JIIA Strategic Comments (2023-01)
03-24-2023

Papers in the "JIIA Strategic Commentary Series" are prepared mainly by JIIA
research fellows to provide comments and policy-oriented analyses ofsignificant international affairs issues in a readily comprehensible and timelymanner.

The 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Partyand Prospects for 2023
Li Hao (Research Fellow, JIIA/ Lecturer, Kobe University)
The new leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was established in October 2022, following
the 20th Congress of the CCP and the subsequent First Plenary Session of the Central Committee. Asexpected, Xi Jinping remained General Secretary and began his third term. Former General Secretary
Hu Jintao's abrupt departure in the middle of the Party Congress' closing ceremony attracted a lot ofattention, and Xi's overwhelming victory in personnel appointments surprised observers. What policies
Xi Jinping will formulate in his third term, particularly his foreign policy and its impact on the security
environment in East Asia, is a matter of great interest to neighbouring countries. In addition, the suddende facto abandonment of the highly restrictive zero-Covid policy, which had been in place for nearly
three years, has led to an explosion of infections across the country.
This article summarises the characteristics of the new leadership inaugurated following the Party
Congress and analyses its impact on the international security environment in East Asia and thebackground to the sudden shift away from the zero-Covid policy, with a view to their likely
repercussions for 2023.

Xi Jinping's efforts to strengthen his authority still have some way to go
Xi Jinping's predecessor as general secretary, Hu Jintao, took office in 2002 and stepped down in
2012. Xi joined the standing committee of the Politburo in 2007 and was widely recognised as the next
general secretary. The consensus among observers was that this periodic generational change ofleadership had been consolidated during the Hu Jintao years and that Chinese politics had becomeinstitutionalised. Xi Jinping's retention as general secretary completely overturned that perception.
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After ten years of the Xi Jinping administration, there was already a widespread view that aconcentration of power was underway and that the collective leadership system was largely in retreat.
With Xi Jinping staying in office this time and with no apparent successor in the Politburo's standing
committee, the likelihood that he will remain in office after the 21st Party Congress in 2027 and servea fourth term has increased. With the timing of the supreme leader's retirement uncertain, most of theassumptions made in analysing China's elite politics are no longer relevant. Even though Xi Jinping'sretention was already anticipated, its long-term impact on Chinese politics will be significant.
As will be shown in the next section, the appointments were a complete victory for Xi Jinping.
However, other aspects did not necessarily further strengthen Xi's authority as initially anticipated. The
party chairman, once held by Mao Zedong, was not reinstated, nor was the title of 'people's leader',reminiscent of Mao, officially bestowed on Xi; the lengthy 'Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinesecharacteristics for a new era' included in the Party Constitution at the 2017 Party Congress was neverupgraded to 'Xi Jinping Thought '. Even the 'two establishments' (meaning the establishment of Xi
Jinping's position as the core of the Party and of his ideology as that of the Party), which was widelyreferred to before the Party Congress, was not included in the Party Constitution. In the tug-of-war
underwater, it seems only natural that Xi made compromises and concessions. Xi's authority has forthe moment failed to deliver on these. However, Xi has secured another five-year term. It is conceivablethat he will further consolidate his power, and that this could develop into a new position at the timeof the Party Congress in 2027. In any case, there is no doubt that the Xi Jinping administration is rocksolid. Xi's authority has not yet reached its peak and is still in the process of further development.

A whole pro-Xi top leadership group and the 'best and brightest' Politburo
The Politburo Standing Committee appointment was a complete victory for Xi Jinping. Li Keqiang
and Wang Yang, who were expected to remain in the standing committee of the Politburo, were not
re-elected as Central Committee members. The newly elected members were all close to Xi Jinping.
In particular, Li Qiang and Ding Xuexiang were Xi Jinping's secretaries during his provincial career
and are close confidants. With a complete victory in the top leadership group appointments, Xi
Jinping will be able to run his administration as he wishes. In this sense, Xi's power establishment isfurther advanced and on solid ground. There are no longer any rivals who can distance themselvesfrom Xi Jinping and sometimes express critical opinions. Outside observers fear that the Xi Jinping
regime, like Mao Zedong's in the past, will be unable to stop becoming a personal dictatorship. In asituation where the supreme leader is surrounded by yes-men, he or she will not have access tocritical opinions and negative information, increasing the likelihood of misjudging situations. While
this risk is certainly present, it is also possible to think that the members of a trusted and close circleof people around him will be able to admonish Xi Jinping more frankly and honestly. As there is noinformation available on the actual relationships between Xi Jinping and his subordinates, it is notpossible to discuss the issue definitively, and we will have to wait and see how things develop in thefuture.

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It should be noted that in the State Council leadership formed at the National People's Congress inMarch 2023, Li Qiang has become the Premier and Ding Xuexiang the first Vice-Premier. Neither ofthem has any experience of serving in the State Council. The premiership had always been held by aperson who had served as vice-premier, with the exception of the first premier Zhou Enlai, but thattradition is broken. Outside observers have also voiced concerns about this appointment.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that Li Qiang has a wealth of administrative experience, having
served as head of Zhejiang Province, an important region in the lower Yangtze River basin, secretaryof the Party Committee of Jiangsu Province and secretary of the Party Committee of Shanghai.
Turning to the Politburo appointments, we see a more complex situation: the number of members
has been reduced from 25 to 24, and there are no longer any women in the Politburo, despite one
having been included for 20 years. Hu Chunhua, who is considered close to Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang,
was unable to join the Politburo and was demoted to Central Committee member. Basically, thePolitburo is solidly occupied by people who are loyal to Xi Jinping, and there is no doubt that thecomposition of the Politburo is more likely to reflect Xi Jinping's wishes. Although most of Xi's close
subordinates from his time working in the provinces have already been selected, they do not makeup a majority in the Politburo. Many Politburo members have made their careers as local cadres so
do not necessarily have career links with Xi Jinping and, compared to Li Qiang and Ding Xuexiang,
many of them do not have deep ties with Xi Jinping. It is not quite clear how unwavering their loyalty
is, so some uncertainty does exist.
It should be pointed out that the appointments to the Politburo include many experts in scienceand engineering, especially in the defence and aerospace industries (Ma Xingrui, Zhang Guoqing,
Yuan Jiajun, Chen Jining and Li Ganjie), and theorists who have served as senior officials in theCentral Party School (Li Shulei and Shi Taifeng). They are, so to speak, China's version of a 'best andbrightest' team. It is impossible to say for sure whether this will work in actual political management,
but it would be short-sighted to regard them simply as a group of Xi Jinping's yes-men. There is still
no one among them likely to succeed Xi Jinping, but they include several strong candidates for thenext highest leadership groups, including Chen Jining, who is now secretary of the Shanghai
Municipal Party Committee.
In addition, there are two members of the Politburo (Zhang Youxia and Wang Yi) who have passed
the traditional retirement age of 68 but who head highly specialised departments: the uniformed
military and the foreign affairs, respectively. Although these two exceptions may set important
precedents in the future, the retirement age exception remains just that - a rare exception - madeonly for these two and Xi Jinping.

Continuity of foreign and security policies and the situation over Taiwan
With Xi Jinping remaining in office after the Party Congress in 2022, it can be assumed that China'sfuture policies in various areas will be continuations of those of the previous decade. The mostsignificant feature of the Xi Jinping administration's foreign and security policies will be thedevelopment of a foreign policy that puts great power consciousness at the forefront. China under
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the Xi Jinping administration has shown a strong awareness of its status as a great power, expanding
its influence around the world and competing with the US and Europe. This attitude is unlikely tochange in the future. As a result, China's foreign policy is often seen as a hard-line stance, andtensions in Sino-American relations are likely to be long-term. From China's perspective, however, it
does not necessarily want a confrontation with the US. China has always opposed the use of the term'competition' to describe Sino-American relations, emphasizing the 'cooperation' aspect. The
announcement made at the end of 2022 of the appointment of Qin Gang, China's ambassador to theUS, as Minister of Foreign Affairs to take over from Wang Yi is clearly US-focussed.
The situation over the Taiwan Strait is likely to remain difficult. Xi long worked in Fujian Province
on the opposite side of the Strait from Taiwan, and he has shown a strong interest in Taiwan. Since
becoming supreme leader, he has repeatedly expressed his desire for Taiwan's reunification. Since
the Tsai administration took power in Taiwan in 2016, the mainland has increased pressure onTaiwan, partly due to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government's refusal to recognise the'1992 Consensus'. The visit of US House Speaker Pelosi to Taiwan in 2022 further aggravated thesituation over Taiwan, and the mainland escalated its military pressure on Taiwan. Concerns about
the situation over Taiwan have been expressed by the countries involved, with US military officials inparticular frequently referring to the possibility of the use of force against Taiwan by the mainlandside. Among Western and Japanese military officials and security experts, an invasion of Taiwan by
the mainland is already envisaged as quite realistic, and the debate is no longer whether it will
happen but when. However, few China experts from other countries believe that an invasion ofTaiwan by mainland China is realistic within the next few years. There seems to be some scope foradjustment in the way references are made to Taiwan, as in the report by Xi Jinping at the Party
Congress, where he referred to the use of force against Taiwan as an option. However, this does notdeviate from the existing policy on Taiwan. At present, there are no indications of major changes in
China's Taiwan policy, and the existing policy of peaceful reunification remains in place. At present,the Xi Jinping administration's main concern is Taiwan's next presidential election.
In terms of personnel, the newly appointed uniformed head of the People's Liberation Army (ViceChairman of the Central Military Commission) He Weidong was the commander of the Eastern
Theatre Command in charge of the Taiwan area. Many uniformed heads have been selected fromunits involved with Taiwan, and it appears the leadership is being positioned with a strong emphasison Taiwan. Fujian, Zhejiang and Shanghai, where Xi Jinping spent most of his career, are all part ofthe former Nanjing Military Region, which oversees Taiwan, and it should be pointed out that Xi
Jinping's personal connections lean heavily towards units involved with Taiwan.
Taiwan is also a major issue in China's relations with Japan. Sino-Japanese relations, which
improved significantly for a time under the Abe administration, have been on a downward trend sincearound 2021. In particular, since the reference to the Taiwan situation made in the joint statement
following the summit between Prime Minister Suga and President Biden in April 2021, the Chineseside has clearly intensified its criticism. And China further intensified its criticism after the former
Prime Minister Abe's statement at a symposium held in Taiwan in December 2021 that "anemergency in Taiwan is an emergency in Japan as well as in the Japan-US alliance". At the same
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time, however, China has shown a willingness to improve relations with Japan: at the first face-toface meeting between Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kishida in Bangkok in November 2022, Xi spoke
frankly to Kishida even before the opening photo was taken, and both were photographed with thebiggest smiles. Although there are many pending issues between Japan and China and it remains
unclear whether relations will improve, there is no doubt that China is trying to stabilise relations
with Japan amid the lack of improvement in US-China relations.

Sudden abandonment of the zero-Covid policy
Since the lockdown of Wuhan in 2020, China has continued to implement a Covid-19 control
programme with strict measures known as the zero-Covid policy. Although people's social lives havebeen severely affected by the lockdown, the containment of the spread of Covid-19 has beensuccessful to some extent. In December 2022, the Chinese government suddenly relaxed restrictions
significantly, effectively abandoning the zero-Covid policy. The Xi Jinping administration has shown
remarkable flexibility. The following factors may be responsible for this abrupt turnaround.
First, the damage caused to the economy by the zero-Covid policy was enormous. The impact of
stopping production and economic activity following the urban lockdowns was obvious, not tomention the clearly growing dissatisfaction of enterprises. The costs associated with PCR testing andquarantine of infected persons, which were carried out daily throughout the country, were also
enormous. It seems that the leadership was aware of the high risks of maintaining the zero-Covid
policy any longer.
Second, the highly infectious Omicron strain was spreading rapidly and was said to have become
uncontrollable as early as November. In other words, the zero-Covid policy, which focused on
prevention, had already been breached and was unsustainable.
Third, as the government has repeatedly mentioned, the virulence of the Omicron strain is thought
to be weaker than that of previous strains so, even if infections were to spread, the risk of serious
illness was not considered to be very high.
Fourth, protests against the zero-Covid policy spread across the country, mainly among youngpeople. A fire in Urumqi, Xinjiang, a city long under lockdown, led to spreading of rumours thatseveral people had died because residents were unable to evacuate due to buildings being sealed off,and triggered mass mourning in various regions that developed into protests against the zero-Covid
policy. Some participants even shouted "Step down, Communist Party! " "Step down, Xi Jinping!",slogans that were spread on WeChat and other social networking sites. Demonstrations were also
held in Japan on several occasions. While it is unclear to what extent these protests had an impact,
Xi Jinping explained during his meeting with European Council President Michel that people's
discontent was behind the protests. It is only natural that they had a certain degree of impact.
The number of people infected with Covid-19 across China exploded, but the government stopped
tracking this number, meaning it is no longer possible to get a full picture; the three-year-long zeroCovid policy focused on prevention rather than treatment, and the medical system has not been
expanded sufficiently to meet the new situation. In addition, vaccination has not progressed
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sufficiently, particularly among the elderly. Chinese vaccines are said to be less effective inpreventing the disease than those from Pfizer and Moderna, but to be effective enough in preventing
severe symptoms. However, the risk of serious illness is high because many elderly people have astrong aversion to vaccines, hindering vaccination progress. These uncertainties should also be bornein mind. Many deaths occurred during the explosive phase of the pandemic. No matter how much thevirulence has weakened, the risk of serious illness is high for those with underlying diseases and theelderly. In addition, there is widespread dissatisfaction with the government and experts who do notrelease accurate information. On the other hand, many infected people recover quickly or are
asymptomatic, prompting a growing realisation that Covid is not an infectious disease to be feared. Itwas said that infections would peak nationwide in February, but the spread of the disease was so
rapid that most citizens, even in rural areas, have already been infected in January. People haveresumed social and economic activities. Having overcome the peak of the outbreak, the governmentis promoting a three-year victory story in the fight against Covid-19. China, too, enters a postpandemic era.
(The original Japanese version of this paper is dated January 16, 2023. The English version reflects
some updates, including those on the Covid-19 situation and personnel appointments. )The Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs

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