Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)JAPAN 2020: ABE’S WELL-LAID PLANS GO AWRY1Corey Wallace
Kanagawa University
wallace@kanagawa-u.ac.jp
Giulio Pugliese
University of Oxford and European University Institutegiulio.pugliese@nissan.ox.ac.uk
Like elsewhere, the COVID-19 pandemic caused substantial disruptionsin Japan. While generous fiscal spending mitigated the pandemic’s economic
fallout, and Japan is poised in 2021 to rebound from its year-on-year 4.8%
fall in GDP, there was significant political fallout in 2020. The postponementof the Olympic Games, the Abe government’s perceived inability to tackle
the pandemic, and the (re)surfacing of political scandals led to Japan’s
longest-serving Prime Minister popularity plummeting. The re-emergence of
Abe’s health problems then precipitated his abrupt resignation. This usheredin the premiership of Suga Yoshihide, who promised to enact structuralreforms and ambitious digitalization and environmental programmes, while
also promising to continue significant elements of Abe’s policy agenda.
Internationally, COVID-19 accelerated US-China tensions and, inconnection to that, China’s regional assertiveness. This perceived
assertiveness as well as China’s political involution and human rights
violations in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, in turn, hardened the Japanese
government’s position vis-à-vis Beijing. This happened despite Abe’s early2020 efforts towards hosting a state visit by the Chinese president. Instead,the year instead ended with a «Quad» meeting at the ministerial level, hosted
in Tokyo, rather than an entente with China. At the same time, Japan
deepened its «Indo-Pacific» engagement with important European nations
as well as the European Union itself. It did so while doubling down on
economic security initiatives that strengthened supply chain resiliency andprovided telecommunication alternatives to Chinese initiatives, thereby
restraining Chinese strategic influence. Security cooperation with the UnitedStates - through joint development of weapons systems, such as a new
1
The authors wish to thank two anonymous reviewers, Glen Fukushima and Paul Nadeau
for feedback. First name follows family name for East Asian names.

1Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
Japanese fighter, and close coordination in space, cyber andelectromagnetic warfare - continued unabated in 2020.
Keywords – COVID-19, Suga Yoshihide, Free and Open Indo-Pacific,
Japanese foreign and security policy, economic security, O-RAN
1. COVID-19 and Abe’s Downfall
2020 was supposed to be a capstone year for Japanese Prime Minister Abe
Shinzō. Ideally, Abe and a newly enthroned Reiwa Emperor would welcome
Xi Jinping to Tokyo, in the first official state visit to Japan by a Chinese
leader since 2008, and put the finishing touches on a tactical détente in SinoJapanese relations. Cashing in on his appearance as Super Mario at the Rio
2016 closing ceremony,2 Abe would then preside over a successful Tokyo
Olympics. With a special emphasis on the Tōhoku region’s post-3/11
reconstruction, the government would showcase to the world a uniquely
hospitable (omotenashi), culturally popular, and still technologicallysophisticated Japan.3
In this scenario, positive patriotic sentiments would accompany
record revenues for corporate and small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) due to the impressive number of visitors and spending - especiallyfrom China - before, during and after the Olympics. Together with themassive ¥ 26 trillion stimulus package (ca. € 208 billion) and ¥ 4.4 trillion(ca. € 35 billion) supplementary budget, the Japanese economy would thenfight off the effects of the September 2019 consumption tax rise andslowdown in Olympics-related construction, extending the anti-recessionary
successes of the eponymous Abenomics growth strategy. 4 A very lightlegislative agenda in the first half of 2020 would also leave plenty of time
for debate and legislative preparations for legacy-making constitutional
revision. 5 By leveraging economic tail winds and the diplomatic anddomestic shine of a successful Olympics, Abe could then secure one final
landslide electoral victory for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in
Autumn. This victory would ripen the conditions for one final constitutional
revision push and give Abe significant influence in selecting his successor.
2

Abe was dressed up as Super Mario for public diplomacy purposes.
Oki Nagai, ‘Japan's Once-a-decade Mind Games with China over Top Leader Visit’,
Nikkei Asia, 27 January 2020.
4
Yuko Aizawa, ‘Tough Diet Session Begins’, NHK World, 27 January 2020; ‘Cabinet
Approves ¥26 trillion Stimulus Package to Prop up Slowing Japanese Economy’, Japan
Times, 5 December 2019.
5
Adam Liff, ‘Japan in 2020: COVID-19 and the End of the Abe Era’, Asian Survey,
Volume 61, Issue 1, 2021, pp.49-64.
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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
His successor would then be set up to break the cycle of six consecutive yearlong premierships preceding Abe’s record-breaking administration.
Fast forward one year, things looked very different from thisidealised timeline. There was no meeting with Xi Jinping, and Sino-Japaneserelations reverted to troubled form. The COVID-19 pandemic forced a oneyear postponement of the Olympics and then its hollowing out due tooverseas spectators not being able to attend. This dealt a financial andpsychological blow to the Japanese people, to Japan’s SMEs, and to the 68
official corporate sponsors anticipating brand enhancement from the mostheavily sponsored athletic event ever.6 In addition to enduring pandemicrelated medical stresses on social services, Japan entered a recession for the
first time in half a decade, arguably enduring its «largest [economic] crisis
since World War II.»7 Abe was gone, and his successor, Suga Yoshihide wasalready struggling as LDP factions again appeared ascendant. No election
had been called and constitutional revision was barely discussed in 2020.
This article elaborates on these developments and theirimplications. They portend a more dynamic domestic and international
environment for Japan and its leaders in the years ahead, compared to therelative stability of the «Abe era». COVID-19 clearly played a role inhastening Abe’s premature departure by depriving him of the economic,
diplomatic, and political tools that had hitherto sustained his administration.8
Up until the end of 2019, the government of Japan could claim a number of
economic successes under the rubric of Abenomics: a yen weakened by 20%
against the United States Dollar which had precipitated a 20% jump in annual
exports and the tripling of overseas visitor and spending numbers; thedoubling of share market prices and pre-tax corporate returns; a 50% increasein tax revenue and a reduction in the government’s budgetary bonddependency ratio; and a plummeting unemployment rate (2.2% - down from4.3%) as 4.1 million more people - and 3.1 million more women - foundwork despite the accelerated onset of an aging and shrinking population.9
6‘「復興」が「打倒コロナ」へ 安倍政権、五輪の意義語れず’ («Reconstruction»
Turns into «Corona Overthrow»; Abe Administration Unable to Appeal to the
Significance of the Olympics), Jiji Tsūshin, 28 August 2020; Leo Lewis, Robin Harding
and Kana Inagaki, ‘Olympic Sponsorship: Japan Inc Pressed into National Service’, The
Financial Times, 15 August 2019; ‘New Record for International Visitors to Japan’,Nippon.com, 27 January 2020; ‘Foreign Tourists Spend Record 4.8 Tril. Yen in Japan in
2019’, Kyodo News, 17 January 2020; Rurika Imahashi & Francesca Regaldo, ‘Tokyo
Olympics Delay Leaves Sponsors Facing Losses and Lawsuits’, Nikkei Asia, 16 February
2021.
7‘Japan Slides into Recession as Economy Shrinks 3.4%’, Kyodo News, 18 May 2020.
8
Liff, ‘Japan in 2020’.
9‘Abenomics’, Government of Japan Website, January 2019(https://www.japan.go.jp/abenomics/_userdata/abenomics/pdf/1901_abenomics.pdf).

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
The global COVID-19 onslaught, however, undermined theseachievements and narratives of success. Exports dropped 11.1% to the lowest
level since 2012 thanks in part to China’s severe first quarter GDP
contraction (-6.8%) - its first negative growth since 1976. At the same time,
private financial institutions and spenders tightened their belts as deflation
reappeared. 10 COVID-19 also undercut the Abe government’s big bet on
increasing inbound tourism. 11 Expectations around the Olympics,
consumption tax exemptions for tourists, and relaxed visa rules for Chinese
visitors raised the possibility of 40 million visitors spending over ¥ 5 trillion
in 2020, stimulating the construction of world-class hotels. With therestrictions on overseas visitors and the postponement of the Olympics,
Japan struggled to reach four million visitors (down 87.1%) in 2020. 12
Furthermore, internal movement was discouraged and business hours limited
by COVID-19, meaning the tourist and hospitality industries bore the burdenof sunk costs in tourist infrastructure and preparations. This and thediminished economic activity of other industries, such as the entertainment
and transportation sectors, contributed to the jobs-to-applicants ratio
plummeting back to 1.08 from a healthy 1.63 in 2019. Unemployment also
jumped to 2.9% as women lost 70% of the more than 700,000 jobs thatvanished during 2020. Japan’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) eventemporarily fell back to 2012 levels - and nominal GDP fell far short of thepromised ¥ 600 trillion 2020 target.13 Falling tax revenue and unprecedented
10
National Bureau of Statistics of China, Decline of Major Economic Indicators
Significantly Narrowed Down in March, 17 April 2020
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202004/t20200417_1739339.html); Adam
Posen, ‘Lessons from Japan: High-income Countries have Common Problems’, The
Financial Times, 24 November 2020;‘Japan's Exports Fell 11% in 2020, Taking Biggest
Hit in 11 Years Amid Pandemic’, Japan Times, 21 January 2021.
11
While the decision to pursue and promote tourism to Japan was a long-standing policy,
this bet was also taken on the advice of a British entrepreneur based in Japan who would
later become a member of the future premier’s and then Chief Cabinet Secretary’s
economic policy council. ‘Sources: British Businessman to Sit on Economic Policy
Council’, Asahi Shimbun, 14 October 2020.
12‘訪日外客数 （JNTO 推計値）’ (JNTO Estimates of Foreign Visitors’ Arrivals),
Japan National Tourism Organization, December 2020
(https://www.jnto.go.jp/jpn/statistics/data_info_listing/xls/210120_monthly.xlsx)
13
Makiko Eda,‘COVID-19 Shows Why Japan Cannot Wait to Act on Gender Equality’,
Nikkei Asia, 23 October 2020; Komiya Kazuyoshi, ‘｢7 年 8 カ月もやってはいけなかった｣安倍長期政権が残した巨大なツケ’(The Big Unpaid Bills for What Couldn’t beDone in the Abe Administration’s Seven Years, Eight Months), President Online, 11
September 2020 (https://president.jp/articles/-/38684); Harada Yutaka, ‘アベノミクスへの辛口評価は根拠なし、景気実感は実は改善している’ (Criticisms of Abenomics
Unfounded, Actual Economic Sentiment Improving), Diamond Online, 14 September
2020 (https://diamond.jp/articles/-/248454); Noriyuki Suzuki & Su Xincheng, ‘Focus:

4Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
stimulus packages undid any progress made by Abe on fiscal sustainability
as ¥ 175.7 trillion in direct spending resulted in the issuance of ¥ 112.5
trillion of bonds (64.1% bond dependence ratio) - double the amount issued
following the 2008 Lehman Shock.14
Abe’s proactive public and global diplomacy - the most publicly
appreciated aspect of Abe’s leadership and what arguably won Tokyo the
Olympics along with the metropolitan government’s good efforts - was also
restrained as countries turned inward.15 Abe’s proactive attempts to enhance
Japan’s partnerships with India, ASEAN nations, Australia, New Zealand,
Europe and even nations in the East Africa subregion had turned him into a
recognizable figure in world affairs as he set world records for prime
ministerial visits.16
Unperturbed by the failure of his two immediate predecessors tojoin the TPP, Abe also tamed traditionally recalcitrant anti-trade interest
groups at home, and Japan carved out a more «liberal» foreign economic
policy. The highlights were the adoption of the Comprehensive andProgressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and JapanEU Economic Partnership Agreement (JEEPA). Enabling a degree ofstrategic diversification between China and the United States and therestoration of Japan’s «geoeconomic agency», Japan continued to play apivotal role in regional rulemaking on trade through Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership negotiations.17
Abe survived and even thrived during the first three years of apotentially perilous Trump administration. Deflecting attention fromtensions in the US-Japan alliance that could have manifested in politicallyinconvenient ways for Japan’s leaders, Abe’s Trump diplomacy eventually
Abe's Departure with Mixed Economic Results to Test Market Confidence’, Kyodo News,
31 August 2020.
14
Including credit guarantees, loan facilities and other support instruments, the COVID19 stimulus package amounted to almost two-thirds of Japan’s GDP. ‘Japan compiles¥73.6 trillion stimulus package to fight pandemic’, Japan Times, 8 December 2020;
Naoki Tsuzaka, ‘Japan to Issue Bonds in Excess of 100 Trillion Yen for the First Time’,Asahi Shimbun, 16 December 2020.
15‘NHK 世論調査’ (NHK Opinion Survey), NHK Senkyo Web, 11 November 2019(https://www.nhk.or.jp/senkyo/shijiritsu/archive/2019_11.html). ‘安倍政権 外交・安保「評価」５７％ コロナ対策は２９％’ (57 Percent Rate Abe’s Diplomacy, Security
Policies, 29 Percent its COVID-19 Response), Mainichi Shimbun, 10 September 2020
(https://mainichi.jp/articles/20200910/ddm/012/010/100000c).
16
Corey Wallace, ‘Leaving (North-east) Asia? Japan's Southern Strategy’, International
Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 4, July 2018, pp.883-904.
17‘Book Review Roundtable: Saori N. Katada’s Japan’s New Regional Reality:
Geoeconomic Strategy in the Asia-Pacific’, Asia Policy, Volume 15, Issue 4, October
2020, pp.134-154.

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
persuaded the US administration to adopt the Indo-Pacific strategic
framework. Abe grew sufficiently confident in the strength of Trump’s
backing and in his own domestic political situation that he pursued a tacticaldétente with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). COVID-19, however,
not only short-circuited Abe’s use of summit diplomacy for strategic
diplomacy and foreign economic policy, but also deprived Abe of a way to
grandstand in front of domestic audiences and reassure Japanese citizens
about the country’s international position.
A third factor in Abe’s success - as an able crisis manager andcommanding leader - was also undermined. Despite Abe-era enhancementsin the government crisis management abilities, such as the establishment of
the National Security Council (NSC) and Secretariat (NSS) within the
Cabinet Secretariat in 2014, the actual government crisis management
response did not seem to benefit from these institutions. 18 Japan lacks adedicated pandemic unit within the NSS and/or an institution like the UnitedStates’ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). There was thus
little coordination of the collection, analysis and sharing of criticalinformation and public communications, including the provision of expert
advice to officials and local authorities on travel restrictions, quarantines,
and isolation. Bureaucratic silos and parallel task forces developed in thePrime Minister’s office, the Cabinet office, the Ministry of Health, Labourand Welfare and the Tokyo metropolitan government. In fact, nobody,
including Prime Minister Abe, appeared to be leading a focused government
response in the early stages.19 The government was also limited in its legal
powers to compel public cooperation. Legislation passed in 2012 gave thecentral government the right to declare a state of emergency in response to a
Novel Influenza pandemic and delegate powers to prefectural governors toclose schools and fine businesses that did not comply with closure requests.
This never-used-before legislation did not initially cover COVID-19. Even
after the government updated the legislation, local governments could not domore than «request» (yōsei) individual residents limit their movements.
2. The Political Genesis of Abe’s Downfall

18
Harukata Takenaka, ‘Expansion of the Prime Minister’s Power in the Japanese
Parliamentary System: Transformation of Japanese Politics and Institutional Reforms’,
Asian Survey, Volume 59, Issue 5, 2019, pp.844-869; Mayumi Fukushima & Richard J.
Samuels, ‘Japan's National Security Council: Filling the Whole of Government?’,
International Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 4, July 2018, pp.773-790.
19
Hiromi Murakami, ‘A Japan Divided over COVID-19 Control’, East Asia Forum, 8March 2020; Linda Sieg, ‘«Where’s Abe?», Critics Ask, as Coronavirus Spreads inJapan’, Reuters, 25 February 2020.

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
Attributing Abe’s downfall to COVID-19 provides a parsimonious
explanation - but also an unsatisfying one. After all, governments in Taiwan,
Vietnam, and South Korea managed to enhance their political support andlegitimacy during the crisis through proactive measures without long
lockdowns periods. Japan’s prefectural governments, despite having lessfiscal and personnel resources, also attained better appraisals than central
government for their COVID-19 response.20 The Japanese government also
did not have to deal with strong public sentiments to prioritise the economy
over stopping the spread of the disease, and the Japanese public generally
supported decisive pandemic suppression measures. Beginning societal
jishuku (self-restraint) well ahead of government action, the public alsobought time for the government as Japan registered COVID-19 outcomesthat compared favourably with most Western nations, notwithstanding
international and domestic criticism of Japan’s initially low levels of PCR
testing. Furthermore, Japan’s relatively modest year-on-year fall in GDP of
4.8 % in 2020 suggests that generous countercyclical fiscal policies helped
economically, as did the rebound in neighbouring East Asian andAustralasian countries that also performed well at suppressing the pandemic.
Even Japan’s SMEs proved more resilient than has generally been the caseworldwide. The job situation was still healthy compared to Japan in 2008
when unemployment was 5.5 % and the job-to-applicant ratio was 0.42.21
The pandemic was an unprecedented but surmountable challenge for the Abeadministration.
The Abe government ultimately lost public legitimacy due to aconfluence of failures in communicating urgency, ethical discipline, andinter-personal administrative functionality. Also, problems in intra-LDP andcoalition unity became apparent precisely when transparent, coherent
government was needed most. First, the Abe administration did notcommunicate a strong sense of urgency by using the powers, resources, andwarning times it did have. It moved slowly to introduce pandemic-specificofficial and expert task forces within the Cabinet Secretariat to provide
advice to the government and guidance to the public about pandemic
suppression. The government’s «Basic Plan» was therefore not announced
20‘2020 年 11 月全国郵送調査「いまの政治と新型コロナ、東日本大震災」’(November 2020 National Postal Survey: COVID-19, Contemporary Politics, Tohoku
Disaster), Asahi Shimbun, November 2020
(https://digital.asahi.com/politics/yoron/download/202011_corona.pdf.html).
21‘GDP 実質年率 12.7%増、10～12 月 20 年は 4.8%減’ (Real GDP Growth between
October and December is 12.7%; in 2020, GDP shrunk by 4.8%), Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
15 February 2021. Yuta Koga, ‘Japan’s Smaller Companies Prove More Resilient to
COVID-19’, Nikkei Asia, 26 August 2020. Mitsuru Obe, ‘Japan's Youth Worst Hit byCountry's COVID Job Losses in 2020’, Nikkei Asia, 29 January 2021.

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
until February 25, - almost two months after China officially informed theWorld Health Organization (WHO) about the Wuhan cluster and five weeks
after Japan’s first reported case. The cabinet was also slow to tighten up
border restrictions on visitors from Hubei and other China hotspots, resulting
in the first COVID-19 wave during February. It similarly hesitated to restrict
visitors from Europe and North America until March, too late to prevent amuch worse second wave in April.22 The Diamond Princess saga also brought
increasing domestic and international concern over the administration’s
handling of the quarantine while also drawing attention to the lack of testing
kits, Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) and sufficiently trained
personnel.23
The government continued to ignore prefectural government
appeals for greater resources to fortify local health authorities who were at
the forefront of battling the pandemic. Moreover, the government did not
implement a state of emergency and delegate powers to prefectural
governments until 7 April, and even then, it did not provide local authorities
with money to compensate businesses that had closed or reduced hours
during the state of emergency. Unlike prefectural governors like Osaka’s
Yoshimura Hirofumi and Tokyo’s Koike Yuriko, who the public viewed as
responsive communicators and decisive,24 the national government and Abe
22‘Japan Bans Entry from 2nd Chinese Province, Raises Travel Advisory’, Asahi
Shimbun, 12 February 2020; ‘Japan to Restrict Travel to and from China, S. Korea overVirus’, Kyodo News, 6 March 2020; ‘Japan to Expand Entry Ban to include U.S., China
and Most of Europe’, Japan Times, 30 March 2020; ‘軽症、無症者間で感染継続か
新型コロナ一時収束後も―感染研’ (NIID: Continued Transmission Even After
COVID-19 Suppressed?), Jiji Tsūshin, 7 August 2020
(https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2020080700218&g).
23
The Diamond Princess was a cruise ship with COVID-19 clusters that docked in
Yokohama in February.
24‘最も評価する政治家は大阪・吉村知事 2 位東京・小池氏 発信好感 毎日新聞世論調査’(Mainichi Survey: Impressed with Clear Messaging, Osaka’s Yoshimura
Highest Rated Politician/Tokyo’s Koike No.2), Mainichi Shimbun, 7 May 2020
(https://mainichi.jp/articles/20200507/k00/00m/010/001000c); ‘新型コロナ対応、評価
トップは吉村大阪府知事 毎日新聞世論調査’ (Mainichi Survey: Osaka Governor
Yoshimura Best Rated for COVID-19 Response), Mainichi Shimbun, 23 May 2020
(https://mainichi.jp/articles/20200523/k00/00m/010/208000c); コロナ対応、評価トッ
プは吉村知事 理由は丁寧な姿勢? (Top COVID-19 Response Politician: Governor
Yoshimura, Reason is Respectful Approach?), Asahi Shimbun, 29 December 2020
(https://digital.asahi.com/articles/ASNDY5SF6NDPUZPS007.html); ‘コロナ対応、評価する政治家は １位は吉村大阪府知事、２位は小池東京都知事 朝日新聞社世論調査’ (Yoshimura No.1, Koike No.2 Rated Politicians for COVID-19 response—Asahi
Survey’), Asahi Shimbun, 30 December 2020
(https://www.asahi.com/articles/DA3S14749076.html).

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
personally were consistently given very poor marks for their COVID-19
response. Opposition to a fourth Abe term as LDP president hardened further
even as public and local government-led COVID-19 suppression started towork. Abe’s cabinet support rate did not recover until he announced his
resignation.25
There were other reasons for Abe’s inability to regenerate public
support in 2020. Old Abe-linked scandals and deceptions intersected withnew developments, distracting from the pandemic fight and compounding
mistrust in Abe.26 For example, in late-2019 there was already dissatisfaction
with Abe’s transparency due to the taxpayer-funded cherry blossom viewing
parties (sakura wo miru kai) and the irregular disposal of guest lists rumoured
to contain many Abe supporters.27 The scandal then deepened in March 2020
when it became known that the expenses for an 800-person gathering of
Abe’s supporters, held the evening before the viewing parties, were not listed
in the Prime Minister’s political funds report. While Abe claimed that he had
paid ¥ 5000 for each attendee, he did not provide verification for this claim.28
Akimoto Tsukasa, a prior Abe appointee to the role of senior viceminister at the Cabinet Office and in charge of integrated resort (IR) projects,
was arrested on Christmas Day 2019 for taking bribes from a Chinese
business in connection with IR projects. Accused of taking more bribes inJanuary 2020, and then bribing witnesses in August, he became the firstJapanese lawmaker in a decade to be indicted.29 The wait for the next two
indictments was, however, much shorter. In July, Abe’s justice minister in2019 and long-time confidant, Kawai Katsuyuki, and his wife, Kawai Anri,25‘世論調査―質問と回答〈2 月 15、16 日実施〉’ (Asahi Survey Questions andAnswers—Conducted 15 and 16th February), Asahi Shimbun, 17 February 2020; ‘朝日新聞世論調査―質問と回答〈5 月 23、24 日実施〉’ (Asahi Survey Questions andAnswers—Conducted 23rd and 24th May), Asahi Shimbun, 25 May 2020
(https://digital.asahi.com/articles/ASN5T0FGVN5SUZPS007.html).
26
Giulio Pugliese and Sebastian Maslow, ‘Japan 2019: Inaugurating a New Era?’, Asia
Maior 2019, pp. 125-62; pp. 127-131.
27
Cherry blossom viewing, or hanami, is a traditional spring festivity in Japan, during
which people gather under the white and pink blooms to eat, drink and be merry. For
years, the government has hosted parties meant to honor the accomplishments of athletes,celebrities and other luminaries. Revelations that Abe's supporters were rewarded byinserting them among the invitees raised questions about inappropriate use of publicfunds. Rintaro Tobita, ‘Abe Cherry Blossom Scandal Stirs up Tweet Storm of Rare
Intensity’, Nikkei Asia, 30 November 2019.
28
Ibid.; ‘調査結果’ (Survey Results), Kyodo Tsūshin, 16 March 2020
(https://47gyosei.jp/article/?id=1969351).
29‘Japan Lawmaker in Casino Scandal Faces Fresh Bribe-taking Allegation’, Kyodo
News, 14 January 2020.

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
were both indicted for vote-buying involving millions of yens during the2019 House of Councillors election.
The Moritomo Gakuen controversy from 2017, which revolved
around a heavily discounted public land sale to an Abe supporter and thefalsification of related official records, also inserted itself into the mix. This
happened when the bereaved family of an official in the Kinki Bureau of the
Ministry of Finance released his suicide note, revealing pressure by a
Ministry of Finance executive to falsify documents.30 Despite strong support
for the issue to be reopened, the government refused, and continued to do soeven after the bereaved family filed a lawsuit in July for damages and toestablish the truth.
The most damaging question of political ethics for Abe involved
Japan’s second-highest ranking prosecutor, Kurokawa Hiromu. Close to Abe
and to his then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga due to his stint as
Vice-Minister of Justice in September 2016, Kurokawa helped contain thefallout over the Moritomo Gakuen land purchase investigation. Subsequently
appointed to head up the Tokyo High Public Prosecutors Office, in February2020 the cabinet extended his tenure beyond the mandatory retirement age(63) for prosecutors. This positioned Kurokawa to become Japan’s top
prosecutor when the then Prosecutor General retired in June. This went
against prior practice and was possibly in breach of the Public Prosecutor
Office Law. The government then exacerbated the controversy by drafting
legislation giving the cabinet the discretion to raise the retirement age to 65.
Allowing the retention of certain prosecutors longer than others challenged
the traditional independence of prosecutor offices. In fact, it introduced
incentives for prosecutors to turn a blind eye to the types of influencepeddling scandals playing out in public at that very moment. This resulted instrong opposition to the bill from not only former high-ranking prosecutors
but even from Japan’s famously apolitical celebrities. 31 Kurokawa’s
resignation in May after being caught flouting social distancing rules during
the state of emergency by (illegally) playing Mahjong for money worsened
Abe’s position while removing Kurokawa from contention for Prosecutor
General. The Abe administration then antagonized public opinion further bylightening the justice ministry’s punishment for Kurokawa under the
National Personnel Law.
Coming during the COVID-19 crisis response and overlapping in
the way they did, these scandals contributed to public perceptions that the
Abe administration was distracted and fatigued by the weight of its own
30

Takashi Endo, ‘Order to Falsify Document led to Steady Decline in Mental State of
Official’, Asahi Shimbun, 19 March 2020.
31
Julian Ryall, ‘«Don’t Destroy this Country» Japan Celebrities Break with Tradition to
Lead anti-Abe Protest on Social Media’, South China Morning Post¸ 11 May 2020.

10Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
deceits after almost eight years in office.32 Interpersonal coordination andcommunication within the executive started to suffer, with cascading effects
on relations between the government and the LDP, and with coalition partner
Komeito. This undermined the Abe administration’s core appeal, built on a
judiciously cultivated appearance of administrative competence and politicalstability. It also disproved the conviction that Abe was better than any
potential replacements inside the LDP and the fragmented opposition fromwhich he «took Japan back» in 2012.
Never shy of reminding his own party of their electoral woes in2009 after three years of political instability, and replacement with an equally
unstable Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), Prime Minister Abe had always
aimed to draw a sharp contrast with past political practice by limiting andcontrolling turnover in high-level cabinet positions, top bureaucratic posts,
and in his circle of personal advisers. His finance minister and deputy prime
minister (Aso Taro), chief cabinet secretary (Suga Yoshihide), andadministrative deputy chief cabinet secretary (Sugita Kazuhiro) had beenwith Abe from beginning to end. The same was true in the case of special
advisors Hasegawa Eiichi, Izumi Hiroto, Saiki Kozo, and Imai Takaya.
Yachi Shōtarō, Abe’s key foreign policy adviser and first ever NSC/NSS
head, had been with Abe until his retirement in September 2019, when he
was replaced with Kitamura Shigeru, a former executive secretary to Prime
Minister Abe in 2006-07, and a long-time Director of Cabinet Intelligence
between 2011 and 2019. Abe also had had only two foreign ministers: one(Kōno Tarō) subsequently became his defence minister; the other (Kishida
Fumio) became the Chairperson of the LDP Policy Research Council for theremainder of Abe’s term. The establishment of the Cabinet Bureau of
Personnel Affairs (2014) also gave Abe and Suga greater control over top
level personnel appointments from within the bureaucracy. In the security
sphere, the role of informal actors such as academics like Kitaoka Shin’ichi
and diplomats such as Kanehara Nobukatsu in giving coherence andcredibility to Abe administration security initiatives was also vital.33
Up until 2019, Abe had therefore been able to count on the supportof an informal «leading small group», which created coherence between thepolitical and bureaucratic executive and gave the Prime Minister’s Officeand the Cabinet Secretariat the upper hand in policy formation against vested
32‘舛添氏「長期政権の堕落」 情報公開せず、遅すぎた対応’ (Masuzoe:
Degradation of the Long Abe Administration—Lack of Transparency, Slow Response),
Asahi Shimbun, 28 February 2020
(https://digital.asahi.com/articles/ASN2W5RJ0N2VUPQJ00C.html).
33
Misato Matsuoka, ‘The Role of Informal Political Actors in Japanese security
Policymaking: The Case of Kitaoka Shin’ichi’, Australian Journal of International
Affairs, Volume 74, Number 6, 2020, pp.670-686.

11Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)bureaucratic and parliamentary interests and factions. 34 As long as hesustained the strategically convenient relationship with Komeito - on which
the LDP depends for winning the majority in single member districts in theHouse of Representatives - Abe’s claim to be a stabilising force rang true. In
2020, however, several successive incidents revealed dysfunction in the
management of inter-personal relations and policy between Abe and top
political figures, between Kantei and the Cabinet Secretariat, and between
the political executive and ruling parties. 35 Immediately after theannouncement of the COVID-19 Basic Plan in February, Abe made an
unprecedented announcement requesting Japanese elementary, junior andsenior high schools nationwide to close for up to five weeks. This decision,bound to have a major impact on families and educators, was made abruptly
and without consultation with Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga or Deputy Chief
Cabinet Secretary Sugita. It was also contrary to the advice of education
officials and Education Minister Hagiuda Kōichi, arguably his closest
political ally.36 The lack of consultation and internal fissures became publicknowledge and Abe admitted in parliament that he had made the school
closure decision on his own and without consulting his expert advisorygroup.
This unsystematic and seemingly improvised approach wasreminiscent of one of Abe’s favourite talking points, the DPJ era’s ad hoc
crisis management. Abe compounded this perception by unilaterally ending
the state of emergency on 25 May, three days before the expert group was tomeet to consider the issue; later he decided to abolish the expert panel. Also
evoking DPJ-era dysfunction was Abe’s repeated clashes with healthministry officials over a range of issues ranging from testing availability toauthorisation of Avigan, Abe’s personal preference as a COVID-19
treatment. Abe’s actions had already contributed to built-up resentments
within the bureaucracy due to a perception of heavy-handed personnel

34‘Inside Japan's Politically Powerful Nerve Center’, Nikkei Asia, 25 April 2017; Giulio
Pugliese, ‘Kantei Diplomacy? Japan's Hybrid Leadership in Foreign and Security Policy’,
The Pacific Review, Volume 30, Number 2, 2017, pp.152-168; ‘Japan's Kissinger? Yachi
Shōtarō: The State Behind the Curtain’, Pacific Affairs, Volume 90, Number 2, 2017,
pp.231-251.
35‘永田町大混乱!｢新型コロナ vs 安倍 vs 菅｣最後に勝つのは誰だ!’ (Nagata-cho in
Turmoil: Who Will Win? COVID-19, Abe, or Suga?), President Online, March 6 2020
(https://president.jp/articles/-/32964); Satoshi Sugiyama ‘«Single Mind» No More: Abe’sOnetime Right-hand Man Sees His Influence Dwindle’, Japan Times, 7 July 2020.
36‘臨時休校要請、首相「独断」に腹心の影 菅氏ら置き去り’ (In the Shadow of
the PM’s Arbitrary Temporary School Closure Request, Suga and Others Left Out), Asahi
Shimbun, 28 February 2020
(https://digital.asahi.com/articles/photo/AS20200228005172.html).

12

Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)management and illegitimate pressure on officials.37 The Prime Minister’s«Abenomask» PR blunder - another ad hoc decision – then provoked a muchwider political backlash. Without consultation beyond a small circle ofofficials, Abe announced in early April a policy of distributing two single
cloth masks to households ahead of the much-anticipated household
economic support packages. Traditional and social media ridicule of the«Abenomask» policy accompanied public criticism from within the LDP,
with Kishida Fumio, chairperson of the Policy Research Council (one of the
top three positions in the LDP), expressing his surprise on national
television. 38 The «Abenomask» fiasco came together with the widelyrecognised insufficiency of the Abe administration’s proposed economic
package of a one-time payment of ¥ 300,000 (ca. € 2,400) limited to families
whose incomes had halved due to COVID-19.39 In turn, this stimulated an
unprecedented pushback from the LDP and Komeito. The Komeito flashedthe coalition dissolution card for the first time in eight years, something it
had previously been unwilling to do, despite strong internal resistance toPeace and Security Legislation (PSL) and Integrated Resort legislation. This
helped the LDP to restrain Abe from forcing through the Diet his own
household economic support package. As a consequence, the government
adopted the «Kishida plan» of a ¥ 100,000 (ca. € 800) payment to every
resident of Japan and their dependents (ichiritsu kyūfu), rent support
proposals, and the doubling of employment adjustment subsidies.
This signalled a shift in the tectonic plates of power that had until
then supported Abe and catalysed further challenges to his political authority.
In quick succession, Abe was forced to scrap the revision to the Public
Prosecutor’s Office Act, suspend discussions over the visit of Xi Jinping,and, through Defense Minister Kōno Tarō’s lobbying, cancel the Aegis
Ashore programme - despite Abe’s sensitivity to Trump’s preferences for
Buy American (weapons) to shrink the trade deficit (see below). Secretary
General Nikai Toshihirō’s unsubtle factional manoeuvring to replace Abe in37‘官僚の忖度、背景に内閣人事局 異を唱えれば「クビ…」’ (Cabinet Bureau of
Personnel Affairs the Source of Bureaucrats Following Unspoken Orders: If you
Disagree, «You’re Fired»), Asahi Shimbun, 15 March 2018(https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASL3H4RCZL3HUTIL01Y.html).
38
Tomohiro Osaki, ‘Abenomask? Prime Minister's «Two Masks per Household» Policy
Spawns Memes on Social Media’, Japan Times, 2 April 2020; Yuki Fujita, ‘Abe Faces
Calls for Decisive Action after «Abenomask» Blunder’, Nikkei Asia, 3 April 2020.
39‘72% support state of emergency over virus in Japan, 70% say declaration came toolate’, Mainichi Shimbun, 9 April 2020; ‘政府の経済対策に「満足していない」６４％’ (64 Percent Say Government’s Economic Measures Insufficient), Yomiuri Shimbun, 7
June 2020 (https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/election/yoron-chosa/20200607-OYT1T50132/).

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
June were the todome (finishing blow) for his administration.40 It lead Suzuki
Shun’ichi, chairperson of the General Council, to publicly express concernthat the poor polling and internal discord in the LDP could lead to a DPJ-likesituation of alienation from public opinion.41 By then, Abe could no longer
sustain his political authority or claim to be a net asset to the LDP at election
time - the key to any prime minister’s political longevity.
3. The Abe to Suga Hand-off
The first public reports of Abe’s rapid weight loss and the return of his
ulcerative colitis surfaced in early June as officials and allies noticed adeterioration in Abe’s performance and gradual disengagement from policy
and parliamentary matters.42 A seemingly irreversible drop in public support,
angst around the realisation that a number of legacy achievements had been
derailed by COVID-19, and the stress caused by the unique challenges ofpandemic management likely precipitated bad health. Abe’s highly
publicised check-up at Keio University Hospital on August 17 took morethan seven hours.43 Seemingly content to become the longest continuously
serving Japanese prime minister in history, Abe announced his resignation
on 28 August, four days after passing the mark of his uncle, Satō Eisaku.
Despite the premature end of its prime ministership, Abe received an averagegross positive rating of almost 70 % from six media company surveys for theoverall achievements of the almost eight-year-long administration.44
Opinion was mixed, however, when it came to specific policies andoutcomes. The public was ambivalent about whether their lives had gotten
better during the Abe administration, and whether the positives outweighed
the negatives. Also, the public was generally negative about whether Abe’s
successor should inherit his policies, including Abenomics.45 Abe was also40
Michael MacArthur Bosack, ‘The Post-Abe Leadership Race’, Japan Times, 25 June
2020.
41
‘党内抗争回避を 自民・鈴木総務会長’ (LDP General Council Head Suzuki:
Avoid Intra-Party Turmoil’), Jiji Tsūshin, 9 June 2020
(https://www.jiji.com/sp/article?k=2020060900747&g=pol).
42‘Japan PM Abe Resigns Due to Illness with Many Issues Unresolved’, Kyodo News, 28
August 2020.
43
Gaku Shimada, ‘A Legacy Slipping Away: Why Shinzo Abe Stepped Down’, Nikkei
Asia, 30 August 2020.
44‘安倍政権、平均６０点’ (Abe Administration Gets 60 Points), Mainichi Shimbun, 18
September 2020 (https://mainichi.jp/articles/20200918/ddm/002/010/104000c).
45‘57 Percent Rate Abe’s Diplomacy’, Mainichi Shimbun, 10 September 2020; ‘世論調
査―質問と回答’ (Survey Questions and Answers), Asahi Shimbun, 3 May 2020
(https://digital.asahi.com/articles/ASN527DP1N4HUZPS005.html); ‘調査結果’ (Survey
Results), Kyodo Tsūshin, 9 September 2020 (https://47gyosei.jp/article/?id=2104858); ‘継

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
unable to play much of a role in selecting his successor as LDP Secretary
General Nikai Toshihirō took advantage of the party presidency election
format (no grassroots membership input) to engineer a fait accompli that put
71-year-old Suga Yoshihide in the Kantei.46 Barely discussed as a potential
successor until endearing himself to the public as «Uncle Reiwa» (reiwa
ojisan), when formally announcing the new era name in April 2019,47 Suga
was not necessarily Abe’s first choice. 48 Suga had actually fallen out of
Abe’s favour in late-2019 over the cherry blossom scandal, Suga’s increased
prominence, and the political perception that Suga had been the key reason
for the success and longevity of the Abe administration. Suga wassubsequently isolated from Abe’s decision-making small group.49
Suga also initially enjoyed surprisingly high support.50 He vowed
to more aggressively tackle vested interests and bureaucratic inefficiencies,
perhaps the least fired of Abenomics’ three arrows. He also promised to work
on behalf of the citizenry as a self-made son of a humble strawberry farmer
from Japan’s deep snow country (a contrast with the patrician Abe).
Suga, nevertheless, struggled to distance himself from Abe, theassociated scandals, and ultimately his own role in distorting politicalaccountability as Abe’s Chief Cabinet Secretary.51 Suga also stumbled into ahighly unnecessary showdown with the media and academy when he refused
続望む政策「コロナ対策」44%、改憲は 13%’ (Preferred Policies to Continue:
COVID-19, 44 Percent, Constitutional Revision, 13 Percent), Nikkei Shimbun, 30 August2020 (https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO63223900Q0A830C2MM8000/).
46
Eric Johnston, ‘Meet the «Shadow Shogun» behind the Making of Japan’s Next Prime
Minister’, Japan Times, 11 September 2020; Tazaki Shirō, ‘キングメーカー、二階俊博幹事長の視線’ (Kingmaker, Secretary General Nikai’s Perspective), Nippon.com, 17
August 2020, https://www.nippon.com/ja/in-depth/d00606/; ‘«絶滅危惧種»二階氏の変
幻自在’ («Endangered Species» - Mr. Nikai’s Transformations), Jiji News, 28 June 2020.
47
Shunsuke Shigeta, ‘How Abe's Deputy Suga Grew to Power Broker and Possible
Successor’, Nikkei Asia, 12 May 2019.
48
Rui Abiru, ‘Abe’s Cabinet Reshuffle Signals Push for Constitutional Reform,
Grooming of Next Leaders’, Japan Forward, 16 September 2019.
49‘永田町大混乱!｢新型コロナ vs 安倍 vs 菅｣最後に勝つのは誰だ!’ (Great Chaos in
Nagatachō: «Novel Coronavirus vs. Abe vs. Suga» Who Will Win in the End?),President, March 2020, Vol. 6, https://president.jp/articles/-/32964; ‘首相と菅氏にすき
ま風？ ポスト安倍めぐる政局の引き金にも’ (A Rift between the Premier and Mr.
Suga? It Could also Trigger Post-Abe Evolutions in the Political Landscape), Sankei
Shimbun, 15 May 2020.
50‘内閣支持率、報道各社 60%超え 人柄・政策が好感’ (Favourable towards Policy
and Political Personality, Suga’s Cabinet Support Over 60 Percent in Each Survey),
Nikkei Asia, 18 September 2020
(https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO6404252018092020EA3000).
51
Aurelia George Mulgan, ‘Suga’s Accountability Problem’, East Asia Forum, 8
December 2020.

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
to appoint six scholars to the prestigious Science Council of Japan
recommended by the Council. Funded by and housed in the Cabinet Office,
the Council’s institutional task was to give independent advice on policy, as
it had been doing during COVID-19. This was the first time a prime minister
had rejected the names of possible Council members recommended by theCouncil itself.52 Suga refused to either explain or reverse his decision, merely
saying that the unprecedented intervention was «relevant and legal». 53
However, critics noted that this was likely a petty payback for the six
scholars’ opposition to Abe’s designated secrets legislation and the 2015
PSL. Possibly, Suga’s decision was also a warning to the Council, which had
refused to change its cautious stance on academic collaboration in militaryresearch, distancing themselves from the Ministry of Defence’s policy.54
Framed by the media as another politically motivated intervention
in the personnel affairs of important societal institutions, and a possible threat
to academic freedom guaranteed under the Constitution, the controversy
dragged on for months, even garnering international attention. Then, newrevelations raised further questions about the ethics of officials from the Abeadministration, including whether Abe himself had lied under oath in theDiet. The result was that the public concluded that Suga was disinterested inaccountability concerns, and therefore not the right person to deal withmoney and political influence problems.55
Suga COVID-19 missteps were also reminiscent of Abe’s botchedpolitical response. Seeming disinterested in the growing concern around
COVID-19’s spread in November, the Suga government ignored calls formore decisive action. The government also pushed ahead on the nation-wide
Go-To-Travel scheme, an indirect aid package for the tourism industry thatsubsidized domestic travel by up to ¥ 20,000 (ca. € 160) per day. Go-To52‘社説: 内閣支持率低下 首相は国会で説明尽くせ’ (Editorial: As Cabinet Support
Dives, the PM Should Face the Diet), Nishi Nippon Shimbun, 20 October 2020
(https://www.nishinippon.co.jp/item/n/656052/).
53
Suvendrini Kakuchi, ‘Pressure Piling up Against PM’s Science Council Decision’,
University World News, 8 December 2020.
54
Two of the scholars were particularly prominent in heading up the Association of
Scholars Opposed to the Security-related Laws, while another testified against thelegislation’s constitutionality in parliament. Masato Shimizu, ‘Suga’s Rejection of
Science Nominees Spurs Constitutional Storm’, Nikkei Asia, 24 October 2020.
55‘共同通信世論調査結果’ (Kyodo News Survey Results), Kyodo Tsūshin, 6 December
2020 (https://47gyosei.jp/article/?id=2171629); ‘共同通信世論調査結果’ (Kyodo News
Survey Results), Kyodo Tsūshin, 10 January 2021
(https://47gyosei.jp/article/?id=2197696); ‘五輪「再延期を」51% ワクチン接種「様子見」は 7 割’ (51 Percent Support Postponing Olympics Again; 70 Percent Will Wait
and See on Immunization), Asahi Shimbun, 25 January 2020
(https://digital.asahi.com/articles/ASP1S7HTRP1PUZPS003.html).

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
Travel had been Suga’s pet project during his months of isolation in the Abeadministration. Launched in July 2020, it excluded Tokyo due to the concernthat the capital’s inclusion would spread the novel coronavirus. Despite thisfear, and the additional anxiety that travel during the mid-winter period could
worsen the situation due to higher viral transmission and susceptibility, theSuga cabinet only reluctantly agreed to halt the policy in late-December
2020.56 By then, evaluations of the administration’s COVID-19 response andSuga’s personal leadership had turned highly negative, with cabinet support
ratings deteriorating at a record pace, particularly among independent
voters. 57 Suga’s «prime minister premium» - the difference between thepremier’s popularity and that of the LDP itself - shrank to less than 5 % by
January 2021, while Suga also oversaw a rare reduction in the popularity of
the LDP, including in voting intention. According to December surveys
conducted by the Yomiuri and Asahi newspapers, the majority of the publicalso switched from its initial view favouring Suga’s permanence in the prime
ministership beyond the next LDP presidential election and for at least two
years or more, to one wanting Suga to stand down as soon as his term wasup in September 2021.58
56‘Japan to Halt Travel Program Over New Year Holidays Amid Virus Surge’, Kyodo
News, 15 December 2020.
57‘内閣支持率 33%に続落、不支持 45% 無党派層で急落’ (Continued Fall in
Cabinet Support to 33 Percent, 45 Percent, Non-Aligned Support Dives), Asahi Shimbun,
25 January 2021 (https://digital.asahi.com/articles/ASP1S7F03P1PUZPS001.html); ‘内閣
支持続落３３％ 緊急事態「遅すぎ」７１％’ (Continued Fall in Cabinet Support to33 Percent, 71 Percent Say State of Emergency Too Late), Mainichi Shimbun, 17 January
2021 (https://mainichi.jp/articles/20210117/ddm/001/010/051000c). ‘菅政権支持率、３
カ月で３２ポイント低下、麻生政権に並び最大’ (Suga’s Cabinet Support Plunges 32
Percent in 3 Months, Same as the Aso Administration), Nikkei Shimbun, 29 December
2020 (https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKZO67797740Y0A221C2PP8000/); ‘劣化する「令和おじさん」’ (Deteriorating Uncle Reiwa), Tokyo Shimbun, 6 January 2021
(https://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/78261);
58‘２０２０年９月 菅内閣発足電話全国世論調査 質問と回答’ (September 2020
Suga Cabinet Inauguration National Telephone Survey Question and Answer), Yomiuri
Shimbun, 21 September 2020 (https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/election/yoronchosa/20200920-OYT1T50175/); ‘２０２０年１１月 電話全国世論調査 質問と回答’ (November 2020 National Telephone Survey Questions and Answers), Yomiuri
Shimbun, 10 November 2020 (https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/election/yoronchosa/20201109-OYT1T50174/). ‘菅政権「来年９月まで」２９．０％ 続けてほしい在任期間’ (29 Percent Want Suga Administration to Continue to September 2021), Jiji
Tsūshin, 16 October 2020 (https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2020101600784&g=pol); ‘
２０２０年１２月２６～２７日 電話全国世論調査 質問と回答’ (December 2627 2020 National Telephone Survey Questions and Answers), Yomiuri Shimbun, 28
December (https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/election/yoron-chosa/20201227-OYT1T50160/); ‘
朝日新聞世論調査―質問と回答’ (Asahi Survey Questions and Answers), Asahi

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
As prime minister, Suga still held the snap election card which hecould use before the LDP presidential election to secure a modest win toenhance his claim to the LDP presidency. Suga was nevertheless limited in
the use of this card, given public expectations, his own promises to fightagainst the COVID-19 pandemic, and the need to prioritise the Olympics andInternational Olympic Committee requirements.59 Suga’s biggest challenge
was preventing a narrative from taking hold, namely that, rather than agenuine reformist, he was, after all, the head of a caretaker government
beholden to the factions.60 In spite of his efforts, the public in general, LDP
supporters, and the business community had already started to gravitate
towards Kōno Tarō as the preferred next prime minister by the end of 2020.61
Kōno represents a blend of administrative reformism, anti-nuclear
scepticism, cautious social liberalism, and a foreign policy that, althoughinternationalist in general, is hawkish towards China. This position alignedwith public opinion and the increasing salience of «democratic» formulationsof Japan’s foreign policy identity (see below).
Suga still had other cards to play. While Suga acted in fullcontinuity with the Abenomics agenda, he initially appeared serious about
structural reforms that would flesh out the Abe era rhetoric, portraying Japanas on the cusp of a fourth industrial revolution (4IR) and positioned to benefit
from a clean energy revolution.62 With an eye on the COP26 UN Climate
Change Conference negotiations of November 2021, Prime Minister Suga
boldly vowed to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 (reflecting
similar announcements made by the UK, the EU, and China). While thissurpassed Japan’s 2015 Paris Agreement vow, what made it bold is that it
requires radical changes to Japan’s energy infrastructure and usage patterns,
Shimbun, 21 December 2020
(https://digital.asahi.com/articles/ASNDP75HTNDNUZPS008.html).
59
Leo Lewis and Murad Ahmed, ‘Japan: How Coronavirus Crushed Abe’s Olympics
Dream’, The Financial Times, 30 March 2020.
60‘Suga, Favored to Succeed Abe, Says Won't Lead «Interim Government»’, Japan
Times, 6 September 2020.
61
Reform Minister Taro Kono Most Favored for Japan PM as Suga Slips to 3rd: MainichiPoll, Mainichi Shimbun, 18 January 2020; ‘次の首相ふさわしい人 河野氏がトップ’(Kōno Tops for Next PM), Nikkei Shimbun, 1 February 2020
(https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKZO68698020R30C21A1PE8000/); ‘2 月ロイタ
ー企業調査’ (February Reuters Company Survey), Reuters, 18 February 2021
(https://jp.reuters.com/article/reuters-survey-feb-olympics-idJPKBN2AH2YK);
62
Ryutaro Abe, ‘Suga Finds Own Pet Policies of Cutting Red Tape, Digitization’ Asahi
Shimbun, 17 September 2020. See also: Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, The
Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant
Technologies, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014; Kai-Fu Lee, AI
Superpowers, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018, pp.12-25.

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
hard to fathom in 2020. After all, only nine nuclear reactors out of 60 werein operation at the end of 2020, and Japan’s reliance on fossil fuels for 87 %of energy consumption, including coal, remained unabated. 63 New
investments in renewable technologies, increased use of hydroelectric andgeothermal resources, accelerated development and adoption of energy
storage technologies such as hydrogen, and nation-wide proliferation of local
smart grids are all essential if Tokyo is to achieve its stated energy
objectives.64
Suga’s own stimulus package targeted direct fiscal spending andcredit resources for trillion-yen funds towards post-pandemic growth basedon reducing carbon emissions and boosting adoption of digital technology.65
Promising regulatory reform and digitalization to complement 4IR
productivity gains and clean energy advancements, 66 Suga appointed the
popular Kōno Tarō to crucial ministerial roles for administrative, regulatory,
and civil service reform. In addition to making Kōno responsible for thegovernment’s immunization campaign, Suga instructed him to work with
Hirai Takuya, the newly-appointed minister for digital transformation, tooversee the creation of a new government agency dedicated to digitaltransformation. 67 Attuned to public sentiment, Kōno’s first act in the debureaucratization and digitalization campaign was a war (datsu-hanko)
declared on the mandatory use of the personal seal (hanko) for official
documentation, registration, and private business. Emblematic of menial
paperwork, the hanko was required in as many as 15,000 types ofadministrative procedures. Kōno declared that he would lower the number toless than one hundred. 68 The Suga administration also announced
government-mandated cuts in mobile phone fees as part of this reform
agenda.
63‘Japan says nuclear crucial to hitting net zero goal by 2050’, Financial Times, 2February 2021. US Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis: Japan, Last
Updated on November 2020 (https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/JPN).
64
Paul Midford, ‘Presentation: EU-Japan Relations: Beyond the Strategic Partnership
Agreement’, European Japan Advanced Research Network Conference, 26 November
2020.
65
Leika Kihara & Tetsushi Kajimoto, ‘Japan Unveils $708 Billion in Fresh Stimulus with
Eye on Post-COVID Growth’, Reuters, 8 December 2020.
66
Hideaki Tanaka, ‘菅義偉政権、３つの課題’ (Three Issues Confronting the Suga
Administration), Japan Center for Economic Research, 30 September 2020
(https://www.jcer.or.jp/blog/tanakahideaki20200930.html).
67‘Japan Aims to Create Digital Agency in 2021: Minister’, Nippon.com, 19 September
2020.
68Tarō Kōno and Toyotaka Sakai, ‘「脱ハンコ」から始まる日本経済再生’ («TheSeal Wars» will kickstart Japan’s Economic Revitalization), Chūō Kōron, December
2020, pp.100-7; p.102.

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
The Suga administration could also emphasise success in the
deflation battle. Despite quantitative and qualitative monetary expansion,
Abenomics did not have much success in its inflation targeting even before
COVID-19 precipitated a 1% fall in Japan’s Consumer Price Index. Whilemonetary policy had positive business and corporate-side effects, it did notdeal with the underlying mechanisms - such as limited real wage increases
or rising education costs - that discipline spending by the public. Wage hikes
remained modest despite the Japanese government having actively
encouraged companies to raise wages faster since 2014, during the annual
shuntō negotiations between unions and large employers. 69 At the end of
2020, the Suga administration was working towards a nation-wide minimum
wage hike to ¥ 1000 per hour, up from a national average of ¥ 902.70 This
could play a major role in stimulating domestic demand.71 Also, by making
it a national minimum, the hike’s likely popularity in the regions where votevalue disparities advantage the LDP could influence political calculations
ahead of the 2021 House of Representatives and LDP Presidential
elections.72
Such reforms will require political courage. The lack of immediateterm direct household and SME relief, and the continued intransigence of
COVID-19, will restrain the recovery, however, potentially denying Suga thelong-term political benefits of any stimulus or reforms instituted under his
watch. An underwhelming and hollowed-out Tokyo Olympics with no nonresident spectators and characterised by public disinterest - and marred bysexism scandals - may also have a dampening effect.73 Suga’s sponsor, LDP
Secretary General Nikai Toshihirō, also suffered a loss of influence due tohis erratic response to sexism and COVID-19 scandals within the party.
Both Kōno and Suga’s leadership prospects could still rise or fall.
Kōno status as a maverick and his past behaviour also do not necessarily
comport with vested LDP or factional interests. This all has unpredictable
69
Suehiro Toru, ‘人々はなぜ｢インフレ率｣を高く感じているのか’ (Why Do People
Believe There’s «High Inflation»?), Toyo Keizai, 19 February 2021.
70
Takahashi Kanji, ‘新政権、最低賃金の大幅上げで中小企業に「荒療治」も’ (TheNew Government Considers Considerable Raises to the Minimum Wage, Also as«Drastic Treatment» for Small and Medium Enterprises), Sankei Business, 25 September
2020 (https://www.sankeibiz.jp/business/news/200925/bsc2009252049010-n1.htm).
71
Takeshi Niinami, ‘需要喚起のアベノミクスから企業活性化のスガノミクス’(From Abenomics’ Demand Stimulation to Suganomics’ Corporate Revitalization), Chūō
Kōron, December 2020, pp.26-34.
72
In Japan, a vote-value disparity arises when a given constituency has fewer voters thananother constituency but can still send the same number of members of parliament to theDiet. The disparity has reached as high as 3:1 in the House of Councillors for rural
constituencies compared to urban ones.
73‘Japan: How Coronavirus Crushed Abe’s Olympics Dream’.

20Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
effects on political calculations. Any move by popular local politicians toinsert themselves into national politics ahead of mandatory elections in 2021
would only compound this uncertainty. It is plausible, however, that popular
Osaka governor Yoshimura Hirofumi and Tokyo Governor Koike Yuriko
will step on to the political battlefield to usurp national leadership.
Yoshimura is also vice president of the national Japan Innovation Party(Nippon Ishin no Kai), while Koike played a prominent role in almost
mortally harming Abe and the LDP in the 2017 House of Representatives
election, when she established a political party to run candidates in urban
districts.74
4. Japan’s Foreign Policy Between China and America in 2020
During the Abe administration, Japanese strategists and leaders have focusedon satisfying two geopolitical imperatives. The first was a much moreforthright balancing of China through greater alignment with the UnitedStates’ regional strategic interests without alienating the PRC to the point ofjeopardising commercial interests. The second imperative was to continue
the pursuit of strategic «Indo-Pacific» diversification for long-term, strategic
autonomy-enhancing effects.75 While Japan’s Indo-Pacific outreach in 2020
was relatively successful in reinforcing «cross-bracing» among regional
partners in trade, technology, and national security domains, 76 further
deterioration in Sino-American relations complicated the first imperative.
Initially, the Abe government tried its best throughout the first halfof 2020 to salvage momentum for a state visit by Secretary General of theCommunist Party of China (CPC) and President of the People’s Republic ofChina Xi Jinping. A part of his legacy building, Abe sought to stabilize
diplomatic relations with its giant neighbour, boost win-win economic
activity (such as the aforementioned inflow of Chinese tourists), and extract
some strategic leverage, aimed at convincing Beijing to restrain its East andSouth China Sea encroachment. Early in the pandemic there were signs that
Beijing also aspired to smoothen relations with Tokyo, although it was not74
Corey Wallace, ‘Losing Hope in Japan’s Snap Election’, East Asia Forum, 18 October
2017.
75
Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East
Asia, Cornell University Press, 2007. Corey Wallace, ‘Leaving (Northeast) Asia?’; seealso: Corey Wallace, ‘Japan’s Strategic Contrast: Continuing Influence Despite Relative
Power Decline in Southeast Asia’, The Pacific Review, Volume 32, Number 5, 2019, pp.
863-897.
76
Euan Graham, ‘Maritime Security and Capacity-Building: The Australia-Japan
Dimension’, NIDS Joint Research Series, Volume 10, 2014, pp.43-58.

21

Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
always clear to local experts what Xi’s aspirations were for a «new era» in
Sino-Japanese relations.77 There were also encouraging signs of grassroots
and bottom-up Chinese efforts towards improving the relations with Japan.
Chinese sister cities and provinces repaid Japanese generous personal
protective equipment (PPE) donations in kind, 78 while donations from thelikes of Jack Ma and his Alibaba group were symptomatic of a concerted
effort to woo Japanese citizens.79 Also, the PRC’s medical aid diplomacy inJapan kept a low profile. This contrasted with China’s activities in Europe
where, in the attempt to undermine the narrative that the PRC bore
responsibility for the novel coronavirus’ diffusion, Beijing presented itself as
the «world’s saviour», for both domestic consumption and diplomatic point
scoring.80
The deepening of the COVID-19 crisis and questions over China’s
WHO behaviour, however, soured international sentiment regarding the
PRC 81 and, in the process, revealed the shaky foundations of the SinoJapanese tactical détente. China found itself in a relatively comfortable
position following its draconian lockdown and test-and-tracing
countermeasures, stoking the resentment of international leaders now tasked
with fighting the pandemic. In particular, in the US, COVID-19 turned froma potential point of strategic leverage over China, which would bolster
Trump’s 2020 re-election chances, to a domestic crisis that imperilled
them.82 This resulted in the Trump administration turning up the volume ofits confrontational policy towards China. In particular, the Trump
77

Interview, Japanese academic and government official. 27 December 2019, Tokyo.
‘新型コロナ 中国、県にマスク寄付 友好関係の２省が３万枚 ／和歌山’(Novel Coronavirus: China’s Sister Provinces Donated 30 Thousand Masks to Wakayama
Prefecture), Mainichi Shimbun, 19 March 2020; ‘マスクの恩返しは「10 倍返し」新華社も報道 箱には漢詩 中国・無錫市新呉区→愛知県豊川市’ (Return for Mask
Kindness «Times Ten», Xinhua News Agency also reports of Wuxi’s Xiwu District gift
to Aichi Prefecture’s Toyokawa City with Chinese poems written on the boxes), Mainichi
Shimbun, 26 March 2020.
79‘Chinese Billionaire Jack Ma Donates 1 Million Masks to Coronavirus-hit Japan’, The
Straits Times, 4 March 2020.
80
Nahoko Etō, ‘新型コロナウイルスをめぐる中国の対外宣伝―人類運命共同体を促進する統一戦線工作’ (China’s External Propaganda on the Novel Coronavirus:
United Front Operations Push for a Community of Common Destiny), SPF China
Observer N. 31, 20 May, https://www.spf.org/spf-china-observer/documentdetail031.html.
81
François Godement, ‘Fighting the Coronavirus Pandemic: China’s Influence at theWorld Health Organization,’ Institut Montaigne, 23 March 2020.
82
John Bolton, The Room Where it Happened: A White House Memoir, New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2020; p.301; conversation with European diplomat, 19 March 2020,
Washington DC.
78

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
administration pursued what looked like a race to the bottom through the allout information war with China on the outbreak and handling of the COVID19 pandemic.83
PRC’s policymakers’ approaches to various domestic andinternational issues hardened and adversely affected Sino-Japaneserelations.84 China’s accelerated authoritarian involution - notably in Hong
Kong and Xinjiang - resulted in Japan joining Five Eyes nations and Europe
in condemning China. The breaking of Beijing’s commitments underinternational law towards Hong Kong and perpetrating human rights abusesin Xinjiang, evidence of which accumulated throughout the year, werecriticized by Tokyo, including at the bilateral leadership level. Japan’s
critical stand on China was coupled with coordination on issues of global
strategic importance with the anglophone nations and complemented
intensive discussion in 2020 of Japan officially joining the Five Eyes as anintelligence partner alongside concrete military engagement.85
Tensions were particularly pointed surrounding East and South
China Seas issues in 2020. In the South China Sea, Beijing appeared to takeadvantage of regional strategic distraction when it established two
administrative districts on the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos and allegedly
sunk a Vietnamese fishing vessel near the Paracel Islands in April. Thisnationalistic assertiveness also allowed Beijing to channel domestic
frustrations. An increased tempo of PLA aerial incursions beyond the medianline in the Taiwan Straits was complemented by a live-fire drill that
obstructed navigation within the Strait as well as increasingly belligerent
communications signalling Chinese impatience with progress on the peacefulreunification of Taiwan. The Chinese Coast Guard’s Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands presence also troubled Tokyo as various incidents suggested that
Beijing may be laying the groundwork for longer periods of law enforcement
within the islands’ territorial and contiguous waters. The Japanese
government even warned that it would consider allowing the Self-Defence
Forces (SDF) to act in concert with the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) if China’s
encroachment was substantial enough to make it impossible for the JCG to
respond alone. At the same time, the government continued to push for an
83

Giulio Pugliese, ‘新型コロナウイルス危機で米中摩擦の狭間に立つ EU：中国の挑戦と米中情報戦を中心とした分析’ (The EU Amid US-China Confrontation
During the Novel Coronavirus Crisis: An Analysis Focused on the China Challenge andthe US-China Information War), 東亜 (Tōa), Vol. 8 (August), 2020, pp. 18-27.
84
Giulio Pugliese, ‘COVID-19 and the Reification of the US-China «Cold War»’, in Jeff
Kingston-edited special issue “COVID-19 in Asia’, Asia-Pacific Journal. Volume 18,
Issue 15, Number 3, (2020) Article ID 5436.
85
Hiroyuki Akita, ‘Pros and Cons of a Six Eyes with Japan and Allies’, Nikkei Asia, 22
December 2020.

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
emergency hotline.86 One little remarked upon development, however, was a
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyer running into
trouble with a Chinese fishing boat (in all likelihood part of China’s maritime
militia) 100 km off Ningbo in international waters in March, where the
PLA’s East Sea Fleet is based. While the incident was reported in theJapanese media, the nature of the warship’s mission was left uncommented
upon by the Japanese Ministry of Defense, suggesting that the SDF was
testing and probing China’s navy. Two retired US navy officials noted that
this could represent a turning point given that Japan has traditionallyexercised restraint in such operations.87
In the South China Sea and East China Sea cases there is analytical
disagreement about whether such activities constituted a new coercive stage,building on long-term strategies to assert effective control, or were businessas usual in terms of Beijing contesting sovereignty.88 Regarding Taiwan, too,
explanations were contested; they ranged from Beijing embracing an
accelerated timetable for forcible reunification, engaging in cognitive
warfare, and the idea that such actions were a response to an uptick in
America arms sales and regional military activities that highlighted PLA
weaknesses in island air defence. 89 It was clear, however, that no
consideration from Beijing was forthcoming in solidarity with regional
nations now fighting a pandemic, whose elites, in many cases, were all too
willing to frame China as the pandemic’s originator or enabler. Indeed, antiChina hawks and Japanese conservatives that made up Abe’s base became
increasingly agitated with Abe himself as he hesitated in imposing travel
restrictions on visitors from the PRC, due to his concern that it would have

86
‘Kono Tells China SDF Will Respond to Intrusions around Senkakus’, Asahi Shimbun,
5 August 2020; Junnosuke Kobara, ‘Japan Defense Chief Calls for China’s Restraint on
the Senkakus’, Nikkei Asia, 15 December 2020.
87
Ankit Panda. ‘Japanese Naval Ship Involved in Collision With Chinese Fishing Vessel
in East China Sea’, The Diplomat, 31 March 2020; Testimony by two former US navy
officers, 31 March 2020; 3, and 7 April May 2020, (online); see also: ‘台國防部智庫：
大陸或藉與日越海事衝突觀察美日反應’ (Taiwan Ministry of Defense Think-tank:
Mainland China May Take Advantage of Clashes with Japan and Vietnam to Test USJapan alliance’s Reaction), HK01, 7 May 2020 (https://bit.ly/3f5uBdR).
88
Ole Tangen Jr., ‘Is China taking advantage of COVID-19 to pursue South China Sea
ambitions?’, DW.com, 26 May 2020; Mike Mochizuki and Jiaxiu Han, ‘Is China
Escalating Tensions With Japan in the East China Sea?’, The Diplomat, 16 September
2020; Alessio Patalano, ‘What is China’s Strategy in the Senkaku Islands’, War on theRocks, 10 September 2020.
89
Lu Li-shih, ‘China’s Military Exercises Near Taiwan: The Lowdown on an Uptick’,
The Diplomat, 20 October 2020; Joyce Huang, ‘China Using ‘Cognitive Warfare’ Against
Taiwan, Observers Say’, Voice of America, 17 January 2021.

24

Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
serious repercussions on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s scheduled visit.90
Abe also initially rebuffed LDP lawmakers’ calls to cancel Xi’s state visit.91
As Abe’s political strength diminished, LDP lawmakers and even his own
defence minister, Kōno Tarō, publicly expressed reticence about Abe still
entertaining thoughts of a Xi Jinping visit in 2020. Kōno publicly criticised
Beijing’s increase in defence spending despite the fallout and economic
impact from COVID-19 as well as regional maritime tensions.92
Two features of Japan’s China criticism in 2020 bear noting. First,
criticism resonated throughout the political spectrum from the LDP to theJapan Communist Party. Second, this criticism was strongly focused on
democratic and human rights abuses in China, in a marked contrast with thesubstantial lack of political and parliamentary interest at the time of the June
1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. In 2020, Japanese lawmakers
considered the need for a human rights sanctions regime that targeted key
individuals and institutions responsible for gross violations, and the LDP set
up a project team to consider responses to PRC crackdowns in Hong Kongand Xinjiang.93 Japanese lawmakers also proposed a Taiwan Relations Act
that would commit Japan to greater support of the fellow democracy.94 While
the government is unlikely to take up this suggestion, it is notable that
Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu sent an official congratulatory message
to President Tsai Ing-wen for her «democratic» re-election in January.95 His
ministry later emphasized the «extreme» importance of Japan’s partnershipwith Taiwan.96 When former prime minister Mori Yoshihiro visited Taiwan
in August, to attend former Taiwanese President Lee Deng-hui’s memorialservice, he met President Tsai, lauded Japan-Taiwan relations, their sharing
90‘Editorial: Diet Session Ends with Abe Failing to Address Many Policy Failures’,
Asahi Shimbun, 18 June 2020; Linda Sieg, ‘«Where’s Abe?» Critics Ask, as Coronavirus
Spreads in Japan’, Reuters, 25 February 2020; Devin Stewart, ‘China’s Influence inJapan: Everywhere Yet Nowhere in Particular’, CSIS Southeast Asia Program Report,
July 2020. PP.5-6.
91‘Japan Should Reconsider State Visit by China's Xi: LDP Lawmakers’, Kyodo News,
29 May 2020.
92‘習氏来日、閣僚から慎重論 河野防衛相、尖閣・台湾に言及’ (Cautious Stanceby Ministers on Xi’s Visit, Kōno mentions Senkakus and Taiwan), Jiji Tsūshin, 5 June
2020 (https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2020060500590&g=pol);93‘Japan Eyes US-style Law to Sanction Uighur Human Rights Abuses’, Nikkei Asia, 12
November 2020.
94
Takuya Mizorogi & Masaya Kato, ‘Japan Lawmakers Want ‘Taiwan Relations Act’ of
their Own’, Nikkei Asia, 6 February 2021. «»95
Global Taiwan Institute, ‘Sino-Japanese Relations in 2020 and Implications for
Taiwan’, Ketagalan Media, 11 March 2020 (https://ketagalanmedia.com/2020/03/11/sinojapanese-relations-in-2020-and-implications-for-taiwan/).
96‘Taiwan is «Extremely» Important, Japan’s Diplomatic Guideline Says’, Nikkei Asia,
20 May 2020.

25

Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)of «the same values of freedom and democracy», and passed on Suga’s
message that, «[i]f there is an opportunity, I would like to speak (with Tsai)over the phone».97
Japan’s «democratic» foreign policy identity is still in a nascentstage, given Tokyo’s traditional emphasis on pragmatic diplomacy thatavoids emphasising liberal democratic ideals or economic liberalism. Indeed,Tokyo willingly downplayed universal values for most of the Trumpadministration, given the American president’s disinterest.98 This new andnascent identity is nevertheless increasingly derived not only from changes
in public opinion internally, but by a re-elaboration of Japan’s national
character in the face of authoritarian China’s economic rise, which has
caused a liberal turn in Japanese nationalism.99 Still, the Abe government,
which tended to instrumentally invoke liberal democratic values, andJapanese officials were put off balance by Washington’s more aggressive
China policy in 2020. They feared entrapment in a maximalist China strategy
that went beyond the defence of already existing global democracy to,apparently, advocating regime change in Beijing.100 At the same time, theUnited States government became somewhat dissatisfied with Japan’s milder
China policy, 101 another way the tables had turned from the years of the
Obama administration, when the Japanese government had pushed for amore aggressive American China policy.
The election of Biden in November 2020 with his emphasis on
universal values will allay some of the above fears. Multiple Japanese policy
planners have explicitly testified to the infusion of universal values into
Japan’s foreign policy initiatives to better tune in with the US government,
especially Democratic Party administrations.102 Japanese policymakers alsosighed in relief at a likely end to US mercenary requests for «protection
97‘Japan's ex-PM Mori Meets Taiwan Leader Ahead of Memorial Service’, Kyodo
News, 18 September 2020.
98
Testimony by former government official, Prime Minister’s Office, 31 January 2019,
Tokyo. President’s Trump lack of interest, if not hostility, towards democratic principles
and narratives ran against his administration’s insistence on those themes.
99
Kai Schulze, ‘Risks of Sameness, the «Rise of China» and Japan’s Ontological
Security.’ In Maslow, Sebastian, Ra Mason, and Paul O’ Shea, Risk State: Japan’s
Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty, Farnham: Ashgate, 2015, pp.101-16.
100
Hiroyuki Akita, ‘Deepening US-China Strategic Conflict and Japan’s Way Forward’,
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: Policy Paper (2021: soon to be published);
Hiroyuki Akita, ‘US Digs in for Long War against China's Communist Regime’, Nikkei
Asia, 24 July 2020.
101‘U.S.-Japan Dueling China for Influence in Indo-Pacific Region’, Asahi Shimbun, 1
June 2020.
102
Testimony by former mid-ranking official from the National Security Secretariat, 2February 2021, Tokyo (online).

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)money», rumoured to include demands for a fourfold increase in Japanesebudget spending for the stationing of American troops on Japanese soil.103
At the same time, Biden’s pre-inauguration phone calls with foreign leaders
stimulated Japanese sensitivity about the fate of the government’s successful«Free and Open Indo-Pacific» vision, as transition team readouts suggested
that the new US President was going for a different Indo-Pacific wording «Stable and Prosperous Indo-Pacific» - potentially portending a markedly
different American policy.104 Yet, these fears were soon proven overblown,
as the Biden administration rapidly reverted to standard Free and Open IndoPacific (FOIP) wording and even created an Indo-Pacific «tsar» within the
National Security Council.105
5. Japan’s Deepening Indo-Pacific Outreach
One question raised even before 2020 was the post-Abe fate of Japan’s IndoPacific outreach given Abe’s long-standing personal connection to thevision. During Abe’s short-lived first premiership (2006-7), he and a small
number of Japanese diplomatic and strategic thinkers grew wary of China’s
growing strategic clout relative to the United States. 106 They expressed
concerns that widening economic asymmetries between China and Southeast
Asian nations would facilitate a sphere of influence where Beijing could
deploy economic tools for coercive purposes. Additionally, China’s rapid
naval modernisation could turn the South China Sea into «Lake Beijing»,
thereby enabling the PLA to cut off resources-poor Japan’s sea lines ofcommunications for coercive purposes or during war. 107 The Abeadministration’s vision of an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity was not widely
embraced at the time in Japan. Nonetheless, a slow consensus within
officialdom and across political party lines started to form during the DPJ
103
Lara Seligman and Robbie Gramer, ‘Trump Asks Tokyo to Quadruple Payments for
U.S. Troops in Japan’, Foreign Policy, 15 November 2019.
104
Yūichi Hosoya, ‘インド太平洋地域における「自由」と「開放性」の終わりか？’ (Is This the End of ‘Freedom’ and ‘Openness’ in the Indo-Pacific Region?),blogpost, 15 November 2020, http://blog.livedoor.jp/hosoyayuichi/archives/2003137.html
105‘Joe Biden Considers Appointing a White House Tsar for Asia’, Financial Times, 2
December 2020.
106
MOFA (2007) Confluence of the Two Seas, 22 August 2007,https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html; Yuichi Hosoya, ‘The
Rise and Fall of Japan’s Grand Strategy: The «Arc of Freedom and Prosperity» and the
Future Asian Order’, Asia-Pacific Review, Volume 18, Number 1, 2011, pp.13–24.
107
Abe, Shinzō, ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,’ Project Syndicate, 27 December(https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-indiaby-shinzo-abe).

27Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
administration on the need to diversify relations away from China by
increasingly centring Southeast Asia and India in Japanese foreign policy
thinking. The political environment was thus very amenable for Abe toenhance his vision on his return to the premiership in December 2012.108
Prime Minister Abe signified the importance and the energy his
administration would invest into Southeast Asia by first visiting thestrategically critical states of Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand in midJanuary 2013. His government promised aid financing and a more proactive
regional engagement, also of the military kind, to maintain international
public goods in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.109 Over time Abe refined thisvision into the «Free and Open Indo-Pacific», which quickly gained
currency in domestic discourse as a way of framing Japan’s strategic
attention - that is, attention focused not just on optimising relations between
China and the United States. Given more pronounced multipolarity, theJapanese government focused on taking advantage of new diplomatic
opportunities with other powers to go beyond the constraints placed onJapanese (and other’s) autonomy by the two great powers and the state ofrelations between them.110 At the same time, much of Japan’s engagementwith «middle powers» was in line with US strategic interests and aimed at
China. 111 So much so that the Trump administration’s 2018 strategic
framework for the Indo-Pacific, a key strategic document declassified by theoutgoing Trump administration, underlined the US government’s need to«reinforce Japan’s proactive leadership to amplify U.S. strategic goals inSoutheast Asia».112
Will this Indo-Pacific framing of Japan’s foreign policy endure?
The long-term prospects are good given its wide acceptance in Japan. The
framing is flexible and allows Japanese governments to adjust the degree ofemphasis they want to place on consolidative, constructive, and competitive
aspects of regional messaging and actions as Tokyo adapts to short-term
strategic exigencies and post-pandemic geopolitical challenges. The IndoPacific vision supports narratives of consolidation as Japan signals
geopolitical alignment with the United States. The shared policy vision keeps
the U.S. government strategically interested in the region and in Japan’s
108
Corey Wallace, ‘Japan's Strategic Pivot South: Diversifying the Dual Hedge’,
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 13, Number 3, 2013, pp.479-517.
109
MOFA (2013) Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy,
18 January 2013 (https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/abe_0118e.html).
110
Wallace, ‘Leaving (Northeast) Asia?’.
111
Marco Zappa, Il Giappone nel sistema internazionale, Venezia: Cafoscarina, 2020: pp.
229-32.
112
US National Security Council, ‘US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific’, 15
February 2018 (https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/IPSFinal-Declass.pdf).

28

Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
national defence, while it avoids framing the policy as exclusionary towards
Beijing. Thus, FOIP extends the period of time for Japanese commercial
interests to extract benefits from Japan’s prior economic engagement with
the PRC. It allows constructive messaging by rhetorically centring new
future-oriented bilateral and mini-lateral relations with the non-great powers
and includes «third-country» cooperation with the two great powers. It also
allows expressions of competition as Japan seeks to cross-brace militarily,
economically, and technologically with both new and traditional regional
partners in ways that decentres China as the key focus of regional
engagement, thereby restraining Beijing’s ability to exploit relative power
asymmetries.
Short-term prospects that Abe’s Indo-Pacific framing of Japan’s
foreign policy might endure are also good and belie initial anticipation,
including in Beijing, that Suga’s anointment and his reappointment of Nikai
to the Secretary-General role signalled a friendlier Japanese policy towards
the PRC.113 The reality is that Suga’s well-known lack of interest in foreign
policy grants Abe a potential role as a coach to Suga and as a go-between in
his prime ministerial afterlife. 114 Suga thus vowed to continue his
predecessor’s work during his LDP presidency candidacy: «Prime Minister
Abe’s leadership diplomacy was truly amazing. I don’t think I can match
that. [I] will stick to my own style, while also seeking assistance from theForeign Ministry. And of course, I will consult with (Abe)». 115 Sugasignalled his reliance on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Motegi
Toshimitsu’s reappointment as foreign minister, and shortly after theinauguration Suga visited Vietnam and Indonesia, recalling Abe’s first prime
ministerial visit in 2012. Ichikawa Keiichi, who now heads up the North
American Affairs Bureau, represented further continuity between Suga andAbe. Ichikawa worked under Kanehara Nobukatsu in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs’ Foreign Policy Bureau that promulgated the Arc of Freedom andProsperity vision that later informed the FOIP. Ichikawa returned as
executive secretary when Suga was chief cabinet secretary. Ichikawa thenfound himself in the Foreign Policy Bureau in 2016 as he coordinated with
Kanehara and Abe’s diplomatic brain, Yachi Shōtarō, in the crafting ofFOIP.116
113
Tomoyuki Tachikawa, ‘China Expects Japan's Next PM to be Conciliatory amid U.S.
Tensions’, Kyodo News, 9 September 2020.
114
Hugo Dobson & Caroline Rose, ‘The Afterlives of Post-War Japanese Prime
Ministers’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Volume 49, Issue 1, 2019, pp.127-150.
115“Japan PM Hopeful Says he May Need Help from Abe on Diplomacy”, Mainichi
Shimbun, 13 September 2020.
116
Testimony by former mid-ranking official from the National Security Secretariat, 2February 2021, Tokyo (online).

29Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
Furthermore, Japanese leaders and officials have been encouragedby their success in influencing audiences sitting in foreign capitals by making
use of the «Indo-Pacific» framing. 117 This result was partially aided by
Trump’s lack of a clear Asia strategy and the more assertive and riskier
Chinese foreign and security policy under Xi Jinping. Tokyo has of course
had to make its own adjustments, such as the transmutation of Japan’s Free
and Open Indo-Pacific strategy into an inclusive vision that was rhetorically
inclusive of China. This served to assuage ASEAN, which announced its
own Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, as well as countries like New Zealand,
which adopted the terminology in 2019, and Australia, which had adopted
Indo-Pacific terminology in its 2013 sans the «Free and Open» rhetoricalflourish. 118 As ASEAN and the Australasian countries endorsed Japan’s
approach, Japan succeeded in convincing European nations of the virtues of
FOIP-centred strategic action as the Europeans also recalibrated relations
with China. Germany published its rather comprehensive Cabinet-approved«Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific» in September 2020, the Netherlands
published a non-paper on its own Indo-Pacific guidelines in November
2020, 119 and France, which is a resident power in the Indian and Pacific
Oceans, announced its «Indo-Pacific strategy» in 2018. Germany and France,
namely the two major EU member states, pushed for an EU-wide strategy on
the Indo-Pacific in the late-Autumn of 2020. The United Kingdom has also
trumpeted the synergy between its Global Britain and Indo-Pacificconceptions. All of the afore-mentioned European documents on the IndoPacific aimed at the twin challenges of balancing their relationship with
China by deepening their relationship with East and South Asian players
such as Japan, India and ASEAN countries, while avoiding the pitfalls of a
US-China strategic rivalry that risks rocking the entire regional architecture,
if not the multilateral global order.
Japan’s role in these European conceptions has been pivotal, as
signalled by the invitation of Foreign Minister Motegi to the EU Foreign
Affairs Council of January 2021, a first in the history of EU-Japan relations.
Moreover, various security agreements on intelligence, defence equipment,
and regularised two-plus-two dialogues with Japan provided momentum for
117
Testimony by former high-ranking official from the National Security Secretariat, 2February 2021, Tokyo (online).
118
Fusaku Gō,, 安倍氏と国際政治 「友達外交」相手が去ると… (Mr. Abe andInternational Politics – What Happens to “Friendship Diplomacy” when the Counterpart
Leaves the Scene?), Asahi Shimbun, 19 September 2020; Corey Wallace, ‘Australia andAotearoa New Zealand's Layering of Strategic Communications (2016-2020)’, Asian
Perspective, Volume 45, Issue 3, 2021 (Forthcoming).
119
Gudrun Wacker, ‘Europe and the Indo-Pacific: comparing France, Germany and theNetherlands’, Real Instituto Elcano ARI 29/2021, 9 March 2021 (https://bit.ly/3m1vPbx).

30

Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
European Indo-Pacific outreach. France, the United Kingdom, and Germany
have all announced their interest in the region by sending military assets toEast Asia for exercises. These coups were the result of US lobbying, but alsoof the Japanese government’s quiet diplomacy and strategic communications
efforts throughout the second Abe administration: after all, major European
think-tanks and, to a lesser extent, academic institutions benefitted fromJapanese funding to put the spotlight on Tokyo’s initiatives and transmit its
strategic narratives to policymakers and the expert community. And by 2020,
the government of Japan had decided to invest in two major EU researchintensive universities with close links to the policy world, to inaugurate aJapan programme and an EU-Asia project, respectively, at The Vrije
Universiteit Brussel and the European University Institute (Florence). These
initiatives would be led by experts on Japan and East Asia’s international
relations.120 Moreover, throughout 2020 the EU and Japan undertook a seriesof Track 1.5 and webinar discussions, which culminated in a Joint Study on
Connectivity Cooperation. These discussions aimed at building on the 2019
EU-Japan Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality
Infrastructure Agreement to identify flagship projects entailing joint EUJapan private-public financing, with an eye on the Western Balkans, Eastern
Europe and Central Asia.121 In the process, Japan’s leadership role has helped
build a loose coalition of middle powers that may come handy in the face of
two nightmare scenarios: American abandonment and the potential for
Sinocentric hegemony, or excessive U.S.-China competition that risks
ushering in a world defined solely by power politics.
6. National Security: Supply Chain Resiliency and Technological Autonomy
The twin lens of managing Japan’s position within the Sino-American
relationship and pursuing Indo-Pacific diversification also applies to Japan’s
economic and military security. Even before 2020, fears lingered about
China’s asymmetric ability to leverage its centrality in many global andregional value chains as a form of «weaponized interdependence». 122
120
One of the two authors is a direct beneficiary of this engagement and is a holder of apart-time professorship at EUI. He can personally testify to freedom of expression andlack of self-censorship. Readers should be able to judge for themselves on his academic
integrity.
121
E-mail exchange with European External Action Service official, 16 April 2020; Marie
Sōderberg, “Eu-Japan Connectivity Promises”, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies: Policy Paper (2021: forthcoming).
122
Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, ‘Weaponized Interdependence: How Global
Economic Networks Shape State Coercion’, International Security, Volume 44, Issue 1,
2019, pp. 42–79.

31

Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
COVID-19 only drew more attention to this concern as China’s stringent
lockdown measures initially created a bottleneck in the supply of PPE andother medical necessities. In 2019, China was the largest supplier of PPE in
medical goods, with a market share of 64% for surgical masks, 59% for
goggles, 47% for protective wear, and 37% for gloves. As of May 2020,
Japan still depended on China for 96% on masks, 73% on goggles, andbetween 80% and 90% of imported protection gear (including those products
produced by Japanese companies in the People’s Republic).123 COVID-19’s
impact, therefore, ultimately enhanced regional (geo)political preferences fordiversification - whether the Trump administration’s maximalist position of
decoupling from China or the more subtle pursuit of enhanced «IndoPacific» strategic «resilience» favoured by other nations.124
In terms of the former, COVID-19 developments initially buoyed
Trump administration officials with further justification for their scepticism
towards globalisation in general, and China’s central role in driving it
forward since it joined the WTO in 2001 in particular. In January 2020,
Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross suggested that COVID-19 would alert
companies about the multiple risks associated with China and bring jobs backto the United States.125 COVID-19 and PRC actions throughout 2020 also
provided the Trump administration with ample opportunity to emphasise theCommunist Party of China’s (CPC) «malign» intent and China’s sustained
technological and military modernization, and hegemonic aspirations at theexpense of the rest of the world.
Washington’s emphasis on national security considerations in SinoAmerican economic relations was not new. The Trump administration had
already identified the need to apply maximum «asymmetric pressure» todefend America’s domestic industrial base, impose serious costs on China’s
party-state regime, 126 and avoid assisting the PRC in sectors where statesubsidies, distorted market practices, and economies of scale nurtured its
national champions. In 2020, the United States sought to accelerate
decoupling further through a wide range of tightened export controls andforeign investment screening mechanisms, including adding various Chinese123
Yukiko Fukagawa, ‘Post Mega-FTA Integration in Asia: Asia-Pacific, Indo-Pacific, orEurasia?’, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: Policy Paper (2021:
forthcoming).
124
Corey Wallace, ‘Australia and Aotearoa’.
125‘Wilbur Ross Says Coronavirus Could Bring Jobs Back to the U.S.’, New York Times,
30 January 2020.
126
US National Security Council, ‘US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific’, 15
February 2018 (https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/IPSFinal-Declass.pdf); ‘Virtual Alexander Hamilton Society Book Talk: The China
Nightmare: Dan Blumenthal, Matt Pottinger, & Nadia Schadlow’, The Alexander
Hamilton Society (webinar), 9 March 2021.

32

Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
companies to the entity list (EL), which lists goods and services requiring
export licences, managed by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau ofIndustry and Security. This made it increasingly difficult for Chinesecompanies to do business in the United States as well as around the world
with companies that also want to operate in the United States.127
Washington’s combative approach during the Trumpadministration rested on the insight that the CPC’s legitimacy was based on
economic performance and that China’s catch-up in high-tech sectors, suchas semiconductors, was still dependent on market access and technology
cooperation with Western nations and American allies like Japan. 128 For its
part, the Abe administration had started moving before 2020 to defend
Japan’s technological base through tighter export controls and foreign
investment screening mechanisms. It also established funding mechanisms
to woo Japanese companies to diversify away from China,129 and sought tomitigate the economic consequences of China establishing a sphere of
influence through its own connectivity initiatives by promoting Japan’s own«high quality» infrastructure initiatives. 130 In 2020, Tokyo strengthened
surveillance of university laboratories to prevent outflows of advanced
technologies,131 updated its Data Privacy Law in line with the strict standardsof the EU’s GDPR and its vision for a Data Free Flow with Trust initiative.132
Finally, Tokyo agreed to a EU-Japan-US trilateral proposal for strengthening
industrial subsidy discipline within the World Trade Organization.133
127
Hiroyuki Suzuki, ‘Building Resilient Global Supply Chains: The Geopolitics of the
Indo-Pacific Region’, CSIS Report, 19 February 2021.
128
Evan Medeiros, ‘China Reacts: Assessing Beijing’s Response to Trump's New China
Strategy’, China Leadership Monitor, 1 March 2019(https://www.prcleader.org/medeiros); ‘Virtual Alexander Hamilton Society Book Talk:
The China Nightmare: Dan Blumenthal, Matt Pottinger, & Nadia Schadlow’, The
Alexander Hamilton Society (webinar), 9 March 2021.
129
Giulio Pugliese and Sebastian Maslow, ‘Japan 2019’, pp. 141-5. Interview with senior
official from the Trump administration, Washington DC 5 March 2020.
130
Aurelio Insisa and Giulio Pugliese, ‘The Free and Open Indo-Pacific versus the Beltand Road: Spheres of Influence and Sino-Japanese Relations’, The Pacific Review, 2020
(online first) DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2020.1862899; Wallace, 2019.
131‘Japan Considers Tougher Rules on Research Interference amid US-China Tensions’,
Nature, 4 August 2020.
132
Paul Hastings. ‘New Amendment To Japan’s Data Privacy Law (APPI)’, Lexology, 10
December 2020 (https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a7e615b4-f6c5-42dc9b2c-a771d51063f9).
133
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Joint Statement of the Trilateral
Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the United States and the European Union, 14January 2020 (https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2020/january/joint-statement-trilateral-meeting-trade-ministers-japan-unitedstates-and-european-union); ‘Push for Japan, Korea to Join Breakaway Trade Disputes

33

Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
Tokyo also launched a supply chain diversification campaign
initially provisioned with US$ 2.3 billion in subsidies, a sum which it latermatched in early 2021. 134 This was complemented by an Indo-Pacificfocused «Supply Chain Resilience Initiative» agreed to with Australia, andIndia in September 2020. India and Australia both suffered economic fallout
from heightened diplomatic disputes with the PRC in 2020, and like Japan,sought to increase supply chain «resilience» with financial incentives.135
The ultimate effectiveness of these diversification initiatives andthe United States’ trade war is still unclear, however. China’s position in
global value chains is, after all, mostly dependent on regional demand, rather
than American demand. 136 Foreign Direct Investment into China actually
grew in 2020, making China the largest recipient of global FDI.137 Japanesebusinesses, much like the rest of the world, also continued to do businesswith and locate their supply chains in China. According to JETRO’s regularbusiness conditions survey, ten times more Japanese businesses are
considering expanding their China business in the future (40 %) than are
considering withdrawal (4 %) as of December 2020.138
One commercial domain where Japanese government and corporate
manoeuvring is likely to profoundly affect strategic diversification is
telecommunications. Beginning in 2017, the Japanese government beganencouraging Japanese companies to develop 5G/6G infrastructure throughspectrum allocation policies, tax incentives and credit facilities, and byextending the support of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry(METI) to cooperative R&D and test-bed facilities. While China’s national
champions, Huawei and ZTE, were increasingly excluded from Western andAmerican allied 5G networks, national leaders publicly wondered what theaffordable alternatives were.139 Tokyo positioned itself as that alternative in
Body’, Financial Review, 16 June 2020. Japan did not ultimately follow through on the
EU’s initiative for an ad interim appellate body within the WTO.
134
‘Japan Boosts Incentives to Counter China’s Factory Dominance’, Bloomberg News, 3
February 2021.
135
Amitendu Palit, ‘Resilient Supply Chain Initiative: A Political Driver to Revive AsianRegional Growth’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs Online, 30 January 2020.
136
Fukagawa, ‘Post-Mega FTA Integration in Asia’.
137‘Global Foreign Direct Investment Fell by 42% in 2020, Outlook Remains Weak’,
UNCTAD, 24 January 2021 (https://unctad.org/news/global-foreign-direct-investmentfell-42-2020-outlook-remains-weak).
138‘Survey on Business Conditions of Japanese-Affiliated Companies FY2020,’ Japan
External Trade Organization, December 2020. According to a survey by the Japan
External Trade Organization, more than 40% of Japanese companies considered
expanding their business in China, while the percentage of businesses considering a
withdrawal from that offshoring economy almost halved to less than 4%.
139
Kate Proctor, ‘Johnson: Huawei Critics «Must Tell us What’s the Alternative»’, The
Guardian, 14 January 2020.

34

Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
late-2019, when it signalled its desire for Japan to «lead America and the EU
on 5G development».140 These ambitions have been greatly helped by the
emergence of the Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) concept andalliance. O-RAN implementation proceeds from open standards in datatransmission and enhanced interfacing between different network devices
and infrastructure components to prevent «lock-in» by singular infrastructure
vendors or nations.141 O-RAN does not require a single telecommunications
vendor to provide an infrastructure «backbone», and allows governments tocustomize their networks with equipment from multiple vendors. In the longrun, these «virtualized» networks may also be cheaper, and governments will
not need their own national telecommunications champions to retain
strategic autonomy. Governments will, however, need initial assistance fromequipment «integrators». Japanese companies are well positioned to provide
this assistance given their world-leading demonstrations of the ability tointegrate O-RAN compliant equipment in early-2020. METI followed up onthese developments in June 2020 when it announced a «Beyond 5G» support
initiative and accompanying international strategy. In the second half of 2020
there was rapid consolidation of strategic 5G/6G partnerships between
domestic Japanese companies and international allies.142
Domestic developments were augmented by international
dynamics. The 2019 Prague 5G Security Conference saw 32 countries,
NATO and the EU agree on security standards for 5G rollout (The Prague
Proposals) while excluding Russian and Chinese representatives andcompanies. The United States placed Huawei on its entity list in May 2020
against the background of its Clean Path initiative to exclude «unreliable»
vendors like Huawei and ZTE from any networks that connect throughAmerican diplomatic facilities.143 Moreover, the formulation of the OpenRAN Policy Coalition brought NEC, NTT, Rakuten Mobile, and Fujitsu
together with Samsung, and large American and European
140‘Japan to Earmark ¥50 Billion for 6G Development’, Japan Times, 10 December 2020;
Ruling Bloc Approves Tax Reforms to Boost Tech Investment in Japan’, Japan Times, 12
December 2019; ‘Japan Approves Bill to Help Firms to Develop 5G, Drone
Technologies’, Reuters, 18 February 2020.
141
Mihoko Matsubara, ‘Japan’s 5G Approach Sets a Model for Global Cooperation’,Lawfare, 14 September 2020 (https://www.lawfareblog.com/japans-5g-approach-setsmodel-global-cooperation); Yohei Hirose & Naoyuki Toyama, ‘Chile Picks Japan's
Trans-Pacific Cable Route in Snub to China.’ Nikkei Asia, 29 July 2020.
142
James L. Schoff & Rika Kamijima-Tsunoda, ‘The United States and Japan ShouldTeam Up on 5G’, Carnegie Commentary, 23 July 2020; ‘NTT to Take over Docomo,
Aiming to Accelerate Research on 6G Tech’, Nikkei Asia, 29 September 2020; ‘NTT to
Take Stake in NEC, as they Form Alliance to Develop 5G’, Asahi Shimbun, 26 June
2020.
143
Hiroyuki Suzuki, ‘Building Resilient Global Supply Chains’.

35Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
telecommunications, computing, and systems technology companies toadvocate for the O-RAN consortium. This firmly ensconced Japanesecompanies at the centre of geopolitical machinations overtelecommunications infrastructure. In December 2020, the United States
government lent its imprimatur to the Open RAN Policy Coalition when theFederal Communications Commission unanimously voted to support making
O-RAN solutions eligible for federal funding. This was followed by
Congress passing the Utilizing Strategic Allied (USA) Telecommunications
Act to provide funding and assist with the deployment of O-RAN 5G
network solutions throughout the United States and to remove «unreliable»
equipment. Congress also passed the Multilateral Telecommunications
Security Fund Act, establishing a fund to prevent the spread of equipment
made in China overseas, specifically noting the Five Eyes countries andJapan as likely contributors.144
Beyond North America, Japanese providers like NEC, NTT,
HAPSMobile (Softbank subsidiary), Fujitsu, and Rakuten have served as
testers, integrators, and equipment providers for multi-vendor O-RAN
systems in cooperation with the British government, BT and O2 in the United
Kingdom, Madrid-based Telefonica, Deutsche Telekom in Germany, andVodafone in the Netherlands. Japanese providers have also made high profile
demonstrations of the O-RAN alliance’s potential in France, Thailand, andIndia - with Japanese and Indian governments agreeing to the mutual
enhancement of technology development and human resource provision.145
It ought to be stressed, however, that, in the short-to-medium term, open
radio access network-based 5G is still being tested and its deployment andadoption is substantially behind traditional «hardware»-centred suppliers,
such as Huawei, Nokia and Ericsson, whose components are ready to be
deployed. In short, the US-led O-RAN alliance was playing to the UnitedStates’ strengths in software-based ICT solutions and is only likely to pose aserious challenge in the medium-term to Huawei and European
telecommunication components providers.146
While virtualized Open-Radio Access Network solutions might besufficient for domestic telecommunications, international traffic is still
overwhelmingly transmitted by submarine cables. Japanese companies were
144
‘U.S. 5G Fund to Attract Japan, ‘Five Eyes’ against China’, The Japan News, 1
February 2021.
145‘NEC to Support 5G Networks in UK as Alternative to Huawei’ Nikkei Asia, 26
October 2020; Japan to Help India with 5G to Counter China's Growing Influence’,
Nikkei Asia, 29 November 2020.
146‘How the Biden Administration will handle high-tech’, Asia Times webinar with Dr.
Robert Atkinson and RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, 10 December 2020,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3kKq-sTBKFM

36Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)at the centre of strategic machinations in this item as well in 2020. In October
2020, the US-Australia-Japan Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure
Investment in the Indo-Pacific agreed to its first project to fund a largecapacity submarine optical cable built by NEC to connect Oceania’s Palau toSoutheast Asia and the U.S. mainland.147
Japan’s telecommunications aspirations and «middle power»
cooperation also got a boost in 2020 due to the Chilean government’s
decision to snub Huawei Marine for the Transoceanic Cable.148 Huawei hadplanned landing points in Shanghai and Hong Kong for the first submarine
cable linking South American to Asia. However, with encouragement from
United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Santiago eventually choseTokyo’s proposed route connecting Santiago and Auckland to a landing pointat Sydney. This will in turn connect to a cable that links Sydney to Japanthrough Guam, completed in July 2020. Japanese government funding will
support NEC to construct the Transoceanic Cable, with the two governments
agreeing to a digital partnership that will assist Chile in fulfilling its ambition
to become the Southern American digital hub.
The Transoceanic Cable and Japan’s 5G/6G ambitions are also
timely for New Zealand and Australia after the two nations effectively
excluded Chinese telecommunications vendors from their 5G networks in
2018.149 Indeed, Australia and Japan agreed to cooperate in the 5G field in
mid-July, essentially closing the Quad loop on 5G cooperation, and NECannounced its plans in August to enter the Australian 5G market as areplacement for Huawei. NEC also hired a recently retired top-ranked
Australian telecommunications official as its chairman to lead its penetration
strategy in Australia.150
The Transoceanic Cable plan is not the first instance of proactive
middle power diplomacy involving Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The
three countries came together to forge the Comprehensive and Progressive
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) after the withdrawal of the UnitedStates from the original Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and continued in2020 to promote the agreement with «likeminded» countries such as
Thailand, Colombia, Switzerland, South Korea (ROK), Philippines,
Indonesia, and the UK (who would in early 2021 apply for membership).
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand also pushed for a higher quality version
147
Yohei Hirose, ‘Japan, Us and Australia to Finance Undersea Cable for Palau’, Nikkei
Asia, 28 October 2020.
148
Mihoko Matsubara, ‘Japan’s 5G Approach’.
149
Corey Wallace, ‘Australia and Aotearoa’.
150‘NEC Aims to Enter Australia's 5G Market in 2021’, Japan Times, 3 August 2020;‘NEC Pitches Itself as Huawei Replacement in 5G Rollout’, Australian Financial Review,
22 June 2020.

37

Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)of the ASEAN-centred Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP) agreed upon in late-2020, with Japan playing an important role as an«interlocutor for [RCEP] negotiating members».151
New Zealand and Australia, while announcing their Pacific Resetand Pacific Step-up policies in partial response to concerns over China’s
increasing influence in the Pacific Islands region, encouraged Japan to takeup a greater infrastructure, aid, and even military role in the region. Finally,
inevitably described as a «Quad Plus» initiative, New Zealand, Australia, andJapan joined Vietnam, South Korea, India, and the United States to form the
Economic Prosperity Network (EPN). The EPN held weekly meetings
throughout 2020 just below the ministerial level to discuss supply chain
resilience and trade in a post-pandemic world.152
7. Military Balancing in 2020: The Quad and Beyond
Japan continued to enhance Quadrilateral Security Dialogue(«Quad») activity in 2020. Japan and India finalized an Acquisition and
Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) agreement in September just as Abe left
office. This will have particular strategic significance as it allows the Indian
military to access Japan’s Djibouti base near key Middle East sea lanes andprovides the SDF access to major Indian bases in the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands in the Bay of Bengal, which sit astride western approaches to theMalacca Strait. Then, in October, the second ever ministerial-level Quadmeeting took place in Tokyo ahead of Australia’s November return to the
Malabar Naval Exercises and the first four-member Quad military exercise
in 13 years.153 The Quad’s growing momentum was facilitated by mounting
tensions between its four members and China throughout 2020, especiallybetween India and China.
Further tightening of the Australia-Japan security relationship wasof particularly profound significance in 2020. The completion of a reciprocal
access agreement (RAA) that will govern the presence of their respective
militaries in each other’s territory represents Japan’s first such post-war
agreement with a singular non-allied nation and the first since the 1960 Status
of Forces Agreement with the United States. Japan also joined Australia andthe United States in multiple naval exercises in the US Navy’s 7th Fleet’s

151
Saori Katada, ‘RCEP is Concluded and the Middle Powers Carry the Torch’,
Australian Outlook, 18 February 2021.
152
Corey Wallace, ‘Australia and Aotearoa’.
153
Junnosuke Kobara, ‘'Quad' Nations Flaunt Stronger Ties with First Drill in 13 Years’,
Nikkei Asia, 7 November 2020.

38

Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)area of operations, including the South China Sea. 154 After this exercise,defence minister Kishi Nobuo announced that Japan would look at permitting
the SDF to provide «asset protection» to Australian military presence in East
Asia. It is worth stressing that only the United States had hitherto benefitted
from the authorisation of such missions under Japan’s PSL.
The precedents established by these activities and new agreements
are not only important in a Quad context but could form the foundation forJapan to play a greater a role in military cross-bracing amongst middle andregional power partners present in the Indo-Pacific, given mutual concerns
about both PRC activity and American reliability and commitment to IndoPacific stability. While the Australia-Japan relationship is the mostadvanced, Japan continued to pursue an acceleration of strategic cooperation
with non-Quad members in 2020. This accelerated program included
maritime and amphibious military training exercises that involved non-Quad
Indo-Pacific democracies such as Canada and New Zealand in AntiSubmarine Warfare exercises, as well as new defence equipment agreements,and equipment sales to ASEAN nations to enhance their maritime domainawareness.
Despite COVID-19, the UK, Australia, NZ, Canada, and France
continued to operate out of the United States’ pivotal Kadena Air Base toperform aerial and maritime monitoring of UN Security Council sanctions
against North Korea (DPRK). To match words with deeds in their strategic
partnership, Europe and Japan converged on hard and soft security
cooperation. While European navies steadily engaged in the Indo-Pacificregion, commitments by the UK, France and Germany to increase theirmilitary presence were welcomed by Japan (and the US) in 2020. 155
Furthermore, the EU and the development agencies of major EU member
states inaugurated a four-year «Enhancing Security Cooperation in and withAsia» project. It aimed to promote policy dialogue, confidence building, andcapacity building with partners such as India, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore,
South Korea and Vietnam, in the fields of maritime and cyber security,
counter-terrorism, and training in peacekeeping.156
8. Alliance Developments
154
Euan Graham & Yuka Koshino, ‘Australia and Japan Inch Closer towards Landmark
Defense Agreement’, IISS Analysis, 17 December 2020.
155
Hiroyuki Akita, ‘European Navies Hold Stronger China Deterrent than First Appears’,
Nikkei Asia, 5 March 2021.
156
Deutsche Gesellschaft fūr Internationale Zusammenarbeit Gmbh (GIZ), Enhancing
Security Cooperation in and with Asia, January 2020
(https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/87412.html).

39

Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
The alliance with the United States was enhanced in two notableways in 2020. The first reflected Japan’s increased recent focus on enhancing
multi-domain warfare capabilities with space, cyber and electromagnetic
spectrum technologies. Space cooperation took a big leap forward inparticular. Half a year after the creation of the United States Space Force(USSF), the Japanese government established the Space Operations
Squadron (SOS) as a specialized space domain unit within the Air SelfDefense Force (ASDF) in May. Then in June, the United States released its
Defense Space Strategy and Japan adopted a new Basic Plan on Space
Policy. The two governments agreed to expand space cooperation in a
number of civilian and military space and technology areas, including the allimportant space situational awareness (SSA). The SOS soon signed an MOU
for cooperation with the United States Space Force (USSF). The allies later
concluded an agreement to strengthen their space-monitoring capabilities
through mutual use of their satellites. Part of it was Japan’s decision to mount
two United States optical sensors to enhance Space Domain Awareness on
Japan’s Michibiki Quasi-Zenith (QZ) satellites to be launched from Japan’sTanegashima Space Centre. The QZ satellites have significant futurecommercial and civilian applications by improving on the United States’
GPS system in terms of both coverage and precision for Japan and theWestern Pacific. However, the fused civilian-military strategic aspects ofspace systems are also important as exemplified by the United States and its
allies’ increasingly competition with the PRC’s «Space Silk Road» in theprovision of commercial space services. On the launch of the SOS, theJapanese government stated forthrightly its need to protect commercial andmilitary space assets from new anti-satellite weapons and the need to build«the capability to disrupt the C4I (command, control, communication,
computer, and intelligence) of opponents with combined use of theelectromagnetic domain».157
A second positive development for the alliance was the Japanese
government welcoming significant involvement of American companies in
its ¥ 5 trillion (ca. US$ 48 billion) F-3 project to develop 90 fighters to
replace Japan’s F-2 and the older F-15Js from 2035. This was the firstJapanese-led fighter initiative since the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI)
F-1 in the 1970s. Tokyo nevertheless anticipated enhanced allianceintegration through deepened industrial and technological cooperation and157
Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’,
USCC Website, November 2019, p.359 (https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/201911/2019%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf). ‘Special Feature: Launch of theSpace Operations Squadron’, Japan Defense Focus, Number 125, July 2020
(https://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no125/specialfeature.html); ‘201940

Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
interoperability. Tokyo also envisioned the development of a platform thatenhances resilience to the networking-disrupting electronic warfare
capabilities deployed by China to counter the United States and Japan’sability to operate within the 1st Island Chain. Project-lead Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries would engage Lockheed Martin for systems integration, stealthand-airframe/mobility enhancements, and, in all likelihood, Northrop
Grumman for sensors and data-linking. In addition to using performanceenhancing materials developed by MHI and IHI that lighten the airframe andengine, the F-3 will include new systems such as an Electromagnetic
Warfare-resilient fly-by-optics control system, a self-repairing flight control
capability, a VR helmet, and the use of drones as «loyal wingmen» forforward sensing and combat purposes.158 Various new technologies could
thus be improved through cooperation and plausibly taken up into a future
United States 6th generation fighter, allowing development costs to be
reduced.
A third development was more mixed in symbolism. As the UnitedStates and Japan welcomed the 60th anniversary of the Mutual Security
Treaty in January, Japan’s inability to take part in the «collective»
contribution to United States’ pressure on Iran by joining an international
coalition to protect ships that pass through the Strait of Hormuz highlighted
the continued restraints on Japan’s ability to contribute to the alliance. The
government dispatched the Takanami destroyer and two P-3C surveillance
craft in February to the Middle East, but operations were limited toindependent «research and study», the use of weapons restricted to theprotection of Japan-related ships, and the MSDF prohibited from operatingin the critical Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf areas, traversed by ships
carrying 80 % of Japan’s crude oil imports, which are there potentially at
maximum risk. 159 While the United States welcomed Japan’s move,
President Trump and the United States Ambassador in Tokyo both noted
their expectations of greater alliance contributions ahead of Host Nation
Support negotiations scheduled for 2020.160 With Trump’s re-election still a
158
Sebastian Roblin, ‘Japan Plans to Spend $48 Billion To Field F-X Stealth Fighters By
2035 That Would Outperform F-35 And Chinese Fighters’, Forbes Online, 15 December
2020.
159
Giulio Pugliese and Sebastian Maslow, ‘Japan 2019’, pp. 141-5; Corey Wallace, ‘The
End of the Golden Weather for Abe’s Diplomacy?’, Australian Outlook, 1 August 2020.
160
Taketsugu Sato, ‘U.S. Diplomat Confident that U.S., Japan Will Contribute More to
Alliance, Asahi Shimbun, 31 January 2020; ‘Statement from the President on the 60th
Anniversary of the United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security’,
White House Website, 18 January 2020
(https://web.archive.org/web/20200119023009/https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/statement-president-60th-anniversary-united-states-japan-treaty-mutualcooperation-security/).

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
realistic possibility at the time, Japan’s leaders could not but be anxious
about American perceptions of Japan’s commitment to the alliance and what
was to come.
9. Domestic Security Politics
COVID-19 ultimately obscured discussions of security matters inJapan in the first half of 2020. This changed with Minister of Defence Kōno
Tarō’s abrupt June cancellation of the Aegis Ashore midcourse ballistic
missile defence (BMD) system. Several developments foreshadowed
cancellation, however. In Akita Prefecture, existing reservations over thehealth effects of emplacing Aegis Ashore’s AN/SPY 7 radar next to aresidential area were transformed into resistance after mid-2019 revelations
that the Ministry of Defence (MOD) had miscalculated elevation angles used
to rule out alternative Tohoku candidate sites. A MOD official falling asleep
at a June 2019 meeting dedicated to assuaging Akita residents’ safetyconcerns worsened matters. With the prefectural governor and 60 % of all
Akita residents opposing Aegis Ashore’s deployment, the LDP lost Akita
Prefecture’s sole single member district seat in the July 2019 House ofCouncillors election, and Akita was withdrawn as a candidate site in May
2020. 161 The MOD then informed Kōno of problems near SouthwesternJapan’s Yamaguchi Prefecture candidate site, where modifications to prevent
interceptor boosters landing in a residential area would add ten years to
deployment time and a further ¥ 200 billion to already ballooning life-cycle
costs.162
With North Korea’s recent missile testing programme reminding
the Japanese government that Aegis Ashore was not optimised for theinterception of ballistic missiles with lofted, depressed, or boost-glide
trajectories in addition to cruise missiles, Kōno convinced Prime Minister
Abe to cancel the whole programme, burnishing his own credentials as adecisive and fiscally sensitive reformer in the process. This cancellation,
however, startled an American defence establishment that had grown used toa more accommodating Tokyo, which, following the Abe administrations
support for the revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence
Cooperation and the passage of the PSL, had become open to greater
operational integration and expensive purchases of American military161‘陸上イージス、秋田市配備を断念 県内で再選定へ―防衛省’ (Abandoning
Akita City Deployment of Land-based Aegis, Re-selection within Prefecture: MOD), Jiji
Tsūshin, 6 May 2020 (https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2020050600381&g=pol).
162
Isabel Reynolds and Emi Nobuhito, ‘Abe's Plan for U.S. Aegis Ashore Missile Shield
Rattles Akita Residents’, Japan Times, 10 September 2019.

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
equipment. Cancellation also bifurcated domestic security debate into two
streams: one focused on a BMD replacement as an alliance contribution, andanother on overseas territorial strike roles for the SDF as a hedge against
American abandonment.
Regarding BMD, the Japan government’s selection of Lockheed
Martin’s AN/SPY 7 radar system as the core of Aegis Ashore in 2017 wasparticularly significant for alliance integration. Using active electronicallyscanned arrays (AESA) more resistant to jamming and difficult to detect,
SPY-7 promised greater precision and three times more coverage than thepassive phased array AN/SPY-1D radars on Aegis-equipped MSDF and USNavy destroyers on BMD duty in the Western Pacific. The deployment of
SPY-7 and Aegis Ashore interceptor batteries to land-based locations in
Akita and Yamaguchi would enhance Japan’s integration into the UnitedStates’ regional BMD network, free up the MSDF and US Navy fromballistic missile defence duties, and potentially enable Japan to make agenuine «collective self-defence» contribution to protecting Guam or
Hawaii, while also mollifying Trump administration demands for increased
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases by allies.
Balancing alliance and domestic demands, Tokyo eventually
settled on a five-year plan to build two destroyers modified to house the SPY7. While it adds flexibility about radar and interceptor battery placement andconcealment, «Aegis Afloat» will not be a true replacement for Aegis
Ashore. It will also eventually cost more in terms of the maintenance andmanpower required operate the vessels. 163 Space and power generation
limitations will likely result in decreased radar sensitivity compared to aground-based system, and will prevent future performance enhancements ofthis modular system. Maritime weather conditions and the upkeep
requirements for the vessels also make the promise of 24/7 radar coverage ofpotential ballistic missile threats impossible to realise. Instead of reducing
the need for two MSDF destroyers to be out at sea on BMD duty, «Aegis
Afloat» will enhance the MSDF need to recruit and retain enlarged crews for
its existing fleet and missions. This was demonstrated immediately by the
MSDF proposing to assign 500 Ground Self-Defence Force troops to crew
the new ships.164
Aegis Ashore’s cancellation temporarily breathed new life into
Japan’s perennial policy debate over acquisition of a strike capability against
163
Reito Kaneko, ‘Japan to Build 2 New Aegis Ships as Alternative to Land-Based
System’, Kyodo News, 9 December 2020. A past Ministry of Defence analysis showedthat 30-year life cycle costs for a two-ship-based option would be closer to ¥ 700 billion
rather than the MOD’s quoted ¥ 480 to ¥ 500 billion.
164
Yukio Tajima, ‘Japan Aims to Recruit 500 New Crew for Future Aegis Ships’, Nikkei
Asia, 14 November 2020.

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Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
military bases in foreign territory. Increasing awareness of BMD costs andeffectiveness limitations, diffidence towards President Trump’s enthusiasm
for foreign arms sales, and doubts about Japan’s «excessive dependence on
the U.S. for its defense» catalysed by uncertainties about COVID-19’s
geopolitical implications moved the LDP to establish a task force to reevaluate Japan’s missile defence options in July. 165 When the task force
submitted its proposals to Prime Minister Abe in August, it highlighted theneed for «new measures that will heighten deterrence, including possessionof the capability of preventing ballistic missile launches even from within
enemy territory». This policy was called «missile interdiction», watering
down the previous terminology, «enemy base strike».166 Abe immediately
convened a meeting of the NSC to consider the changes, promising to «move
ahead in setting a new direction and swiftly implement” new measures».167
Despite this promise, authorisation of foreign territory strike
missions under the guise of missile interdiction was eventually rejected.
Defence analysts and some former defence ministers cautioned that the typeof missile threat North Korea (and China) posed in 2020 was very different
from even five years before, given their enhanced launcher mobility anddeception practices. To eliminate enemy missile positions, Japan’s recent
acquisition and development of long-range «stand-off» weapons would need
to be accompanied by the SDF acquiring familiarity with even more
expensive and costly-to-maintain detection and support platforms operatingclose to heavily contested DPRK (or Chinese) territory.168 Even with United
165

Yukio Tajima, ‘Japan Must Rethink Excessive Reliance on US Security, Says Expert’,Nikkei Asia, 7 July 2020; ‘政府・自民にトマホーク配備論 中朝のミサイル攻撃抑止に期待’ (Government, LDP Debate Tomahawk Deployment, Anticipating Deterrent
against PRC/DPRK Missile Attack), Sankei Shimbun, 27 July 2020
(https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/200727/plt2007270017-n1.html); Mori Eisuke,‘日本のミサイル防衛はキーパーだけでサッカーするようなもの: 中谷元・元防衛相に聞く’ (Japan’s Missile Defence is Like Playing Soccer with Just the Keeper:
Interview with Former Defence Minister Nakatani Gen), Nikkei Business, 24 August 2020
(https://business.nikkei.com/atcl/gen/19/00179/082100007/?P=4).
166‘自民、ミサイル防衛の提言了承 「相手領域内で阻止」’ (Liberal Democratic
Party Accepts Missile Defence Proposals for «Interdiction Inside Foreign Territory»),
Nikkei Shimbun, 4 August 2020
(https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO62262380U0A800C2EAF000/).
167‘Abe Pushes ‘New Direction’ in Defensive Policy: 1st Strike Option’, Asahi Shimbun,
5 August 2020.
168
Takahashi Kousuke, ‘日本の敵基地攻撃能力保有、7 つの課題’ (7 Challenges forJapan’s Possession of Enemy Base Attack Capability), Yahoo News, 21 June 2020
(https://news.yahoo.co.jp/byline/takahashikosuke/20200621-00184300/); ‘敵基地攻撃「論理の飛躍」 政府の検討批判―石破氏’ (Ishiba Calls Enemy Base Attack ‘Leapof Logic’, Criticizes Government Review), Jiji Tsūshin, 26 June 2020; Jeffrey Hornung,44Corey Wallace and Giulio Pugliese “Japan 2020: Abe’s Well-Laid
Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
States (and unlikely) ROK help, Japanese experts doubted the plausibility ofpre-empting a missile attack and questioned the effectiveness of hunting
down mobile launch platforms after an initial saturation attack. In theirevaluation, such an attempt was unlikely to generate much more than damage
mitigation or enemy firing-rate disruption effects.169
Foreign experts questioned the cost-benefit calculations of Tokyo
concerning stand-off weapons for purposes other than maritime domain
denial and their contribution to alliance burden sharing. They noted the lackof Japanese investment into affordable, but symbolically prosaic, lower
technology adaptations, which would enhance the resilience of the US-Japan
alliance. Likewise, they assessed long-standing ASDF and MSDF
deficiencies in ISR capabilities, air/sea lift, and logistical support as moreurgent needs for a Tokyo wanting to add value to American operations duringa regional conflict. 170 These conventional weapons are also unlikely togenerate the expected strategic and deterrent effects for retaliation,
punishment, and counterforce missions as they lack destructive andpenetrative power. On top of this, the quantities Japan could acquire will belimited by other expensive military acquisitions and fiscal restraints. Most
problematically, the likely targets for more aggressive uses of these weapons
are nuclear-armed authoritarian states that share, and nurture, historicalantagonism towards Japan due to its brutal imperial legacy. Ultimately,
carrying out «missile interdiction» would be unwise without a solidcommitment from Washington, which might, however, be undermined byincessant Japan’s doubts about the alliance with the United States.
‘Three Questions Japan Must Answer as It Seeks Missile Strike Options’, Nikkei Asia, 13
August 2020.
169
Grant Newsham, ‘Abe’s Aegis Ashore Cancellation Doesn’t Add Up’, Asia Times, 30
June 2020; Ken Jimbo, ‘ポスト・イージスアショアの防衛構想：中国との「戦略的競争」を焦点に’ (Post-Aegis Ashore Defense Initiative: Focusing on ‘Strategic
Competition’ with China), Canon Institute for Global Studies Website, 14 July 2020
(https://cigs.canon/article/20200714_6558.html); Mori Eisuke, ‘敵基地攻撃能力で朝鮮半島有事の損害を限定’ (Limiting the Damage During a Korean Peninsula Contingency
through Base Attack Capability), Nikkei Business, 13 August 2020
(https://business.nikkei.com/atcl/gen/19/00179/081100003/).
170
Eric Heginbotham & Richard J. Samuels, ‘Active Denial: Redesigning Japan's
Response to China's Military Challenge’, International Security, Volume 42, Number 4,
2018, pp.128-169; ‘A New Military Strategy for Japan’, Foreign Affairs, 16 July 2018;
Jeffrey Hornung, ‘Japan’s Potential Contributions in an East China Sea Contingency’,
RAND Research Report, 2020; ‘南西諸島防衛、空港足りぬ’ (Nansei Islands Defence,
Airport Shortage), Sankei Shimbun, 22 August 2020
(https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/200822/plt2008220020-n1.html); Jeffrey
Hornung, ‘Is Japan’s Interest in Strike Capabilities a Good Idea?’, War on the Rocks, 17
July 2020.

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Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
Commentators increasingly saw this missile interdiction agenda as
Abe’s attempt to leave a stronger diplomacy and security focused legacy andas compensation for his failures on «revising the pacifist Constitution,
regaining sovereignty of some or all of the Northern Territories from Russia
and resolving the thorny problem of Japanese nationals abducted by North
Korea».171 As Abe’s political authority deteriorated, criticism of the rationale
for missile interdiction gained traction. Coalition partner Komeito - alreadychastened by stakeholder criticism over its close cooperation with LDP
hawks during the Abe era - exerted itself to protect Japan’s senshu bо̄ei or«defensive defence» policy. In September, Abe, in a public statement, madeno specific mention of the SDF being able to strike missile positions inenemy territory, only going as far as to note «there is a need to heighten
deterrence to further reduce the possibility of an attack on Japan».172 Even
within the LDP, Abe’s statement did not get the approval of the relevant
policy body, and the statement was generally ignored by newspaper editorial
boards.173 In December 2020, the debate was once again quietly shelved, justas the government announced its most anaemic increase (0.5 %) in defence
spending for almost a decade. This limited increase occurred despite the
PRC’s 6.6 % 2020 increase in defence spending and awareness about the
future burdens coming from Aegis Afloat and F-3 development.
Like commitment to revising Article 9 of the constitution, rollingback senshu bо̄ei, retains totemic symbolism for many revisionist
conservative politicians, looking to transcend the «post-war regime». 174
However, senshu bо̄ei is a symbolic policy stance rather than a strategic
doctrine. The focus on it by both its defenders and assailants ultimately
obscures needed debates about the strategic rationale for ensuring Japan’s
security and prioritization of defence options in the constrained context of alimited defence budget. And, as COVID-19 demonstrated all too painfully in
2020, geopolitical insecurity may not necessarily be the most pressing
security problem. The government does not seem to have learned this lesson,
however, despite the major political consequences it had. When thegovernment tasked a team in the NSS to craft Japan’s pandemic response on
April 1, it was tacked on to a new unit focusing on economic security, making
171‘Abe Pushes ‘New Direction’ in Defensive Policy’.
‘Abe in One of Last Policy Steps Calls for New Defense Policy Initiative’, Asahi
Shimbun, 12 September 2020.
173
Kuni Miyake, ‘Abe’s Last National Security Legacy for Suga to Complete’, Japan
Times, 15 September 2020.
174
Shogo Suzuki & Corey Wallace, ‘Explaining Japan's Response to Geopolitical
Vulnerability.’ International Affairs Volume 94, Number 4, 2018, pp.711-734; Shelia
Smith, Japan Rearmed: The Politics of Military Power, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2019; p.172.
172

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it seem like a makeshift and temporary adaptation.175 Similarly, there has
been a surprising lack of progress on instituting a Japanese disease control
and prevention centre despite support from within the LDP, Komeito, the
Science Council of Japan, and Japan Medical Science Federation for an
independent, expert-focused agency. 176 As globalization is only being
reworked rather than being rewound in response to recent political andpandemic-related instability, there is no guarantee that COVID-19 will be themost serious pandemic facing Japan in the years ahead. The safety andstrategic implications of non-traditional security threats require greater
institutional attention from the Japanese government than has been the caseup to the end of 2020.
Conclusion
Up until 2020, increased strategic uncertainty in Japan’s
geopolitical environment and the unpredictability of international events
experienced during the Abe administration appeared to be balanced out by
Prime Minister Abe introducing greater predictability to Tokyo’s domestic,
foreign, and security policies and imposing on to national politics a rare senseof stability. With the Olympics as the backdrop, 2020 was supposed to serve
as a symbolic if not substantive turning point for consolidating consensus
around Tokyo’s long-standing national challenges, as Abe looked towards
building his political legacy. The developments of 2020 surveyed in thisarticle, however, mean that Japan’s political elite entered 2021 with morequestions than ever to answer in the pursuit of national wellbeing. Abe’s
departure from the premiership and Japan’s ongoing battle with COVID-19
left a strategic vacuum domestically. Political actors from within the LDP, aconsolidated national opposition, and newly resurgent local and nationallevel populist politicians will seek to occupy it. At the same time, local
populist politicians gain little national traction and the opposition – acollection of small parties with different agendas – has hardly consolidated.
More likely, rising stars in the LDP will be able to consolidate andreinvigorate it to face old and new challenges. Japan’s attempts to balance
175‘Japan Sets up NSC Team to Meet Coronavirus, Tech Challenges’, Mainichi Shimbun,
1 April 2020
(https://web.archive.org/web/20200404043937/https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/202004
01/p2g/00m/0na/066000c); ‘Japan National Security Secretariat to Form Economic
Division’, Nippon.com, 18 September 2020.
176
Rieko Miki, ‘Slow Pandemic Response Inspires Japan to Build Own CDC’, Nikkei
Asia, 24 June 2020; ‘科学的な政策提言を行う常設組織を要望:日本医学会連合’(Japan Medical Science Federation: Appeal for Permanent Organisation to Provide
Scientific Policy Recommendations), Mainichi Shimbun, 16 January 2021
(https://mainichi.jp/articles/20210116/k00/00m/040/268000c).

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Plans Go Awry”, Asia Maior XXXI/2020 (forthcoming)
relations between China and the United States became even more perilous asboth nations signalled their acceptance of a new era of strategic competitionand communicated their resolve to shape international relations moreaggressively. While Japan’s attempts to diversify its «Indo-Pacific»
partnerships appeared to bear fruit, questions remained about how much andhow quickly such outreach would generate alternative sources of strategic
autonomy. Japan’s leaders - whoever they might be - clearly face more
dynamic and testing domestic and international environments in the years
ahead.

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