Great Power Relations, Regional
Multilateralism, and International
Relations of East Asia
G. V. C. NAIDU

The principal intent of titling the article in the above way is to highlight
two important dimensions of international relations of East Asia, i.e., thechanging nature of great power relations and the genesis of regional
multilateralism. The role and relations that govern the great powers had
undoubtedly been at the heart of East Asia’s discourse in the past,
continue to be central in the present, and may become even more
important in the future if the current trends are any indication. What isdifferent today when compared to the Cold War era is that regional
political and economic relations are being increasingly conditioned by
new rising powers, which in turn are leading to the realignment of forcesamong great powers to ensure regional power balance. There is also a newelement, that is, regional multilateralism that is beginning to make its
mark towards which the attitudes of great powers have varied fromskepticism to strong support to sheer indifference. It must, however, bementioned that regional multilateralism is still in its infancy and its futureremains uncertain. Capturing this dynamic in the larger context offundamental changes, both economic and politico-security, that are
occurring in the region would provide us with useful pointers on thenature and direction of the current international politics of East Asia.
Surely, East Asia is an integral part of the global system, and it is not
immune to events at world level. Nevertheless, perhaps the changes that- 153 -

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are sweeping this part of the world will have implications far beyond theregion. This is what makes this region special and significant.
While the Cold War era of East Asia was dominated by the super
powers, in the aftermath of which we are still in search of a paradigm
though more than a decade and half has elapsed we still talk in terms of apost-Cold War era. This, in a nutshell, exemplifies the fluidity and fluxthat characterize the current period, a period of enormous transition andchange. The change is best manifested by the metamorphosis the great
powers are undergoing in terms of their power, role, and attitude.
The article proposes to discuss, aside from an overview of major
trends across East Asia, aspects of two triangular relationships that havebeen talked about: one involving China, Russia, and India, and the other,
the United States, Japan, and India. There is, of course, another great
power triangle that has been talked about consisting of China, Japan, andIndia as the future determinant of regional relations concomitant with theirnear simultaneous rise, an entirely new and unprecedented development.
However, that triangular relationship is yet to fructify in any concrete
fashion, though its dynamics is clearly manifesting in many ways. The
logic and rationale of these triangles in the context of a fast-changing East
Asian political environment needs a closer look and deeper examination.
Secondly, the article also examines the role and viability of regional
multilateralism, both economic and security, in influencing theinternational relations of East Asia.

East Asia: A Region of Focus and Transformation
There are several crucial aspects of the changes the world is witnessingthat are influencing international relations. The geoeconomics, contrary to
the previous geopolitics that dominated much of the debate, has come tothe fore in a big way. No power, small or big, can any longer ignore thecritical role that economic factors play in shaping and influencing
relations with other countries. Similarly, nontraditional security issues,
from terrorism to WMD proliferation, never considered serious issues of
security in the past, are emerging as dominant issues of global politics.
Yet another dimension that is influencing relations among countries is thephenomenon of globalization. Notwithstanding the enormous and ongoingdebate on whether or not it is good, it has come to be recognized as- 154 -

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something unstoppable. Thanks in part to globalization, the great powers
especially are forced to forge cooperative relationships among themselves.
As a result, one sees in a relative sense the best of relations among global
great powers despite lingering suspicions and rivalry.1
As noted, in East Asia, great powers historically had played a vitalrole in shaping relations not only within the region but without, as well.
The fact that India and China exerted enormous influence since ancient
times culturally, religiously, linguistically, and economically is well
documented and is still visible. Once these powers became weak after theonslaught of colonialism, the European powers started having completesway over regional affairs. Towards the end of colonialism, the newly
rising powers, the United States and Japan, began to have an enormous
impact on the region greatly. During the Cold War, the bipolar order that
dominated the world was reflected in East Asia, too. The post-Cold War
period is characterized by the rise of new power centers within the region.
The current changes have to be seen in the context of thetransformation the region is undergoing even as the global shift of focus toEast Asia in both economic and security terms continues. The region
remains the most promising economically—the rise of new economic
powerhouses, huge foreign exchange reserves, vibrant consumption
patterns, rapidly expanding markets, and, more importantly, an
unparalleled demographic advantage. Regional security, however,continues to be a cause of concern, as exemplified by the developments inNortheast Asia. In the East Asian context, issues of security and economic
development are not mutually exclusive; they influence each other either
in the promotion of peace and prosperity or in imperiling them. Two, thesubregions of East Asia, Southeast, and Northeast Asia, whose linkages
during the Cold War were relatively tenuous, are being strengthened, andhence the segregation of issues of security and economic development
between them is no longer valid.
A major hallmark of East Asia today is that the regional major
powers, China, Japan, and India, are becoming more assertive and are at
the center of a new regional economic and security architecture that is
unfolding. The impact of a rapidly rising China as a military andeconomic power, India’s attempts to catch up and match China’s might,
1

David Sadler, “A Study in Harmony: The Great Powers in Asia and the Pacific,” Global
Change, Peace and Security 17, no. 3 (2005): 299–314.

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and Japanese determined moves to become a “normal” country are yet tobe fully felt. How relations among these powers evolve will be a criticalelement in the shaping of regional security.
The issue that most visibly looms larger in East Asia at present is therise of China on which opinions are divergent, although most countries in
the region feel that it is both an opportunity as well as a challenge.
Dubbed as the world’s factory for manufacturing, China’s economy is thesecond largest in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms and may become
the largest by leapfrogging the US in less than three decades if it manages
to maintain the current momentum. It can create huge opportunities for avariety of goods and services for other countries. China has alreadybecome the largest trading partner of most of the East Asian countries,
notably for two of America’s closest political and economic partners,
Japan and South Korea. The rapidly expanding Chinese market andprosperity are also providing vast investment opportunities. In fact, muchof the phenomenal surge in China’s trade is investment driven. Despite
unabated skepticism about the sustainability of double-digit growth rates
for prolonged periods, growing income disparities among people andbetween provinces, increasing incidents of social unrest, and mounting
concerns about overheating, the Chinese economy has demonstrated aremarkable resilience, and signs of major disruptions in the foreseeable
future appear rather remote.
China, however, is also a challenge as it becomes a magnet forinvestments at the cost of others. Growing wealth is also allowing China
to spend more on defense, enabling it to rapidly expand its militarycapabilities. The lack of transparency especially in defense expenditures
and attempts at rapid modernization of its armed forces at a time when it
hardly faces a military threat are already ringing alarm bells. Both the US
and Japan time and time again have expressed their anxieties about
China’s military modernization. Suspicions of this kind can lead to a
debilitating arms race. On a different plane, if history is any indicator, aneconomically and militarily rising power not only tends to fundamentally
alter the existing balance and equilibrium, but also becomes more
assertive even as its interests grow. Thus, China is redrawing the map ofeconomic and political relations in East Asia. The implications of these
are too obvious. Japan, which used to be the biggest economic player- 156 -

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since the early 1970s, feels it is being pushed to the margins. 2 A
comparison of ASEAN’s trade with Japan and China in the last decade isrevealing: between 1995 and 2004, ASEAN exports to Japan declined
from 14.4 percent to 12.1 percent, and imports, from 24.7 to 15.8, whereas
ASEAN exports to China increased from 2.1 percent to 7.4 percent, andimports jumped from 2.2 to 9.4 percent.3 It is little wonder that theSoutheast Asian countries have become so conscious of the China factor
in their economic and political calculations. Beijing’s deft diplomacy,
often called a “charm offensive,” especially since the 1997–1998 financial
crisis, has further contributed to its growing stature.
Either because of China or pressure from the US or propelled by thedesire to play a larger role, Japan, too, is transforming, and the numerous
moves that Tokyo has made in the last few years are indeed profound. The
decision to extend logistical support to the American counterterrorism
efforts in Afghanistan by sending war ships to the Indian Ocean, thedispatch of troops for the first time since World War II to Iraq, a combat
zone, in support of the US, the participation in the development anddeployment of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems with the US,
attempts at amending its constitution so that its armed forces can becomea regular military and participate in collective defense activities, openly
coming out with a joint statement with the US that Taiwan was a common
security concern, naming China and North Korea as potential threats, etc.,
are some measures that are likely to have considerable implications for
East Asia. With conservatives at the helm, Tokyo’s quest for “normal”
power status will continue under Abe Shinzo’s leadership, which means
Japan will become more assertive and can be expected to assume a larger
security role, which some Southeast Asian leaders feel may not be such abad thing after all. In an interview, for instance, Indonesian defense
minister Yuwano Sudarsono stated that “a forceful and assertive Japanese
security role in East Asia security would be welcome. I think it would
provide good balance.” India is also beginning to figure prominently as a
2

URATA Shujiro, “Declining Importance of Japan in East Asia: Are Free Trade Agreements theAnswer?” NRB Special Report, no. 5 (2004): 29–34, http://www.nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/SR5.pdf.
3
Asean Statistical Yearbook 2005, chap. 5, http://www.aseansec.org/SYB2005/Chapter5.pdf (The data exclude Laos and Vietnam); “Countries turn to China: Japan marginalized
as APEC focuses on terror,” Japan Times, October 22, 2003, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20031022b7.htm.

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potential partner in the changing Japanese security policies after a seriesof steps that these two have taken starting from the eight-point initiative
agreed upon during Koizumi’s visit to India in April 2005.4 Japan also
appears to be desperately trying to regain its economic supremacy bysupporting East Asian integration attempts and in the creation of an Asiancurrency unit.
Not to be left behind, India, too, is intensifying its efforts to identify
and integrate itself with East Asia through the “Look East” policy. Thishas since evolved into a multifaceted policy encompassing political,
economic, and strategic dimensions. Strongly underpinned by a variety of
institutional and bilateral linkages to promote economic cooperation,
India’s political and strategic interactions with East Asia are extensive.
Reciprocally, the countries of East Asia can no longer overlook an
increasingly confident, assertive, and rising India. Many look at India notjust as an economic opportunity but as a potential countervailing power toChina.5 As Singaporean minister George Yeo stated, “We in Southeast
Asia have no wish to become merely an adjunct to the Chinese
economy.”6
The US continues to be a major factor although its overall importanceappears to be on the wane, partly because of its preoccupation with its
war on terror and its involvement in Iraq, and partly because of itschanging policies especially relating to forward deployment of its troops.
While the US security partnership with Japan is strengthening, its
relationship with South Korea is beginning to unravel. Growing
differences between Washington and Seoul on tackling the tricky North
Korean nuclear problem and mounting opposition to US troops in South
Korea will have considerable impact on regional security. Growing ties
between China and South Korea and between China and Russia would
further increase Japanese consternation, which in turn might force it toundertake drastic measures.
Russian fortunes in East Asia have always fluctuated although muchof Moscow’s focus has traditionally been on Europe and to a lesser extent,
4

Eight-fold Initiative for Strengthening Japan-India Global Partnership, April 29, 2005,
Japan-India, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/partner0504.html#eight.
5
Anindya Batabyal, “Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India’s ‘Look
East’ Strategy,” China Report 42, no. 2 (2006): 179–197.
6
Philip Day, “Singapore: Dancing with Giants,” Far Eastern Economic Review 167, no.
14 (2004): 44–45.

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GREAT POWER RELATIONSCentral Asia. Russian engagement with East Asia began, one, with the
emergence of China as a communist country and a close ally and later as amajor antagonist; two, with the existence of the so-called weakest link in
its Far East theater and hence militarily the most vulnerable; and three,with border and territorial disputes involving fairly large tracts. However,Russia managed to maintain good relations with two important countries,
India and Vietnam. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union had amore profound effect on its Far Eastern region than others, and it tooknearly a decade and half for it to realize the import of East Asia. Thus,
Russian reengagement is a recent phenomenon, and it is still not deep
enough to warrant great attention. Nonetheless, one should recognize
important developments in order to appreciate its likely enhanced role in
East Asian relations in the coming years. One such development is thatthe strategic partnership between Russia and China is increasingly being
cemented by large quantities of modern defense hardware supplies toChina. It also helps that they share common political views on a range ofissues, especially on the US-led unipolar movement. Russia is also
emerging as a major supplier of defense equipment, not just to its
traditional markets such as India and Vietnam, but also to several othercountries in Southeast Asia like Malaysia, Indonesia, and possibly even
South Korea and the Philippines. Finally, energy is emerging as a major
link between the Russian Far East and East Asia. All the three majorenergy consumers in the region—China, Japan, and India—are eying ashare of the vast reserves of oil and gas in the Russian Far East. Russia
also has institutional linkages with ASEAN as a dialogue partner, is amember of the ARF and APEC, is part of the six-party talks on North
Korea, and more recently, was invited as an “observer” to the inaugural
East Asian Summit (EAS) in December 2005. Nonetheless, Russia islikely to be more preoccupied with Europe and Central Asia than East
Asia in the nearer term and hence is not yet a major factor in the East Asia
security calculus.

East Asian Multilateralism
The other discernible trend in East Asia is regional multilateralism, andinvariably, ASEAN figures prominently in any discourse on this. Despite
not being monolithic and differences on a range of political and economic- 159 -

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issues remain, Southeast Asian countries have managed to create andsustain many multilateral structures to enhance their own collective
influence and, importantly, to engage the great powers. Both ASEAN as
an organization and Southeast Asia as a region are under focus as a resultof certain recent developments thus casting doubts on ASEAN’s ability tolead these multilateral institutions. Further, the ASEAN region as an
economic entity has become less attractive when compared to larger andfaster growing economies such as China and India. In PPP terms, thecombined GDP of the entire Southeast Asia is about 60 percent of India’s
and less than one-third that of China. Importantly, the gap will further
widen if the current trends continue.
In security terms, in the overall context of East Asia, the focus isshifting away from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia and to a lesser extent
to the Indian Ocean region. Southeast Asia does not command the same
political attention it did during the Cold War, notwithstanding the disputein the South China Sea and growing concerns about terrorism. There is noquestion that far more serious security issues lie in Northeast Asia. The
deadlocked North Korean nuclear issue could have serious repercussions
if unresolved, triggering a domino effect with a potential nuclear arms
race between China and Japan (and India and Pakistan). Unabatedtensions between Japan and China and the simmering Taiwan question areother issues that could have far-reaching impact. Additionally, there isconsiderable uncertainty because of changing American military strategy
towards East Asia even as it prepares to reorder its military in Northeast
Asia, and the EAS is the first occasion on which the US is not involved.7
All these developments are having a combined effect on ASEAN and
its ability to manage regional economic and security affairs. Both AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF), although they still exist, have clearly lost their sheen. Waning
American 8 and Japanese 9 interest will further reduce their role and7

See for instance Daniel Sneider, “Asia’s Polite Response Masks Declining US
Influence,” Yale Global, November 17, 2005, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=6531.
8
Evelyn Goh, “The ASEAN Regional Forum in United States East Asian Strategy,”
Pacific Review 17, no. 1 (2004): 47–69.
9
YUZAWA Takeshi, “Japan’s Changing Conception of the ASEAN Regional Forum: Froman Optimistic Liberal to a Pessimistic Realist Perspective,” Pacific Review 18, no. 4(2005): 463–497.

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importance, not that the track record of ARF’s achievements (for thatmatter, even APEC’s, as discussed below) is particularly impressive.
ASEAN would have to devise ways to accommodate the interests of India,
China, and Japan rather than a regional agenda dominated by terrorism
and religious radicalism and issues of domestic stability. Perceived
clashes of interests along with the persistence of historical animosities andmutual suspicions among the great powers will persist for ASEAN tograpple with. The American attitude toward China has vacillated from Bill
Clinton’s “strategic partnership” to Bush’s initial “strategic competition,”whereas China-Russia strategic cooperation is deepening. As the row
between Japan and China reaches new highs, Tokyo sees strategic
convergence with New Delhi. Suddenly, India appears to be in demand,
wooed by all these major powers because of its potential to tilt the balance
decisively in the East Asian emerging balance of power. India is paying
enormous attention to ensure that its rise and its recent improvement ofrelations with both the US and Japan are not either directed at or at thecost of China.

Russia-China-India Strategic Triangle
Relations among major powers are witnessing a peculiar phenomenon. On
the one hand, they are forced to cooperate to deal with certain issues ofcommon concern, terrorism, illegal transfers of WMD material, a numberof maritime security issues, disaster management, for instance, but there isalso a fair amount of distrust among certain major powers, on the other. It
is this dynamic that has given rise to the idea of strategic partnerships
contrary to the alliance partnerships of the Cold War. It is not the purposeof the article to deal with bilateral strategic partnerships or alliances but tofocus on the changing contours of major power relations, especially what
are popularly called “triangles” that have often come up. There have been
several of them, however. In the post-Cold War East Asian context, thefirst one mentioned included Russia, China, and India, the second one was
the US, Japan, and China, the third consisting of China, Japan, and India,
and the fourth and most recent comprising the US, Japan, and India. Here,it is proposed to examine two triangles—Russia-China-India and USJapan-India.

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When in December 1998 Evgenii Primakov, then Russian prime
minister, proposed the creation of a strategic triangle with China and India,
it was received both with skepticism and bemusement. It was promptly
interpreted as Russian frustration with and fear of a US-led unipolar
movement, particularly in the light of two events: one, the eastward
expansion of NATO into what the Russians had traditionally considered
their backyard, and two, NATO’s unilateral military action in Kosovo.
Russia was also obviously concerned about a lack of balance vis-à-vis the
US and hence sought to bring together China and India who appeared toshare a similar concern. As these countries tried to find some common
ground apart from the US, it turned out that there were three global issues
on which they shared some interest although certain differences on details
remained—one, the emerging global system, two, Islamic terrorism, andthree, America’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) program.
Firstly, it appeared all three countries were uncomfortable with theidea of global unipolarity. As a result, they started advocating the conceptof multipolarity wherein the global order is characterized by several
centers/poles of power although not necessarily to the same degree. Whenit became apparent that such an idea was increasingly becoming
unrealistic (partly fueled by a severe economic downturn in Russia), someIndians started advocating the idea of a “polycentric” world, which while
not disputing the preponderance of the US, sought to underline theexistence of several poles of power of various kinds. With the dramatic
improvement in relations between India and the US, New Delhi’s
perception of the US has undergone a fundamental change. Resultantly,
India is much less vociferous about global multipolarity. These views are
obviously out of sync with either Russian or Chinese thinking.
Two, all the three countries faced the problem of terrorism, religious
extremism, and separatism to varying degrees in Chechnya, Kashmir, andXinjiang. Although no apparent and direct connection between these
problem areas could be established, there was a common concern about
greater radicalization of these movements after the Taliban’s emergencein Afghanistan with Pakistan’s support. While India and Russia had been
more strident in castigating Pakistan and the Taliban for fomenting
terrorism, China was more circumspect in accusing Pakistan for obvious
reasons.
Three, the BMD issue, at least until India changed its stance in 2001,
seemed to provide a strategic consensus in opposing it. These three- 162 -

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countries had a different set of reasons to oppose American plans topursue BMD research and deployment. Russia was more concerned about
unilateral abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, whichmight further accentuate the strategic disparity with the US andsupremacy in space, and China quite unexpectedly turned out to be themost vocal opponent of BMD because of Japan’s participation. In Chinese
thinking, BMD deployment in Northeast Asia would, on one hand, makeits nuclear deterrent ineffectual and make the incorporation of Taiwan into
the mainland all the more difficult if Taiwan was brought under the BMD
shield. India, too, initially opposed it on the grounds that it would trigger anuclear arms race in Asia as China would try to counter BMD by further
accelerating the build-up of its nuclear arsenal, and India (and Pakistan)would invariably be affected by this. India has since made an about-turnas it is interested in erecting some kind of missile defense, possibly with
American assistance, primarily because of the political uncertainties
Pakistan is now facing and the real danger of some WMD falling into thewrong hands.
Despite not having a tangible agenda or consensus even on thoseissues where there is some convergence, the foreign ministers of Russia,
China, and India have been holding their annual meetings. Russian foreign
minister Sergei Lavrov in an interview to an Indian newspaper claimed
that:
it is about shared values on how to approach international relations thesedays. It’s about our common belief that multilateral approaches are the bestsolution to global problems and regional conflicts. It’s certainly our belief
that our three countries can do a lot together to keep and promote stability in
the Asia-Pacific region, Eurasia in general and in the United Nations.10

It must be mentioned, however, that there are limitations to thistriangle, although bilateral relations have witnessed considerable progress.
There are, for instance, several problems that plague Sino-Indian relations
such as the intractable border dispute, China’s policy toward Pakistan, andwariness about each other in East Asia. Similarly, China is also concerned
about the new bonhomie between India and the US and between India and
10Sergei Lavrov, interviewed by Amit Baruah, The Hindu, October 11, 2004,
http://www.thehindu.com/2004/10/11/stories/2004101104331000.htm.

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Japan. Any attempt to increase its role in South Asia by China is viewed
with suspicion in Delhi, and similarly, India’s forays into Central Asia
would make Beijing uneasy. India-Russia relations, too, have undergone afundamental shift in recent years. It is not premised on shared ideology or
threat perception as during the Cold War but mostly based on mutuallyconvenient military cooperation. On the contrary, Sino-Russian relations
have improved remarkably primarily based on their shared concern about
the US, and also their strong defense cooperation. Thus, the Russia-ChinaIndia triangle is a stillborn idea beset with too many problems to become aviable idea.

US-Japan-India Strategic Triangle
Currently, the much-talked-about triangle is US-Japan-India, andobviously, this will have a far greater impact on East Asian international
relations and regional security. An instant reaction to such a major power
triangle is that it is aimed at China, but this is not the sole reason as there
are also several other dimensions to it, including the management of thetransition that the region is undergoing. A factor that has greatly
contributed to such an idea is the astonishing pace with which India-US
relations are progressing. Much of the acrimony that marked therelationship during the Cold War was due to extraneous reasons, such as
India’s close links with Moscow, the American attitude toward Pakistan,
Washington’s policy towards nuclear nonproliferation, etc. Surprisingly,
there was no major bilateral dispute between the two. Hence, it was easier
to quickly forge close links once the Cold War strategic divide ended. Of
course, India’s nuclear tests in 1998 were only a temporary setback.
Relations, however, quickly bounced back once Washington recognized
the sensitivity of the nuclear issue in India and security challenges it was
faced with and the potential India has as a global player. Starting fromPresident Clinton’s visit in early 2000 to India, relations have witnessed aremarkable turnaround. Right from his campaign days, President Bush
had underscored the importance of improving relations with India. His
administration’s decision “to help India become a major world power inthe twenty-first century” represents the grand transformation. Relations
are driven by the intrinsic value of each country to the other and theirshared interests, such as commitment to democracy, countering terrorism,- 164 -

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and nuclear proliferation, and preserving a stable balance of power in Asia.
Growing defense and economic cooperation and nearly four million
highly educated, super-rich ethnic Indians are also making an impact on
the decision making process. The biggest and most important (andcontroversial, too) agreement so far between the two is the July 2005
agreement that includes nuclear civilian cooperation.
In a remarkable coincidence, India-Japan relations, too, have started
improving in a big way alongside Indo-US relations. Contrary to Tokyo’s
relations with rest of East Asia, which have been marred by historicalissues, the people of India and Japan have always had a good opinion ofeach other. Once again, the Cold War environment rather than any
bilateral problems was responsible for creating a big political divide
between the two countries. Even as relations started showing considerable
improvement beginning from the mid-1990s, they nosedived following
India’s nuclear tests in 1998. The momentum was quickly regained with
Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro’s visit in 2000 and the announcement of a“global partnership” with India. Whereas the 2001 Indian prime minister’svisit further cemented relations, the landmark visit was by Koizumi
Junichiro in April 2005, which resulted in the most comprehensive
bilateral agreement ever signed between India and Japan. The eight-foldinitiative covered vast ground, importantly including defense cooperation.
Thus, a new “Japan-India strategic partnership” started taking shape.
Undoubtedly, China looms large in Japanese attempts to seek closer
relations with India. China’s rise obviously poses serious challenges toJapan. It not only severely undercuts Japan’s role and influence in the
Asia-Pacific region but there is a direct clash of interests, too. For the firsttime in the last several centuries, Japan has to contend with the rise of anew power center in its vicinity and its impact on the regional order in
East Asia. It would be too simplistic, however, to link the new-foundJapan’s interest in India to its concerns about China. There are othermotives such as economic, maritime and a number of non-traditional
security issues, and, of course, the future architecture of Asian security.
The new US-Japan-India triangle is going to be much more
substantial and important in the coming years than probably any othertriangle, impacting not only on East Asia but on the world at large, as well.
For the first time, the three large, well-established democracies have moreconvergence than clash of interests. This trilateral relationship is likely
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China’s rise. It is necessary to differentiate the changed nature of thesepartnerships from Cold War threat-based to post-Cold War interest-driven.
Thanks to globalization and growing interdependence, no major power
can afford to openly antagonize any counterpart. Any conflictual situation
is simply too heavy a price to pay. Thus, notwithstanding the acrimony,rancor, and suspicion, either Japan and China or the US and China or
China and India have to find ways to address each other’s concerns. The
common interests that govern the US-Japan-India triangle are democracy,
respect for civilian liberties, rule of law, terrorism, WMD proliferation,
export controls, maritime security, disaster management, management of
Asian security, etc. As Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of state,
rightly pointed out:
India is a very young country, and will soon have the largest and fastestgrowing middle class in the whole world. India is going to be a tremendous
power in the world. India’s society is open, free, and transparent, so it posesno threat to the international community . . . The US and Japan should beworking closely together to deepen ties with India. The point is not to
contain China. The point is to embrace India as a nation with which weshare common values of democracy and openness. India is looking East, andpolitical leaders in Washington and Tokyo should embrace that.11

A similar sentiment was expressed by Shayam Saran, a former
foreign secretary of India:
India and the United States could contribute to a better balance of power inthe Asian region at a time when a major process of realignment is taking
place on the continent with the emergence of China as a “global economic
power house” and New Delhi poised to be a major player, as well. The US,
Mr. Saran claimed, had been very careful to put across that it wasn’t
engaged in any containment policy regarding China. And, I wonder if that’s
at all practical, given the scale of the US-China engagement, especially on
the business and investment side.”1211“Armitage on Asia,” PacNet, March 23, 2006, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/
pac0612.pdf.
12
Amit Baruah, “India, US can Contribute to Better Balance of Power in the AsianRegion: Shyam Saran,” The Hindu, November 29, 2005, http://www.thehindu.com/2005/
11/29/stories/2005112919470900.htm.

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GREAT POWER RELATIONSWhat it signifies is that India has become for the first time in several
decades a factor and player in East Asian international relations. India wasneither consulted nor involved in the deliberations leading to the creationof regional multilateral mechanisms, both economic and security related,in the early 1990s. When the first East Asian Summit was proposed to beconvened in late 2005, India could no longer be ignored despite
reservations by some countries.

Conclusion
Without a doubt, relations among major powers will to a large extent
determine the nature of East Asian international relations and regional
security even as the region hogs the global spotlight. This unprecedented
economic dynamism is, however, accompanied by enormous politicaluncertainty. The great power relations are undergoing a majortransformation wherein there are both competitive and cooperative
elements. The emergence of nontraditional security issues, particularly
terrorism and nuclear proliferation as major global concerns, along with
globalization are having a profound effect on the way the major powers
interact with each other. There are elements of wariness about the rise of
new powers and their impact on redrawing the regional political andeconomic architecture, and hence attempts at “balancing” by employing
the strategy of “hedging.” At the same time, they need to cooperatebecause of strong economic stakes and commonly shared interests andconcerns. The US needs Chinese cooperation to rein in the recalcitrant
North Korean regime on the nuclear question and to maintain peace acrossthe Taiwan Straits. China needs the US for markets, capital, andtechnology and to ensure that Japan does not embark on a militaristic path
once again. Japan needs China for its economic recovery and China needs
Japanese investments, technology, and aid. Japan also needs the US as asecurity guarantor, and the US wants Japan for its forward deployment
and as an alliance partner for its East Asian strategy. The US and Japan
look at India both as an economic opportunity and to counterbalance
China, where as India wants their capital and technologies and a potential
partnership to enhance its security and political standing. There is also alimit to India and China in maintaining an antagonistic relationship. Chinaneeds a friendly India so that it will not become a part of the coalition to- 167 -

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contain China. Similarly, India wants a friendly China because of its
leverage with Pakistan. This does not mean there is no competition among
them, nor have the suspicions about each other gone away. The emerging
pattern of relations among Russia, China, the US, and India thus becomes
important. The strengthening of relations between China and Russia andbetween India and the US (and Japan) is an indication of a new
permutation of power balancing.
What is noteworthy is that a rising China and India are emerging notjust as megamarkets and economic powerhouses but also as military
powers equipped with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. With Japan
poised to play a larger political role, the regional political architecture will
undergo a major change. For the first time in history, the region has tocontend with the prospect of three powers simultaneously aspiring to playa larger role. They can offer numerous opportunities for the region tosignificantly improve its economic prosperity but can also pose serious
challenges if they start competing with each other or if they perceive that
their interests are becoming undermined due to these changes. The recent
tense relationship between China and Japan is a good example. Thus,
there are, on one hand, economic imperatives pushing the entire region toreap the benefits of economic cooperation, but political and security
factors, fueled by historical suspicions and mistrust, are emerging as
impediments that can potentially jeopardize economic cooperation
attempts, on the other. A greater appreciation of the nature of evolving
great power relations thus becomes crucial to understanding the East
Asian dynamic.
The ostensible principal purpose of regional multilateralism is topromote economic cooperation and politically engage the major powers toencourage dialogue and transparency in security and military matters. The
results, however, have been mixed. Due mainly to these structures,
attempts to economically integrate the region and thus increase theirinterdependence so that it will reduce the chances of conflict and increase
stakes have made some progress, but they have not been able to mitigate
security concerns altogether. The ARF, for instance, has not been able toshed the image of a talk shop since it has not made much headway inaddressing any regional security issue, such as East Timor or the North
Korean nuclear crisis. Both in Washington and Tokyo, interest in the ARF
is waning, although Beijing is more upbeat whereas in the case of India
and Russia, their stakes are limited anyway. Multilateralism either at the- 168 -

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global or the regional level will succeed only as long as major world
powers extend their full support, and this will happen only if they perceivethat their interests are advanced in such an initiative. There is obviously
no uniformity of opinion on the role of security multilateralism in East
Asia, whereas there appears to be greater enthusiasm for economic
multilateralism despite areas where differences persist.
Among the many strategic triangles involving major powers, twoseem to have drawn considerable attention: the earlier Russia-China-India
triangle and the present US-Japan-India triangle. The first, which cameabout as a Russian initiative primarily to counter US-led unilateralism andon certain shared values, has failed to make progress primarily because ofa lack of shared political perceptions and continuing mistrust between
China and India. The second triangle seems to be more promising as theconstituents face fewer contradictions. There are, of course, limitations forany triangle because of other imperatives.
Insofar as India is concerned, the “Look East” policy will remain oneof its top priorities, which will result in further engagement with East Asia.
Started with the limited objective of reestablishing relations with
Southeast Asia, it has since evolved into a comprehensive policy. India
has some advantages unlike other regional powers since it neither has thehistorical baggage that plague other nations nor any land or maritime
disputes in Southeast Asia. Hence, it has been relatively more successful
in forging defense cooperation relations with several countries of theregion. India is also striving to become a major economic player. What iscertain is that, along with its increased engagement, India has become an
inalienable part of the East Asian political and economic calculus.
In any case, East Asia will have to grapple with competing interestsof major powers as its international relations will be largely determined by
the nature of inter-major powers relations. Asia’s future will notnecessarily have to be Europe’s past, but the political flux thatcharacterizes the region will continue for the foreseeable future.

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