Crisis Management at Sea
Urgent Proposals from the Field
by

IIPS Study Group on Maritime Security in East Asia

Crisis Management at Sea
Urgent Proposals from the Field by IIPS Study Group
Table of Contents
1. Follow-up to the Yasuhiro Nakasone Proposal(1) Uninhibited access to the seas(2) Maintenance of maritime order(3) The Nakasone Proposal and its translation into action

1

2. Pressing issues regarding maritime security(1) Ensuring legitimate maritime law enforcement
and building a crisis management framework(2) Framework to avoid incidents in airspace(3) MLEA capacity-building(4) Maritime situational awareness andenhanced international collaboration(5) The relationship between MLEAs and navies

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3. Crisis Management for Maritime Security

1
2
3

5
5
6
6
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(First Recommendation)(1) Principles governing law enforcement by
MLEA vessels (vis-à-vis private vessels)(2) Securing a system of communication among MLEAs(3) Agreements for the prevention of incidents
among military vessels and aircraft(4) The issue of fishing vessels operated
by such elements as “maritime militia”

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4. Capacity-Building in the Field of Maritime Security

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7
8
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(Second Recommendation)(1) MLEA capacity-building(2) Promoting a common understanding of International Law(3) Enhancing MSA

10
11
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5. Efforts on the part of Japan(1) The Japanese government as a cohesive partner(2) Easing restrictions on capacity-building assistance(3) Cooperation through JCG(4) Assistance through MOD and JSDF
(5) Effective use of human resources

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12
12
13
13
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6. The case for OMSEA: streamlining pluralistic

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efforts and promotion of regional integration
IIPS Study Group on Maritime Security in East Asia
Notes
Annex 1 Yasuhiro Nakasone Proposal on Maritime Security in East Asia
Annex 2 Reference
Attachment Table of cases of maritime law enforcement
operations and of conduct at sea by “maritime militia” etc

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17
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Crisis Management at Sea
Urgent Proposals from the Field by IIPS Study Groupto follow up on

The Yasuhiro Nakasone Proposal on Maritime Security in East Asia
East Asia1 is the world’s most rapidly growing region. In order to uphold peace andprosperity, it is indispensable to secure uninhibited access to the seas and a stable
maritime order through the efforts of each country and international cooperation. The“Yasuhiro Nakasone Proposal on Maritime Security in East Asia”2 of December 2015
presented a comprehensive proposal for ensuring the rule of law and enhancing
practical (functional) cooperation.
In order to translate the Proposal steadily into action, and taking a mid- tolong-term perspective, this Study Group 3 delved into issues that underlie pressing
maritime security challenges. As a result, this year (in 2016) we decided to present thefollowing recommendations:
One: Crisis Management for Maritime Security
Two: Capacity-building in the field of Maritime Security

1. Follow-up to the Yasuhiro Nakasone Proposal(1) Uninhibited access to the seas
Maritime transport is a major pillar supporting the prosperity of East Asia, the growthcenter of the world today. The seas of East Asia are some of the main arteries of theworld economy. Only by ensuring safety and security in these waters and guaranteeing
free passage through them shall the world economy become more robust and shall theinternational community prosper as a whole.
The seas, just as outerspace and cyberspace,composetheglobalcommons. Uninhibited useof the seas and passage
through them must be
equally open to all. A global
and liberal maritime orderserves universal interests.
Travel at sea only requires aboat or ship. Cables along
the seabed allow us toconnect all over the world.
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Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

The seas are a vitally important space for humanity, not only as a route for transportand communications but also for the exploitation of aquatic and other resources.
Preserving the marine environment is a pressing requirement for preserving fishing
resources, countering climate change, and other goals.
Amidst present-day globalization, the waters of East Asia have become an evermore central part of the world. Peace and prosperity in the region’s seas now have amajor bearing on the entire world.
(2) Maintenance of maritime order
Since the end of the Vietnam War, East Asia has enjoyed relative stability without
large-scale conflicts. Yet since the turn of the century we have seen situations thatsignificantly threaten the freedom and safety of the seas.

Proceedings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Peace Palace, The Hague,
the Netherlands. (UN Photo/CIJ-ICJ/Frank van Beek)

Changes in the regional power balance are the likely cause. Two things are requiredin order to achieve a stable international order and make the twenty-first century “EastAsia’s century”. First, the regional power balance needs to be maintained. Second, weneed to reinforce the sense of obligation among states to uphold common norms such as
International Law. The norms that form the bedrock of the global maritime order are
manifest in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The
principles of the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the high seas areunequivocally clear in this treaty.
However, in the South China Sea and East China Sea we have recently witnessed
numerous unilateral claims and actions that are inconsistent with the establishedinternational legal order. The situation may well deteriorate. Along with preventing2

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Fieldinternational conflicts by upholding law and order, there is a pressing need to ensurethat disputes are peacefully resolved, based on UNCLOS and other instruments.
Since the past summer enthusiasm appears to be growing among China and
ASEAN states on an early conclusion of a legally-binding Code of Conduct in the South
China Sea (COC). A COC would not substitute for existing International Law or disputesettlement procedures, but it would help to prevent disputes from arising. It is thus
hoped that this enthusiasm would lead to an early conclusion of an effective COC.
(3) The Nakasone Proposal and its translation into action
The wisdom of many countries and peoples needs to be brought together to swiftly
ameliorate this situation and to make the waters of East Asia veritable “seas of peace,cooperation and prosperity”. It was from this standpoint that the “Yasuhiro Nakasone
Proposal on Maritime Security in East Asia” presented a comprehensive set of ideas toensure the rule of law and enhance practical (functional) cooperation.
Southeast Asia and northeast Asia, along with the South China Sea and East China
Sea, are all inextricably linked within the broader expanse that is the Asia-Pacific region.
This is indeed the case in many respects such as politics, economics, culture, history andsecurity. It is incumbent upon all states of the Asia-Pacific region without exception tocooperate for the peace and prosperity of the region.
Challenges in maritime
security transcend national
borders and profoundly
affect the existence andwelfare of people within
the region. Hence theimportance of not onlyinternational cooperation(i.e. cooperation amongstates) but also of a more

Devastation after 2004
Indian Ocean earthquake & tsunami andJapanese emergency medical assistance(Photos courtesy of JICA)

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Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

comprehensive endeavour—one in which the state and various non-state actors join
forces to secure the survival, dignity and livelihood of each individual. Meeting suchchallenges as large-scale natural disasters, environmental destruction, and safe andsustainable fishery are of particular importance from this human security viewpoint.
Partnership among national governments, regional (i.e. intergovernmental)
organizations, civil society and others are essential for this purpose. This Study Group
anticipates that the Organization for Maritime Security in East Asia (OMSEA),
advocated in the Nakasone Proposal, shall serve as a focal point where such pluralistic
efforts converge.
The establishment of a permanent international body for the maritime security of
East Asia will also have a major bearing on regional integration in East Asia, which
remains gradual. A permanent body will provide the essential infrastructure that would
enable the pursuit of maritime security on a multilateral basis in a more sustained andsystematic manner—a vital endeavour in a region where the sea represents a precious
common asset.

2. Pressing issues regarding maritime security
Heightened tensions between states over territorial and/or jurisdictional claims now
pose a serious challenge in the seas of East Asia. While evidently military force remains
essential as the last resort in defending territory, states need to use other means tomanage crises so that conflicts and tensions will be restricted to the lowest levelpossible, thus preventing them from escalating into military situations.
Maritime law enforcement agencies (MLEAs) play a highly important role in thisregard. MLEAs were created in many countries in East Asia and elsewhere after theSecond World War. In most cases MLEAs are police agencies whose main duties
consist of law enforcement and life-saving (in the event of distress at sea).
MLEAs differ from country to country in their origins, organizational scale, asset
levels and operational capacity, as well as in their (domestic) legal systems andoperating procedures. Despite such differences, they are required, in conformity with
International Law and the basic principles applicable to MLEAs, to enforce the law in alegitimate manner. And in waters where national claims conflict, MLEAs are expected
to perform a subsidiary function as “buffers” between states, which prevents suchcontention from escalating into military confrontations. Establishing a crisis
management framework is a matter of urgency in order to enable MLEAs to performtheir “buffer” functions adequately, as is the capacity-building of these agencies.
The following five measures are required:(1) Ensuring legitimate maritime law enforcement and building a crisis
management framework
An overview of maritime law enforcement activity by various states shows that there
have recently been, in the South China Sea in particular, cases where MLEA vessels 44Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

have been excessively violent in the course of their operations vis-à-vis private vessels.
Underlying causes include differences in interpretation of International Law as well as
insufficient communication among MLEAs. Such factors could result inmisunderstanding/misinterpretation among MLEA vessels, both in the course of regularlaw enforcement activities (vis-à-vis private vessels) and in situations where MLEAs
serve as “buffers” between states as described above. In the latter case, the causes above
could even trigger escalation into a contingency. In order to prevent such outcomes, amore reliable crisis management framework urgently needs to be put in place throughsuch means as: (a) ensuring that law enforcement is conducted in a legitimate manner,for example by promoting a common understanding of International Law and its basic
principles; (b) securing a functioning system of communication among the vessels andheadquarters of MLEAs; and (c) other confidence-building measures.
(2) Framework to avoid incidents in airspace
In airspace it is military aircraft that enforce the law, for example in the case of aviolation of territorial airspace. Unlike on the sea’s surface, there is no separation
between the military and law enforcement agency. Given the higher risk of escalation in
the process of law enforcement, creating a framework to avoid incidents in airspace isthus an urgent priority.

Two JASDF F-15Js taking off(3) MLEA capacity-building
MLEAs in East Asia face various educational needs in terms of assimilating the basic
norms and principles that are the foundations of legitimate law enforcement activity,
such as International Law and the principle of proportionality. Also a matter of urgency
is to ensure that a common means of contact is in place so that a reliable system ofcommunication functions among MLEAs.
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Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

Furthermore, the operational capacities (in both qualitative and quantitative terms)of MLEAs need to be enhanced so as to enable them to perform their “buffer” function
adequately. Their capacity-building in both “hard” and “soft” areas remains an outstanding
challenge before a crisis management mechanism can be put in place.
(4) Maritime situational awareness and enhanced international collaboration
Promoting a common maritime situational awareness (MSA) picture is important inparallel with MLEA capacity-building. States need to know the situation in the waters
around them and the skies above those waters, and to share their awareness with otherstates concerned.
MSA is necessary not only to ensure a stable security environment (in the
traditional sense) and crisis management. It also enables information-sharing andcollaboration to meet various challenges in the realm of non-traditional (human)security. These include the prevention of and response to large-scale disasters,
environmental issues and ensuring safe and sustainable fishery.
(5) The relationship between MLEAs and navies
The domestic relationship between MLEAs and the navy is determined by theorganizational background of those institutions, which in turn reflects the history of thecountry in question. It is therefore difficult to define this relationship in a single manner,
regardless of existing differences from country to country. Meanwhile, it should be
noted that the navy conducts maritime law enforcement in some countries. From thestandpoint of limiting confrontations and tensions between states and of crisis
management, there is a future need to clarify the domestic relationship between MLEAs
and the navy, with due regard to their respective duties and characteristics, so that theformer can adequately fulfil their “buffer” function.

3. Crisis Management for Maritime Security (First Recommendation)
The Study Group began its consideration5 of the means to enhance crisis management
arrangements in the field of maritime security with the idea to extend the Code for
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES)6 to non-naval vessels. CUES was agreed at theWestern Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and is applied to naval vessels and naval
aircraft.
The conclusion reached was that “non-naval vessels” need to be considered on acategory-by-category basis and that CUES cannot be applied to all types of vessels inblanket fashion. A broad-ranging set of directions is therefore proposed for crisis
management according to category, including military vessels/aircraft, MLEA vessels,
and private vessels.

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Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field(1) Principles governing law enforcement by MLEA vessels (vis-à-vis private
vessels)
Generally speaking, an MLEA is a police agency that itself adheres to the laws andregulations of its own country and ensures that those same laws are observed by third
parties. In the event an MLEA has more than a single means of achieving a law enforcement
objective at its disposal, it may exercise its authority only through such means that arewithin the limits of proportionality to the level of difficulty in attaining that objective(principle of proportionality).7 It follows that fundamentally an MLEA must restrict theuse of force to a minimum and exercise restraint in the execution of its duties.
In East Asian waters, the South China Sea in particular, there are many areas where
territorial and/or jurisdictional claims overlap in complicated fashion and boundaries
have yet to be delimited. In such zones, countries must strictly refrain from taking
unilateral law enforcement action vis-à-vis private vessels engaged in fishery, researchon resources under the seabed, or other activities. In reality, however, not only havethere been cases of unilateral law enforcement but also instances of excessive use offorce that caused extensive damage to, and in extreme cases the sinking of, the ship(s)subject to the law enforcement operation, as well as injury to those on board.8
Leaving aside the question which state should rightfully be entitled to exercise
jurisdiction over a particular area of the sea whose borders have yet to be delimited,
MLEAs are required to do the following when indeed they conduct law enforcement
operations at all: (a) communicate as appropriate with the counterpart agencies of otherstates; and (b) observe sufficiently the principle of proportionality, which is a basic
requirement for law enforcement agencies. Discussions are taking place among a
number of littoral states of the South China Sea with a view to agreeing on a certain setof principles on the conduct of law enforcement operations as well as to exchange
information to create guidelines based on best practice.9 Such discussions should by allmeans be further promoted.
(2) Securing a system of communication among MLEAs
The duties of most if not all MLEAs include life-saving (in the event of distress at sea)10
as well as law enforcement. As a matter of basic principle, MLEAs are inherently
required to restrict the use of force to a minimum when enforcing the law (as well as
during life-saving operations) and to exercise restraint. This is why MLEAs are also
expected to perform the function of “buffers”, as referred to above, so that escalation is
avoided beyond certain levels in situations where they compete with their foreigncounterparts (over the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction). This “buffer” function isfundamentally unfamiliar to naval vessels.
CUES was adopted as an arrangement for naval vessels and naval aircraft to avoid
incidents (including any physical contact) in the event of unexpected encounters. It istherefore inappropriate to extend the scope of CUES, in its existing form, to cover
MLEAs. Nor is it suitable to apply a separate arrangement, whose content is similar to
CUES, to MLEAs.
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Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

Meanwhile, in East Asia, the South China Sea in particular, we have actuallywitnessed cases where for example an MLEA of a particular state took law enforcement
action against fishing vessels of another state operating in contested waters, and in
response the MLEA of the flag state of those fishing vessels attempted to impede law
enforcement by the other (non-flag) state. Some of these situations developed into astand-off between MLEAs, at times going as far as intimidation using large-calibre
weapons and the forceful retrieval of fishing vessels. Among the underlying causes wasinsufficient communication among MLEA vessels, which in turn resulted fromdifferences in the interpretation of International Law or from language issues, eventhough communication was itself in function.11
So far as the failure of certain MLEAs to operate in a legitimate manner isconcerned such as in the cases above, steps need to be taken to establish a functioning
system of communications among MLEAs, including a common method of contact
among MLEA vessels on-site, in order to avoid misunderstanding/misinterpretation.
In so doing, the duties and characteristics of MLEAs should be duly taken into account.
Enhancing mutual confidence in other respects is also required.
(3) Agreements for the prevention of incidents among military vessels and aircraft
Implementation of the aforementioned CUES has so far been satisfactory. The
declaration issued at the China-ASEAN summit in September 2016, which reaffirmed
the application of CUES in the South China Sea, is also a positive development.
Yet CUES applies only to naval vessels and naval aircraft. It does not apply to airforce aircraft which patrol airspace, for which there is no distinct law enforcement
agency. Furthermore, CUES’s actual efficacy in preventing incidents is limited as it is
not a binding international agreement.
INCSEAs (Agreement(s) on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the HighSeas), first signed between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972,12 are a
successful example of international agreements to avoid incidents at sea. The US-Soviet
agreement became a model for subsequent INCSEAs signed between the former Soviet
Union/Russia and over ten Western countries including Japan. In addition, INCSEAs
whose parties do not include the Soviet Union/Russia were signed between such states
as Germany and Poland, and Israel and the United Arab Republic. The supplementarysignals provided for in the original INCSEA are appended to the International Code of
Signals (INTERCO), and they are in practice used widely by non-INCSEA signatories
as well. Furthermore, INCSEAs apply to all aircraft, not just naval aircraft.
Japan and/or the United States should emulate the successes of existing INCSEAs
in East Asia. They should first take the initiative on bilateral INCSEAs with China so as
to set a precedent for agreements in the region to prevent incidents among military
vessels and aircraft. Such agreements would serve as a lead towards a normative,
multilateral agreement for the prevention of incidents in this region.

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Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

The understanding reached between the leaders of Japan and China at their meetingin September 2016 to accelerate discussions on promptly starting the operation of amaritime-air communications mechanism between their defence authorities can be
regarded as a positive measure that precedes the above initiative. It should be followed
through without delay.
(4) The issue of fishing vessels operated by such elements as “maritime militia”13
Attention has been cast by academics and the media on the existence in East Asia offishing vessels that receive instructions and compensation from the state, and operate as
quasi-military or quasi-MLEA vessels. Yet their details remain unclear. Examples thatrecently received broad media coverage include the vessels that harassed thesurveillance ship USNS Impeccable in March 2009, and those that obstructed the USS
Lassen as it conducted a Freedom of Navigation operation in October 2015.
Such vessels fall into a number of categories. (i) There are some that are clearly
operated by official “maritime militia” organizations whose members on board are inuniform. (ii) There are others that are operated by ordinary private citizens who do notappear to be typical “militia” members, but could be regarded as “part-time militia”
members who cooperate with the authorities on an ad hoc basis. (iii) Yet some otherships are believed to belong to independent groups that act of their own accord toprotect their maritime interests.
Exploiting their appearance as regular fishing vessels, these vessels appear to be
operating with the following intentions: (a) to observe the reaction of other states to a
preconceived exercise of law enforcement or military activity; and/or (b) to provoke law
enforcement action and/or the use of force by other states against these vessels. The

USNS Impeccable being harassed by apparent fishing vessels, March 20099

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

manipulation of fishing vessels as above not only presents a conundrum for MLEA andnaval vessels of other states; it also represents a major maritime security concern, since
it may well trigger unexpected consequences.1415
Furthermore, the involvement of persons in military conflict under the guise ofcivilian seamen, without identifying their military status, represents a material breach ofa fundamental principle of international humanitarian law and cannot be tolerated. Thisis the principle of distinction and discrimination, whose purpose is to ensure theprotection of civilians in times of armed conflict through a clear separation between
military personnel and civilians.
States that employ groups such as “maritime militia” should disclose the facts
concerning their activities. Other states should also exchange information andcollaborate in order to shed light on the question of the vessels above.

4. Capacity-Building in the Field of Maritime Security (Second
Recommendation)
A wide range of measures is required in order to ensure safety and security in the South
China Sea, one of the largest “seas” in the world. These include maritime surveillance,
patrolling of territorial waters, ensuring the safety of navigation and overflight, searchand rescue operations, response to natural disasters, fishing regulation, combatting
piracy, prevention of marine pollution and preservation of resources. Littoral states inparticular bear a collective responsibility towards the international community ineffectively meeting these multiple challenges. Thus they should steadily enhance therequired capabilities.
There are, however, challenges that East Asian states cannot fully meet on theirown when dealing with these broad and sophisticated needs. Hence a substantial amountof external cooperation continues to be required. Developed nations of the Asia-Pacificregion such as Japan and the United States, along with other interested countries outside
the region, need urgently to collaborate and work out an effective division of labour so
as to make the best use of their respective strengths and enable other regional states toenhance their maritime security capabilities.
(1) MLEA capacity-building
For the sake of minimizing tension levels at sea, the capacity-building of MLEAs is atask of greater urgency than even that of the military (defence forces). In addition to theupgrade of hardware assets and their maintenance, (a) securing a system ofcommunication among MLEAs as given under the First Recommendation, and (b)education in order to strictly ensure legitimate law enforcement operations in adherence
to the principle of proportionality are among the indispensable areas ofcapacity-building cooperation for MLEAs. Cooperation should always be extended inboth such “hard” and “soft” areas and in a manner that caters to various individual
needs. Measures should also be taken to promote government-wide efforts on the part ofrecipient countries, including information exchanges between the military and MLEAs.
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Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

Cooperation to promote domestic security is also important, as it will enable recipient
countries to devote more resources to maritime security.
(2) Promoting a common understanding of International Law
A common understanding and awareness of the areas of International Law relevant tomaritime security, such as maritime law and aviation law, are a basic condition for astable international order. It is thus important to assist in creating further opportunities
for countries to discuss matters in these areas.
(3) Enhancing MSA
The disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 in March 2014 highlighted theinadequacy of systems to track air traffic above the South China Sea. Enhancing MSA
capacity including in airspace is an urgent priority.
Until OMSEA is able to assume an overall role concerning MSA, it is important for
countries such as Japan and the United States that possess the willingness andcapabilities in this area to take the lead in promoting coordination and integration
among existing international frameworks. This process should not be limited to thework of governments and international organizations but should also reach out tonon-state actors such as NGOs and private enterprises. It is also necessary to support thecreation of (widely accessible) databases in such fields as hydrography, submarine
earthquakes, marine ecosystems, marine pollution and illegal, unreported andunregulated (IUU) fishing.

Portion of main wing presumed to be of missing MH 370 plane (Photo from ATSB website)11

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

The following points should be borne in mind in pursuing the three goals above (4(1) to 4 (3)).
(A) A coordination forum of partner (donor) countries should be set up (ordesignated) so that sustained and consistent support is offered under a common policy
which is formulated from a strategic and mid- to long-term perspective. While bilateralcapacity-building cooperation to meet individual needs will remain important, a
multilateral setting to exchange views and coordinate among partner and recipient
countries would also be useful. In the near term, the use of existing frameworks such as
ADMM+16 should be considered.
(B) In parallel to urgent capacity-building support to the littoral states of the South
China Sea, attention should also be paid to the maritime security needs of all ASEAN
and other recipient countries, and tailored help should be provided to suit theirindividual requirements. This region faces common security challenges in areas otherthan maritime security per se, such as natural disasters. Meeting the diverse needs ineach country will lead to stability in this region as a whole, which in turn will contributeto maritime security.

5. Efforts on the part of Japan
As part of these international efforts, it is incumbent upon Japan to contributeproactively to the capacity-building of the military and MLEAs of ASEAN and othercountries, and thereby to stability in East Asia’s security environment. In so doing, itshould make effective use of the capabilities and know-how that the Japanese Ministryof Defense (MOD)/Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and Japan Coast Guard (JCG)
have hitherto accumulated.
(1) The Japanese government as a cohesive partner
A system needs to be created under the Cabinet (Naikaku Kambou: Cabinet Secretariat)
through which the government can provide consistent and effective support inwell-coordinated fashion.
In so doing, it is particularly important that: (a) the capabilities and know-how of
the MOD/JSDF and JCG should be well shared within the government; and (b)capacity-building cooperation by MOD/JSDF should be coordinated well with official
development assistance (ODA), mindful that the peace and prosperity of theinternational community serve as the foundations of economic development.
(2) Easing restrictions on capacity-building assistance
Judging from the examples of other countries, and other factors, non-ODA as well as
ODA schemes are required to extend international cooperation in the field of maritime
security. In order to assist the capacity-building of developing nations with limited
financial means, Japan should establish a legal framework that enables flexible forms of
non-ODA cooperation that do not require financial compensation from recipient
countries, as with grant ODA. In parallel, the system of overseas transfers of defence
12Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

equipment and technology should be employed in a flexible manner, given that these
forms of international cooperation contribute to the peace of the region as a whole.
(3) Cooperation through JCG
For many years JCG has supported the formation of MLEAs in the Asia region and has
extended capacity-building cooperation through programmes held at home and abroad.
JCG remains prepared to do its utmost to meet the needs of recipient countries.
In Japan, since October
2015, institutions such as the
JCG Academy in Hiroshima
and the National Graduate
Institute for Policy Studies(GRIPS) in Tokyo arerunning a master’s-levelcourse titled “Maritime
Safety and Security Policy
Programme” which offers
lectures on subjects such as
International
Law
andJapan-Singapore joint exercise on suppression of piracy
international relations. The(Photo courtesy of JCG)
course aims to heighten
awareness of the importance of a maritime order governed by law and rules, and isbeing offered to young executive MLEA personnel from Asian countries. It is highly
important to improve and enhance this programme to assist the development of humanresources that will serve at the helm of MLEAs of various countries in the years to
come.
(4) Assistance through MOD and JSDF
A capacity-building programme is being
offered in Vietnam in the field of
underwater medicine in the context ofJapan-US-Australia
trilateraldefencecooperation. This is a flagship example ofmultilateral security cooperation in which
Japan takes part today. Such projects assist
recipient countries not only in maritime
fields but also help to strengthen the overall
security capabilities of these countries.
They also contribute to network-buildingon the side of partner countries. Therefore,
the momentum of such cooperation must be
kept robust.
13

JMSDF underwater medicine cooperation with Vietnam(Photo from Japan Ministry of Defense website)Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field(5) Effective use of human resources
Being a country prone to natural
disasters, Japan should further utilise
the vast know-how and capabilities indisaster relief (and prevention) that it has
accumulated at home and abroad for thecapacity-building of ASEAN and othercountries. As part of such efforts, it
should step up cooperation in the areasof post-disaster medical care andlivelihood assistance. The on-site rolesof female SDF personnel and retired
government officials of relevant
ministries should be further promoted.

6. The case for OMSEA:
streamlining pluralistic efforts
and promotion of regional
integration

Female JSDF member offering emergency medical
assistance as part of International Disaster Relief
Operations in the Philippines (Photo from JGSDF
website)This report presents a set of recommendations on urgent challenges regarding maritime
security in East Asia. Continued work in this field is required in various forms. In orderto achieve further progress multilaterally, we need to install the essential infrastructurethat would enable more sustained and systematic efforts to be made. It is for this reason
that the Nakasone Proposal advocated the formation of OMSEA.
An authority from ASEAN has suggested likewise.17 Given prevailing realities
including the gradual pace of regional integration in East Asia, the idea should beconsidered a mid- to long-term goal. An initial step would be to exchange opinions
through existing ASEAN-led mechanisms (such as the EAS, ARF, ADMM+ andEAMF), other multilateral fora such as HACGAM,18 and other bilateral, Track 1.5 andTrack 2 channels. We should thereby engage in further discussion on ways to integrate
the dialogue and cooperation in the maritime security area that is currently dispersed
over numerous fora. The functions that a permanent multilateral organization could
effectively perform, as well as practical questions such as the size, location and budgetof the organization (secretariat), should also be addressed. An idea would be to appointa coordinator (group of coordinators) and request that role to consolidate views over acertain period of time and to prepare a concrete plan on OMSEA’s foundation. We
consider that dialogue and cooperation through OMSEA should not be mandatory on all
members/participants but ought to be conducted on a voluntary basis both with regard
to the adoption and attainment of particular goals. A central role by ASEAN in both theestablishment process and function of the organization would be welcome. The
permanent body should establish an appropriate organizational relationship withmechanisms such as EAS.
The Japanese government should extend financial cooperation for OMSEA’s
establishment and participate as appropriate from the preparation process.
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Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS)
Study Group on Maritime Security in East Asia
Members & Participants
1. Members
Head of Study Group: Takashi SAITO, Admiral (ret), former Chief of Staff,
Joint Staff of Japan Self-Defense Forces
Deputy Head: Izuru FUKUMOTO, Vice Admiral (ret), former President,
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Command and Staff College
Koichi SATO, Professor, J. F. Oberlin University, Tokyo
Hiroshi SUZUKI, former Vice Commandant for Operations, Japan Coast Guard
Hideshi TOKUCHI, former Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Hidetoshi HIRATA, Lieutenant General (ret), former Commander,
Air Training Command, Japan Air Self -Defense Force

2. Participants
Ken SATO, President, IIPS and former Vice Minister for Defense
Ichiro FUJISAKI, Vice-President, IIPS and former Ambassador of Japan to USA
Osamu SAKASHITA, Senior Research Fellow, IIPS (coordinator of present report)
Hiroshi TAKAYAMA, Senior Research Fellow, IIPS

15

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

Notes
This proposal uses the term “East Asia” with a certain flexibility. In a geographic sense, it
primarily encompasses the South China Sea and the East China Sea, as well as the areas of landsurrounding them (southeast Asia and northeast Asia, including landlocked states). Yet
depending on the context, it also includes, for instance, other member countries of the East
Asia Summit that have close and legitimate interests in the region, not least the United States.
2 The “Yasuhiro Nakasone Proposal on Maritime Security in East Asia” is attached as Annex 1.
3 The members and participants of the Study Group on Maritime Security in East Asia at theInstitute for International Policy Studies are given at the end of this report.
4 Kousen, stated here in the Japanese original and which literally means “public vessel(s)”, aregovernment vessels other than those of the military. They are primarily law enforcement
vessels of the Coast Guard, Naval Police, Fishery Patrol and other government authorities. The
same applies hereafter.
5 See Part 1 of reference section (Annex 2) for further background.
6 See Part 2 of reference section.
7 See Part 3 of reference section.
8 See Table A of cases referred to in Part 4 of reference section.
9 See “Outcome Document, Fourth Experts Meeting on Confidence-Building in the Spratlys Area,
May 25-27, 2016, Cebu, Philippines”, co-hosted by the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) of thePhilippines and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (a Swiss NGO).
10 Among the recent life-saving operations that received widespread attention was the searchand rescue conducted by a Japan Coast Guard (JCG) patrol vessel(s) and airplanes on 11
August 2016. The operation was in response to a collision between a Greek cargo vessel anda Chinese fishing vessel in the high seas to the northwest of Uotsuri Island, of the Senkaku
Islands. Six Chinese crew members were rescued, and the search for further survivors wascontinued thereafter.
11 See Table B in reference section given in note 8.
12 See Part 5 of reference section for details.
13 “China’s Maritime Expansion and Maritime Militia Organizations”, NIDS Commentary, no. 53(15 July 2016) by Masaaki Yatsuzuka of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) is
informative on fishing vessels operated by “maritime militias”.
http://www.nids.go.jp/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary053.pdf.
China’s Military Service Law states that “[t]he militia is an armed organization of the masses
not divorced from production and is an assisting and reserve force for the Chinese People's
Liberation Army”. Simply put, they are “part-time officers and soldiers” who are normallyengaged in other occupations but serve as military personnel when the need arises. Katsuya
Yamamoto, “Maritime Militias and China’s Fishermen”, JMSDF Command and Staff College,
Column, no. 56 (8 December 2014).
http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/navcol/SSG/topics-column/col-056.html (accessed on 12 August2016).
14 See Table C in reference section given in note 8.
15 James Kraska & Michael Monti, “The Law of Naval Warfare and China’s Maritime Militia,” U.S.
Naval War College, International Law Studies, Vol. 91, 2015, pp. 450-467.
16 See note 18 below.
17 PDP Osman Patra, “Strengthening Maritime Cooperation in East Asia” in Rizal Sukma andYoshihide Soeya eds, Navigating Change: ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership in East Asia andin Global Governance, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta and Japan
Center for International Exchange, 2015, pp. 116-132.
18 See Part 6 of reference section for details of these multilateral fora.
1

16

(Annex 1)

Yasuhiro Nakasone Proposal on Maritime Security in East Asia
I. Context
East Asia represents the world’s most populous and dynamically growing region in thiscentury. The East China Sea and the South China Sea, which interconnect countries inthis region, serve also as a great artery of the world economy through which anenormous amount of trade flows ceaselessly.
Thus freedom of the seas and maritime security in East Asia are preconditions for global
peace and prosperity. They are matters of crucial interest for countries both within andbeyond the region. Regrettably however, developments that call for concern in thisregard have recently increased in frequency and seriousness, making them the subject ofintense discussion at intergovernmental and private sector meetings on the world stage.
Against this backdrop I submit the following proposal for the sake of upholding the East
China Sea and South China Sea as veritable “Seas of peace and prosperity.” This call ismade to various parties in the region and beyond, including governments, research
institutions and academic circles, and the media, all of which contribute to thediscussion and policy formulation on this matter.

II. Adhering to international rules and promoting practical cooperation
1. In order to ensure freedom of the seas and maritime security in East Asia, all parties
need to re-affirm and fulfil their commitment to faithfully observe established common
rules, namely international law and other international norms of behavior. Foremost
among these are the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight as enshrined in
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Many of theserules are also stated in such regional instruments as the 1976 Treaty of Amity andCooperation in Southeast Asia and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in theSouth China Sea.

17

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

2. Conversely, all parties need to refrain from the self-righteous assertion of claims thatare inconsistent with such rules, as well as from unilateral actions that heighten mistrust
and tensions. It is essential that any differences of opinion or disputes that exist should
be managed peacefully and be resolved through such established means as diplomaticnegotiation and arbitration.
3. Meanwhile, collective efforts should be further promoted in such practical areas as
the following in order to strengthen the sense of reassurance and mutual confidence
among relevant parties and thereby enhance maritime security in East Asia:(1) strengthening the maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities of regional statesand organizations;(2) coordination and capacity-building assistance in the fields of law enforcement andhumanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR);(3) dialogue between countries concerning their respective national maritime policies aswell as the organizational structure and operations of the implementing agencies of suchpolicies;(4) dialogue in order to enhance mutual understanding on national positions and issues
related to the interpretation and implementation of maritime international law;(5) an early conclusion of a meaningful Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea,
and adherence thereto;(6) establishing and expanding communication mechanisms, as well as rules of behavior
for the safety of air and maritime encounters such as the Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea (CUES) adopted in April 2014;(7) cooperation in such non-traditional security (human security) areas as marine
science technology, marine resource management, environmental monitoring andpreservation, as well as disaster risk reduction.

III. East Asian Maritime Security Charter
I propose that countries in the region and beyond adopt an East Asian Maritime Security
Charter in order to jointly and comprehensively re-affirm the aims, rules and measures
above. Such an instrument would provide a focused political framework for improving
the current climate in East Asian waters and an impetus for further advancing
cooperation.

18

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

IV. Organization for Maritime Security in East Asia (OMSEA)
1. As a major means to enhance maritime security in this region, I further propose thecreation of an Organization for Maritime Security in East Asia (OMSEA) in parallelwith adoption of the Charter in Section III above. The objectives of OMSEA would
include:(1) providing a permanent and open forum for exchanging information, views and ideas
concerning maritime security;(2) the collection and integration of information from an impartial standpoint, andsharing the results thereof; and(3) taking collective steps in order to promote or complement existing efforts in theareas given in Section II.3 above and to formulate policy recommendations.
2. This proposal concerning an OMSEA represents an evolution of an earlier concept
which the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) introduced in January 2015.
Modifications have been made over the past year so as to reflect the discussions withvarious interlocutors, including those from the ASEAN region and beyond East Asia.
3. Membership as well as the operational activities of OMSEA should be open tocountries within and beyond the East Asia region. The mandate and other details of
OMSEA should be determined by an early date, and IIPS stands ready to work withother parties for this end. A central role by the ASEAN region would be welcome in thisprocess.
4. OMSEA should establish an appropriate relationship with the East Asian Summit(EAS), taking note of the confirmation by EAS leaders at their tenth anniversary
meeting in November 2015 that the inclusion of maritime cooperation among priority
areas of cooperation merits further consideration.
Note: Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone is Chairman of IIPS and served as Prime Minister ofJapan from 1982 to 1987.

19

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field(Annex 2)

Reference
1. Background (note 5 of Report)(1) In East Asia and the Western Pacific, no agreements on the prevention of incidents at
sea among navies (INCSEAs; see section 5 below) have been concluded, with the sole
exception of an agreement between Japan and Russia. An adequate framework forpreventing accidents and unforeseen conflicts does not exist. Against this backdrop,
naval leaders from twenty-five countries—many located in the Western
Pacific—including from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force agreed to a Code for
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES; see section 2 below) at an April 2014 meeting of
the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) held in Qingdao, China.
(2) Meanwhile, China has been rapidly stepping up its maritime expansion in recent
years, and in so doing it has made extensive use of vessels from its maritime law
enforcement agencies (MLEAs). As a result, there have been frequent encounters
between vessels of the US Navy and China’s MLEAs, heightening concerns about therisk of an unforeseen contingency. The situation has led a number of senior US Navy
personnel and others to suggest, since 2014, the idea of extending CUES to MLEAs.
These developments prompted the Study Group to consider the merits of this idea aspart of this report.
(3) There are very few pre-existing international agreements on crisis management
mechanisms for MLEAs, or judicial precedents that have directly ruled on details
concerning such mechanisms.
(4) In view of the importance of MLEA vessels in the seas of East Asia, this reportaddresses pressing issues regarding maritime security and proposes a broad-ranging setof directions for crisis management. The latter was considered on acategory-to-category basis, considering military vessels/aircraft, MLEA vessels, andprivate vessels separately.
2. CUES (Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea: note 6 of Report)
CUES is a maritime code of conduct that promotes communication and offers means of
avoiding danger when one navy’s vessel or aircraft inadvertently encounters a vessel oraircraft of another country’s navy. (It provides for communication methods and safety
procedures.) CUES applies to the vessels and aircraft of the navies of countries thathave adopted (implemented) the code. However, it does not apply to other vessels or
aircraft (such as those belonging to MLEAs or the air force). Moreover, unlikeinternational agreements, it is non-binding.

20

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

CUES adopts English as the standard language of communication and designates radio
frequencies to be used between naval vessels and aircraft. Additionally, it stipulates
coded signals to be used in case of lack of proficiency in radio communication in
English. CUES further advises against such actions as flashing a searchlight on thebridge of a vessel or the cockpit of an aircraft, simulating an attack by aiming guns,
missiles or fire-control radars on vessels of other countries.
3. The principle of proportionality in the conduct of maritime law enforcement(note 7 of Report)
In the course of law enforcement operations, MLEAs are required both to perform theirduties pursuant to the law (including both International Law and domestic laws) and, as
police agencies, to abide by the so-called “principle of proportionality”.
(1) In this context, “the principle of proportionality” refers to the idea that “in the event
an MLEA has more than a single means of achieving a law enforcement objective at its
disposal, it may exercise its authority only through such means that are within the limitsof proportionality to the level of difficulty in attaining that objective”.
(2) There is no internationally-recognised document expressly stating this principle.
Considering international judiciary precedents and past state actions, MLEAs arenonetheless expected jointly to adhere to this principle and thereby to conduct law
enforcement operations in a legitimate manner, regardless of differing circumstances ineach instance. Such law enforcement demands that the use of force be limited to thebare minimum required, and that the situation be prevented from escalating, whatever
the situation.
(3) The 1999 judgement of the M/V “SAIGA” (No. 2) Case by the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) is a relatively recent judicial precedent
concerning this matter. The tribunal ruled in paragraphs 155 to 156 of the judgement asfollows:
I. Paragraph 155(i) [I]nternational law … requires that the use of force must be avoided as far as
possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable andnecessary in the circumstances.
(ii) Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do in otherareas of international law.
II. Paragraph 156
This paragraph states that “[t]he normal practice used to stop a ship at sea” is asfollows:(i) [F]irst to give an auditory or visual signal to stop, using internationally recognizedsignals.
21

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field(ii) Where this does not succeed, a variety of actions may be taken, including the firingof shots across the bows of the ship.
(iii) It is only after the appropriate actions fail that the pursuing vessel may, as a lastresort, use force.
(iv) Even then, appropriate warning must be issued to the ship and all efforts should bemade to ensure that life is not endangered …
4. Cases of maritime law enforcement operations considered to have been
conducted in a less than legitimate manner in waters where differences overterritorial and/or jurisdictional claims overlap and whose boundaries are notdelimited, and of problematic conduct at sea by fishing vessels believed to be
operated by “maritime militia” or other such groups (notes 8, 11 and 14 of Report)
See attached table.
5. INCSEA (Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas:
note 12 of Report)
On 25 May 1972, an Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High
Seas (INCSEA) was signed in Moscow between the United States and the Soviet Union.
This agreement was not only the first military agreement signed between the two
Superpowers after the Second World War, but it also came to serve as a model for
subsequent INCSEAs, covering naval vessels and naval aircraft at sea and in airspace,between the Soviet Union (later Russia) and other states having adversarial relations
with it, as well as between third states with tense relations.
(1) US-Soviet INCSEA
The military expansion of the United States and the Soviet Union turned into an arms
race after the Second World War. As the Soviet Union expanded the area of its navy’s
operations and this extended to the vicinity of US territory in the late 1960s, the level of
provocative actions between vessels that approached each other during reconnaissanceactivities began to escalate. These operations were conducted in such ways as
manipulating the status of stand-on vessels and give-way vessels as provided for in the
COLREG Convention. (*reference details below) For example on 10 May 1967, USS
Walker, a destroyer that was taking part in a joint Japan-US anti-submarine training
mission in the Sea of Japan, collided with a “Kotlin”-class Soviet destroyer. The
following day, the same US destroyer was hit by another Soviet naval vessel. These
incidents were likely caused by clashes between the Soviet Navy’s close observation of
US Navy exercises and counteractions by US vessels.
Various forms of psychological and physical provocations were exchanged between US
and Soviet vessels during these encounters and their intensity rose. Concrete methods
included: throwing dangerous objects such as ropes, drums in the way of passage ofother vessels; dazzling by the use of powerful searchlights; spraying water in dangerous
22Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

directions; discharging signal shells; designating guns, missiles and fire-control radars;
aircraft approaching at very low altitude; dumping waste and filth; and the flaunting of
insulting acts from visible distance. Such acts were exchanged not just between vesselsof the United States and the Soviet Union but also those of their respective allies. Fears
grew that they could trigger all kinds of military clashes, large and small.
The concerns were raised in the US Congress. The point was made that the acts above
could not be prevented merely by international regulations for preventing the collisionof vessels, and that some form of special regulation was required to cover also the useof arms and dangerous acts that were deliberate. As a result, in 1968, the United States
first proposed negotiations on an INCSEA. Initially the Soviet Union declined, andfriction between the naval vessels and aircraft of the two states continued. In September
1970, US and Soviet vessels that were sent to waters off Lebanon during the Jordaniancrisis aimed fire-control radars at the other’s aircraft, each side with their missiles
loaded. Tensions almost reached a flash point. This development prompted a change in
the Soviet attitude and negotiations on INCSEA were started.
Naval officers, who had first-hand knowledge of on-site realities, took part in these talks.
Agreement was reached after two rounds, first in October 1971 in Moscow, and thesecond in May 1972 in Washington. The US-Soviet agreement was signed inconjunction with the Moscow summit meeting between President Richard Nixon andGeneral Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in May 1972.
Taking lessons from dangerous acts in the past, the agreement provides for thefollowing: (a) manoeuvres and concrete procedures to avoid collision; (b) radio
frequencies for mutual on-site communications; (c) special signals to supplement theInternational Code of Signals (INTERCO) which are used for communications among
all kinds of vessels; (d) exchange of information in the event of incidents throughmilitary attachés of the two sides; and (e) meetings at least once a year to review the
implementation of the terms of the agreement.
Following the conclusion of the US-Soviet agreement, similar instruments wereconcluded between the Soviet Union/Russia and at least the following twelve countries:
the United Kingdom, West Germany (Germany), France, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Portugal, Greece (all the above in NATO) as well as Japan and theRepublic of Korea. In addition, INCSEAs whose parties do not include the Soviet
Union/Russia were concluded between Germany and Poland, Turkey and Greece, India
and Pakistan, and Israel and the United Arab Republic (presently succeeded by Egypt).
The supplementary signals annexed to the US-Soviet agreement is also appended to
INTERCO and serves de facto as a universal set of signals that is used also among thevessels of non-INCSEA parties.

23

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field(2) Japan-Russia INCSEAThis agreement was one of the sixteen documents on practical matters signed between
Japanese Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev
during a meeting held simultaneously with the summit meeting between Russian
President Boris Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa during theRussian president’s visit to Japan in October 1993. The agreement entered into force on
12 November that year.
The agreement differs little from other INCSEA agreements, but separate wording isused to accommodate the fact that (technically) a military force does not exist in Japan.
6. Existing multilateral fora (note 18 of Report)(1) East Asia Summit (EAS)
This forum was inaugurated in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Its purpose
is to enable the leaders of the ASEAN countries and those of the organization’s dialogue
partners to engage in candid talks on crucial issues facing the East Asia region and theinternational community. Currently, eighteen countries participate (the ten ASEAN
member states, Japan, China, Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, USA
and Russia; USA and Russia joined in 2011.)
At the inaugural meeting, the following were established as priority areas forcooperation: energy, finance, education, measures for combatting avian influenza andother infectious diseases, and disaster prevention. In addition, the Declaration of the
Sixth East Asia Summit on ASEAN Connectivity was adopted in 2011, adding“connectivity” to the list of priority areas. Leaders affirmed that endeavours in the areasof politics and security would be strengthened when the US and Russia began theirofficial participation in 2011.
(Source: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JMFA) website)(2) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
The ARF has been held since 1994, and its purpose is to improve the security
environment in the Asia-Pacific region through dialogue and cooperation on politicaland security issues. This has the longest history and the largest number of participating
countries among the various fora (including the EAS and ADMM+) that attach
importance to ASEAN centrality. The ARF aims to achieve incremental progress
through a three-stage approach consisting of the promotion of confidence-building,progress in preventive diplomacy, and the elaboration of approaches to conflicts.
Participants consist of 26 countries and one organization: the ten ASEAN member states,
Japan, China, Republic of Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, USA,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Papua New
Guinea, East Timor, Russia, Mongolia and the EU.
(Source: JMFA website)24

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field(3) The Expanded ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM+)
The forum was inaugurated in October 2010 with the addition of eight countries outside
the ASEAN area (Japan, China, Republic of Korea, the United States, Australia, New
Zealand, India and Russia) to the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), which
had been held since May 2006. The ADMM+ aims to bolster cooperation among themilitaries of participant countries, as well as to promote strategic dialogue at theministerial level.
(Source: the websites of the Japanese Ministry of Defense and JMFA)(4) Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF)
At the November 2011 East Asia Summit (EAS), Japan presented a proposal to establish
a venue for the countries participating in the EAS to discuss the modalities of maritime
cooperation, emphasising the importance of such a setting. After consideration within
ASEAN, the decision was taken to hold meetings that include ASEAN and non-ASEAN
EAS participants (Japan, China, USA, Australia, New Zealand, India and Russia), in
conjunction with ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) meetings which had been heldamong ASEAN member states. The first EAMF meeting was held in October 2012 andthere have since been three further meetings.
(Source: the websites of the JMFA and the ASEAN Secretariat)(5) Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (HACGAM)
The Asian region is home to some of the world’s most important maritime routes, notleast the Strait of Malacca and the Singapore Strait. HACGAM is a Japanese-led
meeting that has been held nearly every year since 2004, whose purpose is to bring
together the heads of the maritime safety agencies of the Asian region in order tostrengthen regional cooperation on the administration of maritime safety. Nineteen
countries and one entity (the ten ASEAN member states, Japan, China, Republic ofKorea, Hong Kong, Australia, India, Bangladesh, the Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka)
currently take part in this forum.

*

COLREG Convention: International regulations for preventing collisions at sea have been
repeatedly agreed and revised, starting from the rules of the Washington conference of 1889 to
the current “Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea(COLREG)” of 1972. These regulations are applicable on the high seas, in EEZs and territorial
waters that are navigable by seagoing vessels. They are also applicable in internal waters andarchipelagic waters connected to territorial waters navigable by seagoing vessels. They cover all
vessels, naval, MLEA and civilian, including seaplanes on water and surfaced submarines.
COLREG came into effect in Japan in July 1977 as a result of approval by the Diet. The “Act on
Preventing Collision at Sea” was passed in June of the same year in conformity with theconvention.

25

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field(Attachment)
Cases of maritime law enforcement operations considered to have been conductedin a less than legitimate manner in waters where differences over territorial andjurisdictional claims overlap and/or whose boundaries are not delimited (A and B),
and of problematic conduct at sea by fishing vessels believed to be operated by“maritime militia” and other such groups (C)Note: Cases involving naval vessels are included.
A. MLEA vessel(s) vs civilian vessel(s) (note 8, section 3(1) of Report)

Date

1

2

3

May 26,2011

January27, 2013

March 20,2013

Location

Incident

East ofVietnamChinese MLEA vessels, equipped withcable slashing devices, severed the
exploration cables of a PetroVietnam
resource survey vessel searching foroil.

Scarborough
Shoal

Chinese MLEA vessels repelled
Philippine fishing vessels that were
stationed at the shoal or taking shelterMedia
there during stormy weather, spraying(Inquirer)
them with water cannons. According
to the DFA of the Philippines, there
were nine similar incidents.

Near
ParacelIslands

A Chinese navy vessel approachedfrom astern the starboard side of aVietnamese vessel engaged in fishing.
It fired four flares from a distance of
40 meters without warning. The top
part of the fishing vessel’s cabin burst
into flames and burned down. The
Chinese authorities claimed that: (a)after unsuccessful demands bywhistle-blowing, shouting, hand flagguiding for the fishing vessel to stop
its activity and leave Chinese
territorial waters, the Chinese vessel
fired two red signal shells; and (b) theflares burst and went out in the air,hence the burning of the fishing vessel
was a fabrication.

26

SourceVietnamese
MFA
Media
(Sydney Morning
Herald)Media(Asahi Shimbun;
The Guardian;
BBC News)

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

4

5

6

7

May 16,2014

September
29, 2015

March 6,
2016

July 9,2016

Near
ParacelIslands

A Chinese MLEA vessel threw rocks
at a Vietnamese fishing vessel inoperation. The Vietnamese vessel
raised its speed and fled the scene, but
all its windows were broken. The same
Chinese MLEA vessel violently
assaulted two crew members ofanother Vietnamese fishing vessel, ofa twelve-passenger capacity, anddestroyed nearly all the equipment on
the Vietnamese vessel.

Near
ParacelIslands

A Chinese MLEA vessel intentionallyrammed a Vietnamese fishing vessel
carrying ten crew members. Five crew
members from the Chinese vessel,Media
armed with knives, forcibly boarded(Taipei News)
the Vietnamese vessel and took awaynavigational devices, fishing gear, andthe fish that had been caught. The
fishing vessel sank twelve hours later.

Near
ParacelIslands

A Chinese MLEA vessel approached aVietnamese fishing vessel in operation
with ten crew members onboard.
Media
Eleven persons from the Chinese(Jiji Press;
vessel boarded the Vietnamese vessel
Tuoitre News)and forcibly took control of theVietnamese vessel. They seized foodand fuel and destroyed fishing gear.

Near
ParacelIslands

A Vietnamese fishing vessel waschased by
two apparent Chinese
MLEA vessels, and was rammed andoverturned by two other ships. Five Mediacrew members had to wait rescue in (The Hindu)
the water by clinging on to thecapsized vessel. The Chinese vessels
obstructed their rescue.

27

Vietnamese
MFA
Media
(Asahi Shimbun;
Tuoitre News)Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

B. MLEA vessel(s) vs MLEA vessel(s) (note 11, section 3(2) of Report)

Date

1

2

3

April
2010

June 23,
2010

May
2014
to
July
2014

Location

Incident

SourceSwallow
Reef

Malaysia dispatched two destroyers
and a maritime patrol aircraft to the
Swallow Reef (within the Malaysian
EEZ) when three armed patrol vessels Media
were sent there from China under the (The Yomiuri
pretext of “protecting fishing vessels”. Shimbun)
The ships faced each other downintermittently, with guns at the ready,for 17 hours.

Near
NatunaIslands

One Chinese fishing vessel, out of afleet of at least ten, was captured forillegal operations by an Indonesian
patrol vessel. Two Chinese MLEA
vessels appeared and demanded therelease of the fishing vessel, claiming
on radio that China does not recognize
the area as being within Indonesia’s
EEZ. The Indonesian patrol vessel
released the fishing vessel. The
following morning, the patrol vessel
re-captured the fishing vessel after an
Indonesian naval vessel arrived on thescene, but released the fishing vessel
again after threats were made by oneof the Chinese MLEA vessels, which
aimed a heavy machine gun at theIndonesian ship. Similar incidents
occurred on May 15 of this year andMarch 26, 2013.

Media(Mainichi
Shimbun;The Strategist
on ASPI
website)Watersnear
ParacelIslands

A Chinese oil rig was moved into
waters near the Paracel Islands in May
2014, with a naval vessel, MLEA
vessels, fishing vessels and other ships
around the rig’s perimeter forprotection. These ships prevented
Vietnamese MLEA vessels fromapproaching the rig. Many of theChinese MLEA vessels rammed theVietnamese MLEA vessels andsprayed them with high-pressure waterguns. See also C3 below.

Vietnamese
MFA
Media
(Tuoitre News)

28

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

Date

4

March 19,2016

Location

Incident

SourceNatunaIslands

An Indonesian Maritime Affairs andFisheries Ministry patrol vessel
detained a Chinese fishing vessel
involved in illegal fishing. After thecrew was arrested and during escortof the fishing vessel, a Chinese
MLEA vessel rammed the towed
fishing vessel, presumably to turn off
the engine and prevent the vessel
from being towed. When another
Chinese MLEA vessel demandedthat the Indonesian patrol vessel
release the Chinese vessel within 30
minutes, the patrol vessel complied.
The Chinese MFA claimed that thefishing vessel had been attacked andobstructed by an armed Indonesian
vessel and that the MLEA vessel had
assisted the fishing vessel.

Chinese MFAMedia(Jakarta Post;
The Guardian)

C. Fishing vessels believed to be operated by “maritime militia” and other suchgroups (note 14, section 3(4) of Report)

1

Date

Location

March 8,
2009

South of
HainanIslandIncident
SourceActivities of US Navy ocean
surveillance ship Impeccable some
75 nautical miles from Hainan Island
were obstructed by a frigate, two
MLEA vessels and two fishingvessels. The fishing vessels veered Media (CNN)
dangerously close to the Impeccableto try to steer it off course, threw
lumber in its way and attempted tosnag the Impeccable’s acoustic
equipment in the water.

29

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

Date

2

3

Location

Incident

SourceJune 9,2011

South ofVietnam

A resource survey vessel chartered byPetroVietnam was towing an exploration
cable, when it was approached by two
Chinese fishing vessels that were
equipped with cable slashing devices andsupported by two Chinese MLEA Vietnamese
vessels. The resource survey vessel fired MFA
signal shells as a warning, but a Chinese
fishing vessel came into contact with thecable. The vessel became entangled andreceived help from Chinese MLEA
vessels and several other fishing vessels.

May 2014
toJuly 2014

Watersnear
ParacelIslands

Vietnamese
During situation B3 above, the Chinese
MFA
fishing vessels, supported by MLEA
Media
vessels, made dangerous approaches to(Tuoitre
the Vietnamese fishing vessels.
News)

30

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

31

Crisis Management at Sea: Urgent Proposals from the Field

32