Institute for Economics & Peace Measuring peace in a complex world

GLOBAL
PEACE
INDEX
2023
Results &TrendsEconomic
ImpactConflict
Hotspots

Positive
Peace

Institute for
Economics& PeaceQuantifying Peace and its Benefits
The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicatedto shifting the world’s focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being
and progress.
IEP achieves its goals by developing new conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness; providing
metrics for measuring peace; and uncovering the relationships between business, peace and prosperity as
well as promoting a better understanding of the cultural, economic and political factors that create peace.
IEP is headquartered in Sydney, with offices in New York, Brussels, The Hague, Mexico City and Harare. It
works with a wide range of partners internationally and collaborates with intergovernmental organizations
on measuring and communicating the economic value of peace.
For more information visit www.economicsandpeace.org
Please cite this report as:
Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Peace Index 2023: Measuring Peace in a Complex World, Sydney,
June 2023. Available from: http://visionofhumanity.org/resources (accessed Date Month Year).

Contents
Executive Summary
Key Findings

1

Results

7

2023 Global Peace Index Rankings
Results
Regional Overview
Improvements and Deteriorations

8
10
13
21

2 Trends
GPI Trends
Domain Trends
Geospatial Trends

3

Economic Impactof Violence
The Economic Value of Peace
The Value of Peace in 2022
Methodology at a Glance
Economic Focus - The Impact of a Blockade of Taiwan

4

Conflict Trends
and Hotspots
Introduction
Conflict Trends
Conflict Hotspots

5 Positive Peace
6

2
4

25
26
27
30

34
35
35
42
44

51
52
53
56

64

What is Positive Peace?
Global Trends in Positive Peace
Positive Peace and Systems Theory

65
66
69

Appendices74

Appendix A: GPI Methodology
Appendix B: GPI Indicator Sources, Definitions & Scoring Criteria
Appendix C: GPI Domain Scores
Appendix D: Economic Cost of Violence
Endnotes

75
79
87
90
93

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

Executive
SummaryThis is the 17th edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI),
which ranks 163 independent states and territories
according to their level of peacefulness. Produced by
the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GPI is
the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness.
This report presents the most comprehensive datadriven analysis to-date on trends in peace, its economic
value, and how to develop peaceful societies.
The GPI covers 163 countries comprising 99.7 per centof the world’s population, using 23 qualitative andquantitative indicators from highly respected sources,
and measures the state of peace across three domains:the level of Societal Safety and Security; the extent of
Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and thedegree of Militarisation.
In addition to discussing the findings from the 2023
GPI, the report includes analysis of current conflicts andpotential future conflicts, including an analysis of thelikely economic impact of a Chinese blockade of Taiwan
on the global economy.
This year’s results found that the average level ofglobal peacefulness deteriorated by 0.42 per cent. Thisis the thirteenth deterioration in peacefulness in thelast fifteen years, with 84 countries improving and 79
deteriorating in peacefulness in 2022.
Iceland remains the most peaceful country in the world,
a position it has held since 2008. It is joined at the topof the index by Denmark, Ireland, New Zealand, andAustria. Afghanistan is the least peaceful country in
the world for the eighth consecutive year, followed
by Yemen, Syria, South Sudan, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. All these countries in bothgroups, other than Ireland, have always been ranked
amongst the ten most peaceful or least peacefulcountries, highlighting the stickiness of peacefulness at
both ends of the Index.
The war in Ukraine had a significant impact on global
peacefulness, with Ukraine and Russia having thelargest and fifth largest deteriorations in peacefulness
respectively. Haiti, Mali, and Israel were the othercountries with the largest deteriorations.
The largest improvement in peacefulness occurredin Libya for the second successive year, followed by
Burundi, Oman, Côte d'Ivoire, and Afghanistan.
Europe is the most peaceful region in the world and ishome to seven of the ten most peaceful countries. The
other three most peaceful countries are in the AsiaPacific region. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
region remained the world’s least peaceful region. It
is home to four of the ten least peaceful countries,2

however it was also the region with the largest
improvement in peace.
The largest improvements occurred in MENA andNorth America. North America’s improvement was
driven by improvements in Canada. In the MENA region
Ongoing Conflict domain was the primary driver of the
improvement, with terrorism impact, internal conflicts
fought, and deaths from internal conflict all improving.
The largest regional deterioration occurred in the
Russia and Eurasia region. Although this was primarily
driven by a deterioration in peacefulness in Ukraine
and Russia, many other countries in the region also
experienced significant falls in peacefulness.
Of the 23 indicators in the GPI, ten recorded
improvements, eleven deteriorated, and two recorded
no change. The Safety and Security and Ongoing
Conflict domains both deteriorated, while theMilitarisation domain recorded a slight improvement,
continuing a long-term trend of improvement.
The largest year-on-year deteriorations occurred on theexternal conflicts fought, deaths from internal conflictand political instability indicators. The number of battle
deaths had been rising even before the Ukraine conflictbegan, with the total number of conflict-related deaths
rising by 45 per cent between 2020 and 2021.
On a more positive note, there were substantial
improvements for several Safety and Security indicators,
including terrorism impact and the homicide rate.
Several countries in the Central America and Caribbean
recorded reductions in the number of homicides,
although the region still has the highest homicide rate
on average of any area in the GPI.
Over the last 15 years the world has become lesspeaceful, with the average country score deterioratingby five per cent. Of the 163 countries in the GPI,
95 recorded deteriorations, while 66 recorded
improvements and two recorded no change in score.
Sixteen of the 23 GPI indicators deteriorated between
2008 and 2023 while eight improved.
Two of the three GPI domains have deteriorated
since 2008, with Ongoing Conflict deteriorating by
14 per cent and Safety and Security deteriorating by
5.4 per cent. Militarization was the only domain to
improve. Some of the largest indicator deteriorations
were for external conflicts fought, internal conflicts
fought, number of refugees and IDPs and violent
demonstrations. There were 120 countries where thenumber of violent demonstrations increased over the
past fifteen years, compared to just 20 where it fell.

Executive Summary

External conflicts fought recorded the largest
deterioration of all indicators since 2008, worsening byover 50 per cent. There were 77 countries that recorded
a deterioration on this indicator since 2008. Of the
163 countries in the GPI, 122 were involved in at least
one external conflict since 2008, although the majority
did so as part of broad coalitions and not committing
substantial resources.
The improvement in the Militarisation domain was
widespread, with every region recording a fall in scoresince 2008. The armed service rate fell in 113 countries,
while the average level of military expenditure as apercentage of GDP also fell, from 2.04 to 1.95 per cent.
However, the absolute level of military expenditure
increased, with the largest increases occurring in China,
the US, and India, where total expenditure increased by$USD 180 billion, 70 billion and 40 billion respectively
since 2008.

of peacefulness, where countries improved their GPIscores over the past 15 years, despite widespread
violence in the neighbouring Sahel region, and astrong history of violent conflict. Other than Guinea,
every single coastal West African country recorded
an improvement in peacefulness from 2008 to 2023.
Improvements in governance and political stability, as
well as increased resources for policing and security
services have played a key role in the increase inpeacefulness.
The economic impact of violence on the global
economy in 2022 was $17.5 trillion in purchasing
power parity (PPP) terms. This figure is equivalent to12.9 per cent of the world’s GDP or $2,200 per person,increasing by 6.6 per cent from the previous year. Thiswas mainly driven by an increase in the total economic
impact of global military expenditure, which rose by
16.8 per cent, although more countries reduced theirmilitary expenditure as a percentage of GDP thanincreased it. Much of the increase resulted from Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine and associated military spending
from countries directly and indirectly involved in theconflict.

Several conflicts, other than the war in Ukraine, havealso been devastating. 2022 was the deadliest year for
armed conflict since the 1994 Rwandan genocide, thedeadliest year in the history of the GPI.
This was driven by more than 100,000
For the ten countries most affected
deaths in the war in Tigray in northern
Ethiopia. The battles between the
The largest year-on- by violence, the average economic
impact was equivalent to 34 per centEthiopian Defence Force, ally Eritrea andyear deteriorationsof GDP, compared to 2.9 per cent inrebel group TPLF is the single deadliest
occurred on thethe ten countries least affected byevent since 1994. Ukraine also saw atexternal conflicts
violence. Ukraine, Afghanistan, andleast 82,000 conflict deaths in 2022.
fought, deaths fromCentral African Republic incurred
Conflict-related deaths in Mali increased
internal conflict, and thethe largest proportional economic
154 per cent in 2022, with violence
political instability
cost of violence in 2021, equivalentagainst civilians rising by 570 per cent,indicators.
to 63, 47, and 40 per cent of GDP,
while in Myanmar, conflict-related deaths
respectively.
increased by 87 per cent. In contrast,
the level of violence in other conflictThe 2023 GPI report also looks at theaffected areas fell sharply over the
economic impact of a hypothetical Chinese blockade
past year. Conflict-related deaths fell by 91 per cent inof Taiwan. IEP estimates that a blockade would have
Afghanistan, and by 63 per cent in Yemen.
an impact twice as large as the global financial crisis,with global GDP falling by 2.8 per cent within a year.
The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly
The Chinese economy would shrink by an estimatedknown as drones, are being more commonly deployed,
seven per cent, while Taiwan’s economy would shrinkwith both state and non-state actors increasingly
by almost 40 per cent. There would be significant spillusing drones in attacks against both military andover effects in any industry that relies on complex
infrastructure targets. The number of non-state groups
electronics, as Taiwan produces over 90 per cent of theusing drones doubled between 2018 and 2022, and theworld’s advanced logic semiconductors. China’s five
total number of drone strikes nearly tripled over the
major trading partners are all developed democracies
same period.
with strong defence links with the US.
Both violence and peacefulness can be contagious.
The need for a systemic response to building peace is
Actions in one region or country can spill over into
urgent. Conflict is intensifying in several regions, withbordering regions and countries, leading to virtuous
conflict-related deaths rising rapidly. The gap between
or vicious cycles where peace and conflict movethe most and least peaceful countries continues toin tandem. Eastern Europe is an example of where
grow, and although many measures of militarisation
changes in one country have led to large decreases
have improved over the past fifteen years, thein peacefulness in neighbouring countries. Russia’s
proliferation of cheaper advanced military technologies,
annexation of Crimea in 2014 led to a surge inincreasing geopolitical competition, and an underlying
militarisation in Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, andcurrent of political instability in many countries means
Estonia, with military expenditure and neighbouringthat a continuing deterioration of global peacefulness
countries relations deteriorating in all these countries.
seems likely.
Coastal West Africa is an example of a virtuous cycle3Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

Key Findings
SECTION 1: RESULTSSECTION 2: TRENDS•

The average level of country peacefulness deteriorated by 0.42 percent in the 2023 Global Peace Index. This is the ninth consecutive
year that global peacefulness has deteriorated. The average levelof peacefulness has only improved twice year-on-year since 2008.

••

In the past year, 84 countries recorded an improvement, while 79
countries recorded a deterioration in peacefulness.

The level of global peacefulness has deteriorated by five per centsince 2008, with 95 countries deteriorating and 66 improving in the
GPI. The average level of global peacefulness has deteriorated for
13 of the last 15 years, with no year-on-year improvements
recorded since 2014.

••

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its consequences were the main
drivers of the deterioration in peacefulness globally. Both Russia
and Ukraine are now ranked amongst the ten least peacefulcountries, and Ukraine had the largest deterioration of any country
in the 2023 GPI.

The gap between the least and the most peaceful countries
continues to grow. Since 2008, the 25 least peaceful countries
deteriorated on average by 9.8 per cent, while the 25 most peacefulcountries improved by 0.1 per cent.

•Of the three GPI domains, two recorded deteriorations and one
improved since 2008. Ongoing Conflict and Safety and Security
deteriorated by 14 and 5.4 per cent respectively. Militarisation
improved by 6.2 per cent.

•All six of the Ongoing Conflict indicators deteriorated. In total, 99
countries recorded a deterioration on this domain, with 52 recording
an improvement, and 10 registering no change since 2008.

•

Conflict and terrorism in the Middle East were key drivers of the
global deterioration in peacefulness until 2015, but in the past eight
years conflicts in other regions have underpinned the global decline
in peacefulness.

•

Sixteen of the 23 indicators in the GPI deteriorated, while only
seven improved. Only one indicator improved by more than ten percent, while eight deteriorated by more than ten per cent.

•

The two indicators with the largest deterioration in peacefulness
since 2008 were violent demonstrations and external conflicts
fought, each deteriorating by an average of 53 per cent. The
increase in external conflicts fought reflects more external actors
becoming involved in internal conflicts in other countries.

•

The terrorism impact indicator deteriorated sharply until 2015, but inrecent years has begun to improve. The epicenter of terrorism has
shifted from the Middle East and North Africa into sub-SaharanAfrica, especially the Sahel.

•

The average homicide rate across all GPI countries fell from 7.6 to
6.3 per 100,000 from 2008 to 2023, representing a 17.1 per centimprovement. 104 countries improved their score on the homicide
rate indicator, while 42 deteriorated.

•

Five of the six indicators in the Militarisation domain have improved
since 2008, with the average armed personnel rate declining from476 to 403 soldiers per 100,000 population, and 123 countries
improving on UN peacekeeping funding.

•

In contrast with the global trend, Eastern European countries
bordering Russia deteriorated on the Militarisation domain by anaverage of 6.9 per cent between 2008 and 2023. The relations withneighbouring countries indicator also deteriorated significantly inthis region.

•

Coastal West Africa recorded an improvement in overall
peacefulness, despite a history of conflict, political instability, and asurge in violent conflict and terrorism in the neighbouring Sahelregion. There were no deaths from terrorism recorded in this regionin 2022.

•

There are now 15 countries where at least five per cent of the
population are either refugees or internally displaced. Syria has 61
per cent of its population displaced, South Sudan over 42 per cent,Ukraine over 30 per cent, while Somalia and the Central African
Republic have more than 20 per cent displaced.

•

The intensity of conflict was increasing around the world even prior
to the start of the conflict in Ukraine.

•

The total number of conflict-related deaths increased by 96 percent. Both the deaths from internal conflict and external conflicts
fought indicators would have deteriorated even if Ukraine andRussia were excluded from the analysis.

•

The two indicators with the largest deteriorations in 2022 wereconflict-related, external conflicts fought and deaths from internal
conflict, followed by political instability. The indicators with thebiggest improvement were UN peacekeeping funding and military
expenditure.

•

Although 92 countries improved on military expenditure (%GDP) in
2022 total military expenditure increased, mainly driven bycountries involved in the Ukraine war.

•

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region recorded thesecond largest improvement in peacefulness after North America,
however it remained the world’s least peaceful region. It is home tofour of the ten least peaceful countries in the world.

•

•

•

•

•

4

Europe remains the most peaceful region in the world and is home
to seven of the ten most peaceful countries. However, it
deteriorated on all three GPI domains over the past year, as
tensions between European countries and Russia continued to
grow. Europe is less peaceful now than it was 15 years ago.
Peacefulness improved on average for the Militarisation domain but
deteriorated on both the Ongoing Conflict and Safety and Security
domains.
Of the 23 GPI indicators, ten recorded an improvement, 11 had adeterioration, and two recorded no change over the past year. The
largest deterioration occurred on the external conflicts fought
indicator, while UN peacekeeping funding had the largest
improvement.
Several countries that had experienced serious conflict in the past
two decades recorded the largest improvements in peacefulness.
Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Afghanistan were all ranked amongst thefive biggest improvers in peace.
There were 59 countries where political instability deteriorated overthe past year, compared to just 22 where the indicator improved.

Key Findings

through the supply of military assistance.

SECTION 3: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE•

The global economic impact of violence was $17.5 trillion in 2022,
equivalent to 12.9 per cent of global GDP, or $2,200 per person.

•

The war in Ukraine had a devastating economic effect, with theeconomic impact of violence in Ukraine increased by 479 per centor $449 billion. This was the largest increase of any country.

•

Ukraine, Afghanistan and Sudan incurred the highest relative
economic cost of violence in 2022, equivalent to 63.1, 46.5 and39.7 per cent of GDP, respectively.

•

In the ten countries most affected by violence, the economic cost ofviolence averaged 34 per cent of GDP in 2022, compared to just
2.9 per cent for the ten least affected countries.

•

Drones have also played a major role in many conflicts, with militaryand commercial drones utilised in large numbers in Ukraine,
Ethiopia and Myanmar. The total number of drone attacks
increased by 40.8 per cent from in 2022, with the number ofdifferent groups using drones increasing by 24 per cent.

•Violence in Mali escalated after France withdrew its forces from thecountry. Mali saw a 154 per cent increase in conflict-related deaths,
including a nearly four-fold increase in deaths from violencetargeted at civilians. There were nearly 5,000 battlefield deaths in
2022.

•

Myanmar saw a shift from protest-related violence towards civil war,as various militias gained support after the coup. Protest-related
deaths fell 99.2 per cent, while conflict-related deaths increased by
86.7 per cent.

•

The war in Ethiopia's Tigray region saw the most severe battles of
the war with over 104,000 people killed between August andNovember prior to a truce between the Ethiopian government and
TPLF. Violence also surged in Oromia, a separate conflict.

•

IEP estimates that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would lead to adrop in global economic output of USD 2.7 trillion in the first year.
This estimate is considered conservative.

•

The blockade would lead to a 2.8 per cent decline in global
economic output in the first year. This is almost double the loss that
occurred as the result of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.

•

Almost 60 per cent of this loss of economic activity would occur in
China and Taiwan, with the two countries having combined lost
output of 1.6 trillion USD.

•

Afghanistan recorded the largest reduction in deaths from armed
conflict in 2022 with conflict-related deaths falling 90.6 per cent,from almost 43,000 to just over 4,000.

•

The Chinese economy would shrink by an estimated seven percent, while Taiwan’s economy would shrink by almost 40 per cent.

••

The loss of economic output would be strongly felt in other parts of
the world, most noticeably South-East Asia and Oceania. Losses inthese regions would range from three per cent in Australia andLaos, to up to six per cent in Vietnam.

Conflict declined in Yemen as a truce held. Improvements inrelations between Saudi-Arabia and Iran may further reduce
tensions.

SECTION 5: POSITIVE PEACE•

The impact of a blockade would be especially strong on trade incomputers and electronics. China and Taiwan put together
dominate global trade in computer and electronics, at 31 per centand electrical equipment at 23 per cent.

Positive Peace is defined as the attitudes, institutions andstructures that create and sustain peaceful societies.

•

These same factors also lead to many other positive outcomes thatsociety feels are important, such as economic strength, resilienceand wellbeing.

China and several East Asian Countries including South Korea andJapan are highly dependent on imports of computer and electronic
components from Taiwan. The share of trade with Taiwan in total
trade in this sector ranges from 10 per cent for the Philippines to 21
per cent for China.

•

The most peaceful countries in the world perform strongly on alleight Pillars of Positive Peace.

•High Positive Peace countries are more likely to maintain stability,
adapt and recover from shocks.

Taiwan is the global leader in semiconductor production, with a 20
per cent share of the total global capacity, 37 per cent of the world’s
logic semiconductors production capacity, and 92 per cent of theworld’s advanced logic semiconductors production capacity.

•

Of the countries with a substantial Positive Peace Deficit in 2009,
almost 80 per cent deteriorated in the GPI in the subsequent
decade. A Positive Peace deficit is where the actual peacefulnessof a country is substantially higher than what its levels of Positive
Peace would suggest.

SECTION 4: CONFLICT TRENDS AND HOTSPOTS•

Positive Peace improved two per cent globally from 2009 to 2022.

•

2022 saw a shift in the global distribution of violence. Major conflicts
in the MENA region and South Asia declined, while conflicts in
sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and Asia-Pacific intensified.

••

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the largest war in Europe since theBalkan wars in the 1990s. Conservative estimates suggest there
were at least 82,200 conflict-related deaths in Ukraine in 2022,
although the true number is likely to be much higher.

The global PPI improved every year without interruption from 2009
until 2019. The slight decline since 2019 was associated with
COVID-19 and the global recession created by the policy
responses to the pandemic.

••

Even when the violence in Ukraine is excluded, there has been an
increase in the level of conflict since 2019. Conflict-related deathsrose by 45 per cent in the year prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,with over 100,000 total deaths being recorded in 2021.

Improvements in the PPI are due to the Structures domain of
Positive Peace, which showed substantial development since 2009,
while the Institutions domain recorded only a small improvement in
the period.

••

Violence increased significantly in Mali, Myanmar, and Ukraine in
2022. 2022 was the deadliest year for armed conflict in the historyof the GPI. In Ethiopia over 104,000 people died in the war in
Tigray, the single largest conflict death event since the 1994
Rwandan genocide. By contrast, conflict decreased significantly in
Afghanistan and Yemen.

In contrast, the Attitudes domain deteriorated by two per centglobally from 2009 to 2022. This domain deteriorated in 99 of thetotal 163 countries assessed, reflecting increased polarisation ofviews on political and economic administration matters, as well as adeterioration in the quality of information disseminated to the public.

•

Increased geopolitical competition has fueled conflict in many
countries. Both great and middle powers are competing for
influence in states or regions by supporting competing interests

•

•

•

5

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world6Results 1

1 Results
Key Findings•

The average level of country peacefulness
deteriorated by 0.42 per cent in the 2023 Global
Peace Index. This is the ninth consecutive year that
global peacefulness has deteriorated. The averagelevel of peacefulness has only improved twice
year-on-year since 2008.

•

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region
recorded the second largest improvement inpeacefulness after North America, however it
remained the world’s least peaceful region. It ishome to four of the ten least peaceful countries in
the world.

•

In the past year, 84 countries recorded an
improvement, while 79 countries recorded a
deterioration in peacefulness.

••

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its consequenceswere the main drivers of the deterioration inpeacefulness globally. Both Russia and Ukraine are
now ranked amongst the ten least peacefulcountries, and Ukraine had the largest deteriorationof any country in the 2023 GPI.

Europe remains the most peaceful region in theworld and is home to seven of the ten mostpeaceful countries. However, it deteriorated on all
three GPI domains over the past year, as tensions
between European countries and Russia continued
to grow. Europe is less peaceful now than it was 15
years ago.

•

Peacefulness improved on average for the
Militarisation domain but deteriorated on both the
Ongoing Conflict and Safety and Security domains.

•

Of the 23 GPI indicators, ten recorded an
improvement, 11 had a deterioration, and tworecorded no change over the past year.

•

Several countries that had experienced serious
conflict in the past two decades recorded the largest
improvements in peacefulness. Libya, Côte d'Ivoire,and Afghanistan were all ranked amongst the fivebiggest improvers in peace.

•

There were 59 countries where political instability
deteriorated over the past year, compared to just 22
where the indicator improved.

•

The intensity of conflict was increasing around theworld even prior to the start of the conflict in
Ukraine.

•

The total number of conflict-related deaths
increased by 96 per cent. Both the deaths frominternal conflict and external conflicts fought
indicators would have deteriorated even if Ukraine
and Russia were excluded from the analysis.

•

The two indicators with the largest deteriorations in
2022 were conflict-related, external conflicts foughtand deaths from internal conflict, followed bypolitical instability. The indicators with the biggest
improvement were UN peacekeeping funding andmilitary expenditure.

•

Although 92 countries improved on the military
expenditure indicator in 2022 total military
expenditure increased, mainly driven by countries
involved in the Ukraine war.

7

Global Peace
GlobalPeaceIndex
Index2023
2023| Measuring| Measuringpeace
peaceinina acomplexcomplex
world
world

2023
GLOBALPEACEINDEXA SNAPSHOT OF THE
GLOBAL STATE OF PEACETHE STATE OF PEACEVERY HIGH

RANK
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

8

HIGH

MEDIUMLOW

COUNTRYSCORE CHANGE

IcelandDenmark
Ireland
New ZealandAustria
Singapore
PortugalSlovenia
Japan
Switzerland
CanadaCzechia
Finland
Croatia
Germany
Netherlands
BhutanHungary
Malaysia
Belgium
Qatar
Australia
Mauritius
NorwayEstonia
Slovakia
LatviaSweden

1.124
1.31
1.312
1.313
1.316
1.332
1.333
1.334
1.336
1.339
1.35
1.379
1.399
1.45
1.456
1.49
1.496
1.508
1.513
1.523
1.524
1.525
1.546
1.55
1.563
1.578
1.582
1.625

↔
UP-LONG 1
DOWN-LONG 1
UP-LONG 2
DOWN-LONG 1
UP-LONG 4
UP-LONG 1
DOWN-LONG 4↔
UP-LONG 1
UP-LONG 2
DOWN-LONG 5
UP-LONG 3
UP-LONG 1
UP-LONG 2
UP-LONG 5
DOWN-LONG 5
DOWN-LONG 4↔
UP-LONG 4
UP-LONG 1
UP-LONG 4
UP-LONG 5
DOWN-LONG 6
UP-LONG 1
DOWN-LONG 6
UP-LONG 3
UP-LONG 1

VERY LOW

RANK
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

NOT INCLUDEDCOUNTRY
PolandBulgaria
Romania
Spain
TaiwanItaly
KuwaitLithuania
United Kingdom
North Macedonia
Costa Rica
Albania
VietnamBotswanaSouth Korea
Mongolia
Montenegro
Laos
Sierra Leone
Oman
Timor-Leste
Uruguay
Ghana
SenegalIndonesia
Argentina
Madagascar
Namibia

SCORE CHANGE
1.634
1.643
1.649
1.649
1.649
1.662
1.669
1.671
1.693
1.713
1.731
1.745
1.745
1.762
1.763
1.765
1.772
1.779
1.792
1.794
1.796
1.798
1.799
1.827
1.829
1.837
1.846
1.859

DOWN-LONG 6
DOWN-LONG 5
UP-LONG 4↔
UP-LONG 2
DOWN-LONG 2
UP-LONG 3
DOWN-LONG 2
DOWN-LONG 1
DOWN-LONG 1
UP-LONG 2↔
UP-LONG 4
UP-LONG 6
UP-LONG 2
DOWN-LONG 5
UP-LONG 5
UP-LONG 3↔
UP-LONG 18
UP-LONG 3
DOWN-LONG 5
DOWN-LONG 8
UP-LONG 4
DOWN-LONG 12
UP-LONG 10↔
UP-LONG 6RANKCOUNTRYSCORE CHANGE

57
58
59
60

Moldova
Chile
The Gambia
Greece

1.873
1.874
1.888
1.89

UP-LONG
DOWN-LONG
DOWN-LONG
DOWN-LONG

61

Bosnia andHerzegovina

1.892

DOWN-LONG 4

Jordan1.895
Zambia1.898
Cyprus1.904
Serbia1.921
Armenia
1.929
France1.939
Panama1.942
Paraguay
1.942
Trinidad and Tobago 1.946
Kosovo1.946
Liberia
1.946
Cambodia
1.947
Malawi
1.97
United Arab Emirates 1.979
Kazakhstan
1.98
Jamaica
1.986
Bolivia
2.001
Nepal
2.006
China
2.009
Tunisia
2.01
Equatorial Guinea
2.013
Dominican Republic 2.019

UP-LONG 6
DOWN-LONG 4
UP-LONG 1
DOWN-LONG 7
UP-LONG 3↔
DOWN-LONG 8
UP-LONG 12
UP-LONG 1
UP-LONG 5
UP-LONG 8
DOWN-LONG 1
DOWN-LONG 4
UP-LONG 3
UP-LONG 21
UP-LONG 3
DOWN-LONG 1
DOWN-LONG 5
UP-LONG 6
UP-LONG 1
DOWN-LONG 19
UP-LONG 5

62
63
64
65
66
67
=68
=68
=70
=70
=70
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

4
5
8
6

Results 1
Results

IMPROVEMENTS

DETERIORATIONSOVERALL AVERAGE
CHANGE (%)

countries recorded
improvements inpeacefulness

countries recorded
deteriorations inpeacefulness

The average level of global
peacefulness deteriorated by 0.42 percent in the 2023 Global Peace Index

84

79

RANK

COUNTRYSCORE CHANGE

=84
=84
86
87
=88
=88
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
=97
=97
99
100
101
102

AngolaMoroccoUzbekistan
Guinea-Bissau
Bangladesh
RwandaCôte d'Ivoire
Tanzania
Thailand
Gabon
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Algeria
Ecuador
Papua New Guinea
Cuba
Turkmenistan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
GuatemalaPeru
Togo
GuyanaSri Lanka
BahrainEswatini
Benin
Lesotho

2.02
2.02
2.033
2.045
2.051
2.051
2.053
2.058
2.061
2.068
2.071
2.09
2.094
2.095
2.095
2.103
2.107
2.11
2.114
2.13
2.13
2.13
2.134
2.136
2.145
2.168
2.177
2.191

=103
=103
=103

106
107
108
109
110
111

DOWN-LONG 9
DOWN-LONG 1
DOWN-LONG 2
UP-LONG 12
UP-LONG 8
UP-LONG 3
UP-LONG 18
UP-LONG 2
UP-LONG 13
DOWN-LONG 6
UP-LONG 1
UP-LONG 15
UP-LONG 8
DOWN-LONG 24
DOWN-LONG 8
UP-LONG 1
UP-LONG 3
DOWN-LONG 16
DOWN-LONG 8
UP-LONG 2
DOWN-LONG 1
UP-LONG 4
DOWN-LONG 5
DOWN-LONG 18
UP-LONG 1
DOWN-LONG 17
UP-LONG 1
DOWN-LONG 13

+0.42

RANK

COUNTRYSCORE CHANGE

112

Djibouti

2.196

UP-LONG 1

113

Republic of the
Congo

2.21

UP-LONG 1

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
=124
=124
126
127
128
129
130

Mauritania
Philippines
Belarus
Kenya
Mozambique
Saudi Arabia
Honduras
Egypt
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Zimbabwe
UgandaIndia
GuineaBurundiHaiti
South Africa

2.228
2.229
2.248
2.254
2.259
2.26
2.265
2.267
2.279
2.294
2.3
2.3
2.314
2.359
2.393
2.395
2.405

UP-LONG 4
UP-LONG 6
UP-LONG 4
UP-LONG 2
DOWN-LONG 2
UP-LONG 5
DOWN-LONG 5
UP-LONG 5
DOWN-LONG 6↔
UP-LONG 3
UP-LONG 1
UP-LONG 2
UP-LONG 2
UP-LONG 6
DOWN-LONG 17
DOWN-LONG 8

131

United States ofAmerica

2.448

↔

132
133
134
135
136
137

BrazilEritrea
Palestine
LebanonMexico
Libya

2.462
2.505
2.538
2.581
2.599
2.605

↔
↔
DOWN-LONG 4
UP-LONG 1
UP-LONG 3
UP-LONG 14

RANK
138
139

COUNTRYSCORE CHANGE

Niger
Cameroon
Venezuela
Colombia
Chad
IsraelNigeria
Myanmar
Pakistan
Türkiye
IranNorth Korea
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia

2.625
2.66
2.693
2.693
2.699
2.706
2.713
2.741
2.745
2.8
2.8
2.848
2.868
2.872

UP-LONG
UP-LONG
UP-LONG
UP-LONG
DOWN-LONG
DOWN-LONG
DOWN-LONG
DOWN-LONG
UP-LONG
UP-LONG
DOWN-LONG
UP-LONG
DOWN-LONG
DOWN-LONG

152

Central African
Republic

2.934

UP-LONG 2

153
154
155
156
157
158

Mali
Iraq
Sudan
Somalia
UkraineRussia

2.963
3.006
3.023
3.036
3.043
3.142

DOWN-LONG 4
UP-LONG 3↔
UP-LONG 2
DOWN-LONG 14
DOWN-LONG 3

159

Democratic Republic
3.214
of the Congo

↔

160
161
162

South Sudan
Syria
Yemen

3.221
3.294
3.35

↔
↔
↔

163

Afghanistan

3.448

↔

=140
=140

142
143
144
145
146
=147
=147
149
150
151

9

2
5
5
2
5
8
3
7
2
5
1
4
3
2

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

Results
The 2023 GPI finds that the world became less peaceful for the 13th time in the last 15 years, with theaverage level of country peacefulness deteriorating by 0.42 per cent over the past year. Figure 1.1 shows
the change in the average levels of peacefulness for each of the GPI domains, as well as the percentage
of countries that improved or deteriorated. In total, peacefulness improved in 84 countries and deteriorated
in 79, highlighting that falls in peacefulness are generally larger than improvements.
The deterioration in peacefulness was mainly due to a
deterioration in the Ongoing Conflict domain. Deaths frominternal conflict, neighbouring countries relations, and external
conflicts fought all recorded significant deteriorations, with thetotal number of conflict-related deaths increasing by 96 percent. Although the conflict in Ukraine was the primary driver ofthis increase, increases in conflict were also seen in many othercountries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and the AsiaPacific.
There was a slight deterioration in the Safety and Security
domain, with the largest deterioration occurring in the politicalinstability indicator. There were 59 countries that recorded a
deterioration in political instability in 2022. However, theterrorism impact indicator improved for the fourth consecutive
year, with 70 countries recording lower levels of terrorism in
2022, and only 28 recording a deterioration.

Militarisation was the only domain to record an improvementon the 2023 GPI. Of the 163 GPI countries, 109 recorded an
improvement. The major driver of the change in Militarisation
was an increased commitment to UN peacekeeping funding andlower military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. However,even though the average military expenditure score improved,
total global military expenditure increased because of the large
increase in military spending related to the conflict in Ukraine.
Figure 1.2 shows the average percentage change for eachindicator from the 2022 to the 2023 GPI. Eleven of the 23 GPI
indicators deteriorated on average, with ten improving and two
remaining unchanged. The largest average deterioration was on
the external conflicts fought indicator, while the UN
peacekeeping funding indicator had the largest improvement.

FIGURE 1.1

Year-on-year change in GPI score by domain, 2023
Only the Militarisation domain recorded an improvement on the 2023 GPI.

% COUNTRIES IMPROVED
OR DETERIORATEDAVERAGE DOMAIN SCORE CHANGEOVERALL
SCORE
0.009

48

%

25

27

ONGOING CONFLICT
0.028

52

%
48

SAFETY & SECURITY
0.014

29
56

%

44

1

MILITARISATION-0.02933%
67-0.030More Peaceful

Source: IEP

10-0.020-0.010

0.000
CHANGE IN SCORE

0.010

0.020

0.030
Less PeacefulResults 1

FIGURE 1.2

Percentage change in score by indicator, 2022–2023

Increasing external involvement in conflict hotspots led to the external conflicts fought indicator deteriorating by over four
per cent.
External Conflicts Fought
Deaths from External Conflict
Political Instability
Neighbouring Countries Relations
Refugees and IDPs
Violent Crime
Deaths from Internal Conflict
Perceptions of Criminality
Weapons Exports
Incarceration Rate
Armed Services Personnel Rate
Access to Small Arms
Police Rate
Nuclear and Heavy Weapons
Internal Conflicts Fought
Homicide Rate
Intensity of Internal Conflict
Terrorism Impact
Weapons Imports
Political Terror Scale
Violent Demonstrations
Military Expenditure (% GDP)UN Peacekeeping Funding
-10%

-8%

-6%

Improvement

-4%

-2%

% CHANGE IN AVERAGE SCORE

0%

2%

4%

Deterioration

Source: IEP

The deterioration on the external conflicts fought indicatorreflects the increase in external actors becoming involved ininternal conflicts. There were 65 countries with scores that
deteriorated on this indicator, with seven of the ten largest
deteriorations occurring in countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
There are now 91 countries who are least partially involved insome form of external conflict, up from 58 in 2008. Of those 91,
13 were acting alone in an external conflict, 33 were involved ina small coalition, and 45 were involved in a large coalition of ten
or more countries. In the majority of conflicts, countries were
offering support to an existing government in its conflict withan internal armed rebel or terrorist group.
The rise in the level of conflict globally led to a deterioration on
the deaths from internal conflict indicator. The total number ofdeaths rose sharply in the past year and would have risen even
if the conflict in Ukraine was not included in the analysis. There
were 47 countries that recorded at least one death from conflicton the 2023 GPI.

with 118 countries improving the timeliness of their financial
commitment to peacekeeping. The UN peacekeeping funding
indicator has recorded the biggest improvement of any of the
GPI indicators since the inception of the index.
The relative level of military expenditure improved for thesecond consecutive year, with 92 countries reducing their levelof military spending as a percentage of GDP. There are now 43
countries where military expenditure accounts for less than one
per cent of GDP. However, military expenditure still accounts
for the greatest share of the total economic impact of violence.
The average score on the violent demonstrations indicator
improved for the first time since 2016, although it remains
considerably higher than fifteen years ago. There were 59
countries that recorded an improvement on the indicator,
compared to 43 which recorded a deterioration. However,violent demonstrations are still common globally, with 140
countries recording at least one violent demonstration over the
past year.

Political instability had the third largest average deteriorationand has deteriorated every year for the past five years. There
were 59 countries where political instability deteriorated overthe past year, compared to just 22 where the indicator improved.
The largest deteriorations occurred in Israel, El Salvador,
Malawi, and Burkina Faso.
Although many indicators of conflict deteriorated globally, there
was an increased commitment to UN peacekeeping funding,11

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

UP-LONGDOWN-LONG

Five Most & Least PeacefulCountries by Domain

TABLE 1.1

Safety and Security domain
Rank

Country

2023
Score

Score
changeRankchangeRank

Country

2023
Score

Score
changeRankchange1Finland1.251-0.096

UP-LONG 6

163

Afghanistan

4.136

0.001

↔

2

Japan

1.272

-0.014UP-LONG 1

162

Yemen

3.900

-0.124↔

3

Iceland

1.282

0.104

DOWN-LONG 2

161

Syria

3.842

-0.050↔

4

Singapore

1.300-0.027

UP-LONG 1

160

South Sudan

3.835-0.001↔

5

Norway

1.301

0.043

DOWN-LONG 3

159

Democratic Republic of the
Congo

3.749

-0.004↔

TABLE 1.2

Ongoing Conflict domain
Rank

Country

2023
Score

Score
changeRankchangeRank

Country

2023
Score

Score
changeRankchange1

Iceland

1.000

0.000

↔

163

Yemen

3.486

0.132

DOWN-LONG 3

1

Mauritius

1.000

0.000

↔

162

Ukraine

3.470

0.580

DOWN-LONG 13

1

Singapore

1.000

0.000

↔

161

Syria

3.460

-0.173UP-LONG 2

1

Uruguay

1.000

0.000

↔

160

Russia

3.445

0.575

DOWN-LONG 12

5

Malaysia

1.005

0.000

UP-LONG 2

159

Afghanistan

3.434-0.193UP-LONG 3

TABLE 1.3

Militarisation domain
Rank

Country

2023
Score

Score
changeRankchangeRank

Country

2023
Score

Score
changeRankchange1

Iceland1.015-0.004↔

163

Israel3.783-0.018↔

2

Malaysia

1.180-0.023UP-LONG 3

162

Russia3.187-0.024↔

3

Hungary

1.191

0.014

UP-LONG 1

161

United States of America

3.081-0.033↔

4

Portugal

1.211-0.067

UP-LONG 6

160

North Korea

3.000-0.094↔

5

Slovenia

1.230

0.085

DOWN-LONG 3

159

France2.769-0.004↔

12

Results 1

Regional Overview
Six of the nine regions in the world deteriorated in peacefulness in 2023. Asia-Pacific, North America andthe Middle East and North Africa were the only three regions that improved.

Russia and Eurasia recorded the largest average deterioration of
all the regions, primarily driven by the conflict in Ukraine while
North America recorded the largest average percentage
improvement, with improvements recorded across all three GPI

domains. Figure 1.3 shows the overall score for each region on
the 2023 GPI, as well as the change in score from the 2022 to the2023 GPI.

FIGURE 1.3

Regional GPI results, 2023

Six of the nine global regions experienced deteriorations in peacefulness.
OVERALL SCORECHANGE IN SCORE

EuropeAsia-PacificNorth America
Central America and the Caribbean
South America
Russia & Eurasia
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
Middle East & North Africa
1

1.5
More Peaceful

2
GPI SCORE

2.5
Less Peaceful

-0.04

-0.02

More Peaceful

0

0.02

0.04

0.06

Less Peaceful

Source: IEP

KEY FINDINGSMILITARISATION

Although 92 countries improved on the
military expenditure indicator in 2022
total military expenditure increased,
mainly driven by countries involved in
the Ukraine war.

CONFLICT96%

The total number of conflict-related deaths
increased by 96 per cent. Both the deaths
from internal conflict and external conflicts
fought indicators would have deteriorated
even if Ukraine and Russia were excluded
from the analysis.

Several countries that had experienced
serious conflict in the past two decades
recorded the largest improvements inpeacefulness. Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, andAfghanistan were all ranked amongst thefive biggest improvers in peace.

13

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

ASIA-PACIFIC
The Asia-Pacific region recorded a slight improvement inpeacefulness in the 2023 GPI, with an average improvement of0.32 per cent. The rise in peacefulness was driven by the Safety
and Security and Militarisation domains, which were led by
improvements in the violent demonstrations and UN
peacekeeping funding indicators.
The Ongoing Conflict domain deteriorated by 2.1 per cent, withfour of its six indicators deteriorating. This was driven mainlyby the worsening conflict in Myanmar, and an increase inviolence in the West Papua region of Indonesia. Six countries in
the region recorded deteriorations in their score, while 13
countries recorded improvements. All but five of the 19
countries in the region are ranked in the top half of the index.
New Zealand is the most peaceful country in the region and thefourth most peaceful country overall. New Zealand recorded aslight improvement in score in the 2023 GPI, because of
improvements in the violent demonstrations, incarceration rate
and terrorism impact indicators. However, the Militarisation
domain deteriorated by six per cent, with nuclear and heavy
weapons and armed services personnel rate being the only two
indicators to improve. Both weapons imports and weapons
exports recorded deteriorations on the back of the sale ofsurplus tanks to Chile and upgrades on armed personnel
carriers.
North Korea has been the least peaceful country in the region
since the inception of the GPI. In 2023 however, the country
recorded the third largest improvement in the region and is at
its most peaceful level since 2010. The only indicator to

TABLE 1.5

Asia-PacificRegional
Rank

Country1

New Zealand

Score
ChangeOverall
Rank

1.313

-0.0044

2

Singapore

1.332-0.013

6

3

Japan

1.336

-0.0049

4

Malaysia

1.513

0.036

19

5

Australia

1.525-0.040

22

6

Taiwan

1.649

0.002

33

7

Vietnam

1.745-0.04441

Myanmar experienced the largest deterioration in its overall
score, owing to changes in perceptions of criminality, violent
crime and deaths from internal conflict. All three GPI domains
experienced deteriorations. The rising political tensions in
Myanmar led to a worsening of violent crime in 2022. The
continued focus of the security agencies on cracking down on
the political opposition, as well as the need for financial
resources on both sides, has resulted in an increase in serious
and organised crimes, including drug trafficking.
Thailand experienced the largest improvement in the region
with a 3.3 per cent improvement in its score. While all threedomains improved, the change in peacefulness was largely
driven by significant improvements in violent demonstrations,political instability and the incarceration rate. Thailand's
improvement on the political instability indicator in 2022
resulted from the successful transfer of power following thevictories of the opposition camp in recent by-elections and themayoral election in the capital, Bangkok. The smooth transfer of
power has reduced the likelihood of disruptive large protests as,
to some degree, faith has been restored in the political systems
ability to effect change through elections and democratic means.

CENTRAL AMERICA & THE CARRIBEAN
Peacefulness in Central America and the Caribbean deteriorated
slightly in the 2023 GPI, with an average deterioration in scoreof 0.71 per cent. However, of the 12 countries in the region, only
Panama, Honduras, El Salvador and Haiti experienced
deteriorations, compared to seven countries that deteriorated in
the year prior. Ongoing Conflict and Safety and Security
deteriorated in 2023, while Militarisation recorded

TABLE 1.6

Central America & The Carribean
Regional
Rank

Country

Overall
Score

Score
ChangeOverall
Rank

8South Korea

1.763-0.02843

1

Costa Rica

1.731

-0.044

39

9

Mongolia

1.765

0.006

44

2

Panama

1.942

0.062

68

10

Laos

1.779

-0.04146

3

Trinidad and Tobago

1.946-0.032

70

11

Timor-Leste

1.796-0.042

49

4

Jamaica

1.986-0.003

77

12

Indonesia

1.829

0.054

53

5

Dominican Republic

2.019-0.00383

13

Cambodia

1.947-0.005

73

6

Cuba

2.103

-0.008

99

14

China

2.009

-0.00980

7Guatemala

2.130

0

105

15

Thailand

2.061-0.07092

8Honduras

2.265

0.036

120

16

Papua New Guinea

2.095

0.068

98

9

El Salvador

2.279

0.022

122

17

Philippines

2.229-0.059115

10Nicaragua

2.294-0.027123

18

Myanmar

2.741

0.129

145

11

Haiti

2.395

0.193

129

19

North Korea

2.848-0.046149

12

Mexico2.599-0.017136

1.857-0.006

2.141

0.015

REGIONAL AVERAGE

14

OverallScore

deteriorate was perceptions of criminality indicator which fell
by 5.4 per cent. The change in overall score was driven by
improvements in violent demonstrations and refugees and IDPs.
However, improvements on these indicators were likely driven
by the government-imposed national lockdown after thecountry experienced its first confirmed case of COVID-19 in May
2022, leading to border and mobility restrictions that were inplace for months.

REGIONAL AVERAGE

Results 1

improvements across all indicators in the domain except thearmed services personnel rate. The overall fall in peacefulness
was largely driven by a large deterioration in political instability
as well as neighbouring countries relations, which deteriorated
by 5.3 and 4.2 per cent respectively.
Costa Rica remains the most peaceful country in the region andis ranked 39th overall in the 2023 GPI. Costa Rica also recorded
the largest improvement in peacefulness of any country in theregion over the past year, owing to improvements in the violent
demonstrations, incarceration rate and perceptions ofcriminality indicators. Both the Militarisation and Safety andSecurity domains improved, while the Ongoing Conflict domain
experienced no change. Political stability improved in Costa
Rica towards the end of 2022. Costa Rica also has one of thelowest poverty rates in Central America and the Caribbean,
which in part explains the low levels of social unrest in 2022.
Mexico is the largest and most populous country in Central
America, and it remained the least peaceful country in theregion in 2023. However, it recorded a 0.65 per centimprovement in the 2023 GPI, rising three places in the
rankings to 136th overall. The improvement was mainly driven
by improvements in the militarisation domain. More than halfof its GPI indicators remained stable between 2022 and 2023,
while only three indicators deteriorated during the period: theincarceration rate, violent demonstrations and external conflicts
fought. Despite these improvements, Mexico still has very large
number of deaths from internal conflict, with the ongoing
conflict between the government and criminal organisations stillposing a serious threat to internal peacefulness.
Haiti recorded the biggest deterioration in peacefulness in theregion and the second largest deterioration in the 2023 GPI,
with falls in peacefulness across all GPI domains. The
deterioration in peacefulness was driven by increases inintensity of internal conflict, violent crime and politicalinstability. The intensity of internal conflict deteriorated
significantly in Haiti throughout 2022. The country has
descended into extreme instability, with a variety of organised
crime groups, which control much of the country, unleashingviolence against both civilians and government security forces.
The government has been unable to put together a proper
security strategy. There have been continuous election delays, aswell as collusion between organised crime groups and somegovernment officials.

EUROPE
Europe remains the most peaceful region in the world and ishome to seven of the ten most peaceful countries. However,Europe deteriorated in peacefulness over the past year, with anaverage increase in its overall score of just over one per cent. Of
the 36 countries in the region, 12 had improvements inpeacefulness and 23 had deteriorations. All three of Europe's
domain scores deteriorated, with the largest occurring on the
Ongoing Conflict domain. The political instability, neighbouring
countries relations and external conflicts fought indicators allrecorded deteriorations, as the impact of the war in Ukraine
continued to be strongly felt across the region.
While Russia and Ukraine are part of the Russia and Eurasia
region, the conflict had serious repercussions globally, mostnotably in Europe. Of the five countries in Europe with thelargest deteriorations in peacefulness in 2023, three share a

TABLE 1.7

EuropeRegional
Rank

Country

Overall
Score

Score
ChangeOverall
Rank

1

Iceland

1.124

0.044

1

2

Denmark

1.310

0.012

2

3

Ireland

1.312

0.029

3

4

Austria

1.316

0.006

5

5

Portugal

1.333

0

7

6

Slovenia

1.334

0.025

8

7

Switzerland

1.339-0.02310

8Czechia

1.379

0.063

12

9

Finland1.399-0.04013

10

Croatia

1.450

0.012

14

11

Germany

1.456

0.003

15

11

Netherlands

1.490-0.031

16

13

Hungary

1.508

0.075

18

14

Belgium

1.523-0.02220

15

Norway

1.550

0.074

24

16

Estonia

1.563-0.00325

17

Slovakia

1.578

0.070

26

18

Latvia1.582-0.042

27

19

Sweden

1.625

0.034

28

20

Poland

1.634

0.093

29

21

Bulgaria

1.643

0.086

30

22

Romania

1.649-0.017

31

23

Spain

1.649

0.012

32

24

Italy

1.662

0.021

34

25

Lithuania

1.671

0.014

36

26

United Kingdom

1.693-0.00637

27

North Macedonia

1.713

0.006

38

28

Albania

1.745-0.01940

29Montenegro

1.772-0.05445

30

Greece

1.890

0.047

60

31

Bosnia and Herzegovina

1.892

0.035

61

31

Cyprus1.904-0.00564

33

Serbia

1.921

0.060

65

34

France

1.939

0.021

67

35

Kosovo1.946-0.002

71

36

Türkiye

2.800

0.046

147

1.619

0.017

REGIONAL AVERAGE

border with either Ukraine. These countries largely had
deteriorations on the political instability and neighbouring
countries relations indicators.
Iceland remains the most peaceful country in the region and theworld in the 2023 GPI. It has been the most peaceful country in
the world for every year since the index began. However, Iceland
recorded a four per cent deterioration in its overall score as theresult of an increase in the homicide rate and also the terrorism
impact indicator. This is the first year that any terrorist activity
has been recorded in the country. Four individuals were arrested
and charged with plotting terrorist attacks against the Icelandic

15

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

parliament and several prominent Icelandic politicians.
Türkiye remains the least peaceful country in the region and is
the only European country ranked outside the top half of theindex. The country experienced a 1.7 per cent decrease in its
overall score, which was led by deteriorations in the Ongoing
Conflict and Safety and Security domains. This is the least
peaceful Türkiye has been since the inception of the GPI in 2008.
The deterioration in peacefulness was driven by the deaths fromexternal conflict and the incarceration rate indicators, whichrose 46.3 and 12.3 per cent respectively. Türkiye has also been
one of the most active exporters of military technology in thepast few years, particularly drones, which led to its weapons
exports indicator deteriorating.
Montenegro recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness
in the region and is now ranked 45 th on the index overall. The
improvement in peacefulness was driven by improvements on
the Political Terror Scale, violent demonstrations and UN
peacekeeping funding indicators. The only three indicators todeteriorate were armed services personnel rate, military
expenditure as a percentage of GDP and weapons imports.
Fourteen of the 23 indicators experienced no change.
Poland experienced the largest deterioration in peacefulness in
Europe, falling six places to rank 29 th in the overall index. Poland
is now less peaceful than at any time since 2008. The country
recorded deteriorations across all three domains, with Ongoing
Conflict experiencing the most significant deterioration at 14.4
per cent. This change was driven by Poland’s changing
relationship with Russia, which saw its neighbouring countries
relations score deteriorate significantly. Poland has been one of
the leading proponents in Europe of taking a tough line against
Russia. Poland is a member of NATO and shares a border with
Kaliningrad, an exclave that is part of the Russian Federation.
Poland was also one of the first countries in the region to havesupplies of natural gas cut off by Russia. Like the rest of the EU,
Poland is suffering from the economic fallout from the war andRussia's cut-off of gas supplies to the EU.

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains the least
peaceful region in the world for the eighth consecutive year,
despite recording consecutive improvements in peacefulness since2020. It is home to four of the ten least peaceful countries in theworld. However, MENA improved by 0.63 per cent over the past
year, with significant improvements recorded on the Militarisation
and Ongoing Conflict domains. The MENA region has improved inpeacefulness year-on-year for the past three years.
Several post-conflict countries in the region recorded
improvements in peacefulness, including Libya, Syria, Iraq, andYemen. Libya recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness in
the region and the largest improvement globally, with a 7.2 per centimprovement in its overall score. This is the most peaceful Libya
has been since the start of the second Libyan civil war in 2014. The
improvement in Libya's overall score was driven by significant
improvements on the Ongoing Conflict domain, with deaths frominternal conflict, internal conflicts fought, and the intensity ofinternal conflict all improving. Although the internal security
situation is still fragile, the ceasefire agreement signed in August2022 between the Government of National Accord and the Libyan
National Army has improved the chances of future increases inpeacefulness.

16

TABLE 1.8

Middle East & North Africa
Regional
Rank

Country

Overall
Score

Score
ChangeOverall
Rank

1

Qatar

1.524

-0.01121

2

Kuwait1.669-0.048

35

3

Oman

1.794

-0.12148

4

Jordan1.895-0.02462

5United Arab Emirates

1.979-0.00175

6

Tunisia

2.010

0.012

81

7

Morocco

2.020

0.020

84

8

Algeria

2.094-0.03296

9Bahrain

2.145-0.020108

10

Saudi Arabia

2.260-0.061

119

11

Egypt

2.267

-0.068121

12Palestine

2.538

0.132

134

13

Lebanon

2.581

0.021

135

14

Libya

2.605

-0.202137

15Israel

2.706

0.154

143

16

Iran

2.800

-0.008

148

17

Iraq

3.006

-0.022

154
155

18

Sudan

3.023

0.029

19

Syria

3.294

-0.076

161

20

Yemen

3.350

-0.054162

2.378-0.019REGIONAL AVERAGE

Israel experienced the largest deterioration in peacefulness the
MENA region, falling eight places to 143rd in the GPI. Israel’s overalllevel of peacefulness has not been this low since 2010. There were
two main drivers of this deterioration in peacefulness: a worseningof neighbouring countries relations, especially with Palestine, and a
sharp increase in political instability. Israel’s relationship with its
neighbours was damaged by an increase in the intensity of theconflict between Israelis and Palestinians, with the terrorism
impact and deaths from internal conflict indicators both
deteriorating. Political instability deteriorated after mass politicalprotests against attempts by the government to curb the power ofthe judiciary to limit or overturn government legislation.
Qatar remains the most peaceful country in the region, a position it
has held since 2008. It is the only country in the region to be
ranked in the top 25 most peaceful countries globally. Qatar
improved in overall peacefulness in 2023, driven by improvements
in political instability, external conflicts fought and UN
peacekeeping funding. The restoration of diplomatic relations in
2021 with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt helped
improve the internal political situation in Qatar. Relations haveremained stable throughout 2022, resulting in a full-year
improvement to political stability.
Sudan is the third least peaceful country in the MENA region, even
before accounting for the eruption of of conflict in mid-April 2023
between the Sudanese military and the Rapid Support Forces(RSF), a coalition of paramilitary groups that rivals the military.
The source of the fighting is predominantly a power struggle
between the two forces over control of Sudan’s armed forces andtheir roles in the ruling military regime. The fighting has believed
to have resulted in at least 1,000 deaths by the end of April. Up to
200,000 Sudanese have fled the country and 700,000 have beeninternally displaced by the violence, which includes with significant
urban warfare.

Results 1

Yemen is the least peaceful country in the MENA region for thethird consecutive year. Yemen is also the second least peacefulcountry globally. However, there are signs that peacefulness in
Yemen is beginning to improve, with the country recording its first
improvement in peacefulness since 2017. This change was driven bysignificant improvements in violent demonstrations andneighbouring countries relations. The ceasefire that was signed in
April 2022 significantly reduced the number of Saudi airstrikes in
Yemen. Despite the ceasefire's collapse in October 2022, airstrikes
have not resumed to pre-2022 levels and Houthi cross-borderattacks have also ceased. Fighting along the frontline reduced
sharply, despite the persistence of some localised skirmishes
between the Houthis and militias associated with theinternationally recognised government (IRG), and some notable
clashes between IRG-affiliated militias in southern Yemen. The
collapse of the ceasefire has led to an uptick in Houthi attacks
against IRG-controlled infrastructure and the intensification of
clashes along the frontline, but these remain less frequent and lessintense than in 2021.

NORTH AMERICA
North America recorded the largest improvement of any region
in the 2023 GPI, with the average level of peacefulness in theregion improving by 0.84 per cent. North America is third mostpeaceful GPI region. There are only two countries in the North
American region, with Canada recording a 2.9 per cent increasein peacefulness, and the US experiencing a slight fall inpeacefulness, with its overall score deteriorating by 0.38 percent. There is a considerable disparity in peacefulness between
the two countries in the region, with Canada being ranked as
the 11 th most peaceful country and the United States being
ranked 131st.
All three domains improved across the region. Nine of the 23
indicators improved, while only three deteriorated and the rest
experienced no change. The three indicators to deteriorate
regionally were the homicide rate, perceptions of criminality
and weapons exports. North America is more peaceful than the
global average on the Safety and Security and Ongoing Conflictdomains, but scores poorly on the Militarisation domain,
particularly with regards to military expenditure, nuclear andheavy weapons, and weapons exports.
Overall peacefulness improved in Canada, owing to
improvements on the Ongoing Conflict and Safety and Security
domains. The Political Terror Scale, terrorism impact,
incarceration rate and perceptions of criminality indicators allrecorded improvements over the past year. Less than 20 per centof Canadians report that they do not feel safe walking alone atnight in their city or neighbourhood. The Militarisation domain
recorded a slight deterioration, owing to an increase in weapons
exports. However, Canada is ranked amongst the 25 countries
with the highest levels of weapons exports per capita.

TABLE 1.9

North America
Country

Overall
Score

Score
ChangeOverall
Rank

1

Canada1.350-0.04011

2

United States of America

2.448

0.009

131

1.899

-0.016

Regional
Rank

REGIONAL AVERAGEThe United States experienced a slight deterioration inpeacefulness over the past year, the continuation of a trend thatbegan in 2015. Civil unrest is no longer the primary driver of thedeterioration, as the violent demonstrations indicator improvedby ten per cent and political instability experienced no change.
The deterioration was driven by a deterioration on the Safety
and Security domain, particularly in the perceptions ofcriminality and homicide rate indicators. The United Statesrecorded the fourth largest overall increase in its homicide rate,
which is now above six per 100,000 people and more than six
times higher than most Western European countries.

RUSSIA & EURASIAThe Russia and Eurasia region experienced the largest
deterioration in peacefulness in the world in 2022. The fall inpeacefulness was more than twice as large as any other region.
Six of the 12 countries in the region recorded deteriorations inpeacefulness, with the largest occurring in Ukraine and Russia,
which had the largest and the fifth largest deteriorations
respectively.
Russia remains the least peaceful nation in the region and is oneof the least peaceful countries in the world in the 2023 GPI, withan overall rank of 158 th. Russia recorded a deterioration of justunder five per cent in overall score, and now has its lowest levelsof peacefulness since 2008. The major driver of the fall inpeacefulness was a four per cent increase in deaths fromexternal conflict which is a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Despite this, Russia improved in both the Militarisation and
Safety and Security domains, driven by improvements in theviolent demonstrations and incarceration rate indicators.
Ukraine experienced the largest deterioration in overall score
both regionally and globally. Ukraine deteriorated across all
domains, with the largest deteriorations occurring on the deaths
from internal conflict, refugees and IDPs and armed services
personnel rate indicators. The Russian invasion in February
2022 led to mass displacements, with close to 30 per cent of the
population now estimated to be refugees or internally displaced.
Whilst the true number killed in the conflict in 2022 is not yet

TABLE 1.10

Russia & Eurasia
Regional
Rank

Country

Overall
Score

Score
ChangeOverallRank

1

Moldova

1.873-0.00857

2

Armenia

1.929-0.004

66

3

Kazakhstan

1.980-0.08776

4

Uzbekistan

2.033

0.023

86

5

Georgia

2.071

0.010

94

6

Azerbaijan

2.090-0.082

95

7

Turkmenistan

2.107-0.018100

8Kyrgyz Republic

2.110

0.098

101

9

Tajikistan

2.114

0.057

102

10

Belarus2.248-0.030116

11

Ukraine

3.043

0.356

157

12

Russia

3.142

0.148

158

2.228

0.038

REGIONAL AVERAGE

17

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

known, some estimates suggest there have been as many as
300,000 casualties, with possible fatalities of over 80,000 people.
Kazakhstan experienced the largest improvement in overall
peacefulness, improving by 4.2 per cent and rising 21 places toan overall rank of 76 th, which is the third highest rank of all
countries in the region. The country recorded an improvement
in both the Militarisation and Safety and Security domains,with five indicators improving, the largest being in violent
demonstrations, which improved by 50 per cent. Fifteen of the
23 GPI indicators remained unchanged in Kazakhstan in 2023,
with only three indicators deteriorating: the incarceration rate,
political instability and military expenditure as a percentage ofGDP.
Moldova is the most peaceful nation in the Russia and Eurasia
region for the 16 th consecutive year. Moldova experienced aslight improvement in overall peacefulness, owing to
improvements in violent demonstrations and perceptions ofcriminality. Despite the overall score improving, Moldova's
political stability deteriorated by 4.2 per cent in 2022. Russia's
invasion of Ukraine has escalated regional instability andincreased the threat of a broader conflict between Russia andthe NATO alliance partners. The Russia-Ukraine conflict, andthe resultant sanctions imposed on Russia, also brought major
economic disruptions, including strong increases in staple
commodity prices. The worsening economic conditions
domestically stirred public pressure on the government to
mitigate the negative impacts on living conditions. The conflicthas resulted in an unprecedented influx of refugees from
Ukraine, further straining Moldova's limited resources. The
fighting threatened to spread to Moldova's Russian-backed
breakaway region Transnistria.

SOUTH AMERICASouth America experienced a slight deterioration inpeacefulness in 2023, owing to deteriorations in Ongoing
Conflict and Safety and Security. The average level ofpeacefulness in South America rose by 0.33 per cent over the
past year, with three countries recording improvements andeight recording deteriorations. The deterioration in peacefulness
in the region was driven by increases in internal conflicts,
violent demonstrations and incarceration rate. The region is thefifth most peaceful overall.
Uruguay remains the most peaceful country in South America
for the fourth consecutive year. It is the only country in SouthAmerica to be ranked amongst the 50 most peaceful countries
globally. Uruguay recorded a slight deterioration in peacefulness
over the past year, with a 0.4 per cent deterioration in its overall
score. This deterioration was driven by increases in violent
demonstrations and the incarceration rate. Uruguay also
suffered a deterioration in political instability in 2022.
Colombia has the lowest levels of peacefulness in the region,
although it did record a small improvement in its overall scoreover the past year. All six of the Militarisation domain
indicators improved in 2022, with the largest improvement
occurring on the UN peacekeeping funding indicator. However,despite the overall increase in peacefulness, Colombia
experienced a deterioration in political stability throughout
2022. In the run-up to the May 2022 presidential elections,social unrest increased as opposing sides became further

18

TABLE 1.11

South America
Regional
Rank

Country

Overall
Score

Score
ChangeOverall
Rank

1

Uruguay

1.798

0.007

50

2

Argentina

1.837-0.068

54

3

Chile

1.874

0.033

58

4

Paraguay

1.942-0.046

69

5

Bolivia

2.001

0.024

78

6

Ecuador

2.095

0.135

97

7

Peru

2.130

0.008

104

8

Guyana

2.134

0.014

106

9

Brazil

2.462

0.011

132

10

Venezuela

2.693

0.009

140

11

Colombia

2.693-0.045141

REGIONAL AVERAGE

2.151

0.007

polarised and divisive over key issues. Tensions related to deep
divisions within Colombian society remained high even after theelection of the current president Gustavo Petro.
Argentina recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness in
the region and now ranks 54 th in the overall GPI. The
Militarisation and Safety and Security domains both recorded
improvements, with no change recorded on the Ongoing
Conflict domain. The largest improvement occurred on theviolent crime indicator. Violent crime is less of a concern inArgentina than in most of Latin America. According toArgentina's Ministry of Security, the homicide rate in the
country was 4.6 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2021, which was well
below the regional and global averages. The previous
government made progress in improving policing practices andmarkedly reduced rates of violent crime from 2015 to 2019. This
improvement in violent crime has been maintained throughout
2022.
Ecuador experienced the largest deterioration in overall score,owing to increases in violent crime and deaths from internal
conflict. Ecuador's overall score deteriorated by 6.9 per cent,leading to a fall in the rankings of 24 places, to 97 th overall.
Instances of violent crime became more frequent in Ecuador
over the past year owing to the rise in power and prominence oforganised crime groups, and a subsequent surge in homicide. In
2022 the regions of Guayaquil, Duran and Samborondon
recorded three times the level of violent crime as the same
period in 2021, with the homicide rate in some areas increasing
past 25 per 100,000 inhabitants.

SOUTH ASIA
South Asia recorded a slight deterioration in peacefulness overthe past year and remains the second least peaceful region
overall. The average level of peacefulness in the region increased
by 0.13 per cent, owing to deteriorations in the Militarisationand Safety and Security domains. Four of the seven countries in
the region experienced improvements in peacefulness, while
three deteriorated. There is a wide disparity between the leastand most peaceful countries in the region, with Bhutan ranked

Results 1

TABLE 1.12

South Asia
Regional
Rank

Country

Overall
Score

Score
Change1

Bhutan

1.496

0.11

Overall
Rank
17

2

Nepal

2.006

0.039

79

3

Bangladesh

2.051-0.012

88

4

Sri Lanka

2.136

0.109

107

5

India

2.314

-0.084

126

6

Pakistan

2.745-0.047146

7Afghanistan

3.448-0.097

163

2.314

0.003

REGIONAL AVERAGE

while 22 deteriorated and one remained unchanged. The regionis less peaceful than the global average on the Safety andSecurity and Ongoing Conflict domains, but more peaceful than
the global average on the Militarisation domain. The overall
deterioration in score in sub-Saharan Africa was driven byincreases in both the internal conflicts fought and the external
conflicts fought indicators, as well as a rise in violent
demonstrations.
The most peaceful country in the region is Mauritius, which isranked 23 rd in the 2023 GPI. The country recorded a slight
improvement of 1.8 per cent in its GPI score, owing to

TABLE 1.13

Sub-Saharan Africa

17 th overall and Afghanistan being the least peaceful country in
the world in the 2023 GPI.

Regional
Rank

Country

Overall
Score

Score
Change1

Mauritius

1.546-0.02923

Afghanistan has been the least peaceful country in the world forthe past six years. However, it recorded a 2.73 per centimprovement in peacefulness over the past year, which was thefifth largest improvement globally. Improvements in UN
peacekeeping funding, intensity of internal conflict and armed
services personnel rate drove the improvements of both theMilitarisation and Ongoing Conflict domains. The terrorism
impact indicator also improved for the fourth consecutive year,
although terrorism remains a serious security concern. The
withdrawal of US troops and the Taliban’s recapture of
Afghanistan in August 2021 led to a rapid fall in the number ofdeaths from internal conflict in late 2021 and throughout 2022.
The intensity of internal conflict also improved due to fewer
reported instances of hostilities between the Taliban and the
National Resistance Front in 2022 and early 2023.

2

Botswana

1.762-0.05242
47

Bhutan is the most peaceful country in South Asia, despite
recording the largest deterioration in the region over the past
year. It is also the highest-ranking country on the GPI outside ofEurope, Asia-Pacific and North America. Bhutan’s deteriorationin the level of peacefulness over the past year was driven by adeterioration on the Political Terror Scale, as well as a 50 per
cent deterioration on the violent demonstrations indicator.
Despite the Militarisation domain deteriorating by just under
three per cent, Bhutan remains one of the least militarised
countries in the world, with the 15 th lowest overall score on the
Militarisation domain.
India is the most populous country in the region and ranks as
the 126 th most peaceful nation in the 2023 GPI. The country
experienced an improvement of 3.5 per cent in overall
peacefulness over the past year, owing to improvements inviolent crime, neighbouring countries relations and politicalinstability. The improvement on the neighbouring countries
relations indicator occurred because of fewer incidences of crossborder violence and ceasefire violations with Pakistan and China
in 2022. Furthermore, the reduction in geopolitical tensions
with China owing to the reduction in border incidents, as wellas less social unrest more generally, led to an improvement on
the political instability indicator.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Sub-Saharan Africa recorded a slight fall in peacefulness in the2023 GPI, with the average country score deteriorating by 0.57
per cent. Of the 44 countries in the region, 21 improved in score,

Overall
Rank

3

Sierra Leone

1.792-0.011

4

Ghana

1.799

0.014

51

5

Senegal

1.827-0.02452

6Madagascar

1.846

0

55

7

Namibia

1.859-0.032

56

8

The Gambia

1.888

0.059

59

9

Zambia

1.898

0.027

63

10

Liberia

1.946-0.023

72

11

Malawi

1.970

0.036

74

12

Equatorial Guinea

2.013

0.113

82

13

Angola

2.020

0.051

85

14

Guinea-Bissau

2.045-0.04387

14

Rwanda

2.051

0.012

89

16

Côte d'Ivoire

2.053-0.10790

17

Tanzania

2.058

0.007

91

18

Gabon

2.068

0.049

93

19

Togo

2.130

-0.004103

20

Eswatini

2.168

0.127

109
110

21

Benin

2.177

0.001

22

Lesotho

2.191

0.109

111

23

Djibouti

2.196-0.015112

24

Republic of the Congo

2.210-0.014113

25

Mauritania

2.228-0.031

114

26

Kenya

2.254

-0.018

117

27

Mozambique

2.259

0.003

118

28

Zimbabwe

2.300-0.026124

29

Uganda2.300-0.04612530

Guinea2.359-0.041

127

31

Burundi2.393-0.133

128
130

32

South Africa

2.405

0.099

33

Eritrea

2.505-0.014

133

34

Niger

2.625

-0.013

138
139

35

Cameroon

2.660-0.059

36

Chad

2.699

0.111

142

37

Nigeria

2.713

0.049

144
150

38

Burkina Faso

2.868

0.100

39

Ethiopia

2.872

0.067

151

40

Central African Republic

2.934

0.007

152

41

Mali

2.963

0.158

153

42

Somalia
Democratic Republic of
the Congo
South Sudan

3.036-0.032

156

3.214

0.105

159

3.221

0.030

160

2.28

0.013

43
44

REGIONAL AVERAGE

19

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

improvements in both the Militarisation and Safety andSecurity domains. The only two indicators to deteriorate werepolitical instability and military expenditure as a percentage ofGDP. Political stability deteriorated in Mauritius owing to there-emergence of Covid-19 infections in mid-2022 and subsequent
renewed restrictions that led to economic uncertainty andgeneral public dissatisfaction with the government's handling of
the pandemic.
South Sudan remains the least peaceful country in the regionand one of the least peaceful countries in the world. South
Sudan experienced a one per cent deterioration of its overall
score, owing to deteriorations in the Ongoing Conflict and
Militarisation domains. The country continues to have highlevels of internal conflicts, with internal conflicts fought anddeaths from internal conflict both deteriorating over the past
year. The only indicators to improve were armed services
personnel rate and incarceration rate, which improved by 0.7
and one per cent respectively. Sudan has the least peaceful
possible score on the violent crime, Political Terror Scale,political instability, and refugees and IDPs indicators.

20

Burundi experienced the largest improvement in peacefulness,with a 5.3 per cent improvement in its overall score. This waslargely driven by improvements in Burundi's intensity ofinternal conflict as well as deaths from external conflict. During2022, the EU’s decision to lift financial sanctions and resume
direct financial assistance to the Burundian administration also
underscores the improving situation in the country.
The largest deterioration in peacefulness in the region occurredin Mali. This was also the fourth largest deterioration of any
country on the 2023 GPI. The 5.6 per cent deterioration in its
overall score was driven by an increase in the intensity ofinternal conflict. Conflict between the Malian government andjihadists groups has continued to grow over the past year, withclashes also recorded between different ethnic militias. There
has been a large increase in attacks against civilians, and thelatest available data shows that the number of conflict-related
fatalities increased to around 9,000 in 2022, up from 6,000 in
2021. The deterioration in the levels of organised internal
conflict is likely due to the government's failure to retain control
of its territory, allowing jihadist groups to launch more attacks
against government and UN forces.

LibyaCHANGE IN GPISCORE 2022–2023-0.202Burundi-0.133

Improvements &Deteriorations

Oman-0.121

Côte
d'Ivoire-0.107Afghanistan-0.097

137

128

48

90

163

157

129

153

143

158

0.158

0.154

0.148

Mali

IsraelRussia

0.193
Haiti

0.356
Ukraine2023 GPI RANKGlobal Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

driven by a fall in deaths from internal conflict and an easing of
the intensity of internal conflict. There was widespread publicdissatisfaction and violent unrest when former president Pierre
Nkurunziza decided to run for a third term as president.
However, this unrest has abated since his successor Evariste
Ndayishimiye was elected in 2020.

Five Largest
Improvements in
Peace
Libya

Rank: 137
CHANGE IN SCORE
2022–23:-0.202CHANGE IN RANK
2022–23:

14

Libya recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness in the2023 GPI with its overall score improving by 7.1 per cent. Libya
is now ranked 137 th on the GPI, its highest ranking since 2014.
This is the fourth year in a row that Libya has improved inpeacefulness, and the second year in a row that it had thelargest overall improvement in peacefulness. The increase inpeacefulness follows the turmoil and violent conflict that
occurred after the Arab Spring uprising in 2011, and the firstand second Libyan civil wars that followed.
The largest improvement in Libya occurred on the Ongoing
Conflict domain, which improved by 21.5 per cent. The primary
driver of this improvement was a fall in the deaths from internal
conflict indicator. Libya recorded no deaths from conflict in 2021
for the first time since 2010. The intensity of internal conflictindicator also improved for the first time since 2013. Although
the country remains divided and heavily armed, with sporadic
conflict occurring in the past year, the Government of National
Accord and the Libyan National Army reached a ceasefire
agreement in August 2022. These developments led to
improvements on the terrorism impact, Political Terror Scale,and refugees and IDPs indicators.
However, despite the improvements over the past five years,
Libya still faces many challenges to peace. The Safety andSecurity domain deteriorated on the 2023 GPI, with both theviolent demonstrations and incarceration rate indicators
deteriorating over the past year. Libya also still has the highest
possible score on the violent crime and access to small arms
indicators, and the level of political instability remains highdespite the ceasefire agreement.

BurundiRank: 128
CHANGE IN SCORE
2022–23:-0.133

CHANGE IN RANK
2022–23:

6

Burundi recorded the second largest improvement inpeacefulness in the 2023 GPI, improving its score by 5.2 per centand its ranking by six places to 128 th. Burundi recorded
improvements on both the Safety and Security and Ongoing
Conflict domains, however it deteriorated on the Militarisation
domain, contrary to the global trend.
The largest improvement in peacefulness in Burundi occurredon the Ongoing Conflict domain, which improved by just under
15 per cent over the past year. This improvement was largely

22

Burundi also recorded an improvement on the Safety andSecurity domain, driven by improvements on the Political Terror
Scale, a fall in terrorism impact, and a reduction in the numberof refugees and IDPs. The improvement on the Political Terror
Scale has been recognised by other countries. In February 2022,
the EU cited improvement in Burundi's rule of law and humanrights situation in its decision to lift financial sanctions andresume direct financial assistance to the Burundian
administration. Ongoing voluntary repatriation operations for
Burundian refugees in neighbouring countries such as Tanzania
have also increased, reflecting the improved domestic security
outlook.

Oman

Rank: 48
CHANGE IN SCORE
2022–23:-0.121

CHANGE IN RANK
2022–23:

18

Oman recorded the third largest improvement in peacefulness
in the 2023 GPI, rising eighteen places in the rankings to 48 th
overall. Oman’s overall score improved by 6.2 per cent, with thebiggest improvement occurring on the Militarisation domain.
Oman is now the third most peaceful country in the MENA
region, behind only Qatar and Kuwait.
Oman recorded improvements on every single indicator in the
Militarisation domain, with the largest improvements occurringon the weapons imports and military expenditure indicators.
However, despite these improvements Oman still has one of thehighest relative levels of military expenditure in the world,
accounting for just under six per cent of its GDP. Oman is also
still amongst the 20 countries with the highest levels of weapons
imports per capita, despite having the single largest
improvement of any country on this indicator.
Oman also improved considerably on the Safety and Security
domain, driven by improvements on the political instability andviolent crime indicators. Furthermore, high global oil prices
have delayed the introduction of planned austerity measures,
easing economic conditions and lowering the risk of social
unrest and civil retaliation. This was reflected in the country’s
improvement on the violent demonstrations indicator.

Côte
d'Ivoire

Rank: 90
CHANGE IN SCORE
2022–23:-0.107CHANGE IN RANK
2022–23:

18

Côte d'Ivoire recorded the fourth largest improvement inpeacefulness in the 2023 GPI, rising eighteen places in the
rankings to 90 th. This is the first time since the inception of theindex that Côte d'Ivoire has been ranked amongst the 100 mostpeaceful countries. It improved across two of the GPI domains,with the largest improvement occurring on the Safety andSecurity domain. There was a slight deterioration on theResults 1

Ongoing Conflict domain, as Côte d'Ivoire became more involvedin external conflicts in the West Africa and Sahel region.
The largest single improvement in score occurred on the
Political Terror Scale, where Côte d'Ivoire moved from a score offour to a score of two. Côte d'Ivoire also experienced an
improvement in political instability in 2022. The country saw
reconciliation efforts between current President Alassane
Outtara and former President’s Lauren Gbagbo and Henri
Konan Bedie, who sought to repair ethnic and political divisions
ahead of elections in 2025. There was also an improvement in
the terrorism impact indicator, with no deaths from terrorism
reported in 2022.
The violent crime indicator recorded a significant improvementin 2022. The impact of violent crime is most prominent in theborder region with Burkina Faso, owing to the risk posed byjihadist groups. In other parts of the country violent crime,
car-hijacking and armed break-ins were on the decline
throughout 2022.

Afghanistan

Rank: 163
CHANGE IN SCORE
2022–23:-0.097CHANGE IN RANK
2022–23:0Afghanistan recorded the fifth largest improvement inpeacefulness in the 2023 GPI, however it remains the least
peaceful country in the world. Although violence is stillwidespread throughout the country, the level of conflict has
dropped considerably since the withdrawal of US troops inAugust 2021, and the subsequent Taliban takeover of thegovernment.
Afghanistan recorded improvements on the Ongoing Conflictand Militarisation domains, and a very slight deterioration on
the Safety and Security domain, owing to an increase in violent
demonstrations. The perceptions of criminality of Afghan
civilians improved slightly, with the number of people who say
they felt unsafe walking alone falling from 84 per cent to 77 percent. The intensity of internal conflict improved, owing to fewer
reported instances of hostilities between the Taliban and the
National Resistance Front over the past year.
Afghanistan has had the worst impact of terrorism over the past
five years, but that has changed since the Taliban took power as
the Taliban is no longer classified as a terrorist organisation.
Terrorist incidents in Afghanistan fell by 75 per cent in 2022,with deaths from terrorism falling 58 per cent, leading to
improvements on the terrorism impact and internal conflicts
fought indicators. However, the security situation in Afghanistan
remains uncertain, with an escalation in conflict between ISK
and the Taliban remaining a strong possibility. Since its
emergence in 2015, ISK has viewed the Taliban as both its
strategic and ideological rival. ISK has repeatedly denounced the
Taliban’s efforts to form an emirate based on nationalboundaries, which directly opposes ISK’s vision of a global
caliphate. Additionally, a number of local militias have aligned
against the Taliban under organisations such as Afghan National
Liberation Front, the Afghan National Resistance Front.

Five Largest
Deteriorations in
Peace
UkraineRank: 157
CHANGE IN SCORE
2022–23:

0.356

CHANGE IN RANK
2022–23:

14

Ukraine recorded the largest deterioration in the 2023 GPI, with
its overall score deteriorating by 13.27 per cent. The country is
now ranked 157 th globally on the index after falling fourteen
places in the rankings. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February
2022 was the primary factor in the deterioration in peacefulness,leading to deteriorations across all three GPI domains.
The Russian invasion has had a devastating impact on the
Ukrainian population, which is reflected in the deterioration inscore on both the Safety and Security and Ongoing Conflictdomains. The single largest change occurred on the refugees and
IDPs indicator. It is estimated that over 30 per cent of the total
Ukrainian population are now either refugees or internallydisplaced. Prior to the invasion, this figure stood at just 1.7 percent of the population. The second largest deterioration
occurred on the deaths from internal conflict indicator. Although
there are a range of estimates on the exact number of
Ukrainians killed in the conflict, best estimates suggest that over
30,000 Ukrainians have been killed, with hundreds of thousands
wounded.
Ukraine was one of the few countries where the Militarisation
domain deteriorated over the past year, owing to a large increase
in weapons exports, and the single largest increase in the armed
services personnel rate. There has also been a considerable
deterioration in the intensity of internal conflict and politicalinstability indicators. President Volodymyr Zelensky imposedmartial law in response to the Russian invasion, and most
government processes were disrupted by the defence effort.
While domestic support for the government is extremely strong
and widespread, the instability remained elevated by therealities of open conflict raging in the eastern and southern
regions. Even the less affected areas in west Ukraine sufferedfrom rocket and drone attacks.

Haiti

Rank: 129
CHANGE IN SCORE
2022–23:

0.193

CHANGE IN RANK
2022–23:

17

Haiti recorded the second largest deterioration of peacefulness
in the GPI, dropping seventeen places to 129 th. This is the lowest
ranking that Haiti has had on the index since its inception in2008. Haiti recorded significant deteriorations on all three GPI
domains, with the largest occurring on the Safety and Security
domain.

23

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

The internal security situation in Haiti significantly worsened
over the past year, with deteriorations on the violent crime,
political instability, and Political Terror Scale indicators. Since
the assassination of the previous president, Jovenel Moise, Haiti
has entered a crisis of insecurity with criminal gangs controllingover half the country, forcing thousands from their homes. A
recent UN report noted that gang violence and violent crime in
Haiti have increased significantly, with 934 killings and 680
kidnappings recorded in the first half of 2022 in the capital
Port-au-Prince alone.
The scale of the internal security problem in Haiti has increased
to the point where it has now been classified as outright violent
conflict, with the intensity of internal conflict indicator rising toa score of five, the highest possible score. The country has
descended into extreme instability, with a variety of organised
crime groups, which control much of the country, unleashingviolence against civilians and openly battling security forces.
Multiple election delays have meant that the terms of mostelected officials have expired, which has affected the ability of
the government to properly formulate a security strategy. Thereis a high level of corruption and collusion between politicalelements and organised crime groups, which have also
infiltrated government security forces.

Mali

Rank: 153
CHANGE IN SCORE
2022–23:

0.158

CHANGE IN RANK
2022–23:

4

Mali had the third largest deterioration in peacefulness in the2023 GPI, falling four places to 153 rd. Mali has been at thecentre of the increase in conflict and violence in the Sahelregion in the past decade, with the level of violence continuing
to increase over the past year. Mali’s score on both the Safety
and Security and Ongoing Conflict domains deteriorated
significantly, however it did record a small improvement on the
Militarisation domain, owing to an improvement on the UN
peacekeeping funding indicator.
Increased activity by jihadist groups led to Mali’s intensity ofinternal conflict indicator deteriorating over the past year, andit now has the maximum possible score of five. It is now
estimated that the government only retains control of 20 per
cent of the country, with jihadist groups launching attacks
against both government and UN forces throughout the year.
There have also been increased clashes between regionally or
ethnically based defence forces.
The rise in the level of conflict in Mali led to a deterioration on
the violent crime indicator. Both jihadist and inter-ethnic
violence has increased because of the conflict, causing morecivilian deaths. The latest available conflict data shows that
there were around 5,000 conflict-related casualties in 2022, up
from 2,000 in 2021. Mali also recorded deteriorations on theterrorism impact, political terror scale, and refugees and IDPs
indicators.

IsraelRank: 143
CHANGE IN SCORE
2022–23:

0.154

CHANGE IN RANK
2022–23:8

Israel recorded the fourth largest deterioration in peacefulnessof any country, dropping eight places to 143 rd on the 2023 GPI.
Israel’s score deteriorated on both the Ongoing Conflict and
Safety and Security domains, with both internal domestic
turmoil and deteriorating relationships with other countries in
the region playing a key role in its overall deterioration inpeacefulness.
The primary driver of Israel’s change in score was adeterioration in political instability. Israel now has the highest
levels of political instability since 2008. The returning
Netanyahu government, sought to implement changes thatwould curb the ability of the judicial system to overrule
government decisions. The proposed legislation led to enormous
demonstrations in January 2023, with over 100,000 people
attending some of the protests. Israel also recorded
deteriorations on the terrorism impact, perceptions ofcriminality, and Political Terror Scale indicators.
Israel’s score on the Ongoing Conflict domain also deteriorated,
driven by worsening neighbouring countries relations. Some UN
senior officials told the UN Security Council that 2022 was oneof the deadliest years in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, withboth the frequency and intensity of violent clashes increasing.
There have also been increasing tensions with Syria and Iran, as
Israel has attacked Syrian forces and militias that were backed
by the Iranian government.

RussiaRank: 158
CHANGE IN SCORE
2022–23:

0.148

CHANGE IN RANK
2022–23:

3

Russia had the fifth largest deterioration in peacefulness inthe 2023 GPI, falling three places to 158 th. Russia’s fall was
driven by their invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Deaths
from external conflict rose by 400 per cent, and Russia scoresa five on both the external conflicts fought and relations withneighbouring countries indicators. Some estimates suggest thatthe number of Russian fatalities because of the war in Ukraine
may be as high as 43,000, with total casualties of just under aquarter of a million.1
The war in Ukraine has placed considerable strain on
Russia’s military resources. Russian President Vladimir Putinannounced the partial mobilization of up to 300,000 militaryreservists in September 2022, a day after Russia announced theannexation of five regions in the East and South of Ukraine.
Russian offensives in Eastern Ukraine are also increasingly
dependent on soldiers from state sponsored private militarycontractor, the Wagner Group.
Although Russia had one of the five largest deteriorations inpeacefulness of any country, it improved in peacefulness on
several indicators on the Safety and Security domain. The
incarceration rate, violent demonstrations, terrorism impact
and homicide rate indicators all recorded improvements overthe past year. Russia’s homicide rate is now lower than at any
point since the inception of the GPI in 2008.

24

2 Trends
Key Findings•

The level of global peacefulness has deteriorated
by five per cent since 2008, with 95 countries
deteriorating and 66 improving in the GPI. The
average level of global peacefulness has
deteriorated for 13 of the last 15 years, with noyear-on-year improvements recorded since 2014.

•

The gap between the least and the most peacefulcountries continues to grow. Since 2008, the 25
least peaceful countries deteriorated on average by
9.8 per cent, while the 25 most peaceful countries
improved by 0.1 per cent.

•Of the three GPI domains, two recorded
deteriorations and one improved since 2008.
Ongoing Conflict and Safety and Security
deteriorated by 14 and 5.4 per cent respectively.
Militarisation improved by 6.2 per cent.

•All six of the Ongoing Conflict indicators
deteriorated. In total, 99 countries recorded a
deterioration on this domain, with 52 recording an
improvement, and 10 registering no change since
2008.

•

Conflict and terrorism in the Middle East were key
drivers of the global deterioration in peacefulness
until 2015, but in the past eight years conflicts inother regions have underpinned the global decline
in peacefulness.

•

Sixteen of the 23 indicators in the GPI deteriorated,while only seven improved. Only one indicator
improved by more than ten per cent, while eight
deteriorated by more than ten per cent.

•

The two indicators with the largest deterioration inpeacefulness since 2008 were violent
demonstrations and external conflicts fought, eachdeteriorating by an average of 53 per cent. The
increase in external conflicts fought reflects more
external actors becoming involved in internal
conflicts in other countries.

•

The terrorism impact indicator deteriorated sharply
until 2015, but in recent years has begun to
improve. The epicentre of terrorism has shifted from
the Middle East and North Africa into sub-SaharanAfrica, especially the Sahel.

•

Five of the six indicators in the Militarisation domain
have improved since 2008, with the average armed
personnel rate declining from 476 to 403 soldiers
per 100,000 population, and 123 countries
improving on UN peacekeeping funding.

•

In contrast with the global trend, Eastern European
countries bordering Russia deteriorated on the
Militarisation domain by an average of 6.9 per centbetween 2008 and 2023. The relations withneighbouring countries indicator also deteriorated
significantly in this region.

•

Coastal West Africa recorded an improvement inoverall peacefulness, despite a history of conflict,political instability, and a surge in violent conflict andterrorism in the neighbouring Sahel region.

•

There are now 15 countries where at least five percent of the population are either refugees orinternally displaced. Syria has 61 per centdisplaced, South Sudan over 42 per cent, Ukraine
over 30 per cent, while Somalia and the Central
African Republic have more than 20 per centdisplaced.

•

The average homicide rate across all GPI countries
fell from 7.6 to 6.3 per 100,000 from 2008 to 2023,
representing a 17.1 per cent improvement. 104
countries improved their score on the homicide rate
indicator, while 42 deteriorated.

25

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

GPI Trends
The world is considerably less peaceful now than it was in 2008, with the average level of country
peacefulness deteriorating by five per cent between 2008 and 2023. Over that same period, 95 countries
have become less peaceful, compared to 66 that have improved.

MENA remains the least peaceful region in the world, with its
Ongoing Conflict and Safety and Security domain scores
recording large deteriorations since 2008. However, there has
been very little change in overall peacefulness in the region
since 2016. The deaths from internal conflict indicator has
improved by an average of 19.5 per cent across the region since
the peak of violence during the Syrian civil war in 2014.
The gap in peace between the most and least peaceful countries

Trend in peace, 25 most and 25 least
peaceful countries, 2008–2023

The 25 least peaceful countries deteriorated in peacefulness by an average of 9.8 per cent, while the most peacefulimproved by 0.1 per cent.
1.15

Less peaceful

Europe remains the most peaceful region in the world. It has
had a slight deterioration in peacefulness since 2008, with its
average GPI score deteriorating by one per cent. The
deterioration in Europe’s overall peacefulness was largely driven
by the Ongoing Conflict domain. Militarisation improved, andSafety and Security recorded virtually no change. Despite its
high level of peacefulness, Europe recorded deteriorations in
the indicators for violent demonstrations, neighbouring country
relations, political instability, terrorism impact, and external
conflicts fought.

FIGURE 2.2

LEAST PEACEFUL

1.10

INDEXED SCORE

The deterioration in peacefulness since 2008 occurred in mostof the GPI regions, with four accounting for most of the global
increase in violence: MENA, sub-Saharan Africa, South America,and Central America and the Caribbean.

in the world has widened since 2013, as shown in Figure 2.2.
While the 25 most peaceful countries in 2023 recorded anaverage improvement of less than 0.1 per cent in their GPIscores since 2008, the 25 least peaceful nations saw their scores
deteriorate by an average of 9.8 per cent in the period.

More peacefulFigure 2.1 highlights the overall trend in peacefulness from2008 to 2023, as well as the year-on-year percentage change inscore. Peacefulness has declined year-on-year for 13 of the last
15 years.

1.05

1.00
MOST PEACEFUL
0.95

0.90
2008

2011

2014

2017

2020

2023

Source: IEP

FIGURE 2.1

GPI overall trend and year-on-year percentage change, 2008–2023
Peacefulness has declined year-on-year for thirteen of the last fifteen years.
OVERALL SCORE TRENDGPI SCORE

MorepeacefulLesspeaceful

2.08
2.08
2.06
2.04
2.04
2.02
2.00
2008

2010

2014

2016

2022

2020

PER CENT CHANGE

YOY % CHANGE
1.0%

0.0%

-1.0%

Source: IEP

26

2008

2011

2014

2017

2020

2022

Trends 2

Domain Trends
The GPI measures peacefulness across three domains: Safety and Security, Ongoing Conflict, andMilitarisation. Figure 2.3 highlights the indexed trend across these three domains over the past 15 years.

Indexed trend in peacefulness bydomain, 2008 to 2023 (2008=1)

Militarisation was the only domain to record an improvement
since 2008.
1.20
Less peaceful

Eight indicators deteriorated by more than ten per cent. The
largest deterioration was recorded for violent demonstrations
and external conflicts fought, which both deteriorated by 53 percent over the period on average, however violent
demonstrations has improved for the last two years. This
movement reflects the increase in frequency and severity ofviolent protests and riots around the world, as well as theincreasing internationalisation of armed conflicts over time,
which is discussed further in section four. The number andseverity of internal conflicts fought also deteriorated by 17.2 percent since 2008, while deaths from internal conflict deteriorated
by 14.6 per cent.

FIGURE 2.3

INDEXED SCORE

Figure 2.4 shows the percentage change in score for eachindicator from the 2008 to the 2023 GPI. Of the 23 GPI
indicators, 16 recorded deteriorations with the remaining sevenrecording improvements.

Of the seven indicators that improved, only UN peacekeeping
funding had an improvement of over 20 per cent. The nuclear
and heavy weapons, armed services personnel rate and homicide
rate indicators all improved by more than five per cent on
average.

More peaceful

While the world has become less peaceful since 2008, there
have been some notable improvements in peace. The averagecountry score on the Militarisation domain improved by 6.2 percent since 2008. The largest improvements in this domain werein UN peacekeeping funding, the size of the armed forces, andthe stock of heavy weapons in many countries, with only theweapons imports indicator deteriorating since 2008. The Safety
and Security domain deteriorated by 5.4 per cent, and theOngoing Conflict domain deteriorated by 14 per cent.

ONGOING CONFLICT

1.15
1.10
1.05

SAFETY & SECURITY

1.00
0.95

MILITARISATION
0.90

2008

2011

2014

2017

2020

2023

Source: IEP

FIGURE 2.4

Percentage change by indicator, 2008–2023

Funding for UN peacekeeping operations had the biggest improvement, while the indicators for violent demonstrations andexternal conflicts fought saw the largest deteriorations from 2008 to 2023.
Violent Demonstrations
External Conflicts FoughtInternal Conflicts Fought
Deaths from Internal Conflict
Terrorism Impact
Intensity of Internal Conflict
Neighbouring Countries Relations
Refugees and IDPs
Political Instability
Violent Crime
Incarceration Rate
Police Rate
Deaths from External Conflict
Weapons Imports
Political Terror Scale
Access to Small Arms
Military Expenditure (% GDP)
Perceptions of Criminality
Weapons Exports
Homicide Rate
Armed Services Personnel Rate
Nuclear and Heavy Weapons
UN Peacekeeping Funding
-30%

-20%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

% CHANGE IN SCORE, 2008–2023
Source: IEP

27

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

FIGURE 2.5

Trends in key safety and security indicators
Over 80 million people globally have been forcibly displaced.

TOTAL REFUGEES AND IDPSTERRORISM IMPACT

80

8.0
7.5
7.0
6.5
6.0
2005

2008

2011

2014

2017

2020

2.90

IDPS

60

40

REFUGEES
20

0
2007

2012

2013

2016

2019

2022

INDICATOR SCOREPEOPLE (MILLIONS)

8.5

RATE PER 100,000

More peacefulLess peaceful

HOMICIDE RATE

2.70
2.50
2.30
2.10
1.90
1.70
1.50
1.30
2008

2011

2014

2017

2020

2023

Source: Terrorism Tracker, GTD, UNHCR, UNODC, IEP Calculations

SAFETY & SECURITY
The Safety and Security domain deteriorated 5.4 per centbetween 2008 and 2023. Of the 11 indicators in this domain,nine deteriorated and two improved. The largest deterioration
occurred in the violent demonstrations indicator, with 120
countries seeing the impact of violent demonstrations increase
between 2008 and 2023. Average scores on this indicator havedeteriorated in every region around the world. Figure 2.5
highlights the trend from 2008 to 2023 for the key Safety andSecurity indicators.
The terrorism impact indicator had the second largest
deterioration since 2008. Until 2015, most deaths from terrorism
occurred in the MENA region. However, in the last eight years
the epicentre of terrorism has shifted out of South Asia and
MENA and into sub-Saharan Africa and especially the Sahel.
The Sahel region accounted for more terrorism deaths in 2022
than both South Asia and MENA combined. Deaths fromterrorism have been increasing in sub-Saharan Africa, yet they
have been decreasing in every other region since 2019. In thelast four years terrorism impact has improved in every region
except sub-Saharan Africa.
The homicide rate indicator had the largest improvement in the
Safety and Security domain, with 104 countries recording
reductions in their homicide rates since 2008. The average
homicide rate across all GPI nations fell from 7.6 to 6.3 per
100,000. There are now 34 countries globally that have a
homicide rate of less than one per 100,000, and 61 with a rate ofless than two per 100,000. Between 2008 and 2023, the homicide
rate improved in all regions except for MENA and North
America.
The number of forcibly displaced people has increased
consistently since 2008. There are now over 85 million refugees
and internally displaced people (IDPs) according to the UNHCR.
This number includes refugees and IDPs as a result of the war in
Ukraine, but excludes those people classified as ‘others ofconcern’ by the UNHCR. The number of forcibly displaced
people more than tripled between 2008 and 2023. There are
now 15 countries where at least five per cent of the population
are either refugees or internally displaced. Somalia and theCentral African Republic both have more than 20 per cent of
their populations displaced, while South Sudan has over 42 percent of its population displaced.

28

The war in Ukraine had resulted in an estimated 5.4 million
refugees and 6.3 million IDPs according to UNHCR,
representing almost 30 per cent of the country’s population.
However, the extent of displacement is still greatest in Syria,
where the impact and aftermath of the Syrian civil war has led
to 61 per cent of the population being either internally displacedor refugees since the start of the conflict.

ONGOING CONFLICT
Ongoing Conflict had the largest deterioration of the three GPI
domains, with an average fall of 14 per cent between 2008 and2023. All six of the Ongoing Conflict indicators deteriorated. In
total, 99 countries recorded a deterioration on this domain,with 52 recording an improvement, and ten registering nochange since 2008.
Figure 2.6 shows the trend for three key conflict indicators: thetotal number of conflict-related deaths, the average score for theexternal conflicts fought indicator and the average score on theintensity of internal conflict indicator.
Total conflict-related deaths rose sharply in the 2010s to reach apeak of just over 149,000 in 2014. The dramatic increase wasconcentrated in a handful of countries, with most deaths
occurring during the Syrian civil war. There were alsosignificant increases in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria and Central
African Republic. The number of conflict-related deaths beganfalling in 2015 as the intensity of conflict in Syria subsided.
In the last few years there has been a reversal of the downward
trend in conflict-related deaths, with total deaths rising 45 percent between 2020 and 2021. The most recent surge has
primarily occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, most notably in
Ethiopia and the tri-border region of Mali, Niger and Burkina
Faso. In the past year the number of deaths increased by 96 per
cent, owing to conflicts in Ukraine and Ethiopia.
The rise in conflict-related deaths has been mirrored by adeterioration in the external conflicts fought indicator, meaningthat more states are becoming involved in conflicts outside theirown borders by offering troops and support to combatants
within other territories. In 2021, there were 91 countries that
had been at least partially involved in an external conflict in thepast five years. Of these 91, 78 were only involved in an external
conflict in a coalition of at least two countries, and of those 45

Trends 2

FIGURE 2.6

Trends in key ongoing conflict indicators

Battle deaths increased by 45 per cent from 2020 to 2021, reversing the downward trend since 2014.
EXTERNAL CONFLICTS FOUGHTTOTAL BATTLE DEATHS

More peaceful

80,00060,00040,00020,000
0
2006

2009

2012

2015

2018

2021

1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1

2.60

Less peaceful

100,000

1.8

INDICATOR SCORE

120,000

1.9

More peacefulLess peaceful

140,000

INDICATOR SCORENUMBER OF DEATHS

160,000

INTENSITY OF INTERNAL CONFLICT

2006

2009

2012

2015

2018

2.55
2.50
2.45
2.40
2.35
2.30
2.25
2.20

2021

2008

2011

2014

2017

2020

2023

Source: UCDP, EIU, IEP calculations

were only involved in a large coalition of ten or more countries.
The intensity of conflict has also been increasing. The averageintensity of internal conflict indicator score increased from 2.29
to 2.56 between 2008 and 2023. In 2008, 104 countries had ascore of two or less on this indicator, suggesting no conflict oronly a latent potential for conflict. By 2023, this number had
fallen to 85. The number of countries with a score of four or
higher, which indicates the existence of openly violent internal
conflict, rose from 29 in 2008 to 37 in 2023.

MILITARISATION
Militarisation was the only GPI domain to record an
improvement from 2008 to 2023. The average score on thisdomain improved by 6.2 per cent over this period, with 118
countries recording an improvement and 43 deteriorating. Fiveof the six indicators on the Militarisation domain improved,with only the weapons imports indicator recording adeterioration. The largest proportional improvements occurredon the UN peacekeeping funding indicator, where 123 countries
improved, and the nuclear and heavy weapons indicator, where
110 countries improved. A total of 113 nations recorded
improvements in the armed personnel rate. Figure 2.7 shows theaverage trend for the armed forces rate and military
expenditure as a proportion of GDP, as well as the weapons
imports indicator score.
The improvement in both the armed personnel rate andmilitary expenditure since 2008 was particularly notable insome of the largest militaries in the world. The average armed

personnel rate declined from 476 soldiers per 100,000
population in 2007 to 403 soldiers per 100,000 population by2022. Of the five countries with the largest total military
expenditure - the United States, China, India, Russia and theUnited Kingdom - all except Russia recorded falls in militaryspending as a percentage of GDP. Although military
expenditure as a percentage of GDP did decrease, the overall
spending on the military did increase. The countries with thebiggest increases in absolute expenditure were China, the US,
and India, increasing by USD 180 billion, 70 billion and 40
billion respectively since 2008.
There was a slight deterioration in the weapons imports
indicator, the only Militarisation indicator to show adeterioration over the past decade. The number of countries
that recorded no weapons imports fell from 27 in 2008, to 13 in
2023. Six of the ten countries with the largest per capita
weapons imports are in the MENA region.
Weapons exports remain highly concentrated, with 103
countries registering no exports at all in 2023. Several highly
peaceful countries performed poorly on this indicator, with
Sweden, the Netherlands and Switzerland all being ranked
amongst the ten highest weapons exporters per capita in 2023.
Eight of the ten largest exporters on a per capita basis arewestern democracies. However, by total export value, just fivecountries account for over 75 per cent of total weapons exports:
the US, Russia, Germany, France, and China, with the US alone
accounting for over 40 per cent.

FIGURE 2.7

Trends in key militarisation indicators
The armed personnel rate has fallen by an average of 18.3 per cent since 2008.

Less peaceful

480

2.15

440
420

2.10
2.05
2.00

More peaceful

460

1.95
1.90

400

1.85
1.80
2010

2013

2016

2019

2022

1.55

INDICATOR SCORE

2.20% OF GDPRATE PER 100,000 PEOPLE

2.25

500

380
2007

WEAPONS IMPORTS

MILITARY EXPENDITURE

ARMED PERSONNEL RATE

2007

2010

2013

2016

2019

2022

1.50

1.45

1.40
2008

2011

2014

2017

2020

2023

Source: Military Balance, IEP calculations
29

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

Geospatial Trends
The Global Peace Index measures peacefulness at the national level, yet the dynamics of violence,
peace, and conflict are frequently influenced by transnational events and factors. Conflicts can overflow
from one country into another, causing regional clusters or 'hotspots'. Countries in these hotspots sharecertain economic or political traits, which often serve as the root causes of conflicts. Additionally, there issubstantial evidence suggesting that internal conflicts can spill over from one country to another.

The level of peacefulness in one country can affect the level ofpeacefulness in neighbouring countries either directly or
indirectly. Conflict can spread directly across borders throughthe movement of weapons or people, including combatants anddisplaced persons or refugees.1 The spread of conflict is more
likely if rebel groups in neighbouring countries share ethnic ties
and separatist motivations.2 The presence of conflict can also
depress the economies of bordering nations, contributing to an
environment where conflict is more likely.3
This means that a country’s overall level of peacefulness may beaffected by events that occur in bordering nations, both
positively and negatively. This section highlights trends inpeacefulness in two clusters: Eastern Europe and Coastal West
Africa.

EASTERN EUROPE
Eastern Europe is one of the few regions of the world where themilitarisation domain deteriorated over the past fifteen years.
The key driver of this deterioration were the tensions between
Russia and its western neighbours, which were rising long
before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s support ofseparatist forces in Georgia in 2008 and its annexation of the

Crimean Peninsula in 2014 were the main events which led to
an increase in tensions, and subsequent levels of militarisationin the region. Figure 2.8 maps the changes in the Militarisation
domain in Europe between 2008 and 2023.
Militarisation in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus andUkraine deteriorated by an average of just under seven per centbetween 2008 and 2023, compared with a global average
improvement of 6.2 per cent over the same period. All five of
these countries deteriorated on the weapons imports, military
expenditure and armed personnel rate indicators. The score forweapons imports deteriorated by an average of 57.2 per cent,compared with a global average improvement of 1.4 per cent.
Russia’s level of Militarisation did not increase as it wasstarting from a very high base, with the size of its armed forces
personnel rate decreasing slightly between 2008 and 2022.
The level of military expenditure amongst Russia’s
neighbouring countries increased sharply following theannexation of Crimea and the start of the Donbas War in 2014,as shown in Figure 2.9. Ukraine, Latvia, and Lithuania allrecorded large increases in military expenditure, with a smaller
increase in Estonia.

FIGURE 2.8

Militarisation in Eastern Europe, 2008–2023

Eastern European countries bordering Russia have deteriorated on the Militarisation domain by an average of seven per centsince 2008.

Deteriorating

Improving

Source: IEP

30

Trends 2

FIGURE 2.9

Trend in military expenditure (% GDP), Eastern Europe, 2008–2022

Military expenditure increased sharply in Ukraine, Latvia and Lithuania following the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
3.00

UKRAINE

% GDP

2.50

ESTONIA

LITHUANIALATVIA

2.00
1.50

BELARUS

1.00
0.50

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Source: Military Balance

Ukraine’s military expenditure had already increased sharply
between 2013 and 2014. Political rhetoric and threats from
Russia toward Ukraine intensified during the Euromaidan
demonstrations in late 2013 before Russian troops entered the
Crimean Peninsula in February 2014. Military expenditure
increased again in 2015 as Ukrainian forces fought pro-Russian
separatists in the Donbas. Spending has remained high since.
Data on Ukrainian military expenditure are only available to2021, but it is likely that the level of spending increased to an
all-time high in 2022. Some sources estimate military
expenditure, including foreign aid, accounted for more than athird of Ukraine’s GDP in 2022.4

2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, did not substantially increase
its military expenditure after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
However, weapons imports to Belarus more than doubled
between 2015 and 2022.

Latvia and Lithuania were vocal supporters of tough EU
sanctions against Russia for its actions in the Crimean
Peninsula, and both countries committed to increasing theirmilitary expenditure to the NATO target level of two per cent of
GDP.5 Lithuania achieved the target of two per cent in 2019, andLatvia followed in 2021, with both countries maintaining
spending above the NATO target and well above both NATO andEU average military expenditure up to 2022.6

The neighbouring country relations scores for Ukraine, Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania all deteriorated in 2015 in reaction to
Russia’s activities in Crimea and as a result of Russia’s embargo
on food from the EU. Belarus’ neighbouring country relations
score deteriorated in 2021 because of declining relations with
the EU. The EU imposed a range of sanctions against Belarus in
2021 and 2022 in reaction to political repression after the 2020
election, the forced landing of a flight in Minsk the following
year, and the actions of Belarusian authorities to facilitate tensof thousands of third-country migrants across the Lithuanian,Latvian, and Polish borders.7

Estonia’s military expenditure increased by 0.24 percentage
points between 2008 and 2022, from an already high starting
point of 1.89 per cent. Belarus, a country which supported the

Figure 2.10 shows the proportion of the population in fiveneighbouring countries that disapproved of Russia’s leadership
between 2006 and 2021, prior to the Russian invasion of
Ukraine. From 2013 to 2015, the proportion of the populationthat disapproved of President Putin increased by 52.8
percentage points, to over 80 per cent of the population in
Ukraine.

FIGURE 2.10

Proportion of the population disapproving of Russia's leadership,
Eastern Europe, 2006–2021
100%
90%

% DISAPPROVAL80%
UKRAINE

70%
60%

ESTONIA50%

LATVIA
LITHUANIA

40%30%

BELARUS

20%
10%
0
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Source: Gallup World Poll

31

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

FIGURE 2.12

West Africa has been described as one of the world’s most
unstable regions, having experienced numerous coups and civil
wars over the past fifty years.8 However, as Figure 2.11 shows,there has been an improvement in overall peacefulness inseveral countries in the region since 2008. These improvements
in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal
and Mauritania contrast with the steep deterioration inpeacefulness seen in the neighbouring Sahel region, where
violent conflict and terrorism have increased considerably overthe past 15 years.
The improvement in peacefulness in the region was driven by
substantial improvements in the Militarisation domain and a
decline in the number and intensity of internal conflicts. Figure
2.12 shows the average trend in Militarisation in Côte d'Ivoire,
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Mauritania
between 2008 and 2023. Militarisation improved by an averageof 13.4 per cent in these countries, which was over twice as highas the global average improvement of 6.2 per cent.

Trend in Militarisation, West Africa,
2008–2023

Militarisation has improved by an average of 13.4 per cent inCôte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal
and Mauritania.
2.10

2.00
AVERAGE DOMAIN SCORE

COASTAL WEST AFRICA

1.90
1.80
1.70
1.60

The level of internal conflict in the region has fallen
significantly over the past 15 years. None of the six countries
has recorded a new conflict with over 25 battle deaths in the2023

The improvements in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire
are a reversal of the conflict contagion that was seen in the
1990s and 2000s. Liberia’s military leader between 1997 and2003, Charles Taylor, was accused of directly supporting rebels
in Sierra Leone, and armed groups in all three countries are

Countries in coastal West Africa have improved on the GPI by an average of 4.95 per cent since 2008.

Deteriorating

Improving

32

2021

past five years. Since 2008, the intensity of internal conflictindicator improved by over 25 per cent in Senegal, Mauritania,
and Guinea-Bissau, while the internal conflicts fought indicator
improved by over 30 per cent in Côte D’Ivoire and Sierra Leone.

Overall peacefulness in coastal West Africa, 2008–2023

Source: IEP

2022

2019

Source: IEP

FIGURE 2.11

Côte d'Ivoire

2020

2017

2018

2016

2014

2016

2013

2014

2011

2012

2010

2008

2009

1.50

All six countries in West Africa have seen a sustained
improvement in the armed personnel rate. In Sierra Leone, thearmed personnel rate fell by 48.8 per cent, from 193 per 100,000
population in 2008 to 99 per 100,000 in 2023. In Senegal and
Mauritania, it improved by over 30 per cent, compared with a
global average improvement of 15.3 per cent. All six countries
also improved their contribution to UN peacekeeping funding
between 2008 and 2023. In Sierra Leone the score for UN
peacekeeping funding improved by 75 per cent, and in Senegal
it improved by more than 50 per cent.

Trends 2

reported to have recruited foreign combatants, includingchildren, from their neighbours.9
Peacekeeping and peacebuilding have also played a vital role inincreasing peacefulness in the region. The widely praised UN
mission in Sierra Leone ended in 2006, and those in Côte
d'Ivoire and Liberia ended in 2017 and 2018 respectively.
Evidence from the region suggests that the successful peace
processes have been underpinned by a focus on the social andeconomic concerns of local communities. However, theirlong-term success still depends on building sufficient economic
opportunity to avoid the return of violence.10
One of the starkest differences between these countries and theneighbouring Sahel countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and
Niger is the impact of terrorism, as shown in Figure 2.13. Côte
d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and
Mauritania all recorded zero deaths from terrorism in 2022,
compared with 1,135 deaths in Burkina Faso and 994 deaths in
Mali.11
Jihadist terror groups have expanded in Sahelian countries withhigh group grievances and poor economic growth, funding theiractivities through criminal activities such as kidnapping andsmuggling.12 However, despite the existence of many of theserisk factors in West African countries, terrorist activity has been
relatively limited.

Political instability and poverty in Mauritania, and the existenceof separatist grievances, trafficking networks and gold resourcesin Senegal are potential risk factors for the spread of terrorism.
Investments in the capacity of policing and security services
have been important preventive measures in both countries, as
have strategic interventions in border regions. Althougheconomic development across Mauritania has been limited sincethe 2008 coup, the new government extended services such as
water, electricity, schools, and mobile connectivity to remoteareas where terrorists were known to be recruiting.13 Senegal
began building a military camp near the Malian border toprotect its gold assets.14
Improvements in peacefulness have coincided with an
improvement in governance and other key political institutions,which have led to more open and transparent elections andpeaceful transitions of power. Liberia has had three election
cycles since the end of the civil war, including a peacefultransfer of power in 2017. Although there was some violence
after the 2020 elections in Côte d'Ivoire it did not escalate into
armed conflict as it had a decade before. Governments in
Senegal have increasingly collaborated with their neighbours by
sharing intelligence in the fight against violent extremism, andCôte d'Ivoire has taken on a more significant role in regional
peacekeeping missions. These improvements in governing
institutions are important given that countries with more
effective governments are better able to protect against potential
spill over effects from nearby conflicts.15

FIGURE 2.13

Terrorism deaths in West Africa, 2022

There was not a single death recorded from terrorism in 2022 in any coastal West African country from Morocco to Ghana.

More than 400 deaths
100–400 deaths
Less than 100 deaths
No deaths

Source: IEP

33

3

Economic
Impact ofViolence

Key Findings

34•

The global economic impact of violence was $17.5
trillion in 2022, equivalent to 12.9 per cent of global
GDP, or $2,200 per person.

•

The 2022 result represented an increase of 6.6 percent – or $1 trillion – from the previous year, largely
driven by a 16.8 per cent increase in the economic
impact of military expenditure.

•

The war in Ukraine had a devastating economic
effect, with the economic impact of violence in
Ukraine increasing by 479 per cent or $449 billion.
This was the largest increase of any country.

•

Other than Ukraine, Togo and Qatar recorded thelargest increases in the economic impact ofviolence, with all recording increases of over 60 per
cent. However, Qatar’s was from a very low base.

•Ukraine, Afghanistan and Sudan incurred thehighest relative economic cost of violence in 2022,
equivalent to 63.1, 46.5 and 39.7 per cent of GDP,
respectively.

•

In the ten countries most affected by violence, theeconomic cost of violence averaged 34 per cent of
GDP in 2022, compared to just 2.9 per cent for theten least affected countries.

•

Kuwait, Mauritius, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, andCambodia had the largest improvements in theeconomic impact of violence. All these nations
recorded reductions of more than 25 per cent from2021 to 2022.

•

Expenditure on peacebuilding and peacekeeping
was $34.1 billion in 2022, which equals only 0.4 percent of military spending.

•

The biggest increases in the economic costingmodel are for Armed Conflict which increased 102
per cent since 2008.

Economic Impact of Violence 3

The Economic
Value of Peace
In 2022, the impact of violence on the global economy amounted to $17.5 trillion, in US dollars inpurchasing power parity (PPP) terms. This is equivalent to 12.9 per cent of global GDP, or $2,200 perperson. The total economic impact of violence increased by 6.6 per cent over the past year.
The global economic impact of violence is defined as theexpenditure and economic effect related to containing,
preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence. The
economic impact of violence provides an empirical basis tobetter understand the economic benefits resulting from
improvements in peace.
Violence and the fear of violence create significant economic
disruptions. Violent incidents generate costs in the form ofproperty damage, physical injury or psychological trauma. Fearof violence also alters economic behaviour, primarily by
reducing the propensity to invest and consume. Expenditure on
preventing, containing and dealing with the consequences ofviolence diverts public and private resources away from moreproductive activities and towards protective measures. Violence
generates economic losses in the form of productivity shortfalls,
foregone earnings and distorted expenditure.

The direct costs of violence include the immediate consequences
to the victims, perpetrators and public systems including health,judicial and public safety. The indirect cost refers to longer-termcosts, such as lost productivity resulting from the physical andpsychological effects and the impact of violence on theperception of safety and security in society. The multiplier effectrepresents the economic benefits that would be generated by thediversion of expenditure away from sunk costs, such as
incarceration spending, and into more productive alternatives.
The economic impact of violence includes many indicators
contained in the GPI, such as military expenditure, conflict
deaths and homicides. However, the model also includes costs
that are not incorporated into the GPI, such as the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) expenditure
on refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP), losses fromconflict, suicide, and internal security expenditure.

The total economic impact of violence has three componentsthat represent different ways in which violence impacts
economic activity: direct costs, indirect costs and a multipliereffect.

FIGURE 3.1

The Value of
Peace in 2022
The economic impact of violence was $17.5 trillion
in 2022. This represented a 6.6 per cent increase
from the previous year, owing largely to an increasein military and private security expenditure. Figure
3.1 displays the breakdown of the total economic
impact of violence by category for 2022.
The single largest component was global military expenditure,
which totalled $7.6 trillion, or 43.6 per cent of the total
economic impact. Note that this is an economic measure ofmilitary expenditure that includes a multiplier effect, as well as
spending on veterans’ affairs and other related costs. For thisreason, it differs from other estimates of global military
expenditure.

Composition of the global economic
impact of violence, 2022

Military and internal security expenditure accounts for over73 per cent of the global economic impact of violence.
Conflict, 1.8%

Other, 4.1%

Violent crime, 3.1%
Suicide, 4.1%
Homicide,
6.6%
Military
expenditure,
43.6%

Privatesecurity
expenditure,
6.8%

Internal security
expenditure,
29.9%

Source: IEP

35

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

TABLE 3.1

Change in global economic impact of violence, billions of PPP 2022 US dollars, 2021–2022
The total economic impact of violence increased by 6.6 per cent from 2021 to 2022.
2022
COST
COMPONENTDIRECTCOST

INDIRECT
COST

2021
MULTIPLIERTOTALECONOMICIMPACT

CHANGE (2021 TO 2022)

TOTAL
ECONOMICIMPACTTOTALCHANGE% CHANGE
16.8%

Military expenditure

3,813

-

3,813

7,626

6,529

1,097.4

Internal security

2,619

-

2,619

5,238

5,238

-0.8

0.0%

Private security

594

-

594

1,187

1,304

-116.3-8.9%

Homicide

100

949

100

1,149

1,104

44.3

4.0%

Suicide

1

713

1

715

714

0.2

0.0%

Violent crime

45

444

45

534

532

2.4

0.5%

Refugees and IDPs

4

454

4

461

384

77.2

20.1%

GDP losses

-

281

-

281

274

7.0

2.6%

Incarceration

64

-

64

128

143

-14.7

-10.3%

Fear

-

71

-

71

68

3.7

5.4%

Conflict deaths

18

-

18

36

35

0.5

1.3%

Peacebuilding

12

-

12

24

32

-8.4

-25.9%

Small arms

11

-

11

22

24

-2.0

-8.3%

Peacekeeping

5

-

5

10

18

-8.2

-44.9%

8-0.9-11.1%

16,408

1,081

6.6%

Terrorism

Total

1

6

1

7

7,286

2,918

7,286

17,489Internal security expenditure was the second largest component,
comprising 29.9 per cent of the global economic impact ofviolence, at $5.2 trillion. It includes spending on the police andthe judicial system as well as the costs associated with
incarceration.
Table 3.1 gives a more detailed breakdown of the total economic
impact of violence, as well as the change in the impact from2021 to 2022.
Globally, the economic impact of military expenditure increased
by 16.8 per cent in 2022 equivalent to $1.1 trillion. Much of that
increase occurred as the result of the war in Ukraine, andassociated military spending from countries directly andindirectly involved in the conflict.
Expenditure on private security decreased by 8.9 per cent to $1.2
trillion. Private security is the third largest category in themodel and comprises 6.8 per cent of the total. China and India
had the biggest reductions in private security expenditures witha combined reduction of $51 billion in 2022 compared to theprevious year.
Homicide is the fourth largest component in the model,
comprising 6.6 per cent of the global economic impact ofviolence, at $1.1 trillion. This category increased by four per
cent, or $44.3 billion, from the previous year. Sixty-two countries
recorded a deterioration in the economic impact of homicide,
while 101 countries recorded an improvement.
The impact of suicide remained unchanged and amounted to$714.6 billion in 2022, representing 4.1 per cent of the global
total. Suicide is defined by the WHO as self-inflicted violence
resulting in death.
The economic impact of violent crime increased by less than one

36

per cent in 2022 or by $2.4 billion. Violent crime comprises
violent assault and sexual violence and makes up 3.1 per cent of
the total economic impact of violence.

TRENDS IN THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
VIOLENCE
The overall impact of violence in real terms is 6.9 per centhigher in 2022 when compared to 2008, although it has
fluctuated by 15.5 per cent in this time as shown in Figure 3.2.
Substantial improvements were recorded between 2010 and2013, after which the impact has steadily risen. In this period,
87 countries recorded increases in their economic impact ofviolence, while 74 had improvements.1 Of the 87 countries thatrecorded higher impacts, the average increase was 55 per cent.
Among those that recorded reductions, the average decrease was
18.7 per cent.

Economic Impact of Violence 3

FIGURE 3.2

Trend in the global economic impact of violence, 2008–2022
CONSTANT 2021 US$ PPP, TRILLIONS

The total economic impact of violence has increased eight times in the last 14 years.
18
17
16
15
14
13

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2015

2014

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

YOY % CHANGE
10%

0%

-10%

Source: IEP

TABLE 3.2

Change in the global economic impact of violence, billions of PPP 2022 US dollars, 2008–2022
TOTAL ECONOMIC IMPACT
INDICATOR
Conflict deaths
Refugees and IDPs
GDP losses

2008

CHANGE (2008–2022)

2022

BILLIONS

%

8.4

35.9

27.5

326%

166.3

461.3

295.0

177%

194.1

280.8

86.6

45%

6,790.4

7,625.9

835.5

12%

Suicide

645.6

714.6

69.0

11%

Homicide

1,103.2

1,148.7

45.5

4%

Small arms

21.3

21.9

0.6

3%
2%

Military expenditure

Internal security

5,148.8

5,237.6

88.9

Fear

70.3

71.4

1.2

2%

Incarceration

129.8

128.1

-1.8

-1%

Violent crime

585.0

534.0

-51.0

-9%

Private security

1,445.1

1,187.5-257.6-18%

Peacebuilding

31.3

24.0

-7.2

-23%

Terrorism

9.4

7.2

-2.2

-24%

Peacekeeping

17.8

10.1

-7.8

-44%

16,367

17,4891,122.2

6.9%

Total

Table 3.2 shows a breakdown of the change in the economic
impact of violence between 2008 and 2022 by category. Between
2008 and 2022, it recorded a 6.9 per cent increase. Costs
associated with conflict deaths and refugees and IDPs rose mostsignificantly, with both more than doubling.

37

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

FIGURE 3.3

Indexed trend in the economic impact by domain, 2008–2022
The economic impact of armed conflict has doubled since 2008.

Deterioration
Improvement
INDEXED CHANGE (2008=1)

2.20

ARMED CONFLICT

2.00
1.80
1.60
1.40
1.20

VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT
INTERPERSONAL AND
SELF-INFLICTED VIOLENCE

1.00
0.80
2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

2022

Source: IEP

ECONOMIC IMPACT BY DOMAIN
The relative long-term trends in the economic impact ofviolence differ among the three domains of violence. Figure 3.3
shows the indexed changes in the three domains since 2008.
The total economic impact of violence increased across all threedomains. Armed Conflict deteriorated substantially since 2013,
while Violence Containment and Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted
Violence had small relative increases.

Armed Conflict
The economic impact of Armed Conflict on the global economy
in 2022 amounted to $807.1 billion. The Armed Conflict domain
includes the costs associated with violence caused by larger
groups such as nation-states, militia groups and terrorist
organisations.
This collective violence includes armed conflict within and
FIGURE 3.4

Breakdown of the global economic
impact of the Armed Conflict domain,
2022

Forced displacement accounts for 57 per cent of the global
economic impact of Armed Conflict.
Small arms, 3%

Terrorism, 1%

Conflict deaths, 4%GDP losses
from armed
conflict, 35%

Source: IEP

38

between states, including militias and drug cartels, violent
political repression, genocide and terrorism. The domain also
includes the costs associated with the consequences ofmanaging armed conflict, such as UN peacekeeping andpeacebuilding funding. The economic impact of Armed Conflictis highest across three regions: sub-Saharan Africa, MENA andSouth America.
Figure 3.4 shows the composition of the economic impact ofArmed Conflict in 2022. Refugees and IDPs is the largest
component, accounting for approximately 57 per cent of theeconomic impact of Armed Conflict, followed by the GDP losses
from conflict at 35 per cent.

Interpersonal Violence and Self-Inflicted Violence
The economic impact of Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted
Violence aggregates homicide, violent and sexual assault, suicideand fear of violence. In 2022, the economic impact ofInterpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence on the global economy
amounted to $2.6 trillion. Compared to the previous year, theimpact increased by 1.4 per cent, or $35 billion.
Figure 3.5 shows the composition of the economic impact of theInterpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence domain. Homicide
accounts for approximately 44 per cent of the domain's
economic impact, followed by suicide at 28 per cent and assault
at 14 per cent.

Violence Containment

Armed Conflict

Refugeesanddisplaced
persons,
57%

Violence Containment is the largest component of the overall
economic impact of violence. It consists of all spending whichaims to prevent and contain the spread of violence. Figure 3.6
shows the composition of the economic impact for this domain.
Military expenditure is the largest component of this domain,
accounting for 54 per cent of the total, while internal security
expenditure is the second largest component, at 37 per cent.
Internal security expenditure encompasses all the expenses
associated with the police and judicial system. Private security
accounts for eight per cent of the economic impact of Violence
Containment, while peacebuilding and peacekeeping combined
account for less than one per cent.

Economic Impact of Violence 3

FIGURE 3.5

Composition of the economic impact ofInterpersonal Violence and Self-inflicted
Violence domain, 2022
Homicide comprises almost half of the global economic
impact of interpersonal violence.

FIGURE 3.6

Composition of the Violence
Containment domain, 2022

Military Expenditure accounts for over half of the global
economic impact of violence containment.
Private security,
8%

Fear of victimisation,
3%

Incarceration, 5%

Peace keeping andbuilding, 0.2%
Military
expenditure,
54%

Internal
security
expenditure
37%

Violent
crime,
21%

Violence
Containment

Interpersonal and
Self-inflicted Violence Homicide,
44%

Suicide,28%

Source: IEP

Source: IEP

The distribution of the economic impact of Violence
Containment differs considerably from region to region. In
North America, the impact of Violence Containment equated to$4,485 per person in 2022. This is over twice as high as in
Russia and Eurasia, the region with the second highest level, as
shown in Figure 3.7. However, North America is the region withthe highest level of per capita income.
Central America and the Caribbean, South Asia, and subSaharan Africa have the lowest per capita impact. On average,
the economic impact of violence containment is 11 times higher
in the Middle East and North Africa than sub-Saharan Africa.

Violence Containment is
the largest componentof the overall economic
impact of violence.

FIGURE 3.7

Per capita containment spending (military and internal security) by region, 2022
Per capita violence containment spending is more than 11 times higher in MENA than in sub-Saharan Africa.
sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
Central America& the Caribbean
Asia-PacificSouth America
EuropeMENA
Russia & Eurasia
North America
$0

$500

$1,000$1,500$2,000$2,500$3,000
CONSTANT 2022 PPP, PER PERSON$3,500$4,000$4,500$5,000Notes: Includes expenditure on private security, internal security and the military.
Source: IEP

39

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

TABLE 3.3

Military expenditure: total, per capita, and as percentage of GDP, 2022
MILITARY EXPENDITURE(TOTAL, $US BILLIONS)COUNTRY

COUNTRYMILITARY EXPENDITURE(PER CAPITA, $US)

COUNTRYMILITARY EXPENDITURE(% OF GDP)

United States$821.0

North Korea$8,105.28

Ukraine**

36.9%

China

$439.9Qatar$7,102.67

North Korea**

33.4%

India

$248.9

Ukraine**$4,770.25

Afghanistan

11.0%

North Korea**$211.3

Saudi Arabia$3,615.68

Palestine

9.0%

Russia$193.5

United Arab Emirates$3,493.38

Saudi Arabia

8.2%

Ukraine**$189.4Singapore$3,227.33

Qatar

7.6%

Saudi Arabia$131.6

United States*$2,427.03

Togo

6.0%

United Kingdom$75.1

Kuwait$2,099.29

Oman

5.7%

Germany$68.1

Israel$1,988.45

Jordan

5.3%

Korea

$66.0

Oman

$1,946.97

Algeria

5.3%* estimated; Veterans affairs spending and interest on military-related debt is excluded.				
Source: IEP calculations

Table 3.3 shows the ten countries with the highest military
expenditure as a total, per capita, and as a percentage of GDP.
The US spends the most of any country annually on its military.
North Korea has the highest on per capita spending andUkraine has the highest military spending as a percentage of

The Regional Economic Impact of Violence
The economic impact of violence deteriorated for most regionsof the world in 2022. The regions with the largest percentage
improvements were in Central America and the Caribbean, andsub-Saharan Africa, as shown in Figure 3.8.

its GDP.

REGIONAL AND COUNTRY ANALYSIS
There are noticeable regional differences in the economic
impact of violence. In some regions, the Violence Containment
domain, and in particular military expenditure accounts formost of the economic impact, whilst in other regions crime andconflict are the largest components of the economic impact ofviolence.

The Russia and Eurasia region had the largest deterioration,
driven by the costs associated with the conflict in Ukraine. The
economic impact of violence increased by 479 per cent inUkraine, compared to an average of eight per cent in othercountries in the region. The deterioration in Russia and Eurasia
can be attributed to an increase in military expenditure, thecosts associated with refugees and IDPs and the costs associatedwith conflict deaths.

FIGURE 3.8

Total economic impact and change by region

Only two GPI regions recorded an improvement in the economic impact of violence.
TOTAL ECONOMIC IMPACT$4,378North
America

5$3,923Asia-Pacific6$2,770Europe$1,556

3
57

Russia & Eurasia$1,395South Asia2

$1,367MENA

0$1,054South America$557

sub-Saharan Africa$488

Central America
and the Caribbean

0
Source: IEP

40

PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN ECONOMIC
IMPACT (2021 TO 2022)$1,000$2,000$3,000
CONSTANT 2022 PPP, BILLIONS

1-1-4$4,000

-20%

0%
20%
40%
PERCENTAGE CHANGE

60%

Economic Impact of Violence 3

The region with the largest improvement was in Central
America and the Caribbean with a 4.1 per cent reduction in theoverall economic impact of violence from the previous year. The
biggest reduction came from a $3 billion reduction in theimpact of homicide. Preliminary data from 2022 suggests thatthe fall in homicide in the region has accelerated over the past
twelve months. For example, it is estimated that El Salvador’s
homicide rate dropped from 103 per 100,000 in 2015, to 7.8 per
100,000 in 2022.

TABLE 3.4

The ten countries with the highest economic
cost of violence, percentage of GDP, 2022
There are six countries where the economic cost of violence isequivalent to more than 30 per cent of GDP.
ECONOMIC COST OF
VIOLENCE AS (% OF GDP)

COUNTRY
Ukraine63.1

The composition of violence varies substantially by region, as
shown in Figure 3.9. The greatest variation between regions isin military expenditure. This represents 57.75 per cent of theeconomic impact for the MENA region, and less than ten percent in the Central America and the Caribbean region.

Afghanistan

46.5

Sudan

39.7

North Korea

38.5

Somalia

35.4

The proportions of internal and private security spending also
varies between regions, fluctuating between just under 40 per
cent in Asia-Pacific to just under 30 per cent in the MENA
region.

Central African Republic

31.5

Colombia

28.6

Cyprus23.3

Burkina Faso

19.3

South Sudan

17.2

Average

34.3

Countries with the Highest Economic Cost
Table 3.4 lists the ten countries with the highest economic costof violence as a percentage of GDP. The economic cost ofviolence for the ten most affected countries ranged from 17.2 to63.1 per cent of their GDP. These countries have high levels ofarmed conflict, large numbers of internally displaced persons,high levels of interpersonal violence or large militaries.
In the ten countries most affected by violence as gauged by the
GPI, the economic cost of violence averaged 34.3 per cent of
GDP in 2022. Among the ten most peaceful countries, theaverage economic cost of violence was equivalent to just under
three per cent of GDP.
The country suffering the highest cost of violence is Ukrainewith the economic cost increasing by 479 per cent. A large

Source: IEP

portion of costs made up of military expenditure, refugees and
IDPs as well as costs associated with conflict deaths.
High-intensity conflict-affected countries suffer from higher
costs from conflict deaths, terrorism, losses from refugees and
IDPs and GDP losses from their conflicts. These countries
include Ukraine, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Central African
Republic, Burkina Faso and South Sudan. North Korea’s highcosts are associated with its military while Colombia andCyprus suffer high costs because of the number of refugees andinternally displaced people.2

FIGURE 3.9

Composition of the regional economic cost of violence, 2022

The proportional regional impact of military expenditure ranges from ten to almost 58 per cent.

PROPORTION OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

Military
100%
90%Internal and private security
0.2%

4.7%
6.6%

12.3%

Violent crime, Homicide and Suicide

0.5%
0.8%

10.7%

0.7%
1.4%

10.5%

0.8%
1.0%

18.7%

0.4%

7.6%

Armed Conflict
0.8%

13.4%

Other
1.0%

17.9%

0.8%

1.0%

14.0%

12.8%

80%
70%

30.3%

31.5%

39.1%

28.3%

38.7%

28.6%
34.6%

60%

37.5%

40.4%

50%

33.8%

40%

34.3%
30%

57.7%

55.6%

49.0%

48.8%

20%

34.8%
45.0%

41.7%
23.6%

10%
0%

MENA

North
America

Asia-PacificSouth Asia

Notes: Other includes the economic impact from fear and small arms.
Source: IEP

EuropeRussia &EurasiaSouth
America

18.2%

sub-SaharanAfrica10.0%
CentralAmerica &the Caribbean

41

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

Methodology at a Glance
The global economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic effects related tocontaining, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence. The estimate includes the direct
and indirect costs of violence, as well as an economic multiplier. The multiplier effect calculates the
additional economic activity that would have accrued if the direct costs of violence had been avoided.

Expenditure on containing violence is economically efficientwhen it effectively prevents violence for the least amount ofspending. However, spending beyond an optimal level has thepotential to constrain a nation’s economic growth. Therefore,
achieving the right levels of spending on public services such as
the military, judicial and security is important for the mostproductive use of capital.
This study includes two types of costs: direct and indirect.
Examples of direct costs include medical costs for victims ofviolent crime, capital destruction from violence and costs
associated with security and judicial systems. Indirect costs
include lost wages or productivity from crime due to physicaland emotional trauma. There is also a measure of the impact offear on the economy, as people who fear that they may become
a victim of violent crime alter their behaviour.
An important aspect of IEP’s estimation is the international
comparability of country estimates, thereby allowing cost/benefit analysis of country interventions. The methodology uses
constant prices purchasing power parity (PPP) international
dollars, which allows for the costs of various countries to becompared with one another. By using PPP estimates, theanalysis takes into consideration the differences in the averagelevel of prices between countries. For instance, if the US-dollar
cost of a basket of goods in country A is higher than the
US-dollar cost of the same basket of goods in country B, thenone US dollar will have a lower purchasing power in country A
than in B. Thus, an expense of a certain amount of US dollars incountry B will be more meaningful than a similar expense incountry A. IEP’s use of PPP conversion rates means that theestimates of the economic impact of violence accurately
captures the true significance of that impact or expense in eachcountry.

IEP estimates the economic impact of violence bycomprehensively aggregating the costs related to violence,
armed conflict and spending on military and internal security
services. The GPI is the initial point of reference for developing
the estimates for most variables, however some variables are
not in the GPI, such as suicide, and are calculated separately.
The 2021 version of the economic impact of violence includes 18
variables in three groups, shown in Table 3.5
The analysis presents conservative estimates of the global
economic impact of violence. The estimation only includes
variables of violence for which reliable data could be obtained.
The following elements are examples of some of the items notcounted in the economic impact of violence:••••the cost of crime to businessdomestic violencehousehold out-of-pocket spending on safety and security
spillover effects from conflict and violence.

A unit cost approach was used to cost variables for which
detailed expenditure was not available. The unit costs wereobtained from a literature review and appropriately adjusted
for all countries included. The study uses unit costs from
McCollister, French and Fang for homicides, violent and sexual
crimes.3 The McCollister, French and Fang cost of homicides isalso used for battle deaths and deaths from terrorism. The unit
cost for fear of crime is sourced from Dolan and Peasgood.4
The total economic impact of violence includes the following
components:

TABLE 3.5

Economic impact of violence - domains and indicators
The 18 indicators in the economic impact of violence model.
VIOLENCE CONTAINMEMNTARMED CONFLICTINTERPERSONAL AND
SELF-INFLICTED VIOLENCE

Military expenditure

Direct costs of deaths from internal violent conflict

HomicideInternal security expenditure

Direct costs of deaths from external violent conflict

Violent assault

Security agency

Indirect costs of violent conflict (GDP losses due to conflict)Sexual assault

Private security

Losses from status as refugees and IDPs

Fear of crime

UN peacekeeping

Small arms imports

Indirect costs of incarceration

ODA peacebuilding expenditure*

Terrorism

Suicide* Official Development Assistance (ODA) for peacebuilding
Source: IEP calculations

42

Economic Impact of Violence 3• Direct costs are the cost of violence to the victim, theperpetrator, and the government. These include direct
expenditures, such as the cost of policing, military andmedical expenses. For example, in the calculation of
homicides for a given country, the total number of homicides
is computed and multiplied by the unit costs estimated by
McCollister, French and Fang. The result is updated andconverted using country specific inflation and exchange
rates.
• Indirect costs accrue after the violent event and include
indirect economic losses, physical and physiological trauma
to the victim and lost productivity.

• The multiplier effect represents the flow-on effects ofdirect costs, such as the additional economic benefits thatwould come from investment in business development or
education, instead of the less-productive costs of containing
or dealing with violence. Box 3.1 provides a detailed
explanation of the peace multiplier used.
The term economic impact of violence covers the combined
effect of direct and indirect costs and the multiplier effect,
while the economic cost of violence represents the direct andindirect cost of violence. When a country avoids the economic
impact of violence, it realises a peace dividend.

The term economic impact of violence covers the combined effect of direct and indirect
costs and the multiplier effect, while the economic cost of violence represents the direct
and indirect cost of violence. When a country avoids the economic impact of violence, it
realises a peace dividend.

BOX 3.1

The multiplier effect
The multiplier effect is a commonly used economic
lifetime income of the victim. The economic benefits fromconcept, which describes the extent to which additional
greater peace can therefore be significant. This was also
expenditure improves the wider economy. Every time there
noted by Brauer and Tepper-Marlin (2009), who argued
is an injection of new income into the economy this willthat violence or the fear of violence may result in somelead to more spending which will, in turn, create
economic activities not occurring at all.5 More generally,
employment, further income and additional spending. This
there is strong evidence to suggest that violence and themutually reinforcing economic cycle is known
fear of violence can fundamentally alter theas the “multiplier effect” and is the reason that a
incentives for business. For instance, analysis
dollar of expenditure can create more than aof 730 business ventures in Colombia fromdollar of economic activity.
1997 to 2001 found that with higher levels of
A dollar of
expenditure can violence, new ventures were less likely tocreate more
Although the exact magnitude of this effect issurvive and profit. Consequently, with greaterthan a dollar
difficult to measure, it is likely to be particularly
levels of violence it is likely that we mightof economic
high in the case of expenditure related to
expect lower levels of employment andactivity.
containing violence. For instance, if a
economic productivity over the long-term, as
community were to become more peaceful,the incentives faced discourage newindividuals would spend less time and resources
employment creation and longer-term
protecting themselves against violence.
investment.
Because of this decrease in violence there are likely to be
substantial flow-on effects for the wider economy, asThis study assumes that the multiplier is one, signifying
money is diverted towards more productive areas such asthat for every dollar saved on violence containment, there
health, business investment, education and infrastructure.
will be an additional dollar of economic activity. This is arelatively conservative multiplier and broadly in line with
When a homicide is avoided, the direct costs, such as thesimilar studies.
money spent on medical treatment and a funeral, could bespent elsewhere. The economy also benefits from the43

Economic FocusThe Impact of a
Chinese Blockadeof Taiwan
Key Findings

44•

IEP estimates that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan
would lead to a drop in global economic output of
USD 2.7 trillion in the first year. This estimate isconsidered conservative.

•

The blockade would lead to a 2.8 per cent decline
in global economic output in its first year. This isalmost double the loss that occurred as the result of
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.

•

Almost 60 per cent of the loss of economic activity
would occur in China and Taiwan, with the twocountries having a combined lost output of 1.6
trillion USD.

•The Chinese economy would shrink by an
estimated seven per cent, while Taiwan’s economy
would shrink by almost 40 per cent.

•

China and Taiwan account for a quarter of global
trade in computers and electronics, while Chinaalone accounts for a quarter of the global trade in
textile clothing and footwear, and more than ten percent of global trade in plastic and rubber, chemicals,
and base metals.

•

China’s level of trade with the rest of the world
would fall by more than 20 per cent. This figure
assumes that some portions of China’s existing
trade could be immediately and smoothly rerouted
or substituted with equivalent domestic products.

•

The loss of economic output would be strongly felt
in other parts of the world, most noticeably
South-East Asia and Oceania. Losses in theseregions would range from three per cent in Australia
and Laos, to up to six per cent in Vietnam.

•

The impact of a blockade would be especiallystrong on trade in computers and electronics. China
and Taiwan put together dominate global trade incomputer and electronics, at 31 per cent andelectrical equipment at 23 per cent.

•

China and several East Asian countries includingSouth Korea and Japan are highly dependent on
imports of computer and electronic components
from Taiwan. The share of trade with Taiwan in total
trade in this sector ranges from 10 per cent for thePhilippines to 21 per cent for China.

•

Taiwan is a global leader in semiconductor
production, with a 20 per cent share of the total
global capacity, 37 per cent of the world’s logic
semiconductors production capacity, and 92 percent of the world’s advanced logic semiconductors
production capacity.

Economic Focus – The Impact of a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan 3

Introduction
This section of the report analyses the likely impact of a theoretical Chinese trade blockade on Taiwan on global
trade. It looks at the effect of a blockade rather than a full-scale military invasion. This highlights that even alimited military confrontation would have devastating effects on the global economy, particularly on trade.

This analysis takes a conservative approach to estimating theimpact on trade, with many potential longer-term effects
excluded such as the spillover effects of revenue loss, including
a rise in unemployment, supply-side inflation, or a global
recession. Even given this conservative scenario, it is estimatedthat global economic output would fall by 2.7 trillion dollars in
the first year after a blockade, leading to fall in global GDP of
2.8 per cent.
Any type of conflict between Taiwan and China would havedevastating economic consequences globally. A potential
conflict could take many different forms, such as a full-scale
military invasion of Taiwan, a limited military operation,
cyber-attacks and sabotage, or a naval blockade.
A full-scale military invasion of Taiwan by China would be a
massive undertaking and would involve a wide range of militarytactics and strategies. China would need to deploy a significant
number of ground troops, air assets, and naval vessels to
successfully invade Taiwan, which could lead to a prolonged
conflict that would significantly damage the country’s coastal
assets and the economy. It would also cause significant loss oflife. Taiwan’s missile capabilities can reach significant distances
within China and could cause major damage on many of theirlargest ports.
Rather than a full-scale invasion, China could opt for limited
military action, such as targeted airstrikes on military targets
and civilian infrastructure. Such tactics could be aimed atpressuring Taiwan to agree to reunification with China or to
make political concessions.
China could also opt to use cyber-attacks and sabotage todisrupt Taiwan's infrastructure and military capabilities. A
targeted cyber-attack on Taiwan's power grids, communication
networks, or defence systems could severely hamper Taiwan's
ability to defend itself. The use of cyber-attacks and sabotage
might be particularly attractive for China as it could causesignificant damage to Taiwan's infrastructure and economy
without directly risking military assets.
Finally, China may decide to deny Taiwan’s access to the outside
world through a naval blockade. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan
would involve the use of naval vessels to prevent goods, people,
and military equipment from entering or leaving Taiwan. The
blockade could be used to exert pressure on Taiwan to agree toreunification with China or to make political concessions. Any
Chinese blockade would have significant consequences for
Taiwan's economy, as Taiwan is heavily reliant on trade for its
economic survival.

by volume. Furthermore, any conflict between Taiwan and China
would likely draw in other major powers such as the UnitedStates and its Asian and European allies, potentially escalating
into a larger regional or even global conflict. Even a perceived
threat of conflict could lead to increased militarization andtensions in the region, impacting trade, tourism, and regional
cooperation. That is why it is imperative to understand theeconomic consequences of a possible conflict between China andTaiwan.
The analysis in this section differs from other studies of apotential conflict by focusing specifically on the impact on
global trade of a Chinese blockade of Taiwan. A blockade in thiscontext refers to the act of using military means by China toprevent the movement of people, goods, or military equipment
into or out of Taiwan.
Other studies have investigated the economic consequences ofconflict over Taiwan. One report estimated that the costs of a
blockade on global industries heavily reliant on Taiwanese
semiconductor industries at USD two trillion.6 This study only
includes semiconductor industries, and industries highly
dependent on them whereas IEP’s analysis include all industries.
Another study projected a 5-10 per cent drop in US GDP and
25-35 decline in China’s GDP in the event of a full-scale military
conflict between the two countries over Taiwan.7 Similar studies
that focused on Taiwan’s production of semiconductors
estimated that a year-long disruption of Taiwan's semiconductor
manufacturing could cost global electronics companies USD 490
billion, and a permanent disruption would require an
investment of USD 350 billion and three years to replace
Taiwan's lost semiconductor capacity.8

No matter which ofthese scenariosmaterialises, theconsequences for the
global economy
would be devastating.

No matter which of these scenarios materialises, theconsequences for the global economy would be devastating.
Taiwan is a major hub for technology manufacturing and trade,
and China is the second largest trading economy in the world45

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

China, Taiwan, andInternational Trade
China was the second largest trading country in the world in 2018, with USD 3.856 trillion of trade in valueadded.9 Taiwan is also a major player in international trade, despite its relatively small population. It recorded
USD 470 billion of trade in value-added in 2018, making it the 19th largest trading economy in the world.
Most of China and Taiwan’s major trading partners are either
OECD countries or other countries in South-East Asia, as shownin Figure 3.10. China’s five biggest trading partners are OECDmembers. They are also democracies and highly integrated
economically and militarily.

were to occur, it would be a major disruption to OECD countries,
countries in South-East Asia and to Taiwan and China.
As China and Taiwan are such large contributors to global trade,with many countries dependent on them in terms of their total
trade. Figure 3.11 shows the countries which are most dependent
on China and Taiwan as trading partners. Australia and several
countries in East and South-East Asia are the most dependent on
China, with all having more than 20 per cent of their total trade

China and Taiwan also trade extensively with each other. Chinais the largest trading partner of Taiwan, while Taiwan is China's
sixth largest trading partner. If a blockade or trade disruptions
FIGURE 3.10

Ten largest trading partners, China and Taiwan (Billions USD)

Taiwan is China’s sixth largest trading partner in trade volume.

TAIWAN

CHINA
United States

616

Japan

317

South Korea

United States

62

Japan

60

266
172

Germany

25

South Korea

151

Australia

125

China

Singapore

15

Taiwan125

Germany

14

India

120

Saudi Arabia

11

Russia117

Australia

10

Brazil89

Hong Kong

10

France89

Malaysia

10

Source: IEP

FIGURE 3.11

Ten countries most dependent on trade with China and Taiwan (% of total trade)

Many countries in Southeast Asia are strongly dependent on trade with China or Taiwan.
% OF TOTAL TRADE WITH CHINA% OF TOTAL TRADE WITH TAIWAN

Australia

30

Myanmar

28

Japan

Cambodia

28

Malaysia

27

Laos

3
3.5

Hong Kong

3.1

Vietnam

26

China

3.1

Taiwan26

Singapore

2.9

South Korea

26

Chile

24

Japan
Indonesia
Source: IEP

46

5.9

Brunei22
21

Vietnam

2.8

Philippines

2.8

Saudi Arabia

2.6South Korea

2.4

Economic Focus – The Impact of a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan 3

FIGURE 3.12

Combined share of China and Taiwan in global trade in value-added in selected
sectors

China and Taiwan dominate global trade in the computer and electronics sector.
40%

OECD

Non-OECD

Electrical
Equipment

Plastics &RubberSHARE OF TOTAL TRADE,
CHINA AND TAIWAN

35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

Computer &Electronics

Textile Clothing& Footwear

Chemicals

Basics Metals

Source: IEP

with China. Taiwan’s top trading partners are not as dependent
in percentage terms, but do rely on Taiwan for trade in several
key industries, most notably computers and complex
electronics.

CHINESE AND TAIWANESE TRADE BY
SECTOR
Figure 3.12 shows China and Taiwan’s combined share of global
trade in value-added for several key sectors, for both OECD andnon-OECD countries. China and Taiwan account for more than
21 per cent of total trade in computers and electronics, and 23
per cent of electrical equipment. China alone accounts for 25
per cent of trade in the textile, clothing, and footwear sector,
and over ten per cent of global trade in the plastics and rubber,chemicals, and basic metals sectors. The difference between
OECD and non-OECD countries is largest in the computer andelectronics sector, where China and Taiwan account for justunder 40 per cent of all trade for OECD countries, as comparedto just under 25 per cent for non-OECD countries.
Although Taiwan accounts for a far smaller percentage of global
trade than China, it has an outsized influence in certain parts ofthe computer and electronics sector. As shown in Figure 3.13,
Taiwan accounts for 20 per cent of global semiconductor
production capacity, 37 per cent of the logic semiconductor
production capacity and a staggering 92 per cent of the mostadvanced logic semiconductor production capacity.10
The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC),
the primary chip manufacturer in Taiwan, is responsible for
manufacturing 35 per cent of the global automotive
microcontrollers and 70 per cent of the world's smartphone
chipsets according to some estimates.11 It also holds a dominantposition in producing chips for top-tier graphics processing
units utilised in servers and personal computers.

FIGURE 3.13

Taiwan’s share in global semiconductor production capacity
Taiwan produces more than 90 per cent of advanced semiconductors.
ALL SEMICONDUCTORSLOGIC SEMICONDUCTORSADVANCED LOGICSEMICONDUCTORS

20%

37%

92%

TaiwanRest of World

Source: IEP

47

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A
CHINESE BLOCKADE OF TAIWAN
A conflict between China and Taiwan, even in a limited form
such as a naval blockade, would have far-reaching economic
consequences including a decline in investment andconsumption, increased volatility in financial markets, a
substantial drop in global trade, and shrinking productivity andoutput of any sector dependent on semiconductors.
China is the second largest recipient of foreign direct
investment (FDI) and the fifth largest provider of FDI globally,
at USD 334 billion and 128 billion respectively in 2021.12 Despite
Taiwan’s relatively small size, its FDI inflow and outflow are alsosizeable, at USD 5.4 billion and USD 10 billion respectively in
2021.13 A large number of countries in Africa and Asia such as
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Djibouti and Angola are heavily dependent
on Chinese investments, financing and loans.14 Any disruption in
the flow of capital from China to these countries would be
economically and financially destabilizing.
China is a large global debtor with USD 2.5 trillion debt tointernational lenders.15 China is also the second largest foreign
holder of US debt after Japan, with USD 867 billion in US
Treasury holdings. The Chinese economy is thus deeplyintertwined with the US economy. Any disruption in economic
and financial ties between China and the West would have adestabilising impact on financial markets. The financial
sanctions by the West that would be a likely result of theblockade would lead to asset freezes, huge exchange rate
volatilities, a sell-off of Chinese assets, and stricter capital
controls in China. The catastrophic impacts would also be felt
by China’s debtors and creditors.
The effect of a blockage on global trade would be devastating.
Trade relies on confidence. Global trade dropped by more than17 per cent immediately following the 2008 Global Financial
Crisis, and substantially again after the COVID-19 pandemic.16
A Chinese blockade of Taiwan and inevitable intensification of
military activities in and around the Taiwan Strait would affectbusiness confidence and global trade through several channels.
Firstly, it would make trade logistically harder for all countries
that depend on trade with Asia and would make trading very
difficult for Taiwan. Secondly, it would most likely lead to asizeable decline in trade finance and marine trade insurance.
Furthermore, it would be followed by a wide range ofinternational sanctions and boycotts that would impedeinternational trade with China.
The Taiwan Strait is one of the busiest shipping routes in theworld. China’s major ports for international trade (Shanghai,
Dalian, and Tianjin) all rely on access to the strait. Taiwan’s
three largest ports are also located on the Taiwan Strait. It is amajor shipping route between North Asia (China, Japan, andKorea) and the rest of the world, as well as the most direct routefrom South China to the US.17 Some estimates suggests that
almost half of the world’s container ships pass through thestrait.18 One study even suggested that a conflict between China
and the United States over Taiwan would almost completely haltshipping to and from the South-East Asia region.19 A naval
blockade would completely halt Taiwan’s maritime trade and airtransportation. It would hinder the portion of international
trade that relies on maritime shipping through East andSouth-East Asia.

48

A blockade would result in a fall in the level of trade financing.
Financial institutions annually provide between six to eight
trillion in trade finance to exporters and importers around theworld.20 The role of these institutions in global trade isindispensable. Most of these institutions are based in Europe
and the United States.21 A China-Taiwan crisis would push
investors of these institutions to reduce their exposure to China
and East and South-East Asia. This scenario would likely
happen even in the absence of any sanctions against China.
Logistical trade disruptions and currency fluctuations would
increase the costs of trade financing. Delays in shipping could
lead to defaults and a higher risk of non-payment by importers
and exporters, which could make lenders more cautious about
financing trade in the region. Volatilities in the Asian currency
markets could impact the value of trade financing agreements
denominated in those currencies.
In response to a Chinese blockade of Taiwan, major tradeinsurance providers would increase their premiums forhigh-risk trade and reduce their coverage to exclude certain
risks. Furthermore, major providers of trade insurance would be
likely to drastically reduce their exposure to trade activities thatinvolve China, in anticipation of Western sanctions. Like themajor trade finance providers, the largest trade insurance
services providers are based in the United States and Europe.22
Therefore, even if a country was willing to trade with China in
the event of a blockade, it would find it hard to insure andfinance its trade and secure a viable trading route. Trade withother countries in East and South-East Asia would also beaffected due to the heightened risks throughout the region.
Finally, disruption in Taiwan’s semiconductor industry resulting
from a naval blockade would create seismic aftershocks acrossseveral economic sectors. Lost revenue in industries dependent
on high-end semiconductors could be as high as 1.6 trillion
within one year of a Chinese blockade.23 This estimate does notinclude spill over effects of the revenue loss, such as a rise in
unemployment, supply-side inflation, and a global recession.
Taiwan’s chip manufacturing capacity could also not be easily or
quickly replicated elsewhere. One estimate suggested that three
years and USD 350 billion in investment would be needed toreplace semiconductor production in the event of a permanent
loss of Taiwan’s production capacity.24

Economic Focus – The Impact of a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan 3

The Impact on Global Trade
The following analysis focuses on the impact of a Chinese blockade of Taiwan on global economic output only
through its effect on international trade in the first year of the blockade.

It does not include a wide range of longer-term consequencessuch as negative impacts on global FDI, the flow of people andideas, productivity of many global industries which are highly
vulnerable to disruption in the semiconductor global value
chain, and Hong Kong’s likely loss of its status as a global tradeand finance hub. It also does not include the effect of cyber
warfare on non-military targets, or the severing of Taiwan’s
communication channels.

incur the largest falls in total economic output, with a 40 per
cent and seven per cent drop in GDP, respectively.

THE IMPACT ON GLOBAL ECONOMICOUTPUT
A Chinese blockade of Taiwan would result in a USD 2.7 trillion
dollar fall in economic activity in the first year. This isequivalent to a 2.8 per cent fall in global economic activity,
almost twice as much as the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.

THE IMPACT ON CHINA AND TAIWANCountries in South-East Asia would be the most heavily affected,
with Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, and South Korea having
the highest economic losses from a blockade, with falls in GDP
ranging from three to six per cent. Outside of South-East Asia,
many OECD countries would be heavily impacted, mostly
notably Australia, which would see a fall in GDP of three percent.

Taiwan’s national economy is heavily dependent oninternational trade, with trade in value-added accounting for 79
per cent of Taiwan’s GDP. Taiwan is also almost completelydependent on energy imports, as it produces only 12 per cent of
its energy domestically.25 The rest is mostly imported in theform of liquified natural gas. China’s economic growth model
also relies on international trade, especially imports of energy
and raw material. Moreover, the two countries are major trading
partners with each other, with China being Taiwan’s largest
trading partner. China is also heavily reliant on Taiwanesecomputer, electronic, and semiconductor components.

Figure 3.14 shows the relationship between absolute economic
loss, measured in USD billions, versus relative economic loss,
assessed as a percentage of GDP. The greatest overall economic
loss would occur in the US, with losses of over 200 billion,
however this would be a relatively small fall in GDP of justunder one per cent. By contrast, countries like Vietnam andSingapore have a much lower total loss of around USD 25
billion, but a much higher relative loss of over five per cent ofGDP.

Unsurprisingly, China and Taiwan are the parties that would
lose most in the event of a blockade. The amount of lost
economic output would be around USD 310 billion for Taiwan
and USD 1.282 trillion for China. Taiwan and China would also
FIGURE 3.14

Relative vs total economic loss from chinese blockade of Taiwan

While the US would have the greatest total economic loss, the relative loss would be much higher in South-east Asia.
7%

RELATIVE ECONOMIC LOSS (%GDP)

6%

VNM

KHM

SGP

5%

BRN

KOR

MYS

4%

THA
CHL

3% LAO
MMR

PHL
NZL
MLN

AUS
SAU
JPN

2% VNM

KAZ MEX
IDN
IRL
PER
LUX
RUS
CZE
EST
SVK
CAN
SVN
CHE
HUN
NLD
TUR
ISR
SWE
ZAF
1% MAR
IND
POL
COL
CRI
BRA FRA
BGR
GRC
TUN
NOR
AUT
FIN ITACYPISLESP GBR
HUN
DNK
ROU
PRT
EVA
ARG
BEL
LTU
HRV

0%

DEU
USA

50

100
150
TOTAL ECONOMIC LOSS (BILLIONS USD)

200

250

Source: IEP

49

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

Methodology andData Sources
The global economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic effects related tocontaining, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence. The estimate includes the direct
and indirect costs of violence, as well as an economic multiplier. The multiplier effect calculates the
additional economic activity that would have accrued if the direct costs of violence had been avoided.
In 2018, global trade in value-added was USD 33.8 trillion while
global GDP was USD 87.1 trillion. Global trade as percentage of
economic output in that year was around 39 per cent. This ratio
has been growing since the end of World War Two, albeit withsome interruptions because of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis,
and more recently because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
There are several studies that have looked at the historicalimpact of conflict on trade:• Trade between direct belligerents in World War 1 and WorldWar 2 dropped by 96 and 97 respectively.26• Military conflicts from late 19 th century to late 20 th century
resulted in an 80 per cent average drop in trade during the
war and were still 42 per cent lower five years after the
conflict ended.27• With regards to a conflict between China and Taiwan, thehighest estimates suggest that bilateral trade would drop 90
per cent in the event of a full-blown conflict.
The analysis in this section makes the following assumptions:• In the event of a blockade, all countries on average would
lose 40 per cent of their value-added trade with Taiwan.
Even though all trade could theoretically fall to zero, it isassumed that only 40 per cent of total trade with Taiwan
could not be rerouted or substituted by domestic
production.
• Trade with China, would fall by 20 per cent for OECD
countries, and 15 per cent for non-OECD countries.
The drop in trade with China and Taiwan would be due to a
combination of factors, including but not limited to:••••

Riskier and costlier marine transport
Decline of global trade financing
Costlier trade insurance options
Fear of retaliatory trade and financial sanctions against
China

There is a strong empirical support for the link between
international trade and growth in economic output. Trade canpromote economic growth through a range of channels,
including access to larger markets, technology transfer, andincreased competition. These channels can lead to greater
efficiency and innovation, resulting in higher productivity andeconomic growth. Various studies have looked at the impact oftrade on economic growth, with most estimates suggesting thata one per cent change in international trade as a share of GDP
would lead to change in GDP per capita of between 0.5 to two
per cent.28 This analysis uses the average value and assumes
that a one per cent decline in trade as a share of GDP will resultin a 1.25 per cent per cent loss of economic output in thefollowing year.29

50

This analysis uses the World Bank’s WDI dataset for GDP data,
which is available up until 2021. To estimate share of bilateral
trade, this analysis uses trade in value-added data from theOECD trade in value-added dataset, which is available up until
2018. This dataset encompasses all industries including
agricultural and fishing, mining, and fossil fuels, 17
manufacturing sectors, 20 services sectors, and construction.
This analysis assumes the share of bilateral trade among
countries in different sectors and overall remained stablebetween 2018 and 2021.
IEP uses trade in value-added data, rather than bilateral data
which has been used in similar studies in the past. Raw trade
data can be misleading because it does not account for theintermediate inputs that are used in the production of goods
and services. When two countries trade intermediate goods, thevalue of these goods can be counted multiple times in the raw
trade data, leading to double counting. In contrast, trade invalue-added accounts for the value-added at each stage of
production and avoids double-counting. For example, anelectronic board that is exported from China to Taiwan forfurther processing. The board has components designed,
manufactured, and assembled in South Korea and Japan.
Counting the board as a Chinese product would be misleading
as a portion of the value of the board is created outside of
China.
Measuring the value-added in each stage of trade ensures thevalue of the intermediate inputs will not be excluded. This isespecially important in the modern global economy, where
production processes are often fragmented across multiple
countries. Trade in value-added data provide a more accurate
picture of the true economic value of international trade.

4

Conflict
Trends andHotspots

Key Findings•

Last year saw a shift in the global distribution ofviolence. Major conflicts in the MENA region andSouth Asia declined, while conflicts in sub-SaharanAfrica, Europe, and Asia-Pacific intensified.

•

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the largest war in
Europe since the Balkan wars in the 1990s.
Conservative estimates suggest there were at least
82,600 conflict-related deaths in Ukraine in 2022,
although the true number is likely to be muchhigher.

•Even excluding the violence in Ukraine, there has
been an increase in the level of conflict since 2019.
Conflict-related deaths rose by 45 per cent in theyear prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with over
100,000 total deaths being recorded in 2021.

•

Violence increased significantly in Mali, Ethiopia
Myanmar, and Ukraine, making 2022 the deadliest
year for armed conflict since the 1994 Rwandan
genocide, and the deadliest in the history of the
GPI.

•

Increased geopolitical competition has fueled
conflict in many countries. Both great and middles
powers are competing for influence in states orregions by supporting competing interests throughthe supply of troops and weapons.

•

Drones have also played a major role in many
conflicts, with military and commercial drones
utilised in large numbers in Ukraine, Ethiopia and
Myanmar. The total number of drone attacks
increased by 40.8 per cent in 2022, with the numberof different groups using drones increasing by 24
per cent.

•

Violence in Mali escalated after France withdrew its
forces from the country. Mali saw a 154 per centincrease in conflict-related deaths, including anearly four-fold increase in deaths from violencetargeting civilians. There were nearly 5,000
battlefield deaths in 2022.

•

Myanmar saw a shift from protest-related violence
towards civil war, as various militias gained support
after the February 2021 coup. Protest-related
deaths fell 99.2 per cent, while conflict-related
deaths increased by 86.7 per cent.

•

The war in Tigray intensified with over 100,000
conflict deaths recorded between August andOctober 2022.

•

Afghanistan recorded the largest reduction indeaths from armed conflict in 2022 with conflictrelated deaths falling 90.6 per cent, from almost
43,000 to just over 4,000.

•

Conflict declined in Yemen as a truce held.
Improvements in relations between Saudi Arabia
and Iran may further reduce tensions.

51

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

Introduction
News headlines over the past year have been dominated by the Russia-Ukraine war, which began with
Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. This conflict is the largest in Europe since
the Balkan wars of the 1990s and potentially the largest since World War II.

However, deaths from conflict have seen a substantial increase
even when the Russia-Ukraine conflict is excluded. Fatalities
from organised violence worldwide surged in the year prior to
Russia’s invasion, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. This escalation
comes after a five-year period of steady decline, after conflictrelated deaths peaked in 2014 during the height of the Syrian
civil war.

Battle deaths increased by 45 per cent between 2020 and 2021,
with the total number of deaths rising from 82,773 to 119,980.
The sharp increase in fatalities in 2021 took place before theRussian invasion of Ukraine and can be primarily attributed to asurge in state-based violence in the Asia-Pacific and sub-SaharanAfrica regions.

FIGURE 4.1

Total battle deaths globally, 2000–2022

There was a 96 per cent increase in battle deaths from 2021 to 2022.
250,000

NUMBER OF DEATHS

200,000

150,000

100,000

50,00002000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Source: UCDPKEY FINDINGSCONFLICT TRENDS

Violence increased significantly in
Mali, Ethiopia Myanmar, andUkraine, making 2022 the deadliest
year for armed conflict since the1994 Rwandan genocide, and thedeadliest in the history of the GPI.

52

CONFLICT HOTSPOTSThe total number of drone attacks
increased by 40.8 per cent in
2022, with the number of different
groups using drones increasingby 24 per cent.

The war in Tigray intensified
with over 100,000 conflict
deaths recorded between
August and October 2022.

90.6%

Afghanistan recorded the largest
reduction in deaths from armed
conflict in 2022 with conflict-related
deaths falling 90.6 per cent, fromalmost 43,000 to just over 4,000.

Conflict Trends and Hotspots 4

Conflict Trends
INCREASING GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION
The escalation of conflict in recent years has been marked byrising geopolitical competition in an increasingly multipolarworld. This competition has intensified many conflicts,
particularly in strategically significant areas with pre-existing
disputes. This pattern aligns with a trend observed over the
past two decades, during which the number of"internationalised intrastate" conflicts has consistently risen, as
shown in Figure 4.2. Internationalised intrastate conflicts are
now as common as intrastate conflicts.

BOX 4.1

Conflict type definition
The UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset classifies
conflicts in three ways:

Intervention in an intrastate conflict is nothing new. Over 80
per cent of intrastate conflicts between 1975-2017 had at least
one actor receiving some form of external support.1 However,there is an increasing willingness on the part of outside actors
to directly provide troops and other forms of support.
Both great and middle powers are competing for influence inmany conflicts by offering political and military assistance,
intelligence, and funding. These efforts help build or strengthen
relationships with the countries they support. In somesituations, like in Syria, Libya, and Ukraine, multiple powerfulexternal states back competing actors, leading to an
intensification and prolonging of conflict.
One recent geopolitical shift is the willingness of more states toproject power beyond their immediate region. Following theCold War, this type of power projection was largely the domainof the United States. This is no longer the case, with great
powers like Russia and China now seeking to expand theirinfluence globally and regional actors like Türkiye, Saudi Arabia
and Iran increasingly willing to play a role outside their
immediate vicinity.

•

Interstate armed conflict, occurring between
two or more states.

•

Intrastate armed conflict, occurring between
the government of a state and one or moreinternal opposition groups without intervention
from other states.

•

Internationalised intrastate armed conflict,occurring between the government of a stateand one or more internal opposition groups withintervention from other states on one or bothsides.

Some countries may also use intervention in one conflict as away of bolstering support in other international matters. For
example, Russia has increased its support to the government inMali, effectively replacing France as the primary supporter inMali's fight against jihadist terror groups. Russia and China areboth providing military assistance to Myanmar's military junta
as the conflict there intensifies into a full-blown civil war. In
both cases, the ruling regimes in Mali and Myanmar have both
expressed support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

FIGURE 4.2

Number of conflicts per year by type of conflict, 1976–2021
Internationalised intrastate conflicts are now as common as intrastate conflicts.
50

NUMBER OF CONFLICTS40
INTRASTATE
30

20
INTERNATIONALISEDINTRASTATE
10INTERSTATE
0

1976

1979

1982

1985

1988

1991

1994

1997

2000

2003

2006

2009

2012

2015

2018

2021

Source: UCDP-PRIO

53

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

While China is not currently directly involved in any external
conflicts, it has become more assertive in the South China Sea
and has intensified aerial operations near Taiwan. After theRussian invasion of Ukraine, China has continued to maintain aclose relationship with the Russian government and increasing
their economic cooperation. The recent Chinese-brokered
Iran-Saudi normalisation agreement also demonstrates China's
growing diplomatic influence. Furthermore, China continues tosupport the Myanmar government, even though it disapprovesof the military coup.
While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is central to its foreign
policy, it has become increasingly active outside of its
immediate neighbourhood, although the running down of its
military assets caused by the Russian-Ukraine war may limit its
future support to its allies. Russia influence has also been
spread via the state-aligned private military contractor the
Wagner Group, which is active in multiple states acrosssub-Saharan Africa, as well as in Ukraine. Russian influence inAfrica grew after France withdrew from Mali and Burkina Faso
and now plays a much-reduced role in its former colonies. Other
European powers are largely focused on Ukraine, in particular
the United Kingdom and Germany.
Many middle powers are becoming more engaged in conflicts intheir region, a trend that is likely to continue over the next
decade. Türkiye is as an example of a rising middle power thathas sought to expand its influence within its immediate region,such as in conflicts in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as
in more distant locations like Somalia and Libya. Moreover,
Türkiye has established itself as a 'drone superpower' byexporting drones to two dozen countries, including Ethiopia,
Ukraine, and Mali.2 Between 2002 and 2021, Türkiye’s arms
exports grew by 72.7 per cent.3 Its strategic location at thecrossroads of Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus, andCentral Asia makes Türkiye an influential power in the region.
Turkish foreign policy has become increasingly ambitious,
working to broaden its influence and maintain working
relations with major players like the US, China, and Russia.

THE PROLIFERATION OF DRONES
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones are increasingly
playing a significant role in conflicts across the globe, with bothstate and non-state actors using them in a variety of ways.
Although drones were traditionally only employed by large
countries in counterterrorism operations, they are increasingly
being used in more conventional military operations, targeting
both troops and infrastructure.
Drones played a key role in the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh
and Ethiopia.4 In 2022 drones of both military and commercial
grade have been critical to the conflicts in Ukraine and

54

Myanmar, both as mechanisms to deploy munitions and forintelligence gathering. The usage and types of drones vary fromhigh-end military drones to weaponised versions ofcommercially available small drones.
Figure 4.3 highlights the significant increase in the use ofdrones as weapons in conflict by both state and non-state
actors. The number of states using drone strikes has increased
by 50 per cent since 2018, while the number of non-state groups
using drones increased by more than 100 per cent over the same
period.5 Reports of drone usage are becoming increasingly
prominent on conflict monitoring and crisis reports.6
FIGURE 4.3

Total number of armed groups using
drone strikes, 2018 to 2022

The number of non-state groups using drones doubled
from 2018 to 2022.7
States

Coalitionsof states

Non-stategroups35
30
NUMBER OF GROUPS

The increasing rivalry between the US and China is likely toshape geopolitics over at least the next two decades as thecountries increase their level of competition, both economicallyand militarily. Having wound down its engagements in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the US is now facing two crises: The
Russia-Ukraine war for which they are supplying considerable
military support, and the rising Chinese militarisation in the
Pacific and the potential for a Chinese blockade or invasion of
Taiwan. The US also continues to have military bases in the
Middle East, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia,
and South and Central America.

25
20
15
10
5
0

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Source: IEP

One reason for the increase in drone usage is that more states
now manufacture drones and are willing to export thesetechnologies. Whilst the United States has routinely protected
their highly sophisticated drone technology, states including
China, Iran, Israel, the UAE, and Türkiye have become mass
producers of drones across technological and cost spectrums. Of
28 heavy weapons deals delivered by Türkiye in 2022, 12
included the export of armed UAVs, including shipments to
Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Mali, and Ukraine.8

Conflict Trends and Hotspots 4

FIGURE 4.4

Total drone strikes and deaths from drone strikes, 2018–2022

The total number of drone strikes increased by 264 per cent between 2018 and 2022.
DeathsStrikes

1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
0

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Source: IEP

The effect of this proliferation can be seen in Figure 4.4, whichshows both the total number of drone strikes, and the numberof deaths from drone strikes from 2018 to 2022. The total
number of drone strikes now outnumbers fatalities, with total
strikes increasing by almost 200 per cent from 2020 to 2022.

capacity. The drones played a critical role in Azerbaijan winningtheir 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh.9 The conflict inEthiopia also shows how drones, especially where they are only
held by one actor in a conflict, can significantly alter conflict
dynamics.

In 2018, drone strikes were primarily carried out by large
countries for targeted assassinations of individuals or groups
during counterterrorism operations, leading to a lower numberof total strikes but a high average fatality rate. However, in thepast few years drones have increasingly been used by smaller
states and non-state actors against a range of targets, including
infrastructure. The increased use of smaller, low-cost drones,
and the increasing variety in target type, has led to the increase
in total strikes, without an accompanying increase in deaths.

Despite the increase in the use of drones globally, they stillaccount for a relatively small percentage of total attacks andconflict-related deaths, particularly in larger conflicts. In
Ukraine, both Ukrainian and Russian forces have used drones
effectively. One estimate suggests that small drones have beenused in military actions at least 900 times by both Russia andUkraine up until March 2023.10 However, their use as weapons isstill much lower than for air strikes and conventional artillery.
Drone strikes caused just 79 deaths compared to over 16,200
deaths from air strikes and other explosions in Ukraine in 2022.

The strategic importance of drone attacks can be seen in
Azerbaijan’s use of Israeli and Turkish drones to target
Armenian soldiers and logistics, who largely lacked UAV

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles(UAVs) or drones are
increasingly playing asignificant role in conflicts
across the globe, withboth state and non-state
actors using them in avariety of ways.

55

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

Conflict Hotspots
Last year saw a shift in the global distribution of violence, with casualties from major conflicts in the MENA andSouth Asia regions declining, while conflict in Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia-Pacific intensified.

UKRAINE
Over the past year, the Russia–Ukraine war has become one ofthe deadliest conflicts seen in Europe since the end of theSecond World War. In 2022 there were at least 32,300 deaths
from conflict-related violence in Ukraine, and possibly
hundreds of thousands. Figure 4.6 summarises the range of theestimated deaths from 2021 to 2022. The 2023 GPI uses thelowest estimate, although it is likely that these figures will berevised upwards in the coming years. Leaked US intelligence
documents suggest a total of 325,000 casualties, of whicharound 60,000 were fatalities.11 The most recent estimate
suggest that there were just over 82,000 fatalities.12
Violence in the war in Ukraine has taken three main forms:• Battle deaths, which occur in direct confrontations
between forces• Remote violence, such as artillery, roadside bombs, and air
strikes• Targeted civilian violence, in which civilians outside of abattle are directly targeted by opposition troops.
Figure 4.7 displays the geographical spread of conflict-related
deaths in Ukraine, with violence against civilians highlighted inorange, and battle deaths and remote violence highlighted in
red.
FIGURE 4.6

Conflict-related deaths in Ukraine,
low and high estimates

The lowest estimates suggest that at least 32,300 people
were killed in 2022, with the highest estimates suggestingthat as many as 130,000 people were killed.

CONFLICT-RELATED DEATHS

Figure 4.5 highlights the subnational areas with the mostsignificant changes in conflict-related deaths between 2021 and2022. Outside of Ukraine, there were significant increases infatalities from both battles and violence against civilians incertain regions of Mali, Myanmar, and Ethiopia. There weresignificant decreases across most of Afghanistan, and in a few
areas in Yemen.

140,000

130,000

120,000
100,000
80,00060,00032,30040,00020,0000

310
2021

2022 low
estimate

2022 highestimate

Source: ACLED, UCDP, UK MOD, UNHCR

FIGURE 4.5

Subnational areas with most significant change in conflict-related deaths, 2021 to 2022
Although conflict intensified in many regions, there was a significant fall in conflict-related deaths in Afghanistan.

Increasing

Decreasing

Source: IEP

56

Conflict Trends and Hotspots 4

FIGURE 4.7

Location of conflict-related deaths in Ukraine by type of violence, 24 Feb 2022–Mar 2023
The vast majority of conflict-related deaths have been in the eastern and south-eastern regions of Ukraine.

Violence against civilians

Other conflict-related deaths

Source: ACLED; IEP Calculations

Most of the fighting in the conflict has been concentrated ineastern Ukraine, along the contested line of control between
Ukrainian and Russian forces. Fifty per cent of conflict-related
deaths during 2022 occurred in the two regions of Luhansk andDonetsk, together known as the Donbas.
There have been ongoing battles in eastern Ukraine since thestart of the Donbas war in 2014, which coincided with theRussian invasion and annexation of Crimea. At that time,
separatist republics were declared in the southern part ofLuhansk and the south-eastern part of Donetsk, and althoughcasualties were heavy early on, the intensity of fighting declined
over time and had been very low from the most recent ceasefire
in July 2020 to the start of the Russian invasion.
The deadliest battles since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine
last year have been fought along the pre-existing Donbas war
front.
At least 8,500 conflict-related deaths occurred in Luhansk, thesite of major Russian offensives and Ukrainian counteroffensives
as Russia struggled to gain and keep control of the entire region.
There were also at least 7,700 deaths in Donetsk, which includes
the strategically important port city of Mariupol. Significant
battles were also fought in the regions of Kherson andZaporizhia, which were attacked from Donetsk and from Crimea
in the south, and in Kharkiv, located to the north of the Donbas.

Most conflict-related deaths occurred in battles or explosions
targeted at armed opposition. Less than four per cent of deaths
were due to violence against civilians, with most of these deaths
occurring in Kyiv. Although only four per cent of all conflictrelated deaths in 2022 occurred in Kyiv and surrounding towns,
50 per cent of targeted civilian deaths occurred in these areas.
Figure 4.8 displays conflict-related deaths over time for eachweek from the beginning of the invasion in February 2022 until
March 2023. Although violence against civilians was moreprevalent in the early stages of the war, there has been relatively
little targeted violence against civilians between the Russian
offensive pause in early July and March 2023. There were atleast 620 civilian deaths in towns surrounding Kyiv between thestart of the invasion and April 2022. In May, at least 200
civilians were killed by Russian forces in the strategic port cityof Mariupol, in the Donetsk region. Only 92 confirmed targeted
civilian casualties were recorded after the offensive pause. Notethat this figure does not include civilians who may have been
killed in battles or other attacks targeting troops.

57

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

FIGURE 4.8

Weekly total deaths in Ukraine by type of violence, 24 Feb 2022–Mar 2023
Attacks targeting civilians have declined since the beginning of the war.

Battle of Pavlivka,
Donetsk

2,000First battle of
Bilohorivka,
Luhansk

1,500

Shelling inZaporizhia

1,000
Withdrawal
from Kyiv

Offensive
pause

Renewed offensivein the Donbas

Kherson & Kharkiv
counteroffensives

500

0

March
2022

May

July
Violence against civilians

September

NovemberJanuary

Other conflict-related deaths

March
2023

Source: ACLED; IEP Calculations

The rate of conflict-related deaths has increased considerably
since July 2022. At least 11,500 fatalities occurred between thestart of the invasion and the pause in the offensive that
occurred in July 2022, a rate of 720 deaths per week. As thenumber of attacks increased after the pause, the rate of deaths
also increased. In just eleven weeks between September andearly November, the death rate increased to just under 930
deaths a week.
More than 16,000 conflict-related deaths were recorded
between the early November 2022 and the end of March 2023,
as Russian offensives escalated throughout the Donbas andZaporizhia.
At the time of writing there is no clear path to the end of
hostilities. The longer the conflict drags on the more depleted
the Russian military supplies will become, however if Western
resolves fades and military support for the Ukraine wanes thenUkraine may find itself at a substantial military disadvantage.

MALI
Mali has become an increasingly prominent conflict zone overthe past decade, as violence across the Sahel has increased, withmore external actors becoming involved. Figure 4.9 shows theincrease in violent incidents and conflict-related deaths in Mali
from 2021 to 2022.
Mali has experienced varying intensities of civil war over the
past decade. Since 2014 secessionist ethnic groups in the northof the country have aligned themselves with Islamist groups.
This has intensified and deepened ethnic divisions between
pastoralist and farming groups leading to increases in conflict.
The current crisis is also fuelled by factors such as climatechange, poor governance, terrorism, and conflict over natural
resource extraction.
France, the former colonial power in Mali, had been working

58

with the Malian government to try and stop the violence since2013. However, the failure of French and Malian forces to stem
the security crisis was a significant factor that led to the military
coup in 2021. Since the coup, violence in Mali has escalated
considerably, as shown in Figure 4.9, with total conflict-related
deaths increasing by 154 per cent.
Over the past year conflict between the government and jihadist
forces has intensified, as well as infighting amongst jihadistgroups, particularly between the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for
the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and the Islamic State
Sahel Province (IS-Sahel). All actors appear to be taking moreaggressive approaches to the conflict, which is driving an overall
surge in violence.
FIGURE 4.9

Change in violent incidents anddeaths, Mali, 2021 to 2022

There was a 154 per cent increase in conflict-related deathsin 2022.
2021

2022

6,000
154% increase

5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000

41% increase

1,000
0

Source: ACLED

Conflict-related
incidents

Conflict-related
deathsConflict Trends and Hotspots 4

The most significant change has been the increase in violenceagainst civilians. In 2021, at least 158 civilians were killed bystate or paramilitary forces, with this number increasing to
1,058 in 2022.13 Most of the targeted violence against civilians
has been carried out by government forces, as shown in Figure
4.10. The Malian army were responsible for 845 civilian deathsin 2022, a significant increase from 20 civilian deaths in 2021,
while IS and JNIM were responsible for 221 deaths, also asignificant increase from the 75 deaths they caused in 2021.14
FIGURE 4.10

Actors perpetrating violence against
civilians in Mali

The Malian Armed forces have perpetrated most of theviolence against civilians in 2022.
2021

2022

Government

Pro-government

Jihadist
0

200

400

600

800

1,000

CIVILIAN DEATHS
Source: ACLED, TerrorismTracker

France began to withdraw from Mali in February 2022 after its
relations with the military junta began to deteriorate. The
French government was criticised for its failure to stop the
jihadist insurgency, and by August 2022 it had fully withdrawn
its troops into Niger. France has also been forced to withdraw
its troops from other countries, with the governing authorities
in Burkina Faso announcing in January 2023 that all French
troops would have to leave the country.

The decline of French influence in Mali has led to an increase in
Russian involvement in the country. The Russian government,
through their private military contractor the Wagner Group,
deployed to Mali in December 2021 and now operates alongside
Malian forces in counterterrorism operations.
Figure 4.11 highlights how Russia has significantly increased its
weapons imports to Mali, despite a drop in overall Russian
weapons exports over the same period.15 Mali now imports moreheavy weapons from Russia than from all other countries
combined.
There are signs that geopolitical rivalries between France andRussia could hamper efforts to address the terrorism crisis in
the Sahel, with counterterrorism cooperation between
neighbouring states now subject to divisions between thosestates supported by Russia and those supported by France.16 The
Malian government has declared Russia its primary security
partner and has provided political support for Russia’s invasionof Ukraine.
Although the use of drones in the conflict has been limited,
there are signs that drone usage might increase soon. French
forces operated US-made drones in Mali until their withdrawal
in August 2022. In response, The Malian government purchased
two Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones in 2022, becoming one of the
few countries in sub-Saharan Africa to have access to armed
drone technology.

MYANMAR
Although the conflict in Myanmar intensified in 2022, violent
protest and riot-related deaths declined, with protests falling 67
per cent and deaths from protests falling 99 per cent. However,there was a concurrent increase in violent conflict, as theresistance to the new government became increasingly
militarised and organised. The number of conflict-related
incidents rose by 36 per cent in 2022, while conflict-related
deaths increased 87 per cent, as shown in Figure 4.12

FIGURE 4.11

Mali heavy weapons imports, 2008–2022 (five year moving average)

Russia exports more heavy weapons to Mali than all other countries combined.
20

RUSSIA
15
OTHER
10

5

0

UAE

FRANCE
2008

2010

2012

2014
2016
TREND INDICATOR VALUE, MILLIONS

2018

2020

2022

Source: SIPRI

59

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

Myanmar has faced numerous armed conflicts since gaining
independence in 1948. Groups such as the Kachin, Karen, Shan,
Chin, and Rakhine have long battled the Bamar-majority
government, resulting in persistent cycles of violence over the
decades. However, the current conflict differs from these
historical conflicts, as the Sagaing region, which has a Bamar
majority, has also become a place of violent resistance.

partner to Myanmar since independence. Weapons imports from
China rose sharply between 2010 and 2015, but have beensteadily declining over the past seven years.

The military junta has become increasingly isolated on the
diplomatic front. To maintain power and counter its
international isolation, it sought to strengthen ties with Russia
and China. Myanmar also supports Russia’s position on theconflict in Ukraine. This alliance with Russia was a strategic
move by the junta to secure critical military assistance andbolster its position against growing opposition within Myanmar
and on the global stage.

The conflict in Myanmar has seen a proliferation of drone usage
across both state and non-state actors. Unlike in some recent
conflicts where the use of drones by one side decisively tipped
the balance of conflict, both sides in the conflict in Myanmar
have used drones to attack a wide variety of targets. The military
junta have relied on Chinese-made military drones tocomplement their heavy use of airstrikes, whilst supporters ofthe militias have relied mostly on cheap commercial drones
retrofitted for military use.

Heavy weapons imports from Russia had been steadily
increasing since 2015, and have increased significantly since thecoup.

Myanmar’s heavy weapons imports over the last 15 years show
the changing influence of various foreign governments in the
country, as shown in Figure 4.13. China has been a critical
FIGURE 4.12

Change in conflict-related and protest-related incidents and deaths in Myanmar,
2021 to 2022

While conflict-related deaths increased 87 per cent from 2021 to 2022, protest deaths declines by over 99 per cent.
2021

2022

87% increase

20,00018,00016,00014,00012,00010,00036% increase

8,000

67% decrease

6,000
4,000
2,000
0

99% decrease
Conflict-related
incidents

Conflict-related
deathsProtest incidents

Protest deaths

Source: ACLED

FIGURE 4.13

Myanmar Heavy Weapons Imports, 2008–2022 (Five year moving average)
TREND INDICATOR VALUE (TIV), MILLIONS

Russia is now the largest exporter of heavy weapons to Myanmar, after a sharp fall in Chinese exports.
200

150

100

RUSSIA
CHINA
OTHER

50

0

2008

Source: SIPRI

60

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

2022

Conflict Trends and Hotspots 4

ETHIOPIA
The war between the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea andthe Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was one of thelargest armed conflicts of the past five years. The war ended
with a peace agreement in November 2022, which has not beenbroken as of May 2023. The final three months of the war saw
major battles involving human wave tactics that resulted in
104,000 conflict deaths.17 This was the most violent conflict
event in the history of the GPI and most violent year in a single
state since the Rwandan genocide. Violence also surged in
Oromia, leading to a shift in the conflict from the North to theSouth of the country after the peace agreement.
FIGURE 4.14

Conflict-related deaths in Ethiopia,
2019–2022

There were over 100,000 deaths from conflict in 2022.
120,000
100,000
80,00060,00040,00020,000
0

2019

2020

2021

2022

Source: UCDP GED

Other estimates have put the number of conflict-related
fatalities as high as 600,000, owing to a famine caused by thehumanitarian blockade of Tigray. The Ethiopian government
estimates that the total number of fatalities is between 80,000
and 100,000. The internet blackout imposed on Tigray and theban on media visits to the region has meant information has
been very difficult to obtain.
The conflict began in November 2020, as the TPLF faced alarge-scale military offensive from Ethiopian and Eritrean
forces, as well as militias from neighbouring Amhara and Afarregions. Initially, it seemed as though the TPLF had been
defeated, but they managed to counterattack and regain controlof Tigray and adjacent provinces. By early 2021, there wereindications that the TPLF could potentially seize power in
Ethiopia as their forces advanced towards the capital, Addis
Ababa.
The conflict in Ethiopia is a good example of the ability of drone
usage to shift the balance of power. During late 2021, mass use
of Turkish drones by the Ethiopian government forces halted
the TPLF’s march on the capital. The Ethiopian army used a
combination of its Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones and the small
Ethiopian air force to give the government a significant
asymmetric air war advantage.18 As a result, the conflict inEthiopia had a much higher percentage of remote violence
deaths caused by drone strikes compared to other conflicts.
Almost a third of all remote violence deaths in the country in
2022 were caused by drone strikes, as shown in Figure 4.15.
Drone strikes are also now increasingly being seen in the
response to a separate insurgency in Oromia where violenceagainst civilians and battles surged in 2022.19 The Oromo
Liberation Front/Army has led a violent insurgency which isalso affecting the stability of Ethiopia. There is a long history ofprotests and violence in Oromia, and conflict in the region waspartially responsible for the fall of the previous government,
prior to the start of the Tigray war.

FIGURE 4.15

Ethiopia deaths due to drone strikes and other remote violence, 2018–2022
Deaths from drone strikes make up more than half of the deaths from airstrikes in Ethiopia from 2020 to 2022.
Drone strikes

Other air strikes

Other remote violence

600

NUMBER OF DEATHS

500
400
300
200
100
0
2018

SAFETY & SECURITY
2019

2020

2021

2022

Source: UCDP-PRIO

61

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

FIGURE 4.16

Change in conflict-related incidents anddeaths in Afghanistan, 2021 to 2022
Conflict-related deaths dropped by 91 per cent between
2021 and 2022.
2021

2022
91% decrease

45,00040,000The withdrawal of US troops and the rise to power of the
Taliban has complicated the geopolitical landscape in
Afghanistan. No country has recognised the Taliban as thelegitimate government of Afghanistan, although both Russia
and China have accredited their diplomats. In November 2022,
Russia signed a deal to supply oil, gas, and wheat to
Afghanistan.20

35,00030,00025,00020,00015,00070% decrease

10,000Figure 4.17 shows the scale of the fall in conflict-related deaths
following the US troop withdrawal in August 2021. The number
of weekly deaths from conflict had surged to be well over 2,000in the three months preceding the troop withdrawal. However,since the withdrawal there has only been three occasions wheremore than 200 deaths were recorded in a single week, and morethan 100 deaths in a single week has not been recorded since
October 2022.

5,000
0

Conflict-related
incidents

Conflict-related
deaths

Source: ACLED

AFGHANISTAN
The biggest improvement in conflict-related activity occurred in
Afghanistan, where incidents fell by 70 per cent, and conflictrelated deaths fell by 91 per cent between 2021 and 2022, asshown in Figure 4.16.
The level of conflict fell in 2020 following the announcement of
the future US troop withdrawal, however violence surged in
2021 as the Taliban began its final offensive. Since thecompletion of the US troop withdrawal in August 2021, thenumber of monthly conflict-related deaths has dropped
significantly.

China, the only major power sharing a border with Afghanistan,
primarily considers its relationship with Afghanistan from asecurity standpoint. Afghanistan, particularly under the Taliban,
has long been a haven for Islamic extremist groups from
Western China, which Beijing perceives as a security threat.
Since the fall of Kabul, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement
has enjoyed increased freedom. However, seemingly as aconcession to Beijing, the Taliban moved Uyghur militants awayfrom the Afghan-Chinese border and relocated them within
Afghanistan. Large-scale economic investments, such as mining,oil, and gas concessions obtained by China over a decade ago
are yet to be developed.21
The reluctance of great powers to become too involved in the"graveyard of empires" might explain the absence of significant
geopolitical competition. There is also a wariness about
supporting the Taliban regime, which has a history of providing
a safe haven for terrorist groups.

FIGURE 4.17

Weekly conflict-related deaths in Afghanistan, Jan 2021 to Mar 2023

Following a spike in violence from April 2021, there was a sharp decline in conflict-related deaths after mid-August when the
Taliban took control.
3,000

US TROOP WITHDRAWAL

CONFLICT-RELATED DEATHS

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

Jan
2021

Source: UCDP-PRIO

62

Mar

May

Jul

Sep

Nov

Jan
2022

Mar

May

Jul

Sep

Nov

Jan

Mar
2023

Conflict Trends and Hotspots 4

The potential for future violence is still present, despite thelarge fall in conflict-related activity. There were several attacks
by former security forces and by populations considered to besupporting groups like the National Resistance Front in 2022.
There were also increased attacks against the Taliban and theminority Hazara ethnic group by Islamic State-Khorasan
terrorists. Terrorist attacks were recorded in 26 of the 34
provinces in Afghanistan in 2022. Broader anti-Taliban
resistance and Taliban infighting is also a possibility.22
FIGURE 4.18

Change in conflict-related incidents
and deaths in Yemen, 2021 to 2022

Conflict-related deaths dropped by 63 per cent between
2021 and 2022.
2021

2022
63% decrease

20,00018,00016,00014,00012,00010,00012% decrease

8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
Source: ACLED

Conflict-related
incidents

Conflict-related
deathsYEMEN
Conflict in Yemen improved considerably in 2022. The civil war
in Yemen was described as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis
in 2019.23 Conflict-related deaths dropped by 64 per cent in
Yemen in 2022, and conflict-related incidents decreased by 12
per cent, as shown in Figure 4.18. The primary driver of the fallin activity and deaths was the April 2022 truce.
The biggest declines in battle deaths between 2021 and 2022
occurred in the regions of Al-Hudaydah and Marib, where
fighting had continued and escalated during 2021. All otherregions had already seen a substantial drop in battle deaths
during 2021. The ceasefire seems to have largely held since thetruce lapsed in October.
The external dynamics of the war suggest a greater possibility
for a peace agreement. In March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iranannounced a deal to improve diplomatic relations between thetwo countries. This development holds significance for Yemen,
as Saudi Arabia has been involved in the war since its
intervention in 2015, while Iran has provided military assistanceto the opposing Houthi rebels. Although the Houthis are notunder Iran's direct control, the hope is that Iran's improved
relations with Saudi Arabia will encourage them to move towarda peace deal.
Another crucial aspect of this agreement is China's role inbrokering it. China maintains strong relationships with both
Iran and Saudi Arabia. The deal represents a diplomatic victoryfor China and given its investment in the agreement's success,China is likely to put significant effort into ensuring its stability.

63

5

Positive
Peace

Key Findings

64•

Positive Peace is defined as the attitudes,
institutions and structures that create and sustain
peaceful societies.

•

These same factors also lead to many otherpositive outcomes that society feels are important,such as economic strength, resilience andwellbeing.

•

The most peaceful countries in the world perform
strongly on all eight Pillars of Positive Peace.

•High Positive Peace countries are more likely tomaintain stability, adapt and recover from shocks.

•

Of the countries with a substantial Positive Peace
Deficit in 2009, almost 80 per cent deteriorated intheir GPI scores in the subsequent decade. A
Positive Peace deficit is where the actual
peacefulness of a country is substantially higher
than what its levels of Positive Peace would
suggest.

•Positive Peace improved two per cent globally from2009 to 2022.

•

Positive Peace peaked in 2019 followed in 2020 bydeteriorations due to the policy responses to thepandemic. Although Positive Peace improved in
2021 and 2022 it is not back to the 2019 levels.

•

Improvements in the PPI are due to the Structures
domain of Positive Peace, which showed
substantial development since 2009, while theInstitutions domain recorded only a small
improvement in the period.

•

In contrast, the Attitudes domain deteriorated by
two per cent globally from 2009 to 2022. Thisdomain deteriorated in 99 of the total 163 countries
assessed, reflecting increased polarisation of views
on political and economic administration matters, aswell as a deterioration in the quality of information
disseminated to the public.

Positive Peace 5

What is Positive Peace?
Positive Peace is defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies.
The same factors also lead to many other desirable socio-economic outcomes.
Higher levels of Positive Peace are statistically linked to greater
income growth, better environmental outcomes, higher levels of
wellbeing, superior developmental outcomes and stronger
resilience. Positive Peace is a gauge for societal resilience, or theability to shield citizens from shocks and to promote therecovery of the socio-economic system in their aftermath.
IEP has empirically derived the Positive Peace Index (PPI)
through the analysis of almost 25,000 economic and social
progress indicators to determine which ones have statisticallysignificant relationships with peace as measured by the Global
Peace Index (GPI).

FIGURE 5.1

What is Positive Peace?

Positive Peace is a complementary concept to negative peace.

NEGATIVE
PEACE... is the absence ofviolence or fear of
violence.

POSITIVE
PEACE... is the attitudes,
institutions & structuresthat create and sustain
peaceful societies.

THE PILLARS OFPOSITIVE PEACE
Positive Peace is predicated on eight key factors, or Pillars, that describe the workings of thesocio-economic system:
WELL-FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT

A well-functioning government delivers high-quality publicand civil services, engenders trust and participation,
demonstrates political stability and upholds the rule of law.

SOUND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

The strength of economic conditions as well as the formal
institutions that support the operation of the private sector.
Business competitiveness and economic productivity areboth associated with the most peaceful countries.

ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS

Peaceful countries often have formal laws that guarantee
basic human rights and freedoms, and the informal socialand cultural norms that relate to behaviours of citizens.

GOOD RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURS

Peaceful relations with other countries are as important as
good relations between groups within a country. Countries
with positive external relations are more peaceful and tend
to be more politically stable, have better functioning
governments, are regionally integrated and have lower
levels of organised internal conflict.

FREE FLOW OF INFORMATIONFree and independent media disseminates information in a
way that leads to greater knowledge and helps individuals,
businesses and civil society make better decisions. This
leads to better outcomes and more rational responses intimes of crisis.

HIGH LEVELS OF HUMAN CAPITAL

A skilled human capital base reflects the extent to whichsocieties educate citizens and promote the development ofknowledge, thereby improving economic productivity, carefor the young, political participation and social capital.

LOW LEVELS OF CORRUPTION

In societies with high levels of corruption, resources are
inefficiently allocated, often leading to a lack of funding foressential services and civil unrest. Low corruption canenhance confidence and trust in institutions.

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES

Peaceful countries tend to ensure equity in access toresources such as education, health, and to a lesser extent,
equity in income distribution.

65

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

The Pillars of Positive Peace interact systemically tosupport society’s attitudes, institutions and structures that
underpin development and peacebuilding. High levels of
Positive Peace occur where attitudes make violence lesstolerated, institutions are resilient and more responsive to

FIGURE 5.2

The Pillars of Positive Peace

A visual representation of the factors comprising Positive Peace.
All eight factors are highly interconnected and interact in varied
and complex ways.

society’s needs and structures create the environment for

WellFunctioning
Government

the nonviolent resolution of grievances.
The Pillars also offer a practical framework for the

Sound
Business
Environment

Equitable
Distributionof Resources

implementation of small-scale Positive Peace projects. In
cooperation with its global partners, IEP has implemented
and supported hundreds of projects in local communities
around the world using the Pillars of Positive Peace as theframework for action.

Low Levels ofCorruption

Acceptanceof the Rights
of Others

PEACE

Free Flow ofInformation

Good
Relations with
Neighbours
High Levelsof Human
CapitalGlobal Trends in
Positive Peace
The global score for the PPI has improved by two per cent since 2009, with 125 countries improving in Positive
Peace, 37 countries deteriorating and one country score being little changed. The score is calculated by taking
the average country score for the 163 countries included in the Positive Peace Index.
Figure 5.3 highlights the global trend in Positive Peace. Changes
in Positive Peace generally occur slowly and may take many
years for the benefits to show because institution building andchanges in social norms are long-term processes. As such, globalchanges in the PPI Pillars happen relatively slowly, and evenslight changes in global Positive Peace can be considered
important.
Positive Peace has improved almost continuously from 2009
until 2019, largely on the back of greater technological andeconomic development. It then declined because of COVID-19
and the global recession created by the policy responses to thepandemic. Although Positive Peace has improved in 2021 and2022 it is not back to the levels of 2019.

66

Since 2009 progress in the three domains has varied markedly.
Improvements in Positive Peace has mainly been driven by the
Structures domain which improved by 7.5 per cent since 2009,
while the Attitudes domain deteriorated by more than two percent since 2009. The Institutions domain improved by around
one per cent.
Access to information, GDP per capita and life expectancy havegenerally improved rapidly since 2009. All of these indicators
are part of the Structures domain. Globally, institutional
effectiveness has also improved over the past decade, albeit at amuch slower pace than structural factors. However, theattitudinal indicators have been deteriorating over the period.
The indicators showing the deepest deteriorations are quality of
information and factionalised elites.

Positive Peace 5

FIGURE 5.3

Cumulative improvement in Positive Peace from 2009

By 2022, the global average Positive Peace score had improved by more than two per cent since 2009.

PPI PERCENTAGE IMROVEMENT

2.0%

1.5%

1.0%

0.5%

0.0%

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Source: IEP

FIGURE 5.4

Changes in the Attitudes, Institutions and Structures of Positive Peace, 2009–2022
The improvement in PPI since 2009 was largely driven by structural improvements globally. Institutional functioning has
remained the same over the period while attitudes have deteriorated.

Lesspeaceful

1.00

0.975

More
peaceful

AVERAGE SCORE(NORMALISED TO 2009 = 100)

1.025

0.95

Attitudes
Institutions
PPI Overall Score
Structures

0.925
2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

2022

Source: IEP

CHANGES IN THE POSITIVE PEACE PILLARS
Figure 5.5 shows the percentage change from 2009 to 2022 forall eight Pillars of Positive Peace. These scores reflect gradualchanges within complex social systems and typically do notfluctuate drastically year to year. As such, since 2009, theaverage Pillar score has changed by just 2.4 per cent, and except
for Free Flow of Information no Pillar score has changed by morethan five per cent. The slow-moving nature of Positive Peacecalls for long-term planning and sustained investment toimprove the Pillars.

Six of the eight Pillars improved with Low Levels of Corruption
and Well-functioning Government both deteriorating. The
deterioration in Well-functioning Government was driven by one
indicator, Government openness and transparency, with the Ruleof Law and Government effectiveness both improving slightly.
Low Levels of Corruption mainly deteriorated because offactionalised elites and control of corruption which deteriorated
slightly, while public theft improved.

67

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

FIGURE 5.5

Changes in the Pillars of Positive
Peace, 2009–2022

Seven of the eight Pillars have improved since 2009. Low
Levels of Corruption deteriorated by around 1.8 per centover the period.
Free Flow ofInformation
High Levels of
Human Capital
Acceptance of theRights of Others

Twelve out of the total 24 indicators used in the PPI recorded
improvements from 2009 to 2022. However, the average
improvement among indicators was larger than the averagedeterioration. This led to an overall improvement in Positive
Peace over the period.
The indicators that showed the most substantial improvements
were those related to the Structures domain, as shown in Figure5.6. Some examples are individuals using the Internet,
inequality-adjusted life expectancy and healthy life expectancy.
On the other hand, the quality of information, factionalised
elites and freedom of the press indicators recorded the mostsignificant deteriorations.

Good Relations
with Neighbours
PPI Overall Score
Equitable Distributionof Resources

Improvement
Deterioration

Sound Business
Environment
Well-Functioning
Government
Low Levels ofCorruption
0.0%

2.5%
5.0%
7.5%
PERCENTAGE CHANGE

10.0%

Positive Peace has
improved almost
continuously from 2009
until 2019, largely on theback of greater
technological andeconomic development.

Source: IEP

FIGURE 5.6

Percentage change in PPI indicators, 2009–2022

Individuals using the Internet recorded the largest improvement while hostility to foreigners and quality of information
recorded the largest deteriorations.
Individuals using the Internet (% of population)
Inequality-adjusted life expectancy
External intervention
Healthy life expectancy (HALE)
Gender inequality
Research in R&DGroup grievanceGDP per capita
Public sector theft
Financial Institutions Index
Rule of law
Government effectivenessControl of corruption
Regulatory quality: Estimate
International tourism
Youth not in employment, education or training (NEET)
Equality of opportunity
Access to public services
Exclusion by socio-economic group
Government openness and transparency
Law to support equal treatment of population segments
Freedom of the press
Factionalised elites
Quality of information
0.0%

Source: IEP

68

Improvement
Deterioration

10%

20%
PERCENTAGE CHANGE

30%

Positive Peace 5

Positive Peace andSystems Theory
This section gives a brief overview of IEP’s approach to Positive Peace andsystems theory. It serves as an introduction to the HALO approach to systems
analysis. There are many approaches to systems analysis, all with varying

strengths and weaknesses. One that is commonly used in conflict analysis andbusiness is Structures, Attitudes and Transactions (SAT), others are more suited tothe ecology, including the Social, Ecological Systems (SES) framework.

What sets IEP’s approach apart from other systems analysis methods is themultimodal approach and modularity, along with a bias towards data and ananalysis framework borne out IEP’s decade long research work on Positive Peaceand systems thinking. It is practical and based on real-world analysis. Since it ismodular, it can be scaled according to the necessary level of sophistication,

available data and knowledge of the participants. It is a framework specificallydesigned for assessing societal systems and can be used to analyse a nation,
region or small community.

The approach has been designed as a set of building blocks. This allows for an

adaptive approach, that can be uniquely tailored based on many dependencies,

including the size of the societal system and also the sophistication required in theanalysis. Workshops and programs can be as short as two days or as long as one
year using this building block approach. Different building blocks can be utilised

depending on the strengths of the design team, what may suit the project best andthe length of time allocated for the analysis.

69

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

The results from implementing this systems design approach
will allow for more informed policy decisions because before
starting systemic interventions, a thorough understanding of
the system is needed. This means that institutions can now be
structured to match the needs of the system.
In most cases, governments, multilaterals and other institutions
engaging in societal development initiatives do not address
their initiatives systemically. This can create unforeseen
consequences and lead to only partially successful outcomes
since there is not a wider understanding of the dynamics of thatsociety. If institutions themselves are not set up systemically,
often it will result in inefficiencies, partial solutions, interorganisational disagreements and duplication to name some of
the issues.
Systems also evolve slowly over time; therefore, systems analysis
can be used successfully and meaningfully again at future
points in time. Analysis can be iteratively updated andadditional complexity added, creating a living analysis.

The Attributes of a System
A system can be understood from many different perspectives;
however, the starting point is what you wish to achieve from theanalysis. For example, if the aim was to improve familyplanning or the containment of terrorism, within the samesocial system, the knowledge needed and the approach taken
would be very different even though many of the components
and dynamics of the system may be the same.
The following section of the report provides a brief overview of
the attributes of a system. These are the building blocks thatneed to be incorporated into any systemic analysis in order to
get the best possible understanding of the system. Thesebuilding blocks are the foundation of the HALO approach.

Define the Bounds of the System
Systems have boundaries. These boundaries can be describedaccording to a geographic area or social grouping. For example,
a system can be defined by a geographic area, such as a nation,state or a forest. These types of geographic boundaries are theeasiest to define. It is more difficult if the system is an ethic
group or a societal function. Social functions include theeducation system, military, policing or a local health system. It
is best to approach these as simplistically as possible at first.
Some questions that help are what are the sub-systems which
lie within the system, what are the legal frameworks affecting
the system. For example, the health system consists of hospitals,
doctors, pharmacists, government health departments,
psychologists, etc.
Often relations and flows can be confused as systems, forexample a conflict is an exchange between two or more systemicgroups. A conflict is not a social system, but a series ofrelationships and flows between systems.

What are the Sub-Systems Contained Within a
System?
Systems do not exist in a vacuum, as they form parts of larger
systems. For example, states are systems that form part of alarger national system. However, they are also comprised ofsystems, such education, policing, business associations and70

others. Identifying the core systems, or sub-systems, within agreater system provides the basis for understanding its
dynamics.

What are the Other Major Systems it Interacts
with?
Systems interact with other systems. This could be an adjacentcountry, or district. It could be another ethnic group or an areaof governance. For instance, the military, the police, thejudiciary and border control can all be seen as systems thatinteract with one another to achieve a certain objective.
Another example could be a school which interacts withfamilies, the education department and local leaders to improve
literacy rates in a community.

What is the Intent of the System?
The intent of a system is its willing pursuit of desired outputs orstates. For example, the intent of a school system is to provide
pupils with the best possible education through the mostefficient use of resources. If the system of analysis is a socialgroup occupying a geographic area, its intent may be to control
the area and stop outsiders from accessing it and maximise theuse of that area. There can be multiple intents in the same
system. Attempting to rank the intents is important tounderstand the priorities within the system. It is also critical todifferentiate between actual intent and stated or idealised
intent, as the two often differ substantially.

What Measurements Exist for the System?
Where accurate and consistent data is available, a system may
be characterised by a set of statistical indicators that could
constitute the foundation for a deeper analysis. However, it isoften the case that statistical data for the specific system or
sub-system is not produced and the analysis needs to be
conducted indirectly through proxy data or via qualitative or
subject matter expert assessments. IEP uses three different
approaches when the data is insufficient which are describedlater in this section.
IEP has curated a set of approximately 400 indicators groupedby specific systemic areas based around Positive Peace to assess
the level of societal resilience and development in a nation.
These indicators can also be compared across similar orneighboring countries, states or communities to provide adeeper insight. They can be broken down further and cangrouped under IEP’s Positive Peace framework to better analyse
the strengths and weaknesses of the overall system. Figure 5.7
shows that Zimbabwe recorded improvements in 13 of the 18
indicators of governance performance over the past decade.
However, the country’s performance remains inferior to that ofits sub-Saharan African neighbors in many of these indicators,
despite such improvements.
This type of statistical analysis can measure, directly or
indirectly, the dynamics of sectoral components of the systems
and the exchanges, or flows, between them.
To determine the importance of a system, consider the numberof people within it, the number of people affected by the system,
the amount of money revolving within it, the number ofrelationships or the extent of the laws or regulations prevailingin or governing the system.

Positive Peace and Systems Theory 5

What is the Direction or Momentum of the
System?

Momentum is important as it helps explain the changing
dynamics of the system or sub-system, including emergence,
runaway feedback loops, decay and positive functions. The data
can be assessed individually or grouped. By grouping the data,
the momentum of the overall system or sub-system can beascertained.
It is also beneficial to compare the measures to the systems
neighbors. This gives insight into the relative strengths andweaknesses as the neighboring systems should be the systems
most similar.
Momentum is an important concept for systems analysis
because it facilitates the extrapolation or forecasting of futurestates the system may find itself in. If those states are
undesirable – according to the intent of the system –interventions should be designed to slow down and possibly
invert the system’s momentum in that area. Where theextrapolated future state is desirable, programs can be
developed to reinforce a specific momentum and take advantage
of it to nudge other sub-systems into higher states ofdevelopment.

The example of Figure 5.7 shows an improvement in the
momentum in the Zimbabwean governance system in regards
to government effectiveness and government accountability
over the past decade. If this momentum is preserved, Zimbabwe
may reach levels of effectiveness in these indicators on par with
its sub-Saharan African neighbors. However, the country hasrecorded a sharp deterioration in institutions’ ability to provide
food security for the population since 2009, with food insecurity
now being more severe than among neighbors. This is a criticalarea that should be prioritised in any resilience building
programme for the country.

What is the Path of the System and its
Dependencies?
Systems are path dependent. This means that the way a system
will develop in the future from a given state depends on thepath taken to reach that state. Path dependency can beunderstood as the influence that a social system’s history,
memory and cultural values exert on the future development ofthat society. These influences are expressed in the encoded
norms within the system.

FIGURE 5.7

Example of changes in governance indicators, Zimbabwe and sub-Saharan Africa,
2009–2020
Zimbabwe has improved on many governance indicators over the past decade. However, the country remains lessdeveloped than its sub-Saharan African neighbours in many areas.

Arrows show how indicators have changed from 2009 to 2020 in Zimbabwe. The
begining of the arrow is Zimbabwe’s position in 2009 and the end, the position in
2020. Green arrows represent improvements; red arrows, deteriorations.

5

Bars represent the average level of the indicator
for the sub-Saharan region in 2020

4

4

3

3

2

2

1

1

Pro
pe
y
rty
Rig
gu
h
lat
ts
ory
Sc
ore
Qu
alit
y: E
Cle
stim
an
ate
Ele
cti
on
s In
de
x
Ru
Lib
le o
era
Go
fL
lC
ve
aw
om
rnm
po
en
n
en
tE
t In
ffe
cti
de
ve
x
ne
ss:
Ta
Est
xR
im
ev
ate
en
ue
(%
of
GD
Ac
Go
P)
co
ve
un
rnm
tab
en
i
l
i
t
tA
y In
tta
de
cks
x
o
n
Lib
J
ud
era
i
cia
lD
ry
em
Po
oc
liti
r
a
cy
ca
Go
lC
Ind
ve
ivil
ex
rnm
Lib
en
e
rtie
tC
ap
s In
ac
de
ity
x
to
F
Re
oo
gu
dS
lat
afe
eO
ty
nli
ne
Hig
Co
hC
nte
ou
nt
rt I
Go
nd
ve
ep
rnm
en
de
en
nc
t’s
e
On
lin
Lo
eS
ca
erv
lG
ov
ice
ern
me
nt
Ind
ex
Fo
od
Se
cu
rity

Pro
pe
rt

ing
ter

gis

Re

Re

Re

sol

vin

gI

nso

lve

nc

y

Worse

INDICATOR SCORE

Better5

Source: IEP

71

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

Define the Homeostasis States
All systems seek a steady state, which is a state ofminimal change in the system’s components, stocks andflows. In the same way the human body seeks to maintaina core temperature, societal systems also seek stability.
Comprehending the main processes – encoded norms– which maintain the steady state are at the crux ofunderstanding how a system operates. However, systems
do have a tendency to grow. The steady state can be one
in which the system achieves growth, however it can also
cause stagnation. This can vary by sub-system.

What are the Main Encoded Norms Within
the System?
Isolating the main encoded norms within a system andthe bounds within which they operate provides anunderstanding of the mechanisms that hold the system
together. The encoded norms can sometimes be very
subtle and difficult to quantify and therefore it isimportant to focus on the important ones. They can be
expressed through laws and cultural norms, rules orregulations, either formal or informal.

What Type of Feedback Loops are
Occurring?
There are two main types of feedback loops – reinforcing
and balancing. Reinforcing feedback loops continue toamplify the effect of the input. A reinforcing feedback
loop might include population growth or economic
subsidies. When such feedback mechanisms are toostrong, they become runaway feedback loops and may
completely destabilise the system.
Balancing feedback loops are those in which the outputs
mitigate the effect of the inputs. They keep the system inbalance and support the steady state.

Has the System Passed any Tipping Points?
This is important in understanding the path trajectory of
the system. Tipping points are thresholds beyond which
the relationships between components of a system change
abruptly. It is hard to predict the timing of them in the
future, however, they can be seen in the past. They may
have been positive, when they lead to higher levels ofsocietal resilience, or they may have been negative. A
tipping point refers to a permanent and irreversible
change in the state of a system. Identifying past tipping
points might give insight into the dynamics which createdthe current system. Identifying the exact timing when asystem may go through a future tipping point isextremely difficult, therefore understanding the pastsystem tipping points from its history is the best
approach.

How Resilient and Adaptable is the System?
There are two methods for measuring resilience andadaptability. The first is an analysis of past shocks thatthe system has suffered and the speed with which thesystem recovered back to a steady state. The second is adata driven approach based around the Positive Peaceframework which is an accurate measure of resilience.
Societies with greater resilience will more easily absorb

72

the effects of shocks and recover more quickly in its aftermath.

Efficiency and Redundancy
Efficiency means that a system produces a maximum output with theminimum number of components and with the lowest level ofresources. Redundancy means a system has excess capacity, or not
fully used components or resources. In most cases, efficiency andredundancy are antagonistic concepts.
Efficient systems produce the highest level of output with theminimum costs and use of resources. However, if a component or
sub-system is stressed or fails, the lack of alternate paths or capacity
means the system may become disabled. Building redundancies in asystem reduces the expected losses from failures. However, this comesat a cost to efficiency. Systems with redundancies tend to be thosewith the highest levels of resilience, as they are capable of absorbing
shocks. However, too much redundancy may mean the system is
uncompetitive.
Redundancies can be constructed in two different ways. Redundancyof components means the system has unused, or only partially used,components. For example, a factory may operate with two computers
instead of one – if one breaks down the other takes over, thereby
creating a failsafe environment. Another example is an over-capacity
in the health system to deal with any spikes in hospitalisation rates.
Redundancy of relationships takes place when two or morecomponents are linked by a larger number of connections thanstrictly necessary. An example is when two cities are interconnected
through various highways instead of just one.

Follow the Money
Money flows within a system often give an idea of the size of
sub-systems or the importance of encoded norms. If the amount ofmoney is growing over time, the system may be in a virtuous cycle ofdevelopment. Conversely, rising monetary power may also be anindication of an imbalance. An example would be if industry or
special interest groups are subsidised by the tax payer, which
enhances their ability to garner political influence with which tosecure additional government money and concessions.

Function, Purpose and Potential
All components of a system can be seen through these three lenses –function, purpose and potential. All purposes in systems havefunctions and functions also have potential.
The function of a system or sub-system is the set of activities throughwhich output is produced. The purpose of the system can be seen as
similar to intent, however, intent is best applied to the overall system,
while purpose is better applied to sub-systems. A sub-system can havemultiple purposes but the best analytical approach is to focus on themost important purpose or purposes.
Potential describes what the function could be with more resources or
the purpose was modified.
For example, a department that collects data on crime for thegovernment has the function of collecting, compiling and divulging
crime data. Its purpose is to inform policing policy and the allocationof the security budget. Its potential may lie in collecting additionaldata, operating with an increased budget to promote its findings or tocommunicate directly with the population to improve crimeawareness.

Positive Peace and Systems Theory 5

Causality in Systems

Different parts, events or trends can mutually influence one
another, such that the differentiation between cause and effectloses usefulness. This way of thinking avoids the pitfalls andfailures of the traditional cause/effect approach whereby anintervention is targeted at the presumed cause of a problem orvulnerability. Understanding mutual causality leads to a deeper
perspective on agency, feedback loops, connections andrelationships, which are all fundamental parts of systems
mapping.

Positive Peace has identified two attractor plains, as discussed
in Section 2 of this report. One is called Sustainable Peace andis the state where countries have high rankings in both the GPI
and the PPI. None of the countries in the Sustainable Peace areaof the GPI x PPI phase plane have had a substantial fall in theirlevels of peace in the 15 years of the GPI. These countries tend
to remain peaceful without falling in states of violence as aconsequence of shocks. The other attractor plain is the ConflictTrap, defined as low rankings in both the GPI and the PPI.
Countries in this plain find it difficult to improve their societal
resilience because of the losses incurred by high levels ofviolence. Conversely, without resilience they cannot achieve
higher states of peacefulness. Nations in the Conflict Trap
region find it difficult to exit this region without external
assistance.

Non-Linearity of Effects

Archetypes

The effect of one part of a system on another is not always
linear. Relationships may change depending on the state ofdevelopment of the system. For example, for low peacecountries, improvements in peace lead to small increases inworker productivity. However, as countries progress in peace,further reductions in violence lead to ever higher increases inworker productivity. This non-linear relationship has been
discussed in IEP’s Business and Peace Report 2021.1

Archetypes are common reinforcing themes or patterns ofinteractions that are seen in many systems. The number ofarchetypes varies depending on who is defining them, but
generally there are seven to ten. Examples are ‘limits to growth’,‘seeking the wrong goals’ and ‘exponential success’. The value in
identifying the archetypes in a system is that it short-cuts theanalysis and helps in identifying solutions which are applicablefor the specific archetype. A number of specific architypes isdefied in the following section on performing a societal systems
analysis.

Causality is about being able to understand the influences thatlead the system to behave in certain ways. However, in systems
cause and effect can become entwined. Think of a mutual
feedback loop.

Emergent Properties
A system evolves through time and its current properties may
not fully describe future dynamics. Finding new emerging
properties is important to understand where the system isheading. The speed with which something is accelerating isgood way of identifying emergence. This can be the increase inmoney, the number of people employed or the rate ofdevelopment of new technologies.

Stocks, Flows and Transformations
A stock is a metric that defines the state of a component, a
sub-system or a system. Examples of stocks could be thenumber of people in a country, the balance in a bank account,
the amount of grain in storage or the number of persons
incarcerated. Flows are movements between stocks. Examples
could be money transfers, the movement of a prisoner to theworkforce or immigrants entering the system. These concepts
are important in understanding the dynamics of systems.
Stocks and flows are homogeneous. That means what is stocked
or what is flowing remains the same across time. For instance,money can be stored in a safe or be transacted between persons,
without losing or changing its attributes.

Static and Dynamic modelling
Static modelling analyses the system at a given point in time,
while dynamic modelling uses many iterations of data over a
period of time. Static models are useful where there isn’t
sufficient time series data for analysis. It is also useful toprovide a snapshot early in the analysis that is simpler andeasier to understand before building up the dynamics.

Analysis Through Positive Peace
Positive Peace has been derived empirically to provide a holistic
expression of a system and as such it can be used in this process
as a check on extent to which the system has been analysed
systemically. Once as model has been derived, each of items can
be classified as belonging to a Pillar of Positive Peace. If theanalysis is weak in a particular Pillar or Pillars, then there may
be a flaw in the analysis.
Positive Peace can also be used as a method of analysis to better
understand the various subsystems, stocks, flows and emergent
qualities of the system.

However, a transformation changes the nature of the object,service or resource within the system over a given period oftime. For example, both materials and electricity flowing into afactory to produce a machine. Another example is people andknowledge in a research institute create new forms ofknowledge, while a stock of food may rot and become unusable
even if there has been no outflow from the storage.

Is the System Stuck in an Attractor Basin?
An attractor basin is a context or state from which the systemfinds it difficult to escape. Within the peace and conflict arena,
the analysis of actual peace, as measured through the GPI, and73

6 Appendices74

Appendices 6

APPENDIX A

GPI Methodology
Peace is notoriously difficult to define. The simplest way of approaching it is in terms of the harmony
achieved by the absence of violence or the fear of violence, which has been described as Negative
Peace. Negative Peace is a complement to Positive Peace which is defined as the attitudes,
institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies.

The GPI was founded by Steve Killelea, an Australiantechnology entrepreneur and philanthropist. It is producedby the Institute for Economics and Peace, a global thinktank dedicated to developing metrics to analyse peace andto quantify its economic benefits.
The GPI measures a country’s level of Negative Peace using
three domains of peacefulness. The first domain, Ongoing
Domestic and International Conflict, uses six statisticalindicators to investigate the extent to which countries are
involved in internal and external conflicts, as well as their roleand duration of involvement in conflicts.
The second domain evaluates the level of harmony or discord
within a nation; eleven indicators broadly assess what might
be described as Societal Safety and Security. The assertion isthat low crime rates, minimal terrorist activity and violent
demonstrations, harmonious relations with neighbouring
countries, a stable political scene and a small proportion of
the population being internally displaced or made refugees
can be equated with peacefulness.
Six further indicators are related to a country’s Militarisation—reflecting the link between a country’s level of militarybuild-up and access to weapons and its level of peacefulness,both domestically and internationally. Comparable data on
military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the numberof armed service officers per head are gauged, as are financial
contributions to UN peacekeeping missions.

The expert panel
An international panel of independent experts played a keyrole in establishing the GPI in 2007—in selecting theindicators that best assess a nation’s level of peace and inassigning their weightings. The panel has overseen each
edition of the GPI; this year, it included:

Professor Kevin P. Clements, chairperson
Foundation Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies andDirector, National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies,
University of Otago, New Zealand

Dr Sabina Alkire
Director, Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative(OPHI), University of Oxford, United Kingdom

Dr Ian Anthony
Research Coordinator and Director of the Programme on
Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
SwedenDr Manuela Mesa
Director, Centre for Education and Peace Research(CEIPAZ) and President, Spanish Association for Peace
Research (AIPAZ), Madrid, Spain

Dr Ekaterina Stepanova
Head, Unit on Peace and Conflict Studies, Institute of theWorld Economy and International Relations (IMEMO),
Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia

75

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

The Indicators
The GPI comprises 23 indicators of the absence of violence or fear of violence. The indicators were originally selected withthe assistance of the expert panel in 2007 and have been reviewed by the expert panel on an annual basis. All scores foreach indicator are normalised on a scale of 1-5, whereby qualitative indicators are banded into five groupings andquantitative ones are scored from 1 to 5, to the third decimal point.

ONGOING DOMESTIC& INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT Number and duration of internal
conflicts
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)
Battle-Related Deaths Dataset,
Non-State Conflict Dataset andOne-sided Violence Dataset; Institutefor Economics & Peace (IEP)
 Number of deaths from externalorganised conflict
UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
 Number of deaths from internalorganised conflict
UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
 Number, duration and role inexternal conflicts
UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset;
IEP Intensity of organised internal
conflict
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts
 Relations with neighbouring
countries
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

SOCIETAL SAFETY& SECURITY
 Level of perceived criminality
in society
Gallup World Poll, IEP estimates Number of refugees and internallydisplaced people as a percentage ofthe population
Office of the High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) Mid-Year Trends;
Internal Displacement Monitoring
Centre (IDMC)
 Political instability
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts
 Political Terror Scale
Gib­ney, Mark, Linda Cor­nett, Reed
Wood, Peter Hasch­ke, Daniel Arnon,
and Attilio Pisanò. 2021. The Polit­ic­alTer­ror Scale 1976-2019. Date Re­trieved,
from the Polit­ic­al Ter­ror Scale website:ht­tp://www.polit­ic­al­ter­rorscale.org.
 Impact of terrorism
IEP Global Terrorism Index (GTI) Number of homicides per
100,000 people
United Nations Office on Drugs andCrime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime
Trends and the Operations of Criminal
Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates
 Level of violent crime
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts
 Violent demonstrations
Armed Conflict Location and Event
Data Project (ACLED); IEP
 Number of jailed population per
100,000 people
World Prison Brief, Institute for
Criminal Policy Research at Birkbeck,
University of London
 Number of internal security officers
and police per 100,000 people
UNODC CTS Ease of access to small arms
and light weapons
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts

76

MILITARISATION
 Military expenditure as apercentage of GDP
The Military Balance, IISS, EIU
Estimates Number of armed services
personnel per 100,000 people
The Military Balance, IISS
 Volume of transfers of major
conventional weapons as recipient(imports) per 100,000 people
Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms
Transfers Database Volume of transfers of major
conventional weapons as supplier(exports) per 100,000 people
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database Financial contribution toUN peacekeeping missions
United Nations Committee onContributions; IEP
 Nuclear and heavy weapons
capabilities
Military Balance+, IISS; IEP

Appendices 6

Methodological Notes
WEIGHTING THE INDEX

When the GPI was launched in 2007 the advisory panel of
independent experts apportioned scores based on the relative
importance of each of the indicators on a scale of 1-5. Two subcomponent weighted indices were then calculated from the GPIgroup of indicators:
1. A measure of how internally peaceful a country is;
2. A measure of how externally peaceful a country is (its state ofpeace beyond its borders).
The overall composite score and index was then formulated byapplying a weight of 60 per cent to the measure of internal peaceand 40 per cent to external peace. The heavier weight applied tointernal peace was agreed upon by the advisory panel, following
robust debate. The decision was based on the notion that a greaterlevel of internal peace is likely to lead to, or at least correlate with,lower external conflict. The weights have been reviewed by theadvisory panel prior to the compilation of each edition of the GPI.

MEASURING THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE INDEX Robustness is an important concept in composite index analysis.
It is a measure of how often rank comparisons from a composite
index are still true if the index is calculated using different

weightings. For example, if the GPI is recalculated using a large
number of different weighting schemes and Country A ranks
higher than Country B in 60 per cent of these recalculations, thestatement “Country A is more peaceful than Country B” isconsidered to be 60 per cent robust.
 IEP finds that the Global Peace Index (GPI) is at the same levelof absolute robustness as the Human Development Index (HDI),a leading measure of development since it was first constructedby the United Nations Development Programme in 1990.
 Technically, the robustness of the GPI is measured by the factthat 70 per cent of pairwise country comparisons are
independent of the weighting scheme chosen. In other words,
regardless of the weights attributed to each component of theindex, 70 per cent of the time the pairwise comparisons between
countries are the same.
The GPI is a composite index of 23 indicators weighted andcombined into one overall score. The weighting scheme within any
composite index represents the relative importance of each indicator
to the overall aim of the measure, in the GPI’s case, global peace. To
fully understand the representative nature or accuracy of any
measure it is necessary to understand how sensitive the results of
the index are to the specific weighting scheme used. If the analysis
holds true for a large subset of all possible weighting schemes thenTABLE A.1

Indicator weights in the GPIInternal Peace 60% / External Peace 40%
INTERNAL PEACE (Weight 1 to 5)

EXTERNAL PEACE (Weight 1 to 5)

Perceptions of criminality

3

Military expenditure (% GDP)

2

Security officers and police rate

3

Armed services personnel rate2

Homicide rate

4

UN peacekeeping funding

2

Incarceration rate

3

Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities

3

Access to small arms

3

Weapons exports

3

Intensity of internal conflict5

Refugees and IDPs

4

Violent demonstrations

3

Neighbouring countries relations

5

Violent crime

4External conflicts fought

2.28

Political instability

4

Deaths from external conflict

5

Political terror

4

Weapons imports

2

Terrorism impact

2

Deaths from internal conflict

5

Internal conflicts fought

2.56

77

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

the results can be called robust. While it is expected that ranks will
be sensitive to changes in the weights of any composite index, what
is more important in a practical sense is the robustness of country
comparisons. One of the core aims of the GPI is to allow for Country
A to be compared to Country B. This raises the question that for any
two countries, how often is the first ranked more peaceful than thesecond across the spectrum of weights. The more times that the first
country is ranked more peaceful than the second, the more
confidence can be invested in the statement “Country A is morepeaceful than Country B”.
To avoid the computational issue of evaluating every possiblecombination of 23 indicators, the robustness of pairwise country
comparisons has been estimated using the three GPI domains
militarisation, societal safety and security and ongoing conflict.
Implementing an accepted methodology for robustness, the GPI is
calculated for every weighting combination of three weights from 0
to 1 at 0.01 intervals. For computational expedience only weighting
schemes that sum to one are selected, resulting in over 5100
recalculated GPI’s. Applying this, it is found that around 70 per centof all pairwise country comparisons in the GPI are independent of
the weighting scheme, i.e. 100 per cent robust. This is a similar levelof absolute robustness as the Human Development Index.

QUALITATIVE SCORING:THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT APPROACH

The EIU’s Country Analysis team plays an important role inproducing the GPI by scoring five qualitative indicators and filling indata gaps on quantitative indicators when official data is missing.
The EIU employs more than 100 full-time country experts andeconomists, supported by 650 in-country contributors. Analysts
generally focus on two or three countries and, in conjunction withlocal contributors, develop a deep knowledge of a nation’s politicalscene, the performance of its economy and the society in general.
Scoring follows a strict process to ensure reliability, consistency andcomparability:

78

1.
2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

Individual country analysts score qualitative indicators basedon a scoring methodology and using a digital platform;
Regional directors use the digital platform to check scores
across the region; through the platform they can see how
individual countries fare against each other and evaluate
qualitative assessments behind proposed score revisions;Indicator scores are checked by the EIU’s Custom Researchteam (which has responsibility for the GPI) to ensure global
comparability;
If an indicator score is found to be questionable, the Custom
Research team, and the appropriate regional director andcountry analyst discuss and make a judgment on the score;
Scores are assessed by the external advisory panel before
finalising the GPI;
If the expert panel finds an indicator score to be questionable,
the Custom Research team, and the appropriate regional
director and country analyst discuss and make a final judgmenton the score, which is then discussed in turn with the advisory
panel.

Because of the large scope of the GPI, occasionally data forquantitative indicators do not extend to all nations. In this case,country analysts are asked to suggest an alternative data source orprovide an estimate to fill any gap. This score is checked by
Regional Directors to ensure reliability and consistency within theregion, and by the Custom Research team to ensure global
comparability. Again, indicators are assessed by the external
advisory panel before finalisation.

Appendices 6

APPENDIX B

GPI Indicator Sources,
Definitions & Scoring Criteria
The information below details the sources, definitions, and scoring criteria of the 23 indicators thatform the Global Peace Index. All scores for each indicator are banded or normalised on a scaleof 1-5, whereby qualitative indicators are banded into five groupings and quantitative ones scoredcontinuously from 1 to 5 at the third decimal place. The Economist Intelligence Unit has provided
imputed estimates in the rare event there are gaps in the quantitative data.

INTERNAL PEACE INDICATORS

Number of Internal Security Officers
and Police per 100,000 People

Level of Perceived Criminality in Society
Indicator type

Quantitative

Indicator weight3

Indicator weight (% of total index)

3.8%

Data source

Gallup World Poll

Measurement period

2022

Definition: This indicator uses a question from the Gallup
World Poll as the basis for perceptions of criminality. The
exact wording of the question is: “Do you feel safe walking
alone at night in the city or area where you live?” IEP
calculates the indicator score based on the percentage of
people who answer ‘no’ to this question.
Where data is not available, IEP uses multivariate imputationby chained equations to create country-level estimates.

Scoring Bands:
1/5

2/5

3/5

4/5

5/5

0–19.9%20–39.9%

40–59.9%

60–79.9%> 80%

Indicator type

Quantitative

Indicator weight3

Indicator weight (% of total index)

3.8%

Data source

UNODC Survey of
Crime Trends andOperations of
Criminal Justice
Systems

Measurement period

2018

Alternative Source: EIU. Where data is not provided, the EIU’s
analysts have filled them based on likely scores from the set
bands of the actual data.
Definition: This indicator is sourced from the UNODC Survey of
Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems andrefers to the civil police force. Police refers to personnel inpublic agencies whose principal functions are the prevention,
detection and investigation of crime and the apprehension ofalleged offenders. It is distinct from national guards or local
militia.

Scoring Bands
1/5

2/5

3/5

4/5

5/5

0–199.8

199.9–399.8

399.9–599.8

599.9–799.8> 799.9

Number of Homicides per 100,000 People
Indicator type

Quantitative

Indicator weight4

Indicator weight (% of total index)

5%

Data source

UNODC Survey of
Crime Trends andOperations of Criminal
Justice Systems

Measurement period

2021

79

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

Alternative Source: EIU. Where data is not provided, the EIU’s
analysts have filled them based on likely scores from the set
bands of the actual data.
Definition: This indicator comes from the UNODC Survey of
Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems.
Intentional homicide refers to death deliberately inﬂicted on a
person by another person, including infanticide. The figuresrefer to the total number of penal code offences or theirequivalent, but exclude minor road traffic and other petty
offences, brought to the attention of the police or other law
enforcement agencies and recorded by one of thoseagencies.

Scoring Bands

Indicator type

Qualitative

Indicator weight3

Indicator weight (% of total index)

3.8%

Data source

EIU

Measurement period

March 2022 to 		
March 2023

Definition: Assessment of the accessibility of small arms andlight weapons (SALW), ranked from 1-5 (very limited access tovery easy access) by the EIU’s Country Analysis team. Country
analysts are asked to assess this indicator on an annual basis,for the period from March to March.

1/5

2/5

3/5

4/5

5/5

Scoring Criteria:

0–1.99

2–5.996–9.9910–19.99> 20

1 = Very limited access: The country has developed policy
instruments and best practices, such as firearm licences,
strengthening of export controls, codes of conduct, firearms
or ammunition marking.
2 = Limited access: The regulation implies that it is difficult,time-consuming and costly to obtain firearms; domestic
firearms regulation also reduces the ease with which legalarms are diverted to illicit markets.
3 = Moderate access: There are regulations and commitment toensure controls on civilian possession of firearms, although
inadequate controls are not sufficient to stem the flow ofillegal weapons.
4 = Easy access: There are basic regulations, but they are noteffectively enforced; obtaining firearms is straightforward.
5 = Very easy access: There is no regulation of civilian
possession, ownership, storage, carriage and use of firearms.

Number of Jailed Population per 100,000 People
Indicator type

Quantitative

Indicator weight3

Indicator weight (% of total index)

3.8%

Data source

Institute for Criminal
Policy Research at
Birkbeck, Universityof London, World
Prison Brief

Measurement period

2022

Definition: Figures are from the Institute for Criminal Policy
Research and are compiled from a variety of sources. In
almost all cases the original source is the national prison
administration of the country concerned, or else the Ministry
responsible for the prison administration. Prison population
rates per 100,000 people are based on estimates of thenational population. In order to compare prison population
rates, and to estimate the number of persons held in prison in
the countries for which information is not available, median
rates have been used by the Institute for Criminal Policy
Research to minimise the effect of countries with rates thatare untypically high or low. Indeed, comparability can becompromised by different practice in different countries, forexample with regard to pre-trial detainees and juveniles, butalso psychiatrically ill offenders and offenders being detained
for treatment for alcoholism and drug addiction.

Scoring Bands

Intensity of Organised Internal Conflict
Indicator type

Qualitative

Indicator weight5

Indicator weight (% of total index)

6.3%

Data source

EIU

Measurement period

March 2022 toMarch 2023

Definition: Assessment of the intensity of conflicts within the
country, ranked from 1-5 (no conflict to severe crisis) by the
EIU’s Country Analysis team. Country analysts are asked toassess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March
to March.

Scoring Criteria:

1/5

2/5

3/5

4/5

5/5

0-126.405

126.406252.811

252.812379.217

379.218-505.624>505.625

Additional Notes: The data provided by the Institute for
Criminal Policy Research are not annual averages but indicate
the number of jailed population per 100,000 inhabitants in aparticular month during the year. The year and month may
differ from country to country.

80

Ease of Access to Small Arms and Light Weapons

1 = No conflict.
2 = Latent conflict: Positional differences over definable valuesof national importance.
3 = Manifest conflict: Explicit threats of violence; imposition of
economic sanctions by other countries.
4 = Crisis: A tense situation across most of the country; at least
one group uses violent force in sporadic incidents.
5 = Severe crisis: Civil war; violent force is used with a certain
continuity in an organised and systematic way throughout
the country.

Appendices 6

Violent Demonstrations

1/5

Strongly no

2/5

No

Indicator type

Qualitative

3/5

Somewhat of a problem

Indicator weight

3

4/5

Yes

Indicator weight (% of total index)

3.8%

5/5

Strongly yes

Data source

ACLED

Measurement period

March 2022 toMarch 2023

Definition: The indicator reflects the number and severity ofviolent demonstrations in a country for a give year. Scoresvary from 1 to 5, with values close to 1 representing infrequent
violent demonstrations and scores close to 5 representing
frequent demonstrations with high numbers of fatalities. The
data includes four types of events as classified by ACLED:"Protest with intervention" (weighted at 1), "Excessive force
against protesters" (weight 2), "Violent demonstration" (weight3), and "Mob violence" (weight 4). Note that this set of event
types means that the indicator includes violent protests, riots
etc, but also protests that were originally peaceful but wererepressed violently by security forces. For each type of eventthe number of incidents and the number of fatalities arecalculated. Fatalities are weighted more heavily than thenumber of incidents, as a gauge of incident severity. Where
ACLED data are not available a transformation was used toadapt raw data from the Cross National Time Series (CNTS)
data for imputation.

Score interpretation guidance
1/5

Very rare incidents of violent demonstrations, protests arealmost all peaceful.

2/5

A few violent protests, mostly without fatalities.

3/5

A few violent protests or protests repressed violently by
security forces. Some fatalities.

4/5

Frequent protests with violence, with a material number offatalities.

5/5

Large number of protests with large number of fatalities.
Number of incidents and fatalities are large by internationaland historical standards.

Political Instability
Indicator type

Qualitative

Indicator weight4

Indicator weight (% of total index)

5%

Data source

EIU

Measurement period

March 2022 toMarch 2023

Definition: Assessment of political instability ranked from0 to 100 (very low to very high instability) by the EIU’s Country
Analysis team, based on five questions. This indicatoraggregates five other questions on social unrest, orderlytransfers, opposition stance, excessive executive authority andan international tension sub-index. Country analysts assess thisquestion on a quarterly basis.

Specific Questions:• What is the risk of significant social unrest during the next
two years?
• How clear, established and accepted are constitutional mechanisms
for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?
• How likely is it that an opposition party or group will come to
power and cause a significant deterioration in business operating
conditions?
• Is excessive power concentrated or likely to be concentrated in theexecutive so that executive authority lacks accountability andpossesses excessive discretion?
• Is there a risk that international disputes/tensions will negatively
affect the economy and/or polity?

Scoring Bands
1/5

2/5

3/5

4/5

5/5

0–20.420.5–40.4

40.5–60.4

60.5–80.4

80.5–100Level of Violent Crime
Indicator type

Qualitative

Indicator weight4

Indicator weight (% of total index)

5%

Data source

EIU

Measurement period

March 2022 toMarch 2023

Political Terror Scale
Indicator type			Qualitative
Indicator weight			4
Indicator weight (% of total index)

5%

Data sourceGib­ney, Mark, Linda
Cor­nett, Reed Wood, Peter
Hasch­ke, Daniel Arnon, andAttilio Pisanò. 2018. The
Polit­ic­al Ter­ror Scale
1976-2018. Date Re­trieved,
from the Polit­ic­al Ter­ror
Scale website: ht­tp://www.
polit­ic­al­ter­rorscale.org.

Measurement period		

2021

Definition: Assessment of the likelihood of violent crimeranked from 1 to 5 (very low to very high) by the EIU’s Country
Analysis team based on the question, “Is violent crime likely topose a significant problem for government and/or businessover the next two years?” Country analysts assess thisquestion on a quarterly basis.

Scoring Criteria“Is violent crime likely to pose a significant problem forgovernment and/or business over the next two years?”81

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

Definition: The Political Terror Scale (PTS) measures levels ofpolitical violence and terror that a country experiences in agiven year based on a 5-level “terror scale” originallydeveloped by Freedom House. The data used in compiling thisindex comes from two different sources: the yearly country
reports of Amnesty International and the US Department ofState’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The
average of the two scores is taken.

Scoring Criteria

Impact of Terrorism
Indicator type

Quantitative

Indicator weight2

Indicator weight (% of total index)

2.5%

Data source

IEP Global Terrorism
Index (GTI)

Measurement period

March 2018 toMarch 2023

1 = Countries under a secure rule of law, people are notimprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional.
Political murders are extremely rare.
2 = There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent
political activity. However, few persons are affected, tortureand beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
3 = There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent historyof such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders
and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with orwithout a trial, for political views is accepted.
4 = Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large
numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, andtorture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on
this level terror affects those who interest themselves inpolitics or ideas.
5 = Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders ofthese societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness
with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Definition: Terrorist incidents are defined as “intentional actsof violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor.” Thismeans an incident has to meet three criteria in order for it tobe counted as a terrorist act:

Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons,as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people

1.

A

The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious
calculation on the part of a perpetrator.

B

The incident must entail some level of violence or threat ofviolence, including property violence as well as violenceagainst people.

C

The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national
actors. This database does not include acts of state
terrorism.

For all incidents listed, at least two of the following threecriteria must be present:

2.
Indicator type			Quantitative
Indicator weight			2
Indicator weight (% of total index)

3.

2.5%

Data source			
SIPRI Arms Transfers
				Database
Measurement period		

2022

Definition: Measures the total volume of major conventional
weapons imported by a country between 2017 and 2021,
divided by the average population in this time period at the
100,000 people level (population data supplied by the EIU).
The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database covers all internationalsales and gifts of major conventional weapons and thetechnology necessary for their production. The transfer
equipment or technology is from one country, rebel force orinternational organisation to another country, rebel force orinternational organisation. Major conventional weapons
include: aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar systems,
missiles, ships, engines. SIPRI uses a unique pricing system,
the Trend Indicator Value (TIV) that measures militarycapability. The indicator raw value is measured as TIV per
100,000 population.

The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic,
religious or social goal.
There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate
or convey some other message to a larger audience (oraudiences) than the immediate victims.
The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare
activities.

Methodology: Using the comprehensive, event-based
Terrorism Tracker, the GTI combines four variables to develop
a composite score: the number of terrorist incidents in a given
year, the total number of fatalities in a given year, the total
number of injuries caused in a given year and the approximatelevel of property damage in a given year. The composite score
captures the direct effects of terrorist-related violence, interms of its physical effect, but also attempts to reflect theresidual effects of terrorism in terms of emotional wounds andfear by attributing a weighted average to the damage inflicted
in previous years. To assess the impact of terrorism between
this date and March 2022 cutoff, IEP uses data from publicly
available third party sources to estimate terrorist activity inthat period.

Scoring Bands
1/5

2/5

3/5

4/5

5/5

0-13.479

13.48181.699

181.72,449.309

2,449.3133,015.949>33,015.95

Scoring Bands

I

82

1/5

2/5

3/5

4/5

5/5

Number Of Deaths From Organised Internal Conflict

0-7.233

7.23414.468

14.46921.702

21.70328.936>28.937

Indicator type

Quantitative

Indicator weight5

Indicator weight (% of total index)

6.3%

Appendices 6

Data source

UCDP Georeferenced
Event Dataset

Measurement period2021-2022

Definition: This indicator uses the UCDP’s definition of
conflict. UCDP defines conflict as: “a contested
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory
where the use of armed force between two parties, results in
at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.”

Scoring Bands
1/5

2/5

3/5

4/5

5/5

No
internal
conflict

Combined
conflictscore ofup to 4.75

Combined
conflictscore ofup to 9.5

Combined
conflictscore of
up to
14.25

A combined conflictscore of 19 or above.
This shows very highlevels of internal
conflict.

EXTERNAL PEACE INDICATORS
Scoring Bands
1/5

2/5

0–23 deaths 24–998
deaths

3/5

4/5

5/5

999–4,998
deaths4,999–9,998 > 9,999
deathsdeathsInternal Conflicts Fought
Indicator type

Quantitative

Indicator weight

2.56

Indicator weight (% of total index)

3.2%

Data sources

IEP; UCDP BattleRelated Deaths
Dataset, Non-State
Conflict Dataset andOne-sided 		
Violence Dataset

Measurement period

2021

Definition: This indicator measures the number and durationof conflicts that occur within a specific country’s legal
boundaries. Information for this indicator is sourced fromthree datasets from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP):
the Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset
and One-sided Violence Dataset. The score for a country isdetermined by adding the scores for all individual conflicts
which have occurred within that country’s legal boundaries
over the last five years.

Each individual conflict score is based on the following factors:
Number:•
The number of interstate armed conflicts, internal armed
conflict (civil conflicts), internationalised internal armed
conflicts, one-sided conflict and non-state conflict
located within a country’s legal boundaries.
•
If a conflict is a war (1,000+ battle-related deaths) it
receives a score of one; if it is an armed conflict (25-999
battle-related deaths) it receives a score of 0.25.
Duration:•
A score is assigned based on the number of years out of
the last five that conflict has occurred. For example, if a
conflict last occurred five years ago that conflict will
receive a score of one out of five.
The cumulative conflict scores are then added and banded toestablish a country’s score. This indicator is two years lagging due
to when the UCDP data is released.

Military Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP
Indicator type

Quantitative

Indicator weight2

Indicator weight (% of total index)

2.8%

Data source

International Institutefor Strategic Studies,
Military Balance+

Measurement period

2022

Alternative Source: When no data was provided, several
alternative sources were used: National Public Expenditure
Accounts, SIPRI information and the Military Balance.
Definition: Cash outlays of central or federal government tomeet the costs of national armed forces—including strategic,
land, naval, air, command, administration and support forces
as well as paramilitary forces, customs forces and border
guards if these are trained and equipped as a military force.
Published EIU data on nominal GDP (or the World Bank whenunavailable) was used to arrive at the value of military
expenditure as a percentage of GDP.
Scoring Criteria: This indicator is scored using a min-max
normalisation. Applying this method, a country’s score is basedon the distance of its military expenditure as a share of GDP
from the benchmarks of 0% (for a score of 1) and 8.37% orabove (for a score of 5). The bands, while linear, approximately
conform as follows:
1/5

2/5

3/5

4/5

5/5

0-2.092

2.093-4.184

4.185-6.277

6.278-8.37>8.371

Number of Armed Services Personnel
per 100,000 people
Indicator type

Quantitative

Indicator weight2

Indicator weight (% of total index)

2.8%

Data source

International Institutefor Strategic Studies,
Military Balance+

Measurement period

2022

Alternative Source: World Bank population data used if
unavailable from the EIU.

83

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

Definition: Active armed services personnel comprise allservice men and women on full-time duty in the army, navy,
air force and joint forces (including conscripts and long-term
assignments from the reserves). Population data provided by
the EIU.

Scoring Bands
1/5

2/5

3/5

4/5

5/5

0-657.744

657.7451,315.489

1,315.491,973.234

1,973.2352,630.98>2,630.981

Additional Notes: The Israeli reservist force is used to
calculate Israel’s number of armed services personnel.

Financial Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Missions

1/5

0–25% of stated contributions owed

2/5

26–50% of stated contributions owed

3/5

51–75% of stated contributions owed

4/5

75–99% of stated contributions owed

5/5

100% of stated contributions owed
(no contributions made in past three years)

Additional Notes: All United Nations member states share thecosts of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The General
Assembly apportions these expenses based on a special scaleof assessments applicable to peacekeeping. This scale takes
into account the relative economic wealth of member states,with the permanent members of the Security Council required
to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility forthe maintenance of international peace and security.

Indicator type

Quantitative

Indicator weight2

Indicator weight (% of total index)

2.8%

Data source

IEP; United Nations
Committee
on Contributions

Indicator type

Quantitative

Indicator weight3

Indicator weight (% of total index)

4.2%

2019–2021

Data source

IEP; SIPRI; IISS
Military Balance+

Measurement period

2022

Measurement period

Methodology: The UNFU indicator measures whether UN
member countries meet their UN peacekeeping funding
commitments. Although countries may fund other programsin development or peacebuilding, the records on
peacekeeping are easy to obtain and understand and provide
an instructive measure of a country’s commitment to peace.
The indicator calculates the percentage of countries’“outstanding payments versus their annual assessment to thebudget of the current peacekeeping missions” over an
average of three years. This ratio is derived from data
provided by the United Nations Committee on Contributions
Status reports. The indicator is compiled as follows:
1.
2.

3.

4.

84

Scoring Criteria

The status of contributions by UN member states isobtained.
For the relevant peacekeeping missions, the assessments(for that year only) and the collections (for that year only)
are recorded. From this, the outstanding amount iscalculated for that year.
The ratio of outstanding payments to assessments is
calculated. By doing so a score between 0 and 1 isobtained. Zero indicates no money is owed; a country
has met their funding commitments. A score of 1
indicates that a country has not paid any of theirassessed contributions. Given that the scores already fall
between 0 and 1, they are easily banded into a score
between 1 and 5. The final banded score is a weighted
sum of the current year and the previous two years. The
weightings are 0.5 for the current year, 0.3 for theprevious year and 0.2 for two years prior. Hence it is athree-year weighted average.
Outstanding payments from previous years and credits
are not included. The scoring is linear to one decimal
place.

Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities

Methodology: This indicator is based on a categorised system
for rating the destructive capability of a country’s stock ofheavy weapons. Holdings are those of government forces anddo not include holdings of armed opposition groups. Heavy
weapons numbers were determined using a combination of
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance and the United Nations Register of Conventional
Arms.
There are five categories of weapons, each of which receive acertain number of weighted points. The five weaponscategories are weighted as follows:

1. Armoured vehicle and artillery pieces = 1 point
2. Tank = 5 points
3. Combat aircraft and combat helicopter = 20 points
4. Warship = 100 points
5. Aircraft carrier and nuclear submarine = 1000 points
Countries with nuclear capabilities automatically receive themaximum score of five. Other scores are expressed to thesecond decimal point, adopting a min-max normalisation thatsets the max at two standard deviations above the average
raw score.
1/5

Nil–18,185

2/5

18,185–36,368

3/5

36,368–54,553

4/5

54,553–72,737

5/5States with nuclear capability receive a 5, or states withheavy weapons capability of 72,738 or in the top 2% ofheavy weapons receive a 5.

Appendices 6

Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons
as Supplier (Exports) per 100,000 people

Indicator weight (% of total index)

7.1%

Indicator type

Quantitative

Indicator weight3

Measurement period		
March 2022 to				March 2023

Indicator weight (% of total index)

4.2%

Data source

SIPRI Arms 		
Transfers Database

Measurement period

2022

Data source			EIU

Definition: Assessment of the intensity of contentiousness ofneighbours, ranked from 1-5 (peaceful to very aggressive) by
the EIU’s Country Analysis team. Country analysts are asked toassess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March
to March.

Scoring Criteria:

Definition: Measures the total volume of major conventional
weapons exported by a country between 2015 and 2019
divided by the average population during this time period(population data supplied by the EIU). The SIPRI Arms
Transfers Database covers all international sales and gifts ofmajor conventional weapons and the technology necessary
for the production of them. The transfer equipment or
technology is from one country, rebel force or internationalorganisation to another country, rebel force or internationalorganisation. Major conventional weapons include: aircraft,armoured vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, ships andengines. SIPRI uses a unique pricing system, the Trend
Indicator Value (TIV) that measures military capability. The
indicator raw value is measured as TIV per 100,000
population.

Scoring Bands

1 = Peaceful: None of the neighbours has attacked thecountry since 1950.
2 = Low: The relationship with neighbours is generally good,
but aggressiveness is manifest in politicians’ speeches orin protectionist measures.
3 = Moderate: There are serious tensions and consequenteconomic and diplomatic restrictions from othercountries.
4 = Aggressive: Open conflicts with violence and protests.
5 = Very aggressive: Frequent invasions by neighbouring
countries.

External Conflicts Fought
Indicator type

Quantitative
2.28

1/5

2/5

3/5

4/5

5/5

Indicator weight
Indicator weight (% of total index)

3.2%

0-3.6813.682-7.364

7.365-11.046

11.047-14.729>14.73

Data source

IEP; UCDP BattleRelated Deaths
DatasetMeasurement period

2021

Number of Refugees and Internally Displaced People
as a Percentage of the Population
Indicator type

Quantitative

Indicator weight4

Indicator weight (% of total index)

5.7%

Data source

UNHCR Mid-Year 		
Trends 2021; 		
International 		
Displacement 		
Monitoring Centre 		(IDMC)

Measurement period

2022

Definition: Refugee population by country or territory of origin
plus the number of a country’s internally displaced people(IDPs), as a percentage of the country’s total population.
Scoring Bands
1/5

2/5

3/5

4/5

5/5

0-3.034

3.0356.069

6.07-9.104

9.105-12.139>12.14

Relations with Neighbouring Countries
Indicator type			Qualitative
Indicator weight			5

Definition: This indicator measures the number and durationof extraterritorial conflicts a country is involved in. Information
for this indicator is sourced from the UCDP Battle-Related
Deaths Dataset. The score for a country is determined byadding all individual conflict scores where that country is
involved as an actor in a conflict outside its legal boundaries.
Conflicts are not counted against a country if they havealready been counted against that country in the number andduration of internal conflicts indicator.

Each individual conflict score is based on the following factors:
Number:• Number of internationalised internal armed conflicts andinterstate armed conflicts.
• If a conflict is a war (1,000+ battle-related deaths)
it receives a score of one; if it is an armed conflict (25-999
battle-related deaths) it receives a score of 0.25.
Duration:• A score is assigned based on the number of years out of
the last five that conflict has occurred. For example, if a
conflict last occurred five years ago that conflict will
receive a score of one out of five.
Role:• If the country is a primary party to the conflict, thatconflict receives a score of one; if it is a secondary party(supporting the primary party), that conflict receives a85

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex worldscore of 0.25.
If a country is a party to a force covered by a relevant
United Nations Security Council Resolution, then theentire conflict score is multiplied by a quarter; if not, it
receives a full score.

•

The different conflict scores are then added and banded toestablish a country’s score.

Scoring Bands
1/5

2/5

3/5

4/5

5/5

No
external
conflict

Combined
conflictscore ofup to 1.5

Combined
conflictscore ofup to 3

Combined
conflictscore ofup to 4.5

A combined conflictscore of 6 or above.
This shows very highlevels of external
conflict.

Number Of Deaths From Organised External Conflict
Indicator type

Quantitative

Indicator weight5

Indicator weight (% of total index)

7.1%

Data source

UCDP Georeferenced
Event Dataset

Measurement period

2021–2022

Alternate Source: Where applicable, IEP also uses several
other open-source datasets to construct this indicator.
Definition: This indicator uses the UCDP’s definition of
conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties,
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year”.

Scoring Bands
1/5

2/5

0–24 deaths 25–998
deaths

86

3/5

4/5

5/5

999–4,998
deaths4,999–9,998
deaths> 9,999
deathsAppendices 6

APPENDIX CGPI Domain Scores
TABLE C.1

Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict domain, most peaceful to least
COUNTRYSCORE

COUNTRYSCORE

COUNTRY

SCORE

Iceland

1.000

Sierra Leone

1.506

Djibouti

1.960

Mauritius

1.000

Romania

1.540

Togo

1.961

Singapore

1.000

Senegal

1.540

Rwanda1.967

Uruguay

1.000

The Gambia

1.540

Morocco1.989

Malaysia

1.005

Sweden1.562

United States of America

1.994

New Zealand

1.009

Nepal

1.577

Bangladesh

1.997

Botswana

1.018

Zambia

1.577

Moldova

2.006

Ireland

1.028

Jordan1.602

Nicaragua

2.006

Canada1.037

Cyprus

1.604

Zimbabwe

2.006

Germany

1.046

Dominican Republic

1.604

Bahrain

2.035

Italy

1.046

Equatorial Guinea

1.604South Africa

2.083

Switzerland

1.046

Guyana1.604

Venezuela

2.086

Netherlands

1.055

Honduras

1.604

Colombia

2.099

Austria

1.068

Poland1.604

Mozambique

2.117

Belgium

1.084

Slovakia

1.604

Guinea2.150

United Kingdom

1.120

Taiwan1.604

Tajikistan

2.174

Portugal

1.138

Turkmenistan

1.604

Saudi Arabia

2.184

Argentina

1.201

Guinea-Bissau

1.613

Belarus2.208

Bulgaria

1.201

Ghana

1.616

Philippines

2.230

Costa Rica

1.201

Papua New Guinea

1.618

Kenya

2.250

Croatia

1.201

Angola

1.639

Haiti

2.255

Jamaica

1.201

Guatemala

1.641

Burundi2.267

Mongolia

1.201

Ecuador

1.676

India

2.282

Namibia

1.201

United Arab Emirates

1.678

Kyrgyz Republic

2.284

Trinidad and Tobago

1.201

Gabon

1.696

Egypt

2.362

Czech Republic

1.247

Peru

1.701

Libya

2.419

Denmark

1.247

Republic of the Congo

1.706

Israel

2.435

Qatar

1.247

Cambodia

1.742

Lebanon

2.447

Australia

1.258

Mauritania

1.742

North Korea

2.610

Spain

1.352

Tunisia

1.742

Mexico2.657

Albania

1.403

Indonesia

1.758

Palestine

2.659

Chile

1.403

Côte d'Ivoire

1.760

Chad

2.674

Japan

1.403

Benin

1.763

Myanmar

2.778

Kuwait1.403

Sri Lanka

1.763

Central African Republic

2.831

Laos

1.403

Armenia

1.783

Nigeria

2.882

North Macedonia

1.403

Eritrea

1.787

Cameroon

2.914

Montenegro

1.403

Cuba

1.805

Iraq

2.926

Oman

1.403

Georgia

1.805

Pakistan

2.943

Panama1.403

Greece

1.805

Niger

2.947

Paraguay

1.403

Kazakhstan

1.805

Burkina Faso

3.005

Slovenia

1.403

Kosovo

1.805

Iran

3.072

Timor-Leste

1.403

South Korea

1.805

South Sudan

3.080

Vietnam

1.403

Uzbekistan

1.805

Mali

3.085

France1.416

Malawi

1.815

Turkiye

3.088

Bolivia

1.417

Eswatini

1.816

Somalia

3.131

Hungary

1.439

Algeria

1.821

Sudan

3.263

Bhutan1.448

Lesotho

1.824

Ethiopia

3.419

El Salvador

1.448

Thailand

1.841

Democratic Republic of the Congo

3.421

Estonia

1.448

Uganda1.844

Afghanistan

3.434

Finland

1.448

Azerbaijan

1.847

Russia3.445

Latvia1.448

Bosnia and Herzegovina

1.851

Syria

3.460

Liberia

1.448

China

1.897

Ukraine3.470

Lithuania

1.448

Serbia

1.897

Yemen

3.486

Norway1.448

Brazil1.900

Madagascar

1.504

Tanzania

1.901

87

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

TABLE C.2

Societal Safety and Security domain, most to least peaceful
COUNTRYSCORE

COUNTRYSCORE

COUNTRY

SCORE

Finland

1.251

Montenegro

2.172

Panama

2.638

Japan

1.272

Senegal

2.174

Kenya

2.639

Iceland

1.282

Cambodia

2.176

Guinea2.659

Singapore

1.300

Timor-Leste

2.182

Benin

2.682

Norway1.301

Costa Rica

2.231

Lesotho

2.700

Denmark

1.305

Sierra Leone

2.244

Cuba

2.701

Switzerland

1.310

Malawi

2.250

Peru

2.729

Slovenia

1.339

Morocco2.257

Eswatini

2.746

Qatar

1.439

The Gambia

2.272

Pakistan

2.767

South Korea

1.485

Kyrgyz Republic

2.272

Palestine

2.769

Austria

1.510

Kosovo2.275

Mauritania

2.780

Netherlands

1.519

Cyprus

2.281

Zimbabwe

2.781

Czech Republic

1.526

Kazakhstan

2.291

Jamaica

2.785

Sweden

1.528

Chile

2.332

Republic of the Congo

2.788

Canada1.537

Azerbaijan

2.339

Mozambique

2.789

Portugal

1.546

India

2.346

Lebanon

2.815

Ireland

1.548

Madagascar

2.347

Guatemala

2.830

Croatia

1.581

Israel

2.349

Russia2.838

New Zealand

1.594

Uzbekistan

2.361

Niger

2.850

Australia

1.606

Bahrain

2.364

Burundi2.878

Bhutan1.608

Tajikistan

2.365

Nicaragua

2.881

Germany

1.628

Tanzania

2.367

Iran

2.907

Taiwan1.638

Botswana

2.376

Guyana2.909

Estonia

1.657

Zambia2.380

Uganda2.914

Kuwait1.693

Rwanda

2.407

Haiti

2.944

Poland1.710

Guinea-Bissau

2.412

North Korea

2.960

Slovakia

1.721

Tunisia2.417

Cameroon

2.974

United Kingdom

1.723

Algeria

2.423

Chad

3.030

Hungary

1.736

Angola2.423

Honduras

3.046

Latvia1.741

Bangladesh

2.435

El Salvador

3.048

Romania

1.745

United States of America

2.438

Nigeria

3.057

Lithuania

1.753

Liberia

2.441

Turkiye

3.077

Belgium

1.802

Sri Lanka

2.442

Ethiopia

3.087

Spain

1.837

Mongolia

2.442South Africa

3.112

United Arab Emirates

1.850

Equatorial Guinea

2.448

Ukraine

3.120

Greece1.857

Georgia

2.452

Mexico

3.133

Oman

1.863

Egypt

2.467

Libya

3.155

France1.872

Paraguay

2.479

Myanmar

3.211

North Macedonia

1.915

Togo

2.495

Sudan

3.250

Italy

1.930

Belarus2.495

Burkina Faso

3.253

Armenia

1.987

Namibia

2.504

Brazil

3.319

Serbia2.003

Côte d'Ivoire

2.505

Eritrea

3.428

Bulgaria

2.008

Argentina

2.519

Central African Republic

3.532

Vietnam

2.053

Uruguay

2.528

Mali

3.539

Ghana

2.057

Djibouti

2.531

Venezuela

3.544

China

2.070

Dominican Republic

2.535

Iraq

3.577

Albania

2.078

Gabon

2.537

Colombia

3.584

Laos

2.088

Nepal

2.541

Somalia

3.641

Malaysia

2.093

Turkmenistan

2.550

Democratic Republic of the Congo

3.749

Indonesia

2.104

Bolivia

2.555

South Sudan

3.835

Mauritius

2.106

Ecuador

2.571

Syria

3.842

Jordan2.125

Papua New Guinea

2.592

Yemen

3.900

Moldova

2.125

Thailand2.599

Afghanistan

4.136

Saudi Arabia

2.137

Philippines

2.600

Bosnia and Herzegovina

2.144

Trinidad and Tobago

2.622

88

Appendices 6

TABLE C.3

Militarisation domain, most peaceful to least
COUNTRYSCORE

COUNTRYSCORE

COUNTRY

SCORE

Iceland

1.015

Philippines

1.680

Republic of the Congo

1.911

Malaysia

1.180

Timor-Leste

1.682

Zimbabwe

1.912

Hungary

1.191

Dominican Republic

1.687

Turkiye

1.917

Portugal

1.211

Eswatini

1.688

Myanmar1.921

Slovenia

1.230

Tunisia

1.694

Colombia

1.924

Moldova

1.234

Peru

1.696

Algeria

1.925

New Zealand

1.236

The Gambia

1.703

Papua New Guinea

1.933

Slovakia

1.271

Taiwan

1.703

Libya

1.947

Czech Republic

1.279

Côte d'Ivoire

1.704

Bahrain

1.951

Ireland

1.301

Mexico1.707

Mauritania

1.966

Mauritius

1.319

Eritrea

1.709

Djibouti

1.971

Austria

1.328

Nicaragua

1.709

Azerbaijan

1.986

Japan

1.333

Jamaica

1.713

Nigeria

1.990

Mongolia

1.336

Burundi1.716

Palestine

1.991

Bhutan

1.368

Haiti

1.721

China

2.030

Denmark

1.403

Germany

1.730

Burkina Faso

2.052

Sierra Leone

1.406

Malawi

1.734

Central African Republic

2.052

Madagascar

1.449

Botswana

1.735

Armenia

2.061

Thailand

1.454

Tanzania

1.741

Kuwait2.062

Indonesia

1.457

Georgia

1.745

Democratic Republic of the Congo

2.063

Cuba

1.460

Togo

1.749

Guinea-Bissau

2.069

Bangladesh

1.465

Spain

1.751

Italy

2.070

Canada1.466

Kazakhstan

1.759

Venezuela

2.073

Latvia1.471

Australia

1.772

Netherlands

2.079

Panama

1.476

Chile

1.776

El Salvador

2.082

Bosnia and Herzegovina

1.496

Gabon

1.788

Turkmenistan

2.088

Guyana1.499

Cameroon

1.793

Qatar

2.104

Zambia1.503

Liberia

1.798

Greece2.114

Rwanda

1.504

Laos

1.805

Syria

2.116

Poland1.542

Switzerland

1.808

Sri Lanka

2.156

Estonia

1.545

Uzbekistan

1.812

Norway2.165

Argentina

1.547

Paraguay

1.814

Iraq

2.174

Cyprus1.550

Equatorial Guinea

1.817South Korea

2.182

Croatia

1.575

Brazil1.824

Guinea2.183

Finland

1.585

Honduras

1.825

Chad

2.233

Mozambique

1.592

Ethiopia

1.826

Iran

2.234

Kosovo

1.597

Egypt

1.831

Yemen

2.235

Montenegro

1.606

North Macedonia

1.835

Oman

2.282

Costa Rica

1.608

Uganda1.835

Afghanistan

2.300

Bulgaria

1.619

Lithuania

1.835

Sudan

2.318

Guatemala1.621

Lesotho

1.838South Sudan

2.347

Romania

1.624

Trinidad and Tobago

1.840

Ukraine2.349

Senegal1.625

Serbia1.846

Lebanon

2.384

Ghana

1.625

Angola

1.847

India

2.388

Kenya

1.633

Niger

1.853

United Kingdom

2.452

Uruguay

1.634

Somalia

1.857

Pakistan

2.516

Morocco1.644

Sweden1.864

United Arab Emirates

2.633

South Africa

1.648

Mali

1.872

Saudi Arabia

2.694

Kyrgyz Republic

1.658

Bolivia

1.873

France2.769

Tajikistan

1.663

Ecuador

1.876

North Korea

3.000

Nepal

1.664

Cambodia

1.880

United States of America

3.081

Namibia

1.665

Singapore

1.897

Russia3.187

Albania

1.670

Jordan1.898

Israel

3.783

Belgium

1.672

Benin

1.901

Vietnam

1.672

Belarus

1.907

89Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

APPENDIX D

Economic Cost of Violence
The economic impact of violence includes the direct and indirect costs of violence as well as an
economic multiplier applied to the direct costs. The economic cost of violence includes only the direct
and indirect costs. Per capita and percentage of GDP results are calculated using the economic costof violence.

TABLE D.1

Economic cost of violence
Economic Costof Violence as %of GDP, Rank

Country90

Economic Impact ofViolence(US$ 2022 PPP)Per Capita Impact(2022, US$ PPP)

Economist costof violence asa percentage ofGDP

Economic Cost ofViolence(US$ 2022 PPP)

1

Ukraine543,394,741,569

13,68763%

2

Afghanistan

42,532,484,084

1,034

47%

324,502,057,387
29,017,856,711

3

Sudan

86,335,661,712

1,842

40%

68,895,854,370

4North Korea

478,079,749,226

18,33939%

243,423,612,664

5

Somalia

8,539,721,295

485

35%

7,080,492,913

6

Central African Republic

1,777,359,139

319

32%

1,473,944,647

7

Colombia

271,552,298,833

5,235

29%

217,440,197,948

8Cyprus

14,418,816,842

11,521

23%

12,140,886,177

9

Burkina Faso

13,138,325,035

579

19%

9,559,380,600

10South Sudan

9,479,762,479

869

17%

8,408,941,532

11

Azerbaijan

34,669,779,300

3,347

16%

23,454,350,119

12Lesotho

1,015,056,592

440

15%

814,773,903

13

El Salvador

12,543,727,590

1,980

15%

8,848,350,227

14

Georgia

11,923,136,880

3,184

15%

8,821,042,510

15South Africa

176,486,287,827

2,947

15%

118,909,878,921

16

Mali

9,848,032,531

436

14%

6,781,365,190

17

Myanmar41,421,514,142

765

14%

30,620,590,417

18

Honduras

10,935,412,162

1,048

14%

8,146,366,323

19

Iraq

82,010,771,239

1,843

14%

55,822,403,274

20

Jamaica

5,010,016,448

1,772

13%

3,596,579,438

21

Democratic Republic of the Congo

15,525,063,859

157

13%

13,747,235,095

22

Eritrea

2,776,598,723

754

13%

2,093,771,795

23Venezuela

66,512,442,864

2,350

12%

52,994,352,557
481,831,463,084

24

Russia857,669,772,163

5,927

12%

25

Palestine

6,256,366,927

1,192

12%

3,526,190,457

26

Saudi Arabia

376,085,044,094

10,33012%

191,765,787,051
8,562,694,273

27

Bahrain

16,243,555,458

11,03312%28

Mauritania

4,952,041,917

1,046

11%

2,861,407,801

29

Brazil462,881,700,253

2,150

11%

351,919,079,535

30

Botswana

6,602,004,264

2,510

11%

4,363,874,256

31

Trinidad and Tobago

5,288,045,149

3,454

11%

3,911,288,451

32

Mexico350,239,245,483

2,747

11%

269,019,777,291

33

United States of America

4,206,923,585,346

12,43611%

2,365,332,637,391

34

Ethiopia

37,500,421,067

304

11%

30,793,605,571

35

Libya

23,978,096,371

3,520

11%

15,729,781,348

36

Burundi1,465,862,583

114

10%

952,067,447

37

Chad

4,095,413,473

231

10%

2,603,400,306

38

Guyana2,652,281,506

3,280

10%

1,825,428,291

39

Guatemala23,467,056,106

1,315

10%

15,797,754,228

40

Qatar

47,546,613,126

17,642

10%

24,307,297,065

41

Togo

3,177,054,793

359

10%

1,816,009,309

42

Pakistan

181,755,480,661

771

9%

115,735,626,504

43

Nigeria44

United Kingdom

45

Namibia

120,770,738,172

553

9%

100,176,213,589

459,367,986,963

6,805

9%

282,543,881,418

3,600,397,328

1,403

9%

2,168,794,787

Appendices 6

TABLE D.1

Economic cost of violence (continued)
Economic Costof Violence as %of GDP, Rank
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Country

Economic Impact ofViolence(US$ 2022 PPP)

Algeria
United Arab Emirates
Oman
Cuba
IsraelArmenia
Mozambique
Syria
LebanonMontenegro
Costa Rica
LatviaSri Lanka
Bosnia and Herzegovina
SerbiaPanamaUruguay
Republic of the Congo
GreeceCroatia
Bulgaria
The Gambia
Cameroon
Eswatini
Uzbekistan
Lithuania
PolandRomania
Timor-Leste
Argentina
Hungary
KuwaitJordanNiger
MoroccoAustralia
Estonia
Tunisia
FranceBelgium
India
Ecuador
New Zealand
Albania
Slovakia
KosovoVietnam
North Macedonia
Gabon
Cambodia
Kyrgyz RepublicSouth Korea
AngolaBelarus
Liberia
Djibouti
Iran
Chile
Czech Republic
Bolivia
UgandaGuineaDominican Republic
CanadaNicaragua

87,551,322,827
117,616,891,977
28,147,405,481
26,895,260,952
58,865,422,154
6,452,497,514
4,898,304,261
57,260,446,793
11,161,117,967
1,925,136,150
14,081,767,751
8,521,020,596
39,623,757,305
5,845,511,652
20,491,777,464
16,623,286,389
9,603,779,656
2,160,246,172
44,738,165,373
17,171,505,294
23,371,520,084
671,327,529
10,509,732,127
1,175,208,731
37,660,336,051
13,522,855,091
189,440,208,286
81,582,621,682
886,540,007
117,233,458,704
42,251,096,407
24,755,464,497
13,595,162,294
3,449,675,816
36,736,697,556
151,986,909,972
6,140,332,334
15,093,774,780
327,903,067,143
62,407,310,242
1,077,108,046,144
20,293,911,420
22,338,060,150
4,622,037,195
20,152,464,150
5,285,577,746
117,861,295,781
3,864,252,991
3,163,648,733
8,118,576,710
3,482,446,929
225,697,253,780
21,406,740,947
18,829,229,462
753,273,069
512,099,868
134,916,944,642
48,784,318,883
44,230,129,134
9,189,530,840
9,518,095,015
3,185,722,761
18,346,537,449
171,462,934,622
3,225,951,040

Per Capita Impact(2022, US$ PPP)
1,950
12,458
6,151
2,399
6,513
2,321
149
2,588
2,033
3,070
2,718
4,604
1,815
1,808
2,838
3,771
2,806
362
4,308
4,261
3,446
248
376
978
1,088
4,917
4,753
4,150
661
2,576
4,239
5,799
1,205
132
981
5,806
4,631
1,222
5,074
5,354
760
1,127
4,308
1,626
3,571
3,185
1,200
1,846
1,324
484
525
4,356
601
1,975
142
457
1,524
2,489
4,215
752
201
230
1,634
4,459
464

Economist costof violence asa percentage of
GDP
9%
9%
9%
9%
9%
9%
9%
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
7%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
5%
5%
5%

Economic Cost ofViolence(US$ 2022 PPP)
45,477,569,369
60,309,421,302
14,374,347,883
15,161,544,332
33,066,098,508
3,431,334,649
3,448,940,203
51,367,543,630
5,927,777,711
1,070,136,219
8,894,920,263
4,721,448,949
23,115,419,345
3,985,953,292
11,238,161,720
10,041,778,089
6,075,251,196
1,496,796,352
23,114,307,407
9,527,987,132
12,353,489,211
416,520,856
7,648,469,123
786,100,081
19,732,518,320
7,824,324,911
100,153,227,101
43,228,575,218
478,026,084
68,673,106,798
23,283,491,719
12,958,254,208
7,154,549,805
2,109,435,809
20,289,593,319
87,408,435,824
3,422,538,667
8,468,568,184
191,233,045,765
39,507,210,756
597,546,499,142
12,229,701,866
13,976,776,926
2,566,275,151
10,921,258,692
3,437,090,797
62,758,881,320
2,071,373,241
1,977,217,106
4,322,048,436
1,879,138,757
134,459,727,104
12,307,775,320
10,940,467,422
435,760,079
317,081,185
76,062,970,131
28,392,876,071
24,005,991,889
5,500,835,418
5,919,475,629
2,031,504,174
11,405,057,390
100,367,360,488
2,127,870,345

91

Global Peace Index 2023 | Measuring peace in a complex world

TABLE D.1

Economic cost of violence (continued)
Economic Costof Violence as %of GDP, Rank
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

92

Country
Benin
Moldova
Peru
Paraguay
Tajikistan
SwedenRwandaSingapore
Netherlands
Slovenia
Germany
NorwayItaly
Sierra Leone
Portugal
Mongolia
BhutanGuinea-Bissau
Côte d'Ivoire
FinlandTurkmenistan
TurkiyeSpain
Equatorial Guinea
Kenya
Mauritius
China
Laos
Zimbabwe
TaiwanThailandZambiaEgypt
Denmark
Yemen
Nepal
AustriaJapan
Senegal
Haiti
Switzerland
Malaysia
Iceland
Tanzania
Ghana
Kazakhstan
Philippines
Papua New Guinea
Malawi
IrelandBangladeshIndonesia
Madagascar

Economic Impact ofViolence(US$ 2022 PPP)
3,988,307,285
4,186,630,311
36,991,863,639
8,063,611,503
3,851,498,041
48,658,027,812
2,254,842,755
61,168,097,792
93,516,115,957
7,617,113,468
397,885,673,777
32,349,589,725
233,964,880,746
1,201,606,218
31,978,215,013
3,166,590,779
697,410,527
348,822,091
10,989,104,808
23,096,633,194
8,462,896,525
224,816,105,729
160,070,694,295
1,830,992,985
19,715,631,488
2,092,174,305
2,075,370,710,410
4,131,221,310
2,014,296,371
45,914,049,718
89,280,802,693
4,283,070,952
97,697,467,859
23,632,447,896
44,746,521,656
8,097,520,804
31,577,517,016
342,270,401,041
4,307,893,966
1,812,299,955
40,688,703,555
59,162,583,247
1,137,403,260
9,408,667,230
10,112,158,111
25,408,602,904
50,174,793,150
1,586,490,251
1,278,878,970
22,138,611,293
44,935,181,593
144,645,734,220
1,475,540,901

Per Capita Impact(2022, US$ PPP)

Economist costof violence asa percentage of
GDP

299
1,279
1,086
1,189
387
4,612
164
10,236
5,324
3,593
4,773
5,953
3,963
140
3,113
932
891
166
390
4,169
1,316
2,634
3,366
1,093
365
1,610
1,455
549
123
1,922
1,245
214
880
4,018
1,328
265
3,532
2,761
249
156
4,655
1,743
3,050
144
302
1,310
434
156
63
4,407
262
525
50

5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
5%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
4%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
2%
2%

Economic Cost ofViolence(US$ 2022 PPP)
2,377,199,665
2,451,751,527
22,525,784,812
4,858,222,657
2,027,238,143
29,377,804,266
1,600,866,993
32,835,606,742
51,063,669,837
4,353,347,368
227,124,281,535
18,259,599,633
125,642,259,985
703,234,488
17,446,470,684
1,999,384,550
429,605,931
194,091,128
7,470,686,359
13,315,440,575
4,743,042,052
128,191,866,011
86,061,468,676
1,114,546,406
11,389,786,876
1,210,291,938
1,106,023,936,012
2,593,839,402
1,502,072,948
25,069,462,739
52,940,785,082
2,767,113,387
52,889,819,636
13,664,147,217
36,680,639,891
4,591,182,646
18,534,926,873
193,391,679,829
2,310,574,226
1,254,688,762
23,275,441,100
33,411,247,245
717,573,445
5,849,133,067
6,284,893,653
16,602,479,675
29,870,607,504
1,186,256,294
829,581,352
13,772,851,784
25,958,131,759
76,844,418,392
849,506,871

Endnotes

Endnotes
SECTION 1
1

Barnes, Julian E., Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Michael
Schwirtz, and Eric Schmitt. “Leaked Documents Reveal Depth of U.S. Spy
Efforts and Russia’s Military Struggles.” The New York Times, April 8,
2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/08/us/politics/leaked-documentsrussia-ukraine-war.html.

SECTION 2

1. Salehyan, Idean. “Transnational Rebels: Neighboring States as Sanctuaryfor Rebel Groups.” World Politics 59, no. 2 (2007): 217–42. https://doi.
org/10.1353/wp.2007.0024.

2. Buhaug, Halvard, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. "Contagion or confusion?
Why conflicts cluster in space." International studies quarterly 52.2 (2008):
215-233.
3. De Groot, Olaf J. "The spillover effects of conflict on economic growth inneighbouring countries in africa." Defence and peace economics 21.2
(2010): 149-164.
4. “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.” Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.

5. Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index, 2022.

6. “Between Continuation and Adaptation: The Baltic States’ Security Policy
and Armed Forces.” OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, April 19, 2018.
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-11-24/
between-continuation-and-adaptation-baltic-states-security#_ftn10.

7. Belarus: EU Broadens Scope for sanctions to tackle hybrid attacks and ...
Accessed May 30, 2023. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pressreleases/2021/11/15/belarus-eu-broadens-scope-for-sanctions-to-tacklehybrid-attacks-and-instrumentalisation-of-migrants/.

9. Ayissi, Anatole. “Three Decades of Disarmament, Demobilization,
and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Africa: Lessons Learned andChallenges Ahead.” The State of Peacebuilding in Africa, 2020, 141–62.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46636-7_9.

10. Edu-Afful, Fiifi, and Kwesi Aning. “Peacekeeping Economies in a SubRegional Context: The Paradigmatic Cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone andCôte d’Ivoire.” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 9, no. 3 (2015):
391–407. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2015.1070020.
11. Dragonfly - Terrorism Tracker.

12. Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index, 2023.

13. “How Has Mauritania Managed to Stave off Terror Attacks?” ISS Africa,
December 6, 2019. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/how-has-mauritaniamanaged-to-stave-off-terror-attacks.

14. “Senegal: Extremism and Terrorism.” Counter Extremism Project. https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/senegal-extremism-and-terrorism.
15. Braithwaite, Alex. "Resisting infection: How state capacity conditions
conflict contagion." Journal of Peace Research 47.3 (2010): 311-319.

8. Adebajo, Adekeye (2002) Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra
Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder p. 24.

SECTION 3

1. Palestine and South Sudan are removed from this calculation.

2. FY22 List of Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations accessed 17/03/2022
from https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/bb52765f38156924d682486726
f422d4-0090082021/original/FCSList-FY22.pdf.
3. McCollister, Kathryn E., Michael French and Hai Fung, ‘The Cost of
Crime to Society: New Crime-Specific Estimates for Policy and Program
Evaluation’, Drug and Alcohol Dependence, April 2010.

4. Dolan, Paul, and Tessa Peasgood, ‘Estimating the Economic and Social
Costs of the Fear of Crime’, The British Journal of Criminology, April 2006.

5. Brauer, Jurgen, and John Tepper Marlin, ‘Defining Peace Industries andCalculating the Potential Size of a Peace Gross World Product by Country
and by Economic Sector’, ResearchGate, May 2009.

6. Vest, Charlie, Agatha Kratz, and Reva Goujon. "The Global Economic
Disruptions from a Taiwan Conflict." Rhodium Group, 2022. Accessed May
30, 2023. https://rhg.com/research/taiwan-economic-disruptions/.
7. Gompert, David C., Astrid Stuth Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola, Warwith China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2016. Accessed May 30, 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR1140.html.

8. Varas, Antonio, Raj Varadarajan, Jimmy Goodrich, and Falan Yinug.
"Strengthening the global semiconductor supply chain in an uncertainera." Boston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association(2021). Accessed May 30, 2023. https://www.semiconductors.org/
wp-content/ uploads/2021/05/BCG-x-SIA-Strengthening-the-GlobalSemiconductorValue-Chain-April-2021_1.pdf.

13. Statista. "Value of foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows from Taiwan
from 2011 to 2021." Feb 27, 2023. Accessed May 30, 2023. https://www.
statista.com/statistics/1267438/taiwan-foreign-direct-investment-outflows/.

14. Buchholz, Katharina. "The Countries Most In Debt To China [Infographic]."
Forbes. Aug 19, 2022. Accessed May 30, 2023. https://www.forbes.
com/ sites/katharinabuchholz/2022/08/19/the-countries-most-in-debt-tochinainfographic/?sh=5a504f0c61d8.
15. CEIC. "China External Debt." 2022. Accessed May 30, 2023. https://www.
ceicdata.com/en/indicator/china/external-debt.
16. Uren, David. "What if…? Economic consequences for Australia
of a US-China conflict over Taiwan." Australian Strategic Policy
institute, (2021). Accessed May 30, 2023. https://ad-aspi.
s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/2021-06/What%20if_0.
pdf?VersionId=F4HBNSAt208lUBDV4YZQ08mGSiS5.rZ4.

17. Uren, David. "A blockade of Taiwan would cripple China’s economy."
The Strategist. August 8, 2022. Accessed May 30, 2023. https://www.
aspistrategist.org.au/a-blockade-of-taiwan-would-cripple-chinas-economy/.
18. Varley, Kevin. "Taiwan Tensions Raise Risks in One of Busiest Shipping
Lanes." Bloomberg. August 2, 2022. Accessed May 30, 2023. https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-02/taiwan-tensions-raise-risks-inone-of-busiest-shipping-lanes.

9. OECD. "FDI IN FIGURES." 2022. Accessed May 30, 2023. https://www.
oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/FDI-in-Figures-October-2022.pdf.
10. Varas, Antonio, Raj Varadarajan, Jimmy Goodrich, and Falan Yinug.
"Strengthening the global semiconductor supply chain in an uncertainera." Boston Consulting Group and Semiconductor Industry Association(2021). Accessed May 30, 2023. https://www.semiconductors.org/
wp-content/ uploads/2021/05/BCG-x-SIA-Strengthening-the-GlobalSemiconductorValue-Chain-April-2021_1.pdf.

11. Vest, Charlie, Agatha Kratz, and Reva Goujon. "The Global Economic
Disruptions from a Taiwan Conflict." Rhodium Group, 2022. Accessed May
30, 2023. https://rhg.com/research/taiwan-economic-disruptions/.
12. OECD. "FDI IN FIGURES." 2022. Accessed May 30, 2023. https://www.
oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/FDI-in-Figures-October-2022.pdf.

93Endnotes
SECTION 4
1

2

Meier, Vanessa, Niklas Karlén, Therése Pettersson, and Mihai Croicu.
“External Support in Armed Conflicts: Introducing the UCDP External
Support Dataset (ESD), 1975–2017.” Journal of Peace Research, 2022,
2234332210798. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221079864.

Soyaltin-Collela, Digdem, and Tolga Demiryol. “Unusual Middle Power
Activism and Regime Survival: Turkey’s Drone Warfare and Its RegimeBoosting Effects.” Third World Quarterly 0, no. 0 (January 10, 2023): 1–20.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2158080.

3 Soyaltin-Collela, Digdem, and Tolga Demiryol. “Unusual Middle Power
Activism and Regime Survival: Turkey’s Drone Warfare and Its RegimeBoosting Effects.” Third World Quarterly 0, no. 0 (January 10, 2023): 1–20.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2158080.
4 Watling Jack and Kaushal Sidharth, “The Democratisation of Precision
Strike in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.” Royal United Services Institute,
October 22, 2020. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/democratisation-precision-strike-nagorno-karabakh-conflict;Gatopoulos, Alex. “How Armed Drones May Have Helped Turn the Tide in
Ethiopia’s War.” Military | Al Jazeera, December 10, 2021. https://www.
aljazeera.com/features/2021/12/10/how-armed-drones-may-have-helpedturn-tide-in-ethiopia-conflict.
5 There were also at least 27 People’s Defense Force (PDF) units and 46
other local militias in Myanmar that weaponised drones in 2022, but we
exclude them here because these groups only emerged as distinct
non-state actors since 2021.
6 Crisis Watch scrape.
7

Combines armed groups in Myanmar into two-groups: pro-Junta andanti-Junta.

8 “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute. https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.

9 Watling Jack and Kaushal Sidharth, “The Democratisation of Precision
Strike in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.” Royal United Services Institute,
October 22, 2020. https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/democratisation-precision-strike-nagorno-karabakh-conflict.
10 Greenwood, Faine. “The Drone War in Ukraine Is Cheap, Deadly, andMade in China.” Foreign Policy, February 16, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.
com/2023/02/16/ukraine-russia-war-drone-warfare-china/.

11 Low estimate from ACLED in 2021 and 2022. High estimate for 2021 from‘high’ UCDP estimate, and for 2022 based on UK government estimatesand combined Russian and Ukrainian public claims, including
approximately 7000 civilians reported by the UN: https://ukraine.un.org/
sites/default/files/2023-01/Ukraine%20-%20civilian%20casualty%20
update%20as%20of%202%20January%202023%20ENG.pdf.

SECTION 5
1

Institute for Economics and Peace, Business and Peace Report 2021, May
2021, section ‘Worker Productivity’ page 9, www.visionofhumanity.org.

12 Davies, Shawn, Therese Pettersson & Magnus Öberg (2023). Organizedviolence 1989-2022 and the return of conflicts between states?. Journal of
Peace Research 60(4).
13 Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen.
“Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset.”
Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 651–60. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0022343310378914.

14 Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen.
“Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset.”
Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 651–60. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0022343310378914.

15 Trend Indicator Value is a SIPRI measure for arms exports across trends
and time to retain consistency.
16 Moody, Jessica, “The New ‘Cold War’ in Africa - OZY | A Modern Media
Company.” January 12, 2023. https://www.ozy.com/pg/newsletter/the-daily-dose/455558/.

17 Davies, Shawn, Therese Pettersson & Magnus Öberg (2023). Organizedviolence 1989-2022 and the return of conflicts between states?. Journal of
Peace Research 60(4).
18 Gatopoulos, Alex. “How Armed Drones May Have Helped Turn the Tide in
Ethiopia’s War.” Military | Al Jazeera, December 10, 2021. https://www.
aljazeera.com/features/2021/12/10/how-armed-drones-may-have-helpedturn-tide-in-ethiopia-conflict.
19 “Ethiopia’s Economy Struggles as War Reignites in Tigray,” AP NEWS.
September 13, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/africa-economygovernment-spending-kenya-826141a7a692574d9609462d2549bffb.

20 East Asia Forum. “Russia and Afghanistan’s Partnership of Convenience,”
November 2, 2022. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/11/03/russia-andafghanistans-partnership-of-convenience/.
21 Zhou, Jiayi, Fei Su, and Jingdong Yuan. “Treading Lightly: China’s
Footprint in a Taliban-Led Afghanistan.” Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, November 18, 2022. https://doi.org/10.55163/
OVBO3684.

22 Rafi, Kambaiz. “Afghanistan: With Civil War on the Cards, the West Needs
to Identify a Moderate Ally to Support.” The Conversation, October 24,
2022. http://theconversation.com/afghanistan-with-civil-war-on-the-cardsthe-west-needs-to-identify-a-moderate-ally-to-support-191700.
23 “Humanitarian Aid: EU Announces over €161.5 Million for Yemen Crisis.”Parlement.com. https://www.parlement.com/id/vkwchdw0ytst/nieuws/
humanitarian_aid_eu_announces_over_161_5.

Our research analyses peace
and its economic value.

We develop global and national indices, calculate the economic impact of violence, analyse country
level risk and have developed an empirical framework for Positive Peace that provides a roadmap toovercome adversity and conflict, helping to build and sustain lasting peace.

Download our latest reports and research briefs for free at:visionofhumanity.org/resources

Institute for
Economics& Peace

FOR MORE INFORMATIONINFO@ECONOMICSANDPEACE.ORG
EXPLORE OUR WORK
WWW.ECONOMICSANDPEACE.ORG AND
WWW.VISIONOFHUMANITY.ORG

GlobalPeaceIndex@GlobPeaceIndex

IEP is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit thinktank dedicated to shifting the world’s focus to peace
as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure ofhuman well-being and progress.
IEP is headquartered in Sydney, with offices in New
York, Brussels, The Hague, Mexico City and Harare.
It works with a wide range of partners internationallyand collaborates with intergovernmentalorganizations on measuring and communicating the
economic value of peace.
The Institute for Economics & Peace is a registered charitable
research institute in Australia as a Deductible Gift Recipient.
IEP USA is a 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization.

JUNE 2023 / IEP REPORT 90

ISBN 978-0-6451494-9-4

9 780645 149494 >