Russia’s Multilateral Diplomacy
in the Process of Asia-PacificRegional Integration:
The Significance of ASEAN*
for Russia
KATO Mihoko

Introduction
In recent years, Russia’s multilateral diplomacy has been intensifying in
the Asia-Pacific region. Russia became a full member of international
nongovernmental organizations through the Russian National Committee
for Pacific Economic Cooperation (RNCPEC) and the Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1992, and the Pacific Basin Economic
Council (PBEC) in 1994. Regarding intergovernmental cooperation,
Russia has participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since its
inauguration in 1994 and was accepted as a full member of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1998. Moreover, Russia
was a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
in 2001, and has taken part in the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear*

Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It was established in 1967 with five original
countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) to promote
regional reconciliation in the wake of Indonesia’s confrontation with Malaysia. Brunei
Darussalam joined in 1984, Vietnam, in 1995, Laos and Myanmar, in 1997, and Cambodia,
in 1999.

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program since 2003. This tendency is one of the main aspects ofpost-Cold War Russian foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific region.
Since the late 1980s, the Soviet Union and Russia have sought tointegrate Siberia and the Far East into the process of Asia-Pacific regional
economic cooperation with domestic economic reconstruction. In
particular, Russia has shown great interest in APEC membership, anorganization that aims to facilitate trade and investment liberalization
within the major economies in Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, as Boris
Yeltsin stated in South Korea in 1992, Russia’s security priority wasplaced on Northeast Asia, where Russia faced unresolved territorial issues
with China and Japan, and instability on the Korean Peninsula. Russia
repeatedly proposed the building of a multilateral conflict regulation
system in Northeast Asia.
However, Russia’s participation in the regional cooperation
framework was realized in its involvement with the ASEAN Regional
Forum in 1994. Then, ASEAN members pursued the building of a new
security mechanism to respond to new, emerging threats in the aftermathof the collapse of the Cold War structure, especially China’s aggressive
policy toward the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. ASEAN
countries needed to establish a security cooperation system, including all
major powers and former communist parties, to avoid the emergence of adominant power in Southeast Asia. In this context, Russia was needed tobuild the new security framework. Until the late 1990s, Russia had been
excluded from APEC due to poor economic linkage in this region,
domestic socio-economic turmoil, and the stagnation of territorial
negotiations with Japan. In this situation, a series of ASEAN conferences,such as the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC)1 and ARF were
the only places in which Russia could participate in confidence-building
measures and make contact at the ministerial level in Asia-Pacific.
In November 1997, Russia’s entry into APEC was decided bypolitical judgment among major powers, regardless of the economic
criteria; the United States agreed to Russia’s entry into APEC as
1

ASEAN-PMC is one of the most important of ASEAN’s conferences with major
economic partners that were called “dialogue partners.” It has been held every year for twodays since 1979. The general meeting, between the foreign ministries of ASEAN and the
dialogue partners and representatives of EC (EU), and individual meetings, between theforeign ministries of ASEAN and a dialogue partner, are held during these conferences.

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compensation for NATO enlargement. China and Russia had just finishedthe demarcation work of the Sino-Russian eastern border. The Japanese
government then pursued the normalization of relations with Moscow.
Russia was accepted in APEC under a “temporary” accord among the four
major powers. The middle powers such as ASEAN and Australia wereconcerned that APEC would be dominated by Japan, China, the UnitedStates, and Russia.
After the Asian financial crisis, economic cooperation was
strengthened based on the bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) andEconomic Partnership Agreement (EPA) among ASEAN and China,
South Korea, and Japan. Recently, these counties are seeking a way tocreate an East Asia community. Russia has expressed its willingness to
become a member of the East Asia Summit (EAS). The most importantcriterion for Russia is “to have substantive relations with ASEAN.” Thistime, Russia cannot enter through the back door. President Vladimir Putin
has been enhancing political relations with ASEAN since the latter part ofhis first term. In recent years, Russia upgraded relations with ASEAN bysigning the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC,
2004) and by inaugurating the annual Russia-ASEAN Summit (2005). To
become a full member of this region, Russia must expand its economic
ties with not only Northeast Asian countries but also Southeast Asian
countries.
What are the meanings of Russia’s approach to ASEAN? In
post-Cold War Asia-Pacific, neither the multilateral security system nor
the efforts of community building such as the East Asian Summit were led
by major Northeast Asian countries, but by ASEAN. Focusing on Russia’s
political relations with ASEAN as a whole and its entry into APEC,2 thisarticle describes the process through which Russia has been accepted by
the participating countries of existing regional cooperation frameworks,
and explains the regional and subregional factors that permit Russia tojoin the movement toward regional security and economic cooperation.

2

APEC began as an informal ministerial-level dialogue group with 12 members (Japan,
the Republics of Korea, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, US). China, Hong Kong, and Chinese Taipei
entered in 1991, Papua New Guinea and Mexico, in 1993, Chile, in 1994, and Russia,
Vietnam, and Peru, in 1998.

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Russia and ASEAN in the Early 1990s
Debate over National Interests
The Soviet Union and Russia gave initial emphasis to relations with
Western countries, paying less attention to the striking economic progressin the Asia-Pacific region. It has been demonstrated that the importance ofAsia in Russian foreign policy was gradually underlined by Sergei
Stankevich, a former presidential adviser, and academics connected withthe old Soviet institutes and think tanks devoted to the study of Asianaffairs as criticism against extreme pro-Western foreign policy increased.3
Russia was in political and economic turmoil shortly after thecollapse of the Soviet Union and was dependent on Western aid for thetransformation from socialism to a market economy and democracy. Boris
Yeltsin, the first president of the Russian Federation, made thetransformation and the reconstruction of Russia’s economy his first
domestic priority. Although his first foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev,
assumed the task of clarifying the basic principles of Russian foreign
policy, there was debate about national identity and the priorities of
Russian foreign policy among the political elites.
Kozyrev, who had spent sixteen years in the Department ofInternational Organization of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs andput the “new thinking” policy into practice under Mikhail Gorbachev’s
administration, argued that post-Soviet Russia could best protect its stateinterests by closely aligning itself with the institutions and policies ofindustrialized democracies. 4 Kozyrev and his advocates recognizedWestern democracies as their model and partner for Russia, and believedthat Russia should abandon the illusion of playing a special role as a“bridge” between Europe and Asia. They also thought that Russia should
avoid playing a leading role in economic integration or peacekeeping
operations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) because
the reintegration of Russia’s economy with members of CIS would
decelerate economic reform and participation in European economic
3

Oles M. Smolansky, “Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region: Policies and Polemics,” inStephen J. Blank and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, eds., Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Rolein Asia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 8–9.
4
Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior
and the End of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 107–108.

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institutions.5 Such a prominent Westernizing line impelled by Yeltsin andKozyrev, however, was not welcomed by Western countries, and Russia
was unable to draw economic assistance to the extent expected. Not
surprisingly, such a servile foreign policy that begs for foreign aid did not
gain internal support.
Criticism against Westernism (or Atlanticism) developed in disputes
over the definition of post-Soviet Russia’s national interests among
officials in government and academic institutions from the spring to thesummer of 1992. Most critics made much of the new boundaries and new
geopolitical environment that resulted from the independence of theformer Soviet republics. These “Eurasianists” thought that the priority ofRussia’s foreign policy was to defend the Russian population and Russian
assets left in the states of the former Soviet Union. In particular,
Stankevich advocated that Russia was indeed separate and distinct fromthe West and did have a special mission to serve as a bridge between
Western and Eastern civilization. Stankevich’s idea was not a rejection of
the Western world, but meant to seek a more balanced foreign policy in its
relations with the rest of the world. Accordingly, Stankevich argued,
Russia would draw, at best, the position of junior partner in its relations
with the United States, Japan, and Europe, but there would be many morechances among second-echelon countries in such regions as Latin
America, Africa, South Europe, and Asia (India, China, and Southeast
Asia).6 In this context, Russia could seek to play a unique role as a great
power.
With this background, it became clear that international organizations
such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
could not play a leading role in the resolution of conflicts that broke out in
Predoniester, Abkhazia, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan from thespring of 1992. Given this situation, Kozyrev’s Atlanticism was exposed
to strong criticism and turned in a diplomatic direction toward advocating
Russian rights and assets in the former Soviet Union (the near abroad) and
improved relations with Eastern Europe, Asia-Pacific, Africa, and the5
Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing
Systems, Enduring Interests, 2nd ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 125–126.
6
Sergei Stankevich, “Derzhava v poiskakh sebia: zametki o rossiiskoi vneshnei politike,”
Nezavisimaia gazeta, March 28, 1992.

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Middle East as well as Western countries.7 Under such circumstances, thedirection of Russian foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific region
gradually became apparent from the middle of 1992. The first foreign
policy concept approved by Yeltsin in April 1993 claimed Russia’s rights
and responsibilities in the near abroad, and the securing of Russia’s great
power status in the balance of power in the multilateral control system of
the world economy and in international affairs.8 As for the Asia-Pacificregion, Russia emphasized the necessity of ensuring its independent rolein the regional political system. For this purpose, priority was given to
establishing a more balanced and stable relationship with the UnitedStates, China, and Japan.9 In this context, cooperation with ASEAN was
considered to be useful for its full participation in the economic andpolitical process in Asia-Pacific.10 Although the role of Southeast Asia in
Russian foreign policy was uncertain in the early 1990s, as the then viceminister of foreign affairs Aleksandr Panov asserted, a “middle power”
like ASEAN began to be recognized as a vital player in thedecision-making process regarding regional problems in Asia-Pacific in
1994.11

Russia’s Debut in Southeast Asia
The view that Russia has more attractive and important partners in the
Asia-Pacific region than members of ASEAN has been shared by Russian
officials and foreign policy experts. That is, Russia’s security interests in
China, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula are geographically close. Russian
foreign policy experts acknowledged that ASEAN was becoming aconsiderable factor in economic and political relations in the Asia-Pacificregion, especially noting that the total ASEAN GDP exceeded $300
million in 1992 ($208 million in 1981), and that the overall value of
external trade accounted for $140 million in 1990 ($70.1 million in 1980).

Nevertheless, they considered that Russia has attached and will
7

Andrei Kozyrev, “Rossiia: god minuvshii i god nastupivshii,” Diplomaticheskii vestnik,
no. 1–2 (1993): 3–5.
8
“Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1992 g.,” in A. V. Torkunov, ed.,Vneshniaia politika i bezopasnost’ sovremennoi Rossii, 1991–2002 v 4-x tomakh, tom 4,
Dokumenty (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002), 23–27.
9“Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1992 g.,” 38–39.
10“Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1992 g.,” 40.
11
Doklad “Aleksandr Panov,” Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 23–24 (1994): 34.

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attach much less importance to ASEAN countries than China orJapan.12 Contrary to such a prediction, Russia and ASEAN have been
gradually evolving dialogue relations since Russia was elevated to a full
dialogue partner of ASEAN in July 1996.
Russia was invited to the 25th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM)
in 1992 as a guest of ASEAN together with China and Vietnam. 13
Kozyrev articulated Russia’s newly emerged perception on security
cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region in front of the countries of thisregion. The key points of his speech were:• It is necessary to restrict the scale of naval exercises and refuse themin the international straits and sea areas where shipping and fisheryare centered;• It is necessary to start multilateral dialogue on building acrisis-control structure in order to prevent the rise of military tension;• It is necessary to arrange the formation of an international naval force
to ensure mare liberum;• Russia will continue to be stationed in the Russian military base in
Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam;• Russia is willing to develop cooperation in the military andmilitary-technological area with members of ASEAN with the aim ofsupporting their security.14
Although Kozyrev referred to the necessity of rapid expansion of
economic cooperation with Asia-Pacific states in advance of AMM,15 his
12

B. Nikolaev, “Psikhologicheskii bar’er preodolevaetsia,” Aziia i Afrika segodnia, no. 7(1993) : 47–51.
13
Malaysia suggested approving the Soviet Union and China as dialogue partners of
ASEAN and inviting the foreign ministers of both countries to a Post-Ministerial
Conference in July 1992. However, some members of ASEAN and the existing dialogue
partners raised objections to the suggestion. So, the Soviet Union and China ended up
attending only AMM as guests of the government of Malaysia. In 1992, the two countries
were raised to the status of guests of ASEAN, See YAMAKAGE Susumu, ASEAN Pawa: Ajia
Taiheiyo no chukaku he [Changing ASEAN: Self-transformation and Regime-formation](Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1997), 296.
14
Krasnaia zvezda, July 25, 1992.
15
Krasnaia zvezda, July 25, 1992.

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speech primarily dealt with security concerns. Russia’s chief purpose inSoutheast Asia was to strengthen mutual economic ties as Gorbachev
declared in his July 1986 Vladivostok speech, but Russia had no trumpcards for playing an active role in economic cooperation in this region.16
Thus, the Russian foreign ministry took the policy of ensuring its status asguarantor of security in Southeast Asia, taking advantage of the assets ofthe past—that is, its positions as a permanent member of the UN
Security Council as well as a military power in Asia, allowing
security relations to follow economic ties.17
Russian troops were virtually withdrawing from Cam Ranh Bay atthat time. The strategic value of the Cam Ranh Bay naval base wassignificantly reduced after Gorbachev strove to improve relations withneighboring countries in Asia. He announced at the UN in December 1988
that the partial withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay was part of a general
reduction in Soviet forces in Asia and around the globe. Eduard
Shevarnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister, said, “The day when
there will be no Soviet military presence in Asia beyond the Soviet Unionis near.”18 The Vietnamese foreign minister also predicted that all Soviet
troops would leave the country by 1992.19
Several factors lay behind the policy change over the Cam Ranhnaval base. First of all, some political elites insisted on keeping the former
Soviet Union’s military presence in the world for as long as possible. The
first meeting to adjust the Security Council convened on May 20 1991,
prior to the decree of the “Creation of the Security Council of the RussianFederation,” which was issued by President Yeltsin on June 3, 1991.20
The program of Russia’s national security that was prepared at the16
Total Russia-ASEAN trade was $638.1 million in 1993. It was only about 0.1 percent of
total ASEAN trade in 1993 ($429,948 million). See ASEAN Statistical Yearbook, 2005,
70–73. For a figure of ASEAN-Russia trade in 1993–1996, see Amado M. Mendoza Jr.,“ASEAN’s Role in Integrating Russia into the Asia Pacific Economy,” WATANABE Koji,ed., Engaging Russia in Asia Pacific (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange,1999), 134.
17
Krasnaia zvezda, July 25, 1992.
18“United States Lauds Soviet Military Reduction in Vietnam,” The Associated Press,
January 19, 1990.
19“Vietnam Faces Crisis in Loss of Soviet and East European Aid,” The Associated Press,
July 9, 1990.
20
Nezavisimaia gazeta, July 31, 1992.

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meeting mentioned that it was necessary for Russia’s national security
interests to deploy troops in potential tinderboxes around the world.
According to the program, Russia should appear as a counterbalance tothe United States, which is currently seeking leadership on the global
stage independently.21 Given the reduction in defense expenditure after
the Soviet breakup and the serious damage to the Russian Pacific Fleet, it
seems that the view as mentioned in the program is unrealistic. However,great power ambitions remained within the Yeltsin administration, andthey supported the maintenance of the outlying military base. 22 In
addition, Moscow intended to link its military presence at Cam Ranh Bay
to the issue of Hanoi’s 10-billion-ruble debt to the Soviet Union that
Russia inherited.23
On the other hand, for Vietnam, China was regarded as the greatest
threat at that time. Military aggression and oil exploration in the Spratly
region of the South China Sea had been conducted since the beginning of
1992,24 which provoked a sense of crisis from Vietnam as well as theASEAN states. Under these circumstances, it was assumed that Vietnam
would ask Russia to maintain its Cam Ranh base. 25 However, theVietnamese government was actually faced with a dilemma. Russia’sforeign policy priority was to join ASEAN and improve relations with the21

Nezavisimaia gazeta, July 31, 1992.
Kozyrev said himself that Russia should abandon its status as a superpower and become
a vigorous stimulus for the expansion of cooperation with the Asia-Pacific statesdeveloping dynamically. Izvestiia, July 22, 1992.
23
Ian Storey and Carlyle A. Thayer, “Cam Ranh Bay: Past Imperfect, Future Conditional,”
Contemporary Southeast Asia 23, no. 3 (2001): 458.
24
The Spratly Islands include over 400 tiny islands, reefs, shoals, and sandbanks in theSouth China Sea. The Spratly Islands are a potential tinderbox due to their being a natural
resource-rich region. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam lay claim to all of the islands, while thePhilippines, Malaysia, and Brunei each claim various islands. In February 1992, theStanding Committee of China’s National People’s Congress enacted a law on territorial
waters, reasserting sovereignty over islands in the East China Sea and the South China Sea
as well as the right to take all necessary measures to prevent and stop the so-called harmful
passage of foreign vessels through its territorial waters. See Mickael Leifer, ed., Dictionaryof the Modern Politics of South-East Asia, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2001), 256–257.
China occupied a reef in the Spratly region in Feburary 1992, and signed an oil explorationagreement with a US corporation for 25,000 square kilometers at the edge of the Spratly
group only some 150 kilometers southeast of the Vietnamese coastal islands in May. Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, July 23, 1992.
25
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 23, 1992.
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KATO MIHOKO

United States and China. Some Vietnamese political elites thought that the
military presence of Russia might block their approach for thenormalization of relations with the United States.26 On the one hand, there
was serious concern within the Vietnamese government about themodernization of the Chinese navy and its aggressive policy toward theSouth China Sea. In addition, the Vietnamese hoped to turn the Cam Ranhnaval base into a commercial base like the Philippines’ successfultransformation of the former US naval base at Subic Bay.27 Hanoi andMoscow established working-level talks on whether Russia should be able
to use the bay in 1992. Russia continued to claim that it should inherit theSoviet-Vietnam agreement that required Vietnam to provide Soviet naval
fleets with logistical supplies such as fuel and water free of charge until
2004,28 but it was not until Putin’s accession that the issue of Cam Ranh
Bay was settled. Under such circumstances, Russia formed closer politicaland economic relations with the ASEAN states than with Vietnam in the
1990s.29

Russia’s Participation in Asia-Pacific Regionalism
From the beginning of 1996, Gorbachev began to pay particular attention
to the Asia-Pacific region. While the Soviet’s economic growth had
started to decline in the 1970s, dynamic economic and political change
was taking place in this region. Since the 1980s, multilateral economic
cooperation organizations such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation
26

Storey and Thayer, “Cam Ranh Bay,” 458.
“Vietnam looks to Subic as model for former Soviet base,” Kyodo News Service,
March 14, 1994. US forces returned the Subic naval base to the Philippines in November
1992.
28“Vietnam, Russia still at odds on Cam Ranh Bay,” Kyodo News Service, March 29,
1993.
29
Compared to the previous year, total Russia-Vietnam trade decreased by 58 percent in1992. However, Singapore and Thailand each expanded foreign trade with Russia about
2.5 fold from the previous year, see Roshia Too boeki chosa geppo [Monthly bulletin on
trade with Russia & East Europe] (August 1992), 1–4. Singapore was Russia’s biggest
trade partner in Southeast Asia until 1997. After the settlement of the Cam Ranh naval baseissue in 2002, trade between the two countries doubled in 2002–2004, and Vietnam again
became Russia’s biggest trade partner in this region, see Tamozhennaia statistika vneshnei
torgovli Rossiiskoi Federatsii: sbornik, (1998): 8; tom. 1 (2003): 7–10; tom. 1 (2005):
7–9).
27

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Council (PECC) started to be formed. It aimed to deepen economic ties
among industrialized capitalist countries, including Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, Japan, and the United States, and promote their economic
assistance to developing countries in Southeast Asia. It contributed to theformulation of the Asia-Pacific economic zone whose total populationaccounted for over half of the world’s total and whose share of theworld’s total GNP had increased over the previous 25 years. The
Asia-Pacific economic zone is emerging as a center of global economy,
replacing the European economic zone.
Gorbachev argued that the Soviet Union needed to make efficient useof its bountiful natural resources in Siberia and the Soviet Far East for thedevelopment of the Soviet economy. In addition, it was necessary for theSoviet Union to use the great economic and technological potential of the
Asia-Pacific region and to strengthen economic, trade, and technologicalcooperation with it to accelerate the development of Siberia and the Soviet
Far East.30 In fact, Gorbachev set up the Soviet National Committee on
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (SNCAPEC) in 1988 in order toovercome the difficulties impeding Soviet’s integration into theAsia-Pacific region by joining PECC and PBEC, which were predecessorsof APEC. The first chairman of SNCAPEC was Evgenii Primakov who
subsequently became Russia’s foreign minister in January 1996. Primakovthought that if the goal of SNCAPEC was to be achieved, Russia’s Far
East and Eastern Siberia had to fit naturally into the global economic
relations of the Asia-Pacific region, although certainly not at the expenseof the country’s territorial integrity.31

Russia and the ASEAN Regional Forum
The disputes over the objective, the priority of national interests, and the
direction of their foreign and security policies converged on one that
assimilated the rational aspects of both Westernizers and pragmatic
nationalists by the end of 1992. In a speech at the National Assembly30

See the political report by Gorbachev at the 27th Party Congress. Pravda, Feburary 26,
1986.
31
Evgenii Primakov, Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium, trans. Felix
Rosenthal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 39. The committee changed its namefrom SNCAPEC to the Russian National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation(RNCPEC) in August 1992. For the history and the activities of RNCPEC, see
http://www.rncpec.fareast.ru/index.htm.

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during his visit to South Korea in November 1992, President Yeltsin
stated, “Geopolitically, our country is an integral part of the Asia-Pacificregion, but today’s situation is inadequate. We intend to become a full
member of the dynamic regional economy and join the political andcultural rapprochement.” In particular, he stressed, “We are ready toparticipate in important multilateral interactions, such as Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation.”32 Thus, President Yeltsin announced Russia’s
intention to enter APEC officially. However, Russia’s first participation inregional cooperation was not achieved in the economic sphere, but in the
security sphere.
Then, ASEAN sought a way to use established forums, particularly
the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, to promote external dialogue on
enhancing security in the region as well as intra-ASEAN dialogue on
ASEAN security cooperation.33 ASEAN members recognized the need torespond to the profound international political changes that had occurredsince the end of the Cold War. They were concerned about a new threat
from China—the hard policy toward the territorial disputes in the South
China Sea that followed the collapse of the Cold War structure in
Southeast Asia,—that is, the reduction in US and Soviet military forcesfrom the Philippines and Vietnam. ASEAN members were afraid that
regional powers like China, Japan, and India would aspire to fill the power
vacuum resulting from the two superpowers scaling down their presencein the region. Therefore, ASEAN’s heads of member governments needed
the wider multilateral security system joined by external powers to ensureand balance regional stability.
At the 26th AMM in July 1993, ASEAN members gave up on using
the ASEAN-PMC as a security cooperation framework, but did decide to
hold a new forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum, in 1994.
At the meeting of ASEAN and ASEAN-PMC senior officials in May 1993,
Singapore, with strong backing from Australia and the United States, went
further and recommended expanding the existing ASEAN-PMC structure.
There was some resistance from Indonesia, Thailand, and Japan, who were
nervous about moving beyond the familiar context of the Western-aligned
ASEAN-PMC. In the event, the meeting recommended the additional
32

Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 12 (1992): 39.
Singapore Declaration of 1992, January 28, 1992, ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/
5120.htm.
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RUSSIA’S MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

membership of China and Russia, with which ASEAN had begun to develop
a consultative partner relationship in July 1991, and of Vietnam and Laos,
which had been accorded observer status within ASEAN-together with
Papua New Guinea, a long-time observer-on acceding to the Association's
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in July 1992.34

At the meeting, Russian foreign minister Kozyrev expressed interest
in institutionalizing Russia-ASEAN relations and founding a RussiaASEAN committee similar to the one between ASEAN and its dialogue
partners.35 Russia and China were invited to the first ASEAN Regional
Forum as consultative partners.
By participating member of ARF, Russia was now in a position to be
involved in the consultation of political and security issues. In 1993,
ministers of APEC members agreed to defer consideration of additional
members for three years with the objective of increasing APEC’s
effectiveness.36 It meant that Russia was excluded from the process ofdeepening economic cooperation in APEC. Furthermore, US president
Bill Clinton upgraded the importance of Asia in his first year in office,while proposing the creation of a “New Pacific Community” at the G7
Tokyo Summit in July 1993. Although his efforts to convene a summit
with the leaders of the other 14 members of APEC failed, informal
summits of APEC had become regularized since 1993. The informal
summit’s topics were largely economic, but the involvement of heads ofgovernments added political implications to APEC. The subregional
forums held by ASEAN provided Russia with a chance to commit toregional affairs and build confidence among the members at theministerial level.
As Kozyrev expressed in his speech in the Russia-ASEAN meetingof AMM in 1994, Russia’s primary objective of the Asia-Pacific policy
was the stabilization of the eastern border, the nonproliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and the inclusion of Siberia and the Russian
34
Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional
Security (London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1996), 21–22.
35
Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 15–16 (1993): 20.
36
APEC Ministerial Meeting, Joint Statement, November 17–19, 1993, http://
www.apec.org/apec/ministerial_statements/annual_ministerial/1993_5th_apec_ministerial.
html.

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KATO MIHOKOFar East into the economic system in this region.37 Regarding the regional
security vision, Russia sought to create multilateral security dialoguemechanisms both at the regional level and subregional level. Russia
particularly expected to create a conflict regulation system, such as
meetings of multilateral experts on the nuclear nonproliferation problem
in Northeast Asia (especially on the Korean Peninsula), and an
Asia-Pacific center for the study of strategic problems. 38 Behind theemphasis on multilateral cooperation was the recognition that Russia’s
isolation from both the near abroad and far abroad had become a national
security threat to creating a favorable international climate for Russia’s
economic reconstruction.

Emerging Partnership between Russia and ASEAN
Under Evgenii Primakov, Russia’s foreign minister from January 1996 to
September 1998, Russia’s relations with ASEAN as well as with China
and Japan strengthened. Primakov declared that the Asia-Pacific direction
for Russia had a clear objective. The first was the development ofmutually beneficial relations and partnerships with all countries of theregion. The second was the promotion of sound security on the Russian
Far-Eastern borders. The third was the creation of favorable conditions for
economic transformation in Russia, particularly for the economic
development of its Far East.39
Russia hosted an ARF track-two seminar on the principle of security
and stability in Asia-Pacific in Moscow in April 1996. ASEAN valued
Russia’s commitment and contribution to the ARF process and welcomed
Russia’s readiness to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation inSoutheast Asia and its support for the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on theSouth China Sea.40 At the 29th AMM held from July 20–21 in Jakarta,
ASEAN
members
also
expressedinterest
in
Russia’sscientific-technological potential and considered Russia as an attractive
37

Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 15–16 (1994): 11.
These were proposed in Yeltsin’s speech at South Korea’s National Assembly.
Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 12 (1992): 40.
39
See Primakov’s speech in the 18th ASEAN-PMC in 1996. Statement by His Excellency
Mr. Yevgeni Primakov Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ASEAN,
http://www.aseansec.org/4813.htm.
40
Statement by H. E. Mr. Nguyen Manh Cam Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/4793.htm.
38- 138 -

RUSSIA’S MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

market with rich natural resources. With a view to creating fruitful
dialogue relations, ASEAN elevated Russia to the status of a full dialogue
partner. In his first speech at PMC, Russian foreign minister Primakovexpressed dynamically developing associations as “one of the mostimportant poles of our multipolar world.”41
In June 1997, the first meeting of the ASEAN-Russia Joint
Cooperation Committee was held in Moscow. On the Russian side,
representatives from various government agencies participated. The
ASEAN delegation was composed of representatives from all member
countries and an ASEAN secretariat. The two sides reaffirmed their desire
and readiness to further strengthen their relationship. They discussed the
dialogue mechanisms and agreed that the following institutions would
form the structure of the Russia-ASEAN Dialogue;42 the ASEAN-Russia
Joint Cooperation Committee (ARJCC); the ASEAN-Russia Joint
Management Committee of the ASEAN-Russia Cooperation Fund;43 theASEAN-Russia Business Council; and the ASEAN Committee in
Moscow.
ARJCC has formed working groups on science and technology, andtrade and economy. Today, the ASEAN-Russia Joint Planning andManagement Committee supports interaction among members andapproves specific economic and science-technology projects. The ASEAN
Committee in Moscow was established in October 1996, which comprised
all ambassadors of ASEAN members in Moscow. The committee has
contributed to regular contact between diplomats from both sides. Total
Russia-ASEAN trade grew from $638.1 million in 1993 to $1.655 billion
in 1997.44
41

Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 8 (1996): 38–39.
See Joint Press Release the First ASEAN-Russia Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting,June 5–6 1997, ASEAN-Russia Joint Cooperation Committee, http://www.aseansec.org/
2720.htm.
43This fund aimed to facilitate private sector participation. Although Russia provided US$0.5 million to set up the fund, it has not worked successfully. See Iurii Raikov,“Rossiia-ASEAN: Partnerstvo v interesakh bezopasnosti i razvitiia,” in Evgenii P.
Bazhanov, ed., Rossiia i ASEAN: Tematicheskii sbornik (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2004),
16.
44
For figures on ASEAN-Russia trade in 1993–1996, see Mendoza, “ASEAN’s Role inIntegrating Russia into the Asia Pacific Economy,” 134. For total ASEAN-Russia trade in1997, see Tamozhennaia statistika vneshnei torgovli Rossiiskoi Federatsii: sbornik, (1998):
8.
42- 139 -

KATO MIHOKOIn this way, Russia has gradually shifted its assessment of ASEAN’s
role in Asia-Pacific regional cooperation since the mid-1990s. The
ASEAN states successfully engaged Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar in
ASEAN and put security dialogue involving major powers on track in thepolitical sphere. Furthermore, in the economic sphere, ASEAN showed its
assertiveness over the issue of the institutionalization of APEC. In 1993,
opposition between the United States, who intended to lead theinstitutionalization of APEC and proposed the building of a “New PacificCommunity,” 45 and the other members, who placed emphasis onconsensus and voluntarism to pursue trade and investment liberalization instages, became obvious. The leaders of the member economies agreed ona two-step approach to free and open trade and investment in the region
by 2010 for developed economies and by 2020 for developing economies
in Bogor in November 1994.46 The Malaysian prime minister, Mahathir
Mohamad, however, issued a reservation purporting that his government
would accept the schedule only if it were on a “best endeavors” basis andwere conditional and nonbinding. In addition, APEC decisions should bebased on consensus; this means unanimity rather than majority
agreement.47 At Osaka in November 1995, the Bogor Action Agenda wasreaffirmed but also qualified by a provision for flexibility in theliberalization and facilitation process to take account of the different
levels of economy. In fact, the claims of Southeast Asian countries
that have fragile national markets were approved in APEC. Since
then, the concepts of “open regionalism”48 and “flexibility”49 have been
45
The proposal was announced in a speech at Waseda University by President Bill Clinton,
Asahi Shimbun, July 7, 1993, evening edition.
46“APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration of Common Resolve,” November 15, 1994,
APEC, http://www.apec.org/apec/leaders__declarations/1994.html
47
John Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 117.
48
The concept of “open regionalism” was defined as “nondiscrimination” in the Osaka
Action Plan that was adopted by the leaders at a meeting in 1995. “APEC economies will
apply or endeavor to apply the principle of nondiscrimination between and among them inthe process of liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment. The outcome of tradeand investment liberalization in the Asia-Pacific region will be the actual reduction in
barriers not only among APEC economies but also between APEC economies andnon-APEC economies.” “APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration for Action,” November 19,
1995, http://www.apec.org/apec/leaders__declarations/1995.html.
49
See also the Osaka Action Plan. “Considering the different levels of economic- 140 -

RUSSIA’S MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

the basic, shared principles among the member economies. In this way, it
showed that ASEAN became an influential player in APEC. Russia
started to think that strengthening relations with ASEAN might enable her
to join the process of regional integration.50

Russia’s Entry into APEC
The member countries of APEC approved the membership of Russia,
Vietnam, and Peru at the Vancouver Summit in November 1997. APEC
was established at the initiative of the Japanese and Australian
governments in 1989. In 1991, China, Taiwan,51 and Hong Kong wereadmitted to APEC. Moscow noted that China, professing socialist values,
became a full member of the capitalist economic institution and sits at thesame table as Taiwan.52 It meant participating countries needed China as aregional power to discuss regional economic issues. After the collapse of
the Soviet Union, Russia’s new foreign policy has sought greater
integration with the world economy, and as a part of this policy, it has
sought to enter the existing frameworks of regional cooperation in
Asia-Pacific.
Participation in APEC is limited to economies in the Asia-Pacificregion that:
1. have strong economic linkages in the Asia-Pacific region
2. accept the objectives and principles of APEC as embodied in the
Seoul APEC Declaration.53

development among the APEC economies and the diverse circumstances of each economy,
flexibility will be available in dealing with issues arising from such circumstances in theliberalization and facilitation process.” “APEC Economic Leaders’ Declaration for
Action.”50
Rafis Abazov, “Dialog Rossiia–ASEAN v kontekste XXI veka,” Mezhdunarodnaia
zhizn’, no. 10 (1996): 67–69.
51
Taiwan realized its membership as “Chinese Taipei” with its acceptance as an economic
entity.
52
Izvestiia, November 13, 1991.
53
These conditions were stipulated in the Seoul APEC Declaration. See the APEC
Ministerial Meeting, “Seoul APEC Declaration,” November 12–14, 1991, APEC, http://
www.apec.org/apec/ministerial_statements/annual_ministerial/1991_3th_apec_ministerial/
annex_b___seoul_apec.html.

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KATO MIHOKOIn 1997, intra-APEC trade recorded $5.2 trillion, which accounted for
54 percent of the total world trade. On the other hand, the total trade
between Russia and APEC members was $22.3 billion, which accounted
for only 0.4 percent of total APEC trade.54 APEC members, conversely,
amounted to 16.2 percent of the overall value of Russia’s external trade.
Despite this limited economic relation, why was Russia accepted in
APEC?
The decision on Russia’s membership was largely a political one,rather than a consensus of members. Normally, participation problems aredealt with at the Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM). New acceding
members have been announced in the leader’s declarations or theministerial statements. However, the documents released in 1997 made noreference to the membership of Russia, Vietnam, or Peru. It meant either
that there were no plans to accept the additional members or that theexisting members could not reach an agreement on the issue until the end.
In the 9th APEC Ministerial Meeting, while China, Japan, and theUnited States strongly supported Russia’s membership, Australia,
Singapore, the Philippines, Mexico, Chile, and New Zealand opposed it.55
Australia and Singapore, in particular, pointed out the poor economic
linkage between Russia and Asia-Pacific countries. Although Japanese
foreign minister Obuchi Keizo noted Russia’s role as a major power,
Mexico and Chile reacted against making an exception for Russia.56
Until then, Japan and the United States had blocked Russia fromjoining such economic cooperation forums as PECC and APEC.57 Japan,
in particular, always linked economic cooperation and territorial disputes
with Moscow. 58 The United States advanced negotiations on NATO
54

APEC Economic Committee, 1998 APEC Economic Outlook (Singapore: APEC
Secretariat, 1998), 5.
55
Izvestiia, November 27, 1997.
56
Izvestiia, November 27, 1997.
57
Regarding the Soviet’s participation in PECC, see Lawrence T. Woods, “Delicate
Diplomatic Debuts: Chinese and Soviet Participation in the Pacific Economic Cooperation
Conference,” Pacific Affairs 63, no. 2 (1990): 218–224.
58
Japan’s response to Russia’s request to support its accession to APEC has largely rested
upon the stalled negotiation process on territorial issues over the Northern Territories. In
November 1994, Russian first deputy prime minister Oleg Soskovets visited Japan andheld talks with Japanese foreign minister Kono Yohei. Both sides agreed to commence
formal negotiations on fishing in waters around the four disputed islands (Habomai,
Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu). However, Kono rejected Soskovets’ call for bilateral- 142 -

RUSSIA’S MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

enlargement in Europe, while it excluded Russia from the US-led
resolution process on the Korean Peninsula (KEDO) in Northeast Asia. In
contrast, some Southeast Asian and Oceanian members took a permissive
stance toward Russia’s participation in PECC or APEC. For instance, thePhilippine undersecretary of foreign affairs, Rodolfo Severino, said that
the Philippines supported the entry of Vietnam, Peru, and Russia amongthe 11 candidates on the eve of the APEC ministerial meeting in 1996.59
Japanese prime minister Hashimoto pushed “Eurasian diplomacy”
and tried to improve relations with Russia by laying special emphasis on
economic cooperation (although he never forgot the territorial disputes).
Hashimoto thought that Japan might be able to improve its relations with
Russia by inviting Russia, which then was completely isolated both from
Europe and Asia, to APEC.60 The United States thought that Russia’s
entry into APEC would be effective in easing Russia’s opposition to
NATO enlargement. 61 On the other hand, Russia noted China’s
contribution to Russia’s entry. Maxim Potapov, first secretary of theRussian foreign ministry, pointed that China shifted to a position of
official political support of Russia’s intention to become active in APEC
when Russian-Chinese relations entered a progressive stage.62 Russia andChina issued a joint statement on the finalization of the demarcation workof the eastern Sino-Russian border on November 6, only two weeks before
economic cooperation on the Kurile Islands because of the unsolved territorial issue. Kono
also rejected support for Russia’s entry into APEC on the grounds that APEC members
decided to defer acceptance of new members for three years. In March 1995, Russian
foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev visited Japan and asked Foreign Minister Kono forJapan’s support in joining APEC again, but was rejected. Thus, the Japanese Foreign
Ministry maintained the principle that expansion of economic cooperation with Russia andthe progress of negotiations on the territorial issue were inseparable until the mid-1990s.
See HASEGAWA Tsuyoshi, Hoppo Ryodo mondai to nichiro kankei [The Northern
Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 2000),
325–326.
59
The Straits Times, November 21, 1996.
60
Hashimoto also asked President Clinton and German chancellor Kohl to encourage
President Yeltsin to take serious steps toward the normalization of relations with Japan.
HASHIMOTO Ryutaro, “Nodo-teki gaiko o mezasi te” [Seeking an Active Diplomacy],Interview by IOKIBE Makoto, Kokusai mondai [International Affairs] 505 (2002): 88–93.
61
SAITO Motohide, Roshia no gaiko seisaku [The Foreign Policy of Russia] (Tokyo: Keiso
Shobo, 2004), 199.
62
Maxim Potapov, “China’s Experience as a Member of APEC: Lessons for Russia,” Far
Eastern Affairs, no. 1 (2001): 47.

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KATO MIHOKOan APEC meeting. There was, undoubtedly, an optimistic atmospherebetween the two governments. Middle powers such as ASEAN andAustralia were concerned that APEC was being dominated by Japan,
China, the US, and Russia. Thus, Russia’s entry into APEC was a politicaldecision made by the major powers.

Putin’s Policy toward Asia-Pacific Regional Cooperation
ASEAN in Putin’s Asia-Pacific Policy
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Japan, China, South
Korea, and ASEAN have been pursuing problem-solving mechanisms thatare not led by the United States because neither the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) nor APEC could implement effective support in thecrisis. Today, the process of Asia-Pacific economic integration isdeveloping based on the bilateral Free Trade Area or Economic
Partnership Agreement among ASEAN, Japan, China, and South Korea.
ASEAN has a degree of presence in the movement of enhancing East
Asian regional cooperation such as ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit(EAS).
After Putin came to power, Russia started paying significant attention
to what was happening not only in Europe and the United States but alsoin Asia-Pacific. He has attended informal summits of APEC since 1999
(except 2002), and has made efforts to deepen exchange with Asianleaders.63 In the new version of the foreign policy concept of the RussianFederation, which was approved by Putin in June 2000, it was mentionedthat for Russia, the significance of Asia is growing, because the need for
economic progress and development in Siberia and the Far East has
become more pronounced. In this context, it was recognized that Russia
needs to participate in APEC as a key economic integration system in
Asia-Pacific, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the process of thefoundation of the “Shanghai Five” under the initiative of Russia.64 Afterthe September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, APEC members announced the63

In the APEC Summit of 2002, Mikhail Kasiianov, secretary of state, attended. Yeltsin
never attended APEC. On Russia’s debut in APEC, then Prime Minister Primakov attended.
See APEC’s Website, http://www.apec.org/.
64“Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2000 g.,” in Torkunov, Vneshniaia
politika i bezopasnost’ sovremennoi Rossii, tom 4, Dokumenty, 119.

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RUSSIA’S MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

leaders’ statement on counterterrorism and took joint action to prevent theflow of funds to terrorists. Russia regards its APEC membership as animportant measure to strengthen the fight against terrorism both at the
global and regional level. 65 President Putin has offered rail freighttransportation between Asia and Europe across the Korean Peninsula andRussia for a project of APEC.66 If the project is successful, there will be a
substantial cut in the cost of transportation between Europe and Asia,
although it would require stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Looking at the present situation, Russia’s foreign policy toward
Asia-Pacific was shaped by four factors that directly serve Russia’snational interests: the settlement of North Korea’s nuclear development
issue, the Siberian oil pipeline issue between Russia, China, and Japan,
integration into the Asia-Pacific regional cooperation, and arms export.
That is, Russia’s interests continuously focus on relations with China,
Japan, and two Koreas. However, unlike the Yeltsin government,
President Putin, since the latter part of his first term, has restored relations
with former allies Vietnam and North Korea, and has been enhancing
dialogue relations with ASEAN.
Today, Russian foreign policy experts regard ASEAN as animportant partner in creating a multipolar world and in shaping a coherent
system of regional security, and counteracting new challenges andthreats.67 Russia’s main aim in relations with the ASEAN states is firstly
to gain their support to become full member of all regional internationalorganizations. In particular, Russia seeks to enhance her influence in
Asia-Pacific countries through the dialogue and the cooperation in the
SCO, ASEAN’s conferences, and EAS, which are not led by the UnitedStates. Russia has also demonstrated a willingness to join the Asia-Europe
Meeting (ASEM) since 1996.68 Now, Russia needs ASEAN’s support for
65

See the contributed article by President Putin. Asahi Shimbun, November 17, 2005.
Asahi Shimbun, November 17, 2005.
67“Opening Remarks by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov at
Russia-ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, December 10, 2005,” The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation, no. 2645-10-12-2005, December 10, 2005,
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/f982bd095207f90cc3
2570d500524cd7?OpenDocument.
68
Speech by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov at the Session of theRussia-ASEAN Postministerial Conference, Phnon Penh, June 19, 2003, The Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Russian Federation, no. 1441-19-06-2003 June 19, 2003, http://66- 145 -

KATO MIHOKO

membership both into ASEM and EAS. But there is a problem regarding
Russia’s acceptance—whether it views itself as a European country or asan Asian country. This identity problem has embarrassed participating
countries of not only ASEM69 but also other institutions.

Russia in the New Dimension of the Asia-Pacific Regionalism
Russia and ASEAN signed a joint declaration on the partnership for peaceand security, and prosperity and development in the Asia-Pacific region inJune 2003.70 The foreign ministers of both sides confirmed advocating afurther enhancement of the effectiveness of the United Nations andexisting multilateral regional mechanisms, particularly ARF. In thisdocument, Russia referred to the encouragement of dialogue partners toaccede to ASEAN’s two basic norms, the Treaty of Amity andCooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and the Protocol on the Southeast
Asia Nuclear Weapon-free Zone (SEANWFZ). Furthermore, ASEAN
noted Russia’s efforts to promote peace and security in the region within
the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The
following year, Russia signed TAC after AMM, and a joint declaration oncooperation in combating international terrorism. They also decided toregularize the ASEAN-Russia Summit in December 2005. They are keen
to enhance cooperation in counterterrorism and combating transnational
crime through sharing information on terrorist organizations, potential
acts of terrorism, and the possibility of WMD attack.71

www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/273f45b5e07cbd4943256d4
c0027aac7?OpenDocument.
69
The member countries decided not to accept Russia because they could not conclude
Russia’s position in ASEM either as a European side or an Asian side. SATO Koichi,
ASEAN rejimu: ASEAN ni okeru kaigi gaiko no hatten to kadai [The ASEAN Regime:
Development and Challenges of the ASEAN Foreign Policies] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2003),
194.
70
Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations on Partnership for Peace and Security, andProsperity and Development in the Asia-Pacific Region, June 19, 2003, ASEAN,
http://www.aseansec.org/14849.htm.
71
For details, see Comprehensive Programme of Action to Promote Cooperation between
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Russian Federation 2005–2015,
December 13, 2005, http://www.aseansec.org/18074.htm.

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RUSSIA’S MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

In the economic sphere, the ASEAN-Russia trade value increased
from $1 billion in 1998 to $3.1 billion in 2004.72 It came close to totaling
ASEAN-New Zealand trade, $3.5 billion in 2004.73 However, Russia’s
exports to ASEAN were almost one percent of its total exports in 2004,
and ASEAN’s exports to Russia were 0.3 percent of their total exports.
They have made efforts to boost trade ties through a working group on
trade and investment and the ASEAN-Russia Business Council. It is
important for Russia to become a supplier of not only raw materials but
also modern technology such as oil extraction and space exploration.74 At
the same time, Southeast Asia is a potential new market for Russian arms
export.
The partnerships with ASEAN will contribute to not only
strengthening Russia’s position in Asia, but also using multilateral
cooperation for solutions to social-economic problems and security issues
including the fight against terrorism.75 In November 2004, the holding of
the first East Asia Summit was determined at the ASEAN+3 Summit. The
participation of a wide range of countries, especially India, Australia, New
Zealand, and Russia, was disputed until just before the date of the firstsummit in December 2005 among members of ASEAN+3. In the end,
President Putin was invited to address the summit, but was not aparticipant.
ASEAN foreign ministers established the following three-point
criteria for participation at their meeting in Cebu in April 2005.76
The country
1. is a full dialogue partner of ASEAN;
2. has acceded to or agreed to the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation inSoutheast Asia;
3. has substantive relations with ASEAN.77
72

Tamozhennaia statistika vneshnei torgovli Rossiiskoi Federatsii: sbornik, (1999): 9–10;
tom 1 (2005): 8–9.
73
ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2005 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2005), 70–73.
74
Vladimir Putin, “Rossiia: novye vostochnye perspektivy,” Nezavisimaia gazeta,
November 14, 2000.
75
Aleksandr Alekseev, “Proruabaia okno v Aziiu,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, December 26,
2005.
76
The Financial Express, April 16, 2005, http://www.financialexpress.com/print.php?content_id=89010.

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KATO MIHOKO

These conditions were approved at the first East Asia Summit inDecember 2005, and the participating countries recognized ASEAN as thedriving force.78 Unlike the case of APEC, Russia’s relations with ASEAN
has important implications in joining East Asian regional cooperation.
Russia meets the first and second criteria, but not the third. While
Malaysia, China, South Korea, and Thailand expressed their approval of
Russia’s involvement, Singapore opposed it because Russia’s economic
links with many ASEAN countries were quite weak.79 Japan faced adilemma. Japan supported the involvement of India, Australia, and New
Zealand under the open regional policy to counteract China’s influence in
EAS. However, the policy accelerated further applications from Russia,
Mongolia, Pakistan, and the EU. Japan is concerned that Russia’s entry
may enhance China’s influence.80
While there seems to be a struggle for leadership between China andJapan, member states of ASEAN try to maintain a stable balance of power
among the major regional powers. By integrating Russian power into the
Asian balance composed of China, Japan, India, and the United States,
ASEAN would benefit. More specifically, the rise of China and India adds
Malaysian-Russian strategic engagement in Asia-Pacific to incentives toensure equilibrium over the next few decades. 81 Malaysia has alsopurchased fighter jets and military transport helicopters from Russia as apart of its policy of diversifying its sources of defensive weapons and as
an endorsement of its policy of maintaining equidistance with external
powers.82 Besides, Russia is expected to be a cheaper and more stable oil
supplier to Southeast Asia. The Philippines in particular should seek todiversify its sources of crude oil products and ensure a sufficient energy
77

These membership qualifications were contained in the declaration on the first East
Asian Summit. East Asian Summit, Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit,
December 14, 2005, ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/18098.htm.
78
East Asian Summit, Chairman’s Statement of the First East Asia Summit, December 14,
2005, ASEAN, http://www.aseansec.org/18105.htm.
79
The Straits Times, November 5, 2005.
80
Asahi Shimbun, December 10, 2005.
81
K. S. Nathan, “Malaysia and Russia: Strengthening Strategic Partnership in the 21st
century: A Malaysian Perspective,” in Gennadii Chufrin, Mark Hong and Teo Kah Beng
eds., ASEAN-Russia Relations (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; Moscow:
Institute of World Economy and International Relations, 2006), 24.
82
Nathan, “Malaysia and Russia,” 25.

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RUSSIA’S MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

supply. The Philippine foreign secretary Alberto Romulo and thePhilippine National Oil Co. president Eduard Manalac held a meetingwith Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow in October 2005,
and they reached several agreements including the expansion of energy
cooperation and anti-nuclear proliferation. 83 Romulo stressed that thePhilippines was the nearest Southeast Asian country to Russia’s
resource-rich part.84 As mentioned above, today, Russia and ASEAN havefound the sphere of congruity in each other’s interests.
Although it was decided to regularize EAS, the aim and direction of
the summit remains unclear. It will take some time to create a true
community in East Asia due to the great diversity of its members and the
distrust among the major powers. However, it is necessary for Russia tojoin the regional integration process in the early stages to avoid its
exclusion from this region again. Also for Russia, it is important tostrengthen bilateral and multilateral regional economic agreements andpromote the socio-economic development of its fragile Far East andEastern Siberia to balance a rising China.

Conclusion
Even after Russia’s foreign policy was revised from a prominent
Westernizing line to a more pragmatic course at the end of 1992, Russia’sforeign policy priority was given to the major Northeast Asian powers
rather than Southeast Asian countries. In Asia-Pacific, Russia had firstly
to ensure the stability of its border region and maintain its territorial
integrity as well as participate in the regional cooperation organizations to
overcome international isolation from the regional integration process inboth Europe and Asia. In South Korea in 1992, as for economic
cooperation, Yeltsin showed enthusiasm to join the existing regional
cooperation framework such as APEC. However, in terms of the security
sphere, Yeltsin aspired to establish a multilateral mechanism especially on
the nuclear nonproliferation problem in Northeast Asia. This means
Russia wanted to be involved with the conflict resolution process as oneof the influential powers in Northeast Asia. However, from 1994 to 1995,
83

Asia Pulse, October 17, 2005.
Romulo said that the Philippines could be a hub for the delivery of Russian fuel andenergy products to other Asia-Pacific countries. Business World, October 6, 2005.
84- 149 -

KATO MIHOKO

the negotiation process over North Korea’s nuclear programs was
conducted without Russia. In addition, as mentioned above, the JapaneseForeign minister persisted in saying no to Russia’s request to support its
accession to APEC, mainly because negotiations on the territorial disputes
over the Northern Territories had been plagued with stagnation. At thattime, Evgenii Nazdratenko, the then governor of Primor’e, campaigned
against the 1991 agreement on the Sino-Russian (then USSR) easternborder demarcation work.85 In Russia, the tension between the central andlocal governments over the transfer of territory to China increased.
Under these strained circumstances, ASEAN provided Russia with anopportunity to be involved in the dialogue and cooperation on regional
nonmilitary security problems by inviting Russia to ARF. Naturally, it
was important that Russian officials meet with Asian leaders and officials
even if there were intractable conflicts between the countries. As for the
position of ASEAN and its influential role in the regional integration
process, Russia began to regard ASEAN as another door to political andeconomic integration in Asia-Pacific.
From January 1996–September 1998, Foreign Minister Primakov
played a leading role in foreign policy making; Russia became a dialogue
partner of ASEAN and a full member of APEC. This was proof of
Russia’s recognition as a regional player, and a confirmation of its
legitimate right to participate in the decision-making process regarding
regional and subregional problems. Up until the mid-1990s, Russia’sforeign policy toward Southeast Asia largely relied on its bilateralrelations in Northeast Asia. From when Primakov expressed ASEAN as
one of the most important poles of a multipolar world, ASEAN as a group
was given an independent role as a door to multilateral cooperation in
Asia-Pacific.
President Putin has restored Russia’s right to take part in regional
affairs by effectively using the multilateral cooperation mechanisms such
as SCO, the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear programs, and
ASEAN. As Foreign Minister Lavrov said, ASEAN is an importantpartner in the creation of a multipolar world as well as a center of theintegration process in Asia-Pacific. For Russia, ASEAN conferences are85

For details on the territorial campaign, see IWASHITA Akihiro, A 4,000 Kilometer
Journey Along the Sino-Russian Border (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido
University, 2004), 18–23.

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effective tools that appeal to Russian policies and cooperation projects in
Asia. Since each Asia-Pacific country regards its relationship with theUnited States as its most important bilateral relationship, only throughthese multilateral conferences can Russia enhance its influence in theregion.
Russia’s relations with ASEAN have so far been limited to thepolitical sphere. To foster substantive relations, Russia has to make anassertive effort to become a stable resource supplier as well as an arms
and technology supplier. Both sides also have considerable Muslim
populations. Russia regards both ASEAN and APEC as important
counterterrorism mechanisms.
Meanwhile, ASEAN has needed Russian power to balance theexternal great powers comprising China, Japan, India, and the UnitedStates. ASEAN countries traditionally aim to avoid the emergence of one
dominant power in the region. In addition, Russia’s status in the world
makes its role as an ASEAN partner all the more important. Russia isrecognized as both a nuclear power and a conventional military power.
Also, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia cancontribute to ASEAN proposals of establishing in Southeast Asia a zoneof peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN), a nuclear weapon-free zone
in Southeast Asia and TAC. Besides, Russia is expected to become asupplier of energy and inexpensive arms.
Northeast Asia was and will be at the center of Russian foreign
policy toward Asia-Pacific. However, Russia has to avoid exclusion fromthis region again to ensure the economic development of Siberia and theFar East. In this context, political and economic cooperation with ASEAN
countries has more significance in Russian eastern policy than it did in thelate 1990s.

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