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Japan-Europe Relations at the Multilateral Level*
Hirotaka Watanabe

I. Conceptual Framework
Relations between Japan and Europe have a long history going back to the mid-nineteenth century, when
the Tokugawa shogunate opened Japan’s doors to the Western world. That history lives on in the numerous bilateral relationships that Japan has maintained and cultivated with individual European nations.
Here, however, I would like to focus on the postwar development of a multilateral Japan-Europe relationship built on the foundation of those historical ties. For many years Europe occupied a relatively inconspicuous place in Japanese foreign policy, at least by comparison with such key diplomatic partners as theUnited States and Japan’s Asian neighbors.
Sheer geographical distance was the most basic reason. Until the end of the Cold War era, the postwar history of Japan-Europe relations is primarily a story of trade ties. And from the European perspective, it is a story centered on the so-called trade friction that mounted as Europe sought to defend its
industries from the growing onslaught of exports from Japan, whose economy was growing at a remarkable pace. Both the Japanese postwar economic miracle and the rise of the European Economic
Community from the late 1950s on owed much to the injection of US economic assistance amid thegrowing Cold War tensions of the postwar years. In this sense, they could both be seen as the fruit of an
extended postwar recovery program.
Amid these trends, Europe’s interest in Japan grew over time. In the early 1960s, when Prime
Minister Hayato Ikeda visited France, the prevailing European attitude was epitomized by President
Charles de Gaulle’s sarcastic reference to the Japanese leader as “a transistor radio salesman.” These attitudes changed with the advance of globalization, as the progressive integration of international society
and the advent of ever-faster modes of communication expanded the range of international contact andcooperation. The burst of progress toward European market unification in the second half of the 1980s
encouraged further development of Japan-Europe ties, and this trend accelerated greatly after the collapse of the Cold War system. From that time on, the scope of Japan’s interaction and cooperation with
Europe continued to expand, eventually encompassing not only the European Union (EU) but also theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other security frameworks.
In the 1990s, Europe began to take a greater interest in Asia. With the end of the Cold War and theunification of the European market, European businesses began to eye China and other Asian countries
as prime destinations for overseas capital investment. At the same time, in order to create and maintainan environment conducive to sustained trade and investment in the region, the EU broadened the scope* This article was originally published as 渡邊啓貴「多国間枠組みの中の日欧関係」国分良成編『日本の外交 第4 巻 対外政策 地域編』、岩波書店、2013年、201-218頁.

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of its interaction to encompass cooperation in the political, social, and cultural spheres (promotion ofhuman rights, democracy, environmental protection, etc.).
In the following, I examine this historical development, dividing it into three phases. Phase one iscentered on the 1970s, an era of increasing activity in trade including interactions with the members of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Phase two corresponds roughly to the 1980s, aperiod of growing economic cooperation accompanying booming foreign direct investment. This leads
into the third and most recent phase of Japan-Europe relations, characterized by marked progress inpolitical dialogue and cultural exchange.

II. Phases One and Two: From Trade Friction to Foreign Investment
From the end of World War II until the close of the 1960s, relations between Japan and Europe are largely
confined to certain limited forms of cultural exchange and give little evidence of significant interactionin the political and economic spheres. But from around the end of the 1960s when Japan achieved postwar economic recovery and expanded its international trade, the rising tide of Japanese exports began
generating chronic trade imbalances. This set the stage for phase one in postwar Japan-Europe relations.
Two major developments of the early 1970s helped usher in a new era of Japan-Europe trade relations:the “Nixon shock” of 1971 and the oil crisis of 1973. With the US economy and the dollar in decline,
Japan and Europe were both obliged to revise their outlook on international economic relations.
Bit by bit, the European Community (EC) began placing more importance on its ties with Japan. In
1974, the EC established a European delegation in Tokyo. In 1979, the Commission of the European
Communities (referred to hereafter by its current name, the “European Commission,”) launched the
Executive Training Programme in Japan for European business managers, and in 1984 the EC-Japan
Centre for Industrial Cooperation opened in Tokyo.
After the EC adopted a common commercial policy at the beginning of the 1970s, it sought toreplace the bilateral trade frameworks in effect between Japan and various member states with a unified
framework negotiated by the European Commission. However, attempts to hammer out a comprehensive trade agreement with Japan broke down in 1973 over the commission’s insistence on negotiating an
EC-wide mechanism for emergency restrictions on Japanese imports to replace bilateral safeguardclauses.
Since 1968, trade between Japan and the EC had been marked by a persistent surplus on the Japaneseside. Japan’s export drive, sometimes characterized as “a flooding strategy”, focused intensively on specific sectors, notably automobiles, electronics, ball bearings, steel, and shipbuilding. In 1974, the EC
registered a trade deficit of $2 billion with Japan. Over the next decade, Japanese exports grew by 330%.
By 1981, the EC’s trade deficit with Japan had soared to $10.3 billion.
Meanwhile, 1972-73 witnessed the first boom in foreign direct investment (FDI) by Japanese businesses in Europe. Japanese FDI in Europe soared from $29 million in 1971 to $113 million in 1972, precipitating a sharp backlash by European businesses determined to deny their Japanese competitors
access. When a delegation from Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) visited Europe
in 1976, its presence triggered a storm of anti-Japanese criticism (an episode known in Japan as the“Doko shock,” after then Keidanren Chairman Toshiwo Doko), and trade tensions sharpened into a
political issue (was then defused for the time being by the Ushiba-Haferkamp joint statement of March
1978). The year 1979 was highlighted by the leak of an internal EC document referring to Japan as anation of “workaholics” living in “rabbit hutches.” Then, in October 1982, supply of Japanese video cassette recorders in France all but ground to a halt when the imports were deliberately routed through a2customs bottleneck at the town of Poitiers (an episode that some in the media dubbed the Second Battleof Poitiers). Influenced by such incidents, the production of Japanese mechanical products such as automobiles bound for European markets began shifting overseas, relying increasingly on local manufacturing facilities. The second oil crisis in late 1979 caused a temporary setback in Japan-Europe economic
relations, but ties would pick up again and enter a new phase of development in the 1980s thanks to the
yen’s appreciation against the dollar and the revival of the European economy.
This brings us to phase two of the postwar Japan-Europe relationship. The EC’s trade deficit withJapan had leveled off at around $10 billion in the early 1980s, but it resumed its growth in 1985, hitting$16.7 billion in 1986 and $20 billion by the end of 1987. This was largely the result of the 1985 Plaza
Accord on exchange rates. Since the international agreement caused the yen to rise more dramaticallyagainst the dollar than against European currencies, many Japanese manufacturers began shifting the
focus of their export efforts from the United States to the EC.
Foreign direct investment in Europe by Japanese businesses also rose sharply during this time.
Japanese FDI in the EC grew from $1.8 billion in 1985 to $3.4 billion in 1986, and the EC’s share of total
Japanese FDI swelled from 11% in 1980 to 21% in 1989 (as compared with 48% for the United States and
12% for East Asia). Particularly from the late 1990s on, with the transition to an era of dialogue andcooperation, FDI in both directions has grown significantly, creating a strong reciprocal investment relationship between Japan and the EU (Ishikawa 1990).
In April 1988, the EC Council of Foreign Ministers adopted the Statement on Relations between theCommunity and Japan, and the EC’s critical attitude toward Japan began to soften. From the 1990s
through the early 21st century, Japan-Europe relations would take on increasing importance as European
unification progressed with the completion of market integration, the adoption of a single currency, andthe admission of the Central and Eastern European nations.
The March 1988 Cecchini Report, projecting the economic impact of the completion of a single
European market at the end of 1992, had a major impact on Japanese businesses and their attitudes
toward the EC. The liberalization of trade within the community offered a tremendous opportunity forJapanese businesses to expand in Europe and they strongly hoped that market integration would bringabout the removal of all quantitative restrictions (QRs)—import quotas targeting Japanese goods. The
EC had adopted QRs at the time when Japan had acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT). Indeed, the European Commission had hoped to eliminate such national import restrictions by
the end of 1992, but it was not until March 1994 that they were lifted entirely.
Japan-US trade relations also had a significant impact on Japan-EC ties during this period (Tanaka
1995, 34-36). After the United States initiated Market-Oriented Sector-Selective talks with Japan, the EC,
too, called for MOSS-style trade negotiations targeted to its own priorities, such as alcoholic beverages,
automobiles, medical equipment, and pharmaceuticals. The EC also lodged a complaint against Japan
under article XXIII, paragraph 2, of the GATT, charging that Japan’s liquor taxes discriminated against
imported alcoholic beverages, and it instituted strict antidumping rules that applied punitive tariffs evento imported parts and materials. (The rules defined dumping as the export of a product to the EC atprices lower than what was “normal” in the exporting country’s domestic market, and penalties were also
applicable to products manufactured within the EC if their local content was deemed too low.) These
measures represented the EC’s efforts to apply the US approach to its own trade disagreements withJapan.
Japan-Europe relations are inevitably linked to broader global trends. In this sense, American foreign policy had a huge influence on European policies, and the Japanese tended to view ties with Europe

3within the context of the Japan-US relationship. For Europe as well as Japan, their mutual partnershipwas secondary to their respective strategic partnerships with the United States which were based on alliances in the Atlantic and the Pacific, respectively.

III. The End of the Cold War and the Dawn of Phase Three
1. The Hague Joint Declaration of 1991—Building a Framework for Dialogue as Global
Partners
The end of the Cold War precipitated a fundamental reexamination of the international structures that
had grown up around the East-West conflict. This reexamination, in turn, helped usher in the third phaseof the Japan-Europe relationship, a period marked by more comprehensive ties extending into the realmsof politics, culture, and security.
In this historical context, the year 1991 represented a milestone in post-Cold War Japan-Europe
relations. In July that year, at the first Japan-EC Summit, Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu andEuropean Commission President Jacques Delors signed the Joint Declaration on Relations between theEuropean Community and Its Member States and Japan, also known as the Hague Declaration of 1991.
The Hague Declaration began by noting that Japan and Europe were conscious of their common
attachment to freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, and affirmed a common attachment to market principles, the promotion of free trade, and the development of a prosperous and soundworld economy. It also affirmed the parties’ common interest in security, peace, and stability of the world
and their desire to make a “joint contribution towards safeguarding peace in the world, setting up a justand stable international order in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations
Charter, and taking up the challenges that the international community has to face.”
Under the heading of “General Principles of Dialogue and of Cooperation,” Japan and the European
Community declared their intent to enhance cooperation and exchange of information on major international issues, including political, economic, scientific, and cultural matters. Under “Objectives of
Dialogue and Cooperation” the two sides agreed on a wide range of priorities, including cooperation
within international organizations; support for freedom, democracy, human rights, and the market
economy; nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and of missile technology;
sound development of the world economy and trade; dialogue and cooperation on trade, investment,
industrial cooperation, advanced technology, energy, employment, social affairs, and competition rules;
international development linked with respect for human rights; policing and prevention of international terrorism and drug trafficking; and development of academic, cultural, and youth exchange
programs.
In order to give substance to the declaration, a variety of consultative mechanisms were established,creating a framework for Japan-Europe dialogue and cooperation. These include the regular annual
Japan-EC Summit (now the Japan-EU Summit) and the twice-yearly Japan-EU Troika Ministerial
Meeting (now the Japan-EU Foreign Ministers’ Meeting) and the Japan-EU Political Directors’ Meeting,as well as Senior Officials’ Meetings, Japan-EU High-Level Consultations, Japan-EU Regulatory Reform
Dialogue, Japan-EU High-Level Meeting on the Environment, Japan-EU Dialogue on Intellectual
Property Rights, and Japan-EU Strategic Dialogue (Strategic Dialogue on Central Asia and Strategic
Dialogue on East Asian Security Environment).
In the early 1990s, the EU undertook a review of its overall Asia strategy. The EU’s Towards a New
Asia Strategy adopted in 1994 provided the impetus for the establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting(ASEM) in 1996. The EU also drew up a new China strategy around this time. In one sense, the Hague

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Declaration can be viewed as part of this larger process. At the same time, the EU’s drive for stronger
economic ties with Japan in particular is apparent in the Gateway program to promote trade and investment, launched as Gateway to Japan in 1994 and scheduled to conclude in 2014. As of this writing, 2,770
EU companies had taken part in this program.
The Japan-EU Summit of November 1996 marked another milestone in the development of JapanEurope ties during this period. This was when Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto adopted a new Europe
policy based on the concept of a global partnership supported by bilateral country-to-country relationships and stressing the need for Japan and Europe to combine forces to help solve a wide range of problems confronting the international community. The Japanese government acted on this policy by adopting
a series of bilateral action plans with each of the EU’s three core members, Britain, France, and Germany:
UK/Japan Action Agenda, France-Japan 20 Actions for the Year 2000, and Action Agenda for the JapanGermany Partnership. From this time on, the Japanese government would use bilateral frameworks withthe major EU powers as a springboard for the development and expansion of amicable and cooperative
relations across a wide range of sectors, including the political, economic, and cultural spheres. Thus
there grew up a dual mode of interaction and exchange between Japan and Europe, built on the idea ofbilateral country-to-country ties as the foundation for the multilateral Japan-EU relationship.

2. Fostering a Strategic Partnership
In January 2000, during his diplomatic tour of Italy, Belgium, Britain, and France, Foreign Minister Yohei
Kono gave a policy speech in Paris on the subject of Japan-Europe relations. A core message of his
remarks was the need for Japan and the EU to enhance political dialogue and cooperation, which still
paled next to the strength of economic relations. The following July, at the 2000 Japan-EU Summit meeting in Tokyo, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, French President Jacques Chirac, and European Commission
President Romano Prodi jointly proclaimed a Decade of Japan-EU Cooperation starting in 2001, whichmarked the 10th anniversary of Japan-EC Joint Declaration, to further develop their relations. Soon
Foreign Minister Kono was consulting frequently by phone with Javier Solana, the EU’s High
Representative for the Foreign and Security Policy, and a close and active political dialogue grew up
between Japan and the EU.
The three pillars of Japan-Europe political cooperation, as proposed in the speech, were (1) “realizing shared values while respecting diversity” among cultures with a view to helping to build a new international order; (2) “strengthening Japan-Europe political cooperation” in the areas of conflict prevention,
disarmament and nonproliferation, and reform of the United Nations, in view of the rapid unification of
the EU’s foreign and security policies; and (3) “sharing the benefits of globalization”—tapping into the
dynamism of globalization in order to bring prosperity to the world and protect the socially vulnerable
by working for a new round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations and cooperating on aid
to developing countries. The basic idea behind the Decade of Japan-EU Cooperation was to devote thenext ten years to building closer ties oriented to those goals.
At the Japan-EU Summit of December 2001, the parties agreed on an Action Plan for Japan-EU
Cooperation to serve as an agenda for the Decade of Japan-EU Cooperation. The agenda was organizedunder four basic priorities: (1) promoting peace and security; (2) strengthening the economic and trade
partnership utilizing the dynamism of globalization for the benefit of all; (3) coping with global and societal challenges; and (4) bringing together people and cultures. In response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the summit also issued the EU-Japan Joint Declaration on Terrorism, highlighting
the security cooperation to address such global problems.

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In April 2002, President Prodi visited Japan and became the first European Commission president
to address the National Diet. The Japan-EU Summit held in Tokyo in July 2002 was a landmark meetingthat took another new step in Japan-EU ties with an agreement to “deepen strategic partnership collaboration in areas of priority international concern,” including counterterrorism, regional situations in
Afghanistan, the Middle East, and North Korea, environmental issues, and the WTO. The 2004 summitin Tokyo continued in this vein. The parties reaffirmed their basic agreement on a number of items on
the international political agenda, such as Iraq and North Korea, while issuing more concrete statements
and initiatives in areas of high priority for both sides: disarmament and nonproliferation, promotion of
two-way investment, enforcement of intellectual property rights in Asia, and information and communication technology.
The next step in the development of a broad-based Japan-EU relationship was the expansion ofstrategic ties and the activation of people-to-people interaction. The latter emphasis can be seen in thedesignation of 2005 as the Japan-EU Year of People-to-People Exchanges. In that year, numerous events
took place throughout Japan and Europe to foster exchange among private citizens. At the 2006 Japan-EU
Summit, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi won the EU’s leaders’ approval for his three keys to stronger
Japan-EU relations: visible cooperation (establishing a legal framework), enhanced strategic dialogue,
and expansion of people-to-people exchanges. In addition, the EU leaders welcomed the Koizumi
administration’s “Framework Initiative for Exchange Networks and Dialogues” as a concrete follow-up to
the 2005 Japan-EU Year of People-to-People Exchanges. In keeping with Koizumi’s call for enhanced
strategic dialogue, the 2006 summit opened up a new avenue for consultation when the leaders agreed toestablish a dialogue on the security environment in Central Asia.
At the 2007 Japan-EU Summit, Japan unveiled a proposal for the control of greenhouse gas emissions to combat climate change, and the parties agreed to cooperate on reducing emissions. The summit
leaders also agreed on the importance of energy conservation, green technology for improved energy
efficiency, and energy diversification as keys to reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
In 2009, control of the Japanese government shifted to the Democratic Party of Japan under theleadership of Yukio Hatoyama, who had pledged to pursue the formation of an East Asian community
founded on the spirit of yu-ai (fraternity) and a long-term vision for the future. The advent of the
Hatoyama cabinet prompted wide-ranging discussion on the subject of regional integration and fueledhopes for a leap forward in Japan-Europe cooperative relations. At the 2010 Japan-EU Summit, the leaders described 2010 as the beginning of a new era in Japan-EU relations and decided to establish a joint
high-level group to start examining ways to comprehensively strengthen and integrate the Japan-EU
economic relationship. They also pledged to collaborate in peace-building efforts, as by cooperating in
Somalia and Yemen operations (the leaders discussed the deployment of a joint Japan-EU force foranti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, cooperation in support of Japan’s proposed Djibouti
training center, and Japan’s deployment of P-3C aircraft to Djibouti, which was commended by the EU)
and in providing assistance to Afghanistan. With respect to the global agenda, they called for Japan-EU
cooperation in G8 and G20 Summits against the background of monetary and fiscal crisis in Europe; on
climate change (noting the need for participation by major emitters so as to ensure emissions reduction
on a global scale); on the upcoming 16th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 10); on disarmament and nonproliferation (specifically the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference); and on the International Thermonuclear
Experimental Reactor project for research on nuclear fusion. Summit leaders also discussed China’s economic development and the EU arms embargo on China, as well as North Korea’s nuclear weapons pro-6

gram, noting areas of agreement and disagreement.

3. Current State of Japan-EU Relations
At the Japan-EU Summit held in 2011, in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami,
Japan expressed its appreciation for the EU’s support for post-disaster relief efforts, and the two parties
reaffirmed their relationship as global partners sharing fundamental values. As next steps toward thecomprehensive strengthening of Japan-EU relations, the leaders agreed to set in motion processes leading to negotiations for a Japan-EU economic partnership agreement (EPA) and a formal agreement oncooperation in the political sector and other areas. They made specific reference to cooperating in assistance to Afghanistan and the Palestinian people, as well as in the areas of nuclear safety and disastermanagement, with Prime Minister Naoto Kan placing particular stress on nuclear safety and energy
policy. The leaders also exchanged views and explored possibilities for cooperation in relation to theworld economy and the situation in the Middle East, North Africa, Iran, North Korea, and China. On theoccasion of the 2011 summit, the second Japan-EU English Haiku Contest was held. At the joint press
conference following the summit meeting, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, himself ahaiku aficionado, read his own composition expressing hopes for Japan’s recovery from the March disaster: “The three disasters, Storms turn into a soft wind, A new humane wind.” It was a moving gesture that
seemed to herald the beginning of a new chapter in Japan-EU exchange.
The scope of Japan-EU cooperation expanded further around this time with the first meeting of the
Joint Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation between the EU and Japan in June 2011.
Meanwhile, the two sides continued their collaborative efforts on global issues via the Japan-EU HighLevel Meeting on the Environment (December 2011), implementation of the Japan-EU Action Plan on
IPR Protection and Enforcement (adopted June 2007), the Japan-EU Dialogue on Intellectual Property
Rights (April 2012), and the Japan-EU Energy Dialogue (June 2012). In the wake of the 2011 summit,
Japan and the EU were particularly active in pursuing dialogue and cooperation in the fields of nuclear
power and advanced energy technology. They also worked together to improve the climate for trade andinvestment on both sides by strengthening the legal framework (such as the Japan-EU Mutual Recognition
Agreement, Agreement on Cooperation on Anti-competitive Activities, and Agreement on Cooperationand Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters signed by Japan and the EU in January 2008),
as well as through public-private sector cooperation (the Japan-EU Business Round Table and cooperation on drafting of international standards). In addition, Japan and the EU both signed the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement, a multinational pact designed to prevent trade in counterfeit goods—Japan in October 2011, and the EU in January 2012. (However, the agreement did not come into force
in the EU, as the European Parliament voted not to ratify it in July 2012).
Particularly noteworthy was the progress Japan and the EU made toward opening negotiations foran economic partnership agreement, following the agreement made at the 2011 summit to begin theprocess for negotiations. In late November 2012, the EU Council of Trade Ministers voted to enter into
formal negotiations for a Japan-EU EPA aimed at liberalizing trade and investment, including the service
sector. While Japan is eager for an agreement that could expand exports of automobiles and consumer
electronics (by eliminating the high 10% tariff on automobiles and 14% tariff on electronic equipment),
Italy and France remain extremely wary of moves to liberalize imports of Japanese automobiles.
Meanwhile, the EU’s call for total liberalization of agricultural trade faces fierce opposition from within
Japan. Japan’s insistence on applying its own food safety standards is another obstacle from the European
standpoint. Also at issue are various non-tariff measures in such sectors as chemical products, electronic7equipment, food safety, processed food, alcoholic beverages, medical equipment, and pharmaceuticalproducts.
As of 2011, the total volume of trade between Japan and the EU stood at roughly 14 trillion yen. The
EU is Japan’s third-largest export market, and Japan is the EU’s seventh-largest. In 2011, the EU was thesecond-largest destination for Japanese FDI outflows (about 17 trillion yen) and the largest source of FDI
inflows to Japan (about 7 trillion yen). Some 3,750 Japanese companies have set up operations in the EU,
creating about 470,000 European jobs. Cooperation in economy, science and technology between
European and Japanese companies has expanded rapidly, particularly in the booming environmental
sector. Examples include tie-ups for production and sale of electric cars (Mitsubishi Motors and France’s
PSA Peugeot Citröen) and alternative energy projects (Sharp and Italy’s Enel Green Power; Mitsubishi
Corp. and Spain’s Acciona). Recent commitments by Japanese airlines to purchase Airbus A380s andA320s also testify to the growth of economic ties between Japan and the EU. In 2013, although theJapan-EU Summit scheduled for March was postponed, a decision was made to launch negotiations fora strategic partnership agreement and a free trade agreement (FTA). If concluded, the Japan-EU FTA is
expected to generate a 32.7% increase in EU exports to Japan and a 23.5% increase in Japanese exports tothe EU.
In addition to the direct Japan-EU cooperation we have examined so far, Japan and Europe havealso been expanding cooperative relations within multilateral frameworks.
The key framework for multilateral cooperation between Europe and Asia is the aforementioned
Asia-Europe Meeting, or ASEM. Although Japan may not have met all of ASEAN’s expectations in termsof leadership, it has participated faithfully since the forum was launched in 1996. It has also spearheaded
a number of initiatives, including the Asia-Europe Business Forum, created to encourage interregional
trade and investment encompassing small and medium-sized businesses; exchange programs for young
leaders in the areas of business, government, and science; and the development of an interregional thinktank network. In addition, it played an important role in the establishment of the Asia-Europe Foundation
to promote intellectual exchange and lobbied vigorously for the adoption of the Trade Facilitation(Promotion) Action Plan and Investment Promotion Action Plan. In these ways, Japan has demonstrated
a continued commitment to pursue collaboration with the EU in the context of interregional
cooperation.

IV. Japan-Europe Security Cooperation
1. Japan-Europe Cooperation amid Evolving Concepts of International Security
Because of the central role the Japan-US alliance has played in Japanese security in the postwar era, Japan
has not cultivated strong ties with NATO over the years. Japan’s thinking during the Cold War era wasthat the scope of joint defense under the NATO alliance was clearly defined and consequently there were
no common concerns considered directly relevant to Japanese security.
Occasionally, to be sure, the perceived potential for an Atlantic security crisis to spill over into Asia
prompted some to call for Japanese involvement in NATO affairs. In connection with the debate over
deployment of American Pershing II intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe in response to theSoviet deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles in Eastern Europe (the Euro-missile crisis, leading to the 1979 NATO “double-track decision”), the administration of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone
took a position on the grounds that the situation in Europe could lead to the deployment of strategic
nuclear weapons in Asia. This led him to assert at the 1983 Group of Seven summit in Williamsburg thatthe security of Japan and Europe was “indivisible.” Pressure from Japan and the United States also suc-8

ceeded in preventing the EU from lifting its arms embargo on China.
Be that as it may, the end of the Cold War inevitably altered Japan’s perspective. Two key changes
were at play. One was a shift in the nature of international security cooperation. The end of the East-West
conflict eliminated the need for collective defense partnerships oriented to the global threat of massdestruction from nuclear weapons and shifted the focus to collective security oriented to peacekeeping,policing, and peacemaking in response to low-intensity regional conflicts. The second change was a
sharp increase in the number of such collective security operations around the globe. The new environment also raised the possibility of eventual participation by Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF).
In 1992, at a ministerial summit at the Hotel Petersberg near Bonn, the leaders of the Western
European Union alliance signed a declaration sanctioning military action for humanitarian and peacemaking purposes. In the same year, the United Nations issued a report titled Agenda for Peace (alsoknown as the Ghali report after UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali) calling for steps to strengthen theorganization’s peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities. Also in 1992—in a notable display of synchrony—Japan passed the Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other
Operations, which opened the way for overseas dispatch of the SDF. This was the beginning of a process
by which Japan, to its credit, sought to keep pace with international security trends originating in Europe
in the wake of the Cold War. The bitter experience of being excluded from the list of countries contributing to the 1991 Gulf War effort—notwithstanding its huge financial contribution—had made the Japanese
government sensitive to the importance of direct “boots on the ground” contributions to international
security.
Accordingly, a new feature of Japan-Europe relations in the post-Cold War era was the rise of global
cooperation in the area of global security. In the wake of the Gulf War, as Japan endured international
criticism for contributing only money to the multinational effort, Japanese foreign policy found itself at
an important crossroads.
There were increased expectations regarding Japanese cooperation in the security sector and Japanwas obliged to respond. This is apparent in Japan’s participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
launched in 1994, as well as in calls for foreign-policy and security cooperation incorporated in theJapan-Europe political cooperation initiatives and the Action Plan for Japan-EU Cooperation. In reality,
however, the scope of Japan-EU security cooperation remains quite limited owing to major legal constraints on the dispatch of the SDF and their use of weapons in overseas operations. In 2009, the ARF
held a field exercise for disaster relief, in which the SDF took part, but since then development of the ARF
itself has stalled. And Japan has yet to follow up on the idea of cooperating in civilian missions undertaken by the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy.
Nonetheless, seen in the light of the Cold War, when Japan and the EU rarely even exchanged views
on security matters, the relationship has definitely evolved, albeit slowly. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi
visited Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1998 and made a point of communicating his concerns regarding the situation there, both within Japan and internationally. In November 1999, the Japanese government dispatched Foreign Ministry officials for a seven-month mission to Yugoslavia and a six-month
mission to Skopje, the capital of Macedonia. It also sent 65 observers to monitor elections (at a cost of$3.5 million) in 1997-98, and another 30 observers in September 1998 ($1 million). In 2004, Foreign
Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi gave a speech clarifying the Japanese government’s continuing commitment
to the stability of the Balkans. Significant progress in security cooperation can also be seen in the SDF
refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, launched around the time of the Iraq war to support US andEuropean antiterrorism efforts, and Japan’s cooperation in multinational counter-piracy operations off

9the coast of Somalia. Deserving of special mention are the Maritime Self-Defense Force escort operations
in support of the EU Naval Force Somalia Operation ATALANTA, as well as its deployment of P-3C
Orion maritime patrol aircraft to assist in that mission. Japan has also worked with the EU in providing
and coordinating aid for the reconstruction of Libya and Mali.

2. Cooperation in Afghanistan, Consultation with NATO
Japan has made an important contribution to reconstruction in Afghanistan. The basis for the international community’s support for Afghanistan is the Afghan Compact adopted at the London Conferenceon Afghanistan held at the end of January 2006 and the Afghan government’s Interim Afghanistan
National Development Strategy. The London Conference also established the Joint Coordination andMonitoring Board (JCMB) as a framework for international cooperation. The JCMB met in Japan in
February 2008.
In January 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered a speech titled “Japan and NATO: Toward
Further Collaboration” before the North Atlantic Council at NATO Headquarters. In his remarks, Abecharacterized Japan and NATO as partners sharing fundamental values and stressed the need to work
together to consolidate peace in conflict-torn areas. He went on to state that it was time to move on to a
new phase of cooperation, and he expressed high hopes for regular consultations between Japanese officials and their NATO counterparts. He noted that there was ample room for Japan and NATO to pool
their knowledge and experience in such areas as peace building, reconstruction, and disaster relief, andhe went as far as referring to personnel cooperation to enhance Japan’s contribution in Afghanistan. This
led some to view his statement as referring to potential security cooperation by the SDF in Afghanistan
and NATO looked forward to major changes in Japan’s mode of involvement. In the end, domestic opposition prevented the dispatch of SDF troops, and the only contribution by Japanese personnel in
Afghanistan was that of NGO workers operating under the protection of other countries’ armed forces.
In December 2007 NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer visited Japan, and Japan’s relationship with NATO quickly advanced to a new level. In a joint press statement, Prime Minister Yasuo
Fukuda and Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer affirmed a shared sense of responsibility towards global
security challenges and a determination to continue cooperating to meet those challenges. They agreed
that Japan and NATO would “seek utmost synergy in utilizing their respective resources and capabilities”
in the fight against terrorism as well as in the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan. More specifically, they agreed to promote defense exchanges (participation by SDF personnel in courses at theNATO Defense College), Japan-NATO policy dialogue (including high-level consultations), participation by Japanese officials in NATO-hosted seminars and conferences, and Japanese aid to Afghanistan incooperation with NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) under Japan’s Grant Assistance for
Grassroots Human Security Project. Although these commitments fell short of NATO’s hopes, theexplicit affirmation of a cooperative relationship between Japan and NATO was in itself a majorachievement.
Collaboration in Afghanistan has been a linchpin of Japan-NATO cooperation. In November 2009,
the Japanese government announced a new aid package of up to $5 billion, to be disbursed over a period
of about five years. Designed to actively support Afghanistan’s own nation-building efforts, the package
focused on the three key goals of public safety, reunification, and development. It was the single largest
financial commitment by any country to Afghan reconstruction.
June 2010 saw the conclusion of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and NATO on
the Security of Information and Material. Originally requested by NATO in 2007 to strengthen the10bilateral relationship, the agreement establishes the basic rules and mechanisms for protecting classified
information and materials that Japan and NATO share with one another.
In May 2011, Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto visited NATO headquarters and met with
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. In May 2012, Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba
attended the Meeting on Afghanistan held on the occasion of the NATO Chicago Summit, and the Tokyo
Conference was held the following July. In April 2013, during Secretary General Rasmussen’s visit toJapan, the Japanese government pledged further support for the effort in Afghanistan, while expressing
a willingness to cooperate in other areas.

3. Cooperation with the OSCE
Under the 1992 Helsinki Summit Declaration and Helsinki Document adopted by the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe—now the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe(OSCE)—it was agreed that Japan would be invited to attend the organization’s meetings, including thoseamong heads of states, foreign ministers, and senior officials, and that it would be able to contribute tosuch meetings but not participate directly in decision making.
Accordingly, Japan has regularly sent a government delegate or state minister for foreign affairs toattend the OSCE Summit, held once every two years, and a deputy minister for foreign affairs or government delegate to meetings of the Ministerial Council. In December 2000, the OSCE began holding conferences jointly with partner states, and Foreign Minister Yohei Kono attended the first such conference.
Since then Japan has continued to participate, represented by a deputy minister, deputy director-generalof European affairs, or other ambassador-level official at meetings held in other Asian countries, andattended by the foreign minister when Japan serves as host. Other opportunities for cooperation with the
OSCE include the Forum for Security Cooperation (since October 1992), attended by the Japaneseambassador to Australia or a comparable official in the region, and meetings of the Permanent Council.
Japan has also sent personnel to take part in election monitoring missions organized by the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.
In June 2009, a Japan-OSCE Conference was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The theme of
the meeting was “Sharing knowledge and experiences between the OSCE participating states and Asianpartners for cooperation to address common challenges,” and discussion centered on three topics: (1)enhancing confidence building by military transparency, (2) energy security dialogue, and (3) civil society development, including the media.

4. Concluding Observations
Although this chapter has focused on the development of Japan-Europe relations in the context of multilateral frameworks, it goes without saying that the historical foundations for this relationship are thebilateral ties established between Japan and individual European nations since the mid-nineteenth century, during the final decades of the Tokugawa shogunate. As the Japan-US relationship emerged as the
bedrock of Japanese foreign policy after World War II, the emphasis in Japanese foreign policy inevitably
shifted away from friendship with Europe. But ties that went back to the opening of Japan could not
simply be written off. Following the years of postwar reconstruction, Japan and Europe restored theiramicable ties and developed them into relationships of exchange in the fields of economy, science andtechnology, and culture. We must not forget that throughout this period, bilateral ties were the foundation on which the multilateral relationship was built.
The history of postwar Japan-Europe relations at the bilateral level is much too vast a subject to11cover in a modest survey like this. Numerous books have been published on the subject of Japan’s relations with one European country or another. However, to the best of my knowledge, only the Japan-UK
relationship has been the object of comprehensive and systematic study covering the development ofbilateral ties in each area up to the present day.
Detailed description of the Japan-UK relationship will be the subject of the next chapter. Generally
speaking, however, the postwar development of bilateral ties between Japan and the major European
nations followed basically the same course. Initially, Japan’s export drives led to a period of trade friction.
Economic ties and cultural exchanges began to deepen. Gradually diplomatic efforts bore fruit in stronger and more broad-based relationships encompassing cooperation in the political and foreign-policy
spheres, and Japan and its major EU partners implemented personnel exchange, created forums for dialogue, and adopted wide-ranging action agendas.
Postwar relations between Japan and France began with the restoration of diplomatic ties following
the San Francisco Peace Conference. After reciprocal visits by top government officials, a regular bilateralconference was established in 1962. The 1980s saw the creation of a bilateral council of experts’ meeting
dedicated to strengthening economic ties. Shortly after the end of the Cold War, efforts to stimulate private-sector economic exchange accelerated with the establishment of the Japan-France Committee andthe launch of an export promotion campaign, “Gateway to Japan.” In the wake of the Cold War, the twocountries began working actively to enhance cooperation and broaden the scope of interaction with theestablishment of the Japan-France Dialogue Forum in 1996, the 1996 adoption of the aforementioned
France-Japan 20 Actions for the Year 2000, and the 2005 Declaration for a New Japan-France Partnership.
These frameworks and documents sought to foster and deepen relations through regular summits andministerial consultations, science and technology exchange, promotion of tourism, people-to-people
exchanges, security cooperation relating to peace and disarmament, and cooperation in such areas as thepeaceful use of nuclear energy, international development, and the environment. During this time, cultural exchange has also taken root thanks to such initiatives as the Paris-Tokyo Year, events commemorating the 150th anniversary of Japan-France relations, and the establishment of cultural facilities in bothcountries.
The history of Japan-Germany postwar relations begins with the establishment of diplomatic ties
between Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. From the late 1960s on, economic interaction between the two countries intensified as Japanese automobiles and other exports penetrated theGerman market. The 1970s and 1980s saw the establishment of the German Culture Center, the conclusion of an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation on science and technology, and the opening of
the Japanese-German Center Berlin and the German Institute for Japanese Studies in Tokyo. In 1996, theaforementioned Action Agenda for the Japan-Germany Partnership was drafted, and in 2000 the two
governments adopted the document “Seven Pillars of Cooperation For Japan-Germany Relations in the
21st Century” with the aim of strengthening collaboration at the regional and global levels in the areas ofinternational peace, economics, society, politics, and culture.
Japan’s bilateral relations with other European nations have generally developed along similar lines.
The capacity to incorporate such bilateral relationships into the multilateral European frameworks featured in this chapter is one of the great strengths of the EU’s foreign policy.

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