12
Alexander M A R K A R O V

Regime Formation and Development
in Armenia

Founding Semipresidentialism:
The Context and First Steps
Semipresidential regimes as a political phenomenon were quite a rareexperience some fifteen—twenty years ago. Most scholars agreed thatthey existed in the Weimar Republic, Fifth French Republic, Finland, Sri
Lanka, and Portugal; added to the list of Austria, Iceland, and Ireland.1
The article is part of the research conducted within the frames of the INTAS Young Scientist Post-Doctoral Fellowship awarded for the project entitled “Regime Formation andTransformation in the Post-Soviet Region: A Comparative Analysis of Semipresidentialism
in Armenia, Russia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine,” INTAS Ref. No. 05-109-4708.
Editor’s note: The chapter was written in 2005, and the information contained here has
not necessarily been updated. The Armenian Constitution was finally amended in November 2005.
1 For the account of semipresidential regimes see, for example: Robert Elgie, ed., SemiPresidentialism in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Maurice Duverger, “A
New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government,” European Journal of Political
Research 8 (1980), pp. 165–187; Gianfranco Pasquino, “Semi-Presidentialism: A Political
Model at Work,” European Journal of Political Research 31 (1997) pp. 128–137; Steven D.
Roper, “Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes,” Comparative Politics 34, no. 3 (2002), pp. 253–272; Rafael Martinez, “SemiPresidentialism: A Comparative Study” (Paper presented at ECPR Joint Sessions, Workshop 13 “Designing institutions,” Mannheim, Germany, March 26–31, 1999).

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Alexander MARKAROVFrom the late 1980s to the early 90s, when former socialist countries
started the democratization process, the number of nations which
adopted semipresidential features within their constitutions grew and at
first glance included such countries as Armenia, Lithuania, Russia,
Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Croatia, etc. Robert
Elgie observed over forty semipresidential regimes all over the world,
including those seventeen in the former-USSR and Central and Eastern
Europe.2
In the course of the present study we will examine semipresidential
regime formation and development in Armenia, which had evolved
through various stages, presenting constitutional alternatives put forward within the discussion that occurred in Armenia from 1993 to 1995
and will conclude with the constitution amendment process that has
been going on in the country since 1998.
The issue of adopting a certain regime type, defining the manner ofpolitical institutions to be created and defining the mode of executive–legislative relations was on the agenda and defined the political
discourse of all the post-socialist nations, especially in the early 1990s.
Within some of them discussion is not over yet, some amended theirconstitutions, adapting to new realities, and some like Armenia are stillgoing through this process. While discussing the issue of regime type,three alternatives are focused on: presidential, parliamentary or a kind of
semipresidential government. 3 Presidentialism supposes general election of the head of state for a fixed term in office. He or she is simultaneously chief executive, who appoints the government that is not subject
2 Robert Elgie, “The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism,” in Elgie, Semi-Presidentialism inEurope, p. 14.
3 Detailed discussion could be found in Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Juan Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a
Difference?” in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy, vol. 1, Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994);
Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in
Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Arend Lijphart, Patterns of
Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1999); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992).

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to the legislature’s vote of (non)confidence as well as the president. Parliamentary government briefly could be presented as a “form of constitutional democracy in which executive authority emerges from, and is
responsible to, legislative authority.”4 And the third option is a semipresidential government which in Duverger’s terms might be describedas one, where constitution “combines three elements: (1) the president of
the republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime ministerand ministers who possess executive and governmental power and canstay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition tothem.”5
Each regime type has certain advantages and disadvantages. It is usually said that presidentialism has such advantages as stability of the executive and more democratic government that coexists with such disadvantages as possible deadlock within the executive-legislative relations,time rigidity and a government that is formed by a “winner-takes-all”
formula. On the contrary, regarding the parliamentary form of government it is usually mentioned that it has more flexible executivelegislative relations because of a possible vote of non-confidence to the
executive that could be introduced by the legislature. In addition, thepossibility of coalition formation, but simultaneously executive instability is usually given as the major disadvantage for parliamentary government. Semipresidentialism combines the advantages and disadvantages of those already mentioned but it is also claimed that this system“would develop a pattern of alternation between presidential and parliamentary phases,”6 but it allows one of the major disadvantages ofpresidentialism—the possibility of deadlock in the executive–legislative
relations to be overcome.7
4 Lijphart, Democracies, p. 68.
5 Maurice Duverger, “A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government,”
European Journal of Political Research 8, no. 2 (1980), p. 166.
6 Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, p. 122.
7 More detailed discussion on the advantages and disadvantages could be found in
Arend Lijphart, ed., Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) (especially J. Linz’s articles: “The Perils of Presidentialism,” pp. 118–127,
and “The Virtues of Parliamentary Democracy,” pp. 212–216). See also Linz andValenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, vol. 1.

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Duverger’s semipresidential concept definition was subject to various
critiques,8 within which we would like to put forward the following
definition of semipresidentialism. It could be viewed as a form of republican government, where a fixed-term popularly elected head of state has
authorities within the appointment of the government headed by theprime minister and possesses authorities (including veto powers) within
the law-making process. The cabinet is also subject to the legislative(non)confidence vote, while legislature can be dissolved by the president.
This definition allows the construction of two basic models for potential
presidential–parliamentary relations development. Within the two basicmodels parliamentary support toward the president is the most important factor. Having the assembly’s support the president is free to form agovernment supporting his politics and policies, and in Duverger’s
terms becomes “absolute monarch,” while upon meeting parliamentary
resistance he or she has to take into consideration the composition of thelegislature, when appointing the government. Those basic models might
be elaborated on further, supplemented by such additional variables as
the nature of parliamentary majority (within a continuum ranging fromsingle party majority to oversized coalition) and the nature of the party
system, making the game of politics within the frames of semipresidential constitution more and more complex.
In Armenia the issue of adopting a new constitution was put forward
months after the Declaration of the Independence of Armenia wasadopted by the Supreme Soviet on August 23, 1990. On November 5,1990 the parliament established a Constitutional Commission to draft the
new constitution, comprised of twenty politicians, members of the parliament and professional lawyers. The Commission was headed by the
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Levon Ter-Petrosyan. But before thefirst meeting of the Commission, held almost two years after its creation
on October 15, 1992, the Armenian political system had already undergone considerable changes.
Based on the Declaration, which also declared separation of the executive, legislative and judicial branches, of June 25, 1991, the Supreme
Soviet took a decision to establish Presidency in Armenia and to sched8 See Elgie, Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, pp. 4–12.

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ule presidential elections for October 16 of 1991.9 There was no doubt
such an institution was necessary, but the controversy was related not somuch to the need for the institution, but to the question of authorities of
the President. Two main camps—one supporting a strong president andthe other a weaker version of presidency as in a parliamentary regime
had been formed in the summer of 1991. Supporters of the parliamentary
regime were stressing that it was more democratic and allowed a meansof avoiding power centralization within the hands of one person. In addition, they had been emphasizing that there was already an existing
tradition of parliamentarism in Armenia, established in the First Armenian Republic of 1918–1920 and even in Soviet times. Another point wasthat parliamentarism with a PR electoral formula will positively influence the creation of political parties and their institutionalization in Armenia, while strong presidentialism will discourage that process. On theother hand supporters of a strong presidency brought their own arguments in favor of their position. They stressed that within non-professional parliament and weak political parties, the political system mightend in anarchy where there is just one step toward dictatorship. They
also stressed that the Soviet system was rather a fiction and real authority was concentrated within the hands of the party and its sole first secretary, so providing a base and tradition not for a collective decisionmaking body, but rather for one–person rule—in this new situation—thepresident. No less important was the contextual situation, within which
debates regarding institutional changes were taking place—a situation
involving political transition, economic transformation from planned
economy towards the market and finally the issue of state and nationbuilding. In Armenia all that was overburdened by the external (Karabakh) conflict and economic blockade, so supporters of a strong presidency viewed it as a more effective way of dealing with the problems
9 On September 26, 1991 the Central Electoral Commission registered 6 candidates forthe president’s and vice president’ offices: P. Hayrikyan and A. Arshakyan, R. Kazaryan
and S. Zolyan, A. Navasardyan and G. Khachatryan, S. Sargsyan and V. Hovhannisyan, L.
Ter-Petrosyan and G. Haroutyunyan, Z. Balayan and A. Marzpanyan. The results of theelections show the strong support for L. Ter-Petrosyan then. He got 83 percent of votes or
58 percent of votes of all the citizens. The next two candidates P. Hayrikyan and S. Sargsyan got 7.2 percent and 4.3 percent, respectively, and all other less than 1 percent.

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compared with the non-professional, multiparty and multi-voice legislature, which was unable to make sharp decisions in the rapidly changing situation.
By the end of the year the Supreme Soviet adopted two laws—“Onthe President of the Republic of Armenia” (August 1, 1991) and “On theSupreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia” (November 19, 1991), which
established the first steps toward the creation of a strong presidency inArmenia. Within the debates that took place in the parliament over thelaws two major camps—one advocating the “governmental” draft, andanother advocating the opponents’ draft, were formed in the Supreme
Soviet. The latter stated that the governmental draft is in sharp contradiction to the principle of the balance of powers and provides the president with dictatorial authorities. The contradictions between the twocamps continued later, when the Supreme Soviet started to discuss thedraft law on its own status. The main controversial issues addressedsuch problems as limitations of presidential authorities and the possibility of control over presidential actions as well as the issue of appointment of the officials. Primary distinctions were related to the authoritiesof parliament and mutual executive-legislative control. Opponents of astrong president also had been stressing the role of the parliament notjust as legislative authority, but also as a political body with wide controlling authorities over other branches. The debate started in the early
90s and has continued throughout the entire history of the independent
Armenia, establishing two camps: one usually those in power, advocating rather strong presidential powers; and another camp, those usuallyin opposition, with a focus on the primacy of the parliament.
After the introduction of the presidential institution in Armenia andadoption of the laws on Presidential power and Supreme Soviet the balance within the executive-legislative relations changed and moved towards the dominance of the president. Before the adoption of those laws,
Armenia could be considered a parliamentary republic with the head of
executive, Chair of the Council of Ministers and the government being
appointed by the parliament and subject to its confidence. The Supreme
Soviet could vote them out of office by two-thirds qualified majority of
all the members of parliament. In general the parliament was the highest
institution of state authority and it was the most powerful institution,

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which was solely responsible for lawmaking, including the authority toamend the Constitution. It was responsible for filling principal political
offices and had wide controlling powers.
That phenomenon of power transfer toward presidential institutions
is not unique to Armenia—most of the post-soviet states adopted a system of government with strong presidency. Advocates explained theneed for an effective executive, enabling competent and prompt decisions to be made within the situation of a permanent crisis in politics
and economic transformation. Those who advocated strong presidency
also usually were the politicians sure that they would be elected for thepresidents office.
According to the legal norms set by the newly adopted laws, thepresident was appointed for five years by popular election as the head ofthe executive branch. He was responsible for appointing and dismissing
the prime minister and by his suggestion members of the government.
Both the chairman of the government and the members were also subject
to parliamentary confidence. Significant changes took place within thedecision-making process. If previously the parliament had been solely
responsible for law-making, after the initiation of the presidential institution the president gained veto powers. The Supreme Soviet could votefor the bill by a simple majority of all deputies—131 votes, but some of
the bills required a qualified majority of two thirds; such as constitutional amendments, the vote of non-confidence, recall of the chairman ofparliament, first deputy chair, deputy chairman and the secretary of theparliament. The bills passed by the parliament had to be signed by thepresident within two weeks or returned to the legislature with suggestions and objections, requiring new debate and revoting. The Supreme
Soviet could accept presidential suggestions by a simple majority of
votes of the deputies with accepted authorities but with no less than one
third of all the deputies or it could insist on its own version of the billthat required two thirds of the votes of the deputies with recognizedauthorities. In the latter case the president had to sign the bill within fivedays. If the president did not sign or did not return the bill within two
weeks or did not sign it within five days after the second voting the bill
had to be published with the signature of the Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet.

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Crafting the New Armenian Constitution
After basic norms regulating executive-legislative relations were established, the Constitutional Commission started to perform its duties more
actively and from October 15, 1992 till May 11, 1995 held 109 meetings.10
On June 24, 1993 the Constitutional Commission presented its first draftof the constitution for nation-wide discussion. The draft constitution
comprised eight chapters: Chapter 1—General Statements; Chapter
2—Basic Rights and Duties of the Citizens; Chapter 3—National Council(Parliament); Chapter 4—President of the republic; Chapter 5—The
Government; Chapter 6—The Judiciary; Chapter 7—Territorial Government and Local self-government; Chapter 8—Order of acceptance andamendments of the Constitution. The draft declared the Republic of Armenia a sovereign, democratic state with the rule of law. State authority
was based on the principles of the separation of power between the executive, legislative and judicial branches. The legislative body—National
Council—had to become a permanently acting representative body with
100 members elected for five years. The dissolution of parliament could
be reached only by decision of the legislature or by presidential decree.
The President was the highest official who had to secure the constitutional balance. The executive belonged to the government, headed by theprime minister, who was the subject of both parliamentary and presidential confidence. The proposed draft could be characterized as one
that continued the existing logic within presidential/executive-legislative
relations, proposing strong presidential authorities comparable withthose of the President of France and even exceeding them, because thePresident of Armenia got the right both to appoint and dismiss theprime minister. Formally the draft could be assessed as a semipresidential constitution, but in the case the president had a parliamentary majority his powers were almost unlimited. In that case parliament would
become a body just to ratify bills presented by the president and thegovernment, who had bill initiation authorities.
In addition to the official draft some alternatives were developed by
10 Genrik Khachatrian, Pervaia Konstitutsiia Respubliki Armeniia (Yerevan: Nzhar, 2001),
p. 21.

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individuals or parties. The first alternative constitutional draft waselaborated by Henrikh Khachatryan and was submitted to the President’s Administration in December of 1992. In 1992 the Ministry of Justice, the Parliamentary Standing Commission on Founding Independent
Statehood and State Politics presented their constitutional draft as well,only to be criticized and not get any further development. Another draft
was presented by the Christian-Democratic Union of Armenia. The draft
declared the Republic of Armenia a federal state with a presidential
government. But analyzing the draft one can come to the conclusion thatthe political practice under that constitution would be more semipresidential as the prime minister proposed by the president had to be confirmed in office by the parliament and he or she was the subject of bothpresidential and parliamentary confidence. Parliament also had to confirm appointments of ministers and the structure of government.
Two more alternative drafts were prepared by Dashnaktsutyun andRamkavar-Azatakan Parties. They were presented in party media—
correspondingly Erkir (June 3, 1993) and Azg (August 5, 1993) newspapers.11 Presidential authorities still caused major controversies. Dashnaktsutyun draft opted for indirect elections of the President by themembers of the parliament, government and the Constitutional Court.
One was elected receiving two thirds of the votes. The executive authorities had to belong to the government, headed by the prime minister to beelected by the parliament. Functions of the president had to be sharedwith the parliament or the government. A more balanced proposal was
elaborated by Ramkavars. Within their draft, the president, being thehighest official, had to be elected by universal suffrage for a four-year
period. He had the authority to present prime ministers’ candidacy forparliamentary approval. He had also the authority to appoint ministers
after being presented by the prime minister and receiving parliamentary
approval. The president had the right to dissolve parliament but compared with the so-called “official draft,” that right was reserved only
within specific circumstances; for example, parliament could be dissolved if it had disapproved of the program of the government’s activities three times. The prime minister could put forward parliament’s dis11 In-depth analysis of those two drafts is presented in Armen Harutiunian, Institut
Prezidenta Respubliki Armeniia: Sravnitel’no-pravovoi analiz (Yerevan: Mkhitar Gosh, 1996).

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solution motion to the president if the assembly put forward a government non-confidence vote, but if, within 30 days, parliament had elected
a new prime minister that motion could be annulled. The process of appointing a prime minister was shared between president and parliament—National Assembly. Upon election the president put forward a
prime minister’s candidacy for parliamentary approval. If he or she was
not approved, parliament had the authority to elect a prime minister
within 15 days. If not elected, the president could dissolve parliamentand appoint the prime minister.
In 1993–1994 the opposition to the official draft of the constitution was
growing within the parties opposing the president Ter-Petrosyan and six
parties (with the exception of two major opposition actors—the Communist Party and the Union of National Self-determination) formed analliance and developed their own draft of the constitution, known as“the Draft of six”: Dashnaktsutyun, Ramkavar-Azatakan, Democratic,
Republican and Agrarian Parties as well as the Union of Constitutional
Self-government. This elaborated draft had the one developed by Ramkavar-Azatakan Party as its basis. Accordingly, the president—the headof the state—had to be elected by a special body, comprised of themembers of parliament—National Assembly or Council and equal
numbers of the representatives of the local self-government bodies. The
president was allowed to dissolve parliament in specific cases. The
president could dissolve the assembly if the latter presented a nonconfidence vote to the government, but was unable to appoint a new government within fifteen days. The government was authorized to request
a confidence vote regarding its activities or any other draft law. In thecase the National Assembly voted against it and within twenty-one days
was unable to appoint a new prime minister, the president, by proposalof the prime minister, was authorized to dissolve parliament. The president was also authorized to put forward for parliamentary confirmation
the candidacy of the prime minister. The rest of the cabinet was presented to the parliament by the head of government. If parliament
would not approve the candidacy of the prime minister put forward by
the president, the latter could appoint a caretaker head of government,
and parliament within twenty one days had to elect the prime minister.
If it was unable to do so, the president was authorized to dissolve the310Regime Formation and Development in Armenia
legislature.
Besides the discussion over the content of the constitution, debate
took place on how it had to be adopted. Three possibilities existed: one
being to adopt a constitution by parliamentary vote. Then the acting
constitution and the law “On the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia” granted the right solely to the parliament.12 A second option
was drafting and adopting a constitution by the Constitutional Convention—the representative body with legislative authority, elected by the
citizens solely for the purpose of elaboration and adoption of the constitution. Finally a constitution could be adopted by referendum. President
Ter-Petrosyan presented his views on those options during the meetingsof the Constitutional Commission on March 2 and 27, 1993 and later in
his speeches at the parliament. He stated that the draft must be elaborated by the Constitutional Commission and the draft approved by thecommission had to be presented for parliamentary consideration anddebate, but the final word had to belong to the citizens, who had to ratify
the draft by referendum and the parliament had to make necessary legal
provisions, allowing presentation of the draft constitution for referendum. The president did not exclude that two drafts could be proposed
for the referendum—one advocating strong presidency and another one
advocating parliamentary government. The president found it inappropriate to convoke the Constitutional Convention, because the membersof the parliament were competent enough to come up with the draft
constitution. The president’s position was supported by the Armenian
National Movement (ANM) faction of the parliament, which formed amajority in the legislature after the 1990 parliamentary elections.
Other political actors like Dashnaktsutyun, National Democratic Union, Democratic and Republican Parties were advocating the idea ofConstitutional Convention, presenting their own pro arguments. According to them the Constitutional Commission’s staff, as well as a
non-professional parliament were not competent enough to elaborate a
draft constitution. Elected in 1990 the Supreme Soviet by the mid-1990s
12 Vladimir Nazaryan—one of the authors of the Draft of six, who was supporting theidea of Constitutional Convention, stated that the acting constitution made provision forpresenting to referendum the most important issues of the state, but not the constitution ordraft laws.

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lacked popular confidence, and in contrast a convention will have theclear mandate of the citizens. The final argument for the elections of theConstitutional Convention was that the body that had to elaborate andadopt the draft constitution, had to be not only politically neutral but
also independent from the existing power institutions. The commission
was headed by the president—chief executive, and the deputy of thecommission—the Minister of Justice—was appointed directly by thepresident. Having such a composition, in the opposition’s opinion, thecommission was not politically neutral and would adopt a draft favorable to the executive and the president. Consequently the opposition
decided to boycott the work of the Constitutional Commission, statingthat it was acting under the direct pressure of the president and would
adopt the draft designed for the president. The opposition actors wereadvocating the election of the Constituent Assembly, that would nothave its own political interests and would be able to choose and propose
for the referendum a draft meeting the interests and values of the state
and the nation, but not the interests of one person or one of the branchesof government.13 For a while the president, while advocating the idea ofthe referendum, was proposing the following: the parliament will votefor one of the drafts—the draft of the Constitutional Commission or the“Draft of six.” The one receiving a qualified majority will be proposed
for the referendum without parliamentary debate. If no draft gets aqualified majority both of them will be proposed for the referendum. In
the case of the “Draft of six” being accepted, the president and the government will resign and in case the Constitutional Commission’s draft
gets the majority, new presidential and parliamentary elections will takeplace. Still the issue was not settled till March 27, 1995 when the decision
was made to have the draft constitution ratified by two thirds parliamentary majority, having to put forward for nation-wide referendum thesole parliamentary adopted version.
On April 20, 1994 the Constitutional Commission presented its newdraft to the Supreme Soviet, which on June 1, 1994 had taken a decision
to expand commission membership, to be supplemented by one repre13 In March 1993 parliament held an extraordinary session to discuss the issue of calling elections for the Constituent Assembly. 91 MPs—which was not enough—voted forholding Constitutional assembly.

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sentative from each socio-political organization represented in the parliament, as well as one representative from each group, which had developed alternative constitutional drafts. This commission, which wascomprised of 32 members, held 56 meetings till April 13, 1995 and washeaded by then Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Babken Ararktsian,elected by the parliament to chair the commission as well.14 On July 23,
1994 the Constitutional Commission finally decided which draft would
become the basis for further elaboration. It satisfied the demand of V.
Nazaryan, R. Hakobyan and A. Navasardyan—authors of the “Draft ofsix” not to vote on their draft and voted to elaborate draft and later haveit modified by the commission as a basis for further work, and finally tobe presented to the Supreme Soviet. The legislature started the discussion of the presented draft on May 2, 1995. On May 12, 1995 it adopted
the resolution “On the draft of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia”, deciding to accept the draft developed by the commission and present it for referendum to be called on July 5, 1995. The draft had to be
adopted, if more than half of the citizens who participated in the referendum voted for it, but no less than one third of the electorate had toparticipate.15 The official data on the referendum presented by the authorities, but accused by the opposition of fraud, offered the following
figures: out of 2,189,804 citizens 1,217,531 participated in the referendum
and 823,370—about 68 percent of participants or 37.6 percent of all eligible voters voted for the proposed draft.

The 1995 Constitution in Action:
Semipresidentialism within Armenian Reality
The adoption of the Constitution underlines the next major step within
the process of regime development of the Republic of Armenia. Formallyit could be presented as a semipresidential constitution, but political practice had shown more signs of presidential dominance rather than signs of
14 Khachatrian, Pervaia Konstitutsiia, pp. 21–23.
15 At the referendum, the citizens of Armenia had to answer the following question:“Do you agree to accept the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia approved by the Supreme Soviet?”313

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balance in executive-legislative relations. The President of the Republic
is elected by general election for five years and is not allowed to hold theoffice for more than two subsequent terms. The president appoints anddismisses the prime minister and the latter submits the list of government members. Within twenty days after its formation the government
must present the program of its activities to the National Assembly (NA)for approval. The National Assembly—a unicameral 131-member parliament,16 within 24 hours can initiate a nonconfidence vote by one thirdof its members. If no action takes place or the vote is not supported, theprogram is approved. If a nonconfidence vote17 is passed, the prime
minister presents to the president the government’s resignation and thepresident within 20 days accepts it, while forming a new government.
The government executes executive authority in the republic. The meetings of the government are chaired by the president or per procurationem
by the prime minister, who leads the daily activities of the governmentand coordinates the work of the ministries.
The president signs and makes public the laws adopted by the parliament. The National Assembly adopts bills by simple majority if morethan half of the MPs participate in the voting. Some decisions require aqualified majority of more than half of all the members of the NA—suchas the decision on the resignation of the president or the nonconfidence
vote. In case of objections and suggestions the president can return thebill for new debate within twenty-one days. The parliament can vote forthe same version by a qualified majority. In that case the president has tosign and publish the law within five days. As a last measure after the
consultations with the prime minister and the chairman of the NA, thepresident can dissolve the parliament and call for new elections. Two
exemptions exist—within the first year after the elections of the NA andthe last six months of the president’s term in office.
The president makes major civil appointments. By the proposal of theprime minister he appoints and dismisses the Prosecutor General, four
16 The first National Assembly elected on July 5, 1995, the same day the constitutionalreferendum took place, had 190 members.
17 The nonconfidence vote could be initiated by the parliament also during the parliamentary session by no less than one-third of MPs or by the members of the parliament in
way of initiation of the law.

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out of nine members of the Constitutional Court. If the parliament does
not appoint the chairman of the Constitutional Court within 30 days after its formation, the president appoints him as well. The President
represents the country within the foreign relations, leads and heads foreign policy, concludes international treaties, and signs treaties ratified by
the NA. He or she appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives. The
president is also the Commander in Chief of the military forces andmakes the appointments for high ranking military positions. By the
proposal of the president the parliament makes the decision to declare
war and the president makes the decision on the use of military force.
Theoretically the parliament could impeach the president for high treason or other crimes. By a majority of votes it could apply to hear theopinion of the Constitutional Court. And if the parliament gets a positive
opinion supported by two thirds of the members of the Constitutional
Court, it can impeach the president. The president can also resign as was
the case in 1998 with the first president L. Ter-Petrosyan, who held asecond term in office in 1996 after elections with disputed results.
The Constitution proclaims the principle of power separation, but infact it provides little if any means for real checks and balances. Neither
does it guarantee the independent function of the branches of government. It could be viewed as a triangular structure that includes legislative, executive and judicial branches that are overshadowed by thepresidential institution. The semipresidential regime founded in 1991 got
its continuation in the 1995 Constitution that could be blamed for the
existence and presence of pseudo-democratic political practice, especially within the period of 1995 to 1997. Within the constitutionalframework two possible development trajectories could be outlined. The
first one, with the president supported by one-party parliamentary majority, gave him practically unlimited power execution within almost all
spheres of state politics and policy. Actually that was Armenia’s politicalreality from 1995 to 1997, when the regime could be best described interms of superpresidentialism with the legislative, executive and judicial
branches totally subordinate to the president and political process andpractice in Armenia at that period could be best described as pseudodemocratic, functioning under the guise of semipresidential constitution.
A second development path allowed certain dualism within the lead-

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ership and more balanced executive-legislative relations in case a parliamentary majority did not support the presidential policy or the majority, while support for the president was rather coalition-based. The
semipresidential constitution allowed a relatively smooth shift of powersuch as the one that occurred in Armenia at the beginning of 1998.
President Ter-Petrosyan lost the support of the parliamentary majority,
when about forty deputies defected from the then ruling Hanrapetutyun(Republic) coalition mostly towards the Yerkrapah deputy group.18 Before taking the decision to resign he had two other possibilities. The first
one—dissolution of the parliament and a call for new elections, but there
were no guarantees for the president that the newly elected parliament
would support his policies. The second possibility supposed the coexistence or cohabitation of the president with the opposing prime minister
supported by a parliamentary majority.
However, the first elected president Levon Ter-Petrosyan decided toresign. His resignation was mostly influenced by the contradictions that
divided the governing elite over the Karabakh conflict settlement issue.
On November 1, 1997 Armenian mass media published the president’s
article “War or Peace—the moment of earnest,” presenting two major
approaches toward conflict settlement—the so-called “stage-by-stage”
and “package” approaches. While the president was opting for the former solution, as became clear during the Security Council meeting heldon January 7 and 8, 1998, Prime Minister R. Kocharyan, Defense minister
V. Manukyan, and Interior and National Security minister S. Sargsyan,
were against that. On January 14, Prime Minister Kocharyan, during ameeting with journalists, accepted that there were considerable contradictions within the highest power echelons. A few days later the Karabakh president, A. Ghukasyan, also denied the appropriateness of thestage-by-stage approach, getting an implicit response from Ter-Petrosyan
18 According to the existing constitutional norms, in case of presidential resignation heis followed in that position by the Chairman of National Assembly and if that is impossibleby the prime minister. After Ter-Petrosyan’s resignation parliament’s chairman—Babken
Ararktsyan—a close ally to the president resigned from his position as well, so the prime
minister—R. Kocharyan became acting president. Amendments developed in 2001 had
added the Chairman of the Constitutional Court as the third person in the chain of command for presidency, after taking into account the events of October 27, 1999, when both
the Chairman of the National Assembly and Prime Minister were assassinated.

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Regime Formation and Development in Armenia
via his press secretary, mentioning that the Karabakh leadership should
not interfere in Armenian internal affairs. But Armenian siloviki (top security and military officials) had already defined their position and theonly ally to the president at that time, Yerevan mayor V. Siradeghyan,
resigned on February 2. The same day, the ruling parliamentary coalition “Republic” block, formed in 1995, dissolved and a majority joined
the “Yerkrapah” deputies group formed in the autumn of 1997. Having
nobody and nothing to cling to power with, Ter-Petrosyan resigned on
February 3 and the next day the leader of the “Yerkrapah” deputies
group, A.Bazeyan, already spoke on behalf of a new parliamentary majority. On February 4, 1998 the National Assembly accepted the resignation of Ter-Petrosyan and in accordance with the Constitution, new elections took place within forty days. Robert Kocharyan won on the second
round of elections, which put him face-to-face with the former first secretary of the Communist party of Armenia—Karen Demirchyan, silent
within Armenian politics since 1988, when he was sacked and replacedby Suren Harutyunyan within the party hierarchy. Officially, neither of
the two were party affiliated, but it was generally recognized that Kocharyan had the support of Yerkrapah and a few other rather small parties and groups, while Demirchyan had the support of a newly formed
protoparty called the People’s Party. With 59.49 percent of the votes
Robert Kocharyan was elected the second President of the Republic of
Armenia.

The Call for Constitution Redesign
Being incumbent Robert Kocharyan put the issue of constitutional reform as one of the cornerstones of his electoral platform, considering
amendments as absolutely necessary. As stated by a Constitutional
Court member, F. Tokhyan, there were three major fields within theprocess of constitutional re-design; human rights issues, interrelations
between branches of government and assurance of a real checks andbalances system and the redesign of the existing system of local self
government. Being elected in 1998 as president R. Kocharyan on May 19,
1998 signed a Decree forming the Constitutional Reform Preparation

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Committee under the President of the Republic of Armenia. That firstcommittee under the newly elected president, staffed by 32 members,
existed till July 1999. Having been formed on the principle of fair representation, it consisted of half professional lawyers, especially experts on
constitutional law; the other 50 percent being representatives from different political parties present at the National Assembly of Armenia. The
committee was headed by Paruir Hayrikyan—a Soviet-era human rights
activist and dissident and later prominent figure on the Armenian political scene. Major issues within the committee’s activities were executedby the task group, which was comprised of seven members of the commission. Later on, when the committee continued its work in 1999, thecomposition changed and it was formed solely on professional groundswith sixteen members.
The committee was working closely with the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). Their joint meetings,
aiming for the improvement of the existing constitution and liquidationof the existing gaps and controversies, started in April 2000 in Strasbourg and later continued in Yerevan and again in Strasbourg in December 2000 to January 2001. As a result of those meetings the proposals
and amendments elaborated by the Constitutional Reform Preparation
Committee got an expert assessment and the proposed changes werereviewed. Later concrete amendments and their justification were presented for each revised part of the Constitution. The nature of the proposed amendments, as mentioned by F. Tokhyan, allows the draft to be
named a completely “new version” of the existing Constitution. It iseven hard to call those changes just amendments.19 In addition to thedraft elaborated by the Constitutional Committee, alternatives were
presented by the Armenian Communist Party and by Shavarsh Kocharyan, then Chairman of the Standing Commission of the National
Assembly for Science and Education, advocating parliamentary government. The package with proposed constitutional amendments waspresented to the National Assembly in July 2001. Parliamentary debates
started during the fall session, and lasted till spring of 2003 when theamendments package was proposed for referendum (in May), but failed
19 About half of the currently existing 117 articles were changed or were proposed under the new edition and about twenty new articles were introduced.

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Regime Formation and Development in Armenia
to gain the necessary majority of popular votes.
The first principal arena of the constitutional re-design had to do withhuman rights issues. The intended changes were based “upon the principle of the prevalence of law and constitution with a prevalent role ofintrinsic human rights.” Some other related parts of the Constitution also
had to be improved within the Armenian membership of the Council ofEurope. Among the long list of obligations that country has to fulfill
within the human rights field in order to become a CoE member, Armenia faces obligations to cancel the death penalty, adopt a law on thecommissioner on human rights, i.e., to introduce the Ombudsman institution, adopt new laws on mass media, political parties, non-governmental organizations, alternative military service, accomplish judicial
reform, make guarantees for a completely independent judiciary andguarantee citizens the right to appeal to the Constitutional Court.
One of the articles changed dramatically was related to the citizenshipissue. While the existing Constitution does not allow Armenian citizens
to be a citizen of another country, a proposed draft alternatively contained no limitations for dual citizenship. The Constitution also introduced changes related to capital punishment—not allowing it to be usedin future with the exception of the cases of war.
The second major issue addressed within the amendment process wasto ensure power separation and clarification of the president’s authorities, meanwhile assuring the independence of the judiciary, as well as
more independence for cabinet activities, including the prime minister’s,and parliamentary activities, forging the institutionalization of the Armenian parliament and strengthening its independence. The purpose
was to assure a smooth system transformation and assurance of thepower separation principle as a basis for sustainable democratic development in future. Within the Armenian context the issue could be rephrased as follows: the executive-legislative relations and relations between the president and other branches of government must becomebalanced and ensure checks and balance. This was to be done without
altering the semipresidential framework of the Constitution, as a generalagreement between the Constitutional Committee and the Venice Commission was achieved not to discuss the possibility of changes to the existing structure, as mentioned in the report after the meeting in Stras-

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bourg on April 25–26, 2000. The existing institutional macro-settings are
viewed by current authorities as pretty reliable, allowing major politicalcrises to be overcome, such as those of 1998 when president L.
Ter-Petrosyan resigned or in 1999 when terrorists attacked the Armenianparliament building and killed the speaker of the National Assembly,
Karen Demirchyan, the prime minister Vazgen Sargsyan, both vice
speakers and some other high ranking officials and members of parliament. Especially, what causes most problems are the articles that concern discrete authorities of the National Assembly, possible limits that
could be set on presidential powers, the sphere of his authorities and theprocess of decision-making by the head of state.
In addition to those issues, another crucial set of problems concerns
the process of appointing the prime minister and government as well as
the judges—the issue which is also related to the problem of limitingpresidential powers and creation of a more effective checks and balances
system in Armenia. Some amendments were aimed at the decreasing ofpresidential authorities; for example, the president would no longer beable to veto all decisions of government and he or she would also lose inpart the right to dismiss the majority of judges, but mostly amendments
aim at strengthening branches of government, introducing more balances and checks into the system, clarifying the role of the president ashead of state as well as clarifying some controversial or unclear points
within the existing Constitution. Within the part of the Constitution related to the president, the following major amendments were noticeable.
The draft changed the process of decision-making regarding the adoption of laws. According to the existing norms, the parliament adopted
the law and the president could sign it within a twenty-one day periodor he had a right to return it to the National Assembly within that periodof time with his suggestions and objections and requesting new discussion. Parliament could override the veto by a majority of 50 percent plus
one vote and in that case the president signed the law within five days.
The proposed draft introduced the following option. The bill adopted by
the National Assembly the second time is to be signed by president
within five days or he could submit it to the Constitutional Court to get aconclusion if the law corresponds to the Constitution of Armenia.
Among the major constitutional amendments proposed by the Con-320

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stitutional Committee was the process of the appointment of the prime
minister. The draft proposed by the Constitutional Committee has acompletely new article that introduces changes into that process. In thecase that the prime minister was not appointed by the president withintwenty days or a governmental program (in the proposal “an outline ofthe program”) did not receive a vote of confidence, the National Assembly, after the end of that period and within two weeks, appoints theprime minister and by his proposal also appoints the government. The
procedure requires an absolute majority of votes within the parliament(50 percent plus one vote). In the case of the National Assembly not appointing the government in that way, the president again has a right toappoint the prime minister and members of government. If the latter do
not receive a confidence vote from the parliament, the president dissolves the parliament and calls new parliamentary elections no earlier
than 30 days and no later than forty days after the dissolution of the National Assembly. Those amendments provide at least some institutionaland constitutionally guaranteed mechanisms to overcome a possible crisis that could arise in different cases: for example, when a new parliamentary majority was formed as a result of the elections and its goals
and policy do not correspond to those of the president. Within previous
settings it depended only on the (good) will of the president to propose
to the parliament the candidacy that will get a majority of parliamentary
votes—as was the case after the 1999 parliamentary elections, when
Vazgen Sargsyan was appointed prime minister and was backed by asolid parliamentary majority. But the system provides little incentive forthe president to share power with the prime minister or parliament andthat could lead to a constant deadlock that in political science is considered mostly to be a feature of a presidential system rather that of semipresidentialism. In case of major and constant controversy between thepresident and parliament there are no institutional mechanisms allowing
the parliament to appoint the government it will support.
Amendments proposed in 2001 granted the National Assembly an
authority not just to reject or approve the nominee of the president (akind of passive position) but prescribe a more active role in the process
of forming the government and in cases when the parliamentary majority has priorities different from those of the president the proposed

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amendments allow the legislature to swear into office the government of
its own choice. In addition, what made the government more independent within the presented amendments was a proposed change in
Article 86 that no longer requires the signature of the president for all
governmental decisions.20 Another provision that aimed at strengthening parliament’s role was amending Article 85. According to the current
Constitution the structure of the government is decided by presidential
decree, but the proposed amendments made the governmental structure
the subject of the law, so it could be changed by an ordinary legislativeact and in case the president disagrees the existing parliamentary majority of 50 percent plus one (that supports the government) could override
the veto.
Another major issue that caused constant controversy within the constitutional amendment process was and still is the issue of parliamentary
dissolution by the president. Within the currently existing Constitution,
the head of state is allowed to dissolve the legislature after consultations
with the prime minister and parliament speaker, with two time-boundexemptions not allowing dissolution—during the president’s last six
months in office and the first year after parliamentary elections. Thoughamendments proposed in 2001 lack those two provisions they tried toclarify the dissolution process to the greatest extent possible. According
to the draft, the president, after consultation with the chairman of parliament and prime minister, can dissolve parliament and call for new
elections only in cases supposed by the Constitution and a way prescribed by it. That meant that in addition to the case already discussed
above, the president will have constitutional rights to dissolve the parliament in the following four cases: If the government appointed by thelegislature did not fulfill the budget and the program approved by theparliament. If the parliament did not deliberate within two months on a
draft presented as immediate by the government. If during the regularsession the parliamentary meetings are interrupted for more than twomonths, and finally if during the regular session the parliament is unable
to deliberate and make any decision for more than two months. Those
provisions would allow the president to dissolve parliament mostly in
20 The same article stated that the President may suspend a governmental decision andapply to the Constitutional Court to study its conformity with the Constitution.

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the cases when there is a danger of the malfunction of the governmental
system and introduce more stability for parliamentarians, making thedissolution of parliament not a process of presidential personal desire
but a process that fits certain logic and arguably could prevent system
malfunction.
That draft was really very positive in the sense of fostering further
democratization within institutional settings, but it failed to get theneeded approval. Such an outcome in a certain sense was predetermined,
as neither party, pro-governmental nor the opposition, was satisfied
with the draft presented for the referendum by the end of parliamentary
debates. Those supporting the president were dissatisfied with the decreasing authority of the head of state, while the opposition was insisting
on more substantial changes and more authority to be given to the parliament. Neither of the parties was prepared to advocate the draft at thereferendum, being concerned more with the outcomes of simultaneously
held parliamentary elections, rather than supporting the amended constitution draft. In addition, certain political leaders—from both
camps—having ambitions for the next presidential elections (R. Kocharyan by the time of constitutional debates in the parliament alreadyhad secured his second and last allowed term as president), would prefer potentially more authority with the office of president, rather thanthat of prime minister or the parliament, within given conditions of underdeveloped parties and party system. By the end, after brief campaigning, the draft did not survive the referendum. Among the reasons
one can mention briefly, the almost non-existent nature of the campaign,
low awareness among the populus, uninterested elites that included theoutgoing president and his dissatisfied supporters as well as the opposition, which carried out negative propaganda during the campaign period. The draft constitution did not survive the referendum cum parliamentary elections, under conditions, when actually no political actors inArmenia had been really interested in having it accepted.

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Instead of Conclusion: The Coalition to Hoist
Constitutional Amendments Flag
In the aftermath of the failed constitutional referendum and simultaneously held May 2003 parliamentary elections, three winning parties—theRepublican Party, Orinats Erkir and Dashnaktsutyun—that supported
Kocharyan in the 2003 presidential elections and got his support at parliamentary elections, formed a governing coalition, which continued theconstitutional amendment process. Coalition member-parties had signed
the memorandum, which had declared that one of its major aims was toimplement constitutional amendments. The memorandum also fixed
portfolio distribution between coalition member parties. The parliament
chairman was elected from the Orinats Erkir party—A. Baghdasaryan,
and two deputy chairmen represented the remaining coalition members—V. Hovhannisyan was elected from Dashnaktsutyun and T. Torosyan was from the Republican Party. In addition, coalition members divided chairmanship positions within the standing committees of parliament and ministerial portfolios. Dashnaktsutyun got chairmanship in
the NA Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs as well as being responsible for proposing three ministers for health, agriculture, and social security. The Republicans got leadership in three standing committees: onefor financial, budgetary and economic issues; the second for science,education, culture and youth affairs; and third, the judicial committee.
The prime minister also came from their party. Actually Kocharyan instituted a tradition, appointing the prime minister from the party that
had a majority in the parliament, in 1999 to 2000 appointing as prime
minister the leader of the party having a majority of seats within the parliament. Later, after V. Manukyan was assassinated on October 27, 1999
he was followed by his brother and then in May of 2000 by A.
Manukyan—again the leader of the Republican Party, which had a relative majority within the National Assembly. He stayed as prime minister
also after the 2003 parliamentary elections as the leader of the party that
got a relative majority. In addition to the prime minister’s position, Republicans were also requested to propose candidates for the positions ofgovernment chief of staff, ministers of trade and economic development,324

Regime Formation and Development in Armenia
environment, energy, transportation and communication, finance andeconomy, territorial governance. Orinats Erkir got two standing committees (for social, health and environment issues; defense, national security and internal affairs), as well as three ministry portfolios (urban
building; education and science; culture, youth affairs and sport). Threeremaining ministry portfolios—(defense, justice and foreign affairs) had
to be determined and appointed by the President.
The new stage within the constitutional amendment process was carried out mostly through the newly formed temporary parliamentarycommittee on European integration. It also had to address the issues related to the obligations Armenia had been assigned within its membership of the Council of Europe. The committee was headed by the deputy
chairman of the parliament, T. Torosyan, and the commission involved
one representative from each party represented in the parliament. 21
Within one year of parliamentary elections, coalition parties had developed their draft of constitutional amendments and presented it to theparliament in August 2004. In addition, two more drafts were developed.
First, by one of the opposition leaders A. Sadoyan, while the second
came from the parliamentary party, the United Labor Party (ULP),
headed by G. Arsenyan. The former of those two drafts, following tradition set by the opposition in the early 90s, advocated a significant increase in parliamentary authority and made the republic president almost a figurehead, while the latter draft presented by the ULP, according to the Venice Commission, ensured “a better balance of powers bystrengthening the government and the National Assembly’s position.”22
21 Representatives of the opposition parties/parliamentary factions boycotted the activities of the temporary commission as well as the activities of the National Assembly as awhole, requesting implementation of the Constitutional Court decision related to holding areferendum of confidence. After the disputed presidential elections, in April 2003 the Constitutional Court adopted a decision, according to which the decision of the Central Electoral Commission that announced Kocharyan elected president was valid, but in anotherpart of the decision, the Court recommended the president and parliament to consider the
possibility of having a referendum of confidence within a one-year period.
22 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Interim
Opinion on Constitutional Reforms in the Republic of Armenia, Strasbourg, December 6, 2004,
Opinion no. 313/2004. The opinion was adopted by the Venice Commission at its 61st Plenary Session, Venice, December 3–4, 2004, on the basis of comments by: Mr. Aivars Endziņš (Member, Latvia), Mr. Kaarlo Tuori (Member, Finland), Mr. Owen Masters (Expert,

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Alexander MARKAROVIn spring of 2005 the National Assembly started debates over the draft
proposals of amendments to the Constitution of Armenia with a decision
taken on May 11, 2005 to approve, upon first reading, the draft proposedby the coalition and to make it a basis for further deliberation. Two otherdrafts became part of Armenian political history: Sadoyan’s draft, receiving 13 votes for, with 36 abstentions and no votes against, and a ULP
draft getting 19 pro votes with 29 abstentions and again none against.23
Meanwhile, following the National Assembly’s decision, the Venice
Commission issued a press release, supported by the opposition parties
in Armenia, where the members of the commission’s Working Group on
Constitutional Reform in Armenia expressed “their deep dissatisfaction”
with the text adopted upon first reading, stressing that the commission’s
suggestions presented within the interim report did not get their place inthe draft, “notably those concerning the balance of powers between the
President and the Parliament—which implies a stronger role of the National Assembly—, the independence of the judiciary and the elections of
the Mayor of Yerevan (instead of his appointment by the President).” It
was suggested the amendments be “drastically revised, before they undergo the second reading” by the commission member from Finland,
Kaarlo Tuori.24 That means that the battle for the constitution (that was
believed to be put forward for the referendum in autumn of 2005) will
still go on. The coalition has to take into consideration the Venice Commission’s position, while it simply ignores opposition requests, whichhave no influence within parliamentary decision-making process. On theother hand, its position might be advocated via the Venice Commission
activities, as the opposition points and those of the Commission dooverlap, stressing a more accountable presidency, more autonomy forthe branches of government and local government. Meanwhile, thecommission’s suggestions are less radical, more realistic, and acceptable
for the coalition, providing a basis for negotiations over the existing
United Kingdom), and Mr. Bruno Nascimbene (Expert, Italy). CDL-AD(2004)044[http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2004/CDL-AD(2004)044-e.asp (valid as of January 29,2007)].
23 RFE/RL Newsline, May 12, 2005.
24 Venice Commission, The Draft Armenian Constitution Needs Drastic Changes, Press Release, Strasbourg, May 27, 2005.

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draft and its improvement, and further parliamentary deliberation.
Summing up the semipresidentialism genesis in Armenia, the tablebelow represents some major steps within its development. The president, be it Ter-Petrosyan or Kocharyan, for the majority of his time inoffice enjoyed some type of majority within the parliament, but its nature varied from an absolute majority enjoyed by the first president till
February of 1998 to a coalitional majority, formed in the aftermath of the2003 parliamentary elections. Current constitutional amendments proposed and supported by the coalitional majority within parliament obviously will not introduce changes in the semipresidential regime in
Armenia, but the issue on the agenda is whether either of those amendments will allow the creation of a more unbiased governance system,with more effective checks and balances and a more independent parliament and judiciary, or if those changes will become a guise for thesystem with a strong president, and another outbreak of delegative democracy.

Table 12.1.

Presidential
majority intheparliament

1991 –
1995

1995 –
Feb. 1998

Yes,
ANM

Yes, majority
within“Republic”
quasi-coalition
block

Feb. 1998

Feb. 1998 – May 1999 – May 2000 – May 2003 –May 1999
May 2000
May 2003
up to nowYes,
relative

No, newly
formedYerkrapah
majority in
the National
Assembly327

Yes,
relative

No, Unity
block. An
alliance
betweenRepublican
Party andthePeople’s Partyof Armenia

Coalition of
three parties