Policy ProposalToward Optimization of
Nuclear Safety Regulation- Prospecting the Amendment ofReactor Regulation Act -Akihiro Sawa, Senior Executive Fellow

August 2014

Introduction
In the environment of rapidly growing mistrust for nuclear
technologies, corporate governance of operating organizations of
nuclear power plants (hereinafter referred to as “operators”) and theGovernment’s nuclear policy in general following the accident at the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (hereinafter referred to as
the “Fukushima Daiichi NPS”) of Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as “Tokyo Electric Company”), efforts aregradually being undertaken to restore the public confidence in nuclear
power, including a wide range of activities including reconstruction ofoperators’ safety culture, reassessment of the Government’s nuclear
policies and reform of the administrative organizations as well as theactivities on and around the Fukushima Daiichi NPS site such as
rebuilding of neighboring communities which were suffered from
nuclear damages, decommissioning of the reactor facilities whichcaused the accident and confinement and processing of contaminatedwater.
As part of such efforts, the former Government organizations who
were responsible for safety regulation of the nuclear energy related
activities were separated from the organizations resp onsible forpromotion of nuclear energy use and the Nuclear Regulation Authority(hereinafter referred to as “NRA”) and its secretariat organization (NRA
Secretariat) were established as highly independent administrative
organizations responsible for nucle ar safety regulation under Article 3of the National Government Organization Act. This organizational
reform was intended to make the check-and-balance mechanism
function properly on both promotional and regulatory sides. On theother hand, operators are expected to take the causes of the Fukushima
Daiichi NPS accident, the Tokyo Electric Company’s efforts forpreventing the spread of damages and the efforts toward resolution ofsituations resulted from the accident as their own matters, and to work
seriously on the improvement of their organizational culture andcorporate governance.
Such efforts by the Government and operators can become reallyeffective only when sound and constructive relations are establishedbetween operators (licensees) and the regulator (licenser) on the basisof mutual respect and trust. It is certainly difficult to establish suchmatured relations at this moment only three years after the Fukushima
Daiichi NPS accident. It is quite natural for the NRA as a regulatory
agency to take a stern attitude to operators as licensees, in order toirebuild the public confidence in nuclear technologies, facilities, plants
and activities which are subject to its regulation and consequently toreceive high acclaim from the third parties. It also makes sense for theorganizations promoting nuclear energy as their organizational role tokeep a cautious attitude to the actions which might cause
misunderstanding that they are impeding independency of safety
regulation or intervening in regulatory acti vities or decision making
processes.
On the other hand, operators seem to be bewildered by the changeof administrative agency’s attitude. The procedural practices andprecedents which had been shared between operators and regulatory
bodies before the establishment of the NRA became completely not
useful and both sides are required to go through fully new license
application and review processes. So called “predictability”, that is,prepare for the next step according to practices, was lost in suchsituation. In addition, operators’ minds are filled with “impatience” forplant restart, under the situation where financial conditions are going
down due to increased purchase of fossil fuels.
Current relations between operators and regulatory body may be
temporary. But if such relations should be structuralized and should
be continued for a long time, only mistrust and suspiciousness would
prevail among all parties concerned, and that could bring concern that“true improvement of safety”, which is a common aim o f all concerned
parties, becomes difficult to achieve.
Based on such understanding of the current issues, this policy
recommendation document identifies the recent problems of regulatory
activities and discusses what is expected for the NRA regulatory
activities, what is expected for operators and what institutional actions
are required to make the proposals actually effective (e.g. amendment
to the “Act for the Regulation of Nuclear Source Materials, Nuclear Fuel
Materials and Reactors” [hereinafter referred to as the "Reactor
Regulation Act"])
This policy recommendation document does not intend to address
detailed technical issues of safety regulation, but mainly focuses on the
expected discipline/norms, procedures and management of regulatory
activities.
Finally the author expresses its gratitude to Accenture Japan Ltd.
for the considerable assistance in the investigation of regulatory
matters in foreign countries and regulatory -review-related example
cases in Japan.
* This report is a research result of the 21st Century Public Policy
Institute, and does not show the view of the Keidanren.
ii

Table of Contents

Introduction ............................................................................. i

Chapter 1

Issues of current regulatory activities by the Nuclear
Regulation Authority ................................................ 1

Chapter 2

Approach required for future regulatory activities Policy recommendations -....................................... 15

1. Approach required to the regulatory body .......................... 15(1) Reconstruction of the fundamental principles of regulatory

activities ...................................................................... 15(2) Establishment of regulatory processes and procedures .... 25i)

Backfit procedure ...................................................... 26ii) Documentation of views of the regulatory body shown inreview process ............................................................. 29(3) Issues of incorporation of external knowledge and decision
making process ............................................................. 32i)

Issue on 40-year operation period restriction .............. 33ii) Approachforadvancedengineering

discussion

onearthquake and fault issues .......................................... 39iii) Issue of unification of the risk assessment and risk
management function .................................................. 47iii

2. Efforts required to power plant operators .......................... 48(1)

Effective

operationofthe"evaluationofsafetyimprovement" system .................................................... 49(2)

Design of appropriate peer review system ..................... 54(3)

Communication with stakeholders ............................... 56

Chapter 3

Prospecting the amendment of Reactor Regulation Act- Example of bill outline - ....................................... 61

1. Outline of Amendment ...................................................... 62

2. Drafted amendment bill .................................................... 64(1) Reactor Regulation Act; Comparison of old and new articles.................................................................................... 64(2) Act for establishment of Nuclear Regulation Authority;
Comparison of old and new articles ................................ 74(3) Drafted articles for the act for establishment of the Nuclear
Safety Goal Council ....................................................... 77

Supplement: Safety regulation and administrations of justice ... 79

References ............................................................................. 81(This report is the English translation of the Japanese report releasedin Aug. 2014 by the 21st Century Public Policy Institute .)iv

Chapter 1

Issues of current regulatory
activities by the Nuclear Regulation
Authority

The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) is now in the process ofreviewing conformity of nuclear power plant designs to the new regulatory
requirements established following the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident
in response to operators’ applications for review. This review (conformity
review) is being carried out for reactor establishment license (amendment),
approval of construction plan and approval of operational safety program
as a combined set in order to effectively conduct the review for restart ofplant operation.
The following gives an overview of the current problems arising fromsuch new regulatory activities.
As is the case for safety regulation of other technologies, nuclear
safety regulation is generally based on the idea that fundamentally any“technology” has potential risks and therefore precaution has to be taken
to minimize the probability of actualization of potential risks and tominimize possible damages in case the risks are actualized. Therefore theconcept of “safety” is not absolute, but relative. Such idea has been thebasis of safety regulation before the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident.
However, instead of explaining such idea, the Government as well as
operators repeated explanations suggestive of absolute safety as a reality(“zero-risk argument”) and finally they themselves got entrapped inbelieving such argument (“myth of safety”). This was because accurate
explanation was thought to passively encourage local community torequire absolute safety and impede the continuity of their claims inongoing nuclear power generation lawsuits (if continuous safety
improvement is required, that might be taken as “safety” as the basis of
the past licensing is doubtful). That was the actual situation before the
Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident. Under such situation, the risk-informed
regulatory framework to minimize accident probability and possible
damages in case of an accident could not be generally accepted.
In light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi NPS
accident, safety regulation after the accident fully incorporated the ideathat the possibility of accident is not zero, and it is tried to provide“necessary conditions” for operating nuclear plants. This approachrequires operators to take necessary actions and measures to minimize
the possibility of accident and the NRA to review the conformity of thoseactions and measures to conditions it provided. Thus establishment ofsuch conditions and confirmation of conformity of operators’ actions andmeasures to those conditions became a major function of the NRA.
1

Improvement of safety and reliability

Onvoluntarybasis

Onvoluntary& regulation
basis
Measures were taken to prevent
similar accidents even if
attacked by earthquake/tsunamiof the same level as thatexperienced at Fukushima
Daiichi NPS.

Emergency
preparedness
y Enhancementof emergency
power sources
y Enhancementof coolingcapabilities
y Enhancementof flooding
countermeasures, etc.

Further safetyenhancement measuresy Measures based on technical findings
from Fukushima Daiichi NPP
accidenty Measures against external events(earthquake, tsunami, other natural
hazards, terrorism, etc.)
y Consideration of international trends
y Enhancement of emergency measures

Before Immediately
After
accidentt
id t

World
highest level

Incorporationof goodpracticeworld wideand new
knowledge
under theleadership of
JANSI

Present

Figure 1 Efforts toward enhanced nuclear safety
Then, what comes next is a question whether safety is really ensured
by meeting those necessary conditions. Compliance with the necessary
conditions is a matter of course and in addition operators have to take a
responsibility for developing and implementing the measures tocontinuously improve plant safety. The primary responsibility for plantsafety lies on operators. That is a global standard. The Nuclear Damage
Compensation Act requires operators to assume no-fault liability. From
this viewpoint also, it is clear that operators cannot escape their liability
for loss of safety or actualization of potential risks, i.e. accidents, even if
they have taken all the actions necessary for meeting the regulatory
requirements required by regulatory body. This also suggests how it isirrelevant that claims are often raised by local authorities and others
requiring the parties other than operators, such as the NRA or othergovernment agencies, to “ensure safety.”In the above context, it would be an expected practice for the NRA tofocus on necessary conditions and for operators to independently
implement self-imposed safety enhancement measures of different quality
in different dimension. But reality is not like that. As shown in Fig. 1,
operators themselves still have misunderstanding to take safety measureson an extended line same as that in the regulator’s dimension. That would
still lead to misunderstanding to think that zero-risk world really exists.
Operators’ voluntary safety enhancement efforts should include not only
those to be performed on the extended line of regulatory requirements, but
2also comprehensive safety measures which incorporate the issues out ofregulatory scope and site-specific conditions.
The Fukui district court granted the caveat against the Kansai
Electric Power’s Ohi Power Station the other day.
The summary of judgment says that “the point of judgment waswhether there is, by any chance, any specific risk to cause such situation(like Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident)” and added that “if there is any
such possibility, the caveat should be granted as a matter of course.” Inother words, the judge took a stance of zero-risk requirement, not to accept
non-zero-risk situation.
The NRA showed no specific reaction to this court decision. Bu t the
NRA as an administrative agency has to pay attention to judicial judgment
even if it was a lower court decision. In addition, situations are becoming
somewhat realistic where the NRA has to be prepared for an administrative
lawsuit brought by anti-nuclear groups. Furthermore, since increasing
number of caveats against nuclear power plants are being filed across thecountry, possibility of assisting intervention under Article 42 of the Codeof Civil Procedure should be considered.
Then the NRA will have to explain to the public (and to the court)
about the relative nature of the basis for safety regulation. In that case, it
is doubtful whether the NRA can convince the public by explaining only
about necessary conditions. It is easy to imagine that the NRA may feelanxiety for being required to provide something like sufficient conditions.
The anti-nuclear groups, which have been insisting so far that there is nozero-risk technology in this world, have now changed their argument andbegun to claim that restart of a nuclear power plant should not be
permitted unless it is shown that the plant involves no risk (though thisclaim is self-contradictory in itself). Under such circumstances, the NRA
seems to be afraid that it could be subject to bitter criticis ms if it tries tounderstand operators’ opinions, and that if it tries to enhance preliminary
review to streamline its review process, then it could be accused of doing
things in secrecy. As a result of such mounting concern, the NRA’s attitude
toward operators has become awkward and moreover it seems that strange
misunderstanding is prevailing within the NRA that taking stubborn
approach is no other than showing its independence. That may be thecurrent situation in the NRA.
As for “transparency” of review process, some criticize that the NRA
has a misconception that “transparency” is synonymous with live
broadcasting of meeting on the internet. But, transparency should be to
publicly explain decision making process including the data, judging
criteria and reasoning applied to the decision. It is not enough forachieving accountability only with line-broadcasting meetings between theregulator and operators (sometimes it is unclear what they are talking
about at meetings). Sometimes we encounter the scenes where they seemto be “acting”, knowing that they are being broadcasted. As will be
discussed later, approach to achieving “transparency” should bethoroughly reconsidered.
It is hardly possible to provide sufficient conditions for safety3measures without establishing normal communication with operators who
know best about detailed conditions of plants. Technical information also
cannot be kept updated without communication with operators andmanufactures. Lack of communication could result in request for
additional information, because the NRA cannot determine withconfidence whether data received from operators or manufactures for acertain review item are sufficient or not. Even when requesting additional
information, the NRA itself is sometimes not aware of what type and levelof data would be sufficient for regulatory review. That is a root cause, inmany cases, of the situation where operators are accused of not providing
sufficient data and are obliged to take responsibilities for everything.

(Example 1) The NRA Expert Meeting on the Crush Zone on Tsuruga Power Station
Site discussed the draft report "Evaluation of Crush Zone on Tsuruga Power
Station Site of the Japan Atomic Power Company" 1 on May 15, 2013. This reportmainly insists that the data submitted by the operator are insufficient to rule out
the possibility of the concerned crush zone being an active fault, without showing
the basis for the NRA’s argument to consider the crush zones as active faults. In
this report, the NRA uses reference 4, “Guide for Reviewing Seismic Safety of
Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities” (December 20, 2010, Nuclear Safety
Commission) 2 , as a basis for its judgment. The clause (5) of “1.3 Identification of
Active Fault to be Considered in Seismic Design” of this Guide pr escribes that “inidentifying an active fault to be considered in seismic design, the method, basis
and reliability of information supporting the basis should be shown”. Obviously
the report does not meet this requirement, and that means the NRA expert
meeting has not achieved its accountability.
(Example 2) “Evaluation Meeting on the Current Status of the Kansai ElectricPower Company’s Ohi Power Station Units 3 and 4” was held on June 20, 2013.
The discussion at this meeting is an example of the case wher e the NRA excluded
an evaluation method other than that described in the relevant NRA’s guide. The
reason for excluding other method was not clearly explained, although the guide
only provides “an example”. This case is an example where possibility for app lying
different method was foreclosed because the necessary conditions for properly
demonstrating adequacy of an alternative method have not been clearly defined.
The NRA’s “Guide for Evaluating the Impact of Internal Flooding at Nuclear
Power Plants” 3 describes that “a piping damage should be assumed to occur at alocation where leakage is expected to have the largest impact on the safetyfunctions of the plant. As for leakage amount, when the maximum leakage fromwater inventory can be specifically estimated considering the factors such as
1

Japan Atomic Power Company, “Evaluation of Crush Zone on Tsuruga Power Station Site“, http//www.nsr.go.jp/committee/kisei/h25fy/data/007_02.pdf

2Guide for Reviewing Seismic Safety of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities ,http://www.nsr.go.jp/archive/nsc/shinsashishin/pdf/1/101220_1.pdf

3

Guide for Evaluating the Impact of Internal Flooding at Nuclear Power Plants ,http://www.nsr.go.jp/nra/kettei/data/20130628_jitsuyouissui.pdf

4

piping height and route, the amount of flooding water may be calculated
assuming such upper bound of water leakage (details of flooding due to damageof fluid-containing piping are given in Annex A)”. Pipe rupture need not beassumed for those pipes which meet a certain criterion. This Guide requires
detailed stress evaluation in assuming a pipe damage and refers, in its appendix,
to “the U.S. NRC’s Standard Review Plan (SRP) Branch Technical Position (BTP)
3-4 ‘Postulated Rupture Locations in Fluid System Piping Inside and Outside
Containment’ and the Standards for Nuclear Power Generation Facilities of Japan
Society of Mechanical Engineers "Piping Damage Protection Design Code (JSMES NDl-2002)" as "examples" of the methods applicable to such evaluation.
In addition, the Guide allows use of alternative evaluation methods bydescribing, in its appendix, that “use of any evaluation method other than thosereferred to in this guide is not hindered if adequacy of such met hod is properly
demonstrated.” Accordingly the Kansai Electric Power Company performed stressevaluation using an alternative evaluation method other than those given in the
Guide as examples in order to get approval for applying the exemption provision,
which is applicable to pipe damage assumption for general portions of high energy
piping, to a part called terminal end. The Kansai Electric Power showed that same
design philosophy was applied to both general portions of high energy piping andterminal ends and then showed the results of stress analysis results for eachpiping subject to evaluation 4 . The NRA did not accept the evaluation using thisalternative method. Instead it pointed out the necessity for establishing a wholesystem of evaluation encompassing from evaluation method to judging criteria 5 .
The status assessment report compiled later by the NRA describes its commentas “the NRA confirmed the conditions of the systems and components which areinstalled in the zones harboring high energy piping and are to be protectedagainst flooding, and pointed out that the Kansai Electric Power’s method was
not adequate for evaluation of flooding prevention measures” 6 .
In this Kansai Electric Power’s case, the NRA made a judgment to denyadequacy of an alternative method, without any clear explanation of specificcriteria or technical basis for accepting (or not accepting) alternative methods,
both in the Guide and at the assessment meetings, although the Guide generally
allows use of alternative methods. The reason for not accepting the Kansai
Electric Power’s alternative method has not been presented either at the review
meetings. This example represents the current situation where operators will
have to grope their way to find how to apply alternative metho ds, even in the
future.

4

The Kansai Electric Power Company, "Strategy for Evaluating Impact of Internal
Flooding”, (May 30, 2013, supplemental material for “Meeting on Assessment of Current
Status of Ohi Power Station Units 3 and 4”),https: //www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisha/ooi_genjyou/data/0008_04.pdf

5Nuclear Regulation Authority, June 13, 2013, “Minutes of the 12th Meeting on Assessmentof Current Status of Ohi Power Station Units 3 and 4”,
https: //www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisha/ooi_genjyou/data/20130613 -ooi.pdf
Nuclear Regulation Authority, June 20, 3013, “Report on Current Status of the Kansai
Electric Power Company’s Ohi Power Station Units 3 and 4”,
https://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/ooi_genjyou/data / 0013_01.pdf

6

5

Looking at such response of the NRA, operators would get suspicious
about what judgment the NRA makes with what amount of data and would
often hesitate to provide data and materials. As will be presented later withanother examples, it becomes difficult for operators to determine howmuch money they should invest in safety measures, if regulatory judgmentchanges inconsistently or interpretation of review criteria is unstable. Thatwould result in uncertainty in cost estimation and have a significant
impact on the business conditions of operators. On the other hand, the
NRA casts blame on operators by criticizing their bit-by-bit provision of
information and takes organizationally defensive attitude insisting that it
is not to blame for prolonged review.
Operators, who will suffer significant damages to their management
if they cannot restart their plants, have no other choice but to finally follow
the insistence of the NRA, who only seeks for ensuring safety through its
review without any consideration of managerial issues. So operators would
feel there is no other way but to show their “will to submit” and make ittheir sole short-term target to get through the NRA’s review. That mightlead to operators’ mind to think there is nothing more to do if they passed
the review, and finally to collapse of the fundamental safety improvement
mechanism on which basis operators assume primary responsibility forplant safety and pursue continuous safety enhancement on a autonomousbasis. Such concern is now growing.
The NRA has to re-recognize that its role is not “to stop” nuclear
power plants, but “to safely operate” the plants. What the NRA has to do
now is to operate its organization keeping in mind what regulatory
requirements it should develop and how it should verify operators’ actions
for meeting the requirements, in order to make effective use of theeconomical asset so far invested on the public burden. If the NRA has such
recognition that it has to be the “last defense line” for stopping nuclear
power plant operation or for leaving the plants stopped, then that is noneother than lack of fundamental understanding of its own organizationalrole.
The recent amendment to the Reactor Regulation Act was made underadministration of the Democratic Party. It is hard to say that thisamendment is based on sufficient discussion on expectation for and roleof nuclear safety regulation, since there was no consensus at that timeeven within the administration as well as in the ruling party concerning
the extent to which nuclear power generation should be maintained in the
future including restart of existing plants. Restart strategy has finally been
acknowledged in the “Basic Energy Plan” adopted recently at a Cabinet
meeting. It has become clear that quantitative discussion will be madeabout the extent to which nuclear power generation should be maintainedin the future. Under such situation, it is required to make it clearer thatan objective of the Reactor Regulation Act is “to safely operate” nucle ar
power plants.

○ Example of delayed review process
An example is the delay of review process for the Japan Atomic Power

6

Company’s Tsuruga Power Station outlined below. On May 15, 2013, the 5th
expert meeting (official name: Expert Meeting on the Investiga tion of the Crush
Zone on Tsuruga Power Station Site) made evaluation and concluded that “fault
K is likely to extend further to southern direction. Faults K and G and crush zone
D-1 are likely to compose a series of geological structure”. After about two months,
on July 11, the Japan Atomic Power Company submitted to the NRA a report
titled “Report on the Investigation of the Crush Zone on Tsuruga Power Station
Site” to demonstrate more clearly that the crush zone is not an “active fault to beconsidered in seismic design” 7 . Upon receiving this report, the NRA held several
times of hearings and one review meeting, but after those meetings the expert
meeting was not held for about a year without any clear reason until additional
investigation meeting started in April, 2014. This is an example of problem casesthat brought significant delay to review process.

○ Examples of unstable interpretation of review criteria(Example 1) Maximum wind velocity of design basis tornado
In taking necessary measures against tornados, the Kansai Electric Power
Company defined the maximum wind velocity (V B ) of the design basis tornado inaccordance with the “Guide for Evaluating Impacts of Tornados at Nuclear Power
Plants” developed by the NRA.
This Guide requires that “the maximum velocity (V B ) be ‘the maximum windvelocity of the tornados experienced in the past (V B1 )’ or ‘the maximum windvelocity obtained from the maximum tornado hazard curve (V B2 )’, whichever ishigher”. In addition, while the Guide requires operators to define V B1 considering
the maximum tornado wind velocity ever experienced in the past in Japan as a
general rule, at the same time it prescribes that “‘Japan’ can be read as ‘tornado
impact assessment areas’ (the area where the nuclear power plant is sited a nd
those other areas which have similar meteorological conditions from theviewpoint of tornado phenomena) if sufficiently reliable data are available for theevaluation.” 8In performing tornado impact assessment as a part of status assessment for
Ohi Units 3 and 4, the Kansai Electric Power Company defined and used tornado
impact assessment area. The Guide provides the following basic consideration for
defining a tornado impact assessment area:
For defining a tornado impact assessment area, an IAEA standa rd(reference 31) can be consulted. The IAEA standard recommends about
100,000 km 2 of area for which tornado records should be investigated whenassessing annual frequency of tornado exceeding a certain level of windvelocity. Using this IAEA’s standard as a reference, an area of 100,000 km 2
around a nuclear power plant is defined as a candidate for tornado impact
assessment area. However, meteorological conditions may vary significantly
within a relatively small area in Japan. For example, meteorological
7

Japan Atomic Power Company, “Submission of the Report on the Inves tigation of the
Crush Zone on Tsuruga Power Station Site”,
http://www.japc.eo.jp/news/press/2013/pdf/250711.pdf

8

Nuclear Regulation Authority, “Guide for Evaluating Impacts of Tornados at Nuclear
Power Plants”, http://www.nsr.go.jp/nra/kettei/data/20130628_jitsuyoutatsumaki.pdf

7conditions are significantly different between the Sea of Japan side andPacific Ocean side. Therefore, irrespective of this 100,000 km 2 , the basic
method for defining a tornado impact assessment area should be based oninvestigation for the areas where meteorological conditions are similar, fromthe viewpoint of tornado phenomena, to those in the area where the nuclear
power plant is sited.
The Kansai Electric Power Company defined a tornado impact assessment
area by reference to 100,000 km 2 recommended in the IAEA document “SSG-18”
which is referred to in the NRA Guide. Specifically, the Kansai Electric Powerselected the overlapped area of “the area within 180 km from Ohi Power Station(about 100,000 km 2 ) and the area within 5 km on both sides (sea-side andmountain-side) of the coastline (5,321 km 2 )” as the tornado impact assessment
area. Using the Japan Meteorological Agency’s “Gust and Tornado Database” 41
tornados were identified to have occurred in the specified tornado impact
assessment area in a period from 1961 to June 2012. The largest tornado was ofclass F1, which corresponds to 33 - 49 m/s of wind velocity. So the Kansai
Electric Power adopted 49 m/s as the maximum wind velocity of the tornados
experienced in the past (V B1 ). The wind velocity V B2 was statistically evaluatedusing a hazard curve prepared for the tornado impact assessment area and 69
m/s, which corresponds to the wind velocity of 10 -5 annual exceedance
probability, was selected as V B2 value. Therefore, the maximum wind velocity V B
was set at 69 m/s, the larger value of V B1 and V B2 9 .
However, at a subsequent status assessment meeting the NRA commented
that “the tornado impact assessment area need not necessarily be a circular zone”
and suggested to “expand the coverage of investigation to wider areas along the
Sea of Japan which have similar conditions.” 10 Receiving such comments, theKansai Electric Power redefined the tornado impact assessment area by adding
the areas “geographically and meteorologically similar” to the plant site within 5
km on both sides of the coastline from Hokkaido to Honshu Island. For this new
tornado impact assessment area, 69 m/s was derived as the value of V B1 and V B2
and the maximum wind velocity V B was set at 69 m/s. 11
Upon receiving the evaluation results from the Kansan Electric Power
Company, the NRA commented, in the “Report on the Current Status of the
Kansai Electric Power Company’s Ohi Units 3 and 4 12 ” (July 3, 2013), that “it has
confirmed that the design basis tornado was properly d efined based on necessary
investigation judging from the fact that the operator evaluated the structural
integrity against 100 m/s of wind velocity”, and added that “in the review after

9

The Kansai Electric Power Company, “Strategy for Tornado Impact Assessment” (May 30,2013), https://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/ooi_genjyou/data/0008_03.pdf

10

The Kansai Electric Power Company “Minutes of the 8th Evaluation Meeting on Current
Status of Ohi Power Station Units 3 and 4” (May 30, 2013),
https://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/ooi_genjyou/data/20130530 -ooi.pdf

11

The Kansai Electric Power Company, “Response to Comment on Tornado and Results of
Impact Evaluation” (June 11, 2013),
https://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/ooi_genjyou/data/0011_11.pdf

12

Nuclear Regulation Authority, “Report on the Current Status of the Kansai ElectricPower Company’s Ohi Units 3 and 4”, July 3 2013,https://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/kisei/h25fy/data/0013_01.pdf

8

the new regulatory requirements are put into force, further investigat ion will beneeded to take into account regional characteristics and to collect more data fordefining a design basis tornado to be used as a design basis. 13 ” However, the NRA
showed neither its criterion for determining “the areas which have similar
meteorological conditions from the viewpoint of tornado phenomena” mentioned
in the Guide, nor its idea concerning how to judge sufficiency and reliability ofthe tornado data.
The regulatory requirement allows licensees to read “Japan” as “the tornado
impact assessment area” under the condition of availability of sufficiently reliable
data. But adequacy of this condition has become a point of argument in thecourse of regulatory review involving multiple operators. Immediately after thestart of review of conformity to new regulatory requirements (conformity review),
applications for the review were filed for Sendai Nuclear Power Plant unit 1 and
2 of the Kyushu Electric Power Company, Tomari Power Station of the Hokkaido
Electric Power Company, and Ikata Power Station unit 3 of the Shikoku ElectricPower Company. The NRA notified these plants of the focuses of the conformity
review taking into account the contents of amendments to reactor establishment
licenses which were confirmed through the first review meetings and subsequent
hearings 14 . One of the focuses identified in conjunction with assessment of
tornado impacts was a request for explanation on “credibility of defined designbasis tornados and adequacy of the protective measures against missiles 15 .” The
Shikoku Electric Power Company initially defined a design basis tornado byreading “Japan” as “tornado impact assessment area”, but withdrew the original
approach at the review meeting held in November of the same year and proposed
to take a whole “Japan” approach. During that time the NRA repeatedly requested
the Shikoku Electric Power Company at hearings to show adequacy of the basis
and reasoning of using tornado impact assessment area, for example, by saying“explanation should be provided on the relevance of defining V B1 on the basis of
tornados experienced in the tornado impact assessment area rather than thoseexperience in whole Japan” or “clean-cut reasons should be shown for not

13

In the Current Status Assessment Report (draft), the NRA evaluated the results of
tornado impact assessment focusing only on the design basis tornado (V D ) (100 m/s)
necessary for design basis missile evaluation without mentioning the tornado impact
assessment area. The NRA’s evaluation states as follows: “Although Ohi site issurrounded by mountains on three sides and may have little chance of tornado attacked,
the units were designed against a design basis tornado of the same velocity level as thatused in the United States and in addition structural integrity was confirmed against 100
m/s of wind velocity. Therefore, the NRA concluded that the reference tornado wasproperly defined based on necessary investigation.”

14

Minutes of the 2nd Review Meeting on the Conformity of Nuclear Power Plants to New
Regulatory Requirements (July 23, 2013),
http://www.nsr.go.jp/activity/regulation/tekigousei/data/20120723.pdf

15

For detailed information, see the documents distributed at the 2nd Review Meeting on
the Conformity of Nuclear Power Plants to New Regulatory Requirements (major review
points for Sendai Nuclear Power Plant unit 1 and 2 of the Kyushu Electric Power
Company, major review points for Tomari Power Station of the Hokkaido Electric Power
Company, major review points for Ikata Power Station unit 3 of the Shikoku ElectricPower Company and major review points for Takahama Power Station Units 3 and 4 of
the Kansai Electric Power Company),
http://www.nsr.go.jp/activity/regulation/tekigousei/20130723.html

9considering the maximum tornado experienced in Japan 16 ”.
Getting back to the case of the Kansai Electric Power Company, whilehearing to other operators were being repeatedly held about the NRA’s inquiry formore explanation on the adequacy of “reading ‘Japan’ as ‘tornado impact
assessment area’”, the NRA’s review of Ohi Power Station Units 3 and 4 wasinterrupted until the expert meeting on the investigation of the crush zone on thesite reached its conclusion 17 . In the meantime the Kansai Electric Power
Company set the maximum wind velocity of the reference tornado at 9 2 m/s
considering the largest tornado ever experienced in Japan, without “reading‘Japan’ as ‘tornado impact assessment area’.” 18 The new evaluation results were
submitted to the NRA, as a reference material for safety review of Ohi Power
Station, at an operator hearing held prior to resuming of the review 19 . In moredetail, in defining V B (92 m/s), the Kansai Electric Company estimated V B2 using“tornado impact assessment area” defined as “the Sea of Japan side of Hokkaido
and Honshu Island and the area within 5 km on both sides of the coastline to thewest of Erimo Cape, and estimated V B1 without reading “Japan” as “tornado
impact assessment area.” This approach is thought of having passed the review
in effect, because no more discussion has been made on t his topic at subsequent
review meetings.
However this case poses the following problem. At operator hearings, the
NRA pointed out acceptability of small number of tornados actually experienced
as a reason for the argument on the tornado impact assessment area. But, on theother hand, the NRA has not shown any clear notion about under what conditions
site-specific maximum wind velocity is accepted (i.e. under what conditions“Japan” can be read as “tornado impact assessment area” and with what method
and how conservatively the assessment should be performed if sufficient amount16

For detailed information, see the following meeting summary of “Operator Hearing for

the Review of Conformity to New Regulatory Requirements for Ikata Power Station Unit
3” : Operator Hearing 16 (July 29, 2013), Operator Hearing 22 (August 13, 2013),

Operator Hearing 40 (August 30, 2013), Operator Hearing 42 (September 3, 2013),
Operator Hearing 75 (October 11, 2013),
http://www.nsr.go.jp/activity/regulation/tekigousei/shinsa/ikata3.html
17

The NRA’s review of the Kansai Electric Power ’s Ohi Power Station Units 3 and 4 was
kept under suspension during a period from the 2nd Review Meeting on July 23, 2013 to
the 20th Review Meeting on September 17 due to the NRA’s decision which said “thereview will be resumed after the NRA reaches a certain conclusion about ongoingevaluation of the crush zone.” Major review points of the contents of the application forreview of the Kansai Electric Power Company’s Ohi Power Station Units 3 and 4,
http://www.nsr.go.jp/activity/regulation/tekigousei/data/0002_06.pdf

18

The NRA’s review of Ohi Power Station Units 3 and 4 was interrupted during a period
from the 2nd review meeting on July 23, 2013 to the 20th review meeting on September
17 according to the NRA’s decision that “the review will be resumed after the NRA
reaches a certain conclusion about ongoing evaluation of the crush zone.” During thattime, as noted in the text, hearing to other operators were repeatedly conducted on the
NRA’s inquiry about reading Japan as tornado impact assessment area.

19

Meeting summary of “Operator Hearing 47 for the Review of Conformity to New
Regulatory Requirements for Ohi Power Station Units 3 and 4” held on November 14,
2013, and reference material submitted by the Kansai Electric Power Company“Reference Material for Safety Review for Ohi Power Station – Assessment of Tornado
Impacts for Ohi Units 3 and 4”,
http://www.nsr.go.jp/activity/regulation/tekigousei/shinsa/ooi34.html

10

of data is unavailable 20 . Therefore operators have no other choice but to grope ameans for defining the maximum wind velocity.
(Example 2) Design basis earthquake ground motion
In connection with the design basis earthquake ground motion,interpretation of review criteria based on the NRA’s guide has become a major
issue. The regulatory criteria for the design basis earthquake ground motion isprovided in the “Review Guide for Design Basis Earthquake Ground Motion.”“3.3.2 Evaluation of Ground Motion Using the Methods Based on Fault Model” of“I. Evaluation of Groud Mtion” of the Guide requires that geological structures
such as inclination of stratum, faults, and fold structure be ev aluated in modelingthe subsurface structures and “it be confirmed that the subsurface structures
such as depth of upper boundary of seismogenic layer, locations an d shapes ofseismic basement and free surface of base stratum, three -dimensional
irregularity of subsurface structure and seismic velocity structure as well as
attenuation characteristics of the ground have been adequately evaluated.” 21In the review of the Kansai Electric Power Company’s Ohi Units 3 and 4, the“depth of upper and lower boundaries of a seismogenic layer became a point ofargument 22 . The above-mentioned Guide describes that “dominant parameters
significantly influencing the evaluation of ground motion on the site should beanalyzed and reflected on the evaluation, when considering the uncertainties ofseismic source model (length of earthquake source fault, depth of upper and lower
boundaries of a seismogenic layer, inclination angle of fault, location and size ofasperity, stress drop, uncertainty of hypocenter, and uncertainties a ssociatedwith difference in interpretation and handling of those parameters ).”Evaluation of ground motion admits of various interpretations, because noclear guidance is available for handling uncertainties of parameters andcombining those uncertainties. In respect to the uncertainties of the earthquake
source model, the Guide describes that “it should be confirmed that theuncertainties of the model are properly taken into account for example bycombining the uncertainties, as appropriate.” However, no clear guidance isavailable about what kind of combination of uncertainties is required in whatcase. The Guide also describes that “it should be confirmed that factors of
uncertainties are properly analyzed by grouping them into random andepistemological uncertainties.” But again there is no clear statement about whatkind of combination of grouped uncertainties is required in the evaluation of20

As for conservatism, the Kansai Electric Power Company showed a clear approach byproposing that “considering potential for large bias in annual frequency on tornado s in
the tornado impact assessment area, a conservative expected value should be used as the
maximum wind velocity.” But the NRA responded to this proposal by saying “theproposed value could not be conservative enough unless additional conservatism is tak en
into account” or “considerable conservatism should be taken into account.” Both sides
have not yet reached any consensus. (Source: minutes of 8th Evaluation Meeting on Ohi
Units 3 and 4),
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/ooi_genjyou/data/20130 530.pdf

21

Review Guide for Design Basis Earthquake Ground Motion and Seismic Design Principle,
http://www.nsr.go.jp/nra/kettei/data/20130628_jitsuyoutaishin.pdf

22

Minutes of the 18 th Review Meeting on December 18, 2013,
http://www.nsr.go.jp/activity/regulation/tekigousei/data/20121218.pdf

11ground motion. In the review of Ohi unit 3 an 4, the NRA, including a “personal
opinion” of a Commissioner, suggested an idea to incorporate the uncertainties,
such as those associated with coupled movement of faults and depth of upperboundary of seismogenic layer, one by one into the basi c case (see Fig. 2). But
since no clear guidance has been shown yet about handling of uncertainties ofparameters and combination of uncertainties, the evaluation of design basis
earthquake ground motion admits of a wide range of interpretation.

○ Examples of changed regulatory judgment
The Kansai Electric Power Company thought it possible to extinguish a fire
inside reactor building (except for certain parts) using stationary fire hydrant andhoses installed in accordance with the requirement of the “Regulations for
Establishment and Operation of Commercial Power Reactors” and to be usedaccording to the “Review Criteria for Fire Protection of Commercial Power
Reactors and Associated Facilities.” (Use by on -site fire-fighting team wasassumed.) At the Ohi Units 3 and 4 status assessment meeting on June 11, 2013,
the locations difficult of fire extinction were identified based on the list 23 preparedby the Kansai Electric Power Company which showed a plan to install automatic
fire extinguishing system and manually-operated stationary fire extinguishingequipment for the locations difficult of fire extinction. The NRA expressed its view
saying that “we have got a general impression that acceptable level of measures
will be taken.” In addition, the Ohi Units 3 and 4 status assessment report
described an affirmative assessment result that said “according to evaluation
which considers the measures to be taken at this moment, no immediate safety significant problem is anticipated as far as fire events are concerned.” 24 However,at the hearing meeting prior to the review of conformity to new regulatory
requirements for Ohi Power Station Units 3 and 4, the NRA expressed its position
saying “though the Kansai Electric Power has a plan to manually extinguish afire from the planned fire-extinguishing operation bases, which approach isunpractical and automatic fire extinction system should be in place instead of
the current plan.” 25This position of the NRA considers the whole area inside reactor building as
an area difficult of fire extinguishing operation. Therefore it does not accept
manual fire extinguishing operation with stationary fire hydrant and hoses andrequires the operator to install automatic fire extinguishing system for the wholearea inside reactor building. This is an example case where a new position of the
NRA was added in the course of review.
23

The Kansai Electric Power Company, “Comments and Responses on Internal Fire and theResults of Fire Impact Assessment” (Material submitted to th e 11th Ohi Units 3 and 4
Current Status Assessment Meeting),
https://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/ooi_genjyou/data/0011_08.pdf

24

The Nuclear Regulation Authority, “Report of Current Status of Kansai Electric Power
Company’s Ohi Power Station Units 3 and 4”,
https://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/ooi_genjyou/data/0013_01.pdf

25

Nuclear Regulation Authority, “Operator Hearing 61 for the Review of Conformity of Ohi
Power Station Units 3 and 4 to New Regulatory Requirements”,
http://www.nsr.go.jp/activity/regulation/tekigousei/shinsa/data/ooi34/mendan/20131128_0
2giji.pdf

12

Jul

Au

2013
Oct

Sep

Nov

Dec

KEPCO explainedp
the r esultsamof design basis
gr ound motionhto NRA. T hhe depth of thenupper boundar
y of the ffault
was assumed
e to be 4 km
m in thebasic case. *1

Fault upperboundary depth

Jan

Feb

2014
Ma AprMa

NRA commentedm
on t hhe groundamodel wit h 4 km of fault
upper
d
n
boundary depth. One commissioner
y suggested 3 km depth..
personallye KEPCO saidsl
In response,
it would
u 4 km. *2
like to be ccareful about
KEPCO
O submitted t he result s of basic
case evaluatv
ion whichhassumede 3 km as
the deptp h of t he upperpboundarya of t hefault. **3F-6 crush zone

Design basiss ground mot
m ion:
700 Gal, Review
suspendedRefor 2 mont hhs

KEPCO explainedeitst
confirmation
result thatt
the crush zones on ttheudsite including
F-6 hhavebeen inactive
since theclate Pleistocene.
*4st

NRA said “t he review
w of Ohi uniti 3 and 4 w
will be resumed
mafter NRA
about
A reaches a ccertain conclusioncu ongoing
evaluat ion
n of t he crushs zones ” anand t he review
e wasinterrupted
d for 2 montn hs. *5 A certain approachpwaspresent ed at the September
eexperter meet ing. *6

Evaluation of
coupled movementof 3 faults

Boring and aacoustic expl ooration
result ed in ddesi gn basi s gground
5 Gal.
moti on of 759

In respect to possibilit
i y of coupledlmovement
e of 3 faultsl (an issuee atthe current
meetn status assessmentee ing for Ohi
h unit 3 andn 4), KEPCO
C
expressed it s view, basedon t he invest igat ion
ao at Obama
ma Bay, sayingi“FO-A~FO-B
O
fault s anda
Kumagawaafault belongeto differentfgeologicall zones and are 15 km apartafrom eeach other aand no activev
structure iis observed topographically,ic
geologicallyoanddseismologically.
gTherefore,r
coupledp
movementmof 3 fault
u s need noto beconsidered.
d ” *7
NRA said “We discussedscoupledd movementt o f FO-A~FO-B
F
fault s andKumagawaa fault, especiallyefocusingu
on acoust
o ic explorat
o ion recordsoin Obama Bay, but st iill furt her ininvest igat ionn is necessarya and wewould neede to have moremnew data.
a ” *8Earthquakes due
to unspecified
seismic sources*1: 27th
t review meetm ing, October
t
2,
2013
1
*2: 89th
t review meetm ing, March
a
5,
2014
1
*3: 111t
1 h review meet ing, M
May 9,
20141*4: 1stt review meete ing, July 16, 2013
*5: 2ndd review mmeet ing, July
y 23,
2013
1
*6: 6t h meet ing ono t he investt igat ionof crushzoness on Ohi PowercoStata ion site
*7: 27th
t review meet ing, October
t
2,
2013
*8: Minut es of 27t h review meet ing,
October 2, 2013
*9: 74th review meet ing, March 5,
2014*10: 63rd review meet ing, December
25, 2013*11: 92nd review meet ing, March 12,
2014

KEPCO
E
explainedpevaluationaresults s for actt ive
faultsin theuvicinitcy of t hee
sit e and showedethat
a those fault
l s
do not have
impactp
on t hecoupledumovementoof 3
faults.
u*9

Designebasis eeart hquake gground mot iion: 856 Gala

In conjunctc ion wit h tthe West Tottoritk t he KEPCO
PnEarthquake,made ano showingg t hat Tottorii
explanat ioninoof
area is seismicallyindependenth
Ohi/Takahama
area aand should bbe
o of data collect ion.
out of scopeu
C to furt here
NRA requested
KEPCO
clar ify t hee differencee between
Tottori areae and Ohi/Takahama/
area. *10

KEPCO explained t hat “it will perfor man evaluat ion considering t he observed
records dur ing t he West Tottori
Earthquake, t hough Tottori area isseismically different from
Ohi/Takahama area e.g. in the densit yof act ive fault s. *11

N
NRA
addit ionallynrequesteds
Kn
KEPCO to include
t he WWestThh
Tottori Eart hquake
in thevuforevaluation off SS earthquake
Ohi Power StatOt ion as anneart
a hquake too be consideredeintheh scope of eart hquakess due touunspecified seismicssources.
r
KEPCO agreedKe to the request.
eInn respect to the Rumoi
Earthquake, K
E
KEPCO adoptedo620
cm/s 2 of horizontali
accelerat ion,““in considerat ion ofcconservat ism required forsseismic capabilit y of nuclear
ffacilit ies” as shown in themat erial t it led “Evaluat ion ofmEarthquake
E
Ground Mot ion forOhi
O Power Stat ion.” *12

Figure 2 Chronology of Review Meetings on Design Basis Earthquake
Ground Motion (in the case of the Kansai Electric Power Company)

Summing up, it can be said that regulatory activities have run into a
negative spiral shown in the following Figure. We have to go back to the13starting point to think of how the nuclear safety regulation should be, by
cutting off such negative spiral and the NRA’s privileged relationshi p with
operators, and by getting back normal communication between the NRA
and operators. Through such efforts, we have to reconstruct an
institutional environment under which each of the involved parties can be
fully committed to the activities to enhance nuclear safety. The following
chapters discuss the recipes for such challenge.

Primary role
Actually,
should be to establish
sticks too much to developing
and apply the“necessary and sufficient conditions”
necessary conditions
Excessive
Going back tofor restart of plantconsideratioti
the world of safety myth
Operators selfimposed safety
activities are ofessential
Not feasible undercurrent situation
Operators cannot
afford to do all underdegraded management
environmentn of public
opinionrequiring“zero risk”

Prolongation of review
period andunpredictab
lecompletion
time

Conflict of opinions between
operators
and NRA about measures

So eager in blocking out information fromoutside that necessary knowledge is not
sufficiently collected and clear
criteria/guides are not developed

Instead of
applying clear criteria,
repetition of following process:
NRA comment:“not satisfied with that”
Administrative direction
Revised proposal from operator
NRA comment:“not satisfied with that”

Figure 3 Current negative spiral of regulatory activities

14

Chapter 2

Approach required for future regulatory
activities - Policy recommendations -In order to carry out effective and efficient regulatory activities andto enhance safety of nuclear facilities, system development and efforts ofboth regulatory body and operators are required, and complementaryfunctions for regulatory activities by intermediate and neutral
organizations are expected. In addition, when the regulatory bodyconsiders specific political measures, it is appropriate to distinguish thepart related to the operation method of the regulatory organization, NRAfrom the part related to the structure of regulation enactment system.

1. Approach required to the regulatory body
The safety regulation for nuclear power exists assuming that
operators carry on nuclear power generation business that uses
technologies to prevent the risk from adverse effect on the public safety
and the environmental preservation. Therefore, if the safety regulation
cannot remove the uncertainty when operators carry on the business andincreases the uncertainty on the contrary, it is completely illogical. If thenuclear energy business and the technologies are not socially accepted interms of safety and/or other reasons, and it is not allowed to use them as
the business or a mean of business, the nuclear energy business shouldbe abolished by democratic decision making (e.g. establishing the "Act for
Abolishment of Nuclear Power Generation"), not by safety regulation.
Therefore, the common principle required as the role of safety
regulation is "predictability". The predictability is a broad concept. In
respect of the process from license application to disposition, the order oflicense procedure, places, members and time period of the li cense
examination, and other items are included in the concept, and in terms ofcontent, it is included in the concept that license approval criteria andinterpretations are uniform within a certain range and not different among
examiners. In order to improve the predictability, this document discusses
how the current operation and regulatory activities of the NRA should be
improved.
(1)  Reconstruction of the fundamental principles of regulatory
activities
First of all, the principles of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC) are shown in the next table. NRC has determined independence,
openness, efficiency, clarity and reliability as the basic elements ofattitude related to regulatory activities, and has defined the concept at
such a specified level to be able to use as the determination criteria for15

making good technical judgment. It is considered that transparent andconsistent public administration of nuclear safety has been developed by
the regulatory principles in the U.S.
Nothing but the highest possible standards of ethical performance andprofessionalism should influence regulation. However, independence
does not imply isolation. All available facts and opinions must besought openly from licensees and other interested members of the
Independence:
public. The many and possibly conflicting public interests involved
must be considered. Final decisions must be based on objective,
unbiased assessments of all information, and must be documented withreasons explicitly stated.
Nuclear regulation is the public's business, and it must be transacted
publicly and candidly. The public must be informed about and havethe opportunity to participate in the regulatory processes as required
Openness*:by law. Open channels of communication must be maintained with
Congress, other government agencies, licensees, and the public, as
well as with the international nuclear community.
The American taxpayer, the rate-paying consumer, and licensees are
all entitled to the best possible management and administration ofregulatory activities. The highest technical and managerial
competence is required, and must be a constant agency goal. NRC must
Efficiency:
establish means to evaluate and continually upgrade its regulatory
capabilities. Regulatory activities should be consistent with the degreeof risk reduction they achieve. Where several effective alternatives areavailable, the option which minimizes the use of resources should be
adopted. Regulatory decisions should be made without undue delay.
Regulations should be coherent, logical, and practical. There should
be a clear nexus between regulations and agency goals and objectives
Clarity:whether explicitly or implicitly stated. Agency positions should bereadily understood and easily applied.
Regulations should be based on the best available knowledge fromresearch and operational experience. Systems interactions,
technological uncertainties, and the diversity of licensees andregulatory activities must all be taken into account so that risks a remaintained at an acceptably low level. Once established, regulation
Reliability*:should be perceived to be reliable and not unjustifiably in a state oftransition. Regulatory actions should always be fully consistent withwritten regulations and should be promptly, fairly, and decisively
administered so as to lend stability to the nuclear operational andplanning processes.
(Source: "Current status of nuclear regulation organizations of major countries in the world- significance and requirements for regulatory staff -", Naoki Nishida, nuclear power groupof the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, general incorporated foundation, IEEJ August
2013 edition)
Table 1 NRC's Principles of Good Regulation

16

On the other hand, how is the NRA of Japan? The following principles
for activities are presented in the NRA’s Core Values and Principles in thehome page 26 :Guiding Principles for Activities
We in the NRA and its supporting Secretariat shall perform our duties
diligently acting in accordance with the following principles.
(1) Independent Decision Making
We shall make decisions independently, based on the latest
scientific and technological information, free from any outside pressure
or bias.
(2) Effective Actions
We shall discard the previous ineffective approach to regulatory
work and stress the importance of a field-oriented approach to achieve
genuinely effective regulations.
(3) Open and Transparent Organization
We shall ensure transparency and appropriate information
disclosure on regulations, including the decision making process.
We shall be open to all opinions and advices from Japan and theinternational communities and avoid both self-isolation and selfrighteousness.
(4) Improvement and Commitment
We shall be assiduous in learning and absorbing the latest
regulatory know-how and best practices, enhancing individual
capacities, and performing our duties, mindful of the highest ethicalstandards, a sense of mission, and rightful pride.
(5) Emergency Response
We shall be ready to swiftly respond to all emergency situations
while ensuring that in ‘normal’ times a fully effective response system isalways in place.
The difference between the U.S. and Japan is quite obvious. The
principles for activities of the NRA of Japan are “philosophical” comparedto the concrete NRC’s principles for activities and do not have concretenessto be able to use as references for regulatory decision making. Since it is26

NRA’s Core Values and Principles, <Principles of Activities>", NRA
http://www.nsr.go.jp/nra/idea.html

17highly independent Article-Three Committee, self-discipline is required.
This does not make it possible to predict what kind of judgment is madeand what kind of principles for activities is applied to the judgment inpractical regulatory activities.
The example of discussions and judgment made in accordance withthe principles for activities by NRC is shown below. Three improvement
activities were recommended by the NRC commission secretariat to thecommission at the end of 2013 27 . All of them are recommended as the
improvement activities in accordance with Recommendation 1 of "NearTerm Task Force (NTTF) Report", which is a short-term approach
recommendation report prepared by the Task Force established by the NRC
in response to the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident. The content of therecommendation is as follows:
Improvement Activity 1: Establish a design-basis extension category of
events and associated regulatory requirements
Improvement Activity 2: Establish commission expectations for defense in-depth
Improvement Activity 3: Clarify the role of voluntary industry initiatives
in the NRC regulatory process
However, the Commission made judgments of "reevaluation for
Improvement Activities 1 and 2 and partial approval for Improvement
Activity 3" in May 2014, which is "rejection" to the recommendation
practically. The Commission mentioned the reason, that is, "thesecretariat needs to explain the relationship with the risk informed policy
under execution by the NRC in the document of the RMTF (RiskManagement Task Force), so as to surely organize, plan effectively andintroduce the corrective actions.” 28
The conclusion made by the Commission that the relationship withthe activity under execution should be clarified in the long-term regulatory
framework in order to carry out new corrective actions means thefollowing: the requirement that "once established, regulation should beperceived to be reliable and not unjustifiably in a state of transition "concerning "Reliability", which is one of the above-mentioned NRC's
principles for activities, served as the determination criteria.
With regard to this recommendation case, there is another point to
be noted. It is that when the NRC determines important matters related tosafety administration based on the council system, each member attends
27

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Recommendation

28

Staff Requirements SECY13-0132 - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff
Recommendation for the Disposition of Recommendation 1 of the Near-Term Task Force
Report18

the meeting after documenting his/her own opinions. As an example ofsuch a document having 5 to 6 pages of A4 format, a part of two documents
prepared by the Chairman Macfarlane and the Commissioner Apostolakis
is respectively provided below.
The Chairman Macfarlane, who is one of the members of the Task
Force, cast a pro vote stating "Recommendation 1 of the NTTF (Near-TermTask-Force) is related to the establishment of a logical, systematic, andcoherent regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriatelybalances defense-in-depth and risk considerations. In response to thiscomplex recommendation, the staff developed three proposed improvement
activities." Describing that "I approve the staff's proposed activities, withedits, as indicated in my comments below", he casted a positive vote. On
the other hand, the Commissioner Apostolakis cast a negative vote stating"the NRC has the responsibility to ensure that the risks from the operationof power reactors are acceptably low. Consequently, methods to quantify
this risk and identify its major contributors (an essential element of risk
management) should be more systematically integrated into the regulatory
system. I am disappointed that the staff has proposed a much more limited
set of actions in SECY-13-0132 that, in my view, do not come close to what
the NTTF envisioned". (See next table)

Approved
Chairman

Disapproved

Abstain

Not
Participating

Comment

DateX

3/6/14XX

4/8/14X

X

X

1/22/14X

X

X

2/14/14X

2/14/14X

MACFARLANE
Commissioner
SVINICKI
Commissioner
APOSTOLAKIS
Commissioner
MAGWOOD
Commissioner

X

OSTENDORFF
Made by the writer based on the STAFF REQUIREMENTS, SECY -13-0132.

Table 2 Voting results of the task force

The Commission concludes as follows:
For Improvement Activity 1: Establish a Design-Basis Extension
Category of Events and associated Regulatory Requirements andImprovement Activity 2: Establish Commission Expectations for DefenseIn-Depth, reconsideration is required, and for Improvement Activity 3, thewhole recommendation is denied though part of the recommendation can
19be accepted (the items shown in the "For" column of the table).
For the NRA of Japan, there is no such example that theCommissioners document and expresses their opinions. Furthermore, it is
one of the big differences with the U.S. NRC that the council system suchas "voting after expressing independent opinions" is not adopted by the
NRA of Japan.
In addition, the difference in the content is also important. What the
NRC's principles for activities have, but the NRA’s principles do not haveis "Efficiency" and "Reliability".
First of all, the "Efficiency" is the principles for activities including thefollowing factors, but not limited only thereto:yyyRegulatory activities should correspond to the degree of the risk
reduction achieved by them.
When there are several effective alternatives, the one minimizing
consumption of the resource should be adopted.
The determination of the regulation must not be delayed without ajustifiable reason. Though this principle is established on the basisof the natural values that the stakeholders on regulation such as
taxpayers, consumers, and operators have the right to request the
maximum efficiency for the regulatory activities carried out by
governmental organizations, such principle is not established inJapan, probably because the people do not really realize that suchadministrative costs are charged upon the people. Though there may
be social context in Japan that any review processes are accepted(for some cases, the more time and manpower are wasted, the morepositively they are accepted) if their purposes are related to safety,
this point should be improved.

Because the risk is not zero and the measures require costs, the NRA
should actively explain it so that the principle, which determines thenecessity of measures by comparison, can be also accepted in Japan. In
the U.S., regulatory requirements are made without carrying out suchcomparison for the measures immediately required for public safety, andthe principle of efficiency should be applied in relation to the regulatory
requirements in the other cases. In that sense, it should be considered inJapan to prioritize importance to the measures and apply the principle inaccordance with the content of regulatory requirements.
In addition, it should be noted that the regulation corresponding to
the degree of risk reduction has the following meaning: in the case thedegree of risk reduction is very small; on the contrary, the disadvantages
including the safety being damaged are greater because requesting a
regulatory requirement may lead to inconsistency with other requirements.
Since measures require new equipment or procedures, an error of design20and maintenance of equipment, related human error, unknown common
cause failure or secondary effect may be generated.
It is considered that the importance of these principles for activities
will increase with development of the "Probabilistic Risk Assessment(PRA)" 29 , which is under consideration to be introduced in the near futurein Japan.
Secondly, "Reliability" is also important. There are many cases where
slack of the self-discipline is recognized due to lack of "Reliability" as
follows: whether or not the NRA has really determined in consideration of
all the knowledge that can be used (for example, the experts who havebeen engaged in the safety review until that time were excluded in theexpert meeting for incorporating the external knowledge on the earthquake
and fault issues); whether or not a regulatory decision established oncehas been simply reversed; or whether or not regulatory activities conformto the documented regulations. Examples are shown in the following:(Example 1) Uncertainty of regulatory standards
The regulatory standard for cables and accessories is an example that
regulation was reinforced in the new regulatory standards after inauguration of
the NRA. In 1980, the “Review Guide for Fire Protection of Light Water Nuclear
Power Reactor Facilities" 30 was introduced by the former Nuclear Safety
Commission of Japan, and it was required that incombustible and fire -resistantmaterials should be used for the cables and accessories. For the plants
constructed before instruction of the guideline, however, it was accepted to use
the cables with a spreading fire prevention agent applied as an alternative of
incombustible and fire-resistant cables 31, 32 .
After inauguration of the NRA, an operator is required to use fire-resistantcables in its plant in the "Review standard concerning fire protection ofcommercial power reactors and their auxiliary facilities" prepared by the NRA.
However, the guide states as follows:

29"Recommendations toward independent and continuous safety enhancement of nuclear
energy" (Advisory Committee for Energy and Resources, electric and gas enterprise
subcommittee, nuclear subcommittee, working group on independent safety enhancementof nuclear energy)
http://www.meti.go.jp/committee/sougouenergy/denryoku_gas/genshiryoku/anzen_wg/ repot_02.html

30"Review Guide for Fire Protection of Light Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities" by the
Nuclear Safety Councils

31"Considerations on design against fire", the material of the team for studying the newsafety standard for light water nuclear power reactors
https://www.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/shin_anzenkijyun/data / a 0004_01.pdf

32

The non-fire-resistant cables were confirmed from a viewpoint of equivalence in the
Periodic Safety Review (PSR) carried out by the NISA as the Operational Safety
Inspection.

21

"When the cable is the one which has a performance better thanincombustible or fire-resistant materials (hereinafter referred to as"alternative materials"), or when it is technically difficult to use thealternative materials to ensure the functions of the structure, system andcomponent, and measures are taken to prevent a breakout of fire on the
structure, system and component having safety functions due to the fire on
the structure, system and component, this shall not be applied to."
Therefore, the alternative materials having a performance better th anincombustible or fire-resistant materials are only acceptable 33,34 . However, since
the requirement for "having a performance better than incombustible or fire resistant materials" is not provided specifically, individual judgments are
required.
As a specific case, the 122nd review meeting of July 4, 2013 for the Tokai
Daini Power Plant of the Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd., is mentioned.
"For a non-fire-resistant cable with fire-resistive paint coated, (i) equivalence tothe fire-resistant cable, (ii) workability and manageability, (iii) durability, (iv)adverse consequence due to coating of fire-resistive paint, and (v) inspectability
must be explained" were raised as main points for discussion at the meeting. The
Commissioners requested the Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd., to explainin detail if the measures have the similar performance to the fire -resistantmaterials. The Japan Atomic Power Company Co., Ltd. will show that theperformance is equivalent using the results of the UL vertical flam e test and theIEEE code 383 flame test, which are shown as examples of demonstration test in
the guide, and the data will be reviewed from now on.

This is an example of which the "Reliability" and "Clarity" that
"regulatory actions should always be fully consistent with written
regulations" is being questioned, and which also shows "it is difficult to
document the regulatory requirements in detail ".The U.S. NRC has
incorporated the lessons learned from the fire accident of the Browns Ferry
NPP into the regulation and has made efforts to improve the regulation,and it is accepted to use cables meeting the criteria. It is stipulated in the
REGULATORY

GUIDE

1.189 35

that

the

criteria

must

meet

the

requirements of the Institute of Electrical Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Standard 383 (IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Electric Cables and33

Review criteria for fire protection of commercial power reactors and their aux iliary
facilities
https://www.nsr.go.jp/nra/kettei/data/20130628_jitsuyounaiki03.pdf

34

Main point at issue in the framework proposal of the new Safety Standards (design basis)and the matters to be confirmed
https://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/shin_anzenkijyun/data/0007_04.pdf

35

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.189 Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants

22

Field Splices for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, type test of cables
and other materials for NPPs) or the IEEE Standard 1202 (IEEE 1202 flame
testing of cables for use in cable tray, the IEEE criteria for cable flame
tests for industrial and commercial facilities), and it is clearly shown therethat what kind of tests must be accepted in order to use them. In addition,
considering some plants are actually incompatible with the regulatory
requirements on fire protection, the NRC has conducted evaluations basedon the features of individual NPPs 36 in addition to the evaluations basedon the regulatory standards common to NPPs, and has documented thereasons for the change of the plant licensing basis based on the study
results as a report called "Safety Evaluation Report" 37 , which can bereferred to for general regulatory activities.

(Example 2) Though multiplexing of the piping of the "containment spray", which
has functions of depressurization and cooling down of the containment vessel, isrequested for the Unit 3, Tomari PS of Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc. at the77th review meeting on February 4, 2014, it lacks the reliability of regulation that
"regulatory decisions established once should not be simply reversed".
At the time of construction, Article 9, "Consideration of Reliability in Design"of the Review Guide for Safety Design for Nuclear Power Facilities by the former
Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan required for the single failure of passive
components that generates by the frequency that should be taken into
consideration to meet the guideline requirements assuming a leakage from theflange, since a rupture or crack cannot be easily assumed, since intended safetyfunctions are required to be achieved even though a single failure is assumed
considering each failure mode and probability. Even after the change to the new
regulatory standards, descriptions of the guide are not changed. And the"Interpretation of the Regulations for Standards of Locations, Structures andEquipment of Commercial Power Reactors and their Auxiliary Facilities" explainsthat for the single failure of passive components of systems of high significanceincluding the containment spray system, the diversity requirement is not applied"when the possibility of a single failure occurrence can be explained to be very
small

rationally, or when it is confirmed by a safety analysis or other methods

that the safety function of a system can be substitut ed by other system even

36

NRC Appendix A to Part 50 – General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants

37"Report on Fact-Finding of the Regulatory System, and the Standards and Criteria in
Western Countries (investigation of the concrete process, etc., of the US design review)"
by Incorporated Administrative Agency, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, 2005

23

when the function is lost by assuming a single failure 38 ." Therefore, the Hokkaido
Electric Power Co., Inc. confirmed the adequacy of the design concerning thesingle failure of passive components, and showed the high reliability of thecontainment-spray piping. However, at the review meeting, the position is shownthat "there are two cases of assuming and not assuming a single failure
considering the reliability of passive components, and the guide has supposed
the loss of function for the case of assuming a single failure. The guide decides
the assuming or not assuming by generation of a failure, and it is not accepted
to decide the assuming or not assuming by the frequency. The loss of function ofthis piping is a break of flow path." Then, the multiplexing became necessary 39 .

The NRA is a regulatory body with very strong independence basedon Article 3 of the National Government Organization Law. For that reason,
it is not allowed to make approaches from the outside to the regulatory
activities and the review process of the NRA so as to put some "pressure"on them. In that case, it is very important that the NRA imposes firm
norms on it and restrains itself in accordance with the norms. If hiding
behind the system ensuring the independence cuts off the NRA’s
communication with the outside or refuses for the NRA to listen to different
technical knowledge, the attitude may be interpreted as an expression toshow a lack of trust for its own determinations and activities. Though it isoften said that independence is different from isolation, "independence
without self-discipline" is a big problem.
Before it reaches that stage, it is required that the current principles
for activities is fundamentally reviewed again referring to the principles for
activities established by the U.S. NRC to obtain practical basic policies ofregulatory activities. In addition, when the principles are newly
established in such a way, the incorporation of the principles into theReactor Regulation Act or the Act for Establishment of the NRA should beconsidered.
The NRA is in a position to comment on the operators’ governance for
improvement. But if the NRA remains in such an abstraction level ofprinciples for activities, which shows its organizational governance, it
could lose operators’ reliability in the NRA activities and the judgment.
Though operators are sure to take measures as required by the NRA since
the Reactor Regulation Act is enforced, operator’s responses may be only
superficial observance of laws and regulations when the reliability is lost .

38

Interpretation of the Regulations for Standards of Locations, Structures and Equipment ofCommercial Power Reactors and their Auxiliary Facilities
https://www.nsr.go.jp/nra/kettei/data/20130628/ jitsuyounaiki01,pdf

39

77th review meeting on February 4, 2014
http://www.nsr.go.jp/activity/regulation/tekigousei/data/20140204 -2.pdf

24However, if the operators basically have respect for or trust in thedetermination by the NRA, operators will be motivated to promote further
for safety improvement. It is important to avoid falling into the state called"pretending to obey but secretly betraying".
In addition, at the same time, deep and wide discussions should beinitiated about how to approach ensuring safety ("risk-informed
performance-based" in the case of the NRC) as a basis of such a newprinciples for activities from technical and methodological viewpoints. The
NRA will not have resources for such a discussion at this moment since
conformity review of individual plants is the top priority, but it is about
the time to launch an essential discussion about the role of regulatory
administration.
At the discussion, it is important to consider the PRA. When the"interpretation" of regulation or "arbitrariness" of judgment becomes anissue as mentioned above, incorporation of the quantitative safety goal
into the regulatory operation and utilization of PRA become effective
measures to judge the ambiguity. In 1995, NRC issued the "policy
statement of PRA utilization" and made public the following policy:"The NRC aims to expand utilization of the PRA for efficiently utilizing
regulatory resources under the following policies:(i) To expand and improve the method of deterministic analysis andutilize it in a manner consistent with the concept of traditional defense
in depth,(ii) To utilize the sensitivity analysis and uncertainty analysis of the PRA
in order to exclude unnecessary conservatism,(iii) To utilize the realistic PRA under the review by a third party,(iv) To utilize for connecting the safety goal and the regulatory operation,and(v) To utilize for regulatory determination of necessity of backfit
Operators and the NRA are expected to initiate serious discussions
concerning utilization of the PRA in order to exclude the arbitrariness ofregulation and to enhance the predictability in Japan as well. If the bothdo not seem to cope with the PRA positively, it is also considerable toincorporate the philosophy into the Reactor Regulation Act instead of
issuing the "policy statement."(2) Establishment of regulatory processes and procedures
The measures to drastically improve predictability are to document
regulatory processes and procedures, and in addition, where appropriate,
to require the documentation by legislations. The NRA states as follows

25

in the “Policy on Ensuring Operational Transparency of the NRA 40 :”"3. Thorough administration by documents
Dispositions, instructions, guidance, requests, and responses related
to interpretation of regulation to the people subject to regulation, which
are necessary for appropriately executing laws and regulations are
documented. Instructions and requests made orally in unavoidable
circumstances such as an emergency are also documented afterwards."
Despite this provision, however, as shown by the above-mentioned
cases, this policy has not been completely applied in practices. Because
this is the point affecting the predictability most, if self-discipline byinternal rules does not work and it continues to be regarded that they do
not have the will to function it in the future too, it is required to employ
a due process, that is, a democratic procedure control by using laws andregulations. Backfit procedures, and comments and interpretation of theregulatory body at the time of review meetings and prior hearings are
given as the important examples.
i)

Backfit procedure

This licensing process for alteration of the establishment and otherpermits related to the backfit was presented at first as a private plan of
Mr. Tanaka, NRA Chairman (“Basic Policy toward New Regulation
Enforcement for Nuclear Power Plants (private plan)”, March 19, 2013),
and it was considered that the plan was accepted by the NRA (this was the
NRA annual report presented to the Diet on June 4, 2013, which was
confirmed as a fact). However, it has not been formally documented up to
now. Though the NRA shows the operation guideline, its legal basis is notclear. Originally, it should be established as a formal legal procedure in
the form entrusting the matters as a government ordinance based on theReactor Regulation Act. Three specific issues are pointed out below.
First of all, the Units 3 and 4 of Ohi NPS have started the operated
before the new regulatory standards enforced in July 2013. The conformityof the “plants that started operation before the enforcement of new
regulation” with measures taken for the new regulation is reviewed quickly
after the content of the new regulatory standards are settled” (NRA’s
annual report). The Units 3 and 4 of Ohi NPS were judged that there is no
problem, and the continuous operation was accepted as a “special case”
at that time. If this procedure is acceptable, other plants might be
40

Policy on Ensuring Operational Transparency of the NRA
http://www.nsr.go.jp/disclosure/data/securing_transparency.pdf

26permitted to restart before enforcement of the new regulatory standards
and the continuous operation of those plants might be judged through theconfirmation by the NRA that there is no problem. Then, it is difficult tounderstand why the review approach for the Units 3 and 4 of Ohi NPS was“special case” instead of general approach applicable to other plants.
Of course, possibly, there is an opposing opinion that the legal
validity of the Units 3 and 4 of Ohi NPS was admitted on a provisional
basis since the operation was authorized under the former regulation, andthat the review process for the alteration of establishment license isrequired after next periodic inspection. However, since the NRA itself
proved that the safety for plants in operation can be confirmed by thisspecial approach, it is basically possible to admit the approach to review
the conformity to new standards of plants in operation when new backfit
is required from now on. The backfit clause of the Reactor Regulation Act(Article 43-3-23) stipulates only that the NRA “can order to take necessary
measures when the NRA acknowledges incompatibility with standard s.”
Since the clause can be also interpreted as that NRA's confirmation of theactual state of conformance to the standard is presupposed to enter the
licensing procedure for the alteration of establishment and other permits,
it was legally possible to make the case of the Units 3 and 4 of Ohi NPS asa general approach, not making as a special case. If this point is accepted
as an approach established by legislation, the communication like a warof nerves, which is described in Chapter 1, will not occur between the NRA
and operators any more. As the result, the environment will be improved
so that operators can make constructive discussions with the NRA andthis improvement contributes to consider safety measures which can reallyreduce the accident risk and eventually improve the safety and enhancethe effectiveness.
Secondly, the problem arising in many plants is related to the backfitof the reference earthquake ground motion. Since the reference
earthquake ground motion is the information for plant design, it is notrational to backfit a new reference earthquake ground motion to plantsthat are constructed and in operation. In the past, when the Seismic Guide
was revised, operators studied (back checked) the effect of the revision toconfirm the safety under the new reference earthquake ground motion,and it was accepted to use the actual proof strength of the equipment andstructures for judgment.
Since the backfit, not the back check, judges the “conformity with the
new technical standards”, the judging criteria must have an allowance ofthe proof strength of the equipment and structures. It is rational to apply
judging criteria having an allowance (allowance of several times) to plants
27

newly designed and constructed, but it is not rational to apply the same
criteria to plants already constructed, and it is enough only to confirm
whether it can withstand against the assumed earthquake ground motion.
There is an essential cause of problem in the manner that they are trying
to apply the new earthquake ground motion to existing plant equipment
and structures as the “technical standards to be applied.”
Judging from the current status of earthquake-related review by the
NRA, it cannot be said that the above-mentioned principle is wellunderstood. Because this point is a problem which is applicable to nuclear
fuel cycle facilities as well as nuclear power plants and is sure to affectthe operation of them very significantly in the future, a drastic
consideration is required.
Thirdly, there is a problem related to the application timing of backfit
regulations. With regard to this point, as mentioned above, the NRC
requires a quick backfit without considering the cost for cases where the“adequate public security” is affected, and the Code of Federal Regulation 41
stipulates that the necessity of backfit should be judged on the basis ofcomparison of the costs due to modification and additional facility
investment and the merits of safety improvement, for other cases.
Furthermore, in either case, when the backfit is ordered, responses ofwhether or not the operator can observe the order and the implementation
plan are required to submit at the same time, and the suspended period
is set in consideration of the period necessary for carrying out themeasures, and the backfit procedure is promoted not stopping theoperation of plants or facilities. In contrast, the process for deciding the“construction period” (suspended period) is unclear and the predictability
is little in the private plan of Mr. Tanaka, NRA Chairman.
In this way, it is an important issue to sort what is important toapply immediately and what requires the suspended period to someextent in light of the "Efficiency" which is one of the principles for
activities. In sorting the measures, the following are required:
y

y

41

To apply the concept of risk and benefit, and establish the object ive
judging criteria by quantifying the necessity of immediate response;andTo establish a scheme for deciding the suspended period for
application of measures and the timing of application by using thesimilar method.

10 CFR 50.109 Backfit

28

ii)

Documentation of views of the regulatory body shown in review
process

The detailed consideration concerning the safety standard for the
NRC's safety review is specified for each review process. The interpretationof the regulatory staff on the safety standard which has been clarified
through the review process has been documented as the formal guide or
guideline issued by the NRC (See Figure 4). Not having the legal binding
force, the guidelines etc. issued by the NRC are important means forsecuring the reliability and continuity of the review, interpretation, anddetermination related to safety standards which are independent of theindividuals in charge. The Standard Review Plan (SRP) and the Regulatory
Guide (RG) are given as typical ones among these.
Standard Review Plan - light water reactor edition concerning thelatest Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
NUREG0800

Table of contents
Chapter 19
Consists of more than
250 review items

Total number of pages
Approx. 2,000 pages

Introduction

Guideline
NUREG
Generaldocuments, etc.
NRC documents
including theabove

Figure 4

Chapter 19 StandardReview-Plan Group in
respect of Major
Accidents

Chapter 2 Standard
Review Plan Group in
respect of site

NEI guideline
EPRI report
INPO guideline,
etc.

ASME
standards
IEEE
standards, etc.

Reference
documents
Approx.
40,000 pages

U.S. Standard Review Plans and guidelines

On the other hand, how is it in Japan? In the current review process29

of alteration of establishment and other permits, the regulatory body (it is
not clear which of the NRA and the Nuclear Regulation Agency is theregulatory body) requirements are shown to operators at review meetingsor prior hearings, but, it is not clear whether they are explained as
standards determined by regulatory body or just requests, and it isdifficult to believe that the records are systematically accumulated as
documents. Also the Internet relay of many cases of exchange between the
NRA and operators, it is not clear what was decided on what kind of basis
or what kinds of assignments were given. As the result, there is a question
mark on the reliability and transparency of the determination by theregulatory body in the review. Though the ambiguous licensing basis andreview standards have been gradually made clear through thecommunication between the NRA and operators at hearings and review
meetings over several months after the start of reviews to date, thepresented determination of the standard has not been standardized as
referable standards yet. It is desirable that such a situation should be
improved in light of Article 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act shown in
the following.
Article 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act(Review standard)
Article 5(1) Administrative agencies shall establish review standards.
(2) Administrative agencies, in establishing review standards, shall makethem as concrete as possible in light of the nature of the particularpermission, etc. in question.
(Example) In the reviews newly started in June 2014, the NRA questioned tooperators only  whether their considerations were based on the contents ofreview for plants for which review meetings were initiated in advance 42 . However,with regard to the review contents of the plants subjected to reviews performedin advance, it is not clear what are specific contents and what are generalcontents to the plant reviewed in advance. Operators are required to interpret bythemselves the review contents that are not clear how to refer and to reflect thecontents on their applications. As of August 20, applications of 20 plants havebeen submitted to the NRA since the start of review and the NRA has t o performthe review process one by one. The NRA may say that such a question cannot be
avoided to effectively perform the reviews since the time is limited. However, it
should be noted that if the reviews are performed in such a way from now on, thesituation where the predictability of the review process and the determination by
42

The 119th review meeting on conformity to the new regulatory standards of nuclear power
plants, the NRA
http://www.nsr.go.jp/activity/regulation/tekigousei/h26fy/data/20140617.pdf

30

the regulatory body are unclear will go worse and worse.

In order to ensure reliability and transparency for future reviews, all
the information including interpretations and determinations by theregulatory body on the regulatory standards shown in the review processes
should be documented and accumulated in a systematic manner. By
establishing the scheme such that they are continuously accumulated as
referable documents, differences of interpretation by the NRA on measuresprovided by operators, and the basis for the case where the NRA
determined the measure is unsatisfactory are recorded and converted intocase examples. As the result, utilization of previous determinations as
standards for future review becomes possible, the regulatory body can
perform effective and high-quality reviews, and operators do not have to
make unnecessary preparations. By this approach, the entire review
process becomes efficient.
Furthermore, it becomes possible to clarify whether or not the similarinterpretation of standards is applicable to subsequent reviews or what
are the difference from the precedents when different conclusions arederived, which will contribute to improvement of the regulatory standards.
Though there is a story that such documentation is not realistic since it
requires a lot of human resources. But it is clear that the documentation
fully meets the human investment, because efficient documentation ispossible by taking advantage of IT technologies, and the productivity of
the review process itself is improved after once documented. Though abudget and securing personnel are important issues, it is vital to clarify
the principle of documentation in the Reactor Regulation Act in order togive such consciousness to the regulatory body and ensure theeffectiveness.
As a matter of course, disclosure of information and ensuringtransparency are important principles. However, it originally means to be
responsible for explaining to the public by what kind of logic and value
judgment the decision making was made, and through what kind of
discussions it was made, which does not mean only to show various
meetings on the Internet. As a result of transparency placing various
meetings in public, the regulatory body will behave to show the strict
stance and speaking stubbornly, and on the other hand, operators will
give the first priority to showing a humble attitude or making them look
like they are expressing their obedience. In this way, the environment
allowing free and vigorous discussions cannot be established, and negative
effects will be greater than positive merits. In addition, the secretcommunication between the regulatory body and operators may be
criticized as a “closet consultation”, “conspiracy” or not transparent,
which is completely illogical.
Making documentation as a principle also contributes to changing
31

such a “theater type regulatory activity” into the regulatory activity
pursuing reasonable regulatory determination on the basis of the logicality
with repeated calm discussions. The future review should not be theexchange such as an event or a show by the Internet relay, but shouldtake the way that the reviewer examines thoroughly written applications
and questions operators the issues or the points to be clarified in written
forms, and the applicant responds in writing 43 . This approach should beapplied regardless of enacting legislations for documentation.
(3) Issues of incorporation of external knowledge and decision making
process
As indicated in the principles of "Reliability" of the U.S. NRC and"Improvement and Commitment" of the NRA, regulation body is always
required to make efforts to formulate regulatory standards aiming at thebest safety with continuous learning and digesting of latest knowledge.
However, there are considerable criticisms on the attitude of the present
NRA which seems to reject the input from the outside.
For example, at the expert meeting on the fault issues, there is a
restriction that experts who performed safety reviews in the past cannot
be the member of the expert meeting. From this fact, it must be judgedthat the NRA is in the self-contradictory state in the light of the above
principle on organizational activity that decisions must be made after
discussion collecting all the professional knowledge of related field s.
Examples of issues which are generated in various areas are shown
below. Major issues on the introduction of external knowledge andprocesses of decision making for such issues on 40-year operation period
restriction, way of conducting highly technical discussions on theearthquake and fault, and the unification of risk assessment and risk
management function are reviewed.
(Example) For making decisions on the nuclear safety regulation, t he NRA
established "requirements for ensuring the transparency and neutrality inhearing opinions from external experts" on October 10, 2012 for the NRA. The
document stipulates to ensure the openness and transparency of discussions andspecifies how to open the information on the relation between external experts
and operators which may raise a conflict of interests 44 . However, there is no
article how to select external experts, and the NRA does not show the policy of
selection requirements. For example, the expert members for the survey of site
43

In addition, Power Point is only a reference material to facilitate under standing. If this isused instead of a formal review material from now on, it is caused to prepare again the
document eventually to be required though it takes a lot of labor. Both the regulatory bodyand operators should have this common understanding.

44

Gen-Ki-Gi-Hatsu No.121010001 Decision of NRA
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/data/sinkoku_youken.pdf

32

crush zones were selected based on recommendations from four related societies:"Japanese Society for Active Fault Studies", " Geological Society of Japan", "Japan
Association for Quaternary Research", and "Seismological Society of Japan", but
the reason why the four societies were selected is not shown though there areother related societies.
And, the NRA disqualified the person who had participated in past reviewsof the concerned plant site as a member of expert meeting, though the person
who participated in past reviews of other plant site is not necessarily bedisqualified. The NRA itself limits collection and consolidation of scientificknowledge.
Although the reason is for expecting fairness, the NRA should show thealternative way to collect information of scientific knowledge which may be
missing due to the above rule on qualification. The reason that simply the otheralternate expert researchers were selected is insufficient.
On the other hand, U.S. NRC has documented procedures to implement allkinds of expert meetings. 45 For example, for the ACRS (Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safeguards) which consists of experts functioning as the Commission's
advisory body, members are selected by specialized selection team called the“Screening Panel” based on the recognition that the committee's decision varies
largely depending upon the opinion of experts 46 . The Panel reports to thecommittee the selected best experts after reviewing not only specialized
knowledge required to candidates but also the experiences in the past, and otherknowledge and competence scored.

i)Issue on 40-year operation period restriction

There is a procedural problem in the new provision of Reactor
Regulation Act to limit operation period of nuclear power station to 40
years in general. The provision is shown below. It stipulates that the period
of operation of the nuclear power plant in general is 40 years from the dateof passing the pre-service inspection, and the operation period can beextended for 20 years or less only when the NRA permits.
(Operation period, etc.)
Article 43-3-31(1) The nuclear power reactor establisher may operate the nuclear powerreactor established by the establisher for the period of 40 years since
the date on which the inspection of construction of the power reactor
installation concerned of paragraph 1 of Article 43-3-11 passed.
45

10 CFR Part 7 - Advisory Committees
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part007/full-text.html#part007-0001

46

Procedures for Obtaining Nominations for NRC's Advisory Committees
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/policy-making/icp-appendix-1-2011.pdf

33

(2) The period set forth in the preceding paragraph can be extended only
once on the occasion of the expiration by approval of the NRA.
(3) The extended period pursuant to the provision of the preceding
paragraph cannot exceed the period defined by the cabinet order notexceeding 20 years.
(4) The nuclear power reactor establisher who intends to receive theapproval defined in paragraph (2) must apply approval of the NRA as
required by the provision of Nuclear Regulation Authority regulation.
(5) For the nuclear power reactor applied for the approval set forth in
the preceding paragraph, the NRA can approve the application only
when the NRA decides it satisfies the criteria established by the
Nuclear Regulation Authority regulation as the criteria to ensure
safety in the period to be extended in accordance with the provisionof paragraph (2) based on the status of deterioration of reactor andother equipment caused by the long operation period.
This issue has a large impact on management of the NPS and theelectricity rate. Because nuclear power plants can be operated with only
the variable cost after completion of depreciation of the large initial fixed
investment, the operation of long period becomes economicallyadvantageous so far as the safety is ensured. As of July, 2013, among fifty
NPP units in Japan, there are seventeen units that exceed 30 years ofoperation and ten units exceed 35 years of operation (three of them havebeen operated over 40 years). Therefore, reactor operators have to makedecision to apply or not for approval of the life extension of these aged
reactors in the near future. Moreover, operators have to decide whether
the extension should be applied or not about two years before 40 years as
the decision at the 40th year is too late. In order to make this decision, it
must be confirmed how much additional investment for safety measures
is needed to obtain the approval, and what conditions are required to makethe funding arrangement. Furthermore, such decision is very difficult
under the situation that the approvable period of extension cannot be
predicted even when the extension is possible to be approved.
Although the Reactor Regulation Act that stipulates the operation
period restriction was enacted by the Diet, this fact is completely forgotten
at present. As a result, it is considered that the NRA, one of the memberof the Government (although it is Article-Three Committee), shall enforce
literally this Reactor Regulation Act. However, the legislation was proposedby the Diet, and explanation of purpose of the Act and questions andanswers were made among Diet members and parties in the Diet, and theDiet members as the proponents of the bill express their intention as
34

proponents and legislators during discussion. The Government did notinterpret the primary meaning of the Act.
That is, the Government interpretation is secondary. Now, theintention of the proponents about the 40 year issue is reviewed from theDiet record as follows (hereinafter, all underlines are drawn by the author):○○

Mr. Shuichi Kato: ...Considering the tragic accident of 3.11, I think theperiod of 40 years which came out at the beginning should be treatedcarefully...
Mr. Kazunori Tanaka, Member of the House of Representatives:
Regarding the talk of Mr. Kato, the period of 40 years is accepted
tentatively in this bill when we proposed it. However, as I have been
saying, I think the setting of the figure of 40 years is somewhat
political and not determined only based on scientific knowledge
as you may know well. In this circumstance, we include the figure of
40 years into this text of the bill, respecting the period of 40 years
tentatively, but when a new organization is chosen in the Diet,established and started, the way of thinking of the new committee
and agency should be respected. I would say about this again.
(Committee on Environment of House of Councilors , June 18, 2012)

That is, the operation period restriction of 40 years is a tentativevalue, and was planned to perform fundamental review on the adequacyof the period by conducting scientific analysis after the NRA started.

○○

Mr. Kenichi Mizuno: Then, can it be understood that it is neutral
text of the law so that the period of 40 years is probable to change
to, for example, 60 years or 20 years based on the view of thecommittee as experts?
Mr. Kazunori Tanaka, Member of the House of Representatives: That's
exactly right.
(Committee on Environment of House of Councilors June 19, 2012)

As shown above, it is clear that the legislator expected that
fundamental review would be performed when the NRA is established bytrusting the good sense and the specialty of the committee.
And, the House of Councilors Incidental Resolution shown below
describes that "it must be consistent with the existing measures for aging
management.” In Japan the "comprehensive safety reevaluation (periodic
safety review) has already been periodically performed including aged
degradation review" required by IAEA for the plants of 30 year or more
operation. On this point, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan has
35

addressed in its Statement entitled "Recommendation toward the Diet
deliberations concerning the nuclear safety regulation" issued on June 7,
2012, and it concluded that it has already taken the measure severer than
the restriction of operation period to 40 years from a viewpoint ofcontinuous enhancement of safety in Japan, and "for introducing ‘40-yearoperational-restriction’, regulatory body has to have rational and scientificdiscussion in the open manner from viewpoint of purely safety, and also
rational and scientific explanation must be possible about application
system of this restriction."
Article 97 of Supplementary Provisions of Act for Establishment of
Nuclear Regulation Authority
About provisions after amendment under the provisions of Article s
17 and 18 of the Supplementary Provisions, the review shall be promptly
performed taking the status of the enforcement into consideration , andwhen it is considered to be necessary, required measures shall be taken
based on the results.
House of Councilors Incidental Resolution
22 ... And, concerning the provision for restriction of operation period of
power reactor of 40 years, while making consistency with the existingmeasures for aging management etc. because about half of existing
reactors have passed 30 years of operation, compile the measures of theGovernment promptly on disposal of the nuclear facilities, nuclear fuelmaterials, etc. relating to decommissioning of which the number will be
expected to increase from now on.
23... In review of revised Reactor Regulation Act based on
Supplementary Provisions of this Act, the Regulation System consistent
to international criteria and trend shall be established by performing
prompt reviews based on latest scientific and technical knowledge toimprove effectiveness of nuclear safety regulations.
How did the NRA respond to the above situation? Mr. Tanaka, NRA
Chairman, answered at the press briefing immediately after inaugurationof the NRA as follows:"And, there was a question at the Diet whether decommissioning before
the period of 40 years is determined a priori or not. I answered that the
40 years is fairly moderate length as a lifetime of one technical product.
Most of people who developed and made it at the beginning have retired.
Then, from viewpoint of the NRA, backfit will become very important in
the future. Looking carefully at reactors of 40 years ago, the design of36

40 years ago is not necessarily enough in some part when seen from thecriteria which we will establish now. Under the situation of the existing
issue of how this backfit is applied to the plant from now on, I think
extension for 20 years or more exceeding 40 years may be considerably
difficult, though I cannot judge now whether the operator will apply
these extension or not. I don’t think it is right to leave the rest to the
NRA after such political statement. But I have the basic idea said above,
although it may be not necessary to say that." (September 19, 2012)
This remark of Chairman Tanaka: "I don’t think it is right to …." ishis erroneous recognition. The legislator expected that scientific survey
and analysis on the issue of 40 years will be conducted after functioningof the NRA by selecting reliable specialists as members of the NRA. But
the NRA declared that the NRA does not perform the activity responding
to the above expectation without carrying out any such a study may
endanger the administration by legislation, i.e. legalism. In the following
remarks of Tanaka, NRA Chairman, he expressed that he has no intention
to perform the review on the adequacy of the period of 40 years and thinks
the role of the NRA is simply performing review of condition of operation
extension:"As a general rule, the 40th year is the time to terminate the operation.
Since it is written that the operation is also extensible depending on thesituation, the NRA is in the midst of having discussion now what
conditions are required to the extension. When the result is obtained
and the operators are responded to it, we have to consider again.
General rule is 40 years, and that is as you pointed out." (December 12,
2012)
Following is the interpretation of the briefing in a favorable way.
When the above briefing was made, the NRA planned to impose
unprecedented severe technical requirements in the form of new regulatory
standard, and the NRA or the Chairman of NRA may think that severer orother standards is unnecessary and what is necessary is just to satisfy the
newly established severe regulatory standards (but investment whichclears them will be probably difficult as management decision). In addition
to these reason, it seems that he wanted to avoid the impression of being
backward-looking to the 40 year operational restriction decided politicallythose days. However, it is difficult to grasp such an intention from his
remarks of this briefing.
It is not clear whether such circumstance is the cause or not, but the
NRA has never taken any action for collecting external knowledge and try
37

to analyzes and discuss on the external knowledge obtained to decide
whether the operational restriction of 40 years is rational or not. Although
the issue on the operational restriction of 40 years is very important issue,
the NRA never try to use, for example, the Reactor Safety Examination
Committee or equivalent meeting. Even though the above-mentioned
favorable interpretation is taken, the legal interpretation is left ambiguous
if such inaction continues.
The role of Reactor Safety Examination Committee is provided in
Article 14 of the Act for Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority.
Article 14 states that "when directed by the NRA." Therefore, if the NRA
has intention to perform technical expert review about the abovementioned issue of 40-year operation period restriction, the direction
should have already been made. The fact that it has not been performed
is unsuitable inaction of the administrative organization that ignores thelegislative intent. However, since it is highly independent Article-Three
Committee, such situation will be likely to happen and means to admonish
the inaction is limited.
(Reactor Safety Examination Committee)
Article 14: The Reactor Safety Examination Committee will examine andreview the reactor safety when directed by the Nuclear Regulation
Authority.
(Example) The volcanic impact assessment on the Sendai NPS of Kyushu ElectricPower Co., Inc. is a case with an indefinite attitude of the NRA about forecast of
volcanic activity, which is an issue of insufficient scientific information at present.
The Guide for Assessment of Volcanic Impact on Nuclear Power Plants 47 was
prepared for showing an example of appropriate volcanic impact assessment on
NPPs based on the knowledge of the "Technical Guideline for Assessment ofVolcanic Impact on Nuclear Power Plants (JEAG4625)" issued in 2009 by theJapan Electric Association that was used for the safety review of the Spent FuelInterim Storage Facility and the IAEA Safety Standard "Volcanic Hazards in Site
Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (No. SSG-21)" issued in 2012.
The NRA states that "the biggest problem of the volcanic impact assessment
is insufficiency of present science for very large caldera volcanic activity in thepast which human beings have never seen." The volcanic impact assessment is aconcern for the judgment of conformity to the review standard in the field where
the scientific knowledge as well as the knowledge on reviews in the past is limited.
The first review meeting for the volcanic impact assessment was held for the47

Guide for Assessment of Volcano Impact on Nuclear Power Plants
http://www,nsr.go.jp/nra/kettei/data/20130628_jitsuyoukazan.pdf

38

Sendai NPS of Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. In the guide, the operator isrequired "to perform reactor shutdown and shipping -out of nuclear fuelsappropriately by monitoring and detecting the precursory phenomena" based on
the assumption that large scale volcanic activities are possible to predict. And at
the review meeting of the Sendai NPS of Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc., although
the necessity of study of pyroclastic flow simulation was pointed out by a NRA
Commissioner, the volcanic impact assessment of the Kyushu Electric Power Co.,
Inc. was substantially authorized since the point of issue, i.e. "observation
methods (observation of crustal movement etc.) for detecting the precursory
phenomena of all large-scale volcanic activities that are subject to the monitoring",
is cleared as shown in the NRA Commissioner's remarks: "I understand this
impact assessment has come to an end on the whole although some items are left
to study".
However, some experts criticize that prediction of occurrence of volcano
activity in some decades of operation period of NPPs is beyond the current sciencelevel. Among major items of criticism, first one is the question on adequacy andeffectiveness of monitoring methodology, that is, whether a large scale volcano
activity can be foreseen or predicted by monitoring. And the second one is thematter anxious about the safety myth that is caused by the NRA, who is apt totake the attitude to prove the plant safety by sticking to the effectiveness ofmonitoring methodology.
The plan for priority policies toward the request of FY2015 budget andrequest of organization and the number of NRA staffs is planned to incorporate"the complete research system in connection with volcanic impact assessment"
as if responding to the criticism mentioned above. On the other hand, in order toimprove the predictability of review in the future, clear policy should beestablished on the attitude of the NRA and the way of conducting discussion todeal with ambiguity which is unavoidable in evaluation standard becau se thepresent scientific knowledge level on natural events such as large scale volcano
activities is insufficient.
When discussing such highly scientific and technical issues, the NRA should
clarify the attitude to adopt directly and positively the discus sion based on thevarious viewpoints of experts of the Reactor Safety Examination Committee andNuclear Fuel Safety Examination by adopting expert panels using the method of
integration of discussion as shown in the next section or by performing as the
U.S. ACRS (Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards) which suggests NRC
directly.

ii)

Approach for advanced engineering discussion on earthquake andfault issues
The issue concerning roles of the Reactor Safety Examination
39

Committee and Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Committee that arereferred at the end of preceding section is important. The Reactor Safety
Examination Committee was established in 1961 in accordance with theincidental resolution of the Diet in May, 1960 as a legal examinationcommittee performing the safety review referring to the U. S. ACRS. The
establishment of the Reactor Safety Examination Committee is also
required in the current Act for Establishment of Nuclear Regulation
Authority.
However, the NRA limits the role of the Reactor Safety Examination
Committee to "perform survey and examination to judge the necessity ofmeasures based on the collected and analyzed information of accidents
and troubles occurred in and outside of Japan and of trends ofregulations in foreign countries and to report the results including
advices", explaining that the role of the Reactor Safety Examination
Committee which has previously performed the review of construction
permit is changed 48 . On the other hand, the NRA uses ad hoc expert
meetings of which legal position is unclear for formulation of regulatory
standards or for review of adaptability of standards. However, the NRA
obligates itself to formulate regulatory standards, which largely exceeds
its capability. As the result, constructive discussion on regulatory
standards is impaired.
The NRA must discuss with operators who have more and broad
technical information on substantial evidences of nuclear safety
regulations which are highly technical safety measures when newtechnologies appeared by technical innovations in the world are to be
applied. Therefore, it is necessary to reconstruct the function to advise
the NRA from the impartial position based on scientific and technicalknowledge. That is, redefinition of the position of the Reactor Safety
Examination Committee defined in the Act for Establishment of Nuclear
Regulation Authority as an advisory body of the NRA and clear
stipulation of its position and legal role should be examined.
And then, the Reactor Safety Examination Committee becomes
possible to perform timely collection and analysis of the latest knowledge
by communication with technology consulting organization (Four-Pole
Advisory Committee Meeting) which advises regulatory organizations ofvarious countries with scientific and technical viewpoint as a position of
third-party such as U.S. ACRS, GPE (Permanent Expert Group) of France
and RSK (Reactor Safety Committee) of Germany.

48

Gen-Ki-Gi-Hatsu No.1405121
http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/roanshin_kakunen/h26fy/data/0001_05.pdf

40

USA

FranceGermany■ Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safeguards(ACRS)■ Permanent Expert Group(GPE: Groupe Permanentd’Experts)■ Reactor Safety Commission(ReaktorSicherheitskommission, RSK)The organization aiming at
performing advice directly
to committee mainly
concerning on review ofapplications for license andtheir renewal, hazards ofnuclear facilities, or
adequacy of proposal of
regulatory standard.

The organization which
consists of five groups
performing analysis oftechnical issues on nuclear
reactors and two groups
performing advice from view
point of radiation protection.
Its research report will bereferred by Nuclear Safety
Regulation Office when it
presents its view.

The organization which advises
Federal Ministry for theEnvironment, Nature
Conservation, Building andNuclear Safety (BMU:
Bundesministerium fur Umwelt,
Naturschutz, undReactorsicherheit) about items
related to safety of nuclear
facilities, security and waste
disposal

Members are selected fromthe fields of educational
institutions, associations, andoperators, etc. considering
technical capability andexperience of the candidates.
The term of office is four
years.

Members are selected fromwide range of technical fields
and the term of office is three
years.

Consisting of external
expert members from wide
range of technical fields.
The term of office is four
years (regularly up to threeconsecutive terms)

Prepared by Author with referring to “On the Establishment of Reactor Safety Examination Committee andNuclear Fuel Safety Examination Committee” (issued by the NRA) dated January 15, 2014

Figure 5

Technology Consulting Organizations in Western Countries

Among various regulatory standards on technology, there are very many criticisms
especially on the way to conduct discussion about the earthquake and fault issue in the
NRA.
For example,
1) Legal and procedural position of the "expert meeting" is unclear, and it is unknown
how the conclusion of meeting is positioned in the decision making process of the
NRA.
2) Though the NRA take group-decision-making system, its meeting is carried out asif each committee member has his business in charge and specialty.
3) The person engaged in the past safety review is intentionally disqualified as amember of expert meeting. (This item is restated)
4) The discipline of specialized field of the member of expert meeting is biased(especially tectonic geomorphology).
5) The regulatory body does not show sufficient instruction about the detail degree ofdata or explanations required to the operators for which the regulatory body think it
is enough for decision by reviewing.
41

These are typical criticisms.
Each of the above criticisms pointed out the right point, and it is certain to be
improved individually. However, the author does not repeat the above criticisms, but
requires fundamental reformation of review process in the NRA by showing examples of
U.S. good practices. This example is also referred in the "Review Guide concerning theSurvey of Geology and Geological Structure of the Site and the Peripheral Area" issued
by the NRA. But the context and purpose of the example is "for operators to ensure thereliability of the survey and evaluation results based on survey, it is desirable to performthe survey and evaluation open to the public to ensure the transparency as shown in thefollowing." That is, it is not intended for the NRA to perform the review process byreferring to this good practice. However, the NRA itself should incorporate this process,and such a process should be established under the Nuclear Regulation Authority
regulation to improve the predictability of the entire review process.
The example of U.S. good practices is shown in the report (NUREG/CR-6372)
where how the opinions should be integrated for appropriate regulatory decision making
in the field where large variation of opinions and views of experts exists (in this case, itis the analysis of tsunami and earthquake hazard) is described. Unlike the NRA of Japan,
the NRC commissioners do not play a part of Chairman of expert panels. The procedureof optimal integration of expert opinions recommended in the report is shown in thefollowing.
1) To determine significance of facilities and technical difficulty of issues(see Figure 6.), and then determine degree of use of experts inaccordance with the significance and the difficulty.
2) When it is determined that technical difficulty is high, Tec hnicalFacilitator/integrator (TFI) is assigned. TFI organizes panel of experts
and derives conclusion or direction of action by impartial integrationconsidering distribution of the experts of the area.
3) About selection of TFI and experts who form the panel, TFI shouldhave expertise on the target technical subject and also on method of
extraction of opinions. Experts are required to be scientific neutrality
as well as to have expertise on target subject.
4) Although TFI and the experts have responsibility to their own opinion,
they do not have responsibility for the evaluation result.
The committee reviewed this method (Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis
Committee, SSHAC) concluded in the proposal of PSHA (Probabilistic
Seismic Hazard Analysis) that the divergence of the result of PSHA islargely caused by means of procedural differences rather than technicaldifferences. 49 And the following items are pointed out as important points
for the procedure.
49

Recommendations for Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis: Guidance on Unce rtainty andUse of Experts: Main Report (NUREG/CR-6372, Volume l) Abstract

42

Explanation 36 Table 1 Study level of logic tree
Study Level

Degree of Issue

Study Approach

Level 1

Insignificant degreeof incidence tohazardTI evaluates model based onliterature review and experience,and estimates community
distribution.

Level 2Significant degree ofincidence to hazard,
and controversial
opinions

TI interacts with model
proponents and relevant experts tohear their interpretations and/orbases, and estimates community
distribution.

Highly significant
degree of incidence
to hazard, highly

TI brings together model
proponents and relevant experts todebate to perform improvement ofproposals and their screening, andestimates community distribution.

Level 3contentious
opinions , andhighly complex
situation
TFI organizes panel of experts andfocuses discussions, obtains each
Level 4
evaluator's estimate of thecommunity's distribution andintegrates them.
TFI: Technical Facilitator/Integrator. Preview is required for approaches by TI(Note)This is the case implemented in more systematically. [Main body 6.5.2]
References[Appendix SH6.5-1.1]
Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC), "Recommendations for Probabilistic
Seismic Hazard Analysis: Guidance on Uncertainty and Use of Experts" (NUREG/CR-6372,
SSHAC, April 1997)[Appendix SH6.5-1.2]
J. Carl Step, et al. "Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis for Ground Motions and Fault
Displacement at Yucca Mountain Nevada" Earthquake Spectra, Vol. 17, No. 1, February 2001
[Appendix SH6.5-1.3]
N. Abrahamson, et al. "PAGASOS-A Comprehensive Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment
for Nuclear Power Plants in Switzerland" 12th European Conference on Earthquake Engineering,
2002.
Ditto (see note)

From supplementary document of "Standard of Implementation ofEarthquake PRA" issued by Atomic Energy Society of Japan

Figure 6 Study level of logic tree in PSHA(The study approach of PSHA is differentiated by the degree of issue. )1) SSHAC identifies and describes several different roles for experts
based on its conclusion that confusion about the various roles is acommon source of difficulty, in executing the aspect of PSHA involving
the use of experts. The roles for which SSHAC provides the mostextensive guidance include the expert as proponent of a specifictechnical position, as an evaluator of the various positions in the43technical community, and as a technical integrator.
2) SSHAC identifies four different types of consensus, and thenconcludes that one key source of difficulty is failure to recognize that1). there is not likely to be "consensus" (as the word is commonly
understood) among the various experts and 2) no single interpretation
concerning a complex earth-sciences issue is the "correct" one. Rather,
SSHAC believes that the following should be sought in a properly
executed PSHA project for a given difficult technical issue: (1) arepresentation of the legitimate range of technically supportableinterpretations among the entire informed technical community, and(2) the relative importance or credibility that should be given to thediffering hypotheses across that range. As SSHAC has framed themethodology, this information is what the PSHA practitioner ischarged to seek out, and seeking it out and evaluating it is what
SSHAC defines as technical integration.
3) SSHAC identifies a hierarchy of complexity for technical issues,consisting of four levels (representing increasing levels of participation
by technical experts in the development of the desired results), andthen concentrates much of its guidance on the most complex level(level 4) in which a panel of experts is formally constituted and thepanel's interpretations of the technical information relevant to theissues are formally elicited. To deal with such complex issues, SSHAC
defines an entity that it calls the Technical Facilitator/Integrator (TFI),
which is differentiated from a similar entity for dealing with issues atthe other three less-complex levels, which SSHAC calls the TechnicalIntegrator (TI). Much of SSHAC's procedural guidance involves how
the TI and THI functions should be structured and impleme nted.
4) The role of technical integration is common to the TI and TFI roles.
What is special about the TFI role, in SSHAC's formulation, is thefacilitation aspect, when an issue is judged to be complex enough thatthe views of a panel of several experts must be elicited. SSHAC's
guidance dwells on that aspect extensively, in part because SSHAC
believes that this is where some of the most difficult procedural pitfalls
are encountered. In fact, the main report identifies a number ofproblems that have arisen in past PSHAs and discusses how the TFIfunction explicitly overcomes each of them.
5) For most technical issues that arise in a typical PSHA, the issue's
complexity does not warrant a panel of experts and hence theestablishment of a TFI role. Technical integration for these issues canbe accomplished-indeed, is usually best accomplished-by a TI.
6) One special element of the TFI process is SSHAC's guidance onsequentially using the panel of experts in different roles. Heavyemphasis is placed on assuring constructive give-and-take44

interactions among the panelists throughout the process.
7) The TFI's integrator role should be viewed not as that of a "super expert" who has the final say on the weighting of the relative merits ofeither specific technical interpretations or the various experts'
interpretations of them; rather, the TFI role should be seen as charged
with characterizing both the commonality and the diversity in a set ofpanel estimates, each representing a weighted combination of different
expert positions. SSHAC thus sees the TFI as performing an
integration assisted by a group of experts who provide integration
advice.
8) Thus, the TFI as facilitator structures interaction among the experts
to create conditions under which the TFI's job as integrator will be
simplified (e.g., either a consensus representation is formed or it isappropriate to weight equally the experts' evaluations of the knowledgeof the technical community at large).
9) The SSHAC guidance gives special emphasis to the importance of an
independent peer review. We distinguish between a participatory peer
review and a late-stage peer review, and we also distinguish between
a peer review of the process aspects and of the technical aspects forthe more complex issues. We strongly recommend a participatory peer
review, especially for the process aspects for the more complex issues.
This paper details the pitfalls of an inadequate peer review 50 .
It seems that the present NRA regards operators as the "conflict-ofinterest entities", and the NRA is not in the situation to listen to thetechnical and methodical proposals from operators. However, since
operators are actually operating their plants and have primary
responsibility on the safety, it is natural to think that they have constantly
brushed up their technical knowledge for safety improvement. If the NRA
rejects such operators’ proposals because of the NRA’s lack of confidenceof evaluation capability, it is not the attitude to meet the profit of people
who benefits most from the safety improvement. The NRA should stop suchintentional attitude as opposing to operators by escaping from the illusion
or preconception of "not trusting because of proposals from operatorsthemselves, and as shown in the following example, should perform
sincere technical study work with operators, research organizations andother third parties when a proposal is considered that it may lead toenhancement of safety, ".
(Examples) Two U.S. examples of proposals by operators accepted by the NRC areshown below. The first example is about the re-start after an earthquake. On
August 23, 2014, two units of North Anna NPS located at the U.S. east coast were50

Recommendations for Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis: Guidance on Uncertainty
and Use of Experts Main Report (NUREG/CR-6372, Volume l, Executive Summary)45

shut down by the loss of outside power caused by the Virginia Earthquake. The
units re-started on December 20, 2011 after the survey that the plants satisfy restart conditions, which was only 4 months after the shutdown.
One of the reasons which the Plant was able to re-start at the early time isperforming evaluation of seismic ground motion applying Cumulative Absolute
Velocity (CAV). CAV is the methodology developed in 1991, proposed andstandardized in TR-100082 of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) which
is civilian organization, and adopted as NRC's "Regulatory Guide 1.166: Preearthquake Planningand Immediate Nuclear

Earthquake Actions" in 1997.

Power

Plant

Operator

Post

51

One more example is that NRC endorsed the Appendix of "Design Bases
Program Guidelines" prepared by Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) that is theprivate nonprofit institutions on nuclear technology and public information.
Originally, the Nuclear Utility Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) ,the former body of NEI, published Design Basis Program Guideline (NUMARC 90 12) in 1990.
In 1996, NRC staff requested to operators to show that plants are operated
and maintained within design bases after deficiencies on design and equipment
composition were found by plant inspection in some plants. At first, it isconcluded that "the definition of design bases should be clarified". In 1998, NRC
directed NRC Staff to develop guidance regarding design bases issues such as thetype of information to be considered as design bases information.
In 1997, NEI submitted to NRC Appendix to NEI 97-04 "Design Bases
Program Guidelines"

which is the updated version of NUMARC 9012. The

guideline gave additional examples of design bases information. This submission
started letters and public meetings that led to the NRC deciding to endorse
Appendix to the NEI's proposal.
Conclusion of NRC:
"The staff finds that Appendix B to NEI 97-04, ‘Guidance and Examples for
identifying 10 CFR 50.2 Design Bases’ provides guidance and examples that are
acceptable to the staff for providing a clearer understanding of what constitutedesign bases information. Therefore, RG 1.186

52

endorses this version of

51

In Regulatory Guide l.166, seismic-monitor data are took into consideration for decision ofnecessity of reactor shutdown. In the case the reactor shutdown criteria are not exceeded,
reactor shutdown is not required. And when reactor shutdown is caused by earthquake, re start depends on judgment made after the reactor shutdown. The evaluation within fourhours after occurrence of earthquake on whether OBE (Operating Basis Earthquake) is
exceeded or not by confirming response spectrum and CAV and the inspection by walk -down
within 8 hours after occurrence of earthquake to find damages are required to perform.

52

NRC Regulatory Guide l.186 - Guidance and Examples for Identifying 10 CFR 50.2 Design
Bases.

46

Appendix B to NEI 97-04 without exception or clarification.” 53iii)

Issue of unification of the risk assessment and risk management
functionIn the system based on the existing law, the regulation is enforced to
manage risks after the NRA itself assesses risks of accident etc. However,
if such a system is adopted to risk assessment, the assessment whichshould be objectively performed may be influenced by various elements atthe stage of risk management and may be politically distorted when there
is high possibility of being influenced by political elements in enforcing
regulation and when the regulatory body itself have positive or negative
tendency towards introduction of regulation. In order to respond to suchconcern, the structure of enforcement of regulation for food safety isadopted as follows: Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare as regulator does
not perform risk assessment by itself but organizes the food safetycommission as risk assessment organization and listens to the view of thecommittee to enforce regulation (item (1), paragraph (1), Article 24 of theFood Safety Basic Act, paragraph (1), Article 7 of the Food Sanitation Act).
In the field of nuclear safety regulation, as hazard identification andrisk assessment are performed at early stage of enforcement of regulation,
if such assessment is implemented by the regulator itself in accordancewith the way of administration, it will be virtually impossible for regulated
body to state opinions on the risk assessment process itself, though therisk assessment performed at early stage will have large impact on theactual contents of enforced regulation. Because regulated body cannot
legally oppose without involving the administrative disposition about
enforcement of regulation, even if a risk assessment is performed
irrationally, unless the legal process in which risk assessment function
and organization are clearly separated is established.
Various issues on the crush-zone of Tsuruga PS of The Japan Atomic
Power Company and on Ohi PS of The Kansai Electric Power Company, Inc.
arose due to such an organizational structure problem as unclear relations
between the expert meeting organized by the NRA and the NRA itself. The
neutrality of safety regulation administration itself might be suspected
unless considering measure not to impair objectivity of risk assessment
such that the expert meeting which actually perform risk assessment atpresent (and other meetings with similar function) is clearly separated
from the NRA and is operated as third party organization. 54
William D. Travers/RA/Executive Director for Operations, SECY 00 -0212 Policy Issue"Regulatory guide providing guidance and examples for identifying 10 CFR 50.2 designbases"
54 For details about this issue, refer to "Principles on Administrative Implementation of
Nuclear Safety Regulations : Case Study of the Investigation Framework by Nuclear
Regulation Authority on the Shatter Zones at the Tsuruga Power Station" by Tomoyuki
5347

It is required that the quantitative safety goal is firmly positioned in
the basis of nuclear risk assessment. The quantitative safety goal should
be determined by comparison and balance between merits and risks of useof nuclear energy. (NRC establishes safety target based on that theadditional risks of nuclear origin is suppressed to one thousands or lessof risks on general social lives other than nuclear origin. 55 )The attitude of the present NRA seems that the NRA thinks it is the
NRA's duty for the NRA to negatively respond to "utilization" of nuclear
energy, therefore it is impossible that the NRA establishes a quantitative
safety goal determined by the above mentioned comparison and balance,
It is required to enforce regulation based on the quantitative safety goal
decided at the council which is established, for example, in Cabinet
Secretariat for incorporating the views of various field of society not limited
to inside of framework of the NRA through the process to define suitablelevel of the quantitative safety goal. Of course, the NRA Chairman can bea member of the council. By doing so, the basis for introducing theprinciple of "Efficiency" into the safety regulation administration of Japan
will be established. For example, when the necessity of backfit is to beassessed, the degree of effectiveness of the measure is clarified bycomparing with the quantitative safety goal by utilizing PRA method. Aboutthe correlation between process for establishing quantitative safety goal
and the regulation enforcement of the goal (especially about backfit), legal
incorporation by amendment of Reactor Regulation Act should be
investigated.
2. Efforts required to power plant operators
The NRA is said to pursue the regulation of the best in the world. But
the risk is different by external events, accident progression, and site's
characteristics. Therefore, even if the regulation is the best in the world
and all the related regulation items are cleared, it does not mean that thesafety of the entire site is ensured. It is unavoidable for operators to be
criticized that the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident is not sufficiently
reflected, if operators apply safety measures only for the purpose ofcomplying with the regulation established by the NRA and passing theconformity examination without recognition of the safety risk.
Operators should take the prime responsibility for safety as stated in
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) fundamental safety
principles. And operators should not expect to obtain the proof of safety
Tanabe (Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry)
http://criepi.denken.or.jp/jp/kenkikaku/report/download/IscBfw1Mr6hU6kQXtc1qc8mYBq8
5EIzl/report.pdf
55

NRC Safety Goals for the Operation of Nuclear Power Plant, Policy Statement 198648

from the NRA who certifies the compliance by submitting the required
documents, but should perform self-controlled safety improvement
activities continually to attain sufficient safety. "Relief" of local residents
and local governments' staff is obtained by the reliability on operators,
who perform routine operations without a trouble or an incident at sites
and act promptly and effectively at the front line under a dangerous
situation to restore the safety when an accident occurs.
Moreover, in order to wipe out the distrust over the nuclear
technologies and operators' governance and organizational culture whichhave spread among the public, operators should make more efforts forsafety earnestly than the NRA does without being bewildered by the
conflict with the NRA. When operators will continue such attitudes over along period hereafter, it is expected that negative image to nuclear power
will be faded out gradually. On the contrary, the recovery way to theconfidence of nuclear power will turn into a thorny way if operators do notrecognize that the prime responsibility for safety rests on them and if it isperceived that they have unreasonable dissatisfaction with the NRA, or
local governments, the movement against NPPs, and others.
The approach of voluntary safety enhancement by operators is
detailed in the report of the "WG on Voluntary Efforts & Continuous
Improvement of Nuclear Safety" under the "Nuclear Energy Subcommittee"of the "Electricity and Gas Industry Committee" of the "Advisory Committee
for Natural Resources and Energy" issued on May 30, 2014 56 . Suggestions
described in the report, such as full utilization of probabilistic risk
assessment, governance reorganization by operators, and construction ofclose relationships with manufacturers, related groups, and operators are
pertinent and agreeable.
In this section, operation of the safety improvement evaluation
system, design of appropriate peer review systems, and communication
with stakeholders are proposed including some supplementary points.
(1) Effective operation of the "evaluation of safety improvement"
system
In the world of Japanese nuclear safety regulation, the regulation by
the regulatory body has ruled the nuclear and operators' voluntary safety
rules has been historically treated as independent measures. The changes
are roughly explained as follows;
In June 1992, the administrative directive document of the Agency of56

Report of the WG on Voluntary Efforts & Continuous Improvement of Nuclear Safety
http://www.meti.go.jp/committee/sougouenergy/denryoku_gas/genshiryoku/anzen_wg/report_02.html

49

Natural Resources and Energy required operators to perform the periodic
safety review (PSR), which "comprehensively reevaluates the safety of
nuclear power station according to the latest technical knowledge in eachtenth year aiming at the safety improvement of existing nuclear power
plants".
At the task group concerning the inspection (held on July 30, 2003)of the 10th Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee of the Advisory
Committee for Energy and Resources, the PSR was defined as "theapproach to obtain the prospect that safe operation can be continued bymaintaining the safety of high level equivalent to the newest nuclear power
plants by reevaluating the safety preservation activities that have been
performed since commissioning in each tenth year and adding effective
measures for safety enhancement, as necessary, by electric utilities."
Therefore, in October 2003, the Rules for the Installation, Operation
etc. of Commercial Power Reactors (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules
for Commercial Power Reactors") was amended to make the PSR as a legal
claim of the operational safety program (mandating), and the Government
decided to check the contents of PSR as one of items of the Operatio nal
Safety Inspection.
Moreover, the aging technical evaluation and the development oflong-term maintenance program based on the evaluation results had been
performed as part of the periodic safety review. Besides, the probabilistic
safety assessment (called "probabilistic risk assessment" later) was
decided not a legal claim since adequate technical knowledge had not beenobtained, but an arbitrary requirement.
After the accident of Fukushima Daiichi NPS, the amendment of theReactor Regulation Law in 2011 introduced the "safety improvement
evaluation" as an operator's voluntary effort, and the amendment of Rules
for Commercial Power Reactors in 2013 abolished the periodic safety
review. The legal base is the following articles.
(Evaluation for safety improvement of nuclear power reactor
facilities)
Article 43-3-29(1) Nuclear power reactor establishers must, pursuant to the provisionsof the Nuclear Regulation Authority regulation, evaluate the safety of
the nuclear power reactor facilities at each time specified by therelevant NRA regulation in order to improve the safety of their nuclear
power reactor facilities. However, this shall not apply to the case of
power reactor where the approval set forth in paragraph (2) of Article
43-3-33 has been obtained, unless otherwise provided for by the
Nuclear Regulation Authority regulation.
(2) The evaluation set forth in the preceding paragraph must be
performed by investigating and analyzing the following matters,
50

taking these investigations and analyzing results into consideration,and comprehensively evaluating the safety of the whole nuclear powerreactor facilities concerned.
(i) Matters related to the measures for prevention of occurrence andspread of accidents anticipated in the nuclear power reactor fac ilities("prevention of accident occurrence and spread", hereinafter the same
shall apply in this item) specified in the following and the effect ofprevention of accident occurrence and spread by the measures whenthe measures are taken.
(a) The equipment or components that contribute to prevention of
accident occurrence and spread other than those specified to beinstalled by the technical standards of Article 43-3-14 must be
installed.
(b) The structure to perform complete prevention of accident occurre nce
and spread must be established by staff reinforcement and safety
preservation education for ensuring the safety.
(ii) Matters related to the events that may result in the occurrence ofsevere accidents in spite of having taken the measures listed in th e
preceding paragraphs (a) and (b).
(3) When the evaluation of Paragraph (1) is performed, the Nuclear powerreactor establisher concerned must, pursuant to the provisions of the
Nuclear Regulation Authority regulation, notify to the Nuclear
Regulation Authority the results and methods of investigation,
analysis and evaluation of the evaluation concerned and the mattersspecified by the relevant Nuclear Regulation Authority regulation(hereinafter referred to as "results of the evaluation and othermatters", in paragraph (5). However, this shall not apply to the caseof power reactor where the approval set forth in paragraph (2) ofArticle 43-3-33 has been obtained, unless otherwise provided for by
the Nuclear Regulation Authority regulation.
(4) When any of the methods of investigation, analysis and evaluation of
the evaluation concerned among the matters notified by the provision
set forth in the preceding paragraph does not conform to the method
specified by the Nuclear Regulation Authority regulation, the Nuclear
Regulation Authority can order the notified nuclear power reactor
establisher to change the method of investigation, analysis orevaluation.
(5) When the nuclear power reactor establisher notified the evaluation
results and other matters according to the provision of paragraph (3),pursuant to the provisions of the Nuclear Regulation Authority
regulation, the notified evaluation results and other matters shall be
released.
Moreover, concerning the examination by the NRA, the periodic safety51

review is regarded unnecessary to be examined since the safety
improvement evaluation covers the scope of the periodic safety review ormore. Moreover, the safety improvement evaluation is compared with the
IAEA safety standard "Periodic Safety Review of Nuclear Power Plants"(SSG-25), and concluded that IAEA's purpose and confirmation matters
are covered by the safety improvement evaluation 57 .
Although such an institutional structure is "voluntary" initiative, it
is legally obligated (administrative minor penalty to keep order anddiscipline is imposed on the penalty for an inaction), which is a moreregulatory matter as compared with other countries (refer to Figure 7).
Actually, when an operator notifies the safety improvement
evaluation and it does not conform to the Nuclear Regulation Authority
regulation, the order to change the method can be initiated (refer toparagraph (5) of the above-mentioned article). The quality requirement of
the evaluation results and statutory regulation are imposed to voluntary
initiatives, so that actions, such as supervision and instruction, by theregulatory body is possible in order to standardize the methodology tomake it possible to compare operators' initiatives, which cannot be
generally considered irrational.
But, from the present relationship between the NRA and operators,
operators couldn't help be suspicion and fear that, when operators proposea quantitative addition of safety measures and/or qualitative additionreflecting new ideas or technologies voluntarily, the NRA will make theproposal as regulatory matters or will make conformity criteria on the new
and/or additional proposal for the examination. Such an approach does
not foster the incentive to make voluntary efforts but foster the reverse
incentive to treat the voluntary safety improvement just for formality. Ifsuch a situation is caused for the important method, such as theprobabilistic risk assessment, which will influence the future safety
regulation, the desired expectation comes to nothing.
Under the present confrontational structure and mutual distrust
between them, common understanding that evaluation results, data andother information concerning the voluntary initiatives including theprobabilistic risk assessment do not become regulatory requirements
directly is necessary, at least. The memorandum of understanding that
describes the common understanding should be concluded, or more formal
revision of legislation should be studied. In that case, it is appropriate torefer to good practices in U.S.

57

Abolition of the periodic safety review according to the implementation of safety
improvement evaluation of commercial power reactor facilities
https://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/shin_seidoseibi/data/0011_01,pdf

52

Legal position
andextent ofstatutory
regulation

Operators'
voluntary
initiative for safety
improvement

Relationship withhregulatory
requirements(image)United States

FranceJapan

y PSR is notlegally
stipulatedsince
operators'
independency
is respected.

y Since theoperation
period is notdetermined,
PSR at every
tenth year or
shorter time isobligated as
an aging
management
measure.

y The Reactor
Regulation Law
obligates to implement
the voluntary safety
evaluation according
to the regulation
stipulated by the NRA.

y The PSR is
performed
reflecting theknowledge
obtained in
the ten years.

y Matters that havebeen performed in thepast are apt to bereviewed as thevoluntary safety
evaluation for theexamination since
there is no mechanismof pointing out new
matters.

y Promotion ofoperators'
voluntary
safetyimprovement
initiative by
operators
association(INPO)y Research andimplementationof theprobabilistic
risk
assessment by
EPRI and NEI
who support
the initiative ofvoluntary
safetyimprovement
Regulatoryry
ent
requirement

Voluntaryyinitiativey The guide of NRA
defines voluntary
safety evaluation andnotification of theresults within six
months after
execution of theperiodical inspection.

y Since the criteria toreview the reflection of
new technologies areambiguous, it isjudged in many casesthat the voluntary
safety evaluation is
performed
appropriately.

Regulatory
toryy Voluntary
requirementmen
nt initiative

Regulatory
VoluntaryVVolunl ntarytrequirement
iinitiative
initiaitiiativeti

Reference: "Notification timing of the 1st safety improvement evaluation of nuclear power reactor
facilities"; NRA, "Current status and issues of the PSR implementation standard study"; Atomic
Energy Society of Japan, and "Legal system in respect of the safety regulation for nuclear power
stations in foreign countries"; JELI

Figure 7 Relationship between the voluntary initiativeand statutory regulation of individual country
Under the premise of such guarantee, it is very important for
operators to use this system to the utmost and to maintain the intention
and capability to achieve the safety of nuclear facilities considering that it
is a good opportunity to show the recognition that the primary
responsibility is taken by operators.
(Example) Redefinition of voluntary safety enhancement policy of nuclear
industry by the NRC's guideline and the task force in 2012
U.S. NRC defines the guideline for treatment of initiatives perfo rmed by the53

nuclear industry 58 .
"Industry initiatives are typically actions performed by operators that form thebases for either continued compliance with the regulations or obviate the needfor new regulations. It must be clear to the public that substitu ting industry
initiatives for NRC regulatory action can provide effective and efficient
resolution of issues, will in no way compromise plant safety, and does not
represent a reduction in the NRC's commitment to safety and sound regulation.
The NRC and the industry are jointly responsible for the long -term success ofusing industry initiatives as substitutes for NRC regulatory action. Operators
must effectively manage and implement their commitments associated withthese industry initiatives and the NRC must provide a credible and predictable
regulatory response if operators fail to satisfy these commitments." (NRC
Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. NRC; NUREG- BR-0058)
Furthermore, U.S. NRC established the Near-Term Task Force 59 , as theupper-level organization to evaluate the regulation and process, to study
additional needs for regulatory system improvement and to recommend policies
in July 2011, and twelve (12) recommendations for reactor -safety enhancement
are summarized 60 . The recommendations show the view (refer to the lastparagraph) on the voluntary safety enhancement of the industry described in theRegulatory Analysis Guidelines (NUREG/BR-0058, Revision 4). And, therecommendations describe concerning the relationship between the voluntary
safety enhancement of the industry and the regulation, that the voluntary safetyenhancement is not an alternative of the regulatory requirement, but amechanism which promotes implementation and standardization, which
contributes to effective realization of regulatory requirements.

(2)

Design of appropriate peer review system
The 21st Century Public Policy Institute has released the report
entitled "Toward a Comprehensive Solution for Nuclear Policy andBusiness Challenges” in November 2013, and proposed a n ew nuclear
damage compensation system 61 . The Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident
revealed the defects of current nuclear damage compensation system. The
current system (1) cannot cope with the problem of entire community
collapse when an accident occurs, (2) obliges nuclear operators to burden
limitless debts including the damage compensation, decontamination and
58

NRC, Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
NUREG- BR-0058

59

NRC, Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century, the New Term
Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi accident

60

Secretariat of the Nuclear Safety Council, "Recommendation for the Reactor Safety
Enhancement in the 21st Century by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Task Force(Study Results of the Near-Term Task Force on the Fukushima Daiichi NPS Accident) "(Introduction of Recommendation Outline)

61

The 21st Century Public Policy Institute. “Toward a Comprehensive Solution for Nuclear
Policy and Business Challenges.”54decommissioning, which causes a risk that stable supply of electricity
cannot be maintained, and (3) does not incorporate the system to foster
incentives for nuclear operators to perform self-controlled competition forenhancement of safety. Therefore, it is proposed to change the current
nuclear emergency preparedness system to the three stratum structures(refer to Figure 8).

Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage and Local
ReconstructionzzzStudy of relief funds: the upper limit amount of the compensation by theGovernment is deliberated by the Diet
Invocation of the Act is judged by the degree of release and extent of spread ofradioactive materials
Public spending on decontamination

Agreement on mutual assistance among nuclear
operatorszzUpper limit amount of 2 to 4 trillion yen
Compensation cost to be allocated to operators and collected
after the accident

Nuclear damage
compensation liability
insurance(private sector)zz

In case of general accident
Amount of compensation:
120 billion yen

Political
measures forcommunity
reconstruction

Indemnity agreement for
nuclear damage
compensation(Government)zz

In case of earthquakes etc.
during normal operation
Amount of compensation: 120
billion yen

Nuclear operators
Victims
Figure 8 Nuclear emergency preparedness systems of three stratum
structures
This system reconstruction proposal amends the Nuclear Damage
Compensation Act, and also seeks comprehensive victim relief measuresand distribution of damage costs. Please read the report in detail forestablishment of the post-factum-collection-type mutual assistancesystem among nuclear operators to mitigate the uncertainty of nuclear
operation by setting the upper limit to the damage compensation amountwhich is charged to the operator who caused the accident. This system55

follows the Price-Anderson Act of U.S. and has the mechanism for entire
operators to burden the damage caused by the accident. By this system,
when an operator causes an accident that inflicts damage, other operators
will immediately suffer significant impacts on corporate finances. That is,nuclear operators will share the common destiny in terms of safety
operations.
Since the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident has occurred, Japan
Nuclear Safety Institute (JANSI) has established the process by which
nuclear operators make mutual assessment (peer review) of the safety of
nuclear power stations. The post-factum-collection-type mutual
assistance system makes this process effective. There is a concern thatsetting of upper limit damage compensation amount to be paid by n uclear
operators may constitute a moral hazard among the operators. But thisconcern will be dismissed with the simultaneous establishment of aneffective mutual supervision scheme.
Moreover, construction of a scheme may be necessary, which
penalizes nuclear operators who neglect to strive to improve safety levels(by imposing economic burden or weighted inspection), and on the other
hand gives reward to those who achieve high performance in safety
operation.
For example, similar to the U.S. Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), the
NRA links performance indicators of reactors with weighted inspection andmakes the findings available for the public. Also, reactors with highperformance could be given the incentive of longer intervals between
regular inspections. Furthermore, it deserves to study an idea that links
the insurance premium (rates) under the Government-sponsoredindemnity agreements for compensation of nuclear damage withperformance indicators above-mentioned and insurance premiums (rates)of the nuclear damage compensation liability insurance of a private sector
with performance indicators or other systems.
(3) Communication with stakeholders
Japanese nuclear regulatory system did not have relation with local
residents. The Nuclear Regulation Act does not provide to adopt opinions
of local governments. On the other hand, voluntary safety agreements havebeen concluded between each operator and related local governments.
These agreements have been the only approach to reflect the opinion of
local governments to regulate NPP operation.
However, the "Act for Final Disposition of Special Radioactive Wastes"
provides to follow the opinion of local governments and local residents.
And there is a proposal that such a provision to follow the opi nion of local
governments and local residents should be adapted not only to the Act for
Final Disposition of Special Radioactive Wastes but also to otherlegislations, as adapted to other non-nuclear legislations. For example,
56

when the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry gives permission forestablishment of a bicycle racetrack, relevant governor's comments must
be obtained, and the governor's comments must be subject to the public
hearing to obtain opinions of stakeholders (paragraphs (2) and (3), Article
4 of the Bicycle Racing Act). Moreover, when the Minister of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport examines the application of airport
establishment license, the minister is obliged to hold public hearings andgive stakeholders opportunities to state their opinions (paragraph (2),Article 39 of the Aviation Act). Furthermore, when the establishment
license of commercial power reactor is granted, public hearings have been
held by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Nuclear
Safety Commission. ("Rules on Public Hearings for Establishment of
Nuclear Power Plants 62 ", Order by the Minister of Economy, Trade andIndustry and "Tentative Policy of the Nuclear Safety Commission 63 ",Nuclear Safety Commission)
The overseas example, IAEA Safety Standards 64 requires "building up
of professional and constructive formal and informal system to talk with
operators" and "establishment of appropriate measures for providing
information to and negotiating with stakeholders and the public about theprocess and decision of a regulatory body."
Considering these circumstances, it is considerable to legally specify
for the NRA to hold public hearings and other measures and prepare themean for communication with local governments and local residents.
However, the subjects which will be taken at public hearings include s thelegally difficult matters itself, such as administrative matters subject tothe public hearing (the establishment license only or plus amendments),
simplification of procedures according to the importance of the subject,timing to perform the public hearings and so on. And further, there would
be a political consideration that the subject which gives a negative impact
to the actual relationship with local governments must be avoided because
public hearings have been performed based on the safety agreement withlocal governments so far.

62

"Rules on Public Hearings for Establishment of Nuclear Power Plants", Order by the
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry
http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2011/09/20110930007/20110930007 -2.pdf

63"Tentative Policy of the Nuclear Safety Commission", Nuclear Safety Commission
http://www.data.go.jp/data/dataset/cao_Ol_ds_l3112600041782/resource/4dd4735c -32db4066-b254-637dd036beaf?inner_span=True

64

IAEA Safety Standards
https://www.nsr.go.jp/disclosure/meeting_commissioner/data/20140129shiryo.pdf

57

Overseas example - Effective regulation of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)


IAEA held the meeting on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems for the
first time in 2006, and published the content as a report. In recent years,
the 3rd meeting was held in 2013.
The conclusion of the meeting held in 2013 for the first time after the
Fukushima's accident.
Peer reviews must clearly include national action plans and follow-up
missions to complete the process;While regulators perform detailed assessments of regulatory
requirements, systems and processes following significant operational
events, they do not have a systematic way of collecting, analyzing andsharing regulatory experience, nor do they routinely assess lesssignificant events and issues which would contribute toward
continuously improving the regulatory process;Spent fuel pool safety should be reviewed regarding obvious
weaknesses in defense in depth and possible new mechanisms toeliminate as far as possible the possibility of serious accidents
occurring;
Emphasizing the importance of communication, coordination andconsistency in national and international responses to emergencies,
regulators should ensure that national communication plans aredeveloped, tested, implemented and improved well before any accident
occurs;Introducing a nuclear power program entails a wide range of long term
safety and security infrastructure issues, including the e stablishmentof an effective nuclear regulatory system, as well as responsibilities
that go beyond national borders. Regulators should use the IAEA peer
review process as early as possible, report the results openly and takethe needed follow-up actions;
Projected growth in nuclear power combined with retiring experts will
require a workforce with the skills necessary to face these challenges.
A more consistent, international effort is still needed and the IAEA
was called upon to take further actions on these issues;

These conclusions are written by the writer referring to the IAEA Conference on
Regulatory Effectiveness Concludes, April 17, 2013. 65

Although it is difficult to create a common legal approach to all theprocesses at this moment, each organization needs to cooperate regarding
the matters such as "to clarify the responsibility for safety" and evacuation
program required by local residents at least, on which responsibilities havebeen ambiguous. It is necessary to clarify who plays the role of leader andwhat kind of roles other organizations should take. First, it is necessary
to confirm how the authority and responsibility are legally sha red among
the Government, the NRA, and operators, and it is required to makesolutions for the issues, such as necessary legal revisions if there is a
defect or other written document if clarification by the legislation is notsuitable. Especially, considering the position of each local government of
65

IAEA Conference on Regulatory Effectiveness Concludes, April 17, 2013
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2013/regeffectiveness.html

58

the site of which NPPs are expected to re-start, such matters are subjects
to be immediately handled and clarified 66 .
In addition, even if operators do not have a legal obligation, they
operate nuclear plants of which accident risk is not null, and recognizingthat they are primarily responsible for the safety, the following cooperationis required even for off-site matters. If they are not willing to cooperate,
legal imposition needs to be studied.
1) Preparation of the internal system for transportation of goods andevacuation of residents which may have some difficulties when an
accident occurs (measures reflecting the fact that the evacuationand medical care in the hospital had not been performed smoothly
since each of the main groups in charge hesitated to be engaged insuch logistics, when the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident occurred),2) Cooperation for provision of the related information when local
governments make evacuation programs, and
3) Daily training in cooperation with police, fire fighters, and SelfDefense Forces (assuming accident and terrorism)

66

Regarding these matters, further investigation is expected together with the allocation of
the roles and procedures for making effective evacuation program, while the nuclear
power plants will increase in number which are expected to re -start operation following to
Sendai NPS.

59

Chapter 3

Prospecting the amendment of Reactor
Regulation Act - Example of bill outline -This chapter proposes the amendment of Reactor Regulation Act in
the form of articles based on the issues discussed above. Since theconsistency of the Reactor Regulation Act as the whole becomes difficult
to be kept if the patchwork amendments are continued, drastic
amendment may be necessary. Hence, please understand that this
proposal is not a complete form, but an interim proposal for detail
discussion. Moreover, this amendment is limited to that of power reactors
which have issues at present for discussion. In addition, from a view pointof being at-a-glance readability, the old and new comparison table
describes a part of articles that are not necessary to be amended.
Besides, when elements necessary for the future of the whole nuclear
energy related activities are looked at in bird eye view, the Reactor
Regulation Act has important other elements, not only the safety
regulation elements discussed in this document. For example, theapproach to foster the innovative nuclear technologies that is one ofscience and technology policies is also important as the way of the safety
regulation. Considerably extensive points of argument exist; whether
safety regulations of commercial power reactors and research and/or
experimental reactors should be the same or not, how the regulatory
system should be reconstructed to change the specification regulation to
performance regulation. Since the Reactor Regulation Act in which thebusiness regulation remains does not meet the latest concept to s eparate
the promotion and regulation, there is an argument that businessregulation elements should be completely eliminated to specialize in thesafety regulation focused on the facility and the material.
Moreover, if the NRA cannot establish the self-standard and theregulatory administration runs recklessly and self-righteously, the right ofadministrative organizations that take charge of public protection andpromotion will be violated as the result. How to adjust the NRA and theadministrative organizations in such a case is a very important issue froma view of administration governance. It is actually impossible to bring in
all issues to the official residence of the Prime Minister for resolution.
Therefore, it may be one of methods to solve issues, such as positive
utilization of the ministries and agencies adjustment process set forth in
Article 15 of the National Government Organization Act, which was addedin the amendment made by receiving the report 67 of the Administrative

67

Final Report of the Administrative Reform Council
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/gyokaku/report-final/
61

Reform Council.
(National Government Organization Law)
Article 15 When ministers, committees, and secretary generals ofagencies find adjustment of policies among administrative organizations
is necessary, in order to accomplish their responsible functions, they may
require director generals of relevant administrative organizations tosubmit necessary materials and to explain after clarifying the necessity,and state one's opinion related with policies of the relevant administrative
organizations.

1. Outline of Amendment(1) Explicit statement of the purpose of the Reactor Regulation Act
The purpose of the Reactor Regulation Act, that is, "to operate
economical assets, nuclear power plants invested for stable supply ofelectricity, effectively" is clarified, and the system for rational regulatory
activities is established to define basic policies for implementation ofregulation.
(2) Introduction of quantitative safety goal and utilization of PRAs
In order to supplement and improve the old deterministic risk
assessment, it is described for the NRA and operators to utilize theprobabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) positively (it is not mandated since
it is a complementary method). Moreover, in order to avoid the regulatory
arbitrariness and to keep the risk and benefit balance in the examination,a council (tentative name: Nuclear Safety Goal Council) is newly
established in the Cabinet Office to decide quantitative safety goals . Notethat the expertise knowledge is not necessarily required as the members’
qualification requirement since the safety goals should meet the social
general sense.
(3) Clarification of backfit procedures
In order to supply cheap and stable electrical power by efficient
nuclear power generation under rational regulation ensuring the public
safety and to protect operator's predictability and property rights, thebackfit provision, Article 43-3-23 of the Reactor Regulation Act, is revised,
and the application timing is clarified by the Cabinet Order.
(4) Documentation and clarification of evaluation criteria and othermatters(i) Activity guideline and evaluation criteria
In order to encourage the NRA to perform regulatory activities
according to clear criteria based on fundamental principles, the Act for
Establishment of Nuclear Regulatory Authority is amended to mandate
clarification of basic activity guidelines and general policies and criteria
62concerning the safety assessment method.
(ii) Documentation and filing of correction
When the NRA request operators to correct, the request of correction
should be documented and filed so that the accumulation of requests
fosters the operators' predictability.
(iii) Development and filing of the written decision
Development and filing of the written decision is required to the NRA
so that the accumulation of requests fosters the operators' predictability.

(5) Enhancement of the Reactor Safety Examination Committee
In order to position the Reactor Safety Examination Committee as the
special advice organization for individual examination, the Reactor Safety
Examination Committee shall be required for the opinion when the NRA
examines licenses for reactor establishment and alteration and orders theoperation suspension. Moreover, in order to position the Reactor Safety
Examination Committee as the special advice organization concerning thewhole safety regulation policy, the authorized limit of rights of the Reactor
Safety Examination Committee should be specified (in this report, theproposal of amendment is not shown by articles, but the Reactor Safety
Examination Committee should be amended similarly).

63

2. Drafted amendment bill
(1) Reactor Regulation Act; Comparison of old and new articles
Amended article

Current article

Chapter I General Provisions(Objectives)
Article 1 This Act, in accordancewith the spirit of the Atomic
Energy Basic Act (Act No. 186 of
1955), is enacted in order toensure that the uses of nuclear
source material, nuclear fuelmaterial and reactors are limited
to peaceful ones and that thoseare used safely for the purpose ofproviding necessary regulations on
refining activities, fabricating andenrichment activities, interim
storage activities, reprocessing
activities and waste disposal
activities, as well as on the
installment and operation, etc. ofreactors, assuming generation ofmassive natural disasters andterrorism and other criminal acts,
and also for the purpose ofproviding necessary regulations on
the uses of international
controlled material to execute
treaties or other international
agreements concerning the
research, development and use of
atomic energy, and then tocontribute to protection of lives,
health and property of people, andenvironmental preservation, andto ensure national security by
preventing hazards due to arelease of radioactive materials
when a serious accident occurs in
the nuclear facility at an abnormal(Objectives)
Article 1 This Act, in accordancewith the spirit of the Atomic
Energy Basic Act (Act No. 186 of
1955), is enacted in order toensure that the uses of nuclear
source material, nuclear fuelmaterial and reactors are limited
to peaceful ones for the purpose ofproviding necessary regulations on
refining activities, fabricating andenrichment activities, interim
storage activities, reprocessing
activities and waste disposal
activities, as well as on the
installment and operation, etc. ofreactors, assuming generation ofmassive natural disasters andterrorism and other criminal acts,
and also for the purpose ofproviding necessary regulations on
the uses of international
controlled material to execute
treaties or other international
agreements concerning the
research, development and use of
atomic energy, and then tocontribute to protection of lives,
health and property of people, andenvironmental preservation, andto ensure national security by
preventing hazards due to arelease of radioactive materials
when a serious accident occurs in
the nuclear facility at an abnormal
level outside the factory or place64level outside the factory or placeof business where the nuclear
facility is installed and otherhazards due to use of thesematerials and reactors andprotecting nuclear fuel material.

of business where the nuclear
facility is installed and otherhazards due to use of thesematerials and reactors andprotecting nuclear fuel material.

(Quantities safety goal)
Article 1-2 When the Nuclear
Regulation Authority examinesthat licensees' technologies andmeasures, as well as the location,
structure and equipment of thepower reactor facilities, conform to
the standards according to thisAct, the quantitative safety goal
must be below the sociallyacceptable criteria that are
specified by the Nuclear Safety
Goal Council taking themagnitude of damage into
consideration pursuant to theprovisions of the Cabinet Order.
(Probabilistic assessment)
Article 1-3 When the Nuclear
Regulation Authority examinesthat licensees' technologies andmeasures, as well as the location,
structure and equipment of thepower reactor facilities, conform to
the standards according to thisAct, assuming accidents that may
occur and their propagation
processes as much as possible,
methods to comprehensively
consider the occurrence
probability of causative events for
accidents, probability that each
event propagates to the following
event, probability for specificequipment, structure, or othermechanisms to prevent the abovementioned propagation and the65magnitude and other factors of the
final damage must be used
positively.

Article 2 (Omitted)
Chapters II and III (Omitted)
Chapter IV Regulations concerning the Installment, Operation, Etc.
of Reactors

Section 1 (Omitted)
Section 2 Regulations concerning the Installment, Operation, Etc. ofPower Reactors(Installment license)
Article 43-3-5(1) Any person who intends to install a reactor shall, pursuant to theprovisions of the Cabinet Order, obtain the permission of the
Nuclear Regulation Authority.
(2) Any person who intends to obtain the permission set forth in thepreceding paragraph shall submit an application form containing
the following matters to the Nuclear Regulation Authority:(i) th e name and address of the applicant and, in the case of ajuridical person, the name of its representative,(ii) the purpose for which the reactors are to be used,(iii) the type, thermal output and number of reactors,(iv) the name and address of the factory or place of activity where thereactors are to be installed,(v) the location, structure and equipment of the reactors andauxiliary facilities (hereinafter referred to as "reactor facilities"),(vi) the construction plan for reactor facilities,(vii) the type and amount scheduled for annual use of nuclear fuelmaterial to be used as fuel for the reactors,(viii) the method for disposing of spent fuel,(ix) the matter concerning radiation control in the nuclear powerreactor facility, and(x) the matter concerning preparation of the facility and system tocope with accidents that cause a significant damage of the core of
power reactors or other consequences when such accide nt occur .

66

(Criteria for the Permission)
Article 43-3-6(1) In the case that an application
for the permission set forth in
the preceding paragraph ismade, the Nuclear Regulation
Authority shall not grant thepermission in the said
paragraph unless he/she findsthat the application conforms
with each of the following
items:(i) that the reactors will not beutilized for non-peacefulpurposes,(ii) that the applicant has
sufficient technical capability
and financial basis necessaryfor establishment of the powerreactor,(iii) that the applicant has
sufficient technical capability
required for taking necessary
measures in an occurrence ofsevere accidents (significant
core damage and other severe
accidents of power reactors
specified by the relevant
Nuclear Regulation Authority
regulation, the same forparagraph (1) of Article 43-322 and item (ii), paragraph (2)of Article 43-3-29) and forpreventing a spread of severe
accidents, and has sufficient
other technical capability for
operating the power reactors
competently, and(iv) that the location, structureand equipment of the powerreactor facilities are conformto the standards specified by
the relevant Nuclear(Criteria for the Permission)
Article 43-3-6(1) In the case that an application
for the permission set forth in
the preceding paragraph ismade, the Nuclear Regulation
Authority shall not grant thepermission in the said
paragraph unless he/she findsthat the application conforms
with each of the following
items:(i) that the reactors will not beutilized for non-peacefulpurposes,(ii) that the applicant has
sufficient technical capability
and financial basis necessaryfor establishment of the powerreactor,(iii) that the applicant has
sufficient technical capability
required for taking necessary
measures in an occurrence ofsevere accidents (significant
core damage and other severe
accidents of power reactors
specified by the relevant
Nuclear Regulation Authority
regulation, the same forparagraph (1) of Article 43-322 and item (ii), paragraph (2)of Article 43-3-29) and forpreventing a spread of severe
accidents, and has sufficient
other technical capability for
operating the power reactors
competently, and(iv) that the location, structureand equipment of the powerreactor facilities are conformto the standards specified by
the relevant Nuclear
67

Regulation Authority
regulation such that they will
not hinder the prevention ofdisasters resulting from
nuclear fuel material ormaterial contaminated by
nuclear fuel material or the
power reactor.
(2) and (3) (omitted)(4) When the permission set forthin the preceding paragraph is
granted, the Nuclear
Regulation Authority shallhear the opinion of the Reactor
Safety Examination Committee
in advance concerning theapplication of standards set
force in item (iv), paragraph(1).

Regulation Authority
regulation such that they will
not hinder the prevention ofdisasters resulting from
nuclear fuel material ormaterial contaminated by
nuclear fuel material or the
power reactor.
(2) and (3) (omitted)

Article 43-3-7 (omitted)(1) When a person who has obtained the permission set forth in item(i) of Article 43-3-5 (hereinafter referred to as "nuclear powerreactor establisher") intends to amend the matter listed in item (ii),paragraph (2) of the said article (hereafter, called "nuclear powerreactor establisher") intends to change any matter provided for initems (ii) to (v), or items (viii) to (x) of the said article,, pursuant to
the provisions of the Cabinet Order, he/she shall obtain thepermission of the Nuclear Regulation Authority. However, this shallnot apply to changing, from among the matters listed in it em (iv) of
the said paragraph, only the name of the factory or the place ofactivity, or from among the matters listed in item (v) of the said
paragraph, the matters set force in Article 4 of Nuclear Regulation
Authority regulation.
(2) The provision of Article 43-3-6 shall apply mutatis mutandis to thepermission set forth in in the preceding paragraph.
(3) to (8) (omitted)
Articles 43-3-9 to -13 (omitted)(Maintenance of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities)
Article 43-3-14 Nuclear power reactor establishers must maintain
nuclear power reactor facilities to conform technical standards
68prescribed by the Nuclear Regulation Authority regulation; provided,
however, that this shall not apply to cases specified by the Nuclear
Regulation Authority regulation for power reactors for which theapproval of paragraph 2, Article 43-3-33 has been obtained.
Articles 43-3-15 to -21 (omitted)(Measures To Be Taken for Safety and the Physical Protection ofSpecified Nuclear Fuel Material)
Article 43-3-22(1) Any nuclear power reactor establisher shall, pursuant to theprovision of the Nuclear Regulation Authority regulation, takenecessary safety measures (including the matter concerning
measures when severe accidents occur).
(i) maintenance etc. of power reactor facilities,(ii) operation of power reactors, and(iii) shipment, storage or disposal of nuclear fuel material or material
contaminated by nuclear fuel material (shipment and disposal shallbe limited to the factory or the place of activity where the reactor
facilities have been installed; hereinafter the same shall apply toparagraph (1) of the following article).
(2) (omitted)(Suspension, etc. of the Use of
Facilities)
Article 43-3-23(1) When the Nuclear Regulation
Authority finds that location,
structure and equipment of
the power reactor facilities do
not conform with the criteria
set force in item (iv),paragraph (1) of Article 43-3-6,
that the power reactor
facilities do not conform withthe technical standards set
forth in Article 43-3-14, orthat the measures pertaining
to the maintenance etc. of thepower reactor facilities, theoperation of the powerreactors, or that the shipment,
storage or disposal of nuclear(Suspension, etc. of the Use of
Facilities)
Article 43-3-23(1) When the Nuclear Regulation
Authority finds that location,
structure and equipment of
the power reactor facilities do
not conform with the criteria
set force in item (iv),paragraph (1) of Article 43-3-6,
that the power reactor
facilities do not conform withthe technical standards set
forth in Article 43-3-14, orthat the measures pertaining
to the maintenance etc. of thepower reactor facilities, theoperation of the powerreactors, or that the shipment,
storage or disposal of nuclear
69

fuel material or material
contaminated by nuclear fuelmaterial is in violation of theprovision of the Nuclear
Regulation Authority
regulation pursuant to theprovision of paragraph (1) of
the preceding article, he/she
may order, pursuant to theprovisions of the Cabinet
Order, any nuclear powerreactor establisher to suspend
use, remodel, repair or change
the location of the powerreactor facilities, designate amethod for operating thepower reactors or order thenecessary safety measures tobe taken.
(2) (omitted)(3) When the order to suspend thepower reactor set forth in theparagraph (1) is made, theNuclear Regulation Authority
shall hear the opinion of theReactor Safety Examination
Committee in advanceconcerning the application oftechnical standards set force
in item (iv), paragraph (1) of
Article 43 and Article 43-3-14.

fuel material or material
contaminated by nuclear fuelmaterial is in violation of theprovision of the Nuclear
Regulation Authority
regulation pursuant to theprovision of paragraph (1) of
the preceding article, he/she
may order any nuclear powerreactor establisher to suspend
use, remodel, repair or change
the location of the powerreactor facilities, designate amethod for operating thepower reactors or order thenecessary safety measures tobe taken.

(2) (omitted)

Articles 43-3-24 to -28 (omitted)(Evaluation for safety
improvement of nuclear powerreactor facilities)
Article 43-3-29(1) Nuclear power reactor
establishers, pursuant to theprovisions of the Nuclear(Evaluation for safety
improvement of nuclear powerreactor facilities)
Article 43-3-29(1) Nuclear power reactor
establishers, pursuant to theprovisions of the Nuclear
70

Regulatory Commission
Regulation, must evaluate thesafety of the concerned
nuclear power reactor facilities
at each time specified by therelevant Nuclear Regulation
Authority regulation in orderto improve the safety of
nuclear power reactor
facilities. However, this shallnot apply to the case of powerreactor where the approval set
forth in paragraph (2) ofArticle 43-3-33 has beenobtained, unless otherwise
provided for by the Nuclear
Regulation Authority
regulation.
(2) The evaluation set forth in thepreceding paragraph must be
performed by investigating andanalyzing the following
matters, taking theseinvestigations and analyzing
results into consideration, andcomprehensively evaluating
the safety of the whole nuclear
power reactor facilities
concerned.
(i) Matters related to themeasures for prevention of
occurrence and spread ofaccidents anticipated in the
nuclear power reactor facilities("prevention of accident
occurrence and spread",hereinafter the same shallapply in this item) specified in
the following and the effect ofprevention of accident
occurrence and spread by themeasures when the measures
are taken.

Regulatory Commission
Regulation, must evaluate thesafety of the concerned
nuclear power reactor facilities
at each time specified by therelevant Nuclear Regulation
Authority regulation in orderto improve the safety of
nuclear power reactor
facilities. However, this shallnot apply to the case of powerreactor where the approval set
forth in paragraph (2) ofArticle 43-3-33 has beenobtained, unless otherwise
provided for by the Nuclear
Regulation Authority
regulation.
(2) The evaluation set forth in thepreceding paragraph must be
performed by investigating andanalyzing the following
matters, taking theseinvestigations and analyzing
results into consideration, andcomprehensively evaluating
the safety of the whole nuclear
power reactor facilities
concerned.
(i) Matters related to themeasures for prevention of
occurrence and spread ofaccidents anticipated in the
nuclear power reactor
facilities ("prevention of
accident occurrence andspread", hereinafter the same
shall apply in this item)
specified in the following andthe effect of prevention of
accident occurrence andspread by the measures whenthe measures are taken.
71(a) The equipment or componentsthat contribute to preventionof accident occurrence andspread other than thosespecified to be installed by thetechnical standards of Article
43-3-14 must be installed.
(b) The structure to perform
complete prevention of
accident occurrence andspread must be established bystaff reinforcement and safety
preservation education for
ensuring the safety.
(ii) Matters related to the events
that may result in theoccurrence of severe accidents
in spite of having taken themeasures listed in thepreceding paragraphs (a) and(b).
(3) For the evaluation ofparagraph (1), the methods
listed in Article 1-2 must be
used positively.
(4) When the evaluation ofparagraph (1) is performed, theNuclear power reactor
establisher concerned must,pursuant to the provisions of
the Nuclear Regulation
Authority regulation, notify to
the Nuclear Regulation
Authority the results andmethods of investigation,
analysis and evaluation of theevaluation concerned and thematters specified by therelevant Nuclear Regulation
Authority regulation(hereinafter referred to as"results of the evaluation andother matters", in paragraph(5)).However, this shall not(a) The equipment or componentsthat contribute to preventionof accident occurrence andspread other than thosespecified to be installed by thetechnical standards of Article
43-3-14 must be installed.
(b) The structure to perform
complete prevention of
accident occurrence andspread must be established bystaff reinforcement and safety
preservation education for
ensuring the safety.
(ii) Matters related to the events
that may result in theoccurrence of severe accidents
in spite of having taken themeasures listed in thepreceding paragraphs (a) and(b).

(3) When the evaluation ofparagraph (1) is performed,
the Nuclear power reactor
establisher concerned must,pursuant to the provisions of
the Nuclear Regulation
Authority regulation, notify to
the Nuclear Regulation
Authority the results andmethods of investigation,
analysis and evaluation of theevaluation concerned and thematters specified by therelevant Nuclear Regulation
Authority regulation(hereinafter referred to as"results of the evaluation andother matters", in paragraph(5)).However, this shall not72

apply to the case of powerreactor where the approval set
forth in paragraph (2) ofArticle 43-3-33 has beenobtained, unless otherwise
provided for by the Nuclear
Regulation Authority
regulation.
(5) When any of the methods ofinvestigation, analysis andevaluation of the evaluation
concerned among the mattersnotified by the provision set
forth in the preceding
paragraph does not conform to
the method specified by the
Nuclear Regulation Authority
regulation, the Nuclear
Regulation Authority can orderthe notified nuclear powerreactor establisher to change
the method of investigation,
analysis or evaluation.
(6) When the nuclear powerreactor establisher notified theevaluation results and othermatters according to theprovision of paragraph (3),pursuant to the provisions of
the Nuclear Regulation
Authority regulation, thenotified evaluation results andother matters shall be
released.

apply to the case of powerreactor where the approval set
forth in paragraph (2) ofArticle 43-3-33 has beenobtained, unless otherwise
provided for by the Nuclear
Regulation Authority
regulation.
(4) When any of the methods ofinvestigation, analysis andevaluation of the evaluation
concerned among the mattersnotified by the provision set
forth in the preceding
paragraph does not conform to
the method specified by the
Nuclear Regulation Authority
regulation, the Nuclear
Regulation Authority can orderthe notified nuclear powerreactor establisher to change
the method of investigation,
analysis or evaluation.
(5) When the nuclear powerreactor establisher notified theevaluation results and othermatters according to theprovision of paragraph (3),pursuant to the provisions of
the Nuclear Regulation
Authority regulation, thenotified evaluation results andother matters shall be
released.

Articles 43-3-30 to -34 (omitted)
Chapter 4-2 to Chapter 9 and Supplementary Provisions (omitted)

73

(2) Act for establishment of Nuclear Regulation Authority; Comparisonof old and new articles
Amended article

Current article

Articles 1 to 10 (Omitted)(Activity guideline, examination
standard, etc.)
Article 10-2
(1) The Nuclear Regulation Authority
shall prepare and make thepublic the document specifying
the matters set forth in thefollowing:(i) Basic guideline for activities(ii) General principles on safetyassessment methods(iii) The relationship between theexamination standard which wasestablished pursuant to theprovisions of paragraph (1) of
Article 5 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, and the guidelineof the preceding item(iv) Other matters deemed to beeffective in clarifying thestandards of judgment made by
the Nuclear Regulation Authority(2) The guideline of the item (i) of thepreceding paragraph shall bemade as concrete as possible.

(Correction)
Article 10-3
(1) When the Nuclear Regulation
Authority requests correction
against the application madepursuant to the provisions of the
Act on the Regulation of Nuclear
Source Material, Nuclear Fuel74

Material and Reactors, it shall be
filed by submitting the document.
(2) The document set forth in thepreceding paragraph shall state
the reasons.
(3) The Nuclear Regulation Authority
shall submit the document set
forth in paragraph (1) for public
inspection for 30 years from thedate of the correction request.
(Publication of written decision)
Article 10-4
(1) When the Nuclear Regulation
Authority disposes theapplication made pursuant to theprovisions of the Act on theRegulation of Nuclear Source
Material, Nuclear Fuel Material
and Reactors, it shall be made bysubmitting a document.
(2) The Nuclear Regulation Authority
shall submit the document set
forth in the preceding paragraphfor public inspection for 30 years
from the date of the disposition.

Article 11 to 13 (Omitted)(Reactor Safety Examination
Committee)
Article 14 The Reactor Safety
Examination Committee shall takecharge of the following affairs:(i) The Reactor Safety Examination
Committee shall give opinions to
the Nuclear Regulation Authority
pursuant to the provisions ofparagraph (4) of Article 43-3-6,(including the cases where it isapplied mutatis mutandis(Reactor Safety Examination
Committee)
Article 14 The Reactor Safety
Examination Committee shallstudy and deliberate mattersconcerning nuclear reactor
safety when the Committee
has received the instructions
from the Nuclear Regulation
Authority.

75

pursuant to the provisions ofparagraph (2) of Article 43-3-8 ofthe said act), of the Act on theRegulation of Nuclear Source
Material, Nuclear Fuel Material
and Reactors.
(ii) The Reactor Safety Examination
Committee shall conduct surveys
concerning the policy on
regulation for ensuring safety inutilization of nuclear energy, makerecommendations to the heads of
relevant administrative organs
through the Prime Minister when
the Committee finds it necessary,and request them to reportmeasures that are taken inaccordance with therecommendations.
(iii) The Reactor Safety Examination
Committee shall conduct scientificresearch and study necessary to
perform affairs cited in eachpreceding item.

Article 15 to 31 and Supplementary Provisions (Omitted)

76

(3) Drafted articles for the act for establishment of the Nuclear Safety
Goal Council(Establishment)
Article 1 The Nuclear Safety Goal Council (hereinafter referred to as the"Council") shall be established under the Cabinet Office.
(Affairs under the jurisdiction)
Article 2 The council shall consider the merits and demerits associatedwith nuclear energy utilization, and specify quantitative safety goalsprescribed in Article 1-3 of the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source
Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors (Act No. 166 of June 10,1957).
(Organization)
Article 3 (Omitted)(Appointment of the Chairperson and Members)
Article 4(1) The Chairperson and Members shall be appointed by the Prime Ministerwith the consent of both Houses of the Diet.
(2) The Prime Minister may appoint the Chairman or Members
notwithstanding the provisions set forth in the preceding paragraph,when the consent of both Houses of the Diet cannot be obtained due tothe closing of the Diet or the dissolution of the House of Representatives
in case the term of office of the Chairman or Members expires or aposition is vacant.
(3) In the case of the preceding paragraph, the Prime Minister shall obtain
subsequent approval of both houses of Diet at the first Diet session after
the relevant appointment. When the Prime Minister cannot obtain
subsequent approval of both houses of Diet in such a case, the Prime
Minister shall immediately dismiss the Chairman or Members.
(Term of office, dismissal, council, service description and remuneration)(Omitted)77

Supplement: Safety regulation and administrationsof justice
The lawsuit for demand of an injunction based on moral rights, which
was brought by the neighborhood of the Ohi Power Station against theKansai Electric Power Co., Inc., was upheld at the Fukui district co urt on
May 21, 2014. Because this report does not aim to propose the role of theadministration of justice to the safety regulation, the matters are notspecifically discussed in the text. However, having many opinions on the
judgment, I contributed to several newspaper publishing companies. Oneof them is introduced here. For the contributions to other newspaper
publishing companies, anyone may inspect them on the Internet(http://ieei.or.jp/2014/08/sawa-akihiro-blog140801/#more-13983).
If
you are interested in them, please see them.
(Reproduced from the morning edition of the Asahi newspaper, July 16,
2014)
In my opinion, the biggest problem on this judgment by the Fukui
district court is that the judges do not understand the true nature of thesafety regulation. While it is assumed that there is a risk of accident in
nuclear power stations, the basic way of thinking for safety regulation is
to take measures for minimizing the possibility of the risk becoming
apparent and also holding back the spread of damage.
However, the judgment considers that "the subject of determination
is whether or not by any chance there is a specific risk leading to suchsituation as the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident" and "an injunction isnaturally upheld in case there is such a risk". The opinion is that the risk
has to be zero.
On the other hand, they examine whether each nuclear power station
conforms to the new regulatory standard, which has been made strictly by
the NRA based on self-examination of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident.
If the judgment by the Fukui district court becomes final and binding, itmeans that the two regulatory standards, that is, the one of the NRA andthe one of the Fukui district court, "whether or not by any chance of an
accident", coexist for examining nuclear power stations.
In the past, the Supreme Court determined that the establishment
licensing decision is illegal in the case where there have been errors ordefects which cannot be overlooked in the study and deliberation or thedetermination by the Atomic Energy Commission, etc., based on theopinion that an examination of the court on nuclear power stations should
be made from the viewpoint of whether there are any unreasonable points
in the determination of the administrative agency which has been made79

on the basis of the specialized and technical examination conducted by
the Atomic Energy Commission, etc.
That means the role of administration of justice is to examine whether
there have been any problems in the process of the examination of theAtomic Energy Commission or the administrative agency. In this case, two
examination standards do not coexist. This way of thinking has been
followed in the determination of many nuclear power station related
lawsuits. However, considering that "the judgment by the court does notnecessarily require high-level specialized and technical knowledge andexpertise", the Fukui district court passed judgment on the safety bythemselves without showing any reasons.
The determinations similar to the one made by the Fukui district
court will not spread in the future. It is because many district courts
examining the similar lawsuits for demand of an injunction of a nuclear
power station are carefully making sure of the course of the examinationsof the NRA. Though establishing a close logic is required to pass judgment
prior to the judgment of the NRA, it is considered that there are few judges
who want to go that far to pass judgment.
The judgment definitively states that "it is not legally allowed even toparticipate in the discussions in which the right related to existence ofmany people, the electricity cost, etc., are discussed together, and to
decide about right or wrong". The judgment has not been made withenough imagination about the issue of coordination with public interests
such as stable supply of electricity though the judgment might have won
applause of public opinion. In my opinion, because the logic is too roughto lead the lawsuit to a grave decision of an injunction of a nuclear power
station, the judgment will not be upheld in a higher court.

80References
1. Examination terms related to safety
Term

Description

PSA(Periodic Safety
Review)

The implementation items (evaluation of the status ofsafety preservation activities, status of reflecting thelatest knowledge and PSA) were instructed andreviewed by the NISA. At present, some of them areused as the method for the Periodic Safety
Management Review and some of them are thecontent of the safety improvement evaluation
notification. At present, some of them are used as themethod for the Periodic Safety Management Review
and some of them are the content of the safety
improvement evaluation notification.

Transitionalarrangements
PSA

This is the PSR used in the NISA age, which is used
for the rule that the conventional PSR shall be used
for a plant for which the restart of operation is notapplied for. The PSR implementation standard of the
Nuclear Society, 2009 edition is one of the methods.

SAR(Safety Analysis
Report)Used for an operator's independent safetyassessment, this confirms that the plant is safe,
based on the past and present review.

FSAR(Final Safety
Analysis Report)

This is submitted by an operator after evaluation of
the current safety of the facilities, etc., at the stage ofdetermination by the NRC of the operation license in
the US. It is obliged to update the FSAR to the UFSAR
reflecting the latest status of the plant within 24
months.

PSA(Probabilistic
SafetyAssessment)This is a method for clarifying the relative weakness
as well as evaluating quantitatively the safety level ofa facility, by periodically evaluating an occurrence
frequency of an accident and the effect when it has
occurred, for all accidents which may occur innuclear facilities, etc.

PRA
(Probabilistic Risk
Assessment)This is a method for considering the level of safety
based on the level of risk determined by thequantitative evaluation using the probability theory,of the occurrence frequency of an accident and theeffect when it has occurred, for all accidents which
may occur in nuclear facilities, etc.

81

2. Safety regulation at the stage of design and construction
Regulation
nameContent of regulation

Review
methodLegislation

Submittal ofanapplication
form

Establishment
license

Safety review ofwhether an Application
for Reactor
Establishment
submitted by anoperator conforms to
the licensing basis
determined by the
Reactor Regulation Act
is carried out, and alicense to establish areactor is determinedby the NRA.

Articles 433-5 and 433-8 of theReactorRegulation
Act

Supporting
data

Approval of
construction
planAfter obtaining alicense for changes ofelectric facilities and alicense to establish areactor, the content of
the detailed design of
the NPS has to beapproved in order toinitiate full-scaleconstruction work
such as component
manufacturing andinstallation.

Articles 433-9 of theReactorRegulation
Act

Witnessed
inspection
and records
confirmation

Articles 433-12 of theReactorRegulation
Act

Fuel assembly
inspection

For the fuel assemblies
used in the reactor(domestic fuelassemblies andimported fuelassemblies),
conformity (only fordomestic fuelassemblies) to theapproved design andconformity to thetechnical standards
are confirmed.

Preoperational
inspection

For the nuclear powerreactor facilities whose
approval or
notification of
construction plan has
been made, conformity
to the construction
plan and conformity to
the technicalstandards are
confirmed.

Witnessed
inspection
and records
confirmation

Paragraph(1) ofArticles 433-11 of theReactorRegulation
Act

Approval of
operationalsafetyprogramThis stipulates thematters related tooperation of a nuclear
power reactor facility
and is approved by the
NRA Commissioner.
The Operational Safety
Inspection confirmsthat the Operational
Safety Program isobserved.

Submittal ofanapplication
form

Paragraph(1) ofArticles 433-24 of theReactorRegulation
Act82

3. Safety regulation at the stage of operation
Regulation
nameContent of regulation

Review
methodLegislation

Approval of
operationalsafetyprogramAt the time of operation
start, the document(Operational Safety
Program) specifying thematters to be observed forsafety concerning nuclear
facility operation isreviewed and approved by
the NRA.

ApplicationofOperational
SafetyProgramParagraph(1) ofArticles43, etc., oftheReactorRegulation
Act

Periodic
facility
inspection

For the facilities especiallywith high importance,
periodic inspections
conducted by an operator
are witnessed or therecords are confirmed.
The results of examination
are released.

Witnessed
inspection
andconfirmationof anoperator's
examination
results

Articles43-3-15 oftheReactorRegulation
Act

Periodicsafetymanagement
inspection

An operator periodicallycarries out the licensee's
inspection and records theresults. And theimplementation
organization of theperiodic operator's
inspections is examinedby the NRA.

Witnessed
inspection
andconfirmationof anoperator's
results

Articles43-3-16 oftheReactorRegulation
Act

Operational
SafetyInspection

Status of observance ofthe operational safety
programs specifying thematters required for safety
is periodically confirmed
concerning operation ofreactor facilities, The
report of the examination
is open to the public.

Access tofacilities,
document
inspections
andquestioning
to therelevant
peopleParagraph(5) ofArticles 37of theReactorRegulation
Act

Evaluationfor
improving
the safety of
nuclearpower
reactorfacilities

An operator itself
comprehensively evaluates
the safety related to theentire reactor facilities
and submits the results to
the NRA. The operator's
independent approach isevaluated. The notified
content is released.

Submittal ofanapplication
form

Articles43-3-29 oftheReactorRegulation
Act

83

Toward Optimization of
Nuclear Safety Regulation- Prospecting the amendment ofReactor Regulation Act –㸦Project Leader: Akihiro Sawa㸧
August 2014
The 21st Century Public Policy InstituteKeidanren Kaikan 19th Floor,
1-3-2, Otemachi, Chiyoda, Tokyo 100-0004
TEL㸸+81-3-6741-0901
FAX㸸+81-3-6741-0902
HP㸸http://www.21ppi.org