10 Lessons from
Fukushima

Reducing risks and protecting communities
from nuclear disasters
Fukushima Booklet Committee

Table of Contents● Introduction

3

Chapter 1

What is nuclear power, what is radioactivity?

Chapter 2

What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned

5

1 Do not be fooled by the “Nuclear Power is Safe” propaganda
2 During an emergency, the basic premise is to run away
3 Access to information and leaving records is vital

15

16

20

23

4 People affected by the disaster have the right to a comprehensive health survey
and disclosure of information 29

5 To ensure food safety and to protect agriculture, forestry and fishery industries,
citizens must participate in measurement. Information disclosure is also vital 33
6 Complete decontamination is impossible

39

7 The accident cannot be brought to a conclusion unless workers are given better
treatment and healthcare 42
8 Rebuilding the daily lives and community of those affected is essential46

9 Calling for the participation of those affected by the disaster in the enactment andimplementation of laws that are designed to protect them 50

10 Taxpayers are being made to bear the compensation costs

Chapter 3●Afterword

54

International law and disaster risk reduction framework

̶̶ tools we can use to protect ourselves
70

61

Introduction
Co-chair, Fukushima Booklet Committee

Masaaki Ohashi

This booklet is a message to people all around the world from us, the people ofJapan, who were afflicted by and who continue to bear the brunt of the damage
caused by the large-scale nuclear disaster at the Tokyo Electric Power Company(TEPCO) operated Fukushima Daiichi (Number One) Nuclear Power Plant,
directly caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March 11,
2011. The intended beneficiaries of this booklet are the many people around theworld concerned about the risk of a situation similar to Fukushima happening tothem, especially those living in countries where nuclear plants are currently
operating or where construction of nuclear facilities is planned. We also hope that
this booklet will be utilized by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civilsociety organizations (CSOs) who work with such residents in these regions, andby the heads and staff members of local municipalities who are working to prevent
nuclear disasters and to mitigate the damage when they do occur.
Since the nuclear disaster struck Fukushima, we have proactively shared theexperiences of this region with people from all over the world who come to visit
Fukushima, as well as on occasions throughout Japan and internationally. While
this is still not yet sufficient, we have been able to communicate to many people
the facts of this disaster, as well as its severity and the many complicated issues
that have arisen from it. Many of these people have kindly shown a high level ofconcern and sympathy toward the painful plight of those affected.
However, an increasingly common voice from those people listening intently is
the request for information about what to do to prevent a similar situation
happening in their own countries. This helped us to understand that while it isvery important to share the experiences of the disaster, people on the receiving
end of this advice cannot take appropriate action unless they understand how to
anticipate and prevent the actual disaster at the root of all these experiences, alongwith measures for how to mitigate the damage of nuclear accidents or disasters
should they actually occur.
In March 2015, the government of Japan hosted the 3rd World Conference on
Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture, some 90km north of the
Fukushima nuclear plant. There, they adopted the Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction, which will constitute the worldʼs disaster risk reduction framework3

for the coming decade. The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), which constituted
the previous international action guidelines for disaster risk reduction, responded
only to technological hazards such as nuclear disasters in the case that they occur inassociation with natural hazards. However, in reality, no existing international
agencies specialize in prevention of or response to large-scale technological hazards
such as nuclear disasters. Namely, they had not until now dealt sufficiently in anexpert and institutionalized way with the clarification of risks associated with suchhazards, or with necessary withdrawal or evacuation plans, emergency rescue,
recovery, compensation and so on. We advocated for reform to the state of andinsufficient experience of international frameworks in this regard. We are glad that,partially as a result of these efforts, the Sendai Framework does address suchdisasters triggered by man-made hazards.
However, due to the increasingly global nature of the economy, production hubsaround the world are more and more concentrated in places regarded as“developing countries”. It is clear that there are moves afoot to export many
nuclear power plants from “developed countries” in order to supply the energythat is required to underpin this production in developing countries. This is in
spite of the fact that the new construction of nuclear power plants in developed
countries is fraught with difficulties. The unthinkable but inevitable next nuclear
power plant accident and nuclear disaster could easily take place in such an area
hosting newly-build power plants, embroiling the surrounding region andneighboring countries.
At the time of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, not only did we lack basic
knowledge regarding nuclear power and radioactivity, but also failed to sufficiently
take onboard the experiences of Chernobyl and Three Mile Island. Unable toproperly understand mitigation and preventative measures we were extremely
confused and faced a lot of problems head on. We made this booklet in the hopethat nobody else has to go through this same bitter experience ever again and also
to respond to the question of “what should we do” posed by those people withwhom we shared the experiences of Fukushima.
Oriented towards the nonexpert, this booklet is concerned with how to deal with
nuclear power plants and nuclear accidents, based on the experiences ofFukushima and from the point of view of the residents of Fukushima. All of thisbooklet will be translated and published in various global languages; we sincerely
hope that it will be read by a great many people and will become a benchmark foraction related to nuclear power.
4

Chapter 1
What is nuclear power,
what is radioactivity ?

Hisako Sakiyama (Takagi School/Former Member, National Diet of Japan Fukushima

Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC))

■ Principles of power generation

You can generate power with a magnet
and a coil. Turning the magnet withthe rotations of the bicycle will create
electricity (Figure 1.) If you put bladeson the axis of rotation to improve
the rotation efficiency, you have aturbine. While there are various waysof generating electricity, ultimately
the only difference is what sort offorce you use to power the turbine.
Hydroelectric power generation uses
Figure 1 Bicycle Dynamo
a head of water to power a turbine,
wind power generation uses wind,geothermal/thermal power generation uses heat to create steam to power a turbine,and then there is nuclear power generation.
■ Nuclear power generation and atomic bombs

Nuclear power involves using the enormous amount of heat given off in nuclear
fission to boil hot water, creating steam that rotates the turbine. Although thetemperature in the center of a nuclear reactor's fuel rods is approximately 2,000 C,
the steam used to rotate the turbines is somewhat over 200 C. 3GW of heat isrequired to generate 1GW of electricity. The two thirds of this heat which does not
Atomic bomb: nuclear fission/chain reaction of
uranium atoms
Strong radiation and enormous amountsof heat energy are released in parallelwith nuclear fission

Nucleus of Uranium 235 is
made up of 92 protons (pink)
and 143 neutrons (blue)

Figure 2 Nuclear fission in an atomic bomb

6

Chapter 1

become electricity is disposed of in the ocean and rivers, which leads to warmingof the ocean.
Conventional fuel in nuclear reactors uses an atom called U235, which is also used tomake atomic bombs. The theory behind nuclear reactors and atomic bombs is thesame in terms of bombarding these atoms with neutrons to cause nuclear fission.
The fuel in atomic bombs contains more than 95% U235, which causes nuclear fission.
The 2-3 neutrons that are generated from one round of nuclear fission strike U235
one after another, after which all nuclear fission happens in an instant (Figure 2).
Massive amounts of radiation and heat are released, as well as an enormous bomb
blast, which obliterates living things instantaneously. Nuclear fission products arealso called “lethal ash”, due to the high amount of heat and radiation that theyemit, which can result in death in the case of high exposure.
The fuel in nuclear power plants contains about 5% (U235) the remainder being
Uranium 238 (U238) which does not cause nuclear fission. With nuclear power plants,
control rods absorb some of the neutrons created in nuclear fission, regulating theprocess to ensure that a rapid chain reaction does not take place (Figure 3) while
using the heat produced to boil water and generate electricity with the resulting
steam. While nuclear power plants are large-scale and complicated, costing a large
amount of money to construct, they are basically water-heating devices.
The Principles of Nuclear Power Generation(revised Figure from “Encyclopedia of Nuclear
Power Generation”)
Control
Uranium 235

Neutron

Neutronpower
generation

Release of radiation
heat energy

Controlrods

Controlwater boiler

Plutonium 239
Controlrods Uranium 238 (raw material for

Uranium 235

atomic bombs)

NuclearFissionUranium 235

NuclearFission
Nuclear fission
products (lethal ash)

Uranium 235

NuclearFission
NuclearFissionFigure 3 The Principles of Nuclear Power Generation (revised Figure from
Genshiryoku no Wakaru Jiten (“Encyclopedia of Nuclear Power”)

What is nuclear power, what is radioactivity?

7

Some of the neutrons released in nuclear fission are absorbed by U238, creating
Plutonium 239, the raw material for atomic bombs. Operating a nuclear plant
inevitably creates plutonium, and this is the reason why countries who want nuclear
weapons tend to build nuclear power plants.
Large amounts of “lethal ash” are also produced in nuclear power plants. Lethal
ash that invariably accumulates during power generation will continue to emit
radiation and heat for hundreds of thousands of years. There are no countries
around the world, barring Finland, who have decided on a method for disposingof spent fuel rods (lethal ash). This is the reason why nuclear plants are called“mansions without toilets”.
■ The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant is not over

The operators of the Fukushima Power Plant are circulating coolant water in order
to cool the nuclear fuel that melted inside the nuclear reactors due to the accident.
They are doing this because without cooling, the fuel will melt due to the decay heatemitted by the lethal ash, risking a further release of radioactive materials. In thecourse of cooling the fuel, the coolant water flushes lethal ash out of the reactor. It
becomes extremely contaminated in the process, and then leaks into the basementof the building housing the reactor. As 400 tons of groundwater are flowing ineveryday, the whole site of Fukushima Daiichi has been completely packed with1,000 ton capacity tanks containing the contaminated water. The ground on whichthese tanks are placed is not at all sturdy, so they can topple over anytime. Since theaccident, contaminated water has been continuously leaking into the ocean, but it
is not known from where. It is not at all the case that the accident is under control.
At present, to stop the inflow of groundwater, the operators are trying to freeze thesoil around the building housing the reactor, although success is not looking likely.
Nuclear fuel, which is supposed to be contained within the nuclear reactors, hasmelted and is exposed to the environment. Furthermore, leakages of contaminatedwater within the site are occurring on a regular basis. The exposed dose limit ofworkers cleaning up the accident is reached in a short time, leading to a lack ofexperienced workers, further complicating the cleanup operation work.
■ Radiation and radioactive materials

Radiation emanates from radioactive material (also called radioactivity). This canbe likened to the relationship between light (radiation) and light bulb (radioactive
material). However, radiation differs from light as it possesses high energy and canpass through the body. Roentgen was the first person to create artificial radiation,
8

Chapter 1

which was dubbed the “x-ray”. A photo hetook is shown in Figure 4.
Due to the capacity of being able to see
through the body, x-rays were actively
embraced in medical examinations. What
was not known at the time, however, wasthat when x-rays permeate the humanbody they damage cells; thus, people were
unwittingly bathed in x-rays and many lives
were lost to cancer and leukemia. Throughthese experiences, people learned thedamaging effects of radiation to the body.
Figure 4 X-ray photography by Roentgen■ Types of radiation and ways of exposure(external and internal exposure)

Aside from x-rays as described above, there are various other types of radiation. As
shown in Figure 2, during nuclear fission gamma rays and neutron rays are released.
While gamma rays are electromagnetic waves like x-rays, neutron rays, beta rays
and alpha rays are all particles of neutron, electron and helium nuclei respectively.
Being exposed to radiation from outside the body is called external exposure,while radioactive particles entering the body through respiration and food causing
exposure inside the body, is known as internal exposure. With external exposure, it
is possible to avoid exposure by ensuring that there is some kind of shield, such aslead or concrete between the radioactive material and the body, or by keeping far
away from the radioactive material. Furthermore, rays that only travel a distanceof 1mm, like alpha rays, do not cause any harm. Once such rays are inside thebody, however, even if they can only travel a short distance they are surroundedby cells, meaning that damage will definitely be sustained. The toxicity of alpharays is approximately 20 times that of gamma and x-rays, even at the same dosage.
Plutonium emits alpha rays, and due to the fact that it takes 24,000 years for it to
decay to half its value (called half-life), is extremely difficult to get rid of and once
inside the body will continue to expose that body to radiation for the rest of that
personʼs life.
Beta-ray emitting radioactive iodine and strontium build up in the thyroid glandand in bones respectively, causing cancers of the thyroid and bone. Tritium, which
What is nuclear power, what is radioactivity?

9External exposure

Internal exposure

Types of radiation
Gamma rays

Radioactive iodine
Beta rays

Thyroid gland

Alpha rays

(helium nuclide)

X-raysNeutron rays
Beta rays(electrons)

Figure 5 Internal and External Exposure

is problematic because it cannot be eliminated from contaminated water, emits beta
rays but actually gets into human genes and is more highly toxic than other betaray emitting nuclides. Cesium 137 emits beta and gamma rays, and due to having
the same properties as potassium, is distributed throughout the body including themuscles, causing damage. In this way, when it comes to internal exposure, the organ
where accumulation takes place and the damage caused differs depending on thekind of nuclide.
■ The relationship between radiation dosage and damage to health

The impact that radiation has on the body depends on the dosage. In terms of units
for measuring dosage, there is the Gray (Gy) which measures the energy absorbed
by materials, and also the Sievert (Sv), which takes into consideration the effect onliving organisms. 1Gy of x-rays, gamma rays and beta rays is proportionate to 1Sv.
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommends
the annual dosage limit for the public to be 1 millisievert (“mSv”), a value thatmost countries have adopted. What does it mean to be exposed to 1 mSv? Figure
6 shows how on average one ray of radiation permeates one cell nucleus. The adultbody is made up of approximately 60 trillion cells; exposure to 1 mSv per year
means that in one year, on average one ray of radiation passes through the nucleiof every cell in the body.
10

Chapter 1

CellsNuclei

1 mSv

5 mSv

Figure 6 What does it mean to be exposed to 1 mSv of radiation?

Radiation contains a huge amount of energy, so even one ray can cause damage tonumerous molecules in the body. It inflicts particularly serious damage to DNA, theblueprint of the body. Although it is possible for cells to repair radiation induced
DNA damage, DNA damage is usually complex so the repairs are generally notaccurate. This results in mutations and cancer.
If a person is exposed to somewhere in the region of 7000 mSv throughout theirwhole body at once, their DNA will be ripped to shreds and they will certainly
die. There is no way to save them. 50% would die from exposure to approximately
4000 mSv. Exposure to such large quantities of radiation will bring on nausea,
vomiting, diarrhea, fever and in acute cases symptoms include bloody bowel
discharge, hair loss, and subcutaneous bleeding, followed by death. Due to thesymptoms manifesting a short while after exposure, these symptoms are called“acute radiation syndrome”. Exposure to 100 mSv results in a temporary decreasein lymph corpuscles and sperm; dosages below this are not thought to result inacute radiation syndrome. This dosage is called the “threshold” of acute disorder,
and anything under 100 mSv is considered to be low dosage.
Even people who have recovered from acute radiation syndrome, long after the
event, experience cancer and other illnesses depending on the dosage they were
exposed to. With exposure to low doses also, there is an increased incidence ofcancer in proportion to the dosage. There is no threshold beneath which the risk ofcancer dissipates. Put another way, as there is no safe dosage of radiation. The ICRP
chooses to adopt a linear non-threshold model (LNT) (Figure 8). If 10,000 people
are exposed to 1 mSv, 1 person will get cancer, this figure rising to 10 people in thecase of exposure to 10 mSv. This calculation is based on an estimate of half of therisk derived from hibakusha, survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima andNagasaki, and as such has been criticized for underestimating the risk.
Sensitivity to radiation is highest among embryos that are undergoing rapid DNA
What is nuclear power, what is radioactivity?

11

2 dead in the 1999 JCO accident

The greater the dosage, the more
symptoms appear, becoming severe
Temporary decrease in lymph
corpuscles, sperm
100mSv: Threshold of acutedisorderCT ScanLevels below
100mSv are called
Low Level Radiation

Annual radiation exposure upper limit
for general public

Mammography
Chest X-Ray (mass screening)

Natural radiation: Global average 2.4mSv/year

Cancer cases per 10,000 people

Figure 7 Relationship between exposure dosage and health impairment

Exposed dose (mSv)
Figure 8 Relationship between dosage and incidence of cancer

12

Chapter 1

Carcinogenic risk Lateeffects

Radiation Dose (mSv)

50% die

Acute syndrome

Over 99.9% die
In te rn a l b lee din g, hai r l oss,melena, vomiting, diarrhea,
nausea, fever, etc

synthesis and infants, and it decreases as age increases. What is more, special caremust be taken with children as they have many years ahead of them and could
well be exposed to radiation or to many other chemical substances later on in life.
Sensitivity to radiation differs according to gender, with women showing a greater
sensitivity than men. (Figure 9)
Although the exposure dosage limit for the general public is 1 mSv per year, thisis not a safe amount, merely the product of a compromise that fails to balance thepotential risks and cost to society. There is a limit in place for nuclear plant workers
which dictates that exposure over 5 years must not exceed 100 mSv, with no single
year exceeding 50 mSv. Areas where radiation work is carried out and the dosage ismore than 5.2 mSv per year are defined as Radiation Controlled Areas. These areas
are off limits to anyone under 18. Smoking and eating/drinking are not permitted
in this zone.

❶ Women are more easily impacted by effects of radiation❷ The lower the age, the higher the sensitivity to radiation
No. of people per 10,000 populationMale❶ Women have a higher
sensitivity to radiation
than men; the lower theage, the bigger thedifference in impact

Female❷ The sensitivity of 0-year
old baby is 4 times thatof a 40-year old

Figure 9 Sensitivity to radiation by age, gender (no. of incidences of cancer among population of 100,000 people)(NAIIC Report)

What is nuclear power, what is radioactivity?

13

The current repatriation policy being promoted in Fukushima is trying to getpeople to resume their daily lives within the radiation protection zone. This policy
dictates that up to 20 mSv per year is safe. It treats residents with high sensitivity
to radiation (including pregnant women and infants) in the same way as it treats
professional radiation workers. In light of the above international exposure dosage
limits this is a highly reckless policy.

● Dilemma of a professor from a national university

Before the nuclear accident, the maximum permissible amount of radiation for citizens
was 1 mSv per year. After the accident, the maximum limit was raised twenty times. Many
people did not accept this high permissible level of radiation and chose to evacuate. Ms
Junko Gonda (43, pseudonym) and her children, who are 16 and 13, used to live in a housenear Fukushima University, but evacuated and now live in Tokyo. However, her husband
Jiro (46, also a pseudonym) is an associate professor at Fukushima University. Because it is anational university, he does not have a choice but to obey the safety standards adopted by thegovernment. Under these circumstances, Jiro carries on living on his own near the university
against his will - just being estranged from his own family members is highly stressful. Whatmakes Jiro feel even worse is that as an admissions and public relations member of staff, he
has to promote Fukushima University to young high school students. Despite the fact that hehas evacuated his own 16 year old child, he feels incredibly torn and a profound sense of guilt
about trying to entice teenage children to apply to Fukushima.

14

Chapter 1

Chapter 2
What happened at Fukushima,and 10 lessons learned

1 Do not be fooled by the “Nuclear Power is Safe” propaganda■ Nuclear Power came to Japan, a country which already experienced nuclear
bombings at the hands of the United States

In the 1950s, it was the United Statesthat put forth the proposal to build
nuclear plants in Japan, a country
in which Hiroshima and Nagasaki
were still reeling from nuclear
bombing. The United States was
bent on promulgating the “peacefuluse of nuclear power” around theglobe, in an aim to keep nuclear
weapons development under thecontrol of the USA during the Cold
War Era. This is because nuclear
materials produced in nuclear plants Hiroshima A-Bomb Dome
Photo: Takashi Kuroda
can alternatively be used in nuclear
weapons. In Japan also, politicians and media on the “peaceful use” bandwagon
firmly planted the awareness in Japanese society that nuclear weaponry including
atom and hydrogen bombs are different entities altogether to the “peaceful use” ofnuclear power.
During the mid 1960s, commercial nuclear power generation shifted into fullswing, with nuclear plants built along the coastlines of economically disadvantaged,
depopulated areas in order to meet the ballooning electricity demands of urban
areas like Tokyo and Osaka.
■ Why were nuclear power plants built in Fukushima?

Like many other areas where nuclear power plants are located, Futaba County on
the coast of Fukushima Prefecture did not have any prominent industries, and in
most households one person would have to go to earn money in a city to support
the family. Also, Fukushima Prefecture had long since had the role of supplying
energy to Tokyo, including coal mining and hydroelectric power generation.
Electricity made in Fukushima was not consumed in Fukushima, but sent to Tokyo.
The relationship between a major urban area consuming vast amounts of electricity
and a region forced to depend on the power plants that generate this electricity was
16

Chapter 2

certainly intertwined with the problem of economic disparity between regions in Japan.
■ The situation of host municipalities, and negotiations with candidate sites

When the enticement policy for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant wasannounced in 1960, municipalities were welcoming, in the hope that the buildingof nuclear plants would attract other factories and contribute to invigorating
the local economy. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) brought the local
municipal leaders and employees to the bargaining table and set about negotiating
the acquisition of land rights as well as compensation for fishing rights. Voices ofconcern and resisting opinions were met with the reassurance that “with radiation
there is no danger, nor will there be any damage”.
In the second half of the 1960s, a movement developed in Fukushima strongly
opposed to the further construction of nuclear power plants. In the backdrop to thiswere increasingly severe pollution problems nation-wide and continuing problems
at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant which had started operating. The
Fukushima Daini (Number Two) Nuclear Power Plant was built by keeping theprotests of local citizens in check. Construction of another nuclear power plant wasplanned for Namie-Odaka, but these plans were cancelled following a deep-seatedopposition movement from the farmer landowners in the wake of the Fukushimadisaster in 2011.
■ Establishment of the electricity subsidy system

In 1974, a series of laws were passed called the Three Power Source Development
Laws. As collateral for hosting dangerous nuclear power plants, municipalities wereable to gain from subsidies and fixed assets taxes. Subsidies were used to build
superb public facilities, and the region basked in newfound economic abundance.
However, 20 years after the power plants were built, tax revenues and subsidies
dropped sharply, casting the region into a kind of dependence whereby constructionof a new power plant would be necessary to meet the maintenance fees for all the
public facilities they had built.
■ The formation of the nuclear village, propagating the safety myth

Utilities companies, plant manufacturers, ministries such as those responsible forthe economy, trade, science and technology, the mass media, mainstream researchers– this group of people who got rich from promoting nuclear power ended up witha huge amount of influence over the political and financial worlds, and over theacademic community as well as the media. This exclusive club ended up with themoniker of “Nuclear Village”.
What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned

17During the 1960s when the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant was constructed,
the government, TEPCO
and the mass media wereunited in singing its praises,
repeating the refrain “Nuclear power is safe, clean,
dream energy”. The utilities
companies shelled out hugeamounts of money in advertising fees, and through Arch in deserted Futaba Town, that reads “Nuclear Power, Energy
television, radio, newspapers, for a Brighter Future”, March 2014, Photo provided by residents
magazines and school education pumped out their marketing campaign of “nuclear
power is definitely safe”. The local people, over decades, were led to believe this that
nuclear power was safe through lectures and induction courses, pamphlets and school
visits to the power plant facilities.
■ A complex disaster that was “unforeseen”

Following the Great East Japan earthquake in 2011, The Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant had not only lost its coolant liquid due to its vulnerability toearthquakes -as well as losing its external electricity supply - but was also struck by a
14-15 meter tsunami which knocked out its emergency electricity supply, meaningthat cooling could no longer occur, leading to a meltdown of its nuclear fuel. A
major accident followed as the hydrogen, which had built up inside exploded,
causing major damage to the reactor building and releasing massive amounts ofradioactive material in the process. The government was woefully prepared for a
combined earthquake and nuclear power plant disaster - a complex disaster withan earthquake and tsunami causing a nuclear accident. Unable to even get hold of
information about the incident, the chain of command within the government was
thrown into turmoil.
It was well known that major earthquakes with a hypocenter on the Pacific Ocean
off the coast of the Tohoku region occurred periodically over the years, and it wasalso well known that this coastline has weathered enormous tsunami in the past.
Despite this knowledge, power plants were built while underestimating the riskof earthquakes and tsunamis. Many people ended up living in the vicinity of thepower plants. Regarding tsunamis, TEPCO only made provisions for a tsunami
with a maximum height of 5.7 meters. Tokyo is only 200 kilometers away from
18

Chapter 2

Fukushima – if the response to the accident and the direction of the wind had beenslightly different, Tokyo and the entire East Japan area could easily have sustained
devastating damage.

Lesson 1 Do not be fooled by the “safety myth”
The construction and operation of nuclear power plants are promoted as being “forthe benefit of the local economy”, alongside safety reassurances that “an accident
could never happen”. Yet in many cases, this “safety” is claimed based on selective
data provided by experts who are retained by the government, manufacturers andutilities companies, who stand to gain from the construction of nuclear plants.
Once a serious accident happens, the local lives, industry and environment receive
a blow that thoroughly destroys them, from which they may not be able to recover.
At this stage, it is too late. People who peddled the safety myth, once a disaster
actually occurs, defiantly claim that it was “unforeseen”, and refuse to take any
responsibility. Residents must cooperate with independent experts to carry out
their own investigations in order to expose the plans of the government andcorporations. If a severe accident happens, evacuation countermeasures spanningseveral generations as well as environmental countermeasures will be needed – priorpreparation for such events is indispensable. Also, in order to prevent corruption
and collusion between nuclear power affiliated companies and local municipalities,
local residents must insist on full disclosure of information related to nuclear power
projects and plans.
● A mother who evacuated outside of the prefecture with her daughter

Ms Tomoko Suzuki (29, pseudonym) evacuated to neighboring Yamagata Prefecture from
Fukushima City soon after the accident, taking her 4-year-old daughter with her. She hardly
had any knowledge about radiation and had never heard of this unit called “Sievert”, but
she evacuated as one of her best friends told her that it was “a hazardous situation in which
she must not remain any longer”. As her husband did not perceive that it was a dangerous
situation, she had to go against his will and take the decision to evacuate. After that, she learnt
more about radiation by reading books recommended by her best friend, and now thinks thatwhat she did was not wrong. Her husband does not have any intention to quit his job andmove to where they are, so they now carry on their lives in two houses, with her husband
visiting on weekends. Tomoko sometimes cannot sleep, wracked with worry about how long
this situation will continue.
What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned19

2 During an emergency, the basic premise is to run away
■ Contamination spreads beyond the 30km radius

In Japan, the evacuation plan for nuclear
accidents has, in its scope, residents wholive within a 10km from the nuclear plant.
However, the Fukushima disaster showed just
how insufficient this plan was. Also of note isthat having to concentrate on evacuation during
the disaster meant that response to people
afflicted by the tsunami who needed rescuing
was delayed. Although the potency of radiation
weakens as it travels over distance, dust andother small particles contaminated by radiation
are transported by the wind. The direction of
the wind and the features of the land largely
influence the resulting radioactive dispersal andReactor 4 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
contamination. Also, in cases where it rains or Power Plant, destroyed in the Accident
snows while radioactive particles are being July 2011 Photo: JANIC
carried along by the wind, these particles stick to the rain or snow and create hot
spots in the area on which they fall (places that are extremely highly contaminated).
In the absence of snow or rain, the particles are carried yet further. After the 2011
incident at Fukushima, it was discovered that some particles travelled over 100km
away from the nuclear plant. The impact of highly concentrated radioactive water
being flushed into the sea after the accident has been detected as far away as thewestern seaboard of the United States.
■ Radioactive particles flowed northwest from the power plant

Despite confirmation of contamination throughout the whole of Eastern Japan,
at the time of the accident the government did not issue any evacuation orders or
evacuation directives to people living beyond the 30km radius. Beyond the 30km
radius, the area that was strongly impacted (mainly due to the wind direction)
was the area to the northwest direction of the nuclear plant. Unfortunately there
was also heavy snow and rain at the time, which drove the radioactive particles
downward. The affected areas were subjected to evacuation directives after the
event. The aerial current, which had been flowing to the northwest, then changed
direction and headed inland towards major cities like Fukushima and Koriyama.
20

Chapter 2

■ The situation in Fukushima City, location of the prefectural government

What went on in Fukushima City, located some 60km away as the crow flies fromthe Fukushima nuclear plant? Approximately 300,000 people reside in the area
where the Prefectural Government is located. Most people thought that everything
was safe. But in actual fact, the wind had picked up a huge amount of radioactive
particles, which were now raining down from above. Four days after the accident,
on the night of March 15, 2011, the radiation dosage (as announced by Fukushima
Prefecture on March 16) reached 23.88 microsieverts per hour (more than 100
times the general maximum permissible dose). On March 16, radioactive iodine
and cesium were detected in tap water. The same circumstances prevailed in thecommercial city of Koriyama, 45km to the south of Fukushima City. Until thelast, neither city was issued with evacuation directives or advisories from thegovernment or authorities. Serious contamination spread throughout the coastal
area of the prefecture as well as in various cities, towns and villages, and beyond that
into many prefectures in the vicinity.
Radioactive particles can, depending on the weather conditions, be dispersed to
Results of the 4th aerial monitoring by MEXT
(total deposition amount of Cesium 134, 137 inearth’s surface within 80km range of Fukushima
Daiichi Power Plant)

Total deposition amount of Cesium 134, 137 in earth’s
surface in the whole eastern Japan area, reflecting the
4th aerial monitoring data

Data: MEXT media presentation materials, December 16, 2011 (Monitoring Period: October 22-November 5, 2011)

What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned

21

locations so far away that it almost seems impossible. The spread of these particles
does not necessarily occur in a concentric fashion.

Lesson 2 During an emergency, the basic premise is to run away

Depending on factors such as weather conditions, radioactive materials can bedispersed to places much further than might be expected. Such dispersion is also
not limited to a concentric spread.
When an emergency situation occurs at a nuclear power plant, irrespective ofwhether there are evacuation orders or not, one must run away in the first instance;in other words, to safeguard your own life, get as far away as possible from thepower plant as quickly as you can. It is important to put in place evacuation plans
and conduct evacuation drills in the case of an accident not only in municipalities
in which nuclear power plants are located, but also in surrounding municipalities
that may also be impacted by a nuclear accident.
In some cases, nuclear accidents can escalate to a complex disaster if anearthquake/tsunami is involved. Given this fact, it is indeed possible that due totraffic congestion and destroyed infrastructure, it will be physically impossible toevacuate. There are also people for whom evacuation is problematic, including theill, elderly, and those with disabilities or who are hospitalized. In these cases, it isimportant to stay securely at home, insulate the house from radioactive particles inthe external air, and to concentrate on gathering information. Evacuation of suchpeople requiring assistance may have tragic results unless transportation means
and receiving facilities are secured. To make mutual evacuation and reception ofpatients and clients possible, hospitals and aged care facilities should prepare forsuch a situation through building cooperative relationships with other facilities ina wide geographical area, and creating concrete plans including the movements ofmedical and care staff. Even if you evacuate, the place where you have evacuatedto may be in danger of exposure to radiation depending on the wind direction, so
gathering information about this is indispensable. Sending out information using
the Internet is a useful means for collecting/sharing information. However, power
cuts for an extended period of time are a possibility, so a battery or hand-operated
radio is a smart choice.

22

Chapter 2

3 Access to information and leaving records is vital■ Evacuation started with an absence of any detailed information

After the nuclear accident occurred, hardly any municipalities in the vicinity of
the nuclear plant received direct evacuation orders from the government; in othermunicipalities, chiefs learned of evacuation orders through the television, or gave
evacuation orders based on their own judgment, before receiving any official
information.
The majority of residents could not obtain detailed information, with someresidents evacuating unaware that a nuclear accident had taken place. Because thechief cabinet secretary appeared on television repeating that “there is no immediate
effect on health“ and that the evacuation directive was being issued just to be safe,
many residents assumed that they would soon be able to return home and on thatbasis, evacuated with just the clothes they were wearing - leaving behind important
personal items and documents, livestock and pets. In the end, they were unable toreturn for a long period of time.
■ Extremely problematic evacuation

After the disaster struck, some people could not evacuate due to not having
enough gasoline. Many people formed long queues in an attempt to buy gasoline.
Resultantly, the roads from the coastal to the inland part of Fukushima were
thoroughly congested with people trying to evacuate in their cars.
Evacuation advisories from the government extended from a 2km radius toa 10 and then 20km radius, as the seriousness of the damage gradually become
apparent. Many people had to re-evacuate over and over again, becoming ill dueto this exhausting process. In terms of the environment inside evacuation centers,
the conditions were extremely difficult for mothers with children, elderly people,
and those with disabilities. The situation was worse still for hospitalized people
and those in aged care homes; some could not endure the long transferal time, andmany actually died while in the process of evacuating.
■ Neglecting to make use of SPEEDI

Despite having SPEEDI (System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency
Dose Information) in Japan in order to predict how radioactive particles will spreadout during a nuclear accident, it wasnʼt until March 23 that the prediction data
was released, making it completely redundant as a tool for evacuation. Due to this,What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned

23many residents ended up evacuating to areas with even higher radiation doses, andbeing exposed to radiation that could easily have been avoided.
■ Protracted evacuation in indoor shelters. High dosage areas outside the 30km
radius, where evacuation advisories were issued lateOn the evening of March 11, the day the earthquake and tsunami happened in
Fukushima Prefecture, evacuation directives were issued for residents living within
a 3km radius of the power plant, after which the directives were extended to 20km.
Residents living within a 20-30km radius were issued with directives to “shelterindoors”. “Shelter indoors” means not going outside in order to avoid radioactive
particles, staying inside as much as possible. People were advised to seek shelter
within highly airtight concrete buildings. In reality, most residents ended up in
their own homes, turning off their fans and air-conditioning. Most Japanesehouses, however, are made of wood and are simply not built for blocking out theexternal airflow.
In Minamisoma City, 20-30km to the immediate north of the nuclear plant, many
people remained sheltered indoors and the flow of supplies into the city ceased,with shops, banks, and gasoline stations all closed. This left residents isolated ina town where their daily lifeline had ceased to function. The mayor decided topost a video with English subtitles on an Internet video hosting site. His plea was

Minamisoma City Mayor Katsunobu Sakurai appealing for help on YouTube
after the disaster. March 2011

24

Chapter 2this: We are facing the difficulty of even distributing necessary goods... the protection
measure to stay indoors issued by the government restricted our logistics. We ask for yourhelp, volunteers, we need help to transport supplies, but we must depend on volunteers
who could act at their own risk, because of the measures to remain indoors issued by thegovernment... the people are literally drying up as if they are under starvation tactics.
There were also areas such as Iitate Village, which were located outside of the 30km
radius but still suffered extremely high amounts of radiation dosage due to winddirection and land features. Until it was designated as a planned evacuation zone
in April, many residents were left for over a month in an area with a high radiation
dosage, forcing them to be exposed to radiation. It wasnʼt until the middle of Junethat the majority of the villagers were fully evacuated.
■ Voluntary evacuation from outside the evacuation instruction zone

In cities including Fukushima and Koriyama that were not subject to evacuation
directives, many people voluntarily evacuated in order to avoid health damage fromradiation, mainly families with young children. People who voluntarily evacuate
receive practically no support or compensation from TEPCO and the authorities,
and end up being forced into a situation where they have to cover their losses due toevacuating out of their own pockets. There are many “mother and child evacuees”,
from families where the father stays behind to work – resulting in families that haveto pay for the upkeep of two households.
■ More than 120,000 people are still living in evacuation

As of September 2014, three and a half years since the accident, approximately
126,000 people are still living in evacuation and cannot return to their homes. These
are only the numbers that the authorities have for Fukushima Prefecture; in reality
there are many people who evacuated away from other areas in Eastern Japan, mostof whom evacuated due to the impact of the nuclear power plant accident.
In Fukushima Prefecture and in the surrounding areas, many families of two oreven three generations lived together under one roof. After the accident, however,approximately half of all the households who evacuated ended up having to lives
their daily lives separated from family members with whom they had previously
co-habited. Many elderly people are living in isolation in temporary housing, anddespite having been in good health prior to evacuation, cases of people suffering ill
health and passing away are increasing.

What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned25

Total number of evacuees = 126,327

No. of evacuees as of September 30, 2014
(using data from Fukushima Prefecture Evacuee Support Section)■ Increasing number of disaster-related deaths

Rather than direct damage due to the earthquake and tsunami, the number of“disaster-related deaths” indirectly caused by factors including deteriorating
physical condition while in an evacuation center were as follows: Iwate Prefecture
441 deaths, Miyagi Prefecture 889 deaths, Fukushima Prefecture 1704 deaths (asof end of March 2014) – Fukushima Prefecture, which experienced the damageof the nuclear disaster, clearly has the highest number of “indirect deaths.” These
numbers include suicides by people who lost all hope about their future, having
been forced to evacuate away from radioactive contamination in their hometowns.
Comparison of direct deaths/disaster-related
deaths in 3 afflicted prefectures

Comparison of direct deaths/disaster-related deaths in 3 afflicted prefectures(using data from May 27 2014 report by Reconstruction Agency)

26

Chapter 2

■ Government and municipalities are rushing citizens back to their homes

In contrast to the situation after Chernobyl, the Japanese government did not choose
the option of group relocation away from contaminated regions. Two and half years
after the accident, although the government endorsed a policy of rebuilding lives
through relocation for citizens from “difficult to return zones” where the annual
radioactive dosage exceeds 50 mSv, their policies for other evacuated areas are
based on people returning home; many people who evacuated have been forced
into severe uncertainty about their futures, unsure whether or not they will ever beable to return.
In areas with annual exposure dosage below 20 mSv, the government is hastening
decontamination work, hoping to lift evacuation directives one by one. Annual
exposure of 20 mSv is 20 times the annual dose limit of 1 mSv that normallyapplies; if you consider that after Chernobyl, areas with annual exposure of morethan 5 mSv were designated as forced relocation zones and areas with more than
1 mSv were designated as zones with the right to evacuate, this baseline set in
Fukushima is extremely high.

Lesson 3 Access to information and leaving records is vital

As learned from the experience of Fukushima, during an emergency there is thepossibility that governments and utilities companies may not provide the appropriate
information to residents. In areas housing nuclear plants and in the surrounding
regions, residents must during normal times (before disasters strike) confirm how
information will be provided during emergencies as well as ascertaining systems
for disclosing information. They must, when evacuating, have facemasks, raincoats,long boots and any prescription medicines on hand.
Households in the vicinity of nuclear plants must have a stock of iodine preparation,and local schools and residents organizations absolutely must have their own
radiation counters. Local hospitals and public facilities must secure a wholebody counter (a device for measuring internal exposure to radiation in the humanbody) and in order to be able to use it during an emergency, should implement theappropriate operation rules together with training and maintenance.
During normal times, residents must build a network of independent experts whomthey can turn to during an emergency to provide advice when there is no public
What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned27

information available, to verify public information or to provide a second opinion.
Also, although there were many facilities near the power plant that could provide
emergency radiation exposure medical care, the enormity of the incident meantthat these facilities had to be used for evacuation purposes rather than their original
intended purpose. The Fukushima accident showed the need for a fundamental
re-think of the entire emergency radiation exposure medical treatment framework.
Furthermore, during an emergency, it is extremely important for individuals tokeep records of what they did (time spent indoors/outdoors, how they moved
around and where did they go, the construction of the facilities they stayed in,weather, what they ate etc.). In any case, records of actions/behavior of the time
immediately an accident will have a huge bearing on the validity of health care in
subsequent years and months.

Tourist area within Fukushima City with a high radiation dosage of 0.84
microsieverts p/hour. April 2013 Photo: JANIC

28

Chapter 2

4 People affected by the disaster have the right to acomprehensive health survey and disclosure of information■ The biggest concern – The impact on children’s health

After it transpired that the nuclear accident had released a huge amount ofradioactive materials, the most pressing concern not only for Fukushima but also
for the whole of Eastern Japan was the effects of exposure to radiation on childrenʼshealth. Compared to adults, children and children in vitro are more susceptible tothe effects of radiation as they are undergoing rapid cell division and still growing.
Following the 1986 Chernobyl accident, many children who were exposed toradiation developed thyroid cancer and other illnesses.
After nuclear accidents, the government and prefectural governors are supposed
to advise that residents should be administered with iodine preparation to prevent
illnesses such as thyroid cancer, which are caused by radiation exposure. However,in the case of the Fukushima disaster, the judgment made by the government(Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters) did not actually reach the disastercountermeasures office in Fukushima, and the prefectural governor did not givethe order to administer iodine preparation. What this meant was that among
cities, towns and villages within the prefecture, there were municipalities who did
administer iodine preparation or distributed it to residents, and there ware also
municipalities who did not distribute it, waiting for instructions to do so. The end
result of all this was that despite having stocks of iodine preparation, people who
were actually administered it were limited to residents in several municipalities
arbitrarily chosen by the town hall, and various individuals who were privately issued
with the preparation by people affiliated with the Fukushima Medical University.
■ Problems with reopening schools

There were also problems associated with the criteria for reopening schools
following the accident. In April 2011, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (MEXT) decided on a yardstick for determining theusage of the school grounds. This was an annual limit of 20 mSv (hourly doseof 3.8 microsieverts), which is 20 times higher than the annual exposure dosage
limit for the general public during normal times, 1 mSv. There was public outcry
about this benchmark being far too high to guarantee the safety of children, andfollowing a deep-seated opposition movement led by parents, there was no choice
the government had to say that it would aim for a maximum dosage for school
children of 1 mSv. However, an annual limit of 20 mSv remains the benchmark for
What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned29people returning home after evacuating.
■ Citizens willing to learn

Many residents from areas where there was no evacuation directive issued ended up
staying in these areas, full of worries about the effects of radiation on their health.
Such residents, in particular parents with children, sought to avoid unnecessary
radiation exposure by stopping hanging washing outside, wearing face masks whengoing outside, and getting hold of uncontaminated foods. Because residents had
never been taught any knowledge about such radiation protection measures before
the incident occurred, most people had to use the Internet and books to study
independently.
Although various experts visited the contaminated areas and spoke with residents
about the effects of radiation, their opinions were at odds with each other, leaving
residents unsure about what to believe. Among these experts, one doctor who
was appointed as Advisor to Fukushima Prefecture on Radiation Health Risk
Management made comments including: “As long as annual exposure does notexceed 100 mSv, there is no impact on health”; and also “go ahead and let your kids
play outside”. He was subsequently criticized by citizen groups for making people
become exposed to radiation that they should have avoided.
■ Citizen-led radiation measurement posts

Citizens were filled with a sense of mistrust toward the government and authorities
following their response after the accident. Thus, they got hold of instruments tomeasure the airborne radiation dosage by themselves, and set about measuring theradiation dosage around them. Instruments for measuring radiation dosage in food(Becquerel monitor) and devices for measuring radiation dosage inside the human body (whole-body counter)are expensive, so various citizenʼsgroups received support from outside as well as gathering donations
to purchase these instruments,
enabling them to set up citizenled radiation measurement posts
in various areas. A year after theaccident, many such measurement
posts were subsequently secured bymunicipalities.
CSO member involved in measuring radiation in foodJuly 2012 Photo: JANIC

30

Chapter 2

■ Recreation programs for children

No longer able to enjoy outdoor activities at school and other outside natureexperiences was blocking the healthy growth and development of children. Of
particular concern are the physical and mental risks facing infants and children
who could no longer enjoy outdoor exercise. Action was needed for “spiritualdevelopment” which is directly linked to measurable impacts such as a decline in
exercise capacity and obesity.
In order to maintain the health ofchildren living in contaminatedareas, citizens took the initiativein spreading activities called “recreation programs”, under whichchildren are taken for a certain
period of time to a region where
there are no concerns over radiation, where they can play to theirheartʼs content and recuperate. Children enjoy observing fauna in an area free from radioactive
contamination, under a recreation program. May 2014 Photo: Shalom
Citizens' groups throughout Japan continue to invite children from contaminated areas and hold camps or organizedfacilities where parents and children could stay together for a while.
These recreation programs were based on programs that were run in Ukraine andBelarus following the Chernobyl accident. In Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, there
are still nationally funded programs of up to 3 weeks available with the aim of
mitigating the effects of radiation on childrenʼs bodies and maintaining theirhealth. In Japan, however, there are no such moves afoot by the government orauthorities to provide this sort of recuperation over the long term.
■ The absence of a government-run comprehensive health survey

After the Fukushima accident, it is indispensable that the government implements
a comprehensive health survey, to protect residents who may have been exposed
to radiation and the health of residents living in contaminated areas, to prevent
health damage due to radiation before it manifests, and provide medical service
to swiftly handle symptoms when they appear. Despite the fact that radioactive
contamination crossed prefectural boundaries, the only government-funded healthsurvey currently in place is the “Fukushima Health Management Survey”, yet thediagnostic scope and items of this survey are limited.
What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned31One of the items in this survey was a thyroid echo examination for prefectural
citizens who were 18 years or younger at the time of the accident. Results of earlyexaminations done in March 2014 were that 103 people examined were diagnosed
with confirmed or suspected cancer. While expert opinions are divided, Fukushima
Prefecture is taking the position that these figures are not significantly high, andthey are not acknowledging any causal relationship between these diagnoses andthe nuclear power plant accident. As the authorities continue to stress that “there
are no effects from radiation”, an atmosphere prevails where it is increasingly
difficult to voice anxieties about the health implications of radiation, leaving
parents wracked with unimaginable levels of worry about their childrenʼs fate.
Furthermore, these examinations are voluntary, yet it is important to increase theratio of people checked.

Lesson 4 People affected by the disaster have the right to
a comprehensive health survey and disclosure of information

With Fukushima and Chernobyl alike, organizations with vested interests innuclear power such as governments and utilities companies, as well as the IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency), attempt to play down the damage posed tohealth by radiation. Those who end up sustaining the damage are those afflicted bydisasters, including children. It is vital that those people affected by a disaster insist
on the right to a comprehensive health survey done by an independent entity thatis not subject to any political influence.
The primary objective of health examinations is not to gather data, but to ensurethat the information is returned in its entirety to the affected persons themselves.
Opportunities for a second opinion and follow-up examinations must also be
assured for affected persons full of anxiety about their condition.
In Fukushima, on the grounds of an emergency situation, the annual radiation
dosage limit for ordinary citizens including pregnant women and children,
was loosened to the same level as that of professional nuclear plant workers.
Governments and business operators will stoop to such levels in order to reduce
the scope of compensation payments, or for other financial or political gain. This
threatens the basic human rights of affected persons; extraordinary measures
enacted on the grounds of an emergency situation must be removed at the earliest
possible opportunity.
32

Chapter 2

5 To ensure food safety and to protect agriculture, forestry
and fishery industries, citizens must participate inmeasurement. Information disclosure is also vital■ Contamination of soil and produce

Due to the spread of radioactive materials after the accident, agriculture in
Fukushima Prefecture took a massive hit. Early spring vegetables cultivated at thetime of the accident were found to be highly contaminated with radiation, andshipment was prohibited. Primary industry collapsed in most places subject tocompulsory evacuation in Fukushima Prefecture. Contamination spread outside ofevacuation districts, and Fukushima farmers went through a major ordeal related tothe problems caused by contamination of their land and their produce.
In the wake of the nuclear accident, Japan set a tentative standard of 500 Bequerel(Bq) per kilogram for radioactive materials in foods (March 17, 2011), prohibiting
the shipment of foods that exceed this standard. (Bq is the unit to represent theamount of radioactive substance, while Sv is the unit to measure the radiation thatwas released). Until this point, Japan only had the limit of 370 Bq/kg, which was
the limit value for imported foods established after the Chernobyl accident. This
caused great confusion as to how to apply different standards to foods depending
whether they were produced in Japan or imported foods. (For example, would 400
bq/kg be acceptable because it is made in Japan, but unacceptable if imported?).
Subsequently, on April 1, 2012, Japan established a new standard for radioactive
materials in foods (see graph), based upon which all foods in Japan have been
Base standard values for radioactive cesium (based on data from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare)

Food Group

Tentative limit forimported foods(Bq/kg)*1

Tentative limit
soon after
accident(Bq/kg)*2

Current limit(Bq/kg)Applicable
PeriodFrom November 1, 1986
to present

From March 17, 2011 toMarch 31, 2012

From April 1 2012 topresent

Drinking Water
Milk
Baby Foods
General Foods

200
370*

10
50

20*

50

500

100

*1 Only applies to imported foods*2 Selected 4 radioactive materials of which consumption should be limited – radioactive iodine, radioactive cesium,
uranium, plutonium. Uranium values are shown for baby foods. Was advised that radioactive iodine should notexceed 100 bq/kg for powdered milk for babies.

What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned

33

controlled since the accident. For imported foods, the existing standard of 370
Becquerel per kilogram remains in place.
■ Initiatives for monitoring done by farmers and citizens, and initiatives for
information disclosureRadioactive materials were detected in many vegetables harvested directly after
the accident. Although the authorities did carry out some sampling surveys of theradiation dosage in agricultural produce, the number of samples was limited, and they
were unable to specify which areas the specimens came from. Farmers were unable
to determine whether it was OK to eat the produce from their own plots or not. The
government and authorities did not
implement a sufficient investigation.
Despite having no data, they stressedsafety in an attempt to play down thedamage caused by the accident. Most
people ended up thinking that they
could not trust the authorities or thegovernment. Enlisting support fromcitizens' groups, private companies
and universities outside of Fukushima
and from overseas, citizens and farmers
who had never dealt with radiation
before began educating themselvesand doing their own measurements.
The citizens and farmers needed toascertain whether the produce fromwithin the prefecture was safe or not.
Farmers did not limit measurement Fukushima Organic Agricultural Network members
measuring radiation on the landof radioactive materials to their own December 2011 Photo: JANIC
produce, but also began measuring
produce from around the region.They believed that careful and precise measurements
of farmland would provide them with valuable hints about how contamination
spreads, and how to prevent it from migrating into foods. Despite worries about
harvested vegetables, most items were well below the benchmark levels set by thegovernment. This really buoyed the morale of the farmers, and served to protect thecommunity.
However, despite these initiatives, consumers and distributors concerned about
34

Chapter 2

radioactive contamination stopped buying produce from Fukushima. This patterncontinued in spite of the fact that produce was well below the government
standards, in what became known as “damage caused by harmful rumors.” To
overcome this, farmers began initiatives in tandem with municipalities anduniversities. Fukushima University, with whom cooperatives and agricultural
coops were implementing measurement of agricultural land within the prefecture,
made the following recommendations: 1) Distribution map of radioactive materials
across agricultural land; 2) Database of migration coefficients by region/item andcountermeasures to prevent absorption; 3) Improving monitoring at the producer
level prior to shipment; 4) Improving monitoring by both distributors and in
consumer areas together with information disclosure will win back the trust of
consumers and help to prevent any harmful rumors.
In the same manner as decontamination of urban areas, for agricultural land also
the government adopted the method of stripping off a few centimeters of topsoil.
For farmers, however, the soil in their plots is extremely precious, built up overmany years. For them it is simply unacceptable to hack off the topsoil and discard
it. Roughly one month after the nuclear accident, Fukushima Prefecture made clear
its “approach regarding cropping”, as follows: “Due to soil mixing, most of theradioactive cesium has been adsorbed, meaning that it cannot be absorbed into
produce…as far as possible, carry out measures including composting”. Such an“approach” as this, which thins down radioactive cesium through soil mixing,
keeping migration in check, is still recognized today among organic farmers andresearchers both inside and outside of Fukushima as a starting point for study andinvestigation.
Just as important as preventing contamination of produce is the issue of farmworkers being exposed to radiation. Exposure of farmhands working for extended
periods of time on comparatively highly contaminated land is still a major concern,
particularly among younger workers. What is required from now on is a long-termand ongoing health control framework that is publicly funded.
■ Major damage to dairy and livestock

One week after the accident, radioactive materials were detected in fresh milk from
Iitate Village, of which shipment was prohibited. Farmers spent everyday milking
cows and then throwing away the milk. Subsequently, the cows were resold outsideof the region, and dairy farmers in the evacuation zone had to actually close down
their businesses. The same goes for livestock farmers. Despite serious contaminationin areas adjoining evacuation zones, on the grounds of not being a zone included in
What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned

35the scope of evacuation, these farmers were not eligible for any public subsidies orsupport; it was nothing short of absolute misery for them. Milk and dairy products
were screened at their raw material (fresh milk) stage.
Regarding feed crop, in some regions of Fukushima Prefecture and in Iwate
Prefecture to the north, coarse feed and grazing were subject to “voluntary restraint”.
Dairy farmers in these regions subject to restraint worked hard to ensure the safetyof fresh milk by purchasing imported coarse feed to give to their dairy cattle as analternative to their usual feed, which came at considerable cost to their business.
Feed for pigs and cattle was subject to screening with the same standards as dairy
farmers. All beef farmers in areas where shipment restrictions were applied had toundergo full screening; municipalities also carried out sample monitoring on otherkinds of meat (pork, chicken)
and eggs coming from slaughterhouses in these areas.
Unlike cows, pigs and chicken
are not fed with feed crop, andwere mainly fed with imported grains. There were concerns
about contamination of eggs
from poultry raised on small
farms fed with locally sourced
feed, but unexpectedly there
was not much evidence ofcontamination.

Cows dead from starvation in the deserted evacuation zone
April 2011 Photo: Naomi Toyoda■ The fisheries industry – facing tough consumer scrutiny

Related to the problem of contaminated water containing radioactive materials thathas continued to leak into the ocean since the accident, consumers are continuing
to cast a stern eye over the contamination of marine products. Fisheries andtrawl fishing businesses along the Fukushima Prefecture coastline are exercising
voluntary restraint for their operations due to the impact of the nuclear accident.
Under such circumstances, Fukushima Prefecture has made public fish species
deemed to be safe, based on the results of over 10,000 monitoring measurements.
Currently, small-scale operations and sales are taking place on an experimental
basis, while obtaining feedback from purchasers of these fish species. In this way,
“experimental operation” is continuing in order to acquire the basic knowledge
36

Chapter 2

required to re-start fisheries operations in Fukushima Prefecture. As of September
30, 2014, 52 species are included in the scope of this experimental operation.
The Fukushima Prefectural Federation of Fisheries Co-operative Associations isspearheading the sales of these marine products, with the results of all screenings
for radioactive materials made public. Fish species found to have over 50 bq/kilo
are being removed from the scope of experimental operations by the Fisheries
Cooperative. Concerned about the issue of contaminated water, Fukushima
Prefecture is bolstering radiation screening of the ocean; in the permitted fishingzones, radioactive cesium and tritium have not been detected, or have only been
detected at extremely low levels. It should be noted however, that there are concerns
from some quarters over the fact that the types of nuclei subject to screening arelimited.
Freshwater fish have a biological characteristic whereby it is very easy to take inradioactive cesium but very difficult to get rid of it. There are still many instancesin both Fukushima Prefecture and indeed a lot of Eastern Japan where freshwater
fish contain radioactive cesium in excess of the baseline standard (except for farmedfish). Mountain stream fishermen are required to follow a catch-and-release policy,
and have been instructed by the local authorities not to take any caught fish hometo eat.

Lesson 5 It is important to create a monitoring system inwhich producers and consumers alike can participate

Once a situation arises where there are questions about the impact of radiation, even
if producers of fisheries products demonstrate safety through rigorous screening, it
is not at all easy to recover the trust of the market. And even if the government andproducers endeavor to brush away harmful rumors, consumers will not feel peaceof mind unless they can feel trust towards the monitoring and screening levels/
systems, and even more so towards the distribution systems.
In Fukushima, four years have passed since the accident occurred yet still thesituation has not been brought to a conclusion. Fears remain about nuclear fueland contaminated water. This unease is not limited to Fukushima Prefecture, andthere is little hope of recovering trust the way things are. Put simply, it is simply
inconceivable that people will regain trust over a short period of time in primary
produce emanating from the area near the nuclear plant, which caused the disaster.
What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned

37What is more, the local industries are facing increasingly serious labor shortages
due to more people evacuating away and overall instability of the region. At thisrate, the whole local industry could face collapse. This is a problem that cannot betackled by one-off subsidies and compensation monies.
Due to the effects of radiation on primary industry produce, the primary industries
take a massive hit. Not only that; even if the impact of radiation is not so harmful,damage cannot be stopped unless there is widespread confidence among the people
in the measurement systems.
To this end, people in each country must demand that the relevant authorities
establish baseline standards for radiation pertaining to primary industry products,
food products and drinking water before a major disaster occurs. There is the danger
that even if you have strict standards during normal times, once an emergency
occurs the authorities may seek to majorly loosen or even lift these standards. Other
potential problems include screening oversights, products disguised as coming fromanother region, and data falsification. Citizens need a robust wide-area supervisionframework, including seeking advice from independent experts.
It is indispensable to always have screenings and measurements instruments forradiation in stock at all times, and to ensure a system whereby farmers, fishermen,
and consumers can carry out measurements themselves at the levels of agricultural/fisheries coops, coops and communities. Disclosure of information is the key towinning trust for screening and measurement. Citizens need to undergo training
on a regular basis in order to raise their ability to read and understand screenings
and measurements.
● Radiation straddling the prefectural borders

Mr Takashi Sato (38, pseudonym) lived in a village in Miyagi Prefecture, which borders
the northern part of Fukushima Prefecture. He had moved there 10 years ago from Tokyo,
yearning for countryside living. When the nuclear accident happened he somehow felt safe
because he lived in a different prefecture. However, in the neighboring village in Fukushima
Prefecture people were rather concerned. One of his friends measured the radiation of his
village and raised the alarm. Following this, he evacuated his wife and child to Sendai Cityin Miyagi Prefecture, where his wifeʼs parents lived. Despite his village being contaminatedwith radiation, he cannot receive any compensation from the government or prefecture forthe incomprehensible reason that it is not part of Fukushima Prefecture. Takashi learnt thehard way that “radiation does not have anything to do with borders, which are decided byhumans.”38

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6 Complete decontamination is impossible■ A house with no toilets

From the outset, Japanʼs nuclear plant policies have made no clear indication
regarding the final disposal of spent fuel. This is likened to “mansions without
toilets”. What is more, following the Fukushima accident, Japan must now disposeof rubble and other detritus covered in radiation, as well as the spent fuel andwaste substances that will be collected during the decommissioning work that willcontinue for several decades into the future.
The rubble from the disaster has sparked great debate, because of moves by theauthorities to implement wide-area disposal by transporting rubble to areas outsideof the disaster zone. Citizens kept a close eye on these moves, borne from concerns
about the diffusion of radioactive contamination. However, the investigative
commission organized by the Ministry of the Environment was not made public andwas off-limits to citizens; minutes of the meeting were not made public. 1 trillion yen
was allotted for wide area disposal, scheduled to take place over 2 years from 2011.
Decontamination work started in 2012. In post-Chernobyl Europe, however,decontamination was regarded as not being very effective given the enormous cost –thus, there were no precedents for decontamination of the scale required in Fukushima.
■ Facing up to issues that been delayed for too long

Decontamination produces decontamination waste, including soil and sand full ofradioactive particles. Decontamination waste is heaped together in temporary storage sites. Designation of these temporary storage sites was left to the cities, towns
and villages to decide, and to begin with organizing these was heavy going. As alast-ditch measure, the garbage isbeing temporarily “stored onsite” in temporary storage sites,
parks, and gardens of large houses and other premises. The latest
plan is to move this garbage into
the interim storage facilities thatare scheduled to be constructedin municipalities where Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant is locat- Decontamination of downtown areas using high pressure cleaninged (Futaba Town and Okuma equipment. February 2012 Photo: JANIC
What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned

39

Town), after which it will be sent outside the prefecture within 30 years. However,where it will end up after this storage period is still unknown.
■ Decontamination done by amateurs risking radiation exposure

Although decontamination is the job of the central government and local
municipalities, in reality it is the large-scale construction and civil engineering
companies who are sub-contracted. Most of these are major corporations, known
in Japan as “general contractors”, from outside the prefecture. These generalcontractors subcontracted to small to medium sized companies in the local area,
which in turn enlisted workers from all over the country. It was an unknown task,
approached through a process of trial and error. The basic method involves cleaning
and then removal of the topsoil. High-pressure cleaning equipment blows
radioactive materials into the rivers, which flow into the ocean. Following criticism
from citizens that radioactive materials were being unnecessarily dispersed, Tokyo
then instructed workers to retrieve all of the cleaning water.
■ Sluggish housing decontamination

Decontamination of housing was slow to get going. Decontamination of nurseries,
kindergartens and schools was either outsourced to local businesses, or could be doneby school staff and parents. In some cases, volunteers offered to help. In areas where
there were no evacuation directives, residents ended up living where there shouldhave been decontamination work implemented. Unable to wait for the authorities to
get around to their area, many residents took up the initiative themselves.
■ General contractors who promoted nuclear plants are now profiting from thenuclear accident

Most wide-area disposal of disaster rubble and decontamination work provides
profit for the major general contractors. With wide-area disposal, general contractors
receive the jobs, acting on behalf of the prefecture or Tokyo; after taking their
margin, they subcontract the work to local industrial waste contractors. At the levelof cities, towns and villages, decontamination provides an opportunity for local
contractors to form a business union together and to create some momentum forrecovery in their locality; alas, they had a hard fight when major general contractors
from outside the prefecture entered the picture. The very people who had profited
up until now from nuclear policies now set to gain from the nuclear accident.

■ A multilayered subcontracting arrangement that obstructs the sense of
mission of the workers involved in decontamination/decommissioning work

The people on the front line of decontamination work are from small to

40

Chapter 2

medium and micro-sized businesses. The work comes down from the originalcontractor, down through several other operators. It is normal to have work go fromsub-contractor to sub-sub contractor, with 4 or 5 intermediaries involved. This is
the traditional structure in Japan, not just limited to decontamination work, andcommon in construction and civil engineering. It is the same for the work todecommission a nuclear power plant. Workers are exposed to radiation and risk
their health, but it is an essential and necessary job. However, the conditions are notat all satisfactory, neither economically nor mentally. Reportedly, people working
on decommissioning the reactors in Ukraine are assured sufficient conditions; yet
in Fukushima, the conditions offered to front-line decontamination anddecommissioning workers are completely at odds with the importance of the job
and the risks involved.

Lesson 6 It is not possible to completely get rid ofradioactive contamination

Despite the term decontamination, in reality, it is not possible to completely get rid
of contamination. In most cases, it just amounts to transporting the contaminatedmaterial somewhere else. The very process of decontamination and the gathering
up of waste materials could actually increase the risk of exposure to radiation.
Accordingly, areas should be divided into those where decontamination work is
absolutely necessary and areas where it is not so necessary, so as to avoid raising thepossiblity of exposure to radiation. In the process of the decontamination work, or
due to a hit-or-miss management system for decontamination and waste materials,
the danger of exposure to radiation increases.
Rather than being left to a few municipalities and corporations, decontamination
work must be implemented under a public system with responsibility for a wide
area. It is a grave error to consider it an issue that is the personal responsibility ofafflicted municipalities and communities. Public organizations must have the dutyof responsibility to provide full explanation to afflicted residents.
In Fukushima, the tsunami and nuclear accident inflicted composite damage. There
are instances where disposal of huge amounts of rubble created by the tsunami
could not proceed due to the rubble possibly being contaminated with radiation.
Dealing with complex disasters can make the problem more and more complicated– this is a point that must be borne in mind.
What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned41

7 The accident cannot be brought to a conclusion unlessworkers are given better treatment and healthcare■ A serious worker shortage

Many workers are required to operate a nuclear plant. Before the accident, theamount of radiation that workers could be exposed to wasstrictly regulated; yet after theaccident, this limit was drastically loosened. Even when anuclear plant is operating normally, workers cannot avoid being exposed to radiation. Many
more workers are now required
to bring the accident undercontrol and to complete the dePost-disaster work within the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
commissioning work.
July 2013

As well as preventing health damage for workers, radiation exposure standards arealso used for authorizing workers compensation when health damage does occur.
However, it is evident that managers detest recognition of work-related damages,
and through faulty radiation exposure control are attempting to show the exposure
as being lower than it actually is.
■ Multi-layer subcontracting, meager wages

Workers on the frontline of reactor decommissioning receive lousy treatment for
their toil, which carries a higher exposure risk than decontamination work. Between
the original contractor that utilities companies contract with and the frontline
workers, there are many other contractors on the way down, meaning that
middlemen are all taking a cut from the workersʼ wages. Many of the workers are
irregular workers with no benefits on hourly or daily rates. Homeless people areamong some of the workers who are sent to Fukushima by urban worker dispatch
companies. In this type of industry, there are underground operators known as“people dispatchers” who are often linked to the Yakuza, or the Japanese mafia.
This multilayered employment situation within the nuclear plants has been
identified as a problem before the accident, with citizen groups appealing to
TEPCO that the Yazuka (organized crime syndicates) have gotten involved andthat it is providing a hotbed for illegal treatment of workers.
42

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■ Insufficient healthcare for workers

Nuclear plants are often constructed in depopulated areas, and people have tended
to see utilities companies and their affiliated companies as being solid and stable
places to work. However, most workers at subcontracted companies are unorganizedlaborers; frontline workers, in particular, are often temporary workers paid on adaily basis. Depending on the company, some workers donʼt even receive healthinsurance. “Hidden workers” are also widespread –where workers are notauthorized for labor as it will cause a major problem to the contracting company ifthey become ill or get injured. In Japan, nuclear plant workers accident compensation
for illnesses caused by radiation was first filed for in 1975, but was not granted. Asof 2013, only 16 people have ever been authorized for this compensation.
People actually affected by the disaster from within Fukushima Prefecture arethemselves also among the workers. Before the accident at Fukushima Daiichi
Power Plant, the ratio of subcontracted workers exposed to radiation was by far thehighest in the country, and it was becoming an issue. The issue was that workers at
Fukushima had been exposed to 4 times as much radiation as full-time employees
working in nuclear plants all over Japan; despite a lack of any accident occurring,some workers had annual exposure of as high as 8 mSv.
Before the accident, the mass media did not give much coverage at all to the issueof nuclear plant workers being exposed to radiation. While citizen groups continue
to provide steady and patient support, the utilities companies are keeping a tight lid
on information, which prevents frontline workers from telling their side of thestory. When it comes to exposure to radiation by nuclear plant workers, it is thesubcontracted laborers at the frontline who are overwhelmingly exposed. 97% of
the total amount of radiation exposed to corresponds to that of subcontracted
workers.
During work carried out on-site to bring the accident under control until March
2014, the number of workers with accumulated radiation exposure dosage greaterthan 100 mSv was 174. The highest was a TEPCO employee exposed to 678
milliseiverts, and a worker from a cooperating company at 238 mSv. There were also
cases where radiation supervision data has been falsified.
After the accident, Tokyo raised the accumulated radiation exposure upper limit forworkers to 250 mSv. Exposure in excess of 50 mSv requires mandatory annual
screening for cataracts, and exposure of over 100 mSv requires mandatory annual
screening for cancer. However, the experts involved in writing the “Self-Guarding
What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned

43

Manual for Manual Laborers Exposed to Radiation” (issued by a citizens' groupnamed “Emergency Council on Fukushima Nuclear Plant Accident”), havepointed out the fact that people exposed to radiation after Hiroshima and Nagasaki
were issued with personal health records that entitled them to free healthcare, whileon the other hand workers in Fukushima are receiving no such coverage. Theseexperts are urging the government to provide such personal health records and lifelong coverage to exposed workers.
Furthermore, actual working hours for nuclear plant laborers are much shortercompared to ordinary labor given the need for protection from radiation exposure.
Work in highly irradiated areas can be limited to as short as 10-20 minutes per day.
Even if workers know that they may develop late-onset disorders due to radiation,
they donʼt actually feel anything directly after radiation exposure. Much more
stringent management and control of radiation exposure is necessary.
■ A radical rethink of working environment and worker treatment is now required

In the preceding section, we compared the treatment of workers involved in thecleanup and decommissioning work since the nuclear accident in Fukushima withthat of Chernobyl. There is a large gap in the treatment that these two sets ofworkers received. In Japan, there are laborers being exploited through multi-layer
subcontracting with no assurance or hope for their future, while at the thick end of
the wedge are companies making a profit without getting their hands dirty at all.
This kind of working arrangement is simply not healthy. Workers involved indecommissioning operations that involve radiation exposure must be provided withsound treatment and a working environment that fulfills all aspects of safety, as well
as system that will look after them once they have retired from these jobs.

Lesson 7 Nuclear plant workers must be provided withproper health management

When nuclear plant accidents occur, in most cases, victims and their families areamong those who end up involved in cleanup and decommissioning operations.
Offsite residents and onsite workers have different concrete standards, however,the same principle applies for both that health care measures must be extremely
thorough. Above all, when workers are forced to resolve emergency situations,
there is the danger that their basic human rights are being neglected. Among otherconcerns, it is vital to insist on information disclosure regarding the conditions
44

Chapter 2

of workers. While safety and confidentiality concerns can stand in the way of
information disclosure, journalists from both countries with nuclear power andthose without must be encouraged and urged to shine a light on the conditions
faced by onsite workers.
As a matter of public responsibility, the many temporary workers must be
guaranteed medical expenses in the long run after they have retired, and be issued
with a personal health record, which entitles them to follow-up checkups later onin life.

● Radioactive waste, burnt in secret

Ms Mayumi Kanno (38, pseudonym) is originally from Tokyo, and ten years ago marrieda farmer in a village within Fukushima Prefecture. It has been four years since the nuclear
accident, and she is now worried about incinerators being built one after another within theprefecture. Mayumi, who has a child at elementary school, considered evacuation following
the nuclear accident; her husband and parents-in-law, however, were opposed to this decisionand she was obliged to carry on living in Fukushima. Sewage sludge, decontamination waste,
rubble and rice straws, all containing radioactive materials, will be burnt at the incinerators.
After the accident, the government raised the standard with which they decide what to treat asradioactive waste from 100 bq/kg to 8,000 bq/kg outside nuclear power plants. However, it ispossible that materials containing in excess of 8,000 bq/kg could be burned at this incinerator.
There is no maximum radiation dosage for materials to be brought to the incinerator, andrestrictions are placed only on the ash after incineration. Mayumi has begun to oppose this
together with friends from the local community.

What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned45

8 Rebuilding the daily lives and community for of thoseaffected is essential■ People pressured into unreasonable choices

People facing up to radioactive contamination causedby the nuclear plant accident are under pressure to
make various decisions intrying to cope with the situation. The issue of radiation
governs every decision,from major matters such aswhether to stay put or evacuate somewhere else, tosmaller everyday decisions
such as what to eat and Temporary accommodation in Fukushima City
February 2014 Photo: Kristian Laemmle-Ruff
where to hang the washing.
The fact that radiation is invisible and that there are many unknowns including theeffects of low-dosage radiation exposure on health, all serve to make people evenmore worried and to further complicate their decisions.
A bountiful natural environment where people can bring up their children withpeace of mind, a job that feels worth doing, the land of their ancestors, relationships
with neighbors, shops and schools necessary for daily life, hospitals and infrastructure– all of these elements that are necessary for peopleʼs lifestyles should all be present
within the local area by right. However, due to the nuclear plant accident, many
people have been forced into making unreasonable decisions about what toprioritize, and what to give up on.
■ The division between people who evacuated and those who stayed

Decisions about what to prioritize while under pressure to make such unreasonablechoices differs between people and families. In areas where there were no evacuation
directives despite a high radiation dosage, people were under pressure to decide
whether to carry on living there or to evacuate. Long-term evacuation means
making major sacrifices, including cutting off ties with work, the local community,and childrenʼs schools. People have to weigh up these various elements against therisks of radiation, and to reach their own decisions.
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Under these circumstances, people who chose to evacuate feel somehow sorry orindebted to the people who stayed. Some people were discriminated against in
their new areas of residence simply because they came from Fukushima, or due tomisconceptions about radiation. On the other hand, people who stayed werewracked with anxiety about exposure to low-dose radiation.
■ Division within households

Even within families, people do not share the same priorities. Tensions mounted
between mothers worried about health and fathers worried about their jobs, as wellas tensions regarding their parents who are used to living on the local land. There
were differences in opinion about where to live, what the children should eat, andother issues.
While on one hand there are many families who chose for the mother and children
to evacuate, there were also mothers who wanted to evacuate with the children, but
gave up on the idea because the rest of the family did not feel it necessary. There arecases where radiation is a taboo subject at home, and where mothers become
isolated in their point of view. In more than a few cases, couples ended up getting
divorced as the crisis revealed different ways of thinking about child-rearing anddifferent sets of priorities in life.
■ Division within schools

Once schools re-opened, parents concerned about childrenʼs exposure to radiation
decided to take them to and from school by car, to stop them from participating in
outdoor activities and sports, and insisted on giving them their own lunch to eat at
school over worries about radioactive contamination in school food. Depending on
their parentsʼ way of thinking, some children could participate in outdoor sports
activities while others could not, and similarly some could eat school lunch provided
centrally and made with local produce, while others could not; this causes divisions
within daily school life. There are cases where school staff put pressure on worriedparents to get in step with other parents.
■ Division between areas that received evacuation orders and areas that did notContamination due to radioactive materials spread with no regard for boundaries
between towns and villages, dispersing in a complicated manner due to the landʼs
features and weather conditions. This meant that boundary lines were drawn within
villages or towns to indicate which areas were subject to evacuation orders andwhich areas were not. Apart from the issue of whether to carry on living there ornot, depending on which side of a boundary line a house is, the amount and type ofWhat happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned

47

compensation payable by TEPCO differs significantly. In some instances, despite
being neighbors with almost exactly the same circumstances, one household would
receive tens of thousands of yen (hundreds of dollars) monthly in compensation,
while their neighbors only received a one-off payment; this only served to ratchet
up tensions between people within the same community.
■ Conflict between people coming from areas issued with evacuation directives
and local citizens

One coastal city in Fukushima Prefecture which is located some 40~50km to thesouth of Fukushima Daiichi lost about 300 residents to the tsunami, and has morethan 7,000 people forced into living in temporary housing or rental accommodation.
Despite this they have taken in some 24,000 evacuees from municipalities in thevicinity of the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant. In this city, there is friction between
evacuees and local citizens. These local citizens were devastated by the tsunami andcontinue to be affected by radiation, yet they receive little compensation; as such,they feel doubt and antipathy towards evacuees who are receiving substantial
monetary damages from the nuclear incident. Another separate issue stems fromthe fact that the large inflow of evacuees has suddenly increased the local population,
further exacerbating the existing shortage of doctors, making longer waiting times
in hospitals, worsening traffic jams, causing a shortage of rental properties, andmaking property and land prices shoot up as evacuees buy up homes in the area;
these have all been identified as the root causes for antipathy felt by local citizens
towards incoming evacuees.

Lesson 8 The importance of rebuilding lifestyles andcommunities cannot be overlooked

Regarding the nuclear accident at Fukushima, several high-ranking politicians fromthe ruling party have heartlessly claimed, “nobody has died from the accident.”
This has led to great debate - while it is true that there have been no deaths directly
attributable to exposure to high doses of radiation, it is a fact that many people havedied due to the illness and stress stemming from the dramatic change in their lives,
including evacuation. These are referred to as “nuclear accident-related deaths.”
To limit the effects of the nuclear accident to direct loss and illness serves only totrivialize the damage.
Measures for people afflicted by a disaster are not limited to one-off compensation
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payments and health check-ups, neither does merely building them a house solve
their problems. In response to their prolonged life as evacuees, it is vital to think interms of rebuilding the daily lives of those affected, and also to maintain, or where
necessary, rebuild their communities. In order to do so, comprehensive initiatives
are required, encompassing employment, securing a means of making a living,accommodation, education, leisure, as well as mental care. As well as demanding thatthe government provides these services, the roles of the local doctors' associations,lawyer groups, educators, NGOs and community groups are also very important inconstructing a collaborative framework for rebuilding communities.

● Carrying on farming on contaminated land

Ms Miko Endo (26, pseudonym) is the only daughter of a farming family in Kawamata
Town. Her parents were organic farmers, who used to ship their products to a local community
marketplace. Miko was about to graduate from university and had secured a job in Tokyo, but
returned home in order to support her parents, who were extremely worried by the radiation
issue. At the moment, radiation is barely detected from their agricultural products. After theaccident, university researchers cooperated with farmers in an attempt to prevent radioactive
materials in the soil migrating into crops. Miko is very appreciative of these efforts. However,
the radiation level of their farmland remains high and Miko sometimes gets hit withuncontrollable anxiety that she could have health problems by carrying on farming.

What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned49

9 Calling for the participation of those affected by thedisaster in the enactment and implementation of laws thatare designed to protect them
■ Enactment of the Nuclear Disaster Victims’ Support Act

Due to the explosion caused by the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant accident,
radioactive materials were dispersed far and wide, contaminating areas beyond thezones in which theJapanesegovernment
issuedevacuation
directives. In such areas,
many people had nochoice but to evacuate on
their own decision.
In June 2012, a year after
the nuclear accident, lawmakers established a newlaw in the Japanese parliament. The purpose of Mothers and children heading for the first day of school ceremony
April 2011 Photo: Naomi Toyoda
this new law was to provide support not only to people who evacuated based on government directives, butalso to people who evacuated voluntarily, as well as people who did not choose toevacuate but who lived in areas where a radiation dosage above the baseline standard was detected, who now have to face up to worries about health and otherconcerns in their daily lives. It was named the Nuclear Disaster Victimsʼ Support
Act (Official name: Act Concerning the Promotion of Measures to Provide Living
Support to the Victims, including the Children, who were Affected by the TEPCO
Nuclear Accident in Order to Protect and Support their Lives). This bill was pushed
for both by pleas from people affected by the disaster and citizens supporting them,and was unanimously enacted by members of the Diet in a non-partisan effort.
The “Nuclear Disaster Victims' Support Act” was an epoch-making piece oflegislation that recognized head on the “right to avoid exposure to radiation”. “Theright to avoid exposure to radiation” consists of the two concepts of “the right toevacuate” and “the right to avoid radiation exposure in the course of daily life”. The
key principles of the act are as follows: “Support must be afforded to afflictedpersons residing in the “Support Target Area” in instances where they choose to50

Chapter 2

continue to live in that area, in instances where they choose to evacuate or moveaway from that area, or in instances where they chose to return to their originalresidences. Support must be provided in any of these instances, and all choices areto be equally respected”.
The premise of “the right to avoid exposure to radiation” is the Precautionary
Principle. This principle stems from the environmental law stating that: “In cases
where there is a major impact on the environment, countermeasures should be
adopted even if scientific knowledge is insufficient:” The “Nuclear Disaster Victimsʼ
Support Act” states that, because the negative impact of radiation on human healthhas not been scientifically verified beyond any reasonable doubt, minimizing
radiation exposure and ensuring full health management of exposed persons arenecessary measures to support victims, from the perspective of active prevention ofhealth damage.
■ The Nuclear Disaster Victims’
Support Act in crisis

When this act was passed, many
people affected by the disaster, including those who evacuated autonomously, were pleased as they felt
this law would benefit them. Twoyears since it was passed, however, it
was evident that the act had beensignificantly watered down by the"All-Japan assembly to help those affected by the nuclear plantgovernment. The basic policy plan, accident" convened in Fukushima City
which was supposed to be estab- September 2013 Photo: Shalom
lished within one year after the act was passed, was significantly delayed; although
the Reconstruction Agency finally announced it in August 2013, its contents werecompletely out of joint with the principles of the act.
Despite the act specifying that the “support target area” would be “areas where theradiation dosage is lower than baseline standard set by the government forevacuation directives, but higher than a certain standard”, when it came down to it
the basic policy plan ignored this premise, limiting the “support target area” to asmall area comprising thirty-three cities, towns and villages in Fukushima
Prefecture, rather than conducting any debate on what the aforementioned “certain
standard” should be.
What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned51

Affected citizens and their supporters were incensed by this, and held meetings
with the government and related agencies, organizing hearings all around thecountry, where they appealed for the following: the holding of public hearings allaround Japan; involving those affected by the disaster and those supporting themin the public debate process, and at the least the designating of any area with anannual radiation dosage over 1 mSv as being in the support target area. Many
people submitted opinions in writing to the government, not just citizens but also
municipalities and local assemblies throughout Japan.
However, in October 2013, without holding any hearings, and completely ignoring
the opinions of citizens and assemblies, the cabinet approved a basic plan withminor adjustments. Despite the support act stating that necessary measures would
be pursued by the government to reflect the opinions of those affected by thedisaster when formulating the basic plan, their opinions had not been reflected inany way at all.
■ Comparison with Chernobyl“The Nuclear Accident Victimsʼ Support Act” was drawn up using references fromlegislation known as the “Chernobyl Laws” which were created by Russia, Ukraine

and Belarus five years after the Chernobyl Accident. The Chernobyl Laws clearlystipulate the standard that for the critical group of population - children born in1986 - the effective exposure dose due to the Chernobyl accident should not exceed
Differences in evacuation segmentation between Fukushima and Chernobyl

Air radiation dose(annual)

Fukushima zoning

Chernobyl zoning

50mSv and above"Difficult to return" zone

Forced evacuation zone

20 - less than 50mSv

Habitation restricted zone
(temporary return possible)

Forced evacuation zone

Less than 20mSv

Zone being prepared for liftingof evacuation order

Forced evacuation zone

5mSv and above

No instructions

Compulsory resettlement zone

1 - less than 5mSv

No instructions

Right to resettlement zone

0.5 - less than 1mSv

No instructions

Radiation control zone

N.B. 1: Segments in red are in principle off-limits
N.B. 2: Zone designation in Chernobyl was carried out mainly according to soil contamination dose, and themethod used for calculating annual exposure is also different in the case of Fukushima. References here aresimplified for the purpose of general comparison.

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1 mSv per year and 70 mSv for the life period in any specific environment (except
for exposure due to natural background radiation). Based on this basic concept, theChernobyl Laws established “zones with the right to evacuate”, where residents
can choose whether to evacuate or not, even outside forced migration zones
designated by the government. Residents in these areas are granted the right tomigrate, and are able to demand compensation from the government to cover their
moving expenses, as well as aid to help them secure housing and employment intheir new areas of residence. On the other hand, those who chose not to migrate
and to remain within the region were paid compensation and provided with had
their medical expenses paid.
Under the “Nuclear Accident Victimsʼ Support Act”, people in Japan expectedthat the government would establish zones with the right to evacuate outside ofzones subject to evacuation directives; yet at present, this is still not the case.

Lesson 9 Laws for rights and relief for those affected must
be made with their participation

Relief for victims is not something that comes from the kindliness of victims or the
expression of concern by corporates. Receiving legitimate compensation and having
your life rebuilt are basic human rights. As seen in the example of the Victimsʼ
Support Act of Fukushima, those affected victims can stand up for themselves andenlist the cooperation of lawyers and legislators to win.
While this is no simple matter, there are precedents from around the world
including Chernobyl and Fukushima, demonstrating this possibility. It is hopedthat people around the world threatened by nuclear plant accidents can think up
countermeasures and preventative measures based on these precedents.
When creating these systems, it is absolutely essential that the affected communities
and individuals themselves can be at the center of the process. Those who have apersonal stake in the process must create a cooperative framework, overcoming theinevitable differing points of view and conflicts. Even if a legal system is established,
its significance differs greatly depending on how it is operated. Those who wereafflicted by the original disaster must be present on a constant basis to participate
in inspecting operational regulations and frameworks.
What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned

53

10 Taxpayers are being made to bear the compensationcosts■ Who is responsible for the accident?

The Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant accident was on a different order of magnitude
to other industrial accidents that have struck Japan in the past, causing colossal andserious damage. Yet four years on from the accident, it has still not been made clear
who is responsible for such a huge disaster.
■ Responsibility of the Japanese Government

The Japanese government is responsible for promoting nuclear power generation asa national policy. The central government and some politicians got close to theutilities companies and related companies, forming the “nuclear village” to promote
nuclear power. The government is also responsible for not implementing sufficientcrisis management measures to prevent accidents. Particularly serious is the factthat the system for monitoring and regulating the operators was not functioning.
Indeed, because the government did not imagine a complex disaster such as thisone, there were many inadequacies in the initial response framework deployed by
the office of the Prime Minister, forcing many people to be exposed to radiationthat could have been avoided.
■ Responsibility of TEPCOTEPCO, the operator of thenuclear power plant, has the responsibility of neglecting to put
in place sufficient crisis management measures to prevent
accidents despite being fully
aware of the dangers posed bytsunamis, in the pursuit of profit and on the foundation of its
own “safety myth.”Appeal by Complainants for Criminal Prosecution of the Fukushima
Nuclear Disaster. February 2013 Photo: Peace Boat

When the accident occurred, on top of problems related to information sharing
within TEPCO and backup systems, information disclosure about the accident wasinsufficient. TEPCO's failure to provide information to the government caused
delays in evacuation directives that ended up leading to even more damage. Not to54

Chapter 2mention the fact there is still no indication of when the ongoing issues of radioactive
materials dispersal and leakage of contaminated water might be resolved.
■ Responsibility of the Fukushima Prefectural Government

The Fukushima Prefectural Government must assume part of the responsibility forenticing the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant, and for promoting nuclear power.
The prefecture must also be called to account for various oversights which served toincrease the damage directly after the accident, including not making public the
System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI)
data and not providing appropriate directives regarding the administering of iodine
preparations.
■ Responsibility of local municipalities

Okuma Town and Futaba Town where Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant islocated, and Naraha Town and Tomioka Town to the south where Fukushima
Daini Nuclear Power Plant is located, all received large grants as kickback for
hosting the power plants, and gradually developed a strong dependence on thesegrants. These local municipalities are responsible for playing the role of promulgating
the nuclear safety myth among the people.
While areas where nuclear plants are located and the municipalities in the vicinity
are in one sense victims of the nuclear accident, they also assume responsibility forthe safety of residents of the respective municipalities. During the accident at
Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant, municipalities made their own decisions that
decided the fate of residents, in the absence of proper instructions from Tokyo and
the Prefecture. There were municipalities in the vicinity of the nuclear plant thatwere woefully unprepared.
■ The nuclear accident compensation framework that foists the burden onto thetaxpayers

There is a law in Japan known as the “Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage”,
which touts the two conflicting goals of “protecting victims” and the “healthy
development of the nuclear industry.”
Under the provisions of this act, the business operator bears primary compensation
liability, which is supplemented by financial aid by the nation if insufficient. This act
does not require proof of negligence; therefore the question of where responsibilitylies tends to remain ambiguous.
What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned

55Under the compensation framework decided on by the government following the
Fukushima disaster, the basic premise is to uphold the existence of TEPCO, whoshould be held responsible for the accident, with support from utilities companies
nationwide and from the government. Ultimately, the cost of compensation is
being transferred onto the people, through both hikes in electricity rates andthrough the injection of tax.
■ The actual state of compensation

There are 3 methods for seeking compensation from TEPCO for victims of thenuclear plant accident: 1) Direct claim to TEPCO; 2) File a lawsuit; 3) Plea
through alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
In the case of (1), victims must use a format prepared by TEPCO, and mustcomplete a complex compensation claim process, forcing them to comply withstandards defined by TEPCO. On the other hand, the method in (2) whereby
victims have to file a law suit for compensation and go to court means a hugeburden in terms of time and money. Given this, the “Dispute Reconciliation
Committee for Nuclear Damage” (ADR Center) was set up, providing anintermediary agency between TEPCO and the victims.
However, there have been various stumbling blocks from the outset such as the
ADR Center not taking on pleas that TEPCO considers to be outside the scope of
consideration.
■ Cost of decommissioning work

According to TEPCO, it will take between 30-40 years to finish decommissioningof the reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. However, the overall
cost of decommissioning work and the time required to do it will greatly exceed
TEPCOʼs estimation, even for decommissioning work on reactors that have ceased
operating. If we consider the handling of the problem of highly contaminatedwater, which is still ongoing, it is extremely difficult to gauge just how much money
and time will be required.
Furthermore, as an indirect result of the serious damage done during this accident, it is expected that as well as Reactors 1-4 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant which were directly damaged by the accident, the remaining two
reactors 5 and 6, as well as reactors 1-4 of the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power
Plant will also need to be decommissioned - this cost must be added on. FinanceGreen Watch (FGW), which sends out environmental information of Japanese
56

Chapter 2

financial institutions,have put the decommissioning cost of reactors
1-6 at 7 trillion yen (approximately 58 billion
USD, with calculations
throughout this booklet
made at 1USD=120JPY).
The US Government
Accountability Office(GAO) reported to the
US Congress in 1986
that damage caused by acatastrophic
accident A pile of decontamination waste
October 2014 Photo: Fukushima Beacon
would amount to 15 billion US dollars for one power plant.
■ Decontamination and disposal of waste

As a result of preliminary calculations, a research group from the National Instituteof Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) has announced the
maximum total cost of decontamination work implementable within Fukushima
Prefecture for residential and agricultural areas, at 5.13 trillion yen (approximately 43
billion USD).The costs of “Special Areas for Decontamination” directly administeredby the government were calculated at 1.83-2.03 trillion yen (15-17 billion USD).
The cost for decontamination implemented by municipalities in “decontamination
implementation zones” was estimated at 700 billion-3.1 trillion yen (5.8 – 26 billion
USD). Calculations are made (for decontamination) in two ways - one based on thestandard unit cost and the other on the highest unit cost, derived from hearing
sessions with municipalities. Calculations include costs for moving contaminatedsoil to temporary storage sites and interim storage facilities, as well as the cost of
storing within interim storage facilities. (Kyodo News, July 24, 2013)■ Other data for compensation costs made public by the government and TEPCO

A new policy was concluded for compensation in December 2013, based on which
TEPCOʼs estimate exceeds 5 trillion yen (42 billion USD). Separate from this, thefollowing budgets were enacted by Tokyo and Fukushima Prefecture due to the
nuclear accident:
1. 200 billion yen (1.7 billion USD) in subsidiary aid paid to Fukushima
Prefecture for hosting nuclear plants.
What happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned57

2. 160 billion yen (1.3 billion USD) in subsidiaries to accelerate restoration/
reconstruction.
3. 96 billion yen (800 million USD) to cover costs for prefectural citizens
health care examinations
4. 73 billion yen (608 million USD) to cover costs of constructing disasterpublic housing
5. 40 billion yen (330 million USD) for Nuclear Power Disaster Restoration
Fund
These do not include costs for the final disposal of the soil from decontamination
work, nor the personnel costs incurred for public servants responding to theaccident. It is also considered appropriate to add to these numbers the cost of
support required for revising employment conditions for workers involved indecontamination and decommissioning efforts, as well as revised treatment thatcovers health care and medical costs.
Just with these limited estimations and the previously mentioned estimations fordecommissioning and decontamination costs, the total amount exceeds 23 trillion
yen (190 billion USD). Incidentally, the general account budget for fiscal 2014 wasapproximately 95.9 trillion yen (800 billion USD).
■ Cost to victims that cannot be recuperated through compensation

Through evacuating, victims of the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant accident losttheir houses, land and household goods. Whole families lost everything they had
amassed until now, including items with sentimental value. This amounts to losing
the familyʼs history. There were many cases where mothers moved away with theirchildren due to concerns about radiation, leaving fathers behind and breaking up
families.
There are a considerable number of cases where having to lead two separate lives
has resulted in divorce, as mentioned before. Similarly, the increase in spending tomaintain two separate households, such as transportation costs, pushed low-income
families towards poverty.
■ Stolen livelihoods

An occupation is not solely for the purpose of earning money for daily life. Work isalso about making a social contribution that provides a feeling of worth, a feelingof being needed. In this sense, no amount of compensation can make up for losing
oneʼs livelihood and calling. Most evacuees were robbed of their social standing
58

Chapter 2that they had built up over the years, in some cases even losing their confidence anddignity as a human being.
■ Broken communities, and lost neighborhoods, hometowns, cultures andnatureMost evacuees had greatly enjoyedtheir lives in the rich natural environment replete with mountains
and the sea. They are no longer
able to live alongside nature or bepart of a community rooted in it.
Due to evacuation – both forced
and voluntary – and due to the ineptitude of the government andauthorities, many communities
have collapsed. Never knowing TEPCO employees apologizing to the bereaved family of a victim
committed suicide by self-immolation in her own garden
when their “temporary” lives as an who
following the accident. September 2014 Photo provided by relatedparties
evacuee will end, people have losttheir hometowns while at the same time having no way to restart their lives anew.
Local cultures may be able to survive intact if some community ties remain; however, it is mostly only the elderly who return to their hometowns, and the young
people who should inherit the culture have left.
■ Anxiety about health damage in the future, resolving mental anguish

There are still aspects to be scientifically verified regarding the impacts of radiation
on health. At present, we have no idea about so-called late-onset health disordersthat may occur in the future. For parents who are worried about the health of theirchildren in the future, “peace of mind” campaigns rolled out under suchcircumstances are simply counterproductive. In particular, mothers and children
separated from their families due to evacuation face a great deal of mental strain, as
do the fathers who have been left behind.
■ Difficulties of Compensation

People who have sustained damage have a clear right to compensation payments. If
you consider the seriousness of the damage, including losses that cannot be replacedby money, in most cases the amounts of compensation are not satisfactory. On theother hand, however, those affected by the disaster who continue to receive
compensation can lose the will to work, and there are many cases of divisions
occurring between people and communities due to receiving different amounts ofWhat happened at Fukushima, and 10 lessons learned

59compensation. Policies are not being designed with a view to rebuilding the lives of
those affected.

Lesson 10 Damage from accidents must be factored into
“the cost of nuclear power”

Governments and corporations singing the praises of nuclear power often makethe following claims: “it will benefit the local economy” or “nuclear power iscomparatively inexpensive”. In most cases, however, such calculations omit the costof accidents, compensation, and expenditure required to clear up the accidents. In
the case of Fukushima, even four years after the accident occurred, the damage is stillongoing and even ballooning; it is problematic even trying to put a figure on the sum
total of damage. TEPCO, who should be held responsible, have not gone bankrupt
and in fact continue to operate as normal. In the background to this is the fact thatTEPCO, the perpetrator of this accident, is being kept afloat through large injectionsof tax money provided by the people of Japan, who are themselves the victims.
Governments provide various financial subsidiaries and grants for constructing
and operating the plants, and once an accident occurs, the same government
then provides a financial safety net for the operators. Under such a framework, ininstances where nuclear power is promulgated as a national policy, the real cost is
not reflected in the management of the operators. As a result, those who ultimately
bear the brunt of the damage are the victims themselves, and the taxpayers.
● Hidden Exposure to Radiation

The village where Mr Takashi Watanabe (33, pseudonym) was born is about 30 minutes
by car from Fukushima City, around where the Abukuma Mountains start. He lived withhis 31-year old wife, 7 and 4-year old daughters, and his parents, and kept about 20 cows asa dairy farmer. After the accident, his wife was worried about their children being exposed
to radiation. However, because the doctors and officials from Tokyo (claiming to be experts)
declared that there was not any danger, he convinced his wife that evacuation was notnecessary. However, a month later, the entire village was ordered to evacuate, and he had togive up his cattle and everything else. On top of this, he was forced to live separately from his
parents. Recently his wife told him about the prefectural survey results, which indicated thatmost of the Fukushima residents who were estimated to have been exposed to more than 5
mSv of radiation (during the first 4 months after the accident) were from his village. Takashi
could no longer look her in the eye.

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Chapter 2

Chapter 3
International law anddisaster risk reduction framework– tools we can use to protect ourselves

How should ordinary citizens, those affected should a nuclear accident occur, go
about exercising their rights? Furthermore, which rights are acknowledged to beuniversal, and how exactly can people insist on exercising their rights? Below is asummary of tools that can be can used, including international agreements.

From the human rights perspective

Humans have basic human rights, and the societies they inhabit are formed basedon universal values. These include the right to safety, the right to health, and theright to know and participate. To expect information and protection is universally
recognized as a basic human right. The basic approach regarding human rights is
codified in the following international treaties:＊ International Bill of Human Rights, 1948

http://www.un-documents.net/a3r217.htm
3 years after the United Nations was established, the UN General Assembly
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which became thecornerstone of modern human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights was adopted on December 10, 1948, stating that every human is entitled
to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

＊ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1976

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx
Entering into force in 1976 and ratified by 163 countries (as of January 2015).
The human rights promoted and protected by this covenant include the right towork under fair and decent conditions, the right to social security, the right to an
adequate standard of living, the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health, the right to be educated, andthe right to the development and diffusion of science and culture.

＊ Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990

http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
Entering into force in 1990 and ratified by 193 countries, this treaty is acomprehensive body of law summarizing human rights in all categories forprotecting children. According to this treaty, all states parties pledge nodiscrimination, and the guiding principle for all actions is the pursuit of the bestinterests of children.

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Those affected by the Fukushima Nuclear Plant disaster, due to this completely
unforeseen accident, had various rights snatched away from them. Among thesewere the freedom to choose and change oneʼs residence (Article 22 of the JapaneseConstitution) and property rights (Article 29 of the Japanese Constitution). Many
people were unable to continue inhabiting their own houses and were forced toevacuate or move house; alternatively, due to the area around their house being
contaminated, many lost their houses/land/property, sustained a decrease in thevalue of their property, or could not longer use their land/property even if they still
owned it. Furthermore, there are cases of infringement of the right to pursue
happiness which is protected by the constitution, and many people had “happiness”
and “purpose in life” stolen, which can hardly be converted into monetary value.
Without exception, everybody has the right to live in peace and health, free fromfear and want. The Japanese constitution states; “All people shall have the right tomaintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living”. Underinternational law, in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights - one of the international human rights treaties - is a provision recognizing
the “right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard ofphysical and mental health.” People have the right to avoid exposure to radiationin order to protect the health of their families, and this needs to be guaranteed as ahuman right.
The following points may also be referenced with regard to the relationship between
nuclear disasters and human rights.
＊ Grover Report, 2013

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/
Session23/A-HRC-23-41-Add3_en.pdf
In May 2013, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to HealthAnand Grover submitted a very important report to the United Nations. In it, heexhorted the Japanese government to provide swift information disclosure, toimplement comprehensive health monitoring and the provision of treatment,
the provision of psychological care, and independent monitoring by a third party
to ensure regulation (annual exposure limit for the general public of 1 mSv), andalso recommended that residents should participate in the decision-making
process for nuclear energy policies.

＊ Proposal from Waseda Symposium, 2014

http://www.wcdrr.org/preparatory/commitments/110
International law and disaster risk reduction framework – tools we can use to protect ourselves63In October 2014, an international symposium was held at Waseda University,
Tokyo entitled “Legal and Medical Aspects of Nuclear Disaster and Human
Rights.” The recommendations issued in its final document rang alarm bells
about radioactive contamination caused by a lack of morals and responsibility. In
particular, the recommendations place the highest importance on human rights,
and advocate the importance of formulation of legislation and plans for times ofdisaster.
＊ International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) letter toJapanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan, 2011

http://ippnweupdate.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/ippnw_pmkan082211.pdf
The letter sent by 1985 Nobel Peace Laureate organization IPPNW to the thenJapanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan in August 2011 emphasized the necessityof “a comprehensive, consistent, best-practice approach.” The provisions of thisletter included: management based on actual levels of contamination andanticipated total exposures, both external and internal, not simply distance fromthe Fukushima Daiichi plant; ongoing long-term monitoring with timely, full
public reporting of radioactive contamination of the terrestrial and marine
environment, and of food, plants and animals and water; and relocation assistancebeing made available to all likely to receive more than 1 mSv/year additionalradiation exposure.

＊ Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were submitted to the UN
Commission on Human Rights in 1998. While lacking the legally binding force
of a treaty, these principles function as an international standard for ensuring thehuman rights of internally displaced peoples, urging signatory countries toprovide legislation and policies that conform to these principles. These principles
firmly state that the authorities in a nation/state have a primary duty andresponsibility to protect and support internally displaced persons. These
principles also contain provisions regarding rights pertaining to compensation
for assets and rights pertaining to physical and mental health; freedom to choose
migration and residents; and ensuring the participation of internally displaced
persons in formulating plans and programs pertaining to repatriation andresettlement.

＊ Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992

http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163

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Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which was adopted at the 1992 Rio Earth
Summit is as follows: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.” Based on this precautionary principle, sufficient
precautionary measures must be adopted for nuclear disasters that could cause
serious environmental destruction, even in cases where scientific proof isincomplete.

From the perspective of disaster risk reduction

While disaster risk reduction policy of each country is controlled by respective
domestic laws, in recent years greater emphasis is being placed on taking responsible
action, implementing policies, and international collaboration as a member of the
global community., The following internationally agreed frameworks andinternational documents are of particular mention.
＊ Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015

http://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf
This international framework for disaster risk reduction, which follows on fromthe Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), was adopted with the consensus of
187 states at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction(WCDRR). Over 150,000 people participated in the WCDRR and related
events, and this conference became the first time nuclear accidents were included
as a topic at a high level conference on disaster risk reduction. The Sendai
Framework applies to manmade hazards such as nuclear disasters in the same
way as it does to natural disasters, and emphasises investing in understanding
and reducing disaster risks, as well as strengthening governance. At theconference, the Cabinet Office of the Japanese Government indicated a "clear
break-away from the nuclear safety myth." This was a landmark event, where therisk of a nuclear accident, said to be "political," was positioned as a "disasterrisk." This framework is in effect from 2015 to 2030.

＊ Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), 2005

http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa
In 2005, at the World Conference for Disaster Reduction in Kobe, Japan, 168
International law and disaster risk reduction framework – tools we can use to protect ourselves65countries adopted the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA): a 10-year strategy
to integrate disaster risk reduction into the development programs of individual
nations. It also functions as a successor version to the Yokohama Strategy andPlan of Action for a Safer World, which was adopted in 1994.
(http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/8241)
The 168 states which agreed upon the HFA are required to proactively engage inthe following 5 priority actions:
Priority Action 1: Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local
priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation.
Priority Action 2: Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early
warning.
Priority Action 3: Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture ofsafety and resilience at all levels.
Priority Action 4: Reduce the underlying risk factors.
Priority Action 5: Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at alllevels.
The major disasters envisioned during the formulation of the HFA included
both natural disasters and man-made disasters alike, allowing for a wide range ofdisasters. Accordingly, it is of course applicable to complex disasters faced byhigh-risk infrastructure such as nuclear power plants. The following international
documents also highlight the relationship between the risks of nuclear power
plants and international disaster risk reduction frameworks.
＊ Chair’s Summary, Third Session of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk
Reduction and World Reconstruction Conference, 2011

http://www.preventionweb.net/files/20102_gp2011chairssummary.pdf
The UN Secretary General called for a high-level meeting at the next UN
General Assembly in order to better understand and deal with the relationshipbetween natural disasters and nuclear disasters. There is global consensus thatinternational collaboration is required to tackle this issue.

＊ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
Resolution, 2011

http://ndrc.jrc.or.jp/archive/item/?id=M2013091919392484046&lang=en
At its 2011 General Assembly, the IFRC adopted a resolution on “preparedness
to respond to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear accidents,” specifying
the respective roles of the IFRC and national Red Cross/Crescent Societies in

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providing aid to victims of nuclear disasters. This was a very significant resolution
signifying the need for collaboration between a diverse set of stakeholders in theevent of a nuclear emergency, and that prior preparation greatly impacts theability to respond in the actual event of an emergency.
What has become apparent in the course of appraising the implementation of
HFA in the process of formulating the Sendai Framework is that, of the 5 priority
actions, the status of achievement of priority action 4 (reducing underlying risk
factors) is remarkably low. This is considered attributable to various factors, withthe main reasons detailed below:
1. Underlying risk factors are extremely wide-ranging, encompassing for example
poverty, conflict, climate change, rapid urbanization and economic investmentthat brings environmental destruction. As such, the standalone efforts ofstakeholders engaged in disaster risk reduction are not sufficient. There is aneed to go above and beyond the disaster risk reduction sector, and tointerweave disaster risk reduction policies into development strategy throughmultistakeholder collaboration based on a universal set of values akin tohuman rights.
2. There has been a tendency to overlook the overall danger/risk posed bydisasters such as the Fukushima Nuclear Plant Accident where one disastertriggers others. The boundary between natural and human disasters is receding.
3. The HFA is ultimately an agreement between governments, and thestrengthening of grass-roots partnerships for mitigating community risk
factors was not sufficient. Another insufficiency was the lack of realistic
indicators for monitoring progress.

Within the contents of the Sendai Framework adopted at the March 2015
Sendai Conference, of particular mention is the emphasis on the need forcommunities themselves to participate in identifying and mitigating risks. The
Sendai Framework stresses the need for risk management focused oncommunities, as well as evaluating and disclosing ahead of time the risks posedby economic investment. It is our hope that community leaders who obtain thisbooklet can be confident in taking steps forward to gauge and mitigate the risksfacing their respective communities. As mentioned, the Sendai Framework also
sets forth the intention to deal with natural disasters and manmade disasters.
It is also asserted that it is important to clearly specify the responsibilities of eachstakeholder. The era of risk management being implemented by the central
government of one nation is over – surely now is the time to clearly establish theInternational law and disaster risk reduction framework – tools we can use to protect ourselves

67respective roles and responsibilities of business operators/municipalities/
international organization/NGOs. The debate regarding risk management andmitigation at both the local government/central government level and within thecommunity must be deepened. Ultimately, the necessary frame of mind whenstarting to make steps forward is that “everyone must look out for him/herself.”
In May 2014, following a lawsuit by citizens in Fukui Prefecture to suspend therestarting of Oi Nuclear Power Plant, the local court issued a ruling to suspend its
restart. This was only made possible because of citizens deciding to take action. The
following principles can be referenced in the debate encircling this issue.
＊ Istanbul CSO Development Effectiveness Principles, 2010

http://cso-effectiveness.org/-istanbul-principles,067-.html
Of particular importance is Principle 3 – “Focus on people's empowerment,
democratic ownership and participation.” It could be said that this principle has
been pushed to the sidelines in past campaigns to promote nuclear power. Widerecognition is needed regarding the fact that participation and independence are
generally accepted ideas internationally.

Necessary Action

In light of the above-mentioned contents, what sort of action is now necessary?
First and foremost, we need to grasp what kind of responsibilities our governments
bear both internationally and domestically. International law is not exercised by one
abiding country punishing a non-abiding country, in the manner that criminal law
works within one particular country. In any case, countries that do not abide tointernational standards will be seen by other countries as not carrying out their
responsibilities. Governments surely want to avoid disgracing themselves atinternational meetings, so it is effective to meet government delegations at suchmeetings to inform them of the realities on the ground and facilitate policy
discussions.
However, as mentioned previously, responsibility is not only borne by central
governments. Business operators, local municipalities and other entities have theirown roles and responsibilities to fulfill; we need to deepen the debate about how tocarry out these obligations. When a tragic disaster such as a nuclear accident occurs,
who is responsible for emergency response, evacuation of citizens, disclosure of risk
68

Chapter 3

information, compensation for victims and other vital responses? It is necessary to
clarify where the responsibility lies if these vital responses are not implemented. It
is particularly important for community leaders to clearly confirm this information,
as they will probably the ones acting as rescuers directly after a disaster strikes.
What we have learned up to this point is that when it comes to disasters, we should
expect anything and everything. There are no limits to the scope of a disaster. We
strongly exhort people from around the world to proactively learn from Japanʼsmistakes in creating safety myths and failing to grasp and disclose the actual risks.
Only by specifying and identifying risks ahead of time can we implement
countermeasures to mitigate these risks.
Armed with the frame of mind to “solve our risks by ourselves”, we need to takeaction and broaden the dialogue. This is surely our responsibility to future
generations.

International law and disaster risk reduction framework – tools we can use to protect ourselves69Afterword
The impetus behind publishing this booklet was the convening of the 3rd World
Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Sendai in March 2015. The publishingcommittee for this booklet, bringing together the lessons of the Fukushima nuclear
disaster as seen from the citizenʼs point of view, came from the Japan CSO Coalition
for 2015 WCDRR （http://jcc2015.net/) which formed with the intention ofdelivering the voices of civil society at this conference.
In this booklet, we have extracted 10 lessons that must be learned from the
Fukushima nuclear disaster, and also presented the international laws andinternational standards that are at our disposal. None of these are memories of thepast. The disaster in Fukushima, four years after the accident, is still very muchongoing, with the situation continuing to change.
Rather than a publication for learning about events that happened in the past, we
see this booklet in terms of providing guidelines for dealing with issues in thepresent, and as such it should be used to prevent disasters that could easily happen
in the future. We aim to translate this booklet into as many languages as possible,
and to have it read throughout countries that have nuclear plants or in countries
where there are plans afoot to build nuclear plants.
This booklet has, out of the plethora of issues, chosen to focus particularly on
problems faced by local communities. This, we have not gone into deep detailregarding governmental and political challenges, problems related to nuclear power
technology nor the medical domain. There may be parts that need improvements oralterations in line with changing circumstances; there may also be omissions. We
look forward to receiving feedback from all readers. We see this as a work inprogress.
In putting together this booklet, we made reference to existing literature as well as
a great deal of press reports. These references included: The National Diet of Japan
Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC)'s
Report ( July 2012, http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/); and “Our Path to a Nuclear-Free Japan: Policy Outline for a Nuclear
Phaseout” by the Citizenʼs Commission on Nuclear Energy (April 2014), in
particular the first chapter on the full extent of the damage and restoration ofdamaged lives. (http://www.ccnejapan.com/)70

During the drafting stage, we received many valuable comments from many people,
including the following:
Takumi Aizawa (Iitate Village, teacher)
Hideo Hasegawa (Iwaki Independent Living Center)
Keniichi Hasegawa (Head of Maeda District, Iitate Village)
Yoshiyuki Inoue (Tokyo Shimbun, Fukushima Bureau)
Hideki Ishii (Fukushima University)
Kenichi Oshima （Ritsumeikan University）
Ruiko Muto (Complainants for Criminal Prosecution of the Fukushima
Nuclear Disaster)Eiichi Sadamatsu (Save the Children Japan)
Maki Sato ( Japan Iraq Medical Network, JIM-NET)
Satoshi Sugai ( Japanese Red Cross Society)
Seiji Sugeno (Fukushima Organic Agriculture Network)
Mikako Takahashi (Tsunagaro Minamisoma)
Emiko Yoshida (NPO The People)
Hiroyuki Yoshino (Shalom)(and many others)
We are particularly grateful to (former National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear
Accident Independent Investigation Commission member) Hisako Sakiyama of
Takagi School for kindly providing the text for Chapter One “What is Nuclear
Power, What is Radiation?” and for providing valuable editorial support throughout.
We would like to point out that it was not possible to reflect all the comments
received due to limitations of space and our own capabilities. While this booklet isunderpinned by the cooperation of these people mentioned above, responsibility
for any contents lies with the publication committee, the members of which arelisted at the end.
We firmly hope that this booklet can cross borders in linking up the experiences ofmany people and learning lessons together, and that it can be used in the buildingof disaster-resilient societies that protect human lives.
January 2015
Co-chair, Fukushima Booklet Committee

Akira Kawasaki

71

10 Lessons from Fukushima

Reducing Risks and Protecting Communities from Nuclear Disasters
Date of First Issue: March 11, 2015. Second Edition: February 29, 2016
Publication：Fukushima Booklet Committee
http://fukushimalessons.jp

Fukushima Booklet Committee：(Chapter authored in brackets)
Masaaki Ohashi ( Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation, JANIC)(Co-chair) …… (Introduction)
Akira Kawasaki (Peace Boat)(Co-chair) ……(Chapter 2)
Toshiyuki Takeuchi (Fukushima Beacon for Global Citizens Network, FUKUDEN)…… (Chapter 2)
Emiko Fujioka (Fukushima Beacon for Global Citizens Network, FUKUDEN)……(Chapter 2)
Takeshi Komino (CWS Japan)……(Chapter 3)
Aoi Horiuchi ( Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation, JANIC)
Miyako Tsukagoshi (Peace Boat)
Meri Joyce (Peace Boat)
Editing: Takashi Kuroda
Book Design: Jun Katsuragawa
Photos provided by: Naomi Toyoda, Kristian Laemmle-Ruff, Takashi Kuroda, Shalom, JapanNGO Center for International Cooperation JANIC, Fukushima Beacon for Global Citizens
Network, Peace Boat and others.
English Translation: Joel Challender (NPO CeMI)
English Typesetting: Mikio Kodama
We are seeking donations to translate this booklet into various other languages, and would
appreciate any such support.
Fukushima Booklet Committee http://fukushimalessons.jp/
Contact fukushimabooklet@gmail.com

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