ASEAN‟s response to the Changes of the US andChinese foreign policy to the ARF

Satoshi MARUYAMAPhD Candidate: Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies[Abstract]
This paper examines the changes of the US and Chinese foreign policy to the
ARF and ASEAN‟s reaction to the changes. The two powers are indispensablefactors for the establishment of the ARF and sustainable stability in the Asia Pacificregion. The two powers‟ ways of utilizing the security forum have gradually become
similar in the point that they has participated pro-actively in the forum. Yet there
are significant differences of use of the ARF between them. One the one hand, theUnited States had requested more institutionalized and active ARF while started tohave an idea on a new security framework in East Asia that might overlap the roleof the ARF. On the other hand, China has gradually concentrated on improvementof CBMs that might not disturb its crucial security issue such as Taiwan Strait andthen South China Sea. While such big powers‟ involvement has occurred, ASEAN
has adhered to the ASEAN Way and has not failed to manage the ARF.

Introduction

In 1994, ASEAN held inaugural ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting whereparticipants exchanged their opinions on various security issues in the Asia Pacificregion. The primary and principal purpose of the forum was to deal with theuncertainty of Asia Pacific security which had emerged from the demise of the Cold1

War. Regarding the uncertainty, main concern of ASEAN states was future conduct
of two states in the region, the United States and China. The Dominant power inthe Asia Pacific region, the United States‟ political and military involvement has
been recognized as important factor for Southeast Asian security during the Cold
War. As another significant actor in the region, China has been increasing its
economic and political influence over the world. Saying more, China has been had
territorial dispute with ASEAN states on the South China Sea. Hence, ASEAN
states have sought to maintain US presence in Southeast Asia by both individualand collective ways while engaging flexibly with rising China.
So far, ASEAN has seemed to achieve its objectives of establishment of the ARF
because the United States and China have participated in the forum for 15 years.
However, the principle of management of the ARF is still controversial. On this acertain level of success, the application of the ASEAN Way that consists ofconsensus decision making, informality, principle of non-interference, andmaintaining comfortable pace of development for all participants can be regarded asa reasonable factor. Besides, ASEAN„s driving role in the ARF and the application of
the ASEAN Way to the ARF are expected to manage balance of power in the region
by spreading a norms of restraint among the ARF members from long term
perspective1. In contrast with the positive argument above, some researchers on the
stance of realism points out negatively that the ARF which has been driven by
ASEAN is not appropriate institution for Asia-Pacific security. They say that the
ASAEN Way is not simply applicable to the ARF where external big and middle
power states participate with ASEAN members that can be said as weaker powers
than them2.
The objective of this paper is to explore how big powers foreign policy influences
the characteristic of the ARF. Changes of US and Chinese foreign policy to the ARF
and reaction of ASEAN to these changes will be examined.
This paper consists of four sections: introduction; three sections on the foreign
policy of the United States and China; and conclusion. In the first section, present
situation of the ARF and the reasons for existence of the forum are demonstrated.
In the second section, US foreign policy to the ARF is examined with mentioning US
1

Amitav Acharya.2001. “Constructing a security community in SE Asia” Chapter 6 inConstructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem ofregional order. London; New York: Routledge 184.
2

See, Shaun Narine.1997. “ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the “ASEAN Way””

Asian Survey 37:10. and Yoneji Kuroyanagi. 2003. ASEAN 35 nen no kiseki: „ASEAN
Way‟ no koyo to genkai. Tokyo: Yushindokobunsya
2

incentives to participate in the regional security dialogue framework. The dominant
power in the region has utilized the forum to while it has kept its bilateral relations
with Asian states and Then, Chinese foreign policy to the ARF is elaborated.
Generally speaking, China has proactively participated in the ARF to reassureneighbor states and prevent the forum from evolving into coercive institution
against national behavior. Next, ASEAN‟s reactions to the changes of US andChinese foreign policy follow. Finally, the common points and differences of the two
big powers‟ foreign policy to the ARF are demonstrated as the conclusion of thispaper.

ASEANS‟ Cooperative Security framework
On 24 July 2008, 15th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which had been held
annually since 1994 was convened in Singapore. 26 countries and European Union(EU) participated in it and both traditional and non-traditional security issues in
the Asia Pacific region were discussed by them 3 . For instance, as traditional
security issues, missile and nuclear development in North Korea, territorial disputeon the South China Sea, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction(WMD) were listed on the Chairman‟s statement. Regarding, non-traditional
security challenges, counterterrorism, disaster relief, transnational crimes, andmaritime security in the Strait of Malacca and so on were noted in the statement.
The ARF is defined as comprehensive security framework by the expansion of
security agendas that are discussed in the forum4. Each government sends its
foreign minister or an equivalent of that and senior officials to the ARF.
As its name shows, the ARF is a forum that does not have coercive power toparticipant states but improve interaction and information exchange among
participants. The two fundamental objectives of the ARF agreed in its augural
meeting are: “to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political andsecurity issues of common interest and concern”; “to make significant contributions
to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia pacific
ASEAN 10, Australia, Canada, China, EU, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,
ROK, Russia, The United States India (1996), Mongolia (1998), DPRK (2000), Pakistan(2004), Timor Leste(2005) ,Bangladesh(2006), and Sri Lanka(2007) attended.
4 Julie Gilson. 2007. “Regionalism and security in East Asia” (in) Anthony Burke andMatt Mcdonald (eds.) Critical Security in the Asia Pacific UK: Manchester University
Press, 232-33
33

region”5. These objectives also demonstrated in the 1995 second ARF by adopting
the Concept Paper. In the paper, the development of the ARF is divided into threestages: “Promotion of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)”; “Preventive
Diplomacy (PD)”; and “Conflict Resolution”6.
As of the beginning of 2009, the ARF is on the stage between promotion of CBMs
and PD, which means that the participants has not fully prepared to reach at PD
yet. The ARF adopted the Concept Paper of Preventive Diplomacy and defined thedefinition of PD applied only to the ARF with articulating CBMs 7 . However,concrete development in this area has not appeared. Besides, regarding to the ARF‟sthird stage, “Conflict Resolution”, even conceptual discussion has not started 8.
While the development of the ARF stage has been gradually (or slowly) done,
institutions of the ARF regarding to improvement of mutual understanding havebeen arranged. The enhancement of the role of ARF Chairman, institution ofEminent Expert Persons Group, and incorporation of the ARF Unit in the ASEAN
Secretariat were set for increase of information exchange. In addition, new security
dialogues under the ARF framework were set. ARF Security Policy Conference(ASPC) and ARF Defense Officials Dialogue demonstrate recent development of
CBMs in the ARF.
The ARF is managed by “the ASEAN Way” that has been key principles of
ASEAN since 1967. The components of the ASEAN Way are: informal and gradualapproach to cooperation while rejecting rigid rules and procedures; the principles of
non-interference in internal affairs; decision making through consensus; and5

Chairman‟s Statement The First Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum 1994. And

According to the objectives, the ARF has set up various Inter - Sessional Meeting (ISM)
depending on participants‟ requests that comes from international situation, In theISMs, a certain security issues are discussed by government staffs For instance, ISM on
Counter- Terrorism, Disaster Relief, and Peace-Keeping Operation are there. ASEAN

Regional Forum List of Track 1 Activities Year 1994-2008 (Classified by Subject)“CBMs” includes: Dialogue on security perception; defense publications; participation
in UN Conventional Arms Register and so on in short term. Over medium and long term,
for instance, Maritime security information bases, establishment of zone of cooperation,and mechanism to mobilise relief assistance in the event of natural disaster are
included. The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper 1995
7 PD in the ARF is defined as “consensual diplomatic and political action taken bysovereign states with the consent of all directly involved parties”. Its subject is toprevent disputes and conflicts arising from States that could potentially pose a threat toregional peace and stability. ASEAN Regional Forum Concept and Principles ofPreventive Diplomacy 2001
8 There is a difference of expression on this matter. While it is noted as “Conflict
Resolution” in the Concept Paper 1994, it is noted as “elaboration of approaches toconflicts” in the second ARF Chairman‟s Statement.
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nonuse of force9. The principles of the ASEAN Way are reflected in the Treaty ofAmity and Cooperation signed in 1976: (1) Mutual respect for the independence,sovereignty, territorial integrity of all nations; (2) The right of every state to lead its
national existence free from external interference, subversion, and coercion; (3)Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; (4) Settlement of differencesand disputes by peaceful means; (5) Renunciation of the threat of use of force. The
reason why the ASAEAN Way has been adopted is that ASEAN states have had toconcentrate on national development since their independences. Unstable domestic
situation of each Southeast Asian state with delayed economic development andcomplex social situation where consisted of various religion and ethnic groups
needed stable inter-state relations in the region. “The ASEAN Way” has given
ASEAN states the basis of mutual trust and enabled them to concentrate on its
economic and social development without anxiety on interference from other
ASEAN states.
The establishment of the ARF was initiated by ASEAN countries although othercountries in the Asia Pacific region presented their own suggestion on a new
security framework. The forum was instituted on the basis of the ASEAN‟s political
relationship with its 7 dialogue partners of ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference(PMC) which were the Australia, China, the Europe Union, India, Japan, Russia,
and the United States. Although Australia, Canada, and Japan proposed on ahead
to establish a security organization in Asia pacific region that is more
institutionalized than the ARF in the beginning of the 1990‟s, these proposals did
not realize because of persistent skepticism among states concerned inclusive
ASEAN member countries.
The primary reason why the ARF was established is to cope with theuncertainty of Asia Pacific security environment which was expected to emerge
from the demise of the Cold War. Especially among ASEAN states who sat driver‟sseat of the ARF, they held two big concerns in the world after the Cold War; future
conduct of the dominant United States and rising China. First concern was how theUnited States would redefine security environment of the Asia pacific region andreconsider its foreign policy to the region. The US decided to reduce its
forward-based military presence in 1990.The Bush administration agreed American
withdrawal from Philippine base in 1991 as part of decrease of US deployment allover the world.
Hiro Katsumata 2006. “Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum: constructing a„talking shop‟ or a „norm brewery‟?” The Pacific Review 19:2 188.
95

Whichever only political or both political and military meanings, however,
ASEAN states of the Cold War period shared the same viewpoint that the US
presence in Southeast Asia region contribute to the stability of the region 10. Yet it
should be pointed out that there was difference of extent on desired US involvement
among ASEAN states in around the end of the Cold War. Singapore, Thailand, andPhilippine favored a strong relationship with the United States in military realm.
Thailand and Philippine were allied with the United States during the Cold War.
Singapore did not have an alliance with but cooperated in military fields, especiallymaritime security area. In contrast, Indonesia and Malaysia of ASEAN disliked
excessive US political and military involvement to Southeast Asia and they strived
to strengthen regional resilience since ASEAN established11.
The other concern for ASEAN on the future Southeast Asian security is the riseof China. Their concern was related to Chinese military enhancement, increase ofpolitical influence, and rapid economic growth. However, in political security realm,
how China responds the power vacuum in Southeast Asia that appeared from thedemise of pressure of Soviet Union distress strongly ASEAN states. Even during theCold War when Soviet Union, China and the US mutually supervised, China did nothide its territorial ambition to Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. China andsome ASEAN states has had territorial dispute on the area and Chinese action got
aggressive since the end of the 1980‟s. Besides, in 1992 after the Cold War, China
instituted a Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of People‟s
Republic of China in which the regarded the territory as China‟s. This Chinesepolitical action threatened ASEAN states concerned. Besides, in the same year,
China navy set up a territorial sign on a reef of Spratly Islands and ASEAN‟sconcern on the territory additionally rose.
As illustrated above, the motivations for the establishment of the ARF are basedon ASEAN‟s fear on US excessive withdrawal from Southeast Asia and Chinese
aggressive action in the region. It can surely be said that other states in the Asia
Pacific region such as Canada, Australia, Japan, and even the United States had
motive to construct new security institution whichever the one is institutionalized
strongly or weakly. Because, they also strived to deal with the security uncertainty
hanging in the Asia Pacific region as ASEAN states did. The number of ARF
Renato Cruz De Castro. 2000. “Managing Strategic Unipolarity: the ASEAN States‟
Responses to the Post Cold-War Regional environment” (in) Southeast Asian
Perspectives on Security. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 62-63.
11 Tobias Nischalke. 2002. “Does ASEAN measure up? Post-Cold War diplomacy and theidea of regional community” The Pacific Review 15:1 95.
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participants has increased since 1994 and then political interaction among themhas been articulated. Yet since its establishment, the importance of US and Chinese
factor has not decreased. Future viability of the ARF depends on to what extent the
ARF can prevent from troublous relationship between the two states heightening
more12.

The U.S. foreign policy to the ARF
In the early 1990‟s, the United States had political incentives to participate in
the ARF. Firstly, by getting involved in regional multilateral security framework,
the United States sought to maintain and show its political presence in the region.
Secondly, the Unites States regarded the forum as tools for increasing engagementwith China.
The US involvement in multilateral security framework was triggered by theend of the Cold War and crucial regional security issues left, especially the rise of
China. During the Cold War, the US alliance network in Asia and balance of power
between Soviet Union and the United States formed by the network shaped theregional security. Under the bipolar security during the Cold War, There is little
room for multilateral security framework in the Asia Pacific region.
However, the demise of the bipolar order made the United States reconsider its
front-force deployment in the Asia Pacific. Under Bush‟s administration, as noted
above, the government planed US military retreat from the region. The importanceof the US alliance network in the region did not changed and was put in the centerof US East Asian strategy. But, at the same time, a multilateral security institution
was also regarded as an important supplementary venue for bilateral relations.
While decreasing the US military presence in the region, the United Statessought to maintain its legitimacy of US involvement in the region‟s politics. Demiseof clear threat might reduce legitimacy of US political presence in the region. The
United States needed to a new framework to support and advocate US involvement
even after the Cold War. Then, multilateral framework is thought as realistic tool toachieve the goal.
Besides, the United States had crucial security issues whose deterioration

Cameron J. Hill and William T. Tow. 2002. “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Material
and Ideational Dynamics” Reconfiguring East Asia: Regional Institutions andOrganizations after the Crisis. London: RoutledgeCurzon. 179.
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might damage US national security interests; nuclear development in the Korean
Peninsula (proliferation of nuclear weapon); freedom of navigation in the South
China Sea; Taiwan straits; and related to the adjacent issues, rising China13. The
ARF Chairman‟s statements for 15 years in which those security issues except
Taiwan Straits has been noted in most of all the Chairman‟s statements show the
US attention to them. To get obtain good management and solution for those issues,
multilateral approach was regarded as useful supplementary and sustainable way.
The Secretary of State James Baker presented such idea in his article published in

Foreign affairs14.
The United States has confronted with China on the Taiwan issue for long time.
Since the end of Clinton‟s administration which took “constructive engagement”
policy to China, the United States has gradually taken strategic engagement policy.
There are three variants of US engagement to China: a bilateral approach by whichescalated tension is avoided and highlights negotiation for resolving solution; amultilateral approach to promote China‟s participation to international institution
and request her to be as a responsible player; and long-term cooperative
relationship with China15.
Again, back to the ARF as revenue for legitimizing US foreign policy in the Asia
Pacific region, the characteristics of the ARF management, decision making basedon consensus and tendency to avoid an issue that might increase tension among
participants, disturbed US strife. Regarding to the Theatre Missile Defense (TMD)
system for its allies in Asia that the U.S. was working on, China complained
strongly against the plan. The U.S. explained the necessity of the Missile defense
system as the U.S. had to meet the fear of North Korean long range missile program.
Yet China feared that the missile shields could increase Taiwan‟s defensive
capability. In addition, China, with Russia, condemned that the missile system
might bolster arms race in the Asia Pacific and even ASEAN states, especially
Vietnam, were also skeptical about the ideas16. Then, the issue has not been notedin the ARF Chairman‟s statement.
After the tragic terror attack in the United States in September 11, 2001, The
Evelyn Goh. 2004. “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asianstrategy” The Pacific Review 17:1 58.
14 James A. Baker (1991/2). “American in the Asia: emerging architecture for a Pacificcommunity” Foreign Affairs 70:5 1-18.
15 Robert S.Ross. 1999. “Engagement in US China policy” (in) Alastair Iain Johnston
and Robert S. Ross (eds.)Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power.
London: Routledge. 183-185
16 The Strait Times (Singapore) July 28, 2000
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ARF has concentrated on anti-terrorism. Every ARF of since 2002, the ARF
participants have discussed anti-terrorism as the Chairman‟s statements shows. As
the result of strong involvement in the Middle East and War against Iraq, theUnited States under Bush‟s administration frequently downplayed and depreciatedthe importance of the security dialogue in the ARF17. Anti-terrorism has becomecommon interests among the ARF participants and changed the Sino-US
relationship more constructive18.
The United States which had demonstrated its favor for institutionalized andactual cooperation framework since the beginning of 1990‟s launched recently
concrete cooperation in the ARF framework. In 2007, Christopher Hill, the assistant
Secretary of State expressed US desire to develop that kind of cooperation in the
ARF and the field of disaster relief was a suitable option for the development. In
2004, destructive earthquake and Tsunami hit Indonesia and other its neighborstate was the background of this idea19. The US proposal for a disaster relief force is
one clear indication of American engagement in the region20. Then, at the next ARF,
ARF participants agreed on revolving the ARF from mere dialogue institution into
the one with concrete operations.21 Singapore Declaration adopted in the fifteenth
ARF of 2008 is the first joint declaration in the 15-years history of the ARF. The
declaration said that ARF participants would commit to undertake concrete andpractical cooperation in the common interest realm 22。As the future cooperation
fields, disaster relief, non-proliferation, Peace Keeping Operation (PKO), andmaritime security are considered. When it comes to maritime security, the safety ofStrait of Malacca which is the important sea lane for ARF participants was paid
Condoleezza Rice was absent from the 14th ARF in 2007 as She put the visits to Egypt
and Iraq ahead of the forum. But, the representative of the United States was sent to
the forum instead of her. Financial Times August 1, 2007. It was her second absencefrom the forum and first time is the 12th ARF in 2005.
18 Jia Qingguo 2003. “The impact of 9-11 on Sino-US relations: a preliminary
assessment” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol.3 171-173.
19 The Strait Times (Singapore) August 1, 2007
20 The same perspective is shared with Australian government. The Australia‟s Prime
Minister Kebin Rudd, Now let's jump across the pond to Rudd's famous (or infamous)
speech to the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, on April 20: `Seventh, it has
timely deployed the ASEAN Regional Forum for the purpose of developing confidence
and security-building measures across the region. The ARF has spent far too long as aregional talkfest. One practical area where we can begin building CSBMs is in thedevelopment under this ASEAN Regional Forum umbrella of a regionalcounter-disaster co-ordination authority, an Asia-Pacific disaster management
organisation.'' The Australian July 24, 2008
21 Asahi Newspaper July 25, 2008
22 Asahi Newspaper July 24, 2008179

attention. The U.S. and China expressed their recognition that eliminating piracy
in the strait and preserving the sea lane was necessary for stable international
trade. Yet, Malaysia and Indonesia condemned their proposals with regarding themas arrogation23.
In addition to the achievement of non-traditional security cooperation,
long-standing US desire that the ARF will launch a concrete security cooperation
activity has gradually realized. In May 2009, the United States and Philippine
co-hosted the first actual joint exercise under the ARF framework; disaster relief
exercise. The contents of this mile-stone exercise included search and rescue
operations, medical activity, reconstructive of disaster area. The United States,
China, Japan and other Asian states participated in the exercise. The existent ideaon the future actual disaster relief was supported more strongly by the damage of
big cyclone in Myanmar and large-scale earthquake in China happened in 2008.
The United States has utilized the ARF as political opportunity to increase acontact with North Korea. On the sideline of the ARF, US strife for holding themeeting with parties concerned was partly succeeded. According to the proposal
from Malaysia, the United States held unofficial meeting on the North Korean issue
with 5 other six-party talk‟s members except North Korea and ARF participants:
Indonesia, Canada, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand in the 13 th ARF of 200624.
However, an idea appeared in the US government on which the United Statesmight launch into forming a new security framework in the East Asia. The idea is totransform irregular six-party talks framework on the North Korean nuclear
development into a certain kind of permanent organization which is expected tohavesimilarfunctions of Commission

on

Security

andCooperation in

Europe(CSCE) for the region‟s security, which was showed by US Secretary of State,
Condoleezza Rice in 2008 25. This idea is thought in long-term and substantial
practical obstacles: skepticism on the effectiveness of the six-party talks framework
it self; North Korean political system totally different from other six-party‟smembers; and the question how the new permanent security organization will havea linkage with Asian economic groups such as ASEAN plus three or Chiang Mai
Initiative26.

Asahi Newspaper 3 July 2004
Asahi Newspaper 28 July 2006
25 The Strait Times (Singapore) July 25, 2008
23
24
26

Francis Fukuyama. 2005. “Re-Envisioning Asia” Foreign Affairs 84:1 80-83.
10The Chinese foreign policy to the ARF
There are mainly two political incentives for Chinese participation in the ARF:
Firstly, China had to reassure its neighbor and other states that held a feeling of
threat against rising China; Secondly, China strived to softly balance against theUnited States in the Asia Pacific region and prevent the United States fromincreasing its political influence more27.
First, China needed stable relationship with neighboring countries andcomfortable regional security environment to achieve steadily high rate of economic
growth, as well as to aggrandize its political presence in the world. Over the 1980s
and the 1990s, the number of Chinese participation into international security
institutions started to increase dramatically 28. There was a fundamental strategy
that China would participate actively in and give a proposal to the forum as long as
those activities do not prevent Chinese political conducts 29.
Especially regarding to Sino-ASEAN relationship, since Tiananmen incident in
1989, China was imposed economic sanctions by European states and Japan so that
China wanted to improve political relationship and economic cooperation with
ASEAN. ASEAN states regarded the event as an internal affair and stood on theprinciple of non-interference that is also one of the important factors of the ASEAN
Way30.
When it comes to political relationship with ASEAN states, China has had
territorial dispute on the South China Sea. Although China had already attended
the workshops on resolution for the territorial dispute which were chaired byIndonesia which was non- concerned state, China additionally tried to increase theopportunity to contact with parties concerned by participating in the ARF. Besides,
China has sought to make a better political relationship with ASEAN. China
acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in the ASEAN-China summit in
October 2003 as well as India did in the ASEAN-India summit.
China has been basically eager to maintain the South China Sea dispute as
bilateral issue with ASEAN states and resisted to the United States which tried to
Kuroyanagi also noted these two Chinese incentives and added third factor: brakeagainst enhancement of US-Japan alliance. Kuroyanagi (2003) 103.
28 Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans. 1999. ”China and multilateral security
institutions,” in Engaging China: The management of emerging power. Alastair Iain
and Robert S. Ross (eds.) London: Routledge. 238.
29 Chinese foreign minister, Qian Qichen, stated that they would utilize all helpful
factors. Asahi Newspaper July 26th 1994.
30 Tobias Nischalke. 2002. 96.
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interfere with the dispute. The United States requested the freedom of navigationin the area and that the territorial issues should be dealt with as multilateralframework. Yet China fiercely opposed the US and said in the second ARF that the
dispute had been already discussed in ASEAN States –China relationship31. Both of
China and ASEAN has had incentives to avoid the situation in the South China Sea
more vulnerable because of considered rewards of continued peace in terms of
security and economic realms32.
In the ARF Chairman‟s statements, the importance and the progress of
ASEAN-China agreement on the South China Sea has been confirmed. Declarationof the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea adopted in 2002 requested
restraint to the parties concerned. The continuous confirm of regional code of
conduct in the multilateral framework has been expected to facilitate the adoptionof actual code of conduct.
Second Chinese main incentive to participate in the ARF is to utilize the ARF
for soft balancing against the United States in the Asia Pacific politics. Chinese
rapid economic growth and subsequent increasing military capability were enoughto make international society recognize China as rising power against US
dominance in the region. Yet China has not hoped to conflict directly with US.
Actually, there are scenarios in which relatively weaker China use its military
power against the United States and that will emerge from US excessiveintervention against China or US military decline 33 . However, There is little
tendency of Chinese hard balancing against the United States because China hasneeded to cooperation with the United States for economic and militarymodernization34.
In initial period of the ARF, China was not pro-active to participate in the forum
because the future direction of the ARF and the usefulness of the forum to China
were still unclear. Especially, China held suspicion that the ARF might be ruled by
US political influence, deal with Taiwan issue, and set certain binding rule or norm
to states. The anxiety made China absent from Council for Security Cooperation in
the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) meeting until its third meeting which was important track
two meeting of the ARF although China has attended all ARF meetings since 1994.
31

Asahi Newspaper 2nd August 1995

Michael G. Gallagher 1994. “China‟s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea”
International Security 19:1, 193-194
33 Thomas J. Christensen. 2001.”Posing Problems without Catching up: China‟s Rise
and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy” International Security 25:4 14-21.
34 Peter Van Ness. 2002. “Hegemony, not anarchy: why China and Japan are notbalancing US unipolar power” International Relations of the Asia Pacific Vol.2 140-1433212However, China started to get involved in the CSCAP after being released fromthose doubts by keeping its participation in the ARF.
China gradually participated in the ARF with proactive attitude. Yet, its
attitude is divided into two types although Chinese common purpose to keep its
political freehand as much as possible is there. In first type attitude, China tries to
exclude a certain content that might be able to restrict Chinese behavior from the
ARF consensus. In the second ARF of 1995, China strongly opposed to incarnate the
ARF concept of “Conflict Resolution” in A Concept Paper. As a result of Chinese
objection, its expression was weaken and changed into abstract one as “elaborationof approaches to conflicts35.
In addition, China sharply insisted the non-necessity of US involvement to theSouth China Sea dispute who requested freedom of navigation in the sea. China
rejected that the territorial issue was discussed in broader multilateral framework
than Sino-ASEAN states relationship. Yet, as China articulated territorial
dialogues with ASEAN states, China started to soften its robustness and open theissue to the ARF discussion. China agreed to put the South China Sea issue
formally on the agenda of the ARF‟s meetings. Actually, political achievements on
the South China Sea issue between China and ASEAN were observed and there has
been no substantial progress on the issue in the ARF dialogue 36. However, themultilateral forum might function to confirm the bilateral agreement. Positivechange of Chinese attitude to the forum is based on the recognition of trend of
multipolarization in international system37.
As second type of Chinese action to the ARF, China strives to develop the ARF
process and improve CBMs so as to prevent ARF‟s excessive institutionalizationthat might have coercive power against China. In 2005, the first ARF Security
Policy Conference (ASPC) was held by initiative of China who proposed theconference in the 11th ARF in 2004. The reason why China has came to participate
actively in a part of light institutionalization in the ARF is that China hasrecognized the advantage to set up rules in international politics ahead of otherstates.

The Second ARF Chairman‟s Statement 1995
Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 2002
37 Biwu Zhang 2005. “Chinese Perceptions of American Power, 1991-2004” Asian
Survey 45:5 680.
35
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Influences of the changes on ASEAN‟s initiative
In this section, ASEAN‟s perception about and reaction to the changes of US
and China‟s foreign policy towards the ARF are explored. As discussed above, thetwo big powers have gradually got proactive towards the ARF although the forum
has not been given priority in their foreign policy.
Regarding the driving force of the ARF, ASEAN still occupied the driving seat of
the forum although the big powers‟ pro-activeness to the ARF has strengthened. For
instance, Chairmanship of the ARF is limited only to ASEAN members while theenhanced role of the ARF chair was clarified in the 2001 paper submitted by
Eminent, Expert Persons (EEPs). In the paper, the roles of the ARF Chair wereclearly defined as a facilitator for dialogues and mutual trust and a coordinator forconsensus among the ARF members38.
While ASEAN has kept the driving seat of the ARF, ASEAN also fears that
ASEAN and the ARF might reduce its political significance because of an idea
emerging from the United States. A creation of a new security framework which willbe transformed from six-party talk to a permanent and more institutionalized
framework might overlap the security area which the ARF has treated39. Mr. Ong
Keng Yong, ASEAN secretary-general from 2003 to last year, acknowledged that: 'If
the six-party talks emerge as a formal mechanism, ASEAN will lose some of its
shine‟40.
On ASEAN‟s reaction to Chinese involvements in the ARF, it can be said that
Chinese involvements are consistent compatible with the purposes of the ARF thatis supposed to improve trust among the forum‟s members. Chinese initiative of
ASPC is a good example. ASEAN as an aggregation of weaker states cannot expect
easily itself to affect other stronger powers by material factors but to affect themwithnon-material factors. Chinese

preference

for improving

CBMs andnon-preference for coercive and institutionalized security framework in the Asia
pacific region worked in a good sense in terms of development of the ARF process.
As the issues to which both the United States and China are related, first,
ASEAN members did not necessarily agree on US and Chinese contention about
38

Enhanced Role of the ARF Chair (Shared perspectives among the ARF members)

2001.
http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/PublicLibrary/ARFChairmansStatementsandRepor
ts/EnhancedRoleoftheARFChairEEPs/tabid/112/Default.aspx
39 It is supposed to be open to other Asian states The Australian April 2, 2008.
40 The Strait Times (Singapore) July 28, 200814

maritime security around Southeast Asia. US proposal about maritime security
vision on counter piracy and terrorist around Strait of Malacca area was agreed
with Thailand in 2004 before it was submitted to the 9th ARF41. Yet at next ARF,
about security in Strait of Malacca, Foreign Minister of Singapore contended that it
was important for costal states to hold their jurisdiction in the area while theUnited States and other ARF members emphasized freedom of navigation42. On theSouth China Sea dispute between China and ASEAN members, ASEAN states havealready agreed on the Code of Conduct and peaceful settlement without use of force.
Yet the dispute is still shelved.
Second, in disaster relief area which was recently regarded as one of the mostimportant regional security issues, implementation of joint disaster relief exercise iswelcomed for ASEAN members because they are victims of recent natural disastersuch as Tsunami in Indonesia in 2005. In addition, accumulation of concrete actions
in non-traditional security area under the ARF framework might further function of
the ARF without disagreement among its members.

Conclusion
The two powers‟ foreign policy to the ARF in which the basis of security
cooperation among states has been articulated for 15 years has been made aprogress for pro-active tendency. Both of the United States and China haveparticipated proactively in the multilateral security framework, proposed andcarried out concrete operation. The two states recognize the importance and theusefulness of the forum that enable them to increase political opportunity to contact
other states. The United States deal with North Korea issue in the ARF and took
the advantage of the forum for holding meetings on the issue even with ARF
participants not involved directly in the issue.
China also used the ARF to reassure ASEAN states which have had territorial
dispute on the South China Sea with China. Although China gave permission to the
ARF consensus that the territorial dispute was treated in the ARF, the Chinese
basic diplomacy has been that the dispute must be argued only between ASEAN
states and China. Even though China strived to avoid the territorial dispute being
treated on multilateral basis, her involvement in continuous security dialogue has
41
42

Asahi Newspaper June 26 2004.
Asahi Newspaper July 30 2005.
15

partly improved Sino-ASEAN states relationship.
Yet the directions where the two states have paid their effort are different interms of future figure of the ARF. One the one hand, the United States has sought todevelop the ARF for more institutionalized security framework and requested theforum concrete and actual operations. The US ambition for more robust ARF has
not necessarily received affirmativeness from ASEAN states which has had driving
force of the ARF. Because excessive institutionalization of the ARF which mightinterfere national behavior with coercion has been not favorable for ASEAN states
which has adopted the ASEAN Way for more than 40 years.
While the United States‟ likelihood to more active ARF that might increase its
usefulness for regional comprehensive security, the United States‟ strategy for theregional security might decrease relatively the value of the ARF. The United States
started to consider the idea that transformed six-party talk framework into a new
permanent security organization in East Asia. It might overlap the security fields
which the ARF has dealt with and decline ARF‟s position in international politics.
On the other hand, China has mainly focused on improvement of CBMs.
Improvement of CBMs set as the first stage of the ARF, ASEAN has accepted
positively proposals that non-ASEAN members presented such as ASPC. In
addition, implementation of concrete security cooperation against natural disaster
which was listed in the line of CBMs over medium and long term demonstrates thegood development of the ARF process with pro-activeness of China (and the UnitedStates).
Besides, about the definition of PD which is applicable only to the ARF, it wasagreed that principle of non-interference which is also one of the features of theASEAN Way as a result of China‟s insistence. Taking the ASEAN Way into
consideration, the definition of PD is favorable for ASEAN. But for Chinesecontention, the definition might be defined differently by the influences of
non-Asian ARF members such as the United States, EU, Canada, and Australia.
Examining ASEAN‟s responses to both US and Chinese foreign policy to the
ARF and regional multilateral security framework, ASEAN has reacted to themconsistently on the basis of ARF process which was defined in the Concept Paper in1994 and been holding tightly the driving force of the ARF while receiving criticism
on the inefficiency of the ASEAN Way. ASEAN itself has also kept basically theprinciples of the ASEAN Way in political and economic area since its
establishment.The US and Chinese political influences in the ARF have surely big
impact as many instances shows but ASEAN has taken advantage of their influence16

for their interests. Given the objectives of the establishment of the ARF, ASEAN has
achieved them and even more.

17

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