2011-E-4
Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia and the Tribute System I:
Balancing in a Hierarchical System

Min Shu
School of International Liberal Studies
Waseda University0Abstract
Southeast Asia had long been an integral part of the China-centered tribute system in the
pre-colonial era. Yet, the hierarchical relationship between China and Southeast Asia
has not been studied from the perspective of international relations. This article
contributes to the literature by looking into the strategic responses of Southeast Asian
countries to the China-dominated regional hierarchy. It argues that international
relations in pre-colonial Southeast Asia were characterized by a complex politicalstructure of anarchy-within-hierarchy. In this structural context, Southeast Asian
countries often actively sought close tributary relations with China in order to survive
and dominate the sub-regional order. The tribute system was also instrumental inbringing about balancing behavior at the sub-regional level. Detailed analysis reveals
that the tribute system offered three mechanisms crucial to the power balance ofpre-colonial Southeast Asia: imperial recognition, tributary trade, and external
arbitration and protection.

1

Introduction
The tribute system had played a key role in the regional order of pre-colonial East Asia,
which stretched from Korea and Japan in the northeast to Burma, Siam and Java in thesouthwest. This order is commonly regarded as a China-dominated regional hierarchy(Kang, 2003a). As one of its key features, international relations in pre-colonial East
Asia had not followed the logic of balance of power because ‘[t]here is… no evidenceof external balancing or other coordinated efforts to constrain China’ (Wohlforth et al.,2007: 172; see also Kaufman et al., 2007). Instead, the hierarchical regional order reliedon the cultural prominence of Confucianism, the disparity in economic and militarystrength, and the long-standing influences of the tribute system, all of which favored thecentrality of China (see Kang, 2010).
This article does not dispute the view that there was a lack of systemic balancing against
China in pre-colonial East Asia. However, it shows that there was plenty of inter-statebalancing among then the small and medium-size countries in Southeast Asia. Though
the logic of balance of power was not immediately obvious at the regional level, it had
played a crucial part in the sub-regional system of pre-colonial Southeast Asia. The
centuries-old conflicts between Dai Viet and Champa, between Burma and
Ayutthaya/Siam, and among various Sumatra and Javanese kingdoms all point to theimportance of power balancing. Notably, the dynamics of such inter-state balancing was
not isolated from the power structure of East Asia. Upon close examination, the article
argues that the hierarchical regional order dominated by China and embedded in thetribute system was in many ways instrumental in bringing about balancing behavior inpre-colonial Southeast Asia.
More specifically, the Sino-centric tribute system had provided three major mechanisms
linking Southeast Asia and China in the pre-colonial regional order. Firstly, the imperial
recognition by China was vital for Southeast Asian leaders to acquire politicallegitimacy in a hierarchical regional order. Secondly, the China-centered tributary trade
was essential to meet the commercial interests of Southeast Asian trading states. Thirdly,
Southeast Asian countries were not shy from seeking China’s arbitration and protectionin their inter-state disputes. These three mechanisms, the article shows, had played acrucial part facilitating and regulating the sub-regional balance of pre-colonial Southeast
Asia.
Recognizing that balancing remained relevant at a sub-regional level of hierarchical2East Asia is important in both theoretical and policy terms. Theoretically, it provides
evidence for a possible synthesis of two contrasting theoretical approaches in the realist
tradition: the balance of power and the hierarchical relations 1. Instead of regarding thetwo as competing explanations of universal relevance (Wohlforth et al., 2007; Kaufman
et al., 2007), it appears more useful to consider their interactive dynamics in a statesystem. In policy terms, the findings of the article indicate that the lack of systemicbalancing and the abundance of sub-system balancing may coexist in a hierarchicalsystem. This helps to explain, for example, the puzzles of post-Cold War international
order where the US hegemony met with few direct challenges while the world has notbeen free from small-scale power balancing at the regional level (see Ikenberry, 2002;
Paul et al., 2004).
The remaining of the article is organized in the following way. The next section traces
the theoretical arguments about balancing and hierarchy in international relations. The
discussion leads to a possible synthesis of the two approaches to account for complex
political structure. In the third section, the China-dominated tribute system and the
Mandala-like Southeast Asian states are analyzed. It shows that international relations in
pre-colonial Southeast Asia were characterized by a complex structure of ‘anarchy
within hierarchy’. The fourth section examines three mechanisms of the tribute systemthat were crucial to the power balance of Southeast Asia: imperial recognition, tributarytrade, and external arbitration and protection. The final section summarizes the main
findings and discusses the implications of the study.
Balance of Power and Hierarchical Relations in Structural Theories
Hierarchy is one of the key concepts that Kenneth Waltz employs to examine thebalance-of-power theory (Waltz, 1979: Ch6). In his structural realist framework,hierarchy stands on the opposite side of anarchy. Whereas anarchy is an international
structure in which the units (i.e., states) are similar and independent, hierarchy denotes acontrasting situation where the units are not just differentiated but closelyinterdependent. The differentiated inter-state relations may take several forms from ahighly hierarchical extreme to complete anarchy. According to Lake (2003: 312),
hierarchical political relationships vary from imperium, dominion, mandate, to universal
covenant (i.e., treaty between sovereign states); hierarchical economic relationships
range from economic union, dependency, economic zone, to non-hierarchical market
1

According to Wohlforth et al. (2007: 160), hierarchical relations may vary ‘from various stages ofsystem hegemony and suzerainty to rare instances of universal empire’.
3exchange; hierarchical security relationships may appear as empire, informal empire,
protectorate, sphere of influence, or alliance under anarchy. It is concerning the
dynamics of alliance and balancing in an anarchic system that the theory of balance ofpower has most explanatory power.
The balance-of-power theory has two basic assumptions. First, individual states findthemselves in an undifferentiated anarchic world where they can rely only on self-help.
Second, states are ‘unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and,at a maximum, drive for universal domination’ (Waltz, 1979: 118). In order to survive
under such an anarchic order, states have to constantly guard against aggressive peers
and check the rise of potential hegemon. They may resort to self-strengthening
measures such as economic development and military build-up (i.e., internal balancing),
to alliance formation strategies by aligning with friendly states and staying away fromantagonist ones (i.e., external balancing), and to active learning through the adoption ofother states’ successful practice (i.e., emulation) (Wohlforth et al., 2007: 157; see also
Little, 2007). In the end, balancing behavior is expected to result in the formation ofbalances of power in the anarchic world. The strongest state in the system always faces
systemic balancing by its weak peers.
In contrast to the theoretical assumptions of balance of power, hierarchical relations
recognize the structural inequality of international order. The inequality is reflected in
the relationship among, say, the dominant power, great powers, and medium and small
powers (Organski, 1958; Clark, 1989). It also appears in the interaction between thehegemonic superpower and the rest of the world (Gilpin, 1981). It may even take theform of relational contracts that the dominant state enters into with subordinate ones
(Lake, 1996; see also Krasner, 2001; Keene, 2007). Despite the structural difference,states still strive for survival and domination under the hierarchical order. However, theoptimal strategy for weak states shifts from balancing to bandwagoning (Waltz, 1979;
Walt, 1987; Kang, 2003b). That is, they are more likely to align with strong states. By
recognizing their lower status in the hierarchical system, weak states may benefit fromtheir close relations with the powerful (Schweller, 1994). Such benefits include open
international trade, security protection provided by the dominate state 2, and easier
resolution of disagreement with third parties. As David Lake points out, subordinate
2

Lake’s (2007) empirical analysis shows that subordinate states spend significantly less on theirown defense than non-subordinate states in a US-dominated security hierarchy between 1950 and2000.
4states ‘can prosper internationally under authoritative orders’ (Lake, 2009: 176). Under
these circumstances, there should be very few, if not none, revisionist challengers
against the dominant state in a hierarchical system.
With their predicted outcomes in sharp contrast, the theories of balance-of-power andhierarchical relations appear competing with each other. Indeed, the recent efforts to test
the balance-of-power theory against the non-European context are based exactly onsuch an understanding of the two theoretical approaches (Wohlforth et al., 2007;
Kaufman et al., 2007). However, as the above discussion shows, the theories ofbalance-of-power and hierarchical relations make different assumptions about thestructures of world politics: anarchy vs. hierarchy; describe contrasting behavior
patterns of weak states: balancing vs. bandwagoning; and lead to opposite predictions
about international relations: systemic balancing vs. hierarchy-based alignment. If thetwo theoretical approaches share anything, it is the structural realist presumptions thatstates seek survival and domination, and that state behavior is influenced by the
structure of world politics (Clark, 1989). Because balance of power and hierarchicalrelations focus on the impacts of two completely different international politicalstructures, one may reasonably doubt whether the two are competing theories at all. 3
This, then, opens the possibility of juxtaposing the theories of balance-of-power andhierarchical relations to understand the impacts of complex structure in world politics.
Yet, can anarchy and hierarchy coexist within the same international system? In theoriginal Waltzian framework, anarchy and hierarchy are two logically opposing
concepts, the former being a realm of politics and power and the latter the realm ofauthority and administration (Waltz, 1979: 115). Though the view that anarchy andhierarchy are mutually exclusive is now rejected, scholars still use the notion of‘degrees of hierarchy’ along a single-dimensional continuum between total anarchy andcomplete hierarchy to identify different forms of hierarchical relations (see Milner,
1991; Watson, 1992; Lake, 2003; Kang, 2003b). Within such a framework, anarchy andhierarchy remains incompatible with each other.

3

For example, Japan formed an alliance with Germany to balance against the US prior to the pacific
war under an anarchic structure of world politics. However, during the Cold War as the West formed
an initially ideological and late political and economic hierarchy, Japan became a subordinate state
under the dominance of the US. Apparently, neither cases can be used to disconfirm the theories ofbalance-of-power or hierarchical relations.
5

The theoretical rigidity forces scholars to develop new concepts to explain the analyticalabnormality in international relations. In his update of the Waltzian balance of power,
Walt (1987) argues that balance of threat is better equipped to explain (the lack of)balancing behavior in world politics. In contrast to Waltz’s view that balancing isalways targeted at a perspective hegemon, he claims that states are more likely tobalance against their imminent security threats which may not come from the mostpowerful. In the absence of perceived ‘offensive intentions’, small and medium-sizestates may well choose to bandwagon with, rather than balance against, the powerfulone. This, for instance, explains the ‘abnormal’ alliance pattern during the Cold War thatwestern European countries aligned with the most powerful state—the US—under the
security framework NATO, because they faced more security threats from the USSR
and its allies in eastern Europe (Walt, 1987: 273-281).
Focusing on the eastern side of the Cold War confrontation, Wendt and Friedheim(1995) employ a hierarchy-based concept of ‘informal empire’ to analyze the
USSR-East Germany relations. In this Cold-War bilateral relationship, the authors argue
that there was a tension between the juridical equality of territorial sovereignty and thede facto inequality regarding the distribution of (military) power. The former constitutes‘the states system as an anarchy’ (699), whereas the latter produces ‘a genuine hierarchyin the system’ (698). Rather than treating anarchy and hierarchy as the two extremes ofa single-dimensional continuum, Wendt and Friedheim consider the relationship as‘hierarchy under anarchy’. Their article claims that the tension between hierarchy andanarchy has characterized the USSR-East Germany relations throughout the Cold War.
Though the study adopts a constructivist perspective, the conceptualization of informal
empire as a ‘hierarchy under anarchy’ is worth further discussion.
From a structuralist point of view, the Cold War was essentially a bipolar anarchy. It
was anarchy at the global level because there was no world authority capable ofregulating the inter-state relations. Indeed, the confrontation between the East and theWest has several times brought the world on the brink of war. Meanwhile, there were
two parallel hierarchies because the US and the USSR were the superpowers in thesystem. Each claimed special authority over other states belonging to the sameideological camp. Taking both aspects together, it is possible to ascertain both asystem-level structure and a sub-system-level structure of Cold War politics. At thesystem-level, states were formally recognized as the same independent and sovereign
entities; at the sub-system level, the states within the same camp were economically and6militarily interdependent. Under this analytical framework, the Cold War wascharacterized by a complex political structure of system-level anarchy andsub-system-level hierarchy.
In a world where anarchy and hierarchy coexist, balance of power and hierarchicalrelations each offer a valuable approach to explore the structural impacts of worldpolitics. To account for the alliance of the US and western Europe in the West, Walt
(1987) applies the balance-of-threat theory and argues that western European countries
balanced against the security threats originated from the anarchic, not the hierarchical,
part of the system. By comparison, Wendt and Friedheim (1995) look into thehierarchical dimension of USSR-East Germany relations in the East. Their researchhighlights the tension between juridical equality and de facto inequality in a ‘hierarchy
under anarchy’ system. The two studies highlight different aspects of theanarchy-hierarchy structure. However, the conceptualization of balance-of-threat andhierarchy-under-anarchy allows the researchers to grasp the dual structural feature of
the Cold War.
To understand a complex political structure like the Cold War, a more fruitful analytical
approach should combine the theories of balance of power and hierarchical relations
together. Anarchy and hierarchy are conceptualized as two logically opposite structuresof international relations. Nevertheless, they may coexist at different levels of worldpolitics, or simultaneously characterize different domains of international affairs. Under
such circumstances, what at stake is not simply whether states balance or bandwagon,
but the seemingly irrational strategies 4 that states adopt in a ‘nested game’ of complex
political structure (see Tsebelis, 1990). A mixed balance-of-power and hierarchicalrelations perspective offers a promising way to account for these analytical anomalies instructural theories.
The international relations of pre-colonial Southeast Asia offer a good case in point.
Under a hierarchical tributary order, Southeast Asia had been subordinate to the imperial
influences of China for several centuries. On the one hand, most Southeast Asian
countries chose to comply with the regional hierarchy, rather than challenge it (Reid,
1996). On the other hand, these countries were simultaneously engaged in thecompetition for survival and dominance at the sub-region level (Lieberman, 1993). How
4

In the real world, states not just choose between balancing and bandwagoning. They also opt forengagement, hedging, buckpassing, containment, neutrality, and even non-alignment.
7

did regional hierarchy and sub-regional anarchy evolve into a viable political structure
between China and Southeast Asia? What were the structural impacts of Chinese
supremacy on the dynamics of international relations in pre-colonial Southeast Asia?
The following sections address these two questions in turn.
Structuring Anarchy within Hierarchy: The Tribute System and the Mandalas
China had for centuries stood at the center of a regional hierarchy in pre-colonial East
Asia, a multi-state system that was eventually brought to an end by the Europeansaround the mid-19th century (Fairbank, 1968; Mancall, 1984). There were times when
China appeared less than a regional hegemon because of dynastic changes and internal
division 5 (Rossabi, 1983). Nonetheless, East Asia for most of the time had been
culturally, economically, and militarily dominated by a single country (see Kang, 2010).
At the heart of the hierarchical inter-state relations was the long-standing tribute system
of China.
The Tribute System and the Regional Hierarchy
Generally speaking, the tribute system fulfilled three main functions that were essential
to China’s central position in the regional hierarchy. First, it created a set ofsophisticated rules to regulate how the foreign missions performed the tributary rituals(Fairbank, 1942; Mancall, 1984; Stuart-Fox, 2003). Though the details varied from time
to time, receiving a tributary mission normally involved the following procedures. The
tributary mission was first welcomed at a designated border or coastal city. From thispoint onwards only a limited number (of people, animals and ships) were allowed totravel to the capital. Transportation and postal services were provided to facilitate thetrip. In the capital, the mission stayed at the Official Residence for Tributary Envoys. Its
members were paid allowances drawn from the Chinese treasury for the period of theirstay. In the court, the tributary ruler (through his/her envoys) received an imperial patentof appointment, together with a noble rank and an imperial seal. All these were dated
according to the Chinese dynastic calendar. Then, members of the mission wereentertained at banquets with the presence of the emperor. On this occasion the envoys
performed the so-called kowtow 6, and then received tea and gifts from the emperor. The
5

For instance, China was divided between the Jin Dynasty and the Southern Song Dynasty forabout one and a half century (1127-1279). During this period, the Korean kingdom of Koryo paid
tributes to both royal courts. Meanwhile, the weakened Sothern Song lost almost all the tributarycontact with Southeast Asia (Wang, 1968a: 47).
6
Kowtow refers to the gesture of deep respect that one kneels and bows so low that his/her head
touches the ground. This tributary ritual met a famous refusal in 1793. On that occasion Lord
Macartney was sent by the British government to demand trade concessions from China. He refused8

tributary mission’s return trip was accompanied by a ceremonial usher, who escorted themission back to the border.
The tributary rituals, performed usually on the important days such as the New Year or
the birthday of the emperor, aimed at a large domestic and foreign audience to show not
only the superior status of China in relations to the tributary countries but also the virtueof the emperor and his/her personal prestige. Despite the symbolic significance oftributary rituals, the tribute was not supposed to be a burden on the tributary countries.
As Fairbank (1942: 135) notes, ‘the value of the tribute objects was… balanced, if notout-weighed, by the imperial gifts.’ Of more importance to China was the extent towhich the tributary countries respected the Chinese civilization. Indeed, the tributary
countries were ranked by China according to this standard, creating a regional hierarchy
based on perceived Chinese-ness rather than actual power or strengthen (Kang, 2010:57). For instance, Korea and Vietnam were ranked higher than Japan because of theircloser adoption of Chinese practices. The rules of tributary rituals directly reflected sucha rank. Highly ranked tributary countries not just enjoyed more elaborated rituals at the
Chinese capital, but were awarded with higher noble ranks and better imperial seals by
the emperor. They were also allowed more frequent tributes, a privilege some Southeast
Asian countries once fiercely competed for. Considering the fact that the ceremonies forforeign missions were organized around the same days, this artificially ranked status
was of considerable significance in a China-dominated regional hierarchy.
Second, the tribute system offered a two-way diplomatic channel between China and thetributary countries. The foreign relations of traditional China were conducted almost
entirely within the tributary framework (Fairbank, 1968; Mancall, 1984). From time totime China sent its own envoys to foreign countries. These China-initiated diplomatic
missions were tributary in nature because most of them were tasked with imperial
communication that encouraged a foreign country to send tribute to China. 7 This
usually occurred at the beginning of a new dynasty in China. Historical records show
that, soon after he defeated the Mongols and reunited China in 1368, the first Ming
emperor sent his envoys on the same day to Korea and Dai Viet (in today’s northern
Vietnam) to inform them of his victory and the new dynasty; one month later, similar
missions were dispatched to Japan, Champa (in today’s southern Vietnam), and Javato perform kowtow in front of the Qian-long emperor in the belief that such behavior would indicatethat Britain was inferior to China.
7
China also sent its own tributary mission to other countries when it was weak (see Rossabi, 1983).
A notable example is the Southern Song court which paid regular tributes the Jin.
9

(Ming Shi Lu, 1968). Notably, even before the Ming envoy reached the destination, amission from Champa had arrived at Nanjing to congratulate the new dynasty (Wang,
1998: 304). When the famous expeditions of Zheng He was sent abroad, the missions
brought imperial appoints and seals with them in order to convince foreign rulers to takepart in the tribute system. Such imperial communication was considered so importantthat after the Qing dynasty replaced the Ming in the mid-17th century, the tributary
countries were explicitly required to ‘send back the imperial seal granted them in the
Ming period’ (Fairbank and Teng, 1941: 164).
Third, the tribute system allowed the bilateral trade between China and the tributary
countries to be conducted at the official level. Before the colonial trade of staple goods
dominated the world, international trade focused mostly on luxury goods since only avery high profit margin could compensate for the risks associated with trade. Then,
China was both a major producer of luxury goods such as silk and porcelain and a
crucial market for luxuries and precious metals. There were two ways that a foreigncountry conducted trade with China: tributary trade and private trade. During the Songdynasty, tributary and private trades were both allowed. Private trade generated huge tax
revenues for the imperial court, but the official tributes to China came to a minimum(Yoshinobu, 1984). When private trade was banned in the Ming and the early Qing
dynasties, tributary trade flourished as a result. It is therefore not surprising that thetribute system is considered by some scholars as ‘a cloak for trade’ (Fairbank, 1942,
1968; Wang, 1998; Stuart-Fox, 2003). The tributary missions usually included
merchants, who effectively monopolized the tributary trade with China. Thesemerchants were allowed to trade at the designated market in the border or coastal citywhere the mission was first received. Alternatively, they could bring their goods to thespecial market set up next to the Official Residence for Tributary Envoys in the capitalof China. Though trade outside these markets was strictly forbidden, tributary trade wasfree of duty—an attractive bounty of the tribute system that many trading states founddifficult to resist.
In short, the tribute system with its elaborated tributary rituals, two-way diplomaticcommunication and profitable tributary trade had created a China-dominated regional
hierarchy in East Asia. Nevertheless, the system provided China with surprisingly few
means to interfere with the internal affairs of tributary countries. As long as the tributary
rulers agreed to an inferior status, they were mostly ‘free to pursue domestic affairs and10

[conduct] diplomacy with one another as they saw fit’ (Kang, 2010: 55) 8. Standing at
the top of the regional hierarchy, China was consciously self-restrained to limit thepotentially negative impacts of its superiority. The self-restraint by China, paradoxically,
allowed the formation of a complex political structure of ‘anarchy within hierarchy’ inSoutheast Asia.
The Mandalas and Sub-Regional Anarchy
In pre-colonial Southeast Asia, sub-regional anarchy was a direct consequence of the
distinctive political structure that characterized many pre-modern Southeast Asianstates—the Mandalas. The Mandalas refer to the political structure of concentric circles
of power that a central authority claims over its territory, where the influences of theauthority wane as it moves away from the center (Wolters, 1999; Stuart-Fox, 2003). As
the basic form of pre-modern states, the Mandalas had dominated the political scene ofSoutheast Asia until they were finally displaced in the 19th century (Frederick, 2011).
There is an inherent tension within the political structure of the Mandalas. In rhetoric,
the king of each Mandala claimed universal authority and personal hegemony over the
local rulers as if they were obedient allies and vassals. In practice, the Mandalas
represented an ‘unstable political situation in a vaguely definable geographical area
without fixed boundaries and where smaller centers [and their local rulers] tended tolook in all directions for security’ (Wolters, 1999: 27-28). Adding to the internal
uncertainty is the fact that ‘Mandalas would expand and contract in concertina-likefashion. Each one contained several tributary rulers, some of whom would repudiate
their vassal status when the opportunity arose and try to build up their own networks ofvassals’ (28). For pre-modern Southeast Asian states, the fluid and often overlapping
claims of the Mandalas generated intensified security problems from both within andwithout.
The recurring conflicts in pre-colonial Southeast Asia offer some vivid examples ofsuch intensified security problems. The political history of Southeast Asia is usuallydivided into two phrases: the rise of early kingdoms between the 8th and 13th century,and the consolidation of pre-modern states from the 14th century to the late 18th and8It should be noted that the tribute system operated under the Yuan dynasty followed a very
different pattern. The Mongols requested the tributary rulers to (1) seek imperial audience personally,(2) send their sons as hostages, (3) conduct a census of their population, (4) provide military covée,(5) pay tax, and (6) allow a Mongol governor to be in charge (Wang, 1968a: 48). Such a sharp
departure from the traditional Chinese understandings of its tributary authority had never been
repeated in the late history of imperial China.
11early 19th century (Bentley, 1986; Lieberman, 2003, 2009; SarDesai, 2010). In theearlier phrase, mainland Southeast Asia was occupied by Dai Viet and Champa in theeast, the Khmer Empire of Angkor in the middle, and the Burmese-Mon Kingdom ofPagan in the west. Around the same time, maritime Southeast Asia was dominated by
the trading state of Srivijaya in Sumatra and the mostly agriculture-oriented JavaneseKingdoms of Sailendra, Mataram and Kediri. These earlier Southeast Asian kingdoms
virtually all adopted the organizational principles of the Mandalas. For instance, theKhmer Empire of Angkor was characterized by ‘a pluralistic society permeated bycrosscutting patronage ties’ (Bentley, 1986: 282). There were often multiple claims to
the throne. The royal controls weakened as it moved further away from the capital. The
maritime power of Srivijaya was no less Mandala-like. Once monopolizing the traderoutes of the Malacca and Sunda Straits, Srivijaya was a powerful trading state claiming
authority over much of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra and West Java (Wolters, 1967,1970). Nevertheless, study shows that there was a lack of ‘centralized administration’ in
Srivijaya (Wicks, 1992). During its reign, Srivijaya had moved its capital several times
because successive rulers formed close alliances with different neighbors. The internal
instability of early Southeast Asian Kingdoms coincided with the inter-state conflicts atthe sub-region level. In the mainland, Dai Viet battled with Champa in the east; theKhmer Empire was split into Upper Chenla in the north and Lower Chenla in the south,
and was ultimately weakened by internal division (Lieberman, 2003; SarDesai, 2010).
In the Indonesian archipelago, Srivijaya competed with successive Javanese Kingdoms
for almost five centuries, especially during the periods when the latter developed special
interests in maritime trade (Wolters, 1967, 1970; Lieberman, 2009).
The early phrase of political development was abruptly interrupted by the Mongol
invasion in the 13th century. Within a period of less than four decades, Mongol troops
were dispatched to Dai Viet in 1257, 1285 and 1287, to Champa in 1281, to the
Burmese-Mon Kingdom of Pagan in 1277 and 1287, and to Java in 1293 (Stuart-Fox,
2003: Ch4). These military expeditions ended only in short-term victories. By the end of
the 13th century, Mongol troops were mostly pushed out of Southeast Asia. Nevertheless,the Mongol invasion fatally weakened some powerful early kingdoms, and opened up
crucial space for the rise of new states. Adding to the political changes were the growing
influence of new religions—Theravada Buddhism and Islam, both of which were set to
replace Hinduism in Southeast Asia (Coedes, 1968).

12

Not surprisingly, the second phrase of political history in Southeast Asia began with aperiod of widespread turmoil in the 14th century as newly established states struggled
for survival and domination on the ruins of old kingdoms (Lieberman, 2003: 28). In thecentral mainland, Tai kingdoms of Sukhothai, Lan Na, and Ayutthaya started tochallenge the authority of weakened Khmer Empire. Among them, Ayutthaya quicklyrose to prominence partly because of the steady revenue from trade (Wyatt, 1984). In
the east mainland, Dai Viet and Champa both survived the Mongol invasion, so did theircenturies-old antagonism. The power balance between the two was largely maintained
until the Dai Viet’s campaign in 1471 decisively defeated Champa. In the west mainland,
the newly formed kingdoms of Ava, Pegu, Toungoo, and the Shan states battled against
one another on the ruins of Pagan. It was not until the mid-16th century that Toungoo
finally conquered the rest and unified the country. In maritime Southeast Asia, Majaphit
established a powerful maritime empire. At the peak, it controlled nearly the whole
Indonesian archipelago. As Majaphit went into decline, the Muslin state of Melaka
turned itself into the best Southeast Asian trading port in the 15th century.
Most of the newly established states still followed the Mandala model of concentricauthority and ‘semi-independent tributaries’ (Lieberman, 2003: 35). As powerful statescompeted for domination through their networks of tributary vassals, small countries
strived to survive between powerful neighbors. For instance, the Tai state of Lan Na was
a victim of the rivalry between Toungoo and Ayutthaya. It became a vassal of Toungoo
after a war broke out between the two sides in 1558. Yet, when the Frist Toungoo
dynasty fell apart in 1599 the Toungoo prince who resided in Lan Na was forced to seek
assistance from Ayutthaya. This created a bizarre situation that ‘a Burmese prince rulingin Lan Na under Siam’s suzerainty’, a clear evidence of the anarchic order andintensified power struggles at the time (Wyatt, 1984: 118). By contrast, Melaka wasskillful enough to maneuver between its powerful neighbors. Soon after it wasestablished as a small trading city-state in the early 15th century, Melaka sent tribute to
Ayutthaya and accepted its claim. At the same time, Melaka rulers made considerable
efforts to pursue close tributary relationship with China to counterbalance the influenceof Ayutthaya (SarDesai, 2010: 57). Between 1405 and 1435 the trading state dispatched
20 tributary missions to the Ming court, and its first three rulers all visited China inperson (Wang, 1968b).
As Southeast Asian states continued to consolidate, the Mandala model of political
governance went through some notable changes in the 18th century. By this time13

maritime Southeast Asia had already been under the controls of the Europeans, butmainland Southeast Asia still followed its own political dynamics. In the central
mainland, an Ayutthaya general, Taksin, managed to reclaim the country after adevastating Burmese invasion. He declared himself the king of Siam in 1768. The
successive campaigns of his troop unified Siam and Lan Na, solving a long-term
security problem of the vassal state. In the west mainland, the Toungoo dynasty
collapsed in 1752. Its successor, the Konbaung dynasty, pursued a more rigorous
state-building policy that brought Arakan, Manipur and Assam and the Shan states
under its firm control around the end of 18th and the start of 19th century. In the east
mainland, the remnant of Champa and the Mekong Delta were finally incorporated intosoon-to-be-unified Vietnam in the mid-18th century. Though the traditional Mandalas
still characterized weak Khmer, Malay and Tai states till the 19th century, ‘tighter
tributary controls’ had replaced ‘semi-independent tributaries’ and became the key
feature of consolidated Siam, Burma and Vietnam in mainland Southeast Asia
(Lieberman, 2003: 35). Nonetheless, it is difficult to assess the long-term impacts ofconsolidated states on the sub-regional conflicts in Southeast Asia. Soon these countries
were to face major security challenges from the other side of the Eurasian Continent.
In short, notwithstanding the regional hierarchy formalized by elaborated tributary
rituals and lucrative tributary trade, the relationship between China and its tributarystates allowed ‘considerable informal equality’ (Kang, 2010: 54). Behind the
China-dominated regional hierarchy, one may identify fairly independent dynamics ofinternational relations at the sub-regional level of Southeast Asia. Because of the
distinctive political configuration of the Mandalas, Southeast Asian countries faced
more intensified security threats from their sub-regional neighbors than from China. All
these contributed to the pre-colonial political order in Southeast Asia: formal hierarchy
at the regional level and de facto anarchy at the sub-regional level, the structural
impacts of which are examined in the next section.
Balance of Power under Hierarchy: the China Factor in Pre-Colonial Southeast
Asia
China had always loomed large in the sub-regional affairs of pre-colonial Southeast
Asia because of its prominent status in the regional hierarchy. Nonetheless, the unusual
impacts of China were not derived from the military strength it had. Except for the
military expeditions sent by the Mongols, large-scale operation by China was rarely
seen on the ground of Southeast Asia. Dai Viet was twice invaded by Ming and Qing
14

troops in 1407 and 1788 (Wang, 1998: 316-319; Reid, 1996: 47; Stuart-Fox, 2003: 113);
the Konbaung dynasty of Myanmar was attacked by the Qing in the 1760s (Dai, 2004).
Apart from the Mongol invasions, these were all the major military campaigns that the
China had ever launched against Southeast Asia between the 8th and 19th century.
Notably, none of them ended in the long-term victory of China.
Compared with China’s lack of military ambitions, Southeast Asian countries weremuch eager to be involved in the China-dominated regional hierarchy. Most paid
tributes to China; some rulers even presented the tributes in person. It was not a small
deal if one considers the transportation of pre-modern East Asia. Some indeed died on
their way to China. This was the case when the King of Brunei took his family to pay
homage to the Ming court in 1408 (Reid, 1996: 23-24). 9 Then, what had made China soimportant to Southeast Asia? In general, Southeast Asian countries were keen to seek
the imperial influences of China under three specific conditions. First, when a dynasticchange or royal succession took place, the countries often sought China’s approval of
the new ruler. Second, during the periods when private trade was banned, Southeast
Asian trading states tried to establish close tributary trade relations with China. Third,
when the countries were in conflict with neighboring states, they were inclined to invite
China to arbitrate, and sometimes intervene, in their conflicts.
As it is discussed in the last section, Southeast Asian countries faced the harsh reality of
sub-regional anarchy in the pre-colonial era. Individual states constantly struggled forsurvival and domination. Royal succession, trade competition and inter-state conflicts
were usually the crucial circumstances under which the fate of a country could be
fundamentally redefined. Turning to a powerful ‘outsider’ for assistance and assurance
was not inconceivable even if it required ceremonial subordination to the imperial court.
As Reid (2003: 234) points out, ‘all Southeast Asian states recognized that China waslarger and stronger than themselves, and…all were content to have letters of homage
written in Chinese in their name.’ The political influences that China had on Southeast
Asia were very likely an outcome of the balancing strategies that Southeast Asian
countries adopted in response to the complex structure of sub-regional anarchy andregional hierarchy.

9

China has stipulated detailed rules on how to bury and honor a foreign envoy died on the tributary
mission (Fairbank, 1942: 133-134). The Bruneian King was eventually buried in China. His lavish
tomb is still located in Nanjing today.
15

Balancing Strategy I: Seeking Imperial Recognition
Royal succession and dynastic change were probably the most sensitive political issue
in pre-colonial East Asia. Legitimate succession enhanced the authority of the newly
installed ruler vis-à-vis his/her subjects. It also allowed the ruler to resume theresponsibilities and privileges of his/her predecessor. By contrast, illegitimate
succession weakened the new ruler’s authority. If the self-claimed succession turned out
to be a disguise of usurpation or even dynastic change, not only were the country’s
foreign relations subject to re-definition, but the norm of legitimate succession was left
in limbo. Hence, both the new ruler and the neighboring countries had strong interests
in legitimizing the succession process.
In pre-colonial Southeast Asia, succession issues were complicated by the
anarchy-within-hierarchy structure of international relations. At the sub-regional level,
the Mandala-style polities were prone to the problem of illegitimate succession. The
concentric circle of power structure often created the situation that several royalmembers or local rulers simultaneously claimed to the throne (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 28).
The existence of antagonist neighboring states further exacerbated the problem.
Meanwhile, China had adopted a set of very strict rules of legitimate succession,reflecting deep influences of the Confucian tradition. Legitimate succession was soimportant to China that it was willing to use force to punish the usurpers (see Shu, 2011).
Because of this, China’s recognition of the new regime often brought substantial
legitimacy to the rulers in Southeast Asia.
When Taksin, a provincial governor of Ayutthaya, reclaimed his country from thedevastating invasion of Burma, he declared himself the King of Siam in 1768.
Immediately he sent his envoys to China for recognition. The Qing court replied that the
new ruler should first try to find and install the descendants of the older ruling house.
Indeed, there was evidence that two Ayutthaya princes had fled the Burmese invasion
and stayed in a settlement of Chinese emigrants on the western edge of the Mekong
Delta. The settlement was stormed and conquered by Taksin forces in 1771. During theprocess, the Qing authorities had sent at least three missions to investigate the matter.
When it was concluded that no Ayutthaya descendant could be found, China recognized
Taksin as ‘lord of the country’ (Wills, 2001). Only after he decisively defeated theBurmese and built an even stronger country than Ayutthaya, was Taskin eventually
recognized by the Qing court as ‘King of Siam’ in 1781 (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 114).

16

Another complication occurred one year later when Taksin was disposed andimprisoned by his own general for alleged mental problems. The general, once anadopted son of Taksin’s family, claimed himself the legitimate successor to the throne.
In his letter to the Qing court, he used the same Chinese surname as Taksin’s to reportthe ‘death’ of his father. The letter stated, Taksin on his deathbed ‘exhorted me to rulewith care, not to change the old order, to have care for our own sovereign land and tohonor the Heavenly Dynasty’ (cf. Wills, 2001). The new King called himself Rama I,
and started the Chakkri dynasty which remains the ruling royal family of Thailand today.
The dynasty continued to use Taksin’s surname in its correspondence with China until
the tribute system came to an end in the mid-19th century.
The recognition by China was of particular importance to small Southeast Asian states.
An illegitimate small country was vulnerable to the intervention of neighboring powers.
It might even be used as an excuse for the country’s inclusion in an expanding Mandala.
Due to such risks, China’s recognition was regarded as a vital counterbalance toaggressive neighbors. The grand expeditions of Zheng He between 1405 and 1431
strengthened such a view (Wang, 1998: 320). On his fourth voyage, Zheng He sent hisforces to restore a rightful ruler of Samudra, a small state on the northeast coast of
Sumatra. The usurper was defeated and humiliated. He was then taken as a prisoner toChina, together with his wife and child (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 88). On some other occasions,the submission of small Southeast Asian countries to China provoked their powerfulneighbors. In 1377 the son of a recently died ruler of Jambi, then a vassal of theMajapahit Empire in central Sumatra, sought China’s recognition because he ‘had not
dared to succeed his father without imperial permission’ (Wolters, 1970: 62). The
powerful Javanese empire was so angry with the contact, that they diverted the Chinese
envoys, who were due to grant Jambi investiture, to Java and killed them there in 1378
(Wolters, 1999: 132).
Balancing Strategy II: Securing Tributary Trade
To benefit from the highly profitable tributary trade was another major reason why
many Southeast Asian countries paid tributes to China. Particularly during the periods
when private trade was banned, the only way to get access to the products and themarket of China was tributary trade. As Reid (1993: 235) notes, ‘[i]f Chinese emperors
tolerated international trade only as an aspect of diplomacy, with Southeast Asian rulers
it was inclined to be the other way around.’ However, trade diplomacy was only half ofthe story. In pre-colonial Southeast Asia, the steady inflow of trade revenues not just17brought the tributary states wealth but provided them with the crucial means to compete
in an anarchic world.
Along the pre-colonial Southeast Asian trade routes, three areas had been able to thrive
repeatedly on their trade with China. One of these was located in southern Vietnam.
Until it was integrated into unified Vietnam in the early 19th century, the area witnessed
the rise and fall of Champa as well as the southern Vietnamese regimes known as
Cochin-China. To the north, Champa was locked in the power struggle with Dai Viet fornearly five centuries. To the west, the country faced threat from the Khmer empire.
Throughout its history, Champa had kept close tributary relations with China. Trade wasundoubtedly an important factor behind this relationship. For example, between 960 and
1087 Champa sent 44 official trade missions to the Song court whereas Dai Viet only
dispatched four such missions in the same period (Wade, 2009: 227). Trade with China
was so extensive that Song cashes became an integral part of Cham economy around the11th and 12th century. In the end, however, trade was not enough to help the country
survive the attacks of Dai Viet in the 15th century. Yet, the significance of trade further
grew in the next one hundred years. Cochin-China became the base of southern
Vietnamese regimes around the second half of the 16th century. The continued
importance of traditional trade routes allowed these regimes to collect a substantial
amount of taxes from the shipping trade (Reid, 1993: 211). Between 1627 and 1672
seven wars were fought between the north and the south. All ended with Cochin-China’s
victory over the numerically much larger armies of the north. In the 18th century traderevenues reached about one-third of the royal income (Li, 1998). The inflow of traderevenues aided the Nguyen regime’s military campaigns against the north in the 1780s
and 1790s, and probably contributed to the final unification of Vietnam in 1802
(Lieberman, 2003: 48).
The southern coast of Thailand was another place that had traditionally benefited fromtrade with China. In the aftermath of destructive Mongol invasions, three Tai
kingdoms—Ayutthaya, Sukhothai and Lan Na—established themselves on the westedge of the weakened Khmer Empire. When it was founded in 1350, Ayutthaya was
only a small kingdom along the southern coast. The country was recognized as a tradingstate by China in 1370. In response, Ayutthaya dispatched 61 missions to the Ming courtin the following six decades, more frequently than any other country in Southeast Asia
(Reid, 1996: 22-23). During this period private trade was banned in China. The close
tributary relations made Ayutthaya and its port an integral part of the Southeast Asian18

trade routes. Trade revenues quickly became a major source of loyal income (Stuart-Fox,
2003: 93). The country soon expanded to the Malay Peninsula in the south and madeSukhothai its vassal in the north by 1412. Even after Ayutthaya was destroyed by theinvasion of Konbaung Burma in 1767, the new Kingdom of Siam continued to rely on
the China connection to prosper (Lieberman, 2003: 48). Regular tributes were sent toBeijing till the mid-19th century. With the help of substantial trade revenues, Siam soon
recovered from the war, unified the kingdom of Lan Na into its own territory, andeventually became the most powerful Tai Kingdom in history. Economically, Bangkok
probably replaced the Dutch base of Batavia to be the leading port of Southeast Asia at
the end of 18th century; politically, Siam managed to extend its authority to the Laos tothe north and to Kedah and Terengganu to the south in the same period (Reid, 1996: 47).
The third such area, the Malacca Strait, had long been the center of Southeast Asian
trade routes. The rise of Srivijaya in the 7th century coincided with the growing
importance of maritime Silk Road. Located on the northern coast of Sumatra, Srivijaya
was a powerful trading state able to attract a large number of ships to its ports. The
country’s influence did not rely on territorial occupation, but on its control overstrategic ports on the main trade routes. In order to secure the lucrative trade with China,
Srivijaya started to send tributary missions to China as early as in the late 7th century.
With the exception of the 9th century, tributary missions continued into the 13th century(Lieberman, 2009: 778; Wolters, 1967, 1970). The close relations with China
considerably strengthened Srivijaya’s position among its peers. Especially when private
trade was banned prior to the Song dynasty, its ports offered the only way to trade with
China. When Srivijaya lost its prominence around the end of the 13th century, Melakarose quickly on the southern coast of Malay Peninsula. Initially a small port city,
Melaka adopted a very similar strategy to seek close tributary relations with China. Not
only were regular tributes submitted, the rulers of Melaka five times went to China to
pay their homage (Wang, 1968b, Reid, 1993: 206). In 1405 the country received the first
inscription that the Ming Yong-le emperor ever addressed to foreign rulers, an
extraordinary honor in the eyes of neighboring states (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 91). When
Zheng He’s grand fleets sailed across Southeast Asia in the early 15th century, they
visited Melaka no less than ten times (Lieberman, 2009: 804). These exchanges
significantly enhanced the reputation of Melaka as a China-favored trading port. It did
not take long for Melaka to become the major trading center, where Southeast Asian
goods gathered for sell in China and Chinese goods gathered for sell in Southeast Asiaand beyond.
19Balancing Strategy III: Inviting External Arbitration and Protection
Amid sub-regional anarchy, the China factor was carefully reckoned with by Southeast
Asian countries. When it became necessary or even urgent, some were willing to invite
China to arbitrate in their disagreement with other countries, and to protect themselvesfrom the aggression of powerful neighbors (Wolters, 2008: 69; Stuart-Fox, 2003). On
some occasions China’s mighty presence in the regional hierarchy itself was enough to
restore the sub-regional balance; on other occasions China had to make explicit
warnings to make other countries comply with its opinions; on still other occasions therequest for assistance was carefully turned downed or quietly ignored. Though notalways effective, China had played a non-negligible part in the sub-regional order ofSoutheast Asia.
Mentioned earlier, the powerful trading state of Srivijaya had long benefited from its
monopoly over trade with China that it secured from close tributary relations. This
monopoly, however, came to a gradual decline from the 10th century because the Song
Dynasty (960-1279) abolished the official ban on private trade (see Yoshinobu, 1984).
Contrary to the expectation that Srivijaya would reduce its tributary missions to China,
it actually sent more. The reason, as Wolters (2008: 68-69) argues, lied in the
non-commercial interests of these missions. Srivijaya was under heavy attacks by theJavanese and Tamil armies between 992 and 1025. The support from China wasparticularly important during this period. Indeed, Sirvijiyan missions to the Song court‘were never so numerous as during and after this troubled period’ (68). Although thelack of historical records made it difficult to ascertain the actual exchanges between thetwo countries during these tributary missions, the maritime order in Southeast Asia wasduly restored. Srivijaya not only survived the attacks but prospered well into the 13th
century.
The China factor was also important for another maritime trading state: Melaka. In its
rise to prominence in the first half of the 15th century, Melaka had to deal with therapidly growing influence of Ayutthaya to the north and the declining but still powerful
Javanese Empire of Majaphit to the south. Soon after its establishment, the city-state
paid homage to both Ayutthaya and Majaphit in an attempt to win their support(Lieberman, 2009: 804). Nevertheless, it was not the final solution for the Melakan ruler.
When the Ming envoy visited the country in 1403, Melaka asked for full protection
from China. In response, the Ming emperor Yong-le ordered the enfeoffment of its
20

western hill and personally wrote an inscription for the occasion. The intention was toensure Melaka that full protection would be provided as if the country were ‘atribute-paying province of China’ (Wang, 1968: 56). Ayutthaya, itself a loyal tributary of
China, was not happy. It even tried to confiscate the imperial seal that the Ming court
had granted to Melaka. When Zheng He’s voyages visited Ayutthaya in 1407 and 1419,
stark warnings were delivered—demanding Ayutthaya not to infringe the rights ofMelaka (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 91-92).
In mainland Southeast Asia, countries like Champa, Lan Xang, and Lan Na had allreferred to China for assistance. In particular, Champa was keen to have China
arbitrating in its conflict with Dai Viet. Dai Viet won independence from China in the10th century (Taylor, 1983). Soon after, the Song court was requested by Champa toprovide arbitration in its conflict with Dai Viet (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 50). Instead offavoring one side over the other, China had been careful not to disturb the balance ofpower between the two countries. When the conflict broke out again in the 1370s, theMing court five times appealed to the two sides to stop fighting (Wang, 1998; 309).
Nevertheless, such appeals did not stop Champa from being fatally defeated by Dai Vietin 1471. 10
In 1479 Dai Viet launched an attack against another neighboring country—the Laotian
Kingdom of Lan Xang, capturing its capital and killing its ruler. The Laotian envoys
applied to China for assistance (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 92). China responded with a strong
worded warning against Dai Viet, demanding its withdrawal from Lan Xang. Similar
warning was also sent to nearby tributary vassals against any assistance to Dai Viet.
However, the Laotian request for Chinese forces was turned down. It was the Tai
Kingdom of Lan Na that eventually offered military support to Lan Xang. Together,
they drove Dai Viet out of the country. The Ming court promptly rewarded Lan Na for
its action (Wang, 1998: 329). The sub-regional order was restored without the directintervention of China. Indeed, sometimes China was unable to offer meaningful
assistance and some request for protection was quietly ignored. This was the case when
Melaka requested imperial protection against the Portuguese in 1511, and again whenthe Burmese asked for assistance to save their Toungoo dynasty in 1750 (Stuart-Fox,
2003: 101, 107). Still, these unanswered requests show that amid intensified security
10

China did not intervene in the conflict between Dai Viet and Champa in 1471. The reason
probable lies in the fact that China’s occupation of Dai Viet between 1407 and 1427 ended in ahumiliating withdrawal. Dai Viet seemed to believe that the Ming court would not attempt anotherinvasion to punish its campaign against Champa (Wang, 1998: 327).
21

threats from both within and without, there was ‘a tendency among Southeast Asianrulers to appeal to China for help against enemies’ (Wolter, 2008: 69).
Conclusion
This article has examined the structural characteristics of international relations in
pre-colonial Southeast Asia and the special roles that China had played at the
sub-regional level. In pre-colonial Southeast Asia, most countries were willing to submit
to the hierarchical order in East Asia by taking part in the China-centered tribute system.
At the same time, these countries were involved in the fierce competition for survival
and domination at the sub-regional level. Taken together, international relations in
pre-colonial Southeast Asia featured a complex political structure: regional hierarchy
coexisting with sub-regional anarchy.
The anarchy-within-hierarchy structure, the article argues, had generated considerable
impacts on the inter-state relations of Southeast Asia. While there was no clear sign ofsystemic balancing against China at the regional level, Southeast Asian countries
carefully checked and maintained their power balance at the sub-regional level. In sucha structural context, the supremacy of China allowed it to play a crucial part in the
sub-regional power balance. More specifically, there were three essential mechanisms
through which the China factor became important in the international relations ofSoutheast Asia. First, the imperial recognition by China enhanced the legitimacy of
individual Southeast Asian countries in a hierarchical regional order. Second, thetributary trade with China met the commercial interests of Southeast Asian tradingstates, and allowed these countries to consolidate their power amid the sub-regional
competition. Third, China’s arbitration and protection were sought by some Southeast
Asian states to defend themselves against the threat of neighboring powers. Notably, allthese took place even during the periods when China was not actively playing adominant role in Southeast Asia.
Theoretically, the article has challenged the widely held view that international relations
are either characterized by the balance of power in an anarchic system or dominated bya single superpower in a hierarchical system (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987; Clark, 1989;
Lake, 2009). It shows that a complex political structure of hierarchy-anarchy
coexistence is both theoretically viable and empirically possible. If the Cold War order
resembled a ‘hierarchy under anarchy’ (Wendt and Friedheim, 1995), the article has
demonstrated that pre-colonial Southeast Asia under the tribute system was obviously22an anarchy-within-hierarchy system. It should be noted that allowing a complex patternof political structure in theoretical modeling has not weakened the structuralist
explanations of balance-of-power and bandwagoning. On the contrary, it offers a fertile
theoretical ground based on which a variety of state behavior such as hedging,
containment and neutrality can be accounted for by a structuralist framework. In
pre-colonial Southeast Asia, China had long been a ‘detached’ superpower, but its
impact on the sub-regional power balance was substantial and profound. A structuralist
model of anarchy-with-hierarchy, the article shows, makes it possible to trace thespecial roles that China had played at the sub-regional level.
A better understanding of China’s roles in pre-colonial Southeast Asia also sheds lighton the current debate about the future of East Asia. As China rose quickly in economic
and political terms during the past three decades, the future of East Asia has been
increasingly considered as a choice between balancing against the growing Chinese
influences and bandwagoning with the rise of China (Friedberg, 1993; Kang, 2003,
Acharya, 2004). The historical records of Southeast Asia’s engagement with China
show that neither of them is sufficient to guide the future of East Asia. Contrary toKang’s (2003a, 2010) account of the Confucian world in historical East Asia, a
China-dominated hierarchical order was neither willing nor able to maintain peace andstability in pre-colonial Southeast Asia (Shu, 2011). The China-centered tribute system
had in many ways facilitated the balance of power among Southeast Asian countries. If
history is of any guide to the future, it perhaps points to the structural impacts of the
intricate link between the current US unipolarity and the complex balancing dynamics
in East Asia.

23

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GIARI Working Paper Vol. 2011-E-4,
December 2011
Published by Waseda University Global COE Program
Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI),
Waseda University, Nishiwaseda Bldg. 5F#507 1-21-1
Nishi-waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-0051 Japan
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