LAYING THE
FOUNDATIONS OF DPRKENERGY SECURITY:
1990-2020 Energy Balances,
Engagement Options, and Future
Paths for Energy and Economic
Redevelopment

DAVID VON HIPPELPETER HAYES
April 2021

1.

The Nautilus Institutefor Security and Sustainability

LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS OFDPRK ENERGY SECURITY:
1990-2020 ENERGY BALANCES, ENGAGEMENTOPTIONS, AND FUTURE PATHS FOR ENERGYAND ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENTREPORT PREPARED BY THE NAUTILUS
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY ANDSUSTAINABILITY
Prepared byDavid von Hippel and Peter Hayes
April 26, 2021
D. von Hippel e-mail dvonhip@igc.org;
P. Hayes e-mail: phayes@nautilus.org,

Copyright Nautilus Institute, 2003, 2007, 2012, and 2021 ©
Published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License, the terms of which
are found here.

Executive Summary
The purpose of this report is to provide policymakers and other interested parties with an
overview of the evolution of demand for and supply of energy in the Democratic Peoples’
Republic of Korea (DPRK) over the last three decades. This report provides estimates ofdemand and supply for 14 individual years during that span, namely:•

1990, just before much of the DPRK's economic and technical support from the Soviet Union
was withdrawn;•

1996, possibly when the DPRK hit its lowest economic point in the 1990s;•

2000, a year that has been perceived by some observers as a period of modest economic"recovery" in the DPRK, and just before (October 2002) the nuclear confrontation re-erupted
between the DPRK, the United States, and it neighbors in Northeast Asia over the DPRK’s
nuclear weapons development program;•

2005, when observers noted an upward trend in some aspects of the DPRK economy, as wellas the most recent year for which any published estimates on the DPRK’s energy sector andeconomy are available;•

2008 through 2010, starting with the last year in which the DPRK received heavy fuel oilfrom its negotiating partners in the Six-Party talks; and•2014-2019, recent historical years during which the DPRK economy began to grow withexpanded coal exports to China, imports of consumer goods, and adoption of some additional
aspects of a market economy, followed by several years during which the DPRK has been
under United Nations Security Council sanctions affecting its energy trading (oil imports andcoal exports) in particular, and marked by on-again, off-again interludes of engagement andconflict with the international community.

•

2020, the year of the coronavirus-19 pandemic, which has affected the economy and energy
sector of every country on the map, including the DPRK.

Building on previous energy balances prepared for 1990, 1996, 2000, and 2005, 2008 through2010, and 2014, the authors assembled information from as many data sources as possible toupdate our earlier work and to provide estimates of recent-year energy supply and demand in the
DPRK. Somewhat revised results of the 1990, and 1996 energy balances, which provide theunderpinnings of our updated DPRK energy sector analysis, as well as a detailed description of
input parameters and assumptions used in the analytical process, are presented in Chapter 2 of
the Report that follows.
The estimates of year 2000 and on energy demand and supply presented here are typicallysomewhat lower than some estimates assembled by others, including international statisticalresources and ROK estimates. The estimates described in Chapter 3 of this report include overall
year 2000 through 2020 gross electricity generation varying somewhat by year within the rangeof 13 to 18 terawatt-hours (TWh, or billion kilowatt-hours) annually, reflecting somewhat
improved electricity sector performance in some recent years. Overall coal production between
2000 and 2020 peaked in 2016 at about over 1 million terajoules (TJ), or about 35 million tonnesof coal equivalent, of which more than half was exported, almost all to China. Crude oil importsi
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKin 2020 were an estimated 750,000 tonnes, somewhat higher than in previous years, and net
refined products imports were 6.6 million GJ, or about 150,000 tonnes, a considerable decline
from previous years caused, we estimate, but the combination of United Nations Security
Council sanctions and the impacts of COVID-19. The electricity and coal output, and oil
imports, estimates for even 2019 are on the order of one third of the levels of output and importsof these fuels as of 1990, and outputs in 2020 were lower due to COVID-19 restrictions on crossborder travel and activity within the DPRK imposed by the DPRK government to try to halt (orlimit) the spread of the pandemic. The use of wood and biomass has to some extent, particularly
in households in rural areas, made up for the lack of commercial fuels, and in-country observers
and forestry experts alike note the negative impact of increased wood harvesting for energy on
the DPRK’s forest resources and, in some areas, on soil fertility.
One major refinery continues to run in the DPRK as of 2020, and likely operated at a higher rate
than in 2000 or through most of the 2010s, but at a lower level even than in 1996. A minor
refinery also apparently operated periodically in 2000, and we assume that has continued to do sothrough 2020, though we have no direct recent evidence regarding this facility. Much of theelectricity generation infrastructure in the DPRK continues to be in poor condition, though somerehabilitation of power plants has apparently taken place, thus our estimate is that thermal andhydroelectric power plant operable capacity (and output) are slightly higher than in 2000.
Hydroelectric plants continue to be in somewhat better condition than thermal power plants, but
remain at the mercy of water availability, and thus operate with relatively low capacity factors.
Coal mines continue to be plagued with equipment and transport problems and, mostimportantly, by lack of electricity to operate mining machinery, lights, air supply, water pumps,
and other crucial infrastructure, though selected coal mines have been upgraded in the 2010s to
produce coal for export to China. The coal seams currently mined in many locations are
becoming lower-yielding, or yield coal of lower quality, as the better deposits are mined and new
seams are not opened up. In addition, many coal galleries are reportedly flooded—and may insome cases take years to pump out.
Industrial output is estimated to have declined, even by 2019 (with further declines in 2020), to 9
to 60 percent of 1990 levels, varying substantially by subsector—with export-oriented subsectors
such as mining and metals showing the greatest activity relative to 1990 levels. As aconsequence of this decline, the share of overall energy demand contributed by the industrial
sector is now second to that of the residential sector, as shown in figure ES-1, though residential
demand continues to include a substantial amount of wood and other biomass estimated to be
used as "substitute" fuels in the absence of sufficient or consistent supplies of coal andelectricity.

ii
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure ES-1:
ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR: 2019
NON-ENERGY

8NON-SPECIFIED-

PUBLIC/COMML

37

MILITARY

46

FISHERIES

1AGRICULTURAL

24

RESIDENTIAL

269

TRANSPORT

14

INDUSTRIAL

173

-

50

100

150

200

250

300

PJ ENERGY DEMAND

In Chapters 4 and 7 of this report, we review what is known about the DPRK’s natural resource
base, with Chapter 4 focusing on fossil fuels and renewable resources including forests, andChapter 7 providing more detail on other minerals, including existing mining infrastucture andinstitutions in the DPRK, along with a summary of some of the key challenges facing theminerals sector. The resources described in these Chapters, plus the productive capacity of theNorth Korean people, provides the base on which future economic and energy development in
the DPRK will be built, and must be considered in any plan for DPRK energy sector assistance.
Chapter 4 also provides updated results of our illustrative analysis of the “energy efficiency”
resource in the DPRK, in which we estimate the potential cost and resource savings from theapplication of several key energy efficiency options for the DPRK energy demand and supply
sectors. Chapters 5 and 6 of this report present, respectively, additional detail on the electricity
and refined products supply sectors, including a review of resources available for use ingenerating power, and existing infrastructure, and oil refining infrastructure and oil productsupply and demand.
Chapter 8 presents sketches and analysis of several future pathways for the DPRK economy andenergy sector, including a "Redevelopment" pathway, and describes some of the preconditions
for and impacts on the energy sector of different paths—including the relative costs and benefitsof different DPRK energy futures, as well as their relative impacts on the DPRK’s energy
security. Also described in Chapter 8 is a list of institutional changes—ranging from training toestablishment of energy pricing practices to strengthening of regulatory agencies to setting out
clear and consistent rules for commerce with foreign companies—that the DPRK should adopt
and be assisted with in order to work toward rebuilding its energy sector.
Following on from the quantitative exploration of different DPRK energy futures in Chapter 8, in
Chapter 9 we address the implications of a possible collapse of the DPRK’s government
Although we continue to emphasize that in our view, even as the DPRK transitions to a newiii
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

young leader, such a collapse is not likely, considering the possible implications of such a
collapse provides insights into which policies by the international community are likely to be
helpful in any kind of DPRK transition, whether abrupt or gradual and managed.
Chapter 10 provides suggestions on a number of areas for international cooperation, including
providing technical and institutional assistance in implementing energy efficiency measures,promoting better understanding of the North Korean situation in the ROK, working to open
opportunities for independent power companies to work in the DPRK, and cooperation ontechnology transfer for energy efficiency and renewable energy. Key and attractive energy
sector technologies and processes for energy sector redevelopment in the DPRK are identified,including rebuilding of the electricity transmission and distribution system, rehabilitation of
power plants and other coal-using infrastructure, rehabilitation of coal supply and coal transportsystems, development of alternative sources of small-scale energy and implementation ofenergy-efficiency measures, rehabilitation of rural infrastructure, advanced investigation ofregional electricity grid interconnections, and gas supply and demand infrastructuredevelopment. Referring to another recent report by the authors, Chapter 10 also includes a brief
description of a potential cooperative threat reduction “plus” approach led by a nongovernmental consortium of international actors and focused on building energy efficiency,
renewable energy, and microgrid measures, all of which DPRK representatives have consistently
shown a keen interest in. Also discussed, in response to the DPRK’s announcement of its
construction and operation of a uranium enrichment facility and ongoing construction of a small
experimental light water nuclear reactor, are possibilities for international cooperation with the
DPRK on peaceful activities in the nuclear energy arena.
This document is intended to provide a best estimate, given available data, of an internallyconsistent energy supply/demand balance for the DPRK for the most recent year that our analysis
covers, 2020, as well as balances for previous years prepared with similar methodologies. In sodoing, we have tried to assemble what is known, and assess what is not known, about the DPRK
energy sector. As with previous reports, this analysis is intended to be revised as more and betterdata are available, and the authors welcome reader comments and input on the material presented
here. For example, much of the analysis for energy supply and demand in the DPRK for the year
2020 presented here was prepared before 2020 was over, and given recent news reports (still
almost all anecdotal) of energy shortages in the DPRK during 2020, we would say that ourestimates of energy use, and particularly electricity use, might in fact be a bit higher than actual
values in 2020, to the extent that they could or can be known.
As this report is being finalized, a new administration in Washington D.C is just entering its
second month in office. How the administration of President Biden will approach the possibilityof discussions with Chairman Kim Jong Un’s regime on the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programand other issues is not yet fully evident, although President Biden seems likely to take a much
more collaborative approach, at least with regard to coordination with the Republic of Korea andJapan than did his predecessor. Ultimately, however, the DPRK, the United States, and the
DPRK’s neighbors, and other parties will need to return to the bargaining table, and at that point,
as in past negotiations, provision of energy security will continue to be a critical element of a
successful and robust resolution to the nuclear confrontation between the DPRK and theinternational community.

iv
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKForeword
As this Report is released, prospects for engagement of the international community with the
DPRK on its nuclear weapons program and a variety of related issues seem indeterminate. This
state of affairs has not been unusual over the past 30 years, with opportunities for diplomacy
waxing and waning as leadership of the countries involved changed, as the DPRK’s rhetoric
toward the ROK and the US, in particular, has oscillated from strident to conciliatory and back(often with matching rhetoric on the other side), as conditions inside the DPRK have changed,
and as politicians in all of the countries involved have adjusted their approaches to engagement
to, in part, address domestic political needs. Still, a new administration in Washington, an ROK
administration with a generally favorable attitude to engagement, and signals from the DPRK
that, while decidedly mixed, appear to offer hope for at least sitting down for discussions,suggest that there may be an opportunity for progress in addressing concerns related to the
DPRK. Given the deep reservoir of distrust that has built up between the DPRK and those who
would seek to engage it in discussions, any such engagement must be considered a long-term
effort, one in which any given day, month, or even year may see steps back, but in which steadyprogress must be the goal.
Since the early 1990s, we have contended that one of the core (though not only) reasons that the
DPRK has pursued development of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems has beenenergy insecurity—namely the lack of adequate fuel supplies and energy conversion systems—
particularly electricity generation systems—to support a reasonable rate of economic
development. Starting with the publication, in 1995, of our first report related to analysis of the
DPRK energy sector, and its prospects for evolution in the future, we have worked to provide
those who study the DPRK, and particularly those whose jobs are to figure out ways to engage
the DPRK, with analysis of what is known, what can be inferred or estimated, and what isn’t
known about the DPRK energy sector, because we see an understanding of the DPRK’s energy
systems and energy needs as crucial for the international community to be able to develop
meaningful energy sector engagement with the DPRK. And, as shown in many of theagreements forged (if later abandoned) with the DPRK over the years, energy sector measures
are crucial to providing the DPRK with incentives to engage.
The cover of this report is a composite of two different images. The grid of red text and lines
represents an estimated “energy balance”—a common tabular representation of the supply anddemand of the different forms of energy used in an economy—for the DPRK, in this case, for theyear 1996. Energy balances like this one summarize where an economy has been, with regard toenergy supply and demand, where it is currently, and where it might be going (balances for
future years). The underlying image, showing a nuclear power plant and other infrastructure of
the modern age, shows the DPRK’s vision of where it saw its energy sector and broader
economy going, at least as of 2009. This image (provided below) was presented by a cast of
many thousands of North Koreans in a large stadium in Pyongyang at the fall “Arirang” festival
in late September, witnessed in person by one of us (von Hippel). It represents a message
relaying the country’s leadership’s aspirations to the international audience in attendance and,just as crucially, to the DPRK people. As such, it represents a marker for what the DPRK may
most value out of any engagement with the international community, and should be taken into
account by those in the US, ROK, and elsewhere who are working to prepare diplomatic
initiatives to engage the DPRK. –David von Hippel and Peter Hayesv
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKPhoto of performance at “Arirang” festival in Pyongyang, September 2009. The backgroundimage of a nuclear reactor and other technologies is composed of cards held up by thousands of
DPRK performers seated in the steeply-pitched area on the other side of the stadium from where
the photo was taken. Photo by D. von Hippel.

vi
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKAcknowledgments
The authors acknowledge the financial support of the MacArthur Foundation for the preparationof this report as a part of Nautilus Institute’s 2018-2020 Regional Energy Security (RES) project,
as well as the support of the United States Department of Energy, the Korea Energy Economics
Institute (KEEI), the Korea Foundation, the Ploughshares Foundation, the MacArthur
Foundation, the Iara Lee and George Gund III Foundation, and the New Land Foundation, whichhave funded earlier, recent, and in some cases current Nautilus research efforts related to the
DPRK, and the Korean Institute for Energy Research and the Korea Development Cooperation
Institute, which previously funded work related to this study. We would also gratefully
acknowledge the many colleagues who have provided their time and invaluable insights to assist
us and guide us in the preparation of this analysis, including the participants in the 2006 and2008 DPRK Energy Experts Working Group (EEWG) Meeting and the 2010 Energy andMinerals Experts Working Group Meeting. Some of those colleagues’ names and work are citedin the pages that follow, but there are many who are not cited but who have made key
contributions nonetheless. We are indebted to the Preventive Defense Project for their support ofthe 2006 DPRK EEWG Meeting, which was held at Stanford University: see
https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting, and to KEEI for co-sponsoring
the 2010 Meeting; see http://www.nautilus.org/projects/dprk-energy/dprk-energy-and-mineralsworking-group-2010/dprk-energy-and-minerals-working-group-meeting.
We would also like to acknowledge the input of Nautilus colleagues past and present in the
research that underlies this report. Ms. Lea Prince, Dr. Jungmin Kang, and Ms. Eun Kyung Park
helped to assemble data used in earlier versions of this report, and Mr. Tim Savage provided
materials for and was involved in the preparation of earlier versions of this Report. Ms. Joan
Diamond was instrumental in organizing and facilitating workshops that hosted DPRK
delegations and informed our DPRK analysis work. Mr. Steve Freedkin provided relevant news
articles and ably administered the Nautilus Regional Energy Security project as a whole.
Thanks also to Mr. Roger Cavazos, for a review of an earlier version of this Report, to Mr. LiamTasa, who assisted with research on oil storage in the DPRK and helped to assemble theworkpapers volumes attached to this report, and Ms. Sophia Mauro, who prepared the cover art
for this volume. We also thank the many DPRK experts and counterparts in our regional energy,
regional grid, and in-DPRK training projects, including our colleagues from the DPRK, for theirassistance and guidance on country-specific energy matters that are analyzed in this report.
Finally, our special thanks go to our Korean colleagues at KEEI and in many other institutions in
the Republic of Korea for their continuing support and friendship through more than 25 years ofcollaboration.
As always, any errors of fact or analysis in this report are by the authors, not those with whom
we have been fortunate to work with over the previous twenty-plus years of energy andenvironmental engagement and cooperation with the DPRK.

vii
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... I
FOREWORD................................................................................................................................ V
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................... VII
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ VIIITABLE OF FIGURES............................................................................................................. XVITABLE OF TABLES............................................................................................................ XXIIIACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................. XXVI
1.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND: THE DPRK ENERGY SECTOR .......... 1
1.1. PURPOSE AND GOAL OF REPORT ...................................................................................... 1
1.2. SUMMARY AND HISTORY OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE DPRK .......... 3
1.2.1. Brief history of the evolution of the DPRK economy following WWII, andstatus as of 1990.......................................................................................................... 4
1.2.2. Changes in the DPRK since 1990 ............................................................................... 8
1.2.3. Impacts of flooding and food shortages .................................................................... 12
1.2.4. Past and current international relations and potential impacts on the DPRK
economy: negotiations, food aid, and the Agreed Framework ................................. 14
1.2.5. The DPRK Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic.................................................... 17
1.3. SUMMARY OF THE OVERALL ENERGY SITUATION IN THE DPRK ................................... 19
1.3.1. Energy demand—sectors, fuels, and problems ......................................................... 19
1.3.2. Energy supply—resources, technologies and processes ........................................... 21
1.3.3. Summary of electricity demand and supply .............................................................. 21
1.4. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND ............................................ 22
1.4.1. Summary of environmental problems in the DPRK, including those associatedwith energy use ......................................................................................................... 22
1.4.2. The impact of the 1995/1996 floods and the food crisis ........................................... 23
1.4.3. DPRK agricultural conditions and food situation since 1996 .................................. 24
1.4.4. The DPRK social and political system, and its influence on the energy andelectricity sector ........................................................................................................ 25
1.4.5. The “Agreed Framework” and KEDO ..................................................................... 27
1.5. GUIDE TO REMAINDER OF REPORT ................................................................................ 28

2.

ESTIMATED 1990 AND 1996 SUPPLY/DEMAND ENERGY BALANCES .......... 31
2.1. GOALS AND APPROACH IN PREPARING 1990 AND 1996 SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCE ....... 31
2.1.1. Study approach ......................................................................................................... 34
2.2. SUMMARY OF METHODS AND DATA USED TO ESTIMATE 1990 AND 1996 DEMAND
FOR ENERGY .................................................................................................................. 37
2.2.1. The industrial sector in 1990 .................................................................................... 37
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2.2.2. Changes in industrial output for 1996 ...................................................................... 43
2.2.3. Transport sector ........................................................................................................ 44
2.2.4. Transport sector activity changes for 1996 .............................................................. 47
2.2.5. The residential sector in 1990................................................................................... 48
2.2.6. Residential sector changes by 1996 .......................................................................... 49
2.2.7. The agricultural and fisheries sectors in 1990 ......................................................... 50
2.2.8. Changes in the agricultural and fisheries sectors as of 1996 ................................... 51
2.2.9. Public and Commercial sectors ................................................................................ 52
2.2.10. Commercial/Public/Institutional sector changes by 1996 ........................................ 52
2.2.11. The military sector in 1990 ....................................................................................... 52
2.2.12. Changes in military fuel use by 1996 ........................................................................ 56
2.2.13. Non-Specified/Other sectors ..................................................................................... 57
2.2.14. Non-energy use ......................................................................................................... 57
2.3. SUMMARY OF INFORMATION ON ENERGY SUPPLY IN THE DPRK AS OF 1990 AND
1996 .............................................................................................................................. 57
2.3.1. Energy resources ...................................................................................................... 57
2.3.2. Coal resources in 1990 and 1996 ............................................................................. 57
2.3.3. Petroleum .................................................................................................................. 59
2.3.4. Wood and biomass .................................................................................................... 61
2.4. TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES IN 1990 AND 1996 ......................................................... 62
2.4.1. Electricity generation in the DPRK, 1990 and 1996 ................................................ 63
2.4.1.1. Total electricity generated and losses, and district heat production, in 1990 ................... 63
2.4.1.2. Detail of existing thermal generating facilities ................................................................. 64
2.4.1.3. Detail of existing hydroelectric facilities .......................................................................... 68
2.4.1.4. Status of the Transmission and Distribution Network ...................................................... 71

2.4.2. Petroleum refining .................................................................................................... 84
2.4.3. Coal production and preparation ............................................................................. 88
2.4.4. Charcoal production ................................................................................................. 90
2.5. DESCRIPTION OF KEY RESULTS AND UNCERTAINTIES IN 1990 AND 1996
SUPPLY/DEMAND BALANCES .......................................................................................... 90
2.5.1. Energy Balances for 1990 and 1996 ......................................................................... 90
2.5.2. Energy supply, including exports and imports ......................................................... 97
2.5.3. Energy transformation results .................................................................................. 99
2.5.4. Energy demand in 1990 and 1996 .......................................................................... 100
2.5.5. Key uncertainties in 1990 and 1996 energy balances: Energy demand ................. 117
2.5.6. Summary of key data gaps and uncertainties: DPRK energy supply in 1990 ........ 119
2.5.7. Summary of key data gaps: DPRK energy transformation in 1990........................ 119
2.5.8. Key uncertainties in 1996 energy data ................................................................... 121
3.

ESTIMATED 2000, 2005, 2008 THROUGH 2010, 2014 THROUGH 2020
SUPPLY/DEMAND ENERGY BALANCES ............................................................. 124
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.

OVERALL APPROACH ................................................................................................... 124
SUMMARY OF KEY CHANGES IN THE DPRK ENERGY SECTOR BETWEEN 1996 AND
2000 ............................................................................................................................ 125
SUMMARY OF KEY CHANGES IN THE DPRK ENERGY SECTOR BETWEEN 2000 AND
2005 ............................................................................................................................ 130
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3.4.

SUMMARY OF KEY CHANGES IN THE DPRK ENERGY SECTOR FROM 2005
THROUGH 2009 ............................................................................................................ 131
3.5. SUMMARY OF KEY CHANGES IN THE DPRK ENERGY SECTOR FROM 2010
THROUGH 2019 ............................................................................................................ 133
3.6. THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON THE DPRK ENERGY SECTOR IN 2020 ......................... 135
3.6.1. Assumed DPRK Responses to Coronavirus Pandemic ........................................... 136
3.6.2. A Scenario for Drivers of 2020 Energy Supply and Demand in the DPRK ........... 137
3.7. KEY INPUT PARAMETERS, SOURCES, ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODS USED IN
ESTIMATING ENERGY SUPPLY-DEMAND BALANCES FOR 2000, 2005, 2008
THROUGH 2010, AND 2014 THROUGH 2020 .................................................................. 140
3.7.1. Industrial sector activity ......................................................................................... 140
3.7.2. Transport sector activity ......................................................................................... 143
3.7.3. Parameters of residential energy use in 2000-2009 ............................................... 146
3.7.4. Estimates of energy use parameters for the Agricultural and Fisheries sectors .... 149
3.7.5. Public/Commercial sector parameters ................................................................... 155
3.7.6. Military energy use parameters in 2000 through 2020 .......................................... 155
3.7.7. Non-specified and non-energy commodities demand ............................................. 159
3.7.8. Energy resources, imports, and exports.................................................................. 160
3.7.9. Data and assumptions regarding energy transformation processes in 2000,
2005, 2008, and 2009.............................................................................................. 165
3.8. PRESENTATION OF ESTIMATED YEAR 2000, 2005, 2008 THROUGH 2010, AND 2014
THROUGH 2020 DPRK ENERGY BALANCES, AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS ................ 168
4.

THE DPRK’S ENERGY RESOURCES FOR FUELINGREDEVELOPMENT.................................................................................................... 189
4.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 189
4.2. FOSSIL FUELS .............................................................................................................. 189
4.2.1. Coal ......................................................................................................................... 189
4.2.2. Oil and Gas ............................................................................................................. 192
4.3. WOOD AND OTHER BIOMASS ....................................................................................... 197
4.3.1. Forest area and forest types.................................................................................... 198
4.3.2. Wood stocks ............................................................................................................ 202
4.3.3. The DPRK wood resource over time....................................................................... 202
4.3.4. Other biomass ......................................................................................................... 208
4.4. OTHER RENEWABLE RESOURCES ................................................................................. 209
4.5. ENERGY EFFICIENCY ................................................................................................... 213
4.5.1. Analytical Approach ............................................................................................... 214
4.5.2. Overall Results for Energy Efficiency Measures Evaluated ................................... 215

5.

DPRK ELECTRICITY SUPPLY, DEMAND, AND OPTIONS .............................. 232
5.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 232
5.1.1. Overview of North Korean Electricity Policies ...................................................... 233
5.1.2. Overview of Power Supply Infrastructure in the DPRK ......................................... 238
5.1.3. Electricity Industry Challenges in North Korea ..................................................... 241
5.1.4. Guide to the Remainder of this Chapter ................................................................. 242
5.2. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IN THE DPRK ............................................................................ 243
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5.2.1. Introduction............................................................................................................. 243
5.2.2. Resources for Electricity Generation ...................................................................... 244
5.2.2.1. Coal Resources ............................................................................................................... 244
5.2.2.2. Oil and Gas Resources .................................................................................................... 245
5.2.2.3. Biomass Resources ......................................................................................................... 246
5.2.2.4. Hydraulic Resources ....................................................................................................... 246
5.2.2.5. Geothermal Resources .................................................................................................... 246
5.2.2.6. Wind Energy Resources.................................................................................................. 247
5.2.2.7. Solar Energy Resources .................................................................................................. 248
5.2.2.8. Tidal Power Resources ................................................................................................... 249
5.2.2.9. Uranium Resources ......................................................................................................... 250

5.2.3. Electricity Generation Infrastructure in the DPRK ................................................ 252
5.2.3.1. Existing Thermal Generating Facilities .......................................................................... 253
5.2.3.2. Thermal Power Generation in 2000 and Beyond ............................................................ 255
5.2.3.3. Hydroelectric Facilities ................................................................................................... 265

5.2.4.
5.2.5.
5.2.6.
5.2.7.

Wind Power Facilities............................................................................................. 273
Solar Power Facilities ............................................................................................ 277
Nuclear Power ........................................................................................................ 281
Total Power Generation, Imports, and Exports...................................................... 283

5.2.7.1. Electricity Transmission and Distribution ...................................................................... 287
5.2.7.2. Technical Parameters of the T&D System, and Technical Challenges to Integration
with Systems in Other Countries .................................................................................... 289
5.2.7.3. The T&D System in 2000 and Beyond ........................................................................... 290

5.3. ELECTRICITY DEMAND IN THE DPRK .......................................................................... 291
5.3.1. Electricity Balances ................................................................................................ 291
5.3.2. Residential and Commercial/Institutional Sectors ................................................. 301
5.3.2.1. Residential Sector Data and Assumptions ...................................................................... 301
5.3.2.2. Residential Sector Results............................................................................................... 303
5.3.2.3. Commercial/Institutional Sector Data, Assumptions, and Results ................................. 305

5.3.3. Industrial Sector...................................................................................................... 307
5.3.3.1. Industrial Sector Assumptions and Inputs ...................................................................... 308

5.3.4. Industrial Sector Results ......................................................................................... 318
5.3.5. Transport Sector ..................................................................................................... 322
5.3.5.1. Transport Sector Assumptions and Inputs ...................................................................... 323
5.3.5.2. Transport Sector Results ................................................................................................. 327

5.3.6. Agriculture and Fisheries Sectors........................................................................... 329
5.3.6.1. Agriculture Sector Assumptions and Inputs ................................................................... 329
5.3.6.2. Fisheries Sector Assumptions and Inputs ....................................................................... 331
5.3.6.3. Agriculture and Fisheries Sector Results ........................................................................ 332

5.3.7. Military Sector ........................................................................................................ 335
5.3.7.1. Military Sector Assumptions and Inputs......................................................................... 336
5.3.7.2. Military Sector Results ................................................................................................... 338

5.3.8. Overall Electricity Demand Results and Commentary ........................................... 340
5.4. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY AND DEMAND CONCLUSIONS .................................................... 342
5.4.1. Summary of Results—DPRK Electricity Supply and Demand ................................ 342
5.4.2. Implications of Results for ROK and International Community Engagement of
the DPRK on Electricity Sector Issues .................................................................... 343
5.4.2.1. Implications of Findings Regarding the DPRK Electricity Supply System ................... 343
5.4.2.2. Implications of Electricity Demand Findings ................................................................. 345

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

5.4.2.3. Potential Implications of Surge in Solar PV System Sales in the DPRK ....................... 347

5.4.3. Possible “Next Steps” ............................................................................................. 349
5.4.3.1. Potential Research Projects ............................................................................................. 349
5.4.3.2. Potential Engagement Projects—Training ...................................................................... 350
5.4.3.3. Potential Engagement Projects—Energy Assessments and Energy Planning for theElectricity Sector............................................................................................................. 351
5.4.3.4. Help to Build/Reinforce Centers of Expertise ................................................................ 352
5.4.3.5. Pilot and Demonstration Projects.................................................................................... 353

6.

ESTIMATES OF REFINED PRODUCT SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN THE
DPRK, 2010 – 2020 ....................................................................................................... 356
6.1.
6.2.
6.3.
6.4.
6.5.
6.6.
6.7.
6.8.
6.9.

OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................... 356
ANALYTICAL METHODS ............................................................................................... 358
REFINED PRODUCTS BALANCES, 2010 AND 2014-2020 ............................................... 359
REFINED PRODUCTS USE BY SECTOR AND FUEL .......................................................... 369
DPRK DOMESTIC OIL PRODUCTS PRODUCTION .......................................................... 375
IMPORTS OF REFINED PRODUCTS ................................................................................. 386
CONSIDERATIONS IN ANALYSIS OF RECENT DPRK OIL PRODUCT SUPPLY AND
DEMAND ...................................................................................................................... 391
POTENTIAL ENERGY IMPACT OF HUMANITARIAN ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIESRELATIVE TO DPRK OIL IMPORTS .............................................................................. 392
CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 394
THE DPRK’S MINERAL RESOURCE BASE ......................................................... 395

7.
7.1.
7.2.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 395
MINING AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE, OUTPUT TRENDS, AND RELATEDINFORMATION FOR KEY TYPES OF MINERALS .............................................................. 403
7.2.1. Iron .......................................................................................................................... 403
7.2.2. Other base metals ................................................................................................... 410
7.2.3. Precious and specialty metals ................................................................................. 415
7.2.4. Uranium .................................................................................................................. 419
7.2.5. Non-metallic minerals ............................................................................................. 422
7.3. MINING INFRASTRUCTURE ........................................................................................... 425
7.3.1. Transportation Facilities ........................................................................................ 425
7.3.1.1. Railway systems ............................................................................................................. 425
7.3.1.2. Road Transport Systems ................................................................................................. 425
7.3.1.3. Ports ................................................................................................................................ 426

7.3.2. Power Facilities ...................................................................................................... 430
7.3.2.1. Major Thermal Power Plants .......................................................................................... 430
7.3.2.2. Private Power Supplies and Microgrids .......................................................................... 431

7.3.3. Metals/Minerals Refining Facilities ....................................................................... 433
7.3.4. Mining Machinery Manufacturers .......................................................................... 436
7.4. POLICIES, ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCES INVOLVED IN THE DPRKMINERALS SECTOR ...................................................................................................... 438
7.4.1. North Korean Mining Industry Policy and Related Organizations ........................ 439
7.4.2. Sysetm for Authorization of Mineral Resource Exploitation .................................. 441
7.4.3. The DPRK’s Geological Technology Development ................................................ 441
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7.4.4. An Analysis of the Educational System for Mining-related Occupations ............... 441
7.5. CONCLUSIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR OVERSEAS INVESTORS ....................................... 444
7.5.1. The Most Fruitful Areas for Foreign Investment in the DPRK Minerals Sectors .. 444
7.5.2. Obstacles to Effective Minerals Sector Development through Foreign
Investment, and Solutions to Overcome Obstacles ................................................. 445
7.5.3. Infrastructure Investments for Stable Operation of Mining Industries .................. 446
7.5.4. Feasible Strategies for Overseas Investors ............................................................. 446
7.5.5. Alternative Strategies and Issues for Overseas Investors ....................................... 447
7.5.6. Establishing Sustainable Mining Practices ............................................................ 449
7.5.7. Policy Proposals to Maximize Inter-Korean or Foreign Investment in theDevelopment of DPRK Mineral Mines and Coal Mines ......................................... 450
7.5.8. Economic Effects of Inter-Korean Mineral Resources Cooperation ...................... 452
POTENTIAL FUTURE “PATHWAYS” FOR THE DPRK ENERGYSECTOR, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND SUPPORT NEEDEDTO FOR SUSTAINABLE REDEVELOPMENT ...................................................... 454

8.

8.1.
8.2.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 454
THE DPRK UNDER A MEDIUM-TERM "REDEVELOPMENT" PATHWAY AND UNDERVARIANTS OF SAME ..................................................................................................... 456
8.2.1. Variants on the Redevelopment Path ...................................................................... 458
8.2.2. Summary Results, Redevelopment Pathway ........................................................... 458
8.2.3. Sustainable Development Path Results ................................................................... 464
8.2.4. Regional Alternative Path Results .......................................................................... 468
8.3. IMPLICATIONS OF A “RECENT TRENDS” PATH FOR THE DPRK ENERGY SECTOR......... 471
8.4. COMPARISONS BETWEEN DPRK ENERGY FUTURES PATHS ......................................... 473
8.5. ENERGY SECURITY COMPARISON OF FUTURE DPRK PATHS ....................................... 478
8.5.1. Energy Supply Dimension ....................................................................................... 479
8.5.2. Economic Dimension .............................................................................................. 481
8.5.3. Technological Dimension ....................................................................................... 483
8.5.4. Environmental Dimension ...................................................................................... 484
8.5.5. Social and Cultural Dimension ............................................................................... 485
8.5.6. International Military/Security Dimension ............................................................. 485
8.6. INTERNAL POLICY AND LEGAL REFORMS TO STIMULATE AND SUSTAIN ENERGYSECTOR REBUILDING IN THE DPRK............................................................................. 486
8.6.1. Reform of energy pricing practices and the physical infrastructure to
implement them ....................................................................................................... 486
8.6.2. Training for energy sector actors ........................................................................... 487
8.6.3. Strengthening regulatory agencies and educational/research institutions in the
DPRK ...................................................................................................................... 488
8.6.4. Involving the private sector in investments and technology transfer ..................... 489
DPRK “COLLAPSE” PATHWAYS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ENERGYSECTOR AND FOR STRATEGIES OF REDEVELOPMENT/SUPPORT .......... 491

9.
9.1.
9.2.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 491
BACKGROUND: THE DPRK ENERGY SECTOR SINCE 1990, AND NAUTILUS
ANALYTICAL APPROACHES ......................................................................................... 494
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9.3. POTENTIAL “COLLAPSE” PATHWAYS ........................................................................... 496
9.3.1. Analytical Approach and Listing of Pathways Considered .................................... 496
9.3.2. The “War” Path ...................................................................................................... 497
9.3.3. “Regime Implosion Leading to New Authoritarian Regime” Path ........................ 499
9.3.4. “Regime Change by Palace Coup Leading to ROK-installed Regime” Path ........ 500
9.3.5. “Slow Collapse Leading to Eventual Reunification” Path..................................... 500
9.4. IMPLICATIONS OF COLLAPSE PATHWAYS FOR THE DPRK ENERGY SECTOR AND
FOR PROVISION OF ENERGY SERVICES IN THE DPRK .................................................. 501
9.4.1. “War” Path ............................................................................................................. 501
9.4.2. “Regime Implosion Leading to New Authoritarian Regime” Path ........................ 504
9.4.3. “Regime Change by Palace Coup Leading to ROK-installed Regime” Path ........ 504
9.4.4. “Slow Collapse Leading to Eventual Reunification” Path..................................... 506
9.5. LESSONS FROM COLLAPSE PATHWAYS FOR NEAR-TERM INITIATIVES AND
PLANNING EFFORTS ..................................................................................................... 507
10.

REDEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK ENERGY SECTOR: ASSISTANCEAPPROACHES AND PROJECT OPTIONS............................................................. 509

10.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 509
10.2. POTENTIAL FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO ASSIST IN THE
REDEVELOPMENT OF THE DPRK ENERGY SECTOR ...................................................... 509
10.2.1. Provide technical and institutional assistance in implementing energy
efficiency measures ................................................................................................. 511
10.2.2. Promote better understanding of the North Korean situation in the ROK ............. 514
10.2.3. Work to open opportunities for Independent Power Producer companies towork in the DPRK ................................................................................................... 514
10.2.4. Cooperation on technology transfer for energy efficiency, renewable energy ....... 514
10.3. KEY/ATTRACTIVE ENERGY SECTOR TECHNOLOGIES AND PROCESSES FOR ENERGYSECTOR REDEVELOPMENT IN THE DPRK...................................................................... 515
10.3.1. Rebuilding of the transmission and distribution system ......................................... 515
ILLUSTRATIVE PROJECT FOR DPRK DENUCLEARIZATION ENGAGEMENT: “MICROGRIDS
FOR MINES” ................................................................................................................. 516
10.3.2. Rehabilitation of power plants and other coal-using infrastructure ...................... 519
10.3.3. Rehabilitation of coal supply and coal transport systems ...................................... 520
10.3.4. Development of alternative sources of small-scale energy and implementationof energy-efficiency measures ................................................................................. 520
10.3.5. Rehabilitation of rural infrastructure ..................................................................... 525
10.3.6. Electricity grid interconnections ............................................................................. 526
10.3.7. Gas supply/demand infrastructure .......................................................................... 526
10.3.8. Engagement on Nuclear Energy with the DPRK .................................................... 527
10.4. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION THROUGH ENGAGEMENT ON ENERGY ISSUES:
AN EXAMPLE ............................................................................................................... 529
10.5. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 530

xiv
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKSEPARATE VOLUMES OF ATTACHMENTS: WORKPAPERS,BACKGROUND DATA, AND DETAILED RESULTSATTACHMENT VOLUME 1:
WORKPAPERS, BACKGROUND DATA, AND DETAILEDRESULTS: ESTIMATED ENERGY SUPPLY/DEMAND
BALANCESATTACHMENT VOLUME 2:
WORKPAPERS, BACKGROUND DATA, AND DETAILEDRESULTS: DPRK MILITARY SECTOR ENERGY USE

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable of Figures
Figure 1-1: Political Map of the DPRK .......................................................................................... 5
Figure 1-2: Topographic Map of the DPRK ................................................................................... 6
Figure 1-3: Estimated Changes in GDP in the DPRK, 2010 through 2019 .................................. 10
Figure 2-1: Photo of Hungnam Fertilizer Complex, South Hamgyong Province......................... 41
Figure 2-2: Control Room at Pukchang Thermal Power Plant ..................................................... 66
Figure 2-3: Photo of Kangae Hydro Power Plant ......................................................................... 69
Figure 2-4: Overall Map of the DPRK Electric Power Grid ........................................................ 74
Figure 2-5: Map of the DPRK Electric Power Grid ..................................................................... 75
Figure 2-6: Annual Peak Load Curve for the DPRK as of 1989 .................................................. 79
Figure 2-7: Example Hourly Load Curve for the DPRK in August, 1990 ................................... 80
Figure 2-8: Photo of Sungri Chemical Plant Oil Refinery ............................................................ 85
Figure 2-9: Possible Former Oil Refinery Site Near Undok, DPRK as of early 2019 (Google
Earth Pro Image) ........................................................................................................................... 87
Figure 2-10: 1990 DPRK Energy Supply by Type ....................................................................... 98
Figure 2-11: 1996 DPRK Energy Supply by Type ....................................................................... 98
Figure 2-12: DPRK Energy Supply by Fuel and Source, 1990 .................................................... 99
Figure 2-13: DPRK Energy Supply by Fuel and Source, 1996 .................................................... 99
Figure 2-14: 1990 Final Energy Demand by Fuel ...................................................................... 101
Figure 2-15: 1996 Final Energy Demand by Fuel ...................................................................... 101
Figure 2-16: Energy Demand by Sector, 1990 ........................................................................... 102
Figure 2-17: Energy Demand by Sector, 1996 ........................................................................... 102
Figure 2-18: Share of Energy Demand by Sector, 1990 ............................................................. 103
Figure 2-19: Share of Energy Demand by Sector, 1996 ............................................................. 103
Figure 2-20: Share of Coal Demand by Sector, 1990 ................................................................. 104
Figure 2-21: Share of Coal Demand by Sector, 1996 ................................................................. 104
Figure 2-22: Share of Petroleum Products Demand by Sector, 1990 ......................................... 105
Figure 2-23: Share of Petroleum Products Demand by Sector, 1996 ......................................... 106
Figure 2-24: Share of Electricity Demand by Sector, 1990 ........................................................ 106
Figure 2-25: Share of Electricity Demand by Sector, 1996 ........................................................ 107
Figure 2-26: 1990 Industrial Demand by Subsector ................................................................... 108
Figure 2-27: 1996 Industrial Demand by Subsector ................................................................... 108
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Figure 2-28: Shares of 1990 Industrial Coal Demand by Subsector .......................................... 109
Figure 2-29: Shares of 1996 Industrial Coal Demand by Subsector .......................................... 109
Figure 2-30: Shares of 1990 Industrial Electricity Demand by Subsector ................................. 110
Figure 2-31: Shares of 1996 Industrial Electricity Demand by Subsector ................................. 110
Figure 2-32: Transport Energy Demand by Subsector in 1990 .................................................. 111
Figure 2-33: Transport Energy Demand by Subsector in 1996 .................................................. 111
Figure 2-34: 1990 Shares of Transport Petroleum Demand by Subsector ................................. 112
Figure 2-35: 1996 Shares of Transport Petroleum Demand by Subsector ................................. 112
Figure 2-36: Residential Energy Demand by Fuel and Subsector, 1990 .................................... 113
Figure 2-37: Residential Energy Demand by Fuel and Subsector, 1996 .................................... 113
Figure 2-38: 1990 Military Energy Demand by Fuel and Subsector .......................................... 115
Figure 2-39: 1996 Military Energy Demand by Fuel and Subsector .......................................... 115
Figure 2-40: 1990 Military Petroleum Demand Shares .............................................................. 116
Figure 2-41: 1996 Military Petroleum Demand Shares .............................................................. 116
Figure 2-42: Photo of DPRK Truck Powered by a Coal (and/or biomass) Gasifier.................. 123
Figure 3-1: Korean Peninsula and Surrounding Area from Space, 2000 ................................... 127
Figure 3-2: Korean Peninsula and Surrounding Area from Space, 2010 ................................... 128
Figure 3-3: Korean Peninsula and Surrounding Area from Space, 2016 ................................... 129
Figure 3-4: Flooding in Wonsan, DPRK in 2011 ....................................................................... 133
Figure 3-5: Truck Imports to the DPRK from China, 2000 through 2018 ................................. 143
Figure 3-6: Passenger Vehicle Imports to the DPRK from China, 2000 through 2018 ............. 144
Figure 3-7: Bicycle Imports to the DPRK from China, 2000 through 2018............................... 145
Figure 3-8: Estimated DPRK Households, 1990 through 2020 .................................................. 147
Figure 3-9: Tractor Imports to the DPRK from China, 2000 through 2018 ............................... 150
Figure 3-10: Natural-flow Irrigation Waterway in the DPRK Completed in the Early 2000s ... 151
Figure 3-11: DPRK Fishing Vessel ............................................................................................ 153
Figure 3-12: DPRK Fishing Boats in Harbor Near Chongjin, Winter 2018 ............................... 154
Figure 3-13: Hovercraft Based in Northwestern DPRK, November, 2019 ................................ 156
Figure 3-14: Aircraft Lined Up for an Exhibition or Inspection at Wonsan, November, 2019.. 158
Figure 3-15: “5 MWe” Reactor at Yongbyon as of October 2019 ............................................. 160
Figure 3-16: Reported Coal and Coke Exports from the DPRK through 2017 .......................... 162
Figure 3-17: 2000 DPRK Energy Supply Shares by Fuel .......................................................... 181
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 3-18: 2005 DPRK Energy Supply Shares by Fuel .......................................................... 181
Figure 3-19: 2005 DPRK Energy Supply Shares by Fuel .......................................................... 182
Figure 3-20: 2010 DPRK Energy Supply Shares by Fuel .......................................................... 182
Figure 3-21: 2016 DPRK Energy Supply Shares by Fuel .......................................................... 183
Figure 3-22: 2019 DPRK Energy Supply Shares by Fuel .......................................................... 183
Figure 3-23: 2020 DPRK Energy Supply Shares by Fuel .......................................................... 184
Figure 3-24: DPRK Energy Use Shares by Sector, 1990 - 2020 ................................................ 184
Figure 3-25: DPRK Energy Use by Sector, 1990 - 2020 ............................................................ 185
Figure 3-26: Share of DPRK Energy Use by Fuel, 1990 - 2020 ................................................ 185
Figure 3-27: Shares of DPRK Coal Use by Fuel, 2000 .............................................................. 186
Figure 3-28: Shares of DPRK Coal Use by Fuel, 2005 .............................................................. 186
Figure 3-29: Shares of DPRK Coal Use by Fuel, 2010 .............................................................. 187
Figure 3-30: Shares of DPRK Coal Use by Fuel, 2016 .............................................................. 187
Figure 3-31: Shares of DPRK Coal Use by Fuel, 2019 .............................................................. 188
Figure 3-32: Shares of DPRK Coal Use by Fuel, 2020 .............................................................. 188
Figure 4-1: Location of Potential DPRK Oil Resources ............................................................. 193
Figure 4-2: Oil Rig, Provided by Romania, in use in the Tumen River Area of the DPRK....... 194
Figure 4-3: Projected Onshore and Offshore Locations of Potential Oil and Gas Basins in the
DPRK .......................................................................................................................................... 197
Figure 4-4: Map of Forest Types in the DPRK........................................................................... 201
Figure 4-5: Land-type Maps Created from Satellite Images of the Kaesong Area in the DPRK,1999 and 2004 ............................................................................................................................. 204
Figure 4-6: Landsat Images of an Area in the DPRK taken in 1981 (left) and 1993 (right) ...... 204
Figure 4-7: Estimated Trend in Sources and Amount of Woody Biomass Availability in the
DPRK, 1990 to 2020 ................................................................................................................... 208
Figure 4-8: Photo of West Sea Barrage, Near Nampo, DPRK ................................................... 212
Figure 4-9: Painting of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il at the Dedication of the West Sea Barrage..................................................................................................................................................... 213
Figure 4-10: Graphic of Card-style electricity meter in use in Pyongyang ................................ 218
Figure 4-11: Military Truck in Use by Military Personnel and Civilians near Nampo .............. 228
Figure 5-1: Estimates of Historical Gross Electricity Generation in the DPRK......................... 239
Figure 5-2: Wind Speed Map for the DPRK (100 meters) ......................................................... 248
Figure 5-3: Solar Resource Map for the DPRK .......................................................................... 249
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 5-4: Painting of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il at the Dedication of the West Sea Barrage..................................................................................................................................................... 250
Figure 5-5: Satellite Photo of Unggi Power Plant, Near Sonbong and the Seungri Oil Refinery, asof early 2020 (Source, Google Earth Pro) .................................................................................. 256
Figure 5-6: Satellite Photo of East Pyongyang Power Plant in Operation as of Spring, 2020
(Source, Google Earth Pro) ......................................................................................................... 257
Figure 5-7: Satellite Photo of Pyongyang Power Plant in Operation as of September, 2020
(Source, Google Earth Pro) ......................................................................................................... 258
Figure 5-8: Satellite Photo of the Pukchang (or Bukchang) Thermal Power Complex inOperation as of Spring 2019 (Source, Google Earth Pro) .......................................................... 260
Figure 5-9: Satellite Photo of the Under-construction “Kangdong” Thermal Power Complex in asof Spring 2019 (Source, Google Earth Pro) ................................................................................ 261
Figure 5-10: Satellite Photo of the Possible Ongoing Conversion of the HFO-fired Power Plant at
Sonbong as of September 2020 (Source, Google Earth Pro) ...................................................... 262
Figure 5-11: Estimated Annual Diesel and Gasoline Generator Capacity Imported .................. 263
Figure 5-12: Cumulative Estimated Diesel and Gasoline Generator Capacity........................... 264
Figure 5-13: Satellite Photo of Huichon #2 Hydroelectric Power Plant, Apparently in Operation
as of Late 2015 or Early 2016 (Source, Google Maps) .............................................................. 270
Figure 5-14: Satellite Photo of Probably Small Hydroelectric Plant (name unknown)
Downstream from Huichon #2 Hydroelectric Power Plant, Apparently in Operation as of Late2015 or Early 2016 (Source, Google Maps) ............................................................................... 271
Figure 5-15: Mount Paektu Power Station Dam at Dedication Ceremony in October, 2015 ..... 272
Figure 5-16: Hydroelectric Plant on the Chongchon River ........................................................ 273
Figure 5-17: DPRK Wind Generators Installed in South Hwanghae, DPRK (image from GoogleMaps) .......................................................................................................................................... 275
Figure 5-18: Wind Turbine R&D Units in the DPRK ................................................................ 275
Figure 5-19: Estimated Imports of Wind Power Generators to the DPRK................................. 277
Figure 5-20: Solar PV Generation Capacity Imported to the DPRK .......................................... 279
Figure 5-21: Solar PV System Installed on Ryuwon Footwear Factory in Mangyongdae District,Pyongyang (Source: Korea Friendship Association USA) ......................................................... 280
Figure 5-22: Satellite Photo of Experimental LWR (white domed building) Under Construction
at Yongbyon as of Late 2019 (Source, Google Maps)................................................................ 283
Figure 5-23: Electricity Exports from and Imports to the DPRK Based on Chinese Customs
Statistics ...................................................................................................................................... 284
Figure 5-24: Overall Map of the DPRK Electric Power Grid .................................................... 288
Figure 5-25: Residential Electricity Use by Subsector ............................................................... 304
Figure 5-26: Residential Electricity Use by End Use and Subsector.......................................... 305
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Figure 5-27: DPRK Public/Commercial Electricity Use ............................................................ 307
Figure 5-28: Public/Commercial Electricity Use by End Use .................................................... 307
Figure 5-29: DPRK Iron and Steel Complex Near Songnim...................................................... 311
Figure 5-30: Close-up of New Buildings at DPRK Iron and Steel Complex Near Songnim ..... 312
Figure 5-31: Sangwon Cement Plant Near Pyongyang .............................................................. 313
Figure 5-32: Limestone Mine Feeding Sangwon Cement Plant ................................................. 313
Figure 5-33: Estimated Domestic DPRK Fertilizer Production, 2008-2020 .............................. 315
Figure 5-34: Industrial Energy Use by Subsector ....................................................................... 318
Figure 5-35: Fraction of Sectoral Industrial Electricity Use by Subsector ................................. 319
Figure 5-36: Industrial Electricity Use by End Use, 2010 and 2014 .......................................... 320
Figure 5-37: Industrial Electricity Use by End Use, 2015 through 2018 ................................... 321
Figure 5-38: Industrial Electricity Use by End Use, 2019 and 2020 .......................................... 322
Figure 5-39: Electric Buses in Pyongyang, 2009........................................................................ 324
Figure 5-40: Pyongyang Subway System, 2009 ......................................................................... 325
Figure 5-41: Reported Electric Scooters/Motorcycles/Bicycles Imports through 2018 ............. 325
Figure 5-42: Electric Tourists Carts to be Used at Wonsan-Kalma Resort Area ....................... 326
Figure 5-43: Estimated Rail Transport Electricity Use............................................................... 328
Figure 5-44: Transport Sector Electricity Use by End Use ........................................................ 328
Figure 5-45: Natural-flow Irrigation Waterway in the DPRK Completed Circa 2004-2005 ..... 330
Figure 5-46: DPRK Cereals Production over Time .................................................................... 331
Figure 5-47: Visit by Chairman Kim Jong Un to a Fish Processing Factory in the DPRK........ 332
Figure 5-48: Total Agricultural and Fisheries Electricity Use.................................................... 333
Figure 5-49: Agricultural and Fisheries Electricity Use by End Use, 2010 and 2014................ 334
Figure 5-50: Agricultural and Fisheries Electricity Use by End Use, 2015 through 2018 ......... 334
Figure 5-51: Agricultural and Fisheries Electricity Use by End Use, 2019 and 2020................ 335
Figure 5-52: Military Energy Use by Subsector ......................................................................... 339
Figure 5-53: Military Electricity Use by Subsector and End Use .............................................. 339
Figure 5-54: DPRK Overall Electricity Use by Sector and Year ............................................... 340
Figure 5-55: Overall DPRK Electricity Use by End Use ........................................................... 341
Figure 6-1: 2019 DPRK Petroleum Products Demand by Sector ............................................... 369
Figure 6-2: 2020 DPRK Petroleum Products Demand by Sector ............................................... 370
Figure 6-3: Estimated Diesel Fuel Use in the DPRK through 2020 ........................................... 371
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 6-4: Estimated Gasoline Use in the DPRK through 2020 ............................................... 372
Figure 6-5: Estimated Kerosene and Jet Fuel Use in the DPRK through 2020 .......................... 374
Figure 6-6: Estimated Heavy Fuel Oil Use in the DPRK through 2020 ..................................... 375
Figure 6-7: Refinery at Sinujiu, Northwest DPRK ..................................................................... 376
Figure 6-8: Refinery at Sonbong, Northeast DPRK ................................................................... 377
Figure 6-9: Possible Yalu River Crossing Point for Dandong-Sinuiju Crude Oil Pipeline ........ 378
Figure 6-10: Reported Crude Oil and Oil Products Exports to the DPRK from China, 1999 2020............................................................................................................................................. 380
Figure 6-11: Likely Catalytic Cracking Unit Installed at Ponghwa Chemical Factory .............. 382
Figure 6-12: Site of Future Catalytic Cracking Unit as of May 26, 2015 .................................. 383
Figure 6-13: Probable Catalytic Cracking Unit at Ponghwa Chemical Factory as of February 16,
2017............................................................................................................................................. 384
Figure 6-14: Estimated DPRK Petroleum Supplies Refined Domestically ................................ 385
Figure 6-15: Estimated 2019 DPRK Refinery Output by Fuel ................................................... 386
Figure 6-16: Estimated DPRK Petroleum Products Supplies--Imports ...................................... 387
Figure 6-17: Estimated Overall DPRK Petroleum Products Supplies ........................................ 395
Figure 7-1: Location of Selected Minerals Deposits in the DPRK............................................. 397
Figure 7-2: Location of Selected Minerals Deposits in the DPRK............................................. 398
Figure 7-3 DPRK Exports of Iron Ore to China by Month ........................................................ 410
Figure 7-4: Photos of Kyumduck Zinc Mine .............................................................................. 411
Figure 7-5: Google Earth Pro Image of Hyesan Youth Mine as of June 2020 ........................... 413
Figure 7-6: Ryongyang Magnesite Mining Complex (Google Earth Pro, location approximately
40.82, 128.813) ........................................................................................................................... 423
Figure 7-7: Photos of Daehung Magnesite Mine ........................................................................ 424
Figure 7-8: Coal Terminal at Nampo Port (Google Earth Pro Image, dated 11-8-2019) ........... 427
Figure 7-9: Location of Major Export and Local Ports in North Korea ..................................... 430
Figure 7-10: Example of Chinese Coal Gasification Electricity Generation System ................. 432
Figure 7-11: Possible Location of Munpyong Smelting Factory as of 4-12-2020 (Google Earth
Pro Image) ................................................................................................................................... 434
Figure 7-12: Possible Location of Haeju Minerals Refinery (as of 3-18-2018) ......................... 436
Figure 8-1: Main DPRK Energy Paths/Scenarios Considered ................................................... 455
Figure 8-2: Final Energy Use by Fuel, Redevelopment Case ..................................................... 459
Figure 8-3: Final Energy Use by Sector, Redevelopment Case.................................................. 460
Figure 8-4: Electricity Use by Sector, Redevelopment Case ...................................................... 461
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Figure 8-5: Coal Use by Sector, Redevelopment Case ............................................................... 462
Figure 8-6: Generation Capacity by Generator Type, Redevelopment Case.............................. 463
Figure 8-7: Electricity Output by Generator Type, Redevelopment Case .................................. 463
Figure 8-8: Final Energy Use by Sector, Sustainable Development Case .................................. 465
Figure 8-9: Final Energy Use by Fuel, Sustainable Development Case ..................................... 465
Figure 8-10: Electricity Use by Sector, Sustainable Development Case .................................... 466
Figure 8-11: Coal Use by Sector, Sustainable Development Case ............................................. 467
Figure 8-12: Trends in Electricity Generation Capacity Expansion, Sustainable Development
Path ............................................................................................................................................. 468
Figure 8-13: Final Energy Use by Sector in the Regional Alternative Case .............................. 469
Figure 8-14: Trends in Electricity Generation Capacity Expansion, Regional Alternative Path 470
Figure 8-15: Illustrative Route of Transmission Line through the DPRK in Regional Alternative
Path (Image from Google Earth Pro, with approximate transmission line routing authors’assumption) ................................................................................................................................. 470
Figure 8-16: Final Energy Use by Sector in Recent Trends Path ............................................... 471
Figure 8-17: Final Energy Use by Fuel in Recent Trends Path .................................................. 472
Figure 8-18: Electricity Output by Plant Type in Recent Trends Path ....................................... 472
Figure 8-19: Electricity Generation Capacity by Plant Type in Recent Trends Path ................. 473
Figure 8-20: Total Electricity Use by Path ................................................................................. 474
Figure 8-21: Total Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Emissions for Four Future Paths ..................... 475
Figure 8-22: Social Cost Comparison of Three Future Paths ..................................................... 477
Figure 9-1: DPRK Energy Paths ................................................................................................. 496
Figure 10-1: DPRK-made Mini-Hydroelectric Turbine-Generator ............................................ 521
Figure 10-2: Water-pumping Windmill Installed by Nautilus and DPRK Engineers at Unhari in
the Year 2000 .............................................................................................................................. 522
Figure 10-3: Conceptual Residential Building Design from 2008 DPRK Presentation ............. 523
Figure 10-4: Compact Fluorescent Light Bulb Installed in DPRK Residence During the Unhari
Project, 1998 ............................................................................................................................... 524

xxii
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable of Tables
Table 2-1: Energy Intensity Assumptions by Industrial Subsector .............................................. 39
Table 2-2: Assumptions for Changes in Industrial Production in 1996........................................ 44
Table 2-3: Crude Oil Imports to the DPRK (thousand metric tonnes) ......................................... 60
Table 2-4: Major Thermal Generating Facilities in the DPRK as of 1992 ................................... 65
Table 2-5: Thermal (fossil-fueled) Generating Facilities Reported to be Under Construction or“Planned for Construction” in the DPRK as of About 1996 ........................................................ 67
Table 2-6: Major Hydroelectric Generating Facilities in the DPRK ............................................ 69
Table 2-7: Major Hydroelectric Generating Facilities Reported to be Under Construction or“Planned for Construction” in the DPRK ..................................................................................... 71
Table 2-8: Partial Listing of High-voltage Substations on the DPRK Electrical Grid ................. 77
Table 2-9: Listing of Regional Control Centers on the DPRK Electrical Grid ............................ 78
Table 2-10: Summary Estimated Energy Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 1990 ............ 91
Table 2-11: Detailed Estimated Energy Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 1990 .............. 92
Table 2-12: Detailed Estimated Refined Products Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 1990....................................................................................................................................................... 93
Table 2-13: Summary Estimated Energy Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 1996 ............ 94
Table 2-14: Detailed Estimated Energy Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 1996 .............. 95
Table 2-15: Detailed Estimated Refined Products Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 1996....................................................................................................................................................... 96
Table 3-1: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2000 ..................... 169
Table 3-2: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2005 ..................... 170
Table 3-3: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2008 ..................... 171
Table 3-4: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2009 ..................... 171
Table 3-5: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2010 ..................... 172
Table 3-6: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2014 ..................... 172
Table 3-7: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2015 ..................... 173
Table 3-8: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2016 ..................... 173
Table 3-9: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2017 ..................... 174
Table 3-10: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2018 ................... 174
Table 3-11: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2019 ................... 175
Table 3-12: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2020 ................... 175
Table 3-13: Detailed Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2000 ..................... 176
xxiii
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 3-14: Detailed Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2010 ..................... 177
Table 3-15: Detailed Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2016 ..................... 178
Table 3-16: Detailed Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2019 ..................... 179
Table 3-17: Detailed Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2020 ..................... 180
Table 4-1: Estimated Summary of Forest Areas and Stocks in the DPRK as of 1990 ............... 198
Table 4-2: Species Composition of DPRK Forests as of (approximately) 1990 ........................ 199
Table 4-3: Alternative Estimate of Species Composition of DPRK Forests (as of 1996) .......... 200
Table 4-4: Estimate of Forested Land in 1997 by Province, with Change from 1970 ............... 200
Table 4-5: Estimated Wood Stocks by Type in DPRK Forests (as of 1996) .............................. 201
Table 4-6: Land-type Data from Remote Sensing Studies of an Area of the DPRK, 1999 and2004............................................................................................................................................. 203
Table 4-7: DPRK Forest Area Trends from UN FAO 2020 FRA .............................................. 203
Table 4-8: Estimate of Annual DPRK Woody Biomass Production, 1990 to 2020 ................... 207
Table 4-9: Estimate of Hydraulic Resources in the DPRK......................................................... 210
Table 4-10: Results of Energy-Efficiency Analyses for the DPRK ........................................... 231
Table 5-1: Major Thermal Generating Facilities in the DPRK................................................... 254
Table 5-2: Major Hydroelectric Generating Facilities in the DPRK .......................................... 266
Table 5-3: DPRK Hydroelectric Plants Included in CDM Reporting to UNFCCC ................... 269
Table 5-4: Summary of Capacity and Generation by Generator Type ....................................... 286
Table 5-5: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2010 ....................... 293
Table 5-6: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2014 ....................... 294
Table 5-7: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2015 ....................... 295
Table 5-8: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2016 ....................... 296
Table 5-9: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2017 ....................... 297
Table 5-10: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2018 ..................... 298
Table 5-11: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2019 ..................... 299
Table 5-12: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2020 ..................... 300
Table 5-13: Estimates of Output in DPRK Industrial Subsectors Relative to 1990 ................... 309
Table 5-14: Fraction of Electricity Assumed Used in Motors and Drives (with EstimatedConsumption in 1990)................................................................................................................. 317
Table 5-15: Overall DPRK Electricity Use by End Use ............................................................. 341
Table 6-1: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2010 ................................................ 361
Table 6-2: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2014 ................................................ 362
xxiv
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 6-3: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2015 ................................................ 363
Table 6-4: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2016 ................................................ 364
Table 6-5: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2017 ................................................ 365
Table 6-6: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2018 ................................................ 366
Table 6-7: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2019 ................................................ 367
Table 6-8: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2020 ................................................ 368
Table 6-9: Estimated Output of Cracking Unit, by Product ....................................................... 381
Table 6-10: Estimated Refinery Output after Addition of Cracking Unit, by Product ............... 381
Table 7-1: Estimates of Metals and Minerals Reserves in the ROK and DPRK ........................ 399
Table 7-2: Estimates of Metals and Minerals Resources in the DPRK ...................................... 400
Table 7-3: ROK Estimates of Output of Major Metallic Ores in the DPRK ............................. 401
Table 7-4: USGS Estimates of DPRK Metals and Minerals Production, 2012-2016 (values inMetric Tonnes unless otherwise specified) ................................................................................. 402
Table 7-5: : Output of Major Mineral Products in the DPRK (2013-2017) ............................... 403
Table 7-6: Major Iron Ore Mines in the DPRK .......................................................................... 405
Table 7-7: Production Capacity of Major DPRK Iron Manufacturers (1000 tonnes per year, andfraction of total national capacity) .............................................................................................. 408
Table 7-8: Supply Chains for Major Iron & Steel Manufacturers in the DPRK ........................ 409
Table 7-9: Major Mining Machinery Manufacturers in the DPRK ............................................ 437
Table 7-10: Coal Mining Machinery Manufacturers in the DPRK ............................................ 438
Table 8-1: Estimated Local and Regional Pollutant Emissions, Regional Alternative Case...... 475
Table 8-2: Estimated Local and Regional Pollutant Emissions, Redevelopment Case .............. 476
Table 8-3: Energy Supply (and Demand) Dimension of Energy Security Comparison of DPRK
Paths ............................................................................................................................................ 480
Table 8-4:: Economic Dimension of Energy Security Comparison of DPRK Paths.................. 482
Table 8-5: Technological Dimension of Energy Security Comparison of DPRK Paths ............ 483
Table 8-6: Environmental Dimension of Energy Security Comparison of DPRK Paths ........... 484

xxv
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONSAPLNAsia Pacific Leadership Network

BOE

Barrell of Oil Equivalent

CDM

Clean Development Mechanisms

CFL

Compact Fluorescent Lighting

CH4

MethaneCO2

Carbon Dioxide

CO

Carbon Monoxide

DMZ

Demilitarized Zone between the ROK and DPRKDPRKDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea

EU

European Union

EUR

Euro

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GHG

Greenhouse Gases

GJ

Gigajoule (109 Joules)

GW

Gigawatt (one billion Watts)

GW

Gigawatt (one billion Watts) of electric power

GWh

Gigawatt-hourha

Hectares (land area)

HH

Household

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IEA

International Energy Agency

KEDO

Korean Peninsula Economic Development Organization

KEEI

Korea Energy Economics Institute

KFRI

Korea Forest Research Institutekg

KilogramkJ

Kilojoules (thousand Joules)kVkilovolts (1000 Volts)kWkilowatt (one thousand Watts)

kWh

Kilowatt-hour

kWp

Peak kilowatts (power output)
xxvi

Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKLEDLight-emitting Diode

LWR

Light Water Reactor

Mha

Million Hectares (land area)

MJ

Megajoule (million Joules)

NPT

Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty

MVA

Megavolt-Amp (million volt-amps)

MW

Megawatt (one million Watts)

MWh

Megawatt-hour

N2O

Nitrous Oxide

NOx

Oxides of Nitrogen

Pass-km

Passenger-kilometer (a unit of transportation service)

PCBs

Polychlorinated Biphenyls

PJ

Petajoule (1015 Joules)

PPP

Purchasing Power Parity

PRC

People’s Republic of China

PWR

Pressurized Water Reactor

RFE

Russian Far East

ROK

Republic of Korea

SOx

Oxides of Sulfur

T&D

Transmission and Distribution

TCE

Tonnes of Coal Equivalent

TJ

Terajoule (1012 Joules)

TOE

Tonne of Oil Equivalent

Tonne-kmTonne-kilometer (a unit of transportation service)

TWhTerawatt-hour

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

US

United States

USD

United States Dollar

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WFP

United Nations World Food Programme

UN FAO

United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
xxvii

Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK1.

Introduction and Background: The DPRK Energy Sector
1.1.

Purpose and Goal of Report

During the decade of the 1990s and continuing through the second decade and now into the third
decade of the 21st century, a number of issues have focused international attention on the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the DPRK). Most of these issues—including nuclear
weapons proliferation, military transgressions, provocations, and posturing, economic collapse,
transboundary air pollution, food shortages, floods, droughts, tidal waves, the death of North
Korean leader Kim Jong Il and the passing of the DPRK leadership mantle to the third generationof the Kim dynasty in Chairman Kim Jong Un, increasingly stringent United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) sanctions on the DPRK economy, and the summits over the last two years
involving Chairman Kim, Republic of Korea President Moon Jae-in, and former United States
President Donald Trump—have their roots in a complex mixture of Korean and Northeast Asian
history, global economic power shifts, environmental events, and internal structural dilemmas in
the DPRK economy. Energy demand and supply in general—and, arguably, demand for andsupply of electricity in particular—have played a key role in many of these high-profile issues
involving the DPRK and have played and will play (and are playing, as of February 2021) a
central role in the resolution of the ongoing confrontation between the DPRK and much of theinternational community over the DPRK nuclear weapons program. It was unclear as when thisReport was finalized whether international engagement on addressing DPRK nuclear weapons
and related issues, a process that has seen many periods of optimism, and even more ofpessimism, over the past decades, will be successfully initiated in the coming year. It may welltake some time for the new United States Administration of President Joe Biden to form a DPRK
policy team and to develop and pursue a DPRK engagement strategy.
If a multilateral engagement strategy comes to fruition, it will likely involve many or all of thesame actors (and perhaps others) that participated in the Six-Party Talks process of the 2000s.
What is clear, however, is that DPRK energy sector issues will continue to be a key to theresolution of the nuclear weapons issues that are the major (if by no means the only) disputes
preventing the DPRK from working with its neighbors and others in the international community
to redevelop its economy. At such times as the DPRK and the international community sit down
to address DPRK nuclear weapons and related issues (such as missile development), it is certainthat options for energy and economic assistance to the DPRK will be discussed, as they havebeen during negotiations dating back at least to the 1994 Agreed Framework. Understanding the
DPRK energy sector, to the extent that it is possible for an outsider to do so, is and will be
crucial to developing useful, effective, and appropriate energy and economic inducements tobring the DPRK to the negotiating table and keep them engaged through what will inevitably bea long process of stepwise improvements in relations.
The purpose of this Report is to provide policymakers and other interested parties with an
overview of the demand for and supply of the various forms of energy used in the DPRK in a
number of years during the last three decades:•

1990, the year before much of the DPRK's economic and technical support from the Soviet
Union was withdrawn;
1

Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•

1996, thought by some to be one of the most meager years of the difficult economic 1990s in
the DPRK; and•2000, a year that has been perceived by some observers as a period of modest economic"recovery" in the DPRK, as well as a marker of the period before the start, in late 2002, of aperiod of renewed political conflict between the DPRK, the United States, and it neighbors inNortheast Asia over the DPRK’s nuclear weapons development program; and•2005, also a year in which observers have again noted an upward trend in some aspects of the
DPRK economy, as well as the most recent year for which any published estimates on the
DPRK’s energy sector and economy are available.

•

2008, the last year in which the DPRK received heavy fuel oil from its negotiating partners in
the Six-Party talks;•

2009 and 2010, years marked by a notable lack of engagement between the DPRK and theinternational community, but also by events such as a second nuclear weapons test by the
DPRK and the unveiling of an operating uranium enrichment facility.1•

2014 through 2020, the most recent years for which we have analyzed the DPRK’s energy
sector, and years spanning a period of economic growth and expanded imports and exports
for the DPRK, followed by the application of a series of United Nations Security Council(UNSC) sanctions on the DPRK’s energy and other imports and exports, on-and-off
discussions with the ROK and the US, additional DPRK tests of nuclear weapons andmissiles, and other events, capped in 2020 by the global, regional, and national DPRK
response to the COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019) pandemic.

Requirements for fuels to provide people with energy services—and the ways in which fuels,
including electricity, coal, oil, and biomass, are supplied—are tightly linked to social, political,
and economic conditions, and to the demand for industrial commodities. To analyze the status ofand prospects for changes in electricity demand and supply in the DPRK, we have developed
internally-consistent estimated energy balances for 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008 through 2010,
and 2014 through 2020 for the whole of the DPRK economy on a sector-by-sector basis. Thismethod allows a review of the energy situation in a broader context, and illuminates some of the
key issues, options, and uncertainties that must be included in the consideration of energy—
including electricity, coal, oil, and biomass fuels—supply and demand, present and future, in the
DPRK. We conclude with a discussion of what can be done to improve the energy situation in
the DPRK, and of the role of international cooperation in assisting the DPRK with addressing
energy-sector issues—issues that very often have ramifications beyond its national borders.
This analysis described in this report updates Nautilus studies of the energy situation in the
DPRK that have been ongoing since 1994.2 As a consequence, the estimates presented here are
1 See, for example, CNN (2020), “North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts”, CNN Editorial Research, updated June 21, 2020,

and available as https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html.
2 Nautilus experience drawn upon in preparing this study includes analyses of Korean security issues from 1980 on, and more
recently: Several consulting missions to the DPRK, on energy sector and environmental issues, undertaken in the early 1990s, for
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); an analysis of the DPRK's energy situation as of 1990, and an assessmentof the degree to which energy efficiency measures could result in improved performance of the DPRK energy sector (Von
Hippel, D. F., and P. Hayes, The Prospects For Energy Efficiency Improvements in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea:
Evaluating and Exploring the Options. Nautilus Institute Report, December, 1995); a review of the demand for and supply ofheavy fuel oil in the DPRK as of 1996, with demand pathways for the year 2000, prepared for the Korean Peninsula Energy

2Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKin many cases based on earlier work, revised to take into account new information and new
insights from colleagues with knowledge of and experience in DPRK energy sector issues.
Some of the new information and insights used in previous updates were gleaned from the papers
and discussions presented at the “DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting”, held June
26th and 27th in Palo Alto, California, USA, a second meeting of the same name held in Beijing,
China, in March of 2008, and a “DPRK Energy and Minerals Experts Working Group Meeting”
held also in Beijing, in September of 2010. See http://www.nautilus.org/projects/dprk-energy for
information on and papers and presentations from these Meetings.
The discussions and text provided here are in many cases modified versions of discussions inearlier reports, but, particularly for this report, estimates of energy sector activity in earlier years(1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, and 2008 through 2010) have been revised as information fromcolleagues and the literature have changed our understanding of both the present and the historyof the DPRK energy sector. The goal of this work is to provide, to the extent that time allows,quantitative estimates of annual "snapshots" of the evolution of the DPRK energy situation overthe past three decades. This update endeavors to take into account as much recent and current
information as possible, despite the considerable difficulties inherent in obtaining reliable
information about the DPRK.
1.2.

Summary and History of the Current Economic Situation in the DPRKThe DPRK energy system exists to serve the DPRK economy. As such, we present a very brief
review of the recent and not-so-recent history of the economy in the DPRK, and of the forcesthat have helped to shape and change the economy.

Development Organization (KEDO); research focusing on the DPRK electricity system, updating our estimate of the status of the
DPRK energy sector to 1996, and elaborating and evaluating energy pathways for the DPRK to 2005 (D.F. Von Hippel, and P.
Hayes, Demand and Supply of Electricity and Other Fuels in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Nautilus
Institute (prepared for Northeast Asia Economic Forum), 1997); a discussion of the rural energy crisis in the DPRK, and of
measures that might be taken to rebuild rural energy and agricultural infrastructure in the country (J. Williams, D.F. Von Hippel,and P. Hayes, Fuel and Famine, Rural Energy Policy Options in the DPRK, Nautilus Institute, March 2000); and a long-term
project, which to date has included three missions by U.S. engineers to the DPRK, to provide wind-powered electricity
generation, electricity storage, efficient electric end-use equipment, and water pumping windmills to a flood-affected village in arural area of the DPRK. In the latter project, Nautilus engineers worked (and played) side-by-side with North Koreancounterparts to construct facilities in the village. The project has also included what is to our knowledge the first systematicsurvey of rural energy use ever carried out in the DPRK. (J. Williams et al, “The Wind Farm in the Cabbage Patch”, Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1999). The two most recent versions of Nautilus’ DPRK energy sector analyses, and thestarting points for the preparation of this document (and the analysis that underlies it), were D. Von Hippel, P. Hayes, and T.
Savage, March, 2003, The DPRK Energy Sector: Estimated Year 2000 Energy Balance and Suggested Approaches to Sectoral
Redevelopment, available as http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/DPRK_Energy_20001.pdf. D. von Hippel and P.
Hayes, June 2007 Fueling DPRK Energy Futures and Energy Security: 2005 Energy Balance, Engagement
Options, and Future Paths, available as http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/07042DPRKEnergyBalance.pdf, , andthe most recent (prior to the current volume) published full version of Nautilus’ DPRK energy sector analysis, David von Hippel
and Peter Hayes (2012) Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances, Engagement Options, andFuture Paths for Energy and Economic Redevelopment", NAPSNet Special Reports, dated December 18, 2012, available athttps://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/foundations-of-energy-security-for-the-dprk-1990-2009-energy-balancesengagement-options-and-future-paths-for-energy-and-economic-redevelopment, from which PDF versions of both the Main
Report and its Attachments volume can be downloaded. A partial update to the latter report is available as David F. von Hippel
and Peter Hayes (2014), An Updated Summary of Energy Supply and Demand in the Democratic People’s Republic Of Korea(DPRK), NAPSNet Special Reports, April 15, 2014, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/an-updated-summary-ofenergy-supply-and-demand-in-the-democratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-dprk/. A large number of more recent (2000 through2020) Nautilus DPRK-related publications are referenced later in this Report.

3
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

1.2.1. Brief history of the evolution of the DPRK economy following WWII, andstatus as of 1990
Although the affirmation of a unified and independent Korean state was agreed upon by the
major powers in discussions during 1943 to 1945, the Yalta Conference at the end of World War
II resulted in the partitioning of Korea.3 The boundary created thereby was altered slightly by
the 1953 armistice that suspended hostilities in the Korean War. Since then, the Korean
Peninsula has been politically and economically divided. “North Korea” (the DPRK), backed
politically by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, was formed in the area southof Russia and China (bordered by the Amnok and Tumen rivers) and roughly north of the 38th
parallel, while the portion of the peninsula south of the 38th parallel became the Republic ofKorea (ROK), backed politically and militarily by a host of Western nations, prominently
including the United States. The two Korean states went on to rebuild their shattered economic
infrastructure and pursue development in very different ways, aided by their different economic
and political partners. The DPRK's economic rise from the ashes of war was impressive,
particularly given its political isolation from the Western world. In the three decades since 1990,
however, the effective end of the Cold War and the substantial withdrawal of economic aid fromthe former Soviet Bloc, together with other world and regional events, have set the DPRK's
economy in what most observers agree is either a downward spiral or (at best) stagnation, withyears of modest improvement interspersed with years in which economic conditions worsened.
The DPRK is a nation of, depending on the source of the information, somewhat under 20
million to over 24 million people (as of 2010—and probably close to 25 million in 2020), withapproximately 60 percent4 of the population living in urban areas. The population growth rate
for the nation had been estimated near 1.8 percent per year as of 1990, but the DPRK populationin fact probably decreased, overall, in the decade of the 1990s, with perhaps some modest growthin population since.5 DPRK population centers, as well as the bulk of industry and agriculture,
are concentrated in the coastal plains on both the east and particularly west coasts of thepeninsula. The interior of the peninsula is generally rugged and mountainous.
Political/infrastructure and topographic maps of the DPRK are provided as Figure 1-1 and Figure
1-2.

3 Embassy of the Republic of Korea (1997), “Historical Background of the Division of the Korean Peninsula”.

Part of “The
Unification Policy of Korea”, presented at the time as part of the ROK Embassy (Washington, DC) World-wide Web site,
http://korea.emb.washington.dc.us/korea/Division.html, although no longer available, at least in the same format.
4 Anecdotal reports in the years around 2000 suggested movement of population from some urban areas to the countryside, inpart to help provide labor to bring in crops, and in part for improved access to food. Official statistics, however (see next
footnote) do not reflect a significant urban-rural movement.
5 Census data from the DPRK are notoriously unreliable, when available. An official DPRK census for the year 2008 (DPR
Korea National Population Census, 2008, Central Bureau of Statistics, Pyongyang, 2009, available ashttps://dataspace.princeton.edu/bitstream/88435/dsp01hx11xh65b/1/DSDPRKoreacensus2008.pdf) was completed under United
Nations auspices in 2009, and was the first such official data made available in many years. Though comprehensive andgenerally accepted by researchers working on DPRK issues (in part due to a lack of better alternatives), its estimate of a total
DPRK population of over 24 million in 2008 seemed overstated to many, including the authors, though we have provisionallyused this value and other data from the 2008 census in preparing the energy balances described in this report.

4
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 1-1: Political Map of the DPRK6

6 Map published by the United Nations Department of Public Information, dated 2001, and available ashttps://reliefweb.int/map/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/reference-map-democratic-peoples-republic-korea.

5
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 1-2: Topographic Map of the DPRK7

The government of North Korea is a one-party, socialist system. North Korean politics has,since the formation of the DPRK, been dominated by the Kim family. Kim Il Sung, the "Great
Leader", ruled the DPRK with a tightly controlled inner circle of advisors (Politburo) from justafter World War II until his death in July of 1994. His thought and writings form the primarybasis of the DPRK political framework, which has at its root the principal of “Juch’e”, or
national self-reliance8. The mantle of leadership then passed to the son of Kim Il Sung, Kim

7 Map downloaded from GlobalSecurity.org in March, 2007, and available as

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/images/dprk-map-topo.jpg.
8 Document in Authors' files [HT1].

6
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKJong Il. Upon Kim Jong Il’s death on December 17, 20119, leadership of the nation and the titleof Chairman was passed to a third generation of the Kim family, then 27- (or 28, sources differ)year-old Kim Jong Un, supported at that time by senior Kim family members and close advisors,
although since that time Kim Jong Un has significantly consolidated his power and changed thestaffing of many senior leadership positions.10 11
The economy of North Korea, hobbled by years of Japanese occupation in the period prior toWorld War II, was shattered by the Korean War. Through political and economic discipline, andstrategic aid from East Bloc allies, Kim Il Sung and his government were able to rebuild theNorth Korean economy by focusing on economic autarchy and heavy industries such as theextraction and refining of minerals. A series of national plans set output goals for key
commodities such as iron and steel, coal, electricity, cement, fertilizer, and grain. Collectivized
agriculture and state-owned companies reportedly accounted for about 90 percent of all
economic activity in the early 1990s.12 Key economic resources for the DPRK include:•

A well-trained, disciplined work force;•

An effective system for dissemination of technologies;•

The ability to rapidly mount massive public works projects by mobilizing military and otherlabor; and•Extensive reserves of minerals.

The impressive economic gains of the 1960s and early 1970s, however, were slowed in
the 1980s and especially early 1990s as a result of a number of factors, including:•Foreign debt incurred in purchasing industrial equipment and oil.

•

The global "oil crises" of the 1970s, and the related slowdown in the global economy.

•

The decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, and the resulting reduction in
Soviet/Russian aid to the DPRK and in markets for many DPRK-made goods.

•

Poor grain harvests in the early 1990s.

Estimates of gross national product (GNP) per capita in the DPRK are complicated by the fixed(but arbitrarily set) exchange rate between the DPRK Won and hard currencies (such as the US
dollar); in recent years, the DPRK government has undertaken various monetary actions with
impacts on the exchange rate, including a major devaluation of the Won versus the dollar in 2006
(from 0.45 to about .006 USD per Won13), and a controversial “currency reform” in late 2009.14

9 See, for example, BBC News Asia, “North Korean leader Kim Jong-il dies 'of heart attack'”, dated December 19, 2011, andavailable as http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16239693.
10 See, for example, Ruediger Frank (2011), The Party as the Kingmaker: The Death of Kim Jong Il and its Consequences forNorth Korea, Nautilus Institute NAPSNet Policy Forum, dated December 22, 2011, and available as
http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/forum/Kingmaker_Ruediger.
11 See, for example, Joyce Lee and Josh Smith (2019), “Kim Jong Un consolidates power as North Korea shuffles leadership”,
Reuters, dated April 11, 2019, and available as https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-appointments/kim-jong-unconsolidates-power-as-north-korea-shuffles-leadership-idUSKCN1RN2YO.
12 United States Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (UDOE/EIA, 1996), Country Analysis Brief, North
Korea. Part of USDOE/EIA World-wide Web site, WWW.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nkorea.html.
13 XE.com currency converter (http://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=KPW&to=USD&view=10Y), accessed January 26,
2012.

7
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK“Black market” exchange rates between the dollar (and other hard currencies, such as the Euro)and the Won have typically been much higher (more Won per dollar) than the official rates.
Estimates of per capita GNP in 1990 ranged from an official value of about US $2,000 (probably
in 1990 dollars), down to estimates in the range of US $1,000 by international observers.15 Per
capita GDP has remained, at least by ROK estimates, in the range of $1000 per capita in the late
2000s.16 The (U.S.) CIA World Factbook lists the DPRK’s 2009 GDP per capita at $1800,
expressed on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis in 2010 dollars.17 The online version of the
CIA World Factbook as of 2020 lists the 2015 GDP per capita at $1700 per person on a PPP
basis in 2015 dollars.18 An article quoting the Bank of Korea listed GDP per capita in 2018 atslightly under $1300 per capita, presumably in current dollars, and also presumably not on PPP
terms.19
Although North Korea has raw materials—particularly minerals—that are of interest to trading
partners, it has produced few finished goods (with the exception of armaments) that are of highenough quality to attract international buyers. The DPRK's major trading partners as of 1990—
the reference year for the time series in this study—were China, Russia, Iran (reportedly trading
oil for armaments), and Japan. The DPRK had limited trade with other Asian nations, as well as,
on and off, with some European and other nations. The value of imports to North Korea
exceeded that of exports by $600 million in 1990. Trade in 1991—both exports and imports—
was already down markedly from 1990.20
1.2.2. Changes in the DPRK since 1990
The economic, if not social and political, landscape in the DPRK changed markedly during the
1990s. In the early 1990s, the North Korean government openly admitted the country's failure toachieve the economic goals of its most recent seven-year plan.21 Although little data have been
available from inside the DPRK, information from outside observers of the country indicates that
the North Korean economy was at best stagnating, and most probably in considerable decline,
through the mid-1990s.22 This economic decline has been both a result and a cause of substantialchanges in energy demand and supply in North Korea over the decade of the 1990s, largely
14 See, for example, S. Haggard and M. Noland (2010), The Winter of Their Discontent: Pyongyang Attacks the Market, Peterson

Institute for International Economics Policy Brief Number PB 10-1, dated January 2010, and available as
http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb10-01.pdf.
15 1990 GDP estimates for DPRK using a "purchasing power parity" measure of production and value that adjusts for the pricesof key commodities in different countries are closer to $2000 per capita.
16 ERINA, quoting the Bank of Korea (ROK) lists $989 (USD) estimated per capita GDP for the DPRK in 1996, $757 in 2000,
and $914 in 2004 (Page 50, Chapter 5 of Northeast Asia Economic Databook 2005, dated approximately December, 2005,. The
DailyNK (2012) quoted a ROK source as estimating per capita GNI (gross national income) for the DPRK in 2010 as $1074(Park Seong Guk, DailyNK, dated 18 January 2012, and available as
http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=8696). Factoring in inflation, the GDP/GNI per capita
estimates for 2004 and 2010 were nearly the same.
17 United States Central Intelligence Agency (2012), The World Factbook, “East and Southeast Asia: Korea, North”, previously
available as https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html, as updated 5 January 2012.
18 US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 2020), “Korea, North”, available as https://www.cia.gov/the-worldfactbook/countries/korea-north.
19 See, for example, Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein (2019), “North Korea’s economic contraction in 2018: what the BoK numbers
tell us”, North Korean Economy Watch, dated July 26th, 2019, and available ashttps://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/statistics/gdp-statistics/.
20 Korea Foreign Trade Association (1993), Major Economic Indicators for North Korea.
21 The Economist Intelligence Unit (1994), South Korea, North Korea No. 1 1994. The Economist Intelligence Unit, London,
United Kingdom. Country Report, 1st Quarter 1994.
22 Far Eastern Economic Review (1995), 1995 Asia Yearbook, North Korea.

8
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKcontinuing to this day. Observers of the DPRK economy have suggested that at least a modest
improvement took place in the years around 2000—ROK sources, for example, estimated thatthe DPRK economy grew approximately 6 percent in 1999, and another 1.3 percent in 200023.
An estimate from 2010 by the Bank of Korea showed the DPRK economy (as measured byGDP) growing at 0.4 percent in 2000, and by amounts varying from 1.2 to 3.8 percent annuallyfrom 2001 through 2005, followed by a period of slow decline (-0.5 to -1.2 percent/yr) in all
years from 2006 through 2010 except 2008, when growth of 3.1 percent was estimated, meaning
essentially zero overall growth in the DPRK economy from 2006 through 2010.24 Other
observers, however, tended to argue that most of any economic upturn in the DPRK economy in
the years 2000 through 2005 appears to have been driven by food and other aid from abroad,
inputs that have diminished over the last few years of the 2000s.25
As suggested above, estimates of the DPRK’s GDP over time are complex, typically difficult toevaluate, and vary considerably from source to source. Quoting the Bank of Korea, the website“Trading Economics” provides the chart shown in Figure 1-3.26 Here, the DPRK economy isestimated to have expanded through much of the first half of the 2010s, and again in 2016, but tohave contracted in 2017 and 2018, presumably, at least in part, as a result of UNSC sanctions
restricting DPRK imports and exports. The same source projects DPRK GDP growth in 2020
and the next few years as follows:“GDP Annual Growth Rate in North Korea is expected to reach -5.50 percent by the end of
2020, according to Trading Economics global macro models and analysts expectations. In thelong-term, the North Korea GDP Annual Growth Rate is projected to trend around -1.00
percent in 2021 and 1.30 percent in 2022, according to our econometric models.”
A North Korean economist, however, said in an interview that the DPRK economy in fact
expanded by 3.7 percent during 2017, the first full year in which stringent UNSC sanctions werein place. Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, an analyst of the DPRK economy and the author of thearticle in which the quote of the DPRK economist (“Ri Gi Song, a professor of the Institute of
Economics at the Academy of Social Sciences”) rightly suggests that “[e]ven though North
Korean economic data has become somewhat more public and plentiful in the past few years,
there are still undeniable political imperatives in publishing data that makes the country appear
resilient in the face of sanctions. After all, if sanctions are not “working” (whatever that may

23

Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) data (formally available fromhttp://www.kotra.or.kr/main/info/nk/eng/main.php3, visited 6/3/02) in "South/North Korea's Trend of Real (GDP) Growth Rate",
which lists the Bank of Korea as a Source. Similar growth in the North Korean "GNI" was also cited in data provided to Nautilusby the Korea Energy Economics Institute.
24 Bank of Korea (2011), New Release: Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2010, dated November 3, 2011,
and available as http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/GDP_of_North_Korea_in_2010.pdf.
25 For example, N. Eberstadt (2001), If North Korea Were Really "Reforming", How Could We Tell—And What Would We Be
Able To See? states "...official claims of 'turning the corner' and 'completing the Forced March' notwithstanding, the DPRK
remains in dire economic straits". Eberstadt goes on to cite the UN Food and Agriculture Organization's finding that DPRK
cereal production in 2000/2001 "is expected to be fully a third below the level of 1995/96", and asserts, based in part on the
DPRK's meager reported export earnings in the first half of 2001, that "The country's export capabilities are likewise in a state ofvirtual collapse…".
26 Trading Economics (2020), “North Korea GDP Annual Growth Rate”, undated, but apparently mid-2020 or later, and available
as https://tradingeconomics.com/north-korea/gdp-annual-growth-rate.

9
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKmean), what’s the point in keeping them? That, of course, doesn’t mean that such figures areaccurate, wholly or partially.”27
Figure 1-3: Estimated Changes in GDP in the DPRK, 2010 through 2019

Among the energy-sector changes on the supply side in the DPRK since 1990 have been:•

A vast drop in imports of fuels (particularly crude oil and refined products, but coal and coke
as well) from the Soviet Union and Russia. An index of these imports declined from a valueof over 140 in 1987 to 8.7 in 1993, and crude oil imports from Russia in 1993 were on theorder of one-tenth what they were in 1990,28 and have fallen to practically zero since.

•

A steady decline in the exports of coal to China between 1988 and 1993, with the value of
those exports receding in 1993 to approximately a tenth what they were in 1990. This fall
may have been a sign of reduced output in the DPRK coal industry, particularly as coal
imports to North Korea from China remained near the same level (in dollar terms) from atleast 1982 through the early 1990s.29•

Since 2000, and particularly since 2010, however, the exports of coal and other raw mineralproducts (largely iron and steel scrap and metals ores) to China have increased dramatically,
with coal exports to China reaching 2.8 million tonnes in 2005, 4.6 million tonnes by 2010
and over 22 million tonnes, by 2016, before reported trades (at least) declined due to the

27 Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein (2018), “North Korea’s economic growth – from Pyongyang’s perspective”, North Korea

Economy Watch, dated October 15, 2018, and available as part of https://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/statistics/gdpstatistics/.
28 U.S. Bureau of the Census (1995a), The Collapse of Soviet and Russian Trade with the DPRK, 1989-1993: Impacts and
Implications. Prepared by N. Eberstadt, M. Rubin, and A. Tretyakova, Eurasia Branch, International Programs Center,
Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C., USA. March 9, 1995.
29 U.S. Bureau of the Census (1995b), China's Trade with the DPRK, 1990-1994: Pyongyang's Thrifty New Patron. North
Korea Trade Project Memorandum, International Programs Center, Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington,
D.C., USA. May 1995.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

impacts of UNSC sanctions.30 31 This is one manifestation of a recent increase in investmentin the DPRK by Chinese businesses, particularly in the raw materials sectors, but also, tosome degree, in manufacturing.32•

A change in oil refining equipment at the Ponghwa Chemical Factory to augment the amountof light petroleum products (principally gasoline) that the DPRK can produce from the crude
oil imported from China.

•

Significant new imports of vehicles, most recently including electric bicycles/scooters, since
2010.

•

Expanded import and use, especially since 2010, of small-scale generation equipment,
including solar photovoltaic panels and diesel and gasoline generators by households,
businesses, and other organizations in the DPRK.

Oil import restrictions have reduced the availability of refined products in the DPRK. These
problems arose partly (if indirectly) from economic sanctions related to the nuclear proliferation
issue (see below), and partly from North Korea's inability to pay for oil imports with hardcurrency. This lack of fuel, particularly for the transport sector, has probably contributed to the
DPRK’s economic malaise since 1990. Another factor contributing to the decline in the
country’s economic fortunes has been the inability (again, partly due to lack of foreign exchange,and partly due to Western economic sanctions) to obtain key spare parts for factories, including
factories built with foreign assistance and/or technology in the 1970s.33 Also, as mentioned
above, there has been, in the years since 1990, a virtual halt in economic aid, technical assistanceand barter trade on concessional or favorable terms from Russia and other Eastern European
nations. This reduction, coupled with a sharp decline in similar types of assistance from China(including, in the years between 1995 and 2000, a sharp reduction in crude oil shipments to the
DPRK), had resulted in a total estimated loss of aid to the DPRK economy of more than $ US 1
billion per year34 by the mid-1990s. The DPRK's trade deficit as of 2000 stood at $US 856.88
million,35 remained at near one billion dollars through 2004,36 and was over one billion dollars in

30 N. Aden, “North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and

Implications”, as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA,
USA). Dr. Aden's paper is available as http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/0679Aden1.pdf.
31 Figure for 2010 DPRK coal exports to China from United Nations Comtrade database,
http://comtrade.un.org/db/dqBasicQuery.aspx, accessed 8/2012. Reported coal imports into China from the DPRK in 2011 werean even higher 11.2 million tonnes, more than double the 2010 value.
32 Issues related to Chinese investment in the DPRK, and changes in DPRK policies that have made investment possible, areaddressed in the Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online 06-70A, August 23rd, 2006, “DPRK's Reform and Sino-DPRK
Economic Cooperation” , by Li Dunqiu (https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/dprks-reform-and-sino-dprkeconomic-cooperation/). See also Professor Li’s presentation as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group
Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA, and available as
http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKEnergyMeeting/Papers/Li.ppt. Professor Li describes two “waves” of recent Chinese investmentin the DPRK, with a first wave of investment led by private companies and businessmen, mainly from China’s northeast
provinces, and the second wave described as “mostly represented by large state-owned enterprises, in areas like heavy industry,
energy, mineral [resources] and transportation”.
33 As of 1995 the DPRK’s trade deficit was estimated at $879 million (United States Department of Energy’s Energy Information
Administration (UDOE/EIA, 1996), Country Analysis Brief, North Korea. Part of USDOE/EIA World-wide Web site, previously
available as WWW.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nkorea.html.)
34 United States Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (UDOE/EIA, 1996), Country Analysis Brief, North
Korea. Part of USDOE/EIA World-wide Web site, previously available as WWW.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nkorea.html.
35 Joongang Ilbo, Lee Young-jong, "North Korea Overseas Trade Reaps $1.97 Billion For Last Year," Seoul, 06/04/01. The
figures come from the ROK's Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA).

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

2009 and 2010,37 before declining markedly through 2016, as a result of increased imports ofcoal and other goods, then rising to on the order of $2 billion or more in 2017 and 2018 (sources
differ), mostly with China, and probably mostly due to the impacts of UNSC sanctions.38
1.2.3. Impacts of flooding and food shortages
The economic difficulties mentioned above have been exacerbated by an untimely combinationof climatic events. The early 1990s saw a series of poor grain harvests in the DPRK.
Compounding these difficulties, 1995 and 1996 brought severe flooding to many areas of the
DPRK, washing away topsoil from areas at higher elevation, and burying many areas of crucial
low-lying farmland in tens of centimeters of silt or sand.39 An additional blow to North Korean
agricultural production was dealt by a tidal wave, caused by a typhoon at sea, that swept overand heavily damaged a long dike on the west coast of the DPRK in September of 1997,
inundating hundreds of thousands of hectares of rice fields. The combined effects of flooding
and poor harvests—even before the damage from the tidal wave was factored in—were a foodshortage severe enough to spur the DPRK government to take the unusual step of publicly
requesting food aid from the international community. Additional floods and tidal waves inseveral areas of the country caused damage to agricultural areas in 2006, and left tens of
thousands of residential homeless. This cycle of misery caused by flooding returned to the
DPRK in the summers of 2007, 2010, 2011, 2018 (exacerbated by extreme heat during thegrowing season) and, most recently, 2020.40
Many observers of the DPRK, particularly in areas away from the major cities, have reported
that in many periods over the past three decades official rations have been far from sufficient tomeet dietary requirements, that people are supplementing their rations with tree-bark, grass, andwhatever other semi-edible materials they could obtain, and that those people seen in the streets36

As estimated by ERINA (Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia) in Chapter 5 of Northeast Asia Economic Databook
2005, dated approximately December 2005. ERINA’s estimates are based on data from the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion
Agency (KOTRA) for trade between the DPRK and nations other than the DRPK, plus figures on trade between the Koreas fromthe ROK Ministry of Unification. Page 53.
37 Bank of Korea (2011),”New Release: Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2010”, dated November 3, 2011,
and available as http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/GDP_of_North_Korea_in_2010.pdf.
38 See, for example, Trading Economics (2020), “North Korea Balance of Trade”, available ashttps://tradingeconomics.com/north-korea/balance-of-trade, Ben Heubl (2018), “North Korea's mysterious trade deficit with
China -- in charts”, Nikkei Asia, dated October 8, 2018, and available as https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Datawatch/NorthKorea-s-mysterious-trade-deficit-with-China-in-charts, Alex Lockie (2018), “North Korea falls into $1.7 billion trade deficit with
China — but something mysterious is keeping it afloat”, Business Insider, dated Feb 21, 2018, and available ashttps://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-17-billion-china-trade-deficit-suggests-mysterious-funding-2018-2 , andMaximilian Ernst and Eliana Kim (2020), “Economic Development under Kim Jong Un: The Added Value of Traffic Data andEstablished Indicators in the Study of North Korea’s Economy”, North Korean Review, Volume 16 Number 2, Fall 2020, pages
26 – 48. The latter includes estimates of DPRK trade derived from data from ROK’s KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment
Promotion Agency).
39 One such affected region is the Sinuiju area, where, after the 1995 floods, “…sand poured in from the Yalu Riverand destroyed all the rice fields in the region” (Bernard Krisher “Urgent Proposals To Get Food & Drugs To North Korea”,
extracted in Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Daily Report, 30 May 1997. Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, CA, USA.
40 See, for example, Cankor (2011), “DPRK Flood Damage Reports by KCNA”, dated 8 August 2011, and available as
http://vtncankor.wordpress.com/2011/08/08/dprk-flood-damage-reports-by-kcna/; United States Central Intelligence Agency(2010), North Korea: Assessing the Impact of Flooding on Agricultural Output (U//FOUO), dated 15 December 2010, andavailable as http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/nk-flood.pdf, and 38 North (2020), “How Extreme Flooding in the DPRK Affects
Daily Life”, dated September 23, 2020 and available as https://www.38north.org/2020/09/nkflooding092320/. On its home pagefor its DPRK program (“Democratic People's Republic of Korea“, available as https://www.wfp.org/countries/democraticpeoples-republic-korea) the World Food Program notes the impacts of the 2018 floods and droughts on DPRK food production.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

were thin and weak.41 It is reported that in the 2000s official food distribution channels nolonger functioned in many cities in the DPRK, especially in northern areas of the country, andthat as a result residents are turning to unofficial "farmers' markets", which include produce
grown on plots of land managed by individual farmers, for much of their food.42 The consensus
is that substantial (but unknown) numbers of citizens starved in the latter half of the 1990s, andpossibly in recent years as well, and that hundreds of thousands more (at least) have been andcontinue to be malnourished and gravely at risk. Given drops in the amount of food aid being
donated to the DPRK, the World Food Programme (WFP) warned in 2002 that it was facing ashortage of 611,000 tonnes of food in 2002.43 The United States announced in 2002 that it
would donate 100,000 tonnes to help alleviate this shortage,44 and made other contributions insubsequent years. The WFP reported that significant food shortages in the DPRK continued asof 2006/2007, and continued to appeal to the international community for additional donations,though its program in the DPRK was revised in 2006 toward a more “developmental” focus at
the request of the DPRK government.45 46 As of 2011, the DPRK, based on assessments by theWorld Food Program and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, remained shortof food due to poor harvests and limited ability to secure food imports.47 WFP estimated that 40
percent of North Koreans were malnourished as of about 2018, despite some recent gains in foodsecurity up to that time.48 Due to flooding, COVID-19, and other circumstances, a resurgence of
extreme lack of food in the DPRK is feared for 2020 as well.49
Apart from the overriding human concerns associated with the food shortage, the chronicmalnutrition and intermittent slow starvation reportedly suffered by the DPRK populace cannot
help but decrease economic production still further, as poorly-fed people are less capable ofwork.50 The flooding of 1995 and 1996 damaged an unknown number of irrigation dams and
41 See, for example, Jordan Weissmann (2011), “How Kim Jong Il Starved North Korea”, The Atlantic, dated December 20,

2011, and available as https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/12/how-kim-jong-il-starved-north-korea/250244/.
42 See, for example, North Korean Economy Watch (2011), “Archive for the ‘General markets (FMR: Farmers Market)’Category”, several articles from 2011, available as http://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/farmers-markets/page/8/.
43 Testimony by John Powell, Regional Director for Asia at the World Food Programme, before the Subcommittee on East Asiaand the Pacific of the US House of Representatives International Relations Committee, May 2, 2002.
44 Reuters (2002), "US to Donate 100,000 Tons Of Food To North Korea," Washington, 06/07/02.
45 As of 2006, the WFP (in “Where we work - Korea (DPR), Food Security: Overview”, then available as
http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=408) noted “The 2006 deficit is forecast by the UN Food andAgriculture Organization, WFP’s sister agency, at some 800,000 metric tons (tonnes) – about 15 per cent of needs. Many of thecountry’s 23 million people struggle to feed themselves on a diet critically deficient in protein, fats and micronutrients. Food is
scarcest during the ‘lean season’, the five-month period prior to the autumn rice and maize harvests when stocks of the previous
year’s crops rapidly run down.”
46 As of March 2007, the WFP reported a DPRK food gap of “of 1 million tons, or about 20 percent of its needs”, and noted thatit could only fill a fraction of the DPRK’s needs due to a ”huge” drop in donations over the past two years (Reuters, "NORTHKOREA DESPERATE FOR AID AMID NUCLEAR WOES: U.N.", 2007-03-28, as summarized in Napsnet (Northeast Asia
Peace and Security Network) Daily Report, 3/28/2007).
47 See, for example, CHOE SANG-HUN (2011), “North Korea’s Children in Need of Food Aid, Agencies Warn”, New YorkTimes, dated November 25, 2011, and available as http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/world/asia/north-koreas-children-inneed-of-food-aid-agencies-warn.html?_r=1.
48 United Nations World Food Program (WFP, 2019), “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea interim country strategic plan(2019–2021)”, dated February 2019, and available as https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP0000101974/download/?_ga=2.156492411.118969858.1605138322-1978348243.1605138322.
49 See, for example, James Fretwell (2020), “Why North Korea may be on the brink of another deadly ‘Arduous March’: famine
Sanctions, flooding, COVID-19 and other 2020 conditions look eerily similar to what caused the devastating 1990s famine”, NK
News, dated September 4, 2020, and available as https://www.nknews.org/2020/09/why-north-korea-may-be-on-the-brink-ofanother-deadly-arduous-march-famine/.
50 Another way in which the food shortage likely has affected the economy is that scrap metal, some taken from industrial
facilities, apparently has been (we do not know to what extent the practice continues) used as barter to obtain food via cross-13
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKcanals. Additional flooding in 1999 damaged both agricultural and industrial areas, as did
flooding in more recent years. Cumulative damage to and "wearing out" of agricultural andother infrastructure, coupled with damage to farmlands (both related to climatic events and longterm degradation), means that it may be years before the DPRK is able to grow enough food tofully feed its populace again, even if the required agricultural inputs (fertilizer, machinery, andfuel for the machinery) do become more available.
1.2.4. Past and current international relations and potential impacts on the DPRK
economy: negotiations, food aid, and the Agreed Framework
The DPRK maintains relatively good relations with Russia, China, and the countries of theformer East Bloc, although, as noted above, direct assistance and concessional trade from thesecountries (except, arguably, China) has been substantially suspended for most of the last thirty
years. Recent years—the mid-2000s through at least 2016, and probably continuing as of 2020,albeit at a lower and lower-profile level due to UNSC sanctions—have seen increasing
investment by China in the DPRK, with investments focused on minerals extraction and similarindustries. Relations with Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea remain tenuous,with the last two decades and more seeing cycles of apparent rapprochement scuttled by various
political and military incidents. As a summary to provide context for the discussions of the
DPRK energy sector in this Report, international negotiations with impacts on the DPRK
economy that have taken place in the past three decades have included:•

Negotiations regarding the provision of food aid to the DPRK. The DPRK has allowedinternational aid organizations, including the World Food Programme, International
Federation of the Red Cross, and various European aid agencies to set up residence inPyongyang. In the early years of the 21st century, aid workers had reported growing accessto areas of the country outside the capital, although still well below the desired level. In theyears since 2005, however, these organizations have in many instances been forced to scale
down their operations due to a sharp decrease in donations. The largest donor governments
have been the ROK, the United States, Japan, and the European Union. Russia also
reportedly provided a large amount of food aid to the DPRK, although outside of official
U.N. channels. China has also been a significant donor of food aid to the DPRK.51•

Talks relating to the “Agreed Framework” (see section 1.4.5, below). In these talks the
DPRK agreed to abandon its gas-cooled nuclear reactor program in exchange for anagreement by the US and the ROK to provide to the DPRK two pressurized water reactors
and shipments of heavy fuel oil until the reactors are ready to run. An official
groundbreaking for the reactors, attended by project personnel from several countries, washeld in the DPRK in August of 1997, and work at the reactor site, though significantly
delayed, was proceeding until about 2002 (see below). As of April 2007, the Agreed

border trade with China (Korea Times, "N. KOREA BARTERS SCRAP IRON FOR CHINESE FLOUR, CORN," Beijing,
05/18/97). Although the extent to which operational industrial facilities have been dismantled to trade for food is unknown, we
find it conceivable that even if the DPRK does manage to obtain the needed inputs and investment to restart industrial
production, many plants will be found to be inoperable due to key missing (sold for scrap) parts. In the same vein, there havealso been reports from defectors that North Koreans have cut pieces of telephone and electrical wire to barter the copper in themto Chinese smugglers in exchange for food and other items (Korea Times, "RUMORS OF WAR RAMPANT IN N. KOREA,"
05/23/97).
51 See, for example, the Dong-A Ilbo, “Scale of yearly Chinese unconditional aid to N. Korea unveiled”, June 24, 2012, available
as http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2012062508548.

14
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKFramework had unraveled completely, although both parties continued to argue that the otherparty was obliged to fulfill its past commitments under the Framework.
•

Bilateral US-DPRK talks that were underway during the Clinton administration largely
stalled since George W. Bush assumed the presidency, with limited net progress during theeight years that President Barak Obama was in the White House, although there have beensome (typically fleeting) moments of engagement and optimism. At a visit by U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State James A. Kelly to the DPRK in October of 2002, the United Statesdelegation confronted the DPRK with evidence that suggested that the DPRK was pursuing a
program to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons. This event started a period in which
the provisions of the Agreed Framework were in large part, and by degrees, scuttled by boththe United States and the DPRK sides, leading to the DPRK’s assembly and, in late 2006,
again in May of 2009, and four more times since, testing of nuclear explosive devices.52 US
President Donald Trump has pursued engagement with the DPRK largely based on
developing a personal relationship with DPRK Chairman Kim Jong Un. The two leaders met
three times, in Singapore, Hanoi, and in a rapidly assembled June 2019 meeting at
Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between the ROK and DPRK. These summit
meetings appeared to set the stage for additional discussions and engagement, but little
progress has been forthcoming.53 The DPRK’s major motivations for improving relations
with the United States include the desire to be removed from the U.S. list of terroristsponsoring nations, which would free it up to pursue aid from international financial
institutions dominated by the United States, receiving security guarantees from the UnitedStates, and, more recently, easing/removal of United Nations Security Council sanctions on
the DPRK economy, institutions, and individuals.

•

During the period from late 2002 through early 2007, a set of negotiations known as the SixParty Talks between the DPRK, its neighbors (China, Japan, the ROK, and Russia), and theUnited States have taken place. These negotiations have been marked by periods of action
and agreement interspersed with periods of relative estrangement of the parties. In Februaryof 2007, a tentative agreement was reached between the parties, the details of which were tohave been developed by the parties in a series of “working group” meetings.54 At the firstsession of the Six-Party Energy Working Group on February 17th 2007 in Beijing, the parties
began to discuss the energy dimension of a new framework based on the Six-Party
September 2005 Joint Principles and the February 13th Six-Party Agreement, under which the
DPRK would abandon its nuclear weapons programs in return for energy and otherassistance.55 Like the Agreed Framework, the Six-Party Talks process, although it concluded
some significant agreements, has similarly unraveled in recent years. By early 2012,
informal discussions continued regarding the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, and in the

52 For example, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IAEA Press Releases, Press Release 2006/17, “DPRK Nuclear

Test Statement by IAEA Director General”, 9 October 2006, and available as
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2006/prn200617.html; and Arms Control Association (2011), “Chronology of
U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy”, available as http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.
53 See, for example, Ankit Panda (2019), “US-North Korea Doldrums Return After Third Trump-Kim Summit”, The Diplomat,
dated July 17, 2019, and available as https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/us-north-korea-doldrums-return-after-third-trump-kimsummit/.
54 David von Hippel and Peter Hayes (2007), “Energy Security for North Korea”, Science, dated 01 Jun 2007, Vol. 316, Issue
5829, pp. 1288-1289, DOI:.10.1126/science.1142090.
55 See P. Hayes, The Beijing Deal is not the Agreed Framework, Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online 07-014A: February 14th,
2007, available at: http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/forum/security/07014Hayes.html/.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

years since it has remained unclear whether the process will be revived, and if so, what form
it might take if it is revived.
•

Bilateral ROK-DPRK talks have taken place on an on-again, off-again basis since the two
Koreas held their historic summit meeting in June 2000. The ROK has proposed several
projects for economic cooperation, including connecting the two countries' railroad systems
and building an industrial park in the border town of Kaesong. The Kaesong (or Gaeseong)industrial park project is ongoing, with several factories set up and working in the park; apower line from the ROK to Kaesong started operation in 2005.56 Disagreements between
the ROK and DPRK, and the ROK’s reaction to ongoing DPRK weapons testing, eventually
led the then-ROK leadership (the administration of President Park Geun-hye.) to withdraw
ROK workers and officials from Kaesong (also sometimes referred to as “Gaesong”) and tostop providing electricity and other support to the complex in 2015, and inter-Korean
activities there have not yet resumed as of 2020.57 Work on the rail interconnection
progressed, but a test run of the system was canceled by the DPRK in 2006.58 Other
cooperation projects between the Koreas have included meetings of relatives separated by thedivision of the Korean peninsula, the organization of tours to the Mount Kumgang area of the
DPRK (a project that has been on hold in recent years), and periodic food, fertilizer, medical,
and other humanitarian aid provision from the ROK to the DPRK.59 The current (as of 2020)
ROK administration of President Moon Jae-in has been more proactive and accommodating
than most previous ROK administrations in seeking to engage the DPRK in discussions, but
so far without significant breakthroughs.

•

Bilateral Japan-DPRK talks have usually broken down over allegations that the DPRK
kidnapped some 11 Japanese citizens, a charge that the DPRK denies. Talks in April 2002
resulted in an agreement by the DPRK to investigate the Japanese cases and to allow
Japanese wives of North Korean men to visit their families. The DPRK had hoped that that
normalization of relations with Japan would result in a substantial package of reparations forJapan's colonial rule, similar to the aid that the ROK received in 1965, and which helped fuelthe ROK’s industrialization. Talks between the countries had not been held since 2008,
however, before a reported January 2012 meeting in China between representatives of thetwo countries to discuss “terms for restarting intergovernmental negotiations”.60

56 See, for example, Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online 06-64A: August 3rd, 2006, “Gaeseong Industrial Complex in Steady

Progress Despite a Series of Negative Incidents”, Statement by ROK Ministry of Unification. Available ashttps://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/gaeseong-industrial-complex-in-steady-progress-despite-a-series-of-negativeincidents/.
57 See, for example, Grant Wyeth (2020), “Time to Reopen the Kaesong Industrial Complex? A Conversation With Jin-hyang
Kim”, The Diplomat, dated February 27, 2020, and available as https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/time-to-reopen-the-kaesongindustrial-complex-a-conversation-with-jin-hyang-kim//
58 China English People’s Daily Online, May 29, 2006, “DPRK military blames S. Korea for failure of test train runs”. Available
at http://english.people.com.cn/200605/29/eng20060529_269228.html. See also The Rails Are Geopolitics: Linking North andSouth Korea and Beyond, by Yonhap News and Georgy Bulychev, Dated May 24, and available as https://apjjf.org/-GeorgyBulychev/2008/article.html.
59 For example, The Telegraph, “North and South Korea talks: timeline of Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions”, dated 8 February,
2011 (and available as http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8310219/North-and-South-Korea-talkstimeline-of-Pyongyangs-nuclear-ambitions.html) provides a summary listing of events related to DPRK negotiations with the
ROK and other parties from 2003 to early 2011, when military talks between the ROK and DPRK “to explore the possibility ofre-starting negotiations were to begin.
60 See, for example, The Japan Times Online (2012), “Japan, North hold secret talks in China”, dated 1/10/2011; and Taipei
Times (2012), “North Korea, Japan hold talks: media”, dated 11 January 2012, and available as
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2012/01/11/2003522971.

16
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•Talks between the DPRK and EU nations had, as of 2002, resulted in normalization ofrelations with all EU member states except France and Ireland. Australia and Canada had
also normalized relations with North Korea, and all of these countries had sent delegations to
Pyongyang to discuss bilateral and multilateral projects. It was hoped that these countries
can play a significant role in providing development aid and training to the DPRK, but theimplementation of that role, which looked very promising as late as September of 2002, hasbeen largely on hold since then.

•United Nations Security Council Resolutions/Sanctions on the DPRK started in 2006 with aresolution agreed to following the DPRK’s first test of a nuclear explosive device, andcontinued with a series of progressively more stringent resolutions and economic sanctions
through 2017.61 The most crucial of these resolutions, from the perspective of the DPRK
energy sector, include those capping the DPRK’s oil and oil product imports, and capping the
DPRK’s exports of coal, metals, labor, and other goods and services, thus limiting its ability
to earn hard currency income.

Significant progress in any one of these areas of negotiation would likely lead to greater progressin all arenas, and, ultimately, to a gradual thawing of relations between the Koreas, the DPRK
and Japan, and between the DPRK and the United States. Such an improvement in relations is a
substantial, and even possibly absolute, prerequisite for re-starting the DPRK economy, and, byextension, a prerequisite to implement significant changes in the DPRK energy system.
Another bilateral dialog has been between the DPRK and Russia. These talks reportedly include
discussions about restoring some of the DPRK’s economic ties with Russia, and of Russian
financial and technical involvement in specific DPRK energy and industrial projects, inparticular the inter-Korean railway project and electrical grid interconnection between the
countries. Given the historical economic relationship between the DPRK and Russia, andRussia's strong interest in revitalizing its own Far Eastern region, it is quite conceivable that
Russia could play an important role in the rebuilding of the DPRK economy, particularly as (andif) the economy in the Russian Far East becomes more robust.
1.2.5. The DPRK Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic
Officially, the DPRK has reported no cases of coronavirus during the current global pandemic.62
This report, however, appears at odds with DPRK requests for corona-virus related supplies from
Medecins Sans Frontieres, UNICEF, the WHO, and others, as well as reported quarantines offoreigners and DPRK citizens, and the use of facemasks in the DPRK by most residents pictured
in recent photos (with the exception of Chairman Kim Jong Un). Reports by observers outside
the DPRK, including those receiving intelligence briefings, include descriptions of hundreds ofcovid-19 deaths among soldiers, a one-month military “lockdown”, quarantines of thousands
within and outside of the military, and other evidence of significant changes in life in the DPRK
in recent months.

61 For a summary of UNSC resolutions and sanctions related to the DPRK, see, for example, Arms Control Association (2020),“UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea”, last revised April, 2018, and available ashttps://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea.
62 South China Morning Post (Agence France-Presse), 2020, “North Korea insists it has no coronavirus cases, thanks to shutting
borders, containment”, dated 3 April, 2020, available as https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3078226/north-koreainsists-it-has-no-coronavirus-cases-thanks-shutting.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKWhatever the actual COVID-19 situation is in the DPRK, it is clear that the DPRK’s response to
the pandemic has changed the way that the country operates its economy, including its energy
sector. Worldwide, national and local “lock-downs” and “stay-at-home” orders have resulted invast reductions in energy demand, particularly for transportation, in part causing, among otherimpacts, a vast drop in oil prices, and rapidly filling oil and gas storage depots. The DPRK’senergy supply situation is unlike that of other countries, particularly for oil products, due to
UNSC sanctions and resulting restrictions on its oil imports. This requires the DPRK to use“unofficial” means to obtain oil supplies and export coal, strategies that are likely more difficult
to carry out during the pandemic, due to the need for cooperation by outside trading partners.
As noted above, official reports of the coronavirus situation in the DPRK are few and somewhat
contradictory. Reports by those outside the DPRK, anecdotal and otherwise, therefore form theinformation base on which our analysis of energy supply and demand in the DPRK in 2020 must
be built. Some of the reported changes in the DPRK that would affect energy supply anddemand in the DPRK include:• Quarantines of thousands of individuals, including a recent (April 28) report that the
DPRK has extended its “COVID-19 National Emergency” through the end of the year,
including a strengthening of quarantine procedures.63• A one-month military “lockdown” in February and March.
• Curtailing of border crossing and travel between the DPRK and China, apparently since
January 26.64 More recent news reports suggest that these restrictions will continue forsome months.65• “[W]idespread stories of inflation and the hoarding of critical goods. Many schools havebeen closed [apparently, from at least February 20 through April 15, based on Asia Times
reporting], social gatherings have been limited, and much tourism is suspended.”66• Announcement of construction of a new, modern hospital in Pyongyang.
• Shutdown of most air, rail, road, and ship travel into and out of the country• A “huge economic loss” reported by DPRK state media.67• An increase in the “price of gas”, presumably gasoline.

63 Hyemin Son, Leejin Jun, and Eugene Whong (2020), “North Korea Extends COVID-19 National Emergency to End of Year”,

Radio Free Asia, dated 2020-04-28, and available as https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/national-emergency04282020184222.html?utm_source=AM+Nukes+Roundup&utm_campaign=ba43f31c3aEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_07_25_12_19_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_547ee518ec-ba43f31c3a391728633.
64 Gabriela Bernal (2020), North Korea’s silent struggle against Covid-19: Sources inside report via smuggled cellphones that
official and unofficial measures have been surprisingly effective”, Asia Times, dated March 31, 2020, available ashttps://asiatimes.com/2020/03/north-koreas-silent-struggle-against-covid-19/.
65 Radio Free Asia (2020), ibid.
66 Mitchell Lerner (2020), “History Shows North Korea Will Respond to the Coronavirus by Lashing Out: Will the patternrepeat?”, National Interest, April 1, 2020, available as https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/history-shows-north-koreawill-respond-coronavirus-lashing-out-139732.
67 Chad O'Carroll (2020), “COVID-19 in North Korea: an overview of the current situation: Pyongyang officially claims no
infections within its territory, and has taken strict steps to stave off an outbreak”, dated March 26, 2020, available ashttps://www.nknews.org/pro/covid-19-in-north-korea-an-overview-of-the-current-situation/?t=1585236870435.

18
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK• Issues with industrial output due to lack of inputs and spare parts from China, affecting
the mining sector as well.68• A crackdown on cross-border smuggling.
• A demonstrable idling of the DPRK’s maritime fleet, including many of the ships thathave been implicated in unofficial trade in coal and oil products, starting with a recall of
ships on January 22.69 The New York Times summary of the situation as of late Marchconcluded “The long-term disruptions to North Korea’s revenue stream remain unclear,partly because the duration of the pandemic and its impact on maritime commerce are
not yet known. But analysts said it was reasonable to assume damage has been done toNorth Korean agriculture, industry and the overall economy.”
Our estimates of the impacts of these and other COVID-19-response measures by DPRK
authorities and citizens, and the foreign traders that work with them, are reflected in ourestimates of year-2020 DPRK energy supply and demand, as describe in Chapter 3 of thisReport.

1.3.

Summary of the Overall Energy Situation in the DPRK

Overall energy use per capita in the DPRK as of 1990 was relatively high, primarily due toinefficient use of fuels and reliance on coal. Coal is more difficult to use with high efficiency
than oil products or gas. Based on our estimates, primary commercial energy70 use in the DPRK
in 1990 was approximately 70 GJ per capita, approximately three times the per capita
commercial energy use in China in 1990, and somewhat over 50 percent of the 1990 per capita
energy consumption in Japan (where 1990 GDP per-capita was some ten to twenty times higher
than the DPRK). This sub-section provides a brief sketch of the DPRK energy sector, and someof its problems. Much more detailed reviews/estimates of energy demand and supply in the
DPRK in 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008 through 2010, and 2014 through 2020 are provided inlater chapters of this report.
1.3.1. Energy demand—sectors, fuels, and problems
The industrial sector is the largest consumer of all commercial fuels—particularly coal—in the
DPRK. The transport sector consumes a substantial fraction of the oil products used in the
country. Most transport energy use is for freight transport; the use of personal transport in the
DPRK is very limited. The residential sector is a large user of coal and (in rural areas, thoughmore recently, reportedly, in urban and peri-urban areas as well) biomass fuels. The military
sector (by our estimates) consumes an important share of the refined oil products used in the

68 Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein (2020), “The North Korean Economy: Coronavirus Measures Causing Economic Anxiety”, 38

North, dated March 27, 2020, available as https://www.38north.org/2020/03/bkatzeffsilberstein032720/.
69 See Christoph Koettl (2020), “Coronavirus Is Idling North Korean Ships, Achieving what Sanctions Did Not”, New YorkTimes, dated March 26, 2020, available as https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/26/video/coronavirus-north-korea.html, which also
quotes Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) Project Sandstone (2020), “Rickety Anchor: North Korea Calls its Illicit Shipping
Fleet Home amid Coronavirus Fears”, dated 26 March 2020, and available as https://rusi.org/commentary/rickety-anchor-northkorea-calls-its-illicit-shipping-fleet-home-amid-coronavirus-fears.
70 Primary energy counts all fuel use, including conversion and transmission/distribution losses. Commercial energy excludes,
for the most part, use of biomass fuels such as firewood and crop wastes.

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country. The public/commercial and services sectors in the DPRK consume much smaller sharesof fuels supplies in the DPRK than they do in industrialized countries, due primarily to theminimal development of the commercial sector in North Korea. Wood and crop wastes are used
as fuels in the agricultural sector, and probably in some industrial subsectors as well.
Key energy-sector problems in the DPRK include:•

Inefficient infrastructure: Much of the energy-using infrastructure in the DPRK is reportedly(and visibly, to visitors to the country) antiquated and/or poorly maintained. Buildings
apparently lack insulation, and the heating circuits in residential and other buildings
apparently cannot be controlled by residents. Industrial facilities are likewise either aging orbased on outdated technology, and often (particularly in recent years) are operated at lessthan-optimal capacities (from an energy-efficiency point of view).

•

Suppressed and latent demand for energy services: Lack of fuels in many sectors of the
DPRK economy has apparently caused demand for energy services to go unmet. Electricity
outages are one obvious source of unmet demand, but there are also reports, for example, that
portions of the North Korean fishing fleet have been idled for lack of diesel fuel. Residential
heating is reportedly restricted in the winter (and some observers report that some publicsector and residential buildings have not received heat at all in recent years) to conserve fuel,resulting in uncomfortably cool inside temperatures.
The problem posed by suppressed and latent demand for energy services is that when and if
supply constraints are removed there is likely to be a surge in energy (probably particularlyelectricity) use, as residents, industries, and other consumers of fuels increase their use ofenergy services toward desired levels. (This is a further argument, as elaborated later in thisreport, for making every effort to improve the efficiency of energy use in all sectors of the
DPRK economy as restraints on energy supplies are reduced.)•

Lack of energy product markets: Compounding the risk of a surge in the use of energy
services is the virtual lack of energy product markets in the DPRK. Without fuel pricing
reforms, there will be few incentives for households and other energy users to adopt energy
efficiency measures or otherwise control their fuels consumption. Recent years have seen
limited attempts by the DPRK government to reform markets for energy products, some
private markets exist for local products like firewood, and some commercial fuels have inrecent years reportedly been traded “unofficially” (on the black market), but for the mostpart, energy commodity markets in the DPRK essentially do not exist.71 Energy consumers
are also unlikely, without a massive and well-coordinated program of education about energy
use and energy efficiency, to have the technical know-how to choose and make good use ofenergy efficiency technologies, even when and if such technologies are made available.

71 In his paper and presentation “Changes In The North Korean Economy And Implications For The Energy Sector: Is North

Korea Really Short of Energy?”, as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006,
Palo Alto, CA, USA, William B. Brown discusses the state of DPRK energy markets, and notes that by one measure of electricity
cost, the ratio of the price of rice to the price of a kilowatt-hour of electricity, power was one hundred times as expensive in the
United States in 2006 than it was in the DPRK. See https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/changes-in-the-northkorean-economy-and-implications-for-the-energy-sector-is-north-korea-really-short-of-energy/.

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1.3.2. Energy supply—resources, technologies and processes
North Korea's major energy resource is coal. The DPRK has substantial reserves of bothanthracite and brown coal, though the quality of its coal reserves varies substantially from area toarea. There is little, if any, coal cleaning (washing and sifting of coal to remove impurities suchas sulfur and ash) in the DPRK. There have been reports of some operating oil wells in North
Korea, with production starting around 2000, but these reports are far from fully substantiated.
Modest oil resources reportedly have been located offshore in DPRK waters and have been thesubject of reported agreements between the DPRK and, variously, other countries and foreigncompanies. All crude oil and some petroleum products were imported as of 1990 from Russia,
China, and Iran, plus some purchases on the Hong Kong spot market. Since 1990, crude oil
imports have been restricted by economic and political factors. Two operating oil refineries
produced (as of 1990) the bulk of refined products used in the country. As of 1995 and 1996
(and from 2000 through 2020), only one of the two refineries was apparently operating most of
the time, and imports of refined products had not expanded sufficiently to replace the lost
production. A third, simple, smaller refinery on the West Coast of the DPRK reportedly operates
sporadically when crude oil shipments are available.
1.3.3. Summary of electricity demand and supply
The estimated per-capita electricity end use in the DPRK in 1990 was about 1,500 kWh per
capita. By comparison, overall 1990 electricity demand in South Korea was about 2,200 kWh
per capita.72 Per capita electricity consumption in the DPRK has declined very substantiallysince, due largely to reduced availability of power, though also as a result of reduced economic
activity. As with coal, the bulk of the electricity demand in the DPRK is in the industrial sector,
with the residential and military sectors (by our estimates) also accounting for significant
fractions of electricity use.
Electricity generation as of 1990 was primarily hydroelectric and coal-fired, in approximately
equal proportions, with a small amount of oil-fired electricity generation capacity associated withthe oil refinery at Sonbong and in two other plants. Much of the generation capacity was
installed in the 1970s and 1980s, although a significant portion of generation facilities—
particularly hydroelectric facilities—date back to the Japanese occupation.73 Many of thehydroelectric facilities in the DPRK are reported to be of the “run-of-river” variety, which meansthat their output is more subject to variations in stream flow than plants that rely on larger
impoundments with greater water storage. Since 1990, the ratios of hydro to “thermal” power
production have varied from year to year, for reasons described in the Chapters that follow.
The DPRK has the coal resources necessary to expand thermal power generation, but it is notclear that the coal mining or transport infrastructure is capable of supplying coal to power
stations at a rate much greater than that prevailing in 1990. Given weather patterns in thesubregion, North Korea probably has at least a modest wind power resource, yet untapped (andlargely unmapped), but it is far from equally distributed throughout the nation, with averagewinds in many of the most populous onshore areas (including the western coastal plains) being

72 Korea Energy Economics Institute (KEEI, 1991), Yearbook of Energy Statistics, 1991.

KEEI, Seoul, Republic of Korea.

73 Many of the hydroelectric facilities built during the Japanese occupation were reportedly disabled or dismantled by theJapanese (during retreat from the Peninsula) or by the USSR but were later refurbished with technical assistance and equipmentfrom the USSR.

21
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKrelatively light. The DPRK also has some remaining undeveloped hydroelectric sites, and a solar
energy resource that is similar to that in the ROK, Japan, and Central Europe, that is, useful, but
not exceptional.
Power generation facilities are reported to be in generally poor, and often failing, condition andsometimes (because they are based on technologies adopted from China or the Former Soviet
Union) not well adapted to the coal types with which they are fired. As a consequence, thegeneration efficiency of the thermal power stations in the DPRK is reportedly low. Thermal
power plants generally lack all but the most rudimentary pollution control equipment and also, in
almost all cases, lack any kind of computerized combustion control facilities. In-station use of
power is reportedly fairly high, and “emergency losses” of power have been reported at major
stations.
The system of electricity dispatching is inefficient, minimally or not at all automated, and prone
to failure. Estimates of transmission and distribution (T&D) losses vary from an official 16
percent up to more than 50 percent, but any estimates of T&D losses are difficult to confirm, as
there is minimal end-use metering in the DPRK.74
1.4.

Environmental, social, and political background

The DPRK energy sector in general, and the electricity supply system in particular, is a major
source of environmental problems both within and—in the case of regional and global
pollutants—outside of the country. As such, the status of the environment has a significant
bearing on the future development of the DPRK electrical system. Similarly, the social andpolitical history and current situation in the DPRK constrains the options (and likely directions)for energy sector development. In the following paragraphs we present a very brief review of theenvironmental, political, and social setting for the DPRK energy sector.75
1.4.1. Summary of environmental problems in the DPRK, including those
associated with energy use
The DPRK occupies an area of 122.7 thousand square kilometers, of which roughly threequarters (as of 1990) were classified as forests, and about 20 thousand km2 (2 million hectares)
are used for agriculture. Except for the coastal plains (primarily on the West side of thepeninsula), the topography is rugged and mountainous. North Korea's forests were overexploitedduring the Japanese occupation, and badly damaged during the Korean War; as a consequence
they are not well-stocked, and only about a third of the forest area is classified as "productive".
A significant reforestation effort has, however, been underway.
Rainfall in the DPRK averages slightly over one meter per year, and the climate is temperate,with hot, humid summers and cold winters. A branch of the Northern Pacific Equatorial Current

That is, for the most part, even as of 2020, power is reportedly simply provided to most consumers without metering, so “sales
records” as such do not exist as they do in most other nations.
75 Additional discussion of the environmental situation in the DPRK can be found, for example, in D. Von Hippel and P. Hayes,“Environmental Problems and the Energy Sector in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)”, Asian Perspective, Vol
22, No. 2, 1998, pp. 51 – 77; and in P. Hayes (2009), “Unbearable legacies: The Politics of Environmental Degradation in North
Korea”, Global Asia, Volume 4, Number 2, dated June 2009, and available ashttps://www.globalasia.org/v4no2/cover/unbearable-legacies-the-politics-of-environmental-degradation-in-north-korea_peterhayes.
74

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raises the temperature of Korean coastal and near-shore waters, resulting in highly productive
fisheries.
Although the North Korean leadership has declared that environmental protection is ofparamount importance,76, 77 observers have noted a host of environmental problems in
DPRK. Among these problems are:•Industrial pollution of rivers;•

Urban air pollution (including sulfur and nitrogen oxides, the precursors of acidprecipitation) from industrial facilities and virtually uncontrolled combustion of coal inresidential, industrial, and power plant boilers;78•

Indoor air pollution from domestic combustion of coal and biomass fuels;•

Pollution of surface- and groundwater from agricultural practices (fertilizer and pesticide
application, irrigation) and from insufficient (or absent) sewage treatment systems;•

High per-capita greenhouse gas emissions (from high per-capita coal use);•

Pollution of waters by drainage from mines; and•Potential environmental problems stemming from national efforts to fill tidal flats on thewestern side of the peninsula to create new farmland.

The DPRK suffers from a lack of sufficient trained personnel and analytical equipment for use in
enforcing existing environmental laws, meaning that environmentally-sound practices are likely
to be sporadic at best. In addition, DPRK environmental laws, while in principle stringent andwell-intended, lack the specificity needed to be easily implemented or enforced. In the short run,the absence of an effective regulatory infrastructure means that the extent to which the DPRK
takes environmental considerations of any kind into account in planning and operating its energy
system is likely to be externally, rather than internally, motivated. For example, progress inmaking coal-fired power stations less polluting is much more likely if environmental
performance is tied to technical aid (from the United States, the ROK, the EU, the United
Nations, or others).
1.4.2. The impact of the 1995/1996 floods and the food crisis
The floods of 1995 and 1996, apart from causing damage to irrigation structures and possibly
major damage to hydroelectric facilities, have likely exacerbated the process of soil depletionthat was already well underway. As noted above, sediment from upland areas has been
deposited on important rice paddy areas. Some 90,000 hectares of paddy land were reported to
be under large deposits of sand and debris as of 1996, and fuel was lacking for the excavation
machinery and other equipment needed to rapidly rehabilitate paddy land and restore irrigation

76 Kim Il Sung “set forth the principle that the problem of environmental protection should be taken into account ahead of socio-

economic development and that every possible measure should be taken for environmental protection ahead of production and hehas seen to it that the principle be kept with credit”.
77 Hayes, P, (1993a), Cooperation on Environmental Issues with the DPRK. Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, California, USA.
October 29, 1993.
78 This problem has been notably reduced in recent years with the considerable reduction in industrial activity and overall energy
use in the DPRK.

23
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKsystems.79 It seems likely (though as yet only conjecture) that the sediments deposited by the1997 and subsequent floods bear industrial and agricultural pollutants that may poison soils insome areas for years to come—although the flooding may also have served to flush pollutantsfrom and rejuvenate soils in some areas. Sediment loss from upland soils was probably higherthat it would have otherwise been due to the poor condition of forest stocks—forests in goodcondition help to prevent erosion.
The food shortages exacerbated (in large part) by the floods80 are also likely to have a long-term
impact on forests and on other vegetation. Lack of agricultural products has reportedly sent
North Koreans to foraging intensively for edible and semi-edible wild plants. There have beenreports from the late 1990s through at least the early 2010s of people eating preparations madefrom bark stripped from trees, though visitors to the DPRK suggest that bark use for food was
not common in the mid-2000s, at least. Stripping of bark from trees is likely to at best expose
trees to greater risk from pests, diseases, and other environmental threats, and at worst, kill thetrees, further exposing areas to erosion problems. References to consumption of “grass
porridge” or “grass meal” as a food of last resort also have appeared frequently in anecdotalreports of life in the DPRK over the past two decades and more.81 Over-exploitation due todesperate foraging may also endanger or extinguish rare or threatened species of flora and faunain the DPRK’s natural habitats.
1.4.3. DPRK agricultural conditions and food situation since 1996
In the middle year of the decade from 2000 to 2010, the DPRK's agricultural situation showedsome signs of improvement. The World Food Programme and the Food and Agriculture
Organization reported that the DPRK produced 3.54 million metric tonnes of food in 2001-2002,
a 38 percent increase over two years earlier and the most since 1995. This included an
estimated 1.35 million tonnes of rice (milled basis), 1.4 million tonnes of corn, and 100,000
tonnes of wheat. That left the DPRK with an estimated food deficit for 2001-2002 of around1.47 million metric tonnes, down from 2.2 million tonnes a year earlier.82 The increased foodproduction was not sufficient to make up for the drop in donations that resulted in part from ashift in international attention to the situation in Afghanistan. Improved harvests in more recent
years have reduced the DPRK’s food deficit, and food donations from ROK increased for atime,83 but WFP/FAO estimates (see above) still projected a substantial DPRK food deficit in2006, continuing through the years that followed to various degrees.84

79

United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) and World Food Programme (WFP, 1996), Special Alert No.
267, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
80 There is some evidence that the food shortages of more recent years are in large part a result of structural problems in the
DPRK agricultural sector that date back to 1990 or before.
81 See, for example, Good Friends: Research Institute For North Korean Society (2011), “North Korea Today No. 411”, dated
July 13, 2011, and available as http://goodfriendsusa.blogspot.com/2011/07/north-korea-today-no-411-july-13-2011.html.
Though such anecdotal reports are certainly not systematic surveys and may to some degree reflect the bias of the reportingorganization, they may offer an indication of ongoing problems, if not a definitive statement of their extent or severity
nationwide.
82 Government of the United States of America, "North Korea - Mild winter, dry spring could affect 2002/03 crops," April 10,
2002; IU, "North likely to face greater food shortages," April 4, 2002.
83 ROK food donations to the DPRK in 2006 reportedly declined substantially from previous years.
84 See, for example, Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein (2019), “North Korea’s Food Situation: Bad but not Catastrophic”, 38 North,
dated May 29, 2019, and available as https://www.38north.org/2019/05/bkatzeffsilberstein052919/.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

1.4.4. The DPRK social and political system, and its influence on the energy andelectricity sector
The “Juch’e”, or autarchic, philosophy of the DPRK government has shaped the electricity andenergy sectors in the DPRK. Development of indigenous resources—notably coal—has taken
precedence, as has “reverse engineering”85 and other techniques of developing technologies thatcan be produced domestically. Another major factor in shaping the DPRK’s electricity andenergy-consuming infrastructure has been the influence of Russian advisors and aid. The former
Soviet Union was intimately involved in designing, and often providing equipment for,constructing, and even operating thermal power plants, industrial plants, and many otherelements of the DPRK economy. As a consequence, Russian design criteria and operating
practices are widely used in the DPRK. In many cases, the Russian-designed plants provided to
the DPRK operate much less efficiently than comparable (current) processes in other countries,
contributing to the overall inefficiency of the DPRK economy.86
The use of oil for electricity generation has been limited primarily to a single heavy-oil-fired
power plant associated with an oil refinery, although in recent years work has been underway toconvert that plant to use coal (see section 5.2.3 of this Report). Some smaller older diesel-engine
generators may be in use as well,87 and at least one fairly new large diesel-type generator was
reported installed in an industrial setting around 2000. In recent years (since about 2010) large
numbers of diesel- and gasoline-fired generators have been imported to the DPRK from China.
We have not heard reports of any natural gas-fired generation, and the DPRK lacks facilities forimporting liquefied natural gas, or LNG, at least in significant quantities. The focus ondomestically produced energy technologies, and the corresponding lack of technology imports(especially in the years since 1990, though there have been reports of some modest energy
technology imports recently) has resulted in an energy sector that is notably inefficient.
The North Korean workforce is literate, disciplined, and hard-working; these attributes were key
in allowing the DPRK to make the economic strides that it did during the phase of heavy
industrialization in the two decades following the Korean War. The DPRK workforce, however,
suffers from a lack of technological training because of the DPRK's political isolation. In
addition, the relatively low rate of growth of the population means that the workforce is aging.
This trend may cause average workforce productivity to decline over the long term (all else
being equal, as the ratio of active workers to retirees declines), and may present problems inretraining workers for new, higher-technology jobs (for example, to make goods that would becompetitive in export markets). Academics and engineers involved in the basic sciences and in
applied research and development probably also suffer lower productivity due to limited andtightly controlled contact with their peers in other countries, as well as a lack of up-to-date
research equipment.

In “reverse engineering”, a device or technology is acquired from outside the country, disassembled, and evaluated to figureout how it works and how it was made. A domestic process for production of the item is then designed.
86 In some cases, reportedly, the infrastructure exported to the DPRK from the former Soviet Union was built to extra-rugged
specifications for longevity under DPRK conditions. Often, this involved a tradeoff that resulted in reduced energy-efficiency.
87 Diesel generators were reportedly often incorporated into industrial plants built with USSR assistance to provide back-up
power. It is likely that some newer generators have also come into use in recent years, particularly in, for example, military
installations which reportedly build in more redundancy than other facilities, and in buildings and industrial plants serving
organizations and markets from outside the DPRK.
85

25
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKThe DPRK government has shown a preference for massive construction projects. Thispredilection, plus the ability to muster large workforces rapidly, is helpful when constructinghydroelectric impoundments and barrages (seawalls), as well as in conducting other large public
works such as recovering from floods, but is less helpful in constructing smaller, more
specialized, and more efficient equipment. The large outlays (reportedly up to $890 million peryear, at one point88) by the government for massive monuments honoring the Kim regime havesiphoned off money and labor that could have been used for energy-sector projects or other(arguably more useful) social infrastructure projects.
Another workforce issue is that a significant fraction (probably on the order of 15 percent) of thepotentially economically active males is in the armed forces of the DPRK.89 The duration of
mandatory military service for men is reportedly up to ten years. Although soldiers often
participate in public works projects and in some other civilian economic activities (such as
harvesting of crops), the proportion of workers in the active armed forces (and the time spent by
the five to seven—depending on the estimate—million reservists in undergoing military training)
undoubtedly acts as a drain on the overall DPRK economy.90
In the years since about mid-2002, the DPRK’s government has initiated several economic
reforms leading to currency devaluation, wage, and (for some commodities) price reforms, andthe limited recognition (and later, suppression, and still later, tacit acceptance) of private
markets. These reforms have at times to some degree improved the availability of somecommodities, but have also resulted in economic dislocation, as prices for commodities such as
rice and other cereals have risen to the point where a worker’s official monthly salary would buy
only a few kilograms of basic foodstuffs, and as the general food distribution system, which
formerly provided much of the food needs of residents, had ceased to operate in many areas of
the country. DPRK delegations to meetings outside the DPRK have expressed the desire toobtain training on market creation and operation and noted the government’s commitment toproceeding with economic reforms, but much remains to be done in these areas.
The process of DPRK economic reform, according to observers, is complex and not in a single
direction, as internal struggles between DPRK officials who want to reform the economy, andthose that want to maintain state control of markets, result in liberalization of some markets attimes, but moves toward tighter control of other markets at other times. Overall, the direction of
88 Nikkei Shimbun, 5/19/97, “ROK VICE PRIME MINISTER UNDERSTANDS JAPAN'S CAREFUL STANCE ON FOODAID TO DPRK”. Page 8.
89 This rough estimate assumes a standing army of about 1 million men and a total of about 7.5 million men in the 18 to 65 age
group, the latter from the DPRK’s official 2008 Census. Estimates of the size of the army vary. Wikipedia, in its listing of thesizes of the world’s armies (“List of countries by number of military and paramilitary personnel”, available ashttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_military_and_paramilitary_personnel), puts the DPRK military at
1.28 million troops, which at 50.4 troops per 1000 people in the country, gives the DPRK more soldiers per capita than any othercountry by a factor of two, with the runner-up being Israel. At about 1.3 million troops, the DPRK military is among the top fourlargest armies. Recent estimates based on the 2008 DPRK Census have suggested that the armed forces might be slightly
smaller. The Hankyorreh (“[North Korea Census 2008] Korean People’s Army estimated to number 700 thousand troops”, dated
19 March, 2010, and available as http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/411106.html) suggested “..while a
precise determination is impossible, it can be estimated that the scale of the Korean People’s Army is 702,372 troops plus some
additional, unspecified number. This differs markedly from South Korean Ministry of National Defense estimates, which put thesize of North Korea’s regular army at 1.19 million people as of December 2008. In view of the fact that 27 percent of enlisted
men in the South Korean military as of 2008 were non-commissioned and commissioned officers with addresses outside theirbases, analysts say there are grounds for viewing the Defense Ministry’s estimates on the scale of the North Korean army as
inflated.”
90 This in addition to the direct financial outlays for maintenance of the armed forces.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

change during the middle years of the 2000s was toward market liberalization, but not allchanges in DPRK economic policy implemented in the years since have been in that direction—some have been quite the opposite.
1.4.5. The “Agreed Framework” and KEDO
As a condition of the October 1994 Agreed Framework signed by the governments of the UnitedStates and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the DPRK was to be supplied with twopressurized-water-type light-water nuclear reactors for electricity generation (referred to as
PWRs or LWRs) in exchange for abandoning its existing graphite-moderated nuclear research
reactors and taking further steps to comply with nuclear safeguards. Work at the reactor site (atKumho, near the Sea of Japan/East Sea of Korea port city of Sinpo in the DPRK) began inAugust of 1997.91 Under the agreement, until the reactors were completed the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) had an obligation under the Framework to supply
500,000 metric tonnes (te) of heavy fuel oil (HFO) to the DPRK annually. KEDO oil deliveries
started in 1995, and deliveries in each "HFO year" (not necessarily corresponding to calendar
years) thereafter totaled the agreed annual amount until December 2002, when deliveries weresuspended.92 The oil provided by KEDO was intended to be used to fuel electricity generationand district heating facilities.
This transfer of PWR technology under the Agreed Framework was sought by the DPRK as ameans to maintaining both a civilian nuclear program and the threat of a military nuclear
program. At the same time, the Framework was attractive to other nations (led by the UnitedStates) as a means to start the thawing of relations with the DPRK, as a way to lessen theprobability of nuclear weapons proliferation, and as a means to exert better international control
over the DPRK nuclear program. Funding for the PWR transfer was from the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization, which was formed in the mid-1990s, and which obtained its
financing mostly from the ROK, with some additional inputs from the United States (particularlyfor HFO purchases), Japan (US$1 billion) and the European Union.93 Following the erosion ofrelations between the United States and the DPRK in late 2002, and the DPRK’s subsequent
withdrawal, in January 2003, from the international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), and its related re-starting of previously frozen nuclear facilities, KEDO
suspended construction on the PWR project. The project was formally terminated in mid-2006,
and KEDO was disbanded.
Although energy efficiency and renewable energy measures could conceivably provide the sameenergy services to the DPRK economy as would the PWR, and could do so on at least a similar
time scale and for lower cost,94 energy efficiency measures are not, or at least to date have not
91 “KEDO breaks ground for reactor Project in N. Korea”, The Korea Herald, No. 13,639, August 20, 1997.

Seoul, ROK. Page

1.
92 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO, 1996), Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization,

Annual Report, 1995. KEDO, Washington, D.C., July 31, 1996. "Appendix 1: HFO Deliveries" from Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) Annual Report 2001, obtained from www.kedo.org, 5/31/2002. Information on suspensionof oil deliveries from Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, Annual Report, 2003, obtained as
http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/KEDO_AR_2003.pdf, 3/16/2007
93 Though funding for KEDO has come from the countries indicated, the DPRK will be obliged to repay the funds loaned to build
the PWRs. KEDO and the DPRK signed an agreement on June 24, 1997, specifying penalties to the DPRK if the DPRK fails to
repay the loan (http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/ProtocolNonPayment.pdf).
94 Von Hippel, D., and P. Hayes (1995), The Prospects for Energy Efficiency Improvements in the Democratic People's Republicof Korea: Evaluating and Exploring the Options. Nautilus Institute Report, Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable27
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKbeen, politically substitutable for the PWR transfer.95 The PWR transfer—or some similararrangement that would allow the DPRK to acquire a working nuclear power reactor—has been
considered a necessary first step to a political opening by North Korea, an opening that could
lead to investments—including investments in energy efficiency—that will serve to integrate theeconomy of the DPRK with the other economies of the region. This integration would enhancestability and security in the region in the medium and long-term and is the underlying logic
implicit in the hopes of US and ROK policymakers to achieve a “soft landing” for the DPRK
economy and polity. A possible revival of the Six-Party talks (or a similar process) may offer a
way of achieving an end to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program without the (eventual)
construction of a PWR in the DPRK, but it is not yet clear whether other combinations of energy
assistance will be considered by the DPRK leadership to be an adequate substitute for themodern nuclear power reactors promised under previous agreements. The DPRK’s announced
and apparently near-completed construction (if not yet operation) of their own, small, domestic
LWR, and the DPRK’s uranium enrichment facility revealed in 2010, have further complicatednuclear discussions with other parties, but may offer additional opportunities as well.96
1.5.

Guide to Remainder of Report

The remainder of this report is organized as follows:•

In Chapter 2, we describe the key assumptions and background information that we used in
preparing revised energy supply/demand balances for the DPRK for the years 1990 and 1996.
The key results and uncertainties of our estimates for those years are presented as well.

•

In Chapter 3, we give overviews of the methods, results, assumptions, and uncertainties of
our analysis of the DPRK supply and demand for energy resources and fuels in the years
2000, 2005, 2008 through 2010, and 2014 through 2020. Estimates for the years 2000 and
2005, like those for 1990 and 1996, are as revised from previous analyses based on input
from colleagues and from new sources of information. Estimates for the years 2008 and on
are also based on our research, and include information from colleagues attending the June
2006 and March, 2008 DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meetings, as well as the
September 2010 DPRK Energy and Minerals Experts Working Group Meeting and manyother sources.

•

In Chapter 4 of this report, we briefly renew what is known about the DPRK’s natural
resource base, focusing on fossil fuels and renewable resources including forests. Chapter 4

Development, Berkeley, California, USA. P. Hayes and D.F. Von Hippel (1997), "Engaging North Korea on Energy Efficiency".
Chapter 9 in Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula, Young Whan Kihl and Peter
Hayes, editors. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY. Von Hippel, D.F., and P. Hayes (1996) "Engaging North Korea on Energy
Efficiency". The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume VIII, No. 2, Winter 1996. Pages 177 - 221.
95 For a much more thorough discussion of this issue, see D. von Hippel et al. (2001), Modernizing the US-DPRK Agreed
Framework: The Energy Imperative. Nautilus Institute Report, February 2001. Available at http://nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/ModernizingAF.pdf.
96 See, for example, Siegfried S. Hecker (2010), A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex. NAPSNet Special
Report, dated November 22, 2010, and available as http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/reports/a-return-trip-tonorth-korea2019s-yongbyon-nuclear-complex; Peter Hayes (2010), DPRK Enriched Uranium Highlights Need for New US
DPRK Policy, dated November 22, 2010, and available as http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/forum/dprkenriched-uranium-highlights-need-for-new-us-dprk-policy; and D. von Hippel and P. Hayes (2010), Engaging The DPRK
Enrichment and Small LWR Program: What Would It Take?, NAPSNet Special Report, dated December 23, 2010, and available
as https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/engaging-the-dprk-enrichment-and-small-lwr-program-what-would-ittake/.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

also provides updated results of our brief analysis of the “energy efficiency” resource in the
DPRK, in which we presernt our revised estimates of the potential cost and resource savings
from the application of several key energy efficiency options for the DPRK energy demandand supply sectors.
•

Estimates of electricity supply and demand in the DPRK from 1990 through 2020, withadditional estimated end-use detail from 2010 through 2020, are provided in Chapter 5.
This Chapter provides additional detail on the resources and infrastructure for electricity
supply in the DPRK, and electricity demand by sector, as well as discussions of the meaningof the electricity sector analytical results for engagement of the DPRK on electricity sector
topics.

•

Chapter 7 extends the description of the DPRK’s resource endowment and related
infrastructure by providing detail on what is known about the status of the non-energy
minerals sector, including existing mining infrastucture and institutions in the DPRK, alongwith a summary of some of the key challenges facing the minerals sector. The resource
picture described in Chapters 4 and 7, plus the capacity of the North Korean people,
constitutes a key feature of the base on which future economic and energy development in
the DPRK will be built, and must be considered in any plan for DPRK energy sector
assistance.

•

In Chapter 8 of this report, we present a brief sketch of our revised analyses of "Rebuilding"and other future (through 2050) pathways, including pathways for the DPRK economy andenergy sector, and describe some of the preconditions and impacts on the energy sector ofsuch a path. Also described in Chapter 8 are a list of institutional changes—ranging fromtraining to establishment of energy pricing practices to strengthening of regulatory agencies
to setting out clear and consistent rules for commerce with foreign companies—that the
DPRK should adopt and be assisted with in order to work toward rebuilding.

•

Following on from the quantitative exploration of different DPRK energy futures in Chapter
8, in Chapter 9 we address the implications of a possible collapse of the DPRK’s
government Although in this updated analysis we continue to emphasize that in our view,even given the multiple challenges facing the DPRK and its young leader, such a collapse is
not likely, considering the possible implications of such a collapse provides insights into
which policies by the international community are likely to be helpful in any kind of DPRKtransition, whether abrupt or gradual and managed.

•

In Chapter 10 of this Report, we conclude by providing a summary listing of what we see as
the key issues and options for constructive cooperation between the DPRK and the countries
of Northeast Asia (and other regions) on energy-sector and related issues. Our suggestions
as to attractive energy sector technologies and processes for energy sector redevelopment in
the DPRK are also outlined in summary fashion. As such, Chapter 10 provides suggestions
on a number of areas for international cooperation, including providing technical andinstitutional assistance in implementing energy efficiency measures, promoting better
understanding of the North Korean situation in the ROK, working to open opportunities forindependent power companies to work in the DPRK, and cooperation on technology transfer
for energy efficiency and renewable energy. Key and attractive energy sector technologies
and processes for energy sector redevelopment in the DPRK are identified, including
rebuilding of the electricity transmission and distribution system—including both “top29

Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

down”, or major overhaul/replacement, or “bottom-up” approaches, the latter using rapidlydeveloping renewable energy microgrid technologies to provide local power first, then knit
together a functioning grid. Rehabilitation of power plants and other coal-using
infrastructure, rehabilitation of coal supply and coal transport systems, development ofalternative sources of small-scale energy and implementation of energy-efficiency measures,
rehabilitation of rural infrastructure, advanced investigation of regional electricity gridinterconnections, and gas supply and demand infrastructure development are considered in
Chapter 10 as well. Also discussed, in response to the DPRK’s construction and operation ofa uranium enrichment facility and its construction of its Experimental Light Water Reactor,
are possibilities for international cooperation with the DPRK on peaceful activities in the
nuclear energy arena.
•

Attachments to this report present detailed results of the estimates of DPRK supply anddemand in 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008 through 2010, and 2014 through 2020, and present
details on the data, assumptions, and analytical approach used in preparing those energybalance estimates. The attachments volume also presents details of our estimates of thepotential costs and savings associated with the implementation of energy efficiency andrelated measures in the DPRK, of our estimates of key pollutant emissions (acid gases andgreenhouse gases) in the DPRK in each of the years for which energy balances have been
estimated, summary tables and graphics, and other analyses related to DPRK energy
infrastructure.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

2.

Estimated 1990 and 1996 Supply/Demand Energy Balances

As a backdrop to the discussion of cooperation strategies and other recommendations discussed
in Chapter 10 of this Report, as well as to the estimates of energy demand and supply for later
years (Chapter 3) and for the electricity sector in particular (Chapter 5) this Chapter describes the
inputs to and results of our estimated 1990 and 1996 energy demand-supply balances for the
DPRK. In this Chapter we provide a brief description of the overall approach we used inassembling the estimated supply and demand balance for the DPRK in 1990 and updating it to1996 (section 2.1). Next, we provide more detailed descriptions of the estimation procedures
used for each major part and sub-part of the balance:•

The final demand for the fuels used in the North Korean economy in 1990 and 1996, by
economic sector and (in some cases) subsector, is detailed in section 2.2.

•

Section 2.3 covers energy supply (domestic energy resource production, imports, andexports) for non-electric fuels•

Fuel transformation processes, including electricity generation, transmission, anddistribution, are described in Section 2.4.

The final section of this chapter, section 2.5, presents our estimated 1990 and 1996
DPRK energy supply and demand balances, and discusses some of the key results anduncertainties in the balances, their ramifications, and the questions that they pose for follow-up
research. The approach used here, as well as the discussion that follows, are in large part takenfrom our earlier work. The reader should note, however, that the 1990 and 1996 balance
estimates, and the detailed results reported, have changed somewhat from those presented in ourearlier reports, as we have incorporated recently-obtained information about the status of the
DPRK energy sector in 1990 and 1996. The approach used to prepare the 1996 energy balances,that is, to update the 1990 balance based on reported or inferred changes in the energy sector
between 1990 and 1996, is the same general approach used to prepare energy balances for
subsequent years (2000, 2005, 2008 through 2010, and 2014 through 2020), as presented in
Chapter 3. This Chapter therefore describes the basic approach to preparing energy balances insubsequent years, thus the data and results presented in Chapter 3 are incremental to the data andresults presented here, focusing on changes between the years covered.
2.1.

Goals and approach in preparing 1990 and 1996 supply/demand balance

To assess measures to improve the energy sector of the DPRK (or any country), including
the potential for energy efficiency improvements, implementation of renewable energy sources,or, in the case of the DPRK substantial energy sector redevelopment, it is first necessary to learnsomething about the way that energy is supplied and used in the area under study. One way toobtain a single-sheet "snapshot" of the energy system in a particular country in a given year is toassemble a supply-demand balance. This type of table lists the sources of the fuels used in theeconomy, shows the processes that produce or refine primary fuels for end-use consumption(such as electricity generation facilities), and lists the final demands for fuels, typically by sector.

31
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKThe work presented in this document builds on Nautilus research, funded by the W. Alton JonesFoundation, which culminated in a 1995 report entitled The Prospects for Energy Efficiency
Improvements in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Evaluating and Exploring the
Options, plus further research in 1997, funded by the Northeast Asia Economic Forum/East-WestCenter, that produced Demand and Supply of Electricity and Other Fuels in the Democratic
Peoples' Republic of Korean (DPRK). In our 1995 work, we prepared an estimated energy
supply/demand balance for the DPRK for the year 1990 that synthesized the information
available to us on the North Korean economy and energy sector. In the 1995 report, the energybalance results were used to estimate the (by any measure, considerable) potential for energyefficiency improvements in the DPRK. Our 1997 work produced an estimated energy balance
for 1996 and used it as the starting point for quantitative energy "scenarios97" for the DPRK for2000 and 2005. Our 2002/2003 report, The DPRK Energy Sector: Estimated Year 2000 Energy
Balance and Suggested Approaches to Sectoral Redevelopment, prepared with funding from andin collaboration with the Korea Energy Economics Institute, updated our analysis to a 2000
“base year”. Our 2007 report, Fueling DPRK Energy Futures and Energy Security: 2005 Energy
Balance, Engagement Options, and Future Paths, provided a further update to a 2005 base year,
and our last (before the current report) comprehensive published version of our DPRK Energy
Analysis work was Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances,
Engagement Options, and Future Paths for Energy and Economic Redevelopment, extending theanalysis to the years 2008 and 2009.98
In preparing the 1990 energy balance estimate, we:•Collected available energy and other data on DPRK. The documents assembled included
international and regional publications providing statistics (energy, industrial and agricultural
output, infrastructure) on the DPRK; documents (in Korean) on the DPRK energy andeconomic situation obtained from South Korean (ROK) studies and other sources such as
Russian analysts; official statistics provided by the DPRK government; historical documents
on energy use in ROK; and other documentation from the authors' files.

•

Collected energy statistics and other energy-sector data on economies that are likely to be
similar, in some ways (such as types of infrastructure) to that of the DPRK (or were similar atsome time in the relatively recent past). This process included collection of energy sector
intensity data from the international literature99 for the People's Republic of China, theFormer Soviet Union, and the countries of Eastern Europe.

97 Nautilus typically uses the term "scenario" to refer to fictional, typically qualitative narrative "snapshots" of what the future

might hold based on uncertainty in key parameters (see, for example, A Korean Krakatoa? Scenarios for the Peaceful Resolutionof the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, Nautilus Institute, dated August 2003, and available, as http://nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/DPRKscenarios2003.pdf), whereas "path" or "pathways" present linear, often quantitative descriptionsof future conditions that are derived from current conditions, assuming certain changes. Based on these definitions, the 2000 and2005 analyses contained in our 1997 work would be referred to as energy paths, but at the time we referred to them as"scenarios". In this report, which focuses on quantitative results in looking at future possibilities for the DPRK energy sector, wetend to use the terms “path” and “scenario” interchangeably.
98 David von Hippel and Peter Hayes (2012), Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances,
Engagement Options, and Future Paths for Energy and Economic Redevelopment, NAPSNet Special Reports, dated December
18, 2012, and available as https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/foundations-of-energy-security-for-the-dprk-19902009-energy-balances-engagement-options-and-future-paths-for-energy-and-economic-redevelopment/,
99 In particular, the Energy Analysis Program at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA.

32
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•Synthesized the information available and organized it by balance element (supply,transformation, demand), by fuel, and by subsector (when possible). We further categorized
the types of information we collected as direct data on the energy system of the DPRK,
including the amount of energy produced or consumed, and capacities of key infrastructure;
data on activities relevant to energy use in DPRK, including the physical output (tonnes ofsteel produced, for example) in key subsectors, and other physical, social, and demographic
factors such as population and agricultural land area; and data on the intensity of energy use.
In the case of energy intensities in particular, very little information specific to the DPRK
was available, so analogous and "placeholder" data from other countries, usually China or theformer Soviet Union, were often used.

The detailed inputs to and results of our 1995 work are presented in the 1995 report describedabove. This report was disseminated widely to specialists on Korea and on energy analysis indeveloping countries, with briefings in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul. Copies of this earlier
study were supplied also to DPRK authorities. The 1990 energy balance produced as above wasrevised to reflect comments on the original 1995 study and information recently received. It wasthen used as the starting point for estimating and projecting year 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008, and2009 energy supply and demand, as described below.
Countries maintain statistics on energy supply and demand at differing levels of detail andaggregation; some have very good statistics, while others do relatively little data gathering, andwhat information does exist is of poor quality. These differences are often reflected ininternational compendia of energy statistics, such as the IEA/OECD Energy Statistics andBalances, which rely on data from the various countries themselves, as well as other sources100.
In the case of the DPRK, it is probable that fairly good statistics on energy supply and demand
do exist, but these data are probably in many different hands, and may not have been assembled
to provide a coherent picture for the DPRK energy economy as a whole.101 In addition, theNorth Korean government is reluctant to provide data to outsiders.102 As a consequence, ourefforts to assemble an energy supply and demand balance for DPRK had to rely on what few
official statistics were available, augmented by data from a host of other sources, as detailed
below.
Although the process that we followed in evaluating energy supply and demand in the DPRK isbound to produce energy balances that "fit" the DPRK poorly in some areas, it is our hope that infuture collaboration with DPRK energy experts we will be able to use the balance described and

100 For the case of the DPRK, the IEA (International Energy Agency) had not (as of 1995) significantly updated its country-

specific energy balances and other statistics for several years, as it has judged the incremental data that has been available to it to
be untrustworthy (IEA, John Soderbaum, personal communication, 1995). In addition, the DPRK energy balances available
from the IEA are at a highly aggregate level, with little sectoral detail.
101 Those familiar with the operation of the DPRK bureaucracy suggest that probably no one in the DPRK, with the possible
exception of Kim Jong-il and a few of his closest advisors (and now Chairman Kim Jong Un), has had (or has) statistics that
describe the entire span of the DPRK’s energy economy. Any given government or Party official would have custody ofstatistics bearing only on his or her direct responsibilities, and no more. In addition, reports are reportedly frequently altered asthey are passed up the chain of command to present to supervisors a rosier picture of, for example, energy or industrial
production. These alterations mean that when and if the overall statistics for the economy are actually compiled for top officials,
they are likely to be in error. It should be noted that some observers, however, feel that the trend toward exaggeration of
statistics in the DPRK has changed somewhat in recent years (for example, since 2000), and that the few official DPRK statistics
that are made available to outsiders are, in fact, now relatively reliable.
102 This applies especially to those from outside DPRK, but probably applies to the internal sharing of information, for example,
between government organizations, as well. Many countries, however, share this trait to varying degrees.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

presented below as a starting point to develop better information for use by both the international
community and by the DPRK itself. Moreover, as the balance is built up from many independent
observations, estimates, and assumptions, we feel that the probability is reduced that any one offbase assumption or erroneous piece of data has considerably altered the overall accuracy of theassessment.
It should be noted that other estimates of DPRK energy supply demand balances have beendeveloped over the years, and we have consulted those estimates available to us, and in somecases, collaborated with other researchers developing balances. Notable among other estimatesof DPRK energy balances are those developed by our colleagues at the Korea Energy Economics
Institute (KEEI), as described in a presentation to the 2006 DPRK Energy Experts Working
Group Meeting by Dr. Kyung-Sool Kim of KEEI.103 The International Energy Agency (IEA)
also maintains some energy statistics, including an estimated energy balance, for the DPRK.104
2.1.1. Study approach
Our approach in preparing an estimated 1990 supply-demand balance for the DPRK
proceeded in several steps, as follows:1.

2.

Collect available energy and other data on the DPRK. The documents assembled (mostof which are referenced in the footnotes, bibliography, and/or attachments volume to thisstudy) included:•International and regional publications providing statistics (energy, industrial andagricultural output, infrastructure) on the DPRK.

•

Documents (in Korean) on the DPRK energy and economic situation obtained fromSouth Korean (ROK) studies and other sources such as Russian analysts.

•

Official statistics provided by the DPRK government.

•

Historical documents on energy use in the ROK.

•News reports from around the world related to the DPRK’s economy and/or energy
system.

•Other documentation from the authors' files, and personal conversations andcorrespondence with others interested and conversant in DPRK issues.

Collect energy statistics and other energy-sector data on economies that are likely to be
similar, in some ways (such as types of infrastructure) to that of the DPRK. This processincluded collection of energy sector intensity data from the international literature105 for
the People's Republic of China, the former Soviet Union, and the countries of Eastern
Europe.

103 Kyung-Sool Kim, “DPR Korean Energy Demand/Supply Analysis: Energy Balance Sheet 2003”, prepared for the DPRK

Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA, and available ashttps://nautilus.org/?s=DPR+Korean+Energy+Demand%2FSupply+Analysis%3A+Energy+Balance+Sheet+&cat=0&lang=&sort
104 The IEA’s most recent (2009) energy balance for the DPRK, for example, is available as https://www.iea.org/countries/koreademocratic-peoples-republic-of.
105 In particular, the Energy Analysis Program at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

3.

4.

Synthesize the information available and organize it by balance element (supply,transformation, demand), by fuel, and by subsector (when possible). We further
categorized the types of information we collected as:•

Direct data on the energy system of the DPRK, including the amount of energy
produced or consumed, and capacities of key processes (including power plants)•

Data on activities relevant to energy use in the DPRK, including the physical output(tonnes of steel produced, for example) in key subsectors, and other physical, social,and demographic factors such as population and agricultural land area.

•

Data on the intensity of energy use. In this case, little information specific to the
DPRK was available, so analogous and "placeholder" data from other countries,
usually China or the former Soviet Union, were often used.

Use the data collected to estimate energy supply and demand by fuel, transformation
process, sector and subsector, incorporating judicious (it is hoped) assumptions andplaceholder values where necessary. These estimates have been prepared in an easilymodified Microsoft Excel "workbook" of many linked "spreadsheets" covering the
supply of and demand for energy, so that as more information becomes available, fromDPRK officials or others, our balance can be updated and improved.

We chose 1990 to be the base year for our estimated supply/demand balance for several reasons.
First, it was (as of the start of our work in 1994/95) sufficiently recent to pertain to current
conditions, but sufficiently far in the past that we could expect to find relatively complete energy
and economic statistics. Second, 1990 represented a watershed year for the DPRK economy, inthat after 1990 the continuing withdrawal of financial and other aid, as well as trade credits, fromthe former Soviet Bloc has contributed to a spiral of decreasing production and consumption in
virtually all sectors. 106 As a consequence, we felt that 1990 was a reasonable choice to represent
a North Korean economy operating on a roughly “business as usual” basis, at least for the period
before the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc.
The output of steps 3 and 4 above are synthesized as part of the workbook titled"Estimated/Projected Energy Supply/Demand Balances: Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK)", an updated version of which is printed out as Attachment Volume 1 to this report. A
printout of an additional workbook, used to prepare estimates of annual fuel use in the DPRK
military, is provided as Attachment Volume 2. Though the remaining sections of this chapter
provide detail on how the elements of the estimated supply/demand balance were assembled, thereader is urged to refer to the Attachments for additional information, details on data andassumptions used, and specific references.

106 Some observers, in fact, argue that 1989 was the peak year for the DPRK economy and energy sector, and that spending on

public works (for example, venues for the 13th World Festival for Youth and Students, held in Pyongyang in July of that year—
see, for example, “Photos Highlight 50-Year State History-On Occasion of Golden Jubilee of DPRK”, formerly available at
http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/058th_issue/dprk50thann/98090201.htm) helped to begin the downward slide of the DPRK
economy, which accelerated when the Soviet Union/Russia began withdrawing economic support for the DPRK. It has beenargued that the DPRK’s spending in hosting the Youth Festival reduced needed investment in other key sectors (including theenergy sector), contributing substantially to an economic decline that started in 1990. See “Energy ‘Crisis’ Threatens Economy”,
Pukhan (Seoul, ROK) March 1993, pages 39-45, by Naeoe Tongsin reporter Kim Sang-hwan. Economic activity in the DPRK
in 1990 was apparently slightly less than in 1989.

35
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKAn estimate of the potential for energy efficiency and renewable energy measures in the DPRK
was discussed in some detail in the 1995 report mentioned above and in other papers prepared by
the authors.107 A version of this analysis updated to recent years is presented in Section 4.5 ofthis Report.
Our overall approach to preparing a DPRK energy supply-demand balance for 1996:•

Starts with the estimates of demand and supply prepared above for the 1990 “base year”•

Modifies the 1990 estimates of demand for electricity and other fuels to reflect reports ofrecent changes in conditions in the DPRK. These included population growth, reduced
availability of oil products, observed changes in the transport system, and reported reductionsin industrial, agricultural and fisheries output.

•

Revises our 1990 estimates of electricity supply to meet 1996 electricity demand and toreflect information about recent changes in thermal and hydroelectric generating capacity.

•

Estimates 1996 oil supply in a way that reflects available information, including thecapacities, product slates, and utilization of the oil refineries in the DPRK, and quantities ofrefined products reportedly imported by the DPRK, and reportedly exported to North Korea
by the DPRK’s trading partners, during 1996.

•

Revises oil products demand as initially estimated to meet the overall supply for each of the
major classes of oil products (heavy fuel oil, diesel oil, gasoline, and kerosene).

•

Sets the level of coal and biomass supply to meet demand, re-adjusting supply of other fuels
as necessary to produce a rough balance in overall supply and demand.

•

Evaluates the implications for demand for heavy fuel oil supplied in 1996 by KEDO.

In updating our 1990 energy balance to 1996, as well as in subsequent research, we contacted
specialists in DPRK energy issues and economics, including those who deal or dealt with the
DPRK in business and/or regularly visit or visited there, to obtain their data, thoughts andobservations on recent developments the DPRK. Except where explicitly cited in the notes
presented in Attachment 1 or in this chapter, these sources have chosen to remain confidential.
Key changes in the DPRK energy sector between 1990 and 1996 included:•

A reduction in the supply of oil products due to the virtual cessation of crude oil supplies
from the Former Soviet Union.

•

A considerable reduction in industrial production, which reduced demand for (and thus
production of) coal and electricity. Disentangling the causes of the decline in industrial
output is difficult, but lack of oil products for industrial plants and goods transportation, lackof foreign exchange capital to pay for parts to repair industrial and mining equipment, andlack of international markets for DPRK industrial goods all played roles.

107 Von Hippel, D. F., and P. Hayes (1995), The Prospects for Energy Efficiency Improvements in the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea: Evaluating and Exploring the Options. Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development,
Berkeley, CA, USA. December 1995. P. Hayes and D.F. Von Hippel (1997), "Engaging North Korea on Energy Efficiency".
Chapter 9 in Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula, Young Whan Kihl and Peter
Hayes, editors. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY. Von Hippel, D.F., and P. Hayes (1996) "Engaging North Korea on Energy
Efficiency". The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume VIII, No. 2, Winter 1996. Pages 177 – 221, available fromhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10163279609464577.

36
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•A reduction in transport generally, and a reduction in the use of oil products in the transport
and agricultural sectors, with biomass and human and/or animal labor serving as partial
substitutes for gasoline and diesel fuel.

The key assumptions and data used in preparing our estimated supply and demand balances for1990 and 1996 are presented below by sector (for demand) and by fuel group (for supply). In
each case, details of the data, calculations, assumptions, and sources used are presented in
Attachments 1 and 2 to this report.
2.2.

Summary of Methods and Data used to Estimate 1990 and 1996 Demand forEnergyOur estimated DPRK supply-demand balance breaks final fuel demand into the following
sectoral categories:•

Industry, including many different subsectors;•

Transport, including road, rail, water, air and "non-specified" transport modes;•

Residential, which is further divided into the urban and rural subsectors;•

Agricultural, including field operations and a "processing/other" category;•

Fisheries, divided into fuel used in large ships and in processing and other operations;•

The Military sector, including accounting for each branch of the military (ground, air, andnaval forces), and estimates for energy use in manufacturing military equipment and in
military "buildings and other";•

The Public and Commercial sectors;•

Non-Specified/Other energy use, a placeholder category; and•Non-Energy use of fuels.

Our methods for estimating the amount of fuel used in each of these sectors are discussed below.
In some cases, the discussions below overlap with the descriptions of methods used to evaluate
1990 and 1996 electricity use by sector as described in section 5.3 of this Report.
2.2.1. The industrial sector in 1990
The industrial sector in the DPRK consists of a variety of energy-intensive heavy industries anda number of light industries. To estimate energy use in this sector, our basic approach has been
to gather all of the data on the physical output of specific industrial products that we could find,and multiply those physical output figures by per-unit energy intensities obtained mostly fromstudies of Chinese industries.108 In a very few cases, we had and used anecdotal figures for

108 An alternative approach would have been to obtain output figures expressed in monetary terms and use energy intensities perunit financial output. Unfortunately, the command-and-control nature of the DPRK economy, coupled with the fixed andessentially arbitrary exchange rates of the DPRK currency with hard currencies such as the dollar, make this approach unusable
for most subsectors. Because of the lack of true markets in DPRK (until recently, and even now limited to only selected classesof goods), the prices of goods have no particular relationship to the actual value that the goods would have in a market economy(even a partial market economy like China's), thus cross-national comparisons of per-monetary-unit intensities are highly
problematic (when one of the nations is North Korea).

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

energy intensities of key industrial plants in the DPRK, and in a few other cases we were able touse historical energy intensities from the Soviet Union as provided by a colleague in Russia.109
It has been estimated that 60 percent of the industrial infrastructure in the DPRK was developedwith substantial technical assistance from the former Soviet Union. As such, for many
subsectors we realize that it would have been more appropriate to use energy intensity factors
from the USSR experience than to use Chinese factors, but we have not as of yet had access to
sufficient energy intensity data from the USSR to allow us to do so. Happily, our limited
experience thus far has been that industrial energy intensities in the USSR and in China were
often not terribly different.
Note that we have made the general assumption that industries in the DPRK are at least 10
percent more energy intensive than those in China whenever Chinese energy intensities wereused, and 15 percent more energy intensive than USSR where Soviet energy intensities wereused. Although these estimates are little better than guesses, we believe that they are appropriate
given (among other reasons) A) the testimony of travelers to DPRK about the generally poor
condition of North Korean industrial facilities; B) the vintage of most industrial plants in DPRK
(few were built more recently than the 1970s, and some are leftovers from the Japanese
occupation of the 1930s and 1940s); C) the low quality of much of the DPRK's coal, which
contributes to poor combustion efficiencies; and D) reports of how Soviet industrial designs were
“beefed up” to allow equipment to stand up under difficult conditions in the DPRK.
The output units and energy intensities we used for each industrial subsector, and their sources in
the literature, are provided in Table 2-1. The specific methods used to derive fuel use for eachsubsector are detailed in the "Industry" pages of Attachment Volume 1. Notes on the methods
used for selected subsectors are provided below.

109

Data for energy intensities in several industrial subsectors was provided to us by Dr. V. Kalashnikov (personalcorrespondence, September 1997).

38
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 2-1: Energy Intensity Assumptions by Industrial Subsector
ENERGY INTENSITY ESTIMATES USED IN ESTIMATES
OF FUEL USE IN THE DPRK INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, 1990

Industrial Subsector
Iron and Steel
Cement---Fraction of input fuel as coalFertilizers--Ammonium

Output Unitste crude steel
te clinker
te NH3---Additional Heavy Oil andNaptha used as Feedstock
Fertilizers--Superphosphatete P2O5
Other Chemicals--Carbide
te Ca Carbide
Other Chemicals--Caustic Soda te
Pulp and Paper**te pulp
Other Metals--Zincte
Other Metals--Copperte
Other Metals--AluminumteOther Metals--LeadteOther Minerals***
te Magnesia
Building Materials--Glass
50 kg case
Building Materials--Bricks
10,000 pieces
Textiles--Printing and Dyeing
running meter
Textiles--Vinalon fiberteFuel UseIntensity(tce/Unit)*
1.85
0.235
90%
1.71

Electricity
Use Intensity(kWh/Unit)*
805
110

0.55
9.71
0.82
0.96
0.89
2.72
1.88
2.11
2.96
0.43
0.03392.39
4.39E-04
6.032

5,760

16,258
4,571
2,413
1,674
4,228
1,364
17,655
203
110
34

5,400

* Intensities shown are adjusted upward to take into account 10 and 15 percent "intensity
inflators" used when applying energy intensities from Chinese and Russian data
(respectively) to DPRK Industrial sub-sectors. Fuel is coal except as noted.
** Assumes that half of non-electric fuel use for paper production is provided bymill wastes and other wood by-products (but fuel use intensity shown includes
both use of wood and coal).
*** Intensity shown for magnesite production is use of heavy fuel oil (not coal) per tonneof product.
Please see "Industry" section of Attachment 1 for detailed notes and data sources.

In the Iron and Steel industry, we have used an official estimate of steel production (assumed to
be raw steel) that is somewhat higher than estimates from outside observers, and substantiallyhigher than steel output estimates for the years since 1990. Although our method for calculating
solid fuel consumption in this industry uses separate intensities for coal and coke use, we havenot tried to account separately for non-energy use of coke, that is, for that fraction of the carbon
in coke that becomes carbon in steel. For electricity consumption in the industry, we have usedan energy intensity based on 1965 and 1980 values in Soviet steel plants (700 kWh/tonne, before

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

application of the “Intensity Inflator” described in Table 2-1).110 By way of comparison,
intensities in “key, medium and small plants” in China as of 1987111 were somewhat higher (890kWh/tonne).
For the Cement industry, after reviewing available estimates, we have concluded that the official
output figures (13.9 million tonnes) from the National Report of DPRK to UNCED (dated 1992),
may be somewhat overstated, and thus use a somewhat lower estimate of output (11 million
tonnes) for 1990. This is generally consistent with the report by dprkguidebook.org that “[t]hecountry’s overall cement industry is made of a total of 30 plants and has a total capacity of about
12 Mt/yr.”112 We use a DPRK-specific coal-use intensity that is slightly higher than energy
intensities for Chinese plants,113 and quite close to the 1980 intensity reported for cement plants
in the former USSR.
Our data for the Fertilizer industry should be considered incomplete. Although we reviewed
several different estimates for overall fertilizer production, there are several different nutrientsprovided by fertilizers, and several different compounds, delivering vastly different amounts ofnutrient per unit weight of compound, for each nutrient.114 We have used DPRK-specific coaland electricity-use intensities for ammonium production, and an assumption that overall
consumption of nitrogen fertilizer was 600,000 tonnes of nitrogen.115 Depending on theformulations of nitrogen fertilizer used, this figure could be roughly consistent with otherestimates of nitrogen and overall fertilizer use and production. Included in our calculus is an
estimate of nitrogen fertilizer imports from the former Soviet Union, which reportedly amounted
to about 100,000 tonnes (N basis) in 1990.116 We assumed that essentially most of the nitrogen
fertilizer is based on ammonia produced via the DPRK-specific industrial process outlined (by a
DPRK official)117 and that the energy needed to convert ammonia to the other forms of nitrogen
fertilizers used (including urea, ammonium nitrate, ammonium sulfate) is either included in theenergy intensity we used, or is minimal relative to the energy needed to manufactureammonia118. Based on a process diagram for the Hamhung Fertilizer complex, we estimated thatroughly half of the coal used in ammonia manufacture is used as a feedstock. We categorized
this fraction as a non-energy fuel use. Also categorized as non-energy use are inputs of heavy oil
and of naptha (a light hydrocarbon product) to fertilizer manufacture, as a recent source indicatesthat key DPRK fertilizer factories make use of these feedstocks.119 Another major facility for
production of both fertilizer and chemicals/plastics is the Namhŭng Youth Chemical Complex,

110 V. Kalashnikov, personal communication, 9/97.
111 Ross, M. and L. Feng (1990), "The Energy Efficiency of the Steel Industry of China". Energy. V. 16, No. 5, pp. 833-848,

1991.
112
Dprkguidebook.org (undated, but probably 2006 or 2007), “Main Industrial Sectors & Business Opportunities”, formerly
available as http://dprkguidebook.org/contents_3.htm.
113 Document in authors' files [CE1].
114 For example, a tonne of anhydrous ammonia (NH ) delivers approximately 820 kg of nitrogen, while a tonne of ammonium
3
sulfate ((NH4)2SO4) provides only about 210 kg of nitrogen.
115 Document in authors' files [H1].
116 We have thus assumed that the DPRK produced about 500,000 tonnes (as N) of nitrogenous fertilizers).
117 Document in authors' files [HT1].
118 The electricity intensity of urea manufacture in China, for example, appears to be two orders of magnitude less than that forammonia.
119 R.V. Misra, "Agriculture and Fertilizer Situation in DPR Korea", formerly available as
http://www.fertilizer.org/ifa/publicat/PDF/2006_crossroads_misra_slides.pdf (from theInternational Fertilizer Industry Association), and presented as part of the "IFA Crossroads ASIA-PACIFIC 2006
Conference 'Growing markets, nurturing success'”, Chiangmai, Thailand, 13-16 November 2006.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

located near Anju, in South P'yŏng'an Province. This complex, reportedly built in 1976 withJapanese, French, and West German equipment, has a total capacity of 550,000 tonnes/yr (alloutputs), including 400,000 tonnes of urea and 20,000 tonnes of synthetic fibers and resins(Orlon, polyethylene, and others). It uses electricity from the nearby Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River
Thermoelectric Power Plant. The plant is reported to have added equipment in 2000 to produce
sodium carbonate, and “…has a French-built polyethylene production facility that uses
intermediates of propylene and butane. There is also equipment imported from Japan that is used
to produce ethylene, ethylene oxide, and ethylene glycol.”120 Figure 2-1 provides a photo ofanother major fertilizer complex, at Hungnam
Figure 2-1: Photo of Hungnam Fertilizer Complex, South Hamgyong Province121

We have a rough figure for the production of superphosphate fertilizer (P2O5); have assumed thatall superphosphate fertilizer is made from elemental phosphorous (which may not be correct);and have calculated the energy needed to manufacture superphosphate based on its phosphorous
content. This method may overstate the energy needed to make phosphate fertilizers.
Although other fertilizers, including potassium fertilizers, are in use in DPRK, we have no dataon production of these compounds. Because the volume of nutrients other than nitrogen (N) andphosphorous (P) required by plants is substantially less than the amount of N and P needed, theenergy needed to manufacture these other fertilizers may be small relative to that required tomake N and P fertilizer.
Energy use in our Other Chemicals category is limited to the coal, electricity, and petroleum
products used in the production of carbide, a feedstock for the synthetic fibers and plastics
120 From the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI, 2011), “Namhŭng Youth Chemical Complex”, prepared for NTI by the James Martin

Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, available as
http://www.nti.org/facilities/609/.
121 Photo from dprkguidebook.org (date not provided, but probably 2006 or 2007), “Main Industrial Sectors & Business
Opportunities”, formerly available as http://dprkguidebook.org/contents_3.htm.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

industry, and caustic soda. Other compounds, including sulfuric and nitric acids, are produced infairly large (though uncertain) quantities in the DPRK, but we were unable to locate suitableenergy intensity data. For carbide, we were guided by a process diagram for the Hamhung
Chemical complex in DPRK that allows the calculation of rough coal and electricity use
intensities. These values (particularly the coal use) appear to be slightly higher than similarvalues for Chinese industry. This fact is not entirely surprising, given the fairly unique coalbased process for carbide manufacturing used in this complex. The energy used in caustic soda
(sodium hydroxide) manufacturing was calculated using USSR and Chinese figures for coal andelectric energy intensities (respectively).
It has been reported (by DPRK officials122) that 30 percent of all oil (assumed to mean refined
products) use goes into making carbide. This assertion would seem to be at odds with the coalbased process used at the Hamhung plant, and has also been contradicted by reports by others.
As a result, we have assumed that carbide manufacture is not, in fact, a major use of fuel oil. If
one assumes, however, that carbide is a precursor to virtually all plastics manufactured in DPRK,
we may not have accounted for all of the carbide produced in the DPRK as of 1990. Thispossibility is supported by the fact that our assumed production of carbide by the Hamhung plant(350,000 tonnes) would likely be more than consumed solely in the production of textile fiber,
given the level of DPRK textile production that we are using (see below).
In the Pulp and Paper sector, estimates of paper output from the Economist Intelligence Unit123
were coupled with coal and electric energy intensities from Chinese data, and include a working
assumption that 50 percent of the (non-electric) fuel energy needed required to produce pulp andpaper is provided by wood wastes or other by-product fuels such as "black liquor".124 This
assumption ultimately may or may not prove to be correct for the DPRK; we have seen reportsthat disposal in rivers of paper mill wastes in some areas of North Korea is a significant
environmental problem, suggesting that by-products such as black liquor are in fact not used asfuels.
For the production of Other Metals, our analysis includes only Zinc, Copper, Lead, andAluminum. Although these are apparently the non-ferrous (non-iron) metals produced in thegreatest volumes in the DPRK, they are hardly an exhaustive list of the metals found or produced
there. Chinese coal- and electricity-use intensities were used to estimate the amount of fuel usedin producing these products. The electricity intensities used for all of these metals except
aluminum also include the electricity needed to mill the metal ores. The collapse of a barter deal
with international food corporation Cargill Inc. in mid-1997 has been attributed to the DPRK’s
inability to supply the requisite quantities of zinc in exchange for wheat. This inability to
produce zinc suggests that the minerals sector may have been operating at very low capacities by
1997, and/or that fuels and/or minerals transport facilities may not have been available to export
the zinc.
In the Other Minerals category, we include magnesite, a refractory mineral present in abundance(and high quality) in the DPRK and produced in significant quantities (approximately one

122

Document in authors' files [HT1].
The Economist Intelligence Unit (1994), South Korea, North Korea No. 1 1994. The Economist Intelligence Unit, London,
United Kingdom. Country Report, 1st Quarter 1994.
124 “Black Liquor” is a byproduct of the kraft pulping process that includes lignin, hemicelluloses and other components liberated
by heat and chemical treatment from the cellulose wood fibers used in paper.
123

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

million tonnes) as of 1990.125 For magnesite, we used a reported estimate for the intensity ofheavy fuel oil use in DPRK magnesite refining,126 and assumed that electricity requirements per
tonne of magnesite produced would be similar to that needed to process chemically similar
cement “clinker” from limestone.
In the Textiles industry, we started with estimates of the running meters of textiles produced in
the DPRK, applied an average weight per meter figure (approximately a quarter kilogram permeter), and assumed that essentially all fabric was made of the "vinalon" fiber manufactured at
the Hamhung complex (and other places). Most of the coal used for textile production is thus
used in manufacturing vinalon from carbide; some is also used in the printing and dyeing of
fabrics. The coal and electric energy intensities of vinalon production were estimated based on aprocess flow diagram provided by DPRK officials.127
Although Building Materials can be expected to be an important subsector for DPRK industry,
we could find no data for the DPRK output of key materials (other than cement, which isaccounted for separately). To estimate placeholder fuel consumption values for two key
products—glass and bricks—we made the assumption that the per-capita production of these
items in the DPRK in 1990 were similar to per-capita production in China in the same year.
Using per-capita figures derived from Chinese data, we applied a DPRK population estimate toderive figures for total glass and bricks production in North Korea, then applied Chinese energy
intensity values for these products to estimate the use of coal and electricity by the subsector.128
To provide sufficient demand to meet estimates of fuel supply in 1990, we included placeholder
values for coal, petroleum product, and electricity use in Non-specified industries. These values
amount to approximately 15, 13, and 15 percent of the total industrial demand for these fuels,
respectively.
2.2.2. Changes in industrial output for 1996
The detailed calculations and data that we used to produce our 1990 estimates of energy use in
the industrial sector, and to update them to 1996 and beyond, are presented in Attachment 1.
Our estimates of 1996 industrial output relative to 1990 are presented in Table 2-2.

Trigubenko, M. (1991), “Industry of the DPRK”. Paper presented at Korea Development Institute symposium, Seoul, ROK,
October 1991. Quoted in The Economist Intelligence Unit (1993?), China, North Korea Country Profile 1992-1993. The
Economist Intelligence Unit, London, United Kingdom.
126 The value supplied, 300 kg oil equivalent per tonne of magnesite produced, is similar to estimates for coal use in magnesite
production elsewhere in the world.
127 Document from authors' files [HT1].
128 The coal use intensity for glass production that we used (from Chinese experience) is about 15 percent lower than thatreported for Soviet plants in 1965 (V. Kalashnikov, personal communication, 9/97).
125

43
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 2-2: Assumptions for Changes in Industrial Production in 1996

Subsector
Iron and Steel
Cement---- fraction of heat from heavy oil
Fertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-Specified Industry--non-oil fuels
Non-Specified Industry--diesel oil
Non-Specified Industry--heavy oil

1996
Production
Relative to
1990

35%
40%
10%
25%
30%
30%
30%
30%
30%
30%
33%
20%
30%

For the steel and cement subsectors, we assumed production in 1996 of 2.1 and 4.4 million
tonnes, respectively, or somewhat lower than 1992 production estimates from ROK sources.129
We assume that fertilizer production decreased to less than 25 percent of its 1990 value in 1996,
which is intended to be roughly consistent with the reported decrease in agricultural fertilizer
availability. “Other chemicals” production (including carbide) for 1996 was set 30 percent of1990 levels. Production in most other industrial subsectors is also assumed to be 30 percent of
the 1990 value in 1996, consistent with anecdotal estimates of utilization of productive capacity
standing at 20 to 50 percent due to lack of fuel and spare parts.130 For all industries, in 1996, weassume that the energy intensity (fuels use per unit output) was 110 percent of 1990, as industrial
equipment (including boilers, for example) are generally less efficient when partially orintermittently loaded then when operating at near full capacity, and factoring in the probable
lower average efficiency of DPRK industrial equipment in 1996 relative to 1990, due to greaterdifficulties in obtaining spare parts and other maintenance supplies.
2.2.3. Transport sector
The transport sector in North Korea is concentrated on the movement of freight, principally byrail. Visitors to the DPRK have noted that there is relatively little vehicle traffic on city streets
and roads, and that the main form of personal transport appears to be walking. This is aided by
the fact that the apartments in which most urban dwellers live are typically located close to theirplaces of work. Based on these observations, we have assumed 1,200 average passenger
129 Far Eastern Economic Review (1995).

1995 Asia Yearbook, North Korea.
It is certainly possible that even the drastically reduced levels of industrial production that we assume may be greater thanactual production. A 1997 analysis by the US Department of Defense reportedly suggests that DPRK industrial production(presumably as of early or mid-1997) was one-tenth of the level of five years earlier (Chosun Ilbo, “POSSIBILITY OF COUP IN
DPRK: HONG KONG MAGAZINE”, 06/19/97).
130

44
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKkilometers traveled per year in 1990 in motorized transport by the roughly two-thirds of the
population that is "economically active". This translates to about 800 kilometers of travel incars, trains, and buses per person (all residents) per year, which is greater than the 1990 level ofpassenger transport in China, but less than that in India (and far less than that in industrializedcountries131).
We have relatively little direct quantitative information on the DPRK transport sector and its
energy requirements but have attempted to derive estimates for energy use in the five transport
subsectors described below.
The Road transport subsector is divided into passenger transport and freight transport. For
freight transport, we started with a figure of 42 million tonnes as the amount of freighttransported by road (as estimated by the Korea Foreign Trade Association132) but had to guess at
an average transport distance of 75 kilometers. Another assumption was that about 24 percentof the freight transport occurred in diesel trucks, somewhat under 5 percent (probably mostly inrural locations) in trucks fitted with biomass gasifiers, and the rest in gasoline trucks. Although
this is just an assumption, it is informed by 1) the fairly large fraction of gasoline in overall
petroleum product consumption as reported by Choi;133 and 2) the probability that a great deal of
freight as of 1990 was transported in the ubiquitous locally-produced 2.5 tonne (capacity)
gasoline trucks that make up the bulk of the military transport fleet (see discussion of this sector
below). Energy intensities for freight transport by truck are taken from USSR data (from the1970s) and inflated by 20 percent to account for what is probably an older, more poorlymaintained vehicle stock in the DPRK, operating on what were on average more difficult roads.
Our estimate of gasoline used in civilian autos starts with an estimate, obtained by recent visitors
to the DPRK, that there were approximately 15,500 civilian autos (including taxis) in
Pyongyang, and very few outside the capital city. These autos, which as of 1990 were allimported (Nissan, Volvo, and smaller Mercedes sedans) during the 1970s and 1980s, wereassumed to travel an average of 8,500 km per year (fairly low for an auto in an industrialized
nation, but possibly still high for DPRK), and were assumed to have an average fuel economy of
11 km/liter (26 miles per gallon).
For other passenger road transport, we assumed that 30 percent of motorized public passenger
transport was by road134, and that 50 percent of this (bus) transport was in diesel vehicles. We
adapted energy intensity estimates from 1985 Chinese data, marked up by 20 percent as for
freight transport.
Rail transport in the DPRK was and is fueled by diesel oil and by electricity. An ongoingprogram of electrifying the DPRK rail system had increased the fraction of freight hauled byelectric engines as of 1990. We assumed this fraction to be 87.5 percent.135 For freight

131

Sinton, J., editor (1996), China Energy Databook 1996 Edition, Revised January 1996. Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, California, USA. LBL-32822.Rev.3. UC-900.
132 Korea (ROK) Foreign Trade Association (1993), "Major Economic Indicators for North Korea, 1993".
133 Choi Su Young (1993), Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea, Research Institute for National
Unification (RINU), Seoul, (ROK).
134 The Economist Intelligence Unit (1994), South Korea, North Korea No. 1 1994. The Economist Intelligence Unit, London,
United Kingdom. Country Report, 1st Quarter 1994.
135 The Economist Intelligence Unit (1994), South Korea, North Korea No. 1 1994. The Economist Intelligence Unit, London,
United Kingdom. Country Report, 1st Quarter 1994.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

transport, we began with an estimate of 169 million tonnes of freight carried by rail,136 but wereforced again to make a guess as to the average distance (300 km for electric rail, 250 km fordiesel rail) of freight transport. We again used marked-up USSR energy intensities for both
diesel and electrically powered freight locomotives (see the "Transport" section of Attachment 1
for specific values and sources).
We assumed that practically no passenger transport is by diesel rail, as railways between mostcities are reportedly electrified. The residual 70 percent of motorized public passenger transport
not provided in road vehicles was assumed to take place in trains (or trams), at an efficiency of
13.2 kg coal equivalent per thousand passenger kilometers. The latter is an average 1989
efficiency for US commute-time train transit.137 While trains in the DPRK are probably lessefficient than US trains, their load factors are probably significantly higher.
Our estimate of oil use in transport of freight by Water in the DPRK (excluding international
shipping) started with an estimate of 18 million tonnes of freight transported138, and assumed anaverage transport distance of 200 kilometers. A Chinese energy intensity of 9.9 kg coalequivalent per thousand tonne-kilometers was used,139 and is in the range of energy intensity
values for Soviet maritime freight transport, but it may still be too low for the DPRK situation.
The civilian Air transport subsector in the DPRK is quite limited. We assumed that the non-jetengine planes among the 24 total aircraft that reportedly made up the 1990 North Korean civilian
fleet would be used an average of 300 hours per year, and that the planes themselves are mostly
AN-24 propeller planes (a Soviet design from about 1960), with similar fuel consumption to thatwhich we calculated for AN-24s in military use in the DPRK. The DPRK reportedly purchased
three Tupolev Tu-154 jets (similar in size to the Boeing 727) between 1976 and 1978,140 which
we assume were used about 750 hours per year. For both the jets and non-jets, the estimates ofoperating hours that we used are probably more likely to be high than low, given the age of theairline fleet and probable difficulties in obtaining spare parts and aviation fuel. We assumed
that the few (4 or 5) international airlines that flew into and out of the DPRK as of 1990 provided
all of their own fuel. Thus, the DPRK made no contribution to international aviation bunkers.
A final category of Non-specified transport was added to account for electricity and petroleum
product use not included in the categories above. Pipeline transport of crude oil or oil products
within the DPRK is one possible use of fuels in this group. For 1990, we have used placeholder
values of 1.0 million and 0.6 million GJ of petroleum products and electricity, respectively, inthis category.
Our estimates of energy use in the transport sector in 1990 currently includes no coalconsumption, although coal may have been used to a limited extent as a fuel on some isolated
railways, in older ships, and/or in trucks powered by gasifiers. As noted above, we have
136 Korea Foreign Trade Association (1993), Major Economic Indicators for North Korea.
137 Gordon, D. (1991) Steering a New Course: Transportation, Energy and the Environment.

Island Press, Washington, D.C.,
USA.
138 Korea Foreign Trade Association (1993), Major Economic Indicators for North Korea.
139 In comparing this value with the energy intensities we estimate for DPRK military ships, this intensity seems quite low,
perhaps by an order of magnitude or more. The low value of the Chinese shipping energy intensity may be due to the muchlarger ships that are probably used to transport freight in China.
140 Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress (1993), North Korea, A Country Study. Edited by Andrea M. Savada.
Research completed 1993. US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, USA. Available (in part) on the World-wide web
at https://www.loc.gov/item/2008028547/.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

assumed, based on anecdotal reports, that trucks fueled with biomass in some form (possibly
charcoal) were (and are) in use in the DPRK, possibly remnants from the Japanese occupation of
Korea during WWII.141 We assume that these vehicles convert biomass (or charcoal made of
biomass) to “producer gas” (a gas produced by pyrolysis—a process of partial combustion—of
biomass or other fuels) for use in internal combustion engines,142 although it is possible thatsome vehicles are steam-driven. We assume that the overall efficiencies of biomass-fueled
trucks are on average about 50 percent of the efficiency of their gasoline-driven analogs,
although this may be somewhat of an over-estimate.
2.2.4. Transport sector activity changes for 1996
Transport-sector calculations and data that we used to produce our estimates of energy use in thetransport sector in 1990 and beyond are presented in Attachment 1. Key assumptions for 1996
are as follows:•

Road Freight—down to 32 percent of 1990 value in 1996, roughly following the decrease inindustrial and food output. Use of biomass-fueled trucks increases to move 7.6 percent ofroad freight in 1996, up from an assumed 4.6 percent in 1990, and the fraction of freight
carried in diesel trucks was assumed to decrease modestly, to about 20 percent of the total.
Energy intensities for all gasoline- and diesel-fueled trucks, and buses were assumed to be 10
percent higher than in 1990, reflecting poorer fuel economy caused mostly by poorer
maintenance (due to lack of parts and lubricants, for example) and a generally aging stock ofvehicles. The energy intensity for cars (kilometers per liter) was assumed to be 5 percent
higher than in 1990.

•

Electric Rail, Water Freight—down to 40 of 1990 values in 1996. Diesel rail freight also
declines to 40 percent of 1990 values.

•

Road, Rail Passenger (except civilian auto)—down to about 44 percent of 1990 levels per
capita in 1996 for diesel buses, although nearly 60 percent of 1990 levels for travel ingasoline buses, reflecting the assumption that more smaller buses, for example, minibuses
and vans, were in use in 1996. These changes reflect a shortage of transport facilities andgeneral “belt-tightening”.

•

Civilian Auto passenger kilometers traveled—100 percent of 1990 value in 1996, reflecting
an observed continued presence of autos in and around Pyongyang (if not so much in otherareas), as well as reports of (used) vehicle imports from Japan and elsewhere during the
1990s, with the addition of vehicles perhaps offset by less travel per vehicle due to reduced
supplies of fuel and spare parts.

•

Air transport—down to 80 percent of 1990 value in 1996, with the ratio of fuel consumed inpropeller and jet aircraft remaining the same as in 1990.

141

Professor Y.S. Jang, 1995, personal communication.

142 A photo of a gasifier-powered truck appears at the end of this Chapter.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

2.2.5. The residential sector in 1990
Our estimate of energy use in the residential sector begins with the assumption that 60 percent of
the approximately 22 million people in the DPRK as of 1990 (excluding the 1.2 million persons
in active units of the military) lived in urban areas,143 and that the average number of persons perhousehold in both urban and rural households was 4.65 in 1990.144
For the Urban subsector, we assumed, based on the observations of visitors to the DPRK
(including the authors), that the average urban household lives in a multi-story building in anapartment of approximately 50 square meters.145 We further assumed that the vast majority ofthese buildings are at least nominally heated using coal-fired boilers supplying hot water or
steam to the apartments in the building, although some buildings use district heating systems thatuse steam provided from power plants, central district heating boilers (often, as in Pyongyang,co-located with power plants), and industrial cogeneration. Based on a series of very roughestimates (see Attachment 1) we estimate that somewhat under 9 percent of urban households
used district heat (from both dedicated central district heat boilers and central combined heat andpower systems as of 1990. For urban households using coal-fired heating systems, meaning
either boilers in their buildings supplying heat to all (or many) apartments, or coal stoves inindividual dwelling units, for 1990 we applied an average figure of 30 kg coal equivalent/m2
from Chinese data, increased by 20 percent to account for the colder (on average) climate in the
DPRK, to derive an average household use of 2.2 tonnes of coal per year, or about 53
GJ/household-yr. We further assumed an average electricity use of about 770 kWh per
household (HH)-year in 1990. This is about 2.4 times the average household use of electricity in
the ROK in 1975,146 but is roughly consistent with a household using several electric lights, asmall refrigerator (if used), a few small appliances, and a household's share of common
electricity use (pumps, lighting) in common areas of multi-family buildings.
For urban sector cooking, we assumed that in 1990 petroleum-based cooking fuels (liquefied
petroleum gas, or LPG, and kerosene) were used exclusively in Pyongyang, but were not used
extensively elsewhere.147 Usage of these fuels per household was assumed to be about 9.3 GJ/yr,
approximately half the energy used reportedly used in wood-fueled stoves in rural households inthe Kumgang area. We also assumed, as a placeholder estimate, that 16 percent of urbanhouseholds used charcoal for cooking, mostly for specialty foods, at a rate of 150 kg/HH-yr.
This assumption produces a charcoal demand consistent with the charcoal production weestimate (see section 2.3.4). All other urban cooking is assumed to be provided by coal or(much more rarely) electricity, with cooking use of those fuels subsumed in the overall coal andelectricity use figures cited earlier.

143

Document in authors' files [HT1].

144 This figure is an extrapolation from a single area (the Ongjin area) in southern DPRK (Document in authors' files [FC1]).

Although it may not be an accurate weighted average figure for the country as a whole, it is probably fairly close, based on theauthors’ own observations in the Western DPRK village of Unhari in 1998.
145 This size dwelling would be roughly consistent with conditions in parts of China (Liu, F. (1993), Energy and Conservation in
China's Residential and Commercial Sectors: Patterns, Problems, and Prospects. Energy Analysis Program, Energy andEnvironmental Division, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA. LBL-33867 UC-350.
146 Kim, E.-W., H. Kim, H.-K. Lim, C. Nahm, M.-C. Shin, and Y. Kim (1983), The Electric Future of Korea. Resource Systems
Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. Research Materials RM-83-8.
147 Document from authors' files [FA].

48
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKFor Rural households, we reviewed estimates of household fuel use provided by DPRK officials
for three areas of the country. Based on these data, which may or may not prove representative
for the country as a whole, and on other anecdotal information, we estimated that in 1990 50
percent of rural households used coal for heating and cooking, 2 percent used LPG for cooking(a guess on our part), and that the rest use wood or biomass fuels. These assumptions, and thefuel use rates for each fuel, are detailed in the "Residential" pages of Attachment 1 to this report.
Electricity use in rural households was assumed to be less, on average, than in urban households,
namely 512 kWh per HH-year.
2.2.6. Residential sector changes by 1996
In the residential sector, we assumed the following changes from 1990 conditions:•

Population growth averaging a small 0.08 percent annually through 2000.148•

The fraction of the population living in urban areas increases slightly, to about 60.3 percent
in 1996. We have heard unsubstantiated reports of involuntary urban-to-rural migration, plus
reports of residents of northern cities relocating to the countryside where food can moreeasily be foraged, but we assume for the sake of preparing this estimate that these
movements, at least through 1996, were slightly more than balanced by rural to urban
migration, greater net population growth in urban areas than in rural areas, and/or otherdemographic shifts.

•

Through a combination of austerity and fuel unavailability, that residential end-uses of coaldeclined to 75 and 60 percent of 1990 values in the urban and rural subsectors, respectively,
while the fraction of households using coal for heating and cooking declined to about 82
percent in urban areas and 38 percent in rural areas, offset in part by increased use of biomass
fuels. Urban use of electricity and heat per household is estimated to have declined to 57.5
percent of 1990 levels in 1996, with rural electricity use declining to about 45 percent of1990 levels (due to relatively lower availability of electricity in rural areas). Rural biomass
use per household is assumed to decrease by about 10 percent relative to 1990, as the greaternumber of households using biomass fuels due to reduced availability of coal is more thanoffset by a combination of the impacts of tighter supplies of firewood and reduced levels of
cooking and heating in households. The use of charcoal—which as we understand it is usedin the DPRK mostly as a fuel for cooking special dishes, rather than as a routine cooking
fuel—is assumed to decline to 75 percent of 1990 levels, and the use of kerosene and LPG in
urban and rural homes decrease to about 52 and 47 percent, respectively, of their 1990 levels

148 The US Central Intelligence Agency ("Korea, North", CIA Factbook, 2001 (World Wide Web Version), USCIA, Washington,

D.C., USA, 2001, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-north/) lists a 2001 estimated growth rate of 1.22 %/yr
and a total population of just under 22 million. The USDOE Energy Information Administration listed a year 2000 population of
21.7 million in its North Korea Country Analysis Brief (www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nkorea.html, visited 5/2002). A file of"DPRK Energy Data" provided to Nautilus by the Korea Energy Economics Institute (KEEI, 2002) suggests a year-2000
population of 22.175 million and a growth rate of 0.4 percent annually (with the growth rate decreasing substantially between
1990 and 2000) but uses a year-1990 base population of 20.221 million for the DPRK. While recognizing the extreme difficultyin estimating DPRK population, we continue to assume that year 1990 population was 22 million (as official estimates suggest)
and adopt the figure provided by KEEI as the year 2000 population. This implies a very modest net total increase in population
over the decade, which is certainly consistent with food shortages and anecdotal but fairly widespread evidence of lack of proper
food rations, as well as medical care, for the DPRK populace, offsetting the impacts of a national government program toincrease the population.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

as a result (primarily) of reduced fuel availability.149 The fraction of homes using these fuelsis assumed to have declined slightly from 1990 levels as well.
2.2.7. The agricultural and fisheries sectors in 1990
To estimate fuel use in the agricultural sector, we started with the area of field crops grown in the
DPRK, approximately 1.7 million hectares150. We have divided energy use in the agricultural
sector into two components, accounting separately for the fuel used in Field Machinery and thatused for Processing of crops and other applications.
To estimate the petroleum product consumption in field machinery in 1990, we applied a
Chinese figure for annual fuel consumption of 41 liters of diesel oil per hectare (ha) farmed151 to
the total DPRK field crop area. By way of comparison, this equates to approximately 6 hours oftractor use per hectare per year if one assumes 1) an average fuel consumption rate of 195 grams
per horsepower hour;152 and 2) a 28-hp tractor, the size that is apparently common in the DPRK.
If tractors are typically used at less than full power, this tractor-hours-per-hectare figure would
increase. Official DPRK sources suggest that there are seven to eight tractors per 100 hectares offield crops, which would imply on the order of 10 to 20 days of tractor operation per tractor per
year. This level of tractor use seems low, but is not entirely implausible given A) the fairly
narrow time windows that Korean weather provide for planting and harvesting crops; B) the
large amount of hand labor used in North Korean agriculture; and C) the probable scarcity of fueland spare parts for tractors in DPRK, even as of 1990.
Electricity use in field machinery was estimated using a Chinese value of 126 kWh/ha-yr.153
Most electricity use would probably be for water pumping.
Chinese energy intensities were also used to estimate the coal and petroleum products used incrop processing and other applications. In this case, we estimated intensities by dividing thefigures for consumption of coal and electricity in Chinese agriculture (1987 values) by the total
area of rice crop cultivated, then applied the resulting coefficients to the area of rice crops(650,000 ha154) cultivated in the DPRK. This procedure, of course, yields intensity figures thatare approximations at best; the ratio of rice hectarage to area of all crops were doubtlesssomewhat (though probably not vastly) different in China than in the DPRK, as were agricultural
practices and agricultural yields, both of which would affect the energy used in processing crops.

149

We assume that availability of LPG and kerosene for cooking would be more limited in rural areas than in urban areas, hence
the smaller percentage of rural households that are assumed to use oil fuels. Based on our experience, however, there may be acountervailing effect of increased use of kerosene (and diesel) for lighting as electricity has become less available, particularly inrural areas, in the evening hours.
150 Document in authors' files [KJ1].
151 Liu, F. (1993), Energy and Conservation in China's Residential and Commercial Sectors: Patterns, Problems, and Prospects.
Energy Analysis Program, Energy and Environmental Division, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA.
LBL-33867 UC-350.
152Liu, F., W.B. Davis, and M.D. Levine (1992), An Overview of Energy Supply and Demand in China. Energy Analysis
Program, Energy and Environment Division, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA. LBL-32275 UC-350.
Available as https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/efea/52764ce6a4fc75a7ac0d6c41ce55619b0f50.pdf.
153 Liu, F., W.B. Davis, and M.D. Levine (1992), An Overview of Energy Supply and Demand in China. Energy Analysis
Program, Energy and Environment Division, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA. LBL-32275 UC-350.
Available as https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/efea/52764ce6a4fc75a7ac0d6c41ce55619b0f50.pdf.
154 Document in authors' files [KJ1].

50
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKLastly, we summed figures provided by DPRK officials for straw and bran used as fuel inagricultural operations. This sum provided an initial estimate of the biomass fuel used by thesector. Some wood is probably used in the sector as well, but we have no quantitative data to
describe this use.
Very little data are available to describe energy use in the fisheries sector of DPRK. The
approach we used was to start with the tonnage of larger fishing vessels (about 438,000 tonnes,
and 360,000 horsepower155), to guess at the average annual usage of the fishing fleet, and to
apply a Chinese coefficient for energy use intensity of ships, expressed in energy perhorsepower-hour. We assumed that 85 percent of the DPRK fishing fleet was in service, and thatthose ships spent an average of 200 days at sea, were underway an average of 12 hours per day,and operated at an average of 50 percent of full power when underway. Our best guess is that
this estimate for the activity of the North Korean fishing fleet is high, if anything, but the
Chinese energy intensity is probably a low value for the DPRK.
For other uses of energy in the fisheries sector, including petroleum used by smaller fishingcollectives and in fish processing, and electricity use in processing operations, we have preparedestimates based on a report as to the number of fishing collectives and the number and size (onaverage) of motorized boats used by each collective156. We assumed the same average of 200
days per year, 12 hours per day of operation assumed for larger ships but assumed that only 75
percent of boats were in operation in 1990, and that average power use was 25 percent of fullpower.
It is possible that some coal, or even wood, is used in ships and/or in the processing of fisheries
products, but we have thus far assumed that none is used.
2.2.8. Changes in the agricultural and fisheries sectors as of 1996
We assumed no significant change in the area cropped between 1990 and 1996, but that theelectricity used in field operations decreased to 90 percent of its 1990 value by 1996 as a resultof decreased agricultural output and flood damage, while oil products use (diesel) decreased to
30 percent of the 1990 value by 1996, consistent with observations of greatly reduced farmmechanization due to fuel shortages over the first half of the 1990s. For coal, electricity, andbiomass used in crop processing, we assumed that these would decrease with the significant
decrease in the amount of crops harvested, with cereal crop harvest estimates as the metric tocalculate a ratio of output in 1996 versus 1990. We also assumed that per-unit crop use of thesefuels would be 90 percent of 1990 levels, due to fuel shortages, lack of spare parts for key
equipment, and other factors. In the fisheries sector, we assume that 1996 fishing effort (asreflected in fuels use in fishing) was approximately 30 percent of 1990 effort, and that themechanized processing of fisheries products was 45 percent of 1990 levels, consistent with
reports of a recent sizable reduction in marine products output.157

155 Document in authors' files [IF1]; Seoul T'ongil Kyongje, dated January 2002, pages 38-50, article by Hong Mi-ri entitled"North Korean Industries (Part IX): Fisheries Industry"; and WORKING PAPER 6, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
KOREA REPORT OF THE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING MISSION, prepared for the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, dated November 1998, and available as
http://www.fao.org/tempref/FI/CDrom/aquaculture/a0845t/volume2/docrep/field/.!52305!383547.htm (Table 1).
156 Document in authors' files [IF1]; and Seoul T'ongil Kyongje, dated January 2002, pages 38-50, article by Hong Mi-ri entitled"North Korean Industries (Part IX): Fisheries Industry".
157 Noland (1996) quotes Y.S. Lee (1995) as reporting a reduction in marine products output between 1989 and 1993.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

2.2.9. Public and Commercial sectors
As in the fisheries sector, we have essentially no direct data on the use of fuels in public andcommercial buildings (which we define to include institutional buildings such as nurseries,
schools, and hospitals) in the DPRK. To provide a "ballpark" (approximate) estimate of thesequantities, we started with our estimate of urban residential floor space and applied the ratio of
residential urban floor space to public and commercial floor space (approximately 0.3) thatprevailed in the "heating zone" of China as of 1989.158 We then applied coal use intensities(from the same source) to this total. To estimate electricity use, we derived an annual electricity
use intensity of 33 kWh/m2, derived from Chinese data (but about 10 percent higher to accountfor cooler average temperatures), and applied it to our public/commercial floor space estimate.
In order to bring the sum of electricity demand in the agricultural, public/commercial, andmilitary sectors up toward (but not quite to) the approximately 25 percent share of total
electricity demand that these sectors reportedly account for, we included an additional
placeholder value of 7 million GJ/yr for other uses of electricity in the public/commercial sector.
We assumed that 15 percent of public/commercial floorspace in 1990 was heated using district
heating systems, and that public and commercial sector buildings used wood and biomass fuels
in 1990 in an amount equal to 5 percent of their use of coal (on an energy-content basis). We
assumed that oil use in the public/commercial sector was modest in 1990, at 0.3 percent of coaluse, with 90 percent of oil use in the sector in 1990 being kerosene, and the rest LPG. Ourestimate of energy use in the public and commercial sector in the DPRK might be improved bycollecting and applying intensity figures representative of Soviet-style construction.
2.2.10. Commercial/Public/Institutional sector changes by 1996
For all activities in this sector, we assume that total floor space per unit residential floor space tohave remained constant at 1990 levels through 1996, but that coal consumption per unit floor
space decreased to 75 percent of 1996 levels, and electricity and heat use per unit floor space(and for other sectoral electricity use) declined to 57 percent of 1996 levels, similar to the decline
in urban residential electricity use. At these levels of 1996 energy use, thecommercial/public/institutional sectors are assumed to have fared better than the industrial orresidential sectors, reflecting a rough balance of slowly declining “official” activities in the
sector with increasing “private” commercial activities. In addition, and consistent with thereports of observers of the DPRK, we have assumed a level of wood/biomass use in the sector
equal to10 percent of coal use in 1996. Wood/biomass use in the public and commercial sector
in the DPRK in 1996 was likely to be concentrated in more rural areas, and in areas of thecountry where supplies of coal and electricity were curtailed. Oil use is assumed to increase
somewhat with the reported increase in private sector activities, to a level equal to 0.5 percent ofcoal use, with oil use split evenly between kerosene and LPG use.
2.2.11. The military sector in 1990
Although we have thus far been able to obtain essentially no direct data on energy use in the
military sector in the DPRK, the DPRK military is monitored closely by the military andintelligence community in the United States and elsewhere. For our study, this attention has
158 Liu, F. (1993), Energy and Conservation in China's Residential and Commercial Sectors: Patterns, Problems, and Prospects.

Energy Analysis Program, Energy and Environmental Division, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA.
LBL-33867 UC-350.

52
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKmeant that there are reasonably good data on the stocks of energy-using equipment in the DPRK
military. These data on stocks can be used as the basis for estimates of fuels consumption. Our
approach to estimating fuel use in the DPRK armed forces has been to use these stock figures
together with data and estimates of vehicle/aircraft/vessel fuel capacities and estimates of theamount of "practice time" that each piece of equipment might receive in a year. Of these three
types of information, our estimates of equipment use are by far the most speculative. The
methods and data used to prepare our estimates of fuel use by the DPRK military sector arepresented in Attachment 2 and are summarized (and augmented) in the "Military" section of
Attachment 1. In addition, the methods and key assumptions that we used in preparing
estimates for the different military subsectors are summarized below.
To estimate the energy used by the DPRK Ground Forces, we started with estimates of the total
number of mobile equipment and vehicles in seven classes:
•

Tanks

•

Amphibious Vehicles (used for fording rivers and lakes, landing on seashores, or
operating in wet terrain)•

Armored fighting vehicles•

Truck- and Tank-mounted artillery and missiles•

Jeeps and motorcycles•

2.5 tonne trucks•

Other trucks and utility equipment.

Using information on the number of the different types of regiments and other units in the DPRK
Army,159 and on the equipment stocks in each type of unit,160 we estimated the personnel andequipment totals in the DPRK Army. This exercise yielded a personnel total somewhat lower(936,000 versus 1.066 million) than the total reported personnel active in the Army, so we
multiplied the resulting equipment totals by 1.14 to "true-up" to the total reported force strength.
Next, we used data from two US sources161 that described the various equipment types (size,
range, fuel capacity, weight, and engine power) to estimate the fuel consumption per kilometerof vehicle travel. We assumed average speeds during maneuvers ranging from 15 to 30
kilometers per hour and assumed that the vehicles would be active during maneuvers about 50
percent of the time (except for engineering utility vehicles, which were assumed to be active 25
percent of the time). We further assumed that 20 percent of the stock of all types of vehicles andequipment are unusable (due to lack of fuel or spare parts, ongoing maintenance, or just age anddecay) at any given time, and that the Army conducts maneuvers approximately 1,000 hours per
year, but that heavy armaments (tanks, armored vehicles, amphibious vehicles, and selfpropelled guns and missiles) are used in training only 100 hours per year. Interestingly, a single

159 US Defense Intelligence Agency (1990?), North Korea, The Foundations for Military Strength.

US Defense Intelligence
Agency, Washington, DC, USA.
160 US Headquarters Department of the Army (1982), Opposing Force Training Module, North Korean Military Forces.
Department of the Army, Washington, DC, USA. February 1982. Field Manual No. 34-21.
161 US Headquarters Department of the Army (1982), Opposing Force Training Module, North Korean Military Forces.
Department of the Army, Washington, DC, USA. February 1982. Field Manual No. 34-21.US Department of Defense (1994),
North Korea Handbook. US Department of Defense, Washington, DC, USA.

53
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

type of vehicle--the DPRK's 2 1/2 tonne trucks--dominates both the numbers of vehicles in the
DPRK Ground Forces (over 75 percent) and our estimate of fuel used by those forces (about 90
percent). These and other trucks nominally in military use often, based on our own direct
observations and that of many others, are used for both civilian (goods and human transport) andmilitary purposes, often simultaneously.
We used our estimates of fuel used by light vehicles, trucks, and utility vehicles in the groundforces to estimate the amount of fuel used by support vehicles in the DPRK Air Force and Navy.
We did this by applying simple ratios of the personnel in each branch to the Army fuel use total.
For Aircraft in the DPRK Air Force, we used estimates of each class of aircraft162 andinformation on the early-1980s stocks of specific aircraft163 to estimate the current stocks bymodel of plane (or helicopter). Most of the DPRK's aircraft are antiquated, with many models
dating from the 1960s or before. Of the approximately 1,400 aircraft in the DPRK inventory,
approximately 750 are fighters, 80 are bombers, 300 are transport aircraft (90 percent of which
are smaller single-engine Russian AN-2 biplanes), and the remainder are helicopters.
Information on aircraft range, size, and fuel capacity was gleaned from the US documents
mentioned above, from Jane's All the World's Aircraft,164 and from other sources.165 These data
were used to estimate the "fuel economy" of the planes and helicopters in the DPRK stock.
Based on the assumption that these aircraft receive minimal use--due to their typically advanced
age, scarcity of fuel and parts, and the DPRK's typically ground-oriented military doctrine--weassumed fairly minimal annual operating hours of:•Fighters and Bombers: 24 hours per year•

Transport Planes: 50 hours per year•

Military Helicopters: 32 hours per year.

It is quite possible that some aircraft receive substantially more use than we have assumed, but it
is more likely that many aircraft are entirely or effectively in "mothballs" (long-term storage) andreceive little or no use. For most aircraft, we assumed that their average airspeed while on
training or practice missions is about 80 percent of their reported maximum speed, interpreted tomean that average fuel consumption was about 80 percent of fuel consumption implied byconsideration of the fuel capacity, range, and maximum airspeed of the different aircraft asreported in the literature.166

162 As supplied in US Defense Intelligence Agency (1990?), North Korea, The Foundations for Military Strength, US DefenseIntelligence Agency, Washington, DC, USA, available in part as http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/knfms/knfms_toc.html.
163 US Headquarters Department of the Army (1982), Opposing Force Training Module, North Korean Military Forces.
Department of the Army, Washington, DC, USA. February 1982. Field Manual No. 34-21.
164 Jane's (1990/91, 1981/82, 1972/73, 1968/69), Jane's All the World's Aircraft. 1990/91, 1981/82, 1972/73, and 1968/69
editions. Jane's Publishing Co., N.Y., NY, USA.
165 Chant, C., (1990), Air Forces of the World. Brian Trodd Publishing House, Ltd. Taylor, J.W.R., and G. Swanborough (1979),
Military Aircraft of the World. Ian Allen Ltd., UK (1979).
166 This is admittedly a rough approximation, as published aircraft ranges may not be quoted at maximum airspeed, and therelationship between airspeed and fuel consumption is not linear (see, for example, page 252 in Warren F. Phillips (2004),
Mechanics of Flight, published by John Wiley and Sons).

54
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKOur estimates of fuel use in Naval vessels used a similar approach: figures on current total
numbers of ships by class in the DPRK Navy were combined with an older167 inventory of
numbers of ships by model to yield estimates of the current number of ships by model and typeof ship (including submarines). The DPRK's forces include few ships of any size (by naval
standards), consisting mostly of smaller (40- to 400-ton displacement) missile attack boats(numbering about 40) and patrol craft (over 400), with a number of amphibious craft designed toland troops on beachheads (about 200) and 24 diesel-electric submarines.
We then compiled information on the engine power for each model in this inventory of ships andused a benchmark figure of 0.38 lb of diesel fuel per horsepower (hp)-hr of operation,168 169 plus
an assumption that at cruising speed, naval ships operate at approximately half-throttle (that is,they are using half of the total horsepower available). For submarines, we used a figure of 0.50
lb of diesel per hp-hr.170 These data were used to estimate the fuel consumption for each vessel
per hour of operation.
We assumed, based primarily on conjecture, that amphibious naval vehicles would be inoperation only 50 hours per year, that submarines would operate 100 hours per year, and that allother vessels would operate 800 hours per year (many of the latter may be dual-use vessels).
The reasons for assuming these low operating levels (the US Naval fleet reportedly has had an
operating tempo upwards of 60 percent, or over 5000 hours per year) are the same as those cited
above for the low number of operating hours per aircraft. These operating assumptions were
multiplied by the per-unit fuel consumption figures and the number of ships of each type andsummed to yield overall fuel consumption by the Navy.
In an additional exercise, we estimated the amount of fuel used in Manufacturing Military
Equipment. This calculation was done by estimating the total weight of iron and steel in the
Army and Navy equipment inventories (aircraft were assumed to be all imported), applying
estimates of the average of lifetimes of each equipment type (assumed to be 20 years for large
Ground Force equipment, 10 years for small armaments, and 30 years for ships and boats), andusing these figures to derive an average amount of iron and steel needed per year in military
manufacturing to replace equipment reaching the end of its nominal lifetime. A Chinese figureof 250 kg coal equivalent per tonne of steel,171 multiplied by an intensity inflator of 1.1, wasassumed to be required for each of the approximately two meltings required to fabricate militaryequipment.172 It was further assumed that the fuel (assumed to be coal) used in melting iron andsteel for military goods represents roughly 60 percent of the total coal needed for military
manufacturing. An estimate of the electricity requirements by this sector was prepared byapplying the ratio of electricity to coal consumption estimated for the civilian iron and steel
industrial subsector to the coal use estimate for military manufacturing.

167 US Headquarters Department of the Army (1982), Opposing Force Training Module, North Korean Military Forces.

Department of the Army, Washington, DC, USA. February 1982. Field Manual No. 34-21.
168 Although this value is derived from a reference that dates to WWII, it is apparently not unreasonable. Conversations with a
US dealer of large marine engines indicates that even the best current (as of the mid-1990s) diesels were not vastly more efficient(0.32 to 0.33 lb/hp-hr), and that the value we are using would be justified (perhaps even low) for the older (1960s and 1970s)
engines that likely make up the bulk of the DPRK fleet.
169 Chapman, L.B. (1942), The Marine Power Plant. McGraw-Hill, N.Y., N.Y., USA.
170 Freedman, N. (1984), Submarine Design and Development. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, USA.
171 Ross, M. and L. Feng (1990), "The Energy Efficiency of the Steel Industry of China". Energy. V. 16, No. 5, pp. 833-848,
1991.
172 P. Zimmerman, personal communication, 1995.

55
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Armed forces of on the order of 1.2 million people do not exist without a substantial stock ofmilitary buildings. As in other sectors, however, we currently have no information on energy use
in these structures. To compile estimates of fuel use in military buildings, we have assumed that
there are 20 million square meters of floor space in such buildings (about 17 square meters per
active member of the armed forces), and that they are heated with the same type of coal-fired
equipment (and at the same efficiency) used for residential and public/commercial buildings.
Electricity consumption per square meter in these buildings was assumed to be twice that incivilian public and commercial building (55 kWh/m2-yr).
We have included a placeholder value of an additional 10 million GJ annually to account forother uses of electricity in the military. End-uses covered by this assumed allotment as of 1990
could include fixed radar sites and the DPRK's nuclear research program (nominally a civilian
operation), which we estimate may have had an electricity demand in 1990 of approximately 5MW, as there was and is no electricity production by the DPRK's 25 MW thermal (though often
referred to as “5 MW electric”) research reactor at Yongbyon (prior to its shut-down as part of
the Agreed Framework). An additional 9.6 million GJ/year placeholder allotment was assumed
for other uses of coal in the military, along with an additional 100,000 GJ/year for other uses of
petroleum products.
2.2.12. Changes in military fuel use by 1996
Our assumptions and calculations for fuel use in the DPRK military are presented on
Attachments 1 and in Attachment 2. We assume that there was a 13 to 20 percent decline inground forces active hours (that is, exercises in which fuel-using vehicles and armaments are
actually in use) from 1990 to 1996, a 16 to 33 percent decline in aircraft use,173 and about a 30
percent decline in the use of the most actively used naval vessels. Force sizes were assumed,
based on the documents available, to have changed only modestly, with the notable exception
being the addition of amphibious hovercraft. Military manufacturing was assumed to decrease to
70 percent of 1990 levels by 1996. Changes assumed in energy use by military buildings withincluded a 45 percent decline in electricity use for military activities relative to 1990 levels,along with a 5 percent decrease in the use of coal and wood fuels to meet end-uses typicallyserved by coal, and a 5 percent decrease in the use of oil products. The decline in militaryelectricity use was assumed to be partially the result of changes in the DPRK’s nuclear program
under the terms of the Agreed Framework.174 Wood use in the military was assumed to be
negligible in 1990, when coal supplies were generally available, but we assume that wood use in
the military by 1996 represented 10 percent of the total coal and wood used, as some military
units, particularly in rural areas, found the need to supplement inadequate coal supplies withwood and biomass for heating and cooking.

173

The decline in aircraft use that we assume can be thought of as consistent with a reduction in the supply of spare parts for the
DPRK’s (mostly) vintage Soviet-type aircraft, as well as reduced availability of fuels.
174 As noted by Noland (1996), our estimate of fuel use by the DPRK military is rather narrowly focused on fuel used by militaryequipment, in manufacturing of particular pieces of military equipment, and use of fuels in military buildings. In fact, the DPRK
armed forces are reported to control a large fraction of the DPRK economy and are reportedly involved many enterprises outsideof those we have modeled. For these enterprises, however, separating military from civilian activities is probably, at best, very
difficult, if not impossible. In any case, the energy associated with these activities owned and operated by the DPRK military inwhat would be designated in most countries as “civilian” sectors is already included in our energy accounting for the DPRK’s
national energy balance and is not “missing.”

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

2.2.13. Non-Specified/Other sectors
This category was included to help balance supply and demand if sufficient demand could not be
accounted for in the sectors described above. At present the only entries here for 1990 areplaceholder values of 5.9 million GJ of petroleum products consumption, of which 1.7 million
GJ is diesel oil, and the rest kerosene, plus an estimated 0.47 million GJ of heat from the
Yongbyon reactor, placed in the “hydro/nuclear” balance category.175 No non-specified sector
energy uses were included in the 1996 energy balance.176
2.2.14. Non-energy use
This balance row includes wood fuel used as a feedstock for commercial wood (such as lumber)production, and coal and oil used as a feedstock for the fertilizer industry (for ammonia
production—see description in the Industrial Sector discussion above). In addition, non-energy
use includes petroleum products such as lubricants, bitumen for asphalt, waxes, and petroleum
coke. We assume that coal used as a fertilizer feedstock was used at about 25 percent of its 1990
level in 1996, that non-energy petroleum products use declined to about 25 percent of 1990
levels (consistent with the overall decline in industrial production), and that biomass used as"roundwood" (lumber feedstock) was at 60 percent of 1990 levels by 1996.
2.3.

Summary of information on energy supply in the DPRK as of 1990 and 1996

In this section we describe the energy uses estimated to have been available in the DPRK as of1990 and 1996. Note that some of these resources were and are used to generate electricity andare thus also described in section 5.2.2 of this Report.
2.3.1. Energy resources
The major primary energy resources used in North Korea are as follows:•

Coal, almost all of which is domestically produced. The types of coal mined in DPRK are
anthracite and brown coals.

•

Wood and Biomass, including fuelwood and commercial wood harvested from the DPRK's
extensive but degraded forest area, and crop residue biomass.

•

Petroleum, including imported crude oil and a smaller amount of imported refined petroleum
products.

•

Hydroelectric power from a number of hydroelectric plants (see Section 2.4.1).
2.3.2. Coal resources in 1990 and 1996

Coal is (and was) produced in many areas of the DPRK. The major coal type mined is anthracite
coal, a hard coal that is typically high in carbon and is relatively rare world-wide (thoughcommon in Korea and in adjacent areas of China). Second in importance is much lower-quality
brown or lignite coal. The DPRK's reserves of coal are significant, sufficient for on the order of
175 Calculated based on thermal output for the Yongbyon reactor of 25 MW, and a 1990 capacity factor of 60 percent (see"Yongbyon 5-MW(e) Reactor" from http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/yongbyon-5.htm for estimates of Yongbyon
capacity factor).
176 The Yongbyon reactor’s heat output for 1996 is taken to be zero, as the reactor was shut down under the terms of the Agreed
Framework at the time.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

1,000 years at current consumption levels, but the quality of the coal is uneven. The heat
contents of coals mined in one major district alone (the Anju district on the west side of the
DPRK) vary from 1,000 to 6,000 kcal/kg,177 with ash contents from 12 up to 65 percent.
Untreated coals of this quality can be expected to have a low efficiency of combustion, and thelarge volumes of bottom and fly ash generated when these coals are burned create a disposal
problem.178
Approximately one-half of the coal reserves in the important Anju mining area (locatednorthwest of Pyongyang) are located under the seabed. The DPRK currently lacks thetechnology to effectively and safely extract this coal, which includes some of the higher-quality
coal in the area. In mines in the Anju district that are in areas close to the sea, it was reportedly
already necessary, as of the mid-1990s (or even before), for miners to pump six tonnes ofseawater per tonne of coal mined, due to saltwater intrusion into the low-lying coal seams.
Estimates of the amount of coal mined in DPRK vary quite widely, even for a single year,
depending on the source of the information. Official estimates were as high as 85 million tonnesof coal (for 1989), although estimates by the ROK’s National Unification Board (NUB179)
suggested that the total for 1990 was only 33.2 million tonnes. Further confounding theevaluation of these estimates is the issue of energy contents. Official DPRK figure place theaverage (apparently) value for coal energy content at 4500 kcal/kg, while the NUB apparently
assumes an average energy content that is on the order of that used for high-quality anthracite
coal.180, 181
We have assumed, in preparing our estimate, that the production of coal in 1990 was 70 million
tonnes, of which 49 million tonnes was anthracite coal, and 21 million tonnes was brown coal.182
We have taken the figure of 4500 kcal/kg as the weighted-average energy content for this coal.
Our guess, based on the documents we have reviewed in compiling this report, is that both ofthese estimates are on the high side for 1990, though some observers suggest otherwise.
Imports and exports of coal and coke to and from the DPRK were of modest scale in 1990,
relative to domestic demand. The DPRK imported about 209,000 tonnes of coke in 1990
(probably from the Former Soviet Union), and 2.38 million tonnes of bituminous coal from
China.183 The DPRK also exported 1.17 million tonnes of anthracite to China184 and about
530,000 tonnes to Japan185 in 1990, so DPRK was a net importer of both coal and coke in that
177 "Standard" bituminous coal (a “tonne of coal equivalent, or tce) is defined as 29.3 GJ/tonne, or 7000 kcal/kg, so 6000 kcal/kg

represents coal of relatively high energy content, while coal of 1000 kcal per kg would be considered of quite poor quality.
178 Combustion efficiencies decline in part because a large volume of inert material (ash) must be heated up by the burning coal.
“Fly ash” denotes that fraction of coal ash that leaves the boiler with the hot exhaust gases and is trapped by ash collection
devices or emitted to the atmosphere. “Bottom ash” is that fraction of the inert material in the coal that remains in the bottom of
the boiler after the coal is combusted.
179 Choi Su Young (1993), Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea, Research Institute for National
Unification (RINU), Seoul, (ROK).
180 Jang, Young Sik (1994), North Korean Energy Economics. Korea Development Institute.
181 It is possible that the NUB estimate is expressed in tonnes of oil equivalent, which would put it even closer, in energy terms,
to the official figure (Y.S. Jang, personal communication, 1995).
182 Document in authors' files [HT1].
183 Choi Su Young (1993), Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea, Research Institute for National
Unification (RINU), Seoul, (ROK). Jang, Young Sik (1994), North Korean Energy Economics. Korea Development Institute.
184 Choi Su Young (1993), Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea, Research Institute for National
Unification (RINU), Seoul, (ROK).
185 Derived from Japan customs statistics, available as http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/index_e.htm, andhttp://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/download/index_d012_e.htm (the latter last visited 4/2010).

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

year, but imports comprised only a few percent of the total coal supply. It is likely that imported
coal was used primarily for special industrial processes such as metallurgy. We assumed thatcoke imports to the DPRK stood at about 53 percent of their 1990 levels by 1996,186 and thatcoal imports (based on China Customs statistics) were at 18 percent of 1993 levels in 1996.
DPRK coal exports to China were recorded at 22 percent of their level in 1993, but overall
DPRK coal exports to China, Japan, and other nations were about 76 percent of 1993 levels, and28 percent of 1990 levels.
2.3.3. Petroleum
There are reportedly oil and gas reserves in offshore areas of the territory of the DPRK,187 but thecountry lacks the technologies to effectively explore and develop these resources alone. In
recent years (see Chapters 3 and 4), the DPRK has entered into agreements to develop its oil
resources and has by at least one report produced some crude oil from an onshore well. As of
1990, however, all of the petroleum products used in DPRK were either derived from imported
crude oil refined in DPRK or were imported refined products. Crude oil imports as of the firsthalf of the 1990s came from four main sources:•

Iran, principally in trade for North Korean armaments;•

China, in trade for various goods and for hard currency;•

The Former Soviet Union, previously on soft terms but more recently on a much more strict
hard-currency basis;188 and•The open market, for example, through Hong Kong or Singapore.

The Korean Foreign Trade Association189 lists total crude oil imports of 2.43 Mte (million
tonnes) from the first three sources in 1990, while Choi190 cites a total of 2.8 Mte crude oil
imports from all sources. Some sources suggest that the 2.8 Mte estimate is too high, so wehave used a figure of 2.6 Mte total crude oil imports in preparing the 1990 energy balance.
In addition to refining these crude oils in its own refineries (see below), the DPRK also
apparently purchased (as of 1990) some refined products on the open market. These products,
principally diesel fuel, heavy oil, gasoline, and kerosene (in that order of importance) sum to a
total of approximately 640,000 tonnes of oil equivalent.191

186

This includes coke imported from China (as reported in China Customs Statistics, as compiled by Nathanial Aden, 2006. For
related analysis, see also N. Aden, North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy
Trends and Implications, as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA). Dr. Aden's paper is available as http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/0679Aden1.pdf), plus anassumed 10 percent additional to account for small-volume imports from Russia and other countries.
187 DPRK sources place estimates of total oil reserves at 6 to 10 billion tonnes. Although we have been told by independentsources that oil deposits do indeed exist beneath the DPRK and its offshore territory, we have been unable to confirm the extent
of those deposits.
188 Some sources indicate that in recent years exports of oil from the Former Soviet Union to the DPRK have fallen to as little asa tenth of the pre-end-of-cold-war level (Choi Su Young (1993), Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea,
Research Institute for National Unification (RINU), Seoul, (ROK); and Alexander Karabanov, 1993, personal communication).
189 Korea Foreign Trade Association (1993), Major Economic Indicators for North Korea.
190 Choi Su Young (1993), Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea, Research Institute for National
Unification (RINU), Seoul, (ROK).
191 Choi Su Young (1993), Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea, Research Institute for National
Unification (RINU), Seoul, (ROK).

59
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKAs noted above, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the DPRK was receiving substantial suppliesof crude oil from China, Russia, and the Middle East (notably Iran and Libya). Since then,supplies from Russia have reportedly essentially ceased, and shipments from the Middle East
have virtually stopped as well. Data from Choi192 suggest that crude oil imports declined by 23
percent between 1990 and 1991 alone. In 1996, the only crude oil reported to be entering the
DPRK had come via pipeline from China. Chinese customs statistics for 1996 show oil
shipments into the DPRK at about 940,000 tonnes per year, a rate similar to that which had
prevailed for most of the 1990s.193 194 According to the Korean Energy Economics Institute,195
the DPRK received 80,000 tonnes of crude oil from Libya in 1995, but no similar shipments
were reported in 1996. Table 2-3 presents crude oil import figures provided by KEEI for 1989
through 1995, plus our crude oil imports figures from China for 1996.
Table 2-3: Crude Oil Imports to the DPRK (thousand metric tonnes)
Exporter

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996*

China

1,140

1,160

1,100

1,100

830

1,050

1,020

940

Russia

500

410

-

-

-

-

-

-

Libya

-

-

200

200

80

100

80

-

Iran

920

980

220

220

-

210

-

-

Total

2,650

2,450

1,890

1,520

910

1,360

1,100

940

Source:

KEEI, 1996, personal communication with Mr. Dongseok Roh; based on Chung
Woo Jin, The Energy Industry of North Korea, 1996.
* China Customs Statistics from 1996.

In addition to the refined products produced at the Chinese-built refinery from Chinese crude oil
received in 1996,196 China provided a small amount of “official” (reported in customs statistics)
refined products to the DPRK during 1996. These are assumed to be primarily gasoline, andbased on China Customs Statistics, totaled about 68,000 tonnes. This figure is on the order of 80
percent of the total of official exports of refined products from China to the DPRK in 1993.197
Additional imports of refined products during 1996 reportedly were received from Russia(approximately 100,000 tonnes, assumed to be half gasoline and half diesel oil), plus “one half of

192 Choi Su Young (1993), Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea, Research Institute for National

Unification (RINU), Seoul, (ROK).
193 China Custom Statistics, 1996 (Information obtained via personal communication from Mr. David Fridley, Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory).
194 China Customs Statistics data as compiled by Nathanial Aden in 2006, 2008, and 2010. See, for example, N. Aden (2006),
North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and Implications as prepared
for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA). Mr. Aden's 2006 paper
is available as http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/0679Aden1.pdf.
195 Korean Energy Economics Institute (KEEI, 1996). Personal communication from Mr. Dongseok ROH, Electricity Policy
Division.
196 See “Oil” worksheet of Attachment 1 for an estimate of 1996 refined product output by this refinery.
197 Sinton, J., editor (1996), China Energy Databook 1996 Edition, Revised January 1996. Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, California, USA. LBL-32822.Rev.3. UC-900.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

the output” of a 750,000 tonne/yr (output capacity) refinery across the Tumen river in China.
We assume that this refinery’s actual production is no more than 600,000 tonnes per year. We
further assume that the output of this small Chinese refinery was of the same composition (byproduct type) as the Chinese-built refinery on the west coast of the DPRK, but that fuel exports
from the Chinese refinery to the DPRK were weighted slightly toward motor fuels and awayfrom HFO, relative to the refinery’s product slate.198 To reflect KEDO’s provision of refined
product (HFO) to the DPRK during 1996, we used reported and expected deliveries during the“1996 HFO Year” (11/1/95 to 10/31/96), which total approximately 500,000 tonnes of HFO.
2.3.4. Wood and biomass
Approximately 9 million hectares (ha) of the DPRK was covered with forests as of 1990.
Unfortunately, the extensive mining of these forest resources during the decades of Japanese
occupation of Korea (ending in World War II), coupled with generalized devastation of the
Korean peninsula during the Korean war in the early 1950s, left the forest stocks of DPRK ingenerally poor condition. A significant reforestation effort, totaling some 2.5 million hectares ofplantations by 1993, was reported to be taking place as of the early 1990s,199 and was mentioned
periodically in North Korean news reports. A total of 3 million hectares were classified as"productive forests".
Various figures have been given for the level of domestic wood production in the DPRK, ranging
from about 4 million200 to approximately 16 million cubic meters of wood. We have used avalue, 6 million m3, somewhat below the range provided in official DPRK estimates201 that setswood used for firewood at 8 - 10 million m3. Official DPRK estimates set wood for charcoal
production at 0.8 to 1 million m3, wood for construction at 3 - 5 million m3, and approximately
500 - 650 thousand m3 for industrial fuelwood and for paper production.202 Based on ourassessment of the DPRK forest resource base (see Chapter 4), we use somewhat lower estimatesfor 1990 in some of these categories—930,000 m3 wood for charcoal production, and1 million
m3 wood for construction—but use 650 thousand m3 for the total wood used as industrial
fuelwood and for pulp and paper production.
In addition to its domestic production, the DPRK also imported (at least until fairly recently)
wood from the Russian Far East. Teams of workers from the DPRK are (or at least routinelywere) sent to harvest wood in Russia and the DPRK retained a share of the wood harvested in
exchange for the labor (reportedly approximately one third). There appears to be a discrepancy
between sources as to the magnitude of these imports, but we have assumed a total of 1.5 million
m3 of roundwood (logs) were imported annually from Russia.203 Much of this wood was
198 Fridley, D. (1996), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (personal communication).
199 Document in authors' files [HT1].
200 Document in authors' files [TP1]; also the UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s Global Forest Resource Assessment 2005,

from which DPRK data are available at www.fao.org/forestry/site/32086/en/prk.
201 Document in authors' files[T1].
202 When wood volumes are specified, it is important to note whether they are listed as "solid" or "stacked" volumes, as the latter
implies a lower density, and thus lower energy content per cubic meter, than the former. The volume estimates that we are using
appear to be in solid cubic meters, thus we have assumed a conversion factor of 1.5 cubic meters per tonne in estimating theenergy content of these wood resource flows.
203 A document in the authors' files lists imports of 2.5 million cubic meters from Russia [TP1, p. 4], but other sources list theseimports at 230 kcu.m./yr, and also list the number of DPRK workers sent to Russian forests at 16-20,000 annually. An abstractfrom a 1990s report on the Russian Far East forestry sector (CINTRAFOR Working Paper Abstract, "The Forest Sector in the
Russian Far East: Status and Near-Term Development", by Ekaterina Gataulina and Thomas R. Waggener, 1998, formerly

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

probably used as commercial wood (lumber and other products) with milling wastes used forfuelwood, manufacture of small items, paper-making, and other applications.
We found a limited amount of direct information on the consumption of non-wood biomass forfuel. A document in our files204 reports that a total of 3.1 million tonnes of crop residue (straw
and bran) was used in agriculture in 1990. In addition to this figure, we have assumed a total of
2.55 million tonnes of crop residues were used, primarily in the rural sector, in order to provide
sufficient biomass supply to meet demand for fuel and other uses. Although this figure (revised
relative to some previous versions of this report) is plausible, given the areas and reported yields
of crops in the DPRK, it is may still be somewhat high, indicating that our estimate for 1990
wood/biomass fuel demand in the rural residential subsector (see below) may remain somewhat
on the high side.
The DPRK biomass production potential probably was damaged in some areas by the floods of1995 and 1996. In addition, increased foraging in response to the food shortages in the DPRK
may end up having a long-term detrimental impact on the forests of the DPRK. For 1996, weassume that sufficient domestic wood and biomass resources were available to meet demand, andthat wood imports remained at the same level as in 1990, although this assumption has yet to be
fully confirmed.
2.4.

Transformation Processes in 1990 and 1996

We have included the following fuel-transforming processes in the estimated DPRK supplydemand balance:•

Electricity Generation, including thermal power generation fueled with coal and oil products,
and hydroelectric generation;•

District Heat Production;•

Petroleum Refining;•

Coal Production and Preparation; and•Charcoal Production from wood.

Also included in the balance are categories for Coke Production, which is not accounted forseparately from other coal use (as we lack adequate information on coke production in the
DPRK), but could be at some point; Other Transformation, for future inclusion of majortransformation processes that we may not have yet taken into account (or may be used in the
future); Own Use, for use of fuels during transformation processes (such as electricity used in
power plants); and Losses, for losses of fuels between the point at which they are produced andthe point at which they are consumed.

available as http://www.cintrafor.org/research_tab/links/WP/WP63.htm) suggests that the average productivity of Russian forest
workers as of 1994 was "360 m3 per worker (roundwood equivalent)", presumably per annum. This suggests, if the productivityof DPRK work crews were similar, that the DPRK crews might harvest up to about 7 million cubic meters per year, assuming thesame rate of production (and the same access to harvesting equipment--which may well not be a given) as Russian crews. If, as
has been reported, DPRK harvesting crews brought home approximately a quarter or a third of their harvest (the rest remaining in
Russia), annual imports of wood back to the DPRK would be in the range from 1.4 to 2.4 million tonnes. We assume that 1990
imports of wood to the DPRK from the RFE were at the lower end of this range.
204 Document in authors' files [HT1].

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

2.4.1. Electricity generation in the DPRK, 1990 and 1996
Chapter 5 of this Report provides a detailed description of our analysis of the DPRK electricity
sector through the year 2020. In this section we focus on what was known about electricity
generation in the DPRK as of 1990 and 1996, information that forms the basis of our analysis of
sectoral activity and changes in later years. As such, to provide the reader with information
relevant to the chapter topics in both places, there are some overlaps between the coverage ofthis section and of Chapter 5 for the early years of our analysis.
There are reportedly over 500 electricity generation facilities in the DPRK. Of these, however,
only 62 major power plants operate as part of the (nominally) interconnected transmission anddistribution grid, with the remaining plants being primarily small, isolated hydroelectric facilities
and/or facilities associated with industrial installations. One estimate suggests that 85 percent of
total national generation took place in the 62 major power plants in the 1990s; other, unofficial
reports suggest generation at smaller plants is insignificant. The 62 “major” plants reportedly
include 42 hydroelectric plants and 20 thermal plants. Of the thermal plants, 18 are reportedly
fired primarily with coal.205 The power generation system in general suffers from a lack of spareparts (particularly for plants built with USSR assistance), as well as a lack of testing equipment
for use in maintenance activities.
2.4.1.1.Total electricity generated and losses, and district heat production,in 1990
Our estimate of electricity generation starts with the assumption that gross generation in North
Korea in 1990 totaled 46 TWh of electricity.206 This estimate is somewhat closer to official
DPRK estimates (60 TWh and higher) and UN estimates (55.5 TWh207) than to estimates by
ROK sources (27.7 TWh208), Russian sources (35 TWh209), and more informal estimates of 3132 TWh,210 but the latter may be a consumption rather than a production figure. To split total
generation into thermal and hydroelectric generation, we adopted the official DPRK figure,which indicates that slightly more than half (about 54 percent) of all electricity generation
occurred in thermal plants in 1990.211 To provide separate estimates of coal-fired and oil-fired
electricity generation, we started with an estimate of generation in the DPRK's largest oil-fired
plant. We then assumed, based the available partial accountings of the number, type, and size ofgenerating facilities, and on more informal reports, that generation in this plant (the Oung gi
plant, associated with the refinery at Sonbong) comprised 100 percent of all oil-fired generationin 1990. Subtracting total oil-fired generation from total thermal generation yielded our estimateof total coal-fired generation.

205 Document in authors’ files [EE1].
206 Document in authors’ files/personal correspondence.
207 Choi Su Young (1993), Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea, Research Institute for National

Unification (RINU), Seoul, (ROK).
208 ROK Ministry of Unification (1996), “Electric Generation Capacity and Actual Generation”. Obtained from World-wide website http://www/unikorea.go.kr/eng/ja/table/enk21.htm (but link no longer in service).
209 Moiseyev, V. (1996), The Electric Energy Sector of the DPRK Paper presented at the workshop on "Security on the Korean
Peninsula," November 21, 1996, Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, sponsored by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at theMonterey Institute of International Studies (with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation).
210 A. Karabanov (1993); personal communication.
211 Document in authors’ files [EE1].

63
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKFor losses, we used the official estimate that 10 percent of net generation is lost in electricity
transmission, and an additional 6 percent in distribution (T&D).212 These estimates are inaggregate similar to current Chinese values for such losses but may be optimistic. Except in the
Pyongyang region, the DPRK power grid as of 1990 was (and reportedly largely still is, as of2020) dispatched literally by phone and telex, and outages on the grid are frequent. As recordsof power consumption at the end-user are not at all common in DPRK, however, there is
probably limited opportunity to determine the true extent of transmission and distribution
losses.213
There was, as of 1990, a considerable but unknown amount of self-generation of electricity byindustry. We do not know whether this generation is accounted for in the total electricity
generation estimate that we have used, but since our estimate for total generation is more likely
to be high than low, we assume that self-generation has been adequately taken into account.
There is also an unknown but substantial amount of district heating in the DPRK, some of which
reportedly uses steam generated in fossil-fueled power plants (this in addition to steam and hot
water provided by the 11,000 small- to mid-sized boilers reportedly used in buildings andindustries in the DPRK) and by stand-alone district heat boilers located in major power plants
along with boilers for electricity generation.214 Our rough estimate, based on numerous
assumptions, is that as of 1990 somewhat under 11 million GJ of total heat for district heating
was generated, of which about 75 percent was from power plants, with the remainder from heatonly district heating plants. We assumed average heat losses of 15 percent between the district
heating or combined heat and power plants and heat consumers. This assumption does not havea direct effect on estimates of electricity production or use but does affect the amount of heat that
consumers receive from combined heat and power plants. If district heating from power plants
proves more extensive that we have estimated, it would likely increase our estimate for coal usedin the power sector, because it would increase the heat output of combined heat and power plants(such as the Pyongyang plant), which would in turn mean an effective decrease in the electricity
generation efficiency (because more heat is diverted to heat production). Increasing our estimate
of district heating would, however, reduce our estimate for coal used in the urban residential andpublic commercial sectors, because more heat supply would be accounted for by district heat andcombined heat and power plants, rather than stand-alone coal boilers and stoves.

2.4.1.2.Detail of existing thermal generating facilities
Although there are discrepancies between the various estimates of the installed capacity ofthermal electricity generating capacity in the DPRK,215 we have assumed that the total installed

212 (Document in authors' files [EP1].
213 Other reports indicate that total electricity losses in the DPRK were on the order of 25 percent of generation in 1990, but the

25 percent figure includes routine and emergency station losses and “own use” as well as T&D losses. Our estimate of 16
percent T&D losses, coupled with our estimates of own use and emergency station losses, yield an overall loss rate that is also in
the 25 percent range.
214 A document in the authors’ files, citing a DPRK source [NKES-01], indicates that the Pyongyang power plant has two district
heating boilers rated (each, we presume) at 210 tonnes of steam/hr, or 100 Gcal/hr. Based on a very rough calculation, twoboilers of this size could supply space heat and hot water for tens of thousands of households (perhaps 50,000 to 100,000).
215 Choi (1993), for example, cites a total capacity for coal-fired generating stations of 2,850 MW in 1991, while the United
Nations lists 4,500 MW of thermal capacity for 1989 through 1992. Other documents in our files list a total of 2,900 MW of

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

and potentially usable216 thermal generating capacity as of 1990 was approximately 3,200
megawatts. Table 2-4 provides our best attempt, compiled from a number of sources, at a plantby-plant accounting of the capacities and vintages of some of the thermal generating facilities inthe DPRK as of the early 1990s. The total of the listed plants (6 plants, 2,850 MW as of 1990)
comes up short of both the 20 thermal facilities reportedly connected to the grid and to the 4,500
MW of capacity that has been reported in official documents to be the overall total. If our 3,200
MW total is correct, this figure means that the additional 14 reportedly grid-connected thermal
facilities have an average capacity of about 25 MW each. We assume that there existed (andmay still exist) additional smaller and/or industry-associated plants that fit this description but
updated or more accurate information on this topic is needed to fully complete the picture.
Table 2-4: Major Thermal Generating Facilities in the DPRK as of 1992217#

Name
1 Pyongyang
2 Bukchang
3 Chongjin
4 Chonchonang
5 Oungi
6 Sunchon
7 East Pyongyang

Capacity(MW)
Fuel
500 Coal
1600 Coal
150 Coal
200 Coal
200 Oil
200 Coal
50 CoalYear
Completed
1968
1985
1984
1979
1973
1988
1992

2900

TOTAL OF LISTED PLANTS

Of the major thermal power plants that are connected to the national transmission anddistribution (T&D) grid, only two were reported to be oil-fired as of 1990. Of these, one was the
200 MW plant at Sonbong (listed as “Oungi” in the table above, and also referred to sometimes
as “Oung gi” and “Unggi” by other sources) where many of the KEDO heavy fuel oil (HFO)
deliveries were made. Figure 2-2 provides a photo of the control room at the Pukchang(“Bukchang”, in the table above) Thermal Power Plant, the DPRK’s largest.

capacity as of 1990 in the largest seven thermal plants alone, and still others list “official figures” of up 6,000 MW of thermal
capacity in 1990. We have adopted the United Nations figure as our estimate for 1990.
216 It has been reported that a large number of the smaller power plants reportedly included in official estimates of overall
generation capacity were essentially built as “shams” to satisfy authorities and were actually never actually capable of generating
power.
217 Please see Attachment 1 for a listing of the sources used in developing this table.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 2-2: Control Room at Pukchang Thermal Power Plant218

Since 1990, the only reported major addition to the roster of large thermal power plants has been
the completion in the early 1990s of the (reportedly) 150 MW East Pyongyang plant. Reports
indicate that only 50 MW of the 150 MW plant were actually completed by the early 1990s, andonly with great difficulty, as Russian assistance was not available at that time to complete thework on the plant that was started in the 1980s in collaboration with the USSR. Although the
Korea Energy Economics Institute (KEEI) reports that a new 600 MW plant called
Dongpyungyang at Nakrangku, Namposhi was completed in 1996, we do not know if the
Dongpyungyang plant is an addition to an existing plant in the Pyongyang area (perhaps East
Pyongyang?), or a completely new plant, or whether it in fact ran in 1996—although sourcesindicate that it hasn’t. Given these uncertainties, we have assumed for the purposes of modelingthat the total coal-fired generation capacity in 1996 was the 3,200 MW reported in 1990, plus 50
MW for the addition of the East Pyongyang plant. Several other thermal generating facilities
have been reported to be under construction in the DPRK. A roster of these plants is provided inTable 2-5. We do not know the present status of construction of these facilities. We have been
told that, as of 1996, thermal power plant construction had stopped except at the East Pyongyang
power plant. See Chapter 3 for estimated updates on the capacities and status of power
production facilities as of 2000 and 2005.

218 Photo from dprkguidebook.org (date not provided, but probably 2006 or 2007), “Main Industrial Sectors & Business

Opportunities”, available as http://dprkguidebook.org/contents_3.htm.

66
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 2-5: Thermal (fossil fueled) Generating Facilities Reported to be Under Construction or“Planned for Construction” in the DPRK as of About 1996219#

Name
1 Pyunghung(?)
2 Suncheon(?)
3 Dongpyungyang
4 Kimchaek
5 Hamhyng central
6 12wol
7 Haeju
8 Ahnju
9 Hamheung

TOTAL OF LISTED PLANTS

Capacity(MW)
Fuel
200 Coal
200 Coal
600 Coal
150 Coal
100 Coal
150 Coal
Unknown Coal
1200 Coal
150 CoalYear
StartedYear
Completed1993 - 1996
1988
1994
1993
1990
1989
1989

2,750

To calculate the fuel used by thermal power plants, we have assumed that coal-fired plants use
heavy fuel oil primarily as a start-up fuel in 1990, with HFO constituting about 2.0 percent of thetotal heat value of input fuel. Using figures for electricity generation by fuel type derived asindicated above, we then calculated the fuel requirements for thermal electricity generation using
gross generation efficiencies in 1990 of 29.5 percent for oil-fired plants220 and 28 percent forcoal-fired plants. The efficiency figure we have assumed coal-fired plants is somewhat lower
than the average heat rate (30 percent) reported in the Chongjin plant in the Sonbong area but iscomparable to Chinese electricity generation efficiencies for thermal plants of late-1970s
vintages.221, 222
The "own use" of electricity in oil-fired and coal-fired plants was assumed to be 8 and 9 percent
of gross generation, respectively. These own use values are those quoted for the Oungi andChongjin plants, respectively,223 and are relatively high compared to typical thermal power
plants. For coal-fired plants, we assumed an additional "emergency loss" rate in 1990 of 5
percent (accounted for in the "own use" row of the energy balances), which is a bold
extrapolation from experience at the Pyongyang power station,224 and may be indicative of poor
operating conditions in all DPRK coal-fired power plants. For 1996, we increased this rate to 7.5
percent of gross generation in coal-fired plants.

219

Please see Annex 1 for a listing of the sources used in developing this table. Due to differences in nomenclature andtranslation between sources, there may be some plants that actually appear twice on this list.
220 This value is substantially lower than an official (we assume) figure of 35 percent quoted in UNDP (1994) (Studies in
Support of Tumen River Area Development Programme, as prepared by KIEP, Seoul, ROK for the UNDP, July, 1994). An
efficiency of 35 percent seems too high oil-fired generation in the DPRK, given reports about the condition of the oil-fired plantat Sonbong. The 29.5 percent efficiency we have used is consistent with information we have received about the Sonbong plant’s
recent operations.
221 Sinton, J., editor (1996), China Energy Databook 1996 Edition, Revised January 1996. Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, California, USA. LBL-32822.Rev.3. UC-900.
222 It should be remembered that most of the thermal power plants in the DPRK were built with assistance from the USSR—theexample of efficiencies in Chinese plants is used here only as a benchmark.
223 UNDP (1994), Studies in Support of Tumen River Area Development Programme. Prepared by KIEP, Seoul, ROK for theUNDP, July, 1994.
224 Document in authors' files [EE1].

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

2.4.1.3.Detail of existing hydroelectric facilities
The DPRK is a mountainous country with substantial rainfall. It thus has fairly extensive total
potential for hydroelectric development. The DPRK's ability to mobilize massive work forces
for public works projects such as dams has helped the country to tap this potential, and as of1990 approximately 4,500 of an estimated 10,000 to 14,000 MW of hydroelectric potential had
been developed. Table 2-6 provides a listing of those major hydroelectric facilities about which
we have capacity information. The 20 plants on this list built prior to 1990 account for
approximately 3,100 of the 4,500 MW of hydroelectric capacity reportedly in service as of 1990,
and probably comprise about half (numerically) of the grid-connected hydroelectric plants.
Electricity from several plants on this list (Supung, Ounbong, T’aep’enmang, and Weewong) is
exported to China. Note that the capacities listed in Table 2-6 exclude the portions of power
generated in those four plants that is sent to China. Including that portion of the capacity
reportedly under contract to China (700 MW) raises the total 1990 capacity accounted for by thefacilities in Table 2-6 to about 4,000 MW, over 85 percent of the total hydro capacity reported.
Many of the smaller hydroelectric facilities in operation in the DPRK, are reportedly of the "runof-river" type, meaning that relatively little water is impounded behind the dams. Although thiswould tend to suggest that electric output from the DPRK's hydro plants may be more likely tobe subject to the vagaries of the weather—poor rainfall months or years resulting in lower-thanaverage electricity production—than systems with more impoundment-type dams, it has beensuggested that the larger plants, including those initially designed and built during the Japanesecolonial era, reportedly combine impoundment and run-of-river elements, resulting in relatively
high capacity factors.225 Figure 2-3 presents a photo of one of the “cascades” of the Kangae(also referred to as “Kanggye”) hydro power plant, showing a series of turbine-generator units
floating on the surface of the river. It is unclear what fraction of the capacity of the Kangae
cascade the units in the photo represent.

225

As an example of the potential of the combined impoundment/run-of-river design to produce power consistently, Prof. Y.S.
Jang (personal communication, 1996) reports that the capacity factor of hydroelectric plants in North Korea was over 70 percent
during 1943.

68
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 2-6: Major Hydroelectric Generating Facilities in the DPRK226#

Capacity
Year
Year
(MW)
Completed Refurbished
400
13.5
1930
1958
28.5
1932
260
1932
1956
390
1936
1958
394
1942
1958
90
1959
246
1965
200
1970
180
1974
230
1978
45
1982
200
1982
32
1980
32
1983
20
198?
20
198?
90
1989
200
1989
200
1994
36

Name
1 Supung
2 Kymgansang cascade
3 Puren cascade
4 Puch’on-gang
5 Chanjin-gang
6 Hoch’on-gang
7 Tonno-gang
8 Kangae
9 Ounbong
10 Sodusu-1
11 Sodusu-2
12 Sodusu-3
13 Taedong-gang
14 Mirim
15 Ponhwa
16 Hwan-gang
17 Tonhwa
18 T’aep’enmang
19 Weewong
20 Nam-gang
21 Dokro river

TOTAL OF LISTED PLANTS

3,307

Figure 2-3: Photo of Kangae Hydro Power Plant227

226 Please see Attachment 1 for a listing of the sources used in developing this table.
227 From document in the authors’ files [OS-4-19-2012, page 37].

69
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 2-7 presents our summary of hydroelectric plants reported to be under construction orplanned as of the early 1990s. Although the capacities of these plants—to the extent that they
have been assigned an estimated value—add to nearly 3,000 MW, we had little information
about how far construction on these projects (if any) had progressed as of 1996 (see Chapter 5
for analysis of more recent hydroelectric plant additions). The only exception was the Kumgang
Mountain plant, a first phase of which (reportedly about 125 MW) was opened in 1996. We
were told that, as of 1996, construction on all hydro plants except the Kumgang Mountain plant(which reportedly has political and military importance beyond its role in the power sector) was
at a standstill.
Given the location and extent of the flooding in the DPRK during 1995 and 1996, it always
seemed probable to us that the DPRK hydroelectric system had sustained significant damage.
Until about 2000, however, the reports that we could glean either yielded no information about
the impacts of flooding on hydro production or indicated minor damage to smaller facilities. In
about 2000, information from a source that we consider reliable indicates that reservoir siltationand perhaps mechanical damage at major hydroelectric facilities had in fact taken place, to theextent that the effective capacity factor of hydroelectric facilities in 1996 was on the order of 15
percent. We have modeled this reduction in usable hydroelectric capacity by assuming thatavailable hydro capacity at existing facilities fell by about 3250 MW from 1990 values by 1996
as a result of flood damage,228 offset slightly by additions to capacity.229 We have further
assumed, based on conversations with those familiar with the situation, that 1996 power
production for China from Chinese-controlled plants were reduced to about 28 percent of their1990 levels as a result of flood damage to the hydroelectric stations on the DPRK/Chinese
border. Note that the electricity produced by these plants for China is not included in our energybalances as “exports” from the DPRK to China, since those plants are in fact owned andcontrolled by China.

228 Several sources that have been to the DPRK recently said they had no knowledge of major damage to large hydroelectricfacilities. Another source had heard of damage to “one or two” “small to medium-sized” (less than 10 MW) plants.
229 KEEI (Korean Energy Economics Institute, 1996; personal communication from Mr. Roh Dongseok, Electricity Policy
Division) cites an 800 MW increase in capacity from the newly opened Kumgang Mountain plant. Earlier ROK estimates had
also placed the (expected) capacity of this plant at 800 MW, although its capacity under the phases completed as of the late 1990s
and/or accounting for existing reservoir levels is probably in the range of 100 - 150 megawatts. The Kumgang mountain plant
was also referred to in announcements in the DPRK press, but without reference to plant capacity.

70
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 2-7: Major Hydroelectric Generating Facilities Reported to be Under Construction or“Planned for Construction” in the DPRK 230#

Name
1 Taechun
2 Kumgang Mountain
3 Sodusu-4
4 Namkang
5 Youngwon
6 Ehrangcheon
7 Jabgjakang
8 P’och’on
9 Oranch’on
10 Heech’on
11 Kymyan-gang

TOTAL OF LISTED PLANTS

Capacity
(MW)
750
800
200
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
240
820
180
Unknown
Unknown

Year
Year
StartedCompleted
1983
1985 1996 (1st Phase)
1990
1983
1986
1986

1989

2,990

Our estimate for the supply of hydroelectric power in 1990 starts with the overall generation of
46 TWhe described above, of which slightly less than half (46 percent) is assumed to begenerated in hydro plants.231 These two figures, taken together, imply an overall capacity factor
for hydroelectric facilities of about 54 percent. We counted the hydro input energy to electricity
generation assuming an efficiency conversion of 100 percent output electricity to input energy,
as is done in United Nations statistics.232 The "own use" of electricity in hydro plants was
assumed to be 0.3 percent of gross generation, which corresponds to ROK conditions in 1970,233
and is also similar to values for Chinese plants.
2.4.1.4.Status of the Transmission and Distribution Network
The unified electrical grid in the DPRK apparently dates to 1958.234 The DPRK T&D system
must nominally manage a fairly complex grid of 62 power plants, 58 substations, and 11 regionaltransmission and dispatching centers. Our limited information on the DPRK T&D system as itstood in 1990 (and for the most part, is assumed to stand today) is presented below.

230

Please see Attachment 1 for a listing of the sources used in developing this table.
Document in authors' files [EE1].
232 Note that the actual conversion efficiency of energy in falling water to electricity in hydro plants is typically less than 100%,on the order of 70 to 90 percent.
233 Kim, E.-W., H. Kim, H.-K. Lim, C. Nahm, M.-C. Shin, and Y. Kim (1983), The Electric Future of Korea. Resource Systems
Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. Research Materials RM-83-8.
234 Moiseyev, V. (1996), The Electric Energy Sector of the DPRK Paper presented at the workshop on "Security on the Korean
Peninsula," November 21, 1996, Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, sponsored by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at theMonterey Institute of International Studies (with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation).
231

71
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKMain Transmission Lines, Substations, and Dispatching Centers
A general map of the electricity transmission system in the DPRK is provided as Figure 2-4, anda similar map from another source with power station and other titles in English is provided as
Figure 2-5. The main transmission lines in the DPRK are rated at 220 and 110 kV (kilovolts).
The main transmission lines in the DPRK include (but are not limited to) the following:•

A 220 kV line from the Bukchang (also referred to as “Pukchang”) thermal power plant to
the Vynalon substation•

A 220 kV line from the Vynalon substation to the Chanjin-gang power station•

A 220 kV line from the Bukchang thermal power plant to the Chanjin-gang power station•

A 220 kV line from the Chanjin-gang power station to the Kangae hydro power station via
the Taedong-gang hydro power station•

A 220 kV line from the Kangae hydro power station to the Ounbong hydro power station•

A 220 kV line from the Bukchang thermal power plant to a substation located southeast of
Pyongyang (probably named “Pyongyang No. 2”) via the Songchon substation•

A 220 kV line from a substation located southeast of Pyongyang to the Pyongyang thermal
power plant•

A 220 kV line from the “Central center” in Pyongyang to the Chonchonang thermal plant•

A 110 kV line from the Chonchonang thermal plant to the Supung hydro power plant. The
Taechon hydro power plant is also connected to this line.

•

A 110 kV line from a substation located west and slightly south of Pyongyang (probably
named “Pyongyang No. 1”) to the Supung hydro power plant via the Sin-Anju substation.
The Taechon hydro power plant is also connected to this line.

•

A 110 kV line from a substation located west and slightly south of Pyongyang to the “Central
Center” in Pyongyang•

A 110 kV line from a substation located southeast of Pyongyang to the “Central Center” inPyongyang•

A 110 kV line from the Pyongyang thermal power station to the “Central Center” inPyongyang•

A 110 kV line from the “Central Center” in Pyongyang to the Buckchang thermal power
station.

•

A 110 kV line from the Pyongyang thermal power station to the substation located west andslightly south of Pyongyang•

A 110 kV line from the Chanjin-gang hydro power station to the Danchon switching station,
via another substation or switching station•

A 110 kV line from the Danchon switching station to the Chongjin substation (and Chongjin
thermal plant)
72

Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKIn the Tumen River area, the system of 110 and 66 kV transmission lines has been estimated toinclude:235•

A 110 kV line from the Chongjin substation (and Chongjin thermal plant) to the Puryong
area and North to the Chinese border at Haeryong•

A 110 kV line from the Chongjin substation (and Chongjin thermal plant) to the Aoji area•

A 110 kV line from the Chongjin substation (and Chongjin thermal plant) along the coast to
the Unggi and Sonbong area•

A 66 kV line from the Chinese border at Haeryong further north along the border to Onsong•

A 66 kV line from Onsong to the Hunyung area•

A 66 kV line from the Hunyung area to the Aoji area•

A 66 kV line running east in a loop near the border from the Aoji area through the Unggi andSonbong area.

•

A 66 kV line from the Puryong area to the Musan area.

In addition to these lines, there is reportedly a 60 kV line supplying power (possibly from theSupung hydro plant) to a remote area of China. There are certainly other transmission lines inthe DPRK, but we do not, at present, have their specifications. In some locations, 66 kV lines(or possibly 60 kV lines—sources differ on the voltage specification) are used for transmission,as well as for bulk distribution. In particular, it is reported that 66 kV line is used in the regionsof Kongonwon, Saebyol, and Onsong.236
In addition to 66 kV/60 kV feeder lines to distribution systems, 10 kV and 3.3 kV lines are used
for bulk distribution of power. Secondary distribution voltages are reportedly 380 and 220
volts,237 although some outlets are supplied at both 110 and 220 volts.
As of early 1992, the DPRK had plans to build 200 km of 220 kV power lines, 60 km of 110 kVlines, and 500 km of 66 kV lines per year through the year 2000.238 Although we do not know
the status of these construction projects, we assume that progress has not achieved targeted
levels. Also, as of 1992, the DPRK had plans to build a 330 kV transmission system, with
implementation to start within 2 years, and planned, in the long term, to build a 500 kV
transmission system. We assume that little progress has been made on either of these highervoltage systems.

235

Document in authors' files [EP1].
UNDP (1994), Studies in Support of Tumen River Area Development Programme. Prepared by KIEP, Seoul, ROK for theUNDP, July 1994.
237 Document in authors' files [EP1].
238 Kilometers of line here probably refers to conductor-kilometers.
236

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 2-4: Overall Map of the DPRK Electric Power Grid

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 2-5: Map of the DPRK Electric Power Grid239

There were, as of about 1990, reportedly 58 substations on the DPRK grid at the highest
transmission voltage levels.240 We have capacity information about only four of these,241 andThe legend entry “Nuclear Plant, broken in 1997” likely refers
to the groundbreaking for the KEDO nuclear reactors at Kumho/Sinpo, and dates this map to sometime after 1997.
240 More recent estimates provided by experts suggest that there may be somewhat under 80 transmission substations in the
DPRK designed to operate with nominally 220 kV inputs, with perhaps another 200 transmission substations operating at the 66
kV/11 kV levels, 2500 11 kV distribution substations, and about 15,000 transformers to distribute power to consumers.
241 Capacity is supplied in units of million volt-amps (MVA).
239 From document in the authors’ files [OS-2-27-2012, page 38].

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

names for a number of others. These data are provided in Table 2-8. A substation in the
Sonbong area is reportedly rated at 110 kV, and there are (or were to be by 1995) two 110 kV
substations and one 220 kV substation in the Chongjin district.242 The substations in the DPRK
are reportedly antiquated—based on obsolete Russian and Chinese technology—and are also
poorly maintained. Our assumption is that most or all substations would need to be replaced, orat least substantially refurbished, to bring the DPRK grid up to modern standards. We do nothave a detailed current estimate for the costs of updating or replacing existing transmission lines
and substations in the DPRK. As a benchmark from our earlier analysis, however, using 1990s
cost estimates presented in the context of Tumen River area infrastructural development would
appear to indicate that a mixture of new 110 and 220 kV transmission lines and substations in the
DPRK will cost in the range of $250,000 to $500,000 per conductor-kilometer (most lines will
have at least two conductors)243 in mid-1990s dollars. Estimates of transmission lines in South
Korea were similar, about $150,000 to $300,000 per conductor-kilometer for 154 kV lines, and$400,000 to $600,000 per conductor-kilometer for 345 kV lines. Costs for substations, again
from ROK sources, were about $10 million for 154 kV units, and $36 million for 345 kV
substations as of the late 1990s.244 Costs for transmission lines vary considerably with thecapacity and voltage of the line, the topography to be covered, and other variables. In addition,
costs for transmission lines and substations may have increased, particularly in recent years,
faster than inflation, due to the increase in commodities prices (especially metals) that preceded
the recent global recession. As a rough total estimate based on the figures above, assuming an
average transmission line costs cost of $250,000 per conductor kilometer, a total length of (2conductor) line to be replaced of about 5,000 kilometers (also a very rough estimate), and 58
substations and 11 control centers to be replaced (or refurbished) at a cost of $10 million eachyields an extremely rough, order-of-magnitude estimate of about $3 billion—in 1995 dollars—
for the costs of replacing the entire DPRK electricity grid.245 In 2020 dollars, this estimate
would be above $5 billion, which we would suggest is definitely a lower bound for possible
costs, especially as it does not include either the costs of either distribution lines or transformers(lower-voltage lines and transformers within cities and towns, and connecting buildings andother loads to the grid) or any power plant refurbishment. Given the rugged topography of the
DPRK, costs might be much higher, although the use of existing substation sites and power line
rights-of-way (as well as the possibility of using some existing equipment) might be a mitigating
factor. If we had to guess, we would say that this estimate is probably a factor of 5 low if done
more comprehensively and with more current costs, although, as noted later in this report, theapproach used to redevelop the DPRK grid—for example, whether “top-down” or “bottom-up”,
and with which generation resources, may have a huge bearing on overall costs. Depending on
242

UNDP (1994), Studies in Support of Tumen River Area Development Programme. Prepared by KIEP, Seoul, ROK for theUNDP, July 1994.
243 UNDP (1994), Studies in Support of Tumen River Area Development Programme. Prepared by KIEP, Seoul, ROK for theUNDP, July 1994.
244 Representative costs for transmission lines and substations supplied by KEPCO (personal communication, 8/14/97). The
costs for substations shown are at the low end of the range supplied. Enclosure costs can increase the costs of substations. Costs
shown here are in approximately mid-1990s USD.
245 Again, it must be stressed that this is the roughest of estimates. It would not surprise us if a more thorough estimate of thecosts of replacing/refurbishing the DPRK transmission grid was within the range of $2 to $10 billion, exclusive of any costs forrefurbishing the power plants themselves. As noted, also excluded from these estimates are costs of refurbishing distribution
systems (if necessary). Simply installing electricity meters on the distribution feeders to the (very roughly) 5 million households
and other electricity users in the DPRK alone would likely cost on the order of $0.25 to $1 billion dollars for even relatively
simple meters.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

the materials used in the existing substations,246 there may be environmental issues and costs
associated with substation replacement.
Table 2-8: Partial Listing of High-voltage Substations on the DPRK Electrical Grid247#

Name
1 Changjingang
2 Chongjin
3 Pyongyang No. 2
4 Vynalon
5 Pyongyang No. 1
6 Undok
7 Munsan
8 Kilju
9 Hamhung
10 Songchon
11 Sepo12 Nampo
13 Kusong
14 Sinuiju
15 Pyongsong
16 Sin-Anju

Capacity
MVA
Units
48 1x28, 1x20
165 1x100, 1x5, 1x60
100 2x50
200 2x50, 1x100

The T&D system is nominally controlled by the Electric Power Production and Dispatching andControl Centre (EPPDCC) in Pyongyang and by 11 regional dispatching centers. The names of
the regional centers are provided in Table 2-9.

246 Possibly including, for example, costs and risks associated with disposal of PCBs, or (polychlorinated biphenyls), which are

likely present in older substations and transformers as insulating oils.
247 Document in authors' files [EP1].

77
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 2-9: Listing of Regional Control Centers on the DPRK Electrical Grid248#

Name
1 North Kamgyong
2 Ryanggang
3 Chagang
4 South Hamgyong
5 South Pyongan
6 Kangwon
7 North Hwanghae
8 Nampo9 South Hwanghae
10 Kaesong
11 North Pyongan

Location (city)
Chongzin
HyesanKanggyeHamhung
Pyongsong
WonsanSariwon
Nampo
Haeju
KaesongSinijuReported Status of Transmission Network
For transmission and distribution losses, for 1990, we used the official estimate that 10 percentof net generation is lost in electricity transmission, and an additional 6 percent in distribution.249
These estimates are in aggregate similar to Chinese values of the same period for such losses,250
and comport with independent reports of loss rates (as noted above) but may still be optimistic
for the DPRK. As records of power consumption at the end-user are apparently not common in
DPRK, there is probably limited opportunity to determine the true extent of transmission anddistribution losses.
As of 1989, load shedding was reportedly already frequently practiced, with 1,000 MW shed in
the winter season (November/December) and up to 2,000 MW shed in the spring(March/April/May) as water levels in the hydroelectric reservoirs decreased and only minimumhydro power generation was available. It is not clear to us, however, whether load shedding atthat time was principally a function of lack of generation resources, of unavailability ofgeneration units, or of defects in the T&D system, or, more likely, was a complex combination ofthese factors.
The reported annual variation of peak load for the year 1989 is provided in Figure 2-6. We do
not know to what extent the load figures in this graphic may be overstated, or to what extent load
shedding, if any, is reflected (either included or excluded) in the curve. The curve shows peak
power demand in the DPRK to be (or at least, to have been) relatively insensitive to changes inseasons, with demand in July being about 5 percent higher than average, and demand in March
being about 10 percent lower. The stability of the peak over the year is not unreasonable, given
the extent to which industrial electricity demand was dominant over demand in the other sectors
in the DPRK at the time, given that most heating in the DPRK is non-electric, and given that

248

Document in authors' files [EP1].
Document in authors' files [EP1].
250 Note, however, that transmission and distribution data in Chinese energy statistics often only include losses on transmission
and major distribution systems, with losses from smaller distribution systems counted as a part of end-use consumption byindustry, residences, and others. As a consequence, published statistics for T&D losses in China will typically be much smaller,
closer to 5-8 percent of generation.
249

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

there was (and continues to be) relatively little air conditioning in the DPRK. 1989 was,however, an unusual year for the DPRK, in that it was the year in which the DPRK hosted a
massive international youth festival that likely resulted in at least somewhat atypical load
patterns. In addition, it has been reported that schedules in industrial plants in the DPRK at least
were (as of 1990) coordinated to make maximal use of electricity supplies. It is conceivable thatthe summer peak has something to do with higher use of fans and some air conditioning ininstitutional buildings, but this is only speculation on our part, as it could also be related todemand related to the youth festival and/or to an all-out push to have all power generation
facilities operating during that period. Why demand should be lower in March, we do not know,
unless what is being reported in Figure 2-6 is actually peak power supplied, which could belower in March due to lack of availability of hydroelectric resources.
Figure 2-6: Annual Peak Load Curve for the DPRK as of 1989
Annual Peak Load Curve for the DPRK: 1989

Peak Load (MW)

10500
10000
9500
9000
8500
8000
0

1

2

3

4

5

Months

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

The variation of peak load over time during a weekday in August 1990 is provided in Figure 2-7.
Peak load appears to have exceed baseload at that time by about 30 percent, which is somewhat
less than in many countries. Again, the large portion of power demand accounted for by theindustrial sector is probably the reason why the ratio of peak power to baseload power was not
greater. Based on the load curve shown in Figure 2-7, the load on the DPRK grid peaked
broadly in the early evening (about 7 PM to 9 PM), with a minor peak in the morning (about 7AM). The timing of these peaks is fairly typical of grids with a substantial number of residential
consumers, though grids in most countries will typically show a much higher morning andevening peaks relative to baseload than is indicated in Figure 2-7. There is a relatively
substantial dip in demand at about the noon hour, which could possibly be explained byindustrial facilities shutting down (partially) when workers take their lunch. Some factories, asof the early 1990s, were also known to phase their workdays to allow maximum use of baseload
capacity (for example, in Hamhung). There also may well have been unmet demand during peaktimes during 1990, meaning that the actual peak would have been higher if supplies of electricity
had been sufficient. It is worth keeping in mind that this is just one “snapshot” of a daily load
79
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKpattern, and may or may have been representative of conditions in general as they were in 1990
(let alone in more recent years), though it is all we have to use at present.
Figure 2-7: Example Hourly Load Curve for the DPRK in August, 1990
Hourly Load Curve for the DPRK: August, 1990
12000

Load (MW)

10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0:00

22:00

20:00

18:00

16:00

14:00

12:00

10:00

8:00

6:00

4:00

2:00

0:00

0

Dispatching Capabilities and Systems
Connections between the elements of the T&D system were, as of the early 1990s, reportedly
operated literally by telephone and telex, without the aid of automation or computer systems.
This system results in poor frequency control, poor power factors, and power outages251.
Outages on the grid are reportedly frequent, and the process of reacting to outages and isolatingareas where the outages occur is cumbersome and slow, often resulting in a cascading series ofoutages (and further delays in restoring power). Poor frequency control and low power factors
can damage end-use equipment and can shorten the life of T&D components.252 In addition,
outages result in significant economic losses because of lost industrial production and services.
As of 1990, the Electric Power Production and Dispatching and Control Centre (EPPDCC) for
the DPRK grid lacked direct access to even the most rudimentary data from power plants andsubstations, having direct readout of neither measurements such as voltage, current, active
power, frequency, nor status indicators such open/closed conditions of circuit breaker or switch
positions. The only exceptions to this lack of access, as of 1990, were links to three power
plants, but even these links were reportedly “slow and outdated”. (See below for information on
the status of projects to update the dispatching system.)
As of the mid-1990s, when a transmission fault or power plant failure disrupted the system, or
when voltages or frequencies at load centers fell below permissible levels, the EPPDCC staff
were obliged to guide remote operators in restoring the system through the aforementioned
system of telephones and telexes, and without access to complete system information on which

251 A now-completed UNDP-funded project, "Electric Power Management System" was only designed to address control systems

at four critical power plants and four substations around Pyongyang.
252 Hayes, P. (1997), “Supply of Light-Water Reactors to the DPRK”. Chapter 3 in Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The
Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula, Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes, Editors. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, USA.

80
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKto base their instructions. There is no indication that this system has changed substantially since,
beyond the installation of the a few upgrades in a limited area under projects undertaken with theUnited Nations Development Programme (see below).
It has been reported that as of 1996, the DPRK grid did not really function as a single unified
grid any longer, but as a group of mostly independent regional grids. We do not know what
technical or operating problems (among those noted above and below) are central in preventing
operation of the unified grid, but identifying and solving those central problems will likely beone (but not the only) requirement if a large power plant (such as the KEDO nuclear reactors, on
which construction ceased in the mid-2000s) or a large power transfer to the DPRK (such as the
2 GW power transfer proposed by the ROK in mid-2005) are to be used effectively and safely in
the DPRK.
Technical Parameters of the T&D System, and Technical Challenges to Integration
with Systems in Other Countries
The power grid in the DPRK operates at a nominal frequency of 60 Hz (Hertz, or cycles per
second). As of the 1990s, frequency control was poor (and reportedly remains so), however, andthe actual frequency on the system often reportedly fell to 57 to 59 Hz, and sometimes as low as
54 to 55 Hz (based on reports as of 1990).253 254
Of the neighboring countries, both China and Russia have electricity systems that operate at 50
Hz, while the grid in the Republic of Korea operates at 60 Hz. This difference means that inorder to interconnect the DPRK grid with the Chinese and/or Russian grid, as has been
contemplated under the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP), it will either benecessary to convert from 60 Hz to 50 Hz or from 50 Hz to 60 Hz at the intersection of thepower grids using an AC/DC/AC power converter (for additions discussion on this point, see
Chapter 5).
Although the ROK power grid operates at nominally the same frequency as the DPRK grid255 it
is virtually certain that interconnection of the grids, in their present form, will require somepower conditioning at the point of interconnection to assure that the power entering the ROK
meets ROK standards for frequency and other attributes. The best way to achieve this outcome(short of wholesale refurbishment/replacement of the DPRK grid to ROK standards) is probably
to add a station near the DPRK/ROK border that converts the AC (alternating current) powerfrom the DPRK to DC (direct current) power, then back to AC power synchronized with the
ROK system for export to the south. This conversion process would be carried out using a seriesof solid-state devices. Power losses through these types of AC-DC-AC system are minimal,
253

The historically poor control of frequency, and frequent loss of power, on the DPRK grid has reportedly figured indetermining the efficiency of industrial equipment in an interesting way. To make sure that the USSR-built industrial equipment
installed in the DPRK would hold up under the prevailing conditions of poor power quality, Soviet engineers typicallyaugmented (usually older) USSR designs to make the DPRK plants extra-rugged. These more rugged plants were thus probably
more electricity-intensive, on the whole, than typical Soviet plants of the same types and vintages.
254 Our own power measurements in the DPRK in 1998 and 2000, in fact, showed a much wider range of frequency variation—with frequencies dropping at times to the 45 Hz range.
255 The fact that the power grids in the Koreas operate at a different frequency than most of the rest of continental Asia (andvirtually all of Europe) is probably a legacy of the Japanese colonial period (and possibly of US influence in the ROK). Japan
uses both 50- and 60-cycle grids (“Listing of Countries with their Frequency and Voltage”, provided on ZZZAP Power Worldwide Web site http://azap.com/countries.html).

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

typically much less than one percent. The cost of AC-DC-AC systems of the size that would be
required was estimated to be on the order of US $125 million per GW of capacity256 in the late
1990s, or on the order of 5 percent of the costs of the PWRs that were to have been transferred to
the DPRK by KEDO.
This information about the types and costs of technologies required for power inter-conversion
costs suggests (to us) two interesting questions related to the ordering of ROK assistance (ifforthcoming) in revamping the DPRK grid:•

Should the first step in assistance be to interconnect the two grids, so that power can be sold(for example) from reactors built on the Sinpo site (where the KEDO-provided PWRs were
to have been, and where their substantial foundations and other infrastructure remain), to the
ROK (or so that the ROK can supply power to the North); or would the ROK (and,ultimately, a unified Korea) be better served by revamping the DPRK system first to make itsuitable to synchronize with the ROK grid (effectively creating one Korea-wide system), thus
avoiding (at least some) power conditioning costs?257•

Would it be less expensive and technically less risky (again assuming the power from any
PWRs located in the DPRK is to be substantially sold to the ROK) to simply connect thereactors to the ROK grid, but not (at least initially) to the DPRK grid? Doing so, of course,
could face political difficulties quite apart from its practicality. In this case, it would almost
certainly be necessary to build a new transmission line from the reactor site to the ROK
border.

•Might it be more effective to rebuild the DPRK grid piecemeal, by developing new (orsubstantially refurbished) “mini-grids”, perhaps at the county level, each supported by theirown local generation, and designed to augment local economic redevelopment?

As we enter the 2020s, these options have been augmented by another possibility, that is,redeveloping the DPRK grid from the bottom-up, by building mini-grids focused on renewableenergy (mostly small hydro and solar photovoltaic plants) to serve local areas, and eventuallyknitting these systems together into a new “smart grid”. This option is discussed further later inthis Report. Interconnecting the DPRK with the grid systems of other neighboring countries isalso a topic that is being explored and should be considered further.
Status of Projects to Upgrade T&D System
In the early-to-mid-1990s, a project carried out by the United Nations Development Programme(entitled “Electric Power Management System”) was undertaken in the DPRK. The overall
intent of this pilot project was to install modern monitoring, modeling, and planning hardware
and software in the Pyongyang EPPDCC to enable the grid operators to detect and model system
256

Order-of-magnitude cost estimate obtained in conversation (1997) with G. Jutte of Siemens Power Transmission andDistribution, Limited. Indications at that time were that per-unit costs for these systems were declining. There are manytechnical issues that will have to be considered when and if AC-DC-AC converters are to be used in Korea, including the line
voltage on the DPRK side, the distance over which the power must be transferred, and many others. The AC-DC-AC systems
could also be used to inter-convert 50 Hz and 60 Hz power at the borders of the DPRK with China and Russia, suggesting thatthe $460 million interconnection cost listed above may be somewhat high (or may include different/additional hardware).
257 A variant of this pathway has been proposed whereby the DPRK grid could be stabilized by adding gas-turbine plants along
the ROK side of the DPRK/ROK border and operating the gas turbines to maintain proper frequency on the DPRK transmission
system. We do not know what additional investments to upgrade the DPRK grid would be required to make this proposed
scheme technically feasible.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

conditions in real time. The project was to include monitoring and data transmission systems ateight remote locations on the grid, including four power plants and four substations. The pilot
project, once completed, was to be replicated throughout the grid, so that ultimately power
control and dispatching capabilities would be brought up to international standards.
As of 1996, a personal computer-based local area network (LAN), complete with LAN softwareand software for modeling the T&D system, had been installed at EPPDCC, and operators hadreceived some training in the use of the facilities. Microwave links with the eight remote power
plants and substations had been established and activated, and the remote stations had been fittedwith the necessary sensors and transducers for data acquisition. The hardware for the various
components of the system was supplied by primarily Chinese contractors. Jae-Young Yoon258
reported on the outcome of the project as follows:“Some important new systems have been added with help from the international
community. A supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) computer system, used
for the monitoring and distribution of electricity, was supplied from China by the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1990s and has been operating in the
power plants of Supung, Jangjingang, Pyongyang, and Puckchang [listed as “Bukchang”
in Table 2-4] as well as in the substations of Chungjin, Pyongyang #2, Pyongyang #3,
and Wonjin.
“These new systems still have to interface with aging, made-in-the-DPRK parts. While
the SCADA system has a relatively modern electricity control mechanism, the protective
relaying systems (which are necessary to identify problems in the system and keep themfrom spreading) are domestically made in the DPRK and are of unknown quality; in
addition, it is unclear how well they have been maintained. This may limit the ability of
the DPRK to effectively use the SCADA system to protect its power system.”
As of our last information (approximately 1996), the DPRK and UNDP (in some combination)
were preparing a pre-feasibility study to extend the system installed to the entire grid, but to ourknowledge no substantial activity of this type has occurred.
We do not know how well the systems installed under the pilot project are operating, or whether
they have contributed significantly to overall system reliability in the DPRK.
Some of our assumptions as to the changes in the electricity supply system between 1990 and1996 are described above. These changes as to changes in electricity supply, plus changes not
mentioned above, can be summarized as:•

The addition to the system in the early 1990s of the first 50 MW unit of the (reportedly) 150
MW East Pyongyang coal-fired power plant•

The average 1996 capacity factor of coal-fired power stations was approximately 70 percentof the value we assume for 1990, or about 58 percent overall.

•

Effective hydroelectric capacity from existing facilities fell by about 3,250 MW from 1990
values (to 1,250 MW) by 1996 because of flood damage259 offset by some additions to

258 Yoon, Jae-Young (2011), “The DPRK Power Sector: Data & Interconnection Options”, The Korean Journal of Defense

Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2011, pages 175–190. Available as http://www.kida.re.kr/data/kjda/03_Jae-Young%20Yoon.pdf.
259 Several sources that have been to the DPRK recently said they had no knowledge of major damage to large hydroelectricfacilities. Another source had heard of damage to “one or two” “small to medium-sized” (less than 10 MW) plants. Still another83
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

capacity.260 Electricity production from the Chinese-controlled generator units in joint
China/DPRK dams along the border rivers shared by the two countries decreased to 28
percent of their 1990 levels.
•

The average capacity factor of hydroelectric generating stations was at about 90 percent of
the level in 1990, or about 49 percent overall (but effective capacity is much lower).

•

Thermal plants fueled exclusively with heavy fuel oil were assumed to have a 1996 capacity
factor 71 percent of that in 1990, or about 52 percent overall.

•

We assumed that coal-fired plants used HFO in 1996 as both a start-up fuel and to augment
poor quality coal, with HFO constituting about 6.2 percent of the total heat value of input
fuel. Much of this HFO was supplied by KEDO.

•

Transmission and distribution losses were assumed to have been 50 percent higher, as afraction of net plant output, than in 1990, as are "emergency losses" at thermal power plants.
The efficiency of thermal power plants is assumed to have declined due to lack of spare partsand general degradation of boiler and combustion air pre-heat systems (in part due tomaintenance difficulties and in part due to the impact of using high-sulfur fuels).
2.4.2. Petroleum refining

The DPRK has two major oil refineries. Various estimates have placed the total refining
capacity at these plants between 3 million tonnes261 and 4.5 million tonnes.262 Capacities in thisrange would be adequate to process the volume of crude oil that is reported to have been
imported in the years before 1990 (see, for example, Table 2-3, above). Our best information isthat crude oil imported from China via a pipeline was refined in the DPRK’s 29,000 barrel per
day (bpd, or about 1.45 million tonnes/yr263264) Chinese-designed refinery in the northwest
DPRK. This refinery, named the Ponghwa Oil Refinery, was reportedly built in the late 1950s.
It is designed to take Chinese crude oils (such as Daqing or Liaohe265). We assumed that the
product slate of this refinery is the same as that of refineries of similar design in China, withproduct fractions (on a weight percentage of input basis) of 45 percent HFO, 22 percent gasoline(low octane), 20 percent diesel oil, 4 percent kerosene, and 5 percent liquefied petroleum gas(LPG) and refinery gas.266 The DPRK’s other major refinery, the Sungri Oil Refinery is locatedin the town of Unggi, on the East Coast close to the Russian border and near Sonbong, has areported capacity of 42,000 bpd (about 2.1 million tonnes/yr—though other sources suggest

source with recent knowledge of the situation in the DPRK states that there has been significant siltation to reservoirs andpossibly structural damage to some turbine-generators, and that the combined damage to the plants will take years to repair. Thislatter point of view is reflected in our DPRK energy supply-demand estimate for 1996. See additional discussion in Chapter 2.
260 See discussion in Chapter 2.
261 United Nations estimate, as cited in Jang, Young Sik (1994), North Korean Energy Economics. Korea Development Institute.
262 It is not clear whether these figures are given per tonne of crude oil input or per tonne of product output, though the difference
between the two measures is unlikely to be more than 10 percent.
263 International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1996. Tulsa, Oklahoma Petroleum Publishing Company, Tulsa, OK.
264 Other sources (document in the authors’ files [OS-2-27-2012, page 45]) suggest that the current capacity of this refinery is 2.5
million tonnes/year.
265 Fridley, D. (1996), then of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (personal communication).
266 Fridley, D. (1996), then of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (personal communication).

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capacity of 2.5 million tonnes/yr), with a reported fluid cracking facility of 7,300 bpd.267, 268 The
refinery was built in around 1968 by the Soviet Union, and expanded in 1970. As of 1990, thisrefinery probably processed much or all of the oil imported to the DPRK from the Soviet Unionand from Middle Eastern countries. Sources suggest that inputs from the Soviet Union arrived
by train, with imports also received by ship from Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Iran. A
page from a Japan-based North Korean organization lists the storage capacity of the plant at 2
million tonnes (it is unclear whether this is tonnes of oil products, of crude oil, or both—but ismost likely for crude oil and oil products combined).269 A separate source reports much lower
storage capacity of 30,000 tonnes of crude oil, 40,000 tonnes of diesel, 30,000 tonnes of heavy
oil, 20,000 tonnes of gasoline, and 5,000 tonnes of lubricants270. A “panorama” of the “Sungri
Chemical Plant Oil Refinery, Sonbong” from the “The People’s Korea” (source as above) is
provided below as Figure 2-8.
Figure 2-8: Photo of Sungri Chemical Plant Oil Refinery

In addition to these two major refineries, some of our contacts have suggested that the DPRK has
one or possibly two other smaller refineries, possibly used (when operating) to produce fuel forthe military, with capacities no larger than 10,000 bpd, and likely much smaller. These arereportedly of the “fractionating tower” type, without cracking facilities. One or both may be

267

Some information about this refinery, and plans for its expansion, was at one time available on the UNIDO (UN Industrial
Development Organization) World-wide Web site at http://www.unido.org, though it is unclear if that information remains
available.
268 International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1996. Tulsa, Oklahoma Petroleum Publishing Company, Tulsa, OK.
269 Sourced from web page formerly available as http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/095th_issue/99051905.htm, dated 1999, by “ThePeople's Korea”, and titled “Rajin-Sonbong Region”.
270 Document in authors’ files [OS-2-27-2012, page 44]. This source also lists the Sonbong port that serves the refinery as having
two underwater pipelines from the end of the wharf to a loading buoy for crude oil (3500 m), plus (apparently) one each forloading and unloading gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil, with a crude oil (presumably) pipeline transit capacity of 2-3 million
tons/year. The port is described as having docking capacity for two 6,000 ton, one 15,000 ton, one 30,000 ton, and one 250,000ton tankers, plus storage tanks for crude oil in the following sizes: 9 tanks of 20,000 m3, 10 tanks of 22,000 m3 and one tank
400,000 m3.

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associated with chemical production complexes. One of these units is located on the West Coastof the DPRK and is associated with a small thermal power plant. We know nothing more about
these facilities, but assume that their activity during 1990 and 1996,271 if any, was minimal
relative to the larger refineries, due to (at least) lack of crude oil.
Based on a 1954 CIA document, there were three oil refineries in the DPRK described as“Japanese-built” that operated during 1946 to 1950.272 The “Wonsan Refinery, the Yongan
Synthetic Oil Refinery, and the Aoji Synthetic Oil Refinery – which produced a total of 85,000
tonnes of refined products during this period”. All three were heavily damaged by bombing
during the Korean war, and as of 1954, only the Aoji plant appeared to be being rehabilitated.
The closest industrial facility to the town of Aoji (in the DPRK’s far northeast, near the
Chinese/Russian border that appears to have (or have had) equipment (large oil tanks, stacks, andwhat appear to be electrical substation equipment, for example) consistent with oil refining is a
few kilometers away in an area labeled as Undok in Google Earth Pro, at approximately
coordinates 42.521, 130.348. This refinery does not look like it would have been in use as of
1990.

271 An estimate for the operation of one of these refineries in the years 2000 and beyond is provided in 119of this report.
272 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 1954), Intelligence Memorandum: Reconstruction in North Korea dated 26 July 1954,

and available as https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00935A000200370001-2.pdf.

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Figure 2-9: Possible Former Oil Refinery Site Near Undok, DPRK as of early 2019 (Google
Earth Pro Image)In estimating the energy used during refining, we have used a value for oil consumption duringrefining derived from Chinese data, namely 0.0578 tonnes oil equivalent per tonne of crude oilprocessed.273 This yields an overall energy efficiency in refining of just over 94 percent, which
is not unreasonable, but could be somewhat high for the DPRK.
We have attempted, in preparing our estimated supply/demand balances, to account for
production and consumption of the major refined petroleum products separately (see Attachment1). We have done this somewhat differently, however, in the 1990 balance than in our estimated273 Shen, W.B. (1988), "Progress of Energy Saving in China's Petrochemical Industry". In Meyers, S. (Ed.), Proceedings of theChinese - American Symposium on Energy Markets and the Future of Energy Demand, Nanjing, China June 22-24, 1988.
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

balances for subsequent years. For 1990, we have essentially taken our estimates for demand by
fuel, subtracted known imports, and then assumed that domestic production of petroleum
products would meet the residual demand (less any exports). Our figures for 1990 refined
products consumption--as measured by the fraction of total refined products demand accounted
for by each separate product, differs from consumption data provided by Jang.274 Data in thelatter is taken from UN and IEA statistics, however, which may be suspect in the case of DPRK.
For 1996 and beyond, we have used data on imports of crude oil to define the refinery inputs,
together with the fractions of refinery output by product, plus imports, to estimate fuel supply by
product, and adjusted our demand estimates to (roughly) meet those supply estimates.
The DPRK’s refinery in the Sonbong region (reported capacity of 42,000 bpd, or about 2.1
million tonnes/yr) probably processed the load of Libyan crude oil that the DPRK received in
1995 but has reportedly been “in mothballs” (inactive) for most of time since then. We assume
that only the DPRK's refinery near the Chinese border on the West Coast operated in 1996.
2.4.3. Coal production and preparation
Coal production in the DPRK is principally from underground mines (as opposed to open pit orsurface mines), but most underground mines are not particularly deep. As noted above, much of
the better coal in the large Anju field in western North Korea is near or in fact under the ocean,which presents extreme mining difficulties due to the need to constantly remove seawater fromthe mines, requiring constant pumping and, thus (typically) reliable supplies of electricity. Coal
production in some mines in the DPRK is (or was, as of about 1990) reportedly almost
completely mechanized, but mechanization is apparently limited in other mines.275 We applied
Chinese figures from the 1980s for coal and electricity use during coal mining276 to estimate theown use of these fuels during coal production in DPRK.277 These estimates could be either low
or high. The difficulties with water intrusion (for example) would argue that a large amount ofenergy would be expended for pumping, and thus these estimates would be understated.278 On
the other hand, the probable higher degree of mechanization in at least the larger Chinese mines
would argue that “own-use” of energy would be lower in coal mines the DPRK than in mines in
China.
Coal washing is apparently not practiced in the DPRK, although it would be beneficial for many
coal combustion applications. Coal briquetting to produce household fuel is practiced widely(based on our observations) but on a small scale—many briquettes are produced in hand presses.
No quantitative data were available to us to describe how this preparation process works on
average nationwide,279 but our own 1998 and 2000 surveys as a part of the Unhari Wind Energy
Project characterized the briquettes, at least in one village where we worked, as being on average
3 to 4 parts coal per part clay binder, and with the mass of the final, dried briquettes about 2.5 kg

274 Jang, Young Sik (1994), North Korean Energy Economics. Korea Development Institute.
275 Document in authors' files [H2-A2].
276 Chinese language spreadsheet dated 12-Feb-93 provided by J. Sinton of Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory; Sinton, J. (1995),"Physical Intensity of Selected Industrial Products". Spreadsheet printout. LBL" Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley,
California, USA.
277 These own-use figures do not include the capture and combustion of coal-bed methane, which is employed in at least one
DPRK coal mine.
278 It is reported (Document in authors' files [VO1]) that in some areas of the Anju field 6 m3 of water must be pumped to mine atonne of coal. It is not known how representative this situation is of the Anju field as a whole or of all mines in DPRK.
279 Document in authors' files [R1].

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each.280 Though this information is derived from a single locale, we would not be surprised if
briquetting practices are fairly similar throughout the DPRK.
For 1996, we assumed that coal and biomass production could meet demand (as estimated basedon the demand-sector parameters described earlier in this chapter), although coal production
capacity probably decreased somewhat by 1996 because of flooding. We have heard that the coalmines in the important Anju district were flooded and badly damaged, which is entirely
believable, given that many were below sea level to begin with. Despite the importance of this
district, however, it did not produce a major fraction of the DPRK’s coal even in 1990, when
demand for coal was much higher than in 1996. As a consequence, unless flooding caused longterm problems with transport facilities (and the DPRK seems to have mobilized very quickly toclean up flood damage in many areas), we suspect that the floods by themselves did not have amajor effect on national coal production.
We heard a report in the late 1990s that the quality of coal produced in the DPRK has fallen
significantly since 1990, and as of 1996 had an average energy content of no better than 1000kcal per kilogram. By way of comparison, “standard” coal has an energy content of about 7000
kcal per kg (29.3 GJ per tonne); productive soils that are rich in organic matter (such as the“black soils” of the Russian steppes) have about the same energy content as has been reported for
DPRK coal. If the average energy content of coal mined in the DPRK is really 1000 kcal perkg, it implies one of two things: either the actual mass (as opposed to the energy content) of coalproduced in the DPRK in 1996 was about twice (some 140 or more million tonnes) that produced
in 1990 (70 million tonnes), or our estimate of total coal production in 1996 is significantly inerror, or some combination of the two. We would venture to guess that the average energy
content of coal that was mined in the DPRK in 1996 could have been less than the 4500 kcal/kg
that we used as an average value for 1990, but not as low as 1000 kcal/kg, We certainly wouldn’trule out the possibility, however, that even our fairly low value for overall 1996 coal production(in TJ) is too high. If indeed the average energy content of coal mined in the late 1990s was in
the vicinity of 1000 kcal/kg, the use of heavy fuel oil to augment coal in (particularly) utility andin industrial boilers would have become more important.
The reasons for the reported decline in coal quality in the DPRK are said to have centered on thelack of spare parts for mining equipment (and probably diesel oil to fuel equipment) that can beused to open new coal seams. Lacking sufficient working equipment, mining operations wereforced to get what coal they could out of existing mines and seams, sometimes taking marginal
coals that would, in better times, be left behind.281 Another potential explanation for low recent
coal production in the DPRK—an explanation that may also bear on the low energy content of
the coal produced—takes into account social and political forces. An ROK observer has
suggested that coal miners in the DPRK “are mostly those classified as belonging to hostilesocial strata and, as such, not even provided with minimum human living conditions.

280 See, for example, page 24 of Rural Energy Survey in Unhari Village, The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK):

Methods, Results, and Implications, David F. von Hippel, Peter Hayes, James H. Williams, Chris Greacen, Mick Sagrillo, andTimothy Savage, Nautilus Institute Report, dated May 20, 2001, available as http://nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/Unhari_Survey1.pdf.
281 Recent mining practices may have also included removing the pillars and walls of coal that had been left in the mines during
more normal mining operations, allowing the mines to collapse as the coal in these structures is removed. In addition to being
dangerous to miners, these practices, if actually carried out (and we have no corroboration that they have been), would imply
premature destruction of coal mines, as areas allowed to collapse are rendered much more difficult to mine further in the future.

89
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKConsequently, they are not eager to work at all” .282 We do not know to what extent thisassertion of coal miner antipathy is an accurate reflection of general conditions in the DPRK, or
to what extent worker unhappiness acted (or acts) to reduce coal production and/or coal quality.
2.4.4. Charcoal production
We have little information on the technologies used for charcoal production in the DPRK.
Using a fuelwood input of 0.65 million cubic meters at 1.5 cubic meters per tonne,283 we assume
an efficiency of 30 percent to yield a charcoal output of approximately 2.1 million GJ(gigajoules) in 1990. An efficiency of 30 percent would be lower than that achieved in mostcommercial kilns in industrialized countries, but is probably somewhat higher than the average,
for example, for earthen kilns in developing countries. We assumed that charcoal production
continued to meet demand as of 1996.
2.5.

Description of key results and uncertainties in 1990 and 1996 supply/demandbalances
2.5.1. Energy Balances for 1990 and 1996

In this section we present our current best estimates, based on the information that we havereviewed, of energy supply and demand balances for the DPRK in 1990 and 1996. We
intended, when we first prepared them in the 1990s, and have treated these as “living”
documents, that is, estimates that can be (and have been) updated as reviewers and others comeforward with suggestions for improvements and with better information. We hope that thesebalances, and the balances for 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009, presented later in this Report, can beused as starting points for additional analysis and planning regarding the DPRK energy
economy, including being adapted as bases for estimates of energy efficiency potential (that is, ina more thorough and detailed manner than the estimate we have prepared and presented in
Chapter 4 of this report).
Although the balances that we have prepared are digests of a great deal of information, they also
contain, necessarily, a great deal of conjecture on our part.
Units
Our summary, detailed, and petroleum products energy balances for 1990 and 1996 are presented
as Table 2-10 through Table 2-15, below, and as the first pages of Attachment 1. We havepresented these balances in a standard energy unit, the Terajoules (TJ), a unit equal to 1000
Gigajoules (GJ). In some cases (the summary balance and some tables and graphs) we express
results in Petajoules (PJ), a unit equal to a thousand terajoules or a million GJ. For those who
may be more familiar with other units, some standard conversions are:•

41.84 GJ per tonne of oil equivalent (toe)•41.84 TJ per thousand tonne of oil equivalent (ktoe)

282 “Energy ‘Crisis’ Threatens Economy”, Pukhan (Seoul, ROK) March 1993, pages 39-45, by Naeoe Tongsin reporter Kim

Sang-hwan.
283 Document in authors' files [T1].

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•

4.184 GJ per million kilocalories (Gcal)•

4.184 TJ per billion kilocalories (Tcal)•

29.3 GJ per tonne of standard coal equivalent (tce)•29.3 TJ per thousand tonne of standard coal equivalent (ktce)•

3.6 GJ per million watt-hours (MWh)•

3.6 TJ per billion watt-hours (GWh)•

1.055 GJ per million British Thermal Units (MMBtu)•

6.1 GJ per barrel of oil equivalent (boe)•

6.1 TJ per thousand barrels of oil equivalent (kboe)

Table 2-10: Summary Estimated Energy Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 1990
UNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

REF.
PROD

HYDRO/NUCL.

WOOD/BIOMASSCHARCOAL

1,326

111

27

78

162

(0)

1,301
68
44

111

78
27

150
12
0

0

(378)

(111)

83

(78)

(10)

3

(22)
111

(77)

(111)

(0)
(6)

(1)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses(295)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.

948.00-109.38-152.02ENERGY DEMAND

948.01-109.38-152.02

672
189
10
1
30
33

-

-

6
2
86
45
2

14

28
38
7
5
3
17
0
6
6

23.43

1.28

21.29

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGYElect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)

HEAT

ELEC.

-

1,703

-

1,529
218
44

9

120

(361)

8

166
(1)
(9)

(2)

(12)
(24)

(220)
(1)
(72)
(7)
(2)
(18)
(41)

2.98

9.25

120.46

1,342

2.97

9.25

120.47

1,342

-

-

70
11
11
3
1
14
11

776
51
302
62
5
60
48
6
31

(63)
(10)
(3)

TOTAL

-

3
3

(16)

3
-

6
3
0

12

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

46.00

Table 2-11: Detailed Estimated Energy Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 1990
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONCOAL &
COKE
1,325,571

CRUDE
OIL
110,742

REFINED
PROD.
26,622

HYDRO/NUCLEAR78,075WOOD/
BIOMASS
161,941

1,301,288
68,392
44,108110,742

26,622

78,075

149,909
12,183151

0(377,571)(110,742)

82,762(78,075)(76,641)(110,742)(21,947)
110,742(9,920)2,976Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses(294,926)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

948,000-

109,384-

152,021

ENERGY DEMAND

948,009-109,384-

152,021671,661
324,615
68,13923,994
11,203
4,026
23,72029,38561,980124,600-

28,393-

5,626

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified--

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

189,274
129,155
60,119-AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

9,750

-

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

1,132
1,132

-

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

29,828-890
28,938100

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

32,64698

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

CHARCOAL
(0)

HEAT
-

ELECTRICITY--

1,529,272
217,938
44,259-9,251

120,464(360,855)

7,884

165,600(593)(8,544)(1,549)(12,408)(23,592)(220,030)(593)(71,636)(6,944)(2,008)(18,368)(41,277)

2,976

9,251

120,464

1,342,096

2,973

9,251

120,467

1,342,105--

70,242
17,3884,356
18,891
6,616
932
4,126
396
2,497
189
14,850775,923
342,003
80,06547,45817,8198,985
27,846
12,99631,882
62,169144,700--

11,470600

51,03934,243
12,819
1,253
1,123
1,600

(63,092)(9,920)(3,417)

(73)

2,976

(1,433)

2,916(5,960)(16,136)

7,571
4,573
4,026
12,600

3,650

-

9,750

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

1,600

37,89632,571
1,949
1,253
1,123
1,000

-

6,600
6,256
344

-

5,005
2,619
2,386

-

3,137
2,681
456

-

16,533
6,585
263
2,648
6,937

-

1,672
1,672

10,87086,140

6,134
6,134

86,140

2,973
1,814
1,159

10,7187,420
3,298

301,840
150,780
151,060

44,950

-

-

2,572
907
1,664

62,2773,526
58,750

-

-

524

4,794
2,681
2,112

44,950
-

524
-

1,632

5,950

NON-ENERGY USE

13,7185,771

Electricity Gen. (Gross TWhe)

23.43

1.28

TOTAL
1,702,951

-

-

2,644
473

12,00021.29

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

14,00848
13,96060,369
6,585
263
2,648
6,937
938
42,998

10,932

47,952
6,423
31,48846.00

Table 2-12: Detailed Estimated Refined Products Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK,1990
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

CRUDE
OIL
110,742GASOLINE
5,275

DIESEL
12,962HEAVY KEROSENE
LPG, REF.
OIL& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
6,224
2,160
-

AVIATION
GAS

110,742

5,275

12,962

6,224

2,160

(110,742)

25,332

19,357

16,583

8,849

11,5601,080(110,742)

25,332

19,357(21,947)
38,603

8,849

17,521

1,080

TOTAL
137,364
137,364-(73)(5,960)(27,980)(21,947)
0(73)(5,960)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION-

30,60732,31922,807

11,00911,5601,080

109,384

ENERGY DEMAND-

30,60632,31722,807

11,008

11,566

1,080

109,384

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

3,050

21,685

-

3,658

-

28,393
7,571
4,573
12,600-TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

4,473
4,129
344

2,127
2,127

-

6,600
6,256
344

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

5,005
2,619
2,386

-

-

-

-

5,005
2,619
2,386

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

2,777
2,547
230

360
134
226

-

-

-

3,137
2,681
456

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

7,386
6,476
45
494
371

6,859
109
218

134

1,798

-

356

6,432

134

16,533
6,585
263
2,648
6,937
100

7,571
915

12,60023,22023,2203,050

600

12,926
9,351
1,949
627

627

3,650
399

-

724

627
399

724

1,000

1,798

356

100

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORSNON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

3,658

88
-

1,700

NON-ENERGY USE

10

4,250

37,89632,571
1,949
1,253
1,123
1,000

98
5,950

5,771

93
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

5,771

Table 2-13: Summary Estimated Energy Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 1996
UNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASS

CRUDE
OIL

REF.
PROD

682

40

32

19

158

-

683
12
12
-

40
-

39
1
6

19
-

148
14
4
-

-

(40)

12

(19)

(208)
(33)
(2)
(8)

(40)
-

(19)
-

-

-

(25)
40
(0)
(2)
-

-

-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.

431

-

44

-

150

ENERGY DEMAND

431

-

44

-

150

251
122
3
1
25
26

-

9
17
2
1
1
13
0
1

-

2
1
118
15
5
3

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

3HEAT ELEC.

-

932

-

850
104
16
6

5

51

(248)

5

82
(0)
(4)
-

(1)

(10)
(17)

(165)
(0)
(37)
(6)
(1)
(12)
(26)

5

51

684

5

51

684

24
5
6
1
0
8
6

285
22
254
20
2
52
37
12
22.84

2

(8)

TOTAL

-

-

2

(8)

(251)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLossesENERGY TRANSF.

CHARCOALCOAL &
COKE

2
2
2
-

-

4

2
-

2

7

5.32
0.91
16.61
Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)**Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

94
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 2-14: Detailed Estimated Energy Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 1996
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONCOAL &
COKE
682,118

CRUDE
OIL
39,874

682,630
11,614
12,12539,874REFINED HYDRO/WOOD/PROD. NUCLEAR BIOMASS CHARCOAL
32,166
19,160158,306
19,16039,100521

148,292
13,5883,574-(7,916)2,375(251,225)(39,874)

11,979(19,160)(25,467)
39,874(19,160)(39,874)(207,721)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

430,893-

44,146-150,390

ENERGY DEMAND

430,897-

44,146-

250,538
124,977
29,981
6,515
3,697
1,329
7,828
832
9,697
20,45345,230

-

8,655

-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified--

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

121,735
92,74728,988AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

3,183

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

ELECTRICITY
-

-

5,280

50,769(247,772)

4,729

82,238(213)(4,425)(1,159)(10,186)(16,644)(165,381)(213)(37,103)(5,541)(921)(12,452)(26,161)

2,375

5,280

50,769683,853

150,390

2,374

5,280

50,770683,857

1,909

-

-

24,001
6,694
1,917
5,130
2,183
308
1,362
131
824
62
5,391

285,104
131,671
35,22912,774
5,880
2,965
9,189
4,289
10,521
20,51652,070

-

-

4,815

-

22,406
15,412
5,595
501
899
-

(32,678)(7,916)(2,468)

2,375

(163)

1,710

(2,266)(8,358)

3,331
1,129
1,329
3,326

869

581

16,707
14,528
779
501
899
-

-

-

1,785
1,649
136

-

117,606
15,135
102,471

2,374
1,455
919

3,669
3,669

6,359
4,685
1,674

253,529
119,340
134,189

-

1,319
690
629

-

14,674

-

-

1,261
717
543

20,437
1,408
19,029

998
804
193

-

-

-

236

1,743
804
939

-

-

3,183
509
509

-

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

25,365-623
24,742

13,186
5,734
211
1,886
5,261
95

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

26,180131

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

TOTAL
931,626
850,082
104,175
16,220
6,412

6,412

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesINDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

HEAT
-

884
884

4,815

14,674
-

236
5,498

-

5,498
2,618

-

NON-ENERGY USE

3,386

1,365

Electricity Gen. (Gross TWhe)*

16.61

0.91

-

1,612
-

7,200
5.32

*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

95
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

7,711

33
7,678

51,761
5,734
211
1,886
5,261
657
38,013

6,387

36,927
11,95122.84

Table 2-15: Detailed Estimated Refined Products Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK,1996
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesCRUDEOILGASOLINE
39,874
8,545
39,874

DIESEL
5,185

HEAVY
OIL
18,422

8,545

5,185

24,834
-

-

-

6,412

(39,874)

8,183

8,090

(39,874)

8,183

8,090

KEROSENE
LPG, REF. AVIATION& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
GAS
518
(504)
-

TOTAL
72,041
78,974
521
6,412

518

17
521

(10,852)

1,618

4,070

871

(25,450)
14,760

1,618

(17)
6,352

871

(163)
(2,266)(27,895)(25,467)0(163)(2,266)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION-

16,72813,275

7,570

2,136

3,565

871

44,146ENERGY DEMAND-

16,72913,274

7,570

2,137

3,565

871

44,146

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

671

7,081

-

903

-

8,655
3,331
1,129
3,326
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

553
430
123

1,232
1,218
14

-

1,785
1,649
136

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

1,319
690
629

-

-

-

-

1,319
690
629

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

856
764
92

142
40
102

-

-

-

998
804
193

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

6,352
5,639
36
395
281

5,248
95
174

96

1,199

-

292

4,884

96

3,331
226

903

3,326

10,378
10,378

671

198

5,180
4,150
779
251

251

869
320

-

579

251
320

579

-

1,199

292

95

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

65

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS-NON-ENERGY USE

65-

16,707
14,528
779
501
899
-

13,186
5,734
211
1,886
5,261
95
131
-

1,365

96
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

1,365

Total Energy Use
Our balance shows a total of 1703 PJ of primary (not end-use) energy estimated to have beenused by DPRK in 1990, or about 77 GJ per person in the country. By way of reference, this isalmost four times the per capita energy consumption in China in 1990, and only about a third lessthan per-capita energy consumption in Japan in the same year.284 By 1996, this total had
decreased to 932 PJ, or about 43 GJ per person, of which over one-sixth was biomass.
2.5.2. Energy supply, including exports and imports
Coal made up approximately 78 percent of the total energy supply in the DPRK as of 1990
(Figure 2-10), with wood and biomass contributing the second largest portion to the total
national fuel input, at 9 percent. By 1996 (Figure 2-11), coal was less than 73 percent of
supplies, and biomass contributed 17 percent. Hydroelectricity (counted at 3600 GJ per GWhelectricity generated) accounted for about 4.6 percent and 2.8 percent of the national energy
supply in 1990 and 1996, respectively, with imported crude oil and refined products supplying
the remaining approximately 8 percent in 1990 and 1996. Imports—by energy content, about 51
percent crude oil, 31 percent coal and coke, 6 percent wood, and 12 percent refined petroleum
products in 1990—made up only about 13 percent of the total energy used in DPRK. The
fractions of total energy imports accounted for by crude oil and coal decreased substantially in
1996. In the exports row for 1990, our balance includes only coal exports (at about 44 petajoules
per year in 1990, and 12 PJ in 1996), but no electricity exports, since electricity generated atborder dams from generators owned by China, and not appearing as imports to China in China
Customs Statistics, are not counted as exports in this version of our energy balances. Figure 2-12
and Figure 2-13 show the components of exports, imports, and domestic production by fuel typeand for all fuels.

284

Figures for China (from Sinton, J., editor (1996), China Energy Databook 1996 Edition, Revised January 1996. Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, California, USA. LBL-32822.Rev.3. UC-900) do not include
biomass energy use. Biomass energy use is a relatively large factor fraction of total fuels use in the case of China, but minimal in
the case of Japan.

97
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 2-10: 1990 DPRK Energy Supply by TypeESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE: 1990

CRUDE OIL
6%
REF. PROD
2%

COAL & COKE
78%

HYDRO/NUCL.
5%WOOD/
BIOMASS
9%

Figure 2-11: 1996 DPRK Energy Supply by TypeESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE: 1996

CRUDE OIL
4%
REF. PROD
4%HYDRO/NUCL.
2%

COAL & COKE
73%

WOOD/
BIOMASS
17%

98
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 2-12: DPRK Energy Supply by Fuel and Source, 1990

DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY FUEL AND SOURCE:
1990
Wood

Domestic Production

Hydro

Imports

Ref. Prod.

Exports

Crude Oil
Coal

(500)

-

500

1,000

1,500

Petajoules (PJ)

Figure 2-13: DPRK Energy Supply by Fuel and Source, 1996

DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY FUEL AND SOURCE:
1996
Wood

Domestic Production

Hydro

Imports

Ref. Prod.

Exports

Crude Oil
Coal

(200)

-

200

400

600

800

Petajoules (PJ)

2.5.3. Energy transformation results
The results of the energy transformation portion of our estimated supply/demand balance for the
DPRK are as follows:•

Electricity generation is the most important energy transformation process in the DPRK,
consuming 22 percent of total coal and coke supplied, 16 percent of refined petroleum
products (domestically refined and imported), and all (by definition) of the hydro energy
99

Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

used in 1990, as well as 30 percent of coal and coke plus 35 percent of refined products(mostly KEDO HFO) in 1996.
•

Petroleum refining uses all of the crude oil imported to the country and produced roughly 80
percent of the refined products used in DPRK in 1990, as opposed to approximately 50
percent of refined products in 1996. Petroleum refining losses (own use) amount toapproximately 5.4 percent of the crude oil input to refining.

•

Coal production in 1990 used 8.5 PJ of electricity, just under 5 percent of gross national
generation, and 4.4 PJ in 1996 (also about 5 percent of generation).

•

In 1990, charcoal production consumed 9.9 PJ of wood, producing 3.0 PJ of charcoal.
Charcoal production in 1996 consumed 7.9 PJ of wood, producing 2.4 PJ of charcoal.

•"Own use" of fuels occurs for two fuel types: coal and electricity. The coal is consumed incoal mining operations at a rate equivalent to just under 5 percent of the total coal mined in
DPRK. The use of electricity within electricity generating plants, including "emergency"
losses of electricity, accounted for about 7.5 percent of gross electrical production in 1990,
and 12.4 percent of gross generation in 1996.

•

The "losses" category includes losses of coal (such as coal falling from coal trains or blown
as dust from coal piles) at an assumed 1.2 percent of total production on a calorific basis.
Electricity losses in 1990 totaled 23.6 PJ, 14.3 percent of total gross generation.285 Losses in1996 were proportionally higher, totaling over 16 PJ, or over 20 percent of generation.
District heat losses were estimated at about 14 percent of heat production (counting heatproduced in both dedicated district heating plants and central combined heat and power units)
in 1990, and about 18 percent in 1996.
2.5.4. Energy demand in 1990 and 1996

Of the total final energy demand in the DPRK in 1990, 71 percent was estimated to be provided
by coal, 11 percent by wood and biomass, 9 percent by electricity, 8 percent by refined
petroleum products, and a fraction of a percent each by charcoal and heat (Figure 2-14). If
charcoal and wood/biomass are excluded, the fraction of fuel demand provided by coal rises to81 percent. Figure 2-15 shows energy demand by fuel for 1996. Relative to 1990, demand in1996 showed a reduction in the shares of coal and petroleum products, and an increase in theshare of wood and biomass.

285

Note that this figure appears lower than the sum of the 10 percent transmission losses and 6 percent distribution losses that weassumed (based on official DPRK figures). This result is obtained because these factors were applied sequentially to the total net
electricity generated after in-plant use and exports are accounted for.

100
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 2-14: 1990 Final Energy Demand by Fuel
ESTIMATED DPRK FINAL ENERGY DEMAND BY FUEL,
1990
REF. PROD
8%
COAL & COKE
71%

WOOD/ BIOMASS
11%
CHARCOAL
0%
HEAT
ELEC.
1%
9%

Figure 2-15: 1996 Final Energy Demand by Fuel
ESTIMATED DPRK FINAL ENERGY DEMAND BY FUEL,
1996
REF. PROD
7%WOOD/
BIOMASS
22%
COAL & COKE
63%

CHARCOAL
0%

ELEC.
7%

HEAT
1%

Looking at the sectoral shares of total energy demand, the industrial sector was estimated to be
responsible for 776 PJ of total energy use, about 58 percent of all demand in 1990, but only 285
PJ (and 42 percent of demand) in 1996 (Figure 2-16 through Figure 2-19). In 1990, theresidential sector contributed 22 percent of demand (29 percent of which was wood andbiomass), and the transport, agricultural, military, public/commercial, and non-energy uses eachcontribute between about 2 and 5 percent to total fuel demand. The share of residential energy
consumption increased markedly in 1996, due to the combination of reduced fuels use in othersectors and increased, relatively less efficient, use of biomass fuels in homes in rural areas.

101
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 2-16: Energy Demand by Sector, 1990

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR: 1990
NON-ENERGY

31

NON-SPECIFIED

6

PUBLIC/COMML

48

MILITARY60

FISHERIES

5AGRICULTURAL

62

RESIDENTIAL

302

TRANSPORT

51

INDUSTRIAL

776

-

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

PJ ENERGY DEMAND

Figure 2-17: Energy Demand by Sector, 1996

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR: 1996
NON-ENERGY

12NON-SPECIFIED-

PUBLIC/COMML

37

MILITARY

52

FISHERIES

2AGRICULTURAL

20

RESIDENTIAL

254

TRANSPORT22

INDUSTRIAL

285

-

50

100

150

200

250

PJ ENERGY DEMAND

102
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

300

Figure 2-18: Share of Energy Demand by Sector, 1990
ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR:
1990
0%
0%

4%

2%

5%

INDUSTRIAL

5%

TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIES
22%
58%

MILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

4%

Figure 2-19: Share of Energy Demand by Sector, 1996
ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY DEMAND BY SECTOR:
1996
0%

42%

2%

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORT

5%RESIDENTIAL

8%AGRICULTURAL0%FISHERIES3%MILITARY

3%37%

PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGYWhen consumption of specific fuels are considered, industry accounted for 71 percent of final
demand of coal in 1990 (58 percent in 1996), while the residential sector accounted for 20
percent (28 percent in 1996), and others sectors contribute a few percent at most, with themilitary sector showing the greatest relative increase between 1990 and 1996 (Figure 2-20 and
Figure 2-21).
103
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 2-20: Share of Coal Demand by Sector, 1990

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 1990
TRANSPORT0%RESIDENTIAL
20%

AGRICULT.
1%

INDUSTRIAL
71%

MILITARY
3%
PUBLIC/COMM
4%
NON-ENERGY
2%

Figure 2-21: Share of Coal Demand by Sector, 1996

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 1996
TRANSPORT0%RESIDENTIAL
28%
AGRICULTURE
1%MILITARY6%

INDUSTRIAL
58%

PUBLIC/COMM
4%
NON-ENERGY
1%

The major consumers of petroleum products in 1990 are estimated to have been the transport,
industrial, and military sectors, with shares of 35, 26, and 15 percent, respectively (Figure 2-22).
Note, however, that our estimate for industrial demand for oil products includes a rough estimate
104
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

of oil use in magnesite production, an estimate of oil use in cement that is a guess, at best, and aplaceholder value to account for what we estimate could be the rest of industrial oil demand.
Our estimate of the shares of refined products consumption accounted for by the various fueltypes varies in several ways from the estimates of production by product provided by Jang.286
The major difference is that our balance includes much more use of heavy oil. Figure 2-23
shows the pattern of estimated petroleum products demand as of 1996, which differs from the1990 pattern primarily in that military use of these fuels accounts for a much larger fraction(though somewhat less absolute demand) in 1996, with substantial decreases in the fraction of
petroleum products used by the residential, industrial, and non-energy sectors.
Figure 2-22: Share of Petroleum Products Demand by Sector, 1990

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM PROD.
DEMAND BY SECTOR: 1990

PUBLIC/COM
0%

NON-ENERGYNON5%SPECIFIED
5%

INDUSTRIAL
26%

MILITARY
15%

FISHERIES
3%
AGRICULT.
4%RESIDENTIAL

TRANSPORT
35%6%286 Jang, Young Sik (1994), North Korean Energy Economics. Korea Development Institute.

105
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 2-23: Share of Petroleum Products Demand by Sector, 1996

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM PROD.
DEMAND BY SECTOR: 1996

INDUSTRIAL
20%

TRANSPORT38%

NONENERGY3%
NONSPECIFIED0%MILITARY
30%

PUBLIC/COM
0%

RESIDENTIAL
4%AGRICULT.
4%FISHERIES
2%

Industries in DPRK in 1990 are estimated to have used 58 percent of all electricity available forfinal demand. The transport sector (electric rail) is estimated to have used 10 percent, residences
9 percent, the military 12 percent, and the public/commercial sector approximately 5 percent of
the electricity supplied to end-users (Figure 2-24). The pattern for 1996 is shown in Figure 2-25.
Figure 2-24: Share of Electricity Demand by Sector, 1990

Estimated DPRK ELECTRICITY DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 1990
PUBLIC/COM
5%
MILITARY12%
INDUSTRIAL58%

FISHERIES
0%AGRICULT.
2%
RESIDENTIAL
9%

TRANSPORT
10%106
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 2-25: Share of Electricity Demand by Sector, 1996

Estimated DPRK ELECTRICITY DEMANDBY SECTOR: 1996
TRANSPORT
10%RESIDENTIAL

INDUSTRIAL
47%

13%
AGRICULT.
2%FISHERIES0%MILITARY
15%

PUBLIC/COM
5%

Figure 2-26 shows the estimated 1990 DPRK Industrial energy demand by fuel and by
subsector. Coal was the dominant fuel in all subsectors except “Other Minerals”, where we haveincluded an estimate of petroleum products used for carbide production. The iron and steel
production subsector is the largest consumer of coal in our estimate (nearly half of sectoral use,
as shown in Figure 2-28), while iron and steel, fertilizers, other chemicals, and cement were
together responsible for approximately 67 percent of industrial sector electricity use (Figure2-30). The cement industry was another major consumer of fuels, accounting for an estimated
10 percent of industrial coal demand and 6 percent of industrial electricity demand in 1990. As
noted, non-specified industries—consumption in which is specified primarily by placeholder
values—accounted for a substantial fraction of fuel use in our 1990 estimate. We would hope toobtain better information to reduce this fraction. Figure 2-27, Figure 2-29, and Figure 2-31
present industrial sector results for 1996.

107
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 2-26: 1990 Industrial Demand by Subsector

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand by Subsector:
1990
Non-specified Industry

Coal

Building Materials

Petr. Prod.

TextilesWood

Other Minerals

Electricity

Other Metals
Pulp and Paper
Other Chemicals
Fertilizers
CementIron and Steel-

50,000100,000

150,000

200,000

250,000

300,000

350,000

Energy Demand (TJ)

Figure 2-27: 1996 Industrial Demand by Subsector

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand by Subsector:
1996
Non-specified Industry

Coal

Building Materials

Petr. Prod.

TextilesWood

Other Minerals

Electricity

Other Metals
Pulp and Paper
Other Chemicals
Fertilizers
CementIron and Steel-

20,00040,00060,00080,000100,000 120,000 140,000

Energy Demand (TJ)

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Figure 2-28: Shares of 1990 Industrial Coal Demand by Subsector

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 1990
Coal Use Fractions by Subsector
Other Minerals
0%
Other Metals
3%

Building
Materials
9%
Textiles4%

Non-specified
Industry
19%

Pulp and Paper
1%

Other Chemicals
2%
Fertilizers
4%

Iron and Steel48%
Cement10%

Figure 2-29: Shares of 1996 Industrial Coal Demand by Subsector

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 1996
Coal Use Fractions by Subsector

Textiles4%

Building
Materials
8%

Non-specified
Industry18%

Other Minerals
0%
Other Metals
3%
Pulp and Paper
1%
Other Chemicals
1%

Cement12%

Iron and Steel
50%

Fertilizers
3%109
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 2-30: Shares of 1990 Industrial Electricity Demand by Subsector

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 1990 Electricity
Use Fractions by Subsector
Non-specified
Industry
21%
Building
Materials
0%

Iron and Steel
25%
Cement6%

Textiles4%
Other Minerals
1%
Other Metals
6%
Pulp and Paper
Other
1%
Chemicals
9%

Fertilizers
27%

Figure 2-31: Shares of 1996 Industrial Electricity Demand by Subsector

DPRK Industrial Energy Demand: 1996
Electricity Use Fractions by Subsector
Non-specified
Industry
23%
Building
Materials
0%
Textiles3%
Other Minerals
1%

Iron and Steel
28%

Cement8%

Other Metals
6%
Pulp and Paper
1%

Fertilizers
21%

Other
Chemicals
9%

Transport sector energy demand as of 1990 was dominated by petroleum products used in theroad transport subsector, as shown in Figure 2-32. Again, the second greatest demand for fuelsin the sector, as of 1990, was in the rail transport sector. The rail transport subsector isestimated to have consumed approximately 10,900 TJ of electricity in 1990, and less than onefifth of that quantity of energy (1,950 TJ) in petroleum products (in this case, diesel oil). The air
and water transport subsectors each consumed about 3 percent of the total transport petroleum
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products used, though these values must be regarded, pending receipt of better information, as
order-of-magnitude estimates only (Figure 2-34). Similar qualitative patterns in subsectoral
consumption, but with much lower absolute levels of fuels use, are shown for 1996 (Figure 2-33
and Figure 2-35).
Figure 2-32: Transport Energy Demand by Subsector in 1990

DPRK Transport Energy Demand by Subsector: 1990
Non-Specified
Petr. Prod.

Air

Electricity
Wood

Water
Rail
Road

-

5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000

Terajoules (TJ)

Figure 2-33: Transport Energy Demand by Subsector in 1996

DPRK Transport Energy Demand by Subsector:
1996
Non-Specified

Petr. Prod.
Wood

Air

Electricity

Water
Rail
Road
-

5,000

10,00015,00020,000

Terajoules (TJ)

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Figure 2-34: 1990 Shares of Transport Petroleum Demand by Subsector

DPRK Transport Petroleum Demandby Subsector: 1990
NonSpecified
3%
Air
3%

Road
86%

Water
3%
Rail
5%

Figure 2-35: 1996 Shares of Transport Petroleum Demand by Subsector

DPRK Transport Petroleum
Demand by Subsector: 1996
NonSpecified
0%
Air
5%

Road
87%

Water
3%
Rail
5%

Demand in the Residential sector, as shown in Figure 2-36 and Figure 2-37 (for 1990 and 1996
respectively), was dominated by coal and wood/biomass fuels. The urban and rural split ofoverall coal use by the sector is nearly 70/30, while more than twice as much electricity is
estimated to have been used, in aggregate, in urban households than in rural households in 1990.
112
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKThis ratio is even larger in 1996. Wood fuel use in 1990 was, by assumption, limited to the rural
subsector, and amounts to approximately 6.6 (dry) tonnes of wood fuel use per household usingwood fuel per year, or an average of somewhat under 20 kg per day. Refined petroleum products(kerosene and LPG) and charcoal were assumed to be used for cooking in urban households,
with LPG and kerosene also used in a limited number (2 percent) of rural households. Use of
these fuels contributes less than two percent to total sectoral energy demand. Demand for"commercial" (petroleum, coal, and electric) fuels in the residential sector declined significantly,
in our estimate, between 1990 and 1996, while wood and biomass increased by about 25 percent
relative to 1990 levels.
Figure 2-36: Residential Energy Demand by Fuel and Subsector, 1990

DPRK Residential Energy Demand by Fuel andSubsector: 1990
Electricity

Urban
Rural

Heat
Charcoal
Wood
Ref. Prod.
Coal-

50,000100,000

150,000

200,000

Terajoules (TJ)

Figure 2-37: Residential Energy Demand by Fuel and Subsector, 1996

DPRK Residential Energy Demand by Fuel andSubsector: 1996
Electricity

Urban
Rural

Heat
Charcoal
Wood
Ref. Prod.
Coal-

50,000100,000

150,000

Terajoules (TJ)

113
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKIn the Agricultural sector, field operations and crop processing each contributed about half oftotal sectoral petroleum products demand in 1990, with a similar pattern in 1996. The use ofcoal is estimated to have totaled about twice the use of petroleum products in 1990, and overthree times as much in 1996, though the extent of coal use in crop processing is not known. In
terms of overall fuel use, agricultural wastes used in crop processing dominate, accounting over
72 and about 74 percent of total sectoral fuel demand in 1990 and 1996, respectively.
Our estimate is that energy demand in the Fisheries sector was fairly small, and quite uncertain.
Most of the demand that we estimate for this sector was for diesel use by larger fishing craft.
We have included a small amount of electricity use in the sector (520 TJ) in 1990, but thisamount is calculated using US-based (Alaskan) estimates of electricity consumption per unit
processing facility output, and thus could be significantly different in the DPRK.287 Fisheriesenergy use in 1996 is estimated to have been 36 percent of the level estimated for 1990.
For the Military sector, our estimate of fuel use is divided into groups within the ground forces
subsector: “trucks and other transport”, and “armaments”, including motorized guns andmissiles, tanks, and armored personnel carriers. The other military subsectors are the Air andNaval forces, “military manufacturing”, and “buildings and other”. These divisions, and theamount of each fuel type estimated to have been used by the different military subsectors in 1990
and 1996, are shown in Figure 2-38 and Figure 2-39. Total estimated sectoral demand for coaland electricity was dominated by use in military buildings (48 and 23 percent of total sectoralenergy demand, respectively in 1990); although these estimates are based on speculative
estimates of military building floor area that have yet to be confirmed.
Estimates of the shares of petroleum product use in various types of military equipment are
shown in Figure 2-40 and Figure 2-41 for 1990 and 1996, respectively. Notable results here
include the large share of demand accounted for by 2 1/2 tonne trucks in use in the DPRK Army.
When service vehicles from other service branches are included—and these were also likely to
be 2 1/2 tonne trucks, for the most part, in 1990—the share of estimated military oil use by thesetrucks climbs to 43 percent. Aircraft accounted for about 14 percent of military petroleum
demand in 1990, accounting for about the same fraction in 1996. Although aircraft use a great
deal of fuel per hour of flight, we have assumed that their use (especially use of fighter andbomber aircraft) is very limited, and this assumption limits oil demand in the Air Forcesubsector. Naval patrol craft also are estimated to have accounted for a significant share of
sectoral oil demand (27 percent in 1990), with tanks and other heavy armaments using a small
fraction of total fuel demand, as their use in routine exercises by the DPRK military is estimatedto be fairly limited (just 2 percent in 1990). Overall, in 1990, ground forces and naval forces
each consume about 42 percent of total military petroleum products, with air forces using theremainder.

287 by Greg Kelleher, Edward Kolbe, and Greg Wheeler (2001), Improving Energy Use and Productivity in West Coast andAlaskan Seafood Processing Plants, available as https://seafood.oregonstate.edu/sites/agscid7/files/snic/improving-energy-useand-productivity-in-west-coast-and-alaskan-seafood-processing-plants.pdf. Tables 1 and 2.

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Figure 2-38: 1990 Military Energy Demand by Fuel and Subsector

DPRK Military Energy Demand By Subsector: 1990
Buildings and Other
Military Manufacturing

Coal

Naval Forces

Petr. Prod.

Air Force

Electricity

Armaments
Trucks and other Transport-

5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000

Terajoules (TJ)

Figure 2-39: 1996 Military Energy Demand by Fuel and Subsector

DPRK Military Energy Demand By Subsector: 1996

Buildings and Other

Military Manufacturing

Coal

Naval Forces

Petr. Prod.

Air Force

Electricity

Armaments

Wood

Trucks and other Transport
-

5,000

10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000

Terajoules (TJ)

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 2-40: 1990 Military Petroleum Demand Shares

DPRK Military Sector Petroleum Product Demand by
Vehicle/Equipment Type: 1990

Tanks/Heavy Arms
2%

2 1/2 Ton Trucks
38%

Oth Trucks/Utility
2%Service (Land)
Veh.
2%
Fighters/Bombers
11%

Other Vessels
9%

Patrol Craft
31%

Transport/Helic.
2%
Service (Grnd)
Veh.
3%

Figure 2-41: 1996 Military Petroleum Demand Shares

DPRK Military Sector Petroleum Product Demand by
Vehicle/Equipment Type: 1996
Tanks/Heavy Arms
2%

2 1/2 Ton Trucks
41%

Oth Trucks/Utility
2%Service (Land)
Veh.
2%

Fighters/Bombers
9%

Other Vessels
11%

Patrol Craft
28%

Transport/Helic.
2%
Service (Grnd)
Veh.
3%

Our estimates of fuel demand in the Public/Commercial sectors are limited to coal, heat, andelectricity used in public and commercial buildings, at roughly 33, 2.6, and 11 PJ, respectively,
in 1990, and 26, 1.6, and 6.4 PJ in 1996, plus a small amount of use of refined products (about
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

0.10 and 0.13, in 1990 and 1996, respectively, or 0.3 and 0.5 percent of coal use) and wood forheating (1.6 PJ in 1990, and 2.6 PJ in 1996). We have included a relatively modest 5.8 PJ ofpetroleum products demand in the “Non-Specified/Other” sector to assist in balancing petroleum
product demand with reported supplies in 1990, but this value is set to zero for the 1996
estimate. In the Non-Energy Use category we have included coal and oil products used as
feedstocks in fertilizer production, other non-energy use of oil products (for example, as
lubricants or road construction materials), as well as wood used in construction, furniture
making, pulp for paper, and other non-fuel uses. These quantities were approximately 14, 5.8
and 12 PJ for coal, oil products, and wood, respectively, in 1990, and 3.4, 1.4, and 7.2 PJ,
respectively, in 1996.
2.5.5. Key uncertainties in 1990 and 1996 energy balances: Energy demand
There is no doubt that our estimated balances would benefit greatly from additional and better
information in many (if not all) of the areas we have covered. Notable among these areas where
additional information would be welcome are:••Industrial Sector--

Production of all fertilizers by compound, and specifically, production offertilizers other than nitrogen and phosphorous fertilizers. Also needed isinformation on how superphosphate is produced in DPRK.

--

Production figures and energy intensities for additional key metals and nonmetallic minerals produced in DPRK.

--

Confirmation that the iron and steel-making energy intensities we have used arereasonable (they are more likely to be too low than too high).

--

Information on the extent of heavy fuel oil use in the Cement industry, andinformation on other uses of petroleum products in the industrial sector.

--

Information on extent of the use of coal and other feedstocks for production ofother chemical products, including plastics and fibers other than vinalon.

--

Information on the use of biomass and wood fuels and waste products in the pulp
and paper manufacturing subsector.

Transport Sector--

Average figures for the haulage distance (or tonne-km) for freight carried by thevarious major transport modes--train, truck, and ship.

--

Use of personal transport in DPRK, in the aggregate as well as by mode.

--

Information on the number of vehicles in the DPRK bus, fleet, with their averageannual km traveled and fuel economy.

--

Average hours of flight time, and composition, of the DPRK airline fleet.

--

Information on the contribution of DPRK to international aviation bunkers (if
any).

--

Information on the extent, modes, and efficiency of biomass use in the DPRKtransport sector.
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

•

•

•

•

•

Residential Sector--

Confirmation that our estimates of household size are not vastly in error (though
they seem roughly consistent with figures from the 2008 DPRK Census).

--

Specific information on the average floor area and energy use (coal, electricity,
cooking fuels) in urban apartments (or confirmation that our estimates arereasonable).

--

Better information on the use of petroleum products in residential cooking.

--Confirmation that our assumption that rural fuel use in the DPRK is reasonable, orinformation that would allow us to calculate a better weighted average.

--

Average electricity use in rural households.

Agricultural Sector--

Confirmation that our assumption as to fuel use per hectare in production of field
crops is reasonable, or better figures, if available.

--

Information on energy used for irrigation pumping, including the fuel type (thatis, the relative ratios of diesel, gasoline, and electric pumps).

--

Information on the use of fuels in the processing of agricultural products.

--

Information on the use of fuels in producing orchard crops, including silk
manufacturing.288

Fisheries Sector--

Information on fuel used by the fishing fleet (larger ships), or at least informationon the days per year that they are active.

--

Information on energy use by fishing cooperatives (though this is probably
minimal compared with that used by large ships).

--

Data on the fuels (and amounts of fuels) used in processing fisheries products(and on the processing technologies/systems used).

Public/Commercial Sector--

Information on floor space in public/commercial buildings.

--

Better estimates for coal and electricity use per square meter in public andcommercial buildings.

--

Information on any significant petroleum product use in the sector.

Military Sector--

Improved information/estimates on the average annual exercise tempos (hours per
year in use) for military equipment, including tanks, trucks, light vehicles, planes,
and naval vessels.

288 Silkworms are fed on the leaves of mulberry trees.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•--

An estimate of what fraction of the DPRK's military hardware (by category) is
typically operable/operated.

--

A better-grounded estimate of military floor space.

--

Any additional information on energy use in military buildings.

--

Information on major uses of fuels in for special military technologies aside fromenergy use in weapons/vehicles or military buildings (though such data areadmittedly unlikely to be made available).

Non-Specified/Other Sectors--•

Information on major demand sectors that we may have omitted.

Non-Energy Use Sectors--

Information on non-energy uses of fuels other than the few we have cataloged,
particularly for products such as bitumen/asphalt.
2.5.6. Summary of key data gaps and uncertainties: DPRK energy supply in
1990•

In the Coal sector, a wide range of different production estimates exist for 1990. The
uncertainty (on our part) as to which estimate is more correct is compounded by uncertainty
as to which average energy content is appropriate for coal produced in the DPRK.

•In the Petroleum sector, the statistics used are probably fairly accurate--and almost certainly
not low--but should be confirmed if possible. Note that our initial estimate of demand for
petroleum products for 1990, at least, appears to come up somewhat short of estimatedpetroleum products production (thus the use of placeholder values, for example, in “nonspecified industry”—see section 2.5.4), thus it would be prudent to investigate whether the
supply of these products is overstated, whether we have underestimated demand, or both.

•In the Wood and Biomass production sector, the figures available seem to be quite
uncertain, but this lack of information is not unusual (even in countries where data access is
not difficult) when it comes to statistics describing the use of these fuels. The productionlevels that we have used appear plausible, but better statistics on wood production and use,
including a clear indication of the units of production (that is, solid or packed volumes, bonedry, air-dried, or green weights) would be helpful. Our estimate for biomass production ispredicated in part on total biomass use for fuel in the rural household subsector, which is avery uncertain estimate.
2.5.7. Summary of key data gaps: DPRK energy transformation in 1990

For electricity generation processes, the key need is for a substantiated, easily cross-checkedvalue for overall electricity production. Other needs are:•

A complete accounting of all grid connected power generation facilities (capacity, location,
dates of construction/updating, and availability for generation).

119
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•An accounting, by class (size, thermal/hydro), of power plants not connected to the grid andconnected only to local grids, including plants associated with industrial facilities (including
industrial cogeneration).

•

More complete information on district heating, from both heat-only plants and fromelectricity generation plants.

•

Updated values for plant efficiencies, own-use rates, and “emergency losses”.

•

Data showing the relationship between annual rainfall and hydroelectric generation (orpotential generation).

•

More complete information on the impacts of the 1995 and 1996 floods on majorhydroelectric plants and estimates of the work and time that were required to repair any
damage to hydro reservoirs and equipment.

•

Information on the status of fuel supplies to thermal power plants, including any shortages offuel (and the cause of those shortages).
For the Transmission and Distribution system, important uncertainties include:•

The locations and design voltages of the complete set of power lines on the DPRKtransmission grid.

•

The actual level of transmission and distribution losses (though it is quite possible that
accurate data on losses simply do not exist).

•

The current status, capacities, and vintages of individual substations and regional control
centers. This accounting of substations would include a description of the types oftransformers now in use in DPRK substations.289•

The kinds of conductors and poles are currently in use, and the status of the transmission
lines themselves (for example, have they been heavily damaged by scavengers?).

•

The extent to which the DPRK electric system currently operates as a unified grid, and theextent to which it operates as a set of semi-autonomous regional of local networks.
Uncertainties and additional data needs in other transformation sectors include:• In the petroleum refining sector, a better estimate of in-plant use of energy would be
helpful, as would an idea as to the generation and use of electricity in refineries. A betteridea of the output slate of refined products would be needed if the balance were to be
expanded to account for production and consumption of more individual petroleum products.

• Better figures on in-mine uses of coal and electricity for coal mining are needed.
•

Data on the types, capacities, and efficiencies of charcoal production facilities in DPRK are
currently lacking.

289

Older transformers in the US often contain large amounts of insulating oils known as PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls).
PCBs are quite toxic (to humans and other ecosystem elements) and should be disposed of with great care. If substations in the
DPRK are to be replaced in great quantity, and prove to contain PCBs, the disposal of PCBs may prove to be a significant health,occupational, and environmental concern.

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2.5.8. Key uncertainties in 1996 energy data
The assumptions that we have had to incorporate in our estimate of energy supply and demand in
the DPRK in 1996 are many. Hard facts about the recent energy situation in the DPRK havebeen for the most part unavailable. Although our bottom-up method using physical and sectorby-sector balancing can handle some of the key uncertainties by forcing an explicit, cross-cutting
consistency in the analysis, key uncertainties have been identified but not resolved in our
method. In this section we highlight some of our major uncertainties regarding changes in the
DPRK energy sector between 1990 and 1996.
•

Actual total generation in 1996: we have various estimates of total generation in recent years,
but do not know how much electricity was actually produced, or what fractions of the total havebeen from hydroelectric or thermal power plants.

•

Total generation capacity: We have seen several different figures for total generation capacity
in the DPRK, but do not have a definitive list of the plants that were reported to be gridconnected (including industrial cogeneration facilities), nor do we really know how muchcapacity was available or how much total generation had taken place in smaller plants not on themain DPRK grid.

•

The status of generation facilities in general: Although it seems clear that there was enoughcapacity nominally available to generate the electricity called for in our estimated 1996 supplydemand balance, we do not know for certain what condition the generating plants in the DPRK
were in, and so we do not know how much generating capacity was functionally available.

•

The status of large generation facilities now or recently under construction: We do notknow the status as of 1996 of several of the reported large thermal and hydroelectric plants that
had been reported to be under construction, although many of those projects, in hindsight,
appear not to have come to fruition. Also unknown is whether there was significant flood
damage, as of 1996, to the sites of new dams (for example, the Kumgang Mountain project).

•

The status of the Korean plants shared with/generating for China: Were the conditions
and/or capacity factors at these shared plants better or worse than the rest of grid as of 1996?

•

Status of the T&D system: To what extent was the T&D grid fully operational, at stasis,
deteriorating, deteriorated, or somewhere in between? The status of the grid is one of theelements determining how much power was consumed during 1996. Some sources held that it
would take an investment of $1 billion or more just to keep the system from getting worse,but others thought that the system was not getting any worse as of 1996 (though history
seems, based on the reports of most observers, to have proven them wrong, at least for theyears from 1996 on). Report as of 1996 indicated that power outages, at least in the
Pyongyang area, were relatively rare—in contrast to the 1992 to 1994 period when outages
were common, even in Pyongyang.

•

New transmission lines: How much progress (if any) had been made on constructing theplanned 300 kV and 500 kV transmission systems by 1996 is unknown, though it seems likely,
based on information obtained since 1996, that little progress had actually been made. The
status of these systems would affect the level of overall T&D losses, and on plans forconnecting the PWRs to be supplied by KEDO to the DPRK grid.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•

Damage to coal mines: We have assumed that sufficient coal mine capacity still existed toeasily serve the constricted DPRK economy of 1996, but we do not know what the extent offlood damage to mines and mining equipment was as of that time.

•

Status of fuel transport infrastructure: Were the fuel transport facilities (principally rail
facilities) still sufficiently operable to transport the quantities of coal and other fuels that we
estimated were used in 1996? Reserves of coal would not seem to be a problem, but lack oftransport facilities due to lack of diesel fuel and/or lack of steel rails to repair the tracks
and/or lack of electricity, for example, would have created problems in providing fuel toindustries and other users, which would have implications for both coal and electricity
demand.

•The constitution of HFO use in the industrial sector. We have assumed that most of theheavy fuel oil used in the industrial sector as of 1990 was consumed for magnesite
production and (to some degree) for cement production. We have been told that magnesite
production in 1996 was much less than in 1990, but we do not know with any precision how
much production has declined. If magnesite production had declined to less than the 300,000
tonnes that we have assumed for 1996, it means either that much more HFO was used toaugment coal in coal-fired power plants, as a co-fired fuel for cement manufacture, as an
emergency fuel additive in the transport sector,290 was used in some other way in the DPRK
economy, or was somehow exported.291 It is likely that HFO was used in other industrial
subsectors as well, though the DPRK pattern seems to have been to use coal as a fuel andfeedstock even in industries (such as production of synthetic fiber) where virtually every
other installation in the world uses a different (that is, oil-based) feedstock to produce similarcommodities.

•

The role of “unofficial” petroleum products imports. We have tried to learn as much as
possible about how oil and oil products were coming into the DPRK as of 1996, but
uncertainties remain. How much oil crosses the Chinese and Russian borders to enter the
DPRK in tanker trucks, train cars, coastal freighters, and individual barrels? Does the outputof the small refinery in China that we understand has historically shipped oil products to the
DPRK vary substantially from year to year?292 Does the DPRK get a representative share of
the output of that refinery, or are the products that the DPRK receives weighted toward thelighter fractions (of which the DPRK is and was more in need)? Definitive answers to thesequestions could alter our 1996 oil products balance somewhat but would probably haverelatively little impact on the pattern of HFO supply and demand.

•

Biomass-fueled trucks. Biomass or coal-fueled trucks in the DRPK certainly wererelatively common in the period around and after World War II. Some of the people we havetalked to swear that trucks fueled with producer gas generated in on-board gasifiers(“biomass trucks”) predominated for goods transport outside Pyongyang, and we have seen290

We have been told that in recent years, HFO has been used, by some technical means not at all clear to us, as a fuel for trucks
and other internal-combustion-engine transportation equipment. The extent of this use of HFO is not known, but we assume thatit has been minimal relative to other uses of heavy fuel oil.
291 Export markets for HFO accessible to the DPRK may have been limited, given a general glut of heavy fuel oil on the Asianmarket relative to other petroleum products as of the late 1990s.
292 Our conversations with those who keep a finger on the pulse of the Chinese oil industry suggest that refinery capacity factors
could vary from 50 to 80 percent depending on each refinery’s allotment of crude oil input for the year (D. Fridley, personalcommunication, 1996).

122
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKpictures of such vehicles. Others who have extensive experience in the DPRK profess tohave seen them not at all or rarely. If biomass trucks (like the one shown in Figure 2-42)
were, contrary to our assumption, in relatively common use, it would indicate somewhat lesstight supply of motor fuels in 1996. If, on the other hand, biomass trucks carry less than the
7.6 percent of road freight we have assumed, the estimated availability of gasoline (anddiesel) for other uses would decrease somewhat.
Figure 2-42: Photo of DPRK Truck Powered by a Coal (and/or biomass) Gasifier293

293 Peter Hayes, Jim Williams, and Chris Greacen, “Fuel and Famine: North Korea's Rural Energy Crisis”.

Presentation for the
Energy and Resources Group Seminar, University of California, Berkeley, California, USA. November 1, 2000.

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3.

Estimated 2000, 2005, 2008 through 2010, 2014 through 2020
Supply/Demand Energy Balances
3.1.

Overall Approach

Building on our work in compiling estimated energy balances for 1990 and 1996, ouroverall approach to preparing DPRK energy supply-demand balances for the years 2000, 2005,
2008 through 2010, and 2014 through 2020 included:•Starting with the estimates of demand and supply prepared as above for 1990 and 1996.

•

Modification of the 1990/96 estimates (and, for 2005 and on, year 2000 estimates) of demand
for fuels to reflect reports of recent changes in conditions in the DPRK. These included
changes in population, data (mostly from customs statistics of the DPRK’s trading partners)on the availability of oil products and imports of energy-using products (such as vehicles andgenerators) and energy supply sources (such as solar photovoltaic panels) changes in the
DPRK transport system observed by journalists and other visitors (ourselves included), andreported or implied reductions in industrial, agricultural and fisheries output. Reports as tothe availability of electricity in different parts of the country also played a role in theestimation of year 2000 and 2005 (and more recent) electricity demand.

•

Revision of our 1996 estimates of electricity supply to meet 2000-on electricity demand andto reflect information about changes, by each balance year, in thermal and hydroelectric
generating capacity (and its availability).

•

Estimation of 2000 through 2020 oil supply in a way that reflects available information,
including the capacities, product slates, and utilization of the oil refineries in the DPRK, andquantities of refined products reported to be imported during those years (including producttrades recorded in official statistics and products reportedly imported "unofficially").

•

Revision of oil products demand as initially estimated to meet the overall supply for each of
the major classes of oil products (heavy fuel oil, diesel oil, gasoline, kerosene, and
LPG/other).

•Setting the level of coal and biomass supply to meet demand and re-adjusting supply of otherfuels as necessary to produce a rough balance in overall supply and demand.

Overall, our approach to preparing the year 2000-on energy balances, in keeping with the paucity
of information available (both inside and outside the DPRK) about the DPRK in general andabout its energy sector in particular, was to obtain all the information remotely germane to the
problem, sift through the information to see which pieces made sense, and fit with other data,
and to try and use what was available to prepare an internally consistent energy balance. In sodoing we collected information from reports by others, media reports, official statistics of DPRK
trading partners, information on the DPRK from ROK government agencies, and the reports ofvisitors to and observers of the DPRK. In updating our 1990/96 energy balance to 2000 andbeyond, we contacted specialists in DPRK (and broader Northeast Asian) energy issues andeconomics, including those who visit the country, to obtain their data, thoughts, and observations
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKon recent developments the DPRK. Except where explicitly cited in the notes presented in
Attachment 1 or in this chapter, these sources have chosen to remain confidential. Much of theanalysis described here for the year 2000 energy balances was carried out for the 2002/2003
version of our energy sector analysis, and much of the analysis for the years prior to 2010 dates
to our 2012 energy balances work but results for 2010 and before have been updated for thisversion of this Report to make it consistent with information and insights received since.
To further update energy balances to the year 2005, we took advantage of the invaluable input
provided by the participants in the June 2006 DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting,held in East Palo Alto, CA, USA, in collaboration with (and co-hosted by) Stanford University’s
Preventive Defense Project.294 In addition, as in our earlier (2002/2003) work, we reviewed
available literature and news reports, and contacted experts in the field to augment the
information at hand. Much of the analysis described for the 2005 energy balances was carriedout for the 2007 version of our energy sector analysis but has also been updated to reflect more
recent information.
To produce updated estimated energy balances for 2008 and 2009, we similarly reviewed
literature and news reports available to us, reviewed customs and other statistics (including the2008 DPRK Census), consulted with experts including in the context of DPRK Energy Experts
Working Group meetings in Beijing in 2008 and 2010.295
For the years 2010 and 2014 through 2020, we have used the same approach of gathering all
available data and literature—ranging from published articles and news reports to UNSC
documents and trade data—and reviewing it for insights as to economic activity and/or energy
use in the DPRK. In addition to conversations with experts on DPRK energy use, we benefited
from several meetings with technical delegations from the DPRK in the context of meetings on
various Nautilus projects, most recently the Regional Energy Security project of which thisreport is a part, as well as a brief trip to the DPRK, as a part of our Building Energy Efficiency
Training project, in 2009.296
The key assumptions and data used in preparing our estimated supply and demand balances forelectricity and other fuels are presented below by sector (for demand) and by fuel group (forsupply). Note that more detailed assumptions for electricity supply and demand estimates inparticular can be found in Chapter 5 to this Report. In each case, details of the data, calculations,assumptions, and sources used are presented in Attachments 1 and 2 to this report.
3.2.

Summary of Key Changes in the DPRK Energy Sector between 1996 and2000

Changes in the DPRK energy sector between 1996 and 2000 were, for the most part, of a
substantially more incremental nature than the changes in experienced during the first half of the
294 Please see https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/ for information on and materials from thismeeting.
295 See https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2008-meeting/ and https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprkenergy/2010-meeting/ for information and materials from these meetings. The 2010 meeting also included a session on theminerals sector in the DPRK.
296 For additional information on these projects, see, for example, “DPRK Building Energy Efficiency Training (2008 – 2011)”
at https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-buildings/, and the description of the 2010 East Asia Science and Security
workshop, at https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/science-security/workshops/2010-east-asia-science-and-security-meeting/.
Information on the Regional Energy Security Project (2018 – 2020) will be forthcoming on the www.Nautilus.org website.

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1990s (and described in Chapter 2 of this Report). Individual changes are discussed below(section 3.7). Among the key changes (or continuing processes) for the DPRK energy sector
between 1996 and 2000 were:•

A continuing decline in the supply of crude oil from China, significantly reducing theoverall output of the DPRK's remaining operating (Northwest Coast) refinery.

•Continuing degradation of electricity generation infrastructure due to lack of spare parts,
maintenance not performed, or use of aggressive (high sulfur) fuels such as high-sulfur heavy
fuel oil and used tires in boilers designed for low-sulfur coal.

•Continuing degradation of electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure,
resulting in much reduced availability of electricity in most parts of the country away from
Pyongyang. Figure 3-1, Figure 3-2, and Figure 3-3 present views of the lights of Northeast
Asia from space as of 2000, 2010, and 2016, respectively, which suggest that significant
amounts of electricity were available in the DPRK only in highly limited areas.297•

Continuing degradation of industrial facilities (including eyewitness reports of industrial
facilities being dismantled for scrap), and the damage to industrial electric motors from poor
quality electricity (electricity with highly variable voltage and frequency).

•

Some imports of used motor vehicles (which are more efficient than existing vehicles madein North Korea).

•

A continued decline in the production of cement and steel.

•

Evidence of significant international trade in magnesite (or magnesia).

•

Some increase in military activity, relative to 1996.

•

Continuing difficulties with transport of all goods, especially coal.

•

Difficulties in coal production related to lack of electricity, as well as mine flooding (in the
Anju region).

•

Some economic revival, but mostly, it seems, associated with foreign aid and/or with areasof the economy that are not energy intensive.

297 These images should not, however, be used to infer specific changes in the DPRK between years, in part because the 2016

image was taken using a different satellite than the other images and may have been processed differently as well. The time ofyear during which the photo was taken may have an impact as well. In addition, when looking at “night lights” images of the
DPRK in general, it is important to bear in mind that in some areas DPRK authorities have worked to limit the visibility of nighttime lighting for security purposes, so the absence of light does not necessarily correlate directly with the absence of electricity
supplies.

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Figure 3-1: Korean Peninsula and Surrounding Area from Space, 2000298

298 Generated from U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2012) National Geophysical Data

Center website “DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Global Composites (Version 4)”, using “stable lights average” image series. The
image presented here has been enhanced by Nautilus from the originally downloaded image by a process of adjusting brightness,
sharpening, and “colorizing” the overall image.

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Figure 3-2: Korean Peninsula and Surrounding Area from Space, 2010299

299 Generated from the same NOAA (2012) set of images referenced in the previous footnote, but with a “stable lights average”

image for the year 2010 instead of the year 2000. Although it may be tempting to do so, readers are cautioned not to draw firm
conclusions about changes in electricity use in the DPRK in the decade of the 2000s by comparing these two images. Although
we have used the same procedure for enhancing both images, the original NOAA images have not yet been calibrated to assurethat the same points of light yield the same intensity in images from different years (NOAA staff, personal communication,
February 2012). Even with this consideration, however, it is clear that the growth between 2000 and 2010 in electricity use (asindicated by the extent of city lights) in China, and to a somewhat lesser extent in the ROK, has not been shared by the DPRK.

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Figure 3-3: Korean Peninsula and Surrounding Area from Space, 2016300

300 Extracted from global NASA image available ashttps://svs.gsfc.nasa.gov/vis/a030000/a030800/a030876/BlackMarble_2016_global_7km.png.

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3.3.

Summary of Key Changes in the DPRK Energy Sector between 2000 and
2005

The period between 2000 and 2005 was one in which the DPRK government put in placeelements of economic change, including policies encouraging some forms of private markets andprivate production, at least on a small scale, and some price and wage reforms. For the energy
sector, the government encouraged the development of small and medium-sized local power
plants, particularly hydroelectric plants. Though most changes to the energy system in the
DPRK seemed to be incremental, as in 1996 to 2000, most observers noted at least a modest
improvement in the availability of energy services between 2000 and 2005, though these
improvements are by no means uniformly distributed over the country. Individual changes are
discussed in section 3.7, below. Among the key changes (or continuing processes) for the energy
sector between 2000 and 2005 were:•Some economic revival, but mostly, it seems, associated with foreign aid (especially fromthe ROK) and/or with areas of the economy that are not energy intensive (the developing of aflourishing restaurant trade in Pyongyang is an example of the latter that has been notable tovisitors). Small markets in which individuals sell food and household items have become
more numerous and visible. Gauging the overall economy, the (ROK) Bank of Korea
reported a net gain in GDP in the DPRK of about 8 percent from 2000 through 2004, though
the methods used for making this estimate were not transparent.301 Chinese estimates also
showed growth in the DPRK economy during the period, but slightly lower than that
estimated by the Bank of Korea. Chinese estimates reported 0.5 to 1 percent per year GDP
growth from 2000 through 2004, with 2 percent growth in 2005.

•

The substantial breakdown of the country’s central distribution system, accompanied,according to anecdotal reports, with changes in employment and pricing of basic foodstuffs
such that workers were often obliged to have jobs, at least nominally, in both the official (thatis, in state-run factories or other government workplaces) and the private sectors to survive.

•

Significantly expanded exports of coal and other raw mineral products (largely iron andsteel scrap and metals ores) to China, with reported coal exports to China reaching 2.8
million tonnes in 2005.302 This is one manifestation of a recent increase in investment in the
DPRK by Chinese businesses, particularly in the raw materials sectors, but also, to somedegree, in manufacturing.303 In general, DPRK imports from China showed a trend of

301 William B. Brown, “Energy and Economy in North Korea”, presentation prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working

Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA, and available from https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprkenergy/2006-meeting/papers-and-presentations/; see also William B. Brown (2006), Changes in the North Korean Economy andImplications for the Energy Sector: Is North Korea Really Short of Energy?, available as https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnetspecial-reports/changes-in-the-north-korean-economy-and-implications-for-the-energy-sector-is-north-korea-really-short-ofenergy/.
302 N. Aden, “North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and
Implications”, as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA,
USA). Dr. Aden's paper is available as http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/0679Aden1.pdf.
303 Issues related to Chinese investment in the DPRK, and changes in DPRK policies that have made investment possible, areaddressed in the Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online 06-70A, August 23rd, 2006, DPRK's Reform and Sino-DPRK Economic
Cooperation, by Li Dunqiu (https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/dprks-reform-and-sino-dprk-economiccooperation/). See also Professor Li’s presentation as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June
26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA, and available as from https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006meeting/papers-and-presentations/.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKbecoming more energy-intensive, and exports to China showed a trend of becoming morelabor-intensive.
•Continued overcutting and ecological degradation of biomass fuel supply with reduction infuel availability and related erosion, as coal remained hard to obtain, and wood and otherforms of biomass continued to be heavily used for cooking and heating, especially in rural
areas.

•For agriculture, there was some land re-zoning to larger plots to encourage more efficient
production, and new natural-flow irrigation waterways have been constructed to replacesome of the need for electric irrigation pumps. Some new wind-powered water pumps,
probably for local drinking water, have been introduced in the Western DPRK.
Mechanization in agriculture remained low, however.

•In the transport sector, the DPRK imported thousands of automobiles and trucks, andtens of thousands of bicycles, from China in the years 2000 through 2005.

•

Cessation of KEDO heavy fuel oil deliveries in 2002.

•

Continued problems with production in the coal sector, including with electricity supply
to provide basic needs such as air supply, lighting, and pumping of water out of mines.
There was some localized investment in coal mines by Chinese firms.

•

Discussions and agreements by the DPRK regarding oil and gas exploration, including
with the Chinese government, the Russian Gazprom, and at least one Western company.

•

Supply of modest amounts, by the end of 2005, of electricity to the Kaesong industrial areafrom the ROK.

•Electricity imports from China (also modest in scale).

•

Construction of smaller, mostly hydroelectric power plants (many of which, particularly
those of sub-megawatt capacity, were possibly not connected to the main grid).
3.4.

Summary of Key Changes in the DPRK Energy Sector from 2005 through2009

The years 2006 through 2009 included some periods of marginally improved relations between
the DPRK and the international community, as exemplified by agreements at the Six-Party
Talks, but the period ended with relations between the Koreas and between the DPRK and theinternational community on a downward trajectory. Six-Party Talks agreements in February andOctober of 2007, a meeting between the leaders of the DPRK and the ROK, also in October of
2007, and the transfer of heavy fuel oil and materials and equipment to help rebuild energy
infrastructure to the DPRK as a part of the Six-Party Talks agreements were highlights of theperiod. By the end of 2009, however, the Six-Party Talks were all but abandoned, the DPRK
had conducted a second test of a nuclear explosive device, and had test-launched a rocket,
bearing what it said was a communications satellite, on a trajectory over Japan,304 and prospects
304 See, for example, Arms Control Association (2011) “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy”,

available as http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.

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for additional near-term energy sector assistance from the international community looked bleak.
Insofar as we can determine, changes in the DPRK energy sector through 2009 were modest, atbest, with overall energy supply and demand conditions for the country changing relatively little
over the period. A few of the notable occurrences and trends affecting the energy sector andbroader economy in the DPRK from 2005 through 2009 include the following:•

Reduced production of cereals from 2005 through 2007, followed by a better crop in
2008, with another, but more modest, decline in production in 2009.305•

Deliveries of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK in 2007 and 2008 as part of the Six-Party Talks
agreements reached during the period, with deliveries ceasing in late 2008 due todisagreements between the Parties.

•

Continued increases, in most years, in exports of minerals and coal to China.

•

Continued, relatively stable exports to the DPRK from China of crude oil and oil
products, with some additional oil products sourced from other nations. In general,
however, supplies of oil products are sufficiently constrained that relatively modest yearto-year differences in supply can have magnified impacts on some categories oftransportation fuel use (as we estimate to have occurred in 2009—see below).

•

Additional flooding in many years of the period (particularly 2007) and more recently,
including severe flooding in the Northern part of the DPRK and other areas in 2010 and2011 (see Figure 3-2).

•

Continued efforts to construct new hydroelectric facilities, focusing, it appears, on
medium-sized facilities (in the range of tens to a hundred or so megawatts of capacity ineach of several installations), but with continued stated commitment to developing
smaller hydroelectric plants (though with unknown total impact).

•

Continued slow degradation of electricity sector infrastructure, particularly electricity
transmission and distribution infrastructure.

•

Increased electricity imports from the Republic of Korea for use in the joint
ROK/DPRK Kaesong industrial area located just north of the border between the twonations.

•

In recent years, greatly expanded use of mobile phones in the DPRK, with a network
in at least the Pyongyang area developed by the Egyptian company Orascom. Thischange probably had relatively little impact on overall energy use in the DPRK (though
one could surmise that Orascom was probably obliged to install diesel generators toprovide back-up electricity supplies for its network) but may be a harbinger of substantialchange in the way information flows in the DPRK.306

305 See, for example, FAO/GIEWS Global Watch (2008), “Severe Food Shortage in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”,

dated 25 March 2008, and available as http://www.fao.org/3/AX998E/AX998E.pdf; and FAO/GIEWS (2010) Special Report:
FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, dated
16 November 2010, and available as http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al968e/al968e00.htm.
306 See, for example, Alexandre Y. Mansourov. North Korea on the Cusp of Digital Transformation, Nautilus Institute NAPSnet
Special Report, dated November 1, 2011, and available as http://nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/DPRK_Digital_Transformation.pdf; and Peter Hayes, Scott Bruce and Dyana Mardon, NAPSnet Policy
Forum 11-38: “North Korea’s Digital Transformation: Implications for North Korea Policy”, dated November 8, 2011, and132
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Figure 3-4: Flooding in Wonsan, DPRK in 2011307

3.5.

Summary of Key Changes in the DPRK Energy Sector from 2010 through2019

During the decade from 2010 to 2019, despite continued on-and-off negotiations resulting inlittle net change in relations between the DPRK with the international community, as well as amajor leadership change as Kim Jong Il was succeeded, after his death, by his son and now
DPRK Chairman, Kim Jong Un, a number of years, particularly in the middle of the decade,showed growth in the DPRK economy and modernization in some sectors and some geographic
areas, most notably around Pyongyang. Continued missile (many since early 2016) and nuclear
testing (four between 2013 and 2017308) by the DPRK kept the attention of the international
community, but although the decade ended with a series of three meetings between United States
President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim, breakthroughs in engagement were notforthcoming. Some of the key general attributes of the 2010s through about 2016 (see section
3.7 for additional details) included:•

Rapidly increasing (through 2016) exports of coal to China, with over 22 million tonnesof exports reported in 2016. A significant portion of these exports reportedly came frommines where investment by Chinese companies in joint venture arrangements with DPRK

available as http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/north-koreas-digital-transformation-implications-for-north-koreapolicy/.
307 Photo originally labeled “File Photo: AP”, from M. Weingartner (2011), “CIA Assesses Flooding in DPRK”, CanKor, dated 3
April 2011, available as http://vtncankor.wordpress.com/2011/04/03/cia-assesses-flooding-in-dprk/.
308 See, for example, Nuclear Threat Initiative (2020), “North Korea: Overview”, last updated October 2020, and available ashttps://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/.

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organizations had modernized and expanded production. These coal exports generated
over a billion dollars’ worth of revenue annually for the DPRK in 2011 through 2016,
despite rapidly declining coal prices after 2014.309•

Increasing imports, almost exclusively from China, of a range of goods in the transport
sector, including cars, trucks, and motorcycles, at least through 2016, and to a lesser
extent, 2017.

•

Increasing imports of some small appliances, most notably TVs and DVD players.

•

A rapid rise in the use of cellular phones in the DPRK.

•In the middle years of the decade, a rapid increase in the imports of electric scooters
and/or bicycles, in quantities on the order of a hundred thousand in some years, indicating
investments in personal mobility by households.

•

Increasing imports of diesel and gasoline-powered generators.

•

Increasing imports of solar photovoltaic panels and batteries for use with PV systems,
which were put into wide use by households and small businesses to provide nighttime
lighting and power/charging for small devices.

•

Increasing activity in markets not covered by the central distribution system.

•

Substantial growth in the DPRK textile finishing industry, where garment parts fabricatedin China were imported, finished by DPRK workers, and exported again to China. In
some years, this trade was between $500 and $800 million in exports from the DPRK,
although factoring in the cost of the garment parts, DPRK net revenues were closer to$100 to 150 million annually.

•

Significant reported remittances to the DPRK from DPRK citizens, and sometimes
officials, working in various capacities abroad, from ranging from manual labor gangs in
the Russian Far East providing construction and timber harvesting labor to operating
Korean restaurants in South Asia.

•

Modification of the Pongwha Chemical Company to produce more light products,
particularly gasoline, from each barrel of crude oil imported from China.

•

Completion of several medium-sized (megawatts- to tens-of-megawatts scale)hydroelectric power generation facilities, although some plants subsequently had
operational problems related, apparently, to rushed construction and/or materials (such asconcrete) of inadequate quality.

•

Many construction projects, mainly but not exclusively within Pyongyang, have been
noted by visitors, along with at least anecdotal reports of increased vehicle traffic.

Starting in 2016 and continuing through 2017, United Nations Security Council sanctions on the
DPRK came into effect, with several impacts and results (both intended and unintended) on the
DPRK economy from at least 2017, and ongoing as of this writing (late 2020):
309 Based on UN Comtrade statistics, the DPRK received an average of over $100 dollars per tonne for its coal exports to China

during 2011 and 2012, but prices began to fall thereafter, to just over $50 per tonne by 2016, before climbing to over $80 per
tonne in 2017, which export volumes (at least as reported) were constrained by UNSC sanctions.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•Official oil products imports from Russia and (especially) China, declined markedly,
although a number of authors, including the UNSC “Panel of Experts” tasked with
monitoring sanctions on the DPRK, reported the rise of a shadowy network of maritime
traders and substantial “off-books” trades (smuggled oil), primarily from China andRussia.

•Similarly, official coal exports from the DPRK declined substantially after 2016, becauseof UNSC sanctions, but the decline was reportedly at least partially made up for by offbooks coal trades, again mostly through means such as ships discharging their cargoes atplaces other than their stated destinations, ships turning off their transponders during
voyages, and pairs of ships transferring coal cargoes in the open ocean.

•

Official statistics show a marked reduction in all kinds of trade from China to the DPRK
in 2017 and 2018, going beyond oil products, coal, and metals, all of which are included
in UNSC sanctions, to vehicles, appliances, and other commodities. It is unclear to what
extent these reductions are actual reductions in trade volume, or whether some trading
has shifted “off-books”.

•

Crude oil imports to the DPRK from China, via a pipeline across the Yalu River from the
Chinese city of Dandong to the DPRK’s refinery in Sinuiju (the Ponghwa Chemical
Factory) appears to have been steady since 2016, and possibly slightly increased.

•

DPRK labor abroad seems to have been reduced, in large part due to UNSC sanctions.

•

Construction, at least in the Pyongyang area, as well as in some other areas (for example,
the completion of a tourist area on the coast near Wonsan) seems to have continued, atleast through early 2020.

•

Some continued construction of hydroelectric power plants has been announced, albeit
generally with few details around timing or capacity.
3.6.

The Impact of COVID-19 on the DPRK Energy Sector in 2020

Officially, the DPRK has reported no cases of coronavirus during the current global pandemic,
with the exception of one individual with a suspected case who allegedly crossed the border fromthe ROK.310 311 This report, however, appears at odds with DPRK requests for corona-virus
related supplies from Medecins Sans Frontieres, UNICEF, the WHO, and others, as well asreported quarantines of foreigners and DPRK citizens, and the use of facemasks in the DPRK bymost residents pictured in recent photos (with the exception of Chairman Kim Jong Un). Reports
by observers outside the DPRK, including those receiving intelligence briefings, include
descriptions of hundreds of covid-19 deaths among soldiers, a one-month military “lockdown”,

310 South China Morning Post (Agence France-Presse), 2020, “North Korea insists it has no coronavirus cases, thanks to shutting

borders, containment”, dated 3 April, 2020, available as https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3078226/north-koreainsists-it-has-no-coronavirus-cases-thanks-shutting. Later articles report that despite testing programs, the DPRK is stillreporting no active COVID-19 cases. See, for example, United Press International (UPI, 2020), “WHO: North Korea says all
COVID-19 test results 'negative'”, UPI, dated October 1, 2020, and available as https://www.upi.com/Top_News/WorldNews/2020/10/01/WHO-North-Korea-says-all-COVID-19-test-results-negative/8711601558666/.
311 Gabriela Bernal (2020), “North Korea Steps up Its War on COVID-19: As North Korea doubles down on COVID-19
containment measures, local sources report several outbreaks.”, The Diplomate, dated August 06, 2020, and available ashttps://thediplomat.com/2020/08/north-korea-steps-up-its-war-on-covid-19/.

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quarantines of thousands within and outside of the military, and other evidence of significant
changes in life in the DPRK in 2020.
Whatever the actual covid-19 situation is in the DPRK, it is clear that the DPRK’s response to
the pandemic has changed the way that the country operates its economy, including its energy
sector. Worldwide, national and local “lock-downs” and “stay-at-home” orders have resulted invast reductions in energy demand, particularly for transportation, in part causing, among otherimpacts, a vast drop in oil prices, and rapidly filling oil and gas storage depots. The DPRK’senergy supply situation is unlike that of other countries, particularly for oil products, due to
UNSC sanctions and resulting restrictions on its oil imports. This requires the DPRK to use“unofficial” means to obtain oil supplies and export coal, strategies that are likely more difficult
to carry out during the pandemic, due to the need for cooperation by outside trading partners.
The coronavirus pandemic has thus undoubtedly affected DPRK energy supply and demand.
Probably the effect has been significant, as it has in other nations, but since the DPRK provides
no energy statistics, and what international energy statistics there are for trade with the DPRK
are unlikely to be available for 2020 for some months (and will likely show little trade anyway,
due to UNSC sanctions), determining the net impact of the pandemic is a matter for analysis andestimation. Because of the lack of information coming out of the DPRK, and because some of
the year 2020 lies ahead as of this writing, the estimates of DPRK energy supply and demand for2020 presented below in the context of our overall results through 2020 are necessarily guided
by a set of assumptions how the covid-19 situation is changing the DPRK economy. Below we
present, first, our assumptions, based on reports, about how the DPRK is responding to thecoronavirus pandemic, and second, a candidate “scenario” for how the pandemic has affected the
DPRK economy in 2020, and how those impacts will have played out over the course of theyear.
3.6.1. Assumed DPRK Responses to Coronavirus Pandemic
As noted above, official reports of the coronavirus situation in the DPRK are few and somewhat
contradictory. Reports by those outside the DPRK, anecdotal and otherwise, therefore form theinformation base on which our analysis of energy supply and demand in the DPRK in 2020 must
be built. Some of the reported changes in the DPRK that have (or would reasonably be expected
to have) affected energy supply and demand in the DPRK include:• Quarantines of thousands of individuals, including a recent (April 28) report that the
DPRK has extended its “COVID-19 National Emergency” through the end of the year,
including a strengthening of quarantine procedures.312• A one-month military “lockdown” in February and March.
• Curtailing of border crossing and travel between the DPRK and China, apparently since
January 26, 2020.313 More recent news reports suggest that these restrictions willcontinue for some months.314

312 Hyemin Son, Leejin Jun, and Eugene Whong (2020), “North Korea Extends COVID-19 National Emergency to End of Year”,

Radio Free Asia, dated 2020-04-28, and available as https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/national-emergency04282020184222.html?utm_source=AM+Nukes+Roundup&utm_campaign=ba43f31c3aEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_07_25_12_19_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_547ee518ec-ba43f31c3a391728633.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK• “[W]idespread stories of inflation and the hoarding of critical goods. Many schools havebeen closed [apparently, from at least February 20 through April 15, based on Asia Times
reporting], social gatherings have been limited, and much tourism is suspended.”315• Announcement of construction of a new, modern hospital in Pyongyang.
• Shutdown of most air, rail, road, and ship travel into and out of the country• A “huge economic loss” reported by DPRK state media.316• An increase in the “price of gas”, presumably gasoline.
• Issues with industrial output due to lack of inputs and spare parts from China, affecting
the mining sector as well.317• A crackdown on cross-border smuggling.318• A demonstrable idling of the DPRK’s maritime fleet, including many of the ships thathave been implicated in unofficial trade in coal and oil products, starting with a recall of
ships on January 22.319 The New York Times summary of the situation as of late Marchconcluded “The long-term disruptions to North Korea’s revenue stream remain unclear,partly because the duration of the pandemic and its impact on maritime commerce are
not yet known. But analysts said it was reasonable to assume damage has been done toNorth Korean agriculture, industry and the overall economy.”
3.6.2. A Scenario for Drivers of 2020 Energy Supply and Demand in the DPRKWith the above as inputs, we posit the following scenario for DPRK energy supply and demand
for the year 2020. We use this scenario to estimate an energy supply-demand balance for the
DPRK for 2020, with the starting point our supply-demand analyses for 2018 and 2019. The
scenario has the following elements:

Gabriela Bernal (2020), “North Korea’s silent struggle against Covid-19: Sources inside report via smuggled cellphones that
official and unofficial measures have been surprisingly effective”, Asia Times, dated March 31, 2020, available ashttps://asiatimes.com/2020/03/north-koreas-silent-struggle-against-covid-19/.
314 Radio Free Asia (2020), ibid.
315 Mitchell Lerner (2020), “History Shows North Korea Will Respond to the Coronavirus by Lashing Out: Will the patternrepeat?”, National Interest, April 1, 2020, available as https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/history-shows-north-koreawill-respond-coronavirus-lashing-out-139732.
316
Chad O'Carroll (2020), “COVID-19 in North Korea: an overview of the current situation: Pyongyang officially claims no
infections within its territory, and has taken strict steps to stave off an outbreak”, dated March 26, 2020, available ashttps://www.nknews.org/pro/covid-19-in-north-korea-an-overview-of-the-current-situation/?t=1585236870435.
317 Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein (2020), “The North Korean Economy: Coronavirus Measures Causing Economic Anxiety”, 38
North, dated March 27, 2020, available as https://www.38north.org/2020/03/bkatzeffsilberstein032720/.
318 See, for example, Bernal (2020), ibid, and NKPro (2020), “Coronavirus in North Korea: COVID-19 Tracker”, updated
September 9, 2020, and available as https://www.nknews.org/pro/coronavirus-in-north-korea-tracker/facts/.
319 See Christoph Koettl (2020), “Coronavirus Is Idling North Korean Ships, Achieving what Sanctions Did Not”, New YorkTimes, dated March 26, 2020, available as https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/26/video/coronavirus-north-korea.html, which also
quotes Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) Project Sandstone (2020), “Rickety Anchor: North Korea Calls its Illicit Shipping
Fleet Home amid Coronavirus Fears”, dated 26 March 2020, and available as https://rusi.org/commentary/rickety-anchor-northkorea-calls-its-illicit-shipping-fleet-home-amid-coronavirus-fears.
313

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1. The DPRK government will continue coronavirus protection measures, including social
isolation strategies and interruption of most trade, through December 2020, and would
thus be in place for nearly the entire year. This is consistent with the most recent reports
above. It is possible that measures could have been relaxed partially in some sectors orfor some geographical areas. There might, for example, have been of necessity arelaxation of movement (if not border) restrictions at harvest (particularly rice harvest)time, in order to get more hands into the field, but restrictions might have re-started after
harvest, particularly if more infections were found (if not reported internationally). At
any rate, we would argue that even if relaxation of isolation measures starts (or started) inlate 2020, there would be a period of perhaps two months during which the economy
transitions to activities at close to 2018/2019 levels, and as a result annual average energy
supply and demand wouldn’t be much different than if the isolation strategies were inplace for the entire year (our baseline assumption).
2. An assumption that the isolation of the DPRK, in terms of closed border crossings,
minimal or no cross-border plane, train, or road traffic, and idled maritime fleet, will
follow the timing above, with a resulting decrease in international transportation, and a
related decrease in transportation within the country. Some flow of goods from China
has (and will have) continued to cross the borders, albeit with restrictive inspection andquarantine procedures, but the flow of goods will have been much slower than normal.
We assume that increased military vigilance along the border has resulted in reduced
successful smuggling of goods, although the economic incentive for (and thus possibly
attempts at) smuggling will likely have increased.
3. The military “lockdown” is assumed to have been slowly lifted starting in June of 2020,in part due to a need to underscore an appearance of readiness, but even with some
limited military exercises and maneuvers taking place, military activities will not havereached 2018/2019 levels by the end of the year, as military barracks are likely asignificant breeding ground for the virus, and authorities will have been sensitive tocurtailing outbreaks. Military manufacturing is assumed to have continued on a limited
basis to provide spare parts for key equipment.
4. Industrial energy demand will have fallen and remained much lower than recent levels
through the duration of the protection measures in 2020, both because of lack of fuel andof imports of spare parts from China, as well as lack of markets abroad (mostly China).
The lack of fuel for diesel generators will have also played a role in reduced industrial
energy use. Some industries, including, for example, food products, may have continued
at near-normal levels of output, particularly if they use mostly domestic fuels, but manyother industries will show significantly diminished output, particularly those, such as
garment manufacture, relying on inputs from China.
5. Residential access to oil products will decline somewhat, although oil use by the sector is
not large to begin with. Residential electricity use will likely increase modestly, as
generation is mostly based on domestic resources (coal, hydro, and solar), and more
electricity may be made available to residences if industries and other big users are notoperating as normal. If sufficient coal was available, it is possible that residential coaluse for heating will rise somewhat due to residents staying at home more, but it is likelythat most residential heating use is supply-limited anyway.
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6. Agricultural inputs (fertilizer and diesel oil, in particular) will have been in short supply,
thanks to border restrictions (and UNSC sanctions), probably adversely affecting the2020 harvest, and certainly decreasing fuel use, although the fertilizer industry is likely tohave kept going with domestic energy inputs to the extent that it could. It is likely thatmilitary units will have been heavily mobilized to help with harvests in the fall, althoughperhaps less participation of labor from urban dwellers will occur during harvests than insome past years as authorities seek to avoid allowing disease transmission corridors
between urban (probably particularly Pyongyang) and rural areas, and vice versa, asmuch as possible.
7. Fishing diesel use will also likely have declined, though one would expect fishing activity
to be less affected than other sectors because it is likely to be less affected by quarantinesand provides a vital protein source for North Koreans. It is, however, likely affected bydiesel fuel supplies, which may have been reduced due to UNSC sanctions (despite offbooks trade).
8. Public, commercial, and institutional energy demand for all fuels will have fallen
significantly for the duration of the DPRK’s main covid-19 measures, as shops andrestaurants, as well as schools, and other public buildings are closed or operate on
restricted hours. Activities at informal markets will have fallen due to both movement
restrictions and restrictions on volumes of incoming goods from China.
9. There will have been little or no increase in the stock of energy-using or generationequipment during 2020, including, for example, vehicles, diesel generators, solar panels,
or new industrial equipment, due to border restrictions.
10. The idling of the maritime fleet and limited road and rail traffic will have resulted in a
virtual cessation of DPRK oil imports and coal exports, although some off-books tradesin particular will likely have continued.
11. Coal mining will likely have continued as an essential industry, although total volumes
will have decreased because of lack of coal export channels (due to border restrictions
and UNSC sanctions). As much of DPRK coal extraction involves underground mining,it seems possible that mining could be significantly affected by an outbreak of covid-19
among miners, who work in enclosed spaces with recycled air (and often inadequate
safety equipment).
12. The major exception to the above is crude oil imports via pipeline from China, which areassumed to have continued at recent rates, and as a result oil refining, at least at therefinery at Sinuiju, will also continue its operations at recent rates—that is, to the extent
that the crude oil volumes supplied by China allowed.
13. We assume that the DPRK economy will be able to “ramp-up” to 2018/2019 levels fairly
quickly once covid-19 restrictions are lifted. We assume this because of the level ofsocial control in the society, the large influence of state enterprises, and the survival
incentives that the population will face after months of isolation, which will provide a
powerful push for those still able in body to work to restart, in particular, the informal
economy. In addition, we assume that the DPRK’s trading partners in (mostly) China
will be able and willing to re-engage on cross-border trade when the opportunity presents
itself. These assumptions, however, will be off the table if, as is entirely possible (and139
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has been the sad experience of many other countries worldwide), the lifting of restrictions
results in rapid re-infection of a population that is already challenged by underlying heathissues (including, for example, malnutrition, tuberculosis, and the respiratory effects ofindoor and local air pollution), and may have limited “herd immunity” due to being
largely isolated from people in other nations. The implications of the potential impactsof secondary and tertiary infections of covid-19 on the DPRK will be a topic forinvestigation in follow-on work, but could include, for example, renewed and even more
stringent restrictions on movement and commerce within the DPRK, and strict bordercontrols applied by the DPRK’s major trading partners, China and Russia, as well as theinternational community.
14. We assume that ultimately the major impact on health of the covid-19 pandemic in the
DPRK is likely to be not so much the number of people killed or sickened by the virus,
which we assume will have been limited by the state-enforced isolation and othermeasures, but malnutrition due to limited food imports, limited agricultural inputs, andloss of jobs in the informal sector. It is even possible, perhaps likely, that the national
lockdown actually will have reduced the incidence of diseases such as flu andtuberculosis, as well as the health impacts of outdoor air pollution as some factories,
many of which are located within or close to cities, were shut down or reduced theiroperations.

3.7.

Key Input Parameters, Sources, Assumptions and Methods Used in
Estimating Energy Supply-Demand Balances for 2000, 2005, 2008 through2010, and 2014 through 2020

Key parameters, sources, assumptions, and methods drawn upon in preparing the estimated
DPRK energy supply-demand balances for selected years from 2000 through 2020 are discussed
below for key energy demand sectors, fuel supply resources, and energy transformation
processes. The specific parameters used, a printout of the intermediate and final results of thecalculations in which they were used, and additional notes and references to data sources can befound in Attachment 1 to this Report.
3.7.1. Industrial sector activity
In the industrial sector, we assumed that year 2000 industrial output was 18 percent of 1990
levels in all subsectors except cement (30 percent), and fertilizers (7.5 percent).320 The building
320 WWW.koreascope.com, in "Production of Major Industrial Items and World Ranking" (visited 6/3/02), listed the ROK

production of steel in 1999 as 41 million tonnes. In "Economic and Social Comparison between the Two Koreas", on the same
WWW site, the ROK's steel production was listed as being 33 times that of the DPRK, implying an annual production of about
1.24 million tonnes. This figure, about 25 percent of 1990 production levels, seems plausible (though possibly high). A figurethat is probably from the same ultimate source, the Korea Iron & Steel Association, suggests a value of 1.086 million tonnes in
2000, along with 1.208 million tonnes in 1996, and 1.168 million tonnes in 2005. It is unclear how these figures were derived.
Based on consideration of existing estimates, observations of the overall DPRK economy, we adopt the estimate of 1.08 million
tonnes in 2000. The www.koreascope.com source (which is no longer available), in the "Economic and Social…" page, listed a
DPRK cement production of 4.1 million tonnes, or about 41 percent of year 1990 production, in 1999, which seems plausible.
Data that are probably from the same ultimate source, the Korean National Statistical Office and the Korea Cement Industrial
Association, suggest that year 2000 cement output was 4.6 million tonnes, and output in 1996 was 3.79 million tonnes. It is
unclear how these numbers were derived, and though one would expect the cement industry to decline somewhat less than otherindustries, as it is/was not largely an export industry, the observed lack of recent construction activity in the DPRK would suggest

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materials and "other minerals" sectors were assumed to have the same relative output as the
cement sector.321 We assumed, based on reports (and our own observations) of eroding
industrial facilities, plus the probable impact of poor coal, oil, and electricity on industrial
machinery, that the average energy intensity of industrial production was 115 percent of 1990
levels, up from our assumed 110 percent of 1990 levels in 1996. For 2005, we assumed that ironand steel production in the DPRK continued to decline (to 0.87 million tonnes, or 14.5 percent of
its 1990 level), cement production increased slightly (with the overall increase in economic
activity) to 32 percent of 1990 levels, fertilizer output increased slightly from 2000 (to 11 percent
of 1990 levels).322 Activity in 2005 in the building materials, pulp and paper, and otherchemicals subsectors are assumed to be only modestly changed from 2000 levels, with textiles
output up slightly, but output is assumed to have increased substantially in the other metals andother minerals sectors,323 due in part to output destined for export to China. As a result of
closing of some inefficient plants, improved capacity factors in some industries, and someinvestment in industrial infrastructure, particularly by Chinese firms,324 the overall averageenergy efficiency of DPRK industrial plants is assumed to have increased slightly between 2000
and 2005, with energy intensities averaging 112 percent of 1990 levels. For 2008 we assumed
that iron and steel production remained at 2005 levels, though more of the iron and steel
produced was probably exported, but that output rose to the 1.2-1.3 million tonnes per year level(about 20 percent of 1990 levels) through 2014, varied between 1.1 and 1.2 million tonnes
annually between 2015 and 2017, then falling somewhat in 2018 and 2019 to 17 percent of 1990
that the level of 1996 to 2000 increase that the latter source shows is not what one would expect. We assume cement output of
3.3 million tonnes in 2000, and
WWW.nis.go.kr/english/democratic/industry07.html, dated 2001, by the ROK National Intelligence Service, suggests that current
supplies of fertilizer cover only 40 percent of fertilizer needs in the DPRK. Causes and Lessons of the "North Korean Food
Crisis", by Tony Boys of Ibaraki Christian University Junior College (2000), lists total fertilizer supply in the DPRK in 1999 of
200 ktonnes of "NPK", of which 32% was produced domestically, 10% imported, and the remainder provided in aid. This would
imply that about 11% of 1990 levels of fertilizer production were achieved in 1999. As an alternative source, the presentation"Agriculture and Fertilizer Situation in DPR Korea", by R.V. Misra, previously available as
http://www.fertilizer.org/ifa/publicat/PDF/2006_crossroads_misra_slides.pdf (from the International Fertilizer Industry
Association), presented as part of the "IFA Crossroads ASIA-PACIFIC 2006 Conference 'Growing markets, nurturing success'",
Chiangmai, Thailand, 13-16 November 2006, suggests that 1999 production of fertilizer in the DPRK was 63 thousand tonnes (ofnitrogen), which is roughly consistent with the level suggested in the article by Tony Boys that is quoted above. Assuming thisfigure is correct, we adopt Misra's 2000 fertilizer production figure of 37.5 thousand tonnes of nitrogen.
321 With the exception of "Other Minerals" and "Building Materials", we assume that the level of activity in other industries
relative to 1990 in the year 2000 is approximately the same as in the iron and steel sector. The building materials and otherminerals subsectors are assumed to have activities relative to 1990 similar to the cement industry. The other minerals subsector
includes magnesite (or, when processed like lime for cement, magnesia), which is a valuable export product. An industry source
indicates that an 8000 tonne shipment of magnesia (although it may have been magnesite) arrived in Europe in early 2001.
Japan imported $3.5 million worth of magnesia in the first half of 2000 (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency data fromhttp://www.kotra.or.kr/main/common_bbs, visited 6/3/02, "Trade Tendencies of the Major Countries"), which, if annualized andassuming a sales price of $US 100 to $200 per tonne (within the range suggested in Queensland Department of Minerals andEnergy Mineral Information Leaflet No 5: MAGNESITE, dated January 1998, suggests exports of 35 to 70 thousand tonnes toJapan alone, which in turn suggests relatively active production of the mineral. On our trip to the DPRK in October of 2000 wesaw working brick or tile production facilities, some of the very few active industrial facilities we saw during our time in the
DPRK.
322 Based on data in 2006 presentation by R.V. Misra—see reference above.
323 Estimates for these sectors based in part on data provided by Dr. Chung Woo-jin, in his presentation entitled "Mineral
Resources in DPRK", as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto,
CA, USA), and available from https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/papers-and-presentations/.
Additional details of how Dr. Chung’s data were interpreted for this analysis are available in Attachment 1 to this Report.
324 See, for example, Professor Li Dunqiu’s presentation entitled "DPRK’s Reform & Sino-DPRK Economic Cooperation”, asprepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA), and available
from https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/papers-and-presentations/.

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levels.325 In 2020, we assume iron and steel output will have been about 14.5 percent of 1990
output, or about 0.9 million tonnes, as a result of border closings limited trade and of industrial
plant closings related to COVID-19. Cement production is estimated to have risen to 40 percent
of 1990 levels in 2008 and further to 56 percent in 2009 and 61 percent of 1990 levels in 2015
before falling to 58 percent (6.4 million tonnes) in 2018 and 2019, and 46 percent in 2020.326 By
way of comparison, reported DPRK cement imports (mostly from China) in 2010 through 2018
have averaged about 180,000 tonnes per year, or only a few percent of estimated domestic
production. the but was assumed to fall slightly in 2009, possibly due to decreased electricity
availability. Based on estimates from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and World
Food Program, fertilizer output was assumed to fall to 10.9 and 7.2 percent of 1990 levels in2008 and 2009, respectively, before rising to the 21-24 percent of 1990 levels range in 20142016, then falling again to 16 percent of 1990 levels in 2017, 9 percent in 2018 and 2019, and
4.5 percent, as a result of COVID-19 restrictions on manufacturing, in 2020.327 Activities in the
Other Metals and Non-Metallic Minerals subsectors were assumed, again based on increasing
exports to China, to be somewhat higher in 2008 and 2009 than in 2005, before falling gradually
through 2019, with output further reduced in 2020 (to 35 and 37 percent of 1990 levels,
respectively) due to the impacts of COVID-19 isolation measures on trade and manufacturing.
Output in the Other Chemicals, Pulp and Paper, Textiles, and Building Materials subsectors wereassumed to decline slightly by 2009, relative to 2005, remaining at relatively low levels through2019, with much lower output in 2020. Energy use in “non-specified industries” was estimatedto have followed a similar pattern. We assumed that, because of a combination of continued
decommissioning of older, inefficient facilities, plus some investment in new or refurbishedfacilities, particularly by Chinese firms producing materials for export, that the relative energy
intensity per unit of product fell slightly between 2005 and 2008/2009, to 110 percent of 1990
levels, remaining at roughly that level through 2020 for most industries. Major exceptions to thisassumption are the energy intensities in the iron and steel and cement industries, which through a
combination of plant upgrades (including with investment funds from Chinese firms) andretirement of older plants improved to an average intensity around 100 percent of 1990 levels.
Even at that improved level of efficiency, however, DPRK heavy industries in general still offer
a significant additional opportunity for energy efficiency improvements (see the analysis in
section 4.5 of this Report, for example).

325 Quoting the Bank of Korea, the Website "Trading Economics" (https://tradingeconomics.com/north-korea/steel-production)

provides figures for DPRK steel production for the years 2009 – 2017. In all probability, these figures are rough estimates, but
we use them as figures of merit to scale energy use in the DPRK iron and steel industry. Figures for 2018 were not available
from this source as of 2/2020, although a recent OECD document, again quoting the Bank of Korea, shows an estimate for 2018steel output that is considerably lower than that for 2017 (Vincent Koen and Jinwoan Beom, NORTH KOREA: THE LAST
TRANSITION ECONOMY?, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Economics Department
Working Papers No.1607, dated 12 May, 2020, and available as
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP%282020%2915&docLanguage=En).
326 Trends in DPRK cement output from 2009-on are adapted from the Website "Trading Economics"(https://tradingeconomics.com/north-korea/cement-production), which quotes the Bank of Korea. As with iron and steel
production, in all probability these figures are rough estimates, but we use them as figures of merit to scale energy use in the
cement subsector.
327 Late 2000s figures for fertilizer output derived from data in UN Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Program(2010), Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
dated 16 November 2010, and available as http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al968e/al968e00.pdf. Estimates are derived from data
in Table 2 of that document. See section 5.3.3.1 and Figure 5-33 for additional details on assumptions regarding fertilizer
production in the DPRK.

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3.7.2. Transport sector activity
We assumed that the amount of freight to be transported by road would scale roughly with theamount of activity in most industrial sectors, and thus be about 14 percent of 1990 levels by
2000, increasing to about 23 percent in 2005 (due to somewhat increased industrial production,
increased trade with China, and some increase in freight related to food aid). Road freight in2008 was assumed to be slightly higher, at just under 24 percent of 1990 levels, in 2008, but
lower in 2009 (18 percent of 1990 levels) due primarily to a reduction in the availability of motor
fuels. Road freight is assumed to have climbed again to over 25 percent of 1990 levels by 2016
but fallen with the onset of UNSC sanctions to under 22 percent by 2019, then to 16 percent of1990 levels in 2020 due to COVID-related measures. We assume that biomass (gasifier) trucks
accounted for somewhat less than 10 percent of road freight in 2000 through 2016 (which issomewhat higher than in 1996), rising back to 10 percent in 2017 due to fuel supply restrictions
in some areas, but that the share of freight carried by diesel trucks, including recently imported
vehicles, increased to about 35 percent in 2000 and 70 percent in 2005, before decreasing to 4755 percent in 2008 through 2020 due to the estimated relative availability of diesel fuel andgasoline (gasoline trucks carry the remainder of road freight). The pattern of truck imports to the
DPRK from China is shown in Figure 3-5, with larger diesel trucks dominating imports
particularly from 2010 through 2016.
Figure 3-5: Truck Imports to the DPRK from China, 2000 through 2018
Reported Truck Imports from China to DPRK, 2000 - 2018 (number)
9,000
8,000
7,000

Dump Trucks
Diesel, 5 tonnes or lessDiesel, between 5 and 20 tonnes

6,000

Diesel, over 20 tonnes

5,000

Spark Ignition, 5 tonnes or less

4,000

Spark Ignition, over 5 tonnes

3,000
2,000
1,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

"Civilian" auto transport is assumed to be decreased by 27 percent from 1996 levels in 2000,
then have increased to 75 percent of 1990 levels by 2005, to 111 percent of 1990 levels by 2008,
and to over 150 percent of 1990 levels by 2016, consistent with the increased in imports ofprivate autos in recent years, before falling slightly through 2019 due to somewhat reduced fuel143
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availability due to sanctions), and more steeply in 2020 as a result of COVID-19 restrictions.
Figure 3-6 shows the trends in passenger vehicle imports to the DPRK from China since 2000,
with a large increase in small and medium-sized vehicles between, especially, 2009 and 2013.
To put these figures in context, however, the sum of auto imports to the DPRK from 2000
through 2018 is still less than 30,000 vehicles, or slightly more than one per thousand DPRK
citizens. By way of comparison, Chinese passenger vehicle sales have been on the order of 200
million over the past decade alone, or about 140 vehicles per thousand people,328 underscoring
the relative rarity of passenger car use in the DPRK.
Figure 3-6: Passenger Vehicle Imports to the DPRK from China, 2000 through 2018
Reported Passenger Vehicle Imports from China to DPRK, 2000 - 2018 (number)
4,500
Specialty vehicles (snowmobiles, golf carts, etc)

4,000

Spark ignition, <1000 cc
Spark ignition, 1000 to 1500 cc

3,500
3,000

Spark ignition, 1500 to 3000 cc
Spark ignition, > 3000 cc
Diesel, < 1500 cc
Diesel, 1500 to 2500 cc
Diesel, > 2500 cc

2,500

Gasoline Non-plug-in Hybrids
Diesel Non-plug-in Hybrids

2,000Electric Vehicles
Other Vehicles

1,500
1,000
500
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Other mechanized passenger road transport and rail transport is also assumed to have been lower
in 2000 than in 1996, increasing somewhat for most conveyances in 2005 and on, with the use ofdiesel and gasoline buses (measured in passenger-km) decreasing in 2009 due to reduced fuelavailability, but increasing thereafter (about 11,000 buses capable of carrying more than 10
passengers were reported to be imported by the DPRK from China since 2000, most of themsince 2010) but the use of electric rail passenger transport increasing somewhat (to on the orderof 40 percent of 1990 levels) after a decline due to limited electricity availability in 2009.
Diesel rail freight is assumed to be 30 percent of 1990 levels in 2000, and electric rail freightdecreased to 33 percent of 1990 levels by 2000 because of lack of availability of electricity.
Diesel rail freight activity is assumed to have increased slightly by 2005, but to decrease again in
328 See, for example, Statista (2020), “Car sales (passenger and commercial vehicles) in China from 2009 to 2019”, available ashttps://www.statista.com/statistics/233743/vehicle-sales-in-china/.

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2008 and 2009, with improvement in electric rail allowing an increase in transport of goods bythat mode to 36 percent of 1990 levels by 2009, rising to 40 percent by 2016, but declining
slightly thereafter.
Air travel is slightly decreased relative to 1996 by 2000 but assumed to have returned to 1996
levels by 2005 and 2008, decreasing again somewhat (back to 79 percent of 1990 levels) in 2009,
but remaining at 80 to 95 percent of 1990 levels through 2019 before falling dramatically, to justover 50 percent of 1990 levels, in 2020 due to COVID-19 restrictions.
One area of DPRK transport that showed a large jump in the last decade is the use of inexpensive
personal transport, notably electric bicycles and scooters (see Figure 5-41 and section 5.3.5), butalso continued imports from China of large numbers of bicycles, on the order of a million ofthem between 2010 and 2018 alone, underscoring the degree to which DPRK citizens are taking
the provision of energy services—in this case transport, into their own hands (see Figure 3-7).329
Figure 3-7: Bicycle Imports to the DPRK from China, 2000 through 2018

Bicycle Imports from China to DPRK, 2000 - 2018 (number)
300,000
250,000

Bicycles

200,000

150,000
100,000
50,0002000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

In general, no specific data were available for the transport sector for 2000 through 2020, so
estimates of the parameters in the text above are rough figures based on the experiences of
Nautilus staff and others in the DPRK. Visitors to the DPRK generally noted a modest increasein the use of small "private" cars and mini-vans in the years before 2000, but mainly in the
Pyongyang area—thus we have assumed a small overall decrease in this activity, consistent with
329 Note that this figure (derived by the authors, as with Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6, from UN Comtrade data), does not include thepurchases of bicycles made in the DPRK. For example, North Korean Economy Watch (2018), in “Pyongyang Bike Share”,
dated March 28th, 2018, and available as https://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/transportation/bicycles/, reported on a bikeshare program in the DPRK using bicycles made by a joint DPRK/Chinese joint venture “called the Phyongjin Bicycle
Cooperative Company”.

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constricted availability of fuel, between 1996 and 2000, but an increase thereafter through at
least 2016. The use of other vehicles, however, seems to have stayed the same or decreasedslightly between 1996 and 2000, thus the slight decrease in vehicle use by 2000 relative to 1990.
Since 2000, and particularly from 2010 through at least 2017 (after which trade reports from
China, at least as reflected in UN Comtrade statistics, appear to become sporadic), imports ofvehicles from China have increased, and visitors have noted more vehicles on the road, thoughagain, mostly in the Pyongyang area. The efficiency of trucks and buses and “private” vehicles
was assumed to have improved somewhat between 1996 and 2019—on the order of 15 percent—with efficiency gains through the introduction of imported vehicles more than offsetting any
continuing problems with the availability of spare parts and other maintenance supplies forexisting vehicles. We saw many disabled trucks along the road in areas not far from Pyongyang
during our visit in 2000—it is possible that the growth of imports of trucks in the 2010s allowed
some of those older vehicles to be retired.
3.7.3. Parameters of residential energy use in 2000-2009
Based on the population growth rate for 1990 to 2000 that we assumed, as described in Chapter
2, was just above zero for the decade, we estimate that the year 2000 population in the DPRK
was roughly 22.2 million, and that 60.4 percent of the population could be classified as"urban".330 From the year 2000 through 2008, with some reservations, we assumed that the
DPRK population increased at an average rate of 1.02 percent annually, and that a small net
rural-to-urban migration continued, with the national fraction of urban households rising to 60.8
percent of the total by 2008.331 Our reservations about using these population projections are as
follows. The growth rate shown is calibrated to yield the 2008 total population reported in thelandmark 2008 DPRK Census (D P R Korea 2008 Population Census National Report332)
prepared under United Nations supervision. This document was welcomed as the first systematic
census to be carried out on the DPRK in many years and is generally accepted by demographers
as a useful picture of life in the DPRK, especially as no demonstrably superior estimate isavailable. Some researchers, however, have expressed doubts, privately and in some cases
publicly, as to whether the 2008 population of the DPRK was likely, in fact, to be as high as the
24.05 million reported in the Census document. Inconsistencies have been noted between thesize and age composition of the population reported in the 2008 Census and what had been
known or imputed about population trends since 1990 in the DPRK. As of yet, however, neither
we nor any other public documents we have seen have offered a definitive alternative estimate of2008 population, so we adopt it for the estimated described here. We remain wary, however, ofthe fact that the 2008 population estimate that we are using could be overstated, perhaps by asmuch as 20 percent. From 2008 to 2010 we use an annual population growth rate of 0.536

330

By way of comparison, the USDOE Energy Information Administration listed a year 2000 population of 21.7 million in its
North Korea Country Analysis Brief (at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nkorea.html, as of 5/2002).
331 Though some observers of the DPRK report a significant urban to rural migration, others suggest that the migration is largely
seasonal with urban dwellers going to rural areas during the agricultural season and returning to cities at other times of the year.
Depending on how “urban” is defined in allocating the DPRK’s population, the fraction of the population living in urban areas
may be close to 65 percent, though observers suggest that in recent years there has been a “ruralization” of urban life, with many
nominally urban dwellers making their living (or much of it) from farming or raising livestock.
332 D P R Korea 2008 Population Census National Report, Central Bureau of Statistics, Pyongyang, DPR Korea, 2009, available
as https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/wphc/North_Korea/Final%20national%20census%20report.pdf.

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percent, decreasing slightly to 0.5 percent for 2010 through 2014, and to 0.39 percent from 2014
through 2020.333
To estimate trends in the number of households in the DPRK, we started at our 1990 averagevalues (4.65 persons per household in both the rural and urban sectors) and interpolated between
those values and 2008 values as reported in the 2008 Census, yielding estimates of just under andjust over 3.9 persons per household in the urban and rural sectors in 2009, respectively. Thismeans that the number of DPRK households (from which “population not in households”,
meaning mostly those in the military, were excluded) grew faster than the rate of population
growth through 2008. We assumed that the average sized of DPRK households continued to
decline through 2020, with urban and rural households, respectively, averaging about 3.4 and 3.5
persons per household in 2020, and 61.3 percent of DPRK citizens living in urban areas.
Figure 3-8: Estimated DPRK Households, 1990 through 2020

Estimated DPRK Households, 1990 - 2020
5.00

Million Households

4.50
4.00

3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00

Urban

1.50

Rural

1.00
0.50

-

Also included in the 2008 Census are data on the fraction of households using different fuels forcooking and heating, though not, unfortunately, data on the amount of those fuels used perhousehold. Where possible, we used those data in the estimates prepared below. Again, the333

The 2008 Census document (ibid) lists total births in the 12 months prior to the census as 345,630 (Table 16), and total deathsin the same period as 216,616. These figures imply a rate of population increase as of 2008 of 0.536% annually. A compilationof DPRK statistics by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), previously available as
http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/statistics/tags/dprkorea, estimates population growth at a slightly lower 0.50%
annually as of 2014. We use this value as the estimated growth rate for population between 2010 and 2014. Population data fromthe United Nations (downloaded 1/28/2020 from https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/) for the years
2014 through 2020 imply average population growth from 2014 through 2020 of 0.39% annually, which we take as the growthrate from 2014 through 2020.

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reader is urged to consult Attachment 1 for further details and sources used for developing the
inputs described below.
We assumed that the fractions of residences using coal in urban and rural settings were about 77
and 33 percent of 1990 levels, respectively, by 2000 (both having decreased somewhat further
from 1996 estimates), with urban coal use continuing to fall in subsequent years, due mostly tolimited availability, to about 65 percent of 1990 levels by 2009, and increasing slightly thereafter
through 2020 as coal mining output improved. The fraction of rural households using coalfalling to just under 19 percent by 2008, remaining at that level in 2009, but increasing to 32
percent by 2018. At the same time, we assumed a modest continued decline in the amount ofcoal used per household, to starting at 65 percent of 1990 levels in the urban sector in 2000 anddecreasing to 50 percent by 2009 but increasing again to 63 percent of 1990 levels by 2018. In
the rural household sector, per-household usage was set at 50 percent of 1990 levels in 2000,
declining to 45 percent in 2005 and remaining at that level through 2009 before rising to 58
percent by 2018. The fractions of households using of wood/biomass fuels was assumed to haveincreased in both the urban and rural sectors, rising from 10 percent in 1996 in the urban
subsector to nearly 28 percent in 2008/2009 (based on 2008 Census figures), declining slowly to
20 percent of households by 2018. In the rural sector, use of wood/biomass fuels was assumed
to have risen from 60 percent of households in 1996 to over 79 percent in 2008/2009, falling to66 percent of 1990. Average wood/biomass use per household, however, was assumed to decline
slowly over time, from 80 percent of 1990 values in 2000 to 65 percent in 2008/2009 and around
52 percent of 1990 levels by 2018 for both the urban and rural sectors, due to a combination ofincreasing scarcity of fuel, more households in competition for fuel resources, and (relatedly)
less use of heating and cooking, as well as some increase in coal availability in the 2010s.
The use of charcoal was assumed to have decreased since 1996, to 55 percent of 1990 levels in2000 and 45 percent of 1990 levels in 2008 and 2009, rising only slightly thereafter. The
fraction of households using oil products for cooking was assumed to have decreased, due to low
availability of fuel, from 13 percent of urban households and 1.5 percent of rural households in1996 to about 7 percent of urban households and less than 1 percent of rural households in
2008/2009. These values are assumed to have risen slightly, to over 9 percent in urbanhouseholds and about 1.5 percent in rural households, by 2018 through 2020, as a result of
improved fuel ability and possibly more disposable income in the households that could afford
the convenience of LPG or kerosene stoves—that is, in households that were among the“winners” in the shift (at least in effect) to a more market-oriented DPRK economy. Perhousehold urban and rural use of oil products was assumed to have increased, in part due to use
of kerosene as a substitute lighting fuel, through 2008, falling slightly (with reduced availabilityof petroleum fuels) in 2009, but thereafter remaining in the range of 70 to 80 percent of 1990
levels through 2020.
The use of electricity in residences is assumed to have been severely curtailed (by availability)
relative to 1990, but improved somewhat between 2000 and 2008, declining somewhat again in
2009. Visitors to the DPRK in 2000 described electricity in Pyongyang as having been generally
available, but electricity in at least major portions of other cities being largely unavailable.
Based on Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) data334 that listed the
population of Pyongyang as 3.4 million, and assuming, based roughly on a record of electrical
334 Formerly available from http://www.kotra.or.kr/main/info/nk/eng/main.php3, visited 6/3/02.

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outlet voltage collected in Pyongyang and covering most of 2000, that Pyongyang suffered fromblackouts for about 20 percent of 2000, and further assuming that residents of cities other than
Pyongyang had power only 14 percent of the time, we estimate that the average consumption of
power per household in 2000 was about 29 percent of that in 1990 in urban areas. Nautilus
Institute's rural energy survey in the village of Unhari, on the West Coast of the DPRK,335
suggested an annual average usage of 390 kWh per household per year, fairly close to the 1990
value estimated as described earlier in this report. During our mission to Unhari in 2000, we
determined that householders virtually never had electric power available in their homes during
the day, especially in the winter months. As Unhari is relatively close to Pyongyang, it is our
expectation that the situation there is likely, if anything, to be better than that in many other rural
areas. We therefore assume that the lack of availability of power limited rural residents to 12
percent of 1990 levels of electricity consumption in the year 2000. Since 2000, visitors’
observations of electricity supplies in the DPRK have varied dramatically depending on where
and, to some extent, when the observations occurred. In some cities, particularly Pyongyang andareas near the Pukchang power station (the largest plant in the DPRK), close to round-the-clock
supplies were reported, while only sporadic availability was reported for other areas. Overall,the electricity supply situation seems to have improved, at least marginally, since 2000 throughabout 2008, and our estimates of per-household usage reflect that improvement. Anecdotal
evidence in late 2011/early 2012 suggested that electricity supplies were once again on thedownswing, as evidenced by reports of more extensive and longer-duration blackouts, even in
the Pyongyang area.336 We assume that per-household electricity use fell in 2009 through 2014,
remaining at about 26 to 28 percent of 1990 levels in urban areas, and about 7 percent in rural
areas, through 2019. We estimate that household electricity use will have increase substantiallyin 2020, however, as COVID-19 restrictions have residents spending more time at home, andmore importantly, as reduced industrial and commercial/public sector activity has left more
electricity to be distributed to households.
The fraction of urban households using district heat is assumed to have decreased slightly overtime since 2000, essentially because the number of households has grown but we assume that the
deployment of district heating systems has not. The use of district heat per connected household
is assumed to parallel the use of electricity, since the two are either co-produced or depend on thesame sorts of central power plant/central heating plant fuels and infrastructure, and thus would
be subject to the same sorts of constraints, on average.
3.7.4. Estimates of energy use parameters for the Agricultural and Fisheries
sectors
We assume that the availability of mechanized aids to agriculture continued to decrease from1996 to 2000, increased slightly by 2005, then continued to decline slowly through 2009,
resulting in the use of diesel tractors and other oil-fueled equipment in the agricultural sector
decreasing to 25, 27, and 24 percent of 1990 levels in 2000, 2005, and 2008/2009, respectively,
335 As reported on in "A Rural Energy Survey in Unhari Village, The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK): Methods,

Results, And Implications", Asian Perspectives Special Issue, 2002, by D. von Hippel and co-authors. A longer version of thisstudy is available as a Nautilus Report at http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Asian-Perspectives-DPRK-fulltext.pdf.
336 See, for example, North Korean Economy Watch, “Power shortage in Pyongyang prompts residents to move to older
housing”, providing two related stories describing electricity shortages of the winter of 2011/2012, originally dated 2012-1-13
and 2012-2-1, and available as http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2012/02/01/power-shortage-in-pyongyang-prompts-residents-tomove-to-older-housing/.

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down from 30 percent in 1996. The lack of spare parts and fuel play a significant role in thisreduction.337 We assume that this situation eased somewhat in the years after, with the use of
powered field machinery increasing to 29 percent of 1990 levels by 2016, in part with newimported tractors (see Figure 3-9), but fell thereafter as the impacts of UNSC sanctions on fuelavailability and trade in agricultural machinery and other imports were felt.
Figure 3-9: Tractor Imports to the DPRK from China, 2000 through 2018
Reported Tractor Imports from China to DPRK, 2000 - 2018 (number)
3,500
3,000

Tractors

2,500
2,000
1,500

1,000
500
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

The use of electricity in fields (mostly for water pumping) in the agricultural sector were also
assumed to decline relative to 1996 through 2009, though the total area cropped was assumed tochange only modestly. Reduced electricity use “in fields” was due in part to the completion ofmajor gravity-flow irrigation systems in the western agricultural area of the country (see, forexample, Figure 3-10),338 in addition to reduced electricity availability and probable continued
degradation of pumping infrastructure. We assume that electricity use per hectare cropped
remained at about 50 percent of 1990 levels from 2010 through 2020, while the area harvested
falling over the period from about 82 to 69 percent. The use of coal, electricity, and biomass forcrop processing are estimated to have declined from 1996 to 2000 due to a combination of lower
crop output and reduced fuels availability. From 2000 to 2005, we assumed an increase in theavailability (and use) of electricity for crops processing, and also an increase in biomass use (aswell as coal and electricity) related to increased crop output. After 2005, use of these fuels is
assumed to vary somewhat year to year, but to remain near 2005 levels through 2018, falling
337 See, for example, Hugh Bentley, “Trends in the DPRK Agricultural Sector & Implications for Energy Use”, presentation

prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA). Available
from https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/papers-and-presentations/. Bentley notes that ongoingpost-harvest losses during threshing, drying/, and cleaning operations, early crop consumption, shortages of fertilizer, lack oftimely field operations, and soil erosion caused by deforestation in the DPRK all have implications for agricultural energy use.
338 A KCNA news item, “Power Stations Built along Kaechon-Lake Thaesong Waterway”, dated December, 2004 (available ashttps://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/2004/12/dprk-041223-kcna03.htm) reads in part “power stations havebeen built along the Kaechon-Lake Thaesong Waterway in South Phyongan Province, the Democratic People's Republic ofKorea. The 150-kilometer-long natural-flow waterway has been built from Taegak-ri in Kaechon City to Lake Thaesong. It saves
140 million kWh of electricity a year.” 140 million kWh, or 140 GWh, is substantially larger than the reduction in the field useof electricity we estimate which could mean that our estimate of savings is understated, the KCNA figure is overstated, some of
the reduction in electricity use from the waterway has meant that more electricity is available for use in water pumping in otherareas, which would tend to reduce savings—or, most likely, a combination of all three factors.

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thereafter due to reduced availability of fuel and other inputs, in part due to the impacts of UNSC
sanctions.
Figure 3-10: Natural-flow Irrigation Waterway in the DPRK Completed in the Early 2000s339

In the fisheries sector, based on data on DPRK marine catch, we assumed that fisheries effort andenergy use would be 25 percent on 1990 levels in 2000, with activity increasing slightly from2000 levels by 2005, but declining slowly through 2009 due to lack of fuel and equipment
maintenance issues.340 341 Trade statistics show that since at least the years from 2010 the DPRK

339 From John Lewis, “North Korean Energy: 2005-2006 New Technologies and Construction” as prepared for the DPRK Energy

Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA), and available fromhttps://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/papers-and-presentations/.
340 The Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) suggests that DPRK marine products catch decreased substantiallybetween 1996 and 1997 but increased somewhat from that point through 2001. KOTRA data (from "Agriculture, Forestry, andMarine Products industries", available through http://www.kotra.or.kr/main/, visited 6/3/02) lists 1996 output of .876 million
tonnes, and 1999 output of .664 million tonnes. A web page on "North Korea's Foreign Trade in 2000" from the same site lists
the value of marine exports as having increased 9.4 percent between 1999 and 2000. If all fisheries production tracked export
earnings (which is not necessarily the case, but assumed for the sake of argument here), the implied ratio of fisheries output
between 1996 and 2000 is 83%. We further assume that fisheries effort (as reflected in fuel use) is proportional to fisheries
output. Alternatively, end-of-1999 data based on the Economic and Social Comparison between the Two Koreas, published by
the National Statistics Administration (December 2000) and provided as of 2005 (but not as of 2021) on
http://www.koreascope.org/english/sub/1/index3-h.htm, suggest that the DPRK fish catch in 1999 was 45.7 percent of the catchin 1990. The ROK Ministry of Unification web site http://www.unikorea.go.kr/en/index.jsp (but no longer available at that
address as of 2021), as of about 2007, included a listing of fisheries output suggesting that total marine products production in the
DPRK had increased to 1.16 million tonnes by 2004, a significant jump from 2002 and 2003 (0.81 and 0.84 million tonnes).
Much of this production increase, however, may have been in products that were relatively less energy intensive to harvest, suchas seaweed.
341 The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) global fisheries database “FishStat” (downloaded fromhttp://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/software/fishstatj/en on 3/28/2012) includes what appear to be estimated data for DPRK

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has been exporting large quantities of fisheries products. China imports the vast bulk of theseproducts—well over 90 percent. Most of China’s imports from the DPRK are in the category“Molluscs”, a category dominated by imports, specifically, of cuttlefish and squid—exports ofproducts in this category were valued at over $100 million annually for all but one of the years
from 2012 through 2017. The increased harvest of squid is due, in part, to an abundance of squid
as a result of the same climatic conditions that have led to drought in the DPRK.342 This uptick
in exports of fisheries products suggests that fuel use in 2010 was higher—we assume about 39
percent of 1990 levels—and varied thereafter with the level of fisheries exports by the DPRK
through 2017, ranging from about 27 to 48 percent of 1990 levels. We assume that the sum totalof these trends is an increase in fishing effort in smaller boats, mostly (fishing collectives),
reflected in an increase in oil use in those boats between 2010 and 2017, and a slight decrease
from 2010 levels by 2015 (to 30 percent of 1990 levels) in the average use of electricity forprocessing of marine products, since the bulk of the processing of cuttlefish and squid, forexample, seems to be being carried out by hand. Fisheries energy use in 2018 and 2019 wasassumed to be lower than in previous years, due to fuel availability and trade restrictions as aresult of UNSC sanctions, 343 and to be still lower in 2020 as a result of COVID-19 responses inthe DPRK.
An additional potential reduction in DPRK fisheries energy use stems from a reported recent
practice of DPRK organizations selling fishing licenses to Chinese fishing operators.344 This
practice apparently involved transferring DPRK fishing licenses to Chinese fishing boats andships, which then operated in the waters off the DPRK and elsewhere. It is unclear what impact
this practice might have on DPRK fishing effort, and specifically, how it might affect DPRK fueluse for fishing, but to the extent that DPRK fishing was effectively transferred to Chinese
vessels, it likely that DPRK fishing effort would decrease, although it seems possible that someof the Chinese vessels fishing in DPRK waters (or in international waters near that DPRK) withDPRK licenses might be obtaining fuel in the DPRK. We make the assumption that the practicefisheries output from about 2000 on, often with little or no change over time, suggesting that no significant data were available on
DPRK fisheries to UNFAO in recent years.
342 As described, for example, in "North Koreans turn to squid to compensate for drought", prepared by Choi Song Min for Daily
NK, dated July 15, 2015, and available as http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/15/north-korea-drought-squid-harvest.
See also "North Korea's military orders surge in squid poaching", Daily Telegraph, by Mike Firn, dated 28 Nov 2014, available
as http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/11259846/North-Koreas-military-orders-surge-in-squidpoaching.html. Similarly, "North Korean fishing industry increases output", NK News, February 10th, 2015, available as
http://www.nknews.org/2015/02/north-korean-fishing-industry-increases-output/,also reports increased output after about 2011.
343 There was a major change in fisheries trade reports involving the DPRK as of 2018, as China reported no imports in thefisheries category from the DPRK at all. This lack of reporting is probably due to UNSC sanctions on the DPRK, although it
seems improbable that fisheries exports from the DPRK to China really dropped to zero in 2018, when imports to the DPRK from
China were at $71 million, which was about 69% of 2017 imports to the DPRK from China, but hardly insignificant. With little
else to go on with respect to available statistics (exports from the DPRK to other nations, mostly nations in Africa, continued at
levels not very different than in 2017, although those levels were on the order of a percent of historical trade with China), we
assume that fisheries effort probably did decline as a result of the combinations of sanctions on DPRK exports and on DPRK
imports of diesel oil to fuel the fishing fleet, but that fishing effort did not fall to zero. We assume that 2017 fisheries effort andprocessing energy use was about 70% of that in 2017.
344 The March 5, 2019 UNSC Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), includes mention of
the DPRK practice of “...prohibited transfer by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its fishing rights, as clarified inresolution 2397 (2017), continued throughout 2018, acting as a potential source of income for the country." (P. 28 ofhttps://www.undocs.org/S/2019/171). The same source includes a quote from a fisherman indicating "that there were around
200 Chinese fishing boats operating in the 'water of North Korea'". If these were larger fishing vessels (with engines of around
100 hp or more), this would be the equivalent of more than 10% of the DPRK fleet, but we do not really have information on thesize of these vessels using DPRK licenses.

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of transferring licenses further reduced DPRK fishing effort by 5 percent in 2018, although thismust be considered the roughest of estimates. We assume that this estimate also holds for 2019.
For 2020, we assume that the impacts of the COVID-19 virus and the impacts of the measurestaken to prevent it have had a relatively small impact on fishing effort, perhaps 10 percent
relative to 2019, because fishing would likely be considered a crucial occupation, given theimportance of fish and seafood protein to the DPRK population, as well as the importance of
seafood exports to the economy. In addition, fishing itself involves gatherings of relatively few
people, though fish processing plants do typically require large numbers of people working close
together.
Figure 3-11 shows a DPRK fishing vessel that drifted to Japan in late 2017, and Figure 3-12
shows an image of what appears to be a significant portion of the DPRK fishing fleet in harbor in
Chongjin, probably during the winter of 2018.
Figure 3-11: DPRK Fishing Vessel345

Image from Gareth Davies (2017), “Another North Korean 'ghost ship' washes up ashore in Japan as the bodies of three deadfishermen from Kim Jong-un's regime are also discovered”, Daily Mail.com, dated, 4 December 2017, and available ashttps://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5143573/Another-North-Korean-ghost-ship-washes-ashore.html.
345

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Figure 3-12: DPRK Fishing Boats in Harbor Near Chongjin, Winter 2018346

346

Google Earth image showing a harbor in Chongjin filled with on the order of a thousand of what appear to be 10-to-15-meterfishing boats and about 15 larger boats (25-30 meters). Image from Google Earth, approximate coordinates 41.778022,
129.829610, February 11, 2018. An image of another basin about 4.5 km from the first, at coordinates 41.768142, 129.777686(see Attachment 1) appears to also show nearly 1000 10–15-meter boats. This would appear to be a significant portion of the
DPRK's east coast fishing fleet. Whether they have been stored together in these basins for protection to wait out the winterand/or because they are idle for lack of fuel is an interesting question. In addition, at least one report suggests that some of these
Chongjin-based vessels belong to Munitions factories that are tasked with fishing to generate foreign exchange income. See
Radio Free Asia (2017), “North Korean Munitions”, Reported by Jieun Kim for RFA’s Korean Service, translated by Leejin Jun,and written in English by Roseanne Gerin, and available as https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/north-korean-munitionsfactories-turn-to-fishing-to-generate-foreign-currency-08092017152812.html. Interestingly, this particular harbor appears to be
filled with boats in 10 of 12 images of the area taken in 2020, with the harbor mostly empty in a 9/3/2020 image that also appears
to coincide with flooding from a local river and perhaps a pollution episode, and about half full in the next (and last available, asof 11/18/20) image, taken on 9/8/20. Whether this observation says something about fishing activity in 2020 is difficult todetermine.

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3.7.5. Public/Commercial sector parameters
Based on visits to the DPRK in 1998, 2000, and 2009, commercial/public building space did notseem to be under construction at an unusual rate (when there was construction at all), so the ratioof residential to commercial/public space was assumed to have been 95 percent of that in 1990
(assuming, in fact, some closure of public buildings and shops since 1990), meaning, effectively,
less public/commercial building space per person in the DPRK. We assume that this ratio
continued to fall through 2010, to 84% of 1990 levels, before rising slowly thereafter, reflecting
the resumption of commercial building as the economy improved.
We assumed a fraction of electricity use relative to 1990 in the year 2000—about 29 percent—that is a function of the same assumed average urban electricity outage rate used for the
residential sector, namely that power outages in cities outside the Pyongyang area as of 2000
were by far the rule rather than the exception. For 2005 through 2010, the electricity and heatuse per unit floor area was between 40 and 47 percent of the 1990 rate, which is slightly higher
than the rate in urban households for those years, based on the assumption that more commercial
and public buildings were on heating circuits, and had preferred access to electricity. From 2014
through 2019, due in part to limited availability of grid electricity, we assume decreased use ofelectricity and heat, at 33 to 35 percent of 1990 levels, but declining to under 25 percent of 1990
levels in 2020 due to reduction in activity in the sector because of COVID-19 restrictions. The
fraction of 1990 coal use per unit area assumed for 2000 through 2010, 45 percent, reflects theobservation that coal availability was and continued to be poor in many areas of the country,with the modest improvements assumed thereafter—to 52 percent of 1990 levels by 2018/2019,in part due to improved coal availability as exports of coal to China were constrained by UNSC
sanctions. Coal use per unit commercial/public floorspace is estimated to have fallen to about 37
percent of 1990 levels in 2020, however due to measures to reduce the spread of COVID-19.
Visitors to the DPRK within the last few years report that most public buildings are unheated in
the winter, and many of those that have some heat are heated with biomass fuels. We haveaccordingly assumed that the use of wood and biomass fuels in the commercial sector, on a perunit floor area basis, increased from 10 percent of the 1990 rate of coal use in 1996 to 20 percent
in 2000 to 30 percent in 2005 through 2010, but falling thereafter as coal availability increased.
As in the residential sector, the change in electricity availability noted by observers varied
substantially by area and by season in the DPRK, as well as varying in relation to proximity to
new or existing power plants, or to priority users of power.
3.7.6. Military energy use parameters in 2000 through 2020
With the minor exception of the addition to the roster of marine vessels of some small
submarines and some amphibious "Kong Bang" hovercraft, the vehicles, vessels, aircraft andarmaments assumed in use for the DPRK military is much the same in 2000 (and in 2005-2020)
as it was in 1996 (and 1990) .347 348 A photo of a group of hovercraft, assumed to be Kong Bang,at their base in Northwestern DPRK near the mouth of the Yalu river, is shown in Figure 3-13.

347 Two ROK media reports--"North Korea Deploys Air Cushion Warships", Seoul, The Korea Times (Internet Version-WWW)

in English, by Cho'ng Su'ng-ki, dated April 1, 2007 (and quoting the 2006 ROK Defense White Paper); and "N. Korea Develops
High-Speed Military Hovercraft", Seoul, Chosun Ilbo WWW-Text in English, dated April 2, 2007--report the development of
DPRK hovercraft, but these appear to be the same as the Kong Bang hovercraft developed deployed during the 1990s, with no155
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Figure 3-13: Hovercraft Based in Northwestern DPRK, November, 2019349

We have assumed, based on the modest information available in the open literature and on
conversations with analysts, that ground forces military activity in 2000 was lower (by 20 - 25
percent) than in 1996,350 with a smaller continued decline from 2000-2010, and a modest
increase thereafter through 2016, after which oil import restrictions under UNSC sanctions

apparent change in the number of such vessels (both of the 2007 articles give a number of 130 hovercraft) that have been present
in the DPRK fleet since about 2000.
348 A fairly recent publication covering the DPRK’s overall military readiness, North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s
Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles, by Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford, Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, dated April 2007, and available ashttps://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/1869.pdf, implies that DPRK production of armaments continues, but does not,based on our quick review, seem to indicate any substantial net addition of armaments to the DPRK working inventory in recent
years.
349 Image from Google Earth Pro, dated November 2019. This facility hosting amphibious vessels that are probably similar tothe "Kong Bang" craft is located near the northern border of the DPRK. A review of earlier images in Google Earth indicatesthat this facility has been in use since at least 2010, including the structures housing the 16 vessels (one is absent in the photo).
In 2010 there were a few additional vessels at the site. The hovercraft vessels are about 20 m long. Location is 39.808390,
124.412620. Just north of the hovercraft port there is what appears to be a drydock (or possibly production?) facility for small
patrol craft, about 22.5 m, located at approximately 39.819, 124.413. The two facilities are located just south of the city of
Yongju-gun, about 15 km south of the outlet of the Yalu river.
350 Analysts contacted regarding the "tempo" of DPRK military exercises, and reports in the media (for example, "NK Ground
Exercises Up as Navy and Air Force Decline", Yoo Yong-won, www.chosun.com, 2001- 9-10) suggest that the DPRK military
exercise tempo for ground forces had increased somewhat to that point, but not substantially, and that some of the apparent
increase in exercises may be an increase in the number of soldiers involved, but not necessarily the number or use of fuel-using
vehicles and armaments. Accordingly, we assume that the average hours of annual use (and fuel use) by ground vehicles in 2000
was somewhat lower in 2000 than in 1996.

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caused military oil use to stagnate or fall slightly, despite military uses likely being top priority.
Ground forces activity is assumed to have decreased markedly in 2020 due to COVID-19
quarantine measures. Aircraft use in 2000 was substantially less than the already low levels of
1996,351 due in part to the particularly constrained supplies of fuel in that year, but somewhat
higher (close to 1996 levels) in 2005-2019, though with year-to-year variability due to fuelsupplies. 2020 use of fuel by aircraft, as with ground forces, is assumed to have beensignificantly lower than previous years. Figure 3-14 show an array of military aircraft lined up
for an airshow or inspection in late 2019 at the new Wonsan-Kalma International Airport.
Naval vessel energy use in 2000 was modestly (7-10 percent) lower, on average than the levels
assumed for 1996,352 with the assumed number of hours of use of different naval vessels andrelated equipment assumed to be mostly similar to 2000 levels in 2005, but slightly lower in2008 through 2016, and lower still thereafter due to lower fuel availability under UNSC
sanctions. In 2020, naval vessels are assumed to have spent more time in port due to COVID-19.
The level of military manufacturing is assumed to be lower in 2000 through 2010 than was
assumed for 1996, at 45 percent of the 1990 level of activity, but slightly higher from thenthrough 2019, with activity falling to 25 percent of 1990 levels in 2020 due to the impacts of
COVID-19 shut-downs in factories.

351 The informal opinion or analysts familiar with the DPRK military situation suggests that air force activity in the DPRK is, ifanything, declining slowly, perhaps due to lack of fuel, probably due to lack of spare parts, and probably due to a recognition on
the part of the DPRK military command that in a real conflict, the DPRK Air Force is unlikely, given the age and condition of its
aircraft, to play a substantial role. Accordingly, we have assumed that DPRK Air Force training exercises have continued todecrease slowly since 1996, as reflected in the flight-hours estimates shown.
352 There does not appear to be any definitive information of an unclassified nature that could be used to qualitatively estimate thelevel of activity in the DPRK naval forces as of 2000. Analysts contacted in around 2001 in researching an update of thisdocument, however, indicated that the DPRK Navy did not seem to be operating under any particular fuel restrictions, and thatthe level of incursions (from DPRK vessels) experienced in ROK waters seemed to be fairly consistent with prior years. As aresult, we have assumed that DPRK naval activity (at least for patrol craft) was only somewhat lower (in average terms ofactivity per vessel—which would include both serviceable and inactive vessels) than in 1996.

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Figure 3-14: Aircraft Lined Up for an Exhibition or Inspection at Wonsan, November, 2019353

Similar to the public/commercial sector, we assume that from 2000 to 2005 and thereafter the useof coal and oil in military buildings decreased somewhat, rising again slightly in the 2010s, but
the use of wood fuels, for cooking and some heating, continued to increase through 2010 (fallingsomewhat thereafter), as soldiers were increasingly asked to produce and forage food and fuelfor themselves. For 2005 and thereafter, the typically small decrease in activity levels we haveassumed for in all branches of the military relative to 2000 levels is the result of energyconsuming training activities being limited by fuel supplies, lack of spare parts, and also,

353 Image from Google Earth Pro, dated November,13, 2019, shows the new Wonsan-Kalma International Airport, taken on

November 13, 2019, shows a group of military aircraft lined up for what might have been an airshow and/or inspection. Aircraft
appear to include fighters and bombers, among others. Image coordinates are approximately 39.171, 127.479. Additional
military aircraft, including helicopters and transport aircraft, also appear in parts of the airport not shown in this image. The
report by Peter Makowsky and Jenny Town (2019), "Military Aircraft Lined Up at the Wonsan Airport", for 38 North, dated
November 14, 2019, and available as https://www.38north.org/2019/11/wonsan111419/, lists the aircraft present as follows: “"Onimagery from November 11, there were four MiG-17 fighter aircraft, six MiG-15 fighter aircraft, fourteen Su-25 close support
aircraft, six MiG-29 fighter aircraft and six Il-28 bomber aircraft observed on the tarmac north of the passenger terminal. On
November 13, additional MiG-15 and MiG-17 were added to the display bringing their total to eleven MiG-15s and eight MiG17s. Several small vehicles were parked on the tarmac near the MiG-29 and Il-28 aircraft. In addition, thirteen probable MiG-21
fighter aircraft were observed on the alert apron at the south end of the airfield, and six small, either Hughes 500 or Mi-2 Hoplite
light helicopters, six, possibly Mi-8 or Mi-14, medium transport helicopters, and eight An-2 Colt light transport aircraft wereparked along the auxiliary runway located on the southwest side of the airfield. Further to the south of the auxiliary runway at therail transfer point, seven additional MiG-21 were parked on an adjacent apron.". A count from the 11/13/2019 image preparedfor Nautilus in May 2020 by Liam Tasa and Guy Tasa tallied 87 aircraft in similar categories. Either represents about 6 percentof the total estimated DPRK military aircraft fleet. Most of these aircraft were gone when the next available image was taken, a
few weeks later (12/5/2019).

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKpossibly, increased time spent by military personnel in economic pursuits.354 Another possible
reason for reduced military activities in some years could have been the reportedly lower
physical capabilities of soldiers working on shorter rations.
3.7.7. Non-specified and non-energy commodities demand
We have included no non-specified fuels demand in the estimated balances for 2000 through2020, with the exception of heat from the re-started Yongbyon reactor in 2005 (at the 1990
level), but not in 2008 through 2010. As the reactor was operating for at least part of the time
during 2014 through 2018, we assume 67 percent of full heat output during those years, falling to
0 percent for 2019, and rising to 33 percent in 2020.355 The image in Figure 3-15, from Google
Earth Pro, shows the Yongbyon "5 MWe" reactor as of October 13, 2019, apparently not
operating, as indicated by the lack of steam from the smokestack.

354 Reviews of the literature describing DPRK military equipment stocks in the different branches of the armed forces areavailable on http://www.globalsecurity.org, for example, on http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/air-forceequipment.htm for air force equipment, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/kpa-equipment.htm for ground forces
equipment, and http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/navy.htm for the navy. These reviews find relatively littlechange in the DPRK’s stock of energy-using military equipment in recent years but note that it is not entirely clear whether theseresults stem from a lack of recent insights, on the part of analysts, as to any changes in the DPRK military, or to a lack of changes
in the actual equipment inventory in the DPRK.
355 The Yongbyon reactor was not operating in 1996 or 2000. The capacity factor in 2005 was assumed to have been similar tothat in 1990 (about 60 percent). According to several sources (see, for example, Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Yongbyon 5 MWe
Reactor", available at https://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/766/, and GlobalSecurity.org, "Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):
Yongbyon (Nyongbyon)", available as https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/yongbyon-5.htm), the Yongbyon plant
operated at least "intermittently" from 2014 through 2018. We assume that the reactor operated somewhat less than in previous
periods of activity, at an average capacity factor of about 40% percent. In 2019, several sources suggest that the reactor did notoperate at all, so we assume that heat output for 2019 was 0% of full capacity. For 2020, some sources suggest that although noactivity had been detected to about March of 2020, the DPRK was possibly readying the reactor for a restart. We therefore
assume that heat output in 2020 will have been about 20% of capacity. Relevant references include Shim Kyu-Seok (2019),"Yongbyon reactor seems to be idle, says IAEA", Korea JoongAng Daily, dated September 18, 2019, and available ashttps://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3068062; Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha (2019)"Yongbyon Nuclear Complex: Normal Operations with Low Level Activity", Beyond Parallel, dated April 1, 2019, andavailable as https://beyondparallel.csis.org/yongbyon-nuclear-complex-normal-operations-with-low-level-activity/;
38 North (2019), "North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Center: Low Level Activity and Flood Management", dated August 30,
2019, and available as https://www.38north.org/2019/08/yongbyon083019/; and Peter Makowsky, Frank V. Pabian and Jack Liu(2020), "North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Center: Rail Activity at the Radioisotope Production and Uranium Enrichment
Plants", dated February 14, 2020, and available as https://www.38north.org/2020/02/yongbyon021420/.

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Figure 3-15: “5 MWe” Reactor at Yongbyon as of October 2019

For non-energy commodities included in the balance, we have assumed that coal and oil used as
feedstocks for ammonia production scaled with overall fertilizer output, and are thus 8 percent of1990 levels in 2000, rising to 11 percent in 2005 and 2008, but falling again to 7 percent of 1990
levels in 2010. Estimated fertilizer production increased in 2014 through 2017 before falling to 9
percent of 1990 levels in 2018 and 2019, and to 4.6 percent in 2020 due to the economic impactsof COVID-19 measures. Other non-energy petroleum products use is assumed to be greater than1996 levels at 38 percent of 1990 levels in 2000, but the increase relative to 1996 is mostly due
to our estimate for the amount of asphalt required to build the Pyongyang-Nampo superhighway
in that year. In 2005 through 2016, non-energy oil products use is estimated to have ranged
between about 9 and 15 percent of 1990 levels, rising by a few percent to around 20 percent of1990 levels in 2018 and 2019. Roundwood (logs) consumption is assumed to have declined to
50 percent of 1990 levels in 2000, and to have stayed at that level through 2020.
3.7.8. Energy resources, imports, and exports
We based our estimates of energy resources, imports, and exports for 2000 through 2020 on thedata and assumptions described below. Note that a more detailed description of our analysis oil
products supply and demand is provided in Chapter 6 for the years 2010 through 2020.
•

Domestic coal and biomass resources were sufficient for any level of production that could
be sustained by the DPRK infrastructure.

•

In 2000, coal was imported by the DPRK from (at least) China (about 226,000 tonnes,
including bituminous, coking, and unspecified coals), Russia (82,000 tonnes of coal, and160

Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

2000 tonnes of coke) and Australia (about 31,000 tonnes of coal), and exported to (at least)
China (8,100 tonnes) and Japan (351,000 tonnes of anthracite).356, 357, 358 There may havebeen additional off-the-records coal imports from or exports to China (and/or Russia), but wehave no information about such transactions.
•

In 2005, 147,000 tonnes of coal and coal products were imported from China, along with
about 26,000 tonnes of coke. An additional 1.17 million tonnes of coal was imported from
Russia. A significant amount of coal was exported to China—2.8 million tonnes359—and
277,000 tonnes of coal were exported to Japan.360 Again, there may have been some off-therecord imports or exports.

•

In 2008, the DPRK imported about 232,000 tonnes of coal from China, along with 7600
tonnes of coke. 192,000 tonnes of coal were imported from Russia. 2.54 million tonnes ofcoal were exported to China, but exports of coal to Japan were nil, having been discontinued
by Japan after 2006.

•

Coal imports to the DPRK from both Russia and China declined in 2009, to about 28,000 and
90,000 tonnes, respectively along with about 4000 tonnes of coke (from China). Exports ofcoal to China rose to 3.6 million tonnes, rising again to 4.6 million tonnes in 2010, andreaching a peak at over 22 million tonnes in 2016 (see Figure 3-16), before reported (andlikely to some extent, actual) exports fell due to UNSC sanctions.361

356 Chinese import/export data from China Customs Report 2000, pp. 1483-1495 (in Chinese).
357 Estimated roughly based on data from "Democratic People's Republic of Korea Fact Sheet", from the Australian Department

of Foreign Trade (www.dfat.gov.au/geo/dprk, visited 5/17/2002), which listed Australian exports of coal to the DPRK during"2000-2001" as having a value of $AU 1.7 million.
358 From data in Japan customs statistics, http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/index_e.htm.
359 From China Customs Statistics as compiled by Nathanial Aden, 2006. For related analysis, see also N. Aden, North Korean
Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and Implications, as prepared for the DPRK
Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA). Mr. Aden's paper is available as
http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/0679Aden1.pdf. Updated analyses prepared for Nautilus
by Mr. Aden in 2008 and 2010 were drawn upon for the 2008 and2009 statistics on DPRK energy trade with China reported onhere, and are summarized as http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Aden.pdf and http://nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/02.-Aden.pdf.
360 Japan customs statistics, http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/index_e.htm, andformerly at http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/download/index_d012_e.htm (the latter visited 2/2007).
361 Data on Russia’s energy trade with the DPRK, and on China’s coal imports from the DPRK are taken from the United Nations"Comtrade" database (http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx, accessed on several occasions).

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Figure 3-16: Reported Coal and Coke Exports from the DPRK through 2017

Reported Coal and Coke Exports from DPRK
to All Countries, 1992-2017
Thousand Tonnes Coal Product25,00020,00015,00010,000

5,000

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017

-

•

Crude oil imports in 2000 were limited to the 389,000 tonnes reported (in China Customs
Statistics) as imported from China.362 Imports from China in 2005 were 523,000 tonnes363.
It is possible that a modest volume of additional crude oil was imported in one or both years,
as well as in subsequent years, from an unknown location--possibly by rail from Russia or
China, or by ship from Russia, China or elsewhere. Reported crude oil and oil products
exports from China to the DPRK remained remarkably stable from 2005 through even 2020,as shown in Figure 6-10.364•

There have been reports that the DPRK "began to produce crude oil in a sea well off Sukchon
County, South Pyongan Province" in 1998 (Lee Kyo Kwan, writing on www.chosun.com,"North Korea Exports Petroleum", probably sometime in 2001). This article suggests,
without citing any specific figures, that DPRK production was significant enough to allow
the reduction of petroleum imports. It seems clear that foreign companies have obtained the362 A similar quantity of crude oil imports from China was reported by KEEI in a workbook of DPRK energy statistics provided

to Nautilus in April 2002.
363 From China Customs Statistics, compiled by Nathanial Aden—see footnote above.
364 Data for Figure 3-4 China Customs Statistics, compiled by Nathanial Aden—see footnote above, except for 2010 data, which
are from the United Nations “Comtrade” database (see above).

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rights to drill in DPRK territorial waters, and that some exploratory wells have been drilled(though we do not know if drilling was active during 2000). We assume based onconversations with experts in the industry (who were informed by both industry news and aknowledge of the geology of the region—which generally consists of small pockets of oilthat are difficult to extract), that any production from DPRK wells, if it did occur, wasminimal, and as a result have assumed that year 2000, 2005, 2008, and 2009 domestic oil
production in the DPRK was 30,000 tonnes, though this figure may well be too high.365 We
further assume that this oil (or a similar quantity imported by rail or ship) was refined in thesmall West Coast refinery (see below).
•

In 2000, refined products imports to the DPRK included products from the ROK (reported
informally to be "off-spec" products,366 probably heavy oil and diesel fuel, and in not wellknown quantities, but estimated at 50,000 tonnes), Singapore (probably mostly gasoline andsome diesel, totaling about 60,000 tonnes), and Japan (44,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil, plus aminor amount of solvents and lubricants, according to customs statistics), and China (avariety of products totaling about 117,000 tonnes). According to an industry source, barter
trade with Russia may have produced imports of "gas oil and light crude" from Russia at "1.5kbbl/day or less". We have assumed an average of 1500 bbl/day. These quantities are in
addition to the 395,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil delivered by KEDO during the 2000 calendar
year367. We also assume that the DPRK continued to receive oil product imports equal toabout half of the output of a refinery on the Chinese side of the China/DPRK border. These

365 Though our conversations with some experts in the industry have suggested that any production from DPRK wells was

minimal, other sources in the literature suggest that DPRK oil production has indeed been enough to supply a significant
fraction of DPRK needs. For example, Selig Harrison writes in Toward Oil and Gas Cooperation in Northeast Asia: New
Opportunities for Reducing Dependence on the Middle East (published as Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars
Asia Program Special Report No. 106, dated December 2002, and available as
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/asiarpt_106.pdf), that "an oil well [in Sukchon] began producing 2.2 million barrels
annually in 1999". This is similar to a figure of 300,000 tonnes crude oil per year quoted in several publications by Keun-Wook
Paik, including Pipeline Gas Introduction to the Korean Peninsula, published by Chatham House, January 2005, and available as
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/sdp/KPJan05.pdf. In the Chatham House report, Paik wrote (p. 37) "Even though
the scale of annual crude oil production from the Sook-Cheong County’s Anju Basin is very small (0.3 mt/y), to the North
Korean authorities it is a significant volume." In personal correspondence with Dr. Paik, he indicated that the information forthis estimate came from an article in the ROK press in approximately 2001—probably the chosun.com article referenced above,and that while he had not seen the quantity of oil production confirmed, he believed that some oil production was ongoing. Dr.
Harrison indicated that his figure for DPRK oil production was likely taken from the work of Dr. Paik, or from the same original
source. Other experts in the field consulted on this question have expressed skepticism that DPRK domestic oil production todate, if any, has been even close to as significant as the quantity reported. Accordingly, we assume that a more reasonable figurefor ongoing DPRK domestic oil production is one the order of 10 percent of the reported (300,000 tonne) value (which might also
have been misreported due to an error in reporting units, as happens occasionally in the DPRK and elsewhere). Another estimateof DPRK oil production is offered in index mundi (http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=kn&v=88), based on data from the
CIA World Factbook, which suggests that DPRK oil production in 2004 to 2007 was about 140 bbl per day, declining to 118 bbl
per day in 2009 (and 2010, according to the CIA World Factbook). The index mundi (CIA) estimate of 140 bbl/day is theequivalent of 7,000 tonnes/yr, considerably lower than the estimate we are using, but on the same order of magnitude, andperhaps equally plausible (but also equally speculative).
366 “Off-spec” denotes products which may not have met quality or other standards for sale in the ROK or other countries. These
could include, for example, fuels with higher-than-allowed levels of sulfur or other impurities, or fuels that did not meet octane orother specifications.
367 Note that, based on KEDO flow-meter-based estimates, approximately 200,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil remained in storage inthe DPRK as of the end of calendar 2000 (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization 2002 Annual Report, available as
KEDO_AR_2002.PDF from www.kedo.org; page 10). As KEDO changed its practice of accounting for deliveries and estimatedconsumption of HFO (the definition of "HFO Years") between 2001 and 2002, it is not possible to definitively determine from
KEDO annual reports how much HFO was estimated to be in storage as of the beginning of 2000, but KEDO data for months
close to the end of 1999 suggest that HFO in storage at the beginning of 2000 was also close to 200,000 tonnes, meaning that
consumption of HFO more or less matched HFO deliveries for the calendar year.

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products are estimated to have totaled about 300,000 tonnes in 2000. For 2005, the DPRK
received just under 150,000 tonnes of oil products “officially” from China, with gasoline,
diesel fuel, and kerosene/jet fuel the dominant products. We assume that the DPRK also
received a smaller share (a total of 150,000 tonnes) from the output of the Chinese refinerynear the border, and about 60,000 tonnes of fuel (mostly diesel oil) from the ROK. 2005
imports of oil products to the DPRK from Japan were very limited (100 tonnes).
•

We estimate that the total DPRK refined products imports in 2008 were about 700,000
tonnes. Of this total, 304,000 tonnes were in the form of heavy fuel oil provided to the
DPRK as a part of the Six-Party Talks agreement. Most of the rest was imports from China
and Russia, but trade statistics show that the DPRK also imported much smaller amounts ofvarious products from Malaysia, Singapore, Japan (a tiny amount), the Netherlands, and(probably) India.368•

In 2009, we estimate that oil products imports to the DPRK were about 310,000 tonnes, withmuch (but not all) of the large drop related to the cessation of HFO shipments from the SixParty Talks agreement. The largest portion (but less than half) of these imports came from
China, with the rest being cobbled together from most of the same sources the DPRK
received oil products from in 2008, with additional small quantities probably coming fromother countries as well.

•

Also listed under refined products in 2000 are the imports of about 22,000 tonnes of usedtires (or fuel derived from same) from Japan (additional shipments may have originated in
Taiwan) for use as a boiler fuel (for electricity generation).369 Cargoes of tires from Europe
have reportedly also been requested by the DPRK. Imports of used tires/tire-derived fuel to
the DPRK from Japan in 2005 were 26,000 tonnes, with imports declining to about 8600
tonnes in 2006, the last year that such shipments were reported.

•

Year 2000 exports of refined products from the DPRK include about 24,000 tonnes of mostly
heavy oil exported to China. We have guessed that the DPRK traded about 48,000 tonnes ofheavy oil, probably to China, receiving in exchange sufficient asphalt to construct the new (atthe time) superhighway between Nampo and Pyongyang (finished in late 2000). Although
there may have been similar trading of oil products in 2005, the only on-the-record exports ofoil products from the DPRK to China in 2005 were about 4,400 tonnes of liquefied petroleum
gases. The DPRK exported about 3000 tonnes of similar products to China in both 2008 and2009, and also exported a tiny (just under 4 tonnes) amount of oil products to Russia in 2008.

368 Indian trade statistics show substantial (on the order of one million tonnes, with value near a billion dollars) shipments of oil

products to the DPRK in 2008 and 2009. The sizes and types of these shipments (including large amounts of naptha, typicallyused as an input to the plastics industry), however, have led us and other analysts to conclude that most or all of these reported
trades were in fact between India and the Republic of Korea, not the DPRK, and that there were simply clerical errors inreporting the trades. India’s petroleum product trade with the ROK in recent years has been very large. We have assumed that ajust small fraction of the reported imports of oil products from India actually did go to the DPRK—perhaps one smaller tanker’s
worth (20,000 tonnes).
369 A source from the industry reported that the DPRK likely received a total of 25,000 tonnes of used auto tires from Japan andTaiwan in 2000 for use as a supplemental boiler fuel. This estimate corresponds well with data from Japan Customs Statistics(data from files downloaded from http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/download/index_d012_e.htm) that lists year 2000 exports
from Japan to the DPRK in a category (HS # 400400000) that is defined as "Waste, parings and scrap of rubber (other than hardrubber) and powders and granules obtained therefrom" at a total level of 22,156 tonnes in 2000, and 25,599 tonnes in 2005.

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3.7.9. Data and assumptions regarding energy transformation processes in 2000,
2005, 2008, and 2009
Below we present the key data and assumptions used for our estimated of year
2000/2005/2008/2009 activities in the major fuels "transformation" sectors—coal production, oil
refining, and electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. For electricity
generation/transmission and distribution and oil products supplies, Chapters 5 and 6,
respectively, provide additional detail on our estimates from 2010 through 2020, as well as some
additional information about the operation of those sectors in earlier years. (Charcoal production
is assumed to be sufficient to produce the modest quantities required.)•

We generally assume that sufficient coal mining capacity is operable to supply the DPRK
economy at the low level of demand reflected in the 2000 through 2009 energy balances.
Some DPRK observers have suggested that some large coal mines have been operating since
the late 2000s, which is consistent with the large increase in coal exports seen in the mid2010s, and media reports (many of them from DPRK agencies) have mentioned the output ofmajor mines. Other observers suggest that practically no large mines were operating as of2000, due to electricity shortages, but that some smaller, less mechanized mines may havecontinued to supply residential and perhaps other users. The mines in the important Anju
region, portions of which lie below the seabed, reportedly continued to be flooded andinoperable, in part due to lack of electricity for pumping. Recent investments in selected coalmines by Chinese companies have been noted, doubtless supporting the 2.8 million tonnes ofcoal exports from the DPRK to China recorded in 2005 (up to 22 million by 2016, as noted
above). Further, the DPRK government was, at least at one point, revising ownership rules
to encourage any (foreign and, presumably, domestic) groups to undertake coal mine
operation, whether those groups had coal supply expertise or not.370•

We assume that the East Coast (Sonbong) refinery remained largely closed, and that theWest Coast refinery on the Chinese border (on the DPRK side) continued and continues tooperate with crude oil provided from China. As a consequence, the latter plant was assumed
to operate at an average of 27 percent of capacity during 2000, 37 percent of capacity in 2005
and 2008, and 36 percent of capacity in 2009, increasing to about 50 percent by 2018-2020.

•

There is apparently another small (capacity unknown) refinery on the DPRK's West Coast.
This refinery is reportedly very basic, lacking any "cracking" capacity, and operating in batchmode as a "fractionating" unit to produce fuels, reportedly, for the military. We have "backcalculated" the output from (and input to) this plant based on assumptions about the productslate, the capacity factor of an associated 60 MW power plant that uses heavy oil from therefinery, and the efficiency of that plant. See Attachment 1 for details of these calculations.

•

Conversations with industry sources indicated that the thermal power generation system inthe DPRK was rapidly eroding as of 2000. In virtually all of the large power stations, only
selected boilers and turbines are operating, if any are operating at all. The (nominal) 200

370 For example, NK Brief No 06-12-14-1, titled Independent Coal Mines Get Legal Backing in DPRK, and based on a KoreanCentral Broadcasting Agency report dated 12/112006, describes a December 2006 law, the “Small-Medium Coal MinesManagement Development Regulations”, that a number of different types of foreign organization now have the “legal support”,
upon receiving official permission, to develop small and medium coal mines. The article also cites a recognition that coalproduction has decreased.

165
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKMW heavy fuel oil-fired plant near the (East Coast) Sonbong refinery—which has recently
been undergoing conversion to use coal—apparently did not operate at all in 2000, and at
least three other 100 MW plants also did not operate. Those plants that do operate arereportedly plagued by problems with "air heaters"—devices that extract heat from exhaustgases to heat incoming combustion air. These air heaters have in most plants been degradedto the point of inoperability by acid gases from the combustion of high sulfur fuels such as
heavy oil and used tires.371 The result was reportedly a considerable decrease in plant
efficiency, quite possibly greater than the decrease in efficiency (from 28 percent in 1990 to
23 percent in 2000, before accounting for plant own-use) that we have assumed. Further,boiler tubes in many power plants have been degraded from the outside by acid gases fromhigh-sulfur fuels, and from the inside by the use of inadequately-treated or untreated boiler
feed water. The lack of spare boiler tubes—and in many cases it may be that boiler tubes to
fit these generators, which were built in the 1950s and 1960s, are not available at all,anywhere—means that it is very difficult to repair the boiler tube degradation. Two power
plants, however, were added to the roster of thermal generators that we previously knew
about. A 60 MW plant built for operation on heavy fuel oil is located near the small West
Coast refinery described above. This power plant only operates when crude oil is processedby the associated small refinery. A diesel engine-type plant with capacity totaling 9.8 MW
was recently installed and operated for much of 2000 at Songlim, in association with a steel
plant there. This plant generally seems to have been fueled with heavy fuel oil. In total, we
estimate that less than 800 MW of thermal capacity were operable as of 2000, though it ispossible that some other units were technically operable but did not operate due to lack offuel. For those power plants that were operable, we estimate an average capacity factor in
the range of 50 percent or less, due to maintenance problems and lack of fuel.
Many of the problems noted above reportedly persisted through 2009, but we have little
direct evidence of significant changes in the sector since 2002 (see Chapter 5 of this Report).
We have heard reports of some repairs at major power plants, including the (nominal) 1600
MW Pukchang plant, as well as reports of arrangements for importing of used power plantboilers, possibly from Eastern Europe.372 Based on what we have heard from otherobservers, estimates by the (ROK) Korea Electrotechnical Research Institute (KERI) that
operable thermal capacity was about 2 GW, and output 5.4 TWh, in 2005, seems reasonable,
and we have adopted these estimates.373 We estimate the output of thermal generation in2008 at nearly the same level as 2005—5.3 TWh, but, based on consideration of the ratio of
ROK overall generation estimates in 2008 and 2009, we estimate the total thermal generationin 2009 to have been lower—about 4.2 TWh.374
371 Oxford Recycling Inc. (http://www.oxfordrecycling.com/product.html#5, visited 6/8/02) lists a sulfur content of 1.3 percent

for fuel from shredded tires.
372 Observers suggest that the coal mine feeding the Pukchang power plant was working at less than full capacity (as of several
years ago), as the use of largely older, manual tools limited output despite the mine being in operation around the clock. The
mine provides coal to other DPRK counties and provinces. Observers report that the Pukchang power plant itself appeared to be
operating at near-full capacity during approximately 2005, with most or all boilers in use most of the time.
373 J.Y. Yoon , "Analysis of Present Status and Future Supply /Demand Prospects for the DPRK Power System", presented at
the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA). Available fromhttps://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/papers-and-presentations/.
374 13 For 2009, we assume that there was a decrease in overall gross generation approximately equal to that estimated by J.Y.
Yoon in his presentation for the 2010 Energy and Minerals Experts Working Group Meeting in Beijing, September 2010
(available from https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2010-meeting/papers/, and in narrative form at
http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/the-dprk-power-sector-data-and-interconnection-options/), "Analysis on

166
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•As a consequence of the difficulties with thermal power plants, hydroelectric plants had
shouldered the burden of power generation in the DPRK by 2000. Information from industry
sources indicated that any difficulties associated with the 1995/1996 flood damage to theshared power stations (China/DPRK) along the Chinese border has been repaired, and thoseplants were operating normally within a few years. Normally, however, apparently meansthat those plants—about 700 MW of capacity each for China and for the DPRK—are usedlargely in a peaking mode to conserve river water, and operate at full capacity only during
the rainy mid-July to mid-August period. We have thus assumed an overall capacity factorof 17.5 percent for these units. Other hydroelectric facilities in the DPRK may in fact be
operated in a similar manner, and it is clear that the country as a whole has far less power inthe dry winter than at other times of the year. We have assumed, for the year 2000, that of
the approximately 3900 MW of other hydroelectric plants, 75 percent of capacity was
operable, and those operable hydro plants had a capacity factor in 2000 (a low water year)
equaling 75 percent of the capacity factor assumed for 1996, or about 33 percent overall.
This could, in fact, prove an over-estimate.

•

A major "Youth Dam" including a tunnel system for carrying water, had recently been
completed, but its hydroelectric capacity, if any as of 2000, was unclear. Also underway, atthe time of the 2000 Nautilus visit to the DPRK, was a scheme to dam the Taedong River toprovide irrigation water to rice fields on the Southwest Coast of the DPRK without the needto pump water from the Nampo barrage area. That project has since been completed (seeFigure 3-10), but it is not clear to the authors whether the latter project has or is expected tohave significant associated hydroelectric capacity, or whether the "Youth Dam" and theTaedong water diversion project are related.

•

For 2005, we have based our estimate of hydroelectric output on data from KERI (seeendnote reference above), but added 100 MW of large hydroelectric capacity, plus 86 MW of
medium-sized hydroelectric capacity, to account for facilities completed (or likely
completed) in 2005. The resulting estimate of hydroelectric capacity for 2005 is about 4100
MW, with output of about 11 TWh and thus an average capacity factor of a bit over 30
percent. In 2008 and 2009, hydroelectric capacity is assumed to have increased somewhat
over 2005 as a result of the completion of several medium-sized (tens of MW) hydro plants.
Average capacity factors for hydroelectric plants in both years were estimated at just under
32 percent, with total output of just under 12 TWh in both years.

•

The above assumptions as to electricity generation imply a gross output of about 13.3
terawatt-hours in 2000, 16.5 TWh in 2005, 17.2 TWh in 2008, and 16.2 TWh in 2009.
Chinese customs statistics cite export of 22.7 GWh to China from the DPRK in 2000,

DPRK Power Industry & Interconnection Options". In the presentation, Yoon quotes ROK analysts as estimating that the
DPRK's generation in 2008 was 25.5 TWh, and generation in 2009 was 23.5 TWh. We do not use these absolute generation
estimates, because we believe that they are too high (Mr. Yoon agreed that a "minimum" value could be closer to 16 TWh for
2007, for which ROK analysts estimate output of 23.7 TWh), but we use the ratio of these 2009 and 2008 estimates, 92.2%, toestimate a target value for 2009 output. As another point of comparison, a recent article by the Yonhap News Agency (“N.
Korea's power consumption per capita at 1970s levels”, dated 8/6/2010, and available ashttps://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20120806003300315), quoting the ROK’s Statistics Korea, describes per-capita consumption in
the DPRK of 819 kWh per capita, which would, based on the population assumptions used in this report, equate to about 19.7
TWh of overall consumption. Whether the quoted figure is intended to be actual end-use consumption, or simply overall
estimated electricity production divided by population, is unclear, as is the ultimate source used by Statistics Korea to prepare theestimate.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

apparently in addition to the shared output of the plants on the border rivers.375 No exports ofpower from China to the DPRK were recorded in 2000. China Customs statistics reported
DPRK electricity exports to China in 2005 of 90 GWh, along with exports of 143.5 GWh in2008 and 128.9 GWh in 2009. Imports of power to the DPRK from China had fallen to
about 660 MWh in 2005, but rose again to 17.9 GWh in 2008, falling to 6.9 GWh in 2009(and 3.3 GWh in 2010). Imports of power from China may therefore be helpful in somelocal areas near the border, possibly to provide power for enterprises in which Chinese firms
have invested, but imports from China do not contribute much to overall DPRK electricity
needs.
•We have assumed, based on reports of the continuing erosion of the transmission anddistribution (T&D) grid, that T&D losses were 20 percent higher in 2000 through 2009 thanin 1996, totaling over 27 percent of net generation. Although "own use" at coal-fired power
plants was assumed to remain at 9 percent of gross generation, we assumed that additional"emergency losses" decreased net output at coal-fired power plants, with overall net
emergency losses totaling 9.4 percent in 2000, and a slightly lower 9 percent in 2005 through2020, reflecting some improvements in power plant maintenance (or, alternatively, theabandonment of units with worse-than-average losses).
3.8.

Presentation of Estimated Year 2000, 2005, 2008 through 2010, and 2014
through 2020 DPRK Energy Balances, and Discussion of Results

In this section we present our estimated DPRK energy balances for 2000 through 2020. We
provide presentations of results for all fuels, as balances focusing on the supply of and demandfor electricity and of refined products in particular are presented in Chapters 5 and 6 of thisReport. As with our 1990 and 1996 balances, these pictures of the DPRK energy sector in 2000
through 2020 were pieced together from information from many different sources, with many
assumptions made to fill in the gaps in data. In so doing, we have attempted, however, to makethe balances as internally consistent as possible. Although the balances are doubtless in error inmany areas, we hope that it will provide a good starting point for those studying and discussing
the current state of the energy sector in the DPRK, and we would as always welcome any
additional information that reviewers of this document can provide. Additional results of ourestimates of year 2000 through year 2020 energy supply and demand in the DPRK can be foundin Attachments 1 and 2 to this Report.
Table 3-1 through Table 3-12 present summary versions of our estimated 2000 through 2020
energy balances for the DPRK. More detailed versions of selected balances (for 2000, 2010,2016, 2019, and 2020) are presented as Table 3-13 through Table 3-17. Detailed balances forthese and other years can be found in Attachment 1, as can detailed balances that focus on the
supply of and demand for refined petroleum products and electricity. Detailed electricity andpetroleum products balances for recent years are also presented in sections 5.3.1 and 0 of thisReport. In the summary balances, the largest difference between 1996 and 2000 is a pronounced(and growing) increase in the fraction of the total DPRK energy budget supplied by wood andbiomass (17 percent of supplies in 1996 vs. 27 percent in 2000, a slightly larger 28 percent in
375 Apparently, the shared hydro facilities on the Tumen and Yalu rivers have turbine sets dedicated to and operated by the

DPRK, and turbine sets dedicated to and operated by China. The two sets of turbines are operated at different frequencies. The
water resource appears, however, to be jointly managed, so that the two sets of turbines operate with the same capacity factor.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

2005, rising to 31 percent in 2010, then falling to a low of 23 percent in 2019 with better coalavailability, then rising again to 27 percent in 2020 as the impacts of COVID-19 restrictions
reduced activities in most non-residential sectors. Increases and decreases in the fractions of
total demand met by wood and biomass use were met with changes in opposite direction in thefractions of the DPRK energy budget accounted for by other fuels, particularly coal and coalproducts, as shown in Figure 3-17 through Figure 3-23.
Figure 3-24 and Figure 3-25 show, respectively the breakdown in shares of overall energy use by
sector from 1990 through 2020, and absolute energy use by sector in those years. Continuing thetrend of 1990 to 1996 described in Chapter 2 of this Report, the residential sector uses an evenlarger share (over 40 percent in each year) of the overall energy budget, while the industrial
sector share of total energy use shrinks to less than a third of the total through 2019, and falls
even further in 2020 due to a decline in industrial activity due to DPRK measures to restrict the
spread of COVID-19. This change is in general the combined result of continued reduction infuel demand in the industrial sector, slowly rising use of wood and other biomass fuels in theresidential and other sectors, and reductions in the use of other residential fuels (notably coal andelectricity) that are not as severe as the reductions experienced in the industrial sector, although
results vary on a year-to-year basis. Figure 3-26 shows the patterns of final fuels demand by
fuel, with the share of coal use eroding in 1990s and early 2000s but increasing again slightly inthe latter half of the 2010s. Figure 3-27 through Figure 3-32 show the patterns of demand forcoal by sector in selected years between 2000 and 2020.
Table 3-1: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2000
UNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

REF.
PROD

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASS

339

17

40

38

160

336
12
9
-

0
17
-

42
3
(1)

38
-

151
12
3
-

(53)

(17)

(1)

(38)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(32)
(16)
(1)
(4)

(17)
-

(38)
-

-

-

(16)
17
(0)
(1)
-

-

-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.

286

-

39

-

154

ENERGY DEMAND

286

-

39

-

154

150
95
3
0
21
16

-

12
8
2
1
1
11
0
4

-

1
1
122
15
7
3

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

1

CHARCOAL

0

HEAT

-

594

-

525
83
15
(1)

3

31

(79)

2

48
(0)
(2)
-

0

2
-

(6)

TOTAL

(0)
-

0
0

(6)

ELEC.

-

(1)

(2)
(13)

(35)
(0)
(18)
(4)
(1)
(3)
(17)

2

3

31

515

2

3

31

515

13
3
3
1
0
7
3

175
12
225
19
1
47
23
11

2
1
-

-

2

-

2
1

6

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)*
2.64
0.15
10.47
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

13.26

Table 3-2: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2005
COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

REF.
PROD

391

23

23

44

187

434
36
80
-

0
22
-

23
0
(0)

44
-

182
7
2
-

(112)

(23)

13

(43)

(6)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(84)
(21)
(2)
(5)

(23)
-

(43)
-

-

-

(8)
23
(0)
(1)
-

-

-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.

279

-

36

181

ENERGY DEMAND

279

-

36

-

181

150
85
5
0
20
17

-

9
11
2
1
1
11
0
1

-

1
1
135
26
8
5

UNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY2

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASSCHARCOAL

(0)

HEAT

ELEC.

TOTAL

(0)

668

0
0
-

661
89
82
(0)

4

38

(127)

4

60
(0)
(3)
-

-

-

0
0

2
-

(6)

(1)

(4)
(15)

(72)
(0)
(24)
(4)
(0)
(5)
(22)

2

4

38

541

2

4

38

539

15
4
4
1
0
9
5

175
16
230
34
2
47
28
8
16.55

2
2

1

-

-

2

-

2
1

6

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)
5.15
0.26
11.15
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

170
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 3-3: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2008
COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

REF.
PROD

379

23

26

43

204

427
19
67
-

0
23
-

30
4
-

43
-

200
6
1
-

(107)

(23)

9

(43)

(6)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(80)
(20)
(2)
(5)

(23)
-

(43)
-

-

-

(13)
23
(0)
(1)
-

-

-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.

272

-

34

-

198

ENERGY DEMAND

272

-

34

-

198

155
74
5
0
18
17

-

7
12
2
1
1
10
0
1

-

1
1
153
25
7
5

UNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

1

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASSCHARCOAL

HEAT

0

ELEC.

TOTAL

0

675

1
1
-

669
78
72
-

4

40

(124)

4

62
(0)
(3)
-

-

-

0
0

2
-

(6)

(1)

(3)
(16)

(69)
(0)
(23)
(4)
(1)
(5)
(22)

2

4

40

550

2

4

40

550

15
4
5
1
0
9
5

179
17
239
32
1
45
29
8
17.23

2
1
-

-

2

3

-

1

6

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)
5.12
0.29
11.83
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

Table 3-4: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2009
COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

397

22

13

43

205

484
7
94
-

0
22
-

14
0
-

43
-

202
5
1
-

(99)

(22)

14

(43)

(6)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(68)
(23)
(2)
(6)

(22)
-

(43)
-

-

-

(7)
22
(0)
(1)
-

-

-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.

298

-

28

-

199

ENERGY DEMAND

298

-

28

-

199

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMML
NON-ENERGY

181
76
5
0
18
17
1

-

5
9
2
1
1
9
0
1

-

1
1
156
24
7
5
6

UNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

REF.
PROD

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASSCHARCOAL

HEAT

0

ELEC.

-

TOTAL

0

681

1
0
-

729
48
96
-

4

37

(113)

4

58
(0)
(3)
-

-

0

2
-

(1)

(3)
(15)

(56)
(0)
(26)
(4)
(1)
(4)
(22)

2

4

37

568

2

4

37

568

15
4
4
1
0
8
5

202
14
241
31
1
43
28
- 8

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)
4.05
0.32
11.87
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

16.24

(6)

2
1
-

-

2

-

2
1

171
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 3-5: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2010
COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

383

25

15

43

208

492
13
122
-

0
25
-

16
2
-

43
-

205
4
1
-

(89)

(25)

17

(43)

(6)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(58)
(24)
(2)
(6)

(25)
-

(43)
-

-

-

(7)
25
(0)
(1)
-

-

-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.

294

-

31

-

202

ENERGY DEMAND

294

-

31

-

202

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

176
77
5
0
18
17

-

6
10
2
1
1
10
0
1

-

1
1
158
24
7
5

UNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

1

REF.
PROD

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASSCHARCOAL

HEAT

0

ELEC.

-

675

1
1
-

739
60
124
-

4

36

(105)

3

57
(0)
(3)
-

(48)
(0)
(27)
(4)

(1)

(2)
(15)

(4)
(22)

2

4

37

570

2

4

37

570

15
4
4
1
0
8
4

197
15
245
31
2
44
28
- 8

-

0
0

2
-

(6)

TOTAL

1

2
1
-

-

2

-

2
1

6

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)
3.44
0.36
11.91
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

15.70

Table 3-6: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2014
COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

457

25

21

39

851
8
402
-

0
25
-

22
1
-

(153)

(25)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(100)
(41)
(2)
(10)

(25)
-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.
ENERGY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGYUNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

CHARCOAL

HEAT

208

-

-

39
-

205
5
2
-

-

11

(39)

(7)

(39)
-

-

-

(12)
25
(0)
(1)
-

-

-

304

-

32

-

202

304

-

32

-

202

166
91
5
0
19
19

-

6
10
2
1
1
10
0
1

-

1
1
156
26
7
5

3

REF.
PROD

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASS

TOTAL

1

751

1
1
-

1,096
60
406
-

3

37

(171)

3

62
(0)
(6)
-

(87)
(0)
(46)
(5)

(1)

(4)
(15)

(5)
(27)

2

3

37

580

2

3

37

580

17
3
3
1
0
8
4

190
15
256
34
2
44
30
-10

-

2
-

(7)

ELEC.

2
1
-

-

2

-

2
1

6

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)
5.97
0.66
10.57
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

172
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

17.20

Table 3-7: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2015
COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

463

28

25

40

950
30
516
-

0
27
-

25
0
-

(159)

(28)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(100)
(45)
(2)
(12)

(28)
-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.
ENERGY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGYUNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

CHARCOAL

HEAT

204

-

-

40
-

202
5
2
-

-

9

(40)

(7)

(40)
-

-

-

(17)
28
(0)
(2)
-

-

-

304

-

35

-

198

304

-

35

-

198

157
99
6
0
20
20

-

8
11
3
1
1
10
1
1

-

1
1
151
27
7
5

3

REF.
PROD

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASS

TOTAL

1

762

2
0
-

1,192
89
519
-

3

37

(182)

3

62
(0)
(6)
-

(92)
(0)
(52)
(5)

(1)

(3)
(15)

(5)
(28)

2

3

38

580

2

3

38

580

17
4
3
1
0
8
4

182
16
260
35
1
45
31
-10

-

2
-

(7)

ELEC.

2
1
-

-

2

-

2
1

6

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)
5.08
0.96
11.25
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

17.29

Table 3-8: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2016
UNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

REF.
PROD

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASS

477

28

30

42

1,020
41
584
-

0
28
-

30
0
-

42
-

CHARCOAL

HEAT

197

-

-

194
4
2
-

-

TOTAL

(0)

774

0
1
-

1,257
104
586
-

4

39

(180)

3

65
(0)
(7)
-

(85)
0
(55)
(5)

(1)

(4)
(16)

(5)
(29)

-

(155)

(28)

8

(42)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(91)
(49)
(2)
(12)

(28)
-

(42)
-

-

-

(20)
29
(0)
(2)
-

-

-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.

322

-

37

-

190

2

4

39

594

ENERGY DEMAND

322

-

37

-

190

2

3

39

593

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

165
107
5
0
20
21

-

8
11
3
1
1
11
1
1

-

1
1
146
24
6
5

16
4
4
1
0
9
4

191
16
264
32
2
46
33
-10

3

(7)

ELEC.

2
-

(7)

2
1
-

-

2

-

2
1

6

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)
5.44
1.21
11.50
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

173
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

18.15

Table 3-9: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2017
COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

460

28

17

38

567
29
137
-

0
27
-

17
0
-

(126)

(28)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(90)
(27)
(2)
(7)

(28)
-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.
ENERGY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGYUNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

CHARCOAL

HEAT

172

-

-

38
-

169
4
1
-

-

15

(38)

(7)

(38)
-

-

-

(11)
28
(0)
(2)
-

-

-

334

-

31

-

165

334

-

31

-

165

158
126
5
0
20
23

-

4
10
3
1
1
9
1
1

-

1
1
123
22
6
5

2

REF.
PROD

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASS

ELEC.

713

0
1
-

774
77
139
-

4

37

(142)

3

59
(0)
(4)
-

(77)
(0)
(31)
(5)

(1)

(4)
(15)

(5)
(23)

2

4

36

571

2

3

36

571

14
4
4
1
0
9
4

177
15
260
29
2
45
34
-10

-

2
-

(7)

TOTAL

(1)

2
1
-

-

2

-

2
1

6

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)
5.29
0.67
10.37
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

16.33

Table 3-10: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2018
COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

449

31

13

39

531
0
82
-

0
30
-

13
0
-

(107)

(31)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(73)
(25)
(2)
(7)

(31)
-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.
ENERGY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGYUNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

CHARCOAL

HEAT

165

-

-

39
-

161
4
0
-

-

17

(39)

(7)

(39)
-

-

-

(12)
31
(0)
(2)
-

-

-

343

-

30

-

158

343

-

30

-

158

155
137
4
0
21
24

-

4
10
3
1
1
9
1
1

-

1
1
117
21
7
5

1

REF.
PROD

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASS

TOTAL

(1)

697

0
1
-

732
48
83
-

4

35

(125)

4

56
(0)
(3)
-

(64)
(0)
(29)
(5)

(1)

(3)
(14)

(5)
(22)

2

4

35

571

2

3

35

571

13
4
4
1
0
9
4

173
14
266
27
1
45
36
- 8

-

2
-

(7)

ELEC.

2
1
-

-

2

-

2
1

6

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)
4.34
0.67
10.55
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

174
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

15.56

Table 3-11: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2019
COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

457

31

14

38

619
0
163
-

0
30
-

14
0
-

(112)

(31)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLosses

(73)
(30)
(2)
(8)

(31)
-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.
ENERGY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGYUNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

CHARCOAL

HEAT

165

-

-

38
-

161
4
-

-

16

(38)

(7)

(38)
-

-

-

(13)
31
(0)
(2)
-

-

-

345

-

30

-

157

345

-

30

-

157

155
139
4
0
21
25

-

4
10
3
1
1
9
1
1

-

1
1
119
19
7
5

1

REF.
PROD

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASS

ELEC.

704

0
1
-

819
49
164
-

3

35

(131)

3

57
(0)
(4)
-

(64)
(0)
(34)
(5)

(1)

(3)
(14)

(5)
(23)

2

3

35

572

2

3

35

572

13
4
4
1
0
9
4

173
14
269
24
1
46
37
- 8

-

2
-

(7)

TOTAL

(1)

2
1
-

-

2

-

2
1

6

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)
4.34
0.74
10.66
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

15.74

Table 3-12: Summary Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2020
COAL &
COKE

CRUDE
OIL

379

32

461
0
82
-

0
32
-

-

(73)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Prod./Prep.
Charcoal Production
District Heat Production
Own UseLossesUNITS: PETAJOULES (PJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY

REF.
PROD

HYDRO/ WOOD/
NUCL. BIOMASS

HEAT

-

39

164

-

-

39
-

162
2
-

-

(32)

18

(39)

(7)

(43)
(22)
(2)
(6)

(32)
-

(39)
-

-

-

(13)
32
(0)
(2)
-

-

-

FUELS FOR FINAL CONS.

306

-

24

-

156

ENERGY DEMAND

306

-

24

-

156

INDUSTRIAL
TRANSPORTRESIDENTIALAGRICULTURALFISHERIESMILITARY
PUBLIC/COMMLNON-SPECIFIEDNON-ENERGY

125
141
4
0
17
18

-

4
7
3
1
1
6
1

-

1
1
121
18
7
4

Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSF.

7

CHARCOAL

7

619

0
1
-

662
41
83
-

5

33

(94)

5

51
(0)
(3)
-

(40)
(0)
(25)
(5)

(1)

(2)
(13)

(4)
(20)

2

5

32

525

2

4

32

525

10
4
6
1
0
8
3

140
11
278
23
1
37
26
- 7

-

2

1
-

-

2

-

4
1

1

1

TOTAL

(1)

2

(7)

ELEC.

6

Elect. Gen. (Gr. TWhe)
2.58
0.72
10.74
*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

175
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

14.04

Table 3-13: Detailed Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2000
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONCOAL &
COKE
338,806

CRUDE
OIL
16,877336,168
11,952
9,314

298
16,579REFINED HYDRO/WOOD/PROD. NUCLEAR BIOMASS CHARCOAL
40,01037,705
160,477
3
37,705
41,7783,013

150,543
12,4502,517

3
0(6,051)

1,815(52,861)(16,877)(721)(37,705)(16,206)
16,877(37,705)(16,877)(31,665)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

285,945-

39,289-154,425

ENERGY DEMAND

285,944-

39,290-149,673
67,382
19,096
2,070
2,325
836
4,924
869
6,100
21,383
24,689-11,726-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified--

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

95,05573,24621,808AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

2,827

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

ELECTRICITY
(82)

82

2,645

30,857(78,898)

2,451

47,746(99)(2,179)(661)(1,903)(12,708)(35,379)(99)(18,272)(4,236)(524)(2,904)(17,485)

1,818

2,645

30,775514,898

154,426

1,818

2,645

30,774

514,897

1,153-

12,828
3,609
1,503
1,629
1,373
194
857
137
518
65
2,942

175,380
70,991
27,623
4,042
3,699
1,865
5,780
4,484
6,618
21,44828,831

3,237-

12,135
7,052
3,821
476
786
-

(16,093)(6,051)
(988)

1,815

(391)

855

(1,001)(4,116)

7,024
343
836
3,478

882

317

8,395
6,548
585
476
786
-

-

-

2,079
1,924
156

-

121,601
19,021
102,580

1,818
1,117
701

1,826
1,826

2,856
2,421
435

225,235
99,555
125,680

-

968
507
461

-

14,663

-

-

979
526
452

19,437
1,033
18,404

828
668
161

-

-

-

196

1,447
668
779

-

-

2,827
423
423

-

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

21,308-401
20,908

11,094
4,064
148
1,367
5,430
85

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

15,62978

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

TOTAL
593,796524,715
82,762
14,926(1,245)-(1,245)

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesINDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

HEAT
-

504
504

-

3,237

14,663
-

196
7,379

-

1,029

4,121

Electricity Gen. (Gross TWhe)*

2.64

0.15

-

7,379
3,126

-

NON-ENERGY USE

-

820
-

6,000
10.47

*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

176
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

7,420

21
7,399

47,202
4,064
148
1,367
5,430
422
35,771

3,258

22,911
11,15013.26

Table 3-14: Detailed Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2010
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONCOAL &
COKE
383,464

CRUDE
OIL
25,309491,714
13,432
121,681251
25,058REFINED HYDRO/PROD. NUCLEAR
14,78942,864WOOD/
BIOMASS
208,309

CHARCOAL
042,864

204,624
4,268
583

0
0

(6,067)1,820

16,459
1,670

ELECTRICITY
507

1,053
546

(89,126)(25,309)

16,676(42,864)(42,864)(25,309)(7,118)25,309

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses(57,667)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

294,338-

31,465-202,242

ENERGY DEMAND

294,337-

31,465-202,242

175,522
69,19743,099
1,950
1,725
642
15,133
4,423
5,172
19,09015,090

-

5,688

-

836

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified--

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

77,012
63,513
13,499AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

4,907

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

HEAT-(1,900)36,023(105,330)

3,353

56,540(149)(3,188)(935)(2,395)(14,785)(47,756)(149)(26,726)(4,247)(836)(3,875)(21,740)

1,820

3,517

36,530569,912

1,821

3,517

36,530569,912--

15,204
3,707
2,611
1,535
1,019
149
2,633
214
439
58
2,839

197,250
72,90447,988
3,823
2,744
1,433
17,766
7,018
5,611
19,14818,814

-

-

3,913
0
3,913

-

15,111
9,432
4,439
376
863
-

1,820

(35)

1,100

(1,480)(6,020)

2,278
338
642
2,381
691

194

10,485
8,720
526
376
863
-

-

-

2,071
1,894
177

-

158,248
35,291
122,957

1,821
1,127
694

2,294
2,294

3,849
3,366
483

245,295
107,486
137,809

-

1,031
539
491

-

23,955

-

-

1,211
374
838

31,105913
30,192

430
430

-

889
724
165

-

-

-

183

1,502
724
778

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

18,415--401
18,014

10,018
3,186
103
2,100
4,553
76

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

17,037417

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

4,907

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

712
712

739,453
60,270124,480-

3,517(23,539)(6,067)

TOTAL
675,242

23,955
-

183
7,379

-

7,379
5,111

-

NON-ENERGY USE

1,014

866

Electricity Gen. (Gross TWhe)

3.44

0.36

-

1,224
-

6,000
11.91

*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

177
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

7,699

21
7,678

43,512
3,186
103
2,100
4,553
422
33,147

4,469

28,258
7,879
15.70

Table 3-15: Detailed Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2016
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONCOAL &
COKE
476,927

CRUDE
OIL
28,282

1,019,644
41,430584,146251
28,031REFINED HYDRO/PROD. NUCLEAR
29,61442,351WOOD/
BIOMASS
196,968

42,351

194,495
4,172
1,699

29,63420(154,503)(28,282)

7,510(42,351)(19,615)
28,840(42,351)(28,282)(7,137)(91,391)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

322,425-

37,124-

189,831

ENERGY DEMAND

322,424-

37,123-

189,831

165,190
65,23844,481
6,156
1,356
443
13,444
4,230
3,879
14,99910,965

-

8,454

-

584

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified--

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

107,093
83,88023,2135,004

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/OtherFISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/OtherHEAT-ELECTRICITY
(295)

307
602

-

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesINDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

CHARCOAL-

2,141(1,817)38,921(180,109)

3,398

65,340(170)(6,610)(955)(3,679)(15,960)(84,619)389(55,421)(4,996)(704)(5,360)(29,398)

2,141

3,592

38,626

593,739

2,141

3,592

38,627593,737--

16,472
3,494
2,802
4,846
801
103
2,339
212
330
46
1,500

190,700
68,73251,511
12,0982,156
988
15,783
6,953
4,208
15,045
13,224

-

-

4,375
17
4,358

-

16,276
10,013
4,912
363
988
-

2,141

(35)

1,148

(1,681)(12,484)

4,228
1,096
443
2,511
619

141

11,020
9,115
554
363
988
-

-

-

2,993
2,728
266

-

146,422
31,668
114,754

2,141
1,331
810

2,023
2,023

3,508
3,172
336

264,179
124,801
139,379

-

1,106
579
527

-

24,428

-

-

1,163
359
804

31,702938
30,764
2,092
1,282
810

-

5,004

881
881

24,428

430
430

-

1,463
1,282
181

-

-

-

-

199

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

20,106

-

-

6,401

-

-

8,609

445
19,66010,805
3,999
111
2,567
4,049
80

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

21,312746

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

1,256,740
103,574
586,466-

3,592(48,811)(7,137)

TOTAL
773,848

199

6,401
5,115

-

1,254
315

NON-ENERGY USE

3,289

537

Electricity Gen. (Gross TWhe)

5.44

1.21

6,000
11.50

*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

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24
8,585

45,921
3,999
111
2,567
4,049
469
34,7274,300

32,727
315
9,826
18.15

Table 3-16: Detailed Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2019
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONCOAL &
COKE
456,851

CRUDE
OIL
30,705REFINED HYDRO/PROD. NUCLEAR
14,04838,392WOOD/
BIOMASS
164,524

619,098
301
162,548

251
30,45438,392160,907
3,616-(112,177)(30,705)

16,178(38,392)(12,705)
30,705(38,392)(30,705)

14,12779(7,321)(73,027)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

344,674-

30,226-

157,203

ENERGY DEMAND

344,674-

30,226-

157,203

154,886
55,18442,177
2,359
1,356
443
12,785
4,899
3,556
15,681
16,447

-

4,147

-

654

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified--

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

139,060
105,137
33,924
3,826

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/OtherFISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/OtherHEAT-ELECTRICITY
(834)

172
1,006

-

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesINDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

CHARCOAL-

2,196(1,934)35,428(131,435)

3,030

56,674(179)(4,014)(893)(2,937)(14,117)(64,419)(179)(33,650)(5,125)(749)(4,724)(22,589)

2,196

3,359

34,594572,251

2,196

3,359

34,593572,251--

12,995
2,956
2,552
1,857
801
103
2,224
192
302
48
1,960

172,682
58,14046,902
4,632
2,156
988
15,0096,316
3,858
15,72918,952

-

-

3,661
55
3,606

-

14,109
8,828
4,103
320
858
-

2,196

(36)

1,222

(1,786)(7,580)

2,173
416
443
1,225
333
9,662
7,988
496
320
858
-

-

-

3,300
2,998
301

-

119,048
23,621
95,427

2,196
1,368
828

2,037
2,037

3,659
3,308
351

269,300
138,469
130,831

-

749
396
353

-

18,678

-

-

927
312
615

24,180708
23,472

1,032
910
122

-

-

-

147

1,464
910
554

-

-

3,826
285
285

-

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

20,852-445
20,407

9,272
4,035
85
2,209
2,867
76

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

24,515981

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

211
785
785

818,649
48,670163,633-

3,359(29,637)(7,321)

TOTAL
703,686

18,678
-

147
6,644

-

-

6,644
5,393

-

1,321
-

NON-ENERGY USE

1,248

1,083

Electricity Gen. (Gross TWhe)

4.34

0.74

6,000
10.66

*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

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8,819

24
8,795

45,587
4,035
85
2,209
2,867
469
35,922

4,387

36,597
8,331
15.74

Table 3-17: Detailed Estimated Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK in 2020
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONCOAL &
COKE
378,623

CRUDE
OIL
32,196REFINED HYDRO/PROD. NUCLEAR
6,629
39,155WOOD/
BIOMASS
163,652

460,509120
82,006251
31,945

39,155

161,844
1,808-(72,547)(32,196)

17,511(39,155)(12,758)
32,196(39,155)(32,196)

6,629-(7,435)(42,949)

FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

306,076-

24,141-

156,217

ENERGY DEMAND

306,075-

24,141-

156,217

125,183
47,06932,188
1,179
986
354
9,654
3,810
2,586
10,90816,447

-

4,498

-

566

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified--

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

141,394
106,977
34,417
3,629

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/OtherFISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/OtherHEAT-ELECTRICITY
(834)

172
1,006

-

Electricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesINDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

CHARCOAL-

2,231(1,915)32,846(94,106)

4,650

50,560(188)(2,985)(1,233)(1,796)(12,745)(39,652)(188)(25,030)(5,205)(749)(3,667)(19,616)

2,231

4,639

32,012525,315

2,231

4,639

32,013525,316--

10,180
2,521
2,024
928
582
82
1,679
150
220
33
1,960

140,427
49,59037,198
2,316
1,568
791
11,333
4,912
2,806
10,942
18,970

-

-

3,663
57
3,606

-

11,478
6,750
3,980
200
547
-

2,231

(55)

1,222

(1,871)(5,638)

2,986
208
354
953
351
7,233
6,111
374
200
547
-

-

-

3,437
3,127
310

-

120,823
24,00996,814

2,231
1,390
840

3,528
3,528

6,406
5,796
610

277,818
144,827
132,991

-

741
396
344

-

17,713

-

-

895
312
583

22,977708
22,269

929
819
110

-

-

-

132

1,318
819
499

-

-

3,629
257
257

-

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

17,308-223
17,085

5,731
2,409
47
1,653
1,556
65

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

17,682707

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

211
582
582

661,758
40,674
83,012-

4,639(22,045)(7,435)

TOTAL
619,42117,713
-

132
6,644

-

-

6,644
3,890

-

953
158

NON-ENERGY USE

624

866

Electricity Gen. (Gross TWhe)

2.58

0.72

6,000
10.74

*Note: Gross terawatt-hours for coal-fired plants includes output for plants co-fired with coal and heavy fuel oil.

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7,575

12
7,564

37,258
2,409
47
1,653
1,556
235
31,3583,161

26,393
158
7,490
14.04

Figure 3-17: 2000 DPRK Energy Supply Shares by Fuel

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE:
2000
CRUDE OIL
3%
REF. PROD
7%
COAL & COKE
57%

HYDRO/NUCL.
6%

WOOD/
BIOMASS
27%

Figure 3-18: 2005 DPRK Energy Supply Shares by Fuel

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE:
2005
WOOD/
BIOMASS
28%

HYDRO/NUCL.
7%
COAL &COKE
59%

REF. PROD
3%CRUDE OIL
3%

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Figure 3-19: 2005 DPRK Energy Supply Shares by Fuel

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE:
2005
WOOD/
BIOMASS
28%

HYDRO/NUCL.
7%
COAL &COKE
59%

REF. PROD
3%CRUDE OIL
3%

Figure 3-20: 2010 DPRK Energy Supply Shares by Fuel
ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE: 2010

CRUDE OIL
4%

COAL & COKE
57%

REF. PROD
2%

HYDRO/NUCL.
6%WOOD/
BIOMASS
31%

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Figure 3-21: 2016 DPRK Energy Supply Shares by Fuel
ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE: 2016

COAL & COKE
62%

CRUDE OIL
4%

REF. PROD
4%WOOD/
BIOMASS
25%

HYDRO/NUCL.
5%

Figure 3-22: 2019 DPRK Energy Supply Shares by Fuel
ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE: 2019

COAL & COKE
65%
CRUDE OIL
4%WOOD/
BIOMASS
23%

REF. PROD
2%
HYDRO/NUCL.
6%

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Figure 3-23: 2020 DPRK Energy Supply Shares by Fuel

ESTIMATED DPRK ENERGY SUPPLY BY TYPE: 2020

COAL & COKE
61%

CRUDE OIL
5%
REF. PROD
1%WOOD/
BIOMASS
27%

HYDRO/NUCL.
6%

Figure 3-24: DPRK Energy Use Shares by Sector, 1990 - 2020

100%

Fraction of DPRK Energy Demand by Sector: 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005,
2008 through 2010, and 2014 through 2020

Fraction of Energy Demand

90%
80%
70%
60%
50%

Nonenergy
Public/Commercial
Fisheries
Residential
Industrial

Nonspecified/Other
Military
Agricultural
Transport

40%

30%
20%
10%
0%
1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 3-25: DPRK Energy Use by Sector, 1990 - 2020
DPRK Energy Demand by Sector: 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008 through2010, and 2014 through 2020

Petajoules Energy Use

1,600
1,400
1,200

1,000

Nonenergy
Public/Commercial
Fisheries
Residential
Industrial

Nonspecified/Other
Military
Agricultural
Transport

800
600
400

200
1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Figure 3-26: Share of DPRK Energy Use by Fuel, 1990 - 2020

Fraction of Energy Use

DPRK Energy Demand by Fuel Category: 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008
through 2010, and 2014 through 2020
100%
90%
80%

70%
60%
50%

Heat
Electricity
Charcoal
Wood/Biomass
Refined Products
Coal and Coke

40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

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Figure 3-27: Shares of DPRK Coal Use by Fuel, 2000

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2000
AGRICULTURAL
1%

TRANSPORT0%RESIDENTIAL
33%

FISHERIES0%MILITARY
8%
PUBLIC/COMML
6%

INDUSTRIAL
52%

NONSPECIFIEDNON- 0%ENERGY
0%

Figure 3-28: Shares of DPRK Coal Use by Fuel, 2005

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2005
AGRICULTURAL
3%

TRANSPORT0%RESIDENTIAL
30%FISHERIES0%MILITARY
7%
PUBLIC/COMML
6%

INDUSTRIAL
54%

NON-SPECIFIED
0%
NON-ENERGY
1%186
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Figure 3-29: Shares of DPRK Coal Use by Fuel, 2010

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2010 AGRICULTURAL
TRANSPORT0%RESIDENTIAL
26%

3%
FISHERIES0%MILITARY
6%
PUBLIC/COMML
6%
NON-SPECIFIED
0%

INDUSTRIAL
60%

NON-ENERGY
0%

Figure 3-30: Shares of DPRK Coal Use by Fuel, 2016

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2016
AGRICULTURAL
3%
TRANSPORT0%FISHERIES0%RESIDENTIAL33%

MILITARY
6%
PUBLIC/COMML
7%

NON-SPECIFIED
0%

INDUSTRIAL
51%

NON-ENERGY
1%187
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Figure 3-31: Shares of DPRK Coal Use by Fuel, 2019

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
AGRICULTURALSECTOR: 20193%
TRANSPORT0%FISHERIES0%RESIDENTIAL40%

MILITARY
6%
PUBLIC/COMML
7%

INDUSTRIAL
45%

NON-SPECIFIED
0%
NON-ENERGY
1%Figure 3-32: Shares of DPRK Coal Use by Fuel, 2020

Estimated DPRK COAL DEMAND BY
SECTOR: 2020
AGRICULTURAL
3%
RESIDENTIAL
46%

FISHERIES0%MILITARY
6%
PUBLIC/COMML…

INDUSTRIAL
41%

NON-SPECIFIED
0%

TRANSPORT0%

NON-ENERGY…

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK4.

The DPRK’s Energy Resources for Fueling Redevelopment
4.1.

Introduction

As with virtually any country, the key resource that the DPRK possesses to drive theredevelopment of its economy is its people. The political and other developments of the last
three decades, and their effect on the DPRK economy, however, mean that the availability ofdedicated workers alone will not be sufficient to assure significant economic progress in the
DPRK, even assuming an improvement in the DPRK’s relations with neighboring countries andthe world community.
In the short and medium term, the DPRK’s mineral resource endowment will likely be drawn on
to provide the major source of income to fuel economic growth. As the economy improves,energy resources, but from domestic supplies and from exports, will need to be tapped in greater
quantities. Coal has for more than a century been the most important fossil fuel resource for the
DPRK. Oil and gas, though substantially untapped, are said to be found in the DPRK’s onshore
and offshore territories. Wood and other biomass contribute, as noted above, a considerable
portion of the DPRK’s estimated energy supplies, but forest health (and, relatedly, soil
conservation) has become a major concern in the DPRK in recent years. Additional renewable
resources—solar, tidal, and wind energy—are available. Finally, the relatively low efficiency
with which energy is currently used in most applications in the DPRK means that there is asignificant resource of energy efficiency to be tapped as the DPRK economy improves—andtapping that resource has important ramifications for the amounts of fuels, electricity, and heatultimately needed in the DPRK. In the Chapter that follows, we review the status of the DPRK’s
estimated supplies of each of these potential “resources for fueling development”. Note that
Chapters 2, 3 and 5 also provide summary information on DPRK energy resources, the latter inthe context of resources available for electricity generation.
4.2.

Fossil Fuels

Coal has historically been the DPRK’s only significant domestic fossil fuel resource, and the
DPRK has, by all accounts, substantial coal reserves. Recent production of oil in the DPRK has
been rumored, albeit at a small scale, following many years of exploration with a variety ofpartners. Geologic structures bearing gas have also been identified in DPPRK territory.
4.2.1. Coal
The DPRK has abundant coal resources, including deposits of anthracite coal and lignite, or“brown” coal. It substantially lacks, however, bituminous coal, which is the most common coalused worldwide as an input to coke production for steelmaking, and as a power plant fuel. Coalquality in the DPRK seems to be quite variable, with reported energy contents for different
DPRK coals ranging from a very low 1000 and 2300 kilocalories (kcals) per kilogram for “lowgrade coal” (lignite and anthracite, respectively)376 to a relatively high 6150 kcal/kg for high376 Document in the authors’ files [VO-90].

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

grade anthracite coal.377 The DPRK’s total coal resource or reserves have been variously
estimated at levels ranging from 600 million tonnes (“proven coal reserves”, and “recoverable
coal reserves”, as noted in international compendia of energy statistics378) to resources (“coaldeposits”) of nearly 15 billion tonnes.379 The latter estimate was included in a fairly detailed
description of coal (and other mineral) resource in the DPRK published through a Koreanlanguage website in China.380 Information from the latter source includes the following:“Coal in the DPRK is generally divided into two kinds - anthracite and lignite. The major
producing area of anthracite is North and South P'yo'ngan Provinces and lignite is mainly
distributed in North and South Hamgyo'ng Provinces. In terms of area, the four major
coalfields are in the northern part of South P'yo'ngan Province, southern part of SouthP'yo'ngan Province, and northern part of North Hamgyo'ng Province, and southern part ofSouth Hamgyo'ng Province respectively.
“Of the about 100 central-level [chungang-ku'p] coal mines in the DPRK, 70 are
anthracitic coal mines and 30 are lignite ones. There are about 500 local-level small- andmedium-sized coal mines.
“The conjoined areas in the southern part of South P'yo'ngan Province surrounding
Pyongyang, 80 km east and west of [Pyongyang], are very rich in coal deposits. Coal
mines that can be representative include Samsindong in Taeso'ng District, Sadong
District, Ryongso'ng District, Hu'ngnyo'ng District in Kangdong County, Kangso'
County, So'ngch'o'n County, and Onch'o'n County.
“Anthracitic coal in the northern part of South P'yo'ngan Province is distributed in an area
668 square km wide. Major coal mines are To'kch'o'n, Hyo'ngbong, and Chenam in theCity of To'kch'o'n; Choyang, Kaech'o'n, Pongch'o'n, Yo'mjo'n, Wo'lli, Sillim; Songnamand Hyo'ndong in Pukch'ang County; Sinch'ang, Ch'o'nso'ng, and Yo'ngdae in U'nsanCounty; Musandae and Chiktong in Sunch'o'n County; and Ryongdu'ng, Ryongmun, andRyongch'o'l in Kujang County, North P'yo'ngan Province.
“Wuguang Group, one of the five leading Chinese Coal Mining Enterprises, has obtainedmining rights to Ryongdu'ng Coal Mine.
“In North Hamgyo'ng Province, Pukpu Coalfield (north of Aoji-ri), Nambu Coalfield(south of Ch'o'ngjin), and Anju Coalfield in South P'yo'ngan Province have the richest
coal deposit.
“Among the coal mines in the Pukpu Coalfield, the largest are Aoji in U'ndo'k County
and Obong and Hoeryo'ng in the City of Musan. Anju Coal Mine has seven 25-meter377 Choi Su Young, Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea, RINU, 1993.

P. 14.

378 For example, U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration, “EIA Country Analysis Brief”, Updated

February 2006, and available as https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/PRK; and British Petroleum Company,“QUANTIFYING ENERGY: BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY JUNE 2006", more recent versions of which
are available as https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/downloads.html.
379 For example, an article in MSN Encarta, “North Korea”, (now unavailable, but previously available as
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761555092_2/North_Korea.html), states “Most estimates suggest that North Korea’s vast
anthracite coal reserves exceed 10 billion tons.” The Federation of American Scientists, in a web page entitled “other industry”
and available as http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/target/industry.htm, lists, estimated anthracite coal reserves of 1.8 billion
tonnes.
380 Changchun Killim Sinmun (Internet Version-WWW) in Korean 31 Aug 06 - 08 Sep 06, “"Guide to DPRK Mineral
Resources".

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKthick ore beds. Lignite coal with caloric value of over 5,300 kilocalories [kcal/kg] ismainly being produced in this coal mine. It is the largest coal mine in the DPRK,
producing 7 million tonnes a year.
“The DPRK is confirmed to have coal deposit of 14.74 billion tonnes. Of them, 11.74
billion tonnes is anthracitic coal and 3 billion tonnes of lignite coal.”
As noted elsewhere in this Report, customs statistics report that the DPRK has since 2004
exported between 1.5 and 22 (the latter in 2016) million tonnes of coal annually to China in
exchange for strategic materials needed by North Korea or for hard currency.381 For example,
coal produced in the Pyong-An Regional Mines has been reportedly exported to Tien-jin, Dalianand Ching-dao Cities in China from Nam-po port in the Western DPRK.
It has been reported that the Anju coalfield has produced coking coal (high heat content coalused as coking coal), which was exported to China in 2008. South Korean research papers on
the topic, however, have so far denied the existence of coking-quality coal production at Anju.
Annual nationwide coal production was reported by ROK soures as 38.3 million tonnes in 1989,
but production of coal declined sharply after 1990 such that annual coal production was 18.6
million tonnes in 1999.382 Estimated nationalwide coal production capacity, however, is said tohave been 53.50 million tonnes in 1986.
With regard to coal quality, DPRK-produced anthracite coal from the Duck-Chon coal mine isreported by Chinese importing authorities and shipping business sources to have the following
characteristics. Coal of this type has been exported to Chinese thermal power plants in Tien-jin
and Dai-lian. This coal is of much better quality from a caloric value standpoint than normal
coal produced by the DPRK.
Coal Specifications:•

Caloric value: 6,480 kcal/kg (min.)•Fixed Carbon: 80.3% (max.)•

Ash contents: 12.2% (max.)•

Volatile material: 6.1% (max.)•

Sulfur: 0.2% (max.)•

Moisture (max): 6.0% (max.)•Size: 0-30 mm (100%. min.)Urgent Problems in the DPRK Coal Industry
There have been, over the past three decades, and are currently several urgent reported problems
that the DPRK coal industry must overcome. First, the depth of mining at existing sites hasgrown, which means that the expense and difficulty of draining underground water has

381 Most of the remainder of this discussion of the DPRK coal sector is adapted from a report prepared for Nautilus by Edward

Yoon, Status and Future of the North Korean Minerals Sector, dated January 2011, and available as http://nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/DPRK-Minerals-Sector-YOON.pdf.
382 Korea Mineral Improvment Corporation Report, “Deposits of Mineral resource in DPRK and trading between South andNorth Koreas”, 2005.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

increased, and the operational effectiveness of the mines has decreased, on average. Second, alack of power, transport equipment, mining technology and funding has held down production.
Third, there is a lack of attention to mine development, as opposed to enforcement of impracticalplans to promote coal production in the short term when new general managers or Labor party
executive are sent to oversee the mines. Fourth, deterioration of mining equipment andequipment parts, as well as lack of mine support posts, limits production. Fifth, a high rate ofindustrial accidents and the lack of new investment in the coal mining industry reduces output.
And sixth, that lack of electricity for mine operation is a cause of lack of power production due
to the fact that most thermal power plants rely on coal supplied by coal mines as energy sources,
resulting in a vicious circle connecting the problems of lack of power and the energy sources
used to produce power in the DPRK.
Assuming future coal output on the order of 20 to 50 million tonnes annually, coal reserves
would appear to be adequate for at least 20 years, and probably on the order of 100 years, ofconsumption.383
4.2.2. Oil and Gas
Whether or not oil in commercial quantities has actually been produced from wells either on- or
offshore in DPRK territory is somewhat unclear. As noted above (see section 3.7.8), one media
source listed production of 300,000 tonnes of crude oil per year starting in approximately 2000,
but experts consulted in preparing this Report cast doubt on that estimate, though at least one
expert (as of 2006) offered his opinion that ongoing oil production at some level occurred in the
DPRK.
The amount of oil resource present in DPRK territories is uncertain. Explorations of potential
oil-bearing structures—both onshore and offshore—in the DPRK have occurred intermittently
for years. Within the past two decades, the DPRK has negotiated and/or reached agreements on
exploration of its potential oil resource areas with the ROK’s Korean National Oil Company,
with the private firm Aminex Plc., of the United Kingdom, and with the Chinese Government,
though this may not be an exhaustive list of potential DPRK oil (and gas) development
partners.384 385 Several sources suggest that an oil resource of about 12 billion barrels lies in
the Korea West Sea off of the DPRK, in the area near Anju.386 The map shown in Figure 4-1
indicates several possible or probable oil-bearing areas in the DPRK or in its waters.387 Figure383

This assumes that the DPRK will continue to use domestic coal. If its economy develops, and with the global implications ofcoal use on climate change, as well as the relative economics of coal production in other nations the DPRK might trade with (theUnited States, Indonesia, and/or Australia, for example, as the ROK has come to do as its domestic coal industry has been pricedout of the market), though this is not a given, and internationally power generation in many places is trending away from the useof coal, for a variety of reasons.
384 Keun-Wook Paik, “Challenges and Opportunities in Sino-DPRK Energy Cooperation”, in China Brief: A Journal of Analysis
and Information, Volume VI, Issue 16, August 2, 2006, published by the Jamestown Foundation. Pages 6 and 7.
385 Selig S. Harrison, in “Quiet Struggle in the East China Sea”, (Current History, September 2002, page 271) identifies several
other oil exploration arrangements made between the DPRK and mostly small western companies before 2000.
386 Selig S. Harrison (2005), Seabed Petroleum in Northeast Asia: Conflict or Cooperation? Published by the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Available ashttps://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/Asia_petroleum.pdf.
387 Map from The People’s Korea, 2 December 1998, “DPRK has 12 Mil. (sic) Barrels of Oil Reserves in Western Sea: Expert”,
available as http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55a/161.html. Note that this map provides confusing references to oil units.

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4-2 provides a photo of an oil rig, provided by Romania, which was reportedly used by the
DPRK to prospect for oil in the Tumen River area in the late 1990s.388
Figure 4-1: Location of Potential DPRK Oil Resources

The correct unit for the oil estimates by “zone” appears to be million tonnes of oil (summing to a total of 155 million tonnes,
which would be on the order of 1.2 billion barrels.
388 Photo from presentation by SOVEREIGN VENTURES PTE LTD, “Hydrocarbon Potential of Cenozoic Basins In the TumanRiver Area of North Korea (DPRK)”, prepared by Dr. Robert Mummery, dated 7/6/2002, and formerly available at http://svoil.com/oil/cspg/Sub.asp?TitleID=0 and http://sv-oil.com/oil/cspg/images/CSPG_presentation.pdf, but with a related abstract
available as http://www.searchanddiscovery.com/abstracts/html/2004/annual/abstracts/Mummery.htm.

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Figure 4-2: Oil Rig, Provided by Romania, in use in the Tumen River Area of the DPRK

A document from a Korean-oriented, Japan-based website includes the following reference to along-term DPRK program of research into oil resources in its territory:389“In its report released in late 1997, the ministry [Ministry of Petroleum Industry], after 30
years of geological study and test borings in both offshore and onshore parts of thecountry, concluded that there exist seven oil-bearing basins. The report suggests that theWest Sea Bay Basin alone contains billions of barrels of oil.”
The accuracy of this estimate, as with any other assessment of DPRK oil resources, is difficultfor outsiders to determine, but the proximity of the purported oil-bearing areas to similar nearby
structures in, for example, China’s territorial waters390 do suggest that the presence of oil islikely, though the quantities are uncertain.391 Still, oil extraction in onshore and offshore areas of389 “Oil & Gas Reserves Found in DPRK”, from a Korean-oriented website based in Japan, and dated 2002, but no longer

available as of 2021, http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/185th_issue/2002103105.htm. A very similar (likely derivative) article
appears at http://www.gasandoil.com/news/2002/11/dix24872.
390 A report on DPRK oil explorations (Selig S. Harrison, Asia Program Special Report No. 106, December 2002, “Toward Oiland Gas Cooperation in Northeast Asia: New Opportunities for Reducing Dependence on the Middle East”, The Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars), includes the following: “[The DPRK and the oil firms with which it had partnered]hopes for major discoveries on the geological linkages connecting its seabed concessions with the nearby Bo Hai Gulf,
where China has already found oil. There are proved recoverable reserves of 450 million barrels in Bo Hai.”
391 Several available reports and articles summarize the DPRK’s oil sector activities over the years. See for example, NORTHKOREA AND SEABED PETROLEUM, by Keun Wook Paik. Royal Institute of International Affairs (undated, but probably about2005), available as https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/Keun_Wook_Paik.pdf. The
document Energy Scenarios for the DPRK – Report of the Working Group Convened by the United Nations: Phase I, publishedby the University for Peace, New York, and dated 2005 (available as https://documents.pub/document/energy-scenarios-for-the-194
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the DPRK is likely to be an attractive target for investment as (and when) the redevelopment of
the DPRK energy sector gets underway.
In a report prepared for Nautilus,392 Edward Yoon includes the following descriptions of what is
known about oil production, resources, and exploration activity, some of which overlaps with theinformation provided above:“Ascertaining the truth as to whether or not North Korea has petroleum deposits has not
only been one of the critical issues in the geological exploration community in the
DPRK, but also is a factor for central economy planning authorities. In fact, North
Korean geologists and foreign engineers have found oil deposits during East Sea seabedarea exploration (near Tong-Chon, Kang-won) and in West seabed area exploration (nearNam-Po) in 1985 (Private source). North Korean authorities have established a selfreliance policy for oil exploration and production since the 1960s. The DPRK set up an
Oil Exploration Institute in Sook-Chon (near the West Sea) in 1968, with advanced
exploration equipment imported from Russia and Sweden, in order to accelerate oil
exploration within the West seabed area. In 1978, North Korea signed an agreement with
China on oil exploration, under which the DPRK would receive support in the form ofChinese technology and equipment (oil drilling machines and oil prospecting ships) in the
Bal-Hae-man area (the Yellow Sea) (Chinese documents, Private source, 2010).
“In addition, North Korea sent experts in oil exploration to Russia in 1991 in order togain expertise and experience from Caspian Seabed oil exploration activities. The North
Korean Physical Exploration Department drilled 13 exploratory holes in the East seabed
and West seabed with assistance from Sweden engineers, and found significant results in
1993. As a consequence, 350 barrels of oil were produced in 1998 at the “406” location,
located 66 km from Cho-Do Island of Pyong-An province in the West Sea. Also, 450
barrels of oil were produced from an exploration well at the Nam-Po offshore drilling
point, also in 1998. The Canadian oil exploring company Cantexa reported that the oil
deposit in the 406 drilling area could hold 5 - 40 billion barrels (Korea Marine Institute,www.kordi.re.kr). The Microleptonics Research Laboratory of the Russian Exploration
Institute has reported that massive oil deposits have been found in the West seabed andYellow seabed (ITAR NEWs, 4/9/1999). Analysis of oil samples from these explorations
revealed specific gravity of 0.854-0.887, paraffin content of 8-9%, hydrocarbon content
of 70-80%, and asphaltic content of 0.2-1%, suggesting that these finds are commerciallyvaluable oil deposits (ibid, and Private source).
“The latest activities related to oil exploitation in the DPRK in partnership with overseas
investors include an agreement between KOREX and KOEC (Korean Oil Exploration
Company) on a PSC (production sharing contract) in the East-sea, based on a report by
Channel Asia News, 2 June, 2006. KOREX was established as a subsidiary of the Irish
company Aminex and the North Korean firm Cho-sun Energy (as a 50:50 sharedcompany).”

dprk-report-of-the-.html) includes a summary of some of the DPRK’s oil exploration efforts and joint ventures with exploration
firms.
392 Edward Yoon, Status and Future of the North Korean Minerals Sector, dated January 2011, and available as

http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/DPRK-Minerals-Sector-YOON.pdf.

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Reports of the extent of natural gas resource in the DPRK are less numerous than those of oil
reserves, and likely just as speculative. A 2002 report reads as follows:393“’Sovereign Ventures,’ a Singaporean petroleum exploration company, announced on
August 28 that it found in the DPRK reserves of at least 28.3 billion cubic meters ofnatural gas and 50 million barrels of petroleum. The locations are in Hoeryong andOnsong in North Hamgyong Province. The Singaporean venture stressed that thediscovery is particularly significant since the survey covered only a third of the
exploration zone with an area of 6,000 square kilometers.”
A late 2002 presentation by the company involved in the exploration, Sovereign Ventures,
echoed the above, noting:394 395“It is unlikely that a ‘Giant’ oilfield will be found in the Tuman (Tumen) area of North
Korea. However significant potential exists for gas reserves in excess of 1 TCF [trillion
cubic feet] and smaller oil pools”.
A 2015 review of DPRK oil and gas prospects included the maps shown in Figure 4-3, showing,based on geology, five potential onshore resource areas as well as offshore areas in the Korea
East and West Seas.396 This review reports “…five main onshore sedimentary basins in the
DPRK …in which a total of 22 wells have been drilled, many encountering shows of oil and/or
gas, with one well reporting 75 bopd [barrels of oil per day] of light sweet crude oil/condensate”.
Although it is unknown whether this well is still producing oil, the amount reported is equal toapproximately 3700 tonnes of oil annually, well over half of the 5900 tonnes of ongoingdomestic production that we have assumed for recent years.
A reported gas find in the Korea East Sea in ROK waters may increase the probability that gas
will be found offshore of the DPRK as well.397

393 “Oil & Gas Reserves Found in DPRK”, from a Korean-oriented website based in Japan, and dated 2002, formerly available at

http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/185th_issue/2002103105.htm. A very similar (likely derivative) article appears at
http://www.gasandoil.com/news/2002/11/dix24872.
394 SOVEREIGN VENTURES PTE LTD, Hydrocarbon Potential of Cenozoic Basins In the Tuman River Area of North Korea(DPRK), prepared by Dr. Robert Mummery, dated 7/6/2002, and previously available at http://svoil.com/oil/cspg/Sub.asp?TitleID=0 and http://sv-oil.com/oil/cspg/images/CSPG_presentation.pdf. As of 2021, a related abstract
is available as http://www.searchanddiscovery.com/abstracts/html/2004/annual/abstracts/Mummery.htm.
395
It is unclear what the status of Sovereign Ventures’ oil and explorations in the DPRK is currently. The most recent item
apparently available on the company’s website (formerly available as http://sv-oil.com/oil/News/default.asp), “Reuters,
September 08, 2003, INTERVIEW-Politics stall Singapore firm's N. Korea oil plans”), appears to underline the difficulties ofworking in the DPRK energy sector in recent years.
396 Mike Rego (2015), “North Korea - Hydrocarbon Exploration and Potential”, GeoExPro Vol. 12, No. 4, available ashttps://www.geoexpro.com/articles/2015/09/north-korea-hydrocarbon-exploration-and-potential. This article was also
summarized in Anthony Fensom (2019), Could North Korea Become the Next Oil and Gas Mega Producer?”, The National
Interest, dated December 28, 2019, and available as https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/could-north-korea-become-next-oiland-gas-mega-producer-109066.
397 The Korea Herald, “New gas reserves found in East Sea”, dated March 4, 2005, by Kim Min-hee Formerly available as
http://www.nautilus.org/aesnet/2005/MAR0905/Korea_Herald_NewGAS.pdf. Also see a related article from approximately thesame time period: Offshore (2006), “KNOC makes new discovery in the East Sea; Korean National Oil Corp. has discovered an
economically viable natural gas deposit in the East Sea”, dated February 22nd, 2006, and available as https://www.offshoremag.com/home/article/16792973/knoc-makes-new-discovery-in-the-east-sea.

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Figure 4-3: Projected Onshore and Offshore Locations of Potential Oil and Gas Basins in the
DPRK

4.3.

Wood and Other Biomass

The DPRK’s forest resource base as of about 1990 has been estimated at somewhat less than 9
million hectares out of a total national territory of about 12 million hectares. This estimate
appears to include some “unstocked forests”. Table 4-1 presents a forest lands and forest stocks
summary derived from a UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) document.398 399
Anecdotal evidence, time series satellite photos, consideration (as discussed in previous
chapters) of the increasing rate of use of wood fuels in recent years to compensate for short
supplies of commercial fuels, and remote sensing data all point toward a considerable decline in
DPRK forest area and forest stocks over the past two decades. As with (many) other aspects of

398 DPR KOREA: STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 2003, published by the United Nations Environment Programme, andavailable as https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/9690/-DPR_KOREA_State_of_the_Environment_Report2003DPRK_SOEReport_2003.pdf.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y. Table 3.1.
399 Note that the shaded row and column in this table are calculated based on data in the original source table (Table 3.1 in thereport DPR KOREA: STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 2003, published by the United Nations Environment Programme). The
year to which the data in the table correspond is not explicitly described in the source document, but the total forest value is thesame as provided in the UN FAO Forest Resource Assessment for 1990. Text in the source document indicates that the units forwood stocks shown in Table 4-4 may in fact be incorrect—it is possible that the units should be cubic meters of wood per
hectare, not tonnes per hectare.

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the DPRK, different sources disagree on the attributes of the DPRK’s forest stocks, how they
have been changing, and how they are used.
4.3.1. Forest area and forest types
As shown in Table 4-2, based on the DPRK’s “State of the Environment” report, as published by
UNEP, the DPRK’s forests are (or were, as of about 1990) approximately 42 percent coniferous
forests, 35 percent deciduous/hardwood species (referred to as “latifoliate” in the table), and 23
percent mixed conifer and deciduous forests. Pine species dominate the coniferous forests, andoaks dominate the deciduous species. A somewhat different picture of the forests, at least as of1996, was described by Professor Seung-Ho Lee of the Remote Sensing Laboratory of the Korea(ROK) Forest Research Institute (KFRI). Based on UN FAO statistics, he estimated that about
20 percent of forests were conifers, 63 percent were hardwoods, and the rest were mixed forests(Table 4-3 and Figure 4-4).400 Table 4-4 presents another estimate for the forest area of the
DPRK during the 1990s, this estimate for the year 1997 (in comparison with 1970 stocks), andpresented by province and municipality.401 Table 4-5 presents estimates for the distribution ofwood stocks by type of tree.402
Table 4-1: Estimated Summary of Forest Areas and Stocks in the DPRK as of 1990

Classification
TOTAL Forested land
Forest of timber industry
Economic forest
Firewood forest
Protected forest
Non-timber forest land
Unforested area
Grass field
Total of Above

Area (1000hectares)

8,201
5,440
1,436
196
1,129
436
383
170
9,190

Biomass stock Implied stock(ton/hectare) (million tonnes)

62.3
74.55
48.3
40.95
66.15
3.15
18
61.16

510.92405.55
69.36
8.03
74.68
1.37
3.06
562

400 Table and map from presentation entitled "Forest and Other Biomass Production in the DPRK: Current Situation and Recent

Trends as Indicated by Remote Sensing Data - Status of Forest Resources, Degradation & Biomass in North Korea using Remote
Sensing Data" by Professor Lee Seung-ho of the Remote Sensing Laboratory, Korea Forest Research Institute, as prepared for the
DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA). Professor Lee's paper isavailable as http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKEnergyMeeting/papers/Lee.ppt.
401 Table 4-4 was adapted from “Table 1” in a MS Word document entitled Current Status of Forest and Agricultural Land in
North Korea, authored by Park Dong kyun, Secretary General, Northeast Asian Forest Forum, Korea. The document is undated,but apparently from around the year 2000. Document downloaded via Google on 7/19/2012, apparently originally from thewebsite http://english.kfem.or.kr/international/symposium, although direct access to that website did not seem to be available.
Some of the headings in Table 4-4 have been corrected or elaborated, relative to the table in the original source, and the notefollowing the table was added for clarity.
402 From presentation by Professor Lee--same source as for Table 4-3 and Figure 4-4. Data for Table 4-3 originally from UN
FAO Forest Resource Assessment.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 4-2: Species Composition of DPRK Forests as of (approximately) 1990403

403 DPR KOREA: STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 2003, published by the United Nations Environment Programme, andavailable as https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/9690/-DPR_KOREA_State_of_the_Environment_Report2003DPRK_SOEReport_2003.pdf.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y. Table 3.2.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 4-3: Alternative Estimate of Species Composition of DPRK Forests (as of 1996)
Forest TypeArea (1,000 ha)

Ratio (%)

8,445.5100

Subtotal

1,675.5

19.8

Conifers

955.1

11.3

Alpine Con.

720.4

8.5

Subtotal

5,331.9

63.2

Hardwood

4,415.3

52.3

916.6

10.9

1,438.1

17.0

Total

Conifers

Hardwoods

Oaks
Mixed wood

Table 4-4: Estimate of Forested Land in 1997 by Province, with Change from 1970
Province (Do)Forest Land in 1997 (ha)Man-made

Forest Land in Change from 1970

Natural

Total

1970 (ha)Area (ha)Pyongyang-si
Nampo-siPyongyang-S*
Pyongyang-N
Chagang
Gaesung-si
Hwanghae-S*
Hwanghae-N
GangwonHamgyong-S
Hamgyong-N
Yanggang

7,118
3,368
90,18091,387
208,413
20,28780,956
90,071
103,369
207,097
166,793
141,046

93,061
16,767575,249
579,683
859,045
33,007150,432
309,447
619,250
1,076,007
1,045,984
983,974

100,179
20,095
665,429
671,070
1,067,458
53,294
231,388399,518
722,619
1,283,104
1,212,777
1,125,020

918,632
928,406
1,514,766
420,225
586,360
889,313
1,612,493
1,485,447
1,417,040-132,929-257,336-447,308-135,543-186,842-166,694-329,389-272,670-292,020

Total

1,219,025

6,341,906

7,551,931

9,772,682-2,220,751* Note: Totals for Pyongyang-S and Hwanghae-S in the “Forest Land in 1970” and “Change
from 1970” columns apparently include data for Pyongyang-si plus Nampo-si and Gaesung-si(that is, the municipalities of Pyongyang, Nampo, and Gaesung), respectively.

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Figure 4-4: Map of Forest Types in the DPRK

Table 4-5: Estimated Wood Stocks by Type in DPRK Forests (as of 1996)
Growing Stock(1,000 m3)
Total
Subtotal
Conifers

Hardwood

Conifers

Ratio Volume per3(%) ha (m /ha)

342,864100

40.6

86,40225.2

51.6

46,703

13.6

48.9

AlpineConifers

39,69911.6

55.1

Subtotal

205,443

59.9

38.5

Hardwood

163,879

47.8

37.1

Oaks

41,56412.1

45.3

51,01914.9

35.5

Mixed wood
201

Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKAnother source of information on DPRK forests, a set of reports by Keith Openshaw, dated
1994, suggests that the nominal DPRK forest area in 1993 was about 9 million hectares, but that
only 7.8 million hectares were “in practice” forested. He applies an average standing volume for
DPRK forests of 40 cubic meters per hectare, based on forests in surrounding countries, toestimate wood stocks.404 This source suggests that softwoods make up 45 percent of total DPRK
stocks, and hardwoods 55 percent.
4.3.2. Wood stocks
Despite different assumptions about the composition of DPRK forests, the sources cited above
appear to converge on a reasonably consistent set of estimates for stocks of wood in the DPRK.
Correcting the table from the UNEP document for what appears to be an error in units suggests awood volume of about 370 million cubic meters in 1990. Openshaw’s average standing volume
estimate, depending upon whether the stock average is applied to the DPRK area forested “inpractice” or the nominally forested area, yields estimated 1993 stocks of between about 310 and
360 million cubic meters. Table 4-4 yields a growing stock measurement of about 340 million
cubic meters as of 1996. Using two different estimates of average cubic meters of wood per
tonne, Professor Lee calculates 1996 DPRK wood stocks of between 251 and 293 million tonnesof total above-ground biomass. We use the former estimate—which is based on an averagewood density that seems more reasonable for the tree species present in the DPRK, as one input
in the estimation of the time series of DPRK wood resources presented below.
4.3.3. The DPRK wood resource over time
The ultimate question to be answered by an investigation into wood resources is the extent towhich existing rates of resource use are sustainable. To address this question, we used Professor
Lee’s summary of data obtained from remote sensing techniques to estimate a trend in total
DPRK forest area, and used those estimates with estimates of DPRK forest stocks to derive theamount of wood annually available in the DPRK.
Table 4-6 presents data from two “snapshots” of an area within the DPRK, derived from remotesensing images taken by the Landsat (1999) and Quickbird (2004) satellite systems. Figure 4-5
shows maps created from the two sets of data. Though this table represents only one small areaof the DPRK, over only a five-year period, there is a clear increase in the amount of unstocked
forest and denuded forest over the period between analyses.405 Figure 4-6 shows false-color
satellite images of an area of the DPRK, taken in 1981 and 1993, showing that “approximately
10,000 ha [of forest area] has been converted into farmland in Daeheungdan-gun County (near
Yangkang and North Hamgyong Province)” in the DPRK over the 12-year period.406
A series of satellite analyses of the extent of DPRK forest cover were summarized by Professor
Lee as follows: 9.77 Mha in 1970 (DPRK source), 8.97 Mha in 1987 (FAO source), 8.45 Mha in1994 (KFRI Satellite Image Analysis), 7.53 Mha in 1997 (DPRK from UNDP Round Table
404 Keith Openshaw, DPRK/UNDP-GEF Project on Forestry Carbon Sink.

Visit to DPR Korea, October 15th to 25th, 1994.
Project Brief. Technical Appendix: Estimating Carbon Sequestration in North Korean Forests.
405 Table and map from presentation entitled "Forest and Other Biomass Production in the DPRK: Current Situation and Recent
Trends as Indicated by Remote Sensing Data - Status of Forest Resources, Degradation & Biomass in North Korea using Remote
Sensing Data" by Professor Lee Seung-ho, as cited above.
406 Quote and satellite photos for Figure 4-6 from presentation by Professor Lee Seung-ho, as referenced above.

202
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKMeeting) and 7.53 Mha in 1999 (KFRI Satellite Image Analysis). An additional time-series of
DPRK forest area from the UN FAO Global Forest Resource Assessment 2005 (FRA 2005)407
shows a trend from 8.20 to 6.82 to 6.19 Mha in 1990, 2000, and 2005, respectively. A 2011
report estimated that forest area had fallen from 8.20 Mha in 1990 to 6.99 Mha in 2000 and 5.66
Mha in 2010.408 Finally, the most recent version of the UN FAO Global Forest Assessment
suggests a slower rate of decline of DPRK forest area, as shown in Table 4-7.409
Table 4-6: Land-type Data from Remote Sensing Studies of an Area of the DPRK, 1999 and
2004
CLASS

Landsat TM (1999)

Quickbird (2004)

AREA (ha) Ratio (%)

AREA (ha)Ratio (%)

Total

35920.4410028594.72

100

Stocked Forest

8344.0823.23

5124.91

17.93

Unstocked Forest

4345.1112.09

7791.51

27.25

Converted Farmland

4186.4411.65

2470.97

8.65

Denuded Forest

753.932.10

3754.73

13.13

-

-

1828.37

6.39

Paddy

2834.647.89

4574.85

16.00

Cropland

11574.18

32.22

2921.62

10.22

Others3882.06

10.81

127.760.45

Rocky Area

Table 4-7: DPRK Forest Area Trends from UN FAO 2020 FRA
Estimate (Mha)
Other
ForestWoodland
6.912
1.864
6.455
2.172
6.242
2.301
6.136
2.366
6.030
2.430

Year
1990
2000
2010
2015
2020

GrowthRates,
Forest-0.68%-0.33%-0.17%-0.17%

407 The UN FAO Global Forest Resource Assessment 2005 (FRA) provides forest extent, forest stock, and other data over time

for most nations, including the DPRK. DPRK data are available from www.fao.org/forestry/site/32086/en/prk.
408 Korea Forest Research Institute (KFRI, 2011), “NATIONWIDE INTERNATIONAL NEWS, N. KOREA'S
DEFORESTATION PROCEEDING RAPIDLY: REPORT”, Asia Pulse, dated June 17, 2011..
409 The UN FAO Forest Resource Assessment (FRA) for 2020, Desk Study Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, available as
http://www.fao.org/3/ca9858en/ca9858en.pdf, provides details of FAO estimates of DPRK forest area and related data. The
methods and categorizations for forest area appear to be slightly different than those used in earlier versions of the FRA.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 4-5: Land-type Maps Created from Satellite Images of the Kaesong Area in the DPRK,1999 and 2004

Landsat (1999)

QuickBird (2004)

Figure 4-6: Landsat Images of an Area in the DPRK taken in 1981 (left) and 1993 (right)

Based on growth rates for forests in areas of the ROK that have forests similar to the types offorests found in the DPRK, and using data from three sources, Professor Lee calculates aweighted-average annual growth rate of 3.06 %, which implies an annual production fromgrowing tree stocks in the DPRK of 7.68 million tonnes per year in 1996. Note that this figure
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

includes all above-ground biomass, some of which (small twigs and leaves, for example) would
likely not be used as fuel, and likely some of which would be lost during harvesting. Prof. Lee
cites ratios of total above-ground biomass to tree stem volume ranging from 1.22 (forhardwoods) to 1.29 (for conifers). This implies that leaf and twig biomass might be on the orderof 5 to 15 percent of total above-ground biomass.
From the forest area data above, the decline in the area of forest lands in the DPRK averaged
1.45% per year from 1987 to 1999, using the multi-survey timeline cited by Prof. Lee; average
rates of forest decline using the FRA 2005 estimates were and 1.83% per year from1990 to 2000,
and 1.93% per year from 2000 to 2010.
Based roughly on the information above, we make the following estimate of forest area,
wood stocks, and wood production over time through 2020.
Key Assumptions and intermediate results:•

Estimate of forest area in 1990: 8.20 Million ha (DPRK State of Environment Report, 2003,
and UN FAO FRA)•

Change in extent of forest lands, 1990 to 2000: -1.06% per year (average of rates indocuments referenced above).

•

Change in extent of forest lands, 2000 to 2005: -1.21% per year (average of 2020 FRA andKFRI estimates).

•

Change in extent of forest lands, 2005 to 2010: -1.26% per year (average of 2020 FRA withaverage of KFRI and other estimates described above).

•

Change in extent of forest lands from 2010 through 2020: -0.50% per year (estimate, andabout three times 2020 UNFAO FRA estimates for the period, but which likely takes into
account reported DPRK reforestation efforts and improved availability of non-biomass fuels
as the DPRK economy has grown, while still resulting in estimates for the wood harvest by
year consistent with demand-based estimates of wood needs as described in section 3.8,
above).

•

Growing wood stocks on forest lands, 1996: 251 million tonnes (estimate above by Prof. Lee)•

Average annual growth on stocked forest lands: 3.06% per year (estimate above by Prof.
Lee)•

Average growth per ha on forest lands: 0.94 te/ha-yr, based on estimates above.

•

Total degraded forest lands as of about 1997: 1.6317 Million ha (from Prof. Lee presentation,slide 34; including "denuded forest", "unstocked forest", and "converted farmland", of which
the latter is 59% of the total.

•

Average fraction of annual stocked-forest growth per hectare in degraded forests: 20%(rough estimate).

The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4-8 and Figure 4-6. Overall forest lands are
estimated to have decreased by over 25 percent between 1990 and 2020, with a similar decrease

205
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKin the amount of annual growth in growing stocks.410 The total annually available woody
biomass decreases from over 13 million tonnes in 1990 to just under 10 million tonnes in 2010,
but of those totals, about 4 to 4.5 million tonnes annually was biomass from forest areas clearedfor one purpose or another. This suggests that by 2010 some 40 percent, at least, of DPRK
biomass use was unsustainable—that is, cut from forest stocks, not from annual forest growth.
Our estimates for total wood use in the DPRK in 2019 and 2020 are each about 6.5 million
tonnes. This is already most of what we calculate as the total woody biomass available fromannual growth plus wood from cleared lands, but this simple comparison does not consider thefollowing factors:•

The estimate of total woody biomass available includes twigs and leaves, most of which
would likely not be used for fuelwood (or industrial roundwood).

•

There will be some harvest losses (wood left behind in the forests or fields).

•

Much of the annual increment of forest growth may be in rugged terrain inaccessible for use
by people.

•

Not all forest clearing results in complete land conversion, meaning that the wood harvest
from land clearing may be overstated.

•

Both the estimated average wood stocks and the average growth rate of DPRK forests may
be overstated.

Taken in combination, these factors, together with our estimates, suggest that the DPRK
populace is indeed using the bulk of the nation’s available supply of wood as fuel and for otheruses, and underscores the observations by visitors and satellites alike of a dwindling forest andwoodlands resource base. The DPRK government has undertaken massive reforestation
projects, with mixed results, but clearly reforestation and related forest and soils conservation
activities constitute an area where international assistance and capacity building will be both
useful and a crucial step toward environmental sustainability in the DPRK. The importance offorest health and reforestation was underlined in the announcements of national DPRK efforts inlate 2020 to prevent forest fires from further damaging forest stocks, and thus further
exacerbating problems such as erosion and landslides.411

410 The Forestry Department of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, in its Global Forest

Resources Assessment 2010, Country Report, The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, dated 2010, and available as
http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al489E/al489e.pdf, presents a variety of data on the DPRK forest sector, but little of theinformation appears to have been updated since the 1990s. The 2020 update of this assessment (The UN FAO Forest Resource
Assessment (FRA) for 2020, Desk Study Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, available as
http://www.fao.org/3/ca9858en/ca9858en.pdf), does present an estimate of forest area in 2020 that is nearly the same (6.03
million ha) as our estimate for that year.
411 See, for example, Yonhap News Agency (2020), “N. Korea calls for efforts to prevent wildfire amid dry weather”, dated
November 11, 2020, and available as https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201111004400325.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 4-8: Estimate of Annual DPRK Woody Biomass Production, 1990 to 2020

Mha Forest
Lands

Year
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

8.20
8.11
8.03
7.94
7.86
7.77
7.69
7.61
7.53
7.45
7.37
7.28
7.19
7.10
7.02
6.93
6.85
6.76
6.67
6.59
6.51
6.44
6.37
6.32
6.28
6.25
6.22
6.19
6.16
6.13
6.10

Grow ing
Stocks(m illion te)

268
265
262
259
256
254
251
248
246
243
240
238
235
232
229
226
223
221
218
215
212
210
208
206
205
204
203
202
201
200
199

Im plied
AnnualBiom ass
Available
Im plied Annual
fromGrow th in
Reduction in
Grow ing Stocks Forest Area
(Mte)
(Mte)

8.19
8.10
8.02
7.93
7.85
7.76
7.68
7.60
7.52
7.44
7.36
7.27
7.18
7.09
7.01
6.92
6.84
6.75
6.67
6.58
6.50
6.43
6.37
6.31
6.27
6.24
6.21
6.18
6.15
6.12
6.09

2.88
2.85
2.82
2.79
2.76
2.73
2.70
2.67
2.64
2.62
2.59
2.91
2.88
2.84
2.81
2.77
2.85
2.81
2.78
2.74
2.71
2.35
2.01
1.67
1.34
1.03
1.02
1.01
1.01
1.00
1.00

Im plied
AnnualWoody
Estim ated
Biom ass
Degraded
Available
Forestfrom Forest Lands or
Lands and
"OtherClearing
Woodland"
(Mte)
(Mha)

11.07
10.95
10.84
10.72
10.61
10.49
10.38
10.27
10.16
10.05
9.95
10.18
10.06
9.94
9.82
9.70
9.68
9.56
9.44
9.32
9.21
8.78
8.37
7.99
7.62
7.27
7.23
7.19
7.16
7.12
7.09

Im plied
AnnualBiom ass
Availablefrom
Degraded
ForestAreas(Mte)

Im plied
AnnualWoody
Biom ass
Availablefrom all
Stocked andDegraded
Forests
(Mte)

0.19
0.21
0.23
0.24
0.26
0.27
0.29
0.31
0.32
0.34
0.35
0.37
0.38
0.40
0.42
0.43
0.45
0.46
0.48
0.50
0.51
0.53
0.54
0.55
0.55
0.56
0.57
0.57
0.58
0.58
0.59

11.27
11.16
11.06
10.96
10.87
10.77
10.67
10.58
10.48
10.39
10.30
10.55
10.44
10.34
10.23
10.13
10.13
10.03
9.92
9.82
9.72
9.30
8.91
8.53
8.17
7.83
7.80
7.77
7.74
7.71
7.68

1.04
1.13
1.21
1.30
1.38
1.47
1.55
1.6317
1.71
1.79
1.87
1.96
2.05
2.14
2.22
2.31
2.39
2.48
2.57
2.65
2.73
2.81
2.87
2.92
2.96
2.99
3.02
3.05
3.08
3.11
3.14

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Figure 4-7: Estimated Trend in Sources and Amount of Woody Biomass Availability in the
DPRK, 1990 to 2020

10
8
6
4
2

Implied Annual Biomass Available from Degraded
Forest Areas (Mte)
Implied Annual Biomass Available from Reduction
in Forest Area (Mte)
Implied Annual Growth in Growing Stocks (Mte)

-

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

Million Tonnes Tree Biomass

12

4.3.4. Other biomass
Crop wastes constitute the other major source of biomass for fuel in the DPRK. As of thiswriting, we have no detailed estimate of the DPRK’s crop waste resource. A very rough estimate
can be prepared for the major crops of rice and maize as follows. For rice, about one unit ofstraw is typically produced per unit of grain. The year 2004/2005 rice harvest was estimated atabout 1.5 million tonnes, meaning that available rice straw would also have been about 1.5
million tonnes (though in fact some or much of this straw should have been used as a soil
amendment).412 The UN FAO estimated somewhat higher rice production in 2004/2005, at
about 2.2 to 2.4 million tonnes, with similar output in 2009 and 2010 (and about 3 million tonnes
in 2008).413 Maize production was estimated at about 1.7 million tonnes of grain in 2004/2005,
and about the same (as estimated by UN FAO—see previous footnote) in 2009 and 2010, though
2008 harvests were somewhat lower, at about 1.4 million tonnes. The amount of maize crop
residues per unit grain seems to vary depending on the source of information, but most estimates
seem to be in the range of 1 to 1.5 tonnes of residues (stalks, husks, and cobs) per tonne of grain.
Using a value of 1.3 for this parameter suggests that maize residue production in 2005, forexample, was approximately 2.2 million tonnes. Residues from other crops, including othergrains, potatoes, and orchard crops, are likely in the range of 0.5 to 1 million tonnes, meaningthat overall crop residue availability was about 4 to 5.5 million tonnes annually. Our estimatesfor non-wood biomass used for fuel in the DPRK in 2019 and in 2020 are each within this range,
412 Randall Ireson, Food Security in North Korea: Designing Realistic Possibilities, dated February 2006, published by the

Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, andavailable as https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/events/food_security_in_north_korea_designing_realistic_possibilities.
413 See Figure 1 in UN FAO, Special Report, FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, dated 16 November 2010, and available as http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al968e/al968e00.htm.

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at about 4.0 million tonnes, which suggests, if both supply and demand estimates are close toaccurate, that the vast bulk of crop residues are used for fuel in the DPRK and/or (probably and)other biomass fuels, such as grasses and other non-tree biomass, are harvested for fuel use. In
either case, the lack of residues returned to the soil, and the use of non-wood vegetation for fuel,suggest an ongoing pattern of soil fertility decline, and spell trouble for soil conservation.
As the DPRK livestock population is relatively low relative to other countries with similar
population, animal manure presently is unlikely to represent a sizable resource, although the
DPRK does have an active program of dissemination of small biogas digestors that use humannight soil, wastes from pigs raised in rural households, and other biomass materials as substrates.
Based on UN FAO statistics, the DPRK in 2005 had slightly under 600,000 cattle (a very few
dairy cows, with most of the rest classified as “Oxen”), 3.2 million pigs, 21 million chickens, 5.5
million ducks, 2.75 million goats, and about 170,000 sheep. Using rough estimates of 2.2 kg
volatile solids (dry organic matter) per head of cattle per day, 0.3 kg per pig per day, 0.010 kg
per chicken, and 0.024 kg per duck per day suggests that the DPRK’s current resource of
biomass in livestock manures was about 1 million tonnes per year in 2005.414 More recent
statistics suggest somewhat lower livestock numbers. The Yonhap News Agency quoted (in2011) the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) as saying that “North Korea has 577,000
heads of cattle, 2.2 million pigs and 3.5 million goats”.415 The lower number of pigs in the 2011
estimate suggests that the total available livestock manure would probably fall to closer to
900,000 tonnes by 2009/2010.
4.4.

Other Renewable Resources

Other renewable energy resources in the DPRK include hydraulic power, wind energy, solar
energy, tidal power, and geothermal energy. Summaries of these DPRK resources for electricity
generation are provided below—please see section 5.2.2 of this Report for a more extensive
treatment of these resources.
A number of sources suggest that the DPRK’s hydraulic resource is sufficient to provide about
10 GWe of hydroelectric generation. This is consistent with what we have been told inworkshop presentations by delegations from the DPRK:“The hydraulic generating capacity of DPRK is now over 4 million kW – but this figure
only accounts for 30% of the total available resources.” And “DPRK has hydraulicenergy resources of 10 million kW with a favorable development condition and higheffectiveness of investment.”416

414 Manure from goals and sheep, which are typically difficult to collect, are not included in this estimate.

Animal population
estimates are from UN Food and Agriculture Organization FAOSTAT, available as http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#home.
Estimates of manure production per animal are derived from data in Rural Energy Production: Biogas Plant, a Sustainable
Source of Energy for Cooperative Farms, by Arthur Wellinger, dated December 12, 2003, and published by ADRA (Adventist
Development and Relief Agency International) and Nova Energie. This report provides case studies of the application ofmanure-fed biogas digesters in the DPRK.
415 Yonhap news article included in a 2011-4-20 post on North Korea Economy Watch, “Agricultural Statistics” archive,
available as http://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/statistics/agriculture-statistics/.
416 DPRK Delegation, "THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE INTER-STATE ELECTRIC TIES IN NORTH EAST ASIA ON
ENVIRONMENT," September 31, 2003. Paper presented at Nautilus Institute’s 3rd Workshop on Grid Interconnections, held in
Vladivostok, Russia, September 30 to October 3, 2003. Available as http://nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/K_DPRK_2_PPR.pdf.

209
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKMany, but not all, of the sites for large hydroelectric facilities have been built upon, but manysites for small and medium hydro dams remain. In addition, it has been reported that some of the
DPRK hydroelectric plants—some of which were built before the Korean War, have efficiencies(electrical energy output as a fraction of energy available in falling water) that are around 60
percent, suggesting that significant additional electricity could be generated at these existing sites
once plants are upgraded to modern efficiency levels (on the order of 90 percent). Table 4-9
provides one estimate of hydroelectric potential for major rivers in the DPRK. The total of theestimates shown is the equivalent of approximately 9,200 average MW of power.417
Table 4-9: Estimate of Hydraulic Resources in the DPRK418
Name
Amrok River
Tumen River
Taedon River
Chongchon River
Rimjin River (north)
Pukhang River (north)Resong RiverSongchon River
Kumya River
Tanchonnam River
Orangchon River
Kiljunam RiverTOTAL OF ABOVE

GWh39,635.00
8,134.61
7,508.17
4,407.00
2,806.10
3,422.10
701.34
1,675.00
1,617.17
1,692.40
1,451.80
7,670.80
80,721.49

(%)
47.9
9.5
9.1
5.3
3.4
4.1
0.8
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.8
0.9
88.8

Estimation of the wind resources potential in the DPRK is incomplete, and we have foundexisting DPRK wind data to be potentially unreliable. Significant DPRK wind resources are said
to exist, however, in mountain areas and in coastal areas (including offshore areas). A DPRK
delegation to a workshop organized by Nautilus and co-hosts provided an annual wind resource
estimate of 1.7 TWh, which corresponds to about 550 MWe of wind power at an assumed
capacity factor of about 35 percent (not atypical for wind generators). A presentation by a
DPRK delegation at a subsequent Nautilus workshop included the following passage on wind
power in the DPRK
“Most of the western seashore of the country is suitable for installing large size windturbines. The annual average wind speed is above 4.5 m/s in 18% of the territory and it isexpected to have an installed capacity of more than 4,000 megawatts of wind-generated
electricity.”419
417 That is, the total shown is the equivalent of 9200 MW of power supplied continuously, year-round.

Given that the averagecapacity factors of DPRK hydroelectric facilities may be 50 percent or less, this implies a total potential “nameplate”
hydroelectric potential on the order of 18,000 MW, though not nearly all of this potential can be taken advantage of in practice.
418 Table from Some Thoughts on DPRK’s Natural Geological Conditions and Their Evaluation - On the Distribution andDevelopment of Hydropower Resources and the Electric Industry, by Professor Sagong Jun, Korea University in Japan, formerly
available as http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/112th_issue/99091601.htm. Units in the original source were listed as “1,000,000
kw/h”, but it seems likely that the units intended are GWh.
419 “Options For Rehabilitation Of Energy System & Energy Security & Energy Planning In The DPR Of Korea”, prepared by
the DPRK Delegation to the Asian Energy Security Workshop 2004, May 12th - 14th, 2004, Beijing, China. Available as

210
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKBased on our own (Nautilus’) experience in installing several small wind generators in a locationon the western coast of the DPRK, it seems unlikely that onshore wind resources in that area arequite as good as claimed above, though offshore areas may well prove to have a better windregime than onshore areas. Until additional and more rigorous wind data collection iscompleted, the actual DPRK wind resource is uncertain, but it seems likely that the total practicallevel of wind turbine installations in the DPRK will be in the range of hundreds of megawatts, ofwhich some is likely to be in near-offshore areas or on islands.
The same DPRK presentation cited above gives the following information about the DPRK solar
resource: “Annual average solar irradiation is about 1200 kWh/m2 and 55~60% of days per year
are clear.” The DPRK’s winters are often relatively clear but cold, and summers are humid, withmuch of the annual rainfall in the DPRK occurring in the summer months. This weather pattern,
and the solar resource data provided, suggest that the DPRK has at best a moderate solar
resource, on average. At 1200 kWh/m2-yr, the DPRK’s average insolation is less than that inmany cities in the United States (for example, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania has a similar solar
resource420), but is more favorable than the solar resource in most locations in northern andcentral Europe.
Tidal power is a possibility for some coastal areas of the DPRK. The 2004 presentation by
DPRK delegates described above noted: “The west seashore of the DPRK is one of the wellknown tidal zone in the world. The average difference between high and low tide is 4~6 m. n
Tidal potential capable of the development is estimated at about 19 TWh.” Generation of 19
TWh annually suggests installed capacity on the order of 4 to 6 GW. An estimate by a Russianauthor put the tidal power resource of the DPRK at 4700 MW (4.7 GW).421 At least one small
tidal power station exists in the DPRK—a 500 kW unit built into the Nampo barrage near themouth of the Taedong River422 (see Figure 4-8 and Figure 4-9). The DPRK planned, as of 2004,
to build a 2 MW prototype tidal power plant in South Hwanghae province, and to investigate asite for a 20 MW tidal power plant and complete a design for that plant. In 2004, China wasreportedly planning to build a 300 MW tidal power facility based on an artificial offshore lagoon
approach near the mouth of the Yalu River near the DPRK border, but it is somewhat unclear
whether this project has moved forward since.423 The fact that China was planning such a
project, however, probably means that such projects are also possible in nearby DPRK nearshore territory, at least from the point of view of the tidal energy resource.
Geothermal energy is also mentioned as a possible source of both heat and power for the DPRK.
At present, we have no information about the extent of the DPRK’s geothermal resources,
though some potential geothermal sites undoubtedly are present in the DPRK.

https://nautilus.org/supporting-documents/options-for-rehabilitation-of-energy-system-energy-security-energy-planning-in-dprof-korea/.
420 See, for example, http://howto.altenergystore.com/Reference-Materials/Solar-Insolation-Data-USA-Cities/a35/.
421 Marina Trigubenko (1991), “Industry of the DPRK”. Paper presented at Korea Development Institute Symposium, Seoul,
ROK (October 1991).
422 The authors visited this installation on their 1998 Unhari wind power project mission to the DPRK. We do not know its
current operational status, although in Google Earth Pro imagery through 2/27/19, the basic infrastructure of the generating
station appears to be intact.
423 See, for example, K. Steiner-Dicks, Tidal: Asia’s Cinderella renewable energy”, Tidal Today, dated July 5, 2011, and formerly
available as http://social.tidaltoday.com/technology-engineering/tidal-asia%E2%80%99s-cinderella-renewable-energy; andRenewable Energy World.com, “China Endorses 300 MW Ocean Energy Project”, dated November 2, 2004, and available as ashttps://www.renewableenergyworld.com/storage/china-endorses-300-mw-ocean-energy-project-17685/.

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Figure 4-8: Photo of West Sea Barrage, Near Nampo, DPRK424

424 Photo shows locks for ship passage and, in the channel in the center of the photo, spillways and structures where tidal power

turbines are installed. Photo downloaded from http://www.llukasz.com/North_Korea_photos/DPRK/West_sea_barrage.JPG.

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Figure 4-9: Painting of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il at the Dedication of the West Sea
Barrage425

4.5.

Energy Efficiency

In the 1990 energy balance study (conducted in 1995) described in part in Chapter 31 of thisreport, the estimated energy balance was used as a starting point for a indicative—though
admittedly very approximate and not at all exhaustive—quantitative analysis of a subset of theenergy efficiency and renewable energy options that could be implemented in the DPRK. This
analysis was intended to illustrate the significant potential for energy efficiency as a crucialcomponent to energy sector development in the DPRK. Since 1990, based on the observationsof the authors and others who have visited the DPRK, there have been relatively few changes in
end-use equipment that would substantially affect the overall conclusions of the 1995 study.426
An energy-efficiency analysis using substantially the same measures included in the 1995 study,
but updated to take into account 2019 estimated energy consumption, is presented below. Notethat the use of the 2019 energy balance as a starting point reduces both the costs and savings
from the energy efficiency measures. This may in fact be an artificial reduction, as any
economic improvement that also includes an improvement in the availability of electricity andother commercial fuels is likely to increase demand for energy, and thus would increase the425 Photo taken by D. von Hippel at the West Sea Barrage Visitors’ Center, near Nampo, DPRK, in October 1998.
426

For a more complete discussion of the analysis of the energy efficiency opportunities described in this section, as well as amore qualitative discussion of some of the additional opportunities available, see, for example, P. Hayes and D.F. Von Hippel(1997), "Engaging North Korea on Energy Efficiency", Chapter 9 in Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue
and the Korean Peninsula, Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes, editors, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY; and D.F. Von Hippel and P.
Hayes (1996) "Engaging North Korea on Energy Efficiency", The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Volume VIII, No. 2,
Winter 1996, pages 177 - 221.

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savings potential (and absolute costs, if not costs relative to the costs of installing new standard
devices and equipment) of the measures described below.427
4.5.1. Analytical Approach
The general approach used in preparing the analysis of energy efficiency opportunities can be
described as follows:•

Use the estimated DPRK energy balance data as a guide to indicate key sectors andsubsectors where fuel demand could be significantly reduced by energy efficiency measures.

•

Use the energy balance results, together with data from the international energy literatureand rough estimates of key parameters to estimate end-use shares for key technologies.

•

Use cost and performance data on energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies datafrom international literature sources to estimate the potential achievable fuel savings
available in key subsectors, and the investment costs required to achieve those savings.428 In
some of these cases, the cost and performance data are based on actual Chinese experienceobtained during the 1980s, as the measures will pertain to DPRK equipment of that vintage(and earlier) although more recent data were used to estimate improvements for some enduses.

•

Evaluate and aggregate the potential impacts and costs of the energy efficiency andrenewable energy technologies quantified, and suggest other key measures that are likely tobe broadly applicable in the DPRK.

•

Evaluate, briefly, the potential environmental and other impacts of implementing energy
efficiency measures.

A full-fledged analysis of the achievable potential for energy efficiency measures requires a hostof assumptions about the future. Population growth rates, economic growth rates, andunderlying, ongoing structural changes such as changes in the housing stock, shifts in industrial
output, and changing patterns of personal consumption (among many others) form the backdrop
against which energy efficiency opportunities should be considered. For this analysis, however,the choice has been to let estimates of potential energy sector improvements stand for theachievable savings over the next decade. Reasons for this assumption, in addition to the paucityof reliable data, include:•

The relatively static present state of the DPRK economy, suggesting that a complete andimmediate turnaround less likely than a slow recovery, and thus that a 10-year analysis basedon a current year’s data might not be entirely unreasonable.

•

Though complete implementation of a particular energy efficiency measure in a subsector isunlikely, the pathways for technology dissemination in North Korea—if there is committed
support from national leaders and enabling financial and technical support from the427 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, NATIONAL REPORT on Asian Least Cost GHG Abatement Strategy(ALGAS), Ministry of Land and Environment Protection Pyongyang, DPR of Korea, April 2000.
428 In many cases, this analysis has drawn upon the large body of work on energy efficiency programs in the People's Republic ofChina that has been published by the by the Energy Analysis Program of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL or
LBL) and their Chinese collaborators.

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international community—have the potential to allow the rapid implementation of energy
efficiency measures.
•

We believe that our assumptions as to the energy savings achievable from the technologies
we address (quantitatively) are more likely to prove to be under- than over-estimated. Thisbelief is informed by the large number of anecdotal reports of extremely high energy
intensities in the DPRK, even when compared with early 1980s conditions in China, and with
our own (if limited) observations of end-use technologies in the DPRK. Experts withexperience in “energy rationalization” projects in the DPRK during the 1990s have estimatedpotential for energy conservation in the DPRK ranging from 20 to 60 percent of current
energy use, providing further evidence that our estimates of potential energy efficiency
savings may be conservative. The results of an industrial energy audit program carried out in
the DPRK found potential savings of 15 to 60 percent of current consumption, and that a
combination “housekeeping” measures, with simple paybacks (time required for the value ofenergy savings to equal the cost of any initial investment) of less than a year, and process
improvements, with paybacks of one to three years, could by themselves result in savings of
up to 40 percent of current energy use.429
4.5.2. Overall Results for Energy Efficiency Measures Evaluated

The following set of energy efficiency and renewable energy measures have been chosen
for initial analysis:•

Electric Utility Coal-Fired Boiler Improvements: Utility boilers in the DPRK reportedly haveminimal (if any) insulation, are poorly operated, suffer from steam tube cracks and othermaintenance problems, and are often antiquated. We assumed that a combination of
measures that have been applied to industrial boilers in China can be applied to utility boilers
in the DPRK at similar costs to obtain similar results. We have assumed that a combinationof microcomputer boiler control, insulation of piping, and renovation of boilers can raise theaverage boiler efficiency (heat energy output divided by fuel energy input) from about 55-60
percent to 75-80 percent, reducing coal consumption by about 30 percent (total improvement
in heat delivery to turbines for power generation).430 We assumed that these measures areavailable for about the same cost as similar industrial boiler improvements were available in
China in the 1990s—approximately $7.54 per annual GJ of coal saved (year 2019 US
dollars/(GJ/yr)).431 432 In fact, economies of scale may make efficiency improvements for

429 Jan Jasiewicz, presentation "Energy Efficiency Activities in the DPRK and Opportunities for Rationalization of Energy Use",and paper entitled Energy Efficiency Activities in the DPRK and Opportunities for Rationalization of Energy Use, as prepared forthe DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA. Both are available from https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/.
430 Levine, M. and L. Xueyi (1990), Energy Conservation Programs in the Peoples Republic of China, Applied Science Division,
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA and Energy Research Institute, Peoples Republic of China. LBL29211. Levine, M., F. Liu, and J. Sinton (1992), "China's Energy System: Historical Evolution, Current Issues, and Prospects",
in Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 1992, 17:405-435. Yande, D. (1992?), An Analysis of the Potential in
Investment-Cum- Energy Conservation in Chemical Industry in China, Energy Research Institute, The State Planning
Commission, The People's Republic of China.
431 We have used a conversion rate of 4.755 1990 Chinese Yuan to the 1990 US dollar (Microsoft Encarta, 1994) to convert
quoted costs for Chinese energy efficiency investments to $US. This is close to the 4.73 Yuan per dollar value for 1990 found in
Macrotrends (2020), “Dollar Yuan Exchange Rate - 35 Year Historical Chart“, available ashttps://www.macrotrends.net/2575/us-dollar-yuan-exchange-rate-historical-chart. As the Yuan was not as of 1990 a floating
currency, this assumption may introduce some inaccuracy in converting Chinese costs.

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utility boilers less costly, per unit of energy saved, than similar measures for the generally
smaller industrial boilers.
•

Reduction in "Own Use" at Coal-Fired Electric Utility plants: We have assumed that the instation use of electricity at coal-fired power plants is 9 percent of gross generation. Based on
cost and savings estimates from Sathaye,433 we estimate that own use can be reduced to 4.5
percent at a cost of about $93 per GJ/yr of electricity saved.

•

Reduction in Electricity Transmission and Distribution (T&D) losses: Official DPRK
estimates place transmission and distribution losses of electricity at 16 percent of net
generation (electricity leaving the power plant), although, as noted earlier, this figure may
well be low. We have assumed, again based on performance and cost data cited by Sathaye,that will be possible through a combination of measures to reduce combined T&D losses to
10 percent of net generation at an average cost of 58 $/(GJ/yr). T&D improvements would
include better system control facilities, improved transformers and substation equipment, theaddition of capacitance to the system, and other measures to improve power factors andreduce voltage fluctuations.

•

Reduction in "Emergency Losses" at Coal-Fired Electric Utility plants: We have assumed,
based on anecdotal reports, that emergency losses of power at coal-fired power plants in the
DPRK average about 7 percent of gross generation. We assume that these losses can be
reduced by 90 percent through the application of measures available at a cost per unit energy
saved similar to that for T&D improvements described above. It may well be, however, thatthe combination of boiler improvements, T&D improvements, and possibly control system
improvements will by themselves reduce or eliminate emergency losses, with little or no
additional efficiency investments required.

•Wind powered Electricity Generation: Wind power is one of the major renewable resources
readily available to the DPRK, though, as noted above, the wind resources in the country
remain, to our knowledge, largely unmapped at a detailed local scale, and appear to be only
modest over most of the country in international compilations such as the Global Wind
Atlas.434 We have assumed that 500 MW of wind generation capacity (for example, 500
machines per year of 100 kW, or 250 200-kW machines per year) could be installed in the
DPRK over the next 10 years (with machines manufactured in the DPRK and/or imported),
and that the average installed capital costs of the machines would be about $1500/kW,
though costs of wind power in China seems to be somewhat lower, and this estimate may
thus be somewhat high.435 We assumed a relatively low capacity factor of 30 percent for

432 Unless otherwise specified, dollar figures referred to in this description of our energy efficiency analysis refer to year 2019

USD.
433 Sathaye, J. (1992), Economics of Improving Efficiency of China's Electricity Supply and Use: Are Efficiency Investments Costeffective?
434 An official description of the wind resource in DPRK (document in the author's files, 1993 [EE1]) mentions the Chinese
border area and offshore islands as the only likely sites for wind energy development, but it appears from the context of thedescription that this assessment considered wind-generated electricity to be primarily an off-grid resource. Our assessment thatwind is probably an attractive resource for the DPRK is based on the country's rugged topography and strong seasonal(winter/summer) weather patterns—see the map in section 5.2.2.6.
435 See, for example, https://www.alibaba.com/product-detail/wind-turbine-200kw-235kw-250kw275kw_62007888249.html?spm=a2700.galleryofferlist.normal_offer.d_title.1717174e5FSa3r, andhttps://www.alibaba.com/product-detail/China-wind-turbine100kw_60833845707.html?spm=a2700.galleryofferlist.normal_offer.d_title.1717174e5FSa3r.

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machines installed in the DPRK, yielding an investment cost of $160/(GJ/yr) of electricity
generated. Note that this figure does not include fixed or variable operating and maintenancecosts, but variable operating and maintenance costs are included in the overall analysis of thisoption (at $13 per MWh of generation).
•

Solar-powered Electricity Generation: Small solar photovoltaic (PV) panels numbering
probably 100 thousand or more have been put into service by DPRK citizens since 2010, butthere are relatively few large solar PV arrays in use. Assuming an average solar power
resource in the DPRK of 1300 annual kWh output per peak kW of panel capacity, we assume
deployment of 500 MW of solar PV systems over 10 years, although in practice a muchgreater amount of capacity could be put in place. We assume an average installed capital
cost of $1000 per kW, although costs could soon be considerably lower,436 and an average
fixed operating and maintenance cost of $10 per kW-yr. These assumptions together yield an
investment cost of about $210/(GJ/yr) of electricity generated.

Other potential energy efficiency improvements addressing the electricity generation sector thatseem promising but which we have been unable to evaluate quantitatively include:•

Coal Preparation: Grinding and washing coal to remove ash and sulfur will improve theefficiency of coal combustion in utility boilers. Such preparation will reduce the load of ash
in the bottom of boilers and provide a more homogeneous coal particle size, allowing forcleaner and more complete combustion. The environmental benefits of such measures(including reduced particulate and sulfur oxide emissions to the air) could be considerable,
and byproducts of coal cleaning (inert material removed from coal, and elemental sulfur)
could be used in the building and other industries. In addition, coal preparation, if done near
the coal mines, should reduce coal transport costs by increasing the energy content of thecoal per unit mass.

•

Expansion of Electricity Metering: At present there is reportedly very little metering ofelectricity consumption in the DPRK. Metering the electricity used by industrial facilities,
residences, and buildings would not only provide valuable information on the use ofelectricity in the DPRK, it would also, if coupled with per-unit electricity pricing, provide
electricity users with an incentive to use electricity efficiently. It should be noted that thebenefits of metering have apparently been taken to heart by DPRK officials, as witnessed bya trend, starting on the order of 15-20 years ago but of uncertain distribution around thecountry (particularly away from Pyongyang), toward the use of pre-paid card-type electricity
meters in Pyongyang (see Figure 4-10), and the recent establishment in the DPRK of afactory to produce electricity meters.437

436 The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) document RENEWABLE POWER GENERATION COSTS IN 2018,

dated 2019 and available as https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2019/May/IRENA_RenewablePower-Generations-Costs-in-2018.pdf, provides show total installed cost for utility scale solar photovoltaic power of less than
$1000 USD per kW in 2018, with recent trends showing costs falling rapidly. Alibaba.com, as of July 2020, showed numerous
vendors offering solar PV modules for as low as USD $200 per kW, so the estimate used here, $1000 per kW, may be high evenfor the year 2020.
437 William B. Brown, Changes In The North Korean Economy And Implications For The Energy Sector: Is North Korea Really
Short of Energy?, prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA,
USA. Paper and presentation available from https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/.

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Figure 4-10: Graphic of Card-style electricity meter in use in Pyongyang438•

Waste Heat Recovery and Cogeneration: The energy literature on China and the former
Soviet Union (for example, Levine and Xueyi439) cites examples of industrial boilers andfurnaces that have very high exhaust gas temperatures, indicating the availability of a
substantial amount of waste heat. Assuming that such situations are also common in North
Korea, the waste heat from industrial and other large boilers could be used to generate
electricity, though in all probability much of the industrial infrastructure that could support
such cogeneration will need to be rebuilt or replaced as the DPRK economy is redeveloped.

•

Gasification-Combined Cycle Electricity Generation/Retrofits: The efficiency of electricity
generation from coal could be increased significantly in the DPRK by first converting thecoal into a gas, combusting the gas in a turbine that turns a generator, and then routing theexhaust gasses from the turbine to a boiler to raise steam for a second cycle of electricity
generation. Gasifiers could be added as "front ends" to existing (renovated) coal-fired
boilers in the DPRK. The efficiency of gasification-combined cycle plants can be over 40
percent440, a vast increase from the probable 20 to 25 percent efficiency in existing DPRK
plants. There should also be substantial emissions benefits from employing this technology,
though it should be noted that the IGCC (integrated gasification combined-cycle) technology
is arguably still not quite at the point of commercial deployment as of 2020.441 Coal

438 Figure from John Lewis, “North Korean Energy: 2005-2006 New Technologies and Construction” as prepared for the DPRK

Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA), available fromhttps://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/.
439 Levine, M., and L. Xueyi (1990), Energy Conservation Programs in the Peoples Republic of China, Applied Science
Division, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA and Energy Research Institute, Peoples Republic of China.
440 Williams, R.H., and Larson, E.D. (1993), "Advanced Gasification-Based Biomass Power Generation". In Renewable Energy:
Sources for Fuels and Electricity, edited by T.B. Johansson, H. Kelly, A.K.N. Reddy, and R.H. Williams. Island Press,
Washington, D.C., USA.
441 See, for example, Christian Wolfersdorf and Bernd Meyer (2017), “The current status and future prospects for IGCC
systems”, Chapter 25, pages 847-889 in Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) Technologies, dated 2017, and edited

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKpreparation may be a prerequisite for implementing this technology in North Korea.
Repowering of the DPRK's oil-fired utility boilers (over 200 MW) to make them combinedcycle plants could also be a strong possibility, although, as noted in Chapter 5, recent work
has already been done toward converting the major oil-fired plant, near the Northeast refineryat Sonbong, to use coal, presumably using a traditional boiler.442 Looking further into the
future, it is possible that existing coal-fired power plants in the DPRK could be merged withrenewable generation (likely mostly solar) by either converting solar PV electricity tohydrogen to be used in retrofitted boilers when power is needed, or converting existingboilers to used stored heat made from excess electricity produced by renewable generators,
although both types of conversion effectively assume that the DPRK energy system adds
renewables fast enough that a means of longer terms (for example, days or weeks) electricity
storage will need to be developed.
Industrial Sector Measures
Our quantitative analysis of efficiency and renewable energy measures in the industrial
sector of the DPRK includes the following measures:•

Improvements in Industrial Coal-Fired Boiler and Furnaces: Like utility boilers, industrial
boilers and furnaces in the DPRK reportedly have very low average efficiencies, perhaps as
low as 50 percent (or less) for boilers, on average. Using the same set of improvements
assumed for utility boilers (see above), we assumed that the average efficiency of boilers
themselves could be raised from about 50 percent to about 65 to 70 percent, reducing coalconsumption by about 37.5 percent when other boiler-related measures are also applied.443
We assumed that these measures are available for approximately the same cost as has been
estimated in the past for similar industrial boiler improvements in China--approximately$7.60 per GJ/yr saved.

•

Improvements in Industrial Electric Motors: Electric motors in DPRK may be madedomestically, imported from China, or a combination, although based on our observations
some of the older motors we saw in service did seem to have been manufactured
domestically. In any case, the stock of motors in the DPRK is highly likely to be both aging
and inefficient. Table 5-14 provides rough estimates of the fraction of electricity use, by
subsector, that is consumed in motors and drives. These estimates vary from as low as 50
percent, for subsectors where we felt electricity was likely to be used intensively in end uses
other than motive power (such as electrolytic refining of metals), to as high as 95 percent for
subsectors (such as the Cement industry) where we felt that motor-driven applications suchas grinding and sizing of cement "clinker" would likely be the dominant use of electricity.

by Ting Wang and Gary Stiegel. Chapter available throughhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B978008100167700024X.
442 Repowering existing 20- to 30-year-old oil-fired boilers to create combined-cycle plants figured prominently in the futureplans, for example, of the major electricity utility in Hawaii, as of the mid-1990s.
443 Levine, M., and L. Xueyi (1990), Energy Conservation Programs in the Peoples Republic of China, Applied Science
Division, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA and Energy Research Institute, Peoples Republic of China.
LBL-29211. Levine, M., F. Liu, and J. Sinton (1992), "China's Energy System: Historical Evolution, Current Issues, andProspects", in Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 1992, 17:405-435. Yande, D. (1992?), An Analysis of the
Potential in Investment-Cum- Energy Conservation in Chemical Industry in China, Energy Research Institute, The State Planning
Commission, The People's Republic of China.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKAs a point of reference, note that 65 percent of the electricity used in the entire Chinese
economy has been estimated to be consumed in electric motors.
Based again on Chinese experience, we have assumed that it will be possible to increase theaverage motor efficiency from approximately 75 percent to approximately 88 percent.444
The latter efficiency (which corresponds to higher efficiency new motors produced in China
as of 1990—and is considerably lower, in fact, than the current generation of premium
motors made in the US, Japan, and Europe—and possibly in China as well) is similar to thatfor standard new electric motors sold in the US and Japan as of 1990, so efficiency
improvements beyond what we have assumed are definitely possible.445 We have assumed
that the cost of this efficiency improvement would be on the order of $77 per GJ/yr ofelectricity savings.
•

Industrial Lighting Improvements: We have assumed that lighting accounts for a relatively
modest 5 percent of industrial electricity use in the DPRK. Based on the cost andperformance of non-residential lighting improvements in industrialized countries, we haveestimated that it will be possible to save 50 percent of the industrial lighting electricity usedthrough a variety of measures (including improved bulbs and ballasts, more efficient fixtures,
replacement of incandescent lamps—where they are used—and older fluorescent fixtureswith high-efficiency fluorescent lamps and particularly LED (light-emitting diode)-based
lighting, improved daylighting, and lighting controls) at a cost of about $46 per GJ/yr ofelectricity saved, the equivalent of about $25 per MWh of saved electricity.446

As in the electricity generation sector, there is a wealth of opportunities for saving energy in theindustrial sector that we have not been able to quantitatively evaluate. These include:•

Industrial Process Improvements: It is likely that a considerable amount of electricity andcoal could be saved by improvements in industrial processes. These opportunities areavailable in many subsectors. In the DPRK cement industry, for example, the coalconsumption per unit output is 6.9 GJ per tonne of "clinker" (raw cement; data fromdocument in authors' files [CE1]). This can be compared with an average coal use of 6.1
GJ/te in China in 1980, 5.2 GJ/te in China in 1992,447 and 3 GJ/te in modern plants inindustrialized countries, and implies that coal use in the cement subsectors could be reducedby 12 to more than 50 percent. Similar opportunities exist in the iron and steel, other metals,
fertilizer, textiles, and other industrial subsectors. In the important iron and steel subsector,
possible process improvements include integrating steel production and forming processes(thus eliminating the need to cool and reheat the steel), continuous casting and forming,
electricity generation using top pressure in blast furnaces, use of coal gas for electricity

444 Sathaye, J. (1992), Economics of Improving Efficiency of China's Electricity Supply and Use: Are Efficiency Investments Cost-

effective?
445 Note that motor efficiencies vary by size class, with larger motors (for example, 100 to 200 hp or 75 to 150 kW) having
efficiencies generally a few percent higher than smaller motors of similar types. The efficiencies presented here can be thoughtof as rough weighted averages over the stock of electric motors in use.
446 Von Hippel, D., and R. Verzola (1994), Indicative Study of the Potential Economic and Environmental Impacts of DemandSide Management in the Philippines. Nautilus Institute Report. Nautilus Institute, San Francisco, California, USA.
447 Sinton, J. (1995), "Physical Intensity of Selected Industrial Products". Spreadsheet printout. LBL" Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA.

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generation, and other technologies.448 Generic efficiency improvements applicable to manyindustries include insulating product pipelines, using better refractory materials (special
ceramics used as, for example, furnace linings) that last longer and have better insulating
properties, using variable-speed drives to reduce the electricity used in electric motors,
modifications to reduce friction in piping, valves, and conveyance systems, and using harder,
longer lasting materials in cutting and grinding applications.
Note that process improvements can be geared to not only improving the efficiency of fueluse, but also in reducing materials waste. Improving chemical reactors so that there is lesswaste of reactants, using better-quality raw materials to improve product yield, and recycling
waste materials from production processes and product refining can reduce both waste andenergy consumption.449 Product modifications that result in the reduction of raw material(and thus energy) used per unit of product are also possible.450 Not coincidentally, these
improvements also typically reduce process effluents to the environment.
Process improvements could also be directed toward the 30 percent of DPRK petroleum
demand that is reportedly used in carbide manufacturing. As we know little about how thispetroleum is used in carbide manufacture (if the report is in fact correct), it is impossible tosay what the prospects for savings are.
Many DPRK industries use technologies that are on the order of 50 years old. In many cases,
simply replacing key industrial machinery with modern equipment will result in considerable
energy savings, as well as improvements in productivity, but will require significant
investments.
•

Coal Processing: As for electricity generation, coal washing and other methods of coalpreparation could help to dramatically improve the combustion efficiency of coal-fired
boilers and furnaces in the industrial and other sectors. It is likely that coal processing could
also improve the efficiency of industrial processes where coal is used as a feedstock—
including fertilizer (ammonium) and synthetic fiber manufacturing.

•

Construction Industry Modifications: The massive scale of construction projects in the
DPRK, coupled with the use of manual design and construction methods results in wastageof building material relative to more updated methods, although the use of manual design
may be changing as DPRK engineers become more adept in using design software, to theextent that they have access to modern software, or have developed such software
domestically. Considerable savings in steel and cement--and thus savings in the energy
needed to produce these materials–are possible through the use of improved construction
practices.451

448 Liu, Z. P., J. E. Sinton, F. Q. Yang, M. D. Levine, and M. K. Ting (1994), Industrial Sector Energy Conservation Programs in

the People's Republic of China during the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990). Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley,
California, USA and Energy Research Institute, Peoples Republic of China. LBL-36395.
449 For example, valuable metals such as gold, zinc, and cadmium can be recovered from the flue gases and liquid effluents ofmetal smelting industries, and sulfuric acid could be recovered from steel and non-ferrous metal plants. The latter modification
would not only remove SOx from flue gases but would also serve as a source of sulfuric acid for the chemical industry, reducing
energy use in that subsector.
450 As an example of reduction in materials use per unit product (though one unlikely to be directly germane to North Korean
industry at present), by carefully controlling the aluminum rolling and forming process, US manufacturers have been able tomarkedly reduce the thickness and weight of aluminum cans.
451 Document in the authors' files [ER1].

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKResidential and Public/Commercial/Military Sector Measures
Our quantitative analysis included four efficiency measures for the residential sector:•

Boiler Improvements: For small and medium-sized space heating (and possibly water
heating, in some instances) boilers of the type found in urban residential and other buildings,
we assumed, based roughly on the same sources we used for our industrial boiler measure
estimates, that a 15 percent improvement in efficiency (starting from an average boiler
efficiency of 50 percent; thus a 23 percent reduction in coal use) is available forapproximately $4.2/(GJ/yr) of coal saved. Note that the boiler improvements included here
are unlikely to exhaust the opportunities for improving boiler energy efficiency (and deliveryof heat to end-users) through equipment upgrades and improved operations and maintenance.

•

Building Envelope Improvements: We have included two simple building envelope
improvement measures in our estimate of possible energy efficiency savings. A
combination of A) application of a 30 mm coat of concrete containing perlite--a lightweightmineral with insulating properties--to the inside of the typical concrete slab walls ofresidential and other buildings, and B) double glazing of windows are together estimated,based on simulations for Chinese buildings, to save 20 percent of heating energy.452 Theassumption of the use of a perlite/concrete coating for insulation is limiting, in that there aremuch better insulation materials (rigid foam board, for example) that might as easily beapplied to existing buildings, but the DPRK at present, so far as we know, lacks thetechnology to make these insulation products, so we have focused on insulation materials that
could be produced domestically. The costs of these savings are estimated at slightly under$8 per GJ/yr. Note that in applying this measure to coal use in buildings, we have assumed
that boiler improvements take place before (or at the same time as) building envelope
improvements, that is, the savings fraction for building envelope improvements was applied
to the total energy use after boiler efficiency improvements had been factored in.
The two building envelope improvements above can be considered a minimal simple start tothe list of potential measures of this type. Other measures include caulking andweatherstripping to reduce air infiltration, insulation of water and steam piping, improved
radiator controls (in fact, visitors to the DPRK report that the only heat control measure
available to residents of typical North Korean apartment buildings is the opening and closingof windows and doors), interior and exterior wall and roof insulation, roof coatings, and otherimprovements. Actual savings from building envelope measures will vary by building type
and with the current condition of the buildings, but savings of much more than 20 percent of
current energy use are quite possible, at costs possibly not significantly higher than thoseabove. Proposals to undertake pilot building efficiency projects in the DPRK weredeveloped by United Nations agencies in the late 1990s, but have not, to the authors’knowledge, been implemented as of yet. Colleagues from the DPRK that the authors haveinteracted with have shown a very keen interest in promoting building energy efficiency
measures in their country and understand very well the potential benefits of those measures
to the DPRK, but lack the combination of materials, technical know-how, and funding to
implement them.

452 Lang, S., Y.J. Huang, and M. Levine (1992), Energy Conservation Standards for Space Heating in Chinese Urban Residential

Buildings. Energy Analysis Program, Energy and Environmental Division, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California,
USA.

222
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•Rural Residential Coal Stove/heater Improvements: We have assumed that the average
residential stove/heater can be improved from an average of 30 percent efficiency to 40
percent efficiency, thus saving 25 percent of initial coal use. This is a rough estimate on ourpart. The estimates that we have found of coal stove efficiency in the DPRK and China
range from 20 to 50 percent; 30 percent was cited as an estimate for DPRK by an informed
visitor to the country.453 We have assumed that this efficiency improvement is available forthe same cost cited for coal stove improvements in China,454 namely $1.4/(GJ/yr).

•

Electric Motor Improvements in Urban Residential and Non-residential Buildings: Electricmotors are typically used in multi-family apartment buildings and in non-residentialbuildings for a variety of uses, including ventilation, refrigeration, and water pumping (forheating and potable water). We have assumed that 10 percent of the electricity used in theurban residential subsector, and 30 percent of that used in the Public/Commercial and
Military sectors, is used in electric motors. These estimates are admittedly rough guesses atbest but are lower than the fraction of electricity used in motors in similar sectors in manyother countries. We have assumed that the average cost and performance of measures that
increase the efficiency of these motors is roughly the same as in the industrial sector.

•

Improvements in residential and non-residential lighting: We have assumed that the fractionof residential electricity used in lighting end-uses is 50 percent. This figure is somewhat
higher than lighting electricity fractions quoted for Thailand and the former Soviet Union (28and 33 percent, respectively), but both of those societies use electricity for end uses—
including air conditioning and water heating—that reportedly are little used in DPRK
residences. We have assumed that 30 percent of lighting electricity use in residences in
DPRK powers incandescent bulbs, 30 percent goes to fluorescent bulbs, and 40 percent isused in LED bulbs, the use of which has accompanied the widespread use of solar PV panel.
These are rough assumptions, and it is quite possible that LED and fluorescent lighting use isless prevalent nationwide, particularly outside of Pyongyang. We assume that LED bulbs
can save 85 percent of the electricity used by incandescent bulbs (while providing similar or
enhanced light output), and that LED bulbs can provide the same lighting as the different
types of fluorescent bulbs in use (compact fluorescent bulbs and tube-type fluorescents) with
50 percent less electricity input. Taken together, these three assumptions result in a 40
percent reduction in electricity use in residential lighting. If, as has been suggested, tubetype fluorescent lamps are in wider use than we have assumed, these savings may besomewhat overstated, but a combination of luminaire, lamp ballast, and bulb improvements
for tube-type fluorescent lamps can yield savings that are nearly as significant, even without
replacing tube-type lamps with LED bulbs in the same form factors. As an estimate of costs,
we have estimated that the two types of measures above (LED replacement of incandescentand fluorescent bulbs) would provide electricity savings at an average cost of saved energy of$11 per lifetime MWh saved, or an investment cost of about $20 per GJ/yr saved. We shouldnote that the lifetime of most CFLs is shortened if they are operated on a grid withfluctuating voltage and low power factors, and LEDs may have similar issues, thus unless
LEDs are specifically designed for such conditions, and/or power conditioning is used,

453

Document in the authors' files [R1].

454 Levine, M., F. Liu, and J. Sinton (1992), "China's Energy System: Historical Evolution, Current Issues, and Prospects", inAnnual Review of Energy and the Environment 1992, 17:405-435.

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transmission and distribution improvements would probably have to go hand in hand withmajor on-grid introduction of LEDs in the DPRK. This is likely less of an issue with LEDs
operated, for example, from home solar PV systems or from solar PV mini-grids, as bothwould have battery (or other) storage of electricity, which would dramatically reduce power
quality issues at the bulb.
In 2005, we were told by a DPRK delegation to a Nautilus workshop that CFLs had in fact
been implemented in residences in the DPRK, using Phillips brand bulbs and also bulbs
made in the DPRK. This implementation was reportedly fairly extensive, but we do not have
independent feedback on how extensive or effective, on a long-term basis, it will prove to be.
We therefore leave this measure in the list of potential improvements for the time being.
While in Pyongyang in 2009 one of the authors estimated, based on observation (fromoutside) of a limited number of residential buildings in the city, that perhaps 40 percent ofapartments were using CFLs.455 As the penetration of CFLs in other cities and in rural areas
is likely to be lower than in Pyongyang, and since then, LEDs have probably also arrived inPyongyang first, we roughly estimate that 40 percent of residential electric lighting energy
use was, as of 2019, consumed in LEDs. Although it is likely that other improvements inresidential lighting, at similar cost per unit savings, can be identified to replace the savings
ascribed to LED introduction, any estimate of the potential benefits of lighting efficiency
improvements in the DPRK, in a scenario where the DPRK economy is redeveloped, should,
realistically, take into account that existing lighting levels in DPRK residences are, on
average, very low by the standards of most industrialized nations, and thus as the DPRK
economy is rebuilt, residents will probably choose to install much more lighting than iscurrently (typically one bulb per room) present in most dwelling units.
Our assumption for non-residential buildings is that 50 percent of the electricity consumed isused in lighting. As for industrial lighting, we assume that 50 percent of this amount can besaved by a package of lighting energy efficiency measures, at a cost of about $46 per GJ/yr.
Since these costs and savings estimates are based on figures for industrialized countries, ourguess is that similar improvement will cost less and save more in the DPRK, particularly if
production of quality lighting components can be done with a substantial contribution ofdomestic (versus imported) labor and materials.
Other possible energy efficiency measures for the residential and non-residentialbuildings sectors include:•

Improvements in Electric Appliances: The fraction of residences in the DPRK withrefrigerators is unknown, but likely to be small. What refrigerators are in use in the
DPRK—and we found relatively few households with refrigerators in our one-village surveyof rural energy use in 1998 and 2000456—are likely to be mostly older models imported fromJapan or China, or cheaper Chinese models, and thus up to 50 percent less efficient thanthose manufactured in industrialized countries, or the best refrigerators currently

455 This extremely rough survey was done simply by looking around the city at the lights visible inside residential buildings atnight, observing that apartments lit with CFLs showed a more bluish light than apartments lit by incandescent bulbs, andestimating the fraction of dwellings in which each type of bulb was present.
456 See, for example, D. von Hippel et al (2001), Rural Energy Survey In Unhari Village, The Democratic People’s Republic ofKorea (DPRK): Methods, Results, and Implications, Nautilus Institute Special Report dated May 20, 2001, and available as
http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Unhari_Survey.pdf.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKmanufactured in China, China made great improvements in refrigerator efficiency starting in
the early 2000s, a process that has likely continued through recent years as China has
produced progressively more of the world’s appliance).457 Liu et al458 reported that Chinese
refrigerators in the 200-liter size range consumed 365 kWh per year as of approximately
1990, while South Korean models of similar capacity used 240 kWh per year. To the extent
that refrigeration is used in buildings other than private residences (for example, in
communal kitchen facilities), similar savings may be possible. Improvement of theefficiency of refrigerators manufactured in or available to DPRK could be increasingly
important, as a refrigerator is probably one of the first appliances that households will invest
in if economic conditions in North Korea begin to markedly improve.
•

A substantial fraction of households in DPRK have either television or radio, or both.
Recent improvements in electronics technology that the DPRK does not currently haveaccess to have reduced the hourly energy consumption of these devices markedly, though theaggregate amount of electricity saved by such improvements may be small due to the limited
power consumption of radios and small televisions. When we visited the DPRK in 1998 and
2000, most televisions were of an older design, but that situation seems highly likely to havechanged in recent years thanks to imports from China. From 2014 through 2018, based on
UN Comtrade statistics, The DPRK imported nearly 3.3 million televisions (HS Category8528) from China, at an average cost of about $85 (USD) per unit, or a total of $280 million
over the five years. Based on 2020 Alibaba.com prices, this average cost suggests that the
average imported TV was in the 24- to 32-inch-class (60 to 80 cm) range, although the HS
8528 class also includes devices that include both screens and devices such as DVD players,which may reduce the average screen size.459 The number of units sold suggests an averageof about 0.5 new televisions per household during this five-year period alone, with another
930,000 units imported from 2008 through 2013. These imports suggest that efficiency
improvements may be modest, or not available until some years in the future as the Chineseunits purchased through 2018 are retired. Other improvements in appliance efficiency inNorth Korea may well be possible, but their evaluation must await better information on thestock of electricity-using appliances in the household and other sectors. Microwave ovens,for example, accomplish many cooking tasks more efficiently than simple electric resistancestoves and heaters, but based in UN Comtrade data on exports of microwaves from China to
the DPRK (about 2900 total reported over the decade from 2008 through 2018), penetrationof the latter in the DPRK residential housing stock appears likely to be low. On the other
hand, UN Comtrade data suggests that on the order of 2.2 million rice cookers (or similar
devices—HS 851660) were exported from China to the DPRK during 2008 through 2018, an
average of one for every 3 or so DPRK households, at a cost averaging about $14.460

457 See, for example, China Daily.com (2012), “China produces most home appliances: report”, dated 10/3/2012 and available ashttps://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-10/03/content_15958806.htm.
458 Liu, F., W.B. Davis, and M.D. Levine (1992), An Overview of Energy Supply and Demand in China. Energy Analysis
Program, Energy and Environment Division, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA. LBL- 32275 UC-350.
459 Alibaba.com included (as of about 2020) advertisements for a variety of small DVD players with screens at wholesale costs in
the $40 to $60 range, including, for example, a unit with a 15.4 inch (about 40 cm) screen that plays from DVDs, HDMI, or via
USB drives, and uses on the order of 27 watts. See, for example, https://www.alibaba.com/product-detail/manufacture-new-16inch-digital-multimedia_60283354579.html?spm=a2700.galleryofferlist.normal_offer.d_title.5c84560dvD3LoJ.
460 This appears to be a fairly typical wholesale price for a rice cooker made in China. See, for example,
https://www.alibaba.com/product-detail/Rice-Cooker-Ricecooker-National-ElectricRice_1600076813302.html?spm=a2700.galleryofferlist.normal_offer.d_title.3d135ba8xfB9cv&s=p. For reasons unclear to us,

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•

Improvements in Cooking Efficiency (Non-coal fuels): Urban households in the DPRK
reportedly use charcoal, LPG, and kerosene stoves for cooking in addition to coal stoves.
Rural households use wood and other types of biomass for cooking and heating. Efficiency
improvements in all of these technologies are possible, though the percentage improvements(and the aggregate amount of fuel savings) are likely considerably higher for devices using
solid fuels. Reduction in the use of wood and biomass fuels using more efficient stoves andheaters would help to make wood and biomass available for other applications and/or to
reduce harvest pressures on forests.

•

District Heating: District heating of homes and other buildings using heat from power plants,
industrial facilities, and stand-alone central steam plants is apparently practiced in North
Korea (as it is throughout Eastern Europe), but the full extent to which it is practiced is notentirely clear (but see our estimates in earlier chapters of this Report). Switching to an
efficient district heating network from a system of dispersed small boilers and stoves canresult in substantial coal savings, and there are quite likely extensive opportunities for
improvements to existing district heating systems that can markedly increase the efficiency
with which those systems deliver heat (and thus, possibly, increase the number of households
that the district heating systems serve, especially when combined with weatherization ofresidential and commercial/institutional buildings, boiler and other improvements in district
heating plants, and other upgrades).

•Building Shell Improvements in Rural homes: Potential improvements include caulking andweatherstripping, insulation, and glazing (in some cases, in our limited experience in the
DPRK, many windows use plastic or wood coverings, or are cracked, so any reasonableglazing would be an improvement), but any definitive list of measures will have to wait until
a better description of the rural housing stock in the DPRK is in hand.

•

Use of Biogas: Biogas—produced via anaerobic fermentation of human night soil, animal
manures, and agricultural wastes—could be used as a clean cooking fuel in rural areas, or
could contribute to small-scale power production (with cogenerated heat for agriculturalprocessing or other applications).461 The biogas production process also has the potential toyield important by-products such as animal bedding, soil amendments, and organic fertilizer,
as well as potentially (depending on the average current status of rural waste disposal
practices) reducing environmental issues associated with sewage and manure disposal.
Transport and Other Sector Measures

We have evaluated only one energy efficiency measure in the transport sector in aquantitative manner:•

Replacement of Medium-duty trucks: Two and one-half tonne trucks have been theworkhorses of the military ground transport fleet in the DPRK and are reportedly (as well as
by the author’s observations) widely used in civilian goods (and civilian passenger, as shown

the cost of the average unit exported in the HS code category 851660 in 2017 was markedly higher, at about $65, than in years
during 2008 through 2016, when it ranged from about $6 to $13 per unit. This suggests either a reporting error in 2017 or the
inclusion in exports for that year or devices that were unusual for the HS category.
461 See, for example, Rural Energy Production: Biogas Plant, a Sustainable Source of Energy for Cooperative Farms, by Arthur
Wellinger, dated December 12, 2003, and published by ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency International) andNova Energie. This report provides case studies of the application of manure-fed biogas digesters in the DPRK.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKin Figure 4-11) transport as well—often with military and civilian cargoes and passengers
combined. We have assumed that all of the gasoline used for civilian freight transport byroad in the DPRK is used in such trucks, and assuming that the freight transport provided byeach vehicle is on the order of 15,000 tonne-km per year, we very roughly estimate that there
are about 16,000 civilian 2 1/2 tonne trucks in the DPRK fleet, to go along with about 38,000
military trucks in active service. If the most heavily used two-thirds of these trucks (which
we assumed to use 90 percent of the fuel) were replaced with new vehicles similar to the
Isuzu FRR (mid-1990s) model or similar trucks available from China,462 a fuel savings ofabout 43 percent would result. We have assumed that these vehicles could be imported or
manufactured in the DPRK (probably, especially in the first few years, from imported parts,
as has been the practice in recent automobile production joint ventures in the DPRK) at a costof $14,000 each.463 At this cost, however, replacement of the truck fleet is not likely to becost-effective. Note, however, that we have assumed that the existing trucks will be replaced
whether they are at the end of their useful life or not. If one assumes only an incremental
cost for the trucks (the difference between the costs of producing a standard DPRK truck andone like the Isuzu model), and/or if one assumed a substantially heavier usage (in te-km/yr)
for the new trucks, which is probably reasonable, this measure would appear more costeffective. Whether these changes would make this measure sufficiently cost-effective topursue is not possible, with the data at hand, to ascertain.

462 See, for example, the diesel "Dongfeng" trucks described on Alibaba here https://www.alibaba.com/product-detail/4X2-

wheel-drive-3-5-tons_60714507616.html?spm=a2700.7724838.2017115.93.28d138f2PRkKGF, and gasoline-fueled "FOTON"
brand units here https://www.alibaba.com/product-detail/New-China-5-ton-minitruck_60642742600.html?spm=a2700.7724838.2017115.84.287b43a48AOfyp. Note, however, but note that trucks come inmany configurations, sizes, and thus costs.
463 Approximate cost of new truck from China, including roughly estimated taxes and shipping costs. By way of comparison, theIsuzu truck model cited was available in the US for roughly $30,000 (retail) as of 1995. The cost is probably at least double thatby 2020. Assuming A) that a large portion of this cost is dealer profit, profit for Isuzu, import costs and duties, and other nonproduct costs, and B) such trucks could be built in the DPRK at DPRK labor rates, but with Japanese technology (presumably
under license), at perhaps a cost per truck of $24,000 US (2020 dollars). This may well be too high for the DPRK, however, as
the average value of spark-ignition trucks of under 5 tonnes capacity imported to the DPRK from China in 2016 was under$10,000 (though some or many of these units may well have been used).

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Figure 4-11: Military Truck in Use by Military Personnel and Civilians near Nampo464

Other potential improvements in the transport and other sectors might include:•

Electric Motor and Drive improvements for Electric Locomotives: Electrified rail is the
backbone of the DPRK transit system. Though we have no data on the efficiency of electric
locomotives in North Korea, potential efficiency improvements on the order of thosedescribed above for industrial motors seem plausible.

•

Substantial improvements in electric rail efficiency may come about simply throughtransmission and distribution improvements on the electric grid as a whole. Other options
for increasing rail efficiency might include updated rail control and scheduling systems, track
improvements to reduce friction (and forced halts) and optimizing freight loads.

•

Updating Other Transport Fleets: Updating the road passenger transport, water transport(including the fishing fleet), and air transport fleets may as much as double their efficiency,
but any fuel savings is highly likely to be offset by increased use of these transport modes as
they become more efficient and reliable. Improvements in transport infrastructure, ranging
from roads to harbor and lock facilities, can also increase the efficiency of transportation by
reducing transit times.

•

Biofuels for Transport: The DPRK government has expressed an interest, in various
documents, in increasing self-reliance by replacing petroleum-based transport fuels with

464 Figure from David Von Hippel and Jungmin Kang, “Updated DPRK Energy Balance (Draft) and Work to Be Done” asprepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA).

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liquid fuels derived from biomass. While the GHG and pollutant-reduction benefits of sucha program are important, we are reluctant to enthusiastically endorse this idea at present
because 1) all DPRK agricultural land appears to be needed and fully employed just to feed
people, thus production of motor fuels from agricultural crops such as corn would appear tobe ruled out; and 2) there appears to be relatively little extra wood or crop wastes available
for use (see discussion of biomass resources above) as cellulosic feedstocks for biofuels
production (via either fermentation or thermal liquefaction). If the biomass resource
situation changes in the future, however, biofuels would become a more attractive option.
•

Improving agricultural tractors: Specific fuel consumption in tractors in China, reported tobe 195 grams/hp-hr in the 1980s was some 10 percent greater than for similar tractors inindustrialized countries.465 Tractors in the DPRK are unlikely to be more efficient than the
average for these older Chinese units, and are likely to be worse, particularly in recent years,
as spare parts and other maintenance supplies have become increasingly difficult to obtain.

• Reducing fertilizer use: Fertilizer application in North Korea is reported to be excessive forsome crops. On rice, for example, it has been suggested that the typical-practice nitrogen
fertilizer application in the DPRK could be reduced by 25 percent.466 If so, significant
reductions in energy use in the energy-intensive ammonia manufacturing industry in DPRK
should be possible (and/or an expansion of the amount of crops that could be fertilized fromfertilizer produced domestic plus the limited available imports), as well as (probably minor)
reductions in the need for tractor fuel for fertilizer application.
Additional details of the process used in estimating the impacts and costs of these measures areprovided in studies referenced previously in this paper,467 as well as in the section of Attachment
1 providing printouts of the worksheets used for energy efficiency measure analysis.
Table 4-10 shows the overall results of our evaluation of these measures. It has been assumed
that under an aggressive program with both strong leadership commitment inside the DPRK andtechnical and financial cooperation from other countries, these measures (or some of thesemeasures and others with similar per-unit costs and impacts) could be implemented over the next
10 years.468 In total (that is, in year 10 of an aggressive program), they annually save
approximately 150 Petajoules (one Petajoule, or PJ, is equal to 1000 terajoules or 1 million
gigajoules) of coal (about 33 percent of estimated 2019 DPRK coal supplies) at a cost of about$US 1200 million (2019 dollars), plus 23 PJ/yr (about 40 percent of 2019 generation) ofelectricity supply (electricity saved plus 500 MW each of new wind-powered and solar
generation) at a total cost of approximately $2.3 billion. Note that more than half ($1250
465 Liu, F., W.B. Davis, and M.D. Levine (1992), An Overview of Energy Supply and Demand in China. Energy Analysis

Program, Energy and Environment Division, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA. LBL- 32275 UC-350.
466 Personal communications with UN agricultural sector expert with experience in the DPRK, but note that this assessment
probably refers to a time when DPRK fertilizer use was on average much higher than ongoing fertilizer shortages have allowed inrecent years.
467 von Hippel, D. F., and P. Hayes (1995), The Prospects for Energy Efficiency Improvements in the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea: Evaluating and Exploring the Options. Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, USA, December
1995. P. Hayes and D.F. von Hippel (1997), "Engaging North Korea on Energy Efficiency". Chapter 9 in Peace and Securityin Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula, Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes, editors. M.E. Sharpe,
Armonk, NY. Von Hippel, D.F., and P. Hayes (1996) "Engaging North Korea on Energy Efficiency". The Korean Journal of
Defense Analysis, Volume VIII, No. 2, Winter 1996. Pages 177 - 221.
468 Note that figures in Table 4-10 have been rounded for presentation and are likely to be accurate to only one or two significant
digits.

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million) of this total cost for electricity-related measures is for wind and solar power
deployment, which accounts for just 31 percent of the total 23 PJ/yr impacts on generation
requirements. If the package of measures included were reconfigured to include less wind power
but more energy efficiency, the average cost per unit electricity supply impacts could be reduced
significantly—illustrating the fact that this illustrative package of measures is NOT by anymeans cost-optimized. Replacement of the DPRK fleet of 2 1/2 tonne trucks, as it has beenmodeled, is unlikely to be cost effective with respect to saving energy alone but would save
approximately 1.9 PJ of refined products annually, which is somewhat over 6 percent of total
estimated national petroleum use in 2019, and nearly a quarter of road transport petroleum use, at
an investment cost of $440 million.
A key assumption made in estimating the costs and performance of most of the coal- or
electricity-saving energy efficiency measures is that the costs and performance of thesemeasures, when implemented in the DPRK, will be similar to the cost and performance of themeasures as experienced in the People's Republic of China during energy efficiency programs
carried out there in the late 1980s. It could be argued that the costs of the measures in Chinamight be lower than in the DPRK, due to lower labor rates in China at that time and a larger
manufacturing base in China. It could, however, equally be argued that the opportunities forsavings with the measures we have evaluated are likely to be greater in the DPRK than they werein China, due to the, on average, older capital stock in the DPRK.
The environmental benefits of measures such as those described above would be substantial.
The measures to save coal would avoid the emissions of approximately 69 thousand tonnes ofsulfur oxides, 43 thousand tonnes of nitrogen oxides, and nearly 11 million tonnes of carbon
dioxide. Using the year 2019 ratio of thermal to hydroelectric generation, the electricity-saving
measures described above (including the wind power generation) would avoid emissions ofanother 19 thousand tonnes of sulfur oxides, 12 thousand tonnes of nitrogen oxides, and 3.2
million tonnes of carbon dioxide. These emissions reductions represent 28 to 31 percent of ourestimates of total national emissions of each pollutant in 2019.
Together, the energy savings and environmental benefits of these few energy efficiency
measures, as evaluated, underscore the key role that energy efficiency can, and indeed, must playin any DPRK energy sector development/redevelopment effort. By way of comparison, theelectricity savings from the limited package of measures described above (excluding wind powersystems) amounts to about the same amount of electricity that would be produced by a 400 to
500 MW thermal power plant at approximately the same capital cost, but with no fuel costs,
arguably higher reliability, and far fewer environmental impacts. Plus, each individual
investment in energy efficiency measures is smaller, and thus arguably more manageable andsustainable, than investments for the larger capital investments (such as power plants) that are
avoided by energy-efficiency investments.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 4-10: Results of Energy-Efficiency Analyses for the DPRKMEASURES TO SAVE COAL:

MeasureIndustrial Boiler and Furnace Improvements
Residential and Public/Commercial/Military Boiler Impr.
Building Envelope Improvements
Solar Water Heating
Domestic Stove/Heater Improvements
Electric Utility Boiler Improvements
TOTALS
Avoided Losses of Coal During Transport:
TOTAL COAL SUPPLY SAVINGS
Fraction of 2019 Total Coal Supply
Investment required, $ per GJ/yr of Coal Supply Savings
Investment required, $ per tce/yr of Coal Supply Savings

Estimated Energy
Total EstimatedEnergy Savings
Investment
Potential, TJ/yr
Cost, $US 201945,526$ 408,164,600
32,095$ 160,654,656
22,902$ 210,008,992
11,560$ 142,307,337
11,109$18,536,092
25,445$ 229,333,411
148,638 TJ/yr $ 1,169,005,088
1,486 TJ/yr
150,124 TJ/yr
32.9%
$
7.79
$
228

MEASURES TO SAVE/GENERATE ELECTRICITY:
Estimated Energy
Total EstimatedEnergy Savings
Investment
MeasurePotential, TJ/yr
Cost, $US 2019
Industrial Motors and Drives
1,777$ 160,913,054
Motors and Drives in other Sectors
643$
58,193,405
Residential Lighting
741$
17,759,933
Non-residential Lighting
3,620$ 197,774,930
Own Use reduction in Power Plants
708$ 152,393,105
Reduction of Emergency Use in Power Plants
1,266$
86,394,231
Transmission and Distribution Improvements
5,294$ 361,344,118
Wind-powered Electricity Generation
4,730$ 750,000,000
Solar-powered Electricity Generation
2,340$ 500,000,000
TOTALS
21,120 TJ/yr $ 2,284,772,776
Additional Avoided T&D Losses (based on 2019 Rates)
1,880 TJ/yr
TOTAL ELECTRICITY SUPPLY SAVINGS/GENERATION
22,999 TJ/yr
Fraction of 2019 Total Electricity Generation
40.6%
Investment required, $ per GJ/yr of Electricity Supply Savings/Generation$
99.34
Investment required, $ per MWh/yr of Electricity Supply Savings/Generation$
358

MEASURE TO SAVE PETROLEUM PRODUCTS:
Estimated Energy
Energy Savings
Potential, TJ/yr
1,889
6.2%
23.6%

MeasureImprovements in 2 1/2 tonne truck fleet
Fraction of 2019 Total Refined Products Use
Fract. of 2019 Total Refined Prod. Use in Road Transport
Investment required, $ per GJ/yr of refined products Savings
Investment required, $ per toe/yr of petroleum products Savings

Total EstimatedInvestment
Cost, $US 2019437,594,151

$
$

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

231.679,693

5.

DPRK Electricity Supply, Demand, and Options
5.1.

Introduction

During the decade of the 1990s, and continuing into this third decade of the 21st century, anumber of issues have focused international attention on the DPRK. As noted earlier in thisreport, most of these issues—including nuclear weapons proliferation, military transgressions,concern over missile (or satellite launch) tests, provocations, and posturing, economic collapse,
food shortages, floods, droughts, tidal waves, and the death of DPRK leader Kim Jong Il and thepassing of the leadership mantle to the third generation of the Kim dynasty in Kim Jong Un—
have their roots in a complex mixture of Korean and Northeast Asian history, ongoing global
economic power shifts, environmental events, international sanctions on DPRK imports andexports, and as-yet unresolved internal structural dilemmas in the DPRK economy. Energy
demand and supply in general—and, arguably, demand for and supply of electricity inparticular—have played a key role in many of these high-profile issues involving the DPRK, andhave played and will play (and arguably are playing, as of late 2020) a central role in the
resolution of the ongoing confrontation between the DPRK and much of the international
community over the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programs. The DPRK’s electricity supply anddemand situation is also highly likely to play, or have the potential to play, a key role in therapprochement and engagement between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK), if
engagement results from recent or future overtures of peace.469 Electricity-related aid may well
be a key inducement for the ROK to offer in its negotiations with the North, but such aid willneed to be carefully designed and targeted if it is to be effective in building engagement between
the Koreas.
Whether through ROK-DPRK bilateral discussions, through some reinvigorated international
negotiations, perhaps involving most of the participants in the earlier Six-Party Talks process, orvia some new multilateral forum for addressing the DPRK nuclear weapons and related issues, it
is clear that energy sector issues will continue to be central to engagement of the North.
Carefully-designed energy sector—and in particular, given its importance to the economy,electricity sector—assistance projects of modest scale, particularly those that combine economic
development and humanitarian focus, should be sought out, designed, and, as soon as conditions
permit, undertaken. The ROK is in a unique position to develop and deliver such projects, and it
stands to gain considerably if such projects are successful. For the ROK, engagement with the
DPRK on energy issues, and particularly electricity issues, offers many possible benefits,
including an opportunity to improve its relationship with and understand its neighbor, a chance
to potentially clean up the environment that the two nations share, an opening for the ROK toinvest in and benefit from the development of the North’s economy, opportunities to potentiallylink its energy system with potential resource suppliers, most notably the Russian Far East,
China, and even (via Russia or China) Mongolia, and an opportunity to improve the ROK’s
security by promoting peace on the Korean Peninsula.
469 As of this writing (October 2020), the administration of President Moon Jae-in in the ROK continues to press for a formal end

to the Korean War, but recent DPRK announcements and actions, ranging from the killing of a South Korean fisheries official(and an apology by Chairman Kim Jong Un for same), destruction of a liaison office at Kaesong, parading of new missiles, andboth angry and appeasing rhetoric suggest that little concrete action on engagement is likely before the United States elections in
November 2020. See, for example, Hae Won Jeong (2020), “What’s Next for Moon’s North Korea Policy?”, The Diplomat,
dated October 19, 2020, and available as https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/whats-next-for-moons-north-korea-policy/.

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It is critically in the interest of the Republic of Korea and its international allies to know as much
as is possible to know about the electricity sector resources and needs of the DPRK, so as to beready, when the opportunities arise, to assist the people of the DPRK in energy and economic
redevelopment. Such redevelopment will most certainly not be either easy, straightforward, or
inexpensive, but every effort should be made to assure that is as smooth and as sustainable aspossible to reduce both the economic and human costs associated with the DPRK’s transition
and, ultimately, of de-facto economic or full political reunification of the two Koreas. To that
end, this chapter of this Report provides an updated summary of what is known and/or inferred
about the status of the DPRK electricity sector, including the DPRK’s electricity supply anddemand.
In the remainder of this introductory section, we provide a an overview of DPRK electricity
policies, to the extent that they are known (or, indeed, exist), offer a brief summary of the
DPRK’s electricity supply infrastructure, outline some of the challenges facing the electricity
industry in the DPRK, and provide a brief “roadmap” to Sections 5.2 through 5.4 of this chapter.
5.1.1. Overview of North Korean Electricity Policies
The DPRK’s electricity policies—insofar as can be determined from a combination ofannouncements, news reports, and direct contact with DPRK delegations at workshops organized
by Nautilus and others—has been to attempt to embrace virtually all available power sources,
nominally under the self-sufficiency philosophy of juche. This broadly stated desire to pursue avariety of sources of power, ranging from medium-to-large-scale hydroelectric development,
nuclear energy, and coal-fired power to solar, wind, and tidal energy, as well as energy
efficiency, is tempered by the realities of the technologies available to the DPRK under current
international economic sanctions and (relatedly) under the limits imposed by what it can afford.
As such, rather than a broad, concerted, and coordinated electricity policy, the DPRK’s actions in
the electricity sector seem increasingly reactive to whatever the current energy sector and,indeed, international conditions appear to require.470 In recent years, it can be argued, DPRK
electricity policy is being devolved more and more to the local and even individual level, with
regions, counties, businesses, and even households essentially being left to fend for themselves
to secure electricity supplies, and sometimes even being encouraged to do so by the central
government.
Some of the hallmarks, or perhaps more accurately, symptoms of recent DPRK electricity policy
include:471•

Increasing adoption of distributed generation—notably diesel and gasoline-fueled, butalso, especially in recent years, solar photovoltaic and some wind power systems—by

470 In fairness, the DPRK is hardly the only country that lacks a set of fully consistent and coordinated electricity policies.

Inmany countries, the United States and, one would argue, the Republic of Korea among them, stated national goals for the future,for example, regarding climate change mitigation and green growth, are frequently not as consistent as they might be withelectricity and fuels pricing practices, environmental regulations, and other considerations. Differing motivations among public
and private sector energy sector actors and interest groups, as well as the need to maintain energy supplies today to existing
consumers and infrastructure while planning for tomorrow, partly explain these disconnects within electricity policies. This is
not to say that such disconnects are unreasonable, only that it should be kept in mind when considering DPRK electricity policythat in general fully coherent national energy policy is the exception, rather than the rule, in the global community.
471 Please see section 5.2 for additional information about these policies and initiatives.

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households, businesses, and other organizations, as electricity supplies have become more
unreliable and the DPRK government has failed to maintain electricity supplies.472•

Increasing emphasis on the rapid, almost frantic construction of medium and large (on theorder of 10s to in very few cases 100s of megawatts—MW) power plants, particularlyhydro plants, in an attempt to rapidly improve electricity supplies, particularly supplies toPyongyang. Thus far, these efforts, with the Huichon #2 hydroelectric plant being a casein point—have had limited or transient impact, in part, reportedly, because the haste withwhich plants have been constructed has sometimes led to technical defects that, combinedwith low water levels caused by recent droughts, have limited the output of the plants.473•

Development of a small light water nuclear reactor (LWR) at the Yongbyon nuclear
complex after the cessation of construction of the two reactors at Simpo that were to bebuilt under the auspices of the Korean Peninsula Economic Development Organization(KEDO) with international support. As of late 2020, however, while this “experimental”
reactor appears (from satellite photos) to have its major components installed, its
operational status seems uncertain. The overall goal of developing this small LWR was
to eventually deploy similar units elsewhere in the DPRK, in part in recognition thatlarger LWR units, such as the 1000 (and larger) MW units that are most common inmodern installation the ROK and other nations, cannot be built without international
assistance, and, in fact, could not be reliably operated on the DPRK grid even if the
DPRK grid were intact and in perfect repair (which it is not). This small LWR will not
help much with the DPRK’s electricity shortages but is intended by the DPRK as anexperimental endeavor that could lead to the production of more small reactors aroundthe country.474 Meanwhile, the older, nominally “5 MW electric” (though probably not,in fact, electricity-producing) gas-cooled reactor has shown intermittent signs of activity
in the last few years, indicating that it has at least periodically been operated. The older
reactor was, and presumably still is, used for producing plutonium, and has been thesource of plutonium for the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program.

•Stated encouragement by the central government to provinces and counties to look todevelop local power plant options, especially small hydro power plants.

•

Ongoing discussions on international power interconnections (Russia-DPRK-ROK, forexample), and more modest initiatives to supply key economic assets with power from
Russia or China, with an earlier Russian plan to connect the Rason port area to theRussian grid in early 2016 (although this connection has apparently not yet, as of late2020, been established) a particular case in point.475

472 See, for example, James Pearson (2015), “In North Korea, solar panel boom gives power to the people”, Reuters, dated April

21, 2015, and available as http://www.reuters.com/article/northkorea-solar-idUSL4N0XC2O620150421.
473 See, for example, Eric Talmage (2015), “North Korea in rush to boost electricity supply”, Boston Globe, dated June 3, 2015,
available as https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2015/06/03/north-korea-rush-boost-electricitysupply/iNmQzZISrNlSmvTpeZcg6O/story.html.
474 See David von Hippel and Peter Hayes (2010), Engaging the DPRK Enrichment and Small LWR Program: What Would It
Take?. NAPSnet Special Report, dated December 23, 2010, and available as http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-specialreports/engaging-the-dprk-enrichment-and-small-lwr-program-what-would-it-take/.
475 See, for example, Liudmila Zakharova (2016), “Economic cooperation between Russia and North Korea: New goals and new
approaches”, Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 151–161, available ashttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366516300124. See also Scott A. Snyder (2019), “Where Does the234
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More generally, as presented by delegations to Nautilus events (in non-official settings), statedemphases in DPRK electricity policy have included the upgrading of large thermal andhydroelectric plants, and have stressed the national goal of acquiring nuclear power, but havealso expressed sincere desires for assistance and training in areas such as improving building
energy efficiency (and energy efficiency more generally throughout the economy), and smalland medium-scale renewable energy technologies (solar, wind, hydro, production of methane gas
from waste). A key focus stressed by DPRK energy delegations attending international meetings
have always been building human and institutional capacity, including acquisition of technicalmaterials, receiving instruction in basic energy concepts and in the use of design and analysis
tools and software, and, generally learning how to bring DPRK capabilities up to speed withthose in other countries. These capacity-building foci apply to electricity sector technologies andmethods in addition to other technologies in the energy sector more generally. By way ofillustration, the passages below, excerpted from presentations made by DPRK delegations overthe past decade and more, include the following statements on electricity-related priorities, which
are assumedly reflective of national electricity sector policies at the time when the presentations
were delivered.
For example, in a 2008 presentation entitled "The Status of the Building Energy Sector in DPR
Korea",476 some of the national priorities expressed in the area of electricity supply and demand
included:•

Replacing incandescent light bulbs with compact fluorescent bulbs (problems includinglack of investment capital in production facilities and poor power quality were noted).

•

The introduction of mini- and micro-combined heat and power plants, including those
fueled with agricultural residues, to help provide power for agriculture and electricity andhot water for rural communities.

•

The development of solar energy, including passive solar building design, solar water
heaters, and solar photovoltaic systems. The delegation recognized the challenges of theNorth's relatively cloudy climate, and the importance of combining implementation ofsolar energy in buildings with good insulation practices.

•

The presentation concluded by recognizing the importance of building energy efficiency
in relieving energy supply deficits, as well as its consistency with the "needs forsustainable development" and achieving DPRK social, economic, and environmental
goals.

A pair of presentations delivered in 2006 echo many of the goals above.477 The 2006
presentations included the following passages (which have been lightly edited for clarity):
Russia-North Korea Relationship Stand?”, Council on Foreign Relations, dated April 29, 2019 and available ashttps://www.cfr.org/in-brief/where-does-russia-north-korea-relationship-stand.
476 DPRK Delegation (2008), “The Status of the Building Energy Sector in DPR Korea”. Prepared for the Building Energy
Efficiency Technology Training Workshop, Beijing, China, March 9th, 2008.
477 DPRK Delegation (2006a), “Renewable Energy Policy and Wind Energy Development in DPRK”, prepared by the DPRK
delegation to the 2006 Asian Energy Security Workshop, “Energy Futures and Energy Cooperation in the Northeast Asia
Region” November 6th and 7th, 2006, Beijing China, and available as http://nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/DPRKwind.pdf; and DPRK Delegation (2006b), ““Energy Futures and Energy Cooperation in the
Northeast Asia Region”, prepared by the DPRK delegation to the 2006 Asian Energy Security Workshop, “Energy Futures andEnergy Cooperation in the Northeast Asia Region” November 6th and 7th, 2006, Beijing China, and available as
http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/DPRK.pdf.

235
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK"The main path for the long-term energy security of the country is to realize diverse utilization ofenergy resources and to enhance their use by improving demand side management. For thispurpose, the DPRK government emphasizes oil exploration, nuclear power generation,
introduction of advanced energy-efficiency technology and renewable energy development.
Here renewable energy is relatively the most feasible and reliable in consideration of its
technology and its abundant resources.
"The DPRK government always attaches great importance to the development and improvementof renewable energy for the sustainable development of the national economy. Renewableenergy development has been taken as part of energy, environment, and ecology construction in
the DPRK. For the security of the development and utilization of the renewable energy, theDPRK government has taken several relevant measures. To develop renewable energy as themain energy source of the economy, first of all, it was necessary to establish an appropriateorganization that could mobilize and concentrate all related efforts for renewable energy."
The presentation from which the above is excerpted goes on to describe recent DPRK institutions
created to assist in renewable energy development, outlines the DPRK's wind energy program,and concludes, in part:"The DPRK is now framing a new strategy of national wind energy development. According tothis strategy the total installed capacity of wind turbines is expected to reach 500 MW by 2020.
The large-sized wind turbines are designed to be installed primarily in an intensive manner intidal land and dikes of the west coastal region.
"The plan for wind farm construction is set in three stages. At the first stage in the period 20062010, the DPRK is planning to construct a prototype wind farm with a capacity of 10 MW,
which will consist of individual wind turbines with capacity of over 600 kW. During this period,
the DPRK will be acquiring the knowledge and experiences on design, construction, operationand management of large wind farms. At the second stage for the period of 2011-2015, threemain wind farm projects will be implemented with a total capacity of 100 MW. The DPRK isplanning to implement those projects with the cooperation of the international organizations andother NGO groups and communities. At the third stage for the period of 2015-2020, theconstruction of onshore and offshore wind farms throughout the country will be actively driven.
Meanwhile, the manufacturing process for 5 kW small wind turbines will be arranged within a
few years to supply electricity to remote villages and stand-alone wind energy systems forhousehold use will be established in the isolated rural areas and islands. The wind resource
including offshore will be re-explored and the national wind atlas will be completed by the endof 2008."
In a companion presentation, the following points were made:"To cope with this situation [a shortage of electricity in the DPRK, exacerbated by what is
described as the United States' failure to follow through on the LWR project agreement], theDPRK began to increase the government investment in the construction of hydraulic power
stations which are free from the ecological environment pollution, while pushing ahead with thetechnological upgrading of the existing thermal power stations. As a result of putting emphasison building large-sized hydraulic power stations, the ration of hydraulic power in electricity
production has further increased at present.

236
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK"Our Future direction for securing energy is the technological upgrading of the existing thermal
power plants to increase the energy conversion efficiency, further construction of hydraulicpower stations to raise its proportion, and taking positive measures to develop and utilize therenewable energy including wind power. We are going to confine ourselves to the existing
thermal power plants, no longer building new plants for the time being. As for hydraulic power
plants, we plan to raise the turbine efficiency of the existing plants, implement several
technological reconstruction works, and continue with the construction of new power plants,
thereby constantly improving their generating capacity."
The presentation goes on to describe additional wind power initiatives, and concludes, in part, as
follows on electricity-related topics:"We are also consistently pushing ahead with the work of introducing energy saving
technologies in time in economic, social, and all other fields. Last and this year we have
replaced incandescent lamps with compact lamps as one of our energy saving measures, which
has enabled us to save large quantity of electricity.
"It is very important in the development of national and local energy systems to increase theefficiency in energy transmission as well as energy production, saving and transformation
efficiency. In order to ensure balanced development of the area and increase energy supply
efficiency, we are making no small investment in the work of rationalizing the electricity
transmission system, raising transmission voltage and unifying distribution voltage.
"The tense situation in coal production and demand urgently requires us to introduce urban
heating in a modern and efficient way. Given the tense electricity situation and lack of natural
gas in our country, we are going to improve the heat insulation of buildings so as to reduce theheat loss coefficient. This will ensure sufficient urban heating without increasing carbon dioxide
emissions. At the same time, while raising the effectiveness of central urban heating systems, weare also paying attention to the construction of modern sample buildings supplying energy forhousehold use through the comprehensive use of solar energy, and its introduction throughout
the country.
"We are making efforts for all-round technological rehabilitation of the energy sector in order torealize the great goal of building a powerful nation and to ensure a clean living environment for
the future."
Presentations by a DPRK delegation attending the meeting of Nautilus’ Regional Energy
Security Project in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, during December 2019, described a variety of
research and development projects in renewable energy, ranging from biogas and ground-source
heat pumps to wind and solar photovoltaic power systems.478 One of these presentations also
focused on the DPRK’s interest in renewable energy-powered mini-grid systems, which appear
to be a good candidate for the “bottom-up” revitalization and reconstruction of the DPRK grid(see below). Within that presentation (“The Renewable Energy Mini-grid Development in the
DPR Korea”, priorities for mini-grid development were listed as “The regions with richresources of developable renewable energy resources”, “Rural and mountain areas with little
provision of energy”, and “The regions and units with a lot of interest in using the natural
478 “Renewable Energy Development in the DPR Korea”, and “The Renewable Energy Mini-grid Developmentin the DPR Korea”, both presented at the Regional Energy Security Project Second Working Group Meeting, Ulaanbaatar,
Mongolia, December 9th and 10th, 2019.

237
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKresources”, all of which are consistent with a national mandate to pursue local power generation
options. Among the conclusions of that presentation were “The dissemination of the renewableenergy technology should be done in diversified ways and forms on regular basis. Throughmedia, training courses, exchanging the experiences.”, showing DPRK interest in collaboratingwith those from outside in gaining experience with these local generation technologies, and indisseminating the technologies broadly within the DPRK.
Overall, then, both the policy announcements from the DPRK government and more informal
presentations by DPRK delegations paint a picture of a nation looking to diversify andmodernize its electricity sector, and to work in elements of efficiency, sustainability, andenvironmental consideration into its electricity sector choices. The realities of the DPRK’s
isolation from much of the world economic system, however—particularly in the last few year
during which United Nations Security Council sanctions have been in effect, mean that it isdifficult for the DPRK to obtain and/or afford some of the necessary equipment that would help
to rehabilitate or replace key existing electricity sector infrastructure—such as power plant andelectrical substation equipment that cannot or can no longer be made domestically—or toeffectively pursue many of its other “energy security” goals. The result in practice is that theneed for electricity supplies are dealt with on a basically ad hoc basis, with actions ranging fromDPRK engineers doing their creative best to keep systems running with the materials at hand, torushed programs to build new power plants (often with suboptimal results), to organizations andhouseholds taking electricity supplies into their own hands by purchasing and operating theirown generation equipment.
5.1.2. Overview of Power Supply Infrastructure in the DPRKElectricity generation in the DPRK as of 1990 was primarily hydroelectric and coal-fired, inapproximately equal proportions, with a small amount of oil-fired electricity generation capacity
associated with the oil refinery at Sonbong and in two other plants. Total generation as of 1990
was reported to be in the range of 8 to 10 GW (gigawatts, or thousand megawatts--MW). Morethan 6000 MW of this nominal capacity is accounted for by less than 30 larger thermal andhydroelectric plants. Much of the generation capacity was installed in the 1970s and 1980s,
although a significant portion of generation facilities—particularly hydroelectric facilities—dateback to the era of Japanese occupation before World War II.479 Many of the hydroelectricfacilities in the DPRK are reported to be of the “run-of-river” variety, which means that their
output is more subject to variations in stream flow than plants that rely on larger impoundmentswith greater water storage. Since 1990, the ratios of hydro to “thermal” power production havevaried from year to year, based on the availability of hydro power (including low output in the
mid-1990s following plant damage due to flooding) and on the condition of and fuel supply forcoal-fired power plants. Figure 5-1 presents our estimates of electricity output by fuel type in
the DPRK over the last three decades.

479 Many of the hydroelectric facilities built during the Japanese occupation were reportedly disabled or dismantled by theJapanese (during retreat from the Peninsula) or by the USSR but were later refurbished with technical assistance and equipmentfrom the USSR.

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Figure 5-1: Estimates of Historical Gross Electricity Generation in the DPRK

Gross Generation in the DPRK, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005,
2008 through 2010, and 2014 through 2020
50
SOLAR AND WIND

45

COAL-FIREDDIESEL/GASOLINE FUELED

Terawatt-hours

40

HFO-FIRED
HYDRO

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
-

1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

The DPRK has the coal resources necessary to expand thermal power generation, but it is notclear that the coal mining or transport infrastructure is routinely capable of supplying coal topower stations at a rate much greater than that prevailing in 1990. In fact, given problems in thecoal industry, only a fraction of this rate of coal supply is likely currently achievable. In a seriesof vicious spirals, electricity and coal infrastructure problems feed back on each other and link toproblems throughout the economy. For example:•

No or sporadic electricity availability means that lights and pumps in coal mines don’t stayon, reducing coal output;•

No or sporadic electricity means difficulties with coal (and other goods) transport, meaning
less coal is made available for power plants and industry;480

480 Transport difficulties for coal are highlighted by a 2016 article quoting DPRK officials on the need to upgrade coal transport

infrastructure: Leo Byrne (2016), “N. Korea says it will upgrade rail to handle increasing coal”, NK News, dated January 19,239
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•Lack of power and coal for industry limits production of spare parts for transport, generationand mining infrastructure;•

Lack of power makes outside investment in mining, manufacturing more difficult/lessattractive; and so on.

Since about 2010, investments by (mostly) Chinese enterprises in coal mines focusing on the
production of coal for export to China may have made the coal supply situation somewhat better,and the impact of UNSC sanctions targeting DPRK coal exports may have made the output of
those mines more available for domestic use—including direct use for heating by households andenterprises and use for power generation. Sanctions, plus the effect of movement restrictions
caused by the measures taken by the DPRK and its trading partners (especially China) to combat
the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, have reportedly, however, at least in the first half of 2020, madeit more difficult for these mines to obtain supplies of the materials and equipment needed tomaintain full operation, which may have restricted the degree to which formerly exported coalsupplies have been available for domestic use.
As noted in the previous chapter of this Report, given weather patterns in the subregion, theDPRK probably has a modest wind power resource overall, as yet largely untapped (and largely
unmapped), but it is far from equally distributed throughout the nation, with average winds inmany of the most populous onshore areas (including the western coastal plains) being relatively
light. The DPRK also has some remaining undeveloped hydroelectric sites and is working on anumber of hydro plant additions, most of them likely in the megawatts-to-tens-of-megawatts
range in terms of capacity (though public and definitive announcements of power generation
capacity have been few).
Power generation and transmission and distribution facilities are reported to be in generally poor,and often failing, condition and sometimes, because they are based on technologies adopted from
China or the Former Soviet Union, not well adapted to the coal types with which they are fired orother fuels, such as heavy fuel oil and fuel derived from waste tires, that have intermittently beenused to supplement coal supplies. As a consequence, the generation efficiency of the thermal
power stations in the DPRK is reportedly low on average. Thermal power plants generally lackall but the most rudimentary pollution control equipment, and also, in almost all cases, lack any
kind of computerized combustion control facilities. In-station use of power is reportedly fairly
high, and “emergency losses” of power have been reported at major stations.
The system of electricity dispatching is inefficient, minimally or not at all automated, and prone
to failure. Estimates of transmission and distribution (T&D) losses vary from an official 16
percent up to more than 50 percent, but any estimates of T&D losses are difficult to confirm, as
there is minimal end-use metering in the DPRK.481
As described in Chapter 2 of this Report, the DPRK’s aging and often unreliable centralized andregional power grids are increasingly being supplemented by distributed generation adopted bybusinesses and households developing their own access to electricity. As reported by visitors to

2016, and available as https://www.nknews.org/pro/n-korea-says-it-will-upgrade-rail-to-handle-increasing-coal/. The railtransport subsector has been discussed as a potential subject for economic cooperation with Russia (Zakharova 2016, ibid),although it is not clear that substantial work on improving the DPRK rail system has taken place as of this writing (late 2020).
481 That is, for the most part, power was and is reportedly simply provided to consumers largely without metering, so “sales
records” as such generally do not exist.

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the DPRK and supported by analysis of customs statistics from the DPRK’s trading partners(mostly China), North Koreans have been purchasing and deploying diesel and gasoline-fired
generating sets and solar photovoltaic panel/battery kits in increasing volumes in recent years. In
many places, these systems likely provide North Koreans with their principal access to electricenergy services, albeit probably for a limited number of high-value end-uses.
5.1.3. Electricity Industry Challenges in North Korea
The DPRK is facing a number of challenges in its electricity industry with regard to providing
sufficient power for its current economy and for economic development.
Key electricity-sector problems in the DPRK include:•

Inefficient and/or decaying infrastructure: Much of the energy-using infrastructure in the
DPRK in general, and electricity supply and demand infrastructure in particular, is reportedly(and visibly, to visitors to the country) antiquated and/or poorly maintained, although poor
maintenance likely stems more from lack of materials, parts, and tools than from lack ofattention by technicians and engineers. On the demand side, for example, buildings
apparently lack significant, and often any, insulation, and the heating circuits in residential
and other buildings for the most part apparently cannot be controlled by residents. Althoughsome efficient lighting has been introduced in the last 15 years or so—for example, compact
fluorescent bulbs and, more recently, LED (light-emitting diode) bulbs, the latter often in
combination with the use of small solar photovoltaic panels for household use—inefficient,though rugged, incandescent bulbs continue to be used. Electric motors are typically old, andoften not properly sized for the loads they bear. Industrial facilities, where still in use, arelikewise either aging or based on outdated technology, and often (particularly in recent years)
are operated at less-than-optimal capacities (from an energy-efficiency point of view).

•

Suppressed and latent demand for energy services: Lack of fuels in many sectors of the
DPRK economy has apparently caused demand for energy services to go unmet. Electricity
outages in particular are an obvious source of unmet demand, but there are also reports, forexample, that portions of the DPRK fishing fleet have been idled for lack of diesel fuel.
Residential heating is reportedly restricted in the winter (and some observers report that somepublic-sector and residential buildings have not received heat at all in recent years) toconserve fuel, resulting in uncomfortably cool inside temperatures.
The problem posed by suppressed and latent demand for energy services is that when and if
supply constraints—particularly electricity supply constraints—are removed, there is likely
to be a surge in energy (probably particularly electricity) use, as residents, industries, andother consumers of fuels increase their use of energy services toward desired levels. This is afurther argument, as elaborated later in this report, for making every effort to improve theefficiency of electricity (and all energy) use in all sectors of the DPRK economy as restraints
on energy supplies are reduced and as economic redevelopment takes hold.

•

Lack of energy product markets: Compounding the risk of a surge in the use of energy
services is the virtual lack of energy product markets in the DPRK. With the exception of
consumer-owned generation—the solar photovoltaic and fossil-fueled generation describedlater in this chapter—virtually all electricity and substantial amounts of other fuels have
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traditionally been not so much marketed as allocated. Without electricity (and fuel) pricing
reforms, there will be few incentives for households and other energy users to adopt energy
efficiency measures or otherwise control their consumption. Recent years have seen limited
attempts by the DPRK government to reform markets for energy products. Some private
markets exist for local products like firewood, some commercial fuels have in recent years
reportedly been traded “unofficially” (on the black market), and a prepaid card electricity
metering system was used on a limited basis in some areas of Pyongyang, at least for a whilein the 2000s, but for the most part, energy commodity markets in the DPRK essentially do
not exist.482 Energy consumers are also unlikely, without a massive and well-coordinatedprogram of education about energy use and energy efficiency, to have the technical knowhow to choose and make good use of energy efficiency technologies, even when and if suchtechnologies are made available.
The DPRK's energy sector needs are vast, and at the same time, as indicated by the only
partial listing of problems above, many of these needs are sufficiently interconnected as to beparticularly daunting to address. The DPRK's energy sector needs include
rebuilding/replacement of many of its power generation and almost all of its substationequipment, repair, replacement, and/or improvement of coal mine production equipment andsafety systems, updating of oil refineries, improvement or replacement of most if its energyusing equipment, including coal-fired boilers, electric motors and drives, transport systems, andmany other items, modernization of energy use throughout the country, rebuilding of the DPRK
forest stocks, and a host of other measures to address serious electricity sector issues. As one
example of the interrelations of energy problems in the DPRK, renovating the DPRK's coalmining sector is made more difficult because coal mines lack electricity due to electricity sector
problems, and electricity generators in some cases have insufficient coal to supply power
demand because of coal mine problems and problems with transporting coal to power plants. In
addition, without products to sell or markets for those products, it will be very difficult for the
DPRK to pay for the needed infrastructure improvements in the electricity and other energy
sectors, at least without substantial support from outside the country.
5.1.4. Guide to the Remainder of this Chapter
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows:•

Section 5.2 presents a description of electricity supply in the DPRK, including resources
for electricity generation, what is known about DPRK electricity supply infrastructure,

482 In his paper and presentation “Changes In The North Korean Economy And Implications For The Energy Sector: Is North

Korea Really Short of Energy?”, as prepared for the Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo
Alto, CA, USA, William B. Brown discussed the state of DPRK energy markets, and noted that by one measure of electricity
cost, the ratio of the price of rice to the price of a kilowatt-hour of electricity, power was one hundred times as expensive in the
United States in 2006 than it was in the DPRK. See https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/. Brown
also highlighted the lack of properly-functioning electricity and other energy markets in his 2018 paper: William B. Brown(2018), “North Korea’s Economic Strategy, 2018”, Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, 2018, Vol 9, pages 326 – 343, Korea
Economic Institute of America, available as
http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/jukas_4.3_north_koreas_economic_strategy.pdf, as well as in otherpublications, such as William B. Brown, SPECIAL REPORT: North Korea’s Shackled Economy, 2018, published by The
National Committee on North Korea, dated March, 2018, and available as https://www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/issuebriefs/NCNK_William_Brown_NK_Shackled_Economy_Report.pdf .

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and our estimates of electricity generation by type of plant in selected years.
•

Section 5.3 provides our assessment of electricity demand in the DPRK, withdescriptions of current demand sectors, and estimates of overall electricity use (which is
not quite the same as demand, because actual use of electricity in the DPRK is largely
limited by electricity availability) and electricity use by end-use.

•

Section 5.4 provides brief conclusions to this Report, including a summary of results, a
discussion of the implication of the results for engaging the DPRK on electricity sector
issues, and possible “next steps” on elaborating research into DPRK energy issues and inplanning and implementing engagement projects.
5.2.

Electricity Supply in the DPRK
5.2.1. Introduction

The DPRK electricity sector supply and demand estimates summarized in this Report build uponand have as their foundation Nautilus research in compiling and analyzing data on the DPRK
energy sector that started in 1994. Early Nautilus research, funded by the W. Alton JonesFoundation, culminated in a 1995 report entitled The Prospects for Energy Efficiency
Improvements in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Evaluating and Exploring the
Options, and further research in 1997, funded by the Northeast Asia Economic Forum/East-WestCenter, produced Demand and Supply of Electricity and Other Fuels in the Democratic Peoples'
Republic of Korean (DPRK). In our 1995 work, we prepared an estimated energy supply/demandbalance for the DPRK for the year 1990 that synthesized the information available to us on the
North Korean economy and energy sector. In the 1995 report, the energy balance results wereused to estimate the (by any measure, considerable) potential for energy-efficiency
improvements in the DPRK, which in turn allows us to estimate electricity demand (or moreaccurately, electricity use) in the DPRK by end use, as presented in Chapter 3 of this Report.
Our 1997 work produced an estimated energy balance for 1996 and used it as the starting point
for quantitative energy "scenarios" for the DPRK for 2000 and 2005. Our 2002/2003 report, The
DPRK Energy Sector: Estimated Year 2000 Energy Balance and Suggested Approaches toSectoral Redevelopment, prepared with funding from and in collaboration with the Korea Energy
Economics Institute, updated our analysis to a 2000 “base year”, and our 2007 report, Fueling
DPRK Energy Futures and Energy Security: 2005 Energy Balance, Engagement Options, andFuture Paths, provided a further update to a 2005 base year. Finally, our report Foundations ofEnergy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances, Engagement Options, and Future
Paths for Energy and Economic Redevelopment updated our assessment to provide energybalances for the years 2008 and 2009.483 In 2013, with funding from a Korean institute, we
updated our energy balance further to incorporate 2010 data, as described in An Updated
Summary of Energy Supply and Demand in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

483 David von Hippel and Peter Hayes (2012), Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990-2009 Energy Balances,

Engagement Options, and Future Paths for Energy and Economic Redevelopment, dated 18 December 2012, and available as
http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/foundations-of-energy-security-for-the-dprk-1990-2009-energy-balancesengagement-options-and-future-paths-for-energy-and-economic-redevelopment/.

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(DPRK).484 And in 2016, also with funding from a Korean institute, we prepared a study
focusing on the DPRK electricity sector, with updates to the analysis through the year 2014.
This chapter is based on that 2016 study, with updates through 2020.
Although the process that we followed in evaluating energy supply and demand, and electricity
supply and demand in particular, in the DPRK is bound to produce energy balances andelectricity sector estimates that "fit" the DPRK poorly in some areas, it is our hope that in futurecollaboration with DPRK energy experts we will be able to use the electricity supply/demand
results described and presented below as a starting point to develop better information for use byboth the international community and by the DPRK itself. Moreover, as our analysis is built up
from many independent observations, estimates, and assumptions, we feel that the probability is
reduced that any one off-base assumption or erroneous piece of data has considerably altered theoverall accuracy of the assessment. We have, on occasion over the years, showed the results of
our work to DPRK delegations that we have worked with. Those delegations have generally
accepted our work as reasonably accurate portrayals of the DPRK energy system.
It should be noted that other estimates of DPRK energy supply demand balances have beendeveloped over the years, and we have consulted those estimates available to us, and in somecases, collaborated with other researchers developing balances. Notable among other estimatesof DPRK energy balances are those developed by our colleagues at the Korea Energy Economics
Institute (KEEI), as described in a presentation to the 2006 DPRK Energy Experts Working
Group Meeting by Dr. Kyung-Sool Kim of KEEI. The International Energy Agency (IEA) also
maintains some energy statistics, including an estimated energy balance, for the DPRK.
The key assumptions and data used in preparing our estimated supply and demand balances forelectricity and other fuels are presented below by fuel group (for supply) in this section, and bysector (for demand) in section 5.3. Finally, it must be emphasized that the results provided
below, though based on the best data we have available, must still be called estimates, because
information on the DPRK energy system is at best sparse, irregular, and uncertain, and at worst
entirely missing. Still, we feel that the process of assembling what is known about the DPRK
energy sector in a systematic and well-documented format is a key to building better
understanding of the sector. We welcome the input of others in improving these estimates.
In the remainder of this section, we describe the various resources available for generating
electricity in the DPRK, then provide a summary of what is known about the DPRK’s electricity
infrastructure, as well as our estimates of electricity generation in the DPRK, by source, in
selected years.
5.2.2. Resources for Electricity Generation
5.2.2.1.Coal Resources
As noted in the previous chapter of this Report, the DPRK has abundant coal resources,
including deposits of anthracite coal and lignite, or “brown” coal. It substantially lacks,

484 David F. von Hippel and Peter Hayes (2013), An Updated Summary of Energy Supply and Demand in the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), dated February, 2013, Working Paper 2014-2, prepared for Hanyang University Center for
Energy Governance and Security, and available from http://www.egs-korea.org/en/egs/egs02.php.

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however, bituminous coal, which is the most common coal used worldwide as an input to cokeproduction for steelmaking, and as a power plant fuel. Coal quality in the DPRK seems to bequite variable, with reported energy contents for different North Korean coals ranging from avery low 1000 and 2300 kilocalories (kcals) per kilogram for “low grade coal” (lignite andanthracite, respectively)485 to a relatively high 6150 kcal/kg for high-grade anthracite coal486.
The DPRK’s total coal resource or reserves have been variously estimated at levels ranging from
600 million tonnes (“proven coal reserves”, and “recoverable coal reserves”, as noted ininternational compendia of energy statistics487) to resources (“coal deposits”) of nearly 15 billion
tonnes. The latter estimate is included in a fairly detailed description of coal (and other mineral)
resource in the DPRK published through a Korean-language website in China 488. Given the
DPRK’s recent coal exports to China—over 10 million tonnes annually since 2011, and over 15
million tonnes in 2013 and 2014—and the above reports of reserves, it is clear that coal could
serve as a major fuel for electricity generation if supply-chain and thermal generation
infrastructure difficulties are overcome. From an ROK perspective that worries about the healthof the environment on the Korean Peninsula, however, and given recent climate agreements,
fostering continued reliance on coal by the DPRK may not be prudent for the ROK in the longrun.
5.2.2.2.Oil and Gas Resources
Although the DPRK reportedly has oil and gas resources, most prominently in offshore areas,
these resources remain essentially untapped due to lack of access to technologies and investment
capital, as well as restrictions on international ventures posed, effectively when not directly, byinternational economic sanctions on the DPRK.489 The DPRK has essentially no infrastructure
for natural gas distribution, or import sources for natural gas in more than small quantities (forexample, in shipping container-sized cylinders), and its crude oil, refined mostly at a refinery in
the DPRK’s Northwest fed by a pipeline from China, is all imported. Diesel fuel and gasoline,
refined domestically and imported, are used in limited quantities for generation. Heavy fuel oil
is produced as a part of the refining of crude oil but has limited uses in DPRK electricity
generation because there are essentially only one large and one small plant designed to use it.
Heavy fuel oil is used in coal-fired plants to a limited extent as a starter fuel and, when supplies
were available, as a substitute fuel for coal, albeit with some problems.490

485 Document in the authors’ files [VO-90].
486 Choi Su Young, Study of the Present State of Energy Supply in North Korea, RINU, 1993.

P. 14.

487 For example, U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration, EIA Country Analysis Brief, Updated

February 2006, with an updated (2018) version available as https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/PRK; and British
Petroleum Company (2012), BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012, “Coal", available ashttps://www.laohamutuk.org/DVD/docs/BPWER2012report.pdf.
488 Changchun Killim Sinmun (Internet Version-WWW) in Korean 31 Aug 06 - 08 Sep 06, "Guide to DPRK Mineral Resources".
489 DPRK sources place estimates of total oil reserves at 6 to 10 billion tonnes. Although we have been told by independentsources that oil and gas deposits do indeed exist beneath the DPRK and its offshore territory, we have been unable to confirm theextent of those deposits. In an article entitled “Could North Korea Be the Next Energy Superpower?”, dated December 1, 2015,
Anthony Fensom suggests that there are several areas of the DPRK, both onshore and offshore, with good potential resources,and notes that a Mongolia company, HBOil JSC, has looked into oil resources in the DPRK. The article cites unconfirmed
reports of a “1-trillion-cubic-foot (tcf) discovery in 2002” See http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-north-korea-be-the-nextenergy-superpower-14471. See also The Maritime Executive (2015), “North Korea has ‘Excellent’ Oil and Gas Potential”, dated
November 19, 2015, and available as http://maritime-executive.com/article/north-korea-has-excellent-oil-and-gas-potential.
490 It has been reported that the use of high-sulfur heavy fuel oil (HFO) purchased and delivered to the DPRK as a part of andsubsequent to the Agreed Framework negotiated between the DPRK and the United States and its partners in 1994 was a poor

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5.2.2.3.Biomass Resources
The DPRK has biomass resources—crop wastes and forest biomass—that could in theory be
used to fuel biomass-fired generation. In practice, however, the other pressures on biomass
resources, that is, as fodder for animals, as a soil amendment, and as fuel for cooking andheating, coupled with the poor and in many places stressed state of the DPRK’s forest resources,
means that biomass-fired power is unlikely to play a large role in future DPRK electricity
supplies. That said, some biomass-fired plants could be developed, including perhaps combined
heat and power plants where suitable biomass supplies exist, and biogas plants fed with animalor human wastes may also have attractive ancillary benefits such as reducing water pollution.
The overall likely available fuel resource for biomass-fired plants is, however, unlikely toprovide more than a few hundred megawatts of power for the DPRK without severely competingwith other uses for biomass.
5.2.2.4.Hydraulic Resources
Several sources suggest that the DPRK’s hydraulic resource is sufficient to provide about 10
GWe (gigawatt electric) of hydroelectric generation. This is consistent with what we have been
told in workshop presentations by delegations from the DPRK.491
Many, but not all, of the sites for large hydroelectric facilities have been built upon, but manysites for small and medium hydro dams remain. In addition, it has been reported that some of the
DPRK hydroelectric plants—some of which were built before the Korean War—have
efficiencies (electrical energy output as a fraction of energy available in falling water) that arearound 60 percent, suggesting that significant additional electricity could be generated at these
existing sites once plants are upgraded to modern efficiency levels (on the order of 90 percent).
The total of one estimate of hydroelectric potential for major rivers in the DPRK is theequivalent of approximately 9,200 average MW of power.492
5.2.2.5.Geothermal Resources
Geothermal energy is also mentioned as a possible source of both heat and power for the DPRK.
At present, we have no information about the extent of the DPRK’s geothermal resources,
though some potential geothermal sites undoubtedly are present in the DPRK. Recent news
articles indicate an ongoing and expanding interest in the DPRK regarding geothermal energy,
including a recent study tour, funded by a German foundation, by a DPRK delegation togeothermal-related sites in Germany, with a reciprocal visit by a representative of the foundation

match to the steel used in the boiler tubes of the nominally coal-fired power plants in which it was used as a substitute fuel, andits use resulted in significantly accelerated degradation of boiler tubes, air preheaters, and other power plant facilities.
491 DPRK Delegation, "THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE INTER-STATE ELECTRIC TIES IN NORTH EAST ASIA ON
ENVIRONMENT," September 31, 2003. Paper presented at Nautilus Institute’s 3rd Workshop on Grid Interconnections, held in
Vladivostok, Russia, September 30 to October 3, 2003. Available as http://nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/K_DPRK_2_PPR.pdf.
492 That is, the total shown is the equivalent of 9200 MW of power supplied continuously, year-round. Given that the averagecapacity factors of DPRK hydroelectric facilities may be 50 percent or less, this implies a total potential “nameplate”
hydroelectric potential on the order of 18,000 MW, though not even close to all of this potential can be taken advantage of inpractice.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKto Pyongyang,493 and agreements to cooperate with China on renewable energy development,
including geothermal energy.494 A number (over 120, according to various articles quoting
unnamed DPRK sources) of hot springs exist in the DPRK, many of which are in use as spas orresorts (for example, the Ryonggang resort in the Nampo area). Our guess is that the DPRK’s
usable resource for geothermal electricity generation is probably moderate, in the range of tens
or hundreds of megawatts, but that is no better than a guess, pending further information.
5.2.2.6.Wind Energy Resources
Estimation of the wind resources potential in the DPRK is incomplete, and we have foundexisting DPRK wind data to be potentially unreliable. Significant DPRK wind resources are said
to exist, however, in mountain areas and in coastal areas (including offshore areas). A North
Korean delegation to a workshop organized by Nautilus and co-hosts provided an annual windresource estimate of 1.7 TWh (terawatt hours, or billion kilowatt-hours), which corresponds toabout 550 MWe (megawatts electric) of wind power at an assumed capacity factor of about 35
percent (not atypical for wind generators, though possibly a bit high for the DPRK).
Based on our own (Nautilus’) experience in installing several small wind generators in a locationon the western coast of the DPRK, it seems unlikely that onshore wind resources in that area arequite as good as claimed in the quote above, though offshore areas may well prove to have abetter wind regime than onshore areas. Until additional and more rigorous wind data collection
is completed, the actual DPRK wind resource is uncertain, but it seems likely that the totalpractical level of wind turbine installations in the DPRK will be in the range of hundreds ofmegawatts, of which some is likely to be in near-offshore areas or on islands. An extract of a
Global Wind Atlas (see Figure 5-2) indicates that the most favorable areas for wind projects inthe DPRK are likely to be the north coastal areas of North Hamhyung Province, particularly near
the border with China and Russia,495 in some of the mountainous areas of North Hamgyong,South Hamgyong, and Ryanggang Provinces (including the Mount Paektu area), and, though to asignificantly lesser extent, along the West coast of the DPRK.496 Note that this graph shows
estimated average wind speeds at a height of 100 meters, meaning that megawatt-scale windturbines would be needed to take advantage of the resource. Global Wind Atlas images at lower
heights show much smaller areas of high wind speeds. There appears to be large areas of
medium (Class II) winds not far off the DPRK coast in several locations, and as technologies foroffshore wind, including large floating units, continue to improve, this resource may become

493 Friedrich Naumann Foundation (2011), “Geothermal Energy – Energy Source for the DPR Korea?”, available ashttps://www.freiheit.org/seoul/geothermal-energy-energy-source-dpr-korea, and “North Korea: Hope for Economic Revival”(undated, but apparently 2011 or 2012), available as https://www.freiheit.org/seoul/north-korea-hope-economic-revival.
494 People’s Daily Online (2011), “China, DPRK to boost renewable energy cooperation”, available as
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7433273.html. In this article, “Thae Jong Su, alternate member of the
Political Bureau of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) and member of the Secretariat from the Democratic People's Republic ofKorea” is quoted as saying “[t]he DPRK hopes to use geothermal energy in its efforts to develop its economy and build a strong
and prosperous country”.
495 Krahun Company, A group described as a Christian “mission business” (see Justin Rohrlich and Chad O'Carroll (2013),
Spreading the gospel in North Korea”, NK News and The Telegraph, dated 15 November 2013, and available as was at one timeinterested in setting up a wind power farm in the Rason area, in the far Northeast of the DPRK where the wind regime isreportedly favorable. We do not know the current status of this project.
496 Based on information from the “Global Windspeed at 80 m” map by the company 3TIER, available ashttps://www.3tier.com/en/support/wind-online-tools/what-wind-speeds-are-shown-map/. The map is based on a combination ofsatellite data and the results of “mesoscale numerical weather prediction (NWP) atmospheric simulations” done by the company.

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important in a scenario where relations with the international community improve and DPRK
grid redevelopment begins in earnest.
Figure 5-2: Wind Speed Map for the DPRK (100 meters)497

5.2.2.7.Solar Energy Resources
A DPRK presentation to a Nautilus workshop provided the following information about the
DPRK solar resource: “Annual average solar irradiation is about 1200 kWh/m2 and 55~60% ofdays per year are clear.”498 The DPRK’s winters are often relatively clear but cold, and summers
are humid, with much of the annual rainfall in the DPRK occurring in the summer months. This
weather pattern, and the solar resource data provided, suggests that the DPRK has at best, on
average, a moderate solar resource. At 1200 kWh/m2-yr, the DPRK’s average insolation is lessthan that in many cities in the United States (for example, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, locations in
New Jersey, and Western Oregon all have a similar solar resource499) but is greater than the solar
resource in the Northern parts of Europe (most of France and Germany, for example). These
data are consistent with the values shown in Figure 5-3, which shows annual values of 1200 to1500 kWh per peak kilowatt (kWp), a unit effectively similar to kWh/m2-yr.

497 Image extracted from the Global Wind Atlas, accessed 10-27-2020, available as https://globalwindatlas.info/.
498 DPRK Delegation (2004), Policy Forum 04-27A: Options For Rehabilitation of Energy System & Energy Security & Energy

Planning in DPRK of Korea, dated May 14, 2004, and available as https://nautilus.org/supporting-documents/options-forrehabilitation-of-energy-system-energy-security-energy-planning-in-dpr-of-korea/.
499 See, for example, http://howto.altenergystore.com/Reference-Materials/Solar-Insolation-Data-USA-Cities/a35/.

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Figure 5-3: Solar Resource Map for the DPRK500

5.2.2.8.Tidal Power Resources
Tidal power is a possibility for some coastal areas of the DPRK. The 2004 presentation by
DPRK delegates cited above noted: “The west seashore of the DPRK is one of the well-known
tidal zone in the world. The average difference between high and low tide is 4~6 m. Tidal
potential capable of the development is estimated at about 19 TWh.” Generation of 19 TWhannually suggests installed capacity on the order of 4 to 6 GW. An estimate by a Russian author
put the tidal power resource of the DPRK at 4700 MW (4.7 GW).501 At least one small tidal
power station exists in the DPRK—a 500 kW unit built into the Nampo barrage near the mouthof the Taedong River502 (see Figure 5-4). In 2004, China was reportedly planning to build a 300
MW tidal power facility based on an artificial offshore lagoon design near the mouth of the Yalu
River near the DPRK border, but it is somewhat unclear whether this project has moved forward
since—no such facility is evident in recent satellite photos.503 The fact that China was planningsuch a project, however, probably means that tidal energy projects are also possible in nearby
500 Image extracted from the Global Solar Atlas, accessed 10-27-2020, available ashttps://globalsolaratlas.info/map?c=40.805494,121.278076,7.
501 Marina Trigubenko (1991), “Industry of the DPRK”. Paper presented at Korea Development Institute Symposium, Seoul,
ROK (October 1991).
502 The authors visited this installation on their 1998 visit to the DPRK. We do not know its current status.
503 See, for example, K. Steiner-Dicks, Tidal: Asia’s Cinderella renewable energy”, Tidal Today, dated July 5, 2011, and formerly
available as http://social.tidaltoday.com/technology-engineering/tidal-asia%E2%80%99s-cinderella-renewable-energy;
Renewable Energy World.com, “China Endorses 300 MW Ocean Energy Project”, dated November 2, 2004, and formerly
available as http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2004/11/china-endorses-300-mw-ocean-energy-project17685.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKDPRK near-shore territory, at least from the point of view of the tidal energy resource (that is,large differences between high and low tides).
Figure 5-4: Painting of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il at the Dedication of the West Sea
Barrage504

5.2.2.9.Uranium Resources
Figures on the DPRK’s reserves of uranium and the quality of its ore are difficult to obtain, andtheir accuracy is unknown. It has been reported that uranium has been mined to supply theNorth’s domestic nuclear industry from mines located in various areas around the country,
including Pyongsan, Pakchon, Hongnam, Jusong, Ungki, Sunchon, Hamheung, Hekumkang, andNajin. Two sources suggest that the DPRK’s uranium deposits “are estimated at 26 million
tons”.505, 506 One of the sources describes these deposits as “high grade ore”, so it seems virtually

504 Photo taken by D. von Hippel at the West Sea Barrage Visitors’ Center, near Nampo, NP, in October 1998.
505 Larry A. Niksch, United States Congressional Research Service (CRS), CRS Issue Brief for Congress: North Korea’s Nuclear

Weapons Program, updated January 17, 2006. The same figure is also quoted in Yo-Taik Song, “IN OUR TIMES SERIES,PART 6, The North Korean Nuclear Program: Technical and Policy Issues”, formerly available as
http://www.phy.duke.edu/~myhan/ot6-song.html.
506 The DPRK has been highly reluctant to reveal the extent of its deposits of Uranium ore and its annual production capacity tothe outside world. This same estimate of reserves (26 million tonnes of ore), however, was provided in information from private
sources in China and DPRK business contacts compiled by E. Yoon (see, for example, E Yoon (2011), Status and Future of theNorth Korean Minerals Sector, available as http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/DPRK-Minerals-Sector-YOON.pdf).

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certain that the references are to tonnes of ore, not tonnes of uranium metal (or uraniumoxides).507
Another source states:“It has been estimated that, at its peak in the early 1990s, North Korea was able toproduce about 300 tonnes of yellow cake [U3O8] annually, equal to approximately 30,000
tonnes of uranium ore”.508
The information from this source implies that the DPRK’s uranium ore has (or had) an average U
content of about 0.9 percent, which is quite high—most uranium ore in the Northeast Asia region
has an average U content of closer to 0.2 percent or less509—so this estimate may be in error.
Other analysts of the subject have reported estimates of 3 and 4 million tonnes of “reasonably
assured resources”, based on older OECD and ROK estimates, respectively. Still another source
cites a figure of 4.5 million tonnes of uranium ore, and quotes “Russian scientists who havevisited North Korea” as saying that the DPRK’s “mining and milling capabilities produce 2000
tons of natural uranium, per year”.510 A 2004 Nautilus report described DPRK deposits as“uraniferous black shale occurrences (perhaps similar to that at Ok´chon in South Korea)
occurring at a depth about 200 meters. The ore grades are about 0.2%”.511
The DPRK is reported to have exported significant amounts of uranium ore over the years,
starting in (at least) the 1947-1950 period, with the export of “over 9,000 tons of uranium[possibly ore?] and an unknown amount of monazite to the USSR”, and continuing with areported “$6 billion worth of uranium ore” to the USSR in 1985, “1,500 tons of monazite512
annually” in the 1990s to “China, Japan, Spain, and Hong Kong”513. More recently, an
advertisement by the DPRK's International Chemical Joint Venture Corporation was published in
an English-language North Korean trade journal in 2001 and 2002, offered ammonium diuranate(ADU), a processed form of yellowcake (U3O8), for sale on the international market.
Unlike other mining industries in the DPRK, uranium mines have been targets of heavy
investment, and its high grade engineers and skilled workers receive preferential treatment in
507 For additional details, see David F. von Hippel (2019), “Methods for Refining Estimates of Cumulative DRPK Uranium

Production”, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament Volume 2, 2019 - Issue 2. Pages 555-585, available ashttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2019.1660522, from which some of the text here is drawn.
508 International Institute for Strategic Studies (2006). North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programme.
509 As just two anecdotal example, an undated (but probably late 1990s) article available on the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) website describing uranium mining in Benxi, in the Northeast province of Liaoning, China (about 150 km fromthe DPRK border) lists an ore U content of 0.34% U (Zhang Rong (no date, but probably c. 1997) “New Development Stage ofChina's Uranium Industry”, available as https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/33/003/33003339.pdf). The
World Nuclear Association lists Russian mines with ore U contents ranging from 0.05 % to 0.2% uranium, albeit the mines listed
are not particularly close to the DPRK (World Nuclear Association (2020) “Russia's Nuclear Fuel Cycle” available as
http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/russia-nuclear-fuel-cycle.aspx).
510 Paul Vos Benkowski (2006), “North Korean Hullabaloo”, Nukewatch Pathfinder, Winter, 2006-2007, page 6.
511 Hayes, P. (2004). “North Korea's Uranium Exports: Much Ado About Something.” May 25, 2004, available as
http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Hayes-DPRKuranium.txt.
512 Monazite is a name for a group of rare earth phosphate minerals, the most common form of which (Monazite-(Ce)) contains
Cerium, Lanthanum, Thorium, Neodymium, and Yttrium. Monazite is radioactive, and it seems likely to have been exported inthis instance primarily as a source of Thorium, though that is just the authors’ conjecture. A description of Monazite can befound at Amethyst Galleries “THE MINERAL MONAZITE”,
http://www.galleries.com/minerals/phosphat/monazite/monazite.htm.
513 “North Korea Profile, Nuclear Exports”, prepared for the Nuclear Threat Initiative by the by the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2003, available as https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/northkorea/nuclear/.

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terms of food, salary and social status. Funds invested in the mines have been used for mining
equipment and facilities. In particular, instead of freight railway shipping of ore, sophisticatedtrucks, imported from Sweden and Japan, are operating to support production activities.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) lists the uranium ore extracted from the “Kŭmch'ŏn Uranium
Mine” as being reported by a defector as having “a uranium content of 0.8 percent, a vanadium
content of 1.4%, and other rare metals such as nickel, molybdenum and radium”. The same
uranium content is listed by NTI for the Pyongsan mine, although the figures in the quote abovefrom the NTI reference, 290 tons yellowcake from 200,000 tonnes ore, would seem to imply a Ucontent of more like 0.2 percent, assuming about 20 percent losses in processing. The Nuclear
Threat Initiative lists the Hamhung Uranium Deposit as having “approximately 4 million tons ofuranium deposits”. Lewis (2015)514 includes a 1979 quote from a telegram from the Hungarianambassador to the DPRK, in turn quoting a Soviet source, and giving the average ore quality at
the two main North Korean uranium mines at the time as “0.26 percent, while in the other it is0.086 percent”.515 Lewis goes on to say “[b]ased on other information released by the Soviet
Union, it appears these mines are near Pakchon and Pyongsan, with Pyongsan likely having thehigher quality ore.” These values are considerably lower than the 0.8 to 0.9 percent estimates
described above, but closer to international averages.
Reports on a pair of missions (1987 and 1990) undertaken by International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) experts at the request of the DPRK government,516 indicate that at the time
DPRK engineers were working with fairly rudimentary uranium prospecting equipment, often of
Russian origin and decades old, although DPRK government news releases in the last few years
have praised progress in uranium processing technology.517
5.2.3. Electricity Generation Infrastructure in the DPRKWith a relatively few exceptions, the energy infrastructure in the DPRK in general was installedprior to 1990, with some infrastructure—notably large hydroelectric power plants near the borderwith China—dating back to the period in which Japan occupied Korea in the 1920s and 1930s.
Other infrastructure, including thermal power plants and oil refineries (some with associated

514 Lewis, J. (2015). “Recent Imagery Suggests Increased Uranium Production in North Korea, Probably for Expanding Nuclear

Weapons Stockpile and Reactor Fuel.” 38 North, August 12, 2015, available as https://www.38north.org/2015/08/jlewis081215/.
515 These same values are also quoted in B. Szalontai and S. Radchenko (2006), North Korea's Efforts to Acquire Nuclear
Technology and Nuclear Weapons: Evidence from Russian and Hungarian Archives. Cold War International History Project,
Working Paper #53, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, available ashttps://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/WP53_web_final1.pdf.
516 See M. Matolin and M. Tauchid (1987), Report to the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Uranium
Prospecting DRK/3/003 Evaluation Mission, available as
http://oldsite.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/nuclearweapons/DPRKUraniumProspectingMission-1987.pdf, and M. Matolin(1990), Report to the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Uranium Prospecting DRK/3/003-04
Laboratory Gamma Ray Spectrometry, available as
http://oldsite.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/nuclearweapons/DPRKUraniumProspectingMission-1990.pdf. In personalcommunication, Professor Matolin indicated that his mission did not have access to data on ore quality, but he did measure theuranium content of “0.1 percent and up” in uranium ores, though these measurements were made for the purposes of training aspart of the mission, and thus do not reflect a DPRK average or even the average for the deposit where the sample was taken.
517 See, for example, Berger, A. (2014), “What lies beneath: North Korea’s uranium deposits: All signs point to Pyongyang
regime’s ongoing nuclear program development.” NK News, August 28, 2014, available ashttps://www.nknews.org/2014/08/what-lies-beneath-north-koreas-uranium-deposits/.

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generation facilities), were built with substantial technical assistance and/or material from theformer Soviet Union or from China.
Below we describe the major elements of electricity supply infrastructure in the DPRK,
including power plants, and electricity transmission and distribution systems, and also
summarize the status of the coal mines that provide fuel for almost all thermal generation in
North Korea.
There were reportedly over 500 electricity generation facilities in the DPRK as of the mid-1990s.
Of these, however, only 62 major power plants were operated as part of the (nominally)
interconnected transmission and distribution grid, with the remaining plants being primarily
small, isolated hydroelectric facilities and/or facilities associated with industrial installations.
One estimate suggests that 85 percent of total national generation took place in the 62 major
power plants in the 1990s; other, unofficial reports suggest generation at smaller plants was andis insignificant. The 62 “major” plants reportedly included 42 hydroelectric plants and 20
thermal plants. Of the thermal plants, 18 were reportedly fired primarily with coal. The power
generation system in general suffered even in the 1990s from a lack of spare parts (particularly
for plants built with USSR assistance, for which the Soviet factories that produced the parts were
not producing those items, even if the factories were still in business), as well as a lack of testing
equipment for use in maintenance activities.
5.2.3.1.Existing Thermal Generating Facilities
Although there are discrepancies between the various estimates of the installed capacity ofthermal electricity generating capacity in the DPRK518, we have assumed that the total installed
and potentially usable519 coal-fired generating capacity as of 1990 was approximately 3,200
megawatts, with an additional 200 MW of oil-fired capacity. A list of the largest thermal plants
in the DPRK as of 1990 (1992 for the East Pyongyang plant), and still today, to the extent we
can determine, is provided in Table 5-1, and these constituted the bulk of the DPRK’s 1990
thermal capacity, but we assume that there may as of that time have been up to 500 MW in total
capacity of operable smaller thermal plants (thus the total estimate of 3400 MW, including oilfired plants).

518 Choi (1993), for example, cites a total capacity for coal-fired generating stations of 2,850 MW in 1991, while the United

Nations (United Nations (1994) 1992 Energy Statistical Yearbook, Table 32, page 386)) lists 4,500 MW of thermal capacity for1989 through 1992 (along with 5000 MW of hydroelectric capacity), but a notation in the Yearbook indicates that the capacity
figures are estimates by “the Statistical Division” of the UN. We feel that the UN estimates are likely to have been too high.
Other documents in our files list a total of 2,900 MW of capacity as of 1990 in the largest seven thermal plants alone, and stillothers list “official figures” of up 6,000 MW of thermal capacity in 1990. We have adopted an overall estimate of 3400 MW ofoperable thermal capacity in 1990 as a reasonable figure between the sum of capacities of the plants that were identified andclearly in operation in 1990 and the higher estimates that must include some plants not explicitly named or identified in plant-byplant rosters as of 1990.
519 It has been reported that a large number of the smaller power plants reportedly included in official estimates of overall
generation capacity were essentially built as “shams” (inoperable models) to satisfy authorities and have actually never beencapable of generating power.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 5-1: Major Thermal Generating Facilities in the DPRK520#

Name
1 Pyongyang
2 Bukchang
3 Chongjin
4 Chonchonang
5 Oungi
6 Sunchon
7 East Pyongyang

Capacity(MW)
Fuel
500 Coal
1600 Coal
150 Coal
200 Coal
200 Oil
200 Coal
50 CoalTOTAL OF LISTED PLANTS

Year
Completed
1968
1985
1984
1979
1973
1988
1992

2900

In order to calculate the fuel used by thermal power plants, we have assumed that coal-fired
plants use heavy fuel oil primarily as a start-up fuel in 1990, with HFO constituting about 2.0
percent of the total heat value of input fuel. Using figures for electricity generation by fuel typederived as indicated above, we then calculated the fuel requirements for thermal electricity
generation using gross generation efficiencies in 1990 of 29.5 percent for oil-fired plants521 and28 percent for coal-fired plants. The efficiency figure we have assumed coal-fired plants issomewhat lower than the average heat rate (30 percent) reported in the Chongjin plant in the
Sonbong area but is comparable to Chinese electricity generation efficiencies for thermal plantsof late-1970s vintage.522, 523
The "own use" of electricity in oil-fired and coal-fired plants was assumed to be 8 and 9 percent
of gross generation, respectively. These own use values are those quoted for the Oungi andChongjin plants, respectively,524 and are relatively high compared to typical thermal power
plants. For coal-fired plants, we assumed an additional "emergency loss" rate in 1990 of 5
percent (accounted for in the "own use" row of the electricity balances presented in section 5.3),
which is a bold extrapolation from experience at the Pyongyang power station,525 and may be
indicative of poor operating conditions in all DPRK coal-fired power plants. For 1996, weincreased this rate to 7.5 percent of gross generation in coal-fired plants to reflect the reported
increasing difficulties with power plant maintenance and in obtaining parts to repair andmaintain thermal power plants.

520

Please see von Hippel and Hayes, 2012 (ibid), for a listing of the sources used in developing this table.

521 This value is substantially lower than an official (we assume) figure of 35 percent quoted in UNDP (1994) (Studies in Supportof Tumen River Area Development Programme, as prepared by KIEP, Seoul, ROK for the UNDP, July 1994). An efficiency of
35 percent seems too high oil-fired generation in the DPRK, given reports about the condition of the oil-fired plant at Sonbong.
The 29.5 percent efficiency we have used is consistent with information we have received about the Sonbong plant’s recent
operations.
522 Sinton, J., editor (1996), China Energy Databook 1996 Edition, Revised January 1996. Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, California, USA. LBL-32822.Rev.3. UC-900.
523 It should be remembered that most of the thermal power plants in the DPRK were built with assistance from the USSR—theexample of efficiencies in Chinese plants is used here only as a benchmark.
524 UNDP (1994), Studies in Support of Tumen River Area Development Programme. Prepared by KIEP, Seoul, ROK for theUNDP, July 1994.
525 Confidential document in authors' files.

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5.2.3.2.Thermal Power Generation in 2000 and Beyond
Conversations with industry sources indicated that the thermal power generation system in the
DPRK was rapidly eroding even as of 2000. In virtually all of the large power stations, only
some boilers and turbines are operating, if any are operating at all. The (nominally) 200 MW
heavy fuel oil-fired plant near the (East Coast) Sonbong refinery (see satellite photo in Figure5-5) apparently did not operate at all in 2000. We assume that it operated little in subsequent
years. Several sources suggest that the 200 MW oil-fired power plant associated with the oil
refinery at Sonbong has operated relatively little since, as the oil refinery has been off-line due tolack of crude oil to process (possibly compounded with maintenance issues). The oil-fired
power plant generated power when heavy fuel oil was available from KEDO and, we assume
probably also operated when HFO was shipped to the DPRK as a part of the Six-Party Talks
agreements, but absent those inputs, has probably operated little, if at all. The website NK
Economy Watch, in a posting dated November 7, 2011, under "Choson Exchange October trip
findings" (available as part of http://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/energy/oil/), include thefollowing: “Sonbong Power: This power plant was originally designed to take fuel oil from
Victory Petrochemical as feedstock and generate power to feed back to Victory. Since therefinery has been offline, Sonbong Power has at times provided electricity to the region, but with
fuel oil prices close to $700/metric ton and current electricity prices at 6.5 eurocents/kwh, theeconomics of running the plant do not work leaving the 800 workers employed here largely
idle." By 2016 was apparently in the process of being converted into a coal-fired power plant,
although it does not seem that it has operated as such as of 2020.

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Figure 5-5: Satellite Photo of Unggi Power Plant, Near Sonbong and the Seungri Oil
Refinery, as of early 2020 (Source, Google Earth Pro)526

Our understanding is that at least three other 100 MW thermal plants also did not operate as of
2000-2010. Those plants that have operated are reportedly plagued by problems with "airheaters"—devices that extract heat from exhaust gases to heat incoming combustion air. Theseair heaters have in most plants been degraded to the point of inoperability by acid gases from the
combustion of high sulfur fuels such as heavy oil and used tires.527 The result is reportedly aconsiderable decrease in plant efficiency, quite possibly greater than the decrease in efficiency(from 28 percent in 1990 to 21 percent in 2000 and subsequent years, before accounting for plantown-use) that we have assumed. Further, boiler tubes in many power plants have been degradedfrom the outside by acid gases from high-sulfur fuels, and from the inside by inadequatelytreated or untreated boiler feed waters. The lack of spare boiler tubes—and in many cases it may
be that boiler tubes to fit these generators, which were built in the 1950s and 1960s, are notavailable at all, anywhere—means that it is very difficult to repair the boiler tube degradation.
Two heavy oil-fired power plants, however, have been added to the roster of thermal generators
526 This image is from Google Maps, coordinates 42.3279749,130.3795243, and dated March 29,2020.

It shows the formerly
HFO-fired plant with new coal storage and coal feed buildings and equipment in place, as well as new roofs on nearby
administration buildings. There is no smoke coming out of the stack, so it is not clear whether the plant is operating, and it is notclear whether coal was being handled in the storage facility as yet. In earlier images there are smaller piles of coal visible to theeast of the plant, near a wharf (and outside of the image below), but they may be for a different purpose (for example, local use
for households or other buildings). Historical Google Earth Pro images show that coal handling facilities were added to the site
in about 2015-2016.
527 Oxford Recycling Inc. (http://www.oxfordrecycling.com/product.html#5, visited 6/8/02) lists a sulfur content of 1.3 percent
for fuel from shredded tires.

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that we previously knew about. A 60 MW plant built for operation on heavy fuel oil is locatednear the small West Coast refinery described below. This power plant reportedly only operates
when crude oil is processed by the associated small refinery. A diesel engine-type plant withcapacity totaling 9.8 MW was installed and operated for much of 2000 at Songlim, in association
with a steel plant there. This plant generally seems to have been fueled with heavy fuel oil.
We also assume that, by 2000, an additional 100 MW of coal-fired capacity was completed,possibly representing two additional 50 MW units at the East Pyongyang power plant shown in
Figure 5-6. The other large power plant serving the DPRK capital, the Pyongyang Power Plant(with a nominal capacity of 500 MW) is shown in Figure 5-7.
Figure 5-6: Satellite Photo of East Pyongyang Power Plant in Operation as of Spring, 2020
(Source, Google Earth Pro)

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Figure 5-7: Satellite Photo of Pyongyang Power Plant in Operation as of September, 2020
(Source, Google Earth Pro)

In total, we estimate that less than 800 MW of the total nominal thermal capacity was operable asof 2000, meaning that less than 800 MW of thermal capacity both were technically capable ofoperation and had the fuel supplies that enabled them to actually run some of the time. It is
possible that some other units were technically operable but did not operate due to lack of fuel.
For those power plants that were operable, we estimate an average capacity factor in the range of
50 percent or less, due to maintenance problems and lack of fuel. These assumptions help to
inform our overall estimate of a total of about 2.8 TWhe of generation from thermal (nominallycoal- and oil-fired) generation in the year 2000. It should be noted, however, that the nominal
total capacity that we estimate and the technically operable capacity are two different things, as
the nominal total capacity counts plants that (we believe) actually exist and did at one time
operate or could at one time operate at the listed capacity, some of which may have at various
times over the years been inoperable due to technical difficulties with generation units, technicalproblems with associated T&D facilities (such as transformers or substations), and/or lack offuel. For the most part, we factored in the estimated operability of power plants, as well as fuelsupplies (or, in the case of hydroelectric plants, hydraulic resources) by adjusting annual
estimated capacity factors. In years after 2000, we assumed that some repairs to generation units
and possibly better fuel supply increased the effective generation capacity, with total capacity
factors for all coal-fired power plants varying from about 18 to 24 percent from 2005 through2019. In 2020, due to COVID-19, we assume that generation was/is (as of this writing, in late2020) substantially lower than in previous years (about 10 percent) due to restrictions on coalsupply and on economic activity in general resulting from the national effort to reduce the spread
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of the pandemic. For 2000 through 2020 we assumed that “emergency losses” amounted to an
additional 9 to 9.4 percent of coal-fired generation, in addition 9 percent of generation as ownuse in coal-fired power plants.
Many of the problems noted above reportedly persisted through 2014, and continue to the date ofthis writing, but we have little direct evidence of significant changes in thermal power generation
capacity in relatively large plants since 2002. We have heard reports of some repairs at major
power plants, including the (nominal) 1600 MW Pukchang plant—shown in operation in lateearly 2018 in the satellite photo provided in Figure 5-8, as well as reports of arrangements forimporting of used power plant boilers, possibly from Eastern Europe.528 Based on what we haveheard from other observers, estimates by the (ROK) Korea Electrotechnical Research Institute(KERI) that operable thermal capacity was about 2 GW, and output 5.4 TWh, in 2005, seems
reasonable, and we have adopted values close to these estimates.529 We estimate the output ofthermal generation in 2008 at nearly the same level as 2005—5.4 TWh, but, based on
consideration of the ratio of ROK overall generation estimates in 2008 and 2009, we estimate thetotal thermal generation in 2009 and 2010 to have been lower—about 4.4 TWh and 3.8 TWh,respectively.530 For 2015, we assumed that the combination of the persistent drought (20132015) in the DPRK, which assumedly would have induced operators to produce as much thermal
power as possible, coupled with possible expanded coal availability due to the domestic benefits
investments in coal infrastructure for coal export, would allow thermal power generation at coalfired plants to be expanded significantly, relative to 2010. This would put total coal-fired
generation in 2014 at about 6.0 TWh, and total thermal power generation (excluding enginedriven generators, which we discuss separately) at 6.6 TWh. For 2015, we estimate similar
thermal output—about 5.9 TWh, with output in recent years falling in part due to UNSC
sanctions—the trend being 6.6 TWh in 2016, 6.0 TWh in 2017, 5.0 TWh I 2018, and 5.1 TWh in
2019. In 2020, as a result of the measures taken by the DPRK to address the COVID-19
pandemic, we estimate the DPRK thermal electricity output will be lower, about 3.3 TWh.

528 Observers suggest that the coal mine feeding the Pukchang power plant was working at less than full capacity (as of around2010), as the use of largely older, manual tools limited output despite the mine being in operation around the clock. The mine
provides coal to other DPRK counties and provinces. Observers reported that the Pukchang power plant itself appeared to be
operating at near-full capacity during approximately 2005, with most or all boilers in use most of the time.
529 J.Y. Yoon, "Analysis of Present Status and Future Supply /Demand Prospects for the DPRK Power System", presented at the
DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA). Available as
http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Yoon.ppt.
530 For 2009, we assume that there was a decrease in overall gross generation approximately equal to that estimated by J.Y. Yoon
in his presentation for the 2010 Energy and Minerals Experts Working Group Meeting in Beijing, September 2010 (available as
http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/01.-Yoon.ppt, and in narrative form at http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-specialreports/the-dprk-power-sector-data-and-interconnection-options/), "Analysis on DPRK Power Industry & Interconnection
Options". In the presentation, Yoon quotes ROK analysts as estimating that the DPRK's generation in 2008 was 25.5 TWh, andgeneration in 2009 was 23.5 TWh. We do not use these absolute generation estimates, because we believe that they are too high(Mr. Yoon agreed that a "minimum" value could be closer to 16 TWh for 2007, for which ROK analysts estimate output of 23.7
TWh), but we use the ratio of these 2009 and 2008 estimates, 92.2%, to estimate a target value for 2009 output. We assume
relatively little change in hydroelectric output between 2008 and 2009, so the difference in generation between 2008 and 2009
was estimated to affect mainly thermal power output, hence the decline in thermal output from 5.4 to 4.4 TWh between 2008 and2009. As another point of comparison, a 2012 article by the Yonhap News Agency (“N. Korea's power consumption per capita at
1970s levels”, dated 8/6/2012, and available as https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20120806003300315), quoting the ROK’s
Statistics Korea, describes per-capita consumption in the DPRK of 819 kWh per capita, which would, based on the population
assumptions used in this report, equate to about 19.7 TWh of overall consumption. Whether the quoted figure is intended to be
actual end-use consumption, or simply overall estimated electricity production divided by population, is unclear, as is theultimate source used by Statistics Korea to prepare the estimate.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKApart from the capacity additions at the Pukchang Thermal Power Complex and the conversionof the Sonbong Heavy Fuel Oil plant to coal use—both of which may or may not be operational
as of 2020—the only other reported major thermal power plant construction has been the
Kangdong plant, which reportedly is to have a capacity of 300 MW, located near Pyongyang (seeFigure 5-9). Construction at this site has been ongoing since at least 2011, but a review ofhistorical satellite images suggests that progress between 2015 and 2019 has been limited. The
possible location of the conversion of the Sonbong HFO plant (at the Seungri Chemical Complex
Refinery) to use coal is shown in Figure 5-10, including a blue-roofed building of approximately
2000 square meters, constructed between April and September of 2020, with a rail line entering
it, which will possibly be used for storing coal. The location of the image is approximately
40.32, 130.35.
Figure 5-8: Satellite Photo of the Pukchang (or Bukchang) Thermal Power Complex inOperation as of Spring 2019 (Source, Google Earth Pro)531

531 The Pukchang (or Bukchang) Thermal Power Complex, location approximately 39.587368°, 126.307439°.

This image shows
what appears to be a new generating unit (buildings with blue roofs at right), put in place between late 2015 and early 2018,
though the unit does not appear to have been operating as of the time the image was taken. News articles about the improvement
at this power plant include Chad O'Carroll (2018), “North Korea expands capacity at nation’s biggest electric plant: KCTV—
Completion of project may be linked to Kim Jong Un's New Year's Speech”, NK News, dated December 14, 2018, and available
as https://www.nknews.org/2018/12/north-korea-expands-capacity-at-nations-biggest-electric-plant-kctv/, and IEA Clean Coal
Center (2020), “North Korea: Pak Pong Ju Inspects Pukchang Thermal Power Complex and Namyang Coal Mine”, dated 19
October 2020 and available as https://www.iea-coal.org/north-korea-pak-pong-ju-inspects-pukchang-thermal-power-complexand-namyang-coal-mine/. Neither reference suggests how much capacity has been (or is being) added to the plant, although 100
to a few hundred MW seems like a fair guess, based on this image and the images in these articles.

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Figure 5-9: Satellite Photo of the Under-construction “Kangdong” Thermal Power Complex
in as of Spring 2019 (Source, Google Earth Pro)532

532

Image source, Google Earth Pro. The construction of this plant was reported by Curtis Melvin for 38 North, in "Pyongyang’s
Perpetual Power Problems", dated 25 November 2014, and available as http://38north.org/2014/11/cmelvin112514/. This article
shows satellite imagery of "a new coal-powered thermal power plant in Samdung-ri, Kangdong County, in eastern Pyongyang",that was mostly finished (but apparently not yet operational) even as of late-2014. The article estimates the size of the power
plant, which it refers to as the Kangdong plant, as between 100 and 300 MW, though no capacity figures have apparently beenannounced by the DPRK. Our guess, based on comparison of photos of the plant (see below) with photos of the 50 MW (butpossibly designed to be 100 or 150 MW) East Pyongyang power plant, is that the actual capacity is/will be toward the lower endof that range, although the Global Energy Monitor (2019) indicates that the " Kangdong power station is a 300-megawatt (MW)coal plant under construction near Pyongyang, North Korea. ", but suggests that little progress has been made in construction
between 2013 and 2018 and lists the plant as “canceled”. Global Energy Monitor (2019), “Kangdong power station”, dated
December 25, 2019, and available as https://www.gem.wiki/Kangdong_power_station. In fact, in the 2019 Google Earth Pro
image shown, the site looks as though it has not been kept up much in the last few years, judging from what appear to be drifts ofsand in some places, although a set of what may be vehicles, trailers, or storage containers at the northwestern edge of the site
may indicate pending activity.

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Figure 5-10: Satellite Photo of the Possible Ongoing Conversion of the HFO-fired Power
Plant at Sonbong as of September 2020 (Source, Google Earth Pro)

Another type of thermal power generation that seems to have become more significant in recent
years in the DPRK are engine-generator sets used when grid power is not available, either
because power plants are not running or due to T&D outages (see below) or both. Nathanial
Aden’s reports on DPRK-China trade in energy and related commodities, first commissioned by
Nautilus in 2006 and updated in 2008 and 2010,533 and data from the UN (United Nations)
Comtrade database534 show that the DPRK has since 2000 imported many hundreds (and in 2012
through 2017, several thousand) small, medium, and larger diesel-fueled generator units, along
with, particularly starting in 2008, tens of thousands (a total of nearly 200,000 since 2004 alone)of small spark-ignition (meaning gasoline-fueled) generator sets. Our guess is that the diesel
generators were likely imported to provide power, when grid power was not available, forbusinesses, institutions, small industrial plants, and agricultural processing, but the spark-ignition
generators probably have been purchased by wealthier DPRK residential households to provide
533 See, for example, Nathaniel Aden (2011), North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs Statistics: 1995-

2009 Energy and Minerals Trends and Implications”, Nautilus Special Report, dated June 7, 2011, and available as
http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/dprk-prc-trade-aden/.
534 United Nations (2020) Comtrade Database, queried through 2020 via http://comtrade.un.org/data/,

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power in their homes, by small businesses—for example, vendors at informal markets, and/or
even by units of the military.535
It is very difficult to estimate exactly the total generation capacity represented by these units,
since the trade statistics are categorized only by three ranges of capacity for the diesel generators,
and provide no direct guidance for the spark-ignition units, but considering the reported value ofthe trades, and the prices of generators on the open market, we estimate that the diesel generators
imported from China trade from 1994 on summed to a total capacity of about 225 MW by 2010
and over 950 MW by the end of 2020 (see Figure 5-11 and Figure 5-12), with spark-ignition
generators representing a total of over 30 MW of capacity by 2010, and over 400 MW by 2020.
Pending more information about these trades (for example, information on the types ofgenerators shipped from Chinese exporters, and whether those generators were mostly new orused), these capacity estimates should probably be considered accurate to within a factor of two
or so. In addition, the official reports of trade in diesel generators, probably as a result of UNSC
sanction, have been sparse since 2017 (as indicated by the small amount of imports shown in
Figure 5-11 for the year 2018), and it is thus difficult to know to what extent DPRK imports ofgenerators have continued, although it seems likely that they have, at least at some level.
Figure 5-11: Estimated Annual Diesel and Gasoline Generator Capacity Imported

Estimated Annual Engine Generator Set Capacity
Purchased in DPRK, 1993 - 2020
kW Estimated Capacity Purchased

350,000
300,000

Spark Ignition Units

Diesel Units
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

-

535 For additional discussion on this topic, see David von Hippel and Peter Hayes, DPRK Imports of Generators in Recent Years:

An Indication of Growing Consumer Choice and Influence on Energy Supply Decisions?, NAPSNet Special Reports, dated
November 02, 2018, and available as https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/dprk-imports-of-generators-in-recentyears-an-indication-of-growing-consumer-choice-and-influence-on-energy-supply-decisions/.

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Figure 5-12: Cumulative Estimated Diesel and Gasoline Generator Capacity

Estimated Cumulative Engine Generator Set Capacity
Purchased from China by the DPRK, 1993 - 2020
kW Estimated Capacity Purchased

1,600,000

1,400,000
1,200,000

Spark Ignition Units
Diesel Units

1,000,000
800,000

600,000
400,000
200,000

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

-

We have assumed, primarily due to restrictions on the availability of diesel fuel and gasoline,that the diesel generators were used relatively lightly, at average capacity factors of 8 to 10
percent in the years from 2005 through 2010,536 but slightly less heavily at a 9.5 percent capacity
factor, in 2014, due to somewhat reduced availability of diesel fuel and better availability of gridelectricity. The average capacity factor for diesel generators is assumed to have increased
through 2016, to 12.6%, due to better availability of fuel and more economic activity, but then tofall to about 6 percent from 2017 through 2020 because of diesel availability restrictions due to
UNSC sanctions. Gasoline generators were assumed to be used even more sparingly, at averagecapacity factors of 1.5 to 2.0 percent in 2008 through 2014 but rising to 3.5 to 4 percent in later
years with more demand for household electricity use and greater gasoline availability, and to 4.5
percent in 2020 as COVID-19 increases activity in households.
An additional type of thermal electricity generation that has reportedly begun to be used in the
DPRK in the past decade, particularly for is installations such as remote mines that need reliable
power, is small (100s of kW to MW-sized) gasifier-driven generation units, fueled with coal, andburning the produced coal gas in an engine-generator or a boiler. These units are available from536 In 2005, the first year in which we separately account for fuel used by diesel generators (in previous years, some oil accounted

in the energy balances presented in our previous studies as used in specific sectors was undoubtedly used in generators), we haveassumed that the total capacity of diesel generators in the DPRK was about 100 MW, which would include both generators
officially recorded as imported from China and some stock of existing generators and/or generators imported from elsewhere.
Note, however, that UN Comtrade statistics on imports of generators to the DPRK from countries other than China indicate very
few such trades, which is not surprising given international economic sanctions imposed on the DPRK, and the dominance andnearby location of China as a trading partner.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKChinese vendors.537 We do not know how many of these units are currently in service in the
DPRK, but we assume it is on the order of tens to low hundreds. Pending more information
about how many of these units might be in service, we have not estimated the output of theseunits in the current version of our energy analysis.
5.2.3.3.Hydroelectric Facilities
North Korea is a mountainous country with substantial rainfall. As such, it has fairly extensive
total potential for hydroelectric development. The DPRK's ability to mobilize massive workforces for public works projects such as dams has helped the country to tap this potential, and asof 1990 approximately 4,500 of an estimated 10,000 to 14,000 MW of hydroelectric potential
had been developed. Table 5-2 provides a listing of those major hydroelectric facilities about
which we have capacity information. The 20 plants on this list built prior to 1990 account for
approximately 3,100 of the 4,500 MW of hydroelectric capacity reportedly in service as of 1990,
and probably comprise about half (numerically) of the larger grid-connected hydroelectric plants.
Electricity from several plants on this list (Supung, Ounbong, T’aep’enmang, and Weewong) is
exported to China, or, more accurately, shared with China, with the output from individual
generating units in some dams going separately to the DPRK and to China. Note that thecapacities listed in Table 5-2 exclude the portions of power generated in those four plants that issent to China. Including that portion of the capacity reportedly delivered to China (700 MW)
raises the total 1990 capacity accounted for by the facilities in Table 5-2 to about 4,000 MW,
over 85 percent of the total hydro capacity reported.

537 See, for example, a vendor advertisement on Alibaba, “300kw Coal gas gasifier plant gasification power plant generator “,available as https://www.alibaba.com/product-detail/300kw-Coal-gas-gasifier-plantgasification_60058806591.html?spm=a2700.galleryofferlist.normal_offer.d_title.3d3f2655ILVn8b.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 5-2: Major Hydroelectric Generating Facilities in the DPRK538#

Name
1 Supung
2 Kymgansang cascade
3 Puren cascade
4 Puch’on-gang
5 Chanjin-gang
6 Hoch’on-gang
7 Tonno-gang
8 Kangae
9 Ounbong
10 Sodusu-1
11 Sodusu-2
12 Sodusu-3
13 Taedong-gang
14 Mirim
15 Ponhwa
16 Hwan-gang
17 Tonhwa
18 T’aep’enmang
19 Weewong
20 Nam-gang
21 Dokro river

Capacity
Year
Year
(MW)
Completed Refurbished
400
13.5
1930
1958
28.5
1932
260
1932
1956
390
1936
1958
394
1942
1958
90
1959
246
1965
200
1970
180
1974
230
1978
45
1982
200
1982
32
1980
32
1983
20
198?
20
198?
90
1989
200
1989
200
1994
36

TOTAL OF LISTED PLANTS

3,307

Many of the smaller hydroelectric facilities in operation in the DPRK, are reportedly of the "runof-river" type, meaning that relatively little water is impounded behind the dams. Although thiswould tend to suggest that electric output from the DPRK's hydro plants may be more likely tobe subject to the vagaries of the weather—poor rainfall months or years resulting in lower-thanaverage electricity production—than systems with more impoundment-type dams, it has beensuggested that the larger plants, including those initially designed and built during the Japanesecolonial era, reportedly combine impoundment and run-of-river elements, resulting in relatively
high capacity factors.539
Given the location and extent of the flooding in the DPRK during 1995 and 1996, it always
seemed probable to us that the North Korean hydroelectric system had sustained significant
damage. We have modeled this reduction in usable hydroelectric capacity by assuming thatavailable hydro capacity at existing facilities fell by about 3250 MW from 1990 values by 1996
as a result of flood damage540 offset slightly by additions to capacity.541
538

Please see the volume of detailed calculations provided as an Attachment to this Report, 2009, for a listing of the sources
used in developing this table.
539 As an example of the potential of the combined impoundment/run-of-river design to produce power consistently, Prof. Y.S.
Jang (personal communication, 1996) reports that the capacity factor of hydroelectric plants in North Korea was over 70 percent
during 1943.
540 Several sources that have been to the DPRK recently said they had no knowledge of major damage to large hydroelectricfacilities. Another source had heard of damage to “one or two” “small to medium-sized” (less than 10 MW) plants.

266
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKOur estimate for the supply of hydroelectric power in 1990 starts with the figure of 46 TWhedescribed above, of which slightly less than half (46 percent) is assumed to be generated in hydroplants.542 These two figures, taken together, imply an overall capacity factor for hydroelectricfacilities of about 54 percent. We counted the hydro input energy to electricity generation
assuming an efficiency conversion of 100 percent output electricity to input energy, as is done in
United Nations statistics543. The "own use" of electricity in hydro plants was assumed to be 0.3
percent of gross generation, which corresponds to ROK conditions in 1970,544 and is also similar
to values for Chinese plants.
As a consequence of the difficulties with thermal power plants, hydroelectric plants had
shouldered the burden of power generation in the DPRK by 2000. Information from industry
sources indicate that any difficulties associated with the 1995/1996 flood damage to the shared
power stations (China/DPRK) along the Chinese border has been repaired, and those plants areoperating normally. Normally, however, apparently means that those plants—about 700 MW ofcapacity each for China and for the DPRK—are used largely in a peaking mode to conserve riverwater, and operate at full capacity only during the rainy mid-July to mid-August period. We
have thus assumed an overall capacity factor of 17.5 percent for these units. Other hydroelectricfacilities in the DPRK may in fact be operated in a similar manner, and it is clear that the country
as a whole has far less power in the dry winter than at other times of the year. We have assumed,
for the year 2000, that of the approximately 3900 MW of other hydroelectric plants, 75 percent
of capacity was operable, and those operable hydro plants had a capacity factor in 2000 (a low
water year) equaling 75 percent of the capacity factor assumed for 1996, or about 38 percent
overall in 2000. This could, in fact, prove an over-estimate.
News reports from the DPRK regularly include items on hydroelectric dams under construction
and, more rarely, commissioned. In addition, North Korean delegations to Nautilus events and
DPRK contacts with ROK colleagues have suggested that many smaller hydroelectric facilities
have been planned and built in the DPRK since about the mid-1990s. What remains very
unclear, however, is the total capacity that these units represent, the amount of power theygenerate on average (in all likelihood, their average capacity factors are relatively low), and how
many of the units are connected to a power grid, or, in fact, operate at all. Anecdotal reportssuggest that the reportedly thousands of small hydro facilities (with average capacities of a few
tens of kilowatts to a megawatt) installed by the end of 2004545 (and, we assume, subsequently),
have in fact, due to limitations on hydraulic resources, poor workmanship and/or operation, or a
combination of factors, produced relatively little power.

541 KEEI (Korean Energy Economics Institute, 1996; personal communication from Mr. Roh Dongseok, Electricity Policy

Division) cites an 800 MW increase in capacity from the newly opened Kumgang Mountain plant. Earlier ROK estimates had
also placed the (expected) capacity of this plant at 800 MW, although its current capacity under the phases now completed and/or
considering existing reservoir levels is probably in the range of 100 - 150 hundred megawatts. The Kumgang mountain plant wasalso referred to in announcements in the DPRK press, but without reference to plant capacity.
542 Confidential document in authors' files.
543 Note that the actual conversion efficiency of energy in falling water to electricity in hydro plants is typically less than 100%,on the order of 70 to 90 percent.
544 Kim, E.-W., H. Kim, H.-K. Lim, C. Nahm, M.-C. Shin, and Y. Kim (1983), The Electric Future of Korea. Resource Systems
Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. Research Materials RM-83-8.
545 See table in J.Y. Yoon, "Analysis of Present Status and Future Supply /Demand Prospects for the DPRK Power System",presented at the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA). Available as
http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Yoon.ppt.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKA major "Youth Dam" including a tunnel system for carrying water, had recently been
completed, but its hydroelectric capacity, if any as of 2000, was unclear. Also underway, at thetime of the 2000 Nautilus visit to the DPRK, was a scheme to dam the Taedong River to provide
irrigation water to rice fields on the Southwest Coast of the DPRK without the need to pumpwater from the Nampo barrage area. That project has since been completed (see Figure 3-3), but
it is not clear to the authors whether the latter project has or is expected to have significant
associated hydroelectric capacity, or whether the "Youth Dam" and the Taedong water diversion
project are related.
For 2005, we have based our estimate of hydroelectric output on data from KERI (see reference
to presentation by J.Y. Yoon, above), but added 100 MW of large hydroelectric capacity, plus 86
MW of medium-sized hydroelectric capacity, to account for facilities completed (or likely
completed) in 2005. The resulting estimate of hydroelectric capacity for 2005 is about 4100
MW, with output of about 11 TWh and thus an average capacity factor of a bit over 30 percent.
In 2008 through 2010, hydroelectric capacity is assumed to have increased somewhat over 2005
as a result of the completion of several medium-sized (tens of MW) hydro plants. Averagecapacity factors for hydroelectric plants in all three years were estimated at just under 32 percent,with total output of just under 12 TWh in each year.
A number of under-construction medium-sized hydroelectric plants have been put forward by the
DPRK in recent years as possible projects for international investment in greenhouse gas
emissions reduction under the “Clean Development Mechanisms” (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocolof the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Particularly
notable in this list of projects is the recently completed (at least one unit) “Heecheon” (or, as
more commonly referred to, Huichon #2) Youth Power Station hydro power plant, designed toprovide power for Pyongyang. Recent news reports suggest that as a result of the opening of thisplant, the DPRK authorities had intended to retire the aging and polluting Pyongyang Thermal
power plant546, but uncertainty as to the actual reliable output of the Huichon plant, coupled, atleast we would surmise, with the fact that the Pyongyang plant provides both heat to residents inthe older part of the metropolis, as well as power, and the Huichon plant could not provide
district heat to those existing buildings the Pyongyang plant now serves (except throughinstallation of electric resistance heaters, which would dramatically increase Pyongyang’s
electricity consumption if done on a large scale). The DPRK has reported to the UNFCCC quitedetailed output and capacity data for six plants included in their CDM program, sufficient toestimate capacity factors for these six medium-sized hydro plants as ranging from 38 to 44
percent in 2014-2017, as shown in Table 5-3.547

546 Choi Song Min (2012), “Iconic Pyongyang Power Plant Could Go”, DailyNK, dated 2012-05-08, available as

http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=9207.
547 Data describing the size and output of six hydroelectric plants registered with the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) as DPRK CDM projects obtained from documents on the UNFCCC CDM website,
https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 5-3: DPRK Hydroelectric Plants Included in CDM Reporting to UNFCCC
MWh Annual Net Generation
Plant

First
Operation

Capacity
(MW)

2012

2013

Hamhung Hydro
Power Plant #1

Dec-2013

10-

Kumya Hydropower
Plant

Dec-2013

7.5

Paekdusan Songun
Youth 14 MW
Hydropower Project
No.2

10/1/2015

14

Ryesonggang
Hydropower Plant
No.4

11/28/2014

Ryesonggang
Hydropower Plant
No.5
Ryesonggang
Hydropower Plant
No.3
Totals
Implied aggregateannual capacity
factor (for plants
while on line)

Location
2014

2015

2016

2017

50

24,85525,392

29,87530,47239°39′
25′ N

127°15′01′′ E

48

16,256

17,394

19,462

14,90939°34′
22′′N

127°07′
08′′E

-

-

-

8,675

52,68052,26341°43′
18′′ N

128°50′
15′ E

5

-

-

1,303

26,251

24,747

19,10038°18′
02′′ N

126°31′42′′ E

11/30/2013

7.5

-

2,646

31,24632,33531,64530,24338º15′
35′′ N

126º29′41′ E

10/11/2013

5

-

1,868

26,397

26,911

29,20918,92438°19′
42′′ N

126°34′03′′ E

49

-

4,612

100,056

136,958

187,617

165,91129.77%

37.55%

40.61%

43.71%

38.65%The Huichon power plant, which has a reported capacity of 300 MW, was reported to have beenbrought on line in April of 2012. The plant is one of several to be developed on the Chongchon
River in Northern DPRK, and reportedly improved power supplies in Pyongyang in someperiods in 2012 and 2013.548 Numerous other articles about this plant exist, but few provide
much information about its generation capacity. One internet post states "[t]he dam is reported
to be more than 300 [feet] [91 meters] high and 1,800 [feet] [550 meters] wide and capable ofstoring 850 million cubic metres of water.", but also suggests that it has a serious structuraldefect, apparently a crack or similar problem, allegedly stemming from its rapid construction
and/or the use of inappropriate grades of cement/concrete.549 Figure 5-13 shows a satellite
photo of the Huichon #2 hydroelectric dam as of late 2015 or early 2016.

548 See, for example, "N. Korea completes new power plant to tackle energy shortage", Yonghap news agency, dated 2012/04/06,

available as https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20120406001900315. Rainer Dormels (2014), “Profiles of the cities of DPR Korea –Huichon”, also lists the capacity of the Huichon #2 power plant at 300 MW. See
http://www.univie.ac.at/koreanologie/fileadmin/user_upload/DigitalNK/Forschungsarbeit/Huichon.pdf.
549 See, for example, (Rich Lennon, May 24, 2013, available ashttps://www.facebook.com/DragonsParadox/posts/4975149101259, though many other articles make the same point regarding
the dam having a structural defect that limits its capacity and may potentially be dangerous.

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Figure 5-13: Satellite Photo of Huichon #2 Hydroelectric Power Plant, Apparently in
Operation as of Late 2015 or Early 2016 (Source, Google Maps)

Multiple sources indicate that the drought in 2014 (and 2015) had a significant impact onhydroelectric output, but few sources offer numerical estimates as to the impact of the drought onhydroelectric output. One story, "North Korea Newsletter 368 (June 25, 2015) " by Yonghap
News Agency, referencing a Reuters report, indicates that hydroelectric output in 2015 wasaffected as follows "Reuters reported on May 30 that many hydro power plants in North Korea
have suspended operation, reducing the nation's power generation by half."550 We assume thatthe drought resulted in a significant decrease in 2014 hydroelectric output. We assume that
relative to 2008, hydro output in existing dams shared with China (along the Yalu river)decreased by 20 percent, and that hydro output in other large and medium hydro plants was
reduced by 25 percent relative to 2008. For the new Huichon #2 plant, we assume a capacity
factor for 2014 of 25 percent, which is designed to consider the impacts of the combination of
the drought plus reported structural problems in reducing what would be an average 45-50
percent capacity factor for a DPRK hydroelectric plant. We also assume that a "normal year"
capacity factor for the medium-sized hydro plants added in 2006 through 2010, many of whichare “run of river” type and thus quite sensitive to seasonal water flows, was about 25 percent in2014. Overall, we estimate that 2014 gross hydro generation in the DPRK was just over 10
TWh, about 13 percent lower than our hydroelectric generation estimate for 2010. In 2015 and2016, we estimate that hydro generation was in the 11 to 11.5 TWh/yr range, falling again toabout 10.2 to 10.7 TWh in 2017 through 2020.
News releases by the DPRK in 2015 claimed the completion of 10 more hydroelectric facilities,
mostly (apparently) on 80 km of the Chongchon River, in 2015.551 Our examination of available
550 Source, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/full/2015/06/24/49/1200000000AEN20150624007300325F.html.
551 See, for example, Leo Byrne (2015), N. Korea completes 10 hydro plants”, NK News, dated November 18th, 2015, andavailable as http://www.nknews.org/2015/11/n-korea-completes-10-hydro-plants/.

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satellite images (Google Maps) of the Chongchon River suggest that there are several sites wheresome hydroelectric development could arguably have taken place, but that the claim that 10
plants had been completed, and that the plants would provide a significant amount of power(hundreds of megawatts), seems likely to be overstated. For example, one probable hydroelectricsite on the Chongchon downriver from the Huichon #2 plant described above appears quite
small, and with its limited head (apparently only a few meters) probably only produces a few
MW of electric power, if that (see Figure 5-14).
Figure 5-14: Satellite Photo of Probably Small Hydroelectric Plant (name unknown)
Downstream from Huichon #2 Hydroelectric Power Plant, Apparently in Operation as of Late2015 or Early 2016 (Source, Google Maps)

An under-construction hydroelectric plant frequently mentioned in the media is the hydroelectricfacility at Mount Paekdu”, or the “Mount Paekdu Songun Youth Power Station”. According to a2015 report, the first two units were to have been completed in late 2015, in time for the 70th
anniversary of the Korean Workers Party, while a third unit was reportedly to have been
completed in May of 2016, based on a report quoting an article in the Pyongyang Times,552
Figure 5-15 shows a photo of the Mount Paektu dam at its dedication ceremony in October of
2015. Interestingly, one source claims that the completion of this plant, which it lists as having
a capacity of 50 MW, was delayed due to damage to its concrete spillway caused by the DPRK’s
underground nuclear weapons tests at a location nearby.553
552 See Leo Byrne (2015), “North Korea adding to electricity grid”, NK News.org, dated July 13th, 2015, and available ashttps://www.nknews.org/2015/07/north-korea-adding-to-electricity-grid/, and Leo Byrne (2015b), “Third Paekdu power plant tobe completed by May – DPRK media”, NK News.org, dated December 24th, 2015, and available ashttps://www.nknews.org/pro/third-paekdu-power-plant-to-be-completed-by-may-dprk-media/.
553 Sung Hui Moon (2013; translated by Doeun Han, written in English by Joshua Lipes), “North Korea Struggles for 20 Years toComplete Hydropower Plant”, Radio Free Asia Korean Service, dated September 27, 2013, and available as
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/hydroplant-09272013161417.html.

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Figure 5-15: Mount Paektu Power Station Dam at Dedication Ceremony in October, 2015554

Overall, based on news reports that typically lack specificity, we assume that total hydroelectric
capacity was growing by an average of about 50 to 70 MW annually in the 2014 through 2019
time period, falling to 33 MW by 2020, as construction would have slowed due to COVID-19
restrictions on gatherings and on trade with China, the latter potentially limiting imports of plantcomponents. Some of these additions reflect the plants detailed in the DPRK’s CDM projectlisting, but most are assumed to be plants with capacity in the MW to low tens-of-MW scale,including those listed in media reports (but typically without any mention of capacity). For
example, there appeared to be a number of power stations completed or under construction on
the Chongchon river as of mid-2019. An example, from Google Earth, at coordinates
40.0290466,126.1781053, appears in Figure 5-16, and includes what appears to be a skating rinklaid out the river ice, presumably for use by the residents of the adjacent city of Kuwollim. In an
article entitled "Progress in North Korea’s renewable energy production", dated February 15th,
2016, NK Economy Watch quoted the Institute for Far Eastern Studies as saying "...the recently
constructed Chongchon power plant which took three years to complete and has a total output of
430,000 kW". Looking at the hydro plants on the Chongchon river, which seem to have modest
head and relatively limited impoundments (therefore more "run-of-river" type plants), our guessis that even assuming this figure is intended to be a total for all 11 (or so) or the plants on the
554 Source, The Telegraph, dated October 5, 2015, available as

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/picturesoftheday/11911342/Pictures-of-the-day-5-October2015.html?frame=3463526.

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river, the estimate of capacity is likely to be an order of magnitude or so too high, perhaps as aresult of a units reporting error. But as noted above, we have no solid data on the capacity ofthese plants.
Figure 5-16: Hydroelectric Plant on the Chongchon River555

5.2.4. Wind Power Facilities
Wind power development in the DPRK, despite being very much of interest to both thegovernment and renewable energy experts there, remains minimal. The seven small windturbines (totaling slightly over 11 kW) installed by Nautilus during its 1998 and 2000 missions to
the village of Unhari, north of Nampo in the DPRK, have reportedly been taken down due tomaintenance problems that Nautilus and its North Korean counterparts could not solve within theconstraints of the long-distance communication modes available at the time. The wind turbinesand related equipment are in storage in Pyongyang.556 Within a few km of the Unhari site, two
grid-connected Vestas wind turbines with capacity on the order of 100 kW or so each, were
installed in the late 1990s, but reportedly operated very little, if at all, due mostly (probably) tothe unstable electric grid in the area. On Nautilus’ 1998 and 2000 missions to the DPRK, we
saw small DPRK-made, perhaps in some instances home-made, wind turbines with capacities in
the range of a few hundred Watts, often using automobile alternators as generators, but these did
555 Image from Google Earth Pro, coordinates approximately 40.0290466, 126.1781053, dated 12/23/2018.
556 See, for example, Jim Williams et al, “Wind Farm in the Cabbage Patch”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists May 1999 vol. 55

no. 3 40-48, doi: 10.2968/055003014; and David F. Von Hippel, Peter Hayes, James H. Williams, Chris Greacen, Mick Sagrillo,
and Timothy Savage (2001), RURAL ENERGY SURVEY IN UNHARI VILLAGE, THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF KOREA (DPRK): METHODS, RESULTS, AND IMPLICATIONS, dated May 20, 2001, and available as
http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Unhari_Survey1.pdf.

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not seem to be working much.557 At that time, Nautilus engineers also inspected wind power
equipment being produced (in unknown but likely small quantities) in a factory in Pyongyang.
The opinion of the Nautilus engineers was that the wind power units being produced wereunlikely to be operable, due to the shape of the blades and the design of the inverters used toprocess power from the units.
A more recent report, the original source of which was the Pyongyang Times, claims that lowcost “small wind turbines made by the Aeguk Magnet Factory” have been attracting an
increasing domestic market in the DPRK since mid-2015, with units rated from 100 to 300
Watts. We assume that relatively few of these were in active service by 2014.558
A short video is available online of the Korean People’s Army installing one of a pair ofrelatively large (by DPRK standards) wind generators—with rated power probably on the orderof one hundred or so kilowatts each, based on a rough measurement of the rotor size—on a ridgein the Southern DPRK near the town of Onjin.559 A Google Maps image of these generators as
they looked in probably mid-2019 or mid-2020 is provided in see Figure 5-17), A generator ofthis size would need to be tied into a stable local (if not regional) electricity grid, meaning (to us)that either it is backed up by local diesel or hydro power sources, or it does not operate properly.
The year of installation of these units, which appear to be imported (not made in the DPRK), is
unclear, but was probably 2008 or 2009, since they appear on Google Earth photos in 2009, but
not in 2006. An additional report from 2015 shows three wind generators, possibly about thesame size (blade diameter of about 20 meters) as those shown in the video referenced above andan array of photovoltaic panels probably totaling in the tens of kilowatts of capacity.560 It was
unclear from the available photos, or from current Google Earth images, whether thesegenerators were tied to the local power grid. Interestingly, the Google Earth images of the site
available as of February 2016, which appeared to have been taken in late summer of 2015,
appeared to show the mounts or mounting holes for the solar PV arrays shown in the state media
photos of Kim Jong Un’s visit to the site provided in the March 2015 North Korea Tech article,
but the panels themselves appear to be missing, suggesting that they had been removed sometime
between March and late-summer 2015 for use elsewhere.
Photos of wind turbine installations provided in a presentation by a DPRK delegation to Nautilus
Institute’s Regional Energy Security Workshop in 2019, showed two larger wind generators,
reportedly 100 and 250 kW units (see Figure 5-18).561 As these units appear to have been
installed at the same location (at different times), we assume that they are test or demonstration
units used in a DPRK research and development program, and do not represent permanent wind
power installations.

557 See, for example, NK Economy Watch (2012), “UNDP wind power project”, dated 2012-9-24, and available ashttps://www.nkeconwatch.com/2012/09/24/undp-wind-power-project/.
558 NK Economy Watch (2015), “DPRK’s domestic sales of wind turbines”, dated October 28, 2015, and available as
http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2015/10/28/dprks-domestic-sales-of-wind-turbines/.
559 Youtube, “North Korean military (KPA) installing wind power turbines”, at coordinates 37.945745°, 125.411339°. Available
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JYG_SOHZ_fA. Turbine size is our rough estimate based on measurements made from
Google Earth satellite imagery.
560 Martyn Williams (2015), “State media shows off solar and wind power plant”, North Korea Tech, dated March 14, 2015, andavailable as http://www.northkoreatech.org/2015/03/14/state-media-shows-off-solar-and-wind-power-plant/.
561 “Renewable Energy Development in the DPR Korea” presented by the DPRK delegation to the Regional Energy Security
Project Second Working Group Meeting, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, December 9th and 10th, 2019.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 5-17: DPRK Wind Generators Installed in South Hwanghae, DPRK (image from
Google Maps)

Figure 5-18: Wind Turbine R&D Units in the DPRK

275
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKThe DPRK has been importing wind power systems from China in small quantities since2008.562 By the end of 2014, we estimate the total capacity of these imported systems were on
the order of 500 kW, rising to over 800 kW by 2017. We assume that most or all of thesesystems—which, based on the number of units and the import value, must be relatively small (afew kilowatts on average)—were likely used in stand-alone (not grid connected) modes, withbattery systems for electricity storage. Figure 5-19 shows a graph of annual and cumulative
wind power capacity in the DPRK, as per our estimates. As with diesel and gasoline generators,
customs data on wind power systems exports from China to the DPRK does not appear for 2018,
so we do not know whether imports have in fact continued or have been interrupted by UNSC
sanctions on imports to the DPRK.
We have assumed that in addition to the deployment of the wind generators imported from
China, there has been some production of domestic DPRK wind power turbines. Including both
domestic and imported wind power systems, we assume that a total of about 790 kW of capacity
were operating in 2015, rising to about 1.6 MW by 2020. Considering the generally modest
DPRK wind resource, we assume average capacity factors were 25 percent, whereas commercial
wind installations elsewhere typically see capacity factors closer to 35 percent. It is likely thatsome fraction of the total wind power included in this estimate was not grid-connected, but
included units, many likely small, used to charge batteries, including in rural locations.

562 A very few units were also reported in China Customs Statistics to have been imported from China into the DPRK in 1998 (3units) and 2002 (1 unit).

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 5-19: Estimated Imports of Wind Power Generators to the DPRKkW Estimated Capacity Purchased

900

Estimated Annual and Cumulative Wind Power
Generator Set Capacity Reported as Purchased (inTrade Statistics) in the DPRK, 2008 - 2018

800
700
600
500

Estimated Annual Wind
Capacity Imported
Estimated Cumulative
Wind Capacity Imported

400
300
200
100
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

It has been reported that Russia plans a joint venture with the DPRK in which Russia “isplanning to build wind farms on both sides of the Russian-North Korean border during the next
two years.”563 A reported 40 MW of wind power systems are planned to be developed in 2016
and 2017, with investments totaling “$55-62 million”. What is unclear is whether these plants
are to be connected to the DPRK grid or the Russian grid. Our guess is that in order for the windturbines to be operated in a stable manner, they will need to be connected to the Russian grid,with power then exported to the DPRK grid via an intertie.
5.2.5. Solar Power Facilities
Although there are probably some small-scale solar electricity systems (photovoltaic and/or solar
thermal) installed for research or demonstration purposes in the DPRK—an example of whatsounds like a 10 kW pilot facility on a government building (Research Institute of the Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunications) in Pyongyang was cited in 2015 Pyongyang Times article564—
the vast bulk of the adoption of solar power in the DPRK has certainly been by private
563 Eugene Gerden (2015), “Russian plan to sell wind power to North Korea”, Wind Power Monthly, dated 29 June 2015, andavailable as http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1353670/russian-plan-sell-wind-power-north-korea.
564 Kim Hyon Uk (2015), “Solar energy brought into wider use”, Pyongyang Times, dated December 8, 2015, and formerly
available as http://naenara.com.kp/en/order/pytimes/?page=Economy&no=21253.

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households and businesses purchasing solar photovoltaic (PV) units, batteries, LED lighting, andsmall electronic devices for lighting and entertainment use during the frequent periods when grid
power is not available.565
We estimate, based on data on DPRK imports of solar PV and related devices from the UN
Comtrade database, that there were over 10 MW of PV systems purchased from China between
2008 and 2014 in operation in the DPRK as of the end of 2014, and nearly 30 MW by 2017.566
At an assumed average annual output of 1200 kWh per kW of capacity, with an assumed 80
percent of panels unshaded (that is, panels harvesting on average 80 percent of the sun available
to a completely unshaded panel), these panels are estimated to have provided about 10 GWh(gigawatt-hours) of electricity in the DPRK in 2014. This is obviously a small fraction of total
electricity supplies, but these devices provide power for very highly valued end-uses in homes
and businesses. Figure 5-20 provides a summary of our estimate of annual and cumulative
capacity of solar PV systems imported into the DPRK from China from 2009 through 2018.
Although the categories used for Comtrade statistics make it difficult to determine for certain,
recorded trades (as opposed to trades in goods that do not appear on the Customs ledgers, which
may also be substantial in the case of the DPRK) in PV systems could have been on the order ofmany (perhaps 3 to 8) megawatts annually, meaning that perhaps 200,000 or more DPRK
households have adopted small PV systems to date.
As with import data for diesel and gasoline generators and for wind power units, official
information on exports of solar units from China to the DPRK have been lacking for 2018,
possibly due to UNSC sanctions on exports to the DPRK. These considerations may haveaffected 2017 import statistics as well. We assume, based on media reports of continuing
deployment of small solar PV panels in the DPRK, that panels continue to be deployed in the
DPRK, sourced either from “off-books” trades with China, or manufactured in the DPRK,567
presumably from photovoltaic and other electronic components imported from China, inquantities representing aggregate capacities of nearly 60,000 kW over the five years of 2016
through 2020, with perhaps some slowdown in 2020 due to COVID-19 restrictions on movement
and trade.

565 See, for example, Hyonhee Shin (2017), “Cheap solar panels power consumer appliance boom in North Korea”, Reuters,

dated April 17, 2019, and available as https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-solar-feature/cheap-solar-panels-powerconsumer-appliance-boom-in-north-korea-idUSKCN1RT2P1. See also David Von Hippel and Peter Hayes (2015), "Private
Purchases of Solar Photovoltaic Panels in the DPRK: Signs of Green Growth on the Way?", NAPSNet Policy Forum, dated
January 13, 2015, available as https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/private-purchases-of-solar-photovoltaic-panelsin-the-dprk-signs-of-green-growth-on-the-way/.
566
Based on UN Comtrade database information regarding trades in solar photovoltaic equipment from China to the DPRK since2009 in as reported in trade category (HS) "854140" = "Name: Photosensitive/photovoltaic/LED semiconductor devices;
Description: Photosensitive semiconductor devices, including photovoltaic cells whether or not assembled in modules or made up
into panels; light emitting diodes". We use these data to estimate the implied volume of imported solar photovoltaic panels into
the DPRK. UN Comtrade data do not provide the capacity of solar PV systems. Our capacity estimates are based on applying
reported costs of solar PV panels on the DPRK market, consistent with internet prices for Chinese solar PV systems, to calculate
capacity from the value of trade in the category listed. This approach provides is an imperfect, estimate of solar PV capacity, but
one that should be reasonably accurate.
567 A solar PV factory in Pyongyang is mentioned in Voice of America (2015), “Solar Panel Boom Helping to Power N. KoreanHomes”, dated April 22, 2015, and available as https://www.voanews.com/east-asia/solar-panel-boom-helping-power-n-koreanhomes. What appeared to be a solar PV panel assembly panel facility was at one time shown in an available video clip,
presumably from a DPRK news outlet, although the video itself no longer appears to be available. See John Parnell (2016), “Is
this factory driving North Korea’s solar boom?”, dated March 14, 2016, and available as https://www.pv-tech.org/news/is-thisfactory-driving-north-koreas-solar-boom.

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Figure 5-20: Solar PV Generation Capacity Imported to the DPRK

35,000Estimated Annual and Cumulative Solar Photovoltaic
Generation Capacity Reported (in Trade Statistics) as
Purchased in the DPRK, 2009 - 2018

kW Estimated Capacity Purchased

30,00025,000

Implied kW PV Systems
Imported

20,000

Implied Cumulative kW PV
Systems Imported

15,00010,000

5,000

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

An indication of the emphasis on the use of renewable energy by DPRK authorities is provided
in a 2019 story by the Korean Friendship Association USA about a factory fitted with “over a
thousand solar panels on the roof of the factory building to generate several hundred kW ofelectricity”, as well as solar thermal panels for water heating.568 Interestingly, the article reportsthat “[t]he electric power generated at the factory is supplied through the private distribution
network to the workshops, sci-tech learning space, mess hall and other units of the factory, andthe surplus electricity is transmitted to the national power network”, suggesting that the emphasis
is on providing power to the facility via a mini-grid, rather than simply providing power to themain grid. An image of the PV array provided in the article (see Figure 5-21) does in factsuggest capacity on the order of 150 kW or more.

568 Korea Friendship Association USA (2019), “The DPRK is Benefitting from Renewable Energy Sources”, dated July 2, 2019,

and available as https://www.kfausa.org/the-dprk-is-benefitting-from-renewable-energy-sources/.

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Figure 5-21: Solar PV System Installed on Ryuwon Footwear Factory in Mangyongdae
District, Pyongyang (Source: Korea Friendship Association USA)A calculation of the cost of electricity from solar PV panels underscores the value of this sourceof energy to DPRK residents. As of about 2015, DPRK citizens in many cities are reportedly
spending the equivalent of several months of household income to buy solar PV systems topower small electronics (the most common being combination DVD/CD/media players with 9inch screens) as well as, probably, some light-emitting diode (LED) lighting and other small
electric devices. The most common system purchased as of about 2015 included a PV panel
with a rated capacity of 30 Watts (W), and a sealed lead-acid automotive-type battery with acapacity of 28 Amp-hours. Wealthier households purchased larger panels and batteries, andlarger electronic devices. Households purchased the systems because electricity supplies fromthe DPRK central grid were (and are) in many places unreliable at best, and at worst, rarely
available. Although these systems provide households with consistent access to entertainmentand (probably) some lighting and other services, and do so without pollutant emissions, the costof providing electricity via the solar PV systems is relatively high. The reason for this was not
so much the cost of the PV panel in the DPRK—PV costs have been declining rapidly for years,
and the in-DPRK retail cost quoted by Daily NK, about $1.30 on a per-Watt-capacity basis, issimilar to the high end of current bulk pricing for 30 W PV panel kits as quoted in Alibaba (thedominant Chinese internet market). Taking just the cost of the panel into account, and assuming
a lifetime of 20 years, the cost per kWh of delivered electricity in the system comes to about

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$0.22 per kWh.569 The system cost becomes much more expensive, however, when the cost ofbatteries is included. The reason here is that the batteries used in the system, 12-volt lead-acidbatteries of the type used in small vehicles (for example, electric scooters), have a finite lifetime(perhaps 5 or 6 years) even under the best of circumstances, but when continuously discharged toa low level, as they likely would be when used as North Korean households are likely to usethem, the battery lifetime could be much shorter, even though some of the batteries sold with PV
systems may be nominally designed for deep-cycle use. As a result, the batteries needed toaccompany PV panels must be replaced many times over the life of the panels. Factoring inbattery lifetimes of 5 years (a best-case scenario, although the lifetimes of lithium-ion batteries,
especially for transport applications, continue to improve), the cost of usable energy from thePV/battery systems rises to $0.49 per kWh. If the batteries last only an average of 2 years, thecost per unit of energy rises to $0.78 per kWh. By 2020, with both reductions in cost for PV
panels and cost reductions and improvements in lithium-ion battery technologies, the costs ofenergy for a solar PV system of the type that might be available to a DPRK household (assuming
access to imported goods from China) has continued to fall. As an example, a recent listing on
Alibaba.com offers a system with solar panels rated at 30 W with battery with a capacity of 144
Watt-hours for a wholesale cost on the order of $40 (USD).570 If such a system sold for $60 in
the DPRK, if the equivalent of half of the battery’s capacity were used each evening, and if thebattery lasted five years, then the cost of the system would equate to less than $0.50 per kWh,including the cost of LED bulbs, a fan, and the solar panel itself, which would presumably
outlive the battery. As the size of these systems increase, the cost per Watt decreases
significantly. For example, a 1 kW system including a battery and inverter was advertised on
Alibaba as of late 2020 at $0.21 to 0.29 per Watt, which even with a five-year lifetime assumed
for the full system would equate to about $0.20 per lifetime kWh even assuming a mark-up 100
percent from wholesale to retail costs.571 By way of comparison, the average retail price ofelectricity in the ROK was about $0.11 (121 ROK Won) per kWh as of July 2020.572
The actual cost of electricity from PV systems underscores the high value that DPRK households
place on access to even small amounts of electricity, and probably even significantly understates
it. Based also on UN Comtrade data, the DPRK imported from China on the order of 4 to 5
million flashlights and other lamps in each of the years 2014 through 2017, and 60 million small
batteries (likely for electronics) per year in 2012 and 2013 (and 22 million in 2017). The
effective cost of electricity from these small batteries is on the order of $20 per kWh.
5.2.6. Nuclear Power
No commercial nuclear power plants are currently operating in the DPRK. An Experimental
Light Water Reactor (ELWR), however, remains under construction at the nuclear weapons
569 Calculated using a real (not including inflation) discount rate of 15%/year, which is probably appropriate, if not low, forhousehold consumers, an assumed output of 1200 W-hours per W of PV capacity, and an average charge/discharge efficiency of
80 percent for the PV/battery system.
570 See, for example, https://www.alibaba.com/product-detail/30W-Solar-Power-SystemHome_60734588898.html?spm=a2700.galleryofferlist.normal_offer.d_title.6a386adc6WCWV4/.
571 See, for example, https://www.alibaba.com/product-detail/High-quality-low-price-solarsystem_62283944000.html?spm=a2700.galleryofferlist.normal_offer.d_title.6a386adc6WCWV4. Note that this example likely
overstates the cost per delivered kWh from Solar PV systems, as the life of the solar panel and inverter in this case are likely
closer to 20 years than to five years.
572 Korea Energy Economics Institute (2020), Monthly Energy Statistics, Volume 36-10 (October 2020), available as
http://www.keei.re.kr/keei/download/MES2010.pdf.

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complex at Yongbyon. Satellite images suggest that the major buildings associated with theexperimental LWR at Yongbyon appear complete, but the reactor is not yet operating. The
ELWR, with a reported thermal capacity of 100 MW and an estimated electricity generation
capacity of about 25 MW, has been built adjacent to the site of the Yongbyon uranium
enrichment facilities and the DPRK’s older reactor and plutonium separation facilities.
A 2015 report by the Institute for Science and International Security indicates that “recent
imagery does not show any evidence that the LWR has started operation”.573 There have beensome small indications of changes on the site in recent images, including recent additions oflandscaping, new buildings, and modifications to the berms and dam in the adjacent river in thelast few years. Although it appears complete, the ELWR apparently has not run yet as of early2020.574 It is possible that the ELWR is being readied for operation in the near future, but
we assume that it will not operate, or at least will not provide electricity to the grid, in 2020.
Figure 5-22 show a satellite image of the experimental LWR. The small LWR, when and if it iscompleted, will not help much with the DPRK’s electricity shortages, but is intended by the
DPRK as an experimental endeavor that could lead to the production of more small reactors
around the country.575
Meanwhile, the older, nominally 5 MW electric (though probably not, in fact, electricityproducing) gas-cooled reactor has shown intermittent signs of activity in recent months, possibly
indicating that testing or low-power operations have been underway. The older reactor was, andpresumably still is, used for producing plutonium, and has been the source of plutonium for the
DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. The construction of the two large (1000 MW) reactors
being built at Sinpo under the auspices of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) on the DPRK’s east coast as a part of the provisions of the 1994 Agreed
Framework has been suspended for over 15 years (the project was terminated by KEDO’s board
in 2006).576 It is not clear at this point whether construction (which was being and would be
carried out by the ROK and/or the international community, with DPRK workers involved) couldin fact be restarted, or if the infrastructure installed at the time that construction ceased has now
degraded sufficiently that construction would essentially have to begin all over again.

573

David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini (2015), Yongbyon: A Better Insight into the Status of the 5 MWe Reactor,
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) Imagery Brief, dated April 29, 2015, and available as http://isisonline.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Yongbyon_April_29_2015_Final.pdf. A Google Earth image of the area around theexperimental LWR, available ashttps://www.google.com/maps/place/Yongbyon+Nuclear+Scientific+Research+Center/@39.7955895,125.7551529,294m/data=!
3m1!1e3!4m2!3m1!1s0x0:0x47e303bb5423c566, shows the experimental LWR, and as of May 1, 2015 seemed to have beentaken in mid-to-late April, similar to the image shown in Figure 1 of the ISIS report, with some minor differences.
574 See, for example, "North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Center: Rail Activity at the Radioisotope Production and Uranium
Enrichment Plants", dated February 14, 2020, and available as https://www.38north.org/2020/02/yongbyon021420/.
575 See David von Hippel and Peter Hayes (2010), Engaging the DPRK Enrichment and Small LWR Program: What Would It
Take?, NAPSnet Special Report, dated December 23, 2010, and available as http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-specialreports/engaging-the-dprk-enrichment-and-small-lwr-program-what-would-it-take/.
576 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI, 2011), “Geumho-Jigu Light Water Reactor Site”, last updated September 30, 2011, andavailable as https://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/768/.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 5-22: Satellite Photo of Experimental LWR (white domed building) Under
Construction at Yongbyon as of Late 2019 (Source, Google Maps)577

5.2.7. Total Power Generation, Imports, and Exports
The above assumptions as to electricity generation imply a gross output of about 13.3 terawatthours in 2000, 16.5 TWh in 2005, 17.2 TWh in 2008, 16.2 TWh in 2009, 15.7 TWh in 2010, and17.2 TWh in 2014, rising to 18.2 TWh in 2016 before falling to 15.7 TWh in 2019, and 14.0
TWh in 2020 (see Figure 5-1).
The DPRK’s electrical transmission interconnection with neighboring countries are very local innature at present, and electricity imports and exports do not contribute significantly to the
DPRK’s overall electricity balance. Power exports have been on the order of one percent the
DPRK’s total generation in recent years, totaling 222 GWh in 2014 and to an estimated 279
GWh in 2018, the last year for which such exports are reported in customs statistics.578 Exports
have, however, varied considerably on a year-to-year basis, ranging to as low as 119 GWhduring the last decade (2010 to 2020). Imports of power to the DPRK from China have also
varied on an annual basis, but also are generally in the tens of GWh, and thus about a tenth of a577 Image from Google Earth Pro, showing the Yongbyon ELWR as of October 13, 2019, apparently not operating, as

indicated by the lack of steam from the smokestack. Some stains on the dome of the reactor have appeared in recent years, but
we do not know what their significance is, if any.
578 Export electricity volumes for the DPRK-China trade are not reported in 2018 statistics on Comtrade.un.org, thus we haveestimated the volume of electricity traded based on the average price paid per MWh paid by China in 2017. As noted above, thehydro facilities on the Tumen and Yalu rivers shared by China and the DPRK have turbine sets dedicated to and operated by the
DPRK, and turbine sets dedicated to and operated by China. The two sets of turbines are operated at different frequencies. The
water resource appears, however, to be jointly managed, so that the two sets of turbines operate with the same capacity factor.

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percent or less of our estimates for DPRK total generation. Exports to the DPRK from China
were considerably higher in 2018 than previous years, at 111 GWh. We have assumed thatexports from the DPRK to China continued at the 2018 rate through 2020, and that imports into
the DPRK from China were at the average rate of 2014 through 2018 during 2019 and 2020. The
trends in DPRK exports to and imports from China are shown in Figure 5-23.
Figure 5-23: Electricity Exports from and Imports to the DPRK Based on Chinese Customs
Statistics

250

Exports
Imports

200
150

100
50
-

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

GWh Electricity Exports or Imports

300

Interestingly, trade statistics indicate that China paid the DPRK on the order of 32 to 41 USD per
MWh of power it imported during 2010 through 2017 but charged the DPRK 100 to 122 USD
per MWh it exported to the DPRK during 2010 through 2016. Presumably, this difference
reflects China’s market power relative to the DPRK, though there could be other explanations,such as a higher local cost of providing power at the location where the exports from China to
the DPRK originate. The last two years of data on electricity exports to the DPRK from China
show markedly lower prices per unit than previous years. We do not know whether to ascribe
this change to an entry error in the statistics, concessional pricing by China, or some otherexplanation.
Additional imports into the DPRK occurred from the ROK, as part of the Kaesong Industrial
Complex located just north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) from the ROK. We estimate that
ROK power exports to the DPRK were about 73 GWh in 2005, 225 GWH in 2008, 230 GWh in
2009, 290 GWh in 2010, 350 GWh in 2014, and 440 GWh in 2015, though these are only ourestimates and presumably can be specified precisely by ROK engineers involved or familiar withthe operation of the power line providing electricity to Kaesong. In the Spring of 2013, the284
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKDPRK unilaterally brought a halt to joint industrial activities at Kaesong,579 but the infrastructure
for power supply from the ROK was not affected, and was restored quickly when an agreement
between the DPRK and ROK to restart Kaesong was reached in September of that year.580 In
February 2016, in response to the DPRK’s most recent nuclear weapons test and rocket launch,
the ROK unilaterally shut down the Kaesong Industrial District “indefinitely”.581 As a result, weestimate that exports of electricity from the ROK into the DPRK were about 50 GWh in 2016,
but have been zero in the years since.
Table 5-4 summarizes our estimates and assumptions regarding electricity generation capacity byfuel or energy type, capacity factors, and generation in the DPRK from 1990 through 2020. Notethat in this table we have treated hydroelectric and thermal capacity somewhat differently interms of definitions of capacity. Reported hydroelectric capacity is reduced significantly in 1996
and 2000, and by smaller amounts after that, to account for the damage to hydro facilities doneby the floods of the early-mid 1990s. Reports as of the late 1990s indicated that flood damage
to hydro facilities was significant—for example, floodwaters were such that turbines at someplants were forced to run backwards. As such, for (especially) 1996 and 2000, there was morehydro capacity actually present at that time, but some of it was under repair and inoperable. For
thermal plants, on the other hand, the capacity shown is the total capacity that we estimate exists
of units that are or were once operable, which is somewhat different to the approach taken forhydroelectric power. By the late 2000s, we assume that most of the damage done tohydroelectric plants by the floods of the 1990s had been repaired, and from that point on we
define hydroelectric and thermal capacity essentially the same as for thermal capacity—if thecapacity exists and was at one time operable, it is counted in the capacity total. But the reader
should understand that not all of the capacity we list is actually operable, either due to damage,lack of spare parts, or inoperable transformers and other substation equipment. We use thecapacity factors listed in the table to adjust output to take into account considerations of
inoperability, as well as constraints on output due to lack of fuel or low river flows.

579 See, for example, Alexandre Mansourov (2013), “Fear Prevails Over Greed: The Kaesong Shutdown” (available as

http://38north.org/2013/05/amansourov052113/), and Curtis Melvin (2013), “Whither the Kaesong Industrial Complex?”(available as http://38north.org/2013/05/cmelvin052113/), both in 38 North, and both dated, 21 May 2013.
580 See, for example, Andrew Salmon (2013), “Inside North Korea: Could the Kaesong complex give hope for the future?”, The
Telegraph, dated 24 Dec 2013, and available as http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10535828/InsideNorth-Korea-Could-the-Kaesong-complex-give-hope-for-the-future.html.
581 See, for example, Elsie Hu (2016), “South Korea Shutting Down Joint Industrial Park In North Korea”, National PublicRadio, available as http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/10/466254605/south-korea-shutting-down-joint-industrialpark-in-north-korea. We assume that the ROK has, as a part of the Kaesong closure, cut off the power supplies from the ROK to
the Kaesong region as well.

285
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 5-4: Summary of Capacity and Generation by Generator TypeSupply Summary for Electricity Nominal (Operable and Previously Operable) Capacity (MW),
Estimated Capacity Factors, and Generation in Gigawatt-hours of Gross Generation
YEAR
CAPACITY (MW)
1990
1996
2000
2005
2008
2009
HYDRO
4,500
1,250
3,100
4,116
4,245
4,283
HFO-FIRED
200
200
270
270
270
270
DIESEL/GASOLINE FUELED*
100
161
222
COAL-FIRED
3,200
3,250
3,350
3,350
3,350
3,350
SOLAR, WIND, AND TIDAL*
NUCLEAR
TOTAL
7,900
4,700
6,720
7,836
8,025
8,125
ESTIMATED CAPACITY FACTORS (%)
HYDRO
54.0%
48.6%
38.6%
30.9%
31.8%
31.6%
HFO-FIRED
73.1%
52.0%
6.3%
7.3%
7.3%
7.3%
DIESEL/GASOLINE FUELED*
9.7%
8.3%
7.6%
COAL-FIRED
83.6%
58.3%
9.0%
17.6%
17.4%
13.8%
SOLAR, WIND, AND TIDAL*
NUCLEAR
GENERATION (GWH)
HYDRO
21,2895,322
10,474
11,146
11,826
11,866
HFO-FIRED**
1,772
1,941
897
357
629
255
DIESEL/GASOLINE FUELED*
85
116
148
COAL-FIRED**
22,93915,580
1,892
4,966
4,661
3,968
SOLAR, WIND, AND TIDAL*
NUCLEARTOTAL **
46,00022,844
13,263
16,555
17,232
16,237

2010
4,321
270
282
3,350
1
8,224
31.5%
5.8%
9.0%
11.7%
6.2%

11,907
207
223
3,368
1
15,705YEAR
CAPACITY (MW)
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
HYDRO
4,716
4,781
4,846
4,921
4,961
4,991
5,011
HFO-FIRED
270
270
70
70
70
70
70
DIESEL/GASOLINE FUELED*
805
1,105
1,272
1,370
1,383
1,393
1,395
COAL-FIRED
3,350
3,350
3,350
3,350
3,350
3,350
3,350
SOLAR, WIND, AND TIDAL*
12
21
33
48
64
80
88
NUCLEAR
TOTAL
9,152
9,527
9,570
9,758
9,828
9,884
9,914
ESTIMATED CAPACITY FACTORS (%)
HYDRO
25.6%
26.8%
27.0%
23.9%
24.1%
24.2%
24.3%
HFO-FIRED
5.1%
5.1%
18.3%
5.8%
5.8%
5.8%
5.8%
DIESEL/GASOLINE FUELED*
7.7%
8.6%
9.9%
5.3%
5.2%
5.8%
5.6%
COAL-FIRED
20.3%
17.3%
18.5%
18.0%
14.8%
14.8%
8.8%
SOLAR, WIND, AND TIDAL*
11.5%
11.3%
11.3%
11.2%
11.2%
11.2%
11.2%
NUCLEAR
GENERATION (GWH)
HYDRO
10,568
11,25011,49910,370
10,548
10,664
10,744
HFO-FIRED**
230
219
216
101
117
116
108
DIESEL/GASOLINE FUELED*
540
837
1,103
632
632
702
688
COAL-FIRED**
5,858
4,982
5,333
5,227
4,259
4,260
2,505
SOLAR, WIND, AND TIDAL*
12
20
32
47
63
79
86
NUCLEARTOTAL **
17,207
17,30918,182
16,377
15,61915,821
14,131* Some generation probably occurred in these categries prior to the first years in which they are reported, but
capacity and output for previous years have not been estimated.
** HFO-fired generation includes, and coal-fired generation excludes, generation in coal-fired units fueledwith HFO, usually (but not exclusively) as a starter fuel.

286
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKOne consideration to keep in mind when looking at time-series estimates of DPRK electricity
supply is that the changes in power supplies have not been uniform over the entire country.
Some areas, most notably in the northern part of the DPRK and rural areas, appear based both on
anecdotal information and satellite images of the DPRK lights at night (such as those shown in
Chapter 1 of this Report) to have borne more of the burden of electricity supply shortages than,for example, Pyongyang. One researcher attempted to statistically link the impact ofinternational economic sanctions on the DPRK with the distribution of lights from satellite
images and found a small impact of sanctions on the relative luminosity of lights in urban versus
rural areas, with rural areas more adversely affected.582
According to at least one report, the overall lack of power in the DPRK is recognized as a key
factor in impeding economic development. Quoting an unnamed “engineer, from North
Hamgyong province” in the context of failed negotiations on importing power from China, a
2013 Radio Free Asia article suggests that the DPRK generated only “3.6 million kilowatts per
year on average”, or about 20 percent of the “20 million kilowatts” it needs.583 It is difficult tointerpret these figures directly, since “kilowatts per year” is not a unit that makes sense. If weinterpret the statement as “3.6 average gigawatts”, implied generation is about 30 TWh, or about
twice our estimate of 2010/2014 generation. If, as seems more likely, the 3.6 GW refers tooperable capacity, then at capacity factors of about 50 percent (in the range of likely capacity
factors for the DPRK’s thermal and hydroelectric plants) the quoted capacity would be very
close to our estimate of total DPRK generation in 2014.
5.2.7.1.Electricity Transmission and Distribution
The unified electrical grid in the DPRK apparently dates to 1958.584 The DPRK T&D system
must nominally manage a fairly complex grid of 62 power plants, 58 substations, and 11 regionaltransmission and dispatching centers. A general map of the electricity transmission system in the
DPRK is provided as Figure 5-24. The main transmission lines in the DPRK are rated at 220 and
110 kV (kilovolts).
As of early 1992, the DPRK had plans to build 200 km of 220 kV power lines, 60 km of 110 kVlines, and 500 km of 66 kV lines per year through the year 2000.585 Although we do not know
the status of these construction projects, we assume that progress has not achieved targeted
levels. Also, as of 1992, the DPRK had plans to build a 330 kV transmission system, with
implementation to start within 2 years, and planned, in the long term, to build a 500 kV

582 See Martyn Williams (2015), “North Korea’s lights tell story of economic redistribution”, North Korea Tech Watch, dated

May 18, 2015, and available as http://www.northkoreatech.org/2015/05/18/north-koreas-lights-tell-story-of-economicredistribution/#more-6564.
583 Sung Hui Moon (2013, translated by Doeun Han, and written in English by Joshua Lipes), “North Korea Seeking Electricity
Supply from China”, Radio Free Asia Korean Service, dated 2013-10-21, available as
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/electricity-10212013160033.html.
584 Moiseyev, V. (1996), The Electric Energy Sector of the DPRK Paper presented at the workshop on "Security on the Korean
Peninsula," November 21, 1996, Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, sponsored by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at theMonterey Institute of International Studies (with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation).
585 Kilometers of line here probably refers to conductor-kilometers.

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transmission system. We assume that little progress has been made on either of these highervoltage systems.
Figure 5-24: Overall Map of the DPRK Electric Power Grid

There were, as of about 1990, reportedly 58 substations on the DPRK grid at the highest
transmission voltage levels586. We have capacity information about only four of these,587 andnames for others. The substations in the DPRK are reportedly antiquated—based on obsolete
Russian and Chinese technology—and also poorly maintained due largely to lack of parts andmateriel. Our assumption is that most or all of the substations would need to be replaced, or atleast substantially refurbished, to bring the North Korean grid up to modern standards.
The T&D system is nominally controlled by the Electric Power Production and Dispatching andControl Centre (EPPDCC) in Pyongyang and by 11 regional dispatching centers.

586 More recent estimates provided by experts suggest that there may be somewhat under 80 transmission substations in the

DPRK designed to operate with nominally 220 kV inputs, with perhaps another 200 transmission substations operating at the 66
kV/11 kV levels, 2500 11 kV distribution substations, and about 15,000 transformers to distribute power to consumers.
587 Capacity is supplied in units of million volt-amps (MVA).

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5.2.7.2.Technical Parameters of the T&D System, and Technical
Challenges to Integration with Systems in Other Countries
The power grid in the DPRK operates at a nominal frequency of 60 Hz (Hertz, or cycles per
second). Frequency control is poor, however, and the actual frequency on the system often
reportedly falls to 57 to 59 Hz, and sometimes as low as 54 to 55 Hz (based on reports as of1990).588 589 Our own experience in the DPRK in 1998 and 2000 showed even more radical
departures from 60 Hz; on several occasions we measured grid frequencies of 50 Hz and below.
It seems likely that these large excursions from the nominal frequency have for the most partcontinued through 2020.
Of the neighboring countries, both China and Russia have electricity systems that operate at 50
Hz, while the grid in the Republic of Korea operates at 60 Hz. This difference means that inorder to interconnect the DPRK grid with the Chinese and/or Russian grid, as has been
contemplated under the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP), it will either benecessary to convert from 60 Hz to 50 Hz or from 50 Hz to 60 Hz at the intersection of thepower grids. Interchange costs can in theory be offset, however, by reductions in required
reserve capacity in one or both interconnected systems. That is, the interconnected systems (inaggregate) need not build as many power plants, thus there is significant capital cost savings.
Although the ROK power grid operates at nominally the same frequency as the DPRK grid590 it
is virtually certain that interconnection of the grids, in their present form, will require substantial
power conditioning at the point of interconnection to assure that the power entering the ROK
meets ROK standards for frequency and other attributes, and that the load on the DPRK side is
not sufficiently unstable as to disrupt the ROK grid. The best way to achieve this outcome(short of wholesale refurbishment/replacement of the DPRK grid to ROK standards) is probably
to add a station near the DPRK/ROK border that converts the AC (alternating current) powerfrom the DPRK to DC (direct current) power, then back to AC power synchronized with the
ROK system for export to the south. This conversion process would be carried out using a seriesof solid-state devices. Power losses through these types of AC-DC-AC system are minimal,
typically much less than one percent. The cost of AC-DC-AC a system of the size that would be
required was estimated to be on the order of US $125 million per GW of capacity591 as of the late
1990s but may or may not be similar (in current dollar terms) today.592
588

The historically poor control of frequency, and frequent loss of power, on the DPRK grid has reportedly figured indetermining the efficiency of industrial equipment in an interesting way. In order to make sure that the USSR-built industrial
equipment installed in the DPRK would hold up under the prevailing conditions of poor power quality, Soviet engineers typicallyaugmented (usually older) USSR designs to make the DPRK plants extra-rugged. These more rugged plants were thus probably
more electricity-intensive, on the whole, than typical Soviet plants of the same types and vintages.
589 Our own power measurements in the DPRK in 1998 and 2000, in fact, showed a much wider range of frequency variation—with frequencies dropping at times to the 45 Hz range.
590 The fact that the power grids in the Koreas operate at a different frequency than most of the rest of continental Asia (andvirtually all of Europe) is probably a legacy of the Japanese colonial period (and possibly of US influence in the ROK). Japan
uses both 50- and 60-cycle grids (“List of Voltages & Frequencies (Hz) Around the World”, provided by Generator Source on
https://www.generatorsource.com/Voltages_and_Hz_by_Country.aspx). (Note that the Generator Source website lists the DPRK
as having a (nominal) grid frequency of 50 Hz, which is inconsistent with other sources.)
591 Order-of-magnitude cost estimate obtained in conversation (1997) with G. Jutte of Siemens Power Transmission andDistribution, Limited. Indications at that time were that per-unit costs for these systems were declining. There are a number oftechnical issues that will have to be considered when and if AC-DC-AC converters are to be used in Korea, including the line
voltage on the North Korean side, the distance over which the power must be transferred, and many others. A 2014 ETSAP
study listed the cost of converters at $230,000 million per MW of capacity, or nearly twice the estimate above, but we do notknow what sized converters were used to compute the figure given in the ETSAP study, and it is highly likely that unit costs for289
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5.2.7.3.The T&D System in 2000 and Beyond
We have assumed, based on reports of the continuing erosion of the transmission and distribution
grid, that T&D losses were 20 percent higher in 2000 through 2020 than in 1996, totaling over
27 percent of net generation. This level is quite high, but hardly unprecedented—as of 2014 theWorld Bank lists India as having T&D losses of 19 percent, and a number of other nations havehigher reported losses.593 Although “own use” at coal-fired power plants was assumed to remain
at 9 percent of gross generation, we assumed that additional “emergency losses” decreased net
output at coal-fired power plants, with overall net emergency losses totaling 9.4 percent in 2000,
and a slightly lower 9 percent in 2005 through 2020, reflecting some improvements in power
plant maintenance (or, alternatively, the abandonment of units with worse-than-average losses).
We have been told that almost all of the transformers in the major substations of the DPRK are invery poor condition, and that many of the transformers that are operating (many units are not) areworking at all because North Korean technicians have applied heroic and often inventive
measures to keep the units in service.594 It is unclear, without supplies of replacement parts (ornew transformers, which would be better) for substations, whether key equipment at substations
can continue to operate for much longer, even though the equipment is for the most part alreadywell beyond what would normally be considered its rated lifetime.

these converters fall for GW-sized installations. See International Energy Agency, Energy Technology Assistance Programme(IEA ETSAP, 2014), Electricity Transmission and Distribution, IEA ETSAP Technology Brief E12, dated April, 2014, andavailable as https://iea-etsap.org/E-TechDS/PDF/E12_el-t&d_KV_Apr2014_GSOK.pdf. Two other references more recent
also suggest that the older Siemens estimates are still reasonably accurate. The first is: Black and Veatch (2012),
Recommendations for WECC Transmission Expansion Planning [the US Western Electricity Coordinating Council], dated
October, 2012, available as https://www.wecc.org/reliability/1210_bv_wecc_transcostreport_final.pdf, and the second is a 2018
document, presumably for application in Saudi Arabia, available ashttps://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a573aade45a7c861137d973/t/5a8413409140b75ef98b4ec5/1518605140613/EE623_Assig
nment_1.pdf.
592 For example, the article “Analysing the costs of High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) transmission”, posted on ElectricalEngineering Portal, dated August 6, 2014, and available as http://electrical-engineering-portal.com/analysing-the-costs-of-highvoltage-direct-current-hvdc-transmission, gives an sample cost for converter stations on a 2000 MW HVDC line of 250 M USD.
593 World Bank (2020), “Electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of output)”, available ashttps://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS. These data are based on statistics compiled by the International Energy
Agency (IEA) as of 2018. For 2014, the World Bank list the DPRK’s T&D losses at 16 percent, the same as our estimate for predegradation conditions in 1990, though it is not clear what the basis of that figure is.
594 This is also consistent with our own personal observations of the capabilities of DPRK engineers and technicians—they are
well-trained and very capable, particularly in adapting what materials and tools are at hand to the task of keeping machines
running.

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5.3.

Electricity Demand in the DPRK
5.3.1. Electricity Balances

Table 5-5 through Table 5-12 present, respectively, estimated electricity supply/demand balances
for the DPRK for the years 2010 and 2014 through 2020. The top part of each of these tables
show the estimated sources of electricity for the DPRK (hydro, fossil, wind, solar, and otherfuels), presenting the amount of generation provided by each type of plant, and the estimatedamount of fuel or energy resource consumed in generation. The bottom part of each tableprovides our estimate of electricity use in each demand sector and subsector by end-use. Here
“Motors and Drives” means electricity used in electric motors and their mechanical or electronic
drive systems. Most industrial electricity use, and a much of electricity use in other sectors (infans, pumps, and other devices) is ultimately consumed in electric motors, so we have found it
convenient to categorize industrial end uses (mainly) with motors and drives as a key category,because most energy efficiency improvements to motor and drive systems can span industries,and sometimes other sectors. “Process Energy” is general category for electricity use in theindustrial sector that is not in motors and drives or in lighting. An example might be electrolytic
processes in the electronics or metallurgy sectors, or the use of electricity to provide process
heat. “Other End Uses” appear mostly in the residential and public/commercial sectors, andinclude, for example, electricity used in electronic equipment, cooking (because it is notseparately reported), and refrigerators and other appliances (except air conditioning andwater/space heating). The end-use divisions presented in these tables are based on our researchin the past, and thus may not be fully consistent with compilations in other countries. In
addition, the reader is urged to remember that the division of electricity consumption in the
DPRK into individual end uses is very much an exercise in applied assumptions based on
experience in other places (including, for example, China in the 1990s), as there are essentiallyno quantitative data on electricity end uses in the DPRK currently available. As such, toprefigure one of the conclusions of this report, one of the key collaborative activities that should
be undertaken, as a part of any energy sector project with the DPRK, is to undertake
energy/electricity end-use surveys. These will serve as to inform the design of and act as thebaseline for evaluation of any cooperative engagement activities undertaken in the electricity
sector.
Additionally, the reader is urged to remember that although we refer to electricity “demand”,
what we really mean here is electricity use, because in virtually all areas of the DPRK the use ofelectricity is constrained by available supplies. In its compilation of access to electricity bycountry for 2012, the World Bank estimated that less than 30 percent of North Koreans hadaccess to electricity.595 Although it is not clear exactly how World Bank researchers derived thisfigure, it is quite plausible, and it is striking to remember that virtually all North Korean
residences are, or were as of 1990, grid connected, so the World Bank’s 30 percent accessfigures is, in effect, an estimate of average electricity availability, that is, the fraction ofhouseholds that received electricity supplies.

595 World Bank (2016), “Data: Access to Electricity (% of Population), available as

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS.

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Moreover, the division between how much electricity would be consumed if supplies wereroutinely available and how much is actually consumed varies considerably from place to place.
One researcher has suggested, based on an analysis of satellite photos of lights in the DPRK, thatinternational economic sanctions on the DPRK have caused economic activity in the DPRK toshift, by one to a few percent, from rural areas to urban areas and to the centers of cities.596
These supply/demand balance tables do, however, in addition to providing first estimates ofelectricity end uses in the DPRK, offer a structure for improved end-use estimates, ideally in thecontext of collaborative survey work with DPRK (and ROK) colleagues.

596 Yong Suk Lee (2014), Countering Sanctions: The Unequal Geographic Impact of Economic Sanctions in North Korea, dated

August 26, 2014, and available as https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/519wp.pdf. We have not fully
evaluated this author’s analysis of the relationship between sanctions and luminosity, but feel that technical, as well as economic
or policy, factors may well also be strongly involved in the shift of power availability (and thus the availability of grid electricity
for lighting) away from rural areas and toward urban areas, as we have directly observed (in 1998 and 2000) and as anecdotes
from travelers to different areas of the DPRK suggest.

292
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 5-5: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2010
UNITS: GIGAWATT-HOURS (GWh)
EXCEPT AS NOTEDMOTORS AND
DRIVESPROCESSELECTRICITY

END USESSPACE ANDWATER
LIGHTINGHEATINGAIR
CONDITIONING

OTHER END
USES

ENERGY SUPPLY
Imports
Exports
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION-Electricity Generation, of which:--Coal-fired--Heavy Fuel Oil-fired--Diesel-fueled--Gasoline-fueled--LPG-fueled--Natural Gas-fired--Other Fossil-fuel-fired--Hydroelectric Power--Solar Power--Wind Power--Tidal Power--Nuclear PowerPetroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

-

-

-

-

-

-

ELECTRICITY FOR FINAL CONSUMPTIONTOTALELECTRICITY
(GWh)

TOTAL
ELECTRICITY
(TJ)

141

507

292
152

1,053
546

10,00636,023

107,71115,70656,540107,711

3,367
207
219
4
1
11,907
0.5
0.1
0.2
(41)
(885)

12,123745
788
16
2
42,864
1.8
0.3
0.7
(149)
(3,188)57,727
3,546
3,428
135
10
42,864
2
0
1
-

(665)
(4,107)(2,395)(14,785)

10,14736,530

4,955

1,449

2,469

152

129

993

10,14736,530

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

2,562.7
514.8
689.0
213.2
141.5
39.2
146.3
56.4
116.0
15.4
630.9

1,449.4

-

-

-

463.3
191.9
127.4
0.0
548.5
0.0
0.0
118.3

211.2
51.5
36.3
21.3
14.2
2.1
36.6
3.0
6.1
0.8
39.4

4,223
1,030
725
426
283
41
731
59
122
16
789

15,204
3,707
2,611
1,535
1,019
149
2,633
214
439
58
2,839

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified

1,032.7
0.0
1,032.7

-

27.2

-

-

27.2

1,087
0
1,087
-

3,913
0
3,913
-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

93.5
93.5
-

-

534.6
467.6
67.0

27.9
27.6
0.3

4.8
4.8
-

408.4
341.7
66.7

1,069
935
134

3,849
3,366
483

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

324.9
103.8
221.1

-

7.0
7.0

-

-

4.7
4.7

337
104
233

1,211
374
838

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

48.4
48.4

-

1.5
1.5

-

-

1.0
1.0

51
-

183
183

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

644.6

-

1,066.7

-

4.8
639.8

0.3
1,066.4

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

248.3

620.7

ELECTRICITY DEMAND

27.2

27.2

124.1

-

124.1

427.4

GENERATION
FUEL/ ENERGYINPUTS (TJ)

51

7,699
-

0.9
426.6

2,139
6
2,133

124.1

1,241

4,469

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21
7,678

Table 5-6: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2014
UNITS: GIGAWATT-HOURS (GWh)
EXCEPT AS NOTEDMOTORS AND
DRIVESPROCESSELECTRICITY

END USESSPACE ANDWATER
LIGHTINGHEATINGAIR
CONDITIONING

OTHER END
USES

ENERGY SUPPLY
Imports
Exports
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION-Electricity Generation, of which:--Coal-fired--Heavy Fuel Oil-fired--Diesel-fueled--Gasoline-fueled--LPG-fueled--Natural Gas-fired--Other Fossil-fuel-fired--Hydroelectric Power--Solar Power--Wind Power--Tidal Power--Nuclear PowerPetroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

-

-

-

-

-

-

ELECTRICITY FOR FINAL CONSUMPTIONTOTALELECTRICITY
(GWh)

TOTAL
ELECTRICITY
(TJ)

174

628

397
222

1,429
801

10,202

36,726150,645

17,196

61,904

150,645

5,854
230
505
35
4
10,556
10.0
1.4
0.2
(41)
(1,533)21,073
829
1,820
124
15
38,002
36.0
5.2
0.7
(146)
(5,520)100,347
3,949
7,279
957
69
38,00236
5
1-(1,115)(4,305)(4,016)(15,496)

10,37637,354

5,100

1,716

2,389

134

114

924

10,37737,356

2,836.9
491.1
711.5
638.7
111.2
27.1
131.1
56.4
87.0
12.1
570.8

1,715.6

-

-

-

441.9
0.0
574.8
100.1
491.7
0.0
0.0
107.0

239.6
49.1
37.4
63.9
11.1
1.4
32.8
3.0
4.6
0.6
35.7

4,792
982
749
1,277
222
28
656
59
92
13
714

17,252
3,536
2,696
4,599
801
103
2,360
214
330
46
2,569

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified

909.2
1.1
908.2

-

23.9

-

-

23.9

957
1
956
-

3,445
4
3,442
-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

78.9
78.9
-

-

439.6
394.3
45.3

23.5
23.2
0.2

4.0
4.0
-

333.3
288.2
45.1

879
789
91

3,165
2,839
326

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

328.4
99.0
229.4

-

7.2
7.2

-

-

4.8
4.8

341
99
241

1,226
357
869

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

45.7
45.7

-

1.4
1.4

-

-

1.0
1.0

48
-

173
173

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

679.8

-

1,124.9

-

5.1
674.7

0.3
1,124.6

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

220.8

552.0

ELECTRICITY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

23.9

23.9

110.4

-

110.4

450.8

GENERATION
FUEL/ ENERGYINPUTS (TJ)

48

8,120
-

1.0
449.8

2,255
6
2,249

110.4

1,104

3,975

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23
8,097

Table 5-7: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2015
UNITS: GIGAWATT-HOURS (GWh)
EXCEPT AS NOTEDMOTORS AND
DRIVESPROCESSELECTRICITY

END USESSPACE ANDWATER
LIGHTINGHEATINGAIR
CONDITIONING

OTHER END
USES

ENERGY SUPPLY
Imports
Exports
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION-Electricity Generation, of which:--Coal-fired--Heavy Fuel Oil-fired--Diesel-fueled--Gasoline-fueled--LPG-fueled--Natural Gas-fired--Other Fossil-fuel-fired--Hydroelectric Power--Solar Power--Wind Power--Tidal Power--Nuclear PowerPetroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

-

-

-

-

-

-

ELECTRICITY FOR FINAL CONSUMPTIONTOTALELECTRICITY
(GWh)

TOTAL
ELECTRICITY
(TJ)

365

1,314

484
119

1,741
427

10,28637,028

157,522

17,28862,238

157,522

4,981
219
727
111
0
11,230
18.5
1.7
0.2
(45)
(1,711)

17,932
790
2,616
398
2
40,428
66.6
6.2
0.7
(163)
(6,158)100,347
3,762
10,0602,844
840,428
67
6
1
-

(958)
(4,289)(3,448)(15,441)

10,651

38,342

5,311

1,637

2,475

140

119

968

10,651

38,343

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

2,807.6
434.3
713.8
593.7
111.2
27.1
131.1
56.4
87.0
12.1
640.9

1,637.2

-

-

-

390.9
0.0
534.4
100.1
491.7
0.0
0.0
120.2

233.9
43.4
37.6
59.4
11.1
1.4
32.8
3.0
4.6
0.6
40.1

4,679
869
751
1,187
222
28
656
59
92
13
801

16,844
3,127
2,705
4,275
801
103
2,360
214
330
46
2,884

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified

1,109.2
1.8
1,107.4

-

29.1

-

-

29.1

1,167
2
1,166
-

4,203
6
4,196
-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

83.7
83.7
-

-

464.3
418.3
46.0

24.9
24.6
0.2

4.3
4.3
-

351.5
305.7
45.8

929
837
92

3,343
3,012
331

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

335.8
99.1
236.6

-

7.5
7.5

-

-

5.0
5.0

348
99
249

1,254
357
897

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

41.5
41.5

-

1.3
1.3

-

-

0.9
0.9

44
-

157
157

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

703.2

-

1,163.7

-

5.2
698.0

0.3
1,163.3

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

230.2

575.5

ELECTRICITY DEMAND

29.1

29.1

115.1

-

115.1

466.3

GENERATION
FUEL/ ENERGYINPUTS (TJ)

44

8,399
-

1.0
465.3

2,333
6
2,327

115.1

1,151

4,143

295
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

23
8,376

Table 5-8: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2016
UNITS: GIGAWATT-HOURS (GWh)
EXCEPT AS NOTEDMOTORS AND
DRIVESPROCESSELECTRICITY

END USESSPACE ANDWATER
LIGHTINGHEATINGAIR
CONDITIONING

OTHER END
USES

ENERGY SUPPLY
Imports
Exports
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION-Electricity Generation, of which:--Coal-fired--Heavy Fuel Oil-fired--Diesel-fueled--Gasoline-fueled--LPG-fueled--Natural Gas-fired--Other Fossil-fuel-fired--Hydroelectric Power--Solar Power--Wind Power--Tidal Power--Nuclear PowerPetroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

-

-

-

-

-

-

ELECTRICITY FOR FINAL CONSUMPTIONTOTALELECTRICITY
(GWh)

TOTAL
ELECTRICITY
(TJ)

(82)

(295)

85
167

307
602

10,811

38,921

152,401

18,15065,340152,401

5,331
216
992
111
2
11,466
30.0
2.1
0.2
(47)
(1,836)19,192
777
3,570
400
6
41,279
108.0
7.7
0.7
(170)
(6,610)91,391
3,699
13,221
2,667
27
41,279108
81-(1,022)(4,433)(3,679)(15,960)

10,73038,626

5,222

1,692

2,545

146

124

1,002

10,73038,627

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

2,654.4
485.3
739.5
673.1
111.2
27.1
129.9
55.9
87.0
12.1
333.2

1,692.4

-

-

-

436.8
605.8
100.1
487.3
0.0
0.0
62.5

228.8
48.5
38.9
67.3
11.1
1.4
32.5
2.9
4.6
0.6
20.8

4,576
971
778
1,346
222
28
650
59
92
13
417

16,472
3,494
2,802
4,846
801
103
2,339
212
330
46
1,500

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified

1,154.9
4.8
1,150.1

-

30.3

-

-

30.3

1,215
5
1,211
-

4,375
17
4,358
-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

88.1
88.1
-

-

487.2
440.5
46.7

26.2
26.0
0.2

4.5
4.5
-

368.4
322.0
46.4

974
881
93

3,508
3,172
336

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

312.0
99.8
212.2

-

6.7
6.7

-

-

4.5
4.5

323
100
223

1,163
359
804

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

52.6
52.6

-

1.7
1.7

-

-

1.1
1.1

55
-

199
199

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

720.7

-

1,192.7

-

5.3
715.5

0.3
1,192.4

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

238.9

597.2

ELECTRICITY DEMAND

30.3

30.3

119.4

-

119.4

478.0

GENERATION
FUEL/ ENERGYINPUTS (TJ)

55

8,609
-

1.0
477.0

2,391
7
2,385

119.4

1,194

4,300

296
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

24
8,585

Table 5-9: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2017
UNITS: GIGAWATT-HOURS (GWh)
EXCEPT AS NOTEDMOTORS AND
DRIVESPROCESSELECTRICITY

END USESSPACE ANDWATER
LIGHTINGHEATINGAIR
CONDITIONING

OTHER END
USES

ENERGY SUPPLY
Imports
Exports
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION-Electricity Generation, of which:--Coal-fired--Heavy Fuel Oil-fired--Diesel-fueled--Gasoline-fueled--LPG-fueled--Natural Gas-fired--Other Fossil-fuel-fired--Hydroelectric Power--Solar Power--Wind Power--Tidal Power--Nuclear PowerPetroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

-

-

-

-

-

-

ELECTRICITY FOR FINAL CONSUMPTIONTOTALELECTRICITY
(GWh)

TOTAL
ELECTRICITY
(TJ)

(249)

(898)

20
269

72
969

10,21336,767

138,424

16,33058,789138,424

5,226
101
508
124
1
10,323
44.3
2.5
0.2
(45)
(1,021)

18,814
364
1,827
447
3
37,164
159.3
9.1
0.7
(162)
(3,675)89,592
1,735
6,768
2,982
14
37,164
159
9
1
-

(986)
(4,065)(3,551)(14,635)

9,964

35,869

4,736

1,431

2,523

145

123

1,005

9,964

35,870

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

2,333.7
438.7
721.7
460.8
111.2
27.1
123.6
50.8
79.7
11.5
308.6

1,430.9

-

-

-

394.9
0.0
414.8
100.1
463.4
0.0
0.0
57.9

198.1
43.9
38.0
46.1
11.1
1.4
30.9
2.7
4.2
0.6
19.3

3,963
877
760
922
222
28
618
53
84
12
386

14,266
3,159
2,735
3,318
801
103
2,224
192
302
44
1,388

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified

1,005.5
11.3
994.2

-

26.2

-

-

26.2

1,058
11
1,047
-

3,808
41
3,767
-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

89.2
89.2
-

-

493.5
446.1
47.4

26.5
26.3
0.2

4.5
4.5
-

373.2
326.1
47.1

987
892
95

3,553
3,212
341

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

287.8
93.8
194.0

-

6.1
6.1

-

-

4.1
4.1

298
94
204

1,073
338
735

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

55.3
55.3

-

1.7
1.7

-

-

1.2
1.2

58
-

210
210

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

726.6

-

1,202.4

-

5.3
721.3

0.3
1,202.1

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

237.8

594.6

ELECTRICITY DEMAND

26.2

26.2

118.9

-

118.9

481.8

GENERATION
FUEL/ ENERGYINPUTS (TJ)

58

8,679
-

1.0
480.8

2,411
7
2,404

118.9

1,189

4,281

297
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

24
8,655

Table 5-10: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2018
UNITS: GIGAWATT-HOURS (GWh)
EXCEPT AS NOTEDMOTORS AND
DRIVESPROCESSELECTRICITY

END USESSPACE ANDWATER
LIGHTINGHEATINGAIR
CONDITIONING

OTHER END
USES

ENERGY SUPPLY
Imports
Exports
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION-Electricity Generation, of which:--Coal-fired--Heavy Fuel Oil-fired--Diesel-fueled--Gasoline-fueled--LPG-fueled--Natural Gas-fired--Other Fossil-fuel-fired--Hydroelectric Power--Solar Power--Wind Power--Tidal Power--Nuclear PowerPetroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

-

-

-

-

-

-

ELECTRICITY FOR FINAL CONSUMPTIONTOTALELECTRICITY
(GWh)

TOTAL
ELECTRICITY
(TJ)

(168)

(605)

111
279

401
1,006

9,841

35,428

122,775

15,55656,003

122,775

4,259
117
505
127
0
10,485
59.7
2.9
0.2
(50)
(956)

15,332
421
1,820
456
1
37,746
214.9
10.5
0.7
(179)
(3,443)73,012
2,004
6,740
3,041
6
37,746
215
11
1
-

(816)
(3,893)(2,936)(14,017)

9,673

34,823

4,535

1,247

2,572

174

131

1,012

9,673

34,822

2,182.4
410.6
673.4
257.9
111.2
27.1
123.6
50.8
79.7
12.6
435.6

1,246.7

-

-

-

369.5
0.0
232.1
100.1
463.4
0.0
81.7

180.5
41.1
35.4
25.8
11.1
1.4
30.9
2.7
4.2
0.7
27.2

3,610
821
709
516
222
28
618
53
84
13
545

12,995
2,956
2,552
1,857
801
103
2,224
192
302
48
1,960

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified

965.6
14.0
951.6

-

25.0

-

-

25.0

1,016
14
1,002
-

3,656
50
3,606
-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

96.7
96.7
-

-

532.9
483.4
49.4

53.5
52.2
1.3

10.5
10.5
-

372.2
324.0
48.1

1,066
967
99

3,837
3,481
356

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

271.9
86.6
185.3

-

5.9
5.9

-

-

3.9
3.9

282
87
195

1,014
312
702

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

38.7
38.7

-

1.2
1.2

-

-

0.8
0.8

41
-

147
147

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

738.2

-

1,221.8

-

5.3
732.9

0.3
1,221.5

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

242.0

604.9

ELECTRICITY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

25.0

25.0

121.0

-

121.0

489.6

GENERATION
FUEL/ ENERGYINPUTS (TJ)

41

8,819
-

1.0
488.6

2,450
7
2,443

121.0

1,210

4,355

298
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

24
8,795

Table 5-11: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2019
UNITS: GIGAWATT-HOURS (GWh)
EXCEPT AS NOTEDMOTORS AND
DRIVESPROCESSELECTRICITY

END USESSPACE ANDWATER
LIGHTINGHEATINGAIR
CONDITIONING

OTHER END
USES

ENERGY SUPPLY
Imports
Exports
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION-Electricity Generation, of which:--Coal-fired--Heavy Fuel Oil-fired--Diesel-fueled--Gasoline-fueled--LPG-fueled--Natural Gas-fired--Other Fossil-fuel-fired--Hydroelectric Power--Solar Power--Wind Power--Tidal Power--Nuclear PowerPetroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

-

-

-

-

-

-

ELECTRICITY FOR FINAL CONSUMPTIONTOTALELECTRICITY
(GWh)

TOTAL
ELECTRICITY
(TJ)

(232)

(834)

48
279

172
1,006

9,841

35,428124,123

15,74356,674

124,123

4,260
116
576
126
0
10,586
75.1
3.3
0.2
(50)
(1,115)

15,336
418
2,074
454
1
38,109
270.2
11.9
0.7
(179)
(4,014)73,027
1,989
7,681
3,029
6
38,109
270
12
1
-

(816)
(3,921)(2,937)(14,117)

9,609

34,594

4,511

1,247

2,551

173

132

996

9,609

34,5932,182.4
410.6
673.4
257.9
111.2
27.1
123.6
50.8
79.7
12.6
435.6

1,246.7

-

-

-

369.5
0.0
232.1
100.1
463.4
0.0
81.7

180.5
41.1
35.4
25.8
11.1
1.4
30.9
2.7
4.2
0.7
27.2

3,610
821
709
516
222
28
618
53
84
13
545

12,995
2,956
2,552
1,857
801
103
2,224
192
302
48
1,960

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified

966.9
15.3
951.6

-

25.0

-

-

25.0

1,017
15
1,002
-

3,661
55
3,606
-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

91.9
91.9
-

-

508.1
459.4
48.7

50.9
49.6
1.3

10.0
10.0
-

355.4
307.9
47.4

1,016
919
97

3,659
3,308
351

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

248.9
86.6
162.2

-

5.1
5.1

-

-

3.4
3.4

257
87
171

927
312
615

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

38.7
38.7

-

1.2
1.2

-

-

0.8
0.8

41
-

147
147

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

738.2

-

1,221.8

-

5.3
732.9

0.3
1,221.5

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

243.7

609.3

ELECTRICITY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

25.0

25.0

121.9

-

121.9

489.6

GENERATION
FUEL/ ENERGYINPUTS (TJ)

41

8,819
-

1.0
488.6

2,450
7
2,443

121.9

1,219

4,387

299
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

24
8,795

Table 5-12: Estimated Electricity Supply/Demand Balance for the DPRK, 2020
UNITS: GIGAWATT-HOURS (GWh)
EXCEPT AS NOTEDMOTORS AND
DRIVESPROCESSELECTRICITY

END USESSPACE ANDWATER
LIGHTINGHEATINGAIR
CONDITIONING

OTHER END
USES

ENERGY SUPPLY
Imports
Exports
ENERGY TRANSFORMATION-Electricity Generation, of which:--Coal-fired--Heavy Fuel Oil-fired--Diesel-fueled--Gasoline-fueled--LPG-fueled--Natural Gas-fired--Other Fossil-fuel-fired--Hydroelectric Power--Solar Power--Wind Power--Tidal Power--Nuclear PowerPetroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLosses

-

-

-

-

-

-

ELECTRICITY FOR FINAL CONSUMPTIONELECTRICITY DEMAND
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

TOTAL
ELECTRICITY
(GWh)

TOTAL
ELECTRICITY
(TJ)

(232)

(834)

48
279

172
1,006

9,124

32,846

94,384

14,04550,56094,384

2,505
108
525
163
0
10,657
82.7
3.5
0.2
(52)
(829)

9,018
388
1,891
585
1
38,366
297.9
12.5
0.7
(188)
(2,985)42,949
1,850
7,002
3,900
6
38,366
298
13
1
-

(499)
(3,540)(1,796)(12,745)

8,892

32,012

3,963

936

2,552

177

105

1,160

8,893

32,013

1,750.9
350.2
534.1
128.9
80.9
21.7
93.3
39.5
58.0
8.8
435.6

935.6

-

-

-

315.2
0.0
116.1
72.8
349.9
0.0
0.0
81.7

141.4
35.0
28.1
12.9
8.1
1.1
23.3
2.1
3.1
0.5
27.2

2,828
700
562
258
162
23
467
42
61
9
545

10,180
2,521
2,024
928
582
82
1,679
150
220
33
1,960

25.0

-

-

25.0

1,018
16
1,002
-

3,663
57
3,606
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified

967.5
15.9
951.6

-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

161.0
161.0
-

-

889.7
805.0
84.8

89.2
86.9
2.2

17.5
17.5
-

622.1
539.6
82.5

1,779
1,610
170

6,406
5,796
610

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

240.5
86.6
153.9

-

4.9
4.9

-

-

3.2
3.2

249
87
162

895
312
583

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

34.9
34.9

-

1.1
1.1

-

-

0.7
0.7

37
-

132
132

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

632.9

-

1,050.7

-

2.6
630.3

0.2
1,050.5

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

175.6

439.0

25.0

25.0

87.8

-

87.8

420.7

GENERATION
FUEL/ ENERGYINPUTS (TJ)

37

7,575
-

0.5
420.2

2,104
3
2,101

87.8

878

3,161

300
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

12
7,564

5.3.2. Residential and Commercial/Institutional Sectors
The residential and commercial/institutional (or public/commercial) sectors in the DPRK
consume a smaller fraction of national energy use than in most nations. Use of electricity, and, infact, all non-biomass energy by the residential and commercial/institutional sectors has fallen
substantially since 1990, as the availability of electricity and non-biomass fuels (and, eventually,
biomass fuels as well) have declined. By our estimates, however, electricity use in these sectors
has grown somewhat in many recent years, relative to the 2000s, with the exception of COVIDafflicted 2020. Below we outline the major assumptions underlying in our estimates ofelectricity use in the two sectors, present our 2020 and earlier results, describe key energy sector
technologies in the sectors, outline what we see as the key energy sector needs, and describe theresults of the analysis of a (non-comprehensive) set of electrical energy efficiency technologies
for the two sectors.
5.3.2.1.Residential Sector Data and Assumptions
Our estimate of energy use in the residential sector begins with the assumption that 60 percent of
the approximately 22 million people in the DPRK as of 1990 (excluding the 1.2 million persons
then in active units of the military) lived in urban areas,597 and that the average number of
persons per household in both urban and rural households was 4.65 in 1990.598 We assumed
population growth averaging a small 0.08 percent annually through 2000599. From the year 2000
through 2020, with some reservations, we assumed, based on DPRK Census and other data, thatthe DPRK population increased at an average rate of 1.02 percent annually from 2000 through2008, 0.536 percent per year from 2008 through 2010,600 0.500 percent per year after 2010
through 2014,601 and 0.39 percent per year from 2014 through 2020, and that a small net rural-tourban migration continued, with the national fraction of urban households rising to 61.3 percent

597Document in authors' files [HT1].
598 This figure is an extrapolation from a single area (the Ongjin area) in southern DPRK (Document in authors' files [FC1]).

Although it may not be an accurate weighted average figure for the country as a whole, it is probably fairly close, based on theauthors’ own observations in the Western DPRK village of Unhari in 1998.
599 The US Central Intelligence Agency ("Korea, North", CIA Factbook, 2001 (World Wide Web Version), USCIA, Washington,
D.C., USA, 2001, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kn.html) lists a 2001 estimated growth rate of 1.22 %/yr
and a total population of just under 22 million. The USDOE Energy Information Administration listed a year 2000 population of
21.7 million in its North Korea Country Analysis Brief (www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/nkorea.html, visited 5/2002). A file of"DPRK Energy Data" provided to Nautilus by the Korea Energy Economics Institute (KEEI, 2002) suggests a year-2000
population of 22.175 million and a growth rate of 0.4 percent annually (with the growth rate decreasing substantially between
1990 and 2000) but uses a year-1990 base population of 20.221 million for the DPRK. While recognizing the extreme difficultyin estimating DPRK population, we continue to assume that year 1990 population was 22 million (as official estimates suggest)
and adopt the figure provided by KEEI as the year 2000 population. This implies a very modest net total increase in population
over the decade, which is certainly consistent with food shortages and anecdotal but fairly widespread evidence of lack of proper
food rations, as well as medical care, for the DPRK populace, offsetting the impacts of a national government program toincrease the population.
600 The 2008 Census document lists total births in the 12 months prior to the census as 345,630 (Table 16), and total deaths in thesame period as 216,616. These figures imply a rate of population increase as of 2008 of 0.536% annually.
601 A compilation of DPRK statistics by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), formerly available as
http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/statistics/tags/dprkorea, estimates population growth at a slightly lower 0.50%
annually as of 2014. We use this value as the estimated growth rate for population between 2010 and 2014, and adopt a slightly
lower growth rate through 2020 based on the growth rate implied by population data from the United Nations for 2014 through2020 (downloaded 1/28/2020 from https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/), which is also consistent withtrends in population in the region in general.

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of the total by 2020.602 By 2020, our estimate is that total DPRK population was 25.4 million,
with about 4.4 million urban households and 2.8 million rural households.
That said, our reservations about using these population projections are as follows. The growthrate shown is calibrated to yield the 2008 total population reported in the landmark 2008 DPRK
Census (D P R Korea 2008 Population Census National Report603) prepared under United
Nations supervision. This document was welcomed as the first systematic census to be carriedout on the DPRK in many years and is generally accepted by demographers as a useful picture oflife in the DPRK, especially as no demonstrably superior estimate is available. Several
researchers, however, have expressed doubts, privately and in some cases publicly, as to whether
the 2008 population of the DPRK was likely, in fact, to be as high as the 24.05 million reported
in the Census document. Inconsistencies have been noted between the size and age compositionof the population reported in the 2008 Census and what had been known or imputed about
population trends since 1990 in the DPRK. As of yet, however, neither we nor any other public
documents we have seen have offered a definitive alternative estimate of 2008 population, so weadopt it for the estimated described here. We remain wary, however, of the fact that the 2008
population estimate that we are using could be overstated, perhaps by as much as 20 percent.
For the urban subsector, we assumed, based on the observations of recent visitors to the DPRK
(including the authors), that the average urban household lives in a multi-story building in anapartment of approximately 50 square meters.604 We further assumed an average electricity useof about 770 kWh per household (HH)-year in 1990. This is about 2.4 times the average
household use of electricity in South Korea in 1975,605 but is roughly consistent with a householdusing several electric lights, a small refrigerator (if used), a few small appliances, and ahousehold’s share of common electricity use (pumps, lighting) in common areas of multi-family
buildings.
For urban sector cooking, we assumed that in 1990 petroleum-based cooking fuels (liquefied
petroleum gas, or LPG, and kerosene) were used exclusively in Pyongyang, but were not used
extensively elsewhere, where coal dominated.606 For rural households, we estimated that in1990 50 percent of rural households used coal for heating and cooking, 2 percent used LPG for
cooking (a guess on our part), and that the rest used wood or biomass fuels. As of 1990, very
little electricity was used for cooking or heating in either residential sector, as cooking was
mainly fuels-based, and heating used fuels or district heat provided by a central plant or was
accomplished using boilers housed in the utility rooms of apartment buildings or complexes.

602 Though some observers of the DPRK report a significant urban to rural migration, others suggest that the migration is largely

seasonal with urban dwellers going to rural areas during the agricultural season and returning to cities at other times of the year.
Depending on how “urban” is defined in allocating the DPRK’s population, the fraction of the population living in urban areas
may be close to 65 percent, though observers suggest that in recent years there has been a “ruralization” of urban life, with many
nominally urban dwellers making their living (or much of it) from farming or raising livestock. The recent reported surge inurban dwellers going to ports to help to process an exceptional squid and cuttlefish harvest can be thought of as one manifestationof this “ruralization”—essentially, DPRK residents taking advantage of opportunities to make a living as they are presented.
603 D P R Korea 2008 Population Census National Report, Central Bureau of Statistics, Pyongyang, DPR Korea, 2009, available
as https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/wphc/North_Korea/Final%20national%20census%20report.pdf,
604 This size dwelling would be roughly consistent with conditions in parts of China (Liu, F. (1993), Energy and Conservation in
China's Residential and Commercial Sectors: Patterns, Problems, and Prospects. Energy Analysis Program, Energy andEnvironmental Division, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA.LBL-33867 UC-350.
605Kim, E.-W., H. Kim, H.-K. Lim, C. Nahm, M.-C. Shin, and Y. Kim (1983), The Electric Future of Korea. Resource Systems
Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. Research Materials RM-83-8.
606 Document from authors' files.

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1990 Electricity use in rural households was assumed to be less, on average, than in urbanhouseholds, namely 512 kWh per HH-year.
Between 1990 and 2020, through a combination of austerity and fuel unavailability, ourassumption, based on our own discussions with DPRK residents, our observations while in the
DPRK, and on the experiences of other visitors to the DPRK that we have spoken with, as wellas our analytical results, is that that residential end-uses of electricity, as well as (though to asomewhat lesser extent) coal, and oil products, declined substantially, particularly before 1996,
while the number of households using wood or biomass fuels (though typically in substitution forcoal for heating and cooking) rose, though the use per household did not rise much (due torestricted supplies). The fraction of urban households using district heat is assumed to havedecreased slightly over time since 2000, essentially because the number of households has grown
but we assume that the deployment of district heating systems has not. The use of district heatper connected household is assumed to parallel the use of electricity, since the two are either coproduced or depend on the same sorts of central power plant/central heating plant fuels andinfrastructure, and thus would be subject to the same sorts of constraints, on average.
Lacking the data to make well-informed estimates, we have assumed that the fractions ofelectricity used in the residential subsectors by end use have not changed radically over time.
Some shifts are likely—for example, the hours of residential electronics use may be up (whenpower supplies are available), though increased usage is probably offset by the use of newer,
more energy efficient electronics imported from China. Similarly, there has likely been an
improvement in lighting efficiency with the (mainly) import of compact fluorescent bulbs which
were, when we visited the DPRK in 2009, beginning to overtake the use of inefficientincandescent bulbs, and the deployment of imported LED bulbs since, particularly in
combination with the use of small household solar PV panels.
5.3.2.2.Residential Sector Results
Overall DPRK Residential electricity use fell dramatically, by our estimates, between 1990 and2000 (Figure 5-25), due to a lack of electricity availability caused by a combination of limited
fuel supplies for thermal generation and difficulties with hydroelectric output caused by the
impacts of floods. In the late 2000s, electricity generation, and residential electricity use,
rebounded somewhat, but urban and, especially, rural electricity use fell again between 2010 and2014 due to the impacts of drought conditions on hydro output, before rising slightly through2018, and then rising significantly in 2020 due to assumed A) to increased home-based activities
due to restrictions on movement to comply with COVID-19 quarantine policies, and B) increased
availability of electricity because other large users of power—industries and big institutions, forexample—were substantially shut down for a period.

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Figure 5-25: Residential Electricity Use by Subsector

Estimated DPRK Residential Electricity Use by Subsector,
1990 through 2020

3,500

Gigawatt-hours

3,000
2,500

Rural

2,000

Urban

1,500
1,000
500
1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Figure 5-26 shows 2010 and 2014 through 2020 residential electricity use by subsector (urban
and rural) and by estimated end use. Clear from a comparison of the two figures is the decline inelectricity use—a function of the decline in availability of electricity—in both subsectors from2010 to 2014, but particularly in the rural subsector, followed by modest growth in most years
thereafter, due in part to more access to electricity from solar PV panels and electric generators.
The year 2020, as noted above, is estimated to be an outlier due to the extraordinary conditions
COVID-19 has visited on the DPRK (and the rest of the world as well). Our estimate is that
average 2010 electricity use per household in 2010 was about 252 kWh for urban households,
and 56 kWh for rural households, and corresponding figures for 2014 were 199 kWh perannually per urban household, and 36 kWh per year in rural households, the latter the equivalentof just one 40-Watt incandescent bulb (which still, as of 2009, were common, although not thedominant sources of light, even in Pyongyang) burning for 2 to three hours per day. By 2018,
our estimate of electricity use per urban household rises to 238 kWh annually, although rural use
remains at about 37 kWh. Use of electricity in 2020 per household is projected to be notably
higher, for the reasons mentioned above at 368 and 61 kWh for urban and rural dwellings,
respectively. We should emphasize, however, that actual consumption will vary widely fromhousehold to household and, particularly, from place to place, as some places (most notably,
Pyongyang, and places near operating power plants and critical facilities) have and have had far
more frequently-available electricity supplies than others (such as rural or otherwise remotelocations, such as the DPRK’s Northeast). Many locations, particularly in rural areas, probably
get no electricity at all in some years, even if their grid connection remains intact. In Figure304
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5-26, “motors and drives” pertains to electricity that is used mainly in motor and drive systems inurban residential buildings, which in the urban sector would likely be pumps, fans, and in a few
cases, elevators. “Other end uses” include consumer electronics such as radios, televisions andDVD players, and chargers for tablets or cell phones (for example). In general, urban electricity
use dominates rural use, and electricity use in both sectors was estimated to be lower, due toreduced availability, in 2014 than in 2010, and in 2019 relative to 2018.
Figure 5-26: Residential Electricity Use by End Use and Subsector

Estimated Residential Electricity Use by End Use and Subsector, 2010
and 2014 through 2020
1,800
1,600

Gigawatt-hours

1,400
1,200
1,000

Other End Uses

Air Conditioning

Space and Water Heating

Lighting

Motors and Drives

800

600
400

200
-

5.3.2.3.Commercial/Institutional Sector Data, Assumptions, and Results
We have essentially no direct data on the use of electricity (or other fuels) in public andcommercial buildings (which we define to include institutional buildings such as nurseries,
schools, and hospitals) in the DPRK. To provide an approximate estimate of these quantities, westarted with our estimate of urban residential floor space, and applied the ratio of residential
urban floor space to public and commercial floor space (approximately 0.3) that prevailed in the“heating zone” of China as of 1989.607 To estimate electricity use, we assumed an annual
electricity use intensity of 33 kWh/m2, derived from Chinese data (but about 10 percent higher toaccount for cooler average temperatures), and applied it to our public/commercial floor spaceestimate. In order to bring the sum of electricity demand for 1990 in the agricultural,public/commercial, and military sectors up toward (but not quite to) the approximately 25
607Liu, F. (1993), Energy and Conservation in China's Residential and Commercial Sectors: Patterns, Problems, and Prospects.

Energy Analysis Program, Energy and Environmental Division, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, California, USA.LBL33867 UC-350.

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percent share of total electricity demand that these sectors reportedly accounted for, we included
an additional placeholder value of 7 million GJ/year for other uses of electricity in the
public/commercial sector. We assumed that 15 percent of public/commercial floorspace in 1990
was heated using district heating systems, and that public and commercial sector buildings usedwood and biomass fuels in 1990 in an amount equal to 5 percent of their use of coal (on anenergy-content basis). We assumed that oil use in the public/commercial sector was modest in
1990, at 0.3 percent of coal use, with 90 percent of oil use in the sector in 1990 being kerosene,
and the rest LPG.
Over the period between 1990 and 2020, we assumed that total floor space per unit residential
floor space declined somewhat from 1990 levels, as construction of public and commercial
buildings received a lower priority for scarce resources, and that electricity (and coal and heat)consumption per unit floor space decreased significantly, particularly between 1990 and 1996,
and 1996 and 2000.608 We assumed a fraction of electricity use relative to 1990 in the year
2000—about 29 percent—that is a function of the same assumed average urban electricity outage
rate used for the residential sector, namely that power outages in cities outside the Pyongyang
area as of 2000 were by far the rule rather than the exception.
Figure 5-27 and Figure 5-28 chart the trends in electricity use, including by end use (for 2010
and 2014 through 2020), in the commercial and institutional sector in the DPRK. Key trends
here, as described above, are the overall reduced use of electricity after 1990, generally tracking
energy use in the residential sector as well as electricity availability, and rising slowly from 2014
through 2019 as the economy slowly improved. Electricity use in the sector is projected to havefallen relatively dramatically in 2020 because of COVID-19 restrictions (again, as in most otherplaces in the world), shuttering shops and offices. As in the residential sector, one would expectthat the commercial/institutional sector electricity demand in the DPRK will increase
substantially if and when sufficient supplies are available, which makes the application ofbuilding energy efficiency measures in the sector a huge priority for any assistance activities inthe sector. The estimated pattern of electricity use by end use for the public and commercial
sector in Figure 5-28 show lighting as the dominant end-use in the commercial/public sector,
mainly because most space and water heating (which is reportedly used sparingly in many
commercial, public and institutional buildings) is by district heat (fired by coal) or via coalboilers, and air conditioning is relatively rare, though perhaps on the rise in some buildings in
Pyongyang. Other end uses, including office machines and other devices, are estimated to use
the most electricity in the sector after lighting.

608

At least one recent account suggests that there has been a significant amount of new construction and newcommercial activity in Pyongyang in recent years, though little evidence of such activity in other parts of the DPRK
that the visitor (Stephanie T. Kleine-Ahlbrandt of the International Crisis Group) went to. Adam Taylor (2012),“These Pictures Offer A Rare Glimpse Into North Korea's Changing World”, Business Insider, dated July 22, 2012,
and available as http://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-photos-provide-a-glimpse-into-a-changing-world2012-7?op=1.

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Figure 5-27: DPRK Public/Commercial Electricity Use

3,500

Estimated DPRK Public/Commercial Electricity Use, 1990
through 2020

3,000

Gigawatt-hours

2,500

2,000
1,500
1,000
500
-

1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Figure 5-28: Public/Commercial Electricity Use by End Use

Estimated Public/Commercial Electricity Use by End Use, 2010 and2014 through 2020
Other End Uses
Space and Water Heating
Motors and Drives

1,400

Air Conditioning
Lighting

Gigawatt-hours

1,200

1,000
800
600
400

200
2010

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

5.3.3. Industrial Sector
The industrial sector in the DPRK consisted, as of 1990, of a variety of energy-intensive heavy
industries and a number of light industries. Since that time, many of the DPRK’s industrial
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facilities have been idled, or are operating at low capacity factors, due to a lack of fuel,electricity, spare parts, raw materials, markets for output, or (likely, in many cases) a
combination of the above. Some new industrial facilities have been commissioned in the DPRK
since 1990, sometimes, perhaps mostly, as joint ventures with foreign firms, but the majority of
the DPRK industrial sector continues to suffer from low output, particularly in the traditional
heavy industries, with the major exceptions being where Chinese firms have invested to produce,for example, mineral products for export to China. Exports of raw materials to China, rather
than goods in the DPRK processed, are the norm, with a significant exception being the export offinished clothing to China, an industry that has matured since 2010 and typically involves theimport of cut cloth and other imports from China, and the export of clothing sewn by DPRK
workers by to China. In some of the years before UNSC sanctions restrictions took hold, tradeson the order of a billion dollars of exports and imports in the clothing customs categories werereported between the countries, with the DPRK’s net income from the transaction looking muchsmaller than the gross trade flows—perhaps on the order of $100 million annually, though thatsum still represents significant income for the DPRK. Below we outline the major assumptions
underlying in our estimates of 2020 and earlier electricity use in the industrial sector, and present
our results.
5.3.3.1.Industrial Sector Assumptions and Inputs
To estimate energy use in the industrial sector, our basic approach has been to gather all of thedata on the physical output of specific industrial products, as of 1990, that we could for the majorindustrial subsectors of the DPRK, and multiply those physical output figures by per-unit energy
intensities obtained mostly from studies of Chinese industries.609 In a very few cases, we
obtained and used anecdotal figures for energy intensities of key industrial plants in the DPRK,
and in a few other cases we were able to use historical energy intensities from the Soviet Union
as provided by a colleague in Russia.610
It has been estimated that 60 percent of the industrial infrastructure in the DPRK was developedwith substantial technical assistance from the former Soviet Union. As such, for many subsectors
we realize that it would have been more appropriate to use energy intensity factors from the
USSR experience than to use Chinese factors, but we have not had access to sufficient energy
intensity data from the USSR to allow us to do so. Happily, our experience thus far has been thatindustrial energy intensities in the USSR and in China as of 1990 were often not terribly
different.
We have made the general assumption that, as of 1990, industries in the DPRK are at least 10
percent more energy intensive than those in China whenever Chinese energy intensities wereused, and 15 percent more energy intensive than USSR where Soviet energy intensities were609 An alternative approach would have been to obtain output figures expressed in monetary terms and use energy intensities perunit financial output. Unfortunately, the command-and-control nature of the DPRK economy (particularly in the 1990s), coupledwith the fixed and essentially arbitrary exchange rates of the DPRK currency with hard currencies such as the dollar, make thisapproach unusable for most subsectors. Because of the lack of true markets in DPRK (until recently, and even now limited toonly selected classes of domestic goods, including some foods, although many manufactured goods imported from China are soldin unofficial markets), the prices of goods have no particular relation to the actual value that the goods would have in a market
economy (even a partial market economy like China's), thus cross-national comparisons of per-monetary-unit intensities arehighly problematic for use in the DPRK case.
610 Data for energy intensities in several industrial subsectors was provided to us by Dr. V. Kalashnikov (personalcorrespondence, September 1997).

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used. Although these estimates are rough, we believe that they are appropriate given (among
other reasons) A) the testimony of travelers to DPRK about the generally poor condition of
North Korean industrial facilities; B) the vintage of most industrial plants in the DPRK (fewwere built more recently than the 1970s, and some are leftovers from the Japanese occupation of
the 1930s and 1940s); C) the low quality of much of the DPRK’s coal, which contributes to poor
combustion efficiencies; and D) reports of how Soviet industrial designs were “beefed up”(reinforced) to allow equipment to stand up under difficult conditions in the DPRK.
Key estimates of our assumptions as to the evolution of industrial output over time relative to1990 output are provided in Table 5-13, and described below.
Table 5-13: Estimates of Output in DPRK Industrial Subsectors Relative to 1990

Subsector
Iron and Steel
Cement---- fraction of heat from heavy oil
Fertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-Specified Industry--non-oil fuels
Non-Specified Industry--diesel oil
Non-Specified Industry--heavy oil

Iron and Steel
Cement---- fraction of heat from heavy oil
Fertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-Specified Industry--non-oil fuels
Non-Specified Industry--diesel oil
Non-Specified Industry--heavy oil

1996
Production
Relative to
1990

2000
Production
Relative to
1990

2005
Production
Relative to
1990

2008
Production
Relative to
1990

2009
Production
Relative to
1990

2010
Production
Relative to
1990

2014
Production
Relative to
1990

35%
40%
10%
25%
30%
30%
30%
30%
30%
30%
33%
20%
30%

18%
30%
27%
8%
18%
18%
18%
30%
18%
30%
17%
18%
36%

15%
32%
13%
11%
18%
18%
60%
50%
20%
30%
15%
20%
28%

15%
40%
10%
11%
17%
17%
62%
52%
20%
30%
15%
12%
28%

21%
56%
3%
7%
15%
15%
61%
50%
17%
30%
11%
14%
25%

21%
57%
5%
7%
14%
15%
58%
50%
16%
28%
11%
15%
29%

20%
61%
5%
23%
11%
10%
52%
50%
12%
22%
8%
10%
28%

2015
Production
Relative to
1990

2016
Production
Relative to
1990

2017
Production
Relative to
1990

2018
Production
Relative to
1990

2019
Production
Relative to
1990

2020
Production
Relative to
1990

18.0%
60.9%
8.0%
21.0%
11.0%
10.0%
52.0%
50.0%
12.0%
22.0%
8.0%
12.5%
23.0%

20.3%
64.3%
8.7%
24.0%
11.0%
10.0%
52.0%
50.0%
12.0%
22.0%
8.0%
14.0%
23.0%

18.2%
62.2%
4.1%
16.3%
11.0%
10.0%
49.0%
45.0%
11.0%
21.0%
8.5%
7.0%
14.8%

17.0%
58.0%
4.9%
9.1%
11.0%
10.0%
49.0%
45.0%
11.0%
23.0%
12.0%
7.0%
15.2%

17.0%
58.0%
4.9%
9.1%
11.0%
10.0%
49.0%
45.0%
11.0%
23.0%
12.0%
7.0%
15.2%

14.5%
46.0%
8.5%
4.6%
8.0%
8.0%
37.0%
35.0%
8.0%
16.0%
12.0%
7.0%
18.0%

In the industrial sector, we assumed that year 2000 industrial output was 18 percent of 1990
levels in all subsectors except cement (30 percent), fertilizers (7.5 percent), and non-specified
industries (17 percent).611 The building materials and “other minerals” sectors were assumed to
611 WWW.koreascope.com (no longer available as of 2021) in "Production of Major Industrial Items and World Ranking" (visited

6/3/02), listed the ROK production of steel in 1999 as 41 million tonnes. In "Economic and Social Comparison between the Two

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have the same relative output as the cement sector612. We assumed, based on reports (and ourown observations) of eroding industrial facilities, plus the probable impact of poor coal, oil, andelectricity on industrial machinery, that the average energy intensity of industrial production was
115 percent of 1990 levels, up from our assumed 110 percent of 1990 levels in 1996. For 2005,
we assumed that iron and steel production in the DPRK continued to decline (to 0.87 million
tonnes, or under 15 percent of its 1990 level), remaining at that level through 2009 before
increasing slightly in 2010 to accommodate increased exports of iron and steel to China. For
2014, we assumed that iron and steel production remained close to the levels of the recent past,at about 20 percent of 1990 levels, falling to about 17 percent of 1990 levels by 2019 due to theimpacts of UNSC export sanctions, and still further in 2020 due to a reduction in industrial
activity due to COVID-19 restrictions.613 Figure 5-29 shows an image of what appears to be theSongnim-Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex, along the Taedong River, as of late 2019.614
Koreas", on the same WWW site, the ROK's steel production is listed as being 33 times that of the DPRK, implying an annual
production of about 1.24 million tonnes. This figure, about 25 percent of 1990 production levels, seems plausible (thoughpossibly high). A figure that is probably from the same ultimate source, the Korea Iron & Steel Association, suggests a value of
1.086 million tonnes in 2000 along with 1.208 million tonnes in 1996, and 1.168 million tonnes in 2005. It is unclear how thesefigures were derived. Based on consideration of existing estimates, observations of the overall DPRK economy, we adopt theestimate of 1.08 million tonnes in 2000. The www.koreascope.com source, in the "Economic and Social…" page, lists a DPRK
cement production of 4.1 million tonnes, or about 41 percent of year 1990 production, in 1999, which seems plausible. Data thatare probably from the same ultimate source, the Korean National Statistical Office and the Korea Cement Industrial Association,suggest that year 2000 cement output was 4.6 million tonnes, and output in 1996 was 3.79 million tonnes. It is unclear how thesenumbers were derived, and though one would expect the cement industry to decline somewhat less than other industries, as it
is/was not largely an export industry, the observed lack of recent construction activity in the DPRK would suggest that the levelof 1996 to 2000 increase that the latter source shows is not what one would expect. We assume cement output of 3.3 million
tonnes in 2000, and www.nis.go.kr/english/democratic/industry07.html, dated 2001, by the ROK National Intelligence Service,suggested (the site is no longer active) that supplies of fertilizer at the time covered only 40 percent of fertilizer needs in the
DPRK. Causes and Lessons of the "North Korean Food Crisis", by Tony Boys of Ibaraki Christian University Junior College(2000), lists total fertilizer supply in the DPRK in 1999 of 200 ktonnes of "NPK", of which 32% was produced domestically,
10% imported, and the remainder provided in aid. This would imply that about 11% of 1990 levels of fertilizer production wereachieved in 1999.
As an alternative source, the presentation "Agriculture and Fertilizer Situation in DPR Korea", by R.V.
Misra, formerly available as http://www.fertilizer.org/ifa/publicat/PDF/2006_crossroads_misra_slides.pdf (from the International
Fertilizer Industry Association), presented as part of the "IFA Crossroads ASIA-PACIFIC 2006 Conference 'Growing markets,
nurturing success'", Chiangmai, Thailand, 13-16 November 2006, suggested that1999 production of fertilizer in the DPRK was
63 thousand tonnes (of nitrogen), which is roughly consistent with the level suggested in the article by Tony Boys that is quoted
above. Assuming this figure is correct, we adopt Misra's 2000 fertilizer production figure of 37.5 thousand tonnes of nitrogen.
612 With the exception of "Other Minerals" and "Building Materials", we assume that the level of activity in other industries
relative to 1990 in the year 2000 were approximately the same as in the iron and steel sector. The building materials and otherminerals subsectors are assumed to have activities relative to 1990 that are similar to the cement industry. The other minerals
subsector includes magnesite (or, when processed like lime for cement, magnesia), which is a valuable export product. An
industry source indicates that an 8000 tonne shipment of magnesia (although it may have been magnesite) arrived in Europe inearly 2001. Japan imported $3.5 million worth of magnesia in the first half of 2000 (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency
data from http://www.kotra.or.kr/main/common_bbs, visited 6/3/02, "Trade Tendencies of the Major Countries"), which, if
annualized and assuming a sales price of $US 100 to $200 per tonne (within the range suggested in Queensland Department ofMinerals and Energy Mineral Information Leaflet No 5: MAGNESITE, dated January 1998, suggests exports of 35 to 70 thousand
tonnes to Japan alone, which in turn suggests relatively active production of the mineral. On our trip to the DPRK in October of2000 we saw working brick or tile production facilities; these were some of the very few active industrial facilities we saw during
our time in the DPRK.
613 Quoting the Bank of Korea, the Website "Trading Economics" (https://tradingeconomics.com/north-korea/steel-production)offers the following figures for DPRK steel production over the years (thousand tonnes): Web page "North Korea Steel
Production". In all probability, these figures are rough estimates, but we use them as figures of merit to scale energy use in the
DPRK iron and steel industry. Figures for 2018 and 2019 were not available from this source as of 2/2020.
614 This Google Earth Pro image of a factory, along the Taedong River between Nampo and Pyongyang, is possibly of theSongnim-Hwanghae Iron and Steel Complex. The image was taken in November 2019. Coordinates are approximately 38.737,
125.634. An active smokestack is visible in the upper part of the image, along with a coal port and coal storage, and storage ofwhat appears to be iron and/or steel products is the lower part of the image, near the river. Other images of this complex, goingback several years in time, do not appear to show active smokestacks, suggesting that the plant is often idle.

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Figure 5-30 shows a location about 1.5 km up the river (Northwest) from the image in Figure5-29 that is probably a part of the same complex, on the same day in 2019. The close-up image
shows a new building with a brown roof, built between early 2018 and 2019, next to a set of fourtall smokestacks that were once a set of six. The site has been otherwise refurbished as wellduring that time period. Earlier images available on Google Earth Pro show those smokestacks
not operating except in 2002, which one of the (then six) is operating. Although of course highly
anecdotal, this observation supports that the assumption of a low capacity factor for DPRK ironand steel production over the last two decades is probably justified, but indicates that the DPRK
is, in some instances, upgrading industrial sites, although it is difficult to say whether in this casethe upgrade is designed for a resumption of iron and steel production or to allow the site to be
used for another purpose.
Figure 5-29: DPRK Iron and Steel Complex Near Songnim

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Figure 5-30: Close-up of New Buildings at DPRK Iron and Steel Complex Near Songnim615

Cement production is assumed to have increased slightly (with the overall increase in economic
activity) to 32 percent of 1990 levels by 2005, rising to about 56 percent (6.1 million tonnes) in
2009, 57 percent in 2010, and 61 percent in 2014, and 64 percent in 2015, before falling to 58
percent in 2018 and 2019, and to an assumed 46 percent in 2020, due to production restrictions
and reduced demand (due to reduced construction activity) related to COVID-19. For 2009-on,
we use cement production figures provided on the website "Trading Economics", which quotes
the Bank of Korea.616 In all probability, these figures are rough estimates, but we use them as
figures of merit to scale energy use in the DPRK cement industry. Fractions of heat from heavy
oil are estimates used to balance overall heavy fuel oil supply and demand. These production
figures seem somewhat high to us, and are somewhat at odds with reports of cement shortages
for, for example, hydroelectric plant construction. In addition, the DPRK has generally been a
net importer of cement, based on UN Comtrade statistics, since 2015, with reported imports from
China dominating and ranging from 77 to 310 thousand tonnes annually between 2010 and 2019(with considerable annual variation), though the decision to use imported or domestic cement

615 Source, Google Earth Pro, location 38.742355°, 125.617459°.
616 Trading Economics (2020), web page "North Korea Cement Production", https://tradingeconomics.com/north-korea/cement-

production. As of February 2020, this source did not yet include an estimate for cement output in 2018, thus we assume output
in 2018 was somewhat lower than in 2017 due to the general economic slowdown induced by UNSC sanctions. Although the
inputs to the DPRK cement industry, with the possible exception of spare parts, are likely of domestic origin (coal, limestone,
silica), it seems probable that overall cement use would have declined in 2018 due to a reduction in construction as sanctions
affected other industries and the economy in general.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKmay be a function of either location (construction sites near the Chinese border may find it easier
to source cement from China) or of required cement grade or quality.
The Sangwon Cement Plant, located South and East of Pyongyang, is shown in the Google Maps
image below (Figure 5-31; rough coordinates, 38.876890, 126.036658). What we assume to belimestone is supplied to this plant from a set of mines a few kilometers away, as shown in thesecond Google Maps image below (Figure 5-33; coordinates 38.867119, 126.091016). It is
unclear why this mine is labeled "Steel Mine" in the image.
Figure 5-31: Sangwon Cement Plant Near Pyongyang

Figure 5-32: Limestone Mine Feeding Sangwon Cement Plant

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Fertilizer output increased slightly from 2000 (to 11 percent of 1990 levels)617 in 2005,
decreasing to about 7 percent of 1990 levels in 2009 and 2010. By 2014, by our estimate,
fertilizer output had risen to 23 percent of 1990 levels, and remained at close to that level
through 2016, before dropping in 2017 and 2018, to about 16 and 9 percent, respectively. For
2008 through 2010, estimates of fertilizer production were obtained from the UN Food andAgriculture Organization and World Food Program (2010), Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop andFood Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.618 The mostrecent update to the above report what we could find is dated 2013, and includes a table thatsuggests increasing domestic output of nitrogenous fertilizer through 2013.619 Although we
could not find, as of this writing, direct information on fertilizer production in the DPRK in
2014, the trends in the table above suggest increasing domestic output, which is consistent withDPRK announcements and the results of a 38 North analysis (“North Korea’s Namhung YouthChemical Complex that notes increases in fertilizer production in recent years.620 Coupled with
this, imports of nitrogenous fertilizer from China declined in the early 2010s, based on
information from the UN Comtrade database. (The DPRK does imports fertilizer from othercountries, but the quantities imported are very small compared with imports from China.) We
were unable to find direct estimates of DPRK fertilizer output prepared by others for years after
2012, but a pair of United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) studies offer
estimates of overall supplies of DPRK nitrogen (and phosphate) fertilizer through 2017,621 and
we used UN Comtrade statistics on fertilizer imports by the DPRK to prepare the estimates fordomestic production shown in Figure 5-33. For 2020, we assumed fertilizer production equal tohalf of 1990 levels, due to restrictions on trade and industrial activity related to the COVID-19
pandemic.

617 Based on data in 2006 presentation by R.V. Misra, "Agriculture and Fertilizer Situation in DPR Korea",available as
http://www.fertilizer.org/ifa/publicat/PDF/2006_crossroads_misra_slides.pdf (from the International Fertilizer Industry
Association), presented as part of the "IFA Crossroads ASIA-PACIFIC 2006 Conference 'Growing markets, nurturing success'",
Chiangmai, Thailand, 13-16 November 2006..
618 Dated 16 November 2010, and available as http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al968e/al968e00.pdf. Estimates are derived fromdata in Table 2 of that document.
619 UN Food and Agriculture Organization and World Food Program (2013), Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security
Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, dated 28 November 2013, and available as
http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/aq118e/aq118e.pdf. Table 2 of that report includes fertilizer consumption and production data for
the DPRK.
620 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr (2014), “Seven Years of Construction Pays Off", 38 North, dated 10 April 2014, and available as
http://38north.org/2014/04/jbermudez041014/).
621 UN FAO (2018), GIEWS Update: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Food Supply and Demand Outlook in
2017/18 (November/October), dated 9 July 2018, and available as http://www.fao.org/3/ca0363en/CA0363EN.pdf, and for earlier
years, UN FAO (2016) GIEWS Update: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Food Supply and Demand Outlook in
2015/16 (November/October), dated 27 April 2016, and available as http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5572e.pdf,

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Figure 5-33: Estimated Domestic DPRK Fertilizer Production, 2008-2020

Estimated DPRK Production of Nitrogen Fertilizer as
Ammonium Sulphate
Thousand Tonnes (NH4)2SO4

600
500
400
300
200
100

0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Activity in 2005 in the building materials, pulp and paper, and other chemicals subsectors wereassumed to be unchanged from 2000, but to have fallen slightly through 2010, with textiles
output up slightly in 2005, but falling slowly thereafter. Output is assumed to have increased
substantially in the other metals and other minerals sectors622 between 2000 and 2005, due in partto output destined for export to China, and to remain at approximately those higher levels
through 2010. Output in all of these industries is estimated to have been lower in 2014 than in2010 as a result of continued displacement of domestic goods by imported (mostly Chinese)
goods, the degradation of factory infrastructure due to lack of parts and replacement equipment,
and the lack of reliable power supply. Even prior to 2010, anecdotal and fragmented reports ofactivity, or lack of activity, in industrial installations included:•“The Wonsan shipyard has not built a new ship since 1985, and struggles in even repair
work due to deteriorated equipment, with only 1/6th of the original workforce evenreporting.”•“The 6.4 Wonsan Vehicle Factory has ceased manufacturing trains due to a shortage ofraw materials and electricity, and now occasionally repairs trains, but also makes doors
for buildings; its reporting workforce is about 1/6th of 1990 levels”.623•“Production Rate below Thirty Percent at Lanam Mine Machinery Factory in Chungjin”
despite the pressure of a “150-day battle campaign” (national productivity push).624•

Low output (due to lack of electricity and food) at the Duksa Coal Mine (producing “low622 Estimates for these sectors based in part on data provided by

Dr. Chung Woo-jin, in his presentation entitled "Mineral
Resources in DPRK", as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto,
CA, USA), and available from https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/papers-and-presentations/.
623 North Korea Today, No. 298, 10/2009.
624North Korea Today No. 291, 8/2009.

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heat anthracite coal”) of Soodong District, and “[i]dled clothing, shoe, and “market”
factories in Hamheung, which used to receive 1000 te/month from the mine.”625
We assume that there was relatively little change in industrial output in these sectors from 2015
through 2019, but production is projected to fall in 2020 as a result of COVID-19.
As a result of closing of some inefficient plants, improved capacity factors in some industries,and some investment in industrial infrastructure, particularly by Chinese firms,626 the overall
average energy efficiency of those DPRK industrial plants that remained in operation is assumed
to have increased slightly between 2000 and 2010, with energy intensities averaging 112 percent
of 1990 levels in 2005 and declining to 110 percent of 1990 levels in 2008 through 2010 (andless in some subsectors), in part as a result of simply closing the oldest plants. We assume thatthese efficiencies were mostly unchanged through 2020, ranging from 108 to 110 percent of1990 levels, with the exception of iron and steel production, at 99 to 100 percent of 1990 levels,and cement production, at 101 to 102 percent.
To estimate the amount of electricity imported to the DPRK from the ROK, as reported in
section 5.2.7, above, we estimated the amount of electricity used in the (mostly) textile firms
operating in the Kaesong Industrial Zone. An article quoting the KEPCO manager of the powerline running into Kaesong, however, indicates that while the capacity of the substation feeding
Kaeosong is 100 MW, the power delivered to Kaesong averaged 30 to 50 MW, presumably inearly 2013 when the complex was operating at a “normal” level.627 The total value of goods
from the Kaesong complex was 251.4 million USD in 2008 and 256.5 million USD in 2009, up
from 14.9 million USD in 2005.628 In 2010, the value of goods from the Kaesong complex was
323.3 million USD.629 More than half of this output value was from textile/apparel firms. In the
ROK in 2007, the approximate electricity intensity of the textile industry was 1.379 kcal per
ROK Won, or about 1.67 kWh per USD. This would imply electricity consumption at Kaesongof about 419 GWh in 2008, 428 GWh in 2009, and 540 GWh in 2010. These figures are roughestimates, but close enough to the capacity of the line to be plausible. The ROK textile industry,
however, is probably more energy-intensive on average than the textile industry in Kaesong,
since the latter is mostly smaller businesses involved in assembling garments, not, for example,
in making cloth or fiber. We therefore assume that, based on news reports above, the averagecapacity factor for the 100 MW substation providing power to the complex was 33% in 2010,
and estimate electricity use based on the reported value of output (although this is not ideal, as
output value is an indirect measure of required energy input at best) and estimate electricity
delivery from the ROK to Kaesong accordingly. In 2007, we assume that total electricity
provision over the 15 and then 100 MW lines were mid-way between the totals estimated to beprovided in 2006 and 2008, or 193 GWh. In 2008, based on the output above, we estimate the625 North Korea Today, No. 268, March 2009.
626 See, for example, Professor Li Dunqiu’s presentation entitled "DPRK’s Reform & Sino-DPRK Economic Cooperation”, asprepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA), and available
from https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/papers-and-presentations/.
627 See, for example, Kang Tae-ho and Ha Eo-young, "Electricity use at Kaesong hums along at bare minimum", The Hankyoreh,
dated, May 7, 2013, and available as http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/586276.html.
628 Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, U.S. Congressional Research Service (2010), The Kaesong North-South Korean
Industrial Complex, dated June 1, 2010, and available as www.opencrs.com/document/RL34093/2010-06-01/download/1013/.
629 Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin (2011), (US) Congressional Research Service, The Kaesong North-South Korean
Industrial Complex, dated April 18, 2011, and available as http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34093.pdf.

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electricity provision to Kaesong at 225 GWh, with electricity use estimated at 229 GWh in 2009,
and 289 GWh in 2010, 350 GWh in 2014, 438 GWh in 2015, and 54 GWh in 2015, with nosupplies provided thereafter through 2020.630
In 2014, the value of the output of the Kaesong industrial complex was reported as $470 million.
Adjusting this value downward somewhat to account for the difference in exchange rates
between the ROK Won and USD in 2014 versus 2010 (roughly 10 percent, based on Xe.comdata), and USD inflation between 2010 and 2014 about nine percent, yields an equivalent output
in 2014 of $392 million, which suggests that ROK electricity provision to Kaesong in 2014
might have been in the range of 350 GWh, Of course, the direct data on consumption ofelectricity at Kaesong is known to KEPCO and probably others in the ROK, but data on Kaesong
electricity consumption were not immediately available to the authors, if indeed they areavailable publicly.
Our estimate of industrial electricity use by sector and end-use, though generally consistent withinternational experience, including in 1990s China, should be considered only a starting point to
be built upon and refined with further analysis and, ideally, energy use surveys in the DPRK.
We assumed that the fraction of electricity used in electric motors and motor drive systems ineach industrial subsector and in transportation, agricultural processing, and military
manufacturing were and are as indicated in Table 5-14, with lighting accounting for another five
percent of overall electricity use in each industrial subsector, and the remaining electricity usedin the general “process energy” category. Process energy would, for example, include
electrolytic or electric arc processing of metals,
Table 5-14: Fraction of Electricity Assumed Used in Motors and Drives (with EstimatedConsumption in 1990)

Subsector
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry
Transportation
Agricultural Processing
Military Manufacturing

Total
TJ/yr
2,869
1,461
1,535
1,092
149
2,633
222
448
58
2,838
4,185
1,023
21

Fraction in
Motors &Drives
Note 10
50%
95%
50%
50%
95%
20%
95%
95%
95%
80%
95%
95%
80%

Total TJ/yr
Motors &Drives
1,435
1,388
768
546
141
527
211
425
55
2,270
3,976
819
20

630 Kim Myong-song (2015), "Output at Kaesong Soars Despite Friction" Choson ilbo, dated July 10, 2015, and available as

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/07/10/2015071000808.html.

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5.3.4. Industrial Sector Results
Figure 5-34 shows our estimate of industrial electricity use by subsector from 1990 through2020. As indicated, industrial electricity use in the DPRK has dropped by about 80 percent since
1990, as a result of the combination of lack of markets for DPRK industrial goods, lack of spareparts for factories built with assistance from the former Soviet Union, international economic
sanctions, and, of course, a lack of electricity supplies. As shown in Figure 5-35, the fraction of
estimated industrial sector electricity demand accounted for by each subsector has varied over
the years, with the cement and other minerals (the latter are mostly for export) sectors accounting
for a greater share of total electricity consumption in 2014 than in 1990.
Figure 5-34: Industrial Energy Use by Subsector

20,000Estimated DPRK Industrial Electricity Use by
Subsector, 1990 through 2020
Non-specified Industry
Building Materials
TextilesOther Minerals
Other Metals
Pulp and Paper
Other Chemicals
Fertilizers
CementIron and Steel

18,00016,000

Gigawatt-hours

14,00012,00010,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
-

1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

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Figure 5-35: Fraction of Sectoral Industrial Electricity Use by Subsector

Fraction of Estimated DPRK Industrial Electricity Use
by Subsector, 1990 through 2020
Non-specified Industry
Other Minerals
Other Chemicals
Iron and Steel

Building Materials
Other Metals
Fertilizers

TextilesPulp and Paper
CementFraction of Sectoral Consumption

100%
90%
80%
70%

60%
50%
40%
30%

20%
10%
0%

1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Our estimate of electricity use by end-use does not at present use different end-use factors in the
different subsectors for different years, that is, we used the same assumed end-use breakdown in
all industrial subsectors for 2010 through 2020. The results are shown in Figure 5-36 throughFigure 5-38. Electricity used in motors and drives generally dominates industrial electricity use,with the exceptions being subsectors, such as metals and fertilizers, where process energy isdominant. Overall, by our estimate, about 57 percent of electricity use in DPRK industry in2014 (for example) was used in motors and drives—and this estimate may be low. Given the
typically antiquated designs of the electric motors we saw in service (and not in service) in the
DPRK during our visits, upgrading electric motors and motor drive systems seems likely to be an
important and cost-effective way of stretching supplies of electricity, as well as increasing
productivity.

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Figure 5-36: Industrial Electricity Use by End Use, 2010 and 2014

Estimated Industrial Electricity Use by End
Use and Subsector, 2010 and 2014
1,400
Lighting
1,200

Process Electricity
Motors and Drives

Gigawatt-hours

1,000

800

600

400

200

Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

2010

2014

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKIron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

Gigawatt-hours

Figure 5-37: Industrial Electricity Use by End Use, 2015 through 2018
Estimated Industrial Electricity Use by End Use and Subsector, 2015 through
2018

1,600
Lighting

1,400
Process Electricity

1,200
Motors and Drives

1,000

800

600

400

200

-

2015
2016
2017

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2018

Figure 5-38: Industrial Electricity Use by End Use, 2019 and 2020

Estimated Industrial Electricity Use by End
Use and Subsector, 2019 and 2020
900
Lighting
800

Gigawatt-hours

700

Process Electricity
Motors and Drives

600
500
400
300

200
100

Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

2019

2020

5.3.5. Transport Sector
The transport sector in the DPRK, as of 1990, was concentrated on the movement of freight,
principally by rail. Visitors to the DPRK have noted that there was relatively little vehicle traffic
on city streets and roads—though some visitors report that traffic has been increasing, in
Pyongyang at least, in recent years—and that the main form of personal transport appears to bewalking. This is aided by the fact that the apartments in which most urban dwellers live are
typically located close to their places of work.

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5.3.5.1.Transport Sector Assumptions and Inputs
Based on these observations of limited transport use in the DPRK as of 1990, we have assumed
1,200 average passenger kilometers traveled per year in 1990 in motorized transport by theroughly two-thirds of the population that is “economically active”. This translates to about 800
kilometers of travel in cars, trains, and buses per person (all residents) per year, which is greaterthan the 1990 level of passenger transport in China, but less than that in India (and far less thanthat in industrialized countries).631
Significant use of electricity use in the transport sector of the DPRK is currently limited almost
entirely to the electric freight and passenger rail, including urban rail such as electric streetcars
and buses, and the Pyongyang subway system. Figure 5-39 shows electric buses in Pyongyang,
and Figure 5-40 shows a photo of the Pyongyang subway, both as of September, 2009.632 A
growing, but likely not significant in terms of electricity use, additional transport use ofelectricity is the use of electric and electric-assist scooters, motorcycles and bicycles, which havebeen appearing in UN Comtrade statistics as imports to the DPRK from China in increasing
numbers in recent years. As shown in Figure 5-41, these include an estimated 128,000 units,with an average value on the order of $300 and an average weight of 15 kilograms, likely
meaning that most are small scooters or bicycles, in the year 2017.633 We are guessing it ishighly likely that these popular vehicles continued to be imported in significant numbers after2017, but that fewer trades were Customs statistics suggest that a very few electric cars, perhaps
on the order of 75, have been imported to the DPRK from China—based on the UN Comtrade
statistics available to us, which lump electric and other non-internal-combustion vehicles into asingle “other” category,634—but in any case this fleet cannot consume much electricity as yet. A
recent NK News article shows photos of a fleet of electric tourist vehicles destined for the
Wonsan-Kalma resort (see Figure 5-42).635 A 2015 news article, citing North Korean State TV,
shows a “solar powered” bus covered with PV panels, operating in the city of Nampo.636 The
claim that this bus operates entirely on electricity produced by its own panels and stored in its
batteries is considered dubious (“One expert in solar technology tells the US-based site that theclaim of 140 people riding a fully solar-powered bus has ‘no credibility’”), and in factcalculations suggest that it would be physically impossible for such as bus to generate enoughelectricity in a day from its own solar panels to travel more than a few kilometers even on the

631 Sinton, J., editor (1996), China Energy Databook 1996 Edition, Revised January 1996. Lawrence Berkeley National

Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, California, USA.LBL-32822.Rev.3. UC-900.
632 Photos by D. von Hippel, September 2009.
633 A 2016 article from Reuters, "Power to the people: electric bikes take off in North Korea", by James Pearson, dated May 7,
2016, and available as https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-congress-bicycles/power-to-the-people-electric-bikes-takeoff-in-north-korea-idUSKCN0XY06I, provides additional anecdotal evidence of the rise of the use of personal electric vehicles inthe DPRK. This article includes a reference to "A bike made by a Chinese company called Anqi was for sale this week inPyongyang’s Kwangbok Department Store for 2.62 million won - around $330 at the unofficial exchange rate of 8,000 won to thedollar." This price is roughly consistent with the cost per unit for exports from China to the DPRK as seen in Comtrade data for(probably) electric "motorcycles" in 2016.
634 By way of comparison, according to UN Comtrade data, the DPRK imported on the order of 2000 passenger cars from China
in 2014, somewhat fewer than in other recent years, as 2009 to 2013 imports increased steadily from about 2800 to nearly 3900
units.
635 Colin Zwirko (2020), "Pyongyang to send tourist electric carts to delayed Wonsan-Kalma Resort", NK News, dated May 13,
2020, and available as https://www.nknews.org/2020/05/pyongyang-to-send-tourist-electric-carts-to-delayed-wonsan-kalmaresort/. Some of the carts shown in the images in the article are made in China, but others are reportedly made in the DPRK.
636 BBC News (2015), BBC News (2015), “North Korea: State TV promotes solar-powered bus”, available as
http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-news-from-elsewhere-34702544.

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sunniest of days, but the presence of the bus, the electric tourist vehicles, and the massive private
purchases of electric scooters and bicycles, do demonstrate the DPRK’s interest in electrictransport technologies, and in the use of renewable energy in general.637
Figure 5-39: Electric Buses in Pyongyang, 2009

637 The BBC News article cited in the previous footnote quotes slogans on DPRK billboards as “The development reflects one ofhundreds of new slogans unveiled by the communist state in February, one of which urged citizens to: ‘Develop and makeeffective use of wind, tidal, geothermal and solar energy!’".

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Figure 5-40: Pyongyang Subway System, 2009

Figure 5-41: Reported Electric Scooters/Motorcycles/Bicycles Imports through 2018

140,000
120,000

Electric and "Other" (probably mostly electric in later years) Motorcycle
Imports from China to DPRK, 2000 - 2018 (number)Electric
Other [likely electric after 2010]

100,000
80,00060,00040,00020,00002000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

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Figure 5-42: Electric Tourists Carts to be Used at Wonsan-Kalma Resort Area

We have relatively little direct quantitative information on the DPRK transport sector and its
energy requirements as a whole, or for transport electricity use in particular, but have in previous
publications derived estimates for energy use by fuel in the road, rail, air, and water transport
subsectors. Of these, only the rail subsector uses a significant amount of electricity. As noted
above, Pyongyang, as well as some other cities, do have some electrified buses, but we include
the likely small electricity consumption of these systems with our estimates for total electricity
consumed in rail passenger transport.
For passenger transport, we assumed for 1990 that 30 percent of motorized public passenger
transport (in passenger-km) was by road, with the rest by rail. Rail transport in North Korea isfueled by diesel oil and by electricity. We assumed that practically no passenger transport is bydiesel rail, as railways between most cities were, as of 1990, reportedly electrified (thoughelectricity supplies to railroads, as to other parts of the economy, have become less reliable since1990). The residual 70 percent of motorized public passenger transport not provided in roadvehicles was assumed to take place in trains (or trams), at an efficiency of 13.2 kg coalequivalent per thousand passenger kilometers, for an assumed passenger rail energy intensity of
0.39 MJ per passenger-km as of 1990. This value is an average 1989 efficiency for US
commute-time train transit. While trains in the DPPK are probably less efficient than US trains,which would result in higher intensities, their load factors are probably significantly higher,
resulting in lower intensities. The intensity value used is also similar to that quoted for publicmunicipal electric (presumably, subways, buses, and urban rail) in “developing countries” byBelyaev et al (2002),638 but is higher than the same source provides for the intensity of passenger
rail transport in general.
An ongoing program of electrifying the DPRK rail system had, as of 1990, increased the fractionof freight hauled by electric engines. We assumed this fraction to be 87.5 percent in 1990. For
638 Lev S. Belyaev et al (2002), World Energy and Transitions to Sustainable Development, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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freight transport, we began with an estimate of 169 million tons of freight carried by rail in 1990,
and then estimated the average distance (300 km for electric rail, 250 km for diesel rail) offreight transport. We used older Russian energy intensities for both diesel and electricallypowered freight locomotives, with those intensities increased by 20 percent due to presumed
difficulties with maintenance and higher operational inefficiency in the DPRK rail sector—thelatter due, for example, to much shorter distances between stops than in Russia, requiring moreenergy for acceleration. We assume that the amount of potential passenger rail transport
increases with increasing population, but that due to the availability of electricity supplies for rail
travel economic difficulties affecting motorized passenger transport in general, the use electricrail transport falls to 44 percent of 1990 levels by 1996, varying from about 27 percent to 38
percent of 1990 levels through 2010. Electric rail freight varies from 33 to 40 percent of 1990
levels in the years from 1996 through 2010, increasing and decreasing slightly based on theavailability of electricity and assumptions about overall economic activity. The intensity ofelectric passenger and freight rail transport is assumed to be the same as 1990 levels for all years
except 1996 (when it is five percent higher), with trends such as improvements in locomotives(some imports of locomotives from China appear in Customs statistics) and/or higher train
loadings assumed to be offset by inefficiencies associated with intermittent electricity supplies
and/or other technical problems with rail transport.
In recent years, chronic electricity shortages have reportedly caused the DPRK to rely more ondiesel-powered trains, including bringing old locomotives reserved for emergency use back into
service.639 We assume that this caused a significant decrease in the fraction of passenger andfreight traffic transported by electric rail, with the usage of electric rail for passenger and freighttransport falling to 24 percent of 1990 levels by 2014, and rail electric freight to 40 percent of1990 levels. We assume that passenger electric rail activity rose again in 2015 and remained in
the range of 38 to 40 percent of 1990 levels through 2020, but that rail electric freight fell to 30
percent of 1990 levels in 2017, then remained slightly below that level (28 percent) through2020, as freight was reduced in part because of the impact of UNSC sanctions on the rail
movement of goods imports and exports.

5.3.5.2.Transport Sector Results
Estimated electricity use in rail transport in the DPRK from 1990 through 2020 is shown in
Figure 5-43. Estimated 2014 transport electricity use was about 8 percent of total electricity use
in the DPRK in 2014, with transport electricity use split approximately evenly between
passenger and freight rail. Transportation electricity use is estimated to be dominated by motors
and drives (electric motors for locomotives, subways, and buses), as one would expect, with amuch smaller amount of electricity for lighting and other end uses, as shown in Figure 5-44.

639 See, for example,

Joon Ho Kim, Yunju Kim, and Roseanne Gerin (2015), "North Korea Resorts to Diesel Locomotives to
Deal with Rail Power Shortage", Radio Free Asia, dated 2015-04-08, and available as
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/authorities-use-diesel-locomotives-04082015165102.html.

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Figure 5-43: Estimated Rail Transport Electricity Use

Estimated Annual Rail Transport Electricity Use, 1990 through
2020

3,500

Gigawatt-hours

3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Figure 5-44: Transport Sector Electricity Use by End Use

Estimated Transport Sector Electricity Use by End Use,
2010, and 2014 through 2020
Other End Uses
Space and Water Heating
Motors and Drives

1,400

Air Conditioning
Lighting

Gigawatt-hours

1,200
1,000
800

600
400
200
2010

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

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2020

5.3.6. Agriculture and Fisheries Sectors
The DPRK agricultural and fisheries sectors have the difficult task of providing most of the foodfor the DPRK’s population with limited inputs of land, fuel, fertilizer, and equipment. Below we
describe what we understand about these sectors, including our estimates of electricity use andelectricity use by end use in each sector.
5.3.6.1.Agriculture Sector Assumptions and Inputs
To estimate electricity and fuel use in the agricultural sector, we started with the area of field
crops grown in the DPRK in 1990, approximately 1.7 million hectares. We have divided energy
use in the agricultural sector into two components, accounting separately for the energy used in
Field Machinery, and that used for Processing of crops and other applications.
Electricity use in field machinery was estimated using a Chinese value of 126 kWh/ha-year in
1990. Most electricity use would probably be for water pumping. We assumed that electricity
use in fields declined to 90 percent of 1990 levels in 1996 and 75 percent of 1990 levels in 2000,
due to a combination of a lack of electricity and, possibly, problems with keeping pumps
operating due to lack of parts. An article in KCNA in English (Pyongyang), dated 14 March,
2005, and entitled “Kaechon-Lake Thaesong Waterway Pays Off”, suggested that the waterway,
created to provide irrigation water to fields on the west coast of the DPRK (see Figure 5-45),
carried 100 million cubic meters of water over two years, and displaced more than 500 water
pumps that “had to consume more than 60,000 kW of electricity a year to supply needed water to[the areas served].” Assuming that this note referred to the power input to the displaced pumps
as 60 MW, and assuming an annual average capacity factor for those pumps of about 20 percent,this implies a displacement of about 105 GWh, about 42 percent of our estimated field use ofelectricity in 1990. On this basis we decrease estimated use of electricity in agricultural fields in
2005, but by somewhat less than this estimate (to 65 percent of 1990 levels by 2005), assumingthat there may still be additional pumping from the new aqueduct into the fields, and assumingthat the KCNA article may present a somewhat optimistic account of the impacts of thewaterway. In subsequent years, we assume that electricity use in fields falls still further, to 52.5
percent of 1990 values in 2008, and from 50 percent to 53 percent in 2014 and the years between
2014 and 2020, due to a combination of lack of availability of power for pumping and some
additional displacement of pumping electricity use via gravity-fed irrigation.

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Figure 5-45: Natural-flow Irrigation Waterway in the DPRK Completed Circa 2004-2005640

Electricity is also used in crop processing, for example, in the hulling and milling of rice. To
estimate crop processing electricity use, we start with an intensity of 444 kilograms of coalequivalent (kgce) per hectare of rice harvested derived from 1987 Chinese data for all (not justrice) agricultural processing electricity use. This figure is applied to the rice harvest in the
DPRK (processing electricity is assumed to be mostly for rice) to yield an estimate of overall
agricultural processing electricity use in 1990. For the use of electricity (and other fuels) in crop
processing after 1990, we assumed that these would increase and decrease in rough proportion
with the amount of crops harvested, with annual cereal crop harvest estimates as the metric tocalculate a ratio of output versus 1990. Figure 5-46 show the variation in cereals production in
the DPRK since 1990 as reported by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO),641
with our rough estimate for 2020 assuming output slightly lower than 2019.

640 From John Lewis, “North Korean Energy: 2005-2006 New Technologies and Construction” as prepared for the DPRK Energy

Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA), and available fromhttps://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprk-energy/2006-meeting/papers-and-presentations/.
641 Based on summary data on DPRK cereals production from UN FAOStat, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QC, accessed
8/30/2012, 8/9/2018, the UN FAO document GIEWS Update: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Food Supply and
Demand Outlook in 2017/18 (November/October), dated 9 July 2018, and available as
http://www.fao.org/3/ca0363en/CA0363EN.pdf, and the DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK)
FAO/WFP JOINT RAPID FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT, dated May 2019, and available as
http://www.fao.org/3/ca4447EN/ca4447en.pdf.

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Figure 5-46: DPRK Cereals Production over Time

Cereals Production in the DPRK in Selected Years
7

Million Tonnes Cereal Production

6

5
4
3
2
1
0
1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

5.3.6.2.Fisheries Sector Assumptions and Inputs
Very little data are available to describe energy use in the fisheries sector of the DPRK ingeneral, or electricity use in particular. Electricity is used in the fisheries industry in theprocessing of fisheries products, including, for example, for conveyor belts and lighting in fishprocessing plants, and in providing refrigeration for fisheries products. For electricity use inprocessing operations, we have prepared estimates based on an estimate of electricity use in fishprocessing in Alaska (admittedly a rough comparison at best) of about 110 kWh of electricity per
tonne of catch processed, and DPRK fisheries production in 1990 of 2.2 million tonnes, based on
UNFAO statistics. After 1990, we assume a decline in both fisheries effort and catch, based onreports from several sources, which, combined with a lack of access to electricity for processing
operations, result in electricity use in fisheries processing declining to 45 percent of 1990 levels
by 1996, and further to 25 to 40 percent in later years, varying from year to year based onelectricity availability and available information on fish catch. Trade statistics show that since atleast the years from 2010 the DPRK has been exporting large quantities of fisheries products.
China imports the vast bulk of these products—well over 90 percent. Most of China’s imports
from the DPRK are in the category “Molluscs”, a category dominated by imports, specifically, of
cuttlefish and squid—exports of products in this category were valued at over $100 million
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annually for all but one of the years from 2012 through 2017. The increased harvest of squid isdue, in part, to an abundance of squid as a result of the same climatic conditions that have led todrought in the DPRK.642 It has been reported that a substantial portion of the DPRK fisheries
industry is under the control of the DPRK military. Figure 5-47 shows an image from late 2019
of Chairman Kim Jong Un visiting a military fish processing factory.643 The robotic equipment
shown is reportedly an ABB (a Swiss equipment maker) design, made in China, and possible
exported second-hand to the DPRK.
Figure 5-47: Visit by Chairman Kim Jong Un to a Fish Processing Factory in the DPRK

5.3.6.3.Agriculture and Fisheries Sector Results
Estimates of electricity use in the DPRK in selected years for agricultural field use (water
pumping, mostly), agricultural processing, and fisheries processing are provided in Figure 5-48.
Our estimates for these subsectors have totaled in the range of 300 to 400 GWh annually in mostyears since 1996, with agricultural processing the largest of the three subsectors.

642 As described, for example, in "North Koreans turn to squid to compensate for drought", prepared by Choi Song Min for Daily

NK, dated July 15, 2015, and available as http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/15/north-korea-drought-squid-harvest.
See also "North Korea's military orders surge in squid poaching", Daily Telegraph, by Mike Firn, dated 28 Nov 2014, available
as http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/11259846/North-Koreas-military-orders-surge-in-squidpoaching.html. Similarly, "North Korean fishing industry increases output", NK News, February 10th, 2015, available as
http://www.nknews.org/2015/02/north-korean-fishing-industry-increases-output/,also reports increased output after about 2011.
643 The UNSC "Panel of Experts" in UNSC (2020), Note by the President of the Security Council, number S/2020/151, dated 2
March 2020, and including "Annex: Letter dated 26 February 2020 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution
1874 (2009) addressed to the President of the Security Council", available as https://undocs.org/S/2020/151. Photo from page 49
of UNSC document, dated November 19, 2019, and originally from the Korea Central News Agency (KCNA).

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Figure 5-48: Total Agricultural and Fisheries Electricity Use

Estimated DPRK Agricultural and Fisheries Electricity Use by
Subsector, 1990 through 2020

Gigawatt-hours

1,000
900

Fisheries Processing

800

Agricultural Processing

700

Agricultural Field Use

600

500
400
300
200
100
1990

1996

2000

2005

2008

2009

2010

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Figure 5-49 through Figure 5-51 show estimated 2010 and 2014 through 2020 use of electricity
in the agriculture and fisheries sectors by subsector and end use. The use of electric motors andelectric motor drives dominate, with motors use in agricultural processing the single largest enduse.

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Figure 5-49: Agricultural and Fisheries Electricity Use by End Use, 2010 and 2014
Estimated Agricultural and Fisheries Electricity
Use by End Use and Subsector, 2010 and 2014
300
Other End Uses
250

Lighting

Gigawatt-hours

Motors and Drives

200
150
100
50

-

Figure 5-50: Agricultural and Fisheries Electricity Use by End Use, 2015 through 2018

Estimated Agricultural and Fisheries Electricity Use by End
Use and Subsector, 2015 - 2018
300

Other End Uses

Lighting

250

Gigawatt-hours

Motors and Drives
200
150
100

50
-

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Figure 5-51: Agricultural and Fisheries Electricity Use by End Use, 2019 and 2020

Estimated Agricultural and Fisheries Electricity
Use by End Use and Subsector, 2019 and 2020
180
160

Gigawatt-hours

140

Other End Uses
Lighting
Motors and Drives

120
100
80
60
40
20
-

5.3.7. Military Sector
There are few other countries in the world, possibly none, where military and civilian lives are sofully entwined as in the DPRK. In addition to having a far larger standing military per capita thanany other nation—the world’s fourth largest, behind only nations with populations 13 to about 55
times greater644—approximately 5 million DPRK citizens are said to serve in the militaryreserves, representing a significant fraction of the economically active population. Military units
are used as labor forces in numerous projects, some mostly civilian in nature (such as bringing in
the agricultural harvest, and, most notably for the electricity sector, building dams and canals),
and the DPRK military is said to essentially have its own economy, including a supply networkfor food, fuel, and other goods, and its own industrial facilities, some of which make munitions
and armaments, but others of which reportedly make civilian goods, but are controlled by the
military.645 As a result, in addition to the energy used for strictly military activities—exercises
644 See, for example, Jessica Dillinger (2020), “29 Largest Armies In The World”, World Atlas, dated January 7 2020, andavailable as https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/29-largest-armies-in-the-world.html.
645 Although it is not clear to us how representative this example is military-owned factories in the DPRK—and it probably is an
example selected particularly for its public relations value, the online video “N. Korean Disabled Soldiers′ Plastic Goods
Factory”, dated January 9, 2012, and previously available as http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uckV5rygOxE, shows a plastic
goods and plastic packaging factory run by the DPRK military.

335
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKwith tanks, artillery, gunboats, and military aircraft, for example, some military energy use
provides energy services—for example, for goods and human transport—for civilians as well.
Although it is unlikely that significant electricity is used in the operation of military armaments
and vehicles at present (though, as in other nations, that will likely change in the future), simply
housing and feeding the one-million-plus-person armed forces of the DPRK requires significant
fuel and electricity.
One anecdote we have heard that may relate both to strictly military activities and to militaryventures that produce civilian goods is that in addition to (and perhaps as part of) having what is
effectively a separate economy for the DPRK military, many DPRK military facilities haveseparate or, at least, back-up power supplies to render them largely independent of the unreliable
DPRK grid. For example, although most of the DPRK’s transmission and distribution
transformers are in poor condition, some military installations have their own, new or newer,
largely imported transformers that are in good operating condition, as well as alternative sourcesof power (such as some of the imported diesel generators described above). To the extent thatthese newer electricity supply infrastructure items have been implemented for military-owned
factories producing civilian goods, those factories might serve as examples for DPRK economic
redevelopment, although, of course, issues related to their ownership and control will be nontrivial to unravel if and when the DPRK opens economically.
Below we provide a summary of our assumptions and data sources relied upon in estimating year
1990 through 2020 electricity use in the DPRK military, along with a summary of thoseestimates.

5.3.7.1.Military Sector Assumptions and Inputs
Although, as with some other sectors, we have been able to obtain essentially no direct data onenergy use in the military sector in the DPRK, the DPRK military is monitored closely by the
military and intelligence community in the United States and elsewhere. For the purposes of ouranalysis, this attention has meant that there are reasonably good data on the stocks of energyusing equipment—at least vehicles, armaments, aircraft, and naval vessels—in the DPRK
military. These data on stocks have been used in other Nautilus publications (and elsewhere inthis Report) as the bases for estimates of petroleum fuels consumption for the DPRK groundforces, naval fleet, and air force. Although these machines do not use electricity directly, themanufacturing of these and other military hardware requires electricity, as do the headquarters
buildings, barracks, and other military buildings and installations used by the DPRK armed
forces. To estimate the amount of fuel and electricity used in manufacturing military equipment,
we estimated the total weight of iron and steel in the Army and Navy equipment inventories(aircraft were assumed to be all imported), applying estimates of the average of lifetimes of eachequipment type (assumed to be 20 years for large Ground Force equipment, 10 years for small
armaments, and 30 years for ships and boats), and using these figures to derive an averageamount of iron and steel needed per year in military manufacturing to replace equipment
reaching the end of its nominal lifetime. A Chinese figure of 250 kg coal equivalent per ton of336
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steel,646 multiplied by an efficiency inflator of 1.1, was assumed to be required for each of theapproximately two meltings required to fabricate military equipment.647 It was further assumed
that the fuel (assumed to be coal) used in melting iron and steel for military goods representsroughly 60 percent of the total coal needed for military manufacturing. An estimate of theelectricity requirements by this sector was prepared by applying the ratio of electricity to coalconsumption estimated for the civilian iron and steel industrial subsector to the coal use estimate
for military manufacturing.
Armed forces of on the order of 1.2 million people do not exist without a substantial stock ofmilitary buildings. As in other sectors, however, we currently have no direct information onenergy use in these structures. To compile estimates of fuel use in military buildings, we haveassumed that there were 20 million square meters of floor space in such buildings as of 1990
(about 17 square meters per active member of the armed forces), and that electricity consumption
per square meter in these buildings as of 1990 was twice that in civilian public and commercial
building (55 kWh/m2-yr).
We included a placeholder value for 1990 of an additional 10 million GJ annually to account forother uses of electricity in the military. End-uses covered by this assumed allotment as of 1990
could include the operation of fixed radar sites and the DPRK’s nuclear research program(nominally a civilian operation), which we estimate may have had an electricity demand in 1990
of approximately 5 MW, as there is no electricity production by the DPRK’s 25 MW thermal(though referred to as “5 MW electric”) research reactor at Yongbyon.648
Military manufacturing was assumed to decrease to 70 percent of 1990 levels by 1996, and to 45
percent of 1990 levels in subsequent years through 2010, then rose to 50 percent by 2019 as the
economy improved somewhat. For 2020, we assume that military manufacturing activity will
average 25 percent of 1990 levels due to the restrictions on military and other activity related to
the response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
We assume that from 1990 to 2000 the use of electricity in DPRK military buildings fell to 53
percent of 1990 levels due to a combination of supply constraints and reduced military activity.
We assume that electricity use rose again somewhat in 2005 and 2008 as a result of somewhat
better electricity supplies (for which the military probably had priority), to 62.5 and 65 percent of1990 levels, falling again gradually thereafter due to supply constraints and, possibly, due to thesmall decreases in activity levels we have assumed for in all branches of the military relative to2000 levels, which in turn is the result of energy-consuming training activities being limited by
646Ross, M. and L. Feng (1990), "The Energy Efficiency of the Steel Industry of China".

Energy, V. 16, No. 5, pp. 833-848,
1991.
647 P. Zimmerman, personal communication, 1995.
648 The nominally 5 MWe nuclear reactor at Yongbyon was shut down under the terms of the 1995 Agreed Framework between
the DPRK and the United States, restarted in 2003 after the breakdown in negotiations over the provision of light water reactors
to the DPRK and other issues, shut down again in 2007 as a part of the proceedings of the Six Party Talks on the DPRK’s nuclear
weapons program (and related issues). See, for example, Global Security.org (undated, but probably 2015), “Yongbyon(Nyongbyon)”, available as http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/yongbyon-5.htm. The Yongbyon reactor was likely
restarted once more in 2013 after engagement talks failed again and appears to have been operating at least intermittently and/or
at partial power since. See, for example, David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini (2016), Update on North Korean’s
Reactors, Enrichment Plant, and Possible Isotope Separation Facility, dated February 1, 2016, and available as http://isisonline.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/Yongbyon_January_2016_Update_Final.pdf. Although this reactor is typicallyreferred to as “5 MWe”, and various authors suggest that it produced or produces power, other researchers suggest that it is notclear that it actually has or does generate electricity, although it has, at least in the past, been used to provide heat for the
Yongbyon research complex.

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fuel supplies, lack of spare parts, and also, possibly, increased time spent by military personnel
in economic pursuits.649 Another possible reason for reduced military activities in some years
could be the reportedly lower physical capabilities of soldiers working on shorter rations. As of2014, we assume that electricity use in buildings and other non-manufacturing applications themilitary was about 58 percent of 1990 levels, rising slowly thereafter to 63 percent of 1990 levels
by 2018 and 2019, perhaps due to better access to generators and/or heightened activity due tointernational tensions, before declining markedly in 2020 due to COVID-19 response measures.
5.3.7.2.Military Sector Results
Our estimates suggest that the DPRK military sector uses a substantial fraction of the DPRK’s
overall electricity supplies, perhaps on the order of 20 to 25 percent of total DPRK final
electricity use. Almost all of this use is estimated to be in buildings and other end-uses, rather
than in military manufacturing, as shown in Figure 5-52. The underpinnings of this high fractionof overall national energy use are the large number of people in the DPRK military, the probably
preferential access to electricity by military installations, and the reportedly frequent overlap
between military and what would in other nations typically be civilian economic activities. Ourestimate of military manufacturing electricity use may be artificially low due to its focus on thesteel content of military hardware. As indicated above, however, dividing electricity use
between the military and civilian manufacturing economies of the DPRK may be nearly
impossible, at least without detailed survey data that is highly unlikely to ever be collected, atleast before the DPRK transitions to an open economy—at which point, the current
manufacturing economy of the DPRK will likely have ceased to exist. Figure 5-53 shows
estimated electricity end-uses for 2010 and 2014 through 2020. Dominated by electricity use inmilitary buildings, the electricity end-use division for the sector is similar to that in the
Public/Commercial sector, with lighting a major portion of electricity use, followed by motors
and drives and other end uses (such as electronics).

649 Reviews of the literature describing DPRK military equipment stocks in the different branches of the armed forces areavailable on http://www.globalsecurity.org, for example, on http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/NP/air-forceequipment.htm for air force equipment, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/NP/kpa-equipment.htm for ground forces
equipment, and http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/NP/navy.htm for the navy. These reviews find relatively littlechange in the DPRK’s stock of energy-using military equipment in recent years, but note that it is not entirely clear whether theseresults stem from a lack of recent insights, on the part of analysts, as to any changes in the DPRK military, or to a lack of changes
in the actual equipment inventory in the DPRK.

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Figure 5-52: Military Energy Use by Subsector

Estimated DPRK Military Electricity Use by Subsector, 1990
through 2020
4,500
4,000

Military Buildings/Other

Gigawatt-hours

3,500

Military Manufacturing

3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500

1990

1996

2000

2005

2008

2009

2010

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Figure 5-53: Military Electricity Use by Subsector and End Use
Estimated Military Electricity Use by End Use and Subsector, 2010 and 2014
through 2020
3,000

Other End Uses

Lighting

Motors and Drives

Gigawatt-hours

2,500

2,000
1,500
1,000
500
-

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2019

2020

5.3.8. Overall Electricity Demand Results and Commentary
As shown in Figure 5-54, estimated overall electricity use in the DPRK has declined by a factorof three since 1990 due to a combination of the lack of availability of power caused by supplyside constraints, but also because of economic difficulties, most notably in the industrial sector.
Industry is still the largest sectoral consumer of electricity in the DPRK, but its share of overall
electricity use has fallen somewhat over time. Once again, it is important to understand thedifference between electricity use and electricity demand in the DPRK context. It is difficult,probably impossible, to know how much electricity would be demanded by the various sectors if
supplies of electricity were not so tightly constrained. Although this difference is not necessarily
crucial in understanding the DPRK’s energy system today, it is crucial to the estimation of what
electricity demand might be in a future DPRK where supplies of electricity are not constrained,
and thus must be factored in as a consideration in projects that might seek to redevelop all or partof the DPRK electricity supply and demand system (see Chapter 8 of this Report). .
Figure 5-54: DPRK Overall Electricity Use by Sector and Year

Estimated DPRK Electricity Use by Sector and Year
40

Terawatt-hours

35
30
25

PUBLIC/COMM'L

MILITARYFISHERIESAGRICULTURALRESIDENTIAL

TRANSPORTINDUSTRIAL
20
15

10
5

0
1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Figure 5-55 presents our rough estimate of overall DPRK electricity use by end use. As
indicated in Table 5-15 as well, electricity used in motors accounts for over half of estimatedelectricity use, with lighting nearly 30 percent, other end-uses about 12 percent, and air
conditioning and space and water heating less than two percent each. The latter two categories
comprise a relatively small share of current DPRK electricity demand because A) air
conditioning is not widely used in the DPRK, especially in residences, and B) space and water
heating are mostly supplied using non-electric energy sources. Both of these situations could
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change, and change rapidly, if electricity supply constraints are lifted for DPRK consumers, thus
it is important to keep these end-uses in mind when considering the DPRK’s electricity future.
Figure 5-55: Overall DPRK Electricity Use by End Use

Estimated Overall DPRK Electricity Use by End Use, 2010 and 2014
through 2020
10,000

9,000
8,000

Gigawatt-hours

7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000

Other End Uses

Air Conditioning

Space and Water Heating

Lighting

Motors and Drives

1,000
2010

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Table 5-15: Overall DPRK Electricity Use by End Use
Estimated Overall DPRK Electricity Use by End Use, 2010 and 2014 through 2020
Electricity Use (GWh)
2010
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Fraction of Total by
End Use
2010
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

Motors and Drives
4,955.13
5,099.74
5,311.13
5,221.56
4,735.99
4,535.48
4,510.74
3,963.28

Lighting
2,468.82
2,388.74
2,475.31
2,544.54
2,522.66
2,572.19
2,551.13
2,551.83

57.0%
58.9%
58.9%
57.8%
55.5%
53.8%
53.9%
49.8%

28.4%
27.6%
27.5%
28.2%
29.6%
30.5%
30.5%
32.1%

Space and
Water
Air
Heating
Conditioning
152.03128.91133.87114.42139.98119.36145.63123.93145.44123.46174.49131.48172.75131.84176.97105.29

1.7%
1.5%
1.6%
1.6%
1.7%
2.1%
2.1%
2.2%

1.5%
1.3%
1.3%
1.4%
1.4%
1.6%
1.6%
1.3%

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKOther End
Uses
992.85924.18967.911,001.65
1,005.35
1,012.49
996.11
1,159.62

11.4%
10.7%
10.7%
11.1%
11.8%
12.0%
11.9%
14.6%

5.4.

Electricity Supply and Demand Conclusions

Throughout this Chapter we have characterized our information on the DPRK electricity sector
as estimates, which they very much are. There are few other countries in the world wherereliable data on energy supply and demand—and probably many other aspects of life—are so
unavailable, at last to outsiders, and probably to all but a very few—if any—residents as well.
The few other countries that come to mind that have comparable data constraints are, forexample, African nations such as Somalia, or South Sudan, or nearby war-torn Yemen on the
Arabian Peninsula, that are frequently in crisis and/or lack functioning governments. It is
probable that even North Korean officials, perhaps even those at the top of the DPRK
administration, do not have a reliable statistical overview of electricity supply and demand.650
As a result, we have been forced to use what information is available, often including anecdotal
and/or indirect information, to assemble an internally-consistent, but still approximate, picture ofelectricity supply and demand in the DPRK. We view our work as a tool for understanding the
DPRK energy and electricity sector, to be updated whenever possible, and as a consequence
welcome inputs from others that can help to refine the estimates presented here.
In this concluding section of this Chapter, we provide a summary of the results of this updated
estimate of DPRK electricity supply and demand, offer some thoughts on the implications of theresults for engagement with the DPRK on electricity sector issues, and identify a few “nextsteps” toward a better understanding of electricity supply and demand in the DPRK and towards
development of engagement projects.
5.4.1. Summary of Results—DPRK Electricity Supply and Demand
The DPRK’s energy sector as of 2020, as well as in most of the preceding three decades, wascharacterized by a combination of lack of key fuels, particularly oil products and electricity, andmostly antiquated demand- and supply-side equipment and infrastructure, often with difficulties
in operation caused by lack of materials for maintenance, particularly in the electricity sectors.
As described above, electricity use since 1990 has decreased considerably in all sectors, though
not necessarily, by our estimates by the same amount in each sector. Most of this decline
occurred during the 1990s—electricity supplies and use appear to have changed relatively little
since 2000, as the DPRK continues to operate on the modest supplies that can be provided byaging power plants and a few new small and medium-sized hydroelectric plants, though the latter
may have technical issues of their own. Hydroelectric power is currently the major source ofelectricity, which makes the DPRK vulnerable to even more constrained power supplies in timesof drought, such as in the past few years. One trend of note in recent year has been forhouseholds and businesses in the DPRK to take power supply into their own hands via thepurchase of imported diesel and gasoline-fueled generators and, more recently solar photovoltaic
panels and battery systems, for use in providing key energy services (lighting and entertainment,
for example) when grid power is not available. Almost all of these imported power systems havecome from China. Although this trend toward distributed electricity provision has some positive
650 On the occasions over the years where we have presented our energy sector estimates to DPRK delegations, delegation

members, after some internal discussion, have found our estimates to be, to their knowledge, “pretty close”.

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impacts (see below), the use of relatively low-efficiency gasoline- and diesel-fueled generators
constitute an inefficient use of the DPRK’s limited petroleum products supplies, in addition to
the negatives of the local pollution and noise created by these generation units.
These results suggest at least two conclusions. First, the status of electricity supply and demand
technologies, and the constraints on electricity supplies, mean that there is considerable scope forenergy efficiency improvements in the DPRK, as better technologies become available.
Widespread deployment of such technologies, of course, are only likely if and once internationalsanctions are eased and as the DPRK’s relations with the international community improve,
which in turn is largely dependent on agreement being reached—or at least a path forward being
agreed upon—on measures related to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. Second, andcountervailing, once restrictions on electricity supplies are eased and the DPRK economy begins
to grow, there will be a considerable increase in energy demand in general, and electricity
demand in particular. It will thus be crucial for the ROK and other nations seeking to engage the
DPRK in energy sector activities strive to assist the rebuilt DPRK to use electricity (and otherfuels) as efficiently as possible to reduce the overall costs and difficulty of supplying electricity
to the DPRK economy in the long run.
5.4.2. Implications of Results for ROK and International Community
Engagement of the DPRK on Electricity Sector Issues
Some of the key implications of the results of this description of the DPRK electricity system aredescribed in the following subsections.
5.4.2.1.Implications of Findings Regarding the DPRK Electricity Supply
SystemThe DPRK electricity supply system, as noted in Section 5.2, is for the most part aging andantiquated, and faces multiple technical and resource challenges in providing reliable electricity
service to the people and organizations of the DPRK. Some of the implications of the DPRK
electricity supply situation for the international community and the ROK, as they consider
engagement options, include:•

Simple provision, by the ROK (or China, or Russia, for that matter) of large amounts ofpower from one of the neighboring country grids will not be possible in the short-tomedium term, because the status of the DPRK electricity T&D system will not support
such imports, even if they could be made available. Provision of relatively small
amounts of power (tens to hundreds of MW) to areas largely isolated from the central
grid, such as the power that the ROK has supplied in the past to the Kaesong Industrial
Park, may be possible in some areas around the DPRK’s borders, but significant infusionsof power to the central or a major regional grid are unlikely to be feasible for several
years, even if grid reconstruction begins soon.

•

Although construction apparently continues on a number of generating stations in the
DPRK—mostly hydroelectric, possibly at least one thermal plant as well—even if all ofthese were to be completed in the next few years, power supply deficits nationwide
would hardly be eliminated. Although the power situation in Pyongyang and surrounding
areas targeted by most of the new plants could improve, evidence, including at one point
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

the replacement of electric locomotives with diesel units for routes heading north from
Pyongyang, suggest that electricity problems, particularly outside of Pyongyang andaway from major power plants, continue to be acute. These deficits continue to present
an opportunity to the international community to work with the DPRK, as a part of acarefully negotiated package of incentives coupled with actions on the DPRK’s part
related to the eventual dismantling of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, onelectricity supply and demand technologies.
•

The status of the DPRK’s thermal power plants, including their age, condition, efficiency,
and environmental characteristics, may mean that when the DPRK electricity grid is
updated, with assistance from the ROK or others, the plants will need to have most of
their components, including boilers, emissions control equipment, generators, andsubstation equipment, totally replaced within a few years of the start of any upgrading ofgenerators. In many cases, even if these plants can be repaired, it is likely that spare parts
for the plants, formerly made in the Soviet Union, would not be available. The conditionof these thermal units likely means that the ROK or others contemplating assisting withrebuilding the DPRK’s generation capabilities will need to be resigned to replacing mostof the existing thermal generation infrastructure.

•

Similarly, although hydroelectric power comprises, by our estimates, the majority ofgeneration in the DPRK, most of the hydroelectric plants in operation in the DPRK are
older, some dating to Japanese colonial times, and likely in need of refurbishment andrepair. Some newer hydro plants, in the megawatt to at most several-hundred-megawatt
size range, have come on line in the last two decades, but in some cases they are quite
small and prone to hydrologic resource restrictions related to river flows, and in othercases there have been disconcerting reports of poor dam stability, substandard materials
use, and other technical difficulties that bring into question the true operability, expected
longevity, and safety of the dams both for workers and for downstream populations.
What this means for the ROK and the international community is that when the DPRK isopen to assistance and engagement on its hydroelectric facilities, the first item of businessis likely to be a full expert technical review of the status of existing facilities, which may
provide sobering and unwelcome news for both North and South Koreans. Thus,
although the DPRK’s resources for hydroelectric generation are certainly significant, it isunlikely that the ROK could count on the existing hydroelectric infrastructure to help
power a unified Korea without considerable additional investment, including, probably
outright replacement (or just removal) of some dams.

•

The unfortunate accompaniment to problems with thermal and hydro generating stations
is the declining condition of the DPRK’s electricity transmission and distribution grid.
With few modern automatic dispatch centers, substation equipment that was reported,even as of the early 2000s, to be many decades old and on the verge of failure (those units
that had not already failed), reports of theft of power lines and equipment for sale on the
scrap metal market (mostly to China, during periods of high commodities prices in thelate 2000s), the DPRK T&D system is reported to be no longer a unified grid, but apatchwork of regional grids centered around power plants. The condition of substationequipment at power plants and other locations constrains the amount of power that can bedelivered to consumers in many areas, as well as the power that could be put into the gridfrom new power plants or from imports. Renewing the T&D system—meaning likely
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replacing everything except, possibly, some power line towers/utility poles—will be a
giant undertaking, with costs likely in the tens of billions of dollars.
•

The sum of the status and needs of the DPRK’s thermal generation, hydroelectric
generation, and electricity T&D systems mean that massive investment and work byperhaps hundreds of thousands of engineers and technicians would be needed to fully
modernize the DPRK’s electricity supply system using a conventional (central grid)
approach. Even in the (highly unlikely, in our view) scenario where the current DPRK
government completely but peacefully collapses, and the ROK is left to fill the void ofadministering the DPRK, the raising of funds for a complete, all-at-once overhaul of the
DPRK electricity system would be extremely daunting, and the logistics of carrying out
the overhaul while providing a clamoring North Korean population with even basic
energy (and other) services would be extremely daunting from many perspectives. As
such, the approach that will probably need to be required is to build/rebuild power
grids—including electricity generation, perhaps with a focus on renewable generation,
T&D (“mini-grids”), and probably even energy demand infrastructure— in local area,
possibly as small as villages, towns, or counties, and slowly aggregate those areas into
more regional and then a national grid over time. Such an approach would allow the
ROK and its international partners to start on DPRK grid modernization even under alimited economic and diplomatic opening by the DPRK, and would allow learning on apractical scale by both DPRK officials and technicians and their international partners
that would allow the scope of the overhaul (and/or replacement) to be efficiently andsmoothly increased as capabilities for engagement on both sides of the DMZ, as well as
in the international community, are enhanced.
5.4.2.2.Implications of Electricity Demand Findings

The findings of our estimates of electricity demand in the DPRK have implications for ROK andinternational community engagement with the DPRK on electricity issues that include thefollowing:•

The substantial decrease in electricity demand—or rather, electricity use—since 1990 isin part due to degradation of end-use equipment (see below on the topic of industrial
electricity demand) but is more closely associated with a lack of electricity supplies. Thismeans that particularly in the residential and public/commercial sectors, but in the
agriculture/fisheries, transport, and to some extent, industrial sectors as well, whenconstraints on electricity supplies are relaxed—assuming some degree of economic
revitalization—demand for electricity will surge. This means that if and when the ROK
makes plans for providing North Koreans with power, requirements will not be in the 7 to
9 TWh range we estimate for electricity use in recent years, but considerably more,perhaps two or three (or more) times that amount within a very few years, depending on
the pace and extent to which regions of the country away from Pyongyang have theirpower supplies restored/redeveloped, and increasing rapidly after that. A DPRK engineer
is quoted in a Radio Free Asia article as suggesting that the country’s current electricity

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

supplies are in fact a fifth of what the DPRK needs for economic development.651 Thisestimate may in fact not be far off, assuming a decade or more of a sustained transition toan open economy.
•

It also means that it is crucial that those who help the DPRK to overhaul its electricity
supply system also pay attention to end-use equipment purchases by households andother consumers as reliable electricity supplies come on line. It will be much lessexpensive (as well as less-polluting) to supply “negawatts” of power—that is, to saveelectricity through assuring purchase of high-efficiency equipment—than to build
additional generation. For example, refrigerators are not particularly common in DPRK
households, especially outside of Pyongyang and especially in rural areas, because
unreliable power supplies make them less than useful. If reliable power supplies areprovided, and incomes are sufficient, it is probable that many households will quickly
purchase refrigerators. The temptation may be for many DPRK households to purchaseused older and less-efficient refrigerators from, for example, the ROK, Japan, or China.
Refrigerator efficiency, however, has improved markedly in recent years, particularly in
Chinese-made units, so the difference between the annual electricity required by a used
and a higher-efficiency new refrigerator may be significant, perhaps a factor of two.
Multiplied by perhaps several million refrigerators that might be purchased in the firstfew years after reliable power service is available, the difference between deploying, or
regulating the deployment, of less- and more-efficient refrigerators could be on the orderof many hundreds of GWh per year, perhaps the approximate equivalent of the output of
a 100 MW power plant. A similar case can be made for upgrading the lighting of all
DPRK buildings to modern LED (light-emitting diode) bulbs and other high-efficiency
lighting systems, many of which use on the order of a tenth of the energy (or less) per
unit of light output of the DPRK’s rugged-but-very-inefficient standard-issue 40-Watt
incandescent bulb, which was until the last 15 years or so the most common lighting
device in the DPRK. High-efficiency industrial motors and motor drives is yet anotherexample of where it will much less expensive to invest in demand-side energy
efficiency—by either subsidizing consumers to purchase high-efficiency units, by
preventing the import of used or low-efficiency new units, and/or by providing
information and design services to firms and government organizations that use motors.

•

The DPRK’s industrial sector as of 1990 was in large part tuned to provide inputs for, anduse outputs of, industries in the Soviet Union. In the years since, although not
exclusively, DPRK factories have, insofar as can be determined, been operating in prettymuch the same way as they did in 1990, albeit at much lower levels of production,
overall, due to a combination of lack of markets (or access to markets), lack of inputs,
lack of spare parts, lack of fuel and electricity, lack of investment capital, and lack ofaccess to modern industrial equipment (due to international economic sanctions on the
DPRK. If the ongoing political impasse on the DPRK’s nuclear (and other) weapons
programs can be overcome, and an opening of the DPRK economy begins, it is not clear
what the DPRK’s industrial economy will look like, once change takes hold, but it likely
will not, for the most part, look like what it did in 1990. Smaller, lighter manufacturing

651 Sung Hui Moon (2013, translated by Doeun Han, and written in English by Joshua Lipes), “North Korea Seeking Electricity

Supply from China”, Radio Free Asia Korean Service, dated 2013-10-21, available as
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/electricity-10212013160033.html.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKmay become much more prevalent, for example, although the DPRK’s mineral wealthand lower labor costs than in the ROK and other nearby nations may leave the basic
metals and minerals sectors, in upgraded form, a key part of the industrial economy.
What this means for electricity use remains to be seen, but it seems possible thatelectricity use per unit of economic output could decline in the DPRK under an economic
opening scenario, and the growth in electricity requirements for industry may be lower
than the growth in electricity use in other sectors. The implications of a changing
industrial sector for the ROK and the international community include both expanded
opportunities for new businesses in the DPRK, and opportunities to guide the acquisitionof new end-use equipment so as to restrain the growth in DPRK industrial sector
electricity consumption, and the requirement of supplies to serve that consumption,
without impinging on economic growth.
•

If and when the DPRK electricity sector is overhauled and modernized, presumably withthe help of ROK and international organizations, it will likely be expected that North
Koreans will ultimately be responsible for at least a significant share of the cost of the
upgrades. A key problem in the DPRK shouldering those costs, however, is thatelectricity markets essentially do not exist in the DPRK. With a very few exceptions,electricity in the DPRK has been distributed for a minimal monthly flat fee, not meteredby the kilowatt-hour. As a result, markets for electricity, and the organizations andtechnical infrastructure to operate (and regulate) them, must be created as or before theelectricity system is modernized in order for at least a significant portion of the costs ofelectricity supplies to be recovered from consumers, as well as to send price signals to
discourage inefficient use of electricity. Building those markets will be a key undertaking
for the ROK and the international community as engagement with the DPRK onelectricity sector issues begins.
5.4.2.3.Potential Implications of Surge in Solar PV System Sales in the
DPRK

In a way, and perhaps not entirely intentionally, the DPRK seems to be approaching the same
renewable energy path that German policies have been emphasizing for some years. A recent
article in Foreign Policy describes the trend, under a policy called Energiewende, in which theorchestrated use of mostly local renewable energy sources has been replacing power from central
stations:652 “[i]n just a dozen years, industrial-powerhouse Germany has replaced around 31
percent of its nuclear and fossil fuel generated electricity with green power, produced
overwhelmingly from moderately sized onshore wind, solar PV, hydro, and bio-energy
installations—an achievement no one predicted when the Energiewende commenced in 2000.”
One of the features of the German approach has been an emphasis on increasing the use ofrenewable energy starting at the local and regional levels, a “citizen-led energy boom” in which
local projects increasingly use smart grids to manage local demand and supply and, increasingly,
to trade power with other cities and regions. Such an approach, if not necessarily consistent withhow the DPRK government has typically managed its energy sector, is certainly consistent with

652 Paul Hockenos (2014), Germany's Revolution in Small Batch, Artisanal Energy”, Foreign Policy.com, dated October 31,

2014, and available as
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/10/31/german_green_energy_revolution_backyard_windmills_solar_gas.

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both the North Korean philosophy of juche, or self-reliance, as well as with DPRK government
exhortations, in recent years, to local areas to provide their own energy sources to augment
central supplies. Consistent with this direction is the recent announcement of the organization ofa “natural energy institute” in Pyongyang “with various rooms for researches into wind energy,
geotherm, solar heat and other natural energies, e-library, laboratories, a pilot plant, etc”.653
Setting up such an institute was a topic that Nautilus Institute talked about with DPRK
counterparts as early as 2000. The DPRK government’s longstanding interest in renewableenergy, coupled with the widespread grassroots adoption of solar PV and other renewable
technologies, mean that cooperation in renewable energy systems will likely serve as an
attractive (to both sides) and helpful approach to engagement between the DPRK and theinternational community.
The DPRK’s growing markets for solar PV systems in the last decade (and presumably
continuing, although recent trade data are lacking) suggest two things. First, it suggests that that
there is likely a high level of suppressed demand for electricity in the in both rural and urban
areas. Second, the evident willingness on the part of DPRK citizens to pay high costs per unit ofelectricity delivered by use of PV/battery systems reflects the very high “opportunity cost” offoregoing the use of electricity when it is needed.
In South Korea, on the other hand, in contrast with German policies, and also in contrast, forexample, to the strong growth in installation of solar power in Japan (driven in part by the postFukushima anxiety about reliance on nuclear power, as well as by the high prices of electricity inJapan and Japanese Feed-in Tariff policies), the ROK government’s commitment to promoting
the domestic use of solar PV power waned in the mid-2010s.654 Under the Administration of
President Moon Jae-in in the ROK, a renewed commitment to renewable power development has
been made, but progress remains limited. In the DPRK, the need to rehabilitate virtually theentire power sector may, paradoxically, coupled with the demonstrated interest by individual
DPRK citizens in harvesting the benefits of renewable energy (and thereby receiving at least
some of the energy services they have been missing), make it easier, not harder, for the DPRK tofollow the German model of growth of local and even household renewable energy systems into
local, then regional, then national renewables-dominated smart grids. Achieving such a future
rapidly will of course require investment, as well as technical and other assistance, from outside
the DPRK, assistance that can only come via cooperation and engagement with the international
community. It is even possible that a DPRK focused on using renewables for green growth will
help to spur the ROK to take more meaningful steps in the same direction, thus moving South
Korea more rapidly toward the goals implied by its government’s stated, and as far back as 2008,
and recently renewed, intent to undertake a green energy path.

653 Korean Central News Agency (KCNA, 2014), “Natural Energy Institute Established in DPRK”, dated November 4, 2014, andpreviously available as http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2014/201411/news04/20141104-10ee.html.
654 BusinessKorea (2014), “Dark Outlook: Domestic Solar Power Demand Expected to Plummet”, dated October 15, 2014, andavailable as http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=6812.

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5.4.3. Possible “Next Steps”“Next steps” related to understanding of the DPRK electricity sector, and, ultimately, toengagement of DPRK counterpart organizations in collaborative projects on electricity sector
topics might include the following.
5.4.3.1.Potential Research Projects
Research organizations, whether governmental, non-governmental, private, or affiliated with
regional multinational organizations, could help to develop additional background information toassist DPRK engagement projects in several different ways, including:•Continuing to update, at every opportunity, the publicly available knowledge about theelectricity sector (and broader energy sector and economy) in the DPRK. Related
research efforts could include working with visitors to the DPRK, including, for example,
Chinese and Russian commercial interests who have worked on electricity projects there, toobtain a more complete view of the DPRK electricity sector, working with DPRK refugees in
the ROK and China to learn about electricity availability in different locations and different
sectors in the DPRK, and continuing to otherwise gather and assemble, within an organizedstructure (including, for example, a Geographic Information System—GIS—database655),
updated information on the DPRK electricity sector, as has been summarized earlier in thisReport.

•Continue to investigate and refine future electricity scenarios for the DPRK, so as tolearn more about the potential for different approaches to electricity sector redevelopment,
including the relative cost and performance of different approaches. This work could include
assembly of updated information on electric energy efficiency and renewable energy
measures that might be applied in the DPRK. Future electricity scenarios should be
evaluated in the context of overall energy scenarios for the DPRK, in order to assure
consistency across the entire energy economy, and should also, ideally, be integrated withanalysis of energy futures in neighboring countries that might share electricity generation andother resources with the DPRK, particularly that of the ROK.

•

Undertake an examination of the costs and requirements to bring the DPRK’s
electricity generation and T&D system up to 21st century standards. This would involve
doing a careful estimation of the electricity supply system needs under different DPRK
electricity demand scenarios and would likely involve both the exploration of different typesof supply systems (for example, distributed versus centralized grids) as well as therequirements and options for merging the DPRK grid system with that of the ROK and/or
exploring regional grid interconnections with, for example, the Russian Far East.

•

Assemble a roster of experts on DPRK electricity issues, including those from the ROK
and elsewhere, and call together a meeting of a group of experts similar to the Energy
Experts Working Group Meetings that Nautilus convened in 2006, 2008, and 2010, to allow
experts to share experiences and learn from each other, and also to inform selected others,

655 An example of a GIS database for the DPRK is that compiled by 38 North in their DPRK Digital Atlas, available as

http://38northdigitalatlas.org/.

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potentially including ROK government representatives and key members the international
community (including bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and donors, for example).
•

Work to develop electricity products and related goods for application in the DPRK
and elsewhere. Research organizations could also undertake R&D into what types ofelectricity supply and demand approaches—for example, solar photovoltaic/battery andefficient end-use equipment systems for different types of humanitarian and other needs inthe DPRK—might be most applicable and cost-effective in a DPRK context, so as to beready to deploy those technologies in the context of engagement projects (and ultimately,commercial sales in the DPRK) when the opportunity arises.

The ultimate goals of all of these types of research are to increase the readiness of theinternational community, and particularly the ROK, and to provide useful, well-informed, andwell-designed assistance to the DPRK electricity sector when the opportunity arises to do so.
5.4.3.2.Potential Engagement Projects—Training
In all likelihood, the first set of engagement projects undertaken between any ROK orother foreign institution and their DPRK counterpart will be related to training/capacity-building,whether in the electricity sector or in other areas. Here the typical sequence of training on any
topic would likely be:
1. Start with trainings in a third (not ROK) country, such as China or possibly Mongolia, for afew (4-10) DPRK counterparts. The training can be provided by experts from the ROK, US,or other nations, and should probably involve a brief local study tour. Such a training could,
and in some cases would optimally, involve trainees from other nations, particularly thosefriendly to the DPRK and to others (such as Mongolia or other developing Asian nations), forwhom the training is also applicable.
2. Offer DPRK counterparts the opportunity to undertake short courses of study at academic
institutions in a third country, and/or organize study tours for DPRK counterparts in Europe,
North America, Australia or elsewhere on the desired topic.
3. Send a delegation of experts to the DPRK to provide a course of perhaps one to three weeks
in a desired topic for perhaps several dozen DPRK trainees. A follow-up course may also benecessary. One of the goals of such a training would be to “train the trainers”, that is, train
DPRK counterparts sufficiently that they can pass on what they have learned to others, or atleast be “up to speed” sufficiently to be active participants in pilot and demonstration projects(such as those described below). A part of this visit will be for the foreign experts to assess
the skills and needs of DPRK trainees, and see what “works” in the DPRK, so as to be able toimprove the design of course offerings in the future.
4. Work to integrate trainings into more formal and regular course offerings at DPRK institutesof higher learning and/or research institutes.
5. Provide opportunities for DPRK researchers to undertake graduate courses of study abroad invarious energy-related fields.
This generic sequence would be applicable to any of dozens of different training topics in theenergy and related fields. For the electricity sector, these topics could include (but are most350
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

certainly not limited to) the following, which are presented in no particular order of importance,
though all would be extremely useful in the DPRK:•

Organization and operation of electricity markets, including methods of electricity
pricing, billing, and collections.

•

Development of stable financing arrangements and markets for independent
power producers, including developers of local mini-grids.

•

Renewable electricity generation resources assessment.

•

Electricity supply planning and electricity demand survey design andimplementation.

•

Building energy efficiency, including efficient use of electricity in lighting,heating/cooling, and other end-uses.

•

Renewable electricity system design and implementation, including solar, wind,and small/mini/micro hydro power.

•

Energy economics, including techniques for economic assessment of electricity
projects and alternatives.

•

Application of energy planning tools, both for broad energy sector use andspecifically for modeling in the electricity sector such as electricity transmission
and distribution and production cost modeling.

•

Environmental impacts of electricity generation systems, including environmental
monitoring and estimation of emissions from power plants.

•

Development of Clean Development Mechanism projects in the electricity sector.

•

Electricity transmission and distribution system equipment, control, planning, andmonitoring.
5.4.3.3.Potential Engagement Projects—Energy Assessments and Energy
Planning for the Electricity Sector

The first step to addressing electricity sector needs in the DPRK is to better understand theexisting problems and current conditions, as well as to explore options for addressing those
problems with DPRK counterparts. These could include:•

Carrying out joint surveys of electricity use in various sectors, as well as surveys of the useof other fuels that might be used as substitutes for electricity (due to the lack of electricity
availability). Examples here include rural and agricultural electricity use, household
electricity use, and electricity use in specific industrial facilities, including, for example, asurvey of the types, sizes, and uses of electric motors in industry. The results of thesesurveys, which should be carried out jointly with DPRK counterparts and used as both data
gathering and capacity-building opportunities, would then help to inform, for example, thedevelopment of pilot and demonstration projects as suggested below, and ultimately, tosector-wide implementation of electric energy use improvements. Working hard to maintaintransparency at all levels of energy surveys will be a key to their success in the DPRK. That
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKmeans involving DPRK counterparts in all phases of the survey process, from survey design
to implementation, data processing, and interpretation of results.
•

Electricity demand/supply assessments. Researching and compiling (with local authorities
and engineers/technicians/researchers) a thorough quantitative assessment of the electricity
demand of a particular subject facility or area, which could be a hospital, school, industrial
facility, or a village or town, together with an assessment of the existing electricity supply
resources (thermal, hydro, wind, and portable generators, for example) and infrastructure(power supplies, fuel storage, mines, electricity T&D, and others) available to provide
electricity One tool in carrying out such assessments is energy surveys like those above, butother types of tools will be needed as well. The assessments themselves should, by involving
a team of DPRK counterparts, help to complete the necessary surveys and measurements,
provide "teachable moments" to start to build the capability to carry out such assessments
wherever they are needed in the DPRK, which is essentially everywhere. As such, it willoffer a first step in what will need to be a similar process nationwide, as the DPRK figuresout (with whatever outside assistance can be practically provided) how to modernize its
electricity system to support a sustainable economy.

•

Engagement built around energy planning topics and tools. Ideally in conjunction withsome of the activities described above, it will be useful to engage DPRK researchers incarrying out the building and testing of different electricity scenarios for the DPRK. A
software tool such as LEAP (Low Emissions Analysis Platform, formerly Long-range Energy
Alternatives Planning656)—which we have used to prepare and evaluate quantitative
scenarios for the DPRK energy sector, as reported in Chapter 8 of this Report and in previous
Nautilus publications, and in which we have trained a number of DPRK delegations in theuse of—could be used as an organizing mechanism for teaching and assembling data, as well
as for learning about what data are missing. Other types of energy planning that could be
explored, some of which could use LEAP, include greenhouse gas emissions
mitigation/Clean Development Mechanisms application associated with the electricity sector,
utility integrated resources planning, climate change adaptation related to the electricity
sector, electric energy efficiency measure implementation, and transmission system planning.
In each case, the subject for these energy planning exercises could be the DPRK as a wholeor, if that is initially politically difficult within the DPRK, could start with a smaller
jurisdiction, such as a single county or province, moving on to a country-wide assessment(and, perhaps eventually, a two-Koreas effort), as DPRK authorities become more
comfortable with the concept.
5.4.3.4.Help to Build/Reinforce Centers of Expertise

The DPRK has a tradition of developing centers of expertise on various topics, including,for example, electricity supply and renewable electricity generation, which are used both as
R&D facilities and as means for dissemination of technologies and practices to places andorganizations where they are needed. Potential options for engagement in building new, or
enhancing existing, Centers of Expertise related to electricity supply and demand include:

656 The LEAP software tool has been developed and is offered by the Stockholm Environment Institute—United States (SEI-US).

See https://leap.sei.org/default.asp?action=home.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Training Center. This concept, discussed atsome length and with great enthusiasm with several DPRK delegations we have hosted,
would involve combining provision of information materials (a process already begun by
Nautilus and other), assembling assessment tools (such as measurement devices for wind andsolar energy, and more basic measurement tools for temperature, pressure, heat flow,
electricity, and other parameters), and, above all, providing training by experts in renewableenergy and energy efficiency for DPRK actors who would then serve to further disseminate
the information. This concept was, in fact, the topic of a partial proposal written jointly by
Nautilus and a DPRK delegation in 2001, and still very much in favor in the DPRK, thoughpolitical conditions since late 2002 have not allowed the joint proposal effort to move
forward.

•Center of Expertise for Building Energy Efficiency. An important special case of anenergy efficiency center, one worthy of standing on its own, is developing a Center ofExpertise for building energy efficiency, including efficient building design, training ofbuilding energy auditors, provision of computer tools and analytical hardware related tobuilding energy design and efficiency, and R&D on materials for energy-efficient buildings.
The Center would also include a component related to the development and analysis ofbuilding energy codes (including a library of codes from other countries). Many US andKorean organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, exist that could be engaged
in helping to provide training and materiel for such a center, and we are certain that DPRK
counterparts are interested in this idea.

•

Center of Expertise on Environmental Management. This concept would involve
equipping a DPRK center to do research on the environmental conditions in the DPRK,
including, for example, monitoring of toxins in the environment, air and water pollutants,
ecological health, and other parameters. Engagement options could include providing
training on a variety of environmental issues, including those associated with electricity
supply facilities, for DPRK scientists and technicians, and carrying out pilot remediation
projects, initially small, to address environmental concerns in local areas. This concept was
originally suggested by Nautilus and others in the context of possible “repurposing” of the
Yongbyon nuclear facility for peaceful purposes,657 but could be applied to existing researchor academic centers in the DPRK, could involve creating a new center on a new site, or could
be used to find new purposes for other types of industrial or military research units.
5.4.3.5.Pilot and Demonstration Projects

Demonstration projects have great value in the DPRK, where they serve as a key tool for
dissemination of technologies, experience, and know-how in the country. A few of the many
opportunities for such projects in the electricity sector include:•

Solar photovoltaic system deployment: Solar PV systems imported from China havealready proven extremely popular in the DPRK, as noted above. A project could implement
solar photovoltaic/battery systems for humanitarian (at one or more schools, hospitals, and/or

657 See D. von Hippel (2010), Possible Energy, Economic, and Other Engagement/Assistance Activities to Combine with

Yongbyon Decommissioning/Conversion, dated January 2010, and available as http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/Yongbyon-Decommissioning-and-Conversion.pdf.

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nurseries, for example) and/or for economic (tourist facilities) use. The project would startwith imported solar panels but could include a component for design and fabrication of
support structures in the DPRK, as well as providing training on the maintenance andmonitoring of solar PV systems, and/or to the ultimate integration of larger PV systems withlocal electrical grids, either existing or new.
•Mini or micro-hydro system pilot project: There are apparently many mini- and microhydro projects in the DPRK, but their level of performance is unknown, and thought to be
suboptimal. Choosing a mini- or micro-hydro site, whether new and existing, and applying
cost-effective construction methods to develop both the dam and generator and the systems
to use power from the generator (probably including some local economic development
and/or humanitarian project using the power) would provide a pilot facility that could, ifwell-designed, be replicated in many parts of the DPRK.

•Wind power pilot projects: Alternatively, a pilot project could be launched to assess thewind resource in one or more candidate areas where the wind power potential is expected to
be good, followed by deployment, working closely with DPRK engineers and researchers, of(probably imported) wind machines, and follow-up monitoring of same. Here it should be
noted that if the wind power project is to be stand-alone, it should probably be integrated
with another renewable energy project, such as micro-hydro or mini-hydro, and an energy
storage system, such as battery electricity storage or pumped-storage hydro, as well as a new
distribution grid and related equipment for the area served. If the project is to be gridintegrated, a prior assessment of the local grid will be needed to see if it is adequate tosupport the wind machines. In the likely event that it is not, it may be necessary to build a
new grid in the local area, supplied with power from hydro and/or diesel generation. In any
case, a key part of such projects would be training on installation and maintenance protocols,
in wind power technology and economics, and in monitoring and assessing wind resources.
Wind power can also be interpreted more broadly to include water pumping windmills,
which have many applications in the DPRK, and can be made locally.658•

Development of new “green buildings” for use as clinics, schools, or for other purposes:
An activity that could involve and help to retrain DPRK workers in the building sector might
be to work closely with international counterparts in the ROK, US, Europe, and elsewhere to
design and build one or several highly energy-efficient “green buildings” incorporating, forexample, solar passive or active heating, along with many electric and other energy
efficiency measures. The idea is that the building would be a laboratory and showcase forelectric and other building energy efficiency measures for the DPRK, and available formonitoring and study as a part of the work of the Center of Expertise for Building Energy
Efficiency and/or the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Training Center
described above.

•

Energy efficiency in existing residential and institutional buildings: More generally,
existing residential and institutional buildings on a chosen site, which could possibly be thesites of an existing institutes that might be project partners, as well as nearby support
buildings (child care centers, schools, cafeterias, and similar facilities) could be fitted with

658 In our trip to the DPRK in 2000, we provided our counterparts with an example of a relatively easily fabricated water-

pumping windmill. Our understanding is that this design has in fact been replicated and deployed in some areas.

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energy-efficient lighting systems and with building control and monitoring systems (heat,electricity, and temperature sensors, meters, and recorders) to allow the buildings to also beenergy efficiency “laboratories” to help to advance energy efficiency practices in the country
as a whole. This type of demonstration project could also be an undertaking of staff of theCenter of Expertise for Building Energy Efficiency and/or the Renewable Energy andEnergy Efficiency Training Center described above. The buildings might well (almost
certainly will) need to be largely rewired to take advantage of electrical system efficiency
upgrades, which would provide an opportunity to wire the host institute campus fortelecommunications (especially computer networks) as well. The energy efficiency upgrade
process would be preceded by assessments of energy-efficiency needs for the targetedbuildings, which would again provide an opportunity for initial training of DPRK expert
trainers-to-be who, in turn, might help to staff one of the Centers of Excellence describedabove.
•Development of local power options and T&D systems: This option would begin with anassessment of one or more local electricity grid and power supply systems, and, dependingon the findings of the assessment, could include partial or wholesale rebuilding of theelectricity distribution grid in local areas, replacement of existing substations or transformers,
and possibly the addition of new power generation, either in the form of combined heat andpower systems (as above) and/or with independent power systems, probably, judging fromthe terrain and the presence of a river nearby (if applicable), a mini- or micro-hydro system(as noted above), but possibly integrated with a small ridge-mounted wind-power system(and/or pumped-storage hydro system) as well (in part for demonstration/training purposes).
Once again, energy supply assessment process, and the development of local power systems
and T&D networks, can be expected to contribute to local and national expertise in theseareas, and the new energy infrastructure set up as a result of this effort could/should be
configured with sensors and other attributes so as to be used as pilot and demonstration
systems for further training and study for researchers and technicians from throughout the
DPRK.

•

Providing agricultural assistance for local areas: Providing a combination of technicalassistance, and improved electric equipment (crop processing equipment, irrigationequipment, and food storage equipment, for example) for one or more villages could help toboost local food production, providing both a humanitarian benefit and a demonstration ofsustainable modern agricultural practices, as well as a way for foreign experts to learn about
which practices are likely to applicable in the DPRK, and which are now. Monitoring ofagricultural soils and products for soil composition and, if the area has a history of, forexample, industrial pollution, for toxins, with remediation as needed, could also be a part ofthis type of assistance. Making sure that those in the project area have as much control as
possible over their food security—by providing them with enhanced wherewithal to produce
their own food to the extent possible, would also be a goal (perhaps unstated) of this option.

•“Energy Independent Village” Demonstration Project: An “Energy-Independent/Green
Energy Village” (GEV) project could integrate many of the pilot project concepts describedabove. Such a project would combine elements of renewable energy supply, rebuilt or
replaced electricity infrastructure, energy needs assessment/energy planning, deployment ofbuilding energy efficiency and other energy efficiency technologies, and local economic
development opportunities, among others. A GEV project would meet the needs of a DPRK
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

village or town by, for example, providing energy supplies and livelihoods for village
dwellers that reduce their dependency on the state while demonstrating “green” technologies
and green energy concepts that could be applied throughout the DPRK. A GEV project
could also be a laboratory for applications of energy-efficiency and renewable energy (EEand RE) concepts developed in the ROK, as well as an opportunity to market ROK EE andRE technologies to other nations. A GEV project would also provide a demonstration of
low-carbon development, thus it could be a useful illustration of approaches to global
environmental problems, as well as an application of Clean Development Mechanisms(CDM) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The
humanitarian benefits that an GEV project would be expected to provide will help to meetthe political needs of groups in the ROK and elsewhere who would be called upon to support
the project, and the economic development elements that must be incorporated in the projectwill be important in securing both the DPRK and ROK approval for the project.659

6.

Estimates of Refined Product Supply and Demand in the DPRK, 2010 –
2020
6.1.

Overview

The supply of refined oil products in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has
been constrained to varying degrees since the breakup of the Soviet Union after 1990. The
economic dislocation in the DPRK—due to severed access to concessional oil supplies, tomarkets for goods formerly made in the DPRK for use in Soviet republics and satellite nations,and to spare parts for factories largely provisioned by the USSR, among other factors—meantthat crude oil and oil products imports in the quantities consumed in 1990 and earlier became
unaffordable for the DPRK. What imports were available after the early 1990s were at levels
that constrained demand, meaning, for example, that vehicles were used less (and human andanimal labor more) in transport and in farming, and that substitute fuels for various end uses
became more important. In more recent years, the availability of oil products in the DPRK, atleast judging from anecdotal evidence and based on statistics on imports of oil-consuming
vehicles and equipment, appears to have been improved.660 This trend has been interrupted tosome extent starting in 2017 by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions targeting
DPRK oil imports in response to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and missile programs, but
sanctions do not have appeared to have had the dramatic impact on the DPRK economy that the659 Nautilus prepared a detailed report on the “GEV” project concept in 2013 for an organization in the ROK.

The report has not
yet been released.
660 See David von Hippel and Peter Hayes (2018), DPRK Motor Vehicle Imports from China, 2000-2017: Implications For
DPRK Energy Economy, NAPSNet Special Reports, August 23, 2018, available as https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-specialreports/dprk-motor-vehicle-imports-from-china-2000-2017-implications-for-dprk-energy-economy/, and David von Hippel andPeter Hayes, DPRK Imports of Generators in Recent Years: An Indication of Growing Consumer Choice and Influence on
Energy Supply Decisions?, NAPSNet Special Reports, November 02, 2018, available as https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnetspecial-reports/dprk-imports-of-generators-in-recent-years-an-indication-of-growing-consumer-choice-and-influence-on-energysupply-decisions/. Note that DPRK imports of vehicles and generators as reported in United Nations Comtrade trade statistics(https://comtrade.un.org/data/), most of which are from China, have dropped off steeply between 2017 and 2018. It is certainly
possible that some of this decline is due to UNSC sanctions enforcement, but the decline is such that it is difficult to believe that
trade channels and relationships between vendors and buyers would have shriveled so quickly, so we suspect that some off-books
trades in vehicles and generators continued through 2018.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKUnited States and others had hoped for, likely meaning that oil products are finding their way
into the country by routes not reported in, for example, customs statistics.
This Chapter661 presents Nautilus’ estimates of refined oil product supply and demand in the
DPRK for the years 2010 and 2014 through 2020, along with the methods and assumptions used
to prepare these estimates, key conclusions, and a related comparison of a potential DPRK
engagement strategy for humanitarian relief of some impacts of UN Security Council sanctions
versus the volume of petroleum products use in the DPRK. Although as of this writing the year
2020 is not yet complete, we include estimates and projections for oil and oil product supply anddemand for 2020 here in part to illustrate the likely effects of the coronavirus SARS-CoV2(COVID-19) pandemic, and national measures put in place to control it, on the DPRK. An
additional factor that has led us to update the report at this time has been the finding that the
DPRK’s main active refinery added a piece of equipment, called a catalytic cracking unit, inapproximately 2016, and that the use of that unit has likely changed the mix of products that the
DPRK can produce from the crude oil it imports from China. This finding caused us toreexamine our refined product balance for the year 2017, as well as changing our assumptions
for subsequent years, and suggests that supplies of (and demand for) diesel fuel and (especially)
gasoline were in fact higher in that year than we originally estimated.
Key elements of these results presented in the sections that follow include:•

Estimated refined product balances, showing the origin of refined product supplies (thatis, imported or produced in domestic refineries), the use of refined product in energy
transformation (such as electricity generation), and estimated demand for refined
products by fuel and by sector through 2020.

•

Figures showing the estimated volumes of oil product imports and oil products refined incountry by type of refined product for selected years between 2000 and 2020.

•

Tables and graphs showing fuel demand by end-use sector (and for electricity generation)
for diesel oil, gasoline (petrol) and kerosene/jet fuel.

•A brief description of the potential impacts of a program of rapid-deployment building
energy efficiency and solar photovoltaic power measures, were it to be offered by theinternational community, that would address some of the humanitarian issues associatedwith UNSC sanctions on the DPRK related to coal exports and oil product imports
without removing those sanctions.

Our analysis of DPRK oil products supply and demand shows fairly robust growth in the use of
petroleum products in most sectors from 2010 through 2016. This growth included very rapid
growth in the use of diesel fuel and gasoline to fuel imported internal combustion electricity
generators that were imported in large quantities, particularly in 2014 through 2016, and mostly
from China. As UNSC sanctions came into full force, our analysis shows declines in oil
products use in most sectors, as well as in electricity generation by households and organizations,
between 2016 and 2019, due to the oil supply restrictions brought on by sanctions. Even with

661 The contents of this chapter was published earlier as David von Hippel and Peter Hayes (2020), UPDATED ESTIMATES OF

REFINED PRODUCT SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN THE DPRK, 2010 – 2020, NAPSNet Special Reports, dated September 02,
2020, and available as https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/updated-estimates-of-refined-product-supply-anddemand-in-the-dprk-2010-2020/.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

reduced demand, we found that a balancing was required between assumptions as to reductions
in domestic demand for oil products from 2016 to 2019—given reports of only modest fuelshortages and limited evident reduction in economic activity in the DPRK as reported byvisitors—together with what we assume, based in part on reports by others, must be theavailability of additional “off-books” oil supplies procured by various means. The combinationof the impacts of quarantines to protect the DPRK population from COVID-19, together with theimpacts of those quarantines on fuel supplies (both “on-books” and “off-books”), has meant thatour projections for fuel demand and supply in 2020 will ultimately be significantly lower than in
2019, although these demand reductions vary significantly by sector.
6.2.

Analytical Methods

Although energy supply and, particularly, demand statistics are less complete than analysts might
prefer in many countries, the DPRK is an outliner in terms of information provision, as it
publishes essentially no direct information on its energy supply and demand. At the same time,
its “energy insecurity”—that is, its lack of access to fuels, particularly petroleum fuels, and theenergy services that those fuels provide, has been (and continues to be), in our view, a key driverof its decision to pursue nuclear weapons and related missile technology development over the
past three decades. As such, understanding the DPRK’s fuels supply and demand situation is
critical to understanding potential solutions to the current political stalemate that international
community actors might pursue.
Given the need to understand the DPRK energy sector, and the lack of direct data available,
Nautilus Institute has built and periodically updated its analysis of North Korean energy supply
and demand by collecting as much available public sector data relating to energy use and the
DPRK economy as possible, including anecdotal information from visitors, customs statistics
from the DPRK’s trading partners, estimates on sectoral output by international and otherorganizations, and analyses of the DPRK economy by other researchers. This information was
and is used to compile a “bottom-up” (demand-driven) analysis of changes to the DPRK
economy, starting in 1990 (the last “normal” year for DPRK energy supply and demand), using
as much sector detail as can be included. To ensure that these estimates are internally consistent,
we use an “energy balance” approach widely used to report national energy supply and demand
worldwide, for example, by the International Energy Agency (IEA).662
Our DPRK energy analysis works includes the preparation of energy balances—in which
supplies (imports, exports, domestic production) of fuels are balanced by their use andconversion to other forms via energy transformation processes such as oil refining and electricity
generation, and, ultimately, by end-use demand—for all of the fuel categories used in the DPRK
economy.663 In addition, we prepare estimated detailed supply-demand balances for oil products

662 See, for example, the IEA compendium available for sale at http://data.iea.org/payment/products/117-world-energy-balances-

2019-edition-.aspx, or the energy balances published by the Korea Energy Economics Institute for the Republic of Korea (ROK)
as a part of (for example) Energy Info Korea 2017, available as http://www.keei.re.kr/keei/download/EnergyInfo2017.pdf.
663 Previous versions of our DPRK energy analysis work for all fuels are David von Hippel and Peter Hayes (2012), Foundationsof Energy Security for the DPRK: 1990 – 2009 Energy Balances, Engagement Options, and Future Paths for Energy andEconomic Development, dated September 13, 2012, and available as
http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/1990-2009-DPRK-ENERGY-BALANCES-ENGAGEMENT-OPTIONSUPDATED-2012_changes_accepted_dvh_typos_fixed.pdf; and David von Hippel and Peter Hayes (2014), An Updated Summaryof Energy Supply and Demand in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), NAPSNet Special Reports, April 15,

358
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKin particular, meaning for crude oil and for the refined petroleum products made from crude oil,whether those products are domestically refined or imported. Our most recent estimated refined
product balances for the DPRK are provided in the section of this report that follows.
Refined Products Balances, 2010 and 2014-2020
through Table 6-8 present refined product balance tables for the years 2010 and 2014 through2020, respectively. By our estimates, overall supplies of refined products increased by on theorder of 25 percent between 2010 and 2016, with some of that increase being used to expand
activity in the transport and other end-use sectors, but much of it going to fuel gasoline- and,particularly, diesel-engine generators, which had been imported in increasing number in previous
years, largely from China. Increased use of generators is an indicator of DPRK citizens andorganizations taking more of the initiative in providing for their needs for energy services—in
this case electricity—in response to limited supplies of electricity available from national andregional grids.
The supplies and thus use of oil products decreased between 2016 and 2017, by our estimates, as
the impacts of UNSC sanctions on oil products imports, although it is our estimate that “offbooks” imports of oil products must have continued at a significant level in 2017. Supplies
decreased only somewhat from 2017 to 2018, despite ongoing UNSC sanctions, again, we
estimate, because off-books imports were significant, and also because we assume that crude oil
supplies increased somewhat in 2018 (see below).
Another key set of difference between the refined product balances estimated for 2017 andsubsequent years versus those of 2016 and previous years is the implication of the impacts of theinstallation of a catalytic cracking unit at the DPRK’s refinery in its far Northwest at Sinuiju, thePonghwa Chemical Factory. The estimated impacts of the addition of this unit are presented in
more detail below, and include a reduction in the amount of heavy fuel oil available to and usedby the DPRK (as heavy fuel oil is a key input to the cracking unit) and a nearly corresponding
increase in gasoline and diesel oil, with an emphasis on gasoline and similar light oil products.
Although there have been no official-reported cases of COVID-19 in the DPRK, the DPRK
government has responded to the pandemic with measures designed to protect North Koreansfrom the virus. It is clear that the DPRK’s response to the pandemic has changed the way thatthe country operated its economy, including its energy sector, through at least the first half of2020, and many of these changes seem likely to persist, at least partially, through the end of 2020
at least. Worldwide, national and local “lock-downs” and “stay-at-home” orders have resulted
in vast reductions in energy demand, particularly for transportation, in part causing, among otherimpacts, a vast drop in oil prices, and rapidly filling oil and gas storage depots. The DPRK’senergy supply situation is unlike that of other countries, particularly for oil products, due to
UNSC sanctions and resulting restrictions on its oil imports. These restrictions require the
DPRK to use “unofficial” means to obtain oil supplies and export coal, strategies that are likely
more difficult to carry out during the pandemic, due to the need for cooperation by outside
trading partners as well as domestic regulations on contacts with foreigners.
The coronavirus pandemic has thus undoubtedly affected DPRK oil product supply and demand.
Probably the effect has been significant, as it has in other nations, but since the DPRK provides
2014, available as http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/an-updated-summary-of-energy-supply-and-demand-in-thedemocratic-peoples-republic-of-korea-dprk/

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKno energy statistics, and what international energy statistics there are for trade with the DPRK
are unlikely to be available for 2020 for some months (and will likely show little trade anyway,
due to UNSC sanctions), determining the net impact of the pandemic is a matter for analysis andestimation. We have assumed that the national COVID-19 “lockdown” has and will continue torestrict fuel products demand in many sectors through 2020, although there may be some
reduction in restrictions toward the end of the year, and will also results in restrictions on fuelimports, both on- and off-books, by limiting and slowing cross-border commercial traffic by landand sea. The results of our analyses of energy supply and demand for oil products are provided
below.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 6-1: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2010
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesCRUDEOILGASOLINE
25,3093,649

DIESEL
9,523

HEAVY KEROSENE LPG, REF.
AVIATIONOIL& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
GAS
(426)
1,741
302
-

251
25,058

3,649

9,955
432

684
1,110

1,741

430
128

(25,309)

5,199

1,585

5,728

1,218

2,466

480

(25,309)

(135)
5,333

(3,428)
5,013(3,546)
9,310

1,218

(10)
3,956

480

TOTAL
40,099251
41,517
1,670
-

(35)
(1,480)(8,634)(7,118)0(35)(1,480)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

-

8,848

11,107

5,302

2,959

2,768

480

31,465ENERGY DEMAND

-

8,849

11,107

5,302

2,958

2,769

480

31,465

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

503

4,915

-

270

-

5,688
2,278
338
2,381
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

793
699
94

1,278
1,195
83

-

2,071
1,894
177

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

1,031
539
491

-

-

-

-

1,031
539
491

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

766
688
79

122
36
86

-

-

-

889
724
165

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

3,775
3,133
18
381
243

4,447
53
85

77

1,386

-

334

4,233

77

2,278
68

270

2,381

5,074
5,074

503

188

4,360
3,645
526
188

188

691
717

-

146

188
717

146

-

1,386

334

76

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

63

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

355-

NON-ENERGY USE

10,485
8,720
526
376
863
-

10,018
3,186
103
2,100
4,553
76
417
-

866

361
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

866

Table 6-2: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2014
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesCRUDEOILGASOLINE
24,870
4,916

DIESEL
12,844HEAVY KEROSENE LPG, REF.
AVIATIONOIL& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
GAS
349
1,593
880
-

251
24,6194,916

13,695
851

349
-

1,593

1,155
275

(24,870)

4,218(2,225)

5,264

1,019

2,367

485

(24,870)

(957)
5,175

(7,279)5,053(3,949)
9,247

1,019

(69)
3,891

485

TOTAL
45,453251
46,327
1,126
-

(33)
(1,455)(13,742)(12,254)0(33)(1,455)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

-

9,134

10,618

5,614

2,612

3,247

485

31,711ENERGY DEMAND

-

9,135

10,617

5,614

2,613

3,246

485

31,710

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

336

5,238

-

825

-

6,398
2,530
1,031
2,320
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

780
683
97

1,406
1,321
86

-

2,186
2,004
183

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

983
515
469

-

-

-

-

983
515
469

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

1,084
996
88

138
52
86

-

-

-

1,222
1,048
174

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

4,192
3,480
13
490
210

3,852
47
83

69

1,066

-

342

3,644

69

9,522
3,527
96
1,899
3,923
78

2,530
206

825

2,320

4,942
4,942

336

181

4,362
3,668
525
169

169

516
703

-

143

169
703

143

-

1,066

342

78

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

64

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

427-

NON-ENERGY USE

10,320
8,610
525
338
846
-

491
-

589

362
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

589

Table 6-3: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2015
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesCRUDEOILGASOLINE
27,734
6,670

DIESEL
14,943HEAVY KEROSENE LPG, REF.
AVIATIONOIL& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
GAS
464
2,118
1,097
-

251
27,482

6,670

14,943
-

464
-

2,118

1,287
190

(27,734)

2,926(4,426)

6,509

1,135

2,721

541

(27,734)(2,844)
5,769(10,060)
5,634(3,762)
10,307

1,135

(8)
4,347

541

TOTAL
53,026
251
52,965190-(36)(1,618)(18,327)(16,673)0(36)(1,618)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

-

9,596

10,517

6,974

3,253

3,819

541

34,699ENERGY DEMAND

-

9,596

10,518

6,974

3,252

3,819

541

34,700

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

419

6,626

-

766

-

7,812
3,761
958
2,524
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

974
855
119

1,779
1,674
106

-

2,753
2,528
224

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

1,042
546
497

-

-

-

-

1,042
546
497

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

748
681
66

104
36
68

-

-

-

851
717
134

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

4,555
3,822
14
508
211

3,884
52
88

69

1,404

-

398

3,665

69

3,761
192

766

2,524

5,041
5,041

419

149

4,424
3,714
535
175

175

568
789

-

143

175
789

143

-

1,404

398

79

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

85

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

625-

NON-ENERGY USE

10,573
8,755
535
351
932
-

10,310
3,874
102
2,310
3,944
79
710
-

648

363
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

648

Table 6-4: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2016
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesCRUDEOILGASOLINE
28,282
6,434

DIESEL
19,004HEAVY KEROSENE LPG, REF.
AVIATIONOIL& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
GAS
527
2,452
1,198
-

251
28,031

6,434

19,004
-

537
10

2,452

1,207
9

(28,282)

3,357(7,363)

6,982

1,180

2,816

537

(28,282)(2,667)
6,025(13,221)5,859(3,699)10,717

1,180

(27)
4,523

537

TOTAL
57,896
251
57,66520-(35)(1,681)(20,772)(19,615)558(35)(1,681)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

-

9,791

11,641

7,509

3,632

4,014

537

37,124ENERGY DEMAND

-

9,792

11,640

7,510

3,631

4,013

537

37,123

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

470

7,107

-

877

-

8,454
4,228
1,096
2,511
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

1,058
908
149

1,936
1,819
116

-

2,993
2,728
266

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

1,106
579
527

-

-

-

-

1,106
579
527

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

1,313
1,218
95

150
64
86

-

-

-

1,463
1,282
181

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

4,702
3,945
15
526
216

3,991
54
96

71

1,648

-

393

3,762

71

10,805
3,999
111
2,567
4,049
80

4,228
219

877

2,511

5,090
5,090

470

149

4,761
4,025
554
182

182

619
843

-

144

182
843

144

-

1,648

393

80

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

82

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

664-

NON-ENERGY USE

11,020
9,115
554
363
988
-

746
-

537

364
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

537

Table 6-5: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2017
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesCRUDEOILGASOLINE
27,731
4,077

DIESEL
9,778

HEAVY KEROSENE LPG, REF.
AVIATIONOIL& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
GAS
157
1,363
1,169
-

251
27,480

4,077

9,778
-

157
-

1,363

1,169
0

(27,731)

5,629

(300)

3,605

1,302

3,863

499

(27,731)(2,982)8,610(6,768)6,468(1,735)
5,364

1,302

(14)
5,495

499

TOTAL
44,274251
44,0230-(24)(1,618)(13,134)(11,499)
7(24)(1,618)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

-

9,706

9,478

3,761

2,664

5,032

499

31,140ENERGY DEMAND

-

9,707

9,478

3,762

2,664

5,031

499

31,140

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

235

3,399

-

595

-

4,229
1,930
744
1,225
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

679
582
96

2,344
2,165
179

-

3,023
2,748
275

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

887
464
423

-

-

-

-

887
464
423

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

1,261
1,171
91

143
62
82

-

-

-

1,404
1,232
172

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

4,733
3,980
12
578
164

3,066
55
74

50

1,170

-

371

2,858

50

9,391
4,035
85
2,119
3,072
80

1,930
149

595

1,225

4,973
4,973

235

96

4,028
3,343
516
169

169

331
746

-

128

169
746

128

-

1,170

371

80

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS70

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

802-

NON-ENERGY USE

10,044
8,317
516
338
873
-

872
-

1,290

365
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

1,290

Table 6-6: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2018
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesCRUDEOILGASOLINE
30,705
2,879

DIESEL
8,263

HEAVY KEROSENE LPG, REF.
AVIATIONOIL& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
GAS
30
785
1,064
-

251
30,454

2,879

8,263
-

30
-

785

1,071
7

(30,705)

6,571

423

3,872

1,441

4,302

482

(30,705)(3,041)
9,612(6,740)7,163(2,004)
5,913

1,441

(6)
6,095

482

TOTAL
43,725251
43,4817-(37)(1,786)(13,614)(11,790)(0)(37)(1,786)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

-

9,450

8,686

3,902

2,225

5,366

482

30,112ENERGY DEMAND

-

9,449

8,687

3,902

2,225

5,366

482

30,112

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

235

3,593

-

333

-

4,161
2,186
416
1,225
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

325
269
56

3,046
2,791
255

-

3,371
3,060
311

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

757
396
361

-

-

-

-

757
396
361

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

930
865
65

103
45
57

-

-

-

1,032
910
122

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

4,709
3,980
12
564
153

2,872
55
74

47

1,097

-

354

2,667

47

9,078
4,035
85
2,015
2,867
76

2,186
83

333

1,225

4,741
4,741

235

98

3,894
3,244
491
160

160

333
746

-

128

160
746

128

-

1,097

354

76

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS58

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

907-

NON-ENERGY USE

9,668
7,984
491
320
873
-

965
-

1,080

366
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

1,080

Table 6-7: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2019
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesCRUDEOILGASOLINE
30,705
2,679

DIESEL
9,432

HEAVY
OIL

KEROSENE LPG, REF.
AVIATION& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
GAS
2
864
1,071
-

251
30,454

2,679

9,432
-

80
79

864

1,071
0

(30,705)

6,557

(518)

3,887

1,441

4,302

508

(30,705)(3,029)9,586(7,681)
7,163(1,989)
5,913

1,441

(6)
6,095

508

TOTAL
44,753251
44,58179-(36)(1,786)(14,528)(12,705)(0)(36)(1,786)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

-

9,237

8,914

3,889

2,305

5,373

508

30,226ENERGY DEMAND

-

9,237

8,914

3,889

2,305

5,373

508

30,226

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

235

3,580

-

333

-

4,147
2,173
416
1,225
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

264
210
54

3,036
2,788
247

-

3,300
2,998
301

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

749
396
353

-

-

-

-

749
396
353

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

930
865
65

103
45
57

-

-

-

1,032
910
122

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

4,722
3,980
12
578
153

2,872
55
74

47

1,243

-

389

2,667

47

9,272
4,035
85
2,209
2,867
76

2,173
83

333

1,225

4,515
4,515

235

98

4,129
3,473
496
160

160

333
739

-

119

160
739

119

-

1,243

389

76

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS59

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

922-

NON-ENERGY USE

9,662
7,988
496
320
858
-

981
-

1,083

367
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

1,083

Table 6-8: Estimated DPRK Refined Product Balance for 2020
UNITS: TERAJOULES (TJ)
ENERGY SUPPLY
Domestic Production
Imports
Exports
Inputs to International Marine Bunkers
Stock Changes
ENERGY TRANSFORMATIONElectricity Generation
Petroleum Refining
Coal Production/Preparation
Charcoal Production
Coke Production
District Heat Production
Other Transformation
Own UseLossesCRUDEOILGASOLINE
32,196381

DIESEL
5,797

HEAVY KEROSENE LPG, REF.
AVIATIONOIL& JET FUEL FUEL, NON-E.
GAS
30
43
379
-

251
31,945

381

5,797
-

30
-

43

379
-

(32,196)

6,327

509

4,284

1,511

4,519

361

(32,196)(3,900)
10,228(7,002)7,512(1,850)
6,189

1,511

(6)
6,396

361

TOTAL
38,825251
38,574-(55)(1,871)(14,685)(12,758)(0)(55)(1,871)-FUELS FOR FINAL CONSUMPTION

-

6,708

6,306

4,314

1,554

4,898

361

24,141ENERGY DEMAND

-

6,709

6,305

4,315

1,554

4,897

361

24,141

INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
Iron and Steel
CementFertilizers
Other Chemicals
Pulp and Paper
Other Metals
Other Minerals
TextilesBuilding Materials
Non-specified Industry

-

-

235

4,097

-

166

-

4,498
2,986
208
953
-

TRANSPORT SECTOR
Road
Rail
Water
Air
Non-Specified-

RESIDENTIAL SECTOR
Urban
Rural

-

-

-

-

243
188
56

3,193
2,939
254

-

3,437
3,127
310

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Field Operations
Processing/Other

-

-

741
396
344

-

-

-

-

741
396
344

FISHERIES SECTOR
Large Ships
Collectives/Processing/Other

-

-

837
778
58

92
41
51

-

-

-

929
819
110

MILITARY SECTOR
Trucks and other Transport
Armaments
Air Force
Naval Forces
Military Manufacturing
Buildings and Other

-

3,030
2,376
6
564
83

1,587
33
41

25

804

-

285

1,448

25

5,731
2,409
47
1,653
1,556
65

2,986
42

166

953

3,679
3,679

235

117

2,907
2,432
374
100

100

351
471

-

76

100
471

76

-

804

285

65

PUBLIC/COMMERCIAL SECTORS

35

NON-SPECIFIED/OTHER SECTORS

672-

NON-ENERGY USE

7,233
6,111
374
200
547
-

707
-

866

368
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

866

6.3.

Refined Products Use by Sector and Fuel

Overall estimated DPRK petroleum products demand by end-use sector (that is, not including
electricity generation) is shown in Figure 6-1. The three major oil products end-use sectors in2019 (the years 2010 through 2018 show similar patterns) were military, transport, and industry.
Most industrial use was of heavy fuel oil, while the military and transport sectors used mostly
diesel fuel and gasoline. Agriculture, fisheries (both mostly diesel), residential, andpublic/commercial (both using liquefied petroleum gas and kerosene) demand were each a small
fraction of overall petroleum products use, as was non-energy petroleum use (consisting offeedstocks for industrial processes, asphalt, and other products).
The pattern of overall petroleum products use by sector is estimated to be somewhat different in2020 (see Figure 6-2), with reductions in the fraction of oil products used by the transport sector
and particularly the military, due to the national lockdown, while the fraction of industrial oil use
rises (mostly as a result of using surplus heavy oil in the cement subsector), as does oil use in theresidential sector (due to more availability because other sectors have been shut down, as well as
more time spent at home by DPRK citizens, mirroring the experience elsewhere in the world).
Figure 6-1: 2019 DPRK Petroleum Products Demand by Sector

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
DEMAND BY SECTOR: 2019
TRANSPORT
32.0%
INDUSTRIAL
13.7%

RESIDENTIAL
10.9%

NONENERGY
3.6%

NONSPECIFIED
0.0%

MILITARY
30.7%

AGRICULTURE
2.5%
FISHERIES
3.4%

PUB/COMML
3.2%

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Figure 6-2: 2020 DPRK Petroleum Products Demand by Sector

Estimated DPRK PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
DEMAND BY SECTOR: 2020

INDUSTRIAL
18.6%

TRANSPORT
30.0%

NONENERGY
3.6%
NONSPECIFIED
0.0%

RESIDENTIAL
14.2%

MILITARY
23.7%

PUB/COMML
2.9%

AGRICULTURE
3.1%
FISHERIES
3.8%

Use of most refined products (heavy fuel oil being the exception) increased from 2010 through2016 due to enhanced availability and a more vibrant DPRK economy. Figure 6-3 shows
estimated diesel fuel use over time. Diesel fuel use in the transport sector and agricultural
sectors increased generally between 2010 and 2016, with increases in transport activity in diesel
trucks offset somewhat by decreases in energy intensity (increases in energy efficiency), as
newer trucks imported (largely) from China were incorporated into the DPRK fleet. Diesel use
in the military changed relatively little, based on our estimates, as there was not a marked change
in military activity during the 2010-2016 period, or at least little change that would affect fueluse. The largest change in diesel use during 2010 through 2016 was in the use of diesel forelectricity generation, as the combination of broader availability of diesel, increased imports ofgenerators, and continued unreliable electricity supplies allowed consumers to generate more of
their own power. We estimate this trend to have changed markedly in 2017 through 2019, whenreduced fuel availability caused reductions of diesel use in virtually all sectors, but particularly
for electricity generation.
Diesel use in 2020 is estimated to be lower in virtually all sectors than in previous years,
particularly for the transport and military sectors, due to restrictions on activity and movement
due to the DPRK’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Figure 6-3: Estimated Diesel Fuel Use in the DPRK through 2020

800,000

Tonnes700,000
600,000

Estimated Diesel Fuel Use in the DPRK, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008-2010,
and 2014-2020
NON-SPECIFIED/OTHERFISHERIESRESIDENTIAL
INDUSTRIALMILITARY
AGRICULTURAL
TRANSPORTELECTRICITY GENERATION

500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Figure 6-4 shows estimated trends in gasoline use by year. Here the marked increase from 2010
through 2015 stalls in 2016 as estimated supplies did not continue to expand in that year, anddeclines in 2017 and slightly further in 2018 due to reductions in gasoline availability due to
USNC sanctions. The declines in availability of gasoline imports in 2017 through 2019,
however, are estimated to have been substantially offset by additional gasoline available from thecatalytic cracking unit installed at the Ponghwa Chemical Factory during 2016. To some extent,
and mostly in rural areas, reduced motor fuel (in 2017 through 2019, mostly diesel) availability
may have been compensated for by a rise in the use of trucks adapted to use “gasifiers” fueledwith wood, crop waste, charcoal, and/or coal as a substitute for gasoline. Use of such trucks has
been reported regularly during the last three decades in the DPRK, but may have risen in the last
few years.664 As with diesel fuel, the years since 2010 have seen a marked rise in the use ofsmall imported personal/household generators (perhaps 500 to 2000 watts) fueled with gasoline,
although we estimate that the rapid increase in use of such generators leveled off in 2016 and664 A Radio Free Asia article entitled "Charcoal-powered Vehicles Stage a Comeback in North Korea", dated 2016-12-09,

reported by Jieun Kim, translated by Soo Min Jo, written in English by Roseanne Gerin, and available ashttps://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/charcoal-powered-vehicles-make-a-comeback-in-north-korea-12092016160533.html,
describes the resurgent use of "charcoal" fueled trucks in particularly rural parts of the DPRK, and in the Northeast city of
Chongjin, for transport services of all kinds, including transport for hire. The article notes the use of these gasifier trucks (which
we assume are actually using charcoal, wood, crop waste, coal, and/or waste oil fuels, as available locally, in on-truck gasifiers),
has increased in recent years in some locales due to fuel restrictions, possibly due to sanctions. 1, 2.5, and 15, and 20-tonne truckmodels have been seen using the technology, but it appears that the 2.5-tonne, DPRK-made Seung-ri 58 (Victory 58) model ismost frequently seen fueled by gasifiers. The article also notes that around 70 percent of gasifier-driven trucks (presumably inthe specific area described) are from rural military units.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK2017 when fuel availability fell and DPRK market prices for fuel, at least in some areas, rose.665
666

For 2020, the national lockdown is estimated to have substantially reduced military and transport(as well as overall) gasoline use, but part of the reduction of gasoline use in those sectors is
estimated to have been offset by increased use of gasoline in the small personal generators thatwould be used in homes (and possibly informal markets) to provide power when grid power was
not available.
Figure 6-4: Estimated Gasoline Use in the DPRK through 2020
Estimated Gasoline Use in the DPRK, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008-2010, and2014-2020
800,000
MILITARY

Tonnes700,000
600,000

TRANSPORTELECTRICITY GENERATION

500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

665 As an example of fluctuating DPRK fuel prices, albeit from 2018, a July 24, 2018 Reuters article entitled "Exclusive: North

Korean fuel prices drop, suggesting U.N. sanctions being undermined", by Hyonhee Shin, and available ashttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-economy-exclusive/north-korean-fuel-prices-drop-suggesting-u-n-sanctionsbeing-undermined-idUSKBN1KE15F,
includes the following passage: “China said on Tuesday it strictly abided by U.N. sanctions, but indicated it may have resumed
some fuel shipments to North Korea in the second quarter of this year. Gasoline was sold by private dealers in the North Korean
capital Pyongyang at about $1.24 per kg as of Tuesday, down 33 percent from $1.86 per kg on June 5 and 44 percent from thisyear’s peak of $2.22 per kg on March 27, according to Reuters analysis of data compiled by the Daily NK website. Diesel prices
are at $0.85 per kg, down about 17 percent from March. The website [that collects price data] is run by North Korean defectors
who collect prices via phone calls with multiple traders in the North after cross-checks to corroborate their information, offering arare glimpse into the livelihoods of ordinary North Koreans.”
666 In addition, the rapid growth in imports of generators to the DPRK through 2015, or at least imports as reported in customs
statistics available through the UN Comtrade system, ceased in 2016, with reported 2016 imports of generators to the DPRK
from China markedly lower than in 2015, 2017 imports lower still, and 2018 imports only a few percent, if that, of 2015 imports.
Some of this decline was doubtless due to the impact of UNSC sanctions on DPRK fuel supplies and availability of DPRK funds
to pay for equipment, but it is possible that the decline in actual trade was not as steep as is shown in official statistics, because
there was some off-books trade in generators. We have no direct evidence of off-books trade in generators, but it would be
unusual to see such active trades in a set of products fall quite so rapidly. See Chapter 5 for additional analysis of generator use
in the DPRK in the context of electricity supplies.

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Figure 6-5: shows estimated kerosene and jet fuel use in the DPRK over the years, divided
mostly between use in the transport sector (for jet transport), the military (for military aircraft)and in the residential sector (as a lighting and cooking fuel). We assume that all of these enduses declined significantly between 2016 and 2017, with reduced use continuing through 2019(and 2020). Unlike diesel and gasoline, we have heard little suggesting that off-books trade inkerosene and jet fuel has been significant in recent years, though such trades are of course
possible. The reduction in transportation use of jet fuel between 2016 and 2017 (and2018/2019) probably meant fewer domestic flights on jet-engine aircraft, as we assume thatinternational flights (most relatively short, by the national carrier Air Koryo) probably fueled up
mostly in their destination countries.667 The decline in kerosene use in the residential sector
could have been partially compensated for by the use of other cooking fuels (LPG, biomass andcoal, for example), and/or the use of alternative lighting fuels, such as electricity fromphotovoltaic panels. In 2018, in particular, we assume that kerosene use declined in large partthrough substitution by LPG, which is a cleaner and more convenient fuel for many end-uses andseemed to be in more abundant supply in 2018 and 2019. The reduction in military jet fuel use
between 2016 and 2017/2018 probably stemmed from a reduction in training flights in fighterand other jets; such flights were already at what would be considered a low level for most othermilitaries. In 2020, we estimate significant reductions in kerosene/jet fuel use for military andcivilian aircraft, but that the use of kerosene in the residential sector changed relatively little.

667 A number of reports have indicated that on a number of instances, at least in 2019, and contrary to expectation, Air China jet

aircraft have been seen apparently fueling at the international airport in Pyongyang from an Air Koryo fuel truck. This has raised
speculation that Air China is actually defueling in the DPRK and thus providing jet fuel in violation of sanctions, although doing
so may be technically difficult. Other explanations for this observed activity. including simply that China was able to get a goodprice for DPRK-refined jet fuel, are possible, or has brought in its own fuel by truck but is using Air Koryo fueling infrastructure.
See, for example, Oliver Hotham (2019), “NK Pro investigation sheds light on Air China’s N. Korea fueling arrangements”, NK
News, dated December 16, 2019, and available as https://www.nknews.org/2019/12/nk-pro-investigation-sheds-light-on-airchinas-n-korea-fueling-arrangements/.

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Figure 6-5: Estimated Kerosene and Jet Fuel Use in the DPRK through 2020
Estimated Kerosene/Jet Fuel Use in the DPRK, 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 20082010, and 2014-2020
180,000
160,000

MILITARYFISHERIESAGRICULTURALRESIDENTIAL

TRANSPORTINDUSTRIAL

Tonnes140,000
120,000

100,000
80,00060,00040,00020,0001990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Heavy fuel oil (HFO, also sometimes called residual fuel oil) has limited uses in the DPRK. It is
used in a very few freighters and ships of the DPRK navy, for some industrial processes (as afuel, albeit not a major fuel, for cement making and for minerals processing), and as a fuel forelectricity generation in two or three power plants designed to use heavy oil, plus as a starter fuel(typically only a percent or two of total fuel use) for coal-fired power stations and district heating
boilers. The trend in disposition (use/storage) of heavy fuel oil by year is shown in Figure 6-6.
We estimate that heavy fuel oil use rose somewhat between 2010 and 2016, with most of theincrease being in the industrial sector, and declined substantially between 2016 and2017/2018/2019 because of lower availability, as roughly half of the heavy fuel oil formerly
produced by the DPRK’s one operating large refinery was converted to lighter products using thecatalytic cracking unit installed in 2016. This decline in heavy oil use, however, was mainly insectors and in end uses where coal is a ready substitute for heavy fuel oil. In 2020, we estimatethat heavy oil use actually increased somewhat relative to 2019, with most of that increase in theindustrial sector, and largely related to increased use (per unit of total fuel use) of HFO formaking cement, although the overall volumes of cement manufactured (and used) are estimatedto have fallen due to the impact of COVID-19 restrictions on the construction sector. HFO
supplies are estimated to have increased in 2020 relative to 2020 because of greater assumed
refinery input in 2020 (see below).

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Figure 6-6: Estimated Heavy Fuel Oil Use in the DPRK through 2020
Estimated Disposition of Heavy Fuel Oil by Year
1,200,000
STORAGE

Tonnes1,000,000

SHIPS
INDUSTRY

800,000

COAL-ELECTOIL-ELECT.

600,000
400,000
200,000

1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
(200,000.0)

6.4.

DPRK Domestic Oil Products Production

The DPRK has two major larger oil refineries, located near the border with China at Sinuiju andnear the border with Russia at Sonbong. The refinery at Sinuiju, the Ponghwa Chemical Factory(see Figure 6-7) is supplied via a crude oil pipeline from China and appears to have operated
more or less continuously for three or more decades. A refinery of somewhat larger capacity, theSeungri Chemical Complex refinery, in the DPRK’s northeast near Sonbong, was fueled with
Russian, and then Middle Eastern, crude oil in the 1980s and early 1990s, but has reportedly
operated only sporadically since, and perhaps hardly at all in the last decade (see Figure 6-8). A
third refinery, of relatively small capacity and using fairly basic technology, was reportedly in
use in the Nampo area, possibly operated by the DPRK military.

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Figure 6-7: Refinery at Sinujiu, Northwest DPRK668

668 From Google Maps, accessed May 23, 2019,https://www.google.com/maps/place/Sinuiju,+North+Pyongan,+North+Korea/@40.0735202,124.5453298,964m/data=!3m1!1e3!
4m5!3m4!1s0x5e2afe38ccd630eb:0xd9765aa741246bf5!8m2!3d40.0823213!4d124.4489192.

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Figure 6-8: Refinery at Sonbong, Northeast DPRK669

There have been reports of crude oil production in the DPRK dating to the 1990s and possibly
earlier, including an onshore well and possibly some offshore production. These reports havebeen difficult to corroborate, and though experts contacted by the authors believe there is
probably (or at least has been) some domestic DPRK oil production, the quantity produced
appears to be (or have been) small. We assume production of just under 6 thousand tonnes
annually, about 1 percent of what the DPRK imports from China, but that must be seen as arough estimate.670

669 From Google Maps, accessed May 23, 2019,https://www.google.com/maps/search/sonbong+refinery/@42.3113238,130.348157,2387m/data=!3m1!1e3.
670 See also section 4.2.2 in this Report.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKAlthough crude oil imports, likely mostly by sea, to its refinery in Sonbong have dwindled over
the years, the DPRK continues to import oil by pipeline to its Sinuiju refinery. The pipelinefrom Dandong, on the Chinese side of the Yalu River, to the Ponghwa Chemical Factory outside
Sinuiju is fed with oil transported from the Daqing oil fields by train to Dandong, where it isloaded into the pipeline (see Figure 6-9).
Figure 6-9: Possible Yalu River Crossing Point for Dandong-Sinuiju Crude Oil Pipeline671

These crude oil flows were reported in China’s customs statistics through 2013, when reporting
stopped, although the flows of oil apparently have not. A recent article confirmed that China
continues to send crude oil across the border to the DPRK, in part because the waxy nature of theoil means that if flows are allowed to stop, particularly during cold weather, it would be very
difficult to return the pipeline to operation. We have assumed that 2014 crude oil exports from
China to the DPRK via pipeline were 578,000 tonnes, the same as was reported in customs
statistics in 2013, were 645,000 tonnes from 2015 through 2017, and increased, possibly
temporarily, to 715,000 tonnes in 2018.672
We assume that inputs of crude oil by pipeline
671

We are not entirely sure where the pipeline crosses the Yalu River from China to the DPRK, but the Google Earth Pro image
below, located at approximately coordinates 40.154, 124.44, shows what could be the pipeline crossing the Yalu diagonally fromupper left to lower right. Image date 2.19-2020.
672 A 2018 article in NK Economy Watch, "Chinese oil exports to N Korea increased after KJU’s third visit to China", dated July
19th, 2018, by Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein includes the following passage: "China also dramatically increased oil shipments to
the North. A source in Beijing said it nearly doubled crude oil supplies to the North through pipelines from Dandong since Kim’s
recent visits. 'Some 30,000 to 40,000 tons of oil is enough in the summer to maintain the lowest possible flow of oil in thepipelines to ensure that they don’t clog, and about 80,000 tons in winter,” the source added. “Though it’s summer now China hasrecently increased flow to the winter level.” (Units are assumed to be metric tonnes.) Original source, "China Doubles Oil

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from China were the same in 2019 as assumed for 2018. For 2020 we assume—and this islargely conjecture on our part—that in China's desire to help the DPRK manage the coronavirus
pandemic,673 it provides somewhat more oil by pipeline to the DPRK. The opportunity cost of
China in doing so would be quite low, considering reduced demand for oil in China and low
international oil prices during the pandemic. We thus assume that the flow through the pipeline
in 2020 will total 750,000 tonnes. Figure 6-10 summarizes crude oil and refined oil productexports to the DPRK from China since 1999, as reported in Chinese customs statistics. China
reported just under 7000 tonnes of non-crude oil products exports to the DPRK in 2018, far lessthan in previous years. Although some oil export statistics have been published for 2019 in the
UN Comtrade database, no information on oil exports from China have been published there for2019 or 2020 as of this wrting. China did, however, report to the “Panel of Experts” of the
UNSC oil product exports to the DPRK during the first 10 months of 2019 totalling just under
23,000 tonnes, with the Russian Federation reporting about 31,000 tonnes of exports to the
DPRK over the same period.674

Shipments to N. Korea After Kim’s Visit", Lee Kil-seong and Kim Myong-song, Chosun Ilbo, 2018-07-19. Assuming that thisphysical reason for China to maintain minimum flows through the pipeline is correct (and we have heard this explanationelsewhere), one can estimate a minimum flow through the pipeline in a "normal" year by assuming 35,000 metric tonnes permonth over a 7-month (April-October) "summer" season of warmer months, with a corresponding average of 80,000 tonnes permonth over the remainder of the year, which would yield an average of 645,000 tonnes of crude oil annually. We assume crude
imports via pipeline at this rate from 2015 through 2017, with 2018 imports likely, based on the above, to have been at least
somewhat higher. Note that the report of the UN Panel of Experts (March 5, 2019 Report of the Panel of Experts establishedpursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), available as available at https://www.undocs.org/S/2019/171) includes (on page 153) a noteon China's exports of crude oil to the DPRK:"....and China reported that the amount of the supply of crude oil by China to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was150,500 tons from December 2017 to February 2018; 147,900 tons from March to May 2018; 108,500 tons from June to August
2018; and 118,100 tons from September to November 2018." These figures total 525,000 tonnes, which is the maximum
allowed under the UNSC sanctions regime. Although these periods in total do not quite match up to the 2018 calendar year, we
assume that they are approximately the same as a calendar year total. We feel that the higher estimate of crude oil provision
based on the physical limitations of the China-DPRK pipeline operation as described above may be a better figure than thereported total here, thus we use the higher total crude oil imports for 2018 and 2019 estimated as described.
673 See, for example, BBC News (2020), "Coronavirus: China offers to help North Korea fight pandemic", dated 9 May 2020, andavailable as https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52597749.
674 The UNSC "Panel of Experts" in UNSC (2020), Note by the President of the Security Council, number S/2020/151, dated 2
March 2020, and including "Annex: Letter dated 26 February 2020 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution
1874 (2009) addressed to the President of the Security Council", available as https://undocs.org/S/2020/151, includes information
on both recorded petroleum product exports by member states (China and the Russian Federation) to the DPRK that are allowed
under sanctions, and a range of estimates of suspected volumes of ship-to-ship transfers of oil products ultimately delivered to the
DPRK that would have been in evasion of sanctions.

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Figure 6-10: Reported Crude Oil and Oil Products Exports to the DPRK from China, 1999 2020675
700,000

Tonnes per Year

600,000
500,000
400,000
300,000

Crude Oil (Reported
Trades)Oil "(Not Crude)"(Reported)

200,000
100,000-

As noted above, a key change—and one of the few reported in recent years—in the DPRK’s oil
refining capacity has been the addition of a catalytic cracking unit at the Sinuiju refinery (thePonghwa Chemical Factory). Although the details of this addition, estimated from satellite
images to have been installed in approximately 2016, are not available, basic oil refining
equipment tends to be similar the world over.
In late July 2019, we were made aware676 that the DPRK's refinery at Sinuiju had installed a newunit in 2016, most likely a fluid catalytic cracker unit (Figure 6-11).677 Based on expert advice,678
it is likely that this unit is being used to convert some of the heavy fuel oil produced by therefinery into lighter products.
It is most likely that this cracking unit was supplied by a Chinese vendor, and that this size ofunit would be available from Chinese manufacturers. Our review of trade statistics suggests thatthe DPRK did import significant quantities of catalyst materials (over $1 million worth) from
China in each of the years 2015 – 2017679 but there is no way to know if these catalysts wereused for this cracking unit. We have thus far been unable to identify with any certainty acustoms statistics category in which the import of this unit by the DPRK is identified, as there
675 Data from United Nations Comtrade Statistics, https://comtrade.un.org/. No data for oil trades from China to the DPRK for2019 had been entered in Comtrade as of mid-2020, and no 2020 data were yet available.
676 Leo Byrne, then of NK News, personal communication, 7/29/2019.
677 Figure from Google Maps, 2019. Location of cracking unit (latitude and longitude) is approximately 40.071680, 124.551321.
678 The remainder of this paragraph and the next paragraph drew on input from Dr. David Fridley, formerly of Caltex, for which
we are grateful (personal communications, July 30, 2019). The authors remain solely responsible for any errors of fact orinterpretation therein.
679 From review of annual trade statistics at: https://comtrade.un.org/data. Catalyst trades from HS category 3815.

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are several possible categories under which the trade could have been listed, if the trade was infact recorded.
Such units, however, are typically provided in a small number of discrete sizes. We therefore
assume that the unit is sized to use approximately 50 percent of the HFO produced by therefinery into lighter products. This would imply a capacity of about 250,000 tonnes per year forthe cracker unit--a common size for such units--albeit at the smaller end of the size range ofcracking units typically sold internationally.
The product slate for the throughput of the cracker is estimated to be as shown in Table 6-9.
Applying the cracking unit to half of the refinery’s output of heavy fuel oil results in the outputs,
expressed as a fraction of crude oil input, shown in Table 6-10.
Table 6-9: Estimated Output of Cracking Unit, by ProductFraction of Output of
Cracking Unit
0%55%

Product
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil (light cycle oil)
Kerosene/Jet Fuel (light cycle oil)
LPG/other gases/Refinery Gas
Bottoms and Coke (non-energy)

20%
18%
7%

Table 6-10: Estimated Refinery Output after Addition of Cracking Unit, by Product
Fuel/Fuel Category
Heavy Fuel Oil
Gasoline
Diesel Oil (light cycle oil)
Kerosene/Jet Fuel (light cycle oil)
LPG/other gases/Refinery Gas
Bottoms and Coke (non-energy)
Implied overall Refinery efficiency with Fluid
Catalytic Cracker Unit

Output as weightfraction of input
19.0%
32.1%
23.1%
4.6%
12.0%
4.7%

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95.4%

Figure 6-11: Likely Catalytic Cracking Unit Installed at Ponghwa Chemical Factory

Figure 6-12 shows the site at the Ponghwa Chemical factory where the cracking unit is currently
located as of May 2015, before the unit was installed. The red circle in this image, as well as in
Figure 6-11 and Figure 6-13, indicate the location of the unit. Little work on the site is in which
the catalytic cracking unit was later installed is evident in this image, but the installation appears
complete as of an image from February 16. 2017 (Figure 6-13), suggesting to us that the unit was
not operational during 2015 and probably most of 2016, but was operational for most or all of2017 and thereafter. This timing, of course could be made more definitive by review ofadditional images taken between the time points shown in the figures, but additional images were
not immediately available to the authors.

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Figure 6-12: Site of Future Catalytic Cracking Unit as of May 26, 2015680

680 Image from Google Earth.

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Figure 6-13: Probable Catalytic Cracking Unit at Ponghwa Chemical Factory as of February
16, 2017681

Figure 6-14 presents our estimates of refined products outputs by the DPRK’s refineries throughthe years. Most evident here is the drop-off in output between 1990 and 1996 and later years.
As 1990 was arguably the last “normal” year for the DPRK economy—the impacts on the DPRKof the collapse of the Soviet Union were just starting to be felt then—the difference between
1990 and subsequent refined products output is an indicator of the DPRK’s “energy insecurity”,
that is, the restrictions in the availability of fuel that has been in significant part driving DPRK
policies. By our estimates, refined product output, constrained largely by the availability ofcrude oil imports, mostly from China, changed relatively little between 2010 and 2020, with the
exception of the reduction in heavy fuel oil output, and increase in (mostly) gasoline output,
starting in 2017, with the installation of the catalytic cracking unit described above. We also
estimate about a 10% increase in output in 2018 relative to 2017, and another small increase in
output in 2020, based on our estimates of somewhat higher crude oil supplies to the Ponghwa
Chemical Factory refinery via pipeline from China, as described above.

681 Source: Google Earth.

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Figure 6-14: Estimated DPRK Petroleum Supplies Refined Domestically

3,000,000
2,500,000

Tonnes2,000,000
1,500,000

Estimated DPRK Petroleum Products Supplies--RefinedDomesticallyGasoline
Kerosene

Diesel
HFO
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy

1,000,000
500,000

1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Our estimates of the fractional outputs of refined products by fuel type in the DPRK in 2019 arepresented in Figure 6-15. Results for other years from 2017 to 2020 are similar. In general, theability of a given refinery to change the fractions of the different products it produces is limitedby the refinery’s infrastructure and by the type of crude oil it uses. As a consequence, forexample, although the DPRK’s needs for gasoline and diesel are greater than its needs for heavy
fuel oil (HFO), it was constrained by the type of reactors available at its refinery and thecomposition of the crude oil that it (mostly) gets from China to produce more HFO than either ofthe more valuable motor fuels. This situation changed with the installation of the new cracking
unit in approximately 2016, which allowed the DPRK to produce more of the products needed by
the economy. Further changes in the aggregate product “slate” of the DPRK’s refineries could
come through use of different types of crude oil,682 if and when such imports (or, likely further
into the future, significant crude oil supplies from domestic resources) are available, as well as
through expansion or reactivation of existing refineries.683

682 Comtrade statistics for 2017 show exports of a very small amount of crude oil, 165 tonnes, from the Russian Federation to the

DPRK. This quantity of oil would not have materially changed the DPRK’s overall product slate.
683 Thinking further into the future, however, the advance of non-fossil energy technologies may ultimately mean that in a time
when the DPRK has resolved its differences with the international community it may choose to base production of fuels andchemicals on, for example, processes that use hydrogen produced with renewable electricity together with carbon dioxide fromthe atmosphere or other sources, rather than simply upgrading its existing venerable refineries. See, for example, Stephen Leahy(2018), “This Gasoline Is Made of Carbon Sucked From the Air”, National Geographic, published June 7, 2018, and available ashttps://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2018/06/carbon-engineering-liquid-fuel-carbon-capture-neutral-science/.

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Figure 6-15: Estimated 2019 DPRK Refinery Output by Fuel

ESTIMATED DPRK REFINERY OUTPUT BY
FUEL, 2019
LPG/Refinery
Gas/NonEnergy
20.4%

Gasoline
31.0%

HFO
20.3%

Kerosene
4.7%
Diesel23.6%

6.5.

Imports of Refined Products

DPRK petroleum products imports, by our estimates, increased sharply between 2010 and 2016,providing fuel for the economic growth in the DPRK witnessed by many visitors (see Figure6-16). We estimate that refined product imports declined in 2017 through 2019 due to theenforcement of UNSC sanctions by the international community, but that a significant volume ofrefined products still must have reached the DPRK through “off-books” channels, with those
trades assumed to continue through 2020. In 2020, however, oil product trades are assumed tobe reduced by transport/import restrictions, including reductions in truck, rail, and ship traffic,
and slowdowns at border facilities, caused by the DPRK’s quarantine procedures related to the
COVID-19 pandemic.

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Figure 6-16: Estimated DPRK Petroleum Products Supplies--Imports

Estimated DPRK Petroleum Products Supplies--Imports
1,200,000

Gasoline
Kerosene
Diesel
HFO
LPG/Refinery Gas/Non-Energy

1,000,000

Tonnes800,000
600,000
400,000

200,000
1990 1996 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Oil products imports have reached and reach the DPRK in a variety of ways:• Official (that is, reported in customs statistics) oil product exports from China. Up until
about 2010-2015, this was the largest source of oil products imports to the DPRK in
most years and included many different categories of fuels and non-fuel oil products. In
recent years, official oil product trade from China to the DPRK have fallen dramatically
due to UNSC sanctions. We assume that this oil has entered the DPRK mostly by seaborne tanker, but some doubtless also arrives across the DPRK’s northern border in rail
tanker cars and trucks.
• Official (on-books) trade of oil products—largely, it appears, diesel fuel—from Russia to
the DPRK. This reported trade has tended to vary significantly from year to year, withsome years showing trades of hundreds of thousands of tonnes (2005 to 2007, forexample), and others showing trades of only a few thousand tonnes (2009, 2012, 2016,
and 2017, for example), with a total of about 25,000 tonnes of exports from Russia to
the DPRK in 2018. These shipments are also by ship, rail, and truck.
• Official (reported in customs statistics) shipments from other countries to the DPRK,
including spot market purchases from oil trading centers such as Singapore. In mostrecent years, these imports have been in the thousands to tens of thousands of tonnes,
and come from a variety of countries around the world. In some cases, however, wehave assumed that trades must have been reported in error. For example, we find it
unlikely that India sold 800,000 tonnes of gasoline to the DPRK in 2008 for threequarters of a billion dollars. It seems more likely that this trade was mis-reported, and387
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

actually involved the Republic of Korea (that is, was mistakenly recorded as exports toNorth Korea rather than South Korea) or another country.
• Unofficial (not reported in customs statistics) trades involving Chinese companies,
including, for example at-sea ship to ship transfers of oil.684• Unofficial or semi-official (not reported in customs statistics, but in some caseacknowledged by Russian authorities) shipments of oil from Russia to the DPRK.685 686• Smuggling of oil from unknown sources.687
The first three of these import modalities are (to the extent that customs statistics are accurate)straightforward to quantify. The last three are quite difficult to quantify, and probably, absent
the most advanced and assiduously applied intelligence tools (which are certainly not available
to the authors of this paper), impossible to quantify accurately.
In order to estimate “off-books” imports of oil products to the DPRK in recent year, we haveadopted and adapted estimates from several sources (including those above), then estimated whata reasonable reduction in DPRK oil products use might be to meet the level of estimated supply,
taking into account the apparently modest economic impacts of oil supply reductions on the
DPRK economy that have been observed by visitors in recent years.
In the report The Rise of Phantom Traders: Russian Oil Exports to North Korea, dated July
2018, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies estimates, based on tracking customs transactions
between the Russian firm Independent Petroleum Company (IPC) and three North Koreanbusiness entities, that refined oil product sales to the DPRK in the years 2015 through 2017 wereas follows:688
Metric Tonnes of Oil
Land
Sea
Total

2015
42,026150,800
192,8252016
88,066
258,743
346,8102017
18,61064,634
83,244

Total
148,702474,177
622,878684 See, for example, Yosuke Onuchi (2019), “North Korea's oil smuggling blows past import cap: UN report:

Ship-to-ship transfers become increasingly sophisticated”, Nikkei Asian Review, dated February 26, 2019, and available ashttps://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Trump-Kim-Summit/North-Korea-s-oil-smuggling-blows-past-import-cap-UN-report.
685 For example, a Reuters article in 2017 ("Russia says its oil supplies to North Korea are negligible", by Denis Pinchuk, dated
September 5, 2017, and available as https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-northkorea/russia-says-its-oil-supplies-to-northkorea-are-negligible-idUSKCN1BG13N), quotes Russian President Vladimir Putin as saying "We have supplies of 40,000 tonnesof oil and oil products to North Korea a quarter", which would imply about 160,000 tonnes per year. This is close to the lower
end of the range of oil exports from Russia to the DPRK, as estimated by other analysts.
686 A North Korean émigré has been quoted in various publications as estimating that Russia exported 200,000 to 300,000 tonnesof oil products annually in recent years to the DPRK via dealers based in Singapore ("…Ri Jong Ho, a former official in North
Korea’s Office 39, supplied in a recent interview with Kyodo News."). See, for example, Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein (2017),"North Korea’s ICBM-test, Byungjin and the economic logic", dated, July 4th, 2017, and available as
http://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/energy/oil/.
687 Courtney Kube and Dan De Luce (2018), “Top secret report: North Korea keeps busting sanctions, evading U.S.-led sea
patrols”, NBC News, dated December 14, 2018, and available as https://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/top-secret-reportnorth-korea-keeps-busting-sanctions-evading-u-n947926.
688 The Asan Institute report is available as document http://en.asaninst.org/wpcontent/themes/twentythirteen/action/dl.php?id=45032; data shown from table on page 27 of that report.

388
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKThese figures are reasonably consistent with the estimates offered in both the references cited
above (Reuters article quoting President Putin, and quote from DPRK émigré) We therefore
assume that the Asan Institute estimates apply as the total amount of oil exported "off books"
from Russia to the DPRK in 2015 through 2017, and further estimate that 90 percent of the oil
products in these shipments were diesel fuel, with the other 10 percent being gasoline, basedroughly on the pattern of on-books trades in the two products from 2005 through 2017 (based on
customs statistics). We further assume that this pattern of trade was established prior to 2014,
but that in 2014 imports from Russia by this mode were a bit lower, at 180,000 total tonnes, withdiesel and gasoline (or similar products) sold in approximately the same proportions as assumedfor 2015 through 2017.
A more recent range of potential ship-to-ship transfers of oil products during part of the year2018 is included the March 5, 2019 Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant toresolution 1874 (2009), which includes an analysis of potential ship-to-ship oil transfers
allegedly used by the DPRK to circumvent UNSC sanctions restricting imports of refined
products. The Panel of Experts analysis remotely tracked the berthing of relatively smallcapacity (approximately 900 to 5000 deadweight tonnes) tankers at DPRK ports, most notably
Nampo, but also including Chongjin, Najin, Wonsan, and others. The Panel of Experts analysis
calculated the volume of oil that would have been delivered by those vessels over the period
from January 1 through August 18 of 2018 under assumptions that the vessels were 33 percent,
50 percent, and 90 percent full when they docked (and delivered that quantity of fuel). Under
these three assumptions, the total fuel delivered would have been about 108,000, 164,000, and295,000 tonnes of oil products, respectively.689 Official reviewers of this analysis from theRussian Federation did not find the analysis acceptable, for reasons not fully specified. It seems
possible to us that in counting all of the vessels docking at these ports, the analysis may haveincluded some transfers of oil products purchased under the allowed UNSC 500,000-barrel (bbl)
limit, and/or some transfers of refined product from DPRK refineries (most notably the refineryat Sinuiju, the Ponghwa Chemical Factory) to one or more of these ports. And/or some of these
shipments might have represented transfers from port to port, and thus have been effectively
double-counting oil shipments. Still, we take the Panel of Expert's point is that even if thesevessels were a third full, they would represent oil transfers greater than the 500,000 bbl limit, andthus is it improbable that all of the transfers viewed by these ships were of oil obtained throughtransactions that allowed under sanctions. Further, the volumes calculated by the Panel ofExperts did not cover all of 2018. Starting with the Panel of Experts estimate of the amount ofoil that would have been delivered by the observed tankers if they were on average half full, andassuming that the deliveries continued at about the same pace through the rest of 2018, thetankers would have delivered about 260,000 tonnes of oil products. We consider this as an upper
limit on off-books oil product imports to the DPRK for 2018.
For 2019, in addition to the officially-reported volumes of exports from China and Russia to the
DPRK described above, the March 2020 “Panel of Experts” UNSC document previously cited690
includes descriptions, provided by a Member State (the US), of 64 deliveries of oil products (or,at least, visits to oil terminals) by foreign-flagged tankers to the DPRK (paragraph 10, page 9),
and another "at least" 157 suspected deliveries (paragraph 33, page 20) from DPRK-flagged
689 Figures above from Panel of Experts report (2019), Table 1 of Annex 2, starting on page 74 of the referenced document,

available at https://www.undocs.org/S/2019/171.
690 UNSC Panel of Experts (2020), ibid.

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tankers. Some or many of the oil products that made up these deliveries were apparently
obtained through ship-to-ship transfers at sea, either from foreign-flagged to DPRK-flagged
vessels, or from foreign-flagged to other foreign-flagged vessels. The US report to the UNSC
Panel of Experts estimated the total deliveries of petroleum products over the first 10 months of2019 under three scenarios, as follows: with tankers providing deliveries averaging of 1/3rd full
1,436,412 bbl, if averaging 50% full, 2,164,113 bbl, and if averaging 90% laden 3,894,426 bbl.
The tankers used in these shipments appear to vary in capacity from about 8000 to 44,000 tonnesof oil products.691 It is not clear whether these recorded deliveries include those "on-books"
transfers recorded in the (roughly) 409,000 bbl from Russia and China, and it seems possible tous that some of these port visits could have been intra-DPRK transfers from its Sinuiju refinery(via transfer from train cars or tanker trucks, or from an oil product pipeline connected to the
Ponghwa Chemical factory, if such a pipeline exists). Assuming the deliveries described above
continued through 2019 and were at the 50 percent level on average, and an average of 8.0 bbl ofoil products per tonne, the total deliveries reported by the US in the UNSC report would be324,617 tonnes. If the "on-books" deliveries are included in this total (we cannot tell whether
they are or are not), the total additional "off-books" imports, at least via ship (which is highly
likely to be most, perhaps nearly all, of total off-books imports) would be 260,266 tonnes in
2019. The figure before subtracting on-books trade (if it is included) is somewhat higher thanthe corresponding figure for 2018 (see above). To what extent that reflects a real increase in offbooks imports by the DPRK or is simply the result of better methods of/more complete detectionof deliveries is not possible for us to determine.
For 2020, we estimate and project that oil product imports to the DPRK, both on-books and offbooks, will be significantly reduced due to restrictions in cross-border transport and quarantine
arrangements related to the DPRK’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, we
assume that 2020 on-books exports of diesel and gasoline to the DPRK from China and Russia
will total 35 percent of 2019 levels, and that off-books exports from Russia sum to 30 percent of
the 2017 values estimated as above.692
Comparing the total petroleum product supplies based on the on-books and off-books estimates
above, together with our estimates of supplies from domestic DPRK oil refining, with ourestimates of trends in demand, for 2014 through 2020 we assume that ion each year there were atleast some oil product imports to the DPRK that are not captured in any of the statistics or
estimates of "off-books" trade above for those years. These imports may come from Russia,
China, or other international vendors, and may be coming in by land or sea. They may be barter
trades or products imported via the black market. Our assumptions as to imports by product,from 2014 on, are as follows:

691 From the first Table in Annex 1 of UNSC 2020 report, totals on page 86.
692 This value is reasonably close to the actual year-on-year 2020 versus 2019 January through June reported shipments of oil

products from China and Russia to the DPRK. Quoting a UNSC document of 7/22/20 that was not immediately available to us,
Yonghap News Agency, in "Chinese, Russian oil shipments to N. Korea plunge amid coronavirus pandemic", dated 7/22/20 andavailable as https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20200722008000325, lists total deliveries from China and Russia to the DPRK of
14,302 tonnes of refined products, compared with an approximate reported 29,602 tonnes in the first half of 2019 (a roughestimate, as we do not have at hand monthly figures for Russian exports during 2019), which would be about 48% of 2019deliveries. This represents, however, only the "on books" trades reported in the first half of 2020, and the impact of COVID-19
on total on- plus off-books trades is likely to have been different.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKProductGasoline
DieselKerosene/ Jet Kerosene

2014
15,00085,000-2015
60,000-2016
15,00020,000-2017
120,000
15,0002018
35,000110,000
15,0002019
35,000110,000
20,0002020
100,000
1,000

For 2017, when UN Security Council restrictions on oil imports were in full force, ourassumption is that even after the addition of the catalytic cracker unit to the Sinuiju refinery,
without a significant amount of fuel--likely diesel and some kerosene/jet fuel, beyond theimports described in customs statistics and off-books imports from Russia above, signs of fuelshortages, particularly for diesel fuel would have been more evident in the DPRK than visitors
describe. We therefore assume that there were reductions in fuel use across the board, but also
the amounts of fuels shown above made their way into the country. For example, the 120,000
additional tonnes of diesel fuel that we assume were imported "off-books" is more or lessconsistent with the (sanctions-evading) shipments recorded as received or planned through a
Taiwanese company, as reported by the UNSC "Panel of Experts".693
The installation and start of operations of the catalytic cracking unit at Ponghwa, depending on
how and when its operations were phased in, may have resulted in a change in the market forgasoline in the DPRK. Manifestations of this change in the short term, until the market adjusted
to increased supply through, for example, more use of gasoline vehicles relative to diesel
vehicles, could have included reductions in off-books imports of gasoline, some additional
storage of gasoline (augmenting stocks temporarily or for the longer term), and/or reduced
gasoline prices at DPRK filling stations.
For 2018, we assume that the total off-books trade in oil products with the DPRK was on theorder of 160,000 tonnes, which would be at the low end of the set of sensitivity values provided
in the Panel of Experts analysis, if those figures were extrapolated to 12 months of deliveries.
Our estimate for 2019 is much the same but includes slightly more imports of kerosene/jet fuel.
For 2020, we estimate that in addition to our (projected) on-books and off-books estimates ofimports above, another 100,000 tonnes of diesel (plus 1000 tonnes of kerosene/jet fuel) would beneeded to meet fuel demand at the levels we estimate, even factoring in a substantial demand
reduction due to COVID-19. This would represent about one-third of the medium scenario(tankers averaging half-full) 2019 estimate of deliveries of oil products to the DPRK provided in
the March 2020 Panel of Experts Report. We feel that this level of imports is consistent with thegeneral reported reductions in DPRK/China cross-border traffic and trade into and out of the
DPRK in general in 2020 as described by many observers.
6.6.

Considerations in Analysis of Recent DPRK Oil Product Supply and
DemandKey caveats to the analysis presented above include:•

Although we have done our best to estimate energy demand by sector, based on what is
known about physical sectoral outputs, and what can be guessed at based on reports by

693 From paragraphs 71 and 72 of UNSC (2018), Note by the President of the Security Council, number S/2018/171, Annex:

Letter dated 1 March 2018 from the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the President of
the Security Council, available as http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2018/171&referer=/english/&Lang=E.

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visitors and other analysts, there is little solid information about energy demand in the
DPRK. As such, although we provide trends that seem consistent with availble
information, true figures, if indeed they are ever ascertained, may be different.
•

For the years 2014 through 2020 we have estimated volumes of oil products imported“off-books”, that is, not captured in customs statistics, that exceed, at least for 2017
(though not necessarily for 2018 and 2019) the volumes of such imports estimated byothers, because we feel that it A) likely that some off-books imports have inevitably gone
undetected, and B) assuming that our energy demand results for earlier years arereasonable, it seems improbable that DPRK oil products demand could decrease enoughto account for the decrease in reported (on- and off-books) fuels imports without severe
and visible economic dislocation, which visitors have not reported.

•

We have also estimated that China shipped to the DPRK by pipeline in 2018 and 2019was somewhat more oil than it reported to the Panel of Experts—though crude oil exports
from China to the DPRK have not appeared in customs statistics for several years. Thisestimate is based on an estimate, which we find persuasive, of crude oil flows that factor
in the technical characteristics of the pipeline into the Ponghwa Chemical Factoryrefinery, and results in higher 2018 and 2019 domestic production of refined products inthe DPRK than would otherwise be the case. For 2020, we assume that these exports,
which cost China relatively little, will ultimately be about 5 percent higher than in 2019and 2018. It is, however, very difficult for an outsider to know how much oil China isshipping to the DPRK in a given year, and it is probable that even the most careful
remote analysis of how much crude oil goes into the Dandong/Sinuiju pipeline will havemargine of errors of greater than 5 or 10 percent.694•

It is possible that off-books imports were either greater than we have estimated, in whichcase served demand for oil products would be higher (particularly in 2017 through 2019)
than we show in the tables and figures above, and/or that some of the oil product demandin 2017 through 2019 was served by drawing down stocks of oil products. If we had toguess, we would probably say that off-books imports were greater than we haveestimated, rather than less.
6.7.

Potential Energy Impact of Humanitarian Engagement Strategies Relative to
DPRK Oil Imports

In a Nautilus Institute Special Report published in 2018, David von Hippel and Peter Hayes
described a rapid-deployment (6 months) $100 million “Program” of humanitarian energy
assistance and engagement that the international community might provide for the DPRK (seehttps://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/rapid-relief-of-humanitarian-stress-fromenergy-sanctions-building-energy-efficiency-and-solar-pv-measures-for-rapid-installation-inpyongyang/). The Program centers on the use of A) building energy efficiency measures in
694 Such an analysis would be possible using high-resolution and regular satellite images to count the number of oil cars/trains

discharging cargo at the oil storage and pumping terminal at Dandong. We do not have access to a complete annual set of such
images, as our work is limited to the use of publicly available images such as those in Google Earth or images that other authors
have published. Even with a very complete set of images, it would be difficult to know for certain that one has accounted for allof the trains discharging their cargo, due to unloading missed due to the timing of satellite images or prevailing cloud cover.
And even with a complete count of every train car that has been unloaded at Dandong, one would still not know with certainty
how full the train cars were, on average.

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apartments in the DPRK, likely in Pyongyang, to provide heating services to residents, and B)
installation of solar photovoltaic mini-grids in schools and clinics to provide to reliable power for
those facilities. Both sets of measures provide opportunities for on-the-ground and highly visible
engagement between the international community and the DPRK.
The 50,000-apartment building energy retrofit (insulation, improved windows and doors,
weatherstripping, heating controls, and other measures) we propose would reduce coal use(assumed to be central heating) by about 900 TJ (terajoules, a unit of energy equivalent to about
24 tonnes of oil products) annually, or 22,000 TJ over the lifetime of the measures. An
alternative to providing heat with coal-fired central heating (or boilers) in the DPRK might be touse diesel-fueled generators (which have been imported in large numbers in recent years, see
https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/dprk-imports-of-generators-in-recent-yearsan-indication-of-growing-consumer-choice-and-influence-on-energy-supply-decisions/) toproduce electricity, then for apartments to use electrical resistance heat. If heating is provided
via diesel generating sets, the savings in fuel from the building energy efficiency measures isabout 2400 TJ/year, or about 60,000 TJ over the lifetime of the measures.
The photovoltaic (PV) installations (about 14 MW total) for schools and/or clinic would save
300 TJ per year in displaced coal for electricity generation or about 7,000 TJ over the life of thesystems.
By way of comparison with refined products volumes, the 1200 (900 + 300) TJ of displaced coal
per year would be about 3% of the approximately 35,800 TJ of diesel, gasoline, kerosene/jet fuel,and LPG that we estimate was used in the DPRK (including for electricity generation) in 2017,and a slightly higher percentage of the about 34,900 we estimate was used in 2018. The 35,800
used TJ in 2017 excludes heavy fuel oil, but includes all sources of refined products, bothreported and “off-books”. Using the “genset-and-resistance-heating” comparison, the total rises
to 2700 TJ/year, or about 8 percent of refined products use (again excluding heavy oil). The
analog to the 35,800 TJ figure for 2017 in 2016 is about 44,000 TJ, meaning that our estimate isthat use of these fuels (including for electricity generation) fell by about 8.5 PJ (petajoules, or
thousand TJ) between 2016 and 2017 as a result of accommodations to the lower availability ofoil product supplies in the DPRK (including reduced fuel use and, in some sectors, fuelsubstitution) due to UNSC sanctions.
If our six-month program is ramped up to approximately four times its size in a 2-year
engagement strategy, the expanded program would save coal use on the order of 13 percent of
DPRK 2017 petroleum products supplies, which would be more than half (in TJ) of what we are
estimating the DPRK reduction in oil use between 2016 and 2017 might have been. If one
assumes that some or all of the program savings are displacing electricity generation by diesels
generator sets to generate heat for apartments, the relative savings is greater.
This type of engagement serves to relieve some of the humanitarian impacts of sanctions, with aparticular focus on addressing impacts on ordinary DPRK citizens but leaves the sanctions
regime largely intact pending progress in talks to address the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program.
It thus represents an important option for engagement and confidence-building while talks
continue, with few “downsides” in terms of potential diversion of significant benefits to the
DPRK military or to elites.

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6.8.

Conclusions

We estimate the overall supplies of oil products in the DPRK as shown in Figure 6-17. Refined
products produced (almost entirely) from crude oil imported by pipeline from China serve as aconsistent, if minimal, source of fuel supply for the DPRK economy, but it has been imports,
which increased markedly from 2010 to 2015, that have allowed the DPRK economy to grow.
Some of these imports were from on-books (customs-reported) trades, but many most likely werenot, particularly after the advent of UNSC sanctions. We estimate that 2017 through 2019 oil
supply (and thus use) was less than in 2016, based on at least transient price spikes for diesel andgasoline as reported by visitors to the DPRK, but do not see the type of reductions in oil productavailability that the authors of the UNSC sanctions on oil product imports probably hoped to see.
For gasoline, in particular, supplies in the DPRK were likely improved in 2017 by the addition,in 2016, of a catalytic cracker unit at the DPRK’s Ponghwa Chemical Factory, its oil refinerynear the Northwestern city of Sinuiju. This unit allowed some of the heavy fuel oil formerly
produced by the refinery to be converted into lighter products, most notably gasoline. 2018 and2019 supplies from domestic refining may have been slightly higher than in 2017, if ourassumptions about crude oil flows to the Sinuiju refinery being higher than reported are correct.
It is also possible that 2017 through 2019 oil supplies to the DPRK were in fact greater than wehave estimated, but we do not think it is likely that supplies would have been much less. For
2020, we estimate that the result of the DPRK government’s measures to prevent the COVID-19
pandemic from severely affecting the DPRK have and will have resulted in reduced oil productuse in 2020, particularly in the transportation and military sectors, and likely also limited
imported refined oil product imports.
As time goes on, it is likely that the DPRK will get more adept, rather than less, in obtaining offbooks the oil (oil products in particular) imports that it needs, and the enthusiasm of somecountries for preventing such imports may wane. We therefore suggest that an even stronger
emphasis on engagement with the DPRK by the international community is called for on issues
vital to the DPRK’s energy security (and addressing its energy insecurity), such as the building
energy efficiency/renewable energy engagement strategy described above.

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Figure 6-17: Estimated Overall DPRK Petroleum Products Supplies

Estimated DPRK Petroleum Products Supplies--Refined Domesticallyand Imports

2,000,000
1,800,000
1,600,000

Tonnes1,400,000

Gasoline--RefinedDiesel--Refined
LPG/Ref Gas/Non-En--Refined
Kerosene--Imported
HFO--Imported

Kerosene--Refined
HFO--RefinedGasoline--Imported
Diesel--Imported
LPG/Ref Gas/Non-En--Imported

2008

2016

1,200,000
1,000,000

800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
1996

7.

2000

2005

2009

2010

2014

2015

2017

2018

2019

2020

The DPRK’s Mineral Resource Base
7.1.

Introduction

Minerals, including metal ores and non-metallic minerals, constitute a major economic resource
for the DPRK. The DPRK has the world’s largest known resource of the refractory mineralmagnesite, estimated at up to 50 percent of the world’s resources. The DPRK has sevenminerals, including tungsten, molybdenum, barite, and fluorite, for which the DPRK’s resources
rank among those of the top ten countries in the world.695 Minerals and metals represent an
important current source of income for the DPRK, and will be an important short-to-mediumterm area of investment to spur the redevelopment of the DPRK economy. The DPRK website“DPRKorea-Trade” listed graphite, gold, silver, platinum, palladium tellurium, bismuth,
selenium, zinc, talc and granite among the metals and minerals that the DPRK currently seeks toexport.696 A 2016 article quoting a DPRK minerals researcher described (and lauded) the
DPRK’s mineral wealth, including “…the copious amounts of over 500 types of quality mineralreserves in North Korea..”, and quoted the researcher as noting that the DPRK’s mineralendowment was a result of “…the long history and diversity of crustal movement over time. . . .

695 Changchun Killim Sinmun (Internet Version-WWW) in Korean 31 Aug 06 - 08 Sep 06, “Guide to DPRK Mineral Resources".
696 Formerly available as http://www.dprkorea-trade.com/metals/metals01.htm, “DPRKorea-Trade, Metals, Minerals and Stones

Export Items” visited 4/2/07.

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the earth of our country has a long history of more than 3.6 billion years.”697 Figure 7-1 andFigure 7-2 show selected minerals deposits and industries in the DPRK, with Figure 7-2 focusing
on the locations of key reserves. Table 7-1 shows ROK estimates of reserves of a group of
metals and minerals in the DPRK and in the ROK, with the estimated value of those reserves.
The subsections that follow provide additional information on DPRK resources for iron, otherbase metals and precious metals, uranium and other heavy metals, and key non-metallic
minerals. Also provided are descriptions of the existing minerals-related infrastructure in the
DPRK, and key minerals-related government authorities and training organizations in the DPRK.
The text, tables, and figures in this Chapter largely draw upon three studies prepared for Nautilus
in 2008, 2010/2011, and 2019. These studies are:•

A presentation by Choi Kyung Soo of the ROK-based North Korea Resources Institute, titled“The Mineral Resources of North Korea”, prepared for the 2010 DPRK Energy and Minerals
Working Group Meeting. This presentation is available as http://nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/05.-Choi.pptx•

A presentation by Chung Woo-jin of the Korea Energy Economics Institute (KEEI), dated
March 2008, titled “North Korea’s Mineral Resources and Inter-Korean Cooperation”, andprepared for the 2008 DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting. This presentation isavailable as http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Chung1.ppt.

•

A report prepared by Edward Yoon entitled Status and Future of the North Korean Minerals
Sector, dated January 2011, and available as http://nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/DPRK-Minerals-Sector-YOON.pdf. Slightly edited versions ofsections in Mr. Yoon’s report are the primary source for the text in sections 5-3 through 5-5of this Chapter, as well as in other sections, as indicated.

•

An update to the report above by Edward Yoon entitled Recent Activities in The DPRK
Minerals Sector prepared for Nautilus in 2019 as a part of the Regional Energy Security
Project.698

697 North Korean Economy Watch (2016), “Over 500 types of high-quality mineral reserves in North Korea”, dated March 3,

2016, and available as https://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/mining/rare-earths/.
698 Edward Yoon (2019), Recent Activities in the DPRK Minerals Sector, NAPSNet Special Reports, dated April 03, 2019,available as https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/recent-activities-in-the-dprk-minerals-sector/.

396
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 7-1: Location of Selected Minerals Deposits in the DPRK699

699 Map from Federation of American Scientists web page on “Other Industry” in North Korea,

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/target/industry.htm.

397
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 7-2: Location of Selected Minerals Deposits in the DPRK700

700 Map from Choi Kyung Soo’s 2010 presentation prepared for Nautilus, as referenced above.

398
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 7-1: Estimates of Metals and Minerals Reserves in the ROK and DPRK701

MineralType

Reserves (1,000 ton except as
noted)

Potential Value($ million)

South
Korea

North Korea

South
Korea

North
Korea

Gold (Au100)

0.030

1-2

469

23,450Silver (Ag100)

1.175

3-5

296

1,007.7

Copper (Cu100)

41

2,155

55.1

2,896.1

Lead (Pb100)

305

6,000

117.4

2,309.5

Zinc (Zn100)

440

10-20 (million)

264.8

9,027.3

Iron (Fe50)

19,7002-4 (billion)

484.9

73,842.6

Tungsten

100

200-300

86.9

217.3

Molybdenum

10

1-3

208.6

41.7

Manganese

123

100-300

20.8

6.5

Nickel

-

10-20

-

3.6

Graphite

1,837

6,000

1,183.4

3,865.2

Limestone

6,547,800

100 (billion)

65,248.6

996,496.5

Kaolin74,3572,000

1,143.8

30.8

Talc

5,451

600

545.1

60

Asbestos

511

13

55.2

1.4

Fluorite

345

500

53

76.8

Barite

712

2,100

75.5

222.7

Magnesite-

3-4 (billion)-

126,000

701 Table 7-1 is from a presentation by Dr. Chung Woo-jin, entitled "Mineral Resources in DPRK", as prepared for the DPRK

Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA), and available as
http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Chung.ppt. The table shown has some minor edits and format differences fromthe table in Dr. Chung’s presentation. A similar table, with generally similar estimates of resources, is available (as Table 2) inthe 2011 report by Edward Yoon referenced above.

399
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 7-2: Estimates of Metals and Minerals Resources in the DPRK702
Type of Minerals

Unit

DPRK Publication#1

DPRK Publication #2

Total deposits

Confirmed &remaining

Forecasted

Total deposits

Coal

Anthracite

billion tons

20.5

2.6

20.1

22.7

Precious

Gold

tons

2,000

317

655

972

MetalsSilver

tons

5,000

974

6676

7,650

Copper1,000 ton

2,900

1,438

3,523

4,961

Pb

1,000 tons

10,600

2,577

7,391

9,968

Zinc

1,000 tons

21,1009,477

18,70628,183Iron

billion tons

5.0

1.7

3.0

4.7

Tungsten

1,000 tons

246

36

119

155

Molybdenum

1,000 tons

54

18

29

47

Nickel1,000 tons

36

25

35

60

Graphite

1,000 tons

2,000

18,729-18,729Limestone

billion tons

100

1.3

5.0

6.3

Magnesitebillion tons

6.0

1.3

6.3

7.6

Apatite

tons

1.5

0.8

1.7

2.5

Barite

tons

2,100

2,399

2,426

4,825

MetalsNonmetals

Table 7-3 summarizes ROK estimates as of 2008 of mineral resources output from major minesin the DPRK. In this table, production data for North Korean minerals in 1990 have likely been
understated, with production somewhat overstated after 1990. A reason for these inaccurate
estimates by ROK organizations is that North Korean natural resource production capacity
actually reached its highest level in 1990 but declined dramatically through 1999. This decreasein DPRK mining capacity was not well known to ROK analysts. As a result, the numbers in
Table 5-2 are inaccurate reflections of true DPRK minerals production. Based on the testimonyof former North Korean miners, mining production in the DPRK declined dramatically from theearly 1990s (from about 1993-1994) through 1999.703

702 Table 7-2 is from Edward Yoon (2019) as referenced earlier in this Chapter, derived from a report by Dr. Chung Woo-jin, “A

Study on the Actual Condition of Energy Trade in North Korea”, Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2015. The table shown has
some minor edits and format differences from the table in Yoon’s report.
703 Information on reduced DPRK minerals production described here are based on personal observations and interviews
conducted by E. Yoon, as described in the 2011 document referenced earlier in this Chapter.

400
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 7-3: ROK Estimates of Output of Major Metallic Ores in the DPRK 704
Gold(tonnes)Silver(tonnes)

Copper
(1,000tonnes)Tungsten(ton)

Pb(1,000tonnes)Zinc(1,000tonnes)Iron ore(1,000tonnes)

1990

5

50

15

1000

80

230

8430

1992

5

50

16

1000

75

200

5747

1994

5

50

16

900

80

210

4586

1996

4,5

50

16

900

80

210

3440

1998

4.5

50

14

500

70

100

2890

2000

2

40

13

500

60

100

3793

2001

2

40

13

500

60

100

4208

2002

2

40

12

600

60

100

4078

2003

2

20

12

600

60

100

4579

2004

2

20

12

600

12

100

4580

2005

2

20

12

600

13

100

5000

2006

2

20

12

600

13

100

5000

An estimate of DPRK minerals production in more recent years by the United States Geological
Survey (USGS) is provided in Table 7-4.705 Like the ROK estimates above, these must be
considered rough at best, and many do not change from year to year, indicating that the authors
had received little new information to inform changes in the estimates. Compared with the ROK
estimates for earlier years, the USGS estimated about the same production of gold and iron ore,higher production of silver, somewhat higher production of copper, significantly higher
production of tungsten, lower production of lead and zinc. It should be emphasized, however,that these changes do not necessarily indicate changes in DPRK production between 2006 and2012, as the methods used by the two groups to estimate production were likely different.
An additional estimate of DPRK production of coal and six other minerals was provided by
Yoon (2019) and is shown in Table 7-5.706

704 Korea Mineral Improvement Corporation Report, Deposits of Mineral resource in DPRK and trading between South andNorth Koreas, 2008.
705 Jaewon Chung (2010), “The Mineral Industry of North Korea”, In United States Geological Survey (USGS) National
Minerals Information Center, USGS Minerals Yearbook 2016, volume III, Area Reports—International, Excel workbook withembedded Word file downloaded from https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/asia-and-pacific#kn. First posted October 1, 2019.
706 Yoon (2019), ibid, based on data from North Korea Natural Resource Institute, (www.nokori.or.kr) visited Dec.22

2018.

401
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 7-4: USGS Estimates of DPRK Metals and Minerals Production, 2012-2016 (values inMetric Tonnes unless otherwise specified)
Commodity 2, 3
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
MET ALS
Cadmium metal, smelter
200
200
200
200
200
Copper:Mine production, Cu content
16,00017,00019,30020,00020,000Refinery production:
Primary
10,000 r
10,000 r
10,000 r
10,000 r
10,000r
r
r
Secondary
5,000
5,000
5,000
5,000 r
5,000
Smelter production, undifferentiated
15,000 r
15,000 r
15,000 r
15,000 r
15,000Gold, mine output, Au content
kilograms
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
Iron and steel:
Pig ironthousand metric tons
250
250
250
250
250
Steel, raw
do.
1,220
1,210
1,220
1,080
1,220
Iron ore:
Gross weight
do.
5,200
5,500
5,500
5,000 r5,300
r
r
r
Fe content
do.
3,220
3,400
3,400
3,000 r
3,300
Lead:
Mine production, Pb content
38,400 r
58,800 r
36,000 r
32,400 r
54,100Refinery production, primary
7,000 r7,000 r7,000 r7,000 r2,400
Silver, mine production, Ag content
kilograms
50,00050,00050,00050,300 r
50,400T ungsten, mine production, concentrate, W content
100
65
70
70
50
Zinc:
Mine production, Zn content
35,00036,00032,00026,00030,000Smelter production, primary and secondary
35,00035,00030,00020,00020,000
INDUST RIAL MINERALS
Cement, hydraulicthousand metric tons
6,400
6,600
6,700
6,700
7,100
Graphite
30,000 r
30,000 r
30,000 r
30,000 r
30,000Magnesite
500,000
700,000
700,000
700,000
700,000
Nitrogen, ammonia, N content
thousand metric tons
70 r
70 r
70 r
70 r
70
Phosphate rock:
Gross weight
300,000
300,000
300,000
300,000
300,000
90,000 r
95,00095,00095,00095,000P 2 O5 content
Salt
500,000
500,000
500,000
500,000
500,000
MINERAL FUELS AND RELAT ED MAT ERIALS
Coal:
Anthracite
thousand metric tons
11,70012,00012,20012,40014,000
Bituminous
do.
10,900
11,20011,40011,60013,100Lignite
do.
3,290
3,390
3,450
3,500
3,960
Coke, metallurgical
do.
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
r
Revised. do. Ditto.
1
T able includes data available through April 9, 2018. All data are reported unless otherwise noted. Estimated data are rounded to no morethan three significant digits; may not add to totals shown.
2
In addition to the commodities listed, sand and gravel, sulfur, stone, and refined petroleum products may have been produced in North
Korea, but available information was inadequate to make reliable estimates of output.
3
Because of the lack of official reported data, mineral commodity production numbers have been estimated.

402
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 7-5: Output of Major Mineral Products in the DPRK (2013-2017)
Item

Unit

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Coal

1,000 tons

27,861

27,081

31,11535,741

21,738Iron ore

1,000 tons

5,716

5,487

4,020

4,280

4,473

MagnesiteTons

143,848

179,450

149,599

160,935

172,488

CopperTons

33,42938,56342,826

62,768

8,749

Zinc

Tons

144,556

149,044

181,329

265,877

142,685Pb

Tons

95,45896,52993,187

94,45895,944Presentations of what is known about key mines, output trends, and infrastructure for each of
several different important types of minerals are provided below in section 7.2, below, followed
by a section providing a description of major mining, metals refining, minerals transport, andrelated infrastructure (section 7.3), a review of the policies, organizations and human resources
involved in the DPRK minerals sector (section 7.4), and a presentation of conclusions regarding
the DPRK minerals sectors offering potential strategies for overseas investors who might wish to
become involved in development of the sector (section 7.5).

7.2.

Mining and Other Infrastructure, Output Trends, and Related Information
for Key Types of Minerals
7.2.1. Iron

The DPRK’s iron ore reserves are substantial. In addition to the ROK estimates of DPRK
reserves, at 2 to 4 billion tonnes, other sources note reserves of 3 billion tonnes.707 The Korea
Mining Corporation (ROK) estimated the overall size of deposits of iron ore in the DPRK at 3.5– 4.0 billion tonnes (including ores of quality in the 22-50% Fe range) as of 2008. The Musan(or Moo-san) mine, in the DPRK’s northeast, is described by one source as “the largest open air[presumably meaning open pit] mine in Asia”, and has been a recent target of investment by
Chinese mining companies.708 Major iron ore regions are the Moo-san, Lee-won, Buk-Chong,Hur-chon areas (Ham-Kyung province), and Eun-Ryul, Shin-Won, and Jae-Ryong (in HwangHea province). Details of key mines and factories using iron ore are provided below
Table 7-6 summarizes the major iron ore mines in the DPRK, including their location, thereported size of their deposits, and the reported grade of their ore bodies, as well as estimates of
707 MSN Encarta, previously available as http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761555092_2/North_Korea.html.
708 North Korea Brief No 06-4-8-1, “Digging for Answers in the DPRK Mining Sector: Seeking Solutions for the North Korean

Economy”, lists reserves for the Musan mine at “7 trillion tons”, which we assume is a mistranslation, a mistake in units, orboth—probably the proper value is 700 million tons or 7 billion tons.

403
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKtheir output as of 2011. There have reportedly been no major new iron ore mines opened in the
DPRK in the last five years. Iron ore production in the DPRK peaked in 1985 (at 9.8 million
tonnes, based on ore with Fe content of 65%) but sharply declined to 2.89 million tonnes as of
1998.709

709 Source: "DPRK's Industry", Korea Industrial Bank (ROK), 2011.

404
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 7-6: Major Iron Ore Mines in the DPRK710
Area

Mine nameLocation

Deposit

Grade

East

Moo-sanMoo-san, Ham-kyung
province

1.5 billion
tonnes

25-35%

Lee-wonHam-Nam, prov.
Poong-San
Ran-gang prov.
Hur-chon
Ham-namDan-chon
Hamnam
Ja-Gang province
Hwang-namprovince
Hwang-namprovinceGae-chon
Pyong-Nam province
Eun-Ryul
Hwang-Nam province
Shin-Won
Ham-Nam province
Eui-JooPyong-Buk, province
Hwang-namprovince
Hwang-bukprovince
Hwang-bukprovince
Hwang-bukprovince
Hwang-namprovince
Pyong-Namprovince

20 years
operation
120 million
tonnes
150 million
tonnes
100 million
tonnesunknown
100 million
tonnes
100 million
tonnes50 million
tonnes

Lee-WonPoong-San
Hur-ChonDan-chonJang-GangWest

Eun-Ryul
Jae-RyungChon-Dong
Suh-hae-ri
Hah-Sung
Duck-Hyun
An-ArkSong-rim
Hwang-Joo
Yon-San
Tae-TanGae-chon

Others
8 million tonnes.
(30%), 3 million
tonnes (60%)

49%
45%
48%
45%
50%
48%
50%

Open mine
1.6 million tonnes
Open mine
500,000 ton

50%

1 million tonnes
Underdevelopment
Open mine
500,000 ton
Iron & copper
500,000 tonnes

unknown55%

15 million
tonnes45%

unknown

50%

unknown

50%

Newly developed

unknown

55%

Newly developed

unknown

55%

Newly developed

unknown

55%

Newly developed

unknown

55%

Newly developed

17.5 million
tonnes4555%

Developed 1976

710 Source: "DPRK's Industry", Korea Industrial Bank (ROK), 2001.

405
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKThe Moo-san (Musan) Iron Ore Mine
The reserves of the Moo-san mine are estimated at 1.5-2.0 billion tonnes as Magnetite(FeOFe2O3) containing Fe at 23-30%. Choi (see reference above) describes development of thismine as beginning in 1935, its reserves as 1.73 billion tonnes at an ore grade of 24% Fe. The
mine’s reserves are considered low-grade ore (average 25%), but as it is a strip mine (an open pitmine), it offers iron ore production at low cost. There are 3-4 mineral veins in the Moo-san mine.
The first vein is 400 meters in width, 3,000 meters in length, and 1,000 meters deep. Another 3veins are known to be similar in structure to the first, but further details on those veins are notavailable. Starting from an iron content of 28-30%, ore is refined to an iron content of 60%-65%
through a dressing (separation of higher-grade ore products) procedure in the mine area. Ore
produced from an open surface mine (open pit mine) is sent to 6 ore separators in 25-ton and 50ton heavy trucks (which were mostly imported from Sweden) then, the ore is sent to dressing
plants for further refining by gravity separation methods at a location near the ore separator.
Using this refining method above, the 60-65% Fe powdered ore is produced, then sent to the
Kim-Chaek Iron-manufacturing plant in Chong-Jin city, 97 km from the Moo-san mine.
Transport is via freight train and via a steel pipeline that is 2 meters in diameter. Unlike mostregional one-way railway systems in the DPRK, the railway from the mine is a double line sothat powdered ore can be carried out without any delay via freight train if the mine produces at
its maximum capacity. The total capacity to carry out powdered ore via the railway and pipelinefrom the Moo-San mine to the Chong-Jin iron manufacturer) was 6 millon tonnes per year.711
The Moo-San mine’s production capacity is 3 million tonnes of 65% powdered ore. The mine
produced 9.9 million tonnes of raw ore in 1985, but after that production sharply declined to 2.89
million tonnes, or 30% of production in 1985 production, though iron ore production at the mine
has reportedly been slowly increasing between late 2002 and 2009. Choi (see reference above)
lists the mine’s capacity as 10 million tonnes or ore annually, with ore processing throughput
capacity of 7.5 million tonnes/yr using a magnetic separation (wet) processing method. Choi
estimates the 2006 output of the mine at 5 million tonnes of ore, and 2 million tonnes ofconcentrate (Fe 65%), at a recovery rate of 79.5%. The mine is linked to the Seodusu
hydroelectric power plant over a 60 kV power line, and draws its water from the Duman (orTumen) river. It is also linked by railroad to the port at Chengjin, 150 km from the mine site.
The mine has been supplying its production to the Kim-Chaek Iron-Manufacturing Company.
This iron-manufacturer’s annual production capacity is reportedly 2.17 million tonnes,
accounting for about 40% of the DPRK’s iron production capacity (5.42 million tonnes).712
Kim-Chaek employed 20,000 workers when operating at peak output, and its annual capacity isreported to be 2.4 million tonnes of pig iron, 2 million tonnes of steel, and 1.4 million tonnes ofsteel materials (rolled steel) .713

711 Based on data from Kim, Young Yoon DPRK’s Mineral production systems and future, Korea Reunification Institute, 2007,

and personal communications with industry sources.
712 Based on Korean (ROK) Central Bank report, 2005.
713 Source, Han GyeRe Newspaper, March 3, 2002. Note that the 2.4 tons of pig iron is probably roughly consistent with theestimate of 2.17 tons of iron output noted above.

406
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKEun-Ryul Mine
This mine extracts iron ore in the form of limonite (Fe(OH)n H2O) and is located in Eun-RyulGun, Hwang-Hae province. Deposits in this mine are estimated to total 200 million tonnes. Dueto their high grade of iron ore (Fe 44%) and the convenience of transporting ore in ships (theEun-Ryul mine is within 20 kms of Hae-Joo port) the Eun-Ryul mine and the nearby Jae-Ryong
mine descibed below are likely possible destinations for overseas investment funds.714
Jae-Ryong Mine
This mine is located in Jae-Ryong-Gun, Hwang-Hae province. The mine vein is similar to thatin the Eun-Ryul mine. Both mines provide their production to the Hwang-Hae Ironmanufacturer.
Hwang-Hae Iron-Manufacturer
The two mines above provide their production to the Hwang-Hae Iron-manufacturer. Thisfactory’s capacity in to produce pig iron is approximately 1.14 million tonnes per year.715 Thisiron-manufacturer has more modernized and sophisticated facilities relative to the Kim-Chaek
Iron-Manufacturer, but it does not operate continuously due to a shortage of iron ore supplies
from the Jae-Ryong and Eun-Ryul mines.
Hur-Chon iron ore mine
This mine is located in Hur-Chon Gun, Hwam-Kyung Nam province. The deposit is composedof reserves of hematite (Fe2O3), and the quality of iron ore is 44%.
North Korea has been reluctant to export iron ore, but it has encouraged iron ore manufacturers
to export steel or pig iron production to China or South Korea. Table 7-7 provides a summary of
DPRK steel and pig iron production capacity in units of thousand tonnes per year. Table 7-8
shows the supply chains—sources of ore and electricity—for major iron manufacturers in the
DPRK.

714 Sources of information used to describe this and other mines in this section include Kim, Young Yoon DPRK’s Mineralproduction systems and future, Korea Reunification Institute, 2007; Chung, Woo-Jin Strategic Cooperation Plans and Current
Situation in Development of South and North Korea, Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2007, and personal communications
with industry sources.
715 Korea Mining Improvement Corporation report, Deposits of Mineral resource in DPRK and trading between South and North
Koreas, 2005, p. 9.

407
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 7-7: Production Capacity of Major DPRK Iron Manufacturers (1000 tonnes per year,
and fraction of total national capacity)716
Iron Making

Steel Making

Rolling(1000 tonnes)(1000 tonnes)(1000 tonnes)

Kim-Chaek Iron
Manufacturer

2167 (40%)

2400 (40%)

1470 (36.4%)

Hwang Hae Iron
Manufacturer

1142 (21%)

1445 (24.1%)

750 (18.6%)

Sung Jin Iron
Manufacturer

480 (8.9%)726 (12.1%)

415 (10.3%)

Chong Jin steel
manufacturer

960 (17.7%)

4.13 Iron
manufacturer

516 (9.5%)

September (Kuwol) Iron
manufacturer

96 (1.8%)

90 (1.5%)550 (13.6%)

Others60 (1.1%)

Total

5421

6002

4037

Name

716 Source: “DPRK’s Industries”, Korea (ROK) Industrial Bank, 2002.

These data are consistent with data provided by Dr.

Chung Woo-jin in the presentation listed in section 7.1, above.

408
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 7-8: Supply Chains for Major Iron & Steel Manufacturers in the DPRK
Name

Major Products

Iron OrePower Plant

Supplies Products
for

Kim-Chaek Iron
Manufacturer

Pig iron, steels,rolled steel

Moo-san Iron
mine

Chong-Jin
Thermalpower plantSung-Jin,
Chunrima
steel maker

Eun-Ryul,
Jaer-yongmine

Pyongyang
Steel sheet,
Thermal power rails, shaped
plant
steel

Chon-dong,Gea-chonmines

Pyong-Yang
Construction,
Thermal power building
plantmaterials

Pig iron, steels,
Hwanog-Hae
secondary metal
Iron Manufacturer
products

Chunrima steel
Manufacturer

General rolled steel
steel rope, secondary
steel products

Chong-jin steel
manufacturer

Secondary steel
products
alloy steel products
structural steel

Chong-Jin
Thermalpower plant

Machineryfactories,
exports

Exports of Iron Ore to China
The share of iron ore in the DPRK’s exports to China as of 2016 was not high compared to thoseof other mineral resources (particularly coal). In 2016, the value of the DPRK's iron ore exports
to China amounted to $7.33 million. This was not a large proportion of total exports compared toother mineral resources exported to China, but this share had sharply increased in 2014, and fellto zero for several months after April 2017, then fell again sharply after September 2017 when
UNSC sanctions began. As a whole, the value of the DPRK's iron ore exports to China in 2017
(the “Export” line in Figure 7-3) totaled US $100 million, an increase of 43% over 2016.717.

717 From Yoon, 2019, ibid, original source Information system for Resources of North Korea (2018), (in Korean), available ashttps://www.irenk.net/.

409
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

Figure 7-3 DPRK Exports of Iron Ore to China by Month718

7.2.2. Other base metals
Most lead and zinc deposits are found in Ham-Kyung, Pyong-An and Hwang-Hea provinces, andthe total and total reserves are approximately 600,000 tonnes (Pb 100%) and 15 - 20 million
tonnes (Zn 100%), respectively,719 ROK estimates, as noted above, place the DPRK’s
endowments of lead and zinc at 6 and 10-20 million tonnes of metal, respectively. Anothersource suggests that reserves of these metals are roughly 12 million tonnes each and areconcentrated in the Komdok area of the DPRK’s Northeast (South Hamgyong province).720
Surveys for a single mine in Komdok mine show about 2.7 million tonnes of lead, 7.9 million
tonnes of zinc, and several other metals, including precious metals, in the mine’s estimated 240
million tonnes of ore.721
The National total output of lead and zinc around 2010 were reported to be approximately 60,000
tonnes and 100,000 tonnes per year respectively, or somewhat lower than the annual output in2013-2017 reported in Table 7-5. Most zinc and lead ores are smelted at the Moon-Pyong
Refinery (located in Moon-Chon City, Kang-Won province).
Gum-Dock (or Kyumduck) Zinc Mine
This mine is located in Dan-Chon area in Ham-Kyung province722. As the largest zinc mine in
the DPRK, this mine has rich vein of ore 9 km in extent, and its deposit is estimated at 8 million

718 Source: Choi, Young Yun, KDI, 2018, www.Kita.net
719 From E. Yoon 2011 report described above.
720 MSN Encarta, previously available as http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761555092_2/North_Korea.html.
721 From document in the author’s files.

Other metals described as present in ore from this mine include silver, mercury, andcadmium. The mine’s ore-handling capacity is described as about 14 million tonnes/yr.
722 Choi, in the 2010 presentation listed above, described this mine as the “Kyumduck Zinc mine”, located in “Hamkyungnam-do,
Dancheon, Kyumgol-dong”.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKtonnes (Zn 100%), about half of the DPRK’s total deposits. Development of this mine began in
1932, and its reserves are estimated at 266 million tonnes of Sphalerite ore at a grade of 4.21%
Zn and 0.88% Pb. It is an Underground mine, with a reported production capacity of 10 million
tonnes of ore per year, produced with a mining method described by Choi (source as above) as“70% shrinkage, with 30% sub-level stoping”,723 processing the minerals extracted using
flotation, with a throughput (capacity) of 10 million tonnes/yr. In 2006, this mine reportedly
produced 3.5 million tonnes of ore, yielding 196,000 tonnes of zinc concentrate (Zn 53%), at arecovery rate of 52%, and 31,800 tonnes of lead (Pb 63%) at a recovery rate of 63%. The mineis powered by a link to the 50 MW Hyeuchen hydroelectric power plant, uses water from the
Bukdaechen river, and is connected to the Kimcheck port by a 78 km rail line. At the Kimcheckport, the loading capacity for product is about 800,000 tonnes per year. Figure 7-4 provides
photos taken from the outside and inside of the Kyumduck Zinc mine.
Figure 7-4: Photos of Kyumduck Zinc Mine724

Copper reserves in the DPRK are estimated by ROK experts at about 2.2 million tonnes. The
Honchon mine, in Honchon County, South Hamgyong province, is reported to have reserves ofabout 400,000 tonnes of copper, and the nearby Sangnong mine has reported copper reserves ofover 500,000 tonnes.725 The four major copper refining facilities in the DPRK are listed as
Nampo , at 41,400 tonnes/yr, Heungnam, at 4000 tonnes/yr, Wunheung, at 25,000 tonnes/yr, and

723 According to Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stoping_%28mining_method%29), The mining technique known asstoping “is the removal of the wanted ore from an underground mine leaving behind an open space known as a stope”.
724 From presentation by Choi Kyung Soo of the ROK-based North Korea Resources Institute, titled "The Mineral Resources ofNorth Korea", prepared for the 2010 DPRK Energy and Minerals Working Group Meeting. This presentation is available as
http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/05.-Choi.pptx.
725 From document in the author’s files. Gold reserves in these two mines combined are listed at about 400 tonnes.

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Pyungbuk, at 20, 000 tonnes/yr. These facilities are described as small in scale, by international
standards726.
North Korean authorities have been deliberately reluctant to reveal information about North
Korea’s copper mines and copper production capacity to outsiders, including China and South
Korea, due to the fact that copper has been a significant material for producing militaryequipment, for including copper cable, bullets, shells and missile-related.727 It is thus not easy togather data related to copper mines and copper production in North Korea. There are 3 major
copper mines in the Northern part of the DPRK: Hur-Chon Copper Mine, Hye-San copper mineand Yong-Heong Copper Mine. These mines are owned by the People’s Army Department(PAD), as they provide strategic war industry supplies, and are controlled and operated by the
PAD. The information available on these mines is as follows.
Hye-San Youth Copper Mine
This mine is located in the Hye-San region in Ryang-Gang province. The copper ore deposit forthis mine is known to be 20 million tonnes, the mine’s annual production capacity is 30,000
tonnes (of 30% copper concentrate) and its employees number about 2,500. Copper ore from themne is processed in a concentrator unit at the mine, and the concentrated ore is carried by freighttrain to the Dan-Chon metals refinery. There are two copper mines in this region: Gap-San
copper mine and Shin-Pa copper mine in Ran-gang province.
DPRK-China joint venture at the Hyesan Youth Mine
The “Hyejung Mining Co.”, which runs the Hyesan Youth Mine in Yanggang Province, anoperation that the DPRK and China’s Wanxiang Group have jointly established, is reported to begreatly expanding production and has been operating normally in recent years. The Hyejung
Mining Co., Ltd., a joint venture between Wanxiang Resources Co., Ltd. and Hyesan Youth
Mine in Yanggang Province, DPRK produced 5,000 tons of copper concentrate in about 2018,
local sources said. The Hyejung Mining Co., Ltd. was established in 2007 with an ownershiparrangement that China Wanxiang Resources Co., Ltd. owned 51% of the shares, and Hyesan
Youth Mine of North Korea secured 49% of the shares. Due to a conflict between the DPRK andChina over mining operation rights, it was only in September 2011 that the venture was officiallylaunched. Sources have said that the “Hyesan Youth Mine” was almost the only copper
production mine in the DPRK. The Hyesan Young Mine was introduced as a successful example
of foreign investment in efforts to attract additional investment, and sources contacted haveindicated that the mine is operating normally, and that production has been rapidly increasing.728
Figure 7-5 shows an image of the Hyesan Youth Mine as of 2020 (location approximately
41.366, 128.157), showing what are likely waste ponds related to copper production. Several of
the buildings shown in the image appear to have been added or renovated since 2005.729

726 Presentation by Dr. Chung Woo-jin, same source as listed for Table 7-1.
727 Yoon (2019), ibid, cites “Private source, 2018” as the source for this information.
728 Yoon (2019), ibid, cites a private source, 2018, and Radio Free Asia, 2014-10-17 for this information.
729 North Korea Economy Watch (2011), “Chinese joint venture company takes over Hyesan Youth Copper Mine”, dated 9-19-

2011, and available as https://www.nkeconwatch.com/2011/09/19/chinese-joint-venture-company-takes-over-hyesan-youthcopper-mine/.

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Figure 7-5: Google Earth Pro Image of Hyesan Youth Mine as of June 2020

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKHur-Chon Copper Mine
This mine (likely the same as the “Honchon” mine described above) is located in the Hur-Chonregion of Ham-Kyung province. The known copper ore deposit for the mine as 15 million
tonnes, and Gold and other rare minerals are also found in the deposit. The annual production
capacity of the mine is 20,000 tonnes (Copper 40%) and it employs 5,500 personnel. Copper ore
is processed in a concentrator at the mine and is carried by trucks and freight trains to the DanChon refinery.
Yong-Heong Copper Mine
This mine is located in the Yong-Heong region in Ham-gyung province. The known copper ore
deposit is 12 million tonnes, and is associated with Gold and rare minerals. The annual
production capacity of the mine is 10,000 tonnes (Copper 40%), it employs 1,500 workers.
Copper ore is concentrated in concentrator units at the mine, and is also carried by trucks andfreight trains to the Dan-chon refinery.
Rim-gang District Copper Mine Joint Venture Investment Plan
Copper ore reserves in the Rimgang District, Yang-gang Province are reported to be of a 12%
grade, with 20 million tons of reserves, and confirmed by geological exploration. Cu reserves inthis area generally are estimated to be the equivalent of 24 million tons at 100% copper. The
value of the total reserves thus amounts to $183 billion (about 200 trillion won) at current (late2020) copper prices, which are near historical highs.730 Production plans by the joint venture
estimate that 3 months after the first investment, 3,000 tons per month of copper concentrate(300 tons/month of net tons of copper) can be produced, with the value of the planned monthly
output at international prices estimated (at the time) at 300 * $7100 = $ 2.13 million.
Power supply and copper concentrate sales plans are as follows. As the mine is located within 3
km of the Chinese border, supplies of electricity will come from China, but it is possible that themine will be supplied with electricity using an on-site generator. The copper concentrate
produced (using ore dressing yielding a Cu concentration of 30% or more) is exportable to
China. It can be transported via the Hyesan-Dancheon railway line and exported from theDancheon port.731
The DPRK has aluminum resources sufficient to support exports of up to 20 thousand tonnes of“unwrought” aluminum annually to China.732 China imported about 800 tonnes of bauxite (theore typically used to produce aluminum) from the DPRK in 2005, and nearly 3000 tonnes in
2007, but in most other years its imports were on the order of 100 tonnes. In 2007, for example,
China paid about one-third as much per tonne for DPRK bauxite (about $15) as it did for bauxite
on the world market on average (about $44), suggesting that either DPRK bauxite has a lower Al

730 December 2020 copper prices were about $3.2 per pound, or $7.6 per kg, or $7600 per tonne.

See, for example,
https://www.macrotrends.net/1476/copper-prices-historical-chart-data,
731 Information from Yoon (2019), ibid, based on conversations with a private source.
732 The UN Comtrade database shows imports of Al from the DPRK to China of 20 thousand tonnes in 2013, although this figure
dropped markedly in subsequent years, to about 5000 tonnes in 2014, 2000 tonnes in 2015, and 300 tonnes in 2016. The DPRK
has also been an importer of aluminum scrap from various countries in recent years, although in quantities of just a few hundred
to a thousand or so tonnes.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKcontent than the average of China’s other sources (mostly Indonesia and India), and/or China
was using its market power to strike a favorable deal with the DPRK. We have no further
quantitative information at present about DPRK reserves of this metal. A Czech website notes
the availability of DPRK-made bauxite mills and describes the DPRK as having bauxite, but thismention does not seem definitive.733 Another source also mentions bauxite resources in the
DPRK and provides a map in which bauxite deposits are identified as being near Danchon in the
Northeast of the DPRK, and also near the DMZ about 100 km inland from the East coast.734
7.2.3. Precious and specialty metals
The DPRK has gold reserves estimated at 1000-2000 tonnes, and silver reserves estimated at
3000 to 5000 tonnes. In addition, the DPRK has significant reserves of the strategic minerals
tungsten and molybdenum, used in specialty metal alloys, and also has, at least in the past,offered for sale the precious metals platinum and palladium (see above). Tungsten output in theyears around 2000 was estimated at 500 tonnes/yr.735 The largest of a reported 51 gold mines inthe DPRK is Woonsan, located in the DPRK’s Northwest. DPRK gold mines, like many otherindustrial establishments, lack modern equipment, are relatively small, and in some cases haveworked existing seams for some time, resulting in declining productivity.736
Gold ore is typically produced with silver ore and also with copper ore in the DPRK.737 Gold andsilver ore reserves total a few million tonnes of raw ore, according to a Korea Mining
Corporation source. Major gold mines in the DPRK are the Soo-An Mine (Soo-an-gun, Hwang
Buk province), the Hol-dong mine (Yonsan-gun, Hwang Buk province), the Dae-yoo-dong mine(
Dongchang –gun, Pyungbuk province), the Woon-san mine (Woonsan-gun, Pyong-Buk
province), the Sung-hong mine (Hoi Chang-gun, Pyongnam province), the Sang-nong mine
(Huh-chon-gun, Hamnam province), the Ong-Jin Gold mine (Hwang-Hae province) and the
Kum-kang mine (Kumkang-gun, Kangwon province). The total production from these 7 majorgold mines has not been officially reported, however it is clear that the annual gold production
capacity is approximately 5 tonnes in these major mines, and annual silver production isapproximately 40 tonnes. In particular, the annual production capacity of the Woon-San gold
mine is about 1.5-1.8 tonnes according to private sources (as of 2018), worth about $90 to $105
million at the (near historically high) prices prevailing in late 2020. This mine’s capacity is
estimated to amount to over 40% of the DPRK’s gold production capacity. The Woon-sanmine’s deposits of gold ore are estimated as 1,500 tonnes alone, which is almost 50% of North
Korean gold reserves, and nominally worth on the order of $100 billion.
The DPRK has been experiencing a shortage of technology and infrastructure in precious metals
mining. For example, the large mines described above generally have 30–40-year-old (or older)production equipment, including some equipment inherited from the 1940s Japanese colonial
period. As a result, these mines’ production capacity is likely similar to their 1940s era
733 Sky Blue (2020), includes listings for “North Korea Bauxite Ball Mills Fireproof” and “North Korea Bauxite”, at

https://www.restaurant-lahabana.cz/24267/jiUzt//.
734 Intelligent Security Solutions Limited (2015), DPRK Current Situation and Future Intentions Briefing & Analysis, available
as http://issrisk.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/DPRK-current-situation-and-analysis.pdf.
735 Pui-Kwan Tse, “The Mineral Industry of North Korea”, p. 14-3 in U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY MINERALS YEARBOOK—
2002. Available as http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2002/knmyb02.pdf.
736 Presentation by Dr. Chung Woo-jin, same source as listed for Table 7-1.
737 Text in the remainder of this subsection is derived from material from the 2011 report by E. Yoon, as referenced earlier, andbased on a combination of ROK sources and personal contacts, as referenced in the original report.

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production capacity. DPRK authorities have declared that all gold production in the country
should belong to the Labor Party’s assets (which are controlled by the “39” Department (or“Office No. 39”), which was Kim Jong Il’s private assets manager), and as a result no otherorganization has the authority to deal with and to produce gold in the DPRK. Deeper and deeper
strata in the gold mines described above have been worked due to the mines having been
operated for more than 50 years, and the increasing depth of pit (tunnel depth) is making it more
complicated and difficult to extract gold ore from these mines.
Due to a decline in gold ore production at the time, DPRK authorities contacted, in the years
before 2010, Chinese businessmen and Japanese business interests in an attempt to attract funds
to invest in those major gold mines. These contacts implied that the Labor Party (39 Department)
wished to produce more gold ore to earn more hard currency to support the newly-announced (asof 2010) military leader, Kim Jong Un.
As of 2010, investment proposals made to overseas investors by DPRK authorities werereportedly as follows: (1), investors should invest at least 1 million US dollars in cash to produce
gold ore (Hol-dong gold mine, Kum-Kang, and Woon-san gold mine), (2), the North Korean
government would be the guarantor to protect the investor’s funds, and (3), investors would havethe authority to bring out gold ore from the mine they invested in, and export it to overseas
locations for refining into gold metal.
Gold mining regions use trucks and freight trains as major carriers of ore from mines torefineries, with heavily-armed guards to protect shipments against potential theft.
The following are examples of proposals and ongoing projects for, respectively, Chinese anddomestic investment in DPRK gold mining ventures:738
1. Proposal for a joint venture between Kangsung Trading Company and China todevelop a gold mine in Dong-chang-gun, North Pyongan Province
Despite UNSC sanctions, the DPRK is pursuing underground resource development by attracting
Chinese capital. The ROK’s Channel A Broadcasting Company in 2019 reported on a proposal
from a Chinese company to invest in DPRK gold mining development. A 50-year long-term
contract was being discussed in the context of a proposal to invest in the development of mines
run by the “Kang Sung Trading Company”, which operates under the North Korean People's
Army. This proposal was offered by Chinese investors to DPRK officials. This was a joint
venture proposal for the development of the gold mines in Dong Chang, North Pyongan
Province. Reportedly the DPRK had the right to exploit the mines’ resources, but the production
and operation facilities were to have been owned 51% by the DPRK and 49% by Chinese
partners. At the same time, investors had secured an annual income guarantee of about 23.4
million dollars and about 26.5 billion won. A source in the DPRK met with Channel A and said,"The development period is 50 years and the long-term contract is underway."739 (Channel A
News source.)

738 From Yoon (2019) ibid.
739 Channel A News (Korea), dated July 19, 2018.

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2. Development of North Daebong Gold Mine
Local sources say that North Korean authorities are concentrating their investment in Daebong
Mine located in Rojung-Ri, Yangkang Province. Daebong mine, in which mining began in the
mid-1990s, is a mine that produces high-quality gold, tungsten, and quartz, according to sources.
Dae Bong Mine belongs to the Daesung Administration, which belongs to Office No. 39 of theLabor Party, which controls the secret funds of Chairman Kim Jong Un. In the mid-1990s, themonthly production of pure gold rose to 40 kg, and the income from this production played an
important role in getting the DPRK out of "The March of Suffering" period under the Kim Jong
Il regime, the source explained. According to another source in Yanggang Province interviewed
recently, "The monthly production of the Daebong Mine, which was sent down from the center
this year, is 25 kg of pure gold. And the annual production plan is 300 kg of pure gold.
[Producing this volume of gold] is not a difficult task if transportation and electricity is
guaranteed." Presently, North Korea's gold production is strictly authorized by the Daesung
Administration operating under Office No. 39. The source added that if other foreign currencyearning-institutions wanted to produce gold they needed to have approval from the Daesung
Administration, and would be required to provide a certain amount of the gold produced to the
Daesung Administration in return.740 A 2020 Radio Free Asia report describes the diversion ofelectricity supplies to gold mines run by Office 39, underscoring the importance of these minesto the DPRK regime, particularly during the current period of high gold prices.741
A proposed joint venture for silver ore production at the Gu-jang silver mine in the DPRK was
described as follows:•

The quality of ore reserves of the silver mine in Gujang, North Pyeongan province wasreported at 0.06% (about 600g of pure silver per tonne of silver ore), and it was
confirmed through geological exploration that the mine has 4 million tons of reserves. It
thus is estimated that silver reserves were about 2,400 tons at 100% purity. Thesereserves are estimated to be valued at close to 1.9 billion dollars (about 2 trillion ROKwon) at current silver prices.

•Electricity can be supplied via a power line from China, as the mine is located only 50
kilometers from the border, or electricity can be supplied by an on-site generator.

•

The joint venture is reported to include a planned profit distribution in a ratio of 6:4,
namely 60 percent to the investor, and 40 percent to the DPRK’s Chosun Daebang byexporting 60 percent of the silver ore overseas while 40 percent of the ore is managed by
DPRK business partner.

•

The joint venture is to be authorized through issuance of a guarantee certificate by the
Chosun (DPRK) government and the Second Economic Committee for 100 percent of theinvestment funds, along with a national institutional certificate for joint development andoperation rights for the 60 percent of the operations assigned to the investor.

740 Radio Free Asia, Jan. 13, 2017.
741 Hyemin Son, Leejin Jun, and Eugene Whong (2020), “North Korea’s Office 39 Diverts Electricity to Gold Production”, RadioFree Asia, dated 8-12-2020, and available as https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/gold-08122020213702.html.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKThe Man-Nyun Mine produces tungsten and molybdenite. This mine is located in Shin-Pyong –Gun, Hwang-Hae province. Tungsten reserves in this area are approximately 20 million tonnes(WO3 65%), accounting for half of North Korea’s total reserves. There are 10 veins of Tungsten
in the deposit, of 3–6-meter width and 1,800 meter length. This mine also produces manganese
ore and copper pyrite ore. The mine’s ore separator’s capacity is 1000 tonnes/day, and the mine
produces 500,000 tonnes of ore annually (measured as WO3 65%). The mine employs 3,500
workers and has 8 work tunnels to support mining activities.
The DPRK is thought to have substantial reserves of rare-earth minerals, global production ofwhich is now dominated (95 percent) by China, although other nations, including the UnitedStates, have produced significant quantities of these minerals in the past and hold substantial
reserves. News reports as of 2012 suggested that the ROK’s Korea Resources Corp. (KORES)
was been in discussions with DPRK officials about developing DPRK rare earth resources.742
As of 2013, a privately-held company called SRE Minerals (see below) announced “thediscovery in North Korea of what is believed to be the largest deposit of rare earth elements
anywhere in the world.”743 A 2019 Radio Free Asia article reported that the DPRK was underdiscussion to trade rights to DPRK rare earth deposits to China in return for construction of alarge solar power plant in the DPRK, although according to at least one source apparently the
Chinese response to the proposal was thought unlikely to be positive, in part because the types ofrare earth minerals available in the DPRK largely contain the lighter, rather than heavier, rareearth elements, and lighter rare earths are fairly common in China.744 The apparently vastpotential of DPRK rare earth continues to be a topic of international discussion as of 2020.745
Clearly this resource could be a major earner for the DPRK if and when its issues with theinternational community are resolved (or on the way to resolution), perhaps even aided bycurrent trade and other tensions between the west and China, as countries look to diversify
suppliers of rare earth minerals.
Yoon reports the following about DPRK exports of rare earth minerals to China and investmentsin DPRK rare earth production ventures:746
The DPRK has exported large quantities of rare earth mineral ores, a source of elements(examples are yttrium and neodymium) important for but used in small quantities in the
production of high-tech products, to China in recent years. According to trade statistics publishedby the Korea International Trade Association (KITA) in 2017, North Korea exported about$550,000 of rare earth mineral ore to China in May of 2016, followed by exports of $1,329,000

742 See, for example, Wall Street Journal Asia, July 24, 2012, “South, North Korea Discussed Rare Earth Mining”, available as

http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2012/07/24/south-north-korea-discussed-rare-earth-mining/.
743 Frik Els (2019), “FLASHBACK: Largest known rare earth deposit discovered in North Korea”, Mining.com, dated May 29,
2019, originally published in December, 2013, and available as https://www.mining.com/largest-known-rare-earth-depositdiscovered-in-north-korea-86139/.
744 See Hyemin Son, Leejin Jun, and Eugene Whong (2019), “North Korea Trades Rare Earth Mine Rights to China for
Investment in Solar Plants”, Radio Free Asia, dated 10-12-2019, available as https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/nk-rareearth-solar-10212019133544.html, and Li Xuanmin and Shen Weiduo (2019), Global Times, dated 2019/10/24, and available ashttps://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1167917.shtml.
745 See, for example, Patricia Schouker (2020), “The Trillion Dollar Battle Over North Korea's Rare Earth Elements Is Just
Beginning”, The National Interest, dated June 15, 2020, and available as https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/trillion-dollarbattle-over-north-koreas-rare-earth-elements-just-beginning-162834,
746 Text adapted from Yoon, 2019 (ibid).

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKin June of that year. The DPRK exported its first rare earth mineral ore (worth $24,700) to China in
January of 2015 and after 15 months of no recorded trades, exports resumed.
Apart from rare earth mineral ores, the DPRK has been exporting rare earth-containing carbonate
mineral compounds to China since 2011. Up until the first half of 2016, however, the export
volume was small, remaining at around $170,000 for three years and for the six months up until
the first half of 2016.747
It has been reported that North Korea has established a joint venture with international private
equity funds in order to develop rare earth mineral resources in the DPRK. The International
private equity fund SRE Minerals announced that it has signed a joint venture agreement with
North Korea 's Chosun Natural Resources Trading Company to develop rare minerals in Jung-ju,
North Pyongan Province. According to a press release made available on April 4 of 2013, PacificCentury, a joint venture located in the British Virgin Islands, has been granted the rights todevelop all rare minerals in Jungju over the next 25 years. It was also given the right to extend
the contract for 25 years.748
SRE Minerals has announced that it has been able to build a rare minerals processing plant inJungju in accordance with the agreement and has already conducted preliminary surveys in
Jungju and planned to conduct further exploration work in March of 2014. SRE Minerals said
that it was possible that Jung-ju, North Korea, is the largest rare mineral reserve in the world.
The company website estimated that the value of Jungju rare minerals will reach about $65
trillion. Another source places SRE’s estimate of rare earth ores at 6 billion tons, with 262
million tonnes of rare earth oxides.749 Other articles published since, however, have suggested
that SRE and related companies have “opaque” ownership structures, and may be making
dubious claims.750
7.2.4. Uranium
DPRK resources of uranium are discussed in the context of fuels for electricity generation insection 5.2.2.9. Some of that discussion is repeated here for completeness of the content of thischapter, along with additional information about DPRK uranium mining.
Figures on the DPRK’s reserves of uranium are difficult to obtain, and their accuracy is
unknown. It has been reported that uranium has been mined to supply the DPRK’s domestic
nuclear industry from mines located in various areas around the country, including Pyongsan,
Pakchon, Hongnam, Jusong, Ungki, Sunchon 2, Hamheung, Hekumkang, and Najin.751 Anothersource refers to a uranium mine near Hungnam (probably the same as “Hongnam”), where theJapanese built a cyclotron in 1943-44.752 Two sources suggest that the DPRK’s uranium

747 Yonhap News, (ROK), July 28, 2016
748 Voice of America, December 9, 2013
749 (Creamer Media’s Engineering News (2013), “Largest Known Rare Earth Mineral Deposit Discovered”, dated 4th December

2013, and available as http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/print-version/largest-known-rare-earth-mineral-deposit-discovered2013-12-04.
750 See, for example, Mailey, J.R., 2016, “Hiding in Plain Sight: Cowboys, Conmen and North Korea’s $6 Trillion Natural
Resource Prize”, 38 North, dated April 6, 2016, and available as https://www.38north.org/2016/04/jrmailey040616/.
751 Document in the authors files, referencing several Korean and international literature sources [ELE-96]
752 Federation of American Scientists (1998), “Hungnam N39°49 E127°37' Hungnam Chemical Engineering College
Hungnam Fertilizer Complex”, available as http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/facility/hungnam.htm.

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deposits “are estimated at 26 million tonnes”.753 754 One of the sources describes these deposits
as “high grade ore”, so it seems virtually certain that the references are to tonnes of ore, nottonnes of uranium metal (or uranium oxides). Another source states:“It has been estimated that, at its peak in the early 1990s, North Korea was able toproduce about 300 tonnes of yellow cake [U3O8] annually, equal to approximately 30,000
tonnes of uranium ore.”755
Other analysts of the subject have reported estimates of 3 and 4 million tonnes of “reasonably
assured resources”, based on older OECD and ROK estimates, respectively. Still another source
cites a figure of 4.5 million tonnes of uranium ore, and quote “Russian scientists who havevisited North Korea” as saying that the DPRK’s “mining and milling capabilities produce 2000
tonnes of natural uranium, per year”756.
The DPRK is reported to have exported significant amounts of uranium ore over the years,
starting in (at least) the 1947-1950 period, with the export of “over 9,000 tonnes of uranium[presumably ore] and an unknown amount of monazite to the USSR”, and continuing with areported “$6 billion worth of uranium ore” to the USSR in 1985, “1,500 tonnes of monazite757
annually” in the 1990s to “China, Japan, Spain, and Hong Kong”.758 More recently, an
advertisement by the DPRK's International Chemical Joint Venture Corporation was published in
an English-language DPRK trade journal in 2001 and 2002 advertised ammonium diuranate(ADU), a processed form of yellowcake, for sale on the international market.759 A report in late2006 that the DPRK and Russia had been negotiating, apparently since 2002, a deal that would
give Russia “exclusive rights” to the DPRK’s uranium deposits “in exchange for Moscow's
support at six-party talks aimed at denuclearizing Pyongyang“, suggested that Russia would
enrich DPRK uranium for re-export to Vietnam and China as nuclear fuel. The report was
dismissed as “rumors” by Russian authorities.760 Exports from the DPRK to China of 90.54
tonnes of "Uranium, Thorium Ore and Concentrate" were listed in China Customs statistics for

753 Larry A. Niksch, United States Congressional Research Service (CRS), CRS Issue Brief for Congress: North Korea’s Nuclear

Weapons Program, updated January 17, 2006. The same figure is also quoted in Yo-Taik Song, “IN OUR TIMES SERIES,PART 6, The North Korean Nuclear Program: Technical and Policy Issues”, previously available as
http://www.phy.duke.edu/~myhan/ot6-song.html.
754 The DPRK has been highly reluctant to reveal the extent of its deposits of Uranium ore and its annual production capacity tothe outside world. This same estimate of reserves (26 million tonnes of ore), however, was provided in information from private
sources in China and DPRK business contacts compiled by E. Yoon for the 2011 report described above.
755 North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programme, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006, available as
http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/northkoreas-nuclear-weapons-programme.
756“North Korean Hullabaloo”, by Paul Vos Benkowski, 6 - Nukewatch Pathfinder, Winter, 2006-2007, page 6.
757 Monazite is a name for a group of rare earth phosphate minerals, the most common form of which (Monazite-(Ce)) contains
Cerium, Lanthanum, Thorium, Neodymium, and Yttrium. Monazite is radioactive, and it seems likely to have been exported inthis instance primarily as a source of Thorium, though that is just the authors’ conjecture. A description of Monazite can befound at Amethyst Galleries “THE MINERAL MONAZITE”,
http://www.galleries.com/minerals/phosphat/monazite/monazite.htm.
758 “North Korea Profile, Nuclear Exports”, prepared for the Nuclear Threat Initiative by the by the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2003, available as https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/northkorea/nuclear/.
759 Foreign Trade of the DPRK, 1 Jul 2001, and1 Oct 2002.
760 NUKEWARS, “Moscow Dismisses Rumors On Uranium Deal With Pyongyang” by Staff Writers
Moscow (AFP—Agence France-Presse), Dec 04, 2006; and “NKorea, Russia in secret deal over nuclear talks: report”, Tokyo(AFP) Dec 03, 2006. Available as
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Moscow_Dismisses_Rumors_On_Uranium_Deal_With_Pyongyang_999.html.

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the year 2004. The listed value for these shipments, about $22,000 USD, suggests that theexports were of ore, not refined metal. Uranium exports from the DPRK to China are not listed
for other years between 1995 and 2005.761
There are two major Uranium ore mines in the DPRK: the Pyong-San mine, and the Woong-Gi
mine, as described below, along with brief desciptions of important institutions and infrastucture
related to uranium mining.762
Pyong-San Uranium Mine
This mine is located in Pyong-San–Gun, Hwang-Hae province and has been operating for 30
years under the control of the People’s Army Department. The deposit in this mine area wasestimated at 1.5 million tonnes (as Uranium ore), and the mine’s annual production capacity is
10,000 tonnes (private source). The mine has own separator for concentration of ore. All
products are sent to the Nyung-Byun (Yongbyon) Nuclear power station under armed guards.
Recently, a new facility for Uranium extraction has been built in the Pyong-Won area.
Woong-gi Uranium Mine
This mine is located in Woong-gi, Ham-Kyung province and has been operating for 35 years
under the control of the People’s Army Department. The deposit in this mine area was estimatedat 10 million tonnes (as Uranium ore), and its annual production capacity is 19,000 tonnes. The
mine has its own separator for concentration of ore. All products are sent to the Nyung-Byun
Nuclear power station under armed guards. The mine’s operation has been kept secret fromoutsiders, and even from North Koreans, due to the fact that output from the mine is known tohave been used for nuclear weapon development purposes. As a result, the workers andengineers in the mine have been reportedly restricted to the area within the mine facilities even if
they suffered from nuclear radiation-related disease.
Educational Institute for Uranium Mines
In the fields of geological exploration and engineering , the Kim-Chaek Engineering University,
the Chong Jing Mining and Metal University, and the Sariwon Geology University have beenplaying major roles in staffing exploration activities to find additional Uranium ore deposits.
Nyung-Byun Physics University and Lee-Gwa University have been playing major roles in theareas of mining and ore separator operation within mines, as well as logistics, for security
reasons.
Infrastructure and Facilities for the Mines
Unlike other mining industries in the DPRK, Uranium mines have been targets of heavy
investment, and its high grade engineers and skilled workers receive preferential treatment interms of food, salary and social status. Funds invested in the mines have been used for mining
equipments and facilities,. In particular, instead of freight railway shipping of ore, sophisticatedtrucks, imported from Sweden and Japan, are operating to support production activities.

761

China Customs statistics as compiled by N. Aden for North Korean Trade with China as Reported in Chinese Customs
Statistics: Recent Energy Trends and Implications, as prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26thand 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA). Dr. Aden's paper is available as http://nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/0679Aden1.pdf.
762 From Yoon, 2011 (ibid), citing a private sources.

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7.2.5. Non-metallic minerals
A number of key non-metallic minerals are present in the DPRK in significant quantities. Of
primary importance is magnesite, for which principal mines are the Namgye mine (Ryanggang
province Baegam county), the Danchun mine (South Hamgyung province Danchun city), theDaehung mine (South Hamgyung province Danchun city), the Ryongyang mine (South
Hamgyung province Danchun city), and the Saengjang mine (Ryanggang province Unhung
county).763 Estimates of Magnesite reserves range from the 3-4 billion tonnes cited in Table 7-1
to 6 billion tonnes.764 North Korea’s magnesite reserves are the world’s largest. The Ryongyang
mine is reported to have reserves of 4 billion tonnes of magnesite ore, and the Daehung mine has
reserves of 2.3 billion tonnes; the two mines had estimated production capacity, as of the mid1990s, of 1.0 and 0.8 million tonnes magnesite per year, respectively.765 The Danchon
Magnesia Clinker Factory is reported to have production capacity of about one million tonnes ofmagnesia clinker per year, if a combination of heavy oil and coal is used as fuel (output is lower
with just coal).766 Crude magnesite output in the DPRK has been estimated by several sources atabout one million tonnes annually. Magnesite is used to produce magnesia clinker, which isused in making refractory materials (materials to line high-temperature furnaces for the metals
industry, for example).
The deposit in the Baekgumsan area is approximately 3.6 billion tonnes and is 7,660 meters
length, 7 to 100 meters in depth, and is the site of a major strip mine. North Korean productionof Magnesite as of 2005 was estimated at 1 million tonnes of concentrated ore. The Ryong-Yang(Ryongyang) Mine is located in Don-san dong, Danchun city and is a subsidiary of the DanChon Regional Mining Group. The Magnesite ore grade in the mine is 30% MgO, and analternative the mine’s capacity to produce Magnesium ore is reportedly 8 million tonnes per
year, which after concentration of the ore (to 55-60% Mg) yields 3 million tonnes ofconcentrated product. Note that this estimate, from the E. Yoon 2011 study described earlier inthis Chapter, appears somewhat at odds with the capacity described above for this mine. Mining
operations use two methods, terraced strip mining and underground mining. Heavy trucks
operate from inside the mine to transfer points outside of the mine tunnels, and freight trains areused as the major carrier to move ore from the mine area. Double railways were built early inthe 1990s as infrastructure for this mine. Freight railways operating from the seaside (Dun-chonCity) to the mining sites are, however, on steep slopes, and alternative freight methods need to beconsidered to serve the mine.
A major ore separator was built within the mine in 1988, and the reported capacity of theseparator is 8 million tonnes of ore per year.

763 Personal correspondence with ROK expert, 1999.
764 MSN Encarta, previously available as http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761555092_2/North_Korea.html.
765 Another source describes three major mines in South Hamgyung Province, one open-pit—with a capacity of 1.3 million

tonnes/yr, and two underground, with combined capacity of 1.3 million tonnes/yr (“MAGNESIUM COMPOUNDS”, by Deborah
A. Kramer, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY MINERALS YEARBOOK—2003, pages 47.1 – 47.5, available as
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/magnesium/mgcommyb03.pdf). Professor Li Dunqiu describes the DPRK’s
reserves of magnesite as being 56 percent of the world’s total (Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online 06-70A: August 23rd,
2006, DPRK's Reform and Sino-DPRK Economic Cooperation, available as https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policyforum/dprks-reform-and-sino-dprk-economic-cooperation/).
766 From document in the author’s files [MIN-99].

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKThe Ryongyang mine is operating as a subsidiary of the Korea Magnesia Clinker Industry Group(KMCIG), and this parent company has three mines and three clinker manufacturers with 30,000
employees. In addition, the KMCIG operates four kilns for producing CCM (caustic calcinedmagnesia) and dead burned magnesia, and its capacity of production is 750,000 tonnes per year.
The Ryongyang area (see Figure 7-6) is a mining/refining complex that includes several minesand processing facilities, as well as transport infrastructure and lodging and services for workers.
Bermudez and Cha (2019) provide considerable additional detail about infrastructure andactivities at the Ryongyang complex.767
Figure 7-6: Ryongyang Magnesite Mining Complex (Google Earth Pro, location
approximately 40.82, 128.813)

Choi768 provides the following information about the Dae-Hyeung (Daehung) Magnesite mine:

767 Joseph Bermudez and Victor Cha (2019), “Mining North Korea: Magnesite Production at Ryongyang Mine”, CSIS Beyond

Parallel, dated August 16, 2019, and available as https://beyondparallel.csis.org/mining-north-korea-magnesite-production-atryongyang-mine/.
768 Choi Kyung Soo (2010), ibid.

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Location: Hamkyungnam-do, Dancheon, DaeHyeung-dong•

History: Redevelopment in 1982•

Reserves: 820 million tonnes•

Ore Grade: MgO 46.77%, SiO2 0.73%, CaO 0.79%, R2O3 0.67%•

Mining method: Open pit and underground (in the winter season)•

Mine production(capacity): 600,000 t/yr•

90% open pit, 10% underground.

•

Mineral processing: Crushing and screening throughput (capacity): 600,000 t/a•

Production in 2006: About 360,000 tonnes of concentrate at a grade of MgO
46.77%•

Infrastructure: Power station, 50 MW, link to Hyeucheun hydroelectric power
plant; Railroad, 98 km from mine site to Kimcheck port; Kimcheck port, loading
capacity about 800,000 tonnes per year.

Figure 7-7 presents photos of the Daehung mine.
Figure 7-7: Photos of Daehung Magnesite Mine769

769 Photos and information above from presentation by Choi Kyung Soo of the ROK-based North Korea Resources Institute,

titled "The Mineral Resources of North Korea", prepared for the 2010 DPRK Energy and Minerals Working Group Meeting.
This presentation is available as http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/05.-Choi.pptx.

424
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKThe DPRK possesses significant reserves of graphite (6 million tonnes, as estimated by ROK
sources), a form of carbon with a number of industrial uses. A 2006 report from KCNA
describes the opening of the Jongchon Natural Graphite Mine, apparently as a joint venture with
the ROK.770 Other important minerals in the DRPK are limestone771 (with reserves on the orderof one hundred billion tonnes), kaolin (used in ceramics), barite, and talc.
7.3.

Mining Infrastructure

Infrastructure in mine areas can be classified into three categories: 1) transportation facilities
including trucks roads and railways, 2) power facilities for mining and related industrial
operations, and 3) metal refining industries including refineries and iron manufacturers. Each ofthese is discussed below.
7.3.1. Transportation Facilities
7.3.1.1.Railway systems
Most mines are linked with freight railways. Railways are single lines in most areas in the
DPRK, although double track railways have been built over the 97 km between Moo-San (ironmine area) and the Choing-Jin refining facilities. Open freight cars have been used for carrying
iron ore and other ore materials. The DPRK’s railway system is experiencing deterioration in its
technology and operational system. Most locomotives are electric-powered, for example, andthus rely on consistent supplies of electricity. Most mining operations cease when sufficient
supplies of electricity, typically generated by thermal power plants, are unavailable. Railroad
tracks are mostly so old (built in the 1940s and partially replaced in the 1970s) that fatal
accidents have occurred annually. Quoting a private source, Yoon (2019) suggests that therailway system and its operating conditions must be improved or replaced within the next few
years if transportaton of products from mines in large quantities is to be sustained. As a result of
the generally poor condition of the road system, freight trains have become the major means oftransportation for iron ore and coal. Most open cars of freight trains are of 60 tonnes capacity forheavyweight cargoes, but some 30 tonnes cars are also used as coal carriers.772
7.3.1.2.Road Transport Systems
With regard to facilities for truck transport of mine products, the North Korean roads system
identifies roads linking provinces as 1st Class roads. Second Class roads link counties within aprovince, and 3rd Class road link towns within a county. Most roads used to carry mining
products (and inputs) fall into the 2nd or 3rd road Classes. Ore products are sent typically via
railway facilities, as previously noted, but some products are not sent via freight trains due tosafety or security concerns. Gold and other rare metal ores are therefore carried using heavy
trucks, made in the DPRK or imported from Russia, Sweden, and more rarely, China. Thus 2nd,
3rd Class roads should be considered as important infrastructure serving mines. In fact, however,
although 1st Class roads have been paved with asphalt since the1990s, 2nd Class roads are notpaved with asphalt due to a shortage of asphalt, which must typically be imported from China or
770 KCNA, Pyongyang, April 27, 2006, “New Graphite Mine Commissioned”.

Available ashttps://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1451884512-588937038/new-graphite-mine-commissioned/.
771 Limestone is the principal raw material for cement and is a building material in its own right.
772 Text adapted from Yoon, 2019 (ibid).

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKRussia. Most 3rd Class roads also are not paved with asphalt, so that operation of trucks on thoseroads entails higher costs for repair, tires and fuel. For instance, trucks operating on unpaved
roads have more than 20% higher maintenance, fuel, and tires expenses, according to a DPRK
research centre. In recent years, due to a lack of dollars for operation of heavy truck (for tires andoil and truck components/parts), heavy trucks are being operationed with inappropriate
maintenance, contributing to more frequent breakdowns and shortening vehicle life. China andRussia, however, are keen to participate in road construction projects in the DPRK For example,
Russian authorities indicated a wish to participate in a DPRK railway development andimprovement construction business, and were willing to invest 200 million dollars, according toan article in the Vladivostok News, 17th July, 2008.
7.3.1.3.Ports
Key to the export of minerals and mineral products from the DPRK are the port facilities
available to handle these materials. Brief summaries of the specifications of the major North
Korean ports used to handle minerals and mining products are provided below.
1. Nampo Port: Located in Nampo City, this port is the largest port and the most importantfacility for shipping infrastructure in the DPRK. An estimated 78% of trade cargo andcontainers are coming to DPRK through the Nampo port.773 The port plays the role ofexporting mineral ores and coal produced from the Pyong-an coalfields, as well as
shipping metallic materials refined in the Nampo refinery to China and the ROK. Figure
7-8 shows an image of what appears to be the major coal terminal at Nampo, as of late
2019. The larger of the two ships at the bottom of the image appears to be a
“Handymax”-class vessel with a length of about 180 m, and thus a capacity of about
50,000 dwt (deadweight tonnes).774

773 Text in this section also adapted from Yoon, 2019 (ibid). The estimate of Nampo port traffic here and details for other ports

below provided to Yoon by a private source.
774 For a guide on sizes of bulk carrier vessels, see, for example, Septrans (2018), “Bulk Carriers”, available as
http://septrans.in/dry-cargo-vessels/.

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Figure 7-8: Coal Terminal at Nampo Port (Google Earth Pro Image, dated 11-8-2019)

2. Najin Port: Najin port is located in the Na-Jin Sun-bong (also known as Rajin-Sonbong)
Free Trade area. The port specializes in importing and exporting bulk oil and mineralores. Approximately 100,000-ton capacity cargo ships can be handled at this port. The
port was modernized in 2013 with support from Chinese and Russian enterprises.775
According to several 2008 news reports, a development district plan has been approved
by Jillin province (China) authorities for development of Najin port to expand Jilin
province’s exports to Japan and the USA. Another report suggested China wa planning
to invest more than 10 million dollars to expand a 54 km highway to link Hoon-Choon
and Na-Jin city, and would also support construction to expand Na-Jin port to build the775 Information on ports adapted from Yoon, 2019, ibid, from private sources (2018).

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port’s third and fourth docking areas. Two 2010 publications described a ten-year leaseof a pier at Najin Port by China as a mainly commercial, not military, investment.776
3. Chong-Jin Eastern & Western Port: Chong-Jin (Chongjin) Port is one of the threemajor ports in the DPRK and is located in Chon-Jin, Shin-am district and Po-hang
district. The port is important for iron ore and iron-related products exports.
Approximately three 100,000-ton cargo ships can be handled by this port at the sametime. The port was modernized in 1984 with support by Russian enterprises777, andunderwent a second modernization in 2001.
4. Heong-Nam (Hungnam) Port: This port is a major port and is located in Ham-Huong(Hamhung) City. Mineral products produced in the Hur-Chon and Ham-Nam region areexported via this port. The port was fully modernized in 2008. Loading facilities such as
dock cranes and warehouses are in good condition and prepared for use.
5. Dan-chon (Danchon) Port: This port is located in Dan-Chon city and is used forexporting Magnesite ore and Zinc ore to overseas and domestic locations. Its capacity toload goods is 300,000 tons/month, expressed as the capacity of the ships that this port canhandle.778
6. Hae-Joo (Haeju) Port: This port is located in Hea-joo (Haeju), Hwang-Hae province.
The port plays a significant role in exporting iron ore and steel produced at the HwangHea Iron manufacturer and the Eun-Ryul and Jae-Ryong Iron mines. Its loading facilities
were modernized in 1999 with imported dock cranes from Russia and Japan.
Additional information from studies by Lee Sung-woo and based on “Chosun GeographicalManual - Transportation Geography” Pyongyang Educational Publishing House, 1988:779
The DPRK has 137 ports (55 ports in North Pyongan province, 27 ports in South Pyongan
province, 1 port in North Hwanghae province, and 54 ports in South Hwanghae province) on its
west coast and 152 ports (65 ports in North Hamkyong province, 53 ports in South Hamkyong
province, and 34 ports in Gangwon province) on its south coast. As shown in Figure 7-9, there
are 9 ports (Heungnam, Chungjin, Najin, Wonsan, Sunbong, Nampo, Haeju, and Songrim) thatare responsible for international shipping (trade port facilities), and 24 ports that primarily deal
with coastal cargos. The remaining small ports are more fishing ports rather than commercial
port facilities and are used mainly by fishing boats.780 In the 1970s and 1980s, the first port
modernization period, the Nampo, Chungjin, and Haeju ports were modernized rapidly. From1990 to 2010, however, the DPRK did not make further investments in the ports except for the
Najin port, and therefore many ports are slowly deteriorating. The DPRK received Russian
776 See, for example, Russell Hsiao (2010), Strategic Implications of China’s Access to the Rajin Port”, The Jamestown

Foundation, dated March 18, 2010, and available as https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-implications-of-chinas-access-tothe-rajin-port/; and Chosun Ilbo (2010), “China's Jilin Wins Use of N. Korean Sea Port”, dated March 09, 2010, andavailable as http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/03/09/2010030900360.html.
777 Original sources for information on DPRK ports include Kwon, Hyuk-Soo, Current Situation of DPRK’s Coal Mining Sector
Korea Resource Institute, 2000, as well as private sources contacted by E. Yoon.
778 Yoon (2019), ibid, citing private sources.
779 Original source, Lee, Sung-Woo Development Direction of North Port for Integration and Expansion of Korean Logistics,
KDI (Korea Development Institute) North Korea Economy Review, February 2018.
780 Names for the nine major ports in roman character have been added in Figure 7-9 to the original map with Hangul charactersas provided by Lee. Note that the romanization of names of these ports varies in the descriptions provided here, due in part todifferences in romanization used by Yoon versus that of other sources.

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investment in Najin Port after 2010, renovated part of Nampo Port, and modernized theDancheon Port in 2012 as an international shipping port. Since then, there has been little or noattempts at further modernization of the ports.
Depending on the literature source consulted, there are discrepancies in the documentations of
the current status of North Korean port facilities. The document Chosun Geography Book
(1988). released by the DPRK and State of North Korean Port Facilities (2018), released by the
ROK Oceanic and Fisheries Development Institute are believed to include the most accurate
data. There are some similarities and differences between the two documents. Since 1988, there
have not been many changes in the North Korean ports other than minor changes in the Nampo,
Haeju, Danchun, Chungjin and Najin ports described above.
Comparison of the Current Status of the North Korean Port Facilities (Reference
1988/2018)
According to the Marine Traffic statistics, nine trade ports: Nampo, Songrim, Haeju, Sunbong,
Najin, Chungjin, Danchun, Heungnam, and Wonsan ports, handle the most cargo in North
Korea. 40 ships from Nampo, 31 ships from Wonsan, and 23 ships from Najin were found tohave been entering and leaving the port during the two years from January 2015 to January
2017.781

781 Lee (2018), ibid.

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Figure 7-9: Location of Major Export and Local Ports in North Korea782

Seonbong
Najin
Chongjin

Tanchŏn

Hongwŏn

WonsanNampo
SonglimHaeju

7.3.2. Power Facilities
7.3.2.1. Major Thermal Power Plants
The connection between power plants and the minerals and coal mining industries is crucial formining operations in the DPRK. All industries rely on power plants that were built in major
cities or major industrial areas. More than 60 percent of the DPRK’s electricity needs for themining and minerals industries in recent years have been supplied by five major thermal power
plants fueled with coal and heavy oil. These are the Chongjin and Danchon thermal power
plants (Ham-Kyung province), the Buk (or Book, or Puk)-Chang and Hamhuong thermal power
plants, the Pyongyang thermal power plant, the Chongcheon Gang thermal power plant, and the782 Source: Lee Sung-woo (2018), North Korea Economic Review, KDI, March 2018.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKNampo thermoelectric power plant (Pyong-An province). For example, the Chongjin power
plant supplies electricity to the Moo-San (Musan) mine and the Kim-Chaek Iron manufacturer
group, and the Buk-Chang power plant supplies electricity to the Pyong-An coalfields and to
major Pyong-An metals refineries. The annual electricity production capacities of each power
plant are sufficient to supply its client companies, but the power plants often fail to produce
enough power due to a shortage of coal and heavy oil. As with other types of entities in the
DPRK, power is allocated to mines based on their designated importance, with “express” or“first class” facilities receiving relatively regular supplies, and other facilities sometimes
receiving little power from the grid. A confidential source reports that grid power costs formines averaged about $0.13 per kWh as of 2019.
7.3.2.2.Private Power Supplies and Microgrids
As a result of power deficits resulting, in recent years, in perhaps only 40 percent of mining
electricity demand being actually supplied by the central grid,783 some DPRK mining operations,particularly those involving Chinese or other foreign investors, have been turning to providing
their own power supplies. On-site power in mining operations, which may be present in on theorder of a fifth of DPRK mines, involves the use of diesel power generators (mostly, like thosedescribed in 5.2.3.2 of this report, imported from China) or, more recently, coal-fired gasification
generators imported from China (see Figure 7-10).784 In some locations, where local hydraulicresoruces are avaialble, mini- or micro-hydro systems may provide some or all of the power used
on a private mine grid network.
Most of the mines in the DPRK that use on-site power are small-to-medium-sized mines
generating hard currency income by selling products such as gold, copper, graphite andmolybdenum abroad, and are thus able to afford to purchase power systems. Mines with theirown power sources typically have their own microgrid distributing power for mining processs,
offices, barracks/living quarters, and sometimes to nearby parts of host communities. In somemines near the Chinese border, DPRK mines run with Chinese investors and managers obtain
power via cross-border supplies from China.
As described in Chapter 10 of this report, the provision of microgrids for DPRK mines, andperhaps microgrids powered wholly or in part by renewable energy (solar, wind, and/or hydro),
may ultimately be a very attractive (and economically sustainable) engagement option to offer
the DPRK in talks to address DPRK nuclear weapons issues.

783 Confidential source, 2020.
784 Figure from “Coal Gasification Power Generation Plant”, a listing in Alibaba.com at https://www.alibaba.com/product-detail/Coal-Gasification-Power-GenerationPlant_1703514696.html?spm=a2700.galleryofferlist.normal_offer.d_title.6447e3c7k1YVbc. As of this writing (December2020) this listing offered gasifier generation systems ranging in size from 50 kW to 1.2 MW, with the capital equipment costs forthe larger size probably in the vicinity of $700 per kW, and therefore more expensive than diesel-fueled generators, which might
cost only a tenth as much to purchase (see, for example, https://www.alibaba.com/product-detail/heavy-duty-generators-1250kvastand-by_62011572215.html?spm=a2700.galleryofferlist.normal_offer.d_title.41bc3ef21BhzR6), but would be much more
expensive to fuel (and for which fuel would be more difficult to get in the DPRK) than the coal-fired systems.

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Figure 7-10: Example of Chinese Coal Gasification Electricity Generation System

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7.3.3. Metals/Minerals Refining Facilities
Some of the more important metals and minerals refining facilities in the DPRK are listed
below.785
Moon-Pyong Metals/Minerals Refinery
Most of the DPRK’s zinc and lead ore is smelted at Moon-Pyong (or Munpyong) Smelting
Factory, which is located in Moon-Chon (Munchon) City, Kang-Won province. The annual
production capacity of this smelter is: Pb: 35,000 tonnes, zinc:110,000 tonnes, gold: 600 kg,
silver: 40 tonnes, tin: 115 tonnes, antimony: 100 tonnes, cadmium: 450 tonnes, sulfuric acid:
240,000 tonnes, and superphosphate of lime: 200,000 tonnes. This facility is mentioned in two
1950s CIA documents, including one (from 1951) that notes that the smelter was founded in1936 by a Japanese industrialist, and operated before World War Two (WWII), starting in 1938,
producing silver, gold, copper, and lead, refined from ore from nearby mines, but produced lead
during the WWII.786 Figure 7-11 shows a large industrial facility that we believe is probably thissmelter, as it include two large stacks, numerous factory buildings, a set of what appear to beadministration buildings (lower middle of image) around a courtyard with what appears to be acommemorative obelisk in the center, several impoundments that look like waste settling ponds(lower middle/left of image), piles of coal and spoil (and in images taken at other times, what
appear to be piles of ore), rail line access, an electrical substation, and access to shipping
facilities. Some buildings with new roofs are evident on the site, which as a whole is centered at
approximately coordinates 39.257, 127.256. The 1951 CIA document lists the coordinates(when converted into digital form) as 39.233, 127.367, which would be somewhat to the Southof the existing facility. This difference could either be due to a rounding error or the smelter
may have been moved, as there does appear to be a smaller industrial facility near the CIA
coordinates that looks abandoned. A more recent USGS document lists the Munpyong refinery
close to the coordinates we have identified, and as being under the authority of the Korea Zinc
Industrial Group.787
Based on the 1954 CIA document (see footnote 786), the Munpyong refinery was the only one of
the three major metals refineries extant as of that time that was not badly damaged by bombing
during the Korean War.

785 Text adapted from Yoon (2019), ibid.
786 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA, 1951), Munp’yong Refinery, dated 28 September 1951, and available (partiallyredacted) as https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00457R008300670001-0.pdf; and U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA, 1954), Intelligence Memorandum: Reconstruction in North Korea dated 26 July, 1954, and available ashttps://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00935A000200370001-2.pdf.
787 United States Geological Survey (2010), “Table1.—Attribute data for the map "Mineral Facilities of Asia and the Pacific,"
2007 (Open-File Report 2010-1254).”, available as https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2010/1254/pdf/USGS_ofr2010_1254_table.pdf.

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Figure 7-11: Possible Location of Munpyong Smelting Factory as of 4-12-2020 (Google Earth
Pro Image)

Nam-Po Metals/Minerals Refinery
The Nam-Po (Nampo) refinery is one of the major gold refineries in the DPRK, but the use of
the refinery facilities for gold production has been hidden from the public. The refinery has
capacity to produce 2 tonnes of gold and 15 tonnes of silver annually. The refinery at Nampo isalso quite old, having been built in the 1940s and modified in the 1970s, thus its infrastructure
and production systems are not only inefficient, they are also not environmentally friendly.788
The area where the facilites are located (Nampo City) is polluted by heavy metal wastes fromthe refinery, and an unknown number of patients have reported health problems, in particulardental problem and skin diseases.
As one of the largest smelters in the DPRK, the Nampo Refinery Group also produce non-ferrous
metal products. The annual production capacity of the refinery is: electrolytic copper: 414,000
tonnes (99.97%), electronic zinc: 45,000 tonnes, tin: 200 tonnes, gold: 500 kg, copper cable:
10,000 tonnes, and superphosphate of lime: 200,000 tonnes.
In order to operate its electric furnaces, the power requierments of this refinery are supplied by
the Buk-Chang (Pukchang) and Pyongyang thermal power plants, for which the refinery is amajor consumer.
788 Yoon (2011), ibid, citing Kim, Young Yoon (2007), “DPRK’s Mineral production systems and future”, Korea Reunification

Institute; Chung, Woo-Jin (2007), “Strategic Cooperation Plans and Current situation in Development of South and North
Korea”, Korea Energy Economics Institute; and private sources, 2010.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKHeong-Nam (Hungnam) Refinery:This refinery is located in near Ham-Heong (Hamhung) City and produces copper, gold, and rareearth materials using mineral ores supplied from the Hye-San and Dan-chon mines.
Hae-Joo Refinery:This plant is located in Hae-Joo (Haeju). Its main products are gold, copper, tungsten, and rareearth materials using ore mined in Hwang-Hea province. These facilities have the potential to be
used to extract gold and copper for export via Hae-Joo port as a part of a foreign investment.in
the DPRK mining sector.Figure 7-12 shows a Google Earth Pro image, as of early 2018, of thepossible location of the Haeju mineral refinery, showing a number of updated roofs and otherchanges in recent years (coordinates, approximatly 38.029, 125.666).
One confusing aspect of historical images of this facility, however, is that the most recent (2018and 2019) images appear to show the blue roofing that was applied to many buildingsand otherequipment (such as the roofs of conveyor belts) in approximately 2017 being removed again.
This leads us to wonder whether UNSC sanctions caused plans to reopen or increase output at
the facility to have been scuttled, prompting the salvaging of roofing materials for use elsewhere.
This is pure conjecture on our part, but could be investigated further with access to a series ofmore frequent historical satellite photos than were available to use through Google Earth Pro.

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Figure 7-12: Possible Location of Haeju Minerals Refinery (as of 3-18-2018)

The 7.27 Gold Refinery:A third major gold ore refinery in North Korea is the 7.27 Refinery (Heong-Nam 2 refinery).
The 7.27 Refinery is located in Ham-Heong (Hamhung) City, and was established in 1983 as a
subsidiary of the People’s Army Department. Its annual production capacities are gold, 1 tonne,
and silver 10 tonnes, respectively.
7.3.4. Mining Machinery Manufacturers
Another key category of infrastructure related to the DPRK mining industry is the supply chain
for equipment used in mining. Table 7-9 provides information about manufacturers of key
mining machinery, and Table 7-10 lists key manufacturers of equipment specific to coal mining
and transport.
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 7-9: Major Mining Machinery Manufacturers in the DPRK
Name

Size

Products

Notes

Nack-Won
MachineManufacturer

Site: 93,000 m2
employees: 4,500
1st class firm

Oil pressure (hydraulic)excavators

Specialized in
Excavator
production

Koo-Sung Mining
Machinery
Manufacturer

Site: 27,000 m2:
employees: 5,000

Drillers, lorries,
crushers, pumps

Built in 1957

Dan-chon
Mining
Machinery
manufacturer

Site: 10,000 m2
employees: 2,000

Lorries, crushers,
polishers, pumps

Also called the4.28 factory

Sariwon Mining
Machinery
Manufacturer

Site: 43,000 m2
employees: 2,500

pumps, conveyors,
belts, compressors,
winches

Shin-Ui Joo
Mining Machinery
Manufacturer

Employees: 1,500

High-speed
excavators,
rock drillers

Also called the
8.9 factory

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 7-10: Coal Mining Machinery Manufacturers in the DPRK789
Province

Name of
Manufacturer

Products

Ham-GyungBuk province

Hei-Ryong
Coal mining
Machinery
Manufacturer

Coal carrier car production,iron supports, compressors,cranes, machinery parts,
crushers, comprehensive
drillers

Ham-Buk
Province

Na-NamCoal mining
machinery
Manufacturer

Various coal mining drills,
carrier cars, cranes, safety
equipment production

Pyong-Yang
City

Pyong-Yangcoal mining
machinery
manufacturer

Supports, hydraulicmachinery, hydraulic coalmining machines, pumps,
conveyors, rock drills

1st class company
64,000 m2
35,000 employees

Pyong-An
province

Duck-Chon
Coalminingmachinery
Manufacturer

Coal lorries, coal drills,
pressure horse
winches, belts, reduction
gears

1st class firm
50,000 m2
4,000 employees

Hwang-Heaprovince

Jae-Ryongcoal mining
machinery
manufacturer

coal lorries, coal drills,
pressure hoses
winches, belts, reduction
gears, air chargers, minebuses

2nd class firm,
1,600 employees,
31,000 m2

7.4.

Size
29,000 m2
2,500 employees
1st class company

1st class enterprise (3,000
employees)

Policies, Organizations and Human Resources Involved in the DPRK
Minerals Sector

Brief summaries are provided below for North Korean mining industry policies and miningrelated organizations, as well as the organizations in charge of minerals exploitation in the
DPRK, development of technology related to geological exploration, and the educational system
for mining and minerals-related occupations.

789 Original Source: DPRK's Industries, Korea Industry Bank (ROK), 2002,

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7.4.1. North Korean Mining Industry Policy and Related Organizations
Mining Policy
The mining industry has been a top priority industry for the DPRK government since the 1970s,
exceeding other industries in importance because of its key role in providing sufficient materials
and energy sources for the DPRK. For successful development of the mining industry, the DPRK
has established three major policies: first, strengthening geological exploration to promote newcoal and minerals mine development; second, promoting technological development in the
excavating of underground tunnels and in ore collection procedures; and finally, scientificresearch in digging equipment and exploration. Another major principle in the DPRK mining
industry is the self-supporting and self-sufficiency policy. This policy has been interpreted suchthat most mineral resources produced domestically are to be used for domestic purposes. As aresult, the domestic supply rate for minerals resources in the DPRK is very high compared to the
DPRK’s historical imports of mineral resources. For example, the DPRK is 100 percent selfsufficient in iron ore, pig iron, partially-finished steel products, copper, cement and graphite.
In spite of this self-sufficiency policy, North Korean authorities have since the 1990s been
pursuing opportunities for minerals exports to earn hard currency, according to KORTRA (ROK)
data. In fact, resource development in DPRK has also been closely related to the needs of North
Korea’s munitions industry; for example, copper, uranium and iron mines exploitation have beendeveloped substantially to meet military equipment and weaopns needs.
Natural Resource Law in the DPRK
According to this law (Section, 21 of DPRK Published Laws, 2003), the North Korean cabinet isin charge of the exploration, exploitation, and use of minerals, with several organs ofconsultation involved in the approval of exploration, development and standards for minerals
deposit estimation by geologic exploration institutions. Section 40 of the law indicates that anorganization or individual company should acquire a permit from a government body when theorganization plans to export precious metals or iron ore overseas, and section 51 indicates that incase of any breach in the law, the company or organization should be punished. Section 46
indicates that any skilled labor or engineer, equipment, materials, or funds related to the mineral
exploration industry may not be used for other industrial purposes. In particular, section 17
emphasizes that any existing mine or coal mine cannot be closed (abandoned mine issues)
without permission from the government consulting body.
Mining Industry-related Organizations
The DPRK mining industry is essentially under the control of the Labor Party and the Cabinet atthe same time, but the Party’s power dominates the Cabinet’s role in the DPRK. As part of theGeological Exploration Institute system, the DPRK established in 1995 the Central Mineral
Resource Institute in Pyong-Sung, which is a scientific city and part of the Pyongyang capitalcity. This Central Institute controls all geological organizations and institutes of the DPRK,
including the Hamhung and Pyongyang Exploration Institutes.790
DPRK commercial organizations involved in trading and development of mineral resources
include the Cho-sun General Mining Trading group, the Chosun Magnesite Clinker trading

790 Based on reports from Chosun News, 26 January 2002, and other sources reviewed by E. Yoon.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

group, the Myong-Ji group, the Dae-Sung Trading Company, the Chosun Baek-Gumsan Trading
Company, and the Chosun Maebong-san Trading Company, as well as others. These
organizations are described briefly below.791•

Chosun General Mining Trading GroupThe company is located in Joong District, Pyongyang City. Its primary business is to tradenonmetallic minerals. It has 10 subsidiaries in 10 major cities throughout the DRPK, and two
branch offices. Zinc, copper-related products, and silver are the major export items handled by
the company, in addition to nonmetallic refinery-related equipment and facilities, tin, antimony,aluminum cable and bar, coated wire, and other products.
•

Chosun Magnesite Clinker Trading Enterprise

The major trading items of this company are magnesite clinker, magnesite ore, magnesite brickand diatomite for export. The company also imports coking coal, chrome steel, mining
equipment and machinery.
•

Myong-Ji Corporation

This company was called Samchonri Group, but changed its name. Zinc and heating coils are its
major export items.
•

Kang-Sung Trading Company

This company operates under the North Korean People's Army•

Chosun DaiJin Trading Company

This company is located in Pyong-Yang and is controlled by the 39 Room (also sometimest
translated as “Office” or “Department”) of the Labor Party. Its focus is on trading to obtain hardcurrency, and it specializes in exporting coal and mineral ore overseas and in importing
commodities and electric goods from Hong-Kong, Macau and China for Chairman Kim Jong
Un’s family and others.
•

Cho-sun Natural Resources Trading Company

This is a newly established company focusing on international cooperation projects in thenatural resources area.
•

Other Companies

The Chosun-Daesung Group, the Chosun DongHeong Trading Company, the Chosun
Baekgumsan Trading Company, and the Chosun Maebong Company are major and exporters
raw mineral resources to overseas buyers, and importers of machinery and equipment fromoverseas.792

791 As described by Yoon (2019), ibid, citing private sources, 2018.
792 Original source cited by E. Yoon, Lee, Hea-Jung Development of Mineral Resources of DPRK, Hyun-Dai [Hyundai]

Economic Research Institute, 2008.

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7.4.2. Sysetm for Authorization of Mineral Resource Exploitation
In cases of independent development of mineral resources, the National Underground Resource
Development Committee is in charge of providing permission for mining activities through the
Ministry of Gathering Industry and the Ministry of Electricity & Coal Industry. Once permission
is granted, an individual mine or company would be able to commence the development process.
In this step, foreign investors could be involved in the process by contracting with an individual
mine or company. In other words, once overseas investors invest by purchasing facilities andequipment for mining, the investors can bring out of the country a contracted amount of
produced ore or refined products, which they can offer for sale.
With regard to mining operations and development, skilled workers and engineers are
responsible for management and engineering affairs in mines and minerals-related companies,
and military servicemen and skilled workers are responsible for the required labor. The mineralores produced are then sold by the independent mining company to overseas buyers for dollars(or Euros, Yuan, or other hard currencies), or to domestic clients.
7.4.3. The DPRK’s Geological Technology Development
Geological technologies for minerals exploration have been developed in the DPRK since the1990s. There are two major elements of geological exploration. The first is geological
technology, and the second is earth physics exploration technology. According to a technical andgeological magazine published in the DPRK, there are 10 major technology development needs
facing the DPRK mining industry, namely (1) new explorathon methods to look deep into theearth’s crust, (2) computer controlled drilling under GPS (global positioning system) guidance,(3) development of new earth physical exploration methods for depths up on 2,500 meters, suchas 3-dimensional elastic wave exploration, (4) satellite-controlled exploration methods
development (for coal, gold, geothermal heat, natural gas, and underground water prospecting,for example), (5) far-infrared radiation controlled exploration, (6) bio-earth physics exploration,(7) electrical exploration development, (8) tomography technology for finding coal and colored
metals (such as gold or copper), and (9) advanced chemical exploration methods development.
These technologies are related to Earth Physics exploration methods.
7.4.4. An Analysis of the Educational System for Mining-related Occupations
The DPRK maintains a three-level higher-educational system for mining-related occupations.
The first level is central government-controlled universities, the second level is local
government-controlled colleges, and the third level is enterprise- or company group-controlledcolleges used as occupational skill schools. The Mining and Metals and Nonmetallic
engineering-related educational system in the DPRK has been well established for developmentof the industries in comparison with the treatment of these discriplines in the ROK and Chinese
educational systems—for example, there is only one Earth Physics Exploration course in South
Korean Universities.
University Curricula
With regard to the curricula and quality of education in fields related to mining and minerals, thetechnology and equipment used for training in the Universities are mostly from Russia or China,

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

and more rarely from Japan. In Yoon’s view,793 the quality of education on these topics in the
DPRK is competitive with that offered South Korean students, but needs additional support toreach USA or European standards. The situation in each of the three levels of education inmining-related topics is described below.
Universities Controlled by the Central Government
There are five major Universities with courses in areas of mining and metals, geological
exploration, and Earth physics exploration: Kim Il Sung University, Kim-Chaek Engineering
University, Chong-Jin Mine and Metal University, Pyong-Sung Coal Mining Engineering
University and Sari-won Geology University.

• Kim-ll-Sung University is located in Pyongyang. It has 12,000 students, including 600
students in the geology exploration course. The university has three courses, Geology
Exploration, Earth Physics Exploration and Earth Chemical Exploration. In order tograduate from the university, students must attend five years of courses including at least
one year spent doing a practicum in their field . Students in these courses learn English
and Russian (most students learn English since about 2000). Graduates of this university
are dispatched by the University to geology-related exploration companies and research
institutes throughout the DPRK. The graduates have no opportunity try to find jobs thatthey favor as individuals, rather they are obliged to follow the orders of authorities
because their university have studieswere supported by the government, which paid fortheir school fees and dormitory costs, including clothes and food. The graduates areclassified into three categories: those destined to work as Labor Party officials, those whowill work as government cabinet officials (in Ministries, for example), and those whowill work as exploration company experts or in research institutes. The classification of
the graduates is done by the Education Department of the Central Labor Party. Graduatesare granted Bachelor degrees in their mining or minerals course and become official
experts of their industry. For example. If a student graduates from the Geology
Engineering course in this university, she/he will be entitled as a Geology Expert with a
Bachelor’s degree of Geology Exploration.

• Kim-Chaek University is aksi located in Pyongyang. It has 10,000 students including
1,800 students of Geology Exploration, Mining Engineering, Metal and Nonmetallic
Engineering courses. The university has six related courses, Geology Exploration, Earth
Physics Exploration, Earth Chemical Exploration, Metal and Nonmetallic Engineeringand Colored Metal Engineering, Refinery Engineering and Iron engineering, and Material
Analytics courses. In order to graduate from the university, students must attend a fiveyear course including one year at least for practicum. Students at Kim-Chaek also learn
English and Russian, with English the language of choice since about 2000. Graduates ofthis university are dispatched to geology related exploration companies and research
institutes, mines, Iron manufacturing companies, and refineries throughout the DPRK.
The graduates are classified into three categories by Central Labor Party officials as
described above. If a student graduates from the mining engineering course in thisuniversity, she/he will be entitled as a mining engineer with a Bachelor’s degree in
Mining Engineering.
793 Yoon (2011), ibid.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK• The Chong-Jing Mines and Metals University is located in Chongjin, Ham-gyung
Province. This university was established in 1959 to support the Moo-san (Musan) mine,
the Kim-Chaek iron manufacturing group, and other coal mines with personnel trained inengineering, management, and exploration work. This university has 6,000 students.
There are 20 courses related to mining, iron making and management of refinerycompanies. A selection of these are as follows. The geological exploration courses are
the Underground Water Exploration Course, the Drilling Engineering Course, and theEarth Physics Exploration Course. In Geology Engineering School, mining-related
courses are:Mining Engineering, Coal Mining Engineering, the Mine Management
Course, and the Mining Analytics Course. The university ofers two mining mechanicalequipment courses: Mining Mechanic Engineering, and Coal Mechanic Engineering. In
order to graduate from the university students must fulfill the same requirements listed
for the universities above, and are similarly dispatched to geology-related explorationcompanies and research institutes, mines, iron manufacturing companies and metals
refineries throughout the DPRK by decisions made by the Education Department of theCentral Labor Party.

• Sariwon Geology University is located in Sariwon (Hwang Hae province) to support
minerals and coal mining in the province. The University has five exploration courses
including Earth Chemical Exploration, Earth Physics Exploration, Drilling, Underwater
Exploration, and Analytics. Graduates become geology engineers and are sent to
exploration companies and to be university teachers for colleges. Other arrangements as
to graduation and certification of graduates are similar to those of the universities
described above. This university has 3,000 students.

• Pyong-Sung Coal Mining University is located in Pyong-Sung city and supports coalmining engineering in Pyongan and Hwang-hae provinces. The University offers 10
major coal mining-related courses, including: Coal Mining Engineering, Coal
Exploration, Coal Mining Mechanics and Analytics, as well as management courses.
Most graduates are dispatched to coal mining and exploration companies as engineers.
Other conditions for graduation from the University are similar to those of Chong-Jin
Mines and Metals University. This university has 4,000 students.
Colleges Controlled by Local Governments
Each province has a mining engineering college and a exploration engineering college. College
students take 3-year courses in their majors. All financial support for school fees, dormitory
costs, food, and clothes are provided by the government. Graduating students are dispatched to
local mines, coal mines, and exploration companies as junior engineers. Students must finish auniversity course of two years or more, following their training at the provincial level, if theywish to be engineers in their industry. The dispatching of graduates to their positions is carriedout by the local government department for human resources. Each college has 700-800 students
in every province. For example, the Danchon Exploration College has 800 students and has
three courses: Geologic Exploration, Drilling, and Underground Water Exploration. After
graduation from this college, graduates are granted positions as junior engineers and aredispatched to exploration companies in Ham-gyung province. Their wages are typically 70 to 80
percent of those of engineers graduating from universities.
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKColleges Controlled by Enterprise Groups
The college system controlled by enterprise groups is built upon an educational scheme firstestablished during the 1970s. Large enterprise groups such as the Kim-Chaek Iron
Manufacturing Group or the Moo-san (Musan) Mining Group operate colleges called “Factory
Colleges”. College students study after work from 7 pm to 9 pm twice or three times per week inthese colleges to obtain more advanced skills and knowledge. Education in these colleges
provides good opportunities for promotion or professional development within the company ororganization, but the courses taken in these colleges are not recognized by other companies ororganizations. These college’s curicula are different than those of other universities and colleges,
but are worthwhile students in that they provide applicable work skills for their jobs. For
example, if a worker in mining company studies in a factory college, she/he would be granted anincrease in job level from 3 to 4, and the next year, would receive an increase from level 4 to 5,
accompanied by a promotion and an increase in wages. It is estimated that there are 100 “factorycolleges” throughout the DPRK, with an estimated current enrollment of more than 100,000
students.
7.5.

Conclusions and Strategies for Overseas Investors
7.5.1. The Most Fruitful Areas for Foreign Investment in the DPRK Minerals
Sectors

The most fruitful areas for foreign investment in the DPRK minerals sector are as
described below.
(1)

The iron mines in the Moo-San and Eun-Ryul areas have great potential to produce
significant benefits for overseas investors due to the fact that the DPRK’s biggest ironmanufacturers, the Kim-Chaek and Hwang-Hae corporations, could be used to processiron from those mines, and the steel and pig iron products could be exported to provide
return on investment with low costs for transportation.

(2)

Gold and copper mines could be beneficial investment projects offering lowtransportation expenses. In recent years, as described above, DPRK authorities haveproposed that overseas funds be provided to invest in gold mines and copper mines. In
fact, newly explored and developed mines such as the Sang-Nong, Gap-San and Shin-pa
copper mines may be great opportunities for overseas investors.794(3)

Another possible mine for investment is the Dan-Chon Magnesite Mine, which could be
developed to export product to China and the USA. In this case, it should be possible tocooperate with the authorities for a “win-win” strategic investment. According to private
sources,795 a DPRK company has made a deal with a Chinese trading company for theexport of Caustic calcined Magnesia (MgO 90%, CaO 2.5%, SiO2 2.5%, Fe2O 1.05 %,LOI 3.5%, Size; 200 mesh 95%). In this deal, the selling price of the material FOB
Heong-Nam port was US$ 88.0 per metric tonne.

794 Hwang, Jung-Nam (1999), Strategy and Current Situation of Cooperation of Mineral Sector between South- North Koreas,

Korea Energy Economy Institute.
795 As cited by Yoon, (2011), ibid.

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(4)Mining of limestone ore is another possible application of overseas investments, coupledwith construction of cement factories in the DPRK and export of cement product to China
and the ROK. In addition, with investments in the cement industry, overseas funds could
be involved in SOC (State-owned Corporations) in the DPRK, as well as North Koreancalcium fertilizer industries, which can provide products key to helping DPRK
agriculture to be more productive.

(5)

The coal mining industry could be an alternative investment for foreign investors, as the
DPRK needs to increase production of coal as a required energy source to drive thecountry’s economic engine. In this industry, exploration and development of new coalmines would bring significant benefits to overseas investors.

(6)

Investing in zinc ore mines such as the Gum-dok, Hye-san and Ruck-Yon mines has
potential for investors due to the fact that the DPRK has sufficient existing industrial
capacity to refine the zinc ore, and thus zinc metal could be exported, providing a good
return on investment.

(7)

Tungsten mines could be alternative destination for investment due to the high pricetungsten fetches in the international market, its low transportation expenses, and huge
deposits of tungsten ore exist at the Man-Nyun mine, which is currently being further
developed and expanded.

(8)

New exploitation of deposits of rare-earth elements such as titanium, indium, and cerium
are another area in which the DPRK’s natural resources could be developed. Rare–earth
element production has in recent years been dominated by Chinese mines, which have
30% of global deposits, but account for 97% of global production.796 The DPRK isknown to have reserves of these materials in the Gyung-Sung and Hur-Chon areas. In
particular, the Saen-gi-ryong area in Kyung-sung country is not only abundant in Kaolin,
the raw material for ceramics, but also has some indium and cerium elements in abundant
wastes rocks from the kaolinite mining process.797 Due to the DPRK’s competitive laborcosts relative to costs of Chinese labor, development of DPRK rare-earth resources forexport would yield significant benefits.
7.5.2. Obstacles to Effective Minerals Sector Development through Foreign
Investment, and Solutions to Overcome Obstacles

Key obstacles to effective minerals development in the DPRK with funds from overseas
investors include 1) the shortage or lack of adequate and consistent constant supplies of oil andcoal for energy in the DPRK; 2) the fact that the DPRK lags behind other nations in technologies
and operational methods for minerals (due to reliance on old methods), as well as in the use ofmodern equipment in mining and other minerals sector operational activities; and 3) a shortageof funds for education of engineers and for investment in technologies.
Key solutions to the obstacles above are as follows: 1) stabilizing coal mining operations to
supply adequate coal for power plants, and/or promote the deployment of local microgrids,
including those using renewable-based power sources, for mines ; 2) attract overseas funds forinvestment in modernization of mining equipment and related technologies; and 3) provide better
796 Yoon (2011), ibid, citing Chosun News, 22 October.2010.
797 Yoon (2011), ibid, citing private sources, 2018.

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balance in mining business management between production and export operations, thereby
providing more of an emphasis on sustainable production and making operations less sensitive(and potentially more reponsive) to swings in export markets.
7.5.3. Infrastructure Investments for Stable Operation of Mining Industries
With the above obstacles and solutions in mind, key infrastructure investments to allow stable
operation of mining industries in the DPRK will be:•

Thermal power plants should be stabilized in order to provide reliable sources of power formining and minerals refining facilities, thus investments in the DPRK’s coal mining industry
should be carried out as soon as possible as a short-term solution.

•

Modernizing minerals processing facilities such as metals refineries and iron manufacturers
is necessary for the DPRK to be able to export secondary goods derived from mineral
resources, steel, or refined metals at higher prices (relative to raw ores) so that the DPRK can
increase its foreign exchange earnings.

•

In the longer term, a self-supporting accounting system for the management of mining andminerals refinery industries should be applied and implemented (adopted) in the DPRK.
Capacity-building will be needed to train DPRK workers and officials in management
techniques consistent with operating self-supporting businesses.
7.5.4. Feasible Strategies for Overseas Investors

Cooperating with South Korean firms would be beneficial for overseas investors in order toassist in enhancing the security of investments in the DPRK minerals sector, and to build
relationships with future consumers of mineral products. South Korean firms investment in themining industry in the DPRK, and Chinese firm’s experience in the DPRK in investment inmining trading and mineral resource development represent valuable experience that overseas
investors can learn from.798 South Korean firms are also likely to be willing buyers of minerals
products from the DPRK.
Building sustainable relationships with DPRK authorities in mining departments, as well as withother officials, is significant for hedging risks in the uncertain business environments that prevailin the DPRK. First, using the Korean-Chinese business network, for instance, by trading
between the DPRK and China via Chinese-Korean community channel, would be beneficial.
These Chinese live in the DPRK and have been playing major roles to in the trading businessbetween the two countries since the 1980s. According to private sources, approximately 5,000
Chinese live in the DPRK (with Pyongyang home to about 2,000 Chinese expatriots, and with
South Hamgyong province, South Pyongan province, and Ryangang province homes to another
3,000). These Chinese have knowledge of outside news and skills for trading between the twocountries, and could play major roles to promote international business for overseas investors.
Second, contributing towards the DPRK’s social and humanitarian needs (for example, by
providing free supplies of basic medicines, milk, childrens’ clothes, and food) is an alternative
strategy to deal with those focused targets. In fact, DPRK authorities wish to build partner
relationship in developing the country’s mining sectors. As an example, during a visit by Tony
Namkung, an advisor to the governor of the US state of New Mexico, to Pyongyang, DPRK
798 Yoon (2011), ibid, citing private sources, 2010.

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officials suggested foreign investment in DPRK mineral resource development be considered by
the USA, in particular, in the Dan-Chon Magnesite mine for mine development and exporting ofore.799
7.5.5. Alternative Strategies and Issues for Overseas Investors
Alternative strategies and special issues relating to investment by foreign companies in the
DPRK’s minerals sector are described below, incluidng possible funding approaches fordevelopment of the minerals sector, issues to consider when reviewing investment possibilities,
approaches to making investments in the sector, and provision of mining rights issues for foreign
investors. A case study of an investment possibility in a Molybdenite mine concludes thissection.
Establishing Special-purpose Enterprises (SPEs) for Funding Development of the DPRK
Mineral Sector
Due to the large amount of funds needed for investment in this sector, one approach fordeveloping mining businesses would be to establish SPEs and then issue company debentures orbonds to attract large amounts of investment funding. In fact, individual and institutional
investors would be interested in this business opportunity due to the fact that the DPRK’s
mineral sector could generate significant benefits (return on investment) if the US or South
Korean government could provide assurance for those investments as, for example, the ROK
government has been providing assistance and assurance to Korean companies investing in
Kaesong and other joint ventures.800 According to the South Korean government policy forinvesting in the DPRK, funding for ventures could be subsidized by the South Korean
government on the basis of its contrbution to North-South Korea economic cooperation. Thismeans that more than 50 percent of investment funds could be provided in the form ofgovernment assistance. The USA and other governments can also provide such assistance foroverseas mineral exploration businesses, assuming that UNSC sanctions on the DPRK are
lifted.801
Factors to Be Considered When Evaluating Potential Investments
There are five major issues that should be considered when overseas investors are making
decisions regarding investment in DPRK’s mineral sector: (1) the attributes of the deposit ofmineral resource with repespect to its possible development; (2) the quality and cost of available
labor; (3) the availability and status of infrastructure needed for mining, such as power plants ,railways, roads, and ports; (4) the status of environmental regulations; and (5) the political andeconomic stability of the country. In the case of the DPRK, in its current situation, (5), (1), and(3) should be improved to allow safe investment in the mineral sector. Based on the experienceof South Korean companies, DPRK authorities seem to have principally been considering threefactors when overseas investors offer investment possibilities: (1) the scale of the investment, (2)whether the investment will result in the transfer of mining technologies to DPRK, and (3)whether the investment will support infrastructure development.

799 See, for example, Michael Ha (2008), “NK Seeks Textile Exports to Wal-Mart”, Korea Times, dated 5/16/2008, and available

as http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/05/116_24317.html.
800 Yoon (2011), ibid, citing private source, 2010.
801 Korean Central Bank (2008), Comparison of South & North Korean Economies.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKPossible Scenarios for Investment
Contracting for equipment supply in exchange for mineral products is an option that avoids thepossible failure of large investments in the DPRK. Due to environmental concerns in developed
nations that result in mine closures and a surplus of mining infrastructure, second-hand mining
equipment and facilities could be assembled at low cost and exchanged for minerals resources ininitial deals with the DPRK then, if the deals proceed as expected, small amounts of funds could
be invested in DPRK mining operations in a step-by-step fashion.
In addition, investing in mines already operating and drawing on economic deposits of mineral
resources reduces risk. Investing in new mine development requiring an initial exploitation stepis a significantly more risky business when compared with investing in existing mines. Investingin existing mines would be an appropriate strategy to reduce the possibility of failure ofinvestments in the DPRK. With regard to difficulties in the DPRK energy sector, which might
affect the more than 20 mine development projects for overseas investors that have been
identified by DPRK authorities (according to private sources and South Korean sources), energy
supplies can be provided if investments in mining projects require energy supply upgrades.
The DPRK has been experiencing a lack of technology and equipment in the mining sector.
Thus, overseas investors or companies could offer exploration systems and equipment andengineers as an in-kind investment in the DPRK minerals sector, and new minerals finds or
production could be shared between the DPRK and the company providing the technology andexpertise.
Mining Rights Issues for Foreign Investors
In cases of cooperation between foreign investors or overseas companies in development or
exploitation of DPRK minerals resources, it is very rare that mining rights will be transferred toforeigners who invest in mining technology, equipment, and facilities such as dump trucks anddrills. Rather, foreign companies would likely gain only the rights to sell the products producedby the mining operation.
There are a number of reasons why the DPRK has been reluctant to transfer its mining
development rights to foreign companies and investors thus far. The first reason is politicalconcern that the authority’s power would be reduced in terms of its power/ability to mobilize
workers, that is to control its people, therefore resulting in political risk. Second, the authorities
believe that mineral resource development could be a significantly beneficial business in the
future, and thus are reluctant to offer rights to outsiders. Third, the DPRK expects that it could
make enormous profits in this industry if funds, facilities and mining engineering technologies
one day become available, despite the current shortage and lack of those resources for minedevelopment. This means that DPRK authorities have likely been overstating the potential
profits from their mining development businesses, and are less willing, as a result, to part withmining rights.
Case Study of Investment in a Molybdenite Mine
According to the (DPRK) Pyongyang IP Centre, as relayed in a research paper (obtained from
confidential sources) focused on estimating the potential economic benefits from expanding the
Yon-San Molybdenite ore production and exporting venture, US$ 397,307 would need to beinvested in equipment and an electricity generating plant, materials, labor costs, and freight costs
in order to increase the annual production capacity of the mine from 10,000 tonnes to 40,000
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKtonnes. The authors of the research paper estimated that the investment would have a six-month
payback. The analysis, however, incorrectly estimated that the investment could produce 17.2
million dollars as profit within 5 years ($3.94 million per year). In fact, it should be consideredthat production capability per DPRK worker is unlikey to be higher than a South Korean
worker’s production capacity, given the South Korean workers will have generally superior tools
and conditions to work with, but the per-capita productivity of Molybdenite ore by N. Korean
workers was estimated to be higher than that of South Korean workers in the research paper.
This appears to be an example of the overstatment of the potential economic benefits frommining businesses by DPRK authorities. This tendency to overstate potential benefits suggeststhat DPRK authorities would likely suspect, in reviewing estimates prepared using standard
procedures and provided by Western companies, that foreign investors or companies areunderestimating its mineral resources.
The DPRK lacks experience in attracting foreign investors to participate in its minerals sector
development. This example shows that negotiations between foreign investors and DPRK
authorities should be implemented carefully, and based on reasonable and transparent estimation
procedures and international benchmarks in the industry, with supervision and participation by
DPRK experts who have some experiences in the industry.
7.5.6. Establishing Sustainable Mining Practices
Prior to, or at the very least concurrent with, the expansion of foreign investment in the DPRK
minerals sector, capacity-building on sustainable mining practices are needed to ensure that arush to exploit the DPRK’s mineral wealth does not results in significant adverse environmental
and social impacts. Rather, investment and joint-ventures in the minerals sector should do
everything possible to improve conditions for mine workers, and to amerliorate existing
environmental problems associated with the DRRK minerals sectors. There is much to belearned by DPRK officials, mining company personnel, technicans, and engineers from bothpotential regional partners in minerals development and from experts in the broader international
minerals arena, and any large-scale minerals sector development in the DPRK, particularly if it
involves foreign partners, should include a component of capacity-building on sustainable
mining practices, backed up by project organization and investments in equipment andmonitoring practices designed to implement sustainable practices. Several presentations on the
topic of sustainable mining practices from different nations and different points of view were
provided at the 2010 DPRK Energy and Minerals Working Group Meeting organized by
Nautilus Institute and convented September 21st and 22nd in Beijing, China.802 The
presentations from this Meeting are avaialble at http://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/dprkenergy/2010-meeting/papers/.

802 Examples of relevant presentations from the 2010 Meeting include Peter Denura, “The Global Minerals Sector: Production

Trends, Markets, and Lessons for the Future”, Arabella Imhoff, “Key Issues and Best Practices for Minerals Sector Development:
Overarching Themes”, Ji-hyun Lee “Key Issues and Best Practices for Minerals Sector Development: ROK Case Study”, Allen
Clark, “Minerals, Economic Development, and Local Communities: Key Approaches and Case Studies from Asia”,
Natalia Lomakina, “A Case Study on Mineral Development in the Russian Far East: Best Practices for Sustainable
Development”, Odonchimeg Lundaa, “The Mongolian Minerals Sector, Future Plans, and Regional Cooperation”, Ren Peng,“Development of Environmental Policy for PRC Investment in Mineral Sectors Abroad”’, Hu Yuhong, “Key Issues and Best
Practices for Sustainable Minerals Sector Development in China”, and Chung Woo-jin and Park Jimin, “Experience and Goals of
the ROK in Regional Mineral Sector Development Cooperation”.

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7.5.7. Policy Proposals to Maximize Inter-Korean or Foreign Investment in theDevelopment of DPRK Mineral Mines and Coal Mines
Even if the current political situation between the DPRK and the international community is
resolved, South Korean entities (or foreign companies) will still face many problems in investingin the field of mineral resources in the DPRK. Investment in the DPRK's mineral resources
sector should be pursued after addressing various infrastructure issues, especially the stability ofelectric power supply.803
A gradual investment approach has been considered reasonable with most mine development
investment in the DPRK, starting with small-scale investment and exploring the various risks
involved. The results of this study, however, show that for investments in even a small mine in
the DPRK, various infrastructure conditions along with electric power problems will make it
difficult to conduct business.
To surmount these infrastructure barriers, large-scale investments in infrastructure will generally
be needed before investments in individual mines and it is difficult to implement investment ininfrastructure unless the DPRK authorities provide measures to guarantee the safety ofinvestment. (A partial work-around to this problem in some cases, particularly for smaller minesthat produce high-value products, could be to provide on-site power generation using microgrids,
including those powered by renewable energy, as described above and in later chapters in thisreport.) Guaranteeing infrastructure investments may even require the implementation of new laws orlegal systems to replace the current political and institutional practices of the DPRK, and implementationof such laws can be expected to be preceded by a very difficult negotiation process. In particular, toattract investment from the ROK and foreign investment companies in mine development in the
DPRK, the DPRK leadership needs to identify and implement new approaches, such as the
special regional law implemented in the Kaesong Industrial Complex, to create an investmentfriendly environment. Without such changes in the laws governing investment and cooperation,
it will be difficult for the DPRK to attract investment from overseas.
1) Exclusion of joint venture type
If the negotiations for mining sector investments between the ROK and the DPRK or between
foreign companies and North Korean companies are to proceed, the DPRK will require foreign
investors to invest only in the form of joint ventures, in which foreign investors provide capital,technology and facilities but the North Korean companies are responsible for managing thebusiness. This type of North Korean joint venture is not, what is commonly understood as a"joint venture company". Rather, it is close to "compensation trade," in which the capital andfacility investments are provided in exchange for a share of the resources produced generated bythat investment. Although this type of arrangement is nominally a joint venture, in practice most foreign
investors participating in such arrangements are kept in dark about the North Korean company they are
working with. In addition, the management of the business is constantly under surveillance by North
Korean authorities. This type of business mode should therefore be avoided when investing in North
Korean mines.

803 Yoon (2019), ibid, citing Chung Woo-Jinn (2015), Investment Potential in North Korea's Mineral Resources Development

and Processing, Korea Energy Economics Institute; and private sources.

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2) Separating investment mining companies from existing governance structures
Except for investments in newly developed mines, the mines that South Korean (or overseas)
companies would be looking to invest in would be existing mines that have been in operation forquite some time. Under the current management system in the DPRK, it would be very difficult
for the two Koreas to jointly manage North Korean mines. Within the framework of the current
bureaucratic system (Collective Industry - Unified Business Offices/The Provincial Leadership
Department - investment mines) it is virtually impossible to do business independently. The firstthing to be addressed by DPRK authorities in order to create a foreign-investment-friendly
environment is to allow some independence in the management of mines. The corporate
organization of the mines invested in by foreign or South Korean companies should be separated
from the existing governance structure in the DPRK and be newly established as independent
corporations.804 On the other hand, it is possible for the DPRK to initiate the separation of themines invested in by South Korea or overseas companies from the existing governance structure
in order to avoid the human and cultural influences of the South. If the mining operation inwhich South Korean or foreign investment occurs operates in the form of a joint venture, it isexpected that operations in the DPRK will remain under the existing management system. If themine is operated, however, in the form of an equity joint venture and/or South Korea's
management participation is high, the DPRK may want to initiate separation.
3) Independent and Joint Management Company (Possibility of the creation of a thirdcountry equity joint venture)
Even if the ROK's (or foreign) investment in a mining company is established as an independent
corporation, the issue will be whether the company should be an independent company run by
the South or a joint venture run by both the South and the North. Under the current North Korean
regime, it is most unlikely that the North will allow independently managed companies, not tomention leaving the resource production company in the hand of an ROK organization to
manage. The best type of business the DPRK can accommodate is therefore a joint venture orjoint management company, run by organizations from the two Koreas. From the perspective of
the ROK, an independent company has advantages in that it can achieve efficiency inmanagement using capital, production technology, and management expertise from the ROK. In
particular, for a joint venture or joint management company run by the two Koreas, there would
be no concern about the risk of friction or lack of communication with North Korean partners
because communications between the partners would be directly between those entities
immediately involved in the venture, without the need to communicate through DPRK or ROK
government agencies, for example. If problems related to the external environment (such as
licensing, purchasing of materials within the DPRK, and dealing with North Korean businesses)
arise, the South Korean (or foreign) company will need to figure things out on its own. It will
not be easy for the South Korean or foreign company, however, to handle these issues, as they
will not be within North Korean administrative procedures and the DPRK legal system. Taking
all of this into account, it would be best to conduct investment in DPRK mines in the form of

804 Yoon (2019), ibid, citing Chung Woo-Jinn (2015), Investment Potential in North Korea's Mineral Resources Development

and Processing, Korea Energy Economics Institute; and private sources, 2018.

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4) Stabilization plan for South-North Korea’s joint management
Given the considerations above, the management structure of choice and on which we focus
here, one in which a DPRK organization oversees day to day management, while South Korean(or foreign) companies oversee the core management of the company, can be effective. It seems
appropriate for South Korean managers to take responsibility for the management of facilities
and materials imported from (or brought in from) the ROK, as well as for the management andsale of the products of the company. In addition, the accounting for funds used and generated by
the corporation needs to be directly managed by the South Korean (or foreign) management.
This provides access to and control over financial information such as the flow of funds, costtreatment, cost structure, size of sales and profits, and the status of assets and liabilities within an
investment enterprise. In addition, although the core management field will be somewhat
different depending on the characteristics of each company or business, the most important goal
is to establish a monitoring function that can have access to all of the information about theinternal operation of the company. This ability enables companies to recognize problems inadvance and to take pre-emptive actions.805
7.5.8. Economic Effects of Inter-Korean Mineral Resources Cooperation
There are significant differences in the current state of mineral resources and in the economic
structure of the South and North. These differences, however, can create synergy and bringabout various economic results that satisfy the common interests of both countries.
Effect on the ROK
The most direct effect of inter-Korean cooperation related to investing in DPRK mineral
resources on the ROK is to contribute to the supply and demand of raw materials for South
Korean businesses, and in stabilizing prices for those inputs.
In terms of the South Korean economy, the iron and nonferrous minerals (in which South Korea
currently has a self-sufficiency rate of less than 1%) industries are virtually totally dependent on
imports and are therefore highly vulnerable to changes in the price and supply-demand situationin the international resource market.806
If the ROK invests directly in the DPRK's mineral resource production, and imports products
into the South, any increase in international resource prices will be recovered in the profits ofdomestic companies. Since the distance between the two Koreas is shorter than between the
ROK and the other countries that export mineral resources to ROK companies, the South candeal with any market instability faster with materials from the DPRK than with imports fromother supplier countries. If the non-metallic mining industry, which is in decline in the ROK, isin effect relocated to the DPRK, it will be able to regain its competitiveness.

805 Yoon (2019), ibid, citing Chung Woo-Jinn (2015), Investment Potential in North Korea's Mineral Resources Development

and Processing, Korea Energy Economics Institute; and private sources, 2018.
806 Yoon (2019), ibid, citing Chung Woo-Jin (2015), A Study on the Actual Condition of Energy Trade in North Korea, Korea
Energy Economics Institute.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKThe ROK is losing competitiveness in industries involving the processing of non-metallic
minerals, such as the cement, ceramic, pottery, glassware, and tiles industries, due to high wages
and environmental constraints. Moreover, if a new production base for the steel and smelting
industries is established in the DPRK, it will be possible to create additional value. The ROK has
advanced technology and is competitive, but ROK heavy industries are experiencing difficulties
in securing sites for expanded production bases within the ROK. In response to these difficulties,
the ROK is considering establishing production bases overseas in areas that are rich in raw
materials. The DPRK is a good candidate for investment as it is easy, in terms of location, for the
ROK to access (assuming the normalizing of political and economic relations) and is relatively
rich in raw materials such as iron ore, lead, zinc, and copper ore, as well as being advantageousfor its low wages and affordable land costs.807
Effect on the DPRK
As overseas investment in the mining sector in the DPRK grows, it will significantly contributeto economic growth in the DPRK. Mining in the DPRK is a key export industry that accounts
for an estimated 13.42% of its GDP and for about 70% of its total exports.808
Investment in related industries such as steelmaking, smelting and other mineral resource
processing industries, along with the development of mines, will generate high value added andcontribute to job growth.
If North-South mineral resource cooperation is carried out rationally, it could develop into a
strategic, win-win cooperation field that contributes to the DPRK's economic development while
the ROK gains profit and reduces raw materials costs for its industries. In so doing, cooperationin the minerals sector could help, under some scenarios of actual or de-facto reunification, to lift
the burden of supporting the DPRK financially from the ROK, as profits from minerals products
exports from jointly managed companies could help to subsidize infrastructure investments andhumanitarian needs in the DPRK.

807 Yoon (2019), ibid, citing Chung Woo-Jinn (2015), Investment Potential in North Korea's Mineral Resources Development

and Processing, Korea Energy Economics Institute; and private sources, 2018.
808 Yoon (2019), ibid, citing Chung Woo-Jinn (2015), Investment Potential in North Korea's Mineral Resources Development

and Processing, Korea Energy Economics Institute; and private sources, 2018.

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8.

Potential Future “Pathways” for the DPRK Energy Sector, andInstitutional Changes and Support Needed to for Sustainable
Redevelopment
8.1.

Introduction

Despite a few outward and sometimes intermittent signs (and the key word here is "outward") of
economic recovery in recent years—including more activity in the capital and a population thathas at least until the last few years looked, in general, better nourished (to at least some
visitors)—it is clear that the DPRK energy sector is a long way from good health. What could
the near- and medium-term future hold for the DPRK, and what can be done by the international
community in general, and the ROK in particular, to make the lives of DPRK citizens somewhat
less burdensome? To address this two-part question, the chapter that follows first sketches a setof substantially different storylines (scenarios) for DPRK economic/energy sector redevelopment(and in one case, lack of redevelopment), then translates those scenarios into numbers (energy
paths) to yield a more concrete sense of where the economy might go, given different policyemphases both in the DPRK and among the countries and international organizations that might,
under certain circumstances, work with the DPRK. This chapter examines these questions andpotential energy paths, compares the paths generated with respect to energy security criteria,
both qualitative and quantitative, looks for common lessons in the analytical results, andprovides some ideas for initiatives that could assist the DPRK in building a sustainable energy
sector.809
There are essentially three different ways that the DPRK energy sector and economy could
evolve from their current states, although many variants to these three paths are certainly
possible. First, the economy could open, leading to economic redevelopment. This process, ofcourse, could occur slowly or rapidly, and could take on quite different characteristics,
depending on how it is managed (or not managed). Second, the economy could fail to open
substantially, leading to a continuation of recent trends of stagnation in the economy and inavailability of energy supplies. Third, the Kim regime could collapse in one of many possible
ways, leading, in most scenarios, to actual or de-facto economic integration with the ROK. We
must emphasize that we do NOT think that DPRK regime collapse is likely in the near- or evenmedium-term. It is instructive, however, to think through the implications of collapse scenarios,
and we present an update of our previous work on the topic in Chapter 9, below.810 The main
809 Some of the text in this chapter updates material prepared for an earlier paper, David von Hippel and Peter Hayes (2013),“Assessment of Energy Policy Options for the DPRK Using a Comprehensive Energy Security Framework”, Paper prepared forthe International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco 2013, Panel TA58: “Energy Security: An International
Assessment”. Also prepared as a Working Paper for the Energy, Governance and Security Center of Hanyang University,
Republic of Korea EGS Working Paper 2013-4, and available as https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/assessmentof-energy-policy-options-for-the-dprk-using-a-comprehensive-energy-security-framework/.
810 See, for example, Peter Hayes and David von Hippel (2011), DPRK “Collapse” Pathways: Implications for the Energy Sector
and for Strategies Redevelopment/Support, Nautilus Institute Special Report, dated January 18, 2011, and available as
http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/dprk-collapse-pathways-implications-for-the-energy-sector-and-for-strategiesredevelopmentsupport/; and Peter Hayes and David von Hippel (2011) “North Korea’s ‘Collapse’ Pathways and the Role of theEnergy Sector”, Chapter 8 in The Survival of North Korea: Essays on Strategy, Economics and International Relations, Edited by
Suk Hi Kim, Bernard Selinger, and Terence Roehrig, McFarland & Company, Inc.

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variants of the economic redevelopment scenarios fall on the right hand side of Figure 8-1, while“Recent Trends” and “Collapse” scenarios fall on the left side.

DPRK
EnergyPaths
Considered
Quantitatively
Figure 8-1:
Main DPRK
EnergyPaths/Scenarios
Considered
to DatePOLITICAL STALEMATE IS….
RESOLVEDNOT RESOLVED“REDEVELOPMENT”
CASE: Revitalization, re-“RECENT TRENDS”
CASE: Economy

mechanization, infrastructure
upgraded

opens a very little, aidflows modest,
infrastructure erodes“SUSTAINABLE DEV.”
CASE: Redevelopment plus

“COLLAPSE” CASE(S):“REGIONALALTERNATIVE”
CASE: Redevelopment plusemphasis on energy
efficiency, renewables

Economy and regime fails (notquantitatively modeled)regional projects
Hayes/von Hippel
8/2010CSIS Korea Project Presentation

19

In both the Sustainable Development (SDV) and Regional Alternative (RAT) pathways (andvariants of same), a greater degree of formal rapprochement with the international community isboth required and assumed than in the Redevelopment (RDV) pathway. We would argue that
only truly significant and demonstrably continuous progress with addressing the DPRK’s nuclear
weapons program (and, probably, missile program), coupled with real progress in peace talks
with both the US and ROK, can offer the prospect of sufficient international cooperation andeconomic opening for the DPRK to rebuild its economy in a more coordinated fashion thatbuilds in energy efficiency and other measures geared toward more sustainable economic
development.
Four additional paths, themselves variants on the paths above, were also explored. Each assumes
that the nuclear reactors initially under construction by KEDO, or, should the existing work on
the sites prove unrecoverable (as is increasingly likely as time passes), new reactors on thosesites, will be completed, and the bulk of the power from those reactors routed to the ROK until aunified or substantially joined Korean grid (including a rebuilt DPRK grid) can be developed.
This “with nuclear” overlay is applied to the Sustainable Development and Regional Alternative
paths. A third variant, “Regional Alternative Max Nuclear”, builds an additional three reactors
in the North by 2045, likely under ROK direction and using ROK designs and components.
One further scenario, the “Recent Trends” path, assumes that the DPRK remains largely a closed
economy, but continues to trade with China and others in quantities such that it is able tomaintain its economy at close to current levels, with possible modest improvements in some
sectors. This assumes that the DPRK’s energy infrastructure, in particular its electricity
generation and T&D infrastructure receives just enough investment to keep it from failing, but
not enough to make significantly enhanced supplies of energy services available to the DPRK’s
citizens, at least on average. The Recent Trends case serves as a counterpoint to the scenarios
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above, but is not strictly comparable to them, because it does not produce the same level of
economic activity or energy services.
It is critical to emphasize that the small number of future paths for DPRK energy sector
development considered below are illustrative and are neither intended to be “optimal” or to beconstrued to in any way exhaust the universe of possible energy futures for the DPRK. Future
work can and should explore other possible trajectories for the DPRK economy, preferably inconsultation and in collaboration with Koreans from both sides of the DMZ. Such paths could
and should explore in more detail opportunities to sustainable redevelopment of the DPRK
economy in the context of sustainable development of the nations of the Northeast Asia region asa while, including paths that illustrate ways to get to “net zero” carbon emissions for the DPRK
by 2050. Given that much of the energy and economic infrastructure in the DPRK will likely
need to be upgraded in the event that the DPRK economy is transformed, there may be an
opportunity to make DPRK economic development a model for sustainability, though effectively
seizing that opportunity depends significantly on how the internal and international politicalprocesses underway in and related to the DPRK play out in the coming years.

8.2.

The DPRK Under a Medium-Term "Redevelopment" Pathway and Under
Variants of Same

Below we describe, in a very qualitative way, what a medium-term "Redevelopment" path mightlook like for the DPRK economy and, by extension, for the DPRK energy sector. Thisqualitative sketch is a first step to the estimation of the quantitative attributes of such a path—what the path might mean in terms of future terajoules of energy used and supplied, such as
annual tonnes of coal, and megawatts and megawatt-hours of electricity.
First and foremost, a "Redevelopment" pathway implicitly assumes a major breakthrough in
relations with the ROK, and probably with the United States and other nations as well, resulting
in some investment in the industrial and energy infrastructure in the DPRK from outside thecountry, and much-increased foreign development aid. The "Redevelopment" path also assumes,
however, that the DPRK government essentially maintains its integrity. If the current DPRK
government loses power, rapid reunification of North and South Korea may result, which
probably means very large, very fast changes for the DPRK energy sector, providing that theunified Korea can obtain internal and external financing for infrastructure reconstruction in the
North. Some of these “collapse” scenarios—which the authors of this report stress that we feel
are unlikely—are presented and discussed qualitatively in Chapter 9.
A “Redevelopment” pathway for the DPRK would likely be built upon the following
assumptions:•With some political and economic opening, coupled with increased foreign aid, the DPRK
economy starts to revive in earnest (for example, in 2022)—but note that the structure of theeconomy will almost unquestionably evolve along quite different lines than those prevailingin 1990, as the world’s markets, and the markets that the DPRK will sell and buy from, aremanifestly different in the 2020s than they were in 1990.

•

Industrial production increases, particularly in the lighter industries; and there is increased
demand for transport.
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•There is an increase in household energy use, with trends toward using more electricity,
LPG, and kerosene in homes.

•

There is a considerable increase in commercial sector activity, and a relatively small increasein military sector energy use.811•

Refurbishment of electric transmission and distribution infrastructure takes place, coupledwith refurbishment of existing hydro plants, building of new hydro capacity, the re-startingand expansion of the DPRK's east coast refinery, and partial retirement of coal-fired
electricity generating capacity.

•

Modest improvements in energy efficiency take place.

This pathway, or one very much like it, may in fact be one of the only ways that DPRK
infrastructure can be sufficiently rehabilitated to use within the DPRK even some of the powerfrom commercial-sized nuclear reactors such as those that were being built by KEDO until 2002.
There is at present no way to use 1000 MW-class reactors within the existing DPRK grid,812 soto use such a reactor interties to other countries must be constructed, and preferably, from a
political and practical perspective, the DPRK grid would need to be totally rebuilt as well, either
from the top down or from the bottom up, via establishment of local microgrids (or both). Had
the construction of the KEDO reactors at Sinpo continued, interconnection issues could havebeen both a huge problem that could have led to poor relations between the DPRK and theoutside for years to come, or, if handled correctly, could have constituted a huge opportunity forbuilding of economic links (and better relations) between the countries of the region. If
construction of the LWRs at Sinpo is taken up again in the future, this technical consideration,and its various solutions and non-solutions, will remain. Given the unresolved nature of thevarious nuclear-related issues (nuclear weapons, uranium enrichment, the DPRK’s stated aim
and ongoing program to develop a domestic small light water reactor, and the lingering—
although, in practical terms, dwindling—possibility of resuming work on the large Sinpo LWR
units with ROK or international assistance), we have chosen to leave large nuclear power units
out of the modeling of the Redevelopment path, and also out of the major variant paths described
below. We have, however, also prepared preliminary “with nuclear” paths with nuclear power inthe DPRK at three different levels of nuclear deployment corresponding to the Redevelopment
path and to each of its variants. In those paths, we assume the construction of large (1000 MW)
reactors, with the bulk of the power from those reactors, at least initially, exported directly to the
ROK through a direct tie-line to the larger, stable ROK grid.

811 Depending on the nature of the diplomatic breakthrough—which must, for a redevelopment pathway to begin in earnest,

include a substantial or full relaxation of UNSC sanctions and reciprocal actions from the DPRK—the degree to which a
breakthrough is embraced by the DPRK leadership, and the economic opportunities it offers to North Korean citizens, it isentirely possible that the DPRK armed forces may be partially demobilized, resulting in lower military energy use, althoughprobably offset by greater energy use per soldier due to increased mechanization. Partial demobilization seemed to be underdiscussion in the DPRK as of about 2002, before tensions between the DPRK and the international community rose again during
the United States’ George W. Bush administration.
812 Nuclear safety concerns (back-up power for coolant pumps and controls) and the attributes of a large-capacity nuclear unit
operating in a small power grid (the DPRK grid is far below the minimum size to support the KEDO reactors) are key reasons
why these reactors cannot operate under current conditions. See D. von Hippel et al (2001), "Modernizing the US-DPRK Agreed
Framework: The Energy Imperative", and available as http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/ModernizingAF.pdf, as
referenced earlier in this report.

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8.2.1. Variants on the Redevelopment PathIn the context of collaborative research on regional energy security in Northeast Asia,813 Nautilus
Institute has developed and evaluated alternative paths that provide the same energy services as
the Redevelopment path described (in summary) above, but that incorporate features of energy
efficiency and renewable energy, as well as strengthened regional cooperation in the energy area.
The two main alternative paths evaluated are:•

The “Sustainable Development” Path. This path provides the same energy services as the“Redevelopment” Path—with, for example, the same demographic assumptions, and thesame levels of economic output—but applies energy efficiency, renewable energy, and othermeasures in an aggressive fashion, including upgrading of industrial infrastructure to levels
above average standards to high-efficiency international standards, a rapid phase-out ofexisting coal-fired power plants, and addition of LNG (liquefied natural gas) terminals andgas CC (combined cycle) generating plants.

•

The “Regional Alternative” Path. This path resembles the Sustainable Development path,but as a result of regional cooperation, efficiency improvement targets are reached two years
earlier than in Sustainable Development path, and at costs that are 10 percent lower. In thefuel supply sector, a gas pipeline from the Russian Far East to the DPRK and the ROK
begins operation in 2030, with 10 percent of the pipeline throughput provided for use in
DPRK initially, increasing to 20 percent by 2034, and about 33 percent by 2050, with anassumed doubling of pipeline capacity in 2035. The DPRK receives $20 million per year as“rent” for hosting the pipeline. Also, a larger LNG facility is installed over time than in the
Sustainable Development path—and is again shared with the ROK. A power line from theRussian Far East through the DPRK to the ROK is included in the Regional Alternative path.
Cooperation in renewable energy technologies yields more rapid deployment of thosetechnologies, and a 10 percent reduction in cost of wind and small hydro technologies overtime relative to the Redevelopment path. In the Regional Alternative path, all of the DPRK’s
existing coal-fired plants are retired before 2050.

Some initial results of the evaluation of these three paths are provided below. Note that theseresults have been updated to reflect the updates to the 1990 through 2020 energy balances
described in Chapters 2 and 3 of this report, as well as the updated electricity sector and refined
products analyses in Chapters 5 and 6.
8.2.2. Summary Results, Redevelopment Pathway
Figure 8-2 shows final demand by fuel for the Redevelopment Path. Trends here of note after
2021 include the decrease in the use of biomass fuels, the increase in the use of electricity, thedecrease in coal use after about 2028, and the introduction of more use of liquefied petroleumgas (LPG) and diesel fuel over time. Coal use increases rapidly between 2021 and the early813 In the Asian Energy Security project, and the related and follow-on East Asia Science and Security and Regional Energy

Security (RES) projects, the latter running from 2018 through 2020, collaborating groups of researchers from each of thecountries of Northeast Asia have worked together to research the energy security implications of different energy policy choices,
both within their countries and regionally. See, for example, “East Asia Science and Security Meeting 2010”, at
http://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/science-security/workshops/2010-east-asia-science-and-security-meeting/. In these projects,
the Working Groups all used common modeling software--the LEAP Low Emissions Analysis Platform (formerly the Longrange Energy Alternative Planning system), available from the Stockholm Environment Institute—United States Center (seehttps://www.sei.org/projects-and-tools/tools/leap-long-range-energy-alternatives-planning-system/).

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2030s, as supply restrictions are lifted and existing basic industries are brought back on line tosome extent, but coal use declines after 2035 as households and industries begin switching toother fuels, and a transition away from heavy industry begins. There is an approximately 4.5-foldincrease in petroleum products use between 2021 and 2050, led by gasoline and diesel use in(mostly) the transportation sector, but also by the rise of the use of LPG, in particular, in theresidential sub-sectors, as LPG is substituted for less-convenient-to-use coal in cooking
applications. Diesel use increases in the agricultural sector as agriculture is re-mechanized, andthe use of “non-energy” oil products, especially asphalt (for upgrading the DPRK’s roadinfrastructure), but also lubricants and other specialty products, increase as well.
Figure 8-3 shows final demand by sector, showing the increase, in future years, of consumption
in the transport, public/commercial (commercial/institutional), and residential sectors relative tothe industrial sector. Relative growth in residential sector energy use would appear greater were
it not for the gradual phasing out of biomass use in households.

Figure 8-2: Final Energy Use by Fuel, Redevelopment Case

Final Energy Use by Fuel: Redevelopment Case
1,600
1,400

Million GJ

1,200
1,000

HEAT YBHEAT DISTRICTVEGETAL WASTESFIREWOOD
COKING COALCOKELPGBOTTLED GASDIESELGAS OIL
AVIATION GASNATURAL GASHYDROGENSOLAR
CHARCOALCOAL AVG DOMES.
OTHER PETRO PRODRESIDUALFUELOILKEROSENEJETFUELGASOLINE
ELECTRICITY

800
600
400
200
0

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Figure 8-3: Final Energy Use by Sector, Redevelopment Case

Final Energy Use by Sector: Redevelopment Case
1,600
1,400

Million GJ

1,200

NonEnergy
Public Commercial
Fisheries
Residential
Industrial

Nonspecified
Military
Agricultural
Transport

1,000
800
600
400
200
0

Figure 8-4 shows the trends in demand by sector for electricity under the Redevelopment path.
Electricity use increases by nearly a factor of seven between 2021 and 2050, as, particularly,
households and public/institutional buildings have access to adequate supplies of electricity andare able to purchase new electricity-using devices and enjoy higher levels of electricity-related
energy services.

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Figure 8-4: Electricity Use by Sector, Redevelopment Case

Final Electricity Use by Sector: Redevelopment Case
80
70
60

TWh

50

Public Commercial
Fisheries
Residential
Industrial

Military
Agricultural
Transport

40
30

20
10
0

Figure 8-5 shows the pattern of coal use by sector, including coking coal used in steelmaking,under the Redevelopment case. Although coal use never returns to 1990 levels, and does decline
slowly starting in the mid-2030s, considerable coal is still used in the DPRK economy, includingin the residential sector, as of 2050, underscoring the need for DPRK leadership and international
cooperation to focus on reduction of coal use in the DPRK if national and international climate
goals are to be met.

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Figure 8-5: Coal Use by Sector, Redevelopment Case

Final Coal Use by Sector: Redevelopment Case
1,000
900
800

Millon GJ

700
600
500

Industrial Coking Coal
Public Commercial
Military
Fisheries
Agricultural
Residential
Industrial

400
300
200

100
0

Figure 8-6 and Figure 8-7 show, respectively, the changing patterns of electricity generation
capacity and of output by type of generator in the Redevelopment path. Other than hydroelectric
generation, renewable energy plays a relatively small role in electricity production, despite theaddition of 3 GW of solar PV capacity (and 300 MW of wind power) by 2050, even as the
economy redevelops. Existing and some new hydro remains a significant, though declining,
portion of total capacity through 2050, but constitutes a smaller portion of output due to thelimited capacity factor of hydro facilities (due to seasonal variations in water supply). As older
coal plants are phased out, new coal plants and new gas combined cycle plants (fueled withLPG) are brought online, constituting a significant share of capacity, and a larger share ofelectricity output, by 2050. The projections of capacity of and output from older coal-fired
power plants can be thought of as implicitly requiring significant rebuilding over time, as theexisting coal-fired plants cannot be expected to continue to provide power at significant levels
otherwise.

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Figure 8-6: Generation Capacity by Generator Type, Redevelopment Case
Generation Capacity Summary: Redevelopment Path
30,00025,000

Megawatts

20,000Tidal Generators
Solar PV Utility
Diesel Generators
Wind Offshore
LPG Gas Combined_Cycle
Small Modular Nuclear
Nuclear Simpo PWRs
New Small Hydro
Existing Hydro
Expanded Oil fired
IGCC
Existing Coal

Solar PV Community
Gasoline Generators
Electr from the RFE
Wind Onshore
Gas Combined_Cycle
Additional Large Nuclear
Experimental LWR_Yongbyon
New Med_Large Hydroelectric
Oil Combined_Cycle
Existing Oil fired
New Coal Plants

15,00010,0005,000

01990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023 2026 2029 2032 2035 2038 2041 2044 2047 2050

Figure 8-7: Electricity Output by Generator Type, Redevelopment Case
Electricity Output Summary: Redevelopment Path
90
80
70

TWh

60
50

Tidal Generators
Solar PV Utility
Diesel Generators
Wind Offshore
LPG Gas Combined_Cycle
Small Modular Nuclear
Nuclear Simpo PWRs
New Small Hydro
Existing Hydro
Expanded Oil fired
IGCC
Existing Coal

Solar PV Community
Gasoline Generators
Electr from the RFE
Wind Onshore
Gas Combined_Cycle
Additional Large Nuclear
Experimental LWR_Yongbyon
New Med_Large Hydroelectric
Oil Combined_Cycle
Existing Oil fired
New Coal Plants

40
30
20
10

0
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023 2026 2029 2032 2035 2038 2041 2044 2047 2050

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8.2.3. Sustainable Development Path Results
The “Sustainable Development” path is an illustration of the potential impacts of applying a
selected set of demand-side energy efficiency measures across the sectors, together withexpanded deployment of renewable energy systems (in this case, renewable electricity generation
options, particularly solar PV but also wind power). As such, it is designed to provide the same“energy services” (lighting, heating, cooking, transport, and industrial output, for example) as the
Redevelopment case, but in a different way. Figure 8-8 and Figure 8-9 show final energy use by
sector and fuel, respectively, in the Sustainable Development path. Here, overall energy use
rises quickly after 2021, but then plateaus and begins to fall as the increased use of energy
services is more than offset by the aggressive application of energy efficiency measures. In
addition, there is a stronger transition to electricity and gas use than in the Redevelopment path,
including more electricity use in the transportation sector. Both lower energy use because
electricity can be used much more efficiently than combustion fuels for most end uses undermost conditions (heating in cold weather being a possible exception), and gas can be burnedmore efficiently than coal or biomass. The direct use of solar energy, in the form of solar water
heating, also plays a role by 2050 in the residential subsectors (both urban and rural) and to asmaller extent in the public/commercial sector. Note that in both Figure 8-8 and Figure 8-9 theuppermost wedge (white with grey dots) shows the difference in final fuel use between the
Sustainable Development case and the Redevelopment path increasing over time after 2021,
ultimately showing nearly a 37 percent decrease in annual fuel use in 2050. It is quite possible,
however, that an aggressively applied combination of energy efficiency options, fuel switching,
and well thought-out structural changes in the DPRK economy could drive final energy use
down even further than indicated in the Sustainable Development case.

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Figure 8-8: Final Energy Use by Sector, Sustainable Development Case

Final Energy Use by Sector: Sustainable Development Case
1,600
1,400

Million GJ

1,200

Avoided vs. RDV Case
Nonspecified
Military
Agricultural
Transport

NonEnergy
Public Commercial
Fisheries
Residential
Industrial

1,000
800
600
400
200
0

Figure 8-9: Final Energy Use by Fuel, Sustainable Development Case
Final Energy Use by Fuel: Sustainable Development Case
1,600

1,400

Million GJ

1,200
1,000

Avoided vs. RDV Case
HYDROGENSOLAR
CHARCOALCOAL AVG DOMES.
OTHER PETRO PRODRESIDUALFUELOILKEROSENEJETFUELGASOLINE
ELECTRICITYHEAT YBHEAT DISTRICTVEGETAL WASTESFIREWOOD
COKING COALCOKELPGBOTTLED GASDIESELGAS OIL
AVIATION GASNATURAL GAS

800
600

400
200
0

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Figure 8-10 shows the trends in demand by sector for electricity under the Sustainable
Development Redevelopment path. Electricity use increases by a factor of about 4.5 between
2021 and 2050, but that is significantly less than in the Redevelopment case, even though there issubstantially more fuel switching to electric drive in the transport sector and in the military
sector (the latter mostly for medium-sized trucks and boats/ships). As in the RDV case,particularly, households and public/institutional buildings have access to adequate supplies ofelectricity, are able to purchase new electricity-using devices and enjoy higher levels ofelectricity-related energy services, but energy efficiency improvements throughout the economy
make it possible to do so with substantially lower supplies of electricity than in the RDV case.
This is significant because it makes it possible to produce the needed electricity at lower cost(including fuel and investment costs) and with more reliance on renewable and other clean fuels,
as described below.
Figure 8-10: Electricity Use by Sector, Sustainable Development Case

50

TWh

45

Final Electricity Use by Sector: Sustainable
Development Case
Public Commercial

Military

Fisheries

Agricultural

40

Residential

Transport

35

Industrial

30
25
20
15
10
5
0

Figure 8-11 show that the changes included in the Sustainable Development case have the effect,in aggregate, of decreasing coal use by 2050 by more than two thirds relative to the
Redevelopment case, from about 587 PJ to about 191 PJ. Given the recent pace with which coaluse has been declining in many nations (albeit particularly for electricity generation) it is not
impossible to think that a concerted effort could reduce coal use in the DPRK by 2050 even morethan the results of this path suggest.

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Figure 8-11: Coal Use by Sector, Sustainable Development Case

1,000

900
800

Final Coal Use by Sector: Sustainable Development
Case
Coking Coal Avoided vs. RDV
Industrial/Coking Coal
Military
Agricultural
Industrial/Average Coal

Average Coal Avoided vs. RDV
Public Commercial
Fisheries
Residential

Millon GJ

700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0

Figure 8-12 provides a summary of the pattern of electricity generation capacity overtime for the Sustainable Development path. 814 The Sustainable Development path provides amore diverse set of generation resources, by 2050, than the Redevelopment path, and despite
including more renewable generation (wind and particularly solar) that feature, by their nature,
lower maximum capacity factors than conventional generation, the overall requirement forcapacity is about 650 MW (about 2.6 percent) less, by 2050, than in the Redevelopment path, asa consequence of enhanced demand-side efficiency. The Sustainable Development path also
features a more rapid phase-out of existing coal-fired power plants. The Regional Alternative
path shows a similar pattern to the Sustainable Development path, but also includes two large
additions to capacity representing power from a tie-line to the Russian Far East, though much of
the power transmitted through that line would be destined for the ROK, not for the North
Korean, grid.

814 Note that both Figure 8-12 and Figure 8-14 assume that commercial-scale nuclear generation capacity in the DPRK (forexample, the reactors at Sinpo that were being constructed under the 1994 Agreed Framework) is not completed, though we have
prepared variants of these paths that do include nuclear generation, starting operation in approximately 2030, which is probably
the very earliest that a plant could possibly come on line given the international situation as of 2021 and the typical recent leadtimes for nuclear reactor construction. The exclusion of nuclear plants from each of these cases should be considered one ofmany possible variants in each case, but at present, possibly the more likely variant.

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Figure 8-12: Trends in Electricity Generation Capacity Expansion, Sustainable Development
Path
Generation Capacity Summary: Sustainable Development Path
30,00025,000

Megawatts

20,000Tidal Generators
Gasoline Generators
Wind Offshore
Gas Combined_Cycle
Nuclear Simpo PWRs
New Med_Large Hydroelectric
Expanded Oil fired
New Coal Plants

Solar PV Community
Diesel Generators
Wind Onshore
Small Modular Nuclear
Experimental LWR_Yongbyon
Existing Hydro
Existing Oil fired
Existing Coal

Solar PV Utility
Electr from the RFE
LPG Gas Combined_Cycle
Additional Large Nuclear
New Small Hydro
Oil Combined_Cycle
IGCC

15,00010,0005,000

01990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023 2026 2029 2032 2035 2038 2041 2044 2047 2050

8.2.4. Regional Alternative Path Results
The pattern of energy demand by sector in the Regional Alternative case, as shown in Figure
8-13, is very similar to that in the Sustainable Development path, with a shift to lower overall use
slightly earlier in time (about one to two years) by the 2030s and 2040s, based on the assumptionthat regional cooperation accelerates the deployment of energy efficiency and renewable energy
measures in the DPRK. This somewhat earlier introduction of demand-side technologies yields a
difference between demand in the Regional Alternative case and the Redevelopment case by
2050 of than 38.5 percent, and thus slightly more savings than shown in the Sustainable
Development case. An assumption of a more aggressive program of getting energy efficiency
and other relevant technologies (including electric vehicles) into the DPRK from nations of theregion, for example, through technology transfer programs that lower the cost of high-efficiency
devices and equipment in the DPRK and create opportunities for the development of new
manufacturing in the DPRK (and foreign investment in same), would accelerate energy
efficiency deployment and result in lower fuel use earlier and lower overall fuel use by 2050 thanshown here.

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Figure 8-13: Final Energy Use by Sector in the Regional Alternative Case

Final Energy Use by Sector: Regional Alternative Case
1,600
1,400

Million GJ

1,200

1,000

Avoided vs. Redevelopment Case
NonEnergy
Nonspecified
Public Commercial
Military
Fisheries
Agricultural
Residential

800
600
400
200
0

Figure 8-14 shows the pattern of electricity generation capacity over time for the Regional
Alternative path. The Regional Alternative path allows a somewhat faster phase-out of existing(although, by the 2040s, likely refurbished) DPRK coal-fired capacity, leaving only an IGCC
unit using coal by 2050. The Regional Alternative path includes more gas-fired capacity than in
the Sustainable Development path, mostly as an artifact of the way that electricity generation ismodeled in the DPRK LEAP dataset, but gas-fired and LPG-fired combined-cycle units are notused as much (have a lower capacity factor) in the Regional Alternative Path, due to theadditional renewable generation capacity and the use of a portion of the power from theinterconnection with the Russian Far East to meet DPRK domestic needs. Figure 8-15 shows anillustrative routing of a transmission line from the southern part of the Russian Far East, largely
following the east coast of the DPRK before heading across the southern DPRK to intersect the
ROK border near Seoul. This routing would be on the order of 650 km, including an adder of
10 percent from the linear route as measured on the map. The transmission line is modeled as if
the DPRK were the owner of the line, having borrowed money to build it from an international(in practice, likely private/public) consortium, and in effect purchases power coming from theRussian Far East (though in practice, possibly routed in part from elsewhere, such as Mongolia),
and sells it to the ROK at a price that allows it to recoup the payments for the line itself plus
additional “rent” for hosting the line. In practice, the financing and ownership, and sales
arrangements associated with such as power line could involve many different countries andinstitutions, and will be a matter for detailed negotiations between parties in the region (andoutside of it).

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Figure 8-14: Trends in Electricity Generation Capacity Expansion, Regional Alternative Path
Generation Capacity Summary: Regional Alternative Path
45

40
35

Megawatts

30
25

Tidal Generators
Solar PV Utility
Diesel Generators
Wind Offshore
LPG Gas Combined_Cycle
Small Modular Nuclear
Nuclear Simpo PWRs
New Small Hydro
Existing Hydro
Expanded Oil fired
IGCC
Existing Coal

Solar PV Community
Gasoline Generators
Electr from the RFE
Wind Onshore
Gas Combined_Cycle
Additional Large Nuclear
Experimental LWR_Yongbyon
New Med_Large Hydroelectric
Oil Combined_Cycle
Existing Oil fired
New Coal Plants

20
15
10
5
0
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023 2026 2029 2032 2035 2038 2041 2044 2047 2050

Figure 8-15: Illustrative Route of Transmission Line through the DPRK in Regional
Alternative Path (Image from Google Earth Pro, with approximate transmission line routing
authors’ assumption)

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8.3.

Implications of a “Recent Trends” Path for the DPRK Energy Sector

Figure 8-16 shows fuel use by sector in the Recent Trends case. This case is very different inconcept than the Sustainable Development or Regional Alternative cases, as the Recent Trends
case provides a standard of living and economic output by 2050 only slightly improved from thatprevailing in 2020, but the overall energy consumed by 2050 is not very different than in the
Sustainable Development case, mostly because the Recent Trends case continues to use
inefficient demand-side devices, and continues to rely on coal and biomass, which provide lessusable energy per unit of fuel consumed (see Figure 8-17).
Following the trend of fuels use in general, electricity generation in the Recent Trends case rises
only modestly after 2020, as the additions of relatively small amounts of hydro and coal-fired
capacity, as well as some continued increase in small distributed solar PV systems and diesel andgas generators for businesses and households, combine with maintenance activities that keep
older power plants running at closer to the rates we estimate for recent years (Figure 8-18 and
Figure 8-19).
Figure 8-16: Final Energy Use by Sector in Recent Trends Path

Final Energy Use by Sector: Recent Trends Case
1,600
1,400

Million GJ

1,200
1,000

NonEnergy

Nonspecified

Public Commercial

Military

Fisheries

Agricultural

Residential

Transport

Industrial

800
600
400

200
0

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Figure 8-17: Final Energy Use by Fuel in Recent Trends Path

Final Energy Use by Fuel: Recent Trends Case
1,600
1,400

Million GJ

1,200
1,000
800

HEAT YBHEAT DISTRICTVEGETAL WASTESFIREWOOD
COKING COALCOKELPGBOTTLED GASDIESELGAS OIL
AVIATION GASNATURAL GASHYDROGENSOLAR
CHARCOALCOAL AVG DOMES.
OTHER PETRO PRODRESIDUALFUELOILKEROSENEJETFUELGASOLINE
ELECTRICITY

600
400
200

0

Figure 8-18: Electricity Output by Plant Type in Recent Trends Path
Electricity Output Summary: Recent Trends Path
50
45
40
35

TWh

30

Tidal Generators

Solar PV Community

Solar PV Utility

Gasoline Generators

Diesel Generators

Electr from the RFE

Wind Offshore

Wind Onshore

LPG Gas Combined_Cycle

Gas Combined_Cycle

Small Modular Nuclear

Additional Large Nuclear

Nuclear Simpo PWRs

Experimental LWR_Yongbyon

New Small Hydro

New Med_Large Hydroelectric

Existing Hydro

Oil Combined_Cycle

Expanded Oil fired

Existing Oil fired

IGCC

New Coal Plants

Existing Coal

25
20
15
10
5
0
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023 2026 2029 2032 2035 2038 2041 2044 2047 2050

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Figure 8-19: Electricity Generation Capacity by Plant Type in Recent Trends Path
Generation Capacity Summary: Recent Trends Path
12,00010,000

Megawatts

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

Tidal Generators
Gasoline Generators
Wind Offshore
Gas Combined_Cycle
Nuclear Simpo PWRs
New Med_Large Hydroelectric
Expanded Oil fired
New Coal Plants

Solar PV Community
Diesel Generators
Wind Onshore
Small Modular Nuclear
Experimental LWR_Yongbyon
Existing Hydro
Existing Oil fired
Existing Coal

Solar PV Utility
Electr from the RFE
LPG Gas Combined_Cycle
Additional Large Nuclear
New Small Hydro
Oil Combined_Cycle
IGCC

1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 2020 2023 2026 2029 2032 2035 2038 2041 2044 2047 2050

8.4.

Comparisons between DPRK Energy Futures Paths

Figure 8-20 compares electricity use over time in the three paths evaluated, as well as in the“Recent Trends” path where a solution to the current impasse over the DPRK’s nuclear program
is not found, and large-scale economic redevelopment in the DPRK does not occur. Note that
due to the aggressive implementation of energy efficiency measures, the consumption ofelectricity (and thus the need for power generation facilities) is less, by 2050, in the Sustainable
Development and Regional Alternative paths (net of the capacity of the interconnection to theRussian Far East and the ROK), relative to the Redevelopment Path, even with the incorporationof more low-capacity-factor renewable power sources.

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Figure 8-20: Total Electricity Use by PathDPRK Total Final Electricity Use by Path
80
70

Recent Trends Case
Redevelopment Case

60

TWh

50

Sustainable Development
Regional Alternative_Total

40
30
20
10
0
1990 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

A result of aggressive energy efficiency and renewable energy implementation in the Sustainable
Development and Regional Alternative Paths is that air pollutant emissions (including carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases from the energy sector, as shown in Figure 8-21) are much
lower in those paths by 2050. In addition, due to the efficiency gains, fuel switching to natural
gas and electricity from coal use, and the substantial phase-out of coal from electricity
generation, greenhouse gas emissions in the Sustainable Development and Regional Alternative
cases are actually less by about 2040 and on, than emissions in the Recent Trends case, which
provides much less in the way of economic output and services to the DPRK populace.

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Figure 8-21: Total Carbon Dioxide Equivalent Emissions for Four Future Paths815

Global Warming Potential by Case
160
140

Million Tonnes CO2 Equiv.

Recent Trends Case120

Sustainable Development
Redevelopment Case100

Regional Alternative_Total

80
60

40

2050

2048

2046

2044

2042

2040

2038

2036

2034

2032

2030

2028

2026

2024

2022

2020

2018

2016

2014

2012

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

1998

1994

0

1990

20

In addition, the energy efficiency and fuel switching in the Sustainable Development andRegional Alternative paths markedly reduce emissions of local and regional air pollutants
relative to the Redevelopment case. For the Regional Alternative path, emissions, for example,
emissions of carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides, and nitrogen oxides are estimated to be less thanhalf that in in the Redevelopment case by 2050 (see Table 8-1 and Table 8-2).
Table 8-1: Estimated Local and Regional Pollutant Emissions, Regional Alternative Case
SUMMARY TABLE OF ESTIMATED EMISSIONS, REGIONAL ALTERNATIVE CASE (Thousand tonnes)
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
2050
Carbon Dioxide (Fossil Sources)
132,565
35,76538,56637,85470,46358,056
36,688Carbon Monoxide
1,610
1,040
1,170
1,106
1,043
657
392
Methane
778
248
331
326
547
383
188
Non-Methane Hydrocarbons
189
116
131
123
120
85
59
Nitrogen Oxides
499
132
160
135
222
198
112
Nitrous Oxide
2.4
1.0
1.1
1.0
1.2
1.0
0.6
Sulfur Oxides
1,414
380
404
403
653
472
235

815 Global Warming Potential is a measure of how the radiative forcing of air pollutant emissions with direct or indirect impacts

on climate compare, on a per unit basis, to that of Carbon Dioxide (CO2). As such, it allows the tonnes of emissions of different
pollutants to be totaled within a common metric, but CO2 dominates the total.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 8-2: Estimated Local and Regional Pollutant Emissions, Redevelopment Case
SUMMARY TABLE OF ESTIMATED EMISSIONS, REDEVELOPMENT CASE (Thousand tonnes)
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
2040
Carbon Dioxide (Fossil Sources)
132,565
35,76538,56637,854
99,996 127,151
Carbon Monoxide
1,610
1,040
1,170
1,106
1,333
1,237
Methane
778
248
331
326
818
1,009
Non-Methane Hydrocarbons
189
116
131
123
152
149
Nitrogen Oxides
499
132
160
135
358
547
Nitrous Oxide
2.4
1.0
1.1
1.0
1.8
2.3
Sulfur Oxides
1,414
380
404
403
879
1,115

2050
123,077
1,061
775
134
555
2.2
955

Though costs on the demand side (for higher-efficiency equipment) are higher than in the
Sustainable Development and Regional Alternative Paths than in the Redevelopment Path,offsetting savings in the transformation sector (mostly due to the reduced need for electricity
generation capacity and coal mining, for example) and in resources (avoided fuel production andimports) mean that the Sustainable Development path is only slightly more expensive than the
Redevelopment Path from and internal DPRK social cost point of view, and the Regional
Alternative Paths is less expensive than the Redevelopment Path, overall, even before any credits
are taken for avoided environmental impacts, as shown in Figure 8-22.
The Sustainable Development Path would in fact be less expensive than the Redevelopment Pathbut for the assumption in the former is that coal exports are phased out much more rapidly in the
Sustainable Development Path, while continuing for longer and at a higher level in the
Redevelopment Path. This assumption results in less resource income for the DPRK, as theexports in the Sustainable Development Path to the ROK of natural gas from the LNG terminal
developed in the DPRK are less lucrative than coal exports due to a lower assumed price markup
for imported LNG relative to the markup over costs of production for coal exported. Even
under these assumptions, however, the Sustainable Development path’s net cost relative to the
Redevelopment path results in a net discounted cost for avoided DPRK greenhouse gas
emissions of about $2.3/tonne CO2 equivalent, which was, for example on the order of 14
percent of the price at which carbon allowances were trading on the Korea Exchange as ofFebruary 10, 2021, and as such, a relative bargain as an investment in greenhouse gas control,
even without taking advantages of significant opportunities for cost optimization.816
Relative to the Redevelopment Path, the Regional Alternative Path features a modest reduction(10 percent) in the cost of demand-side energy efficiency measures, savings in (for example)
electricity and coal production, resource costs for avoided fuel imports and production, plus net
income from sales of electricity from a line from the Russian Far East to the ROK and of gas to
the ROK derived from a pipeline from the RFE and from LNG terminals in the DPRK. Thesechanges combine to make the net social costs within the DPRK of the Regional Alternative pathsignificantly less, by $17 billion on an NPV basis through 2050, than the Redevelopment Path,

816 Korea Exchange (2021), “[50101] Daily / Closing price”, accessed at

http://global.krx.co.kr/contents/GLB/05/0506/0506030102/GLB0506030102.jsp on 2-12-2021, showed a price for carbon on theemissions trading system of about 19,000 ROK Won per tonne CO2 equivalent, or about USD 17 per tonne.

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while also reducing year 2050 greenhouse gas emissions in the DPRK by more than a factor ofthree, and by over 1.6 billion tonnes over 2020-2050.817
Figure 8-22: Social Cost Comparison of Three Future Paths

Cost (NPV, 2020-2050) Relative to Redevelopment Case
Million USD (Net Present Value)$10,000$5,000$0($5,000)($10,000)
Sustainable Development Case($15,000)
Regional Alternative Case($20,000)($25,000)

DemandTransformation

Resources

Total Net Costs

It should be emphasized again that the small number of future paths for DPRK energy sector
development considered here are illustrative, and not intended to be “optimal” by any particular
standard, so that there are many other paths that can and should be explored for the DPRK.
Examples might include paths to get to “net zero” carbon emissions by 2050, similar to thoserecently published for the United States (for example).818
817 In modeling the Regional Alternative and Sustainable Development Paths it was assumed that the shared infrastructure

include—LNG terminals, and gas pipelines and electricity transmission lines passing through DPRK territory, would be owned
and paid for by the DPRK, and the gas and electricity passing through them would effectively be purchased by the DPRK andsold at a higher price—about 10 percent—to the ROK to pay for a combination of the costs of owning and operating theinfrastructure plus some “rent” to the DPRK for hosting the facilities. In practice, a number of other financing options are
possible, including that the cost of the infrastructure was paid though some sort of international consortium or by an ROK
company, with the DPRK receiving payments of some kind for hosting the facilities.
818 See, for example, James H. Williams, Ryan A. Jones, Ben Haley, Gabe Kwok, Jeremy Hargreaves, Jamil Farbes, andMargaret S. Torn (2021), “Carbon‐Neutral Pathways for the United States”, AGU Advances, first published 14 January 2021, andavailable as https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1029/2020AV000284. Several other studies on of “net-zero” or“carbon-neutral” pathways for the United States and other nations have also been published recently, including a U.S. National
Academies study reported on by John Fialka (2021), “New Report Maps Out the U.S. Road to Net-Zero Emissions” E&E News,

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8.5.

Energy Security Comparison of Future DPRK Paths

Three of the paths described as above—the Redevelopment path, the Sustainable Development
path, and the Regional Alternative path—offer roughly the same energy services and economic
development for the DPRK populace, and thus can reasonably be compared in terms of theirenergy security attributes. Below we apply the framework sketched out in previous work ontechniques for energy security analysis by the authors and our colleagues to weigh the relative
benefits and costs of the three paths.819 Before doing so, however, consideration must be given
to the perspective from which the comparison is made. Looking at even the broad suite ofenergy security attributes in our framework from the perspective of the DPRK’s leadership(assumed, for the sake of this analysis, to be a continuation of the Kim regime), may yield quite
different results from those prepared from the perspective of the international community. In
considering the perspective of the DPRK’s leadership, we acknowledge that there are, in fact, anumber of different factions within the DPRK with different points of view, aspirations, andgoals.820 And further, indeed, the “international community can hardly be considered amonolithic bloc, though the agendas of the DPRK’s neighbors and others, notably the UnitedStates, are in at least some cases (and probably increasingly, for at least Japan and the ROK,with respect to the US, since the change in US administrations in January 2020), arguably betteraligned with each other than with the DPRK, at least where interactions with the DPRK areconcerned. As such, in the remainder of this section we evaluate the merits of the Sustainable
Development and Regional Alternative paths relative to the Redevelopment path with regard toeach of the six energy security dimensions included in our framework, attempting to take thebroad perspectives of A) the DPRK’s leadership, and B) the international community, meaning
the DPRK’s neighbors and their allies.

dated February 5, 2021, and available as https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/new-report-maps-out-the-u-s-road-to-netzero-emissions/.
819 The analytical framework for comparing the energy security costs and benefits of future energy paths was developed startingwith work done as part of the Nautilus Institute’s “Pacific Asia Regional Energy Security” project, including a summary of the
PARES energy security analysis approach published earlier (see https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/pacific-asia-regionalenergy-security-1997-1998/), and developed in related articles, as well as articles published in an Asian Energy Security Special
Issue of the journal Energy Policy. See, for example, Hayes, P. and D. von Hippel (2006), “Energy Security in Northeast Asia,”
Global Asia 1(1): 91–105; von Hippel, D. F., T. Suzuki, J. H. Williams, T. Savage, and P. Hayes. 2011. “Energy Security andSustainability in Northeast Asia,” Asian Energy Security Special Issue of Energy Policy, Volume 39, Issue 11, November 2011,
Pages 6719-6730 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.001); and von Hippel, D. F., T. Savage, and P. Hayes. 2011.
“Introduction to the Asian Energy Security Project: Project Organization and Methodologies,” Asian Energy Security Special
Issue of Energy Policy, Volume 39, Issue 11, November 2011, Pages 6712-6718 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2008.01.010).
This approach has also been described in Chapter 3 of the Routledge Handbook of Energy Security, “Evaluating the Energy
Security Impacts of Energy Policies”, by David F. von Hippel, Tatsujiro Suzuki, James H. Williams, Timothy Savage, and Peter
Hayes, dated December, 2010, and available from https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203834602.ch3.
Note that an updated version of the Routledge Handbook and of the Chapter is currently in process (as of 2020).
820 See, for example, the discussion “What Does the DPRK Want?” in David von Hippel and Peter Hayes (2009), DPRK Energy
Sector Assistance to Accompany Progress in Denuclearization Discussions: Options and Considerations, prepared for the project“Improving Regional Security and Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula: U.S. Policy Interests and Options”, dated October 2009,
and available as http://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/Hipple_and_Hayes_DPRK_Energy_Assistance.pdf.

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8.5.1. Energy Supply Dimension
The Sustainable Development (SDV) and Regional Alternative (RALT) paths offer, by 2050,
lower annual energy demand, primary energy use, and net imports, and more diversity by fueltype, than in the Redevelopment (RDV) path (see Table 8-3). Although our paths evaluation
does not explicitly track the geographic source of all fuel imports to the DPRK, thus rendering
impossible the quantitative calculation of a diversification index by supplier, it is virtually certainthat the SDV path and, particularly the RALT path would show a more diversified portfolio ofenergy suppliers than the RDV path, in which energy supplies from China, and to a lesser
degree, Russia, would likely continue to dominate, though the fraction of the DPRK’s energy
imports from China seems likely to decline over time (as overall energy use expands). We do
not explicitly track stocks of fuels in the energy paths, as it is difficult to know the full extent of
the DPRK’s stocks (particularly of oil products) to begin with,821 but it seems likely that theSDV and particularly the RALT scenarios, with their greater diversity of fuel types andinfrastructure, such as LNG terminals, will offer a higher ratio of stored fuel to imports than the
RDV scenario.

821 Although it does not attempt to estimate the stocks of crude oil and oil products that the DPRK is currently holding, thefollowing report provides an estimate of the potential volume of oil storage tanks in the DPRK: David von Hippel, Peter Hayes(2020), Estimate of Oil Storage Capacity in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, NAPSNet Special Reports, August 25,
2020, available as https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/estimate-of-oil-storage-capacity-in-the-democraticpeoples-republic-of-korea/.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 8-3: Energy Supply (and Demand) Dimension of Energy Security Comparison of DPRK
Paths
Energy Supply
Dimension
Measure/Attribute

Annual 2050 Values
Relative to RDV

Implications of Values Relative to RDV from the
Perspective of:

SDV Path

DPRK Leadership

RALT
Path

International Community

Total Energy Demand-385 PJ-405 PJ

Lower = better

Lower = better (butindirectly)

Primary Energy Use-661 PJ-587 PJ

Lower = better

Lower = better (butindirectly)

Fraction of Primary
Energy as Imports(net of Exports)

31.0%
(RDV
5.1%)

29.6%
(RDV
5.1%)

Higher = Worse (moreexposure to cost risk)

Mixed (Lower has betteroverall implications, buthigher offers leverage)

Diversification Index(by fuel category,
primary energy)

0.21 (RDV
0.55)

0.21 (RDV
0.55)

Lower = better

Indifferent, except withregard to indirect impacts
such as on the environment
and the regional economy

Diversification Index(by supplier, key fueltypes)

Lower

Lower
(and lower
than SDV)

Lower = better

Mixed (Lower spreads risk
among nations, but higher
offers more leverage forindividual nations)

Stocks as a fraction ofimports (key fuels)

LikelyHigherLikelyHigher = better
Higher(andhigher than
SDV)

Mixed (higher improves
regional situation, but
provides less leverage inthe event of conflict)

From the perspective of the DPRK’s leadership, lower energy primary and final energy demand,and particularly lower electricity and petroleum products demand, would seem preferable, as
leadership would see less of a burden of supplying fuels to the DPRK economy. Lower
diversification indices (indicating more diversity of supply) would also likely be preferable to the
DPRK’s leadership, as the DPRK’s dependence on any individual fuel or supplier, and thus theinfluence that any given supplier or country might have over the DPRK, would be attenuated.
From the perspective of the international community as a whole, higher or lower DPRK energy
demand is probably not of great concern in and of itself directly, though lower energy use
implies lower environmental impacts, including impacts that cross national boundaries. The
major exception here is likely to be the ROK. If one presumes that one day the Koreas will again
be united, either officially or de facto, it will be much easier for the ROK to integrate into its
economy a DPRK that has a modern, efficient energy supply and demand infrastructure than one
that features a haphazard mix of new, older, and derelict equipment. For the international
community, a DPRK that uses more different fuels and suppliers both spreads any risk of conflict
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKover energy trades with the DPRK over more nations—which would likely be considered a goodthing—but on the other hand could make it harder for the international community to reachconsensus on actions restricting energy trade should the DPRK fail to follow up on commitments
related to its nuclear weapons program. In addition, the interconnected energy infrastructureelements of the RALT path would improve the energy supply diversity, and thus perceived
energy supply security, of neighboring individual countries, probably most notably the ROK.
8.5.2. Economic Dimension
As a result of the emphasis on end-use efficiency and renewable energy, the SDV andRALT paths offer significantly lower total energy system costs, lower fuel costs overall, andlower imported fuel cost (net of the value of fuel exported) than in the RDV path (see Table 8-4).
It is likely that the DPRK leadership would see these lower costs as beneficial, as more hardcurrency could be used for other priorities. From the perspective of the international community,
the implications of these lower costs are likely to be mixed, but modest. For example, lower fuelcosts might enhance the competitiveness of the DPRK in certain industries (though other barriers
to DPRK competitiveness are likely much higher), resulting in (marginally) increased
competition for some industries in some nations, while on the other hand lower fuelconsumption, particularly of traded fuels, could lower regional prices of some energy products,
though this effect would be tiny due to the DPRK’s small market relative to other nations in theregion.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKTable 8-4:: Economic Dimension of Energy Security Comparison of DPRK Paths
Economic
Dimension
Measure/Attribute

Present Value 2020
through 2050 Relative
to RDV (2020 USD)

Implications of Values Relative to RDV from the
Perspective of:

SDV Path

RALT
Path

DPRK Leadership

Total Net Energy
System Internal Costs+$3.6 B-$16.5 B

Lower = better

Indifferent (except in how
differences in DPRK
expenditures for specificgoods are affected)

Total Net Resource
Costs+$6.1 B-$19.9 B

Lower = better

Import Fuel Costs

HigherHigherLower = better

Largely indifferent(Reduced or increased
DPRK demand likely tohave a negligible impact onregional prices, which are
driven by demand frommuch larger economies)

Economic and
Employment Impactof Fuel Price Increase

Additional diversity infuel types and sources
helps insulate economy
from increases in prices
of individual fuels

Lower = better

Improvement in DPRK
economic stability in theface of price increases
would likely be seen as apositive

Economic and
Employment Impact
of difference between
paths

Mixed, for example,
coal mining sector
lower, high-tech higher.
In RALT, construction
higher (pipelines,
powerlines)

Mixed: implications
depend on politicalpower of individual
groups affected

Probably positive, in that
SDV and RALT paths willbring more North Koreansin contact with foreigners
than RDV path

International Community

Reduced fuels demand, and thus costs, for domestically consumed fuels in the SDV and RALT
paths, together with a greater diversity of energy sources in those paths, would likely render the
DPRK economy less sensitive to price increases for individual fuels, which would be seen as abenefit by the DPRK leadership. Reduced fuel demand and increased diversity of fuel use would
also, though indirectly, be seen as a benefit by the international community, which would preferto see a more economically resilient DPRK, assuming that it was a DPRK that was also notthreatening other nations. The SDV and RALT paths shift outputs between some DPRK
industrial sectors, relative to the RDV path. For example, coal production would be decreased,
the use of renewable fuels increased, and trades that worked on regional energy infrastructure—
LNG terminals, gas pipelines, and transmission lines—would also benefit. The degree to whichthese changes would be perceived as positive by the DPRK leadership would depend upon which
industries are more influential with DPRK leadership. The international community would
probably see the shifts in economic emphasis under the SDV and RALT plans as a positive, asboth, and particularly the RALT plan, offer more opportunities for teachers, engineers,technicians, and officials from outside the DPRK to engage with DPRK actors.
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

8.5.3. Technological Dimension
Table 8-5 provides our assessment of the relative merits of the SDV and RALT paths from atechnological risk point of view. In general, the SDV and RALT provide greater diversity interms of new technologies used (though this difference is not much reflected in the indices inTable 8-5, which do not distinguish between new and older technologies), which would probably
be considered a benefit by DPRK leadership, but also offer some exposure to technologies withwhich the DPRK is not familiar. From the perspective of the international community, the
DPRK’s technological choices per se are probably not a large issue in a direct sense, though they
may be of concern for other reasons, such as environmental risk or risk of nuclear weapons
proliferation. The SDV path, with its greater diversity of technologies, is likely to improve the
DPRK’s adaptability to climate change risk or other stresses, though the addition of large
regional infrastructure in the RALT case might arguably reduce the DPRK’s ability to adapt toconditions favoring different energy technologies.
Table 8-5: Technological Dimension of Energy Security Comparison of DPRK Paths
Technological
Dimension
Measure/Attribute

Value Relative to RDV

Implications of Values Relative to RDV from the
Perspective of:

SDV Path

RALT
Path

DPRK Leadership

International Community

0.1888(RDV
0.1977)Lower = better due todemonstrated national
capability in more
technologies

Lower = generally
preferred as developing
DPRK markets for newer
technologies

Diversification
Indices for Electricity
Generation Industry(as of 2050)

0.1907(RDV
0.1977)

Diversity of R&D
Spending

Higher in these paths
than in RDV

Higher likely to be seen
as better by leadership in
most cases

Diversified DPRK R&D
probably would be
welcomed, particularly if it
diverted funds from nuclear
R&D

Reliance on Proven
Technologies

Lower in these paths
than in RDV

Lower might be seen as
higher risk by DPRK
leadership

Probably not a large issue
for international
community, as “new”
technologies will not seem
unproven outside the
DPRKTechnological
Adaptability

Likely higher in SDV
path than in RDV path,though arguably
somewhat lower in
RALT than SDV due toinclusion of large
infrastructure

Higher likely to be seen
as better, thoughadaptability in the faceof threats from othernations is likely to beconsidered as well as
adaptability toenvironmental and otherstresses

Improvement in DPRK
resilience would likely beseen as a positive, assumingthat the DPRK was nolonger a military threat

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8.5.4. Environmental Dimension
The Sustainable Development (SDV) and Regional Alternative (RALT) paths have much lower
attendant annual emissions of greenhouse gases, acid gases, and “criteria” air pollutants(including sulfur and nitrogen oxides and particulate matter) in 2035 than does the
Redevelopment (RDV) path (see Table 8-6). Other air and water pollutants would likely be
reduced as well. The variants of the SDV and RALT paths without nuclear power would haveless generation of nuclear waste and spent fuel than the RDV path, in which the DPRK pursues
its domestic reactor program. For the variants that include large nuclear power units, generationof spent fuel and nuclear wastes would be much higher, but it is presumed that a precondition of
construction (done mostly by organizations from outside the DPRK) and operation of new, large,
modern LWRs (or small modular reactors, if that evolving technology is used in the DPRK)
would be an agreement as to stringent monitoring and handling of spent fuel.
Table 8-6: Environmental Dimension of Energy Security Comparison of DPRK Paths
Environmental
Measure/Attribute

Annual 2050 Values
Relative to RDV

Implications of Values Relative to RDV from the
Perspective of:

SDV Path

DPRK Leadership

RALT
Path

International Community

GHG emissions(tonnes CO2 equiv.)(RDV 140 Mte)

45 Mte41 MteLower = better (national
image, CDM
opportunities)

Lower = better

Acid gas emissions(ktonnes) (RDV 955
kte SOx, 555 kte NOx)

274 kteSOx, 137
kte NOx

235 kteSOx, 112
kte NOx

Lower = better (local
impacts, national image)

Lower = better

Local Air Pollutants(tonnes)

Lower

Lower

Lower = better

Lower = better (but not amajor concern)

Other air and waterpollutants (including
marine oil pollution)

Lower

Lower

Lower = better

Lower = better (primarily
for neighbors)

Solid Wastes (tonnes
coal ash)

Lower

Lower

Lower = better

Lower = better (but not amajor concern)

Nuclear waste/spent
fuel generation(tonnes or Curies, by
type)

Lower
(except
variants
withnuclearpower)

Lower(except
variants
withnuclearpower)

Mixed (less waste to
manage, but lesspotential fissile material
in the event of abreakdown inrapprochement)

Lower = better (variants
with nuclear power would
presumably include/require
stringent IAEA
management of spent fuel)From the perspective of the DPRK leadership, the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions islikely to be seen as an enhancement in the DPRK’s international stature, as well as an
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK

opportunity for profiting by implementing greenhouse gas reduction measures under the clean
development mechanisms (CDM) provision of the Kyoto Protocol. Though they might be less ofconcern to the DPRK leadership than in other nations, reductions in acid gas and local air andwater pollutants, and their attendant impacts, would likely be seen in a favorable light, and would
probably be recognized as an achievement by the Kim Jong Un regime. Though the variants of
the SDV and RALT paths without large new nuclear plants would generate less nuclear waste
and spent fuel than the RDV path, which assumes completion of the small Experimental LWR
unit that has been under construction at Yongbyon, that might be seen by the DPRK leadershipas both good (less waste to dispose of) and bad (less potential fissile material, in case bets on
continued improvements in relations with the international community need to be hedged).
From the perspective of the international community, the reduced greenhouse gas and acid gas
emissions in the SDV and RALT paths would be seen as a positive, since emissions of thesepotentially transboundary pollutants could have impacts beyond the DPRK. Other air pollutant
emissions reductions, though local in nature, might make them less of a concern, except, forexample, in immediately adjoining regions of neighbors’ territories (the ROK, China, andRussia) that share waterways and other environmental resources with locations in the DPRK.
The reduction in nuclear waste/spent fuel production between the RDV and the SDV/RALT
paths would be considered significant positive by the international community.
8.5.5. Social and Cultural Dimension
From the perspective of the DPRK’s leadership, the SDR path, which implies significantly
greater interaction between a wide range of DPRK citizens and an equally wide range of actors
from outside the DPRK, would likely be seen as substantially riskier than the RDV path, thougheven the RDV path involves significant interaction with the outside world, albeit in perhaps aless-planned way. The DPRK’s leadership would probably see those interactions as threatening
because they would further weaken leadership’s ability to control the flow of information andideas, exacerbating the potential for internal conflict. The addition of the requirement to work
jointly with foreigners to manage international infrastructure in the RALT path probably, fromthe perspective of DPRK leadership, adds to that risk, although it offers monetary and otherbenefits that would be considered attractive.
The international community, on the other hand, would see shifts from the RDV to the SDR and,especially, the RALT path as a positive for an almost opposite set of reasons—namely that
exposure of DPRK citizens to ideas and people from outside the DPRK would reduce the risk of
conflict between the DPRK populace and foreigners by increasing the understanding that DPRK
citizens have for the outside world. The view of the shift from the RDV path to the other paths
as being advantageous will likely be shared by most other nations, but may be tempered, in thecase of China and Russia, by fears that a DPRK populace that knows more about the outside
world might be more likely to run for their borders in the event of an internal crisis in the North.
8.5.6. International Military/Security Dimension
From the perspective of the leadership of the DPRK, it is likely that the SDV path, which
depends more on other nations for technological know-how, and requires the DPRK to allow
probably a wider range of visitors to a wider range of places than the RDV case, would be seen
as offering greater exposure to military security risks. The RALT path would have similarfeatures, but would also include the double-edged sword of major shared energy facilities, which
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would both provide a weapon to the DPRK via the potential threat of interrupting the flow ofenergy to/from the other partners sharing the infrastructure, and would also provide avulnerability in that the other partners could also threaten to shut down the flow of gas orelectricity, with impacts both on the DPRK energy sector and on the national budget. The RALT
path might require the DPRK to spend more, for example, on guards and monitoring equipment,
to securing the portion of the shared infrastructure that passes through the DPRK than itotherwise might need to spend to secure its own infrastructure.
The international community would likely see the SDV path, with its increased engagement
between the DPRK and other nations, as reducing military/security risks by giving the DPRK
more reasons to avoid confrontation with other nations. The RALT path would likely be seen as
going even further in the direction of encouraging interaction, and discouraging confrontation, byincreasing the drawbacks (in the form of forgone income and available resources) to behaviors
that would upset the other members of the consortium. To the extent that, over time, the SDV
and RALT paths would result in a reduction in military tensions in the region, they would also
result in a reduction in the requirement for military-related spending, both by the DPRK and byothers, though it is likely that the partners in shared international energy infrastructure under the
RALT path would, like the DPRK, need to allocate funds to guard and monitor the pipeline,
powerline, and LNG facilities included in the path.

8.6.

Internal Policy and Legal Reforms to Stimulate and Sustain Energy Sector
Rebuilding in the DPRK

There are several areas in which DPRK policies must be revised if the DPRK energy sector is tobe rebuilt within a more open economy. The ROK and other nations could assist in the processof learning and phasing in the types of reforms that will be necessary. Some of the areas inwhich policy reform is called for are described briefly below.
8.6.1. Reform of energy pricing practices and the physical infrastructure to
implement them
Hand in hand with rebuilding of energy supply infrastructure should go the rebuilding of end-use
equipment, but accomplishing the former in a cost-effective manner is in large part dependent on
making sure that new end-use equipment is purchased and operated with an eye toward
efficiency. The economic levers of prices, in a market economy, are important tools for helping
to make sure that energy is used wisely, as has been frequently underlined by Professor William
Brown of Georgetown University and other analysts.822
Before adopting market style pricing of energy commodities, the modification of existing
incentives facing plant managers and relevant officials is needed to encourage more efficientuse of energy. Some of these reforms have begun in the DPRK, but the process remains in its
infancy, and issues related to corruption by officials and “black market” activity may well haveto be addressed as reforms are implemented. Despite some problems, quota management andadministrative measures were key to China's success in eliminating many of the worst energy
822 See, for example, William Brown (2018), “Special Report: North Korea's Shackled Economy (2018)”, The National

Committee on North Korea, dated March, 2018, and available as https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefingpapers/special-report-north-koreas-shackled-economy-2018.

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inefficiencies in its industrial sector, and in stimulating adoption of relatively more advanced
techniques and technologies. Although inappropriate to a market economy, a well-designed
program of administrative measures would effectively utilize the strengths of the DPRK's current
form of government, and would be a first step toward a more efficient energy economy823.
Reforming energy pricing is a longer-term goal. Before market forces of any kind can help tospur the implementation of energy efficiency measures (or choices of efficient, rather than thecheapest, equipment on the supply side), the prices for energy products in the DPRK must be
adjusted towards their actual costs of production. This adjustment must include products that are
currently not priced at all. Pricing of some energy products, particularly electricity, will require
the implementation of metering and billing systems (some of these changes are reportedly
underway, at least in the Pyongyang area of the DPRK, as noted in previous chapters in thisreport). To be effective, parallel reforms that sensitize local decision-makers to prices (that is,that allow, for example officials responsible for purchase of industrial equipment to benefit fromenergy cost savings by retaining the savings for their organization) must be implemented.
One way to modify existing disincentives for energy efficiency is to promote changes inphysical infrastructure that will facilitate energy decision-making. In previous reports (and in
brief above), we have discussed some of the types of energy-using equipment and otherinfrastructure in the DPRK that could be targeted for replacement or rehabilitation. What has
been emphasized relatively less, but is at least as important, is the need to invest in equipmentthat allows flows of energy to be controlled and quantified adequately. Such equipment includes
electricity, heat, and hot water meters; steam and process control valves and shunts; and dimmers
and other equipment for controlling lighting. Applications for such equipment exist throughout
the residential, commercial/public/military, and industrial sectors. Without such equipment-which typically is inexpensive and relatively easy to install and operate--any attempt to instituteprice signals in energy markets, or even to reward reduced energy use in other ways, will be
futile, as end-users will lack the ability to control energy flows, the quantitative feedback thattells them whether efforts to reduce energy use have succeeded, or—worst of all—both.
8.6.2. Training for energy sector actors
Recovery of the DPRK economy, and modification of the DPRK’s energy and industrial
infrastructure, will require that a wide spectrum of energy sector actors—from analysts inplanning institutions to building maintenance personnel—receive training on topics varying fromlong-range energy planning (as noted above) to operation and maintenance of commercial
boilers. Here, regional cooperation will be helpful in making experienced personnel available totrain their counterparts in the DPRK.
In particular, if energy efficiency and renewable energy are to be successful in the DPRK—andthese may be the areas where, given stated interest on the part of the DPRK government, and the
823 That the DPRK is aware of this need for managerial reform is suggested by a recent article in the newsletter North Korea

Today, number 65, published by Good Friends, and dated 3/28/07 (in Korean—available as
http://www.goodfriends.or.kr/download/newsletter/newsletter65.pdf). The article on the DPRK electricity situation notes that
Kim Jong Il has stressed the need to increase the rate at which new hydroelectric and thermal power generation capacity is built,
and that the DPRK is looking for aid and/or investment to help solve the energy shortage, but at the same time realizes that there
are problems of management inefficiency that might hamper reform of the power sector, and is in the process of replacing themanagers currently running the electricity and water facilities in the DPRK with "experts"—presumably meaning managers withmore technical training and background in the specific industries. (Content of article paraphrased by Tim Savage of Nautilus
Institute).

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potential small unit size of assistance efforts, it will be possible to start the earliest energy
cooperation projects with the DPRK—it will be necessary to provide specific information andtraining to local actors. Training of a very specific and practical nature must be provided topersonnel at the local level. Examples here are factory energy plant managers, boiler operators inresidential and commercial buildings, power plant and heating system operators, and new jobclassifications such as energy-efficiency equipment installers and energy auditors. The departure ofSoviet/Russian assistance after 1990 (or at least much of it) has left a vacuum of technical expertise
that, according to some observers, very much persists to this day. The sort of training describedabove is therefore both badly needed and a necessary complement (or, more probably, precondition)
for any other type of technical assistance to the DPRK energy sector.
8.6.3. Strengthening regulatory agencies and educational/research institutions in
the DPRK
There is and will be a definite need to strengthen a variety of North Korea's government
institutions through a combination of provision of information, persuasion of leaders, training of
personnel, and supplying institutions with needed equipment. Many of these tasks have been
started (or at least attempted) through initiatives of the United Nations Development Programme(UNDP) and other ongoing programs.
One general area in which DPRK institutions could be strengthened is in their ability to develop
and implement practical standards, and to enforce them. DPRK officials have made generalstatements about their support for energy efficiency and environmental protection. The next stepis to codify these in terms of quantitative standards for the efficiency of new appliances andequipment, as well as effluent/emissions standards for new—and perhaps eventually, existing—factories, power plants, residential heating boilers, vehicles, and other major sources of pollution.
Once standards are set (or adapted/adopted from other nations), it will be necessary to create thecapability to enforce them by recruiting and training enforcement personnel and supplying themwith the tools necessary to do their job (measurement and testing equipment, and adequately
equipped analytical labs, for example) and the high-level administrative and political support
needed for credible implementation of sanctions.
Standards for specific energy consumption (for example, the amount of energy needed to
produce a unit of physical, and sometimes economic, output) have long been used in China togauge performance of and within industrial and other enterprises. Issued nationally, and often
tailored to conditions specific to individual enterprises, these standards have been used tomeasure progress in improving efficiency and have formed the basis of a system of financial andother awards. It is, in effect, a system of performance evaluation that parallels that evaluations
based on output levels and product quality. This system is losing its effectiveness as China'stransition to a market-oriented economy has progressed (although it has recently been revived
somewhat as a tool for greenhouse gas emissions reduction in China) and the central planningapparatus becomes less important, but it may still be quite appropriate for the DPRK at this time,
if temporarily during a transition toward a market system.
There is not as yet in the DPRK, a single center of technical excellence that is devoted to thestudy and promotion of energy efficiency and renewable energy opportunities, although there arevarious institutes tasked with issues in these areas. We would encourage the formation of suchan institution, which could be modeled on existing institutions like the Beijing Energy
Conservation Center and a similar Center in Russia. The Center in China was established jointly
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKwith the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory(both U.S. government-sponsored organizations with extensive experience in energy demandissues), and the Center in Russia was founded with Battelle.824 It is possible that the Center for
the Rational Use of Energy (CRUE), formed during the early 1990s within the existing DPRK
Institute of Thermal Engineering under a UNDP project, could be strengthened through a
combination of North Korean and extramural support into such a center of excellence. The firststep will be to start training current CRUE staff in the fundamentals of energy-efficienttechnologies and analysis.
8.6.4. Involving the private sector in investments and technology transfer
Much of the money and other assistance necessary to help the DPRK toward recovery will haveto come from the more flexible and fast-moving private sector. If substantial private-sector
financing for DPRK projects is to be forthcoming, it is likely that inducements and guarantees—
possibly supplied by other governments of the region—will be necessary in order to mediate, atleast initially (but perhaps for years), the risks of dealing with the DPRK. Chinese entrepreneurs
have already established many operations in the DPRK, though it is not clear to what extent the
Chinese government has provided support for these ventures.825 ROK businesses andorganizations have also, during the last decade, started businesses and joint ventures in the
DPRK, with mixed (and sometimes transitory) results.
One way that the governments of the region, including the DPRK government, and governmentsof other countries with an interest in what happens on the Korean Peninsula (including theUnited States) can help in this regard is to promote joint ventures and licensing agreements. The
government of the DPRK, and other interested parties, should promote joint ventures and licensing
agreements between DPRK concerns (governmental or otherwise) and foreign firms with energyefficient technologies to produce. Compact fluorescent light bulb factories were at one time acommonly cited example of potential energy technology transfers,826 827 and our understanding isthat in the 2000s a factory for local production of CFLs has been set up in the DPRK. As
technology has moved on, at this point, joint venture manufacturing of LED lighting in the DPRK
might be an interesting choice, though the key electronic components of LED lamps would
probably need to be imported for at least several years before a workable modern electronics
industry could be built in the DPRK, as well as a stable electricity grid to power both the
manufacturing and the lighting products it would produce. Solar photovoltaic panel manufacturing
is another potential obvious joint venture, and one with some historical precedent, as there haveapparently been examples of factories that (probably) assemble PV panels from solar cells imported
from China.828

824 Chandler, W. U., Z. Dadi and J. Hamburger (1993), U.S. - China Cooperation for Global Environmental Protection. PacificNorthwest Laboratory, Richmond, Washington, USA. Chandler, W. U. (1993), AISU's China Program Update June 1993.
Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richmond, Washington, USA.
825 Judging from anecdotal reports of some Chinese businesses that have had difficulty reaching profitability in trading with the
DPRK, it is unclear to what extent the Chinese government actively supports these ventures.
826 Sathaye, J., R. Friedmann, S. Meyers, O. de Buen, A. Gadgil, E. Vargas, and R. Saucedo (1994), "Economic Analysis of
Ilumex: A Project to Promote Energy-Efficient Residential Lighting in Mexico". Energy Policy, February 1994, pp. 163 - 171.
827 We have been told by a delegation from the DPRK that a CFL factory has been set up in the DPRK, though it is not clear to us
whether this factory is a joint venture or a domestic DPRK enterprise.
828 See, for example, James Pearson (2015), “In North Korea, solar panel boom gives power to the people”, Reuters, dated April
21, 2015, and available as https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-solar/in-north-korea-solar-panel-boom-gives-power-tothe-people-idUSKBN0NC2FG20150422.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKAs examples of technology transfers, a wide variety of efficient industrial equipment and controls(including adjustable-speed drive motors and improved industrial and utility boilers), efficienthousehold appliances and components, and efficient building technologies have already been
introduced to China through commercial channels, and are being widely manufactured there—and,indeed, exported to the world. A similar process for similar devices is possible for the DPRK.
Wind turbine-generators are another intriguing possibility, given the apparent success of such
ventures in former East-bloc nations and China, 829 and the North Koreans' historical emphasis onmachinery manufacture. Foreign firms that have successfully transferred efficient and renewable
technologies to China, Russia, and Eastern European nations represent a valuable repository ofexperience that could be applied to similar efforts in the DPRK. Depending on how fast the Tumen
River Economic Development Zone develops (infrastructure in the area is not yet adequate tosupport major industry, and relatively little progress in fulfilling the initial plans for the Zone has
occurred in recent years, though bilateral action between China and the DPRK and Russia and the
DPRK has occurred around ports and other transport facilities in the region in recent years), thisarea could be the location most acceptable to the DPRK for the first such ventures, along with the
Kaesong Industrial Zone in the southern DPRK. It is likely that the foreign companies that would
participate in joint ventures in the DPRK will require guarantees not only from the DPRK
government, but also from their own government or another industrialized-nation or a multilateral
donor, and will require those guarantees for years until the DPRK’s legal and regulatory systems
evolve to operate consistent with the practices of typical industrialized nations.
Before any of these types of ventures can be initiated, however the DPRK will have to implement,
and show the international community that it is adequately enforcing, laws to protect the intellectual
property and investments of foreign companies doing business in the DPRK. A description of all of
the areas in which such laws are required, and the reasons why they are needed, is, however, beyond
the scope of this report.

829 Martinot, E. (1994), Technology Transfer and Cooperation for Sustainable Energy Development in Russia: Prospects andCase Studies of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. Energy and Resources Group, University of California at Berkeley,
Berkeley, California, USA. [Summary of a Ph.D. Dissertation - Draft]

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DPRK “Collapse” Pathways: Implications for the Energy Sector and for
Strategies of Redevelopment/Support
9.1.

Introduction830

The prospect for the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and its leadership remains
unsettled. The succession of power to Chairman Kim Jong Un following his father Kim Jong Il‘sdeath appears to have proceeded relatively smoothly, albeit with expected forced changes inupper-tier leadership as the younger Kim has consolidate his political power. There is as yet
little sign, however, given the economic and energy sector situation described in the earlier
chapters of this report, that the economic poverty of the vast majority of DPR Koreans willchange for the better in the near future. The external powers continue, as of 2021, to squeeze the
DPRK with sanctions over its nuclear weapons program, and even the change in administrationsin the US in early 2020 may not markedly change the sanctions regime without some sort of
diplomatic breakthrough. Inflation occurred in the aftermath of the currency redenomination
failure of 2010, and droughts and floods have continued to plague DPRK agriculture eventhrough 2020.831 External aid will be minimal so long as the nuclear weapons issue remains
unresolved.
This dismal future does not mean the DPRK is about to collapse. “Collapsists” have beenarguing since the end of the Cold War that the DPRK “is about to collapse.” 832 Many scenarios,
including a persistent, slow recovery and gradual modernization of the DPRK, are possible.833
The continued survival against all apparent odds of the DPRK is not regarded as refutation of thecollapsist prediction. Nor apparently does the DPRK’s regime pose a longevity worthy ofinvestigation and explanation. Apparently, the only way to prove the prediction is to wait for thepredicted outcome, at which time the prediction has a post-ad hoc character of truth after thefact. Thus, we should tread warily when it comes to claims about the prospective nature ofcollapse in the DPRK.
There is a reason, we suggest, that the DPRK has outlasted every other statist, personalized
regime since the end of the Cold War. The DPRK is different, it is unique, and it represents asample of one. It is hard to conduct authentic social science with a sample of one, especiallyfrom a distance. Moreover, this sample of one is intimately connected with and arguably

830 Much of the text presented in this chapter was developed for a paper originally prepared as part of The Korea Project, co-organized by the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California and the Office of the Korea Chair at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., and presented at the conference “The Korea Project: Planning for theLong Term” Conference, August 20-21, 2010, Los Angeles, USA. Versions of that paper are available as
http://csis.org/files/publication/101215_Collapse_Pathways_North_Korea.pdf and as http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-specialreports/dprk-collapse-pathways-implications-for-the-energy-sector-and-for-strategies-redevelopmentsupport/.
831 See, for example, Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein (2020), “The North Korean Economy: Assessing the Flood Damage”, 38
North, dated October 16, 2020, and available as https://www.38north.org/2020/10/bkatzeffsilberstein101620/.
832

See, for example, Bryan Kay, staff reporter: "Is Collapse of NK Regime Imminent?" Korea Times, November 15,
2009, at: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/08/120_55550.html, and Aidan Foster-Carter, "The
Gradualist Pipe-Dream: Prospects and Pathways for Korean Reunification," in ed. A. Mack, Asian Flashpoint:
Security and the Korean Peninsula, Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1993, 159-175.
833 J. Witt, Four Scenarios for a Nuclear DPRK, US-Korea Institute, Working Paper 10-01, February 2010, at:

http://uskoreainstitute.org/bin/s/g/USKI_WP10-01_Wit.pdf

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inextricably linked with the status of United States policies towards the DPRK. The DPRK and
the US national security state were born in war with each other; they have remained at war fornearly six decades; they are at war today. In our view, one cannot analyze the prospects forchange in the DPRK without simultaneously analyzing the rates and types of change in US
foreign and military policy.
Rather than outright collapse in the next decade, far more likely is either a “slow burn” by which
we mean continuing slow degradation of the economy and consequent adaptation at local levels
to tighter scarcity constraints; or a very slow recovery nurtured by economic reforms, buttressedby external support from and trade with China, and large-scale labor exports; or a faster recovery
based on rapprochement with the ROK and the integration of DPRK state-owned-enterprises
with the ROK’s chaebols.
In an overall spectrum of possibility, we estimate that the non-collapse pathways dominate,
covering roughly 95 percent or more of the policy spectrum. In this 95 percent plus range, theprimary question is what support and reconstruction policies are available to avoid outrightcollapse, the outcome that is most likely to lead to loss of control of fissile material, nuclear
warheads, people, and escalation to war via civil war or cross-DMZ war. Many, perhaps most, ofthe policy responses needed to avoid collapse are the same as will be needed in the case ofoutright collapse.834 The main difference in the post-collapse pathways is greater scale andspeed and therefore cost needed to re-establish stability rather than to merely maintain it.
Perhaps there is an obvious lesson in economics of policy choice in that difference.
The biggest single qualitative difference between non-collapse and collapse pathways will be in
the military dimension after a DPRK regime collapse. Obviously, the highest velocity policy
response in the case of DPRK collapse will be the moves by the ROK military (in particular, its
special forces) to occupy and control key leadership posts, military bases, critical infrastructure,and transport chokepoints. How long this intervention would last is impossible to know inadvance, but it could be held in place for many months or even years, depending on the degree towhich local populations comply with the legitimacy of the occupying forces as against rebel
against perceived injustices inflicted during the takeover. This policy response has its energy
implications, both in its execution, and in its implications for energy sector reconstruction and
immediate humanitarian assistance to the DPRK population. We do not cover, however, themilitary-energy aspects of establishing post-collapse control of the DPRK in this chapter,
although we review the implications for post-war reconstruction of how a war might be foughtwith the DPRK.

834 We have outlined in detail appropriate policy options for this goal in, for example, von Hippel, D.F., and P. Hayes (2009),“DPRK Energy Sector Development Priorities: Options and Preferences”, Asian Energy Security Special Issue of Energy Policy,
and available as http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.11.068; von Hippel, D.F., and P. Hayes (2007), Fueling DPRK Energy
Futures and Energy Security: 2005 Energy Balance, Engagement Options, and Future Paths (Nautilus Institute Report, available
as http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/07042DPRKEnergyBalance.pdf); von Hippel, D.F., and P. Hayes (2007),“Energy Security for North Korea”, Science, volume 316, pages 1288 – 1289, June 1, 2007; von Hippel, D. F., P. Hayes, J. H.
Williams, C. Greacen, M. Sagrillo, and T. Savage, 2008, “International energy assistance needs and options for the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)”. Energy Policy, Volume 36, Issue 2, February 2008, Pages 541-552; and D. von Hippel
and P. Hayes, DPRK Energy Sector Assistance to Accompany Progress in Denuclearization Discussions: Options andConsiderations, produced as part of the project “Improving Regional Security and Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula: U.S.
Policy Interests and Options.”, organized by Joel Wit of Columbia University's Weatherhead Institute for East Asia and the U.S.Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., and available as
http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/vonHippel.pdf.

492
Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKIn spite of these caveats and our best judgment that collapse is unlikely, it is conceivable andtherefore should be addressed. Indeed, we have observed situations in the DPRK where thefabric of rural life was literally coming apart, and the demands on individuals and social units
were beyond what would in most conditions be considered the bounds of human endurance. Bycollapse, however, we have a specific meaning in mind in this chapter, namely, the complete
breakdown of central government in Pyongyang. Given the number of interacting internal andexternal variables that affect the probability of DPRK collapse in the long-term (ten plus years),
that probability is simply unknowable. Thus, we will concentrate largely on the short tomedium- term in our analysis.
Whether precipitated by war, coup, or simply continuing slow economic decline, it will beincumbent on the international community to help to provide services and support to stabilize
North Korea in the unlikely event of outright collapse. Fortunately, many of the measures thatwould for stabilization are the same as should be undertaken in the non-collapse pathways.
Among the many likely needs of the North Korean population following a collapse—food, cleanwater, heath care, and economic development among them—the need to promptly provide thepopulation with reliable and demonstrably improving access to energy services (heat, light,
mechanized transportation, and so on) will be a key to stabilizing the country, meeting otherpost-collapse needs, and readying the DPRK for eventual smooth (one hopes) integration with
the ROK. In this paper, we begin, in a largely qualitative way, the exploration of theimplications of various DPRK “collapse” pathways for the energy sector of the North Korea, andfor the approaches that the Republic of Korea and other interested parties will need to take torebuild and redevelop the DPRK energy sector, and in planning for same.
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows:• Section 9.2 provides a summary of the background on the status of the DPRK energy sector
relevant to the prospects of a DPRK “collapse”, drawing on the materials presented in earlier
chapters of this Report.

• Section 9.3 provides a summary of Nautilus Institute’s approach to evaluating the impact of“collapse” pathways, and presents our illustration of four potential pathways that could leadto the collapse of the government of the DPRK, ranging from a quick collapse brought on by
a “shooting war” or a West-friendly coup to a collapse from continued isolation and slow
decline, which could take years or decades.

• Section 9.4 describes our assessment of the implications of collapse pathways for the DPRK
energy sector, and for provision of energy services (including energy supply and demand
infrastructure) in the DPRK. For each collapse pathway, we identify key measures that theinternational community—including but hardly limited to the ROK and the US, would be
obliged to or could take to help the DPRK transition toward eventual reunification with the
ROK (whether official or de facto through economic integration).

• Section 9.5 summarizes key overall lessons from our preliminary analysis of collapse
pathways, focusing on near-term initiatives and planning efforts that the international
community might carry out and support that would help to manage, smooth, and make easier
the post-collapse transition for the DPRK populace, independent of how collapse actuallyoccurs.
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9.2.

Background: The DPRK Energy Sector since 1990, and Nautilus Analytical
Approaches

When the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1990, the DPRK lost not only its major supplier of
crude oil and of parts for its power plants and factories, but also the markets for the bulk of thegoods that its factories were designed to produce. The rapid economic and resource contraction,
compounded by a series floods and droughts that affected both agriculture and energy
production, plus economic isolation resulting from the international reaction to the DPRK’s
nuclear weapons program, resulted in a downward economic spiral of reduced energy
availability and reduced industrial energy demand as the country’s infrastructure fell into
disrepair and markets dried up. By 2000 the DPRK’s use of coal and production of electricity
had fallen (by our estimates—see above) to almost a quarter of its 1990 levels, and overall
energy end use had fallen to less than 40 percent of what it had been a decade before. Since thisperiod, the DPRK’s energy sector has been sustained primarily by an annual half-million tonnes(possibly somewhat more, in the 2010s) of crude oil from China, modest imports of refined oil
products, Korean tenacity and ingenuity that have kept some of its coal mines and aging powerand coal production infrastructure running, and the substitution of wood and other biomass forcoal and oil products to provide subsistence energy use. Much of the DPRK’s major energy andindustrial infrastructure dates to the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s, with some, including majorhydroelectric plants, dating to the 1920s Japanese occupation era.
Since 2000 there have been modest improvements in the DPRK economy and energy sector,
with some power plant repairs, new small hydroelectric facilities, and new mining activity
underwritten, in large part, by Chinese investment. DPRK citizens have started to provide theirown energy supplies by adopting diesel and gasoline-powered generators and using (mostly)
small solar panels to provide lighting and power small electronic devices. Still, shortages ofpower, district heat, and coal persist, with blackouts even in Pyongyang, and much more tenuous
power supplies in other areas. In effect, the North Korean electricity system, though it isnominally a nationwide transmission and distribution grid, is a patchwork of a few regional andsome local grids, centered around major and smaller power plants. Most of the large thermal(almost all coal-fired) power plants and heating plants are only partially in operation due todamage of various kinds to one or more boilers/generating units, and/or to transformers,
substations, or other parts of the transmission and distribution system. This means that even iflarge amounts of fuel or electricity were suddenly to be available to the DPRK, distribution ofthat energy would be problematic.
The combination of erosion in its energy system and industrial infrastructure, together withsimilar erosion in its transport infrastructure in many (not all—Pyongyang and Nampo being
exceptions) areas and lack of investment capital, means that the DPRK will not be able tosubstantially reconstitute, or perhaps more accurately, redevelop, its energy system and economy
in general without outside help. Rebuilding power plants—most of which, remember, werebuilt with major components imported from the USSR or elsewhere—could not be done, at least
for many years, using materials “made from scratch” in the DPRK because the industrial
infrastructure to make the required power plant components either is no longer operating or, infact, was never present in the DPRK. Similarly, decades of relative isolation have left the DPRK
substantially without the capabilities in metallurgy, electronics, and other fields that would allow
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKit to develop new industries. This means that the DPRK cannot redevelop its infrastructure
sufficiently to develop a sustainable, peaceful economy without outside help.
Even for the DPRK economy to remain at its current “subsistence” level, help from other nations
has been required. As noted above, the DPRK receives sufficient crude oil from China to keep
one of its two oil refineries running, though at well below full capacity. This oil was, at least
until the middle of the 2010s when China ceased to report crude oil trades with the DPRK, paid
for at market prices, but the DPRK runs an annual trade deficit with China. China could provide
more crude oil to the DPRK, and has done so in the past (in some years during the 1990s), but
the fairly constant flow of oil from China to the DPRK for the past two decades or so suggeststhat China has determined the amount of oil that the DPRK economy needs to receive to fuelbasic economic functions, and is providing that amount.835 This suggests to us that although
China is willing to provide fuel to keep the DPRK economy (and society) from failing, it isunwilling, until the DPRK can afford the additional imports on its own, to provide sufficientassistance to actually redevelop the DPRK economy.
Starting from the estimated energy balances presented in earlier Chapters, we prepared futurescenarios of energy-sector development for the DPRK, using the Low Emissions Analysis
Platform energy/environment software tool or LEAP, as reported in Chapter 8.836 In that work,
as shown in Figure 9-1 (as well as in Chapter 8), we compare a “Redevelopment” path, implying
significant opening of the DPRK economy to outside investment and assistance, but without
significant emphasis on energy efficiency improvement, with a “Sustainable Development” pathemphasizing energy efficiency and (to a lesser extent) renewable energy, and a “Regional
Alternative” path also including DPRK participation in several types of regional energy
infrastructure (for example, LNG terminals, gas pipelines and electricity trading). An additional
path modeled, the “Recent Trends” path, assumed that a substantial solution to the DPRK
nuclear issue was not forthcoming, and recent trends in the DPRK economy continued. Not
modeled quantitatively, as indicated in the shaded box in Figure 9-1, are the “collapse” cases thatare the subject of this Chapter.

835 This in addition to technical reasons for maintaining flow through the pipeline—see section 6 of this Report.
836 The LEAP software tool is developed and maintained by Stockholm Environment Institute—United States.

https://leap.sei.org/Default.asp for information about the LEAP tool.

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Please see

Figure 9-1: DPRK Energy Paths

DPRK Energy Paths Considered Quantitatively
to DatePOLITICAL STALEMATE IS….
RESOLVEDNOT RESOLVED“REDEVELOPMENT”
CASE: Revitalization, re-“RECENT TRENDS”
CASE: Economy

mechanization, infrastructure
upgraded

opens a very little, aidflows modest,
infrastructure erodes“SUSTAINABLE DEV.”
CASE: Redevelopment plus

“COLLAPSE” CASE(S):“REGIONALALTERNATIVE”
CASE: Redevelopment plusemphasis on energy
efficiency, renewables

Economy and regime fails (notquantitatively modeled)regional projects
Hayes/von Hippel
8/2010

9.3.

CSIS Korea Project Presentation

19

Potential “Collapse” Pathways
9.3.1. Analytical Approach and Listing of Pathways Considered

Our general approach to the analysis of potential pathways of DPRK regime collapse is asfollows. First, we define several significantly different, illustrative regime collapse pathways.
We make no predictions about the relative likelihood of any of these paths, and freely admit thatthe four paths we illustrate have been chosen out of a universe of many possible options. The
second step in the analysis is to think about the impacts of regime collapse, for each path, on the
DPRK energy sector, and, by extension on energy and related infrastructure that supports the
DPRK economy. Third, we consider how the ROK, the US, and the rest of the global
community might or would need to respond to energy needs following each different type ofcollapse. Finally, we identify “robust” planning approaches that, if pursued now or soon, would
prove useful in the event of any type of collapse pathway.
We consider four possible paths of regime collapse. These paths are described briefly below,
and in more detail in the section that follows:• War: A brief but very destructive war occurs between the DPRK and the ROK and its allies,
precipitated by a military incident that rapidly escalates, and leads to essentially immediate
unification.

• Regime Implosion Leading to New Authoritarian Regime: Death, incapacitation, or someother significant event befalls Chairman Kim Jong Un before a firm leadership succession
plan is in place, leading to regime replacement in the DPRK, with the new regime being
modernizing, but leaning toward China and Russia for economic support, and away from the
ROK and its Western allies.
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK• Regime Change by Palace Coup Leading to ROK-installed Regime: While notimmediately leading to unification, this collapse path would lead to modernization that inturn would lead to at first de-facto economic unification, then, somewhat later, politicalunification with the ROK.

• Slow Collapse Leading to Regime Change through Internal Conflict: In this path, theKim family and/or other leaders continue the current (largely) isolationist policies, whichleads eventually, though perhaps not for many years, to the collapse of the DPRK state, with
the ROK and its allies obliged to “pick up the pieces”.
9.3.2. The “War” Path
The “War” path of regime collapse assumes that a shooting war between the DPRK and the ROK(and its allies), once set off by a military incident of some kind, quickly escalates. Given theproximity of DPRK artillery to the ROK border, we assume that this path results in considerable
destruction in the Northern ROK (including the parts of the Seoul area close enough to the DMZ
as to be within range of DPRK artillery and rocket fire—to the extent that DPRK groundlaunched weapons capacity is not suppressed by ROK and US counter-fire), and also in
considerable destruction in many areas of the DPRK, especially in areas associated with military
installations, but perhaps sparing areas near the DPRK’s northern borders (for reasons touched
on below). Based on previous work (see text box below), our rough estimate is that the DPRK
would not be able to sustain a conflict long (probably for weeks, or at most, a month or two) due
to lack of fuel supplies. This assumes that China does not somehow step up fuel deliveries to the
DPRK, which seems unlikely if the DPRK is seen as the aggressor in the conflict.
We assume that war leads to ROK (assisted by US and others) administration of the DPRK. We
further assume that the ROK’s administration of the DPRK is managed in such a way thatsignificant dissatisfaction with the administration on the part of the North Korean population is
avoided. This is a crucial assumption, as an insurgency related to popular local dissatisfaction
with ROK administration of the DPRK would set DPRK rebuilding and redevelopment backyears, as has been the case following the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Would the DPRK
population welcome ROK/US victors with open arms? Iraq/Afghanistan provide cautionary
tales, but an analysis of that particular issue, though it has potentially significant ramifications
for what types of energy infrastructure improvements will be possible/effective, is beyond thescope of this Chapter. Clearly, however, one of the lessons of Iraq is that the degree to which theadministration quickly ramps up the provision of the essentials of life—food, clean water, healthcare, electricity, waste treatment, jobs—to the populace will play a huge role in how well the
populace adapts to its new government.
How the war is prosecuted by the ROK/US side will have a significant bearing on the tasksneeded to reconstruct the energy system. For example, will the ROK/US alliance choose to:• Destroy power plants wholesale, or just render plants relatively temporarily unusable withsurgical strikes on key, relatively easily-replaceable (at least post-conflict) components?

• Destroy the DPRK’s operating refinery, or just cut refined products supply lines?
• Destroy coal mines, or just cut power to them, rail lines from them?

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKDPRK Energy Supply during a War
Several years ago, we carried out, and more recently updated, a rough calculation thatsuggested that it would take about three months of DPRK refinery output, at current levels, toresupply the gasoline and diesel fuel that the military would use in the first month of anactive conflict. By the end of the first month of conflict, it would take about two months oftotal refinery production plus imports (assuming current levels) of gasoline and diesel tooperate for an additional month of war the DPRK military vehicles that we estimate mightremain operable after the initial 30 days of conflict.
This calculation includes several simplifying assumptions, each with significant toconsiderable degrees of uncertainty. First, it assumes that 50 percent of DPRK military
ground vehicles and armaments would be inoperable after 30 days of conflict, and that 90
percent of the DPRK’s navy and 100 percent of its air force would be similarly inoperable orin deep storage. Given the superior firepower, particularly from the air, of the ROK/US
alliance, these assumptions seem reasonable to us. Second, it assumes that the DPRK does
not have many months of fuel stored in deep bunkers. Here, we have no direct information
one way or another, but suspect that the relatively constant fuel shortages over the past
decade and more have probably eroded stocks, at least somewhat. Third, it assumes that theone operating refinery continues to provide fuel at current levels, and that the second major
DPRK refinery, at Sonbong on the DPRK’s northeast coast (currently and recently inactive)
is not reopened. The degree to which the currently-operating refinery, in the DPRK’s
northwest and connected by pipeline with China, maintains its output depends largely on the
degree to which China continues supplying crude oil. Refineries are easy military targets, but
it seems unlikely to us that the ROK-US forces would attack a facility so close to China.
Whether China might increase or decrease the flow of crude oil to the refinery is an open
question—our guess is that they might not do either. Reopening the Sonbong refinery would
likely take much too long to help much in the event of a conflict, and it is unclear where thecrude oil to fuel it would come from. Fourth, we assume that the current (mostly minor)
sources of imported refined products would not increase or decrease much in a conflict. If
anything, it seems to us that it would be more difficult, not easier, to import oil by truck,train, or small tanker ship in the event of an armed conflict.
These caveats notwithstanding, the essential finding from our calculation is that the DPRK
military would quickly—in a matter of weeks or certainly months—run short of fuel in any
major armed conflict. With regard to the “War” path to regime change discussed in this
Chapter, this finding has (at least) two implications. First, the major part of a war between
the DPRK and the ROK and its allies is likely to be over, at least in terms of participation oflarge fuel-using vehicles, aircraft, and vessels by the DPRK, within two or so months.
Second, knowing that a war is likely to be brief, the ROK and its allies might be more
inclined NOT to inflict difficult-to-reverse damage on major DPRK energy facilities.

We assume that, given that ROK/US air power superiority will provide control of the skies
within days, the ROK/US military command can be prevailed upon to knock out energy
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infrastructure surgically. War planners will probably deem it necessary to knock out electrical
grid to deny power to munitions and armaments factories and other military installations(although the latter will likely have their own power sources). Doing so by wholesale
destruction of the transmission and distribution (T&D) grid and major power plants, however,would make it much harder to redevelop the DPRK energy sector in a timely fashion, andprobably is not necessary. Targeting and destroying, for example, substations at power plants,
which are already in poor shape, will knock the power plants offline indefinitely, and be mucheasier to fix than would major damage to the power plants themselves. It seems unlikely that
ROK/US forces would try to destroy or permanently disable the DPRK’s one major operating(Northwest) refinery, as it is so close to China (and tied to China by pipeline), but they mightseek to bomb major rail and road links that would be used to provide fuel to the front, andpossibly sink or disable some coastal tankers used to transport petroleum products, and/or target
petroleum fuel depots. Disrupting the provision of power to DPRK coal mines would knock
most coal production offline, but again, targeting rail links would inflict damage that would be
relatively easy (once the war ended) to fix, but still effective in reducing the DPRK’s supply offuel to the front lines of the war. Probably some war damage would be sustained in DPRK
seaports, especially those that host submarines or Special Forces that use naval craft. Due toconcerns about humanitarian impacts, plus effects on ROK water resources (rivers that flow
across or near the DPRK/ROK border) and on China (for rivers in the northern part of the
DPRK), we assume that ROK/US forces would avoid damaging hydroelectric facilities, at least
the dams, but might, again, choose to knock hydropower stations off line (except probably, theseveral Supung and other power stations shared by the DPRK and China that are located along
northern border rivers) by destroying key substations.
The descriptions of the “War” path above, and analysis of the energy implications of the War
path provided below, assume that Russia and especially China stay out of the conflict. If they do
not stay on the sidelines, at least in a military sense, the ROK/DPRK conflict becomes a very
different and much more dangerous altercation, to say the least, with possible global
consequences.
9.3.3. “Regime Implosion Leading to New Authoritarian Regime” PathIn the second path considered here, a new regime takes over from the Kim family as a result of
the death of Chairman Kim Jong Un or his successor, or as a result of some internal coup. The
new regime is authoritarian but modernizing and is dominated by military and technocraticelements. Despite its modernizing elements, the new regime continues to spurn the ROK and theWest. Rather, the modernizing approach implies much higher than recent rates of investment(from non-ROK, non-Western sources), and as a result energy infrastructure isrebuilt/redeveloped in close cooperation with China and Russia. For the most part, international
governmental organizations and international financial institutions are also excluded by the new
regime from the DPRK modernization process.
The elites of the new regime serve themselves by modernizing the DPRK economy enough tomodestly improve the lot of the general population but do so in the process of establishingbusinesses that mostly emphasize export of the DPRK’s mineral and labor resources, with China
and Russia as major partners. The elites of the regime operate the export companies, and thereby
install themselves as a Korean equivalent of the Russian oligarchs of the 1990s. The ROK
remains locked out of DPRK economy in the short and medium-term but may in the longer term
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obtain regional network integration (via agreements on and construction of electricity interties
and gas pipelines) by paying rent to the DPRK government for energy infrastructure andtransport corridors through the DPRK to resources in Russia and markets in China and beyond.
9.3.4. “Regime Change by Palace Coup Leading to ROK-installed Regime” PathIn this path, following, for example, an act by Chairman Kim Jong Un or his successor that is
considered the “last straw”, a group of cosmopolitan younger DPRK diplomats and technocrats
backed by young officers in the KPA takes power, and immediately establishes links with the
ROK, the United States, and their allies. The result, initially, is an authoritarian regime that
sympathetic to the ROK and the West. The regime slowly, perhaps very slowly, installs
elements of democracy in the DPRK, but focuses first on economic reforms. These economic
reforms place an emphasis on planning a DPRK economy that complements the ROK economy.
For example, initially, economic reforms would likely emphasize development of the DPRK
mineral resource base to help provide raw materials for ROK industry and would utilize cheap
labor in the DPRK to compete in industries (for example, textiles, and basic electronics) thathave been moving out of ROK to lower-cost suppliers such as China, and subsequently Vietnam,
India, and other nations. To fund these economic reforms, significant investment is drawn fromthe ROK, and probably from the US and elsewhere as well.
As with the China- and Russia-leaning elite in the “Regime Implosion Leading to New
Authoritarian Regime” path, the new, ROK-leaning regime elites in the DPRK seek to serve
themselves but do so possibly by setting up ROK-style chaebol that they control, and thatinterface with/draw investment from analogs in the South. Such a regime might be amenable tolarge-scale virtual exports of DPRK labor via the internet, for example, for Korean language
records processing for the insurance, medical, and telecommunications industries, or for softwaredevelopment.
9.3.5. “Slow Collapse Leading to Eventual Reunification” PathIn this variant of “Regime Implosion”, either Chairman Kim Jong Un or a successor from theKim clique maintains control, or another regime (perhaps run by a “regent” governing thecountry in the name of a Kim successor) takes power. In either case, however, there is a failure
to modernize or open the DPRK significantly to the outside world. Aided by continued
isolation, the national regime’s control over the country becomes progressively less effective due
to continued erosion of energy and other infrastructure, and its inability to provide food and otheressentials for the population as a whole. It is possible that this type of process would be broughton or at least encouraged by the kind of international sanctions regime that was in place as ofearly 2021.
As this erosion continues, possible situations between national control and total collapse of
authority might include the effective fragmentation of the DPRK into “fiefdoms” run bypowerful party or military (or criminal) leaders, perhaps supported individually by national
neighbors (China, Russia, Japan?) or large foreign investors such as Chinese companies.
We assume that this scenario will lead to eventual reunification of the DPRK with the ROK.
Control of information coming into the DPRK would breaks down as the power of the central

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authority to impose order wanes,837 which, coupled with continued declines in living standards,
leads eventually to disillusionment on the part of the majority of the population (for which,crucially, access to information from outside the DPRK has gradually been increasing), internal
conflict, civil disorder, and possibly even civil war in DPRK. A “Civil War” situation may bedifficult to conceive of, given the lack of significant ethnic or religious divides in the DPRK, but
a possible mechanism might occur in a “fiefdom” situation where rival warlords controlling (forexample) different provincial areas, and using arms smuggled from different friendly
nations/groups, begin to struggle for territory/key assets (mines would be an example, withanalogs in Africa and elsewhere) or power.
Overall, the process of decline under this path may be very slow, taking years or even decades toplay out, but would likely end with a rapid collapse at the end stage that requires urgent
intervention by the ROK and its allies, and possibly others on the DPRK’s northern borders tostem/support a flood of refugees leaving the DPRK.

9.4.

Implications of Collapse Pathways for the DPRK Energy Sector and for
Provision of Energy Services in the DPRK

Each of the four “collapse” pathways outlined above has its own implications for how the DPRK
energy sector will be affected. As such, each of the pathways implies different ways in whichthose in the international community with the wherewithal to help might provide or plan toprovide energy services to the DPRK population and economy in response to, or to soften theeffects of, regime collapse. What follows are our initial thoughts on the energy sector andenergy assistance implications of each of the paths described above.
9.4.1. “War” Path
As noted above, a major military conflict between the DPRK and the ROK (and its allies) would,
depending significantly on the military strategy that the ROK/US alliance chooses to pursue,
eliminate considerable energy and industrial infrastructure in the DPRK, though much of it isalready failing and/or obsolete. If a “surgical” military approach is used, the minimum shortterm requirements to supply basic energy services to the DPRK and to start to build a peaceful
DPRK economy would likely be:• Replace virtually all substation equipment, including both equipment that was war-damaged
and equipment that has simply become inoperable (or close to it) over time, as mostsubstation transformers and related equipment are reportedly in poor condition.

• Establish emergency electricity generation and provide fuel for the stock of existing
generation that has grown substantially during the 2010s, initially fueled with diesel oil or
possibly liquefied petroleum gas (LPG, a mixture of propane and butane). Larger-scale
generation under this approach might take the form of power barges in coastal areas or where

837 Some would say that, due to the advent of cell phone usage in the Chinese border region and in Pyongyang, and more recently

nationwide, coupled with the dissemination of South Korean music, films, TV shows, and other content in the DPRK via flash
drives, control of information in the DPRK is breaking down already. See, for example, Jeremy Hsu (2018), “How the USB
Taught North Korea to Love K-Pop”, Discover, dated April 6, 2018, and available ashttps://www.discovermagazine.com/technology/how-the-usb-taught-north-korea-to-love-k-pop.

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river transport is possible, and package diesel or portable combined heat and power plants ininland areas.

• Try to get major coal-fired power stations restarted, and restart or stabilize output from coalmines to supply them, while undertaking temporary transmission repairs sufficient to getelectricity onto the local or regional grid on a semi-reliable basis.

• Ramp up petroleum products production in ROK refineries to substitute for whatever DPRK
fuel production/transport capacity was destroyed in the war, with additional fuel provided tosupply emergency generation facilities. ROK refining capacity is large enough that it could
easily supply the ROK and the DPRK together today, though possibly not both the ROK andDPRK at ROK per-capita levels of consumption. Given the status of DPRK fuels demand
infrastructure (such as its road vehicle fleet), however, the DPRK would not reach ROKlevels of consumption for many years. As such, overall refined products supplies might not
be a problem in a suddenly reunified Korea (though some products will be easier to supply
than others), but the infrastructure to move supplies to where they are needed in the DPRK—
port facilities, rail facilities, and roads—will need upgrading even if they not damaged bywar.

• Try to get major hydroelectric facilities restarted, including required transmission repairs
and/or repairs to dams.

• Provide critical power and fuel for agriculture. The urgency of doing so will, of course,
depend on the season in which the conflict occurs, but planning for supporting DPRK
agriculture as much as possible will be a priority in any circumstance to reduce the quantityof food aid that will inevitably be required.
If a surgical military approach is NOT used by the ROK and its allies, supplying basic services
and economy-building in the DPRK would be more difficult. For example, immediate
replacement of most power plants would be needed, meaning more “triage” solutions to restartparts of energy facilities however possible, and more provision of emergency generation.
Significant emergency civil engineering work will be also needed to shore up damaged
infrastructure, repair ports, rail facilities, roads so that emergency supplies of refined products
can be brought in.
A key complication of the “War” path is that it will somehow be necessary to rebuild/develop the
DPRK at the same time as the considerable damage to the ROK infrastructure (and society) is
being repaired. This complication argues for the need for countries beyond the ROK and US totake very active roles in DPRK reconstruction, as a great deal of ROK rebuilding effort will
necessarily be domestically focused. The need to support/rebuild both Koreas will makecoordination, even amid post-war chaos, even more necessary if citizens both south and north of
the 38th parallel are to get needed services in a timely manner. All these factors underline theneed for detailed and coordinated pre-crisis planning.838
In any post-war path there will be a need to quickly ramp up capacity-building for energy,
environment-related, and other occupations. Capacity-building will be needed in part because

838

We assume that at least some significant planning for DPRK collapse has been undertaken by ROK government agencies, but
if these plans have been reported in the public literature, we have not yet seen them.

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trained people will be needed for reconstruction and redevelopment, but also because the DPR
Korean population will need gainful, useful, peaceful employment. This is especially true forthose officials and technicians associated with sensitive industries (for example, militaryindustries and nuclear weapons programs) in today’s DPRK. A key focus of early capacitybuilding efforts should be on providing skills and technologies that encourage the growth of local
economies (for example, at the county level) that are capable, to a large degree, of providing
essentials such as food and energy services for themselves. As concrete example, training should
be provided for redeployment of scientists and technicians working at the Yongbyon nuclear
weapons complex and military missile development/production programs so as to make suretheir skills are directed toward productive and peaceful activities, rather than having their skills
diverted to serving threatening states or organizations.839
In the medium- and longer-term, several types of actions will be needed under a collapse via the“War” path:• Plan for and start to build an integrated ROK/DPRK grid, probably starting with extending
ROK grid into areas in the southern part of the (current) DPRK and building local/regional
grids (including microgrids) in other areas for eventual hook-up to national grid.

• Make sure to replace damaged (or otherwise unserviceable) energy demand infrastructurewith the most energy-efficient devices that are widely available, so as to lessen therequirements for new or rebuilt energy supply infrastructure.

• Make sure to choose energy-efficient devices for all of the new housing, commercial, andindustrial developments that will be built as the North’s economy and living standards start togain on those of the South.

• Evaluate which industrial facilities need to be developed (or in rare cases, rebuilt), and planfor evolving supply systems for fuels (such as electricity, gas, heat) to serve the evolving
economy. In this case, serving the “evolving economy” means, for example, putting supply
systems where people will be, factoring in elements like re-mechanization of agriculture andshifts in economic composition toward the services sectors, and away from heavy industry,and probably toward cities and away from the countryside. That is, don’t plan to necessarily
put facilities where the people happen to be located now (or where they are shortly after
collapse) as they work in the planned economy and in survival-level cottage industries.

• Work with the Russians to reconstruct–or, more likely, construct a new–Sonbong refinery,
related port facilities, and the combined heat and power facilities associated with and serving
the refinery and the local area in the DPRK’s far Northeast.

• Work with the Russians to bring gas supplies and gas transmission and distribution
infrastructure into and through DPRK to the ROK, and/or work with the Russians and DPRK
to develop new liquefied natural gas (LNG) import, storage, and regasification facilities(again, with associated gas T&D facilities) somewhere near the 38th Parallel (for example, inor near Nampo in the DPRK). LNG facilities would likely be shared to serve both the North

839 See, for example, David F. von Hippel (2010), “Possible Energy, Economic, and Other Engagement/Assistance Activities to

Combine with Yongbyon Decommissioning/Conversion”, dated January, 2010, and available as http://nautilus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/Yongbyon-Decommissioning-and-Conversion.pdf.

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and South, particularly in the early years as DPRK gas distribution capacity and demand is
still being built.

• Consistent with global needs for evolving energy systems to address climate change, andwith the opportunity offered by the need for substantial energy sector redevelopment in the
DPRK in a “War” path (and, in fact, in essentially any path for the DPRK that involves
substantial change, collapse-driven or not) emphasize the development of renewable energy
sources in the DPRK, including micro-grids powered with solar (and possibly wind) energy
and with electricity storage using batteries, small pumped-storage hydro, or othertechnologies.
9.4.2. “Regime Implosion Leading to New Authoritarian Regime” PathIn the “Regime Implosion Leading to New Authoritarian Regime” Path, the technocratic regime
would presumably assess the country’s energy needs, and attempt to focus internally on energy
infrastructure redevelopment, taking advantage of largely Chinese and Russian technical help.
Energy infrastructure development would be focused on serving raw materials export industries,
and as such might be focused on areas in the North and West of the DPRK, leading to somewhat
geographically and sectorally-unbalanced energy systems. For example, if the regime is focusedon maximizing income from raw materials and labor exports, it might give limited attention to
improving energy supplies to and infrastructure in urban areas (outside of areas where elites live)
or to rural areas (outside of where minerals are found).
The ROK and West would be expected to have limited short and medium-term influence under
this path. The main options the ROK and West might have to influence the DPRK energy sector
might be to try and work through the Russians and Chinese to provide capacity-building, andthus affect patterns of change in DPRK energy infrastructure at the margin, and also to look foropportunities for joint ventures with Russians on regional infrastructure (for example, in
electricity and gas networks, and on oil refining). Working through the Chinese and Russians,
however, may be complicated by the bottom-line focus of Chinese and Russian trading
companies operating in the DPRK, which may leave little room for modifications in approachthat would help an eventually-reunified Korea. In general, the ROK and West could offer
capacity-building on energy and related topics as a lever to start opening the DPRK economy toother influences, but how those overtures might be received by the new DPRK regime, under thispath, is hard to predict.
In the longer-term, assuming an eventual gradual or sudden opening of the regime, theROK/West will need to focus on providing energy infrastructure in areas and populations left
underserved by export-oriented infrastructure.
9.4.3. “Regime Change by Palace Coup Leading to ROK-installed Regime” Path
The implications for the energy sector under the “Regime Change by Palace Coup Leading to
ROK-installed Regime” path are similar in many ways to those under the “surgical strike”
variant of “War” path, but with less DPRK destruction/dislocation to address, and without theneed to rebuild infrastructure in the ROK
As such, short-term needs under this path would include:

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK• Making a full assessment of the status of the North Korean electricity grid (T&D andgeneration) and other major energy and related infrastructure, including mines, refineries, rail
facilities, and ports.

• Replacing virtually all electrical substation equipment, starting with failed and failing units.
• Establishing emergency electricity generation, initially, on a city scale, with diesel orpossibly LPG-power barges in coastal areas, and package diesel or combined heat and power
plants in inland areas, and on a village/town scale with microgrids powered mostly by
renewable energy, focusing where power supply is particularly inadequate, in order to build
social stability in those areas and stem out-migration.

• Where possible, applying quick repairs to keep the best of the major coal-fired power stations
going for a few years while the national power grid is being replaced.

• Look for ways to upgrade existing hydroelectric facilities to improve their safety ofoperation, efficiency, and generation capacity.

• Ramping up ROK refined products production to supply currently unmet demand fortransport fuels in the DPRK, plus diesel fuel needs for temporary generation.

• Providing critical power, fuel, and equipment for farming.
In the medium- and longer-term, one priority under this path will be to assess coal supply
infrastructure to determine if any existing mines will be cost-effective to operate in the longerterm; and to shut down and abandon (and remediate) mines with poor prognosis. Poor prognosis
for North Korean mines may occur as a result of a damaged mining infrastructure that would be
too difficult to repair, unsafe mining conditions, a poor or depleted resource base (in terms ofcoal quantity and/or quality), or simply poor mine economics (which could be a function ofmany factors, including all of the above, plus coal transport and other considerations). Even
under this path, it would not make sense to abandon mines immediately as the regime changes,
given the importance of coal to the existing infrastructure and the importance of the coal industry
as an employer, but the coal mining sector should be reviewed soberly and shrunk if needed infavor of importing coal from major international low-cost producers if the assessment so
indicates, and/or working to adopt substitute fuels. A second major priority will be to evaluate
which industrial facilities need to be developed, based in large part, on demand for DPRKlocated facilities as indicated by the willingness of private sector actors (in the DPRK, the ROK,
and beyond) to invest. In addition, in the medium- and longer-term, plans need to be developedfor evolving supply systems for fuels (electricity, gas, heat, and refined products or renewablefuels) to serve the evolving Northern economy.
Again, in the medium- and longer-term, under the path leading to an ROK-friendly regime, a key
requirement will be to establish markets for fuels, and the regulatory authorities to oversee them,with an eye toward merging markets and regulatory authorities in a unified Korea. For markets,
the DPRK could in fact lead (or at least go arm-in-arm with) the ROK into the world of “smart
grids” and smart electricity meters. This could include, for example, widespread use of time-ofdemand pricing, local generation, and renewable generation. Demand for electricity in the
DPRK under this path could be expected to increase rapidly, accompanied by an opportunity (notto be missed) to build a very modern, very high-efficiency supply and demand-side electricity
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sector. Hand-in-hand with this effort should go development of progressively tighter building
energy efficiency regulations and build human capacity to enforce building energy efficiency andother regulations, and to design and construct high-efficiency buildings.
As with other paths, it will be desirable to work with Russia, and possibly with China and othernations, to explore and extend regional electricity and gas grids, and to partner on a new
Sonbong refinery. It will also be necessary to develop gas use infrastructure (demand-side anddistribution) for all sectors, including electricity generation and combined heat and power, for anumber of reasons, including reducing the greenhouse gas emissions in a unified Korea, andproviding energy services as cleanly and efficiently (in terms of overall fossil fuel use) as
possible. As in other paths, another priority will be to explore extending gas grids north from
ROK and building shared (North/South) LNG facilities.
Last, but certainly not least, this path will provide both the opportunity and need to do aggressive
capacity-building on a vast host of topics, starting as soon as possible. This will mean sending
the best North Korean students to the ROK, the United States, Australia, Europe, and elsewhere
for study, and providing them with incentives to return to work in the DPRK, but also, just as if
not more importantly, building up North Korean educational institutions at all levels.
9.4.4. “Slow Collapse Leading to Eventual Reunification” PathIn the “Slow Collapse Leading to Eventual Reunification” path, energy infrastructure continues
to slowly decay, following the general pattern—albeit occasionally partially reversed by isolated
repair projects and new developments—over the last two decades. As infrastructure decays it
continues to become more inefficient over time, and also loses capacity (for example, electricity
generation capacity, transport capacity, heat production capacity, and so on) as the performanceof individual units continues to decline, and as units fail altogether. In this path, scavenging formetals to sell for scrap may take an increasing toll on important energy infrastructure (such as
electricity T&D) systems and other infrastructure (such as rail lines) as well.
In the “Slow Collapse…” path, the DPRK’s efforts to keep infrastructure running will continue,
but will run up against diminishing returns due to a lack of replacement parts (for infrastructure
originally manufactured outside the DPRK) and of outside expertise that can only be acquiredwith scarce foreign exchange dollars. Exceptions to the pattern of decaying infrastructure may
be infrastructure that is required to support export ventures with outside investors, for example,
Chinese companies (especially, recently, mines), where outside investors have a vested interestin making sure that key infrastructure is operable.
From the perspective of the ROK and its allies, actions to usefully help to address DPRK energy
sector and related needs in the short-to-medium term are limited. So long as a central regime
hostile to the outside remains in power in North Korea, little can be done but to take advantagesof the (likely) rare opportunities that occur for engagement and capacity building. As the central
regime loses power, there may be more opportunities for small, local engagement projects
addressing energy sector needs, but such projects will be difficult and potentially hazardous tocarry out and may more likely be the province of non-national groups such as non-governmental
or international organizations. If an era of “fiefdoms” occurs during the slow collapse, arranging
any type of regional project (electricity interties, gas pipelines, or rail interconnections) will bedifficult due to shifts in who is in charge or in power in areas transited by proposed infrastructure
at any given time.
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKIn the longer-term, when the collapse of the state is complete, with or without an interim“fiefdom” era, the types of measures required of the ROK and its partners following
reunification-by-default are the same as in the “Regime change by palace coup” path, but with asignificant difference. Continued degradation of energy infrastructure, leading (in part) toextreme scarcity and suppressed demand, is likely to make eventual
reconstruction/redevelopment and recovery the DPRK a progressively larger and larger longterm issue for the ROK, with growing complexity and expense.
Also in the longer-term, relative to a more immediate collapse, the Slow Collapse path implies
that full assessments of DPRK energy and related infrastructure will not be possible for sometime. Full, on-the-ground assessments of infrastructure needs, energy demand, and other key
factors that are needed to plan effective energy sector assistance will be stymied by lack ofaccess for years. As a result, the countries and organizations that would need to step in toprovide energy services and rebuild energy infrastructure under a collapse scenario will not beable to fully assess the slowly deteriorating situation until actual collapse occurs, at which pointneeds (for food, water, electricity, waste treatment, health care, jobs, and other essentials) will
likely be more urgent than they would have been had collapse occurred sooner.
The lack of access to the DPRK to perform a full energy sector assessment means that planningfor energy sector support, and increasingly, as time passes, redevelopment, will need to continue
to be informed by fragmentary information. This underlines the need for the international
community to A) coordinate and share information on the DPRK whenever possible, B) use that
information to formulate and regularly update plans for energy sector triage and rebuilding undera collapse scenario, even if collapse is long in coming, and C) provide resources to consistently
support both A) and B). Gathering and making sense of energy sector information will require
coordination by interested parties in data gathering and analysis. Considerable persistence andpatience will also be required of those in the ROK and the international community who must
prepare for DPRK regime collapse by keeping energy sector assistance and contingency plans
updated, and remaining in readiness to effectively activate plans when needed.

9.5.

Lessons from Collapse Pathways for Near-term Initiatives and Planning
Efforts

Our initial consideration of the energy sector implications of potential DPRK regime collapse
pathways suggests that there are several initiatives that those in the ROK, the United States, andthe broader international community who are interested in the future of the Korean peninsula canundertake to be ready to assist in the event of a DPRK regime collapse. Possible initiatives
include:• Do capacity building on lots of topics whenever possible. Capacity-building is cheap, useful,and necessary in any path, and has many ancillary benefits. Required capacity building
topics include technical training in electricity generation, energy efficiency, oil refining,
renewable energy, environmental remediation, waste treatment, reforestation, and othersimilar disciplines. In addition, training will be needed in running commercial enterprises,
including economic analysis, building an operating regulatory and legal systems, and manyother organizational topics. Ancillary benefits of capacity building include engagement on
the individual and organizational level, opening minds to new ways of thinking, increasing
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the availability of competence and personal connections for application at key movements oftransition, as well as availability of in-country trainers to rapidly expand training as needed.

• Plan now for the wholesale rebuilding of the transmission and distribution system, likely withthe dissemination of microgrids using largely renewable energy in the short- and mediumterm, followed by knitting those microgrids together to restore a national grid. Doing so will
be necessary sooner or later. An initial step might be to stockpile key components, such astransformers and substation switchgear, for rapid installation as needed.

• Assess the ROK’s current refining capacity versus the petroleum products needs of areunified (in fact if not in deed) Korea. Start talking with Russians about possibility of
rebuilding and expanding the Sonbong refinery to be ready to rapidly start a refinery project
when conditions permit. In a world that is addressing climate change through, for example,
reducing/replacing the use of petroleum products in motor vehicles, it may be that today’s
petroleum refining capacity—particularly considering the ROK’s huge refining base—will
suffice essentially indefinitely.

• In order to reduce the burden on energy supply infrastructure (including reducing the amountof new energy supply infrastructure needed), have the discipline to provide high-efficiency
energy demand (and supply) devices when rebuilding the DPRK economy. Provide highefficiency demand and supply devices rather than, for example, marketing secondhand
appliances, industrial motors, power plants, automobiles, and other devices to the DPRK
from China, the ROK, and/or Japan, so as to make sure that the DPRK has a better chance of“catching up” with technology in the ROK, yielding better outcomes from social, resource
conservation, environmental, economic/infrastructure integration perspectives.

• Think through how markets for energy goods can be established so as to spur private sector
investments.

• Plan integrated energy infrastructure/economic development demonstration projects, forexample, on a county scale, and try to get some integrated projects implemented even before
collapse.

• Network with other interested parties to provide the best assessment possible of DPRK
energy sector status and needs, and collaborate (including the participation of DPRK actors,
if and when possible) on concrete plans so as to be able to swiftly and effectively address
those needs when an opening occurs.
Finally, medium- and long-term regional energy projects such as a regional electric grid tie-lines
and/or regional gas pipelines should be implemented in ways that provide China, Russia, theROK and perhaps energy suppliers/users not immediately adjacent to the DPRK, such as
Mongolia and Japan, with some leverage over the reconstruction agenda should the DPRK
collapse. This leverage may be needed, in part, to ensure that the ROK hands over all fissile
material and nuclear weapons-related hardware and knowledge to the IAEA and/or to nuclear
weapons states in the scenario where such hardware and knowledge is obtained/inherited by the
ROK from DPRK sources after the collapse of the DPRK. Meanwhile, policymakers should
focus on the measures needed to stabilize the DPRK to avoid collapse of the DPRK in the shortand medium-term.
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10.

Redevelopment of the DPRK Energy Sector: Assistance Approaches andProject Options
10.1.

Introduction

When and if negotiations between the DPRK and the involved players in the international
community (formerly constituted as the Six-Party Talks and the diplomatic venues that emerged
to replace them) resume, negotiations will center on the dismantling of the DPRK’s nuclear
weapons program, and on the incentives that will be offered by the international community to
induce the DPRK to do so.840 Chief among the incentives will be energy sector assistance to the
DPRK. This chapter outlines a number of generic policy areas where assistance would be inorder, as well as some ideas for cooperation activities in specific energy sectors. Neither set ofsuggestions is intended to provide an exhaustive list of the opportunities for cooperation, andneither is intended to provide a “schedule” of any kind to guide the development of a package ofoptions to offer the DPRK. Development of such a package is necessary (and is a critical need),but is beyond the scope of this Report, and must necessarily involve consultations among key
policy actors in the ROK, the US, China, Russia, the EU, and other nations, as well as, to theextent that such conversations are possible, the DPRK.
10.2.

Potential for International Cooperation to Assist in the Redevelopment of the
DPRK Energy Sector

Key economic resources for the DPRK, as noted earlier in this Report, include a large, welltrained, disciplined, and eager work force, an effective system for dissemination of technologies,
the ability to rapidly mount massive public works projects by mobilizing military and otherlabor, and extensive reserves of minerals. What the DPRK lacks are modern tools andmanufacturing methods, fuel, arable land (though the land it does have might be just sufficient tofeed its population with improvements in agricultural methods), and substantial financial capitaland the means to generate it. The lack of capital is largely a function of the DPRK’s historicaleconomic isolation from most of the international economy but has certainly been exacerbatedunder the international sanctions regime that has been imposed during the last few years (to2021). In part to make up for the lack of ways to earn foreign exchange through typicalinternational trade, DPRK has earned money to by allegedly selling weapons (sometimes
through barter for fuel or other goods) and by implementing a range of alleged illicit activities,
including cyber-crime, and, until recently (that is, until the practice was mostly halted due to
UNSC sanctions), through remittances from North Koreans working abroad.841 As a

840 For a perspective on the views of DPRK officials regarding energy assistance options and nuclear weapons dismantlement,

see Siegfried Hecker, “Energy Dialog with DRPK Officials Aug. 23-27, 2005 Visit to DPRK”, presentation prepared for the
DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA. Presentation available as
http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Hecker.ppt.
841 See, for example, US Department of Justice (2021), “Three North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme
to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe”, dated February 17, 2021, and available ashttps://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-north-korean-military-hackers-indicted-wide-ranging-scheme-commit-cyberattacks-and..
See also Michelle Nichols and Raphael Satter (2021), U.N. experts point finger at North Korea for $281 million cyber theft,

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consequence, given the energy sector problems outlined above, a coordinated program ofassistance from the ROK, the United States, and other countries that builds upon these skills will
be needed. Providing key assistance in a timely manner will enhance security in Northeast Asia,
accelerate the process of North Korean rapprochement, and help to position the countries andfirms as major suppliers for the DPRK rebuilding process.
The nature of the DPRK's energy sector problems, however, mean that an approach that focuseson one or several massive projects—such as a single large power plant—will not work. A multipronged approach on a several fronts is required, with a large suite of coordinated, smaller,
incremental projects addressing needs in a variety of areas. Installing a large power plant in the
DPRK without addressing problems of fuel supply, end-use efficiency, and electricity
transmission and distribution, and without helping the DPRK to develop the means to peacefully
earn the money to pay for the plant plus its operating expenses, is “putting the cart before thehorse”. Providing a power plant with no fuel supply, or a power plant with fuel supply but noworkable grid, or fuel supply and an upgraded grid but no power plant, or even a power plantwith fuel supply and an upgraded grid but no efficient end use equipment (or no end use
equipment at all) with which to use the electricity, are neither cost-effective nor even feasible
options in the DPRK and will not improve the security situation in the long term. A coordinatedapproach is necessary.
Below, we identify priority areas where we see DPRK energy sector assistance as both necessary
and in the best interests of all parties.842 All of these interventions would put foreign (US, ROK,
or other) engineers, trainers, consultants, and other program staff in direct contact with their
DPRK counterparts and with DPRK energy end-users. In our own experience working on the
ground in the DPRK, visitors working hard to help and to teach North Koreans has great
effectiveness in breaking down barriers between our peoples. Actions speak louder than words
or missiles in negotiating with the DPRK.
Many of the options described below are also consistent with the key areas for international
cooperation to assist in developing the DPRK energy sector and the broader DPRK economy
outlined in 2006 by Dr. Ji-Chul Ryu of the Korea Energy Economics Institute in his presentation
for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting entitled “Energy Crisis in DPR Korea
and Cooperation Issues”.843 We summarize Dr. Ryu’s key areas for cooperation as:
1. Abandoning the DPRK’s self-reliance economic policy, including opening the energy system
to commercial energy supply from overseas.
2. Establishing market mechanisms for distribution of energy, and creating energy markets,
including introducing energy pricing and tax systems and reforming energy legal structures.

KuCoin likely victim”, Reuters, dated February 9, 2021, and available as https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkoreasanctions-cyber/u-n-experts-point-finger-at-north-korea-for-281-million-cyber-theft-kucoin-likely-victim-idUSKBN2AA00Q.
842 See also Peter Hayes, “Options for DPRK Energy Sector Engagement”, presentation prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts
Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA. Presentation available as
http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Hayes_Options.ppt.
843 Ji-Chul Ryu, “Energy Crisis in DPR Korea and Cooperation Issues”, presentation prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts
Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA). Available as http://nautilus.wpengine.netdnacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Ryu.ppt.

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3. Promoting active regional/international cooperation, including for rehabilitation of theexisting energy facilities, and expansion of the energy system through accommodating
foreign investments.
4. Adopting cost-effective energy options in rebuilding the DPRK energy sector, including
increasing the role of petroleum in the DPRK’s energy mix while at the same time pursuingin parallel the development of new and renewable energy in the short term, and developmentof natural gas in the medium-long term goals.
5. Strengthening the energy policy-making capability in the DPRK by improving energy
statistics and modeling infrastructure, and through training of energy experts and scientists.
ROK--DPRK cooperation in many of these areas has already, at least at times, been underway, asreported by Dr. Kyung Sool Kim of KEEI in his 2006 presentation “Current Situation and
Prospects of Energy Cooperation between Two Koreas”. Though Dr. Kim noted that thecooperative interactions between the ROK and the DPRK at that time had been “very limited”,
they had included the supply of oil for a railroad interconnection, the supply of materials for roadbuilding, the development of the Gaesung (Kaesong) industrial district, and humanitarian aid
related to the 2004 rail accident. Dr. Kim noted that possibilities for “Major Inter-Korean
Energy Cooperation Projects”, including transmission lines and gas pipelines involving theRussian Far East as well as the two Koreas, similar to those described in Chapter 8 of this reportwith reference to a future “Regional Alternative” energy path for the DPRK.844
10.2.1. Provide technical and institutional assistance in implementing energy
efficiency measures
Focusing in particular on energy efficiency, regional cooperation would be useful to help the
DPRK to:•Provide the DPRK with access to energy-efficient products, materials and parts. Since
these items will probably, at least initially, be imported, this will entail a loosening ofrestrictions on exports to the DPRK. China, the DPRK's largest trading partner, would be agood source of efficient technologies and equipment that may be more easily absorbed (andmore affordable) than those available from most other countries. The flow of such
equipment from China to the DPRK China has in fact stepped up in recent years, as noted
above, as the rapid growth of trade in televisions, bicycles, electric scooters, solar PV panels,
and generators (to name just a few products) attests. China is the DPRK’s major energy
supplier, and thus may have an interest not only in marketing equipment, but in reducing the
DPRK's dependence on (in some cases, reportedly subsidized) energy imports from China,
particularly given China’s own recently tight energy supplies in the wake of trade disputes

844 Kyung Sool Kim, “Current Situation and Prospects of Energy Cooperation between Two Koreas”, presentation prepared forthe DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA, and available as
http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/KEEI.ppt. Dr. Kim also presented information on thepotential cost, capacity, and other features of these and other options, placed possible cooperation on these projects in the context
of the goals of the 6-Party Talks, and reviewed an agenda for cooperation opportunities in other sectors, including non-physicalcapacity building, capacity building in the energy market system, and cooperation in the coal, oil, electricity, gas, new andrenewable energy, and other sectors.

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due to UNSC sanctions.845•

Pursue sector-based implementation of energy efficiency measures. One point madeforcefully by early studies of East European economies “in transition”846 is the need topursue energy efficiency opportunities on a sector-by-sector basis, as opposed to through an
overarching "Least Cost Planning"-style of analysis as has been practiced for electric and gas
utility service areas.847 It is people at the sectoral level who must work with energy-using
equipment daily to do their jobs who are most likely to be interested in energy-efficiency
opportunities, rather than planners in a central ministry.
One way to gain support for energy efficiency measures is to emphasize those that achieve
multiple goals. Energy-efficient technologies can be combined with building retrofits that
increase the comfort of residents, the rebuilding of factories to improve output, therenovation of power plants to cut down on forced outages, and other upgrading efforts thathave little--explicitly--to do with energy efficiency. China, in the 1980s, introduced a major
process improvement to the steel industry—continuous casting—primarily as an energy
efficiency measure, and supported its introduction with funding from the national program ofefficiency investments. In China's other energy-intensive industries, such as chemicals andcement manufacturing, measures to increase energy efficiency have typically resulted ingreater product output and higher product quality as well, resulting in high rates of adoption
once the benefits of the measures have been appreciated by other manufacturers.
To the ultimate users of energy efficiency measures, the relative costs per unit of energy
savings of the various possible industrial process, transport, and energy supply improvements
is less than meaningful--what matters is how energy efficiency opportunities stack up toother potential uses for the investment funds that they have available (for example,
investment funds allocated from the central government). In addition, it is often
counterproductive to charge personnel from the typically supply-oriented energy sector withequipment decisions in end-using sectors of the economy, because they would bring withthem a strong supply-side bias.

•

Carry out demonstration projects. The most effective way to convince decision-makers in
the DPRK—both at the national and local levels—that energy efficiency measures andprograms are worthwhile will be to show that they work in specific North Korean situations.
Carefully designed, effective demonstrations of energy efficiency and renewable energy

845 See, for example, Chuin-Wei Yap (2021), “China’s Coal War With Australia Fuels Shortage at Home: The trade dispute has

forced Chinese buyers to pay steep premiums for imports amid a supply crunch”, Wall Street Journal, dated February 10, 2021,
and available as https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-coal-war-with-australia-fuels-shortage-at-home-11612953005.
846 Schipper, L. and E. Martinot (1993), Energy Efficiency in Former Soviet Republics: Opportunities for East and West.
International Energy Studies, Energy Analysis Program, Energy and Environment Division, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory,
Berkeley, California, USA. LBL-33929. Prepared for U.S. Department of Energy. A version of this work is available forpurchase from https://www.inderscienceonline.com/doi/abs/10.1504/IJGEI.1994.063544.
847 Schipper and Martinot also point out two disadvantages of least-cost planning in the context of the former Soviet Union

that are probably equally relevant to North Korea. First, stable energy markets and prices (which are inputs to Least Cost
Planning) do not exist as they do (for the most part) in the West, and data on energy end-uses, as noted above, as well as
cost data for domestic and imported equipment, are problematic. Second, Least-cost planning is sufficiently similar to thesystem of planning formerly in use in the USSR (and still, apparently, used in the DPRK) that it would provide a
comfortable and familiar retreat for central planners, and thus could be considered a step away from, rather than towards,
economic reform.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKtechnologies that involve local actors as much as possible are likely to catch the interest of
North Koreans. Given the good system for technology dissemination in the DPRK, thisapproach is likely to lead to the adoption of energy efficiency measures into the North
Korean way of doing things. One word of caution here is to make sure that any
demonstration projects carried out can be replicated elsewhere in the DPRK—measuresunique to one or a few specific industrial plants, for example, are not likely to be widely
replicated.
The authors of this Report have over the years prepared several concepts for demonstration
engagement projects centered around energy-efficiency and/or renewable energy, designed tomeet the political and energy service needs of constituents in the DPRK and beyond. Most
recently, we have prepared a concept, to be published shortly, that we summarize as follows:“A consortium-led humanitarian/capacity-building/engagement project, focusing on the
installation of energy-efficiency measures in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK) buildings sector and mini-grid systems powered by renewable energy for electricity
generation, could potentially be deployed rapidly and would meet the requirements of a
substantial pilot engagement project that would contribute toward cooperative threat
reduction on the Korean Peninsula. The project would offer positive attributes such as highly
visible symbolic improvements for the DPRK energy sector, consistency with DPRK statedinterests, limited potential for military diversion, affordability, scalability, humanitarian andeconomic development elements, and large scope for face-to-face interactions between North
Koreans and the international community. It would also provide a demonstrable model forboth future direction in the DPRK energy sector and for productive and cooperative future
engagement between the parties as they work toward threat reduction. In order for such a
project to be deployed rapidly, it is likely that a consortium of third parties—that is, nongovernmental organizations—in the international community will need to plan, organize, anddeliver the project, albeit, of course, with the approval and support of the governments
involved.” Our publication on this concept provides a summary of our estimates of DPRK
energy supply and demand (which is updated in earlier chapters of this report), a descriptionof what the goals of and challenges faced by a cooperative project would be, and an
illustration of what the project might include, how it might be organized, what organizations
and skills would be needed, and an example project budget and timeline, plus thoughts on thetypes of organizations might be involved in a project consortium and overall conclusions.848
In addition, in 2012 one of us (von Hippel) worked with colleagues from an ROK
government institute to prepare a document entitled Development of an Energy-Independent
Village in the DPRK: Scoping Study for Pilot Project that illustrated of an engagement
project whereby a chosen village or small town in the DPRK would be host to a project that
included an energy needs survey, development of local industries, provision of humanitarian
services, and environmental benefits using a combination of energy efficiency, renewableenergy, and other technologies and approaches. That report was prepared for publication,

848 David von Hippel And Peter Hayes (2021), Provision of Humanitarian Energy Efficiency, Renewable Energy, and Micro-

Grid Measures to The Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) as Complementary to Engagement-Focused Cooperative
Threat Reduction Activities, Paper prepared in September 2020 for the Asia Pacific Leadership Network (APLN), andforthcoming as an APLN Special Report (https://www.apln.network/analysis/special-report).

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and even printed in book form, but never distributed by the sponsoring institute. We plan to
update and publish it soon.
10.2.2. Promote better understanding of the North Korean situation in the ROKSouth Koreans have a deep and natural interest in what goes on in the DPRK but have no better
access to information on the DPRK than those in other countries. It will be important inparticular to involve South Korean actors—to the extent allowed and desired by the DPRK and
ROK—in the types of research and training activities mentioned above. This suggestion follows
partly from the proximity of the two countries, and from the considerable economic support andtechnical know-how amount that the South can offer the North. In addition, given the premisethat the two countries will ultimately reunify, we believe that the more contact officials from thetwo countries have, and the more they know about each other, the less painful will be the processof reunification.
10.2.3. Work to open opportunities for Independent Power Producer companies towork in the DPRKAs noted above, the scale and complexity of the energy sector problems in the DPRK mean thatthe most reasonable way to address those problems is on a local and regional level. Though the
ROK (and US, for example) governments might reasonably provide technical assistance andlimited direct humanitarian aid, as well as support for international efforts, it is probably
unreasonable to expect other countries to directly underwrite the renovation of DPRK
infrastructure on even a county scale. What the other governments can do, however, is pave theway for companies such as Independent Power Producers (IPPs) to operate in the DPRK. In thisliaison role, the governments could provide assistance to firms in identifying, negotiating with,and working with DPRK counterparts, underwrite performance guarantees, and provide lowinterest financing. The governments can also help by providing North Korean counterparts withtraining in the economics of project evaluation and in international contract law, both of whichare, as noted above, at present alien concepts in the DPRK. The goal would be to assist IPP
firms in working with DPRK authorities to set up with local and regional infrastructure (forexample, power plants of less than 50 MWe) using small hydro installations, wind farms, solar
PV installations, or possibly small or mid-sized coal-fired plants, for example, using gasification
technology. In most cases, infrastructure projects would need to be coupled with the initiation orre-establishment of local revenue-generating activities so that IPP products and services can becompensated. A necessary condition for the implementation of IPP projects is the developmentof markets for electricity in the DPRK that would allow IPP companies to recover their costs andprofit from their investments.
10.2.4. Cooperation on technology transfer for energy efficiency, renewableenergyA number of suggestions for beginning to work with the DPRK on confidence-building measuresin the realm of energy efficiency and renewable energy were listed in our initial (1995) report on
the topic,849 as well as in subsequent publications. Briefly, these include:

849 Von Hippel, D. F., and P. Hayes (1995), The Prospects for Energy Efficiency Improvements in the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea: Evaluating and Exploring the Options. Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development,
Berkeley, CA, USA. December 1995.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK•Provide information and general training in energy efficiency to high-level government officials.

•

Provide specific information and training to local actors (such as power plant managers,
industrial energy plant overseers, and building boiler operators).

•

Encourage and support implementation and enforcement of energy efficiency standards.

•

Assist in establishing a program of grants and concessional loans for energy efficiency
investments to industrial organizations and others.

•

Encourage the modification of existing incentives that thwart energy efficiency improvements.

•

Assist in and encourage the reform (or establishment) of energy pricing.

•

Provide training in the design and implementation of micro-grid focused on using renewableenergy systems such as solar PV systems. Nautilus provided well-received training to adelegation from the DPRK as a part of our December 2019 Regional Energy Security Project
meeting in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.850 Ultimately, implementation of local mini-grids to provide
electricity needs in villages, towns, and counties, then, later, integrating those mini-grids into arebuilt national grid system in the DPRK, may prove the most effective and cost-effective way
to restore provision of electricity to much of the country.

•

Promote and support joint ventures and licensing agreements between the DPRK and foreign
firms, possibly as part of development of the Rajin-Sonbong Free Trade Zone (Rason Special
Economic Zone), or the further development/restarting of the Kaesong Industrial Park.851•

Initiate a program of exchange focused on methods of and training in energy planning (and thedata gathering needed to make such planning relevant), including consideration of theenvironmental and economic impacts of energy choices.
10.3.

Key/attractive energy sector technologies and processes for energy sector
redevelopment in the DPRK
10.3.1. Rebuilding of the transmission and distribution system

The need for refurbishment and/or rebuilding of the DPRK T&D system, and the types ofmaterials and equipment that will be required, have been identified briefly earlier in this Report.
The most cost-effective approach for international and ROK assistance in this area will be tostart by working with DPRK engineers to identify and prioritize a list of T&D sector
improvements and investments, and to provide limited funding for pilot installations in a limited
area—perhaps in the Tumen River area, in counties where key industries for earning foreignexchange (such as mines) are located, or in the Kaesong area. Ultimately, it will be necessary toengage the World Bank as a leader in DPRK power sector refurbishment, likely with funding
from the Japanese government. It is possible, as noted above, that an approach involving

850 See Chris Greacen (2020), Integrating Mini Grids into National Grids: Technical And Organizational Aspects, NAPSNet

Special Reports, dated September 22, 2020, and available as https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/integrating-minigrids-into-national-grids-technical-and-organizational-aspects/.
851 Relatedly, for example, Won Bae Kim, in a 2008 presentation for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, March
8 and 9, 2008, Beijing, China, entitled “ Design of Infrastructure Development in North Korea: A Practical Approach”, available
as http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/WBKim.ppt, advocated focusing on industrial zones inthe “four corners” of the DPRK for infrastructure development to serve as a catalyst for overall DPRK economic redevelopment.

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implementation of mini or microgrids in the short-to-medium term could be the most practicaland cost-effective path to providing reliable electricity service across the DPRK. Local solutions
could be focused on projects that would help the DPRK earn foreign exchange in acceptablemanner, such as repairing or replacing T&D infrastructure and local power plants in specificareas so that facilities such as key mines can operate.
The box below presents a “Microgrids for Mines” engagement/development project concept that
we hope to have a chance to expand and discuss further with DPRK and other colleagues in the
future.

Illustrative Project for DPRK Denuclearization Engagement:“Microgrids for Mines”
Summary
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) possesses abundant mineral resources,and economic development based on minerals extraction is a key priority for the DPRK
government. A lack of mining technology in general, and of electricity to run mines inparticular, significantly limits the degree to which the DPRK can develop minerals resources
without outside investment. An offer of a demonstration project that builds a “micro-grid”—asmall electrical grid to run the mine and nearby settlements using mini-hydro, solar PV, andother technologies—for a mining complex could well be of keen interest to the DPRK, andcould serve as a means for engaging in denuclearization dialog with the DPRK.
Minerals and Electric Power in the DPRKAs noted in Chapter 7 of this Report, the DPRK possesses significant, and in some cases
world-class, reserves of many minerals and metal ores, including gold, silver, iron, zinc, lead,copper, magnesite, rare earth minerals, and many others. These resources have attracted
attention from the Republic of Korea, with its massive industrial structure but a general lack ofresources, but although inter-Korean mining projects have been proposed, successful
implementation has been lacking. Chinese investors, particularly from the Northeastern
provinces, have developed joint ventures in many DPRK mines, with mixed success.
Although the DPRK has limited supplies of modern mining equipment, a key impediment todevelopment of mines is the lack of reliable electricity supplies from the central grid. Since
the fall of the USSR in 1990, the DPRK’s electricity and transmission and distribution (T&D)
assets have generally eroded, with the development of new, mostly smaller, mostlyhydroelectric plants insufficient to make up for the gap between electricity supply and demand,
which is exacerbated by high T&D losses.
The DPRK has a system of prioritizing supplies that allows some key mines to receive power,
sometimes directly from power plants, as much as 24 hours per day, but many installations
receive much less, hardly any (2-3 hours per day) or indeed no power from the grid. Mines
require nearly full-time power to be reasonably productive, and in some cases lack of power
for key end uses—such as pumping water out of mining areas—results in significant setbacks.
In addition, some mine operators must pay significant tariffs (reportedly between $0.10 and$0.15 per kWh) for the electricity they receive from the grid. As such, many mine developers
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have taken to installing equipment to produce their own electricity, typically either with minihydroelectric power plants, with diesel generators (although use of these has been more limited
as sanctions have reduced oil supplies), or with small coal-gasifier-powered generator units.
Microgrids for Mines Concept
The “Microgrids for Mines” concept proposes offering to undertake a collaborative projectwith the DPRK that would develop a microgrid and related systems to power a mine in the
DPRK, the output of which would be sold internationally. The project and the ability to sellmine output would be a part of a bargain with the DPRK to induce participation in
denuclearization talks and first steps—such as allowing IAEA inspectors back to some key
DPRK nuclear facilities—toward reaching agreements. The microgrid could be applied to one
or more mines and could be adjusted in terms of cost and power output to meet the needs ofthe mine and the needs of negotiations. A 2018 article by ROK authors envisioned a solar
microgrid for a large existing zinc and lead mine at Gumdeok with an output capacity of 7.5
million tonnes of ore annually,852 but smaller installations are also possible due to the scalable
nature of microgrids.
Like the grid electricity they supplant, microgrids for mines would need to provide power for arange of end-uses, including conveyors and elevators (motive power), air compressors fordrills and jackhammers, hydraulic drilling equipment, water pumping, ore grinding andclassifying, lighting for mines, and lighting and plug loads for offices and workers’ quarters,
although the latter demands are quite small. The microgrid could also be extended to nearby
villages, providing a humanitarian benefit and additional rural economic development
opportunities (for education, agricultural processing, local manufacturing, and other needs). A
mining operation would likely need power 12-16 hours per day, for most of the year (possiblywith a hiatus in winter). Sources of power for microgrids would include solar photovoltaic
panels, mini- and micro-hydro installations, and wind power (some areas of the DPRK havegood wind resources, particularly in the far Northeast and along the high ridges in the center ofthe country). These could be augmented with fossil-fueled units such as electricity generatorsand coal gasifier-fueled generating units. For microgrids based on solar power, in particular,
solar output would need to be stored, with the two most likely technologies being battery
storage—the cost of which has been falling rapidly (and of which the ROK is a leading
producer), and pumped-storage hydro, which pumps water uphill when excess power isavailable, and routes water back down to turn a turbine when needed. Pumped-storage hydromay be a good match to the DPRK’s rugged terrain in many places.
Examples of Scales of Microgrids for Mines
Two examples of mines where microgrids might be applied are shown below to illustrate thepotential scales of such systems, although they represent neither the largest nor the smallest
grids that are possible.
◼

In the Gumdeok mine example provided by the ROK authors referenced above,
electricity requirements of 255 GWh (million kWh) per year were estimated, requiringon the order of 250 MW of solar PV power to provide all of the power needed for the

852 Myeongchan Oh, Sung-Min Kim, Young-Hyun Koo, and Hyeong-Dong Park (2018), “Analysis of Photovoltaic Potential andSelection of Optimal Site near Gumdeok Mine, North Korea”, New & Renewable Energy 2018. 9 Vol. 14, No. 3, available ashttps://doi.org/10.7849/ksnre.2018.9.14.3.044.

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mine, or less than that if other power sources are used as well. The authors estimate acost of about $200 million for the PV systems, although that A) is based on ROK costs(probably from 2 years ago, at this point), which may be high if panels are purchasedfrom China, for example, and B) the cost does not appear to include storage forelectricity, which would be required, particularly if solar was the main power source.
As such, a range of $150 to $300 million is probably a reasonable assumption for thisinstallation.
◼

Another example, which might be applicable, for example, to a smaller gold mine(which typically would produce other metals as well), would require about 500 kW ofpower on a fairly continuous basis (12-18 hours per day), about 200-250 days per year.
Depending on the types of power supplies used for the microgrid, one would expect a
microgrid for such an installation using renewable energy to cost on the order of $3
million to $7 million or more including microgrid elements such as generation, storage,
distribution lines, transformers, and control equipment. Oil- or coal-fired generators
would be considerably less expensive (though distribution costs would not change) but
would incur costs for continuous fuel inputs and for the systems supplying those fuels.

Additional Considerations
This illustrative example has provided a necessarily brief treatment of the “Microgrids for
Mines” concept. Much would need to be done to negotiate, plan, and implement such a
project in the DPRK, requiring many types of expertise. Among the additional considerations
to be addressed, and additional possibilities to consider, are:◼

Will restrictions be placed on who the DPRK can export the mine output to, and/or how
the proceeds from sales of the output would be used? For example, would there be an
insistence that funds from the sale of minerals commodities go toward humanitarian
uses?

◼

Relatedly, the mine targeted for a microgrid would need to be carefully considered.
Gold and silver mines, for example, produce instantly and globally saleable output, but
perhaps offer less opportunity to control the use of the output, if that is an issue.

◼

It is to be expected that the choice of the mine or mines to be included in a microgrids
project will be neither random nor straightforward, and will require North Koreans to
consult a number of internal constituencies even as the project is discussed as a part oftalks.

◼

The timing of the project will need to be coordinated with agreements made during
talks, and probably will require the project to be mounted and delivered quickly oncethe parties get to “Yes”. This means that significant initial planning and developmentof at least conceptual project options, including identification of potential projectdelivery mechanisms and participants, will need to be done well in advance.

◼

This type of project is consistent with the DPRK’s own stated priorities for economic
development in general, minerals sector development in particular, development ofstand-alone power sources, and development of sources of renewable energy, some ofwhich have been highlighted by Kim Jong Un himself. As such, a Microgrids for
Mines project would be expected to have considerable symbolic and demonstration
value to the DPRK.
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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRK◼

The DPRK’s endowment of rare earth minerals ores, sources of elements (examples are
yttrium and neodymium) important for but used in small quantities in the production ofhigh-tech products, should be of strategic interest to the US and others, as China
currently produces on the order of 97% of these elements. Rare earth resources arefound in many places, including the US, so there may be synergies with microgrids anddevelopment of rare earth mines in the DPRK that could provide experience that would
also benefit US producers.

10.3.2. Rehabilitation of power plants and other coal-using infrastructure
Rehabilitating existing thermal power plants, industrial boilers, and institutional/residential
boilers will result in improved efficiency so the coal that is available goes further, will reduce
pollutant emissions, and will improve reliability so that the lights and heat stay on longer.
Accomplishing these upgrades will require a combination of training, materials (especiallycontrol systems), and perhaps assistance to set up and finance manufacturing concerns to massproduce small boilers and heat-exchange components.
An initial focus, in the area of boiler technology, should be on improvements in small, medium,and district heating boilers for humanitarian end-uses such as residential heating and provision ofheat and hot water for hospitals, schools, and orphanages, many of which have reportedly had
little or no heat, or have used biomass fuels for heating, in recent years. If possible, it would be
optimal to provide such upgrades in areas of the country away from Pyongyang, those hardest hit
by the DPRK's economic difficulties.
The DPRK building stock, even in rural areas, tends to make extensive use of masonry andconcrete, with leaky windows and doors, and minimal insulation. A program of boiler upgrades
should go hand-in-hand with a program of "weatherization" (insulation, caulking,weatherstripping, and window replacement). Even minimal weatherization measures promise
significant savings, with attendant reductions in coal use (making the supply go further), and in
local and regional pollution.
Another early focus should be on rehabilitation of boilers in key industries that could help the
DPRK to "bootstrap" the civilian economy. As a specific example, the DPRK has one of theworld's largest deposits of the mineral magnesite, which is used in making refractory (furnacelining) materials. Helping to rebuild the boilers or kilns that are used to produce magnesite,
along with the fuel- and ore-supply chains that feed them, would help to boost magnesite
production, and would bring much-needed additional foreign exchange into the country. We
suspect that with international and ROK government participation and guidance, a private sector
partner from the ROK or elsewhere could be found to assist with this type of rehabilitation, andto share in the profits of a joint-venture firm.
In the short run, it may also be useful for the international community to provide the DPRK withcoal for selected power plants (to the extent that they are operable) in areas now poorly served by
the existing coal and electricity supply systems. Providing such supplies would help restore
humanitarian services and assist in economic revival while other energy sector upgrades areunderway. In general, assuming an agreement is reach with regard to the DPRK’s nuclear
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weapons and related programs, it is likely that improvements in coal-fired power and heat will belargely short-to-medium term measures to provide energy service while the DPRK (and theworld) transitions to cleaner, low/no-carbon fuels.
10.3.3. Rehabilitation of coal supply and coal transport systems
Strengthening of the coal supply and transport systems (again for the short-to-medium term)
must go hand in hand with boiler rehabilitation if the amount of useful energy available in the
DPRK is to increase. Foreign coal industries—in the United States and Australia, for instance,
as well as China and Russia—have significant expertise to assist with evaluating and upgrading
coal mines in the DPRK, including helping with improvements in mining technologies andequipment, in evaluation of coal resources, in mine ventilation systems, and in mine safety. The
needs in this sector are so extensive, however, that no one should expect that substantial
rehabilitation of the coal sector will happen quickly. For example, even once power is restored
to mines, electrical and other equipment has been replaced or upgraded, and in-mine life support
systems are adequate, in many mines it may take literally years before many coal galleries are
pumped sufficiently free of water to be worked again. Coal processing to remove ash andimprove fuel value could be another focus of assistance, as could the tapping of coalbed methane
for use as a fuel853 (and to improve mine safety).
In parallel with any mine upgrades, rehabilitation of the coal transport network must also takeplace. This involves making sure that train tracks between mines and coal users are operable,that locomotives have electricity or diesel fuel to operate, and that working coal cars areavailable. In turn, this may mean providing or helping to set up a remanufacturing facility forsteel rails, providing or helping to renovate factories for rail car and locomotive parts, and othertypes of assistance.
10.3.4. Development of alternative sources of small-scale energy andimplementation of energy-efficiency measures
The North Koreans we have worked with have expressed a keen interest in renewable energy andenergy-efficiency technologies. This interest is completely consistent with both the overall
DPRK philosophy of self-sufficiency and the practical necessities of providing power and energy
services to local areas when national-level energy supply systems are unreliable at best. Suchprojects should be fast, small, and cheap. Some of the key areas where the United States andpartners could provide aid (some of which have been noted in earlier Chapters in this Report)
are:•

Small hydro turbine-generator manufacturing: Much of the rugged topography of the DPRK
is well suited to small, mini, and micro-hydroelectric development, and the DPRK
government has given its blessing for local authorities to undertake hydro projects. The
DPRK does manufacture some small turbine-generator sets (see Figure 10-1), but it is clearthat assistance would be helpful to produce more reliable and cost-efficient units, as well as
to expand mass production.

853 Methane is the chief component of natural gas.

Once processed to remove water, CO2, and other impurities, coalbed methane
can be used in the same way and with the same equipment as natural gas and can be injected into existing natural gas pipelines.

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Figure 10-1: DPRK-made Mini-Hydroelectric Turbine-Generator854•

Wind power: Likewise, the dissemination of wind turbines is a both a national goal and, fromour first-hand observations, a keen interest of individuals in the DPRK. As noted in section
5.2.2, the barren ridges of the interior of the country and some areas along the northernborder are likely to be excellent wind power sites. The DPRK-manufactured wind generatorsand control components that we saw in 1998/2000, however, are at best grossly inefficient,and more likely non-functional, and although improvements have been made since then, it isstill not clear that the DPRK has a significant capability for manufacturing serviceable wind
power turbines. Design assistance and joint venture manufacturing of wind power systems
are needed. A first phase might be the manufacture of lower-technology water-pumping
windmills (see Figure 10-2).

854 Figure from David Von Hippel and Jungmin Kang, “Updated DPRK Energy Balance (Draft) and Work to Be Done” asprepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA). Available as
http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/DvHKang.ppt.

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Figure 10-2: Water-pumping Windmill Installed by Nautilus and DPRK Engineers at Unhari
in the Year 2000855•

Agricultural equipment efficiency measures: Helping North Koreans to feed themselves
should be a high priority. The rice harvest in the DPRK has for most of the last two decades
been, based on our observations in the "rice basket" of the country, a nearly completely
manual process. To increase productivity, improvements are needed in tractor design andmaintenance (including spare parts manufacture) to make sure that the diesel fuel that is usedin agriculture goes further. Improvements in motors and drives for electrically-driven
agricultural equipment, such as rice threshers and mills, will stretch supplies of electricity.

•

Building Envelope Improvement/Building Energy Efficiency. As noted in section 4.5, thethermal efficiency of building envelopes in the DPRK—the efficiency with which buildings

855 Photo by Nautilus Institute.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKkeep heat in and cold out, or vice versa (depending on the season), is generally quite poor.
Existing multi-unit residential buildings and commercial/institutional buildings in the DPRK
are typically made of precast concrete or reinforced concrete pillar construction, with thewalls filled in with concrete blocks and mortar. Few such building have any substantial
insulation, and those that do may have some insulation made of lightweight concrete, which
has far less insulation value than modern insulation materials. Cooperation on building
energy efficiency including production (or, initially, import) and use of insulating materials,
collaboration on development of building designs in the residential andcommercial/institutional sectors with excellent thermal properties, and production or importof key building components that would contribute to high-efficiency buildings (doors,
windows, radiators, heat controls, and other components) is one of the most important
options to pursue from the energy savings, economic, environmental, and humanitarian
perspectives. It is also an option very much of interest to the DPRK, as witnessed, forexample, by a presentation provided by a DPRK delegation at the 2008 DPRK Energy
Experts Working Group Meeting, March 8 and 9, 2008, Beijing, China, entitled“Introduction of the Building Sector in DPR Korea”, and including conceptual designs ofenergy-efficient buildings (see Figure 10-3) among other details.856
Figure 10-3: Conceptual Residential Building Design from 2008 DPRK Presentation•

Residential lighting improvements: Three or four times as many households (or more) can besupplied with much higher quality light with the same amount of electricity if DPRK
incandescent and tube fluorescent bulbs are replaced with LED light bulbs, or with the older
CFL technology. As noted above, at least for CFLs, this measure has reportedly been taken
up by the DPRK government, with distribution of CFLs to many households. Ultimately,

856 Presentation available as http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/DPRKBuilding.ppt.

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKjoint venture manufacturing (or at least assembly) of LEDs in the DPRK could beundertaken, but until then provision of LEDs of robust quality should accompany any local
power supply or T&D improvement initiative. In our work in the DPRK in 1998 and 2000,
we found the provision of modern (at the time) lighting products to be invaluable forsecuring grassroots support, as it provided a direct and tangible improvement in the lives ofordinary Koreans (see Figure 10-4), as residents have found the improvement in light quality
in their homes from installing CFLs to be considerable.
Figure 10-4: Compact Fluorescent Light Bulb Installed in DPRK Residence During theUnhari Project, 1998857•

Industrial and irrigation motors: The opportunities for efficiency improvement in large
electric motors and motor drive systems are estimated to be considerable. Imports ofefficient motors, pumps, air compressors, and other motor-related equipment may be the first

857 Figure from David Von Hippel and Jungmin Kang, “Updated DPRK Energy Balance (Draft) and Work to Be Done” asprepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA).

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Nautilus Institute, Laying the Foundations of Energy Security for the DPRKstep (once power quality has been improved sufficiently), followed by assistance in setting
up facilities to manufacture or assemble equipment in the DPRK. Improving the reliability
and efficiency of irrigation pumps will help the DPRK move toward feeding its populace.
•

Humanitarian measures: Even the best orphanages, hospitals, and schools in the DPRK are
cold and bleak today. Providing on-site power (preferably with renewable energy systems),
water purification equipment, and efficient lighting and other end-use devices are necessaryand highly visible first steps toward meeting humanitarian needs in the DPRK.
10.3.5. Rehabilitation of rural infrastructure

The goal of a rural energy rehabilitation program would be to provide the modern energy inputs
necessary to allow DPRK agriculture to recover a sustainable production level, and for the basic
needs of the rural population to be met. The priority areas for rehabilitation would be those forwhich energy shortfalls most seriously affect agricultural production, human health, andfundamental quality of life. These areas include maintenance of soil fertility, farmmechanization, irrigation and drainage, and lighting, heating, cooking, and refrigeration forhouseholds and essential public institutions such as clinics and schools.
A comprehensive rehabilitation program for rural areas would feature a combination of short tomedium-term energy supplies from imports and medium to long-term capital construction andrehabilitation projects. Components of an import program would include fertilizer, tractor fuel,and electricity at levels sufficient to enable agricultural recovery in the shortest attainable time.
Some imports of tractors themselves may be necessary, as many of the DPRK tractors havesuffered for years from lack of spare parts and poor fuel quality. Piloting the use of electrictractors, as a component, for example, of projects in which rural micro-grid play a role, would bea means of accelerating the deployment of both reliable and sustainable re-mechanization of
DPRK agriculture.858 A capital construction program for rural energy would include projects
necessary to achieve the sustainable rehabilitation of the North Korean rural energy sector in themedium term (approximately 5 years). It is possible to outline some of the main elements ofsuch a program: rehabilitation of the rural electricity transmission and distribution grid,development of reliable local power generation, improving the energy efficiency of the irrigationand drainage system, modernizing fertilizer and tractor factories, and improving thetransportation of agricultural inputs and products. Many of these projects have already been
proposed in the context of UN-sponsored agricultural reconstruction studies. An integrated,county-level project of rural rehabilitation would be more useful, and a more useful example forsimilar work in other areas of the country, than piecemeal efforts in many locations.
Another key element of rural rehabilitation with links to the energy sector is rehabilitation of the
agricultural sector. The United Nations AREP (Agricultural Recovery and Environmental
Protection) project in the DPRK noted a number of agricultural sector problems that, if

858 See, for example, “Lindsay Campbell (2020), “Going Green: Can Electric Tractors Overtake Diesel”, Modern Farmer, dated

March 28, 2020, and available as https://modernfarmer.com/2020/03/going-green-can-electric-tractors-override-diesel/. A
company called Solectrac based in the United States, is one of the first manufacturers to provide a range of electric tractors (seehttps://solectrac.com/), but major manufacturers such as US-based John Deere are also working on electric tractor
commercialization (see, for example, Sam Francis (2019), “John Deere showcases autonomous electric tractor and other newtech”, Robotics and Automation News, dated November 19, 2019, and available ashttps://roboticsandautomationnews.com/2019/11/19/john-deere-showcases-autonomous-electric-tractor-and-other-newtech/26774/.

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addressed, would likely help to improve consumable crop production per unit energy input,
including reducing post-harvest losses and early crop consumption, ensuring that field operations(tilling, planting, fertilization) occur at the right time of year (and have the inputs available to doso), optimizing fertilizer application (amount, type, and timing),improving seed stocks, and otherimprovements.859 Post-harvest crop losses and early crop consumption alone have been
estimated to reduce usable crop production by 20 percent in the DPRK.
10.3.6. Electricity grid interconnections
Although hardly either a quick fix or a short-term project, it is imperative and attractive, from theperspectives of virtually all countries in the region, to move ahead with the consideration ofelectricity grid interconnections involving the ROK, the DPRK, Russia, and possibly China andMongolia as well (as described in Chapter 8, above).860 As of 20 years ago, a driving force forthe implementation of such interconnections would have been the need to provide a means ofsafely "turning on" reactors built by KEDO on the Simpo site, as the reactors would have been
(and will be until the DPRK is stable and much larger) too large for the DPRK grid, even if thegrid were fully operational. As of now, in the (probably unlikely) event that construction isresumed, once the nuclear units are complete (at this point, probably no earlier than 2028), theinterconnection would more likely serve mostly as a means of getting power through the DPRK
to the ROK from Russia, or possibly (through Russia or China) from Mongolia, as described in
Chapter 8. An international connection would also be needed to provide a means of transferring
significant amounts of power from the ROK to the DPRK, as was proposed by the ROK in 2005,
although doing so would probably require both reinforcement of the ROK grid in certain places
and reconstruction of the DPRK grid to allow the latter to accept significant amounts of power.
10.3.7. Gas supply/demand infrastructure
Little or no gas is used in the DPRK at present. Given, however, the keen interest in Russia andthe ROK in extending a gas pipeline from the vast resources of Siberia and the Russian Far East
to the consumers of South Korea (see Chapter 8), it may be worthwhile to start to establish an
appreciation for the benefits of gas on the part of the DPRK. Initial steps might be to build small
demonstration power plants fired, for example, with liquefied petroleum gas imported to small(probably coastal) storage facilities, and also to use gas piped from such facilities to provide
essential humanitarian services and residential fuel (for cooking, space and water heating, andother uses) to a small surrounding area. If these types of small, local gas distribution systems
can be established, it may be possible to build a small LNG terminal in the DPRK, as describedas part of the “Sustainable Development” and “Regional Alternative” paths investigated in
859 Hugh Bentley, “Trends in the DPRK Agricultural Sector & Implications for Energy Use”, presentation prepared for the DPRK

Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, June 26th and 27th, 2006, Palo Alto, CA, USA). Available as
http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Bentley.ppt.
860 See, for example, Alexander Ognev and Ruslan Gulidov, “Russia – DPRK Electricity Cooperation: the Role of INTER RAOUES Company at Current Stage”, prepared for the DPRK Energy Experts Working Group Meeting, March 8 and 9, 2008,
Beijing, China, and available as http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/RussiaDPRK.ppt, Yoon
Jae-young, “Analysis on DPRK Power Sector Data & Interconnection Option”, prepared for the same meeting, and available as
http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Yoon.ppt, and another presentation by the same author,
entitled “Analysis on DPRK Power Industry & Interconnection Options”, prepared for the 2010 DPRK Energy and Minerals
Working Group Meeting, September 21st-22nd, 2010, Beijing, China, available as http://nautilus.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/01.-Yoon.ppt.

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Chapter 8, above, and, as gas consumption increases and a local pipeline network begins tocoalesce, consider, as a next step in energy relations between the DPRK and its neighbors, aninternational pipeline. As a relatively clean fuel, and one that is relatively resistant to diversion
for most military purposes, it may in at least the medium run (assuming eventual global efforts tobring carbon emissions down to near-zero) prove worth the ROK's effort to begin the process of
introducing gas as a fuel in the DPRK.
10.3.8. Engagement on Nuclear Energy with the DPRKThe DPRK’s current and planned use of nuclear technologies may present severe problems
related to nuclear security and safety. Of most concern is possible loss of control of nuclear
materials and/or nuclear weapons due to instability in the DPRK itself associated with aleadership transition or occurring during a conflict. Short of such disorder in the DPRK itself,
the DPRK’s “routine” nuclear security on fuel cycle sites and its nuclear material- and weaponsrelated sites is likely to be very stringent. Nonetheless, it may be important to engage the DPRK
to ensure that its domestic legislation is fully developed with respect to the obligations that allstates must observe regarding UN Security Council resolution 1540 (passed in 2004). Measuresrelated to 1540 compliance, and training in same, may be useful confidence-building activities inthe early stages of engagement of the DPRK to denuclearize its nuclear weapons program.
With regard to nuclear safety, it is understood that the DPRK electric power system in general
operates with very low standards for technical performance and maintenance, in large part due tothe DPRK’s many decades of isolation from the international community, and also due to therelated lack of spare parts and materials, leading to remarkable improvisation but also to asystem prone to constant breakdown. Similar practices were observed at Yongbyon nuclear sites
during the period of US and IAEA monitoring in the 1990s, and there is little reason to think that
this proclivity to take short cuts, conduct speed campaigns, and proceed with regard for worker
health and safety that is typically lower than international norms has changed. There is certainly
reason to be concerned about the DPRK’s construction practices in its construction of theexperimental LWR (ELWR) at Yongbyon that has been in process for most of the last decade.
The experimental LWR core could also be disabled accidentally due to poor design, operator
error, or hardware failure, but it is too small a thermal mass to lead to a fuel meltdown as
occurred at Fukushima, Chernobyl, or Three Mile Island. If some other accident or attack
disabled the reactor, however, it could release a relatively small amount of radioactive material,
but the plume will affect mostly local areas close by Yongbyon.861
There are many ways to engage the DPRK on safety and nuclear fuel security, once a realistic
framework for denuclearizing the DPRK’s weapons program is agreed to and being
implemented. Although nuclear engagement with the DPRK may not appear attractive to theinternational community, it is likely that the DPRK will continue, as it has in the past, to see anopportunity to pursue a nuclear energy future, at least at some level, as a required element of an861 See David F. von Hippel and Peter Hayes, Illustrative Assessment of the Risk of Radiological Release from an Accident at the

DPRK LWR at Yongbyon, NAPSNet Special Reports, May 06, 2014, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-specialreports/illustrative-assessment-of-the-risk-of-radiological-release-from-an-accident-at-the-dprk-lwr-at-yongbyon-2/.

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agreement with the international community on its nuclear weapons program. Such an
engagement could entail some or all of the following steps:862•

Helping the DPRK to make or contribute to production of low-enriched uranium (LEU) toconvert and fuel the DPRK’s IRT research reactor (possible, for example, for use in medical
isotope production),863 and/or, in the future, to supply LEU for small stationary or bargebased LWRs;•

Jointly designing with the DPRK a made-in-DPRK small reactor that meets internationalsafety and manufacturing standards, possibly in a joint project with ROK LWR
manufacturing firms. This could include designing and deploying (or importing) a small
barge-mounted reactor (possibly Russian, if imported) to provide power in a coastal DPRK
town, though recent Russian experience suggests that such deployment will take years andmay face significant obstacles;•

Undertaking power system planning for the rational development of a national grid capableof supporting a fleet of small LWRs over a decade;•Creating a multilateral financing scheme (possibly linked to a regional grid connecting the
ROK with the Chinese and Russian Far East grids) for the manufacturing and construction ofsmall LWRs in the DPRK (or, more likely, jointly with the ROK, with components made inboth nations) over time, starting with a survey of DPRK manufacturing capabilities capableof contributing to or being upgraded to international standards required for safe, reliable
LWR production;•

Creating a regional enrichment consortium involving Japan, the ROK and the DPRK (among
other possible partners) whereby DPRK enrichment capacities are either incorporated into asafeguarded scheme, possibly operated as part of a multinational facility, in return for which
the DPRK would reveal all its enrichment acquisition history;•

Development of a small reactor export program as part of an inter-Korean nuclear export
push;

•

Provision of a program of training and institutional development needed to support each of
the above activities, which is likely currently almost completely missing in the DPRK today;
and•Development of alternative functions and missions—ranging from nuclear safety, nuclear
facilities dismantlement and cleanup, and nuclear materials disposal and/or packaging fortransfer to the US or its allies, to environmental monitoring and other productive activities—
to redeploy and employ scientists and technicians currently working at Yongbyon. Providing
such opportunities as a part of cooperative threat reductions can help to minimize

862 These and other approaches are outlined in more detail in David von Hippel and Peter Hayes, Engaging the DPRK

Enrichment and Small LWR Program: What Would It Take?, NAPSNet Special Reports, December 23, 2010,
http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/engaging-the-dprk-enrichment-and-small-lwr-program-what-would-it-take/.
863 See, for example, David Albright and Serena Kelleher Vergantini (2016), North Korea’s IRT Reactor: Has it Restarted? Is it
Safe?, dated March 9, 2016, available as https://isis-online.org/uploads/isisreports/documents/IRT_Reactor_March_9_2016_FINAL.pdf; and528
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opportunities for leakage of nuclear weapons expertise to other nations as DPRK
denuclearization proceeds.864
An engagement on nuclear energy issues including the types of activities described above cannot
occur in a vacuum. LWR engagement should be accompanied by engagement on a host of otherpolicy, economic, and humanitarian issues, but most importantly it must be accompanied byengagement on a wide range of other DPRK and regional energy sector issues such as thosedescribed above.
10.4.

Cooperative Threat Reduction through Engagement on Energy Issues: An
ExampleAs noted earlier in this Report, a key reason for the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea’s(DPRK’s) development of nuclear weapons and missile systems has been the DPRK’s energy
insecurity, that is, its lack, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, of access to key fuels—
particularly crude oil, oil products, and electricity—at affordable prices and in sufficientquantities to develop its economy. A consortium-led humanitarian/capacity-building/engagement
project, focusing on the installation of energy-efficiency measures in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) buildings sector and mini-grid systems powered by renewable energy
for electricity generation, could potentially be deployed rapidly and would meet the requirementsof a substantial pilot engagement project that would contribute toward cooperative threat
reduction on the Korean Peninsula.
The authors have presented an outline of this type of cooperative threat reduction project in a
recent publication for the Asia Pacific Leadership Network (APLN).865 Such a project would
offer positive attributes such as highly visible symbolic improvements for the DPRK energy
sector, consistency with DPRK stated interests, limited potential for military diversion,affordability, scalability, humanitarian and economic development elements, and large scope forface-to-face interactions between DPR Koreans and the international community. It would also
provide a demonstrable model for both future direction in the DPRK energy sector and for
productive and cooperative future engagement between the parties as they work toward threat
reduction. In order for such a project to be deployed rapidly, it is likely that a consortium of third
parties—that is, non-governmental organizations—in the international community will need toplan, organize, and deliver the project, albeit, of course, with the approval and support of thegovernments involved.
A consortium-led, third-party-funded Pilot Energy-efficiency Renewable Energy Cooperative
Threat Reduction “plus” (EE/RE CTR+) DPRK engagement project would be designed to havethe following elements and attributes:

864 See, for example, the documents available from National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine Committee on

National Security and Arms Control, “Redirecting North Korean Nuclear Scientists”,
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/pga/cisac/pga_085529.
865 David von Hippel and Peter Hayes (2021), Provision of Humanitarian Energy Efficiency, Renewable Energy, and Micro-Grid
Measures to the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) as Complementary to Engagement-Focused Cooperative
Threat Reduction Activities, Asia Pacific Leadership Network Special Report, March 2021, available ashttps://cms.apln.network/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/David-Von-Hippel-and-Peter-Hayes_DPRK-Energy.pdf and fromwww.nautilus.org.

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A focus on energy efficiency, starting with building envelope/system efficiency(including in apartment buildings in Pyongyang, to enhance project visibility within the
DPRK), but also potentially including, to a lesser extent, elements such as residential
lighting improvements, improved industrial and irrigation motors, and heating system andagricultural equipment efficiency measures.

•

A second focus on renewable energy, emphasizing solar photovoltaic (PV) power andmicrogrids, but also potential including small hydroelectric and wind power installations
where applicable.

•

Humanitarian measures in homes/schools/clinics (for both the EE and RE measures), andpossibly in one or more rural villages (combined EE and renewable energy systems)
where economic development is a need.

•Job creation in the DPRK during the project and afterward, both through the local
expanded availability of energy services provided by the project and through replicationof project successes elsewhere in the DPRK. This could include job creation for militaryand nuclear-sector workers whose current jobs could be displaced by a threat reduction
agreement. For example, positions for technicians and researchers in the Yongbyon
Nuclear Complex could be developed to allows those workers to provide research anddevelopment on energy efficiency and renewable energy topics, to investigate
environmental problems in the DPRK (and their solutions), and to work on safeguarding
DPRK nuclear material with the involvement and oversight of international colleagues(for example, from the International Atomic Energy Agency).

•

CO2 emissions reductions, which, depending on how the project is structured, Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) rules, and ROK laws, could possibly result in carbon
credits for the ROK if ROK firms invest in the project.

•

Materials provision to the DPRK that is not likely to violate the spirit of United Nations
Security Council sanctions.

•

The positive image of cooperation, which can be pointed to by both ROK/US and DPRK
leaders, of cargo ships headed north across the line of demarcation bearing insulation andother EE/RE products for installation in the DPRK.

The timeline of an EE/RE CTR+ DPRK Engagement project, like the scope of the project itself,
could be scalable to meet the needs of threat reduction negotiations. For example, an initial rapid
demonstration project including a limited number of measures could be carried out in 9 to 12
months, assuming good agreement and active/timely participation from all parties, with a more
substantial and economic development-focused project carried out over five years or more,consistent with a negotiated timeline for nuclear weapons threat reduction by the DPRK andreduction/elimination of sanctions, economic and energy assistance, and other measures by theinternational community.
10.5.

Conclusion

In this report we have provided our best estimate of DPRK energy supply and demand in theyears 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2008 through 2010, and 2014 through 2020. Despite what someobservers report as a turn-around in the DPRK economy in the early years of the decade of the530
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2000s, and in some more recent years as well—at least in some areas of the country, andparticularly in the mid-2010s, before the application of the more stringent UNSC sanctions—ourestimates are that on a nationwide basis the DPRK's energy supplies of commercial fuels, andprobably wood and biomass as well, remain extremely limiting. In addition, key infrastructure,especially in the power sector, continues to erode, with only modest improvements in isolatedcases running counter to the trend. We have also reviewed the status of the electricity sector inparticular, and of refined product imports, exports, and domestic production, and have reviewed
the DPRK’s considerable mineral resource base and its infrastructure for minerals production.
We have quantitatively explored and quantitatively and qualitatively compared several of theuniverse of different future energy pathways for the DPRK and explored the energy sector
implications of a range of “collapse” pathways for the DPRK, though we emphasize that we
think the regime collapse in the DPRK is quite unlikely. Finally, we have suggested initiatives
and cooperative activities that we believe, assuming the right approach and open, consistentdealings on the part of all of the nations and agencies involved, could provide a means ofconfidence-building while providing tangible benefits at the local level to DPRK citizens.

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