Ethnic Federalism in a Comparative Perspective: Implications for Uganda

研究ノート

Ethnic Federalism in a Comparative
Perspective: Implications for Uganda
Vick Lukwago SSALIIntroduction
Dimitrios Karmis and Wyne Norman most succinctly define federalism as “anarrangement in which two or more self-governing communities share the same
political space” (Karmis and Norman 2005, 3). It is also defined by David Turton,
regarding nation-states, as “a principle of self-determination for regional
federated units” (Turton 2006, 1). As a form of institutional power sharing,
Turton argues, “federalism is based on the territorial autonomy of regional
subunits, so as to create jurisdictions which are coordinate but independent”(Turton 2006, 2).
The origins of such ‘self-governing communities’ and ‘federated regional units’,
however, differ from federation to federation. Two possible origins can be
identified from the existing federations. In some cases like the United Statesand Australia, aggregations of self-governing, former British colonies (of mainly
European migrants) were created regardless of ethno cultural identities. Otherfederations, like Belgium and Switzerland in Europe and Nigeria, South Africa
a nd Ethiopia in A frica , however, orig inate from ethno cultura l g roups
distinguishing themselves from other groups either by language, dialect, religion,
ethnicity or race. The Canadian Federation is also based on a multi-culturalsociety, with most French speakers living in Quebec. In such cases, federalism
is often debated in terms of ethnic diversity, horizontal inequalities, citizenship,
justice, and stability. It is even sometimes seen as an alternative to interethnic
violence, civil wars, and secession.
In a GSGS-directed research covering ten ethnicities, I have undertaken an
inquiry into the grassroots perceptions of the relevance and possibility of using
ethnicity as the fundamental federal principle in Uganda.1 The study waspremised on the hypothesis that a federal arrangement is a better system ofgovernance for Uganda, culturally, economically and politically, and there was a
93

研究ノートsignificant correlation between the results and this hypothesis. All in all, amajority of respondents think the federation of tribes is a viable option forma nag i ng d iversit y i n Uga nda . Et h n ic federa l ism is seen as a way ofaccommodating the differences in the beliefs and desires of Uganda’s diverse
ethnic groups. But Uganda is not alone. Social divisions based on ethnicity are areality in most of sub-Saharan Africa, and many independent states have had todeal with the relationship between such groups and the rise and frequency ofhorizontal inequalities and other ethnic problems.
The debate about whether Federalism is relatively suitable to Uganda,
nevertheless, requires a look at other democracies that favor and enforce powersharing between different cultural groups. This research note, therefore, takes alook at case studies from Switzerland, Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia. How
do they create and maintain a nation on one hand, and preserve the integrity of
the units, their identity, culture, and tradition, on the other? (Hicks 1978, 4)

Ⅰ. Switzerland
Together with Canada and the United States, Switzerland has the reputationof being one of the three “classical Federations” (Linder and Steffen 2006, 222).
In these models, we see the common perception of a ‘federation,’ by definition
and identity, as “a type of polity operating a constitution which works on twolevels of government: as a nation and as a collection of related but self-standing
units” (Hicks 1978, 4).
Switzerland is arguably the longest standing federation, dating from as backas the thirteenth century. 26 cantons with different historical backgrounds andcultures confederated into what is recognized today as the first modern
federation built on indigenous ethnic a nd ling uistic differences. These
differences, as Daniel Elazar notes, “were considered permanent and worth
accommodating” (Elazar 1987, 42). They were therefore initially accommodated
in separate sovereign states called cantons. The cantons joined and drafted a
set of common objectives, especially defense, foreign policy and public works,
which were coordinated by a representative central Diet. Said to have started
with the federal charter of 1291 from three original cantons, it had expanded toeight by the end of the 15th century. The modern federal state, whose legal
foundation dates back from 1848, consists of three levels of government: the94

Ethnic Federalism in a Comparative Perspective: Implications for Uganda

Federation, 26 cantons, and 2,324 communes.
About 65% of the population speak German, 20% French, 6% Italian, less than
1% Romansch (a minor language mainly descended from Latin and spoken in a
few Alpine regions in southeast Switzerland), and 8.5% immigrants who speakother languages (Linder and Steffen 2006). Although the four linguistic groups
are not clearly divided by the sub-national units, most of the Swiss cantons
represent an overwhelming majority of one linguistic group. Hence, there are 15
mainly German cantons, six mostly French cantons, one mainly Italian-speaking
canton, and four multilingual cantons.
1. The Swiss model as a consensus democracy
Constitutionally, the Swiss federation has remained highly decentralized since
its foundation in 18 4 8, with the cantons retaining their autonomy, theirstatehood, their constitutions and their political and economic powers. Todaythe central (federal) government controls only 30% of the overall public budget,making the Swiss system a typical example of what is called a consociationalmodel of democracy. Considered to be both empirical and normative (Lijphart1977), a consociation is a power-sharing model of democracy in which minorities
are integrated through proportional representation with a vertical division of
power which ensures total autonomy and political participation for the smaller
units (Linder 2012).
Arend Lijphart is one of the strongest proponents of this model, and he hasargued that “in a consociation democracy, the centrifugal tendencies inherent in aplural society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behavior of theleaders of different segments of the population” (Lijphart 1977, 1). It may bedifficult, therefore, as Lijphart observes, “but it is not at all impossible to achieve
and maintain a stable democratic government in a plural society” (Lijphart 1977, 1).
2. The institutional elements of the Swiss model
Federalism in Switzerland guarantees the autonomy of the sub-national units.
The cantons and communes are granted considerable political freedom as longas they keep their side of the bargain. Their primary responsibility, as Linderand Steffen point out, is to “respect the principles of democracy, and guarantee
fundamental rights and the rule of law as described in the federal constitution.”I n ret u r n , t hey a re a l lowed “t heir ow n pol it ica l aut hor it ies f ree f rom
95

研究ノートinterference from the federal government, and are given ample autonomy inlegislation, in the provision of public goods and services, and in taxation andfinancial policies”(Linder and Steffen 2006, 224). While the federal government
ma kes genera l laws , ca ntons have considerable opt ions at t he level of
implementation because of the differences in cantonal traditions. These options,
therefore, give the cantons, and the communes for that matter, “a strong vetopoint” (Linder and Steffen 2006, citing Vatter 2002). This power of minority vetoon the most importa nt issues is indeed one of the key elements in the
consociation schema of leading advocate Arend Lijphart (1977, 1985, and 1999).
The sub-national units are represented both in the National Council (theLower Chamber) in a democratic one-person-one-vote principle. They are also
represented in the Council of States (the Upper Chamber) in the federalist
principle of the one-vote-for-each-member state (Steinberg 1996; Linder 1998;
Linder and Steffen 2006; Trampusch and Mach 2011). Each chamber has thesame competencies, and all important federal decisions are subject to a second
decision rule. But since the cantons are unequal in population size and economic
power, the Swiss system uses the idea of “co-operative federalism” (Linder 2012).
This practice adjusts differences in fiscal revenue between rich and poor
cantons or communes or compensates bigger cantons for the services they
provide for the smaller ones. The minority rights of la ng uage are also
guaranteed by the principle of ‘territoriality,’ whereby it is not a group but thelanguage of the region that is protected (Linder and Steffen 20 0 6, 227 ).
Therefore, no linguistic group has individual rights. Finally, a seven-member
Swiss Federal Council is considered a collective Head of State. The presidencyof the Confederation is held for only one year and rotates among the sevencouncil members in order of seniority.
It can be argued in conclusion that the strength of the Swiss Federation lies
in a couple of factors that favor the process of integration, and which have madeSwitzerland “a country of outstanding political stability without serious societal
conflicts” (Linder and Steffen 2006, 236).

Ⅱ. The African contradictions
It has been demonstrated that a Power Dispersing (PD) design of politicalinstitutions is more suited for A frica’s horizonta l cleavages which a re96

Ethnic Federalism in a Comparative Perspective: Implications for Uganda

characterized by ethnic, cultural, religious and geographical divides (Lijphart
1977; Mine et al. 2013). It can be argued, therefore, that the Swiss nationalmodel, as described above, should be the most suitable model for multicultural
African states. At independence, however, most African countries adopted
either a majoritaria n parlia mentary democracy or the winner-ta ke -a ll
presidential system. These unitary systems have not worked well in thesecountries for several reasons:
The main reason is that in these multi-cultural societies, cultural values,
beliefs and languages are heterogeneous and may lead to different politicalpreferences. These are preferences and choices so embedded in the histories
and cultures of individual ethnic groups that they are not always easy toaccommodate in a unitary democratic setting.
The other reason is the consequences of the colonial policy of divide and rule.
This system empowered some ethnic groups over others. It also createdheightened group awareness among the colonial subjects. Nevertheless, thema i n a rg u ment a mong nat iona lists at i ndependence was t hat u n it a r y
governments were the only way to keep culturally diverse nations together(Meredith 2005; Mutiibwa 1992; Thomson 2010).
The third reason is that a culture of patronage and clientelism has beencreated in countries like Uganda where, for instance, a lot of power is invested
both in the executive and in the military and security forces, which, moreover,are often dominated by certain ethnic groups. Such states tend to concentrate
too much power in the executive branch. “The result is semi-authoritarianism,
repression and a selective use of two of the most valuable national resources:
military force and money” (Tripp 2010, 194). This abuse of power, in turn,results in narrow ethnic and political clientelistic networks (Tangri 1999; Tangriand Mwenda 2001, 2003 and 2006; Mwenda 2007; Tripp 2010; Asiimwe 2013;
Ssali 2016). Could Uganda, and other ethnically diverse African countries, haveavoided the turmoil of the last 50 years if they had adopted the Swiss-type“consensus” model of democracy where, as Linder and Steffen argue, “structural
minorities have a better chance of inclusion” (Linder and Steffen 2006, 223)?
Very few African countries defied the post-independence unitary trend andadopted federalism as a system of government. Those that chose federalism did
so for various reasons. Some had regional or ethnic minorities that felt
marginalized by dominant, ascendant parties. They were anxious about their97

研究ノートpolitical status in post-colonial Africa, and they “demanded a system thatdevolves power and allows communities to exercise control over their own
affairs without interference from the dominant group” (Fessha 2012, 265). Other
countries simply had regions and institutions with distinctive interests which
they wanted to preserve as autonomous entities. The kingdom of Buganda in
Uganda was a case in point.
The Baganda [people of Buganda kingdom] had always enjoyed a special
recognition and status. They also had an extraordinary devotion to their kinga nd his hiera rchica l authority, a nd they would accept only the federa larrangement to proceed along constitutional lines (Mutiibwa 1992). They were
g ra nted federa l status at independence, a nd some ack nowledg ment ofautonomous standing was similarly extended to four other tribal kingdoms:
Ankole, Bunyoro, Busoga, and Toro. This arrangement would, however, become
a victim of the “nation-building” trend that characterized the post-colonial
period in Africa. Ultimately, in Uganda, as in most post-independence Africancountries that tried it, federalism was an ill-fated experiment. Indeed, very few
federations have survived the half-century of independence (see Table 1 below),among them, Nigeria and Ethiopia. The South African model of federalism,
embedded in the new post-apartheid constitution, is a later addition.
Table 1 Post-Independence Federal Systems in Africa
Country

Longevity of Federal System

Cameroon

1962 – 1972

DRC Congo

1960 – 1965

Ethiopia

1952 – 1962; 1991 – present

Kenya

1963 – 1965

Nigeria1960 – present

South Africa

1997 – present

Sudan

1972 – 1983

Tanzania

1964 – present

Uganda1962 – 1966

(Source: Dean E. McHenry, Jr. “Federalism in Africa: is it a Solution to, or a cause ofEthnic problems?” (1997:1)).

1. Nigeria
Nigeria is recognized as the longest enduring post-colonial federation in
Africa. At independence in 1960, the mainly Muslim, Hausa-Fulani North98

Ethnic Federalism in a Comparative Perspective: Implications for Uganda

already had a mostly separate ethnic administration and political party. In theSouth, each of the two other main ethnic groups, the Christian Igbo in thesoutheast, and the religiously bi-communal Yoruba in the southwest, also had
their own political parties and ambitions. Besides, there were some other 250
minority groups scattered among the big three, all of which had ambitions to
obtain their own states and escape dominance, neglect and discrimination. Latera fourth region, the Mid-West Region, was added but still this number of regions
was too small to satisfy the fundamental needs of the ethnic minorities
swallowed up in each of the four ethnic majority-dominated areas. This fluidity
led to the fall of the first independence government to a military coup, and to
the ethnic-military (Biafra) civil war of 1967. Further diffusion of the regions
into 12 states helped the defeat of this Igbo-dominated secession war, andstrengthened the federation through two Military (1966-1979 and 1984-1999)
and two Democratic (1979-1983 and 1999-present) republics.
Nigeria currently features a three-tier federal system with a federal
government, thirty-six states and the federal capital territory of Abuja. The
system has undergone many changes and lapses in democracy corresponding
with periods of military rule. Its ‘federalness’ has nevertheless persisted since1960. It has also managed “not only to hold together and avoid the protracted,
large-scale internal conflicts that have convulsed or pulverized several other
African states but also to achieve a reasonably effective compromise of ethnic
interests” (Suberu 2006, 65). One of the factors that have accounted for thepersistence of the Nigerian federal system is that the country’s multi-statefederalism affords a good measure of autonomy for its territorial communities
despite its over-centralization by soldiers and oil (Panter-Brick 1978).
The Nigerian federation has experienced both the 19 60s chaos of the
cessation war and periods of decline coinciding with military dictatorships.
Nigeria’s multi-state federalism, nevertheless, has mostly held the country
together and helped it to achieve a reasonably efficient compromise of ethnic
interests. It has also shown that federalism can either mitigate or exacerbate
ethnic conflict.
The ma in cha llenge to the system, which is a lso a n epitome of postindependence Nigeria n histor y, is t he nea r absolute dependence of a ll
governments in the federation on centrally collected oil revenues. “This fiscal
centralism has stimulated several interrelated pathologies and deficits in
99

研究ノートNigeria’s federal governance” (Suberu 2006, 77).
2. Ethiopia
Ethiopia is another of the few functioning federations in Africa, and it has
undergone two arrangements during two distinct periods: the period of formal
federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia (1952-1962) and the current federal
experiment in ‘ethnic federalism’ since the adoption of the 1991 charter.
Ethiopia’s experimentation with federalism began in the 1950s when Emperor
Haile Selassie decided to expand the Ethiopian empire when the future ofEritrea came up for discussion at the United Nations. Eritrea had been an
Italian colony for 50 years but had gained some degree of self-identity under the
British caretakers after the defeat of the Italians in 1941.The Muslim half of the
population supported the idea of an independent Eritrean state proposed by
Arab countries while the Christian half tended to support unification with
Ethiopia. The emperor intervened on the claim that Eritrea had after all
historically been part of the empire. The UN also chose the option of forming afederation linking Ethiopia and Eritrea, “under which the Ethiopian government
was given control of foreign affairs, defense, finance, commerce, and ports while
Eritrea was allowed its own elected government and assembly to deal withlocal affairs.” (Meredith 2011, 209)
Emperor Selassie, nevertheless, always saw the federation as only a step
towards unification, and by 1959 he had discarded the Eritrean flag andimposed Ethiopian law. Eritrea’s two main languages, Arabic, and Tigrinya
were replaced by Amharic, and finally, “in 1962 the Eritrean Assembly was
persuaded to vote for the dissolution of the federation and its own existence forannexation by Ethiopia” (Meredith 2011, 209). The formal federal arrangement
had lasted only ten years.
The annexation would, nevertheless, from then on face a great deal ofresistance and revolts in the name of the Eritrean insurgency. Well-equipped
militarily and ideologically, the insurgency gained prominence for declaiming
against what it regarded as the imperialist oppression of Ethiopia’s Emperor
Haile Selassie.
In 1974, the Emperor was overthrown by a radical military group under
Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam. The new revolutionary government fueled
even more nationalism and rebellion by groups such as the Tigray People’s
100Ethnic Federalism in a Comparative Perspective: Implications for Uganda

Liberation Front (TPLF); the Somali supported Oromo Liberation Front; and theEthiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). They wanted botha civilian control of the revolution, and an end to Soviet influence and Colonel
Mengistu’s efforts to turn Ethiopia into a socialist state. The result was a
protracted civil war. It lasted until 1991 after Mengistu had lost Soviet backing
due to the end of the cold war, and the rebel Ethiopian and Eritrean coalition
forces event u a l ly cla i med v ictor y. Er it rea wa s i m med iately g ra nted
independence, Mengistu’s socialist policies were abandoned, and a process began
under former EPRDF rebel leader Meles Zenawi, to transform the politicalstructure of Ethiopia. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia waseventually officially proclaimed in 1995, the nation’s second take on federalism.
Federalism in the second Republic of Ethiopia has been both “radical” and“pioneering” (Turton 2006, 1). It has been radical because as a system of ‘ethnic
federalism’ it has introduced the principle of self-determination for Ethiopia’s six
ethnic provinces and three multi-ethnic ones in a formerly highly centralized
and unitary state. It has also been pioneering because Ethiopia has gone further
than any other African state and even further than almost any country
worldwide. By adopting ethnic federalism, Ethiopia wanted to assuage theconcerns of her federated regional units by reconstituting them on ethnicnationalistic lines without a single dominant one.
Critics argue, nevertheless, that as an organizing principle, ethnic federalism
in Ethiopia faces some challenges, and is at best a “risky” and “ fragile”
experiment (Turton 2006, 5-6; Kymlicka 2006, 58; Young 2012, 331). They argue,
first of all, that thanks to the Afro-Marxist Mengistu legacy, it is borrowed fromthe Soviet nationality model, which, in any case, collapsed. They also argue thatwhile a similar model of multination federalism has resulted in a genuinely
federal system in Switzerland, Canada, Belgium and Spain, it was introduced
there “in a peaceful and democratic way, consistent with human rights andliberal freedoms” (Kymlicka 2006, 58). In Ethiopia, on the other hand, there areno such conditions, and ethnic-based regional autonomy is more likely to emerge
there from force rather than from peaceful and democratic reforms.
Ethiopia’s second attempt on federalism thus arouses genuine interest in that
it is pioneering in form, it recognizes the reality of minority nationalism throughsome territorial autonomy, and it could be a good formula for solving horizontal
inequalities and other ethnic problems in Africa. On the other hand, as a
101

研究ノートprocess of institutionalization it “has not always been the outcome of peacefuldemocratic mobilization, but rather has been imposed from above, or captured
by local elites who do not present the interests of the wider group” (Kymlicka
2006, 58). This fact, therefore, underlines the relevance of my inquiry, in the
aforementioned research, into “grassroots perceptions” on the road Uganda
should take moving forward.
3. South Africa
The South African model of federalism, as embedded in the new postapartheid constitution, gives the Rainbow Nation’s nine provinces considerable
powers. A very prog ressive entity in its own right , the S outh A frica nconstitution was the result of remarkably detailed and inclusive negotiations
that were carried out with an acute awareness of the injustices of the country’s
non-democratic past. Given the dark history of apartheid, the constitutional
makers were faced with the question of whether to have a unitary or federal
system. An interim constitution was first drafted in 1993 as the country madeits transition from apartheid to democracy. It was an urgent and necessary
compromise among mainly the mainstream African National Congress (ANC),
the Inkhata Freedom Party, seeking more autonomy for the KwaZulu-Natalprovince, and some minority Afrikaner groups seeking an Afrikaans homelandof sorts. Boundaries were therefore explicitly negotiated, as Inman and
Rubinfeld (2009) have noted, to assure the white (National Party) and black(Inkatha) political minorities control over public resources and policies in atleast one province each. The interim constitution of 1993 was thus “the result of
the imperative of finding consensus among these political forces to pave theway for free elections…” (Simeon 1998, 2).
Then, after the April 1994 elections, a new constitution was written in
consultation with the public as well as elected public representatives. It wasapproved by the Constitutional Court on 4 December 1996, signed by President
Mandela on 6 December 199 6, and took effect on 4 February 1997. The
permanent constitution, like its 1993 precursor, continues to envisage federal,provincial (and local) spheres of government, each elected separately by
proportional representation. Operating at both national and provincial levels areadvisory bodies drawn from South Africa’s traditional leaders. It is a statedintention in the Constitution that the country is run on a system of co-operative102

Ethnic Federalism in a Comparative Perspective: Implications for Uganda

governance. The system thus continues to embrace the imperative of finding
party agreement as did the 1993 interim constitution. It is thus, although not
explicitly defined as such, by and large, a federal constitution. It has also
succeeded in ma nag ing deep ethno cultura l cleavages a nd autonomist
movements in a previously deeply divided country.
Towards a synthesis
This paper has attempted to argue that federations originate and can function
successfully in both homogeneous and heterogeneous societies. Majoritarian
democracies, on the other hand, work better in communities where people sharecommon cultural values, beliefs, and language. It has been argued therefore thatthe adoption of Unitarian, winner-take-all democracies in post-independence
Africa could have been a mistake influenced by several factors. Indeed, theimposition by post-independence central governments of centralized politicalpower on pre-existing nationalities has more than often resulted in disastrous
consequences. This imposition is now being challenged in many parts of Africa.
It is being challenged because it is not sustainable, and has, in the long run,failed to guarantee sustainable development and the rule of law where therights, interests, and feelings of the different and diverse communities on thecontinent are respected.
The Swiss model of “consociational” democracy has been hailed as a beaconof stability and democracy in a plural society, whose strength lies in a couple offactors that favor the process of integration and a fair representation of her subnational units. As for the pathology of federations in Africa, it can be argued
that the picture of federalism over half a century of independence is grim. It
has worked in fewer countries than it has failed. In some countries, it collapsed
almost as soon as it had been conceived (See Table 1). In others, it carries
negative political baggage, and it is not mentioned even though its techniques
are being practiced. The South African constitution, as mentioned earlier, is acase in point.
That said, the fact must be acknowledged that there is no causal relationshipbetween federalism and anything else. Nigeria, for instance, has been relatively
stable under a federal system, and there is no causal relationship between thismodel and Africa’s most populous country’s problems. Nigeria’s problems havebeen rather attributed to fiscally centralized overdependence on oil revenues.
103

研究ノートNigeria has unfortunately not adopted the Swiss model ’s “co - operative
federalism” which would guarantee equitable resource sharing. Ethiopia
returned to the ethnic federal experiment in 1995 after decades of turmoil. At
the time of writing, however, the country is in a state of emergency as a resultof the government’s high-handed response to public protests against its
development-obsessed, but an authoritarian, undemocratic and anti-federal
character of leadership (Ficquet 20162). Is the current state of the federal statebecause of, or in spite of ethnic federalism? The answer, according to Prof.
Ficquet, lies both in the big and complicated volume of Ethiopia’s history, as wellas in the lack of commitment on the part of government to the implementationof the post-1995 ethnic federalism agenda. In South Africa, the resilience of thesystem will be tested more and more as this young democracy strives to avoid
the fate of other failed African federations.
Uganda, like most unitary African states, has had tensions that havecharacterized and indeed restricted power-creating capacity and stability since
independence. They are tensions between the desire and strife for politicalmodernization on the one hand, and the primordial solidarity groupings namely
kinship, clan, and tribe, on the other (Kilson 1975). Uganda, as a multi-ethnic
state, ought to emulate Switzerland, but she can also learn a lesson or two from
where the other African models of federalism have succeeded.
The debate on ethnicity and federalism in Uganda, which is the topic of theresearch mentioned in the introduction, was born out of the realization that inthis multi-cultural society, cultural values, beliefs and languages are not only
heterogeneous but may lead to different political preferences that do not change.
The results of my qualitative inquiry into grassroots perceptions showed that
ethnically based federal units would presumably provide safe accommodation
for these preferences. Ethnic federalism has thus been depicted as one way of
empowering people in their traditional institutions and enabling them to play adecisive role in socio-economic and political development. The challenge is on
the political elite in Uganda to re-think the salient political, social and economic
issues affecting their diverse peoples. They need to emulate Switzerland andother democracies that favor and enforce power-sharing between different
cultural groups. That way, they can go a long way to solving many of thecountry’s chronic problems of injustices and social inequalities.

104

Ethnic Federalism in a Comparative Perspective: Implications for Uganda

Selected References
Bangura, Yusuf, ed. 2006. Ethnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Cooper, Fredrick. 2009. Africa Since 1940: The past of the present. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Davis, Solomon R. 1978. The Federal Principle: A journey Through Time in Quest of ameaning. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Elazar, Daniel J. 1987. Exploring Federalism. Alabama: The University of Alabama Press.
Fessha, Yonathan Tesfaye. 2012. “Federalism, Territorial Autonomy and the Management ofEthnic Diversity in Africa: Reading the Balance Sheet.” L’Europe en formation 363:
265-288. Accessed February 28, 2016. DOI : 10.3917/eufor.363.0265
Ficquet, Eloi. 2016. “Authoritarianism in Post-modernity: The deaf state vs buzzing social
media in Ethiopia.” Lecture delivered at the Graduate School of Global Studies,
Doshisha University on November 1.
Hicks, Ursula K. 1978. Federalism: Failure and Success- a comparative study. Oxford
University Press.
Kalinaki, Daniel K. 2014. Kizza Besigye and Uganda’s Unfinished Revolution. Kampala:
Dominant Seven Publishers.
Karmis, Dimitrios, and Wayne Norman, eds. 2005. Theories of federalism – a reader. New
York:Palgrave Macmillan.
Kymlicka, Will. 2006. “Emerging Western Models of Multinational Federalism: Are they
relevant for Africa?” In Ethnic federalism: The Ethiopian experience in comparative
perspective, edited by David Turton, 32 -64. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University
Press.
Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New
Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Linder, Wolf. 1998. Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conf lict in Multicultural
Societies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Linder, Wolf. 2012. “Federalism: The case of Switzerland.” Paper presented at . The
University of Karachi, November 6-7.
Linder, Wolf and Isabelle, Steffen. 2006. ‘Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance in the
Public Sector in Switzerland’. In Ethnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance,
edited by Yusuf Bangura, 221-238. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Meredith, Martin. 2011. The State of Africa. London: Simon & Schuster.
Mill, John S. 2005. “Of Fedaral Representative Governments.” In Theories of Federalism :areader, edited by Dimitrios Karmis and Wyne Norman, 165-172. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Mine Yoichi, Mari Katayanagi and Satoru Mikami. 2013. “Comparing Political Institutions:
Institutional Choice and Conflict Prevention in Africa.” In Preventing Violent Conflictin Africa, edited by Yoichi Mine, FrancesStewart, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Thandika
Mkandawire. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mutiibwa, Phares. 1992. Uganda Since Independence: A story of Unfulfilled Hopes. Trenton,
New Jersey: Africa World Press Inc.
Panter-Brick, Keith, ed. 1978. Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria.
London: Frank Cass.
Robert, Inman P. and Daniel Rubinfeld, 2009. “Federalism and South Africa’s Democratic
Bargain: The Zuma Challenge.” escholarship.org (University of California), August.

105

研究ノートAccessed on April 2, 2016 from http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6239g0gb.
Simeon, Richard. 1998. “Considerations on the Design of Federations: The South African
Constitution in Comparative Context.” Working paper, Department of Political Scienceand Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, February. Accessed on April 22nd 2014,from
http://www.queensu.ca/iigr/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.iigrwww/files/files/
WorkingPapers/Archive/1998/1998-2RichardSimeon.pdf).
Simeon, Richard and Christina Murray. 2001. “Multi-Sphere Governance in South Africa: AnInterim Assessment.” Oxford Journals of Social Sciences, Publius 31 (4): 65-92.
Accessed on March 10, 2016, from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3331062?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Ssali, Vick L. 2016. “Patronage, Clientelism and Economic Insecurity in Uganda.” Pambazuka
News, January 1st, Issue 756.
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/96316
Steinberg, Jonathan. 1996. Why Switzerland? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Suberu, Rotimi. “Federalism and the Management of Ethnic Conf lict: the Nigerian
Experience.” In Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative
Perspective, edited by David Turton, 65 – 92. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University
Press.
Trampusch, Christine, and Mach André, eds. 2011. Switzerland in Europe: Continuity andChange in the Swiss Political Economy. London: Routledge.
Tripp, Aili M. 2010. Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime. London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Turton, David, ed. 2006. Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative
Perspective. Addis Ababa: University Press.

注1	This research note was inspired by my PhD dissertation, “Ethnicity and Federalism in
Uganda: Grassroots Perceptions” which is about to be submitted to the Graduate Schoolof Global Studies at Doshisha.
2	Notes from the lecture, “Authoritarianism in Post-modernity: The deaf state vs buzzing
social media in Ethiopia,” delivered by Prof. Eloi Ficquet, at the Graduate School of
Global Studies, Doshisha University on November 1, 2016.

106

Ethnic Federalism in a Comparative Perspective: Implications for Uganda

Abstract

Ethnic Federalism in a Comparative
Perspective: Implications for Uganda
Vick Lukwago SSALI

On gaining independence, most African states inherited a strongly centralized
apparatus at the national level. Pro-independence nationalists rejected both theimperial masters’ proposals to aggregate nations into regional federations andthe temptation to devolve them for the efficient management of ethnic diversity.
The first half century of the post-colonial era has however seen a succession ofcrises. Many leaders at the helm of overly strong, centrist governments haveover this period become authoritarian and have contributed a lot to the mire ofcorruption, economic collapse, ethnic resentment, violence and civil war. They
have exploited Africa’s ethnic differences to consolidate patronage-driven
democracies and economies. The result has been the personalization of states,
their collapse into mini-bureaucracies, the neglect of the people at the grassrootsof society, and massive social inequalities.
Given such a systematic fading of the hopes and ambitions of independence,
many African countries have recently found it indispensable to re-think the
structure of the state. Federalism has often been considered as one effective
way of reconciling the diversity of the constituent parts of nations with theirunity, and of restoring stability and equality in African countries. My researchat the Doshisha Graduate School of Global Studies (Kyoto - Japan) over the past
four years has been an inquiry into the grassroots perceptions of ethnicity andfederalism in Uganda. What are the attitudes of the people at the grassroots ofUgandan society, about their self-identity vis a vis the center? The study waspremised on the hypothesis that a federal arrangement is a better system ofgovernance for Uganda, culturally, economically and politically, and there was asignificant correlation between the results and this hypothesis. The majority of
respondents see Ethnic federalism as a way of accommodating the differencesin the beliefs and desires of Uganda's diverse ethnic groups.
But Uganda and Africa as a whole need good models to emulate from within107

研究ノートand from outside the continent. This research note looks at case studies from
Switzerland, Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia, and how they create andmaintain a nation on one hand, while preserving the integrity of the units, theiridentity, culture, and tradition, on the other. The Swiss model is particularly
being presented as a solid argument for the theory that a consociation or powersharing model of democracy is the most suitable model for multicultural African
states.
Keywords: ethnic diversity, ethnic federalism, consociation democracy, powersharing

108