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International Trends in Development Aid andJapan’s ODA*
Toru Yanagihara(Takushoku University)
Introduction
Official development assistance (ODA) is aid in the form of capital, goods, and knowledge provided bydeveloped countries and international institutions to improve the economic and social conditions ofdeveloping countries, and can be viewed as a part of global-scale public policy. Following World War II,
the United States provided assistance for the recovery of Western Europe through the Marshall Plan, and
the World Bank was established. Subsequently, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was set
up within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the beginning of
the 1960s. These events had a significant impact on subsequent implementation of development assistance. The United States, through its own policies and through its influence on the World Bank, was asignificant presence in the direction of trends for international assistance notably up to the 1980s. Fromthe 1990s on, the influence of the northwestern European countries increased and was reflected in thepolicies of not only the United Nations organizations and the DAC, but also those of the World Bank andthe International Monetary Fund (IMF), generating various new trends in assistance.
This paper examines Japan’s position within the DAC from the 1960s up to today, and the country’s
responses to trends originating from the World Bank from the 1980s to the first half of the 1990s and totrends originating from Europe from the latter half of the 1990s to the 2000s. It concludes by noting challenges at present and in the near future.1

1. Trends at the DAC and Japan’s position2
Following the end of World War II, Japan’s ODA started in 1954 when it joined the Colombo Plan (established in 1950 by the British Commonwealth to provide technical assistance in the countries of SouthAsia). In 1955, Japan began to provide postwar reparations to Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, andVietnam. In 1958, Japan, along with the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Germany, participated in a meeting held by the World Bank to respond to India’s balance of payments crisis. With such a
record of activities, when the Development Assistance Group (DAG) was created within the Organization
for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) under the leadership of the United States in 1960, Japan,
although not one of the eight founding nations, was invited to become a member immediately after its* This article was originally published as “Kokusai Enjo Choryu to Nihon no ODA” in Kokusai Mondai [international af-

fairs], No.637 (2014), 37-47.

1

establishment, and thus participated in the group’s activities from the start. In March 1961, the DAG
declared its resolution on the “Common Aid Effort.” This set forth a model for assistance cooperation (ina loose form based on sharing experiences and mutual review), which continues up to the present day. In
July 1961, the final meeting of the DAG was held in Tokyo, with then Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda delivering the opening address. At this meeting, studies were conducted for implementing the above-mentioned Resolution on the Common Aid Effort, marking the start of the operational method of mutual
review and assessment of each country’s policies and performances. In October 1961, with the supersession of the OEEC by the OECD, the DAG was reconstituted as the DAC. Japan was one of the original
DAC members, along with nine Western countries. In the beginning of the 1960s, all of the developed
nations established assistance organizations. Japan launched the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
(OECF) in 1961 and the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency (OTCA) in 1962. Japan was not lagging
behind the developed nations of the West in establishing such assistance institutions.
In 1962, the DAC conducted a review on the achievements of its member countries’ assistance policies, and published the aid review as the first DAC Chair’s Report. The report’s recommendations
touched on points such as the difference in aid efforts between the member countries, conditions forprovision of financial aid, promotion of aid untying, aid distribution across recipient countries and regions, formation of a cooperative assistance group, and improvement of aid effectiveness. The Chair’s
Report was subsequently examined at the DAC’s first High Level Meeting, which was held later in thesame year. From this time on, recommendations were repeatedly made for improving and harmonizing
the financial terms of aid. As one of the countries with low grant shares and grant element (degree ofconcessionality of the financial terms of loans), Japan bore the brunt of criticism (along with Germany
and Italy). In 1963, the DAC adopted a resolution recommending that the terms of aid should be adapted
to the circumstances of recipient countries, and in 1965 it noted the necessity of untying aid, non-project
assistance and local cost financing, in addition to softening financial terms of aid. At the same time, studies were also advanced on coordination of assistance, and in 1966, the Guidelines for Co-ordination ofTechnical Assistance were formulated. With regard to assistance efforts, in 1967 data was published on
total official contributions as percentage of national income. There continued to be conflicting views on
untying aid. Japan did not clearly indicate its attitude toward this issue at first, but from a certain point in
time, it revealed its position to promote the shift to untied aid. In 1972, a new recommendation was madefor terms of financial assistance, calling for an increase of the grant element and to apply special preferential terms for the least developed countries. In 1978, the grant element target was raised higher. In
addition, in 1979, the DAC adopted the Guidelines for Improving Aid Implementation and later that year
the High Level Meeting instructed that initiatives be taken for evaluation of aid effectiveness.
Entering the 1980s, in addition to the above-mentioned aid conditions and operational matters,
new proposals were made on the principle and purpose of development. With regard to conditions andoperations, in addition to individual country reviews, in 1980, comparative reviews of donor countries
on actual and prospective aid were launched. In 1981, the DAC formed a group for evaluating aid projects, and studies by that group paved the way for the adoption of the Principles for Aid Evaluation, which
covered all stages of the project cycle, at the High Level Meeting of 1988. Moreover, in the following year,
an expert group prepared a document compiling the experiences of the donor countries. With regard toaid coordination, the High Level Meeting in 1983 examined ways for raising aid effectiveness throughimprovement of aid coordination for each recipient country, and at the 1986 meeting, the guiding principles for Aid for Improved Development Policies and Programmes and Implications for Aid Coordination were adopted. Report on Development Cooperation in the 1990s, a policy statement released in
1989, emphasized that the promotion of aid coordination was indispensable to raise aid effectiveness.
2

Regarding the promotion of aid untying, a ministerial-level agreement was reached in 1985, guiding
principles were adopted in 1987, and it was agreed to further strengthen discipline in 1992. A recommendation on completely untying aid to the least developed countries was adopted in 2001.
Regarding development ideals and goals, women, the environment and participation were raised asimportant themes. In 1981, a review was conducted on the role of women in development, and it was
decided to make this a focal point in the review of aid policies and actual performance of DAC member
countries, and in statistical reporting. A group formed for this theme drafted the Guiding Principles to
Aid Agencies for Supporting the Role of Women in Development, which were adopted at the 1983 HighLevel Meeting, and an expanded version of the principles and guidelines was adopted in 1989. The HighLevel Meeting of 1995 issued an important policy statement concerning gender equality, and in 1998, theGuidelines for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development Co-operation were adopted. Meanwhile, an environmental focus and sustainable development were positioned as central challenges for development cooperation in the 1990s, and a working group was established in 1989. At the1990 High Level Meeting, discussions were pursued on the interrelationships among the environment,
population and development, and from 1991, a series of Guidelines on Aid and the Environment were
formulated. In 2001, the Guidelines on Strategies for Sustainable Development, and in 2002, theGuidelines on Integrating the Rio Conventions (the 27 principles agreed to at the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development) into Development Co-operation were adopted. With
regard to participatory development and good governance, the Policy Statement on Development Cooperation in the 1990s, released in 1989, called for promotion of participation in both economic and political domains, and at the 1990 High Level Meeting, discussions were conducted on the role of aid inachieving development with broad participation. In 1992, based on discussions and reviews of donor
country policies and performances, agreement was reached on the formulation of a common frame ofreference for cooperation in the area of participatory development and good governance, including not
only basic principles such as democracy and human rights, but also matters such as military expendituresand corruption. After further study, the DAC adopted the Guidelines for Participatory Development andGood Governance in 1995.
The above is a somewhat detailed summary of DAC policies and its trajectory of activities from the
1960s to the early 2000s; the reason being that the DAC was the forum where Japan was constantly subject to peer pressure with regard to the trends of international aid. Be it financial or operational aspects
such as concessionality and untying aid, the aspects of ideals or objectives such as gender equality andparticipation, or even the aspect of distribution of aid such as the focus on Africa, a large part of the newdevelopments in Japan’s development assistance was introduced as Japan gradually softened its initial
discomfort and antipathy and became steadily swayed by the increasingly clear direction of discussions
at the DAC. However, among issues on the operational aspects, no meaningful changes were seen on thethemes of aid effectiveness, aid evaluation or aid coordination. It may be surmised that the Guidelines
and the strong inertia for maintaining the status quo and disrespecting expert capabilities—characteristicfeatures of Japan’s official aid administration—were especially binding and constraining factors preventing changes on these matters. These factors will again be taken up in the following section.

2. Trends emerging from Washington and Japan’s response3
From the mid-1980s to the end of the 1990s, Japan’s aid circles were directly confronted by the trends(ground-shaking at times) emerging from Washington, and were pressed to respond. In the process,there were also very interesting episodes of Japan’s attempts to fight back. Around 1980, conservative
administrations were born both in the United States and the United Kingdom that adhered to the3ideologies of liberalization and market focus, ousting Keynesianism and planning orientation from economic policies. The impacts were strongly reflected in international aid institutions, particularly thepolicies of the World Bank. This was concretized most markedly in practice in the policy conditionalityof structural adjustment lending (SAL).
At that time, the “adjustment” in the World Bank’s operational term “structural adjustment” meant,above all, “adjustment of external balance of payments.” As causes of difficulties in external balance of
payments, attention was directed not only to changes in the international economic climate, but also topast inappropriateness in economic management, with the latter being considered as the key focus ofpolicy and institutional reform for structural adjustment in developing countries. It was anticipated thatSAL would serve an important role, since it was thought that there was large possibility for policy andinstitutional reforms and their effects throughout the economy as a whole. This view was thought to beparticularly applicable to the middle-income countries where state-led import-substituting industrialization had generated large distortions in policies and institutions.
In the view of the World Bank, the structural adjustment plans for many countries had a common
challenge to address, since the economies of many of the developing countries showed common distortions. The distortions in the economy that required structural adjustment were largely divided into thefollowing two types. First, the size of the public sector was excessively large compared to the private
sector, and a great deal of inefficiencies were seen in the operations of the public sector. Second, the various restrictions placed by the government on private sector activities obstructed the market mechanismand generated inefficiencies in resource mobilization and allocation. Based on this basic recognition,
structural adjustment plans were formulated and implemented throughout the economy under the basic
policy of focusing on private sector initiatives and the market.
The trend for liberalization and pro-market focus, which emerged from Washington, presented aserious situation for Japan’s aid circles, particularly the international financial bureau of the Ministry of
Finance, which was responsible for relations with the World Bank. The scope of the trend was not limited
to restricting the implementation of individual aid projects.
The clearest conflict between the World Bank and Japan broke out in 1984 over the liberalization of
the financial sector.4 A letter was sent under the name of the senior vice president of the World Bank to
the president of the OECF, urging a reconsideration of the operation of the ASEAN-Japan-Development
Fund, a two-step loan under the jurisdiction of the OECF, because it was providing loans at preferential
interest rates for specific purposes. The reason for this was that it generated new distortions in financial
markets and thus went against financial sector reforms in the Philippines implemented with the assistance of the World Bank and IMF. The World Bank executive director from Japan made a strong protest
against this, and in Tokyo, the international financial bureau of the Ministry of Finance and the OECF
began to formulate countermeasures. One of these was the preparation of a paper presenting Japan’sviews, to be distributed at the 1991 World Bank-IMF Annual Meeting. Another was the initiation of an
exploration for ways to direct the attention of the World Bank to the development experiences of Japanand East Asia. The outcome of the first countermeasure was the October 1991 release of a paper titled,
Issues Related to the World Bank’s Approach to Structural Adjustment: Proposal from a Major Partner,
which was distributed at the World Bank-IMF Annual Meeting. The outcome of the second countermeasure was an agreement by the World Bank for implementation of a study on the development experiencesof Japan and East Asia. Japan shouldered the 1.2-million dollar cost for implementing the study, and at
the Board of Executive Directors, withdrew its opposition to the financial sector Operational Directive of
the World Bank, which focused on the promotion of deregulation.
The above-mentioned OECF paper was a concise and straightforward statement of the philosophy
4and policy behind Japan’s development aid. In it, views were expressed on the following five points.5
1.	In order to realize sustainable growth, it is beneficial to promote investment in priority areas
by employing tax concessions and state-led financing.
2.	Promotion of industry should be considered from the perspective of long-term economic
development; hasty opening of the markets could have negative effects.
3.	The financial sector of developing countries is underdeveloped, and the market mechanism
is incomplete, with this making policy intervention, including preferential interest rates,
indispensable.
4.	There are cases where developing countries lack the conditions for effectiveness of privatization, and there is the possibility that foreign companies will control core sectors of theeconomy.
5.	The principle of placing efficiency first above all should be rejected and a balance between
efficiency and fairness from the viewpoint of social welfare should be pursued.
It appears that a fundamental difference in the conceptualization of economy and development wasat the root of the conflict between the development policies of the World Bank and Japan.6
The World Bank’s policy thinking, informed by neoclassical economics, places importance on efficiency of resource allocation and thus focuses on the “framework” of incentive systems. In contrast, theJapanese view the economy as a collection of tangible “ingredients,” such as machinery, human resources,
and infrastructure, with economic development considered as a process to expand and improve them. In
the “framework” approach, it is argued that the level of various economic activities should be determinedin line with the incentive system, and that policy intervention gives rise to distortions and inefficiencies.
Contrarily, in the “ingredients” approach, economic development is viewed as a process of realizing thegovernment’s future vision for economy by means of the implementation of policy measures.7
Regarding the above-mentioned second countermeasure that was realized, the outcome of one anda half years of research conducted by the World Bank was released as The East Asian Miracle at the
September 1993 Annual Meeting. This publication included some new developments in studies on official development from an academic perspective, but it was basically a political document that served asa point of compromise to mitigate the conflict between the World Bank and Japan. The views presented
in it fundamentally reconfirmed the basic policies of the World Bank, but it also recognized that there
could exist positive effects of state-led financing under certain conditions, and thus provided the Japaneseside (Ministry of Finance) with some satisfaction. This marked the beginning of the end to the ideological conflict. In Japan, during the Ryutaro Hashimoto administration in the second half of the 1990s, theMinistry of Finance led market-oriented deregulation that urged a break with the development-centeredsystem under the slogan of “creating a socioeconomic system that anticipates global trends.” With regard
to policies for developing countries, on the occasion of the World Trade Organization (WTO) coming
into effect in 1996, Japan (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) started to prioritize the promotion of business interests of Japanese companies through trade and investment, and criticized the industrial policies of developing countries that conflicted with this policy. And within the World Bank as
well, based on reconsiderations that conditionality was not being observed, initiatives were launched tosearch for more flexible policies befitting the circumstances of the recipient countries.
When the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 struck East Asia, the World Bank came out with a viewthat structural reforms centering on the restructuring of the financial and corporate sectors were crucial
for recovery and renewed development. It proposed and promoted the establishment of financial andcorporate governance framework and the strengthening of the management capabilities of the public
sector as necessary conditions for recovery and sustainability of growth, and it engaged in these issues
5through a series of SALs and technical assistance projects.8 What was particularly important here was theestablishment of a “framework” for financial and corporate governance. This included, among others,
strengthening regulation and supervision, monitoring management, improving information disclosureand accounting practices, and protecting investors. These reform measures can be characterized from thefollowing two perspectives. First, they included the promotion of opening markets to foreign financial
institutions and multinational enterprises and freeing investment regulations, emphasizing institutional
reforms that went beyond emergency response (reopening of foreign capital inflow). Second, they conceived a reform of the overall governance system, covering the corporate, financial and government
sectors, for the abolishment of the existing interrelationships and collusion among them and the realization of high transparency, adequate regulations and supervision, and market discipline. In response tothis new trend from Washington, Japan did not present any criticisms or counterproposals beyond an
expression of concern with regard to overly short-term capital movement.

3. Trends from Europe and Japan’s response9
From the latter half of the 1990s, policies emerging from Europe focusing on reduction of poverty andsocial participation became mainstream in the international development community. Moreover, with
the World Bank and IMF taking on a poverty-focused policy under pressure from the European countries, extremely strong influences came to be exerted by this trend. Reduction of poverty (rather thaneconomic growth) was put forward as the overarching purpose of development assistance, and was pursued on all fronts. Through a resolution at the special session of the UN General Assembly, the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) for the reduction of poverty were officially adopted as the goals of the international community as a whole. In the implementation of aid, important developments were the introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) scheme by the World Bank and IMF, andactions taken at the DAC to improve aid effectiveness and establish a system for aid coordination. In bothof these developments, Japan played only a side role, hardly visible on stage.10
As a new approach for managing the implementation of financial aid within the PRSP scheme, theWorld Bank and IMF called for “country ownership,” as a replacement for conditionality, and the institutionalization of broad participation by all levels of society in the domestic policy discussion and formulation process. The fact that the World Bank and IMF—international organizations with money andpower—presented poverty reduction as the most crucial challenge to address and came out with a joint
policy, meant that recipient countries were presented with procedural conditions that were inescapable inorder to receive financial aid. Under the PRSP scheme, the roles of the European countries in the practiceof aid coordination also increased. With the ideational orientation toward cooperation to achieve “common
objectives and goals,” the framework for coordination was a “sector-wide approach” (joint or collaborative
actions taken in each sector, such as public health or education), and many countries opted for financing
mechanisms suited for that approach, such as sector programs or common funds (pooled financial aid
scheme established for individual sectors) and general budget support. In other words, large restrictions
were placed on the traditional modality of individual donors providing assistance for specific projects.
Under such circumstances, Japan was confronted with extremely difficult problems concerning
local participation in aid coordination. In addition to lacking appropriate aid modality for funding, thiswas due to significant weakness in human resources and institutions to handle local activities.11 Following
this initial bewilderment and some makeshift responses, however, with a confirmation that the traditional approach would also continue in effect, it appears that Japan’s attitude toward (European-led) aid
coordination returned to its original state of low interest.
The MDGs, unlike many preceding UN resolutions, did not stop at just being a declaration, but
6came to exert tangible effects. There were many factors behind this. First, the United Nations itself madesystematic efforts for its realization. In July 2002, the Millennium Project was launched, and in January
2005, the project’s report was submitted to the secretary-general of the United Nations. In addition, theMillennium Campaign was organized to advance initiatives by citizens of member nations to request
their governments to fulfill their responsibility for achieving the MDGs. At the 60th UN General
Assembly World Summit held in September 2005, strong determination to achieve the MDGs was reconfirmed, and an appeal was made for the developed nations to increase their aid. Second, the UK
Department for International Development (DFID), the World Bank, and other important aid institutions officially positioned the achievement of the MDGs as their institutions’ goal for aid. Third, the international civil society campaigns to eradicate poverty focused on achievement of the MDGs. Amidsuch diverse developments, global public opinion rose to the point where each of the national governments had to recognize that they will shoulder the responsibility for achieving the MDGs.
Developments for achievement of the MDGs within the international aid community were rapid andsystematic. In March 2002, the United Nations held the International Conference on Financing forDevelopment, and the outcomes were compiled as the Monterrey Consensus. In this conference and theagreement on development aid, both increase in financing and enhancement of aid effectiveness werecalled for in order to achieve the MDGs. In relation to the latter, the challenges to be addressed included:
untying aid, presenting multi-year plans for donor assistance, respect for partner country policies and administrative principles, and harmonization of aid procedures between donor institutions. Support was expressed for the Monterrey Consensus and the MDGs in the Chair’s Summary of the Group of Eight (G8)
Summit held in June 2003, giving it international political weight that went beyond a mere UN resolution.
In the Rome Declaration of February 2003, the representatives of donor countries and multilateraldevelopment finance institutions set forth a joint policy on the harmonization of aid procedures as partof initiatives to improve aid effectiveness for realization of the MDGs and Monterrey Consensus. Thiswas based on the recognition that the practice of each aid institution implementing aid without coordinating with each other and without consideration of the administrative burdens on the recipient country
was undermining aid effectiveness. The declaration gave support to work for the formulation of standards and principles for “good practices,” which had been advanced by the OECD-DAC and international development finance institutions, and agreement was also reached on monitoring the progress on
individual articles of the declaration. For developing countries, implementation of harmonization was
encouraged, and it was agreed that the donors would support this and report on their progress.
From the end of February to the beginning of March 2005, the High Level Forum on Aid Effectivenesswas held in Paris co-sponsored by the OECD-DAC and multilateral development finance institutions,with the participation of government representatives from the donor and recipient countries (now called
partner countries). This was held with the aim to compile concrete measures for the improvement of aid
effectiveness and to obtain official commitment to this on high levels, including political levels. The results were adopted as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which was made up of three parts: (1)Statement of Resolve, (2) Partnership Commitments, and (3) Indicators of Progress. The Declaration
marked clear advancements in the aspects of principles, actions, and monitoring of progress for better
aid effectiveness. The main outcomes can be summarized as follows:
1.	Contents of the Paris Declaration: In addition to reconfirming “ownership” (the partnercountry decides on the policy for aid received from the donor), “alignment” (the donor country respects the policy and institution of the partner country), and “harmonisation” (thedonors adopt common conditions and procedures), which were matters that had been agreed
to since the Rome Declaration, new agreements on “mutual accountability,” “managing
7

development results,” “capacity development,” and “enhancing effectiveness of aid in fragile
states” were also made.
2.	Action plan: In the Partnership Commitments, the commitments of both the partner countries and the donors were listed for “ownership,” “alignment,” “harmonisation,” “managing forresults,” and “mutual accountability.”
3.	Mechanisms for monitoring progress: Twelve indicators were established in accordance withthe above Partnership Commitments
Just as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) laid down the goals for aid for the international
community as a whole, the Paris Declaration stipulated the policy for engagement by the internationalsociety as a whole in increasing aid effectiveness. And, in both cases, follow-up systems were prepared toachieve the goals through partnership and peer pressure. This was an important development thatmarked the formation of the “development aid regime” on a global scale. In May 2005, the OECD issued
the Statement on the Follow-up to the UN Millennium Declaration and Monterrey Consensus, and in it,
also touched upon examining both quantitatively and qualitatively the implementation of commitments
included in the Paris Declaration. As of 2007, this Declaration, with its implementation promoted mainlyby the OECD-DAC, had the participation of 111 countries (including donors and recipients), 26 international institutions, and 14 civil society organizations, and was broadly recognized as a model for enhancing aid effectiveness. In 2008, high-level follow-up meetings were held for the Millennium Development
Goals, the Monterrey Agreement, and Paris Declaration, respectively.
Throughout such European-led developments, Japan failed to develop a sense of responsible party
and its role was nothing more than an onlooker. The reaction and response of Japan (the Ministry ofForeign Affairs and Japan International Cooperation Agency [JICA]) was sluggish and obscure. It is presumed that the reasons for this were as follows. First, the Japanese government totally lacked awarenessas a responsible party in signing the resolutions of the conferences. Second, in relation with the above
point, Japan did not at all feel any individual responsibility for the goals of the UN member nations as awhole. Third, as mentioned previously, Japan was not paying proper attention to the development of thesituation noted above. Fourth, Japan did not have intellectual basis for constructive engagement because
the MDGs and subsequent resolutions were so completely different from its conception of development
and aid, which never placed importance on poverty reduction or aid coordination.
The year 2008 marked a turning point, however, with the situation beginning to divert from theoriginal scenario. At the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan in 2011, the agenda
on harmonized actions for the formation of a development aid regime based on the Paris Declaration
was, for all practical purposes, shelved. The following three can be noted as the factors that brought about
this change of course. First, the Paris Declaration, which aimed to improve aid effectiveness, expressed incomprehensive and detailed manners the desirable aid modality as an conceptual and operational system
made up of principles, agreements, goals and indicators. However, in its implementation, a large discrepancy was unavoidable between principles and actual situations, and the promotion of implementation
through review of progress was unable to produce material results. Second, as important external factors
in international politics and economy, newly emerging donors such as China and India, and the increasing weight of engagement by the private sector in international development, led to stronger criticism of
the Paris Declaration, which focused solely on the procedural and technical aspects of ODA. This gavestrength to arguments for development aid with a focus on results and a broader scope for diverse
non-traditional actors. Third, with the official recognition of the role of NGOs in international development—although their actual importance was still limited—calls were raised for expanding perspectives
to encompass all types of activities related to development, without limiting attention to official aid.
8

Reflecting these diverse factors, in the Busan Partnership Document (Busan Declaration), which
officially called for enhancing the effectiveness of aid, attention was not narrowly focused on the MDGs
or ODA, but was expanded to cover various aspects of development and all actors involved. In this document, the goal of enhancing “aid effectiveness” was replaced by “effectiveness of development co-operation,” and it newly called for establishment of the Global Partnership for Effective Development
Co-operation, which covers all development actors. Notably, it encouraged the emerging donors, which
are also developing countries, to voluntarily carry out commitments that differ from those of the traditional donors. It also called for a shift of the seat of the secretariat from the OECD-DAC to a joint organ
co-managed by the United Nations and the OECD.12
Under this new development, it is highly likely that actionable improvement measures for enhancing“aid effectiveness” will also be shelved. In fact, the increasing weight of emerging donors is expanding thefreedom of choice on the part of recipient countries, and making it difficult for traditional donors to apply
their rules. Amid such a situation surrounding development aid, the character of the aid regime in each
recipient country will most probably be determined not by external forces but by how and to what extent
calls arise within the country for enhancing aid effectiveness as part of realizing good governance.

Conclusion: Prospects and challenges for the near future13
The international development aid community is now entering a period of turbulence. The international
aid trends surrounding ODA no longer originate from factors or actors in the aid community, but havebecome a turbid current generated by all actors engaged in various aspects of development. However, thissituation is a desirable change of climate for Japan to engage actively in making international contributions. Distinct diversity is arising in the ideas and goals of development cooperation, in its character andforms, and in the actors involved as well. Moreover, amid the growing role of private capitals and resources, partnership between the public sector and private for-profit sector is becoming increasingly
important. With the rise of emerging donors, notably China, conditions have transpired for Japan tocollaborate with emerging donors and take new initiatives in development cooperation that would
counter the rules formation led by the West. Those charged with policymaking in the developing countries highly appreciate and hold large expectations toward Japan’s development cooperation, which theyrecognize has contributed to high economic development in East Asia. They have strong ambitions forthe development of infrastructure as a premise for realizing economic development through direct investments and exports, and the only countries that can answer such aspirations are Japan and China.
Holding the keys to the formation of an industrial cluster that will lead to future industrial advancement
are private corporations possessing sophisticated technologies and management capabilities. In this respect, Japan stands above China.
However, the expansion of investment and exports is only one facet of development cooperation.
Even for the purpose of attracting direct investments, it will be indispensable to have social and politicalstability, including public security, and to this end as well, it would be essential, in many cases, to containor reduce growing income inequality within the country. In the area of improving the livelihoods andlives of those at the bottom of the pyramid, there are many issues that must be addressed by ODA in
partnership with BoP business (business development targeting low-income people in developing regions, which aims to help solve social problems) and the private non-profit sector. By sharing the spiritof “omoiyari (consideration toward others)” and advancing collaborative activities based on the grassroots experiences of the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers, NGOs, and other groups, it is hopedthat Japan will convey the innate empathy of the Japanese people while improving the livelihoods andlives of people in developing countries.
9With the long-lasting economic slump and downward trend in the level of the national budget,Japan’s engagement in ODA in recent years have withered in a way that could fall under the saying, “poverty dulls the wit.” Amid the current situation in which economic revitalization is postulated as an absolute must, an approach we often see is one that benefits Japanese companies by applying tied aid to ODA
programs. This could be called, “poverty breeds greed.” What is called for is political judgment that is not
swayed by myopic business interests, to define anew what constitutes, albeit a hackneyed phrase, the“enlightened self-interest” of Japan.

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— (2014). “‘Kaihatsu Enjo Rejimu’ no Keisei to Zasetsu” [The Formation and Breakdown of the“Development Aid Regime”], in Hideyoshi Sakai, Toru Yanagihara, Akifumi Kuchiki, eds., Gendaino Kaihatsu Keizaigaku—Riron to Jissho [Modern Development Economics—Theory and Empirical
Studies]. Minerva Shobo.
DAC (2006) DAC in Dates: The History of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Führer, Helmut (1996). “The Story of Official Development Assistance,” OCDE/GD (94) 67, OECD.
OECF (1998). “Issues related to the World Bank’s approach to structural adjustment: a proposal from amajor partner,” in Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno, eds., Japanese Views on Economic Development:
Diverse Paths to the Market, Routledge.
Wade, Robert (1996). “Japan, the World Bank and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: The East Asian
Miracle in Political Perspective.” New Left Review, Vol. I, No. 217, May–June.
Yanagihara, Toru (1998). “Development and dynamic efficiency: ‘framework approach’ versus ‘ingredients approach,’” in Ohno and Ohno, eds, op. cit.

1.

Valuable literature exists regarding trends in international aid and Japan’s development assistance, including the threethemes taken up in this paper. I recommend readers who are interested in this issue to read them. These are by Yasutami
Shimomura (2011) and Takehiko Nakao (2005). Mr. Shimoura is a researcher who entered academism after working at the10

OECF. At the time of the writing, Mr. Nakao was director of general affairs in the international bureau of the Ministry of
Finance, and is currently the President of the Asian Development Bank.
2.

Führer (1996) and DAC (2006) were used as sources of information for this section.

3.

A part of this section is based on Yanagihara (2000).

4.

Some of the information here is based on Wade (1996).

5.

The contents of this document are included in OECF (1998).

6.

The themes of this section are discussed in more detail in Yanagihara (1998).

7.

From this kind of stance, Japan provided, in addition to the above-mentioned two-step loans, large-scale assistance to industrialization projects that met with opposition or criticism of the World Bank (e.g., South Korea’s Pohang steel mill project and Thailand’s eastern seaboard development).

8.

The World Bank (2000) serves as useful reference on this.

9.

A part of this section is based on Yanagihara (2014).

10. The only episode that can be considered an exception was Japan’s important role in the formulation of the New Development
Strategy (1996) in the DAC. This strategy had the characteristic of compiling the goals set forth at conferences held on
various themes by the United Nations, and marked a significant step in the process of formulating the MDGs. This fact,
however, makes all the more notable Japan’s low interest in engagement after the MDGs were established (to be explainedlater).
11. Rare exceptions within the general situation of hesitation toward aid coordination were Japan’s active participation in
Tanzania and Vietnam. For details about Tanzania, see the country aid evaluation report on Tanzania (Economic
Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hyouka/kunibetu/
gai/tanzania/kn05_01_index.html). For Vietnam, see the country aid evaluation report on Vietnam (Economic Cooperation
Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hyouka/kunibetu/gai/vietnam/
pdfs/kn06_01.pdf), as well as the evaluation report on the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Poverty Reduction Support Credits for
Vietnam (JICA, 2008, http://www2.jica.go.jp/ja/evaluation/pdf/2007_VNC8_4_f.pdf). One document reviews in a comparative manner these two rare episodes of active engagement through the use of a financing instrument of general budget
support (Tanzania PRBS and Vietnam PRSC) (Economic Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, http://
www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/hyouka/kunibetu/gai/ip_zaimu/pdfs/sk05_01_0004.pdf).
12. The sequence of events from the time of the Paris Declaration through the Busan Declaration is discussed in detail by
Takayanagi (2014).
13. Many suggestions for this section were provided by Shimomura (2014). I thank Mr. Shimomura for allowing me to cite andquote his presentation material. However, I hold sole responsibility for the content and wording of the quotation.

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