Ian Bremmer
President

Cliff Kupchan
Chairman

1 Rigged!: Who governs the US?
2 The Great Decoupling
4 MNCs not to the rescue
5 India gets Modi-fied
3 US/China
6 Geopolitical Europe
7 Politics vs. economics of climate change
9 Discontent in Latin America
10 Turkey
8 Shia crescendo

March 2020

The time has come to update our Top Risks 2020,
taking into account how the coronavirus has accelerated
the trends that worry us most.

Introduction
In January, we wrote that this year was a tipping point, with a historic shift
in globalization; a weakened US leadership; the rise of populism within theworld’s democracies; the rise of an alternative Chinese economic, political andtechnological model; and the decline of an aggrieved and interventionist Russia
pushing the world into a geopolitical recession. We now face the first global crisisof our geopolitical recession … a coronavirus pandemic. The timing isn’t good.

The cycles driving the world

Global well-being

Climate/resource constraints

Globalization

Geopolitical cycles

Economic cycles

Period of economic
recession (duration of US
real GDP contractions)

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

Source: Eurasia GroupWe warned in January that globalization was under siege; we were more rightabout that than we would like to be. Travel to the US from Europe and China, andtravel to Europe from just about anywhere, has now been halted. The coronavirus
outbreak has dealt a body blow to the global flow of goods and services, accelerating
the process we wrote about. The public health emergency has also deepened
the geopolitical recession, as the US shows little interest in quarterbacking aninternational response, and China aims to take advantage of the vacuum. More
broadly, the pandemic has forced all nations to look inward, speeding both thisrecession and the process of deglobalization.

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3Risk significantly
decreases

Risk
decreases

Risk stays
the same

Risk
increases

Risk significantly
increases

Summary of main impacts
1 Rigged!: Who governs the US?
As an extremely politicized crisis of grave scale, and by complicating the physical act of voting, the coronavirus
intensifies fears and doubts about the presidential election’s legitimacy.

2 The Great Decoupling
Coronavirus adds to pressure on supply chains, accelerating the trend toward decoupling.

3 US/China
Attempts by Washington and Beijing to explain coronavirus and its containment to their respective domestic
audiences will intensify recriminations between the two governments.

4 MNCs not to the rescue
Coronavirus will hit MNCs from multiple directions, but distracted and overwhelmed governments will create
opportunities for them as well.

5 India gets Modi-fied
India has managed the coronavirus relatively effectively to this point, but the continuing vulnerabilities posedby its weak healthcare system will exacerbate tensions among angry citizens already on edge.

6 Geopolitical Europe
Coronavirus exacerbates transatlantic tensions, but it will also fully occupy European leaders at a time when
they would like to become much more assertive toward both the US and China in many areas.

7 Politics vs. economics of climate changeCoronavirus will shift global attention and resources away from addressing climate change, putting the issue
on the backburner.

8 Shia crescendo
Coronavirus eases the risks of failed US policy in Iran, but amplifies them in Iraq and Syria.

9 Discontent in Latin America
Latin America’s lack of preparedness for the coronavirus will add to the many existing causes of public
discontent.

10 Turkey
Coronavirus in and around Turkey will weaken both Erdogan and his foreign rivals.

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1

Risk significantly decreases

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Risk stays the same

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Rigged!: Who governs the US?

In January, risk #1 described how US institutions would be tested as neverbefore, and how the November election would produce a result many would
see as illegitimate. If President Donald Trump won amid credible chargesof irregularities, the results would be contested. If he lost, particularly
if the vote was close, same. Either scenario would create months oflawsuits and a political vacuum, but unlike the contested George W. BushAl Gore election of 2000, the loser was unlikely to accept a court-decided
outcome as legitimate. It was a US version of Brexit, where the issue wasn’t
the outcome but political uncertainty about what people had voted for.
The coronavirus outbreak heightens these risks and brings them forward.
Georgia, Louisiana, Kentucky, and Ohio are the first states to delay theirprimaries due to coronavirus fears, and they surely won’t be the last. Many
voters won’t feel safe casting a ballot in person, a fear that will be amplified
by misinformation.
As the administration’s handling of the coronavirus outbreak continues toattract criticism, and the economy tumbles into recession, Trump will be
tempted to sow doubts about the integrity of the election, not to mention
aggressively going after presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden and hisson Hunter. Health fears and rumors about the likely Democratic nominee
are already being weaponized for political ends, and politicized investigations
are likely. Meanwhile class tensions will be exacerbated, with many bluecollar workers unable to easily work from home, school cancelations
wreaking havoc on poor and single-parent families, and possible violenceand disruptions over access to both public and private medical care. Already,generational divides are sharpening, with many young Americans, at lower
risk of dying from the coronavirus, defying orders for “social distancing.”
The run-up to this election will be the most divisive in modern history.

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5As the campaign season progresses, a candidate trailing in the polls could play on social anxiety
to call for a delay in the vote—even if the date is legally very difficult to change because it would
require legislation that could win approval from Congress, the president, and the courts. Morelikely, states could shift most voting from in person to absentee paper and/or online ballots.
This approach would bring new risks. There is currently no plan B for an election that can’t havepeople voting at polls. If states turn to the mail, can it be done securely, will it structurally favor
one side, and will that tempt one or both candidates to undermine its credibility? If the US goesto e-voting, nefarious actors will see greater opportunity to disrupt the process. Even without
malign interference, all it would take is a technical glitch to call the results into question. Whowould it help? No one knows, which is exactly our point.
After the election, the vote could be contested on grounds of tampering, procedural flaws, and/or historically low turnout. Whoever wins would lack full authority in the eyes of Americans
and the international community. The US Congress could become even more dysfunctional
than we expected in January, not least because of teething pains as it learns to work remotely—
all amid a crisis over the vote. Finally, on foreign policy, the coronavirus will cause the US toturn inward and increase its isolation from the world. Less US leadership and reassurance toallies will be the result.

KEY TAKEAWAY

As an extremely politicized crisis ofgrave scale, and by complicating thephysical act of voting, the coronavirus
intensifies fears and doubts about thepresidential election’s legitimacy.

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62

Risk significantly decreases

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Risk stays the same

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The Great Decoupling

In January, risk #2 described how the decoupling of the US and Chinese
tech sectors was already disrupting bilateral flows of technology,
talent, and investment. In 2020, we argued that this decoupling would
move beyond strategic tech sectors such as semiconductors, cloudcomputing, and 5G into broader economic activity. This trend would
affect not just the $5 trillion global tech sector, but other industries and institutions
as well. It would create a deepening business, economic, and cultural divide that risks
becoming permanent, casting a deep geopolitical chill over global business. The big
question we asked back in January: Where would the virtual Berlin Wall stand?
Decoupling between the US and China was marching ahead before the coronavirus outbreak,spreading from the technology sector to arenas such as finance and scientific cooperation. But
the coronavirus has dramatically accelerated and extended this trend to the manufacturing andservices sectors, forcing many companies to rapidly switch supply chains, close facilities, andmove staff. Public health restrictions have halted routine travel between the US and China, stiflingcooperation and exchange. Corporations will face hard choices. Do they permanently movesupply chains away from China, now that events have demonstrated the risk of over-concentratingproduction? Or do they stay in China but build costly redundancies? Policymakers in the US andelsewhere will have their say, with many using the crisis to argue that production must movecloser to home. Trends of broader decoupling between theworld’s two largest economies will become more, not less,deeply entrenched as a result of the coronavirus, while othercountries will experience greater challenges in balancing
relations with both sides.

KEY TAKEAWAY

Coronavirus adds to pressure on
supply chains, accelerating thetrend toward decoupling.

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US/China

In January, risk #3 argued that as US-China decoupling occurred,tensions would provoke a more explicit clash over national security,
influence, and values. The two sides would continue to use economic
tools in this struggle—sanctions, export controls, and boycotts—
with shorter fuses and goals that were more explicitly political.
Confrontation would grow over Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Uighurs, the South China
Sea, and a host of other issues.
Washington and Beijing view the outbreak as the next round in their geopolitical rivalry, andthat dynamic will continue to shape the global response to the crisis. US officials blame Beijing
for causing what they pointedly call the “Chinese” coronavirus and are wary of emergency
coronavirus funds from the IMF being used to repay countries’ debts to China under the Beltand Road Initiative. Beijing, eager to counter US criticism, will use its success at coronavirus
containment to tout its governance model. It will provide financial and medical assistance tofriendly countries (including more and more US allies) channeled, when possible, via its own
currency and through Chinese-led institutions. As the election nears, a defensive Trump will
deflect criticism of his handling of the outbreak by heaping more blame on China, while more
confident Chinese authorities will respond in kind (recent moves by Beijing to ban US journalists
from the mainland and Hong Kong are particularly noteworthy on that count). Escalating tensions
will create more uncertainty around the phase one trade deal, US treatment of Huawei and other
Chinese tech firms, and foreign policy flashpoints such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. All this meansthat a phase two trade deal is nearly impossible, and escalating tensions could unravel the phase
one deal itself. There’s a growing likelihood that when the coronavirus pandemic is over, the US
and China enter a new cold war.

KEY TAKEAWAY

Attempts by Washington and Beijing to explain
coronavirus and its containment to theirrespective domestic audiences will intensify
recriminations between the two governments.

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4

Risk decreases

Risk stays the same

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MNCs not to the rescue

In January, our risk #4 described how multinational corporations(MNCs), far from compensating for the shortcomings ofunderperforming national governments on critical issues suchas climate change, poverty reduction, and trade liberalization,
would face new pressures from political officials, both elected andunelected. Politicians working to manage slowing
global growth, widening inequality, mounting
populist threats, and intensifying security challenges created by newtechnologies would assert themselves at the expense of MNCs. In thismore difficult global environment, corporate leaders would be more
focused on their bottom lines, not less.
Multinational corporations are already hit hard by the outbreak.
Economic stimulus will dominate the geo-economic landscape, andthat will frequently mean higher taxes on MNCs and other entities topay for them. Health-focused regulations will increase dramatically,raising costs. And the outbreak will force MNCs to shorten supply
chains, build redundancies, and manage a virtual work force—a
recipe for financial and management stresses. But it’s not all bad
news. With governments consumed by public health crises, there
will be little bandwidth for aggressive tech regulation initiatives,
for example. And many MNCs will have an opportunity to step
up and play leadership roles as governments falter, whether byhelping officials conduct coronavirus testing or by developing new
teleworking and paid sick leave practices.

KEY TAKEAWAY

Coronavirus will hit MNCs frommultiple directions, but distracted andoverwhelmed governments will create
opportunities for them as well.

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95Risk significantly decreases

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Risk stays the same

Risk increases

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India gets Modi-fied

In January, risk #5 described how Prime Minister Narendra Modi andhis government revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir,piloted a plan that stripped 1.9 million people of their citizenship,
and passed an immigration law that considers religious affiliation.
As protests of various kinds expanded across India, Modi would notback down, we warned, and a harsh government response in 2020
would provoke more demonstrations. Meanwhile, emboldened state-level opposition
leaders would directly challenge the central government, leaving Modi with less room
for maneuver on economic reform at a time of slowing growth.
With a population density nearly three times that of China, a weaker health and sanitation
infrastructure, and a far less autocratic government, India is acutely vulnerable to a coronavirus
outbreak. So far, it has handled it well—the Indian government was one of the first to impose
draconian border measures, with no foreign tourists allowed to enter the country until at least
15 April. But the challenges for India going forward will only increase. There is a significant
risk that misinformation about the coronavirus will be targeted at minority communities and/or sow confusion, possibly sparking sectarian violence. The financial stress for India andemerging markets generally will offset benefits from the drop in oil prices. India islikely to see significant capital outflows, currency devaluation, and renewed urgency
for economic reforms. However, those reforms are unlikely to happen, as Modi’s
economic team is still dominated by statists, andthe government will continue to prioritize its
nationalist agenda over reforms.

KEY TAKEAWAY

India has managed thecoronavirus relatively
effectively to this point,
but the continuing
vulnerabilities posed by
its weak healthcare system will
exacerbate tensions among
angry citizens already on edge.

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6Risk significantly decreases

Risk decreases

Risk stays the same

Risk increases

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Geopolitical Europe

In January, risk #6 described how the European Union aimed to defend
itself more aggressively against competing economic and politicalblocs. On regulation, antitrust officials would continue to battle
North American tech giants. On trade, the EU would become
more assertive on rules enforcement and retaliatory tariffs.
On security, officials would try to use the world’s largest market to break
down cross-border barriers to military trade and tech development.
This more independent Europe would generate friction with boththe US and China.
Individual European governments have been late to react to thecoronavirus crisis, which is pushing the EU to become more cohesive
and act as the critical backstop for the continent. Authorities inBrussels have given Italy more fiscal room to reduce risk and provided
both fiscal stimulus and budgetary flexibility with strong agreement
among all member states. Trump’s decision to target Europe fortravel restrictions will strongly encourage the trend toward more
independence and increase the transatlantic strains we wrote about inJanuary. If the EU successfully manages the coronavirus response, its leaders
may become bolder in pursuing a more independent geopolitical policy. But that’s
a big if, especially given the likelihood of recession over the coming months. And
should that recession be deeper or longer than currently expected, a Europe with adepleted monetary policy toolkit and no shortage of political obstacles to large-scale
fiscal stimulus could face a “lost decade” a la Japan. Either way, the pandemic will
also blunt some of the other implications of a geopolitical Europe, most notably a moreaggressive posture toward Beijing, which is implausible in this environment.

KEY TAKEAWAY

Coronavirus exacerbates transatlantic tensions, but
it will also fully occupy European leaders at a time
when they would like to become much more assertive
toward both the US and China in many areas.

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7Risk significantly decreases

Risk decreases

Risk stays the same

Risk increases

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Politics vs. economics ofclimate change

In January, risk #7 described how climate change would put
governments, investors, and society at large on a collisioncourse with corporate decision-makers, who would have tochoose between ambitious commitments to reduce their emissions and theirbottom lines. Civil society would be unforgiving of investors and companies
they believe are moving too slowly. Oil and gas firms, airlines, carmakers,
and meat producers would feel the heat. Disruption to supply chains would
be a meaningful risk. Investors would reduce exposures to carbon intensive
industries, sending asset prices lower. All this as global warming would
make natural disasters more likely, more frequent, and more severe.
The global focus on coronavirus will come at the expense of attention paid
to climate change. Environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG)
investing mandates will become weaker in implementation if not in spirit, as
investors and companies pursue recovery and growth above all else. Countries
will utilize their fiscal space on targeted measures to blunt the impact of thecoronavirus, and whatever is left over for broad fiscal stimulus will only
be partially dedicated to “green” projects, and to varying degrees acrosscountries. Further, collapsing oil prices will undercut the competitivenessof cleaner alternative energy sources. With large-scale protest activity
diminished because of social distancing, civil society actors will turn tocyber and online tools to apply pressure on companies and governments,
most of which will have less appetite and ability to respond to climatechange. The immediate risk of a clash between politics and economics
over climate change significantly diminishes in the short term, even if theoverarching threat of climate change remains as real as ever.

KEY TAKEAWAY

Coronavirus will shift global
attention and resources away fromaddressing climate change, putting
the issue on the backburner.

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8Risk significantly decreases

Risk decreases

Risk stays the same

Risk increases

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Shia crescendo

In January, risk #8 detailed how the failure of US policy toward Iran,Iraq, and Syria—the major Shia-led nations in the Middle East—
would create significant risks for regional stability. These included
a lethal conflict with Iran; upward pressure on oil prices; an Iraq
caught between Iran’s orbit and state failure; and a rogue Syria fused
to Russia and Iran. Neither Trump nor Iran’s leaders want all-out war, we argued,
but deadly skirmishes inside Iraq between US and Iranian forces are probable. The
likelihood would increase that the Iraqi government would expel US troops this year,
and popular resistance from some Iraqis against Iran’s influence there would strain the
Iraqi state—OPEC’s second-largest oil producer. Feckless US policy in Syria would also
drive regional risk in 2020.
The coronavirus outbreak will weaken Iran, Iraq, and Syria. That will lessen the threat of US
military conflict with Iran but amplify the effects of failed US policy on the latter two nations
and the region. Iran is struggling to confront one of the world’s largest outbreaks of coronavirus.
Tehran wasn’t looking for war with the US before the coronavirus and certainly does not want
one now. But it will continue making trouble in the region and wage a public relations battle
against Washington’s refusal to meaningfully ease sanctions in
the face of a humanitarian crisis. As we wrote in January, illconceived US policy has been a cause of instability across theregion. Iraq is now even more at risk of state failure—with a collapse in oil prices and without a government—
and could be pushed over the cliff by an outbreak
there. That would be a boon for a resurgent IslamicState and potentially force the US to abandon ship.
Syrian reconstruction will also suffer, both if there’s
an outbreak of the coronavirus and because regional
capital will become more constrained as a result of
sharply lower oil prices.

KEY TAKEAWAY

Coronavirus eases the risks offailed US policy in Iran, but
amplifies them in Iraq and Syria.

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9Risk significantly decreases

Risk decreases

Risk stays the same

Risk increases

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Discontent in Latin America

In January, risk #9 described how Latin American societies had become
increasingly polarized in recent years. In 2020, public anger oversluggish growth, corruption, and low-quality public services would
keep the risk of political instability high. This comes at a time whenvulnerable middle classes are expecting more state spending on social
services, reducing the ability of government to undertake austerity measures expectedby foreign investors and the IMF. We expected protests to spread, fiscal balances todeteriorate, antiestablishment politicians to grow stronger, and election outcomes tobecome less predictable.
Latin America is one of the least-prepared parts of the world to deal with the coronavirus.
Serious outbreaks across the region, in conjunction with the oil price collapse, will further stoke
the voter anger described in our January report. All the problems we predicted will become
more likely: fiscal balances will deteriorate, currencies will plummet, anger with governments
will rise, public services will fray, and investment flows will diminish. In turn, discontent will
reduce governments’ ability to undertake needed austerity measures in some countries andfurther reduce the fiscal space needed to appease protesters in others (for example, Chile).
Amid a collapse in oil prices, the leaders of oil-producing countries such as Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Mexico will struggle to keep their approval ratings from collapsing. All four
also face fiscal constraints. The outlook is particularly bad for Ecuador (and Argentina,
though for reasons aside from oil); in Brazil, reforms will stilladvance, though at a more erratic pace, while in Mexico
a poorly functioning government will worsen the crisis.

KEY TAKEAWAY

Latin America’s lack of
preparedness for the coronavirus
will add to the many existingcauses of public discontent.

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Risk significantly decreases

10

Risk decreases

Risk stays the same

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TurkeyIn January, risk #10 described how President Recep Tayyip
Erdogan—who has a long history of provocative behavior in
response to threats, sparking confrontation with both foreignand domestic critics—has entered a period of steep politicaldecline. He’s suffering defections from the ruling Justiceand Development Party (AKP) as popular former
allies establish new parties. His rulingcoalition is shaky. Relations with the US would hit new lows,
we forecasted, as likely US sanctions take effect in the firsthalf of this year, undermining the country’s reputation andinvestment climate and putting further pressure on the lira.
Erdogan’s responses to these various challenges would further
damage Turkey’s ailing economy, we warned.
A serious coronavirus outbreak in Turkey would put Erdogan even moreon the defensive and leave him even more prone to erratic policymaking.
He would dive deeper into unorthodox economic policies. Cheap oil gives
Turkey’s central bank the scope to cut interest rates into single digits, as
Erdogan has long desired. But it also leaves the country with limitedmonetary policy capacity to fight economic fallout from the coronavirus,
as real rates in Turkey are already negative. The coronavirus will damage
tourism, as well as electronics, pharmaceutical, and automotive exports
at a time when portfolio inflows are slowing. On the other hand, falling
oil prices will help lower inflation and harm Turkey’s opponents, Saudi Arabia
and the UAE, more than Turkey and its ally, Qatar. Amid the challenges, Turkey will continue
to muddle through, but economic headwinds and the defection of more former AKP allies to
new opposition parties—most recently former deputy prime minister Ali Babacan—will render
Erdogan a wounded and unpredictable leader.
KEY TAKEAWAY

Coronavirus in and aroundTurkey will weaken both
Erdogan and his foreign rivals.

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RED
HERRINGS
The new axis of evil
In January, we described how the new “Axis ofevil”—Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and Syria—wasunlikely to blow up in 2020, despite the headlines.
Iran represents the biggest threat, but neither Trump
nor Tehran want all-out war.
Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela remain adamantly
anti-American, but war with the US this year is now an evenmore distant possibility. Facing a domestic public healthcrisis, Trump’s inclination toward military adventures
against these countries is even less than before. And noneof these states will likely seek a confrontation.

Still a herring

Populist policies in thedeveloped world
In January, we argued that the world’s advanced
industrial democracies (the US, Europe, and Japan)
remain well-positioned to withstand the populist
storm this year.
The coronavirus has strained public confidence ingovernment in many countries, but it doesn’t herald
a populist resurgence with major near-term policy
implications in the US, Europe, or Japan. This is an absolutely
critical point as we look ahead to the global economic andpolitical system in the eventual aftermath of the pandemic.

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In the US, the outbreak will increase pressure for universal
health care, although these demands will be funneledthrough Biden’s decidedly establishment candidacy. The
EU has acted pragmatically during the crisis, undercutting
populist campaigns against Brussels. Given the possibility
he could be forced to cancel the Olympics, Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe is under some of the greatest nearterm pressure, but his departure wouldn’t markedly change
governance for Japan.

Still a herring

Post-Brexit
In January, we described how a big win for Prime
Minister Boris Johnson and his Conservative Party,
and an historic loss for Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour
Party, gives the UK a much-needed break from Brexit
madness in 2020.
The coronavirus outbreak has added complications toalready messy negotiations between the UK and the EU.
The coronavirus means limited face-to-face talks, andit may weaken the UK government’s commitment to its“divergence” agenda over fears that UK business would face
added bureaucratic burdens on top of coronavirus effects(not to mention that Johnson will be politically weakerfor having badly mismanaged the crisis). Nevertheless, anarrow UK-EU goods deal or a prolongation of the talks
remain the most likely outcome, meaning 2020 in the UK
is still a red herring.

Still a herring ... just16

It’s important to recognize the unprecedented nature of thisenvironment in the context of our experience over recent
decades. In the coming weeks the world will get a much better
handle on the epidemiology of the coronavirus pandemic, but thefractiousness and weakness of the geopolitical order—in termsof the legitimacy of domestic politics, the weakness of existing
international alliances, and the lack of alignment of institutionalframeworks and today’s global balance of power—reflect aradically different backdrop for a global crisis than any we’ve
experienced in recent decades. Looking forward, it also implies
a different trajectory for the world order as we know it, when weeventually come out the other side.
Yours through the looking glass,—Ian & Cliff

Brasília

London

New York

San Francisco

São Paulo

Singapore

Tokyo

Washington D.C.

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