Chapter 9__________________________________________________________

Japan in the Midst of Multilateral Negotiations on
the Future Framework for Climate Change
Yasuko Kameyama

Introduction
In 1990, Japan hosted an International Conference on Climate Change in Tokyo. This was
the first major international conference on climate change to be hosted by Japan. Since then, Japan
has been enthusiastic about international dialogue on climate change.
In Japan, climate change is in many cases considered as an environmental problem and as an
economic problem that firmly relates to energy use. Many publications on climate policies in Japan by Japanese authors state climate change as a problem of “trilemma” or the “3Es”, namely
environment, economy and energy (Yoda, 1993; Hamakawa, 2001; Institute of Applied Energy,
2007; Kansai Electric Power, 2007). Discussions on climate change policies are thus frequently led
by energy engineers and experts, governmental officials, and industry stakeholders. The problem is
expected to be overcome mainly by technology, including energy efficient technology, technology
to enhance the use of renewable as well as nuclear energy, and technology related to carbon capture and storage.
On the other hand, Japan merely perceives the climate change problem as an international
problem that formulates a part of Japanese foreign policy. Some may even criticize seeing climate
policy as a consequence of politics, saying that politicizing the problem overlooks reality, such as
the costs required to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This situation is quite different fromwhat we see in other countries, especially those in Europe. Academic experts, at least, based incountries outside Japan have observed the development of international climate change policies as
one type of foreign policy (Susskind, 1994; Rowland, 1995; Harris 2000), for which explanations
on the real state-of-the-art world of climate change negotiations proved to be quite convincing.
It is, however, not adequate to say that foreign policy has played no role in Japanese decision-making on climate change policies. This paper aims to show how Japan’s decision-making on
climate change during international negotiations was influenced by the foreign policy aspects ofthe country. Foreign policy has not always affected Japan’s position, but there were times when it
was influential. In addition, this paper argues that there are two distinct types of influence on foreign policy in Japan: actions taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and actions taken
by politicians, especially prime ministers and Jiminto (Liberal Democratic Party, LDP). These two
aspects of foreign policy have affected Japan’s position on climate change in the past, quite independently from each other. It is likely that both are going to affect Japan’s position at least until
the next agreement is reached at the international level on what is to be done after 2012.

- 187 -

Yasuko Kameyama

Theoretical BackgroundIn one of the most well-acknowledged traditional papers on foreign policy by Allison (Allison, 1971), a nation-state’s decision-making is explained by three hypotheses, namely “the rational
actor” (Model I), “organizational behavior” (Model II), and “governmental politics” (Model III).
Model I explains the behavior of national governments, assuming that the state is a unified rational
actor. Models II and III look into the black box of nation-state decision-making. The former focuses on the behavior of organizations that are built upon mindless routine that does not requiredecision-making at individual levels. Model III looks into bargaining among players in the government and assumes a country’s decision to be a consequence of such bargaining within the government. Allison has attributed the three models to explaining the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.
One way of analyzing national decision-making on climate change could be to attempt to utilize
the three models and to see whether any one of these is more applicable than others.
In Japan's case, it is often said that ministries and bureaucrats hold the central power of decision-making (Shiroyama et al., 1999). Numerous publications and newspaper articles describe
climate change policy-making as a process of bargaining between the ministries involved (Tanabe,
1999; Takeuchi, 1999). This is not often the case when politicians have strong positions and themeans to achieve agreement on their positions. If this holds true for Japan’s climate policy, suchpolicy will be influenced only by the relevant ministries, such as the Ministry of Environment andthe Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and Model III would be applied to determine Japanese decision-making. The argument in this paper is that Japanese climate policy within Japan has
been influenced by foreign policy periodically, and that the foreign policy influence can be separated into two distinctive elements, namely that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that of political leaders. The two aspects of foreign policy are most applicable to Models II and III, andModel 1 respectively, but the two do not always exert their influence synchronically.
In the next two sections, the two types of organizations and individuals that represent Japanese foreign policy are considered, to explain the history of Japanese decision-making on climatechange since the late 1980s. The historical aspects are then followed by an analysis of the two
types by comparing their behaviors, and by applying the three Models to the analysis.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Climate Change
Usually, in Japan, most inter-ministerial debates on climate change policies take place between MOE and METI. The Ministry of Territory and Transport (MOTT) is involved in any debates that relate to GHG emissions by the transportation sector, and the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) also becomes involved in debates on emissions and sequestration byland, land-use change and forestry. In any case, overall, the main role of MOFA is to coordinate
the diverse views of these various ministries and to develop a common position that is acceptable
to all ministries.
Most of the officials that work for MOFA are interested in various international affairs. The- 188 -

Japan in the Midst of Multilateral Negotiations on the Future Framework for Climate Change

global environmental problem is merely one of them. In many cases, negotiating environmental
problems requires expert-level knowledge. This may be one of the reasons why most MOFA officials were not really interested in environmental problems. Even when countries started negotiating the Kyoto Protocol, initiated by the Berlin Mandate agreed to at COP 1 in 1995, the chief
manager of MOFA, whose role is to coordinate the relevant ministries, was posted from anotherministry, mainly the Meteorological Agency.
At the time of COP1, in a statement made by the Minister of the Environment, Sohei Miyashita, Japan stated its willingness to host the third or the next COP in Japan. This was an initiative
mainly of MOE and MOFA. At the time, because most of the actual work was performed by people outside MOFA, MOFA was not aware of how difficult the negotiations leading up to COP3
would be. It was a time when Japan was striving to become a permanent member of the UN Council. In order for Japan to receive support from other countries, it was important for Japan to hostsome significant international conferences. MOFA considered that holding an international conference on climate change could be an opportunity for Japan to show its leadership, and its capability of playing a mediator’s role between developed and developing countries. Perhaps Japanwas not able to consolidate its determination to host COP3 unless ministries other than MOFA
were interested in hosting the conference. MOE was supportive because holding an international
conference would be covered by the media, and this was a good opportunity to raise publicawareness on climate change.
As the time for COP3 drew near, MOFA became increasingly aware of the significance anddifficulty of the problem. In March 1997, the EU announced its position on emission reduction
targets. Other countries expected Japan, as the host of COP3, to announce its position by taking aleadership role. However, serious internal disputes among various ministries hampered Japan inmeeting this expectation. MOE (the then Environment Agency), as the ministry responsible forenvironmental effectiveness, called for a 6-7 emission reduction target. METI (then called MITI),
which was responsible for the protection of Japanese industries, insisted that any absolute reduction in emissions was unrealistic, and called for the stabilization of emissions from 1990. MOFA,
which was responsible for foreign affairs, cared about other countries’ expectations of Japan taking a leadership role, and adopted the position that at least a 5% reduction was necessary for Japanto play its role as host of COP3. Japan’s position, which was submitted in October, was somewhat
of a mixture of the three positions.
After the United States announced its position, MOFA became more serious about the involvement of the United States. Because the United States was, and still is, the largest emitter ofcarbon dioxide (CO2), MOFA believed that the participation of the United States was indispensable for COP3 to be considered a success. At the same time, MOFA also started to see negotiations
from a foreign affairs perspective. Since the end of World War II in 1945, Japan has been an allyof the United States in terms of security in the Far East. It was most important for MOFA, from asecurity perspective, to maintain healthy relations with the United States. During the COP3 meeting, the United States expected to see some meaningful participation by key developing countries.
MOFA supported the U.S. position and the developing countries were offended by the Japanese- 189 -

Yasuko Kameyama

position. They became firmer on the issue of no new targets for developing countries. Japan was
also supportive of the U.S. position that the stabilization of emissions from a 1990 level was themost it could agree to. However, at the final moment, the U.S. accepted a 7% reduction target, andthis was when Japan had to accept its 6% reduction target (Grubb, 1999; Oberthür and Ott, 1999).
After COP3 was concluded, a major debate concerning climate policy shifted the arena to
the domestic implementation stage. It was again MOE and METI that were mainly at the center ofthe debate. MOFA withdrew from such argument. The agendas for COP4 and the succeeding
COPs until COP7 were mainly on detailed rules for the implementation of what was agreed to in
the Kyoto Protocol. There was no role for MOFA.
The Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005. Until then, Japan had maintained silence in theinternational arena. The EU’s position was rather consistent, even after 2001. It wanted to see the
Kyoto Protocol become effective. In order for the Protocol to prevail, Russia needed to ratify it.
The EU used every foreign affairs diplomacy trick between itself and Russia to entice the latter to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Harris, 2007). On the other hand, Japan remained silent and watched
events around the world. Internally, there were clearly two voices. One saying Japan should takefurther steps to support the Kyoto process because climate change is a serious issue, because Japan
can benefit from selling its energy-efficient technology, and because Kyoto is the name of an ancient Japanese city and the Kyoto Protocol is actually the only multilateral agreement named after
a Japanese city. The other voices insisting that Japan should remain silent until Kyoto collapses,
because the 6% emission reduction target set by the Kyoto Protocol would be difficult to achieve,
if it was ever achievable in the first place. This was a dispute between the environment and economy, and MOFA found no place to settle the debate, from a foreign policy perspective (Schreurs,
2002).
At COP11, held in Montreal, countries started discussing ways of moving forward on an international institution after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012). The
positions of the various Ministries were, as usual, diverse. The only common position that could be
drawn from various ministerial positions was that Japan was seeking the participation of major
emitting countries, namely the United States, China and India. MOFA was not able to say anything
further: for example, on the elements of a future climate regime. The then Ambassador, Mutsuyoshi Nishimura, was personally heavily engaged in the climate change debate.
He had personally read various proposals for a future climate regime, and tried to come up
with his own ideas. This was effective in stimulating positive feedback from other ministries, but it
was still difficult to mediate ministerial positions to construct a uniform Japanese position.
The irrelevance of MOFA as an institution for dealing with the climate change debate wasterminated as the G8 process became an important part of climate regime building. This process
started at the Gleneagles Summit meeting held in 2005. The then Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, Tony Blair, initiated a new process on climate change in the G8 Summit. The Summit
initiated dialogue on this global problem and also determined the duration of the process to be twoyears. Because each country receives a turn to host the G8 Summit, it was already clear that Germany, the host of the G8 Summit in 2007, would be at the forefront of the process, and that Japan,- 190 -

Japan in the Midst of Multilateral Negotiations on the Future Framework for Climate Change

the host of the subsequent G8 Summit in 2008, would need to take responsibility for the outcomeof the climate change process. This became the new incentive for MOFA to work on the climatechange problem. In early 2007, MOFA officials started internal discussions on how Japan could
play a leadership role in the process and formulate a successful outcome. At the Heiligendamm
Summit in June 2007, Japan called for the halving of global GHG emissions by 2050, comparedwith current levels. This debate on a long-term target was supported by MOFA.
MOFA believed that in order for Japan to succeed in the Toyako G8 Summit in 2008, a major agreement would have to be achieved at the COP13/CMP 3 in Bali. The same rule that wasapplied during COP3 emerged again. In order for any agreement to be reached, MOFA considered
the involvement of the United States to be indispensable. The Japanese government submitted its
original draft proposal for a possible COP decision on what was then called the Bali Road Map.
The proposal was never officially distributed during the Bali meeting, but the paper investigatedways for the United States to accept the decision. When the United States distributed its
counter-proposal against the Co-chairs’ proposal on a COP decision on future cooperation, MOFA
supported the position taken by the United States.
Early in 2008, Japan’s awareness on climate change negotiations as well as on Toyako G8
Summit began to grow. Soon after the Bali meeting, the Japanese government began to discuss
consolidating Japan’s position on whether to accept the emission reduction target at the national
level. This closed meeting involved ministers of four ministries, MOE, METI, MOFA and theMinistry of Finance (MOF), so the meeting was unofficially dubbed the “four-ministers’ meetingon climate policies”. Ministers from MOE, MOFA and MOF were basically supportive of setting
the emission reduction target at the national level, but the minister of METI was strongly opposed
to taking such an option, as he was in sympathy with industries’ view. In particular, the Minister of
MOFA was concerned that Japan would be left out of the negotiation table discussions if Japan did
not accept any emission reduction target in absolute terms.
After the final decision was made by the then Prime Minister Fukuda himself that Japan
would accept an emission reduction target at a certain level, MOFA was keen on setting focus on
the debate on the long-term global emission target. This was to be the main element of discussion
on climate change at the Toyako G8 Summit. The Toyako G8 Summit, held between 7-10 July
2008, highlighted agreeing on the 2050 global target, but the United States did not accept such anemission target. The final Chair’s summary wrote, “we seek to share with all Parties to the
UNFCCC the vision of, and together with them to consider and adopt in the UNFCCC negotiations, the goal of achieving at least 50% reduction of global emissions by 2050, recognizing that
this global challenge can only be met by a global response, in particular, by the contributions fromall major economies, consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities.”
After the Toyako G8 Summit was over, MOFA started to lose its leadership role in determining the Japanese position at multilateral negotiating meetings on climate change. In October
2008, a new committee was set up under the “Council on the Global Warming Issue”, which had
been established in the Prime Minister’s Office since early 2008. The goal of the committee was to- 191 -

Yasuko Kameyama

discuss levels of Japan’s mid-term emission reduction target, and to develop several options ofsuch target. The final choice among the options was to be made by the prime minister himself. The
committee involved experts and stakeholders from various fields, and it was mainly MOE and
METI that supported modeling works to show emission reduction potentials and economic cost toachieve a certain emission reduction target (PMO, 2009). Similarly, also in October 2008, a pilot-phase of the domestic emissions trading scheme was initiated. Policy-making on this scheme
was also led by MOE and METI. MOFA had no role to play because this was a domestic matter.

Political Leaders on Climate Change
Japanese political leaders are mainly influenced by two voices: one derives from domestic
stakeholders and ordinary citizens, through elections; the other voice from outside Japan. It is often said that Japan is sensitive to Gaiatsu (pressure from outside the country). It was often the casethat the Japanese position became reactive rather than proactive, because Japan takes a position
only after obtaining sufficient information on how other countries are acting.
The first political leader who became aware of climate change as an issue in international
politics was Noboru Takeshita who was the Japanese prime minister from 1987 to 1989. Initially,
he had not been very eco-friendly in his early years as prime minister, and was surprised to hearother heads of state discussing climate change during the Toronto Summit in 1988. Thereafter,
Takeshita started encouraging the Japanese government to prepare for environmental negotiationsin the near future. His personal instinct that global environmental problems would be placed highon the political agenda at an international level shifted his party, the LDP, to a pro-environmental
position. This shift in the LDP’s position was maintained throughout Toshiki Kaifu’s administration from 1989 to 1991.
In the late 1980s, some countries in Europe started setting national targets for their CO2
emissions. The Japanese Environment Agency believed that Japan should also set a national target,s aiming to at least stabilize emissions at the 1990 levels by 2000. This was vigorously opposed by
MITI, stating that such stabilization is unrealistic. The argument between the two ministries wasdifficult to solve internally. The LDP showed strong political leadership in concluding this debate
and the Japanese government announced an Action Plan to Address Global Warming in the autumn of 1990, when the plan set a national emission stabilization target for CO2, as was supportedby the LDP. The target was actually set at two levels, first the stabilization of per capita emission,and then the stabilization of overall emissions. The first level target was incorporated to address
MITI’s concerns. The next Prime Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, was also basically supportive ofglobal environmental activities. Nevertheless, he was not able to attend the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in June 1992, because at that time the Japanese Diet was poised to adopt the International Peace Cooperation Bill, legislation that was criticalfor Japan to participate in a Peace Keeping Operation (PKO) under the United Nations. As political interest at an international level started to decline after UNCED, the willingness of the LDP totake the lead in environmental policies also started to diminish.

- 192 -

Japan in the Midst of Multilateral Negotiations on the Future Framework for Climate Change

A new wave from the international arena struck the LDP in 1997 during negotiations leading
up to the third Conference of the Parties (COP3) held in Kyoto. Japanese government officials
were negotiating emission reduction targets for the period around 2010. Three ministries, namely
MOFA, MITI and EA, all held different positions and were not able to reach consensus. The
Japanese government consolidated its position in late September 1997. This was led by the thenHashimoto administration. On the final night of COP3 in Kyoto, it was actually heads of state thatagreed to emission reduction targets.
After adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, the main debate on climate change policy shifted todomestic legislation, which would be necessary to achieve the agreed emission reduction target.
Unlike debates on emission reduction targets, discussions on minute rules and procedures to install
the Kyoto Protocol were not very enticing for political leaders to take the initiative. It was mainly
ministries that discussed the rules of implementing emissions trading, or for counting emissions
and sequestration by land use, land-use change and forestry.
The next phase that called for political leadership occurred in 2001, when the United States
under the new Bush administration announced that it would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. As soon
as this news spread among climate-related stakeholders in Japan, two voices were heard. On one
side, there was a group that supported the Kyoto Protocol and believed that Japan should move
forward with the EU and Canada and agree on detailed rules. The other group insisted that the
Kyoto Protocol would no longer be environmentally effective without the participation of thelargest emitter, and that Japan should follow the United States. The former was based mainly on
the principle of environmental effectiveness, while the latter was most concerned about economic
damage in Japan that might be caused by trying to reach a 6% emission reduction target without
US participation. The latter group also mentioned that any climate regime without the participationof the United States, as well as major emitting developing countries, could never be environmentally effective.
The debate in Japan on this issue was not agreeable to government officials. During the resumed COP6 meeting in Bonn in July 2001, the then Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, is said tohave taken the final position that Japan would adhere to the Kyoto regime. The Parties attending
the meeting agreed to what was named the Bonn Agreement, and also agreed to the Marrakesh
Accord at COP7 in late 2001. Koizumi was followed by Shinzo Abe. Abe had been appointed
prime minister in September 2006 but had rarely expressed opinions on climate change and was
not known for being enthusiastic about environmental protection. In his address on administrative
policy on January 16, 2007, he mentioned a plan for achieving the goals of the Kyoto Protocol andgiving support to developing countries but only after talking about creating a sound and safe society. Just before giving his speech, Abe visited European countries to seek their understanding on
the abductions by North Korea. At that time, the EC proposed a package of climate and energy
policies, and climate change was the central topic in all the countries he visited, thus sparking
Abe’s interest in climate change.
After the visit to EC, Abe became interested in the climate change debate. He announced his
first slogan “Cool Earth 2050” in May 2007 (PMO, 2007), where he stressed three themes in- 193 -

Yasuko Kameyama

which progress needed to be made in Japan: (i) long-term strategies for halving global greenhousegas emissions by 2050, (ii) medium-term approaches on the framework after 2012, and (iii) policies for fulfilling the 6% reduction commitment of the Kyoto Protocol. The position on thelong-term target in (i) was consistent throughout the Heiligendamm Summit in June of the same
year. However, the Abe administration did not endure. He resigned as prime minister in July 2007
due to health problems. The next Prime Minister, Fukuda, was more interested in domestic issues,
such as the collapse of the pension fund. Nevertheless, he was also aware that the Toyako Summit
in July 2008, hosted by himself, was going to be an important forum in which to finalize discussions on climate change, a process that had started at the Gleneagles Summit back in 2005. Fukuda
thus took a position that was fundamentally in line with Abe’s proposal on long-term global emission targets. This position did not affect the Japanese position much during the COP13 held in Bali,
Indonesia in late 2007, because the meeting focused mainly on short-term emission mitigation
targets.
At the time of the 13th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP13) that took placein Bali, the Japanese government had not been able to consolidate its position on whether to support what is called the “cap & trade” system, as industries strongly rejected such an approach. The
industry group emphasized the “failure of the Kyoto Protocol” and called for a new international
commitment that included another type of commitment, such as a voluntary sectoral approach(Sawa, 2007). In an agreement reached at COP13, the Bali Action Plan, included a paragraph on
the “sectoral approach” (UNFCCC, 2007), but Japan’s suggestion to discuss the “sectoral approach” was not reflected in a way Japan had expected. A paragraph on the “sectoral approach” inthe Bali Action Plan stated; “cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, in orderto enhance implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1(c) of the Convention.” This meant that the“sectoral approach” under the Bali Action Plan was mainly intended to motivate technology transfer in developing countries, and not to discuss it as a part of the commitments of the developed
countries.
Soon after the Bali meeting, the Japanese government began to discuss consolidating Japan’s position on whether to accept the emission reduction target at the national level. The final
decision was made by then Prime Minister Fukuda himself. In his speech made at the annual
meeting of the World Economic Meeting in Davos in January 2008, he made a proposal called the“Cool Earth Promotion Programme,” which basically accepted a quantitative emission reduction
target at the national level (PMO, 2008a). Such national target for each country should be set basedon calculation of the amount of emission reduction potentials in each country. He said, “Japan will,along with other major emitters, set a quantified national target for the greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions reductions to be realized from now on. In setting this target, I propose that the equity of
reduction obligations be ensured. The target could be set based on a bottom-up approach by compiling on a sectoral basis energy efficiency as a scientific and transparent measurement and tallying up the reduction volume that would be achieved based on the technology to be in use in subsequent years. This methodology has become a new definition of the “sectoral approach” in Japan.
Fukuda also went on to start climate change debate at the domestic level. He established the- 194 -

Japan in the Midst of Multilateral Negotiations on the Future Framework for Climate Change“Council on the Global Warming Issue” under the Prime Minister’s Office in February 2008. This
council consisted of twelve members, who were either from academia, the business community, orother related organizations. The council met once a month until the G8 summit in July 2008. It
discussed various aspects of the issue, including a long-term target, a vision for a low-carbon society, technology transfer, etc. Japan had already proposed halving global emissions by 2050 at thetime of Abe administration a year ago. The next step was to investigate the long-term emission
target for Japan. In early June, Fukuda announced a proposal called “the Fukuda Vision”, which
included Japan’s emission target for 2050 (PMO, 2008b). He said that Japan was ready to aim at
reducing its emission 60-80% of the current level by 2050 and develop a low-carbon society. The
Council on the Global Warming Issue also published its own proposal called the “Proposal of theCouncil on the Global Warming Issue, in pursuit of Japan as a Low-carbon society” (Council on
Global Warming, 2008). With “the Fukuda Vision” and its long-term emission goal in hand, Prime
Minister Fukuda was proved to be eligible for hosting the Toyako G8 Summit in July 2008.
Soon after the Toyako G8 Summit, however, Fukuda suddenly resigned his position as
Japanese prime minister. Mr. Taro Aso succeeded the position and became the new Japanese prime
minister. Japan’s decision-making including that related to climate change policies stalled until the
new administration began to take action in fall 2008. Prime Minister Aso generally accepted Japan’s positions on future climate policies that were determined under Abe and Fukuda administrations. He also maintained the Council on the Global Warming Issue, which met after several
months’ interval, in October 2008, to establish a new committee called the “Committee on
Mid-term Emission Target” under the Council. This newly established committee has been given
the task of using several economic models to develop several scenarios that reflect Japanese people’s concern such as by how much Japan would be able to reduce GHG emissions at a certain cost,and how that certain level of effort could be compared with the efforts of the EU or of the UnitedStates. The several scenarios will be used as references for the prime minister to make the final
decision on Japan’s mid-term emission reduction target.
The committee worked intensively in early 2009. In April 2009, it finalized its role by proposing six options for the Japanese GHG emission reduction target for the year 2020, which were+4% (extension of current climate policy), +1~-5% (-25% Annex I as aggregate, distribution
among Annex I countries according to equalizing the marginal abatement cost), -7% (installmentof the best available technologies in terms of energy efficiency), -8~-17% (-25% Annex I as aggregate, distribution among Annex I countries according to equalizing the abatement cost perGDP), -15% (rapid introduction of the best available technologies) and -25% (assuming all Annex
I countries committing to the same figure), all percentages having been based on emissions in theyear 2000. On 10 June 2009, Prime Minister Aso suggested -8% from 1990, explaining that his
choice was -7%, plus an additional 1% by the additional introduction of solar PV panels. His
choice was somewhere in the middle of the six options, expressing his position that was somewhere in the middle between the position of industries and that of environmental NGOs.

- 195 -

Yasuko Kameyama

Discussion: Explanation on Two Types of Foreign Policy Element
on Climate Change
Relations between foreign policy and its consequence, decision-making of a nation state or agovernment, have been explained by different theories, as was given in the examples in the earlier
section of this paper. One type of explanation is to see national decisions as a result of organizational behavior. Another type of explanation is to see it as a result of government politics at thedomestic level. The former can be applied to explain the activity of MOFA in the context of involvement in climate policy-making. However, neither the former nor the latter adequately explain
the actions taken by Japanese political leaders. This is a type of cultural shock that is experienced
by political leaders individually, and that can alter their mindset in a short period of time.
Table 1 summarizes the influence of MOFA and political leaders in Japanese climate change
policy-making. Some elements are worth discussing. First, the influence of foreign policy by the
involvement of MOFA is mostly observed whenever Japan hosts international conferences of ahigh significance. This is observed especially when Japan announced it would host the third or thesubsequent COP, in 1997 up to COP3, and in 2007-8 for preparation of the Toyako G8 Summit.
The role expected to be taken by MOFA is to conclude significant international meetings in a successful manner. In the case of climate change, MOFA’s evaluation criteria of the level of “success” are based on whether the United States is on board. The United States is not merely the largest emitter of GHG that needs to be part of an agreement on mitigation activities. For Japan, theUnited States is the largest partner in terms of security, trade, and politics. The Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, agreed in 1960, remains the basisof Japanese defense policy. The United States is the largest buyer of Japanese goods, purchasingnearly one-fifth of the total exports from Japan (Ministry of Finance, 2007). As a result, MOFA
officials in any section experience US-Japan relations one way or another. Thus, the influence of
MOFA does not always conclude in pro-environmental positions.
Second, the influence of foreign policy by the involvement of political leaders can be observed whenever the climate change debate attracted international attention, as well as wheneverdecisions were not achievable among ministries. The involvement of political leaders is likely toshift Japan’s position on climate change towards a pro-environmental position. This was observed
in decisions taken by Takeshita, Hashimoto, Koizumi, Abe and Fukuda.
On the other hand, whenever Japanese climate change policy-making does not encountersuch leadership from foreign policy, Japanese decisions are mainly influenced by the economic
perspective. For instance, the Marrakesh Accord in 2001 was agreed in such a way as to count on
sequestration by forests and also by utilizing Kyoto Mechanisms. Emission reduction targets forthe year 2020 were discussed in terms of marginal abatement cost in 2008-9. MOE therefore expects the involvement of foreign policy in climate change decision-making.

- 196 -

Japan in the Midst of Multilateral Negotiations on the Future Framework for Climate Change

Table 1Year

EventsInfluence byleadership of
MOFA

Japan’s position as a nation
Influence by
state
leadership ofpolitical leaders1990 Action Plan to Address Global
Warming (stabilization target)

No

Yes

Japan announced emission
stabilization target

1992 United Nations Conference forEnvironment and Development(UNCED)

PartiallyNo

UNFCCC adopted a month
before UNFCCC

1995 Announcement to host COP3

Partially

No

Japan determined to host
COP3

1997 Japanese proposal on emission
targets

Partially

Partially

Japan proposed -5% reduction with differentiation formulae

Partially

Yes

Japan committed -6% target

2001 Bonn Agreement

Adoption of Kyoto Protocol

No

Yes

Japan’s position on sink sequestration was accepted

Marrakesh Accord

NoNo

2005 Kyoto Protocol entered into
force

No

No

2006 Abe’s Statement “Cool Earth”

No

Yes

Japan called for halving
global emission by 2050

2007 COP13 and Bali Road Map

Partially

No

Japan called for “sectoral
approach”

2008 Japan’s decision to consider
emission reduction target

Partially

Yes

Yes

Yes

2008 COP14NoNo2009 Discussion on Japan’s emission
reduction target

No

No

Japan elaborated six options

Determination on Japan’s emission reduction target

No

Partially

Japan announced -8% from1990 for 2020

Toyako Summit

Japan called for halving
global emission by 2050

Conclusion
Much of the literature suggests that the foreign policy aspect of decision-making on climatechange brings about a positive influence on the country’s position in terms of environmental consciousness, but this proposition proved to fit only partially for Japan. The first type of Japanese
foreign policy on climate change is to view national decisions as a result of organizational behavior. This can be applied to explain the activity of MOFA in the context of involvement in climate
policy-making. Whenever MOFA exerted its influence, it respected the U.S. involvement in the- 197 -

Yasuko Kameyama

scheme, as MOFA considered the United States to be the most significant partner for Japan. On
the other hand, the actions and decisions taken by Japanese political leaders were difficult to explain by various theories on foreign policy. This is a kind of cultural shock, which is experienced
by political leaders individually, and that can alter their mindsets in a short period of time. Politicalleaders, once they became aware of climate change debates, sought political leadership in the negotiations, which resulted in shifting Japan’s national position towards the pro-environmental direction.

References
Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston, MA: Little, Brown
and Company, 1971.
Proposal of the Council on the Global Warming Issue, in Pursuit of Japan as a Low-carbon Society. Council
on the Global Warming, published in June 2008.
Grubb, Michael, with Christiaan Vrolijk, and Duncan Brack, The Kyoto Protocol, A Guide and Assessment. London, UK: Earthscan, 1999.
Hamakawa, Yoshihiro, Nishikawa Yoshikazu, and Tsuji Kiichirou, eds., Enerugi kankyo gaku (Energy
Environment Studies). Tokyo, Japan: Ohmusha, 2001(in Japanese).
Harris, Paul, ed., Climate Change & American Foreign Policy. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.
Harris, Paul ed., European and Global Climate Change: Politics, Foreign Policy and Regional Cooperation,
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007.
Institute of Applied Energy. 2007 [http://www.iae.or.jp/energyinfo/energydata/data1018.html].
Kansai Electric Power. 2007 [http://www.kepco.co.jp/insight/content/column/library/library098.html] (inJapanese).
Ministry of Finance, Trade Statistics of Japan. 2007 [http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/] (in Japanese).
Oberthür, Sebastian, and Hermann Ott, The Kyoto Protocol, International Climate Policy for the 21stCentury. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 1999.
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Invitation to Cool Earth 50. (A speech made by then Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe on May 24, 2007), 2007 [http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ondanka/2007/0524inv/siryou2.pdf](in Japanese).
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Special Address by H.E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan on the
Occasion of the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum (Cool Earth 50). A speech made by thenPrime Minister Yasuo Fukuda on January 26, 2008 at Davos, Switzerland, 2008a [http://www.mofa.go.
jp/policy/economy/wef/2008/address-s.html].
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), “Low Carbon Society and Japan (Fukuda Vision),” A speech made by thenPrime Minister Yasuo Fukuda on June 9, 2008, 2008b [http://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/prg/prg1904.html](in Japanese).
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Chikyu ondanka ni kansuru kondankai (Council on the Global Warming
Issue ) 2009 [http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/tikyuu/index.html] (in Japanese).
Rowlands, Ian, The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press,
1995.
Sawa, Akihiro, “Proposal for a Post-Kyoto Framework,” Interim report on the research project entitled “Japan’s Strategy and International Cooperation Measures for a Post-Kyoto Framework,” Working Paper,the 21st Century Public Policy Institute, 2007.
Schreurs, Miranda, Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany and the United States. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2002.

- 198 -

Japan in the Midst of Multilateral Negotiations on the Future Framework for Climate Change

Shiroyama, Hideaki, Hosono Sukehiro, and Suzuki Hiroshi, Chuo kancho no seisaku keisei katei: Nippon
kanryosei no kaibo (Policy Making Process of Central Bureaucracy). Tokyo, Japan: Keikaku gyosei
sosho, 1999 (in Japanese).
Susskind, Lawrence, Environmental Diplomacy, Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Takeuchi, Keiji, Chikyu ondanka no seijigaku (Political Science of Global Warming). Tokyo, Japan: Asahi
sensho, 1998 (in Japanese).
Tanabe, Toshiaki, Chikyu ondanka to kankyo gaiko (Global Warming and Environmental Diplomacy). Tokyo, Japan: Jiji tsushinsha, 1999 (in Japanese).
Yoda, Susumu, ed., Tri-lemma he no Chosen (Challenge to Tri-lemma), Tokyo, Japan: Mainichi shinbunsha,
1993 (in Japanese).
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ) Document Decision 1/CP.13 Bali
Action Plan, 2007.

- 199 -