The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization: China’s Experimentin Multilateral Leadership
JIA Qingguo

One of the most prominent features of China’s foreign policy behavior inrecent years is its increasing activism in multilateral diplomacy. From the
UN to the WTO, from the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to the
six-party talks, from the Boao Forum to the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, one sees Chinese leaders and diplomats busy working with
their counterparts from other countries on a variety of international issues.
This presents a sharp contrast to its behavior in the past when China
stayed away from international disputes and only became seriously
involved when some narrowly defined Chinese national interests such as
the Taiwan problem and international criticism of China were involved.
With the rise of China, China’s role in multilateral diplomacy is also
likely to increase. What is the nature of China’s new multilateral
activism? How effective is China’s new active approach to multilateral
cooperation? What are the implications for China’s future approach tomultilateral cooperation and for multilateral cooperation as a whole?
These are questions that have attracted increasing international attention.
This article is designed to deal with one fairly recent aspect ofChina’s role in international multilateral cooperation through studying
China’s experience with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO):
China’s leadership in multilateral cooperation. It will examine the way the
Chinese government has taken up a leadership role in the SCO, evaluate
its effectiveness and problems as well as its implications for China and the- 113 -JIA QINGGUO

international community. As the first international organization named
after a Chinese city, China has played an important role in theestablishment and development of the SCO. What a rising China has donewith the SCO is of great significance for us in understanding China’s
emerging role in international multilateral cooperation.

Leadership: A Definition
Before discussing China’s leadership role in the SCO, one needs to clarify
the concept of leadership. Leadership is a process by which a person or an
actor manages an organization or influences others to take action.
Effective leadership requires vision, will, resources, and skills. Good
leaders should be able to come up with a vision that appeals not only tothemselves, but also to the people that are supposed to be led. They shouldhave the will to pursue such a vision even when confronted withdifficulties, especially when it comes with certain risks and sacrifices tothemselves. They should have sufficient resources or the ability to comeup with sufficient resources to back up such a pursuit. They should also
have sufficient skills to persuade and make others follow if necessary.
Likewise, in international relations, leading states should be able tocome up with a vision that appeals not only to themselves but also to theinternational community. They should have the political will to pursue
such a vision in the face of serious difficulties and take risks or makecertain sacrifices if necessary. They should also be economically capableof sustaining such efforts. Finally, they should have the diplomatic skills
to mobilize and sustain support for such a vision from other countries.

The SCO: An Evolving Enterprise
The SCO was officially founded on the basis of the Shanghai Five, asecurity mechanism initially established to deal with the border problems
between China and four states of the former Soviet Union, including
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, plus Uzbekistan since June
2001. Since its founding, the SCO has made much progress despite ups
and downs in its development.
At the beginning, the SCO appeared somewhat redundant. After all,the border problems had already been largely dealt with within the- 114 -

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Shanghai Five framework. If the Shanghai Five could deal with most of
the border problems, it was certainly sufficient to manage the remaining
border problems. Beyond the border problems, these countries did notappear to have much substantive to work with. Surely, terrorism,
separatism, and religious fundamentalism, the so-called three forces,
posed a threat to all of its members, and fighting against them was a
newly announced goal of the SCO. However, at the time, it was largely
viewed as a domestic concern. In principle, SCO members vow to respect
each other’s sovereignty and to adhere to the principle of noninterferencein each other’s internal affairs. Under these circumstances, cooperation inthis area can only be limited, and the Shanghai Five appeared to beadequate. In addition, SCO members except Russia did not have much
experience with multilateral diplomacy. It would take them some time tolearn how to tap the potential of the SCO. Finally, SCO members were by
and large poor countries and lacked the resources to support more
ambitious goals. Russia was struggling to get back on its feet. China’s
economy was doing well. However, as a developing country undergoingsome fundamental transitions, China did not have much to spare to
support multilateral endeavors. Other central Asian states were also invarious degrees of economic difficulty. For these and other reasons, theSCO was generally perceived as something politically symbolic, not as aninternational organization with much substance, let alone one with great
promise.
The toothless response of the SCO to the 9/11 terrorist attacks against
the US appeared to have confirmed the previous impression. In the wakeof 9/11, the SCO did not take any substantive actions other than issuing astatement condemning the terrorist attacks. In any case, it did not have an
established institutional mechanism to respond to the new challenge. The
fate of the SCO became even more precarious following the US-led war
against Afghanistan. Instead of taking collective action together, the SCO
members chose to cooperate with the US on an individual basis. China
and Russia rushed to demonstrate their respective support for the US war
against terrorism. Other members of the SCO chose to work with the US
in their respective ways, some even allowing the latter to use their militaryfacilities and moreover setting up military bases in their own territories.
For a time, many observers thought that the SCO was dead.
However, the SCO survived and even grew stronger and more active
over time. Gradually, it has managed to develop various forms of- 115 -JIA QINGGUO

cooperation among its member states. To begin with, SCO members havemanaged to hold an annual summit meeting of the heads of state.
Meanwhile, they have set up regular meetings among heads ofgovernment, ministers of foreign affairs, as well as officials at various
levels such as heads of ministries and departments.
In the second place, the SCO has stepped up cooperation to fightagainst the “three forces.” In addition to closer cooperation among thepolice and intelligence institutions of the member states, the SCO has also
engaged in military cooperation. Among other things, member states haveconducted several joint military exercises of increasingly larger scale andwith the alleged aim of combatting terrorist activities more effectively.1
In the third place, the SCO has made much progress in expanding
economic relations among its members. As the following table shows,while the absolute volume of trade between China and other members of
the SCO remain moderate, they have grown substantially since the SCO’s
establishment.
Increasing economic relations are accompanied by enhanced efforts
to build transportation links between China and other SCO members. (1)Railways: in 1990, the rail line between Urumuqi (China) and Aqtoghay(Kazakhstan) was opened. Another line has been under negotiation
Trade between China and Other Members of the SCO2 (In US$1,000)
Country
RussiaKazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Uzbekistan

2001
10,670,550
1,288,370
118,860
10,76058,3001

2005
29,103,140
6,810,320
972,200
157,940
680,560

Growth
173 %
429 %
718 %
1,368 %
1,067 %

John W. Garver, “China’s Influence in Central and South Asia: Is It Increasing?” inDavid Shambaugh ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2005), 213.
2
Constructed according to the statistics of the Ministry of Commerce, http://3w.mofcom.
gov.cn/table/jcktj_2001/zygb/zygb2001_12c.html; http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/tongji.shtml.

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between China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. (2) Highways: In addition to
the five hard-surfaced roads crossing between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan,
several highways are either under construction or under improvement.3
According to a Xinhua news report, China plans to invest 2.3 billion yuan($294 million) in the next five years to upgrade highways linking border
trading areas in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.4 On top of this,an agreement to build a highway linking nine Asian countries—South
Korea, China, Japan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Myanmar,
Cambodia, and Azerbaijan—took effect on July 4, 2005.5 (3) Airlines:
After years of growth, China already has thirty-eight regular passenger
flights with member states of the CAREC (Central Asia Regional
Economic Cooperation).6 These plus efforts to build oil pipelines andtelecommunication optical fiber cables are laying a firm, solid foundation
for further rapid expansion of economic relations among SCO member
states.
In the fourth place, the SCO has set up some institutional
mechanisms to facilitate and sustain cooperation. As of now, the SCO hasestablished two permanent institutional bodies in this regard: theSecretariat in Beijing and the Regional Antiterrorist Structure in Tashkent.
It has also given its blessing to the creation of the SCO Business Council
and Interbank Association.7 More recently, the SCO opened a forum in
Moscow designed to involve experts and officials in discussing anddeveloping policy for the organization.
Finally, as a result of these and other aspects of cooperation, SCO
members identify more firmly with and are more committed to theorganization than ever before. This is especially true in the past few years
when the so-called “color revolutions” in the region led to instability inthe member states of the SCO. “Color revolutions” are generally seen inthese countries as a result of efforts on the part of the US to put their men
in power. Fear of domestic instability drove the governments of thecentral Asian states to turn to the SCO for support.8
3

Garver, “China’s Influence in Central and South Asia,” 206–208; http://www.rferl.org/
featuresarticle/2006/6/18F4BC0C-94AA-4873-A4AB-61D9FF33DB93.html.
4
http://english.cri.cn/3130/2007/01/01/262@180471.htm.
5
http://www.unescap.org/unis/eye_on_unescap/issue46_7july2005.doc.
6
http://www.unescap.org/unis/eye_on_unescap/issue46_7july2005.doc.
7
http://www.coscos.org.cn/200607181.htm.
8
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=325&language_id=1.

- 117 -JIA QINGGUOOver time, the progress that the SCO made was significant enough toprompt some neighboring countries including Mongolia, India, Pakistan,and Iran to seek membership in the organization. As of now, thesecountries have already become observers of the organization. Even the US
has applied for observer status as it does not want to be excluded fromwhat it believes to be an increasingly significant regional organization.9
In part for the previous reasons, some people believe that the SCO is
becoming a formidable international organization. As David Wall, an
expert on the region at the University of Cambridge’s East Asia Institute,
put it, “An expanded SCO would control a large part of the world’s oil
and gas reserves and nuclear arsenal. . . . It would essentially be an OPEC
with bombs.”10
To be sure, the SCO is still a relatively weak institution if comparedto such international organizations such as NATO. “The basic picture isthat the SCO is not as important as people in Washington think,” says
Daniel Kimmage, an expert on Central Asia at Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty. He argues, “If you take NATO as your standard fororganizational effectiveness, . . . the SCO is not even close yet.”11
People may have different views as to the influence of the SCO as aninternational institution in the days to come. Almost without exception,
they all agree that the importance of the SCO has grown, and that it can nolonger be ignored.

Crossing the River by Feeling for Stones along the Way:
China’s Role
As one of the initiators of the SCO, China has played a significant role inits founding and subsequent development. In retrospect, it appears that
China did not, and still does not, have a grand strategy or sufficient
influence to steer the SCO to its current position and beyond. Instead,
China’s expectation and capacity to influence the development of theorganization evolves with changing circumstances over time. China’s
9

http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=4699.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10883/rise_of_the_shanghai_cooperationorganization.
html.
11
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10883/rise_of_the_shanghai_cooperationorganization.
html.
10

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input reminds people of the Deng Xiaoping’s erstwhile famous saying,“mozhe shitou guohe” [crossing the river by feeling for stones along theway].
At the beginning, China saw the SCO as a useful mechanism for anumber of reasons. First, it expected it to help consolidate theachievements of the Shanghai Five on border settlement and security
confidence-building measures along the borders between China and its
neighbors in the SCO. Second, it expected that the SCO would facilitate
the settlement of the remaining border problems such as the disputed
islands in the Amur and Argun Rivers with Russia. Third, it hoped that the
SCO would help alleviate the mounting security pressures on China fromthe Bush administration, especially following the Hainan air collision
incident. Finally, China hoped that the organization could expand its
mission into other areas of cooperation such as joint efforts against the“three forces,” economic relations, and cultural exchanges. Its hope on the
expansion of cooperation, upon reflection, was limited. For instance, it did
not expect much progress in joint efforts against the “three forces,” nor
did it make much effort in this regard, just like other members of the SCO.
The agreement on joint efforts against the “three forces” appeared to besigned more as a way to demonstrate political support to each other intheir own respective fight against these forces than a significant step
toward collective action under the SCO. Thus, while the SCO members
agreed to fight against the “three forces” as early as June 2001, the SCO
did not do much in this regard and found itself incapable of an immediate
and meaningful response to the challenges of 9/11.
Over time, however, China’s expectations of the SCO escalated. First,
it attached more importance to cooperation in fighting against the “three
forces” in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Then, it made greater efforts topromote trade and investment among SCO members. As economic
relations expanded and the energy issue loomed larger, it began to makemore efforts to promote cooperation in infrastructure building and energy
cooperation among SCO members. More recently, as the international
profile of the SCO increases, China has begun to use the organization as aplatform for advocating a Chinese version of multilateral cooperation.
Along with the rise in expectations, the Chinese government’s vision
for the SCO has also changed. When the SCO was founded, it
championed the “Shanghai Spirit,” allegedly a new security concept, a
new model of interstate relations and regional cooperation. It is based on- 119 -JIA QINGGUO

the principles of nonalignment, openness to the rest of the world, mutual
trust and benefits, equality, consultation, respect for diversified
civilizations, and mutual development. 12 And, as the organization’scharter notes, the SCO is not aimed at any other country or internationalorganization.13 In general, there is a code of conduct of interstate relations
instead of value-based goals and objectives.
Five years later, China’s expectations of the SCO have grown beyond
this and are more substantive and more ambitious than ever. In his speechat the 2005 SCO summit, President Hu Jintao stated that China hopes that
the SCO can better deal with challenges, advance regional development,
maintain regional stability, and fulfill common prosperity throughdeepening and expanding bilateral and multilateral cooperation of all
forms among SCO member states.14 On top of this, more recently, Chinabegan to call for building a “harmonious region with sustainable
development and common prosperity.”15
Escalating expectations have been accompanied by increasing
political commitment on the part of the Chinese government to the SCO.
With the passage of time, the Chinese government has attached increasing
importance to the organization. To the Chinese government, the SCO is
not only a source of security in an uncertain and threatening world, but
increasingly, an opportunity for an expanding its market, diversifying its
energy supplies, demonstrating to the world the benign nature of China’srise, and advocating a new type of multilateral cooperation. 16
Consequently, China has invested an increasing amount of time andresources to make the SCO a success. Among other things, China pledged
nearly $1 billion in loans to the SCO Central Asian members.17
12

Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, http://
www.sectsco.org/html/00088.html (August 15, 2006).
13
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Charter, Article 2, http://www.sectsco.org/html/
00096.html (August 15, 2006).
14“Hu Jintao Attends the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit and Delivers
an Important Speech,” July 5, 2005, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/hzxcfelseng/t202787.htm.
15“Chinese president anticipates successful SCO summit,” People’s Daily, May 31, 2006,
http://english.people.com.cn/200605/31/eng20060531_269829.html.
16
One that attaches importance to equality, respect for each other, and consensus and that
downplays differences.
17“SCO provides big opportunities for business,” People’s Daily, June 14, 2006,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200606/14/eng20060614_273872.html (accessed August- 120 -

THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATIONAs China’s economy grows, the amount of resources China can tap tofacilitate its desires and expectations for the SCO has also expanded. Witha vast foreign currency reserve, a large and rapidly expanding market, andrapidly rising international political clout, China has the increasing
capacity to help other members of the SCO. Thus, in addition to the $1
billion in loans mentioned previously, China is also encouraging its
companies to expand operations into the region.
China’s diplomatic skills, especially knowledge and skills to manage
multilateral cooperation, have improved. This has been especially obvious
over the past few years, in which a new generation of Chinese diplomats
with both a good command of foreign languages and ample knowledge ofinternational affairs has emerged, and now plays a significant role in therunning of China’s diplomacy. In part as a result of their efforts, China’s
international image and influence has significantly improved.

China’s Leadership in SCO: An Interim Assessment
Evaluating China’s leadership role in the development of the SCO, onegets the following impressions: (1) China’s leadership capability has been
growing; (2) its leadership behavior has been maturing; (3) its leadershiprole remains limited; and (4) its leadership holds much promise.
China’s leadership capability in the SCO has been growing both interms of the resources China can come up with and in terms of the vision,
political will, and diplomatic skills now it commands. First, China’s
economic capacity has expanded substantially over the first five years of
the SCO. Because China’s economy has been growing at a much fasterpace than those of other member states of the SCO, China’s share of thetotal GDP of the SCO member states has become much larger than before.
This, coupled with growing interdependence among the SCO member
states, has placed China in a better position to influence the developmentof the SCO than ever before.
Second, China’s diplomatic skills have improved over time. In recent
years, Chinese diplomats have earned international respect for their fineperformance in cultivating good relations with the outside world and in
improving China’s image abroad. This also applies to their performance in
3, 2006).

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the SCO. Finally, as discussed in the previous passages, China is attaching
more importance to the SCO and is coming up with a new vision for theorganization such as a “harmonious region with sustainable development
and common prosperity.”
China’s leadership role in the SCO is maturing and becoming moresophisticated. Over time, China sees the SCO both as a means to promote
regional security and as a vehicle to promote regional cooperation in
many other areas. China no longer merely thinks of the SCO as amechanism to enhance the individual interests of SCO member states,
especially those of China. It also regards it an instrument to push for
positive changes in the region. Although China does regard the SCO as amechanism to balance the US presence in Central Asia, it does not try, norwish, to make it an anti-US institution.
China’s leadership role in the SCO remains limited for a number ofreasons. First, the vision China can come up with for the SCO at the
moment remains abstract and inadequately defined due to its inability
China’s GDP and Its Growth (2001–2005)18 (in 100 million yuan)

18

http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/ndtjgb/qgndtjgb/t20060227_402307796.htm.

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to offer a well-articulated set of values that appeals both to the Chineseand other people of the SCO member states. Second, as a developing
country in the midst of drastic and fundamental transformations, theresources China can come up with for promoting SCO cooperation are
still quite limited. Finally, despite the drastic improvements, Chinese
knowledge and skills in leading multilateral cooperation remain largely
insufficient.
China’s leadership role in the SCO is promising in part because the
SCO has already had a good start and in part because China itself is likely
to continue its current rise and become more mature in multilateralleadership.

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