from the British Prime Minister Sebastiano Maffettone (Bruxelles conference Spring
2011)“From Liberal Multiculturalism to Multicultural Liberalism”

Section 1: The Nature of the Problem

The last European authoritative expression of retreat from multiculturalism cameDavid Cameron. In his speech at Munich Conference (Feb. 2011) Mr Cameron
formulated a wholehearted rejection of “the doctrine of state multiculturalism”. In his
words:“ ...I believe it is time to turn the page on the failed policies of the past. So ... insteadof encouraging people to live apart, we need a clear sense of shared national identitythat is open to everyone.”
Cameron’s criticism is framed as a defence of a neutral and liberal-democraticnational identity against the “separatist” attacks moved by multiculturalism. In thisperiod, Mr Cameron has been in good company. His own political position on
multiculturalism –since then- has been substantially endorsed by the German
Chancellor Merkel and the French President Sarkozy. Moreover it has been precededby a substantial amount of similar criticism recently formulated by many Westerngovernments including the ones of Holland and Australia, countries that were before
among the supporters of multicultural policies. In the last years, the public crisis ofmulticulturalism has been confirmed by numerous media attacks and government
Reports. Moreover, both political, bureaucratic and media harsh criticisms of
multiculturalism seem to correspond to widespread popular sentiments and to theelectoral behaviour of voters.
Of course, reasons behind political and media strategies can be also motivatedby tactical needs. For instance, one can imagine that Cameron and other politicians

are making an attempt to distance themselves from the past to be more in tune withthe expectations of a fluid electorate which is supposed to be anti-multicultural. If westay within a tactical interpretation, the backlash of multiculturalism in the Westwould merely depend on the political cycle -caused by a simultaneous increase in
unemployment and immigration- having no particular theoretical implications. Thispurely tactical view can however be hardly defended if we consider the intellectualand emotional width of the phenomenon and the huge number of criticisms tomulticultural liberalism that have been contemporaneously presented from atheoretical point of view (see Section 3 forward) 1.
This recent anti-multiculturalism contrasts with the traditional sympathies withwhom multiculturalism was received until about ten years ago. Many citizens of theWest became friends of multiculturalism with the hippy generation and the pro-thirdworld attitude of 1968, by looking the photo reportages of Seastiao Salgado, by
traveling in India and South America, by dreaming Africa and California, by going
through the train stations and airports of cosmopolitan cities. In the West,multiculturalism as cultural strategy and platform for policies has about 40 years ofhistory, inaugurated by Trudeau in Canada following US trends, then adopted byAustralia, and in the eighties by UK, Holland, Germany and so on. In its generalmeaning, multiculturalism can be taken a positive response to the claims of the age of“identity politics”, in which minorities demand forms of recognition, such as
language rights, cultural or religious autonomy, regional self-government, or
increased political representation. For obvious reasons, the peak of this identity
politics has coincided with the fall of communism in 1989, and with the progressive
sunset of class politics. It is plausible to argue –in the light of the recent evidencethat European governments, their public opinion and more generally the mosttraditional liberal-democratic countries are moving against multiculturalism in the1

A consequent problem concerns the way in which we are supposed to put in touch the empirical side of the backlashof multiculturalism and the theoretical discussion.(see Jopke 239, see also Levy 2000). Multiculturalism is together adescription of attitudes and policies and a normative project. I will not discuss however this specific problem here,
being content to say that critical political theory follows here critical political practices.

last ten years. There is a widespread shift of sentiments involved in this supposed
backlash of multiculturalism2.
The atmosphere of sympathy of once is not the same in the last period, andcoherently it is more difficult to enforce public policies inspired by multiculturalism.
Still, it is unclear what properly means to be multicultural. There are many ways to be
multicultural and correspondingly to deny this very possibility. In the paper, I willargue that to be multicultural in a sensible and right way one must before be liberal.
More generally, in my opinion liberal-democracy is a precondition for soundmulticulturalism.
It is quite natural to ask what is the substance matter of this supposed crisis of
the practice and the theory of multiculturalism. Both practice and theory ofmulticulturalism traditionally concern three basic issues:(i)

Ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities within a state like Quebec in
Canada and South Tyrol in Italy;(ii)

Indigenous people like Australian aborigines and American Indians;(iii)

Migrants like people from North Africa in continental Europe and latinos in
US.

Now, the first and important point in this light consists in noting that in the last years
there have been no particular problems in connection with sub-state minorities andindigenous people. Words like retreat, backlash and crisis apply to multiculturalism
only if we have in mind the third option, that is the case of migrants. For sub-stateminorities and indigenous people there has been nothing similar.
Assuming that this conclusion is reasonable, and that we have main difficulties
with multiculturalism when migrants are at stake, we can make another step. We cannote that the timing of the supposed crisis of multiculturalism in the West2honestly admitted by theoreticians, see K., “The Rise…” 32,33).

corresponds to the after September 2001 widespread Islamophobia. There seems to
be a connection between the crisis of multiculturalism and the “complicate”
relationship between Westerners and Arabs and more generally with Muslims after
2001. Which means that we could concentrate the investigation focussing on the
Muslim minorities in the Western world in particular Europe, like are for example
Arabs in France and in Southern Europe, Turkish in Germany, other Asian Muslims
in North Europe and UK. In so doing, of course one does not capture the wholemeaning of the problem concerning multiculturalism today, and for example does notconsider the role of latinos in US, of Samis in Northern Europe and of Chinese in
East Asia, but surely can grasp a substantial part of the popular shift from more toless multiculturalism in theory and practice.
On this basis, I will mainly discuss the multicultural attitude of liberalism andits supposed crisis in the light of the problem as specified by the presence of Muslim
minorities in Europe. The discussion will be kept within the limits of a politicalphilosophical point of view. In Section 2, I will present an articulated conceptual
framework concerning the treatment of Muslim minorities (actually I concentrate
upon Arab minorities). I claim that form a normative point of view there is aconvergent interest –if we assume a Muslim and a Western observer- to respect
minimal liberal-democracy when multicultural problems are at stake. Muslims andWestern observers can share this horizon.
Sharing this horizon is the consequence of a sort of “overlapping consensus”
between the two observers here at stake 3. If however a limited overlapping consensus
is the form in which we can imagine an Arab and a Western observer could agree onsome basic principles of liberal-democracy, the content of their agreement must be
defined in other terms. In the final part of Section 2 and in Section 3, I advance thehypothesis that this content cam be understood in terms of “public reason”. To be
more precise, I imagine two different conceptions of public reason, the first being
3

On this interpretation of the notion of overlapping consensus, see Rawls 1993 (1996) and Maffettone 2010

weaker and the second stronger. This distinction is based on the nature of theconsensus on liberal-democracy in the universes to which I am referring, the Araband the Western. In both cases, public reason aims to reunite –only in limited areas
when fundamental public issues are treated- citizens divided by different
comprehensive doctrines. My interpretation says that this unifying role of publicreason can be twofold, depending on how much of liberal-democratic rules of thegame the citizens are supposed to hold in common. The older and firm is the tradition
and the respect of liberal-democracy, the stronger can be the consensual basis for
public reason.
This is why there are differences when one takes in consideration the
distinction between Western and Arab countries. In liberal-democratic Westernpolities it is usually possible to get a stronger background consensus on public reason,and consequently to advance more intense liberal-democratic claims than in the Arabpolities. This is so because in the West pluralism is constitutionally defended in amore robust way.
This background framework –with the form of an overlapping consensus on adifferent amount of public reasons to share- is intentioned to show the way in which
the qualification “multicultural” requires a preliminary liberal platform to be properly
understood and applied. In particular, I identify three levels of liberal-democracy:
level 1 concerns minimal liberal-democracy; level 2 Western like liberal-democracy;
level 3 pluralism. Arabs and Westerners are supposed to share an interest, inconditions of overlapping consensus, for keeping alive level 1, whereas Westerners
defend level 2 when discussing home features in which background public reason canbe stronger. Level 3, namely pluralism, depends on levels 1 and 2.
The supposed crisis of multiculturalism seems to depend on the fact thatmulticulturalism itself can weaken the defence of these levels of liberal-democracy.
To put it bluntly, many Arabs think that they cannot even speak of minorities andmulticulturalism until when they would have got level 1. Even a relatively weak

convergence on public reason seems problematic for them living in situations inwhich often liberal-democratic citizenship is denied 4. Public reason exists to defend
pluralism, and pluralism is someway incompatible with a collectivist view of Muslim
umma. Westerners instead are afraid that by conceding too much to the claims ofminorities and to multiculturalism –in particular if these minorities are inspired by
Muslim comprehensive doctrines- they can jeopardize their level 2 of liberaldemocracy. Their strong consensus on basic public reason can be jeopardized.
According to this opinion, Muslim political culture, being sometimes substantiallypre-modern, does not permit the flourishing of a robust public reason 5 . Previous
equilibrium points, like liberal multiculturalism, do not seem, to the eyes of many
Westerners, adequate to protect from these widely perceived risks.
In Section 3, the idea of a “multicultural liberalism” is analysed and defended
contrasting it with “liberal multiculturalism”-. In the first part of the Section, I give acomparative

quasi-semantic

definition

of

the

terms

“liberalism”

and“multiculturalism” highlighting the differences between the two notions. Thistaxonomy permits to make sense of the best attempt to reconcile the terms which isprobably the one provided by Will Kymlicka that I label here “liberalmulticulturalism” (LM) 6 . Then I try to examine in the light of some well known
criticisms to LM the main responses by the advocates of LM. In the concluding
remarks, I note that some perplexities for what concerns LM are still present and I
propose an alternative view, labelled here multicultural-liberalism or ML, where theemphasis evidently is on the necessary priority of liberal-democracy to get soundmulticulturalism. This conclusion seems coherent with what is said in Section 2. Inother words, the supposed crisis of multiculturalism has a lot to do with the difficult
relationships between Arabs and Westerners in particular in Europe. Their reciprocal
concerns however –if properly investigated- do not focus on cultural difference in
4

For “public reason” see books quoted in Note 3
Of course, this Western view is reinforced by Islamic radicals like the Egyptian Al Qutb (2000) and the Pakistani
Mawdudi6
See Kymlicka1989, 1995 and5itself but rather on a kind of liberal-democratic deficit that both Arabs and Westerners
perceive behind their respective institutional structures. This deficit can be analysedin terms of a weakening of the background consensus on public reason when
multiculturalism is not opportunely qualified –a public reason which is stronger in theWest than in the Muslim world- in both kinds of societies.
Perhaps, it is even superfluous to close this section by arguing that my claim in
this paper does not pretend to be neutral, both culturally and politically speaking,from a global point of view. The whole argument, on the contrary, is framed in termsof Western philosophical liberalism.. Before maintaining that this point of view-the
one in which the West presents the scheme the others are supposed to accept- isneither fair nor empirically plausible, one should to think about two main
characteristics of my proposal. First, I divide the world in two parts, the liberaldemocratic Europe and the less liberal-democratic Arab world. The division of course
can be extended to the political structure of the whole planet even if, in these terms, it
is not treated here. Within this limit I claim that to have minimal liberal-democracy isof general interest in both parts. The distinction comes afterwards, when in the more
liberal-democratic Europe a stronger level of public reason is defended. So, if nonliberal democratic groups and individuals offend minimal liberal-democracy they are
responsible of breaking the world order both in Europe and in the Arab world.
Breaking a stronger view of liberal-democracy and public reason, is instead relevant
only if we take in consideration Europe (and the Western world). Second, my starting
point coincides with a crisis of multiculturalism concerning in particular Europe. If
this retreat is not dependent on merely empirical matters, like growing unemployment,
than ideological factors have some relevance. Within the range of these ideologicalfactors, I think that in Europe the fear of an attack to public reason by minorities
someway connected with the Islam is a popular and significant aspect of thewidespread anti-multiculturalism. If this is true, like I believe, then the attempt to put
some liberal conditions to weaken this fear is particularly important to block thegrowing wave of anti-multiculturalism. Which means that, in the long run to put
liberal conditions on minorities is in their interest.

Section 2 Arab Minorities and Liberal-democracy
The problem of Arab minorities can be investigated from different points of view. It
is matter of further concern to understand whether and why these points of view –reflecting different situations- can be coherently treated. Before going into this,however, we must clearly state what are these different points of view, given thebinary vie I have assumed. Not surprisingly, they are:i. The perspective of a Western observer concerning an Arab minority
within a liberal-democratic Western country;
ii. The perspective of an Arab observer concerning an Arab minority withina liberal-democratic Western country;iii. The perspective of a Western observer concerning an Arab minority
within an Arab country;
iv. The perspective of an Arab observer concerning an Arab minority within
an Arab country;
v. The perspective of a Western observer concerning a non-Arab minority
in an Arab country;
vi. The perspective of an Arab observer concerning a non-Arab minority in
an Arab country;
For simplifying, I avoided to take in consideration possibilities beyond the ArabWestern couple of observers, taking Arabs as test-case instead that a more general
Muslim option and excluding for example even important perspectives like Asian
Muslims’. I also –and for the same reasons- assumed that all Arab observers are
Muslim (or at least serious influenced by a generic Islamic doctrine) and that allWestern observers are not Muslim. Moreover, even more unrealistically, there is nodistinction between Sunni and Shi and the Arab Muslim doctrine here considered is avague and generic Islamic form of background culture. Finally, there is the qualifying
determination “liberal-democratic” before “Western country” in the here above list. It
must not be taken as saying that all Western countries are liberal-democratic and all
the Arab countries are not so, but rather as a simplification strategy to keep thenumber of variables minimal.
Under these assumptions, it is fair to split the camp in two parts: what happensin the liberal-democratic West, say Europe (which is the core of my argument); what
happens in the Arab world (that I am not discussing here if not occasionally).
Minorities are here always discussed under this binary framework. Now, it is clearthat this move is controversial, because how can we suppose that –even if we concedethat the people can be indifferent toward the ethnic or religious specifications of aminority (whether for example it is Arab or not)- there is no difference between the
Arab and the Western observer? Indeed, to accept this we must make a tremendous
tour de force. In other words, this similarity of perspective can be taken seriously if
and only if we make strong assumptions on the normative side of theapproach.
Form the normative point of view, we can suppose that liberal-democracy
offers a privileged position that we are universally invited to accept. Of course, one
knows that there is not only one liberal-democracy but several and that many people
would endorse forms of liberal-democracy different from the traditional Western one.
Still, normatively, we can pivot our pluralistic approach around a fixed point which
consists in a priori approving one ideal form of liberal-democracy. In other words, it
seems that generic liberal-democracy is a pre-condition for pluralism andconsequently for multiculturalism. This form of liberal-democracy will be thin andweak. I have in mind under the universal acceptance of liberal-democracy only thegeneral agreement on the fact that we prefer a society in which some basic humanrights are respected and some consultation procedures are observed 7.
If we assume the normative priority of liberal-democracy in this minimal form,
then we get a vantage point of view in our conception of pluralism. To put it inRawlsian, we can accept that there are limits to admissible pluralism and that theselimits are oriented by the prior legitimation that the common liberal-democratic
horizon offers 8 . In my interpretation, this legitimation presupposition offers thepossibility of the coexistence within it of different justifications. These justifications
will refer only to “reasonable comprehensive doctrines”, the required reasonablenessbeing given from the fact that all the justification bearers accept the common
normative standpoint of liberal-democracy (albeit in a partial and limited way).
Continuing with the Rawlsian terminology, in these conditions a fusion of horizons
based on an “overlapping consensus” becomes now plausible. Different people, withdifferent beliefs anchored in alternative worldviews, nevertheless can converge on
limited political pre-conditions concerning liberal-democracy.
An overlapping consensus, however, presupposes a basic structure like theliberal-democratic nation-state. How can we expand overlapping consensus outside
this domain, moreover going from the institutional original meaning of the expression
to the new cultural sense of which we are discussing here and now? After all, what is
at stake is the possible and plausible convergence of two different perspectives: theWesterner and the Arab. And there is no doubt that the original overlapping
consensus concerns a largely less vague post-constitutional agreement upon thereasons for which in liberal-democracy we can accept the force of the state evenwhen we disagree with the reasons motivating it. We need a further step toward thepossible and plausible convergence of the Western and Arab perspectives on
minorities, before we proceed to investigate how this convergent standpoint can

78

a society that is “decent” in the Rawlsian sense, see Rawls 1999
See Maffettone 2010

constitute a basis for examining the twofold case of minorities in the West and in the
Arab world.
This further step can be offered from that Kantian device Rawls calls“conjecture” 9. In Rawls’ theory of public reason, “conjecture” appears as one of theforms in which comprehensive doctrines can be used without violating the limits ofpublic reason (other forms being “declaration” and “witnessing”). In case of
conjecture, “...we argue from what we believe, or conjecture, are other people’s basic
doctrines, religious or secular, and try to show them that, despite what they might
think, they can still endorse a reasonable political conception that can provide a basis
for public reason” 10. By conjecturing we put ourselves in the others shoes, trying toshow how their views fit the requirements of public reason being compatible with apolitical conception of liberalism. This move is here needed because the Western and
the Arab observer are empirically nourished by different background cultures. The
normative approach, so conceived, provides a reason for stating that all theparticipants to this ideal dialogue share a common interest for liberal-democracy.
This political common basis trumps several distinctions originated in the backgroundculture permitting a limited overlapping consensus. For the same reason, we canimagine that the Arab and Western observer can converge and constraint theirdifferences coming from their alternative background cultures when fundamental
political items are at stake.
The further step consists in assuming that minimal liberal-democracy is part ofthe shared political culture. In so doing, I imagine a division of labour. Both theobservers, the Arab and the Western, share the minimal liberal-democratic politicalpart, whereas they are divided by their respective general comprehensive doctrines.
On such a basis, it is possible to conceive of some basic rights that both observers,
the Arab and the Western, would like to be respected everywhere when they think ofmulticulturalism. This means that these rights are conceived of as a priori constraints
9
10

March 2009
See Rawls’ “The Idea of Public Reason Rivisited” in Rawls 1999, pp 155-6

with respect to the policies that Western and Arab polities are authorized to
implement. The implication for the discussion upon minorities is that both observers,
the Arab and the Western, should welcome treatments of minorities that respect basic
rights and favour consultation procedures.
Analogy tends to stop here. For, under our assumptions Western states are
more robustly liberal-democratic. This implies that in the Western environment there
could be a stronger claim to protect liberal rights and democratic procedures than in
the Arab environment. I maintain that it is normal to argue separately about these twoissues, keeping the shared minimal liberal-democratic perspective of theobservers. The way in which we can separate these two environments does notconcern the form of the overlapping consensus, but rather the content on which thisconsensus insists. This content can be defined in terms of public reason.
Rawls’ public reason does not concern a determinate object, but rather thelimits of the public debate when fundamental questions are at stake within a liberaldemocratic society. From this point of view, public reason is the reason of thecitizens, being public in three ways: (i) as reason of the citizens, it is also the reasonof the public; (ii) its subject is the good of the public when constitutional essentials
and matters of fundamental justice are concerned; (iii) its nature and content are
public in so far they are provided by the political conception (PL 213). Public reason
concerns the constraints upon the way we address each other in liberal-democracy.
The first constraint imposed by public reason is an institutional one. There are many
political topics which are not included in this domain. Public reason does not apply
prima facie to the cultural debates that, albeit politically significant, take placeoutside these institutional constraints, such as those that take place in churches,families, universities and other associations. All these non-public debates are part of
the “background culture”. The criteria of public reason do apply, on other hand,when we have political deliberations in “public forums” and, more controversially,when citizens discuss about voting and more generally about constitutional essentials
and matters of public justice (PL 215) i.
There are also two different ways in which public reason can be understood. In
both ways, the role of public reason is analogous. Public reason is always functional
to keep citizens united over fundamental issues of justice in conditions of substantial
pluralism. So conceived, public reason is always a virtue of liberal-democratic
citizenship that emerges when diversity is at stake. The two ways in which it can beunderstood depart from this common function. In the first, more robust interpretation,
public reason depends on a strong point of view from which controversial issues
concerning basic justice must be evaluated. In the second, less robust interpretation,
public reason depends on the mere convergence of different points of view. From ahistorical and interpretive perspective, one can maintain that countries of antique andfirm tradition of liberal-democracy tend to adopt the first more robust interpretationof public reason, whereas other countries the second less robust interpretation.
An immediate consequence of this reasoning, consists in saying that often
Western countries adopt the stronger, conception of public reason whereas Arabcountries aim to reach the weaker, conception of public reason. To grasp the
difference and the similarity between these two environments, we can think of a
metaphor like the following. Imagine a wall in a museum. Upon the wall there is only
one framework that can frame one picture at time. Within the metaphor, we havethree levels: level 1 is the wall, level 2 is the framework, level 3 the picture. Now,
level 1 represents the general conceptual space of minimal liberal-democracy. In it,
just some basic rights and vague consultation procedures are significant and valid. At
level 2, instead, rights and democracy get a further implementation, oriented to the
tradition of Western liberal-democracy. Level 3, finally, gives conceptual space to thefact of cultural pluralism: on the same museum wall, within the same framework
many pictures are supposed to change. The three levels, all together taken, represent
the conceptual space of pluralism in liberal-democracy at different stages. We assume
that both the Arab and the Western observer share level 1, or in other words that they

share a political culture in which –from a normative point of view- basic rights andminimal democracy are embedded. Both can get at this level what we called theconvergence view weaker form of public reason. The analogy, however, ends withlevel 2, where a Western liberal-democratic institutional background provides aunifying framework that does not exist in the standard contemporary Arab world.
This unifying framework coincides with the adoption of a stronger, form of publicreason 11. As far as the level 3 is concerned, we can instead imagine that the single
pictures represent several cultural minorities.
Out of metaphor, this means that –when we have in mind the treatment ofminorities- we can conjecture similar attitudes of both observers, the Arab and theWestern, for what concerns the general respect of basic rights and minimal
democracy (at level 1 before). This level coincides with the acceptance of a weakview of public reason based on the mere convergence of different perspectives. When
we however discuss the problem in the environment of Western liberal-democracy
we can advance stronger liberal democratic claims in agreement with a more robust
view of public reason. (level 2). Less robust liberal-democratic claims instead can beadvanced if we discuss minorities in the Arab environment.
It is natural to ask what are the consequences of this dual system. Note that theone I have imagined is an inclusive duality. Western societies are supposed to share –albeit in a differentiated way- level 1 and level 2 of protection, whereas Arab
(Muslim) societies are supposed either to share level 1 or not even it. In this secondcase they are “before” justice, and the minority cultures problems are not seen at all.
Assuming however that they (the Arab societies) share level 1 of protection, in what
does consist the main difference of protection with Western societies? Basically, thedifference I see is that they share a more restricted normative plateau. This normative
plateau may be seen as similar to the content of basic human rights. In Western
societies instead we pretend much more. If acceptable, this distinction would be of11

for the meaning of this distinction I refer to Macedo (unpublished paper and personal communication) .

paramount importance. For, the minimalist human rights-like normative plateau –thatis the concern of the Arab societies as here imagined- is matter of international
concern. The violation of its main rules is not an internal affair of the states, butrather it is something the international community will take in serious consideration
and will provide for in ways to be decided case by case. On the contrary, the more
pretentious Western platform of rights is –in standard cases- defended by the states asrepresentatives of their citizens. The crisis of multiculturalism in the West depends –in my interpretation- on the fear Western population nourish that migrants (inparticular if Muslims) will violate their ambitious system of rights. This system isconnected with a robust view of public reason. Now, the way in which I see theconflict between respect for pluralism and fear for the related risks in the West is
roughly game-theoretical. We can imagine a tit for tat situation, in which Western
societies are ready to accept pluralism for migrants but only if migrants themselves
are inclined to accept prior basic liberal rules of conduct. As a consequence, states
will propose to the representatives of migrants an offer including some liberty rights
under the conditions that they will respect some prior conditions of adequacy withrespect to the rules of the game as seen by a Western liberal-democratic society. This
strategy exemplifies the main difference between LM and ML: as we shall see LM isready to give rights before hoping for adaptation to them by the migrant (minority)
population later: ML instead implies that the state bargains in name of its citizens:
migrants will not get some rights if not through a prior commitment to respect ofpublic reason.

Section 3: Toward Multicultural Liberalism
3.1. From LM to ML
In this Section, I argue that the traditional reconciliation between the claims ofliberalism and the claims of multiculturalism does not work. This traditional

reconciliation is here identified with liberal multiculturalism or LM. On the one side,
it seems that LM is not able in particular to cancel Western fears of ceding too muchof their countries level 2 of liberal-democracy –and coherently of their strong notionof public reason- if confronted with significant Muslim minorities. On the other side,
also in Arab countries liberal-democratic citizenship coherent with level 1 above
presented –and necessary to hold a weak view of public reason- seems to many anecessary premise for accepting multiculturalism. On this basis, I propose
multicultural liberalism or ML as an approach that better fits these needs. To reframe
the thesis within the dictionary of public reason, one could argue that the challenge ofmulticulturalism –we are discussing in this conference- can be re-proposed in theWest –and in Europe as a sub-case within the West- as a challenge to a more robust,
form of public reason. Western countries are afraid of the multicultural challenge
because they fear that the differences it introduces in society can be too violent topermit to keep alive the strong conception of public reason they normally adopt intheir liberal-democratic citizenization. LM does not give a sufficient response to thisperceived danger, whereas ML can.
The argument in favour of ML is not difficult to understand if we have in mind
the case of the Muslim migrants in the West and in Europe in particular. I interpreted
public reason in the light of a Rawlsian view of political liberalism. This view
requires not only that the state cannot be used to impose whatsoever version of thegood life connected with a comprehensive doctrine but also that people, as
individuals or groups does not matter here, cannot force others to act in agreementwith a conception of the good. This requirement of course concerns in particularqualified minorities in which cultural membership has consequences that normally
imply an obligatory respect of a comprehensive doctrine. No surprise that many
liberals identify these minorities with Muslim minorities. Standard liberals have noproblems in understanding what is that these cultural minorities cannot do within aliberal-democratic Western environment: they must for example guarantee free exit
and liberty of religion to their members, they have to educate children to pluralism,they cannot punish in a cruel and unusual way their members or cannot do harmful
things (like genital mutilation), they cannot publicly discriminate across genders andso on (see March 97 and ff.).
Of course, if these requirements are easy to accept for standard liberals, often
they are not so for members of Muslim minorities 12. They can even feel offended by
the imposition of a liberal outlook obliging them to respect rules of the game they do
not share. Standard liberals themselves can understand what is at stake here: publicreason is after all is for permitting to people more independence and autonomy notless. And this general predicament is supposed to be valid also for Muslim citizens
and residents in Western states. Still, standard liberals fear that permitting too muchautonomy and independence to members of cultural minorities –in particular if
Muslim- can undermine the public reason oriented bases of their liberal-democratic
regime. At this point, we can imagine a kind of bargaining situation: liberal citizensof the Western states want to be assured that the liberties that are quintessential totheir political regimes will not be used by cultural minorities –in particular if Muslimto implement illiberal strategies and forms of behaviour. In particular, within theframework I presented, liberal majorities in the West when confronted with Muslim
minorities are afraid of risking the strong conception of public reason which is at thecentre of their liberal-democratic system. It is here that ML and LM differ. For ML
requires a more stringent acceptance of the basic liberal-framework before including
the minoritarian differences within the community. The more stringent acceptance I
have in mind coincides with the acceptance by the cultural minorities of a strong
conception of public reason.

3.2. Liberalism versus Multiculturalism

12

for difficulties see March 2009

Before directly addressing the distinction between LM and ML in terms of
public reason, I think a detour is needed. In this detour I try to analyse the meaning
and the limits of what I call the “reconciliation strategy” adopted by LM. The
reconciliation I have in mind is a reconciliation between liberalism andmulticulturalism. Both LM and ML of course depends on what we mean by“liberalism” and “multiculturalim” and how these two concepts can be related. Even
if it is almost impossible to properly define liberalism because there are many
liberalisms, I will assume –for the sake of the argument- that liberalism ischaracterized by the following elements:(i)

Individualism. Liberal political theory starts with an assumption of

normative individualism. According to normative individualism, main function of theliberal theory consists in protecting individual interests and rights assuming that there
are fundamental individual interests and rights that cannot be trumped for reasons ofgeneral well-being. Deliberative democratic procedures are usually conceived of as
instrumental to this goal. ;(ii) Pluralism. In a liberal society, citizens believe in a situation characterized bymoral and political pluralism. This basic pluralism is a fact we observe but also avalue we praise, and there are “burdens of judgment” that make impossible to convert
this basic pluralism in an universal consensus. This irreducible pluralism concerns
topics in which moral and political values are at stake. The possible destructive effectof pluralism is balanced by citizens’ overlapping consensus on matters of priorpolitical relevance.
(iii) Basic structure. To what entity our theory refers to? One can imagine several
concentric circles: self and family, ethnic or religious group, nation-state, humanity.
Some scholars say that there could be a scalar greatness according to which ourloyalty goes from the nearer to farer. Standard liberalism usually presupposes thenation-state as basic structure. This depends on its implicit institutionalism. Liberalpolitical theory still moves in the horizon of the Leviathan even if many auspicate amore cosmopolitan turn.
(iv) (Equal) Liberty. Equal liberty is considered a fundamental asset for a liberalsociety. According to many liberal theorists, liberty presupposes individual autonomy
as capacity of formulating and revising conceptions of the good life.
(v) Neutrality. Within liberal political theory the state, and more generally public
institutions, must be neutral and fair in matters concerning religious and secularcomprehensive theories. This requisite can be put in terms of public reason, whose
limits must be observed by public institutions especially when coercion is at stake.
What we mean instead by multiculturalism? In what sense to be multicultural
challenges liberalism? In what sense the conjunction between multiculturalism andliberalism is an oxymoron? Let us see how including multiculturalism can change theabove definition of liberalism.
(i) (Partial) Communitarianism instead of individualism: groups are the focus of themulticultural theory and they normatively count instead of individuals. In this sense,
multicultural normative theory protects group (minorities) rights and interests.
(ii) Pluralism. In multiculturalism, cultural pluralism takes over moral and politicalpluralism. In this sense, a multicultural doctrine is naturally differentialist because isdifference itself to count instead than difference of ideals of justice and conceptionsof the good. Moral and political pluralism hold the most important values areincommensurable 13 and that anyway uniformity is impossible and not even desirable
in the practical domain. Moral-political pluralism is however different from cultural
pluralism: e.g. a large quantity of Nazi fans would implement diversity within thecultural spectrum of Belgian population. Nevertheless, do we miss them? Cultural
pluralism in itself cannot be identified with a political ideal. If we can praise a society

13This is Berlin’s metrical gap

able to keep alive a large amount of moral and political diversity of opinions, wecannot praise a society simply because it keeps alive many different cultural
traditions. Cultural diversity cannot not easily be taken as an intrinsic good likebiological diversity instead is. This means that –for a liberal- normative protection of
moral and political pluralism trumps the normative protection of cultural pluralism.
From this a natural questions descends: how is it possible to justify cross cultural
moral-political criticism if we defend cultural pluralism?
(iii) Basic structure. For multicultural scholars, the basic structure cannot coincidewith the state in the liberal tradition. The emphasis here is not on the nation state(whose borders sometimes are considered arbitrary) but rather on smallerintermediate-hyphenated groups. 14 There are different ways to reconcile a two(many)-fold institutional interpretations of basic structure. If universal nationalism
can seem intrinsically inconsistent 15, then some form of federalism can appear as thenormal solution. Reconciliation strategies focus on the strong connection between
institutions (e.g. the state) and their ethnic presupposition (e.g. the nation). They canfor example maintain that liberal-democratic institutions are traditionally “vernacular”
rather than universal.
(iv) (Equal) Liberty. Multicultural liberty usually is not liberty from culturalmembership. It is rather liberty of cultural membership. Consequently, one is invited
to distinguish between liberty out and in a minority or a group. Groupal sentiments
are often hostile toward outsiders. The reconciliation arrives through the idea ofinternal restrictions. There must be limits to the power of minorities, for example
favouring the exit from them, to have a view compatible with a LM. The dialectics
between internal (minorities’) point of view and versus the external (society’s) pointof view is relevant here. 16.

14

see Levy 2000 on the non-reconciliability of nationalisms)
idem
16
see Goodin 2006
15

(v)

(v) Neutrality is obviously challenged by multicultural doctrines: you are supposed tonormatively defend group (minorities) rights in a non-neutral way otherwise they
could.

It is possible to be tolerant toward all religions (or for what matterscomprehensive doctrines) but it is not possible to affirm their values
simultaneously 17. In this case, it is possible to be neutral only if there is a liberal
basic structure behind.

3.3. Reconciliation strategy.
If there is a sort of natural mismatch between “liberalism” and“multiculturalism”, then attempts to reconcile them are also ways to overcome thedistinctions between the two concepts we have shown. Reconciliation strategies, inthis light, try to make multiculturalism compatible with liberalism. The most wellknown liberal view of multiculturalism has probably been proposed by Will
Kymlicka 18 . Liberal multiculturalism claims that states should not only endorse
traditional civil, social and political rights but also recognize identities andaspirations of ethno-cultural groups 19 . This reconciliation strategy is based on theidea of recognition. In the paper, I will mainly allude to Kymlicka’s 20 view when I
speak of “liberal multiculturalism” or LM.
In general terms, to reconcile liberalism and multiculturalism LM aims toprovide a connection between individual autonomy and collective rights. The central
idea within this project of reconciliation consists in the “context of choice” view 21.
According to this view, freedom of choice –which is the standard liberal starting
point- cannot be context independent. Freedom of choice and consequently thepossibility to form and revise conceptions of the good life is on the contrary shaped
17

See Levy 2003 p. 31
See Kymlicka 2007, but see also at least Taylor 1992
19
See Kymlicka 2007 p. 61
20
and Taylor’s idea of a recognition deficit, see Taylor 199221
the expression is Goodin’s
18

by the cultural milieu in which we are necessarily embedded. In this view, in sum,
one cannot reach full autonomy without going through an original cultural context.
In the following, I will split the concept of “context of choice” in two parts.
The first part concerns the idea of context with the related thesis according to which
there is no autonomy without proper cultural context. The second part concerns theidea of choice and the connected notion of responsibility. The distinction is here –as
we shall see- the one between choice and circumstance, where we can attributeresponsibility only to choices. Within the context of choice view, there is no real
choice without a life inspired by an appropriate cultural environment.
The corollary of the context of choice view is that often minority groups are
deprived of this “authentic” choice or risk to be so. Traditionally these groups weresilenced when pretending to exit this marginalised status. LM reasonably argues that
this discriminatory situation is not acceptable any more and that traditional liberal“benign neglect” is not enough to protect endangered cultural minorities. This is why
we need a normative theory which protects minorities from cultural expropriation.
Protecting directly the cultural environment of groups and assuming the context ofchoice view, LM claims to indirectly protect also autonomy in the traditional liberal
sense. To universalize: if we are all embedded in groups and if only on thiscontextualization depend true autonomous choices, then there is no way to guarantee
autonomy but by protecting group rights.
However, as we have noted, often multiculturalism seems to endanger the very
possibility to take seriously liberalism. Does the reconciliation strategy of LM avoid
this risk? From this point of view LM has been critically discussed at length and in
profoundness. In particular, LM has been challenged by (at least) four different
alternative approaches.: (i) “reactionary liberalism” (RL) –championed by authors
such as Barry and Sartori 22 - according to which liberalism and multiculturalism
promote inconsistent values; (ii) the multiculturalism of fear (MF), proposed by22

See Barry 2001and Sartori 2000

Jacob T. Levy, which criticizes CML in name of a kind of negative consequentialism(first: avoid dangers!) 23; (iii) anti-essentialist liberal-democracy (AEL) –championed
by authors like Phillips, Frazer, Appiah and Benhabib24- according to which

multiculturalism epitomizes some prerogatives of liberal-democracy that could bebetter protected in alternative ways; (iv) post-colonial thought (PCT) –championed
by authors like Said and Guha- according to which liberalism is intrinsically unable
to captures basic features of multiculturalism because it uses a logic of power andoppression to evaluate the situation (eg: the logic of the colonialists, see Willett).
Post-colonial critics maintain that is this logics that must be changed.
To these objections, Kimlicka provides a response from the reconciliation
strategy standpoint 25. In this response, K. distinguishes different stages of LM and of
multiculturalism26. The first stage is characterised by a communitarian turn. In thisperiod –that K. dates before 1989- the debate over multiculturalism overlaps with thedebate between liberals and communitarians. Traditional liberals were against
multiculturalism seeing it as contrary to the claim of autonomy. This position isreflected in RL arguments against LM. On the contrary, communitarians were infavour cultivating the idea that multiculturalism was able to protect communities
from the danger implied by extreme liberal individualism. The second stage ischaracterized by the separation of the arguments for communitarianism from thearguments for multiculturalism. After all many minorities –differently from theAmish- did not want cultivate completely different (and sometimes pre-modern)styles of life. They want rather merge in the national society being treated withconcern and respect. For K. -but this is more controversial than he thinks- migrants
are supposed to desire reasonable integration. The output of this second stage is
supposed to consist in a reconciliation between multiculturalism and liberalism. The
23
24

See Levy quoted
See Frazer 2003, Phillips 2009, Appiah 2005, Benhabib 2002

25

Multiculturalism of critics is a “caricature”, (see “The Rise…” 33 and ff.)

26

Kymlicka 2002 p 336

reconciliation happens following the context of choice view, and more generally
assuming that individual autonomy requires cultural autonomy 27. This claim can be
integrated by an argument that distinguishes choices and circumstances bymaintaining that is arbitrary from a moral point of view to be discriminated forreasons that do not depend on choices. The corollary is that to be member of acultural minority is fruit of circumstances. There are however cases in which todefend cultural pluralism is not for more autonomy but rather for less. In these cases
to affirm minority rights would undermine individual autonomy. The most obvious ofthese cases –in the light of our whole thesis- is the case of women in a Muslim
minority. In the light of this possibility LM advocates must find a way to distinguishgood from bad minority rights, good being the ones that enhance individualautonomy bad the ones that instead undermine it. K. himself finds out good rightsthat protect a group from the larger societies and its external pressures, from ad rightsthat jeopardize internal dissent in name of the group. The conclusion is that LM is forminority rights that (i) treat all groups in an equalitarian way; (ii) protect the freedomof the individuals within the group.
In order to get this outcome, K maintains among other things that:(i)

For a sound LM not all cultural particularities must be celebrated(ii)

for LM minority rights are part of a larger human rights revolution andmore generally of an enlargement of democratic citizenization(iii)

Within LM a defence of minority rights in name of multiculturalism to beliberal should avoid essentialism and any static view of cultures and groups.
On the contrary ML is supposed to be transformative of identities.

(iv)

LM recognises basic liberal-democratic rights (e.g.: forced marriage or
clitoridectomy are not admitted)(v)

there are necessary pre-conditions for ML: among which securitization
and respect for human rights,

27

See Raz 1994 D Miller 1995 Mnaual 147

These two stages of multiculturalism are supplemented by a third, morenuanced, stage in which traditional liberal “benign neglect” toward culturalmembership is substituted by a strategy in which cultural membership isconsidered matter of self-respect. This distinction is seen in the light of nationbuilding public policies nation states normally promote. According to K. and LM,
these state policies normally discriminate –via the use of language, cv in educationand so on- cultural minorities in favour of national majorities. Of course, cultural
minorities of migrants are different in this from indigenous people and subnational groups. Traditionally, they have accepted that to be integrated they mustbe partially assimilated. In case this option was still true, then there will be not somuch to do: assimilation would be good both for local majorities and for migrants.
As K. himself admits, however, it is not the case that migrants are disposed toaccept assimilationist practices as in the past. This seems particularly true forMuslim minorities. Now, it seems that part of the force of LM argument rests ideathat migrants would like integration. In case this is not so, like it frequently
happens in our days, probably the terms of the multicultural relationship must be
re-negotiated. A minority reluctant to integrate –especially if this minority does notcultivate a strong view of public reason- is for the local majority of population
cause of that fear that I assumed was a main cause of the backlash ofmulticulturalism.

3.4. Philosophical BackgroundIf we make an attempt to see how the reconciliation strategy satisfies the claimsof its critics from this point of view we can derive a list of “pros” and “cons”, thepros being connected with points (prima facie) successfully discussed by thereconciliation strategy and the cons with points less successfully discussed by it.
This balanced exercise concerns both the theory and the practice ofmulticulturalism.

In the realm of theory, LM strategy or reconciliation provides a fertile platform
for discussing some elements of potential conflict between liberalism andmulticulturalism, like the ones I listed above. It is not altogether clear how much
LM defensive view is compatible with original LM. It surely goes toward what Ilabel ML in this paper, arguing for multicultural liberalism ML in alternative to
LM 28.
The essential doubt concerning LM however focuses on the context ofchoice view itself. Within its framework, the reconciliation strategy is –from its
beginning- foundationally based on inserting (independent) communitarianarguments within a liberal-democratic platform. From the contemporary politicaltheory point of view, this often implies to adopt a background liberal perfectionist
vision 29. This move has significant consequences in terms of the strategy of publicreason we are discussing. In substance, the more you move toward a liberal
perfectionist vision, the less you are inclined to accept a strong view of publicreason. As matter of fact, liberal-perfectionist visions –here read in terms ofinsertions of communitarianism within liberal-democracy- nourish a thickconception of the good. As a consequence, they emphasize respect for diversities
and conceive of public reason as a thin umbrella permitting a decent compromise.
In other words, liberal-perfectionists tend to be in agreement with a weak view ofpublic reason, rejecting a strong conception. LM can be seen as based on such a
strategy.
If we reflect upon this conclusion, we can argue that these limits of LM areconnected with two perplexities we stressed in our balanced evaluation of thereconciliator’s response to the critics. Cultural pluralism is different from moralpolitical pluralism. The second concerns primarily individuals, whereas the first
concerns primarily groups. In the second case, we are confronted with conceptionsof the good whereas in the first with comprehensive doctrines. The second is
28
29

ML is different from anti-multiculturalism of Barry and Sartori
See Raz 1994, Galston 1995

eminently private whereas the first is typically public. These differences makecultural pluralism much more problematic in terms of public reason. The same canbe said for neutrality which is strictly connected –through the duty of civility- to
public reason.
Authors in favour of LM are natural critics of serious restraints imposed bypublic reason. Given the wide diversities present in contemporary societies they
think that support for justice should come from a set of plural sources rather thanfrom a common shared view of liberal-democracy. No surprise that such view does
not satisfy the assurance problem raised by liberal-democratic majorities in theWest. It is here that the ML strategy differs from LM’s. If who is in favour of LM
has a propensity to defend a quasi aggregative view of public reason, who is infavour of ML has instead a propensity to defend a stronger view of public reason.
Authors in favour of ML are for a strong common centre which for them also
permits more peripheral freedoms. In other words, if you want plural jurisdictions
or valid religious marriages –inspired by minority traditions- for ML you have toaccept a strong core of liberal-democratic precepts. Communitarian bonds –in thisview- are acceptable if and only if you assume pre-given and safe liberaldemocratic restraints.
How these problems can be philosophically re-united and given sense? I
think that a plausible way consists in contrasting the essentialism of LM with theanti-essentialism of ML.The accuse of essentialism is not new for LM. As we haveseen it is at the core of those strategies that I named AEL. The point is that what I
mean by essentialism of LM is different and more complex from the way it isnormally seen by AEL critics of LM. We can read the standard view of AEL
advocates as a claim for a “multiculturalism without culture” to use an expression
by one of them, Anne Phillips. Phillips conceive of this essentialism of Al as a deontologization of the very notion of culture as assumed by LM. This deontologization happens though a cultural deconstruction of culture via

contemporary anthropology and liberal feminism 30 . Both contemporary
anthropology and liberal feminism deconstruct the unitary view of culture –usuallytaken up by LM- in name of a more complex view of personal identity and basic
individual rights. One could say that this reading attack LM both from a
descriptive and a normative point of view. From the descriptive point of view, it
maintains that –contrary to LM- cultures are not unitary blocks and that individuals
contemporaneously participate in different cultures. From the normative point ofview, it maintains that –contrary to LM- a critical defence of cultures does notnecessarily go toward a promotion of individual autonomy.
My own philosophical criticism of some essentialism implicit in LM differsfrom the AEL standard attack to LM. In fact it reads this supposed essentialism interms of two building blocks not always perceived by LM critics: liberal
perfectionism à la Raz and luck egalitarianism à la Cohen. Raz view of liberalism
multiculturalism as requiring a “…political society to recognize the equal standardof all the stable and viable cultural communities existing in (that) society” 31 isstrictly connected with his view of a comprehensive liberalism based on autonomy.
Within this comprehensive view of autonomy, freedom, interpreted in terms ofindividual well being, presupposes the availability of a social option of cultural
nature from which one is supposed choose his-her personal way of existing andbehaving. In this way liberal multiculturalism –for Raz- goes far beyond tolerationand neutrality (fairness) in believing that individual freedom depends on full
membership in a culture. The pre-requisite of this view is the avoidance of what
Raz calls “epistemic abstinence”. The claim against epistemic abstinence attacks“strong autonomy” liberalism à la Rawls for being divisionist, where the division
is here the one between ethics and political theory. Contrary to this divisionist
option, comprehensive liberalism sees political theory more embedded in a visionof the good culminating in autonomy. This thick vision of the good overcomes the30
31

Phillips 49-52 and 25-27
Raz 174

traditional thin and political vision of liberalism, and this is why it requires thecomplement of multiculturalism. It is only within the regional ontologies
represented in compact communities that we find such a thick vision of a good life.
Now, it is difficult to make this vision coherent with a liberalism based on
public reason. The thick conception of autonomy à la Raz, and more generallycomprehensive liberalism, does not permit that strategy of avoidance and respect
which is so necessary to have a strong view of public reason. In conclusion, if LM
is framed in terms of comprehensive liberalism, then it cannot properly defend thestrong vision of public reason we put at the centre of Western conception ofliberal-democracy. ML on the contrary starts with political liberalism which isconnected with a strong view of public reason. Given that the defence ofmulticulturalism presupposes a bargaining strategy in which Western majorities
must be assured about their view concerning a strong public reason, then LM can
not work here whereas ML can.
The second starting point of the philosophy of LM is luck egalitarianism.
Luck egalitarianism and multiculturalism can be associated through the idea thatbeing member of a minority is consequence of a circumstance and not of a choice,where choice implies responsibility. So, if one shares a thick (comprehensive)
conception of liberalism and thinks that there is a basic right to live within theproper cultural environment, then luck egalitarianism sees the non recognition ofminority rights like a patent case of injustice. To be a minority member is arbitraryfrom a moral point of view and consequently should not have practicalconsequences. Arbitrariness from the moral point of view relates to what we are
fated with by society and nature, how we are born and, ultimately, who we are. No
one deserves in a strict sense to be born in a given family or to be member of a
specific group. The origin of luck egalitarianism is Rawls. On the subject, Rawls
famously states in TJ:

“It seems to be one of the fixed points of our considered judgments that no one
deserves his place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than one
deserves one’s initial starting place in society. The assertion that a man
deserves the superior character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate
his abilities is equally problematic, for his character depends in large part uponfamily and social circumstances for which he can claim no credit. The notionof desert seems not to apply to these cases.” (TJ 104)

Rawls however confines himself to supporting his thesis in relation to the
distribution of primary goods through the basic structure. In so doing, thearbitrariness of native and social endowment is not itself under attack, but only its
arbitrariness insofar it relates to the “basic structure”. As Rawls affirms:“The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons
are born into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts.
What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts.” (TJ
102)
In other words, the fact of being born into a good family or a majority group isirrelevant from the point of view of the theory of justice. However, if this contingent
fact affects the “basic structure” and becomes the main basis for distributing primary
goods, then it gives rise to a problem of justification and, therefore, of justice.
The need to justify a distribution of primary goods (as derived from Rawls),
showing that it is not morally arbitrary, should not be mistaken for the viewpoint of
the “luck egalitarians”. According to the latter, the main moral task of a vision ofjustice is to compensate individuals for social and natural disadvantages that do notdepend on their choices and for which they may not be blamed. The case of thehandicapped represents an emblematic test of the thesis of the luck egalitarians. 32 But,
if one starts with the “context of choice view” and the reconciliation strategy then32

See W. Kymlicka 2002, p. 70, which attributes to Rawls the original idea on which luck egalitarianism depends, thatis, the distinction between choices and circumstances, and the fault of not having pursued it.

Rawls can be criticized –from the same luck egalitarian point of view- for having
failed to consider this moral requirement to redress certain fundamental injustices
connected with cultural membership. According to this accusation, Rawls would in
effect be inconsistent, because such unlucky fates like to be member of cultural
minority are indeed those that are typically more arbitrary from a moral point of view.
In general terms, the argument of the luck egalitarians within LM may be built
around the following consistent parts:(i)our life depends upon a mix of voluntary choices and random
circumstances that every individual needs to confront;(ii)

inequalities may be broken down into inequalities that depend upon
voluntary

choicesandinequalities

that

dependupon

randomcircumstances;(iii) there is a principle of responsibility that lays down that each may be
blamed for the outcome of his voluntary choices, but not for the outcomeof random circumstances. For example, there is a difference between mylosing all I own in a game of poker and my losing all I own in an
earthquake;(iv) whoever is concerned about cultural liberal equality should take into
account (i), (ii), and (iii) to conclude that inequalities due to random
circumstances –like to be born member of a cultural minority- areparticularly unjust and that their victims should be protected in a special
manner.
There are notorious general objections to luck egalitarianism. First, the idea ofneutralizing fate is impracticable. The very possibility of clearly distinguishing
between choices and circumstances is questionable. Second, inequality depending on
cultural membership are already part of the public morality of a liberal-democraticsociety. Such society does not tolerate all inequalities, including cultural ones, that
result from discrimination, just on account of the fact that they do not depend uponindividual choices of the disadvantages. Thirdly, we know that individual preferences
may often be “adaptive” and, therefore, they are only partly authentic and evidence of
responsible intentions. Fourthly, according to Rawls, the principles of justice apply to
the “basic structure” and the way it provides primary goods to the citizens. All the
movements of goods and resources, for Rawls, presuppose a regime of standard
cooperation among individuals capable of contributing. It is just within this preformed ambit that redistribution applies. 33 As a consequence, a direct application of
the second principle for example to foreigners is not plausible – if we go by the
Rawlsian logic – owing exactly to the same reason why we cannot begin from special
cases, such as those of the handicapped. In other words, the nature of the theory is notdirectly allocative, as it is first of all associative. From this point of view, equality is
not so much a compensation for bad luck as a condition to keep a liberal-democraticsociety firmly and fairly together.34 Therefore, it is only the normality of a fruitfulcooperation in terms of reciprocity that justifies the application of the second
principle. What needs to be redistributed is not manna from heaven, as the
distribuendum depends upon the story of how it has been produced, starting from theproducers’ relations. Finally, there seems to be an inconsistency between two clams
contemporaneously made by luck egalitarian when discussing multiculturalism. For,on one hand they celebrate the natural niche in which our identities have beenbasically shaped, a cultural environment that cannot be excluded in a decent society.
But, on the other hand they should recognize in this niche a constraint and not an
option, exactly that kind of circumstance that make authentic choices difficult if not
impossible.
These objections show that luck egalitarianism has a claim which is muchstronger than the usual claim of Rawlsian liberalism. Such claim is inconsistent with
the Rawlsian priority of the right, being the priority of the right the methodological
33

From this point of view, the composition of the basic structure governs the legitimate expectations of the individuals.
However, given the continuous structure (in a mathematical sense) of Rawls’ argument, a basic structure can become
instantaneously unjust and engender problems for the persons in their capacity of planning the future based on
legitimate expectations. A similar thesis is advocated by A. Buchanan in “Distributive Justice”.
34
As S. Scheffler happens to say, op. cit., p. 21.

device through which Rawlsian liberals separate the good from the right andconsequently ethics from politics. Luck egalitarianism –not differently from liberal
perfectionism- bypasses the priority of right. In such a way it does not respect thelimits imposed by the priority of right and supports –like thick liberalism- acomprehensive view. A comprehensive view is a political position in which ethics
comes in the realm of politics without respecting liberal limits like the priority ofright. In this way, a comprehensive view contrasts with the basic principles of publicreason.

3.5. Conclusion
Until here, I discussed the situation of cultural minorities –in particular
Muslim- within a Western like state. LM has been presented as a better strategy –if
confronted with LM- to assure Western majorities worried about the way in which
minorities can jeopardize their strong view of public reason. The same kind ofargument can be however exported to cover different situations. In fact, ML seems to
be sensible not only where Western majorities fear a weakening of their strong
conception of public reason but also where there is not a basic liberal-democratic
tradition. If you, for example, take a Confucian universe, it does not make sense to
enforce more communitarianism before assuming you have got enough liberaldemocracy 35. Note that a similar strategy would not work even in the optics of LM.
For to give more power to communal authorities would not imply to go in directionof more individual autonomy as the context of choice view claims to do.
The same argument can be used for minorities within the Arab world. Many
Muslim thinkers feel difficulties in even speaking of minority rights because they
think that liberal-democratic citizenship is a premise for cultural pluralism. There is –according to them- clear evidence that minority rights must be preceded by individual35

On multiculturalism in a Confucian universe see Baogang He 2004

liberal rights. Consequently, also in this case ML can work better if confronted withLM.
What all this does means in practice? Basically to adopt ML means that there
are many liberal-democratic pre-requisites for making multiculturalism acceptable.
LM has offered across the years a reasonable platform of rights minorities shouldhave been entitled to within the protective umbrella of a liberal-democratic state.
These rights include non-discrimination, administrative autonomy, protection of thelanguage of the minority, liberty of religion, alternative education, permission to
adopt different dressing styles and more generally the adoption of a (partial) legal
pluralism. ML just says that all these rights are intrinsically acceptable provided that
we a priori respect some basic liberal-democratic principles. These principles include
securitization, relative secularization, respect for individual autonomy, pluralism in
education, and constitutional loyalty. Respect of these principles can be taken as an
instrumental good. The main aim this respect wants to realize consists in providing aplatform that permits to reinforce and make stable public reason when significant
cultural minorities are present.

iHere, there is perhaps a (minor) difference between PL text and IPRR text, because the later text lists – among people
usually constrained by public reason – judges, government officers, politicians and their campaign managers, but notcitizens during the election times (like in PL). Citizens electoral discussions take in consideration public reason – also in
IPRR – but just within the weaker domain of the “ideal” of public reason.

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