14O K A Natsuko

Transnationalism As a Threat to State
Security? Case Studies on Uighurs andUzbeks in Kazakhstan

Transborder ethnic groups are often considered to be a threat to the security of states in which they reside. In particular, if an ethnic minority
in a “host state” calls for help from a state in which their co-ethnics
dominate (a “kin state”), this, it has been argued, might lead to conflict
between the host state and the kin state, as the latter tries to meddle in
the internal affairs of the host state to protect its ethnic kin, or even claim
sovereignty over their settlements.
Post-Soviet Kazakhstan provides a variety of examples for the study ofinterrelationship between host state, minority, and ethnic homeland. 1
Among ethnic communities straddling Kazakhstan’s borderlands, the extant studies have focused almost exclusively on the Russians, the largest
non-titular nationality in the republic. In the years following the end of theSoviet order, their potential call for unification with the Russian Federation was seen as the greatest danger to Kazakhstan’s integrity. The Russians, however, did not take to the streets with separatist demands. The
passive attitude by the Russian population has been explained by several
1 For definition of ethnic homeland and kin state, see Charles King, “Introduction: Nationalism, Transnationalism, and Postcommunism,” in Charles King and Neil J. Melvin,eds., Nations Abroad: Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union(Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), p. 12.

351

OKA Natsuko

factors, among others, large out-migration to Russia, weak and diffused
ethnic identity that made mobilization difficult, and Russia’s vocal but notnecessarily substantial policy toward its compatriots abroad.2
While considerable attention has been paid to the Russians, there remain only a limited scholarly account on Kazakhstan’s other transbordernationalities. This paper focuses on the Uzbeks and the Uighurs, Turkic
Muslim communities who have historically grown a strong attachment
to their settlements within Kazakhstan, and examines why, despite predictions by some observers, these ethnic communities have not become athreat to the host state. As discussed below, the two groups’ relationships with homelands have developed quite differently under the Soviet
rule and since Kazakhstan’s independence. By comparing them, the paper also highlights the varied nature of the relationship between Kazakhstan, its minority, and their ethnic homeland.

Minority‐Homeland Relationship
One of the most important characteristics of the Soviet state structure
was its multilayered federalism based on ethnicity. In the USSR, ethnicity was territorially institutionalized; each republic was perceived as ahomeland for a particular nationality, in which its language and culture
were promoted and ethnic cadres and intelligentsias were cultivated.3
Needless to say, however, not all Soviet nationalities were fortunate tohave their own national republic, and even if they did, not all of theirmembers resided in it.
2 Neil Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity (London: Pinter,
1995); Neil J. Melvin, “The Russians: Diaspora and the End of Empire,” in King and Melvin,
Nations Abroad, pp. 27–57.
3 For detailed accounts of institutionalization of ethnicity under the Soviet rule, see
Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union,
1923–1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). On Soviet institutional legacy for ethnic
mobilization during perestroika and nation building in newly independent states, see, forexample, Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the
New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Dmitry P. Gorenburg, Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003).

352

Transnationalism As a Threat to State Security?
How did the Soviet breakup affect lives of non-titular minorities who
found themselves on the “wrong” side of the border or did not have“their own” republic from the beginning? Focusing on the cases of the
Uzbeks and the Uighurs in Kazakhstan, I analyze how their relationships with ethnic homelands have changed before and after the end of
the Soviet order.
UzbeksThe number of the Uzbeks in Kazakhstan is 370,000, or 2.5 percent of thecountry’s whole population (based on the 1999 population census). 89.6
percent of them reside in the South Kazakhstan oblast, in which the Uzbeks amount to 16.8 percent of the oblast’s population. Among its lower
administrative units, areas in which Uzbeks are most concentrated are
the city of Turkestan (42.7 percent), the Sairam raion (61.3 percent), andthe oblast’s capital Shymkent (15.0 percent). From Shymkent to Tashkent,
the capital of Uzbekistan, it is less than a two hour drive (120 kilometers),
while it is a one hour and forty minute flight to Almaty, a former capitaland the biggest city of Kazakhstan.
The Uzbeks located in the south have developed a strong sense ofrootedness to their settlements and consider themselves indigenous to theregion. Interestingly, this claim seems to be accepted by the authorities of
Kazakhstan,4 who have been asserting since independence that the current
borders of the republic “correspond completely to the historically formed
area of habitation of the Kazakh people.”5 And yet, the Uzbeks havenever demanded that their settlements be incorporated into Uzbekistan’s
territory or a territorial autonomy be established within Kazakhstan.
Most probably, during the Soviet period, the Kazakhstan’s Uzbek
community did not feel that they lived outside of their homeland; they
4 On the official website of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan[http://www.assembly.kz/ (accessed June 23, 2005)], the Republican Association of Social
Unions of the Uzbeks Do‘stlik declares that the Uzbeks are an indigenous population (korennoe naselenie) to the South Kazakhstan oblast. In my conversation with officials from theoblast administration, they also supported this point of view.
5 Natsional’nyi sovet po gosudarstvennoi politike pri Prezidente Respubliki Kazakhstan, Kontseptsiia formirovaniia gosudarstvennoi identichnosti Respubliki Kazakhstan (Almaty,1996), pp. 25–26.

353

OKA Natsuko

belonged de facto to Uzbekistan’s cultural, social, and economic space.
In 1936, an oblast Uzbek newspaper printed in Shymkent in the 1920s
was abolished.6 An Uzbek theater in Kazakhstan—another importantcomponent of the Soviet nationalities policy—was also closed in 1941.7
This lack of cultural institutions, however, did not cause serious inconvenience to the Kazakhstani Uzbeks. They subscribed to newspapers
from Uzbekistan, enjoyed Uzbek TV and radio programs broadcast fromthere. Upon graduation of an Uzbek school in Kazakhstan, those who
wished to receive higher education in their native language went to
Tashkent or other cities within the neighboring republic. Many students
remained there and joined the ranks of Uzbekistan’s party apparatus.
Thus, if Uzbeks wanted to enjoy privileges as members of the titularethnicity, they could move relatively easily to neighboring Uzbekistan,
without cutting themselves off from their hometown.
The collapse of the Soviet Union gradually but completely changed thissituation. Although visa-exempt agreements are still in force between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, presenting an international passport is notenough to cross the border. According to the residents in the borderlandarea, it is necessary to certify a reason for visiting Uzbekistan; such regulations, they complain, have been intensified since the late 1990s.8
The growing distance between the Uzbek communities in Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan is symbolized by the reopening of an official Uzbek
newspaper, theater, and the establishment of a new university for Uzbek
students within Kazakhstan. A state-owned oblast newspaper Janubiy
Qozoghiston was launched in April 1991, shortly before the Soviet
breakup.9 In March 2003, the Oblast Uzbek Drama Theater was opened
6 Author’s interview at the editorial board of the newspaper Janubiy Qozoghiston, March
9, 2005. Throughout the Soviet period, however, there were two Uzbek local newspapers
printed in Turkestan and the Sairam raion.
7 The theater had been established in 1934. Author’s interview with Z. Mominjanov,
Director of the Uzbek Drama Theater, March 16, 2005. Kazakhstanskaia pravda, December 23,
2003. Here and below, non-Russian names are Latinized from Cyrillic script using the Russian spelling.
8 It is not unusual for people to cross the border at locations other than a checkpoint. Illegal border crossing “business” is also rampant.
9 The newspaper holds this name since 1998. In addition to official ones, several independent Uzbek newspapers have been issued since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

354

Transnationalism As a Threat to State Security?
in the Sairam raion.10 Although not state-sponsored, the Uzbek-Kazakh
Engineering-Humanities University was established in the South Kazakhstan oblast in 1999.11
According to an Uzbek school principal in the Sairam village, in recent years almost all of the pupils go on to university in Kazakhstan.12
One of the key issues here is the alphabet for the Uzbek language; in
Uzbekistan, the Latin alphabet was introduced in 1993. Although the
Cyrillic is still widely used, school education has completely shifted to
the Latin script. Meanwhile, in Kazakhstan, all newspapers, school textbooks, and other publications in Uzbek are printed in the Soviet-madeCyrillic script.13
Thus, Kazakhstan’s Uzbek community has been gradually distanced
from Uzbekistan not only by an international border but also by different sources of information and even different alphabets used in school.
The newly established Uzbek newspaper, theater and university in theSouth Kazakhstan oblast demonstrate the institutionalization of theirminority status within Kazakhstan. Despite many newly created obstacles, however, contacts with homeland have not ceased to exist. For instance, personal ties between the Uzbeks on both sides are still verystrong, as almost every Uzbek in the south of Kazakhstan has relatives in
Uzbekistan.
Uighurs
The Uighur population in Kazakhstan amounts to 210,000, or 1.4 percentof the republic’s total population (based on the 1999 population census).
95.6 percent of them reside in Almaty and the Almaty oblast, located in
the southeastern part of the republic. The Uighurs account for 3.0 per10 Kazakhstanskaia pravda, December 23, 2003.
11 This is a private university and has campuses in Shymkent, Turkestan, and the
Sairam raion. According to one of the organizers of the university, as of 2005 the main
language of instruction is, contrary to their original idea, Kazakh.
12 Author’s interview with Khalmurat Iuldashev, Principal of the Uzbek School No. 19
in the Sairam raion, March 16, 2005.
13 According to Khalmurat Iuldashev, in his school the Latin script was temporarily introduced in the second half of the 1990s, but the Cyrillic has been reintroduced afterwards.
Author’s interview, March 16, 2005.

355

OKA Natsuko

cent of the population of Almaty (the city has a republican status anddoes not belong to the Almaty oblast), and 9.0 percent of the Almaty
oblast. Within the oblast, areas with most compact Uighur settlements
are the Uighur raion (55.4 percent), the Panfilov raion (29.4 percent),
both of which border China, and the Enbekshikazakh raion (22.2 percent). Despite such geographical proximity to their homeland, theUighurs had been almost completely isolated from co-ethnics in Xinjiang
for more than two decades until the last years of the Soviet rule.
During the last two centuries, the Uighurs straddled the border thattoday separates the Semirech’e area, southeastern part of Kazakhstan,from the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Province of China. In the borderlands, multiple migrations occurred in two directions. In particular,
the mass immigration from China to the Soviet Union in the 1950s to
1960s had significant impact on the self-understanding of the Uighurs in
Kazakhstan. Using their own designations, Roberts divides the Uighurs
into yerliklär (“locals”), who are born in Kazakhstan and whose families
have lived there since at least 1900, and kegänlär (“newcomers”), whoseparents or who themselves came to Kazakhstan in the 1950s and 1960s.14
While both of the groups consider Xinjiang to be the home of their ancestors, yerliklär, as the name suggests, have developed a strong sense of
attachment to Semirech’e and perceive themselves autochthonous to theregion.
In 1963, the Sino-Soviet political split resulted in the complete closureof the border between Kazakhstan and China, and exchanges between
the Uighurs on opposing sides were cut off. Meanwhile, with an aim toshow the superiority of its nationalities policy over the Chinese one, theSoviet government strongly supported Uighur education and culture.
The Uighurs were provided with a variety of cultural institutions—schools, mass media, theater, and a department of Uighur Studies at the
14 Other designations for yerliklär and kegänlär are sovetliklär (“Soviets”) and khitailiklär(“Chinese”) respectively. See Sean R. Roberts, “The Uighurs of the Kazakhstan Borderlands: Migration and the Nation,” Nationalities Papers 26, no. 3 (1998), pp. 511–530. See also
Ablet Kamalov, “Uighur Community in 1990s Central Asia: A Decade of Change,” inTouraj Atabaki and Sanjyot Mehendale, eds., Central Asia and the Caucasus: Transnationalism
and Diaspora (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 152. In his article, Roberts divides the Uighurs
in Kazakhstan into three groups; yerliklär, kegänlär, and temporary sojourners (primarily
traders) from China.

356

Transnationalism As a Threat to State Security?
Kazakh Academy of Science, which during the last decade of the USSR
transformed into the Institute of Uighur Studies. Those institutions werelocated primarily in Kazakhstan, a republic with the largest Uighur
population.15 While the Soviet Uighurs used the Cyrillic script for theirlanguage, one of the two Uighur newspapers was published in the Arabic alphabet like in Xinjiang.
The reopening of the border between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan began
in the late 1980s. The improvement of the Sino-Soviet relationship andthen the collapse of the USSR in 1991 have resulted in renewed links
between the Uighurs on opposing sides of the border in personal, cultural, economic, and other spheres.16 Beijing has seen the cross-borderexchange of the Uighurs with suspicion in fear that Kazakhstan might
become an area of support for the independence movement of Xinjiang.
Kamalov attributes the closing of many Uighur cultural institutions,most importantly the Institute of Uighur Studies (transformed into theCenter of Uighur Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies), and the
Uighur newspaper printed in the Arabic script, to Chinese pressure.17
Although there is no movement seeking territorial autonomy for the
Uighurs now in Kazakhstan, 18 the issue was discussed among the
Uighur intelligentsia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Their primary argument was demography: why do the Uighurs have no ethnic territory,
when smaller nationalities are provided with autonomous republics orprovinces? At the time of “a parade of sovereignty,” the Uighurs also
prepared a petition asking for autonomy. This letter, however, wasnever submitted to the party; the Uighur leadership worried that thealready tense interethnic relations would deteriorate and decided not to

15 Kamalov, “Uighur Community,” p. 152.
16 Sean R. Roberts, “A ‘Land of Borderlands’: Implications of Xinjiang’s Trans-borderInteractions,” in S. Frederick Starr, ed., Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland (Armonk: M.E.
Sharpe, 2004), pp. 216–237.
17 Kamalov, “Uighur Community,” p. 162.
18 Uighur activists stress that they do not demand territorial autonomy be createdwithin Kazakhstan, or a part of Kazakhstan be attached to an Uighur state upon its foundation. However, some observers in Kazakhstan suspect that Uighurs might make separatist or irredentist demands. See, for example, Konstantin L. Syroezhkin, Mify i real’nost’
etnicheskogo separatizma v Kitae i bezopasnost’ Tsentral’noi Azii (Almaty, 2003), p. 441.

357

OKA Natsuko

raise this question.19
While both of the Uzbeks and Uighurs in Kazakhstan are transborderethnic communities, since the breakup of the USSR their relationshipwith respective homeland has changed in quite different directions. Under the Soviet rule, the Uzbeks in the south were practically integrated in
Uzbekistan’s cultural, social, and economic space, but since Kazakhstan’s independence they have been increasingly distanced from thehomeland. It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union that the Uzbeks have become a “stranded” minority in Kazakhstan. In the case of
the Uighurs, they were already a “diaspora” in a sense that it had ahomeland outside of the Soviet state. The Uighur community had been
cut off from homeland during the Sino-Soviet split, and the end of theconflict and then the collapse of the Soviet Union have resulted in an
increase in contact with co-ethnics abroad.

International Relations around Minority
The most significant difference between the Uzbeks and Uighurs iswhether or not they have a kin state. In this section, focusing on the relationships between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Uzbeks’ kin state) as
well as China (the state that rules Uighurs’ homeland), it is examined
whether and how the issue of minority matters in these relationships.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
With the demise of the USSR, Kazakhstan had to delimitate borders withneighboring states, all of which, except China, were former Soviet republics. For Kazakhstan, the border with Uzbekistan was the most disputed one. Basically, both sides agreed to accept the previous administrative border as their new state boundary. However, the Soviet border
between the two republics was not necessarily clear due to frequent exchange of territories and land leases.20
19 Author’s interview with Kommunar Talipov, Director of the Center of Uighur Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies, September 23, 2004.
20 OKA Natsuko, Kazafusutan no jinko hendo [Demographic changes in Kazakhstan] (Tokyo:
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Discussion Paper No. D98-16,358

Transnationalism As a Threat to State Security?
What worried and irritated the Kazakhstani side most was perhaps
the Uzbekistan’s border guards. In early 2000, they were found undertaking unilateral demarcation of the border with Kazakhstan, allegedly
deep inside Kazakhstan territory.21 Moreover, the guards did not hesitate to open fire on local residents who, often not knowing where they
were exactly located, crossed the border. (Such incident continued evenafter delimitation was completed.)22 Naturally, shooting on Kazakhstani
citizens by foreign authorities roused public sentiment in Kazakhstan.
Antipathy to Uzbekistan and dissatisfaction with its own government
were frequently expressed in newspapers and on the Internet. These incidents did affect interethnic relations among people living in the borderland area; an Uzbek resident of a border village admitted thatanti-Uzbek slogans, such as “Uzbeks go home,” were heard.
Some Kazakh inhabitants of the borderland, increasingly irritated bystalled delimitation talks, resorted to extreme measures. In December
2001, villagers from Baghys and Turkestanets, not knowing in whichcountry they lived, declared the establishment of the “Baghys Kazakh
Republic” to attract public attention to their desperate situation. The
majority of the residents of Baghys and Turkestanets were ethnic Kazakh,
and they wished that their settlements would be included in Kazakhstan’s territory. This “independence” movement assumed an ethnic
character and was obviously instigated by activists of Azat, a Kazakh
nationalist organization.23 Participants’ primary concern, however, wastheir mundane problems rather than high politics.
Meanwhile, the both governments did not raise the issue of kin minority in the negotiation process. While in some cases ethnicity of resi1999), p. 8.
21 International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential (Oshand Brussels, 2002), pp. 7–8.
22 According to the prosecutor’s office in Shymkent, four people were shot dead by
Uzbekistani border guards from mid-1999 through June 2004. Olga Dosybieva, “Uzbek
Border Death,” Reporting Central Asia (Institute for War & Peace Reporting) 291 (June 8,2004).
23 By delimitation, Baghys has been incorporated into Kazakhstan. Turkestanets has
been passed into Uzbekistan’s jurisdiction; most of its residents expressed their desire to
move to the Kazakhstani territory. Daur Dosybiev, “Uzbekistan: Ethnic Kazaks Set to
Leave,” Reporting Central Asia 157 (November 1, 2002).

359

OKA Natsuko

dents in a disputed territory was taken into account, the two states madeno claim on each other to territory on the grounds that it is settled byco-ethnics. After multiple and complex negotiations, Kazakhstan andUzbekistan finally signed a border delimitation agreement in September
2002. As of July 2006, demarcation is still in progress.24
Neither Uzbekistan nor Kazakhstan dared to interfere in the matter ofco-ethnics residing in another country, much less annexation of theirsettlements. As to the relationship between Tashkent and the Uzbeks
abroad, Megoran points out that the Uzbekistan’s foreign policy has notbeen influenced by the presence of the Uzbek minorities abroad. Rather,
the Karimov administration has often met its ethnic kin with suspicion
and even hostility.25 Meanwhile, Kazakhstan has been encouraging ethnic Kazakhs abroad to “return” to their historic homeland.26 Unlike Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan has suffered from a sharp decrease in its population since independence due to large out-migration and a relatively low
birthrate. Moreover, Astana aims to increase the share of titular nationality, which is just over a half of the whole population of the republic.
Kazakhstan and China
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan and China have established close relations in a variety of spheres. Among others, the twostates, together with Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan set up theso-called “Shanghai Five,” named after the place where its first summit
was held in April 1996. The five states signed an agreement on confidence building measures in the borderland area, and subsequently
China and the four CIS countries completed delimitation of respective
borders. In June 2001, this regional framework accepted Uzbekistan as a
new member and renamed itself the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
24 Information provided by Daur Dosybiev, independent journalist in Shymkent, Kazakhstan, July 3, 2006.
25 Nick Megoran, “The Borders of Eternal Friendship? The Politics and Pain of Nationalism and Identity along the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary, 1999–2000”(PhD diss., Cambridge University, 2002), pp. 109–110.
26 Sally N. Cummings, “The Kazakhs: Demographics, Diasporas, and ‘Return’,” in Kingand Melvin, Nations Abroad, pp. 133–152; M. Auezov and S. Zhusupov, eds., Immigratsionnaia politika v Kazakhstane na primere repatriantov iz dal’nego zarubezh’ia (Almaty, 2000).

360

Transnationalism As a Threat to State Security?
(SCO). A delimitation agreement between Kazakhstan and China wassigned in July 1998.27 In Kazakhstan, despite some criticism against Astana’s allegedly too generous concessions to Beijing, this agreement did
not trigger popular protest movement like in neighboring Kyrgyzstan.
China keeps its eyes on the Uighur communities abroad, and puts
pressures on foreign governments not to allow Uighur activists to engage in anti-Chinese campaigns in their territories. Today, the chief
agenda of the SCO has shifted to the fight against “separatism, extremism, and terrorism.” Although each member state has different (but allegedly linked) targets such as Chechen insurgents and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, many Uighur leaders believe that the real
purpose of the SCO is to suppress international Uighur movements.
Kazakhstan not only closely cooperates with China within theframework of the SCO, but also demonstrates its regard for its greatneighbor over the issue of the Uighurs.28 Astana bans Uighur independent movements within its territory, and categorically denies asylum
to Chinese citizens. For example, in February 1999, Kazakhstan deported
three Uighurs back to China where they were subsequently executed.
This step aroused international criticism.29 According to local NGO activists, since then no refugees have officially been deported back, but infact Kazakhstani authorities did arrest some Uighurs and handed themto China.
Thus, despite disputes and conflict over the border delimitation andcontrol, the governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan did not make anissue of co-ethnics during negotiations. On the contrary, the Uighur
question is a matter of great importance in Sino-Kazakhstani relations.
The Uighurs are sandwiched between a state hostile to any kind of theirethnic movements and the host state that seeks to keep friendly relations
with that state.
27 IWASHITA Akihiro, “Shanhai purosesu no kiseki to tenbo: Soren hokai kara kikosetsuritsu made” [Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Its Formative Years and Prospects],
Roshia kenkyu 34 (2002), p. 103.
28 Kamalov and Roberts argue that Kazakhstan plays the “Uighur card” to obtain concessions from China, or to gain China’s support for its own agenda. See Kamalov, “Uighur
Community,” p. 162; Roberts, “A ‘Land of Borderlands’,” p. 233.
29 UNHCR Almaty, Kazakhstan, Annual Protection Report, November 1998–December
1999 (Almaty, 2000), p. 6.

361

OKA Natsuko

Minorities’ Strategy
How are minorities affected by their relationship with homeland as wellas the relationship between Kazakhstan and the kin state or the stateruling their homeland? Do the Uzbeks take any action to be united with
their co-ethnics? How do the Uighurs seek to cope with problems they
face as a stateless nation? Below, I focus on the strategies taken by the
Uzbeks and Uighurs since Kazakhstan’s independence.
Exit
Unlike the Russians, the overwhelming majority of the Uzbeks andUighurs have not chosen a strategy of exit. One of the factors preventing
out-migration can be found in the strong indigenous identity among the
Uzbeks in the south and the Uighur “locals.” As discussed above, bothof them consider themselves native to their settlements, not immigrants.
In the early 1990s, when living conditions were more favorable in
Uzbekistan than in the south of Kazakhstan, a certain number of Uzbeks
did leave for Uzbekistan. At any rate, however, Kazakhstani Uzbeks
have not “returned” to their ethnic kin state on a massive scale like theRussians or Germans. Today, the Kazakhstan’s rising economy all themore encourages them to stay; as of 2003, Kazakhstan’s GNI per capita
was four times larger than that of Uzbekistan. As most Uzbeks haverelatives in the neighboring country, they are clearly aware of economic
superiority of the state in which they live. On the part of Uzbekistan, it
cannot afford to invite co-ethnics abroad; it already suffers from overpopulation and lacks resources for new immigrants. The tightening political control in Uzbekistan also appears to have discouraged the Uzbeks to move to their kin state.
Meanwhile, some analysts argue that Astana is settling ethnic Kazakh
immigrants from abroad (oralmans) in primarily Uzbek villages tochange the nationality composition in favor of the Kazakhs.30 My respondents in Shymkent and the Sairam raion, however, related the set30 Igor Savin, “Upravlenie mestnymi mnogoetnichnymi soobshchestvami v Kazakhstane,” in V. Tishkov and E. Fillipova, eds., Mestnoe upravlenie mnogoetichnymi soobshchestvami v stranakh SNG (Moscow, 2001), p. 287.

362

Transnationalism As a Threat to State Security?
tlement of Kazakh “repatriates” in their region not to the intention of thegovernment, but to the desire of oralmans themselves to live in a temperate climate.
With no kin state, the Uighurs are not leaving for their homeland under Chinese control.31 Living in Xinjiang is not an attractive option as
the Chinese policy toward the Uighurs is much more severe than that of
Kazakhstan. Some Uighurs told me that they would wish to move to
Xinjiang if and when an independent Uighur state was established—which is very unlikely in the near future. As is clear from thecase of Uzbekistan, kin state does not necessarily welcome its co-ethnics.
Stateless Uighurs, however, have high expectations of what “their own”
state would have to offer. Meanwhile, a few Uighurs sought politicalasylum in Europe and North America.
Authorized Ethnic Movement
Today in Kazakhstan, with few exceptions, ethnic organizations are officially registered and act within the framework set by the regime. The
area of their activities is mostly depoliticized; the main focus is put onnational language (without questioning a status of the state—i.e. Kazakh—language), culture, and tradition.
In Kazakhstan, thirty five nationalities have ethnic organizations, officially registered as social associations (obshchestvennoe ob”edinenie). Mostof them have their roots in so-called cultural centers that were born inthe midst of perestroika. Out of them, thirty one join the Assembly of thePeoples of Kazakhstan (APK),32 a president’s consultative body established in March 1995 to “strengthen public stability and interethnic accord” (it is chaired by the president himself).33 With an official aim to
31 For example, in 1994, 284 Uighurs immigrated to Kazakhstan (among them 261 fromthe other CIS countries.) In the same year, 351 migrated from Kazakhstan (307 to the CIS
countries.) In 1999, these numbers were 94(91), and 94(75) respectively. See Bakhytzhamal
Bekturganova, “Uigurskii ekstremizm” v Tsentral’noi Azii: mif ili real’nost’? (Sotsiologicheskii
analiz problemy) (Almaty, 2002), p. 82.
32 APK’s website [http://www.assembly.kz/info-culture_unit.shtml (accessed June 23,2005)].
33 Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 1 marta 1995 g. ob obrazovanii Assamblei
narodov Kazakhstana.

363

OKA Natsuko

provide support for ethnic organizations, a more important mission of
the APK appears to be control and cooption of ethnic groups through its
affiliated members. From the point of view of ethnic organizations, APK
membership offers certain access to power as well as recognition by theauthorities as a representative body of their ethnicity.
Authorized ethnic organizations are ardent supporters of pro-regime
forces. Despite their wish to achieve representation in state organs inproportion to their population, ethnic organizations do not back up candidates on grounds of ethnicity. Rather, it appears that these cultural
centers, by supporting pro-regime candidates irrespective of ethnic
background, seek to lobby their interests through these politicians. For
example, in the fall of 2004, during the election campaign for the Majilis,or the lower chamber of the national assembly, neither Uzbek nor
Uighur organizations supported candidates of their own ethnicity.34
The core of the Uzbek movement in Kazakhstan is the Uzbek Cultural
Center of the South Kazakhstan oblast, in which the Uzbek population ismost concentrated. The Republican Association of Social Unions of the
Uzbeks Do‘stlik officially claims to unite regional cultural centers, but it
seems to play a rather symbolic role.35 Uzbek leaders do their utmost to
demonstrate their faithfulness to the regime. In March 2005, for example,
at Qurultoy (assembly) of the Uzbek Cultural Center of the South Kazakhstan oblast held at the House of Friendship of the Peoples in Shymkent,
activists repeatedly expressed their gratitude to the president. Ikram
Khashimzhanov, chairman of the oblast Uzbek cultural center is, not surprisingly, a member of Otan (Fatherland), the biggest pro-Nazarbaev
34 Two Uzbek candidates stood for the 2004 Majilis elections from Constituency 63,
formed primarily from the Sairam raion of the South Kazakhstan oblast. Abdumalik Sarmanov, one of the candidates, was de-registered due to comments he made that allegedly
incited ethnic hostility. Commenting on this, the Uzbek respondents that I interviewed toldthat Sarmanov would not have defeated the successful candidate Satybaldy Ibragimov, anethnic Kazakh and a “friend of Nazarbaev,” even if he were allowed to run. In the same
elections, the Republican Cultural Center of Uighurs of Kazakhstan did not support an
Uighur candidate who ran from a constituency that included the Uighur raion and thePanfilov raion of the Almaty oblast, the area with a highest percentage of the Uighur
population.
35 Do‘stlik is headed by Rozakul Khalmuradov, chairman of the Disciplinary Council of
Akimat of the South Kazakhstan oblast. He was deputy Akim (governor) of the oblast from1999 until 2002.

364

Transnationalism As a Threat to State Security?
party.
On the part of the Uighurs, as an umbrella for Uighur organizations,
the Republican Cultural Center of Uighurs of Kazakhstan (RCCUK) wasestablished in September 2003. Although he did not run for the chairmanship of the center, the key figure here was Dilmurat Kuziev, thepresident of the Republican Uighur Association of Manufacturers, Entrepreneurs, and Agricultural Workers. As a successful entrepreneur, he
has been offering financial support for the Uighur community, including
the Uighur Theater, schools, mosques, and translation of the Qur’an into
the Uighur language.36 On the political front, he is a devoted supporterof President Nazarbaev. In the 2004 Majilis elections, the RCCUK appealed to the Uighur community to support the Otan party.37
Nevertheless, there are several organizations that did not join the
RCCUK. Reasons for this are the differences in spheres of activities, personal conflict and competition among leaders, as well as the attitude toward Beijing. As Xinjiang independence movement is not allowed in
Kazakhstan, organizations acting within the limits of the current regime
are primarily focusing on cultural and economic issues of Kazakhstani
Uighurs. But some leaders’ close relations with the Chinese authorities
have provoked distrust and criticism against them. And yet, the community of Uighur activists and intelligentsia is quite small, and personalties can often be found even among conflicting organizations. As with
the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, the Society of the Culture of
Uighurs (SCU), headed by Farkhad Khasanov, is the only organization
representing the Uighurs in the Assembly. Currently the RCCUK isseeking its official membership, in an attempt to replace the SCU.
Underground Organizations
Despite Beijing’s apprehension that Kazakhstan might serve as astronghold for the Xinjiang independence movement, the support provided by the Kazakhstani Uighurs is more moral than practical. Never36 Author’s interview with the staff of the Republican Uighur Association of Manufacturers, Entrepreneurs, and Agricultural Workers, September 22, 2003.
37 Shardinov, Chairman of the Republican Cultural Center, is a member of the Otan
party; Kuziev has joined the Asar party, headed by Dariga Nazarbaeva, daughter of President Nazarbaev.

365

OKA Natsuko

theless, there are a few but vocal activists who openly demand Xinjiang’s
independence. Kakharman Khozhamberdi has formed the People’s Partyof Uighurstan in September 2002; it declares in its platform that the“main purpose of the party is to contribute to the political struggle ofour nation for the restoration of the sovereign, civic, and democratic
state in its historic homeland (the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Province of the People’s Republic of China).” At the same time, it stresses that“in its activities [the party] will use only political methods” and “decisively will condemn and expose all manifestations of terrorism, extremism, and religious fanaticism.”38 Its proclaimed moderateness notwithstanding, the People’s Party of Uighurstan has no prospect of being registered under the Law on Political Parties that bans parties along ethnicity.39
The United National Revolution Front of Eastern Turkistan, headedby the deceased Iusupbek Mukhlisi40 was allegedly willing to resort toforce for the sake of national independence. With very few followers andlimited financial resources, it appears that Mukhlisi did not have a realcapability to carry out any armed struggle. However, his sensational
statements and aggressive slogans, published in the local press and in
his own newspaper Voice of Eastern Turkistan, created a negative image
about the Uighur community and offer a pretext for the authorities of
Kazakhstan, as well as China, to take suppressive measures againstthem.
In recent years, the Uighurs in Kazakhstan (and Central Asia as awhole) have been increasingly labeled as “extremists” or “terrorists,”
who are plotting armed struggles with an aim to build an Uighur stateor an Islamic caliphate. An incident in September 2000 further intensified
such prejudice against them. At the center of Almaty, four men (as to thecitizenship and ethnicity among them, various sources gave different
figures, but at least one of them was a Chinese citizen of Uighur ethnic38 “Narodnaia partiia ‘Uighurstan’: Sbornik dokumentov” (in Uighur and Russian),
Almaty, 2003. I owe this document to Khozamberdi.
39 Under the 2002 Law on Political Parties, formation of parties based on “professional,
racial, national (natsional’naia), ethnic (etnicheskaia), and religious affiliation of citizens”(Section 8, Article 5) are prohibited.
40 He died in August 2004.

366

Transnationalism As a Threat to State Security?
ity), who allegedly had killed two personnel of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of Kazakhstan, were shot dead by the internal ministry’s forces.
After this, police searched houses in compact Uighur settlements, andtook many Uighurs who had nothing to do with the incident to the police station for questioning. The mass media sensationally reported theincident as “Uighur extremism.” My interviewees in Almaty complainedthat many Uighurs who had worked in the state sector lost their jobs
after the incident. Dilbirim Samsakova, head of the Nazugum Foundation,
who took in two children of a deceased suspect, was found dead in June
2001; the culprit is still at large.
Among the Uzbeks, there is no nationalist organization whose political agenda openly contradicts Kazakhstan’s domestic or foreign policy.
Meanwhile, Southern Kazakhstan has reportedly seen a rise of activities
by banned religious movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, a movement
seeking to create an Islamic state by political means. Some observers relate this not exclusively but primarily to the ethnic Uzbeks, both locals
and those from Uzbekistan.41 According to my informants, there indeed
were relatively more Uzbeks who joined the ranks of Hizb ut-Tahrir, butcurrently they are not overrepresented.42
The two Muslim communities, in particular the Uighurs, are often
blamed that they allegedly produce more “terrorists.” The issues of Islamic and Uighur movements, however, have been politicized not somuch by these communities as by the three states—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and China—that view those movements as a serious threat to theirsecurity and overemphasize such threat.

Conclusion
The cases of the Uzbeks and the Uighurs in Kazakhstan show that theirtransborder ethnic links with homelands have not challenged the existing border of the host state. The breakup of the Soviet Union made theUzbeks in Kazakhstan a “real” ethnic minority who live in a host state
41 International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir(Osh and Brussels, 2003), p. 18.
42 Authors’ interview in Turkestan, March 29, 2005.

367

OKA Natsuko

and have a distinct kin state. Seemingly, this situation is likely to lead toconflict over territory in which a minority resides. However, the Uzbek
community has never asked to revise the border so that their settlements
are incorporated into Uzbekistan, nor did Uzbekistan make an irredentist claim. Disagreements over border delimitation and control between
the two states notwithstanding, interethnic relations in the south of Kazakhstan generally remained stable. The Uzbeks are aware of more favorable economic and other conditions in the host state as compared to
the kin state, and seem to enjoy certain advantage of being “stranded” inKazakhstan.
By contrast, the Uighurs, after more than two decades of separationfrom their homeland, have been renewing ties with their ethnic kin since
the late 1980s. The opening of the border has enabled exchange withco-ethnics on the other side of the border, which has led to the increasein China’s suspicion about their support for the Xinjiang independence
movement. Close relations between the host state and the state rulingtheir historic homeland obviously have worked to Uighurs’ disadvantage; the two states are in agreement not to allow transnational Uighur
ethnic movements to flourish. Although they wish to have their own
state, the majority of the Uighurs do not support the idea of an independent Uighurstan for fear that such a demand would invite negative
reactions from the host state.
Despite differences in the relationship with their homeland, the strategy taken by the two minorities focused here are quite similar. Their
choice of such a strategy has been strongly influenced by Kazakhstan’s
policy of control and cooption, which is only partially mentioned in thispaper. Such discussions will be developed in a future study.

368