This article was translated by Mitsubishi UFJ Research and Consulting (MURC, http://www.murc.jp/english) fromJapanese into English as part of a research project sponsored by the Government of Japan to promote academic
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Citation: Japan's Territories Series, Japan Digital Library (March 2016),
http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/digital_library/japan_s_territories.php

The Creation of a Basis for the Possession of Takeshimaby the Korean Government*
Yoshiko Yamasaki

Introduction

In recent years, newly released and acquired diplomatic documents have provided the basis fornumerous studies on the territorial dispute over Takeshima that manifested during the period
from the end of World War II through the process of concluding the San Francisco Peace Treaty
into the Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) diplomatic normalization talks from 1951 to 1965.
Among documents acquired and released by ROK-based organizations and researchers inparticular, a large number provided additional information regarding previously unclear matters.
Particularly noteworthy in that regard was the Note Verbale (No. 187) sent by the US Embassyin the ROK to the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on December 4, 1952. It constituted an
official re-iteration of the US position, invoking the so-called “The letter from Rusk” 1 (which
notified the ROK government that Takeshima is a part of Japanese territory.). The Rusk letter
had been sent in response to the ROK government’s protest against the September 1952 incident
in which the US armed forces conducted bombing training using Takeshima as a target, thereby
endangering people from Ulleungdo [translator’s note: a larger island to the west-northwest
about 88 km away from Takeshima] who were allegedly fishing nearby.
A review of research, analysis, and assertions made by the government, researchers, and mass
media in the ROK reveals that the main assertions are: (i) Dokdo [translator’s note: the Koreanname for Takeshima, known in English as “Liancourt Rocks”] was the first Korean territory tofall victim to the Japanese aggression against Korea; upon the liberation of Korea, it returned to*This article was originally published as 山崎佳子「韓国政府による竹島領有根拠の創作」竹島問題研究会『第 2 期「竹島問題に関する調査研究」最終報告書』島根県、2012 年、61-78 頁.

1

United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) (RG59) Lot 54 D422,“Japanese Peace Treaty Files of John Foster Dulles”, Box 8, Korea (in English). The content of thisletter was first made public in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Vol.6, Part 1, 1951, p.
1203, Footnote 3, issued in 1977 and made publicly available in April 1978.

1

its country. It is a symbol of Korea's independence; historically it was a Korean territory but it
was seized by Japan and returned to the ROK when Japan was defeated” 2; (ii) Because it could
not be a signatory to the Peace Treaty, the ROK became unable to receive any benefits orassurances whatsoever with regard to issues including the issue of territorial rights over
“Dokdo” 3 ; and (iii) Up until the mid-1950s the United States strongly supported Japan’s
position on Takeshima as a result of Japan’s vigorous diplomacy toward the United States andlobbying by Japanophiles such as William J. Sebald, US political advisor to SCAP, chief of theSupreme Headquarters of the Allied Forces Diplomatic Bureau, head of the Diplomatic Sectionof the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers, and chairman and member of the Allied
Council for Japan 4 (but the United States subsequently changed to take a neutral position).
The second session of Shimane Prefectural Government’s Takeshima Issue Research Groupalso focused on the post-war territorial dispute over Takeshima and actively acquired andstudied related documents. According to those documents, there is no basis for the assertions
above.
This research paper aims to critically examine the legitimacy of the ROK’s assertions bypresenting new documents in addition to those already introduced in existing research toreconstruct the circumstances that led to Takeshima being omitted from the islands to berelinquished by Japan under the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Detailed examination of assertion(i) in particular highlights the process by which, despite a lack of clear historical evidence, thepost-war government of the ROK asserted that Takeshima was historically the ROK’s territory
and brought it inside the Syngman Rhee line, then distorted official letters and statements fromthe United States describing Takeshima as Japanese territory in order to fabricate new“evidence.”(1) Pre-war—The Origins of the Territorial Dispute over Takeshima

At a routine press conference on August 12, 2011, the ROK’s minister of foreign affairs

2“Why did Kim Sung-hwan bring up Byun Young-tae’s letter of 57 years ago?,” Joong-ang ilbo
(Korea Joongang daily), online version, August 15, 2011 (in Korean), available at
http://article.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.asp?total_id=5973972 (as of February 15, 2012).

3

Park Jin-hee, “The Korea-Japan post-war relationship and the San Francisco Peace Treaty,” Korean
Historical Research, No.131, 2005, pp. 3–4 (in Korean).

4Jung Byung-joon, “William J. Sebald and the Dokdo Territorial Dispute”, Korea Focus Vol.13,
No. 4, 2006, p. 80 (in English). Jung states that Japan spread inaccurate information and devised avariety of plots without the pre-ROK Korea knowing, using Sebald to actively lobby the United Statesin order to make it recognize Dokdo as part of Japan’s territory (p.77).

2

and trade, Kim Sung-hwan, alleged that Dokdo was the first victim of Japan's aggression
against Korea, and that upon the liberation of Korea, Dokdo returned to its country’s
embrace. It was indeed the symbol of Korean independence, he claimed, and whoever
touched this island should be prepared to face stubborn strong resistance from all the
Korean people. Any attempt by Japan to seize Dokdo would signify re-invasion of Korea.
Kim was said to be directly quoting the official letter of 57 years earlier by former minister forforeign affairs Byun Young-tae 5. Likewise, the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses the
Cairo Declaration (of 1943) regarding territories “which Japan has taken by violence andgreed” 6 as its foundation to assert the illegality of Japan’s claim to ownership. However, no oldmaps or documents have yet been found to prove categorically that Korea historicallyrecognized Takeshima as its territory prior to the formal incorporation of Takeshima by Japan in
1905. In order to establish that Takeshima was “the first victim of Japan's aggression against
Korea” and Japan had “taken” the islands, the ROK’s historical records must provecategorically that Takeshima was a territory of the ROK before it was incorporated into Japan’s
Shimane Prefecture.
However, from the 18th century, when inspectors began to be posted regularly to Ulleungdo,
old maps of Korea compiled by the government depict Usando [translator’s note: alleged by the
ROK to be the previous Korean name for Dokdo] not as Takeshima(Dokdo) but as Chikusho(called “Jukdo” in the ROK) 7 and Takeshima itself was not included in any of the geographies,
old maps, and maps of coordinates produced from the end of the Kingdom of Joseon until the5

Supra note 2.

6(omitted)“in the midst of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), which had been triggered by Japan’s
imperialistic invasion scheme toward Northeast Asia since the 1890s, disseized Dokdo andincorporated the islands into the Shimane Prefecture by issuing the Shimane Prefecture Public Notice
No. 40(1905). Japan’s annexation of Dokdo constituted a violation of international law, and cannot bejustified under any circumstances, for it is a clear infringement on the undeniable sovereignty of
Korea over the islands from ancient times to the recent Empire of Korea. More importantly, Japan’s
actions carry no legal validity under international law.” “Korea was annexed to Japan in 1910 and thecolonial rule ended in 1945 with Japan’s defeat in World War II. In 1943, while the war was still
being fought, the three Allied Powers—the United States, Britain and China—issued the Cairo
Declaration, vowing that Japan would “…be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by
violence and greed.” In 1945, when Korea regained its independence, Dokdo, too, was returned to
Korea as a matter of course.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, “Dokdo: Korean
Territory—The Basic Position of the Government of the Republic of Korea on Dokdo”, 2008, p. 6–7(in English).

7

Park Chang-seok, Ulleungdo Do-hyeong (Map of Ulleungdo), 1711; “Ulleungdo Jido” (Map of
Ulleungdo), Joseon-jido (Map of Korea), around 1770, etc. (all in Korean). Until then Usando had
generally been depicted on the west side of Ulleungdo.

3

Empire of Korea 8. The “Seokdo” referred to in the Empire of Korea’s Imperial Edict No. 41 9
issued on October 25, 1900 (Seokdo being the old name for Takeshima according to thegovernment of the ROK) has never once been directly proved to correspond to Dokdo 10 andeven in printed materials written by those not under the sway of the Japanese government, suchas Korean independence campaigners under exile overseas or the Korean diaspora living in the
United States, there is no mention of Takeshima as being a seized territory as far as I amaware 11.
Following a Cabinet decision on January 28, 1905, to incorporate Takeshima into Japan, andShimane Prefecture’s subsequent Notification No. 40 of February 22, Takeshima’s
incorporation into Shimane Prefecture was frequently reported in newspapers 12 and academic
journals 13. It was, moreover, the year in which the Battle of Tsushima took place, and on May
28 the outcome of the battle was decided in the vicinity of Takeshima, so the name and its
location on maps came to be known throughout Japan via official gazettes 14, newspapers 15, and8

Lee Kyu-won, Ul-leung-do-oe-do (Survey map of outer Ulleungdo), 1882; Heul-beop (Homer
Hulbert), Sa-min-pil-ji (Knowledge necessary for all) (Baek Nam-kyu and Lee Myung-sang, Trans.),
1895; Hyun Chae, Dae-han-ji-ji (Geography of the Korean Empire), 1899; Dae-han-Jeondo(Complete map of Korea), 1899; Dae-han-yeu-ji-do (Map of the Korean Empire), around 1900; Jang
Ji-yeon, “Ji-ri-il” (Geography 1), Dae-han-ja-gang-hoe-wol-bo (Korean Self-Strengthening Society
monthly magazine), No. 3, 1906, pp. 25–28; Jang, Dae-han-sin-ji-ji (A new geography of Korea),
1907, etc. (all in Korean).

9

Even in the ROK, scholars have not been aware of this historical record for very long. It was first
introduced in Lee Han-ki, Territory of Korea, Seoul National University Press, 1969, p. 57 (inKorean).

10

Ikeuchi Satoshi, “Takeshima/dokdo to ishijima no hitei mondai: noto” (Is there any island referred to
as Seokdo?) Tekusuto fuchi no kaishakugakuteki kenkyu to kyoiku (HERSETEC), Vol.4, No. 2, 2010,
pp. 1–9 (in Japanese).

11

Tae-Baek-Gwang-No, Han-guk-tong-sa (Painful history of Korea), 1915; Park Eun-sik, Han-guk-doklib-un-dong-ji-hyeol-sa (The bloody history of the Korean independence movement), 1919–20 (bothin Korean). Tae-Baek-Gwang-No was the pen-name of Park Eun-sik, the second president of theProvisional Government of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai. The former work put the easternboundary of Korea at 130°50’ east longitude, while the latter work records the 1906 incident in which
the party from Shimane Prefecture visited Ulleungdo and reported the news of Takeshima’s formal
incorporation into the prefecture as an event pertaining to Ulleungdo. Sin-han-min-bo (The new
Korea) (San Francisco 02.10.1909–1980) was a newspaper published in San Francisco by North andSouth Koreans living in the United States. All these publications had a strongly nationalist bent.

12“Oki no shinto” (Oki’s new island), San-in shimbun (San-in newspaper), February 24, 1905; “Shogen,”ibid., February 25, 1905; “Oki-no-kuni kyodo no bocho” (Oki boundary expanded), Oki Shimpo (Okinews), No. 16, March, 1905, etc. (all in Japanese). Thereafter, the San-in Shimbun continued toinclude frequent articles relating to Takeshima.

13“Teikoku shinryodo takeshima” (The Empire’s new territory of Takeshima), Chigaku zasshi (Journalof Geography), Vol.17, No. 4, 1905, p. 282 (in Japanese).

14“Correction,” Official gazette, June 5, 1905 (in Japanese). The initial account of the report of Togo4magazines 16. The name Takeshima would naturally have come to the notice of the more than
300 Koreans 17 including members of legation staff and foreign students said to be living inJapan in 1905, and the official gazettes were also reported in Korea18. However, there is nothing
in the historical records to suggest that Koreans appeared to harbor any reservations with regard
to the territorial incorporation of Takeshima by Japan.
In March 1906, a party from Shimane Prefecture stopped off at Ulleungdo as it was going toinspect Takeshima and informed Sim Heung-Taek, the magistrate of Uldo-gun [translator’snote: the Korean county within which Ulleungdo was located], of the incorporation of
Takeshima. The magistrate filed a report notifying the government of the Empire of Korea
about the incorporation of Takeshima, and the government ordered an investigation 19, but there
is no evidence of the Japanese resident-general of Korea subsequently being approached withany inquiry regarding the matter, let alone any protest. The ROK government and theresearchers who support its position assert that “Korea’s situation was such that it had been
deprived of its diplomatic power and it was therefore not able to lodge any diplomatic protest” 20,
but this assertion is not based on historical records.
Heihachiro, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy, received bytelegram on the morning of May 29 of the same year, had referred to Liancourt Rocks, but this wascorrected to Takeshima.
15“Riyankorudo iwa” (Liancourt Rocks), Yomiuri Shimbun (Yomiuri newspaper), June 1, 1905;“Tenchi genko” Niroku Shimbun (Niroku newspaper), June 16, 1905; “Daikaisen no ato (matsue)”(The site of a great sea battle (Matsue)), Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo Asahi newspaper), June 25,
1905; “Shin sagamimaru to takeshimamaru” (The new Sagami-maru and Takeshima-maru vessels),Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, August 11, 1905, etc. (all in Japanese).

16

Tayama Katai, “Senji sowa—riyankorudo iwa” (Collection of Wartime Stories—Liancourt Rocks),
Nichiro senso jikki (True Record of the Russo-Japanese War, 75th edition, 1905, pp. 115–117; Nozu
Chosui, “Aa takeshima” (Ah, Takeshima), ibid., 76th edition (“Kankoku shashinjo” (Album of Korea),
Shashin gaho rinji zokan (Special illustrated supplement) 25), 1905, p. 35, etc. (both in Japanese).

17

Morita Yoshio, “Zainichi chosenjin shogu no suii to genjo” (Present circumstances and trends in thetreatment of Koreans in Japan), Homu kenshujo homu kenkyu hokokusho (Training Institute of the
Ministry of Justice legal research report), 43rd series, No. 3, 1955, p. 4; Morita, Suji ga kataru
zainichi kankokujin, chosenjin no rekishi (A history of North and South Koreans in Japan throughnumerical data) (new edition), Akashi Shoten, 1996, p. 173 (both in Japanese).

18“Miscellaneous—Official gazette of the Japanese fleet,” Hwang-sung sin-mun (Hwang-sungnewspaper), June 2, 1905, (in Korean).

19“Special report,” “Directive No. 3,” Gak-gwan-chal-do-geo-re-an (各觀察道去來案), KyujanggakArchives of Seoul National University, 奎 17990, 1906 (in Korean). This historical document was
first introduced in Shin Yong-ha (1989), “Joseon wangjo eui dokdo ryeongyu wa ilbon jegukjueui eui
dokdo chimryak” (Korean dynastyʼs possession of Dokdo and invasion of Dokdo by imperialistic
Japan), Han-guk-dok-lib-un-dong-sa-yeon-gu (Journal of Korean independence movement studies) 3rdseries (also in Korean).

20

ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Refutation of the assertion of sovereignty over Dokdo by
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, p. 12 (in Japanese).

5Indeed, the Empire of Korea was at that time frequently lodging protests and taking otheradministrative and diplomatic measures to address tree felling and other acts by Japanesecitizens that had become common on Ulleungdo since before 1900. However, right up to the
Uldo-gun rule book (Uldogunjeolmok; 1902), a document of the Empire of Korea’s Ministry ofHome Affairs indicating administrative guidelines for Uldo-gun that was discovered in Korea in
2010, there were no statements whatsoever indicating that islands such as Takeshima, which
was 90 km away, were included within Korea’s area of administration21. Moreover, there is noevidence whatsoever that any measures were taken to tackle fishing by Japanese citizens aroundTakeshima, which had most likely already started by 1903, or surveys by the Ministry of theNavy of Japan 22.
Moreover, a Japanese diplomatic note of October 1905 records that the Korean minister forforeign affairs, Park Che-soon protested verbally to Hayashi Gonsuke, Japan’s deputy
ambassador to Korea, as well as in a letter to the British deputy ambassador 23 , about thedescription of Korea’s status included in the second Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Subsequently, inFebruary 1906, a Japanese resident-general of Korea was appointed, and from March 13 theCouncil for Improvement of Korean Administration met every Tuesday, providing a forum forministers of the Empire of Korea’s State Council to directly discuss a genuinely diverse range ofmatters including Korea’s judicial system with residents-general such as Ito Hirobumi andJapanese advisors 24. Moreover, the historical records of the Empire of Korea’s State Council(the Ministry of Home Affairs) include records stating that enquiries were made to the residentgeneral and others on the Japanese side with regard to a wide range of matters that came up
involving the Japanese. Particularly notable in this regard was the fact that the Empire of Korea
21

Daegu Internet News, January 4, 2011 (in Korean), available at
http://www.dginews.co.kr/ArticleView.asp?intNum=23465&ASection=001003(as of January 14, 2012).

22

JACAR (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records), Ref. C09050402800, Gunkan Tsushima senji
nisshi (Wartime journal of the battleship Tsushima), Vol.5, National Institute for Defense Studies (inJapanese).

23“Dai 384-go nichiei domei joyakuchu kankoku ni kansuru kitei ni tsuki kan gaibudaijin yori eikoku
koshi ni kogi no ken” (No. 384 The Korean foreign minister’s protest to the British deputy
ambassador regarding provisions relating to Korea in the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty), Nikkan
kyoyaku teiketsu narabini tokanfu secchi no ken fu zaikan kakkoku koshikan teppai no ken(Conclusion of the Japan-Korea Treaty and appointment of the Japanese resident-general of Korea &removal of countries’ legations in Korea), October 17, 1905 in Gaimusho—Nihon gaikobunsho
dijitaru akaibu, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan—Digital Archive of the Documents on
Japanese Foreign Policy) Vol.38, Part 1, 1905 (in Japanese).

24

JACAR, Ref. A04017269100, Tankosho—Kankoku shisei kaizen ni kansuru kyogikai yoryo hikki—
kankoku genro no ito tokan shotaikai sekijo danwa yoryo (Monograph—Notes on key points from theCouncil for Improvement of Korean Administration—Key points of discussions at banquet of Koreanelder statesmen attended by resident-general Ito (National Archives of Japan) (in Japanese).

6made inquiries to the resident-general about a land transaction at Jukbyeon coast, Uljin-gun. In
December 1905, the Korean minister of internal affairs, Lee Ji-yong, suspected that a Japanesecitizen had illegally obtained land on the former site of the Japanese Navy’s watchtower. He
reported it to Park Che-soon, who was by then prime minister, and unlike with Takeshima, Park
made an inquiry to the resident-general. As a result, Park received the response that no landtransaction had taken place, and in April of the same year Lee received a report to that effect 25.
In July 1906, soon after the incorporation of Takeshima, when Ikeda Juzaburo, chief of the
Administrative Bureau of Communications of the Japanese resident-general, inquired about theislands belonging to the county of Uldo-gun and the year and month of the county office’s
establishment, the official response of the Empire of Korea was “The islands under thatcounty’s jurisdiction are Jukdo and Seokdo, and the county extends 60 ri from east to west and40 ri from north to south, totaling over 200 ri.” Thus the response excluded Takeshima, at a
distance of 90 km from Ulleungdo, from the area included in Uldo-gun 26. Yet, if one follows the
ROK government’s subsequent assertion [translator’s note: that Takeshima was originally under
Korean jurisdiction], the Uldo-gun magistrate Sim Heung-Taek would have committed ablunder by overlooking the incorporation of Takeshima into Japan’s Shimane Prefecture formore than a year. However, there was no evidence that he suffered any kind of punishment by
the Korean central government, and what is more, he continued to receive pay rises andpromotions steadily thereafter 27.
In light of these facts, it would be most natural to infer that the investigation by the governmentof the Empire of Korea after it had received the report from the magistrate referring to25

Official documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Vol.1, February 26, 1906 in Inquiry No. 3,(Kyujanggak Archives of Seoul National University, 奎 17768), and State Council Inquiry No. 56,
April 17, 1906. These documents were introduced in Shin Yong-ha, “The Japanese Empire’s attempt
to annexe Dokdo during 1904–1905 and criticism thereof”, Research on the history of the Korean
independence movement, 11th series, Institute of Korean Independence Movement Studies,
Independence Hall of Korea, 1996 (all in Korean).

26“Facts on arrangement of Uldo County,” Hwang-sung-sin-mun (Hwangsung newspaper), July 13,
1906 (in Korean); this document was discovered by Sugino Yomei; “Ishijima=Dokdo setsu hitei nokijutsu mitsukaru” (Description negating the theory that Seokdo corresponds to Dokdo discovered),San-in Chuo Shimpo (San-in Chuo News), February 22, 2008 (in Japanese); “Ikeda’s official letter,”Dae-han-mae-il-sin-bo (The Korea daily news), July 13, 1906 (in Korean).

27

Sim Heung-Taek was appointed to the post of Uldo-gun magistrate and sonin (senior official) of the
6th rank on January 26, 1903 (Dae-han-je-guk-gwan-bo (Official gazette of the Empire of Korea),
January 29, 1903) and was promoted to the post of Hoengseong-gun magistrate and sonin (senior
official) of the 3rd rank on March 13, 1907 (ibid., March 15, 1907). Furthermore, on October 1, 1906
he received a pay increase to wage grade five (ibid., October 13, 1906), and a further increase to wage
grade four on March 14, 1907 (ibid., March 27, 1907). I was informed about this document andrelated information by Matsuzawa Kanji.

7

“Dokdo…being under our jurisdiction,” revealed that Dokdo was neither an alternative namefor Ulleungdo, nor was it Chikusho (Jukdo), which was 2 km off the east coast of Ulleungdo,
nor was it any of the islands or reefs in the waters around Ulleungdo. It was, rather, an island
outside the Empire of Korea’s territory that had never before appeared in any maps of Korea.
Thus the central government must have noticed the report by the local official was mistaken insaying Dokdo was an island “under our jurisdiction,” and it did not lodge any protest.
This is also evident from the petition of the Korean minister of internal affairs, Lee Geon-ha, for
Imperial Edict No. 41 of 1900, which raised the status of Ulleungdo to a gun (county). He
stipulated an area that excluded Dokdo from the new Uldo-gun, saying “the area of the islands
concerned should be 80 ri in length and 50 ri in width.” The name Dokdo that first appeared as
the written name for Takeshima in the magistrate’s report had not existed in any Korean records
until then, and despite the fact that newspaper articles and other sources publicized themagistrate’s report and the directive from the Empire of Korea’s Ministry of Home Affairs
immediately afterwards28, there were no records of this matter whatsoever subsequently. Even
during the period when Korea was annexed by Japan, the issue of territorial rights was raisedwith regard to another island, Tsushima 29, but in the records relating to the issue of Ulleungdo’s
ownership 30, there is nothing referring to Takeshima. This is further underlined by the fact that28

“Mu-byeon-bu-yu” (無変不有), Dae-han-mae-il-sin-mun (The Korea daily newspaper), May 1, 1906and “Ur-sui-bo -go-ne-bu”(鬱倅報告内部), the Hwang-sung-sin-mun (Hwangsung newspaper), May9, 1906 reported Sim’s report and the content of the directive by the ministry of internal affairs, but
the accounts show no accurate understanding of the location of “Dokdo” or the fact that it was an
uninhabited island. Hwang Hyun’s O-ha-gi-mun (梧下記聞) and Mae-cheon-ya-rok (梅泉野録) (Vol.
5, April 5, 1906) (both 1906) also record the articles in the Hwang-sung-sin-mun, but the same applies(all sources in Korean).

29“The appeal of an isolated island—Visits to Tsushima Island (5)—Tsushima Island definitely Korean
territory in ancient times,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), August 7, 1926 (in Korean). Moreover,according to Morita Yoshio, Syngman Rhee cited the restoration of Tsushima Island as one item whendescribing the provisional government’s policy toward Japan in his letter of November 1942 to 胡世
沢, vice-minister for foreign affairs of the government of the Republic of China (Morita Yoshio,“Nikkan kankei” (Japan-Korea Relations), edited by Yoshizawa Seijiro, Nihon gaikoshi dai 28-kan—
Kowago no gaiko 1—tai rekkoku kankei (jo) ((Diplomatic history of Japan) Vol. 28—Diplomacy after
peace 1—Relations with other nations (first part)), Kajima Kenkyujo Shuppankai, 1973, p. 23.

30

There were many articles that referred to territorial disputes with Japan during Ulleungdo’s history:
Lee Eul, “Ul-leung-do-tam-bang-gi” (Ulleungdo report), Gae-Byeok (開闢) No. 41, 1923; Lee Yoonjae, “The marvellous An Yong-bok— Korean diplomatic issues of two hundred years ago, focusing
on Ulleungdo,” Dong-gwang (Eastern Light), No. 1 & No. 2, 1926; “Island pilgrimage toward
Ulleungdo (6)—Lush forests on every cliff, just like an enchanted land at sea,” The Dong-a ilbo (EastAsia daily), September 6, 1928; Su-chun-san-in, “An Yong-bok—The pleasant hero of the sea who
won back Ulleungdo with his eloquence,” Byeol-Gun-Gon (別乾坤) No. 65, 1933; Chwi Un-saeng(翠雲生), “Seol-hwan Ul-leung-do-bi-sa” (Seol-hwa (雪禍)—A secret history of Ulleungdo), ByeolGun-Gon (別乾坤), No. 70, 1934, etc. (all in Korean). Most of these articles alleged that Ulleungdo
had come close to being seized by Japan, but Korea had managed to take the island back; however,8even among independence campaigners and the diaspora living in the United States, there were
no Koreans who asserted Korea’s territorial rights over Takeshima.
As the above account shows, the Korean historical records found to date contain no evidence
that Korea officially owned Takeshima in 1905 or earlier. When the ROK government claims
that Takeshima was “the first victim of Japan's aggression against Korea,” or that Japan took
Takeshima “by violence and greed” or “invaded” the island, it is therefore alleging actions thatwere by definition impossible.

(2) From the War’s End to the Signing of the Peace Treaty

So, is it true to say that “upon the liberation of Korea, Dokdo returned to its country’s
embrace”? In fact, even during the period of US military administration immediately after thewar, when Korea was supposedly “liberated” from Japanese rule, Takeshima was still notdepicted in Korean maps and documents 31 . It was not included within the eastern limit of
Korean territory specified in geography textbooks and other references of the period32. Indeed,
Korean textbooks and maps during the US military administration set Ulleungdo as thecountry’s eastern limit, placing Takeshima outside the national territory33.
This lack of awareness of Takeshima finally changed in the summer of 1947, when the citizensof Ulleungdo complained to the military government in North Gyeongsang Province thatJapanese citizens had traveled over to Takeshima and asserted their proprietary rights over theisland. This was the beginning of the Takeshima issue in the post-war ROK 34. Subsequently, arange of research was conducted within the ROK 35, including surveys by the Corea Alpine Club,
there was no mention whatsoever of the present-day Takeshima.
31

Kim Jin-bok, Complete map of Korea, Joong-ang Publishing, 1946; (in Korean), etc. According toJung Byung-jun in “The Post-Liberation ROK’s Awareness of Dokdo and Policy Toward It (1945–51)”, Journal of Northeast Asian History 5-2, 2008, p. 3 (in English), the first map issued in hangul(the Korean alphabetic script) after liberation was the (Map attached to the geography of Korea)
published by the interim government’s printing office and edited by the education ministry’s editorial
office. He states that he was not able to view the map itself, but it is very likely that Dokdo was notincluded in it.

32

Jung Hong-heon et al., Jo-seon-ji-ri (Geography of Korea), Jeong-eum-sa, 1946, etc. (in Korean).

33

Supra notes 15 and 16, No Do-yang, Jung-deung-guk-to-ji-ri-bu-do (National geographic student atlas
for middle school), Mun-u-sa, 1947; Choi Nam-sun, Jo-seon-sang-sik-mun-dap (Questions andanswers regarding common knowledge of Korea), 1947; Choi, Jo-seon-sang-sik (Common knowledgeof Korea), 1948, etc. (all in Korean).

34

Supra note 31 (Jung , 2008), pp. 3–5.

35

One typical example of such research is Shin Seok-ho, “On where Dokdo belongs”, Sa-hae, first issue,
1948 (in Korean).

9but historical evidence for Korean ownership of Takeshima remained inconclusive. Up to 1952,
the year the peace treaty went into effect, the ROK identified Sambongdo, which was anothername for Ulleungdo, as the old name for Takeshima 36, and the key current assertion that theisland referred to as Usando in old maps and documents is the modern-day Takeshima did notappear until 1953, once the territorial dispute had erupted 37.
On June 8, 1948 an incident occurred in which a large number of Korean fishermen who had
landed on Takeshima were killed or injured by US armed forces bombing. The US forces
apologized and paid compensation to the victims or their families, and subsequently the ROK
used this as grounds to assert that the United States recognized the ROK’s ownership ofTakeshima. According to reports at that time, it claimed that Takeshima was the ROK’s territory
for a number of reasons, including the facts that (i) Takeshima had been called Sambongdo
since ancient times, (ii) as a result of the local dialect, the name Dolseom (Seokdo) had changed
to Dokseom (Dokdo), and (iii) the victims were Korean citizens and the US forces dealt with the
ROK to resolve the matter 38 . However, the key assertions of the ROK government duringnegotiations with the United States over reparations immediately after the signing of the peace
treaty were that Takeshima was under Korean jurisdiction and comprised islets that “belonged
to” Ulleungdo, that in 1905 Japan “seized” Takeshima for the purposes of the Russo-JapaneseWar, and that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction Note (SCAPIN) 1033
to Japan placed Takeshima in the “Korean fishing zone.” 39
SCAPIN 1033 demarcated the boundary within which Japanese fishing boats could operate.
According to the so-called “MacArthur line,” Japanese vessels were prohibited fromapproaching or landing on Takeshima, but it did not designate the waters outside the line (i.e.,on the Korean side) as an area in which Korean fishing boats could operate exclusively, and it
also did not stipulate territory. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) was not
authorized to transfer territory, and the fifth paragraph of SCAPIN 1033 specified that “[t]hepresent authorization is not an expression of allied policy relative to ultimate determination of
36

Song Seok-ha, “Seeking the ancient, historic site of Ulleungdo,” Guk-je-bo-do (International Report),
January 1948, Part 3, No. 1 (new year’s issue; in Korean), etc. In the section on the “UlleungdoJaeng-gye” (Ulleungdo dispute) in his set of books entitled Chun-gwan-ji (春官志) (1745), which
comprised a compilation of the records of the ministry of rites (the governmental department charged
with diplomacy and protocol), Lee Maeng-hyu stated that Sam-bong-do was Ulleungdo.

37

Fujii Kenji, “Takeshima mondai ni okeru kankoku no shucho no keisei” (The shaping of the ROK’s
position on the Takeshima issue), Shimane-ken [dai-ni-ki] Takeshima Mondai Kenkyukai Saishu
Hokoku-sho (Final report of the Shimane Prefectural Government Takeshima Issue Research Group[second session]), 2012, pp. 52–53 (in Japanese).

38

Supra note 31 (Jung, 2008), pp. 18–21.

39

Supra Note 37, p. 53.

10

national jurisdiction, international boundaries or fishing rights in the area concerned or in any
other area.” This was backed up by the August 1947 activity report by the US armed forces
administration 40 and the November 27, 1952 letter to the US Embassy in Korea from the US
Army Forces Far East 41 (communicated as the opinion of Mark Clark, commanding general, US
Army Forces Far East and commander in chief, UN Command). Both of these documents statedthat SCAPIN 1033 did not stipulate territory.
In 1951 the ROK government asserted its basis for the ownership of Takeshima by enploying
SCAPIN 677 42, which excluded Takeshima from the scope of Japanese administrative authority.
However, the sixth paragraph of this instruction note again stated that “[n]othing in thisdirective shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate
determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.”
Furthermore, the fact that this instruction note bears no relation whatsoever to territorial rights
over Takeshima is indicated by the fact that on February 13, 1946, the officer in charge of theGovernment Section at the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers (GHQ) replied to an
inquiry by a liaison officer of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that “the directive
relating to administrative separation was issued merely for the administrative convenience of theAllied Powers and it had nothing to do with the territorial issue, which should be decided bymeans of a peace treaty to be concluded at a later date” 43 . Moreover, the article reporting
SCAPIN 677 in The Dong-a Ilbo (East Asia daily), then the leading Korean newspaper, did not
mention that Takeshima had been specifically cited in the instruction note44; thus Takeshima

40

NARA (RG331), GHQ/SCAP Records, United States Army Forces in Korea, No. 1, Aug. 1947 (U.S.
Army Military Government—South Korea Interim Government activities; in English). According tothis report, “Formerly belonging to Japan, a recent occupation directive which drew an arbitrary line
demarcating Japanese and Korean fishing waters placed Tok-to within the Korean zone. Finaldisposition of the islands’ jurisdiction awaits the peace treaty.” However, the US armed forces
administration in Jeoson (Korea) was misunderstanding the nature of the MacArthur line (M line)
when it described the seas that lay outside the M line from the Japanese point of view as Korean
fishing waters. The M line was drawn up under the exclusive authority of SCAP and was supposed tobe beyond any interference by other countries (Fujii Kenji, “Kankoku no kaiyo ninshiki—Ri shobanrain mondai o chushin ni” (Maritime perceptions of South Korea—Centered on the Syngman Rheeline problem), Kankoku Kenkyu Senta nenpo (Annual report, the Research Center for Korean Studies),
2011, p. 55 (in Japanese).

41

NARA (RG84), “Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of States,” Entry 2846, Korea,
Seoul Embassy, Classified General Records, 1953–55, Box 12 (in English).

42

Supra note 37, p. 53.

43

Public documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “2. Gyosei no bunri ni kansuru shireibu
gawa to no kaidan” (2. Talks with SCAP regarding administrative separation), Kyu Nihongaichi jokyo
zakken (Miscellaneous matters relating to circumstances in former Japanese territories outside Japan)(in Japanese).

44“Reduced Japanese territory—Only the mainland remains as the country is torn apart,” The Dong-a

11was clearly of no concern to Korean people at that time. Subsequently, on July 6, 1951,
SCAPIN 2160 designated Takeshima as a bombing range, and this was notified to the Japanese
government 45.
Meanwhile, on November 21, 1945, the Japanese government established the ResearchCommittee on Peace Treaty Issues within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and started preparing
for the upcoming treaty signing. The committee prepared seven booklets of documents
regarding territorial issues, which it submitted to the United States. Included among these was adocument entitled “Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part IV. Minor Islands in the
Pacific, Minor Islands in the Japan Sea” (June 1947), which cited the two islands of Takeshima
and Ulleungdo in the Sea of Japan, describing their relative geographies, histories, andindustries in turn. It stated that Korea could not assert its territorial rights over Takeshima
because, unlike Ulleungdo, “Liancourt Rocks” had no Korean name and did not appear on any
maps drawn up in Korea. On the last page of the relevant booklet an old map by Nagakubo
Sekisui (Revised Complete Map of Japanese Lands and Roads) was attached. In 1946 theelection regulations for the lower house of the Japanese Diet (the national legislature) stipulated“Takeshima within Goka Village under the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture”(Imperial Ordinance No. 97) 46 and in the same year the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
recorded prospecting rights for two Japanese citizens including Hidaka Fusaichi to mine such
resources as silver, copper, and iron sulfide 47.
As it dealt with the aftermath of World War II, the Korean government at the time was focusing
especially on issues relating to the return of national assets and demands for reparations fromJapan; its demands in terms of territorial issues centered on frequent demands for the “return” of
the island of Tsushima, rather than Takeshima. On January 23, 1948, 60 members of the Southilbo (East Asia daily), February 5, 1946 (in Korean).
45

On March 22, 1951, the US Pacific Air Force Headquarters drew up the Korean Air Defense
Identification Zone (KADIZ) to include Takeshima, and on June 20 the second-in-command of theEighth United States Army (EUSA) requested the ROK government for permission to use Takeshima
as a bombing range. The ROK’s view is that this action by the US armed forces constitutes proof that
the United States recognized Takeshima as Korean territory. However, the US forces had no authority
to determine territorial boundaries, and as stated in the aforementioned activity report by the US
armed forces administration, they assumed that territorial boundaries would be defined in thesubsequent peace treaty.

46

JACAR, Ref. A04017805000, “Showa niju nen chokurei dai nana hyaku nana go (Shugiingiin senkyo
ho shikorei chu kaisei no ken)” (1945 Imperial ordinance No. 707 (Amendment of enforcement
ordinance for election law of the members of the House of Representatives)), Original with imperial
signature and seal; “Showa nujuichi nen chokurei dai kyuju nana go” (1946 Imperial ordinance no.
97) (National Archives of Japan; both in Japanese).

47

Mar. 5, 1953, 15th Diet Session, “Sangiin gaimu, homu rengo iinkai kaigiroku” (Minutes of theForeign and Legal Affairs Commission of the House of Councillors), No. 1 (in Japanese).

12Joseon Interim Legislature signed and submitted a “petition for the return of Tsushima Island”48
and in the Diet on February 17 the same year they proposed requesting the return of TsushimaIsland at the peace conference with Japan49. In a press conference immediately after the new
government of the ROK was established on August 17, 1948, Syngman Rhee stated that
“Tsushima was the ROK’s territory” 50, and in response to that statement, on September 10 of
the same year, the presidential envoy held a press conference in Tokyo, where he proposed that
Tsushima should belong to the ROK 51. Moreover, on January 7, 1949, Syngman Rhee strongly
asserted his country’s territorial rights over Tsushima, saying in his new year’s press conference
that “Tsushima should be returned” 52. Meanwhile, on August 5, 1948, members of a privateorganization called the Patriotic Old Men’s Association sent a petition to Douglas MacArthur[translator’s note: the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers] in which they called for the
return of Dokdo and Parangdo, as well as Tsushima 53.
This demonstrates, therefore, that there was no evidence the Korean government recognized
Takeshima as part of its own country’s territory immediately after World War II and it was only
after an incident relating to territorial rights occurred in the summer of 1947 that it becameaware of the existence of “Dokdo” for the first time. Moreover, Japan had clearly indicated thehistorical basis for its sovereignty of Takeshima to the Allied Powers early on, whereas Korea(which continually insisted on the return of Tsushima from Japan) failed to give a clear
historical basis for ownership of Takeshima—an island which did not appear on any of its own
maps—instead relying mainly on SCAP’s directives to provide the basis for its territorial claims.
Thus the ROK’s assertion that “upon the liberation of Korea, Dokdo came back to its country’s
embrace” does not hold true either.
48“Tsushima Island was originally Korean territory—Should its return be demanded in the peace
conference with Japan?” Seoul-sin-mun (Seoul newspaper), January 25, 1948 (in Korean).

49“Proposal to request the return of Tsushima Island,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), February 19,
1948 (in Korean).

50“Tsushima no katsujo—Ri daitoryo yokyu” (President Rhee to demand that Tsushima is ceded),
Yomiuri Shimbun (Yomiuri newspaper), August 19, 1948. The Asahi Shimbun (Asahi newspaper)
article of August 19, 1948, “Tsushima no henkan—Ri daitoryo yokyu” (President Rhee to demandthat Tsushima is returned), reported that on August 18 Rhee responded to a question by an AP
reporter, saying that he would demand the return of Tsushima.

51“Tsushima Island was Korean territory 300 years ago: Its return to the ROK is reasonable in terms ofnational defense,” Kyung-hyang-sin-mun (Kyunghyang newspaper), September 12, 1948 (in Korean).

52“Plans for participation in peace conference with Japan— President Rhee states in new year press
conference that he will demand the return of Tsushima Island,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily),
January 8, 1949 (in Korean).

53“Request for Arrangement of Lands Between Korea and Japan” (Records of the U.S. Department ofState relating to the internal affairs of Japan, 1945–1949: Department of State decimal file 894; inEnglish).

13

(3) Preparation of the draft peace treaty and the ROK government’s actions

The draft peace treaty went through several rounds of revisions 54, after which the US draft dated
March 23, 1951, was passed on to the ROK government. The ROK government then sent a
letter dated April 26 requesting amendments to the draft 55. These included a request to specify
Tsushima as ROK territory, but there was no mention of Takeshima, and the activities record of
the Committee to Investigate Peace with Japan established by the Korean diplomatic mission in
Japan made no mention of Takeshima in connection with any territorial issue56. The islets werealso not mentioned in the various countries’ opinions with regard to Article 2, Paragraph 2 of
the joint US-UK peace treaty draft of May 3 (which excluded the ROK’s request regarding
Tsushima). Subsequently, on July 9, the revised US-UK draft dated June 14 was presented to
Korea via Yang You-chan, the ROK ambassador to the United States. As the request for
Tsushima had been rejected out of hand by the United States, on July 19 the ROK agreed towithdraw it, but sent a letter requesting that Takeshima and Parangdo instead be deemed tobelong to Korea 57 . Around the same time, Rhee sent a personal letter dated August 3 toambassador Yang expressing fury that the request for Tsushima had been rejected 58. Yet there
was nothing in the eight-page letter referring to Takeshima. Thereafter, the opinions of thevarious countries relating to the US-UK joint draft were compiled into the “Treaty Changes”
document dated August 7, and the ROK’s requests for Takeshima and Parangdo were included

54

Tsukamoto Takashi, “Heiwa joyaku to takeshima (sairon)” (The Peace Treaty and Takeshima(revisited)), Refarensu (The Reference), No. 518 (March edition), National Diet Library, 1994, pp.
31–56 (in Japanese).

55

Dae-han-min-guk-sa-ja-ryo-jip 30, Rhee Syng-man Gwan-gye-seo-han-ja-ryo-jip 3 (Documents on
the history of the ROK 30—Letters relating to Syngman Rhee 3), National Institute of Korean History,
1951, pp. 233–236 (in Korean).

56

Nam, Kijeong, “saenpeulansiseuko pyeonghwajoyag han-ilgwangye -‘gwandaehan pyeonghwa’ wanaengjeon-ui sang-gwanseong– (Taking Diplomacy Seriously: Japan and Korea on the Road to theTreaty of Peace with Japan),” Journal of Northeast Asian History, Vol. 22, 2008 (in Korean), pp.6364.

57

Supra note 54. The ROK government currently asserts its territorial rights based on the reasoning that
Takeshima is an island belonging to Ulleungdo, but this written opinion indicates that in fact there
was no such recognition. Prior to this, moreover, the letter from Mr. Boggs of the Department ofState’s Geographical Office to Robert A. Fearey dated July 16, 1951, stated “If it is decided to givethem [the Liancourt Rocks/Takeshima] to Korea, it would be necessary only to add ‘and Liancourt
Rocks’ at the end of Art. 2, par. (a).” This again makes it clear that Takeshima was designated as
Japanese territory in the peace treaty (NARA [RG59], Department of State, Decimal File 1950–54,
694.001/7-1351; in English), and the preamble to the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan andthe Republic of Korea signed in 1965 also invokes the peace treaty provisions.

58

Supra note 55, pp. 330–331.

14

in Article 2, Paragraph a 59. However, other countries’ opinions with regard to the paragraphwere not recorded.
In talks on July 19, the ROK requested John Foster Dulles to specify Takeshima and Parangdo
as territories to be relinquished by Japan in the peace treaty. Dulles replied that provided there
was historical justification, that would not be a problem, but a subsequent investigation
conducted within the Department of State revealed that the ROK had no historical basis
whatsoever for its requests. Robert A. Fearey of the US Embassy in Japan wrote a letter dated
August 3 to the assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs, John M. Allison, informing
him that Mr. Boggs, a geographer in the Department of State had “tried all resources in
Washington, but had been unable to identify Dokdo (Takeshima) and Parangdo”. Fearey said healso “asked the Korean Embassy and they told him they believed Dokdo was near Ulleungdo, orTakeshima Rock, and suspected that Parangdo was too. Apparently, he said, that was all they
could learn short of sending a cable to Muccio” 60. In response, on August 7, US Secretary ofState Dean Acheson notified Muccio that “Neither our geographers nor [the] Korean Embassy
have been able locate Dokdo and Parangdo Islands. Therefore unless we hear immediately [we]cannot consider this Korean proposal to confirm their sovereignty over these islands.” 61 The
following day Takeshima’s coordinates latitude and longitude were received, and at the sametime the US was notified that the ROK government had withdrawn its demand for Parangdo.
Thus it was as a result of this course of events that finally on August 10 the assistant secretaryof state for far eastern affairs Dean Rusk formally notified Ambassador Yang of the US viewthat Takeshima was Japanese territory, stating (in the Rusk letter) that Takeshima had not been
59

NARA (RG59) Records of the Bureau of Public Affairs, Records Relating to the Japanese Peace
Treaties, 1946–1952, Lot 78D173, Box 2 (in English). In recent years there have been occasionalcomments on the Internet to the effect that the Rusk letter is invalid because it was not disclosed to
the Allies and the Japanese government at the time and because Secretary of State Dulles wrote in aninternal memorandum a couple of years later that the US view regarding Takeshima was simply thatof one of many signatories to the treaty. However, the Rusk letter was a diplomatic document
exchanged between the US and the ROK in the process of drafting the peace treaty and it serves only
as a supplementary means of interpreting the treaty, attesting to the course of events by which
Takeshima was designated as Japanese territory as a result of the two governments discussing theissue of the attribution of Takeshima. As such, it was not the type of document that would usually
have been made available to third parties, let alone one for which the issue of validity or invalidity
was applicable. Bearing in mind, moreover, that the treaty was drafted, agreed, and signed afterincorporating the opinions of the relevant countries other than the United States to which the draft wassent, it is clear that these assertions do not hold true. It is also significant that the 1965 preamble to theTreaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea invokes the relevant peace treaty
provisions.

60

NARA Confidential U.S. Lot 58 D118 and D637, Records of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs,
Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Reel 39 (in English). “Muccio” refers to John J. Muccio, the USambassador in the ROK’s Pusan.

61

Supra note 55, p. 110.

15

claimed by Korea as its own territory prior to 1905. Subsequently, on August 16, Yang and
Rusk held talks, but no opinions relating to Takeshima were recorded62.
Thus, up until July 19, 1951, there was no evidence that the ROK government made any official
assertions of territorial rights over Takeshima directed toward third parties. Moreover, the peace
treaty was signed without any of the other countries involved raising any objection to the factthat Takeshima was excluded from the territories to be relinquished by Japan. However, perhaps
in an attempt to avoid US intervention in a dispute between the ROK and Japan, The Rusk letter
notifying the official view of the United States was not made public until 1978. As a result,
therefore, it failed to prevent the ROK’s illegal occupation of Takeshima and perpetuated thecause of conflict thereafter.
The only historical document of this period indicating the Japanese government’s assertions
with regard to the sovereignty over Takeshima is “Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part
IV. Minor Islands in the Pacific, Minor Islands in the Japan Sea,” and no records have beenfound to suggest that Japan “actively” lobbied the Allied Powers. As demonstrated by a series of
US Department of State documents, the Korean government asserted its territorial rights over
not only Tsushima, but also over Takeshima at the treaty drafting stage. And despite the factthat it was given the benefit of an opportunity to explain the historical evidence for its
ownership of Dokdo (Takeshima), which did not appear on any of its maps, it failed to do so.
These, therefore, are the likely reasons why Takeshima was designated as Japanese territory in
the peace treaty. Accordingly, the ROK’s second and third assertions as described in thisresearch paper’s introduction are also incorrect.
Having had both its ownership of Takeshima and the continuing existence of the MacArthur line
rejected during the peace treaty drafting process, the ROK government then decided on the day
before the treaty’s signing to establish a fisheries protection zone. This fisheries protection zone
added a vast expanse of the Sea of Japan that was not a major fishing area, but included
Takeshima, to the fisheries jurisdiction zone already created by the ROK’s Ministry ofCommerce and Industry63. That fisheries jurisdiction zone had already added Socotra Rock (asubmerged rock that the ROK asserted was Parangdo, located in a valuable fishing area in the62

For more details of the series of events, see supra note 54.

63

The actions taken within the ROK government at the time are analyzed in detail in Fujii Kenji, “Rishoban rain senpu e no katei ni kansuru kenkyu” (Research on the process leading to proclamation of
the Syngman Rhee line), Chosen gakuho (Journal of the Academic Association of Koreanology inJapan), Vol. 185; 2002, and Fujii, “Ri shoban rain sengen to kankoku seifu” (The declaration of theSyngman Rhee line and the ROK government), Dai-ni-ki Takeshima Mondai ni Kansuru Chosa
Kenkyu Saishu Hokoku-sho (Final Report of the Research Survey on the Takeshima Issue (second
session)), Shimane Prefecture, 2011 (both in Japanese).

16Yellow Sea) to the area within the MacArthur line. Kim Dong-jo, leader of the Government
Affairs Bureau in the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs recalls that the reason they included
Takeshima within the Syngman Rhee line despite opposition from some quarters was that they
had become convinced it was necessary to create a precedent for exercising sovereignty64.
As described above, therefore, a mere two months before the signing of the peace treaty, theROK demanded that Takeshima, rather than Tsushima, be specified as one of the islands to berelinquished by Japan. However, it was unable to respond to inquiries regarding Takeshima’s
exact location and a clear historical basis for its sovereignty over the islets, and consequently its
demand was rejected by the United States. Then, immediately before the peace treaty was
signed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to expand the ROK’s territory by making
preparations to incorporate Takeshima into its territory by force under the name of fisheries
protection.
(4) Actions after the signing of the peace treaty and the ROK’s tricks

The capture and detention of Japanese fishing boats by the ROK that had started in 1947 took
place even more frequently after the Syngman Rhee line was declared, while the ROK
government maintained an uncompromising stance with regard to Takeshima, and started toconstruct an ex post facto basis for its actions to make up for the weakness of its historicalgrounds.
On September 21, 1951, following the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty on September
8, the ROK minister for foreign affairs, Byun Young-tae, again contacted Muccio to assert his
country’s ownership of Takeshima 65. The “definitive” grounds he gave for his argument werelargely based on SCAPIN 677, followed by the fact that Takeshima had been placed on “theKorean side” of the MacArthur line, and also the fact that after the bombing incident by the US
military aircraft over Takeshima in 1948, the US armed forces had apologized to the Korean
victims. He also alleged that substantial documented evidence existed to demonstrate that
Takeshima was a Korean territory during the several hundred years before it was“surreptitiously incorporated into Japan” in 1905. However, in a letter dated October 3 from the
US Embassy in the ROK’s Pusan to the Department of State, the embassy official who dealt

64

Kim Dong-jo, Hoe-sang-30-nyeon Han-il-hoe-dam (30 Years of ROK-Japan talks recollected),
Joong-ang-ilbo-sa, Seoul, 1986, p. 16 (in Korean), translated into Japanese by Hayashi Takehiko,“Kan-nichi no wakai—Nikkan kosho 14 nen no kiroku” (Reconciliation between the ROK andJapan—A record of 14 years of Korea-Japan negotiations), Simul Press, 1993, p. 11.

65

Dok-do-ja-ryo―Mi-guk-pyeon 巻 2 (Dokdo documents—The United States, Vol. 2), National
Institute of Korean History, 2008, p. 110 (in Korean and English).

17

with the matter wrote “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not possess a compilation of such
‘evidence’ at this time. Although it was pointed out to the Minister that the Embassy would
welcome the submission of such ‘evidence’ for transmittal to the Department, it appears
doubtful that such information will be forthcoming.” Subsequently, in the preparatory
discussions held from October 20, 1951 prior to the ROK-Japan diplomatic normalization talks,
the ROK’s proposal to replace the MacArthur line with an alternative zone excluding Japanesefishing boats from international waters was rejected. In a special committee meeting of theHouse of Representatives on October 22, Kusaba Ryuen, the parliamentary vice-minister forforeign affairs, who served as plenipotentiary advisor to the San Francisco peace conference,
expressed the opinion that the peace treaty clearly confirmed Takeshima as Japanese territory.
Spurred by his words, an Asahi Shimbun newspaper reporter went ashore on Takeshima and had
an article printed in the newspaper on November 24 66 . The ROK government issued acondemnation following the article, but the grounds it gave for Korean ownership were
SCAPIN 677 and the fact that the governor of the ROK’s Gyeongsang Province had built amemorial monument to the 1948 bombing incident 67.
Then on January 18, 1952, the ROK declared the Syngman Rhee line. The line excluded
Japanese fishing boats from valuable fishing areas in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea,
while at the same time asserting national sovereignty over an extensive area of international
waters included within the line and also designating Takeshima and Socotra Rock as ROK
territory. By declaring the line, the ROK asserted its intention to maintain and wield its nationalsovereignty, as well as its fisheries jurisdiction rights placing the marine products and fisheries
industries under the control of the government in order to preserve resources68.

66“Nihon ni kaeru mujin no takeshima—Kuhaku junen no shima no zenyo o saguru” (The uninhabited
Takeshima returns to Japan—Exploring 10 blank years in the island’s full story), Asahi Shimbun(Asahi newspaper), November 24, 1951. For more details, see Terao Munefuyu, “Hi wa tsuketa
kedo—Takeshima shuzai hoi” (I did light it: Supplement to Takeshima reporting), Asahi Shimbun
Osaka head office local news section, ed., Osaka Shakai-bu Sengo Nijunen-shi Nakanoshima Sanchome San-banchi (Osaka local news section history of the 20 years after the war, Nakanoshima 3chome, 3-banchi), 1966, pp. 168–175 (both articles in Japanese).

67“November 26, 1951, Comments on Dokdo by Chief of Public Relations Lee,” Gwang-bok-30-nyeon
Jung-yo-ja-ryo-jip Wol-gan-jung-ang 1-wol-ho Byeol-chaek-gi-rok (30 years since liberation: Key
documents, Monthly Joongang, Jan. edition, supplementary volume of records), Joong-ang-ilbo-sa,
Seoul, January, 1975, p. 140 (in Korean).

68

Fujii Kenji, “Kankoku no kaiyo ninshiki—Ri shoban rain mondai o chushin ni” (Maritime perceptionsof South Korea: Centered on the Syngman Rhee line problem), Kankoku Kenkyu Senta nenpo (Annual
report, the Research Center for Korean Studies), 2011, p. 58 (in Japanese). Socotra Rock is a
submerged rock located southwest of Jeju Island in the East China Sea. At the time the Syngman
Rhee line was declared, the ROK government called this submerged rock Parangdo and asserted that
it was Korean territory. The ROK has now named it Ieodo and built a maritime research station there.
This has resulted in friction with China, which calls it the Suyan Rock.

18

In response, the Japanese protested by sending a Note Verbale dated January 28, 1952,
indicating their concern about the illegality of the Syngman Rhee line and the occupation of
Takeshima. The United States also sent a letter on February 11, expressing considerable concern
about the ROK wielding administrative authority over an extensive area of international
waters 69. On February 12, the ROK government issued a Note Verbale rebutting the Japanese
government’s concerns, but with regard to Takeshima it made only a brief assertion of its
territorial rights based on SCAPIN 677 and the MacArthur line. On April 25 of the same year,
three days before the peace treaty went into effect, the MacArthur line was abolished, and on thesame day the Japanese government issued a rebuttal to the ROK government’s Note Verbale.
However, the ROK government was unable to respond to the rebuttal with any clear indicationof the historical basis for its sovereignty over Takeshima. On May 20, the Shimane prefectural
government submitted a petition to the minister for foreign affairs and the minister for
agriculture and forestry asking for Takeshima, which it described as within the jurisdiction of
the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture, to be excluded from the bombing exercise
range of the US armed forces in Japan 70. However, on July 26 1952, notification was received
that, pursuant to an administrative agreement between the United States and Japan, Takeshima
had been re-designated as one of the marine exercise and training zones to be provided to the
US forces in Japan by the Japanese nation71.
On September 15, 1952, an incident occurred whereby some people from Ulleungdo who werefishing around Takeshima narrowly escaped injury by a US bomber conducting exercises overthe islets. At the time, the second Ulleungdo/Dokdo academic survey team sponsored by the
Korea Alpine Club was staying in Ulleungdo to conduct a survey; they reported the incident to
the ROK government on September 20, and on November 10 the ROK government issued aprotest to the US Embassy in Pusan alleging that the bombing had targeted “ROK territory” 72.

69“Issues associated with the proclamation of the peace line 1953–55” (Documents of the ROK relating
to the Japan-ROK talks), 0119–0122 コマ (in Korean).

70

Sugihara Takashi, “Zoku takeshima no gyogyoken no hensen ni tsuite—okinoshima gyogyo
kyodokumiai rengokai no doko o chushin ni” (Regarding the changes in fishing rights aroundTakeshima, Part 2—Centered on movements of the Okinoshima Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives),
Shimane Prefecture Web Takeshima Issue Research (in Japanese), available at
http://www.pref.shimane.lg.jp/admin/pref/takeshima/web-takeshima/takeshima04/
takeshima04-1/takeshima04-230701.html (as of February 16, 2012).

71

For more details, see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website, available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/takeshima/g_beigun.html(as of February 16, 2012; in Japanese).
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/index.html (in English)

72

ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government Affairs Bureau, Dok-do-mun-je-gae-ron (“Introduction
to Dokdo Issue”), Annex 5 (in Korean and English), 1955.

19

The correspondence between the US Embassy and the Department of State relating to territorial
sovereignty over Takeshima in relation to this incident are explained in the final report of thefirst session of the Research Survey on the Takeshima Issue 73. It indicates that the content of the
Rusk letter of August 10, 1951 (i.e., the US position that Takeshima was Japanese territory) had
been communicated to diplomats in diplomatic missions overseas, and had been notified to the
ROK government for a second time on December 4. The original text of the Note Verbale ofDecember 4, 1952, written by the US Embassy in reply to the ROK government’s protest, was
not available when the final report of the research study’s first session was compiled. However,it focused on the claim in the ROK government’s protest that Takeshima was ROK territory andstated that the US position remained as described in the Rusk letter of August 10, 1951. It
therefore reiterated to the ROK government the official view of the United States that
Takeshima was Japanese territory74.

73

Tsukamoto Takashi, “Takeshima ryoyuken funso ni kanren suru beikoku kokumusho bunsho (tsuiho)”(Documents of the US Department of State relating to the Takeshima territorial dispute (addendum)),Takeshima Issue Research Group, Takeshima mondai ni kansuru chosa kenkyu saishu hokokusho(Final Report of the Research Survey on the Takeshima Issue), 2007, pp. 79–89 (in Japanese).

74

Supra note 65, p. 255.

20

Fig. 1

Note Verbale No. 187 from the Embassy of the United States of America to the ROK

government, December 4, 1952

No. 187
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the latter’s note of November
10, 1952 stating that a single engined airplane described as being under the commandof the United States Forces in the Far East dropped bombs on Dokdo Island on
September 15, 1952. The Embassy is advised that the limited amount of information
provided in the Ministry’s note as well as the very long time which has elapsed since
the incident is said to have taken place make it virtually impossible for the United
Nations Command to determine the facts in the case. Preparations have, however,been expedited to dispense with the use of Dokdo Island as a bombing range.
The Embassy has taken note of the statement contained in the Ministry’s Note that
“Dokdo Island (Liancourt Rocks).is a part of the territory of the Republic of Korea”.
The United States Government’s understanding of the territorial status of this island
was stated in Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s letter to the Korean
Ambassador in Washington dated August 10, 1951.
American Embassy,
Pusan, December 4, 1952

21

22

This Note Verbale was included as an annex to the book entitled Introduction to Dokdo Issue
published by the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government Affairs Bureau in 195575. It wasused as a basis to argue that, since the US armed forces had responded to the ROK’s protest by
deciding that Takeshima would no longer be a bombing range, it had recognized that Takeshima
was ROK territory. Kim Dong-jo, leader of the Government Affairs Bureau in the Ministry ofForeign Affairs, explained in the preface to Introduction to Dokdo Issue that its purpose was not
to notify the general public of the Dokdo issue, but to enable the heads of diplomatic missions
overseas to correctly understand the matter and to provide them with information necessary tocounter the unwarranted propaganda of the Japanese, for which purposes he hoped the bookwould be put to frequent use. Shockingly, however, the book in fact omitted the section of theNote Verbale reaffirming the Rusk letter, thereby concealing the fact that the US considered
Takeshima to be Japanese territory not only from ROK citizens, but also from its own
diplomats 76.

75

Supra note 72, Annex 6.

76This falsification was first pointed out on Gerry Bevers’ blog (in English), available at
http://dokdo-or-takeshima.blogspot.com/2011/08/1955-introduction-to-dokdo-issue-rok.html (as ofFebruary 16, 2012).

23

Fig. 2

Note No. 187 from the United States Embassy to the ROK government, December 4, 1952,

as it appeared in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government Affairs Bureau Introduction to
Dokdo Issue (1955). The final paragraph reaffirming the letter from Rusk has been abbreviated to“etc.”

24

Meanwhile, E. Allan Lightner, Jr., the ad interim charge d’affaires of the US Embassy in Korea,
made inquiries to establish the facts about the bombing following the ROK government’s
protest. He received a reply from a representative on behalf of the commander-in-chief ofUnited Nations Command, Mark W. Clark, stating that, although they had been unable toconfirm the facts regarding the bombing, if the use of Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima) as abombing range were to be suspended, the ROK as well as other interested agencies would be
notified, but that territorial sovereignty was beyond the scope of SCAP’s authority 77. The letter
also pointed out that SCAPIN 1033, relating to fisheries, specified that “it was not to beconstrued as an expression of Allied policy relative to the ultimate determination of national
jurisdiction, international boundaries or fishing rights in the area concerned.” Lightner replied
enclosing the December 4 notification to the ROK government 78, urging attention to the section
invoking the content of the Rusk letter.
On December 13, 1952, the commander in chief, Far East Command (CINCFE) decided to
revoke the designation of Takeshima as a bombing range and the US Embassies in Japan andthe ROK deliberated with the commanding general of the Korean Communications Zone
(KComZ), Thomas W. Herren, about whether they should notify the ROK of this 79. On January
20, 1953, Herren notified the ROK’s minister for foreign affairs 80, but despite the fact that theNote Verbale of December 4 clearly notified the ROK government that the United Statesrecognized Takeshima as Japanese territory, the relevant Note Verbale was in the end appended
as documentary material to a publication compiled for the ROK government’s embassy officials
to use as grounds to assert the ROK’s ownership of Takeshima 81 . Furthermore, the Note
Verbale had been falsified by omitting the section reiterating the Rusk letter to give theimpression that the United States had acknowledged the ROK’s ownership of Takeshima andrevoked the designation of Takeshima as a bombing range as a result of the ROK government’s
protests and demands. Its inclusion in the publication was intended as evidence that the UnitedStates had acknowledged the ROK’s ownership of Takeshima.
Subsequently, on February 4, 1953, there was an incident in which the Japanese Dai Ichi
Daihomaru fishing boat was fired at by the ROK navy in international waters near Jeju Island,

77

Supra note 65, p. 251.

78

Supra note 65, p. 252.

79

Supra note 65, pp. 262–264.

80

Supra note 72, Annex 7.

81

Supra note 72.

25

resulting in the death of its chief fisherman 82 . On February 13, the Japanese government
protested by sending a Note Verbale to the ROK legation, and on the 18th it demanded
compensation and measures to prevent reoccurrence 83 . On the 23rd, after the incident wasaddressed in the Japanese Diet, the ROK presidential secretariat sent a letter to the Japanese
government stating that it had established the sovereignty line [translator’s note: the Syngman
Rhee Line] for the sake of peace 84. This was followed on the 24th by announcement of “thetruth about the incident” by the ROK Government Information Agency 85, and on the 26th, thesecretary of the interior’s comments relating to the incident were announced 86. Thus tensions
were building between Japan and the ROK, and it was within this context that, on the 27th,
newspapers reported that the ROK Defense Ministry had issued a statement alleging that thecommander of the Far East Air Force (FEAF), Otto Paul Weyland, had sent it a letter
acknowledging Takeshima as ROK territory 87, and this became a major issue within Japan88. On
March 3, Ellis O. Briggs, of the US ambassador in Korea filed a report with the Department ofState saying that he hoped any future communications relating to Dokdo would be transmitted
through the Embassy, thus ensuring there could be no distortion of the US position that the islets
were not subject to Korean jurisdiction. He added that the Embassy had not obtained an original
copy of the ROK defense minister’s statement, but it was clear that the ROK government (or atleast certain elements within it) had distorted the meaning of any such note from Weyland tosuit its own purposes 89. On March 5 (or 4), the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the82

February 23, 1953, 15th Diet Session, “Suisan, homu, gaimu iinkai rengo shinsakai kaigiroku”(Minutes of the Joint Review Board for the Fisheries, Judicial Affairs, and Foreign Affairs
Committees), no. 1 (in Japanese).

83

February 25, 1953, 15th Diet Session, “Gaimu iinkai kaigiroku” (Minutes of the Foreign Affairs
Committee), No. 20 (in Japanese).

84“Sovereignty line demarcated for the sake of peace— Letter to Japanese representative frompresidential secretariat on Japanese fisherman incident,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), February
26, 1953 (in Korean).

85“The truth about the Daihomaru incident—Announcement by the Government Information Agency,”
The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), February 25, 1953 (in Korean).

86“Reinforcement of maritime security unavoidable— Secretary of the Interior Jin—Comments relating
to ROK-Japan dispute over Japanese fisherman incident,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily),
February 27, 1953 (in Korean).

87“Takeshima ryoyu o kakunin—kankoku kokubobu de seimei” (Ownership of Takeshima confirmed—
ROK Defense Ministry issues statement), Mainichi Shimbun (Mainichi newspaper), February 28,
1953 (in Japanese); “Fears of Dokdo fishermen dispelled—US forces guarantee end of aerial bombing
exercises,” The Dong-a ilbo (East Asia daily), February 28, 1953 (in Korean), etc.

88

February 28, 1953, 15th Diet Session, “Shugiin gaimu iinkai kaigiroku” (Minutes of the House ofRepresentatives Foreign Affairs Committee), no. 21 (in Japanese).

89

Supra note 65, pp. 272–273.

26

US Embassy about whether or not Weyland had actually acknowledged Takeshima as ROK
territory 90, and the Japanese Diet also deliberated on the matter91. On March 12, secretary ofstate Dulles sent notification to the US Embassies in both Japan and the ROK that the
Department of State and the Department of Defense had conducted thorough investigations, butthey were unable to discover Weyland’s letter. He also indicated that the Department of State
would maintain its position as outlined in Note No. 365 to Pusan and Note No. 1360 to Tokyo,
both dated November 26. In future, he said, any formal statements affirming or denying thematter would need to be reviewed before being made public92. Note No. 365 to Pusan states thatthe reiteration of the Rusk letter serves only to repeat the existing position of the United States,
so it distances the United States from the dispute and might dissuade the ROK from introducing
a futile issue into Japan-ROK negotiations that have already fallen into considerable
difficulties 93. In the end, the ROK government never offered the Weyland letter as evidence of
territorial rights 94 and consequently it is assumed that it was a falsification by the ROK Defense
Ministry.
On March 19, 1953, it was agreed at the Japan-US Joint Committee’s Marine Subcommitteethat the bombing training area at Takeshima would be eliminated, and following approval by theJapan-US Joint Committee, Takeshima was formally removed from the exercise zone 95. But the90

Supra note 65, p. 279.

91

March 5, 1953, 15th Diet Session, “Sangiin gaimu, homu iinkai rengo shinsakai kaigiroku” (House ofCouncillors—Minutes of the Joint Review Board for the Foreign and Legal Affairs Committees), no.
1 (in Japanese).

92

Supra note 65, p. 285.

93

Supra note 65, p. 250. It can be inferred from the content that Note no. 187 was modelled on this.

94

Supra note 72.

95

According to Naito Seichu, the revocation of Takeshima’s designation as a bombing range within lessthan one year was in response to the protest by the ROK government, which knew that the Japan-US
Joint Committee had made the designation. In other words, it was based on the official letter sent by
the ROK government on February 27, 1953, demanding that the designation be revoked, (Naito,
Takeshima=Dokdo mondai nyumon—Nihon gaimusho “Takeshima” hihan (Territorial issue between
Japan and Korea; case of Takeshima/Dokdo: A critique of the “10 issues of Takeshima” published by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan), Shinkansha, 2008, p. 53 (in Japanese)). Naito also says thatfor this reason the ROK government sent a letter demanding measures to prevent reoccurrence to the
US ambassador in the ROK on November 10, and after receiving notice on December 24 from thecommanding general of the US Army Forces Far East that there would be no more bombing exercisesaround Dokdo, the ROK-US Joint Committee decided on March 19, 1953, to revoke its status as an
exercise area. Naito therefore concludes that the course of events indicates that this series of measures
was taken based on recognition by the US armed forces in the ROK that Dokdo was ROK territory(ibid., p. 54). However, I was not able to locate any record confirming that a meeting of the ROK-US
Joint Committee was held on that date (for details refer to the answer to the third question in theopinions on the Takeshima issue for Dec. 2009 and Jan. 2010 in Shimane Prefecture Web Takeshima
Issue Research (in Japanese), available at27

agreements of the ROK government is not bear on the facts ROK asserts that the United Statesand its armed forces acknowledged Takeshima as ROK territory as a result of the agreement. It
is evident that the US government was treating Takeshima as a Japanese territory. Subsequently,
a letter from R. B. Finn of the US Embassy in Japan to a Mr. Leonhart 96, assumed to have been
written in April 1953 97, suggested that, when the time was right, the US government might
consider issuing a statement to clarify the fact that, according to the US interpretation of thepeace treaty, sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks remained in Japan.
As outlined above, therefore, the ROK government, having been denied its sovereignty ofTakeshima under the peace treaty, used the Syngman Rhee line to forcefully incorporate
Takeshima into its own territory just before the ROK-Japan diplomatic normalization talks were
to be held and the peace treaty was to enter into effect. Then it attempted to gloss over its illegal
action by concealing a part of an official US document to twist the truth, and even going so far
as to distort the words of the US armed forces commander to provide a basis for its assertion
that the United States had recognized the ROK’s territorial rights over Takeshima.
In September 1953, the ROK government sent a Note Verbale to the Japanese government
stating for the first time the historical basis for Takeshima to be considered as ROK territory.
However, the legitimacy of that alleged historical basis has already been empirically denied fora number of reasons, including the claim that the present-day Takeshima was identified as
Usando, an island that appeared on old maps of Korea. The Note Verbale was therefore justanother attempt by the ROK government to fabricate a historical basis for its claims.
Conclusion

The ROK government asserts that “Dokdo is an historic land that was invaded in the process ofJapan’s imperialist invasion of the Korean peninsula, but then recovered” 98 . This assertion
comes from the “official letter of 57 years earlier” by former minister for foreign affairs Byun
Young-tae, mentioned at the beginning of this research paper, which is thought to be the Note

http://www.pref.shimane.lg.jp/soumu/web-takeshima/takeshima08/2007/record200912.html
Note that I was also not able to locate the official letter sent by the ROK government on February 27,
1953, or the notice of December 24, 1952.
96

Supra note 31 (Jung, 2008).

97

NARA (RG 84) Memorandum by R. B. Finn to Leonhart, Japan, Tokyo Embassy, Classified General
Records 1952-63, Box 23, folder 322.1 (in English).

98

ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Refutation of the assertion of territorial rights overDokdo by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008 (in Japanese).

28

Verbale sent by the ROK government on October 28, 1954 99 . However, as this study has
demonstrated, sensationalist remarks such as these that incite nationalism run counter to thefacts of the matter. Nonetheless, the ROK government has for more than 60 years repeatedly
incited anti-Japanese sentiment among its citizens and stirred up public opinion in this way touse for political purposes, or to put diplomatic pressure on Japan.
After World War II, the ROK shocked Japan by petitioning the United States to demand the“return” of Tsushima, an inherent part of Japanese territory100. Although the ROK made anotherformal demand just before the peace treaty was signed, it was denied by the United States. The
ROK then immediately asserted its territorial rights of Takeshima instead, and despite lacking
any basis in the form of geographical or historical documents, it adopted the unquestioning
belief that Takeshima was its own territory by rights and demanded that Takeshima be specified
in the peace treaty alongside Ulleungdo as one of the islands Japan would relinquish. With
inadequate historical documents or knowledge relating to the island, however, the ROK was
unable to secure US support, and instead ended up prompting the decision to make Takeshima
Japanese territory under the peace treaty. The ROK then used force to occupy Takeshima
illegally—still without any legal basis—thereby creating a future source of trouble between
itself and Japan. Furthermore, as this research paper has demonstrated, the ROK did not present
documents as they were, but knowingly falsified them prior to inclusion in official publications,distorting or stretching the meaning of the US armed forces commander’s words in an attempt
to create new evidence for Korean ownership of Takeshima. Consequently, for nearly 60 years,
the ROK’s researchers were forced to write studies and research papers based on erroneous
information101, thus depriving ROK citizens of their right to know the truth.

99

Hyun Dae-song maintains that the minister for foreign affairs, Byun Young-tae also made a verbal
comment in September 1954 refuting Japan’s assertion of territorial rights over Dokdo, and hiscomment indicated “a heroic resolve to fight to the last in defense of Dokdo.” (Hyun, The Birth ofTerritorial Nationalism: The Politics of the Dokdo/Takeshima Issue), 2006, p. 278 (in English)).

100“Tsushima henkan wa gensoku ni kaesu” (The return of Tsushima goes against fundamental
principles), Asahi Shimbun (Asahi newspaper), August 28, 1948 (in Japanese). In recent years there
have been reports of the discovery of historical documents indicating that the official responsible forthe matter at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time was considering measures to counterthe ROK’s demand, in addition to reports of testimony by archaeologists (“Tsushima wa kankokuryo
ni taio: shiryo hakken” (Dealing with the assertion that Tsushima is ROK territory: Documents
discovered), NHK Nyusu (NHK News), July 3, 2008; “Kuni o tadorite—kokkyo to ryodo no
kokogaku, daini-bu (2)—Tsukushiboko nihon wo urazuke” (Tracing the nation—the archaeology ofborders and territories, Part 2 (2)—Tsukushiboko (ancient bronze pikes) provide evidence forJapanese territory), Sankei Shimbun (Sankei newspaper), May 5, 2011.

101

Kim Myung-ki, “A critique of Paragraph 3 of the items relating to the peace treaty with Japan in the“10 issues of Takeshima” published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,” Dok-do-yeon-gu(Dokdo Research), 2009 fall issue (No. 7), 2009, pp. 62–70 (in Korean). In this article, Kim states that
following the response from the US Department of State, the official intent of the United States was to29

Now, however, fewer sources assert that the United States discontinued use of Takeshima as abombing exercise site and recognized the ROK’s ownership of the island in response to the
ROK’s protest. In recent years, even some of the ROK’s researchers are recognizing Usando in
the old maps as Chikusho (called “Jukdo” in the ROK) 102, and we are also seeing researchers
who, as a result of analyzing official US documents and the ROK’s historical documents fromthe period of military administration, acknowledge that the ROK had only a tenuous awarenessof Takeshima at that time. And there have been other new developments: In September 2011,
for instance, the ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade invited a judge who had written anovel imagining that the Takeshima issue had been referred to the International Court of Justice
to join the ministry 103 and requested budget to set about researching litigation and preparing
English-language documents 104. Following on from the discovery of the Uldo-gun rule book,there was another announcement of the discovery of new documents during the writing of thisresearch paper with the unearthing of civil service examination questions and corresponding
answer sheets regarding measures to deal with the Ulleungdo Dispute (known in Japan as theTakeshima Incident) that occurred during the reign of King Sukjong 105. If one reads the texts
released, neither the questions nor the answers include any information about Takeshima and it
is only Ulleungdo that is mentioned in connection with the borders of the Kingdom of Joseon
and the subsequent Empire of Korea, as well as in territorial disputes with Japan. If anything,
therefore, the texts seem to attest to the fact that the recognition of Korea’s central government,
regional officials, and the intellectuals of the day did not extend as far as Takeshima. It is to be
hoped that the results of further document collection and empirical research such as this on theview Dokdo as ROK territory, “as shown below.” He then quotes Annex 6 of Dok-do-mun-je-gae-ron(the Introduction to Dokdo Issue), which omitted the section relating to the Rusk letter.
102

Oh Sang-hak, (The change in perception of Ulleungdo and Dokdo represented in maps of the Joseon
Dynasty), Mun-hwa-yeok-sa-ji-ri (Journal of cultural and historical geography), Part 18, No. 1, 2006,
p. 92; Kim Hwa-kyung, (Research on perception of Dokdo as it appeared in old Korean maps), Dokdo-yeong-yu-gwon-hwak-lib-eul-wi-han-yeon-gu (Research to establish territorial rights over Dokdo),edited by Yeungnam University Dokdo Research Institute, 2010, p. 25 (both in Korean), etc.

103

“Dokdo horitsu shimonkan ni hanji ninmei—Gemba gaisho no hatsugen, ikan—kankoku”, (Judgeappointed as Dokdo legal advisory attorney—Foreign minister Gemba’s statement, regrets—ROK) (inJapanese), Jiji Tsushin (Jiji Press; online version), September 6, 2011, available at
http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201109/2011090600633 (as of February 15, 2012).

104“Kankoku seifu, rainen no dokdo kanren gaiko yosan ni go-oku won o tonyu” (ROK government
invests 500 million won in next year’s Dokdo-related diplomatic budget), Joong-ang ilbo (Korea
Joongang daily), Japanese-language online version, October 17, 2011 (in Japanese), available at
http://japanese.joins.com/article/671/144671.html (as of February 15, 2012).

105

Daegu District Bar Association website, “Dokdo Committee discovers unofficial historical documents
relating to Dokdo” (in Korean), available at
http://www.daegubar.or.kr/index.php?status=menu5&code=01&no=420(as of February 16, 2012).

30

part of the ROK will be forthcoming.
Japan’s budget for Takeshima is less than 50 million yen, including the budgets for both the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Shimane Prefecture. The ROK, on the other hand, expends anenormous budget equivalent to more than 5 billion yen annually. And even greater sums willsoon be required: It has been reported that there are plans to refurbish accommodation and toconstruct sightseeing facilities to enable visitors to observe the maritime research station andundersea views, as well as to construct other facilities such as a quay where 5,000-ton classvessels can berth. Meanwhile, the Japanese government constantly protests and, while thesetypes of actions by the ROK not result in Takeshima becoming ROK territory, there is aconcern that it may make headway in establishing de facto occupation. Japan therefore needs to
respond adequately. As explained previously, what the ROK is doing is illegally occupying
Takeshima without any evidence based on historical documents. However, as the number of
researchers and government officials within the ROK who debate on the basis of historical
documents is increasing, it is to be hoped that a considerable number of people will emerge who
see through the government’s tricks and are concerned about taxes being squandered in this way.
When Shimane Prefecture established local regulations for Takeshima Day in 2005, many
voiced their concerns about the impact on Japan-ROK relations, and in fact there was atemporary deterioration in sentiment toward Japan among ROK citizens. Subsequently, however,as the empirical research of Shimane Prefecture’s Takeshima Issue Research Group proceeded,
the loud, emotional reaction dropped off and instead empirical research even became evident
here and there in the ROK as well. Meanwhile, there also seems to be a shift toward lobbying
the Japanese political world 106 and academic circles 107. The people of Japan need to be aware of
the fact that Japan’s inherent territory, Takeshima, has been occupied and Japan’s statesovereignty has continuously been encroached upon. Meanwhile, the government needs to makeeven greater efforts to resolve the issue peacefully by investing funds in empirical research andactivities to inform the public.

106“Possibility of Dokdo being misused politically because Japan’s democratic party administration is
weak—Interview with Northeast Asian History Foundation,” Jugan Chosun (Weekly chosun), No.
2136, 2010, pp. 22–23 (in Korean).

107

Kyoto Sangyo University Institute for World Affairs, ROK and northeast Asia history foundation,
Joint academic seminar, “Kagami no naka no jiko ninshiki—nihon to kankoku no rekishi, bunka,
mirai” (Self perception in the mirror—The histories, cultures, and futures of Japan and the ROK),(October 9–10, 2010) (in Japanese).

31