Japan:
Foreign Policy in a state of flux
& New government of Japan

Lecturer: Dr. Masayo Goto
1

Security policy2

Background of Security of Japan
Pre-war world Japan was recognized as a dominant power within
Asia A permanent member of the Security Council of the
League of Nations (former UN) from 1920 until 1933
– Japan was not allowed to join the UN until 1956
Post war JapanThe 1947 Constitution of Japan banned the Japanesefrom re-arming
3

Yoshida Doctrine(Postwar Prime Minister Yoshida)
Yoshida’s approach to foreign policy
1.

Economic growth – to win peace after losing
the war2.

Maintain only a small, lightly armed forces for
Self defense

3.

Rely on the US for security guarantee
4Japan‟s nuclear policy(by Prime Minister Kishi)
1.

Reliance on the US nuclear umbrella

2.

Commitment to three non-nuclear principles (not to
produce, possess or have them on Japan soil)

3.

Promotion of worldwide disarmament

4.

Development of nuclear energy for peacefulpurposes5

Three principles for arms exports(prime minister Sato in 1967)


Not to export arms to the communist blocNo to export arms to countries covered by a UN arms
embargo

Not to export arms to countries involved in armed conflictThis was later developed by Prime Minister Miki to a ban on
all arms exports.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)1976 Japan signed the treaty
6Threats to Japan‟s securityNorth Korea
North Korea’s Taepodong launch in 1998
 Infiltration of North Korean spy ships in 1999
 Nuclear weapons program Abduction




China


China is unlikely to inflict a direct attack on Japan, except
for China’s military intervention in Taiwan affair (i.e.
Taiwan’s independence) would threat to Japan’s security)

7Security related Domestic laws1992 Peacekeeping Operations Bill Dispatch of the SDF to overseas for a non-combat role

2001 Anti-terrorism Measures Law
This enabled the SDF to give logistic assistance to the
US-led forces in the Indian Ocean ⇒ The Cabinet
endorsed to extend for one more year

2003 Emergency Legislation

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Emergency Legislation (2003)
1.

The Armed Attack Situation Law or Armed Attack
Contingency Law: The government is given more powers to
respond to a foreign military attack on Japan or perceived
threats of such an attack (武力攻撃事態対処法)

2.

The Revised Self-Defence Law: This allows to loosen some
restrictions to facilitate the mobilization of the SDF including
the use of weapons (自衛隊改正法)

3.

The Revised Law on the Establishment of the Security
Council of Japan: The Home Affairs Minister and others will
be included in the council and they are required to setup of apanel to respond to an emergency situation(安全保障会議設置改正法)

9Constraints on expanding the military

Public opinion
 There is little public support for a combat role for
the SDF

Article 9 The article preclude any military establishment


If Japan want to avoid a major military buildup,
Japan has little choice but to rely on the armed
strength of the US.

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New moves
Japan signed an agreement in 1983 permitting defense technology transfer
with the USEnforcing missile defense capabilities Concern over North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear crisisTo meet US demand to further promote bilateral cooperation in the
missile defense
To build a missile defense shield against China’s ballistic missile – longterm goal
Review on Japan’s arms export ban with the idea of revising it (JDA
director stated this remark in 2004)

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Japanese Ministry of Defense (2007)(Former The Defense Agency of Japan (JDA)12

The Defence Agency was established in 1965



JDA is not a full-fledged ministry, but attached to the Cabinet
Office.

The head of the JDA (Director General) is a minister of state
and a member of the CabinetJapan Defense Agency (Defence) became Japanese Ministryof Defense in Jan. 2007

Objectives
To prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, torepel such aggression to preserve the independence and peaceof Japan13

Defense expenditure
US$ per capita

1985

2001

US

1,631

1,128

UK

852

583

France895

553

Russia

N/A

440

Japan

269

310

North Korea

308

91

China

29

36

Although Japan possesses sizeable military assets, it ranks the fifth
defense spender (Source: International Institute for Strategic
Studies (2002)14

Self Defense Forces (SDF)

SDF was established in 1954
Army, navy and air force under the supervision of the Director
general of the Defense Agency.
Exclusively defense orientedCan only act if attackedMust take minimum actions required for defenseSize of capability must be limited to the minimum
necessary for defense (no offensive and strategic weapons)
In International law, ‘Self-defense’ covers both individual andcollective defense, but Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan isusually viewed as meaning that only acts of individual defense
are permissible.

15Role of the SDF (Since 1979)1.

To maintain an adequate surveillance posture2.

To act and take the steps required to respond to domestic
insurgency

3.

To rebuff cases of limited and small-scale aggression

4.

To effectively function in the fields of command
communication, transportation and rescue

5.

To carry out extensive education and training of SDEF

6.

To carry out disaster relief operations
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Legislation concerning SDF activities and the activities of the
US forces

The SDF can provide the US forces with supplies such as
weapons and ammunition and services free of charge.



The Japanese government will be required to compensate thepublic and local authorities for damages and losses resulting
from the activities of the US military.



The Prime Minister can allow the US military to use privately
owned land or structures if he deems it necessary should Japan
come under attack.

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The Japan-US Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreement (ACSA)
Signed February 2004

This revision allows the SDF and US forces to expand
the scope of exchanging goods and services to Japan’s
emergency situations, international contributions andlarge-scale disasters.

Allows the SDF to supply ammunition to US forces inthe event of an armed attack or an expected attack on
Japan.

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The Japan-US Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement (Cont’)Allow the US and Japan to exchange services inJapan-US joint training, PKO, humanitarian andinternational relief activities and situations in areas
surrounding Japan.
Allow two countries to exchange food, fuel, clothes andmilitary parts and services such as transporting troops andrepairing vehicles.



Not allowed to provide each other with weapons andammunition.

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The Constitution of Japan

20

Comparison
Meiji Constitution (1889) Post-war Constitution (1947)

Drafted by

Enacted as part of theAllied Occupation at the direction of
Meiji Renewal, abolished General Mac-Arthur in 1946, has notafter World War II
been amended since thenSovereignty

Emperor (claimed to rule People
by divine right)

EmperorHeld supreme power

De facto head of state, ceremonial
figurehead

Rights/System

All popular rights were
circumscribed and the
duty of people to serveand obey Emperor was
absolute, imperial system

Parliamentary system of government,
guarantee of certain fundamental
rights, strict separation of state andreligion, liberal democracy

Central policy

Imperial order

Pacifism, no possession of any armed
forces, abolishment of feudalism
21Article 9

RENUNCIATION OF WAR

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based onjustice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or
use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war
potential, will never be maintained. The right ofbelligerency of the state will not be recognized.

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Constitutional Amendments
The revision covers four major areas
1.
Guarantee of Fundamental Human Rights
2.
Fundamental and Organizational Role of
Politics
3.
Japan’s Role in International Society
4.
Local Autonomy.

23

Implications of Article 9After adoption of the Constitution of Japan, the US had adesire for Japan to take a more active military role in the
struggle against communism.
Reinterpreted as ‘renouncing the use of force in international
affairs, but not renouncing a national right to self-defenseProhibits maintaining a military for warfare, though Japanpossesses a self-defense force ⇒ discord between the SDF
and Article 9 (must be addressed clearly)Troubling prospect for Asian neighbors wary of a revival ofJapanese militarism in the region24Debate on major issues by the ruling and opposition parties
LDP & Komeito

DPJ

Timeline

Expected to endorse the LDP
Constitution panel‟s draft amendment
on 22 November 2005 (party‟s 50th
anniversary)Compile a Constitution
revision bill in 2006

SDF and
Internationalcooperation

Calls for a permanent law forinternational cooperation, establish the
SDF military credential

SDF dispatch to Iraq isproblematic.

The role of military would be specified
to deal with Self defence, international
cooperation and contingencies

Calls for legal restraints
to control the SDF
through changes to
Article 9.
SDF should be
reorganized into areserve force for the
UN (Ozawa group)

25

Self
defence,Collective
self-defenc
eSupport both self-defence andcollective defence

Support both self-defence andcollective defence (Maehara)

Collective
security

Support collective security (it isguaranteed under internationallaw (UN Charter 51).

Support collective security(Majority)

Article 9

Retain or reword the
war-renouncing Article 9, Clause
1, but to change Clause 2

Retain the war-renouncing
Article 9, Clause 1, but toscrap Clause 2 to clarity theright of self defence

Against the right to collective
self-defence because it isbanned by Article 9 (former
Japan Socialist Members)

Komeito contends that Article 9,
Clause 1 and 2 should be retained

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The US-Japan Security Arrangements27

Mutual Security Treaty(US-Japan Defense relationship)Japan agreed to the stationing of American
troops in JapanThe US presence in Japan is governed by a
Status of Forces of Agreement (SOFA)

28

US-Japan Security Treaty

To prevent Japan from posing a threat to peace bydenying Japan the right to develop a military (This is byplacing Article 9 in the Japanese constitution)To secure the Sea Lanes of Communication around
Japan up to 1,000 miles outJapan depends on the US for military enforce beyond
the areas surrounding Japan
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New Guidelines for US-Japan Security Defense
Cooperation (1997)

Greater sharing of intelligence informationCollaboration between US and Japanese forces during
UN PKO and humanitarian operations

Bilateral defense planning and exercises

30

Foreign policy

31

Major issues
Two main pillars of Japan’s foreign policy Japan’s international contribution


Economic aid (ODA) PKO activities
 Humanitarian aid (SDF dispatch to Iraq)
Japan’s quest for UNSC permanent
membership Free Trade Agreements32

Two main pillars of Japan’s foreign policyUN centrism (UN centered diplomacy)US-Japan alliance33

Japan’s PKO and participation
UN Charter does not oblige Japan to contribute
military to PKOJapan’s PKO has always been non-military
participation i.e. protection of human life,
election monitoring, humanitarian aid, postconflict economic rehabilitation

1992: UNTAC Cambodia (removal of mines)
1993: Mozambique (50 personnel)
1996: the Golan Heights
1994: Zaire
34

Japan’s PKO
Criticism

Japan’s involvement in PKO is linked toJapan’s bid for permanent Security
Council Membership!

35

Japan’s International Contribution
It has been influenced by ‘Gaiatsu’ (Foreign Pressure) and the
Gulf War, 1991
i.e. US pressure → active role and military role for Japan (1990s)

International Peace Cooperation Bill (PKO Bill) – 1992
SDF is allowed to participate in all non-military PKOs,
including supervising elections and transporting refugees.
Lessons from the Gulf War, 1991
 Despite massive monetary contribution of USD$13 billion,
Japan experienced severe international criticism and loss offace.
 Engaged mainly in mine sweeping activity

Japan offers money but not blood!
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SDF dispatch to Iraq

Up to 600 Ground Self-Defense Force troops havebeen stationed in Samawah in southern Iraq since
early 2004 to repair schools and roads and provide
clean water and medical aid.



About 200 Air Self-Defense Force troops
stationed in Kuwait are transporting goods andU.S. military personnel to and from Iraq.

37

Japan’s quest for UN permanent
membership

38

What is the Security Council ?
Purpose: Maintenance of international peace and security
 Investigate any dispute or situation that could lead tointernational friction
 Recommend methods for adjusting disputes andterms for settlement
 UNSC alone has the power to make decisions which
all Member States are obliged to accept and carry out.
Five UNSC permanent members (P5) with veto rights :US, France, UK, Russia and China – veto power
10 non-permanent members: two-year terms on arotational basis
39

UNSC reform
Major issues for the reform Veto power – Should new Security Members be allowed tohave the veto power or veto power itself should be
eliminated?
Expansion of UNSC membership:
Is their need to expand UNSC permanent membership? If so,
who are qualified?

Possible candidates for the membership (Japan, Germany,
India and Brazil) and the opponents
Japan vs. China and South Korea
 Germany vs. Italy India vs. Pakistan
 Brazil vs. Mexico40

Is Japan qualified to become the UNSC
permanent member?
Japan’s financial contribution to the UN is thesecond largest (19.5%).

Japan has contributed to the international community
through development aid, i.e. ODA, loan

“Enemy state clauses” in the UN Charter must be
deleted (it refers to Japan)

Ultimate restoration of Japan's world prestige
41

ADDRESS BY KOIZUMI PRIME MINISTERFor the last sixty years, Japan has determinedly pursued
a course of development as a peace-loving nation,
making a unique and significant contribution to thepeace and prosperity of the world.

Japan is convinced that Security Council reform is a justcause for the international community - as is thedeletion of the long obsolete "enemy state" clauses
from the UN Charter. In a reformed Council, Japan isready to play a larger role as a permanent member.
(AT THE HIGH - LEVEL PLENARY MEETING OF THE 16th SESSION OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN in 2005)

42

What must Japan do in order to win
support from UN member states?
Win support from P5 nations



China: Strongly againstBoost cooperation toward a common goal ofgaining permanent Security Council
membership with other possible candidates (i.e.
India, Germany)Win support from UN member states → Likely
to win support from most African nations andsome Asian nations ⇒ Economic influence
(ODA)
43

Old Government and
New Government

44

Key dates in Japanese postwar politics
April, 1952 The Allied occupation of Japan ends.
November, 1955: LDP is formed through a merger of the
Liberal Party and the Democratic Party.
August, 1993: The Liberal Democrats lose their grip on power
for the first time, to an eight-party coalition headed by the first
non-LDP prime minister, Hosokawa of the Japan New Party.
June, 1994: LDP return to power in a ruling coalition, but
support Socialist Murayama as prime minister.
January, 1996: The Liberal Democrats' leader returns to the top
office after three non-LDP prime ministers.
September, 1996: The forerunner of the Democratic Party ofJapan is established by Hatoyama and other defectors from the
LDP and some members of the 1993 coalition.
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November, 1996: LDP returns to single-party rule aftergaining a majority in the lower house.
 April, 1998: DPJ expands by merging with several small
centrist opposition groups.
 April, 2000: LDP forms a ruling coalition with a smaller,
Buddhist-backed party, the New Komeito.
 September, 2005: LDP scores a sweeping victory in lower
house elections under Prime Minister Koizumi, withprivatization of the postal savings system as a key issue.
 July 2007: DPJ wins by a landslide in the weaker upper house
vote and leads the opposition bloc to take control of thechamber.


46

End of the 1955 system
What was the 1955 system?


Ideological struggle between conservative and socialist
policies (LDP ability to secure national elections for 38 years
led to the perception that it was a one and half party system)

Powerful role of LDP factions (Habatsu)
selecting party president (and therefore PM)
determining cabinet posts, committee positions andsource of funds to factional members.

1.
2.
3.

Powerful role of the bureaucracy (Arthur
Stockwin – bureaucracy colonised the rulingparty and lesser extent corporate world)Consensus based style of leadership opposition parties were weak – voters were notpresented with a choice (JSP – later SDPJ,
Social Democratic Party of Japan – gave
impression it did not want to take office) Money politics was rife End of Cold War and demise of single party
dominance

End of the LDP dominance and seven party coalition Reform
agendaJune 18, 1993 (break- up of LDP): Diet passed a no confidence
motion in Prime Minister Miyazawa.

June 19: 46 members of the LDP (including Ozawa and Hata)
resigned from the LDP and formed a new party – Shinseito(The Japan Renewal Party). Ten LDP Diet members resigned
to form a party – Sakigake (Harbinger Party)

LDP 30 seats short of a majority in the Lower House.
Miyazawa dissolved the Lower House.

July 18 1993 election result
 LDP 223 (33 seats short of a majority)
 JSP – 70 (had 133 before the election) severely
weakened but still second largest party in theDiet Komeito (Clean Government Party) – 52 seats(increase of seven seats) Japan New Party – 35 seats Harbinger Party – 12 seatsAugust 1993
 Hosakawa Morihiro Prime Minister of a
Coalition GovernmentA result of manoeuvring in the Diet. Hosakawa
leader of the Japan New Party (Nihon Shinto)
was able to cast a vote to forge a coalition ofseven parties to keep the LDP from power.

LDP loss of power Ideological differences between parties was nolonger a factor
 Economic success could no longer be taken for
granted Great public interest in political reform

Coalition lasted nine months due to bickering
mainly between SDJP and Ichiro Ozawa leaderof Shinseito arty.

June 1994 LDP back in coalition with SDPJ
and New Harbingers Party (Shinto Sakigake)2009 General Election
DPJ wins over 300 seats54

Results of the 2009 General Election
The DPJ, which had just 115 seats before the election, secured308. However, still 12 seats short of holding two-thirds of theLower House.
 The DPJ-led opposition parties secured 340 seats against just
140 for the LDP-New Komeito ruling bloc.
 The victory by DPJ will end more than half a century of almost
uninterrupted rule by the Liberal Democratic Party.
 The LDP's fall from power was only its second since it was
founded in 1955. It was out of power for about 11 months
between 1993 and 1994.
 DPJ, Social Democratic Party and Kokumin Shinto (People„s
New Party) agreed to form a coalition government ⇒a fragile
partnership, conflict of interest is highly likely (DPJ won't
remain under the thumb of a coalition if it gains an Upper House
majority in next summer's election)DPJ-led government policies
cut waste created in bureaucrat-reliant politics and reorganize
the budget in such a way as to spend money on what's really
important.
 offer cash to households
 keep the 5 percent consumption tax intact for the next fouryears
 the monthly child allowance to families (have been criticizedas lacking specifics about sources of funding) ending expressway tolls
 The Japan-US security alliance remains a “cornerstone” ofJapan‟s foreign policy.
 remains committed to ending the Maritime Self-Defense
Force„s refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, despite US‟scalls for its continuation ⇒ an anti-U.S. foreign policy?
Policy implications
Constitutional amendments/US Forces inJapan
SDP strongly advocates maintaining the warrenouncing clause in the Constitution andscaling down the U.S. forces in Japan (U.S.
bases, the realignment of U.S. forces, and the
Status of Forces Agreement)

Hatoyama faces tough challenges ahead to reform Japan
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g0g2Dd0O5Jc
Opposition landslide victory ushers in new era in Japan
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sUcHWJeYg6g
Japanese Elect New Leadership
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tSKvMeZX7aY&feature=channel

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Reactions within North Asia
North Korea
Called for "fruitful relations" with DPJ. Ties with Japan willsolely depend on whether Japan offers compensation for its 19101945 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.
 China
The Chinese government is not so familiar with the China policiesof the DPJ as well as their impact on Sino-Japanese relations.
However, Hatoyama will not be visiting the Yasukuni Shrine (adozen-odd number of Japan‟s “Class A” war criminals are being
worshipped) ⇒ will build a religiously and politically neutral“alternative monument” to remember the war dead US
US is concerned about opposition to the Maritime Self-Defence
Force‟s refueling activities in the Indian Ocean, reviewing the58
realignment of US forces stationed in JapanEnd of lecture59