2008-E-25
Imaginings, Identity, Integration: Asia in the Minds of Singapore
Students
Tan Ern Ser, Gloria Arlini, and Fairoz Ahmad
National University of Singapore
February 2009

INTRODUCTION
The Idea of Asia
What do we mean by ‘Asia’? In other words, what does the idea of ‘Asia’
incorporate? Geographically, there exists a continent bounded by the Pacific, Arctic
and Indian Oceans that is called ‘Asia’1 but sociologically, politically and historically;
the idea of ‘Asia’ has always been contested. The extra-geographical conceptions of‘Asia’ have always been a source of conceptual disunity.
Sociologically, Edwardes (cited in Kausikan, 1971:12) writing in 1962, a
period of rapid decolonization and where perceptions of geopolitics were driven by
Cold War considerations, concludes that ‘Asia’ has no meaning, although he admits
that the word tends to be commonly employed as if it has a precise meaning
Politically, Asia is often defined within the context of colonialism as the repository of
everything inferior (Kausikan, 1971:12; see also Said 1979). Hence, Buszynski(2004:138) defines Asia as a “geographical concept representing a vast stretch of
territory comprising diverse traditional cultures and civilizations that has beencolonized by the West. The idea of Asia is a product of contact with the West.”
Specifically, Asia comes from a Greek word first used by Herodotus todescribe the land belonging to the Persian Empire, in opposition to the lands called
Greece and Egypt2. Historically however, not all civilizations living in the continent
we call ‘Asia’ has always conceptualized space the same way. China used to view
itself as ‘Chung Kuo’ –the middle kingdom (Kausikan, 1971:29).3 The idea of beingat the centre of all civilizations implies the rejection of the idea that China is part of‘Asia’. Muslims, the majority of whom live in the continent called ‘Asia’ also have a
different conceptualization of geography. One aspect in classical Muslim thought
divides the world into Dar as-Salam and Dar al-Harb (see Sherwani, 1985). Thisdivision is based broadly on the idea of religious security, rather than absolute space.
The former defines countries where a Muslim can practice their religion freely while
the latter is its anti-thesis.
If we agree that one of the basic questions of ontology deals with therelationship between the properties of an object and the object itself (see Hyde 2007),then we can agree that the idea of ‘Asia’ is an ontological problem that expresses
itself in geographical, political, sociological and historical modes of analyses andthinking. These ontological problems however, do not prevent elites of various

1

Even within physical geography, the idea that ‘Asia’ is a continent distinct from ‘Europe’ does notform a common stock of knowledge. For example, “Sir Barry Cunliffe, the emeritus professor ofEuropean archeology at Oxford, argue that Europe has been geographically and culturally merely ‘thewestern excrescence of the continent of Asia.’” (See entry on Asia in Encyclopedia Britannica. 2006
Edition).
2
For an excellent overview of the origins of the word, see Boston’s University School of Theology
entry on Asia at
http://sthweb.bu.edu/index.php?option=com_awiki&view=mediawiki&article=Asia&Itemid=357#cite_note-5.
3
Until now the term “Chung Kuo,” or its hanyu pinyin “Zhongguo” is still used by the Chinese (bothmainland Chinese and those in diaspora) to refer to China. Nevertheless, the notion of it being the
Middle Kingdom at the centre of all civilizations has been diluted.

1

ideological backgrounds from continuing to construct their own ideas of ‘Asia’4. Thus,
for instance, from the 1970s until the late 1990s, we come across a vast array ofintellectual output, thinking and rhetoric on ideas like the ‘Asian Values’5 (see for
instance Chen, 1976; Nury, 1996) and ‘Asian Renaissance’ (see for instance Anwar
1996, Francois 1996). The latest attempt towards constructing Asia takes the form of
the East Asian Community (EAC).
East Asian Community (EAC)
The importance of the EAC is apparent in Higgott’s (2006:32) assertion that“the Asian voice of region that is emerging in the global political economy is a new‘East Asian’ one”.
Background of the East Asia Community (EAC)
The idea of a regional organization that comprised East Asia was first proposed by then MalaysianPrime Minister Mahathir Mohamed, in the form of an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in 1990.
Mahathir envisioned the EAEC to be a body that would exclusively link the countries of Northeast Asia
and Southeast Asia (Terada 2006:224). The proposal did not lift off for two key reasons: First, thecountries which Mahathir envisioned to be part of the EAEC were generally reluctant to be part ofanother regional organization, especially since the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was
then seen to be a promising regional body. Second, the proposal was construed to be a trading bloc,
which carried connotations of protectionism. This was rejected by many members whose countries
adopted a neo-liberal approach to economic development. As Tommy Koh, currently Singapore’s
Ambassador-at-large put it, “Mahathir’s mistake was the way he put it and the language used” (quoted
in Terada 2006:222). The EAEC eventually was subsumed under APEC as a caucus.
The idea of an East Asian body was revived in the mid 1990s after two key events. The first was thelaunch of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1995, where Asian countries became acutely aware of
the absence of a mechanism to bring all the Asian countries for internal consultations, unlike Europe.
This mechanism eventually took the shape of the ASEAN+3 (China, South Korea and Japan), which
later gained momentum after the failure of APEC to address the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997/98
satisfactorily (see also Stubbs 2002:443). The idea was officially articulated in a joint statement titled,“A Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation” by the leaders during an informal summit in Manila inMarch 1999 (Terada 2006: 225).
In 2001, the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG), made up of prominent intellectuals from the ASEAN + 3
countries, submitted its recommendations on its visions of an East Asian Community (EAC). This waslater taken up at the working level by the East Asia Study Group (EASG), made up of government
officials, who submitted a final report during the ASEAN +3 Summit in Cambodia in 2002. We will
make occasional references to the EAVG and EASG reports in the paper.

Two issues are of importance in understanding the EAC. First, there is astrong emphasis on economic reasons for the establishment of an EAC. Thus, “unlike
the European Union, which started with the clear goal in mind of not wanting another
war erupting on its continent, efforts to integrate Asia are driven by economic
interests 6 .” This emphasis is reflected in the EASG Report. Out of the 26
recommendations in the report, eleven are economic-related.
Second, state actors are much preoccupied with issues of ‘community building’.
The EAVG and EASG reports dwell in great length on ways to build ‘identity’ and4

For an example of Australia’s idea of Asia and its ambivalent relationship within it, see Milner and
Quilty (1996).
5This idea continues to be the focus of many works. See for instance Hill (2000), Mushkat (2004) andXu (2005).
6“Legacy of war stifling bid for single EAC market”. Bangkok Post. 22 November 2006

2‘community’ although it is unclear what they mean by these terms, particularly when
the issue of EAC has yet to be resolved. Although it has been agreed that the ASEAN+ 3 members will be the driving force in creating the EAC7, membership of the EAC
could either be limited to only the ASEAN + 3 or expanded to include members of theEast Asian Summit (ASEAN + 3, India, New Zealand and Australia). 8 Thus
Malaysia’s Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi notes that the problem of a proposed
EAC is the “never ending debates about membership and inclusion.”9
However, what constantly features in these debates is that the idea of the EAC
has systematically excluded West Asian,10 Central Asian and South Asian countries(with the exception of India), while taking it as a given that countries in the Northeast
and Southeast Asia are ‘naturally’ members. History tells us that this has not always
been the case. The 1955 Conference of Southeast Asian Prime Ministers, which
preceded the historic Bandung Conference of Asian and African states in Jakarta inthe same year, included leaders of India, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) and Pakistan(Acharya, 2006b:83). Thus, debates of which countries should be included in the
EAC have much to do with the broader intellectual problem of what Asia is, a point
which was introduced earlier and which we will revisit shortly.
At this point, it suffices to note that regardless of the membership criteria, theidea of a ‘community’ must imply some level of shared interests, norms, values andattitudes across the EAC potential member countries.
But are there suchcommonalities, and what are they? The cultural complexity and diversity of thepotential EAC members implies that the supposedly “shared” values, norms andattitudes tend to be imagined and aspired to, rather than objective and ‘real’(Thompson, 2006; Acharya, 2000). Whose subjective imaginations and aspirations
matter then? Does the governments’ emphasis on economic integration resonate
within the community? What makes a regional community?
These questions have been conveniently neglected because they elude easyanswers. We propose that the concept of regionalism might shed light on these issues.
Regionalism and regionalization
Conceptual problems
The elimination of post-Cold War geopolitical landscapes has facilitated thetrend towards regional cooperation (Dodds, 1998:725). One concept in the study ofregions that has attracted much attention is ‘regionalism’ (see for instance Higgott &Stubbs, 1995; Camilleri, 1999; Sathyamurty, 1999; Higgott, 2006; Acharya, 2006a,
Curley and Thomas 2006, Breslin 2006, Dent 2008). However, like many concepts in
7“Chinese Minister says ‘ASEAN + 3 to be used for talks in the Philippines”. BBC. 6 Dec 2006
Some of the debates are about the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand as part of “East Asia”.
While Mahathir insists that Australia could not be part of the EAC because “they are Europeans, theycannot be Asians” (New Straits Times 5 Dec 2006), New Zealand’s Foreign Minister Winston Peters, inan effort to legitimize New Zealand’s participation in the East Asia Summit, points out to muchskepticism that the indigenous people of New Zealand came from China (The Press, 28 July 2006).
9“PM: Rivalries, distrust, root of East Asia woes”. New Straits Times. 5 Dec 2006
10
This is probably because West Asia is now commonly known as Middle East, which does notconnote a sense of ‘Asia-ness’.
83

the social sciences, ‘regionalism’ does not lend itself to a precise definition. Studies
articulating the concept tend to run into the problem of conceptual deflation. Thisrefers to the tendency to focus on a narrower range of attributes of a concept while deemphasizing or ignoring its other attributes. As a result, the concept is used to refer toa much delimited area of social reality.
In the case of regionalism, this is reflected in the tendency to focus only on theformal, elite level characteristics of regionalism to the point that its other aspects
disappear. For instance, Breslin (2006:27) defines regionalism as “formalized regionswith officially agreed memberships and boundaries that emerge as a result ofintergovernmental dialogues and treaties”, while Higgots (2006:24) defines it as“state-led projects of cooperation that emerge as a result of intergovernmental
dialogues and treaties. In both definitions, there is no suggestion that regionalism
could occur at any level other than the elite’s, which effectively dismisses the notionof a grassroots level regionalism, or regionalism among the people.
The problem of conceptual deflation also occurs with respect to the related
concept of regionalization. In this case, the tendency is to emphasize the role that
economic aspects play in regionalism. Higgots (2006:24) for instance, defines
regionalization as a process of “integration that arise from markets, private trade andinvestments flows and from the policies and decisions of companies rather than thepredetermined plans of national or local governments”, while Breslin (2006:29)
observes that regionalization involves “processes by which societies and economies
become integrated – particularly but not only in the economic sphere”.
In this occasion, however, Breslin adopts a more nuanced tone, noting that
regionalization entails “filling the region with substance” that goes beyond purely the
economic and political. He argues that regionalization also involves the feelings ofcultural belonging and the creation of political trust and ties (Breslin 2006:30). In
other words, an element of regional consciousness is involved in regionalism and byextension regionalization (Terada, 2006:219). This consciousness may be objectively
or subjectively defined. However, as discussed earlier, ‘Asia’ is an idea that is much
more subjective than it is objective. Thus, it would be fair to say that feelings ofregional consciousness in Asia would assume subjective, ‘imagined’ characteristics.11
Working definition of regionalism
However, we should be careful not to overstate the importance of identity andsubjective ties in the process of regionalism and regionalization. Regionalorganizations, especially in Asia, are forged due to the strategic national interests ofmember states that take into account the geopolitical conditions of the region and theworld first rather than a sense of shared belonging. These interests, such as in the caseof the EAC, are often economic in nature, which explains why the economic aspectsof regionalization and regionalism are often stressed.
This is not a new idea. The criterion for membership in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) was not simply whether the country was ‘Asian’ or based in the ‘Pacific’. Geography was aloose and ambiguous criterion. Rather, it was primarily based on the belief in the ethos of a “neo-liberal
economic creed” by member states (Higgotts and Stubbs 1995). This belief forms the thread ofcommon consciousness, or identity for APEC. See however Buszynski who argues against theexistence of shared values or culture in the Asia Pacific (2004, especially chapter 6).
11

4

Yet to completely ignore the ‘softer’ aspects of community building, inparticular the notion of identity and attitudes, especially amongst non-state actors,
could hinder long term efforts towards community building, especially after the hard
aspects (for example economic integration) have taken place.12 For instance, citizens
of individual member states who distrust or hold negative attitudes towards one
another will make it difficult for regional organizations to work effectively on nontraditional security issues that carry a human dimension – like illegal migration andtransnational crime. As Acharya (2006b:81-83), writing in the context of Southeast
Asia observes:
The success or failure of Southeast Asian regionalism is explained not just by
the great power balance, but also by ideational forces; including norms and thepolitics of identity building. Norms and identity matter; while they are not the
only determinants of regionalism in Southeast Asia, they are a central
determinant…while norms do matter, they do not necessarily matter in apositive, progressive manner. They can matter negatively, by creating barriers
or obstacles to change.13
Thus, Hurrell (quoted in Camilerri, 2006:52) fairly notes that regionalism is amultidimensional concept incorporating five aspects: “Regionalization, regionalawareness and identity, regional cohesion, level of cooperation amongst member
states, and state-led effort towards promoting regionalism”. To look at regionalism
requires a comprehensive, balanced analysis of both its formal and informal
conceptualization. A simpler way of phrasing it is that regionalism involves both hard(formal) and soft (informal) aspects. The former refers to regionalism at theinstitutional level which addresses “official” aspects like economy and security, while
the latter refers to a “sense of belonging or feelings of community in a socio-culturalsense—that is, it is a construct associated with identity” (Rumley, 2005:6). At thesame time, it is also important to shift our gaze from discussing regionalism at theelite level to that of non-state actors. As Thomas (2006:5) astutely observes, “If aregional community is to be forged, then it has to go beyond the policy elites toinclude the peoples, societies and nations [of the region].”14
We adopt a multifaceted notion of regionalism as the framework to understandSingaporean students’ perceptions and attitudes towards the idea of Asia as a region
and community. In particular we will be looking closely at the EAC, which is the12

The lack of initiatives or agreements to develop this ‘softer’ aspect of socio-cultural integration isapparent in many instances of regional cooperation, including the EAC. In the context of the EAC, it
has been noted that of its three proposed pillars—economy, politico-security and socio-cultural—thesocio cultural pillar is deemed to be the weakest owing to the focus being on the first two realms(Thomas, 2006:21).
13
The role of norms and identity in regionalism is still a matter of debate in the literature. Scholars likethe late Michael Leifer, who adopts a realist perspective on international relations, generally minimize
their importance, seeing them as being convenient instruments of states. See Liowand Emmers 2006.
14
This view is shared by many other scholars, especially those studying ASEAN. For one, Estanislao(2000:90) has noted that the continued relevance of ASEAN in the future would rest on its “pragmatic
flexibility”. This calls for an expansion of ASEAN’s traditional mandates of high-level political andsecurity issues to issues that are more relevant on the ground level. The new vision is that of the“People’s ASEAN”, where it shifts from “a government-driven regional association to a people-centred
regional community” (ibid:91).

5

proposed regional body driven by the ASEAN+3 countries--countries where our
respondents also hail from. A comparative look would be employed whereappropriate with regards to the issues of regional awareness and identity, regionalcohesion and level of cooperation among likely member states at the people level.
Our paper is divided into three key parts. The first part will discuss the idea of
Asia from the perspective of Singapore students. How do they construct the idea ofAsia? Is Asia a single region with clearly defined borders, or are there further subregions they identify within the geographical boundaries of Asia? The second partwill take a closer look at the extent of Singaporeans’ regional identity andconsciousness by examining how Singapore students identify themselves vis-à-vis
Asia. Finally, the paper will conclude by looking at the hard aspects of regionalism,in particular Singapore students’ attitudes towards economic and security aspects ofregional integration. Before that however, a note about the profile of our respondents
is necessary.
Profile of Respondents
The Global COE Program GIARI collected raw data for its Asian Student
Survey 2008 based on interviews with 453 Singapore students from the National
University of Singapore (NUS) and Nanyang Technological University (NTU). A
parallel data collection was also done in five other countries—South Korea, China,
Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines--to form an Asian dataset. The data were thensubjected to various statistical analyses in SPSS Version 16.0. The Singapore sample
size of n=453, which is comparable to the sample size of respondents in the othercountries surveyed, is large enough for a meaningful exploratory analysis.
49.9 % of the Singaporean respondents were females. 54.1% studied ‘Science’
while the rest studied ‘Arts’. Gender and discipline of study had no bearing on thesurvey results reflected in this paper. More than 90% of the respondents are heavy
users of the Internet, email and mobile phone(to read and write messages), that ismore than 90% made use of these channels and devices ‘almost every day’.15
Being the main language of communications and an official language ofSingapore, it is not surprising that English is proficiently spoken by all the Singapore
respondents. About 93% of the students are either fluent in Mandarin or speak it daily.
This is an important point, as it allows us to infer that an overwhelming majority, if
not all, of the respondents are Chinese Singaporeans. If so, then one shortcoming inthe survey is the under-representation of minority (that is, Indian and Malay) students.
There are very few Singapore students who wield the same level of proficiency in
Korean and Japanese. Most of them indicated that they have “very little” command of
15

Although internet usage is frequently employed as a rough indicator of ‘globalization’, nothingmuch can be inferred from the sample population. NUS’ and NTU’s pedagogies rely heavily on theinternet, especially email systems and dedicated websites, to deliver course-related contents and theuniversities administrative issues. Since other indicators measuring internet usage (such as type ofwebsite surfed, exposure to global websites and news) are not asked, we refrain from making any
further inference in this matter. The heavy use of short message service (SMS) by the respondents is
also not an indicator of anything new, since the use of SMS is also common in third world villages,
where mobile phones have dramatically bypassed the more expensive, unreliable land line systems tobe the preferred communication of choice by both literate (who uses SMS) and illiterate villagers in
isolated areas.

6these Asian languages. The table below summarizes the language profile of theSingapore respondents.
Table 1. Linguistic profile of Singapore respondents
Language
Singapore students who
speak it fluently or use it indaily conversations
English100%
Chinese (Mandarin)
92.9%
Korean0.2%
Japanese
2.0%

PART I
The Idea of Asia: Singapore students’ perspectives
In his analysis of the Asia Pacific region, Buszynski (2004:163) argues that“conceptions of Asia will continue to shape regional responses to the West and will
provide ideological support for notions of Asian regionalism.” It is therefore useful to
uncover Asia as it is being constructed or conceptualized in the minds andimaginations of Singapore students. How do these students characterize Asia, andwhat framework(s) do they use to mark the boundaries of state inclusion andexclusion, so as to differentiate insiders from outsiders in the region (Rumley, 2005:7;
Terada, 2006:219)?
Q: When you hear ‘Asia’ what kind of images do you have?
There are seven dimensions that are available for the respondents to choose inanswering the above question. The seven dimensions are posed as opposing
adjectives at the extremes of a 7-point Likert-scale as follows:
Dirty
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 Clean
Stagnant
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 DevelopingYoung
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 Old
Static1-2-3-4-5-6-7 Dynamic
Homogenous 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 HeterogeneousSafe
1-2-3-4-5-6-7 Dangerous
If we assume that a rank of ‘4’ in the scale above represents ‘neutral,’ and focus on
the top three mean scores; Singapore students on average describe ‘Asia’ as‘Dynamic,’ ‘Heterogeneous’ and ‘Developing’ (see Table 2).
Table 2. “When you hear ‘Asia’, what kind of images do you have?” (Singapore data)
Image of Asia
Dirty (1) vs. Stagnant (1) vs. Young (1) Static (1) vs. Homogeneous (1) vs. Safe (1) vs.
Clean (7)Developing (7) vs. Old (7) Dynamic (7) Heterogeneous (7) Dangerous (7)
Valid

452

448

449

445

436

452

Mean

4.55

5.38

4.16

4.83

4.90

4.08

This comes as little surprise as ‘Asia’ has always been promoted by Singapore
national leaders as the next engine of growth in the world economy. For instance, atthe onset of the American sub-prime crisis, there was a strong belief in the by now
7discredited decoupling theory that despite the US facing a financial crisis, Singapore
will continue to grow, propelled by the engines of China and to some extent, India.
Furthermore, living in a multi-racial society and surrounded by ethnically diverse
neighbours like Malaysia and Thailand, the Singapore respondents have been madewell aware of the heterogeneity of Asia.
But how ‘far’ and ‘deep’ are Singapore students’ concept of ‘heterogeneity’,
and which countries do most have in mind when they speak of Asia as ‘Dynamic’ and‘Developing’? To what extent do these scales of regionalism function as the basis ofinclusion/exclusion?
Q: Which countries are included in your image of Asia?
All the ASEAN member countries are included in the Singapore students’ listof countries of Asia. In fact, there are no anomalies or surprises in the countries listed
as ‘Asia’. The point of interest lies in the exclusion list.
Countries in South and Central Asia are overwhelmingly excluded in this list.
The majority of respondents exclude Afghanistan and Kazakhstan. In the case ofSouth Asia, only India is seen as part of ‘Asia’ by the majority of respondents. 47% of
respondents excluded Sri Lanka while 58% excluded Bangladesh. The other four
countries in South Asia--Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives and Pakistan--were excluded by
78.6%, 62%, 85.4% and 68.2% of the respondents respectively.
Why are South Asian countries with the exception of India (and marginally,
Sri Lanka), excluded as Asia? The first reason could simply be a lack of grasp in
geography. It might be that Singapore students are totally unfamiliar with the locationof--and do not care much about--the countries that seem so ‘far away’. India on theother hand, is immediately recognizable because of its sheer size. Moreover, inschool textbooks, students are often taught that India is one of the most populous
countries in the world.
Furthermore, in the past two to three years, there has been a discernible trend
in Singapore’s foreign policy towards greater engagement of India, such that India is
now mentioned with China in the same breath as emerging Asian giants. In otherwords, India’s recognition could be due to it being increasingly embedded in thepolitical and economic vocabulary of Singapore. Lastly, Indians, constituting about
7% of the population, form a significant minority in Singapore. This could havecontributed to the awareness of India amongst Singapore students.
Yet visibility and geographic familiarity alone does not guarantee theinclusion of a country in Singaporeans’ image of Asia.16 Pakistan, for example, has

16

A note on Maldives: It is a ‘far away’, small country that is relatively unheard of in Singapore,
except in tourism brochures where it is represented in an overwhelmingly singular image –a tourist
paradise with blue waters and white sandy beaches. 85.4% of Singaporeans do not feel that Maldivesis part of Asia. We suspect that this is due to the association that such images do not gel with theirimage of Asia. Recall that Singaporeans are at most, neutral in terms of whether Asia is dirty or clean.
Thus, most would feel that the image of Maldives as a tropical paradise is too ‘clean’ to be seen as partof ‘Asia’.

8received much attention in the media over the past few years 17 due to terrorism,
Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, its delicate relationship with the USA and its
increasingly fraught political environment. Yet it is excluded by close to 7 out of 10
Singapore students.
This implies that Singapore students are relying on criteria other thangeography. This criterion becomes more apparent when we look at the most obvious
anomaly in the data – the fact that only 59.6% of the respondents included North
Korea as part of Asia, compared to 68% for South Korea. The difference accorded tothe two Koreas reveal that an extra-geographical element is involved in deciding
which countries are seen as part of ‘Asia’, especially if these countries are ‘far away’.
Recall that Singapore students are slightly inclined to perceive Asia as‘Dynamic’ and ‘Developing’. In other words, Singapore students tend to see ‘Asia’
within the framework of ‘progress’. North Korea and Pakistan contradicts forcefully
this image. North Korea is by and large portrayed in the media as being governed byan irrational, backward regime with a leader known more for his eccentricities rather
than achievements. Pakistan, as mentioned earlier, is largely portrayed in the media
as an unstable and violent country. To bluntly put it, these countries are seen as‘basket cases’ that do not exhibit any element of ‘progress’.
The same case is also observed for Iran’s exclusion. 77.3% Singapore
respondents do not see Iran as part of Asia. This contradicts Thompson’s (2007)
hypothesis in an earlier study that aims to explain why the majority of Singapore
students tend to include Saudi Arabia as part of Southeast Asia. He conjectures that
this “anomaly” is partly due to the use of “Muslim/Islam” as a criterion in associating
countries. Specifically, he puts forth that Singaporeans hold the perception that they
are a “Chinese” island surrounded by “Muslim neighbours” (Thompson, 2007:282).
His hypothesis does not hold in the present study because we would expect
both Pakistan and Iran, being Muslim countries, to be seen as part of Asia. In fact,beyond Southeast Asia, being ‘Muslim’ seems to exclude a country as ‘Asian’ fromthe perspective of Singapore Chinese students. The framework of ‘progress’ helps to
explain Pakistan’s and, perhaps, likewise Iran’s exclusion. Iran is another country thathas received unfavourable media coverage. It is depicted as a potentially unstablecountry with an irrational leader in the person of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Singapore
students could have classified Iran in the same terms as Pakistan and North Korea,
therefore supporting our hypothesis that the framework of progress influences
Singapore students’ perceptions in this area.
A third factor can also be added. This has to do with the role of “ethnic framesof reference” (Thompson, 2007) in driving perceptions of countries. In his study of
ASEAN member countries, Thompson (2007) notes the role of ethnicity in shaping
perceptions of countries. He observes that Malay Singaporeans, as compared toChinese Singaporeans, tend to view the Philippines as ‘different.’ On the other hand,
Chinese Singaporeans, as compared to Malay Singaporeans, tend to judge Malaysia
and Brunei as ‘different’ (Thompson, 2007:251).
17

Pakistan also made it to the front cover of Economist Magazine in its January 5th 2008 issue with theattention grabbing headline: “The World’s Most Dangerous Place”.

9We have earlier established that there is a high likelihood that the vast
majority of Singapore students in this survey are Chinese. From this perspective,
Singapore students’ image of Asia is really the image of Asia from the lenses ofChinese Singaporeans.18 This occurs because the composition of the sample is suchthat it simply reflects the culture and thinking of the majority, rather than the
Singapore population as a whole. This could partly explain why all the countries inNortheast Asia are included as part of Asia, while most countries in South Asia arenot. This difference could be due to the tendency to see Asia beyond the immediate
region as a place where people look racially similar. Thus, although Singapore
students view Asia as ‘Heterogeneous’, this perception of heterogeneity is limited.
Q: Do you think the following countries have a good or bad influence on you?
One factor that can affect integration is whether citizens of one country feelpositively or negatively about another country. Singapore students in general perceive
China, South Korea and Japan as either a ‘good influence’ or ‘rather good influence’(that is, positive influence) for Singapore. Japan receives the highest score in thismeasure. 81.4% of respondents feel that Japan has a positive influence on Singapore,
followed by South Korea (55%) and China (51.9%).
However, most Singapore students do not see their neighbouring countries as
having positive influence on Singapore. Most respondents choose a neutral response(“Neither good nor bad influence”). Only about 1 out of 5 respondents see Indonesia,
Malaysia and the Philippines as having positive influence on Singapore. 23% of
respondents believe that Vietnam has a positive influence while the response is 34%
for Thailand. Overall, the Southeast Asian countries receive much lower votes ascompared to the favourable ratings obtained by China, South Korea and Japan.
In a paper examining Singapore students’ perception of ASEAN countries,
Thompson (2006:180) describes Singapore’s position as one of “exceptionalism.” Hefound that Singapore students tend to see Singapore as being apart from ASEAN,
rather than as part of it. He further describes Singapore students as preferring to lookto the West and (North) East Asian countries as models to emulate rather than its
immediate neighbourhood. When made to choose an ASEAN country which
Singapore should “try to be like,” they do so grudgingly and believe that Singapore
should not emulate any of the neighbouring countries at all, for it would be a “stepback” (ibid:189). Thompson concludes that the economic-developmental criterion is
the frame of reference uppermost in the minds of Singapore students when choosing
which countries to emulate.19
18

A good analysis of the problems of a Singaporean identity and its relationship with race is provided
by Chua (1998).
19
While Thompson’s research provides valuable insights to the cognitive mapping of countries by
Singaporean students, the economic-developmental criteria alone is insufficient because it does not
explain the position of Malaysia. In Thompson’s study earlier, Singaporean students placed Malaysia
closest to Singapore by virtue of Malaysia being seen as relatively developed compared to other
ASEAN countries. We would expect Malaysia to be seen in a ‘better’ light in the Asian Student Survey
2008 as well. That this is not the case shows a simpler factor at work –the impact of bilateral relations.
Malaysia, together with Indonesia are often portrayed as countries where Singapore foreign policies are
fraught with difficulties. A cursory glance at the Straits Times – Singapore’s sole national newspaper

10Perceptions of countries and regions are often based on the conflation “ofvarious senses of geography, history and ethnological imaginations” (Thompson
2006:192). Singapore students’ imaginings of Asia show that they perceive Asia to be
developing, dynamic and heterogeneous. However, by Asia, they have in mind only
an exclusive number of countries. These countries (with the exception of India) are
the ASEAN member states and countries in Northeast Asia. In short, there is a
conflation of Asia with East Asia (Northeast and Southeast Asia)Thus, in this respect, Singapore students’ regional consciousness of being partof East Asia seems to be strong enough such that it ends up narrowing the idea ofAsia. Furthermore, their perceptions of Asia are partly driven by the idea of progress
and a sense of racial commonalities, such that countries that are ‘backward’ like
Pakistan, Iran and North Korea are excluded or marginally excluded, while countries
where its citizens look ‘different’, like those from South and Central Asia are
excluded. A more specific idea of progress--economic-developmental--may help to
explain why Singapore Chinese students tend to rate Northeast Asian countries morefavourably than Singapore’s immediate neighbours, which are not as economicallydeveloped as Singapore. At this point, we may also speculate that Singapore students
could perhaps feel a sense of closer cultural affinity to Northeast Asia than Southeast
Asia, a point worth investigating in future studies.
A final note should be made about Singapore students’ perceptions of China
before moving on to the next section. Since the 1990s, the Singapore government has
been engaged in efforts to “re-sinicize” Chinese Singaporeans (Tan, 2003:751)
through various measures like the intensive promotion of the ‘Speak Mandarin
Campaign” and the tweaking of the Chinese language syllabus in national schools inorder to produce “a core group of Singaporeans who are steeped in the Chinese
cultural heritage, history, literature and the arts” (Tan, 2003:760). Such an approach isin part driven by motivations to create and maintain cultural affinities with China inorder to reap both economic and political benefits. It stems from the belief that
economically, a sense of ‘Chineseness’ is required to successfully penetrate the China
market. Politically, this stems from geopolitical considerations that it would be
important to maintain close ties with a nation deemed to be an emerging superpower.
However, it seems that more efforts are needed to foster a sense of affinity to China,
as only slightly more than half of Singapore Chinese students (51.9%) feel that China
is a positive influence for Singapore.
This section has discussed in detail Singapore students’ ideas of Asia. The
next sections deal with the issues of identity and integration.
PART II
Regionalism and identity

will reveal that reports on Malaysia and Indonesia tend to focus more, if not exclusively, on negative
news pieces like political problems, crime, corruption and disaster.

11

As mentioned earlier, one of the preoccupations of the East Asia Vision Group(EAVG) and East Asia Study Group (EASG) Reports have to do with issues ofidentity and regional consciousness. The EASG Report recommends that countries“work together with cultural and educational institutions to promote a strong sense ofidentity and an East Asian consciousness” while the EAVG Report recommends the“promotion of a regional identity and consciousness”. What these mean are unclear
and particularly problematic as membership of the EAC has yet to be finalized.
Furthermore, many commentators on Asian regionalism have observed that
the Asian sense of regional awareness and identity is weak. In the context of APEC,
Rumley (2005:5) contends that “what regionalism there has been has been relatively
weak and highly contested.” In the context of ASEAN, Thomas (2006:175) points outthat “ASEAN is an elite-driven institution that does not resonate with the public
consciousness within the ASEAN states, resulting in a shallow ASEAN identity”.
While with respect to the EAC, Blondel (2006:225) wonders, “…the question arises
as to whether the [North] East and Southeast Asian region is culturally united.
Serious doubts can be expressed in this respect.”
Before we could discuss—in the context of the EAC—Thomas’ concern of the“public consciousness”, we need to address Blondel’s questioning remark: Is there
anything in common among the countries that potentially make up the EAC?
Does the EAC possess any common traits?
It is obvious that Northeast and Southeast Asia are culturally diverse. In fact,
this diversity extends beyond the cultural realm to include areas like political systems
and philosophies; as well as the historical experience of individual countries.
However, some commentators have argued that despite these differences, thesecountries share several common traits.
First, most of the countries collectively called East Asia were beneficiaries ofJapanese capital in the late 1980s (Stubbs, 2002:444). This arose after the Plaza
Accord was ratified by Japan, USA, France, United Kingdom and the then West
Germany in 1985. The Plaza Accord allows for the US dollar depreciating against theyen (Acharya, 2000:124), which made Japanese products too expensive to be
manufactured in Japan, resulting in a shift of Japanese capital and manufacturers tolower cost countries; first to its neighbouring countries and later, to Southeast Asia
(Acharya, 2000:125). This in turn compelled Japan to push for greater tradeliberalization to facilitate movement of Japanese goods like spare parts of motor
vehicles across these countries, leading to closer economic integration in the region.
Second, these countries shared similar experiences during the Asian Financial
Crisis of 1997/1998. Stubbs (2002:443) notes that “group identities develop out ofcommon experiences; political actors must act together as a group before they canrecognize the existence of that group”. During the crisis, there emerged a
consciousness that their economies were more closely interconnected than it waspreviously thought, with the crisis which started in Thailand spreading to South Korea.
Reactions to the crisis by the US and Europe also created the perception that the‘West’ was not deeply concerned with the fate of the Asian countries. Lee Kuan Yew,
then Singapore’s Senior Minister, observes:12

…there have been developments showing that neither Europe nor America has
the same level of interest in the rapid recovery or the wellbeing of the Asian
countries that have been hit as much as Japan or even China does…You seethat we have more interest in each other’s well-beings than do Europeans oreven Americans. (quoted in Terada, 2006:225)
It is this sense of shared experiences during the crisis that facilitates the creation of theEAC (see also Higgott, 2006; Terada, 2006; and Camilerri, 1999).
Third, it is believed that these countries have values that make them ‘different’
from the ‘West’. The belief in the existence of a common ‘Asian values’; whichstresses, amongst others, the importance of duties over rights and the primacy ofcommunalism over individualism remains a debatable proposition. Buszynski(2004:143) for instance, points out that
Asian values fell victim to Asian diversity as there was a proliferation of ideas
and opinions as to what those values were. Asia had no common value system,as Lee Kuan Yew referred to Chinese East Asia while Mahathir wasconcerned about Islam, and even the role of the family that Lee Kuan Yew
referred to was not specifically Asian but universal.
It is not the purpose of this essay to articulate the debate. Nonetheless,perceptions and imaginings of shared attitudes are often enough for group formation.
Buszynski (2004:160) contends that “assumptions of a shared Asianness served as
ideological underpinning for [Asian regionalism]” while Acharya (2000:99),
paraphrasing Anderson, notes that “regionalism came to represent an imaginedcommunity underpinned by its organizing myths and principles”.
But moving away from an elite-level viewpoint, one may ask to what extent, if
any, is there regional consciousness amongst non-state actors? Data from the Asian
Student Survey 2008 provide a good opportunity to tease out aspects of thisconsciousness from the perspective of Singapore students. But first how do we
operationalize ‘regional consciousness’?
Operationalizing ‘regional consciousness’
A regional consciousness is by definition trans-national, an identification
beyond the “imagined community” of the nation to include “the otherness of theother” into one’s imagination (Beck, 2002:17). This “dialogic imagination,” says
Beck, centrally characterizes one’s cosmopolitanization, or the extent to which one
internalizes globalization in one’s everyday living. This is opposed to the ‘monologic
imagination’ of the national perspective, which Beck (2002:17) contends as“exclud[ing] the otherness of the other” by only looking at the nation-state as “Self”.
Dialogic imagination, on the other hand, includes that notion of otherness in one’s
everyday living and consciousness.
In looking at regional consciousness, we are narrowing the scope of thiscosmopolitanization from the global to the Asian region. The “other,” in this case,therefore specifically refers to the other countries in Asia. Thus, we operationalize
13

regional consciousness in terms of Singapore students’ sense of identity andbelonging towards ‘Asia’. Where appropriate, we will contrast the Singapore datawith results from other countries.
Sense of Identity and Belonging
Sense of Self vis-à-vis Community
Singapore students, like their counterparts from other Asian countries, hold amultiplicity of identities. The majority of Singapore students see themselves as‘world citizens’, ‘Asians’, ‘Singaporeans’, ‘members of their local community’ and‘autonomous individuals’. This implies what Beck (2002:19), in his cosmopolitanism
thesis, calls “the pluralization of borders”, more specifically, “the pluralization ofnation-state borders or the implosion of the dualism between the national and theinternational.”
However, not all “borders” are seen with the same degree of identification.
From the survey data, most Singapore students see themselves in light of the first four
identities, implying that their sense of identity is largely defined vis-à-vis a broader(imagined) community which they see themselves being part of (see Table 3). Theirrelational sense of identity therefore follows Buszynski’s (2004:4) definition as “anunderstanding of self and one’s place in this world relative to others; it is a group’s
image of itself in relation to the external world providing its members with a sense of
relatedness” (emphasis ours). It is also evident that in cosmopolitan societies like
Singapore, this notion of “the external world” has expanded beyond the confines of
the nation states to include the others in the region and the world as part of one’s“imagined community”.
Table 3. Multiple Identities adopted by Singapore students, ranked by salience(Combined percentage of respondents who “Agree” and “Strongly agree” with eachidentity)
Identity
Percentage
Rank“I see myself as part of my country”
96.0%
1“I see myself as part of local community”
93.7%
2“I see myself as part of Asia”
90.1%
3“I see myself as a world citizen”
70.3%
4“I see myself as an autonomous individual”
57.2%
5
Table 4. Multiple Identities adopted by Asian students, ranked by salience (Combined
percentage of respondents who “Agree” and “Strongly Agree” with each identity)
Identity
Percentage
Rank“I see myself as part of my country”
97.7%
1“I see myself as part of Asia”
92.7%
2“I see myself as a world citizen”
88.2%
3“I see myself as part of local community”
87.2%
4“I see myself as an autonomous individual”
68.1%
5“I see myself as part of Asia”
As seen in Table 3, 9 out of 10 Singapore students identify themselves as partof Asia, a trend that is also mirrored in all other Asian countries surveyed (Asian
average=92.7%). However, the intensity of Singaporean students’ identification with
Asia is rather weak. On the attitude scale where ‘1’ expresses strong agreement and14‘4’ strong disagreement, Singapore students score almost ‘2’ (1.92) as compared to
the Asian average of 1.76 (See Table 5). Likewise, going by percentage distribution,
only 18.9% of Singapore respondents ‘strongly agree’ to see themselves as part ofAsia, which is considerably lower than the overall Asian average of 31.9% (See Table
6).
Table 5. “I see myself as part of Asia”—Means comparison(1-“strongly agree”, 4-“strongly disagree”)
Country

MeanSouth Korea

1.79

China

1.81

Vietnam

1.73

Thailand

1.67

Philippines

1.62

Singapore

1.92

Total

1.76

Table 6. “I see myself as part of Asia”—Percentage distribution
Q10d I see myself as part of Asia

CountrySouth Korea
China
VietnamThailandPhilippines
Singapore
Total

Strongly
Agree

Agree

DisagreeStrongly
Disagree

Total

106

264

22

1

393

27.0%

67.2%

5.6%

.3%

100.0%

120

240

38

2

400

30.0%

60.0%

9.5%

.5%

100.0%

135

239

24

1

399

33.8%

59.9%

6.0%

.3%

100.0%

167

200

30

3

400

41.8%

50.0%

7.5%

.8%

100.0%

165

222

12

1

400

41.2%

55.5%

3.0%

.2%

100.0%

83

312

36

7

438

18.9%

71.2%

8.2%

1.6%

100.0%

776

1477

162

15

2430

31.9%

60.8%

6.7%

.6%

100.0%The point of interest here is not the observation that the majority of Singapore(Chinese) respondents feel themselves to be part of Asia; rather, what could explain
the ‘lukewarm’ identification, or the very low figure for ‘Strongly Agree’? This isparticularly interesting sociologically in the case of Singapore, where the state, since
independence, has tried to socially engineer culture by emphasizing ‘Asia-ness’. In
particular, the Singapore state has been promoting for decades a neo-Confucianist
ethos that has been formally enshrined in the form of ‘Shared Values’20 since 1991.
These ‘values’, in turn, have been taught to all students at the primary level. As such,
we would expect a strong sense of identification with Asia by the population understudy. That this is not the case makes for an interesting topic for further study.
20

The Shared Values are (a) Nation before community and society above self, (b) Family as the basic
unit of society, (c)Community support and respect for the individual, (d)Consensus, not conflict and (e)Racial and religious harmony.

15

Despite the ‘lukewarm’ subjective identification, Singapore students
undeniably identify with the region, that is, Asia, to some extent. What is their visionof the Asian identity, and how important do they perceive it to be?
Asian identity and Asian citizenshipSingapore students are rather ambivalent on whether Asia lacks an identity,
with equal proportions of respondents being split between agreeing or strongly
agreeing, and disagreeing or strongly disagreeing. However, the majority of themassign considerable importance to growing Asian identity and fostering an Asian
citizenship in Asia (See Table 7). We found that Singapore students’ sense of
belonging to Asia has moderately positive correlation with their vision of fostering
Asian citizenship (gamma=.357, p=.00) and the importance they place on growing an
Asian identity (gamma=.345, p=.00). These data statistically support our earlier
hypothesis that Singapore students’ sense of belonging to Asia positively correlateswith their regional consciousness (that is, inclination towards building greater Asian
identity and citizenship).21
Table 7. Singapore students’ vision of Asian identity
Q12d. We should foster the concept of Asian citizenship
Strongly Agree Agree

DisagreeStrongly Disagree Total

46

152

195

33

426

10.8%

35.7%

45.8%

7.7%

100.0%

Q12e. Asia is lacking its own identity
Strongly Agree Agree
Disagree Strongly Disagree Total
62

300

68

5

435

14.3%

69.0%

15.6%

1.1%

100.0%

Q7d. Stability in Asia: Growth of Asian identity
Somewhat Not really
Very important
Not important at all Total
important important
190
198
54
6
448
42.4%
44.2%
12.1%
1.3%
100.0%

An interesting variation is observed among the Northeast (South Korea andChina) and Southeast Asian (Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore) sub-regionsin their views on Asian identity (or the lack thereof) and the related vision of fosteringan Asian citizenship.22 There is strong and significant correlation between sub-region
and Asian identity (gamma=.608, p=.00), as well as sub-region and vision of Asian
citizenship (gamma= -.334, p=.00).
The variations of responses across sub-regions are insightful: in a scale where‘1’ denotes strong agreement and ‘4’ denotes strong disagreement, Southeast Asians
score closer to ‘3’ (‘disagree’) while Northeast Asians score closer to ‘2’ (‘agree’) that
Asia is lacking its own identity. Correspondingly, about 7 out of 10 Northeast Asian21

The correlation between the two measures—“growing Asian identity” and “fostering Asian
citizenship”—is moderately positive and statistically significant (gamma=.356, p=.00).
22
The two measures of identity and citizenship are analyzed together here because they are intuitively
pertaining to the concept of identity and belonging in Asia. Despite this, we find only very weak but
significant correlation between the two measures (gamma=.054, p=.000). Nevertheless, there is amoderately positive and significant correlation between growing Asian identity and fostering Asian
citizenship (gamma=.295, p=.000).

16

students feel that Asia lacks its own identity, while almost the same proportion of
their Southeast Asian counterparts believe otherwise—that Asia does have a
distinctive identity of its own (See Table 8).
The majority of Southeast Asian students (85.8%) are therefore keen to takethis a step further and ‘formalize’ this common identity into a common Asian
citizenship. On the other hand, only about one in three East Asian respondents share
this view, while about two in three of them are not interested in fostering the conceptof an Asian citizenship. Correspondingly, the Southeast Asians show stronger
agreement (mean=1.93) than the Northeast Asians (mean=2.20) on the notion of
fostering an Asian citizenship (See Table 9).
Table 8. Asia is lacking its own identity‘1’=strongly agree’ and ‘4’=strongly disagree
Strongly Agree Agree
Disagree Strongly Disagree Total
Sub-region
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Northeast Asia 133
16.9%Southeast Asia 137
8.4%

Mean

433

205

17

788

54.9%

26.0%

2.2%

100.0% 2.13

372

739

376

1624

22.9%

45.5%

23.2%

100.0% 2.83

Table 9. We should foster the concept of Asian citizenship
1’=strongly agree’ and ‘4’=strongly disagree
Sub-region

Strongly Agree(1)

Northeast Asia 118
15.2%
Southeast Asia 363
22.3%

Mean

Agree
(2)

Disagree Strongly Disagree Total
(3)
(4)

413

216

29

776

53.2%

27.8%

3.7%

100.0% 2.20

1033

216

16

1628

63.5%

13.3%

1.0%

100.0% 1.93

Despite the difference in perception however, almost all respondents (91.4%)
across countries (and sub-regions) concur that the growth of Asian identity isnecessary (either very important or somewhat important) to maintain stability in Asia.
The same sentiment is expressed by 86.6% Singapore students. This is reflected in
the Table 10 below.
Having discussed their sense of regionalism in this section, we would look at
Singapore students’ identification of self as part of their countries in the following
section.23 This would allow us to gauge their sense of national and global identity,and how these compare with their sense of regional consciousness.
“I see myself as Singaporean”
Singapore students’ sense of regional identity ranks slightly behind theirnational identity. In fact, identification of self as part of the nation appears to be themost salient identity among the respondents from all countries surveyed. Practically23

Almost all Singaporeans also identify themselves as part of their local community (see Table 3).
However, it is difficult to pin down exactly how the respondents interpret the idea of the local
community—which could refer to ethnic group, geographical proximity, village of origin, linguistic
group, religious group, etc. We are therefore hesitant in drawing too much conclusion from thisparticular question because of the likelihood of the different interpretations among respondents.

17

all Singapore students (96.0%), mirroring their counterparts in other Asian countries,
see themselves first and foremost as part of their own country (see Table 3 and Table
4 earlier). However, it is interesting to note that the Singapore students’ sense ofnational identity does not seem to be particularly strong. 45.1% Singapore students
strongly see themselves as part of their country, which is slightly lower than the Asian
average of 57.1% (See Table 11). There is also no variation across gender in the
Singapore case, which is somewhat surprising given the consistent rhetoric by thestate that compulsory national service for all Singapore males will lead to a stronger
sense of national identity.
Table 10. Growth of Asian identity
Q7d Stability in Asia: Growth of Asian identity
CountrySouth Korea
China
VietnamThailandPhilippines
Singapore
Total

Very
importantSomewhat Not really
important important

Not at allimportant

Total

240

148

18

4

410

58.5%

36.1%

4.4%

1.0%

100.0%

171

179

42

3

395

43.3%

45.3%

10.6%

.8%

100.0%

185

183

28

4

400

46.2%

45.8%

7.0%

1.0%

100.0%

192

178

27

3

400

48.0%

44.5%

6.8%

.8%

100.0%

282

94

22

2

400

70.5%

23.5%

5.5%

.5%

100.0%

190

198

54

6

448

42.4%

44.2%

12.1%

1.3%

100.0%

1260

980

191

22

2453

51.4%

40.4%

7.8%

.9%

100.0%A caveat needs to be sounded at this point. An earlier study by Singapore’s
Institute of Policy Studies on national pride find that Singaporeans are generally “veryproud” of their country, ranking second in the Chicago’s National Opinion ResearchCentre (NORC) worldwide list of 23 nations. 25 The study notes that university
students in Singapore tend to have the least national pride as compared to their lesseducated counterparts. In the same study, it is also observed that Singapore Chinese,whom we infer to be the majority respondents in this present study, have relatively
lower pride in their country as compared to the Malay and the Indian minorities in
Singapore. As such, the level of national identification in Singapore could not be
accurately measured by the present sample, which only focuses on university students
and fails to fairly represent the ethnic diversity in Singapore.

25

The national pride was measured by a 5-items survey on attitudes and perceptions about Singapore ascompared to other countries, which includes questions like “I would rather be a citizen of Singapore
than of any other country in the world” and “Generally speaking, Singapore is a better country thanmost other countries.” See http://www.ips.org.sg/press/Press%20%20Citizens%20and%20the%20Nation.htm

18

Table 11. I see myself as part of [your country]
Q10c I see myself as part of [your country]

Country

Strongly AgreeSouth Korea
China
VietnamThailandPhilippines
Singapore
Total

Agree

Strongly
DisagreeDisagree

Total

211

188

9

1

409

51.6%

46.0%

2.2%

.2%

100.0%

228

162

9

1

400

57.0%

40.5%

2.2%

.2%

100.0%

253

142

5

0

400

63.2%

35.5%

1.2%

.0%

100.0%

289

105

6

0

400

72.2%

26.2%

1.5%

.0%

100.0%

220

172

6

2

400

55.0%

43.0%

1.5%

.5%

100.0%

203

229

14

4

450

45.1%

50.9%

3.1%

.9%

100.0%

1404

998

49

8

2459

57.1%

40.6%

2.0%

.3%

100.0%

I see myself as a world citizen
It is worth noting that the idea of world citizenry does not hold a strong appeal
to a great many Singapore students, as compared to those who identified themselves
as being part of Singapore and Asia. From Table 12, it appears that only 7 out of 10
Singapore students see themselves as world citizens, as compared to the Asian
average of close to 9 out of 10. Furthermore, in a scale where 1 denotes strong
agreement and 4 strong disagreement, the mean score of Singaporeans (2.26) tilts
more towards ambivalence between agreement and disagreement to being world
citizen. The average Asian student, however, squarely agrees with this statement, as
reflected in the mean score of 1.94.
There appears to be a contradiction here, because there is a tendency to
associate being Singaporean—being a citizen of a global city that embraces
cosmopolitanism in various ways—with being ‘global minded’. Singaporeans arealso frequent travelers: 95.6% Singapore students in this survey have been to a foreigncountry, which is the highest among all countries surveyed and almost double the
Asian students’ average of 54.6% (see Table 13). Thus, it appears that being abroad
alone is not indicative of one being globally-oriented. This contradiction merits
further research in this area, especially along the line of cosmopolitanism.
Table 12. I see myself as a world citizen: Percentage distribution and
Mean comparison ‘1’=strongly agree, ‘4’=strongly disagree
Q10a I see myself as a world citizen
Country
Singapore
Total

Strongly
Agree
(1)
28
6.6%

Agree
(2)
270
63.7%

Disagree
(3)
112
26.4%

Strongly
Disagree
(4)
14
3.3%

Total
424
100.0%

696

1435

250

34

2415

28.8%

59.4%

10.4%

1.4%

100.0%

19

Mean
2.26
1.84

Table 13. Have you been to a foreign country?

CountrySouth Korea

Yes

No
279

68.0%
China

69
17.2%

Vietnam84
21.0%

Thailand

297
74.2%

Philippines

184
46.0%

Singapore
Total

433

Total
131

410

32.0% 100.0%
331

400

82.8% 100.0%
316

400

79.0% 100.0%
103

400

25.8% 100.0%
216

400

54.0% 100.0%
20

453

95.6%

4.4% 100.0%

1346

1117

54.6%

45.4% 100.0%

2463

Sectional summary
One of the goals in both the East Asia Vision Group and East Asia Study
Group Reports was the creation of an East Asian identity and consciousness. A
condition for this to occur is to in the first place inculcate a sense of belonging to Asia.
This sense of belonging, of course, takes the form of many subjective imaginings, thesubstance and form of which lies beyond the scope of the survey. Nonetheless, when
asked at a basic level, a majority of Singapore students feel themselves to be part ofAsia.
In an earlier section, we have pointed out that Singapore students’ idea of Asia
overwhelmingly excludes South and Central Asian countries, and predominantly
include countries of Southeast and Northeast Asia. These also happened to be theASEAN + 3 countries which are driving efforts to build the EAC. Although wecannot objectively link these two strands of results together for lack of appropriate
data, we can cautiously infer at this point that Singapore students feel a sense of
belonging to East Asia (Southeast and Northeast Asia),though the intensity of thisbelonging is not strong.
Furthermore, there is a gulf between students in Northeast Asia and Southeast
Asia. The latter are more positively inclined towards believing that Asia has its own
distinct identity while the former is less so. Thus, overall, identity building efforts bystate actors need to take into account both national and sub-regional differences.
Also, two interesting sociological observations can be made for the Singapore
data. State-led efforts to create an Asian identity for Singaporeans through various
means seem to have a mixed impact. In an earlier section, we have noted that despite
concentrated investments to create cultural affinities with China for various reasons,only slightly more than half of Singapore students feel that China has a positive
influence for Singapore.

20

The data used in this analysis reveal that about one in five Singaporean
students ‘strongly agree’ that they are part of Asia. This low figure seems to suggestthat government efforts since the 1970s to instill in the population a sense of Asianess by various means have not translated into producing a large number of a younger
population who strongly identify themselves with Asia. Perhaps, multiple indicators
measuring different aspects of this idea are necessary to help us make more sense ofthis information, which for now looks mixed.
Second, Singapore has been geographically described as a global city state notsimply due to its size and the collapse between the national/local. One other defining
feature of a global city state is the projection of its hinterland to the region and beyond(Olds and Yeung, 2004:507). It is the orientation beyond the national and towards theglobal that makes Singapore ‘cosmopolitan’. We would therefore expect a large
number of Singaporean students to strongly agree to define themselves as ‘world
citizens’. However, less than 7% of respondents did so.
This could be because of two reasons. First, the phrase ‘world citizen’ might
have sounded ambiguous, thus, to err on the side of caution, respondents chose a lessdefinitive response. On the other hand, it could also be that they genuinely do not feel
globally oriented. Thus, it would be interesting to investigate this discrepancy further.
But if we take the current results at face value, they suggest that in the context ofSingapore, the creation of a regional identity would not compete with the ‘global’;rather, it would have to compete, cooperate and complement the ‘local’ (that is,national identity).
Proponents of globalization tend to take a simplistic approach in viewing thenation and the region. They tend to express what, in actual fact, are complex anddialectical interactions between the local, regional and global as a zero sum game;whereby the nation-state and, hence, national identity are seen to be weakened by
globalization. Regionalism, on the other hand, is seen to be a threat to globalization bycreating regional blocs that inhibit the globalizing process. However, national identity,
regionalism and globalization are “complementary processes (that) occur
simultaneously and interact” (Rumley, 2005:8). If we take the current results at facevalue, they suggest that in the context of Singapore, the creation of a regional identity
will have to compete, cooperate and complement with the stronger tug of national
identity, and less with a global identity.
The next section discusses the ‘hard’ or formal aspects of regionalism in theform of economic and security cooperation.
PART III
Regionalism and Integration
While it would certainly be beneficial, scholars note that the sharing of norms
and values need not be a prerequisite for cooperation to take place. As Buszynski(2004:134) points out,
cultural commonalities within the context of a natural region may not be
required for the successful implantation of cooperative institutional structures.
21

Patterns of economic and security interaction between states may be morereliable guides to cooperative behavior than cultural commonality.
It is unclear what Buszynski (2004) means by “natural region” as ‘region’ is asubjective construction based on various layers of imaginings. Nonetheless, he makes
an important point by highlighting the importance of economic and security issues infacilitating, even pushing (culturally diverse) states towards regional cooperation. In
other words, the formal or ‘hard’ aspects of regionalism tend to lead to greater
chances of integration.
Cooperation is an existential concern of any transnational organization. States
have to agree to move beyond national interests and find a convergence, orcompromise on issues that would permit actors from different states to cooperate witheach other. Thus, individual members of a regional organization need to form aconcert, which “requires from its members a commitment to common goals andpolicies while at the same permitting members to pursue their own specific interests”(Vayrynen, 2003:29).
In this section, we will focus on two areas of cooperation—economic andsecurity. Economic and security issues are also identified in the EASG and EAVG
Reports as important areas of cooperation.26 We will examine Singapore students’attitudes towards economic integration as well as their perceptions of the kinds ofissues they consider to be key threats to Singapore and the world. If the framework ofdevelopment forms their basis of the cognitive mapping of Asia, it stands to reason
that the Asian regionalism, from the perspective of Singapore students at least, would
be driven, among others, by the goal of economic development. We will also compare
their responses with students from other countries to assess whether or not there aresome common interests, goals and a sense of shared future at the students level.27
Economic Cooperation
Table 14. Perceptions on the impact of Economic integration” (Singapore data)
Q11b Economic integration: Greater income inequality
Strongly Agree Agree

DisagreeStrongly Disagree Total

39

208

137

8

392

9.9%

53.1%

34.9%

2.0%

100.0%

Q11c Economic integration: Enrich our life
Strongly Agree Agree

DisagreeStrongly Disagree Total

42

68

2

279

26

391

As mentioned earlier, out of the 26 recommendations made in the EASG Report, eleven deal witheconomic issues. With regards to security cooperation, the EASG Report recommends strengthening“mechanisms for cooperation on non-traditional security issues”. This seems to be a dilution and amore cautious approach to the earlier EAVG Report that recommends “establishing and strengtheningof mechanisms for addressing threats to peace in the region”.
27
Scholars like Beck (2002) argue that trans-national cooperation in the age of globalization could not
be based on values stemming from a shared past, but in common goals for a shared future. This seems
to be what ASEAN was alluding to in its People’s Declaration, which states that “Aware that our
diversity has not undermined the reality of our shared destiny” (Institute of Strategic and Development
Studies, 2003, cited in Delanty and He, 2008:340).

22

Table 14. Perceptions on the impact of Economic integration” (Singapore data)
Q11b Economic integration: Greater income inequality
Strongly Agree Agree

DisagreeStrongly Disagree Total

39

208

137

8

392

10.7%

71.4%

17.4%

.5%

100.0%

Q11f Economic integration: Destroy domestic economies
Strongly Agree Agree

DisagreeStrongly Disagree Total

15

134

208

23

380

3.9%

35.3%

54.7%

6.1%

100.0%

Q11g Economic integration: Benefit only multinationals
Strongly Agree Agree

DisagreeStrongly Disagree Total

13

109

236

36

394

3.3%

27.7%

59.9%

9.1%

100.0%

Table 15. “Is economic inequality a threat to your country?”
Country% Yes
South Korea
84.6
China
74
Vietnam
45.2
Thailand78
Philippines
79.8
Singapore
61.8

In terms of economic integration, while most Singapore students believe
economic integration will create income inequality (63.0% “Agree” or “Strongly
Agree”) and that the latter is a threat to Singapore (61.8% “Agree” or “Strongly
Agree”), they also believe that economic integration will “enrich our lives” (82.1%“Agree” or “Strongly Agree”). This seems to suggest that Singapore students feel they
will not fall ‘victims’ to the impact of economic integration but will instead benefit
from it. The positive attitude of Singapore students towards economic integration isperhaps unsurprising, given Singapore’s open-ness and exposure to globalization.
Consistently, the majority of Singapore students (60.8%) do not believe that greater
economic interdependence will hurt domestic economies, while 58.3% do not view it
as only benefiting the multinationals.
Furthermore, the majority of respondents in all countries believe that
economic integration will “enrich our lives” (see Table 16), and that economic
development is ‘very important’ for the stability of Asia (see Table 17). We believethat the operating factor at work here is class.
A discernible trend from the early 1990s onwards was the emergence of a
middle class in Asia (see for instance Birdsall, 2000; Rohwer, 1995; Robinson, 1995;
and Katzenstein and Shiraishi, 2006). This middle class has been created andsustained by decades of economic growth in countries characterised by“interventionist, facilitative, or developmental states [which] emphasized exportoriented industrial development” (Stubbs, 2002: 445). Although the class backgroundof the respondents are not reflected in the survey, it seems likely that most of theuniversity students surveyed would have a middle class background, or aspire towards

23

middle class status once armed with university qualifications, which could explain
their favourable views of economic integration.
Table 16. “Economic integration will enrich our life”
Q11c Economic integration: Enrich our life

CountrySouth Korea
China
VietnamThailandPhilippines
Singapore
Total

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Strongly
DisagreeDisagree

Total

26

227

108

11

372

7.0%

61.0%

29.0%

3.0%

100.0%

35

275

72

10

392

8.9%

70.2%

18.4%

2.6%

100.0%

130

257

10

2

399

32.6%

64.4%

2.5%

.5%

100.0%

60

258

79

3

400

15.0%

64.5%

19.8%

.8%

100.0%

55

266

67

6

394

14.0%

67.5%

17.0%

1.5%

100.0%

42

279

68

2

391

10.7%

71.4%

17.4%

.5%

100.0%

348

1562

404

34

2348

14.8%

66.5%

17.2%

1.4%

100.0%

Table 17. Economic development is important to maintain stability in Asia
Q7c Stability in Asia: Economic development
CountrySouth Korea
China
VietnamThailandPhilippines
Singapore
Total

Very
importantSomewhat
important

Not really
important

Not at allimportant

232

159

14

5

410

56.6%

38.8%

3.4%

1.2%

100.0%

312

81

5

2

400

78.0%

20.3%

1.3%

.5%

100.0%

295

98

7

0

400

73.8%

24.5%

1.8%

.0%

100.0%

292

102

6

0

400

73.0%

25.5%

1.5%

.0%

100.0%

366

30

3

1

400

91.5%

7.5%

.8%

.3%

100.0%

288

154

7

0

449

64.1%

34.3%

1.6%

.0%

100.0%

Total

1785

624

42

8

2459

72.6%

25.4%

1.7%

.3%

100.0%

It is therefore not surprising that there is an overwhelming agreement among
all respondents that economic integration will be a foundation for building an East
Asian Community (Charts 1 and 2), although it seems that the respondents are being
more cautious in predicting the establishment of EAC by 2020. There is also some24variation among respondents across sub-regions with regards to economic integration
being the cornerstones of EAC. As evident in Tables 18 and 19, the Northeast Asian
countries have more respondents disagreeing that economic integration would be thefoundation of the EAC. Compared to the Southeast Asian respondents, the Northeast
Asians are also less optimistic, even ambivalent, that the EAC could be established by
2020.
Chart 1.

Chart 2.

Table 18. Economic integration as foundation for the EAC
Q13a Econ. Integration foundation for East Asian Comm.
CountrySouth Korea
China
VietnamThailandPhilippines
Singapore
Total

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Disagree Disagree

Total

39

275

71

5

390

10.0%

70.5%

18.2%

1.3%

100.0%

56

266

60

9

391

14.3%

68.0%

15.3%

2.3%

100.0%

147

234

16

0

397

37.0%

58.9%

4.0%

.0%

100.0%

65

300

34

1

400

16.2%

75.0%

8.5%

.2%

100.0%

47

321

29

2

399

11.8%

80.5%

7.3%

.5%

100.0%

46

292

34

3

375

12.3%

77.9%

9.1%

.8%

100.0%

400

1688

244

20

2352

17.0%

71.8%

10.4%

.9%

100.0%

25

Table 19. Possibility of establishing East Asian Community by 2020
Q13b Possible to establish East Asian Community by
2020
Country
South
Korea
China
VietnamThailandPhilippines
Singapore
Total

Strongly
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Disagree Disagree

Total

29

162

156

19

366

7.9%

44.3%

42.6%

5.2%

100.0%

16

197

156

15

384

4.2%

51.3%

40.6%

3.9%

100.0%

74

217

86

7

384

19.3%

56.5%

22.4%

1.8%

100.0%

32

289

73

6

400

8.0%

72.2%

18.2%

1.5%

100.0%

37

228

118

14

397

9.3%

57.4%

29.7%

3.5%

100.0%

32

207

77

8

324

9.9%

63.9%

23.8%

2.5%

100.0%

220

1300

666

69

2255

9.8%

57.6%

29.5%

3.1%

100.0%

Security Cooperation
This section will look at the top three28 ‘threats’ as selected by the majority of
the Singapore students and compare them with the other countries in the survey.
Aging Population
The aging of population is seen as a threat by the most number ofSingaporeans, a perception shared only in South Korea. A government statistic
reveals that 1 out of 5 Singaporeans will be 65 years and older by 2030, up from 1 in
12 today 29 . This demographic change in Singapore society is quite evident at the
everyday level. The awareness of this problem is further reinforced by the state via
campaigns aimed at encouraging employers to hire older workers, as well as
initiatives like the multi million dollar ‘Council for Third Age’—a public-private
partnership that promotes holistic wellness for elderly through active ageing.
Table 20. Is the aging of population a threat to your country?
Country% Yes
South Korea
64.9
China
35.2
Vietnam
11.5
Thailand
23.0
Philippines
12.2
Singapore
77.0
28This will exclude ‘income inequality’, which had been discussed in the earlier section.
See Ministry of Community, Youth and Sports of Singapore, ‘Report on Ageing Population’ at
http://www.mcys.gov.sg/successful_ageing/index.html
29

26

Terrorism
73.7% of Singapore students feel that terrorism is a threat to Singapore. In thisrespect, there is a great gulf between the East Asian countries and ASEAN countries30
on the threat of terrorism. The majority of students from ASEAN countries cite
‘Terrorism’ as a threat but only 12% of South Korean students and 6.5% of students
from China did so. The reason may be quite simple. Southeast Asia is one of thefronts against the ‘war’ on terror, with terror networks like the Jemaah Islamiyah
being indigenous in this region.
Of key interest, however, are the attitudes towards ‘Religious
Fundamentalism’. Given the increased media coverage of Islam and its perceived
association with violence and acts of terror, we would expect a correlation between‘Terrorism’ and ‘Religious Fundamentalism,’ that is, given that the majority of
respondents cite ‘Terrorism’ as a threat, we would expect the majority to cite
‘Religious Fundamentalism’ as a threat too. However, the complete opposite occurs.
In every country surveyed, ‘Religious Fundamentalism’ is cited as a threat only by asmall proportion of students, as reflected in the table below. This discrepancy
suggests that university students are able to ‘filter’ out media images and delinked
religion from acts of terror.
Table 21. Is terrorism a threat to your country?
CountrySouth Korea
China
VietnamThailandPhilippines
Singapore

% Yes
12
6.5
Not asked
77.5
82.2
73.7

Environment
Environmental destruction is a non-traditional security issue (Bedeski, 2000).
The majority of Singapore students consider this to be a threat, but the numbers are
overwhelmingly higher in the other countries surveyed. Later, when asked to decide,from a list of five options, which one is deemed to be the “greatest threat to theworld”, most students from Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam and South
Korea chose “Pollution and other environmental problems” (See Table 23).
Table 22. Is environmental destruction a threat to your country?
Country% Yes

South Korea
China
VietnamThailandPhilippines
Singapore

30

73.9
87.2
80.2
81.8
87.8
61.6

This question was not asked in Vietnam.

27

Table 23. Danger that poses the greatest threat to the world
Q9 Danger that poses the greatest threat to the world
Country
Religiousand ethnic
hatredAIDS and
other
infectious
diseases

73

88

22

127

95

405

18.0%

21.7%

5.4%

31.4%

23.5%

100.0%

118

58

19

99

106

400

29.5%

14.5%

4.8%

24.8%

26.5%

100.0%

113

55

45

146

41

400

28.3%

13.8%

11.3%

36.5%

10.3%

100.0%

37

103

16

206

38

400

9.3%

25.8%

4.0%

51.5%

9.5%

100.0%

68

42

14

145

131

400

17.0%

10.5%

3.5%

36.3%

32.8%

100.0%

115

110

48

122

53

448

25.7%

24.6%

10.7%

27.2%

11.8%

100.0%

Spread ofnuclearweapons
South Korea
China
VietnamThailandPhilippines
Singapore
Total

Pollution&environm Growing gap
ental
between richproblems& poor

Total

524

456

164

845

464

2453

21.4%

18.6%

6.7%

34.4%

18.9%

100.0%

Table 24. Who should decide on policies pertaining to the issues ofenvironmental protection?
Q8b Deciding policies: Protection of the environment
CountrySouth Korea
China
VietnamThailandPhilippines
Singapore
Total

National
governments

Regional
Internationalorganizations organizations

Total

153

83

169

405

37.8%

20.5%

41.7%

100.0%

159

66

175

400

39.8%

16.5%

43.8%

100.0%

164

85

150

399

41.1%

21.3%

37.6%

100.0%

111

100

189

400

27.8%

25.0%

47.3%

100.0%

194

69

136

399

48.6%

17.3%

34.1%

100.0%

131

89

226

446

29.4%

20.0%

50.7%

100.0%

912

492

1045

2449

37.2%

20.1%

42.7%

100.0%

This option had the third highest response in China, which is only 5% lower
than the issue seen as the greatest threat in China by most respondents: the spread of
nuclear weapons. This suggests that environmental problems are deemed to be a very
serious threat by the majority of all students surveyed.
At the same time, only about 20% of students across countries believe that thisproblem is best tackled by regional organizations. We can infer that they have28

relatively low confidence in the ability of regional bodies to deal with the problem,
preferring that the issue be tackled either at the international or national level instead.
Sectional summary
Singapore students, as well as their counterparts in all the countries surveyed,
generally have a positive attitude towards economic integration. Although they
perceive income inequality as a threat, they project this inequality away fromthemselves. This positive attitude towards economic integration, especially in relation
to the EAC, reflects the perceptions at the level of state actors: that the EAC will be
primarily driven by economic imperatives. This attitude is shared by the emerging
professional/middle class in the countries surveyed.
The top issues that are seen as threats by Singapore students are ‘Aging ofPopulation’ (77%), Terrorism (73.7), Economic Inequality (61.8%) and
Environmental Destruction (61.6%). However, not all of these issues are perceived in
the same light by students in other countries. There is also a sub-regional trend atwork, in which differences in opinions are clearly seen between ASEAN countries
and those in East Asia.
One prominent example is terrorism. This means that efforts to promote
cooperation at the level of student exchanges and dialogues with respect to issues ofterrorism would be better executed within ASEAN. The most promising area ofcooperation for EAC in the form of student exchanges, interactions and dialogues
would be that of environmental problems. This is an area in which the majority oftertiary students across all countries surveyed displayed a high level of concern. This
dovetails neatly with the recommendations in the EASG report on environmental
cooperation31. Since environmental problems are also a concern at the elite level, itmeans that environmental concerns provide a promising opportunity for the EAC topromote environmental cooperation of shared concerns at the student-level.
However, most students do not feel that this problem could be tackled at theregional level. The implication of these two opposing results is that the future EAC
has to put in greater effort to ensure its credibility in tackling environmental problems.
At the same time, focusing on environmental cooperation amongst tertiary students
can help develop grassroots level mechanisms to tackle this non-traditional security
threat, while at the same time promoting integration.
CONCLUSION
This has been an essay on the perceptions and subjectivities of geography,
identity and integration. “Regions disappear and reappear as they are transformed byvarious economic, political and cultural factors” (Vayrynen, 2003:25) and in the
cognitive mapping of Singapore students, there seems to be a shrinking in the idea of
Asia based on factors and criteria discussed earlier to heavily mean East Asia. As
such, the Singapore case indicates that there is sufficient basis for East Asia to beperceived as a common region from which a regional body like the EAC could bebuilt upon.
31

The EASG report recommends“closer regional marine environmental cooperation”.

29Singapore students also appear to have sufficient identification of self as partof Asia, although this regional identity is weaker that their national identity, while
their global identity is weakest. Lastly, tackling environmental problems seems to be
the most promising area of regional cooperation, although more efforts should betaken up by the future EAC to increase the credibility that regional bodies are ‘good
enough’ to shoulder this non-traditional security threat.
At this point, we will end by highlighting two areas that merit further studies.
First, two counter-intuitive findings in the Singapore data mean that more detailed
studies need to be carried out to resolve the discrepancies. This refers first, to an
unexpectedly low proportion of Singapore Chinese students who felt that China was apositive influence, although the state has invested heavily for many years in trying todevelop cultural affinities with China, for reasons discussed earlier. It could be that
Singaporeans distinguish between Chinese culture and the People’s Republic of China.
The second discrepancy lies in the relatively lower proportion of Singapore students
who felt that they were global citizens. This runs counter to the ‘common-sense’
perceptions that Singaporeans are globally minded.
Projecting at a higher level of abstraction, perceptions of countries as
positive/negative, feelings of identity and perceptions of threats are all related to theconcept of social capital or trust. The relationship between social capital and regional
formation hardly exists in the body of literature on regionalism. One exception is a
study by Ruiz and Zahrnt (2008) who developed a preliminary theoretical model
linking regional ambition, social capital and regional institutions. More suchconceptual and theoretical efforts are needed to enrich the study of regions.

30References
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GIARI Working Paper Vol. 2008-E-25,
February 9 2009
Published by Waseda University Global COE Program
Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI),
Waseda University, Nishiwaseda Bldg. 5F#507 1-21-1
Nishi-waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-0051 Japan
E-mail: affairs@waseda-giari.jp
Webpage: http://www.waseda-giari.jp
Printed in Japan by Waseda University International Corporation

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