Origins and Consequencesof the Soviet-Chinese Border
Conflict of 1969
Dmitri RYABUSHKIN

Prelude to the Military ClashA change for the worse in Soviet-Chinese relations at the end of the 1950s
was caused, mainly, by ideological discords between the party leadershipof the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Communist
Party of China (CPC). The main points of contention, where the parties
had contrary points of view, were the appraisal of Stalin’s legacy, thepossibility of peaceful coexistence of the states with different social
systems, the problems of war and peace, the economic experiments in
China, etc.
While Joseph Stalin, with his absolute authority, was alive, even Mao
Zedong did not try to play a more important political role than he alreadyhad. Besides this, the Chinese people felt gratitude for Stalin’s help intheir struggle against the Japanese army and Chiang Kaishek’s troops.
But after the death of the Soviet leader and simultaneously with theconsolidation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Mao Zedong
began to demonstrate China’s independence in internal and foreign affairs
more than before. Probably, the Chinese leader proceeded from the ideathat his country’s heavily populated and ancient culture must not play a
supporting role to the Soviet Union in any matter. Thus, the Chinese
leadership intended to occupy the leading position in the world communist
movement, especially in the so-called third-world countries. It is natural- 73 -DMITRI RYABUSHKIN

that such a turn was not pleasant to Moscow who wished to remain thesole and supreme authority for all supporters of Marxism-Leninism(socialism).
Concerning the relation to capitalist countries, there was an absolute
misunderstanding, too. Mao Zedong considered a third world war as agood phenomenon because he had no doubts about the defeat ofimperialism. The death of hundreds of millions of people was consideredby the Chinese leader as an inevitable payment for the achievement of agreat aim—the victory and affirmation of communism worldwide. Mao
Zedong frankly asserted as much in November 1957 when he took part ina ceremonial meeting in connection with the fortieth anniversary of theGreat October Socialist Revolution.
The Soviet leaders had another point of view because many of themhad taken part in the Second World War and therefore imagined quite well
the range of different disasters if something similar were to be repeated.
Thus, the Kremlin was inclined to peaceful coexistence with capitalist
encirclement, but Mao Zedong considered such a position as ademonstration of weakness and unscrupulousness. There was a time when
Mao even tried to set the Soviet leadership against the US—obviously inhopes of taking a neutral position in case of a serious conflict. But
Moscow understood this play and refused to clash with the US.
In 1959, China provoked a conflict with India, 1 but the Soviet
leadership took a neutral position. This ignited Mao’s anger because the
USSR actually demonstrated its unwillingness to help a communist
country in a struggle against a capitalist foe and, moreover, even gave
India moral support.
A definite role in the break of relations was played by a subjective
factor: the impulsive Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, allowed himself
not to validate statements to the address of Mao Zedong who painfully
perceived any possible criticism. The vain Chinese leader tried to imitate
Stalin in many respects, and similar to Stalin, wished to take a position of
infallible authority—all-knowing, understanding, and whose every
decision is accepted without discussion.
1

In that year Chinese troops stifled a rebellion of buddhists in Tibet but India declared
their support of the Dalai Lama and even accepted him after he fled China. In September
he appealed to the UN to interfere in the conflict. In July 1959 some Indian police officers
were captured by the Chinese. Chinese troops began to invade India.

- 74 -

ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE BORDER CONFLICT OF 1969

In 1964, a “change of the guard” took place in Moscow’s Kremlin:
the removal of Khrushchev was followed by the ascent of a new leader,
Leonid Brezhnev. However, this did not lead to the normalization ofSoviet-Chinese relations. The main reason seems to have been Mao's
unchanged intentions of instigating a confrontation with the USSR. The
inertia of this sharp polemic that had developed from the end of the 1950s
to the beginning of the 1960s affected Soviet-Chinese relations.
In particular, Soviet-Chinese border relations became essentiallystrained.
In accordance with the Treaty of Peking of 1860 (or, more exactly, in
accordance with a map of the Russian-Chinese border that was acomponent of the treaty), the border between Russia (later the USSR) andChina was drawn along the Chinese bank of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers
and the Kazakevichevo Channel as well. Thus, these rivers and all islandson them belonged to Russia/USSR. It is necessary to note that both theSoviet and Chinese mass media repeatedly reported the existence of a map
with a border line (the so-called red line) drawn on it; however, this map
was never made public.
In the 1950s, during Soviet-Chinese cooperation and friendship, noneof the Chinese leaders expressed opinions about the doubtful tracing(demarcation) of the border line. But after the beginning of the SovietChinese polemic, Beijing recollected the disadvantageous borderdemarcation and demanded a fair resolution to the problem. The result
was an escalation of tension along the border between the USSR and the
PRC. In the beginning, there were disputes between Soviet border guards
and Chinese citizens, who were inhabitants and so-called hongweibing (or“red guards”) sent by Chinese authorities to the river islands todemonstrate their belonging to China. Gradually, the civilians were
substituted for military men of the People’s Liberation Army of China(PLA), and verbal skirmishes developed into hand-to-hand fights using
sticks, knives, spades, etc. Thus, already at that time, it had become clearthat the official authority of China had deliberately aimed to aggravate its
relations with the USSR. The numerous intrusions of Chinese citizens
onto the Soviet islands at the border rivers resulted in conflicts only.
Many former Soviet participants of the events told the author how before
the armed clashes, they tried to communicate with these local Chinese
inhabitants who demonstratively violated the border and illegally entered
Soviet territory. According to their memoirs, the Chinese fishermen and- 75 -DMITRI RYABUSHKIN

peasants were not glad to take part in the provocations. They were driven
to the river islands by PLA officers, employees of the special services andlocal CPC functionaries.
Many researchers consider the border dispute between the USSR andChina as the main reason for the bloodshed. They see the sources of thisconflict in the imperfection of the border agreements, which were signed
in different historical periods by officials of Russia and China. However,
it is sufficient only to cast a glance at a map to understand theinconsistency of the given statement. Practically, none of the islands on
the Amur and Ussuri Rivers had any important economic or military value,
and, therefore, they could not serve as the reason for such serious
confrontation. But discussions around the islands suited perfectly thesituation where both parties of the conflict spoke about one thing but
thought about absolutely another. Moreover, if the disputed islands had
not existed at all, Mao Zedong and his colleagues in the Chinese
leadership would have found other places for confrontation: to this, they
were pushed by these realities that had developed by 1969 in and around
China.

Who Provoked the Border Conflict in 1969 and Why
Numerous researchers and authors of the West and the Soviet/Russia
argue that conflicts along the Soviet-Chinese border were not a result of
any tragic accident as is often presented in modern China. In fact, allbloody battles of 1969 were planned by the top leadership of the PRC, andcarefully prepared for by the military command of the PLA. And it isnatural to ask—with what purpose?
Of course, the exact answer to this question was known to only one
person—Mao Zedong—but there is no possibility of asking him.
Nevertheless, it is possible to conjecture about the logic of his reasoning
and acts, knowing what occurred after the completion of the fights at theborder.
One of the major reasons that Мао made up his mind for open
confrontation with the USSR could have been his desire to adjust China’s
relations with the US. The fact is that by 1969, Soviet-Chineseconnections were almost completely destroyed. The USSR did not give
China any economic or scientific help, did not send specialists to Chinese- 76 -

ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE BORDER CONFLICT OF 1969

factories, did not supply China with new weapons, etc. But at that time,
the Chinese economy could not develop without help from the outside
world and risked lagging behind the rest of the world for a long time tocome. Thus, China sharply needed a new sponsor to replace the USSR. At
that time and under those circumstances, only the US could play such arole, and Мао therefore decided on a rapprochement with America.
Certainly, squabbles between the Soviet and Chinese leaders were an
insufficient basis to decide on such an important problem because
American politicians might consider the Soviet-Chinese ideologicaldispute as a temporary quarrel within the communist “family,” and no
more than that. Therefore, Mao Zedong needed a more convincing
argument to persuade the US of the serious character of the split between
the USSR and the PRC. In such a situation, there was nothing better thanbloodshed at the border—with numerous victims, but without the risk of it
escalating into a large-scale war.
Another possible reason that might give Мао a shove towards
conflict at the Soviet-Chinese border was a situation inside China because
1969 was a peak year in the “Cultural Revolution.” The crash of theeconomy, the degradation of education and culture, catastrophe in thesocial sphere, full disorder and lawlessness in the country—these andother consequences of Mao’s politics generated doubts concerning thecorrectness of the chosen way. Having organized the battles at the border,
Мао could cast blame for the events in China onto their powerful northernneighbor: how can affairs be well if the country is exposed to external
aggression?
It is quite possible that Mao Zedong chose the way of confrontation
with the USSR because the ninth Congress of the Communist Party of
China, planned for April 1969, could present the chairman of the PRC
with unplanned surprises. Among the delegates of the congress, there
were different people—veterans of the Communist Party belonging tovarious inner-party groups, promoted workers of the Cultural Revolution,
and a large number of military personnel. There were supporters of thedeposed Liu Shaoqi, too, the struggle against whom Mao possibly counted
as the main task of the Cultural Revolution. The attitude of Liu Shaoqi
and his colleagues to the Soviet Union was absolutely different from Mao
Zedong’s. Liu believed that China and the USSR had many common
points in their economies, ideologies, and politics and that it was therefore
necessary to pay paramount attention to that which consolidated the- 77 -DMITRI RYABUSHKIN

Chinese and Soviet peoples instead of that which separated them.
Supporters of Liu Shaoqi excluded even the possibility of armed
confrontation between the PRC and the USSR, and these moods could
somehow be felt at the congress. What had happened at the bordersilenced all those delegates who counted Мао’s policy on confrontation
with the Soviet Union and all disagreements with the CPSU and the USSR
as erroneous.
To consolidate the necessary impression, Мао made sure that one of
the main participants of the clash at the border, Commander Sun Yuguo,
had the right to speak at the congress. Sun Yuguo burst out with a faithfulspeech and after that, rushed, with loud shouts to shake the hands of theChinese leadership—Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, andothers. During this procedure, all delegates of the congress welcomed the“hero” with an ovation.2 As for Mao, he sat in his place and ominously
grinned—as if he had assessed the show at its true value.
Мао Zedong always felt he was a positive force in conditions of
struggle (against Japanese troops, Chiang Kaishek, “Soviet revisionists,”
Liu Shaoqi, etc.), but constantly failed to improve the daily economic
conditions of the Chinese people. Unlike Stalin, who was both arevolutionary and an economist, Мао Zedong was a revolutionary only.
Therefore, the creation of any conflicts or collisions was the know-how
without which Мао felt himself to be unnecessary and superfluous in life.
Events in Czechoslovakia (CSSR) in August 1968 might be one morereason. As is known, the invasion of Warsaw Pact armies of this country
was argued for by the necessity to defend the achievements of socialism.
In reality, the main question that all events developed around was most
likely another; it was a question about the results of the Second World
War because one of the last was an agreement regarding Soviet
domination in Czechoslovakia. There was a moment when leaders of the2

Today, Sun Yuguo lives in Shenyang City. All attempts of the author to contact him andask some questions failed: former commander Sun refuses even to remember the events ofMarch 1969 and his role in them. Moreover, he does not wish to discuss the subject withjournalists of the Chinese mass media. The last circumstance will be understood by thoseinvestigators who studied the events at the border in detail: Sun Yuguo was indeed theChinese military commander who ordered the sudden shooting of a group of Soviet border
guards patrolling a part of the border. For this “heroic” act, Sun Yuguo received the title,“Hero of the PLA,” was elected at the ninth Congress of CPC, and made use of different
privileges all his life.

- 78 -

ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE BORDER CONFLICT OF 1969

USSR lost trust in their comrades in Prague and took all affairs into theirown hands. It is important to notice that the sudden military invasion of
the CSSR happened only after a wide propaganda campaign during which
Soviet newspapers and TV channels inspired the idea that the problems inCzechoslovakia endangered socialism. Approximately the same
expressions were being used by the Soviet mass media in theirinformation about the situation in China. In such a case, Mao Zedong
might find definite analogies and come to the conclusion that the same
scenario might occur in China. If so, Mao simply anticipated such a turnof events and demonstrated to the Kremlin the readiness of the Chinese tofight until the last soldier. Of course, anyone can ask whether Mao saw
the principal difference between the CSSR and China, and whether heunderstood that the military invasion of the PRC did not make any
sense—above all, for territorial and demographic reasons. Besides this,
there was the possibility that a restricted border conflict would develop
into a full-scale war, threatening world catastrophe because both the
USSR and China possessed nuclear weapons.3
The personal qualities of the Chinese leader quite possibly played adefinite role.4 Everybody who was closely acquainted with Mao Zedong
noticed his deep knowledge of Chinese history and literature, his
adherence and love to everything Chinese. Possibly, centuries ofhumiliation and oppression of the Chinese people constantly aroused in
Mao a keen feeling of vengeance, and this feeling appeared in a very
unusual way. The negative qualities of Mao—love of power, vanity, andscornful relations with others—developed in the same way.
As for the Soviet leaders, none of them was interested in aggravating
relations with China—anyway, no documents or personal memoirs offormer Soviet high-ranking officials that testify to the contrary have beenfound. Moscow did not assume that there was any possibility of armed
conflict at the border, even theoretically. Political departments of the3

Not long ago, it became known that the Soviet minister of defense marshal, Andrei
Grechko, offered to Soviet leaders at the top level to destroy Chinese nuclear facilities.
According to his opinion, it would result in the cessation of Chinese provocations at theborder. The probability of such development of events was not unthinkable, but Beijing
stopped hostile activity at the Soviet-Chinese border and the worst did not happen.
4
A former chief of the Soviet special service (KGB), Vladimir Kriuchkov, mentioned it in
his memoirs. See Vladimir Kriuchkov, Lichnoe Delo (Moscow: Eksmo; Algoritm-Kniga,
2003, 480).

- 79 -DMITRI RYABUSHKIN

Soviet border troops explained that consideration of relations with China
demanded the class point of view and use of the principle of proletarian
internationalism. It was said, too, that the USSR disagreed with thepolitics of the Chinese leaders but that the Chinese People’s Republic wasa socialist country with a socialist method of production. And though the
Chinese comrades made serious political mistakes, sooner or later theright line would win. Such was the logic of historical development and thedetermining tendency.
The Soviet ideologists believed that in the modern world, the socialist
countries would fight only against hostile imperialistic encirclement. It
was considered as an obvious fact that socialist countries would neverattack first but would be only forced to beat off the aggression ofimperialists. As to the possibility of war or military conflict inside thesocialist camp, such ideas were not discussed because of their absolute
impossibility and even absurdity.
At closed party meetings and conferences, the personal activity of
Mao Zedong was being analyzed and valued. The CPSU members said
that Mao had digressed from the principles of Marxism-Leninism but,nevertheless, was a communist. One of the main reasons for Mao’s
politics was the personal character of the Chinese leader and even his age(as they said, Mao had simply become senile).
Some Soviet citizens in confidential conversations with each otherexpressed the opinion that “our leaders are ‘good,’ too,” and the squabble
between Moscow and Beijing was the result of mutual ambitions. With
definite humor, the subject of the dispute was determined: Soviet andChinese “comrades” could not discover who among them had a better
understanding of Marx’s and Lenin’s works.
Some Russian researchers have begun to discuss the subject of thepossible interest of the Soviet generals and directors of military industry
in a conflict at the border. But all known facts demand that similar“innovative” hypotheses be recognized as idle conjectures because there
are no data that confirm them. It is just such a case when some
unscrupulous researchers try to attract attention to themselves, even at theloss of their own reputation. Unfortunately, there are such persons incurrent Russian political and literary society who are very free andirresponsible with reference to facts. For example, the well-known writer
Aleksandr Prokhanov taking part in a show at Russian TV International in
January 2006 asserted, when asked about the culprits of the armed conflict- 80 -

ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE BORDER CONFLICT OF 1969

at Damanskii (Zhenbao) Island, that “both parties attacked each other.”After this, Prokhanov said that a confrontation with China was in theinterests of Soviet leadership because the situation demanded it.
(Unfortunately, Prokhanov did not explain what he meant by his commentthat the situation demanded armed conflict against the Chinese.) The firststatement sounds strange because it is very difficult to imagine how bothparties of the conflict might attack each other—simultaneously? The
second phrase (about Soviet leadership’s “interests”) is a typical example
of conjecture, without any consideration of fact and great pretensions tothe sensational. It is very difficult to understand Prokhanov’s position in
any given case because he was the first Soviet journalist to visit thebattlefield and should therefore know who the initiator and provocateur ofthe bloodshed was.
The Soviet economy was always on a war footing and was therefore
never in need of money for its own existence and development. Moreover,in this period, the war in Vietnam reached its apogee, and this factor was asufficient stimulus for strengthening of Soviet defensive capabilities. Thus,
the Soviet directors of military industry had no reasons to request
additional budgetary injections.
Of course, the events at the border could have been used by theleadership of the CPSU and the USSR to put things in the socialist campin order. But that was absolutely another subject and had nothing to dowith revealing the originators of the Soviet-Chinese border tragedy in
1969.

How the River Islands became Chinese
A detailed discussion about the circumstances of the battles between
Soviet and Chinese troops is beyond the scope of this article. Therefore,
the author advises readers who are interested in the subject to read suchworks where military aspects are investigated with special care. There,
one can find important official documents, too.5 The main events that5

Dmitri Ryabushkin, Mify Damanskogo (Moscow: AST, 2004), 396; Vitalii Bubenin,
Krovavyi sneg Damanskogo: sobytiia 1966–1969 gg. (Moscow: Granitsa; Kuchkovo Pole,2004), 192; Andrei Musalov, Damanskii and Zhalanashkol’: sovetsko-kitaiskii
vooruzhennyi konflikt 1969 goda, Eksprint: Fond voennogo iskusstva (Moscow: Eksprint,2005), 40.

- 81 -DMITRI RYABUSHKIN

defined the character of the Soviet-Chinese conflict at the border are thefocus.
The first and the bloodiest clash took place on Damanskii (Zhenbao)
Island on the Ussuri River. There, on the nights of March 1–2, 1969, a
specially trained squad of PLA (about three hundred soldiers and officers)organized an ambush. On the morning of March 2, 1969, a group of thirty
Chinese military units, headed by the already-mentioned Sun Yuguo,
demonstratively violated the border and after that, lured a group of Soviet
border guards into a trap for a sudden ambush. The Chinese attack was
exceptionally cruel, and the battle was very fierce. Although Chinese
troops had full superiority in their quantity of soldiers and weapons, theSoviet border guards succeeded in not only inflicting serious casualties
but also beating back the Chinese provocateurs out of Soviet territory.
The Chinese command did not reconcile itself to the defeat and madea new attempt to capture Damanskii Island on March 15, 1969. At thattime, the Chinese sent a regiment into the battle. Attacks by Chinese
infantry were supported by artillery fire.
The battle proceeded, with variable success, all day and ended only
when the Soviet generals made up their mind to use massed artillery fireon the massed formations of Chinese reserves. The Chinese troops lost ahuge number of soldiers and guns and halted their attempts to capture
Damanskii. In the following days and nights, there were some fights ofreconnaissance groups on the island. These fights resulted in victims forboth parties; however, large-scale battles did not resume.
In the summer of 1969, the Chinese made an attempt to occupy
Kirkinskii (Qiliqin) Island, which is located three kilometers north ofDamanskii. With this purpose, the military men of PLA carried out
different work on the equipment of gun positions and command points inthe spring and summer of 1969. The Soviet officials limited themselves byprotests but the Chinese ignored them. The Chinese command sent twocompanies to occupy the prepared positions on the island on July 20, 1969.
However, violators of the border failed; intensive fire from Soviet
machine guns and mortars forced them to flee.
Local skirmishes took place at other sections of the Soviet-Chinese
border. An important detail is that in all conflicts, only the Chinese were
the provocateurs and violators of the border. As to the Soviet bordertroops, they only defended their own territory from invasion and- 82 -

ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE BORDER CONFLICT OF 1969

occupation.6 And every time, the Chinese were defeated. But ultimately,
the fate of the islands on the Amur and Ussuri Rivers was resolved bypoliticians, not by soldiers. How did it happen? It seems the events
surrounding Damanskii and Kirkinskii are the most instructive in thisrespect.
As a result of the March fights, the Chinese troops were defeated anddriven out of Soviet territory. On the Soviet bank of the Ussuri River,units of the 135th Motorized Rifle Division arranged positions to stop
possible provocations initiated by Chinese troops. But at that time, theSoviet border guards did not patrol Damanskii Island because the ice on
the river had begun to melt and carrying detachments to the island wascomplicated. The Soviet command decided to organize a fire covering of
the island. It meant that groups of snipers and machine gunners would
open fire as soon as any Chinese tried to land on Damanskii. 7 The
participants in these events recollect nowadays that shooting frequently
took place at night, lighted by powerful projectors. The Chinese officials
repeatedly protested because, as they said, the bullets flew toward Chinese
territory, but these protests had no practical consequences. At the sametime, Soviet diplomats tried to adjust the dialogue between Moscow and
Beijing.
Soviet prime minister Aleksei Kosygin already tried to communicate
by telephone with Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai on March 21, 1969. But an
operator of the special communication service in Beijing refused toconnect him with the Chinese leadership and said that leaders of the PRC
had no subjects to discuss with “Soviet revisionists.”8 All attempts by theSoviet leadership to arrange diplomatic contacts with Beijing failed.
6

Some foreign investigators of the events cannot agree with this fact because they thinkthat in any conflict, both parties are guilty. But this point of view reflects only the politicalprejudice of its bearers because the experience of all conflicts demonstrates the presence ofboth an aggressor and a defender. In all clashes at the Soviet-Chinese border, the Soviet
border guards were just defenders of the territory of the USSR. As for the responsibility
for aggravation of Soviet-Chinese relations, both Soviet and Chinese leaders no doubt boreit.
7
The Soviets shot those Chinese soldiers who tried to pull out a Soviet tank T–62, too.
The tank (board number 545) was blown up on a Chinese mine during the battle on March
15, 1969 and, after unsuccessful attempts of the Soviet military to tow it to the Soviet bankof the river or to destroy it, it fell through the Ussuri ice.
8
Many historians mention this episode, but none of them pays attention to an obvious
circumstance: an ordinary operator could not independently decide such an important- 83 -DMITRI RYABUSHKIN

Later on, Moscow repeatedly did its utmost to resume dialogue with
Beijing. However, the Chinese were unwilling to negotiate. At the sametime, Moscow warned the leaders of the PRC about its responsibility incase provocations at the border continued. It became clear soon enoughwhat these warnings meant.
In the region of Zhalanashkol Lake (Kazakh SSR), one more clash
between Soviet border guards and a special squad of PLA occurred on
August 13, 1969. The Chinese tried to occupy positions in Soviet territory
but were discovered and attacked by the local Soviet border guards.
During this short fight, the Chinese were surrounded and then utterly
defeated. This clash and its results made a serious impression on theleadership in Beijing: after the battle, the Chinese stopped any
provocations at the Soviet-Chinese border.
A Soviet delegation, headed by Kosygin, arrived at the capital of
Vietnam, Hanoi, for participation in mourning activities in connection
with the death of the Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh on September 6,
1969. Since there was a Chinese delegation headed by Li Xiannian at thesame place, the Soviet prime minister decided to use this opportunity tomake contact with Beijing. Vietnamese diplomats played the role ofmediators in this cause.
Li Xiannian received information about Kosygin’s desire to make astop at Beijing at the end of the mourning activities and discuss thesituation with the Chinese leadership. Immediately, Li Xiannian sent a
message with this news to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.
Having considered the Soviet offer, Мао agreed. However, he put
forward a condition: the meeting should be of an informal character andtake place outside the Chinese capital. Beijing Airport was chosen as thebest place.
After this, an annoying blunder complicated the agreement; theChinese embassy in Hanoi received an answer from Beijing on themorning of September 10, but Kosygin had already departed for Moscow
through India.
Feeling their own responsibility for the possible failure ofnegotiations for a silly technical reason, the Chinese leadership displayed
persistence. Firstly, the Soviet ambassador in Vietnam was informed
question. It is clear that he only fulfilled a direct order of somebody within the Chinese
leadership.

- 84 -

ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE BORDER CONFLICT OF 1969

about its consent to negotiate (again through the Vietnamese diplomats).
Secondly, the Chinese leadership informed the chargé d’affaires of the
USSR in China, Aleksei Elizavetin, about Zhou Enlai’s consent to meet at
Beijing Airport.
Being guided by the interests of the affair, Kosygin immediately took
off from Tashkent for Beijing.
The negotiations at Beijing Airport, with Kosygin and Zhou Enlai,
took place on September 11, 1969. From the Soviet side, there were thesecretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Konstantin Katushev,
and the vice president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Mikhail
Iasnov. The Chinese party was represented by assistants of Prime Minister
Li Xiannian and Xie Fuzhi. The meeting proceeded for three and a half
hours.
During the conversation, Kosygin emphasized the necessity of aprompt settlement of all disagreements that had accumulated between thetwo countries. Zhou Enlai did not object; however, he laid stress on adecision on the border question. Zhou Enlai declared that “China has no
territorial claims concerning the Soviet Union” and recognizes theexisting border. At the same time, he raised the question of, as heexpressed it, the “disputed lots,” i.e., those territories that formerly
belonged to China but were now under Soviet control in accordance withthe so-called unequal agreements. However, the members of the Soviet
delegation evaded any discussion of the question in such wording,otherwise an impression could have been created that Kosygin and hiscolleagues recognized the deficiency of all agreements concerning theborder. (It might create a basis for further discussion of the problem thatwould be advantageous to the Chinese.) Therefore, Kosygin limited thediscussion with a remark that experts should work in this area.
The main result of the discussion was the arrangement regarding the
cessation of any hostile actions at the Soviet-Chinese border and keeping
the Soviet and Chinese troops in the positions they were in at the momentof the negotiations.
The wording that “the troops will stay where they have stayed untilnow” was offered by Zhou Enlai, and Kosygin immediately agreed with it.
And at that moment, Damanskii and Kirkinskii became de facto Chinese
islands.
Such an unexpected conclusion may be explained by the fact that on
September 10, 1969, the Soviet border guards received an order to stop

- 85 -DMITRI RYABUSHKIN

shooting at those Chinese who tried to penetrate the river islands. After
this, the Chinese landed on Damanskii and Kirkinskii.9
Thus, on the day of the negotiations in Beijing, only the Chinese
were at Damanskii and Kirkinskii. This meant that Kosygin’s consent to
the wording that “the troops will stay where they have stayed until now”
assumed surrender of the islands to China.
In connection with these events, there are, at a minimum, twoquestions:
1. Did the Soviet leader know about the Chinese presence on theislands on the day of the negotiations?
2. If so, why did he agree to Zhou Enlai’s offer?
The answer to the first question is: he knew. And the order to cease
fire was given to create a favorable background for the beginning ofnegotiations. The Soviet leadership knew that the Chinese would land on
Damanskii and deliberately agreed with it.
The answer to the second question is: they decided, in the Kremlin,that sooner or later the new border line would be drawn along the main
waterways of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. It meant that Damanskii andKirkinskii would become Chinese islands. And if this was going tohappen, there was no necessity to fight, all the more so because theseislands had no economic or military value.
A governmental delegation of the USSR headed by the first assistantof Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasilii Kuznetsov arrived in Beijing on
October 19, 1969. The aim of the visit was the renewal of negotiations on
the border question.
Unfortunately, tensions in Soviet-Chinese relations did not weaken.
The fact is that the most powerful groups in the Beijing leadership were
those that considered any steps taken by Moscow as an act of perfidy.
They followed such logic analyzing the behavior of Kosygin during
discussions at Beijing Airport. As for Mao Zedong, he considered allpeaceful initiatives of Moscow as a screen for preparing a sudden military
blow against China. From his point of view, the fact that no top-level
9

The quickness that was demonstrated by the Chinese during this action might testify tothe possible contact between Soviet and Chinese diplomats (or other officials) andinforming the latter about the decision to stop shooting.

- 86 -

ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE BORDER CONFLICT OF 1969

Soviet official met Kosygin at Moscow Airport after returning from
Beijing demonstrated the Kremlin’s attitude to the results of thenegotiations.
At the same time, a new rise in military psychosis in China did notpromote a détente in its relations with the USSR. Nevertheless, Chinese
provocations at the border stopped. Chinese leaders possibly came to theconclusion that all tasks were fulfilled already and new clashes at theborder might have dangerous and unpredictable consequences.10
After this, boundary negotiations began. They took place alternately
in Moscow and Beijing. Top-level Soviet officials actually presented
Damanskii and Kirkinskii to China, but the presence of the Chinese
military on the islands caused protests. Such protests and demands toleave the islands were declared from time to time, for example, on
November 3, 1969, December 30, 1969, February 12–13, 1970, and on
April 1, 1970. It is difficult to tell what aim was pursued by Moscow, buteach Soviet demarche caused only a flash of emotions. The Soviet
participants of the negotiations accused the Chinese of infringing on theagreements, of landing on the islands at night, etc. The Chineseparticipants were indignant at the similar treatment of the events because
the Chinese border guards had landed on Damanskii and Kirkinskii openly,at the moment when the Soviets had stopped shooting.
The next twenty years did not bring any essential shifts in thenegotiating process although discussions on the border question proceeded.
Finally, these negotiations became a formal and even ritual procedure
because neither the Soviet nor the Chinese diplomats made concessions
and, at the same time, did not interrupt their own participation in thediscussions. The first results appeared only at the end of the 1980s.
In Moscow, an “Agreement between the USSR and the PRC on theSoviet-Chinese State border at its Eastern Part” was signed on May 16,
1991. In accordance with this document, the border on the rivers was
drawn along the main waterway or the middle line (it depended onwhether the river is navigable or non-navigable). There was also an

10Some Chinese sources state that Chinese minister of defence Lin Biao visited that place
opposite Damanskii Island where infantry of the PLA was hit by Soviet artillery during thebattle on March 15, 1969. Lin Biao studied the results of that blow and, it is claimed, said:“It was enough to test Russian patience.”- 87 -DMITRI RYABUSHKIN

arrangement about the creation of a demarcation commission in the text of
the agreement.
On February 13, 1992, after the collapse of the USSR, the RussianSupreme Soviet ratified the agreement, and the head of the Presidium of
the Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, signed this decision. The
Chinese did the same in Beijing on February 25, 1992. In Beijing, an
exchange of ratification instruments took place on March 16, 1992. Thus,
the agreement came into force, and the actual belonging of Damanskii andKirkinskii to China became a legally faultless fact on March 16.
Demarcation of the border that followed only confirmed it.

Consequences of the Soviet-Chinese Border Conflict of 1969
Strengthening of military power by both the USSR and the PRC became a
direct result of the conflicts along the Soviet-Chinese border. First of all, it
was expressed in the movement of additional military units andformations along the border zone as well as the formation of newdivisions and armies at the place of the events. According to some sources,in the Soviet Far East, in Mongolia and Central Asia, about 25 percent of
all armed forces of the USSR was concentrated for several years after thebattle. Besides this, along the border, the mass construction of powerfulprotective structures was begun (so-called fortified areas). Obviously,
after clashes at the border, the Soviet leadership seriously assimilated an
outlook of large-scale war with China. As for China, it is not evennecessary to mention the military psychosis that reigned there at that time.
Any economic and cultural cooperation between the PRC and the
USSR practically came to a complete stop, and trade relations werereduced to a minimum. Those former Soviet citizens who remember theend of the 1960s and the beginning of 1970s can confirm the fact of thedisappearance of traditional Chinese exports that were very popular in theSoviet Union (clothes and fabrics, porcelain and fountain pens, lanterns
and thermoses, etc.).
The most important political consequence of the fights at the border
was the change of the position that the PRC had secured in the world
arena. Before March 1969, only two players dominated in worldpolitics—the US and the USSR. Now, after demonstrating readiness foropen military conflict against the mighty Soviet Union, China- 88 -

ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE BORDER CONFLICT OF 1969

unexpectedly broke into the sphere of the direct interests of thesuperpowers. And they had already been forced to recognize the presenceof the PRC while considering the most important political questions.
A visit by US president Richard Nixon to Beijing in February 1972
demonstrated how exactly and correctly Mao Zedong had foreseen all
consequences of the border confrontation. In any case, the clashes along
the border made just the impression on the US administration that Mao
had hoped for.
At the same time, Mao Zedong and his follower Deng Xiaoping wereunable to create a united anti-Soviet front together with Western countries
and Japan. That fact can be explained by the pragmatism that traditionallydominated the politics of the US, Japan, and the countries of Western
Europe. Leaders of these countries realized that the motives of Мао
Zedong were guided by the intention to worsen Soviet-Chinese relations.
To push off the Soviet Union and the West, and to sit out somewhere far
from the battle—this was the idea the Chinese leader thought about,smiling to Nixon and other foreign visitors. Of course, Western leaders
were not admirers of Communist ideology, but this fact did not prevent
them from understanding a simple truth: it is better to have normal
relations with the USSR and, simultaneously, to counteract the expansionof the Soviet influence in the world, than to be at enmity with the Soviet
Union. Thus, Mao Zedong was unable to become like the wise monkey
from the old Chinese parable who observed a fight between two tigers
from the top of the mountain. Contrary to intentions, Mao took on the roleof one of the tigers, having given the US an opportunity to observe thefight from a safe distance.
The Chinese leaders also failed in their attempts to split the socialist
commonwealth; only Albania, earlier completely making common causewith Beijing, completely supported China. The other socialist countries
either supported Moscow or took a neutral position.
It is necessary to mention one more important circumstance that hasreceived almost no attention, which is the question of the attitude ofpresent Russian and Chinese officials to the events of 1969. Basically, thepositions of Moscow and Beijing are rather similar: to try to break off
events that have occurred, and if this is not possible, to reduce any
discussion on the border conflict to a set of banalities. Of course, there aredefinite distinctions. In Russia, nobody forbids journalists,
cinematographers, or historians from engaging in given problems. For- 89 -DMITRI RYABUSHKIN

example, popular Russian TV channels repeatedly aired the film
“Damanskii Island, 1969” that had been created by “Galakon” Film
Studio (Moscow) in 2004. It is significant that the first airing of the film
took place on February 23, 2004, on the so-called Defender of the
Fatherland Day. In 2005 and 2006, some Russian and Ukrainian channels
aired the film again (At the same time, the main historical journal of theRussian Ministry of Defense, the Military-Historical Journal, refused to
publish any articles about the Soviet-Chinese border conflict of 1969
because its editorial board considered this subject too taboo).
Every year, Soviet veterans of the Damanskii Island conflict take partin memorial ceremonies in the Far East region, Siberia, and Moscow.
Every year, Russian newspapers and TV news outlets report it widely.
As for China, the theme of the Soviet-Chinese border conflict ispractically closed. The Chinese mass media only thoughtlessly repeat
everything that comes down “from the top,” which, as a matter of fact,
does not differ from the propaganda clichés of the Cultural Revolution.
Similarly, Chinese newspapers in 1969 said, and modern Chinese
propaganda obstinately repeats, that the Soviet border guards attacked theChinese first, and the Chinese only acted defensively. Meanwhile, the factof the beforehand planned Chinese attack is confirmed by not only theSoviet/Russian materials, but also by the works of Western researchers
who have little sympathy for the USSR. Moreover, some Chinese
historians are already agreeing that bloodshed on Damanskii was preparedand carried out by the Chinese.11 Therefore, the current Chinese positionon the subject looks especially false and cynical.
Here is a typical detail: it is almost impossible to find any Chineseparticipants of the events. And those who are found categorically refuse toanswer any questions about their participation in the fights along theborder. Chinese historians refuse to cooperate on the given theme, too—even in such cases when very interesting and exclusive documents areoffered for joint investigation (the author of this article has a very richexperience in such contacts with Chinese historians). The reason for this isclear: the Chinese—especially the participants of the clash—know thatthey organized and carried out the bloodshed along the border. Some
Chinese participants of the battle may fear that detailed consideration of
11

Lyle J. Goldstein, “Research Report Returns to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting
and Why it Matters,” China Quarterly, no. 168 (December 2001): 985–997.

- 90 -

ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE BORDER CONFLICT OF 1969

their personal actions during the conflict would result in accusations of
war crimes.
The majority of the documents on the conflict of 1969 remain hidden
in secret archives in Russia and China. However, the people who wrote allthese papers are still alive. They and their memoirs are a “delayed-action
bomb” which at careless handling could do much harm to RussianChinese relations.12 It sounds important for the leaders of Russia andChina to treat the events of 1969 prudently and to calm down this painful
question. Such settlement must not be reduced by mutual expressions ofregret and the same mutual nonadmissions in the future. The bloodshed of1969 was prepared and carried out by the authorities of China.
Sincere Soviet-Chinese friendship perished thirty-seven years ago on
the little Damanskii Island on the Ussuri River. From that old history,
different lessons were learnt, and many people had a chance forreflection—politicians and militants, diplomats and weapon designers,scientists and writers. But if to speak only about interstate borders, thefollowing lasting lesson has to be acquired: a party in a moreadvantageous position, thanks to historical circumstances, ought to aspireto fair boundary settlement. To understand neighbors and simultaneously
maintain national interests—this is the real test for the politicians engaged
in the question of boundary delimitation.
* This work reflects only the personal point of view of the author and does not reflect theposition of any state or public organization.

12

Perhaps, a purely emotional aspect of the secret materials of the Soviet medical
commission that inspected the bodies of perished Soviet border guards is the mostdangerous. It follows from the document that nineteen wounded border guards in a
helpless condition were brutally finished off by the Chinese. The text of that paper is soawful that its publication in the Russian mass media may result in an irrational hatred of all
citizens of China.

- 91 -