China’s Threat Perception of Japan after the Cold War:A Tentative Discussion

LIN Yifu
Waseda University
August, 2008

Presented at GIARI Summer Institute on Regional Integration at Waseda
University, Tokyo, August 25, 2008

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ⅠIntroduction
There is no doubt that Japan has been experiencing a long period of peace andeconomic development since the end of WWⅡ.Taking the lesson from the tragediesof the war, many scholars in Japan have devoted themselves in the research of peace.
The social norm of pacifism has been dominant in Japan society (Yoshihide, 1998)，
though it is relatively weakened these days. To regain the trust of the countries in Asia,
Japan has also helped its neighbor countries, including China develop their economy
mainly through ODA. After the end of the Cold War, Japan had suffered a relatively
long period of recession since its economic bubble burst. Its defense budget isrelatively stable, not increased dramatically. From 1991 to 2006, its military
expenditure as percentage of GDP is always 1%. In 2006, Japan‟s military
expenditure reached 43701 Million US dollars (Table 1). However, after the cold war,
especially in the middle of 1990s, the research in the academic circle and the media
cover of “Japan Threat” or “Japan‟s Revival of Militarism” in China was
overwhelmingly gained people‟s attention (Zhang, 2002; Chu, 2005). Meanwhile,
many opinion surveys also indicate that Chinese people looked Japan as the“threatening” or “most threatening” country. For example, the opinion survey
conducted in Beijing in 1997 showed that about 70 percent and 75 percent of the
respondents considered Japan and the United States, respectively, either “threatening”
or the “most threatening” countries, while only about 5 percent of the respondents
placed other countries, such as Russia and India, in the same categories (Yu Guoming,1998).

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This paper seeks to explain why the threat perception of Japan became a target of
security and political debate in China after the end of the Cold War.
This question is important for three reasons. First of all, it attempts to explain aphenomenon involving two of the major powers in the world today, whose
relationship to each other could affect the stability of East Asia and the world as awhole. Secondly, it is important because it offers an insight to the problem of how
threat perceptions formed, especially it intends to explore the role of history andidentity sharing in the formation of threat perceptions. As we all know, mutual trust,
identity sharing and history reconciliation are essential parts to build good bilateralrelations. Finally, it is important because the dissertation illustrates how states respondto changes in relations to their domestic politics, especially in the information era.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section Ⅱ makes a review of theories of
threat perceptions. Section Ⅲ introduces the working hypotheses. Section Ⅳ,Ⅴ,Ⅵ
are the three arguments respectively. And the final part is the conclusion andindications for Sino-Japan relations.

Ⅱ Theories of Apology and Threat Perception
In the international relations literature, a threat is defined as a situation in which one
agent or group has either the capability or intention to inflict a negative consequenceon another agent or group (Davis, 2000). There are two categories of threats: threatsagainst us as individuals and threats against collections of individuals. Threats against
collectives can be in the form of (1) military threats, (2) economic threats, or (3)3cultural threats. In this paper, I define “threat” as military threats on the collective
level.
Theoretical debates about how states perceive threats focus on the role and relative
weight of capabilities and intentions in threat assessments. Some scholars-principally
neorealists-argue that threat assessments are based almost exclusively on the balanceof material capabilities(Waltz, 1979). Powerful states appear threatening; weak states
do not.
Most other scholars, however, argue that the neorealist focus on material capabilities
is too narrow. According to this view, whether a country appears threatening depends
on both its capabilities and what is known about its intentions. Scholars haveproposed and debated a variety of factors that influence how one state‟s intention will
be viewed by others.
Proponents of the democratic peace argue that leaders focus on a state‟s regime type;democracies tend to trust other democracies(Russett, 1996). Other scholars argue thatleaders evaluate another state‟s intentions by assessing its membership in international
institutions. As states become more closely institutionalized, they should perceive
each other‟s intentions as more benign; membership in institutions imposes
constraints, promotes transparency, and reduces uncertainty about intentions(Keohane, 1989). Defensive realists argue that states can signal benign intentions bysending “costly signals”: pursuing unilateral disarmament, signing arms control
agreements, and reducing offensive capabilities(Walt, 1989). In sum, scholars of thedemocratic peace, liberal institutionalists, defensive realists, and constructivists all4

argue that perceptions weigh heavily when states evaluate threats. They merely
disagree over what variables are most important in signaling benign-or
malign-intentions.
Jennifer M. Lind added another variable-remembrance to the debate over how states
signal their intentions. The ways a state remembers and atones for its past violence
signals its intentions, and therefore affect how threatening the country appears toothers. Apologetic remembrance makes a country‟s intentions appear less malign, andhence makes it appear less threatening. Unapologetic remembrance, on the other hand,
sends signals of malign intentions and increases perceptions of threat (Jennifer, 2005).
Social identity theory (SIT) and its offshoot self-categorization theory (SCT) provide
two nonmaterial explanations for identity construction and threat perception. Boththeories were developed to explain prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behavior
toward members of the out-group. Given that prejudice is often associated with a fearthat the out-group has the capability or intention to inflict a negative consequence on
the in-group, these theories can provide a competing explanation for the rise and fallof the perception of threat. International relations scholars have adopted the logic ofSocial Identity Theory to predict that “outsiders” in international affairs will beviewed as more threatening than “insiders”(Wendt, 1999).

Ⅲ Working Hypothesis
As a result, existing literature tells us little about what constitute threat perception. It
is even more difficult to find articles directly targeting on the subject of “China‟s

5Threat Perception of Japan” in various databases. Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki managed
to fill the blank in her Ph.D. dissertation (UEKI, 2006). However, her argument that
relative power positions and increase of power are important factors shaping threat
perception can‟t explain why the “Japan treat” arguments rose when the relative
power positions of China became higher.
I examine three potential explanations for the rise of “Japan treat” based on realism,
constructivism, and theories of apology. I then examine if the predictions are borneout by empirical data. Meanwhile, some points must be acknowledged at the outset.
As for theories of democratic peace and liberal institution, since Japan is already a
democratic country and actively participates in international institutions, it is obviousthat we should try to explain the phenomenon from other angles.
1. Working hypothesis(1) Realist Explanations:Hypothesis 1: “Japan threat” arguments rise because of the redefinition of U.S.-Japan
Alliance which may target at the question of Taiwan.
(2) Explanations from Theory of Apology
Hypothesis 2: “Japan threat” arguments rise because Japanese remembrance of its
history is unapologetic.
(3) Explanations from Social Identity Theory and Constructivism
Hypothesis 3: “Japan threat” arguments rise because of non-shared identity between
China and Japan.
2. Material Sources

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The principle data is from both primacy and secondary source. “Interviews” ofpoliticians near the leadership, government officials, academics, and think-tank
analysts will be conducted. Furthermore, memoirs, elite-authored scholarly articles
and op-eds, archival documents, public opinion polls and media coverage are also of
the fundamental bases of the empirical part of the research.

Ⅳ China’s Threat Perception of Japan and U.S.-Japan Alliance
1 Japan‟s Military Modernization
With the development of economy, Japan also seeks to become a great political power
even a military power. Meanwhile, facing a troublesome North Korea, and a rising
China, Japan is adapting its national security policy to the post-Cold War security
environment through the revision of its military doctrines (such as National Defense
Program Outline, NDPO revision in 1995), the introduction of new security
legislation (such as National Emergency Legislation) and the acquisition of new
military hardware. In addition, traditional constitutional prohibitions on pre-emptive
strikes, arms exports and nuclear weapons are increasingly under question and close
to being breached, or have ceased at least to be taboo subjects for debate. In otherwords, Japan is set to acquire many of the capabilities of a „normal‟ advanced military
power(Christopher, 2005).
As a result of the 1995 NDPO revision, the Japan Self Defense Forces, JSDF has
undergone a quantitative build-down of its Cold War-style capabilities, a trend thatwill likely be consolidated by NDPO revision in 2005. If measured in nominal U.S.

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dollar terms, the total Japanese defense budget has continued to rise strongly evenafter the end of the Cold War-standing at 44 billion US Dollars in 2001, only second
to that of the U.S.. And its military expenditure per capital is much much higher thanthat of China.
Japan is continuing a qualitative build-up of JSDF capabilities, including, mostnotably:the

Maritime

Self

DefenseForces(MSDF)‟s

Navy

Theater-wide

Defense(NTWD) Ballistic Missile Defence(BMD) assets, amphibious capabilities andthe rehearsal of aircraft carrier technologies; and the Air Self Defense
Forces(ASDF)‟s Patriot Advanced Capability-3(PAC-3) BMD system, F-2 fightersand in-flight refueling. In sum, these represent new JSDF power-projection
capabilities for a range of missions, such as UN Peace Keeping Operation, but that
can also be used to support US-led expeditionary campaigns, as in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Japan has complemented this hardware with the introduction of Revolution in
Military Affairs(RMA)-type Battle Management Command, Control, Computers andIntelligence(BMC4I) systems, and a new Joint Staff Organization(JSO) for
streamlined operational decision-making. Japan sees this as essential to maintaining
an edge over regional rivals and to enable improved interoperability with the US.
Japan has further acquired and integrated new intelligence capabilities in the form of
the Japan Defense Agent(JDA)‟s Japan Defense Intelligence Headquarters(JDIH) andthe spy satellite program (Christopher, 2005).
2 Redefinition of U.S.-Japan Alliance
U.S.-Japan alliance was been established in 1951. Its main function was anti Soviet

8Union during the cold war era. As neo-realism‟s theory of alliance points out thatalliance will be dissolved after the major enemy disappears. However, after a periodof uncertainty, U.S.-Japan alliance not only has been remained, but also is being
intensified. In 1996, Japan and the US issued the “Joint Declaration on Security
Cooperation” and started to amend the “Defense Cooperation Guidelines” worked out
in 1978. In September 1997, the new defense guidelines were formally defined. On
October 29, 2005, the United States and Japan “Security Consultative Committee”
issued the document of “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the
future.” In the year of 2006 and 2007, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative
Committee (2+2 Meeting) was held respectively. In the 2006 meeting‟s document,
Taiwan was listed as one of the “common strategic objectives” between the UnitedStates and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. Enhanced security ties between
Washington and Tokyo have transformed the U.S.-Japan alliance and reshaped theEast Asian security environment.
Why has U.S.-Japan alliance been enhanced? Many scholars have made contributions
on this. Nevertheless, the factor of China is one of the most critical factors. As amatter of act, Joseph S. Nye is the advocator of “East Asian Strategy Report”, whichis also known as Nye Report. For Nye, the redefinition of the US-Japan alliance wasnone other than a redefinition in the face of the China challenge (Funabashi, 1999).
As the United States and Japan have expanded their security ties to reflect changes intheir respective threats perceptions and regional security strategies, strong concern has
arisen in other countries (Wu, 2005-06). This is particularly true in Beijing, which

9believes that enhance security between Washington and Tokyo compromises China‟ssecurity interests.
Chinese concerns about Japan‟s military role have increased over the past decade. The
1996 joint declaration on the bilateral security alliance and the subsequent revision of
the Mutual Defense Guidelines were perceived as a clear indication that Japan had
abandoned its policy of „homeland defense‟, which required strictly limiting defense
to Japan‟s soil and passively meeting an enemy attack, and was moving towards
becoming a military power. Specifically, Chinese analysts were concerned that China
was taken as the imaginary enemy of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and that there
was a hidden danger of strategic conflicts between China and the U.S.-Japan allianceover Taiwan. On August 17, 1997, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama Seiroku
indicated that the guideline covers Taiwan, a remark strongly protested by Beijing. An
alarmed Beijing pressured Japan to declare that the new guidelines do not cover
Taiwan. Beijing suspended regular bureau-chief-level security dialogue with Japan(Christensen, 1999). The Chinese government voiced strong opposition to the new
defense guidelines and Japan‟s cooperation with the United States over theater missile
defense during Hashimoto‟s visit in September 1997. Chinese analysts also argued
that although Japan‟s roles would mainly be to provide logistics and rear-area support,
Japan was actually „sailing out in a borrowed boat‟ (Yang, 1999). China wasconcerned that enhanced U.S.-Japan security cooperation would allow Japan toincrease its defense capabilities and that TMD might integrate Taiwan into a security
structure in an East Asia hostile to Beijing(Kori, 2000).

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Chinese analysts believe that the Japanese military will gradually expand its role andparticipate in all sorts of US military operations. It is just a matter of time before
Japan revises its Peace Constitution to enable Tokyo to freely send military forces
overseas (Liu, 2002). Moreover, Japan‟s intentions could be matched by its strength.
A Chinese military observer claimed that what Japan‟s military really has was „morethan its fame‟. Liu Tinghua of the Chinese Academy of Military Science argues thatJapan‟s Self-Defense Forces have become „a strong military with a full range offorces and equipped with advanced weapons‟(Zhang, 2005).Wu Xinbo took a more
pessimistic view on China-U.S.-Japan trilateral relations. Wu argues that the UnitedStates is now driving rather than constraining Japan‟s rearmament. The bright side of
the U.S.-Japan alliance seems to be gone(Wu, 2005-06).

Ⅴ China’s Threat Perception of Japan and Japan’s History
Remembrance
Testing the effects of apologies on threat perception requires a framework for
categorizing different types of remembrance, and criteria for defining a given state‟sremembrance as either “apologetic” or “unapologetic.” A state remembers and judges
its pasts in a variety of areas: through statements (such as apologies), reparations,
legal trials of perpetrators of pastviolence,

education(textbooks) andcommemoration (monuments, museums, ceremonies, and holidays) (Jennifer, 2005).
The first step in coding apologies was to establish criteria for defining individual acts
as apologetic, unapologetic, or neutral(Table 2). The second step is to establish rules
for aggregating the numerous gestures of remembrance that a state displays over a11

given time period to code the extent to which a given period is “apologetic.” To do so,
we can assess the frequency and breadth of a state‟s remembrance.
Table 2: Defining Policies of Remembrance
Type
Remembrance
Apologetic
NeutralUnapologeticof Types of Policies
Apologies
Acknowledgment
Amnesia
DenialJustification
Glorification

Criteria
Admission and remorse
Admission. No moral judgement
Little or no discussion of events
Denial that events occurred, or
denial of one‟s role in them
Admission and claims of necessity
Admission with favorable moral
judgement

Source: Based on Jennifer M. Lind, “Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics”, Paper
Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C.,
Sep.1-4, 2005

Remembrance in Sino-Japan Relations since the end of the Cold War
JAPANESE REMEMBRANCE. Japanese remembrance of war and colonization
evolved dramatically since the end of Cold War. Japanese Government began
regularly issuing apologies—some of them quite remarkable. Numerous high-level
leaders issued remorseful statements: Prime Ministers Miyazawa (1992) and
Murayama (1994 and ‟95). The Socialist Party (members of the ruing coalition in1995) attempted to pass a contrite Diet Resolution, and passed a tepid statement. For
more remarkable were apologies issued by Hosokawa (1993) and Koizumi (2001),
which included both detailed admission and remorse (Jennifer, 2005). In this period
Japan began regularly issuing numerous statements of apology, ranging fromlukewarm to remarkably apologetic.
Japanese statements during this period were far from uniform. Reacting to
Murayama‟s contrite statements, cabinet members Nagano Shigeto and Sakurai Shin
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made statement of denial in 1994. In the 1990s a distinct pattern emerged in which
one leader‟s apology triggered a statement by another leading politician that denied,justified, or glorified Japan‟s past actions. Still, Japanese statements of apology during
this period increased relative to the earlier period.
Japanese education in this period reflects increased coverage of Japanese actions
during the war. Discussion of the sex slaves, the Nanjing Massacre appears in
textbooks. Coverage of Unit 731 was approved after a ruling in the Japanese courts.
For many of these issues, coverage remains scanty; depending on the textbook, theseissues might be omitted, mentioned vaguely, or presented in moderate detail. And
certain Japanese actions during the war remain consistently omitted from textbooks,
such as Japan‟s strategic bombing of Chinese cities, and biological warfare against
Chinese citizens. A controversial textbook was also published during this period by agroup who resented the 1996 legal ruling that permitted mention of the sex slaves inJapanese textbooks, MoE approval of this textbook caused a third textbook dispute in
2001.
Japanese commemoration in this period remains unapologetic. Museums do noteducate the public about victims of Japanese aggression or atrocities. Monuments andmuseums, such as Yushukan museum, reflect amnesia or glorification about Japanese
atrocities and colonization in East Asia. During this period Japanese Prime Ministers
resumed visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. In sum, Japanese remembrance is moderately
apologetic.
Based on the values of the remembrance variable, the apology theories make13

predictions related to both congruence and reasoning. The official theory expects
Chinese to say that their perceptions of Japan are improving because of Japan‟s
increasingly contrite policies; the societal theory expects Chinese to say that they still
do not trust Japan because of widespread denial in Japanese society.
CHINA PERCEPTIONS OF JAPANESE INTENTIONS AND THREAT. China
continued to distrust Japanese intentions in this period. This sentiment is frequently
expressed in the media and by elites. Chinese highlight Japanese denial as a major
factor in their distrust of Japan. Chinese did express some praise for Japanese
apologies. However, Chinese also observe and complain about statements of denialthat accompanied apologies during this period. Chinese also criticized Japan for
approving the history textbook seen as whitewashing Japan‟s past violence. In sum,
Chinese specially say that distrust Japanese intentions because of Tokyo‟sunapologetic policies of remembrance.

Ⅵ China’s Threat Perception of Japan and Identity Sharing
The perception of threat is a function of the line drawn between the in-group and theout-group. Power influences people‟s threat perceptions only after identity between
the self and the other has been established. If the other is completely unlike the self
(i.e. if no shared identity exists), the material balance of power between the self andthe other will be a good predictor of threat perception. However, the higher the levelof shared identity between the self and the other, the less threatening the other willappear (Figure 1). In the extreme case in which the other and the self are members of

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the same in-group, the other will not be seen as a threat regardless of the particularbalance of power. In sum, both a shared sense of identity and power interact with eachother when influencing people‟s threat perceptions(David and Rocio, 2007).
Figure 1
The Aggregation of Latent and Salient Identity Dimensions

Source: David L. Rousseau, and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, “Identity, Power, and Threat Perception
Across-National Experimental Study”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.51, No.5, Oct. 2007

National identity has a profound impact on how the Chinese and Japanese play the
relationship game. How governments and peoples view their country and its place inthe world as well as how they see the counterpart country and its place contribute to
how issues are interpreted and how policy goals and approaches are defined. Needlessto say, the subject of identity in China and Japan is extremely complex. Definitions of
Self and Other shift over time, influenced not only by domestic developments but also
by the two countries‟ interactions with each other and with third countries(Wang,2006).
1. Chinese National Identities
China had an identity of a developing, socialist, major political power, which was15largely consistent with the country‟s place in the world throughout the 1980s.
However, by the early 1990s, China‟s situation had changed, leading to the formationof a new identity as a responsible emerging major power. But the change produced
corresponding confusion, and a parallel identity drawing on victimization-based
nationalism (Wang, 2006).
By the end of the 1990s, however, China began to embrace the identity of a major
economic power and a new thinking on China taking on big-power responsibilities.
While China has gradually accepted the market economy as its economic identity, it
has faced far more confusion over its political identity. Now that communism can nolonger be used as a basis for legitimizing the Chinese Communist Party‟s political rule,
the party has been trying to forge a new nationalist identity for the party and the state.
And the government has actively engaged in patriotic campaigns since the early 1990s,
which has had its intended impact on China‟s youth.
China‟s emerging identity of a responsible major power has already affected its
foreign policy, in a positive sense for most other nations. However, this new thinking
has not been applied to Japan. When it comes to Japan, a victimization-based identity
rather than a responsible-great-power identity prevails in explaining Beijing‟sstrategic goals and approach.
2. Japanese National Identity
In comparison with the pre-1989 period, Japan remains a modern, developed capitalist
country. What has changed is Japan‟s desire to become a “normal state,” which
essentially means that it may act like other major powers in the world. This desire,16

which existed during the Cold War, has become mainstreamed. Conversely, Japan‟sstrong antimilitarist identity has faded. Pacifism has not disappeared. Thus, tensions
exist between a normal state identity and a nonmilitarist identity (Wang, 2006).
Although mainstream Japan desires to become a normal state, one has to recognize
the growing influence of right-wing nationalists who seek to reverse the historicalverdict on Japan‟s aggressive past and to assert what they believe are Japan‟s rights
vis-à-vis neighboring nations.
Japanese Identity is now framed primarily as a member of the “G-7,” and thiscategorization allows Japan to free itself from a sense of separation from the West,from the modern, and allows Japan to assume a rightful place in a club whose
members share the world‟s highest per capita incomes (Masaru, 2003).
U.S.-Japan Alliance also affects Japanese Identity. And the alliance is not about toerode soon. Japanese political culture is dependent on the security arrangement with
the United States, thus will remain ambiguous as long as the United States continues
to command preponderance in East Asia security affairs.
3. Interaction
An image of China as a nondemocratic violator of human rights also sharpened
Japanese‟s image of itself as a mature democracy. Japan has its self-image as a
powerful country that should mentor China as a developing nation in its
modernization drive, and as a bridge between Asia and the West. Although China has
become an open country and Sino-Japan Economic Relation has become moreinterdependent, regarding the nation type, Japan still holds that both Japan and the17United States are “Western Democratic Countries”, while China is just a developing“transition country” (Zhu, 2007). As a matter of fact, Japan has been holding a“mental advantage” to her neighbor countries since the beginning of the modern time.
Furthermore, in a few Japanese people‟s minds, the ideas of “looking down” on her
neighbor countries or societies have never changed since Japan adopted the policy of“Leaving Asia and Joining Europe”(Koro, 1999).
Japan‟s image of China changed drastically again after the mid-1990s. The Japanesestill saw China as politically different, but there was a new shift bred of concern about
a rising China and a declining Japan, accompanied by a growing belief among theJapanese that their country could not depend on economic power alone to be a player
in the global power game.
By the mid-1990s, the Chinese began to view Japan‟s development model critically.
This was a noticeable shift. As a leading Japan specialist in China noted, the Chinese
public went from one extreme to the other: The Chinese were afraid of Japan in theearly 1990s but were now confident that China could take on Japan by itself.

Ⅶ Concluding Remarks
China‟s threat perception of Japan after the Cold War is a very complicated issue. No
single model, theory can give the whole picture. This paper examines three potential
explanations for the rise of “Japan treat” based on realism, constructivism, andtheories of apology. The paper finds out that enhanced U.S.-Japan Alliance was the
major cause of the rise of “Japan Threat” argument. One of the biggest concerns for18

China is territorial integrity. Therefore, Taiwan problem stands as the core interest of
China. The enhanced U.S.-Japan Alliance listed “Peaceful Resolve of Taiwan” as oneof the “common strategic objectives” between the United States and Japan in the
Asia-Pacific region, which may undermine China‟s reunification of Taiwan.
Meanwhile, the tendency to perceive treats was strengthened by Japan‟s unapologetic
remembrance of history and non-shared identity between China and Japan.
However, the relative change of power position between China and Japan, China‟sleaders‟ miscalculation of the big powers game, and the rise of Chinese Nationalism
may take a role of China‟s threat perception of Japan. These are all the points which
need a further research.

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William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations,23

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990
Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press,
1999
Dissertations:
Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki, The Rise of “China Threat” Argument in the United States,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006
Norman A. Graham, Threat Perception, Policy-making, and International
Cooperation: A Comparative Study of the British and French Cases, 1963-1976,
Columbia University, 1980

24

Table 1
Convention:
US$ m. = Million US dollars; - = Empty cell
. . = Data not available or not applicable, ( ) = Uncertain figure, [ ] = SIPRI estimate.

Japan
Military expenditure in b.yen
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
3655 3865 4099 4329 4510

1993
4618

1994
4673

1995
4714

1996
4815

1997
4922

1998
4942

1999
4934

2000
4935

2001
4950

2002
4956

2003
4954

2004
4916

2005
4868

2006
4824

Military expenditure in constant(2005)US$ m.
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
37135 38395 39513 40410 41390 41849 42051 42471 43328 43521 43405 43483 43802 44275 44725 44814 44473 44165 43701
Military expenditure as percentage of gross domestic product1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
1
.9
.9
.9
.9
1
1
1
1

1997
1

1998
1

1999
1

Comments:Figures for Japan include the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO).
Figures are for the adopted budget, rather than actual expenditure
Figures do not include military pensions

Source: SIPRI

25

2000
1

2001
1

2002
1

2003
1

2004
1

2005
1

2006