather, in mostcases, a simplified version will be found for pronunciation and conceptualization. (Vol.
17, No. 12, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 1621, Dec. 5, 1963. See Yoshida "Shohyo
Hyakusen" (100 Selected Trademarks) p. 58 for interpretation of the judicial ruling.).
An example of a case in which one component is an appendage to another can be seem
when a trademark contains components that explain the nature of another component.

32

Frequently the appendage is an indicator of the quality of the goods or services bearing
the trademark and does not function as a distinctive identifier. In a case debating thesimilarity of "JOY" and "SOFTJOY," the "SOFT" part of the latter trademark was seen
as an expression of the quality and comfort of the footwear bearing the trademark, anddid not contribute to its distinctiveness. The ruling in this case was that the two weresimilar. (Second Term edit. 7241, Tokyo High Court, Hanrei, p. 7, Sept. 6, 1990.).
The case discussed earlier regarding the trademark that combines the letters EYE within
a diagram depicting a cross and its relationship to the trademark "SEIKO EYE" can also
be viewed from this angle. Both trademarks are designated to watches and glasses. The
analysis of "SEIKO EYE" was that the "SEIKO" part would be immediately associatedwith the famous watch makers, while "EYE" would be understood as the general term
for eyes. In fact, "SEIKO" was the component people focused on when determining its
pronunciation and concept, that trademark was different from the trademark with thecross and "EYE." (Vol. 47, No. 7, Supreme Court, Minshu, 5009, Sept. 10, 1993.
Criticism of this ruling has been discussed earlier. The problem lies in how one
interprets the significance of the words "SEIKO" and "EYE.")(c) Examination of the whole
Examination of the trademark as a whole is fundamental to decisions concerningsimilarity because it is the impression made by the whole which gives marks their
distinctiveness. (No. 102, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 169, Jan. 21, 1971.). The
examination of only the major components is only one method of viewing that can act
as an aid. "Examination of the Whole" is to view the whole, including the major
components, when forming rulings on similarity. This is not only true in similarity
regarding appearance; it is significant in the similarity of pronunciation and of concepts.
A verdict of dissimilarity might be reached after a viewing of the whole, even if there
was, for example, a similarity in pronunciation. "Shouzan" (hiragana) was a trademark
designated to thread, which came under scrutiny through a comparison with anothertrademark for glass fiber, which combined the word "Hyouzan" with a picture of aniceberg. According to the ruling, "trademark similarity needs to be judged according to
the risks for causing confusion of origin if the trademarks are used on identical orsimilar products. The decision should be made with the actual circumstances
surrounding transactions in mind, as the trademark thus used is viewed for its
appearance, concepts and pronunciation and the impressions, memory and associations
that they may instill in the traders." Despite the similarity in pronunciation, the two
trademarks were considered not to be similar because their appearances and concepts
were very different. Furthermore, in glass fiber transactions the trademarks weredistinguished by their pronounced name only, but there had hardly been any need tocheck on the quality by finding out where it originated. As a result the two were judged
to be dissimilar. (Vol. 22, No. 2, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 399. Feb. 27, 1968. For aninterpretation of the judicial ruling, see Yano, Ikuo, and "Interpretation of Judicial
Ruling of the Supreme Court: 1968 (Minji edit.) p. 56.).
In another case, a trademark combining the letters "SPA" with a figure has been
declared dissimilar to "SPAR spar" [where the second "spar" appears in katakana]because despite the similarity in pronunciation, the appearance, concepts and use are
distinctive. (Vol. 28, No. 2, Tokyo High Court, Chitekishu, p. 406, Apr. 17, 1996.). The
trademark combining "Kodak" with a figure is all too famous, but "Cosack" is also well33

known. Even though Kodak is not a trademark associated with chemical goods, if the
trademark was given to chemical goods, the traders and consumers would assume thatthey were somehow associated with the Kodak with which they were familiar. It is very
unlikely even for chemical goods bearing the Kodak name to be confused with goods
bearing the cited Cosack trademark; therefore the ruling was that the two trademarks
were dissimilar. It is interesting that the familiarity of the Kodak trademark was taken
into account in the decision. (Vol. 22, No. 3, Tokyo Court, Mutaishu, p. 551, Sept. 10,
1990.).
In contrast, "Daishinrin" (kanji for big, forest, bush) and the allegedly infringing
trademark "Dairinshin" (kanji for big, bush, forest) are confusing in appearance andconcepts, and depending on the situation, it was decided that the consumers might
mistake one for the other. The original ruling stating that the two were dissimilar was
quashed and the case referred back to the lower court. (No. 1437, Supreme Court, Hanji,
p. 139, Sept. 22, 1992.).
In practice, if the trademarks have been examined in terms of appearance, pronunciationand concept with the result that there is similarity in at least one of these criteria, thenexcept for those with special reasons, the trademarks as applied to goods and services
will be seen to pose a risk of confusion as to origin. When the similarity in at least oneof the three criteria is not enough to consider the trademarks similar, or if exceptional
circumstances are being strongly voiced by those involved in the transaction, only thenwill a ruling be made by referring to the actual circumstances surrounding thetransaction.
(d) Examination of major component(s) and examination of the whole
Although it may seem contradictory, the examination of the major component
complements the examination of the whole, (Toyosaki, p. 367). A combined
examination is the most thorough test of similarity. The impression of the whole isnecessary and right, yet care must be taken to ensure that the ruling is not arbitrary
depending on the examiner or the judge.
(e) Consideration for Factors affecting Transactions
Judgments on similarity may also take into consideration factors such as therelationship between the trademark and the goods or services, and the customs oftrademark use in that particular industry that might affect transactions. However, theother considerations must be generally and consistently applied, such as the usual
method of transaction for that type of product, the use of trademarks and the existenceof trademarks belonging to other businesses. (Vol. 22, No. 2, Supreme Court, Minshu, p.
399, Feb. 27, 1968, Vol. 1, Tokyo High Court, Mutaishu, p. 280, Sept. 2, 1969.). Recent
trends show an increase in rulings that take current factors into account (Vol. 51, No. 3,
Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 1055, Mr. 11, 1997.) The recent trend has been to permit forconsideration the relative familiarity of trademarks (Vol. 21, Osaka High Court, Minshu,
p. 651, Jun. 10, 1942; Vol. 14, No. 12, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 2408, Oct. 4, 1960;
Vol. 14, No. 14, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 3103, Dec. 20, 1960; Vol. 22, No. 2,
Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 399, Feb. 27, 1968; Vol. 8, No. 2, Tokyo High Court,
Mutaishu, p. 249, Jul. 13, 1976; Vol. 17, No. 3, Tokyo High Court, Mutaishu, p. 444,
Oct. 15, 1985, Toyosaki, p. 368.).

34

Factors that are not permitted for consideration include fluctuating factors that affectonly the transactions of the designated products, the differences or similarities oftrademark appendages (Vol. 4, No. 11, Tokyo High Court, Gyoshu, p. 2707, Nov. 5,
1953), and the differences or similarities of wrapping papers (Vol. 10, No. 6, Tokyo
High Court, Gyoshu, p. 1161, Jun. 23, 1959).12 Recent Supreme Court rulings reflect atendency to seriously consider the factors affecting trade and to view the risk ofconfusion to be synonymous with similarity. The Supreme Court's ruling of
dissimilarity for the "KOZO"/"KOZO SUSHI" case was the most poignant example ofthis. (Supreme Court, Mar. 11, 1997, supra.). Viewed within the framework of pastexamples, this ruling is tantamount to a change in the law.
(c) The Relationship between goods and services and confusion
The concept of "similarity" has, as its counterpart, the concept of "confusion."(Section 4 (1) (xv)). What is meant by "confusion over goods and services" is in fact
"confusion over the origin of the goods and services." Until recently, rulings on"similarity" were an acknowledgement that a danger of an abstract, stereotypical sort ofconfusion regarding origin existed. However, the Supreme Court is now considering
actual transaction practices in determining verdicts.
Registered trademarks which are not in use (but are within 3 years of registration)
come under the same protection given to all trademarks; the future use of registeredmarks needs to be protected. That a mark is not in use will not be permitted as adefense (No. 4598, Daishinin, Newspaper, p. 9, Jun. 27, 1941). For trademarks not yet
in circulation, rulings will be conducted in the customary manner. However, if a
trademark begins to be used during judicial proceedings, the ruling might be influenced,
threatening the stability associated with registration. These issues need to be settled atsome point by the Supreme Court's Grand Bench, but for the time being the courts willrule on similarity based on market practices while the Patent Office continues to makejudgment on similarity regardless of the rulings of the Supreme Court.
In practice, when the appearance, pronunciation or concepts of two trademarks areambiguous, the closer the marks are to each other in semblance and the more likely it isfor confusion to occur regarding the source of the goods or services. The German Law
requires that "goods be of the same type" and have a "risk of product confusion" toexercise the prohibitive right with regard to registered product trademarks, while
Japanese Law considers the similarity of goods and/or services and the "similarity of the
trademarks" within the scope of prohibitive right of registered trademarks. Even so,with the Supreme Court's ruling that "similarity of trademarks" poses "risks for productconfusion" the discrepancies in the outcome according to the two Laws have become
negligible. Interpreting similarity has evolved from an emphasis on the composition of
trademarks derived from a similarity of marks, to an emphasis on similarity causing
risks of confusion. With the ruling on "Kozozushi," the concept of confusion-similarity(where the two concepts of confusion and similarity are merged into one concept ofsimilarity) has been firmly established. (Supreme Court, Mar. 11, 1997, supra.).
12

Nakamura follows the changes in factors affecting transactions in theories regarding trademark
similarity, p.238. Nakamura, " A hypothesis: 'Rule of Thumb' or 'Factors affecting Trade'" serializedin Tokkyo News (Patent News.)

35

Recently, in determining similarity, the Supreme Court will take into account thepractical market situation while paying attention to possible confusion of goods andservices in transactions. In practice, this stance results in well-known trademarks being
advantageously protected. (Unfair Competitions Prevention Law, Section 2(1)(ii) has
recently been set up which removes the need to prove a risk of confusion.).
(d) Resulting effect of ruling confirming Similarity
A trademark that bears similarity to an already registered trademark cannot be
filed by a third party because of the confusion that it will cause regarding source.
Toallow such a filing would violate the fundamental order of Trademark Law that upholds
the notion of the "uniqueness of the trademark;" therefore, the later filing will berefused. (4 (1)(xi), 8,15,43(2) and 46.). The associated trademark system that waspreviously in place was accepted because it had no adverse effects, but since its
abolition, each trademark must now be registered independently. This change has
provided the impetus for the role of trademark monitoring to shift from the law to theindividual. Under the previous law, the transfer of associated trademarks had been alegal impossibility. Now, if a trademark is registered in error that is similar to an
existing mark and were to be handed over to a third party, it will result in limiting theeffect of your the first trademark.
Using a trademark that is similar to a registered trademark is forbidden because it
violates the uniqueness of the registered trademark. (Section 37(1)). If a person uses anamended trademark which is similar to his own registered trademark and it results in a
confusion of origin with another person's registered trademark, then the original
trademark may be canceled. (Section 51). Until recently, the concept of trademark
similarity had been used in Trademark Law in connection with prevention of "risk ofconfusion over source," because similarity was more suited to our people's thought
patterns when compared to the concept of "danger of confusion." However the more
recent Supreme Court rulings indicate that the two have now become indistinct. With
the deletion of Section 6 of Unfair Competition Prevention Law, it is likely that thecases dealing with similarity will in practice be ruled much more frequently under the
Unfair Competition Prevention Law than under the Trademark Law.
(e) Color and Trademark Similarity
Trademarks that differ only in color are considered similar; this is included in theprovisions for exceptions. (Section 70). If color is used in the trademark, pronunciationand ideas may stem from the color.
(f) Trademark Examination Guidelines regarding Similarity in Trademarks (4(1)(xi).
Trademark Examination Guidelines p. 26 and p. 34).
(1) Rulings on trademark similarity must take a comprehensive view of appearance,
pronunciation and ideas.
(2) Ruling on trademark similarity must take into consideration normal market practices
including the primary consumer group of the goods or services bearing the trademark(for example, experts, the elderly, children or women). The consumer's usual scope forattention must be the standard that guides the ruling.
(3) For pronunciation of trademarks written in letters that contain phonetic indicators,

36the following should apply:(i) For a trademark containing kanji for 'red' and 'plum,' even if a phonetic indicator"beni-ume" is included, the pronunciation "koubai" will also be assumed.
(ii) For letter trademarks that have two or more natural pronunciations, such as in the
trademark containing kanji for 'white' and 'plum,' where "hakubai" and "shira-ume" arenatural pronunciations, even if one is used as a phonetic indicator, the other will also be
assumed.
(iii) For trademarks containing phonetic indicators that coincide with a natural
pronunciation, then an unnatural pronunciation will not be considered an option. For
example, a trademark containing three kanji, 'dragon,' 'rice field' and 'river,' with thephonetic indicator "tatsutagawa" alongside it, will only have "tatsutagawa" as its
pronunciation. An unnatural pronunciation such as "ryudensen" will not be assumed.
(4) In the case of combined trademarks, the degree of emphasis for each component andthe relationship between them needs to be considered. However, where there isevidence of considerable difference in appearance, pronunciation or ideas, the following
may not necessarily apply.
(i) Combined trademarks containing descriptive words or phrases (that indicate thequality of the goods, ingredients, originating region, etc.) will be deemed similar to
those which do not have the same appending component.
Example of similarity"SUPER LION" and "LION,""GINZA KOBAN" and "KOBAN,""LADY GREEN" and "LADY."(ii) Trademarks containing letters which vary in size will be deemed similar to a
trademark which is otherwise similar except for the size of the letters.
Examples of similarity:"FUJI HAKUCHO " and "FUJI" or "HAKUCHO""SUN MOON" and "SUN" and "MOON"(iii) Trademarks containing parts or words which are positioned considerably apart willin principle be deemed similar to a trademark consisting solely of one of the parts.
Examples of similarity:"Tsurukame Manju" and "Tsurukame" or "Manju"(iv) Trademarks that, due to a long pronunciation, or due to components that are moresignificant than the rest so that a simplified name is a possibility, will be deemed similar
to a trademark consisting solely of that simplified name.
Examples of similarity:"Cherryblossomboy" and "cherryblossom""Chrysanthemumbluesky" and "chrysanthemum" or "bluesky"(v) Trademarks that combine a word with a general term used in association with thedesignated goods or services will be deemed similar to a trademark consisting of the
trademark minus the general term.
Example of similarity (for product trademarks):
For sake: "Otokoyama Fuji" and "Fuji", "Kiku Masamune"and "Kiku"
For folding knives: "Sakura Higomori" and "Sakura."
Example of similarity (for service trademarks):
For booking seats on leisure travel: "Playguide Shuttle" and "Shuttle"
For hotels: "Kuroshio Kanko Hotel" and "Kuroshio."37

(vi) Trademarks combining a well-known trademark for designated goods and services
with other words will be deemed similar to the well-known trademark.
Examples of similarity:
For tape recorders: "SONYLINE" and "SONY"
For delivery by air: "JALFLOWER" and "JAL"For film production: "TOHOHAKUBAI" and "HAKUBAI."(vii) Trademarks that are also trade names (including trademarks consisting of theabbreviated form of the trade name) will be deemed similar to trademarks consisting
solely of the major component and excluding "Co., Ltd.," "Association," "CO.,""K.K.," "Ltd.," "Union," "cooperative" etc., regardless of where they are positioned in
the original trademark.
(5) (i) If a trademark consists of a significant identifying component, even if it isindicated in smaller print than the insignificant components, the mark's pronunciationand concepts would result from the identifying component.
(ii) If trademarks are colored, the pronunciation and concepts will result from that
part.
(iii) If the major component of the trademark does not contribute to the trademark's
distinctiveness, but that component, through use, acquires distinctiveness, then the
pronunciation will result from that component.
(6) When trademark pronunciation is examined solely in terms of the use of voice,either (I) or (II) listed below shall apply.
In determining similarity in pronunciation of trademarks, the tone, volume,
intonation and syllables of the trademarks will be examined for similarities (see notes 14). The trademarks will also be examined to determine if they are made-up words(different concepts may affect intonation and the attention given to pronunciation). The
two trademarks will be verbalized at different times and in different locations, in orderto gage the overall impression to the listener in order to determine the risk for confusion.
When both trademarks come under the standards listed in II(1) to II(8), they will bedeemedsimilar.
(Notes 5-7).
I.
[Note 1] Decisions on similarity of tone between two trademarks (nature of soundresulting from the quality of the vowel and consonant) are based on the following:(a) Does the syllable that is not identical to any syllable of the mark in question have avowel that is the same? For example, in Japan, the court will look at the distinguishingsyllable and see if it 1). is either in the middle or at the end of the word and has thesame vowels or 2). has consonants that are similar based on the position of the stressedor emphasized syllable. (Questions the court may consider include: Are the syllables
articulated identically or at least similarly, according to the consonant table? Are theyboth, for example, bilabial or fricative sounds? Some discrepancies occur depending on
the position and articulation of the dissimilar syllable as compared to the number ofsyllables in all.) When the same vowel is used, the whole often sounds alike.
(b) Does the syllable that is not the same as its counterpart in the other mark have thesame or a similar consonant? For example, the one syllable that is different (1) has
consonants that is in the same column within the Japanese alphabet table and whosevowels are alike due to the shape of the mouth and the positioning of the tongue: 'e,'38

long 'a' and 'i' are alike; 'o,' short 'a,' 'u' are alike; or (2) is a syllable included in thecolumns of 'ga, za, da, ba', being mistaken for a syllable in "pa" column, or a syllable inthe columns of 'ka, sa, ta, ha' respectively. In these cases the impression made by thewhole is very similar.
[Note 2] Decisions on volume (the length of the syllable) are based on the following.
(a) Is the syllable that does not have a counterpart in the other mark a prolonged soundof the vowel in the previous syllable? (The sole difference would be whether a
prolonged sound is there or not).
(b) Is the dissimilar syllable a halting of the consonant that follows? (The soledifference would be whether a quick sound such as pp, tt, ss is there or not).
The length of a sound is linked to volume (loudness/softness) because both prolonged
and quick sounds tend not to be noticed. By contrast, the syllable just before theprolonged or quick sound tends to be noticed. Prolonged and quick sounds often givethe impression of forming a unit of sound that may also be treated as a syllable.
[Note 3] Decision on intonation (the combination of loudness or softness of sounds
and the positioning of the accent or stressed syllable) is based on the following.
(a) Is the dissimilar syllable a soft sound (weak resonance) in both cases? Is there a soft
sound in one and not in the other? Or is it simply that one is a prolonged sound and theother a quick sound? Soft sounds tend to be absorbed into the previous syllable anddifficult to hear.)(b) Is the dissimilar syllable in both cases placed in the middle or the end of the word?
Middle and end syllables are heard as relatively soft.
(c) Is the beginning or the end of the words pronounced in the same loud sound? Whenthe strong syllable comes at the beginning or the end of a word, the impression of thewhole is often alike.
(d) In European letter trademarks, does the accent fall on the same syllable in bothcases?
The volume of sound is sometimes a result of the mechanism involved in its articulation.
Vowels 'i' and 'u' are pronounced with the mouth slightly open, 'm' and 'n' arepronounced with the mouth shut, 'f' and 's' are pronounced without the vocal cords
vibrating, all of which contribute to the softness of the sound. In addition, a sound willseem soft or loud in relation to others depending on the position of the dissimilar
syllable and the number of syllables and their length. For example, even if the differingsyllable is a soft sound according to the above, it may not be considered soft if those on
either side are also soft.
[Note 4] Decisions on syllables are based on the following.
(a) In regard to the number of syllables:13 Do the two marks both contain more than one
syllable? The overall impression often sounds alike if there are a fair number ofsyllables in each, even if one of the syllables is dissimilar.
(b) Is there a common characteristic in the way the two marks fall naturally into
13

Each kana is a syllable. A kana combined with a small kana such as 'kya' and 'sho' is a syllable.
Prolonged and quickened sounds as well as the 'n' are all considered to be single syllables.

39

syllables or pauses? When there is a common characteristic the overall impression
often sounds alike.
[Note 5] The standards listed are the main, recurring criteria that were taken into
account in reaching a decision of similarity in a number of pronunciation-related cases.
[Note 6] Standards (1) through (8) deal predominantly with tone, intonation, volume,and syllables; each factor affects rulings. One factor not listed anywhere between Notes
1-4 is a change in pronunciation over time. For example, two consecutive syllables
may, over time be inverted in pronunciation.
[Note 7] Even if the case falls into one of criteria (1) - (8), the following three
exceptions will apply if the overall impression is different.
(a) When there is a conspicuous difference in the tone or intonation of the first syllable.
(b) When the dissimilar syllable is not at the beginning of the word but there isconspicuous difference in the tone (for example if the dissimilar syllable has a
consonant in the same column but with distinctly differing vowels) or in the intonation(for example if a strong accent falls on the dissimilar syllable.)(c) Regarding syllables(i) when there are only a few syllables (less than three.)(ii) when there is an obvious disparity in the way they fall into natural syllables orpauses.
Standards (6) and (7) will apply in cases that do not belong to (1) through (5).
(II) The second set of criteria for determining similarity in pronunciation is as follows.
(1) Both contain the same number of syllables and the one dissimilar syllable has thesame vowel:"schipper" (katakana) "skipper" (pronounced 'skippah')"VANCOCIN" "BUNCOMIN""MIGION" "MICHION"(2) Both contain the same number of syllables and the one dissimilar syllable is in thesame column within the Japanese alphabet phonetics table:"ASBA" (katakana) "ASPE" (katakana)"Atomin" "Atamin""VULKENE" (pronounced 'varuken') "VALCAN" (pronounced 'varukan')(3) Both contain the same number of syllables and the one dissimilar syllable's soledifference is that of the "pure" syllable of 'h' 'k' 's' ' t' has been changed to 'b' or 'p', 'g' 'z'
and 'd' respectively:"HETRON" (pronounced 'hetoron') "PETRON""KUREKA" "GLECA""SANSHEEL" (katakana) "SANZEEL"(4) The dissimilar syllable is a weak syllable in both cases, or the weak syllable isomitted in one:"DANNEL"(pronounced 'danneru') "DYNEL" (pronounced 'daineru')

40

"Yamasei" (kanji) "Yamase" (katakana)"VINYLA" (pronounced 'binira') "Binilus" (pronounced 'bilirasu')(5) The difference between the dissimilar syllables lies in the omission of the prolonged
sound or of the quickened sound, or in the replacement of the prolonged sound with theshortened sound, or with a weak sound or vice versa.
"Lehman" (katakana) "Leman""coroneht" (katakana) "CORONET" (pronounced 'koronetto')"takarahato" (hiragana) "takarahto" (katakana)(6) Fairly long words containing the same number of syllables where only one syllable
differs.
"saibatoron" (katakana) "saimotoron" (katakana)(7) Fairly long words where one contains an extra syllable:"CAMPBELL" (pronounced 'canpuberu') "Cambell""BPLEX" "VITAPLEX"(8) Others where the overall impression is alike include:(a) Words where two syllables are dissimilar but their differences fall into one of thecategories from (1) to (5), listed above:"COREXIT" (pronounced 'korekushitto') "Coreskit" (katakana)"biserajin" (katakana) "bizeramin" (katakana)"Frehgen" (katakana) "Frigen" (katakana and hiragana)"tenjingan" (kanji) (pronounced 'tenjingan') "denshingan" (kanji) (pronounced'denshingan')"COMPA" "COMBER"(b) One syllable is a single kana and the corresponding syllable in the other words is amerging of two kana:"SAVONET" "SHAVONET" (katakana)(c) The syllable that differs from its counterpart in the other mark is similar to a word offoreign origin in its vowel or consonant and is pronounced as the foreign word:"TYREX" (pronounced 'tairekkusu') "TWYLEX" (pronounced 'tyuirekkusu')"FOLIOL" (pronounced 'foriohru') "HELIOL"(d) The vowel or consonant of the dissimilar syllable is the same as that of the othermark:"SALIGZE" "Sally Gee" (pronounced 'sariji')"CERELAC" (pronounced 'cererakku') "SELENOC"(e) The sound that has the greatest impact in pronunciation appears in both:"hapaya" (katakana) "pappaya" (katakana)41

(f) Others:"POPISTAN" "HOSPITAN"
Note: The pronunciations indicated in the above parentheses were authorized in trial
decisions.
(g) Guidelines relating to the similarity of three-dimensional trademarks
The promulgation of regulations relating to three-dimensional trademarks has
far-reaching implications for the economic activities of those other than the owners of
trademark right. This is particularly the case in Japan due to the overriding significancegiven to registration and to the semi-permanent status of the trademark right. The
Patent Office has announced in brochures outlining and explaining the new Law, that
distinctiveness will be rigorously examined in rulings on similarity. Furthermore,guidelines as to similarity of three-dimensional trademarks were announced and werelater assimilated into the Similarity Examination Standards. The original guidelines are
as follows:(a) When compared to a two-dimensional trademark, the three-dimensional trademark
has a distinctive feature: its appearance depends on the angle from which it is viewed.
Fundamentally, however, the rationale behind the rulings on similarity is the same; thenormal scope of attention of the principal consumer groups (experts, the elderly,
children, ladies etc.) of the goods and services bearing the trademark will be taken as
the standard, taking into account any other relevant market factors. These standards areused in examining the trademark's appearance, pronunciation and concepts, in the samemanner as for two-dimensional trademarks.
(b) With these points in mind, rulings on similarity for three-dimensional trademarks
will on the whole be conducted as follows. One exception will be when the threedimensional trademark is viewed from an angle whereby its distinctiveness is notapparent because it is unlikely that such an angle would be used when examining theorigin of the product in transactions.
A three-dimensional trademark should resemble an identical or similar two-dimensional
trademark when the three-dimensional trademark is viewed from a specific angle.
Three-dimensional trademarks which have a common appearance (or very similar)
when viewed from a specific angle will be considered similar in appearance.
The pronunciation and concepts of three-dimensional trademarks will also be associatedwith the view from a specific angle and not just of the whole. When the trademark
consists of a combination of a three-dimensional shape and letters, pronunciation andconcepts could conceivably be derived solely from the letters.
The original guidelines as stated above have now been assimilated into the current
Trademark Examination Standard as follows:
7. (1) Taking into consideration that the distinctiveness of three-dimensional trademarks
depends on the angle from which it is viewed, rulings on similarity will be conducted as42

follows. However, there may be exceptions when the three-dimensional trademark isviewed from an angle whereby its distinctiveness is not apparent.
(a) A three-dimensional trademark should be viewed from a specific angle where theimage received is similar in appearance to the comparable two-dimensional trademark.
(b) Three-dimensional trademarks which have a common appearance (or very similar)
when viewed from a specific angle will be considered as possessing similarity inappearance.
(c) The pronunciation and concepts of three-dimensional trademarks will also be
associated with the view from a specific angle and not just of the whole.

(2) When the trademark consists of a combination of a three-dimensional shape andletters, pronunciation and concepts may be derived solely from the letters.
(3) Protection of well-known indicators(a) The standing committee on trademarks within the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) held a meeting in June 1999 where 70 nations, including Japanand other international organizations, adopted a resolution to "recommend theprotection of well-known trademarks." The general assembly of the Paris Union,
concerned with the protection of industrial property rights, and the general assembly of
WIPO will present this recommendation as a joint resolution to their members at a laterdate.
As if to predict this, the Patent Office revised the Examination Standards for Trademark
Law 4 (1) (x), (xi), (xv), (xvi) and (xix)] in June 1999 under the heading "Amendmentof Standards relating to Protection of Well-known/Famous Trademarks." Thetrademarks are referred to as well-known/famous trademarks, but the protection
concerns the famous trademarks more so than the well-known ones. In fact, thedistinction between the two is unclear, which is probably why the phrase "protection ofwell-known/famous trademarks" was adopted.
The Patent Office announced the examination procedures for the protection of wellknown and famous trademarks and introduced the documents for both application andexamination. There are problems in applying for well-known or famous trademarks thatwill be dealt with later. The new examination prodedures clarified the use of foreigncountry names in trademarks. And the Trademark Examination Standard was revised,
the details of which will also be discussed later.
The Patent Office reviewed the examination standards regarding the protection of wellknown and famous trademarks. This is merely a review of standards for the benefit of
the Examiners. It is not a decision that impacts the interpretation of law in the courts.
(b) Similarity in the Trademark's Scope of Protection(1) The international climate leading up to the review of the protection afforded wellknown or famous trademarks has been briefly addressed; the domestic situation stillneeds to be examined.

43

Similarity is found when two trademarks, being used on their designated products intransactions, are compared and lead to confusion over the origin of the products. (See,for example, Vol. 15, No. 6, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 1730, Jun. 27, 1961; Vol. 22,
No. 2, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 399, Feb. 27, 1968; No. 1437, Supreme Court, Hanji,
p. 139, Sept. 22, 1992; Vol. 51, No. 3, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 1055, Mar. 11, 1997.)
In the Daishin-In period (particularly in the Meiji era) similarity was interpreted only interms of the likeness of the marks themselves, irrespective of market factors. There
were Daishin-In rulings that considered trademarks to be similar if even one of the threecriteria of appearance, pronunciation or concept, was similar, and some Patent Office
operations followed their example. In some cases, n indication of similarity inpronunciation is sufficient for two trademarks to be ruled as similar. Perhaps it is not an
offense to rule on similarity solely on similarity of pronunciation.
Even in those days there were rulings that stated "It is obvious that we cannot accept
that trademarks are always similar just because their pronunciation is identical, without
taking into account other factors such as their form." (753, Daishin-In, Hanrei, p. 7,
May 28,1900.). The original decision for another case argued that similarity existed
between the trademarks "kouka" (kanji word meaning 'favorable' and 'flower') and"kouka" (kanji word meaning 'royal' and 'flower') because "comparisons must not bemade solely on the basis of a difference in letters" and because their pronunciation is thesame. It is not surprising that this decision was later re-tried and judged to be wrong on
the basis that a holistic observation was neglected. (767, Daishin-In, Hanrei, p9, Oct. 12,
1930.).
The concept of "similarity of trademarks" has been radically transformed since theDaishin-In days. This is evident in the prevailing notions and in actual cases of theSupreme Court, even in cases that deal with examination. Similarity in pronunciation isseen as only one factor in a system that makes its rulings based on the view of the whole
because the appearance, pronunciation and concepts of the trademark under actual
market conditions are the determining factors whether the two are likely to cause
confusion over source.
These cases have become "anchor precedents" in their significance regarding the change
from the original Daishin-In rulings. Certain questions still need to be answered,however, including the issue of whether to use the "empirical rules" method or toconsider actual market factors in rulings on similarity of trademarks not yet in use.
Registered trademarks that are not in use (but within 3 years of registration) come under
the same protection given to all trademarks because their future use needs to beprotected. It is not an adequate defense to argue that the mark was not in use, [No. 4598,
Osaka High Court, Newspaper, p. 9, Jun. 27, 1940.] For trademarks not yet incirculation, rulings will be conducted in the customary manner. But if trademarks start
being used during judicial proceedings, the ruling might be influenced, threatening thestability associated with the "registration principle." These issues need to be settled atsome point by the Supreme Court's Grand Bench.
Recently the trends to take unfair competition seriously have become so strong thatsimilarity of trademarks is being defined solely by whether it poses a risk of confusion

44

or not. If such a risk does not exist, courts will frequently declare the marks dissimilar.
(Mar. 11, 1997, Supreme Court op.cit.).
(2) Actual cases in which the Supreme Court ruling reflects an Emphasis on
Transactions(i) In the beginning the Supreme Court explained the presumption regarding oftrademarks in the Tachibana shouchu (distilled spirit) appeal:"It is appropriate to rule on the similarity of trademarks by considering whether atrademark's use on a product will pose a risk of confusion over the product's origin."(Vol. 15, No. 6, Supreme Court, Minshu, Jun. 27, 1961.).
(ii) However, in the Hyozan appeal, the interpretation had evolved as follows:"Trademark similarity should be decided by considering whether the use of bothtrademarks on identical or similar products will cause confusion regarding identity oforigin. It is important to view the whole, taking into account the impression, memory
and association that a mark's appearance, concept and pronunciation trigger in the trader.
A comprehensive observation of these factors, combined with as much information as isavailable regarding market factors surrounding the transaction, need to be taken into
account in reaching a verdict." (Vol. 22, No. 2, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 399, Feb. 27,
1968.).
(iii) The following is taken from the Daishin-In appeal case:"In defining the similarity of trademarks on identical or similar products, it is importantto take a view of the whole, taking into account the impression, memory and associationthat its appearance, concept and pronunciation trigger in the trader. A comprehensive
observation of these factors along with as much information as is available regarding
market factors surrounding the transaction need to be taken into account in reaching a
verdict. (No. 110, Gyo- Tsu, Supreme Court, 1964; Vo. 22, No. 2, Supreme Court/Third
Small Court Ruling, Minshu, p. 399, Feb. 27, 1968.). Even if, upon a thoroughobservation, the appearance, concept and pronunciation are not individually similar, themarks when viewed as a whole may be similar depending on actual trading situations.
It is therefore necessary to remember that actual trading situations, which take into
account the elements of appearance, concepts and pronunciation, will influence thesimilarity of the marks as a whole. (No. 165, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 407, Sept. 22,
1992.).
(iv) The following citation is from the Kozozushi appeal (Supreme Court, Mar. 11,
1997, op.cit.):"In determining similarity for trademarks on identical or similar products, it is importantto view the whole, taking into account the impression, memory and association that theappearance, concept and pronunciation trigger in the trader and consumer. A
comprehensive observation of these factors along with as much information as isavailable regarding market factors surrounding the transaction need to be taken into
account in reaching a ruling. The similarity of trademarks in appearance, concepts andpronunciation are only a standard for gauging the risk of confusion of origin of the
products. Therefore, even if there is similarity in one of the three elements, significant
differences in other elements or the presence of market factors that nullify the risks ofconfusion will not automatically result in a finding of similarity of the trademarks. (No.
110, (Gyo-Tsu), Supreme Court, 1964; Vo. 22, No. 2, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 399,
Feb. 27, 1968.).

45

(3) Emphasis on the idea of "actual market practices" as it relates to actual rulings andthe protection of well-known trademarks
Trademark similarity should be decided by considering whether the use of bothtrademarks on identical or similar products is likely to cause confusion over identity oforigin. It is important to view the mark in question as a whole, taking into account the
impression, memory and association that its appearance, concept and pronunciation
trigger in the trader. A comprehensive observation of these factors along with as muchinformation as is available regarding market factors surrounding the transaction need tobe taken into account in reaching a decision. This will naturally result in an expansionof the scope of the well-known trademark's effects.
However, since a view of the whole is fundamental to rulings on similarity, there will becases where trademarks with similarity in pronunciation will, after an overall review, bedeclared dissimilar. (Vol. 22, No. 2, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 399, Feb. 27, 1968.).
Infringement litigation should be treated in the same fashion, with "risks of confusion
over origin" being the deciding factor, after actual market factors have been taken into
account. It is therefore too simplistic to assume that well-known or famous trademarks
are treated as exceptions.
The Supreme Court's ruling proves that a view of the whole is the governing principle.
The Court further discusses the idea that the composition has an impact as a single
united entity, so an overall view is essential. Merely observing the major component isonly valid as a means to assist the overall view, as further expressed by the Court.
(Toyosaki, p. 367)
Therefore, similarity in trademarks is defined as trademarks that, when used on products
in transactions, will cause difficulty in differentiation to the point of being likely tocause confusion over the products' sources. (Vol. 15, No. 6, Supreme Court, Minshu, p.
1730, Jun. 27, 1961; Vol. 22, No. 2, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 399, Feb. 27, 1968. In
the past, market forces were not taken into account. A likeness in the actual marks wasinterpreted as similarity of trademark.) Perhaps a change in standards such as this one isa call for a change in direction across the board.
In the German Law, the concepts behind the laws protecting registered trademarks andthe scope of the prohibitive right of registered product trademarks, have been "sametype of product" and "risk of confusion (verwechslungsgefahr)." In Japan, on the other
hand, they have been "similarity of product" and "similarity of trademarks." To use
similarity of trademarks as a standard for judicial rulings, "similarity" cannot simply be"a likeness." Questions of exactly what resembles what according to which standard,need to be addressed. The Trademark Law defines trademark similarity as not only aresemblance in the outward appearance of the mark, but also anything that is likely tocause a risk of confusion for traders and consumers if the trademarks were used on
goods or services. This has now become the ultimate standard. (Supreme Court, Mar.
11, 1997, op.cit.).
Traders and customers still generally use the old-fashioned method. That is, they lookat the appearance, hear it pronounced and understand the concept in order to distinguish46

the goods and services bearing the trademark. The appearance, pronunciation andconcepts are the criteria by which trademarks are compared by the public and if any ofthem are considered difficult to differentiate, then the trademarks will be deemed similar.
(Vol. 1, Tokyo High Court, Mutaishu, p. 280, Sept. 2, 1969.). Because, in most cases,
this method suffices to define similarity, it is the method that is predominantly used inpractice. (In the past, when the trademarks being compared were similar in any one of
the three criteria, the trademarks were automatically considered to be similar. Hanrei, p.
742, Daishin-In, Mar. 14, 1931; Hanrei, p. 743, Daishin-In, Aug. 20, 1942.).
Confusion over the appearance or formation of trademarks is "similarity in appearance,"
confusion over the pronunciation of trademarks is "similarity in pronunciation," andconfusion over the meaning of the trademarks is "confusion over concept." Empiricalrules use these criteria as standards for deciding similarity. (Only Shibuya still
considers this the basic test for similarity.) However, as explained earlier, the ultimate
standard for determining similarity is not any one of these, but in the overall observationof the transactions, taking into account a comprehensive view of the appearance,
pronunciation and concepts. ("Shohyo Shinsa Kijun" (Trademark Examination
Standards,) p. 26.). Unlike in law suits, the risk of confusion is not as easily identified
in trademark examinations. And because confusion of products is likely to occur incases of similarity in appearance or pronunciation, when either of these are present, thetrademarks will typically be declared similar. (Trademark Gazette, Feb. 17, 1936 issue,
Daishin-In, Jan. 14, 1936. Takeda in "Shohyo no Ruiji" (Similarity in Trademarks)
mentioned earlier, includes concepts.). If similarity in concepts is the only ambiguity
found, there is little risk of confusion and it is usually not sufficient come to aconclusion of similarity, unless there are other market factors that need to be considered.
Nakamura follows the changes in theories on trademark similarity and its relationship tofactors affecting transactions, p. 238. Nakamura, Hideo. " A hypothesis: 'Empirical
Rules' or 'Factors affecting Trade'" serialized in "Tokkyo News" (Patent News.). Recent
High Court rulings reflect a tendency to take seriously the factors affecting trade and toview the risk of confusion as synonymous with similarity. The High Court's ruling of
dissimilarity for the "KOZO" /"KOZO SUSHI" case was the most poignant example ofthis. (Supreme Court, Mar. 11, 1997.). This ruling is tantamount to a change in the law.
(For the time being, the courts will most likely rule on similarity based on market
practices, while the Patent Office continues to make is own judgments on similarity
regardless of the rulings of the Supreme Court.).
The reality in the market is that when the appearance, pronunciation and concepts oftrademarks are ambiguous, particularly when the marks are alike, there is a specific"risk of confusion over the origin of the goods or services." This is the reason theGerman Law has made "same type of product" and "risk of confusion" the requirements
for the prohibitive right of registered product trademarks. This is the direction taken by
the standing committee on trademarks within WIPO that adopted a resolution to"recommend the protection of well-known trademarks." It is probably the path that ourown Trademark Law needs to take in the future.
The recent stance taken by the Supreme Court is that actual product transactions and theconfusion of goods and services that occurs in transactions need to be considered inrulings regarding similarity of trademarks. This stance has led to the protection of47

famous trademarks. (Unfair Competition Prevention Law 2(1)(ii) has been newly set up
to deal with "protection of famous trademarks.).
The concept of "trademark similarity" has been favored over the "risk of confusion" inpreventing the risk of confusion over source, because it was seen as the concept moresuited to the Japanese mentality in making decisions. In recent court cases, theSupreme Court's rulings indicate that the difference between similarity and risk ofconfusion has become negligible. In addition to this, Section 6 has been deleted fromthe former Unfair Competition Prevention Law. This deletion paves the way for a moveaway from actual rulings being conducted under the Trademark Law to being conductedunder the Unfair Competition Prevention Law.
(c) Amendment of Examination Standards relating to the Protection of Well-known or
Famous Trademarks
The following is a list of the problems facing the examiners at present.
(i) Amendment of Examination Standards relating to the Protection of Well-known or
Famous Trademarks"1. i) The protection of well-known or famous trademarks ... will be in proportion to
the significance of protecting the well-known/famous trademark." This is an attempt toamend the explanation given in Trademark 4(1)(x), (xv) and (xix).
The statement that "ii) Well-known and famous trademarks that are combined with otherletters or figures will be refused on principle" is also too simplistic. Although it states,"on principle", this provision differs too much from the original purpose of the
trademark law and will be too radical in some cases from an international perspective.
In practice "(iii)... the 700 or so trademarks listed in the Patent Digital Library under'Japan's well-known/famous trademark search'" will be treated as well-known or famous
trademarks. (This coincides with 4(1)(x), (xi), (xv), (xix) and the standard decision is torefuse).
Problem number iv states that "'well-known foreign trademarks' (those which have been
submitted to the Patent Office by foreign governments or public sector groups on behalfof foreign governments) and 'Selected Famous Trademarks of Japan' (as determined by
AIPPI, the International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property) may beconsidered to be well-known or famous trademarks in trademark examination." This
may also be considered too simplistic.
The section goes on to say in v) that "the trademarks which may be considered as wellknown or famous trademarks according to iv) will, as a rule, be accepted with theassumption that they are well-known or famous trademarks and will be treated as such."(Notification for reasons of refusal will be given if they fall under 4(1) (x), (xi), (xv) or(xix). Trademarks combining trademarks described in iv) with other letters and figures
will also receive a notification of reasons for refusal.)
In regard to timing "(vi) for cases whose date falls after the revision of examination
standards, they will be judged in accordance with the amended standard for examination,
regardless of prior judicial cases or circumstances of registration." The notion of what48

is the exception to the "default" rules, (in other words the theories of strong mark vs.
weak mark,) will no doubt be debated in the coming years.
The next item to be reviewed in the Standards was "2. Guidelines for Rulings
concerning Trademarks which include the name of a foreign country.
The names of foreign countries that are included in trademarks will beinterpreted as the place where the goods were produced or where the nature of theservices is distinctly indicative of that country, or where the service is provided.
For these reasons, marks including the names of foreign countries will be refuse inaccordance with 4(1)(xvi), except when the goods were produced in that country, or
when the nature of the services is distinctly indicative of that country, or when theservice is provided in that country.
These amendments to the Trademark Examination Standards are very sketchy and it is
no wonder that a monthly meeting will take place with Japan Intellectual Property
Association in order to exchange ideas on how the amended Standards are working inpractice.
2) Examination Standards
1. Examination Standards relating to Protection of Well-known/Famous Trademarks14No. 3. Section 4 paragraphs (1) and (3)(Reasons for non-registration)
VIII. Section 4 paragraph (1) item (x)Trademarks that are well-known among consumers as indicating the goods or services
that are connected to a certain person's business, and trademarks similar thereto that areused in respect of the same or similar goods or services.
1. The phrase "well-known among consumers" used in this item includes not only those
trademarks that are known to the end consumer but also those that are known to traders.
They include not only those that are known nationwide but also those widely known ina particular region.
2. Trademarks cited for use in regard to this item must be widely known among theconsumers in the country at the time of the trademark's registration application. (See
Section 4 (3)).
3. In regard to this item, this Standards' No. 2, (Section 3 (2)) 2. (1) and (2) will apply
mutatis mutandis for means of proving and adjudicating on how well known a
trademark is.

14

The changes made with the amendments of June 14, 1999 are underlined in the Trademark
Examination Standards.

49

4. Trademarks that combine another person's unregistered trademark that is "wellknown among consumers" with letters or figures will be considered similar to theunregistered trademark if its outward form is a unified whole or is unified in its
concepts.
However, this excludes cases where the part made up of the unregistered trademark is asection of an existing word, or when it is obvious that it will give rise to very different
appearance, pronunciation or concepts.
(Example) This case is the same as
standard No. 3, IX (Section 4, paragraph 1, item 11), 4 (6).
5. AS mentioned previously, the proof and adjudication regarding how well-known a
trademark is requires extra consideration when it comes to goods and services tradedunder special conditions. (An example would be drugs for medical services that aretraded in a specified market, or the examination, testing and research of medicines thatare services provided only in limited markets.)
6. In determining how familiar a foreign trademark is in our county, any documents
relating to its familiarity abroad, or proof of its export to or the provision of services inseveral other countries, need to be carefully examined.
7. "Trademarks that are well-known among consumers" as stated in this item will
include trademarks that have been registered as a defensive mark or that have beenrecognized as a trademark well-known among customers by deliberation or ruling (Note1) in accordance with the registration or verification.
(Note 1) These trademarks can be searched in the Patent Digital Library on the Internet
under 'Japan's well-known/famous trademark search' provided by the Patent Office.
(Reference) See "Trademark Examination Manual" for other materials related to"trademarks which are well-known among consumers."
IX. Section 4 paragraph (1) item (xi)Trademarks that are identical or similar to another person's registered trademark that
was applied for prior to the filing date of the trademark application concerned and thatare used on the designated goods or designated services 15 covered by the trademark
registration referred to or on similar goods or services.16
4. A ruling on the similarity of composite trademarks has to take into account thestrength or weakness of the combination before making a decision. This does notnecessarily apply to those that will obviously give rise to very different appearances,pronunciations or concepts.

15

Meaning the goods or services designated in accordance with Section 6(1) (including its
application under Section 68(1))-hereinafter referred to as "the designated goods or designatedservices."
16
Excerpt relating to well-known trademarks.

50

(1) - (5) omitted(6) Trademarks combining another person's registered trademark that is "well-known
among consumers" with letters or figures will be considered similar to the registeredtrademark if its outward form is a unified whole or is unified in its concepts.
However, this excludes cases where the part made up of the registered trademark is asection of an existing word, or when it is obvious that it will give rise to very different
appearance, pronunciation or concepts.
(Example) Examples of Similarity
For tape recorders "SONYLINE" "SONY LINE" "SONY/LINE" and "SONY"
For cosmetics "LOVELOREAL" (katakana) and "L'OREAL" "rorearu" (katakana)For baggage "PAOLOGUCCI" and "GUCCI"For delivery by air "JALFLOWER" and "JAL"For film production "Toho Shiraume" (kanji) and "Toho" (kanji)
Examples of Dissimilarity
For metal processing machinery "TOSHIHIKO" and "IHI"
For watches "Arbeit" (Arubaito katakana) and "ALBA/Aruba(katakana)"
For game machines "Segare" (hiragana) and "SEGA"(Note) For determining what is well-known among the consumers, apply Item 7 ofStandards No. 3, XIII mutatis mutandis. (4 (1) (10)).
(7) omitted
XIII. Section 4 paragraph 1 item 15
Trademarks that are likely to cause confusion with the goods or services connected withanother person's business (other than the trademarks mentioned in paragraphs (x) to(xiv)).
1. "Cases that are likely to cause confusion with the goods or services connected withanother person's business" in this item does not only refer to mistaking goods andservices for those that are connected with another person's business and the likelihoodof confusion on the part of the consumers. It also includes cases where goods andservices are mistaken for those connected with the business of another person who may
have economic or organizational connections with them. The consumers of these goods
and services are likely to be unable to distingush the origin of these goods and services.
Some examples of this include:(1) A first business uses Trademark M on goods G and this is well-known throughout
his country. A second business uses Trademark M on its goods X (goods X are
dissimilar to goods G, and do not have any connections with G in terms of manufacturer,
retailer, network, ingredients or use). However, a consumer who comes across goods X
may not believe they belong to the first business, yet he may conclude that they are a
product that belongs to a subsidiary or other company. Though such a company does
not actually exist it is seen as the origin of the goods, thereby resulting in confusion51

over source.
(Note) Example(1) shall apply to services as well, so that if the first business and thesecond business are involved in providing services, the word "goods" shall be read as"services" and the phrase "do not have any connections with G in terms of manufacturer,
retailer, retail system, ingredients or use" shall be read as "do not have any connections
with G in terms of the provider of the services, the method of provision, its purpose andany products related to the provision of service."(2) A first business uses trademark S on its provision of services and this is well-known
throughout the country. A second business also uses mark S on his goods (which isdissimilar to the first business's services). A consumer who comes across this productmistakenly thinks that it is somehow related to the services of the first business andconfuses the origin of the product.
(Note) Example(2) shall apply in cases where the first business is engaged in the
production of goods and the second business is engaged in the provision of services.
2. Criteria for determining "Trademarks that are likely to cause confusion with goods orservices connected with another person's business" are as follows:(a) How well-known the other person's mark is (the extent and prevalence of theiradvertisements and commercials)(b) Whether the other person's mark is a created mark or not.
(c) Whether the other person's mark is a house mark or not.
(d) The possibility of the firm diversifying.
(e) The association between goods or services, or between goods and services will betaken into consideration.
In determining the extent of (a), the trademark does not necessarily have to be wellknown nationwide.
3. Definition 2(a) shall be substantiated by applying mutatis mutandis the Standard's No.
2, 2.(1) and (2) (Section 3 (2)).
4. For trademarks that incorporate a famous trademark as part of its trademark, thefollowing will apply:(1) If it is similar to another person's famous registered trademark and it is used on
goods and services identical or similar to the goods or services designated by the
famous registered trademark, then it will be ruled in accordance with 4 (1) (xi).
(2) If it is not similar to another person's famous registered trademark or if it is similar
but the goods or services are not similar to their corresponding counterparts, then incases that are likely to cause confusion of origin, it will be ruled in accordance with thisitem.
(3) Even if it is similar to another person's famous trademark, if the goods or services
are not similar to their corresponding counterparts and are not likely to cause confusion,then in cases of use with unlawful intent, it will be ruled in accordance with 4 (1) (xix).

52

5. Trademarks combining another person's famous registered trademark with letters or
figures will be considered likely to cause confusion of origin of the goods or services
and will be treated as such if its outward form is a unified whole or is unified in its
concepts.
However, this excludes cases where the part made up of the registered trademark is asection of an existing word, or when it is obvious that it will not be likely to cause
confusion of origin regarding the designated goods or services.
(Example) Examples of trademarks likely to cause confusion of origin:
For clothing "arenoma" and "renoma" (bags etc.)
For toys "Par.Sony" (katakana), "Par Sony"(katakana) or "Parsony"(katakana) and"Sony"(katakana) (electrical appliances)
Example of trademarks not likely to cause confusion of origin:
For camera "POLAROID" and "POLA" (cosmetics)
6. Marks that are famous abroad and are considered to be famous by the consumers of
this country (not necessarily the end consumer) at the time of the filing for trademark
registration (see 4 (3)), will be included in the famous marks cited for refusal on thebasis that it is likely to cause confusion in origin should the person filing for registration
use the trademark on his goods or services.
7. Careful consideration must be given to market conditions and other factors indeciding whether it is likely to cause confusion with another person's goods or services.
8. If a three-dimensional trademark is in the shape of an architectural structure and its
form is well-known in this country prior to the trademark's filing as that of the particularbuilding belonging to another person, this item will apply.
9. For verification of prominence, this Standard's No. 3-VIII, 7. (4 (1) (x)) will beapplied mutatis mutandis.
XVII. Section 4 paragraph 1 item xix
Trademarks that are well-known among consumers in Japan or abroad as indicating thegoods or services connected with another person's business, and trademarks identicalwith or similar thereto that are used by the applicant for unfair intention17 (other than
the trademarks mentioned in each of the preceding paragraphs) with respect to such
goods or services.
1. The following trademarks show how this item applies:(a) When trademarks that are identical with or similar to another person's trademark thatis well-known abroad are filed for registration by taking advantage of the fact that it is17

Intention to gain unfair profits, intention to cause damage to such another person and other unfair
intentions - hereinafter the same.

53

yet to be registered in this country, and they are filed for registration with the intent toforce others to buy from them at a higher price at a later date, or with intent to preventthe foreign owner of the right from entering this market, or with intent to force theminto an agency agreement.
(b) Trademarks that are identical with or similar to another person's trademark that iswell-known in this country nationwide, that are filed with the intent to dilute theeffectiveness of the origin the mark indicates (though perhaps not going so far as
causing confusion) and those that are filed with the intent to jeopardize the well-known
trademark's reputation.
2. "Trademarks that are well-known among consumers" stated in this item includes not
only trademarks that are widely recognized to the end consumer, but also those which
are widely recognized by traders.
3. "Trademarks that are well-known among consumers abroad" stated in this item
should be well-known in the particular country being referred to, but they do not have tobe well-known in more than one country. Also, they need not be well-known in thiscountry.
4. Decisions on "unfair intention" should involve a thorough view of any documentation
which exists, such as those discussed in (a) - (f), below.
(a) Documentation evidencing the fact that the other person's trademark is well-known
among consumers. (Period, scope, and frequency of use).
(b) Documentation indicating whether the well-known trademark is a made-up word orwhether it has a very distinct characteristic in its formation.
(c) Documentation indicating that the owner of the well-known trademark's right has
specific plans to enter our market. (For example export to our country, retail within the
country.).
(d) Documentation to prove that the owner of the well-known trademark's right hasplans to expand the scale of his business in the near future. (For example to open new
businesses in a new region.).
(e) Documentation indicating that a request for purchase of the trademark or forentering into an agency agreement, etc. has been made by the applicant.
(f) Documentation indicating the risk of damage that will be done to trust, reputation or
the customer-attracting power associated with the well-known trademark should theapplicant use the trademark.
5. In accordance with this item, an application for trademark registration that fulfills (i)or (ii), below, will be treated with the assumption that another person's well-known
trademark is used with unfair intention.

54

(i) It is identical with or similar to a trademark that is well-known in one or more
foreign countries or well-known in Japan nationwide.
(ii) The well-known trademark is either a made-up word or it has a very distinct
characteristic in its formation.
6. For gauging how well-known it is, this Standard's No. 3-VIII, 7. (4 (1) (x)) will apply
mutatis mutandis.
2. Guidelines for Trademarks containing the name of a Foreign Country
No. 3 Section 4 (1) and (iii)(Reasons for Refusal of Registration)
XIV. Section 4 (1) item (xvi)
Trademarks that are likely to cause a mistake relating to the quality of goods or services.
(Excerpt regarding trademarks that contain a country name.)
3. When trademarks that contain the name of a country or region are interpreted as 1.
the place where the goods were produced, 2. the place of where the nature of theservices is distinctly indicative, 3. the place where the service is provided, 4. already inuse on goods that are produced elsewhere, 5. in use on services other than those whose
nature is distinctly indicative of that country or region, or 6. in use on services that areprovided elsewhere, they are likely to cause mistakes regarding the quality of the goods
or services and a decision will be made in accordance with this item.
In trademarks containing the name of a particular country, even if the outward form is a
unified whole, or is unified in its concepts, the name of the country shall still be seen as
the place where the goods were produced or where the nature of the services isdistinctly indicative of that place, or where the service is provided and will be ruled inaccordance with this item. (This excludes cases where the name of the country will
obviously not be recognized as such because it forms a part of an existing word etc.).
However, in cases such as the following where the indication is appropriate and unlikely
to mislead regarding quality of goods and services, this may not apply:(a) For clothing or related goods bearing a trademark containing the word "Britain" andthe designated goods are actually articles of clothing "made in Britain."(b) For services involved in the provision of food and drinks that bear a trademark
containing the word "France" and the designated services are actually "provision of
French food."
If the name of the region connected to a product, a sale or the nature of a service is used
as an appendage within the trademark, deletion of that name will be permitted incorrections.

55

Example: Cases to which this applies:"SWISSTEX"
Designated good Class 14 Watch<N.B.> "SWISS" implies the country Switzerland.
Cases to which this does not apply:"dodoitsu" (hiragana)
Designated good Class 11 bath tub<N.B.> "dodoitsu" is associated with its kanji counterpart denoting a popular form ofsong.
References
Guidelines for data concerning "trademarks that are well-known among consumers."
For rulings on Trademark Law 4, (1) (x), (xi), (xv) and (xix), the following reference
resources will be used in order to obtain seamless rulings and application of a uniform
standard.
The following data will be used sequentially as they are completed as reference
resources for rulings; they will be announced as such.
Types of Data
Foreign well-known trademarks
German Edition: BDI (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e. V)-- compiled by"German Industrial Federation"
French Edition: compiled by "Industrial Property Right Office of France"
Italian Edition: INDICAM (Instituto di Dentromarca per la lotta alla contraffazione)]compiled by Italian Institute for Combating Imitation goods.
This data is provided by the country (the foreign government or a corporation in public
interest) as a compilation of well-known trademarks of that country.
The list will be updated as the data come in.
Use of Data
The listed trademarks will be assumed to be trademarks well known among consumers
in that country.
(Related Section)
Section 4 (1) (xix)Types of Data
FAMOUS TRADEMARKS IN JAPAN"Famous trademarks in Japan"
This data concerning famous trademarks of this country is compiled and provided by
the International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property, Japan (AIPPI.

56

JAPAN).
Use of Data
Listed trademarks will be treated by default that they are well-known among consumers
in this country.
(Related Section)
Section 4 (1) (x), (xi), (xv) and (xix) (as of July 22, 1999.).
Protection of famous trademarks is essential and necessary and the government is rightto grant that protection. A recitation of the standards is adequate for administrative
purposes, but the protection, and therefore the scope, of trademark protection needs tobe dealt with more extensively from here.
IV Restrictions Resulting From Limits of Right
1. Definition
Trademark registration is a means of protecting the trust inherent in trademarks. Its
purpose is not to allow the monopolization of letters or figures. It is obviously not toprevent another person from exercising his right to use his own name, or to restrict his
freedom to attracting customers by describing the goods. Its purpose is actually tobalance the effect of trademark rights with the freedom to use indicators, making surethat the freedom to use trademarks is safeguarded in cases where a monopoly of the
trademark would go against the public interest. (Reply 11). The following three
restrictions are the outcome of logical reasoning.
Section 26 lists cases where it is not in the public interest to allow one individual tomonopolize a trademark. The first is registration by mistake or in excess. The second isin cases where a part of the trademark that is similar and not the entire trademark itself
applies to the Section and where the trademark right does not extend to the entire mark.
The third is in cases where the distinctiveness occurs subsequent to Section 26, which
effect does not extend to that degree.
(1) In Cases of Registration by Mistake or in Excess
If a mark that is not distinctive and therefore, unregistrable (see Section 3 (1) (i) to (iv),
4 (1) (viii)), is erroneously registered and the owner of the trademark right has been
exercising his rights, the situation can be salvaged by invalidating the registration attrial. Unfortunately, in reality, the mark will be not salvaged if the wait for a trial
decision for invalidation lasts for years. It is important to have in place a strategy toremedy a registration by mistake or in excess by clearly stating the limits of trademark
rights so that it is not dependant on the outcome of the trial for invalidation. In the caseof trademark registration of indistinctive marks, it is all the more urgent because oncethe period of exclusive appeal by the examiner has passed, (Section 47) the trademark
registration cannot be cancelled. For these reasons, the Trademark Law states that theeffect of trademark rights does not extend to the following: (Section 26)(i) Trademarks indicating, generally, one's own portrait, name, famous pseudonym,
professional name or pen name or a famous abbreviation thereof (except cases where
the intent to be unfairly competitive arose after registration.).

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(ii) Trademarks indicating, generally, the generic name, origin, place of sale, quality,
raw materials, efficacy, use, quantity, shape (including packaging shape-hereinafterreferred to in the following paragraph as "shape") or price or the method or time of
manufacturing or using the designated goods concerned or goods similar thereto or thegeneric name of services similar to the designated goods, location of provision of theservices, quality, articles for use in such provision, efficacy, use quantity, modes, prices,or method or time of such provision.
(iii) Trademarks indicating, generally, the generic name of designated services orservices similar thereto, location of provision of the services, quality, articles supplied
for use in such provision, efficacy, use, quantity, modes, price, or method or time ofsuch provision or the generic name, origin, place of sale, quality, raw materials, efficacy,use, quantity, shape or price, or method or time of manufacturing or using the goods
similar to the designated services.
(iv) Trademarks customarily used on the designated goods or designated services, orgoods or services similar thereto.
(v) Trademarks consisting solely of three-dimensionally shaped goods or theirpackaging with the shape indispensable to the function of the goods or their packaging.
An example of a judicial ruling affecting Section 26 (1) (ii) of the Trademark Law is thecase of "dorokon" (katakana) that was found to be lacking in distinctiveness as atrademarks. The word was being used as a generic name for wall plaster for walls bybuilders, decorators and building contractors in that particular region. It was therefore
considered to be a trademark indicating the designated generic product in a common
way; the effects of the trademark right regarding this registered trademark were limited
to the marks written in katakana from left to right. (No. 765, Nagoya District Court,
Hanyu, p. 232, Nov. 30, 1990.). Each of the following marks, written vertically:"Insougaku: Divination of fate through a study of one's personal seal," "Insougaku andthe Company Seal" "The Seal and Insougaku" "Insougaku Seal" are all what this item
calls trademarks indicating in a general way the quality, use, and method of
manufacturing. As a result, the effect of the registered trademark right for thedesignated product "inshou" (seals) with the trademark "insougaku" written in cursive
style and from left to right, would not cover the individual signs mentioned earlier. (Vol.
13, No. 1, Tokyo High Court, Mutaishu, p. 360, Mar. 30, 1981.). An example of a
judicial ruling against Section 26 (1) (ii) is the case of "mizore," a sign written verticallyin hiragana in brush strokes meaning sleet for use on amanatto, sweet soy beans.
Despite a vague implication of the quality and shape of the semi-dried amanatto,"mizore" could not be taken as a common way to refer to amanatto, and was not thecommon way to indicate the quality or shape of the product. (Vol. 18, No. 2, Nagano
District Court, Mutaishu, p. 239, Jun. 26, 1986.). Similarly although the markcontaining "choco-crispy" (katakana) is used on a breakfast cereal box, the traders andconsumers for the product in this country will not recognize its English meaning of"crispy, crunchy" and will not assume that it is a word denoting quality. (Vol. 23, No. 1,
Osaka District Court, Chitekishu, p. 264, April 26, 1991.).
Amendment No. 65 of 1991 saw the introduction of the provision related to service

58marks, in the shape of Section 26 (iii), which was later amended to Section 26 (iv).
Then the 1996 Amendments saw the addition of subsection(v) regarding threedimensional trademarks. But prior to these changes, the marks "Junsei" (kanji meaning'pure') or "Junsei buhin" ('pure parts') were being used within the car industry as thename given to car parts made by a specific motor company or related parts
manufacturers. (In other words, brand name, or genuine parts.) They were seen as acommonly used trademark for car parts and accessories whose quality was guaranteedby the particular motor company. As a result, a trademark, which was a slight variation
on "Junsei/JYUNSEI," was considered to be limited in its effect because of this mark.
(Vol. 8, No. 2, Tokyo District Court, Mutaishu, p. 262, Jul. 19, 1976.). In contrast, aregistered trademark consisting of two twigs of laurel placed symmetrically so that they
form a crown, having clothing, fabric accessories and bedding as its designated products,
was held not to be a commonly used trademark. (Vol. 4, No. 1, Tokyo Regional Court.
Mutaishu, p. 1, Jan. 31, 1977; Vol. 8, No. 1, Tokyo High Court, Mutaishu, p. 41, Jan. 29,
1976.).
(2) Cases in which the above falls within the FORMAL scope of the prohibitive rightSome trademarks can be registered without a problem, but do not have the power toprevent use by a third party if, for example, they indicate generic names, quality, use,etc. (For example, if "nerikirin" (katakana) is registered for mitsumame (Japanesedessert combining sweet beans and jelly) "nerikiri" would fall within the scope ofprohibitive right due to its composition. Even so, "nerikiri" used on other Japanesedessert whether it is written in kanji and hiragana combined or in katakana) will not be
infringing upon the trademark right for the former. This limit on the effect on trademark
rights needs to be clearly defined. Under the former Law, a system of disclaiming rights
existed which clearly stated that "nerikiri" would not be affected by the prohibitive
powers. Now that this system has been abolished, many wish it to be legally reinstatedto combat abuse of trademark right.) The exception to the rule is if, through use, there isa greater awareness of its prominence.
Even if registration of the trademark is permitted, the registration itself does not prevent
another person from exercising in a fair manner his right to use his own portrait, name,famous pseudonym professional name or pen name or a famous abbreviation thereof.18
Neither does it prevent the freedom to indicate in a common way, the generic name,commonly used trademarks, (the concept itself embodies the notion of common use),19
origin, place of sale, quality, raw materials, efficacy, use, quantity or location ofprovision of the services, quality, articles for use in such provision, efficacy, use, andquantity of services.20
For example, if "ICHI" was registered, this trademark would have the pronunciation of"I-C-H-I." If the system of "disclaiming rights" still existed, the pronunciation of "ichi"
for the trademark would have been submitted for it. The owner of the trademark rightfor "ICHI" does not have the right to require an injunction against the use of thenumeral "1." 21 (The trademark "JUN" for example, is registered as an alcoholic
18

Subsection (i).
Subsection (iii)20
Subsection (ii).
21
The numeral "1" is pronounced "ichi" in Japanese.
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beverage, but its owner of right does not have the right to acquire an injunction against
the use of "jun" (kanji meaning 'pure') on distilled spirits.). The trademark "ICHI" canbe registered without a problem, but even though the use of the numeral "1" is within
the scope of prohibitive right in terms of its composition, the limits on right outlined in
Trademark Law Section 26 prevents the trademark right from having this effect. In
terms of similarity, "ICHI" could not be considered similar to "1" on the strength ofsimilarity in pronunciation alone. The issue here is much more about the numeral "1"
not falling within the scope of prohibitive right of this trademark. This reasoning is
articulated by the freedom of use by a third party of the numeral "1" or, in other words,
whether it is a common use indicated in a common way or not. If "1" was used in an
uncommon way written in an unusual style, this will be considered use without
permission and be regarded as an infringement of trademark right, according to limits ofright stated in Trademark Law 26. However, if the numeral "1" was not included in thescope of prohibitive right from the time the trademark "ICHI" was registered, then it
will not be considered an infringement of right, regardless of whether it was used withor without permission, or whether the numeral "1" is used by a third party in a common
way or in an unusual way. The reasonable interpretation would be that the numeral "1"
is not included in the scope of prohibitive right.
The word "jun" (kanji meaning 'pure') is distinctive in its use, being associated solely
with distilled spirits and registered with this in mind. In this case, the trademark "JUN"used on non-Japanese alcoholic beverages does not fall within the scope of prohibitive
right of the trademark "jun" for distilled spirits. Nor does "jun" fall within the scope ofsimilar trademarks. Trademarks that are registered on the basis of their distinctivenessderived from their use, will also have similar goods and similar services. There is also atendency to extend the scope of identity. But it is far better to define identity narrowly
so that the increase in distinctiveness through use will be an exception leading to anincrease in identity. Thus the scope will be maintained.
(3) When a change occurs in distinctiveness after registration
Occasionally, a trademark becomes a generic name or commonly used trademark after
its registration so that people's ability to distinguish its association with a designatedproduct is diminished. When this happens, a third party is guaranteed the use of theindicator that has now become a generic name or commonly used trademark. An
example would be if a new town, created after the trademark registration, was given a
name that was identical to that of the trademark and the town became the origin of a
product or its place of sale. Also, the spread of foreign customs in Japan after
registration of the trademark may mean that the trademark will be seen as an indicatorof the use of its designated product. It is not permitted, however, to use the trademarkthat is in the process of becoming a generic name or commonly used trademark with theintent to compete unfairly. This would be an infringement of the registered trademark
right.
2. Application Requirement (Meaning of "indicating in a common way")"Indicating in a common way" sometimes refers to the way in which trademarks areused (Vol. 13, Daishin-In, Minshu, p. 742, May 17, 1934; Hanmin, 63 incidents.).
"Common" indications are usually determined by examining transaction practices.
Some believe that the important issue is whether the owner of the trademark right has

60lost profits relating to trademark use, and on that basis, any use similar to that of his
trademarks should not be considered as "indicating in a common way." (Eguchi (1) p.
62 f.; No. 620, Osaka High Court Hanji, p. 100, Apr. 10, 1970. See also Vol. 8, No. 1,
Tokyo High Court, Mutaishu, p. 41, Jan. 29, 1976; Vol. 4, No. 1, Tokyo Regional Court,
Mutaishu, p. 1, Jan. 31, 1971.).
3. The Scope of Effect of Registered Trademarks with Reasons for Invalidation
Trademark Law 26 comes to the rescue where a trademark registration has been affected
negatively as a result of Section 3 on registrability of trademarks, and the period of
exclusion (Section 47) has elapsed. Regarding the trademarks that have been effected
negatively by Section 4 on unregistrable trademarks, whose period of exclusion has
elapsed, and whose violation is evident, one has to wonder if there is any other way tosave the situation other than a ruling under Section 26.
The idea is that there can be no infringement when a right is a mere "formality." For a
trademark that has become a generic name, its registration is allowed to exist, yet it does
not have the power to prevent another person from using the trademark or to restrict
others' freedom to use it as an indicator. Incidentally, in Patent Law, the effectiveness ofa patent that has reasons for invalidation is rationalized logically. This originated inGermany as a result of the influences of the right to use and right to prohibit others fromusing.
On the other hand, there are trademarks that have been resurrected after they havebecome generic names. (After the Supreme Court's [Daishin-In] decision, trademarksthat had become a generic name and were subsequently resurrected as a trademark with
distinctive characteristics that exclude others, include "SINGER" and "GOODYEAR"
in the U.S.A. and "BENBERG" in Japan.). A registered trademark with reasons forinvalidation should not become a non-right. Instead, it should retain its right of use;
however, the scope of the prohibitive right should be limited to actions would harm thereputation of the trademark that is in use.
V. Restrictions on the Effectiveness of Trademark Rights Restored by Retrial(Section 59)(1) Main points
If a registered trademark ceases to exist due to opposition to an approved trademark
registration, a trial decision for invalidation, or a trial decision for cancellation, thetrademark can be used without restriction. If a trademark right relating to a revoked,
invalidated or cancelled trademark registration has been restored through a retrial, thequestion of infringement of a trademark right is raised. However, it is unreasonable toretroactively regard any act of a person who has used the trademark in good faith,believing in the previous ruling for cancellation, or trial decision of invalidation orcancellation as an infringement. For this reason, the Law provides that the effects of a
trademark right shall not extend to the good faith use of the registered trademark on thedesignated goods or services, or the acts mentioned in Section 37, after a decision to
revoke or a trial or retrial decision has been finalized but before demand for retrial has
been registered. Section 59 restricts the effects of the trademark right in this manner.

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(2) Effects
Although Section 59 of the Trademark Law restricts the effects of a trademark right, theprovision does not mention goods or articles made or produced by the acts enumerated
in the provision (acts deemed to be infringement) or goods on which the trademark is
applied. In contrast, the Patent Law refers to articles created or produced as a result of
infringing acts. This is because the question is when such articles were made as a resultof the infringing acts. The effects of a patent right extend to the use or product of an
invention for which a patent has been granted, while the effects of a trademark right do
not extend to goods or articles themselves. A trademark right concerns only theconnection of the trademark and the goods to which it applies. If the trademark inquestion is removed from the goods, the goods can be sold. Therefore, the provision as
to goods or articles has not been inserted in the Trademark Law because the economic
loss was considered to be relatively small. ("Chikujo Kaisetsu (Commentaries on theTrademark Law)" p. 1167; Amino p. 739).
In the case where a person has been using a conflicting trademark in good faith after thetrial decision for invalidation or cancellation became final and conclusive but before thedemand for a retrial has been registered and, as a result, the trademark has become wellknown among consumers, such person shall have a right to use the trademark in the
goods or services provided that he does so continuously (Section 60).22
VI. Limitation Due to Design Right, Patent Right or Copyright of Others(1) Main points
There may be some cases where the use of a registered trademark, being used in respectof the designated goods or services, conflicts with another person's patent or design
right (which application was filed prior to the filing date of the trademark application
concerned) or with another person's copyright taking effect prior to that date. These
cases depend on the manner of use. The following focuses on how such conflicts aresettled.
In such a case, the use of the registered trademark in a manner that infringes on anotherperson's design right, patent right or copyright is not allowed on the part of thedesignated goods or services that give rise to a conflict with that other person's design
right, patent right or copyright (Section 29). The conflicting relationship of trademark
rights, design rights, patent rights and copyrights are adjusted in the manner described
below.
Trademarks are sometimes shaped like designs for various reasons. One example is in
the recent boom of the corporate identity ("CI")23 movements. Conversely, however,designs or artistic works have increasingly come to play the role of trademarks. The
introduction of three-dimensional trademarks has brought trademarks even closer todesigns. If a design or copyright is registered as a trademark, the design right or
copyright is protected by the trademark right that lasts semi-permanently after the
expiration of the term of the design right or the copyright.
22

This may be construed to be an involuntary license.
The revitalization of businesses through unification of the corporate symbol on the basis ofcorporate identity.
23

62

The former Trademark Law had a provision of adjustment for the conflicting
relationship of a design right and a trademark right expected to arise in the case ofoverlapping registration of the rights that were in conflict because there was no order inthe filings (See Section 7(3) of the former Trademark Law; Section 8 (3) of the former
Design Law). However, such conflicting cases increasingly arise between the Patent
Law and the Utility Model Law due to the new allowance of the three-dimensional
trademark registration system.
(2) Conflict
The phrase, "depending on the manner of use (the trademark may conflict with otherrights)", in Section 29 pertaining to conflicting applications means depending how aregistered trademark is used with respect to the articles (goods), articles for use in theprovision of services, and trademarks to apply to such articles ("Chikujo Kaisetsu(Commentaries on the Trademark Law)" p. 1079). Originally, legislators inserted thisprovision about design because they were thinking trademarks being used as design.
However, the provision was not actually changed due to its effect on after-arising
amendments.
One example is regarding the trademark of Parker's fountain pens. In this case, thetrademark, which is a clip in the shape of an arrow, is used for the clip of the fountainpen (Amino p. 723, Toyosaki p. 417). In the case where the figure of a clip in the shapeof an arrow is used in graphical advertisements, it is not a figure of the goods (fountainpen); that is, as the advertisement does not show the goods, it cannot be a design of thegoods. Therefore, the use of the trademark (figure of an arrow) in this manner(advertisement) does not conflict with other rights.
On the other hand, if the trademark is used for the clip, the design is the trademark(figure or graphics of an arrow or three-dimensional trademark) applied to the goods (afountain pen) and is also a design of the goods (a fountain pen) that uses the figure of anarrow.
(3) Adjustment(a) Trademark and design rightIf, in the case where a trademark conflicts with some other intellectual property right,
the owner of the trademark right uses the trademark, which is one of the otherintellectual property right's given manner of use of a design or works, he must obtain aworking license from the owner of a design right or obtain a license to utilize it from theowner of the copyright. There is no compulsory licensing system with respect to otherintellectual property rights under the Trademark Law.
In this case, the use of a trademark within the scope of protection of the trademark right(e.g. the prohibitive right) or within the scope of a right to use conflicts with a design
right filed earlier, the scope of the trademark right will be limited and the use of the
trademark in the manner as the design will not be allowed. Conversely, if the use of adesign as part of the protection of the design right conflicts with an earlier filed
trademark right, the conflicting part of each right will not be usable. ("Chikujo Kaisetsu(Commentaries on the Trademark Law)" p. 1078; Amino p. 724).

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Due to a belief that no conflict would occur between the right of a two-dimensional
trademark and patent rights and utility models before the introduction of the threedimensional trademark system in 1996, the Trademark Law had no provision as to suchconflict. However, the introduction of the three-dimensional trademark registration
system gave rise to the possibility of a conflicting relationship.
(b) Trademark and patent right, etc.
In the case where a trademark right conflicts with a design right and a copyright, there
was a provision to adjust these rights as described above, even before the 1996 revision(Section 29 of the former Trademark Law; Section 26 of the former Design Law,). In
connection with the introduction of the three-dimensional trademark system, thepossibility of conflict has arisen between a trademark right, patent right and utility
model right, in cases where the shapes of the goods which are registered as a patentinvention or registered new utility model (which were not registrable as twodimensional trademark) are registered as a three-dimensional trademark at the sametime. Accordingly, the Law as revised in 1996 has a provision concerning a possible
conflict with patent rights and utility model rights in addition to design rights andcopyrights. That is, "where the use of a registered trademark in respect of thedesignated goods or services conflicts with another person's patent, utility model ordesign right under its application filed prior to the filing date of the trademark
application concerned or after the effective date of another person's copyright, theowner of the trademark right or of the right of exclusive or non-exclusive use shall not
use the registered trademark in such a manner on the part of the designated goods orservices giving rise to the conflict." (Section 29)(c) Trademark and copyrightAt the time a trademark registration is filed, the relationship with a copyright is notconsidered; therefore, the registration will not be rejected. However, if the use of aregistered trademark that is like a work, such as if the company Iwanami Shoten uses
for a trademark Millet's "The Sower", conflicts with the copyright, the user must obtaina license to use it from the owner of the copyright.
Determining whether the trademark or the copyright takes precedence is based on which
occurred earlier, the filing for the trademark registration or the commencement of the
copyright. If the copyright has taken effect prior to the trademark application, the scopeof protection of the trademark right is limited in keeping with Section 29. If the
trademark application occurred earlier, both rights are considered to exist independently,
because there is no relevant provision in the Copyright Law. ("Chikujo Kaisetsu(Commentaries on the Trademark Law)" p. 1079; Amino p. 726). If, however, thetrademark has a works-like quality, the question becomes one of the copyright of the
trademark versus other copyrights. Because subjective conditions need to be fulfilled inorder to prove copyright infringement, there is no possibility that an earlier copyright
could infringe a copyright taking effect later. It is impossible for the author of theearlier work to imitate the later work. The later works may be regarded as an
infringement if objective requirements as well as subjective conditions are fulfilled.
One example of a dispute over a trademark-copyright relationship, is a case concerning64the Popeye comics. This case spawned several trials. A trademark using graphics, a
combination of the characters "POPEYE" in alphabets, "POPAI" in katakana characterson each side and a figure of Popeye in the center was registered before World War II
without contacting the author of the comics. The trademark was applied to thedesignated goods in former Class 36, "clothing, handkerchiefs, hand towels, buttons,
pins, accessories and the like." The owner of this trademark right used the graphic
portion of the trademark for mufflers, etc. When he discovered a seller of the mufflers
using a mark consisting of the figure of Popeye and characters of the caption, and amark consisting of the characters of "POPEYE," the trademark right owner demanded
an injunction and compensation for damages. But the seller had obtained the approvalof the author for reproduction of the well-known figure of Popeye. In this case, theconflict between trademark right and copyright was the crux of the argument. Although
there was an argument that the figure of Popeye was not subject to the prohibitive rightbased on Section 29 of the Trademark Law, the court held that the characters"POPEYE" do not have the nature of works and therefore, Section 29 was notapplicable. (Vol. 17, No. 3, Osaka High Court, Mutaishu, p. 411, Sep 26, 1985; See
Kikuchi, "Chosaku Hyakusen" (A Hundred Excellent Books), First edition, p. 57). On
appeal, the second small chamber of the supreme court held that Section 29 of theTrademark Law be interpreted as follows: Section 29 of the Trademark Law provides
that if a trademark right is found to conflict with a copyright that came into effect prior
to the date of application for the trademark registration, the owner of the trademark mayneither use the trademark after then, nor may request for injunction if another person's
act of using a reproduction of the works as a trademark conflicts with his own
trademark right." The court also decided that since the graphic mark is a reproduction of
the original works, "Popeye", it is not deemed to be an infringement of the trademark
right. However, character marks are independent of the works and do not have a nature
like works. Therefore, such a mark cannot be regarded as a reproduction of the work.
"The owner of the trademark is utilizing the fame of the figure without compensation.
Considering that one of the legislative purposes of the Trademark Law is to objectively
maintain fair competition, it is an abuse of the trademark right for the appellee to claim
infringement when the seller of the [mufflers] has obtained the approval of the
copyright owner for Popeye." This was a significant ruling with respect to therelationship of the Trademark Law and copyright, and to abuse of the trademark right.
(Vol. 44, No. 5, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 875, Jul. 30, 1990; Vol. 17, No. 3, Osaka
High Court (original instance), Mutaishu, p. 411, Sep. 26, 1985; Vol. 16, No. 1,
Supreme Court (first instance), Minshu, p. 138, Feb. 28, 1984.).
Another common point of contention involves the titles of works. For example, in one
case, the question was whether or not the release of a CD album with the title, "UNDER
THE SUN", infringes the right of a registered trademark consisting of the identicalcharacters. The title, "UNDER THE SUN", was written in relatively large and boldcharacters across the upper part of the surface of the CD, and the same characters werealso written in the same way on the upper right part of the CD jacket, with themusician's name, "INOUE YOSUI", written in characters larger than the title
underneath. Furthermore, the characters, "UNDER THE SUN", were written from thecenter to the left side of the CD jacket in large designed or pictorial characters. The
court stated, "It is not appropriate to extend the effects of the prohibitive right of a
trademark to trademarks that are used in a manner that does not indicate source or does65not show distinctiveness from other goods, even if they do not fall under Section 26 (1)(ii)." The court did not adopt the argument of trademark infringement on the theory thatthe use of the characters, "UNDER THE SUN", on the CD album is perceived byconsumers as the title of the edited works. (No. 1526, Tokyo District Court, Hanji, p.
141, Feb. 22, 1995.) Many precedents show that titles do not constitute trademark
infringement. This is seen in both the POS case (No. 1292, Tokyo District Court, Hanji,
p. 142, Sep. 16, 1988.) and the Kiko-jutsu (Qigong) case (No. 1510, Tokyo District
Court, Hanji, p. 150, Apr. 27, 1994.) with regard to books. (With respect to the latter
case, the court held that the trademark fell under Section 26 (1)(ii) of the Trademark
Law, "trademarks indicating in a common way the quality of the designated goods" on
the ground that the title of the book in this case was regarded to be indicative of thecontent of the book (i.e., designated goods). In a case for computer game software, aprovisional injunction was requested for a game with the title of "Sangogkushi"(Romance of the Three Kingdoms). However, the court denied the injunction under thefollowing rationale: "It can be said that the mark used as the title of the software inorder to indicate the content of the creation." (Vol. 26, No. 21, Chitekishu, p. 1076, Aug.
23, 1994.).
(d) Provisions of other Industrial Property Laws
c Section 29 of the Trademark Law, Section 72 of the Patent Law, Section 17 of the
Utility Model Law, and Section 26 of the Design Law are all corollaries that provide forcases in conflict with trademark rights. These sections stipulate that if any patent right,
utility model right or design right (hereinafter referred to as "patent rights, etc.")conflicts with another person's registered trademark right that was applied for prior to
the application for the patent rights, etc., the licensee of such patent rights, etc.
(including exclusive and non-exclusive licensees) may not use the patent, work, orinvention, etc. in connection with business.
d Right to use trademarks after the term of the patent rights, etc., expires.
In cases where any trademark right conflicts with any patent right, utility model right ordesign right ("patent rights, etc."), and the application for the patent rights, etc. is madeon the same day or prior to the date of filing for trademark registration, the patentees,
etc. may freely use their patents or works without any restriction imposed by the ownerof the trademark right.
However, patent rights, etc. have a term, while trademark rights last semi-permanently
through renewal procedures. If a trademark right is still effective after the term ofpatent rights, etc. expires, it is possible that the original patentees, etc. may be unable touse or work his own previous patents and inventions after such expiration.
Section 33-2 of the Trademark Law was added for this reason. In the case where apatent right under a patent application filed prior to or on the date of a trademark
registration application conflicts with the trademark right under that trademark
application and the term of the patent right has expired, the patentee's right to use shallcontinue to the extent of the original patent right, in spite of the registered trademark(Section 33-2 (1)). However, this provision shall apply only where the registeredtrademark is used without the intention of violating the rules of fair competition.
Similarly, a patentee may not "work" a patent that expired a long time ago with the66intention of illegally impairing the business interest of his competitor.
e If more than one person is entitled to a right to use a trademark, the owner of theregistered trademark right or of the right of exclusive use may request the original
patentee who has a right to use the trademark, to mark his goods or services with asuitable indication so as to prevent any confusion between the goods or services
connected with the trademark owner's business and those connected with the otherperson's business (Section 33 (2)).
In the case where a utility model right or design right applied for prior to or on the filingdate of the trademark application conflicts with a trademark right under that trademark
application, it is treated as a patent right (Section 33 (3)).
According to the provision of Section 33-3 of the Trademark Law (the right to use thetrademark of an exclusive licensee), any person who has the exclusive license or a nonexclusive license (non-exclusive license registered for establishment only) on the patentright at the time of its expiration of the term shall have the right to use the registeredtrademark, as the patentee does, within the scope of the original patent right (Section
33(1)). As with patent rights, the owner of the trademark right or of a right of exclusive
use may request the person having the exclusive or non-exclusive license to mark his
goods or services with a suitable indication so as to prevent any confusion between the
goods or services connected with the owner's business. In this case, the trademark
owner may receive due consideration (Section 33 (2)). This provision is also applicable
to an exclusive licensee or a non-exclusive licensee of utility model rights and design
rights (Section 33(3)).
Section 3. Scope of Effects of Trademark Right
I. Scope of Effects of Trademark Right
1. Scope of use and scope of prohibition
The right to use a trademark extends to a trademark identical with the registeredtrademark (a trademark recognized to be identical) in respect of the goods or services
identical with the designated goods or services (goods or services recognized to be
identical); the prohibitive rights of the trademark extend to (1) a trademark identicalwith the registered trademark, (2) a trademark similar to the registered trademark, in
respect of the designated goods or services, (3) a trademark identical with the registeredtrademark or (4) a trademark similar to the registered trademark, in respect of the goods
or services similar to the designated goods or services
2. Standards for determining the scope of the trademark
c The "scope of a registered trademark" must be decided on the basis of the trademark(trademark sample) stated in the request (Section 27 (1)). d The scope of thedesignated goods or designated services must be decided on the basis of the statement in
the request (Section 27 (2)). These two provisions are reasonable. (In theory, an actual
trademark sample, instead of the Trademark Gazette, is to be used for the decision.
Practically, however, a mark appearing in the Trademark Gazette is used. No serious
errors occur by this method.). Section 27 of the Trademark Law is merely a cautionary67

provision.
II. Hantei (interpretation) or Advisory Opinion on Scope of Trademark Right
1. Hantei System(1) Definition of Hantei
The Trademark Law provides that a request for Hantei may be made to the Patent Officewith respect to the effects of a trademark right. The decision on identical or similar
trademarks or identical or similar goods or services is extremely difficult. To determine
the scope of the effect of trademark rights is even more difficult. The owner of a
trademark right tends to interpret the scope of his own trademark right broadly. A third
party tends to interpret it narrowly. Therefore, any person may request the Patent Officefor Hantei (Section 28(1)).
The Hantei system has replaced the confirmation and examination system that was inplace under the former Trademark Law (Former Section 22 (1) (iii)). Although opinions
were divided as to whether the confirmation and examination system, which determined
the scope of the trademark right under the former Law, was legally binding, a person
who had an objection was permitted to make an appeal to the court. On the other hand,under the Hantei system, any appeal cannot be made. Furthermore, Hantei is not legallybinding and there is no prohibition against double jeopardy for Hantei. It is a
specialized service provided by the Patent Office, not an administrative measure.
Furthermore, a request for examination cannot be made under the Administrative
Appeal Law (Vol. 22, No. 4, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 936, Apr. 18, 1968.).
It may be appropriate for the Patent Office to interpret ("conduct Hantei") the similarityof a trademark with the registered trademark, or the similarity of goods or services withthe designated goods or services. However, it is unreasonable that the Patent Officeshould decide the effect of a trademark right based on whether there is a prior user's
right that involves intentional unfair competition, or based on consumers' recognition of
the name as a common name under the Hantei system, which lacks the procedure for
examination of evidence. The duty of the Patent Office, essentially, is not to draw a
final conclusion about the facts. It is stipulated that the Patent Office should give
Hantei ("interpretation") of the effects of trademarks and also of such facts. However,the Patent Office does not provide Hantei in a practical sense concerning the effects of a
trademark, which are determined on the basis of the recognition of the intent of unfair
competition and facts of use.
(2) Nature of Hantei
Hantei is not administrative. (This is contrary to a comment once made by theCommissioner of the Patent Office that it is administrative measures.). Under
precedential case law, Hantei was treated as an administrative act or an expert's
appraisal by an administrative agency, and not as administrative measures. If it wereconsidered an administrative measure, an appeal to a district court would be allowed,
and the procedure for Hantei would become more complicated than the "confirmationand examination procedure to determine the scope of trademark rights" under theformer Law. The result would be a deviation from the purpose of the amendment of theLaw, which intended for a simplification of procedures and settlement of disputes

68without lawsuits.
2. Hantei procedure(1) Request for Hantei
When a request for Hantei is made, the Commissioner of the Patent Office shalldesignate three appeal examiners to answer the request (Section 28 (2)).
Any person who makes a request for Hantei about the effects of a trademark must
submit a written statement containing the following items to the Commissioner of the
Patent Office (Section 2 (2) of the Trademark Order; Section 3 of the Patent Order).
c A description of the case for which Hantei is requested;d Name or appellation, address and domicile of the party and its representative;e Purpose of the request and the reasons therefor(2) Designation and exclusion of appeal examiner
There are provisions concerning who is excluded from participating in Hantei. The
Commissioner of the Patent Office shall not designate the following persons as an
appeal examiner (Section 2 (2) of the Trademark Order; Section 3 of the Patent Order).
c Any person who is or was a party to the case, or whose spouse or whose ex-spouse isor was a party to the case;d Any person whose relative within the fourth degree by blood, or within the third
degree by marriage, or whose relative living in the same house is or was a party to thecase;e A guardian, supervisor or curator of a party to the case;f Any person who is or was an agent of a party to the case;g Any person who has any reason to prevent the fairness of the appeal examination of
the case.
The Commissioner of the Patent Office shall dismiss a designated appeal examiner who
is deemed to be inappropriate for involvement with Hantei and replace him with anotherexaminer (Section 2 (2) of the Trademark Order; Section 4 of the Patent Order). Hantei
shall be given by the collective body of the designated three appeal examiners. The
decision shall be reached by a majority of members (Section 2(2) of the Trademark
Order; Section 5 of the Patent Order). The Commissioner of the Patent Office shalldesignate one of the appeal examiners to be the chief appeal examiner. The chief appeal
examiner shall supervise the affairs concerning the case for which Hantei was requested(Section 2 (2) of the Trademark Order; Section 6 of the Patent Order).
(3) Appeal examination
The chief appeal examiner, upon request for Hantei, shall deliver a copy of the
document specified in Section 2 (2) of the Trademark Law Enforcement Order andSection 2 of the Patent Law Enforcement Order to the person requested to reply. The
written reply shall be due by a date specified and a copy of the reply shall be delivered
to the requesting person by the chief appeal examiner (Section 2 (2) of the Trademark
Law Enforcement Order; Section 7 of the Patent Law Enforcement Order.).
Appeal examinations are conducted principally through an exchange of documents.

69However, upon motion by a party or by ex officio, the chief appeal examiner may
conduct the proceedings orally. (Section 2 (2) of the Trademark Law Enforcement
Order; Section 8 of the Patent Law Enforcement Order.).
With respect to an oral appeal examination, any staff designated by the Commissionerof the Patent Office shall, upon the orders of the chief appeal examiner, prepare minutes
to record the summary of the process and result of the examination each day on which
examination is conducted (Section 2 (2) of the Trademark Law Enforcement Order;
Section 9 of the Patent Law Enforcement Order).
In the case where the examination has included matter not introduced by the requesting
party, the chief appeal examiner shall provide a copy of the result of the examination to
the requesting party and shall offer an opportunity to respond within a specified period(Section 2 (2) of the Trademark Law Enforcement Order; Section 7 of the Patent Law
Enforcement Order Section 2 (2) of the Trademark Law Enforcement Order; Section 7of the Patent Law Enforcement Order).
Proceedings under the Patent Law intended for the reinforcement of procedures such as
examination of evidence shall be applied mutatis mutandis to Hantei (Section 28 (3) of
the Trademark Law; Section 71 (3) of the Patent Law).
(4) Hantei report
When each appeal examination for Hantei is concluded, a Hantei report containing thefollowing matters shall be prepared:c Request number for Hantei proceedings;
d Description of the case for which Hantei was requested;e Name or appellation, address or domicile of each party and its representative;f Conclusion and reasons of Hantei;
g Date Hantei was concluded
The Commissioner of the Patent Office shall deliver a certified copy of Hantei to eachparty concerned (Section 2 (2) of the Trademark Law Enforcement Order; Section 11 of
the Patent Law Enforcement Order).
3. Expert testimony system(1) Expert testimony system
The Commissioner of the Patent Office shall, upon request by the court for expert
testimony, designate three appeal examiners to conduct expert testimony (Section 28(2)).
(2) Nature
Expert testimony is not administrative and is not binding upon the court. Because theexpert testimony proceedings are designed to enable the court to utilize Hantei
proceedings, the result would be the same as if a party made a request for Hantei to thecourt.
However, because expert testimony is relied upon by the court to judge the effects of70

trademark rights, the practical influence on the judiciary may be significant, depending
upon how the system is utilized. Because of this, the adoption of expert testimony for
Hantei should have been more sufficiently discussed.
(3) Proceedings
The expert testimony proceedings are designed to enable the court to utilize Hantei.
Many regulations of Hantei proceedings are applied mutatis mutandis to these expert
testimony proceedings (Section 28-2 (2) of the Trademark Law; Section 71-2 (2),Section 136 (1) and (2), Section 137 (2), and Section 138 of the Patent Law).
III. Grant of Right of Use
The rights of use consist of rights of exclusive use and non-exclusive use. These rights
are exercised in order to utilize the value of a trademark right as a property right. For
instance, a right of exclusive use, especially with respect to an internationally famous
trademark, is utilized in connection with subsidiaries, joint ventures, and sole
distributorship agreements. The reputation acquired by the use of a trademark, not only
by an owner of non-exclusive right of use but also by an owner of exclusive right of use,belongs to the owner of the trademark. (Amino p. 785; Toyosaki p. 449). In such a case,no compensation problem arises unless there are special circumstances.
1. Grant of right of exclusive use(1) Establishment of right of exclusive use(a) Right of exclusive use
The owner of a trademark right may grant a right of exclusive use with respect to his
trademark right (Section 30 (1)). In cases of joint ownership, the other owners' consent
shall be required (Section 35; Section 73 (3) of the Patent Law).
The owner of a right of exclusive use shall have an exclusive right to use the registeredtrademark with respect to the designated goods or services for which the exclusive rightis granted to the extent laid down in the contract granting such right. This extent may
define, for example, manners of manufacturing, sale or offering, term and the territory.
Because a right of exclusive use is like a real right (a right in rem) and has exclusive
effects, it is protected in the same manner as a trademark right (Section 36). If a right of
exclusive use is established, the owner of the trademark right may not use the registeredtrademark in light of the right of exclusive use. (If there is no special term to thecontrary, exceptions which enable a particular person to use it may be made.)(b) Criticism
At the time of legislation of the current Trademark Law, many people opposed allowing
the right to grant exclusive use because it renders registered trademarks unusable by theowner of the trademark right, contrary to the philosophy of the Law (which is to protect
owners of trademark rights) (Report by the Council for Amendment 14 (9)). Currently,
some criticize the exclusive right system, claiming that it attaches too much emphasis to
economic benefits and is insufficiently restrictive with respect to supervision, guaranteeof quality, etc. as compared with overseas laws. (Toyosaki p. 444, Miyake p. 246;
Amino p. 781). It is necessary to reexamine the grant system from consumers'
viewpoint. Some argue that sole distributors need to have a right of exclusive use, but71others insist that only an exclusive right of non-exclusive use would be sufficient(Yoshiwara=Takahashi, p. 168).
(c) Establishment within the scope of prohibitive right
There is a question whether the owner of a trademark right may establish a right of
exclusive use only as to the right to use or also within his prohibitive right. That is,opinions are divided whether a right of exclusive use may be granted only in respect ofgoods or services identical to the registered gods or services or also in respect of similar
goods or services. The former opinion is generally accepted. This is based on the
ground that a prohibitive right is not properly within the scope of a right of exclusiveuse (Yoshiwara, p. 169) or that a prohibitive right cannot be transferred with the right ofuse (Amino, p. 783). In practice, many contracts granting exclusive rights beyond thescope of right of use are entered into. The owner of a trademark right may grant an
exclusive right only with respect to identical goods or services; in such a case he may
not enforce his prohibitive right of the trademark with respect to similar goods orservices. The owner believes that the grant of a right of exclusive use is under his
control and within his power. If the owner is aware of the distinction between a right ofuse and prohibitive right, preparation of a contract granting a right of exclusive use,
while distinguishing between a right of use and a prohibitive right, would make thecontract too complicated. Therefore, a simple contract for establishment of a right of
exclusive use is made for the purpose of registration, while a business contract for
granting rights of use is, in many cases, entered into without a distinction between rights
of use and prohibitive rights.
An unresolved question is whether such agreement is interpreted as an agreement tocancel the prohibitive right of a trademark or, practically, as an agreement to grant theright of use. At least, a broad interpretation should be given to the definition of an
identical trademark and goods or services. In the actual world, an agreement granting aright for exclusive use is an agreement for establishment of a right of exclusive use insome cases, or an agreement combining an agreement for establishment of a right of
exclusive use and an agreement for cancellation of the owner's prohibitive right in othercases. The number of latter cases is considered to be more than the former cases.
(d) Prohibition of establishment
A state, a local public entity, an agency thereof, a non-profit organization working in the
public interest, or a person carrying on a non-profit public enterprise may not grant aright of exclusive use with respect to a well-known registered trademark (identical orsimilar trademark) indicating such organization or individual. Because the reasons forregistration are based on the assumption that the right of use is only used by suchorganization or individual, a right of exclusive use may not be granted (Proviso of
Section 30 (1), Section 4 (2), Section 4 (1) (vi)).
(2) Details of right of exclusive use"The owner of a right of exclusive use shall have an exclusive right to use the registeredtrademark in respect of the designated goods or designated services to the extent set out
in the contract granting such right." (Section 30 (2)).
Because a right of exclusive use appears to be a real or natural right (a right in rem,72effective against anyone), the owner of the trademark right is prohibited from using his
registered trademark in the scope of such right of exclusive use. If a right of exclusive
use covers the entire scope of a trademark right, the owner of a trademark right may notuse it at all. However, special provisions inserted to the agreement can permit theowner of the trademark right to continue to use the right. Everything depends on thecontent of the agreement establishing the right of use. If the owner of a trademark uses
his rights that are within the scope of the exclusive right specified by the agreement, heis regarded to be infringing his own trademark right (right of exclusive right).
Conversely, the holder of the right of exclusive use is regarded to be infringing thetrademark right if he uses the trademark beyond the scope of the right specified by theagreement.
The right of exclusive use usually restricts goods, services, term and territory. It may
specify manner of use, such as manners of sale or provision (e.g., sale only to a
distributor), and quantity (e.g., limit the quantity to be manufactured, sold, or provided
by a manufacturer, seller or provider) or may specify suppliers of the goods with thetrademark applied in some cases. Apart from whether such restriction violates the Antimonopoly Law, it is possible to enter into such restrictive agreement under the
Trademark Law.24(3) Infringement of right of exclusive use
Any owner of a right of exclusive use is entitled, as the "owner" of a trademark, to theright to demand injunctions and compensation for damages (Chapter 4-2, Section 36 f.
(Infringement)). Penal provisions are also provided (Chapter 9, Section 78 f., (Penal
Provisions)).
(4) Transfer of right of exclusive use
The owner of a trademark is vitally interested in who owns his right of exclusive use
because that ownership will influence the reputation of the trademark. Therefore, theowner of the right of exclusive use may transfer such right only with the consent of theowner of the trademark right. In the case of inheritance or other general succession, theconsent of the owner of the trademark is not required because of the nature of such rightof exclusive use (Section 30 (3)).
The owner of the right of exclusive use may not assign or license that right. The
viewpoint of the current Law is that a transfer of the right would be sufficient, weresuch transfer allowed (by the trademark owner). However, in cases where the right of
exclusive use is granted internationally, this system may be insufficient. For instance,
Party B (the owner of the right of exclusive use of a Japanese trademark) has acquired
the right to use the mark exclusively in Asia from Party A (an international enterprisethat owns the Japanese trademark) who owns many trademark rights in many countries.
If Party B assigns the right of exclusive use to C1 in India, to C2 in Indonesia and to C3
in Japan, in such a case, it would be more suitable to the situation that Party B
sublicense the right of exclusive use to C3 in Japan. However, the current trademark
law will not permit Party B to grant or register even the permissible sublicense.
24

As discussed below, the act is not necessarily a violation of the Anti-monopoly Law. It is regarded
as an act of exercising a right and exempted from application under Section 23 of the Anti-Monopoly
Law.

73

(5) Extinction of a right of exclusive use
A right of exclusive use terminates by the expiration of the term, cancellation of theagreement concerning the grant of the right, and surrender of the right. The right will
also terminate with the extinction of the principal trademark. This significantly
influences the interest of the owner of the right of use. Therefore the Trademark Law
provides that the trademark owner must obtain the consent of the owner of the right ofuse when surrendering the trademark (Section 35 of the Trademark Law; Section 97(1)of the Patent Law).
(6) Surrender of right of exclusive use, creation of pledge and grant of right of nonexclusive use
If there exist pledgees or holders of non-exclusive use rights with respect to thetrademark, the owner of a right of exclusive use may surrender the right only with theirconsent, so as not to cause them unexpected loss or damage. Likewise, the owner of aright of exclusive use may create pledges or grant (assign) the right of non-exclusive
use only with the consent of the owner of the trademark so as to avoid any unexpected
loss or damage. In cases of joint ownership, the consent of the remaining owners is
required (Section 30 (4); Section 97 (2) and Section 77 (4) (v)).
(7) Pledge on right of exclusive use
If the right of exclusive use is the subject of pledge, the pledgee may not use theregistered trademark in respect of the designated goods or services, unless otherwise
provided by contract (Section 34 (1)). The laws for security in subrogation shall beapplied to pledges on the right of exclusive use. A pledgee may exercise his pledge withrespect to the compensation of such right of exclusive use, or the money or any otheritems receivable by the owner upon the use of the trademark right; provided, however,he must seize or attach the money or items before the payment or delivery thereof(Section 34 (2); Section 96 of the Patent Law).
(8) Registration of right of exclusive use
Any restriction on establishment, transfer (except for transfers by inheritance or othergeneral succession), change, extinction (except for confusion or extinction of trademark
rights) or disposition, or restriction on establishment or transfer (except for transfers byinheritance or other general succession) of a pledge on the right of exclusive use willtake effect only with respect to the right of exclusive use or registered pledge (Section
30 (4) and Section (3); Section 98 (1) (ii) and (2), Section 98 (1) (iii) and (2) of the
Patent Law). As shown in a precedent, the request for transfer of a right of exclusive
use was dismissed on the ground that no registration was found to be made with regard
to the establishment of the right (No. 1107, Mito District Court, Hanji, p. 120, Sep. 5,
1983).
Notice of inheritance or other general succession shall be supplied to the Commissionerof the Patent Office without delay in order to announce the details of register of
trademarks to the public (Section 30 (4); Section 98 (2)).
2. Right of non-exclusive use(1) Grant of right of non-exclusive use

74

(a) Right of non-exclusive use
The owner of a right of non-exclusive use may sublicense or assign a right of nonexclusive use to others within the scope of his trademark right (Section 31 (1)).
Because the system of registration of a trademark was established for the benefit ofconsumers (as an indication of business reputation or to prevent confusion), essentially,
only the owner of the trademark right should be entitled to use the registered trademark.
Internationally, however, grant of a right of use is acknowledged in some way in many
countries.
The current Law attaches importance to the property nature andtransferability at will of a trademark right and has set up a system for the grant of theright to use trademarks. Based on the assumption that any trademark owner would notgrant a right to use to a person who might harm the reputation of his business, and theowner would have the right used under due control, the system for grant of the right ofuse has become a little too unrestricted. ("Chikujo Kaisetsu" (Commentaries on theTrademark Law, p. 1081)).
There was a precedent as to the effectiveness of an agreement concerning grant of suchright. In this case, the representative director of a firm under his private management
owned the trademark. Although there was no express agreement concerning the grantof a right to use the trademark between the owner and his firm, the court deemed thatsuch agreement had substantially been made (Vol. 4, No. 1, Osaka High Court,
Mutaishu, p. 117, Mar. 29, 1972).

(b) Criticism
From a legislative point of view, it is insufficient that the only consumer protection
mechanism under the current Law is a trial for cancellation of registration (Toyosaki, p.
444, Miyake, p. 246, and Amino, p. 781).
(c) Prohibition of grant
Any trademark owner may not grant a right of non-exclusive use of a trademark which
is a famous mark indicating a State or a local public entity or an agency thereof or a
non-profit organization or enterprise working in the public interest (or a mark identicalwith, or similar to such a mark) (Proviso of Section 31 (1), Section 4 (1) (vi) and (2))
for the same reasons as discussed in the case of a right of exclusive use.
The former Trademark Law prohibited the grant of a right to use a registered trademark
by the owner of the trademark right to a third party. In the case of "Nagasaka
Sarashina," the question was whether the grant of a right to use the mark, "Azabu
Nagasaka Sarashina Honten " that includes as its part the registered trademark,"Nagasaka Sarashina", as its trade name and trade mark. The court found that it was
effective in light of the purpose of Section 9 of the former Trademark Law (Section 32
of the current Law) (Vol. 4, No. 1, Osaka High Court, Mutaishu, p. 117, Mar. 29, 1972).
However, the high court held as follows: "The grant of a right to use "Azabu Nagasaka
Sarashina Honten" is not a grant of right of non-exclusive use. It should be interpreted
as a commitment that the holder of the registered mark will not exercise his right torequest an injunction, etc. Accordingly, the agreement is found valid even under the75

former Law that did not allow the grant of a right to use a trademark.
(2) Right of non-exclusive use(a) Nature of right of non-exclusive use
Because a right of non-exclusive use takes effect based on a contract, the owner of suchright may use the registered trademark for the designated goods or designated services
to the extent set out in the contract granting such right (Section 31 (2)). In other words,
the scope, term and conditions of such right can be specified in any way by a contract
without restriction.
In the case of "Juchheim's," the question was regarding the scope of the grant of a rightto use the trademark. The owner of the trademark, "Juchheim's", allowed anotherperson (who has no legal claim to the right) to use the mark, "Juchheim's confecto",
without imposing any restrictions at the compromise made before the court. Even if norestrictions were imposed on the manner of indication of a mark, the manner could not
be completely unrestricted. The court viewed that there should have been restrictions
coming from the basic nature of a trademark, distinctiveness. In the mark of"Juchheim's Confecto", "Juchheim's" was indicated larger than "Confecto." Eachcomponent, "Juchheim's" and "Confecto", was interpreted as an indication permitted in
the compromise. Namely the manner of indication was within the scope of grant.
Objections might be raised to this decision today. (No. 369, Kobe District Court, Hanyu,
p. 415, Jan. 25, 1979).
There was a court decision regarding the influence of the cancellation of a licensing
agreement of a foreign trademark on a Japanese trademark. A right to use the registeredtrademark, "Troy Bros", was granted to a Japanese corporation as a trademark similar to
the trademark, "Troy", for which a U.S. corporation had a U.S. trademark right.
Because the trademark was registered as a Japanese trademark under the name of the
U.S. corporation, when the Japanese corporation exercised the rights of the registeredtrademark after the cancellation of the license agreement, it was held to be an abuse of
the right and impermissible (No. 536, Tokyo District Court, Hanyu, p. 398, May 30,
1984). Another case involved to whom a trademark belonged when it was registered in
the name of the owner of a right to use, after the termination of a trademark license
agreement. The agreement contained a provision addressing the grant of a right to useby the owner of such right, pertaining to the trademark, any trademark similar to it andits variation used by the owner of such right in respect of the goods sold in Japan. "The
trademark of the person who granted a right of use" in the agreement means a trademark
which the person who granted the right so created as to use it as the trademark specificto his company at present and in the future. "Any trademark similar to it or its variation"
meant a trademark of the same kind or similar in the image created by using, in part, thetrademark of the person who granted the right to use, or by changing the characters,
types and shape of the trademark. Any trademark other than this does not fall in thiscategory if the licensor granted the right of use. The trademark, "Troy Bros", registeredin the name of the owner of the right of use in accordance with the license agreement
belongs to the licensor. But in this case, the graphic mark of a circled pipe registered in
the name of the owner of a right of use under the license agreement was not related tothe trademark of the above-mentioned licensor's trademark. It was independently
created by the owner of a right of use, and therefore, it is reasonable to regard it as a76

trademark of the owner of the right of use that such owner utilized only in Japan after
reporting it to the licensor and obtaining his approval. After that, the court judged thetrademarks, "SUNFAIR" and "CASTAWAY" as follows: "SUNFAIR" that was
registered in the name of the owner of the right of use under the license agreement waspresented and licensed by the licensor to the owner of the right of use. Therefore it
belongs to the licensor. In contrast, "CASTAWAY" which was registered in the name ofthe owner of the right of use under the license agreement originated in the mark, "TheOutlaw" in English created by the licensor and recommended by him to the owner of aright of use because the registrability of the mark was doubtful. For this reason, theowner of a right to use came up with the word "CASTWAY" and created the trademark
to express the same concept. Because the use of it was licensed by the licensor as avariation of the trademark, it was deemed to belong to the licensor (Vol. 17, No. 3,
Osaka High Court, Mutaishu, p. 614, Dec. 20, 1985).
The legal nature of a right of non-exclusive use is not a real right (property right?
effective against anyone), it is, in contrast, a claim (relative right effective against a
specific person) (Vol. 27, No. 3, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 580, Apr. 20, 1973, etc.
Commonly accepted view. "Nature of Patent License" by Yoshihiko Sato views it as aright in rem, Obo Kanreki, Book II, p. 280).
The owner of a trademark right may continue to use his own trademark after granting aright of non-exclusive use to another person. He may grant a right of non-exclusive useof the same trademark to a person other than the first owner of such right, andconcurrently, he may grant a right of exclusive use. If that happens and the right of nonexclusive use has not been registered, the trademark may not be used in the scope of theright of exclusive use. Although the owner of a right of non-exclusive use may have an
action against the owner of the trademark right for breach of contract, he cannot claim
his right of non-exclusive use against the owner of the right of exclusive use. If the
non-exclusive right had been registered first, it would have been effective against theright of exclusive use, and the owner of the right of non-exclusive use could have used
the trademark continuously (Section 31 (4); Section 99 (1) of the Patent Law).
(b) Exclusive right of non-exclusive use and its exclusivity
A right to non-exclusive use with a special term to enter into a trademark license
agreement only with the owner of such right and not to enter into an agreement granting
the same right of non-exclusive use with any other person other than the original owneris called, "exclusive right of non-exclusive use." However, if an exclusive agreement
has been entered into, there is no system to register an exclusive right as such.
Therefore, should any other owner of the trademark appear in breach of the agreement,
the owner of the trademark right would merely be blamed for the non-fulfillment of theobligation under an obligatory agreement between the parties concerned.
Practically, this situation is naturally similar to the right of exclusive use. For thisreason, some theories acknowledge a right to request exclusion of interference, as well,in connection with a registered exclusive right of non-exclusive use. (Vol. 6, No. 12,
Tokyo District Court, Kaminshu, p. 2690, Dec. 24, 1955; Kaneko=Someno, New p. 131,
Toyosaki p. 299, Amino p. 787, Yoshifuji p. 568, Orita=Ishikawa p. 342; "Right toDemand Injunctions of Owner of Right of Exclusive Use", Kazuo Morita, No. 8 of77

Annual report of the Japan Society of Industrial Property) Some courts deny such right(No. 142, Supreme Court, Quick Report, Hanji, p. 3872, Jan. 20, 1987; No. 157, Osaka
High Court, Quick Report, p. 4382, Jun. 20, 1986; No. 1138, Osaka District Court,
Hanji, p. 137, Dec. 20, 1984; Mitsuishi p. 233). Some theories acknowledge a right todemand injunctions by an exclusive licensee of non-exclusive right as an exercise insubrogation. (No. 185, Tokyo District Court, Hanyu, p. 209, Aug. 31, 1965; Nakayama
p. 751; Mitsuishi "Patent Law" p. 303; Amino acknowledges the above-mentioned
subrogation exercise with respect to the right of non-exclusive use. p. 787) A right todemand compensation for damages upon infringement of an exclusive right of nonexclusive use is acknowledged in most of court decisions (Vol. 11, No. 1, Osaka District
Court, Mutaishu, p. 92, Feb. 28, 1979; No. 1138, Osaka District Court, Hanji, p. 137,
Dec. 20, 1984; Vol. 23, No. 3, Osaka District Court, Chitekishu, p. 850, Dec. 25, 1991;
Honma, Jitsumu Horitsu Taikei (Practical Law System) (Patent, Trademarks, Copyright)
p. 443, and all other theories affirming a non-exclusive license).
A right to demand an injunction for infringement of a right of non-exclusive use of isgenerally denied (Vol. 12, No. 11, Tokyo District Court, Kaminshu, p. 2808, Nov. 20,
1961; Yoshinobu Someno, "Licensees' Legal Qualification in Patent Infringement
Actions", Study on Corporate Laws-10th Anniversary, p. 215; Tatsunori Shibuya,"Licensee's Obligation of Working under Patent License Agreement and Legal Nature of
Agreement", Vol. 85, No. 2 of Hokyo, p. 193). Opinions regarding a right to demandcompensation for damages have been divided into affirmative theories25 and negative
theories.26 The affirmative opinions are slightly stronger.
(3) Transfer of right of non-exclusive use
A right of non-exclusive use may be transferred only with the consent of the owner of
the trademark right, and a right of non-exclusive use that affects a right of exclusive use
may be transferred only with both the consent of the owner of the trademark right andthe owner of a right of exclusive use. These consents are required so as not to cause
unexpected loss to the owner of the trademark right or a right of non-exclusive use.
However, in the case of inheritances or other general succession, the consent is not
required (Section 31 (3)).
(4) Joint ownership, pledge, restriction on surrender, and termination
In cases where a right of non-exclusive use is jointly owned, each owner may nottransfer his share or establish a pledge on his share, without obtaining the consent of theremaining owners (Section 31 (4); Section 73 (1) of the Patent Law). Each share of theright covers the entire range of use. The size of each share is insignificant except for thecases of distribution of a license or compensation for transference. A major user having
a small share utilizes the right more fully than a minor user of a large share of the right.
This is the characteristic of intangible property.
The owner of a right of non-exclusive use may establish a pledge on the right of nonexclusive use only with the consent of the trademark right owner. In the case of a rightof non-exclusive use where another holds the right of exclusive use, he may establish a25

Vol. 17, Daishinin, Minshu, p.1675, Aug. 27, 1938; Suehiro p.77, Amino p.787, Shibuya Ibid.
Tokyo District Court, Nov. 20, 1961, Ibid.; Vol. 16, No. 1, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p.271,
Apr. 26, 1984; Someno Ibid.
26

78

pledge on such right of non-exclusive use only with the consent of both the trademark
right owner and the owner of a right of exclusive use (Section 31 (4); and Section 94 (2)of the Patent Law). The owner of a right of non-exclusive use may surrender the rightof non-exclusive right only with the consent of a pledgee, if any exists, so as not toharm the pledgee (Section 31 (4); and Section 97 (3) of the Patent Law). For instance,
there was a case addressing whether or not a refusal to renew a license contract
regarding furnishing a device of towel design and the related trademark license was
effective. The court considered that the intent to terminate the contract was announcedwith a reasonable warning period, the licensor had terminated the contract with valid
reason, and the licensee had contracts with other famous brands, and held that therejection of renewal was not an abuse of the right or a breach of the fairness or equity.
Accordingly, the license agreement was terminated when the renewal was rejected. (No.
398, Osaka District Court, Hanyu, p. 154, Oct. 16, 1979).
(5) Registration of the right of non-exclusive use
Once a non-exclusive license has been registered, it shall be effective against the ownerof the trademark right, a right of exclusive use and anyone subsequently acquiring theright of exclusive use on such a trademark right (Section 31 (4); Section 99 (1) of the
Patent Law). The transfer, modification, extinguishment or any restrictions on disposalof a right of non-exclusive use or the grant, transfer, modification, extinguishment or
any restrictions on disposal of a pledge relating to a right of non-exclusive use shall not
be effective against any third party unless it is registered (Section 31 (4); Section 99 (3)of the Patent Law).
IV. Legal Right of Use
1. Prior user's right(1) Significance
Where, from a time prior to the filing by another person of a trademark application andwithout any intention of violating the rules of fair competition, a person has been using
in Japan the trademark in the application, or a similar trademark in respect of thedesignated goods or designated services in the application, or in respect of similar goods
or services, and, as a result, the trademark has become well known among consumers as
indicating the goods or services as being connected with his business at the time offiling of the trademark application, such person shall have a right to use the trademark
in respect of said goods or services provided that he does so continuously (Section 32(1), First clause). Such a right is called the "right to use trademarks by virtue of prioruse" or the "prior user's right."
The provision concerning prior use sets out the prior user's legal right to use thetrademark. Its purpose is to protect the interest of the user who has been using theunregistered trademark and has accumulated a reputation under the first-to-file system.
Strict adherence to the first-to-file system would not allow a prior user of a trademark in
conflict to continuously use a trademark. The first-to-file principle stabilizes the legal
system and simpifies rights, but it is unreasonable that the interest of a good faith prioruser is lost by mere failure to file.

79

In this situation, the provision concerning prior use is intended to serve as an exception,
to adjust and harmonize the registration principle vs. the first-to-use principle, and thefirst-to-file principle vs. the prior use principle under certain conditions.
Since the former Trademark Law defined the prior user's right, saying he "....maycontinuously use the trademark", a dispute has existed over whether it should be
regarded as a right or a mere factual matter. The current Law defines it as "the right touse a trademark." It is, however, a passive right to continue the use and not an active
and exclusive right.
(2) Requirements(a) From a time prior to the filing of a trademark application by another person, an
identical or similar mark has been in continuous use in Japan for the goods or services
identical with or similar to the designated goods or designated services. The phrase, "inJapan", means in the territory where the Trademark Law is enforced.
(b) From a time prior to the filing by another, a person has been using the trademark
without any intention of violating the rules of fair competition: The phrase, "without
any intention of violating the rules of unfair competition", means "without any intentionof illegally obtaining profit by taking advantage of another person's reputation."
Intention of violating the rules of unfair competition is defined as "intention to conduct
any act identical with or similar to the business operation of another person by means ofviolating the principles of fairness and equity and competing with the person inbusiness." This definition is in accord with the purpose of the provision. The definition
should be wider and more flexible than the definition of the purpose of unfair
competition law in general (Vol. 14, No. 5, Supreme Court, Keishu, p. 525, Apr. 6,
1960). For instance, in the case where, from a time prior to the filing of a trademark
application by person in Industry B, a person in Industry A has been using a trademark
similar to the registered trademark of the person in Industry B, such that it is wellknown in Industry A, and as a result, the trademark has become well-known in Industry
B, an intention to violate the rules of unfair competition is presumed. However, if
Person B who had no ill-intent of unfair competition at the time of filing by Person A
comes to have such ill-intent against Person A later, a prior user's right will not be
granted to Person B.
(c) The trademark has become well-known among consumers as indicating the goods orservices connected with the prior user's business at the time of filing of the trademark
application by another person. "Well-known" at the time of filing means "well-known"in connection with his (the user's) business. The quantity of goods sold or handled by afranchisee will not affect whether a prior user's right will be granted to him. The
reputation acquired through the use of a mark by a franchisee belongs only to thefranchisor.
"Well-known" in this case is discussed from the point of view whether it is reasonable totake away the profit of a person in good faith. For instance, in the case regarding a
newspaper entitled, "Horse Race Fans" which had been issued for about 40 years fromthe time prior to the filing of the registered trademark, "Horse Race Fans", applied toanother designated newspaper and magazines, the court held that the issuer of the80newspaper had a prior user's right to the registered trademark under Section 32 of theTrademark Law, on the ground that the newspaper was well known among persons
concerned and fans of the Japan Racing Association in Kansai area (Vol. 7, No. 1,
Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 175, Jun. 7, 1975). According to the interpretation of
the court, the registered trademark, in this case, need not be as well known as provided
in Section 4(1)(x) where the user of the well-known trademark is exclusively entitled toa right to file for trademark application. (The same gist is found in Vol. 25, No. 2, Tokyo
High Court, Chitekishu, p. 296, Jul. 22, 1993; the opinion that the registered trademark
should be equally well known as the case in Section 4(1)(x) is also strong. See"Chikujo Kaisetsu (Commentaries on the Trademark Law)" p. 1078). According to themajority opinion, "well-known" in Section 4 (1)(x) is defined as covering the area
including several prefectures in Japan, such as Kanto area or Kinki area. In one opinion,
it may be sufficient to cover an area a little larger than one prefecture. However, it may
be insufficient if the area is too small in view of the nationwide effectiveness of
trademark. For instance, when trademark registration of "Hamachidori (prover)" wasfiled for, a person who was not entitled to the trademark had been manufacturing andselling letter pads and envelopes bearing a mark similar to the registered trademark
from a time earlier than the filing. However as the quantity of the letter pads andenvelopes dealt with was too small, the court found that the mark was not widely
accepted by consumers as indicating the goods dealt with by such person and theargument (defense) based on the prior use under Section 32 (1) of the Trademark Law
was not acceptable (Vol. 16, No. 3, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 832, Dec. 20,
1984).
(d) Continuously used with respect to the goods or services
In order to have an effective argument for prior use, the user is required to use thetrademark in question continuously with respect to the goods or services. If the use issuspended seasonally or temporarily for any unavoidable social or economic reasons,the condition of continuity is considered to be unfulfilled.
For instance, a person who had been using a character mark in katakana with the word
"Zelda" (in alphabet) from a time prior to the registration of the same trademark (indesigned or pictorial characters of katakana), stopped using them temporarily. In thiscase, this person stopped using the marks, not voluntarily, but because he was warned ofthe likeliness of trademark infringement by a third party. He was concerned about
causing trouble to his customers, etc. by continuing the use. Because he temporarilysuspended the use for a reasonable time period for legitimate reasons, the court
acknowledged his prior user's right on the ground that his use fell under "a case where
the trademark is continuously used in respect of the goods" as required in Section 32 (1).
(Vol. 23, No. 3, Tokyo District Court, Chitekishu, p. 838, Dec. 20, 1991; The appeal
mentioned above was dismissed by the Tokyo High Court on July 22, 1993.). However,the question remains whether or not, in this case, it can be asserted that the use wassuspended for unavoidable social or economic reasons.
The provision concerning the rights of prior users is useful where an application falls
under the provision of Section 4 (1)(x) of the Trademark Law, and is therefore notrefused, despite the existence of a well-known trademark; it is especially useful where
the trademark has been obtained without the intention of violating the rules of fair81

competition and where the period of exclusion for requesting a trial for invalidation of
trademark registration has lapsed (Section 47). The legislative reasons pertaining to theprior user's right system when it was introduced in 1921 emphasized this point. "At thetime of filing for trademark registration (at the time of submission of an amendment
under Section 9 (4))......", the parenthetical phrase cautions that the provision pertaining
to the filing date is applicable from the time of submission of an amendment, if any
amendment is sought as to the application.
The right of a defendant to argue at a court depends on the whether a prior user has anexisting right. It is the opinion of some that the Patent Office may answer this during
Hantei proceedings and determine the existence of any restrictions on those rights(Section 28) (Yoshihara revised his opinion in Yoshihara=Takahashi, p. 155). However,in practice, the existence or non-existence of a prior user's right of use is not determined
in Hantei.
(3) Effects(a) Details and scope of prior user's right
Any person who meets the requirements to be considered a prior user may continue to
use the trademark even if it violates the prohibitive right of the registered trademark.
Only the use of "the trademark", namely, a trademark identical to the mark that wasused prior to the application of the registered trademark is permitted. The scope of theuse may not be expanded to goods and services similar to the designated goods andservices or a trademark similar to the registered trademark. There is no need to expand
the right to the scope of similarity by transforming the trademark of the prior user,which might possibly make the prior user's trademark too close to the registeredtrademark.
However, the coverage of a prior user's right need not be limited to the narrowly defined
scope of identity necessary for registration. It may be expanded to trademarks identicalwith the registered trademark. The scope of identity may not be expanded to make thetrademark similar to the registered trademark ("Prior use of the trademark right",
Masanobu Ono, 50 lectures, p. 175).
(b) Prior user's right when the user has succeeded to the business
The prior user's right may be assumed by a successor to his business (Section 32 (1),latter clause). Legally, the prior user's right is not assumed by the new owner, instead
the right is granted to the new user as a result of the succession. Both the predecessor
and successor must meet the requirements of prior use.
In one instance, a corporation took over another business and the right to use a markidentical to the registered trademark, "Fugetsudo", from an individual who had beenusing the mark from a time prior to the registration of the trademark. The court
acknowledged that the corporation also took over the right of prior use granted to theindividual and obtained the rights to the above-mentioned trademark in accordance withthe latter clause of Section 9 (1) of the former Trademark Law (latter clause of Section
32 (1) of the current Trademark Law) (Vol. 4, No. 2, Tokyo High Court, Mutaishu, p.
494, Jul. 28, 1972). In another instance, the Zelda case, a sole agent was not a business82

successor but was allowed to use the principal's prior user's right. In the case of"BATTUE CLOTH," the owner of the rights associated with the registered trademark"BATTUE CLOTH" for the designated goods in Class 21 (Bags, packs and other similar
goods) sued for damages on the ground of trademark infringement against a company
importing and selling bags from a U.S. manufacturer to which the mark, "BATTUE",
was applied. The U.S. manufacturer had a prior user's right to use the mark for bags inJapan pursuant to Section 32 (1). Because the company was the sole importer for the
U.S. manufacturer, the manufacturer's right of prior use for that mark included the useof the mark on the bags when selling them through a sole importing agent. Therefore,
the court found that the use of the mark by the sole agent in importing from the
manufacturer and selling the bags was an act within the scope of the manufacturer's
right of prior users. Consequently, the claim for damages by the trademark right owner
was dismissed (Vol. 23, No. 3, Tokyo District Court, Chitekishu, p. 794, Dec. 16, 1991;
Vol. 25, No. 1, Tokyo High Court, Chitekishu, p. 296, Mar. 31, 1993; the appeal was
dismissed).
(c) Right to request a user to mark goods or services with a suitable indication so as toprevent any confusion
The owner of the trademark right or of a right of exclusive use may request the person
having a right to use the trademark to mark his goods or services with a suitableindication so as to prevent any confusion between the goods or services connected withthe owner's business and those connected with the other person's business (Section 32(2)). This provision serves not only to protect the owner of the trademark right or theowner of a right of exclusive use but also the interests of consumers by adjusting therelationship between trademark owners. However, the owner of the registeredtrademark cannot additionally require the prior owner to modify the mark he has beenusing into one dissimilar to the registered trademark.
In order for a right of prior use under Section 32 (1) to take effect, the person having aright to use the trademark must have been using an identical trademark from a timeprior to the registered trademark application, and the prior trademark must have become
well-known among consumers as indicating goods or services connected with thetrademark application. In a case at the Osaka District Court, the court ruled that neither
the user of a trademark nor his predecessor were entitled to a right of prior use withrespect to the trademark because the court found that neither had used a trademark
identical to the registered trademark from a time prior to the date the trademark
application was filed, and the trademark had become well known at the time theapplication was filed (Vol. 19, No. 3, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 389, Oct. 14,
1987; Vol. 21, No. 1, Osaka High Court, Mutaishu, p. 88, Mar. 3, 1989).
2. Non-voluntary license due to use prior to request for trial for invalidation(1) Definition
This is a right to use a trademark that is granted because the trademark was in use prior
to the demand for a trial for invalidation of a trademark (announcement of registration).
This provision found in a clause of Section 33 (1) of the former Trademark Law isintended to protect the original trademark owner, who had been using a trademark thatwas registered in spite of its invalidity and was later invalididated at trial, without

83

knowing of the invalidity. The original owner of a right to use is protected because thePatent Office was also erroneous.
When a person meeting the criteria set out below has been using a registered trademark
or one similar in Japan for the designated goods or designated services, or ones similar,
prior to a demand for a trial for invalidation, without knowing that the trademark
registration falls under any of the paragraphs of the subsection referred to, and thetrademark has become well known among consumers as indicating the goods orservices as being connected with his business, such person shall have a right to use thetrademark in respect of the goods or services provided that he does so continuously.
(i) the original owner of the trademark right, where one of two or more trademark
registrations granted for identical or similar trademarks to be used for identical orsimilar designated goods or services has been invalidated;(ii) the original owner of the trademark right, where his trademark registration has been
invalidated and a trademark registration has been granted to another person for an
identical or similar trademark to be used on identical or similar designated goods orservices;(iii) in the cases referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, a person who, at the timeof the demand for a trial for invalidation, has a right of exclusive use with respect to thetrademark right under the trademark registration that has been invalidated or a right of
non-exclusive use which is effective against the trademark right or the right of exclusive
use.
A prior user's right is granted in relatively many cases, while the grant of a nonvoluntary license due to use prior to request for a trial for invalidation is extremely rare.
"Nojigiku" is one such case. The registered trademark, "Nojigiku", applied to thedesignated goods of former Class 43 (confectionary and other goods classified under
this class), became well known not only among local confectioners but also among
consumers in the area as indicating the confectioneries manufactured by Shibata
Saishodo (owner of the trademark right) due to its corporate efforts, advertisements,
promotions and prizes awarded. The owner of the trademark right did not know that
another identical trademark had already been registered when the demand for a trial forinvalidation was registered and was continuously making efforts to manufacture and sell
the confectionery to which the trademark, "Nojigiku", was applied. In view of thesecircumstances, the court decided that a non-voluntary license due to use prior to arequest for a trial for invalidation be granted to the trademark, "Nojigiku" under Section
33. This is an extremely rare case of this kind. (Vol. 4, No. 1, Osaka High Court,
Mutaishu, p. 117, Mar. 29, 1982).
In the case where a trademark in conflict is a defensive mark, the provision of nonvoluntary license due to use prior to a request for a trial or invalidation is applicable(Section 68 (3); Section 33). The legal characteristics of such a right are almost thesame as those of a right of prior use.
(2) Successor of a non-voluntary license acquired due to use prior to a request for a trial

84

for invalidation
Due to its nature, a non-voluntary license acquired due to use prior to a request for a
trial for invalidation may be taken over only by a person who has succeeded to thebusiness concerned (Latter clause of Section 33 (1)).
(3) Consideration
The owner of the trademark right or of the right of exclusive use shall have a right to areasonable remuneration as consideration for the right of non-exclusive use under thepreceding subsection (Section 33 (2)). No payment of remuneration is required as toprior user's right. Both rights are greatly different in this respect. This is because,
unlike the prior user's right, the owner of the right of non-exclusive use is expected tocontribute to registration fees and renewal fees with respect to the registered trademark.
Also, payments of remuneration have previously been made by the owners of nonexclusive rights, it is regarded as reasonable to continue such payment.
The amount of remuneration is not calculated on the basis of the amount ofconsideration for a right of non-exclusive use (Amino, p. 738). It is lower than suchconsideration. Although the amount usually depends on the decision of the court, there
is no precedent as to such calculation. The question still remains unresolved.
(4) Request to mark person's goods or services with suitable indication so as to prevent
confusion
The provision of Section 33 (2) of the Trademark Law with respect to the prior user's
right is applied mutatis mutandis.
(5) Non-voluntary license due to use prior to a request for a trial for invalidation after
retrialIn the case where a trademark is used in good faith after the trademark registration isrevoked or invalidated or canceled, without knowledge of the invalidation orcancellation, and then the trademark right is restored through a retrial, Section 33
applies. The effects of the prohibitive right of the trademark right will not be extended
to good faith use of the registered trademark after a ruling to revoke or a final andconclusive trial or retrial decision but before the announcement of the demand for a
retrial (Section 59). The protection of a well known trademark used in good faith after
the lapse of such period (after the above ruling but before the registration of demand fora retrial) is covered under the non-voluntary license due to use prior to a request for a
trial for invalidation. However, if the trademark becomes well known during the time
the user is not aware of the existence of the registered trademark, no payment ofconsideration is required (Section 60) as in the case of prior user's right (Section 32). It
is not like the case of a non-voluntary license due to use prior to a request for a trial forinvalidation (Section 33) in this regard.
V. Real Rights Granted By Way of Security
1. Definition
A trademark right is also a property right. In addition to being used for making profit, it
can be offered as security. The former Patent Law, Utility Model Law and Design Law
included provisions concerning pledges, while there were no provisions for pledges

85pertaining to trademark rights, which were regarded as not transferable independent
from business operations. (However, the minority opinion acknowledged theestablishment of a trademark right). Under the current Trademark Law, the proprietarynature of a trademark right has been strengthened and provisions concerning pledges
have been added.
2. Pledge(1) Characteristics
A pledge may be established on either a trademark right or a granted right of use (a rightof exclusive use and non-exclusive use) (Section 34 (1)).
In the case where a trademark right or a right of exclusive or non-exclusive use is the
subject of a pledge, the pledgee may not use the registered trademark for the designatedgoods or services, except as otherwise provided by contract (Section 34 (1)). The
pledge has no effects of retention but is entitled to preferential repayment. This isbecause a pledgee aims to secure its claims but has no need to use the trademark.
Accordingly the owner of trademark right may continue to use the registered trademark.
A pledge on a trademark right is essentially a right of pledge and is similar to amortgage in this respect (Toyosaki, p. 450; Amino, p. 790). Although it is similar tomortgage, the rules for real estate pledges are not applicable. At the time of legislation,
the legislative council initially intended to change a pledge on patent rights to amortgage and to change a pledge on trademark rights in the same manner. (Explanatory
statement attached to the Report p. 38). However, legislators finally decided not toadopt the mortgage system although the provision of Section 34 is in accordance with
the Report.
(2) EffectivenessThe requirements for establishment of a pledge on a trademark right or a right of
exclusive use are ineffective unless they are registered (Section 34 (3); Section 98 (1)(iii) of the Patent Law), and the requirements for establishment of a pledge on a right of
non-exclusive use shall not be effective against any third party unless they are registered(Section 34 (4); Section 98 (1) (iii) of the Patent Law). The requirements in each casecorrespond to the nature of each registration.
The grant, transfer, modification, or extinguishment of a pledge on a trademark right ora right of exclusive use, or a restriction on the disposal thereof shall be of no effectunless it is registered. However, in cases of general succession such as inheritance ormerger of a company, the confusion or extinguishment of a pledged claim shall takeeffect without being registered (Section 34; Section 98 (1) (iii) of the Patent Law).
"Restriction on the disposal of a pledge" means a "direct restriction on disposal of apledge itself" (such as a restriction on sub-pledge) and does not include the cases where
disposal of a pledge is necessarily restricted in connection with the seizure orattachment of secured claims. Accordingly, in the case where debts having a pledge of
trademark rights have been seized, the court ordered seizure shall be effective, unlessthe court has not registered the seizure with the Patent Office (Vol. 19, No. 11=12,
Nagoya High Court, Kaminshu, p. 843, Dec. 25, 1968.).
A pledge on a trademark right may also be exercised against the payment that may be86received as consideration for the trademark right or the use of the registered trademarkthat the trademark right owner would be entitled to receive; provided that the pledge
shall be seized or attached before the payment or delivery, since it is likely to be
confused with other general property of the debtor (Section 34 (2); Section 96 of the
Patent Law). It is clearly stipulated that a pledge that is exercisable as a security insubrogation** (Sections 350 & 304 of the Civil Code) extends to the consideration or
license fee. (It also extends to compensation for damages. ("Chikujo Kaisetsu(Commentaries on the Patent Law" p. 239), although the amount of remuneration
receivable by a non-exclusive licensee is not clearly specified (Section 96 of the Patent
Law).
However, if a non-exclusive licensee receives a sub-license fee andcompensation for damages, there is no reason to treat exclusive and non-exclusive
licensees differently. (Manda, Annotated Patent Law, p. 237).
Pledges shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Execution Law(Sections 161 & 167 of the Civil Execution Law).
3. Security by way of transfer
Under the former Trademark Law, which did not acknowledge pledges, the transfer of a
trademark right by way of security was held effective (No. 3454, Tokyo District Court,
Newspaper, August 5, 1995. p. 6). Under the current Law that values the proprietarynature of a trademark right more than the former Law, "security by way of transfer" isnaturally taken up as a security rather than a pledge. A pledge cannot be effective
against a third party if established on a pending trademark application that is not yet
registered. In practice, "transfer by way of security" of trademark rights is used,although there is still a question regarding the lack of good faith in the use of theregistered trademark.
A trademark right cannot be the subject of a mortgage. However, it can be a component
constituting a foundation (collection of corporate assets) that is the subject offoundation collateral (The Hypothecation of Factory Property Law), or can be thesubject of the enterprise mortgage (The Mortgage of Stock Companies' Property Act).
Section 4. Remedies for Infringement on Trademarks
I. Infringement on Trademarks
1. Kinds of Remedies
The remedies for infringing a trademark or a right of exclusive use consist of both civil
and criminal remedies. Civil remedies sought under tort law under the Civil Code seemto be sufficient; however, application of only the Civil Code would be insufficient as
remedies, in practice. A trademark right is a peculiar right that covers intangible
property and reputation, embodied in a trademark. The Trademark Law has thefollowing four provisions including "deemed" provisions and presumptive provisions:
Sections 36 to 39 under "Chapter IV- 2 Infringement," which supplement the Civil Codeprovisions in order to more firmly protect trademark rights. The Trademark Law
provides the following provisions as civil remedies: Right to require the discontinuanceof infringement or to require preventive measures (Injunctions - Section 36 (1)),

87Presumption of the amount of damages (Section 38), and Measures for Recovery of
Reputation (Section 39; Patent Law, Section 106). Other provisions were also written to
reinforce these provisions, such as: Request for destruction of the infringing articles(Section 36 (2)), Acts deemed to be infringement (Section 37), Presumption of theamount of damages (Section 38), and Production of Documents for the purposes ofpresumption of negligence and of calculation of loss, Expert Opinion for Proof of
Damage and Award of Reasonable Damages (Section 39; Patent Law, Sections 103, 105,
105-2, 105-3.).
2. Uses and Cancellation of Trademark
The definition of trademark right infringement must be derived from the purpose of theTrademark Law. This helps to clarify the substance of trademarks. The objective of theTrademark Law is "to ensure the maintenance of the business reputation of persons
using trademarks by protecting trademarks, and thereby to contribute to thedevelopment of industry and to protect the interests of consumers" (Section 1). What
the trademark right tries to protect is the reputation represented by the trademark.
Therefore, trademark right infringement should not be limited only to infringer's acts toaffix the registered trademark in an unrestrained manner. (The same opinion is found in
Manda, "Study on Unfair Competition Prevention Law", p. 36. According to Manda,
the conventional view that regards the illegitimate use of a registered trademark per se
as an infringement is questionable. Acts of interfering with the legitimate use of aregistered trademark is considered sufficient to constitute an infringement.)
For instance, one person removes another person's trademark from that person's new
product of excellent quality, and affixes his own trademark to the product, posing as the
manufacturer of the product. The question is whether his act of taking advantage ofanother person's reputation without consent (reverse passing off) would be regarded as
an infringement or not. A similar question is whether eliminating or deletingtrademarks from products before distribution constitutes trademark infringement. If
trademark infringement were limited only to an infringer's act to affix the registeredtrademark to any goods, these types of infringement would be overlooked.
As discussed above, there are ways of infringing other than using another's trademark
without restriction. The definition of infringement as "any act that harms the functionsof a trademark" is gaining popularity. (Amino, p. 796; Monya, 50 lectures, p. 163;
Manda, 50 lectures, p. 162; ** Nishizawa, "Negative Infringement on Trademarks", Vol.
14, No. 3 Tokkyo Kanri (Patent Control), p. 173; No. 207, Tokyo Koso-Appeal Court,
Newspaper No. 207, p. 14, Apr. 15, 1904). Generally, trademark infringement isinterpreted as an act that "harms the exclusive use of a registered trademark;" namely,"to use the registered trademark of another person." This only illustrates a typical caseof trademark infringement. It is not sufficient to limit the definition of trademark
infringement only to the use of a trademark without permission if one is to completely
ensure the exclusive use of registered trademark. A close will find that few court
opinions limit infringement only to another person's use of a registered trademark.
3. Acts Harmful to Trademark Functions

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The sole fact that a registered trademark is physically affixed to goods is not sufficient
to prove that use of a trademark identical or similar to the registered trademark is an
infringement. In order to entitle the trademark right owner to demand the other user todiscontinue the use or compensate for damages, the trademark needs to be used in a waythat distinguishes one's own goods from those of others. (Vol. 3, No. 2, Osaka District
Court, Iizuka Branch, Mutaishu, p. 317, Sep. 17, 1971; Vol. 8, No. 1, Osaka District
Court, "First Popeye" Mutaishu, p. 102, Feb. 24, 1976; Vol. 8, No. 2, Tokyo District
Court, "Tatsumura", Mutaishu, p. 400, Sep. 29, 1976; Vol. 11, No. 2, Tokyo High Court,"Tatsumura/ Koso-Appeal Trial ", Mutaishu, p. 577, Nov. 14, 1979; Vol. 12, No. 2,
Tokyo District Court, "TV Animation", Mutaishu, p. 301, Jul. 11, 1980; Vol. 13, No. 1,
Tokyo High Court, "TV Animation/ Appeal", Mutaishu, p. 333, Mar. 25, 1981; Vol. 19,
No. 2, Tokyo District Court, "Tsuko Tegata (Pass)", Mutaishu, p. 277, Aug. 28, 1987;
Vol. 20, No. 3, Tokyo District Court, "POS", Mutaishu, p. 444, Sep. 16, 1988; No. 1526,
Tokyo District Court, "UNDER THE SUN", Hanji, p. 141, Sep 26, 1995).
Infringement is defined as an act of impairing the function of a trademark, yet the rangeof acts to be defined as infringement is not completely defined. A phrase, "infringementof a trademark right" appears in provisions such as Section 36 (Injunctions) and Section
38 (Presumption of amount of damage). However, these provisions only limit the acts
regarding which remedies can be sought to those of applying trademarks without
consent, and give no clear definition of such acts. Therefore, in order to see a broader
range of acts that infringe by impairing the function of a trademark, interpretative
efforts may be required. It may be possible to find infringement in dilution of a
trademark right, but it will probably be only with respect to the rights to a famous orprominent trademark. A demand to discontinue use of a trademark as a generic name indictionaries, etc. may be a legislative issue, as seen in overseas countries (Former
Chikujo Kaisetsu (Commentaries to Trademark Law), p. 993). If a dictionary publisher
mistakes a trademark for a generic name and has failed to correct it in the succeeding
revision of the dictionary, knowing the mistake through warnings of several times, it ispossible that the act, harmful to the value of a famous trademark, would constitute a tort.
4. Use of Trademark in Sound or Voice
Trademarks may be used by the public, but those uses in sound or voice are notcommonly accepted an infringing "use" of a trademark in theory. Radio advertisements,
street advertisements, and advertisement broadcasting by sound tracks are examples of
acceptable public "use" of marks. In addition, a three-dimensional trademark
advertisement, based on the three-dimensional trademark right, which does not containany two-dimensional portion, is not regarded as the use of the trademark. However,these acts may constitute trademark infringement from the viewpoint that any acts
impairing trademark functions should be regarded as infringement (Manda, Fifty
Lectures, p. 162).
5. Acts Deemed to be Non-Infringement of Trademark
Acts that are neither direct nor indirect infringement include: financing criminals, saleof copied components of goods not bearing trademarks, manufacturing raw materials,
not bearing trademarks, which are to be used for finished goods that are copies ofanother's goods and are expected to bear trademarks. Some sellers of such illegitimate
raw materials are actively doing their business, knowing that the materials will be used89

by manufacturers who copy the goods of others. The raw materials producers areaccomplices of persons who are playing the key role in an international association of
copied goods manufacturers. If not, their acts constitute trademark infringement only incases where they are deemed to have been jointly involved with trademark infringers in
unlawful acts, co-conspiracy, or complicity. There was once a firm that was doing
business copying goods involving a listed company, taking advantage of the fact that the
judiciary had not yet started to deal with intellectual property law-related crimes. In
developing countries, businesses such as these still exists, even in the present.
Intellectual property-related crimes are one type of white-collar crimes of today.
6. Infringement of Trademarks
Any act within the scope of the right of use (right of exclusive use) of a trademark rightis deemed to be an infringement of a trademark right, if done without authorization.
(This is obvious from Sections 25, 36(2), and 37 (1) and will be presented in the subsection below.). Such an act is a typical infringement. Any act that is harmful totrademark rights should also be regarded as a trademark infringement. Reverse passing
off is one of the examples of such harmful acts. Conversely, any act that falls under the
category of a typical trademark infringement should not be regarded as an infringement,
unless such an act impairs the value of a trademark right. Parallel importing of genuine
goods is one such example. It should be noted, however, that refilling genuine goods
would constitute an infringement. (Vol. 25, No. 5, Supreme Court Ruling, Keishu, p.
739, Jul. 20, 1971; Vol. 8, No. 3, Fukuoka High Court, Kakeishu, p. 371, Mar. 4, 1966).
Any act, if conducted without authorization, that is within the scope of the prohibitive
rights of a trademark right, is deemed to be an infringement.
7. Acts Deemed to be Infringement(1) Categories
The following acts shall be deemed to be an infringement of a trademark right or of aright of exclusive use (Section 37):(i) use of a trademark similar to the registered trademark in respect of the designatedgoods or services, or use of the registered trademark or a trademark similar thereto in
respect of goods or services similar to the designated goods or services;(ii) acts of holding, for the purpose of assignment or delivery, designated goods, orgoods which are similar to the designated goods or services and to which or on the
packaging of which the registered trademark or a trademark similar thereto has been
applied;(iii) acts of holding or importing articles that are for use by persons to whom theservices are provided and to which the registered trademark or one similar thereto has
been applied, in the provision of the designated services, or of services similar to thedesignated services or designated goods, for the purpose of using such articles in theprovision of such services;"Articles that are for use by persons to whom the services are provided in the provisionof the designated services" mean, for example, napkins or dishes at a restaurant, or carsof a taxi company.

90

(iv) acts of assigning or delivering articles that are for use by persons to whom services
are provided and to which the registered trademark or a trademark similar thereto has
been applied, in the provision of the designated services, or services similar to thedesignated services or designated goods, for the purpose of assigning or delivering sucharticles;(v) acts of holding articles bearing a reproduction of the registered trademark or a
trademark similar thereto for the purpose of using such trademark in respect of thedesignated goods or designated services or of goods or services similar thereto;(vi) acts of assigning or delivering, or of holding, for the purpose of assignment ordelivery, articles bearing a reproduction of the registered trademark or a trademark
similar thereto, for the purpose of causing such trademark to be used in respect of thedesignated goods or designated services or of goods or services similar thereto;(vii) acts of manufacturing or importing articles bearing a reproduction of the registeredtrademark or a trademark similar thereto, for the purpose of using such trademark, or
causing it to be used, in respect of the designated goods or services or of goods orservices similar thereto;(viii) acts of manufacturing, assigning, delivering or importing, in the course of trade,
articles to be used exclusively for manufacturing goods bearing a reproduction of theregistered trademark or a similar trademark.
(2) Definition of indirect infringement
With respect to any act specified under Section 37 (i) to (viii) (Acts deemed to be
infringement), there is no need to prove the facts of infringement. This section tries toreinforce the protection of trademark rights that are likely to be infringed, by
enumerating the acts likely to impair the reputation of registered trademarks. While theinfringement in the essential meaning is called, "direct infringement," the acts
enumerated in Section 37 are called, "indirect or deemed infringement." Because thenature of the provision of (i) is slightly different from (ii) and the following items, thewhole section will be called "deemed infringement."
Acts of infringement as set out under Section 37 may bring about either civil or criminal
remedies. (No. 880, Osaka High Court, Hanji, p. 83, Apr. 28, 1977; No. 1115, Tokyo
High Court, Hanji, p. 136, Nov. 7, 1983 and many other precedents; Toyosaki, p. 397,
Yoshiwara=Takahashi, p. 188; Opposition opinions, Mitsuichi, p. 425) Because theseacts are deemed to be infringements, the infringer is liable under both the criminal law
and the civil law. In view of the provision of Section 37 (1), the argument that such acts
are punished only under the civil law, but not under the criminal law is incorrect. The
conditions for screening infringing acts should not be too broadly applied. Contrary tosentencing, indirect infringers are, legally speaking, in a minor position in crimes, as
opposed to infringers who are the principals, or organizers and central figures of thecrime in a number of cases.
(3) Various theories on indirect infringement

91

(a) Item (i)c The acts stipulated in Item (i) are said to belong to the scope of prohibitive right.
(Chikujo Kaisetsu (Commentaries to Trademark Law), p. 1101; argued that theprovision of (i) is different in nature from the remaining items. While the acts set forthin (i) are deemed to be primary infringements, the acts in the other items are preliminary
to the acts in (i). The same opinion is found in Amino, p. 803. Toyosaki opposes thisviewpoint from a legislative perspective. Another opinion is that Item (1) is a fictitious
provision regarding infringement and not a provision regarding a prohibitive right(Kaneko=Someno, p. 783.)). Each remaining item requires objectives related toinfringement, while Item (1) does not require any such objective.
d There is no system governing the use of a trademark right. One's trademark rightmay, in some cases, overlap the prohibitive right of another's trademark right. As aresult, the owner of the trademark right might possibly harm another's right. However,
the owner of the trademark right is not prevented from using the trademark in the scopeof his right of use. A trademark right is not used in the same way a patent right is.
e Mutual "Kick-Out" or mutual exclusion
The trademark right of one, if used within the scope of the prohibitive right may, insome cases, overlap the scope of the prohibitive right of another's trademark right. The
trademark right owner is not prevented from using the trademark in the scope of his
own right of use; in the prohibitive scope, however, he is allowed to use such right atwill, only to the extent it is not in conflict with the prohibitive right of another's
trademark right. The use of the trademark right in the scope of the prohibitive rightcreates an infringement problem, if it conflicts with the prohibitive right of another's
trademark right. However, the same applies to the other person. This situation iscommonly called "mutual kick-out" or mutual exclusion.
f Item (i) is the provision regarding "use of a trademark". "Use" of a trademark is
defined as acts of "applying a mark...." in Section 2 (3). Therefore "use" of a trademark,as defined here, is limited only to these acts. Such a definition tends to limit the casesthat would be trademark infringement under Section 37. Infringement should beinterpreted more broadly as acts that have a harmful effect on trademarks, or impair thefunction of trademarks. (See "Use of Trademark" and "Effects of Trademark", supra).
Whether or not the act regarded as use of the trademark should be judged objectively,
depends on whether the trademark applied to the goods properly functions as atrademark of the goods. The judgment should not depend on the user's subjective intent
or his purposes of use (No. 1394, Urawa District Court, Hanji, p. 144, Jan. 28, 1991).
For instance, The courts ruled that the act of applying the marks "Kamon", "Orion" and"Capera," which were identical in appearance, pronunciation and concept to one another,to packaging and advertisement leaflets for fiber board ornamental ceiling materials andframe-shaped wooden brimmed ornamental ceiling materials, constituted an
infringement of the trademark right, because each such trademark had the capability to92

distinguish the goods of the manufacturer from those of others (No. 992, Nagoya
District Court, Hanji, p. 93, Apr. 25, 1980; No. 1022, Koso-Appeal to Nagoya High
Court, Hanji, p. 69, Jul. 17, 1981.).
Another case involved a mark consisting of the letters "POPEYE" written across one
end of a muffler that was identical in appearance, pronunciation and concept with aregistered trademark that combined the letters "POPEYE" with the word "Popeye" inkatakana and a figure of a sailor. The courts ruled that the use of this identical mark is
not only ornamental as a design but also in use as a trademark with the functions of
indicating the source of the goods as well as guaranteeing the quality; therefore the act
constituted a trademark infringement (Vol. 16, No. 1, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p.
138, Feb. 28, 1984; Vol. 17, No. 3, Koso-appeal trial at Osaka High Court, Mutaishu, p.
411, Sep. 26, 1985; Vol. 44, No. 5, Jokoku-appeal trial at Supreme Court, Minshu, p.
876, Jul. 20, 1990).
(b) Item (ii)c Items (ii) to (viii) provide for preliminary acts of infringement (P. 1101 of theCommentaries (Chikujo Kaisetsu), states that these are preliminary acts next toinfringement.) and include subjective conditions. The acts under Item (ii) include actsof holding, for the purpose of assignment or delivery, designated goods or goods which
are similar to the designated goods and to which or on the packaging of which theregistered trademark or a trademark similar thereto has been applied. (Item (ii) wasapplied to the case where a person printed another's trademark on boxes of "Haimi"
bottles. He refilled the bottles with "Haimi (artificial seasoning)", which he boughtfrom pachinko (pinball) prize, and sold them. Vol. 20, No. 1, Tokyo High Court,
Kokeishu, p. 14, Jan. 30, 1967; Vol. 25, No. 5, Supreme Court Ruling, Kokeishu, p. 739,
Jul. 20, 1971).
The acts under Item (ii) are different from the acts listed under Item (iii): "acts ofassigning, delivering, displaying for the purpose of assignment or delivery, or importing,the goods on which or on the packaging of which a mark has been applied" that
constitute direct infringement. "Acts of holding" under Item (ii) are held by the court to
be indirect infringement very likely to become an infringement. Such acts under
Section 37 (2) are not necessarily conducted in the course of trade. In addition, in thecase where a person held, for the purpose of sale, designated goods to which or on the
packaging of which the registered trademark had been applied without being duly
authorized, the fact that the contents of the packaging were goods manufactured by the
person and they were brand-new products did not influence in any way whether the
person was found guilty or not under Section 37, Item (ii) and Section 78. Moreover,the court held that, although the packaging was a mere container of goods for protective
purposes during transportation without any special ornamental elements, it wasconsidered to be the "packaging of goods" set out in (ii) (Supreme Court Ruling, Jul, 20,
1971, Ibid).
d Displaying
With respect to the definition of "distributing" under the former Law, it was commonly
accepted that "displaying" was included in "distributing." However, there wasdisagreement involving what constituted acts of "holding." Item (ii) regards all these93basic acts as infringement. The acts of holding under this item form a part of "acts ofselling" together with displaying, and may possibly be embraced in the concept ofselling. Therefore such acts of holding cannot necessarily be regarded as preliminary
acts of infringement. In the above- mentioned "Haimi" case, the court concluded thatwhen the person affixed the registered mark to the packaging, that act constituted theprincipal trademark infringement, by applying Item (ii) (Tokyo High Court, Jan. 30,
1967; Supreme Court, Jul. 20, 1971, op.cit.).
e HoldingActs of holding by consumers for their own use without such objectives as assignment
or delivery are not addressed in this item. Holding for the purposes of assignment ordelivery is sufficient to constitute infringement, if not in the course of trade. A person
who held a cardboard box containing copies of trademarks was found guilty, if they
were not held in connection with his business,. (Supreme Court, Jul. 20, 1971, op.cit.).
(c) Item (iii)c Items (iii) and (iv) have been newly added in connection with the introduction ofservice marks. Acts under (iii) include holding or importing articles which are for use
by persons to whom services are provided and to which the registered trademark or a
trademark similar thereto has been applied, in the provision of the designated services,
or of services similar to the designated services, or designated goods, for the purpose ofusing such articles in the provision of such services.
d Item (iii) is not a provision regarding acts of using a registered trademark or a
trademark similar thereto in respect of the designated services per se. It addresses actsof holding or importing articles, which are for use by persons for whom the services areprovided. It also addresses acts of holding or importing such articles to which theregistered trademark or a trademark similar thereto has been applied for the purpose ofusing such articles in the provision of the designated services to such persons. Whileacts of importing are included in the definition of use with respect to goods, such acts
are not included in the definition of use with respect to services because of the nature ofservices. However, as far as infringement is concerned, acts of importing articles towhich service trademarks are applied for the purpose of using such articles in theprovision of the designated services are regarded as the preliminary acts before
providing services and are classified in the acts of indirect infringement.
(d) Item (iv)Acts under Item (iv) include assigning or delivering articles, which are for use by
persons to whom the services are provided and to which the registered trademark or a
trademark similar thereto has been applied, in the provision of the designated services
or services similar to the designated services or designated goods for the purpose of
causing such articles to be used in the provision of such services, or acts of holding orimporting such articles for the purpose of assigning or delivering them.
These are acts of holding or importing the articles to which registered trademarks orsimilar trademarks are applied for the purposes of assignment, etc. This item does notaddress such acts as holding articles for own use without purposes of assignment anddelivery. However, only if the articles are assigned or delivered (if not in the normal94

course of trade) for the purpose of causing such articles to be used, and similar acts ofassignment, meet the requirements set forth in this item.
(e) Item (v)Acts under Item (v) include holding articles bearing a reproduction of the registeredtrademark or a trademark similar thereto for the purpose of using such trademark in
respect of the designated goods or designated services or of goods or services similar
thereto. In other words, these are acts of holding "articles bearing a reproduction of
infringing trademark" in order to use the infringing trademark. Acts of holding articles
bearing a reproduction of an infringing trademark fall under Item (vi) (not under (v)).
However, the requirement of this item is satisfied if the articles are held for the purposeof using such articles (if not in the normal course of trade).
If Items (ii) and (v) are compared, Item (ii) addresses acts of holding "for the purpose of
assignment or delivery" "trademark infringing goods or their packaging", which are
regarded to be preliminary acts occurring immediately before the sale of infringing
articles (Chikujo Kaisetsu (Commentaries to Trademark Law), p. 1101). While thesubject of the acts under Item (ii) are goods (finished goods), the subject of the acts
under Item (v) is "a reproduction of the infringing trademark." "Packaging of infringing
goods" is provided for in Item (ii), and "packaging" bearing an infringing trademark isaddressed in Item (v). "A reproduction" of the registered trademark or a trademark
similar thereto is not "the designated goods or goods similar thereto to which theregistered trademark, etc. are applied." Item (v) refers to any article bearing a
reproduction of the infringing trademark (which is a component constituting thetrademark infringement), including half-finished goods, labels, flyers, and any and allparts and materials bearing the trademark (Amino, p. 804).
(f) Item (vi)Acts under Item (vi) include assigning or delivering, or holding, for the purpose of
assignment or delivery, articles bearing a reproduction of an infringing trademark forthe purpose of causing the registered trademark or a trademark similar thereto to be
used by others in respect of the designated goods or of goods similar thereto.
Acts of holding the infringing trademark for the purpose of one's own use fall under (v)and not under this item. The requirement of this item is satisfied if the articles are
assigned for the purpose of causing such trademarks to be used (if not in the course of
trade).
(g) Item (vii)
The acts under Item (vii) include manufacturing or importing articles bearing a
reproduction of the registered trademark or a trademark similar thereto for the purposeof using such trademark, or causing it to be used, in respect of the designated goods ordesignated services or of goods or services similar thereto. Manufacturing or importingfor the purpose of one's own use is also included in these acts. The requirement of thisitem is satisfied if the articles are manufactured or imported (if not in the course of
trade). If a person, without knowledge of the circumstances, manufactures or imports
such articles by the consignment of another person, only the person who consigned theinfringement falls under this item.

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Acts of holding such articles so manufactured or imported for the purpose of using themfor himself fall under Item (v), and holding such articles for the purpose of causing
them to be used fall under Item (vi).
In connection with the question of whether the importation provided for in Item (vii)
constitutes an infringement or not, another question is raised as to whether importation
by a third party of genuine (original) goods bearing a mark identical or similar to thetrademark of the trademark owner in Japan; namely, the so-called parallel
importation/sale of genuine goods should be regarded as an infringement.
There should be no concern that the importation and sale of genuine goods would
mislead or confuse consumers regarding the sauce or quality of the goods. The
functions of a trademark are not harmed, and the reputation or other business interest of
the trademark owner is not impaired at all. Additionally, these acts have positive
implications, such as promoting fair and free competition within the country, bringing
advantages to consumers, promoting international trade and stimulating thedevelopment of the industry. In this sense, such importation brings results that suit the
purposes of the Trademark Law. The essential purpose of trademark protection is not
only to protect the trademark owner's interest but also, ultimately, the public interest. In
view of the highly public or social nature of trademark protection, these acts have beenfound practically to be legitimate. In a number of court decisions given after the Parker
incident (Vol. 2, No. 1, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 71, Feb. 27, 1970), suchimportation was adjudged to be non-infringement (Vol. 16, No. 3, Tokyo District Court,
Mutaishu, p. 760, Dec. 7, 1984; Vol. 22, No. 3, Tokyo District Court, Mutaishu, p. 873,
Dec. 26, 1990; Vol. 10, No. 1, Tokyo District Court, Mutaishu, p. 216, May 31, 1978and many other precedents).
In order for the argument regarding the "parallel importation of genuine products" to beeffective, either the trademark right owner using the registered trademark in Japan isrequired to be the same person as the trademark right owner of the identical or similarregistered trademark in a foreign country that is applied to the imported goods
concerned, or there must be a special relationship generally regarded as equal to this.
Such relationship means, namely, a close legal or economic relationship between the
trademark right owner in Japan and the owner in a foreign country; e.g., mutual grant of
a right of exclusive use. Should there be no legal or economic relationship between the
trademark owner in a foreign country and the one in Japan (such as a case where a third
party imports genuine goods), the importation of goods that have originated in the
trademark right owner in the foreign country would be prohibited and the importation
would constitute trademark right infringement (Tokyo District Court, May. 31, 1978,
op.cit.; Vol. 5, No. 2, Tokyo District Court, Mutaishu, p. 261, Aug. 31, 1983). The
issues of parallel importation of genuine goods will be discussed further in the next
section.
(h) Item (viii)
The acts under Item (viii) include manufacturing, assigning, delivering or importing
articles to be used exclusively for manufacturing goods bearing a reproduction of theregistered trademark or a similar trademark. These are acts of manufacturing paper

96molds and rolls for printing trademarks, and metal molds, etc. for articles bearing
trademarks. As these are, technically, preliminary even to preliminary acts, it may be
too broad to consider these acts as infringements. However, in order to ensure perfectprotection of trademark rights, the protection to this extent was regarded necessary(Chikujo Kaisetsu (Commentaries to Trademark Law), p. 1103). In the case of a
trademark infringement by intent, among others, persons who conduct such acts as set
forth in this item are most influential in the infringement. There are many vicious
confirmed criminals who engage in these acts.
"In the course of trade" means an economic act conducted repeatedly and continuously.
It is not necessarily conducted for the purpose of making profit. If the person conducts
the act with the intent to repeat or continue the act, it is regarded to be an act "in thecourse of trade" even if the act is actually conducted only once.
II. Parallel Import of Genuine Goods
1. History and Development
Although goods are distributed across borders, the protection of trademark rights does
not extend beyond the territory of each country (See Paris Convention, Article 6-3;
Principle of independence of trademark rights). Imported goods with trademarks are
required to pass, in addition, screening under the legal system of another country.
This is the problem of balancing the interests between trademark right owner, importerand consumer. This is a problem related to the harmonization with public interests suchas protection of trademark rights, promotion of merchandise distribution and fair pricing
of merchandise. Yet the problems faced vary depending on the nature of each type ofmerchandise and with domestic trademark rights. These conditions complicate thisissue.
The issue of parallel importation of genuine goods represents the importance of theeconomic effects of trademarks. It also deals with the issue of the territorial nature of
trademark rights. It also raises a question of inherent limitations of trademark rights andthus concerns the essence of trademark infringement. Therefore, one section will betaken for this significant problem that has many facets.
(1) Parallel importation in Japan (prior to the Parker Incident)
As our trade is liberalized, increasing numbers of people have attempted parallel
importation of goods bearing famous foreign trademarks due to the price differences
existing between Japan and abroad. In the initial cases focusing on this issue, the goods
involved were not copied goods but genuine goods imported through a route other than
the sole agent.
Domestic trademark rights are, as a matter of form, independent from foreign trademark
rights. When a right of exclusive use without restrictive conditions is established, evena trademark right owner is not allowed to use the trademark without license. Upon
application by the owner of a right of exclusive use, a ruling for a provisional

97

disposition to forbid assignment was given against the importation of genuine fountainpens from the Far East Representative of Parker, Inc. in Hong Kong (Tokyo District
Court, June 1, 1964; Tokyo District Court, Dec. 22, 1964, In re Nescafe Incident; No.
178, Tokyo District Court, Hanyu, May 29, 1965, p. 199). No dispute was raised under
the Trademark Law with respect to this case, and import restrictions were imposed at
the customs in accordance with Article 21 of the Customs Tariff Law (Some problems
in this issue are detailed in "Study of International Trademark Law - Parallel
Importation", "Study of International Trademark Law - Comparative Law II. Intellectual Property" and a series of other books by Saburo Kuwata).
(2) Parallel importation in overseas countries
For details of examination from a comparative law perspective, please see the books
and documents cited for reference. The titles of well-known cases are as listed below.
Theories adopted in the rulings and conclusions vary depending on the case.
(a) Rulings forbidding parallel importation"Bourgeoisie", U.S.A. (1923); "Lux", Switzerland, (1952); "EMI", Switzerland, (1959);"Columbia", Switzerland, (1963); "OMO", Holland, (1979); "Maya", First Instance,
Germany; "Mamiya", U.S.A., (1982); "Osawa", U.S.A., (1984); "Selkou", U.S.A.,(1985); "Second Hague", Germany, (1988); "Silhouette", EU, (1998)(b) Rulings permitting parallel importation"Gelan", U.S.A. (No. 46, Kaigai Shoji Homu, p. 26); "Mepps", Canada, (Kimura, Vol. 1,
Annual Report of Industrial Property Law Society, p. 158, op.cit.); "Levlon", U.K.,(1979); "Saba", (1959); "Philips", (1960); "Levlon", Germany, (1964); "Maya", Second
Instance Trial, Appeal Trial (1964, Important ruling regarding balancing interests);"Chinzano", (1971, Action under the Unfair Competition Prevention Law wasadmitted.); "Grundihi", Holland, (1956); "Agfa", Austria, (1970).
At one time, Europe had an influence on the situation in Japan. In Europe, however, thecircumstances have begun to change. ("New development of Parallel Importation
Problem under the Trademark Law in EU" by Mitsuhiro Kamiya, NBL No. 564, p. 69;"Changing Legal Principles concerning Parallel Importation under the Trademark Law
in Europe" I & II by Katsuya Tamai, NBL, No. 651, P. 6, No. 562, p. 40 f.).
2. Various Theories
The territoriality of a trademark right is its most basic principle. Importation without
license of goods bearing a legitimate trademark in a foreign country constitutes
infringement on the domestic trademark right. However, there is an exception to thisprinciple.
(1) Method of approach and territoriality theory
First, exceptions can be made as to domestic laws and international conventions. The
abuse of rights argument is permitted as one of those exceptions. This issue can be98approached from the Trademark Law, Competition Law and Anti-trust Law, but
generally it is taken up as an issue related to the Trademark Law. Second, opinions on
this issue are divided. One opinion holds that parallel importation is the problem of
territoriality, while the minority opinion disagrees. According to the minority opinion,
the territoriality concerns trademarks that are held by different owners; yet, in the caseof parallel importation, the trademark is held by the same person, and for this reason, it
is not related to the issue of territoriality. However, the issue of parallel importation is
generally viewed as an issue of territoriality. Third, is the issue of international
application of the "Exhaustion Theory or Principle." Recently, the Supreme Court's
decision approved the Exhaustion Theory domestically under the Patent Law and denied
its international application in the BBS Patent case (Vol. 51, No. 6, Supreme Court,
Minshu, p. 2299, Jul. 1, 1997).
(2) Balancing interests
The interests of the following parties should be balanced: (i) owners of a trademark
right; (ii) importer; (iii) owner of domestic rights; and (iv) consumers. In addition, (v)promotion of trade; and (vi) free competition should also be considered. The specificconditions of the problem are diverse.
c The owners of multiple trademark rights are divided into the following types: (a)different owners; (b) the same owner; or (c) persons legally or economically connected.
The relationships of owners in the last case include parent/subsidiary firms, konzern(concerns), affiliated companies, agents, licensor/licensee and fictitious
licensor/licensee.
d The nature of goods can be roughly divided into different goods and the same goods.
The opinion that attaches importance to manufacturing is not generally accepted.
3. Ruling on Parker case
An important ruling, which proved to be a turning point of this issue, was granted on
Feb. 27, 1970 (Vol. 2, No. 1, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 70). The court
acknowledged that the trademark was a world famous trademark and the quality was
identical. It then ruled that we needed to go back to examine the essentials of trademark
protection in order to decide to what extent the principle of territoriality should beapplied. "The Trademark Law intends to protect the good will of the trademark rightowner that has been built up by the use of the trademark by protecting the functions of
the trademark, which are to distinguish own goods from the goods of others and tomaintain the order of distribution. The Law also intends to enable consumers torecognize that the source of goods is not identical, and lead them to not mistake theirselection when purchasing goods and to obtain the goods of a certain quality that theywant and to protect the interest of consumers." The court also stated that "trademark
protection is aimed at the protection of functions of a trademark…. It is a matter ofcourse that the scope of protection necessarily is subject to social restrictions. The
scope to which the territoriality is applicable must be reasonably decided in light of thespirit of trademark protection and by paying close attention to infringement of thefunctions of trademarks."
According to the ruling, in order to deem the act in question an infringement, the act in99

question needs to have been conducted by a person who is not entitled formally to do it,
and the act must also be substantially illegitimate. After examining how parallel
importation affects the interest of related parties, the court concluded as follows: "Theact of the plaintiff (parallel importer) does not contradict the purport of the trademark
system.... Although the plaintiff is not entitled to use the registered trademark formally,
his act of importing and distributing the genuine Parker products is substantiallylegitimate in view of the essential meaning of trademark protection. To conclude, his
act does not constitute infringement." (Ono, Intangible Property Law, Bibliography p.
393 - p. 398; For this ruling at the Koso-appeal trial, see No. 3092, Osaka High Court,
Patent News, p. 1, Aug. 6, 1971).
4. After the Ruling on Parker case(1) Notification of Ministry of Finance
Since the ruling on the Parker case, the Duties Bureau of the Ministry of Finance haschanged the treatment of this type of issue. (No. 1443, Zokan, Aug. 25, 1972). The Fair
Trade Commission specified that "an unreasonable impediment to parallel importation"(Reinforcement of Surveillance and Regulation of Import Agents" (I), Nov. 22, 1972)
would be regarded as an unfair manner of trade.
According to the notification newly issued by the Customs and Tariff Bureau of the
Ministry of Finance, "in the case where goods bearing a mark that is identical to theoriginal trademark specified in an application for parallel importation of genuine goods
to which the original trademark applies are imported by a person other than suchapplicant, the act of importation shall not be regarded as infringement, if such goods are
distributed with the mark legitimately affixed and are acknowledged as genuine goods.
In this case, the range of genuine goods acknowledged to be imported by parallel
importation and regarded as not infringing the trademark right shall be the goods
distributed, so long as the person who affixed the trademark and distributed the goods isthe same person as the trademark right owner in Japan (or such a special relationshipexists between them by which they are regarded as the same person). This excludes
cases where the goods having the source or quality indicated or guaranteed by thetrademark affixed to the them are different from that of the original trademark or where
the use of the trademark on the goods is regarded independent from that of the original
trademark." This notification is based on the same standard as the ruling on Aidale
Standard, a case heard in a EU court, which is regarded to be the most authoritativedecision concerning the cases of this kind. This standard is accepted both domesticallyand internationally.
The liberalization of parallel importation appears not to be related to the importation of
copied goods, but this has made the importation of copied goods easier. Because there
is no interconnection between parallel importation and the importation of copy goods,
preventive measures must be taken with respect to evils accompanying such parallel
importation.
(2) Precedents after the Ruling on Parker Incident

100(a) Mercury Incident
In contrast to Parker case which was regarding a typical parallel importation of genuine
goods, the Mercury case was found to be an infringement on trademark right.
The plaintiff entered into an agency agreement with a subsidiary of Mercury, Inc. andhas imported and sold Mercury's goods. The plaintiff obtained a divisional assignmentof a right to "MERCURY" trademark registered by a third party. The aforementioned
subsidiary granted to the defendant, without prior consultation, the right to sell the
goods in Japan but refused to supply goods to the plaintiff. Given these circumstances,the court stated that the problem of trademark right infringement arose if the owner of
the trademark right in a foreign country owned the trademark right also in Japan, or hehad granted a right of exclusive use to the owner of the trademark right in Japan, or hehad legal (sole agency), economic or other close relationship with the owner of the
trademark right in Japan. Without any such relationship, if there was a person who
owned the trademark right of the mark identical to the trademark in a foreign country,
the owner of the trademark right in Japan was allowed, based on the trademark right inJapan, to suspend the importation of goods shipped from the trademark right owner inthe foreign country, or to regard the importation as infringement of the trademark righteven if the goods to be imported were genuine products (Vol. 5, No. 2, Tokyo District
Court, Mutaishu, p. 261, Aug. 31, 1973).
(b) Ramy Incident
A person, against whom an action for injunction was filed imported from a wholesalerin Hong Kong silver frames, which he then plated with gold in Japan. His skill,
however, was inferior. The court stated as follows: "Parallel importation is approved
only in the case where neither the distinctiveness regarding origin nor quality guarantee
function of the trademark is impaired when the goods are distributed, and accordingly,
where there is no possibility of substantial infringement of the trademark right. The
defendant is not obeying the company in Hong Kong. Rather he gives instructions tothe company regarding the packaging and shape of the glass frames. Moreover, thegoods manufactured by the defendant are partially included in the goods sold..."Therefore, the court accepted the application for the injunction for the reasons that thesource of the goods was completely identical, the structure was identical and the quality
was identical. (Fukui Jibuo Branch, Hanreishu, Mar. 29, 1974, not yet contained*;
Shunichiro Nakano, Ono Kanreki Kinen, Precedents under Unfair Competition
Prevention Law, p. 635).
(c) Technos Incident
In the Technos case, the court ruled that the following three conditions were insufficient
to show that Technos was not infringing: "(i) Technos Inc. owns the trademark right in
Switzerland; (ii) The goods are genuine products; and (iii) The plaintiff assembles
imported movements and finishes the products, to which the trademark is affixed." Thecourt found that it was also necessary to prove that the owner of the trademark right(plaintiff) had a special relationship with the trademark right owner in Switzerland(Technos), by which those two persons were regarded to be the same person. Such
relationship meant that the plaintiff acquired the trademark right with the approval of101

Technos, or the plaintiff was assigned the trademark right from Technos. If the plaintiff
acquired the trademark right independently before Technos acquired its trademark rightin Switzerland or the trademark became well known in Switzerland, the plaintiff wasentitled to suspend another person's importation (Vol. 10, No. 1, Tokyo District Court,
Mutaishu, p. 216, May. 31, 1978).
(d) Technos/Koso-Appeal Trial
At the Koso-appeal trial of Technos case, the court denied that the case was classifiable
under the parallel importation of genuine goods. The main bodies of the watches were
not manufactured by Technos. A subsidiary manufactured them for Korean markets andfor the purpose of re-exporting. Therefore, Technos did not allow Kanryu Bussan to
apply the trademark, "TECHNOS" to the products (Vol. 13, No. 2, Tokyo High Court,
Mutaishu, p. 969, Dec. 22, 1971).
(e) Lacoste Incident
Lacoste is a French corporation, which is recognized worldwide as the source of goods
bearing a series of trademarks consisting of a figure of crocodile and the letters of
LACOSTE. The firm grants a license to manufacture goods of various qualities andforms under the trademarks recognizable as identical to the aforementioned series oftrademarks to licensees in some countries through a Swiss corporation under its control
through equity participation. Lacoste imposes strict controls on the quality of the goods
manufactured by these corporations. Lacoste and its Japanese licensee requested an
injunction against the U.S. licensed goods manufactured by a licensee in the U.S.A.
Such goods bore the LACOSTE mark which was similar to the registered trademark ofgoods imported in parallel from Izott Inc. in the U.S.A. The court held as follows: The
U.S. licensed goods are also Lacoste's products, the trademark of which is managed by a
Swiss corporation under the control of Lacoste. They are the goods of the same origin,and the difference in quality and form is within the scope permitted as the goods
indicating the world famous firm as their origin. Therefore the U.S. licensed goods do
not impair the quality guarantee function of the trademark, nor the reputation of the
trademark owner and interest of consumers. The court acknowledged the defendant's
argument that it imported genuine goods, and concluded that the act of selling the goods
by the defendant may not be prohibited because the defendant's act is not substantially
illegal for the aforementioned reasons (Vol. 16, No. 3, Tokyo District Court, Mutaishu, p.
760, Dec. 7, 1984).
(f) BBS Trademark Incident
In the BBS Trademark case, the goods imported are genuine products of BBS, West
Germany, which manufactures and sells aluminum wheels and spoilers. The plaintiff
registered the trademark independently from BBS. Later the plaintiff granted a license
to use the trademark right to the sole agent, Japan BBS, and became an agent for theWest Japan Region with respect to spoilers. In this case, the court ruled as follows:"BBS West Germany and Japan are affiliated companies in view of their mutual equity
participation and sharing of officers. These two firms and the plaintiff have a special
relationship by which they are regarded as a single enterprise through contractual102

relationship concerning supply of products and administration of the trademark, or othereconomic close ties. The court concluded that the plaintiff/trademark right ownershould not exercise the prohibitive right of the trademark against the defendants'
importation (No. 1277, Nagoya District Court, Hanji, p. 146, Mar. 25, 1984).
(g) Dancer v. Perception Incident
The owner of the trademark right was importing and selling canoes from Perception,Inc., U.S.A. Later, the owner was able to register the trademarks "Dancer" and"Perception." After that, the owner applied to the court for a preliminary injunction toprohibit Perception U.K from importing canoes. The Perception U.K. insisted that it
had acquired a license from Perception U.S., however there was no evidence of such. It
argued the invalidity of the trademark registration because the mark was copied, andalso insisted on its own prior use. These arguments were insufficient and the injunction
against its parallel importation was allowed. This case, however, still contains some
controversial issues (Vol. 25, Osaka District Court, Torikeshishu, p. 604, Jan. 22, 1990).
(h) Robinson Incident
In this case, an applicant company to which the owner of the domestic trademark right
granted a right of non-exclusive use had a business alliance with the sole agent in Japan.
The court held that the relationship among the foreign distributor, applicant and thedomestic trademark right owner was not close enough to be legally or economicallyregarded as a single unit or organization (Vol. 22, No. 3, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu,
p. 651, Oct. 9, 1990).
(i) GUESS Incident
The acts by a third party of importing and selling genuine products (apparel) which a
trademark right owner manufactured and sold in a foreign country (U.S.A.) were notagainst the purposes provided for in the Trademark Law, Section 1; namely, maintaining
the business reputation of persons using trademarks and protecting the interests ofconsumers. Such acts do not impair the functions of the trademark to indicate the origin
and guarantee the quality of the goods, which the Law protects in order to achieve theaforementioned purposes. For these reasons, the court concluded, with respect to therequest for destruction of jeans bearing the trademarks, that the acts in question were
not substantially found illegal and do not constitute infringement (Vol. 22, No. 3, Tokyo
District Court, Mutaishu, p. 873, Dec. 26, 1990).
(j) Crocodile Incident
Although acknowledging that parallel importation of genuine products generally lacks
the necessary illegitimacy to be regarded as trademark right infringement, the court
stated as follows: "In the case where a Japanese corporation was assigned a trademark
owned by a Hong Kong corporation, and has formed its own good will with respect tothe registered trademark independently of the Hong Kong corporation through its
advertising and publicity efforts, the importation of goods bearing the trademark
licensed by the Hong Kong corporation and legitimately applied in Malaysia is not103permitted. Moreover, if the two groups of goods are recognized to be not identical interms of design, raw materials, and the source indicated or quality guaranteed by therespective trademarks, the goods bearing the trademark licensed in Hong Kong andlegitimately applied in Malaysia are not regarded to be genuine goods of theaforementioned Japanese corporation, the owner of the trademark right in Japan. The
parallel import of the aforementioned goods is not permissible for these reasons (No.
1591, Osaka District Court, Hanji, p. 99, May 30, 1996).
5. Summary(1) Range where parallel importation is permissible
The only case that is not regarded as trademark right infringement, is:c where the person who has distributed goods legitimately bearing the mark and theowner of the trademark right is the same person or have any special relationship bywhich both persons are regarded as the same person.
In the case of c, if:d the source indicated or the quality guaranteed by the trademark of products imported
in parallel is not identical, or in other cases where the use of the mark on the products soimported are regarded independent of the domestic products,
e parallel importation would not be permitted.
(2) Nature of the problem
The quality of goods discussed here is the quality in relation to the trademark
infringement problem. The topic of the discussion does not concern the equivalence ofthe quality. The issue should be judged from the viewpoint of whether the prohibitionof importation is substantially beneficial for the protection of a trademark right. The
special relationship by which both persons are recognized as the same person in c of
the above paragraph means their contractual or economic ties or alliance with regard to
the control of trademarks in a broad sense. The purpose of "prohibition of importationin the case where the source indicated or the quality guaranteed by the trademark ofgoods imported in parallel is not identical" is to prevent confusion or mistake of the
public.
(3) Relationship with the trademark right owner
It makes no difference whether the person requesting the injunction is a trademark rightowner (Technos) or the owner of the right of exclusive use. It goes without saying thatgenuine products do not include goods of a pure third party. The typical goods of thiskind are c copied goods; and d genuine (or original) goods illegally distributed by acontractor of the trademark right owner or the owner of the right of exclusive use. If thequality of the illegally distributed goods is identical to the original goods, it makes nodifference. The products are genuine but they are, legally speaking, copied goods.
Because the trademark has not been legitimately affixed, the act is regarded as
trademark right infringement. Rather in the case where a parallel importer imported andsold copies of famous champagne bottles bearing internationally famous trademarks, the104

importer was found liable for damages due to the lack of care, a standard to which aparallel importer is normally responsible (Vol. 2,5 No. 2, Osaka District Court,
Chitekishu, p. 261, Jul. 2, 1993, "Moe et Chandone").
Furthermore, the following acts are prohibited: e to register without permission afamous trademark in any country where the registered mark has not yet been registered;and f to import in parallel trademarked products identical with the original products
and hold them out to be genuine products, when the importer and the exporter are
independent. The following case is an example. The importer and the exporter who
were manufacturing and selling the same trademark products in the respective countries
lost their relationship during World War II. Their capital or management relationshipwas not restored, and they continued to be independent after the war. Currently, they
are using the same trademarks for their respective products of different quality
manufactured independently.
The most typical cases where parallel importation is permitted is where the trademark
owner or the owner of a right of exclusive use within the country c manufactures andimports the products under the same trademark in a business he conducts out of thecountry; and d manufactures and exports the goods from the country and then reimports the same goods. (This is a problem of parallel import of the goods withtrademarks. It does not concern the import of patented goods. See the ruling by theSupreme Court in BBS patent case.)
A legal entity or natural person who is regarded as the same person with the person
domestically granted a right are: c the parent company or a subsidiary (e.g. Agfa case,supra.); d a person who belongs to the same konzern (Levlon case); and e a trademark
licensee (Licensee Parker case). A fictitious trademark licensee should rather be thesame person. Licensees consist of (a) licensees of the person who has a right; and (b)licensees of the person regarded to be the same as the person who has a right. There isno difference between them. f A sole agent is also regarded as one in the same with theperson entitled.
There are many scenarios with respect to goods: goods are manufactured (a) outside thecountry; (b) in the country; (c) both inside and outside of the country. These factors
would affect the difference in the source and the quality of goods.
(4) Quality being identical
The second problem related to parallel import of genuine products is identifying thequality. In order to obtain a permission of parallel importation, both groups of goods
are required to be identical in quality; the group of goods imported in parallel are
required to live up to the expectations of consumers. Opinions may be divided as towhether differences in flavor and taste are related to this issue of identical quality.
Whether the quality difference is negligible or not depends on whether it makes any
difference for consumers in the articles they purchase. If the former is the case, parallel
import would be permitted and if the latter is the case, it would not be permitted.
(5) Refilling
Generally, the Supreme Court and other courts take a strict stance on the issue ofrefilling, which tends to accompany parallel importation (No. 2063, Tokyo Koso-appeal

105

Court, Aug. 9, 1922, Newspaper, p. 17; "Basic Problems in International Property
Transactions", Teruo Doi, p. 177). In the ruling at the Supreme Court on "Haimi"(Vol.
25, No. 5, Supreme Court Ruling, Keishu, p. 739, Jul. 20, 1971) and in other previous
cases, "Van Hoten" (Vol. 8, No. 3, Fukuoka High Court, Kakeishu, p. 371, Mar. 4, 1966),"STP" (Vol. 8, No. 2, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 324, Aug. 4, 1976), and"Magamp K" (No. 1522, Osaka District Court, Hanji, p. 139, Feb. 24, 1994), refilling
and rewrapping were found to be trademark infringement on the ground that only theowner of the trademark right is allowed to conduct these acts.
III. Civil Law Remedies
The civil law remedies for infringement of trademark rights or a right of exclusive use
consist of a right to request injunctive relief and for damages (and to request forrecovery measures of reputation).
1. Injunctive relief(1) Person entitled to request for injunction
The owner of a trademark right and the right of exclusive use may require injunctions(Section 36).
The owner of a right of non-exclusive use may not require injunctive relief. A majorityof precedents and opinions do not authorize owners of a right of non-exclusive use torequire an injunction on the ground that a right of non-exclusive use is a claim. (See Vol.
27, No. 3, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 580, Apr. 20, 1983; Vol. 12, No. 11, Tokyo
District Court, Kaminshu, p. 2808, Nov. 20, 1961, etc.; Yoshinobu Someno,"Qualification for Legal Actions of Licensors under a Patent Licensing Agreement",
Corporate Law Studies, 10th Anniversary, p. 215; Tatsunori Shibuya, "Licensor's
Obligation under a Patent License Agreement and Legal Nature of Agreement", Vol. 85,
No. 2, Hokyo, p. 193 and many other treatises.) Yoshihiko Sato views that a right of
non-exclusive use is a real right (a right in rem, a right effective against anyone).
However, opinions are divided as to this issue. Some acknowledge a right to require
injunctions of the owner of a right of non-exclusive use on the grounds of a right torequire exclusion of interference based on infringement of claims or tort law. Others
would affirm such right on the ground that the owner of a right of non-exclusive use
may exercise a right in subrogation of the owner of a trademark right. (No. 185, Tokyo
District Court, Hanyu, Aug. 31, 1965, p. 209; Patent Law, Mitsuishi, p. 303; Amino, p.
787). The affirmative opinions are further divided into those authorizing injunctions toowners of a right of non-exclusive use in general and those authorizing to only
exclusive registered owners of a right of non-exclusive use. (Vol. 6, No. 12, Tokyo
District Court, Kaminshu, p. 2690, Dec. 24, 1955; Kaneko=Someno, (New) p. 131;
Toyosaki, p. 299; Yoshifuji, p. 568; Orita=Ishikawa, p. 342; Kazuo Morikawa, "Right toRequire Injunctions of a Right of Non-Exclusive Use." No. 8, Annual Report ofIndustrial Property Law Society, p. 59; No. 142, 3872, Supreme Court, Quick Report,
Osaka District Court, Dec. 20, 1984; No. 157, 4382, Osaka High Court, Quick Report,
Jun. 20, 1986; No. 1138, Osaka District Court, Hanji, p. 137; Patent Law, Mitsuishi, p.
303; Amino, p. 787). See Chapter VII, Section III, 2, "Right of Non-exclusive Use",
Supra. for further information about treatises and precedents.

106

(2) Right to require the refraining
The owner of a trademark right or of a right of exclusive use may require a person who
is infringing or is likely to infringe the trademark right or right of exclusive use to
discontinue or refrain from such infringement (Section 36 (1)). Unlike a right todemand compensation for damages, it does not matter whether such infringement is byintention or negligence.
One of the conditions for a request for the refraining, "likelihood of infringement", may
be illustrated in the following two examples: (a) A person who once infringed a
trademark right has suspended the infringing act and currently is using anothertrademark in respect of the goods. However, if he is likely to infringe again in the
future unless ordered to discontinue the infringing act or to destroy the infringing
articles, the owner of a trademark right shall not lose a right to require an injunction
against infringement (No. 1022, Nagoya High Court, Hanji, Jul. 17, 1981, p. 69). (b) A
hair brush and a case of the hair brush that can be also used as a cloth brush arerespectively placed on the left side and right side on a cardboard paper for wrapping,
and a photo of a lady using the hair brush is attached on the hair brush case. These
articles are covered with a transparent cover made of hard vinyl chloride. The letters for"etiquette" (in katakana) are used for explanation of the uses of the hair brush case on
the cardboard paper or in a catalogue of the goods. If the letters are not being used in
the goods for explaining the uses of the case at present, there is a possibility for theletters being used in the goods again in the future. For this reason, the owner of a rightof a trademark consisting of the letters for "ETIQUETTE BRUSH" in katakana andETIQUETT BRUSH, written in two lines horizontally, may require an injunction as
preventive measures against the use of the aforementioned character mark (Vol. 14, No.
1, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 90, Feb. 27, 1982).
If any trademark has begun to be used as a generic name of the goods, the trademark
will not be effective against the use of the mark by a third party (Section 26 (1) (ii)).
However, a trademark does not become a generic name at once. There are various stepsof weakening of the effects of the trademark over a long period. Courts in many
countries ruled that a trademark included in a dictionary, etc. as a generic name was notnecessarily be regarded as a trademark. However it is reasonable to expressly enact
legislation in order to authorize a trademark owner to make a request for correction, inthe case where a famous registered trademark has been erroneously used. If any
publishing company or a broadcasting station is continuously using the trademark after
being informed of the facts, the court may rule such companies' acts of intentional use
as torts depending upon the situation so as to prevent the famous trademark frombecoming a generic name.
(3) Request for destruction
The owner of a trademark right or of a right of exclusive use who is acting under thepreceding subsection may demand the destruction of the articles by which the act of
infringement was committed, the removal of the facilities used for the act of
infringement, or other measures necessary to prevent the infringement (Section 36 (2)).
Although the request for an injunction is usually made according to the procedure for arequest for omission, the right to make the request was provided for in Section 36 (2) inorder to substantially ensure the effectiveness of the protection.

107

The phrase, "articles by which the act of infringement was committed", means articles
absolutely necessary for the act of infringement. It has the same meaning as the"articles by which the crime was committed" under the Criminal Law, Section 19 (1) (i).
On the other hand, "articles by which the act of infringement was committed" also
includes any acts similar to an offering of security (or guarantee) to people who do notwant to destroy articles or remove facilities. An order of delivery of infringing articles
as an act necessary for destruction, etc. should also be included. With respect to thedemand for destruction, the scope of destruction was judged as follows: In the case of
the demand for destruction of bags, packs, and package boxes thereof, bearing marks
similar to the registered trademark, "CARTIER", in respect of the designated goods
classified under the former Class 21, "Bags and packs, etc.", the court held as follows: It
cannot help saying that the demand for destruction of the infringing articles is too strict.
It may be reasonable to authorize the demand to the extent of removal or elimination ofeach of the aforementioned mark, since it would be technically possible to eliminate
only the marks from the articles by painting them over or re-dying them (Vol. 14, No. 1,
Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 90, Feb. 26, 1982). The court ordered the infringer
to eliminate the trademarks from the articles, since it was found an excessively heavy
obligation to destroy the infringing articles. However, the obligation to eliminate themarks may be heavier than the destruction of the articles, considering the value of thearticles to be destroyed and cost of labor for eliminating the trademarks. It may be more
appropriate to destroy the articles in many cases.
The owner of the registered trademark, "Robinson", in respect of the designated goods,"Vehicles; apparatus for locomotion by land, air, or water", made a demand against afirm that imported and sold Robinson R22Beta type helicopter from a U.S.
manufacturer, Robinson Helicopter Co. to destroy advertisement literature such asbrochures, price lists, or transaction documents, in which the marks of "ROBINSON"and "ROBINSON (in katakana)" are used. A demand for destruction should be limited
to the extent necessary and sufficient for effecting the demand. Since it was technicallypossible to eliminate the marks, "ROBINSON" and "ROBINSON (in katakana)", fromadvertisements in magazines and on bodies of container trucks by painting over theseletters, the destruction of advertisements and container trucks may be too strict. On theabove grounds, the court found it appropriate to acknowledge the demand to the extent
of eliminating the letters, "ROBINSON" or "ROBINSON (in katakana)", from themarks affixed to the advertisements or container trucks (Vol. 22, No. 3, Osaka District
Court, Mutaishu, p. 651, Sep. 1, 1998).
2. Right to Demand for Compensation for Damages(1) Definition of presumption of damages(a) A person who has intentionally or negligently infringed another person's right isobliged to compensate for damages caused to the other person (Civil Code, Section 709).
This is a principle under the Tort Law in the Civil Code. Infringement of a trademark
right (property right) makes the demand for compensation of damage possible, without
any provision to the effect in the Trademark Law. The scope of the claimable damage is108

any and all damages caused by the infringement, including "active damage" (decrease insales, cost for investigating infringement, expenses such as attorney fees, etc.) and"passive damage" (presumptive loss of profits, such as estimated increase in sales thatshould have been gained). The scope extends to the damage caused to credibility or
reputation.
It is, however, extremely difficult to prove negligence, amount of damages and causal
relationship of trademark right infringement, as in other intellectual property
infringement cases. It is impossible to make the trademark system substantiallyeffective without reducing the burden of proof by applying a presumptive rule, etc. The
current Law has presumptive provisions in order to reinforce the protection of
trademark right owners. These are supplementary provisions to the Civil Code.
However, they are still insufficient. With the support of interpretations given inprecedents and theories, remedies covering all of the intangible properties must be madesubstantially effective.
(b) Right to demand compensation for damages based on a right of non-exclusive use
The legal nature of a right of non-exclusive use is a claim (effective against a specified
person) rather than a real right (right in rem, effective against anyone). (Supreme Court,
Apr. 20, 1973, Supra. and other commonly held theories. The treatise by Sato views theright as a real right, op.cit.). Because it is a claim, if another person who has been
licensed to use the trademark in breach of the contract appears, only the owner of the
trademark right is blamed for the failure to perform the obligation. The right of nonexclusive use is not effective against the other person. However, under the former
Trademark Law, the right to demand compensation was claimable against a third party
who used the trademark without permission on the basis of a natural rights theory. (Theso-called "claim infringement theory" originated in an infringement problem of a patent
license (Vol. 17, Daishinin, Minshu, p. 1675, Aug. 27, 1938; There were some opinions
denying this theory)
A request for injunction based on a right of non-exclusive use is generally denied, butthere are strong opinions regarding a right to demand compensation for damages(Affirmative opinions: Toyosaki, p. 299; Amino, p. 787; Treatise by Shibuya, op.cit., p.
193. Negative opinions: Treatise by Someno, op.cit. p. 215). On the other hand, a rightto demand compensation for damages based on a exclusive right of non-exclusive use isusually accepted, since an exclusive right as such is close to a right of exclusive use inpractice (Vol. 11, No. 1, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 92, Feb. 28, 1982; No. 142,
Supreme Court, Quick Report, p. 142, Jan. 20, 1987; No. 157, Osaka High Court, Quick
Report, 4382, Jun. 20, 1986; No. 1138, Osaka District Court, Hanji, p. 137, Dec. 20,
1984. Practical Law System (Patent, trademark, copyright) p. 443. These opinions
naturally acknowledge the right to demand compensation based on a right of nonexclusive use. See Section 3 of this Chapter for the precedents and treatises related tothis subsection.)(2) Presumption of negligence
It is necessary to prove whether the act of infringement was intentional or a result ofnegligence. The Patent Law has a provision of presumption of negligence (Patent Law,
Section 103). This provision is applied mutatis mutandis to trademark infringement

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(Section 39). Except for the case of manufacturing copied goods, it is often difficult toprove that the infringement of a trademark right (or a right of non-exclusive right) is
intentional or negligent, even if the act was conducted by an evil unfair competitor. The
presumptive provision is set up for this reason. The trademark gazette is widelydistributed and the registered trademark is officially announced in the trademark register,
etc. The user of the trademark is operating a business (Unless under special
circumstances, legislation is made on the assumption that a person operating a businessis careful about registered trademarks). Therefore, a person who has infringed a
trademark right or a right of exclusive use of another person shall be presumed to havebeen negligent (Section 39; Patent Law, Section 103). Since infringers are obliged toprove that they were not negligent in order to be released from liability forcompensation of damages, their use of registered trademark should not necessarily be
regarded as infringement. There must be sufficient reasons to believe so. In many cases,
the proof of not being negligent does not hold up. The proof of negligence does notprevent a request for compensation of damages due to the presence of this presumptive
provision.
The infringer's negligence may not be defended by the defense or argument that the
infringer believed in the expert's (lawyer or a patent lawyer) opinion denying theinfringement. In Germany, testimony by more than one authorized expert is required.
(3) Presumption of amount of damage(a) Calculation of amount of damage by means of assigned profits
In the case where the owner of a trademark right or a right of exclusive use claims
compensation for damage caused to him by the infringement of a person who has
intentionally or negligently infringed the trademark right or right of exclusive use, theamount of damage shall be calculated as follows: If the person assigns the goods bywhich the act of infringement was committed, the number of articles transferred(hereinafter referred to as the "number of assigned articles") shall be multiplied by theamount of profit per unit that the trademark right owner or the owner of exclusive use
could have normally sold, absent the infringement. If there are any circumstances thatprevent the owner of the trademark right or a right of exclusive use from selling part or
the whole of the number of assigned articles, a sum equivalent to the number ofassigned articles subject to that condition shall be deducted (Section 38 (1)).
c Purport
Trademark infringement is a tort. It is therefore possible to demand compensation fordamage in accordance with the principles of Tort Law. However, there are many
problems regarding a request for compensation for damage caused by the infringementof intellectual or intangible property. Some things that make such requests practicallydifficult include the causal relationship between infringing act and damage, and making
a decision on the amount of material or immaterial damage. Accordingly, the provisions
regarding presumption of the profits gained by the infringer (Section 38 (2); the former
Law, Section 38 (1)), and regarding presumption of the amount of damage equal to themoney the owner of a trademark right or a right of exclusive use would be entitled toreceive for the use of the trademark (Section 38 (3); the former Law, Section 38 (2))

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were inserted in order to make the request easier. Yet these attempts were not sufficient.
Under Civil Proceedings, strict arguments and proofs were required regarding a request
for compensation for damages. It was pointed out that the amount of damages admitted
for compensation in the intellectual property infringement actions in Japan was lower
than that of the U.S.A. and European countries. Where a request for compensation is
made, neither an adequate coverage of damages nor effective restraints against
infringers can be expected. In other words, it looks as though there might be more togain by infringing.
In the trend towards further reinforcement of intellectual property protection in the
United States and other overseas countries, the review of the damage compensation
system for intellectual property infringement was urged also in Japan. The Council on
Industrial Property Right issued a reply, under the heading, "Reply 1 regarding Revisionof Patent Law, etc. Review of the Damage Compensation System - Strong Protection ofIntellectual Property." However, the proposal for an amendment to respond to thesuggestions made in the Reply mostly disappeared during the process of adjustment
between the legal principle of the reply and that of the current damage compensation
system. Only one provision was made on the basis of the suggestion. "The amount ofdamage to be compensated by an infringer shall be estimated as the amount of damage
suffered by the owner of a trademark right or an owner of a right of exclusive use within
a limit not exceeding the working capacity of such person entitled" was added as thefirst subsection. This subsection has been thus set up for the purpose of strengthening
the damage compensation system.
d The word, "estimate", is not used in the original text of this provision. The phrase,"....shall be the amount of damage suffered by the owner of a trademark or the owner ofa right of exclusive use" is used to strengthen fictitious effects, not allowing any
counterevidence.
To illustrate the calculation of damages according to this provision, the owner of a
trademark right, for example, who was making profit of 1,000 yen per article under the
trademark suffered a decrease in sales of 30,000 articles, because an infringer sold
100,000 of the same articles, estimating the profit of 400 yen per article using the
aforementioned trademark without permission.
According to the compensation for damages under Section 709 of the Civil Code, thecausal relationship between the decrease in sales and the sale of infringing articles must
be proved. Also the amount of damage can be estimated, according to Section 38 (2)(Section 38 (1) prior to revision) at 12,000,000 yen by multiplying the profit per article,
400 yen, gained by the sale of infringing articles by the number of articles, 30,000.
Since this is estimation, however, if it can be proven (although difficult) that the ratio ofcontribution in 400 yen of the trademark is extremely small and the strong sales
capability of the infringer greatly contributed, the amount of damage would be smaller.
On the other hand, according to the provision after revision, the profit per article, 1,000
yen (profit per unit), multiplied by 100,000 (number of assigned articles) sold by the
infringer; i.e., 100,000,000 yen may be the damages for compensation. If the sales pricehas to be lowered and the profit per article has decreased by 500 yen, the price per111

article claimable is still 1,000 yen (As "profit per unit that the owner of the trademark
right or the owner of the right of exclusive use could have sold in the absence of theinfringement" is claimable, the profit that may be used in the calculation is not 500 yen,but 1,000 yen.). Therefore, the sum of 100,000,000 yen obtained by multiplying 1,000
yen by 100,000, would be claimable as the amount of damage.
However, if the number of articles that the owner of the trademark can sell is no morethan 10,000, the amount of damage would be 10,000,000 yen, calculated by multiplying
1,000 yen by 10,000 (100,000 minus 90,000, i.e., the number of assigned articles
subject to the condition of the case) or obtained by deducting 90,000,000 yen, a sum
equivalent to number of assigned articles subject to the condition of the case, from
100,000,000 yen.
(b) Presumption of amount of damage (Profit)c Purport (presumption)
In the case where the owner of a trademark right or of a right of exclusive use claims
compensation for damage caused to him by the infringement of a person who has
intentionally or negligently infringed the trademark right or right of exclusive use, theprofits gained by the infringer through the infringement, if any, shall be presumed to be
the amount of damage suffered by the owner (Section 38 (2)).
According to the general principle of the burden of proof, the person requesting
compensation for damages is liable to prove the amount of damage. It is almost
impossible, however, to strictly prove what degree of damage has been caused to thetrademark right owner by the infringing act. If there has been a certain effect, it isdifficult to prove that the effect was caused by the infringing act, especially in thecircumstances where there are plenty of business competitors. It is even more difficult
to evidence the amount of damage caused. The sales or profit of the owner of the
trademark right may have changed even in the absence of such infringement. The
calculation of the amount of damage should not require precise or strict evidence, butshould require evidence from the perspective of reasonable implementation of remedies.
However, if the requirement of evidence is relaxed, it is still difficult to give proof
because of the nature of infringement on intangible property. The provision regarding
presumption has been inserted in the Trademark Law for the above-mentioned reasons.
d Calculation of profit
It is relatively easier to prove the amount of profit gained by an infringer than to prove
the amount of damage on the part of the person making the request for compensation.
The provision stipulates that, if the person making the request is able to prove theamount of profit gained by the infringer by the infringing act, the amount shall be
presumed to be the amount of profit that the requesting person should have gained
absent having been infringed. The protection of the rights of the owner of the trademark
right has thus been simplified (Section 38 (2)). Accordingly, it is not necessary to provethe most difficult causal relationship in this case. Opinions with respect to the "amountof profits" (the profits gained by the infringer) set forth in Section 38 (2) of theTrademark Law are divided into the following two groups: (a) Gross profit, which is thedifference between sales and purchases; and (b) Net income after deducting general andadministrative expenses.

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According to the first opinion, "the amount of profits" set forth in the provision means
the so-called gross profit (operating profit) calculated by multiplying the profit ratio
gained by selling the articles bearing trademarks similar to the registered trademark by
the total number of these articles sold. This amount does not include the profits gainedby the operating efforts of the infringer and other factors, independent of the use of suchtrademarks (Vol. 13, No. 1, Osaka High Court, Mutaishu, p. 71, Feb. 19, 1981). On theother hand, the second opinion upholds that "the amount of profits" means the balance
after deducting from sales all the expenses required for gaining the sales, such aspurchases, advertisement expense, personnel expense, rent expenses for stores andexhibition halls, etc. (Vol. 20, No. 1, Tokyo District Court, Mutaishu, p. 209, Apr. 27,
1988). Although the latter opinion was generally accepted, (Vol. 5, No. 2, Tokyo
District Court, Mutaishu, p. 261, Aug. 31, 1973; No. 1022, Nagoya High Court, Hanji, p.
69, Jul. 17, 1981; Vol. 20, No. 1, Tokyo District Court, Mutaishu, p. 209, Apr. 27, 1988;
and many other precedents), the former opinion is gaining strength recently. In thelatter opinion, the legislative intent to simplify the evidencing process is less significant
and the calculation is difficult. Therefore, the court, using the "net income" theory, held
that, if the requesting person proved the amount of gross profit, it was reasonable toregard such amount of gross profit as the amount of damage suffered by the requesting
person, unless the infringer claimed or proved any factor to reduce the amount (No.
1137, Osaka District Court, Hanji, p. 132, Dec. 20, 1984). The court held that it was
sufficient for calculation of damage to roughly calculate the general profit ratio of thegoods at least regarding the general and administrative expense. If the infringer did notdisclose the profit ratio or claim it below the actual figure, the sales gained by the
infringer multiplied by the profit ratio of the requesting person was regarded to be theamount of profit gained by the infringer. It is reasonable to consider that various ideas
as such were utilized in practice. (No. 215, Tokyo District Court, Hanyu, p. 263, Sep. 13,
1967).
In the case below, the court held as follows: In applying this provision, if the net income
gained by the infringer is available, the net income shall be regarded as the amount ofdamages. In such a case, if the requesting person successfully evidenced the amount ofgross profit, it is reasonable to regard such amount of gross profit as the amount ofdamage in accordance with the Trademark Law, Section 38 (1) ((2) in the current Law),
unless the infringer claims or proves any factor to reduce the amount. Because thevalue of the hair brush case related to the infringing act is one fourth of all the articles
sold by the defendant, the amount of damage suffered by the trademark right owneraccounts for one forth of the amount of gross profit related to the articles sold (Vol. 17,
No. 2, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 311, Jun. 28, 1985).
The case described below is an example of calculation of amount of damage based on
the presumptive provision, Section 38 (2) of the Trademark Law (The precedent cited
below is based on the former Section 38 (1); hereinafter the same) With respect to thetrademark right infringement of the registered trademark, "Piovitan", similar to theregistered trademark, "Pirovitan", the profit per bottle of the lactic acid beverage sold,bearing the aforementioned mark multiplied by the number of bottles distributed wasdeemed to be the amount of damages (Vol. 8, No. 1, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p.
161, Apr. 30, 1976). Of the amount of profit gained by the sale of the articles bearing113the similar mark, the amount equivalent to 20% of such profit was presumed to be theamount of damage, for the reason that the 20% was deemed to represent a reasonablecausal relationship with the use of the mark (Vol. 14, No. 3, Tokyo District Court,
Mutaishu, p. 732, Oct. 22, 1982; Vol. 19, No. 3, Tokyo High Court, Koso-Appeal Trial,
Mutaishu, p. 371, Sep. 29, 1987). Of the amount of profit gained by the sale of thearticles bearing the similar mark, the court found it difficult to calculate the portion of
profit that had a causal relationship with the use of such a mark. For this reason, in
accordance with the Trademark Law, Section 38 (2), the amount of sales of the articles
bearing the mark multiplied by the rate of the license fee of the registered trademark
was deemed to be the amount of damage caused by the trademark right infringement.
Section 38 (2) only presumes the amount of damage sustained by the requesting person.
It does not presume that the person making a request for compensation actually suffered
the amount of damage equivalent to the amount of profits gained by the infringer due tothe infringement. Accordingly, the amount of damage could not be presumed in themanner provided in the subsection (2), if the requesting person was not using theregistered trademark (Vol. 10, No. 1, Tokyo District Court, Mutaishu, p. 102, Mar. 27,
1978; Vol. 13, No. 1, Osaka High Court, Mutaishu, p. 71, Feb. 19, 1981). If therequesting person was not using the trademark, it could not have contributed to the sales.
The right of the trademark right not in use, in principle, is not effective for requesting
compensation for damages (Vol. 51, No. 3, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 1055, Mar. 11,
1997; Vol. 13, No. 1).
e Presumption and disproof
Because the above discussion is based on presumptions, if the infringer offers counterevidence, he is able to reduce the amount of damages. If the customer-attracting abilityof the trademark used by the infringer when combined with the registered trademark is
strong, the total amount of profits gained by an infringer cannot be presumed to be theamount of damage sustained by the requesting person, and the request for compensation
for damages is authorized within a limit of the amount equivalent to a license fee (No.
152, Tokyo District Court, Hanyu, p. 177, Sep. 21, 1963). Section 38 (2) merely
estimates the amount of damage the requesting person suffered in his business due tothe trademark right infringement, and it does not presume the fact that the requesting
person actually sustained damage in his business due to the infringement. In order toapply the provision of this sub-section, it is necessary to assert and prove that therequesting person was using the registered trademark in the course of trade, andsustained the damage caused to his business by the act of infringement on his trademark
right (Vol. 10, No. 1, Tokyo District Court, Mutaishu, p. 102, Mar. 27, 1978; No. 992,
Nagoya District Court, Hanji, p. 93, Apr. 25, 1980; Vol. 18, No. 2, Nagano District
Court, Mutaishu, p. 239, Jun. 26, 1986).
The "damage" sustained by the requesting person as presumed in Section (2) of theTrademark Law is interpreted to be the amount equivalent to the loss of profit in respectof property when the requesting person is gaining profit by actually using the registeredtrademark. The provision, therefore, is not applicable in the calculation of the amountof damage by infringement, unless the trademark right owner is using the registeredtrademark (Vol. 13, No. 1, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 82, Sep. 14, 1979; Vol. 13,
No. 1, Osaka High Court, Koso-Appeal Trial, Mutaishu, p. 71, Feb. 19, 1981; Vol. 16,

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No. 3, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 832, Dec. 20, 1984). In the case where theowner of the trademark right grants a license to use the trademark but does not operate abusiness, this provision is not applicable (In the case of a patent, this may be viewed ascounter-evidence. No. 136, Tokyo District Court, Hanyu, p. 116, Sep. 22, 1962; Vol. 10,
No. 1, Tokyo District Court, Mutaishu, p. 102, Mar. 27, 1978), and the license fee-based
calculation provided for in the next sub-section (Section 38 (3)) would be applied.
In the case where a trademark right owner was not using the registered trademark, it is
not only difficult to conclude that the owner actually suffered losses in business by theuse of the identical trademark by the infringer but also that the infringement led
consumers to confusion, and as a result, the infringer gained profits in business. The
presumption of Section 38 (2), therefore, is not applicable. However, some courts haveheld that the whole provision of sub-section (2) could be applied as a basis. (Vol. 13, No.
1, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 82, Sep. 14, 1979; Vol. 13, No. 1, Osaka High
Court, Koso-Appeal Trial, p. 71, Feb. 19, 1981; Vol. 16, No. 3, Osaka District Court,
Mutaishu, p. 832, Dec. 20, 1984; No. 992, Nagoya District Court, Hanji, p. 93, Apr. 25,
1980.) For instance, if the trademark right owner had never used the registeredtrademark after registration, and it was not only difficult to prove that the owneractually had suffered losses from his business but also that the infringement led
consumers to confusion, and as a result, the infringer gained profits on business, thepresumption of Section 38 (2) would not be found applicable. The court authorized thetrademark right owner to demand compensation in an amount of damages equivalent tothe amount of a license fee for to the registered trademark, in accordance with Section
38 (2) (No. 1022, Nagoya District Court, Hanji, p. 93, Apr. 25, 1980). In the Kosoappeal trial of this case, (No. 1022, Nagoya High Court, Koso-Appeal Trial, Hanji, p. 69,
Jul. 17, 1981) the court used the following logic in reaching its decision. The trademark
right owner suffered the infringement while using the registered trademark. Since it isundeniable that there is a possibility of causing mistake or confusion with the articles
manufactured and sold by the infringer, the trademark right owner should be presumed
to have suffered damage in his business caused by the infringement. The amount ofdamage should be calculated in accordance with Section 38 (2).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court ruled as follows: If the trademark right owner
operates his business at a distant location, using the registered trademark, his trademark
is not contributing to the sales of the infringer. Sub-section (2) is not applicable beyond
the limit of a tort, and the owner is not entitled to demand the compensation for thedamages. Because the demand for compensation for damages is not allowed in the casewhere the owner uses the registered trademark at a distant location, the trademark of theowner who was not using the registered trademark could never have contributed to thesales of the infringer. It, therefore, must be concluded that the demand forcompensation for damages based on the right to the trademark not in use should not beallowed in principle (Vol. 51, No. 3, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 1055, Mar. 11, 1997).
In the author's opinion, "trademarks not in use" should be defined as those that have notbeen used for the preceding three years or more, and deemed to be suitable forcancellation. (However, the treatment of this issue will not change until it is overruled at
the Supreme Court.)(b) Examples of calculation of amount of damage in accordance with Section 38 (2)115As examples of calculating the amount of damage in accordance with Section 38(2), thelower court (Vol. 14, No. 3, Tokyo District Court, Mutaishu, p. 732, Oct. 22, 1982) heldthat an amount equivalent to 20% of the total profit gained by the sale of the articles
bearing similar trademarks was a reasonable result of the use of the mark; the 20%
figure was regarded as the amount of damage caused by infringement of the registeredtrademark right in accordance with Section 38 (2). Yet, the court of the Koso-appeal
trial found it difficult to calculate the amount of profit as a reasonable result of the useof the mark. It concluded that sales of the articles bearing the similar trademarks
multiplied by 2% (rate of license fee of the registered trademark) was deemed to be theamount of damage caused by the infringement of the right to the registered trademark inaccordance with Section 38 (3) (Vol. 19, No. 3, Tokyo High Court, Mutaishu, p. 371,
Sep. 29, 1987). Another court viewed that the amount equivalent to 10% of the total
sales (that equals to the license fee of the trademark) gained by the sale of the articles
bearing similar trademarks was the amount normally receivable for the use of theregistered trademark, and deemed the aforementioned 10% amount to be the amount ofdamage caused by the trademark right infringement (Vol. 20, No. 1, Tokyo District
Court, Mutaishu, p. 209, Apr. 27, 1988).
(4) Section 38 (3) (former (2))(a) The owner of a trademark right or of a right of exclusive use may claim, from aperson who has intentionally or negligently infringed the trademark right or the right of
exclusive use, an amount of money that he would be entitled to receive for the use of
the registered trademark, as the amount of damage suffered by him (Section 38 (3)).
Section 38 (3) has been provided with sub-sections (1) and (2), because it is not easy toprove the amount of damages. Sub-section (2) is a provision of legal presumption, but
it only estimates the amount of damage. It does not presume the occurrence of damage.
The purport of the sub-section (3) is that when a trademark right or a right of nonexclusive use has been intentionally or negligently infringed, an amount equivalent tothe value of a license fee for the trademark may be claimed as the minimum amount ofdamages. It is not a normal type of demand for compensation for loss of the profit thatshould have been gained and is generally called a trademark license fee. There are two
types of license fees: a license fee for the exclusive use of a trademark right and alicense fee for the non-exclusive use of a trademark right. The license fee addressed inthis section should be decided on the basis of the license fee for non-exclusive use. This
principle will not be changed even after the 1998 revision. In such a case, however, thevalue of the license fee will vary depending on the circumstances, such as whether otherrights of use exist, whether the application has been filed in advance, or whether the
dispute has been resolved by licensing after infringement occurred. Prior to the 1998
revision, an amount of money normally receivable for the use of the trademark wasdeemed to be the minimum amount of damage. The word, "normally", was deleted later.
Previously, a "normal" license fee receivable for the use of the trademark was deemed
to be the amount of damage; not a license fee estimated on the basis of the infringer's
profit. At that time, the legislature thought that the process of proving damages wasmade easier by adding this provision. In practice, however, since the amount of eachlicense fee varied greatly, depending on the case, it was not easy to prove the amount inthis manner. In some respects it was easier to prove the licensing fee based on the subsection (2) (formerly (1)). Through the accumulation of court decisions, the amount of116

damages has been reaching a reasonable level. Some disputes will occur, in the
beginning, over the interpretation of the provisions that are currently being revised, but
the rate of damages will gradually come to a reasonable level.
The amount of the license fee referred to in this sub-section is the minimum claimableamount, and it does not prevent the person entitled from making a demand forcompensation for damages by proving that he has suffered more damage as stipulated in
the former clause of the sub-section (4). However, once the amount of license fee isreceived as compensation for damages pursuant to the provision of (3), the person may
not demand any further compensation, even if he proves that he suffered damages
exceeding the initially compensated amount.
(5) Reduction of Amount (Section 38 (4))
There are only a few cases that involved disputes over the reduction of the amount ofdamages that actually granted the reduction, taking into consideration the degree ofnegligence in accordance with Section 38 (4). However, one ruling awarded damages
within a limit not exceeding 30 % of the profit gained by the infringer through the
infringement. In this case, the court judged the degree of negligence to be considerably
low, for the reasons that the owner of the trademark did not raise any objection withrespect to the use of a mark similar to the registered trademark for the preceding 20
years and the infringer was not aware of the infringement (No. 536, Osaka District
Court, Hanyu, p. 425, Feb. 28, 1984). On the contrary, another ruling did not approve
the reduction pursuant to the same section. In this case, the amount of damages was as
small as 101,250 yen. The court, therefore, did not approve further reduction of thedamages since it found this amount not too severe to the infringer (Vol. 16, No. 3, Osaka
District Court, Mutaishu, p. 832, Dec. 20, 1984). The court stated that the latter clauseof Section 38 (4) was a provision that the court may use to reduce damages at its
discretion in cases where, for instance, a person's act of using an identical or similar
trademark in good faith without knowing the existence of the registered trademark wasfound infringement, and the person was liable to compensate a huge amount of damages.
In such a case, the amount of damages was judged too severe to the person (Vol. 16, No.
3, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 832, Dec. 2, 1984).
(a) Examples of intangible damages
There was a dispute over whether compensation for intangible damage should beawarded in addition to damage to property. In this case, handbags bearing marks similar
to the trademark of Chanel were distributed. The materials and sewing of thesehandbags manufactured and sold by a foreign distributor were inferior in quality andwere sold at a low price. Considering that the original handbags bearing the registeredtrademark maintained a reputation as a first-class and famous brand, if the copied goods
similar in shape and bearing a mark very closely resembling the registered trademark
were sold at a low price, the reputation of the original handbags would be degraded, andthe original manufacturer would obviously suffer intangible damage. Such damage wasadjudged to have been caused under the special circumstances and could not be
remedied withonly the damages in respect of its business. The court ordered thepayment of 300,000 yen as damages due to the impairment of reputation in addition to
the 234,000 yen awarded for the profit gained by the infringer through the infringement(No. 1159, Yokohama District Court, Hanji, p. 147, Mar. 22, 1980).

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In another case, the demand for compensation for intangible damage was denied. The
owner of the trademark right demanded the compensation for damages since he sufferedintangible loss and damage caused by another's use of a mark similar to his. However,
the infringement actually lasted less than two months and the similar mark was notfrequently used. Since the quality of goods to which the similar mark was affixed was
not deemed to be inferior, the court concluded that the trademark right owner was notregarded to have suffered intangible damage in addition to damage to his property (Vol.
3, No. 1, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p. 80, Mar. 3, 1971).
(b) Calculation statement
Sanctions are not typically imposed unless documents are intentionally lost or destroyed(No. 225, Osaka District Court, Hanyu, p. 209, May 20, 1968), or in cases where
documents have not been prepared. Apart from the question of whether a right torequest production of accounting statements (in accordance with the general businessadministration practices) can be granted under the current Law, the question must be
considered for the purpose of legislation, in order to make the demand for compensation
for damages by a trademark right owner substantially effective (Such a right isauthorized in the precedents under the common law in Germany).
Section 105 of the Patent Law regarding a request for an order to produce documents is
applied mutatis mutandis to the current Trademark Law (Section 39). The 1999 revisionof the Patent Law includes a provision regarding an order to produce documents todecide whether there is a good reason to demand damages in Section 105 (2), andapplies mutatis mutandis the provision to the inspection procedure (Trademark Law,
Section 39; Patent Law, Section 105 (3)).
(c) Expert opinion for proof of damage
The expert opinion system was established under the 1999 revision of the Law, as ameasure for expanding remedies for infringement, with the legislative purpose of
facilitating the calculation of damages.
In litigation relating to the infringement of a patent right or exclusive license, where thecourt orders, upon the request of a party, expert opinion to be given with respect tomatters necessary for the proof of the damages caused by the infringement, the otherparty shall explain to the expert the matters necessary for the expert opinion to be given(Section 39; Patent Law, Section 105 (2)). This provision is a step towards thelegislation of a request for a statement of accounting. Establishment of an appropriate
expert system, expert theory and practices is urged in the future.
(d) Award of reasonable damages
In order to expand remedies for infringement and to realize a substantial compensation
awarded by the court, the 1999 revision of the Law was provided to aid the court inawarding a reasonable amount of damages for the case where the calculation ofdamages is difficult. A provision regarding the award of reasonable amount of damages
was also provided in the new Civil Procedure Law. However, assuming that suchprovision would be more useful in relation to industrial property right litigation, theprovision was specifically set up in the 1999 revision of the Trademark Law and Patent

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Law.
In the case where it is recognized that the damage was caused in litigation relating to theinfringement of a patent right or exclusive license, the court may award the reasonableamount of damages, based entirely on the oral argument and a review of the evidence,
when it is extremely difficult to prove facts necessary for the proof of damages (Section
39; Patent Law, Section 105 - 3).
The effects of this provision mean that now, a demand for compensation for damages intrademark infringement litigations will not be dismissed on the grounds that the proof of
the amount of damages is not clear even though damage has obviously occurred (as in adilution case regarding a well-known trademark). The provision concerns the award ofdamages in cases where such calculation is difficult. Therefore, such a demand could
be dismissed for because damage was not recognized or no proof of damages was given,
although the proof would be possible from the nature of relevant facts.
3. Request for Recovery of Reputation(1) Definition
Upon request of the owner of a trademark right or the owner of a right of exclusive use,the court may, in lieu of damages or in addition thereto, order a person who has injured
the business reputation of the owner of a trademark right or the owner of a right of
exclusive use by infringing the trademark right or the right of exclusive use, whether
intentionally or negligently, to take measures necessary for the recovery of the business
reputation (Section 39; Patent Law, Section 106).
(2) Content
In trademark infringement, both monetary compensation and recovery of business
reputation must be attempted. The request for measures for recovery of reputation is avariation of a demand for compensation for damages. An act to injure the business
reputation includes the act of selling articles inferior in quality, as a result of which the
reputation of the articles associated with the owner of a trademark right or the owner ofa right of exclusive use is impaired. This is a typical example but the examples are notlimited to this case. If the infringement is not serious, or reputation has already been
recovered, a request for a public apology is not allowed.
(3) Recovery measures
As "measures necessary for the recovery of business reputation", it is common forcourts to order a public apology in a newspaper or business magazine by specifying thetext, the newspaper or magazine to place it, form, size of the type, number of issues inwhich to place it, etc. (According to the ruling of Series 16, Daishinin, Minroku, Nov. 2,
1968, p. 745, it is not necessary to specify the size of the type, but it is necessary to
specify the size of the paper in relation to the stamp for the legal costs.). In some rarecases the apology statement is distributed to customers. In this case, the court orders an
express apology, and no provisional execution is declared; the express apology is a
substitute (Law of Civil Execution).
(4) Compensation for unfair profits gained by the infringer

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The compensation for unfair profits gained by the infringer has not been examinedsufficiently. Unfair profits as originally defined and the definition of unfair profits after
the request for compensation for damages has been cancelled due to prescription need to
be examined separately. The "Okeya Kiomaru" case is an example of the trademark
owner's request for unfair profits gained by the infringer. The owner of a trademark
consisting of "OKEYA" (in Chinese characters) written horizontally and "KIOMARU"
written vertically, used for designated children's medicine, made a request forcompensation for unfair profits, against a person who was selling children's medicine
bearing a mark consisting of "OKEYA the TENTH" and "KIOMARU" both writtenvertically. The suit was also brought against a person who licensed the use of the
trademark and gained the license fee. These persons used a mark analogous to theregistered trademark in respect of goods identical or similar to the designated goods
without any legal right until the trademark of the trademark right owner was
extinguished by surrender. The amount of damages requested for compensation
included the amount of profits deemed to have been gained on the sale plus an amountequivalent to a license fee. Because it is reasonable to consider profits from trademark
infringement as directly related to the equivalent losses suffered by the trademark owner,
the infringers were adjudged liable to the trademark owner for compensation of anamount equivalent to their unfair profits (Vol. 19, No. 3, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu,
p. 389, Oct. 14, 1987; Vol. 21, No. 1, Osaka High Court, Mutaishu, p. 88, Mar. 3, 1989).
The practical business administration theory is in practice in Germany, but not by
Japanese courts. This issue will be a topic of further discussion in relation to the request
for information disclosure in the future.
IV. Criminal Law Remedies (Penal Provisions)
1. Criminal Law Remedies(1) Protection of interest
Any person who has infringed a trademark right shall be punished under the criminallaw (Section 78). Both private and public interests are protected against the offense of
trademark infringement.
The offenses of infringement of patent rights, utility model rights and design rights areindictable upon a complaint, because such offenses infringe only private interests.
(Although infringement on rights of creation such as patent rights and copyrights wereonce regarded as offenses indictable upon a complaint, this is no longer the case after
the 1998 revision of the Law. Importation of infringing articles in breach of Section 109of the Customs Law is an offense indictable upon a complaint.) In contrast, trademark
right infringement not only infringes the reputation and property right of the owner of
the trademark right, but also leads consumers to confusion and mistake regarding thesource of the goods. Because it violates the order of distribution and, as a result, harms
the public interest of consumers and traders, it has long been regarded as an offense
indictable without a complaint. Accordingly, a complaint is merely the beginning of aninvestigation and is not a requirement for the indictment, by which the interest of theperson infringed and general public can be defended. Whether or not the complaint is120

effective does not influence whether the alleged infringer is found guilty.
(2) Territorial effects
Offenses of trademark right infringement are only actionable with respect to acts of
infringement committed within the country. Acts of use of trademarks include
importation. Importation, however, is "an international transaction that brings in articles
manufactured in a foreign country to Japanese markets; therefore, articles stored inbonded areas (bonded warehouse or bonded factory) should not be regarded as imported
goods (Yoshifuji, p. 434. The exception is with respect to production, a bonded
warehouse is interpreted as "inside the country".). This is based on the interpretation ofimportation in normal transactions. Because only articles that clear customs are
regarded as imported articles, the Trademark Law is not applicable to goods in bond.
There is no "attempted offense" under the Trademark Law. According to the "customer
clearance theory," there is a possibility that copied products bearing a famous trademarkof Japan, disguised as a legitimate transaction are carried into the country, bypassing
customs. Under this theory it is unreasonable to just overlook such practice.
Importation of prohibited or contraband goods must be, as with narcotics or stimulant
drugs, interpreted in accordance with the "territorial waters" theory or "unloading"theory, not with the "customs clearance" theory.
Bonded warehouses, which are interpreted as "outside the country" under the Customs
Law, were regarded as "inside the country" in the court decision of the Federal Supreme
Court of Switzerland (Vol. 18, No. 1, Court Decisions IIC (International Industrial
Property Right Magazine), Nov. 2, 1984). The Japanese government explained that
goods that merely pass the territorial sea are not interpreted as imported. They are
regarded as imported when unloaded. (Minutes of Meeting, the 126th Commerce andIndustry Committee, House of Councilors).
2. Offense of Trademark Infringement(1) Constituent features
Any person who has infringed a trademark right or right of exclusive use shall bepunished by imprisonment with labor not exceeding five years or to a fine notexceeding 5,000,000 yen. (Section 78) Compare the Design Law, which stipulates, inSection 69, punishment for trademark right infringement to be imprisonment with labor
not exceeding three years or to a fine not exceeding 3,000,000 yen. The Copyright Law,
in Sections 119 to 122, stipulates, against copyright infringement, imprisonment withlabor not exceeding three years or to a fine not exceeding 3,000,000 yen; forinfringement on personal profit, a fine not exceeding 3,000,000 yen; for use of falsename about author's name and for infringement on the right of foreign originalcommercial recordings, imprisonment with labor not exceeding one year or to a fine notexceeding 1,000,000 yen; and for breach of an obligation to indicate source, to a finenot exceeding 3,000,000 yen. The Unfair Competition Prevention Law, Section 5,
stipulates against acts of unfair competition, imprisonment with labor not exceeding
three years or to a fine not exceeding 3,000,000 yen, and the Customs Law stipulates forimporting goods infringing industrial property right without license, imprisonment withlabor not exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding 5,000,000 yen.

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In the case where a person holds, with the purpose of selling, designated goods on the
packaging of which he has affixed the registered trademark of another withoutauthorization, then the fact that the contents of the packaging were goods manufacturedby the person and they were brand-new products does not influence in any way whether
the person is found guilty or not under Section 37, Item (ii) and Section 78 (Vol. 44, No.
5, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 876, Jul. 20, 1990).
A criminal court decided that the assembling of parts to which the trademark in question
was affixed into a finished product was regarded to be trademark right infringement. In
this case, the act of affixing the trademark to a CPU (Central Processing Unit) attachedto the main circuit board built into a pachinko (pinball) slot machine (finished product)
became the subject of the dispute. The court stated as follows: "The Trademark Law isintended to protect the functions of the trademark such as indicating the source anddistinguishing the designated goods from other goods so as to protect the interests of the
trademark right owner, his business partners and consumers. In view of this, when aproduct bearing a trademark is assembled as one part of a finished product, whether it
is necessary to protect the trademark or not depends on whether the trademark affixed tothe part is seen to function as the trademark of the part, even after it is assembled into
the finished product. The following points must be taken into consideration in making
this determination: (i) the part maintains the same shape or appearance as its originalstate, (ii) the trademark is still recognizable as the trademark of the part; and (iii) thepart and the trademark are noticeable by business partners or consumers in the processof distribution of the finished products. The court concluded that the act of affixing a
trademark to CPU was trademark right infringement on the following grounds: c The
CPU maintained the same shape and appearance as its original state after being affixed
to the finished product; d The trademark affixed to the CPU was recognizable as atrademark for CPU's; e The trademark affixed to the CPU was likely to be noticed bybusiness partners and consumers during the process of distribution (the main body ofthe pachinko slot machine and the main circuit board were separately delivered to thepinball hall and assembled, alternatively, the main circuit board was sold to the pinballhall as a spare part and replaced with the main circuit which had problems). This was
an exceptional decision that acknowledged trademark right infringement of the
trademark affixed to a part in view of the actual circumstances of the transactions, eventhough the trademark was not noticeable from the appearances of the finished product(No. 931, Osaka District Court, Hanyu, p. 298, Feb. 13, 1996).
(2) Intention
In some cases, civil law remedies are insufficient for trademark infringement, andcriminal sanctions are also required. Mere negligence is insufficient to impose criminal
sanctions. Intent is necessary. (Penal Code, Section 38 (1)) In order to prove intent toinfringe a trademark right, it must be proved that the person used the trademark,knowing that it is the registered trademark of another person (Series 13, No. 1194,
Daishinin, Keiroku, p. 1194, Oct. 25, 1907). The intention of infringement (Series. 17,
Daishinin, Keiroku, p. 1083, Jun. 6, 1911) is to gain unfair profits by deceptive acts (Vol.
15, Daishinin, Keishu, p. 812, Jun. 18, 1936). It is not necessary to have the intent todegrade the reputation or value of goods, or cause confusion or mistake (No. 3, Tokyo
High Court, Kokeishu, p. 104, Apr. 21, 1958). Intent is indispensable, but it does nothave to be willful negligence (Tokyo District Court, Not yet included in Hanreishu, Jun.

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20, 1973). The court viewed that if a person did not correctly understand the definitionof similarity of a trademark, he would be regarded as having a criminal intent as far as
he knew the existence of the trademark right (No. 7, Fukuoka High Court, Kokeishu, p.
606, May 6, 1954).
(3) Indirect infringement(a) Offense of deemed infringement
Trademark infringements include not only the acts of infringement set forth in Section
36, but also the acts deemed infringement set forth in Sections 37 and 67. (Vol. 25, No.
5, Supreme Court Decision, Keishu, p. 739, Jul. 20, 1971; Vol. 20, No. 1, Tokyo High
Court, Kokeishu, p. 14, Jan. 30, 1967; No. 880, Osaka High Court, Hanji, p. 83, Apr. 28,
1977; Vol. 336, No. 3, Tokyo High Court, Kokeishu, p. 289, Nov. 7, 1983 and manyother precedents; Nakayama, 50 Lectures, p. 18, Yoshiwara-Takahashi, p. 309;
Opposition, Mitsuishi, p. 425). Both direct infringement and indirect infringement are
in breach of Trademark Law, Section 78 (No. 1042, Tokyo District Court, Hanji, p. 155,
Aug. 3, 1981; Tokyo High Court, Koso-Appeal Trial, Nov. 7, 1983, Ibid.).
The acts set forth in Section 37 (viii) are required to be conducted in the course of trade
to constitute infringement; the remaining acts do not have that requirement (Supreme
Court decision, Jul. 20, 1971, Ibid.).
From a criminological point of view, the acts set out in Section 37 (viii) are acts
preliminary to preliminary acts of trademark right infringement (Sotaro Ishikawa"Problems in Crime and Punishment related to Intellectual Property Right Infringement",
Patent Study No. 4, p. 25). The acts of manufacturing and selling metal fittings andmetal molds for manufacturing illegitimate copied goods are in breach of (viii). The
indirect infringer's influence on an infringement case may be great in some cases. The
classification of indirect infringement and a fact-finding investigation are indispensable
for future legislation to be enacted for the purpose of preventing crimes. The court
viewed that a person who held a cardboard box containing goods with a copied
trademark did not have to do business (Supreme Court Ruling, Jul. 20, 1971, Ibid.).
Refilling is also adjudged infringement (Vo. 8, No. 3, Fukuoka High Court, Kakeishu, p.
371, Mar. 4, 1966, "Harshey").
(b) Similarity
The effects of Section 37 (1) extend to the use of similar goods and similar trademarks.
"Similarity of goods" means, according to the interpretation of the precedent indicatedbelow, goods that are likely to be confused if a trademark identical or similar to theregistered mark is applied to them (Vol. 15, No. 6, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 1730, Jun.
27, 1961; Vol. 18, No. 5, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 774, Jun. 16, 1964). Twotrademarks that are analogous in appearance, sound, pronunciation and concept are
regarded as similar in principle. These are, however, merely practical standards. The
overall observation of the trademark is important. When judging the likeliness ofconfusion as to the source of goods, a court may take general trading conditions (Vol. 22,
No. 2, Supreme Court, Minshu, p. 399, Feb. 27, 1968), and the prominence of the mark(Vol. 21, Daishinin, Minshu, p. 651, Jun. 10, 1942) into consideration. The mainelements of the trademark are construed by means of observation at different locations
and times (Series 15, Daishinin, Minroku, p. 212, Mar. 12, 1909) for the purpose of123

judging similarity (Series 14, Daishinin, Keiroku, p. 772, Sep. 22, 1908).
3. Other Offenses(1) Offense of fraud
Any person who has obtained a trademark or defensive mark registration or has
renewed the term of a trademark right or right based on a defensive mark registration, aruling on an opposition to a trademark registration or a trial decision, by means of afraudulent act shall be punished by imprisonment with labor not exceeding three years
or to a fine not exceeding 3,000,000 yen (Section 79).
(2) Offense of false marking
Any person infringing Section 74 shall be punished by imprisonment with labor notexceeding three years or to a fine not exceeding 3,000,000 yen (Section 80). The detailsof constituent features are provided in Section 74 (See Section 74 that addresses theprohibition of false marking).
(3) Offense of perjury
A witness, expert or interpreter who, having taken an oath under this Law, has made a
false statement or has given a false expert opinion or has interpreted falsely before thePatent Office or a court commissioned thereby shall be punished by imprisonment withlabor for a term of not less than three months and not more than ten years (Section 81(1)).
Where a person committing an offense such as perjury has made a voluntary confession
before a ruling or a decision on an opposition to the trademark registration has become
final and conclusive, his sentence may be reduced or suppressed (Section 81 (2).
4. Dual liability
Where an officer representing a legal entity or a representative, employee, or any otherservant of a legal entity or of a natural person has committed an offense of infringement,
fraud, or false marking, the legal entity shall, in addition to the offender, be liable to thefollowing fines: As to infringement under Section 78, a fine up to 150 million yen; as tofraud under Section 79 or false marking under Section 80, a fine up to 100 million yen.
The natural person shall be liable to the fine prescribed respectively in Section 78, 79 or
80 (Section 82).
Offenses involving industrial property rights have a color of economic offenses. The
imposition of dual liability on both natural persons and corporations, aimed primarily at
prevention, is characteristic of the provisions to control the offenses of this type. These
provisions are effective against large-scale companies. However, because the amount ofdamages involved in illegal goods offenses is not large enough to jeopardize theoperation of the business dealing with such illegal goods, there are almost no preventive
effects. The penalties are merely considered one of the circumstances in the judgmentof a sentence if the offense is recommitted. "At the time of the 1996 revision of theTrademark Law, a decision was made to introduce the dual liability against trademark
right infringement in order to strengthen the effect of a deterrent against brand copying
offenses that have become increasingly organizational and frequent in recent years."
The fine against a legal entity was raised sharply from "up to 5 million yen" to "up to124

150 million yen." In the revision in 1999, the fine was raised to 100 million yen withrespect to Sections 79 and 80.
As transitory measures, however, after the introduction of the dual liability against legal
entities, penal provisions regarding the acts committed prior to the enforcement of theserevisions shall be applied in accordance with the previous regulations (Supplementary
Provisions to the revised Trademark Law, Section 20).
5. Administrative Penalties
Section 83 of the Trademark Law provides for administrative penalties to be imposed on
false statements made before the Patent Office or a court commissioned thereby;
Section 84 provides for penalties on failure to appear before the court despite summons;and Section 85 provides for penalties on failure to comply with the order to produce orshow documents or other evidence. Although these penalties are set forth in the penal
provisions, they are administrative penalties and are not punishment. These procedures
follow the provisions of Section 206 or 208 of the Voluntary Matters Proceedings Act.
6. Number of Offenses and Relationship with Other Crimes
As far as trademark infringement is concerned, the number of repeated infringement
offenses does not correspond to the number of registered trademark right owners
involved. The offenses are collectively regarded as a single offense for each trademark
concerned. (The number of offenses would vary if any jointly owned trademark is
included.) If several registered trademarks are involved in one label, several offenses
would exist, and these offenses would conceptually or imaginatively compete with eachother (Vol. 9, No. 2, Supreme Court, Keishu, p. 2245, Oct. 18, 1955; Vol. 20, No. 5,
Supreme Court, Keishu, p. 429, Jun. 10, 1966; Vol. 5, No. 4, Tokyo High Court,
Kokeishu, p. 461, Mar. 4, 1952; Ishikawa, Vol. 4, "Annotated Special Penal Code,"Trademark Law", p. 63).
Trademarks that have not been applied for registration will also be protected subject tocertain conditions, if they are well known trademarks to which the Unfair Competition
Prevention Law is applicable. The designation of goods to be registered is required forfiling of applications. To illustrate, in one case, a famous trademark for whiskey was
registered in respect of liquor as designated goods, but not registered in respect of a
glass mirror. In a case where the trademark or the graphic mark for the whiskey wasused for a mirror without consent, the trademark needed to be protected under the
Unfair Competition Prevention Law (Vol. 14, No. 1, Osaka District Court, Mutaishu, p.
58, Feb. 26, 1982, "Application of Famous Imported Whisky Trademark to Another
Item"; See Ono, Vol. 4, Annotated Special Penal Code, "Unfair Competition Prevention
Law, p. 12 with respect to offenses under the Unfair Competition Prevention Law).
Breach of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law often serves as supplementarygrounds for a prosecution that is brought for breach of the Trademark Law. Breach of
the Trademark Law has conceptually competitive relationship with that of the Unfair
Competition Prevention Law (No. 546, Osaka High Court, Hanji, p. 85, Dec. 13, 1968;
No. 880, Osaka High Court, Hanji, p. 83, Apr. 28, 1977 and many other precedents).
For instance, a trademark identical or similar to the registered well-known trademark of
the manufacturing company of an original computer game was used on a copy of the125computer game with the intention of unfair competition. This act that infringed thetrademark right of the company and caused confusion with the designated goods of thecompany was found guilty as breach of the Trademark Law (offense of infringement
under Section 78) as well as breach of the Unfair Competition Law. In this way, theoffense of breaching the Trademark Law is conceptually competitive with that of the
Unfair Competition Law (No. 1258, Tokyo District Court, Hanji, p. 143, Oct. 22, 1987).
Breach of the Trademark Law and fraud are similarly regarded as connected crimes (Vol.
12, Daishinin, Keishu, p. 126, Feb. 15, 1933, "Counterfeit Diastase Incident").
Infringement under the Trademark Law and documentary forgery were also regarded asconnected crimes (Vol. 6, Daishinin, Keishu, p. 195, May. 20, 1927, "Ozeki (refinedsake) Label Incident").

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