CSCAP MEMORANDUM NO. 24

Safety and Security of Vital Undersea
Communications Infrastructure

A Memorandum from theCouncil for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
May 2014

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
Memorandum No. 24
Safety and Security of Vital Undersea Communications Infrastructure
May 2014
Introduction
Submarine fibre optic cables carry 97 percent of all international
telecommunications and are vital communications infrastructure for States
globally and in the Asia Pacific region. Multiple cables breaks or hostile actions
by terrorists or other third parties represent a significant risk to the security andeconomic interests of every State connected to that cable. There is currently nointernational legal regime addressing security issues that affect submarine
cables, nor is there an international agency responsible for them.
This Memorandum proposes measures for moving forward at a regional level toprotect submarine cables, reduce the risks to cables, and improve repair
responses to damaged cables when faults occur. Cooperation between States ata regional level is required to plan in advance for incidents involving major breaks
to submarine cables. There is also a need for States to establish national
legislation and policy to reduce the risk of breaks and to improve response times
for repairs to damaged cables. A cooperative partnership between government
and industry is needed to ensure the resilience of the submarine
telecommunications networks.
Submarine cables are vital telecommunications infrastructure
The global submarine fibre optic cable network is comprised of approximately
216 separate, diverse and independent cables systems, totaling more than
870,000 km of fiber optic cables. Presently, 97 percent of all international
communications are carried by submarine fiber optic cables. The majority ofcountries now rely almost exclusively on undersea cables for theirtelecommunications needs, including essential finance, diplomacy and defence
systems. The United Nations General Assembly has described these cables as“critical communications infrastructure,” which is “vitally important to the global
economy and the national security of all States.”
Cable breaks pose a risk to the security and economy of States
The majority of submarine cable breaks are caused by negligent activities fromfishing and shipping, and natural events such as earthquakes, tsunamis and1

typhoons. There have, however, been incidents involving intentional damage
being inflicted on cables. Industry reports that there are also increasing incidentsof theft of cables at sea, causing millions of dollars of repairs and compromising
the resilience of cable networks.
The risk of a deliberate attack against a network of cables with the intention tocripple the core telecommunications of multiple States is a real one. Given thebroad range of man-made hazards that can damage cables, there is a real riskthat in an area where there is a heavy network density of cables, deliberateactions to damage cables could result in multiple faults and maximum damage tointernational telecommunications systems. In addition to cable systems,
supporting physical infrastructure such as landing stations may be also betargeted.
Adding to this are impediments by coastal States that result in delays to repairs;
these may occur as a result of permit delays, requirements for vessels to enter
port before carrying out repairs, customs duties, fees, and taxes, and cabotage
requirements. These delays are sometimes in excess of three months, increasing
the cost of repairs by hundreds of thousands of dollars and creating backlogs ofrepairs.
The current legal regime to protect submarine cables is inadequate
There is no specialized international agency responsible for law and policy
relating to international submarine cables. The only applicable international rules
are those contained in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of theSea (UNCLOS), but the provisions in UNCLOS are inadequate for dealing withthe security of submarine cables. Even where States have enacted legislation tocriminalize intentional acts against cables as required in UNCLOS, such
legislation only applies to nationals of that State (or ships flying its flag), not toforeign nationals. In essence, national laws to protect submarine cables are often
lacking, obsolete or not enforced.
In order to protect air navigation facilities and maritime navigation facilities, theinternational community has adopted treaties which establish a comprehensive
cooperative regime to ensure that persons who intentionally destroy or damage
critical infrastructure are punished for their actions as criminals, regardless of
their nationality and regardless of where the acts took place. However, there isno such convention that applies to international submarine cables, even though
they are arguably more important as critical communications infrastructure than
air or maritime navigation facilities.

2

Areas for Action
There are annually on average approximately 200 or so cable fault repairs. Most
repairs occur in the territorial seas and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), althoughsome occur on the high seas. Repair costs vary between USD1and USD3
million per repair, depending upon weather, location, and the extent of damage.
Given these statistics, regional governments in the Asia Pacific need torecognize the importance of the protection and maintenance of submarine fibre
optic cables as critical telecommunications infrastructure, and the Memorandum
recommends that Governments in the region establish the following mechanisms
to cooperate with each other and with the cable industry in order to protect
submarine cables and ensure their rapid repair:I. Contingency planning at the regional levelGiven that the intentional cutting of submarine cables by thieves or terrorists is aserious threat to the economy and security of the coastal State, governments
should look into developing contingency plans with industry to deal with attacks
on the submarine cable network in the region. The contingency planning should
include a standard procedure whereby the cable industry immediately notifies
relevant government agencies through a designated national lead agency
whenever there is a cable break or suspicious activity observed so that a risk
assessment can be conducted to determine the likelihood of a possible hostileaction. National designation of a lead agency for cables should be a priority.
What may also be required is an arrangement among States in the region toshare information on suspected attacks on submarine cables and to fully
cooperate in the event of an attack on submarine cables outside the territorial
sea of any State. State Parties and the cable industry should carry out joint
desktop exercises to plan and develop protocols and practical responses in theevent of possible disruptions of submarine cable infrastructure. For a successful
desktop exercise, it is essential that all government agencies responsible fordomestic and international security threats at sea be involved as well as theinternational companies that own or operate the cable systems and cable ships
be involved. Such planning should include the development of protocols tofacilitate the quick repair of damaged submarine cables.
II. Cooperation to develop best practice guidelines
Establishing best practice guidelines at a regional level is an important means forStates to cooperate to ensure that submarine cables are protected in law and inpractice, and to ensure that rapid repairs can be undertaken when damage
occurs. Cable breaks are not solely a national matter for the coastal State in3

whose waters the cables are laid; they are also a matter of concern for every
State where that cable lands. Other States in the region are impacted as wellbecause a damaged cable increases the risks to communications because adamaged cable is no longer available for traffic restoration from a damaged
cable. States should ensure mariners, especially fishing vessels, are advised ofdangers to cables from unsafe anchoring or trawling practices on them.
Industry studies have documented inordinate delays in the repairs of cables inseveral countries in the Asia/Pacific region. One reason for this is that in somecountries there is no lead agency responsible for the law and policy onsubmarine cables. The uneven treatment of the repair of international cables byStates in the region should be analyzed and reviewed by Governments incooperation with the cable industry so that the problems can be identified and“Best Practice Guidelines” can be developed.
Specific Recommendations for Action
1. Actions by Statesa. All states should join the International Cable Protection Committee(ICPC).
b. Each State should designate a national lead agency for submarine
cable issues.
2. Regional Cooperationa. Once designated, national lead agencies of states should coordinate(with industry/ICPC and other states) to: (i) Develop regional
protocols to facilitate prompt cable repairs, and (ii) Develop standard
procedures for both information sharing and to notify other regional
nations of cable breaks or suspicious activity.
b. Include tabletop exercises to deal with cable breaks and threats tocables in regional multilateral and bilateral exercises.
3. Future Study
Submarine cables issues should be included as a topic for future study in
ARF Maritime Security ISM and CSCAP Maritime Security Study Groupwork, to refine the above recommendations and to identify best practices
and other specific actions for official consideration.

4

ABOUT CSCAP
CSCAP is a non-governmental (second track) process for dialogue on security
issues in the Asia Pacific. Membership in CSCAP is on an institutional basis andconsists of Member Committees. Current membership comprises Australia,Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Indonesia, Japan,
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
Mongolia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
and the USA.
The functions of CSCAP are as follows:a. to provide an informal mechanism by which political and security issues
can be discussed by scholars, officials, and others in their private
capacities;
b. to encourage the participants of such individuals from countries andterritories in the Asia Pacific on the basis of the principle of inclusiveness;c. to organise various working groups to address security issues andchallenges facing the region;d. to provide policy recommendations to various intergovernmental bodies onpolitical-security issues;e. to convene regional and international meetings and other cooperative
activities for the purpose of discussing political-security issues;
f. to establish linkages with institutions and organisations in other parts of theworld to exchange information, insights and experiences in the area ofregional political-security cooperation; andg. to produce and disseminate publications relevant to the other purposes ofthe organisation.
Study Groups are the primary mechanism for CSCAP activity. As of May 2014,
there were four CSCAP Study Groups. These are concerned with: (i) Countering
the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific. (ii)
Principles for Good Order at Sea; (iii) Regional Security Architecture; and (iv)
Preventive Diplomacy.
This memorandum was produced by the CSCAP Experts Group on Vital
Undersea Communications Infrastructure, a sub-group of the CSCAP Study
Group on Principles for Good Order at Sea and was approved by the out ofsession CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting via electronic consultation on 21May 2014.
Further information on CSCAP can be obtained from the CSCAP website atwww.cscap.org or by contacting the CSCAP Secretariat:
5

CSCAP Secretariat
c/o ISIS Malaysia
1 Persiaran Sultan Salahuddin
PO Box 12424
50778 Kuala Lumpur
Malaysia
T: +603-2693 9366 Ext 125
F: +603-2693 9375
E: cscap@isis.org.my6

CSCAP Memoranda
CSCAP Memoranda are the outcome of the work of Study Groups approved by theSteering Committee and submitted for consideration by the ASEAN Regional Forumand other bodies.
 Memorandum No.23 – Enhancing Water Security in the Asia PacificAuthor: Study Group on Water Resources Security
Date published: January 2014
 Memorandum No.22 – Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Author: Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction in the Asia PacificDate published: September 2012
 Memorandum No.21 – Implications of Naval Enhancement in the Asia PacificAuthor: Study Group on Naval Enhancement in the Asia PacificDate published: August 2012
 Memorandum No.20 – Ensuring A Safer Cyber Security Environment
Author: Study Group on Cyber Security
Date published: May 2012
 Memorandum No.19 – Reduction and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
Author: Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction in the Asia PacificDate published: February 2012
 Memorandum No.18 – Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
Author: Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP)
Date published: September 2011
 Memorandum No.17 – Promoting the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy
Author: Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction in the Asia PacificDate published: June 2011
 Memorandum No.16 – Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations
Author: Study Group on Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations
Date published: January 2011
 Memorandum No.15 – The Security Implications of Climate Change
Author: Study Group on the Security Implications of Climate Change
Date published: July 20107

 Memorandum No.14 – Guidelines for Managing Trade of Strategic Goods
Author: Export Controls Experts Group (XCXG)
Date published: March 2009
 Memorandum No.13 – Guidelines for Maritime Cooperation in Enclosed and SemiEnclosed Seas and Similar Sea Areas of the Asia PacificAuthor: Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific
Date published: June 2008
 Memorandum No.12 – Maritime Knowledge and Awareness: Basic Foundations ofMaritime SecurityAuthor: Study Group on Facilitating Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific
Date published: December 2007
 Memorandum No.11 – Human Trafficking
Author: Study Group on Human Trafficking
Date published: June 2007
 Memorandum No.10 – Enhancing Efforts to Address Factors Driving International
Terrorism
Author: Study Group on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Campaign Against
International Terrorism with Specific Reference to the Asia Pacific RegionDate published: December 2005
 Memorandum No.9 – Trafficking of Firearms in the Asia Pacific RegionAuthor: Working Group on Transnational Crime
Date published: May 2004
 Memorandum No.8 – The Weakest Link? Seaborne Trade and the Maritime
Regime in the Asia PacificAuthor: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: April 2004
 Memorandum No.7 – The Relationship Between Terrorism and Transnational
CrimeAuthor: Working Group on Transnational Crime
Date published: July 2003
 Memorandum No.6 – The Practice of the Law of the Sea in the Asia PacificAuthor: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: December 20028 Memorandum No.5 – Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea
Author: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: February 2001
 Memorandum No.4 – Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation
Author: Working Group on Maritime Cooperation
Date published: December 1997
 Memorandum No.3 – The Concepts of Comprehensive Security and Cooperative
Security
Author: Working Group on Comprehensive and Cooperative Security
Date published: December 1995
 Memorandum No.2 – Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures
Author: Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures
Date published: June 1995
 Memorandum No.1 – The Security of the Asia Pacific Region
Author: CSCAP
Date published: April 1994

9