2011-E-5
Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia and the Tribute System II:
Hegemon and Instability
Min Shu
School of International Liberal Studies
Waseda University0AbstractPre-colonial Southeast Asia had long been an integral part of the China-centered tribute
system. Yet, the hierarchical relationship between China and Southeast Asia has notbeen studied from the perspective of international relations. This article contributes tothe literature by examining the hegemonic strategies that China had pursued inSoutheast Asia. Based on the literature on hegemonic stability, China’s hegemonic
influences are analyzed according to four theoretical angles: norm socialization,
public-good provision, hegemonic coercion, and institution-building. Firstly, China’s
self-perceived cultural state had not socialized the ‘Indianized’ states of Southeast Asia.
Secondly, despite the vibrant commercial links that the China-centered tributary trade
had created, it was not an economic order open to all Southeast Asian countries. Thirdly,
the coercive campaigns of China had altered the power balance of mainland Southeast
Asia beyond its control. Fourthly, the tribute system was sophisticated and long-lasting,but its institutional influences had not moved beyond the dynastic cycle of China’s
imperial power. Although the hegemonic power of China was substantial, it had failed
to bring long-term stability to pre-colonial Southeast Asia.

1Introduction
International relations in pre-colonial East Asia followed a distinctively hierarchicalorder. With its unparalleled economic, political and military strengths, China stood at
the center of this regional hierarchy (Faribank, 1968; Mancall, 1984). The rest of East
Asia was incorporated into the regional order through an elaborated institutionalframework—the tribute system (Faribank, 1942; Mancall, 1968; Kang 2010). Under thissystem, foreign countries were invited to pay tribute to China. By submitting to thesupremacy of China, foreign rulers were rewarded with official recognition by theimperial court, lucrative tributary trade with China, and, on some occasions, imperial
protection in the case of emergency (Shu, 2011). The tributary states were even ranked
by China according to their cultural conformity to the Chinese civilization and theirloyalty to the imperial court (Kang, 2010: 57-59). It is often considered that thehegemony of China, together with the hierarchical tribute system, had contributed to thelong-term peace and stability in East Asia prior to the arrival of European powers
around the mid-19th century (see Kang 2007, 2010).
Southeast Asia had long been an integral part of the China-centered tribute system (Reid,
1996; Stuart-Fox, 2003; Wang, 1998a, 1998b; Wolters, 2008). In the eastern mainland,
Dai Viet had been a ‘loyal’ tributary state ever since it got independence from China in
the 10th century. Its southern neighbor and long-term competitor, Champa, similarly
sought a close tributary connection for both economic and political reasons. In thecentral mainland, the pre-historical Kingdom of Funan sent tributary missions to China
as early as in the 3rd century (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 30). Later, the Khmer empire andvarious Tai and Laotian Kingdoms also pursued active tributary relations with China.
Only in the more distant western mainland, the Burmese kingdoms of Pagan, Toungoo
and Konbaung dispatched sporadic missions. In maritime Southeast Asia, the tradingstates of Srivijaya, Brunei, Luzon, Sulu and Melaka all sought close tributary
connections with China until the region fell under the European controls in the 16th
century. The powerful Javenese Empire of Majapahit, though wary of its vassals’
contact with China, regularly dispatched its own envoys to the Ming court.
For many pre-colonial Southeast Asian countries, tributary trade with China not only
brought a steady inflow of wealth but also created a solid foundation for them to thriveon the trade routes (Reid, 1993). In the periods when China was strong and its foreign
policy outward-looking, the power balance in Southeast Asia was also more easily
maintained (Wolters, 2008: 69). However, Southeast Asian countries were far from2

peaceful under the tribute system. Fierce competition for survival and domination had
characterized the balance-of-power politics in the pre-colonial era (Shu, 2011). The
conflicts between Dai Viet and Champa, between Ayutthaya/Siam and Burma, andamong the kingdoms of Sumatra and Java all lasted for several centuries without a clear
winner. Different from the experiences of the Confucian world in Northeast Asia (Kang,
2010), the hegemony of China had not produced a decisive impact on the sub-regional
stability of pre-colonial Southeast Asia.
Why did the undisputed hegemony of China fail to create long-term peace and stability
among its tributary countries in pre-colonial Southeast Asia? According to thehegemonic stability theory, a predominant hegemon is conducive to an open economicorder and stable inter-state relationship (Kindleberger, 1973; Krasner, 1976; Gilpin,1981). To achieve such a stable order, the hegemon can employ at least four different
strategies, each representing a particular school of international relations theories (seeMilner, 1998). The hegemon may project its power and coerce subordinate states tocomply; it may provide necessary public goods and motivate other states to follow suit;it may establish multilateral institutions to maintain a desirable inter-state order; it may
also create a set of values and norms to socialize its subordinates. Using these
theoretical claims as benchmarks, this article aims to find out the reasons behind
China’s largely failed hegemonic impacts on pre-colonial Southeast Asia.
The rest of the article is organized in the following way. The next section looks into thetheory of hegemonic stability, exploring different interpretations of hegemonic stability
as well as their critics. Then, China’s hegemonic impacts on pre-colonial Southeast Asia
are examined from four perspectives. The third section assesses the socialization effectof China’s self-perceived centrality on Southeast Asia. The fourth section looks into thelink between public goods provision and tributary trade. The fifth section examines thecoercive dimension of hegemonic China, focusing on the imperial China’s military
campaigns in mainland Southeast Asia. The sixth section evaluates the institutional
strength of the tribute system. The article is concluded with a summary of main findings
and their implications.
The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Its Critics
The theory of ‘hegemonic stability’, a term coined by one of its critics (Keohane, 1980),
is first articulated around the mid-1970s. At a glance, the theory is simple andstraightforward. It posits that a single, dominant power (i.e., the hegemon) is conducive3

to stability and prosperity in the world. The theory is normally attributed to threescholars: Charles Kindleberger, Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner. While all of them
accept the logic of hegemonic stability, the meaning of stability differs in their accounts.
According to Kindelberger (1973), the experiences of the Great Depression show that
only a predominant power is able to create a stable world economy. A stable economicorder requires a steady flow of capital, adequate liquidity, stable exchange rate, andcoordinated monetary policies, something Lake (1984) refers to as the ‘international
economic infrastructure’. For Gilplin (1975, 1981), stability is both political andeconomic. In political terms, stability is ‘an international system of relative peace andsecurity’ (Gilpin, 1981: 145). In economic terms, stability is a liberal economic orderfeaturing ‘free trade, foreign investment and a well-functioning international monetarysystem’ (145). In Krasner’s (1976) account, stability is regarded as an open trading
structure. It should be noted that the liberal economic connotations of stability,
especially concerning financial coordination, were well beyond the reach of pre-colonial
Southeast Asia. For the purpose of this article, stability is defined as ‘an open economicorder and stable inter-state relationship’ to avoid conceptual misunderstandings.
Behind the theory of hegemonic stability, there is always a question about the intentionof the hegemon. Is the predominant power a benevolent or a coercive architect of theworld order? The answer to this question matters because a coercive hegemon not only
aggressively imposes its will on the subordinates but is more likely to punish thedisobedient followers. In contrast, a benevolent hegemon acts like an enlightened leader
who guides the rest of the world through crisis and leads them towards prosperity. As
Snidal (1985) points out, the original theory of hegemonic stability fails to specify thehegemonic intentions. Nonetheless, Alt et al.’s (1988) game-theoretical model showsthat there is no qualitative difference between benevolent and coercive hegemon. A
benevolent hegemon may offer selective incentives to reshape subordinate states’
behavior; a coercive hegemon resorts to political or military sanctions to enforce its will.
Both approaches are costly to the hegemon itself. So, whether a hegemon is benevolent
or coercive only depends on the relative ‘efficiency’ of benevolence or coercion (seeLake, 1993). If necessary, a benevolent hegemon can easily resort to coercion.
Logically, the theory of hegemonic stability is based on the analysis of public goods 1
1

Public goods differ from private goods because their consumption by one person does not prevent
others from consuming it. Because of this, the supply of public goods is prone to the problem offree-rider.
4

provision. Stable economic and political order is a genuine public good. Every state
enjoys the benefits of a stable world but few are willing to bear the cost of it. Because ofthis, stability is usually in short supply in international political economy. According to
Mancur Olson (1965), apart for the rare situation of well-coordinated collective action,
only a ‘privileged group’ has the incentive and the capability to supply public goods
because public goods disproportionally benefits the privileged one. The hegemon is the
predominant power in world politics. Analytically, it can be regarded as a privileged
group since the hegemon has a very high stake in the stable world order. For this reason,
the hegemon should be willing to both provide and maintain stability in a world where it
dominates. This is the essential logic of the hegemonic stability theory (Gilpin, 1981;
Gowa, 1989; Lake, 1993). 2
However, the metaphor of public goods is questioned by some. As Conybeare (1984)
points out, it is more plausible to conceptualize the international trade relations as agame of prisoners’ dilemma than the game of public goods provision. In the prisoners’
dilemma game, self-interested players lead to a non-cooperative suboptimal outcome. 3
There is no reason to believe that the hegemon is not self-interested. Instead ofpromoting free trade, the hegemon can use optimal tariff to improve its terms of trade.
Moreover, free trade is excludable and therefore not a public good. The hegemon may
selectively offer free trade to a sub-group of subordinate states rather than create a
global free-trade order. While Conybeare’s criticism focuses only on trade, it has
important implications for the theory of hegemonic stability. It indicates that theexistence of a hegemon may not automatically lead to an open economic order.
In a careful response to these critiques, Gowa (1989) argues that the real hegemon is not
myopic. Just like a monopolist company sets price below the short-term maximum, thehegemon may not want to use optimal tariff to exploit its predominant status for
short-term benefits. In the long run, free trade brings more benefits to the hegemon.
Gowa (1989) also contends that while free trade is not a public good, the enforcement of
non-universal trade rules is. Since the third countries can ship their products to a free
trade state for further (duty-free) export, the enforcement of non-universal free tradearrangement engenders very high minoring cost. So, the hegemon should prefer a global
free trade order to limited free trade deals. However, it is debatable as to what extent a2

It should be noted that Krasner’s (1976) theory of hegemonic stability does not employ public
goods as the logical framework in his theoretical deduction (see Lake, 1993).
3
The literature on the prisoners’ dilemma is extensive and still growing. For an introduction to thegame and its impact on cooperation, see Axelrod (1984).
5hegemon is far-sighted enough to pursue a free trade world, the enforcement of which
could also be very costly. These intellectual exchanges reveal the complexity beneaththe simple appearance of hegemonic stability theory.
Even if one accepts the metaphor of public goods, it is still possible to question thetheory of hegemonic stability on other grounds. In particular, the provision of public
goods does not always require a ‘privileged group’ such as the hegemon. A small groupof actors can also supply public goods and induce collective action (Olson, 1965;
Schelling, 1960). As Lake (1984) and Snidal (1985) show, a small group of state may atleast resume the responsibility of ‘hegemonic cooperation’ after the decline of thehegemony. That is, the world may remain stable even without the presence of ahegemon. Keohane (1984) takes this argument a step further, and claims thatinternational cooperation among a small group of countries under a well-definedinternational regime is plausible ‘after hegemony’. This theoretical advancement not
only explains the puzzles of ‘hegemonic lag’ that the world witnessed in the early 1980s
as the economic power of the US declined vis-à-vis Japan and Germany, but also points
to the crucial roles of international regimes in creating and maintaining a stable worldorder. Yet, the institutional turn has not refuted the plausibility of hegemonic stability. It
instead shows that the hegemon should have a strategic interest in establishing aneffective international regime to maintain its preferred world order after its decline(Keohane, 1997: 161).
Considering the profound influences of ‘cultural hegemony’ on postwar intellectuals(see Gramsci, 1988) 4, it is surprising that the early writers of hegemonic stability has
little to say about the ideologies and values that a hegemon may create to maintain its(stable) order. Only briefly does Gilpin (1981: 34) note that ‘the position of thedominant power may be supported by ideological, religious, or other values common toa set of states.’ Ten years later Ikenberry and Kupchan’s (1990) article on ‘Socializationand Hegemonic Power’ manages to bring scholarly attention to the constructivist aspectof hegemonic power. As their study points out, a hegemon can exercise substantial
power and establish preferred international order by socializing the ‘substantive beliefs’of other countries. In the international system dominated by a hegemon, thesocialization process tends to take place after major wars and political crises or in wake4

‘Cultural hegemony’ is a concept developed and expounded by Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937). It
refers to the dominance of a societal culture including its beliefs, norms and values. Gramsci argues
that such dominance, though only reflecting the worldviews of the ruling class, leads to theperceived universal validity of its ideology and the acceptance of the status quo.
6

of the hegemonic use of coercive power. To achieve hegemonic socialization, it is moreessential to alter the beliefs of elite than to change the public opinion. These arguments
enrich the literature on hegemonic stability. They show that a stable world order is noless plausible under hegemonic socialization. An effective socialization strategy is not
only compatible with but in need of the benevolent use of material incentives and thecoercive means of political sanctions.
In summary, the literature on hegemonic stability offers a sophisticated theoreticalframework to assess China’s limited hegemonic influences on pre-colonial Southeast
Asia. Generally speaking, there are four main hegemonic strategies to create andmaintain a stable international politico-economic order: the socialization strategy, thepublic-good provision strategy, the coercive strategy, and the institution-building
strategy. The effectiveness of these strategies is assessed against the experiences ofpre-colonial Southeast Asia in the following sections.
The Socialization Strategy: Unfulfilled Mission of China’s Culture State
Imperial China’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia was deeply rooted in the
Chinese view of the world and its special position within it (Fairbank, 1968; Mancall,1984). As a number of studies point out, Chinese emperors called themselves the ‘Son
of Heaven’, and indeed considered themselves as the essential link between heaven, thehuman world and the earth (Fairbank and Teng, 1941; Mancall, 1968; Wang, 1998a;
Wang, 2000; Stuart-Fox, 2003). It, then, follows logically that being the mediator
between heaven and earth allowed China to rule not only its own territory but also theother human societies standing between heaven and earth. Such unconcealed culturalegocentrism, characterizing many early human civilizations, is perhaps not a sign ofChinese exceptionalism. What made China special are the restrictive moral
requirements of traditional Chinese cosmology (see Wang, 2000). According to the
Confucian thoughts, real power does not come from the abrupt use of force. Instead, it
is derived from the rule of virtue and the moral authority of the ruler. Internally, rule ofvirtue requires an orderly social hierarchy and a compassionate government; externally,rule of virtue brings barbarians to acknowledge voluntarily the centrality of China(Fairbank, 1942; Wang, 1968; Stuart-Fox, 2003: Ch2). Furthermore, both the social
hierarchy and the Chinese centrality should be performed and celebrated throughelaborated rituals. Such were the basic ideas behind the China’s self-perceived
hegemonic power.

7

Regarding the moral authority that China self-proclaimed, three principles stood out for
their importance to pre-colonial Southeast Asia. One of these was the principle ofinclusiveness. When Zheng He was sent by the Ming court to Southeast Asia in theearly 15th century, he was instructed to persuade all countries to submit to China’s
dominance. Foreign countries, regardless of big or small, were equally welcomed andtreated with respect. This was also the message that the Ming envoy sent to Brunei in
1370. Despite that Brunei was then a vassal of the powerful Javanese Empire Majapahit,
the country was invited with the assurance of equal treatment and full protection. That is,
Brunei and Java would be treated as equal before the Ming court (Wang, 1968: 51). In
addition, China appeared to adopt the principle of non-exploitation in its dealing with
Southeast Asia. The inferior status of tributary states was neither an economic burden
nor a straightforward political obligation. For one thing, ‘the value of the tribute objects
was certainly balanced, if not out-weighed, by the imperial gifts’ to demonstrate China’s‘magnanimity and benevolence’ (Fairbank, 1942: 135; Stuart-Fox, 2003: 33). For
another, China had ‘never [made] any attempt to be precise about what tributary status
meant’ politically (Wang, 1968: 57). The long-term vagueness indicates that China hadrarely exploited the superior position to its own advantage. Tributary countries weresometimes requested to provide assistance in the case of emergency. However, they
were mostly allowed to conduct their domestic and foreign affairs without China’s
interference (Kang, 2010: 55). Last but not least, China also followed the principle ofimpartiality ‘to protect the weak and deter the greedy’ in Southeast Asia (Reid, 1996:
22). The Ming’s invasion of Dai Viet in 1407 was claimed to fight against the usurpers
and to restore the rightful ruler in the country. The Qing’s campaign against Burma in
1765-1770 was intended to protect the independent chieftains from the exploitation of
the Konbaung king. When Dai Viet and the Laotian kingdom of Lang Xang were in
conflict in 1479, China refused to intervene militarily. Instead, the Ming court sent
envoys to both countries to instruct them how to keep good relations and protect theirpeoples (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 92).
Indeed, deep inside China’s self-perceived supremacy was the belief that foreigncountries submitted to its hegemony not for China’s economic, political or militarymight, but because of their respect for China’s culture and civilization. However,whether such a Sino-centric view was really shared by the countries in pre-colonial
Southeast Asia is questionable. Most Southeast Asian countries have been culturally
influenced more by India than by China. Except in Dai Viet where the long-term
Chinese rule produced a different set of social and cultural norms, Confucianism was of8

little significance to ‘Indianized’ Southeast Asian states (Coedes, 1968; Wolters, 1999;
Stuart-Fox, 2003). Locating outside the Sinicized circle of Confucian states, thesecountries had probably interpreted China’s self-claimed inclusiveness, impartiality, andnon-exploitation in very different ways.
Early Southeast Asian kingdoms adopted many cultural ideas from Hinduism, believingthat the ruler was the representative of the greatest god on earth (see Coedes, 1968:
Ch2). The aim of the ruler was to acquire as much power as possible, so that his/her
kingdom could resemble the heavenly realm and the ruler could claim him/herself the
god of it (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 31). The belief in reincarnation also allowed early Southeast
Asian rulers to accept the temporary nature of power. Thus, submitting to anotherpowerful kingdom, say as a tributary vassal, was itself considered temporary(Stuart-Fox, 2003: 32). These understandings of the world were very different from thetraditional Chinese worldviews outlined above. Nowhere was such difference moreevident than in the tributary relations. In pre-colonial Southeast Asia, inter-state
relations were also characterized by a suzerainty-tributary structure (Wolters, 1999).
However, in contrast to the China-centered tribute system, tributary states in Southeast
Asia were supposed to make real contribution to the wealth and power of theirsuzerainty. The subordinate rulers were required to pay a specified amount of valuable
local products as their tributes on a regular base, which then constituted the major
income of the powerful lord. In return, subordinate states were promised effective
protection against other neighboring powers. Moreover, the tributary status was not
something to be shameful about because it only reflected the temporary balance ofpower. When the times change, a subordinate state would build its own tributary
network and be a powerful lord capable of extracting wealth from other countries.
In pre-colonial Southeast Asia, China’s commitment to inclusiveness, impartiality andnon-exploitation was at best misunderstood and at worst resisted. Soon after the Ming
envoy invited Brunei to the China in 1370, Java warned Brunei not to pay tribute to
China. The Javanese envoys were heard as saying, ‘[i]f you give your allegiance toChina, you will be without us. When Sulu attacks again, you will have to seek help from
China’ (cf. Wang, 1968: 51). The warning appeared to deter Brunei from seeking further
relations with China. In the remaining 30 years of the 14th century, Brunei sent only one
mission to China, but continued to pay annual tribute to Java (Wang, 1968: 51). Only
after China promised upgraded protection did Brunei resume its tributary mission to the
Ming court in 1408. On that occasion the Brunei king not only visited China in person
9but brought his family with him. Together they received a splendid reception in the
Chinese capital. Declaring that Java should exempt Brunei from tribute, the Chineseemperor wrote a personal poem and inscription to memorize the occasion (Reid, 1996:
23). 5 Apparently, both sides were satisfied. For Brunei, it won the protection of aregional hegemon. For China, its commitment to inclusiveness and impartiality finallybore fruits. In another case, the son of a recently died ruler of Jambi, then a Sumatra
tributary to Java, secretly sought China’s recognition of his status as the new king in1377. The Javanese envoy resided in the Ming court had probably heard this diplomatic
exchange (Wolters, 1970: 62-63). The ‘betray’ of Jambi enraged the Javanese ruler.
When the Ming envoys were sent to grant imperial recognition to the new Jambi ruler,
they were rerouted to Java and murdered there in 1378.
In short, the pre-colonial hegemony of China had an important cultural dimension. At
least in the eyes of Chinese themselves, it reflected the morality of the ruler and his/herrule of virtue that attracted the voluntary submission of foreign countries. Nevertheless,the self-perceived cultural state of China was not shared by most Southeast Asian
countries. Under the influences of a different cultural tradition, the tributary relations inSoutheast Asia were marked by unquestioned domination and aggressive extraction of
resources. China’s self-proclaimed commitment to inclusiveness, impartiality andnon-exploitation was sometimes misunderstood and even resisted. The socialization
strategy of China’s cultural state, though influential among the Confucian countries inNortheast Asia (see Kang, 2010), had failed to produce desired impacts on pre-colonial
Southeast Asia.
The Public-Good Provision Strategy: Between Tributary Trade and Private Trade
The provision of public goods plays a central part in the hegemonic stability literature.
In particular, the hegemon is expected to maintain an open economic order to the benefitof other countries. However, defining the economic order between China andpre-colonial Southeast Asia is not so straightforward. Firstly, there was a long-standing
tributary framework that allowed Southeast Asian countries to conduct trade with China
free of duty (Fairbank, 1942). Nevertheless, tribute trade was limited by the number oftributary missions that each country was permitted to submit. Secondly, unlimited
private trade was officially accepted in certain periods of imperial China, notably during
5

The Brunei king died several weeks after the grand reception. He was officially buried in Nanjing(then the capital of China) in 1408, where his tomb is still located. His son was then recognized as
the new ruler. A Chinese commissioner was sent to support him during the first several years of his
ruling (Reid, 1996: 23). The young ruler visited China in 1412.
10

the Southern Song and late Qing dynasties (Yoshinobu, 1983; Reid, 1996). However,these periods were marked by the relative decline of China. Allowing private trade canhardly be interpreted as a sign of China’s hegemonic strength. Thirdly, the third
tributary country (e.g., Ryukyu) also played a non-negligible part in the trade between
China and pre-colonial Southeast Asia (Reid, 1993).
To make sense of this complex picture, it is necessary to look into the security
implications of trade in pre-colonial East Asia. Imperial China was largely an
agriculture-based economy. Instead of promoting trade, self-sufficiency had long been
considered as a virtue and an obligation. There was an important security reason behind
limiting trade in China. Due to its impact on the concentration of wealth, free trade
could easily lead to the political claim of local interests. Such claims not only
endangered the unity of the country but also threated the authority of the imperial court.
It was therefore in the interest of the central authority to regulate and control private
trade in imperial China. As Tilly (1992: 128) points out, imperial China, like its
counterparts in Europe, faced the interplay of two socio-political dynamics: ‘thebottom-up building of regional hierarchies based on trade and manufacturing, [and] the
top-down imposition of political control.’ In Europe, the persistence of bottom-up
hierarchies led to its long-term fragmentation after the fall of the Roman Empire. By
contrast, imperial China managed to impose a top-down political order at the expense of
trade and local economic centers. 6 Indeed, private trade was often banned during theperiods of dynastic consolidation such as the beginning of the Ming and Qing dynasties.
Only when the imperial court was financially weak was private trade officiallyencouraged in an attempt to boost royal income.
A similar trend can also be identified in pre-colonial Southeast Asia. Trade had played
an essential part in the state revenues of most Southeast Asian countries. Particularly
during the period of the so-called ‘age of commerce’ (i.e., 1450-1680) 7, revenues fromtrade constituted a substantial part of royal income in both maritime and mainland
Southeast Asia (Reid, 1993: 217). However, trade in important products was often
monopolized by individual rulers. In Burma the royal court controlled the trade of6

Gilpin (1981: 151) also notes, ‘[t]he Chinese Empire pursued a deliberate policy of preventing thedevelopment of economic centers that might break off. Chinese cities were administrative centers
responsive to the imperial center; they seldom became commercial centers.’
7
The ‘age of commerce’ is the title of a two-volume study by Anthony Reid (1988, 1993). The
study examines the transformation of Southeast Asia as the region experienced a trade boom
between 1450 and 1680. This period corresponds roughly to the mid- and late-Ming and the early
Qing dynasties in China.
11amber, gems, gold, and iron; in Siam the loyal warehouse was the only place where
foreigners could buy tin, lead, sappanwood, and saltpeter (Reid, 1993: 248). Even withregard to the trade of less important goods, ‘[s]trong kings almost invariably squeezed
the merchants and drove many of them away’ (Reid, 1993: 247). Rather than
encouraging private trade, Southeast Asian countries had also pursued the strategy ofstate dominance in international trade.
Not surprisingly, the China-centered tributary trade suited the both sides quite well.
Tributary trade allowed foreign countries to conduct trade with China either at theborder city where the tributary missions first arrived or in the market set up next to the
Official Residence for Tributary Envoys in the Chinese capital (Fairbank, 1942). Anycommercial activities outside these designated markets were strictly forbidden, but
tributary trade was duty-free. For China, tributary trade not just minimized the negative
implications of unregulated private trade, but also provided a mechanism to show
China’s benevolence and strength. For Southeast Asian countries, tributary tradeensured that the trade with China was conducted under the proper control of the royalcourt. Therefore, tributary trade did create some sort of open economic order beneficial
to both China and Southeast Asia. Such an economic order even generated somenoticeable stabilization impact on maritime Southeast Asia. As Wolters (2008: 69)
points out, ‘peace in the southern ocean (i.e., maritime Southeast Asia) was restored at
the time when there was a new Chinese dynasty, deliberately recovering the traditional
frontiers of China and, by means of special envoys, announcing its accession overseas
in order to revive China’s foreign trade.’
However, tributary trade had never been an economic order open to all. Only officiallyrecognized tributary countries were allowed to conduct trade with China. In addition,
there was specific limit regarding the number of tributary missions (and therefore trade)
allowed in a certain period of time. In the Qing dynasty, for example, Dai Viet was
permitted one tribute in every two years, while Siam was allowed one in three years,
Sulu one in five years, Burma and the Laos only one in ten years respectively (Fairbank
and Teng, 1941: 175-176). Because of these restrictive rules, tributary trade actuallycreated a group of ‘privileged trading states’ in pre-colonial Southeast Asia. In themainland, Champa and Cochin-China in southern Vietnam, Ayutthaya and Siam insouthern Thailand had maintained close tributary relations with China for several
centuries. All benefited substantially from trade revenues (Wade, 2009; Reid, 1993,
1996; Lieberman, 2003). In the archipelago, close tributary connections with China
12

helped Sirvijaya and Melaka become the center of insular Southeast Asian trade(Wolters, 1967, 1970; Lieberman, 2009). The centrality of Melaka was so prominent in
the 15th century that other Southeast Asian countries all sent their products to Melaka
for further export to China. Meanwhile, the eastern trade route via Taiwan and Luzon(i.e., northern Philippines) was abandoned in the late 1420s (Reid, 1996: 34). For thosecountries which had few or no tributary links, they were forced to rely on a third
tributary country, Ryukyu being the most well-known, to keep their trade flow with
China (Reid, 1996: 30; Lieberman, 2009: 799; Hamashita, 2011) 8.
Because of the extensive influences of tributary trade, its decline and the subsequent riseof private trade often brought change and instability to Southeast Asia. When the Songdynasty allowed private trade in the 10th century, there was no immediate impact on themaritime empire of Sirvijaya. Nonetheless, Sirvijaya’s hold on the trading ports along
the Malacca Strait inevitably loosened as these ports began to pursue their own tradewith China. Step by step, ‘Song trade expansion stoked local resistance to Sirvijaya’s
commercial claims’ (Lieberman, 2009: 793). The once powerful maritime empire
ceased to exist in the 13th century. After almost two hundred years of vibrant tributarytrade, the ban on private trade was officially lifted in 1567 under the Ming dynasty.
Immediately the abandoned eastern trade route was reopened. Port cities such as Manila,
Hoi An, Patani and Batavia prospered as a result. Within a few decades the Portuguese
who had occupied Melaka since 1511 were driven out of the pepper trade from westernJava and southern Sumatra (Reid, 1996: 38-39). Private trade was again allowed in the
Qing dynasty between 1684 and 1717 and from 1727 onwards. Soon foreign merchants
retreated from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Siam. One of the main reasons was that the
newly established access to Guangzhou made it no longer necessary to buy Chinese
goods through Southeast Asian ports (Reid, 1996: 44). As private trade eventually
dominated Southeast Asian trade routes, most maritime Southeast Asian countries cameto be recognized as ‘trading countries’ rather than ‘tributary states’ by the Qing court in
the early 19th century (Fairbank and Teng, 1941: 202-203; Fairbank, 1942: 141, 144).
In summary, it is difficult to deny that China had attempted to build an open economicorder in pre-colonial Southeast Asia. For several centuries, tributary trade effectively
brought Southeast Asian countries into a regional economic network covering almost
the whole East Asia. For those countries which had enthusiastically embraced tributary8

For example, Ryukyu agreed to open commercial relations with Palembang in 1428 and with Javain 1430. Then, Palembang was forbidden to keep direct link with China (Reid, 1996: 30).
13

trade, they often prospered as a result. Nevertheless, tributary trade was never reallyopen to all. Instead of benefiting every Southeast Asian country, it created a group ofprivileged trading states with special access to the Chinese market. Neither was
unlimited private trade capable of restoring order and stability to the region during theperiods when China was weak. The security implications of trade had made it difficult,if not impossible, for China to pursue a coherent public-good provision strategy in
pre-colonial Southeast Asia.
The Coercive Strategy: Unsuccessful Intervention and Unexpected Impact
The hegemonic impacts of China on Southeast Asia had been more benevolent thancoercive in the pre-colonial era. Though China had maintained unmatched military
superiority vis-à-vis Southeast Asia, there were very few conflicts between the two sides.
For one thing, most Southeast Asian countries were China’s tributary states which paid
regular homage to the imperial court (Wang, 1968; Reid, 1996; Stuart-Fox, 2003). For
another, the main security threats to China had been mostly located on the northernborders of the country. The first Ming emperor even issued a long list of Southeast
Asian countries that China should never attack (Wang, 1998a: 311-312). Apart from theMongol invasions in the 13th century9, China waged only three major campaigns against
Southeast Asia in a period of over one thousand years between the 8th and the 19th
century. These were the Ming occupation of Dai Viet between 1407 and 1427, the Qing
campaign against Burma between 1765 and 1770, and the Qing invasion of Dai Viet in
1788-1789.
The two Chinese campaigns against Dai Viet were both intended to restore the ruler
recognized by the imperial court. For China, Dai Viet was special because the country
had been under direct Chinese rule till the 10th century (Taylor, 1983). When Dai Vietwas recognized by the Song dynasty as an independent kingdom, its ruler was awarded
the curious title of ‘King of Jiao-Zhi Prefecture’, indicating a speical connection
between the two countries (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 45). Indeed, Dai Viet and China once
shared very similar bureaucratic structure, written language, and the Confucian rhetoric.
Because of such cultural intimacy, China had maintained close connection with Dai Vietthroughout the pre-colonial era. A new Dai Viet ruler always sent his/her envoy first to
China to seek imperial recognition. China was also keen to play a role in the country’s
9

Mongol troops were dispatched to Dai Viet in 1257, 1285 and 1287, to Champa in 1281, to the
Burmese-Mon Kingdom of Pagan in 1277 and 1287, and to Java in 1293 (Stuart-Fox, 2003: Ch4).
These military expeditions ended only in short-term victories. By the end of the 13th century, Mongol
troops were mostly pushed out of Southeast Asia.
14

loyal succession and dynastic change.
According to the Chinese official records, the Ming invasion of Dai Viet was a response
to a series of unusual succession occurred in the country (Ming Shi Lu, 1968; see also
Wang, 1998a). When the first Ming emperor sent his envoys to Dai Viet in 1369, theTran dynasty just installed an adopted son of the loyal family as the ruler of the country.
The succession was duly confirmed by the Ming court. However, the new ruler was
thrown out by a usurper several months later. Nothing was reported to the Ming court.
When China found out what had happened, it refused to recognize the usurper anddeclined his tribute. The official tributes resumed two years later, but the relations
between the two countries were not in a favorable condition. The emperor ordered thetributary rituals with Dai Viet to be downgraded. When China’s official tallies weredispatched to Champa, Khmer and Ayutthaya (i.e., other tributaries in mainland
Southeast Asia) in 1383, Dai Viet was not on the list (Wang, 1998: 310). Similar
succession and communication problems occurred again during the reign of the third
Ming emperor 10. The emperor was first informed that a relative of the Tran family was
installed as the new ruler in Dai Viet. Yet, it turned out that the recognized king wasagain a usurper and a regicide. The Ming court found the last remaining member of theTran house and sent him back to Dai Viet. The person was murdered on his arrival(Wang, 1998: 315). Soon a full-scale invasion of Dai Viet was ordered in 1407, in thename of punishing the usurper and restoring the Tran dynasty.
One may reasonably doubt the real intention of the Ming court. After all, the repeatedoverthrow was a sign of failed Tran ruling (Taylor, 1992: 149). Moreover, the Tran
family already ceased to exist by the time of invasion. Still a large number of Ming
troops were gathered from ten Chinese provinces, and they were sent to Dai Viet byboth land and sea. Initially the military campaign was a success. The usurper was
overthrown and his troops were defeated. However, the decision to turn Dai Viet into a
province of China turned out to be a disaster (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 82). The occupation
drained the Ming treasury over the years, and the occupiers were exploitative andcorrupted (Taylor, 1992: 150). Years of resistance followed. At the end China wasforced to withdraw in 1427.

10

The third Ming emperor, Yong-le, was himself a usurper. He was the fourth son of the first Ming
emperor. When the emperor died in 1398, the throne passed on to his nephew, Jian-wen. In thefollowing years, bitter distrust emerged between the young emperor and his uncle. In 1402 Yong-lemarched his troops to the capital and claimed himself the new emperor.
15

The Qing invasion of Dai Viet in 1788-1789 was also an attempt to restore a recognizedruler. Officially, it was a response to the plea of the last king of the Le dynasty. Dai Viet
had been thrown into turmoil due to the Tayson Rebellion since 1773. Historical records
show that there were signs that the political turmoil of Dai Viet could spread into China(Wills, 2001). When the rebel took the Le capital in 1787, the king was forced to takerefuge in the nearby Chinese Province. There he asked for the assistance of the Qing
court. A combination of internal concerns and external commitment probably led to thedecision of invading Dai Viet. Within ten days of receiving the plea, the Qing court
ordered the second full-scale invasion of Dai Viet in Chinese history. Troops weredispatched from the nearby provinces. Within a month the capital of Dai Viet was taken
and the Le king was restored. However, Nguyen Hue, the youngest of the Tayson
brothers, marched from the South. His forces launched an unexpected attack against the
Qing troops in the lunar New Year holidays of 1789, and successfully forced them toretreat (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 114). After the Chinese withdrawal, Nguyen Hue dispatchedtributary mission to the Qing court for the official recognition of his new kingdom. To
repair the bilateral relations, he even went to Beijing in person to celebrate the
Qian-long emperor’s eightieth birthday in 1790 (Reid, 1996: 48). It did not take long
before Nguyen Hue was confirmed as the legitimate King of Dai Viet.
Different from Dai Viet, successive Burmese kingdoms had kept distant connection with
China. In the 13th century the ancient Burmese-Mon kingdom of Pagan was fatally
defeated by the Mongols (Stuart-Fox, 2003: 60-61). On its ruins the Toungoo dynasty
and the ensuing Konbaung dynasty established themselves as powerful kingdoms on thewestern Southeast Asian mainland. Nonetheless, China had not recognized thesepowerful rulers as kings during the Ming dynasty (Wang, 1998: 313). Similarly, thesuccessive Burmese rulers showed little interest in establishing close tributary relations
with China. Instead, they were busy battling with their regional rival Ayutthaya/Siam tothe east, and dealing with small Shan states to the north (Lieberman, 2003).
The Konbaung dynasty of Burma was established in 1752. During its reign, Burmapursued an aggressive state-building policy to bring the periphery vassals and tributaries
under its direct control (Lieberman, 2003). At the time, there were a few independent
chieftains located on the bordering areas between China and Burma, most of which paid
tributes to both countries. As Konbaung tightened its controls, some chieftains turned toChina for assistance. The Chinese response, initially only on a local scale, soontriggered a major military confrontation between the two countries (Dai, 2004: 155).
16

Compared with the late invasion of Dai Viet, the Qing campaign against Burma lasted
much longer. Between 1765 and 1770 China sent four batches of forces to invade thecountry. At the beginning only the local troops were dispatched. As the battle dragged
on, the emperor sent his elite Manchu troops to the Southwest border. In response,
Konbaung was forced to withdraw its troops from Ayutthaya to fight against the Chinese.
In the end, it was the generals on the ground who decided to negotiate a truce to end theconflict between the two countries in 1769 (see Dai, 2004). Back in the capitals neither
the Konbaung court nor the Qing court was satisfied with the terms of the truce. It was
not until 1790 that the tributary relations between the two countries were resumed.
Although the three military campaigns all ended in China’s defeat, they generated some
unexpected impacts on the power balance of mainland Southeast Asia. After the Ming
troops withdrew from their twenty-year occupation in 1427, Dai Viet was emboldened
to assert its sub-regional dominance in the eastern mainland. It invaded Champa to thesouth in 1471, and marched into the Laotian Kingdom of Lang Xang to the west in 1479.
On both occasions China was asked to provide assistance to contain the Dai Vietaggression. However, the Ming court was not in a position to launch another attack
against Dai Viet (Wang, 1998: 318). On the southern frontier Champa was fatally
defeated and eventually became a vassal of Dai Viet. On the western frontier Lang
Xang’s capital was taken and its king killed. Only after the Tai kingdom of Lan Na
offered military support did Lan Xang manage to drive Dai Viet troops out of its
territory. By the end of 15th century a new sub-regional order had emerged in eastern
mainland Southeast Asia, with Dai Viet being at the top of it (see Li, 2010).
The Qing campaign against Burma led to a contrasting outcome. In the same year as the
Qing troops entered the Burmese border, the Konbaung dynasty of Burma launched its
second attack against Ayutthaya. The Burmese troops attacked Tai kingdom from boththe north and the south. One year later they sieged its capital. Ayutthaya surrendered in
the middle of 1767. Later that year, however, the Qing court dispatched its elite Manchu
troops in its third campaign against Burma (Dai, 2004). The Konbaung king was forced
to withdraw his forces from their occupation of Ayutthaya to fight against China.
Although Ayutthaya was left in a devastated situation after the Burmese withdrawal, aprovincial governor, Taksin, managed to reclaim the country and declared himself theKing of Siam in 1768. The new Tai kingdom successfully defended itself against
another two Burmese attacks in the following twenty years. During the process, Siam
unified the northern Tai Kingdom of Lan Na into its territory (Lieberman, 2003). By the17end of 18th century Siam had successfully established itself as a sub-regional power incentral mainland Southeast Asia.
It would be naive to conclude that the coercive strategies taken by China reshaped thepower balance of mainland Southeast Asia in the 14th and 18th centuries. At most,China’s unsuccessful campaigns speeded up the ongoing power transition process at the
sub-regional level. To install the rightful rulers and to protect the independent chieftains
were claimed to be the main reasons behind imperial China’s military aggression. Yet,
standing at a higher moral ground, itself being doubted by some, was not enough tocompensate the ineffective coercive measures that China had taken. If hegemonic
China’s benevolent policy of tributary trade achieved something in pre-colonial
Southeast Asia, its coercive strategy had ended in failure.
The Institution-Building Strategy: Rise and Fall of the Tribute System
At the center of China’s hegemonic power had been the long-standing tribute system.
The tribute system was important because it offered an elaborated institutionalframework to conduct China’s foreign relations in the pre-colonial era (Fairbank andTeng, 1941: 141; see also Fairbank, 1942; Mancall, 1984). Receiving foreign envoys
involved the tributary rituals; royal communication with foreign countries employed thetributary rhetoric; international trade was mostly conducted under the tributaryframework; and even restored diplomatic relations had to follow the tributary
procedures. For China, the tribute system reflected the Confucian views of an orderly
hierarchy between China and the rest of the world. For foreign countries, the tribute
system provided a unique diplomatic channel to conduct de facto equal relations with
China (Kang, 2010: 54). For a period of nearly two thousand years, the tribute system
had been the institutional foundation of hegemonic China in East Asia (Fairbank, 1968).
Nevertheless, the tribute system is very different from the modern international regime
articulated in the hegemonic stability literature (see Keohane, 1980, 1984). First of all,the tribute system was an overarching foreign service of China, covering political,
economic and diplomatic areas (Fairbank, 1942). It neither specialized in a particularpolicy issue nor directly regulated the inter-state relations beyond China. In addition, thetribute system was always bilateral (Mancall, 1965). There was probably a multilateralaudience who paid special attention to the tributary relations between their neighboring
countries and China. The tribute system never offered a multilateral framework to
encourage inter-state cooperation. Despite these notable differences, the tribute system18

did facilitate the converging expectations among the tributary countries on China’s
preferred regional order. The tribute system also relied mostly on the voluntary
contribution of China. It was certainly very costly. As the imperial treasury dried up at
the end of each dynasty, the tribute system often lost its influences. Hence, it is still
possible to explore the hegemonic impacts of the tribute system without imposing therequirement of modern international regimes.
Institutionally, the tribute system was put into practice in the Han dynasty. Historical
records show that the first tributary missions probably arrived in China around the 1st
century BC (Li, 2004: 16). At that time, it was already established that tributary rulers
were awarded with the imperial appointment of a noble rank, and that the tributes were
accepted in exchange for imperial gifts. Tributary trade was also an integral part of thetribute system. The first recorded Southeast Asian tributes were sent by the ancient
mainland kingdom of Funan. In total, Funan dispatched six missions to China in the 3rd
century, then one in the 4th century, and another sixteen in the 5th and 6th centuries(Stuart-Fox, 2003: 30). As China was internally divided during these periods, most ofthese tributes were probably delivered to the southern Chinese kingdoms.
It was the unification of China under the Sui and Tang dynasties between the late 6th andthe early 10th century that revitalized the tribute system. As far as Southeast Asia wasconcerned, tributary missions from the Gulf of Thailand and the Java Sea were regularly
sent to the imperial court throughout the 7th and 8th century (Wang, 1970: 375). Amongthem, the maritime Southeast Asian kingdom of Sirvijaya managed to establish very
close tributary relations with China. Its missions continued well into the first half of the
11th century when China was ruled by the Song dynasty (Wolters, 1970). Nevertheless,after the defeated Song reestablished itself as the Southern Song dynasty in 1127, thenumber of tributary missions dramatically declined. For one thing, China was no longer
perceived as powerful as before. For another, private trade became such an importantsource of royal income that the imperial court was unwilling to accept tributary
missions (Yoshinobu, 1983). The traditional Chinese tribute system further deteriorated
under the Mongol ruling. The Yuan dynasty imposed very harsh conditions on thetributary countries, and forced them to pay tax and provide military covée (Wang, 1968:
48). When its demands were rejected, armies were sent to Southeast Asia to enforce
these policies.
The early decades of the Ming dynasty were probably the most glorious period of the19tribute system. Partly because of the official ban on private trade and partly because of
the grand expeditions of Zheng He, Southeast Asian tributes to China peaked in theearly 15th century (see Figure 1). The Mongol version of tribute was abandoned in favorof the traditional Chinese tribute system. Foreign missions were received according toeven more elaborated tributary rituals. Tributary trade became so important that someSoutheast Asian states (e.g., Java) once sent as many as three missions a year to China(Qiu, 1995: 128, 180). However, as the Ming court moved its capital from Nanjing toBeijing in 1421 and the imperial treasury gradually weakened, China lost the interest in
expanding its contact with Southeast Asia. In the decades after private trade waslegalized in 1567, only Dai Viet and the Tai kingdom of Ayutthaya continued to dispatch
tribute to China.
Figure 1 Southeast Asian Tributes to the Ming court (1370-1640)
50
45
40
35
30
25

MelakaBruneiJava

20

Ayutthaya

15

Cambodia

10Champa5

Dai Viet0

Source: Qiu (1995: 128, 180-182, 232-234, 294-295)

The last Chinese imperial dynasty of Qing inherited many Ming practices of the tribute
system, particularly in dealing with Southeast Asia. The institutional context was so
close that the Qing court explicitly requested the tributary countries to return theimperial seals granted to them during the Ming period (Fairbank and Teng, 1941: 164).
The only difference was that the Qing dynasty no longer used tributary trade to promote
its overseas influences. Except an early ban on private trade, tributary trade was
gradually replaced by private trade in the late 17th and early 18th century. Still, Southeast
Asian countries submitted regular tributes to the Qing court. Among the five designated20

tributary countries in Southeast Asia 11, the number of missions was noticeably increased
between 1780 and 1840 (see Figure 2). However, after the Qing troops were defeated in
the Opium Wars in the 1840s and 1850s, the tribute system could no longer function asa hegemonic magnet for Southeast Asia.
Figure 2 Southeast Asian Tributes to the Qing court (1660-1880)
20
18
16
14
Sulu

12

Laos

10

Bruma

8

Ayatthaya/Siam

6

Dai Viet

420

Source: Fairbank and Teng (1941: 193-197)

What factors had contributed to the rise and fall of the tribute system vis-à-vis
pre-colonial Southeast Asia? Obviously, the hegemonic power of China was the most
crucial factor in determining the influences of the tribute system. When China wasstrong and its foreign policy outward-looking, Southeast Asian countries were willing to
pay tributes to its hegemonic influences. When China was weakened by internal
division and external competition in the Southern Song, late Ming and late Qing
dynasties, tributary missions from Southeast Asia declined. Another factor had also been
important: tributary trade. Since private trade was banned in most periods of imperial
China, tributary trade offered an attractive alternative for Southeast Asian trading states
to maintain their commercial links with China. In the Han, Tang, and early Ming
dynasties, tributary trade was probably the most important reason why so many
Southeast Asian missions came to China.
11

According to Fairbank (1968: 11), five Southeast Asian countries were officially recorded as thetributaries of the Qing court in 1818: Dai Viet, Laos, Siam, Sulu and Burma.
21However, the explanations of hegemonic power and tributary trade stand uncomfortably
with the sudden increase of tributary missions between 1780 and 1840 (Figure 2). The
Qing dynasty was in decline during this period. Tributary trade had already been
replaced by private trade. While Fairbank (1942) argues that commercial reasons
explained the sudden increase 12, there were other important political dynamics beneaththe scene. One of these was the coercive measures that the Qing had taken against
mainland Southeast Asia. Mentioned earlier, large-scale military campaigns werelaunched against Burma (1765-1770) and Dai Viet (1788-1789). As the clear winner,
Dai Viet increased the frequency of its tributary missions to China after 1789 in order torepair the bilateral relations. As the unexpected beneficiary of China’s campaign against
Burma, the newly founded Tai kingdom of Siam was eager to keep close relations with
China after it was recognized by the Qing court in 1781. The Burmese missions also
increased briefly after its relations with China were normalized in 1790. Even morenotably, Burma again sent more missions to China in the 1820s and 1830s, probably
requesting for China’s assistance when the country was fighting against Britain.
In short, the tribute system had stood at the center of China’s hegemonic influences. Its
profound impacts on pre-colonial Southeast Asia show that China had long pursued an
institution-building strategy to exert its hegemonic power. Except in the Yuan dynasty,
the tributary system offered China a non-aggressive institutional setting to pursue its
superiority in Southeast Asia. Its institutional influences corresponded roughly with thehegemonic strength of China. Both the public-good provision strategy of tributary trade
and the coercive strategy of military campaigns had generated noticeable impacts on thetribute system. One may even identify a ‘hegemonic lag’ in the late Qing dynasty whenSoutheast Asian tributes increased during a period of China’s decline.
Conclusion
Throughout the pre-colonial era China had a profound impact on Southeast Asia. Under
the tribute system, Southeast Asian countries came to China to pay homage for morethan one thousand and five hundred years. Economically, China created a regional
economic order centered on tributary trade. Its influences were so prominent that it onceencompassed the whole Northeast and Southeast Asia. Politically, China not just exerted
12Fairbank (1942: 145) notes, ‘I am not aware of political or other circumstances likely to haveproduced the recorded increase of activity. As far as it goes, this evidence lends strong support to thetheory that tribute missions functioned chiefly as a vehicle for trade.’22direct impact on the tributary states but regulated inter-state relations far beyond its
borders (see Shu, 2011). Nevertheless, the hegemony of China was not enough to bringstability to pre-colonial Southeast Asia. Neither was the regional economic ordercompletely open, nor did the inter-state relations keep long-term stability among
Southeast Asian countries.
This article has examined the largely failed hegemonic strategies that China had pursued
in pre-colonial Southeast Asia. Firstly, the self-proclaimed commitment to inclusiveness,
impartiality and non-exploitation had not socialized the ‘Indianized’ states of Southeast
Asia. Influenced by a different cultural tradition, pre-colonial Southeast Asian countries
were more pragmatic in handling their relations with other countries. In the end, China’s
cultural state probably had a more attentive domestic audience than overseas influences.
Secondly, because of the security implications of international trade, the pre-colonial
regional economic order had never been really open to all. Instead, tributary tradecreated a group of privileged trading states that kept closer relations with China, andallowed them to dominate the trade routes in Southeast Asia. Thirdly, the limited
coercive campaigns that China had waged against pre-colonial Southeast Asia ended allin failure. Instead of regulating royal succession and protecting small chieftains, thesemilitary expeditions had altered the power balance of mainland Southeast Asia beyond
China’s expectation. Fourthly, the tribute system was extremely influential, but its riseand fall had not gone beyond the cycle of China’s dynastic changes. Despite being
enthusiastic participants of the tribute system, most Southeast Asian countries were
probably attracted more by China’s economic and political influences than by its
hegemonic status.
The fact that the undisputed hegemony of China had not produced sub-regional stability
in pre-colonial Southeast Asia has important implications in theoretical and empiricalterms. Theoretically, it challenges the hegemonic stability literature, and especially theclaim that hegemony always leads to stability (Kindleberger, 1973; Krasner, 1967;
Gilpin, 1981). It is often taken as granted that the hegemon can resort to coercive
measures, public-good provision strategies, institution-building mechanism, andsocialization efforts to maintain a stable international order. The experiences ofpre-colonial Southeast Asia show that stability is not an automatic outcome of an
existing predominant power. Instead, hegemonic stability is contingent on a number ofconditions. The socialization strategy is more effective within a common cultural
background and value system; the public-good provision strategy should follow the23rules of inclusiveness and non-discrimination; the coercive strategy requires consistentgoals and effective implementation; and the institutional-building strategy must aim at
long-term international order rather than short-term hegemonic superiority.
Empirically, the findings of the article raises many questions about the scholarly
optimism that pre-colonial East Asia under the hegemony of China had been a peacefuland stable regional order (Kang, 2007, 2010). It is true that under the tribute system
most Southeast Asian countries recognized the superiority of imperial China. Tributarytrade also established a vibrant regional economic order to the benefit of many
Southeast Asian trading states. However, China’s unquestioned hegemon had notbrought long-term peace and stability to pre-colonial Southeast Asia. Throughout the
pre-colonial era, the politico-economic dynamics at the sub-regional level had been
largely self-contained, following its own logic of survival and competition (Shu, 2011).
Outside the Sinicized Confucian world, pre-colonial Southeast Asia had not moved
beyond in an anarchic state of international relations.

24

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GIARI Working Paper Vol. 2011-E-5,
December 2011
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