Ideologies of Integration Past: Universality, Revolution-phobia and Integration
Tomonori Sano, GCOE-GIARI Fellow

Introduction
This paperi focuses on certain discourses on Shintō in relation to and within
the context of the Asia Pacific War (1931-1945) in order to interrogate Imperial Japan’s
ideologies of regional integration. The ideologues themselves often declared proudlythat Shintō should be the basis of their national essence [国体, Kokutai], and theseideologies have been blamed as the source of imperialistic expansionism for some time,
but I doubt such discourses. Turn them upside down. In this paper I insist that Japan’s
imperialist regional integration was the source or basis of these ideologies. It may
implicate the revivability of such haunted ideologies.
Why is it important for our present understanding of regional integration to
study the Shintō discourses in question? How does it contribute to our efforts to direct
and shape our future? Because the discourses and practices of wartime Shintō thinkers
can be mystic and inapproachable, expressed in an unreasonable form of thought with
illogical logics, progressive scholars have tended to avoid them. What could even themost severe scrutiny of such dogmas produce, other than to reinforce our sense of theiniquity of Japan’s military aggression? Further, as doctrines they are long dead andgone, so there is no realistic chance of their revival. It is easy to dismiss Japan’s
imperialist regional integration project as a form of mad and violent aggression against
Asia—something caused by the arrogance of modern Japan, the mental defectiveness ofJapanese, or the fanatical Shintō ideology. In dismissing the value of such “mad”
ideologies as wartime Shintō fanaticism, we are denying the possibility that they
contain anything universal. This seems like a safe assumption. Or is it?
It is my view that it is now vital that we examine the ideologies of Japan’s
imperialist regional integration. We cannot afford to ignore these ideologies—to put
them out of sight and out of mind. Rather, we need to engage and communicate withthem, however one-sided the historiographical approach may inevitably make this“communication.” Following Karl Marx’s precept that “human anatomy contains a key
to the anatomy of the ape,” we need to appreciate that the anatomy of present-day
1efforts toward regional integration contains a key to the anatomy of integration past.
The narrowness of the opinion which forces the past into exile denies the repeatabilityof these imperialistic ideologies, by ascribing this negation to their unreason andirrationality. In this standpoint, there is no need to discuss the unreasonable insanity ofthese Shintō discourses. If these ideologies are indeed dead and gone, and have no hopeof ever coming back, this paper will have meaning only as a kind of antique appraisal. If
the exile were perfect, we might never trouble ourselves with past specters of theGreater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS, 大東亜共栄圏) when discussing
current efforts toward Asian integration. If younger generations of Asians outside ofJapan did not have memories or did not share in the historical memory of GEACPS, we
could be liberated from such specters. Why are we still afraid of them? Why do we
continue to try to forget them even now? I believe this is because these specters are notresident simply in our minds—the product of some special state or some miserable era.
Rather, they live in the Nation-State system itself. It is for this reason that part of theagenda of this paper is to disclose these seemingly irrational and irrelevant discourses.
How then can we analyze the ideologies of integration past? The firstnecessity for research is to sketch in outline conventional interpretations. “Know Your
Enemy,” (1945) the famous American propaganda movie from the World War II era,
offers valuable documentation of this interpretation. The ultimate purpose of the movie
was to explain to the people of the United Nations why they needed to fight against theenemy, Imperial Japan. Introducing fragmented scenes from Japanese movies,
documentaries and photos, it reconstructed the history of Japan. The history shown wasof the narrative of the unnatural and exaggeratedly speedy modernization of Japan’s
irrational and backward culture—resulting in a distorted and deformed modern state.
Through the process of forced modernization, Japanese reaped the harvest ofindustrialization, strong army, and economic growth, but without political liberty, anarrow democracy tied with Emperorism and utterly despotic governance. These
distortions of modernity nurtured the freakish inflation of self-image and produced
expansionism that had been ravaging Asia, and was bent on world domination.
Therefore, the United Nations (the Allies) had no choice but to beat “the Jap” andrepudiate his “fanatical belief that the Japanese are descendants of gods and destined torule the earth and all who live on it.”ii
The type of interpretation, which explains aggressive expansionism in terms
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of the distorted modernity of Japan, maintains its currency even today. One outcome ofthis interpretation is the idea that, in order to reform Japan, it is necessary to correct the
distortions in its “modernity”, and this was in fact at the heart of the program of reforms
executed by GHQ/SCAP in occupied Japan. It is not my intention here to seek out theflaws in the modernization theory itself. Rather, I will confine myself to noting thesimilarities between the interpretive framework set out in “Know Your Enemy” to theideas and worldview of Shintō thinkers. This assertion may sound odd in light of theobvious fact that Shintō ideologues never imagined the ruin of their Empire. They did,
however, conclusively grasp the “distorted modernity” of Japan. More precisely, theirdiscourses sought to suture the wounds caused by this distortion while at the same timeseeking to consecrate a mixture of the modernity and the tradition, which was regarded
as the imperative to “overcome modernity” [近代の超克, kindai no chôkoku]. On bothpoles, Japanese Shintō ideologues and the American propaganda movie, there is ashared discourse that regarded Shintō as the supreme source of Japanese wartime
activities. The only difference was the adjectives that were attached to Shintō:“prominent” in wartime Japan and “insane” in America (as well as post-war Japan). The
former sought to polish these prominent ideas while the latter sought to abolish theirinsanity. The former explained their prominence through myths, and the later explained
their insanity through the distorted development of Japan’s modernization process, andso on. Still they are on the same position: their ideas or ideologies drifted Japan.
These discourses share the following problem: They both treat Japan as a state
having a special status. The prominence or insaneness they deal with is enclosed andtheir experiences sealed into a single race, which is identified by the special
characteristics of this thing called ”Shintō.””Know Your Enemy” is marked by an exquisite incoherence. And it is thisthat provides the key of my analysis. There is a shade of nuance that is apparent incertain of the adjectives used in the movie. This ambiguous region lies between the twowords, ambition and insanity. We can say clearly that ambition is a concept that exists
within the realm of reason (whether the reason of the acquisitive individual or the“reason of state”); in contrast, insanity by definition lies outside the realm of reason.
How should we grasp this shading? Is it negligible and meaningless? Perhaps it is not.
By this I mean that “insanity” is the distorted form of the ambitious dream, andambition thus forms the essential core of insanity. iii It is not, however, sufficient to3

point out the reasonable meaning of the insane dream. What we have to examine is theform of the discourse. We have to ask why such a primitive ambition can take the formof such a chimerical cosmology. What is the dream-work between the imperialistic
desire and these discourses? To this end we need to anatomize the Shintō discourses
themselves, however difficult they may be to interpret. The key to the anatomy of these
discourses is found in the concept of regional integration.
One more point. This paper reverses the often-assumed order between the
independent and dependent variables. Here it is assumed that ideology follows and issubject to the real. The independent variable is the idea of integration that underlies the
Shintō discourses, while the Shintō discourses themselves are analyzed as the dependent
variable. Shintō discourses self-identified as the independent variable and sometimes
asserted that Shintō ideals lead the process of integration. Such assertions obscure thediscordance between these discourses and on the actual practice of military invasion. In
order to make this discordance explicit we should not base our readings on the kind of
idealistic attitude that claims that the idea precedes and shapes the real. In other words,
if we are able to understand Shintō discourses as a dependent variable of past attempts
at regional integration, we have to acknowledge that this type of discourse is notnation-specific. Rather hegemonic dreams of regional integration are integral to thenation state and will remain so as long as the system of such states persists.

Shintō Discourses
The Concept of State ShintōThis section analyzes Shintō discourses using the keyword “integration.”
The first question we may ask is: what is Shintō? That question is the mostdifficult one for Shintō itself, the question pursued by Shintō thinkers, politicians,
intellectuals for whom it was an overriding concern for years; the attempt to articulate
Shintō determined their position in modern Japan. As is commonly known, the concept
of “State Shintō,” which is still used by some researchers on Shintō issues, was born
within GHQ/SCAP’s democratization policies. To quote Sakamoto Koremaru:

4

In the narrow sense, kokka Shintō refers to shrine Shintō as supervised until
1945 by the state and as administered separately in law from other forms of
Shintō. In the wider sense, it has been conceptualized as the state religion
manifest in the merging of the Shintō of the imperial court and shrine Shintō.
Again, others have defined it as ”the religion that provided the basis forJapanese state ideology from the Meiji restoration of 1868 until Japan's defeat
in World War Two in 1945. To all intents and purposes it was the state religion ofJapan.” In brief, there is little consistency in the conceptualization of State
Shintō among scholars. Historically, the term acquired common currency onlywith the Shintō Directive [神道指令, Shintō shirei] of December 15, 1945. State
Shintō is clearly defined therein as "the branch of Shintō distinguished in state
law from "sect Shintō." This conceptualization or definition of state Shintō
accords with understandings in pre-war Japan.iv …
The argumentation of Shintō’s ideological position in modern Japan has been
supplanted by the argument about how to think about State Shintō. While researchers
have not yet reached a consensus regarding the degree of actual influence it had on thevarious other domains of society, some of them assert that the framework of State
Shintō is useful for describing the close relationships between the state and Shintō fromancient times to the present. Shimazono Susumu, for example, maintains as follows:
I think that after the Meiji restoration the “Rites of the Emperor” and the systemof “the civilization by the worship for the Emperor” such as Imperial Rescripton Education [教育勅語, Kyōiku Chokugo] was formed binding the adoration ofnation-wide powerful Jinja, and the modern State Shintō was constructed. …
Through the building up of the nation state, Shintō played a part of theconsecration of the nation, which the Emperor initiated, and penetrated thenational life in such a new aspect. So it is proper to call such a new aspect of
Shintō “State Shintō.”v
Shimazono questions such arguments as that State Shintō dominated people
ideologically, but insists on refining the idea of State Shintō in order to understandhistorically the deification of the Emperor in the 1930’s, a process he refers to as“Emperor-messianism.” The advantage of this work of refining can be summarized into
three points: (1) to bridge the accomplishment between historical studies and religious
studies; (2) to rethink the relationships between Shintō and the state, and people
5comprehensively from the ancient to contemporary times; and (3) to analyze Shintō
practices and discourses by reasoned deduction, not to dismiss them as unreasonable.
To some extent, I support these outcomes. It is, for example, certain that
Shintō has a special relationship with the nation of Japan. The use of the term ”State
Shintō,” however, risks obscuring the important specificity of Shintō discourses. That
specificity is aspirations to universality through regional integration. The State Shintō
analytical framework cannot explain the universality/universalist aspirations of Shintō
discourses during this period. The framework of State Shintō is suitable for the nation
state of Japan, but not for Imperial Japan during the period of regional integration
through the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Further, the framework of State
Shintō might erase the complexities of Shintō discourses in order to exile them in thename of human reason.
What were the Shintō discourses during the Asia-Pacific War? The following
section introduces two Shintō doctrines, that of Imaizumi Sadasuke (1863-1944) andthat of Hoshino Teruoki (1882-1957). There are several reasons why I have chosen to
examine these thinkers. The first is that their respective discourses exerted important
influences over the world of thought in intellectual circles in Imperial Japan; they are,however, largely forgotten today.vi The basis of their doctrines was clearly traditional
Shintō documents/texts and practices, but they both went beyond these sources andexplored the universality of Shintō. Finally, and most crucially, in 1942, the ideas ofthese two influential thinkers, who knew each other personally, came into an unintended
conflict. The following dissection of these two Shintō thinkers will show how theirdoctrines expanded earlier forms of Shintō into a form compatible with modern thought,
as well as the subtle signs that sustained all the logic of their doctrines.
Imaizumi Sadasuke and his doctrine of Kōdō [皇道]Imaizumi Sadasuke (1863 - 1944) was a Shintō philosopher and activist. In
1921, he assumed the presidency of the Jingū Service Foundation [神宮奉斎会, Jingū
Hōsaikai]. He was also the chairman of Kōdō-sha [皇道社; Imperial Way Association],
which published monthly magazine Kōdō-Hatsuyō [皇道発揚; Enhancing the ImperialWay]. He became the adviser of Jingi-invii [神祇院] in 1941. Imaizumi lectured on his
Kōdō [Imperial Way] theory to leaders of political circles, military, activist groups and6educators, and in December 1941 he lectured Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki on thissubject.
Central to Imaizumi’s thinking is the concept of Kōdō, which he claimed
contains the consistent homology of all laws—from those of nature to those governing
the operation of the human heart and mind. Everything—ethnic cosmology, national
polity, social systems, household, and people themselves—operate in accordance with
Kōdō. It is the perfect truth and the root of all the sciences and philosophy. Potentially it
contains all the knowledge, everything in the universe, from social sciences to quantum
theory. However each element in our universe is not necessarily equal, the root
existence is the Trinity composed of the deities Amenominakanushi, Amaterasu, and theEmperor. Amenominakanushi was given special emphasis because of its vague andmalleable character as an unidentifiable deity in the myth tradition. Imaizumi doctrine
paid special attention to this mysterious Kami (deity) in order to extend the Shintō
theory, and gave the transcendental position to Amenominakanushi as the embodimentof the universe itself.
Imaizumi clarifies the unique and extraordinary position and character ofJapan with a doctrine that indentifies Japan with the universal truth of Kōdō asembodied in successive Emperors. Because Japan is the sole “root” of all things, othernations are merely branches and ramifications of Japan. And because Japan, as the rootofallthings,istheperfect

nation,thewar—anexerciseinimperial

expansion—functions to evangelize the Kōdō, the Universal Truth.
Imaizumi’s Kōdō theory explains the war and its mission, and defines therelationshipbetweenthemetropoleandvarious

cultures/religions

withinJapanese-occupied territory. Imaizumi wrote the short paper named “Answering Doubts
regarding the National Essence” in the style of a dialogue with leftist students.
Question No. 8: We Japanese people forced the governor-general on the Korean
people. At the same time, we educate them on the Japanese National Essence.
Are we not engaged in a contradictory practice?
[Answer] It is not a contradiction at all to teach the Japanese National Essence
to Koreans. To declare our National Essence to the world will in the end be thesalvation of the earth. Thus it is never a contradiction teaching it to Koreans aswell as other peoples. ... Emperor Meiji sanctioned annexing Korea in order ofcourse to improve the welfare of both Japanese and Koreans. However I
7sometimes wonder whether the policy of government-general improves this ornot, and I am afraid it swerves from the wishes of the Emperor. viii
Imaizumi's Kōdō theory projected itself as a universal truth or principle. In this aspect,
it supported the universality of an integrated Empire. On the other hand, however, as the
final quoted sentence of this response demonstrates, it could be the basis of criticizing
the administrative practices associated with the implementation of these principles. In
this aspect, Imaizumi’s doctrine could play a role of dissatisfaction absorber, in thesense that Kōdō discourse could be interpreted in ways with a critical political potential.
Kōdō theory blessed Japan and its expansionism, while at the same time itsought to eliminate the potential for total reformation, or revolution. In Imaizumi’s
doctrine, because Japan as the root is the perfect nation, revolutions have never occurred,
and will never occur in Japan. This self-evident truth is seen in the fact that Japan had
an unbroken line of emperors. Other nations, as branches and ramifications, function
under the theory of historical materialism as defined in the Marxist tradition. ix We mayfind it surprising that Imaizumi’s doctrine accepted the validity of Marxism in a manner.
He was able to do this because his theory confined Marxism to the outer-Kōdō world, tothe imperfect branch and ramification nations. In such countries, class struggles andregime changes continue without cease, and the Royal dynasty is often displaced; thesefundamentally unstable societies might find themselves ruled by democracy, fascism orcommunism. x
Imaimzumi’s Kōdō doctrine was the hybrid integration of Shintō andscientific knowledge with some philosophical flavor. This hybridization gave the theorytranscendent universality that could interpret the meanings of the war for the Great East
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Moreover, the new order for the world manifested the
evolving and providential processes of the perfect truth of Kōdō, a concept so fluid thatit could be used to explain the attack on Pearl Harbor and render acceptable in principle
even Japan’s unconditional surrender. The universalization of the Shintō theory
propelled by regional integration released the theory itself from the yoke of the Empire
into higher reaches of advanced abstraction.
Hoshino Teruoki and his doctrine of Riteology

8

Hoshino Teruoki (1882 - 1957) was a Shōten [掌典; an assistant in the
conducting of ceremonies] and a bureaucrat within the Imperial Household Ministry.
Although most Shōten came from the peerage, Hoshino did not. Hoshino published anumber of articles on the essence of Imperial rites; thus his doctrine was based on
knowledge of the secret ceremonies of the Imperial Court. He carefully kept away frompolitical discourse, but often criticized intellectuals and Shintō philosophers for theirabsurd interpretation of the Court rites; he typically did so without naming any
particular individuals. xi
The central idea of Hoshino’s doctrine is the rites [祭祀, saishi]. In almost all
his works, he described Shintō rites and he developed his theory on the basis of them.
His doctrine asserts that all human practices are some sort of ritual. So he proposed thestudy of ritual practices, or the “Riteology” [祭祀学, saishigaku] in order to interpretthem hermeneutically. For Hoshino, the sole ultimate message of ritual practice is tospur humans into making the greatest possible effort, a message he was confident was
acceptable to all people, including materialists. All rites conducted or presided over byEmperors represent this essential message. Only the Japanese courtesy ceremonies
represent the most essential form of ritual practice, because they have been transmitted
from the imperial ancestress Amaterasu to present time through the pure medium of theEmperors' unbroken succession. The Emperor in this sense is the monarch ofencouragement to ceaseless endeavor.
In this scheme, Jinja shrines exist to refresh human beings’ determination
toward all the efforts and endeavors of everyday life. The ultimate purpose of the rites isthus to improve the everydayness of humankind. Hoshino named this aspect the eternal
returning to and renewal of daily life (everydayness) [復常の生活, fukujō no seikatsu]xii.
For Hoshino the meaning of the war was that of an effort of great creation; this was
ideally the creation of Earthly Completion and Perfection [地上完成, chijō kansei]; in
practical terms, it was the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. In Hoshino’s
doctrine, however, the success or failure of this effort depended on the effort of theJapanese people, not Providence or miracles.
Myths are the process of discovery and revelation of the ethnic philosophy.
According to the classical Japanese mythology, Amaterasu took refuge in the cave
(Amano-iwato gakure) as a result of the fundamental treason of Susano'o andTakamimusuhi. According to Hoshino, it was the successful attempt to lure her out of9the cave using various popular inducements that resulted in the establishment of
Amaterasu as the supreme divinity. This established the foundation for an ethnic
philosophy and revolution-free, immortal dynasty. However, if we neglect doing ourown efforts and/or the people who did their efforts, the possibility of revolution would
again arise. We therefore must respect—worship—the people who work hard to build
the nation, in other words, the Deities (fallen soldiers) enshrined at Yasukuni shrine andKenkoku shrine in Manchuria. Hoshino wrote:
I insisted we should define the subject of the Providence that the emperor ofManchuria followed this time. A man came to me. I asked, "Do you have any
idea?" and he said no. [I said] "Ok, I have an idea. The content of Providence
is the Imperial Edict of Foundation and the one of visiting to Japan. Unless
you restrict it to these, revolution will occur again.... Such a thing [eclectic
interpretation of Providence] occurred not only in China or in Manchuria.
But in Japan, we have to be cautious about the same types of ideology
spreading to the state deeply, which profess themselves to be “Japanese
Idealism.”xiii
As mentioned, Hoshino’s doctrine of Riteology was the hermeneutics of ritual practices
for human beings. This type of universality was not eclecticism but the common
denominator of all the people in the earth. It was the universality which, sifting out
impurities, purified itself.
In Hoshino’s doctrine, text is the production of human practices and theopaque medium that records the processes of practices, but does not have any otherauthority over the world. It is the practice of people—their efforts and endeavors—that
prevents revolution, never the miracles of deities or the grace of sacred texts. To dependon deities and, as a result, failing to make efforts is a grave error; the Japanese deity is
the helper, not the savior nor the giver. Japanese deities desire that humankind makethemselves thrive and achieve the completion of Earthly Completion and Perfection.
“The deity never asks too much of us. ... It is the only wish of deity that we work hardto the best of our ability and skill.”xiv The final conclusion of Hoshino’s quest was thatof a deity that never performed miracles. What he saw in this was the ethics ofcapitalism, a process of infinite endeavor threatened at all times with depravity anddecay.
On his sickbed, one day after defeat, Hoshino told a disciple, ”Under the new10Constitution of Japan, we Japanese renounce war forever. I hope it is followed by every
country on the earth.”xv It was not that the fact of the unconditional surrender madeclear the defects of his doctrines. Rather, it was his doctrine that made clear the faults of
the war.

Universality
Here it is necessary to compare the respective doctrines of Imaizumi andHoshino. Both men were proponents of the reformation of Shintō doctrines in order toaccommodate the reality of expansion and regional integration. Both tried to discover acertain universality within the teachings of Shintō. Each of them attached universality to
the earlier forms of Shintō, so that the actualities of regional integration might be seen
as catching up with this inherent universality. I will call these aspects of Shintō“Universal Shintō.” During the wartime period of regional integration, Shintō could besaid to have met the world. This encounter was not spontaneous but had been forced by
the historical contexts. The doctrines of Shintō expanded in response to the pressuresand demands of this integration. So, we can understand the universal Shintō theories as
the product of wartime regional integration, as eccentric as this may seem to us.
However, the types of universality sought by Imaizumi and Hoshino differed
greatly; their Shintō theories were opposed on all fronts. Although both doctrines
expanded the theoretical application of Shintō beyond the framework of Japan, their
theoretical subject is the cosmos or universe in Imaizumi’s doctrine, and humankind,
Dasein, for Hoshino.xvi
The following are examples of the discourses on truth by Imaizumi. The article
titled “10. The principle of the new world order of Chapter 5 The essence of Kōdō andits enhancement” from Kōdō ronso, shows the characteristics of his doctrine on
universality.
1. Definitely it is the final idea and the honest hope that we live in peacexvii withall the people in the world. However, when we trace the terrible conflicts andstruggles in world history, some people wonder what type of order could
guarantee eternal peace, but they might be defeated in the end by their own
cleverness. …
11

2. Scholars today despise some ideas such as “the truth of the universe” as a
stargazing idealism that cannot be proved, but this attitude is too irresponsible
for a scholar. Without the dedication for proving the truth, the authority ofscience must be suspect. …
4. … The concept of justice in foreign nations, which was based on faked-truths,
has had to change its contents because of revolution and invasion. In
comparison to that, the Japanese never changed their contents of the concept ofjustice; they have aimed at uniting with the truth of the universe as their justice.
After the national founding, for thousands or tens of thousands of years, the[Japanese] justice has been to unite with the Emperor who are as one with
Amaterasu in state of tenjō-mukyū [天壌無窮; the infinite progression of thehomeland].
5. ... It is hardly possible that all of humankind accords with the direction oftengyō-yokusan [天業翼賛; to support the Emperor's holy governance]. The
arbitrary directions of peoples cause conflicts with each other. In contrast,
peace will come by itself if we all go to the center. The Japanese potentially havethis essential attitude so their Kōdō [皇道; the imperial way] never be exploded
by revolution or invasion, like the truth that can never be destroyed by humanpractices. Only our nation has the [Japanese] national essence which embodies
the universal truth directly, and our Emperor has the essence of bansei-ikkei [万世一系; the unbroken succession of the Emperor] and tenjō-mukyū [天壌無窮]
only for the realization of hakko-ichiu [八紘一宇; make the world into one
family], so we must entirely dash forward toward the realization oftengyō-yokusan [天業翼賛] believing the ineluctable coming of the new order ofthe Kōdō-world [皇道世界].xviii
In contrast with Imaizumi, Hoshino’s article "The holy command of Kōso [皇祖;the Emperor's progenitor] and the order of Ten [天]" shows a diametrically opposed
opinion on the question of universality.
This is my memory of Mr. Sugiura Shigetaka [杉浦重剛; 1855-1924, an educatorof Prince Hirohito], whose opinion I cannot agree with, but whom I admire on
two points. Here I introduce one of them... He said to us:
In my youth, I had been to Great Britain for three years to study engineering.
What afflicted me there was the problem of whether the cusp of the straight line12

in the geometric context is real or not. I extended that problem a long away, but
I could not know at last after three years. That is the accomplishment of mythree-years study abroad.
Involuntarily I [Hoshino] take off my hat to him. We are never able to knowwhether the cusp is real or not. We human beings cannot know such a smallthing. How then can we know the truth of the universe? If we could know allabout the others who like us form humankind, could we know their psychology
as if seeing it in the mirror? Do you know how deeply the cosmic science goestoday? Many scientists argue about cosmic rays in different ways. Then, can we
say that the universe loves humankind? Some scientific theory insists thatcosmic ray damages our health even if we take shelter in the basement. In thatcase, can we insist that the universe is the truth or the substance, without any
reason? The tradition of our nation never had such a fantasy. Sometimes in
China, the sage who does not have power and developed only their ideas
daydreamed such a fantasy in order to expand the scope of their power andinfluence, I think.
A good statesperson may conform himself to Ten [天; above, heaven, tian] as theorder and support their king in the name of Ten, but a sly-old-fox politician often
pursues his own interests. All through the history, under the banner of Ten,
Chinese revolutionists came. Considering them, we need to investigate carefully
the concept of the order of Tenxix … .
It is clear that both Imaizumi's article and Hoshino's focused on the same
concept: that is, the truth of the universe. Imaizumi insisted on the necessity of thisconcept and asserted that failure to explore it adequately was what caused the corruptionof the intelligentsia. In his doctrine, what was then called “the new world order [世界新秩序, sekai shinchitsujo] ” meant rejoining the order of the root, or the National
Essence of Japan. In contrast, Hoshino insisted on the more limited knowledge ofhuman beings, separated the truth from the universe or cosmic science, and sought topursue political objectives on the basis of scientific or philosophical knowledge. He
insisted the ressentiment of the intelligentsia caused the confusion of the concepts.
This is the dilemma of exploring universality. It is certain that Imaizumi andHoshino shared the concern for universality, but they could not achieve unanimity.
However, there is one more concern that they shared. It is the negative of universality,
13

revolution-phobia.

Revolution-phobia
These universal Shintō doctrines also shared a theoretical fear. Universal Shintō
was required to produce two universalities. One was the spatial universality, in otherwords, global or international extensiveness, and another one was temporal universality,or historical purity. This is an aporia: ideological extensiveness always threatens
historical purity; in more concrete terms: the pursuit of regional integration undermined
the purity of the national essence.
So, what did they name their terror? Both doctrines called it “revolution”. The
quoted articles above by Imaizumi and Hoshino treat the concept of revolution as
something to be denied from the past to the future. The theoretical principle ofUniversal Shintō is the absolute negation of the possibility of revolution. In reality, they
had a hard time to exorcise revolution from their ideologies, and from their integrated
Empire. We might call this symptom, revolution-phobia, which was an aporia of theuniversal Shintō. More correctly, a revolution-phobia is an integration-phobia, because
their integration had a power to damage Japan’s national essence. The ideal of regional
integration pursued to its logical conclusion would mean the dissolution of the nation ofJapan; but they could not stop the forward momentum of imperial integration. For
example, in introducing a modest outline of the relativity principle, Imaizumi concluded,"It shows that science arrived at the right universal-holism [ 宇宙万有観 , uchūbanyūkan] which is almost identical to our ideas of spirits [霊魂観, reikonkan] at last,after the thousand years of efforts in experiments and theories." xx This farfetcheddiscourse seems to be a hallucinated thought, but it was a strategic one.
The idea that time-space is absolute controlled the thought of human beings fora long time, together with the idea that mass is absolute. Rather, even today suchideas are ruling the thought of many. For instance, three-dimensional Euclidean
space and one-dimensional time are believed to be absolute and the principle
even in Anti-Dühring by Engels, Materialism and the criticism of imperialism by
Lenin and so on, all works considered to be masterpieces of radical materialism.
But if we consider them profoundly, we will find soon that their ideas are14

shallow arguments. So it may be enough to introduce the theory of relativity forthis consideration.xxi
Certainly, the theoretical target of this discourse is Marxism. Imaizumi’s doctrine
combined Shintō myths with Einstein's theory of relativity in order to overcome
Marxian social science that predicted theoretically the doom of capitalism.
By using the concepts of universality/revolution-phobia, Shintō discourses
may be understood more accessibly than ever, in particular in their relation to imperial
integration. The mysterious figure of their doctrine was formed—or distorted—by theirintegration. The positive symptom of Shintō universalism is the desire for the
integration, and the negative one is fear of revolution. Both amplified the traditional
Shintō theories out of their league in order to assure their integration and Shintō itself.
Both of them shut their potential revolutions away overseas or in gray past by
acknowledging Marxism itself.
Both doctrines examined here built what they hoped would be a universal
principle of integration without revolutions. But this was not to be. Although Universal
Shintō had to be one and only literally, they proposed very different universalities. This
inevitably generated the strife. So we should examine the curious incidents that
occurred in 1942. The first attack occurred on March 4, when the censors banned thearticle xxii written by Imaizumi named “The Development of the Imperial History”[Kōdō shikan no tenkai]xxiii. Imaizumi did not blame the authorities for the press ban but
his supporters planned a counterattack against that prohibition. Their strategy against
the government was brilliant: to undermine the authorities by the deployment of
undeniable universal principles.
The supporters lodged some inquiry to the Jingi-in, Dai-Nippon Jingikai [TheGreat Japan Association for the Worship of the Deities] and Kōten kōkyūjo [Imperial
Classics Research Institution] in the spring of 1947. They asked these questions:
1. Is the Kojiki the Holy Classics of Japan, or a violator of Japanese essence[Kokutai], because it contains some flavor of Chinese ideas?
2. Is the genesis at the beginning of the Kojiki a Japanese-ethnic idea, or a
Chinese one?
3. Do theories that undervalue or deny Amenominakanushi profane the HolyClassics, and should they be eliminated?
4. Is the faith affirmed or not, that Amaterasu is the supreme Deity not only of15

Japan and the Japanese people but also of all of humankind and the whole
universe?
5. Is the faith affirmed or not, that the Emperor is not only the leading figure ofJapan and Japanese but of the earth, humankind and the whole universe?
What did this questionnaire mean? They did not blame the government directly, but
proposed in effect a loyalty test to be used against the government authorities. The
inquiry gave rise to the possibility of frictions among the authorities. This inquiry
simplified both the theories of Imaizumi and Hoshino. It focused on the only two topics,
Kojiki's infallibility and the limit of the Emperor's reign. In addition, it pressed thegovernment for an answer about which theory they should give approval to. For
instance, Imaizumi doctrines might say: Kojiki is the Holy Classic and the essence of
the Japanese ideas, so Amenominakanushi and its spiritual successor Amaterasu shallreign over the whole universe, and the Emperor has the authority to govern all over theworld. Against that, Hoshino doctrines might say: Kojiki was edited under the powerful
influence of Chinese ideas, so the idea of Amenominakanushi is a smuggled idea of the
Tian [天] of Chinese mythology system. Therefore, we have to say that the Emperor’sauthority only comes from the divinity of Amaterasu, never from Amenominakanushi.
Furthermore, Japanese Deities never bring miracles; Japan's development andflourishing always hinge only on the efforts of its people. So, the limit of the Emperor's
reign is determined by the people's effort dynamically, not by the Holy Classics
statically.
The directors of Dai-Nippon Jingikai and Kōten kōkyūjo gave their approvalto Imaizumi’s doctrine while Jingi-in answered, "We have no reason to give you ananswer." Receiving this reply, the supporters of Imaizumi might consider that theGovernment affirmed the Hoshino doctrine negatively and tried to suppress the
Imaizumi doctrine with the power of censorship. Then the supporters started somecampaigns to denounce the Hoshino doctrine and his factual work Prolegomenon of theJapanese-ethnic philosophy for failure to respect the Emperor, or lése májesty. The book
Prolegomenon, based on the Hoshino doctrine, was published on November 25, 1941,and credited the son of Hoshino as the author. Some activists among Imaizumi’s
supporters accused Hoshino and his works of liberalism and historical materialism:
Hoshino’s doctrine was regarded as an invitation to revolution. They all feared
revolution—revolution-phobia—and each of them found the sign of revolution in their16

enemy—the other type of universality for their integration.
Probably the Government feared the spread of this conflict and campaign to the radical
nationalists. The authorities struggled to find a solution and conducted discussions
among the Ministry of Education (responsible for religious organizations), the ImperialHome Ministry (for police and censorship), the Imperial Household Ministry andJingi-in. Jingi-in, which was the nominal top administrative institution for Jinja andShintō issues, was not able to approve the Imaizumi doctrine, because his doctrine
overstepped the consensus of modern academic Shintō studies. On the other hand,
Jingi-in was not capable to give full support to the Hoshino doctrine, because the Kojiki
had already become popular as the Holy Classic and the Jinja that deified
Amenominakanushi was very popular, so it was too difficult to eliminate them. Such an
ambiguous attribute delayed the Jingi-in's response, and created the space for politicalintervention into the Shintō issues.
These incidents needed to be resolved from the perspective of politicalcost-management, not as a theological controversy. What was important for theauthorities was not the theoretical potential but the political potential; the strength of
Imaizumi supporters. On August 4, 1942, Imaizumi was invited to the Executive
Mansion of Prime Minister Tōjō, and the same day Hoshino retired from the Imperial
Household Ministry. On August 7, the censorship authority banned the Prolegomenon
and other two books written by Hoshino. Here is a quotation from the secret censorship
journalxxiv.
Prolegomenon of the Japanese-ethnic Philosophy by Hoshino Kōichi. …
Published November 15, 16th year of Shōwa. Banned October 7 [17th year of
Shōwa].
This book intended to illuminate the Cardinal Principles of the National Body
with the knowledge of the Kojiki and the Nihon-shoki, and the Courtesy
Ceremony. However, it contains some factors to obscure the national flavor of
the Imperial Household and National Essence, because its terms and style are
improper. So it must be banned.
Hoshino was expelled from the Imperial Household Ministry with the national
decoration, and this retrieved Imaizumi's honor. Newspaper and other opinions referringto this solution were also censored. Therefore, the campaign ended, the police report17

said. However, what does “the end” mean? After handing in his resignation, Hoshino
composed some Tankaxxv:
Following the legend of the cave;
Still I confine myself to a library.
At present, it has not been possible to find the documents on the censorship codefor religious issues and the connection between censorship authorities and Hoshino
Teruoki. A reconstruction of censorship code for religious issues with the Journal of
Censorship Policing [出版警察報, Shuppan keisatsuhō] shows that the censorship code
seemed to catch two kinds of discourses:
1) Discourses violating the absolute holiness of Amaterasu. For example:
a. The article referring to the dualism of Amaterasu and her brother Susano'o,or Amaterasu and Kunitokotachi.
b. The article referring to the Trinity of Amenominakanushi, Amaterasu andEmperor.
c. The article regarding Amaterasu as the divine of the Sun, or
Amenominakanushi as the supreme ruler of the universe.
2) Discourses containing the phrase like “Emperor shall reign all over theworld.” This idea is based on a stretching of the meaning of the Holy Classics,
their mythology and authority of Deities.
Why were those discourses prohibited? Censorship judgment says that the reason wasthat those descriptions might work to dissolve the Japanese National Essence.
Nevertheless, there may be another reason why the Emperor's sovereignty for the world
was denied by the censors. Some powerful popular religions utilized an over-reading of
the Holy Classics. For example, the Kōdō Ōmoto sect embraced the idea of the dualism,
the Hitonomichi-kyodan sect regarded Amaterasu as the Sun, and the Amatsu-kyo sectintegrated Japanese classical myths to other classics like Egyptian myths, Judaism,
Christianity, Buddhism, and so on. They were all cracked down on, from 1920, and had
been dragged into court cases. It can be supposed that the Hoshino doctrine was thebasic resource of the censorship code to some extent, and the main target of that code
was so-called pseudo-religions [ 類 似 宗 教 , ruiji shūkyō]. Under this code thedescription of the Trinity might apply to Imaizumi's article. Though it is not at all clear
whether Hoshino wanted to provide the theoretical/theological basis for censorship andthus spark the suppression of the Imaizumi doctrine, it is supposed, judging from its
18

form, that the censorship code for Shintō and religious issues was based on the Hoshino
doctrine.

Conclusion
The foregoing analysis shows that the complexity of Shintō discourses was a
product of the past processes of integration. When we approach them from the concept
of integration, we can understand the basic structure of their discourses without labelingthem insanity. It is certain that Shintō discourses may be very complicated and confused,however they cannot be dismissed as the intoxicated fantasies of hidebound nationalists.
They are better understood as a form of modern thought that attempted to supplant thepossibility of revolution by a different solution; theological-theoretical integration.
This integration gave rise to both universal theory and revolution-phobia. The
aporia is that they should realize integration while avoiding revolutions, but integration
itself invited revolutionary changes. The signs of revolution-phobia are never concealedin their discourses. It is always evident. The will toward universality fragmented thediscourses.

This

powerfulintention

fogs

their

revolution-phobia.

However,

revolution-phobia is as old as the nation-state, which in the case of Japan was born of
the revolution called the Meiji Restoration. We could say that the revolution is themother of the nation, but revolution must not come again in the future for the lifetime of
the nation.
Then, we have to ask again: why is the study of Shintō discourses importantfor our integration? Does it contribute to control our future?
Shintō discourses show the symptom, universality with revolution-phobia, or
revolution-phobia with universality. This symptom is embedded in the system of themodern nation, and become evident when the system seeks to transcend itself. The
implication of this analysis is that our present-day integration may also produce such a
symptom. That means the necessity of analyzing quasi-insane discourses distributed in
Asia today, even if their figuration appears incomprehensible and their message appears
too simplistic.

19

This paper is a rewritten and improved version of the author's presentation
at Summer Institute on Regional Integration at Waseda 2008, and ispartially based on the author's paper, “Designs of Universal Shintō: theHeritage of their Empire,” Li Narangoa, ed., New Research in JapaneseStudies: Proceedings of Asia Pacific Week 2007, Faculty of Asian Studies,
The Australian National University.
ii
See: Film & Sound Online - Know Your Enemy - Japan Part 1,
http://www.filmandsound.ac.uk/collections/records/0023-0000-1487-0000-0-0000-0000-0.html (accessed November 2008).
iii
My investigation in this paper was inspired by the works of Slavoj Žižek. See SlavojŽižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, London: Verso, 1989).
iv
Sakamoto Koremaru, Encyclopedia of Shinto - Home : Modern and Contemporary :State Shinto, http://eos.kokugakuin.ac.jp/modules/xwords/entry.php?entryID=1096(accessed November 2008).
v
Shimazono Susumu, “Kokka Shinto to Messianism,” Iwanami Kōza Tennō to Ōkenwo Kangaeru: Cosmology to Shintai, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002, p. 102.
vi
The mechanism of oblivion must be a part of the postwar history, but there is nospace to analyze it in this paper.
vii Jingi-in was established at 1940 to be the national authority of Shintō and Jinja
administrations, and is often considered as the ultimate embodiment of State Shintō.
viii
Quote from: Imaizumi Sadasuke, Kokutai ni taisuru Gimon ni Kotau, Imaizumi
Sadasuke-sensei Kenkyū Zenshū, Vol. 3, Tokyo: Nihon University Imaizumi Institute,1969, p. 235. “Kokutai ni taisuru Gimon ni Kotau” was originally published in 1934and distributed in the army.
ix
See: Imaizumi Sadasuke, Kōdō Ronsō, Tokyo: Kōdō-sha, 1942, Imaizumi
Sadasuke-sensei Kenkyū Zenshū, Vol. 2, Tokyo: Nihon University Imaizumi Institute,1969, pp. 250-251. “Kōdō Ronsō” was originally written in November 1939.
x
See: Imaizumi Sadasuke, Kōdō Ronsō, Tokyo: Kōdō-sha, 1942, Imaizumi
Sadasuke-sensei Kenkyū Zenshū, Vol. 2, Tokyo: Nihon University Imaizumi Institute,1969, p. 315.
xi
Hoshino Teruoki, "Mazu Gojin no Mō wo," Jinja Kyōkai Zasshi, No. 4 of the 37th
Year (April 1938), p. 30.
xii
See: Hoshino Teruoki, Fukujō no Seikatsu, Nihon no Saishi: Hoshino Teruoki Sensei
Chosakushu, Tokyo: Hoshino teruoki sensei icho kankō kai, 1968. “Fukujō noSeikatsu” was originally published in July 1935.
xiii
Hoshino Teruoki, Kokutai no Konki, Tokyo: Dainippon Seinendan Honbu, 1940, p.
6.
xiv Hoshino Teruoki, Syushi wo maki tagayasu kokoro (The mind of seeding
and cultivating), Ie no hikari, vol. 18 no. 5 (May 1942), p. 31.
xv
Kawade Kiyohiko, Sensei wo aogu (Admiring our master), Nihon no saishi: Hoshino
Teruoki sensei chosakushū, Tokyo: Hoshino teruoki sensei icho kankō kai, 1968, p. 404.
xvi
I suppose that some motive from Nietzsche's works and Heidegger's infectedHoshino's and slightly Imaizumi’s, but this is still my inference, not a demonstrated
contention. However, if we extend this supposition, it can be said that Hoshino’s
doctrine found the problems on Dasein into the ritual practices.
xvii"Yasukuni-to tairake-ki naka" is the phrase from Ōharae [大祓].
i20

xviiiImizumi Sadasuke, Kōdō Ronsō, Tokyo: Kōdō-sha, 1942, Imaizumi
Sadasuke-sensei Kenkyu Zenshu, Vol. 2, Tokyo: Nihon University Imaizumi Institute,1969, pp. 498-503.
xix
Hoshino Teruoki, Kokutai no Konki (The foundation of the national essence),
Tokyo: Dainippon Seinendan Honbu, 1940, pp. 4-6.
xx
Imaizumi Sadasuke, Principle of the National Isomorphology (Kokutai genri),
Kyoto: Ritsumeikan Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1935. From: Imaizumi Sadasuke-sensei
Kenkyū Zenshū, Vol. 3, Tokyo: Nihon University Imaizumi Institute, 1969, p. 394.
xxi
Imaizumi Sadasuke, Principle of the National Isomorphology (Kokutai genri),
Kyoto: Ritsumeikan Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1935. From: Imaizumi Sadasuke-sensei
Kenkyū Zenshū, Vol. 3, Tokyo: Nihon University Imaizumi Institute, 1969, p. 391.
xxii
Jōhōkyoku (Intelligence Agency) 1 st Section of 4th Department and the Censorship
Section of the Keiho-kyoku Bureau of the Imperial Home Ministry, Shuppan
Keisatsuhō 142, 1942, p. 155.
xxiii In the article named “The Development of the Imperial History”, Imaizumi
insisted the trilogy of Amenominakanushi, Amaterasu and Emperor. This
description was the direct cause of banning, however, this idea did not seemto be the main topic of the article. I think that the purpose of this text was toovercome the western philosophy, especially the ontology of Heidegger.
xxiv
Jōhōkyoku (Intelligence Agency) 1st Section of 4th Department and the Censorship
Section of the Keiho-kyoku Bureau of the Imperial Home Ministry, Shuppan
Keisatsuhō 144, 1942.
xxv Hoshino Teruoki, Kabunsyū, Nihon no Saishi: Hoshino Teruoki Sensei Chosakushu,
Tokyo: Hoshino teruoki sensei icho kankō kai, 1968, p. 372.

21