Inter-regional Asian Emigration and the Potential for International
Cooperation in East Asia: A Comparative Examination of State
Integration Policies in Korea and Japan
Abstract:
This paper aims to comparatively examine the integration practices of Japan and Korea
at the state level to help understand the measures being taken to mitigate some of the
migratory pressures resulting from deepening Asian regional integration and to enhance
human security in the region. Specifically, the author aims to examine the state-led
initiatives vis-à-vis Japan and Korea's burgeoning multicultural societies in an effort tocomparatively examine their approaches to securing the human rights and security of
their growing migrant populations. Through identifying parallels and differences in theapproaches of the Japanese and Korean governments in terms of securing human rights
and security, the author will outline potential areas of cooperation in dealing withgrowing trans-border migration between these two countries and in Asia in general.
I.
Introduction
The functionalist approach to international integration stresses economic enmeshment
as its foundational component. 1 Initial institutional cooperation in the sphere of
economics creates a platform for further institutional cooperation and eventuallybroader institutional cooperation in the spheres of economics, politics, society andsecurity. In contrast, the neo-functionalist approach to integration focuses on the role ofpressure groups in democracies and their ability to influence the direction of policy. 2
Specifically, democratic governments provide political space for pressure groups toinfluence the direction of policy and subsequently we see these pressure groups being
the primary instigators of cross-border economic liaisons in order to realise thecomparative advantages that exist between one or more states. Initial cooperation thenleads to broad based cooperation and integration through economic compatibility. In
both cases, economic cooperation through institutional cooperation are precursors tonarrowly defined integration in the economic sense, and broader integration which
encompasses integration in political, social, cultural and security spheres.
On route to broader integration in the Asian region, can the economic dimension of
integration be circumnavigated by cooperation in other spheres and be used as a springboard for other kinds of institutional cooperation leading to broader integration?
According to his 2004 article on cross-border migration, Akaha argues that increased
flows of cross-border migrants have given rise to human-security issues such as therights of foreign labours, human rights protection, and human trafficking however;being that these issues have yet to threaten national-security interests we have yet to see
cooperation between the major recipients of cross border migration. 3
1

Taylor, Paul “Functionalism: the Approach of David Mitrany” in Frameworks for International
Cooperation. A.J.R. Groom & Paul Taylor. (eds.), London: Pinter Publishers. pp. 130-131
2Harrison, R.J. “Neo-functionalism” in Frameworks for International Cooperation. A.J.R. Groom &Paul Taylor. (eds.), London: Pinter Publishers. pp. 130-131
3Akaha, Tsuneo. “Cross border migration as a new element of international relations in Northeast
Asia: A boon to regionalism or new source of friction?” in Asian Perspective, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2005,
pp.101-133

1I argue that recent developments in Korea and Japan in the area of social integration
policies and multiculturalism are coeval with broader integration in the region based on
potential institutional cooperation in the sphere of human-security. Specifically, throughthis paper I aim to examine the social integration practices of Japan and Korea at thestate level to help understand the measures being taken to mitigate some of the
migratory pressures resulting from deepening Asian regional integration at theeconomic level, to enhance human security in the region and perhaps act as a platform
for further integration based on cooperation in the area of human security. By
examining the state-led initiatives vis-à-vis Japan and Korea's burgeoning multiculturalsocieties, we can glean an understanding of their approaches to securing the humanrights and security of their growing migrant populations. Through identifying parallels
and differences in the approaches of the Japanese and Korean governments in terms of
securing human rights and security we can delineate potential areas of cooperation in
dealing with growing trans-border migration between these two countries and in Asia ingeneral which may act as a platform for further integration at a broader level,
overcoming the challenges to integration argued by Frost (2008).4
To achieve the above objective this paper is divided into three sections. This firstsection will examine demographic data and the current data on the number of foreign
residents in Korea and Japan in a comparative manner to demonstrate parallels anddissimilarities in terms of their demographic challenges. Second, the integration
practices of Japan and Korea will then be introduced highlighting importing turning
points, policy emphasis and specific measures which are being put into place to help
meet the coming demographic tsunami. In the third section, areas of potential
cooperation will be identified that will help Korea and Japan better deal with the
integration of foreign residents which are in part necessary for them to manage theirdemographic plight.

4

In Ellen Frost’s “Asia’s New Regionalism”, she portends that a plethora of obstacles contribute to
the glacial pace of deeper integration in the region including: geography, cultural, history, the dual
nature of the effects of globalisation, regional politics, problematic governance, corruption, as wellas unpredictable threats such as a the collapse of North Korea. I would add to this list two otherdrivers of integration that can play an enormously positive role or inhibitory role in further
integration: an involved United States and overseas nationals. A United States that remains distracted
by conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan will be unable to direct the appropriate resources necessary(material, political and intellectual) to positively contribute to the region. Similarly, overseas
nationals such as overseas Chinese and Indians who remain disinterested in their ethnic homelands,
may inadvertently negatively affect the shape of Asian regional integration by not lending theirexperience, wealth and ability to act as purveyors of human and social capital from the developed
world to the developing world. Frost, Ellen, L. 2008.” Current Obstacles and Potential Threats,” inAsia‘s New Regionalism. Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner. pp.217-231.

2

II. Demographic Tsunami: Twin plagues of a graying population and low birth
rates
Japan
As of 2005, Japan’s population began to decline owing to low birth rates, a reality thatwill affect the country’s future economic vitality. 5 In fact, Japan has entered alongstanding depopulation process. The population is expected to drop to 115 million
by 2030 and approx. 90 million by 2055 (See Figure 1.0) and according to Goodman
and Harper (2006) this drop will have three major impacts: (1) increase in public
spending in pensions; (2) high dependency rations between workers and non-workers,and (3) slow down in consumption. 6 At minimum, the greater tax burden on smaller
number of tax payers will result in a larger share of national budget allocated to healthcare, social services and pensions, decreased economic strength because of decreased
consumption rates, loss of position in international society (lack of resources, decreased
innovativeness) and a hollowing out of country side (potential loss of agriculturalinterdependence) .

Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.2006.Population
Statistics of Japan 2006. Tokyo.
Like other nations, Japan is using foreign workers to compensate for this trend. Thesemigrant workers find employment (legal and illegal) in Japan’s manufacturing
5

Economist, January 7th-13th 2005, pp. 29-30； Economist, July 28th-August 3rd 2007, pp. 11, 2427；Also see: Sakanaka Hidenori. “The Future of Japan’s Immigration Policy: a battle diary” inJapan Focus. http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2396 (Accessed May 23rd, 2007)
6
Goodman, R. & Sarah Harper. “ Japan in the New Global Demography: A comparative
Perspective”. In JapanFocus. http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2472 (Accessed August 2008)3

industries and other forms of employment deemed dirty, dangerous and difficulty. In
terms of the changes in the number of foreign residents since 2002, we have seen asteady increase in the over all number of foreign residents in Japan (See Table 1.0).
Table 1.0 Changes in the number of new arrivals and alien registration of main
nationalities (place of origin) by status of residence

Source: The Ministry of Justice. “Immigration Control 2007.” http:// www.moj.go.jp(Accessed March 30th, 2008)
According to the Statistics Bureau of Japan, the number of foreigners living, working
and studying in Japan reached 2,084,919 in 2006 representing 1.63% of the total
population (See Figure 2.0).7 This number represents a 46% increase in the number ofregistered foreigners compared with 1994. This figure does not include the number ofknown illegal foreign residents which according to the Ministry of Justice has climbed
to 207,299 (See Figure 3.0).8 Moreover, the number of foreign residents could be muchhigher if we consider those children that result from international marriages called
daburu9 in Japan. 10
7 See: Ministry of Justice http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/070921-1/070921-1.pdf (Accessed April
30th, 2008))
8 See: Ministry of Justice homepage:
http://www.moj.go.jp/English/issues/issues05.html (Accessed September 16th, 2006)
9 Daburu is the Japanese pronunciation of “Double”. It refers to children who have one Japaneseparent and one non-Japanese parent. Children who have parents from different countries but whoseparents are not of Japanese nationality are called international children or just foreign children. See:

4

Figure 2.0: Changes in the number of registered foreign nationals and its percentage ofthe total population in Japan

Source: "2007 Immigration Control," Immigration Control Bureau, Japan, 2008, p. 19
Figure 3.0 Estimated Number of Visa Overstayers by Major Nationality/Place of Origin

Source: "2007 Immigration Control," Immigration Control Bureau, Japan, 2008, p. 31.
What is driving this migration into Japan? In the case of Japan, the Ministry of Justicein their Immigration Control 2007 Report outlined six explanations for the increase: (1)availability of Trainee Programmes; (2) special residency and opportunities for
Nikkeijin;11 (3) abundant jobs for foreign students and entertainers; (4) job opportunities
Tabunka Kyousei Ki-wa-do Jiten Henshu Iinkai.2004. Tabunka Kyousei Ki-wa-do Jiten.Tokyo:
Akashi Shoten. pp.71
10 Suzuki, Eriko. 2004. “Gaikokujin Shujuu Chiiki ni miru Tabunka Kyoushakai no Kadai:“Kyousei” wa Nani Ka?” in FIF Special Report No.8. Tokyo: Fujita Mirai Keiei Kenkyujo. pp.23-25
11
The revision of Japanese immigration policy to allow individuals of Japanese ancestry (up to 3 rdgeneration) to return to Japan for work has resulted in an influx of Nikkeijin into Japan. The
rationale behind this ethnic based immigration selection was that it was assumed that Nikkeijinwould assimilate more smoothly than other foreigners because of their shared blood. See: Ministryof Justice. 1992. Shutsu Nyukoku Kanri Kihon Keikaku. Tokyo: Ministry of Justice. p.12; Abella,5for undocumented workers; (5) family reunion opportunities for those who belong to aninternational marriage; and (6) the ease at which foreigners can enter Japan and overstay
their visa. 12
It is clear from above is that Japan faces the twin conundrum of how to combat its
declining population and to successfully integrate the growing number of non-ethnic
Japanese residents who are choosing to become permanent residents in order that they
can contribute to Japan economically, culturally, politically and socially. Equallyimportant is the promulgation of substantive measures that prevent discrimination(racial or otherwise), exploitation, and marginalisation.
Korea
In a similar manner to Japan, Korea is experiencing a very rapidly graying population
and a crisis level low birth rate. As of 2007, Korean women were averaging just 1.26
children compared with Japan at 1.34 in 2007. 13 This below replacement rate levelcompounds the current labour shortage as young Korean men and women choose toshun blue collar employment opportunities for their white collar counterparts. 14
Magnifying the problem associated with labour shortages and a declining tax pool,according to the Asian Demographic and Human Capital 2008 Data Sheet, Korea’s
ageing population will represent 10% of the total population in 2007, 23% by 2030 and
32% by 2050. 15 More illustrative of coming crises is that in 2007, the ageing population
was supported by a tax base of 72%, a number that will decrease to 65% in 2030, andthan 57% in 2050. Echoing Goodman and Harper’s analysis of the impact of Japan’s
population pyramid reversal, Korea will inevitably face similar economic and social
hardships at a level even higher than Japan owing to a lower birthrate which will havethe effect of having an even smaller tax base to contribute to existing social welfare
programmes and economic productivity.
Korea has also seen a large increase in the number of foreign residents working legallyand illegally in Korea beginning in 1987. 16 According to Kwon Ki sup, Director of
Manolo I. 1995. “Asian Migrant Contract Workers in the Middle East.” in Robin Cohen, (Eds)., The
Cambridge Survey of World Migrations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 418-423:
Kojima, Hiroshi. “Foreign Workers and Health Insurance in Japan: The case of Japanese Brazilians”.
The Japanese Journal of Population, Vol.4, No. 1 March 2006 pp. 78-92
12
See the Ministry of Justice. “Immigration Control 2007.” http:// www.moj.go.jp (Accessed March
30th, 2008)13

http://www.intute.ac.uk/sciences/cgibin/worldguidecompare.pl?country1=1024&country2=924&country3=%23&country4=%23&submi
t=Compare%21&compare=Population&compare=PopGrowth&compare=PopMig&compare=PopLif
e&compare=AgeStructure&compare=PopBirth&compare=PopDeath&compare=LabourForc(Accessed August 2008)14
Lim. T.C., 2006. “NGOs, transnational Migrants, and the Promotion of Rights in South Korea,” in
Local citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration. Tsuda Tatsuyuki (ed.), Oxford: Lexington
Books. pp.235-269.
15
See Asian Demographic and Human Capital 2008 Data Sheet:
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/datasheets/VID_asianDataSheet08_web.pdf(Accessed September 2008)16
Dong-Hoon Seol and John D. Skrentny.2004. “South Korea: Importing Undocumented Workers,”

6Foreign Employment Division of the Ministry of Labour, there is “an embedded
structural demand for foreign labour, which is being compounded by Korea’s ageing
population.” 17 In 1987, Korea was home to approximately 6,409 migrant labours, anumber which has soared to at least 640,000 migrant workers in 2007. 18
Table 2.0 Increase legal and illegal foreign residents in Korea between 2000 and 2005

Source:“Immigration Bureau Publications, " Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice.
2008.
Above and beyond the influx of migrant labourers into Korea brides hailing from South
East Asia have also been major sources of the increase of non-Korean residents whichhave resulted in an international marriage rate 13.6% in 2006.19
The continued influx of migrant workers into Korea can be attributed to several factors.
First, as with many developed nations there is a structural demand for migrant workers
that in part contributes to national economic prosperity by being able to continue tomanufacture goods at competitive prices using cheaper foreign labour. Second, trainee
programmes continue to persist, creating a window to enter into the Korean economy.
Third, proactive post-graduation employment programmes for international students
who have graduated from Korea universities boost the number foreigners staying inin Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, 2nd Edition. Cornelius, W.A., Tsuda, T., Martin,P.L., and J.F. Hollified (eds.), California: Stanford University Press. pp. 481-513.
17
The Prospects and challenge for The Employment Permit System, Presentation by Mr. Kwon Ki
Sup, Director of Foreign Employment Division of the Ministry of Labour June 14 th, 2004
18
Seol, Dong-Hoon. 2000.Nodongryeok eui gukje idong (). Seoul: Seoul National University Press.
This number includes more than 180,000 workers with authorized working permits, 230,000 ethnic
Koreans, 28,000 industrial trainees and foreign residents and 202,000 illegal immigrants. See:
http://www.korea.net/news/news/NewsView.asp?serial_no=20080218023&part=114&SearchDay=&
source= (Accessed September 2008)
19
Jang Ha-jin, Minister of Gender Equality of Korea, released a statement in November 2006 outline
the extent of international marriages in Korea. According to the Minister, in 1990 the international
marriage was 1.6 % however this rate has increased to 13.6% in the cities and up to 1/3 of the total
marriages in farming and fishing villages. http://english.moge.go.kr/index.html (Accessed
September 2008)

7

Japan for work purposes. Fourth, the continued economic gap between Korea andsending countries makes Korea an attractive destination for migrant workers. Fifth, thecontinued dearth in potential spouses in the Korean countryside has created a niche formarriage migration, infusing the Korean countryside with not only foreign brides but
also skyrocketing numbers of children who belong to international families. 20
Korea and Japan share many similarities when we comparatively examine theirdemographic profiles and the numbers of foreigners continuing to settle in their borders(See Table 3.0). In particular, both countries will experience a reversal of theirrespective population pyramids which will affect their socio-economic prosperity andinternational standing. Also, both countries are also seeing a large influx of foreigners
who present a difficult challenge in terms of how best to integrate them, protect theirlabour rights and from exploitation, and assure that their basic human security needs are
met. They also present a great opportunity as to their role in contributing to the longterm socio-economic prosperity of each respective country.
Table 3.0: Demographic data on Korean and Japan through to 205021
Japan
Total Population
Foreign Resident Population
Percentage of
total population
Number of overstayers
Projected % of population
2010
2020
2050
International Marriage Rate
Number of foreign children
Population Growth Rate
Children per familyLife Expectancy
Age structure
0-14 years:
15-64 years:
65 years and over (2008 est.)
Beginning of influx
Rationale

Korea
127,000,000
2,152,973
1.69%

48,846,823
100,254
2.00%

149,785

180,000

no datano data
10.00%
6.60%
No data-0.14%
1.34 (2007female: 85.59 years
male: 78.73 years male

2.80%
5.00%
9.20%
11%
30727
0.39%
1.26 (2007)
female: 80.93 years
male: 73.81 years

13.7% (male 8,926,439/female 8,460,629)
64.7% (male 41,513,061/female 40,894,057)
21.6% (male 11,643,845/female 15,850,388)
Early 80s
3Ds

18.3% (male 4,714,103/female 4,262,873)
72.1% (male 18,004,719/female 17,346,594)
9.6% (male 1,921,803/female 2,794,698) (2007 est.)
Early 90s
3Ds

II.
Social Integration and Migration Practices in Korea and JapanThe recognition of the need to develop social integration and migration policy in Japanand Korea has had different roots. In the case of Japan, bottom-up and local government
movements such as the Kanagawa Prefectural government led by Governor Nagasu
were instrumental in the development of both social integration policy and therecognition of the challenges faced by foreign residents at the local level. First, it was
the protection of human rights, recognition of needs, and the need for equality of
20

Yoon In JIN (2008) “ The Development and Characteristics of Multiculturalism in South Korea:
With a Focus on the Role of the State and Civil Society,” International Conference on
Multiculturalism in Asia, Korea University, October 10th, 200821

http://www.intute.ac.uk/sciences/cgibin/worldguidecompare.pl?country1=1024&country2=924&country3=%23&country4=%23&submi
t=Compare%21&compare=Population&compare=PopGrowth&compare=PopMig&compare=PopLif
e&compare=AgeStructure&compare=PopBirth&compare=PopDeath&compare=LabourForc(Accessed August 2008)

8

Korean residents that were integral parts of the development of foreign resident policies.
Second, both bottom-up and top-down initiatives contributed to the creation andshaping of foreign resident policy. Bottom-up initiation was exemplified by Koreandemands for equality and access to social welfare programmes, where as top-down
initiatives was exemplified by the recommendations of the then Ministry of Home
Affair’s on so-called local internationalisation and Governor Nagasu’s expansion of theparameters of the people-to-people diplomacy declaration.22 Nagasu believed that local
governments and internationalisation were inextricably linked with the national
government not being able to provide for all the needs of her citizens. This included thebasic needs of citizen security and welfare for all residents of Kanagawa, Japanese andnon-Japanese alike.
In part owing to this local government led and grass-roots activism, in March 2006
Japan’s Ministry of International Affairs and Communications (MIAC) promulgated thePlan for the promotion of Multicultural Coexistence. Its major pillars include: (1)communication assistance; (2) lifestyle assistance; (3) creation of multicultural
coexistence; and (4) establishment of a system to promote multicultural coexistence. 23
The MIAC multicultural coexistence plan’s recommended policies aim to over comesystemic, cultural and language barriers in Japanese society. By overcoming thesesystemic, cultural and language barriers, the MIAC plan is promoting more diverse
social conditions which in turn can be described as a more pluralistic society. Policies
espoused by the MIAC multicultural coexistence plan wed systemic, language andcultural initiatives in an effort to open access to Japanese society and by consequence
weave diversity into the fabric of society in the spheres of housing, education and public
services.
Not withstanding the direction towards more plurality in Japanese society that the
MIAC policy seems to be supporting, it is clear that at the cognitive and emotive levels
that multicultural coexistence as a means of creating a co-identity, as a tool forenhancing a shared national identity based on mutual respect and understanding of
ethno-cultural backgrounds is absent from the MIAC multicultural coexistence policy.
Japan’s Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has also put forth several strategies to manage
Japan’s labour shortage, to maintain its raison d’être of protecting domestic security,and to realise its Japan’s international commitments to economic partnershipagreements. Specifically, the Ministry is advocating the acceptance of foreign workers
in professional areas, the acceptance of high skilled labourers, the acceptance of nonprofessional/ technical acceptance, and demand based acceptance in areas such as
nursing-care. 24 The Ministry of Justice has remained reticent to the idea of more open
policies towards migration stressing “that Japan should not rely on foreign workers,
22

Borrowing Sakamoto Yoshikazu’s principle of Minsai Gaiko( 民 際 外 交 ), Governor Nagasu
advocated a revolution at the local government level in which citizens would become the medium
for international relations. See: Sakamoto, Yoshikazu. "Image of changing Peace" in Asahi Shinbun
1972; Nagasu, Kazuji.1983. Jichitai no Kokusai Kouryu: Hirakarereta Chiho wo Mezashite. Tokyo:
Gakuyoshobo pp. 3-16, 21-23.
23
Soumusho. 2007. Tabunka Kyousei no Suishin ni kan suru Kenkyukai. Japan:Tokyo.
24"2007 Immigration Control," Immigration Control Bureau, Japan, 20089

especially not the unskilled.”25 In fact, the Ministry of Justice prefers to maintain thetemporary nature of migrant labourers which manifests itself as a three year nonrenewable system,26 while boosting immigration procedures to decrease the number offoreigners who come to Japan for work without the appropriate visa qualification. 27
The newest proposed immigration plan 2008 put forth in June 2008 by a group ofconservative LDP lawmakers is the latest attempt to maintain Japan’s economic
competitively and contribute to abating the problems associated with Japan’s population
decline. The immigration proposal includes 5 major tenets: (1) raise population of nonJapanese residents to 10% of total population by 2050; (2) increase number of asylum
seekers accepted to 1000; (3) increase foreign students to 1 million by 2025; (4)Guarantee “better” human rights; and (5) emphasis on accepting immigrants non
foreign labourers (including families). 28 Collectively, the proposal aims to broaden its
acceptance of individuals who can contribute to Japan socio-economically and to those
who have been educated and to some degree already assimilated into Japanese society.
The above three approaches to social integration and migration have different focuses.
The MIAC initiative revolves around a strong focus on communication, lifestyleassistance, multicultural awareness, provision of services on par with Japanese, no roadto citizenship, no national action plan to promote integration at a significant level. The
MOJ on the other hand conceptualises policy related to migrant workers as temporary
and thus no need for long-term investment in social integration programmes. Lastly, thenewly proposed immigration policy attempts to embrace the notion of immigration tocombat Japan’s declining population and labour shortage through a proposed systemthat prioritises those immigrants that are either already partially culturally assimilated
through language or who possess needed human capital to contribute to Japan’s socioeconomic prosperity.
In contrast to Japan’s bottom-up and local government initiated social integration andmigration policies, Korea’s social integration and migration policy development has
been fuelled by three important factors: (1) sudden increase in international marriages;

25

Papademetriou, Demetrios G. and Kimberly A. Hamilton.2000. Reinventing Japan: Immigration’sRole in Shaping Japan’s Future. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.pp.47-48
26
The Asahi Shimbun, May 17th, 2007; Arudou, Debito.2007. “Japan’s Future as an International,
Multicultural Society: From Migrants to Immigrants” in Japan Focus.
http://www.japanfocus.org/_Arudou_DebitoJapan_s_Future_as_an_International__Multicultural_Society__From_Migrants_to_Immigrants/(Accessed February 16th, 2008)27
Beginning November 20th 2007, the Japanese Government began requiring all non-Japaneseentering Japan to be photographed and finger printed as part of their efforts to prevent terrorism anddecrease the number of foreigners come to work illegally in Japan. See outline for new immigration
procedures published by General Affairs Division, Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice
http://www.hk.emb-japan.go.jp/eng/docs/20071024Outline_newImmi_e.pdf (Accessed September
2008)28“ Radical immigration plan under discussion,” The Japan Times, June 19th 2008; “Let 10% ofJapan be foreigners: Nakagawa,” The Japan Times, June 13th, 200810

(2) the rapid rise in foreign residents; and (3) government initiatives to protect the rightsof migrant labourers (legal and illegal) in the early 1990s. 29
International marriages brought to the fore front three important issues related to theneed for social integration and formal migration policies. First, the shear number ofinternational marriages that were occurring in Korea vividly illustrated that Korea wasundergoing a transformation of its ethnic composition from within, requiring policies
that would smoothly integrate spouses of Korean nationals into Korean society. Second,
Korean media revealed the widespread abuse of international spouses prompting the
Korean government to take firm measures to address the plight of a growing number ofwomen settling in Korea. Third, and perhaps more importantly, international marriages
highlighted the educational and social prejudice problems faced by children of mixed
marriages prompting the Korean government to take invocate several plans targeting
issues associated with discrimination and social integration that will be outlined below.
The rapid increase of foreign residents since the 1990s and the associated rampant
abuses of foreign residents ranging from lack of pay for industrial accidents, low wages
and clear violations of the Labour Standard Act in Korea also brought to light thesocietal discrimination faced by foreign residents in Korea. As a result, Korea’s
Ministry of Labour announced initiatives to protect the rights of migrant labourers(legal and illegal) including the enforcement of the Labour Standards Act on companies
that hired illegal foreign workers.30
The above three factors have been instrumental in Korea’s about face approach tomulticulturalism, social integration policy, immigration policy and anti-discrimination
policies since 2004. In 2004 the Ministry of Labour implemented the “Employment
Permit System (EPS)”as a response to foreign migrant workers organising unions toprotect themselves from labour standards violations,.31 Protecting migrant workers fromdiscriminatory wage treatment, the EPS system ensures that migrant labourers do notsettle in Korea by making the EPS a 3-year, non-renewable permit.
The EPS system was then followed by several initiatives directly related to the plight of
spouses and children of international marriages including the 2006 establishment of the“Council for the Protection of Human Rights & Interests of Foreign Nationals”, the2006 Plan for Social Integration of Mixed Bloods and Migrants”, the 2006 “Plan forSocial Integration of Marriage Migrants”, and the 2006 “Basic Act on the Treatment
of Foreigners” (effective July 18, 2007). 32 According to Yoon In-Jin (2008), the29“ Court rules invalid government denial of foreign worker’sright to industrial accident
compensation,” Korea Times January 21st, 1997; Lim. T.C., 2006. “NGOs, transnational Migrants,
and the Promotion of Rights in South Korea,” in Local citizenship in Recent Countries of
Immigration. Tsuda Tatsuyuki (ed.), Oxford: Lexington Books. pp.235-269; Yoon In JIN (2008)« The Development and Characteristics of Multiculturalism in South Korea: With a Focus on theRole of the State and Civil Society,» International Conference on Multiculturalism in Asia, Korea
University, October 10th, 2008
30
Ministry of Labour Press Release, October 14th 1998
31
Immigration Bureau Publications, " Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice. 2008.
32
Immigration Bureau Publications, " Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice. 2008.

11

promulgation of these initiatives were impart a result of several factors including the2006 announcement by the Ministry of Government Affairs and Home Affairs
announces “that South Korea is rapidly becoming a multiracial and multicultural society
and“the transformation of S. Korea into a multiracial and multicultural society cannot
be stopped.” 33 Other scholars such as Kim Hee Jung have a more sinister explanation
for these policies, specifically rather than targeting and protecting the human rights andtreatment of all foreign residents, these policies in fact only target a very small numberof foreign residents who belong to the Korean household through marriage. 34
Despite the more pessimistic interpretations of recent social integration, human rights
and immigration initiatives by the Korean government, I argue that the strong adherence
to the Labour Standards Act in 1997, the legislation of the “Basic Act on the Treatment
of Foreigners” in November 2006 and the establishment of the Council for Protection of
Human Rights and Interests of Foreign Nationals are the strongest evidence supporting
Korea’s shift to towards social integration and migration policies that protect migrant
workers using the same labour standards as those for Koreans. The initiatives also
include the strong anti-discrimination measures, advocacy for the protect of humanrights, and the inculcation of stronger multicultural awareness education programmessuch as the recently announced “Overcoming Prejudice against Different Cultures”
curriculum put firth by the Ministry of Education and Human Development.
III.
Potential Areas of cooperation
In arguing that it is in the interest of Korea and Japan to cooperate in the areas of humansecurity I will borrow from Robert Scalapino who conceptualises integration into three
conflictual forces: (1) communalism; (2) nationalism; and (3) internationalism.35 At thecommunalism level, Scalapino asserts that cooperation can be based on shared ethnicity,
affiliation or regional identity. 36 In the case of Japan and Korea, local governments,
grass-root organizations, churdhs, and even unions have strong, established trackrecords of cooperating transnationality, even at times at odds with respective national
governments. Good examples include regional organisations such as the Northern Region
Hokkaido/ Concept( 北 方 圏 構 想 ) 37 Economic exchange/ network, and municipal
diplomacy, 38 and recently the joint workshop held by the ILO apropos
33“Immigration Bureau Publications, " Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice. 2008.
Kim, Hee Jung. 2007. “Korea’s Government-led Multiculturalism: Theories of Multiculturalism
and their application, ” in Korea’s Multiculturalism: reality and Issues. Seoul: Hanul Academy.
35
Scalapino, R.1999. “Northeast Asia at a Historical Turning Point,” in Politics and Economics inNortheast Asia: Nationalism and Regionalism. Tsuneo Akaha (ed.). New York: St. Martens. pp. xixxii.
36
Ibid.
37
http://www.pref.hokkaido.jp/soumu/sm-tksai/nforum/rekishi%20hongenkou.files/rekishisaishu.htm（Accessed September 5th, 2004）
Geographically Hokkaido is located in an ideal and significant location in the northern hemisphere.
With that understanding in mind Hokkaido believes it has an important role in Japan as an exchangebase with countries located in the northern hemisphere, facilitating further prosperity anddevelopment
38
Hanekai Masami, Oozawa Hiroshi.1994.Jichitai Gaiko ni Chosen Chiiki no Jiritsu kara Kokusai
Kouryu no Keiseo he. Tokyo. Akashi Shoten. Pp.1-41
34

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internationalising labour standards.39 With this in mind, I portend that cooperation in
the sphere of human security which includes human and labour rights, between Korea
and Japan can and should proceed first in the communitarian sense, to strengthen
current social integration and migration polices, and approaches to labour and humanrights as well as human-security. The rational for cooperation at this level is that it bypasses much of the challenges outlined by Frost (2008) to integration such as borderdisputes, differences in historical interpretations and a host of other obstacles tocooperation at high levels. 40
First in the area of labour rights, labour protection of all workers rights in both countries
is a useful example of potential communitarian based cooperation between Japan and
Korea.41 Both the RENGO (Japanese Trade Union Confederation), and the KOILAF(Korean International Labour foundation) are strong proponents of ensuring that thelabour rights of all foreign workers are protected. RENGO official’s stance vis-à-vis
foreign workers is as follows:“All individuals working in Japan should be subject to labour laws
and regulations guaranteeing proper working conditions andoccupational health and safety standards, and be protected by labourand social insurance schemes. Even if foreign workers are illegal, in
violation of the Immigration Act, and are thus engaging inunauthorized work, their human rights should be observed equallywith those of Japanese. Also, as a matter of course, they should be
subject to Japanese labour laws and regulations and should be given
protection under labour and social insurance schemes.”42This protective stance related to foreign workers resonates well with the enforcement of
the Korea’s Labour Standards Act in 1997 for employers of foreign migrants but alsowith KOILAF’s stance on foreign migrant workers:“To protect the basic labor rights of foreign migrant workers, we
provide labor relations education and grievance counseling to leadersof migrant worker communities and counselors of civil support
organizations.”
With congruent views on the labour rights of foreign workers within each country’s
respective border, I contend that there is a foundation for cooperation in thecommunitarian sense to lobby each union’s respective government to more strongly
advocate labour rights for migrant workers and to fortify their social integration

39

See Federation of Korean Trade Unions website: http://www.efktu.or.kr/~fktueng/ (Accessed
August 2008)40
Frost, Ellen, L. 2008.” Current Obstacles and Potential Threats,” in Asia‘s New Regionalism.
Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner. pp.217-231.
41
http://www.jilaf.or.jp/English-jilaf/seminar/index.html (Accessed September 2008)
42
See RENGO homepage: http://www.jtuc-rengo.org/specialtopics/foreignworkers03.html(Accessed September 2008)13

programmes so that foreign workers can be more productive, even if the length of theirstay may be limited.
Owing to the structural dependence on foreign labour in both countries, labour union’sin Korea and Japan also can have a key role in ensuring a steady supply of reliable
foreign labour for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) by creating attractive
working environments which not only pay well compared to sending countries, but arealso attractive because of their strong advocacy of labour rights, human rights andhuman-security issues. 43 In this light, stronger cooperation between unions in bothcountries can broaden and increase the quality of labour and human rights for migrant
workers, decrease exploitation of migrant workers while contributing to maintaining
economic productivity of each respective country. I would add that strong advocacy at
the transnational level not only protects the labour and human rights of migrant labours
in the receiving country, but also protects the labour and human rights of Japanese andKorean citizens while working in each others countries.
According to Lim (2004), Japanese and Korean labour unions such as the Zentoitsu
Labour Union (ZWU) and the Labour Pastoral Center (LPC) have been effective insecuring labour rights of foreign migrants by appealing to international labour standards
set forth by the ILO.44 However successful both unions have been in securing labour
rights and subsequently a component of human security for migrant workers, thebureaucratic agencies and employers still can ignore or subvert these progressive
approaches to protecting of labour rights because of what Lim argues, the lack of a
judicial body that can enforce, rather than just persuade parties to abide by labour
standards. 45
Despite the challenge of a judicial body which cannot enforce labour standards, I reason
that labour unions in both countries still have a vested interest in cooperating with eachother to protect the labour rights of all workers for several reasons. Firstly, cooperationin the area of protecting labour rights ensures that businesses do not opt for cheap
foreign labour in lieu of more expensive domestic labour, thus securing their own
employment. Secondly, broader cooperation between unions may enhance each union’s
ability to lobby their own respective government in terms of bringing to light the abusesand exploitation of migrant and non-migrant workers.
The second potential area of communitarian cooperation is at the local government level.
Korean and Japanese local governments are often the immediate interface for foreign
residents with each respective society. Upon arrival in area country, foreign residents
register at the local government in which they reside. This registration process them
43

According the “Direction for the Implementation of the National Policy for Labor Affairs”, Korea
is already considering increasing the upper limit of the number of foreign migrant workers to
132,000 per year to combat the labour shortage in SMEs. See: “Direction for the Implementation of
the National Policy for Labor Affairs” Ministry of Labour 2008”. p.10
44Lim. T.C., 2006. “NGOs, transnational Migrants, and the Promotion of Rights in South Korea,” in
Local citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration. Tsuda Tatsuyuki (ed.), Oxford: Lexington
Books. pp.235-269.
45
Ibid.

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make them eligible for social welfare, pensions, health care and in many cases
multilingual advisory services to help foreigners navigate through administrative
procedures, legal questions etc. Because of the division of labour between the national
and local governments, local governments have been the primary administrative bodies
building the infrastructure to socially integrate foreign residents. These policies translate
into communication assistance, language training, culture training, lifestyle assistance,
multilingual information services, anti-discrimination awareness education, andcounseling for newcomers. 46
Here, Japanese local governments have a potential leadership role. I maintain thatJapanese local governments can and should share with their Korean counterparts theirextensive successful and unsuccessful social integration strategies that have been indevelopment since the early 80s. In particular, the Hamamatsu Declaration, with its
focus on education, social security and the revamping of foreign registration have atreasure trove of valuable suggestions on how to better integrate foreign residents into
local communities. 47 Specifically, the Hamamatsu Declaration offers substantive
strategies to deal with education issues faced by the children of migrant workers, thechildren of international marriages and the establishment of language classes to equip
foreign residents with the language and cultural skills they need to improve their life
while in Japan. The declaration also offers also concrete strategies to cooperation withmedical organisations, NPOs, NGOs, and other volunteer groups, consider creating asystem where non-Japanese residents can avail themselves of multilingual medical careand information with peace of mind.
Similarly, other municipalities with multicultural coexistence plans such as Shinjuku
Ward, Adachi Ward and Tachikawa City located in the Tokyo Metropolis are wellsituated to share their well developed multicultural coexistence plans which have beendeveloped to take meet each local governments particular needs. They have developed
integration strategies which to different degrees focus on cultural, structural, interactive
and identificational integration.
Where as the Japanese local government strength relies on more developed social
integration strategies in accordance with their longer experience with foreign residents,
Korean non-governmental organisations offer a third potential opportunity forcommunitarian based cooperation. In this case, I assert that Korean non-governmentalorganisations can take the lead in social integration of foreign residents by sharing theirexperience in: (1) coordination with NPOs, unions and church groups to facilitate social
integration; and (2) strong advocacy of the protection of the human rights of foreign
residents which includes labour rights and protection against other kinds of exploitation.
In the case of coordination with NPOs, unions and church groups to facilitate social
integration, Seol and Skrentny (2004) and Yoon (2008), assert that non-governmentalgroups form strong lobby groups which not only influence the direction of policy
development vis-à-vis foreign residents, but also provide a plethora of services to46“Kankoku Shakai wo Torimaki Saikin no Shojosei,” Jichitai Kokusaika Fuo-ramu May 2007
See Hamamatsu Declaration (Hamamatsu Declaration):
http://www.debito.org/hamamatsusengen.html (Accessed September 2008)
47

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foreign residents. For example, citizen-led multiculturalism (Yoon 2008) manifests
itself as citizen led NPOs and religious groups who assist foreign residents, marriage
migrants and children of international marriages. Activities are broad in scope but
include the establishment of migrant women’s counseling centers such as the Solidarity
for Migrant Human Rights and the Joint Committee of Migrant Workers’ in Korea. 48 In
each case, human rights, labour rights and the protection from exploitation are the major
tenets of these organisations and I argue another potential area of cooperation that canbe leverage to broader integration between Korea and Japan.
Japan’s relative dearth in citizen-led multiculturalism and advocacy groups for foreign
residents may have much to learn from their Korean counterparts. With shared views on
human rights, labour rights and protection from exploitation, Japanese nongovernmental organisations could find their Korean colleagues to be useful partners in
helping them promote their agenda to local and state governments, but also in the areasof organisation and experience in inculcating international standards into their rhetoricin order to put pressure on concerned parties.
The benefit of cooperation at the communitarian level between non-governmentalorganisations is several fold. First, sharing resources and expertise allows both partners
to enhance their domestic agenda. Simply, they can harness and learn from thesuccesses and failures of each partner’s experience to refine and strengthen domestic
initiatives. For example, Korean non-governmental organizations have utilised theplight of marriage migrants and international children to broaden the human rights,
labour rights and human security agenda such that it applies to all foreigners in Korea.
Second, cooperation at the grass-root level by-passes many of the inherent barriers tocooperation that exist at the state-to-state level including those espoused by Ellen Frost(2008). Third, because of the more nebulous and apolitical nature of people-to-people
cooperation at the non-governmental organisation level, there is room to broaden
cooperation beyond solely Korean and Japan.
IV. Conclusion
Both Korea and Japan are seeing a rapid transformation of their ethnic composition
resulting from low birth rates, aging populations, migration and international marriages.
These North East Asian neighbours are also facing many similar challenges as a resultof shared demographic challenges, structural dependency on foreign labour sources, andinternational marriages. Challenges include the best manner in which to integrate these
newcomers so that they can contribute to their new founds homes. Human rights andlabour rights protection are also important challenges to be overcome in both countries.
Policies that prevent the abuse of newcomers, migrant workers, non-ethnic spouses andexploitation are areas that both nations can and should find areas to cooperate.
In arguing that Korea and Japan can and should cooperate in the area of human security
Using Scalapino’s concept of integration at the commanitarian level, I demonstrated that48

Yoon In JIN (2008) “ The Development and Characteristics of Multiculturalism in South Korea:
With a Focus on the Role of the State and Civil Society,” International Conference on
Multiculturalism in Asia, Korea University, October 10th, 200816

that there already exists ample opportunity for Korea and Japan to cooperate at the nongovernmental organisation, local government and the labour union level to deal withtrans-border migration, securing human and labour rights as well as human security ingeneral. This paper showed that it is in the interest of labour unions to cooperate, as it
not only secures the rights and prosperity of foreign migrant workers but also it also
secures their own employment prospects by ensuring that SMEs do not engage indiscriminatory employment practices that favour migrant workers because they do not
fall under labour standard acts.
On the Japanese side, local governments and their initiatives in the area of social
integration, human rights protection is also a realm ripe for cooperation. The experienceand more developed social integration policies vis-à-vis foreign residents that alreadyexist in Japan can and should be valuable learning devices for Korean counterparts onwhat programmes are effective ways to integrate foreign residents.
Conversely, Korean non-governmental organisations have shown leadership andeffectiveness in developing support programmes that secure human and labour rights aswell as protect foreign residents, marriage migrants and children from international
marriages from marginalization and or exploitation.
Although a considerable vacuum exists at the national level in terms of cooperation thatwould contribute to broader integration in the area, I maintain that integration between
these two neighbours can proceed and the commanitarian level in the area of humansecurity, human rights and labour rights protection. Being based on shared values,
maintaining prosperity of citizens and non-citizens, and efforts to achieve international
standards in the areas of labour and human rights and human security, this initial seed ofcooperation at the non-state level can provide a strong foundation for broader
integration.

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