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Reportby the Comptroller
and Auditor General

Ministry of Defence

Investigation into
military flying training

HC 2635SESSION 2017–2019

4 SEPTEMBER 2019

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Ministry of Defence

Investigation into
military flying training
Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General
Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed on 3 September 2019
This report has been prepared under Section 6 of the
National Audit Act 1983 for presentation to the House ofCommons in accordance with Section 9 of the Act
Gareth Davies
Comptroller and Auditor General
National Audit Office
2 September 2019

HC 2635 | £10.00

The Ministry of Defence (the Department) is not currently meeting its stated targets forthe number of trained aircrew it needs, with students taking longer to complete training
than expected. Since 2012, the Department has introduced new core flying training,
Phase 2 of the training process, through working with its contractor Ascent Flight Training(Management) Limited. We investigated the performance of this new training system within
the context of the Department’s full training system and how the Department plans tomeet its increasing aircrew requirements.
Investigations
We conduct investigations to establish the underlying facts in circumstanceswhere concerns have been raised with us, or in response to intelligence that
we have gathered through our wider work.

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Contents
Key facts 4What this investigation is about 5
Summary 8
Part One
Background 12
Part Two
Performance of the Military Flying
Training System 20
Part Three
Addressing flying training shortfalls 30
Appendix One
Our investigative approach 36
Appendix Two
Response to our 2015
recommendations 38
The National Audit Office study teamconsisted of:Loreen Ash, Thomas White andEmma Willson, under the directionof Jeremy Lonsdale.
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Twitter: @NAOorguk4 Key facts Investigation into military flying training

Key facts

257

45%

94%

average number of aircrew
the Ministry of Defence (theDepartment) needs to complete
Phase 2 training each year in thesix years to 2018-19

average annual shortfall between
the number of aircrew completing
Phase 2 training against the
Department’s requirement in thesix years to 2018-19

percentage of the 965 Phase 3
front-line training places ﬁlled by
students completing Phase 2,
2015-16 to 2018-19

Meeting the Department’s aircrew requirements
7.1 years

average time for Royal Air Force fast-jet pilots to complete thethree-phase training process against the Department’s 3.9-year
optimum, as at July 20191

145

number of Royal Air Force students waiting to start Phase 2 training
against a target of 26 students, as at July 2019

April 2021

Department’s expected date to meet its target for the number ofstudents waiting to start Phase 2 training

2023

Department’s expected date to have all training components inplace to meet its increased aircrew requirements

The Military Flying Training System (MFTS)
76

shortfall between the Department’s latest requirement for aircrew
completing Phase 2 training (342) against the number which Ascent
Flight Training (Management) Limited (Ascent) were contracted todeliver (266) for 2018-19

102

the number of new aircraft Ascent and the Department havebrought into service, across seven different aircraft types

94%

current percentage readiness of MFTS helicopter andfixed-wing training2£514 million

amount received by Ascent from the Department for the MFTS,
as at 31 March 2019

Notes
1
Target time assumes students wait no more than one month between training courses.
2

Other training, advanced jet and rear crew, has been in place since 2012.

Investigation into military flying training What this investigation is about 5

What this investigation is about

1
In the next 10 years, the Ministry of Defence (the Department) plans to invest£46 billion purchasing and supporting front-line aircraft, including the helicopters and fastjets used by the Royal Navy, British Army and Royal Air Force (RAF). Every five years,
through Strategic Defence and Security Reviews, the government sets the strategic
context which informs the Department’s assessment of the aircraft and aircrew required.
It most recently conducted a review in 2015. This increased current aircrew requirements
compared with the previous 2010 review, leading to a 29% (76) rise in students needing
to complete training in 2018-19. This increase resulted from, for example, introducing two
further Typhoon squadrons; accelerating the purchase of F-35 jets; and committing tobuy new maritime patrol aircraft and remotely piloted aircraft.
2
To operate this equipment, the Department must train enough aircrew with the rightskills. These aircrew include pilots, observers and weapons specialists to fly the aircraftand operate its systems. For aircrew to be able to serve in front-line squadrons, theymust complete a three-phase training process (Figure 1 overleaf).
3
The Department currently provides Phase 2 – core flying training – through arange of providers. They include Ascent Flight Training (Management) Limited (hereafter
Ascent) as the principal partner, with whom it contracted in 2008 to design, introduce
and then provide, with the Department, a new Phase 2 training system. This became
known as the Military Flying Training System (MFTS).
4
Since 2012, the Department and Ascent have been transitioning to MFTS fromlegacy training. The Department considers the MFTS, alongside changes to frontline aircraft, to represent the largest transformation of UK military flying in more thana generation. Through the MFTS, the Department aims to:•optimise aircrew training time;•close the gap between the skills that aircrew have on finishing Phase 2 training andthose they need to operate front-line aircraft; and•reduce the overall cost of flying training.

Source: National Audit Office

Aptitude testing for aircrew
training is run by the RoyalAir Force on behalf of thethree front-line commands.

Students are selected foraircrew training based on a
range of aptitude tests, suchas hand to eye coordination.

Students receive
initial military training
provided by each of thethree front-line commands.

Phase 1
(initial)

Students
who pass
progress
accordingto ability
and militaryneed.

Rear-crew

Helicopter

Multi-engine

Students learn basic manoeuvring
through to night and mountain flying.

Students learn to fly large,
multi-engine aircraft, such astransport aircraft.

Students learn to navigate and operate systems to support transport,
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance missions.

Students learn flying basics
such as navigation andhandling in light aircraft.

Elementary flying

Advanced jet

Basic and advanced jet: students learn more advanced
manoeuvring and tactics in more powerful aircraft, withadvanced training focusing on handling, night flying, low-level
navigation, and weapons and tactics training on a jet aircraft.

Basic jetStudents learn the basics, with more detailed training related to their future role

Phase 2
(core flying)

The aircrew training model involves three phases with separate training for different aircraft and aircrew

Figure 1
Military flying training model, as at July 2019

Figure X shows

Students who
pass progress...

Aircrew ready tooperate in front-line
squadrons within theRoyal Navy, British Armyor Royal Air Force.

Students trained on
specific front-line aircraft(such as a Typhoon fast-jet
or an Apache attack
helicopter) or systems within
front-line commands.

Phase 3
(operational)

6 What this investigation is about Investigation into military flying training

Investigation into military flying training What this investigation is about 7

5
Ascent has been contracted to provide the Department’s earlier 2010 Review
aircrew requirements, rather than the higher requirements of the 2015 Review.1 It is
paid for designing and delivering the MFTS, and then for making available training
components across a range of training packages, including for helicopters and fast
jets. These courses cannot be provided if either the Department or Ascent, or their
supply‑chains, do not meet their contractual responsibilities. As shown in Figure 7, these
responsibilities include providing flight simulators and aircraft, and managing airfield
services. As at 2015, the Department had forecast the MFTS would cost £3.2 billion
during the 25-year contract, and up to 31 March 2019 Ascent had received £514 million.2
6
In 2015, we reported that full introduction of the MFTS had been delayed nearly
six years with the expectation that it would operate at full capacity by December 2019.3
This followed several events which affected the Department’s original assumptions andwhich took time to resolve. They included the Strategic Defence and Security Review
2010 approximately halving the number of student recruits each year, and reductions infunding affecting how the Department would purchase aircraft. In our 2015 report werecommended that the Department better incentivise Ascent to meet the MFTS aims,
establish a baseline against which to assess performance, and examine the time and cost
implications of increasing training capacity across the system. Subsequently, the Strategic
Defence and Security Review 2015 increased the demands for trained personnel.
7This investigation follows up recent Parliamentary concerns about the MFTS.
It builds on our 2015 report by describing what has been delivered, while setting thiswithin the broader context of the Department’s current aircrew requirements and its
overall training system. It describes:•

the Department’s aircrew requirements, the three-phase training process and how
this is performing (Part One);•

what has been delivered as part of the MFTS and the system’s performance(Part Two); and•the Department’s actions to address flying training shortfalls (Part Three).

8
We conducted our fieldwork in June 2019 by interviewing Department and Ascentstaff; reviewing available data on training and aircrew requirements; and examining
performance reports. Appendix One describes our approach. We do not consider thevalue for money of military flying training.
9
As the report highlights, in a number of places we identified significant gaps andinconsistencies in data used centrally by the Department to manage the training process.
The central team, which oversees Phase 2 training, also oversees RAF training, with Navyand Army Commands having responsibility for their respective students. Centrally, theDepartment does not collate data from front-line commands other than the RAF. This
includes, for example, on the time students take to complete their three-phase training.
1
2

3

The Department has taken time to consider how it will deliver the increased requirements set by the 2015 Review.
Figures provided by Ascent. They cover the design and delivery of the MFTS, alongside debt repayments for fast jets
and fixed-wing training private finance initiatives. They do not include more than £400 million of Departmental capital
repayments direct to sub-contractors for aircraft and other infrastructure to support training.
Comptroller and Auditor General, Ministry of Defence: Military flying training, Session 2015-16, HC 81, National Audit
Office, June 2015.

8 Summary Investigation into military flying training

Summary

Key findings
Meeting the Ministry of Defence’s (the Department’s) aircrew requirements
10 The Department does not currently have the aircrew it needs. The Department
does not have accessible historical data on the students completing the entire three‑phasetraining process. However, using aircrew shortfalls as a proxy shows it has experienced
significant personnel gaps for several years. For example, as at April 2019, the Royal Air
Force (RAF) – the front-line command requiring the most aircrew – was 331 personnel(18%) below its pilot requirement (paragraph 1.3).
11 In the six years to 2018-19, the Department experienced an average 45%(125 student) shortfall in aircrew completing their Phase 2 training each year.
Students must complete Phase 2 training before progressing to the Phase 3 operational
training. In its worst year (2018-19), 49 students completed Phase 2, an 86% shortfall
against the Department’s current aircrew requirements. In its best year (2015-16),
182 students completed Phase 2, a 21% shortfall (paragraph 1.8 and Figure 3).4
12 Students completing Phase 2 training filled 94% (910) out of 965 Phase 3
operational training places between 2015-16 and 2018-19. To complete their training
and be ready for service, students learn to fly front-line aircraft, such as Typhoon fast
jet or Apache helicopter, during their Phase 3 training run by front-line commands.
If the Department meets its stated requirement for 424 students completing Phase 2
training in 2022-23, it will need to increase its Phase 3 training capacity so students cancomplete their flying training (paragraph 1.9).
13 In the past two years, students have taken longer to complete training
than expected. Centrally, the Department does not collect data from across frontline commands on the time students take to complete their three-phase training. Data
from the RAF show that as at July 2019 training of its fast-jet pilots took an average of
7.1 years, compared with the Department’s optimum time of 3.9 years. The Department
told us that while waiting to take up courses students fill other roles, such as in air traffic
control, where they help deliver services and develop their personal effectiveness. The
data also show that 145 RAF students were due to start their Phase 2 training, having
waited an estimated average of 90 weeks, compared with an expected position of
26 students waiting 12 weeks.5 The Department plans to have an appropriate numberof students awaiting the next stage of training to ensure that courses do not have gaps.
45Phase 2 currently consists of aircrew being trained through the Military Flying Training System (the MFTS), but also
through other training routes.
We were unable to provide full assurance over the data.

Investigation into military flying training Summary 9

It recognises this is not currently the case and is seeking to correct this situation.
It recognises that extended waiting times can reduce the amount of time aircrew areavailable on the front line during their career. In 2018‑19, fewer than 10 students left
the Armed Forces before completing their flying training (paragraphs 1.10 to 1.13 andFigures 4 and 5).

Performance of the MFTS
14 The Department and Ascent now have in place most of the training
components needed for the MFTS to operate fully by April 2020. Ascent and theDepartment have:•brought into service 102 aircraft of seven different types;•

provided around 20 flight simulators and other training devices;•

built or refurbished new aircraft hangars and training facilities; and•designed and certified 36 courses out of a planned total of 67.

Advanced jet and rear crew training has been provided since 2012, with the remaining
training – for helicopter and fixed-wing students – now 94% ready and expected to be
fully introduced from December 2019.6 The MFTS will then provide training as designed tomeet the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 requirement from April 2020. This
represents only a further three-month slippage on top of the six‑year delay we reported
on in 2015. The Department considers this a good outcome considering the past positionof the programme. The first students to be trained entirely via the MFTS courses are
expected to graduate in September 2019 (paragraphs 1.15, 2.4 and Figures 8 and 9).
15 As at 31 March 2019, Ascent had received £514 million from the Department
for introducing the MFTS and starting to deliver courses. As well as some debt
repayments, this sum includes £145 million (30%) relating to fixed payments fordesigning the system, managing training courses and maintaining courseware. It also
includes £245 million (52%) for ensuring the training components, such as the aircraft
and simulators, were available for courses. Historical delays introducing the MFTS meant
Ascent did not initially receive £15 million where training components were not in place.
The Department was eventually liable for paying Ascent £10 million of this sum given it
had failed to fulfill its responsibilities or remained contractually liable to make payments.
As training components have been introduced, Ascent has delivered an increased
number of courses (paragraph 1.16 and Figure 6).

6

The fixed-wing package includes elementary flying and multi-engine training, which have been fully introduced, andbasic jet training, which the Department and Ascent expect to be ready for training use from November 2019.

10 Summary Investigation into military flying training

16 As at 31 March 2019, 44 out of the 369 planned MFTS courses had beencancelled due to one or other party failing to fulfil its responsibilities. Neither the
Department nor Ascent could easily provide a full list of delayed courses with underlying
reasons, in part because the different roles and responsibilities make it difficult todetermine the causes. Of the 44 cancelled courses, 28 related to the Department not
fulfilling responsibilities such as not providing sufficient air traffic controllers or because
runways were being refurbished. Other reasons have included:•

insufficient qualified instructors provided by the Department: For eachtraining type, the Department has agreed to provide a proportion of the required
instructors. This includes 75% of helicopter instructors and all live-flying, fast-jet
instructors. However, there are currently military instructor shortfalls which the
Department and Ascent are working to resolve; and•availability of aircraft provided by Ascent and the Department: Ascent and its
subcontractors provide all aircraft apart from the Hawk T2, which the Department
provides through BAE Systems. Apart from helicopters, aircraft availability has
been poor across the system. For example, between April and July 2019, Ascent
did not provide the elementary flying, rear crew and multi-engine aircraft required.
The Department provided an average of 12 advanced jet aircraft per day, against
a required 18 per day.

In addition, the Department chose not to provide students for 10 of the planned 369
courses (paragraphs 2.12 to 2.20 and Figures 10 to 12).

Looking ahead
17 The Department does not yet have approved plans for every training
package needed to deliver its current Phase 2 aircrew training requirements.
Ascent has been contracted to provide, through the MFTS, the Strategic Defence
and Security Review 2010 aircrew requirements. These requirements subsequently
increased following the 2015 Review. Therefore, the MFTS was designed to provide
76 fewer trained aircrew than the Department’s 2018-19 requirement. Since the 2015
Review, the Department has been considering and testing its options, developing
business cases and putting additional commercial arrangements in place. For example,
in July 2019, it agreed to expand the MFTS helicopter training capacity. The Department
expects to make decisions for rear crew and multi-engine training by the end of 2019.
As such, the Department expects to start incrementally increasing the number of trained
students from 2020, with a fully expanded system from 2023 (paragraphs 1.18 and 3.6).
18 To increase the number of trained aircrew, the Department uses otherproviders outside the MFTS. In 2019-20, it expects to train 125 aircrew in other ways,
such as through civilian training providers, at a cost of £15 million. Students following
these routes need to complete additional military training, which the Department
recognises may cost more than if those students completed the MFTS training(paragraphs 3.4 and 3.5, and Figure 13).

Investigation into military flying training Summary 11

19 The Department has not yet fully addressed the recommendations in our2015 report to ensure it maximises the potential benefits of the MFTS. Our 2015
report recommended that the Department should improve both the MFTS commercial
arrangements and performance information across the training process. In June 2019,the Department and Ascent formalised joint transformation projects to improvecommercial incentives and performance data. In particular:•

Commercial incentives. Ascent and the Department are discussing revisedcommercial terms to incentivise increases in the number of students completing
training, reductions in training times and decreases in costs. Ascent continues to be
paid primarily for service availability, with a small proportion of payments – £7.4 million(1.4%) as at March 2019 – for completing courses (paragraphs 3.7 to 3.13).

•

Whole-process performance information. Our 2015 report recommended thatthe Department establish a baseline to measure, monitor and evaluate performanceacross all three phases of the training process. Although compromised by a lack ofhistorical information, it has assessed Phase 2 training times. However, the central
team does not yet collate data to assess the time taken across the full process.
In addition, it does not yet have data to assess the cost to train aircrew or data on
how many students complete their full training (paragraphs 3.14 to 3.17).

12 Part One Investigation into military flying training

Part One

Background
1.1 The Ministry of Defence (the Department) must train the aircrew it needs to meetits front-line demands. This part explains the Department’s aircrew requirements, thenumber of aircrew being trained and how the training process works. In 2008, theDepartment contracted with Ascent Flight Training (Management) Limited (Ascent)to design, introduce and manage a new approach to Phase 2 training, known as theMilitary Flying Training System (MFTS).

The Department’s aircrew requirements
1.2 The Department must train aircrew to fly and operate around 25 types of front-line
aircraft currently in use by the three front-line commands – the Royal Navy, British Armyand Royal Air Force (RAF). Over the 10 years from 2018-19, it plans to invest £46 billion
in procuring and supporting aircraft, which must then have suitably trained aircrew.
These include pilots to fly all types of military aircraft from fast jets (including Typhoons
and F-35 Lightnings), large aircraft and helicopters, as well as specialist rear crew toundertake a variety of technical roles.
1.3 In April 2019, the RAF, which has a higher demand for pilots than the Navy andArmy, was 18% (331) below its requirement for 1,869 pilots. In 2018, we reported that at
the current rate of training, the RAF estimated it would be another 20 years before it hasenough pilots.7 Since then the Department has been considering ways to increase thenumber of trained aircrew, which we describe in Part Three.
1.4 The Department’s front-line requirements, set by each command, direct the
number and type of aircrew to be trained each year (Figure 2). Every five years,
through Strategic Defence and Security Reviews, the government sets the strategic
context around these requirements. As such these Reviews, last conducted in 2010
and 2015, influence the number of front-line aircraft in service and therefore the aircrew
requirements.
1.5 Changes introduced by the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010(2010 Review) decreased the number of aircrew required, resulting in a 48% (189) fall in
the aircrew who needed to complete Phase 2 training in 2012-13. This followed certain
aircraft being removed from service and the retirement of others earlier than expected.

7Comptroller and Auditor General, Ministry of Defence, Ensuring sufficient skilled military personnel, Session 2017–2019,
HC 947, National Audit Office, April 2018.

2008 requirements

401

165

46

144

46

396

160

46

144

46

391

157`

46

144

44

202

80

15

73

34

228

85

28

83

32

231

95

26

76

34

230

97

25

81

27

245

105

24

87

29

263

111

28

89

35

342

110

121

86

25

375

123

108

104

40

396

141

109

106

40

399

144

106

109

40

424

169

106

109

40

2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23

Requirements influenced
by the 2015 Review

The 2010 Review reduced aircrew requirements following certain aircraft being removed from service and the retirement of others earlier than expected. The 2015 review increased requirements with,for example, the Department purchasing more aircraft and extending the lives of others.

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Defence data

2

Notes
1 From 2018-19, multi-engine numbers include those training to fly remotely piloted aircraft (drones).

398

Total

46

Multi-engine pilots

162

144

Helicopter pilots

Rear crew46

Requirements influenced
by the 2010 Review

Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010
Reduction in the number of trained aircrew required

Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015
Increase in the number of trained aircrew required

2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14

Fast-jet pliots

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

Number of aircrew required to complete Phase 2 each year

The Ministry of Defence’s aircrew requirements have changed over time

Figure 2
Ministry of Defence requirement for students completing Phase 2 training, 2008-09 to 2022-23

Investigation into military flying training Part One 13

Figure X shows...

14 Part One Investigation into military flying training

1.6 Subsequently, the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (2015 Review)
increased requirements. This included the Department committing to: two additional
Typhoon fast-jet squadrons; accelerating the purchase of F-35 fast jets; purchasing nine
new maritime patrol aircraft; acquiring remotely piloted aircraft; and extending the life ofsome existing surveillance aircraft. Prior to the 2015 Review, the Department’s expected
Phase 2 training requirement for 2018-19 was 266. After the 2015 Review, this increasedby 29% (76) to 342 for 2018-19).

How flying training works
1.7 The aircrew training process involves students being put through increasingly
tailored training to operate different aircraft and systems, and undertake specific roles.
As Figure 1 shows, it involves the Department selecting students (Phase 1); teachingthem the basics of flying in training aircraft and simulators (Phase 2); and then providing
operational training on front-line aircraft, such as Typhoon fast jets and Apachehelicopters, within around 25 units across the front-line commands (Phase 3). Students
then join operational squadrons.

Performance of the flying training system
Aircrew numbers
1.8 The Department does not have accessible historical data on the number of aircrew
completing the full three-phase training process. However, using students completing
Phase 2 training as a proxy, as at April 2019, students completing training did not matchthe Department’s requirements (Figure 3). This shortfall has varied between 48 (21%)
in 2015‑16 and 293 (86%) in 2018-19. In the six years to 2018-19, the average aircrew
requirement was 257, but an average of 132 personnel completed Phase 2 training
over this period. This represents an average shortfall of 125 students and an average
percentage shortfall of 45% over the six years to 2018-19.
1.9 To be ready for front-line service, students passing their Phase 2 training must thencomplete Phase 3 within their front-line commands. Between 2015-16 and 2018‑19,
the Department has filled 94% (910) of the 965 Phase 3 places provided by the threefront‑line commands, principally from those completing their Phase 2 training. Should
more students finish Phase 2, the Department must increase Phase 3 training capacity
so students can complete their training.

Investigation into military flying training Part One 15

Figure XX shows

Figure 3
Number of aircrew completing Phase 2 training, 2011-12 to 2020-21
The Ministry of Defence (the Department) has not trained enough aircrew to meet its requirements
2011-12

2012-132013-142014-152015-16

2016-172017-18

2018-192019-20

2020-21

391

202

228

231

230

245

263

342

375

396

Fast jet

n/a

n/a

14

10

19

11

15

17

28

38

Multi-engine

n/a

19

27

22

28

20

26

18

67

48

Helicopter

57

44

67

67

86

77

38

0

55

80

Rear crew

n/a

28

41

40

49

44

42

14

79

92

Total

n/a

n/a

149

139

182

152

121

49

229

258

Shortfall

n/a

n/a

79

92

48

93

142

293

146

138

35%

40%

21%

38%

54%

86%

39%

35%

2

10

4

154

126

53

229

258

Requirement
Total UK aircrew trained

Percentage
International students
Total trained

149

139

182

Notes
1 As the Ministry of Defence (the Department) compiled actual figures from both its systems and discussions with training sites, we have not been able tofully quality-assure these figures. These differ from the student database that the Department uses for internal reporting and to monitor
training times.
2

Requirement shows the number of trained UK aircrew the Department needs to complete Phase 2 training. Up to and including 2017-18,
this reflects the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010, after which it reflects the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015.

3

International students do not count towards the United Kingdom’s requirement. The Department has committed to train some international students
from 2019-20 onwards.

4

Figures from 2019-20 reflect current forecasts.

5

Percentage figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number.

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Defence data

Training times
1.10 The Department does not collect data centrally on how long training takes for students
across the front-line commands. Data from the RAF indicate that as at July 2019, theaverage time taken by RAF students to complete the three-phase training was far longer
than expected (Figure 4 overleaf). The Department told us this reflects that the overall
training system does not currently have the capacity to handle the required throughput andthat managing students through the three-phase process remains a challenge.
1.11 The Department recognises that the full training process currently takes students
longer than anticipated. Students spend longer between individual courses, termed ‘being
on hold’, than the Department expected. It always planned to have students waiting inorder that courses were full, with an optimum one-month wait between different courses.
In July 2019, 145 RAF students were due to start a Phase 2 course, compared with 151
undertaking training courses (Figure 5 on page 17). By managing the number of newstudents entering Phase 1, the Department expects those waiting to decrease by 10%
during 2019-20, with the backlog at planned levels by April 2021.

16 Part One Investigation into military flying training

Figure XX shows

Figure 4
Average actual and optimum Royal Air Force pilot training time in
July 2018 and 2019
The time taken to train aircrew has consistently exceeded the Ministry of Defence’s expectations
Aircrew type

Ministry of Defence’s
optimum time (years)

Average time as at July (years)
2018

2019

Fast jet

3.9

7.4

7.1

Multi-engine

2.6

4.3

4.5

Helicopter

3.0

5.0

5.2

Notes
1

Training time is measured from the start of Phase 1 to the end of Phase 3 training. Optimum times reflect the
average target time once the Military Flying Training Scheme (the MFTS) is fully implemented, assuming no morethan a month between courses.

2

Actual times taken from the Ministry of Defence’s (the Department’s) student database, which it uses for internalreporting. This database does not reconcile with the Department’s manual record of students completing training andwe have been unable to quality-assure these data.

3

Data do not include Army and Navy students. They include all Royal Air Force students training via both the MFTS
and other courses. No earlier information is available, and the Department does not collect data on rear crew as thistraining is currently conducted through a range of training packages.

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Defence data

1.12 In April 2019, the RAF was a total of 1,750 personnel below its required strength.
Students between courses fill various roles which would otherwise be vacant.
In 2018‑19, the salaries of student aircrew working in other areas, such as air traffic
control, air safety assurance and air worthiness, amounted to £8.5 million. Waiting toundertake training can affect morale but the Department told Parliament that in 2018
fewer than 10 people left the Armed Forces before completing their flying training, which
would be less than 3% of 375 students in Phase 2 training as at July 2019. It does not
systemically collect data on student aircrew morale or retention.
1.13 The Department selects students and provides the necessary initial training before
they join Phase 2 training. In 2016, the Department recognised there were delays
introducing new training and that it did not yet have plans to deliver its current aircrew
requirements. In 2016-17, the RAF selected 69% (92) more student aircrew than in
2015-16. This decision did not take account of training capacity and contributed to anincrease in students waiting to start Phase 2 training. As at July 2019, 145 RAF students
had been waiting an average of 90 weeks, compared with 15 students waiting 82 weeks
in 2017. The Department prefers to keep students waiting in advance of starting Phase
2 training, rather than after they have developed aircrew skills that would then need tobe refreshed. In 2019-20, the RAF aims to recruit 146 aircrew, 73 (33%) fewer than in
2016-17. By the end of 2020-21, the Department expects 26 students to be waiting an
average 12 weeks to start Phase 2.

Rear-crew

Elementary
flyingJuly 2017
Number of people waiting (average length of wait)

July 2018
Number of people waiting (average length of wait)

July 2019
Number of people waiting (average length of wait)

No data

145 (90 weeks)
143 (83 weeks)
15 (82 weeks)

Data do not include Navy and Army students. They include all Royal Air Force students
training via both the Military Flying Training System and other courses.

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Defence data

2

Advancedhelicopter

The Department does not have robust data to show students waiting for Phase 3 training
before 2018 or undertaking rear crew training.

4

147

151

298

Total students between courses includes those completing elemtary flying training who have notyet been assigned a specific training route (two as at July 2018; four as at July 2019).

244

92

336

July 2017

No dataPhase 3
(operational)

3

151
224

Students on courses
Students between courses

375

July 2019

8 (21 weeks)
0 (2 weeks)
4 (12 weeks)

Advanced jet

July 201820 (123 weeks)
12 (40 weeks)
16 (107 weeks)
Multi-engine

Basichelicopter

Total students
within Phase 2

No data

26 (129 weeks)
21 (131 weeks)
39 (121 weeks)

9 (17 weeks)
51 (68 weeks)
48 (101 weeks)

10 (50 weeks)
15 (43 weeks)
25 (60 weeks)

Basic jetPhase 2 (core flying)Notes
1 Actual times taken from Ministry of Defence’s (the Department’s) student database, which it uses
for internal reporting. This database does not reconcile with the Department’s manual record ofstudents completing training and we have been unable to quality-assure these data.

Phase 1
(initial)

The numbers of students waiting to start elementary flying training and the time students are waiting has increased since 2017

Figure 5
Royal Air Force students across Phase 2 of the military flying training process in July of 2017, 2018 and 2019

Figure X shows

Investigation into military flying training Part One 17

18 Part One Investigation into military flying training

The Military Flying Training System
1.14 In 2008, the Department signed a 25-year contract with Ascent, a 50:50 Lockheed
Martin and Babcock joint venture, to design, introduce and then manage with the
Department new Phase 2 training. It decided to outsource this training following
Departmental and National Audit Office work, which highlighted that existing training
was fragmented and expensive and that students spent too long in training rather thanon the front line.8 The Department’s aims in using an external provider were to:•optimise training times;•

close the gap between the skills of aircrew finishing training and the skills
needed to use front-line aircraft; and•reduce the overall cost of flying training.

1.15 The Department has been transitioning to the MFTS incrementally, with Ascentintroducing training in phases for different aircraft types. Each training package includes
individual courses, which students must finish to complete Phase 2. During the transition,
the Department continued to operate legacy training and support older aircraft, andhas used other training providers outside the MFTS. The Department expects the firststudents trained entirely through the MFTS to graduate in September 2019. Until thenit will be difficult for the Department to start to assess whether MFTS students performbetter during Phase 3. If so they may need to undertake less of this operational training,
reducing the overall training cost.
1.16 The Department pays Ascent for designing the Phase 2 training, introducing thesystem and managing availability. In 2015, the Department had forecast the MFTS
would cost £3.2 billion over the 25-year contract. From the start of the 2008 contract to2018-19, Ascent had received £514 million from the Department (Figure 6). In 2018-19,
it received £107 million for ensuring training courses were available, with the required
aircraft, simulators and instructors in place for each course. This is almost three times
the £36 million Ascent received in 2017-18, which reflects, in part, that more MFTS
courses are being provided.
1.17 To introduce and provide courses, both the Department and Ascent must fulfil theirrespective responsibilities. These include providing course materials, simulators, aircraft,
instructors and airfield services, and managing student numbers. Part Two of this report
describes the performance of the Department and Ascent in fulfilling these responsibilities.
1.18 The Department contracted Ascent to meet the 2010 Review requirements throughthe MFTS. Subsequent changes made as a result of the 2015 Review mean the MFTS
does not meet the Department’s current requirements. For example, in 2018-19 it
expected to train 76 fewer aircrew within Phase 2 than the current requirement of 342
students. Part Three of this report describes how the Department plans to meet theseincreased requirements.

8

Comptroller & Auditor General, Ministry of Defence, Training new pilots, Session 1999-2000, HC 880, National Audit
Office, September 2000.

26

2012-13
–
0
–
2
8
16
26

2013-14
–
1
–
1
8
16

25

2014-15
0
1
–
0
8
16

29

2015-16
–
1
–
0
9
19

51

2016-17
–
1
15
1
16
18

104

2017-18
–
1
40
4
23
36

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ascent data160

2018-19
–
3
18
11
22
107

Figures do not sum due to rounding. A hyphen shows no payment made. A figure of 0 represents less than £0.5 million.

34

2011-12
–
–
1
10
10
13

3

21

2010-11
–
–
4
4
11
3

Figures include debt repayments for fast-jet and fixed-wing training private finance initiatives. They do not include more than £400 million of Departmental capital repayments direct to
sub-contractors for aircraft and other infrastructure to support delivery of training.

16

2009-10
–
–
2
4
10
0

2

20

2008-09
–
–
–
–
20
–

Notes
1 Figures presented on an accruals basis.

TotalsWhole system incentive
Course completion incentive
Other
Ministry of Defence changes
Training system design
Training availability

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Ministry of Defence payments to Ascent (£m)

Ascent has been paid more as it starts to deliver more courses

Figure 6
Payments received by Ascent Flight Training (Management) Limited from the Ministry of Defence (the Department),
2008-09 to 2018-19

514

Total
0
7
80
38
145
245

Investigation into military flying training Part One 19

Figure X shows...

20 Part Two Investigation into military flying training

Part Two

Performance of the Military Flying Training System
2.1 Part One describes how the Ministry of Defence (the Department) is not yet training
the aircrew it needs, with shortfalls in students completing their Phase 2 training.
To improve flying training, in 2008 the Department contracted Ascent Flight Training(Management) Limited (Ascent) to design, introduce and provide new Phase 2 training– the Military Flying Training System (MFTS). Following a transitional period, the MFTS
is now largely operational, with the number of courses increasing. This part sets out
progress with the MFTS.

Roles and responsibilities
2.2 The Department retains overall accountability for providing flying training thatmeets front-line requirements. To operate effectively, the MFTS requires both the
Department and Ascent to meet their respective contractual responsibilities (Figure 7).
Where responsibilities are not met, there have been delays introducing the MFTS andproviding courses, with financial consequences for the party at fault. Events beyond thecontrol of both the Department and Ascent, such as the weather and accidents, also
have an impact.

Introducing the MFTS
2.3 In 2015, we reported on the challenges the Department and Ascent had
experienced introducing the new Phase 2 training, which led to a delay of nearly
six years. The Department had originally expected to run the MFTS from 2012 and for
it to be at full capacity, providing aircrew requirements set out in the Strategic Defence
and Security Review 2010, by 2014. Delays resulted from the Department having tochange its original assumptions about the 25-year contract following:•

substantial reductions in the number of aircrew entering training each year, anda decrease in overall funding from £6.8 billion to £3.2 billion, which led to changes
to aircraft and training material; and•changes to private finance initiative (PFI) accounting rules that meant the
Department no longer used PFI to obtain aircraft and had to consider what
it could afford.

Department primarily responsible

The contract specifies therequired split between militaryand civilian instructors. It can takesix months to train an instructor,
with the Department’s front-line
requirements influencing thenumber available.

Qualified instructors

These responsibilities include
the Department providing the
runway, airspace, air traffic
controllers and on-site facilities.

Airfield support

Department and Ascent share responsibility in different proportions

Ascent designs and procuresthese in line with departmental
requirements. The Department
approves them before training packages
are ready.

Course materials andtraining devices

Ascent has selected aircraft
according to the Department’s
requirements. The Department
then approves the aircraft if theymeet military regulations, so that they can bebrought into service. Ascent then ensures that theaircraft are available for courses. The Department
provides Ascent with advanced jets.

Training aircraft

Phase 2
(core flying)

The respective responsibilities of the Department and Ascent differ depending on the aircraft type and the training site.

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Defence information

2

Notes
1 Figure shows the most significant dependencies. Ascent also depends on the Department for fuel, aircrew equipment assemblies and meteorological information.
It is responsible for planning and scheduling training.

Ascent primarily responsible

Phase 1
(initial)

The Department and Ascent need to manage dependencies for the Military Flying Training System (MFTS) to work

Phase 3
(operational)

Figure 7
Summary of the roles and responsibilities of the Ministry of Defence (the Department) and Ascent Flight Training(Management) Limited, July 2019

Investigation into military flying training Part Two 21

Figure XX shows22 Part Two Investigation into military flying training

2.4 The Department and Ascent currently expect the MFTS to operate at full capacityfrom April 2020. This is only three months later than when we last reported in 2015.
The Department considers this is a good outcome considering the past position of the
programme. To meet this date, they expect to have the training equipment in place by
December 2019 (Figure 8). They already have in place most of the required infrastructure,aircraft and simulators (Figure 9 on page 24). This includes new facilities on five training
sites; 102 new aircraft (of seven types); around 20 flight simulators and other training
devices; and 36 (out of 67 planned) designed and certified training courses. Ascent starts
to receive availability payments once training courses are ready. As at July 2019, thesepayments had started for rear crew and advanced jet training, with 94% of the milestones
for helicopter and fixed-wing training payments also being reached.9
2.5 In introducing the MFTS, both the Department and Ascent have experienced
challenges fulfilling their respective responsibilities, which we describe below. Up to2018-19, 25 introduction milestones were missed for helicopter and fixed-wing training.
Ascent had initially foregone an estimated £15 million of expected payments due tothese delays. However, the Department remained liable to pay £10 million of this where
it had failed to fulfil its responsibilities or was contractually obliged to make payments.

Ascent-provided training devices
2.6 The MFTS design assumes that students will undertake a proportion of theirtraining in simulators, rather than in live flying. Ascent is responsible for procuring thesedevices and for ensuring they are available. It has sub‑contracted this responsibility.
2.7 When fully implemented, the MFTS provides helicopter training with an estimated
50:50 split between live flying and simulators, with one course solely on simulators.
In 2018-19, no students completed their helicopter training. Full introduction of thistraining has been delayed following Ascent’s sub-contractor providing a flight simulator
18 months later than expected. As a result, the Department withheld £6 million
from Ascent and delayed a further £20 million payment. To continue training, fromJanuary 2019 helicopter students have been trained in handling skills entirely through live
flying, with 16 students starting between that date and July 2019. Ascent has borne thisadditional training cost. The Department has estimated that this equates to £160,000
per student. It now expects to receive the simulators in August 2019 and fully operate
helicopter training from December 2019.

9

The fixed-wing training package includes elementary flying and multi-engine training, which have been fully introduced,
and basic jet training, which the Department and Ascent expect to be ready for training use from November 2019.

2010

2011

National Audit Office report, June 2015

Fully operational

Training launched

Fully operational

Training launched

Fully operational

Training launched

Fully operational

Training launched

Fully operational

Training launched

Fully operational

Training launched

Current

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Sources: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Defence information; Comptroller and Auditor General, Military Flying Training, Session 2015-16, HC 81, National Audit Office, June 2015

2020

Rear Crew Stage 1 was designed to train Royal Navy Observers. Rear Crew Stage 2 was originallyintended to provide training for other rear crew within the Armed Forces. Rear Crew Stage 2 training,as planned at the time of our 2015 report has been cancelled. The Department is currently considering
options of how it will deliver training for rear crew within the MFTS.

Training has been
operational since 2012

Forecast
dates

National Audit Office report publication
September 2019

Note
1 The fixed-wing contract with Ascent covers elementary flying, basic jet and multi-engine training. The Department agreed separate contracts for advanced jet, helicopter and rear crew training.

Original timetable

Rear crew
stage 1

Helicopter

Multi-engine

Advanced jet

Basic jet

Elementary
flying training

Progress

National Audit Office report publication
June 2015

The Ministry of Defence (the Department) expects all training components to be in place from December 2019

Figure 8
Progress introducing the Military Flying Training System (MFTS), July 2019

Investigation into military flying training Part Two 23

Figure XX showsRAF Valley

RNAS Culdrose

Students expected to fly front-line
fast-jet aircraft (Typhoon or F35
Lighting II)

Students who pass basic jet
training move onto advanced
jet training

Students expected to fly large,
multi-engine transport andsurveillance aircraft

For all students expected tofly front-line helicopters. Course
varies depending on the type ofhelicopters they expect to fly

For all students expected to
become Royal Navy Observers

Basic jet

Advanced jet

Multi-engine

Helicopter

RAF Shawbury

RAF Cranwell

RAF Valley

RAF Valley

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Defence and Ascent information

Some rear crew training will take place on the Phenom aircraft at RAF Cranwell.

• flight simulators• flight simulators• 1 flight simulator• Desktop trainers• 6 flight simulators• 2 full mission
simulators• Desktop trainers• 3 flight simulators• Desktop trainers• 5 flight simulators

Simulators
include:3

4 Avenger

3 Jupiter

29 Juno5 Phenom

28 Hawk T2

10 Texan

23 PrefectAircraftnumbers

Simulators include flight simulators that allow students to experience flying; full mission simulators allowing students to practice complex training missions;and desktop trainers so students can familiarise themselves with flying.

Full introductionsuspended

Courses running.
Expect to be
fully ready fortraining from
December 2019

Complete

Complete

Expected tobe ready fortraining from
November 2019

Complete

Status of
introduction

What has been established

2

Notes
1 Certified courses include those developed to train both instructors and aircrew.

Rear crew
stage 1RAF Cranwell

All students currently undertake
this before continuing to either
multi-engine, helicopter orbasic jet training

Elementary
flying training
RAF Barkston
Heath

Sites

Description

Ascent has introduced most of what it needs to provide for the system

Figure 9
Training components introduced as part of the Military Flying Training System, July 2019

Hangars, school
house and training
device facility

3 hangars, 2 school
houses and training
device facilities

3 hangars, 2 school
houses and training
device facilities (sharedwith elementary flying)

Hangar, school
house and training
device facility

Hangar and school house

3 hangars, 2 school
houses and training
device facilities (sharedwith multi-engine)

Infrastructure4

15 (plus
13 outstanding)

6 (plus
5 outstanding)6

0 (plus
7 outstanding)

5 (plus
1 outstanding)

Certifiedcourses

24 Part Two Investigation into military flying training

Figure XX showsInvestigation into military flying training Part Two 25

Ascent-provided course design and materials
2.8 Ascent is responsible for developing new training course materials. The Department
approves these materials before they are used. In 2015, we reported that the Department
had rejected some elements of Ascent’s advanced jet training course materials as not
fit for purpose. It then agreed with Ascent a new approach to developing future training
materials, to be tested on the fixed-wing and helicopter training packages.
2.9 Subsequently, the introduction of helicopter and multi-engine training has been
delayed following difficulties with the course design, particularly in ensuring the course is
up to the required standards. For helicopter training, delays developing course materials
also resulted from the late introduction of simulators. Ascent and the Department must
work together, with Ascent developing the material and the Department approving it.

Department and Ascent-provided aircraft
2.10 When bringing aircraft into service the Department sets the overarchingrequirement and approves the aircraft’s use against approved aviation standards.
Ascent develops the more detailed requirements and has procured all training aircraft,
except for the Hawk T2 and Avenger.10
2.11 As we reported in 2015, the Department assumed civil aviation regulations would
apply to training aircraft but, following changes to military airworthiness regulations,aircraft must now be registered as military aircraft and meet the associated regulations.
For aircraft to meet the Department’s requirements and military regulations, theDepartment has requested 38 aircraft modifications, with 11 of these agreed withAscent, each of which can create delays. They include a modification to the Texan
aircraft ejection seats and survival equipment. This reduces the risks associatedwith pilots ejecting and landing in water, which could limit the training provided. After
having gained their military certification in 2019, these aircraft are now being used totrain instructors.

Providing MFTS courses
2.12 Each year, the Department and Ascent agree the number and type of courses
to be provided. Since 2012, the MFTS has gradually provided more courses as training
packages have been introduced. In total, 245 student courses have been run, with
74 in 2018-19 compared with 38 in 2016-17. An additional 70 instructor courses havealso been provided over this period.

10 The Avenger aircraft were procured by the Department, but Ascent are responsible for ensuring they are available fortraining use. The Department is responsible for ensuring the availability of the Hawk T2.

26 Part Two Investigation into military flying training

2.13 Should either Ascent or the Department not fulfil their contractual responsibilities,
courses may be delayed or cancelled. Reasons, which are examined later in this section,
include the availability of aircraft, air traffic controllers or qualified instructors. Neither
the Department nor Ascent could easily provide us with a list of delayed courses with
underlying reasons. Our analysis showed that 40% (41) of the 103 courses expected
to complete in 2018-19 had experienced delays, with a net slippage of 3,044 days,
an average of 74 days per course.
2.14 Since 2012, 44 MFTS courses (12% of 369 planned courses) have been cancelled
due to the Department or Ascent not fulfilling their responsibilities (Figure 10). Of theplanned cases, a further ten were cancelled given changes to the Department’s
requirements. Course cancellations may have a financial impact for the party at fault. For
2018-19, the Department and Ascent negotiated a settlement covering all completion
incentive fees. For this period, Ascent received £2.6 million against potential course
completion incentive fees valued at £4.4 million.

Ascent-provided training devices
2.15 For 2018-19, the MFTS delivered 703 (8%) more simulator training hours than had
been planned. That year, simulator availability exceeded 98% for multi-engine, rear crew
Figureshows
and Xelementary
flying training.

Figure 10
Summary of reasons for Military Flying Training System cancelled courses,
2012 to 31 March 2019
Of 369 planned courses, 44 have been cancelled for one or other party failing to fulfill its responsibilities
Delays to courseware
introduction, 7, 16%

Ascent or Department notmeeting responsibilities, 9, 20%

Department not meeting
responibilities 28, 64%

In addition, a further 10 of theplanned courses were cancelled
following changes to the
Department’s requirements.
Note
1 Data have not easily reconciled to course information previously provided by the Ministry of Defence (the Department).
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ascent data

Investigation into military flying training Part Two 27

Department and Ascent-provided aircraft
2.16 Ascent must ensure that all aircraft, apart from the Hawk T2, are available for courses.
Except for helicopters, both Ascent and the Department have experienced aircraft
availability problems, leading to delays and cancellations. In the four months up to July 2019,
for training packages fully introduced, availability ranged from 113% (meaning training
requirements had been met) to 38% per aircraft type (Figure 11 overleaf). In particular:•

Elementary flying training: In the four months up to July 2019, aircraft havebeen available for 72% of the required time, with a low of 67% in May 2019.
Reduced availability was due to various factors including difficulties obtaining
spare parts, a lack of engineering resources and aircraft being modified to meetthe required specifications. The Department and Ascent told us they expected
to complete these modifications by March 2020.

•

Multi-engine training: Factors affecting aircraft availability include an in-flight
collision between two MFTS aircraft and technical issues with a third.

•

Advanced-jet training: The Department contracts with BAE Systems to maintain28 Hawk T2 jets. Given technical problems, the Department averaged 12 available
aircraft per day against a required 18. The Department and its industry partners
recognise that they need to improve availability and that the training provision isextremely sensitive to the availability of aircraft and instructors. The Department
forecasts that for 2019-20, these aircraft will be available for 7,100 of the required
9,200 hours (77%).

Department-provided airfield services
2.17 The Department provides the airfields and associated facilities such as air traffic
control and refuelling. It has experienced difficulties providing these on training sites.
For example, runway resurfacing at RAF Cranwell meant less elementary flying training
between June and November 2018, and Ascent had to amend its training programme.
Similar issues were also experienced at RAF Valley, affecting advanced jet training.
2.18 The Department does not have enough air traffic controllers at RAF Cranwell,
RAF Shawbury and RAF Valley, where training hours have been reduced as a result.
In addition, at RAF Barkston Heath, where 11 of the 23 MFTS elementary flying training
aircraft are based, poor air traffic controller availability has meant restricted or no flying
hours one day per week. The Department told us it expects improvements during 2019
after recently contracting for a new provider of air traffic control services.

28 Part Two Investigation into military flying training

Figure XX shows

Figure 11
Military Flying Training System (MFTS) aircraft availability, April to June 2019
Aircraft availability has been below expected levels
Training

AircraftNumberRequired(per day)Actual (average per day) 2019

Availability
over period
(%)

April

May

June

July

Elementary flying

Prefect

23

18

13

12

13

14

72

Advanced jet

Hawk T2

28

18

11

9

12

14

64

Multi-engine

Phenom

5

4

2

2

1

1

38

Helicopter (basic)

Juno

29

20

22

24

23

21

113

Helicopter(advanced)

Jupiter

3

2

2

2

2

2

100

Rear crew

Avenger

4

3

2

2

2

4

83

Basic jet

Texan

10

3

6

3

5

6

167

Note
1 Basic jet training has not yet been fully introduced. The number of Texan aircraft required per day will increase to eight once training operating fully. Aircraft
are currently being used to train instructors.
Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ascent data

Department-provided instructors
2.19 Flying training depends on having both civilian instructors, provided by Ascent,and military instructors, provided by the Department. The balance between military andcivilian instructors varies by course and any change in the number of military instructors
affects the availability of aircrew for military operations. In 2015, we reported that the
Department recognised the risk that it would not be able to provide enough instructors.
As a result, it was considering introducing incentive payments to retain pilots, or using
more civilian, rather than military, instructors.
2.20 Currently, there are not enough qualified instructors across all types of training(Figure 12). For example, for elementary flying training, difficulties increasing the numberof military instructors has led to courses taking longer than expected. Against an
expected instructor availability rate of 80%, the actual rate in the first three months of2019 ranged from an estimated 62% to 67%. Shortages resulted from problems withrunning instructor training courses and runway availability. The Department and Ascentcontinue to consider whether Ascent could make up the instructor shortfall.

Investigation into military flying training Part Two 29

Figure XX shows

Figure 12
Requirement and availability of Military Flying Training System (MFTS) instructors, July 2019
The Ministry of Defence (the Department) has not provided the military instructors required for MFTS
Training type

Proportion civilian: military

Civilian instructors
RequiredIn place (of which
not qualified)

Military instructors
RequiredIn place (of which
not qualified)Elementary flying training

40:60

24

23 (3)

34

33 (1)

Basic jet

25:75

7

7 (3)

13

9 (4)

Multi-engine

25:75

6

6 (1)

15

14 (4)

Advanced jet

0:100

–

–

42 to 4537 (7)

Helicopter

25:75

36

37.5 (2)102

87 (3)

Rear crew (includes Royal Navyobservers and multi-engine
aircraft30:70

7

8.5(3)

17

17 (11)Notes
1Figures show flying instructors and not ground-based instructors. Military instructor requirements based on the MFTS contract, with civilian
requirements based on Ascent’s estimation of need.

2

Military Instructors numbers are Full Time Equivalent (FTE) figures and do not directly correlate to individuals.

3

The Department and Ascent continue to introduce basic jet training, part of which includes training instructors. It expects this to operate from
November 2019. Figures indicate requirements once training fully introduced.

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ascent data

30 Part Three Investigation into military flying training

Part Three

Addressing flying training shortfalls
3.1 Parts One and Two describe the training process and how the Military
Flying Training System (MFTS) contributes to providing the Ministry of Defence’s(the Department’s) aircrew requirements. As the Department retains the risk ofthere being insufficient operational aircrew, this part describes what it is doing tobetter meet its requirements through alternative training and by addressing previous
recommendations. Appendix Two describes the Department’s response to our 2015
report recommendations.

Increased aircrew requirements
3.2 The Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (2015 Review) increased thenumber of aircrew currently required by the Department, leading to a 29% (76) rise in thenumber required to complete Phase 2 training in 2018-19. At that time, the Department
recognised it could buy more MFTS training if needed as part of the contract change
process, but that this would incur a cost if the number increased beyond the capacityof existing equipment and infrastructure. Increasing training capacity takes time as: newaircraft must be bought, modified and certified; flight simulators designed, manufactured
and tested; and new infrastructure built.
3.3 The Department has also committed to training aircrew from other countries tohelp build international relationships, generate income and support United Kingdom
aircraft sales abroad. From 2019-20, it has committed to train between seven and
22 international pilots a year. However, it has not yet incorporated this requirement into
the MFTS, reducing the number of UK pilots who can be trained.

Action to date
3.4 To better meet its aircrew requirements and address shortfalls following MFTS
delays, the Department has also conducted training outside of the system. This creates
additional complexities, with students undertaking different courses on different aircraft
and in different environments. In 2019-20, the Department expects to provide aircrew
training for 125 students outside the MFTS at a cost of £15 million (Figure 13).

Training outside MFTS

MFTS, RAF Cranwell

Multi-engine

MFTS, RAF Shawbury

Helicopter

International training through NATO agreement

L3 Academy,
Bournemouth(44 places, £2.9 million)

US Army(12 places, £3.8 million)

In line with planned introduction, training transitioning
from legacy to MFTS

Basic jet

Spare capacity at RAF Leeming(4 places, £2 million)

Euro NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training(2 places, £2.7 million)

Costs reflect the latest estimated costs and include opportunity costs where the Department has made use of spare capacity.

Elementary flying: Legacy training extended at RAF Wittering, representing an additional cost.

Remotely piloted aircraft: This represents a new requirement not included within MFTS.

Basic jet training: From September 2019, the Department and Ascent expect to operate MFTS training, with legacy training ceasing on 31 October and the aircraft
currently being used, the Tucano, being withdrawn from service.

2

3

4

5

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Defence data

Advanced jet

MFTS, RAF Valley

Notes
1 Total helicopter, advanced jet and multi-engine student numbers show the Department’s overarching requirement for students completing Phase 2 training in 2019-20.

Military Flying Training System (MFTS) training

L3 Academy, Bournemouth(17 places, £0.8 million)

Spare capacity at University
Air Squadrons(6 places, £0.2 million)

Remotely piloted aircraft

University Air Squadron(20 places, £0.8 million)

Babcock, RAF Wittering(20 places, £1.4 million)

MFTS, RAF Cranwell and
RAF Barkston Heath

Elementary flying

The Department will rely on other providers and international agreements to train aircrew beyond the Military Flying Training System (MFTS)

Figure 13
Summary of the Ministry of Defence’s (the Department’s) plans for Phase 2 training, 2019-20

Figure XX shows

Investigation into military flying training Part Three 31

32 Part Three Investigation into military flying training

3.5 Those students completing other courses must undertake additional training
because certain aspects, for example low-level and formation flying, need to be
conducted in a military environment. The Department does not know how much thisadditional training costs, but recognises that outsourcing helicopter training, for example,
could cost more than under the MFTS. The MFTS has been designed to reduce training
costs, with more training conducted during Phase 2, rather than Phase 3.

Future plans
3.6 Since the 2015 Review, the Department has considered various ways to meet its
current requirements for trained aircrew. It has been considering and testing options,developing business cases and putting additional commercial arrangements in place.
To speed up this decision-making process, in April 2018 it decided to consider training
types separately. It now estimates that through incrementally expanding training capacity
it will start increasing the number of trained aircrew from 2020 and will have in place afully expanded system from 2023. The Department’s approach includes:•

Helicopter training: In July 2019, the Department approved funding to recruitand train more civilian instructors and purchase, support and operate a further
four helicopters and one simulator via an amendment to the MFTS contract. This
will provide the students with more helicopter training and enable some to movestraight to helicopter training instead of first undertaking elementary flying training.

•

Fixed-wing training: Following course modifications, Navy and Army helicopter
students will no longer need to complete elementary flying training, freeing up
2,400 hours to train the additional aircrew required by the 2015 Review. For multiengine training, the Department is considering options, including a greater use offlight simulators, and continuing to use training providers outside of the MFTS. It
plans to decide how to meet this increased requirement by the end of 2019. For
basic jet training, in March 2019 the Department agreed with Ascent provisional
plans to procure four additional aircraft to incrementally increase the number ofaircrew trained.

•

Rear crew: The 2015 Review introduced nine new Poseidon maritime patrolaircraft. The Department needs to ensure that the increase in trained aircrew isaligned with these aircraft coming into service. The new aircraft contributed to a
52% increase in the rear crew requirement, from 111 in 2017-18 to 169 in 2022-23.
The Department continues to consider how it will address this increased demand,and aims to have an approved approach by the end of 2019.

Investigation into military flying training Part Three 33

Using contractual arrangements
3.7 Under the current arrangements, Ascent Flight Training (Management) Limited(Ascent) is paid a fixed cost for introducing the MFTS and for ensuring training
components are available. Its incentive to introduce the MFTS to agreed timeframesis that availability fees will be paid once training components are ready for training use.
Once courses are running, Ascent’s availability fees could reduce if training components
are not available as expected. Payments include:•

Training system design fee: This is a monthly fixed payment, which reduces
during the contract, for designing the training, managing the business andmaintaining course materials. Deductions are made if Ascent does not deliver
documentation, such as training strategies and annual training plans, on time.

•

Training service availability payment: This is a monthly fixed payment that starts
to be paid when training components, such as aircraft and simulators, become
available. Service credits accrue where availability does not meet a pre-determinedthreshold. The Department pays compensation if it is at fault.

3.8 Ascent will receive additional incentives for completing courses and meeting
broader departmental aims. Incentive payments cover:•Course completion incentive fee: This is an amount paid from an annually
determined pot of money when a scheduled course completes, regardless ofstudent numbers. If a course is cancelled due to the Department not meeting its
responsibilities, such as insufficient students or military instructors, then the nominal
course fee is redistributed across those courses that have been run. Where Ascentis responsible for a course not completing, then the incentive fee is reduced.

•

Whole-system incentive fee: A proportion of the £22 million pot is paid each year
if Ascent meets specific performance indicators aligned with the Department’s
aims for Phase 2 training. These include providing the agreed number of trained
aircrew or students spending the expected time in training.

3.9 With the MFTS almost fully introduced and providing more courses, up to
2018‑19 Ascent has received a growing amount of incentive fees. However, thesefees still comprise less than 2% of total payments. As at 31 March 2019, £7.4 million(1.4% of £514 million) related to incentives to complete training courses, compared with
£1.7 million (1.2% of £143 million) as at 31 March 2015. With advanced jet and rear crew
training operating fully in 2018-19, and 74 courses running, Ascent did not receive awhole-system incentive payment. The Department and Ascent expected incentive fees
to increase once courses are available.

34 Part Three Investigation into military flying training

3.10 In 2015, we recommended that the Department encourage better performancefrom Ascent by using contract incentives to encourage partnership working and improve
the quality, length and cost of training. At the time, the Department had not based
whole-system incentives on achievable, albeit challenging, milestones. Ascent considers
some of these metrics as very unlikely to be achieved.
3.11 Since 2015, the Department and Ascent have agreed contracts to introduce
helicopter and fixed-wing training. These contracts included annual performanceindicators, linked to incentive payments around training time and student output, which
would take effect once training packages are fully introduced from 2020-21 onwards.
In addition, the Department and Ascent have agreed advanced jet performance
incentives relating to training time, cost and student output. For example, an incentive
payment would be paid where specified advanced jet training courses take less than
55 weeks. The 12 students we identified as completing these courses in 2018-19 took
between 81 and 95 weeks.
3.12 The Department and Ascent continue to consider how to amend other incentive
arrangements. In 2017-18, they sought consultancy support to help identify options andin June 2019 formalised a broader joint transformation project. This work includes acommercially focused project considering changes to the incentive mechanisms, as well
as how data could be collected and used.
3.13 Commercial arrangements do not include specific mechanisms to encourage
innovation. However, the Department expects Ascent to use innovation to deliver thecontractually agreed services and meet agreed incentives. Since May 2018, delays in the
MFTS and pressure on flying training have driven the need to consider further innovation.
Both Ascent and the Department have suggested and supported innovative proposals
to date. This has included course innovations, which have reduced the number of live
flying hours required.

Understanding performance across the whole training process
3.14 In 2015, we recommended that the Department establish a robust baseline
to measure, monitor and evaluate performance across the whole training process.
This followed our finding that the Department did not use available information effectively
to understand performance and would struggle to measure the impact of changes.
3.15 Since our report, the Department has started to collect more information on
Phase 2 training, such as the number of aircrew who are between courses. However,it still does not systematically collect student data across the whole training process,from Phase 1 to Phase 3. Each front-line command collects and manages its own data.
Consequently, it remains difficult to easily determine the time taken to train aircrew andfor the Department to make decisions on how the system should operate. As part of ourwork, we identified inconsistencies between data sources and were unable to validate
some of the information used by the Department for management purposes.

Investigation into military flying training Part Three 35

3.16 Given training costs sit across different areas, the Department does not know
how much flying training costs. It does not have data on: the total cost from Phase 1
to Phase 3; how much it costs for it to meet its MFTS responsibilities, such as military
instructors; or the full cost of training aircrew outside the MFTS. It told us the financial
structures covered by MFTS mean these figures are not easily accessible.
3.17 The Department’s current analytical approach relies on manual input of data andan understanding of the training pipeline to interpret data. It does not have bespoke
software or a dedicated data analytics team to analyse aircrew in training. In 2018,
it recognised the need to change how it held student information to monitor student
throughput more efficiently. The Department told us it has commissioned consultants
to help it improve its data-tracking. In June 2019, it also formalised a broadertransformation project with Ascent aiming to improve end-to-end data, the ability to
predict and analyse student throughput, and understanding the root cause of problems.

36 Appendix One Investigation into military flying training

Appendix One

Our investigative approach
Scope
1
We conducted this investigation following Parliamentary interest in the Ministry of
Defence’s (the Department) management of its Military Flying Training System (MFTS),
which is intended to provide Phase 2 of the three-phase flying training process.
Our report describes:•

the Department’s aircrew requirements, the three-phase training process and how
this is performing;•

what has been delivered as part of the MFTS and the system’s performance; and•the Department’s actions to address flying training shortfalls.

Methods2
In examining these issues, we drew on a variety of evidence sources. In particular,
we interviewed key individuals from the Department and Ascent Flight Training(Management) Limited, the industry training provider of the MFTS, in order to understandthe performance of military flying training and how shortfalls in aircrew training are being
addressed.
3
We also sought to undertake quantitative analysis to understand how well both thePhase 2, and the broader training process, were performing against their objectives.
Our analysis was hindered by gaps and inconsistencies in the Department’s data.
In particular:•

Data on students in training: Since 2017, the Department has improved the datait has on students in Phase 2 training, but these data are incomplete and requiresignificant manual manipulation. The Department does not hold data centrally on
student training across the entire three-phase training process, with Navy andArmy student data held within their respective commands. The Department had
difficulty in providing the number of students completing training, the number ofstudents waiting between courses, and how long training has taken. We havereviewed the figures provided, which are used by the Department for internal
decision-making, but we cannot provide full assurance over these data.

Investigation into military flying training Appendix One 37•

Cost of training: Given training costs sit across a number of different areas, theDepartment does not know how much flying training costs. It does not have dataon the total cost from Phase 1 to Phase 3; how much it costs for it to meet its
MFTS responsibilities, such as military instructors; or the full cost of training aircrew
outside the MFTS. It told us the financial structures that the MFTS covers meanthese figures are not easily accessible.

38 Appendix Two Investigation into military flying training

Appendix Two

Response to our 2015 recommendations
Figure XX shows

Figure 14
The Ministry of Defence’s (the Department’s) response to the National Audit Office’s 2015
recommendations, as at July 2019
The Department has implemented some recommendations from the National Audit Office 2015 report
National Audit Office recommendation

StatusThe Department should:•

encourage better performance from Ascentby more effectively incentivising it to work
as a partner to achieve the aims of the
new core training;

In March 2016, the Department told the Committee of Public Accounts that it
was reviewing contract incentives. It has since introduced new incentives forsome contracts. In June 2019, it launched a broader transformation project tobetter align incentives with the Department’s desired outcomes.

•

assess the cost and time implications ofincreasing training capacity;

Since the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, the Department has
considered various ways to train more aircrew, including through an expanded
Military Flying Training System (MFTS) or other training. It estimates that it will
have the processes in place to fully meet increased requirements from 2023.

•

agree formal contingency plans for covering
gaps in training during the move to the newcore training;With most MFTS courses now available, the need for contingency plans has
reduced. While introducing the MFTS, the Department has continued training
on some legacy aircraft to ensure continuity.

•

set out and communicate clearly roles
and responsibilities across the wholetraining system;

In 2018, the Department told us it had been working with Ascent to manageinterfaces within the MFTS. The Department does not have a senior responsible
owner overseeing the complete training process, with the team responsible
for Phase 2 training not having authority over the subsequent operational(Phase 3) training.

•

the Department should establish a robust
baseline to measure, monitor and evaluate
performance across the whole training
system; andSince 2017, the Department has improved Phase 2 data, but cannot yet assess
historical trends. It does not centrally hold data on the whole training processextending beyond Phase 2. As such, it cannot say how much it costs, or thetime taken to train aircrew.

•

establish a clear process to get benefits acrossthe whole training system and between services.

An objective of the MFTS is to bring forward Phase 3 training, which has been
the most expensive aspect, with the Army estimating in 2011 that it comprises
an estimated 90% of the costs. The Department is now conducting moretraining outside the MFTS than initially planned.

Source: National Audit Office; Comptroller and Auditor General, Ministry of Defence: Military flying training, Session 2015-16, HC 81,
National Audit Office, June 2015

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