Céline Pajon
University Paris 8
Junior Research Fellow, Ifri
August 2009

Significance of the Japan-India Partnershipfor East Asian Regionalism“I believe the time has come for our two ancientcivilizations to build a strong contemporary
relationship involving strategic and global partnershipthat will have a great significance for Asia and I
believe for the world as a whole”
Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh, Address to
the Joint Session of the Japanese Diet, 15 December
2006

The Japanese partnership with India is of particular significance regarding theconstruction of an East Asian Community. This nascent relationship between “the mostdeveloped and the largest Asian democracies” 1, grounded on a rich historical legacy ofcontributions toward East Asian regionalism, has the ambition to play a central role inthe current regional construction.
The rapprochement between Japan and India since 2000 mainly results from theevolution of the geopolitical context: the rise of China and the new strategic partnership
between Delhi and Washington. The Indo-Japanese relationship also builds on Indian
economic growth and the rediscovery of common values, interests and strategic
objectives between the two nations. 2
India has indeed been keen on reconnecting with East Asia since the 1990s for
economic and political reasons, while Japan started a “reasianization” process after the
1997 crisis. Japan finds an interest in getting closer to India, which shares its desire tobuild a multipolar Asia and counterbalance Chinese power. In this regard, Japan played
an essential role in integrating India into the East Asia Summit. This “mutually
beneficial” relationship is also very significant for this new wave of Asian regionalism,
which seems to shift from an “Asia-Pacific” to a “broader East Asia” focus.

1

To borrow the Indian terminology: Prime Minister Singh, Speech to the Japanese Diet, 15
December 2006. See the table below.
2
See N.S. Sisodia, G.V.C. Naidu, India-Japan relations, Partnership for Peace and Security in
Asia, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 2006, 144 pages.

As Paul Evans 3 has suggested, it is useful to distinguish between regionalisation andregionalism, the latter dealing with the expression of an identity and a cultural bedrock
to allow the construction of a regional organisation based on economic and politicalconvergence (regionalisation). From a methodological perspective, this means that theJapan-India contribution shall be examined for these two dimensions of the East Asian
regional construction. The complex reality of Asian international relations justifies an“analytic eclecticism” 4 in order to grasp the most comprehensive image of the ongoingprocesses. While drawing from a broad realist perspective, I will test someconstructivist and functionalist approaches when reviewing Japanese and Indian policy
and discourse about the construction of an integrated Asia.
This paper aims to discuss the implications of Japan-India partnership for the regional
project, the regional identity, and the regional balance of power. The importance of thenascent Japan-India relationship in Asia will be assessed, as well as its capacity to“make sense” for East Asia identity and current regionalism.

1. The regional project behind the Indo-Japanese current
rapprochement

The conjunction of exogenous and endogenous factors explains the current Japan-India
rapprochement. The rise of China transforming the power paradigm in Asia is an objectof concern for both Delhi and Tokyo. The bilateral partnership is part of their effort tohedge against Chinese power. The about-face of the American administration toward
India since the year 2000 is another important reason behind Tokyo’s new approach
toward Delhi.
The rapprochement also builds on Indian economic growth. Prompted by liberalization
reforms since 1991 and accompanied by a charm offensive toward East Asia, it is an
important element that motivated Japan to reconsider India as an attractive economic
partner. The two countries also share common values (democracy and market economy)
and strategic interests (building a multipolar world, gaining a permanent seat at theUnited Nations Security Council 5).
The historic visit of Prime Minister Mori to India in 2000 marked the turning point in
the bilateral relationship: Japan and India decided to build a “global partnership for the
21st Century”. 6 Most of the motives underpinning the Japan-India rapprochement
directly or indirectly relate to the two countries’ ambitions in East Asia.

3

Paul Evans, “Between Regionalism and Regionalization: Policy Networks and the Nascent
East Asian Institutional Identity”, In T.J. Pempel, ed., Remapping East Asia: The Construction ofa Region, Cornell University Press, 2005.
4
Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case forAnalytical Eclecticism”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/02), pp. 153–185.
5
In 2004, Japan, India, Brazil and Germany formed the G4 in order to gather their claim to get apermanent seat in the CSNU.
6
See the Summary of Japan-India Summit Meeting (August 23, 2000) on : www.mofa.go.jp

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Reinvesting the New Asia: common interests
For India, the re-engagement in East Asia takes place in the context of the “Look East
policy” since the 1990s. Aiming at reconnecting India with a dynamic, integrated East
Asia, it is part of an overall strategy to become a regional power. Accordingly, theIndian national interest has been widened to embrace the greater Indian Ocean, “fromthe Persian Gulf to the strait of Malacca”. 7 This new strategic orientation isaccompanied by a build-up of maritime capacity. 8
Japan adopted a more proactive role in Asia in the wake of the 1997 Asian fiscal crisis,
when it provided a large amount of assistance for Asian countries and proposed thecreation of an Asian Monetary Fund. Even if this initiative, opposed by the U.S. andChina, eventually failed, Southeast Asia countries came to see Japan as the real
economic leader of Asia, and asked Tokyo to take a greater political role in the region 9.
Since then, Japan has been very active in promoting regional agreements, in theeconomic (FTAs), political and security field 10 in an effort to refocus its diplomaticefforts toward Asia. This Japanese interest in East Asia has also to do with the rise of
China and Beijing’s attempt to take the lead in the region.
India and Japan share the perception that Asia is the new development locomotive in the
21st Century. Asia represents half of the world’s population, includes the world’s second
economic power, two giant nations that have grown at a fast pace (more than 7 %), anda collection of new industrialized countries. Asia has a high potential for economic
cooperation with a vertical specialization, dense regional networks for production, andmore than 55 % intra-zone trade. In this context, Tokyo and Delhi wish to support this“new Asian era” by defining ways to cope with the US-defined “arc of instability”, bybuilding an “arc of advantage” 11 and contributing to the construction of an East Asian
Community.
The diplomacy of the “arcs”
In 2004, Manmohan Singh, the father of Indian liberal reforms in the 1990s, floated his
vision of an “arc of advantage and prosperity” 12 across Asia, in the context of the
failure of multilateral trade negotiations and the strengthening of regional groupings.
Considered as an extension of the “Look East Policy”, the “arc of advantage” is a new
vision to promote a regional zone of shared prosperity. This expression emphasizes the7David Scott, “India’s “Grand Strategy” for the Indian Ocean : Mahanian Visions”, Asia-Pacific
Review, 13-2, 2006, pp. 97-129, p. 108.
8This is a revival of Mahan and Panikkar doctrine (K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean:
An essay on the influence of Sea Power on Indian history, Macmillan, London, 1945.) See
Indian Navy, Strategic Defence Review: The Maritime Dimension-A Naval View, 20 May 1998.
9
Dirk Nabers, China, Japan, and the Quest for Leadership in East Asia, GIGA Working Papers
n° 67, February 2008, p. 19
10
By example, Tokyo is at the origin of ReCAAP (Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia).
11
Japan-India Summit Meeting-Summary, November 29, 2004.
12
Inaugural Address by Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, Third India-ASEAN
Business Summit, 19 October 2004, New Delhi.

3importance of reconnecting India to East Asia, through the multiplication of tradeexchanges and development of reliable transportation routes.
This objective was to be reached by the completion of a Free Trade Agreement with
ASEAN. 13 Besides, an Asian Economic Community 14 that would encompass theASEAN+3 “from the Himalayas to the Pacific Ocean” would be built. This integrated
market would enable “large scale movement of people, capital, ideas, and creativity”. 15
Further elaborating on his vision, Singh proposed in December 2005 a Pan-Asia Free
Trade Agreement, based on an ASEAN+6 framework 16, on the model of the European
Union. 17
This is mainly a project of economic reintegration in East Asia, in order to take part inthe construction of a large pan-Asian free trade area, which could sustain the Indian
economic growth.
At the end of November 2006, Taro Aso, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, introduced
the expression “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”. 18 It was one of the rare attempts toapproach Japanese diplomacy in conceptual terms. Because this bold move provokedsome negative reactions, especially from China and some Middle Eastern countries, therhetoric soon disappeared from the political discourse. This vision holds that Japanese
foreign policy is founded on a new pillar: “value oriented diplomacy”, based onuniversal values such as democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law and themarket economy. Accordingly, Japan shall assist the young democracies in the outerrim of the Eurasian continent, in order to build an “arc of freedom and prosperity”. As
an Asianpace-setter in terms of democracy and economic development, Japan ispresented as a legitimate leader in the region. In the same statement, Aso stated thatJapan must also “make its ties even firmer with friendly nations that share the common
views and interests”. Comparing Japanese bilateral relations with China and India, TaroAso also called for an improvement in the relationship with Delhi.
In contrast with the Indian “arc”, which is mainly of an economic nature, the Japanesevision of the “arc” is much more political and deals with the promotion of democracy,
to allow a more balanced economic freedom and shared prosperity. However, in March
2007, Minister of Foreign Affairs Aso and his Indian counterpart Mukherjee“reaffirmed that there exists common objectives and values between the idea of "Arc of
Freedom and Prosperity" proposed by Japan and the idea of "Arc of Advantage and

13

The agreement is still not finalized, one of the main obstacles being the liberalization of the
Indian agriculture sector.
14ndThis expression was first used in the Indian context by Prime Minister Vajpayee at the 2
India-ASEAN Summit in 2003.
15
Inaugural Address by Dr. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India, Third India-ASEAN
Business Summit, October 19, 2004, New Delhi.
16
ASEAN+ China, Japan, Korea and India, Australia, New Zealand.
17 Amit Baruah, “Manmohan calls for creation of pan-Asian free trade area”, The Hindu, 13
December 2005.
18
Taro Aso, Minister of Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the Japan Institute of International
Affairs Seminar, “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons”, 30
November 2006.

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Prosperity" proposed by India, and that realisation of such common ideas would benefit
not only Japan and India but also the whole of Asia.”. 19
It must be added that in a recent speech on foreign policy given at the end of June 2009,
Prime Minister Aso elaborated on the concept of “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” as abasis for forming “a modern-day version of the Silk Road”. This new vision, calling forconnecting routes “from the Pacific Ocean to Europe,” clearly meets the Indian versionof the “arc”. 20
Japan and India used the “arc” metaphor in order to advance their vision of an
integrated, multipolar East Asia, extended from India to Australia and New Zealand.
Japan, India and the genesis of the East Asian Summit
Since the beginning of the 21st century and in the context of failure of the global trademechanisms, numerous bilateral and multilateral Free Trade Agreements were tied up in
East Asia. With more than 80 agreements, the question is now how to shift from acomplex noodle bowl of overlapping FTAs to a meaningful pan-Asian framework. The
idea of building an “East Asian community » eventually came up after a process ofreflection led by the countries of ASEAN+3 (or APT for ASEAN Plus Three).
In 1998, APT established successively the East Asian Vision group (1999-2001) and theEast Asia Study Group (EASG). The EASG report, issued in 2002, concluded that “theASEAN+3 framework remains the only credible and realistic vehicle to advance theform and substance of regional cooperation in East Asia.” 21 The report made no
mention of India or Australia. However, intense diplomatic pressure from Singapore,
Japan, Indonesia, and Vietnam succeeded in including India in the project, in less than 3
years. The main reasons behind this change of heart were both realpolitik concerns andan economic rationale: ASEAN countries eventually agreed that the presence of two
demographic and economic giants in the East Asia “Community” would be better thanone. This concern matched perfectly with Japanese interest to balance China in theregion.
In the meantime, Prime Minister Koizumi proposed in 2002 an “East Asian community”,
having ASEAN+3, Australia and New Zealand as the core founding members, and open
to the U.S., India and others. 22 India was later included as a full member in the Japanesevision of a regional project. This resulted from a recognition that India is no longer “alocal power” but “one of the three major powers of Asia”. 23 Also, the Japanese vision ofAsia broadened from “East Asia” (APT) to “the entirety of Asia” including South Asia.
Three main reasons accounted for this new strategic horizon: economic globalization
19

Joint Press release-Visit of External Affairs Minister of India to Japan, March 2007.
“Japan’s Diplomacy: Ensuring Security and Prosperity, 30 June 2009, at JIIA. However, theJapanese concept includes a larger group of countries, among them Central and Middle East
Asian countries.
21
Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, ASEAN+3 Summit, 4 November 2002, Phnom
Penh, Cambodia, p.5
22
Speech by Prime Minister of Japan Junichiro Koizumi, “Japan and ASEAN in East Asia - A
Sincere and Open Partnership,” Singapore, January 14, 2002
23
Ambassador Yasukuni Enoki, “ The Japan-India Partnership”, Lecture at USI, 28 May 2004.
20

5

(linked with India’s economic growth), the regional security issue (especially therevelation of proliferation connections between North Korea and Pakistan) and Japan’s
security interest (in particular, the safety of maritime routes and the JMSDF missions in
the Indian Ocean after 2001). 24
In April 2005, a strategic orientation was outlined for the Japan-India partnership which
included the realization of an East Asian Economic Community as an « Arc of
Advantage and Prosperity ». 25 On this occasion, Tokyo conveyed its decision to support
India’s membership in the East Asian Summit. Before the first EAS, Japan and India
lobbied to have a Chair declaration in which EAS (and not APT) would be presented as
the basis for an East Asian Community. 26
In addition, Tokyo proposed in April 2006 a CEPEA (Comprehensive Economic
Partnership in East Asia or “Nikai initiative”). The CEPEA consists of a fund to start acomprehensive economic partnership (CEP), and a policy-oriented research institution
based on the model of OECD: the ERIA (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN andEast Asia). This consultative body will study the feasibility of a regional FTA, which is
the ultimate end of the initiative.
The “Greater East Asian Community” would be organized around ASEAN at the core,
Japan, China and South Korea as principal members and Australia, New Zealand andIndia as the outer circle. 27 This larger framework allows Japan to counteract and contain
China which had stolen a march on Japan in knotting up bilateral FTAs in the region.
Enlarging the East Asia framework to embrace India also allows Japan to win U.S.
approval for this new regional organization and thereby reconcile potentiallycontradictory interests: to become more actively involved in East Asian regionalism
while maintaining strong alliance links with the U.S. 28
Despite the first mixed reactions to this ambitious project, Japan could count on Indiaand its Pan-Asia free trade proposition (see supra), inasmuch as this latest proposal put
India as a full, original member of a community founded on an ASEAN+4 concept, andwhich could be eventually extended to include Australia and New Zealand.
Both projects had two rival proposals: the East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA),
promoted by China at the second EAS, and based on ASEAN+3; and the Free Trade
Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) supported by the U.S. in late 2006 (partly in reaction to
East Asian regionalization), and that can be viewed as a revival of APEC (excluding
India). Japan supported the U.S. proposal “as one of the multilayered efforts in the24

Op. Cit.
Japan-India Partnership in the New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global
Partnership, 28 April 2005.
26
Bruce Vaughn, « East Asian Summit : Issues for Congress », CRS Report for Congress,
December 9, 2005, p.3.
27
Shinji Shigematsu, “CEPEA: Is It Possible to Organize Asia-Oceanic Community?”,The
Otemon Journal of Australian Studies, Otemon Gakuin University, vol. 32, 2006, pp. 21−28, p.
22.
28David Camroux, “Asia…whose Asia ? A ’return to the future’ of a Sino-India Asian
Community”, The Pacific Review, 20-4, December 2007, pp. 551-575, p. 561.
25

6

region” 29, meaning that it does not compete with the CEPEA project, generally seen as
more feasible than a broad FTAAP. At the Second EAS (January 2007), the Chair
Statement eventually announced that the CEPEA proposal would be studied. A modus
vivendi was found between Japan and China by stating that ASEAN would stand as thedriving force. 30 If the legitimacy of the ASEAN+6 framework has been debated,
especially by China or Malaysia, it was eventually endorsed by ASEAN: in the
Chairman’s Statement of the 2006 and 2007 ASEAN Summit, the EAS is described as“an important component of the merging regional architecture [that] would help build
an East Asian Community”. Besides, the ASEAN+6 framework makes sense
economically: most economic assessments conclude that an ASEAN+6 Free-trade zone
would be more efficient than an ASEAN+3 FTA. 31
The East Asia Summit and the question of Asian identity
The EAS is generally presented as a larger, improved version of the East Asia
Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposed by Malaysian President Mahathir in 1990. The
EAEC proposal was designed to counter the ASEAN’s integration in APEC and create apurely “Asian” economic organization, without the Western nations. As such, it drew
extensively from the discourse on the superiority of Asian values (mainly equated with
Confucian values) that explain the success of the Asian model of development.
It was an early vision of the ASEAN+3 – notwithstanding the discourse on Asian values– but the project failed, because Japan did not want to commit to this organization that
excluded the U.S. Also, the Asian countries lacked a common experience and common“others” to make their organisation meaningful enough. The 1997 Asian crisis provided
for both elements. 32 Besides, in 1996, the constitution of the Asia-Europe Meeting(ASEM) confirmed that the E.U. equated Asia with “East Asia”. At that time, thecandidacy of India to take part in the forum was rejected. 33
Japan and India share a functionalist approach toward East Asian regionalization.
Aiming at preserving peace and prosperity in Asia, they both support the construction ofa free-trade area in order to sustain growth and connecting the whole Asian region, from
India to Australia.

29

Junichi Sugawara, “The FTAAP and Economic Integration in East Asia: Japan’s approach toregionalism and US engagement in East Asia”, Mizuho Research Paper 12, Tokyo, February
2007
30
Mohan Malik, “The East Asia Summit : More Discord than Accord”, YaleGlobal, 20 December
2005
31
Kumar, Nagesh. 2008. “Relevance and Challenges of Broader Regionalism in Asia”. India
Quarterly LXI (1): 79-105 ; Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja, “EAFTA or DEPEA.
Which Way Forward ?”, ASEAN Economic Bulletin 25-2, 2008, pp. 113-139.
32
East Asian countries’ solidarity grew up out of the crisis difficulties. Japan acted as a leader
by assisting the affected countries and proposing a Asian monetary fund. The IFM and the U.S.,
who opposed Tokyo’s AMF, played the role of the “others”. Takashi Terada, “Constructing an‘East Asian’ concept and growing regional identity: from EAEC to ASEAN+3’, The Pacific
Review, 16-2, 2003, pp.251-277.
33
However, in 2007 India (along with Pakistan and Mongolia) was integrated as a regularmember in the ASEM summit.

7

According to a recent survey, 81 % of the Asian strategic elite express support forbuilding an “East Asia Community”; however, the membership is still debated. 34 Thisdebate highlights the lack of a well-defined East Asian identity. In the EAS, “East Asia”
is understood as a geopolitical, constructed concept, rather than a purely geographicalexpression. Actually, the origin of the idea of such a “broader East-Asia” or “Greater
Asia” community can be traced back to the prewar period, when, in the context of antiimperialism and anti-westernism, Japanese and Indian intellectuals conducted areflection on the Asian identity.

2. Coming back to the roots : significance of past interactions on
pan-Asianism

Historical and cultural references on bilateral connections regarding Asianism andAsian identity are extensively used in the Indian and Japanese diplomatic discourses.
Most of the time, both Indian and Japanese diplomats or leaders elaborate on a“romantic vision” of the relationship, referring to early Buddhist connections (travel ofthe Indian monk Bodhisena to Japan in the 8th Century), the friendship of Tagore andOkakura Tenshin (end of the 19th Century until 1913), the Japanese support of therevolutionary activities of Rash Behari Bose (1915-1945) and Chubas Chandra Bose
(1943-1945) and the dissenting judgment of Justice Radhabinod Pal at the Tokyo war
crimes trial in 1948. 35
These references are significant at the bilateral level, but also at the regional level. It isthen important to look at the true history behind the recurrent clichés used by thepoliticians to understand their meaning. It is also a unique occasion to study the Indianand the Japanese vision of the pan-Asianism and to think about the current significanceof this ambivalent ideology for current Asian regionalism. Even if pan-Asianism is arejected discourse today because it underpinned the Japanese violent militarism in theregion, it is still an important part of the cultural and intellectual bedrock of Asian
identity.
Ambivalence of the pan-Asianist discourse in Japan and India
The discourse on “Asia” (labelled as “Asianism” or “pan-Asianism”) in Japan and India
was designed in the context of both countries’ nationalist projects against Western
domination, at the turn of the 20th century. Asianism claims that despite their diversity,
the Asian countries share common cultural values, especially a high degree of
spirituality and aesthetics sensitivity, in opposition to the materialist and decadent West.
The aim is to give the Asian countries a sense of unity based on a renewed pride in
Asian identity, different from the Western vision of Asia as a backward region.
Ultimately, “Asia” is a rallying cry for Asian nations to come together to escape or
emancipate themselves from colonization.
34

Bates Gill, Michael Green, Kiyoto Tsuji, William Watts, Strategic Views on Asian Regionalism,
Survey Results and Analysis, CSIS, February 2009, p. 8.
35
For details, see the quotations of the discourses in the table infra.

8As such, “Asia” is a malleable concept that was invested by ambivalent, contradictory
political projects. Koschmann successfully captured this idea in a nutshell: “Without theWest there is no East. The very idea of Asia is ultimately empty and variously
exploitable. The ideology of Asianism rejects that emptiness by attributing positive,
essential meaning to Asia, however it might be conceived geographically.” 36 This isalso the analysis of an important Japanese historian: Takeuchi Yoshimi, in his book
Nihon to Ajia (1st edition 1966).
In India and Japan, pan-Asianism was used both as a project of national emancipation
and a project of domination in the region.
In Japan, Asianism could be characterised by three elements: 1. The resistance towestern influence in the region, 2. The belief in a common identity in Asia, 3. The claimof Japan to take the lead against Western imperialism. 37
Originally, Asianism was developed as a reaction to the westernization of Japan during
the Meiji era (1868-1912). At that time Japanese authorities, in order to protect national
independence, decided to take a shortcut to modernization by rapidly adopting andmimicking Western institutions and cultural habits. At Fukuzawa Yukichi’s call in 1895,
it was time to escape the fellow Asian countries, considered as backward, and to join themodern West (datsuA nyûO). As a reaction, several intellectuals and politicians began to
advocate a return to Asian values and traditions. They claimed that Asia, not theWestern club of Great Powers, should be the place for Japan’s national project. 38 While
the “liberal” school called for Japanese solidarity with the oppressed nations of Asia,
the “hardliners” asserted Japanese superiority and hegemony in the region. 39
On the other hand, the Indian elite had to get rid of the inferiority complex infused by
the British colonizers in order to develop its own nationalism. This process involved arediscovery of Indian traditional values and history reconsidered in a positive light. 40 In
this context, the concept of an Asian identity and unity was very appealing andsupported the formation of an Indian national identity. Thus, the two processes worked
in synergy. In India, the “universalist” school (Tagore, Gandhi, Nehru) called for an
Asian Federation, that would serve to better advance the interest of Asian countries
toward freedom and independence 41 while the “Greater India” school advocated a new
36

Victor Koschmann, “Asianism’s Ambivalent Legacy”, in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi
Shiraishi eds., Network of power, Japan and Asia, pp. 83-110, 1997, p. 83.
37
Yves Bougon, « Le Japon et le discours asiatiste », pp. 241-253, in Philippe Pelletier dir.,Identités territoriales en Asie orientale (NORAO), Les Indes Savantes, 2004, 388 pages, p. 243.
38
Sven Saaler, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History – Overcoming the nation, creating a
region, forging an empire”, in Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History, colonialism,
regionalism and borders, Sven Saaler and Victor Koschman ed., Routledge, 2007, p. 2-3.
39
The pan-Asianism discourse cannot be identified entirely with the Japanese imperialist
approach, as some intellectuals did not support the Japanese invasion of Asia, conversely, theimperialist school mainly did use this pan-Asianism approach as a pretext for military expansion.
See Cemil Aydin, « Japan’s Pan-Asianism and the Legitimacy of Imperial World Order, 19311945. », Japan Focus, March 12, 2008.
40
Christophe Jaffrelot, “L’émergence des nationalismes en Inde. Perspectives théoriques. »,Revue Française de Science Politique, 38-4, 1988, pp. 555-575.
41
T. A. Keenleyside, « Nationalist Indian Attitudes Towards Asia : A Troublesome Legacy for
Post-Independence Indian Foreign Policy », Pacific Affairs, 55-2, Summer 1982, pp. 210-230,
pp. 216.

9

Indian supremacy within its cultural sphere of influence, “from Kerala to Indonesia”. 42
The “Greater India” ideology saw India as a benevolent hegemon, that has spread its
culture and spirituality (Buddhism and Hinduism) in South and Southeast Asia, making
the region its cultural backyard.
Japan and India contributions to pan-Asianism thinking
The early references in Japan to Asianism (ajiashugi), which first appeared in 1892,
referred to a community of history and values among Japan, Korea and China. 43 The
stress put on the anti-westernism and anti-imperialism explains the later extension of theconcept to embrace Southeast Asia, and eventually South Asia. 44
In India, meanwhile, the fascination with Japan’s modernization process and its victory
over Russia in 1905 was huge, and several opinion leaders came to see Tokyo as an
example and a valuable partner in the Indian fight for independence.
The interactions between Japan and India on pan-Asianism were mainly via individuals.
India, of course, was under British colonial rule. On the other hand, the role of theJapanese state was ambivalent. Tied to its alliance with Great Britain from 1902, Tokyo
was not supportive of the pan-Asianist trend until the 1920s. When Japan gained thestatus of quasi-great power, pan-Asianism emerged as a practical ideology that could be
implemented to demonstrate Japan’s cultural and political might in Asia. 45 Meanwhile,
growing Japanese differences with its British ally led to greater attention andprotectiveness toward the Indian anti-colonial nationalists who sought Japanese support.
Despite this involvement, one must keep in mind that support for Indian anticolonialism actually “came from the margins of Japanese society”. 46
Okakura and Tagore
The Japanese art critic Okakura Kakuzo (or Okakura Tenshin) (1862-1913) asserted in
1903 in the first sentence of his major work The Ideals of the East (1904): “Asia is one”.
This book describes the striking spiritual values of the East and deems Japan torepresent the quintessence of Asian culture. As such, Japan is presented as the central
actor (but not hegemonic actor) in Asian modernisation and emancipation from thewestern powers. 47
42

T. A. Keenleyside, Op. Cit., p. 230.
Yves Bougon, « Le Japon et le discours asiatiste », Op. Cit., p. 241.
44
In 1917, Okawa Shûmei established the “All-Asian Association” (Zen Ajia Kai) that included
India and Western Asia.
45
Sven Saaler, Op. Cit., p. 5-7.
46
Grant K. Goodman, Anand Mohan Sahay (1898-1991)-Indian Revolutionary in Japan,
Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies, 26 January 2008.
47“It has been, however, the great privilege of Japan to realise this unity-in-complexity with a
special clearness. The Indo-Tartaric blood of this race was in itself a heritage which qualified it
to imbibe from the two sources, and so mirror the whole of Asiatic consciousness. The unique
blessing of unbroken sovereignty, the proud self-reliance of an unconquered race, and theinsular isolation which protected ancestral ideas and instincts at the cost of expansion, madeJapan the real repository of the trust of Asiatic thought and culture.[…] It is in Japan alone thatthe historic wealth of Asiatic culture can be consecutively studied through its treasured
specimens.[…] Thus Japan is a museum of Asiatic civilisation”, Okakura Kakuzo, The Ideals of
43

10The strong friendship that united Okakura with the Bengali poet Tagore (1861-1941) iswell-known. Okakura met Tagore in India, where he traveled and lived for a while(1901-1902). Working on Asian arts, he wrote in English and mostly for a foreignaudience (two of his four masterworks were written in India), which makes him an
exception in the Japan of his day. Okakura developed a particular definition of Asia,
similar to Tagore’s view, and evolving from a broad European-biased view to a
Buddhist-tinged vision in which “Asia” equated with the Buddhist civilization“Buddhaland”. 48
Okakura was actually more famous abroad than in Japan, where the political andintellectual elite (including Okawa Shumei) rediscovered his work in the 1930s in theirattempt to build the concept of a “Greater East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity” (Daitôa
Kyôeiken). Okakura is even regarded by some as one of those who inspired the Bengali
revolutionaries of the Secret society Anushilam Samiti, at the origin of the terrorist
independence movement in Bengal (though others debate his real influence). 49
Tagore also travelled to Japan, and in a 1916 message he expressed his admiration for
an Asian nation that could embrace modernity and defeat a Western country in military
combat. He called upon Japan to lead as a virtuous example of a benevolent, spiritual,alternative modernity. 50 But Tagore also worried about the rising Japanese nationalism.
In his lecture “Nationalism in Japan”, he stated: “What is dangerous for Japan is not theimitation of the outer features of the West but the acceptance of the motive force of theWestern nationalism as her own”. 51
In 1938, in his correspondence with the poet Yone Noguchi, Tagore bemoaned Japan’s
aggressive expansionism and wrote that “the doctrine of ‘Asia for Asia’ […] as an
instrument of political blackmail has all the virtues of the lesser Europe which I
repudiate and nothing of the larger humanity that makes us one across the barriers ofpolitical labels and divisions”. 52
The friendship between Okakura and Tagore is idealized as representative of IndiaJapan close interactions on pan-Asianism. However, when looking closer, we discoverthat Okakura’s liberal vision of Asianism was not heard in Japan, and that his work was
distorted in the 1930s by expansionists. Also, this reference obscures Tagore’s very
critical evaluation of Japanese nationalism after the 1920s and Okakura’s passing.
the East with Special References to the Art of Japan, London, John Murray, 1903, pp. 4-5
48
He then revived the old, traditional Buddhist vision of the world organized around the threepoles of Honchô (Japan), Tenjiku (India) and (Shintan) China. Pekka Korhonen, “TheGeography of Okakura Tenshin”, Japan Review, 13-2001, pp. 107-128.
49
Peter Heehs, « Foreign Influences on Bengali Revolutionary Terrorism 1902-1908 », Modern
Asian Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3., Jul., 1994, pp. 533-556.
50
Rabindranath Tagore, The Message of India to Japan, The Macmillan Compagny, New York,
1916.
51
Rabindranath Tagore, “Nationalism in Japan”, in English writings of Rabindranath Tagore,
Atlantic publishers and Distributors, 2007, pp. 466-490, p. 281. The same warning was made by
Sun Yat Sen in his speech “Pan-Asianism” in Kobe (1924).
52
See the reproduction of the letters in Zeljko Cipris, “Seduced by Nationalism : Yone Noguchi’s‘terrible Mistake’. Debating the China-Japan War with Tagore”, Japan Focus, November 17,
2007.

11

Imperialist Japan and Indian revolutionaries
In the 1930s and 1940s, the pan-Asianist ideology was fully part of the Japanese state
imperialist project. As the invasion in China advanced, most Asian leaders turned theirbacks on Japan. Tokyo then sought to legitimize its behaviour by referring to an early,
liberal pan-Asianism of the sort promoted during the pre-World War One era. 53
Even though Japan was harshly criticized 54 by the core leaders of the Congress Party
like Gandhi and Nehru, its connections with some Indian revolutionaries weremaintained as long as both parties saw a way to advance their respective interests.
Rash Bihari Bose, who had been living in Japan since 1915, married a Japanese woman
and was given Japanese nationality. He used his network in ultra-nationalist circles 55 inorder to gain access to Prime Minister Tojo Hideki and he persuaded him to support the
Indian anti-colonial cause. As a result, two conferences gathering Indian expatriates in
Asia were held in Tokyo and Bangkok in 1942, where it was decided to establish theIndian Independence League and the Indian National Army (INA).
Tokyo was actively involved in the formation of the INA in Singapore, initiated by theintelligence agency F-Kikan, and composed of Indian prisoners of war captured in the
Malaya and Burma fronts. However the constitution of the INA complicated therelationship between the Indian revolutionaries and the Japanese Central command whowanted to use the army as a bulwark for the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere on
the Burmese front. However, the charismatic revolutionary Subhas Chandra Bose, whotook command of the INA in 1943, reversed the situation and convinced the Japanese toattack Imphal in Northeast India. The operation turned out to be one of the mostdecisive early defeats for the Japanese Imperial Army. 56
In the wake of the war, the dissenting judgment by Indian Justice Radabhino Pal at theTokyo War Crimes Tribunal reflected the magnanimity of some Indian nationalists
toward imperialist Japan. Justice Pal, who had studied in Kolkata, was well aware of theconnections between Bengalis seeking independence and Japanese nationalists. He had
a great admiration for Japan. 57 He denounced the political bias of the Tokyo trial as“victors’ justice”. He considered that the Tokyo trial wrongly judged and condemned

53

Cemil Aydin (2008) Op. Cit.
When Japan began to invade China, the sympathy of the Congress Party toward Tokyo
faded and turned to the destiny of China. This caused concerns for Indian activists in Japan,
mainly because they feared that it would diminish Japanese support for Indian independence. In
1938 the Congress Party ordered a boycott of Japanese goods. See Grant K. Goodman (2008),
Op. Cit.
55
He had close contact with Toyama Misturu and the Black Dragon Society.
56
The battle lasted from March to July 1944, and the Japanese army was driven back to Burmawith heavy losses. This was the turning point of the Burma campaign, signalling the end of theJapanese offensive on this front. See the work of Joyce C. Lebra, particularly: Jungle Alliance:
Japan and the Indian National Army, Asia Pacific Press, Singapore, 1971.
57
Ashis Nandy, “The Other Within: The Strange Case of Radhabinod Pal’s Judgment on
Culpability”, New Literary History, 23-1, Winter 1992, pp. 45-67, p. 53.
54

12

oriental civilisation, identified as the cultural root of Japan’s militarism. 58 However,Pal’s opinion was his own, and was not representative of the Indian government. 59
A utilitarian relationshipThis short survey of Japan-India historical interactions regarding Asia reveals first of all
the asymmetry of interest between the two countries: while Japan is clearly identified asa leader and key player in the region by Delhi, India is viewed as a country at themargin of East Asia and the Japanese strategic horizon. The Japanese interest in India atthat time was a very contextual one and resulted more from an anti-western sentimentthan a genuine interest in India’s situation. Anand Mohan Sahay60, who spent almost
twenty years (from 1923) in Kobe and was very disappointed to find no Indian orJapanese allies to support India’s independence, is illustrative of Indians who felt
deceived by the Japanese position. Also, the interest in India nurtured by Okawa
Shumei, a major theorist of imperialist pan-Asianism in Japan, actually originated fromhis anti-westernism and racism: he never sought to travel to India and thus developed an
exotic, romantic view of the country. 61
On the Indian side, it is important to recall that as Japan turned imperialist, the coreleaders of the Congress Party became very critical and turned their eyes to China. The
emotional attractiveness of China stemmed from a belief in the spiritual unity of India
and China and a common experience of oppression. Both countries were described by
Nehru in 1938 as “sister nations”. 62 The reality is that only a minority of Indian anticolonial nationalists put their bet on Japan.
The links between Japanese nationalists and Indian revolutionaries were therefore
marginal and mostly self-interested. Each party used its contacts to further its own
interest and agenda. This is revealed by the efforts made by Subhas Chandra Bose tofind an alternative ally in China or the USSR to support the Indian liberation movement
when the Japanese war effort began to face eventual defeat by late 1944. 63 The initialcommon understanding centered around an Asian identity was soon corrupted by theJapanese imperialist project.
What is the significance of these references today ?
In the 1990s, India grounded its Look East Policy in a cultural discourse that harked
back to the heritage of Tagore and Nehru. These references, coupled with a diplomacy
58

Ushimura Kei, Beyond the “Judgment of Civilization”, The Intellectual legacy of the Japanese
War Crimes Trials, 1946-1949, LTCB International Library Trust, Tokyo, 2003, 336 pages, pp.
168-169.
59’Pal Hanji, Tokyo Saiban Hihan to Zettai Heiwa-shugi’ (Judge Pal: His Criticism of the Tokyo
Trial and His Absolute Pacifism) by Takeshi Nakajima, Hakusui-sha, 2007, 308 pages. Review
by Fumiko Halloran, The Japan Society Review, Issue 14 Volume 3 Number 2 (2008).
60
Grant K. Goodman (2008), Op. Cit.
61
Yukiko Sumi Barnett, « India in Asia: Okawa Shumei’s Pan-Asian Though and His Idea of
India in Early Twentieth-Century Japan”, Journal of the Oxford University History Society, 1,
2004
62
T. A. Keenleyside, Op. Cit., pp. 212-213.
63
Grant K. Goodman (2008), Op. Cit.

13

focused on economic cooperation and exchanges, were used to reassure East Asianinvestors for whom India was seen as a turbulent, distant country. This strategy wasused in particular vis-à-vis Japan. 64
The legacy of Tagore and Okakura served to state common Asian values based on
spirituality: Prime Minister Rao asserted in a speech in Japan in 1992: “Asia is one, theessence of this oneness being spirituality”. 65 At the same time, he asserted that Asia wasbased on syncretism, citing the Indian spiritual contribution to the Asian identity as thecradle of Buddhism and Hinduism, in an attempt to integrate (at least, culturally) India
into East Asia.
In Japan, the use of these references has several meanings. First, the reminders thatIndia and Japan share only positive history are supposed to reassure the business
community, scalded by the anti-Japanese demonstrations that took place in China in2005 because of the historical disputes between the two countries.
These references also cast India in a positive light, as an historical friendly nation to
Japan, and a stable partner that also shares democratic values. This attempt to mould apositive perception of India in Japan complements Tokyo’s gradual softening of its
stance toward India’s nuclear power status.
Finally, these references are particularly used by right-wing, nationalistic politicians andintellectuals. These elements that focus on Japanese positive attempts to unite Asia andassist Asian independence movements, and the mention of Justice Pal, can be used topresent a prettier, sanitized vision of Japan’s wartime history. 66 By softening theperception of Japanese war crimes and questioning the legal validity of the Tokyo trial,
the neo-nationalists are trying to “break away from the postwar regime”, instill a newsense of pride in the Japanese nation, and call for a strong Japanese political role in theregion, without dwelling on the details of the past. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,
who elaborated his nationalistic agenda for Japan in his book “Toward a Beautiful
Country,” 67 is a striking example. He is also an Indophile. When he travelled to India in
August 2007, he talked before the Indian Parliament about a “broader Asia” at theconfluence of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans” 68, he went to Kolkata to visit the houseof Subhas Chandra Bose 69 and he met with the son of Justice Pal.
Several Japanese scholars, like Takako Hirose 70 , worry about the danger of suchnationalist rhetoric that does not represent healthy ground on which to build the current

64

Isabelle Saint-Mézard, Eastward bound, India’s New Positioning in Asia, Manohar, Centre desciences Humaines, Delhi, 2006, 499 pages, p. 200 and 202.
65
Cited in Isabelle Saint-Mézard, Op. Cit., p. 197.
66
“Decades after war trials, Japan still honors a dissenting judge”, The New York Times, August
31, 2007.
67
Utsukushii Kuni e, Tokyo, Bungei Shunju, 2006.
68
Abe Shinzo, “Confluence of the Two Seas”, Speech at the Parliament of the Republic of India,
22 August 2007.
69
The ashes of Chandra Bose, who allegedly died in a plane crash off Taiwan in 1945, areactually kept in the Rentokuji temple in Tokyo, Suginami ward.
70
Interview with the author, 6 February 2009.

14

relationship. Moreover, it lends itself to an old-fashioned and stereotypical view ofIndia, still an exotic country in the mind of numerous Japanese.
As the legacy of Japan’s wartime imperialism prevented its postwar political influenceand intimate involvement in the affairs of East Asia, India’s engagement with Southeast
Asian countries was similarly impeded by that nation’s earlier rhetoric on an Indiancultural sphere (“Greater India”). This meant that both powers had to make creative
efforts to involve themselves substantively in the evolving architecture of postwar
relationships within East Asia. Since they had never fought or sought to dominate eachother, and given the common values and perspectives arising from their status asdemocratic nations with market economies, Japan and India perceived a basis forjoining together in an effort to raise their influence in the region.
Cultural and historical reference points are thus used to advance national interests inbuilding ties and integrating into a region. But India and Japan are above all pragmatic
nations; as such, they are also engaged in a classic diplomatic strategy of power
balancing.

3. Constructing an integrated Asia or a balanced Asia ?

The China and United States factors are determining to a great extent the future shape of
relationships within East Asia and between East Asia and the rest of the world. What isthe position of the Japan-India partnership regarding these two powers? Are they
participating in a new axis of democracies against China? Are they trying to balance
U.S. power in Asia ?

The China factor
Rising China is regarded with concern by both Japan and India. While both countries
view Beijing’s economic growth as an opportunity, they also worry about the militarybuild-up and the growing diplomatic influence of Beijing in Asia and in the world.
Their diplomatic rapprochement is thus a way for Tokyo and Delhi to hedge against
China. This is particularly clear with respect to the Japanese side as Tokyo is competingwith Beijing to take the lead in shaping the new architecture for the region. Japan is now
ready to assume a greater political role in the region as the most advanced Asian
democratic power, and seeks to weaken Chinese influence by highlighting theauthoritarian nature of the regime.
If the relationship between New Delhi and Beijing is much warmer since 2002, it is stillcharacterised by suspicion and mistrust. Several contentious issues like Tibet , theterritorial disputes (in Kashmir, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh) and the competition for
influence in the Indian Ocean still loom large in the relationship. 71 The military71

China is assisting the construction of ports at Sittwe in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh,
Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan. This forms a « string of pearls>>. Lisa Curtis,“US-India Relations: The China Factor”, Backgrounder, Heritage Foundation, n°2209, 25

15

strategic community in India is thus very receptive to adoption of a containment
strategy toward China.
On the other hand, even as India is open to a discussion on values 72, Delhi still sticks to
its strategic autonomy rhetoric and refuses to get embroiled in any diplomatic or
security arrangement that openly aims at containing China. 73 Despite official reluctanceto use balance of power rhetoric and its rhetorical commitment to a traditional nonalignment policy, India is de facto playing the realist game of balancing power in Asia
in order to advance its national interests. 74
In this context, the East Asian Summit framework has been characterized as an “antiregion”. 75 Shaun Breslin argues that the EAS is clearly not the most relevant andconsistent framework to build the region, considering the diversity of the participants.
He asserts that the EAS is actually advocated by the regional elite, in reaction to thenascent regional mechanisms that are taking shape within the APT framework, “in an
attempt to neutralize Chinese power” 76.
The U.S. factor
While the goal of balancing China is clearly shared by Japan and India, both countries
are also trying to find a balance in their relationships with the United States. The historyof the quadrilateral initiative is telling with respect to Japanese and Indian expectations
toward the U.S. and China.
Tokyo supports the rise of complementary and alternative poles of power in Asia andthe creation of a network of like-minded partners. Highlighting the importance ofdrawing closer to India, Prime Minister Abe (September 2006-September 2007)
suggested that Delhi be included in the ongoing strategic trilateral dialogue among
Tokyo, Washington and Canberra. 77 This proposal got the blessing of Vice President
Cheney in February 2007. This strategic quadrilateral is underpinned by a unity of
democratic values that implicitly aims at excluding China.

novembre 2008.
72
Voir C. Raja Mohan, “Balancing Interests and Values: India’s Struggle with Democracy
Promotion”, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2007, pp. 99-115.
73
During his visit to China in January 2008, Prime Minister Singh « insisted he would have nopart in any alliance with the United States, Australia and Japan aimed at "containing China",« Singh Rules Out Containment Factor », China Daily, 15 January 2008; and Purnendra Jain,“From Condemnation to Strategic Partnership: Japan’s Changing View of India (1998-2007)”,
ISAS Working Paper, n°41, 10 March 2008, 38 p, p. 13-14.
74
See C. Raja Mohan, “The Asian balance of power”, Seminar, n°487, 2000 ; Christophe
Jaffrelot, “Les quatre points cardinaux de la diplomatie indienne :le régional et le global,
l’idéalisme et le réalisme”, in Christophe Jaffrelot dir., New Delhi et le monde, Editions
Autrement, 2008, pp. 7-31.
75
Shaun Breslin, « Supplying Demand or Demanding Supply ? An Alternative Look at theForces Driving East Asian Community Building”, Policy analysis brief, The Stanley Foundation,
November 2007, 11 pages.
76
Op.Cit., p. 9.
77
Shinzo Abe, Utsukushii Kuni e, Op. Cit., p.160.

16

The strategic component of this “quadrilateral initiative” was seen in the MALABAR
07-2 naval exercises, when 20,000 military personnel, 28 ships, 150 airplanes, and 3
aircraft carriers assembled in the Bay of Bengal during October 2007. 78
So far, it has been the only naval gathering of the four countries. The Chinese
authorities indeed voiced concerns about what they labelled as a foreshadowing of an“Asian NATO”. 79 As a result, and because of domestic sensitivities, the Rudd
administration in Australia decided to withdraw from the quad, and the Indian
communists put pressure on the Singh government to keep away from it. As a result, thequadrilateral initiative is currently in abeyance. 80
In this context, it seems unlikely that the rhetoric of a « coalition of democracies » will
reappear in the short term. Moreover, this does not appear to be the diplomaticorientation of the new Obama administration. 81
Even so, it is worth noting that Japan participated twice in India-U.S. naval exercises, in
April 2007 and June 2009.
If multilateral initiatives centering around the U.S. seem difficult to pursue because ofChinese sensitivities, it would, however, be more acceptable to include Washington incertain forms of a multilateral regional framework.
The question of U.S. integration into an Asian regional organization is central. The U.S.
is a de facto Asian power: it still maintains 80,000 soldiers in the Asia Pacific theatre
and it is a major trading partner for East Asian countries (the current crisis has shownhow much the ASEAN+3 countries are dependent upon U.S. economic growth). Froma realist point of view it thus looks inconceivable to build a viable regional economic
and security structure without including the U.S. Accordingly, 80% of APT experts
strongly support the inclusion of U.S. in EAS (the same percentage supports theinclusion of India). 82
None of the three major Asian powers really opposes the inclusion of the U.S. in the
EAS and there is a broad consensus on an “open and inclusive” regional institution. The
Obama administration is currently studying the possibility of signing the Treaty ofAmity and Cooperation with ASEAN 83 - required to take part in the EAS. This could78

See East Asian Strategic Review 2008, NIDS, Tokyo, p. 222.
A diplomatic meeting was held before the naval exercises, in May 2007 at the ARF Summit(ASEAN Regional Forum). The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman reacted: "China believes
that to enhance mutual trust, expand cooperation for mutual benefit and win-win, be open andinclusive is the global trend". “China slams India, US, Japan alliance”, Express India.com, 27
June 2007.
80
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Bruce Vaughn, “Emerging Trends in the Security Architecture in Asia :Bilateral and Multilateral Ties Among the United States, Japan, Australia and India”, CRS
Report for Congress, 7 January 2008, p. 15.
81
See Hillary Clinton’s statement on the U.S. strategy in Asia. She stated that « Washington
will work with historic allies and emerging nations », « US-Asia Relations. Indispensable to Our
Future », Remarks at the Asia Society, New York, 13 February 2009.
82
Bates Gill, Michael Green, Kiyoto Tsuji, William Watts, Strategic Views on Asian Regionalism,
Survey Results and Analysis, CSIS, February 2009, p. 8.
83Mark E. Manyin, Michael John Garcia, Wayne M. Morrison, U.S. Accession to ASEAN’s
79

17

mean a greater U.S. commitment to the East Asia regional process in the next few years.
In terms of balance of powers, this scenario would enhanced the weight of Japan andIndia in the region. However, a revival of FTAAP, based on APEC, is also foreseen. 84
In this perspective, India, which is not part of APEC, would be marginalized. In termsof membership, the Rudd proposal on an Asia Pacific Community (EAS + UnitedStates) could be a compromise solution.85
What values for the East Asian Community ?
The debate between Peter Drysdale and Hugh White posted on the East Asia Forumwebsite is representative of the arguments on the role of values in the context of East
Asian regionalism. 86 While White argues that a regional political and security
organization needs to be built on a common set of principles, Drysdale retorts that his
vision is hopeless, considering the diversity of the actors. He calls for a “rule-based, nota principle-based Asia Pacific Community” 87, in order to secure the cooperation of all
the regional players.
What about Japan? While the Japanese government favors in principle the constructionof an Asian Community, different approaches coexist and contend; some favor APT
over EAS (for the Ministry of Finance) or the reverse (for the METI), while themainstream supports a multilayered architecture, with both APT and EAS (as MOFA).
Within the Japanese expert community, the realists tend to be against the EAS
framework, deemed as romantic and unrealistic regarding the clash of interests between
Japan and China, and the importance of the United States in the region. Proponents ofthe East Asian community argue that this common project would be able to slowly
engage all the powers in the region and complement the respective nationalisms with aregional identity sentiment. 88 While Tokyo supports a functionalist approach toward
East Asian regionalism, it is also increasingly emphasizing the role of values. However,the Japanese discussion of values and the “arc” does not necessary reflect an idealist
vision of international relations, but has the merit of offering an alternative vision in
opposition to regional domination by a rising China and that could become the strategic
platform for a coalition. 89
India is still maintaining an ambiguous posture regarding support for “values”
diplomacy. Several opinion leaders are calling for a greater emphasis in the country’s
foreign policy on Indian democratic values and the Indian political model. 90 Delhi will
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), Congressional Research Service, May 5, 2009.
84
Interview with Takashi Terada, June 2009.
85
See
his
statementattheShangri-La
Dialogue,
29
May
2009,
on
http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2009/86
East Asia Forum: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/
87
Peter Drysdale, “The Asia Pacific Community, Processes, not principles: the base for regionalarchitecture”, East Asia Forum, 19 June 2008.
88
Akiko Fukushima, « Japan’s Perspective on Asian Regionalism », pp. 103-127, in Michael J.
Green, Bates Gill eds., Asia’s New Multilateralism, Columbia University Press, 2009, 384 pages,
p. 113-114.
89
Aurelia George Mulgan, “Breaking the Mould: Japan’s Subtle Shift from Exclusive Bilateralism
to Modest Minilateralism”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30-1, 2008, pp. 25-72, p. 64.
90
For example, see C. Raja Mohan, “India’s Great power Burdens”, Seminar, January 2008.
Also, Interview with Jabin Jacob from IPCS on 24 June 2009. Jacob has been identified by the18have to redefine its diplomacy in the years to come. For the moment, India will surely
not emphasize liberal values so as to launch an overt contest aimed at marginalizing or
countering China, but will probably seek to employ Asian cultural norms so as topromote its own profile and influence within the broad Asian region.
A third set of conceptual visions has recently emerged, following on the heels of prewar
concept of a united Asia, based on anti-westernism and the cultural characteristics ofthe region, and the 1990s emphasis on “Asian values” aimed at assigning priority toeconomic development – hence the Asian economic miracle – over so-called (implicitly“western”) universal human rights. While it recognizes the originality of Asian culture
and values, this newconcept also fully includes universal values and norms likedemocracy, which are deemed suitable for Asia. 91 This third wave of regionalist values
is called “Neo-Asian Values”. 92 This new approach is consistent with the Japanese andIndian visions of East Asian regionalism.
Governments emphasizeon the conceptual ideal of “community” while they are hedging
one against another in Asia. The fluid balance of power in Asia dictates that mutualsuspicion and pragmatic behaviour will remain characteristic features of the region’s
political landscape. While India and Japan share interests, they do not assign a highpriority to their bilateral relationship, compared to their partnerships with China and the
U.S. The Japan-India partnership is an interesting element in the current evolution of theGreat Game in Asia, especially when there could be some prospects for a future concert
of powers. However, it is not yet strong enough to shape significantly the course ofinternational relations in Asia and is still very much dependent upon the U.S. and China
factors. 93

Conclusion

Japan and India adopt a functionalist approach toward East Asian regionalism: their aim
is to preserve peace and prosperity in the region and build a free-trade zone in order tosustain economic growth and promote Asian stability. At the same time, they support a
broader vision of East Asia, from India to Australia, in order to encourage multipolarity
in the region and create a favorable context to advance their national interests. From a
constructivist point of view, the Japan-Indian vision of a Greater Asia, which draws
upon a common pre-war reflection on Asian identity, could be persuasive and relevant
for current regionalism, especially in the context of a blurred or unarticulated Chinese
vision. 94 Finally, from a realist point of view, Japan-India rapprochement cannot
French MOFA as a “personnalité d’avenir” (young leader).
91
See Fumitaka Furuoka, Beatrice Lim Fui Yee and Roslinah Mahmud, « Japan and Asian
Values: A Challenges for Japan’s East Asian Policy in the New Century », eastasia.at, 5-1,
September 2006 and Kazuo Ogura, “Toward a New Concept of Asia – Asia should contribute to
global values”, Internationale Politik, winter 2007.
92
Fumitaka Furuoka, Betrice Lim Fui Yee and Roslinah Mahmud, Op.Cit.
93
A loss of interest on the part of the Obama administration toward India and warmer relations
with China could lead Tokyo to push its partnership with India into the background.
94
David Camroux, Op. Cit., p. 563. For the details of the Chinese vision, see Wu Xinbo,“Chinese Perspectives on Building an East Asian Community in the Twenty-first Century”, in19feasibly represent a new axis against China, even if the balancing motive is present.
However, this nascent partnership is still dependent upon the international context andis not yet in a position to shape the system to any significant degree. Also, therelationship suffers from the gap between Indian’s political will to draw nearer to Japan
as part of a strategy to become a central player on the Asian scene, and Japan’s interestin engaging with India, although this is consistent with its strategic priority of balancing
against China.
Despite these limitations, the Japan-India partnership is significant in that itstrengthened the third leg of the China-Japan-India triangle in Asia. Their historicalexperience in dealing with the themes of Asian identity and regionalism in the prewar
period could form the basis for allowing the two countries to make a significant
contribution to the construction of a new East Asian identity and community.

Michael J. Green, Bates Gill eds., Asia’s New Multilateralism, Columbia University Press, 2009,384 pages, pp. 55-77.

20

ANALYSIS OF JAPAN-INDIAN JOINT STATEMENTS AND (SOME) JAPANESE AND INDIAN DIPLOMATIC SPEECHESON BILATERAL RELATION
Quotations of references to « Asia », regional organisation in Asia, cultural and historical references in bilateral relations, the ultimate
objectives of Japan and India in the region, and the common values of the partners.
« Asia »Regional organization

Historical and culturalreferences

Ultimate objective in the Common values
regionJOINT DECLARATIONSJapan-India Joint declaration, 10 December 2001
Asia

Tradition of profoundContribute towards the
Democracy and market
interchanges from timestability and prosperity of economy, spirit of
immemorial ; The wisdom Asia.
tolerance, receptivity toto benefit from thediversity.
distinctive characteristicsof their civilizations andcultures.
Japan-India Summit Meeting (Summary), 29 November 2004
To find a way to cope with the “arcStability and economicof instability” and cooperating
development; invigorate
with a view to realize an “arc of
current dynamism in Asia
advantage” which was referred toby Prime Minister Singh.
Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership, 29 April 2005
The New Asian era: A new surge: strengthening ofTo realize an East Asian
Nations sharing
emerging as the
economic linkages, initiatives forCommunity and workcommon values andleading growth
greater regional integration as welltogether to promote theprinciples
centre of the global as multilateral trade liberalization.
vision of an Asianeconomy.

Need concerted efforts to translatethese developments into an “Arc of
Advantage and Prosperity”.

economic Community as
an “Arc of Advantage andProsperity”. The Japaneseside conveyed its decision
to support India’s
membership in the East
Asian Summit.
Joint Statement, Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership, 15 December 2006
While acknowledging the ASEAN Japan and India share
The progressive
India-Japan relation isas the driving force […], theyancient bonds and a proud realisation of an East
rooted in similar
reaffirm the need for all 16 EAS
civilisational heritage.
Asian community in theperception of thecountries to fully participate andRelation unencumbered by EAS framework.
international
actively contribute to the objective any historical differences. To pursue aenvironment,
comprehensiveof closer cooperation andconverging long-term
partnership […] in open
community building in the region.
interests and common
and cooperative regional commitment toFurther promote regionalframeworks.
economic integration: recall theirdemocracy, open
respective proposals for a Pansociety, human rights,
Asian Free Trade Area and for arule of law and freeComprehensive economic
market economy.
Partnership in East Asia.
They are natural
The two leaders share the view onpartners as the largest
the usefulness of having dialogue
and most developed
among Japan, India and other likedemocracies of Asia.
minded countries in the AsiaPacific region on themes of mutualinterest.
Joint press Release, Visit of External Affairs Minister of India to Japan, 22 March 2007
To foster the EAS as a
The Ministers reaffirm
pillar of East Asianthat there exist common

22community building in the objectives and values
future.
between the idea of“Arc of Freedom andProsperity” proposed by
Japan and the idea of“Arc of Advantage andProsperity” proposed byIndia.
Joint Statement on the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global partnership between Japan and India, 22 August
2007
The partnership between Japan andEstablishing an East Asian Japan and India share
India […] is an essential pillar forcommunity in the future. universal values of
The EAS can essentiallythe future architecture of the entire
democracy, open
contribute in the process
region.
society, human rights,
of community building
Japan and India should actively
rule of law and market
based on universallycooperate to promote multi-layered
economy and share
recognised values and in common interest inframeworks and dialogues forenhancing the role of the promoting peace,regional cooperation in Asia.
region at the global level. stability and prosperity
They shared the view on theusefulness of having dialogues
in Asia and in the world.
among Japan, India and other likeminded countries in the AsiaPacific region on themes of mutualinterest.
Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India, 22 October 2008
Support to the EAS as an open,
Promoting peace, stability India and Japan shareinclusive, transparent and Leaders’and prosperity in Asia and common values andled forum […] to deepen regional
the worldinterests
economic integration towards the
progressive realization of an East

23

Asia Community.
Joint declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India, 22 October 2008
Bilateral cooperation
within multilateralframeworks in Asia, inparticular the East Asia
Summit, ASEAN
Regional Forum and
ReCAAP processes.

Common commitment
to democracy, open
society, human rights,
rule of law.

JAPAN AND INDIAN DIPLOMATIC SPEECHES ON BILATERAL RELATIONS
Ambassador Yasukuni Enoki, “The Japan-India partnership”, lecture at USI on 28 May 2004
It is time for Japan
A network of FTA, with ASEAN No negative history. Only Tripartite dialogue
to position India
as the hub in the region. Japan’s
positive historic
between Japan, China andfrom “a local
Asia policy should be structured
memories: interchange
India.
power” to “one ofaround two vectors, namely: North between Tagore andthe three major
to South “East Asia cooperation” Okakura Tenshin, Subhas
powers of Asia”.
and East to West “cooperation
Chandra Bose, the great
The scope of Asia
among Japan, China and India”.
anecdote of the Judge Pal.
for Japan has also
Three great Asian powers to foster
undergone a change: stability and peace in the region.
from East Asia (until Bad historical memories are
Arakan mountains in counterbalanced by good historic
Myanmar) to “entire relations between Japan and India.
Asia (including--> Tripartite dialogue between
South Asia andJapan, China and India.
India) Because :economic
globalization,24

regional security
issue (proliferationfrom DPRK toPakistan) andJapan’s security
interest (maritime
route, intervention inIndian ocean)Manmohan Singh’s banquet speech in honour of Japanese Prime Minister, 29 April 2005
New Asian era‘age-old spiritual, cultural To renew and reinvigorate
and civilizational ties ;our Asian identity,
India refused to attend San building on theFrancisco peacecommonalities of ourconference in 1951 ;interests, aspirations andseparate peace treaty with values.
Japan in 1952 ; India
waived all reparation
claims ; dissenting
judgement Pal (affection
and regard) ; quotation of
Okakura Tenshin.
Prime minister Singh, Speech to the Japanese Diet, 15 December 2006.
Civilizational neighbours; “arc of advantage andheritage of Buddhism,
prosperity”; Asian
Bodhisena, Tagore,
economic community
Okakura Tenshin;
judgement of Pal.
Shri Shyam Saran, special envoy of the prime minister in JIIA, 15 January 2007

Shared commitments tothe ideals of democracy,
peace and freedom.
India hope to imbibe
Japanese values ofmaintenance ofharmony and balance
between social
traditions and economic
modernization.

As the largest and mostdeveloped democracies
of Asia.

We are democracies, wehave respect for the25

same human values andhistory of a very benign
and very positive
relationship.
Address by the External Affairs Minister, Sri Pranab Muukherjee, at the JIIA on 23 March 2007
Heritage of Buddhism
A pan-Asian freetrade
Common values ofarea or comprehensive
democracy, humaneconomic partnership inrights and the rule ofAsia
law
Ambassador Ronen Sen’s address at the CIIS-JIIA conference “Building strategic Asia – The United States, Japan and India”, June
28, 2007.
The old links
Trilateral cooperation:
between India andIndia, the U.S. and Japan
the Asia-Pacifichave shared values andregion are now
aspirations of democracies
being revived andbased on the rule of law.
revitalized.
Also recognize that
democracy anddevelopment are not justcompatible but
inextricably linked.
It is thus evident that thetrilateral interaction ofIndia, the United States
and Japan did not emerge
from a decision to forge a
new grouping or alliance.
“Confluence of the two seas”, Speech by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Parliament of the Republic of India, August 22,
2007

26

“The Pacific and the
He began his speech with A broader Asia takes
A discovery of India as
Indian Oceans area quotation ofshape at the confluence of a partner that shares the
now bringing about
Vivekananda.
the two seas of the Indian same values anda dynamic coupling
Okakura ; Pal; Chandra
and Pacific Oceans;interests. Spirit ofas seas of freedom
Bose, Tagore. Ashoka,
Open and transparent, this tolerance in India;
and of prosperity. A
Gandhi. Kishi, first
network will allow people, sacrality of nature.
“broader Asia”: anJapanese PM who visited goods, capital andimmense network
India.
knowledge to flow freely.
spanning the entiretyof the Pacific Ocean,incorporating theUnited-States ofAmerica andAustralia.
When the Pacific Ocean Becomes an “Inland Sea”, Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister, 22 May 2008
Pacific Ocean as an
India will become one ofInland Sea for:the pillars supporting theJapan, ASEAN,
future of Asia.
North and SouthAmerica, andRussia. China andAustralia, and new
Zealand. “And in
my view this sea
also continues
beyond India toconnect to thenations of middleeast”
New Japan-China,

27

Japan-ROK
Relations28