Assessing China’s Soft Power Diplomacy and its Implications on Asia
Cooperation
By Zhou Ying
Introduction
China‟s influence in Asia has increased remarkably over the past decade. This canaccount for various China threat theories and the argument of China Rising inacademic narratives. Analysis and debates concerning China‟s rise is focused almost
entirely on the economic and military aspects of its growing power. Yet soft power isincreasingly recognized as the essential components of Great Power status. Somescholars point out that besides increase in its steaming economic growth and militarystrengthening, the reinforcing of China‟s soft power has been crucial in expanding thecountry‟s regional influence. During the last decade, not only have Chinese media andscholars increasingly paid more attention to the development and wielding of China‟s
soft power, but also Beijing has adopted more and more soft power-based foreign
policies. With the continued momentum of China‟s rapid economic growth andChina‟s ever-increasing influence in the world, the inevitable question is how has
China developed its own soft power resources and wield them in its foreign relations?
Is there any intricate connection between Chinese idea of soft power and its power
behavior? And if China‟s soft power really rising in Asia as a lot of analysts argued?
This elicited a lot of discourses within and without about China‟s intentions with its
soft power diplomacy. First is the power balance discourse. It is often interpreted inthis school of thought that China seeks to shape the region‟s emerging
political-institutional contours and to encourage movement toward an “East Asian
Community” in order to balance the declining influence of the Unite States. They
think that China is using its soft tools to balance the influense of outside player,
especially the US. As they argued, China appears to be using its soft power toincrementally push Japan, Taiwan, and even the Unite States out of regional influence.
1
The second is the regional hegemony discourse. This school of thought mainly
argue that China‟s soft power is uniform to its grand stategy. In Asia, it means to seek
for the leadership and the dominant role, holding its regional hegemony. China is nolonger a “clumsy elephant” to its Southeast neighbors, but an “agile dragon” in thequest for restoring its regional hegemony. Soft power is imperative to play ahegemonic leadership role in shaping policies in the region. 2 China is determined to
1

David Shambaugh, Focus on China: China‟s New Diplomacy in Asia. Foreign Service Journal, May 2005. David
Shambaugh, China Engages: Reshaping the Regional Order, international security, vol.29.no, 3, 2004. Joshua
Kurlantzick: China‟s charm: implications of Chinese Soft Power, Policy Brief of Carnegie Endowment forinternational peace, Washington, no.47, June 2006. Chien-Peng Chung: China‟s approach to the institutionalizationof regional multilateralism, Journal of Comteporary China (2008), 17(57), November, 747-764. Denise E. Zheng:
China s use of soft power in developing world: strategic intentions and implications for the United State. See
Implications for the United States------competition and cooperation in the developing world. A Report of the CSIS
Smart Power Initiative. edited by Carola McGiffert, Center for Strategic & International Studies. March 2009.
2
H.H.Michael Hsiao and Alan Yang: Soft Power Politics in the Asia Pacific, Chinese and Japanese Quests for
Regional Leadership, Japan Focus. And Transformation in China‟s Soft Power toward ASEAN. From China Brief,
Volume VIII, Issue 22, November 24, 2008.Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang: Sources and Limits of Chinese „soft
power‟, Survival, Vol.48 No.2 Summer 2006, pp1.7-36. Johannes Dragsbaek Schmid, China s soft power
diplomacy in Southeast Asia, translated by Yin Jiwu, guowai lilun dongtai, 2009, 3. Meng Honghua: Report on the
Analysis of China‟s Soft Power, part 2, Intenational observes, Guoji Guancha, International Observer, 2007, no.3.
Joel Wuthnow: the concept of soft power in China s Strategic Discourse, Issues and Studies 44, no.2 (June 2008):
1

demonstrate its commitment to a peaceful foreign policy as an important contributor
to its further economic development and regional leadership. The third isimage-building discourse. In recent years, the perception of the China threat, alongwith China‟s series of domestic dilemmas become the main obstacles for China toproject its national image. Hence, many scholars think that China call for a goodworld image through its soft power diplomacy. 3 The fourth is the discourse of
reducing China threat and legitimatizing China rising. Chinese strategists have awaredthat China‟s economic and military rise has been perceived as a threat by the external
world, especially those with significant strategic interest in Aisa. Then, these scholars
explain, “China hopes that, through soft power, it can achieve its most important goals,
which are, at a regional and global level, to mitigate the “China threat theory”, earn
the understanding of the international comminity, and garner support for China‟speaceful development.” 4 The fifth is hard power limits discourse. This school ofthoughts claims that at present, China possesses few, if any, forward-deployed
military forces in Southeast and South Asia. Hard power resources alone would beinsufficient for China to reach the level of a global power. China‟s capacity to shape
events in this region (Asia) through coercion or military-to-military contacts remains
limited. In this situation, soft power will serve as an alternative. 5 The sixth isgeopolitics discourse. This school states that China‟s fundamental interests lie in Asia.
This makes China place more weights in this area. They think China used soft power
diplomacy in Asia region in order to allay suspicions in Asian countries what wary of
its great power ambitions and foster perceptions that the nation‟s return to the nauticalarena. 6 The finally is the national interests-oriented discourse. 7 It is commonly
1-28. Implications for the United States------competition and cooperation in the developing world. A report of the
CSIS Smart Power Initiative. edited by Carola McGiffert, Center for Strategic & International Studies. March
2009.Li Xing& Zhang Shengjun: China and Regional Integration in East Asia: Opportunities, Constraints andChallenges, CCIS (Centre for Comparative Integration Studies) Research Series Working Paper No.9.ISSN:
1902-9718. Gary D. Rawnsley.. A Survey of China‟s Public Diplomacy, May 12, 2007.
3
C.F. Bergsten, C Freeman, N. lardy, D. Mitchell: Soft Power in China‟s Foreign Policy, from People‟s Daily
Online, http://englishpeopledaily.com.cn/, February 05, 2009. Ingrid d Hooghe, the Rise of China Public
Diplomacy, Netherlands Institution of IR, July 2007. See Lijie: Tisheng ruanshili dui shixian woguo heping jueqi
de zuoyong; Guo Shuyong: xin guojizhuyi yu zhongguo ruanshili waijiao; Su Changhe: Zhongguo de Ruanshili;
Alastair. Iain. Johnston: Zhongguo Canyu Guoji Tizhi de Ruogan Sikao, shijie jingji yu zhengzhi,1999,7. Xiao
Huanrong: China‟s great power responsibility and its regionalism strategy. World Economics and International
Politics, 2003(3).
4Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong: China Soft Power: discussion, resources, and prospects, Asia Survey, Vol.
XLVIII, No.3. May-June 2008. Fang Changping: Zhongmei Ruanshili Bijiao Jiqi dui Zhongguo de Qishi, “A
Comparison of Soft Power between China and the US and its Implications for China”, Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi,
World Economics and Politics, No.7, 2007. pp.21-27. Sheng Ding: To build a harmonious world: China‟ s soft
power wielding in the global south. Journal of Chinese Political Science. Vol.13, No2, 2008. Also see Sheng Ding‟s PhD thesis: soft power and the Rise of China: an Assessment of China s Soft Power in its Modernization Process.
Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E. Murphy: Soft power with Chinese characteristics---the ongoing debate. Ma
Jianying: guojia jueqi bu ke hu shi de liliang: ruanliliang. Journal of Sheng Yang University, Vol. 18, No.5.
5
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes: China‟s Energy-Driven Soft Power, Winter, 2008. Bruce A. Elleman,
Waves of Hope: The US Navy‟sResponse to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College
Press, Februry 2007),pp. 103-105.
6
Pang Zhongying: Transformation of China‟s Asia Policy: Challenges and Opportunities,
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/singapur/04601/2007-2/zhongying.pdf.
7
Ma Jianying: guojia jueqi bu ke hu shi de liliang: ruanliliang. Journal of Sheng Yang University, Vol. 18, No.5.
Pang Zhongying: China‟s soft power. See Liao Wang (Outlook News Weekly). Ren Xiao: Between Adapting andShaping: China‟s role in Asian Regional Cooperation, Journal of Contemporary China (2009), 18(59), March,303-320. Li Mingjiang: China debates soft power, Chinese journal of international politics, Vol. 2, 2008, 287-308.
Gao hongqiang : zhongguo muling waijiao zhong ruanyingshili de goujian jiaodu. Esther Pan: China‟s Soft Power
Initiative may 18, 2006. Gary D. Rawnsley.. A Survey of China‟s Public Diplomacy, May 12, 2007.
2

believed that Beijing is trying to convince the world of its peaceful intentions, secure
the resources it needs to continue its soaring economic growth, and isolate Taiwan. It
must be served to the national interests and the basic goals of China‟s foreign policy
which is to “preserve China‟s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,” and“to create a favorable international environment for China‟s reform and opening up
and modernization construction.” 8Certainly, these discourses can explain China‟s intentions with its soft power in Asia.
Also, based on these discussions, a number of observers see China‟s soft power isrising in Asia and other part of the world. 9 This paper examines the recipient of
Taiwan‟s response toward China‟s soft power diplomacy in an effect to diagnose if
China‟s soft power rising or not in Asia, aiming to clear about the academic dispute.
In this paper, I challenge the conventional views and argue that these interpretations
are methodologically problematic and empirically insufficient. As I will argue
throughout the following research, the central problem of the preceding
interpretations is that they can not offer a persuasive explanation that can adequately
as well as comprehensively assess China‟s soft power. And they missed the lens of therecipient‟s response to investigate China‟s soft power diplomacy. Meanwhile, in theexisting scholarly literatures on Chinese foreign policy, there is no adequate or
persuasive study on the relations between Beijing‟s policy of peaceful development
and Beijing‟s soft power wielding in its rising process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the first, I presented the conventional
approaches on China‟s soft power, pointing out their limits and the academic string inthis research. Then, I design a conceptualization plan about China‟s soft power,
aiming to normalize the concept based on Chinese context and Chinese discourse. To
assess China‟s soft power, I intend to employ the case study of cross-strait relations toillustrate my hypothesis which is that China‟s soft power diplomacy may not work as
well as discussed owing to its limits in its soft power resource and the existing
variables in Asia politics.
Conventional Interpretations
The concept of soft power is initially coined by Professor Joseph S. Nye, but why thisforeign concept has become so salient in the Chinese discourse. In the 1990s, since
the term come into surface, the discussion of soft power on the question of what soft
power is and how it should be defined in the Chinese context sprung up. Soft power
becomes a heated topic in China‟s academic circle and served as a frequently talked
word in some official articles or speeches. The main reason is that Nye‟s theoreticalframework seems to answer some fundamental questions faced by contemporary
China. First, China wants to be a great power so that it has to ask the question of whatmakes for a great power. Meanwhile, Nye‟s theory was introduced into China as thecountry was undertaking an in-depth investigation into the rise and fall of great
nations, seeking not only to escape the fate of the Soviet Union but to transform China
8

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “China‟s Independent Foreign policy of Peace,” August 18, 2003. <htt
p://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjzc/t24881.htm.>
9Bates Gill and Huang Yanzhong: “the Dragon‟s Underbelly: Assessing China‟s Soft Power” (Unpublished paper,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 2005)
3

into great power. Nye‟s framework informed the Chinese of the component of a great
power. Second, China has to participate in international competition which includes
the soft power competition. China has not been alone in embracing the notion of soft
power. In East Asia, the same has been true of the scholarly and policy communities
of Taiwan, Japan and Korea. What‟s more, in the globalization era, to materialize thenational power relies upon the use of soft power. Third, China‟s rapid growth
generated suspicions and concerns around the world especially its Asia neighbors.
Hard means can only worsen the situation. Forth, the concept of soft power is ofcompatibility with Chinese traditions and culture. The theory resonates withtraditional Chinese concept; for example, Confucianism extols a king who relies on
moral force not physical force, believing that the kingly way [wangdao] will triumphover the hegemony‟s way [badao]. All of the aforementioned suggest the reasons of
the sizable audiences of soft power in China.
Previous literatures approach the topic of China‟s soft power under the framework of
the western conceptualization, or they understand the issue in a way notaccommodating to the contemporary China‟s context. They interprete China‟s soft
power mainly from two lenses. One is from the perspective of source, another is frombehavior. As a result, they assess China‟s soft power from either of them but neverboth of them. Along with those discussions, a debate is unfolding on that if China‟s
soft power rising in Asia. Foreign scholars and a minority of Chinese interlocutors
hold the optimistic view that China‟s soft power is rising in Asia, while themainstream Chinese scholarly pessimistically argue that China‟s soft power remains
weak and lags behind that of the main great powers, especially the U.S.
Methodologically, several approaches are attritable to their arguments:
The first approach is from the perspective of otherness. Through investigating othergreat power‟s soft power, these analysts reached this conclusion. They think that it isowing to the U.S.‟s declining influence which left a power vacuum in Asia. China‟s
soft power has benefited from the decline of U.S.‟s soft power in the region; due inlarge part to America‟s perceived over-emphasis on the war against terror and theaccompanying changes in its foreign policy. Chinese analyst attributes US‟sdecreasing soft power to three causes: the unpopularity of US‟s unilateralism, reduced
attention and funding for U.S.‟s public diplomacy program, and an alienation of theworld audience due to Iraq War. 10 The negative regional response to U.S.
counterterrorism policy has made China look good by not doing anything. 11 Other
players like Japan‟s soft power is limited by its history issue, demographic challenges,
inward-looking culture and un-widely-spoken Japanese language. However, incontrast to the U.S., China places more soft power-based policy emphasis on regionalorganizations working toward regional solutions. 12 Such as China‟s role in the
10

Fang Changping: zhongmei ruanshili bijiao jiqi dui zhongguo de qishi (A comparison of U.S. and Chinese soft
power and insight for China), shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, 2007, no.7:25.
11
Lief-Eric Easley: the Hard Politics of Soft Power: prospects and limitations in Cross-Strait and Inter-Korean
Relations, JoongAng Daily (With International Herald Tribune), Nov. 9,2007, p11; IHT-Asahi Shinbun, Nov. 6,
2007, p28; China Post, Nov.4, 2007, p4; OMNI, Nov.10,2007.
12
China in Asia Seminar Series, Seminar 8, Summarized by Joshua Kurlantzick: Will China Wield Soft Power in
Asia? December 12, 2005. <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Repository/INSS_Proceedings/AEI-NDU%20China%20Sem-inar%20Series%202005/Seminar_8_December05/ChinainAsiaSeminar8summary.pdf.>
4Six-party talks on the North Korea nuclear issue, the enhanced relationship with
South Korea, Russia and the new development of relations cross the Taiwan strait, hasmade the U.S. feel that its dominance in the East Asia has been weakened. 13 Beijing
already is using its soft power to limit America‟s role in the region. 14
The second is comparative approach covering quantitative and qualitative means.
Chinese Professor Yan Xuetong and his colleague Xu Jin compared China and the
U.S.‟s soft power. They measured the China‟s soft power using the quantitative
method, calculating and comparing two players‟ international mobilization,international attractiveness, and domestic mobilization. In their research, they adopted
a lot of indexes, like the attractiveness of state mode, culture, the number of military
alliance; decision-making right in international community, etc. 15 There are someanalyst who did comparative studies on China and the U.S.‟s soft power throughphilosophical thinking, comparing a series of features of the two actors‟ soft power. 16
To observe the two plays‟ soft power through case study is also an alternative for theobserver to do comparative study. 17
Thirdly, based on the behavioral perspective, through observing some specificphenomena and various government behaviors in China‟s diplomatic activities inrecent years, they jump to this conclusion. For instance, the forefather of soft power,
Nye, and Chinese soft power watcher Joshua Kurlantzick think China is the looming
giant of Asia, viewing China‟s soft power is increasing 18 According to Nye, therising of China‟s soft power is shown in three aspects, namely, the carrying forward ofChinese traditional culture, the demonstrating of China‟s constructive economic
achievements, and the promoting of China‟s international image. Other scholars
mentioned the Chinese language study and foreign enrollment and China‟s rapid
economic growth has won it admiration. 19 Additionally, China‟s disaster aids, tradesystem, financial cooperation, assistance institution, regional security cooperation are
also referred by some analyst. 20 Some scholars like Alastair. Iain Johnston, Su
Changhe, and Fang Changping assessed China‟s soft power from the angle ofinternational institutions. Through China‟s more membership in international
13

Yuan Peng: New Changes and New Challenges. Global Times, April 5, 2006
Joshua Kurlantzick: China‟s Latest Export: soft power, from the Los Angeles Time, <http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-kurlantzick2sep02,0,645303.story?coll=la-opinion-rightrail.>15
Yan Xuetong& Xu Jin: Zhongmei Ruanshili Bijiao, “A Comparison of Soft Power Between China and the
U.S. ”Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, “Modern International Relations”, No.1, 2008. pp24-29.
16
Fang Changping: Zhongmei Ruanshili Bijiao Jiqi dui Zhongguo de Qishi, “A Comparison of Soft Powerbetween China and the US and its Implications for China”, Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi, World Economics andPolitics, No.7, 2007. pp.21-27.
17
Li Qingsi: Zhongmei Ruanshili Waijiao Bijiao Yanjiu: yi Dongnanya Diqu wei li, Comparative Study on China
and the U.S. s Soft Power Diplomacy, case study on the Southeast Asia, Jiaoxue yu Yanjiu, Teaching and Study,2009(2).
18
Joseph Nye: Soft Power matters in Asia, the Japan Times, Monday, Dec. 5, 2005. <http://search.japantimes.co.
jp/print/eo20051205a1, html.> Joshua Kanlantzick: China‟s growing influence in Southeast Asia, edited by
Riordan Roett& Guadalupe Paz, China‟s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere------implication for Latin
America and the United States, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 2008. p.194. China‟s Soft Power inSoutheast Asia: What does it mean for the region, and for the U.S., on June 13, 2006, the CEIP hosted a talk, as Pei
Minxin as the mediator with the interviewee of Joshua Kurlanzcik.
19
See Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang: Sources and Limits of China‟s Soft Power, Survival, Summer 2006. Also
see David Ting: China‟s soft power growth writ large, Wednesday, August 13, 2008. From the China Post,<http://www.chinapost.com.tw>
20
Chen Xiansi: Lun Zhongguo zai Dongnanya de Ruanshili, “China‟s soft Power in Southeast Asia”, Dongnanya
Yanjiu, “Southeast Asia Studies”, No. 6, 2006. pp.43-48.
14

5

institutions and the frequent debuts in world stage, they assessed China‟s soft power.
Fang thinks that a country‟s soft power is in a direct proportion to the capacity oflobby, mobilization, propaganda in international society. 21
Forth, some professional survey institutions or broadcasting organs did public polls
about China‟s soft power. An Asian soft power survey did by the Chicago Council on
Global Affairs made a public opinion survey on China‟s soft power and some othermain Asian players‟ soft power through the so-called overall “Soft Power Index”
which includes economics, culture, human capital, diplomacy, and politics. With
regards to China, the survey indicated that China‟s growing economics and militarymight have not yet been fully translated into the elements of soft power. This survey
approves that the US still remains to be most influential in perceptions of its
diplomatic, political, and human capital soft power. 22 An recent BBC World Service
poll, also did the similar survay on China‟s influence on the world. 23 This BBC
survey mainly look at polling data measuring China‟s popularity, in part because
popularity is a good first approximation of both how attractive a country appears andthe costs that are incurred by unpopular policies. 24 And some other institution like
Pew Global Attitudes Project released in July 2008, which surveyed 21 countries in all
regions of the world, surveyed China‟s soft power in Asia and other regions. Also, theFinancial Times and Harris Interactive also conduct the similar polls on China‟s soft
power.
In summary, previous literatures assessed China‟s soft power mainly based on two
windows (source and behavior) and employing three methods (comparative,
quantitative and qualitative). Let‟s have a deep look at these windows and approaches.
The first comparative method evaluate China‟s soft power by the comparison with the
U.S. and other major Asian players, pointing out those actors‟ declining soft power
leave room for China‟s rising soft power. The second method is from the perspectiveof China‟s foreign behaviors, examining Chinese government‟s efforts to spread theConfucius Institutions, to offer foreign aids, to participate in internationalorganizations and so on. The third method is calculating China‟s soft power source,
like China‟s GDP growth rate, human capital, and cultural assets. The fourth method
used by those professional survey projects, through designing various questions
related to China‟s soft power and doing the people-to-people interviews, evaluatedChina‟s soft power.
Certainly, the previous studies to some degree reflect China‟s soft power, and to somedegree they can explain China‟s soft power is rising or not. But there are research
limits and blind spots. Firstly, most studies, both in domestic and on abroad, abused
21

See Alastair. Iain. Johnston: Zhongguo Canyu Guoji Tizhi de Ruogan Sikao, Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi, World
Economy and politics, 1999, 7. Fang Changping: Zhongmei Ruanshili Bijiao Jiqi dui Zhongguo de Qishi, “A
Comparison of Soft Power between China and the US and its Implications for China”, Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi,
World Economics and Politics, No.7, 2007. pp.21-27. Su Changhe: zhongguo de ruanshili------yi guojizhidu yu
zhongguo de guanxi weili, “China‟s soft power------an example in the relationship between China andInternational institutions”, Guoji Guancha, International Observations, No. 2, 2007, pp.27-35. See also Su
Changhe: Zhongguo de Ruanshili.
22
Christopher B. Whitney& David Shambaugh: Soft Power in Asia: Result of a 2008 Multinational Survey of
Public Opinion, the Chicago Council in partner ship with East Asia Institution.
23
PIPA and Globescan, “22-Nation Poll Shows China Viewed Positively by Most Countries Including Its Asian
Neighbors,” available at <http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/BBC Worldpoll/030505/html/bbcpoll3.html>
24Nye, Soft Power, p. 18.
6the concept in source level and in behavioral level. This misunderstanding over theconcept of Chinese soft power accordingly misled the problematic approaches,through which it may fail to give a comprehensive and objective assessment on
China‟s soft power. Secondly, no matter the approach that is numbering China‟s soft
power resources or the one calculating Chinese government‟s behaviors in reinforcing
its soft power, this can not rush to the argument of China‟s rising soft power. To
evaluate one country‟s soft power, not only the quantitative sources should be taken
into account, but the quality as well. That is to what extent and in which level the soft
power influenced other actors and shaped others‟ preference. For example, a lot ofelite scholars and analysts in and out, when they diagnose China‟s soft power, theymentioned the attractiveness and success of the Chinese development model, but how
many countries adopted this model is a puzzle. In reality, to measure the appeal
depends on that if the desired goals have been realized or if shaped others preferences.
Even the comparative method only concerned some specific aspects of soft power,
arguing one part‟s advantages and the other‟s disadvantages. Although soft power is auniversal accepted topic on academic agenda, it enjoys different context and thediverging connotations. Therefore, this compare stands on an unequal footing.
Thirdly, the problem of the previous literature, when they assess China‟s soft power,
they focused their attention exclusively on the supply of China‟s soft power, such as
observing Chinese government‟s behavior or figuring China‟s recourse, discussing
China‟s soft power from the standpoint of China itself. To know China‟s soft power isrising or declining or to learn if China‟s soft power really outpaced other Asian
players, it is imperative to examine carefully the recipients of China‟s soft power
diplomacy in Asia.
This gap is to be filled through this research inattentively. In this paper, I challenge
the conventional interpretations stated by experts and scholars in international studies
within and without China. I do not intend to argue that their explanations arecompletely wrong; instead I just want to stuff up their missed theoretical perspectivethat is to turn to the investigation on the receiver of China‟s soft power diplomacy.
Evaluating the effectiveness of a country‟s foreign strategy cannot be separated from
how this country wields its national power, including both hard power and soft power,
to achieve its foreign policy goals. It is difficult to calculate one country‟s soft power.
In doing so, both the source and the behavior aspect must be included. What‟s more,
more in-depth, theoretically-informed, empirically-grounded work and case study is
terribly needed to assess China‟s soft power in Asia. This issue not only matter
China‟s further growth but also matters the forwarding of the Asian cooperation eventhe entire world politics. For in today‟s world roadmap, China is the big problem aswell as the hopeful solution. Before this thesis starts empirical analyses, it isnecessary to set up a conceptual framework on the term of soft power.
I. The conceptualization of soft power
In Nye‟s framework, soft power refers to the ability to obtain preferred outcomesthrough attraction rather than coercion or payment. 25 He further pointed out that the25

Nye: Soft power: the means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004; and Joseph S. Nye:7

soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where
it is attractive to others); its political values (when it lives up to them at home andabroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral
authority). The parenthetical conditions are the key to determining whether soft power
resources translate into the behavior of attraction that can influence others towardfavorable outcomes. For Nye‟s purpose, he chose the definition of power that is quite
close to the common usage implied by the dictionary------the ability to influenceothers to obtain the outcomes one wants. Of the three ways to affect others‟
behavior------coercion, payment, and attraction------he used the term soft power forthe third.
Nye‟s definition, based on the behavioral perspective, is descriptive and normative.
From his discussion, soft power resource includes culture, political values andpolicies. All of them can be generalized to culture alone covering two levels and two
forms. One is the inside idea level including values, thinking ways, principles andspirits which can be called as idea culture. The other is the outside institutional level
which is the socialization of culture. It is involved in national strategies, policies,
norms and rules which can be called as institutional culture. Anyway, these two sortsof culture are all source power, put it in other way, it is soft power resource. Even Nyehimself mentioned that “it is important not to confuse the resources that may produce
behavior with the behavior itself. Whether the possession of power resources actually
produces favorable outcomes depends on the context and the skills of the agent inconverting the resources into behavioral outcomes.”26 In context of international
relations, soft power is equal to the institutional culture covering strategies, policies,
norms and rules.
The mainstream Chinese understanding of soft power is based largely on theconceptual framework proposed by Nye, and they also adhere to Nye‟s parameter ofthe soft power. There is currently no consensus on the definition of soft power in
China. Chinese translations of soft power vary depending on the scholars based on
their respective discipline field; among the choices, ruanshili, ruanquanli, ruanliliang,
and ruanguoli are frequently used. Basically, two main schools of thought haveemerged around which the discourse on China‟s soft power is centered. The
mainstream view, held by China‟s leading sociologists and philosophers, is that “thecore of soft power is culture.” This is the cultural school. The minority view, held bysome international relations experts, does not deny the importance of culture but
focuses instead on how soft power resources are used, concluding that political poweris the core of soft power. This is the political school. 27 Actually, what the twoschools emphasized belong to different scopes. The former is embraced in the entity
narrative and source angle while the later is in relationship narrative and behavioral
angle. In a word, culture is the source and is source power while politics is the
behavior and is political power. Then the dispute between the two schools is not on an
Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York: Basic Books, 1990.
26
Watanabe Yasushi and David L. McConnell, edited: Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets ofJapan and the United States, with a foreword by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. M.E. Sharpe, pp. ix-xiv. 2008.
27
Yan Xuetong: Ruanshili de Hexin shi zhengzhishili, “The Core of Soft Power is Political Power”, Geshujijian.
2007(6).
8

equal footing. As a result, two definitions followed with the two schools. One is fromthe source perspective which refers soft power to Chinese culture, foreign policy, andinternational image, some particular ideas or policies and so on. 28 The otherdefinition that is from the behavioral angle defines soft power as the ability to getwhat you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment. 29
The cultural school has had the greatest impact on officers and policymaking: thecentral role of culture in the exercise of soft power has been embraced by China‟sleadership which is demonstrated in the official report and big potato‟s addresses. 30
As showed in President Hu Jintao‟s political report to the 17th Party Congress ofOctober 2007, he stressed the urgency of building China‟s cultural soft power
sufficiently to meet domestic needs and increase international competitiveness. Peng
Fuchun, National People‟s Congress deputy said: “we should never underestimate theimportance of building soft power as economic miracles is only one side of China‟srising in the world area.” 31 So to say, the cultural school‟s view which defines soft
power as culture was accepted by Chinese top leaders.
Over viewing the previous discussions about the term of soft power coined by Nye,
many analysts confused source with behavior through which soft power could be
defined, or they paid too much attention to rebut the difference of soft power and hard
28

Yu Xintian thinks that China‟s soft power consists of ideology, institution, strategy and policy. (Yu Xintian:Ruanshili Duanxiang, Waijiao Pinglun “Foreign Affairs Review”, No. 97, Aug. 2007.) Zheng Yongnian thinks that
the Chinese mode, multilateralism, economic diplomacy and neighboring policy indicated China‟s soft power.
(Zheng Yongnian & Zhangchi: Guojizhengzhi zhong de Ruanliliang yiji dui Zhongguo Ruanliliang de Guancha,
Shiji Jingji yu Zhengzhi, No.7, 2007.) Men Honghua thinks that culture, ideas, development mode, international
institutions and international image constitute the core element of soft power. (Meng Honghua: Zhongguo Ruanshili Pinggu Baogao, “Assessment and Report of China‟s Soft power”, Guoji Guancha, International Observer, No. 2,
2007.) Scholar Li Jie thinks that the soft power is culture, political values, ability of making the political agenda
and rules of international games, information power, and legitimate foreign policy with moral authority. In addition,
citizen‟s moral level, national image, national cohesion, political stability, leadership capacity and creative capacity
should not be ignored. (Li Jie: Tisheng Ruanshili dui Shixian Woguo Heping Jueqi Zhanlve de Zuoyong, Taiping
yan Xuebao, No. 12, 2005.)
29
Shen Suru thinks that soft power refers to the capability of attraction or benevolence rather than strains to attainits expected goals. It comes from the culture, values and internal and external policies. (Shen Suru: Kaizhan Ruan
shili yu Duiwaichuanbo de Yanjiu.) Ji Ling and Chen Shiping think that soft power is a sort of attractiveness through assimilating others rather than enforcing others to attain its goals. They view that one‟s soft power resource iscomposed of culture, values, policy, and international institutions. (Ji Ling& Chen Siping: Guoji Zhengzhi de Bian
qian yu Ruanquanli Lilun, “The Changes of International Politics and Soft Power Theory”, Waijiao Pinglun, oreign
Affairs Review, No. 96, Jun. 2007.) Liu AMing thinks that soft power is the ability to make others do what you want them to do, emphasizing the cooperation rather imposition. (Liu Aming: Soft power theory and China‟s peaceful rise, Taipingyang Xuebao, No.2, 2002.) Liu Zunyi argues that soft power is the ability to win friends and affectothers morally. This ability means to treat all states fairly, never abuse power, and behave oneself in a modest way.
(http://news.163.com/40819/0/0U52KV2K0001124T.html.) Su Changhe argues that soft power is evident in a state‟s international institute-building, agenda-setting, mobilization of coalitions and ability to fulfill commitments.
(Su Changhe: zhongguo de ruanshili------yi guojizhidu yu zhongguo de guanxi weili, “China‟s soft power------an
example in the relationship between China and International institutions”, Guoji Guancha, International Observations, No. 2, 2007, pp.27-35.)
30
See the political report to the 16 th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress in 2002, for in stance, points out:
“In today‟s world, culture intertwines with economics and politics, demonstrating a more prominent position androle in the competition for comprehensive national power.” Jiang Zemin, Political Report to the 16th CCP Congress, Nov. 8, 2002. President Hu Jintao made this clear at the central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting on
Jan. 4, 2006: “the increase in our nation‟s international status and influence will have to be demonstrated in hard
power such as economy, science and technology, and defence, as well as in soft power such as culture.” Ma Lisi
“guanyu woguo jiaqiang ruanshili jianshe de chubu sikao,” (Preliminary Thoughts on Accelerating China‟s SoftPower Building ), Dang De Wenxian (Literature of Chinese Comunist Party), No. 7, pp. 35-38. Hu again highlighted soft power in his political report to the 17 th Party Congress of Oct. 2007, stressing the urgency of building
China‟s cultural soft power sufficiently to meet domestic needs and increase international competitiveness.
31
Soft Power: A New Focus at China‟s Two Sessions, National People‟s Congress, People‟s Republic of China,
URL: www.npc.gov.cn.
9power. This will negatively lead to the disparity advices on the means of improving
China‟s soft power. The theoretical drawbacks may contribute to the failure inpolicy-making when Chinese government has become increasingly dependent on
experts in policy making, especially policy analysts of the growing number of official
and semi-official think-tanks. 32 Hence, the primary task to do in-depth research on
China‟s soft power is to clarify the concept not only adhering to the acknowledged
theoretical narrative but accommodating to the actual China conditions as well.
In this article, or turning to the actual Chinese case, before we come to talk about its
soft power, we have to make clear about a series of conceptions. Initially, what is
power? On one hand, from the source perspective, it falls into two categories: hard
power (yinshili) and soft power (ruanshili). Hard power refers to one country‟s
military building, GDP, territory, population, infrastructures, natural resources and thelike. They are countable and tangible, and easy to measure. However, in this context,
soft power refers to one country‟s culture which is uncountable, intangible anddifficult to assess. Both of them build up the country‟s comprehensive national
strength (zonghe guoli). On the other hand, from the behavioral perspective, a totallydifferent picture of power will be revealed. In this context, power is one‟s ability toaffect the behavior of others to get what one wants. Hard power is the use of coercion
and payment to get what they want while soft power is the ability to materialize goals
through attraction and appeal. The power defined in source term is an entity while inbehavioral term is a relationship. The comprehensive national strength is the resourceof these three powers based on behavioral lens.
In this research, Soft power (I would like to translate it into ruanquanli) based on the
behavioral lens, is a relationship rather than an entity, which means the ability to gain
what they want through appeal and attraction. The currency of soft power comes fromthe overall national strength. But considering in Chinese discourse, official documents
and top leader‟s speaks mainly refers soft power to culture which is based on thesource perspective. Then, this research will mainly investigate the role of soft powersource in China‟s soft power behavior. Let‟s have a deeper look at China‟s cultural
soft power. As I have mentioned above, soft power (ruanshili) in China is culture
which can be summarized in two levels. One is the idea strata indicated in China‟svalues, thinking ways, ideas and norms and the like. The other is institutional strata
revealed in its output of policies, strategies, rules, and institutions. This institutional
level of culture is the socialization of the culture in idea strata. In the discipline ofinternational relations, the cultural soft power prone to refer to the culture in
institutional level which is involved in one country‟s foreign policies, strategies anddiplomacy. What‟s more, in the globalization era, the significance of the resource
power like the cultural soft power relies upon its application in international relations.
To this point, the implementation of well-thought-out foreign policy can serve as acontributor to detect one country‟s soft power. Turning to China, a series of“harmony” concept like the peaceful rise, peaceful development, and the new arrivalof harmonious world which have been regarded as diplomatic strategies to realize
32

Wang Hongying& Lu Yen-Chung: The Conception of Soft Power and its Policy Implications: a Comparative
Study of China and Taiwan, Journal of Contemporary China (2008), 17(56), August, 425-447.
10

China‟s goal to be a great power, can be looked upon as important diplomatic cases to
examine the cultural soft power and its applications to national strategy.
Positioned in the discipline of international relations, this research will observe therole of institution-level cultural soft power in its soft power wielding. That‟s therelationship between source power and behavioral power, in other word; it‟s theobservation on the connection between culture in institutional level and soft power
behavior. But its focus will be on the assessment of the effectiveness of the soft power
diplomacy.
Before empirical analysis, this study tries to set up a conceptual framework on therelations between the idea of peaceful development and China‟s soft power wielding
in its rising process. Within this framework, this study examines a rising China‟sforeign policy toward its targeted region------Asia. Due to Beijing‟s soft power-based
foreign policies, the Asians has become an increasing harmonious environment for
Beijing to project a favorable national image, exert its political influence on regional
affairs, benefits its domestic developments, etc. Compared to the existing researches
which assess China‟s soft power through numbering its resources or calculating
Chinese government‟s behaviors, this study would not only cover both of them toassess China‟s soft power, but also move eyesight to the recipient to evaluate China‟s
soft power wielding in Asia.
A series puzzles will be resolved and cleared out through this research. What is
China‟s soft power? How China use its soft power? If China‟s soft power reallyeffective? Or if China‟s soft power really rising in Asia?
II. Case Studies
Taiwan is long China‟s greatest security challenge and most sensitive foreign policy
issue. It can be as a good sensor to detect China‟s actions and intentions in Asia. And
through examining Taiwan side‟s response toward China‟s soft power diplomacy, we
may know that if China‟s soft power really works in Asia. A lot of scholars or analysts
do not thinks there is soft power diplomacy in Taiwan issue. Taiwan is not part ofChina‟s charm offensive policies in Asia. However, as some policy advisor point out:
officially and unofficially, the development of the nation‟s soft power has been
regarded as a pressing task and is near the top of China‟s list of priority. 33 Then if
this soft power strategy is also utilized in the Taiwan issue or if it has won the acclaimof Taiwan and Taiwanese, if this marks China‟s soft power diplomacy create asecurity environment in Asia?
Why Taiwan?
First, the cross-strait relations can best serve to the goal of this research. This researchis to assess if China‟s soft power diplomacy really function in Asia. Then it has toknow about China‟s goals in Asia. As to the Taiwan issue, we could smell China‟s
intention clearly.
Second, mainland China‟s policy toward Taiwan experienced a transition from earlier
33

Pang Zhongying: The Beijing Olympics and China‟s Soft Power,<http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0904_olympics_pang.aspx>
11

times‟ hard means to recently soft ones. From “forcing the reunification” to“preventing the independence”, China began to launch a charm offensive against thepoliticians and people in the island. For example, inviting opposition party leaders tovisit the mainland, extending tuition benefits to Taiwanese studying at mainland
universities, and through a zero-tariff policy on imports of Taiwan‟s fruit, offeringexport incentive perks to farmers in the south of Taiwan (traditionally a pro-Taiwan
independence stronghold). Those fresh facts and figures provide with luxuriant andabundant empirical data to observe China‟s soft power diplomacy.
Third, to examine the implication of China‟s soft power diplomacy in Asia integration,it has to conduct research on some hot potato issues in Asia. So far, the Taiwan Strait
issue and the two Koreans are the No. one security issue in Asia-Pacific region. They
would play significant role in the progress of Asia cooperation. As a big variable to
Asia affairs, it is worthy of spending time and energy on such issue.
BackgroundTaiwan was cut off from the mainland China in 1949 when the Kuomintang or
Nationalist Party (KMT) was defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in a
civil war. Relations across the Taiwan Strait were characterized by one crisis after
another during the 1950s and 1960s. Since 1970s, China‟s basic Taiwan policy has
been two fold: peaceful reunification and non-reunification to the use of force. The
first feature of China‟s Taiwan policy is well-known: it ambitions at peacefully
reunifying Taiwan with the Chinese mainland along the lines of a formula------one
country, two system------that has been successfully implemented in Hong Kong since1997 and in Macau in 1999. This policy would turn Taiwan into a special
administrative region of the PRC (article 30 of the PRC constitution), granting theisland with a large autonomy, including in terms of external economic, trade andcultural relations. The second feature------the non-reunification to the use offorce------is not less important: it is aimed at containing and weakening
pro-independence and pro-separatist forces on Taiwan, in other words, at creating on
the island the conditions for a peaceful reunification of China.
However, it was Taiwan‟s democratization and its ambition to reintegrate the worldcommunity as a state entity distinct from the PRC that triggered in the early 1990s a
gradual remilitarization of the Taiwan Strait, a zone that had been partly demilitarized
after 1978. Shortly after Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui‟s unofficial visit to the US
in June 1995 and in the run-up to the first direct Taiwanese presidential elections inMarch 1996, the Chinese People‟s Liberation Army (PLA) launched a series of
missiles at targets in the East China Sea. The 1995-1996 episodes have been labeled
as another Taiwan Strait Crisis. But this coercive strategy make the cross-strait
relation suffer great regress.
It seems the active Chinese military pressure on Taiwan independence movement
today, as distinct from threat, does not appear to be a very promising option for China.
Analysts have argued that prospects for seizing Taiwan through amphibious assaults
are poor but noted that the Chinese submarine threat to Taiwan is possibly the mostserious. More importantly, a Chinese use of force against Taiwan is likely to cause a12major international crisis, and American military intervention may follow. Morecritical of all, such an unstable political environment will have catastrophic
consequences for China‟s economic modernization drive, there by hindering Beijing‟s
drive to truly global power status in the 21st century.
While China‟s military pressure and coercive strategy can not function effectively but
elicit reverse effect, Beijing‟s leadership and think-tank advisors began to concentrate
on a more immediate priority: preventing Taiwan from moving towards independence
and improving its international status. 34 Jiang Zemin‟s “eight point speech” madepublic in January 30, 1995 was the first indicator of this evolution, suggesting that thetwo sides across the Taiwan Strait start negotiations “on officially ending the state of
hostility between the two sides and accomplishing peaceful reunification step bystep.” 35 Then his successor President Hu Jintao again determined to change thisembarrassing situation, aiming to shift China‟s Cross-Strait policy with the indicatorof Hu‟s “four points” and the recently proposed “six points”. These are consistent
with Hu‟s speech in the 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress, when he declared,“On the basis of the one-China principle, let us discuss a formal end to the state of
hostility between the two sides, reach a peace agreement, construct a framework forpeaceful development of cross-Straits relations, and thus usher in a new phase ofpeaceful development.” 36 It seems that Beijing has adopted a peaceful offense, andeconomic and culture exchanges have developed rapidly in recent years.
Analysis
Since the cross-straits relations suffered great setbacks under the coercive strategy,
Chinese leaders and policy advisors turn to adopt a more flexible and realistic policy
toward Taiwan, through which Beijing has attracted the Taiwan side to the negotiatingtable and put the relations in right track. For instance, due to the efforts of both the
Chinese Communist Party on the mainland and the Kuomintang in Taiwan, highofficials from the two parties visited each other and established a mechanism to work
toward reconciliation and handle practical matters. Recently, cross-strait relations
made great progress, directly resulting in the realization of direct links of transport,
trade and postal services between mainland China and Taiwan. This was a historicalachievement. 37
Now, with fewer threats in the air, there would be more room for soft power------theability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment.
Hence, China needs to present itself as a tolerant and benign government to the
Taiwanese masses today. China must win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanesemasses if it hopes to take over the country peacefully. I‟d like to argue that Beijing‟s
policy toward Taiwan take turns with coercive strategy and soft power strategy which
are the two sides of the same coin: the attractive logic is embedded in coercive
34

Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Cross Strait Relations-What Role for the European Union?” ECAN Policy Brief #4.
See Jiang Zemin‟s speech, “Continue to Promote the Reunification of China”,<http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/zlzx/zlzx0.asp?offset=150&zlzx_m_id=1527>
36
Hu Jintao, “The 17th Party Congress Political Report,” Xinhua, Oct. 24, 2007, <http://www.china.com.cn /17 da/2007-10/24/content_9119449.htm>
37
Zhang Quanyi, “Interpreting China‟s New Taiwan Policy”, Global Survey Published, January 15, 2009.
<http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2009/01/15/interpreting_chinas_new_taiwan_policy/5293/>
35

13

strategy. By 2005, with the passage by the PRC National People‟s Congress of theAnti-Secession Law [fan guojia fenlie fa], President Hu had become associated with
an approach to dealing with Taiwan embodied in the dictum “ying de geng ying, ruande geng ruan” [the hard harder, the soft softer]. 38 With this strategy, the PRC has
signaled its intention to make its sticks more menacing while offering carrots that it
hopes will be more alluring. An observer pointed out China‟s direct military coercion
has been replaced by indirect three-in-one approaches that draw on psychology, themedia and law, such as the concept of diplomatic truce, panda diplomacy and socialand economic exchange transmit the good intention of the mainland. 39 For Beijing,
Taiwan is a vital issue of unresolved sovereignty and the most important considerationin its diplomatic policy. Beijing‟s adoption of soft power diplomacy is a result of
accumulated frustration and failure of its coercive strategy. China‟s peaceful policy inthe whole framework of its foreign policy, in essence, comes from its Confucian andhumanistic mindset toward conflict management, exemplified by the saying “blood isthicker than water,” and his philosophy of concern for others. 40
There are several indicators embodied in the China‟s soft power diplomacy. The firstis the concept of China‟s harmonious society and harmonious world, which are thedesired domestic order and international order China would dedicate to construct. The
peaceful development idea served in the above mentioned guidelines imply that China
would use few coercive strategies in the cross-strait relation. The second is promotionof economic and cultural exchanges and peaceful negotiations to end the militaryconfrontation across the Taiwan Strait. The third is reservation of the use of force as alast resort. China has reiterated, in a non-ambiguous way, that to safeguard the one
China principle it will not give up the use of force should the situation require it. 41
The fourth is making full use of every quasi-official platform; CPC leaders received
various high level Pan-blue Coalition officials and tried to establish mutual trust andpositive dealing with them. Fifth, China has also publicly extended friendly gestures
towards the Pan-Green camp, including prominent Democratic Progressive Party(DPP) figures. This included inviting some DPP government leaders to attend in the
opening ceremony of Beijing Olympic Games. 42 As President Hu has said: “If the
DPP could change its Taiwan independence stance, we would make a positive
response to them.” 43 Sixth, cooperation closely with Taiwan‟s schedule, themainland has also implemented a series of preferential policies that will serve andprotect Taiwanese legitimate rights and interests, support their economic development,
and practically benefit common Taiwanese students, farmers, workers andbusinessmen. 44
38“President Hu offers six proposals for peaceful development of cross-Strait relationship,” Xinhua, Dec.31,
2008, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/31/content_10585635.htm>
39
Yu Tsung-chi, “The Shift in China‟s Taiwan Policy,” February 11, 2009 “Max”.
40
Ibid.
41
Zhao Suisheng, Taiwan: From Peaceful Offense to Coercive Strategy, edited by Yong Deng& Fei-ling Wang,“In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World”, Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1999.
42
Unfortunately, no DPP leaders came to the ceremony because of their political and ideological stands. Such avisit will make them be criticized as “pro-China” and put them in a very embarrassing situation in domestic
politics.
43“President Hu offers six proposals.”
44“Wang Yi Declared 10 Preferential Policy towards Taiwan Facing International Financial Crisis,”14But if this soft means have effectively greased the cross-strait relation, it has todiagnose the recipient of Taiwan‟s responses including the degree of adjustment of
Taiwan‟s behavior and preference, the type and pattern of cooperation they selected,
and the amount of sacrifice in terms of relative capabilities toward China‟s soft
power-based policy.
Inattentive Conclusion
China‟s has accomplished impressive gains in its overall level of soft power. Its
successful development model has won global admiration while aiding in thedevelopment of a new affinity between China and the rest of the world. Its cultural
assets attract a great foreign enrolment and the Confucius Institution spreading at theend of nowhere. Its “harmonious world” concept has led to China‟s more active andresponsible participation in international affairs, which is increasing China‟s agenda
setting ability and improving its national image. Its international image bettered off inmany areas of the world. However, the further expansion of China‟s soft power ishistorically and realistically constrained by its domestic dilemmas and international
factors.
Domestically, many obstacles lie in the way of China‟s strengthening its soft power
influence. The traditional image of China as a revolutionary communist country witha communist party still in power is a psychological and ideological obstacle inaccepting China as a regional benign hegemony. The development framework andclear policy of an ideal mix of soft power resources to serve its foreign-policy agenda
remains a daunting challenge for Beijing. As far as cultural attractiveness is concerned,
China has great resources, but admits it is not strong in marketing its cultural products.
China‟s development model was praised by many countries, but how many followerof that model remains a puzzle. Moreover, China‟s model also faces serious
socioeconomic challenges at home, as the government is increasing pressed to provide
adequate public goods and services in many societal respects. The widening income
gap, withering state and widespread corruption call into question sustainability andlong-time appeal of China‟s development and the so-called Beijing Consensus. As tothe diplomacy, the lack of meaningful political reform, coupled with Beijing‟sfriendship with dictators in the developing world, creates a legitimacy problem for
Beijing to cope with. As Nye has pointed out, state most likely to project soft power in
an information age are those whose dominant ideas are closer to global norms which
now emphasize liberalism, pluralism and autonomy. 45 It means such soft powershould be characteristic of nationality as well as universality. 46 Although China
actively participates in international institution and is frequently present in the tablediscussing world affairs, its authoritarian political system of the Communist Party
dictatorship lags far from the universally-accepted values. However, this is a salient
aspect of soft power. Then, another factor hinders Beijing‟s efforts to mobilize soft
power is the lack of coherence in promoting its foreign policy. Beijing‟s ability to<http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/gzyw/gzyw1.asp?gzyw_m_id=1806>
45
Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power in the Information Age”, luncheon lecture, Harvard University, 2 May 2000.
46
Guo Shuyong, “the New Internationalism and China‟s Soft Power Diplomacy”, International Observer, 2007,(2).
15

pursue a coherent and conciliatory foreign policy is crucial for advancing a benign
and attractive image to its neighbors and around the world. In so doing, however,Beijing often finds itself burdened by history and distracted by rising nationalist
sentiments. Problems with internal consistency in foreign policy also explain why
China has not been able to reap significant gains in cross-strait relations. Although
China extended its olive branch and launched charm offensive to the island, Beijing‟s
influence still far short of achieving reunification with Taiwan. Indeed, the vast
majority of Taiwan‟s citizens prefer a status quo which neither invites Chinese
coercive (or worse) nor requires unification with the Communism mainland. But a
combination of Beijing‟s soft- and hard-power instrument in recent years has
stemmed the political fortunes of the pro-independence movement in Taiwan for thetime being. 47
In an addition, Chinese soft power is also limited by the international system itself inthat the rise of China is occurring at a time when the international system isundergoing a structural transformation, which inevitably complicates China‟s further
efforts to project its soft power. China‟s rising influence generates a dilemma for theinternational community. On one hand, China is shepherding its resources for the longterm goal of being a dominant player in Asia and beyond. As Beijing attains its goals
in this pursuit, it will have enormous and potentially negative implications for thecurrent balance of power in the region. Nations balance against threats. This rise will
have implications for other actors‟ competitiveness and diplomatic toolbox. On theother hand, many aspects of China‟s foreign policy which substantiate its soft
power------greater acceptance of norms governing international relations, peacefulsettlement of disputes, mutually beneficial economic ties, and recognition of the needto address non-traditional and transnational security problems, peaceful development,
harmonious Asia, harmonious world------are increasingly convergent with approaches
advocated by the vast majority of the international community. How the major power,
and especially Washington, responds to this dilemma will be a major factor shaping
the stability of Asia and restrain China‟s further projecting of its soft power. Also,
concerned major powers and other regional powers like Japan, Taiwan should also
step up their consultations about China. Beijing is coming to realize, just as
Washington and Tokyo do, that for every international action it takes, an equal andopposite reaction will occur. 48 The rise of Chinese power no matter soft or hard
generates the global response that Beijing cannot fully control and that may not be in
its interest. At the same time, some problems such as its persistent historical disputes
with Asian neighbors, various China threat theories, the so-called China‟s
Neo-Colonialism in Africa, and the increased vigilance from the other players havealready began to challenge Beijing‟s soft power effectiveness in Asia.
In summary, because of these problems, we can not rightly conclude how willingly
neighboring countries will accept China‟s soft power and rashly jump to theconclusion of China‟s rising soft power in Asia. Such judgments are often exaggerated,
one-sided and misled in the West and else where. The discourse of China‟s soft power
47

Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang: Sources and Limits of China‟s Soft Power, Survival, Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer
2006.pp. 17-36.
48
David M. Lampton: The Faces of Chinese Power, Foreign Affairs, January/February. 2007.
16

is rising has easily overestimated China‟s real capacity and underestimated China‟s
problems and difficulties. Given the constant tensions between its foreign policy
objectives and the still-nascent soft power resource, China still has a long way to go
before becoming a true global leader. Anyway, despite such setbacks, China‟s soft
power diplomacy is sure to continue, and it will present American and Asianpolicy-makers with both opportunities and challenges. Also, it is foreordained to be a
key variable to observing the progressing Asian cooperation.
To some degree, this study can predict that as China continues its rising process; thosechallenges will not disappear in the near future. In order to construct a real
harmonious world and inform the world of its peaceful development, Beijing has toadopt more creative and carefully-designed foreign policies, and put more efforts todevelop and wield its soft power in its rising process.
Implications for Asia Cooperation
Asians (and analysts of Asia) have begun to focus on a new level of interaction: soft
power. China‟s rising soft power has certainly had academic and practical
implications in Asia and for Asia cooperation, which are reflected in the various
scholarly debates about the two. Several factors account for the improvement ofChina‟s image and rise of its influence in Asia. The most important is rapid economic
growth. A little less obvious, but equally important factor is China‟s regional policy.
Currently, China‟s Asia policy is summarized as: pursuing good neighbourly relations
and partnership with neighbors and fostering a harmonious secure and prosperous
neigbourly environment. Chinese leaders and diplomats use three Chinese word todescribe it : anling means make the region peaceful and secure, fuling means pursuitof regional common development or win-win situation, muling means goodneighbourliness and friendship. In other words, China has offered Asian countries: (1)peaceful development (2) equality and mutual trust (3) mutual benefit or win-win
partnership and (4) common or cooperative security. 49
China and Asian cooperation is an evolving concept, the questions of how Asian
cooperation influence China‟s internatioal behavior and how China‟s external
behaviors shape the process of Asian cooperation is intensely interwined. As previous
studies have shown, China has been exhibiting a change in its attitude toward Asia
since the mid-1990s: it regards Asia as a core srategic region and has actively
implemented regional policies toward the continent, which had not been the case in
the past. Based on its size, strategic location, and rising economic and military power,
China has become the leading regional power in Asia; and factors of geography andinterest have made Asia the main internaitonal arena where the Chinese government
has always exerted influence. Reflecting its rising stature and influence in Asia, China
has become a key player in dealing with regional hot spots. China‟s decision on
Taiwan by military means or by peaceful means cast the decisively role in over theentire Asian security environment. China is rapidly emerging as the engine of growthin Asia, which affords it increasing influence and leverage. 50 For instance, China has
49
50

Pang Zhongying, “China‟s Asia Policy.”
Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel: China‟s New Diplomacy, Foreign Affairs, Volume 82 No. 6.
17begun propagating various diplomatic ideas such as: responsible power, new security
concept, peaceful rise and development, harmonious world and harmonious Asia, andhas implemented a good neigbor policy to support these notions. These efforts havemitigated the concerns of neighboring countires and warranted China‟s rise as aregional power. 51 China‟s closer integration with economies in the region, alongwith a trend toward more assertive political and diplomatic manner, has contributed togreat optimism for the economic and political regionalization in East Asia. China‟s
active participation in international institutions creates more chances to elicit
cooperation on key issues. Moreover, China now brings more resources and influence
to the table. Beijing‟s lead role in addressing the Korean nuclear crisis is one such
example. When come to the Asia community issue, the bloc should cover all actors inthis region. However, owing to the awkward situation in the cross-strait relation,
Taiwan is excluded from essentially all regional integration efforts in recent years.
Sadly, talking about Taiwan in the context of regional integration (or anything else forthat matter) remains a taboo for many Asian governments when China is in the sameroom. But if China‟s further soft power diplomacy can alleviate the confrontation,
attracting the two parts on the negotiation table, this will grease the cowheel of the
Asia community building.
In historical retrospect, China was the dominant regional power both politically,
economically and culturally. China had substantial soft power influence and had been
the hegemonic power in the East Asian region with tributory relationships with otherneigboring countires in the Qing dynasty and before. And culturally East Asia region
was also heavily influenced by Chinese traditional culture including language andphilosophies. Similar historical and cultural ties hold true for other countries inSoutheast Asia and for Vietnam in particular. This predestinates China‟s ongoing rolein Asia‟s prospect. The source of China‟s soft power in Asia lies in Chinese
civilization, which allows China to take a leading role in creating a new difinition of
so-called Asian values. Put differently, Chinese history and civilization are importantresources because they can be reconstructed and reinvented to help creat an imaged
Asian identity and values. 52 Thus, taking advantage of its history and culturallegacies, China can attempt to increase its soft power by creating common, imagined
identities and values for Asians which is of paramount significance for the further
Asian cooperation and the integration. For China, it is a possible task to assume
because Chinese civilization and history transcend mere representation of a single
national history. The rise of China is once again making it possible to pursue Asianvalues based on Chinese civilization, at least in Confucian East Asian countries. As
some scholar mentioned, to speack of China‟s role in East Asian regional integration,
it is unavoiable to talk about China‟s soft power. This is because soft power in termsof cultural and political influence, and diplomatic relations are indispensible elements
for the region to accept China‟s leadership role in building and influencing policy in
51

Jianwei Wang, “China‟s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Deng Yong and Fei-ling Wang (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005),pp. 159-200; Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, “China‟s Regional Strategy,” in Power Shift, ed. Shambaugh, pp. 48-68.
52
Young Nam Cho and Jong Ho Jeong: “China‟s Soft Power: discussion, resources, and prospects”, Asia Survey,
Vol. XLVIII, No.3. May-June 2008.
18

the region. 53 To China, no matter what it want to be in shaping policies in the region,
political and economic power is indispensible, but soft power is imperative. Softpower diplomacy, an aspect of regional cooperation in Asia, can act as a kind ofadhesion to carry out the cooperation.
In many ways, China‟s new appreciation of soft power has already had impact on its
domestic and foreign policy. It has given the Chinese government a new way toconceptualize and exercise power both at home and abroad. It has inspired thedevelopment of new policy instruments. It has added new considerations to Chinese
calculations of the costs and benefits of particular policy choices. Furthermore, both
Chinese and foreign observers seem to believe that China‟s new policy initiatives
guided by the concept have actually led to greater soft power for China in theinternational context. And in order for China to play a larger role as a new hegemonic
driving force in regional integration in East Asia, China still needs to further
accumulate soft power.
To assess China‟s soft power diplomacy in Asian matters for the contemporary China
study and Asian regional cooperation because it gives us a new perspective to observe
the roles, interests and norms of China involved, assists us in understanding how
China‟s soft power determine the shape and speed of regional integration, and allow
us to speculate on the future of the region. Meanwhile, we may know if China‟s soft
power is rising or not. In that no matter China‟s soft power is rising or not in Asia, thiswill pose as a new variable for the further Asian cooperation and integration, evenmatters for the whole world politics. China‟s future role is vital but hard to define.
However, one thing is sure that China will contribute to act as a facilitator andenforcer of Asian regional cooperation.

53

Li Xing& Zhang Shengjun: China and Regional Integration in East Asia: Opportunities, Constraints andChallenges, CCIS (Centre for Comparative Integration Studies) Research Series Working Paper No.9.ISSN:
1902-9718.
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